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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13726 ***
+
+PLATO'S
+
+APOLOGY, CRITO AND PHÆDO
+OF
+SOCRATES.
+
+
+
+
+Literally Translated By
+
+HENRY CARY, M.A.,
+_Worcester College, Oxford_
+
+
+
+
+With An Introduction By
+
+EDWARD BROOKS, JR.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO
+
+CRITO; OR, THE DUTY OF A CITIZEN
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE PHÆDO
+
+PHÆDO; OR, THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+
+Of all writers of speculative philosophy, both ancient and modern, there
+is probably no one who has attained so eminent a position as Plato. What
+Homer was to Epic poetry, what Cicero and Demosthenes were to oratory,
+and what Shakespeare was to the drama of England, Plato was to ancient
+philosophy, not unapproachable nor unapproached, but possessing an
+inexplicable but unquestioned supremacy.
+
+The authentic records of his life are meagre, and much that has been
+written concerning him is of a speculative nature. He was born at Athens
+in the year 427 B.C. His father's name was Ariston, and his mother's
+family, which claimed its descent from Solon, included among its members
+many Athenian notables, among whom was Oritias, one of the thirty
+tyrants.
+
+In his early youth Plato applied himself to poetry and painting, both of
+which pursuits he relinquished to become the disciple and follower of
+Socrates. It is said that his name was originally Aristocles, but that
+it was changed to Plato on account of the breadth of his shoulders and
+forehead. He is also said to have been an expert wrestler and to have
+taken part in several important battles.
+
+He was the devoted friend and pupil of Socrates, and during the
+imprisonment of his master he attended him constantly, and committed to
+writing his last discourses on the immortality of the soul.
+
+After the death of Socrates it is supposed that Plato took refuge with
+Euclides in Megara, and subsequently extended his travels into Magna
+Graecia and Egypt.
+
+Upon his return to Athens he taught those who came to him for
+instruction in the grove named Academus, near the Cephisus, and thus
+founded the first great philosophical school, over which he continued to
+preside until the day of his death. Above the entrance to this grove was
+inscribed the legend: "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here." Here
+he was attended by persons of every description, among the more
+illustrious of whom were Aristotle, Lycurgus, Demosthenes and Isocrates.
+
+There is a story to the effect that Plato three times visited Sicily,
+once upon the invitation of the elder Dionysius, and twice at the
+earnest solicitations of the younger. The former he is said to have so
+seriously offended as to cause the tyrant to have him seized on his
+return home and sold as a slave, from which state of bondage he was,
+however, released by Anicerius of Cyrene.
+
+The people of his time thought more of him than they did of all their
+other philosophers, and called him the Divine Plato. So great was the
+regard and veneration for him that it was considered better to err with
+Plato than be right with any one else.
+
+The writings of Plato are numerous, and most of them are in the form of
+dialogues. The following pages contain translations of three of his
+works, viz.: "The Apologia," "The Crito" and "The Phædo," all of which
+have reference to the trial, imprisonment and death of Socrates.
+
+"The Apologia" represents Socrates on trial for his life, undertaking
+his own defence, though unaccustomed to the language of the courts, the
+occasion being, as he says, the first time he has ever been before a
+court of justice, though seventy years of age. Plato was present at the
+trial, and no doubt gives us the very arguments used by the accused. Two
+charges were brought against Socrates--one that he did not believe in
+the gods recognized by the State, the other that he had corrupted the
+Athenian youth by his teachings. Socrates does not have recourse to the
+ordinary methods adopted by orators on similar occasions. He prefers to
+stand upon his own integrity and innocence, uninfluenced by the fear of
+that imaginary evil, death. He, therefore, does not firmly grapple with
+either of the charges preferred against him. He neither denies nor
+confesses the first accusation, but shows that in several instances he
+conformed to the religious customs of his country, and that he believes
+in God more than he fears man. The second charge he meets by a
+cross-examination of his accuser, Melitus, whom he reduces to the
+dilemma of charging him with corrupting the youth designedly, which
+would be absurd, or with doing so undesignedly, for which he could not
+be liable to punishment.
+
+His defence, however, avails him nothing, and he is condemned by the
+judges to die by drinking the poisonous hemlock. In the closing part of
+"The Apologia" Socrates is represented as commenting upon the sentence
+which has been passed upon him, and as expressing his belief that in
+going to his death he is only passing to a better and a happier life.
+
+In "The Crito" Socrates is represented in conversation with a friend of
+his named Crito, who had been present at his trial, and who had offered
+to assist Socrates in paying a fine, had a fine been the sentence
+imposed. Crito visits Socrates in his confinement to bring to him the
+intelligence that the ship, the arrival of which was to be the signal
+for his death upon the following day, would arrive forthwith, and to
+urge him to adopt the means of escape which had already been prepared.
+Socrates promises to follow the advice of Crito if, upon a full
+discussion of the matter, it seems right to do so. In the conversation
+which ensues Socrates argues that it is wrong to return evil for evil
+and that the obligations which a citizen owes to his State are more
+binding than those which a child owes his parents or a slave his master,
+and, therefore, it is his duty to submit to the laws of Athens at
+whatever cost to himself. Crito has no answer to make to this argument,
+and Socrates thereupon decides to submit to his fate.
+
+Plato is said to have had two objects in writing this dialogue: First,
+to acquit Socrates of the charge of corrupting the Athenian youth; and,
+second, to establish the fact that it is necessary under all
+circumstances to submit to the established laws of his country.
+
+"The Phædo" relates the manner in which Socrates spent the last day of
+his life and the circumstances attending his death. He is visited by a
+number of his friends, among whom are Phædo, Simmias and Crito. When his
+friends arrive they find him sitting upon a bed rubbing his legs, which
+have just been released from bonds. He remarks upon the unaccountable
+connection between pleasure and pain, and from this the conversation
+gradually turns to a consideration of the question of the immortality of
+the soul. He convinces his listeners of the pre-existence of the soul;
+but they are still skeptical as to its immortality, urging that its
+pre-existence and the fact that it is more durable than the body does
+not preclude the possibility of its being mortal. Socrates, however,
+argues that contraries cannot exist in the same thing at the same time,
+as, for example, the same object cannot partake of both magnitude and
+littleness at the same time. In like manner, heat while it is heat can
+never admit the idea of cold. Life and death are contraries and can
+never coexist; but wherever there is life there is soul, so that the
+soul contains that which is contrary to death and can never admit death;
+consequently the soul is immortal.
+
+Having convinced his listeners, Socrates bathes and takes leave of his
+children and the women of his family. Thereupon the officer appears and
+tells him it is time for him to drink the poison. At this his friends
+commence to weep and are rebuked by Socrates for their weakness. He
+drinks the poison calmly and without hesitation, and then begins to walk
+about, still conversing with his friends. His limbs soon grow stiff and
+heavy and he lays himself down upon his back. His last words are:
+"Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not
+neglect it."
+
+
+
+
+THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.
+
+
+I know not, O Athenians! how far you have been influenced by my accusers
+for my part, in listening to them I almost forgot myself, so plausible
+were their arguments however, so to speak, they have said nothing true.
+But of the many falsehoods which they uttered I wondered at one of them
+especially, that in which they said that you ought to be on your guard
+lest you should be deceived by me, as being eloquent in speech. For that
+they are not ashamed of being forthwith convicted by me in fact, when I
+shall show that I am not by any means eloquent, this seemed to me the
+most shameless thing in them, unless indeed they call him eloquent who
+speaks the truth. For, if they mean this, then I would allow that I am
+an orator, but not after their fashion for they, as I affirm, have said
+nothing true, but from me you shall hear the whole truth. Not indeed,
+Athenians, arguments highly wrought, as theirs were, with choice phrases
+and expressions, nor adorned, but you shall hear a speech uttered
+without premeditation in such words as first present themselves. For I
+am confident that what I say will be just, and let none of you expect
+otherwise, for surely it would not become my time of life to come before
+you like a youth with a got up speech. Above all things, therefore, I
+beg and implore this of you, O Athenians! if you hear me defending
+myself in the same language as that in which I am accustomed to speak
+both in the forum at the counters, where many of you have heard me, and
+elsewhere, not to be surprised or disturbed on this account. For the
+case is this: I now for the first time come before a court of justice,
+though more than seventy years old; I am therefore utterly a stranger to
+the language here. As, then, if I were really a stranger, you would have
+pardoned me if I spoke in the language and the manner in which I had
+been educated, so now I ask this of you as an act of justice, as it
+appears to me, to disregard the manner of my speech, for perhaps it may
+be somewhat worse, and perhaps better, and to consider this only, and to
+give your attention to this, whether I speak what is just or not; for
+this is the virtue of a judge, but of an orator to speak the truth.
+
+2. First, then, O Athenians! I am right in defending myself against the
+first false accusations alleged against me, and my first accusers, and
+then against the latest accusations, and the latest accusers. For many
+have been accusers of me to you, and for many years, who have asserted
+nothing true, of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his party,
+although they too are formidable; but those are still more formidable,
+Athenians, who, laying hold of many of you from childhood, have
+persuaded you, and accused me of what is not true: "that there is one
+Socrates, a wise man, who occupies himself about celestial matters, and
+has explored every thing under the earth, and makes the worse appear the
+better reason." Those, O Athenians! who have spread abroad this report
+are my formidable accusers; for they who hear them think that such as
+search into these things do not believe that there are gods. In the next
+place, these accusers are numerous, and have accused me now for a long
+time; moreover, they said these things to you at that time of life in
+which you were most credulous, when you were boys and some of you
+youths, and they accused me altogether in my absence, when there was no
+one to defend me. But the most unreasonable thing of all is, that it is
+not possible to learn and mention their names, except that one of them
+happens to be a comic poet.[1] Such, however, as, influenced by envy and
+calumny, have persuaded you, and those who, being themselves persuaded,
+have persuaded others, all these are most difficult to deal with; for it
+is not possible to bring any of them forward here, nor to confute any;
+but it is altogether necessary to fight, as it were with a shadow, in
+making my defense, and to convict when there is no one to answer.
+Consider, therefore, as I have said, that my accusers are twofold, some
+who have lately accused me, and others long since, whom I have made
+mention of; and believe that I ought to defend myself against these
+first; for you heard them accusing me first, and much more than these
+last.
+
+Well. I must make my defense, then, O Athenians! and endeavor in this so
+short a space of time to remove from your minds the calumny which you
+have long entertained. I wish, indeed, it might be so, if it were at all
+better both for you and me, and that in making my defense I could effect
+something more advantageous still: I think, however, that it will be
+difficult, and I am not entirely ignorant what the difficulty is.
+Nevertheless, let this turn out as may be pleasing to God, I must obey
+the law and make my defense.
+
+3. Let us, then, repeat from the beginning what the accusation is from
+which the calumny against me has arisen, and relying on which Melitus
+has preferred this indictment against me. Well. What, then, do they who
+charge me say in their charge? For it is necessary to read their
+deposition as of public accusers. "Socrates acts wickedly, and is
+criminally curious in searching into things under the earth, and in the
+heavens, and in making the worse appear the better cause, and in
+teaching these same things to others." Such is the accusation: for such
+things you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes, one
+Socrates there carried about, saying that he walks in the air, and
+acting many other buffooneries, of which I understand nothing whatever.
+Nor do I say this as disparaging such a science, if there be any one
+skilled in such things, only let me not be prosecuted by Melitus on a
+charge of this kind; but I say it, O Athenians! because I have nothing
+to do with such matters. And I call upon most of you as witnesses of
+this, and require you to inform and tell each other, as many of you as
+have ever heard me conversing; and there are many such among you.
+Therefore tell each other, if any one of you has ever heard me
+conversing little or much on such subjects. And from this you will know
+that other things also, which the multitude assert of me, are of a
+similar nature.
+
+4. However not one of these things is true; nor, if you have heard from
+any one that I attempt to teach men, and require payment, is this true.
+Though this, indeed, appears to me to be an honorable thing, if one
+should be able to instruct men, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the
+Cean, and Hippias the Elean. For each of these, O Athenians! is able, by
+going through the several cities, to persuade the young men, who can
+attach themselves gratuitously to such of their own fellow-citizens as
+they please, to abandon their fellow-citizens and associate with them,
+giving them money and thanks besides. There is also another wise man
+here, a Parian, who, I hear, is staying in the city. For I happened to
+visit a person who spends more money on the sophists than all others
+together: I mean Callias, son of Hipponicus. I therefore asked him, for
+he has two sons, "Callias," I said, "if your two sons were colts or
+calves, we should have had to choose a master for them, and hire a
+person who would make them excel in such qualities as belong to their
+nature; and he would have been a groom or an agricultural laborer. But
+now, since your sons are men, what master do you intend to choose for
+them? Who is there skilled in the qualities that become a man and a
+citizen? For I suppose you must have considered this, since you have
+sons. Is there any one," I said, "or not?" "Certainly," he answered.
+"Who is he?" said I, "and whence does he come? and on what terms does he
+teach?" He replied, "Evenus the Parian, Socrates, for five minae." And I
+deemed Evenus happy, if he really possesses this art, and teaches
+admirably. And I too should think highly of myself, and be very proud,
+if I possessed this knowledge, but I possess it not, O Athenians.
+
+5. Perhaps, one of you may now object: "But, Socrates, what have you
+done, then? Whence have these calumnies against you arisen? For surely
+if you had not busied yourself more than others, such a report and story
+would never have got abroad, unless you had done something different
+from what most men do. Tell us, therefore, what it is, that we may not
+pass a hasty judgment on you." He who speaks thus appears to me to speak
+justly, and I will endeavor to show you what it is that has occasioned
+me this character and imputation. Listen, then: to some of you perhaps I
+shall appear to jest, yet be assured that I shall tell you the whole
+truth. For I, O Athenians! have acquired this character through nothing
+else than a certain wisdom. Of what kind, then, is this wisdom? Perhaps
+it is merely human wisdom. For in this, in truth, I appear to be wise.
+They probably, whom I have just now mentioned, possessed a wisdom more
+than human, otherwise I know not what to say about it; for I am not
+acquainted with it, and whosoever says I am, speaks falsely, and for the
+purpose of calumniating me. But, O Athenians! do not cry out against me,
+even though I should seem to you to speak somewhat arrogantly. For the
+account which I am going to give you is not my own; but I shall refer to
+an authority whom you will deem worthy of credit. For I shall adduce to
+you the god at Delphi as a witness of my wisdom, if I have any, and of
+what it is. You doubtless know Chærepho: he was my associate from youth,
+and the associate of most of you; he accompanied you in your late exile,
+and returned with you. You know, then, what kind of a man Chærepho was,
+how earnest in whatever he undertook. Having once gone to Delphi, he
+ventured to make the following inquiry of the oracle (and, as I said, O
+Athenians! do not cry out), for he asked if there was any one wiser than
+I. The Pythian thereupon answered that there was not one wiser; and of
+this, his brother here will give you proofs, since he himself is dead.
+
+6. Consider, then, why I mention these things: it is because I am going
+to show you whence the calumny against me arose. For when I heard this,
+I reasoned thus with myself, What does the god mean? What enigma is
+this? For I am not conscious to myself that I am wise, either much or
+little. What, then, does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For
+assuredly he does not speak falsely: that he could not do. And for a
+long time I was in doubt what he meant; afterward, with considerable
+difficulty, I had recourse to the following method of searching out his
+meaning. I went to one of those who have the character of being wise,
+thinking that there, if anywhere, I should confute the oracle, and show
+in answer to the response that This man is wiser than I, though you
+affirmed that I was the wisest. Having, then, examined this man (for
+there is no occasion to mention his name; he was, however, one of our
+great politicians, in examining whom I felt as I proceed to describe, O
+Athenians!), having fallen into conversation with him, this man appeared
+to be wise in the opinion of most other men, and especially in his own
+opinion, though in fact he was not so. I thereupon endeavored to show
+him that he fancied himself to be wise, but really was not. Hence I
+became odious, both to him and to many others who were present. When I
+left him, I reasoned thus with myself: I am wiser than this man, for
+neither of us appears to know anything great and good; but he fancies he
+knows something, although he knows nothing; whereas I, as I do not know
+anything, so I do not fancy I do. In this trifling particular, then, I
+appear to be wiser than he, because I do not fancy I know what I do not
+know. After that I went to another who was thought to be wiser than the
+former, and formed the very same opinion. Hence I became odious to him
+and to many others.
+
+7. After this I went to others in turn, perceiving indeed, and grieving
+and alarmed, that I was making myself odious; however, it appeared
+necessary to regard the oracle of the god as of the greatest moment, and
+that, in order to discover its meaning, I must go to all who had the
+reputation of possessing any knowledge. And by the dog, O Athenians! for
+I must tell you the truth, I came to some such conclusion as this: those
+who bore the highest reputation appeared to me to be most deficient, in
+my researches in obedience to the god, and others who were considered
+inferior more nearly approaching to the possession of understanding. But
+I must relate to you my wandering, and the labors which I underwent, in
+order that the oracle might prove incontrovertible. For after the
+politicians I went to the poets, as well the tragic as the dithyrambic
+and others, expecting that here I should in very fact find myself more
+ignorant than they. Taking up, therefore, some of their poems, which
+appeared to me most elaborately finished, I questioned them as to their
+meaning, that at the same time I might learn something from them. I am
+ashamed, O Athenians! to tell you the truth; however, it must be told.
+For, in a word, almost all who were present could have given a better
+account of them than those by whom they had been composed. I soon
+discovered this, therefore, with regard to the poets, that they do not
+effect their object by wisdom, but by a certain natural inspiration, and
+under the influence of enthusiasm, like prophets and seers; for these
+also say many fine things, but they understand nothing that they say.
+The poets appeared to me to be affected in a similar manner; and at the
+same time I perceived that they considered themselves, on account of
+their poetry, to be the wisest of men in other things, in which they
+were not. I left them, therefore, under the persuasion that I was
+superior to them, in the same way that I was to the politicians.
+
+8. At last, therefore, I went to the artisans. For I was conscious to
+myself that I knew scarcely anything, but I was sure that I should find
+them possessed of much beautiful knowledge. And in this I was not
+deceived; for they knew things which I did not, and in this respect they
+were wiser than I. But, O Athenians! even the best workmen appeared to
+me to have fallen into the same error as the poets; for each, because he
+excelled in the practice of his art, thought that he was very wise in
+other most important matters, and this mistake of theirs obscured the
+wisdom that they really possessed. I therefore asked myself, in behalf
+of the oracle, whether I should prefer to continue as I am, possessing
+none, either of their wisdom or their ignorance, or to have both as they
+have. I answered, therefore, to myself and to the oracle, that it was
+better for me to continue as I am.
+
+9. From this investigation, then, O Athenians! many enmities have arisen
+against me, and those the most grievous and severe, so that many
+calumnies have sprung from them, and among them this appellation of
+being wise; for those who are from time to time present think that I am
+wise in those things, with respect to which I expose the ignorance of
+others. The god, however, O Athenians! appears to be really wise, and to
+mean this by his oracle: that human wisdom is worth little or nothing;
+and it is clear that he did not say this to Socrates, but made use of my
+name, putting me forward as an example, as if he had said, that man is
+the wisest among you, who, like Socrates, knows that he is in reality
+worth nothing with respect to wisdom. Still, therefore, I go about and
+search and inquire into these things, in obedience to the god, both
+among citizens and strangers, if I think any one of them is wise; and
+when he appears to me not to be so, I take the part of the god, and show
+that he is not wise. And, in consequence of this occupation, I have no
+leisure to attend in any considerable degree to the affairs of the state
+or my own; but I am in the greatest poverty through my devotion to the
+service of the god.
+
+10. In addition to this, young men, who have much leisure and belong to
+the wealthiest families, following me of their own accord, take great
+delight in hearing men put to the test, and often imitate me, and
+themselves attempt to put others to the test; and then, I think, they
+find a great abundance of men who fancy they know something, although
+they know little or nothing. Hence those who are put to the test by them
+are angry with me, and not with them, and say that "there is one
+Socrates, a most pestilent fellow, who corrupts the youth." And when any
+one asks them by doing or teaching what, they have nothing to say, for
+they do not know; but, that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say
+such things as are ready at hand against all philosophers; "that he
+searches into things in heaven and things under the earth, that he does
+not believe there are gods, and that he makes the worse appear the
+better reason." For they would not, I think, be willing to tell the
+truth that they have been detected in pretending to possess knowledge,
+whereas they know nothing. Therefore, I think, being ambitions and
+vehement and numerous, and speaking systematically and persuasively
+about me, they have filled your ears, for a long time and diligently
+calumniating me. From among these, Melitus, Anytus and Lycon have
+attacked me; Melitus being angry on account of the poets, Anytus on
+account of the artisans and politicians, and Lycon on account of the
+rhetoricians. So that, as I said in the beginning, I should wonder if I
+were able in so short a time to remove from your minds a calumny that
+has prevailed so long. This, O Athenians! is the truth; and I speak it
+without concealing or disguising anything from you, much or little;
+though I very well know that by so doing I shall expose myself to odium.
+This, however, is a proof that I speak the truth, and that this is the
+nature of the calumny against me, and that these are its causes. And if
+you will investigate the matter, either now or hereafter, you will find
+it to be so.
+
+11. With respect, then, to the charges which my first accusers have
+alleged against me, let this be a sufficient apology to you. To Melitus,
+that good and patriotic man, as he says, and to my later accusers, I
+will next endeavor to give an answer; and here, again, as there are
+different accusers, let us take up their deposition. It is pretty much
+as follows: "Socrates," it says, "acts unjustly in corrupting the youth,
+and in not believing in those gods in whom the city believes, but in
+other strange divinities." Such is the accusation; let us examine each
+particular of it. It says that I act unjustly in corrupting the youth.
+But I, O Athenians! say that Melitus acts unjustly, because he jests on
+serious subjects, rashly putting men upon trial, under pretense of being
+zealous and solicitous about things in which he never at any time took
+any concern. But that this is the case I will endeavor to prove to you.
+
+12. Come, then, Melitus, tell me, do you not consider it of the greatest
+importance that the youth should be made as virtuous as possible?
+
+_Mel._ I do.
+
+_Socr._ Well, now, tell the judges who it is that makes them better, for
+it is evident that you know, since it concerns you so much; for, having
+detected me in corrupting them, as you say, you have cited me here, and
+accused me: come, then, say, and inform the judges who it is that makes
+them better. Do you see, Melitus, that you are silent, and have nothing
+to say? But does it not appear to you to be disgraceful, and a
+sufficient proof of what I say, that you never took any concern about
+the matter? But tell me, friend, who makes them better?
+
+_Mel._ The laws.
+
+_Socr._ I do not ask this, most excellent sir, but what man, who surely
+must first know this very thing, the laws?
+
+_Mel._ These, Socrates, the judges.
+
+_Socr._ How say you, Melitus? Are these able to instruct the youth, and
+make them better?
+
+_Mel._ Certainly.
+
+_Socr._ Whether all, or some of them, and others not?
+
+_Mel._ All.
+
+_Socr._ You say well, by Juno! and have found a great abundance of those
+that confer benefit. But what further? Can these hearers make them
+better, or not?
+
+_Mel._ They, too, can.
+
+_Socr._ And what of the senators?
+
+_Mel._ The senators, also.
+
+_Socr._ But, Melitus, do those who attend the public assemblies corrupt
+the younger men? or do they all make them better?
+
+_Mel._ They too.
+
+_Socr._ All the Athenians, therefore, as it seems, make them honorable
+and good, except me; but I alone corrupt them. Do you say so?
+
+_Mel._ I do assert this very thing.
+
+_Socr._ You charge me with great ill-fortune. But answer me: does it
+appear to you to be the same, with respect to horses? Do all men make
+them better, and is there only some one that spoils them? or does quite
+the contrary of this take place? Is there some one person who can make
+them better, or very few; that is, the trainers? But if the generality
+of men should meddle with and make use of horses, do they spoil them? Is
+not this the case, Melitus, both with respect to horses and all other
+animals? It certainly is so, whether you and Anytus deny it or not. For
+it would be a great good-fortune for the youth if only one person
+corrupted, and the rest benefited them. However, Melitus, you have
+sufficiently shown that you never bestowed any care upon youth; and you
+clearly evince your own negligence, in that you have never paid any
+attention to the things with respect to which you accuse me.
+
+13. Tell us further, Melitus, in the name of Jupiter, whether is it
+better to dwell with good or bad citizens? Answer, my friend; for I ask
+you nothing difficult. Do not the bad work some evil to those that are
+continually near them, but the good some good?
+
+_Mel._ Certainly.
+
+_Socr._ Is there any one that wishes to be injured rather than benefited
+by his associates? Answer, good man; for the law requires you to answer.
+Is there any one who wishes to be injured?
+
+_Mel._ No, surely.
+
+_Socr._ Come, then, whether do you accuse me here, as one that corrupts
+the youth, and makes them more depraved, designedly or undesignedly?
+
+_Mel._ Designedly, I say.
+
+_Socr._ What, then, Melitus, are you at your time of life so much wiser
+than I at my time of life, as to know that the evil are always working
+some evil to those that are most near to them, and the good some good;
+but I have arrived at such a pitch of ignorance as not to know that if I
+make any one of my associates depraved, I shall be in danger of
+receiving some evil from him; and yet I designedly bring about this so
+great evil, as you say? In this I can not believe you, Melitus, nor do I
+think would any other man in the world. But either I do not corrupt the
+youth, or, if I do corrupt them, I do it undesignedly: so that in both
+cases you speak falsely. But if I corrupt them undesignedly, for such
+involuntary offenses it is not usual to accuse one here, but to take one
+apart, and teach and admonish one. For it is evident that if I am
+taught, I shall cease doing what I do undesignedly. But you shunned me,
+and were not willing to associate with and instruct me; but you accuse
+me here, where it is usual to accuse those who need punishment, and not
+instruction.
+
+14. Thus, then, O Athenians! this now is clear that I have said; that
+Melitus never paid any attention to these matters, much or little.
+However, tell us, Melitus, how you say I corrupt the youth? Is it not
+evidently, according to the indictment which you have preferred, by
+teaching them not to believe in the gods in whom the city believes, but
+in other strange deities? Do you not say that, by teaching these things,
+I corrupt the youth?
+
+_Mel._ Certainly I do say so.
+
+_Socr._ By those very gods, therefore, Melitus, of whom the discussion
+now is, speak still more clearly both to me and to these men. For I can
+not understand whether you say that I teach them to believe that there
+are certain gods (and in that case I do believe that there are gods, and
+am not altogether an atheist, nor in this respect to blame), not,
+however, those which the city believes in, but others; and this it is
+that you accuse me of, that I introduce others. Or do you say outright
+that I do not myself believe that there are gods, and that I teach
+others the same?
+
+_Mel._ I say this: that you do not believe in any gods at all.
+
+_Socr._ O wonderful Melitus, how come you to say this? Do I not, then,
+like the rest of mankind, believe that the sun and moon are gods?
+
+_Mel._ No, by Jupiter, O judges! for he says that the sun is a stone,
+and the moon an earth.
+
+_Socr._ You fancy that you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Melitus, and
+thus you put a slight on these men, and suppose them to be so illiterate
+as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomene are full of
+such assertions. And the young, moreover, learn these things from me,
+which they might purchase for a drachma, at most, in the orchestra, and
+so ridicule Socrates, if he pretended they were his own, especially
+since they are so absurd? I ask then, by Jupiter, do I appear to you to
+believe that there is no god?
+
+_Mel._ No, by Jupiter, none whatever.
+
+_Socr._ You say what is incredible, Melitus, and that, as appears to me,
+even to yourself. For this man, O Athenians! appears to me to be very
+insolent and intemperate and to have preferred this indictment through
+downright insolence, intemperance, and wantonness. For he seems, as it
+were, to have composed an enigma for the purpose of making an
+experiment. Whether will Socrates the wise know that I am jesting, and
+contradict myself, or shall I deceive him and all who hear me? For, in
+my opinion, he clearly contradicts himself in the indictment, as if he
+should say, Socrates is guilty of wrong in not believing that there are
+gods, and in believing that there are gods. And this, surely, is the act
+of one who is trifling.
+
+15. Consider with me now, Athenians, in what respect he appears to me to
+say so. And do you, Melitus, answer me; and do ye, as I besought you at
+the outset, remember not to make an uproar if I speak after my usual
+manner.
+
+Is there any man, Melitus, who believes that there are human affairs,
+but does not believe that there are men? Let him answer, judges, and not
+make so much noise. Is there any one who does not believe that there are
+horses, but that there are things pertaining to horses? or who does not
+believe that there are pipers, but that there are things pertaining to
+pipes? There is not, O best of men! for since you are not willing to
+answer, I say it to you and to all here present. But answer to this at
+least: is there any one who believes that there are things relating to
+demons, but does not believe that there are demons?
+
+_Mel._ There is not.
+
+_Socr._ How obliging you are in having hardly answered; though compelled
+by these judges! You assert, then, that I do believe and teach things
+relating to demons, whether they be new or old; therefore, according to
+your admission, I do believe in things relating to demons, and this you
+have sworn in the bill of indictment. If, then, I believe in things
+relating to demons, there is surely an absolute necessity that I should
+believe that there are demons. Is it not so? It is. For I suppose you to
+assent, since you do not answer. But with respect to demons, do we not
+allow that they are gods, or the children of gods? Do you admit this or
+not?
+
+_Mel._ Certainly.
+
+_Socr._ Since, then, I allow that there are demons, as you admit, if
+demons are a kind of gods, this is the point in which I say you speak
+enigmatically and divert yourself in saying that I do not allow there
+are gods, and again that I do allow there are, since I allow that there
+are demons? But if demons are the children of gods, spurious ones,
+either from nymphs or any others, of whom they are reported to be, what
+man can think that there are sons of gods, and yet that there are not
+gods? For it would be just as absurd as if any one should think that
+there are mules, the offspring of horses and asses, but should not think
+there are horses and asses. However, Melitus, it can not be otherwise
+than that you have preferred this indictment for the purpose of trying
+me, or because you were at a loss what real crime to allege against me;
+for that you should persuade any man who has the smallest degree of
+sense that the same person can think that there are things relating to
+demons and to gods, and yet that there are neither demons, nor gods,
+not heroes, is utterly impossible.
+
+16. That I am not guilty, then, O Athenians! according to the indictment
+of Melitus, appears to me not to require a lengthened defense; but what
+I have said is sufficient. And as to what I said at the beginning, that
+there is a great enmity toward me among the multitude, be assured it is
+true. And this it is which will condemn me, if I am condemned, not
+Melitus, nor Anytus, but the calumny and envy of the multitude, which
+have already condemned many others, and those good men, and will, I
+think, condemn others also; for there is no danger that it will stop
+with me.
+
+Perhaps, however, some one may say, "Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to
+have pursued a study from which you are now in danger of dying?" To such
+a person I should answer with good reason, You do not say well, friend,
+if you think that a man, who is even of the least value, ought to take
+into the account the risk of life or death, and ought not to consider
+that alone when be performs any action, whether he is acting justly or
+unjustly, and the part of a good man or bad man. For, according to your
+reasoning, all those demi-gods that died at Troy would be vile
+characters, as well all the rest as the son of Thetis, who so far
+despised danger in comparison of submitting to disgrace, that when his
+mother, who was a goddess, spoke to him, in his impatience to kill
+Hector, something to this effect, as I think,[2] "My son, if you revenge
+the death of your friend Patroclus, and slay Hector, you will yourself
+die, for," she said, "death awaits you immediately after Hector;" but
+he, on hearing this, despised death and danger, and dreading much more
+to live as a coward, and not avenge his friend, said, "May I die
+immediately when I have inflicted punishment on the guilty, that I may
+not stay here an object of ridicule, by the curved ships, a burden to
+the ground?"--do you think that he cared for death and danger? For thus
+it is, O Athenians! in truth: wherever any one has posted himself,
+either thinking it to be better, or has been posted by his chief, there,
+as it appears to me, he ought to remain and meet danger, taking no
+account either of death or anything else in comparison with disgrace.
+
+17. I then should be acting strangely, O Athenians! if, when the
+generals whom you chose to command me assigned me my post at Potidæa, at
+Amphipolis, and at Delium, I then remained where they posted me, like
+any other person, and encountered the danger of death; but when the
+deity, as I thought and believed, assigned it as my duty to pass my life
+in the study of philosophy, and examining myself and others, I should on
+that occasion, through fear of death or any thing else whatsoever,
+desert my post, strange indeed would it be; and then, in truth, any one
+might justly bring me to trial, and accuse me of not believing in the
+gods, from disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking myself to
+be wise when I am not. For to fear death, O Athenians! is nothing else
+than to appear to be wise, without being so; for it is to appear to know
+what one does not know. For no one knows but that death is the greatest
+of all good to man; but men fear it, as if they well knew that it is the
+greatest of evils. And how is not this the most reprehensible ignorance,
+to think that one knows what one does not know? But I, O Athenians! in
+this, perhaps, differ from most men; and if I should say that I am in
+any thing wiser than another, it would be in this, that not having a
+competent knowledge of the things in Hades, I also think that I have not
+such knowledge. But to act unjustly, and to disobey my superior,
+whether God or man, I know is evil and base. I shall never, therefore,
+fear or shun things which, for aught I know, maybe good, before evils
+which I know to be evils. So that, even if you should now dismiss me,
+not yielding to the instances of Anytus, who said that either I should
+not[3] appear here at all, or that, if I did appear, it was impossible
+not to put me to death, telling you that if I escaped, your sons,
+studying what Socrates teaches, would all be utterly corrupted; if you
+should address me thus, "Socrates, we shall not now yield to Anytus, but
+dismiss you, on this condition, however, that you no longer persevere in
+your researches nor study philosophy; and if hereafter you are detected
+in so doing, you shall die"--if, as I said, you should dismiss, me on
+these terms, I should say to you, "O Athenians! I honor and love you;
+but I shall obey God rather than you; and so long as I breathe and am
+able, I shall not cease studying philosophy, and exhorting you and
+warning any one of you I may happen to meet, saying, as I have been
+accustomed to do: 'O best of men! seeing you are an Athenian, of a city
+the most powerful and most renowned for wisdom and strength, are you not
+ashamed of being careful for riches, how you may acquire them in
+greatest abundance, and for glory, and honor, but care not nor take any
+thought for wisdom and truth, and for your soul, how it maybe made most
+perfect?'" And if any one of you should question my assertion, and
+affirm that he does care for these things, I shall not at once let him
+go, nor depart, but I shall question him, sift and prove him. And if he
+should appear to me not to possess virtue, but to pretend that he does,
+I shall reproach him for that he sets the least value on things of the
+greatest worth, but the highest on things that are worthless. Thus I
+shall act to all whom I meet, both young and old, stranger and citizen,
+but rather to you, my fellow-citizens, because ye are more nearly allied
+to me. For be well assured, this the deity commands. And I think that no
+greater good has ever befallen you in the city than my zeal for the
+service of the god. For I go about doing nothing else than persuading
+you, both young and old, to take no care either for the body, or for
+riches, prior to or so much as for the soul, how it may be made most
+perfect, telling you that virtue does not spring from riches, but riches
+and all other human blessings, both private and public, from virtue. If,
+then, by saying these things, I corrupt the youth, these things must be
+mischievous; but if any one says that I speak other things than these,
+he misleads you.[4] Therefore I must say, O Athenians! either yield to
+Anytus, or do not, either dismiss me or not, since I shall not act
+otherwise, even though I must die many deaths.
+
+18. Murmur not, O Athenians! but continue to attend to my request, not
+to murmur at what I say, but to listen, for, as I think, you will derive
+benefit from listening. For I am going to say other things to you, at
+which, perhaps, you will raise a clamor; but on no account do so. Be
+well assured, then, if you put me to death, being such a man as I say I
+am, you will not injure me more than yourselves. For neither will
+Melitus nor Anytus harm me; nor have they the power; for I do not think
+that it is possible for a better man to be injured by a worse. He may
+perhaps have me condemned to death, or banished, or deprived of civil
+rights; and he or others may perhaps consider these as mighty evils; I,
+how ever, do not consider them so, but that it is much more so to do
+what he is now doing, to endeavor to put a man to death unjustly. Now,
+therefore, O Athenians! I am far from making a defense on my behalf, as
+any one might think, but I do so on your own behalf, lest by condemning
+me you should offend at all with respect to the gift of the deity to
+you. For, if you should put me to death, you will not easily find such
+another, though it may be ridiculous to say so, altogether attached by
+the deity to this city as to a powerful and generous horse, somewhat
+sluggish from his size, and requiring to be roused by a gad-fly; so the
+deity appears to have united me, being such a person as I am, to the
+city, that I may rouse you, and persuade and reprove every one of you,
+nor ever cease besetting you throughout the whole day. Such another man,
+O Athenians! will not easily be found; therefore, if you will take my
+advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, being irritated like drowsy
+persons who are roused from sleep, will strike me, and, yielding to
+Anytus, will unthinkingly condemn me to death; and then you will pass
+the rest of your life in sleep, unless the deity, caring for you, should
+send some one else to you. But that I am a person who has been given by
+the deity to this city, you may discern from hence; for it is not like
+the ordinary conduct of men, that I should have neglected all my own
+affairs, and suffered my private interest to be neglected for so many
+years, and that I should constantly attend to your concerns, addressing
+myself to each of you separately, like a father, or elder brother,
+persuading you to the pursuit of virtue. And if I had derived any profit
+from this course, and had received pay for my exhortations, there would
+have been some reason for my conduct; but now you see yourselves that my
+accusers, who have so shamelessly calumniated me in everything else,
+have not had the impudence to charge me with this, and to bring
+witnesses to prove that I ever either exacted or demanded any reward.
+And I think I produce a sufficient proof that I speak the truth,
+namely, my poverty.
+
+19. Perhaps, however, it may appear absurd that I, going about, thus
+advise you in private and make myself busy, but never venture to present
+myself in public before your assemblies and give advice to the city. The
+cause of this is that which you have often and in many places heard me
+mention; because I am moved by a certain divine and spiritual influence,
+which also Melitus, through mockery, has set out in the indictment. This
+began with me from childhood, being a kind of voice which, when present,
+always diverts me from what I am about to do, but never urges me on.
+This it is which opposed my meddling in public politics; and it appears
+to me to have opposed me very properly. For be well assured, O
+Athenians! if I had long since attempted to intermeddle with politics, I
+should have perished long ago, and should not have at all benefited you
+or myself. And be not angry with me for speaking the truth. For it is
+not possible that any man should be safe who sincerely opposes either
+you, or any other multitude, and who prevents many unjust and illegal
+actions from being committed in a city; but it is necessary that he who
+in earnest contends for justice, if he will be safe for but a short
+time, should live privately, and take no part in public affairs.
+
+20. I will give you strong proofs of this, not words, but what you
+value, facts. Hear, then, what has happened to me, that you may know
+that I would not yield to any one contrary to what is just, through fear
+of death, at the same time by not yielding I must perish. I shall tell
+you what will be displeasing and wearisome,[5] yet true. For I, O
+Athenians! never bore any other magisterial office in the city, but
+have been a senator: and our Antiochean tribe happened to supply the
+Prytanes when you chose to condemn in a body the ten generals who had
+not taken off those that perished in the sea-fight, in violation of the
+law, as you afterward all thought. At that time I alone of the Prytanes
+opposed your doing anything contrary to the laws, and I voted against
+you; and when the orators were ready to denounce me, and to carry me
+before a magistrate, and you urged and cheered them on, I thought I
+ought rather to meet the danger with law and justice on my side, than
+through fear of imprisonment or death, to take part with you in your
+unjust designs. And this happened while the city was governed by a
+democracy. But when it became an oligarchy, the Thirty, having sent for
+me with four others to the Tholus, ordered us to bring Leon the
+Salaminian from Salamis, that he might be put to death; and they gave
+many similar orders to many others, wishing to involve as many as they
+could in guilt. Then, however, I showed, not in word but in deed, that I
+did not care for death, if the expression be not too rude, in the
+smallest degree; but that all my care was to do nothing unjust or
+unholy. For that government, strong as it was, did not so overawe me as
+to make me commit an unjust action; but when we came out from the
+Tholus, the four went to Salamis, and brought back Leon; but I went away
+home. And perhaps for this I should have been put to death, if that
+government had not been speedily broken up. And of this you can have
+many witnesses.
+
+21. Do you think, then, that I should have survived so many years if I
+had engaged in public affairs, and, acting as becomes a good man, had
+aided the cause of justice, and, as I ought, had deemed this of the
+highest importance? Far from it, O Athenians! nor would any other man
+have done so. But I, through the whole of my life, if I have done
+anything in public, shall be found to be a man, and the very same in
+private, who has never made a concession to any one contrary to justice,
+neither to any other, nor to any one of these whom my calumniators say
+are my disciples. I, however, was never the preceptor of any one; but if
+any one desired to hear me speaking, and to see me busied about my own
+mission, whether he were young or old, I never refused him. Nor do I
+discourse when I receive money, and not when I do not receive any, but I
+allow both rich and poor alike to question me, and, if any one wishes
+it, to answer me and hear what I have to say. And for these, whether any
+one proves to be a good man or not, I cannot justly be responsible,
+because I never either promised them any instruction or taught them at
+all. But if any one says that he has ever learned or heard anything from
+me in private which all others have not, be well assured that he does
+not speak the truth.
+
+22. But why do some delight to spend so long a time with me? Ye have
+heard, O Athenians! I have told you the whole truth, that they delight
+to hear those closely questioned who think that they are wise but are
+not; for this is by no means disagreeable. But this duty, as I say, has
+been enjoined me by the deity, by oracles, by dreams, and by every mode
+by which any other divine decree has ever enjoined anything to man to
+do. These things, O Athenians! are both true, and easily confuted if not
+true. For if I am now corrupting some of the youths, and have already
+corrupted others, it were fitting, surely, that if any of them, having
+become advanced in life, had discovered that I gave them bad advice when
+they were young, they should now rise up against me, accuse me, and have
+me punished; or if they were themselves unwilling to do this, some of
+their kindred, their fathers, or brothers, or other relatives, if their
+kinsman have ever sustained any damage from me, should now call it to
+mind. Many of them, however, are here present, whom I see: first, Crito,
+my contemporary and fellow-burgher, father of this Critobulus; then
+Lysanias of Sphettus, father of this Æschines; again, Antiphon of
+Cephisus, father of Epigenes. There are those others, too, whose
+brothers maintained the same intimacy with me, namely, Nicostratus, son
+of Theodotus, brother of Theodotus--Theodotus indeed is dead, so that he
+could not deprecate his brother's proceedings--and Paralus here, son of
+Demodocus, whose brother was Theages; and Adimantus, son of Ariston,
+whose brother is this Plato; and Æantodorus, whose brother is this
+Apollodorus. I could also mention many others to you, some one of whom
+certainly Melitus ought to have adduced in his speech as a witness. If,
+however, he then forgot to do so, let him now adduce them; I give him
+leave to do so, and let him say it, if he has anything of the kind to
+allege. But, quite contrary to this, you will find, O Athenians! all
+ready to assist me, who have corrupted and injured their relatives, as
+Melitus and Anytus say. For those who have been themselves corrupted
+might perhaps have some reason for assisting me; but those who have not
+been corrupted, men now advanced in life, their relatives, what other
+reason can they have for assisting me, except that right and just one,
+that they know that Melitus speaks falsely, and that I speak the truth.
+
+23. Well, then, Athenians, these are pretty much the things I have to
+say in my defense, and others perhaps of the same kind. Perhaps,
+however, some among you will be indignant on recollecting his own case,
+if he, when engaged in a cause far less than this, implored and besought
+the judges with many tears, bringing forward his children in order that
+he might excite their utmost compassion, and many others of his
+relatives and friends, whereas I do none of these things, although I may
+appear to be incurring the extremity of danger. Perhaps, therefore, some
+one, taking notice of this, may become more determined against me, and,
+being enraged at this very conduct of mine, may give his vote under the
+influence of anger. If, then, any one of you is thus affected--I do not,
+however, suppose that there is--but if there should be, I think I may
+reasonably say to him: "I, too, O best of men, have relatives; for, to
+make use of that saying of Homer, I am not sprung from an oak, nor from
+a rock, but from men, so that I, too, O Athenians! have relatives, and
+three sons, one now grown up, and two boys: I shall not, however, bring
+any one of them forward and implore you to acquit me." Why, then, shall I
+not do this? Not from contumacy, O Athenians! nor disrespect toward you.
+Whether or not I am undaunted at the prospect of death is another
+question; but, out of regard to my own character, and yours, and that of
+the whole city, it does not appear to me to be honorable that I should
+do any thing of this kind at my age, and with the reputation I have,
+whether true or false. For it is commonly agreed that Socrates in some
+respects excels the generality of men. If, then, those among you who
+appear to excel either in wisdom, or fortitude, or any other virtue
+whatsoever, should act in such a manner as I have often seen some when
+they have been brought to trial, it would be shameful, who appearing
+indeed to be something, have conducted themselves in a surprising
+manner, as thinking they should suffer something dreadful by dying, and
+as if they would be immortal if you did not put them to death. Such men
+appear to me to bring disgrace on the city, so that any stranger might
+suppose that such of the Athenians as excel in virtue, and whom they
+themselves choose in preference to themselves for magistracies and other
+honors, are in no respect superior to women. For these things, O
+Athenians! neither ought we to do who have attained to any height of
+reputation, nor, should we do them, ought you to suffer us; but you
+should make this manifest, that you will much rather condemn him who
+introduces these piteous dramas, and makes the city ridiculous, than him
+who quietly awaits your decision.
+
+24. But, reputation apart, O Athenians! it does not appear to me to be
+right to entreat a judge, or to escape by entreaty; but one ought to
+inform and persuade him. For a judge does not sit for the purpose of
+administering justice out of favor, but that he may judge rightly, and
+he is sworn not to show favor to whom he pleases, but that he will
+decide according to the laws. It is, therefore, right that neither
+should we accustom you, nor should you accustom yourselves, to violate
+your oaths; for in so doing neither of us would act righteously. Think
+not then, O Athenians! that I ought to adopt such a course toward you as
+I neither consider honorable, nor just, nor holy, as well, by Jupiter!
+on any other occasion, and now especially when I am accused of impiety
+by this Melitus. For clearly, if I should persuade you, and by my
+entreaties should put a constraint on you who are bound by an oath, I
+should teach you to think that there are no gods, and in reality, while
+making my defense, should accuse myself of not believing in the gods.
+This, however, is far from being the case; for I believe, O Athenians!
+as none of my accusers do, and I leave it to you and to the deity to
+judge concerning me in such way as will be best both for me and for you.
+
+[Socrates here concludes his defense, and, the votes being taken, he is
+declared guilty by a majority of voices. He thereupon resumes his
+address.]
+
+25. That I should not be grieved, O Athenians! at what has
+happened--namely, that you have condemned me--as well many other
+circumstances concur in bringing to pass; and, moreover this, that what
+has happened has not happened contrary to my expectation; but I much
+rather wonder at the number of votes on either side. For I did not
+expect that I should be condemned by so small a number, but by a large
+majority; but now, as it seems, if only three more votes had changed
+sides, I should have been acquitted. So far as Melitus is concerned, as
+it appears to me, I have been already acquitted; and not only have I
+been acquitted, but it is clear to every one that had not Anytus and
+Lycon come forward to accuse me, he would have been fined a thousand
+drachmas, for not having obtained a fifth part of the votes.
+
+26. The man, then, awards me the penalty of death. Well. But what shall
+I, on my part, O Athenians! award myself? Is it not clear that it will
+be such as I deserve? What, then, is that? Do I deserve to suffer, or to
+pay a fine? for that I have purposely during my life not remained quiet,
+but neglecting what most men seek after, money-making, domestic
+concerns, military command, popular oratory, and, moreover, all the
+magistracies, conspiracies, and cabals that are met with in the city,
+thinking that I was in reality too upright a man to be safe if I took
+part in such things, I therefore did not apply myself to those pursuits,
+by attending to which I should have been of no service either to you or
+to myself; but in order to confer the greatest benefit on each of you
+privately, as I affirm, I thereupon applied myself to that object,
+endeavoring to persuade every one of you not to take any care of his own
+affairs before he had taken care of himself in what way he may become
+the best and wisest, nor of the affairs of the city before he took care
+of the city itself; and that he should attend to other things in the
+same manner. What treatment, then, do I deserve, seeing I am such a man?
+Some reward, O Athenians! if, at least, I am to be estimated according
+to my real deserts; and, moreover, such a reward as would be suitable to
+me. What, then, is suitable to a poor man, a benefactor, and who has
+need of leisure in order to give you good advice? There is nothing so
+suitable, O Athenians! as that such a man should be maintained in the
+Prytaneum, and this much more than if one of you had been victorious at
+the Olympic games in a horserace, or in the two or four horsed chariot
+race: for such a one makes you appear to be happy, but I, to be so; and
+he does not need support, but I do. If, therefore, I must award a
+sentence according to my just deserts, I award this, maintenance in the
+Prytaneum.
+
+27. Perhaps, however, in speaking to you thus, I appear to you to speak
+in the same presumptuous manner as I did respecting commiseration and
+entreaties; but such is not the case, O Athenians! it is rather this: I
+am persuaded that I never designedly injured any man, though I can not
+persuade you of this, for we have conversed with each other but for a
+short time. For if there were the same law with you as with other men,
+that in capital cases the trial should list not only one day, but many,
+I think you would be persuaded; but it is not easy in a short time to do
+away with, great calumnies. Being persuaded, then, that I have injured
+no one, I am far from intending to injure myself, and of pronouncing
+against myself that I am deserving of punishment, and from awarding
+myself any thing of the kind. Through fear of what? lest I should
+suffer that which Melitus awards me, of which I say I know not whether
+it he good or evil? Instead of this, shall I choose what I well know to
+be evil, and award that? Shall I choose imprisonment? And why should I
+live in prison, a slave to the established magistracy, the Eleven? Shall
+I choose a fine, and to be imprisoned until I have paid it? But this is
+the same as that which I just now mentioned, for I have not money to pay
+it. Shall I, then, award myself exile? For perhaps you would consent to
+this award. I should indeed be very fond of life, O Athenians! if I were
+so devoid of reason as not to be able to reflect that you, who are my
+fellow-citizens, have been unable to endure my manner of life and
+discourses, but they have become so burdensome and odious to you that
+you now seek to be rid of them: others, however, will easily bear them.
+Far from it, O Athenians! A fine life it would be for me at my age to go
+out wandering, and driven from city to city, and so to live. For I well
+know that, wherever I may go, the youth will listen to me when I speak,
+as they do here. And if I repulse them, they will themselves drive me
+out, persuading the elders; and if I do not repulse them, their fathers
+and kindred will banish me on their account.
+
+28. Perhaps, however, some one will say, Can you not, Socrates, when you
+have gone from us, live a silent and quiet life? This is the most
+difficult thing of all to persuade some of you. For if I say that that
+would be to disobey the deity, and that, therefore, it is impossible for
+me to live quietly, you would not believe me, thinking I spoke
+ironically. If, on the other hand, I say that this is the greatest good
+to man, to discourse daily on virtue, and other things which you have
+heard me discussing, examining both myself and others, but that a life
+without investigation is not worth living for, still less would you
+believe me if I said this. Such, however, is the case, as I affirm, O
+Athenians! though it is not easy to persuade you. And at the same time I
+am not accustomed to think myself deserving of any ill. If, indeed, I
+were rich, I would amerce myself in such a sum as I should be able to
+pay; for then I should have suffered no harm, but now--for I can not,
+unless you are willing to amerce me in such a sum as I am able to pay.
+But perhaps I could pay you a mina of silver: in that sum, then, I
+amerce myself. But Plato here, O Athenians! and Crito Critobulus, and
+Apollodorus bid me amerce myself in thirty minae, and they offer to be
+sureties. I amerce myself, then, to you in that sum; and they will be
+sufficient sureties for the money.
+
+[The judges now proceeded to pass the sentence, and condemned Socrates
+to death; whereupon he continued:]
+
+29. For the sake of no long space of time, O Athenians! you will incur
+the character and reproach at the hands of those who wish to defame the
+city, of having put that wise man, Socrates, to death. For those who
+wish to defame you will assert that I am wise, though I am not. If,
+then, you had waited for a short time, this would have happened of its
+own accord; for observe my age, that it is far advanced in life, and
+near death. But I say this not to you all, but to those only who have
+condemned me to die. And I say this, too, to the same persons. Perhaps
+you think, O Athenians! that I have been convicted through the want of
+arguments, by which I might have persuaded you, had I thought it right
+to do and say any thing, so that I might escape punishment. Far
+otherwise: I have been convicted through want indeed, yet not of
+arguments, but of audacity and impudence, and of the inclination to say
+such things to you as would have been most agreeable for you to hear,
+had I lamented and bewailed and done and said many other things
+unworthy of me, as I affirm, but such as you are accustomed to hear from
+others. But neither did I then think that I ought, for the sake of
+avoiding danger, to do any thing unworthy of a freeman, nor do I now
+repent of having so defended myself; but I should much rather choose to
+die, having so defended myself, than to live in that way. For neither in
+a trial nor in battle is it right that I or any one else should employ
+every possible means whereby he may avoid death; for in battle it is
+frequently evident that a man might escape death by laying down his
+arms, and throwing himself on the mercy of his pursuers. And there are
+many other devices in every danger, by which to avoid death, if a man
+dares to do and say every thing. But this is not difficult, O Athenians!
+to escape death; but it is much more difficult to avoid depravity, for
+it runs swifter than death. And now I, being slow and aged, am overtaken
+by the slower of the two; but my accusers, being strong and active, have
+been overtaken by the swifter, wickedness. And now I depart, condemned
+by you to death; but they condemned by truth, as guilty of iniquity and
+injustice: and I abide my sentence, and so do they. These things,
+perhaps, ought so to be, and I think that they are for the best.
+
+30. In the next place, I desire to predict to you who have condemned me,
+what will be your fate; for I am now in that condition in which men most
+frequently prophesy--namely, when they are about to die. I say, then, to
+you, O Athenians! who have condemned me to death, that immediately after
+my death a punishment will overtake you, far more severe, by Jupiter!
+than that which you have inflicted on me. For you have done this,
+thinking you should be freed from the necessity of giving an account of
+your lives. The very contrary, however, as I affirm, will happen to you.
+Your accusers will be more numerous, whom I have now restrained, though
+you did not perceive it; and they will be more severe, inasmuch as they
+are younger, and you will be more indignant. For if you think that by
+putting men to death you will restrain any one from upbraiding you
+because you do not live well, you are much mistaken; for this method of
+escape is neither possible nor honorable; but that other is most
+honorable and most easy, not to put a check upon others, but for a man
+to take heed to himself how he may be most perfect. Having predicted
+thus much to those of you who have condemned me, I take my leave of you.
+
+31. But with you who have voted for my acquittal I would gladly hold
+converse on what has now taken place, while the magistrates are busy,
+and I am not yet carried to the place where I must die. Stay with me,
+then, so long, O Athenians! for nothing hinders our conversing with each
+other, while we are permitted to do so; for I wish to make known to you,
+as being my friends, the meaning of that which has just now befallen me.
+To me, then, O my judges! and in calling you judges I call you
+rightly--a strange thing has happened. For the wonted prophetic voice of
+my guardian deity on every former occasion, even in the most trifling
+affairs, opposed me if I was about to do any thing wrong; but now that
+has befallen me which ye yourselves behold, and which any one would
+think, and which is supposed to be the extremity of evil; yet neither
+when I departed from home in the morning did the warning of the god
+oppose me, nor when I came up here to the place of trial, nor in my
+address when I was about to say any thing; yet on other occasions it has
+frequently restrained me in the midst of speaking. But now it has never,
+throughout this proceeding, opposed me, either in what I did or said.
+What, then, do I suppose to be the cause of this? I will tell you: what
+has befallen me appears to be a blessing; and it is impossible that we
+think rightly who suppose that death is an evil. A great proof of this
+to me is the fact that it is impossible but that the accustomed signal
+should have opposed me, unless I had been about to meet with some good.
+
+32. Moreover, we may hence conclude that there is great hope that death
+is a blessing. For to die is one of two things: for either the dead may
+be annihilated, and have no sensation of any thing whatever; or, as it
+is said, there are a certain change and passage of the soul from one
+place to another. And if it is a privation of all sensation, as it were
+a sleep in which the sleeper has no dream, death would be a wonderful
+gain. For I think that if any one, having selected a night in which he
+slept so soundly as not to have had a dream, and having compared this
+night with all the other nights and days of his life, should be
+required, on consideration, to say how many days and nights he had
+passed better and more pleasantly than this night throughout his life, I
+think that not only a private person, but even the great king himself,
+would find them easy to number, in comparison with other days and
+nights. If, therefore, death is a thing of this kind, I say it is a
+gain; for thus all futurity appears to be nothing more than one night.
+But if, on the other hand, death is a removal from hence to another
+place, and what is said be true, that all the dead are there, what
+greater blessing can there be than this, my judges? For if, on arriving
+at Hades, released from these who pretend to be judges, one shall find
+those who are true judges, and who are said to judge there, Minos and
+Rhadamanthus, Æacus and Triptolemus, and such others of the demi-gods as
+were just during their own life, would this be a sad removal? At what
+price would you not estimate a conference with Orpheus and Musæus,
+Hesiod and Homer? I indeed should be willing to die often, if this be
+true. For to me the sojourn there would be admirable, when I should meet
+with Palamedes, and Ajax, son of Telamon, and any other of the ancients
+who has died by an unjust sentence. The comparing my sufferings with
+theirs would, I think, be no unpleasing occupation. But the greatest
+pleasure would be to spend my time in questioning and examining the
+people there as I have done those here, and discovering who among them
+is wise, and who fancies himself to be so, but is not. At what price, my
+judges, would not any one estimate the opportunity of questioning him
+who led that mighty army against Troy, or Ulysses, or Sisyphus, or ten
+thousand others whom one might mention both men and women--with whom to
+converse and associate, and to question them, would be an inconceivable
+happiness? Surely for that the judges there do not condemn to death; for
+in other respects those who live there are more happy than those who are
+here, and are henceforth immortal, if, at least, what is said be true.
+
+33. You, therefore, O my judges! ought to entertain good hopes with
+respect to death, and to meditate on this one truth, that to a good man
+nothing is evil, neither while living nor when dead, nor are his
+concerns neglected by the gods. And what has befallen me is not the
+effect of chance; but this is clear to me, that now to die, and be freed
+from my cares is better for me On this account the warning in no way
+turned me aside; and I bear no resentment toward those who condemned me,
+or against my accusers, although they did not condemn and accuse me with
+this intention, but thinking to injure me: in this they deserve to be
+blamed.
+
+Thus much, however, I beg of them. Punish my sons when they grow up, O
+judges! paining them as I have pained you, if they appear to you to care
+for riches or anything else before virtue; and if they think themselves
+to be something when they are nothing, reproach them as I have done you,
+for not attending to what they ought, and for conceiving themselves to
+be something when they are worth nothing. If ye do this, both I and my
+sons shall have met with just treatment at your hands.
+
+But it is now time to depart--for me to die, for you to live. But which
+of us is going to a better state is unknown to every one but God.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+  [1] Aristophanes.
+
+  [2] "Iliad," lib. xviii. ver. 94, etc.
+
+  [3] See the "Crito," sec. 5.
+
+  [4] ouden legei, literally, "he says nothing:" on se trompe, ou
+    l'on vous impose, _Cousin_.
+
+  [5] But for the authority of Stallbaum, I should have translated
+    dikanika "forensic;" that is, such arguments as an advocate would use
+    in a court of justice.
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO.
+
+
+It has been remarked by Stallbaum that Plato had a twofold design in
+this dialogue--one, and that the primary one, to free Socrates from the
+imputation of having attempted to corrupt the Athenian youth; the other,
+to establish the principle that under all circumstances it is the duty
+of a good citizen to obey the laws of his country. These two points,
+however, are so closely interwoven with each other, that the general
+principle appears only to be illustrated by the example of Socrates.
+
+Crito was one of those friends of Socrates who had been present at his
+trial, and had offered to assist in paying a fine, had a fine been
+imposed instead of the sentence of death. He appears to have frequently
+visited his friend in prison after his condemnation; and now, having
+obtained access to his cell very early in the morning, finds him
+composed in a quiet sleep. He brings intelligence that the ship, the
+arrival of which would be the signal for his death on the following day,
+is expected to arrive forthwith, and takes occasion to entreat Socrates
+to make his escape, the means of which were already prepared. Socrates
+thereupon, having promised to follow the advice of Crito if, after the
+matter had been fully discussed, it should appear to be right to do so,
+proposes to consider the duty of a citizen toward his country; and
+having established the divine principle that it is wrong to return evil
+for evil, goes on to show that the obligations of a citizen to his
+country are even more binding than those of a child to its parent, or a
+slave to his master, and that therefore it is his duty to obey the
+established laws, at whatever cost to himself.
+
+At length Crito admits that he has no answer to make, and Socrates
+resolves to submit himself to the will of Providence.
+
+
+
+
+CRITO;
+OR,
+THE DUTY OF A CITIZEN.
+
+
+SOCRATES, CRITO.
+
+_Socr._ Why have you come at this hour, Crito? Is it not very early?
+
+_Cri._ It is.
+
+_Socr._ About what time?
+
+_Cri._ Scarce day-break.
+
+_Socr._ I wonder how the keeper of the prison came to admit you.
+
+_Cri._ He is familiar with me, Socrates, from my having frequently come
+hither; and he is under some obligations to me.
+
+_Socr._ Have you just now come, or some time since?
+
+_Cri._ A considerable time since.
+
+_Socr._ Why, then, did you not wake me at once, instead of sitting down
+by me in silence?
+
+_Cri._ By Jupiter! Socrates, I should not myself like to be so long
+awake, and in such affliction. But I have been for some time wondering
+at you, perceiving how sweetly you slept; and I purposely did not awake
+you, that you might pass your time as pleasantly as possible. And,
+indeed, I have often before throughout your whole life considered you
+happy in your disposition, but far more so in the present calamity,
+seeing how easily and meekly you bear it.
+
+_Socr._ However, Crito, it would be disconsonant for a man at my time of
+life to repine because he must needs die.
+
+_Cri._ But others, Socrates, at your age have been involved in similar
+calamities, yet their age has not hindered their repining at their
+present fortune.
+
+_Socr._ So it is. But why did you come so early?
+
+_Cri._ Bringing sad tidings, Socrates, not sad to you, as it appears,
+but to me, and all your friends, sad and heavy, and which I, I think,
+shall bear worst of all.
+
+_Socr._ What tidings? Has the ship[6] arrived from Delos, on the arrival
+of which I must die?
+
+_Cri._ It has not yet arrived, but it appears to me that it will come
+to-day, from what certain persons report who have come from Sunium,[7]
+and left it there. It is clear, therefore, from these messengers, that
+it will come to day, and consequently it will be necessary, Socrates,
+for you to die to-morrow.
+
+2. _Socr._ But with good fortune, Crito, and if so it please the gods,
+so be it. I do not think, however, that it will come to day.
+
+_Cri._ Whence do you form this conjecture?
+
+_Socr._ I will tell you. I must die on the day after that on which the
+ship arrives.
+
+_Cri._ So they say[8] who have the control of these things.
+
+_Socr._ I do not think, then, that it will come to-day, but to-morrow. I
+conjecture this from a dream which I had this very night, not long ago,
+and you seem very opportunely to have refrained from waking me.
+
+_Cri._ But what was this dream?
+
+_Socr._ A beautiful and majestic woman, clad in white garments seemed to
+approach me, and to call to me and say, "Socrates, three days hence you
+will reach fertile Pythia"[9].
+
+_Cri._ What a strange dream, Socrates!
+
+_Socr._ Very clear, however, as it appears to me, Crito.
+
+3. _Cri._ Very much so, as it seems. But, my dear Socrates, even now be
+persuaded by me, and save yourself. For if you die, not only a single
+calamity will befall me, but, besides being deprived of such a friend as
+I shall never meet with again, I shall also appear to many who do not
+know you and me well, when I might have saved you had I been willing to
+spend my money, to have neglected to do so. And what character can be
+more disgraceful than this--to appear to value one's riches more than
+one's friends? For the generality of men will not be persuaded that you
+were unwilling to depart hence, when we urged you to it.
+
+_Socr._ But why, my dear Crito, should we care so much for the opinion
+of the many? For the most worthy men, whom we ought rather to regard,
+will think that matters have transpired as they really have.
+
+_Cri._ Yet you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to attend to the
+opinion of the many. For the very circumstances of the present case show
+that the multitude are able to effect not only the smallest evils, but
+even the greatest, if any one is calumniated to them.
+
+_Socr._ Would, O Crito that the multitude could effect the greatest
+evils, that they might also effect the greatest good, for then it would
+be well. But now they can do neither; for they can make a man neither
+wise nor foolish; but they do whatever chances.
+
+4. _Cri._ So let it be, then. But answer me this, Socrates: are you not
+anxious for me and other friends, lest, if you should escape from hence,
+informers should give us trouble, as having secretly carried you off,
+and so we should be compelled either to lose all our property, or a very
+large sum, or to suffer something else besides this? For, if you fear
+any thing of the kind, dismiss your fears; for we are justified in
+running the risk to save you--and, if need be, even a greater risk than
+this. But be persuaded by me, and do not refuse.
+
+_Socr._ I am anxious about this, Crito, and about many other things.
+
+_Cri._ Do not fear this, however; for the sum is not large on receipt of
+which certain persons are willing to save you, and take you hence. In
+the next place, do you not see how cheap these informers are, so that
+there would be no need of a large sum for them? My fortune is at your
+service, sufficient, I think, for the purpose; then if, out of regard to
+me, you do not think right to spend my money, these strangers here are
+ready to spend theirs. One of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought with
+him a sufficient sum for the very purpose. Cebes, too, is ready, and
+very many others. So that, as I said, do not, through fears of this
+kind, hesitate to save yourself, nor let what you said in court give you
+any trouble, that if you went from hence you would not know what to do
+with yourself. For in many places, and wherever you go, men will love
+you; and if you are disposed to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who
+will esteem you very highly, and will insure your safety, so that no one
+in Thessaly will molest you.
+
+5. Moreover, Socrates, you do not appear to me to pursue a just course
+in giving yourself up when you might be saved; and you press on the very
+results with respect to yourself which your enemies would press, and
+have pressed, in their anxiety to destroy you. Besides this, too, you
+appear to me to betray your own sons, whom, when it is in your power to
+rear and educate them, you will abandon, and, so far as you are
+concerned, they will meet with such a fate as chance brings them, and,
+as is probable, they will meet with such things as orphans are wont to
+experience in a state of orphanage. Surely one ought not to have
+children, or one should go through the toil of rearing and instructing
+them. But you appear to me to have chosen the most indolent course;
+though you ought to have chosen such a course as a good and brave man
+would have done, since you profess to have made virtue your study
+through the whole of your life; so that I am ashamed both for you and
+for us who are your friends, lest this whole affair of yours should seem
+to be the effect of cowardice on our part--your appearing to stand your
+trial in the court, since you appeared when it was in your power not to
+have done so, the very manner in which the trial was conducted, and this
+last circumstance, as it were, a ridiculous consummation of the whole
+business; your appearing to have escaped from us through our indolence
+and cowardice, who did not save you; nor did you save yourself, when it
+was practicable and possible, had we but exerted ourselves a little.
+Think of these things, therefore, Socrates, and beware, lest, besides
+the evil _that will result_, they be disgraceful both to you and to us;
+advise, then, with yourself; though, indeed, there is no longer time for
+advising--your resolve should be already made. And there is but one
+plan; for in the following night the whole must be accomplished. If we
+delay, it will be impossible and no longer practicable. By all means,
+therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and on no account refuse.
+
+6. _Socr._ My dear Crito, your zeal would be very commendable were it
+united with right principle; otherwise, by how much the more earnest it
+is, by so much is it the more sad. We must consider, therefore, whether
+this plan should be adopted or not. For I not now only, but always, am a
+person who will obey nothing within me but reason, according as it
+appears to me on mature deliberation to be best. And the reasons which I
+formerly professed I can not now reject, because this misfortune has
+befallen me; but they appear to me in much the same light, and I respect
+and honor them as before; so that if we are unable to adduce any better
+at the present time, be assured that I shall not give in to you, even
+though the power of the multitude should endeavor to terrify us like
+children, by threatening more than it does now, bonds and death, and
+confiscation of property. How, therefore, may we consider the matter
+most conveniently? First of all, if we recur to the argument which you
+used about opinions, whether on former occasions it was rightly resolved
+or not, that we ought to pay attention to some opinions, and to others
+not; or whether, before it was necessary that I should die, it was
+rightly resolved; but now it has become clear that it was said idly for
+argument's sake, though in reality it was merely jest and trifling. I
+desire then, Crito, to consider, in common with you, whether it will
+appear to me in a different light, now that I am in this condition, or
+the same, and whether we shall give it up or yield to it. It was said, I
+think, on former occasions, by those who were thought to speak
+seriously, as I just now observed, that of the opinions which men
+entertain some should be very highly esteemed and others not. By the
+gods! Crito, does not this appear to you to be well said? For you, in
+all human probability, are out of all danger of dying to-morrow, and the
+present calamity will not lead your judgment astray. Consider, then;
+does it not appear to you to have been rightly settled that we ought not
+to respect all the opinions of men, but some we should, and others not?
+Nor yet the opinions of all men, but of some we should, and of others
+not? What say you? Is not this rightly resolved?
+
+_Cri._ It is.
+
+_Socr._ Therefore we should respect the good, but not the bad?
+
+_Cri._ Yes.
+
+_Socr._ And are not the good those of the wise, and the bad those of the
+foolish?
+
+_Cri._ How can it be otherwise?
+
+7. _Socr._ Come, then: how, again, were the following points settled?
+Does a man who practices gymnastic exercises and applies himself to
+them, pay attention to the praise and censure and opinion of every one,
+or of that one man only who happens to be a physician, or teacher of the
+exercises?
+
+_Cri._ Of that one only.
+
+_Socr._ He ought, therefore, to fear the censures and covet the praises
+of that one, but not those of the multitude.
+
+_Cri._ Clearly.
+
+_Socr._ He ought, therefore, so to practice and exercise himself, and to
+eat and drink, as seems fitting to the one who presides and knows,
+rather than to all others together.
+
+_Cri._ It is so.
+
+_Socr._ Well, then, if he disobeys the one, and disregards his opinion
+and praise, but respects that of the multitude and of those who know
+nothing, will he not suffer some evil?
+
+_Cri._ How should he not?
+
+_Socr._ But what is this evil? Whither does it tend, and on what part
+of him that disobeys will it fall?
+
+_Cri._ Clearly on his body, for this it ruins.
+
+_Socr._ You say well. The case is the same, too, Crito, with all other
+things, not to go through them all. With respect then, to things just
+and unjust, base and honorable, good and evil, about which we are now
+consulting, ought we to follow the opinion of the multitude, and to
+respect it, or that of one, if there is any one who understands, whom we
+ought to reverence and respect rather than all others together? And if
+we do not obey him, shall we not corrupt and injure that part of
+ourselves which becomes better by justice, but is ruined by injustice?
+Or is this nothing?
+
+_Cri._ I agree with you, Socrates.
+
+8. _Socr._ Come, then, if we destroy that which becomes better by what
+is wholesome, but is impaired by what is unwholesome, through being
+persuaded by those who do not understand, can we enjoy life when that is
+impaired? And this is the body we are speaking of, is it not?
+
+_Cri._ Yes.
+
+_Socr._ Can we, then, enjoy life with a diseased and impaired body?
+
+_Cri._ By no means.
+
+_Socr._ But can we enjoy life when that is impaired which injustice
+ruins but justice benefits? Or do we think that to be of less value than
+the body, whatever part of us it may be, about which injustice and
+justice are concerned'
+
+_Cri._ By no means.
+
+_Socr._ But of more value?
+
+_Cri._ Much more.
+
+_Socr._ We must not then, my excellent friend, so much regard what the
+multitude will say of us, but what he will say who understands the just
+and the unjust, the one, even truth itself. So that at first you did
+not set out with a right principle, when you laid it down that we ought
+to regard the opinion of the multitude with respect to things just and
+honorable and good, and their contraries. How ever, some one may say,
+are not the multitude able to put us to death?
+
+_Cri._ This, too, is clear, Socrates, any one might say so.
+
+_Socr._ You say truly. But, my admirable friend, this principle which we
+have just discussed appears to me to be the same as it was before[10].
+And consider this, moreover, whether it still holds good with us or not,
+that we are not to be anxious about living but about living well.
+
+_Cri._ It does hold good.
+
+_Socr._ And does this hold good or not, that to live well and Honorable
+and justly are the same thing?
+
+_Cri._ It does.
+
+9. _Socr._ From what has been admitted, then, this consideration arises,
+whether it is just or not that I should endeavor to leave this place
+without the permission of the Athenians. And should it appear to be
+just, we will make the attempt, but if not, we will give it up. But as
+to the considerations which you mention, of an outlay of money,
+reputation, and the education of children, beware, Crito, lest such
+considerations as these in reality belong to these multitudes, who
+rashly put one to death, and would restore one to life, if they could do
+so, without any reason at all. But we, since reason so requires, must
+consider nothing else than what we just now mentioned, whether we shall
+act justly in paying money and contracting obligations to those who
+will lead me hence, as well they who lead me as we who are led hence, or
+whether, in truth, we shall not act unjustly in doing all these things.
+And if we should appear in so doing to be acting unjustly, observe that
+we must not consider whether from remaining here and continuing quiet we
+must needs die, or suffer any thing else, rather than whether we shall
+be acting unjustly.
+
+_Cri._ You appear to me to speak wisely, Socrates, but see what we are
+to do.
+
+_Socr._ Let us consider the matter together, my friend, and if you have
+any thing to object to what I say, make good your objection, and I will
+yield to you, but if not, cease, my excellent friend, to urge upon me
+the same thing so often, that I ought to depart hence against the will
+of the Athenians. For I highly esteem your endeavors to persuade me thus
+to act, so long as it is not against my will Consider, then, the
+beginning of our inquiry, whether it is stated to your entire
+satisfaction, and endeavor to answer the question put to you exactly as
+you think right.
+
+_Cri._ I will endeavor to do so.
+
+10. _Socr._ Say we, then, that we should on no account deliberately
+commit injustice, or may we commit injustice under certain
+circumstances, under others not? Or is it on no account either good or
+honorable to commit injustice, as we have often agreed on former
+occasions, and as we just now said? Or have all those our former
+admissions been dissipated in these few days, and have we, Crito, old
+men as we are, been for a long time seriously conversing with each other
+without knowing that we in no respect differ from children? Or does the
+case, beyond all question, stand as we then determined? Whether the
+multitude allow it or not, and whether we must suffer a more severe or a
+milder punishment than this, still is injustice on every account both
+evil and disgraceful to him who commits it? Do we admit this, or not?
+
+_Cri._ We do admit it.
+
+_Socr._ On no account, therefore, ought we to act unjustly.
+
+_Cri._ Surely not.
+
+_Socr._ Neither ought one who is injured to return the injury, as the
+multitude think, since it is on no account right to act unjustly.
+
+_Cri._ It appears not.
+
+_Socr._ What, then? Is it right to do evil, Crito, or not?
+
+_Cri._ Surely it is not right, Socrates.
+
+_Socr._ But what? To do evil in return when one has been evil-entreated,
+is that right, or not?
+
+_Cri._ By no means.
+
+_Socr._ For to do evil to men differs in no respect from committing
+injustice.
+
+_Cri._ You say truly.
+
+_Socr._ It is not right, therefore, to return an injury, or to do evil
+to any man, however one may have suffered from him. But take care,
+Crito, that in allowing these things you do not allow them contrary to
+your opinion, for I know that to some few only these things both do
+appear, and will appear, to be true. They, then, to whom these things
+appear true, and they to whom they do not, have no sentiment in common,
+and must needs despise each other, while they look to each other's
+opinions. Consider well, then, whether you coincide and think with me,
+and whether we can begin our deliberations from this point--that it is
+never right either to do an injury or to return an injury, or when one
+has been evil-entreated, to revenge one's self by doing evil in return,
+or do you dissent from, and not coincide in this principle? For so it
+appears to me, both long since and now, but if you in any respect think
+otherwise, say so and inform me. But if you persist in your former
+opinions, hear what follows.
+
+_Cri._ I do persist in them, and think with you. Speak on, then.
+
+_Socr._ I say next, then, or rather I ask; whether when a man has
+promised to do things that are just he ought to do them, or evade his
+promise?
+
+_Cri._ He ought to do them.
+
+11. _Socr._ Observe, then, what follows. By departing hence without the
+leave of the city, are we not doing evil to some, and that to those to
+whom we ought least of all to do it, or not? And do we abide by what we
+agreed on as being just, or do we not?
+
+_Cri._ I am unable to answer your question, Socrates; for I do not
+understand it.
+
+_Socr._ Then, consider it thus. If, while we were preparing to run away,
+or by whatever name we should call it, the laws and commonwealth should
+come, and, presenting themselves before us, should say, "Tell me,
+Socrates, what do you purpose doing? Do you design any thing else by
+this proceeding in which you are engaged than to destroy us, the laws,
+and the whole city, so far as you are able? Or do you think it possible
+for that city any longer to subsist, and not be subverted, in which
+judgments that are passed have no force, but are set aside and destroyed
+by private persons?"--what should we say, Crito, to these and similar
+remonstrances? For any one, especially an orator, would have much to say
+on the violation of the law, which enjoins that judgments passed shall
+be enforced. Shall we say to them that the city has done us an
+injustice, and not passed a right sentence? Shall we say this, or what
+else?
+
+_Cri._ This, by Jupiter! Socrates.
+
+12. _Socr._ What, then, if the laws should say, "Socrates, was it not
+agreed between us that you should abide by the judgments which the city
+should pronounce?" And if we should wonder at their speaking thus,
+perhaps they would say, "Wonder not, Socrates, at what we say, but
+answer, since you are accustomed to make use of questions and answers.
+For, come, what charge have you against us and the city, that you
+attempt to destroy us? Did we not first give you being? and did not your
+father, through us, take your mother to wife and beget you? Say, then,
+do you find fault with those laws among us that relate to marriage as
+being bad?" I should say, "I do not find fault with them." "Do you with
+those that relate to your nurture when born, and the education with
+which you were instructed? Or did not the laws, ordained on this point,
+enjoin rightly, in requiring your father to instruct you in music and
+gymnastic exercises?" I should say, rightly. Well, then, since you were
+born, nurtured, and educated through our means, can you say, first of
+all, that you are not both our offspring and our slave, as well you as
+your ancestors? And if this be so, do you think that there are equal
+rights between us? and whatever we attempt to do to you, do you think
+you may justly do to us in turn? Or had you not equal rights with your
+father, or master, if you happened to have one, so as to return what you
+suffered, neither to retort when found fault with, nor, when stricken,
+to strike again, nor many other things of the kind; but that with your
+country and the laws you may do so; so that if we attempt to destroy
+you, thinking it to be just, you also should endeavor, so far as you are
+able, in return, to destroy us, the laws, and your country; and in doing
+this will you say that you act justly--you who, in reality, make virtue
+your chief object? Or are you so wise as not to know that one's country
+is more honorable, venerable, and sacred, and more highly prized both by
+gods, and men possessed of understanding, than mother and father, and
+all other progenitors; and that one ought to reverence, submit to, and
+appease one's country, when angry, rather than one's father; and either
+persuade it or do what it orders, and to suffer quietly if it bids one
+suffer, whether to be beaten, or put in bonds; or if it sends one out to
+battle there to be wounded or slain, this must be done; for justice so
+requires, and one must not give way, or retreat, or leave one's post;
+but that both in war and in a court of justice, and everywhere one must
+do what one's city and country enjoin, or persuade it in such manner as
+justice allows; but that to offer violence either to one's mother or
+father is not holy, much less to one's country? What shall we say to
+these things, Crito? That the laws speak the truth, or not?
+
+_Cri._ It seems so to me.
+
+13. _Socr._ "Consider, then, Socrates," the laws perhaps might say,
+"whether we say truly that in what you are now attempting you are
+attempting to do what is not just toward us. For we, having given you
+birth, nurtured, instructed you, and having imparted to you and all
+other citizens all the good in our power, still proclaim, by giving the
+power to every Athenian who pleases, when he has arrived at years of
+discretion, and become acquainted with the business of the state, and
+us, the laws, that any one who is not satisfied with us may take his
+property, and go wherever he pleases. And if any one of you wishes to go
+to a colony, if he is not satisfied with us and the city, or to migrate
+and settle in another country, none of us, the laws, hinder or forbid
+him going whithersoever he pleases, taking with him all his property.
+But whoever continues with us after he has seen the manner in which we
+administer justice, and in other respects govern the city, we now say
+that he has in fact entered into a compact with us to do what we order;
+and we affirm that he who does not obey is in three respects guilty of
+injustice--because he does not obey us who gave him being, and because
+he does not obey us who nurtured him, and because, having made a compact
+that he would obey us, he neither does so, nor does he persuade us if we
+do any thing wrongly; though we propose for his consideration, and do
+not rigidly command him to do what we order, but leave him the choice of
+one of two things, either to persuade us, or to do what we require, and
+yet he does neither of these."
+
+14. "And we say that you, O Socrates! will be subject to these charges
+if you accomplish your design, and that not least of the Athenians, but
+most so of all." And if I should ask, "For what reason?" they would
+probably justly retort on me by saying that, among all the Athenians, I
+especially made this compact with them. For they would say, "Socrates,
+we have strong proof of this, that you were satisfied both with us and
+the city; for, of all the Athenians, you especially would never have
+dwelt in it if it had not been especially agreeable to you; for you
+never went out of the city to any of the public spectacles, except once
+to the Isthmian games, nor anywhere else, except on military service,
+nor have you ever gone abroad as other men do, nor had you ever had any
+desire to become acquainted with any other city or other laws, but we
+and our city were sufficient for you; so strongly were you attached to
+us, and so far did you consent to submit to our government, both in
+other respects and in begetting children in this city, in consequence of
+your being satisfied with it. Moreover, in your very trial, it was in
+your power to have imposed on yourself a sentence of exile, if you
+pleased, and might then have done, with the consent of the city, what
+you now attempt against its consent. Then, indeed, you boasted yourself
+as not being grieved if you must needs die; but you preferred, as you
+said, death to exile. Now, however, you are neither ashamed of those
+professions, nor do you revere us, the laws, since you endeavor to
+destroy us, and you act as the vilest slave would act, by endeavoring to
+make your escape contrary to the conventions and the compacts by which
+you engaged to submit to our government. First, then, therefore, answer
+us this, whether we speak the truth or not in affirming that you agreed
+to be governed by us in deed, though not in word?" What shall we say to
+this, Crito? Can we do otherwise than assent?
+
+_Cri._ We must needs do so, Socrates.
+
+_Socr._ "What else, then," they will say, "are you doing but violating
+the conventions and compacts which you made with us, though you did not
+enter into them from compulsion or through deception, or from being
+compelled to determine in a short time but during the space of seventy
+years, in which you might have departed if you had been dissatisfied
+with us, and the compacts had not appeared to you to be just? You,
+however, preferred neither Lacedæmon nor Crete, which you several times
+said are governed by good laws, nor any other of the Grecian or
+barbarian cities; but you have been less out of Athens than the lame and
+the blind, and other maimed persons. So much, it is evident, were you
+satisfied with the city and us, the laws, beyond the rest of the
+Athenians; for who can be satisfied with a city without laws? But now
+will you not abide by your compacts? You will, if you are persuaded by
+us, Socrates, and will not make yourself ridiculous by leaving the
+city."
+
+15. "For consider, by violating these compacts and offending against any
+of them, what good you will do to yourself or your friends. For that
+your friends will run the risk of being themselves banished, and
+deprived of the rights of citizenship, or of forfeiting their property,
+is pretty clear. And as for yourself, if you should go to one of the
+neighboring cities, either Thebes or Megara, for both are governed by
+good laws, you will go there, Socrates, as an enemy to their polity; and
+such as have any regard for their country will look upon you with
+suspicion, regarding you as a corrupter of the laws; and you will
+confirm the opinion of the judges, so that they will appear to have
+condemned you rightly, for whose is a corrupter of the laws will appear
+in all likelihood to be a corrupter of youths and weak-minded men. Will
+you, then, avoid these well-governed cities, and the best-ordered men?
+And should you do so, will it be worth your while to live? Or will you
+approach them, and have the effrontery to converse with them, Socrates,
+on subjects the same as you did here--that virtue and justice, legal
+institutions and laws, should be most highly valued by men? And do you
+not think that this conduct of Socrates would be very indecorous? You
+must think so. But you will keep clear of these places, and go to
+Thessaly, to Crito's friends, for there are the greatest disorder and
+licentiousness; and perhaps they will gladly hear you relating how
+drolly you escaped from prison, clad in some dress or covered with a
+skin, or in some other disguise such as fugitives are wont to dress
+themselves in, having so changed your usual appearance. And will no one
+say that you, though an old man, with but a short time to live, in all
+probability, have dared to have such a base desire of life as to violate
+the most sacred laws? Perhaps not, should you not offend any one. But if
+you should, you will hear, Socrates, many things utterly unworthy of
+you. You will live, too, in a state of abject dependence on all men,
+and as their slave. But what will you do in Thessaly besides feasting,
+as if you had gone to Thessaly to a banquet? And what will become of
+those discourses about justice and all other virtues? But do you wish to
+live for the sake of your children, that you may rear and educate them?
+What then? Will you take them to Thessaly, and there rear and educate
+them, making them aliens to their country, that they may owe you this
+obligation too? Or, if not so, being reared here, will they be better
+reared and educated while you are living, though not with them, for your
+friends will take care of them? Whether, if you go to Thessaly, will
+they take care of them, but if you go to Hades will they not take care
+of them? If, however, any advantage is to be derived from those that say
+they are your friends, we must think they will."
+
+16. "Then, O Socrates! be persuaded by us who have nurtured you, and do
+not set a higher value on your children, or on life, or on any thing
+else than justice, that, when you arrive in Hades, you may have all this
+to say in your defense before those who have dominion there. For neither
+here in this life, if you do what is proposed, does it appear to be
+better, or more just, or more holy to yourself, or any of your friends;
+nor will it be better for you when you arrive there. But now you depart,
+if you do depart, unjustly treated, not by us, the laws, but by men; but
+should you escape, having thus disgracefully returned injury for injury,
+and evil for evil, having violated your own compacts and conventions
+which you made with us, and having done evil to those to whom you least
+of all should have done it--namely, yourself, your friends, your
+country, and us--both we shall be indignant with you as long as you
+live, and there our brothers, the laws in Hades, will not receive you
+favorably knowing that you attempted, so far as you were able, to
+destroy us. Let not Crito, then, persuade you to do what he advises,
+rather than we."
+
+17. These things, my dear friend Crito, be assured, I seem to hear as
+the votaries of Cybele[11] seem to hear the flutes. And the sound of
+these words booms in my ear, and makes me incapable of hearing any thing
+else. Be sure, then, so long as I retain my present opinions, if you
+should say any thing contrary to these, you will speak in vain. If,
+however, you think that you can prevail at all, say on.
+
+_Cri._ But, Socrates, I have nothing to say.
+
+_Socr._ Desist, then, Crito, and let us pursue this course, since this
+way the deity leads us.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+  [6] See the Phædo sec 1.
+
+  [7] A promontory at the southern extremity of Attica
+
+  [8] The Eleven
+
+  [9] See Homer's "Iliad," 1 IX, v 363
+
+  [10] That is to say, the principle which we had laid down in former
+    discussions that no regard is to be had to popular opinion, is still
+    found to hold good.
+
+  [11] The Corybantes, priests of Cybele, who in their solemn festivals
+    made such a noise with flutes that the hearers could hear no other
+    sound.
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE PHÆDO.
+
+
+This dialogue presents us with an account of the manner In which
+Socrates spent the last day of his, life, and how he met his death. The
+main subject is that of the soul's immortality, which Socrates takes
+upon himself to prove with as much certainty as it is possible for the
+human mind to arrive at. The question itself, though none could be
+better suited to the occasion, arises simply and naturally from the
+general conversation that precedes it.
+
+When his friends visit him in the morning for the purpose of spending
+this his last day with him, they find him sitting up in bed, and rubbing
+his leg, which had just been freed from bonds. He remarks on the
+unaccountable alternation and connection between pleasure and pain, and
+adds that Æsop, had he observed it, would have made a fable from it.
+This remark reminds Cebes of Socrates's having put some of Æsop's fables
+into metre since his imprisonment, and he asks, for the satisfaction of
+the poet Evenus, what has induced him to do so. Socrates explains his
+reason, and concludes by bidding him tell Evenus to follow him as soon
+as he can. Simmias expresses his surprise at this message, on which
+Socrates asks, "Is not Evenus a philosopher?" and on the question being
+answered in the affirmative, he says that he or any philosopher would be
+willing to die, though perhaps he would not commit violence on himself.
+This, again, seems a contradiction to Simmias; but Socrates explains it
+by showing that our souls are placed in the body by God, and may not
+leave it without his permission. Whereupon Cebes objects that in that
+case foolish men only would wish to die, and quit the service of the
+best of masters, to which Simmias agrees. Socrates, therefore, proposes
+to plead his cause before them, and to show that there is a great
+probability that after this life he shall go into the presence of God
+and good men, and be happy in proportion to the purity of his own mind.
+
+He begins[12] by stating that philosophy itself is nothing else than a
+preparation for and meditation on death. Death and philosophy have this
+in common: death separates the soul from the body; philosophy draws off
+the mind from bodily things to the contemplation of truth and virtue:
+for he is not a true philosopher who is led away by bodily pleasures,
+since the senses are the source of ignorance and all evil. The mind,
+therefore, is entirely occupied in meditating on death, and freeing
+itself as much as possible from the body. How, then, can such a man be
+afraid of death? He who grieves at the approach of death can not be a
+true lover of wisdom, but is a lover of his body. And, indeed, most men
+are temperate through intemperance; that is to say, they abstain from
+some pleasures that they may the more easily and permanently enjoy
+others. They embrace only a shadow of virtue, not virtue itself, since
+they estimate the value of all things by the pleasures they afford.
+Whereas the philosopher purifies his mind from all such things, and
+pursues virtue and wisdom for their own sakes. This course Socrates
+himself has pursued to the utmost of his ability, with what success he
+should shortly know; and on these grounds he did not repine at leaving
+his friends in this world, being persuaded that in another he should
+meet with good masters and good friends.
+
+Upon this Cebes[13] says that he agrees with all else that had been
+said, but can not help entertaining doubts of what will become of the
+soul when separated from the body, for the common opinion is that it is
+dispersed and vanishes like breath or smoke, and no longer exists
+anywhere. Socrates, therefore, proposes to inquire into the probability
+of the case, a fit employment for him under his present circumstances.
+
+His first argument[14] is drawn from the ancient belief prevalent among
+men, that souls departing hence exist in Hades, and are produced again
+from the dead. If this be true, it must follow that our souls are there,
+for they could not be produced again if they did not exist; and its
+truth is confirmed by this, that it is a general law of nature that
+contraries are produced from contraries--the greater from the less,
+strong from weak, slow from swift, heat from cold, and in like manner
+life from death, and vice versa. To explain this more clearly, he
+proceeds to show that what is changed passes from one state to another,
+and so undergoes three different states--first, the actual state; then
+the transition; and, thirdly, the new state; as from a state of sleep,
+by awaking to being awake. In like manner birth is a transition from a
+state of death to life, and dying from life to death; so that the soul,
+by the act of dying, only passes to another state. If it were not so,
+all nature would in time become dead, just as if people did not awake
+out of sleep all would at last be buried in eternal sleep. Whence the
+conclusion is that the souls of men are not annihilated by death.
+
+Cebes[15] agrees to this reasoning, and adds that he is further
+convinced, of its truth by calling to mind an argument used by Socrates
+on former occasions, that knowledge is nothing but reminiscence; and if
+this is so, the soul must have existed, and had knowledge, before it
+became united to the body.
+
+But in case Simmias should not yet be satisfied, Socrates[16] proceeds
+to enlarge on this, his second argument, drawn from reminiscence. We
+daily find that we are carried from the knowledge of one thing to
+another. Things perceived by the eyes, ears, and other senses bring up
+the thought of other things; thus the sight of a lyre or a garment
+reminds us of a friend, and not only are we thus reminded of sensible
+objects, but of things which are comprehended by the mind alone, and
+have no sensitive existence. For we have formed in our minds an idea of
+abstract equality, of the beautiful, the just, the good; in short, of
+every thing which we say exists without the aid of the senses, for we
+use them only in the perception of individual things; whence it follows
+that the mind did not acquire this knowledge in this life, but must have
+had it before, and therefore the soul must have existed before.
+
+Simmias and Cebes[17] both agree in admitting that Socrates has proved
+the pre-existence of the soul, but insist that he has not shown it to be
+immortal, for that nothing hinders but that, according to the popular
+opinion, it may be dispersed at the dissolution of the body. To which
+Socrates replies, that if their former admissions are joined to his last
+argument, the immortality, as well as the pre-existence, of the soul has
+been sufficiently proved. For if it is true that any thing living is
+produced from that which is dead, then the soul must exist after death,
+otherwise it could not be produced again.
+
+However, to remove the apprehension that the soul may be dispersed by a
+wind, as it were, Socrates proceeds, in his third argument,[18] to
+examine that doubt more thoroughly. What, then, is meant by being
+dispersed but being dissolved into its parts? In order, therefore, to a
+thing being capable of dispersion it must be compounded of parts. Now,
+there are two kinds of things--one compounded, the other simple The
+former kind is subject to change, the latter not, and can be
+comprehended by the mind alone. The one is visible, the other invisible;
+and the soul, which is invisible, when it employs the bodily senses,
+wanders and is confused, but when it abstracts itself from the body it
+attains to the knowledge of that which is eternal, immortal, and
+unchangeable. The soul, therefore, being uncompounded and invisible,
+must be indissoluble; that is to say, immortal.
+
+Still Simmias and Cebes[19] are unconvinced. The former objects that the
+soul, according to Socrates's own showing, is nothing but a harmony
+resulting from a combination of the parts of the body, and so may perish
+with the body, as the harmony of a lyre does when the lyre itself is
+broken. And Cebes, though he admits that the soul is more durable than
+the body, yet objects that it is not, therefore, of necessity immortal,
+but may in time wear out; and it is by no means clear that this is not
+its last period.
+
+These objections produce a powerful effect on the rest of the company;
+but Socrates, undismayed, exhorts them not to suffer themselves to be
+deterred from seeking the truth by any difficulties they may meet with;
+and then proceeds[20] to show, in a moment, the fallacy of Simmias's
+objection. It was before admitted, he says, that the soul existed before
+the body; but harmony is produced after the lyre is formed, so that the
+two cases are totally different. And, further, there are various degrees
+of harmony, but every soul is as much a soul as any other. But, then,
+what will a person who holds this doctrine, that the soul is harmony,
+say of virtue and vice in the soul? Will he call them another kind of
+harmony and discord? If so, he will contradict himself; for it is
+admitted that one soul is not more or less a soul than another, and
+therefore one can not he more or less harmonized than another, and one
+could not admit of a greater degree of virtue or vice than another; and
+indeed a soul, being harmony, could not partake of vice at all, which is
+discord.
+
+Socrates, having thus satisfactorily answered the argument adduced by
+Simmias, goes on to rebut that of Cebes,[21] who objected that the soul
+might in time wear out. In order to do this, he relates that, when a
+young man, he attempted to investigate the causes of all things, why
+they exist and why they perish; and in the course of his researches,
+finding the futility of attributing the existence of things to what are
+called natural causes, he resolved on endeavoring to find out the
+reasons of things. He therefore assumed that there are a certain
+abstract beauty and goodness and magnitude, and so of all other things;
+the truth of which being granted, he thinks he shall be able to prove
+that the soul is immortal.
+
+This, then, being conceded by Cebes, Socrates[22] argues that every
+thing that is beautiful is so from partaking of abstract beauty, and
+great from partaking of magnitude, and little from partaking of
+littleness. Now, it is impossible, he argues, that contraries can exist
+in the same thing at the same time; for instance, the same thing can not
+possess both magnitude and littleness, but one will withdraw at the
+approach of the other; and not only so, but things which, though not
+contrary to each other, yet always contain contraries within themselves,
+can not co-exist; for instance, the number three has no contrary, yet
+it contains within itself the idea of odd, which is the contrary of
+even, and so three never can become even; in like manner, heat while it
+is heat can never admit the idea of its contrary, cold. Now, if this
+method of reasoning is applied to the soul, it will be found to be
+immortal; for life and death are contraries, and never can co-exist; but
+wherever the soul is, there is life: so that it contains within itself
+that which is contrary to death, and consequently can never admit of
+death; therefore it is immortal.
+
+With this he closes his arguments in support of the soul's immortality.
+Cebes owns himself convinced, but Simmias, though he is unable to make
+any objection to the soundness of Socrates's reasoning, can not help
+still entertaining doubts on the subject. If, however, the soul is
+immortal, Socrates proceeds,[23] great need is there in this life to
+endeavor to become as wise and good as possible. For if death were a
+deliverance from every thing, it would be a great gain for the wicked;
+but since the soul appears to be immortal, it must go to the place
+suited to its nature. For it is said that each person's demon conducts
+him to a place where he receives sentence according to his deserts.
+
+He then[24] draws a fanciful picture of the various regions of the
+earth, to which the good and the bad will respectively go after death,
+and exhorts his friends to use every endeavor to acquire virtue and
+wisdom in this life, "for," he adds, "the reward is noble, and the hope
+great."
+
+Having thus brought his subject to a conclusion, Socrates proposes to
+bathe himself, in order not to trouble others to wash his dead body.
+Crito thereupon asks if he has any commands to give, and especially how
+he would be buried, to which he, with his usual cheerfulness, makes
+answer, "Just as you please, if only you can catch me;" and then,
+smiling, he reminds them that after death he shall be no longer with
+them, and begs the others of the party to be sureties to Crito for his
+absence from the body, as they had been before bound for his presence
+before his judges.
+
+After he had bathed, and taken leave of his children and the women of
+his family the officer of the Eleven comes in to intimate to him that it
+is now time to drink the poison. Crito urges a little delay, as the sun
+had not yet set; but Socrates refuses to make himself ridiculous by
+showing such a fondness for life. The man who is to administer the
+poison is therefore sent for; and on his holding out the cup, Socrates,
+neither trembling nor changing color or countenance at all, but, as he
+was wont, looking steadfastly at the man, asked if he might make a
+libation to any one; and being told that no more poison than enough had
+been mixed, he simply prayed that his departure from this to another
+world might be happy, and then drank off the poison, readily and calmly.
+His friends, who had hitherto with difficulty restrained themselves,
+could no longer control the outward expressions of grief, to which
+Socrates said, "What are you doing, my friends? I, for this reason,
+chiefly, sent away the women, that they might not commit any folly of
+this kind; for I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. Be
+quiet, therefore, and bear up."
+
+When he had walked about for a while his legs began to grow heavy, so he
+lay down on his back; and his body, from the feet upward, gradually grew
+cold and stiff. His last words were, "Crito, we owe a cock to
+Æsculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not neglect it."
+
+"This," concludes Phædo, "was the end of our friend--a man, as we may
+say, the best of all his time, that we have known, and, moreover, the
+most wise and just."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+  [12] Sec. 21-39.
+
+  [13] Sec. 39, 40.
+
+  [14] Sec. 40-46.
+
+  [15] Sec. 47.
+
+  [16] Sec. 48-57.
+
+  [17] Sec. 55-59.
+
+  [18] Sec. 61-75.
+
+  [19] Sec. 76-84.
+
+  [20] Sec. 93-99.
+
+  [21] Sec. 100-112.
+
+  [22] Sec. 112-128.
+
+  [23] Sec. 129-131.
+
+  [24] Sec. 132-145.
+
+
+
+
+PHÆDO;
+OR,
+THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
+
+
+FIRST ECHECRATES, PHÆDO.
+THEN SOCRATES, APOLLODORUS, CEBES, SIMMIAS, AND CRITO.
+
+_Ech._ Were you personally present, Phædo, with Socrates on that day
+when he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear an account of it
+from some one else?
+
+_Phæd._ I was there myself, Echecrates.
+
+_Ech._ What, then, did he say before his death, and how did he die? for
+I should be glad to hear: for scarcely any citizen of Phlius[25] ever
+visits Athens now, nor has any stranger for a long time come from thence
+who was able to give us a clear account of the particulars, except that
+he had died from drinking poison; but he was unable to tell us any thing
+more.
+
+2. _Phæd._ And did you not hear about the trial--how it went off?
+
+_Ech._ Yes; some one told me this; and I wondered that, as it took
+place so long ago, he appears to have died long afterward. What was the
+reason of this, Phædo?
+
+_Phæd._ An accidental circumstance happened in his favor, Echecrates;
+for the poop of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos chanced to be
+crowned on the day before the trial.
+
+_Ech._ But what is this ship?
+
+_Phæd._ It is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus formerly
+conveyed the fourteen boys and girls to Crete, and saved both them and
+himself. They, therefore, made a vow to Apollo on that occasion, as it
+is said, that if they were saved they would every year dispatch a solemn
+embassy to Delos; which, from that time to the present, they send yearly
+to the god. 3. When they begin the preparations for this solemn embassy,
+they have a law that the city shall be purified during this period, and
+that no public execution shall take place until the ship has reached
+Delos, and returned to Athens; and this occasionally takes a long time,
+when the winds happen to impede their passage. The commencement of the
+embassy is when the priest of Apollo has crowned the poop of the ship.
+And this was done, as I said, on the day before the trial: on this
+account Socrates had a long interval in prison between the trial and his
+death.
+
+4. _Ech._ And what, Phædo, were the circumstances of his death? What was
+said and done? and who of his friends were with him? or would not the
+magistrates allow them to be present, but did he die destitute of
+friends?
+
+_Phæd._ By no means; but some, indeed several, were present.
+
+_Ech._ Take the trouble, then, to relate to me all the particulars as
+clearly as you can, unless you have any pressing business.
+
+_Phæd._ I am at leisure, and will endeavor to give you a full account;
+for to call Socrates to mind, whether speaking myself or listening to
+some one else, is always most delightful to me.
+
+5. _Ech._ And indeed, Phædo, you have others to listen to you who are of
+the same mind. However, endeavor to relate every thing as accurately as
+you can.
+
+_Phæd._ I was, indeed, wonderfully affected by being present, for I was
+not impressed with a feeling of pity, like one present at the death of a
+friend; for the man appeared to me to be happy, Echecrates, both from
+his manner and discourse, so fearlessly and nobly did he meet his death:
+so much so, that it occurred to me that in going to Hades he was not
+going without a divine destiny, but that when he arrived there he would
+be happy, if any one ever was. For this reason I was entirely
+uninfluenced by any feeling of pity, as would seem likely to be the case
+with one present on so mournful an occasion; nor was I affected by
+pleasure from being engaged in philosophical discussions, as was our
+custom; for our conversation was of that kind. But an altogether
+unaccountable feeling possessed me, a kind of unusual mixture compounded
+of pleasure and pain together, when I considered that he was immediately
+about to die. And all of us who were present were affected in much the
+same manner, at one time laughing, at another weeping--one of us
+especially, Apollodorus, for you know the man and his manner.
+
+_Ech._ How should I not?
+
+6. _Phæd._ He, then, was entirely overcome by these emotions; and I,
+too, was troubled, as well as the others.
+
+_Ech._ But who were present, Phædo?
+
+_Phæd._ Of his fellow-countrymen, this Apollodorus was present, and
+Critobulus, and his father, Crito; moreover, Hermogenes, Epigenes,
+Æschines and Antisthenes; Ctesippus the Pæanian, Menexenus, and some
+others of his countrymen, were also there: Plato, I think, was sick.
+
+_Ech._ Were any strangers present?
+
+_Phæd._ Yes; Simmias, the Theban, Cebes and Phædondes; and from Megara,
+Euclides and Terpsion.
+
+7. _Ech._ But what! were not Aristippus and Cleombrotus present?
+
+_Phæd._ No, for they were said to be at Ægina.
+
+_Ech._ Was any one else there?
+
+_Phæd._ I think that these were nearly all who were present.
+
+_Ech._ Well, now, what do you say was the subject of conversation?
+
+_Phæd._ I will endeavor to relate the whole to you from the beginning.
+On the preceding days I and the others were constantly in the habit of
+visiting Socrates, meeting early in the morning at the court house where
+the trial took place, for it was near the prison. 8. Here, then, we
+waited every day till the prison was opened, conversing with each other,
+for it was not opened very early; but as soon as it was opened we went
+in to Socrates, and usually spent the day with him. On that occasion,
+however, we met earlier than usual; for on the preceding day, when we
+left the prison in the evening, we heard that the ship had arrived from
+Delos. We therefore urged each other to come as early as possible to the
+accustomed place. Accordingly we came; and the porter, who used to admit
+us, coming out, told us to wait, and not to enter until he had called
+us. "For," he said, "the Eleven are now freeing Socrates from his bonds,
+and announcing to him that he must die to-day." But in no long time he
+returned, and bade us enter.
+
+9. When we entered, we found Socrates just freed from his bonds, and
+Xantippe, you know her, holding his little boy, and sitting by him. As
+soon as Xantippe saw us she wept aloud, and said such things as women
+usually do on such occasions--as, "Socrates, your friends will now
+converse with you for the last time, and you with them." But Socrates,
+looking towards Crito, said: "Crito, let some one take her home." Upon
+which some of Crito's attendants led her away, wailing and beating
+herself.
+
+But Socrates, sitting up in bed, drew up his leg, and rubbed it with his
+hand, and as he rubbed it, said: "What an unaccountable thing, my
+friends, that seems to be, which men call pleasure! and how wonderfully
+is it related toward that which appears to be its contrary, pain, in
+that they will not both be present to a man at the same time! Yet if any
+one pursues and attains the one, he is almost always compelled to
+receive the other, as if they were both united together from one head."
+
+10. "And it seems tome," he said, "that if Æsop had observed this he
+would have made a fable from it, how the deity, wishing to reconcile
+these warring principles, when he could not do so, united their heads
+together, and from hence whomsoever the one visits the other attends
+immediately after; as appears to be the case with me, since I suffered
+pain in my leg before from the chain, but now pleasure seems to have
+succeeded."
+
+Hereupon Cebes, interrupting him, said: "By Jupiter! Socrates, you have
+done well in reminding me; with respect to the poems which you made, by
+putting into metre those Fables of Æsop and the hymn to Apollo, several
+other persons asked me, and especially Evenus recently, with what design
+you made them after you came here, whereas before you had never made
+any. 11. If therefore, you care at all that I should be able to answer
+Evenus, when he asks me again--for I am sure he will do so--tell me
+what I must say to him."
+
+"Tell him the truth, then, Cebes," he replied, "that I did not make them
+from a wish to compete with him, or his poems, for I knew that this
+would be no easy matter; but that I might discover the meaning of
+certain dreams, and discharge my conscience, if this should happen to be
+the music which they have often ordered me to apply myself to. For they
+were to the following purport: often in my past life the same dream
+visited me, appearing at different times in different forms, yet always
+saying the same thing--'Socrates,' it said, 'apply yourself to and
+practice music.' 12. And I formerly supposed that it exhorted and
+encouraged me to continue the pursuit I was engaged in, as those who
+cheer on racers, so that the dream encouraged me to continue the pursuit
+I was engaged in--namely, to apply myself to music, since philosophy is
+the highest music, and I was devoted to it. But now since my trial took
+place, and the festival of the god retarded my death, it appeared to me
+that if by chance the dream so frequently enjoined me to apply myself to
+popular music, I ought not to disobey it, but do so, for that it would
+be safer for me not to depart hence before I had discharged my
+conscience by making some poems in obedience to the dream. Thus, then, I
+first of all composed a hymn to the god whose festival was present; and
+after the god, considering that a poet, if he means to be a poet, ought
+to make fables, and not discourses, and knowing that I was not skilled
+in making fables, I therefore put into verse those Fables of Æsop, which
+were at hand, and were known to me, and which first occurred to me."
+
+13. "Tell this, then, to Evenus, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and if he
+is wise, to follow me as soon as he can. But I depart, as it seems,
+to-day; for so the Athenians order."
+
+To this Simmias said, "What is this, Socrates, which you exhort Evenus
+to do? for I often meet with him; and, from what I know of him, I am
+pretty certain that he will not at all be willing to comply with your
+advice."
+
+"What, then," said he, "is not Evenus a philosopher?"
+
+"To me he seems to be so," said Simmias.
+
+"Then he will be willing," rejoined Socrates, "and so will every one who
+worthily engages in this study. Perhaps, indeed, he will not commit
+violence on himself; for that, they say, is not allowable." And as he
+said this he let down his leg from the bed on the ground, and in this
+posture continued during the remainder of the discussion.
+
+Cebes then asked him, "What do you mean, Socrates, by saying that it is
+not lawful to commit violence on one's self, but that a philosopher
+should be willing to follow one who is dying?"
+
+14. "What, Cebes! have not you and Simmias, who have conversed
+familiarly with Philolaus[26] on this subject, heard?"
+
+"Nothing very clearly, Socrates."
+
+"I, however, speak only from hearsay; what, then, I have heard I have no
+scruple in telling. And perhaps it is most becoming for one who is about
+to travel there to inquire and speculate about the journey thither, what
+kind we think it is. What else can one do in the interval before
+sunset?"
+
+"Why, then, Socrates, do they say that it is not allowable to kill one's
+self? for I, as you asked just now, have heard both Philolaus, when he
+lived with us, and several others, say that it was not right to do this;
+but I never heard any thing clear upon the subject from any one."
+
+15. "Then, you should consider it attentively," said Socrates, "for
+perhaps you may hear. Probably, however, it will appear wonderful to
+you, if this alone, of all other things, is a universal truth,[27] and
+it never happens to a man, as is the case in all other things, that at
+some times and to some persons only it is better to die than to live;
+yet that these men for whom it is better to die--this probably will
+appear wonderful to you--may not without impiety do this good to
+themselves, but must await another benefactor."
+
+16. Then Cebes, gently smiling, said, speaking in his own dialect,[28]
+"Jove be witness!"
+
+"And, indeed," said Socrates, "it would appear to be unreasonable; yet
+still, perhaps, it has some reason on its side. The maxim, indeed, given
+on this subject in the mystical doctrines,[29] that we men are in a kind
+of prison, and that we ought not to free ourselves from it and escape,
+appears to me difficult to be understood, and not easy to penetrate.
+This, however, appears to me, Cebes, to be well said: that the gods take
+care of us, and that we men are one of their possessions. Does it not
+seem so to you?"
+
+"It does," replied Cebes.
+
+"Therefore," said he, "if one of your slaves were to kill himself,
+without your having intimated that you wished him to die, should you not
+be angry with him, and should you not punish him if you could?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+"Perhaps, then, in this point of view, it is not unreasonable to assert
+that a man ought not to kill himself before the deity lays him under a
+necessity of doing so, such as that now laid on me."
+
+17. "This, indeed," said Cebes, "appears to be probable. But what you
+said just now, Socrates, that philosophers should be very willing to
+die, appears to be an absurdity, if what we said just now is agreeable
+to reason--that it is God who takes care of us, and that we are his
+property. For that the wisest men should not be grieved at leaving that
+service in which they govern them who are the best of all
+masters--namely, the gods--is not consistent with reason; for surely he
+can not think that he will take better care of himself when he has
+become free. But a foolish man might perhaps think thus, that he should
+fly from his master, and would not reflect that he ought not to fly from
+a good one, but should cling to him as much as possible; therefore he
+would fly against all reason; but a man of sense would desire to be
+constantly with one better than himself. Thus, Socrates, the contrary of
+what you just now said is likely to be the case; for it becomes the wise
+to be grieved at dying, but the foolish to rejoice."
+
+18. Socrates, on hearing this, appeared to me to be pleased with the
+pertinacity of Cebes, and, looking toward us, said, "Cebes, you see,
+always searches out arguments, and is not at all willing to admit at
+once any thing one has said."
+
+Whereupon Simmias replied, "But, indeed, Socrates, Cebes appears to me
+now to say something to the purpose; for with what design should men
+really wise fly from masters who are better than themselves, and so
+readily leave them? And Cebes appears to me to direct his argument
+against you, because you so easily endure to abandon both us and those
+good rulers, as you yourself confess, the gods."
+
+"You speak justly," said Socrates, "for I think you mean that I ought to
+make my defense to this charge, as if I were in a court of justice."
+
+"Certainly," replied Simmias.
+
+19. "Come, then," said he, "I will endeavor to defend myself more
+successfully before you than before the judges. For," he proceeded,
+"Simmias and Cebes, if I did not think that I should go, first of all,
+among other deities who are both wise and good, and, next, among men who
+have departed this life, better than any here, I should be wrong in not
+grieving at death; but now, be assured, I hope to go among good men,
+though I would not positively assert it. That, however, I shall go among
+gods who are perfectly good masters, be assured I can positively assert
+this, if I can any thing of the kind. So that, on this account, I am not
+so much troubled, but I entertain a good hope that something awaits
+those who die, and that, as was said long since, it will be far better
+for the good than the evil."
+
+20. "What, then, Socrates," said Simmias, "would you go away keeping
+this persuasion to yourself, or would you impart it to us? For this good
+appears to me to be also common to us; and at the same time it will be
+an apology for you, if you can persuade us to believe what you say."
+
+"I will endeavor to do so," he said. "But first let us attend to Crito
+here, and see what it is he seems to have for some time wished to say."
+
+"What else, Socrates," said Crito, "but what he who is to give you the
+poison told me some time ago, that I should tell you to speak as little
+as possible? For he says that men become too much heated by speaking,
+and that nothing of this kind ought to interfere with the poison; and
+that, otherwise, those who did so were sometimes compelled to drink two
+or three times."
+
+To which Socrates replied, "Let him alone, and let him attend to his own
+business, and prepare to give it me twice, or, if occasion require, even
+thrice."
+
+21. "I was almost certain what you would say," answered Crito, "but he
+has been some time pestering me."
+
+"Never mind him," he rejoined.
+
+"But now I wish to render an account to you, my judges, of the reason
+why a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy, when he is
+about to die, appears to me, on good grounds, to have confidence, and to
+entertain a firm hope that the greatest good will befall him in the
+other world when he has departed this life. How, then, this comes to
+pass, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavor to explain."
+
+"For as many as rightly apply themselves to philosophy seem to have left
+all others in ignorance, that they aim at nothing else than to die and
+be dead. If this, then, is true, it would surely be absurd to be anxious
+about nothing else than this during their whole life, but, when it
+arrives, to be grieved at what they have been long anxious about and
+aimed at."
+
+22. Upon this, Simmias, smiling, said, "By Jupiter! Socrates, though I
+am not now at all inclined to smile, you have made me do so; for I think
+that the multitude, if they heard this, would think it was very well
+said in reference to philosophers, and that our countrymen particularly
+would agree with you, that true philosophers do desire death, and that
+they are by no means ignorant that they deserve to suffer it."
+
+"And, indeed, Simmias, they would speak the truth, except in asserting
+that they are not ignorant; for they are ignorant of the sense in which
+true philosophers desire to die, and in what sense they deserve death,
+and what kind of death. But," he said, "let us take leave of them, and
+speak to one another. Do we think that death is any thing?"
+
+"Certainly," replied Simmias.
+
+23. "Is it any thing else than the separation of the soul from the
+body? And is not this to die, for the body to be apart by itself
+separated from the soul, and for the soul to subsist apart by itself
+separated from the body? Is death any thing else than this?"
+
+"No, but this," he replied.
+
+"Consider, then, my good friend, whether you are of the same opinion as
+I; for thus, I think, we shall understand better the subject we are
+considering. Does it appear to you to be becoming in a philosopher to be
+anxious about pleasures, as they are called, such as meats and drinks?"
+
+"By no means, Socrates," said Simmias.
+
+"But what? about the pleasures of love?"
+
+"Not at all."
+
+24. "What, then? Does such a man appear to you to think other bodily
+indulgences of value? For instance, does he seem to you to value or
+despise the possession of magnificent garments and sandals, and other
+ornaments of the body except so far as necessity compels him to use
+them?"
+
+"The true philosopher," he answered, "appears to me to despise them."
+
+"Does not, then," he continued, "the whole employment of such a man
+appear to you to be, not about the body, but to separate himself from it
+as much as possible, and be occupied about his soul?"
+
+"It does."
+
+"First of all, then, in such matters, does not the philosopher, above
+all other men, evidently free his soul as much as he can from communion
+with the body?"
+
+"It appears so."
+
+25. "And it appears, Simmias, to the generality of men, that he who
+takes no pleasure in such things, and who does not use them, does not
+deserve to live; but that he nearly approaches to death who cares
+nothing for the pleasures that subsist through the body."
+
+"You speak very truly."
+
+"But what with respect to the acquisition of wisdom? Is the body an
+impediment, or not, if any one takes it with him as a partner in the
+search? What I mean is this: Do sight and hearing convey any truth to
+men, or are they such as the poets constantly sing, who say that we
+neither hear nor see any thing with accuracy? If, however, these bodily
+senses are neither accurate nor clear, much less can the others be so;
+for they are all far inferior to these. Do they not seem so to you?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+26. "When, then," said he, "does the soul light on the truth? for when
+it attempts to consider any thing in conjunction with the body, it is
+plain that it is then led astray by it."
+
+"You say truly."
+
+"Must it not, then, be by reasoning, if at all, that any of the things
+that really are become known to it?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"And surely the soul then reasons best when none of these things disturb
+it--neither hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor pleasure of any kind; but
+it retires as much as possible within itself, taking leave of the body;
+and, so far as it can, not communicating or being in contact with it, it
+aims at the discovery of that which is."
+
+"Such is the case."
+
+"Does not, then, the soul of the philosopher, in these cases, despise
+the body, and flee from it, and seek to retire within itself?"
+
+"It appears so."
+
+27. "But what as to such things as these, Simmias? Do we say that
+justice itself is something or nothing?"
+
+"We say it is something, by Jupiter!"
+
+"And that beauty and goodness are something?"
+
+"How not?"
+
+"Now, then, have you ever seen any thing of this kind with your eyes?"
+
+"By no means," he replied.
+
+"Did you ever lay hold of them by any other bodily sense? But I speak
+generally, as of magnitude, health, strength and, in a word, of the
+essence of every thing; that is to say, what each is. Is, then, the
+exact truth of these perceived by means of the body, or is it thus,
+whoever among us habituates himself to reflect most deeply and
+accurately on each several thing about which he is considering, he will
+make the nearest approach to the knowledge of it?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+28. "Would not he, then, do this with the utmost purity, who should in
+the highest degree approach each subject by means of the mere mental
+faculties, neither employing the sight in conjunction with the
+reflective faculty, nor introducing any other sense together with
+reasoning; but who, using pure reflection by itself, should attempt to
+search out each essence purely by itself, freed as much as possible from
+the eyes and ears, and, in a word, from the whole body, as disturbing
+the soul, and not suffering it to acquire truth and wisdom, when it is
+in communion with it. Is not he the person, Simmias, if any one can, who
+will arrive at the knowledge of that which is?"
+
+29. "You speak with wonderful truth, Socrates," replied Simmias.
+
+"Wherefore," he said, "it necessarily follows from all this that some
+such opinion as this should be entertained by genuine philosophers, so
+that they should speak among themselves as follows: 'A by-path, as it
+were, seems to lead us on in our researches undertaken by reason,'
+because so long as we are encumbered with the body, and our soul is
+contaminated with such an evil, we can never fully attain to what we
+desire; and this, we say, is truth. For the body subjects us to
+innumerable hinderances on account of its necessary support; and,
+moreover, if any diseases befall us, they impede us in our search after
+that which is; and it fills us with longings, desires, fears, all kinds
+of fancies, and a multitude of absurdities, so that, as it is said in
+real truth, by reason of the body it is never possible for us to make
+any advances in wisdom. 30. For nothing else than the body and its
+desires occasion wars, seditions, and contests; for all wars among us
+arise on account of our desire to acquire wealth: and we are compelled
+to acquire wealth on account of the body, being enslaved to its service;
+and consequently on all these accounts we are hindered in the pursuit of
+philosophy. But the worst of all is, that if it leaves us any leisure,
+and we apply ourselves to the consideration of any subject, it
+constantly obtrudes itself in the midst of our researches, and occasions
+trouble and disturbance, and confounds us so that we are not able, by
+reason of it, to discern the truth. It has, then, in reality been
+demonstrated to us that if we are ever to know any thing purely, we must
+be separated from the body, and contemplate the things themselves by the
+mere soul; and then, as it seems, we shall obtain that which we desire,
+and which we profess ourselves to be lovers of--wisdom--when we are
+dead, as reason shows, but not while we are alive. 31. For if it is not
+possible to know any thing purely in conjunction with the body, one of
+these two things must follow, either that we can never acquire
+knowledge, or only after we are dead; for then the soul will subsist
+apart by itself, separate from the body, but not before. And while we
+live we shall thus, as it seems, approach nearest to knowledge, if we
+hold no intercourse or communion at all with the body, except what
+absolute necessity requires, nor suffer ourselves to be polluted by its
+nature, but purify ourselves from it, until God himself shall release
+us. And thus being pure, and freed from the folly of body, we shall in
+all likelihood be with others like ourselves, and shall of ourselves
+know the whole real essence, and that probably is truth; for it is not
+allowable for the impure to attain to the pure. Such things, I think,
+Simmias, all true lovers of wisdom must both think and say to one
+another. Does it not seem so to you?"
+
+"Most assuredly, Socrates."
+
+32. "If this, then," said Socrates, "is true, my friend, there is great
+hope for one who arrives where I am going, there, if anywhere, to
+acquire that in perfection for the sake of which we have taken so much
+pains during our past life; so that the journey now appointed me is set
+out upon with good hope, and will be so by any other man who thinks that
+his mind has been, as it were, purified."
+
+"Certainly," said Simmias.
+
+"But does not purification consist in this, as was said in a former part
+of our discourse, in separating as much as possible the soul from the
+body, and in accustoming it to gather and collect itself by itself on
+all sides apart from the body, and to dwell, so far as it can, both now
+and hereafter, alone by itself, delivered, as it were, from the shackles
+of the body?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+33. "Is this, then, called death, this deliverance and separation of the
+soul from the body?"
+
+"Assuredly," he answered.
+
+"But, as we affirmed, those who pursue philosophy rightly are especially
+and alone desirous to deliver it; and this is the very study of
+philosophers, the deliverance and separation of the soul from the body,
+is it not?"
+
+"It appears so."
+
+"Then, as I said at first, would it not be ridiculous for a man who has
+endeavored throughout his life to live as near as possible to death,
+then, when death arrives, to grieve? would not this be ridiculous?"
+
+"How should it not?"
+
+"In reality, then, Simmias," he continued, "those who pursue philosophy
+rightly, study to die; and to them, of all men, death is least
+formidable. Judge from this. Since they altogether hate the body and
+desire to keep the soul by itself, would it not be irrational if, when
+this comes to pass, they should be afraid and grieve, and not be glad to
+go to that place where, on their arrival, they may hope to obtain that
+which they longed for throughout life? But they longed for wisdom, and
+to be freed from association with that which they hated. 34. Have many
+of their own accord wished to descend into Hades, on account of human
+objects of affection, their wives and sons, induced by this very hope of
+their seeing and being with those whom they have loved? and shall one
+who really loves wisdom, and firmly cherishes this very hope, that he
+shall nowhere else attain it in a manner worthy of the name, except in
+Hades, be grieved at dying, and not gladly go there? We must think that
+he would gladly go, my friend, if he be in truth a philosopher; for he
+will be firmly persuaded of this, that he will nowhere else than there
+attain wisdom in its purity; and if this be so, would it not be very
+irrational, as I just now said, if such a man were to be afraid of
+death?"
+
+"Very much so, by Jupiter!" he replied.
+
+35. "Would not this, then," he resumed, "be a sufficient proof to you
+with respect to a man whom you should see grieved when about to die,
+that he was not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of his body? And this
+same person is probably a lover of riches and a lover of honor, one or
+both of these."
+
+"It certainly is as you say," he replied.
+
+"Does not, then," he said, "that which is called fortitude, Simmias,
+eminently belong to philosophers?"
+
+"By all means," he answered.
+
+"And temperance, also, which even the multitude call temperance, and
+which consists in not being carried away by the passions, but in holding
+them in contempt, and keeping them in subjection, does not this belong
+to those only who most despise the body, and live in the study of
+philosophy?"
+
+"Necessarily so," he replied.
+
+36. "For," he continued, "if you will consider the fortitude and
+temperance of others, they will appear to you to be absurd."
+
+"How so, Socrates?"
+
+"Do you know," he said, "that all others consider death among the great
+evils?"
+
+"They do indeed," he answered.
+
+"Then, do the brave among them endure death when they do endure it,
+through dread of greater evils?"
+
+"It is so."
+
+"All men, therefore, except philosophers, are brave through being afraid
+and fear; though it is absurd that any one should be brave through fear
+and cowardice."
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But what, are not those among them who keep their passions in
+subjection affected in the same way? and are they not temperate through
+a kind of intemperance? And although we may say, perhaps, that this is
+impossible, nevertheless the manner in which they are affected with
+respect to this silly temperance resembles this, for, fearing to be
+deprived of other pleasures, and desiring them, they abstain from some,
+being mastered by others. And though they call intemperance the being
+governed by pleasures, yet it happens to them that, by being mastered by
+some pleasures, they master others, and this is similar to what was just
+now said, that in a certain manner they become temperate through
+intemperance."
+
+"So it seems,"
+
+37. "My dear Simmias, consider that this is not a right exchange for
+virtue, to barter pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, fear for
+fear, and the greater for the lesser, like pieces of money, but that
+that alone is the right coin, for which we ought to barter all these
+things, wisdom, and for this and with this everything is in reality
+bought and sold Fortitude, temperance and justice, and, in a word true
+virtue, subsist with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears, and everything
+else of the kind, are present or absent, but when separated from wisdom
+and changed one for another, consider whether such virtue is not a mere
+outline and in reality servile, possessing neither soundness nor truth.
+But the really true virtue is a purification from all such things, and
+temperance, justice, fortitude and wisdom itself, are a kind of
+initiatory purification 38. And those who instituted the mysteries for
+us appear to have been by no means contemptible, but in reality to have
+intimated long since that whoever shall arrive in Hades unexpiated and
+uninitiated shall lie in mud, but he that arrives there purified and
+initiated shall dwell with the gods 'For there are,' say those who
+preside at the mysteries, 'many wand-bearers, but few inspired'. These
+last, in my opinion, are no other than those who have pursued philosophy
+rightly that I might be of their number. I have to the utmost of my
+ability left no means untried, but have endeavored to the utmost of my
+power. But whether I have endeavored rightly, and have in any respect
+succeeded, on arriving there I shall know clearly, if it please
+God--very shortly, as it appears to me."
+
+39. "Such, then, Simmias and Cebes," he added, "is the defense I make,
+for that I, on good grounds, do not repine or grieve at leaving you and
+my masters here, being persuaded that there, no less than here, I shall
+meet with good masters and friends. But to the multitude this is
+incredible If, however, I have succeeded better with you in my defense
+than I did with the Athenian judges, it is well."
+
+When Socrates had thus spoken, Cebes, taking up the discussion, said
+"Socrates, all the rest appears to me to be said rightly, but what you
+have said respecting the soul will occasion much incredulity in many
+from the apprehension that when it is separated from the body it no
+longer exists anywhere, but is destroyed and perishes on the very day in
+which a man dies, and that immediately it is separated and goes out from
+the body it is dispersed, and vanishes like breath or smoke, and is no
+longer anywhere, since if it remained anywhere united in itself, and
+freed from those evils which you have just now enumerated, there would
+be an abundant and good hope, Socrates, that what you say is true 40.
+But this probably needs no little persuasion and proof, that the soul of
+a man who dies exists, and possesses activity and intelligence."
+
+"You say truly, Cebes," said Socrates, "but what shall we do? Are you
+willing that we should converse on these points, whether such is
+probably the case or not?"
+
+"Indeed," replied Cebes, "I should gladly hear your opinion on these
+matters."
+
+"I do not think," said Socrates, "that any one who should now hear us,
+even though he were a comic poet, would say that I am talking idly, or
+discoursing on subjects that do not concern me. If you please, then, we
+will examine into it. Let us consider it in this point of view, whether
+the souls of men who are dead exist in Hades, or not. This is an ancient
+saying, which we now call to mind, that souls departing hence exist
+there, and return hither again, and are produced from the dead. 41. And
+if this is so, that the living are produced again from the dead, can
+there be any other consequence than that our souls are there? for surely
+they could not be produced again if they did not exist; and this would
+be sufficient proof that these things are so, if it should in reality be
+evident that the living are produced from no other source than the dead.
+But if this is not the case, there will be need of other arguments."
+
+"Certainly," said Cebes.
+
+"You must not, then," he continued, "consider this only with respect to
+men, if you wish to ascertain it with greater certainty, but also with
+respect to all animals and plants, and, in a word, with respect to every
+thing that is subject to generation. Let us see whether they are not all
+so produced, no otherwise than contraries from contraries, wherever they
+have any such quality; as, for instance, the honorable is contrary to
+the base, and the just to the unjust, and so with ten thousand other
+things. 42. Let us consider this, then, whether it is necessary that all
+things which have a contrary should be produced from nothing else than
+their contrary. As, for instance, when any thing becomes greater, is it
+not necessary that, from being previously smaller, it afterward became
+greater?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"And if it becomes smaller, will it not, from being previously greater,
+afterward become smaller?"
+
+"It is so," he replied.
+
+"And from stronger, weaker? and from slower, swifter?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"What, then? If any thing becomes worse, must it not become so from
+better? and if more just, from more unjust?"
+
+"How should it not?"
+
+"We have then," he said, "sufficiently determined this, that all things
+are thus produced, contraries from contraries?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"What next? Is there also something of this kind in them; for instance,
+between all two contraries a mutual twofold production, from one to the
+other, and from that other back again? for between a greater thing and a
+smaller there are increase and decrease, and do we not accordingly call
+the one to increase, the other to decrease?"
+
+"Yes," he replied.
+
+43. "And must not to be separated and commingled, to grow cold and to
+grow warm, and every thing in the same manner, even though sometimes we
+have not names to designate them, yet in fact be everywhere thus
+circumstanced, of necessity, as to be produced from each other, and be
+subject to a reciprocal generation?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+"What, then?" said Socrates, "has life any contrary, as waking has its
+contrary, sleeping?"
+
+"Certainly," he answered.
+
+"What?"
+
+"Death," he replied.
+
+"Are not these, then, produced from each other, since they are
+contraries; and are not the modes by which they are produced two-fold
+intervening between these two?"
+
+"How should it be otherwise?"
+
+"I then," continued Socrates, "will describe to you one pair of the
+contraries which I have just now mentioned, both what it is and its mode
+of production: and do you describe to me the other. I say that one is to
+sleep, the other to awake; and from sleeping awaking is produced, and
+from awaking sleeping, and that the modes of their production are, the
+one to fall asleep, the other to be roused. 44. Have I sufficiently
+explained this to you or not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Do you, then," he said, "describe to me in the same manner with respect
+to life and death? Do you not say that life is contrary to death?"
+
+"I do."
+
+"And that they are produced from each other?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"What, then, is produced from life?"
+
+"Death," he replied.
+
+"What, then," said he "is produced from death?"
+
+"I must needs confess," he replied, "that life is."
+
+"From the dead, then, O Cebes! living things and living men are
+produced."
+
+"It appears so," he said.
+
+"Our souls, therefore," said Socrates, "exist in Hades."
+
+"So it seems."
+
+"With respect, then, to their mode of production, is not one of them
+very clear? for to die surely is clear, is it not?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+"What, then, shall we do?" he continued; "shall we not find a
+corresponding contrary mode of production, or will nature be defective
+in this? Or must we discover a contrary mode of production to dying?"
+
+"By all means," he said.
+
+"What is this?"
+
+"To revive."
+
+"Therefore," he proceeded, "if there is such a thing as to revive, will
+not this reviving be a mode of production from the dead to the living?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Thus, then, we have agreed that the living are produced from the dead,
+no less than the dead from the living; but, this being the case, there
+appears to me sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must
+necessarily exist somewhere, from whence they are again produced."
+
+45. "It appears to me, Socrates," he said "that this must necessarily
+follow from what has been admitted."
+
+"See now, O Cebes!" he said, "that we have not agreed on these things
+improperly, as it appears to me; for if one class of things were not
+constantly given back in the place of another, revolving, as it were, in
+a circle, but generation were direct from one thing alone into its
+opposite, and did not turn round again to the other, or retrace its
+course, do you know that all things would at length have the same form,
+be in the same state, and cease to be produced?"
+
+"How say you?" he asked.
+
+"It is by no means difficult," he replied, "to understand what I mean;
+if, for instance, there should be such a thing as falling asleep, but no
+reciprocal waking again produced from a state of sleep, you know that at
+length all things would show the fable of Endymion to be a jest, and it
+would be thought nothing at all of, because everything else would be in
+the same state as he--namely, asleep. And if all things were mingled
+together, but never separated, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be
+verified, 'all things would be together.' 46. Likewise, my dear Cebes,
+if all things that partake of life should die, and after they are dead
+should remain in this state of death, and not revive again, would it not
+necessarily follow that at length all things should be dead, and nothing
+alive? For if living beings are produced from other things, and living
+beings die, what could prevent their being all absorbed in death?"
+
+"Nothing whatever, I think, Socrates," replied Cebes; "but you appear to
+me to speak the exact truth."
+
+"For, Cebes," he continued, "as it seems to me, such undoubtedly is the
+case, and we have not admitted these things under a delusion, for it is
+in reality true that there is a reviving again, that the living are
+produced from the dead, that the souls of the dead exist, and that the
+condition of the good is better, and of the evil worse."
+
+47. "And, indeed," said Cebes, interrupting him, "according to that
+doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently in the habit of advancing,
+if it is true, that our learning is nothing else than reminiscence,
+according to this it is surely necessary that we must at some former
+time have learned what we now remember. But this is impossible, unless
+our soul existed somewhere before it came into this human form; so that
+from hence, also, the soul appears to be something immortal."
+
+"But, Cebes," said Simmias, interrupting him, "what proofs are there of
+these things? Remind me of them, for I do not very well remember them at
+present."
+
+48. "It is proved," said Cebes, "by one argument, and that a most
+beautiful one, that men, when questioned (if one questions them
+properly) of themselves, describe all things as they are, however, if
+they had not innate knowledge and right reason, they would never be
+able to do this. Moreover, if one leads them to diagrams, or any thing
+else of the kind, it is then most clearly apparent that this is the
+case."
+
+"But if you are not persuaded in this way, Simmias," said Socrates, "see
+if you will agree with us in considering the matter thus. For do you
+doubt how that which is called learning is reminiscence?"
+
+"I do not doubt," said Simmias; "but I require this very thing of which
+we are speaking, to be reminded; and, indeed, from what Cebes has begun
+to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded; nevertheless, however,
+I should like to hear now how you would attempt to prove it."
+
+"I do it thus" he replied: "we admit, surely, that if any one be
+reminded of any thing, he must needs have known that thing at some time
+or other before."
+
+"Certainly," he said.
+
+49. "Do we, then, admit this also, that when knowledge comes in a
+certain manner it is reminiscence? But the manner I mean is this: if any
+one, upon seeing or hearing, or perceiving through the medium of any
+other sense, some particular thing, should not only know that, but also
+form an idea of something else, of which the knowledge is not the same,
+but different, should we not justly say that he remembered that of which
+he received the idea?"
+
+"How mean you?"
+
+"For instance, the knowledge of a man is different from that of a lyre."
+
+"How not?"
+
+"Do you not know, then, that lovers when they see a lyre, or a garment,
+or any thing else which their favorite is accustomed to use, are thus
+affected; they both recognize the lyre, and receive in their minds the
+form of the person to whom the lyre belonged? This is reminiscence: just
+as any one, seeing Simmias, is often reminded of Cebes, and so in an
+infinite number of similar instances."
+
+"An infinite number, indeed, by Jupiter!" said Simmias.
+
+"Is not, then," he said, "something of this sort a kind of reminiscence,
+especially when one is thus affected with respect to things which, from
+lapse of time, and not thinking of them, one has now forgotten?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+50. "But what?" he continued. "Does it happen that when one sees a
+painted horse or a painted lyre one is reminded of a man, and that when
+one sees a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Cebes?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"And does it not also happen that on seeing a picture of Simmias one is
+reminded of Simmias himself?"
+
+"It does, indeed," he replied.
+
+"Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that reminiscence
+arises partly from things like, and partly from things unlike?"
+
+"It does."
+
+"But when one is reminded by things like, is it not necessary that one
+should be thus further affected, so as to perceive whether, as regards
+likeness, this falls short or not of the thing of which one has been
+reminded?"
+
+"It is necessary," he replied.
+
+"Consider, then," said Socrates, "if the case is thus. Do we allow that
+there is such a thing as equality? I do not mean of one log with
+another, nor one stone with another, nor any thing else of this kind,
+but something altogether different from all these--abstract equality; do
+we allow that there is any such thing, or not?"
+
+"By Jupiter! we most assuredly do allow it," replied Simmias.
+
+51. "And do we know what it is itself?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+"Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things
+we have just now mentioned, and that from seeing logs, or stones, or
+other things of the kind, equal, we have from these formed an idea of
+that which is different from these--for does it not appear to you to be
+different? Consider the matter thus. Do not stones that are equal, and
+logs sometimes that are the same, appear at one time equal, and at
+another not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But what? Does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? or
+equality inequality?"
+
+"Never, Socrates, at any time."
+
+"These equal things, then," he said, "and abstract equality, are not the
+same?"
+
+"By no means, Socrates, as it appears."
+
+"However, from these equal things," he said, "which are different from
+that abstract equality, have you not formed your idea and derived your
+knowledge of it?"
+
+"You speak most truly," he replied.
+
+"Is it not, therefore, from its being like or unlike them?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But it makes no difference," he said. "When, therefore, on seeing one
+thing, you form, from the sight of it, the notion of another, whether
+like or unlike, this," he said, "must necessarily be reminiscence."
+
+"Certainly."
+
+52. "What, then, as to this?" he continued. "Are we affected in any such
+way with regard to logs and the equal things we have just now spoken of?
+And do they appear to us to be equal in the same manner as abstract
+equality itself is, or do they fall short in some degree, or not at
+all, of being such as equality itself is?"
+
+"They fall far short," he replied.
+
+"Do we admit, then, that when one, on beholding some particular thing,
+perceives that it aims, as that which I now see, at being like something
+else that exists, but falls short of it, and can not become such as that
+is, but is inferior to it--do we admit that he who perceives this must
+necessarily have had a previous knowledge of that which he says it
+resembles, though imperfectly?"
+
+"It is necessary."
+
+"What, then? Are we affected in some such way, or not, with respect to
+things equal and abstract equality itself?"
+
+"Assuredly."
+
+"It is necessary, therefore, that we must have known abstract equality
+before the time when, on first seeing equal things, we perceived that
+they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in doing so."
+
+"Such is the case."
+
+53. "Moreover, we admit this too, that we perceived this, and could not
+possibly perceive it by any other means than the sight, or touch, or
+some other of the senses, for I say the same of them all."
+
+"For they are the same, Socrates, so far as, our argument is concerned."
+
+"However, we must perceive, by means of the senses, that all things
+which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality, and yet fall
+short of it; or how shall we say it is?"
+
+"Even so."
+
+"Before, then, we began to see, and hear, and use our other senses, we
+must have had a knowledge of equality itself--what it is, if we were to
+refer to it those equal things that come under the senses, and observe
+that all such things aim at resembling that, but fall far short of it."
+
+"This necessarily follows, Socrates, from what has been already said."
+
+"But did we not, as soon as we were born, see and hear, and possess our
+other senses?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But, we have said, before we possessed these, we must have had a
+knowledge of abstract equality?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"We must have had it, then, as it seems, before we were born."
+
+"It seems so."
+
+54. "If, therefore, having this before we were born, we were born
+possessing it, we knew, both before we were born and as soon as we were
+born, not only the equal and the greater and smaller, but all things of
+the kind; for our present discussion is not more respecting equality
+than the beautiful itself, the good, the just, and the holy, and, in one
+word, respecting every thing which we mark with the seal of existence,
+both in the questions we ask and the answers we give. So that we must
+necessarily have had a knowledge of all these before we were born."
+
+"Such is the case."
+
+"And if, having once had it, we did not constantly forget it, we should
+always be born with this knowledge, and should always retain it through
+life. For to know is this, when one has got a knowledge of any thing, to
+retain and not lose it; for do we not call this oblivion, Simmias, the
+loss of knowledge?"
+
+"Assuredly, Socrates," he replied.
+
+55. "But if, having had it before we were born, we lose it at our
+birth, and afterward, through exercising the senses about these things,
+we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed, would not that
+which we call learning be a recovery of our own knowledge? And in saying
+that this is to remember, should we not say rightly?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"For this appeared to be possible, for one having perceived any thing,
+either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense, to form an
+idea of something different from this, which he had forgotten, and with
+which this was connected by being unlike or like. So that, as I said,
+one of these two things must follow: either we are all born with this
+knowledge, and we retain it through life, or those whom we say learn
+afterward do nothing else than remember, and this learning will be
+reminiscence."
+
+"Such, certainly, is the case, Socrates."
+
+56. "Which, then, do you choose, Simmias: that we are born with
+knowledge, or that we afterward remember what we had formerly known?"
+
+"At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose."
+
+"But what? Are you able to choose in this case, and what do you think
+about it? Can a man who possesses knowledge give a reason for the things
+that he knows, or not?"
+
+"He needs must be able to do so, Socrates," he replied.
+
+"And do all men appear to you to be able to give a reason for the things
+of which we have just now been speaking?"
+
+"I wish they could," said Simmias; "but I am much more afraid that at
+this time to-morrow there will no longer be any one able to do this
+properly."
+
+"Do not all men, then, Simmias," he said, "seem to you to know these
+things?"
+
+"By no means."
+
+"Do they remember, then, what they once learned?"
+
+"Necessarily so."
+
+"When did our souls receive this knowledge? Not surely, since we were
+born into the world."
+
+"Assuredly not."
+
+"Before, then?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"Our souls, therefore, Simmias, existed before they were in a human
+form, separate from bodies, and possessed intelligence."
+
+57. "Unless, Socrates, we receive this knowledge at our birth, for this
+period yet remains."
+
+"Be it so, my friend. But at what other time do we lose it? for we are
+not born with it, as we have just now admitted. Do we lose it, then, at
+the very time in which we receive it? Or can you mention any other
+time?"
+
+"By no means, Socrates; I was not aware that I was saying nothing to the
+purpose."
+
+"Does the case then stand thus with us, Simmias?" he proceeded: "If
+those things which we are continually talking about really exist, the
+beautiful, the good, and every such essence, and to this we refer all
+things that come under the senses, as finding it to have a prior
+existence, and to be our own, and if we compare these things to it, it
+necessarily follows, that as these exist, so likewise our soul exists
+even before we are born; but if these do not exist, this discussion will
+have been undertaken in vain, is it not so? And is there not an equal
+necessity both that these things should exist, and our souls also,
+before we are born; and if not the former, neither the latter?"
+
+58. "Most assuredly, Socrates," said Simmias, "there appears to me to be
+the same necessity; and the argument admirably tends to prove that our
+souls exist before we are born, just as that essence does which you have
+now mentioned. For I hold nothing so clear to me as this, that all such
+things most certainly exist, as the beautiful, the good, and all the
+rest that you just now spoke of; and, so far as I am concerned, the case
+is sufficiently demonstrated."
+
+"But how does it appear to Cebes?" said Socrates; "for it is necessary
+to persuade Cebes too."
+
+"He is sufficiently persuaded, I think," said Simmias, "although he is
+the most pertinacious of men in distrusting arguments. Yet I think he is
+sufficiently persuaded of this, that our soul existed before we were
+born. But whether, when we are dead, it will still exist does not appear
+to me to have been demonstrated, Socrates," he continued; "but that
+popular doubt, which Cebes just now mentioned, still stands in our way,
+whether, when a man dies, the soul is not dispersed, and this is the end
+of its existence. 59. For what hinders it being born, and formed from
+some other source, and existing before it came into a human body, and
+yet, when it has come, and is separated from this body, its then also
+dying itself, and being destroyed?"
+
+"You say well, Simmias," said Cebes; "for it appears that only one half
+of what is necessary has been demonstrated--namely, that our soul
+existed before we were born; but it is necessary to demonstrate further,
+that when we are dead it will exist no less than before we were born, if
+the demonstration is to be made complete."
+
+"This has been even now demonstrated, Simmias and Cebes," said Socrates,
+"if you will only connect this last argument with that which we before
+assented to, that every thing living is produced from that which is
+dead. For if the soul exists before, and it is necessary for it when it
+enters into life, and is born, to be produced from nothing else than
+death, and from being dead, how is it not necessary for it also to
+exist after death, since it must needs be produced again? 60. What you
+require, then, has been already demonstrated. However, both you and
+Simmias appear to me as if you wished to sift this argument more
+thoroughly, and to be afraid, like children, lest, on the soul's
+departure from the body, the winds should blow it away and disperse it,
+especially if one should happen to die, not in a calm, but in a violent
+storm."
+
+Upon this Cebes, smiling, said, "Endeavor to teach us better, Socrates,
+as if we were afraid, or rather not as if we were afraid, though perhaps
+there is some boy[30] within us who has such a dread. Let us, then,
+endeavor to persuade him not to be afraid of death, as of hobgoblins."
+
+"But you must charm him every day," said Socrates, "until you have
+quieted his fears."
+
+"But whence, Socrates," he said, "can we procure a skillful charmer for
+such a case, now that you are about to leave us?"
+
+61. "Greece is wide, Cebes," he replied, "and in it surely there are
+skillful men. There are also many barbarous nations, all of which you
+should search through, seeking such a charmer, sparing neither money nor
+toil, as there is nothing on which you can more seasonably spend your
+money. You should also seek for him among yourselves; for perhaps you
+could not easily find any more competent than yourselves to do this."
+
+"This shall be done," said Cebes; "but, if it is agreeable to you, let
+us return to the point from whence we digressed."
+
+"It will be agreeable to me, for how should it not?"
+
+"You say well," rejoined Cebes.
+
+"We ought, then," said Socrates, "to ask ourselves some such question
+as this: to what kind of thing it appertains to be thus
+affected--namely, to be dispersed--and for what we ought to fear, lest
+it should be so affected, and for what not. And after this we should
+consider which of the two the soul is, and in the result should either
+be confident or fearful for our soul."
+
+"You speak truly," said he.
+
+62. "Does it not, then, appertain to that which is formed by
+composition, and is naturally compounded, to be thus affected, to be
+dissolved in the same manner as that in which it was compounded; and if
+there is any thing not compounded, does it not appertain to this alone,
+if to any thing, not to be thus affected?"
+
+"It appears to me to be so," said Cebes.
+
+"Is it not most probable, then, that things which are always the same,
+and in the same state, are uncompounded, but that things which are
+constantly changing, and are never in the same state, are compounded?"
+
+"To me it appears so."
+
+"Let us return, then," he said, "to the subjects on which we before
+discoursed. Whether is essence itself, of which we gave this account
+that it exists, both in our questions and answers, always the same, or
+does it sometimes change? Does equality itself, the beautiful itself,
+and each several thing which is, ever undergo any change, however small?
+Or does each of them which exists, being an unmixed essence by itself,
+continue always the same, and in the same state, and never undergo any
+variation at all under any circumstances?"
+
+"They must of necessity continue the same and in the same state,
+Socrates," said Cebes.
+
+63. "But what shall we say of the many beautiful things, such as men,
+horses, garments, or other things of the kind, whether equal or
+beautiful, or of all things synonymous with them? Do they continue the
+same, or, quite contrary to the former, are they never at any time, so
+to say, the same, either with respect to themselves or one another?"
+
+"These, on the other hand," replied Cebes, "never continue the same."
+
+"These, then, you can touch, or see, or perceive by the other senses;
+but those that continue the same, you can not apprehend in any other way
+than by the exercise of thought; for such things are invisible, and are
+not seen?"
+
+"You say what is strictly true," replied Cebes.
+
+64. "We may assume, then, if you please," he continued, "that there are
+two species of things; the one visible, the other invisible?"
+
+"We may," he said.
+
+"And the invisible always continuing the same, but the visible never the
+same?"
+
+"This, too," he said, "we may assume."
+
+"Come, then," he asked, "is there anything else belonging to us than, on
+the one hand, body, and, on the other, soul?"
+
+"Nothing else," he replied.
+
+"To which species, then, shall we say the body is more like, and more
+nearly allied?"
+
+"It is clear to everyone," he said, "that it is to the visible."
+
+"But what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?"
+
+"It is not visible to men, Socrates," he replied.
+
+"But we speak of things which are visible, or not so, to the nature of
+men; or to some other nature, think you?"
+
+"To that of men."
+
+"What, then, shall we say of the soul--that it is visible, or not
+visible?"
+
+"Not visible."
+
+"Is it, then, invisible?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"The soul, then, is more like the invisible than the body; and the body,
+the visible?"
+
+"It must needs be so, Socrates."
+
+65. "And did we not, some time since, say this too, that the soul, when
+it employs the body to examine any thing, either by means of the sight
+or hearing, or any other sense (for to examine any thing by means of the
+body is to do so by the senses), is then drawn by the body to things
+that never continue the same, and wanders and is confused, and reels as
+if intoxicated, through coming into contact with things of this kind?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But when it examines anything by itself, does it approach that which is
+pure, eternal, immortal, and unchangeable, and, as being allied to it,
+continue constantly with it, so long as it subsists by itself, and has
+the power, and does it cease from its wandering, and constantly continue
+the same with respect to those things, through coming into contact with
+things of this kind? And is this affection of the soul called wisdom?"
+
+"You speak," he said, "in every respect, well and truly, Socrates."
+
+"To which species of the two, then, both from what was before and now
+said, does the soul appear to you to be more like and more nearly
+allied?"
+
+66. "Every one, I think, would allow, Socrates," he replied, "even the
+dullest person, from this method of reasoning, that the soul is in every
+respect more like that which continues constantly the same than that
+which does not so."
+
+"But what as to the body?"
+
+"It is more like the other."
+
+"Consider it also thus, that, when soul and body are together, nature
+enjoins the latter to be subservient and obey, the former to rule and
+exercise dominion. And, in this way, which of the two appears to you to
+be like the divine, and which the mortal? Does it not appear to you to
+be natural that the divine should rule and command, but the mortal obey
+and be subservient?"
+
+"To me it does so."
+
+"Which, then, does the soul resemble?"
+
+"It is clear, Socrates, that the soul resembles the divine; but the
+body, the mortal."
+
+"Consider, then, Cebes," said he, "whether, from all that has been said,
+these conclusions follow, that the soul is most like that which is
+divine, immortal, intelligent, uniform, indissoluble, and which always
+continues in the same state; but that the body, on the other hand, is
+most like that which is human, mortal, unintelligent, multiform,
+dissoluble, and which never continues in the same state. Can we say any
+thing against this, my dear Cebes, to show that it is not so?"
+
+"We can not."
+
+67. "What, then? Since these things are so, does it not appertain to the
+body to be quickly dissolved, but to the soul, on the contrary, to be
+altogether indissoluble or nearly so?"
+
+"How not?"
+
+"You perceive, however," he said, "that when a man dies, the visible
+part of him, the body, which is exposed to sight, and which we call a
+corpse, to which it appertains to be dissolved, to fall asunder and be
+dispersed, does not immediately undergo any of these affections, but
+remains for a considerable time, and especially so if any one should die
+with his body in full vigor, and at a corresponding age;[31] for when
+the body has collapsed and been embalmed, as those that are embalmed in
+Egypt, it remains almost entire for an incredible length of time; and
+some parts of the body, even though it does decay, such as the bones and
+nerves, and every thing of that kind, are, nevertheless, as one may say,
+immortal. Is it not so?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+68. "Can the soul, then, which is invisible, and which goes to another
+place like itself, excellent, pure and invisible, and therefore truly
+called the invisible world,[32] to the presence of a good and wise God
+(whither, if God will, my soul also must shortly go)--can this soul of
+ours, I ask, being such and of such a nature, when separated from the
+body, be immediately dispersed and destroyed, as most men assert? Far
+from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias. But the case is much rather thus: if
+it is separated in a pure state, taking nothing of the body with it, as
+not having willingly communicated with it in the present life, but
+having shunned it, and gathered itself within itself, as constantly
+studying this (but this is nothing else than to pursue philosophy
+aright, and in reality to study how to die easily), would not this be to
+study how to die?"
+
+"Most assuredly."
+
+"Does not the soul, then, when in this state, depart to that which
+resembles itself, the invisible, the divine, immortal and wise? And on
+its arrival there, is it not its lot to be happy, free from error,
+ignorance, fears, wild passions, and all the other evils to which human
+nature is subject; and, as is said of the initiated, does it not in
+truth pass the rest of its time with the gods? Must we affirm that it is
+so, Cebes, or otherwise?"
+
+"So, by Jupiter!" said Cebes.
+
+69. "But, I think, if it departs from the body polluted and impure, as
+having constantly held communion with the body, and having served and
+loved it, and been bewitched by it, through desires and pleasures, so as
+to think that there is nothing real except what is corporeal, which one
+can touch and see, and drink and eat, and employ for sensual purposes;
+but what is dark and invisible to the eyes, which is intellectual and
+apprehended by philosophy, having been accustomed to hate, fear, and
+shun this, do you think that a soul thus affected can depart from the
+body by itself, and uncontaminated?"
+
+"By no means whatever," he replied.
+
+"But I think it will be impressed with that which is corporeal, which
+the intercourse and communion of the body, through constant association
+and great attention, have made natural to it."
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"We must think, my dear Cebes, that this is ponderous and heavy, earthly
+and visible, by possessing which such a soul is weighed down, and drawn
+again into the visible world through dread of the invisible and of
+Hades, wandering, as it is said, among monuments and tombs, about which,
+indeed, certain shadowy phantoms of souls have been seen, being such
+images as those souls produced which have not departed pure from the
+body, but which partake of the visible; on which account, also, they are
+visible."
+
+"That is probable, Socrates."
+
+70. "Probable indeed, Cebes; and not that these are the souls of the
+good, but of the wicked, which are compelled to wander about such
+places, paying the penalty of their former conduct, which was evil; and
+they wander about so long until, through the desire of the corporeal
+nature that accompanies them, they are again united to a body; and they
+are united, as is probable, to animals having the same habits as those
+they have given themselves up to during life."
+
+"But what do you say these are, Socrates?"
+
+"For instance, those who have given themselves up to gluttony,
+wantonness and drinking, and have put no restraint on themselves, will
+probably be clothed in the form of asses and brutes of that kind. Do you
+not think so?"
+
+"You say what is very probable."
+
+"And that such as have set great value on injustice, tyranny and rapine,
+will be clothed in the species of wolves, hawks and kites! Where else
+can we say such souls go?"
+
+"Without doubt," said Cebes, "into such as these."
+
+"Is it not, then, evident," he continued, "as to the rest, whither each
+will go, according to the resemblances of their several pursuits?"
+
+71. "It is evident," he replied. "How not?"
+
+"Of these, then," he said, "are not they the most happy, and do they not
+go to the best place, who have practiced that social and civilized
+virtue which they call temperance and justice, and which is produced
+from habit and exercise, without philosophy and reflection?"
+
+"In what respect are these the most happy?"
+
+"Because it is probable that these should again migrate into a
+corresponding civilized and peaceable kind of animals, such as bees
+perhaps, or wasps, or ants, or even into the same human species again,
+and from these become moderate men."
+
+"It is probable."
+
+"But it is not lawful for any one who has not studied philosophy, and
+departed this life perfectly pure, to pass into the rank of gods, but
+only for the true lover of wisdom. And on this account, my friends
+Simmias and Cebes, those who philosophize rightly, abstain from all
+bodily desires, and persevere in doing so, and do not give themselves up
+to them, not fearing the loss of property and poverty, as the generality
+of men and the lovers of wealth; nor, again, dreading disgrace and
+ignominy, like those who are lovers of power and honor, do they then
+abstain from them."
+
+"For it would not become them to do so, Socrates," says Cebes.
+
+72. "It would not, by Jupiter!" he rejoined. "Wherefore, Cebes, they who
+care at all for their soul, and do not spend their lives in the culture
+of their bodies, despising all these, proceed not in the same way with
+them, as being ignorant whither they are going, but, being convinced
+that they ought not to act contrary to philosophy, but in accordance
+with the freedom and purification she affords, they give themselves up
+to her direction, following her wherever she leads."
+
+"How, Socrates?"
+
+"I will tell you," he replied. "The lovers of wisdom know that
+philosophy, receiving their soul plainly bound and glued to the body,
+and compelled to view things through this, as through a prison, and not
+directly by herself, and sunk in utter ignorance, and perceiving, too,
+the strength of the prison, that it arises from desire, so that he who
+is bound as much as possible assists in binding himself. 73. I say,
+then, the lovers of wisdom know that philosophy, receiving their soul in
+this state, gently exhorts it, and endeavors to free it, by showing that
+the view of things by means of the eyes is full of deception, as also is
+that through the ears and the other senses; persuading an abandonment
+of these so far as it is not absolutely necessary to use them, and
+advising the soul to be collected and concentrated within itself, and to
+believe nothing else than herself, with respect to what she herself
+understands of things that have a real subsistence; and to consider
+nothing true which she views through the medium of others, and which
+differ under different aspects;[32] for that a thing of this kind is
+sensible and visible, but that what she herself perceives is
+intelligible and invisible. The soul of the true philosopher, therefore,
+thinking that she ought not to oppose this deliverance, accordingly
+abstains as much as possible from pleasures and desires, griefs and
+fears, considering that when any one is exceedingly delighted or
+alarmed, grieved or influenced by desire, he does not merely suffer such
+evil from these things as one might suppose, such as either being sick
+or wasting his property through indulging his desires; but that which is
+the greatest evil, and the worst of all, this he suffers, and is not
+conscious of it."
+
+"But what is this evil, Socrates?" said Cebes.
+
+74. "That the soul of every man is compelled to be either vehemently
+delighted or grieved about some particular thing, and, at the same time,
+to consider that the thing about which it is thus strongly affected is
+most real and most true, though it is not so. But these are chiefly
+visible objects, are they not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"In this state of affection, then, is not the soul especially shackled
+by the body?"
+
+"How so?"
+
+"Because each pleasure and pain, having a nail, as it were, nails the
+soul to the body, and fastens it to it, and causes it to become
+corporeal, deeming those things to be true whatever the body asserts to
+be so. For, in consequence of its forming the same opinions with the
+body, and delighting in the same things, it is compelled, I think, to
+possess similar manners, and to be similarly nourished; so that it can
+never pass into Hades in a pure state, but must ever depart polluted by
+the body, and so quickly falls again into another body, and grows up as
+if it were sown, and consequently is deprived of all association with
+that which is divine, and pure, and uniform."
+
+"You speak most truly, Socrates," said Cebes.
+
+75. "For these reasons, therefore, Cebes, those who are truly lovers of
+wisdom are moderate and resolute, and not for the reasons that most
+people say. Do you think as they do?"
+
+"Assuredly not."
+
+"No, truly. But the soul of a philosopher would reason thus, and would
+not think that philosophy ought to set it free, and that when it is
+freed it should give itself up again to pleasures and pains, to bind it
+down again, and make her work void, weaving a kind of Penelope's web the
+reverse way. On the contrary, effecting a calm of the passions, and
+following the guidance of reason, and being always intent on this,
+contemplating that which is true and divine, and not subject to opinion;
+and being nourished by it, it thinks that it ought to live in this
+manner as long as it does live, and that when it dies it shall go to a
+kindred essence, and one like itself, and shall be free from human
+evils. From such a regimen as this the soul has no occasion to fear,
+Simmias and Cebes, while it strictly attends to these things, lest,
+being torn to pieces at its departure from the body, it should be blown
+about and dissipated by the winds, and no longer have an existence
+anywhere."
+
+76. When Socrates had thus spoken, a long silence ensued; and Socrates
+himself was pondering upon what had been said, as he appeared, and so
+did most of us; but Cebes and Simmias were conversing a little while
+with each other. At length Socrates, perceiving them, said, "What think
+you of what has been said? Does it appear to you to have been proved
+sufficiently? for many doubts and objections still remain if any one
+will examine them thoroughly. If, then, you are considering some other
+subject, I have nothing to say; but if you are doubting about this, do
+not hesitate both yourselves to speak and express your opinion, if it
+appears to you in any respect that it might have been argued better, and
+to call me in again to your assistance, if you think you can be at all
+benefited by my help."
+
+Upon this Simmias said, "Indeed, Socrates, I will tell you the truth:
+for some time each of us, being in doubt, has been urging and exhorting
+the other to question you, from a desire to hear our doubts solved; but
+we were afraid of giving you trouble, lest it should be disagreeable to
+you in your present circumstances."
+
+77. But he, upon hearing this, gently smiled, and said, "Bless me,
+Simmias; with difficulty, indeed, could I persuade other men that I do
+not consider my present condition a calamity, since I am not able to
+persuade even you; but you are afraid lest I should be more morose now
+than during the former part of my life. And, as it seems, I appear to
+you to be inferior to swans with respect to divination, who, when they
+perceive that they must needs die, though they have been used to sing
+before, sing then more than ever, rejoicing that they are about to
+depart to that deity whose servants they are. But men, through their
+own fear of death, belie the swans too, and say that they, lamenting
+their death, sing their last song through grief; and they do not
+consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold, or is afflicted
+with any other pain, not even the nightingale, or swallow, or the
+hoopoes, which, they say, sing lamenting through grief. But neither do
+these birds appear to me to sing through sorrow, nor yet do swans; but,
+in my opinion, belonging to Apollo, they are prophetic, and, foreseeing
+the blessings of Hades, they sing and rejoice on that day more
+excellently than at any preceding time. 78. But I, too, consider myself
+to be a fellow-servant of the swans, and sacred to the same god; and
+that I have received the power of divination from our common master no
+less than they, and that I do not depart from this life with less
+spirits than they. On this account, therefore, it is right that you
+should both speak and ask whatever you please, so long as the Athenian
+Eleven permit."
+
+"You say well," said Simmias, "and both I will tell you what are my
+doubts, and he, in turn, how far he does not assent to what has been
+said. For it appears to me, Socrates, probably as it does to you with
+respect to these matters, that to know them clearly in the present life
+is either impossible or very difficult: on the other hand, however, not
+to test what has been said of them in every possible way, so as not to
+desist until, on examining them in every point of view, one has
+exhausted every effort, is the part of a very weak man. For we ought,
+with respect to these things, either to learn from others how they stand
+or to discover them for one's self; or, if both these are impossible,
+then, taking the best of human reasonings and that which is the most
+difficult to be confuted, and embarking on this, as one who risks
+himself on a raft, so to sail through life, unless one could be carried
+more safely, and with less risk, on a surer conveyance, or some divine
+reason. 79. I, therefore, shall not now be ashamed to question you,
+since you bid me do so, nor shall I blame myself hereafter for not
+having now told you what I think; for to me, Socrates, when I consider
+the matter, both with myself and with Cebes, what has been said does not
+appear to have been sufficiently proved."
+
+Then said Socrates, "Perhaps, my friend, you have the truth on your
+side; but tell me in what respect it was not sufficiently proved."
+
+"In this," he answered, "because any one might use the same argument
+with respect to harmony, and a lyre, and its chords, that harmony is
+something invisible and incorporeal, very beautiful and divine, in a
+well-modulated lyre; but the lyre and its chords are bodies, and of
+corporeal form, compounded and earthly, and akin to that which is
+mortal. When any one, then, has either broken the lyre, or cut or burst
+the chords, he might maintain from the same reasoning as yours that it
+is necessary the harmony should still exist and not be destroyed; for
+there could be no possibility that the lyre should subsist any longer
+when the chords are burst; and that the chords, which are of a mortal
+nature, should subsist, but that the harmony, which is of the same
+nature and akin to that which is divine and immortal, should become
+extinct, and perish before that which is mortal; but he might say that
+the harmony must needs subsist somewhere, and that the wood and chords
+must decay before it can undergo any change. 80. For I think, Socrates,
+that you yourself have arrived at this conclusion, that we consider the
+soul to be pretty much of this kind--namely, that our body being
+compacted and held together by heat and cold, dryness and moisture, and
+other such qualities, our soul is the fusion and harmony of these, when
+they are well and duly combined with each other. If, then, the soul is a
+kind of harmony, it is evident that when our bodies are unduly relaxed
+or strained, through diseases and other maladies, the soul must, of
+necessity, immediately perish, although it is most divine, just as other
+harmonies which subsist in sounds or in the various works of artisans;
+but that the remains of the body of each person last for a long time,
+till they are either burned or decayed. Consider, then, what we shall
+say to this reasoning, if any one should maintain that the soul, being a
+fusion of the several qualities in the body, perishes first in that
+which is called death."
+
+81. Socrates, therefore, looking steadfastly at us, as he was generally
+accustomed to do, and smiling, said, "Simmias indeed speaks justly. If,
+then, any one of you is more prompt than I am, why does he not answer,
+for he seems to have handled my argument not badly? It appears to me,
+however, that before we make our reply we should first hear from Cebes,
+what he, too, objects to our argument, in order that, some time
+intervening, we may consider what we shall say, and then when we have
+heard them, we may give up to them, if they appear to speak agreeably to
+truth; or, if not, we may then uphold our own argument. Come, then,
+Cebes," he continued, "say what it is that disturbs you, so as to cause
+your unbelief."
+
+"I will tell you," said Cebes; "the argument seems to me to rest where
+it was, and to be liable to the same objection that we mentioned before.
+For, that our soul existed even before It came into this present form, I
+do not deny has been very elegantly, and, if it is not too much to say
+so, very fully, demonstrated; but that it still exists anywhere when we
+are dead does not appear to me to have been clearly proved; nor do I
+give in to the objection of Simmias, that the soul is not stronger and
+more durable than the body, for it appears to me to excel very far all
+things of this kind. 82. 'Why, then,' reason might say, 'do you still
+disbelieve? for, since you see that when a man dies his weaker part
+still exists, does it not appear to you to be necessary that the more
+durable part should still be preserved during this period?' Consider,
+then, whether I say any thing to the purpose in reply to this. For I,
+too, as well as Simmias, as it seems, stand in need of an illustration;
+for the argument appears to me to have been put thus, as if any one
+should advance this argument about an aged weaver who had died, that the
+man has not yet perished, but perhaps still exists somewhere; and, as a
+proof, should exhibit the garment which he wore and had woven himself,
+that it is entire and has not perished; and if any one should disbelieve
+him, he would ask, which of the two is the more durable, the species of
+a man or of a garment, that is constantly in use and being worn; then,
+should any one answer that the species of man is much more durable, he
+would think it demonstrated that, beyond all question, the man is
+preserved, since that which is less durable has not perished. 83. But I
+do not think, Simmias, that this is the case, and do you consider what I
+say, for every one must think that he who argues thus argues, foolishly.
+For this weaver, having worn and woven many such garments, perished
+after almost all of them, but before the last, I suppose; and yet it
+does not on this account follow any the more that a man is inferior to
+or weaker than a garment. And I think, the soul might admit this same
+illustration with respect to the body, and he who should say the same
+things concerning them would appear to me to speak correctly, that the
+soul is more durable, but the body weaker and less durable; for he would
+say that each soul wears out many bodies, especially if it lives many
+years; for if the body wastes and is dissolved while the man still
+lives, but the soul continually weaves anew what is worn out, it must
+necessarily follow that when the soul is dissolved it must then have on
+its last garment, and perish before this alone; but when the soul has
+perished the body would show the weakness of its nature, and quickly rot
+and vanish. 84. So that it is not by any means right to place implicit
+reliance on this argument, and to believe that when we die our soul
+still exists somewhere. For, if any one should concede to him who admits
+even more than you do, and should grant to him that not only did our
+soul exist before we were born, but that even when we die nothing
+hinders the souls of some of us from still existing, and continuing to
+exist hereafter, and from being often born, and dying again--for so
+strong is it by nature, that it can hold out against repeated births--if
+he granted this, he would not yet concede that it does not exhaust
+itself in its many births, and at length perish altogether in some one
+of the deaths. But he would say that no one knows this death and
+dissolution of the body, which brings destruction to the soul; for it is
+impossible for any one of us to perceive it. If, however, this be the
+case, it follows that every one who is confident at the approach of
+death is foolishly confident, unless he is able to prove that the soul
+is absolutely immortal and imperishable; otherwise it necessarily
+follows that he who is about to die must be alarmed for his soul, lest
+in its present disunion from the body it should entirely perish."
+
+85. Upon this, all of us who had heard them speaking were disagreeably
+affected, as we afterward mentioned to each other; because, after we had
+been fully persuaded by the former arguments, they seemed to disturb us
+anew, and to cast us into a distrust, not only of the arguments already
+adduced, but of such as might afterward be urged, for fear lest we
+should not be fit judges of anything, or lest the things themselves
+should be incredible.
+
+_Echec._ By the gods! Phædo, I can readily excuse you; for, while I am
+now hearing you, it occurs to me to ask myself some such question as
+this: What arguments can we any longer believe? since the argument which
+Socrates advanced, and which was exceedingly credible, has now fallen
+into discredit. For this argument, that our soul is a kind of harmony,
+produces a wonderful impression on me, both now and always, and in being
+mentioned, it has reminded me, as it were, that I, too, was formerly of
+the same opinion; so that I stand in need again, as if from the very
+beginning, of some other argument which may persuade me that the soul of
+one who dies does not die with the body. Tell me, therefore, by Jupiter!
+how Socrates followed up the argument; and whether he, too, as you
+confess was the case with yourselves, seemed disconcerted at all, or
+not, but calmly maintained his position; and maintained it sufficiently
+or defectively. Relate everything to me as accurately as you can.
+
+86. _Phæd._ Indeed, Echecrates, though I have often admired Socrates, I
+was never more delighted than at being with him on that occasion. That
+he should be able to say something is perhaps not at all surprising; but
+I especially admired this in him--first of all, that he listened to the
+argument of the young men so sweetly, affably, and approvingly; in the
+next place, that he so quickly perceived how we were affected by their
+arguments; and, lastly, that he cured us so well and recalled us, when
+we were put to flight, as it were, and vanquished, and encouraged us to
+accompany him, and consider the argument with him.
+
+_Echec._ How was that?
+
+_Phæd._ I will tell you: I happened to be sitting at his right hand,
+near the bed, upon a low seat, but he himself sat much higher than I.
+Stroking my head, then, and laying hold of the hair that hung on my
+neck--for he used, often, to play with my hairs--"To-morrow," he said,
+"perhaps, Phædo, you will cut off these beautiful locks?"
+
+"It seems likely, Socrates," said I.
+
+87. "Not if you are persuaded by me."
+
+"Why so?" I asked.
+
+"To-day," he replied, "both I ought to cut off mine and you yours, if
+our argument must die, and we are unable to revive it. And I, if I were
+you, and the arguments were to escape me, would take an oath, as the
+Argives do, not to suffer my hair to grow until I had renewed the
+contest, and vanquished the arguments of Simmias and Cebes."
+
+"But," I said, "even Hercules himself is said not to have been a match
+for two."
+
+"Call upon me, then," he said, "as your Iolaus, while it is yet day."
+
+"I do call on you, then," I said, "not as Hercules upon Iolaus, but as
+Iolaus upon Hercules."
+
+"It will make no difference," he replied. "But, first of all, we must
+beware lest we meet with some mischance."
+
+"What?" I asked.
+
+"That we do not become," he answered, "haters of reasoning, as some
+become haters of men; for no greater evil can happen to any one than to
+hate reasoning. 88. But hatred of reasoning and hatred of mankind both
+spring from the same source. For hatred of mankind is produced in us
+from having placed too great reliance on some one without sufficient
+knowledge of him, and from having considered him to be a man altogether
+true, sincere, and faithful, and then, after a little while, finding him
+depraved and unfaithful, and after him another. And when a man has
+often experienced this, and especially from those whom he considered his
+most intimate and best friends, at length, having frequently stumbled,
+he hates all men, and thinks that there is no soundness at all in any of
+them. Have you not perceived that this happens so?"
+
+"Certainly," I replied.
+
+"Is it not a shame?" he said "And is it not evident that such a one
+attempts to deal with men without sufficient knowledge of human affairs?
+For if he had dealt with them with competent knowledge, as the case
+really is, so he would have considered that the good and the bad are
+each very few in number, and that those between both are most numerous."
+
+89. "How say you?" I asked.
+
+"In the same manner," he replied, "as with things very little and very
+large Do you think that any thing is more rare than to find a very large
+on a very little man, or dog, or any thing else? and, again, swift or
+slow, beautiful or ugly, white or black? Do you not perceive that of all
+such things the extremes are rare and few, but that the intermediate are
+abundant and numerous?"
+
+"Certainly," I replied.
+
+"Do you not think, then," he continued, "that if a contest in wickedness
+were proposed, even here very few would be found pre-eminent?"
+
+"It is probable," I said.
+
+"It is so," he said, "but in this respect reasonings do not resemble
+men, for I was just now following you as my leader, but in this they do
+resemble them, when any one believes in any argument as true without
+being skilled in the art of reasoning, and then shortly afterward it
+appears to him to be false, at one time being so and at another time
+not, and so on with one after another,[34] and especially they who
+devote themselves to controversial arguments, you are aware, at length
+think they have become very wise and have alone discovered that there is
+nothing sound and stable either in things or reasonings but that all
+things that exist, as is the case with the Euripus, are in a constant
+state of flux and reflux, and never continue in any one condition for
+any length of time."
+
+"You speak perfectly true," I said.
+
+90. "Would it not, then, Phædo" he said "be a sad thing if, when there
+is a true and sound reasoning, and such as one can understand, one
+should then, through lighting upon such arguments as appear to be at one
+time true and at another false, not blame one's self and one's own want
+of skill, but at length, through grief, should anxiously transfer the
+blame from one's self to the arguments, and thereupon pass the rest of
+one's life in hating and reviling arguments and so be depraved of the
+truth and knowledge of things that exist?"
+
+"By Jupiter!" I said, "it would be sad, indeed."
+
+"In the first place, then," he said, "let us beware of this, and let us
+not admit into our souls the notion that there appears to be nothing
+sound in reasoning, but much rather that we are not yet in a sound
+condition, and that we ought vigorously and strenuously to endeavor to
+become sound, you and the others, on account of your whole future life,
+but I, on account of my death, since I am in danger, at the present
+time, of not behaving as becomes a philosopher with respect to this very
+subject, but as a wrangler, like those who are utterly uninformed 91.
+For they, when they dispute about any thing, care nothing at all for the
+subject about which the discussion is, but are anxious about this, that
+what they have themselves advanced shall appear true to the persons
+present. And I seem to myself on the present occasion to differ from
+them only in this respect, for I shall not be anxious to make what I say
+appear true to those who are present, except that may happen by the way,
+but that it may appear certainly to be so to myself. For I thus reason,
+my dear friend, and observe how interestedly. If what I say be true, it
+is well to be persuaded of it, but if nothing remains to one that is
+dead, I shall, at least, during the interval before death be less
+disagreeable to those present by my lamentations. But this ignorance of
+mine will not continue long, for that would be bad, but will shortly be
+put an end to. Thus prepared, then, Simmias and Cebes," he continued, "I
+now proceed to my argument. Do you, however, if you will be persuaded by
+me, pay little attention to Socrates, but much more to the truth, and if
+I appear to you to say any thing true, assent to it, but if not, oppose
+me with all your might, taking good care that in my zeal I do not
+deceive both myself and you, and, like a bee, depart leaving my sting
+behind."
+
+92. "But let us proceed," he said "First of all, remind me of what you
+said, if I should appear to have forgotten it For Simmias, as I think,
+is in doubt, and fears lest the soul, though more divine and beautiful
+than the body, should perish before it, as being a species of harmony.
+But Cebes appeared to me to grant me this, that the soul is more durable
+than the body, but he argued that it is uncertain to every one, whether
+when the soul has worn out many bodies and that repeatedly, it does
+not, on leaving the last body, itself also perish, so that this very
+thing is death, the destruction of the soul, since the body never ceases
+decaying Are not these the things, Simmias and Cebes, which we have to
+inquire into?"
+
+They both agreed that they were.
+
+"Whether, then," he continued "do you reject all our former arguments,
+or some of them only, and not others?"
+
+"Some we do," they replied, "and others not."
+
+"What, then," he proceeded, "do you say about that argument in which we
+asserted that knowledge is reminiscence, and that, this being the case,
+our soul must necessarily have existed somewhere before it was inclosed
+in the body?"
+
+93. "I, indeed," replied Cebes "was both then wonderfully persuaded by
+it, and now persist in it, as in no other argument."
+
+"And I, too," said Simmias, "am of the same mind, and should very much
+wonder if I should ever think otherwise on that point."
+
+"Then," Socrates said, "you must needs think otherwise, my Theban
+friend, if this opinion holds good, that harmony is something
+compounded, and that the soul is a kind of harmony that results from the
+parts compacted together in the body. For surely you will not allow
+yourself to say that harmony was composed prior to the things from which
+it required to be composed Would you allow this?"
+
+"By no means, Socrates" he replied.
+
+"Do you perceive, then," he said, "that this result from what you say,
+when you assert that the soul existed before it came into a human form
+and body, but that it was composed from things that did not yet exist?
+For harmony is not such as that to which you compare it, but first the
+lyre, and the chords, and the sounds yet unharmonized, exist, and, last
+of all, harmony is produced, and first perishes. How, then, will this
+argument accord with that?"
+
+"Not at all," said Simmias.
+
+94. "And yet," he said, "if in any argument, there ought to be an
+accordance in one respecting harmony."
+
+"There ought," said Simmias.
+
+"This of yours, however," he said, "is not in accordance. Consider,
+then, which of these two statements do you prefer--that knowledge is
+reminiscence, or the soul harmony?"
+
+"The former by far, Socrates," he replied; "for the latter occurred to
+me without demonstration, through a certain probability and speciousness
+whence most men derive their opinions. But I am well aware that
+arguments which draw their demonstrations from probabilities are idle;
+and, unless one is on one's guard against them, they are very deceptive,
+both in geometry and all other subjects. But the argument respecting
+reminiscence and knowledge may be said to have been demonstrated by a
+satisfactory hypothesis. For in this way it was said that our soul
+existed before it came into the body, because the essence that bears the
+appellation of 'that which is' belongs to it. But of this, as I persuade
+myself, I am fully and rightly convinced. It is therefore necessary, as
+it seems, that I should neither allow myself nor any one else to
+maintain that the soul is harmony."
+
+95. "But what, Simmias," said he, "if you consider it thus? Does it
+appear to you to appertain to harmony, or to any other composition, to
+subsist in any other way than the very things do of which it is
+composed?"
+
+"By no means."
+
+"And indeed, as I think, neither to do any thing, nor suffer any thing
+else, besides what they do or suffer."
+
+He agreed.
+
+"It does not, therefore, appertain to harmony to take the lead of the
+things of which it is composed, but to follow them."
+
+He assented.
+
+"It is, then, far from being the case that harmony is moved or sends
+forth sounds contrariwise, or is in any other respect opposed to its
+parts?"
+
+"Far, indeed," he said.
+
+"What, then? Is not every harmony naturally harmony, so far as it has
+been made to accord?"
+
+"I do not understand you," he replied.
+
+"Whether," he said, "if it should be in a greater degree and more fully
+made to accord, supposing that were possible, would the harmony be
+greater and more full; but if in a less degree and less fully, then
+would it be inferior and less full?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Is this, then, the case with the soul that, even in the smallest
+extent, one soul is more fully and in a greater degree, or less fully
+and in a less degree, this very thing, a soul, than another?"
+
+"In no respect whatever," he replied.
+
+96. "Well, then," he said, "by Jupiter! is one soul said to possess
+intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and another folly and vice, and
+to be bad? and is this said with truth?"
+
+"With truth, certainly."
+
+"Of those, then, who maintain that the soul is harmony, what will any
+one say that these things are in the soul, virtue and vice? Will he call
+them another kind of harmony and discord, and say that the one, the good
+soul, is harmonized, and, being harmony, contains within itself another
+harmony, but that the other is discordant, and does not contain within
+itself another harmony?"
+
+"I am unable to say," replied Simmias; "but it is clear that he who
+maintains that opinion would say something of the kind."
+
+"But it has been already granted," said he, "that one soul is not more
+or less a soul than another; and this is an admission that one harmony
+is not to a greater degree or more fully, or to a less degree or less
+fully, a harmony, than another; is it not so?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"And that that which is neither more or less harmony is neither more nor
+less harmonized: is it so?"
+
+"It is."
+
+"But does that which is neither more or less harmonized partake of more
+or less harmony, or an equal amount?"
+
+"An equal amount."
+
+97. "A soul, therefore, since it is not more or less this very thing, a
+soul, than another, is not more or less harmonized?"
+
+"Even so."
+
+"Such, then, being its condition, it can not partake of a greater degree
+of discord or harmony?"
+
+"Certainly not."
+
+"And, again, such being its condition, can one soul partake of a greater
+degree of vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord, and virtue
+harmony?"
+
+"It can not."
+
+"Or rather, surely, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul will
+partake of vice, if it is harmony; for doubtless harmony, which is
+perfectly such, can never partake of discord?"
+
+"Certainly not."
+
+"Neither, therefore, can a soul which is perfectly a soul partake of
+vice."
+
+"How can it, from what has been already said?"
+
+"From this reasoning, then, all souls of all animals will be equally
+good, if, at least, they are by nature equally this very thing, souls?"
+
+"It appears so to me, Socrates," he said.
+
+"And does it appear to you," he said, "to have been thus rightly argued,
+and that the argument would lead to this result, if the hypothesis were
+correct, that the soul is harmony?"
+
+98. "On no account whatever," he replied.
+
+"But what," said he, "of all the things that are in man? Is there any
+thing else that you say bears rule except the soul, especially if it be
+wise?"
+
+"I should say not."
+
+"Whether by yielding to the passions in the body, or by opposing them?
+My meaning is this: for instance, when heat and thirst are present, by
+drawing it the contrary way, so as to hinder it from drinking; and when
+hunger is present, by hindering it from eating; and in ten thousand
+other instances we see the soul opposing the desires of the body. Do we
+not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But have we not before allowed that if the soul were harmony, it would
+never utter a sound contrary to the tension, relaxation, vibration, or
+any other affection to which its component parts are subject, but would
+follow, and never govern them?"
+
+"We did allow it," he replied, "for how could we do otherwise?"
+
+"What, then? Does not the soul now appear to act quite the contrary,
+ruling over all the parts from which any one might say it subsists, and
+resisting almost all of them through the whole of life, and exercising
+dominion over them in all manner of ways; punishing some more severely
+even with pain, both by gymnastics and medicine, and others more mildly;
+partly threatening, and partly admonishing the desires, angers and
+fears, as if, being itself of a different nature, it were conversing
+with something quite different? 99. Just as Homer has done in the
+Odyssey,[35] where he speaks of Ulysses--'Having struck his breast, he
+chid his heart in the following words: Bear up, my heart; ere this thou
+hast borne far worse.' Do you think that he composed this in the belief
+that the soul was harmony, and capable of being led by the passions of
+the body, and not rather that it was able to lead and govern them, as
+being something much more divine than to be compared with harmony?"
+
+"By Jupiter! Socrates, it appears so to me."
+
+"Therefore, my excellent friend, it is on no account correct for us to
+say that the soul is a kind of harmony; for, as it appears, we should
+neither agree with Homer, that divine poet, nor with ourselves."
+
+"Such is the case," he replied.
+
+"Be it so, then," said Socrates, "we have already, as it seems,
+sufficiently appeased this Theban harmony. But how, Cebes, and by what
+arguments, shall we appease this Cadmus?"[36]
+
+100. "You appear to me," replied Cebes, "to be likely to find out; for
+you have made out this argument against harmony wonderfully beyond my
+expectation. For when Simmias was saying what his doubts were, I
+wondered very much whether any one would be able to answer his
+reasoning. It, therefore, appeared to me unaccountable that he did not
+withstand the very first onset of your argument. I should not,
+therefore, be surprised if the arguments of Cadmus met with the same
+fate."
+
+"My good friend," said Socrates, "do not speak so boastfully, lest some
+envious power should overthrow the argument that is about to be urged.
+These things, however, will be cared for by the deity; but let us,
+meeting hand to hand, in the manner of Homer, try whether you say any
+thing to the purpose. This, then, is the sum of what you inquire you
+require it to be proved that our soul is imperishable and immortal; if a
+philosopher that is about to die, full of confidence and hope that after
+death he shall be far happier than if he had died after leading a
+different kind of life, shall not entertain this confidence foolishly
+and vainly. 101. But to show that the soul is something strong and
+divine, and that it existed before we men were born, you say not at all
+hinders, but that all these things may evince, not its immortality, but
+that the soul is durable, and existed an immense space of time before,
+and knew and did many things. But that, for all this, it was not at all
+the more immortal, but that its very entrance into the body of a man was
+the beginning of its destruction, as if it were a disease; so that it
+passes through this life in wretchedness, and at last perishes in that
+which is called death. But you say that it is of no consequence whether
+it comes into a body once or often, with respect to our occasion of
+fear; for it is right he should be afraid, unless he is foolish, who
+does not know, and can not give a reason to prove, that the soul is
+immortal. Such, I think, Cebes, is the sum of what you say; and I
+purposely repeat it often, that nothing may escape us, and, if you
+please, you may add to or take from it."
+
+Cebes replied, "I do not wish at present either to take from or add to
+it; that is what I mean."
+
+102. Socrates, then having paused for some time, and considered
+something within himself, said, "You inquire into no easy matter, Cebes;
+for it is absolutely necessary to discuss the whole question of
+generation and corruption. If you please, then, I will relate to you
+what happened to me with reference to them; and afterward, if any thing
+that I shall say shall appear to you useful toward producing conviction
+on the subject you are now treating of, make use of it."
+
+"I do indeed wish it," replied Cebes.
+
+"Hear my relation, then. When I was a young man, Cebes, I was
+wonderfully desirous of that wisdom which they call a history of nature;
+for it appeared to me to be a very sublime thing to know the causes of
+every thing--why each thing is generated, why it perishes, and why it
+exists. And I often tossed myself upward and downward, considering first
+such things as these, whether when heat and cold have undergone a
+certain corruption, as some say, then animals are formed; and whether
+the blood is that by means of which we think, or air, or fire, or none
+of these, but that it is the brain that produces the perceptions of
+hearing, seeing, and smelling; and that from these come memory and
+opinion; and from memory and opinion, when in a state of rest, in the
+same way knowledge is produced. 103. And, again, considering the
+corruptions of these, and the affections incidental to the heavens and
+the earth, I at length appeared to myself so unskillful in these
+speculations that nothing could be more so. But I will give you a
+sufficient proof of this; for I then became, by these very speculations,
+so very blind with respect to things which I knew clearly before, as it
+appeared to myself and others, that I unlearned even the things which I
+thought I knew before, both on many other subjects and also this, why a
+man grows. For, before, I thought this was evident to every one--that it
+proceeds from eating and drinking; for that, when, from the food, flesh
+is added to flesh, bone to bone, and so on in the same proportion, what
+is proper to them is added to the several other parts, then the bulk
+which was small becomes afterward large, and thus that a little man
+becomes a big one. Such was my opinion at that time. Does it appear to
+you correct?"
+
+"To me it does," said Cebes.
+
+104. "Consider this further. I thought that I had formed a right
+opinion, when, on seeing a tall man standing by a short one, I judged
+that he was taller by the head, and in like manner, one horse than
+another; and, still more clearly than this, ten appeared to me to be
+more than eight by two being added to them, and that two cubits are
+greater than one cubit by exceeding it a half."
+
+"But now," said Cebes, "what think you of these matters?"
+
+"By Jupiter!" said he, "I am far from thinking that I know the cause of
+these, for that I can not even persuade myself of this: when a person
+has added one to one, whether the one to which the addition has been
+made has become two, or whether that which has been added, and that to
+which the addition has been made, have become two by the addition of the
+one to the other. For I wonder if, when each of these was separate from
+the other, each was one, and they were not yet two; but when they have
+approached nearer each other this should be the cause of their becoming
+two--namely, the union by which they have been placed nearer one
+another. 105. Nor yet, if any person should divide one, am I able to
+persuade myself that this, their division, is the cause of its becoming
+two. For this cause is the contrary to the former one of their becoming
+two; for then it was because they were brought nearer to each other, and
+the one was added to the other; but now it is because one is removed and
+separated from the other. Nor do I yet persuade myself that I know why
+one is one, nor, in a word, why any thing else is produced, or perishes,
+or exists, according to this method of proceeding; but I mix up another
+method of my own at random, for this I can on no account give in to."
+
+"But, having once heard a person reading from a book, written, as he
+said, by Anaxagoras, and which said that it is intelligence that sets in
+order and is the cause of all things, I was delighted with this cause,
+and it appeared to me in a manner to be well that intelligence should be
+the cause of all things, and I considered with myself, if this is so,
+that the regulating intelligence orders all things, and disposes each in
+such way as will be best for it. 106. If any one, then, should desire to
+discover the cause of every thing, in what way it is produced, or
+perishes, or exists, he must discover this respecting it--in what way it
+is best for it either to exist, or to suffer, or do any thing else. From
+this mode of reasoning, then, it is proper that a man should consider
+nothing else, both with respect to himself and others, than what is most
+excellent and best; and it necessarily follows that this same person
+must also know that which is worst, for that the knowledge of both of
+them is the same. Thus reasoning with myself, I was delighted to think I
+had found in Anaxagoras a preceptor who would instruct me in the causes
+of things, agreeably to my own mind, and that he would inform me, first,
+whether the earth is flat or round, and, when he had informed me,
+would, moreover, explain the cause and necessity of its being so,
+arguing on the principle of the better, and showing that it is better
+for it to be such as it is; and if he should say that it is in the
+middle, that he would, moreover, explain how it is better for it to be
+in the middle; and if he should make all this clear to me, I was
+prepared no longer to require any other species of cause. 107. I was in
+like manner prepared to inquire respecting the sun and moon and the
+other stars, with respect to their velocities in reference to each
+other, and their revolutions and other conditions, in what way it is
+better for both to act and be affected as it does and is. For I never
+thought that after he had said that these things were set in order by
+intelligence, he would introduce any other cause for them than that it
+is best for them to be as they are. Hence, I thought, that in assigning
+the cause to each of them, and to all in common, he would explain that
+which is best for each, and the common good of all. And I would not have
+given up my hopes for a good deal; but, having taken up his books with
+great eagerness, I read through them as quickly as I could, that I might
+as soon as possible know the best and the worst."
+
+108. "From this wonderful hope, however, my friend, I was speedily
+thrown down, when, as I advance and read over his works, I meet with a
+man who makes no use of intelligence, nor assigns any causes for the
+ordering of all things, but makes the causes to consist of air, ether,
+and water, and many other things equally absurd. And he appeared to me
+to be very like one who should say that whatever Socrates does he does
+by intelligence, and then, attempting to describe the causes of each
+particular action, should say, first of all, that for this reason I am
+now sitting here, because my body is composed of bones and sinews and
+that the bones are hard, and have joints separate from each other, but
+that the sinews, being capable of tension and contraction, cover the
+bones, together with the flesh and skin which contain them. The bones,
+therefore, being suspended in their sockets, the nerves, relaxing and
+tightening, enable me to bend my limbs as I now do, and from this cause
+I sit here bent up. 109. And if, again, he should assign other similar
+causes for my conversing with you, assigning as causes voice, and air,
+and hearing, and ten thousand other things of the kind, omitting to
+mention the real causes, that since it appeared better to the Athenians
+to condemn me, I therefore thought it better to sit here, and more just
+to remain and submit to the punishment which they have ordered; for, by
+the dog! I think these sinews and bones would have been long ago either
+in Megara or Boeotia, borne thither by an opinion of that which is best,
+if I had not thought it more just and honorable to submit to whatever
+sentence the city might order than to flee and run stealthily away. But
+to call such things causes is too absurd. But if any one should say that
+without possessing such things as bones and sinews, and whatever else I
+have, I could not do what I pleased, he would speak the truth; but to
+say that I do as I do through them, and that I act thus by intelligence,
+and not from the choice of what is best, would be a great and extreme
+disregard of reason. 110. For this would be not to be able to
+distinguish that the real cause is one thing, and that another, without
+which a cause could not be a cause; which, indeed, the generality of men
+appear to me to do, fumbling, as it were, in the dark, and making use of
+strange names, so as to denominate them as the very cause. Wherefore one
+encompassing the earth with a vortex from heaven makes the earth remain
+fixed; but another, as if it were a broad trough, rests it upon the air
+as its base; but the power by which these things are now so disposed
+that they may be placed in the best manner possible, this they neither
+inquire into, nor do they think that it requires any superhuman
+strength; but they think they will some time or other find out an Atlas
+stronger and more immortal than this, and more capable of containing all
+things; and in reality, the good, and that which ought to hold them
+together and contain them, they take no account of at all. I, then,
+should most gladly have become the disciple of any one who would teach
+me of such a cause, in what way it is. But when I was disappointed of
+this, and was neither able to discover it myself, nor to learn it from
+another, do you wish, Cebes, that I should show you in what way I set
+out upon a second voyage in search of the cause?"
+
+111. "I wish it exceedingly," he replied.
+
+"It appeared to me, then," said he, "after this, when I was wearied with
+considering things that exist, that I ought to beware lest I should
+suffer in the same way as they do who look at and examine an eclipse of
+the sun, for some lose the sight of their eyes, unless they behold its
+image in water, or some similar medium. And I was affected with a
+similar feeling, and was afraid lest I should be utterly blinded in my
+soul through beholding things with the eyes, and endeavoring to grasp
+them by means of the several senses. It seemed to me, therefore, that I
+ought to have recourse to reasons, and to consider in them the truth of
+things. Perhaps, however, this similitude of mine may in some respect be
+incorrect; for I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in
+their reasons considers them in their images, more than he does who
+views them in their effects. However, I proceeded thus, and on each
+occasion laying down the reason, which I deem to be the strongest,
+whatever things appear to me to accord with this I regard as true, both
+with respect to the cause and every thing else; but such as do not
+accord I regard as not true. 112. But I wish to explain my meaning to
+you in a clearer manner; for I think that you do not yet understand me."
+
+"No, by Jupiter!" said Cebes, "not well."
+
+"However," continued he, "I am now saying nothing new, but what I have
+always at other times, and in a former part of this discussion, never
+ceased to say. I proceed, then, to attempt to explain to you that
+species of cause which I have busied myself about, and return again to
+those well-known subjects, and set out from them, laying down as an
+hypothesis, that there is a certain abstract beauty, and goodness, and
+magnitude, and so of all other things; which if you grant me, and allow
+that they do exist, I hope that I shall be able from these to explain
+the cause to you, and to discover that the soul is immortal."
+
+"But," said Cebes, "since I grant you this, you may draw your conclusion
+at once."
+
+"But consider," he said, "what follows from thence, and see if you can
+agree with me. For it appears to me that if there is any thing else
+beautiful besides beauty itself, it is not beautiful for any other
+reason than because it partakes of that abstract beauty; and I say the
+same of every thing. Do you admit such a cause?"
+
+"I do admit it," he replied.
+
+113. "I do not yet understand," he continued, "nor am I able to
+conceive, those other wise causes; but if any one should tell me why any
+thing is beautiful, either because it has a blooming florid color, or
+figure, or any thing else of the kind, I dismiss all other reasons, for
+I am confounded by them all; but I simply, wholly, and perhaps
+foolishly, confine myself to this, that nothing else causes it to be
+beautiful except either the presence or communication of that abstract
+beauty, by whatever means and in whatever way communicated; for I can
+not yet affirm this with certainty, but only that by means of beauty all
+beautiful things become beautiful. For this appears to me the safest
+answer to give both to myself and others; and adhering to this, I think
+that I shall never fall, but that it is a safe answer both for me and
+any one else to give--that by means of beauty beautiful things become
+beautiful. Does it not also seem so to you?"
+
+"It does."
+
+"And that by magnitude great things become great, and greater things,
+greater; and by littleness less things become less?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+114. "You would not, then, approve of it, if any one said that one
+person is greater than another by the head, and that the less is less by
+the very same thing; but you would maintain that you mean nothing else
+than that every thing that is greater than another is greater by nothing
+else than magnitude, and that it is greater on this account--that is, on
+account of magnitude; and that the less is less by nothing else than
+littleness, and on this account less--that is, on account of littleness;
+being afraid, I think, lest some opposite argument should meet you if
+you should say that any one is greater and less by the head; as, first,
+that the greater is greater, and the less less, by the very same thing;
+and, next, that the greater is greater by the head, which is small; and
+that it is monstrous to suppose that any one is great through something
+small. Should you not be afraid of this?"
+
+To which said Cebes, smilingly, "Indeed, I should."
+
+"Should you not, then," he continued, "be afraid to say that ten is more
+than eight by two, and for this cause exceeds it, and not by number,
+and on account of number? and that two cubits are greater than one cubit
+by half, and not by magnitude (for the fear is surely the same)?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+115. "What, then? When one has been added to one, would you not beware
+of saying that the addition is the cause of its being two, or division
+when it has been divided; and would you not loudly assert that you know
+no other way in which each thing subsists, than by partaking of the
+peculiar essence of each of which it partakes, and that in these cases
+you can assign no other cause of its becoming two than its partaking of
+duality; and that such things as are to become two must needs partake of
+this, and what is to become one, of unity; but these divisions and
+additions, and other such subtleties, you would dismiss, leaving them to
+be given as answers by persons wiser than yourself; whereas you,
+fearing, as it is said, your own shadow and inexperience, would adhere
+to this safe hypothesis, and answer accordingly? But if any one should
+assail this hypothesis of yours, would you not dismiss him, and refrain
+from answering him till you had considered the consequences resulting
+from it, whether in your opinion they agree with or differ from each
+other? But when it should be necessary for you to give a reason for it,
+would you give one in a similar way, by again laying down another
+hypothesis, which should appear the best of higher principles, until you
+arrived at something satisfactory; but, at the same time, you would
+avoid making confusion, as disputants do, in treating of the first
+principle and the results arising from it, if you really desire to
+arrive at the truth of things? 116. For they, perhaps, make no account
+at all of this, nor pay any attention to it; for they are able, through
+their wisdom, to mingle all things together, and at the same time please
+themselves. But you, if you are a philosopher, would act, I think, as I
+now describe."
+
+"You speak most truly," said Simmias and Cebes together.
+
+_Echec._ By Jupiter! Phædo, they said so with good reason; for he
+appears to me to have explained these things with wonderful clearness,
+even to one endued with a small degree of intelligence.
+
+_Phæd._ Certainly, Echecrates, and so it appeared to all who were
+present.
+
+_Echec._ And so it appears to me, who was absent, and now hear it
+related. But what was said after this?
+
+As well as I remember, when these things had been granted him, and it
+was allowed that each several idea exists of itself,[37] and that other
+things partaking of them receive their denomination from them, he next
+asked: "If, then," he said, "you admit that things are so, whether, when
+you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates, but less than Phædo, do
+you not then say that magnitude and littleness are both in Simmias?"
+
+"I do."
+
+117. "And yet," he said, "you must confess that Simmias's exceeding
+Socrates is not actually true in the manner in which the words express
+it; for Simmias does not naturally exceed Socrates in that he is
+Simmias, but in consequence of the magnitude which he happens to have;
+nor, again, does he exceed Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but
+because Socrates possesses littleness in comparison with his magnitude?"
+
+"True."
+
+"Nor, again, is Simmias exceeded by Phædo, because Phædo is Phædo, but
+because Phædo possesses magnitude in comparison with Simmias's
+littleness?"
+
+"It is so."
+
+"Thus, then, Simmias has the appellation of being both little and great,
+being between both, by exceeding the littleness of one through his own
+magnitude, and to the other yielding a magnitude that exceeds his own
+littleness." And at the same time, smiling, he said, "I seem to speak
+with the precision of a short-hand writer; however, it is as I say."
+
+He allowed it.
+
+118. "But I say it for this reason, wishing you to be of the same
+opinion as myself. For it appears to me, not only that magnitude itself
+is never disposed to be at the same time great and little, but that
+magnitude in us never admits the little nor is disposed to be exceeded,
+but one of two things, either to flee and withdraw when its contrary,
+the little, approaches it, or, when it has actually come, to perish; but
+that it is not disposed, by sustaining and receiving littleness, to be
+different from what it was. Just as I, having received and sustained
+littleness, and still continuing the person that I am, am this same
+little person; but that, while it is great, never endures to be little.
+And, in like manner, the little that is in us is not disposed at any
+time to become or to be great, nor is any thing else among contraries,
+while it continues what it was, at the same time disposed to become and
+to be its contrary; but in this contingency it either departs or
+perishes."
+
+119. "It appears so to me," said Cebes, "in every respect."
+
+But some one of those present, on hearing this, I do not clearly
+remember who he was, said, "By the gods! was not the very contrary of
+what is now asserted admitted in the former part of our discussion, that
+the greater is produced from the less, and the less from the greater,
+and, in a word, that the very production of contraries is from
+contraries? But now it appears to me to be asserted that this can never
+be the case."
+
+Upon this Socrates, having leaned his head forward and listened, said,
+"You have reminded me in a manly way; you do not, however, perceive the
+difference between what is now and what was then asserted. For then it
+was said that a contrary thing is produced from a contrary; but now,
+that a contrary can never become contrary to itself--neither that which
+is in us, nor that which is in nature. For then, my friend, we spoke of
+things that have contraries, calling them by the appellation of those
+things; but now we are speaking of those very things from the presence
+of which things so called receive their appellation, and of these very
+things we say that they are never disposed to admit of production from
+each other." 120. And, at the same time looking at Cebes, "Has anything
+that has been said, Cebes, disturbed you?"
+
+"Indeed," said Cebes, "I am not at all so disposed; however, I by no
+means say that there are not many things that disturb me."
+
+"Then," he continued, "we have quite agreed to this, that a contrary can
+never be contrary to itself."
+
+"Most certainly," he replied.
+
+"But, further," he said, "consider whether you will agree with me in
+this also. Do you call heat and cold any thing?"
+
+"I do."
+
+"The same as snow and fire?"
+
+"By Jupiter! I do not."
+
+"But heat is something different from fire, and cold something different
+from snow?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"But this, I think, is apparent to you--that snow, while it is snow, can
+never, when it has admitted heat, as we said before, continue to be what
+it was, snow and hot; but, on the approach of heat, it must either
+withdraw or perish?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"And, again, that fire, when cold approaches it, must either depart or
+perish; but that it will never endure, when it has admitted coldness, to
+continue what it was, fire and cold?"
+
+121. "You speak truly," he said.
+
+"It happens, then," he continued, "with respect to some of such things,
+that not only is the idea itself always thought worthy of the same
+appellation, but likewise something else which is not, indeed, that idea
+itself, but constantly retains its form so long as it exists. What I
+mean will perhaps be clearer in the following examples: the odd in
+number must always possess the name by which we now call it, must it
+not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Must it alone, of all things--for this I ask--or is there any thing
+else which is not the same as the odd, but yet which we must always call
+odd, together with its own name, because it is so constituted by nature
+that it can never be without the odd? But this, I say, is the case with
+the number three, and many others. For consider with respect to the
+number three: does it not appear to you that it must always be called by
+its own name, as well as by that of the odd, which is not the same as
+the number three? Yet such is the nature of the number three, five, and
+the entire half of number, that though they are not the same as the odd,
+yet each of them is always odd. And, again, two and four, and the whole
+other series of number, though not the same as the even, are
+nevertheless each of them always even: do you admit this, or not?"
+
+122. "How should I not?" he replied.
+
+"Observe then," said he, "what I wish to prove. It is this--that it
+appears not only that these contraries do not admit each other, but that
+even such things as are not contrary to each other, and yet always
+possess contraries, do not appear to admit that idea which is contrary
+to the idea that exists in themselves, but, when it approaches, perish
+or depart. Shall we not allow that the number three would first perish,
+and suffer any thing whatever, rather than endure, while it is still
+three, to become even?"
+
+"Most certainly," said Cebes.
+
+"And yet," said he, "the number two is not contrary to three."
+
+"Surely not."
+
+"Not only, then, do ideas that are contrary never allow the approach of
+each other, but some other things also do not allow the approach of
+contraries."
+
+"You say very truly," he replied.
+
+"Do you wish, then," he said, "that, if we are able, we should define
+what these things are?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Would they not then, Cebes," he said, "be such things as, whatever they
+occupy, compel that thing not only to retain its own idea, but also that
+of something which is always a contrary?"
+
+"How do you mean?"
+
+123. "As we just now said. For you know, surely, that whatever things
+the idea of three occupies must of necessity not only be three, but also
+odd?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"To such a thing, then, we assert, that the idea contrary to that form
+which constitutes this can never come."
+
+"It can not."
+
+"But did the odd make it so?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"And is the contrary to this the idea of the even?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"The idea of the even, then, will never come to the three?"
+
+"No, surely."
+
+"Three, then, has no part in the even?"
+
+"None whatever."
+
+"The number three is uneven?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"What, therefore, I said should be defined--namely, what things they are
+which, though not contrary to some particular thing, yet do not admit of
+the contrary itself; as, in the present instance, the number three,
+though not contrary to the even, does not any the more admit it, for it
+always brings the contrary with it, just as the number two does to the
+odd, fire to cold, and many other particulars. Consider, then, whether
+you would thus define, not only that a contrary does not admit a
+contrary, but also that that which brings with it a contrary to that to
+which it approaches will never admit the contrary of that which it
+brings with it. 124. But call it to mind again, for it will not be
+useless to hear it often repeated. Five will not admit the idea of the
+even, nor ten, its double, that of the odd. This double, then, though it
+is itself contrary to something else,[38] yet will not admit the idea of
+the odd, nor will half as much again, nor other things of the kind, such
+as the half and the third part, admit the idea of the whole, if you
+follow me, and agree with me that it is so."
+
+"I entirely agree with you," he said, "and follow you."
+
+"Tell me again, then," he said, "from the beginning; and do not answer
+me in the terms in which I put the question, but in different ones,
+imitating my example. For I say this because, besides that safe mode of
+answering which I mentioned at first,[39] from what has now been said, I
+see another no less safe one. For if you should ask me what that is
+which, if it be in the body, will cause it to be hot, I should not give
+you that safe but unlearned answer, that it is heat, but one more
+elegant, from what we have just now said, that it is fire; nor, if you
+should ask me what that is which, if it be in the body, will cause it to
+be diseased, should I say that it is disease, but fever; nor if you
+should ask what that is which, if it be in number, will cause it to be
+odd, should I say that it is unevenness, but unity; and so with other
+things. But consider whether you sufficiently understand what I mean."
+
+125. "Perfectly so," he replied.
+
+"Answer me, then," he said, "what that is which, when it is in the body,
+the body will be alive?"
+
+"Soul," he replied.
+
+"Is not this, then, always the case?"
+
+"How should it not be?" said he.
+
+"Does the soul, then, always bring life to whatever it occupies?"
+
+"It does indeed," he replied.
+
+"Whether, then, is there any thing contrary to life or not?"
+
+"There is," he replied.
+
+"What?"
+
+"Death."
+
+"The soul, then, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings
+with it, as has been already allowed?"
+
+"Most assuredly," replied Cebes.
+
+"What, then? How do we denominate that which does not admit the idea of
+the even?"
+
+"Uneven," he replied.
+
+"And that which does not admit the just, nor the musical?"
+
+"Unmusical," he said, "and unjust."
+
+"Be it so. But what do we call that which does not admit death?"
+
+"Immortal," he replied.
+
+"Therefore, does not the soul admit death?"
+
+"No."
+
+"Is the soul, then, immortal?"
+
+"Immortal."
+
+126. "Be it so," he said. "Shall we say, then, that this has been now
+demonstrated? or how think you?"
+
+"Most completely, Socrates."
+
+"What, then," said he, "Cebes, if it were necessary for the uneven to be
+imperishable, would the number three be otherwise than imperishable?"
+
+"How should it not?"
+
+"If, therefore, it were also necessary that what is without heat should
+be imperishable, when any one should introduce heat to snow, would not
+the snow withdraw itself, safe and unmelted? For it would not perish;
+nor yet would it stay and admit the heat."
+
+"You say truly," he replied.
+
+"In like manner, I think, if that which is insusceptible of cold were
+imperishable, that when any thing cold approached the fire, it would
+neither be extinguished nor perish, but would depart quite safe."
+
+"Of necessity," he said.
+
+"Must we not, then, of necessity," he continued, "speak thus of that
+which is immortal? if that which is immortal is imperishable, it is
+impossible for the soul to perish, when death approaches it. For, from
+what has been said already, it will not admit death, nor will ever be
+dead; just as we said that three will never be even, nor, again, will
+the odd; nor will fire be cold, nor yet the heat that is in fire. 127.
+But some one may say, what hinders, though the odd can never become even
+by the approach of the even, as we have allowed, yet, when the odd is
+destroyed, that the even should succeed in its place? We could not
+contend with him who should make this objection that it is not
+destroyed, for the uneven is not imperishable; since, if this were
+granted us, we might easily have contended that, on the approach of the
+even, the odd and the three depart; and we might have contended in the
+same way with respect to fire, heat, and the rest, might we not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Wherefore, with respect to the immortal, if we have allowed that it is
+imperishable, the soul, in addition to its being immortal, must also be
+imperishable; if not, there will be need of other arguments."
+
+"But there is no need," he said, "so far as that is concerned; for
+scarcely could any thing not admit of corruption, if that which is
+immortal and eternal is liable to it."
+
+128. "The deity, indeed, I think," said Socrates, "and the idea itself
+of life, and if anything else is immortal, must be allowed by all beings
+to be incapable of dissolution."
+
+"By Jupiter!" he replied, "by all men, indeed, and still more, as I
+think, by the gods."
+
+"Since, then, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, can the
+soul, since it is immortal, be any thing else than imperishable?"
+
+"It must, of necessity, be so."
+
+"When, therefore, death approaches a man, the mortal part of him, as it
+appears, dies, but the immortal part departs safe and uncorrupted,
+having withdrawn itself from death?"
+
+"It appears so."
+
+"The soul, therefore," he said, "Cebes, is most certainly immortal and
+imperishable, and our souls will really exist in Hades."
+
+"Therefore, Socrates," he said, "I have nothing further to say against
+this, nor any reason for doubting your arguments. But if Simmias here,
+or any one else, has any thing to say, it were well for him not to be
+silent; for I know not to what other opportunity beyond the present any
+one can defer it, who wishes either to speak or hear about these
+things."
+
+"But, indeed," said Simmias, "neither have I any reason to doubt what
+has been urged; yet, from the magnitude of the subject discussed, and
+from my low opinion of human weakness, I am compelled still to retain a
+doubt within myself with respect to what has been said."
+
+"Not only so, Simmias," said Socrates, "but you say this well; and,
+moreover, the first hypotheses, even though they are credible to you,
+should nevertheless be examined more carefully; and if you should
+investigate them sufficiently, I think you will follow my reasoning as
+far as it is possible for man to do so; and if this very point becomes
+clear, you will inquire no further."
+
+"You speak truly," he said.
+
+"But it is right, my friends," he said, "that we should consider this---
+that if the soul is immortal, it requires our care not only for the
+present time, which we call life, but for all time; and the danger would
+now appear to be dreadful if one should neglect it. 130. For if death
+were a deliverance from every thing, it would be a great gain for the
+wicked, when they die, to be delivered at the same time from the body,
+and from their vices together with the soul; but now, since it appears
+to be immortal, it can have no other refuge from evils, nor safety,
+except by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul goes to
+Hades possessing nothing else than its discipline and education, which
+are said to be of the greatest advantage or detriment to the dead, on
+the very beginning of his journey thither. For, thus, it is said that
+each person's demon who was assigned to him while living, when he dies
+conducts him to some place, where they that are assembled together must
+receive sentence, and then proceed to Hades with that guide who has been
+ordered to conduct them from hence thither. But there having received
+their deserts, and having remained the appointed time, another guide
+brings them back hither again, after many and long revolutions of time.
+The journey, then, is not such as the Telephus of Æschylus describes it;
+for he says that a simple path leads to Hades; but it appears to me to
+be neither simple nor one, for there would be no need of guides, nor
+could any one ever miss the way, if there were but one. But now it
+appears to have many divisions and windings; and this I conjecture from
+our religious and funeral rites.[40] 131. The well-ordered and wise
+soul, then, both follows, and is not ignorant of its present condition;
+but that which through passion clings to the body, as I said before,
+having longingly fluttered about it for a long time, and about its
+visible place,[41] after vehement resistance and great suffering, is
+forcibly and with great difficulty led away by its appointed demon. And
+when it arrives at the place where the others are, impure and having
+done any such thing as the committal of unrighteous murders or other
+similar actions, which are kindred to these, and are the deeds of
+kindred souls, every one shuns it and turns away from it, and will be
+neither its fellow-traveler nor guide; but it wanders about, oppressed
+with every kind of helplessness, until certain periods have elapsed; and
+when these are completed, it is carried, of necessity, to an abode
+suitable to it. But the soul which has passed through life with purity
+and moderation, having obtained the gods for its fellow-travelers and
+guides, settles each in the place suited to it. 132. There are, indeed,
+many and wonderful places in the earth, and it is itself neither of such
+a kind nor of such a magnitude as is supposed by those who are
+accustomed to speak of the earth, as I have been persuaded by a certain
+person."
+
+Whereupon Simmias said, "How mean you, Socrates? For I, too, have heard
+many things about the earth--not, however, those things which have
+obtained your belief. I would, therefore, gladly hear them."
+
+"Indeed, Simmias, the art of Glaucus[42] does not seem to me to be
+required to relate what these things are. That they are true, however,
+appears to me more than the art of Glaucus can prove, and, besides, I
+should probably not be able to do it; and even if I did know how, what
+remains to me of life, Simmias, seems insufficient for the length of the
+subject. However, the form of the earth, such as I am persuaded it is,
+and the different places in it, nothing hinders me from telling."
+
+"But that will be enough," said Simmias.
+
+"I am persuaded, then," said he, "in the first place, that, if the earth
+is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a spherical form, it has no
+need of air, nor of any other similar force, to prevent it from falling;
+but that the similarity of the heavens to themselves on every side, and
+the equilibrium of the earth itself, are sufficient to support it; for a
+thing in a state of equilibrium when placed in the middle of something
+that presses it equally on all sides can not incline more or less on any
+side, but, being equally affected all around, remains unmoved. 133. In
+the first place, then," he said, "I am persuaded of this."
+
+"And very properly so," said Simmias.
+
+"Yet, further," said he, "that it is very large, and that we who inhabit
+some small portion of it, from the river Phasis to the pillars of
+Hercules, dwell about the sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh; and
+that many others elsewhere dwell in many similar places, for that there
+are everywhere about the earth many hollows of various forms and sizes
+into which there is a confluence of water, mist and air; but that the
+earth itself, being pure, is situated in the pure heavens, in which are
+the stars, and which most persons who are accustomed to speak about such
+things call ether; of which these things are the sediment, and are
+continually flowing into the hollow parts of the earth. 134. That we are
+ignorant, then, that we are dwelling in its hollows, and imagine that we
+inhabit the upper parts of the earth, just as if any one dwelling in the
+bottom of the sea should think that he dwelt on the sea, and, beholding
+the sun and the other stars through the water, should imagine that the
+sea was the heavens; but, through sloth and weakness, should never have
+reached the surface of the sea; nor, having emerged and risen up from
+the sea to this region, have seen how much more pure and more beautiful
+it is than the place where he is, nor has heard of it from any one else
+who has seen it. This, then, is the very condition in which we are; for,
+dwelling in some hollow of the earth, we think that we dwell on the
+surface of it, and call the air heaven, as if the stars moved through
+this, being heaven itself. But this is because, by reason of our
+weakness and sloth, we are unable to reach to the summit of the air.
+Since, if any one could arrive at its summit, or, becoming winged, could
+fly up thither, or, emerging from hence, he would see--just as with us,
+fishes, emerging from the sea, behold what is here, so any one would
+behold the things there; and if his nature were able to endure the
+contemplation, he would know that that is the true heaven, and the true
+light, and the true earth. 135. For this earth and these stones, and the
+whole region here, are decayed and corroded, as things in the sea by the
+saltness; for nothing of any value grows in the sea, nor, in a word,
+does it contain any thing perfect; but there are caverns and sand, and
+mud in abundance, and filth, in whatever parts of the sea there is
+earth, nor are they at all worthy to be compared with the beautiful
+things with us. But, on the other hand, those things in the upper
+regions of the earth would appear far more to excel the things with us.
+For, if we may tell a beautiful fable, it is well worth hearing,
+Simmias, what kind the things are on the earth beneath the heavens."
+
+"Indeed, Socrates," said Simmias, "we should be very glad to hear that
+fable."
+
+136. "First of all, then, my friend," he continued, "this earth, if any
+one should survey it from above, is said to have the appearance of
+balls covered with twelve different pieces of leather, variegated and
+distinguished with colors, of which the colors found here, and which
+painters use, are, as it were, copies. But there the whole earth is
+composed of such, and far more brilliant and pure than these; for one
+part of it is purple, and of wonderful beauty, part of a golden color,
+and part of white, more white than chalk or snow, and, in like manner,
+composed of other colors, and those more in number and more beautiful
+than any we have ever beheld. And those very hollow parts of the earth,
+though filled with water and air, exhibit a certain species of color,
+shining among the variety of other colors, so that one continually
+variegated aspect presents itself to the view. In this earth, being
+such, all things that grow, grow in a manner proportioned to its
+nature--trees, flowers and fruits; and, again, in like manner, its
+mountains and stones possess, in the same proportion, smoothness and
+transparency, and more beautiful colors; of which the well-known stones
+here that are so highly prized are but fragments, such as
+sardine-stones, jaspers, and emeralds, and all of that kind. But there,
+there is nothing subsists that is not of this character, and even more
+beautiful than these. 137. But the reason of this is, because the stones
+there are pure, and not eaten up and decayed, like those here, by
+rottenness and saltness, which flow down hither together, and which
+produce deformity and disease in the stones and the earth, and in other
+things, even animals and plants. But that earth is adorned with all
+these, and, moreover, with gold and silver, and other things of the
+kind: for they are naturally conspicuous, being numerous and large, and
+in all parts of the earth; so that to behold it is a sight for the
+blessed. There are also many other animals and men upon it, some
+dwelling in mid-earth, others about the air, as we do about the sea, and
+others in islands which the air flows round, and which are near the
+continent; and, in one word, what water and the sea are to us, for our
+necessities, the air is to them; and what air is to us, that ether is to
+them. 138. But their seasons are of such a temperament that they are
+free from disease, and live for a much longer time than those here, and
+surpass us in sight, hearing, and smelling, and every thing of this
+kind, as much as air excels water, and ether air, in purity. Moreover,
+they have abodes and temples of the gods, in which gods really dwell,
+and voices and oracles, and sensible visions of the gods, and such-like
+intercourse with them; the sun, too, and moon, and stars, are seen by
+them such as they really are, and their felicity in other respects is
+correspondent with these things."
+
+"And, such, indeed, is the nature of the whole earth, and the parts
+about the earth; but there are many places all round it throughout its
+cavities, some deeper and more open than that in which we dwell; but
+others that are deeper have a less chasm than our region, and others are
+shallower in depth than it is here, and broader. 139. But all these are
+in many places perforated one into another under the earth, some with
+narrower and some with wider channels, and have passages through, by
+which a great quantity of water flows from one into another, as into
+basins, and there are immense bulks of ever-flowing rivers under the
+earth, both of hot and cold water, and a great quantity of fire, and
+mighty rivers of fire, and many of liquid mire, some purer, and some
+more miry, as in Sicily there are rivers of mud that flow before the
+lava, and the lava itself, and from these the several places are filled,
+according as the overflow from time to time happens to come to each of
+them. But all these move up and down, as it were, by a certain
+oscillation existing in the earth. And this oscillation proceeds from
+such natural cause as this; one of the chasms of the earth is
+exceedingly large, and perforated through the entire earth, and is that
+which Homer[43] speaks of, 'very far off, where is the most profound
+abyss beneath the earth,' which elsewhere both he and many other poets
+have called Tartarus. For into this chasm all rivers flow together, and
+from it flow out again; but they severally derive their character from
+the earth through which they flow. 140. And the reason why all streams
+flow out from thence, and flow into it, is because this liquid has
+neither bottom nor base. Therefore, it oscillates and fluctuates up and
+down, and the air and the wind around it do the same; for they accompany
+it both when it rushes to those parts of the earth, and when to these.
+And as in respiration the flowing breath is continually breathed out and
+drawn in, so there the wind oscillating with the liquid causes certain
+vehement and irresistible winds both as it enters and goes out. When,
+therefore, the water rushing in descends to the place which we call the
+lower region, it flows through the earth into the streams there, and
+fills them, just as men pump up water. But when again it leaves those
+regions and rushes hither, it again fills the rivers here; and these,
+when filled, flow through channels and through the earth, and, having
+severally reached the several places to which they are journeying, they
+make seas, lakes, rivers, and fountains. 141. Then, sinking again from
+thence beneath the earth, some of them having gone round longer and more
+numerous places, and others round fewer and shorter, they again
+discharge themselves into Tartarus--some much lower than they were drawn
+up, others only a little so; but all of them flow in again beneath the
+point at which they flowed out. And some issue out directly opposite the
+place by which they flow in, others on the same side. There are also
+some which, having gone round altogether in a circle, folding themselves
+once or several times round the earth, like serpents, when they have
+descended as low as possible, discharge themselves again; and it is
+possible for them to descend on either side as far as the middle, but
+not beyond; for in each direction there is an acclivity to the streams
+both ways."
+
+"Now, there are many other large and various streams; but among this
+great number there are four certain streams, of which the largest, and
+that which flows most outwardly round the earth, is called Ocean; but
+directly opposite this, and flowing in a contrary direction, is Acheron,
+which flows through other desert places, and, moreover, passing under
+the earth, reaches the Acherusian lake, where the souls of most who die
+arrive; and, having remained there for certain destined periods, some
+longer and some shorter, are again sent forth into the generations of
+animals. 142. A third river issues midway between these, and, near its
+source, falls into a vast region, burning with abundance of fire, and
+forms a lake larger than our sea, boiling with water and mud. From hence
+it proceeds in a circle, turbulent and muddy, and, folding itself round
+it, reaches both other places and the extremity of the Acherusian lake,
+but does not mingle with its water; but, folding itself oftentimes
+beneath the earth, it discharges itself into the lower parts of
+Tartarus. And this is the river which they call Pyriphlegethon, whose
+burning streams emit dissevered fragments in whatever part of the earth
+they happen to be. Opposite to this, again, the fourth river first falls
+into a place dreadful and savage, as it is said, having its whole color
+like cyanus:[44] this they call Stygian, and the lake which the river
+forms by its discharge, Styx. This river, having fallen in here, and
+received awful power in the water, sinking beneath the earth, proceeds,
+folding itself round, in an opposite course to Pyriphlegethon, and meets
+it in the Acherusian lake from, a contrary direction. Neither does the
+water of this river mingle with any other; but it, too, having gone
+round in a circle, discharges itself into Tartarus, opposite to
+Pyriphlegethon. Its name, as the poets say, is Cocytus."
+
+143. "These things being thus constituted, when the dead arrive at the
+place to which their demon leads them severally, first of all they are
+judged, as well those who have lived well and piously, as those who have
+not. And those who appear to have passed a middle kind of life,
+proceeding to Acheron, and embarking in the vessels they have, on these
+arrive at the lake, and there dwell; and when they are purified, and
+have suffered punishment for the iniquities they may have committed,
+they are set free, and each receives the reward of his good deeds,
+according to his deserts. But those who appear to be incurable, through
+the magnitude of their offenses, either from having committed many and
+great sacrileges, or many unjust and lawless murders, or other similar
+crimes, these a suitable destiny hurls into Tartarus, whence they never
+come forth. 144. But those who appear to have been guilty of curable yet
+great offenses--such as those who, through anger, have committed any
+violence against father or mother, and have lived the remainder of their
+life in a state of penitence, or they who have become homicides in a
+similar manner--these must, of necessity, fall into Tartarus. But after
+they have fallen, and have been there for a year, the wave casts them
+forth, the homicides into Cocytus, but the parricides and matricides
+into Pyriphlegethon. But when, being borne along, they arrive at the
+Acherusian lake, there they cry out to and invoke, some those whom they
+slew, others those whom they injured, and, invoking them, they entreat
+and implore them to suffer them to go out into the lake, and to receive
+them, and if they persuade them, they go out, and are freed from their
+sufferings, but if not, they are borne back to Tartarus, and thence
+again to the rivers. And they do not cease from suffering this until
+they have persuaded those whom they have injured, for this sentence was
+imposed on them by the judges. 145. But those who are found to have
+lived an eminently holy life, these are they who, being freed and set at
+large from these regions in the earth as from a prison, arrive at the
+pure abode above, and dwell on the upper parts of the earth. And among
+these, they who have sufficiently purified themselves by philosophy
+shall live without bodies, throughout all future time, and shall arrive
+at habitations yet more beautiful than these which it is neither easy to
+describe, nor at present is there sufficient time for the purpose."
+
+"But, for the sake of these things which we have described, we should
+use every endeavor, Simmias, so as to acquire virtue and wisdom in this
+life, for the reward is noble, and the hope great."
+
+"To affirm positively, indeed, that these things are exactly as I have
+described them does not become a man of sense. That, however, either
+this, or something of the kind, takes place with respect to our souls
+and their habitations--since our soul is certainly immortal--this
+appears to me most fitting to be believed, and worthy the hazard for one
+who trusts in its reality; for the hazard is noble, and it is right to
+allure ourselves with such things, as with enchantments, for which
+reason I have prolonged my story to such a length. 146. On account of
+these things, then, a man ought to be confident about his soul who,
+during this life, has disregarded all the pleasures and ornaments of the
+body as foreign from his nature, and who, having thought that they do
+more harm than good, has zealously applied himself to the acquirement of
+knowledge, and who, having adorned his soul, not with a foreign, but its
+own proper ornament--temperance, justice, fortitude, freedom, and
+truth--thus waits for his passage to Hades, as one who is ready to
+depart whenever destiny shall summon him. You, then," he continued,
+"Simmias and Cebes, and the rest, will each of you depart at some future
+time, but now destiny summons me, as a tragic writer would say, and it
+is nearly time for me to betake myself to the bath, for it appears to me
+to be better to drink the poison after I have bathed myself, and not to
+trouble the women with washing my dead body."
+
+147. When he had thus spoken, Crito said, "So be it, Socrates, but what
+commands have you to give to these or to me, either respecting your
+children, or any other matter, in attending to which we can most oblige
+you?"
+
+"What I always say, Crito," he replied, "nothing new that by taking care
+of yourselves you will oblige both me and mine, and yourselves, whatever
+you do, though you should not now promise it, and if you neglect
+yourselves, and will not live, as it were, in the footsteps of what has
+been now and formerly said, even though you should promise much at
+present, and that earnestly, you will do no good at all."
+
+"We will endeavor, then, so to do," he said. "But how shall we bury
+you?"
+
+"Just as you please," he said, "if only you can catch me, and I do not
+escape from you." 148. And, at the same time smiling gently, and looking
+round on us, he said, "I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that I am
+that Socrates who is now conversing with you, and who methodizes each
+part of the discourse; but he thinks that I am he whom he will shortly
+behold dead, and asks how he should bury me. But that which I some time
+since argued at length, that when I have drunk the poison I shall no
+longer remain with you, but shall depart to some happy state of the
+blessed, this I seem to have urged to him in vain, though I meant at the
+same time to console both you and myself. Be ye, then, my sureties to
+Crito," he said, "in an obligation contrary to that which he made to the
+judges (for he undertook that I should remain); but do you be sureties
+that, when I die, I shall not remain, but shall depart, that Crito may
+more easily bear it; and, when he sees my body either burned or buried,
+may not be afflicted for me, as if I suffered from some dreadful thing;
+nor say at my interment that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or
+is buried. 149. For be well assured," he said, "most excellent Crito,
+that to speak improperly is not only culpable as to the thing itself,
+but likewise occasions some injury to our souls. You must have a good
+courage, then, and say that you bury my body, and bury it in such a
+manner as is pleasing to you, and as you think is most agreeable to our
+laws."
+
+When he had said thus, he rose, and went into a chamber to bathe, and
+Crito followed him, but he directed us to wait for him. We waited,
+therefore, conversing among ourselves about what had been said, and
+considering it again, and sometimes speaking about our calamity, how
+severe it would be to us, sincerely thinking that, like those who are
+deprived of a father, we should pass the rest of our life as orphans.
+When he had bathed, and his children were brought to him (for he had
+two little sons and one grown up), and the women belonging to his family
+were come, having conversed with them in the presence of Crito, and
+given them such injunctions as he wished, he directed the women and
+children to go away, and then returned to us. And it was now near
+sunset; for he spent a considerable time within. 150. But when he came
+from bathing he sat down, and did not speak much afterward; then the
+officer of the Eleven came in, and, standing near him, said, "Socrates,
+I shall not have to find that fault with you that I do with others, that
+they are angry with me, and curse me, when, by order of the archons, I
+bid them drink the poison. But you, on all other occasions during the
+time you have been here, I have found to be the most noble, meek, and
+excellent man of all that ever came into this place; and, therefore, I
+am now well convinced that you will not be angry with me (for you know
+who are to blame), but with them. Now, then (for you know what I came to
+announce to you), farewell, and endeavor to bear what is inevitable as
+easily as possible." And at the same time, bursting into tears, he
+turned away and withdrew.
+
+151. And Socrates, looking after him, said, "And thou, too, farewell. We
+will do as you direct." At the same time turning to us, he said, "How
+courteous the man is! During the whole time I have been here he has
+visited me, and conversed with me sometimes, and proved the worthiest of
+men; and now how generously he weeps for me! But come, Crito, let us
+obey him, and let some one bring the poison, if it is ready pounded; but
+if not, let the man pound it."
+
+Then Crito said, "But I think, Socrates, that the sun is still on the
+mountains, and has not yet set. Besides, I know that others have drunk
+the poison very late, after it had been announced to them, and have
+supped and drunk freely, and some even have enjoyed the objects of their
+love. Do not hasten, then, for there is yet time."
+
+Upon this Socrates replied, "These men whom you mention, Crito, do these
+things with good reason, for they think they shall gain by so doing; and
+I, too, with good reason, shall not do so; for I think I shall gain
+nothing by drinking a little later, except to become ridiculous to
+myself, in being so fond of life, and sparing of it, when none any
+longer remains. Go then," he said, "obey, and do not resist."
+
+152. Crito, having heard this, nodded to the boy that stood near. And
+the boy, having gone out and staid for some time, came, bringing with
+him the man that was to administer the poison, who brought it ready
+pounded in a cup. And Socrates, on seeing the man, said, "Well, my good
+friend, as you are skilled in these matters, what must I do?"
+
+"Nothing else," he replied, "than, when you have drunk it, walk about
+until there is a heaviness in your legs; then lie down: thus it will do
+its purpose." And at the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. And
+he having received it very cheerfully, Echecrates neither trembling, nor
+changing at all in color or countenance, but, as he was wont, looking
+steadfastly at the man, said, "What say you of this potion, with respect
+to making a libation to any one, is it lawful or not?"
+
+"We only pound so much, Socrates," he said, "as we think sufficient to
+drink."
+
+153. "I understand you," he said; "but it is certainly both lawful and
+right to pray to the gods, that my departure hence thither may be happy;
+which, therefore, I pray, and so may it be." And as he said this, he
+drank it off readily and calmly. Thus far, most of us were with
+difficulty able to restrain ourselves from weeping; but when we saw him
+drinking, and having finished the draught, we could do so no longer;
+but, in spite of myself, the tears came in full torrent, so that,
+covering my face, I wept for myself; for I did not weep for him, but for
+my own fortune, in being deprived of such a friend. But Crito, even
+before me, when he could not restrain his tears, had risen up. 154. But
+Apollodorus, even before this, had not ceased weeping; and then,
+bursting into an agony of grief, weeping and lamenting, he pierced the
+heart of every one present, except Socrates himself. But he said, "What
+are you doing, my admirable friends? I, indeed, for this reason chiefly,
+sent away the women, that they might not commit any folly of this kind.
+For I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. Be quiet,
+therefore, and bear up."
+
+When we heard this, we were ashamed, and restrained our tears. But he,
+having walked about, when he said that his legs were growing heavy, lay
+down on his back; for the man had so directed him. And, at the same
+time, he who gave the poison taking hold of him, after a short interval,
+examined his feet and legs; and then, having pressed his foot hard, he
+asked if he felt it: he said that he did not. And after this he pressed
+his thighs; and, thus going higher, he showed us that he was growing
+cold and stiff. Then Socrates touched himself, and said that when the
+poison reached his heart he should then depart. 155. But now the parts
+around the lower belly were almost cold; when, uncovering himself, for
+he had been covered over, he said (and they were his last words),
+"Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius; pay it, therefore; and do not
+neglect it."
+
+"It shall be done," said Crito; "but consider whether you have any thing
+else to say."
+
+To this question he gave no reply; but, shortly after, he gave a
+convulsive movement, and the man covered him, and his eyes were fixed;
+and Crito, perceiving it, closed his mouth and eyes.
+
+This, Echecrates, was the end of our friend,--a man, as we may say, the
+best of all of his time that we have known, and, moreover, the most wise
+and just.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+  [25] Phlius, to which Echecrates belonged, was a town of Sicyonia, in
+    Peloponnesus.
+
+  [26] A Pythagorean of Crotona.
+
+  [27] Namely, "that it is better to die than to live."
+
+  [28] Hitto, Boetian for hioto.
+
+  [29] Of Pythagoras.
+
+  [30] Some boyish spirit.
+
+  [31] That is, at a time of life when the body is in full vigor.
+
+  [32] In the original there is a play on the words Haides and
+    haeides, which I can only attempt to retain by departing from
+    the usual rendering of the former word.
+
+  [33] By this I understand him to mean that the soul alone can perceive
+    the truth, but the senses, as they are different, receive and convey
+    different impressions of the same thing; thus, the eye receives one
+    impression of an object, the ear a totally different one.
+
+  [34] kai ahythis eteros kai eteros, that is, "with one argument
+    after another" Though Cousin translates it _et successivement tout
+    different de luimeme_ and Ast, _et rursus alia atque alia_, which
+    may be taken in either sense, yet it appears to me to mean that,
+    when a man repeatedly discovers the fallacy of arguments which he
+    before believed to be true, he distrusts reasoning altogether, just
+    as one who meets with friend after friend who proves unfaithful
+    becomes a misanthrope.
+
+  [35] Lib. xx, v. 7.
+
+  [36] Harmony was the wife of Cadmus, the founder of Thebes; Socrates,
+    therefore, compares his two Theban friends, Simmias and Cebes, with
+    them, and says that, having overcome Simmias, the advocate of
+    Harmony, he must now deal with Cebes, who is represented by Cadmus.
+
+  [37] einai ti, literally, "is something."
+
+  [38] That is, to single.
+
+  [39] Sec. 113.
+
+  [40] It is difficult to express the distinction between osia
+    and nomima. The former word seems to have reference to the souls of
+    the dead; the latter, to their bodies.
+
+  [41] Its place of interment.
+
+  [42] A proverb meaning "a matter of great difficulty."
+
+  [43] "Iliad," lib. viii., v. 14.
+
+  [44] A metallic substance of a deep-blue color, frequently mentioned by
+    the earliest Grecian writers, but of which the nature is unknown.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13726 ***
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+PH&AElig;DO OF SOCRATES, by PLATO.</title>
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+<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13726 ***</div>
+
+<div class="titlepage"><a class='pagenumber' name='page1' id=
+'page1'></a> <a name='apology_crito_and_phaedo_of_socrates' id=
+'apology_crito_and_phaedo_of_socrates'></a>
+
+<h1><span class='smalltext'>Plato's</span><br>
+ Apology, Crito And Ph&aelig;do<br>
+ Of<br>
+ Socrates.</h1>
+
+<br class="noncss">
+
+
+<div class='titleelement'>Literally Translated By
+
+<div class='contributor'>Henry Cary, M.A.,</div>
+
+<span class="emphasis">Worcester College, Oxford</span></div>
+
+<br class="noncss">
+
+
+<div class='titleelement'>With An Introduction By
+
+<div class='contributor'>Edward Brooks, jr.</div>
+</div>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="toc"><a class='pagenumber' name='page2' id='page2'></a>
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page3' id='page3'></a> <a name=
+'contents' id='contents'></a>
+
+<h2>Contents.</h2>
+
+<div class="tocitem"><a href='#introduction'>Introduction</a></div>
+
+<div class="tocitem"><a href='#the_apology_of_socrates'>The Apology
+Of Socrates</a></div>
+
+<div class="tocitem"><a href=
+'#introduction_to_the_crito'>Introduction to the crito</a></div>
+
+<div class="tocitem"><a href=
+'#crito_or_the_duty_of_a_citizen'>Crito; Or, The Duty Of A
+Citizen</a></div>
+
+<div class="tocitem"><a href=
+'#introduction_to_the_phaedo'>Introduction To The
+Ph&aelig;do</a></div>
+
+<div class="tocitem"><a href=
+'#phaedo_or_the_immortality_of_the_soul'>Ph&aelig;do; Or, The
+Immortality Of The Soul</a></div>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="introduction"><a class='pagenumber' name='page4' id=
+'page4'></a> <a class='pagenumber' name='page5' id='page5'></a> <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page6' id='page6'></a> <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page7' id='page7'></a> <a name=
+'introduction'></a>
+
+<h2>Introduction.</h2>
+
+<p>Of all writers of speculative philosophy, both ancient and
+modern, there is probably no one who has attained so eminent a
+position as Plato. What Homer was to Epic poetry, what Cicero and
+Demosthenes were to oratory, and what Shakespeare was to the drama
+of England, Plato was to ancient philosophy, not unapproachable nor
+unapproached, but possessing an inexplicable but unquestioned
+supremacy.</p>
+
+<p>The authentic records of his life are meagre, and much that has
+been written concerning him is of a speculative nature. He was born
+at Athens in the year 427 B.C. His father's name was Ariston, and
+his mother's family, which claimed its descent from Solon, included
+among its members many Athenian notables, among whom was Oritias,
+one of the thirty tyrants.</p>
+
+<p>In his early youth Plato applied himself to poetry and painting,
+both of which pursuits he relinquished to become the disciple and
+follower of Socrates. It is said that his name was originally
+Aristocles, but that it was changed to Plato on account of the
+breadth of his shoulders and forehead. He is also said to have been
+an expert wrestler and to have taken part in several important
+battles.</p>
+
+<p>He was the devoted friend and pupil of Socrates, and during the
+imprisonment of his master he attended him <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page8' id='page8'></a> constantly, and committed to writing
+his last discourses on the immortality of the soul.</p>
+
+<p>After the death of Socrates it is supposed that Plato took
+refuge with Euclides in Megara, and subsequently extended his
+travels into Magna Graecia and Egypt.</p>
+
+<p>Upon his return to Athens he taught those who came to him for
+instruction in the grove named Academus, near the Cephisus, and
+thus founded the first great philosophical school, over which he
+continued to preside until the day of his death. Above the entrance
+to this grove was inscribed the legend: "Let no one ignorant of
+geometry enter here." Here he was attended by persons of every
+description, among the more illustrious of whom were Aristotle,
+Lycurgus, Demosthenes and Isocrates.</p>
+
+<p>There is a story to the effect that Plato three times visited
+Sicily, once upon the invitation of the elder Dionysius, and twice
+at the earnest solicitations of the younger. The former he is said
+to have so seriously offended as to cause the tyrant to have him
+seized on his return home and sold as a slave, from which state of
+bondage he was, however, released by Anicerius of Cyrene.</p>
+
+<p>The people of his time thought more of him than they did of all
+their other philosophers, and called him the Divine Plato. So great
+was the regard and veneration for him that it was considered better
+to err with Plato than be right with any one else.</p>
+
+<p>The writings of Plato are numerous, and most of them are in the
+form of dialogues. The following pages contain translations of
+three of his works, viz.: "The Apologia," "The Crito" and "The
+Ph&aelig;do," all of <a class='pagenumber' name='page9' id=
+'page9'></a>which have reference to the trial, imprisonment and
+death of Socrates.</p>
+
+<p>"The Apologia" represents Socrates on trial for his life,
+undertaking his own defence, though unaccustomed to the language of
+the courts, the occasion being, as he says, the first time he has
+ever been before a court of justice, though seventy years of age.
+Plato was present at the trial, and no doubt gives us the very
+arguments used by the accused. Two charges were brought against
+Socrates&mdash;one that he did not believe in the gods recognized
+by the State, the other that he had corrupted the Athenian youth by
+his teachings. Socrates does not have recourse to the ordinary
+methods adopted by orators on similar occasions. He prefers to
+stand upon his own integrity and innocence, uninfluenced by the
+fear of that imaginary evil, death. He, therefore, does not firmly
+grapple with either of the charges preferred against him. He
+neither denies nor confesses the first accusation, but shows that
+in several instances he conformed to the religious customs of his
+country, and that he believes in God more than he fears man. The
+second charge he meets by a cross-examination of his accuser,
+Melitus, whom he reduces to the dilemma of charging him with
+corrupting the youth designedly, which would be absurd, or with
+doing so undesignedly, for which he could not be liable to
+punishment.</p>
+
+<p>His defence, however, avails him nothing, and he is condemned by
+the judges to die by drinking the poisonous hemlock. In the closing
+part of "The Apologia" Socrates is represented as commenting upon
+the sentence which has been passed upon him, and as expressing his
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page10' id='page10'></a>belief that in
+going to his death he is only passing to a better and a happier
+life.</p>
+
+<p>In "The Crito" Socrates is represented in conversation with a
+friend of his named Crito, who had been present at his trial, and
+who had offered to assist Socrates in paying a fine, had a fine
+been the sentence imposed. Crito visits Socrates in his confinement
+to bring to him the intelligence that the ship, the arrival of
+which was to be the signal for his death upon the following day,
+would arrive forthwith, and to urge him to adopt the means of
+escape which had already been prepared. Socrates promises to follow
+the advice of Crito if, upon a full discussion of the matter, it
+seems right to do so. In the conversation which ensues Socrates
+argues that it is wrong to return evil for evil and that the
+obligations which a citizen owes to his State are more binding than
+those which a child owes his parents or a slave his master, and,
+therefore, it is his duty to submit to the laws of Athens at
+whatever cost to himself. Crito has no answer to make to this
+argument, and Socrates thereupon decides to submit to his fate.</p>
+
+<p>Plato is said to have had two objects in writing this dialogue:
+First, to acquit Socrates of the charge of corrupting the Athenian
+youth; and, second, to establish the fact that it is necessary
+under all circumstances to submit to the established laws of his
+country.</p>
+
+<p>"The Ph&aelig;do" relates the manner in which Socrates spent the
+last day of his life and the circumstances attending his death. He
+is visited by a number of his friends, among whom are Ph&aelig;do,
+Simmias and Crito. When his friends arrive they find him sitting
+upon a bed <a class='pagenumber' name='page11' id='page11'></a>
+rubbing his legs, which have just been released from bonds. He
+remarks upon the unaccountable connection between pleasure and
+pain, and from this the conversation gradually turns to a
+consideration of the question of the immortality of the soul. He
+convinces his listeners of the pre-existence of the soul; but they
+are still skeptical as to its immortality, urging that its
+pre-existence and the fact that it is more durable than the body
+does not preclude the possibility of its being mortal. Socrates,
+however, argues that contraries cannot exist in the same thing at
+the same time, as, for example, the same object cannot partake of
+both magnitude and littleness at the same time. In like manner,
+heat while it is heat can never admit the idea of cold. Life and
+death are contraries and can never coexist; but wherever there is
+life there is soul, so that the soul contains that which is
+contrary to death and can never admit death; consequently the soul
+is immortal.</p>
+
+<p>Having convinced his listeners, Socrates bathes and takes leave
+of his children and the women of his family. Thereupon the officer
+appears and tells him it is time for him to drink the poison. At
+this his friends commence to weep and are rebuked by Socrates for
+their weakness. He drinks the poison calmly and without hesitation,
+and then begins to walk about, still conversing with his friends.
+His limbs soon grow stiff and heavy and he lays himself down upon
+his back. His last words are: "Crito, we owe a cock to
+&AElig;sculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not neglect it."</p>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="book"><a class='pagenumber' name='page12' id=
+'page12'></a> <a class='pagenumber' name='page13' id='page13'></a>
+<a name='the_apology_of_socrates'></a>
+
+<h2>The Apology Of Socrates.</h2>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec1" name=
+"apology_sec1"></a>I know not, O Athenians! how far you have been
+influenced by my accusers for my part, in listening to them I
+almost forgot myself, so plausible were their arguments however, so
+to speak, they have said nothing true. But of the many falsehoods
+which they uttered I wondered at one of them especially, that in
+which they said that you ought to be on your guard lest you should
+be deceived by me, as being eloquent in speech. For that they are
+not ashamed of being forthwith convicted by me in fact, when I
+shall show that I am not by any means eloquent, this seemed to me
+the most shameless thing in them, unless indeed they call him
+eloquent who speaks the truth. For, if they mean this, then I would
+allow that I am an orator, but not after their fashion for they, as
+I affirm, have said nothing true, but from me you shall hear the
+whole truth. Not indeed, Athenians, arguments highly wrought, as
+theirs were, with choice phrases and expressions, nor adorned, but
+you shall hear a speech uttered without premeditation in such words
+as first present themselves. For I am confident that what I say
+will be just, and let none of you expect otherwise, for surely it
+would not become my time of life to come before you like a youth
+with a got up speech. Above all things, <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page14' id='page14'></a>therefore, I beg and implore this of you,
+O Athenians! if you hear me defending myself in the same language
+as that in which I am accustomed to speak both in the forum at the
+counters, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, not to be
+surprised or disturbed on this account. For the case is this: I now
+for the first time come before a court of justice, though more than
+seventy years old; I am therefore utterly a stranger to the
+language here. As, then, if I were really a stranger, you would
+have pardoned me if I spoke in the language and the manner in which
+I had been educated, so now I ask this of you as an act of justice,
+as it appears to me, to disregard the manner of my speech, for
+perhaps it may be somewhat worse, and perhaps better, and to
+consider this only, and to give your attention to this, whether I
+speak what is just or not; for this is the virtue of a judge, but
+of an orator to speak the truth.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec2" name=
+"apology_sec2">2</a>. First, then, O Athenians! I am right in
+defending myself against the first false accusations alleged
+against me, and my first accusers, and then against the latest
+accusations, and the latest accusers. For many have been accusers
+of me to you, and for many years, who have asserted nothing true,
+of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his party, although
+they too are formidable; but those are still more formidable,
+Athenians, who, laying hold of many of you from childhood, have
+persuaded you, and accused me of what is not true: "that there is
+one Socrates, a wise man, who occupies himself about celestial
+matters, and has explored every thing under the earth, and makes
+the worse appear the better reason." Those, O Athenians! who have
+spread abroad this report are my formidable accusers; for they who
+hear them think that such as search into these things do not
+believe that there are gods. In the next place, these accusers are
+numerous, and have accused me now for <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page15' id='page15'></a>a long time; moreover, they said these
+things to you at that time of life in which you were most
+credulous, when you were boys and some of you youths, and they
+accused me altogether in my absence, when there was no one to
+defend me. But the most unreasonable thing of all is, that it is
+not possible to learn and mention their names, except that one of
+them happens to be a comic poet.<a id="footnotetag1" name=
+"footnotetag1" href="#footnote1"><sup>1</sup></a> Such, however,
+as, influenced by envy and calumny, have persuaded you, and those
+who, being themselves persuaded, have persuaded others, all these
+are most difficult to deal with; for it is not possible to bring
+any of them forward here, nor to confute any; but it is altogether
+necessary to fight, as it were with a shadow, in making my defense,
+and to convict when there is no one to answer. Consider, therefore,
+as I have said, that my accusers are twofold, some who have lately
+accused me, and others long since, whom I have made mention of; and
+believe that I ought to defend myself against these first; for you
+heard them accusing me first, and much more than these last.</p>
+
+<p>Well. I must make my defense, then, O Athenians! and endeavor in
+this so short a space of time to remove from your minds the calumny
+which you have long entertained. I wish, indeed, it might be so, if
+it were at all better both for you and me, and that in making my
+defense I could effect something more advantageous still: I think,
+however, that it will be difficult, and I am not entirely ignorant
+what the difficulty is. Nevertheless, let this turn out as may be
+pleasing to God, I must obey the law and make my defense.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec3" name=
+"apology_sec3">3</a>. Let us, then, repeat from the beginning what
+the accusation is from which the calumny against me has arisen, <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page16' id='page16'></a>and relying on
+which Melitus has preferred this indictment against me. Well. What,
+then, do they who charge me say in their charge? For it is
+necessary to read their deposition as of public accusers. "Socrates
+acts wickedly, and is criminally curious in searching into things
+under the earth, and in the heavens, and in making the worse appear
+the better cause, and in teaching these same things to others."
+Such is the accusation: for such things you have yourselves seen in
+the comedy of Aristophanes, one Socrates there carried about,
+saying that he walks in the air, and acting many other
+buffooneries, of which I understand nothing whatever. Nor do I say
+this as disparaging such a science, if there be any one skilled in
+such things, only let me not be prosecuted by Melitus on a charge
+of this kind; but I say it, O Athenians! because I have nothing to
+do with such matters. And I call upon most of you as witnesses of
+this, and require you to inform and tell each other, as many of you
+as have ever heard me conversing; and there are many such among
+you. Therefore tell each other, if any one of you has ever heard me
+conversing little or much on such subjects. And from this you will
+know that other things also, which the multitude assert of me, are
+of a similar nature.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec4" name=
+"apology_sec4">4</a>. However not one of these things is true; nor,
+if you have heard from any one that I attempt to teach men, and
+require payment, is this true. Though this, indeed, appears to me
+to be an honorable thing, if one should be able to instruct men,
+like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, and Hippias the
+Elean. For each of these, O Athenians! is able, by going through
+the several cities, to persuade the young men, who can attach
+themselves gratuitously to such of their own fellow-citizens as
+they please, to abandon their fellow-citizens and associate with
+them, giving <a class='pagenumber' name='page17' id=
+'page17'></a>them money and thanks besides. There is also another
+wise man here, a Parian, who, I hear, is staying in the city. For I
+happened to visit a person who spends more money on the sophists
+than all others together: I mean Callias, son of Hipponicus. I
+therefore asked him, for he has two sons, "Callias," I said, "if
+your two sons were colts or calves, we should have had to choose a
+master for them, and hire a person who would make them excel in
+such qualities as belong to their nature; and he would have been a
+groom or an agricultural laborer. But now, since your sons are men,
+what master do you intend to choose for them? Who is there skilled
+in the qualities that become a man and a citizen? For I suppose you
+must have considered this, since you have sons. Is there any one,"
+I said, "or not?" "Certainly," he answered. "Who is he?" said I,
+"and whence does he come? and on what terms does he teach?" He
+replied, "Evenus the Parian, Socrates, for five min&aelig;." And I
+deemed Evenus happy, if he really possesses this art, and teaches
+admirably. And I too should think highly of myself, and be very
+proud, if I possessed this knowledge, but I possess it not, O
+Athenians.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec5" name=
+"apology_sec5">5</a>. Perhaps, one of you may now object: "But,
+Socrates, what have you done, then? Whence have these calumnies
+against you arisen? For surely if you had not busied yourself more
+than others, such a report and story would never have got abroad,
+unless you had done something different from what most men do. Tell
+us, therefore, what it is, that we may not pass a hasty judgment on
+you." He who speaks thus appears to me to speak justly, and I will
+endeavor to show you what it is that has occasioned me this
+character and imputation. Listen, then: to some of you perhaps I
+shall appear to jest, yet be assured that I shall tell you the
+whole truth. For I, O Athenians! have acquired this character <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page18' id='page18'></a>through nothing
+else than a certain wisdom. Of what kind, then, is this wisdom?
+Perhaps it is merely human wisdom. For in this, in truth, I appear
+to be wise. They probably, whom I have just now mentioned,
+possessed a wisdom more than human, otherwise I know not what to
+say about it; for I am not acquainted with it, and whosoever says I
+am, speaks falsely, and for the purpose of calumniating me. But, O
+Athenians! do not cry out against me, even though I should seem to
+you to speak somewhat arrogantly. For the account which I am going
+to give you is not my own; but I shall refer to an authority whom
+you will deem worthy of credit. For I shall adduce to you the god
+at Delphi as a witness of my wisdom, if I have any, and of what it
+is. You doubtless know Ch&aelig;repho: he was my associate from
+youth, and the associate of most of you; he accompanied you in your
+late exile, and returned with you. You know, then, what kind of a
+man Ch&aelig;repho was, how earnest in whatever he undertook.
+Having once gone to Delphi, he ventured to make the following
+inquiry of the oracle (and, as I said, O Athenians! do not cry
+out), for he asked if there was any one wiser than I. The Pythian
+thereupon answered that there was not one wiser; and of this, his
+brother here will give you proofs, since he himself is dead.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec6" name=
+"apology_sec6">6</a>. Consider, then, why I mention these things:
+it is because I am going to show you whence the calumny against me
+arose. For when I heard this, I reasoned thus with myself, What
+does the god mean? What enigma is this? For I am not conscious to
+myself that I am wise, either much or little. What, then, does he
+mean by saying that I am the wisest? For assuredly he does not
+speak falsely: that he could not do. And for a long time I was in
+doubt what he meant; afterward, with considerable difficulty, I had
+recourse <a class='pagenumber' name='page19' id='page19'></a>to the
+following method of searching out his meaning. I went to one of
+those who have the character of being wise, thinking that there, if
+anywhere, I should confute the oracle, and show in answer to the
+response that This man is wiser than I, though you affirmed that I
+was the wisest. Having, then, examined this man (for there is no
+occasion to mention his name; he was, however, one of our great
+politicians, in examining whom I felt as I proceed to describe, O
+Athenians!), having fallen into conversation with him, this man
+appeared to be wise in the opinion of most other men, and
+especially in his own opinion, though in fact he was not so. I
+thereupon endeavored to show him that he fancied himself to be
+wise, but really was not. Hence I became odious, both to him and to
+many others who were present. When I left him, I reasoned thus with
+myself: I am wiser than this man, for neither of us appears to know
+anything great and good; but he fancies he knows something,
+although he knows nothing; whereas I, as I do not know anything, so
+I do not fancy I do. In this trifling particular, then, I appear to
+be wiser than he, because I do not fancy I know what I do not know.
+After that I went to another who was thought to be wiser than the
+former, and formed the very same opinion. Hence I became odious to
+him and to many others.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec7" name=
+"apology_sec7">7</a>. After this I went to others in turn,
+perceiving indeed, and grieving and alarmed, that I was making
+myself odious; however, it appeared necessary to regard the oracle
+of the god as of the greatest moment, and that, in order to
+discover its meaning, I must go to all who had the reputation of
+possessing any knowledge. And by the dog, O Athenians! for I must
+tell you the truth, I came to some such conclusion as this: those
+who bore the highest reputation appeared to me to be most
+deficient, in my researches in obedience <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page20' id='page20'></a>to the god, and others who were
+considered inferior more nearly approaching to the possession of
+understanding. But I must relate to you my wandering, and the
+labors which I underwent, in order that the oracle might prove
+incontrovertible. For after the politicians I went to the poets, as
+well the tragic as the dithyrambic and others, expecting that here
+I should in very fact find myself more ignorant than they. Taking
+up, therefore, some of their poems, which appeared to me most
+elaborately finished, I questioned them as to their meaning, that
+at the same time I might learn something from them. I am ashamed, O
+Athenians! to tell you the truth; however, it must be told. For, in
+a word, almost all who were present could have given a better
+account of them than those by whom they had been composed. I soon
+discovered this, therefore, with regard to the poets, that they do
+not effect their object by wisdom, but by a certain natural
+inspiration, and under the influence of enthusiasm, like prophets
+and seers; for these also say many fine things, but they understand
+nothing that they say. The poets appeared to me to be affected in a
+similar manner; and at the same time I perceived that they
+considered themselves, on account of their poetry, to be the wisest
+of men in other things, in which they were not. I left them,
+therefore, under the persuasion that I was superior to them, in the
+same way that I was to the politicians.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec8" name=
+"apology_sec8">8</a>. At last, therefore, I went to the artisans.
+For I was conscious to myself that I knew scarcely anything, but I
+was sure that I should find them possessed of much beautiful
+knowledge. And in this I was not deceived; for they knew things
+which I did not, and in this respect they were wiser than I. But, O
+Athenians! even the best workmen appeared to me to have fallen into
+the same error as the poets; for each, because he excelled in the
+practice of his art, thought <a class='pagenumber' name='page21'
+id='page21'></a>that he was very wise in other most important
+matters, and this mistake of theirs obscured the wisdom that they
+really possessed. I therefore asked myself, in behalf of the
+oracle, whether I should prefer to continue as I am, possessing
+none, either of their wisdom or their ignorance, or to have both as
+they have. I answered, therefore, to myself and to the oracle, that
+it was better for me to continue as I am.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec9" name=
+"apology_sec9">9</a>. From this investigation, then, O Athenians!
+many enmities have arisen against me, and those the most grievous
+and severe, so that many calumnies have sprung from them, and among
+them this appellation of being wise; for those who are from time to
+time present think that I am wise in those things, with respect to
+which I expose the ignorance of others. The god, however, O
+Athenians! appears to be really wise, and to mean this by his
+oracle: that human wisdom is worth little or nothing; and it is
+clear that he did not say this to Socrates, but made use of my
+name, putting me forward as an example, as if he had said, that man
+is the wisest among you, who, like Socrates, knows that he is in
+reality worth nothing with respect to wisdom. Still, therefore, I
+go about and search and inquire into these things, in obedience to
+the god, both among citizens and strangers, if I think any one of
+them is wise; and when he appears to me not to be so, I take the
+part of the god, and show that he is not wise. And, in consequence
+of this occupation, I have no leisure to attend in any considerable
+degree to the affairs of the state or my own; but I am in the
+greatest poverty through my devotion to the service of the god.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec10" name=
+"apology_sec10">10</a>. In addition to this, young men, who have
+much leisure and belong to the wealthiest families, following me of
+their own accord, take great delight in hearing men put to the
+test, and often imitate me, and themselves attempt to <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page22' id='page22'></a>put others to the test;
+and then, I think, they find a great abundance of men who fancy
+they know something, although they know little or nothing. Hence
+those who are put to the test by them are angry with me, and not
+with them, and say that "there is one Socrates, a most pestilent
+fellow, who corrupts the youth." And when any one asks them by
+doing or teaching what, they have nothing to say, for they do not
+know; but, that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say such
+things as are ready at hand against all philosophers; "that he
+searches into things in heaven and things under the earth, that he
+does not believe there are gods, and that he makes the worse appear
+the better reason." For they would not, I think, be willing to tell
+the truth that they have been detected in pretending to possess
+knowledge, whereas they know nothing. Therefore, I think, being
+ambitions and vehement and numerous, and speaking systematically
+and persuasively about me, they have filled your ears, for a long
+time and diligently calumniating me. From among these, Melitus,
+Anytus and Lycon have attacked me; Melitus being angry on account
+of the poets, Anytus on account of the artisans and politicians,
+and Lycon on account of the rhetoricians. So that, as I said in the
+beginning, I should wonder if I were able in so short a time to
+remove from your minds a calumny that has prevailed so long. This,
+O Athenians! is the truth; and I speak it without concealing or
+disguising anything from you, much or little; though I very well
+know that by so doing I shall expose myself to odium. This,
+however, is a proof that I speak the truth, and that this is the
+nature of the calumny against me, and that these are its causes.
+And if you will investigate the matter, either now or hereafter,
+you will find it to be so.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec11" name=
+"apology_sec11">11</a>. With respect, then, to the charges which my
+first accusers <a class='pagenumber' name='page23' id=
+'page23'></a>have alleged against me, let this be a sufficient
+apology to you. To Melitus, that good and patriotic man, as he
+says, and to my later accusers, I will next endeavor to give an
+answer; and here, again, as there are different accusers, let us
+take up their deposition. It is pretty much as follows: "Socrates,"
+it says, "acts unjustly in corrupting the youth, and in not
+believing in those gods in whom the city believes, but in other
+strange divinities." Such is the accusation; let us examine each
+particular of it. It says that I act unjustly in corrupting the
+youth. But I, O Athenians! say that Melitus acts unjustly, because
+he jests on serious subjects, rashly putting men upon trial, under
+pretense of being zealous and solicitous about things in which he
+never at any time took any concern. But that this is the case I
+will endeavor to prove to you.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec12" name=
+"apology_sec12">12</a>. Come, then, Melitus, tell me, do you not
+consider it of the greatest importance that the youth should be
+made as virtuous as possible?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> I do.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Well, now, tell the
+judges who it is that makes them better, for it is evident that you
+know, since it concerns you so much; for, having detected me in
+corrupting them, as you say, you have cited me here, and accused
+me: come, then, say, and inform the judges who it is that makes
+them better. Do you see, Melitus, that you are silent, and have
+nothing to say? But does it not appear to you to be disgraceful,
+and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you never took any
+concern about the matter? But tell me, friend, who makes them
+better?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> The laws.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> I do not ask this, most
+excellent sir, but what man, who surely must first know this very
+thing, the laws?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> These, Socrates, the
+judges.</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page24' id='page24'></a><span class=
+"speakername">Socr.</span> How say you, Melitus? Are these able to
+instruct the youth, and make them better?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> Certainly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Whether all, or some of
+them, and others not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> All.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> You say well, by Juno!
+and have found a great abundance of those that confer benefit. But
+what further? Can these hearers make them better, or not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> They, too, can.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> And what of the
+senators?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> The senators, also.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> But, Melitus, do those
+who attend the public assemblies corrupt the younger men? or do
+they all make them better?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> They too.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> All the Athenians,
+therefore, as it seems, make them honorable and good, except me;
+but I alone corrupt them. Do you say so?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> I do assert this very
+thing.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> You charge me with great
+ill-fortune. But answer me: does it appear to you to be the same,
+with respect to horses? Do all men make them better, and is there
+only some one that spoils them? or does quite the contrary of this
+take place? Is there some one person who can make them better, or
+very few; that is, the trainers? But if the generality of men
+should meddle with and make use of horses, do they spoil them? Is
+not this the case, Melitus, both with respect to horses and all
+other animals? It certainly is so, whether you and Anytus deny it
+or not. For it would be a great good-fortune for the youth if only
+one person corrupted, and the rest benefited them. However,
+Melitus, you have sufficiently shown that you never bestowed any
+care upon youth; and you clearly evince your own negligence, <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page25' id='page25'></a>in that you have
+never paid any attention to the things with respect to which you
+accuse me.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec13" name=
+"apology_sec13">13</a>. Tell us further, Melitus, in the name of
+Jupiter, whether is it better to dwell with good or bad citizens?
+Answer, my friend; for I ask you nothing difficult. Do not the bad
+work some evil to those that are continually near them, but the
+good some good?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> Certainly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Is there any one that
+wishes to be injured rather than benefited by his associates?
+Answer, good man; for the law requires you to answer. Is there any
+one who wishes to be injured?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> No, surely.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Come, then, whether do
+you accuse me here, as one that corrupts the youth, and makes them
+more depraved, designedly or undesignedly?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> Designedly, I say.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> What, then, Melitus, are
+you at your time of life so much wiser than I at my time of life,
+as to know that the evil are always working some evil to those that
+are most near to them, and the good some good; but I have arrived
+at such a pitch of ignorance as not to know that if I make any one
+of my associates depraved, I shall be in danger of receiving some
+evil from him; and yet I designedly bring about this so great evil,
+as you say? In this I can not believe you, Melitus, nor do I think
+would any other man in the world. But either I do not corrupt the
+youth, or, if I do corrupt them, I do it undesignedly: so that in
+both cases you speak falsely. But if I corrupt them undesignedly,
+for such involuntary offenses it is not usual to accuse one here,
+but to take one apart, and teach and admonish one. For it is
+evident that if I am taught, I shall cease doing what I do
+undesignedly. But you shunned me, and were not willing <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page26' id='page26'></a>to associate with and
+instruct me; but you accuse me here, where it is usual to accuse
+those who need punishment, and not instruction.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec14" name=
+"apology_sec14">14</a>. Thus, then, O Athenians! this now is clear
+that I have said; that Melitus never paid any attention to these
+matters, much or little. However, tell us, Melitus, how you say I
+corrupt the youth? Is it not evidently, according to the indictment
+which you have preferred, by teaching them not to believe in the
+gods in whom the city believes, but in other strange deities? Do
+you not say that, by teaching these things, I corrupt the
+youth?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> Certainly I do say so.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> By those very gods,
+therefore, Melitus, of whom the discussion now is, speak still more
+clearly both to me and to these men. For I can not understand
+whether you say that I teach them to believe that there are certain
+gods (and in that case I do believe that there are gods, and am not
+altogether an atheist, nor in this respect to blame), not, however,
+those which the city believes in, but others; and this it is that
+you accuse me of, that I introduce others. Or do you say outright
+that I do not myself believe that there are gods, and that I teach
+others the same?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> I say this: that you do
+not believe in any gods at all.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> O wonderful Melitus, how
+come you to say this? Do I not, then, like the rest of mankind,
+believe that the sun and moon are gods?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> No, by Jupiter, O judges!
+for he says that the sun is a stone, and the moon an earth.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> You fancy that you are
+accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Melitus, and thus you put a slight on
+these men, and suppose them to be so illiterate as not to know that
+the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomene are full of such assertions.
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page27' id='page27'></a>And the young,
+moreover, learn these things from me, which they might purchase for
+a drachma, at most, in the orchestra, and so ridicule Socrates, if
+he pretended they were his own, especially since they are so
+absurd? I ask then, by Jupiter, do I appear to you to believe that
+there is no god?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> No, by Jupiter, none
+whatever.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> You say what is
+incredible, Melitus, and that, as appears to me, even to yourself.
+For this man, O Athenians! appears to me to be very insolent and
+intemperate and to have preferred this indictment through downright
+insolence, intemperance, and wantonness. For he seems, as it were,
+to have composed an enigma for the purpose of making an experiment.
+Whether will Socrates the wise know that I am jesting, and
+contradict myself, or shall I deceive him and all who hear me? For,
+in my opinion, he clearly contradicts himself in the indictment, as
+if he should say, Socrates is guilty of wrong in not believing that
+there are gods, and in believing that there are gods. And this,
+surely, is the act of one who is trifling.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec15" name=
+"apology_sec15">15</a>. Consider with me now, Athenians, in what
+respect he appears to me to say so. And do you, Melitus, answer me;
+and do ye, as I besought you at the outset, remember not to make an
+uproar if I speak after my usual manner.</p>
+
+<p>Is there any man, Melitus, who believes that there are human
+affairs, but does not believe that there are men? Let him answer,
+judges, and not make so much noise. Is there any one who does not
+believe that there are horses, but that there are things pertaining
+to horses? or who does not believe that there are pipers, but that
+there are things pertaining to pipes? There is not, O best of men!
+for since you are not willing to answer, I say it to you and to all
+here present. But answer to this at least: is there any one who <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page28' id='page28'></a>believes that
+there are things relating to demons, but does not believe that
+there are demons?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> There is not.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> How obliging you are in
+having hardly answered; though compelled by these judges! You
+assert, then, that I do believe and teach things relating to
+demons, whether they be new or old; therefore, according to your
+admission, I do believe in things relating to demons, and this you
+have sworn in the bill of indictment. If, then, I believe in things
+relating to demons, there is surely an absolute necessity that I
+should believe that there are demons. Is it not so? It is. For I
+suppose you to assent, since you do not answer. But with respect to
+demons, do we not allow that they are gods, or the children of
+gods? Do you admit this or not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> Certainly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Since, then, I allow that
+there are demons, as you admit, if demons are a kind of gods, this
+is the point in which I say you speak enigmatically and divert
+yourself in saying that I do not allow there are gods, and again
+that I do allow there are, since I allow that there are demons? But
+if demons are the children of gods, spurious ones, either from
+nymphs or any others, of whom they are reported to be, what man can
+think that there are sons of gods, and yet that there are not gods?
+For it would be just as absurd as if any one should think that
+there are mules, the offspring of horses and asses, but should not
+think there are horses and asses. However, Melitus, it can not be
+otherwise than that you have preferred this indictment for the
+purpose of trying me, or because you were at a loss what real crime
+to allege against me; for that you should persuade any man who has
+the smallest degree of sense that the same person can think that
+there are things relating to demons and to <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page29' id='page29'></a>gods, and yet that there are neither
+demons, nor gods, not heroes, is utterly impossible.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec16" name=
+"apology_sec16">16</a>. That I am not guilty, then, O Athenians!
+according to the indictment of Melitus, appears to me not to
+require a lengthened defense; but what I have said is sufficient.
+And as to what I said at the beginning, that there is a great
+enmity toward me among the multitude, be assured it is true. And
+this it is which will condemn me, if I am condemned, not Melitus,
+nor Anytus, but the calumny and envy of the multitude, which have
+already condemned many others, and those good men, and will, I
+think, condemn others also; for there is no danger that it will
+stop with me.</p>
+
+<p>Perhaps, however, some one may say, "Are you not ashamed,
+Socrates, to have pursued a study from which you are now in danger
+of dying?" To such a person I should answer with good reason, You
+do not say well, friend, if you think that a man, who is even of
+the least value, ought to take into the account the risk of life or
+death, and ought not to consider that alone when be performs any
+action, whether he is acting justly or unjustly, and the part of a
+good man or bad man. For, according to your reasoning, all those
+demi-gods that died at Troy would be vile characters, as well all
+the rest as the son of Thetis, who so far despised danger in
+comparison of submitting to disgrace, that when his mother, who was
+a goddess, spoke to him, in his impatience to kill Hector,
+something to this effect, as I think,<a id="footnotetag2" name=
+"footnotetag2" href="#footnote2"><sup>2</sup></a> "My son, if you
+revenge the death of your friend Patroclus, and slay Hector, you
+will yourself die, for," she said, "death awaits you immediately
+after Hector;" but he, on hearing this, despised death and danger,
+and dreading much more to live as a coward, and not avenge his <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page30' id='page30'></a>friend, said, "May
+I die immediately when I have inflicted punishment on the guilty,
+that I may not stay here an object of ridicule, by the curved
+ships, a burden to the ground?"&mdash;do you think that he cared
+for death and danger? For thus it is, O Athenians! in truth:
+wherever any one has posted himself, either thinking it to be
+better, or has been posted by his chief, there, as it appears to
+me, he ought to remain and meet danger, taking no account either of
+death or anything else in comparison with disgrace.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec17" name=
+"apology_sec17">17</a>. I then should be acting strangely, O
+Athenians! if, when the generals whom you chose to command me
+assigned me my post at Potid&aelig;a, at Amphipolis, and at Delium,
+I then remained where they posted me, like any other person, and
+encountered the danger of death; but when the deity, as I thought
+and believed, assigned it as my duty to pass my life in the study
+of philosophy, and examining myself and others, I should on that
+occasion, through fear of death or any thing else whatsoever,
+desert my post, strange indeed would it be; and then, in truth, any
+one might justly bring me to trial, and accuse me of not believing
+in the gods, from disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and
+thinking myself to be wise when I am not. For to fear death, O
+Athenians! is nothing else than to appear to be wise, without being
+so; for it is to appear to know what one does not know. For no one
+knows but that death is the greatest of all good to man; but men
+fear it, as if they well knew that it is the greatest of evils. And
+how is not this the most reprehensible ignorance, to think that one
+knows what one does not know? But I, O Athenians! in this, perhaps,
+differ from most men; and if I should say that I am in any thing
+wiser than another, it would be in this, that not having a
+competent knowledge of the things in Hades, I also think that I
+have not such knowledge. But to act unjustly, and to disobey my
+superior, <a class='pagenumber' name='page31' id=
+'page31'></a>whether God or man, I know is evil and base. I shall
+never, therefore, fear or shun things which, for aught I know,
+maybe good, before evils which I know to be evils. So that, even if
+you should now dismiss me, not yielding to the instances of Anytus,
+who said that either I should not<a id="footnotetag3" name=
+"footnotetag3" href="#footnote3"><sup>3</sup></a> appear here at
+all, or that, if I did appear, it was impossible not to put me to
+death, telling you that if I escaped, your sons, studying what
+Socrates teaches, would all be utterly corrupted; if you should
+address me thus, "Socrates, we shall not now yield to Anytus, but
+dismiss you, on this condition, however, that you no longer
+persevere in your researches nor study philosophy; and if hereafter
+you are detected in so doing, you shall die"&mdash;if, as I said,
+you should dismiss, me on these terms, I should say to you, "O
+Athenians! I honor and love you; but I shall obey God rather than
+you; and so long as I breathe and am able, I shall not cease
+studying philosophy, and exhorting you and warning any one of you I
+may happen to meet, saying, as I have been accustomed to do: 'O
+best of men! seeing you are an Athenian, of a city the most
+powerful and most renowned for wisdom and strength, are you not
+ashamed of being careful for riches, how you may acquire them in
+greatest abundance, and for glory, and honor, but care not nor take
+any thought for wisdom and truth, and for your soul, how it maybe
+made most perfect?'" And if any one of you should question my
+assertion, and affirm that he does care for these things, I shall
+not at once let him go, nor depart, but I shall question him, sift
+and prove him. And if he should appear to me not to possess virtue,
+but to pretend that he does, I shall reproach him for that he sets
+the least value on things of the greatest worth, but the highest on
+things that are worthless. Thus I shall act to all <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page32' id='page32'></a>whom I meet, both young
+and old, stranger and citizen, but rather to you, my
+fellow-citizens, because ye are more nearly allied to me. For be
+well assured, this the deity commands. And I think that no greater
+good has ever befallen you in the city than my zeal for the service
+of the god. For I go about doing nothing else than persuading you,
+both young and old, to take no care either for the body, or for
+riches, prior to or so much as for the soul, how it may be made
+most perfect, telling you that virtue does not spring from riches,
+but riches and all other human blessings, both private and public,
+from virtue. If, then, by saying these things, I corrupt the youth,
+these things must be mischievous; but if any one says that I speak
+other things than these, he misleads you.<a id="footnotetag4" name=
+"footnotetag4" href="#footnote4"><sup>4</sup></a> Therefore I must
+say, O Athenians! either yield to Anytus, or do not, either dismiss
+me or not, since I shall not act otherwise, even though I must die
+many deaths.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec18" name=
+"apology_sec18">18</a>. Murmur not, O Athenians! but continue to
+attend to my request, not to murmur at what I say, but to listen,
+for, as I think, you will derive benefit from listening. For I am
+going to say other things to you, at which, perhaps, you will raise
+a clamor; but on no account do so. Be well assured, then, if you
+put me to death, being such a man as I say I am, you will not
+injure me more than yourselves. For neither will Melitus nor Anytus
+harm me; nor have they the power; for I do not think that it is
+possible for a better man to be injured by a worse. He may perhaps
+have me condemned to death, or banished, or deprived of civil
+rights; and he or others may perhaps consider these as mighty
+evils; I, how ever, do not consider them so, but that it is much
+more so to do what he is now doing, to endeavor to put a man to
+death unjustly. Now, therefore, O Athenians! <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page33' id='page33'></a>I am far from making a defense on my
+behalf, as any one might think, but I do so on your own behalf,
+lest by condemning me you should offend at all with respect to the
+gift of the deity to you. For, if you should put me to death, you
+will not easily find such another, though it may be ridiculous to
+say so, altogether attached by the deity to this city as to a
+powerful and generous horse, somewhat sluggish from his size, and
+requiring to be roused by a gad-fly; so the deity appears to have
+united me, being such a person as I am, to the city, that I may
+rouse you, and persuade and reprove every one of you, nor ever
+cease besetting you throughout the whole day. Such another man, O
+Athenians! will not easily be found; therefore, if you will take my
+advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, being irritated like
+drowsy persons who are roused from sleep, will strike me, and,
+yielding to Anytus, will unthinkingly condemn me to death; and then
+you will pass the rest of your life in sleep, unless the deity,
+caring for you, should send some one else to you. But that I am a
+person who has been given by the deity to this city, you may
+discern from hence; for it is not like the ordinary conduct of men,
+that I should have neglected all my own affairs, and suffered my
+private interest to be neglected for so many years, and that I
+should constantly attend to your concerns, addressing myself to
+each of you separately, like a father, or elder brother, persuading
+you to the pursuit of virtue. And if I had derived any profit from
+this course, and had received pay for my exhortations, there would
+have been some reason for my conduct; but now you see yourselves
+that my accusers, who have so shamelessly calumniated me in
+everything else, have not had the impudence to charge me with this,
+and to bring witnesses to prove that I ever either exacted or
+demanded any reward. And I think I <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page34' id='page34'></a>produce a sufficient proof that I speak
+the truth, namely, my poverty.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec19" name=
+"apology_sec19">19</a>. Perhaps, however, it may appear absurd that
+I, going about, thus advise you in private and make myself busy,
+but never venture to present myself in public before your
+assemblies and give advice to the city. The cause of this is that
+which you have often and in many places heard me mention; because I
+am moved by a certain divine and spiritual influence, which also
+Melitus, through mockery, has set out in the indictment. This began
+with me from childhood, being a kind of voice which, when present,
+always diverts me from what I am about to do, but never urges me
+on. This it is which opposed my meddling in public politics; and it
+appears to me to have opposed me very properly. For be well
+assured, O Athenians! if I had long since attempted to intermeddle
+with politics, I should have perished long ago, and should not have
+at all benefited you or myself. And be not angry with me for
+speaking the truth. For it is not possible that any man should be
+safe who sincerely opposes either you, or any other multitude, and
+who prevents many unjust and illegal actions from being committed
+in a city; but it is necessary that he who in earnest contends for
+justice, if he will be safe for but a short time, should live
+privately, and take no part in public affairs.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec20" name=
+"apology_sec20">20</a>. I will give you strong proofs of this, not
+words, but what you value, facts. Hear, then, what has happened to
+me, that you may know that I would not yield to any one contrary to
+what is just, through fear of death, at the same time by not
+yielding I must perish. I shall tell you what will be displeasing
+and wearisome,<a id="footnotetag5" name="footnotetag5" href=
+"#footnote5"><sup>5</sup></a> yet true. For I, O <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page35' id='page35'></a>Athenians! never bore
+any other magisterial office in the city, but have been a senator:
+and our Antiochean tribe happened to supply the Prytanes when you
+chose to condemn in a body the ten generals who had not taken off
+those that perished in the sea-fight, in violation of the law, as
+you afterward all thought. At that time I alone of the Prytanes
+opposed your doing anything contrary to the laws, and I voted
+against you; and when the orators were ready to denounce me, and to
+carry me before a magistrate, and you urged and cheered them on, I
+thought I ought rather to meet the danger with law and justice on
+my side, than through fear of imprisonment or death, to take part
+with you in your unjust designs. And this happened while the city
+was governed by a democracy. But when it became an oligarchy, the
+Thirty, having sent for me with four others to the Tholus, ordered
+us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, that he might be put
+to death; and they gave many similar orders to many others, wishing
+to involve as many as they could in guilt. Then, however, I showed,
+not in word but in deed, that I did not care for death, if the
+expression be not too rude, in the smallest degree; but that all my
+care was to do nothing unjust or unholy. For that government,
+strong as it was, did not so overawe me as to make me commit an
+unjust action; but when we came out from the Tholus, the four went
+to Salamis, and brought back Leon; but I went away home. And
+perhaps for this I should have been put to death, if that
+government had not been speedily broken up. And of this you can
+have many witnesses.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec21" name=
+"apology_sec21">21</a>. Do you think, then, that I should have
+survived so <a class='pagenumber' name='page36' id=
+'page36'></a>many years if I had engaged in public affairs, and,
+acting as becomes a good man, had aided the cause of justice, and,
+as I ought, had deemed this of the highest importance? Far from it,
+O Athenians! nor would any other man have done so. But I, through
+the whole of my life, if I have done anything in public, shall be
+found to be a man, and the very same in private, who has never made
+a concession to any one contrary to justice, neither to any other,
+nor to any one of these whom my calumniators say are my disciples.
+I, however, was never the preceptor of any one; but if any one
+desired to hear me speaking, and to see me busied about my own
+mission, whether he were young or old, I never refused him. Nor do
+I discourse when I receive money, and not when I do not receive
+any, but I allow both rich and poor alike to question me, and, if
+any one wishes it, to answer me and hear what I have to say. And
+for these, whether any one proves to be a good man or not, I cannot
+justly be responsible, because I never either promised them any
+instruction or taught them at all. But if any one says that he has
+ever learned or heard anything from me in private which all others
+have not, be well assured that he does not speak the truth.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec22" name=
+"apology_sec22">22</a>. But why do some delight to spend so long a
+time with me? Ye have heard, O Athenians! I have told you the whole
+truth, that they delight to hear those closely questioned who think
+that they are wise but are not; for this is by no means
+disagreeable. But this duty, as I say, has been enjoined me by the
+deity, by oracles, by dreams, and by every mode by which any other
+divine decree has ever enjoined anything to man to do. These
+things, O Athenians! are both true, and easily confuted if not
+true. For if I am now corrupting some of the youths, and have
+already corrupted others, it were fitting, surely, that if any of
+them, <a class='pagenumber' name='page37' id='page37'></a>having
+become advanced in life, had discovered that I gave them bad advice
+when they were young, they should now rise up against me, accuse
+me, and have me punished; or if they were themselves unwilling to
+do this, some of their kindred, their fathers, or brothers, or
+other relatives, if their kinsman have ever sustained any damage
+from me, should now call it to mind. Many of them, however, are
+here present, whom I see: first, Crito, my contemporary and
+fellow-burgher, father of this Critobulus; then Lysanias of
+Sphettus, father of this &AElig;schines; again, Antiphon of
+Cephisus, father of Epigenes. There are those others, too, whose
+brothers maintained the same intimacy with me, namely, Nicostratus,
+son of Theodotus, brother of Theodotus&mdash;Theodotus indeed is
+dead, so that he could not deprecate his brother's
+proceedings&mdash;and Paralus here, son of Demodocus, whose brother
+was Theages; and Adimantus, son of Ariston, whose brother is this
+Plato; and &AElig;antodorus, whose brother is this Apollodorus. I
+could also mention many others to you, some one of whom certainly
+Melitus ought to have adduced in his speech as a witness. If,
+however, he then forgot to do so, let him now adduce them; I give
+him leave to do so, and let him say it, if he has anything of the
+kind to allege. But, quite contrary to this, you will find, O
+Athenians! all ready to assist me, who have corrupted and injured
+their relatives, as Melitus and Anytus say. For those who have been
+themselves corrupted might perhaps have some reason for assisting
+me; but those who have not been corrupted, men now advanced in
+life, their relatives, what other reason can they have for
+assisting me, except that right and just one, that they know that
+Melitus speaks falsely, and that I speak the truth.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec23" name=
+"apology_sec23">23</a>. Well, then, Athenians, these are pretty
+much the things I have to say in my defense, and others perhaps of
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page38' id='page38'></a>the same kind.
+Perhaps, however, some among you will be indignant on recollecting
+his own case, if he, when engaged in a cause far less than this,
+implored and besought the judges with many tears, bringing forward
+his children in order that he might excite their utmost compassion,
+and many others of his relatives and friends, whereas I do none of
+these things, although I may appear to be incurring the extremity
+of danger. Perhaps, therefore, some one, taking notice of this, may
+become more determined against me, and, being enraged at this very
+conduct of mine, may give his vote under the influence of anger.
+If, then, any one of you is thus affected&mdash;I do not, however,
+suppose that there is&mdash;but if there should be, I think I may
+reasonably say to him: "I, too, O best of men, have relatives; for,
+to make use of that saying of Homer, I am not sprung from an oak,
+nor from a rock, but from men, so that I, too, O Athenians! have
+relatives, and three sons, one now grown up, and two boys: I shall
+not, however, bring any one of them forward and implore you to
+acquit me." Why, then, shall I not do this? Not from contumacy, O
+Athenians! nor disrespect toward you. Whether or not I am undaunted
+at the prospect of death is another question; but, out of regard to
+my own character, and yours, and that of the whole city, it does
+not appear to me to be honorable that I should do any thing of this
+kind at my age, and with the reputation I have, whether true or
+false. For it is commonly agreed that Socrates in some respects
+excels the generality of men. If, then, those among you who appear
+to excel either in wisdom, or fortitude, or any other virtue
+whatsoever, should act in such a manner as I have often seen some
+when they have been brought to trial, it would be shameful, who
+appearing indeed to be something, have conducted themselves in a
+surprising manner, as thinking they should suffer something <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page39' id='page39'></a>dreadful by dying,
+and as if they would be immortal if you did not put them to death.
+Such men appear to me to bring disgrace on the city, so that any
+stranger might suppose that such of the Athenians as excel in
+virtue, and whom they themselves choose in preference to themselves
+for magistracies and other honors, are in no respect superior to
+women. For these things, O Athenians! neither ought we to do who
+have attained to any height of reputation, nor, should we do them,
+ought you to suffer us; but you should make this manifest, that you
+will much rather condemn him who introduces these piteous dramas,
+and makes the city ridiculous, than him who quietly awaits your
+decision.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec24" name=
+"apology_sec24">24</a>. But, reputation apart, O Athenians! it does
+not appear to me to be right to entreat a judge, or to escape by
+entreaty; but one ought to inform and persuade him. For a judge
+does not sit for the purpose of administering justice out of favor,
+but that he may judge rightly, and he is sworn not to show favor to
+whom he pleases, but that he will decide according to the laws. It
+is, therefore, right that neither should we accustom you, nor
+should you accustom yourselves, to violate your oaths; for in so
+doing neither of us would act righteously. Think not then, O
+Athenians! that I ought to adopt such a course toward you as I
+neither consider honorable, nor just, nor holy, as well, by
+Jupiter! on any other occasion, and now especially when I am
+accused of impiety by this Melitus. For clearly, if I should
+persuade you, and by my entreaties should put a constraint on you
+who are bound by an oath, I should teach you to think that there
+are no gods, and in reality, while making my defense, should accuse
+myself of not believing in the gods. This, however, is far from
+being the case; for I believe, O Athenians! as none of my accusers
+do, and I leave it to you and <a class='pagenumber' name='page40'
+id='page40'></a>to the deity to judge concerning me in such way as
+will be best both for me and for you.</p>
+
+<p>[Socrates here concludes his defense, and, the votes being
+taken, he is declared guilty by a majority of voices. He thereupon
+resumes his address.]</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec25" name=
+"apology_sec25">25</a>. That I should not be grieved, O Athenians!
+at what has happened&mdash;namely, that you have condemned
+me&mdash;as well many other circumstances concur in bringing to
+pass; and, moreover this, that what has happened has not happened
+contrary to my expectation; but I much rather wonder at the number
+of votes on either side. For I did not expect that I should be
+condemned by so small a number, but by a large majority; but now,
+as it seems, if only three more votes had changed sides, I should
+have been acquitted. So far as Melitus is concerned, as it appears
+to me, I have been already acquitted; and not only have I been
+acquitted, but it is clear to every one that had not Anytus and
+Lycon come forward to accuse me, he would have been fined a
+thousand drachmas, for not having obtained a fifth part of the
+votes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec26" name=
+"apology_sec26">26</a>. The man, then, awards me the penalty of
+death. Well. But what shall I, on my part, O Athenians! award
+myself? Is it not clear that it will be such as I deserve? What,
+then, is that? Do I deserve to suffer, or to pay a fine? for that I
+have purposely during my life not remained quiet, but neglecting
+what most men seek after, money-making, domestic concerns, military
+command, popular oratory, and, moreover, all the magistracies,
+conspiracies, and cabals that are met with in the city, thinking
+that I was in reality too upright a man to be safe if I took part
+in such things, I therefore did not apply myself to those pursuits,
+by attending to which I should have been of no service either to
+you or to myself; but in order to confer the greatest benefit on
+each of you privately, as I affirm, I thereupon applied myself to
+that <a class='pagenumber' name='page41' id='page41'></a>object,
+endeavoring to persuade every one of you not to take any care of
+his own affairs before he had taken care of himself in what way he
+may become the best and wisest, nor of the affairs of the city
+before he took care of the city itself; and that he should attend
+to other things in the same manner. What treatment, then, do I
+deserve, seeing I am such a man? Some reward, O Athenians! if, at
+least, I am to be estimated according to my real deserts; and,
+moreover, such a reward as would be suitable to me. What, then, is
+suitable to a poor man, a benefactor, and who has need of leisure
+in order to give you good advice? There is nothing so suitable, O
+Athenians! as that such a man should be maintained in the
+Prytaneum, and this much more than if one of you had been
+victorious at the Olympic games in a horserace, or in the two or
+four horsed chariot race: for such a one makes you appear to be
+happy, but I, to be so; and he does not need support, but I do. If,
+therefore, I must award a sentence according to my just deserts, I
+award this, maintenance in the Prytaneum.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec27" name=
+"apology_sec27">27</a>. Perhaps, however, in speaking to you thus,
+I appear to you to speak in the same presumptuous manner as I did
+respecting commiseration and entreaties; but such is not the case,
+O Athenians! it is rather this: I am persuaded that I never
+designedly injured any man, though I can not persuade you of this,
+for we have conversed with each other but for a short time. For if
+there were the same law with you as with other men, that in capital
+cases the trial should list not only one day, but many, I think you
+would be persuaded; but it is not easy in a short time to do away
+with, great calumnies. Being persuaded, then, that I have injured
+no one, I am far from intending to injure myself, and of
+pronouncing against myself that I am deserving of punishment, and
+from awarding myself any thing of the kind. <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page42' id='page42'></a>Through fear of what? lest I should
+suffer that which Melitus awards me, of which I say I know not
+whether it he good or evil? Instead of this, shall I choose what I
+well know to be evil, and award that? Shall I choose imprisonment?
+And why should I live in prison, a slave to the established
+magistracy, the Eleven? Shall I choose a fine, and to be imprisoned
+until I have paid it? But this is the same as that which I just now
+mentioned, for I have not money to pay it. Shall I, then, award
+myself exile? For perhaps you would consent to this award. I should
+indeed be very fond of life, O Athenians! if I were so devoid of
+reason as not to be able to reflect that you, who are my
+fellow-citizens, have been unable to endure my manner of life and
+discourses, but they have become so burdensome and odious to you
+that you now seek to be rid of them: others, however, will easily
+bear them. Far from it, O Athenians! A fine life it would be for me
+at my age to go out wandering, and driven from city to city, and so
+to live. For I well know that, wherever I may go, the youth will
+listen to me when I speak, as they do here. And if I repulse them,
+they will themselves drive me out, persuading the elders; and if I
+do not repulse them, their fathers and kindred will banish me on
+their account.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec28" name=
+"apology_sec28">28</a>. Perhaps, however, some one will say, Can
+you not, Socrates, when you have gone from us, live a silent and
+quiet life? This is the most difficult thing of all to persuade
+some of you. For if I say that that would be to disobey the deity,
+and that, therefore, it is impossible for me to live quietly, you
+would not believe me, thinking I spoke ironically. If, on the other
+hand, I say that this is the greatest good to man, to discourse
+daily on virtue, and other things which you have heard me
+discussing, examining both myself and others, but that a life
+without investigation is <a class='pagenumber' name='page43' id=
+'page43'></a>not worth living for, still less would you believe me
+if I said this. Such, however, is the case, as I affirm, O
+Athenians! though it is not easy to persuade you. And at the same
+time I am not accustomed to think myself deserving of any ill. If,
+indeed, I were rich, I would amerce myself in such a sum as I
+should be able to pay; for then I should have suffered no harm, but
+now&mdash;for I can not, unless you are willing to amerce me in
+such a sum as I am able to pay. But perhaps I could pay you a mina
+of silver: in that sum, then, I amerce myself. But Plato here, O
+Athenians! and Crito Critobulus, and Apollodorus bid me amerce
+myself in thirty min&aelig;, and they offer to be sureties. I
+amerce myself, then, to you in that sum; and they will be
+sufficient sureties for the money.</p>
+
+<p>[The judges now proceeded to pass the sentence, and condemned
+Socrates to death; whereupon he continued:]</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec29" name=
+"apology_sec29">29</a>. For the sake of no long space of time, O
+Athenians! you will incur the character and reproach at the hands
+of those who wish to defame the city, of having put that wise man,
+Socrates, to death. For those who wish to defame you will assert
+that I am wise, though I am not. If, then, you had waited for a
+short time, this would have happened of its own accord; for observe
+my age, that it is far advanced in life, and near death. But I say
+this not to you all, but to those only who have condemned me to
+die. And I say this, too, to the same persons. Perhaps you think, O
+Athenians! that I have been convicted through the want of
+arguments, by which I might have persuaded you, had I thought it
+right to do and say any thing, so that I might escape punishment.
+Far otherwise: I have been convicted through want indeed, yet not
+of arguments, but of audacity and impudence, and of the inclination
+to say such things to you as would have been most agreeable for you
+to hear, <a class='pagenumber' name='page44' id='page44'></a>had I
+lamented and bewailed and done and said many other things unworthy
+of me, as I affirm, but such as you are accustomed to hear from
+others. But neither did I then think that I ought, for the sake of
+avoiding danger, to do any thing unworthy of a freeman, nor do I
+now repent of having so defended myself; but I should much rather
+choose to die, having so defended myself, than to live in that way.
+For neither in a trial nor in battle is it right that I or any one
+else should employ every possible means whereby he may avoid death;
+for in battle it is frequently evident that a man might escape
+death by laying down his arms, and throwing himself on the mercy of
+his pursuers. And there are many other devices in every danger, by
+which to avoid death, if a man dares to do and say every thing. But
+this is not difficult, O Athenians! to escape death; but it is much
+more difficult to avoid depravity, for it runs swifter than death.
+And now I, being slow and aged, am overtaken by the slower of the
+two; but my accusers, being strong and active, have been overtaken
+by the swifter, wickedness. And now I depart, condemned by you to
+death; but they condemned by truth, as guilty of iniquity and
+injustice: and I abide my sentence, and so do they. These things,
+perhaps, ought so to be, and I think that they are for the
+best.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec30" name=
+"apology_sec30">30</a>. In the next place, I desire to predict to
+you who have condemned me, what will be your fate; for I am now in
+that condition in which men most frequently prophesy&mdash;namely,
+when they are about to die. I say, then, to you, O Athenians! who
+have condemned me to death, that immediately after my death a
+punishment will overtake you, far more severe, by Jupiter! than
+that which you have inflicted on me. For you have done this,
+thinking you should be freed from the necessity of giving an
+account of your lives. The very contrary, however, as I affirm,
+will happen to you. <a class='pagenumber' name='page45' id=
+'page45'></a>Your accusers will be more numerous, whom I have now
+restrained, though you did not perceive it; and they will be more
+severe, inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more
+indignant. For if you think that by putting men to death you will
+restrain any one from upbraiding you because you do not live well,
+you are much mistaken; for this method of escape is neither
+possible nor honorable; but that other is most honorable and most
+easy, not to put a check upon others, but for a man to take heed to
+himself how he may be most perfect. Having predicted thus much to
+those of you who have condemned me, I take my leave of you.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec31" name=
+"apology_sec31">31</a>. But with you who have voted for my
+acquittal I would gladly hold converse on what has now taken place,
+while the magistrates are busy, and I am not yet carried to the
+place where I must die. Stay with me, then, so long, O Athenians!
+for nothing hinders our conversing with each other, while we are
+permitted to do so; for I wish to make known to you, as being my
+friends, the meaning of that which has just now befallen me. To me,
+then, O my judges! and in calling you judges I call you
+rightly&mdash;a strange thing has happened. For the wonted
+prophetic voice of my guardian deity on every former occasion, even
+in the most trifling affairs, opposed me if I was about to do any
+thing wrong; but now that has befallen me which ye yourselves
+behold, and which any one would think, and which is supposed to be
+the extremity of evil; yet neither when I departed from home in the
+morning did the warning of the god oppose me, nor when I came up
+here to the place of trial, nor in my address when I was about to
+say any thing; yet on other occasions it has frequently restrained
+me in the midst of speaking. But now it has never, throughout this
+proceeding, opposed me, either in what I did or said. What, then,
+do I suppose to be the cause of this? I will tell you: what <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page46' id='page46'></a>has befallen me
+appears to be a blessing; and it is impossible that we think
+rightly who suppose that death is an evil. A great proof of this to
+me is the fact that it is impossible but that the accustomed signal
+should have opposed me, unless I had been about to meet with some
+good.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec32" name=
+"apology_sec32">32</a>. Moreover, we may hence conclude that there
+is great hope that death is a blessing. For to die is one of two
+things: for either the dead may be annihilated, and have no
+sensation of any thing whatever; or, as it is said, there are a
+certain change and passage of the soul from one place to another.
+And if it is a privation of all sensation, as it were a sleep in
+which the sleeper has no dream, death would be a wonderful gain.
+For I think that if any one, having selected a night in which he
+slept so soundly as not to have had a dream, and having compared
+this night with all the other nights and days of his life, should
+be required, on consideration, to say how many days and nights he
+had passed better and more pleasantly than this night throughout
+his life, I think that not only a private person, but even the
+great king himself, would find them easy to number, in comparison
+with other days and nights. If, therefore, death is a thing of this
+kind, I say it is a gain; for thus all futurity appears to be
+nothing more than one night. But if, on the other hand, death is a
+removal from hence to another place, and what is said be true, that
+all the dead are there, what greater blessing can there be than
+this, my judges? For if, on arriving at Hades, released from these
+who pretend to be judges, one shall find those who are true judges,
+and who are said to judge there, Minos and Rhadamanthus,
+&AElig;acus and Triptolemus, and such others of the demi-gods as
+were just during their own life, would this be a sad removal? At
+what price would you not estimate a conference with Orpheus and
+Mus&aelig;us, Hesiod <a class='pagenumber' name='page47' id=
+'page47'></a>and Homer? I indeed should be willing to die often, if
+this be true. For to me the sojourn there would be admirable, when
+I should meet with Palamedes, and Ajax, son of Telamon, and any
+other of the ancients who has died by an unjust sentence. The
+comparing my sufferings with theirs would, I think, be no
+unpleasing occupation. But the greatest pleasure would be to spend
+my time in questioning and examining the people there as I have
+done those here, and discovering who among them is wise, and who
+fancies himself to be so, but is not. At what price, my judges,
+would not any one estimate the opportunity of questioning him who
+led that mighty army against Troy, or Ulysses, or Sisyphus, or ten
+thousand others whom one might mention both men and
+women&mdash;with whom to converse and associate, and to question
+them, would be an inconceivable happiness? Surely for that the
+judges there do not condemn to death; for in other respects those
+who live there are more happy than those who are here, and are
+henceforth immortal, if, at least, what is said be true.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec33" name=
+"apology_sec33">33</a>. You, therefore, O my judges! ought to
+entertain good hopes with respect to death, and to meditate on this
+one truth, that to a good man nothing is evil, neither while living
+nor when dead, nor are his concerns neglected by the gods. And what
+has befallen me is not the effect of chance; but this is clear to
+me, that now to die, and be freed from my cares is better for me On
+this account the warning in no way turned me aside; and I bear no
+resentment toward those who condemned me, or against my accusers,
+although they did not condemn and accuse me with this intention,
+but thinking to injure me: in this they deserve to be blamed.</p>
+
+<p>Thus much, however, I beg of them. Punish my sons when they grow
+up, O judges! paining them as I have pained you, if they appear to
+you to care for riches or anything <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page48' id='page48'></a>else before virtue; and if they think
+themselves to be something when they are nothing, reproach them as
+I have done you, for not attending to what they ought, and for
+conceiving themselves to be something when they are worth nothing.
+If ye do this, both I and my sons shall have met with just
+treatment at your hands.</p>
+
+<p>But it is now time to depart&mdash;for me to die, for you to
+live. But which of us is going to a better state is unknown to
+every one but God.</p>
+
+<h3>Footnotes</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote1" name="footnote1" href=
+"#footnotetag1">1</a>: Aristophanes.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote2" name="footnote2" href=
+"#footnotetag2">2</a>: "Iliad," lib. xviii. ver. 94, etc.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote3" name="footnote3" href=
+"#footnotetag3">3</a>: See the "Crito," sec. <a href=
+"#crito_sec5">5</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote4" name="footnote4" href=
+"#footnotetag4">4</a>: <span class=
+"greek">&Omicron;&upsilon;&delta;&epsilon;&nu;
+&lambda;&epsilon;&gamma;&epsilon;&iota;</span>, literally, "he says
+nothing:" <span class="french">on se trompe, ou l'on vous
+impose</span>, <span class="emphasis">Cousin</span>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote5" name="footnote5" href=
+"#footnotetag5">5</a>: But for the authority of Stallbaum, I should
+have translated <span class=
+"greek">&delta;&iota;&kappa;&alpha;&nu;&iota;&kappa;&alpha;</span>
+"forensic;" that is, such arguments as an advocate would use in a
+court of justice.</div>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="introduction"><a name='introduction_to_the_crito' id=
+'introduction_to_the_crito'></a><a class='pagenumber' name='page49'
+id='page49'></a>
+
+<h2>Introduction To The Crito.</h2>
+
+<p>It has been remarked by Stallbaum that Plato had a twofold
+design in this dialogue&mdash;one, and that the primary one, to
+free Socrates from the imputation of having attempted to corrupt
+the Athenian youth; the other, to establish the principle that
+under all circumstances it is the duty of a good citizen to obey
+the laws of his country. These two points, however, are so closely
+interwoven with each other, that the general principle appears only
+to be illustrated by the example of Socrates.</p>
+
+<p>Crito was one of those friends of Socrates who had been present
+at his trial, and had offered to assist in paying a fine, had a
+fine been imposed instead of the sentence of death. He appears to
+have frequently visited his friend in prison after his
+condemnation; and now, having obtained access to his cell very
+early in the morning, finds him composed in a quiet sleep. He
+brings intelligence that the ship, the arrival of which would be
+the signal for his death on the following day, is expected to
+arrive forthwith, and takes occasion to entreat Socrates to make
+his escape, the means of which were already prepared. Socrates
+thereupon, having promised to follow the advice of Crito if, after
+the matter had been fully discussed, it should appear to be right
+to do so, proposes to consider the duty of a citizen toward his
+country; and having established the divine principle that it is
+wrong to return evil for evil, goes on to show that the obligations
+of a citizen to his country are even more binding <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page50' id='page50'></a>than those of a child to
+its parent, or a slave to his master, and that therefore it is his
+duty to obey the established laws, at whatever cost to himself.</p>
+
+<p>At length Crito admits that he has no answer to make, and
+Socrates resolves to submit himself to the will of Providence.</p>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="book"><a name='crito_or_the_duty_of_a_citizen' id=
+'crito_or_the_duty_of_a_citizen'></a><a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page51' id='page51'></a>
+
+<h2>Crito;<br>
+ Or,<br>
+ The Duty Of A Citizen.</h2>
+
+<p>SOCRATES, CRITO.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec1" name=
+"crito_sec1"></a><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Why have
+you come at this hour, Crito? Is it not very early?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It is.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> About what time?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Scarce day-break.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> I wonder how the keeper
+of the prison came to admit you.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> He is familiar with me,
+Socrates, from my having frequently come hither; and he is under
+some obligations to me.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Have you just now come,
+or some time since?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> A considerable time
+since.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Why, then, did you not
+wake me at once, instead of sitting down by me in silence?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> By Jupiter! Socrates, I
+should not myself like to be so long awake, and in such affliction.
+But I have been for some time wondering at you, perceiving how
+sweetly you slept; and I purposely did not awake you, that you
+might pass your time as pleasantly as possible. And, indeed, I <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page52' id='page52'></a>have often before
+throughout your whole life considered you happy in your
+disposition, but far more so in the present calamity, seeing how
+easily and meekly you bear it.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> However, Crito, it would
+be disconsonant for a man at my time of life to repine because he
+must needs die.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> But others, Socrates, at
+your age have been involved in similar calamities, yet their age
+has not hindered their repining at their present fortune.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> So it is. But why did you
+come so early?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Bringing sad tidings,
+Socrates, not sad to you, as it appears, but to me, and all your
+friends, sad and heavy, and which I, I think, shall bear worst of
+all.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> What tidings? Has the
+ship<a id="footnotetag6" name="footnotetag6" href=
+"#footnote6"><sup>6</sup></a> arrived from Delos, on the arrival of
+which I must die?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It has not yet arrived,
+but it appears to me that it will come to-day, from what certain
+persons report who have come from Sunium,<a id="footnotetag7" name=
+"footnotetag7" href="#footnote7"><sup>7</sup></a> and left it
+there. It is clear, therefore, from these messengers, that it will
+come to day, and consequently it will be necessary, Socrates, for
+you to die to-morrow.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec2" name=
+"crito_sec2">2</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> But with
+good fortune, Crito, and if so it please the gods, so be it. I do
+not think, however, that it will come to day.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Whence do you form this
+conjecture?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> I will tell you. I must
+die on the day after that on which the ship arrives.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> So they say<a id=
+"footnotetag8" name="footnotetag8" href=
+"#footnote8"><sup>8</sup></a> who have the control of these
+things.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> I do not think, then,
+that it will come to-day, but to-morrow. I conjecture this from a
+dream which I had <a class='pagenumber' name='page53' id=
+'page53'></a>this very night, not long ago, and you seem very
+opportunely to have refrained from waking me.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> But what was this
+dream?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> A beautiful and majestic
+woman, clad in white garments seemed to approach me, and to call to
+me and say, "Socrates, three days hence you will reach fertile
+Pythia"<a id="footnotetag9" name="footnotetag9" href=
+"#footnote9"><sup>9</sup></a>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> What a strange dream,
+Socrates!</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Very clear, however, as
+it appears to me, Crito.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec3" name=
+"crito_sec3">3</a>. <span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Very much
+so, as it seems. But, my dear Socrates, even now be persuaded by
+me, and save yourself. For if you die, not only a single calamity
+will befall me, but, besides being deprived of such a friend as I
+shall never meet with again, I shall also appear to many who do not
+know you and me well, when I might have saved you had I been
+willing to spend my money, to have neglected to do so. And what
+character can be more disgraceful than this&mdash;to appear to
+value one's riches more than one's friends? For the generality of
+men will not be persuaded that you were unwilling to depart hence,
+when we urged you to it.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> But why, my dear Crito,
+should we care so much for the opinion of the many? For the most
+worthy men, whom we ought rather to regard, will think that matters
+have transpired as they really have.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Yet you see, Socrates,
+that it is necessary to attend to the opinion of the many. For the
+very circumstances of the present case show that the multitude are
+able to effect not only the smallest evils, but even the greatest,
+if any one is calumniated to them.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Would, O Crito that the
+multitude could effect the greatest evils, that they might also
+effect the greatest good, for then it would be well. But now they
+can do neither; <a class='pagenumber' name='page54' id=
+'page54'></a>for they can make a man neither wise nor foolish; but
+they do whatever chances.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec4" name=
+"crito_sec4">4</a>. <span class="speakername">Cri.</span> So let it
+be, then. But answer me this, Socrates: are you not anxious for me
+and other friends, lest, if you should escape from hence, informers
+should give us trouble, as having secretly carried you off, and so
+we should be compelled either to lose all our property, or a very
+large sum, or to suffer something else besides this? For, if you
+fear any thing of the kind, dismiss your fears; for we are
+justified in running the risk to save you&mdash;and, if need be,
+even a greater risk than this. But be persuaded by me, and do not
+refuse.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> I am anxious about this,
+Crito, and about many other things.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Do not fear this, however;
+for the sum is not large on receipt of which certain persons are
+willing to save you, and take you hence. In the next place, do you
+not see how cheap these informers are, so that there would be no
+need of a large sum for them? My fortune is at your service,
+sufficient, I think, for the purpose; then if, out of regard to me,
+you do not think right to spend my money, these strangers here are
+ready to spend theirs. One of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought
+with him a sufficient sum for the very purpose. Cebes, too, is
+ready, and very many others. So that, as I said, do not, through
+fears of this kind, hesitate to save yourself, nor let what you
+said in court give you any trouble, that if you went from hence you
+would not know what to do with yourself. For in many places, and
+wherever you go, men will love you; and if you are disposed to go
+to Thessaly, I have friends there who will esteem you very highly,
+and will insure your safety, so that no one in Thessaly will molest
+you.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec5" name=
+"crito_sec5">5</a>. Moreover, Socrates, you do not appear to me to
+pursue <a class='pagenumber' name='page55' id='page55'></a>a just
+course in giving yourself up when you might be saved; and you press
+on the very results with respect to yourself which your enemies
+would press, and have pressed, in their anxiety to destroy you.
+Besides this, too, you appear to me to betray your own sons, whom,
+when it is in your power to rear and educate them, you will
+abandon, and, so far as you are concerned, they will meet with such
+a fate as chance brings them, and, as is probable, they will meet
+with such things as orphans are wont to experience in a state of
+orphanage. Surely one ought not to have children, or one should go
+through the toil of rearing and instructing them. But you appear to
+me to have chosen the most indolent course; though you ought to
+have chosen such a course as a good and brave man would have done,
+since you profess to have made virtue your study through the whole
+of your life; so that I am ashamed both for you and for us who are
+your friends, lest this whole affair of yours should seem to be the
+effect of cowardice on our part&mdash;your appearing to stand your
+trial in the court, since you appeared when it was in your power
+not to have done so, the very manner in which the trial was
+conducted, and this last circumstance, as it were, a ridiculous
+consummation of the whole business; your appearing to have escaped
+from us through our indolence and cowardice, who did not save you;
+nor did you save yourself, when it was practicable and possible,
+had we but exerted ourselves a little. Think of these things,
+therefore, Socrates, and beware, lest, besides the evil <span
+class="emphasis">that will result</span>, they be disgraceful both
+to you and to us; advise, then, with yourself; though, indeed,
+there is no longer time for advising&mdash;your resolve should be
+already made. And there is but one plan; for in the following night
+the whole must be accomplished. If we delay, it will be impossible
+and no longer practicable. By all means, <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page56' id='page56'></a>therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by
+me, and on no account refuse.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec6" name=
+"crito_sec6">6</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> My dear
+Crito, your zeal would be very commendable were it united with
+right principle; otherwise, by how much the more earnest it is, by
+so much is it the more sad. We must consider, therefore, whether
+this plan should be adopted or not. For I not now only, but always,
+am a person who will obey nothing within me but reason, according
+as it appears to me on mature deliberation to be best. And the
+reasons which I formerly professed I can not now reject, because
+this misfortune has befallen me; but they appear to me in much the
+same light, and I respect and honor them as before; so that if we
+are unable to adduce any better at the present time, be assured
+that I shall not give in to you, even though the power of the
+multitude should endeavor to terrify us like children, by
+threatening more than it does now, bonds and death, and
+confiscation of property. How, therefore, may we consider the
+matter most conveniently? First of all, if we recur to the argument
+which you used about opinions, whether on former occasions it was
+rightly resolved or not, that we ought to pay attention to some
+opinions, and to others not; or whether, before it was necessary
+that I should die, it was rightly resolved; but now it has become
+clear that it was said idly for argument's sake, though in reality
+it was merely jest and trifling. I desire then, Crito, to consider,
+in common with you, whether it will appear to me in a different
+light, now that I am in this condition, or the same, and whether we
+shall give it up or yield to it. It was said, I think, on former
+occasions, by those who were thought to speak seriously, as I just
+now observed, that of the opinions which men entertain some should
+be very highly esteemed and others not. By the gods! Crito, does
+not this appear to you to be well said? For you, <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page57' id='page57'></a>in all human
+probability, are out of all danger of dying to-morrow, and the
+present calamity will not lead your judgment astray. Consider,
+then; does it not appear to you to have been rightly settled that
+we ought not to respect all the opinions of men, but some we
+should, and others not? Nor yet the opinions of all men, but of
+some we should, and of others not? What say you? Is not this
+rightly resolved?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It is.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Therefore we should
+respect the good, but not the bad?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Yes.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> And are not the good
+those of the wise, and the bad those of the foolish?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> How can it be
+otherwise?</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec7" name=
+"crito_sec7">7</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Come,
+then: how, again, were the following points settled? Does a man who
+practices gymnastic exercises and applies himself to them, pay
+attention to the praise and censure and opinion of every one, or of
+that one man only who happens to be a physician, or teacher of the
+exercises?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Of that one only.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> He ought, therefore, to
+fear the censures and covet the praises of that one, but not those
+of the multitude.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Clearly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> He ought, therefore, so
+to practice and exercise himself, and to eat and drink, as seems
+fitting to the one who presides and knows, rather than to all
+others together.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It is so.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Well, then, if he
+disobeys the one, and disregards his opinion and praise, but
+respects that of the multitude and of those who know nothing, will
+he not suffer some evil?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> How should he not?</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page58' id='page58'></a><span class=
+"speakername">Socr.</span> But what is this evil? Whither does it
+tend, and on what part of him that disobeys will it fall?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Clearly on his body, for
+this it ruins.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> You say well. The case is
+the same, too, Crito, with all other things, not to go through them
+all. With respect then, to things just and unjust, base and
+honorable, good and evil, about which we are now consulting, ought
+we to follow the opinion of the multitude, and to respect it, or
+that of one, if there is any one who understands, whom we ought to
+reverence and respect rather than all others together? And if we do
+not obey him, shall we not corrupt and injure that part of
+ourselves which becomes better by justice, but is ruined by
+injustice? Or is this nothing?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> I agree with you,
+Socrates.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec8" name=
+"crito_sec8">8</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Come,
+then, if we destroy that which becomes better by what is wholesome,
+but is impaired by what is unwholesome, through being persuaded by
+those who do not understand, can we enjoy life when that is
+impaired? And this is the body we are speaking of, is it not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Yes.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Can we, then, enjoy life
+with a diseased and impaired body?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> By no means.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> But can we enjoy life
+when that is impaired which injustice ruins but justice benefits?
+Or do we think that to be of less value than the body, whatever
+part of us it may be, about which injustice and justice are
+concerned'</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> By no means.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> But of more value?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Much more.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> We must not then, my
+excellent friend, so much regard what the multitude will say of us,
+but what he will say who understands the just and the unjust, the
+one, even <a class='pagenumber' name='page59' id='page59'></a>truth
+itself. So that at first you did not set out with a right
+principle, when you laid it down that we ought to regard the
+opinion of the multitude with respect to things just and honorable
+and good, and their contraries. How ever, some one may say, are not
+the multitude able to put us to death?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> This, too, is clear,
+Socrates, any one might say so.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> You say truly. But, my
+admirable friend, this principle which we have just discussed
+appears to me to be the same as it was before<a id="footnotetag10"
+name="footnotetag10" href="#footnote10"><sup>10</sup></a>. And
+consider this, moreover, whether it still holds good with us or
+not, that we are not to be anxious about living but about living
+well.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It does hold good.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> And does this hold good
+or not, that to live well and Honorable and justly are the same
+thing?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It does.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec9" name=
+"crito_sec9">9</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> From
+what has been admitted, then, this consideration arises, whether it
+is just or not that I should endeavor to leave this place without
+the permission of the Athenians. And should it appear to be just,
+we will make the attempt, but if not, we will give it up. But as to
+the considerations which you mention, of an outlay of money,
+reputation, and the education of children, beware, Crito, lest such
+considerations as these in reality belong to these multitudes, who
+rashly put one to death, and would restore one to life, if they
+could do so, without any reason at all. But we, since reason so
+requires, must consider nothing else than what we just now
+mentioned, whether we shall act justly in paying money and
+contracting obligations to those <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page60' id='page60'></a>who will lead me hence, as well they who
+lead me as we who are led hence, or whether, in truth, we shall not
+act unjustly in doing all these things. And if we should appear in
+so doing to be acting unjustly, observe that we must not consider
+whether from remaining here and continuing quiet we must needs die,
+or suffer any thing else, rather than whether we shall be acting
+unjustly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> You appear to me to speak
+wisely, Socrates, but see what we are to do.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Let us consider the
+matter together, my friend, and if you have any thing to object to
+what I say, make good your objection, and I will yield to you, but
+if not, cease, my excellent friend, to urge upon me the same thing
+so often, that I ought to depart hence against the will of the
+Athenians. For I highly esteem your endeavors to persuade me thus
+to act, so long as it is not against my will Consider, then, the
+beginning of our inquiry, whether it is stated to your entire
+satisfaction, and endeavor to answer the question put to you
+exactly as you think right.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> I will endeavor to do
+so.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec10" name=
+"crito_sec10">10</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Say
+we, then, that we should on no account deliberately commit
+injustice, or may we commit injustice under certain circumstances,
+under others not? Or is it on no account either good or honorable
+to commit injustice, as we have often agreed on former occasions,
+and as we just now said? Or have all those our former admissions
+been dissipated in these few days, and have we, Crito, old men as
+we are, been for a long time seriously conversing with each other
+without knowing that we in no respect differ from children? Or does
+the case, beyond all question, stand as we then determined? Whether
+the multitude allow it or not, and whether we must suffer a more
+severe or a milder punishment than this, still is injustice on
+every account <a class='pagenumber' name='page61' id=
+'page61'></a>both evil and disgraceful to him who commits it? Do we
+admit this, or not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> We do admit it.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> On no account, therefore,
+ought we to act unjustly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Surely not.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Neither ought one who is
+injured to return the injury, as the multitude think, since it is
+on no account right to act unjustly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It appears not.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> What, then? Is it right
+to do evil, Crito, or not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Surely it is not right,
+Socrates.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> But what? To do evil in
+return when one has been evil-entreated, is that right, or not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> By no means.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> For to do evil to men
+differs in no respect from committing injustice.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> You say truly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> It is not right,
+therefore, to return an injury, or to do evil to any man, however
+one may have suffered from him. But take care, Crito, that in
+allowing these things you do not allow them contrary to your
+opinion, for I know that to some few only these things both do
+appear, and will appear, to be true. They, then, to whom these
+things appear true, and they to whom they do not, have no sentiment
+in common, and must needs despise each other, while they look to
+each other's opinions. Consider well, then, whether you coincide
+and think with me, and whether we can begin our deliberations from
+this point&mdash;that it is never right either to do an injury or
+to return an injury, or when one has been evil-entreated, to
+revenge one's self by doing evil in return, or do you dissent from,
+and not coincide in this principle? For so it appears to me, both
+long since and now, but if you in any respect think otherwise, say
+so and <a class='pagenumber' name='page62' id='page62'></a>inform
+me. But if you persist in your former opinions, hear what
+follows.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> I do persist in them, and
+think with you. Speak on, then.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> I say next, then, or
+rather I ask; whether when a man has promised to do things that are
+just he ought to do them, or evade his promise?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> He ought to do them.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec11" name=
+"crito_sec11">11</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span>
+Observe, then, what follows. By departing hence without the leave
+of the city, are we not doing evil to some, and that to those to
+whom we ought least of all to do it, or not? And do we abide by
+what we agreed on as being just, or do we not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> I am unable to answer your
+question, Socrates; for I do not understand it.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Then, consider it thus.
+If, while we were preparing to run away, or by whatever name we
+should call it, the laws and commonwealth should come, and,
+presenting themselves before us, should say, "Tell me, Socrates,
+what do you purpose doing? Do you design any thing else by this
+proceeding in which you are engaged than to destroy us, the laws,
+and the whole city, so far as you are able? Or do you think it
+possible for that city any longer to subsist, and not be subverted,
+in which judgments that are passed have no force, but are set aside
+and destroyed by private persons?"&mdash;what should we say, Crito,
+to these and similar remonstrances? For any one, especially an
+orator, would have much to say on the violation of the law, which
+enjoins that judgments passed shall be enforced. Shall we say to
+them that the city has done us an injustice, and not passed a right
+sentence? Shall we say this, or what else?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> This, by Jupiter!
+Socrates.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec12" name=
+"crito_sec12">12</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> What,
+then, if the laws should say, "Socrates, <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page63' id='page63'></a>was it not agreed between us that you
+should abide by the judgments which the city should pronounce?" And
+if we should wonder at their speaking thus, perhaps they would say,
+"Wonder not, Socrates, at what we say, but answer, since you are
+accustomed to make use of questions and answers. For, come, what
+charge have you against us and the city, that you attempt to
+destroy us? Did we not first give you being? and did not your
+father, through us, take your mother to wife and beget you? Say,
+then, do you find fault with those laws among us that relate to
+marriage as being bad?" I should say, "I do not find fault with
+them." "Do you with those that relate to your nurture when born,
+and the education with which you were instructed? Or did not the
+laws, ordained on this point, enjoin rightly, in requiring your
+father to instruct you in music and gymnastic exercises?" I should
+say, rightly. Well, then, since you were born, nurtured, and
+educated through our means, can you say, first of all, that you are
+not both our offspring and our slave, as well you as your
+ancestors? And if this be so, do you think that there are equal
+rights between us? and whatever we attempt to do to you, do you
+think you may justly do to us in turn? Or had you not equal rights
+with your father, or master, if you happened to have one, so as to
+return what you suffered, neither to retort when found fault with,
+nor, when stricken, to strike again, nor many other things of the
+kind; but that with your country and the laws you may do so; so
+that if we attempt to destroy you, thinking it to be just, you also
+should endeavor, so far as you are able, in return, to destroy us,
+the laws, and your country; and in doing this will you say that you
+act justly&mdash;you who, in reality, make virtue your chief
+object? Or are you so wise as not to know that one's country is
+more honorable, venerable, and sacred, and more highly prized both
+by <a class='pagenumber' name='page64' id='page64'></a>gods, and
+men possessed of understanding, than mother and father, and all
+other progenitors; and that one ought to reverence, submit to, and
+appease one's country, when angry, rather than one's father; and
+either persuade it or do what it orders, and to suffer quietly if
+it bids one suffer, whether to be beaten, or put in bonds; or if it
+sends one out to battle there to be wounded or slain, this must be
+done; for justice so requires, and one must not give way, or
+retreat, or leave one's post; but that both in war and in a court
+of justice, and everywhere one must do what one's city and country
+enjoin, or persuade it in such manner as justice allows; but that
+to offer violence either to one's mother or father is not holy,
+much less to one's country? What shall we say to these things,
+Crito? That the laws speak the truth, or not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It seems so to me.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec13" name=
+"crito_sec13">13</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span>
+"Consider, then, Socrates," the laws perhaps might say, "whether we
+say truly that in what you are now attempting you are attempting to
+do what is not just toward us. For we, having given you birth,
+nurtured, instructed you, and having imparted to you and all other
+citizens all the good in our power, still proclaim, by giving the
+power to every Athenian who pleases, when he has arrived at years
+of discretion, and become acquainted with the business of the
+state, and us, the laws, that any one who is not satisfied with us
+may take his property, and go wherever he pleases. And if any one
+of you wishes to go to a colony, if he is not satisfied with us and
+the city, or to migrate and settle in another country, none of us,
+the laws, hinder or forbid him going whithersoever he pleases,
+taking with him all his property. But whoever continues with us
+after he has seen the manner in which we administer justice, and in
+other respects govern the city, we now say that <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page65' id='page65'></a>he has in fact entered
+into a compact with us to do what we order; and we affirm that he
+who does not obey is in three respects guilty of
+injustice&mdash;because he does not obey us who gave him being, and
+because he does not obey us who nurtured him, and because, having
+made a compact that he would obey us, he neither does so, nor does
+he persuade us if we do any thing wrongly; though we propose for
+his consideration, and do not rigidly command him to do what we
+order, but leave him the choice of one of two things, either to
+persuade us, or to do what we require, and yet he does neither of
+these."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec14" name=
+"crito_sec14">14</a>. "And we say that you, O Socrates! will be
+subject to these charges if you accomplish your design, and that
+not least of the Athenians, but most so of all." And if I should
+ask, "For what reason?" they would probably justly retort on me by
+saying that, among all the Athenians, I especially made this
+compact with them. For they would say, "Socrates, we have strong
+proof of this, that you were satisfied both with us and the city;
+for, of all the Athenians, you especially would never have dwelt in
+it if it had not been especially agreeable to you; for you never
+went out of the city to any of the public spectacles, except once
+to the Isthmian games, nor anywhere else, except on military
+service, nor have you ever gone abroad as other men do, nor had you
+ever had any desire to become acquainted with any other city or
+other laws, but we and our city were sufficient for you; so
+strongly were you attached to us, and so far did you consent to
+submit to our government, both in other respects and in begetting
+children in this city, in consequence of your being satisfied with
+it. Moreover, in your very trial, it was in your power to have
+imposed on yourself a sentence of exile, if you pleased, and might
+then have done, with the consent of the city, <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page66' id='page66'></a>what you now attempt against its
+consent. Then, indeed, you boasted yourself as not being grieved if
+you must needs die; but you preferred, as you said, death to exile.
+Now, however, you are neither ashamed of those professions, nor do
+you revere us, the laws, since you endeavor to destroy us, and you
+act as the vilest slave would act, by endeavoring to make your
+escape contrary to the conventions and the compacts by which you
+engaged to submit to our government. First, then, therefore, answer
+us this, whether we speak the truth or not in affirming that you
+agreed to be governed by us in deed, though not in word?" What
+shall we say to this, Crito? Can we do otherwise than assent?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> We must needs do so,
+Socrates.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> "What else, then," they
+will say, "are you doing but violating the conventions and compacts
+which you made with us, though you did not enter into them from
+compulsion or through deception, or from being compelled to
+determine in a short time but during the space of seventy years, in
+which you might have departed if you had been dissatisfied with us,
+and the compacts had not appeared to you to be just? You, however,
+preferred neither Laced&aelig;mon nor Crete, which you several
+times said are governed by good laws, nor any other of the Grecian
+or barbarian cities; but you have been less out of Athens than the
+lame and the blind, and other maimed persons. So much, it is
+evident, were you satisfied with the city and us, the laws, beyond
+the rest of the Athenians; for who can be satisfied with a city
+without laws? But now will you not abide by your compacts? You
+will, if you are persuaded by us, Socrates, and will not make
+yourself ridiculous by leaving the city."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec15" name=
+"crito_sec15">15</a>. "For consider, by violating these compacts
+and offending against any of them, what good you will do to <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page67' id='page67'></a>yourself or your
+friends. For that your friends will run the risk of being
+themselves banished, and deprived of the rights of citizenship, or
+of forfeiting their property, is pretty clear. And as for yourself,
+if you should go to one of the neighboring cities, either Thebes or
+Megara, for both are governed by good laws, you will go there,
+Socrates, as an enemy to their polity; and such as have any regard
+for their country will look upon you with suspicion, regarding you
+as a corrupter of the laws; and you will confirm the opinion of the
+judges, so that they will appear to have condemned you rightly, for
+whose is a corrupter of the laws will appear in all likelihood to
+be a corrupter of youths and weak-minded men. Will you, then, avoid
+these well-governed cities, and the best-ordered men? And should
+you do so, will it be worth your while to live? Or will you
+approach them, and have the effrontery to converse with them,
+Socrates, on subjects the same as you did here&mdash;that virtue
+and justice, legal institutions and laws, should be most highly
+valued by men? And do you not think that this conduct of Socrates
+would be very indecorous? You must think so. But you will keep
+clear of these places, and go to Thessaly, to Crito's friends, for
+there are the greatest disorder and licentiousness; and perhaps
+they will gladly hear you relating how drolly you escaped from
+prison, clad in some dress or covered with a skin, or in some other
+disguise such as fugitives are wont to dress themselves in, having
+so changed your usual appearance. And will no one say that you,
+though an old man, with but a short time to live, in all
+probability, have dared to have such a base desire of life as to
+violate the most sacred laws? Perhaps not, should you not offend
+any one. But if you should, you will hear, Socrates, many things
+utterly unworthy of you. You will live, too, in a state of abject
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page68' id='page68'></a>dependence on
+all men, and as their slave. But what will you do in Thessaly
+besides feasting, as if you had gone to Thessaly to a banquet? And
+what will become of those discourses about justice and all other
+virtues? But do you wish to live for the sake of your children,
+that you may rear and educate them? What then? Will you take them
+to Thessaly, and there rear and educate them, making them aliens to
+their country, that they may owe you this obligation too? Or, if
+not so, being reared here, will they be better reared and educated
+while you are living, though not with them, for your friends will
+take care of them? Whether, if you go to Thessaly, will they take
+care of them, but if you go to Hades will they not take care of
+them? If, however, any advantage is to be derived from those that
+say they are your friends, we must think they will."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec16" name=
+"crito_sec16">16</a>. "Then, O Socrates! be persuaded by us who
+have nurtured you, and do not set a higher value on your children,
+or on life, or on any thing else than justice, that, when you
+arrive in Hades, you may have all this to say in your defense
+before those who have dominion there. For neither here in this
+life, if you do what is proposed, does it appear to be better, or
+more just, or more holy to yourself, or any of your friends; nor
+will it be better for you when you arrive there. But now you
+depart, if you do depart, unjustly treated, not by us, the laws,
+but by men; but should you escape, having thus disgracefully
+returned injury for injury, and evil for evil, having violated your
+own compacts and conventions which you made with us, and having
+done evil to those to whom you least of all should have done
+it&mdash;namely, yourself, your friends, your country, and
+us&mdash;both we shall be indignant with you as long as you live,
+and there our brothers, the laws in Hades, will not receive you
+favorably knowing that you attempted, so far as you <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page69' id='page69'></a>were able, to destroy
+us. Let not Crito, then, persuade you to do what he advises, rather
+than we."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec17" name=
+"crito_sec17">17</a>. These things, my dear friend Crito, be
+assured, I seem to hear as the votaries of Cybele<a id=
+"footnotetag11" name="footnotetag11" href=
+"#footnote11"><sup>11</sup></a> seem to hear the flutes. And the
+sound of these words booms in my ear, and makes me incapable of
+hearing any thing else. Be sure, then, so long as I retain my
+present opinions, if you should say any thing contrary to these,
+you will speak in vain. If, however, you think that you can prevail
+at all, say on.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> But, Socrates, I have
+nothing to say.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Desist, then, Crito, and
+let us pursue this course, since this way the deity leads us.</p>
+
+<h3>Footnotes</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote6" name="footnote6" href=
+"#footnotetag6">6</a>: See the Ph&aelig;do sec <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec1">1</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote7" name="footnote7" href=
+"#footnotetag7">7</a>: A promontory at the southern extremity of
+Attica</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote8" name="footnote8" href=
+"#footnotetag8">8</a>: The Eleven</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote9" name="footnote9" href=
+"#footnotetag9">9</a>: See Homer's "Iliad," 1 IX, v 363</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote10" name="footnote10" href=
+"#footnotetag10">10</a>: That is to say, the principle which we had
+laid down in former discussions that no regard is to be had to
+popular opinion, is still found to hold good.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote11" name="footnote11" href=
+"#footnotetag11">11</a>: The Corybantes, priests of Cybele, who in
+their solemn festivals made such a noise with flutes that the
+hearers could hear no other sound.</div>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="introduction"><a name='introduction_to_the_phaedo' id=
+'introduction_to_the_phaedo'></a><a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page70' id='page70'></a>
+
+<h2>Introduction To The Ph&aelig;do.</h2>
+
+<p>This dialogue presents us with an account of the manner In which
+Socrates spent the last day of his, life, and how he met his death.
+The main subject is that of the soul's immortality, which Socrates
+takes upon himself to prove with as much certainty as it is
+possible for the human mind to arrive at. The question itself,
+though none could be better suited to the occasion, arises simply
+and naturally from the general conversation that precedes it.</p>
+
+<p>When his friends visit him in the morning for the purpose of
+spending this his last day with him, they find him sitting up in
+bed, and rubbing his leg, which had just been freed from bonds. He
+remarks on the unaccountable alternation and connection between
+pleasure and pain, and adds that &AElig;sop, had he observed it,
+would have made a fable from it. This remark reminds Cebes of
+Socrates's having put some of &AElig;sop's fables into metre since
+his imprisonment, and he asks, for the satisfaction of the poet
+Evenus, what has induced him to do so. Socrates explains his
+reason, and concludes by bidding him tell Evenus to follow him as
+soon as he can. Simmias expresses his surprise at this message, on
+which Socrates asks, "Is not Evenus a philosopher?" and on the
+question being answered in the affirmative, he says that he or any
+philosopher would be willing to die, though perhaps he would not
+commit violence on himself. This, again, seems a contradiction to
+Simmias; but Socrates explains it by showing that our souls <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page71' id='page71'></a>are placed in the
+body by God, and may not leave it without his permission. Whereupon
+Cebes objects that in that case foolish men only would wish to die,
+and quit the service of the best of masters, to which Simmias
+agrees. Socrates, therefore, proposes to plead his cause before
+them, and to show that there is a great probability that after this
+life he shall go into the presence of God and good men, and be
+happy in proportion to the purity of his own mind.</p>
+
+<p>He begins<a id="footnotetag12" name="footnotetag12" href=
+"#footnote12"><sup>12</sup></a> by stating that philosophy itself
+is nothing else than a preparation for and meditation on death.
+Death and philosophy have this in common: death separates the soul
+from the body; philosophy draws off the mind from bodily things to
+the contemplation of truth and virtue: for he is not a true
+philosopher who is led away by bodily pleasures, since the senses
+are the source of ignorance and all evil. The mind, therefore, is
+entirely occupied in meditating on death, and freeing itself as
+much as possible from the body. How, then, can such a man be afraid
+of death? He who grieves at the approach of death can not be a true
+lover of wisdom, but is a lover of his body. And, indeed, most men
+are temperate through intemperance; that is to say, they abstain
+from some pleasures that they may the more easily and permanently
+enjoy others. They embrace only a shadow of virtue, not virtue
+itself, since they estimate the value of all things by the
+pleasures they afford. Whereas the philosopher purifies his mind
+from all such things, and pursues virtue and wisdom for their own
+sakes. This course Socrates himself has pursued to the utmost of
+his ability, with what success he should shortly know; and on these
+grounds he did not repine at leaving his friends in this world,
+being persuaded that in another he should meet with good masters
+and good friends.</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page72' id='page72'></a>Upon this
+Cebes<a id="footnotetag13" name="footnotetag13" href=
+"#footnote13"><sup>13</sup></a> says that he agrees with all else
+that had been said, but can not help entertaining doubts of what
+will become of the soul when separated from the body, for the
+common opinion is that it is dispersed and vanishes like breath or
+smoke, and no longer exists anywhere. Socrates, therefore, proposes
+to inquire into the probability of the case, a fit employment for
+him under his present circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>His first argument<a id="footnotetag14" name="footnotetag14"
+href="#footnote14"><sup>14</sup></a> is drawn from the ancient
+belief prevalent among men, that souls departing hence exist in
+Hades, and are produced again from the dead. If this be true, it
+must follow that our souls are there, for they could not be
+produced again if they did not exist; and its truth is confirmed by
+this, that it is a general law of nature that contraries are
+produced from contraries&mdash;the greater from the less, strong
+from weak, slow from swift, heat from cold, and in like manner life
+from death, and vice versa. To explain this more clearly, he
+proceeds to show that what is changed passes from one state to
+another, and so undergoes three different states&mdash;first, the
+actual state; then the transition; and, thirdly, the new state; as
+from a state of sleep, by awaking to being awake. In like manner
+birth is a transition from a state of death to life, and dying from
+life to death; so that the soul, by the act of dying, only passes
+to another state. If it were not so, all nature would in time
+become dead, just as if people did not awake out of sleep all would
+at last be buried in eternal sleep. Whence the conclusion is that
+the souls of men are not annihilated by death.</p>
+
+<p>Cebes<a id="footnotetag15" name="footnotetag15" href=
+"#footnote15"><sup>15</sup></a> agrees to this reasoning, and adds
+that he is further convinced, of its truth by calling to mind an
+argument used by Socrates on former occasions, that knowledge is <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page73' id='page73'></a>nothing but
+reminiscence; and if this is so, the soul must have existed, and
+had knowledge, before it became united to the body.</p>
+
+<p>But in case Simmias should not yet be satisfied, Socrates<a id=
+"footnotetag16" name="footnotetag16" href=
+"#footnote16"><sup>16</sup></a> proceeds to enlarge on this, his
+second argument, drawn from reminiscence. We daily find that we are
+carried from the knowledge of one thing to another. Things
+perceived by the eyes, ears, and other senses bring up the thought
+of other things; thus the sight of a lyre or a garment reminds us
+of a friend, and not only are we thus reminded of sensible objects,
+but of things which are comprehended by the mind alone, and have no
+sensitive existence. For we have formed in our minds an idea of
+abstract equality, of the beautiful, the just, the good; in short,
+of every thing which we say exists without the aid of the senses,
+for we use them only in the perception of individual things; whence
+it follows that the mind did not acquire this knowledge in this
+life, but must have had it before, and therefore the soul must have
+existed before.</p>
+
+<p>Simmias and Cebes<a id="footnotetag17" name="footnotetag17"
+href="#footnote17"><sup>17</sup></a> both agree in admitting that
+Socrates has proved the pre-existence of the soul, but insist that
+he has not shown it to be immortal, for that nothing hinders but
+that, according to the popular opinion, it may be dispersed at the
+dissolution of the body. To which Socrates replies, that if their
+former admissions are joined to his last argument, the immortality,
+as well as the pre-existence, of the soul has been sufficiently
+proved. For if it is true that any thing living is produced from
+that which is dead, then the soul must exist after death, otherwise
+it could not be produced again.</p>
+
+<p>However, to remove the apprehension that the soul may be
+dispersed by a wind, as it were, Socrates proceeds, in his <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page74' id='page74'></a>third argument,<a
+id="footnotetag18" name="footnotetag18" href=
+"#footnote18"><sup>18</sup></a> to examine that doubt more
+thoroughly. What, then, is meant by being dispersed but being
+dissolved into its parts? In order, therefore, to a thing being
+capable of dispersion it must be compounded of parts. Now, there
+are two kinds of things&mdash;one compounded, the other simple The
+former kind is subject to change, the latter not, and can be
+comprehended by the mind alone. The one is visible, the other
+invisible; and the soul, which is invisible, when it employs the
+bodily senses, wanders and is confused, but when it abstracts
+itself from the body it attains to the knowledge of that which is
+eternal, immortal, and unchangeable. The soul, therefore, being
+uncompounded and invisible, must be indissoluble; that is to say,
+immortal.</p>
+
+<p>Still Simmias and Cebes<a id="footnotetag19" name=
+"footnotetag19" href="#footnote19"><sup>19</sup></a> are
+unconvinced. The former objects that the soul, according to
+Socrates's own showing, is nothing but a harmony resulting from a
+combination of the parts of the body, and so may perish with the
+body, as the harmony of a lyre does when the lyre itself is broken.
+And Cebes, though he admits that the soul is more durable than the
+body, yet objects that it is not, therefore, of necessity immortal,
+but may in time wear out; and it is by no means clear that this is
+not its last period.</p>
+
+<p>These objections produce a powerful effect on the rest of the
+company; but Socrates, undismayed, exhorts them not to suffer
+themselves to be deterred from seeking the truth by any
+difficulties they may meet with; and then proceeds<a id=
+"footnotetag20" name="footnotetag20" href=
+"#footnote20"><sup>20</sup></a> to show, in a moment, the fallacy
+of Simmias's objection. It was before admitted, he says, that the
+soul existed before the body; but harmony is produced after the
+lyre is formed, so that the two cases are totally different. And,
+further, there are various degrees of harmony, but every soul is as
+much a soul as any other. But, then, what will a person <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page75' id='page75'></a>who holds this doctrine,
+that the soul is harmony, say of virtue and vice in the soul? Will
+he call them another kind of harmony and discord? If so, he will
+contradict himself; for it is admitted that one soul is not more or
+less a soul than another, and therefore one can not he more or less
+harmonized than another, and one could not admit of a greater
+degree of virtue or vice than another; and indeed a soul, being
+harmony, could not partake of vice at all, which is discord.</p>
+
+<p>Socrates, having thus satisfactorily answered the argument
+adduced by Simmias, goes on to rebut that of Cebes,<a id=
+"footnotetag21" name="footnotetag21" href=
+"#footnote21"><sup>21</sup></a> who objected that the soul might in
+time wear out. In order to do this, he relates that, when a young
+man, he attempted to investigate the causes of all things, why they
+exist and why they perish; and in the course of his researches,
+finding the futility of attributing the existence of things to what
+are called natural causes, he resolved on endeavoring to find out
+the reasons of things. He therefore assumed that there are a
+certain abstract beauty and goodness and magnitude, and so of all
+other things; the truth of which being granted, he thinks he shall
+be able to prove that the soul is immortal.</p>
+
+<p>This, then, being conceded by Cebes, Socrates<a id=
+"footnotetag22" name="footnotetag22" href=
+"#footnote22"><sup>22</sup></a> argues that every thing that is
+beautiful is so from partaking of abstract beauty, and great from
+partaking of magnitude, and little from partaking of littleness.
+Now, it is impossible, he argues, that contraries can exist in the
+same thing at the same time; for instance, the same thing can not
+possess both magnitude and littleness, but one will withdraw at the
+approach of the other; and not only so, but things which, though
+not contrary to each other, yet always contain contraries within
+themselves, can not co-exist; for instance, <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page76' id='page76'></a>the number three has no contrary, yet
+it contains within itself the idea of odd, which is the contrary of
+even, and so three never can become even; in like manner, heat
+while it is heat can never admit the idea of its contrary, cold.
+Now, if this method of reasoning is applied to the soul, it will be
+found to be immortal; for life and death are contraries, and never
+can co-exist; but wherever the soul is, there is life: so that it
+contains within itself that which is contrary to death, and
+consequently can never admit of death; therefore it is
+immortal.</p>
+
+<p>With this he closes his arguments in support of the soul's
+immortality. Cebes owns himself convinced, but Simmias, though he
+is unable to make any objection to the soundness of Socrates's
+reasoning, can not help still entertaining doubts on the subject.
+If, however, the soul is immortal, Socrates proceeds,<a id=
+"footnotetag23" name="footnotetag23" href=
+"#footnote23"><sup>23</sup></a> great need is there in this life to
+endeavor to become as wise and good as possible. For if death were
+a deliverance from every thing, it would be a great gain for the
+wicked; but since the soul appears to be immortal, it must go to
+the place suited to its nature. For it is said that each person's
+demon conducts him to a place where he receives sentence according
+to his deserts.</p>
+
+<p>He then<a id="footnotetag24" name="footnotetag24" href=
+"#footnote24"><sup>24</sup></a> draws a fanciful picture of the
+various regions of the earth, to which the good and the bad will
+respectively go after death, and exhorts his friends to use every
+endeavor to acquire virtue and wisdom in this life, "for," he adds,
+"the reward is noble, and the hope great."</p>
+
+<p>Having thus brought his subject to a conclusion, Socrates
+proposes to bathe himself, in order not to trouble others to wash
+his dead body. Crito thereupon asks if he has any commands to give,
+and especially how he would be buried, to which he, with his usual
+cheerfulness, makes answer, "<a class='pagenumber' name='page77'
+id='page77'></a>Just as you please, if only you can catch me;" and
+then, smiling, he reminds them that after death he shall be no
+longer with them, and begs the others of the party to be sureties
+to Crito for his absence from the body, as they had been before
+bound for his presence before his judges.</p>
+
+<p>After he had bathed, and taken leave of his children and the
+women of his family the officer of the Eleven comes in to intimate
+to him that it is now time to drink the poison. Crito urges a
+little delay, as the sun had not yet set; but Socrates refuses to
+make himself ridiculous by showing such a fondness for life. The
+man who is to administer the poison is therefore sent for; and on
+his holding out the cup, Socrates, neither trembling nor changing
+color or countenance at all, but, as he was wont, looking
+steadfastly at the man, asked if he might make a libation to any
+one; and being told that no more poison than enough had been mixed,
+he simply prayed that his departure from this to another world
+might be happy, and then drank off the poison, readily and calmly.
+His friends, who had hitherto with difficulty restrained
+themselves, could no longer control the outward expressions of
+grief, to which Socrates said, "What are you doing, my friends? I,
+for this reason, chiefly, sent away the women, that they might not
+commit any folly of this kind; for I have heard that it is right to
+die with good omens. Be quiet, therefore, and bear up."</p>
+
+<p>When he had walked about for a while his legs began to grow
+heavy, so he lay down on his back; and his body, from the feet
+upward, gradually grew cold and stiff. His last words were, "Crito,
+we owe a cock to &AElig;sculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not
+neglect it."</p>
+
+<p>"This," concludes Ph&aelig;do, "was the end of our
+friend&mdash;a man, as we may say, the best of all his time, that
+we have known, and, moreover, the most wise and just."</p>
+
+<h3>Footnotes</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote12" name="footnote12" href=
+"#footnotetag12">12</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec21">21-39</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote13" name="footnote13" href=
+"#footnotetag13">13</a>: Sec. <a href="#phaedo_sec39">39,
+40</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote14" name="footnote14" href=
+"#footnotetag14">14</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec40">40-46</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote15" name="footnote15" href=
+"#footnotetag15">15</a>: Sec. <a href="#phaedo_sec47">47</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote16" name="footnote16" href=
+"#footnotetag16">16</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec48">48-57</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote17" name="footnote17" href=
+"#footnotetag17">17</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec55">55-59</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote18" name="footnote18" href=
+"#footnotetag18">18</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec61">61-75</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote19" name="footnote19" href=
+"#footnotetag19">19</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec76">76-84</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote20" name="footnote20" href=
+"#footnotetag20">20</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec93">93-99</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote21" name="footnote21" href=
+"#footnotetag21">21</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec100">100-112</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote22" name="footnote22" href=
+"#footnotetag22">22</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec112">112-128</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote23" name="footnote23" href=
+"#footnotetag23">23</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec129">129-131</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote24" name="footnote24" href=
+"#footnotetag24">24</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec132">132-145</a>.</div>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="book"><a name='phaedo_or_the_immortality_of_the_soul'
+id='phaedo_or_the_immortality_of_the_soul'></a><a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page78' id='page78'></a>
+
+<h2>Ph&aelig;do;<br>
+ Or,<br>
+ The Immortality Of The Soul.</h2>
+
+FIRST ECHECRATES, PH&AElig;DO.<br>
+ THEN SOCRATES, APOLLODORUS, CEBES, SIMMIAS, AND CRITO.
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec1" name=
+"phaedo_sec1"></a><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> Were you
+personally present, Ph&aelig;do, with Socrates on that day when he
+drank the poison in prison, or did you hear an account of it from
+some one else?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> I was there myself,
+Echecrates.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> What, then, did he say
+before his death, and how did he die? for I should be glad to hear:
+for scarcely any citizen of Phlius<a id="footnotetag25" name=
+"footnotetag25" href="#footnote25"><sup>25</sup></a> ever visits
+Athens now, nor has any stranger for a long time come from thence
+who was able to give us a clear account of the particulars, except
+that he had died from drinking poison; but he was unable to tell us
+any thing more.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec2" name=
+"phaedo_sec2">2</a>. <span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span>
+And did you not hear about the trial&mdash;how it went off?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> Yes; some one told me
+this; and I wondered that, <a class='pagenumber' name='page79' id=
+'page79'></a>as it took place so long ago, he appears to have died
+long afterward. What was the reason of this, Ph&aelig;do?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> An accidental
+circumstance happened in his favor, Echecrates; for the poop of the
+ship which the Athenians send to Delos chanced to be crowned on the
+day before the trial.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> But what is this ship?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> It is the ship, as
+the Athenians say, in which Theseus formerly conveyed the fourteen
+boys and girls to Crete, and saved both them and himself. They,
+therefore, made a vow to Apollo on that occasion, as it is said,
+that if they were saved they would every year dispatch a solemn
+embassy to Delos; which, from that time to the present, they send
+yearly to the god. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec3" name=
+"phaedo_sec3">3</a>. When they begin the preparations for this
+solemn embassy, they have a law that the city shall be purified
+during this period, and that no public execution shall take place
+until the ship has reached Delos, and returned to Athens; and this
+occasionally takes a long time, when the winds happen to impede
+their passage. The commencement of the embassy is when the priest
+of Apollo has crowned the poop of the ship. And this was done, as I
+said, on the day before the trial: on this account Socrates had a
+long interval in prison between the trial and his death.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec4" name=
+"phaedo_sec4">4</a>. <span class="speakername">Ech.</span> And
+what, Ph&aelig;do, were the circumstances of his death? What was
+said and done? and who of his friends were with him? or would not
+the magistrates allow them to be present, but did he die destitute
+of friends?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> By no means; but
+some, indeed several, were present.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> Take the trouble, then, to
+relate to me all the particulars as clearly as you can, unless you
+have any pressing business.</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page80' id='page80'></a><span class=
+"speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> I am at leisure, and will endeavor
+to give you a full account; for to call Socrates to mind, whether
+speaking myself or listening to some one else, is always most
+delightful to me.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec5" name=
+"phaedo_sec5">5</a>. <span class="speakername">Ech.</span> And
+indeed, Ph&aelig;do, you have others to listen to you who are of
+the same mind. However, endeavor to relate every thing as
+accurately as you can.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> I was, indeed,
+wonderfully affected by being present, for I was not impressed with
+a feeling of pity, like one present at the death of a friend; for
+the man appeared to me to be happy, Echecrates, both from his
+manner and discourse, so fearlessly and nobly did he meet his
+death: so much so, that it occurred to me that in going to Hades he
+was not going without a divine destiny, but that when he arrived
+there he would be happy, if any one ever was. For this reason I was
+entirely uninfluenced by any feeling of pity, as would seem likely
+to be the case with one present on so mournful an occasion; nor was
+I affected by pleasure from being engaged in philosophical
+discussions, as was our custom; for our conversation was of that
+kind. But an altogether unaccountable feeling possessed me, a kind
+of unusual mixture compounded of pleasure and pain together, when I
+considered that he was immediately about to die. And all of us who
+were present were affected in much the same manner, at one time
+laughing, at another weeping&mdash;one of us especially,
+Apollodorus, for you know the man and his manner.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> How should I not?</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec6" name=
+"phaedo_sec6">6</a>. <span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span>
+He, then, was entirely overcome by these emotions; and I, too, was
+troubled, as well as the others.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> But who were present,
+Ph&aelig;do?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> Of his
+fellow-countrymen, this Apollodorus was present, and Critobulus,
+and his father, Crito; moreover, <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page81' id='page81'></a>Hermogenes, Epigenes, &AElig;schines and
+Antisthenes; Ctesippus the P&aelig;anian, Menexenus, and some
+others of his countrymen, were also there: Plato, I think, was
+sick.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> Were any strangers
+present?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> Yes; Simmias, the
+Theban, Cebes and Ph&aelig;dondes; and from Megara, Euclides and
+Terpsion.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec7" name=
+"phaedo_sec7">7</a>. <span class="speakername">Ech.</span> But
+what! were not Aristippus and Cleombrotus present?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> No, for they were
+said to be at &AElig;gina.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> Was any one else
+there?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> I think that these
+were nearly all who were present.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> Well, now, what do you say
+was the subject of conversation?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> I will endeavor to
+relate the whole to you from the beginning. On the preceding days I
+and the others were constantly in the habit of visiting Socrates,
+meeting early in the morning at the court house where the trial
+took place, for it was near the prison. <a class="sectionnumber"
+id="phaedo_sec8" name="phaedo_sec8">8</a>. Here, then, we waited
+every day till the prison was opened, conversing with each other,
+for it was not opened very early; but as soon as it was opened we
+went in to Socrates, and usually spent the day with him. On that
+occasion, however, we met earlier than usual; for on the preceding
+day, when we left the prison in the evening, we heard that the ship
+had arrived from Delos. We therefore urged each other to come as
+early as possible to the accustomed place. Accordingly we came; and
+the porter, who used to admit us, coming out, told us to wait, and
+not to enter until he had called us. "For," he said, "the Eleven
+are now freeing Socrates from his bonds, and announcing to him that
+he must die to-day." But in no long time he returned, and bade us
+enter.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec9" name=
+"phaedo_sec9">9</a>. When we entered, we found Socrates just freed
+from <a class='pagenumber' name='page82' id='page82'></a>his bonds,
+and Xantippe, you know her, holding his little boy, and sitting by
+him. As soon as Xantippe saw us she wept aloud, and said such
+things as women usually do on such occasions&mdash;as, "Socrates,
+your friends will now converse with you for the last time, and you
+with them." But Socrates, looking towards Crito, said: "Crito, let
+some one take her home." Upon which some of Crito's attendants led
+her away, wailing and beating herself.</p>
+
+<p>But Socrates, sitting up in bed, drew up his leg, and rubbed it
+with his hand, and as he rubbed it, said: "What an unaccountable
+thing, my friends, that seems to be, which men call pleasure! and
+how wonderfully is it related toward that which appears to be its
+contrary, pain, in that they will not both be present to a man at
+the same time! Yet if any one pursues and attains the one, he is
+almost always compelled to receive the other, as if they were both
+united together from one head."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec10" name=
+"phaedo_sec10">10</a>. "And it seems tome," he said, "that if
+&AElig;sop had observed this he would have made a fable from it,
+how the deity, wishing to reconcile these warring principles, when
+he could not do so, united their heads together, and from hence
+whomsoever the one visits the other attends immediately after; as
+appears to be the case with me, since I suffered pain in my leg
+before from the chain, but now pleasure seems to have
+succeeded."</p>
+
+<p>Hereupon Cebes, interrupting him, said: "By Jupiter! Socrates,
+you have done well in reminding me; with respect to the poems which
+you made, by putting into metre those Fables of &AElig;sop and the
+hymn to Apollo, several other persons asked me, and especially
+Evenus recently, with what design you made them after you came
+here, whereas before you had never made any. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec11" name="phaedo_sec11">11</a>. If
+therefore, you care at all that I should be able to answer Evenus,
+when he asks me <a class='pagenumber' name='page83' id=
+'page83'></a>again&mdash;for I am sure he will do so&mdash;tell me
+what I must say to him."</p>
+
+<p>"Tell him the truth, then, Cebes," he replied, "that I did not
+make them from a wish to compete with him, or his poems, for I knew
+that this would be no easy matter; but that I might discover the
+meaning of certain dreams, and discharge my conscience, if this
+should happen to be the music which they have often ordered me to
+apply myself to. For they were to the following purport: often in
+my past life the same dream visited me, appearing at different
+times in different forms, yet always saying the same
+thing&mdash;'Socrates,' it said, 'apply yourself to and practice
+music.' <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec12" name=
+"phaedo_sec12">12</a>. And I formerly supposed that it exhorted and
+encouraged me to continue the pursuit I was engaged in, as those
+who cheer on racers, so that the dream encouraged me to continue
+the pursuit I was engaged in&mdash;namely, to apply myself to
+music, since philosophy is the highest music, and I was devoted to
+it. But now since my trial took place, and the festival of the god
+retarded my death, it appeared to me that if by chance the dream so
+frequently enjoined me to apply myself to popular music, I ought
+not to disobey it, but do so, for that it would be safer for me not
+to depart hence before I had discharged my conscience by making
+some poems in obedience to the dream. Thus, then, I first of all
+composed a hymn to the god whose festival was present; and after
+the god, considering that a poet, if he means to be a poet, ought
+to make fables, and not discourses, and knowing that I was not
+skilled in making fables, I therefore put into verse those Fables
+of &AElig;sop, which were at hand, and were known to me, and which
+first occurred to me."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec13" name=
+"phaedo_sec13">13</a>. "Tell this, then, to Evenus, Cebes, and bid
+him farewell, and if he is wise, to follow me as soon as he can.
+But I depart, as it seems, to-day; for so the Athenians order."</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page84' id='page84'></a>To this
+Simmias said, "What is this, Socrates, which you exhort Evenus to
+do? for I often meet with him; and, from what I know of him, I am
+pretty certain that he will not at all be willing to comply with
+your advice."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then," said he, "is not Evenus a philosopher?"</p>
+
+<p>"To me he seems to be so," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"Then he will be willing," rejoined Socrates, "and so will every
+one who worthily engages in this study. Perhaps, indeed, he will
+not commit violence on himself; for that, they say, is not
+allowable." And as he said this he let down his leg from the bed on
+the ground, and in this posture continued during the remainder of
+the discussion.</p>
+
+<p>Cebes then asked him, "What do you mean, Socrates, by saying
+that it is not lawful to commit violence on one's self, but that a
+philosopher should be willing to follow one who is dying?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec14" name=
+"phaedo_sec14">14</a>. "What, Cebes! have not you and Simmias, who
+have conversed familiarly with Philolaus<a id="footnotetag26" name=
+"footnotetag26" href="#footnote26"><sup>26</sup></a> on this
+subject, heard?"</p>
+
+<p>"Nothing very clearly, Socrates."</p>
+
+<p>"I, however, speak only from hearsay; what, then, I have heard I
+have no scruple in telling. And perhaps it is most becoming for one
+who is about to travel there to inquire and speculate about the
+journey thither, what kind we think it is. What else can one do in
+the interval before sunset?"</p>
+
+<p>"Why, then, Socrates, do they say that it is not allowable to
+kill one's self? for I, as you asked just now, have heard both
+Philolaus, when he lived with us, and several others, say that it
+was not right to do this; but I never heard any thing clear upon
+the subject from any one."</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page85' id='page85'></a><a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec15" name="phaedo_sec15">15</a>.
+"Then, you should consider it attentively," said Socrates, "for
+perhaps you may hear. Probably, however, it will appear wonderful
+to you, if this alone, of all other things, is a universal truth,<a
+id="footnotetag27" name="footnotetag27" href=
+"#footnote27"><sup>27</sup></a> and it never happens to a man, as
+is the case in all other things, that at some times and to some
+persons only it is better to die than to live; yet that these men
+for whom it is better to die&mdash;this probably will appear
+wonderful to you&mdash;may not without impiety do this good to
+themselves, but must await another benefactor."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec16" name=
+"phaedo_sec16">16</a>. Then Cebes, gently smiling, said, speaking
+in his own dialect,<a id="footnotetag28" name="footnotetag28" href=
+"#footnote28"><sup>28</sup></a> "Jove be witness!"</p>
+
+<p>"And, indeed," said Socrates, "it would appear to be
+unreasonable; yet still, perhaps, it has some reason on its side.
+The maxim, indeed, given on this subject in the mystical
+doctrines,<a id="footnotetag29" name="footnotetag29" href=
+"#footnote29"><sup>29</sup></a> that we men are in a kind of
+prison, and that we ought not to free ourselves from it and escape,
+appears to me difficult to be understood, and not easy to
+penetrate. This, however, appears to me, Cebes, to be well said:
+that the gods take care of us, and that we men are one of their
+possessions. Does it not seem so to you?"</p>
+
+<p>"It does," replied Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore," said he, "if one of your slaves were to kill
+himself, without your having intimated that you wished him to die,
+should you not be angry with him, and should you not punish him if
+you could?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Perhaps, then, in this point of view, it is not unreasonable to
+assert that a man ought not to kill himself before the deity lays
+him under a necessity of doing so, such as that now laid on
+me."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec17" name=
+"phaedo_sec17">17</a>. "This, indeed," said Cebes, "appears to be
+probable. <a class='pagenumber' name='page86' id='page86'></a>But
+what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers should be very
+willing to die, appears to be an absurdity, if what we said just
+now is agreeable to reason&mdash;that it is God who takes care of
+us, and that we are his property. For that the wisest men should
+not be grieved at leaving that service in which they govern them
+who are the best of all masters&mdash;namely, the gods&mdash;is not
+consistent with reason; for surely he can not think that he will
+take better care of himself when he has become free. But a foolish
+man might perhaps think thus, that he should fly from his master,
+and would not reflect that he ought not to fly from a good one, but
+should cling to him as much as possible; therefore he would fly
+against all reason; but a man of sense would desire to be
+constantly with one better than himself. Thus, Socrates, the
+contrary of what you just now said is likely to be the case; for it
+becomes the wise to be grieved at dying, but the foolish to
+rejoice."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec18" name=
+"phaedo_sec18">18</a>. Socrates, on hearing this, appeared to me to
+be pleased with the pertinacity of Cebes, and, looking toward us,
+said, "Cebes, you see, always searches out arguments, and is not at
+all willing to admit at once any thing one has said."</p>
+
+<p>Whereupon Simmias replied, "But, indeed, Socrates, Cebes appears
+to me now to say something to the purpose; for with what design
+should men really wise fly from masters who are better than
+themselves, and so readily leave them? And Cebes appears to me to
+direct his argument against you, because you so easily endure to
+abandon both us and those good rulers, as you yourself confess, the
+gods."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak justly," said Socrates, "for I think you mean that I
+ought to make my defense to this charge, as if I were in a court of
+justice."</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page87' id='page87'></a>Certainly,"
+replied Simmias.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec19" name=
+"phaedo_sec19">19</a>. "Come, then," said he, "I will endeavor to
+defend myself more successfully before you than before the judges.
+For," he proceeded, "Simmias and Cebes, if I did not think that I
+should go, first of all, among other deities who are both wise and
+good, and, next, among men who have departed this life, better than
+any here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death; but now, be
+assured, I hope to go among good men, though I would not positively
+assert it. That, however, I shall go among gods who are perfectly
+good masters, be assured I can positively assert this, if I can any
+thing of the kind. So that, on this account, I am not so much
+troubled, but I entertain a good hope that something awaits those
+who die, and that, as was said long since, it will be far better
+for the good than the evil."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec20" name=
+"phaedo_sec20">20</a>. "What, then, Socrates," said Simmias, "would
+you go away keeping this persuasion to yourself, or would you
+impart it to us? For this good appears to me to be also common to
+us; and at the same time it will be an apology for you, if you can
+persuade us to believe what you say."</p>
+
+<p>"I will endeavor to do so," he said. "But first let us attend to
+Crito here, and see what it is he seems to have for some time
+wished to say."</p>
+
+<p>"What else, Socrates," said Crito, "but what he who is to give
+you the poison told me some time ago, that I should tell you to
+speak as little as possible? For he says that men become too much
+heated by speaking, and that nothing of this kind ought to
+interfere with the poison; and that, otherwise, those who did so
+were sometimes compelled to drink two or three times."</p>
+
+<p>To which Socrates replied, "Let him alone, and let him attend to
+his own business, and prepare to give it me twice, or, if occasion
+require, even thrice."</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page88' id='page88'></a><a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec21" name="phaedo_sec21">21</a>. "I
+was almost certain what you would say," answered Crito, "but he has
+been some time pestering me."</p>
+
+<p>"Never mind him," he rejoined.</p>
+
+<p>"But now I wish to render an account to you, my judges, of the
+reason why a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy,
+when he is about to die, appears to me, on good grounds, to have
+confidence, and to entertain a firm hope that the greatest good
+will befall him in the other world when he has departed this life.
+How, then, this comes to pass, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavor
+to explain."</p>
+
+<p>"For as many as rightly apply themselves to philosophy seem to
+have left all others in ignorance, that they aim at nothing else
+than to die and be dead. If this, then, is true, it would surely be
+absurd to be anxious about nothing else than this during their
+whole life, but, when it arrives, to be grieved at what they have
+been long anxious about and aimed at."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec22" name=
+"phaedo_sec22">22</a>. Upon this, Simmias, smiling, said, "By
+Jupiter! Socrates, though I am not now at all inclined to smile,
+you have made me do so; for I think that the multitude, if they
+heard this, would think it was very well said in reference to
+philosophers, and that our countrymen particularly would agree with
+you, that true philosophers do desire death, and that they are by
+no means ignorant that they deserve to suffer it."</p>
+
+<p>"And, indeed, Simmias, they would speak the truth, except in
+asserting that they are not ignorant; for they are ignorant of the
+sense in which true philosophers desire to die, and in what sense
+they deserve death, and what kind of death. But," he said, "let us
+take leave of them, and speak to one another. Do we think that
+death is any thing?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," replied Simmias.</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page89' id='page89'></a><a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec23" name="phaedo_sec23">23</a>. "Is
+it any thing else than the separation of the soul from the body?
+And is not this to die, for the body to be apart by itself
+separated from the soul, and for the soul to subsist apart by
+itself separated from the body? Is death any thing else than
+this?"</p>
+
+<p>"No, but this," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Consider, then, my good friend, whether you are of the same
+opinion as I; for thus, I think, we shall understand better the
+subject we are considering. Does it appear to you to be becoming in
+a philosopher to be anxious about pleasures, as they are called,
+such as meats and drinks?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means, Socrates," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"But what? about the pleasures of love?"</p>
+
+<p>"Not at all."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec24" name=
+"phaedo_sec24">24</a>. "What, then? Does such a man appear to you
+to think other bodily indulgences of value? For instance, does he
+seem to you to value or despise the possession of magnificent
+garments and sandals, and other ornaments of the body except so far
+as necessity compels him to use them?"</p>
+
+<p>"The true philosopher," he answered, "appears to me to despise
+them."</p>
+
+<p>"Does not, then," he continued, "the whole employment of such a
+man appear to you to be, not about the body, but to separate
+himself from it as much as possible, and be occupied about his
+soul?"</p>
+
+<p>"It does."</p>
+
+<p>"First of all, then, in such matters, does not the philosopher,
+above all other men, evidently free his soul as much as he can from
+communion with the body?"</p>
+
+<p>"It appears so."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec25" name=
+"phaedo_sec25">25</a>. "And it appears, Simmias, to the generality
+of men, that he who takes no pleasure in such things, and who does
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page90' id='page90'></a>not use them,
+does not deserve to live; but that he nearly approaches to death
+who cares nothing for the pleasures that subsist through the
+body."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak very truly."</p>
+
+<p>"But what with respect to the acquisition of wisdom? Is the body
+an impediment, or not, if any one takes it with him as a partner in
+the search? What I mean is this: Do sight and hearing convey any
+truth to men, or are they such as the poets constantly sing, who
+say that we neither hear nor see any thing with accuracy? If,
+however, these bodily senses are neither accurate nor clear, much
+less can the others be so; for they are all far inferior to these.
+Do they not seem so to you?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec26" name=
+"phaedo_sec26">26</a>. "When, then," said he, "does the soul light
+on the truth? for when it attempts to consider any thing in
+conjunction with the body, it is plain that it is then led astray
+by it."</p>
+
+<p>"You say truly."</p>
+
+<p>"Must it not, then, be by reasoning, if at all, that any of the
+things that really are become known to it?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"And surely the soul then reasons best when none of these things
+disturb it&mdash;neither hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor pleasure
+of any kind; but it retires as much as possible within itself,
+taking leave of the body; and, so far as it can, not communicating
+or being in contact with it, it aims at the discovery of that which
+is."</p>
+
+<p>"Such is the case."</p>
+
+<p>"Does not, then, the soul of the philosopher, in these cases,
+despise the body, and flee from it, and seek to retire within
+itself?"</p>
+
+<p>"It appears so."</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page91' id='page91'></a><a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec27" name="phaedo_sec27">27</a>. "But
+what as to such things as these, Simmias? Do we say that justice
+itself is something or nothing?"</p>
+
+<p>"We say it is something, by Jupiter!"</p>
+
+<p>"And that beauty and goodness are something?"</p>
+
+<p>"How not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Now, then, have you ever seen any thing of this kind with your
+eyes?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Did you ever lay hold of them by any other bodily sense? But I
+speak generally, as of magnitude, health, strength and, in a word,
+of the essence of every thing; that is to say, what each is. Is,
+then, the exact truth of these perceived by means of the body, or
+is it thus, whoever among us habituates himself to reflect most
+deeply and accurately on each several thing about which he is
+considering, he will make the nearest approach to the knowledge of
+it?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec28" name=
+"phaedo_sec28">28</a>. "Would not he, then, do this with the utmost
+purity, who should in the highest degree approach each subject by
+means of the mere mental faculties, neither employing the sight in
+conjunction with the reflective faculty, nor introducing any other
+sense together with reasoning; but who, using pure reflection by
+itself, should attempt to search out each essence purely by itself,
+freed as much as possible from the eyes and ears, and, in a word,
+from the whole body, as disturbing the soul, and not suffering it
+to acquire truth and wisdom, when it is in communion with it. Is
+not he the person, Simmias, if any one can, who will arrive at the
+knowledge of that which is?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec29" name=
+"phaedo_sec29">29</a>. "You speak with wonderful truth, Socrates,"
+replied Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"Wherefore," he said, "it necessarily follows from all <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page92' id='page92'></a>this that some such
+opinion as this should be entertained by genuine philosophers, so
+that they should speak among themselves as follows: 'A by-path, as
+it were, seems to lead us on in our researches undertaken by
+reason,' because so long as we are encumbered with the body, and
+our soul is contaminated with such an evil, we can never fully
+attain to what we desire; and this, we say, is truth. For the body
+subjects us to innumerable hinderances on account of its necessary
+support; and, moreover, if any diseases befall us, they impede us
+in our search after that which is; and it fills us with longings,
+desires, fears, all kinds of fancies, and a multitude of
+absurdities, so that, as it is said in real truth, by reason of the
+body it is never possible for us to make any advances in wisdom. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec30" name="phaedo_sec30">30</a>.
+For nothing else than the body and its desires occasion wars,
+seditions, and contests; for all wars among us arise on account of
+our desire to acquire wealth: and we are compelled to acquire
+wealth on account of the body, being enslaved to its service; and
+consequently on all these accounts we are hindered in the pursuit
+of philosophy. But the worst of all is, that if it leaves us any
+leisure, and we apply ourselves to the consideration of any
+subject, it constantly obtrudes itself in the midst of our
+researches, and occasions trouble and disturbance, and confounds us
+so that we are not able, by reason of it, to discern the truth. It
+has, then, in reality been demonstrated to us that if we are ever
+to know any thing purely, we must be separated from the body, and
+contemplate the things themselves by the mere soul; and then, as it
+seems, we shall obtain that which we desire, and which we profess
+ourselves to be lovers of&mdash;wisdom&mdash;when we are dead, as
+reason shows, but not while we are alive. <a class="sectionnumber"
+id="phaedo_sec31" name="phaedo_sec31">31</a>. For if it is not
+possible to know any thing purely in conjunction with the body, one
+of these two things must follow, either that we can never acquire
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page93' id='page93'></a>knowledge, or
+only after we are dead; for then the soul will subsist apart by
+itself, separate from the body, but not before. And while we live
+we shall thus, as it seems, approach nearest to knowledge, if we
+hold no intercourse or communion at all with the body, except what
+absolute necessity requires, nor suffer ourselves to be polluted by
+its nature, but purify ourselves from it, until God himself shall
+release us. And thus being pure, and freed from the folly of body,
+we shall in all likelihood be with others like ourselves, and shall
+of ourselves know the whole real essence, and that probably is
+truth; for it is not allowable for the impure to attain to the
+pure. Such things, I think, Simmias, all true lovers of wisdom must
+both think and say to one another. Does it not seem so to you?"</p>
+
+<p>"Most assuredly, Socrates."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec32" name=
+"phaedo_sec32">32</a>. "If this, then," said Socrates, "is true, my
+friend, there is great hope for one who arrives where I am going,
+there, if anywhere, to acquire that in perfection for the sake of
+which we have taken so much pains during our past life; so that the
+journey now appointed me is set out upon with good hope, and will
+be so by any other man who thinks that his mind has been, as it
+were, purified."</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"But does not purification consist in this, as was said in a
+former part of our discourse, in separating as much as possible the
+soul from the body, and in accustoming it to gather and collect
+itself by itself on all sides apart from the body, and to dwell, so
+far as it can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, delivered,
+as it were, from the shackles of the body?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec33" name=
+"phaedo_sec33">33</a>. "Is this, then, called death, this
+deliverance and separation of the soul from the body?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page94' id='page94'></a>Assuredly,"
+he answered.</p>
+
+<p>"But, as we affirmed, those who pursue philosophy rightly are
+especially and alone desirous to deliver it; and this is the very
+study of philosophers, the deliverance and separation of the soul
+from the body, is it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"It appears so."</p>
+
+<p>"Then, as I said at first, would it not be ridiculous for a man
+who has endeavored throughout his life to live as near as possible
+to death, then, when death arrives, to grieve? would not this be
+ridiculous?"</p>
+
+<p>"How should it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"In reality, then, Simmias," he continued, "those who pursue
+philosophy rightly, study to die; and to them, of all men, death is
+least formidable. Judge from this. Since they altogether hate the
+body and desire to keep the soul by itself, would it not be
+irrational if, when this comes to pass, they should be afraid and
+grieve, and not be glad to go to that place where, on their
+arrival, they may hope to obtain that which they longed for
+throughout life? But they longed for wisdom, and to be freed from
+association with that which they hated. <a class="sectionnumber"
+id="phaedo_sec34" name="phaedo_sec34">34</a>. Have many of their
+own accord wished to descend into Hades, on account of human
+objects of affection, their wives and sons, induced by this very
+hope of their seeing and being with those whom they have loved? and
+shall one who really loves wisdom, and firmly cherishes this very
+hope, that he shall nowhere else attain it in a manner worthy of
+the name, except in Hades, be grieved at dying, and not gladly go
+there? We must think that he would gladly go, my friend, if he be
+in truth a philosopher; for he will be firmly persuaded of this,
+that he will nowhere else than there attain wisdom in its purity;
+and if this be so, would it not be very irrational, as I just now
+said, if such a man were to be afraid of death?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page95' id='page95'></a>Very much
+so, by Jupiter!" he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec35" name=
+"phaedo_sec35">35</a>. "Would not this, then," he resumed, "be a
+sufficient proof to you with respect to a man whom you should see
+grieved when about to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom, but a
+lover of his body? And this same person is probably a lover of
+riches and a lover of honor, one or both of these."</p>
+
+<p>"It certainly is as you say," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Does not, then," he said, "that which is called fortitude,
+Simmias, eminently belong to philosophers?"</p>
+
+<p>"By all means," he answered.</p>
+
+<p>"And temperance, also, which even the multitude call temperance,
+and which consists in not being carried away by the passions, but
+in holding them in contempt, and keeping them in subjection, does
+not this belong to those only who most despise the body, and live
+in the study of philosophy?"</p>
+
+<p>"Necessarily so," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec36" name=
+"phaedo_sec36">36</a>. "For," he continued, "if you will consider
+the fortitude and temperance of others, they will appear to you to
+be absurd."</p>
+
+<p>"How so, Socrates?"</p>
+
+<p>"Do you know," he said, "that all others consider death among
+the great evils?"</p>
+
+<p>"They do indeed," he answered.</p>
+
+<p>"Then, do the brave among them endure death when they do endure
+it, through dread of greater evils?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is so."</p>
+
+<p>"All men, therefore, except philosophers, are brave through
+being afraid and fear; though it is absurd that any one should be
+brave through fear and cowardice."</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"But what, are not those among them who keep their <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page96' id='page96'></a>passions in subjection
+affected in the same way? and are they not temperate through a kind
+of intemperance? And although we may say, perhaps, that this is
+impossible, nevertheless the manner in which they are affected with
+respect to this silly temperance resembles this, for, fearing to be
+deprived of other pleasures, and desiring them, they abstain from
+some, being mastered by others. And though they call intemperance
+the being governed by pleasures, yet it happens to them that, by
+being mastered by some pleasures, they master others, and this is
+similar to what was just now said, that in a certain manner they
+become temperate through intemperance."</p>
+
+<p>"So it seems,"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec37" name=
+"phaedo_sec37">37</a>. "My dear Simmias, consider that this is not
+a right exchange for virtue, to barter pleasures for pleasures,
+pains for pains, fear for fear, and the greater for the lesser,
+like pieces of money, but that that alone is the right coin, for
+which we ought to barter all these things, wisdom, and for this and
+with this everything is in reality bought and sold Fortitude,
+temperance and justice, and, in a word true virtue, subsist with
+wisdom, whether pleasures and fears, and everything else of the
+kind, are present or absent, but when separated from wisdom and
+changed one for another, consider whether such virtue is not a mere
+outline and in reality servile, possessing neither soundness nor
+truth. But the really true virtue is a purification from all such
+things, and temperance, justice, fortitude and wisdom itself, are a
+kind of initiatory purification <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec38" name="phaedo_sec38">38</a>. And those who instituted
+the mysteries for us appear to have been by no means contemptible,
+but in reality to have intimated long since that whoever shall
+arrive in Hades unexpiated and uninitiated shall lie in mud, but he
+that arrives there purified and initiated shall dwell with the gods
+'For there are,' say those <a class='pagenumber' name='page97' id=
+'page97'></a>who preside at the mysteries, 'many wand-bearers, but
+few inspired'. These last, in my opinion, are no other than those
+who have pursued philosophy rightly that I might be of their
+number. I have to the utmost of my ability left no means untried,
+but have endeavored to the utmost of my power. But whether I have
+endeavored rightly, and have in any respect succeeded, on arriving
+there I shall know clearly, if it please God&mdash;very shortly, as
+it appears to me."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec39" name=
+"phaedo_sec39">39</a>. "Such, then, Simmias and Cebes," he added,
+"is the defense I make, for that I, on good grounds, do not repine
+or grieve at leaving you and my masters here, being persuaded that
+there, no less than here, I shall meet with good masters and
+friends. But to the multitude this is incredible If, however, I
+have succeeded better with you in my defense than I did with the
+Athenian judges, it is well."</p>
+
+<p>When Socrates had thus spoken, Cebes, taking up the discussion,
+said "Socrates, all the rest appears to me to be said rightly, but
+what you have said respecting the soul will occasion much
+incredulity in many from the apprehension that when it is separated
+from the body it no longer exists anywhere, but is destroyed and
+perishes on the very day in which a man dies, and that immediately
+it is separated and goes out from the body it is dispersed, and
+vanishes like breath or smoke, and is no longer anywhere, since if
+it remained anywhere united in itself, and freed from those evils
+which you have just now enumerated, there would be an abundant and
+good hope, Socrates, that what you say is true <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec40" name="phaedo_sec40">40</a>. But
+this probably needs no little persuasion and proof, that the soul
+of a man who dies exists, and possesses activity and
+intelligence."</p>
+
+<p>"You say truly, Cebes," said Socrates, "but what shall we do?
+Are you willing that we should converse on these points, whether
+such is probably the case or not?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page98' id='page98'></a>Indeed,"
+replied Cebes, "I should gladly hear your opinion on these
+matters."</p>
+
+<p>"I do not think," said Socrates, "that any one who should now
+hear us, even though he were a comic poet, would say that I am
+talking idly, or discoursing on subjects that do not concern me. If
+you please, then, we will examine into it. Let us consider it in
+this point of view, whether the souls of men who are dead exist in
+Hades, or not. This is an ancient saying, which we now call to
+mind, that souls departing hence exist there, and return hither
+again, and are produced from the dead. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec41" name="phaedo_sec41">41</a>. And if this is so, that
+the living are produced again from the dead, can there be any other
+consequence than that our souls are there? for surely they could
+not be produced again if they did not exist; and this would be
+sufficient proof that these things are so, if it should in reality
+be evident that the living are produced from no other source than
+the dead. But if this is not the case, there will be need of other
+arguments."</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"You must not, then," he continued, "consider this only with
+respect to men, if you wish to ascertain it with greater certainty,
+but also with respect to all animals and plants, and, in a word,
+with respect to every thing that is subject to generation. Let us
+see whether they are not all so produced, no otherwise than
+contraries from contraries, wherever they have any such quality;
+as, for instance, the honorable is contrary to the base, and the
+just to the unjust, and so with ten thousand other things. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec42" name="phaedo_sec42">42</a>.
+Let us consider this, then, whether it is necessary that all things
+which have a contrary should be produced from nothing else than
+their contrary. As, for instance, when any thing becomes greater,
+is it not necessary that, from being previously smaller, it
+afterward became greater?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page99' id='page99'></a>Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"And if it becomes smaller, will it not, from being previously
+greater, afterward become smaller?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is so," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"And from stronger, weaker? and from slower, swifter?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then? If any thing becomes worse, must it not become so
+from better? and if more just, from more unjust?"</p>
+
+<p>"How should it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"We have then," he said, "sufficiently determined this, that all
+things are thus produced, contraries from contraries?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"What next? Is there also something of this kind in them; for
+instance, between all two contraries a mutual twofold production,
+from one to the other, and from that other back again? for between
+a greater thing and a smaller there are increase and decrease, and
+do we not accordingly call the one to increase, the other to
+decrease?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec43" name=
+"phaedo_sec43">43</a>. "And must not to be separated and
+commingled, to grow cold and to grow warm, and every thing in the
+same manner, even though sometimes we have not names to designate
+them, yet in fact be everywhere thus circumstanced, of necessity,
+as to be produced from each other, and be subject to a reciprocal
+generation?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"What, then?" said Socrates, "has life any contrary, as waking
+has its contrary, sleeping?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he answered.</p>
+
+<p>"What?"</p>
+
+<p>"Death," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page100' id='page100'></a>Are not
+these, then, produced from each other, since they are contraries;
+and are not the modes by which they are produced two-fold
+intervening between these two?"</p>
+
+<p>"How should it be otherwise?"</p>
+
+<p>"I then," continued Socrates, "will describe to you one pair of
+the contraries which I have just now mentioned, both what it is and
+its mode of production: and do you describe to me the other. I say
+that one is to sleep, the other to awake; and from sleeping awaking
+is produced, and from awaking sleeping, and that the modes of their
+production are, the one to fall asleep, the other to be roused. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec44" name="phaedo_sec44">44</a>.
+Have I sufficiently explained this to you or not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Do you, then," he said, "describe to me in the same manner with
+respect to life and death? Do you not say that life is contrary to
+death?"</p>
+
+<p>"I do."</p>
+
+<p>"And that they are produced from each other?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then, is produced from life?"</p>
+
+<p>"Death," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"What, then," said he "is produced from death?"</p>
+
+<p>"I must needs confess," he replied, "that life is."</p>
+
+<p>"From the dead, then, O Cebes! living things and living men are
+produced."</p>
+
+<p>"It appears so," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"Our souls, therefore," said Socrates, "exist in Hades."</p>
+
+<p>"So it seems."</p>
+
+<p>"With respect, then, to their mode of production, is not one of
+them very clear? for to die surely is clear, is it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"What, then, shall we do?" he continued; "shall we not <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page101' id='page101'></a>find a corresponding
+contrary mode of production, or will nature be defective in this?
+Or must we discover a contrary mode of production to dying?"</p>
+
+<p>"By all means," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"What is this?"</p>
+
+<p>"To revive."</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore," he proceeded, "if there is such a thing as to
+revive, will not this reviving be a mode of production from the
+dead to the living?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Thus, then, we have agreed that the living are produced from
+the dead, no less than the dead from the living; but, this being
+the case, there appears to me sufficient proof that the souls of
+the dead must necessarily exist somewhere, from whence they are
+again produced."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec45" name=
+"phaedo_sec45">45</a>. "It appears to me, Socrates," he said "that
+this must necessarily follow from what has been admitted."</p>
+
+<p>"See now, O Cebes!" he said, "that we have not agreed on these
+things improperly, as it appears to me; for if one class of things
+were not constantly given back in the place of another, revolving,
+as it were, in a circle, but generation were direct from one thing
+alone into its opposite, and did not turn round again to the other,
+or retrace its course, do you know that all things would at length
+have the same form, be in the same state, and cease to be
+produced?"</p>
+
+<p>"How say you?" he asked.</p>
+
+<p>"It is by no means difficult," he replied, "to understand what I
+mean; if, for instance, there should be such a thing as falling
+asleep, but no reciprocal waking again produced from a state of
+sleep, you know that at length all things would show the fable of
+Endymion to be a jest, and it would be thought nothing at all of,
+because everything else would be in the same state as
+he&mdash;namely, asleep. And if all <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page102' id='page102'></a>things were mingled together, but never
+separated, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be verified, 'all
+things would be together.' <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec46" name="phaedo_sec46">46</a>. Likewise, my dear Cebes,
+if all things that partake of life should die, and after they are
+dead should remain in this state of death, and not revive again,
+would it not necessarily follow that at length all things should be
+dead, and nothing alive? For if living beings are produced from
+other things, and living beings die, what could prevent their being
+all absorbed in death?"</p>
+
+<p>"Nothing whatever, I think, Socrates," replied Cebes; "but you
+appear to me to speak the exact truth."</p>
+
+<p>"For, Cebes," he continued, "as it seems to me, such undoubtedly
+is the case, and we have not admitted these things under a
+delusion, for it is in reality true that there is a reviving again,
+that the living are produced from the dead, that the souls of the
+dead exist, and that the condition of the good is better, and of
+the evil worse."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec47" name=
+"phaedo_sec47">47</a>. "And, indeed," said Cebes, interrupting him,
+"according to that doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently in
+the habit of advancing, if it is true, that our learning is nothing
+else than reminiscence, according to this it is surely necessary
+that we must at some former time have learned what we now remember.
+But this is impossible, unless our soul existed somewhere before it
+came into this human form; so that from hence, also, the soul
+appears to be something immortal."</p>
+
+<p>"But, Cebes," said Simmias, interrupting him, "what proofs are
+there of these things? Remind me of them, for I do not very well
+remember them at present."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec48" name=
+"phaedo_sec48">48</a>. "It is proved," said Cebes, "by one
+argument, and that a most beautiful one, that men, when questioned
+(if one questions them properly) of themselves, describe all things
+as they are, however, if they had not innate knowledge and <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page103' id='page103'></a>right reason,
+they would never be able to do this. Moreover, if one leads them to
+diagrams, or any thing else of the kind, it is then most clearly
+apparent that this is the case."</p>
+
+<p>"But if you are not persuaded in this way, Simmias," said
+Socrates, "see if you will agree with us in considering the matter
+thus. For do you doubt how that which is called learning is
+reminiscence?"</p>
+
+<p>"I do not doubt," said Simmias; "but I require this very thing
+of which we are speaking, to be reminded; and, indeed, from what
+Cebes has begun to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded;
+nevertheless, however, I should like to hear now how you would
+attempt to prove it."</p>
+
+<p>"I do it thus" he replied: "we admit, surely, that if any one be
+reminded of any thing, he must needs have known that thing at some
+time or other before."</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he said.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec49" name=
+"phaedo_sec49">49</a>. "Do we, then, admit this also, that when
+knowledge comes in a certain manner it is reminiscence? But the
+manner I mean is this: if any one, upon seeing or hearing, or
+perceiving through the medium of any other sense, some particular
+thing, should not only know that, but also form an idea of
+something else, of which the knowledge is not the same, but
+different, should we not justly say that he remembered that of
+which he received the idea?"</p>
+
+<p>"How mean you?"</p>
+
+<p>"For instance, the knowledge of a man is different from that of
+a lyre."</p>
+
+<p>"How not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Do you not know, then, that lovers when they see a lyre, or a
+garment, or any thing else which their favorite is accustomed to
+use, are thus affected; they both recognize the lyre, and receive
+in their minds the form of the person to whom the lyre belonged?
+This is reminiscence: just as any <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page104' id='page104'></a>one, seeing Simmias, is often reminded
+of Cebes, and so in an infinite number of similar instances."</p>
+
+<p>"An infinite number, indeed, by Jupiter!" said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"Is not, then," he said, "something of this sort a kind of
+reminiscence, especially when one is thus affected with respect to
+things which, from lapse of time, and not thinking of them, one has
+now forgotten?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec50" name=
+"phaedo_sec50">50</a>. "But what?" he continued. "Does it happen
+that when one sees a painted horse or a painted lyre one is
+reminded of a man, and that when one sees a picture of Simmias one
+is reminded of Cebes?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"And does it not also happen that on seeing a picture of Simmias
+one is reminded of Simmias himself?"</p>
+
+<p>"It does, indeed," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that
+reminiscence arises partly from things like, and partly from things
+unlike?"</p>
+
+<p>"It does."</p>
+
+<p>"But when one is reminded by things like, is it not necessary
+that one should be thus further affected, so as to perceive
+whether, as regards likeness, this falls short or not of the thing
+of which one has been reminded?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is necessary," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Consider, then," said Socrates, "if the case is thus. Do we
+allow that there is such a thing as equality? I do not mean of one
+log with another, nor one stone with another, nor any thing else of
+this kind, but something altogether different from all
+these&mdash;abstract equality; do we allow that there is any such
+thing, or not?"</p>
+
+<p>"By Jupiter! we most assuredly do allow it," replied
+Simmias.</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page105' id='page105'></a><a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec51" name="phaedo_sec51">51</a>. "And
+do we know what it is itself?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? Is it not from the
+things we have just now mentioned, and that from seeing logs, or
+stones, or other things of the kind, equal, we have from these
+formed an idea of that which is different from these&mdash;for does
+it not appear to you to be different? Consider the matter thus. Do
+not stones that are equal, and logs sometimes that are the same,
+appear at one time equal, and at another not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"But what? Does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? or
+equality inequality?"</p>
+
+<p>"Never, Socrates, at any time."</p>
+
+<p>"These equal things, then," he said, "and abstract equality, are
+not the same?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means, Socrates, as it appears."</p>
+
+<p>"However, from these equal things," he said, "which are
+different from that abstract equality, have you not formed your
+idea and derived your knowledge of it?"</p>
+
+<p>"You speak most truly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Is it not, therefore, from its being like or unlike them?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"But it makes no difference," he said. "When, therefore, on
+seeing one thing, you form, from the sight of it, the notion of
+another, whether like or unlike, this," he said, "must necessarily
+be reminiscence."</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec52" name=
+"phaedo_sec52">52</a>. "What, then, as to this?" he continued. "Are
+we affected in any such way with regard to logs and the equal
+things we have just now spoken of? And do they appear to us to be
+equal in the same manner as abstract equality itself <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page106' id='page106'></a>is, or do they fall
+short in some degree, or not at all, of being such as equality
+itself is?"</p>
+
+<p>"They fall far short," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Do we admit, then, that when one, on beholding some particular
+thing, perceives that it aims, as that which I now see, at being
+like something else that exists, but falls short of it, and can not
+become such as that is, but is inferior to it&mdash;do we admit
+that he who perceives this must necessarily have had a previous
+knowledge of that which he says it resembles, though
+imperfectly?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is necessary."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then? Are we affected in some such way, or not, with
+respect to things equal and abstract equality itself?"</p>
+
+<p>"Assuredly."</p>
+
+<p>"It is necessary, therefore, that we must have known abstract
+equality before the time when, on first seeing equal things, we
+perceived that they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in
+doing so."</p>
+
+<p>"Such is the case."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec53" name=
+"phaedo_sec53">53</a>. "Moreover, we admit this too, that we
+perceived this, and could not possibly perceive it by any other
+means than the sight, or touch, or some other of the senses, for I
+say the same of them all."</p>
+
+<p>"For they are the same, Socrates, so far as, our argument is
+concerned."</p>
+
+<p>"However, we must perceive, by means of the senses, that all
+things which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality,
+and yet fall short of it; or how shall we say it is?"</p>
+
+<p>"Even so."</p>
+
+<p>"Before, then, we began to see, and hear, and use our other
+senses, we must have had a knowledge of equality itself&mdash;what
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page107' id='page107'></a>it is, if we
+were to refer to it those equal things that come under the senses,
+and observe that all such things aim at resembling that, but fall
+far short of it."</p>
+
+<p>"This necessarily follows, Socrates, from what has been already
+said."</p>
+
+<p>"But did we not, as soon as we were born, see and hear, and
+possess our other senses?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"But, we have said, before we possessed these, we must have had
+a knowledge of abstract equality?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"We must have had it, then, as it seems, before we were
+born."</p>
+
+<p>"It seems so."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec54" name=
+"phaedo_sec54">54</a>. "If, therefore, having this before we were
+born, we were born possessing it, we knew, both before we were born
+and as soon as we were born, not only the equal and the greater and
+smaller, but all things of the kind; for our present discussion is
+not more respecting equality than the beautiful itself, the good,
+the just, and the holy, and, in one word, respecting every thing
+which we mark with the seal of existence, both in the questions we
+ask and the answers we give. So that we must necessarily have had a
+knowledge of all these before we were born."</p>
+
+<p>"Such is the case."</p>
+
+<p>"And if, having once had it, we did not constantly forget it, we
+should always be born with this knowledge, and should always retain
+it through life. For to know is this, when one has got a knowledge
+of any thing, to retain and not lose it; for do we not call this
+oblivion, Simmias, the loss of knowledge?"</p>
+
+<p>"Assuredly, Socrates," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec55" name=
+"phaedo_sec55">55</a>. "But if, having had it before we were born,
+we lose <a class='pagenumber' name='page108' id='page108'></a>it at
+our birth, and afterward, through exercising the senses about these
+things, we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed,
+would not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own
+knowledge? And in saying that this is to remember, should we not
+say rightly?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"For this appeared to be possible, for one having perceived any
+thing, either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense,
+to form an idea of something different from this, which he had
+forgotten, and with which this was connected by being unlike or
+like. So that, as I said, one of these two things must follow:
+either we are all born with this knowledge, and we retain it
+through life, or those whom we say learn afterward do nothing else
+than remember, and this learning will be reminiscence."</p>
+
+<p>"Such, certainly, is the case, Socrates."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec56" name=
+"phaedo_sec56">56</a>. "Which, then, do you choose, Simmias: that
+we are born with knowledge, or that we afterward remember what we
+had formerly known?"</p>
+
+<p>"At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose."</p>
+
+<p>"But what? Are you able to choose in this case, and what do you
+think about it? Can a man who possesses knowledge give a reason for
+the things that he knows, or not?"</p>
+
+<p>"He needs must be able to do so, Socrates," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"And do all men appear to you to be able to give a reason for
+the things of which we have just now been speaking?"</p>
+
+<p>"I wish they could," said Simmias; "but I am much more afraid
+that at this time to-morrow there will no longer be any one able to
+do this properly."</p>
+
+<p>"Do not all men, then, Simmias," he said, "seem to you to know
+these things?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page109' id='page109'></a>By no
+means."</p>
+
+<p>"Do they remember, then, what they once learned?"</p>
+
+<p>"Necessarily so."</p>
+
+<p>"When did our souls receive this knowledge? Not surely, since we
+were born into the world."</p>
+
+<p>"Assuredly not."</p>
+
+<p>"Before, then?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"Our souls, therefore, Simmias, existed before they were in a
+human form, separate from bodies, and possessed intelligence."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec57" name=
+"phaedo_sec57">57</a>. "Unless, Socrates, we receive this knowledge
+at our birth, for this period yet remains."</p>
+
+<p>"Be it so, my friend. But at what other time do we lose it? for
+we are not born with it, as we have just now admitted. Do we lose
+it, then, at the very time in which we receive it? Or can you
+mention any other time?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means, Socrates; I was not aware that I was saying
+nothing to the purpose."</p>
+
+<p>"Does the case then stand thus with us, Simmias?" he proceeded:
+"If those things which we are continually talking about really
+exist, the beautiful, the good, and every such essence, and to this
+we refer all things that come under the senses, as finding it to
+have a prior existence, and to be our own, and if we compare these
+things to it, it necessarily follows, that as these exist, so
+likewise our soul exists even before we are born; but if these do
+not exist, this discussion will have been undertaken in vain, is it
+not so? And is there not an equal necessity both that these things
+should exist, and our souls also, before we are born; and if not
+the former, neither the latter?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec58" name=
+"phaedo_sec58">58</a>. "Most assuredly, Socrates," said Simmias,
+"there appears to me to be the same necessity; and the argument <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page110' id='page110'></a>admirably tends
+to prove that our souls exist before we are born, just as that
+essence does which you have now mentioned. For I hold nothing so
+clear to me as this, that all such things most certainly exist, as
+the beautiful, the good, and all the rest that you just now spoke
+of; and, so far as I am concerned, the case is sufficiently
+demonstrated."</p>
+
+<p>"But how does it appear to Cebes?" said Socrates; "for it is
+necessary to persuade Cebes too."</p>
+
+<p>"He is sufficiently persuaded, I think," said Simmias, "although
+he is the most pertinacious of men in distrusting arguments. Yet I
+think he is sufficiently persuaded of this, that our soul existed
+before we were born. But whether, when we are dead, it will still
+exist does not appear to me to have been demonstrated, Socrates,"
+he continued; "but that popular doubt, which Cebes just now
+mentioned, still stands in our way, whether, when a man dies, the
+soul is not dispersed, and this is the end of its existence. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec59" name="phaedo_sec59">59</a>.
+For what hinders it being born, and formed from some other source,
+and existing before it came into a human body, and yet, when it has
+come, and is separated from this body, its then also dying itself,
+and being destroyed?"</p>
+
+<p>"You say well, Simmias," said Cebes; "for it appears that only
+one half of what is necessary has been demonstrated&mdash;namely,
+that our soul existed before we were born; but it is necessary to
+demonstrate further, that when we are dead it will exist no less
+than before we were born, if the demonstration is to be made
+complete."</p>
+
+<p>"This has been even now demonstrated, Simmias and Cebes," said
+Socrates, "if you will only connect this last argument with that
+which we before assented to, that every thing living is produced
+from that which is dead. For if the soul exists before, and it is
+necessary for it when it enters into life, and is born, to be
+produced from nothing else than <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page111' id='page111'></a>death, and from being dead, how is it
+not necessary for it also to exist after death, since it must needs
+be produced again? <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec60" name=
+"phaedo_sec60">60</a>. What you require, then, has been already
+demonstrated. However, both you and Simmias appear to me as if you
+wished to sift this argument more thoroughly, and to be afraid,
+like children, lest, on the soul's departure from the body, the
+winds should blow it away and disperse it, especially if one should
+happen to die, not in a calm, but in a violent storm."</p>
+
+<p>Upon this Cebes, smiling, said, "Endeavor to teach us better,
+Socrates, as if we were afraid, or rather not as if we were afraid,
+though perhaps there is some boy<a id="footnotetag30" name=
+"footnotetag30" href="#footnote30"><sup>30</sup></a> within us who
+has such a dread. Let us, then, endeavor to persuade him not to be
+afraid of death, as of hobgoblins."</p>
+
+<p>"But you must charm him every day," said Socrates, "until you
+have quieted his fears."</p>
+
+<p>"But whence, Socrates," he said, "can we procure a skillful
+charmer for such a case, now that you are about to leave us?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec61" name=
+"phaedo_sec61">61</a>. "Greece is wide, Cebes," he replied, "and in
+it surely there are skillful men. There are also many barbarous
+nations, all of which you should search through, seeking such a
+charmer, sparing neither money nor toil, as there is nothing on
+which you can more seasonably spend your money. You should also
+seek for him among yourselves; for perhaps you could not easily
+find any more competent than yourselves to do this."</p>
+
+<p>"This shall be done," said Cebes; "but, if it is agreeable to
+you, let us return to the point from whence we digressed."</p>
+
+<p>"It will be agreeable to me, for how should it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"You say well," rejoined Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"We ought, then," said Socrates, "to ask ourselves some <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page112' id='page112'></a>such question as
+this: to what kind of thing it appertains to be thus
+affected&mdash;namely, to be dispersed&mdash;and for what we ought
+to fear, lest it should be so affected, and for what not. And after
+this we should consider which of the two the soul is, and in the
+result should either be confident or fearful for our soul."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak truly," said he.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec62" name=
+"phaedo_sec62">62</a>. "Does it not, then, appertain to that which
+is formed by composition, and is naturally compounded, to be thus
+affected, to be dissolved in the same manner as that in which it
+was compounded; and if there is any thing not compounded, does it
+not appertain to this alone, if to any thing, not to be thus
+affected?"</p>
+
+<p>"It appears to me to be so," said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"Is it not most probable, then, that things which are always the
+same, and in the same state, are uncompounded, but that things
+which are constantly changing, and are never in the same state, are
+compounded?"</p>
+
+<p>"To me it appears so."</p>
+
+<p>"Let us return, then," he said, "to the subjects on which we
+before discoursed. Whether is essence itself, of which we gave this
+account that it exists, both in our questions and answers, always
+the same, or does it sometimes change? Does equality itself, the
+beautiful itself, and each several thing which is, ever undergo any
+change, however small? Or does each of them which exists, being an
+unmixed essence by itself, continue always the same, and in the
+same state, and never undergo any variation at all under any
+circumstances?"</p>
+
+<p>"They must of necessity continue the same and in the same state,
+Socrates," said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec63" name=
+"phaedo_sec63">63</a>. "But what shall we say of the many beautiful
+things, such as men, horses, garments, or other things of the kind,
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page113' id='page113'></a>whether equal
+or beautiful, or of all things synonymous with them? Do they
+continue the same, or, quite contrary to the former, are they never
+at any time, so to say, the same, either with respect to themselves
+or one another?"</p>
+
+<p>"These, on the other hand," replied Cebes, "never continue the
+same."</p>
+
+<p>"These, then, you can touch, or see, or perceive by the other
+senses; but those that continue the same, you can not apprehend in
+any other way than by the exercise of thought; for such things are
+invisible, and are not seen?"</p>
+
+<p>"You say what is strictly true," replied Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec64" name=
+"phaedo_sec64">64</a>. "We may assume, then, if you please," he
+continued, "that there are two species of things; the one visible,
+the other invisible?"</p>
+
+<p>"We may," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"And the invisible always continuing the same, but the visible
+never the same?"</p>
+
+<p>"This, too," he said, "we may assume."</p>
+
+<p>"Come, then," he asked, "is there anything else belonging to us
+than, on the one hand, body, and, on the other, soul?"</p>
+
+<p>"Nothing else," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"To which species, then, shall we say the body is more like, and
+more nearly allied?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is clear to everyone," he said, "that it is to the
+visible."</p>
+
+<p>"But what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is not visible to men, Socrates," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"But we speak of things which are visible, or not so, to the
+nature of men; or to some other nature, think you?"</p>
+
+<p>"To that of men."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then, shall we say of the soul&mdash;that it is visible,
+or not visible?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page114' id='page114'></a>Not
+visible."</p>
+
+<p>"Is it, then, invisible?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"The soul, then, is more like the invisible than the body; and
+the body, the visible?"</p>
+
+<p>"It must needs be so, Socrates."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec65" name=
+"phaedo_sec65">65</a>. "And did we not, some time since, say this
+too, that the soul, when it employs the body to examine any thing,
+either by means of the sight or hearing, or any other sense (for to
+examine any thing by means of the body is to do so by the senses),
+is then drawn by the body to things that never continue the same,
+and wanders and is confused, and reels as if intoxicated, through
+coming into contact with things of this kind?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"But when it examines anything by itself, does it approach that
+which is pure, eternal, immortal, and unchangeable, and, as being
+allied to it, continue constantly with it, so long as it subsists
+by itself, and has the power, and does it cease from its wandering,
+and constantly continue the same with respect to those things,
+through coming into contact with things of this kind? And is this
+affection of the soul called wisdom?"</p>
+
+<p>"You speak," he said, "in every respect, well and truly,
+Socrates."</p>
+
+<p>"To which species of the two, then, both from what was before
+and now said, does the soul appear to you to be more like and more
+nearly allied?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec66" name=
+"phaedo_sec66">66</a>. "Every one, I think, would allow, Socrates,"
+he replied, "even the dullest person, from this method of
+reasoning, that the soul is in every respect more like that which
+continues constantly the same than that which does not so."</p>
+
+<p>"But what as to the body?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page115' id='page115'></a>It is
+more like the other."</p>
+
+<p>"Consider it also thus, that, when soul and body are together,
+nature enjoins the latter to be subservient and obey, the former to
+rule and exercise dominion. And, in this way, which of the two
+appears to you to be like the divine, and which the mortal? Does it
+not appear to you to be natural that the divine should rule and
+command, but the mortal obey and be subservient?"</p>
+
+<p>"To me it does so."</p>
+
+<p>"Which, then, does the soul resemble?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is clear, Socrates, that the soul resembles the divine; but
+the body, the mortal."</p>
+
+<p>"Consider, then, Cebes," said he, "whether, from all that has
+been said, these conclusions follow, that the soul is most like
+that which is divine, immortal, intelligent, uniform, indissoluble,
+and which always continues in the same state; but that the body, on
+the other hand, is most like that which is human, mortal,
+unintelligent, multiform, dissoluble, and which never continues in
+the same state. Can we say any thing against this, my dear Cebes,
+to show that it is not so?"</p>
+
+<p>"We can not."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec67" name=
+"phaedo_sec67">67</a>. "What, then? Since these things are so, does
+it not appertain to the body to be quickly dissolved, but to the
+soul, on the contrary, to be altogether indissoluble or nearly
+so?"</p>
+
+<p>"How not?"</p>
+
+<p>"You perceive, however," he said, "that when a man dies, the
+visible part of him, the body, which is exposed to sight, and which
+we call a corpse, to which it appertains to be dissolved, to fall
+asunder and be dispersed, does not immediately undergo any of these
+affections, but remains for a considerable time, and especially so
+if any one should die <a class='pagenumber' name='page116' id=
+'page116'></a>with his body in full vigor, and at a corresponding
+age;<a id="footnotetag31" name="footnotetag31" href=
+"#footnote31"><sup>31</sup></a> for when the body has collapsed and
+been embalmed, as those that are embalmed in Egypt, it remains
+almost entire for an incredible length of time; and some parts of
+the body, even though it does decay, such as the bones and nerves,
+and every thing of that kind, are, nevertheless, as one may say,
+immortal. Is it not so?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec68" name=
+"phaedo_sec68">68</a>. "Can the soul, then, which is invisible, and
+which goes to another place like itself, excellent, pure and
+invisible, and therefore truly called the invisible world,<a id=
+"footnotetag32" name="footnotetag32" href=
+"#footnote32"><sup>32</sup></a> to the presence of a good and wise
+God (whither, if God will, my soul also must shortly go)&mdash;can
+this soul of ours, I ask, being such and of such a nature, when
+separated from the body, be immediately dispersed and destroyed, as
+most men assert? Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias. But the
+case is much rather thus: if it is separated in a pure state,
+taking nothing of the body with it, as not having willingly
+communicated with it in the present life, but having shunned it,
+and gathered itself within itself, as constantly studying this (but
+this is nothing else than to pursue philosophy aright, and in
+reality to study how to die easily), would not this be to study how
+to die?"</p>
+
+<p>"Most assuredly."</p>
+
+<p>"Does not the soul, then, when in this state, depart to that
+which resembles itself, the invisible, the divine, immortal and
+wise? And on its arrival there, is it not its lot to be happy, free
+from error, ignorance, fears, wild passions, and all the other
+evils to which human nature is subject; <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page117' id='page117'></a>and, as is said of the initiated, does
+it not in truth pass the rest of its time with the gods? Must we
+affirm that it is so, Cebes, or otherwise?"</p>
+
+<p>"So, by Jupiter!" said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec69" name=
+"phaedo_sec69">69</a>. "But, I think, if it departs from the body
+polluted and impure, as having constantly held communion with the
+body, and having served and loved it, and been bewitched by it,
+through desires and pleasures, so as to think that there is nothing
+real except what is corporeal, which one can touch and see, and
+drink and eat, and employ for sensual purposes; but what is dark
+and invisible to the eyes, which is intellectual and apprehended by
+philosophy, having been accustomed to hate, fear, and shun this, do
+you think that a soul thus affected can depart from the body by
+itself, and uncontaminated?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means whatever," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"But I think it will be impressed with that which is corporeal,
+which the intercourse and communion of the body, through constant
+association and great attention, have made natural to it."</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"We must think, my dear Cebes, that this is ponderous and heavy,
+earthly and visible, by possessing which such a soul is weighed
+down, and drawn again into the visible world through dread of the
+invisible and of Hades, wandering, as it is said, among monuments
+and tombs, about which, indeed, certain shadowy phantoms of souls
+have been seen, being such images as those souls produced which
+have not departed pure from the body, but which partake of the
+visible; on which account, also, they are visible."</p>
+
+<p>"That is probable, Socrates."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec70" name=
+"phaedo_sec70">70</a>. "Probable indeed, Cebes; and not that these
+are the souls of the good, but of the wicked, which are compelled
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page118' id='page118'></a>to wander
+about such places, paying the penalty of their former conduct,
+which was evil; and they wander about so long until, through the
+desire of the corporeal nature that accompanies them, they are
+again united to a body; and they are united, as is probable, to
+animals having the same habits as those they have given themselves
+up to during life."</p>
+
+<p>"But what do you say these are, Socrates?"</p>
+
+<p>"For instance, those who have given themselves up to gluttony,
+wantonness and drinking, and have put no restraint on themselves,
+will probably be clothed in the form of asses and brutes of that
+kind. Do you not think so?"</p>
+
+<p>"You say what is very probable."</p>
+
+<p>"And that such as have set great value on injustice, tyranny and
+rapine, will be clothed in the species of wolves, hawks and kites!
+Where else can we say such souls go?"</p>
+
+<p>"Without doubt," said Cebes, "into such as these."</p>
+
+<p>"Is it not, then, evident," he continued, "as to the rest,
+whither each will go, according to the resemblances of their
+several pursuits?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec71" name=
+"phaedo_sec71">71</a>. "It is evident," he replied. "How not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Of these, then," he said, "are not they the most happy, and do
+they not go to the best place, who have practiced that social and
+civilized virtue which they call temperance and justice, and which
+is produced from habit and exercise, without philosophy and
+reflection?"</p>
+
+<p>"In what respect are these the most happy?"</p>
+
+<p>"Because it is probable that these should again migrate into a
+corresponding civilized and peaceable kind of animals, such as bees
+perhaps, or wasps, or ants, or even into the same human species
+again, and from these become moderate men."</p>
+
+<p>"It is probable."</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page119' id='page119'></a>But it is
+not lawful for any one who has not studied philosophy, and departed
+this life perfectly pure, to pass into the rank of gods, but only
+for the true lover of wisdom. And on this account, my friends
+Simmias and Cebes, those who philosophize rightly, abstain from all
+bodily desires, and persevere in doing so, and do not give
+themselves up to them, not fearing the loss of property and
+poverty, as the generality of men and the lovers of wealth; nor,
+again, dreading disgrace and ignominy, like those who are lovers of
+power and honor, do they then abstain from them."</p>
+
+<p>"For it would not become them to do so, Socrates," says
+Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec72" name=
+"phaedo_sec72">72</a>. "It would not, by Jupiter!" he rejoined.
+"Wherefore, Cebes, they who care at all for their soul, and do not
+spend their lives in the culture of their bodies, despising all
+these, proceed not in the same way with them, as being ignorant
+whither they are going, but, being convinced that they ought not to
+act contrary to philosophy, but in accordance with the freedom and
+purification she affords, they give themselves up to her direction,
+following her wherever she leads."</p>
+
+<p>"How, Socrates?"</p>
+
+<p>"I will tell you," he replied. "The lovers of wisdom know that
+philosophy, receiving their soul plainly bound and glued to the
+body, and compelled to view things through this, as through a
+prison, and not directly by herself, and sunk in utter ignorance,
+and perceiving, too, the strength of the prison, that it arises
+from desire, so that he who is bound as much as possible assists in
+binding himself. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec73" name=
+"phaedo_sec73">73</a>. I say, then, the lovers of wisdom know that
+philosophy, receiving their soul in this state, gently exhorts it,
+and endeavors to free it, by showing that the view of things by
+means of the eyes is full of deception, as also is that through the
+ears and the <a class='pagenumber' name='page120' id=
+'page120'></a>other senses; persuading an abandonment of these so
+far as it is not absolutely necessary to use them, and advising the
+soul to be collected and concentrated within itself, and to believe
+nothing else than herself, with respect to what she herself
+understands of things that have a real subsistence; and to consider
+nothing true which she views through the medium of others, and
+which differ under different aspects;<a id="footnotetag33" name=
+"footnotetag33" href="#footnote33"><sup>33</sup></a> for that a
+thing of this kind is sensible and visible, but that what she
+herself perceives is intelligible and invisible. The soul of the
+true philosopher, therefore, thinking that she ought not to oppose
+this deliverance, accordingly abstains as much as possible from
+pleasures and desires, griefs and fears, considering that when any
+one is exceedingly delighted or alarmed, grieved or influenced by
+desire, he does not merely suffer such evil from these things as
+one might suppose, such as either being sick or wasting his
+property through indulging his desires; but that which is the
+greatest evil, and the worst of all, this he suffers, and is not
+conscious of it."</p>
+
+<p>"But what is this evil, Socrates?" said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec74" name=
+"phaedo_sec74">74</a>. "That the soul of every man is compelled to
+be either vehemently delighted or grieved about some particular
+thing, and, at the same time, to consider that the thing about
+which it is thus strongly affected is most real and most true,
+though it is not so. But these are chiefly visible objects, are
+they not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"In this state of affection, then, is not the soul especially
+shackled by the body?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page121' id='page121'></a>How
+so?"</p>
+
+<p>"Because each pleasure and pain, having a nail, as it were,
+nails the soul to the body, and fastens it to it, and causes it to
+become corporeal, deeming those things to be true whatever the body
+asserts to be so. For, in consequence of its forming the same
+opinions with the body, and delighting in the same things, it is
+compelled, I think, to possess similar manners, and to be similarly
+nourished; so that it can never pass into Hades in a pure state,
+but must ever depart polluted by the body, and so quickly falls
+again into another body, and grows up as if it were sown, and
+consequently is deprived of all association with that which is
+divine, and pure, and uniform."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak most truly, Socrates," said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec75" name=
+"phaedo_sec75">75</a>. "For these reasons, therefore, Cebes, those
+who are truly lovers of wisdom are moderate and resolute, and not
+for the reasons that most people say. Do you think as they do?"</p>
+
+<p>"Assuredly not."</p>
+
+<p>"No, truly. But the soul of a philosopher would reason thus, and
+would not think that philosophy ought to set it free, and that when
+it is freed it should give itself up again to pleasures and pains,
+to bind it down again, and make her work void, weaving a kind of
+Penelope's web the reverse way. On the contrary, effecting a calm
+of the passions, and following the guidance of reason, and being
+always intent on this, contemplating that which is true and divine,
+and not subject to opinion; and being nourished by it, it thinks
+that it ought to live in this manner as long as it does live, and
+that when it dies it shall go to a kindred essence, and one like
+itself, and shall be free from human evils. From such a regimen as
+this the soul has no occasion to fear, Simmias and Cebes, while it
+strictly attends to these things, lest, <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page122' id='page122'></a>being torn to pieces at its departure
+from the body, it should be blown about and dissipated by the
+winds, and no longer have an existence anywhere."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec76" name=
+"phaedo_sec76">76</a>. When Socrates had thus spoken, a long
+silence ensued; and Socrates himself was pondering upon what had
+been said, as he appeared, and so did most of us; but Cebes and
+Simmias were conversing a little while with each other. At length
+Socrates, perceiving them, said, "What think you of what has been
+said? Does it appear to you to have been proved sufficiently? for
+many doubts and objections still remain if any one will examine
+them thoroughly. If, then, you are considering some other subject,
+I have nothing to say; but if you are doubting about this, do not
+hesitate both yourselves to speak and express your opinion, if it
+appears to you in any respect that it might have been argued
+better, and to call me in again to your assistance, if you think
+you can be at all benefited by my help."</p>
+
+<p>Upon this Simmias said, "Indeed, Socrates, I will tell you the
+truth: for some time each of us, being in doubt, has been urging
+and exhorting the other to question you, from a desire to hear our
+doubts solved; but we were afraid of giving you trouble, lest it
+should be disagreeable to you in your present circumstances."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec77" name=
+"phaedo_sec77">77</a>. But he, upon hearing this, gently smiled,
+and said, "Bless me, Simmias; with difficulty, indeed, could I
+persuade other men that I do not consider my present condition a
+calamity, since I am not able to persuade even you; but you are
+afraid lest I should be more morose now than during the former part
+of my life. And, as it seems, I appear to you to be inferior to
+swans with respect to divination, who, when they perceive that they
+must needs die, though they have been used to sing before, sing
+then more than ever, rejoicing that they are about to depart to
+that <a class='pagenumber' name='page123' id='page123'></a>deity
+whose servants they are. But men, through their own fear of death,
+belie the swans too, and say that they, lamenting their death, sing
+their last song through grief; and they do not consider that no
+bird sings when it is hungry or cold, or is afflicted with any
+other pain, not even the nightingale, or swallow, or the hoopoes,
+which, they say, sing lamenting through grief. But neither do these
+birds appear to me to sing through sorrow, nor yet do swans; but,
+in my opinion, belonging to Apollo, they are prophetic, and,
+foreseeing the blessings of Hades, they sing and rejoice on that
+day more excellently than at any preceding time. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec78" name="phaedo_sec78">78</a>. But
+I, too, consider myself to be a fellow-servant of the swans, and
+sacred to the same god; and that I have received the power of
+divination from our common master no less than they, and that I do
+not depart from this life with less spirits than they. On this
+account, therefore, it is right that you should both speak and ask
+whatever you please, so long as the Athenian Eleven permit."</p>
+
+<p>"You say well," said Simmias, "and both I will tell you what are
+my doubts, and he, in turn, how far he does not assent to what has
+been said. For it appears to me, Socrates, probably as it does to
+you with respect to these matters, that to know them clearly in the
+present life is either impossible or very difficult: on the other
+hand, however, not to test what has been said of them in every
+possible way, so as not to desist until, on examining them in every
+point of view, one has exhausted every effort, is the part of a
+very weak man. For we ought, with respect to these things, either
+to learn from others how they stand or to discover them for one's
+self; or, if both these are impossible, then, taking the best of
+human reasonings and that which is the most difficult to be
+confuted, and embarking on this, as one who risks himself on a
+raft, so to sail through life, unless <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page124' id='page124'></a>one could be carried more safely, and
+with less risk, on a surer conveyance, or some divine reason. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec79" name="phaedo_sec79">79</a>.
+I, therefore, shall not now be ashamed to question you, since you
+bid me do so, nor shall I blame myself hereafter for not having now
+told you what I think; for to me, Socrates, when I consider the
+matter, both with myself and with Cebes, what has been said does
+not appear to have been sufficiently proved."</p>
+
+<p>Then said Socrates, "Perhaps, my friend, you have the truth on
+your side; but tell me in what respect it was not sufficiently
+proved."</p>
+
+<p>"In this," he answered, "because any one might use the same
+argument with respect to harmony, and a lyre, and its chords, that
+harmony is something invisible and incorporeal, very beautiful and
+divine, in a well-modulated lyre; but the lyre and its chords are
+bodies, and of corporeal form, compounded and earthly, and akin to
+that which is mortal. When any one, then, has either broken the
+lyre, or cut or burst the chords, he might maintain from the same
+reasoning as yours that it is necessary the harmony should still
+exist and not be destroyed; for there could be no possibility that
+the lyre should subsist any longer when the chords are burst; and
+that the chords, which are of a mortal nature, should subsist, but
+that the harmony, which is of the same nature and akin to that
+which is divine and immortal, should become extinct, and perish
+before that which is mortal; but he might say that the harmony must
+needs subsist somewhere, and that the wood and chords must decay
+before it can undergo any change. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec80" name="phaedo_sec80">80</a>. For I think, Socrates,
+that you yourself have arrived at this conclusion, that we consider
+the soul to be pretty much of this kind&mdash;namely, that our body
+being compacted and held together by heat and cold, dryness and
+moisture, and other <a class='pagenumber' name='page125' id=
+'page125'></a>such qualities, our soul is the fusion and harmony of
+these, when they are well and duly combined with each other. If,
+then, the soul is a kind of harmony, it is evident that when our
+bodies are unduly relaxed or strained, through diseases and other
+maladies, the soul must, of necessity, immediately perish, although
+it is most divine, just as other harmonies which subsist in sounds
+or in the various works of artisans; but that the remains of the
+body of each person last for a long time, till they are either
+burned or decayed. Consider, then, what we shall say to this
+reasoning, if any one should maintain that the soul, being a fusion
+of the several qualities in the body, perishes first in that which
+is called death."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec81" name=
+"phaedo_sec81">81</a>. Socrates, therefore, looking steadfastly at
+us, as he was generally accustomed to do, and smiling, said,
+"Simmias indeed speaks justly. If, then, any one of you is more
+prompt than I am, why does he not answer, for he seems to have
+handled my argument not badly? It appears to me, however, that
+before we make our reply we should first hear from Cebes, what he,
+too, objects to our argument, in order that, some time intervening,
+we may consider what we shall say, and then when we have heard
+them, we may give up to them, if they appear to speak agreeably to
+truth; or, if not, we may then uphold our own argument. Come, then,
+Cebes," he continued, "say what it is that disturbs you, so as to
+cause your unbelief."</p>
+
+<p>"I will tell you," said Cebes; "the argument seems to me to rest
+where it was, and to be liable to the same objection that we
+mentioned before. For, that our soul existed even before It came
+into this present form, I do not deny has been very elegantly, and,
+if it is not too much to say so, very fully, demonstrated; but that
+it still exists anywhere when we are dead does not appear to me to
+have been clearly proved; nor do I give in to the objection of
+Simmias, that <a class='pagenumber' name='page126' id=
+'page126'></a>the soul is not stronger and more durable than the
+body, for it appears to me to excel very far all things of this
+kind. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec82" name=
+"phaedo_sec82">82</a>. 'Why, then,' reason might say, 'do you still
+disbelieve? for, since you see that when a man dies his weaker part
+still exists, does it not appear to you to be necessary that the
+more durable part should still be preserved during this period?'
+Consider, then, whether I say any thing to the purpose in reply to
+this. For I, too, as well as Simmias, as it seems, stand in need of
+an illustration; for the argument appears to me to have been put
+thus, as if any one should advance this argument about an aged
+weaver who had died, that the man has not yet perished, but perhaps
+still exists somewhere; and, as a proof, should exhibit the garment
+which he wore and had woven himself, that it is entire and has not
+perished; and if any one should disbelieve him, he would ask, which
+of the two is the more durable, the species of a man or of a
+garment, that is constantly in use and being worn; then, should any
+one answer that the species of man is much more durable, he would
+think it demonstrated that, beyond all question, the man is
+preserved, since that which is less durable has not perished. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec83" name="phaedo_sec83">83</a>.
+But I do not think, Simmias, that this is the case, and do you
+consider what I say, for every one must think that he who argues
+thus argues, foolishly. For this weaver, having worn and woven many
+such garments, perished after almost all of them, but before the
+last, I suppose; and yet it does not on this account follow any the
+more that a man is inferior to or weaker than a garment. And I
+think, the soul might admit this same illustration with respect to
+the body, and he who should say the same things concerning them
+would appear to me to speak correctly, that the soul is more
+durable, but the body weaker and less durable; for he would say
+that each soul wears out many bodies, especially <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page127' id='page127'></a>if it lives many
+years; for if the body wastes and is dissolved while the man still
+lives, but the soul continually weaves anew what is worn out, it
+must necessarily follow that when the soul is dissolved it must
+then have on its last garment, and perish before this alone; but
+when the soul has perished the body would show the weakness of its
+nature, and quickly rot and vanish. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec84" name="phaedo_sec84">84</a>. So that it is not by any
+means right to place implicit reliance on this argument, and to
+believe that when we die our soul still exists somewhere. For, if
+any one should concede to him who admits even more than you do, and
+should grant to him that not only did our soul exist before we were
+born, but that even when we die nothing hinders the souls of some
+of us from still existing, and continuing to exist hereafter, and
+from being often born, and dying again&mdash;for so strong is it by
+nature, that it can hold out against repeated births&mdash;if he
+granted this, he would not yet concede that it does not exhaust
+itself in its many births, and at length perish altogether in some
+one of the deaths. But he would say that no one knows this death
+and dissolution of the body, which brings destruction to the soul;
+for it is impossible for any one of us to perceive it. If, however,
+this be the case, it follows that every one who is confident at the
+approach of death is foolishly confident, unless he is able to
+prove that the soul is absolutely immortal and imperishable;
+otherwise it necessarily follows that he who is about to die must
+be alarmed for his soul, lest in its present disunion from the body
+it should entirely perish."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec85" name=
+"phaedo_sec85">85</a>. Upon this, all of us who had heard them
+speaking were disagreeably affected, as we afterward mentioned to
+each other; because, after we had been fully persuaded by the
+former arguments, they seemed to disturb us anew, and to cast us
+into a distrust, not only of the arguments already <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page128' id='page128'></a>adduced, but of such
+as might afterward be urged, for fear lest we should not be fit
+judges of anything, or lest the things themselves should be
+incredible.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Echec.</span> By the gods!
+Ph&aelig;do, I can readily excuse you; for, while I am now hearing
+you, it occurs to me to ask myself some such question as this: What
+arguments can we any longer believe? since the argument which
+Socrates advanced, and which was exceedingly credible, has now
+fallen into discredit. For this argument, that our soul is a kind
+of harmony, produces a wonderful impression on me, both now and
+always, and in being mentioned, it has reminded me, as it were,
+that I, too, was formerly of the same opinion; so that I stand in
+need again, as if from the very beginning, of some other argument
+which may persuade me that the soul of one who dies does not die
+with the body. Tell me, therefore, by Jupiter! how Socrates
+followed up the argument; and whether he, too, as you confess was
+the case with yourselves, seemed disconcerted at all, or not, but
+calmly maintained his position; and maintained it sufficiently or
+defectively. Relate everything to me as accurately as you can.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec86" name=
+"phaedo_sec86">86</a>. <span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span>
+Indeed, Echecrates, though I have often admired Socrates, I was
+never more delighted than at being with him on that occasion. That
+he should be able to say something is perhaps not at all
+surprising; but I especially admired this in him&mdash;first of
+all, that he listened to the argument of the young men so sweetly,
+affably, and approvingly; in the next place, that he so quickly
+perceived how we were affected by their arguments; and, lastly,
+that he cured us so well and recalled us, when we were put to
+flight, as it were, and vanquished, and encouraged us to accompany
+him, and consider the argument with him.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Echec.</span> How was that?</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page129' id='page129'></a><span
+class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> I will tell you: I happened
+to be sitting at his right hand, near the bed, upon a low seat, but
+he himself sat much higher than I. Stroking my head, then, and
+laying hold of the hair that hung on my neck&mdash;for he used,
+often, to play with my hairs&mdash;"To-morrow," he said, "perhaps,
+Ph&aelig;do, you will cut off these beautiful locks?"</p>
+
+<p>"It seems likely, Socrates," said I.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec87" name=
+"phaedo_sec87">87</a>. "Not if you are persuaded by me."</p>
+
+<p>"Why so?" I asked.</p>
+
+<p>"To-day," he replied, "both I ought to cut off mine and you
+yours, if our argument must die, and we are unable to revive it.
+And I, if I were you, and the arguments were to escape me, would
+take an oath, as the Argives do, not to suffer my hair to grow
+until I had renewed the contest, and vanquished the arguments of
+Simmias and Cebes."</p>
+
+<p>"But," I said, "even Hercules himself is said not to have been a
+match for two."</p>
+
+<p>"Call upon me, then," he said, "as your Iolaus, while it is yet
+day."</p>
+
+<p>"I do call on you, then," I said, "not as Hercules upon Iolaus,
+but as Iolaus upon Hercules."</p>
+
+<p>"It will make no difference," he replied. "But, first of all, we
+must beware lest we meet with some mischance."</p>
+
+<p>"What?" I asked.</p>
+
+<p>"That we do not become," he answered, "haters of reasoning, as
+some become haters of men; for no greater evil can happen to any
+one than to hate reasoning. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec88" name="phaedo_sec88">88</a>. But hatred of reasoning
+and hatred of mankind both spring from the same source. For hatred
+of mankind is produced in us from having placed too great reliance
+on some one without sufficient knowledge of him, and from having
+considered him to be a man altogether true, sincere, and faithful,
+and then, after a little while, finding him depraved and <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page130' id='page130'></a>unfaithful, and after
+him another. And when a man has often experienced this, and
+especially from those whom he considered his most intimate and best
+friends, at length, having frequently stumbled, he hates all men,
+and thinks that there is no soundness at all in any of them. Have
+you not perceived that this happens so?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," I replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Is it not a shame?" he said "And is it not evident that such a
+one attempts to deal with men without sufficient knowledge of human
+affairs? For if he had dealt with them with competent knowledge, as
+the case really is, so he would have considered that the good and
+the bad are each very few in number, and that those between both
+are most numerous."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec89" name=
+"phaedo_sec89">89</a>. "How say you?" I asked.</p>
+
+<p>"In the same manner," he replied, "as with things very little
+and very large Do you think that any thing is more rare than to
+find a very large on a very little man, or dog, or any thing else?
+and, again, swift or slow, beautiful or ugly, white or black? Do
+you not perceive that of all such things the extremes are rare and
+few, but that the intermediate are abundant and numerous?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," I replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Do you not think, then," he continued, "that if a contest in
+wickedness were proposed, even here very few would be found
+pre-eminent?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is probable," I said.</p>
+
+<p>"It is so," he said, "but in this respect reasonings do not
+resemble men, for I was just now following you as my leader, but in
+this they do resemble them, when any one believes in any argument
+as true without being skilled in the art of reasoning, and then
+shortly afterward it appears to him to be false, at one time being
+so and at another time <a class='pagenumber' name='page131' id=
+'page131'></a>not, and so on with one after another,<a id=
+"footnotetag34" name="footnotetag34" href=
+"#footnote34"><sup>34</sup></a> and especially they who devote
+themselves to controversial arguments, you are aware, at length
+think they have become very wise and have alone discovered that
+there is nothing sound and stable either in things or reasonings
+but that all things that exist, as is the case with the Euripus,
+are in a constant state of flux and reflux, and never continue in
+any one condition for any length of time."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak perfectly true," I said.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec90" name=
+"phaedo_sec90">90</a>. "Would it not, then, Ph&aelig;do" he said
+"be a sad thing if, when there is a true and sound reasoning, and
+such as one can understand, one should then, through lighting upon
+such arguments as appear to be at one time true and at another
+false, not blame one's self and one's own want of skill, but at
+length, through grief, should anxiously transfer the blame from
+one's self to the arguments, and thereupon pass the rest of one's
+life in hating and reviling arguments and so be depraved of the
+truth and knowledge of things that exist?"</p>
+
+<p>"By Jupiter!" I said, "it would be sad, indeed."</p>
+
+<p>"In the first place, then," he said, "let us beware of this, and
+let us not admit into our souls the notion that there appears to be
+nothing sound in reasoning, but much rather that we are not yet in
+a sound condition, and that we ought vigorously and strenuously to
+endeavor to become sound, you and the others, on account of your
+whole future life, but I, on account of my death, since I am in
+danger, at the <a class='pagenumber' name='page132' id=
+'page132'></a>present time, of not behaving as becomes a
+philosopher with respect to this very subject, but as a wrangler,
+like those who are utterly uninformed <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec91" name="phaedo_sec91">91</a>. For they, when they
+dispute about any thing, care nothing at all for the subject about
+which the discussion is, but are anxious about this, that what they
+have themselves advanced shall appear true to the persons present.
+And I seem to myself on the present occasion to differ from them
+only in this respect, for I shall not be anxious to make what I say
+appear true to those who are present, except that may happen by the
+way, but that it may appear certainly to be so to myself. For I
+thus reason, my dear friend, and observe how interestedly. If what
+I say be true, it is well to be persuaded of it, but if nothing
+remains to one that is dead, I shall, at least, during the interval
+before death be less disagreeable to those present by my
+lamentations. But this ignorance of mine will not continue long,
+for that would be bad, but will shortly be put an end to. Thus
+prepared, then, Simmias and Cebes," he continued, "I now proceed to
+my argument. Do you, however, if you will be persuaded by me, pay
+little attention to Socrates, but much more to the truth, and if I
+appear to you to say any thing true, assent to it, but if not,
+oppose me with all your might, taking good care that in my zeal I
+do not deceive both myself and you, and, like a bee, depart leaving
+my sting behind."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec92" name=
+"phaedo_sec92">92</a>. "But let us proceed," he said "First of all,
+remind me of what you said, if I should appear to have forgotten it
+For Simmias, as I think, is in doubt, and fears lest the soul,
+though more divine and beautiful than the body, should perish
+before it, as being a species of harmony. But Cebes appeared to me
+to grant me this, that the soul is more durable than the body, but
+he argued that it is uncertain to every one, whether when the soul
+has worn out many bodies <a class='pagenumber' name='page133' id=
+'page133'></a>and that repeatedly, it does not, on leaving the last
+body, itself also perish, so that this very thing is death, the
+destruction of the soul, since the body never ceases decaying Are
+not these the things, Simmias and Cebes, which we have to inquire
+into?"</p>
+
+<p>They both agreed that they were.</p>
+
+<p>"Whether, then," he continued "do you reject all our former
+arguments, or some of them only, and not others?"</p>
+
+<p>"Some we do," they replied, "and others not."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then," he proceeded, "do you say about that argument in
+which we asserted that knowledge is reminiscence, and that, this
+being the case, our soul must necessarily have existed somewhere
+before it was inclosed in the body?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec93" name=
+"phaedo_sec93">93</a>. "I, indeed," replied Cebes "was both then
+wonderfully persuaded by it, and now persist in it, as in no other
+argument."</p>
+
+<p>"And I, too," said Simmias, "am of the same mind, and should
+very much wonder if I should ever think otherwise on that
+point."</p>
+
+<p>"Then," Socrates said, "you must needs think otherwise, my
+Theban friend, if this opinion holds good, that harmony is
+something compounded, and that the soul is a kind of harmony that
+results from the parts compacted together in the body. For surely
+you will not allow yourself to say that harmony was composed prior
+to the things from which it required to be composed Would you allow
+this?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means, Socrates" he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Do you perceive, then," he said, "that this result from what
+you say, when you assert that the soul existed before it came into
+a human form and body, but that it was composed from things that
+did not yet exist? For harmony is not such as that to which you
+compare it, but first the <a class='pagenumber' name='page134' id=
+'page134'></a>lyre, and the chords, and the sounds yet
+unharmonized, exist, and, last of all, harmony is produced, and
+first perishes. How, then, will this argument accord with
+that?"</p>
+
+<p>"Not at all," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec94" name=
+"phaedo_sec94">94</a>. "And yet," he said, "if in any argument,
+there ought to be an accordance in one respecting harmony."</p>
+
+<p>"There ought," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"This of yours, however," he said, "is not in accordance.
+Consider, then, which of these two statements do you
+prefer&mdash;that knowledge is reminiscence, or the soul
+harmony?"</p>
+
+<p>"The former by far, Socrates," he replied; "for the latter
+occurred to me without demonstration, through a certain probability
+and speciousness whence most men derive their opinions. But I am
+well aware that arguments which draw their demonstrations from
+probabilities are idle; and, unless one is on one's guard against
+them, they are very deceptive, both in geometry and all other
+subjects. But the argument respecting reminiscence and knowledge
+may be said to have been demonstrated by a satisfactory hypothesis.
+For in this way it was said that our soul existed before it came
+into the body, because the essence that bears the appellation of
+'that which is' belongs to it. But of this, as I persuade myself, I
+am fully and rightly convinced. It is therefore necessary, as it
+seems, that I should neither allow myself nor any one else to
+maintain that the soul is harmony."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec95" name=
+"phaedo_sec95">95</a>. "But what, Simmias," said he, "if you
+consider it thus? Does it appear to you to appertain to harmony, or
+to any other composition, to subsist in any other way than the very
+things do of which it is composed?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means."</p>
+
+<p>"And indeed, as I think, neither to do any thing, nor suffer any
+thing else, besides what they do or suffer."</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page135' id='page135'></a>He
+agreed.</p>
+
+<p>"It does not, therefore, appertain to harmony to take the lead
+of the things of which it is composed, but to follow them."</p>
+
+<p>He assented.</p>
+
+<p>"It is, then, far from being the case that harmony is moved or
+sends forth sounds contrariwise, or is in any other respect opposed
+to its parts?"</p>
+
+<p>"Far, indeed," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"What, then? Is not every harmony naturally harmony, so far as
+it has been made to accord?"</p>
+
+<p>"I do not understand you," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Whether," he said, "if it should be in a greater degree and
+more fully made to accord, supposing that were possible, would the
+harmony be greater and more full; but if in a less degree and less
+fully, then would it be inferior and less full?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Is this, then, the case with the soul that, even in the
+smallest extent, one soul is more fully and in a greater degree, or
+less fully and in a less degree, this very thing, a soul, than
+another?"</p>
+
+<p>"In no respect whatever," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec96" name=
+"phaedo_sec96">96</a>. "Well, then," he said, "by Jupiter! is one
+soul said to possess intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and
+another folly and vice, and to be bad? and is this said with
+truth?"</p>
+
+<p>"With truth, certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Of those, then, who maintain that the soul is harmony, what
+will any one say that these things are in the soul, virtue and
+vice? Will he call them another kind of harmony and discord, and
+say that the one, the good soul, is harmonized, and, being harmony,
+contains within itself another <a class='pagenumber' name='page136'
+id='page136'></a>harmony, but that the other is discordant, and
+does not contain within itself another harmony?"</p>
+
+<p>"I am unable to say," replied Simmias; "but it is clear that he
+who maintains that opinion would say something of the kind."</p>
+
+<p>"But it has been already granted," said he, "that one soul is
+not more or less a soul than another; and this is an admission that
+one harmony is not to a greater degree or more fully, or to a less
+degree or less fully, a harmony, than another; is it not so?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"And that that which is neither more or less harmony is neither
+more nor less harmonized: is it so?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is."</p>
+
+<p>"But does that which is neither more or less harmonized partake
+of more or less harmony, or an equal amount?"</p>
+
+<p>"An equal amount."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec97" name=
+"phaedo_sec97">97</a>. "A soul, therefore, since it is not more or
+less this very thing, a soul, than another, is not more or less
+harmonized?"</p>
+
+<p>"Even so."</p>
+
+<p>"Such, then, being its condition, it can not partake of a
+greater degree of discord or harmony?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly not."</p>
+
+<p>"And, again, such being its condition, can one soul partake of a
+greater degree of vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord,
+and virtue harmony?"</p>
+
+<p>"It can not."</p>
+
+<p>"Or rather, surely, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul
+will partake of vice, if it is harmony; for doubtless harmony,
+which is perfectly such, can never partake of discord?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly not."</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page137' id='page137'></a>Neither,
+therefore, can a soul which is perfectly a soul partake of
+vice."</p>
+
+<p>"How can it, from what has been already said?"</p>
+
+<p>"From this reasoning, then, all souls of all animals will be
+equally good, if, at least, they are by nature equally this very
+thing, souls?"</p>
+
+<p>"It appears so to me, Socrates," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"And does it appear to you," he said, "to have been thus rightly
+argued, and that the argument would lead to this result, if the
+hypothesis were correct, that the soul is harmony?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec98" name=
+"phaedo_sec98">98</a>. "On no account whatever," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"But what," said he, "of all the things that are in man? Is
+there any thing else that you say bears rule except the soul,
+especially if it be wise?"</p>
+
+<p>"I should say not."</p>
+
+<p>"Whether by yielding to the passions in the body, or by opposing
+them? My meaning is this: for instance, when heat and thirst are
+present, by drawing it the contrary way, so as to hinder it from
+drinking; and when hunger is present, by hindering it from eating;
+and in ten thousand other instances we see the soul opposing the
+desires of the body. Do we not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"But have we not before allowed that if the soul were harmony,
+it would never utter a sound contrary to the tension, relaxation,
+vibration, or any other affection to which its component parts are
+subject, but would follow, and never govern them?"</p>
+
+<p>"We did allow it," he replied, "for how could we do
+otherwise?"</p>
+
+<p>"What, then? Does not the soul now appear to act quite the
+contrary, ruling over all the parts from which any one <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page138' id='page138'></a>might say it subsists,
+and resisting almost all of them through the whole of life, and
+exercising dominion over them in all manner of ways; punishing some
+more severely even with pain, both by gymnastics and medicine, and
+others more mildly; partly threatening, and partly admonishing the
+desires, angers and fears, as if, being itself of a different
+nature, it were conversing with something quite different? <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec99" name="phaedo_sec99">99</a>.
+Just as Homer has done in the Odyssey,<a id="footnotetag35" name=
+"footnotetag35" href="#footnote35"><sup>35</sup></a> where he
+speaks of Ulysses&mdash;'Having struck his breast, he chid his
+heart in the following words: Bear up, my heart; ere this thou hast
+borne far worse.' Do you think that he composed this in the belief
+that the soul was harmony, and capable of being led by the passions
+of the body, and not rather that it was able to lead and govern
+them, as being something much more divine than to be compared with
+harmony?"</p>
+
+<p>"By Jupiter! Socrates, it appears so to me."</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore, my excellent friend, it is on no account correct for
+us to say that the soul is a kind of harmony; for, as it appears,
+we should neither agree with Homer, that divine poet, nor with
+ourselves."</p>
+
+<p>"Such is the case," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Be it so, then," said Socrates, "we have already, as it seems,
+sufficiently appeased this Theban harmony. But how, Cebes, and by
+what arguments, shall we appease this Cadmus?"<a id="footnotetag36"
+name="footnotetag36" href="#footnote36"><sup>36</sup></a></p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec100" name=
+"phaedo_sec100">100</a>. "You appear to me," replied Cebes, "to be
+likely to find out; for you have made out this argument against
+harmony wonderfully beyond my expectation. For when Simmias <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page139' id='page139'></a>was saying what
+his doubts were, I wondered very much whether any one would be able
+to answer his reasoning. It, therefore, appeared to me
+unaccountable that he did not withstand the very first onset of
+your argument. I should not, therefore, be surprised if the
+arguments of Cadmus met with the same fate."</p>
+
+<p>"My good friend," said Socrates, "do not speak so boastfully,
+lest some envious power should overthrow the argument that is about
+to be urged. These things, however, will be cared for by the deity;
+but let us, meeting hand to hand, in the manner of Homer, try
+whether you say any thing to the purpose. This, then, is the sum of
+what you inquire you require it to be proved that our soul is
+imperishable and immortal; if a philosopher that is about to die,
+full of confidence and hope that after death he shall be far
+happier than if he had died after leading a different kind of life,
+shall not entertain this confidence foolishly and vainly. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec101" name="phaedo_sec101">101</a>.
+But to show that the soul is something strong and divine, and that
+it existed before we men were born, you say not at all hinders, but
+that all these things may evince, not its immortality, but that the
+soul is durable, and existed an immense space of time before, and
+knew and did many things. But that, for all this, it was not at all
+the more immortal, but that its very entrance into the body of a
+man was the beginning of its destruction, as if it were a disease;
+so that it passes through this life in wretchedness, and at last
+perishes in that which is called death. But you say that it is of
+no consequence whether it comes into a body once or often, with
+respect to our occasion of fear; for it is right he should be
+afraid, unless he is foolish, who does not know, and can not give a
+reason to prove, that the soul is immortal. Such, I think, Cebes,
+is the sum of what you say; and I purposely repeat it often, that
+nothing <a class='pagenumber' name='page140' id='page140'></a>may
+escape us, and, if you please, you may add to or take from it."</p>
+
+<p>Cebes replied, "I do not wish at present either to take from or
+add to it; that is what I mean."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec102" name=
+"phaedo_sec102">102</a>. Socrates, then having paused for some
+time, and considered something within himself, said, "You inquire
+into no easy matter, Cebes; for it is absolutely necessary to
+discuss the whole question of generation and corruption. If you
+please, then, I will relate to you what happened to me with
+reference to them; and afterward, if any thing that I shall say
+shall appear to you useful toward producing conviction on the
+subject you are now treating of, make use of it."</p>
+
+<p>"I do indeed wish it," replied Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"Hear my relation, then. When I was a young man, Cebes, I was
+wonderfully desirous of that wisdom which they call a history of
+nature; for it appeared to me to be a very sublime thing to know
+the causes of every thing&mdash;why each thing is generated, why it
+perishes, and why it exists. And I often tossed myself upward and
+downward, considering first such things as these, whether when heat
+and cold have undergone a certain corruption, as some say, then
+animals are formed; and whether the blood is that by means of which
+we think, or air, or fire, or none of these, but that it is the
+brain that produces the perceptions of hearing, seeing, and
+smelling; and that from these come memory and opinion; and from
+memory and opinion, when in a state of rest, in the same way
+knowledge is produced. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec103"
+name="phaedo_sec103">103</a>. And, again, considering the
+corruptions of these, and the affections incidental to the heavens
+and the earth, I at length appeared to myself so unskillful in
+these speculations that nothing could be more so. But I will give
+you a sufficient proof of this; for I then became, by these very
+speculations, <a class='pagenumber' name='page141' id=
+'page141'></a>so very blind with respect to things which I knew
+clearly before, as it appeared to myself and others, that I
+unlearned even the things which I thought I knew before, both on
+many other subjects and also this, why a man grows. For, before, I
+thought this was evident to every one&mdash;that it proceeds from
+eating and drinking; for that, when, from the food, flesh is added
+to flesh, bone to bone, and so on in the same proportion, what is
+proper to them is added to the several other parts, then the bulk
+which was small becomes afterward large, and thus that a little man
+becomes a big one. Such was my opinion at that time. Does it appear
+to you correct?"</p>
+
+<p>"To me it does," said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec104" name=
+"phaedo_sec104">104</a>. "Consider this further. I thought that I
+had formed a right opinion, when, on seeing a tall man standing by
+a short one, I judged that he was taller by the head, and in like
+manner, one horse than another; and, still more clearly than this,
+ten appeared to me to be more than eight by two being added to
+them, and that two cubits are greater than one cubit by exceeding
+it a half."</p>
+
+<p>"But now," said Cebes, "what think you of these matters?"</p>
+
+<p>"By Jupiter!" said he, "I am far from thinking that I know the
+cause of these, for that I can not even persuade myself of this:
+when a person has added one to one, whether the one to which the
+addition has been made has become two, or whether that which has
+been added, and that to which the addition has been made, have
+become two by the addition of the one to the other. For I wonder
+if, when each of these was separate from the other, each was one,
+and they were not yet two; but when they have approached nearer
+each other this should be the cause of their becoming
+two&mdash;namely, the union by which they have been placed <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page142' id='page142'></a>nearer one
+another. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec105" name=
+"phaedo_sec105">105</a>. Nor yet, if any person should divide one,
+am I able to persuade myself that this, their division, is the
+cause of its becoming two. For this cause is the contrary to the
+former one of their becoming two; for then it was because they were
+brought nearer to each other, and the one was added to the other;
+but now it is because one is removed and separated from the other.
+Nor do I yet persuade myself that I know why one is one, nor, in a
+word, why any thing else is produced, or perishes, or exists,
+according to this method of proceeding; but I mix up another method
+of my own at random, for this I can on no account give in to."</p>
+
+<p>"But, having once heard a person reading from a book, written,
+as he said, by Anaxagoras, and which said that it is intelligence
+that sets in order and is the cause of all things, I was delighted
+with this cause, and it appeared to me in a manner to be well that
+intelligence should be the cause of all things, and I considered
+with myself, if this is so, that the regulating intelligence orders
+all things, and disposes each in such way as will be best for it.
+<a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec106" name=
+"phaedo_sec106">106</a>. If any one, then, should desire to
+discover the cause of every thing, in what way it is produced, or
+perishes, or exists, he must discover this respecting it&mdash;in
+what way it is best for it either to exist, or to suffer, or do any
+thing else. From this mode of reasoning, then, it is proper that a
+man should consider nothing else, both with respect to himself and
+others, than what is most excellent and best; and it necessarily
+follows that this same person must also know that which is worst,
+for that the knowledge of both of them is the same. Thus reasoning
+with myself, I was delighted to think I had found in Anaxagoras a
+preceptor who would instruct me in the causes of things, agreeably
+to my own mind, and that he would inform me, first, whether the
+earth is flat or round, <a class='pagenumber' name='page143' id=
+'page143'></a>and, when he had informed me, would, moreover,
+explain the cause and necessity of its being so, arguing on the
+principle of the better, and showing that it is better for it to be
+such as it is; and if he should say that it is in the middle, that
+he would, moreover, explain how it is better for it to be in the
+middle; and if he should make all this clear to me, I was prepared
+no longer to require any other species of cause. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec107" name="phaedo_sec107">107</a>. I
+was in like manner prepared to inquire respecting the sun and moon
+and the other stars, with respect to their velocities in reference
+to each other, and their revolutions and other conditions, in what
+way it is better for both to act and be affected as it does and is.
+For I never thought that after he had said that these things were
+set in order by intelligence, he would introduce any other cause
+for them than that it is best for them to be as they are. Hence, I
+thought, that in assigning the cause to each of them, and to all in
+common, he would explain that which is best for each, and the
+common good of all. And I would not have given up my hopes for a
+good deal; but, having taken up his books with great eagerness, I
+read through them as quickly as I could, that I might as soon as
+possible know the best and the worst."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec108" name=
+"phaedo_sec108">108</a>. "From this wonderful hope, however, my
+friend, I was speedily thrown down, when, as I advance and read
+over his works, I meet with a man who makes no use of intelligence,
+nor assigns any causes for the ordering of all things, but makes
+the causes to consist of air, ether, and water, and many other
+things equally absurd. And he appeared to me to be very like one
+who should say that whatever Socrates does he does by intelligence,
+and then, attempting to describe the causes of each particular
+action, should say, first of all, that for this reason I am now
+sitting here, because my body is composed of bones and sinews <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page144' id='page144'></a>and that the
+bones are hard, and have joints separate from each other, but that
+the sinews, being capable of tension and contraction, cover the
+bones, together with the flesh and skin which contain them. The
+bones, therefore, being suspended in their sockets, the nerves,
+relaxing and tightening, enable me to bend my limbs as I now do,
+and from this cause I sit here bent up. <a class="sectionnumber"
+id="phaedo_sec109" name="phaedo_sec109">109</a>. And if, again, he
+should assign other similar causes for my conversing with you,
+assigning as causes voice, and air, and hearing, and ten thousand
+other things of the kind, omitting to mention the real causes, that
+since it appeared better to the Athenians to condemn me, I
+therefore thought it better to sit here, and more just to remain
+and submit to the punishment which they have ordered; for, by the
+dog! I think these sinews and bones would have been long ago either
+in Megara or Boeotia, borne thither by an opinion of that which is
+best, if I had not thought it more just and honorable to submit to
+whatever sentence the city might order than to flee and run
+stealthily away. But to call such things causes is too absurd. But
+if any one should say that without possessing such things as bones
+and sinews, and whatever else I have, I could not do what I
+pleased, he would speak the truth; but to say that I do as I do
+through them, and that I act thus by intelligence, and not from the
+choice of what is best, would be a great and extreme disregard of
+reason. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec110" name=
+"phaedo_sec110">110</a>. For this would be not to be able to
+distinguish that the real cause is one thing, and that another,
+without which a cause could not be a cause; which, indeed, the
+generality of men appear to me to do, fumbling, as it were, in the
+dark, and making use of strange names, so as to denominate them as
+the very cause. Wherefore one encompassing the earth with a vortex
+from heaven makes the earth remain fixed; but another, as if it
+were a broad trough, rests it upon the <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page145' id='page145'></a>air as its base; but the power by which
+these things are now so disposed that they may be placed in the
+best manner possible, this they neither inquire into, nor do they
+think that it requires any superhuman strength; but they think they
+will some time or other find out an Atlas stronger and more
+immortal than this, and more capable of containing all things; and
+in reality, the good, and that which ought to hold them together
+and contain them, they take no account of at all. I, then, should
+most gladly have become the disciple of any one who would teach me
+of such a cause, in what way it is. But when I was disappointed of
+this, and was neither able to discover it myself, nor to learn it
+from another, do you wish, Cebes, that I should show you in what
+way I set out upon a second voyage in search of the cause?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec111" name=
+"phaedo_sec111">111</a>. "I wish it exceedingly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"It appeared to me, then," said he, "after this, when I was
+wearied with considering things that exist, that I ought to beware
+lest I should suffer in the same way as they do who look at and
+examine an eclipse of the sun, for some lose the sight of their
+eyes, unless they behold its image in water, or some similar
+medium. And I was affected with a similar feeling, and was afraid
+lest I should be utterly blinded in my soul through beholding
+things with the eyes, and endeavoring to grasp them by means of the
+several senses. It seemed to me, therefore, that I ought to have
+recourse to reasons, and to consider in them the truth of things.
+Perhaps, however, this similitude of mine may in some respect be
+incorrect; for I do not altogether admit that he who considers
+things in their reasons considers them in their images, more than
+he does who views them in their effects. However, I proceeded thus,
+and on each occasion laying down the reason, which I deem to be the
+strongest, whatever <a class='pagenumber' name='page146' id=
+'page146'></a>things appear to me to accord with this I regard as
+true, both with respect to the cause and every thing else; but such
+as do not accord I regard as not true. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec112" name="phaedo_sec112">112</a>. But I wish to explain
+my meaning to you in a clearer manner; for I think that you do not
+yet understand me."</p>
+
+<p>"No, by Jupiter!" said Cebes, "not well."</p>
+
+<p>"However," continued he, "I am now saying nothing new, but what
+I have always at other times, and in a former part of this
+discussion, never ceased to say. I proceed, then, to attempt to
+explain to you that species of cause which I have busied myself
+about, and return again to those well-known subjects, and set out
+from them, laying down as an hypothesis, that there is a certain
+abstract beauty, and goodness, and magnitude, and so of all other
+things; which if you grant me, and allow that they do exist, I hope
+that I shall be able from these to explain the cause to you, and to
+discover that the soul is immortal."</p>
+
+<p>"But," said Cebes, "since I grant you this, you may draw your
+conclusion at once."</p>
+
+<p>"But consider," he said, "what follows from thence, and see if
+you can agree with me. For it appears to me that if there is any
+thing else beautiful besides beauty itself, it is not beautiful for
+any other reason than because it partakes of that abstract beauty;
+and I say the same of every thing. Do you admit such a cause?"</p>
+
+<p>"I do admit it," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec113" name=
+"phaedo_sec113">113</a>. "I do not yet understand," he continued,
+"nor am I able to conceive, those other wise causes; but if any one
+should tell me why any thing is beautiful, either because it has a
+blooming florid color, or figure, or any thing else of the kind, I
+dismiss all other reasons, for I am confounded by them all; but I
+simply, wholly, and perhaps foolishly, confine myself to this, that
+nothing else causes it to be beautiful <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page147' id='page147'></a>except either the presence or
+communication of that abstract beauty, by whatever means and in
+whatever way communicated; for I can not yet affirm this with
+certainty, but only that by means of beauty all beautiful things
+become beautiful. For this appears to me the safest answer to give
+both to myself and others; and adhering to this, I think that I
+shall never fall, but that it is a safe answer both for me and any
+one else to give&mdash;that by means of beauty beautiful things
+become beautiful. Does it not also seem so to you?"</p>
+
+<p>"It does."</p>
+
+<p>"And that by magnitude great things become great, and greater
+things, greater; and by littleness less things become less?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec114" name=
+"phaedo_sec114">114</a>. "You would not, then, approve of it, if
+any one said that one person is greater than another by the head,
+and that the less is less by the very same thing; but you would
+maintain that you mean nothing else than that every thing that is
+greater than another is greater by nothing else than magnitude, and
+that it is greater on this account&mdash;that is, on account of
+magnitude; and that the less is less by nothing else than
+littleness, and on this account less&mdash;that is, on account of
+littleness; being afraid, I think, lest some opposite argument
+should meet you if you should say that any one is greater and less
+by the head; as, first, that the greater is greater, and the less
+less, by the very same thing; and, next, that the greater is
+greater by the head, which is small; and that it is monstrous to
+suppose that any one is great through something small. Should you
+not be afraid of this?"</p>
+
+<p>To which said Cebes, smilingly, "Indeed, I should."</p>
+
+<p>"Should you not, then," he continued, "be afraid to say that ten
+is more than eight by two, and for this cause exceeds <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page148' id='page148'></a>it, and not by number,
+and on account of number? and that two cubits are greater than one
+cubit by half, and not by magnitude (for the fear is surely the
+same)?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec115" name=
+"phaedo_sec115">115</a>. "What, then? When one has been added to
+one, would you not beware of saying that the addition is the cause
+of its being two, or division when it has been divided; and would
+you not loudly assert that you know no other way in which each
+thing subsists, than by partaking of the peculiar essence of each
+of which it partakes, and that in these cases you can assign no
+other cause of its becoming two than its partaking of duality; and
+that such things as are to become two must needs partake of this,
+and what is to become one, of unity; but these divisions and
+additions, and other such subtleties, you would dismiss, leaving
+them to be given as answers by persons wiser than yourself; whereas
+you, fearing, as it is said, your own shadow and inexperience,
+would adhere to this safe hypothesis, and answer accordingly? But
+if any one should assail this hypothesis of yours, would you not
+dismiss him, and refrain from answering him till you had considered
+the consequences resulting from it, whether in your opinion they
+agree with or differ from each other? But when it should be
+necessary for you to give a reason for it, would you give one in a
+similar way, by again laying down another hypothesis, which should
+appear the best of higher principles, until you arrived at
+something satisfactory; but, at the same time, you would avoid
+making confusion, as disputants do, in treating of the first
+principle and the results arising from it, if you really desire to
+arrive at the truth of things? <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec116" name="phaedo_sec116">116</a>. For they, perhaps,
+make no account at all of this, nor pay any attention to it; for
+they are able, through their wisdom, to mingle all things together,
+and at the same time please themselves. But you, <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page149' id='page149'></a>if you are a
+philosopher, would act, I think, as I now describe."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak most truly," said Simmias and Cebes together.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Echec.</span> By Jupiter! Ph&aelig;do,
+they said so with good reason; for he appears to me to have
+explained these things with wonderful clearness, even to one endued
+with a small degree of intelligence.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> Certainly,
+Echecrates, and so it appeared to all who were present.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Echec.</span> And so it appears to me,
+who was absent, and now hear it related. But what was said after
+this?</p>
+
+<p>As well as I remember, when these things had been granted him,
+and it was allowed that each several idea exists of itself,<a id=
+"footnotetag37" name="footnotetag37" href=
+"#footnote37"><sup>37</sup></a> and that other things partaking of
+them receive their denomination from them, he next asked: "If,
+then," he said, "you admit that things are so, whether, when you
+say that Simmias is greater than Socrates, but less than
+Ph&aelig;do, do you not then say that magnitude and littleness are
+both in Simmias?"</p>
+
+<p>"I do."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec117" name=
+"phaedo_sec117">117</a>. "And yet," he said, "you must confess that
+Simmias's exceeding Socrates is not actually true in the manner in
+which the words express it; for Simmias does not naturally exceed
+Socrates in that he is Simmias, but in consequence of the magnitude
+which he happens to have; nor, again, does he exceed Socrates
+because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates possesses
+littleness in comparison with his magnitude?"</p>
+
+<p>"True."</p>
+
+<p>"Nor, again, is Simmias exceeded by Ph&aelig;do, because <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page150' id='page150'></a>Ph&aelig;do is
+Ph&aelig;do, but because Ph&aelig;do possesses magnitude in
+comparison with Simmias's littleness?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is so."</p>
+
+<p>"Thus, then, Simmias has the appellation of being both little
+and great, being between both, by exceeding the littleness of one
+through his own magnitude, and to the other yielding a magnitude
+that exceeds his own littleness." And at the same time, smiling, he
+said, "I seem to speak with the precision of a short-hand writer;
+however, it is as I say."</p>
+
+<p>He allowed it.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec118" name=
+"phaedo_sec118">118</a>. "But I say it for this reason, wishing you
+to be of the same opinion as myself. For it appears to me, not only
+that magnitude itself is never disposed to be at the same time
+great and little, but that magnitude in us never admits the little
+nor is disposed to be exceeded, but one of two things, either to
+flee and withdraw when its contrary, the little, approaches it, or,
+when it has actually come, to perish; but that it is not disposed,
+by sustaining and receiving littleness, to be different from what
+it was. Just as I, having received and sustained littleness, and
+still continuing the person that I am, am this same little person;
+but that, while it is great, never endures to be little. And, in
+like manner, the little that is in us is not disposed at any time
+to become or to be great, nor is any thing else among contraries,
+while it continues what it was, at the same time disposed to become
+and to be its contrary; but in this contingency it either departs
+or perishes."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec119" name=
+"phaedo_sec119">119</a>. "It appears so to me," said Cebes, "in
+every respect."</p>
+
+<p>But some one of those present, on hearing this, I do not clearly
+remember who he was, said, "By the gods! was not the very contrary
+of what is now asserted admitted in the former part of our
+discussion, that the greater is produced <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page151' id='page151'></a>from the less, and the less from
+the greater, and, in a word, that the very production of contraries
+is from contraries? But now it appears to me to be asserted that
+this can never be the case."</p>
+
+<p>Upon this Socrates, having leaned his head forward and listened,
+said, "You have reminded me in a manly way; you do not, however,
+perceive the difference between what is now and what was then
+asserted. For then it was said that a contrary thing is produced
+from a contrary; but now, that a contrary can never become contrary
+to itself&mdash;neither that which is in us, nor that which is in
+nature. For then, my friend, we spoke of things that have
+contraries, calling them by the appellation of those things; but
+now we are speaking of those very things from the presence of which
+things so called receive their appellation, and of these very
+things we say that they are never disposed to admit of production
+from each other." <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec120" name=
+"phaedo_sec120">120</a>. And, at the same time looking at Cebes,
+"Has anything that has been said, Cebes, disturbed you?"</p>
+
+<p>"Indeed," said Cebes, "I am not at all so disposed; however, I
+by no means say that there are not many things that disturb
+me."</p>
+
+<p>"Then," he continued, "we have quite agreed to this, that a
+contrary can never be contrary to itself."</p>
+
+<p>"Most certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"But, further," he said, "consider whether you will agree with
+me in this also. Do you call heat and cold any thing?"</p>
+
+<p>"I do."</p>
+
+<p>"The same as snow and fire?"</p>
+
+<p>"By Jupiter! I do not."</p>
+
+<p>"But heat is something different from fire, and cold something
+different from snow?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page152' id='page152'></a>Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"But this, I think, is apparent to you&mdash;that snow, while it
+is snow, can never, when it has admitted heat, as we said before,
+continue to be what it was, snow and hot; but, on the approach of
+heat, it must either withdraw or perish?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"And, again, that fire, when cold approaches it, must either
+depart or perish; but that it will never endure, when it has
+admitted coldness, to continue what it was, fire and cold?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec121" name=
+"phaedo_sec121">121</a>. "You speak truly," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"It happens, then," he continued, "with respect to some of such
+things, that not only is the idea itself always thought worthy of
+the same appellation, but likewise something else which is not,
+indeed, that idea itself, but constantly retains its form so long
+as it exists. What I mean will perhaps be clearer in the following
+examples: the odd in number must always possess the name by which
+we now call it, must it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Must it alone, of all things&mdash;for this I ask&mdash;or is
+there any thing else which is not the same as the odd, but yet
+which we must always call odd, together with its own name, because
+it is so constituted by nature that it can never be without the
+odd? But this, I say, is the case with the number three, and many
+others. For consider with respect to the number three: does it not
+appear to you that it must always be called by its own name, as
+well as by that of the odd, which is not the same as the number
+three? Yet such is the nature of the number three, five, and the
+entire half of number, that though they are not the same as the
+odd, yet each of them is always odd. And, again, two and four, and
+the whole other series of number, though not the same <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page153' id='page153'></a>as the even, are
+nevertheless each of them always even: do you admit this, or
+not?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec122" name=
+"phaedo_sec122">122</a>. "How should I not?" he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Observe then," said he, "what I wish to prove. It is
+this&mdash;that it appears not only that these contraries do not
+admit each other, but that even such things as are not contrary to
+each other, and yet always possess contraries, do not appear to
+admit that idea which is contrary to the idea that exists in
+themselves, but, when it approaches, perish or depart. Shall we not
+allow that the number three would first perish, and suffer any
+thing whatever, rather than endure, while it is still three, to
+become even?"</p>
+
+<p>"Most certainly," said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"And yet," said he, "the number two is not contrary to
+three."</p>
+
+<p>"Surely not."</p>
+
+<p>"Not only, then, do ideas that are contrary never allow the
+approach of each other, but some other things also do not allow the
+approach of contraries."</p>
+
+<p>"You say very truly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Do you wish, then," he said, "that, if we are able, we should
+define what these things are?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Would they not then, Cebes," he said, "be such things as,
+whatever they occupy, compel that thing not only to retain its own
+idea, but also that of something which is always a contrary?"</p>
+
+<p>"How do you mean?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec123" name=
+"phaedo_sec123">123</a>. "As we just now said. For you know,
+surely, that whatever things the idea of three occupies must of
+necessity not only be three, but also odd?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page154' id='page154'></a>To such a
+thing, then, we assert, that the idea contrary to that form which
+constitutes this can never come."</p>
+
+<p>"It can not."</p>
+
+<p>"But did the odd make it so?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"And is the contrary to this the idea of the even?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"The idea of the even, then, will never come to the three?"</p>
+
+<p>"No, surely."</p>
+
+<p>"Three, then, has no part in the even?"</p>
+
+<p>"None whatever."</p>
+
+<p>"The number three is uneven?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"What, therefore, I said should be defined&mdash;namely, what
+things they are which, though not contrary to some particular
+thing, yet do not admit of the contrary itself; as, in the present
+instance, the number three, though not contrary to the even, does
+not any the more admit it, for it always brings the contrary with
+it, just as the number two does to the odd, fire to cold, and many
+other particulars. Consider, then, whether you would thus define,
+not only that a contrary does not admit a contrary, but also that
+that which brings with it a contrary to that to which it approaches
+will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec124" name=
+"phaedo_sec124">124</a>. But call it to mind again, for it will not
+be useless to hear it often repeated. Five will not admit the idea
+of the even, nor ten, its double, that of the odd. This double,
+then, though it is itself contrary to something else,<a id=
+"footnotetag38" name="footnotetag38" href=
+"#footnote38"><sup>38</sup></a> yet will not admit the idea of the
+odd, nor will half as much again, nor other things of the kind,
+such as the <a class='pagenumber' name='page155' id=
+'page155'></a>half and the third part, admit the idea of the whole,
+if you follow me, and agree with me that it is so."</p>
+
+<p>"I entirely agree with you," he said, "and follow you."</p>
+
+<p>"Tell me again, then," he said, "from the beginning; and do not
+answer me in the terms in which I put the question, but in
+different ones, imitating my example. For I say this because,
+besides that safe mode of answering which I mentioned at first,<a
+id="footnotetag39" name="footnotetag39" href=
+"#footnote39"><sup>39</sup></a> from what has now been said, I see
+another no less safe one. For if you should ask me what that is
+which, if it be in the body, will cause it to be hot, I should not
+give you that safe but unlearned answer, that it is heat, but one
+more elegant, from what we have just now said, that it is fire;
+nor, if you should ask me what that is which, if it be in the body,
+will cause it to be diseased, should I say that it is disease, but
+fever; nor if you should ask what that is which, if it be in
+number, will cause it to be odd, should I say that it is
+unevenness, but unity; and so with other things. But consider
+whether you sufficiently understand what I mean."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec125" name=
+"phaedo_sec125">125</a>. "Perfectly so," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Answer me, then," he said, "what that is which, when it is in
+the body, the body will be alive?"</p>
+
+<p>"Soul," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Is not this, then, always the case?"</p>
+
+<p>"How should it not be?" said he.</p>
+
+<p>"Does the soul, then, always bring life to whatever it
+occupies?"</p>
+
+<p>"It does indeed," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Whether, then, is there any thing contrary to life or not?"</p>
+
+<p>"There is," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"What?"</p>
+
+<p>"Death."</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page156' id='page156'></a>The soul,
+then, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with
+it, as has been already allowed?"</p>
+
+<p>"Most assuredly," replied Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"What, then? How do we denominate that which does not admit the
+idea of the even?"</p>
+
+<p>"Uneven," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"And that which does not admit the just, nor the musical?"</p>
+
+<p>"Unmusical," he said, "and unjust."</p>
+
+<p>"Be it so. But what do we call that which does not admit
+death?"</p>
+
+<p>"Immortal," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore, does not the soul admit death?"</p>
+
+<p>"No."</p>
+
+<p>"Is the soul, then, immortal?"</p>
+
+<p>"Immortal."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec126" name=
+"phaedo_sec126">126</a>. "Be it so," he said. "Shall we say, then,
+that this has been now demonstrated? or how think you?"</p>
+
+<p>"Most completely, Socrates."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then," said he, "Cebes, if it were necessary for the
+uneven to be imperishable, would the number three be otherwise than
+imperishable?"</p>
+
+<p>"How should it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"If, therefore, it were also necessary that what is without heat
+should be imperishable, when any one should introduce heat to snow,
+would not the snow withdraw itself, safe and unmelted? For it would
+not perish; nor yet would it stay and admit the heat."</p>
+
+<p>"You say truly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"In like manner, I think, if that which is insusceptible of cold
+were imperishable, that when any thing cold approached the fire, it
+would neither be extinguished nor perish, but would depart quite
+safe."</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page157' id='page157'></a>Of
+necessity," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"Must we not, then, of necessity," he continued, "speak thus of
+that which is immortal? if that which is immortal is imperishable,
+it is impossible for the soul to perish, when death approaches it.
+For, from what has been said already, it will not admit death, nor
+will ever be dead; just as we said that three will never be even,
+nor, again, will the odd; nor will fire be cold, nor yet the heat
+that is in fire. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec127" name=
+"phaedo_sec127">127</a>. But some one may say, what hinders, though
+the odd can never become even by the approach of the even, as we
+have allowed, yet, when the odd is destroyed, that the even should
+succeed in its place? We could not contend with him who should make
+this objection that it is not destroyed, for the uneven is not
+imperishable; since, if this were granted us, we might easily have
+contended that, on the approach of the even, the odd and the three
+depart; and we might have contended in the same way with respect to
+fire, heat, and the rest, might we not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Wherefore, with respect to the immortal, if we have allowed
+that it is imperishable, the soul, in addition to its being
+immortal, must also be imperishable; if not, there will be need of
+other arguments."</p>
+
+<p>"But there is no need," he said, "so far as that is concerned;
+for scarcely could any thing not admit of corruption, if that which
+is immortal and eternal is liable to it."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec128" name=
+"phaedo_sec128">128</a>. "The deity, indeed, I think," said
+Socrates, "and the idea itself of life, and if anything else is
+immortal, must be allowed by all beings to be incapable of
+dissolution."</p>
+
+<p>"By Jupiter!" he replied, "by all men, indeed, and still more,
+as I think, by the gods."</p>
+
+<p>"Since, then, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page158' id='page158'></a>can the soul,
+since it is immortal, be any thing else than imperishable?"</p>
+
+<p>"It must, of necessity, be so."</p>
+
+<p>"When, therefore, death approaches a man, the mortal part of
+him, as it appears, dies, but the immortal part departs safe and
+uncorrupted, having withdrawn itself from death?"</p>
+
+<p>"It appears so."</p>
+
+<p>"The soul, therefore," he said, "Cebes, is most certainly
+immortal and imperishable, and our souls will really exist in
+Hades."</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore, Socrates," he said, "I have nothing further to say
+against this, nor any reason for doubting your arguments. But if
+Simmias here, or any one else, has any thing to say, it were well
+for him not to be silent; for I know not to what other opportunity
+beyond the present any one can defer it, who wishes either to speak
+or hear about these things."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec129" name=
+"phaedo_sec129">129</a>. "But, indeed," said Simmias, "neither have
+I any reason to doubt what has been urged; yet, from the magnitude
+of the subject discussed, and from my low opinion of human
+weakness, I am compelled still to retain a doubt within myself with
+respect to what has been said."</p>
+
+<p>"Not only so, Simmias," said Socrates, "but you say this well;
+and, moreover, the first hypotheses, even though they are credible
+to you, should nevertheless be examined more carefully; and if you
+should investigate them sufficiently, I think you will follow my
+reasoning as far as it is possible for man to do so; and if this
+very point becomes clear, you will inquire no further."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak truly," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"But it is right, my friends," he said, "that we should consider
+this&mdash;- that if the soul is immortal, it requires our <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page159' id='page159'></a>care not only
+for the present time, which we call life, but for all time; and the
+danger would now appear to be dreadful if one should neglect it. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec130" name=
+"phaedo_sec130">130</a>. For if death were a deliverance from every
+thing, it would be a great gain for the wicked, when they die, to
+be delivered at the same time from the body, and from their vices
+together with the soul; but now, since it appears to be immortal,
+it can have no other refuge from evils, nor safety, except by
+becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul goes to Hades
+possessing nothing else than its discipline and education, which
+are said to be of the greatest advantage or detriment to the dead,
+on the very beginning of his journey thither. For, thus, it is said
+that each person's demon who was assigned to him while living, when
+he dies conducts him to some place, where they that are assembled
+together must receive sentence, and then proceed to Hades with that
+guide who has been ordered to conduct them from hence thither. But
+there having received their deserts, and having remained the
+appointed time, another guide brings them back hither again, after
+many and long revolutions of time. The journey, then, is not such
+as the Telephus of &AElig;schylus describes it; for he says that a
+simple path leads to Hades; but it appears to me to be neither
+simple nor one, for there would be no need of guides, nor could any
+one ever miss the way, if there were but one. But now it appears to
+have many divisions and windings; and this I conjecture from our
+religious and funeral rites.<a id="footnotetag40" name=
+"footnotetag40" href="#footnote40"><sup>40</sup></a> <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec131" name="phaedo_sec131">131</a>.
+The well-ordered and wise soul, then, both follows, and is not
+ignorant of its present condition; but that which through passion
+clings <a class='pagenumber' name='page160' id='page160'></a>to the
+body, as I said before, having longingly fluttered about it for a
+long time, and about its visible place,<a id="footnotetag41" name=
+"footnotetag41" href="#footnote41"><sup>41</sup></a> after vehement
+resistance and great suffering, is forcibly and with great
+difficulty led away by its appointed demon. And when it arrives at
+the place where the others are, impure and having done any such
+thing as the committal of unrighteous murders or other similar
+actions, which are kindred to these, and are the deeds of kindred
+souls, every one shuns it and turns away from it, and will be
+neither its fellow-traveler nor guide; but it wanders about,
+oppressed with every kind of helplessness, until certain periods
+have elapsed; and when these are completed, it is carried, of
+necessity, to an abode suitable to it. But the soul which has
+passed through life with purity and moderation, having obtained the
+gods for its fellow-travelers and guides, settles each in the place
+suited to it. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec132" name=
+"phaedo_sec132">132</a>. There are, indeed, many and wonderful
+places in the earth, and it is itself neither of such a kind nor of
+such a magnitude as is supposed by those who are accustomed to
+speak of the earth, as I have been persuaded by a certain
+person."</p>
+
+<p>Whereupon Simmias said, "How mean you, Socrates? For I, too,
+have heard many things about the earth&mdash;not, however, those
+things which have obtained your belief. I would, therefore, gladly
+hear them."</p>
+
+<p>"Indeed, Simmias, the art of Glaucus<a id="footnotetag42" name=
+"footnotetag42" href="#footnote42"><sup>42</sup></a> does not seem
+to me to be required to relate what these things are. That they are
+true, however, appears to me more than the art of Glaucus can
+prove, and, besides, I should probably not be able to do it; and
+even if I did know how, what remains to me of life, Simmias, seems
+insufficient for the length of the <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page161' id='page161'></a>subject. However, the form of the earth,
+such as I am persuaded it is, and the different places in it,
+nothing hinders me from telling."</p>
+
+<p>"But that will be enough," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"I am persuaded, then," said he, "in the first place, that, if
+the earth is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a spherical
+form, it has no need of air, nor of any other similar force, to
+prevent it from falling; but that the similarity of the heavens to
+themselves on every side, and the equilibrium of the earth itself,
+are sufficient to support it; for a thing in a state of equilibrium
+when placed in the middle of something that presses it equally on
+all sides can not incline more or less on any side, but, being
+equally affected all around, remains unmoved. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec133" name="phaedo_sec133">133</a>. In
+the first place, then," he said, "I am persuaded of this."</p>
+
+<p>"And very properly so," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"Yet, further," said he, "that it is very large, and that we who
+inhabit some small portion of it, from the river Phasis to the
+pillars of Hercules, dwell about the sea, like ants or frogs about
+a marsh; and that many others elsewhere dwell in many similar
+places, for that there are everywhere about the earth many hollows
+of various forms and sizes into which there is a confluence of
+water, mist and air; but that the earth itself, being pure, is
+situated in the pure heavens, in which are the stars, and which
+most persons who are accustomed to speak about such things call
+ether; of which these things are the sediment, and are continually
+flowing into the hollow parts of the earth. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec134" name="phaedo_sec134">134</a>.
+That we are ignorant, then, that we are dwelling in its hollows,
+and imagine that we inhabit the upper parts of the earth, just as
+if any one dwelling in the bottom of the sea should think that he
+dwelt on the sea, and, beholding the sun and the other stars
+through the water, should imagine <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page162' id='page162'></a>that the sea was the heavens; but,
+through sloth and weakness, should never have reached the surface
+of the sea; nor, having emerged and risen up from the sea to this
+region, have seen how much more pure and more beautiful it is than
+the place where he is, nor has heard of it from any one else who
+has seen it. This, then, is the very condition in which we are;
+for, dwelling in some hollow of the earth, we think that we dwell
+on the surface of it, and call the air heaven, as if the stars
+moved through this, being heaven itself. But this is because, by
+reason of our weakness and sloth, we are unable to reach to the
+summit of the air. Since, if any one could arrive at its summit,
+or, becoming winged, could fly up thither, or, emerging from hence,
+he would see&mdash;just as with us, fishes, emerging from the sea,
+behold what is here, so any one would behold the things there; and
+if his nature were able to endure the contemplation, he would know
+that that is the true heaven, and the true light, and the true
+earth. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec135" name=
+"phaedo_sec135">135</a>. For this earth and these stones, and the
+whole region here, are decayed and corroded, as things in the sea
+by the saltness; for nothing of any value grows in the sea, nor, in
+a word, does it contain any thing perfect; but there are caverns
+and sand, and mud in abundance, and filth, in whatever parts of the
+sea there is earth, nor are they at all worthy to be compared with
+the beautiful things with us. But, on the other hand, those things
+in the upper regions of the earth would appear far more to excel
+the things with us. For, if we may tell a beautiful fable, it is
+well worth hearing, Simmias, what kind the things are on the earth
+beneath the heavens."</p>
+
+<p>"Indeed, Socrates," said Simmias, "we should be very glad to
+hear that fable."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec136" name=
+"phaedo_sec136">136</a>. "First of all, then, my friend," he
+continued, "this earth, if any one should survey it from above, is
+said to have <a class='pagenumber' name='page163' id=
+'page163'></a>the appearance of balls covered with twelve different
+pieces of leather, variegated and distinguished with colors, of
+which the colors found here, and which painters use, are, as it
+were, copies. But there the whole earth is composed of such, and
+far more brilliant and pure than these; for one part of it is
+purple, and of wonderful beauty, part of a golden color, and part
+of white, more white than chalk or snow, and, in like manner,
+composed of other colors, and those more in number and more
+beautiful than any we have ever beheld. And those very hollow parts
+of the earth, though filled with water and air, exhibit a certain
+species of color, shining among the variety of other colors, so
+that one continually variegated aspect presents itself to the view.
+In this earth, being such, all things that grow, grow in a manner
+proportioned to its nature&mdash;trees, flowers and fruits; and,
+again, in like manner, its mountains and stones possess, in the
+same proportion, smoothness and transparency, and more beautiful
+colors; of which the well-known stones here that are so highly
+prized are but fragments, such as sardine-stones, jaspers, and
+emeralds, and all of that kind. But there, there is nothing
+subsists that is not of this character, and even more beautiful
+than these. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec137" name=
+"phaedo_sec137">137</a>. But the reason of this is, because the
+stones there are pure, and not eaten up and decayed, like those
+here, by rottenness and saltness, which flow down hither together,
+and which produce deformity and disease in the stones and the
+earth, and in other things, even animals and plants. But that earth
+is adorned with all these, and, moreover, with gold and silver, and
+other things of the kind: for they are naturally conspicuous, being
+numerous and large, and in all parts of the earth; so that to
+behold it is a sight for the blessed. There are also many other
+animals and men upon it, some dwelling in mid-earth, others about
+the air, as we do about the sea, and others <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page164' id='page164'></a>in islands which the air flows
+round, and which are near the continent; and, in one word, what
+water and the sea are to us, for our necessities, the air is to
+them; and what air is to us, that ether is to them. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec138" name="phaedo_sec138">138</a>.
+But their seasons are of such a temperament that they are free from
+disease, and live for a much longer time than those here, and
+surpass us in sight, hearing, and smelling, and every thing of this
+kind, as much as air excels water, and ether air, in purity.
+Moreover, they have abodes and temples of the gods, in which gods
+really dwell, and voices and oracles, and sensible visions of the
+gods, and such-like intercourse with them; the sun, too, and moon,
+and stars, are seen by them such as they really are, and their
+felicity in other respects is correspondent with these things."</p>
+
+<p>"And, such, indeed, is the nature of the whole earth, and the
+parts about the earth; but there are many places all round it
+throughout its cavities, some deeper and more open than that in
+which we dwell; but others that are deeper have a less chasm than
+our region, and others are shallower in depth than it is here, and
+broader. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec139" name=
+"phaedo_sec139">139</a>. But all these are in many places
+perforated one into another under the earth, some with narrower and
+some with wider channels, and have passages through, by which a
+great quantity of water flows from one into another, as into
+basins, and there are immense bulks of ever-flowing rivers under
+the earth, both of hot and cold water, and a great quantity of
+fire, and mighty rivers of fire, and many of liquid mire, some
+purer, and some more miry, as in Sicily there are rivers of mud
+that flow before the lava, and the lava itself, and from these the
+several places are filled, according as the overflow from time to
+time happens to come to each of them. But all these move up and
+down, as it were, by a certain oscillation existing in the earth.
+And this oscillation proceeds from such <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page165' id='page165'></a>natural cause as this; one of the chasms
+of the earth is exceedingly large, and perforated through the
+entire earth, and is that which Homer<a id="footnotetag43" name=
+"footnotetag43" href="#footnote43"><sup>43</sup></a> speaks of,
+'very far off, where is the most profound abyss beneath the earth,'
+which elsewhere both he and many other poets have called Tartarus.
+For into this chasm all rivers flow together, and from it flow out
+again; but they severally derive their character from the earth
+through which they flow. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec140" name="phaedo_sec140">140</a>. And the reason why
+all streams flow out from thence, and flow into it, is because this
+liquid has neither bottom nor base. Therefore, it oscillates and
+fluctuates up and down, and the air and the wind around it do the
+same; for they accompany it both when it rushes to those parts of
+the earth, and when to these. And as in respiration the flowing
+breath is continually breathed out and drawn in, so there the wind
+oscillating with the liquid causes certain vehement and
+irresistible winds both as it enters and goes out. When, therefore,
+the water rushing in descends to the place which we call the lower
+region, it flows through the earth into the streams there, and
+fills them, just as men pump up water. But when again it leaves
+those regions and rushes hither, it again fills the rivers here;
+and these, when filled, flow through channels and through the
+earth, and, having severally reached the several places to which
+they are journeying, they make seas, lakes, rivers, and fountains.
+<a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec141" name=
+"phaedo_sec141">141</a>. Then, sinking again from thence beneath
+the earth, some of them having gone round longer and more numerous
+places, and others round fewer and shorter, they again discharge
+themselves into Tartarus&mdash;some much lower than they were drawn
+up, others only a little so; but all of them flow in again beneath
+the point at which they flowed out. And some issue out directly
+opposite the place <a class='pagenumber' name='page166' id=
+'page166'></a>by which they flow in, others on the same side. There
+are also some which, having gone round altogether in a circle,
+folding themselves once or several times round the earth, like
+serpents, when they have descended as low as possible, discharge
+themselves again; and it is possible for them to descend on either
+side as far as the middle, but not beyond; for in each direction
+there is an acclivity to the streams both ways."</p>
+
+<p>"Now, there are many other large and various streams; but among
+this great number there are four certain streams, of which the
+largest, and that which flows most outwardly round the earth, is
+called Ocean; but directly opposite this, and flowing in a contrary
+direction, is Acheron, which flows through other desert places,
+and, moreover, passing under the earth, reaches the Acherusian
+lake, where the souls of most who die arrive; and, having remained
+there for certain destined periods, some longer and some shorter,
+are again sent forth into the generations of animals. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec142" name="phaedo_sec142">142</a>. A
+third river issues midway between these, and, near its source,
+falls into a vast region, burning with abundance of fire, and forms
+a lake larger than our sea, boiling with water and mud. From hence
+it proceeds in a circle, turbulent and muddy, and, folding itself
+round it, reaches both other places and the extremity of the
+Acherusian lake, but does not mingle with its water; but, folding
+itself oftentimes beneath the earth, it discharges itself into the
+lower parts of Tartarus. And this is the river which they call
+Pyriphlegethon, whose burning streams emit dissevered fragments in
+whatever part of the earth they happen to be. Opposite to this,
+again, the fourth river first falls into a place dreadful and
+savage, as it is said, having its whole color like cyanus:<a id=
+"footnotetag44" name="footnotetag44" href=
+"#footnote44"><sup>44</sup></a> this they call Stygian, and the
+lake which the <a class='pagenumber' name='page167' id=
+'page167'></a>river forms by its discharge, Styx. This river,
+having fallen in here, and received awful power in the water,
+sinking beneath the earth, proceeds, folding itself round, in an
+opposite course to Pyriphlegethon, and meets it in the Acherusian
+lake from, a contrary direction. Neither does the water of this
+river mingle with any other; but it, too, having gone round in a
+circle, discharges itself into Tartarus, opposite to
+Pyriphlegethon. Its name, as the poets say, is Cocytus."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec143" name=
+"phaedo_sec143">143</a>. "These things being thus constituted, when
+the dead arrive at the place to which their demon leads them
+severally, first of all they are judged, as well those who have
+lived well and piously, as those who have not. And those who appear
+to have passed a middle kind of life, proceeding to Acheron, and
+embarking in the vessels they have, on these arrive at the lake,
+and there dwell; and when they are purified, and have suffered
+punishment for the iniquities they may have committed, they are set
+free, and each receives the reward of his good deeds, according to
+his deserts. But those who appear to be incurable, through the
+magnitude of their offenses, either from having committed many and
+great sacrileges, or many unjust and lawless murders, or other
+similar crimes, these a suitable destiny hurls into Tartarus,
+whence they never come forth. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec144" name="phaedo_sec144">144</a>. But those who appear
+to have been guilty of curable yet great offenses&mdash;such as
+those who, through anger, have committed any violence against
+father or mother, and have lived the remainder of their life in a
+state of penitence, or they who have become homicides in a similar
+manner&mdash;these must, of necessity, fall into Tartarus. But
+after they have fallen, and have been there for a year, the wave
+casts them forth, <a class='pagenumber' name='page168' id=
+'page168'></a>the homicides into Cocytus, but the parricides and
+matricides into Pyriphlegethon. But when, being borne along, they
+arrive at the Acherusian lake, there they cry out to and invoke,
+some those whom they slew, others those whom they injured, and,
+invoking them, they entreat and implore them to suffer them to go
+out into the lake, and to receive them, and if they persuade them,
+they go out, and are freed from their sufferings, but if not, they
+are borne back to Tartarus, and thence again to the rivers. And
+they do not cease from suffering this until they have persuaded
+those whom they have injured, for this sentence was imposed on them
+by the judges. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec145" name=
+"phaedo_sec145">145</a>. But those who are found to have lived an
+eminently holy life, these are they who, being freed and set at
+large from these regions in the earth as from a prison, arrive at
+the pure abode above, and dwell on the upper parts of the earth.
+And among these, they who have sufficiently purified themselves by
+philosophy shall live without bodies, throughout all future time,
+and shall arrive at habitations yet more beautiful than these which
+it is neither easy to describe, nor at present is there sufficient
+time for the purpose."</p>
+
+<p>"But, for the sake of these things which we have described, we
+should use every endeavor, Simmias, so as to acquire virtue and
+wisdom in this life, for the reward is noble, and the hope
+great."</p>
+
+<p>"To affirm positively, indeed, that these things are exactly as
+I have described them does not become a man of sense. That,
+however, either this, or something of the kind, takes place with
+respect to our souls and their habitations&mdash;since our soul is
+certainly immortal&mdash;this appears to me most fitting to be
+believed, and worthy the hazard for one who trusts in its reality;
+for the hazard is noble, and it is right to allure ourselves with
+such things, as with enchantments, <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page169' id='page169'></a>for which reason I have prolonged my
+story to such a length. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec146"
+name="phaedo_sec146">146</a>. On account of these things, then, a
+man ought to be confident about his soul who, during this life, has
+disregarded all the pleasures and ornaments of the body as foreign
+from his nature, and who, having thought that they do more harm
+than good, has zealously applied himself to the acquirement of
+knowledge, and who, having adorned his soul, not with a foreign,
+but its own proper ornament&mdash;temperance, justice, fortitude,
+freedom, and truth&mdash;thus waits for his passage to Hades, as
+one who is ready to depart whenever destiny shall summon him. You,
+then," he continued, "Simmias and Cebes, and the rest, will each of
+you depart at some future time, but now destiny summons me, as a
+tragic writer would say, and it is nearly time for me to betake
+myself to the bath, for it appears to me to be better to drink the
+poison after I have bathed myself, and not to trouble the women
+with washing my dead body."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec147" name=
+"phaedo_sec147">147</a>. When he had thus spoken, Crito said, "So
+be it, Socrates, but what commands have you to give to these or to
+me, either respecting your children, or any other matter, in
+attending to which we can most oblige you?"</p>
+
+<p>"What I always say, Crito," he replied, "nothing new that by
+taking care of yourselves you will oblige both me and mine, and
+yourselves, whatever you do, though you should not now promise it,
+and if you neglect yourselves, and will not live, as it were, in
+the footsteps of what has been now and formerly said, even though
+you should promise much at present, and that earnestly, you will do
+no good at all."</p>
+
+<p>"We will endeavor, then, so to do," he said. "But how shall we
+bury you?"</p>
+
+<p>"Just as you please," he said, "if only you can catch <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page170' id='page170'></a>me, and I do not
+escape from you." <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec148" name=
+"phaedo_sec148">148</a>. And, at the same time smiling gently, and
+looking round on us, he said, "I cannot persuade Crito, my friends,
+that I am that Socrates who is now conversing with you, and who
+methodizes each part of the discourse; but he thinks that I am he
+whom he will shortly behold dead, and asks how he should bury me.
+But that which I some time since argued at length, that when I have
+drunk the poison I shall no longer remain with you, but shall
+depart to some happy state of the blessed, this I seem to have
+urged to him in vain, though I meant at the same time to console
+both you and myself. Be ye, then, my sureties to Crito," he said,
+"in an obligation contrary to that which he made to the judges (for
+he undertook that I should remain); but do you be sureties that,
+when I die, I shall not remain, but shall depart, that Crito may
+more easily bear it; and, when he sees my body either burned or
+buried, may not be afflicted for me, as if I suffered from some
+dreadful thing; nor say at my interment that Socrates is laid out,
+or is carried out, or is buried. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec149" name="phaedo_sec149">149</a>. For be well assured,"
+he said, "most excellent Crito, that to speak improperly is not
+only culpable as to the thing itself, but likewise occasions some
+injury to our souls. You must have a good courage, then, and say
+that you bury my body, and bury it in such a manner as is pleasing
+to you, and as you think is most agreeable to our laws."</p>
+
+<p>When he had said thus, he rose, and went into a chamber to
+bathe, and Crito followed him, but he directed us to wait for him.
+We waited, therefore, conversing among ourselves about what had
+been said, and considering it again, and sometimes speaking about
+our calamity, how severe it would be to us, sincerely thinking
+that, like those who are deprived of a father, we should pass the
+rest of our life as orphans. When he had bathed, and his children
+were <a class='pagenumber' name='page171' id='page171'></a>brought
+to him (for he had two little sons and one grown up), and the women
+belonging to his family were come, having conversed with them in
+the presence of Crito, and given them such injunctions as he
+wished, he directed the women and children to go away, and then
+returned to us. And it was now near sunset; for he spent a
+considerable time within. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec150" name="phaedo_sec150">150</a>. But when he came from
+bathing he sat down, and did not speak much afterward; then the
+officer of the Eleven came in, and, standing near him, said,
+"Socrates, I shall not have to find that fault with you that I do
+with others, that they are angry with me, and curse me, when, by
+order of the archons, I bid them drink the poison. But you, on all
+other occasions during the time you have been here, I have found to
+be the most noble, meek, and excellent man of all that ever came
+into this place; and, therefore, I am now well convinced that you
+will not be angry with me (for you know who are to blame), but with
+them. Now, then (for you know what I came to announce to you),
+farewell, and endeavor to bear what is inevitable as easily as
+possible." And at the same time, bursting into tears, he turned
+away and withdrew.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec151" name=
+"phaedo_sec151">151</a>. And Socrates, looking after him, said,
+"And thou, too, farewell. We will do as you direct." At the same
+time turning to us, he said, "How courteous the man is! During the
+whole time I have been here he has visited me, and conversed with
+me sometimes, and proved the worthiest of men; and now how
+generously he weeps for me! But come, Crito, let us obey him, and
+let some one bring the poison, if it is ready pounded; but if not,
+let the man pound it."</p>
+
+<p>Then Crito said, "But I think, Socrates, that the sun is still
+on the mountains, and has not yet set. Besides, I know that others
+have drunk the poison very late, after it <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page172' id='page172'></a>had been announced to them, and
+have supped and drunk freely, and some even have enjoyed the
+objects of their love. Do not hasten, then, for there is yet
+time."</p>
+
+<p>Upon this Socrates replied, "These men whom you mention, Crito,
+do these things with good reason, for they think they shall gain by
+so doing; and I, too, with good reason, shall not do so; for I
+think I shall gain nothing by drinking a little later, except to
+become ridiculous to myself, in being so fond of life, and sparing
+of it, when none any longer remains. Go then," he said, "obey, and
+do not resist."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec152" name=
+"phaedo_sec152">152</a>. Crito, having heard this, nodded to the
+boy that stood near. And the boy, having gone out and staid for
+some time, came, bringing with him the man that was to administer
+the poison, who brought it ready pounded in a cup. And Socrates, on
+seeing the man, said, "Well, my good friend, as you are skilled in
+these matters, what must I do?"</p>
+
+<p>"Nothing else," he replied, "than, when you have drunk it, walk
+about until there is a heaviness in your legs; then lie down: thus
+it will do its purpose." And at the same time he held out the cup
+to Socrates. And he having received it very cheerfully, Echecrates
+neither trembling, nor changing at all in color or countenance,
+but, as he was wont, looking steadfastly at the man, said, "What
+say you of this potion, with respect to making a libation to any
+one, is it lawful or not?"</p>
+
+<p>"We only pound so much, Socrates," he said, "as we think
+sufficient to drink."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec153" name=
+"phaedo_sec153">153</a>. "I understand you," he said; "but it is
+certainly both lawful and right to pray to the gods, that my
+departure hence thither may be happy; which, therefore, I pray, and
+so may it be." And as he said this, he drank it off readily and
+calmly. Thus far, most of us were with difficulty able <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page173' id='page173'></a>to restrain ourselves
+from weeping; but when we saw him drinking, and having finished the
+draught, we could do so no longer; but, in spite of myself, the
+tears came in full torrent, so that, covering my face, I wept for
+myself; for I did not weep for him, but for my own fortune, in
+being deprived of such a friend. But Crito, even before me, when he
+could not restrain his tears, had risen up. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec154" name="phaedo_sec154">154</a>.
+But Apollodorus, even before this, had not ceased weeping; and
+then, bursting into an agony of grief, weeping and lamenting, he
+pierced the heart of every one present, except Socrates himself.
+But he said, "What are you doing, my admirable friends? I, indeed,
+for this reason chiefly, sent away the women, that they might not
+commit any folly of this kind. For I have heard that it is right to
+die with good omens. Be quiet, therefore, and bear up."</p>
+
+<p>When we heard this, we were ashamed, and restrained our tears.
+But he, having walked about, when he said that his legs were
+growing heavy, lay down on his back; for the man had so directed
+him. And, at the same time, he who gave the poison taking hold of
+him, after a short interval, examined his feet and legs; and then,
+having pressed his foot hard, he asked if he felt it: he said that
+he did not. And after this he pressed his thighs; and, thus going
+higher, he showed us that he was growing cold and stiff. Then
+Socrates touched himself, and said that when the poison reached his
+heart he should then depart. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec155" name="phaedo_sec155">155</a>. But now the parts
+around the lower belly were almost cold; when, uncovering himself,
+for he had been covered over, he said (and they were his last
+words), "Crito, we owe a cock to &AElig;sculapius; pay it,
+therefore; and do not neglect it."</p>
+
+<p>"It shall be done," said Crito; "but consider whether you have
+any thing else to say."</p>
+
+<p>To this question he gave no reply; but, shortly after, he <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page174' id='page174'></a>gave a
+convulsive movement, and the man covered him, and his eyes were
+fixed; and Crito, perceiving it, closed his mouth and eyes.</p>
+
+<p>This, Echecrates, was the end of our friend,&mdash;a man, as we
+may say, the best of all of his time that we have known, and,
+moreover, the most wise and just.</p>
+
+<h3>Footnotes</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote25" name="footnote25" href=
+"#footnotetag25">25</a>: Phlius, to which Echecrates belonged, was
+a town of Sicyonia, in Peloponnesus.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote26" name="footnote26" href=
+"#footnotetag26">26</a>: A Pythagorean of Crotona.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote27" name="footnote27" href=
+"#footnotetag27">27</a>: Namely, "that it is better to die than to
+live."</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote28" name="footnote28" href=
+"#footnotetag28">28</a>: <span class=
+"greek">&#7993;&tau;&tau;&omega;</span>, Boetian for <span class=
+"greek">&#7985;&omicron;&tau;&omega;</span>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote29" name="footnote29" href=
+"#footnotetag29">29</a>: Of Pythagoras.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote30" name="footnote30" href=
+"#footnotetag30">30</a>: Some boyish spirit.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote31" name="footnote31" href=
+"#footnotetag31">31</a>: That is, at a time of life when the body
+is in full vigor.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote32" name="footnote32" href=
+"#footnotetag32">32</a>: In the original there is a play on the
+words <span class="greek">&#7945;&iota;&delta;&eta;&sigmaf;</span>
+and <span class=
+"greek">&#7937;&epsilon;&#7985;&delta;&eta;&sigmaf;</span>, which I
+can only attempt to retain by departing from the usual rendering of
+the former word.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote33" name="footnote33" href=
+"#footnotetag33">33</a>: By this I understand him to mean that the
+soul alone can perceive the truth, but the senses, as they are
+different, receive and convey different impressions of the same
+thing; thus, the eye receives one impression of an object, the ear
+a totally different one.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote34" name="footnote34" href=
+"#footnotetag34">34</a>: <span class="greek">&kappa;&alpha;&iota;
+&alpha;&#8017;&theta;&iota;&sigmaf;
+&epsilon;&tau;&epsilon;&rho;&omicron;&sigmaf; &kappa;&alpha;&iota;
+&epsilon;&tau;&epsilon;&rho;&omicron;&sigmaf;</span>, that is,
+"with one argument after another" Though Cousin translates it <span
+class="french">et successivement tout different de luimeme</span>
+and Ast, <span class="latin">et rursus alia atque alia</span>,
+which may be taken in either sense, yet it appears to me to mean
+that, when a man repeatedly discovers the fallacy of arguments
+which he before believed to be true, he distrusts reasoning
+altogether, just as one who meets with friend after friend who
+proves unfaithful becomes a misanthrope.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote35" name="footnote35" href=
+"#footnotetag35">35</a>: Lib. xx, v. 7.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote36" name="footnote36" href=
+"#footnotetag36">36</a>: Harmony was the wife of Cadmus, the
+founder of Thebes; Socrates, therefore, compares his two Theban
+friends, Simmias and Cebes, with them, and says that, having
+overcome Simmias, the advocate of Harmony, he must now deal with
+Cebes, who is represented by Cadmus.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote37" name="footnote37" href=
+"#footnotetag37">37</a>: <span class=
+"greek">&epsilon;&#7985;&nu;&alpha;&iota; &tau;&iota;</span>,
+literally, "is something."</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote38" name="footnote38" href=
+"#footnotetag38">38</a>: That is, to single.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote39" name="footnote39" href=
+"#footnotetag39">39</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec113">113</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote40" name="footnote40" href=
+"#footnotetag40">40</a>: It is difficult to express the distinction
+between <span class="greek">&omicron;&sigma;&iota;&alpha;</span>
+and <span class="greek">&nu;&omicron;&mu;&iota;&mu;&alpha;</span>.
+The former word seems to have reference to the souls of the dead;
+the latter, to their bodies.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote41" name="footnote41" href=
+"#footnotetag41">41</a>: Its place of interment.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote42" name="footnote42" href=
+"#footnotetag42">42</a>: A proverb meaning "a matter of great
+difficulty."</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote43" name="footnote43" href=
+"#footnotetag43">43</a>: "Iliad," lib. viii., v. 14.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote44" name="footnote44" href=
+"#footnotetag44">44</a>: A metallic substance of a deep-blue color,
+frequently mentioned by the earliest Grecian writers, but of which
+the nature is unknown.</div>
+</div>
+
+<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13726 ***</div>
+</body>
+</html>
+
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+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for
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+Project Gutenberg's Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates
+
+Author: Plato
+
+Release Date: October 12, 2004 [EBook #13726]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK APOLOGY, CRITO, AND PHAEDO ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Jussi Kukkonen and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+PLATO'S
+
+APOLOGY, CRITO AND PHÆDO
+OF
+SOCRATES.
+
+
+
+
+Literally Translated By
+
+HENRY CARY, M.A.,
+_Worcester College, Oxford_
+
+
+
+
+With An Introduction By
+
+EDWARD BROOKS, JR.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO
+
+CRITO; OR, THE DUTY OF A CITIZEN
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE PHÆDO
+
+PHÆDO; OR, THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+
+Of all writers of speculative philosophy, both ancient and modern, there
+is probably no one who has attained so eminent a position as Plato. What
+Homer was to Epic poetry, what Cicero and Demosthenes were to oratory,
+and what Shakespeare was to the drama of England, Plato was to ancient
+philosophy, not unapproachable nor unapproached, but possessing an
+inexplicable but unquestioned supremacy.
+
+The authentic records of his life are meagre, and much that has been
+written concerning him is of a speculative nature. He was born at Athens
+in the year 427 B.C. His father's name was Ariston, and his mother's
+family, which claimed its descent from Solon, included among its members
+many Athenian notables, among whom was Oritias, one of the thirty
+tyrants.
+
+In his early youth Plato applied himself to poetry and painting, both of
+which pursuits he relinquished to become the disciple and follower of
+Socrates. It is said that his name was originally Aristocles, but that
+it was changed to Plato on account of the breadth of his shoulders and
+forehead. He is also said to have been an expert wrestler and to have
+taken part in several important battles.
+
+He was the devoted friend and pupil of Socrates, and during the
+imprisonment of his master he attended him constantly, and committed to
+writing his last discourses on the immortality of the soul.
+
+After the death of Socrates it is supposed that Plato took refuge with
+Euclides in Megara, and subsequently extended his travels into Magna
+Graecia and Egypt.
+
+Upon his return to Athens he taught those who came to him for
+instruction in the grove named Academus, near the Cephisus, and thus
+founded the first great philosophical school, over which he continued to
+preside until the day of his death. Above the entrance to this grove was
+inscribed the legend: "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here." Here
+he was attended by persons of every description, among the more
+illustrious of whom were Aristotle, Lycurgus, Demosthenes and Isocrates.
+
+There is a story to the effect that Plato three times visited Sicily,
+once upon the invitation of the elder Dionysius, and twice at the
+earnest solicitations of the younger. The former he is said to have so
+seriously offended as to cause the tyrant to have him seized on his
+return home and sold as a slave, from which state of bondage he was,
+however, released by Anicerius of Cyrene.
+
+The people of his time thought more of him than they did of all their
+other philosophers, and called him the Divine Plato. So great was the
+regard and veneration for him that it was considered better to err with
+Plato than be right with any one else.
+
+The writings of Plato are numerous, and most of them are in the form of
+dialogues. The following pages contain translations of three of his
+works, viz.: "The Apologia," "The Crito" and "The Phædo," all of which
+have reference to the trial, imprisonment and death of Socrates.
+
+"The Apologia" represents Socrates on trial for his life, undertaking
+his own defence, though unaccustomed to the language of the courts, the
+occasion being, as he says, the first time he has ever been before a
+court of justice, though seventy years of age. Plato was present at the
+trial, and no doubt gives us the very arguments used by the accused. Two
+charges were brought against Socrates--one that he did not believe in
+the gods recognized by the State, the other that he had corrupted the
+Athenian youth by his teachings. Socrates does not have recourse to the
+ordinary methods adopted by orators on similar occasions. He prefers to
+stand upon his own integrity and innocence, uninfluenced by the fear of
+that imaginary evil, death. He, therefore, does not firmly grapple with
+either of the charges preferred against him. He neither denies nor
+confesses the first accusation, but shows that in several instances he
+conformed to the religious customs of his country, and that he believes
+in God more than he fears man. The second charge he meets by a
+cross-examination of his accuser, Melitus, whom he reduces to the
+dilemma of charging him with corrupting the youth designedly, which
+would be absurd, or with doing so undesignedly, for which he could not
+be liable to punishment.
+
+His defence, however, avails him nothing, and he is condemned by the
+judges to die by drinking the poisonous hemlock. In the closing part of
+"The Apologia" Socrates is represented as commenting upon the sentence
+which has been passed upon him, and as expressing his belief that in
+going to his death he is only passing to a better and a happier life.
+
+In "The Crito" Socrates is represented in conversation with a friend of
+his named Crito, who had been present at his trial, and who had offered
+to assist Socrates in paying a fine, had a fine been the sentence
+imposed. Crito visits Socrates in his confinement to bring to him the
+intelligence that the ship, the arrival of which was to be the signal
+for his death upon the following day, would arrive forthwith, and to
+urge him to adopt the means of escape which had already been prepared.
+Socrates promises to follow the advice of Crito if, upon a full
+discussion of the matter, it seems right to do so. In the conversation
+which ensues Socrates argues that it is wrong to return evil for evil
+and that the obligations which a citizen owes to his State are more
+binding than those which a child owes his parents or a slave his master,
+and, therefore, it is his duty to submit to the laws of Athens at
+whatever cost to himself. Crito has no answer to make to this argument,
+and Socrates thereupon decides to submit to his fate.
+
+Plato is said to have had two objects in writing this dialogue: First,
+to acquit Socrates of the charge of corrupting the Athenian youth; and,
+second, to establish the fact that it is necessary under all
+circumstances to submit to the established laws of his country.
+
+"The Phædo" relates the manner in which Socrates spent the last day of
+his life and the circumstances attending his death. He is visited by a
+number of his friends, among whom are Phædo, Simmias and Crito. When his
+friends arrive they find him sitting upon a bed rubbing his legs, which
+have just been released from bonds. He remarks upon the unaccountable
+connection between pleasure and pain, and from this the conversation
+gradually turns to a consideration of the question of the immortality of
+the soul. He convinces his listeners of the pre-existence of the soul;
+but they are still skeptical as to its immortality, urging that its
+pre-existence and the fact that it is more durable than the body does
+not preclude the possibility of its being mortal. Socrates, however,
+argues that contraries cannot exist in the same thing at the same time,
+as, for example, the same object cannot partake of both magnitude and
+littleness at the same time. In like manner, heat while it is heat can
+never admit the idea of cold. Life and death are contraries and can
+never coexist; but wherever there is life there is soul, so that the
+soul contains that which is contrary to death and can never admit death;
+consequently the soul is immortal.
+
+Having convinced his listeners, Socrates bathes and takes leave of his
+children and the women of his family. Thereupon the officer appears and
+tells him it is time for him to drink the poison. At this his friends
+commence to weep and are rebuked by Socrates for their weakness. He
+drinks the poison calmly and without hesitation, and then begins to walk
+about, still conversing with his friends. His limbs soon grow stiff and
+heavy and he lays himself down upon his back. His last words are:
+"Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not
+neglect it."
+
+
+
+
+THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.
+
+
+I know not, O Athenians! how far you have been influenced by my accusers
+for my part, in listening to them I almost forgot myself, so plausible
+were their arguments however, so to speak, they have said nothing true.
+But of the many falsehoods which they uttered I wondered at one of them
+especially, that in which they said that you ought to be on your guard
+lest you should be deceived by me, as being eloquent in speech. For that
+they are not ashamed of being forthwith convicted by me in fact, when I
+shall show that I am not by any means eloquent, this seemed to me the
+most shameless thing in them, unless indeed they call him eloquent who
+speaks the truth. For, if they mean this, then I would allow that I am
+an orator, but not after their fashion for they, as I affirm, have said
+nothing true, but from me you shall hear the whole truth. Not indeed,
+Athenians, arguments highly wrought, as theirs were, with choice phrases
+and expressions, nor adorned, but you shall hear a speech uttered
+without premeditation in such words as first present themselves. For I
+am confident that what I say will be just, and let none of you expect
+otherwise, for surely it would not become my time of life to come before
+you like a youth with a got up speech. Above all things, therefore, I
+beg and implore this of you, O Athenians! if you hear me defending
+myself in the same language as that in which I am accustomed to speak
+both in the forum at the counters, where many of you have heard me, and
+elsewhere, not to be surprised or disturbed on this account. For the
+case is this: I now for the first time come before a court of justice,
+though more than seventy years old; I am therefore utterly a stranger to
+the language here. As, then, if I were really a stranger, you would have
+pardoned me if I spoke in the language and the manner in which I had
+been educated, so now I ask this of you as an act of justice, as it
+appears to me, to disregard the manner of my speech, for perhaps it may
+be somewhat worse, and perhaps better, and to consider this only, and to
+give your attention to this, whether I speak what is just or not; for
+this is the virtue of a judge, but of an orator to speak the truth.
+
+2. First, then, O Athenians! I am right in defending myself against the
+first false accusations alleged against me, and my first accusers, and
+then against the latest accusations, and the latest accusers. For many
+have been accusers of me to you, and for many years, who have asserted
+nothing true, of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his party,
+although they too are formidable; but those are still more formidable,
+Athenians, who, laying hold of many of you from childhood, have
+persuaded you, and accused me of what is not true: "that there is one
+Socrates, a wise man, who occupies himself about celestial matters, and
+has explored every thing under the earth, and makes the worse appear the
+better reason." Those, O Athenians! who have spread abroad this report
+are my formidable accusers; for they who hear them think that such as
+search into these things do not believe that there are gods. In the next
+place, these accusers are numerous, and have accused me now for a long
+time; moreover, they said these things to you at that time of life in
+which you were most credulous, when you were boys and some of you
+youths, and they accused me altogether in my absence, when there was no
+one to defend me. But the most unreasonable thing of all is, that it is
+not possible to learn and mention their names, except that one of them
+happens to be a comic poet.[1] Such, however, as, influenced by envy and
+calumny, have persuaded you, and those who, being themselves persuaded,
+have persuaded others, all these are most difficult to deal with; for it
+is not possible to bring any of them forward here, nor to confute any;
+but it is altogether necessary to fight, as it were with a shadow, in
+making my defense, and to convict when there is no one to answer.
+Consider, therefore, as I have said, that my accusers are twofold, some
+who have lately accused me, and others long since, whom I have made
+mention of; and believe that I ought to defend myself against these
+first; for you heard them accusing me first, and much more than these
+last.
+
+Well. I must make my defense, then, O Athenians! and endeavor in this so
+short a space of time to remove from your minds the calumny which you
+have long entertained. I wish, indeed, it might be so, if it were at all
+better both for you and me, and that in making my defense I could effect
+something more advantageous still: I think, however, that it will be
+difficult, and I am not entirely ignorant what the difficulty is.
+Nevertheless, let this turn out as may be pleasing to God, I must obey
+the law and make my defense.
+
+3. Let us, then, repeat from the beginning what the accusation is from
+which the calumny against me has arisen, and relying on which Melitus
+has preferred this indictment against me. Well. What, then, do they who
+charge me say in their charge? For it is necessary to read their
+deposition as of public accusers. "Socrates acts wickedly, and is
+criminally curious in searching into things under the earth, and in the
+heavens, and in making the worse appear the better cause, and in
+teaching these same things to others." Such is the accusation: for such
+things you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes, one
+Socrates there carried about, saying that he walks in the air, and
+acting many other buffooneries, of which I understand nothing whatever.
+Nor do I say this as disparaging such a science, if there be any one
+skilled in such things, only let me not be prosecuted by Melitus on a
+charge of this kind; but I say it, O Athenians! because I have nothing
+to do with such matters. And I call upon most of you as witnesses of
+this, and require you to inform and tell each other, as many of you as
+have ever heard me conversing; and there are many such among you.
+Therefore tell each other, if any one of you has ever heard me
+conversing little or much on such subjects. And from this you will know
+that other things also, which the multitude assert of me, are of a
+similar nature.
+
+4. However not one of these things is true; nor, if you have heard from
+any one that I attempt to teach men, and require payment, is this true.
+Though this, indeed, appears to me to be an honorable thing, if one
+should be able to instruct men, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the
+Cean, and Hippias the Elean. For each of these, O Athenians! is able, by
+going through the several cities, to persuade the young men, who can
+attach themselves gratuitously to such of their own fellow-citizens as
+they please, to abandon their fellow-citizens and associate with them,
+giving them money and thanks besides. There is also another wise man
+here, a Parian, who, I hear, is staying in the city. For I happened to
+visit a person who spends more money on the sophists than all others
+together: I mean Callias, son of Hipponicus. I therefore asked him, for
+he has two sons, "Callias," I said, "if your two sons were colts or
+calves, we should have had to choose a master for them, and hire a
+person who would make them excel in such qualities as belong to their
+nature; and he would have been a groom or an agricultural laborer. But
+now, since your sons are men, what master do you intend to choose for
+them? Who is there skilled in the qualities that become a man and a
+citizen? For I suppose you must have considered this, since you have
+sons. Is there any one," I said, "or not?" "Certainly," he answered.
+"Who is he?" said I, "and whence does he come? and on what terms does he
+teach?" He replied, "Evenus the Parian, Socrates, for five minae." And I
+deemed Evenus happy, if he really possesses this art, and teaches
+admirably. And I too should think highly of myself, and be very proud,
+if I possessed this knowledge, but I possess it not, O Athenians.
+
+5. Perhaps, one of you may now object: "But, Socrates, what have you
+done, then? Whence have these calumnies against you arisen? For surely
+if you had not busied yourself more than others, such a report and story
+would never have got abroad, unless you had done something different
+from what most men do. Tell us, therefore, what it is, that we may not
+pass a hasty judgment on you." He who speaks thus appears to me to speak
+justly, and I will endeavor to show you what it is that has occasioned
+me this character and imputation. Listen, then: to some of you perhaps I
+shall appear to jest, yet be assured that I shall tell you the whole
+truth. For I, O Athenians! have acquired this character through nothing
+else than a certain wisdom. Of what kind, then, is this wisdom? Perhaps
+it is merely human wisdom. For in this, in truth, I appear to be wise.
+They probably, whom I have just now mentioned, possessed a wisdom more
+than human, otherwise I know not what to say about it; for I am not
+acquainted with it, and whosoever says I am, speaks falsely, and for the
+purpose of calumniating me. But, O Athenians! do not cry out against me,
+even though I should seem to you to speak somewhat arrogantly. For the
+account which I am going to give you is not my own; but I shall refer to
+an authority whom you will deem worthy of credit. For I shall adduce to
+you the god at Delphi as a witness of my wisdom, if I have any, and of
+what it is. You doubtless know Chærepho: he was my associate from youth,
+and the associate of most of you; he accompanied you in your late exile,
+and returned with you. You know, then, what kind of a man Chærepho was,
+how earnest in whatever he undertook. Having once gone to Delphi, he
+ventured to make the following inquiry of the oracle (and, as I said, O
+Athenians! do not cry out), for he asked if there was any one wiser than
+I. The Pythian thereupon answered that there was not one wiser; and of
+this, his brother here will give you proofs, since he himself is dead.
+
+6. Consider, then, why I mention these things: it is because I am going
+to show you whence the calumny against me arose. For when I heard this,
+I reasoned thus with myself, What does the god mean? What enigma is
+this? For I am not conscious to myself that I am wise, either much or
+little. What, then, does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For
+assuredly he does not speak falsely: that he could not do. And for a
+long time I was in doubt what he meant; afterward, with considerable
+difficulty, I had recourse to the following method of searching out his
+meaning. I went to one of those who have the character of being wise,
+thinking that there, if anywhere, I should confute the oracle, and show
+in answer to the response that This man is wiser than I, though you
+affirmed that I was the wisest. Having, then, examined this man (for
+there is no occasion to mention his name; he was, however, one of our
+great politicians, in examining whom I felt as I proceed to describe, O
+Athenians!), having fallen into conversation with him, this man appeared
+to be wise in the opinion of most other men, and especially in his own
+opinion, though in fact he was not so. I thereupon endeavored to show
+him that he fancied himself to be wise, but really was not. Hence I
+became odious, both to him and to many others who were present. When I
+left him, I reasoned thus with myself: I am wiser than this man, for
+neither of us appears to know anything great and good; but he fancies he
+knows something, although he knows nothing; whereas I, as I do not know
+anything, so I do not fancy I do. In this trifling particular, then, I
+appear to be wiser than he, because I do not fancy I know what I do not
+know. After that I went to another who was thought to be wiser than the
+former, and formed the very same opinion. Hence I became odious to him
+and to many others.
+
+7. After this I went to others in turn, perceiving indeed, and grieving
+and alarmed, that I was making myself odious; however, it appeared
+necessary to regard the oracle of the god as of the greatest moment, and
+that, in order to discover its meaning, I must go to all who had the
+reputation of possessing any knowledge. And by the dog, O Athenians! for
+I must tell you the truth, I came to some such conclusion as this: those
+who bore the highest reputation appeared to me to be most deficient, in
+my researches in obedience to the god, and others who were considered
+inferior more nearly approaching to the possession of understanding. But
+I must relate to you my wandering, and the labors which I underwent, in
+order that the oracle might prove incontrovertible. For after the
+politicians I went to the poets, as well the tragic as the dithyrambic
+and others, expecting that here I should in very fact find myself more
+ignorant than they. Taking up, therefore, some of their poems, which
+appeared to me most elaborately finished, I questioned them as to their
+meaning, that at the same time I might learn something from them. I am
+ashamed, O Athenians! to tell you the truth; however, it must be told.
+For, in a word, almost all who were present could have given a better
+account of them than those by whom they had been composed. I soon
+discovered this, therefore, with regard to the poets, that they do not
+effect their object by wisdom, but by a certain natural inspiration, and
+under the influence of enthusiasm, like prophets and seers; for these
+also say many fine things, but they understand nothing that they say.
+The poets appeared to me to be affected in a similar manner; and at the
+same time I perceived that they considered themselves, on account of
+their poetry, to be the wisest of men in other things, in which they
+were not. I left them, therefore, under the persuasion that I was
+superior to them, in the same way that I was to the politicians.
+
+8. At last, therefore, I went to the artisans. For I was conscious to
+myself that I knew scarcely anything, but I was sure that I should find
+them possessed of much beautiful knowledge. And in this I was not
+deceived; for they knew things which I did not, and in this respect they
+were wiser than I. But, O Athenians! even the best workmen appeared to
+me to have fallen into the same error as the poets; for each, because he
+excelled in the practice of his art, thought that he was very wise in
+other most important matters, and this mistake of theirs obscured the
+wisdom that they really possessed. I therefore asked myself, in behalf
+of the oracle, whether I should prefer to continue as I am, possessing
+none, either of their wisdom or their ignorance, or to have both as they
+have. I answered, therefore, to myself and to the oracle, that it was
+better for me to continue as I am.
+
+9. From this investigation, then, O Athenians! many enmities have arisen
+against me, and those the most grievous and severe, so that many
+calumnies have sprung from them, and among them this appellation of
+being wise; for those who are from time to time present think that I am
+wise in those things, with respect to which I expose the ignorance of
+others. The god, however, O Athenians! appears to be really wise, and to
+mean this by his oracle: that human wisdom is worth little or nothing;
+and it is clear that he did not say this to Socrates, but made use of my
+name, putting me forward as an example, as if he had said, that man is
+the wisest among you, who, like Socrates, knows that he is in reality
+worth nothing with respect to wisdom. Still, therefore, I go about and
+search and inquire into these things, in obedience to the god, both
+among citizens and strangers, if I think any one of them is wise; and
+when he appears to me not to be so, I take the part of the god, and show
+that he is not wise. And, in consequence of this occupation, I have no
+leisure to attend in any considerable degree to the affairs of the state
+or my own; but I am in the greatest poverty through my devotion to the
+service of the god.
+
+10. In addition to this, young men, who have much leisure and belong to
+the wealthiest families, following me of their own accord, take great
+delight in hearing men put to the test, and often imitate me, and
+themselves attempt to put others to the test; and then, I think, they
+find a great abundance of men who fancy they know something, although
+they know little or nothing. Hence those who are put to the test by them
+are angry with me, and not with them, and say that "there is one
+Socrates, a most pestilent fellow, who corrupts the youth." And when any
+one asks them by doing or teaching what, they have nothing to say, for
+they do not know; but, that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say
+such things as are ready at hand against all philosophers; "that he
+searches into things in heaven and things under the earth, that he does
+not believe there are gods, and that he makes the worse appear the
+better reason." For they would not, I think, be willing to tell the
+truth that they have been detected in pretending to possess knowledge,
+whereas they know nothing. Therefore, I think, being ambitions and
+vehement and numerous, and speaking systematically and persuasively
+about me, they have filled your ears, for a long time and diligently
+calumniating me. From among these, Melitus, Anytus and Lycon have
+attacked me; Melitus being angry on account of the poets, Anytus on
+account of the artisans and politicians, and Lycon on account of the
+rhetoricians. So that, as I said in the beginning, I should wonder if I
+were able in so short a time to remove from your minds a calumny that
+has prevailed so long. This, O Athenians! is the truth; and I speak it
+without concealing or disguising anything from you, much or little;
+though I very well know that by so doing I shall expose myself to odium.
+This, however, is a proof that I speak the truth, and that this is the
+nature of the calumny against me, and that these are its causes. And if
+you will investigate the matter, either now or hereafter, you will find
+it to be so.
+
+11. With respect, then, to the charges which my first accusers have
+alleged against me, let this be a sufficient apology to you. To Melitus,
+that good and patriotic man, as he says, and to my later accusers, I
+will next endeavor to give an answer; and here, again, as there are
+different accusers, let us take up their deposition. It is pretty much
+as follows: "Socrates," it says, "acts unjustly in corrupting the youth,
+and in not believing in those gods in whom the city believes, but in
+other strange divinities." Such is the accusation; let us examine each
+particular of it. It says that I act unjustly in corrupting the youth.
+But I, O Athenians! say that Melitus acts unjustly, because he jests on
+serious subjects, rashly putting men upon trial, under pretense of being
+zealous and solicitous about things in which he never at any time took
+any concern. But that this is the case I will endeavor to prove to you.
+
+12. Come, then, Melitus, tell me, do you not consider it of the greatest
+importance that the youth should be made as virtuous as possible?
+
+_Mel._ I do.
+
+_Socr._ Well, now, tell the judges who it is that makes them better, for
+it is evident that you know, since it concerns you so much; for, having
+detected me in corrupting them, as you say, you have cited me here, and
+accused me: come, then, say, and inform the judges who it is that makes
+them better. Do you see, Melitus, that you are silent, and have nothing
+to say? But does it not appear to you to be disgraceful, and a
+sufficient proof of what I say, that you never took any concern about
+the matter? But tell me, friend, who makes them better?
+
+_Mel._ The laws.
+
+_Socr._ I do not ask this, most excellent sir, but what man, who surely
+must first know this very thing, the laws?
+
+_Mel._ These, Socrates, the judges.
+
+_Socr._ How say you, Melitus? Are these able to instruct the youth, and
+make them better?
+
+_Mel._ Certainly.
+
+_Socr._ Whether all, or some of them, and others not?
+
+_Mel._ All.
+
+_Socr._ You say well, by Juno! and have found a great abundance of those
+that confer benefit. But what further? Can these hearers make them
+better, or not?
+
+_Mel._ They, too, can.
+
+_Socr._ And what of the senators?
+
+_Mel._ The senators, also.
+
+_Socr._ But, Melitus, do those who attend the public assemblies corrupt
+the younger men? or do they all make them better?
+
+_Mel._ They too.
+
+_Socr._ All the Athenians, therefore, as it seems, make them honorable
+and good, except me; but I alone corrupt them. Do you say so?
+
+_Mel._ I do assert this very thing.
+
+_Socr._ You charge me with great ill-fortune. But answer me: does it
+appear to you to be the same, with respect to horses? Do all men make
+them better, and is there only some one that spoils them? or does quite
+the contrary of this take place? Is there some one person who can make
+them better, or very few; that is, the trainers? But if the generality
+of men should meddle with and make use of horses, do they spoil them? Is
+not this the case, Melitus, both with respect to horses and all other
+animals? It certainly is so, whether you and Anytus deny it or not. For
+it would be a great good-fortune for the youth if only one person
+corrupted, and the rest benefited them. However, Melitus, you have
+sufficiently shown that you never bestowed any care upon youth; and you
+clearly evince your own negligence, in that you have never paid any
+attention to the things with respect to which you accuse me.
+
+13. Tell us further, Melitus, in the name of Jupiter, whether is it
+better to dwell with good or bad citizens? Answer, my friend; for I ask
+you nothing difficult. Do not the bad work some evil to those that are
+continually near them, but the good some good?
+
+_Mel._ Certainly.
+
+_Socr._ Is there any one that wishes to be injured rather than benefited
+by his associates? Answer, good man; for the law requires you to answer.
+Is there any one who wishes to be injured?
+
+_Mel._ No, surely.
+
+_Socr._ Come, then, whether do you accuse me here, as one that corrupts
+the youth, and makes them more depraved, designedly or undesignedly?
+
+_Mel._ Designedly, I say.
+
+_Socr._ What, then, Melitus, are you at your time of life so much wiser
+than I at my time of life, as to know that the evil are always working
+some evil to those that are most near to them, and the good some good;
+but I have arrived at such a pitch of ignorance as not to know that if I
+make any one of my associates depraved, I shall be in danger of
+receiving some evil from him; and yet I designedly bring about this so
+great evil, as you say? In this I can not believe you, Melitus, nor do I
+think would any other man in the world. But either I do not corrupt the
+youth, or, if I do corrupt them, I do it undesignedly: so that in both
+cases you speak falsely. But if I corrupt them undesignedly, for such
+involuntary offenses it is not usual to accuse one here, but to take one
+apart, and teach and admonish one. For it is evident that if I am
+taught, I shall cease doing what I do undesignedly. But you shunned me,
+and were not willing to associate with and instruct me; but you accuse
+me here, where it is usual to accuse those who need punishment, and not
+instruction.
+
+14. Thus, then, O Athenians! this now is clear that I have said; that
+Melitus never paid any attention to these matters, much or little.
+However, tell us, Melitus, how you say I corrupt the youth? Is it not
+evidently, according to the indictment which you have preferred, by
+teaching them not to believe in the gods in whom the city believes, but
+in other strange deities? Do you not say that, by teaching these things,
+I corrupt the youth?
+
+_Mel._ Certainly I do say so.
+
+_Socr._ By those very gods, therefore, Melitus, of whom the discussion
+now is, speak still more clearly both to me and to these men. For I can
+not understand whether you say that I teach them to believe that there
+are certain gods (and in that case I do believe that there are gods, and
+am not altogether an atheist, nor in this respect to blame), not,
+however, those which the city believes in, but others; and this it is
+that you accuse me of, that I introduce others. Or do you say outright
+that I do not myself believe that there are gods, and that I teach
+others the same?
+
+_Mel._ I say this: that you do not believe in any gods at all.
+
+_Socr._ O wonderful Melitus, how come you to say this? Do I not, then,
+like the rest of mankind, believe that the sun and moon are gods?
+
+_Mel._ No, by Jupiter, O judges! for he says that the sun is a stone,
+and the moon an earth.
+
+_Socr._ You fancy that you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Melitus, and
+thus you put a slight on these men, and suppose them to be so illiterate
+as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomene are full of
+such assertions. And the young, moreover, learn these things from me,
+which they might purchase for a drachma, at most, in the orchestra, and
+so ridicule Socrates, if he pretended they were his own, especially
+since they are so absurd? I ask then, by Jupiter, do I appear to you to
+believe that there is no god?
+
+_Mel._ No, by Jupiter, none whatever.
+
+_Socr._ You say what is incredible, Melitus, and that, as appears to me,
+even to yourself. For this man, O Athenians! appears to me to be very
+insolent and intemperate and to have preferred this indictment through
+downright insolence, intemperance, and wantonness. For he seems, as it
+were, to have composed an enigma for the purpose of making an
+experiment. Whether will Socrates the wise know that I am jesting, and
+contradict myself, or shall I deceive him and all who hear me? For, in
+my opinion, he clearly contradicts himself in the indictment, as if he
+should say, Socrates is guilty of wrong in not believing that there are
+gods, and in believing that there are gods. And this, surely, is the act
+of one who is trifling.
+
+15. Consider with me now, Athenians, in what respect he appears to me to
+say so. And do you, Melitus, answer me; and do ye, as I besought you at
+the outset, remember not to make an uproar if I speak after my usual
+manner.
+
+Is there any man, Melitus, who believes that there are human affairs,
+but does not believe that there are men? Let him answer, judges, and not
+make so much noise. Is there any one who does not believe that there are
+horses, but that there are things pertaining to horses? or who does not
+believe that there are pipers, but that there are things pertaining to
+pipes? There is not, O best of men! for since you are not willing to
+answer, I say it to you and to all here present. But answer to this at
+least: is there any one who believes that there are things relating to
+demons, but does not believe that there are demons?
+
+_Mel._ There is not.
+
+_Socr._ How obliging you are in having hardly answered; though compelled
+by these judges! You assert, then, that I do believe and teach things
+relating to demons, whether they be new or old; therefore, according to
+your admission, I do believe in things relating to demons, and this you
+have sworn in the bill of indictment. If, then, I believe in things
+relating to demons, there is surely an absolute necessity that I should
+believe that there are demons. Is it not so? It is. For I suppose you to
+assent, since you do not answer. But with respect to demons, do we not
+allow that they are gods, or the children of gods? Do you admit this or
+not?
+
+_Mel._ Certainly.
+
+_Socr._ Since, then, I allow that there are demons, as you admit, if
+demons are a kind of gods, this is the point in which I say you speak
+enigmatically and divert yourself in saying that I do not allow there
+are gods, and again that I do allow there are, since I allow that there
+are demons? But if demons are the children of gods, spurious ones,
+either from nymphs or any others, of whom they are reported to be, what
+man can think that there are sons of gods, and yet that there are not
+gods? For it would be just as absurd as if any one should think that
+there are mules, the offspring of horses and asses, but should not think
+there are horses and asses. However, Melitus, it can not be otherwise
+than that you have preferred this indictment for the purpose of trying
+me, or because you were at a loss what real crime to allege against me;
+for that you should persuade any man who has the smallest degree of
+sense that the same person can think that there are things relating to
+demons and to gods, and yet that there are neither demons, nor gods,
+not heroes, is utterly impossible.
+
+16. That I am not guilty, then, O Athenians! according to the indictment
+of Melitus, appears to me not to require a lengthened defense; but what
+I have said is sufficient. And as to what I said at the beginning, that
+there is a great enmity toward me among the multitude, be assured it is
+true. And this it is which will condemn me, if I am condemned, not
+Melitus, nor Anytus, but the calumny and envy of the multitude, which
+have already condemned many others, and those good men, and will, I
+think, condemn others also; for there is no danger that it will stop
+with me.
+
+Perhaps, however, some one may say, "Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to
+have pursued a study from which you are now in danger of dying?" To such
+a person I should answer with good reason, You do not say well, friend,
+if you think that a man, who is even of the least value, ought to take
+into the account the risk of life or death, and ought not to consider
+that alone when be performs any action, whether he is acting justly or
+unjustly, and the part of a good man or bad man. For, according to your
+reasoning, all those demi-gods that died at Troy would be vile
+characters, as well all the rest as the son of Thetis, who so far
+despised danger in comparison of submitting to disgrace, that when his
+mother, who was a goddess, spoke to him, in his impatience to kill
+Hector, something to this effect, as I think,[2] "My son, if you revenge
+the death of your friend Patroclus, and slay Hector, you will yourself
+die, for," she said, "death awaits you immediately after Hector;" but
+he, on hearing this, despised death and danger, and dreading much more
+to live as a coward, and not avenge his friend, said, "May I die
+immediately when I have inflicted punishment on the guilty, that I may
+not stay here an object of ridicule, by the curved ships, a burden to
+the ground?"--do you think that he cared for death and danger? For thus
+it is, O Athenians! in truth: wherever any one has posted himself,
+either thinking it to be better, or has been posted by his chief, there,
+as it appears to me, he ought to remain and meet danger, taking no
+account either of death or anything else in comparison with disgrace.
+
+17. I then should be acting strangely, O Athenians! if, when the
+generals whom you chose to command me assigned me my post at Potidæa, at
+Amphipolis, and at Delium, I then remained where they posted me, like
+any other person, and encountered the danger of death; but when the
+deity, as I thought and believed, assigned it as my duty to pass my life
+in the study of philosophy, and examining myself and others, I should on
+that occasion, through fear of death or any thing else whatsoever,
+desert my post, strange indeed would it be; and then, in truth, any one
+might justly bring me to trial, and accuse me of not believing in the
+gods, from disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking myself to
+be wise when I am not. For to fear death, O Athenians! is nothing else
+than to appear to be wise, without being so; for it is to appear to know
+what one does not know. For no one knows but that death is the greatest
+of all good to man; but men fear it, as if they well knew that it is the
+greatest of evils. And how is not this the most reprehensible ignorance,
+to think that one knows what one does not know? But I, O Athenians! in
+this, perhaps, differ from most men; and if I should say that I am in
+any thing wiser than another, it would be in this, that not having a
+competent knowledge of the things in Hades, I also think that I have not
+such knowledge. But to act unjustly, and to disobey my superior,
+whether God or man, I know is evil and base. I shall never, therefore,
+fear or shun things which, for aught I know, maybe good, before evils
+which I know to be evils. So that, even if you should now dismiss me,
+not yielding to the instances of Anytus, who said that either I should
+not[3] appear here at all, or that, if I did appear, it was impossible
+not to put me to death, telling you that if I escaped, your sons,
+studying what Socrates teaches, would all be utterly corrupted; if you
+should address me thus, "Socrates, we shall not now yield to Anytus, but
+dismiss you, on this condition, however, that you no longer persevere in
+your researches nor study philosophy; and if hereafter you are detected
+in so doing, you shall die"--if, as I said, you should dismiss, me on
+these terms, I should say to you, "O Athenians! I honor and love you;
+but I shall obey God rather than you; and so long as I breathe and am
+able, I shall not cease studying philosophy, and exhorting you and
+warning any one of you I may happen to meet, saying, as I have been
+accustomed to do: 'O best of men! seeing you are an Athenian, of a city
+the most powerful and most renowned for wisdom and strength, are you not
+ashamed of being careful for riches, how you may acquire them in
+greatest abundance, and for glory, and honor, but care not nor take any
+thought for wisdom and truth, and for your soul, how it maybe made most
+perfect?'" And if any one of you should question my assertion, and
+affirm that he does care for these things, I shall not at once let him
+go, nor depart, but I shall question him, sift and prove him. And if he
+should appear to me not to possess virtue, but to pretend that he does,
+I shall reproach him for that he sets the least value on things of the
+greatest worth, but the highest on things that are worthless. Thus I
+shall act to all whom I meet, both young and old, stranger and citizen,
+but rather to you, my fellow-citizens, because ye are more nearly allied
+to me. For be well assured, this the deity commands. And I think that no
+greater good has ever befallen you in the city than my zeal for the
+service of the god. For I go about doing nothing else than persuading
+you, both young and old, to take no care either for the body, or for
+riches, prior to or so much as for the soul, how it may be made most
+perfect, telling you that virtue does not spring from riches, but riches
+and all other human blessings, both private and public, from virtue. If,
+then, by saying these things, I corrupt the youth, these things must be
+mischievous; but if any one says that I speak other things than these,
+he misleads you.[4] Therefore I must say, O Athenians! either yield to
+Anytus, or do not, either dismiss me or not, since I shall not act
+otherwise, even though I must die many deaths.
+
+18. Murmur not, O Athenians! but continue to attend to my request, not
+to murmur at what I say, but to listen, for, as I think, you will derive
+benefit from listening. For I am going to say other things to you, at
+which, perhaps, you will raise a clamor; but on no account do so. Be
+well assured, then, if you put me to death, being such a man as I say I
+am, you will not injure me more than yourselves. For neither will
+Melitus nor Anytus harm me; nor have they the power; for I do not think
+that it is possible for a better man to be injured by a worse. He may
+perhaps have me condemned to death, or banished, or deprived of civil
+rights; and he or others may perhaps consider these as mighty evils; I,
+how ever, do not consider them so, but that it is much more so to do
+what he is now doing, to endeavor to put a man to death unjustly. Now,
+therefore, O Athenians! I am far from making a defense on my behalf, as
+any one might think, but I do so on your own behalf, lest by condemning
+me you should offend at all with respect to the gift of the deity to
+you. For, if you should put me to death, you will not easily find such
+another, though it may be ridiculous to say so, altogether attached by
+the deity to this city as to a powerful and generous horse, somewhat
+sluggish from his size, and requiring to be roused by a gad-fly; so the
+deity appears to have united me, being such a person as I am, to the
+city, that I may rouse you, and persuade and reprove every one of you,
+nor ever cease besetting you throughout the whole day. Such another man,
+O Athenians! will not easily be found; therefore, if you will take my
+advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, being irritated like drowsy
+persons who are roused from sleep, will strike me, and, yielding to
+Anytus, will unthinkingly condemn me to death; and then you will pass
+the rest of your life in sleep, unless the deity, caring for you, should
+send some one else to you. But that I am a person who has been given by
+the deity to this city, you may discern from hence; for it is not like
+the ordinary conduct of men, that I should have neglected all my own
+affairs, and suffered my private interest to be neglected for so many
+years, and that I should constantly attend to your concerns, addressing
+myself to each of you separately, like a father, or elder brother,
+persuading you to the pursuit of virtue. And if I had derived any profit
+from this course, and had received pay for my exhortations, there would
+have been some reason for my conduct; but now you see yourselves that my
+accusers, who have so shamelessly calumniated me in everything else,
+have not had the impudence to charge me with this, and to bring
+witnesses to prove that I ever either exacted or demanded any reward.
+And I think I produce a sufficient proof that I speak the truth,
+namely, my poverty.
+
+19. Perhaps, however, it may appear absurd that I, going about, thus
+advise you in private and make myself busy, but never venture to present
+myself in public before your assemblies and give advice to the city. The
+cause of this is that which you have often and in many places heard me
+mention; because I am moved by a certain divine and spiritual influence,
+which also Melitus, through mockery, has set out in the indictment. This
+began with me from childhood, being a kind of voice which, when present,
+always diverts me from what I am about to do, but never urges me on.
+This it is which opposed my meddling in public politics; and it appears
+to me to have opposed me very properly. For be well assured, O
+Athenians! if I had long since attempted to intermeddle with politics, I
+should have perished long ago, and should not have at all benefited you
+or myself. And be not angry with me for speaking the truth. For it is
+not possible that any man should be safe who sincerely opposes either
+you, or any other multitude, and who prevents many unjust and illegal
+actions from being committed in a city; but it is necessary that he who
+in earnest contends for justice, if he will be safe for but a short
+time, should live privately, and take no part in public affairs.
+
+20. I will give you strong proofs of this, not words, but what you
+value, facts. Hear, then, what has happened to me, that you may know
+that I would not yield to any one contrary to what is just, through fear
+of death, at the same time by not yielding I must perish. I shall tell
+you what will be displeasing and wearisome,[5] yet true. For I, O
+Athenians! never bore any other magisterial office in the city, but
+have been a senator: and our Antiochean tribe happened to supply the
+Prytanes when you chose to condemn in a body the ten generals who had
+not taken off those that perished in the sea-fight, in violation of the
+law, as you afterward all thought. At that time I alone of the Prytanes
+opposed your doing anything contrary to the laws, and I voted against
+you; and when the orators were ready to denounce me, and to carry me
+before a magistrate, and you urged and cheered them on, I thought I
+ought rather to meet the danger with law and justice on my side, than
+through fear of imprisonment or death, to take part with you in your
+unjust designs. And this happened while the city was governed by a
+democracy. But when it became an oligarchy, the Thirty, having sent for
+me with four others to the Tholus, ordered us to bring Leon the
+Salaminian from Salamis, that he might be put to death; and they gave
+many similar orders to many others, wishing to involve as many as they
+could in guilt. Then, however, I showed, not in word but in deed, that I
+did not care for death, if the expression be not too rude, in the
+smallest degree; but that all my care was to do nothing unjust or
+unholy. For that government, strong as it was, did not so overawe me as
+to make me commit an unjust action; but when we came out from the
+Tholus, the four went to Salamis, and brought back Leon; but I went away
+home. And perhaps for this I should have been put to death, if that
+government had not been speedily broken up. And of this you can have
+many witnesses.
+
+21. Do you think, then, that I should have survived so many years if I
+had engaged in public affairs, and, acting as becomes a good man, had
+aided the cause of justice, and, as I ought, had deemed this of the
+highest importance? Far from it, O Athenians! nor would any other man
+have done so. But I, through the whole of my life, if I have done
+anything in public, shall be found to be a man, and the very same in
+private, who has never made a concession to any one contrary to justice,
+neither to any other, nor to any one of these whom my calumniators say
+are my disciples. I, however, was never the preceptor of any one; but if
+any one desired to hear me speaking, and to see me busied about my own
+mission, whether he were young or old, I never refused him. Nor do I
+discourse when I receive money, and not when I do not receive any, but I
+allow both rich and poor alike to question me, and, if any one wishes
+it, to answer me and hear what I have to say. And for these, whether any
+one proves to be a good man or not, I cannot justly be responsible,
+because I never either promised them any instruction or taught them at
+all. But if any one says that he has ever learned or heard anything from
+me in private which all others have not, be well assured that he does
+not speak the truth.
+
+22. But why do some delight to spend so long a time with me? Ye have
+heard, O Athenians! I have told you the whole truth, that they delight
+to hear those closely questioned who think that they are wise but are
+not; for this is by no means disagreeable. But this duty, as I say, has
+been enjoined me by the deity, by oracles, by dreams, and by every mode
+by which any other divine decree has ever enjoined anything to man to
+do. These things, O Athenians! are both true, and easily confuted if not
+true. For if I am now corrupting some of the youths, and have already
+corrupted others, it were fitting, surely, that if any of them, having
+become advanced in life, had discovered that I gave them bad advice when
+they were young, they should now rise up against me, accuse me, and have
+me punished; or if they were themselves unwilling to do this, some of
+their kindred, their fathers, or brothers, or other relatives, if their
+kinsman have ever sustained any damage from me, should now call it to
+mind. Many of them, however, are here present, whom I see: first, Crito,
+my contemporary and fellow-burgher, father of this Critobulus; then
+Lysanias of Sphettus, father of this Æschines; again, Antiphon of
+Cephisus, father of Epigenes. There are those others, too, whose
+brothers maintained the same intimacy with me, namely, Nicostratus, son
+of Theodotus, brother of Theodotus--Theodotus indeed is dead, so that he
+could not deprecate his brother's proceedings--and Paralus here, son of
+Demodocus, whose brother was Theages; and Adimantus, son of Ariston,
+whose brother is this Plato; and Æantodorus, whose brother is this
+Apollodorus. I could also mention many others to you, some one of whom
+certainly Melitus ought to have adduced in his speech as a witness. If,
+however, he then forgot to do so, let him now adduce them; I give him
+leave to do so, and let him say it, if he has anything of the kind to
+allege. But, quite contrary to this, you will find, O Athenians! all
+ready to assist me, who have corrupted and injured their relatives, as
+Melitus and Anytus say. For those who have been themselves corrupted
+might perhaps have some reason for assisting me; but those who have not
+been corrupted, men now advanced in life, their relatives, what other
+reason can they have for assisting me, except that right and just one,
+that they know that Melitus speaks falsely, and that I speak the truth.
+
+23. Well, then, Athenians, these are pretty much the things I have to
+say in my defense, and others perhaps of the same kind. Perhaps,
+however, some among you will be indignant on recollecting his own case,
+if he, when engaged in a cause far less than this, implored and besought
+the judges with many tears, bringing forward his children in order that
+he might excite their utmost compassion, and many others of his
+relatives and friends, whereas I do none of these things, although I may
+appear to be incurring the extremity of danger. Perhaps, therefore, some
+one, taking notice of this, may become more determined against me, and,
+being enraged at this very conduct of mine, may give his vote under the
+influence of anger. If, then, any one of you is thus affected--I do not,
+however, suppose that there is--but if there should be, I think I may
+reasonably say to him: "I, too, O best of men, have relatives; for, to
+make use of that saying of Homer, I am not sprung from an oak, nor from
+a rock, but from men, so that I, too, O Athenians! have relatives, and
+three sons, one now grown up, and two boys: I shall not, however, bring
+any one of them forward and implore you to acquit me." Why, then, shall I
+not do this? Not from contumacy, O Athenians! nor disrespect toward you.
+Whether or not I am undaunted at the prospect of death is another
+question; but, out of regard to my own character, and yours, and that of
+the whole city, it does not appear to me to be honorable that I should
+do any thing of this kind at my age, and with the reputation I have,
+whether true or false. For it is commonly agreed that Socrates in some
+respects excels the generality of men. If, then, those among you who
+appear to excel either in wisdom, or fortitude, or any other virtue
+whatsoever, should act in such a manner as I have often seen some when
+they have been brought to trial, it would be shameful, who appearing
+indeed to be something, have conducted themselves in a surprising
+manner, as thinking they should suffer something dreadful by dying, and
+as if they would be immortal if you did not put them to death. Such men
+appear to me to bring disgrace on the city, so that any stranger might
+suppose that such of the Athenians as excel in virtue, and whom they
+themselves choose in preference to themselves for magistracies and other
+honors, are in no respect superior to women. For these things, O
+Athenians! neither ought we to do who have attained to any height of
+reputation, nor, should we do them, ought you to suffer us; but you
+should make this manifest, that you will much rather condemn him who
+introduces these piteous dramas, and makes the city ridiculous, than him
+who quietly awaits your decision.
+
+24. But, reputation apart, O Athenians! it does not appear to me to be
+right to entreat a judge, or to escape by entreaty; but one ought to
+inform and persuade him. For a judge does not sit for the purpose of
+administering justice out of favor, but that he may judge rightly, and
+he is sworn not to show favor to whom he pleases, but that he will
+decide according to the laws. It is, therefore, right that neither
+should we accustom you, nor should you accustom yourselves, to violate
+your oaths; for in so doing neither of us would act righteously. Think
+not then, O Athenians! that I ought to adopt such a course toward you as
+I neither consider honorable, nor just, nor holy, as well, by Jupiter!
+on any other occasion, and now especially when I am accused of impiety
+by this Melitus. For clearly, if I should persuade you, and by my
+entreaties should put a constraint on you who are bound by an oath, I
+should teach you to think that there are no gods, and in reality, while
+making my defense, should accuse myself of not believing in the gods.
+This, however, is far from being the case; for I believe, O Athenians!
+as none of my accusers do, and I leave it to you and to the deity to
+judge concerning me in such way as will be best both for me and for you.
+
+[Socrates here concludes his defense, and, the votes being taken, he is
+declared guilty by a majority of voices. He thereupon resumes his
+address.]
+
+25. That I should not be grieved, O Athenians! at what has
+happened--namely, that you have condemned me--as well many other
+circumstances concur in bringing to pass; and, moreover this, that what
+has happened has not happened contrary to my expectation; but I much
+rather wonder at the number of votes on either side. For I did not
+expect that I should be condemned by so small a number, but by a large
+majority; but now, as it seems, if only three more votes had changed
+sides, I should have been acquitted. So far as Melitus is concerned, as
+it appears to me, I have been already acquitted; and not only have I
+been acquitted, but it is clear to every one that had not Anytus and
+Lycon come forward to accuse me, he would have been fined a thousand
+drachmas, for not having obtained a fifth part of the votes.
+
+26. The man, then, awards me the penalty of death. Well. But what shall
+I, on my part, O Athenians! award myself? Is it not clear that it will
+be such as I deserve? What, then, is that? Do I deserve to suffer, or to
+pay a fine? for that I have purposely during my life not remained quiet,
+but neglecting what most men seek after, money-making, domestic
+concerns, military command, popular oratory, and, moreover, all the
+magistracies, conspiracies, and cabals that are met with in the city,
+thinking that I was in reality too upright a man to be safe if I took
+part in such things, I therefore did not apply myself to those pursuits,
+by attending to which I should have been of no service either to you or
+to myself; but in order to confer the greatest benefit on each of you
+privately, as I affirm, I thereupon applied myself to that object,
+endeavoring to persuade every one of you not to take any care of his own
+affairs before he had taken care of himself in what way he may become
+the best and wisest, nor of the affairs of the city before he took care
+of the city itself; and that he should attend to other things in the
+same manner. What treatment, then, do I deserve, seeing I am such a man?
+Some reward, O Athenians! if, at least, I am to be estimated according
+to my real deserts; and, moreover, such a reward as would be suitable to
+me. What, then, is suitable to a poor man, a benefactor, and who has
+need of leisure in order to give you good advice? There is nothing so
+suitable, O Athenians! as that such a man should be maintained in the
+Prytaneum, and this much more than if one of you had been victorious at
+the Olympic games in a horserace, or in the two or four horsed chariot
+race: for such a one makes you appear to be happy, but I, to be so; and
+he does not need support, but I do. If, therefore, I must award a
+sentence according to my just deserts, I award this, maintenance in the
+Prytaneum.
+
+27. Perhaps, however, in speaking to you thus, I appear to you to speak
+in the same presumptuous manner as I did respecting commiseration and
+entreaties; but such is not the case, O Athenians! it is rather this: I
+am persuaded that I never designedly injured any man, though I can not
+persuade you of this, for we have conversed with each other but for a
+short time. For if there were the same law with you as with other men,
+that in capital cases the trial should list not only one day, but many,
+I think you would be persuaded; but it is not easy in a short time to do
+away with, great calumnies. Being persuaded, then, that I have injured
+no one, I am far from intending to injure myself, and of pronouncing
+against myself that I am deserving of punishment, and from awarding
+myself any thing of the kind. Through fear of what? lest I should
+suffer that which Melitus awards me, of which I say I know not whether
+it he good or evil? Instead of this, shall I choose what I well know to
+be evil, and award that? Shall I choose imprisonment? And why should I
+live in prison, a slave to the established magistracy, the Eleven? Shall
+I choose a fine, and to be imprisoned until I have paid it? But this is
+the same as that which I just now mentioned, for I have not money to pay
+it. Shall I, then, award myself exile? For perhaps you would consent to
+this award. I should indeed be very fond of life, O Athenians! if I were
+so devoid of reason as not to be able to reflect that you, who are my
+fellow-citizens, have been unable to endure my manner of life and
+discourses, but they have become so burdensome and odious to you that
+you now seek to be rid of them: others, however, will easily bear them.
+Far from it, O Athenians! A fine life it would be for me at my age to go
+out wandering, and driven from city to city, and so to live. For I well
+know that, wherever I may go, the youth will listen to me when I speak,
+as they do here. And if I repulse them, they will themselves drive me
+out, persuading the elders; and if I do not repulse them, their fathers
+and kindred will banish me on their account.
+
+28. Perhaps, however, some one will say, Can you not, Socrates, when you
+have gone from us, live a silent and quiet life? This is the most
+difficult thing of all to persuade some of you. For if I say that that
+would be to disobey the deity, and that, therefore, it is impossible for
+me to live quietly, you would not believe me, thinking I spoke
+ironically. If, on the other hand, I say that this is the greatest good
+to man, to discourse daily on virtue, and other things which you have
+heard me discussing, examining both myself and others, but that a life
+without investigation is not worth living for, still less would you
+believe me if I said this. Such, however, is the case, as I affirm, O
+Athenians! though it is not easy to persuade you. And at the same time I
+am not accustomed to think myself deserving of any ill. If, indeed, I
+were rich, I would amerce myself in such a sum as I should be able to
+pay; for then I should have suffered no harm, but now--for I can not,
+unless you are willing to amerce me in such a sum as I am able to pay.
+But perhaps I could pay you a mina of silver: in that sum, then, I
+amerce myself. But Plato here, O Athenians! and Crito Critobulus, and
+Apollodorus bid me amerce myself in thirty minae, and they offer to be
+sureties. I amerce myself, then, to you in that sum; and they will be
+sufficient sureties for the money.
+
+[The judges now proceeded to pass the sentence, and condemned Socrates
+to death; whereupon he continued:]
+
+29. For the sake of no long space of time, O Athenians! you will incur
+the character and reproach at the hands of those who wish to defame the
+city, of having put that wise man, Socrates, to death. For those who
+wish to defame you will assert that I am wise, though I am not. If,
+then, you had waited for a short time, this would have happened of its
+own accord; for observe my age, that it is far advanced in life, and
+near death. But I say this not to you all, but to those only who have
+condemned me to die. And I say this, too, to the same persons. Perhaps
+you think, O Athenians! that I have been convicted through the want of
+arguments, by which I might have persuaded you, had I thought it right
+to do and say any thing, so that I might escape punishment. Far
+otherwise: I have been convicted through want indeed, yet not of
+arguments, but of audacity and impudence, and of the inclination to say
+such things to you as would have been most agreeable for you to hear,
+had I lamented and bewailed and done and said many other things
+unworthy of me, as I affirm, but such as you are accustomed to hear from
+others. But neither did I then think that I ought, for the sake of
+avoiding danger, to do any thing unworthy of a freeman, nor do I now
+repent of having so defended myself; but I should much rather choose to
+die, having so defended myself, than to live in that way. For neither in
+a trial nor in battle is it right that I or any one else should employ
+every possible means whereby he may avoid death; for in battle it is
+frequently evident that a man might escape death by laying down his
+arms, and throwing himself on the mercy of his pursuers. And there are
+many other devices in every danger, by which to avoid death, if a man
+dares to do and say every thing. But this is not difficult, O Athenians!
+to escape death; but it is much more difficult to avoid depravity, for
+it runs swifter than death. And now I, being slow and aged, am overtaken
+by the slower of the two; but my accusers, being strong and active, have
+been overtaken by the swifter, wickedness. And now I depart, condemned
+by you to death; but they condemned by truth, as guilty of iniquity and
+injustice: and I abide my sentence, and so do they. These things,
+perhaps, ought so to be, and I think that they are for the best.
+
+30. In the next place, I desire to predict to you who have condemned me,
+what will be your fate; for I am now in that condition in which men most
+frequently prophesy--namely, when they are about to die. I say, then, to
+you, O Athenians! who have condemned me to death, that immediately after
+my death a punishment will overtake you, far more severe, by Jupiter!
+than that which you have inflicted on me. For you have done this,
+thinking you should be freed from the necessity of giving an account of
+your lives. The very contrary, however, as I affirm, will happen to you.
+Your accusers will be more numerous, whom I have now restrained, though
+you did not perceive it; and they will be more severe, inasmuch as they
+are younger, and you will be more indignant. For if you think that by
+putting men to death you will restrain any one from upbraiding you
+because you do not live well, you are much mistaken; for this method of
+escape is neither possible nor honorable; but that other is most
+honorable and most easy, not to put a check upon others, but for a man
+to take heed to himself how he may be most perfect. Having predicted
+thus much to those of you who have condemned me, I take my leave of you.
+
+31. But with you who have voted for my acquittal I would gladly hold
+converse on what has now taken place, while the magistrates are busy,
+and I am not yet carried to the place where I must die. Stay with me,
+then, so long, O Athenians! for nothing hinders our conversing with each
+other, while we are permitted to do so; for I wish to make known to you,
+as being my friends, the meaning of that which has just now befallen me.
+To me, then, O my judges! and in calling you judges I call you
+rightly--a strange thing has happened. For the wonted prophetic voice of
+my guardian deity on every former occasion, even in the most trifling
+affairs, opposed me if I was about to do any thing wrong; but now that
+has befallen me which ye yourselves behold, and which any one would
+think, and which is supposed to be the extremity of evil; yet neither
+when I departed from home in the morning did the warning of the god
+oppose me, nor when I came up here to the place of trial, nor in my
+address when I was about to say any thing; yet on other occasions it has
+frequently restrained me in the midst of speaking. But now it has never,
+throughout this proceeding, opposed me, either in what I did or said.
+What, then, do I suppose to be the cause of this? I will tell you: what
+has befallen me appears to be a blessing; and it is impossible that we
+think rightly who suppose that death is an evil. A great proof of this
+to me is the fact that it is impossible but that the accustomed signal
+should have opposed me, unless I had been about to meet with some good.
+
+32. Moreover, we may hence conclude that there is great hope that death
+is a blessing. For to die is one of two things: for either the dead may
+be annihilated, and have no sensation of any thing whatever; or, as it
+is said, there are a certain change and passage of the soul from one
+place to another. And if it is a privation of all sensation, as it were
+a sleep in which the sleeper has no dream, death would be a wonderful
+gain. For I think that if any one, having selected a night in which he
+slept so soundly as not to have had a dream, and having compared this
+night with all the other nights and days of his life, should be
+required, on consideration, to say how many days and nights he had
+passed better and more pleasantly than this night throughout his life, I
+think that not only a private person, but even the great king himself,
+would find them easy to number, in comparison with other days and
+nights. If, therefore, death is a thing of this kind, I say it is a
+gain; for thus all futurity appears to be nothing more than one night.
+But if, on the other hand, death is a removal from hence to another
+place, and what is said be true, that all the dead are there, what
+greater blessing can there be than this, my judges? For if, on arriving
+at Hades, released from these who pretend to be judges, one shall find
+those who are true judges, and who are said to judge there, Minos and
+Rhadamanthus, Æacus and Triptolemus, and such others of the demi-gods as
+were just during their own life, would this be a sad removal? At what
+price would you not estimate a conference with Orpheus and Musæus,
+Hesiod and Homer? I indeed should be willing to die often, if this be
+true. For to me the sojourn there would be admirable, when I should meet
+with Palamedes, and Ajax, son of Telamon, and any other of the ancients
+who has died by an unjust sentence. The comparing my sufferings with
+theirs would, I think, be no unpleasing occupation. But the greatest
+pleasure would be to spend my time in questioning and examining the
+people there as I have done those here, and discovering who among them
+is wise, and who fancies himself to be so, but is not. At what price, my
+judges, would not any one estimate the opportunity of questioning him
+who led that mighty army against Troy, or Ulysses, or Sisyphus, or ten
+thousand others whom one might mention both men and women--with whom to
+converse and associate, and to question them, would be an inconceivable
+happiness? Surely for that the judges there do not condemn to death; for
+in other respects those who live there are more happy than those who are
+here, and are henceforth immortal, if, at least, what is said be true.
+
+33. You, therefore, O my judges! ought to entertain good hopes with
+respect to death, and to meditate on this one truth, that to a good man
+nothing is evil, neither while living nor when dead, nor are his
+concerns neglected by the gods. And what has befallen me is not the
+effect of chance; but this is clear to me, that now to die, and be freed
+from my cares is better for me On this account the warning in no way
+turned me aside; and I bear no resentment toward those who condemned me,
+or against my accusers, although they did not condemn and accuse me with
+this intention, but thinking to injure me: in this they deserve to be
+blamed.
+
+Thus much, however, I beg of them. Punish my sons when they grow up, O
+judges! paining them as I have pained you, if they appear to you to care
+for riches or anything else before virtue; and if they think themselves
+to be something when they are nothing, reproach them as I have done you,
+for not attending to what they ought, and for conceiving themselves to
+be something when they are worth nothing. If ye do this, both I and my
+sons shall have met with just treatment at your hands.
+
+But it is now time to depart--for me to die, for you to live. But which
+of us is going to a better state is unknown to every one but God.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+  [1] Aristophanes.
+
+  [2] "Iliad," lib. xviii. ver. 94, etc.
+
+  [3] See the "Crito," sec. 5.
+
+  [4] ouden legei, literally, "he says nothing:" on se trompe, ou
+    l'on vous impose, _Cousin_.
+
+  [5] But for the authority of Stallbaum, I should have translated
+    dikanika "forensic;" that is, such arguments as an advocate would use
+    in a court of justice.
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO.
+
+
+It has been remarked by Stallbaum that Plato had a twofold design in
+this dialogue--one, and that the primary one, to free Socrates from the
+imputation of having attempted to corrupt the Athenian youth; the other,
+to establish the principle that under all circumstances it is the duty
+of a good citizen to obey the laws of his country. These two points,
+however, are so closely interwoven with each other, that the general
+principle appears only to be illustrated by the example of Socrates.
+
+Crito was one of those friends of Socrates who had been present at his
+trial, and had offered to assist in paying a fine, had a fine been
+imposed instead of the sentence of death. He appears to have frequently
+visited his friend in prison after his condemnation; and now, having
+obtained access to his cell very early in the morning, finds him
+composed in a quiet sleep. He brings intelligence that the ship, the
+arrival of which would be the signal for his death on the following day,
+is expected to arrive forthwith, and takes occasion to entreat Socrates
+to make his escape, the means of which were already prepared. Socrates
+thereupon, having promised to follow the advice of Crito if, after the
+matter had been fully discussed, it should appear to be right to do so,
+proposes to consider the duty of a citizen toward his country; and
+having established the divine principle that it is wrong to return evil
+for evil, goes on to show that the obligations of a citizen to his
+country are even more binding than those of a child to its parent, or a
+slave to his master, and that therefore it is his duty to obey the
+established laws, at whatever cost to himself.
+
+At length Crito admits that he has no answer to make, and Socrates
+resolves to submit himself to the will of Providence.
+
+
+
+
+CRITO;
+OR,
+THE DUTY OF A CITIZEN.
+
+
+SOCRATES, CRITO.
+
+_Socr._ Why have you come at this hour, Crito? Is it not very early?
+
+_Cri._ It is.
+
+_Socr._ About what time?
+
+_Cri._ Scarce day-break.
+
+_Socr._ I wonder how the keeper of the prison came to admit you.
+
+_Cri._ He is familiar with me, Socrates, from my having frequently come
+hither; and he is under some obligations to me.
+
+_Socr._ Have you just now come, or some time since?
+
+_Cri._ A considerable time since.
+
+_Socr._ Why, then, did you not wake me at once, instead of sitting down
+by me in silence?
+
+_Cri._ By Jupiter! Socrates, I should not myself like to be so long
+awake, and in such affliction. But I have been for some time wondering
+at you, perceiving how sweetly you slept; and I purposely did not awake
+you, that you might pass your time as pleasantly as possible. And,
+indeed, I have often before throughout your whole life considered you
+happy in your disposition, but far more so in the present calamity,
+seeing how easily and meekly you bear it.
+
+_Socr._ However, Crito, it would be disconsonant for a man at my time of
+life to repine because he must needs die.
+
+_Cri._ But others, Socrates, at your age have been involved in similar
+calamities, yet their age has not hindered their repining at their
+present fortune.
+
+_Socr._ So it is. But why did you come so early?
+
+_Cri._ Bringing sad tidings, Socrates, not sad to you, as it appears,
+but to me, and all your friends, sad and heavy, and which I, I think,
+shall bear worst of all.
+
+_Socr._ What tidings? Has the ship[6] arrived from Delos, on the arrival
+of which I must die?
+
+_Cri._ It has not yet arrived, but it appears to me that it will come
+to-day, from what certain persons report who have come from Sunium,[7]
+and left it there. It is clear, therefore, from these messengers, that
+it will come to day, and consequently it will be necessary, Socrates,
+for you to die to-morrow.
+
+2. _Socr._ But with good fortune, Crito, and if so it please the gods,
+so be it. I do not think, however, that it will come to day.
+
+_Cri._ Whence do you form this conjecture?
+
+_Socr._ I will tell you. I must die on the day after that on which the
+ship arrives.
+
+_Cri._ So they say[8] who have the control of these things.
+
+_Socr._ I do not think, then, that it will come to-day, but to-morrow. I
+conjecture this from a dream which I had this very night, not long ago,
+and you seem very opportunely to have refrained from waking me.
+
+_Cri._ But what was this dream?
+
+_Socr._ A beautiful and majestic woman, clad in white garments seemed to
+approach me, and to call to me and say, "Socrates, three days hence you
+will reach fertile Pythia"[9].
+
+_Cri._ What a strange dream, Socrates!
+
+_Socr._ Very clear, however, as it appears to me, Crito.
+
+3. _Cri._ Very much so, as it seems. But, my dear Socrates, even now be
+persuaded by me, and save yourself. For if you die, not only a single
+calamity will befall me, but, besides being deprived of such a friend as
+I shall never meet with again, I shall also appear to many who do not
+know you and me well, when I might have saved you had I been willing to
+spend my money, to have neglected to do so. And what character can be
+more disgraceful than this--to appear to value one's riches more than
+one's friends? For the generality of men will not be persuaded that you
+were unwilling to depart hence, when we urged you to it.
+
+_Socr._ But why, my dear Crito, should we care so much for the opinion
+of the many? For the most worthy men, whom we ought rather to regard,
+will think that matters have transpired as they really have.
+
+_Cri._ Yet you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to attend to the
+opinion of the many. For the very circumstances of the present case show
+that the multitude are able to effect not only the smallest evils, but
+even the greatest, if any one is calumniated to them.
+
+_Socr._ Would, O Crito that the multitude could effect the greatest
+evils, that they might also effect the greatest good, for then it would
+be well. But now they can do neither; for they can make a man neither
+wise nor foolish; but they do whatever chances.
+
+4. _Cri._ So let it be, then. But answer me this, Socrates: are you not
+anxious for me and other friends, lest, if you should escape from hence,
+informers should give us trouble, as having secretly carried you off,
+and so we should be compelled either to lose all our property, or a very
+large sum, or to suffer something else besides this? For, if you fear
+any thing of the kind, dismiss your fears; for we are justified in
+running the risk to save you--and, if need be, even a greater risk than
+this. But be persuaded by me, and do not refuse.
+
+_Socr._ I am anxious about this, Crito, and about many other things.
+
+_Cri._ Do not fear this, however; for the sum is not large on receipt of
+which certain persons are willing to save you, and take you hence. In
+the next place, do you not see how cheap these informers are, so that
+there would be no need of a large sum for them? My fortune is at your
+service, sufficient, I think, for the purpose; then if, out of regard to
+me, you do not think right to spend my money, these strangers here are
+ready to spend theirs. One of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought with
+him a sufficient sum for the very purpose. Cebes, too, is ready, and
+very many others. So that, as I said, do not, through fears of this
+kind, hesitate to save yourself, nor let what you said in court give you
+any trouble, that if you went from hence you would not know what to do
+with yourself. For in many places, and wherever you go, men will love
+you; and if you are disposed to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who
+will esteem you very highly, and will insure your safety, so that no one
+in Thessaly will molest you.
+
+5. Moreover, Socrates, you do not appear to me to pursue a just course
+in giving yourself up when you might be saved; and you press on the very
+results with respect to yourself which your enemies would press, and
+have pressed, in their anxiety to destroy you. Besides this, too, you
+appear to me to betray your own sons, whom, when it is in your power to
+rear and educate them, you will abandon, and, so far as you are
+concerned, they will meet with such a fate as chance brings them, and,
+as is probable, they will meet with such things as orphans are wont to
+experience in a state of orphanage. Surely one ought not to have
+children, or one should go through the toil of rearing and instructing
+them. But you appear to me to have chosen the most indolent course;
+though you ought to have chosen such a course as a good and brave man
+would have done, since you profess to have made virtue your study
+through the whole of your life; so that I am ashamed both for you and
+for us who are your friends, lest this whole affair of yours should seem
+to be the effect of cowardice on our part--your appearing to stand your
+trial in the court, since you appeared when it was in your power not to
+have done so, the very manner in which the trial was conducted, and this
+last circumstance, as it were, a ridiculous consummation of the whole
+business; your appearing to have escaped from us through our indolence
+and cowardice, who did not save you; nor did you save yourself, when it
+was practicable and possible, had we but exerted ourselves a little.
+Think of these things, therefore, Socrates, and beware, lest, besides
+the evil _that will result_, they be disgraceful both to you and to us;
+advise, then, with yourself; though, indeed, there is no longer time for
+advising--your resolve should be already made. And there is but one
+plan; for in the following night the whole must be accomplished. If we
+delay, it will be impossible and no longer practicable. By all means,
+therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and on no account refuse.
+
+6. _Socr._ My dear Crito, your zeal would be very commendable were it
+united with right principle; otherwise, by how much the more earnest it
+is, by so much is it the more sad. We must consider, therefore, whether
+this plan should be adopted or not. For I not now only, but always, am a
+person who will obey nothing within me but reason, according as it
+appears to me on mature deliberation to be best. And the reasons which I
+formerly professed I can not now reject, because this misfortune has
+befallen me; but they appear to me in much the same light, and I respect
+and honor them as before; so that if we are unable to adduce any better
+at the present time, be assured that I shall not give in to you, even
+though the power of the multitude should endeavor to terrify us like
+children, by threatening more than it does now, bonds and death, and
+confiscation of property. How, therefore, may we consider the matter
+most conveniently? First of all, if we recur to the argument which you
+used about opinions, whether on former occasions it was rightly resolved
+or not, that we ought to pay attention to some opinions, and to others
+not; or whether, before it was necessary that I should die, it was
+rightly resolved; but now it has become clear that it was said idly for
+argument's sake, though in reality it was merely jest and trifling. I
+desire then, Crito, to consider, in common with you, whether it will
+appear to me in a different light, now that I am in this condition, or
+the same, and whether we shall give it up or yield to it. It was said, I
+think, on former occasions, by those who were thought to speak
+seriously, as I just now observed, that of the opinions which men
+entertain some should be very highly esteemed and others not. By the
+gods! Crito, does not this appear to you to be well said? For you, in
+all human probability, are out of all danger of dying to-morrow, and the
+present calamity will not lead your judgment astray. Consider, then;
+does it not appear to you to have been rightly settled that we ought not
+to respect all the opinions of men, but some we should, and others not?
+Nor yet the opinions of all men, but of some we should, and of others
+not? What say you? Is not this rightly resolved?
+
+_Cri._ It is.
+
+_Socr._ Therefore we should respect the good, but not the bad?
+
+_Cri._ Yes.
+
+_Socr._ And are not the good those of the wise, and the bad those of the
+foolish?
+
+_Cri._ How can it be otherwise?
+
+7. _Socr._ Come, then: how, again, were the following points settled?
+Does a man who practices gymnastic exercises and applies himself to
+them, pay attention to the praise and censure and opinion of every one,
+or of that one man only who happens to be a physician, or teacher of the
+exercises?
+
+_Cri._ Of that one only.
+
+_Socr._ He ought, therefore, to fear the censures and covet the praises
+of that one, but not those of the multitude.
+
+_Cri._ Clearly.
+
+_Socr._ He ought, therefore, so to practice and exercise himself, and to
+eat and drink, as seems fitting to the one who presides and knows,
+rather than to all others together.
+
+_Cri._ It is so.
+
+_Socr._ Well, then, if he disobeys the one, and disregards his opinion
+and praise, but respects that of the multitude and of those who know
+nothing, will he not suffer some evil?
+
+_Cri._ How should he not?
+
+_Socr._ But what is this evil? Whither does it tend, and on what part
+of him that disobeys will it fall?
+
+_Cri._ Clearly on his body, for this it ruins.
+
+_Socr._ You say well. The case is the same, too, Crito, with all other
+things, not to go through them all. With respect then, to things just
+and unjust, base and honorable, good and evil, about which we are now
+consulting, ought we to follow the opinion of the multitude, and to
+respect it, or that of one, if there is any one who understands, whom we
+ought to reverence and respect rather than all others together? And if
+we do not obey him, shall we not corrupt and injure that part of
+ourselves which becomes better by justice, but is ruined by injustice?
+Or is this nothing?
+
+_Cri._ I agree with you, Socrates.
+
+8. _Socr._ Come, then, if we destroy that which becomes better by what
+is wholesome, but is impaired by what is unwholesome, through being
+persuaded by those who do not understand, can we enjoy life when that is
+impaired? And this is the body we are speaking of, is it not?
+
+_Cri._ Yes.
+
+_Socr._ Can we, then, enjoy life with a diseased and impaired body?
+
+_Cri._ By no means.
+
+_Socr._ But can we enjoy life when that is impaired which injustice
+ruins but justice benefits? Or do we think that to be of less value than
+the body, whatever part of us it may be, about which injustice and
+justice are concerned'
+
+_Cri._ By no means.
+
+_Socr._ But of more value?
+
+_Cri._ Much more.
+
+_Socr._ We must not then, my excellent friend, so much regard what the
+multitude will say of us, but what he will say who understands the just
+and the unjust, the one, even truth itself. So that at first you did
+not set out with a right principle, when you laid it down that we ought
+to regard the opinion of the multitude with respect to things just and
+honorable and good, and their contraries. How ever, some one may say,
+are not the multitude able to put us to death?
+
+_Cri._ This, too, is clear, Socrates, any one might say so.
+
+_Socr._ You say truly. But, my admirable friend, this principle which we
+have just discussed appears to me to be the same as it was before[10].
+And consider this, moreover, whether it still holds good with us or not,
+that we are not to be anxious about living but about living well.
+
+_Cri._ It does hold good.
+
+_Socr._ And does this hold good or not, that to live well and Honorable
+and justly are the same thing?
+
+_Cri._ It does.
+
+9. _Socr._ From what has been admitted, then, this consideration arises,
+whether it is just or not that I should endeavor to leave this place
+without the permission of the Athenians. And should it appear to be
+just, we will make the attempt, but if not, we will give it up. But as
+to the considerations which you mention, of an outlay of money,
+reputation, and the education of children, beware, Crito, lest such
+considerations as these in reality belong to these multitudes, who
+rashly put one to death, and would restore one to life, if they could do
+so, without any reason at all. But we, since reason so requires, must
+consider nothing else than what we just now mentioned, whether we shall
+act justly in paying money and contracting obligations to those who
+will lead me hence, as well they who lead me as we who are led hence, or
+whether, in truth, we shall not act unjustly in doing all these things.
+And if we should appear in so doing to be acting unjustly, observe that
+we must not consider whether from remaining here and continuing quiet we
+must needs die, or suffer any thing else, rather than whether we shall
+be acting unjustly.
+
+_Cri._ You appear to me to speak wisely, Socrates, but see what we are
+to do.
+
+_Socr._ Let us consider the matter together, my friend, and if you have
+any thing to object to what I say, make good your objection, and I will
+yield to you, but if not, cease, my excellent friend, to urge upon me
+the same thing so often, that I ought to depart hence against the will
+of the Athenians. For I highly esteem your endeavors to persuade me thus
+to act, so long as it is not against my will Consider, then, the
+beginning of our inquiry, whether it is stated to your entire
+satisfaction, and endeavor to answer the question put to you exactly as
+you think right.
+
+_Cri._ I will endeavor to do so.
+
+10. _Socr._ Say we, then, that we should on no account deliberately
+commit injustice, or may we commit injustice under certain
+circumstances, under others not? Or is it on no account either good or
+honorable to commit injustice, as we have often agreed on former
+occasions, and as we just now said? Or have all those our former
+admissions been dissipated in these few days, and have we, Crito, old
+men as we are, been for a long time seriously conversing with each other
+without knowing that we in no respect differ from children? Or does the
+case, beyond all question, stand as we then determined? Whether the
+multitude allow it or not, and whether we must suffer a more severe or a
+milder punishment than this, still is injustice on every account both
+evil and disgraceful to him who commits it? Do we admit this, or not?
+
+_Cri._ We do admit it.
+
+_Socr._ On no account, therefore, ought we to act unjustly.
+
+_Cri._ Surely not.
+
+_Socr._ Neither ought one who is injured to return the injury, as the
+multitude think, since it is on no account right to act unjustly.
+
+_Cri._ It appears not.
+
+_Socr._ What, then? Is it right to do evil, Crito, or not?
+
+_Cri._ Surely it is not right, Socrates.
+
+_Socr._ But what? To do evil in return when one has been evil-entreated,
+is that right, or not?
+
+_Cri._ By no means.
+
+_Socr._ For to do evil to men differs in no respect from committing
+injustice.
+
+_Cri._ You say truly.
+
+_Socr._ It is not right, therefore, to return an injury, or to do evil
+to any man, however one may have suffered from him. But take care,
+Crito, that in allowing these things you do not allow them contrary to
+your opinion, for I know that to some few only these things both do
+appear, and will appear, to be true. They, then, to whom these things
+appear true, and they to whom they do not, have no sentiment in common,
+and must needs despise each other, while they look to each other's
+opinions. Consider well, then, whether you coincide and think with me,
+and whether we can begin our deliberations from this point--that it is
+never right either to do an injury or to return an injury, or when one
+has been evil-entreated, to revenge one's self by doing evil in return,
+or do you dissent from, and not coincide in this principle? For so it
+appears to me, both long since and now, but if you in any respect think
+otherwise, say so and inform me. But if you persist in your former
+opinions, hear what follows.
+
+_Cri._ I do persist in them, and think with you. Speak on, then.
+
+_Socr._ I say next, then, or rather I ask; whether when a man has
+promised to do things that are just he ought to do them, or evade his
+promise?
+
+_Cri._ He ought to do them.
+
+11. _Socr._ Observe, then, what follows. By departing hence without the
+leave of the city, are we not doing evil to some, and that to those to
+whom we ought least of all to do it, or not? And do we abide by what we
+agreed on as being just, or do we not?
+
+_Cri._ I am unable to answer your question, Socrates; for I do not
+understand it.
+
+_Socr._ Then, consider it thus. If, while we were preparing to run away,
+or by whatever name we should call it, the laws and commonwealth should
+come, and, presenting themselves before us, should say, "Tell me,
+Socrates, what do you purpose doing? Do you design any thing else by
+this proceeding in which you are engaged than to destroy us, the laws,
+and the whole city, so far as you are able? Or do you think it possible
+for that city any longer to subsist, and not be subverted, in which
+judgments that are passed have no force, but are set aside and destroyed
+by private persons?"--what should we say, Crito, to these and similar
+remonstrances? For any one, especially an orator, would have much to say
+on the violation of the law, which enjoins that judgments passed shall
+be enforced. Shall we say to them that the city has done us an
+injustice, and not passed a right sentence? Shall we say this, or what
+else?
+
+_Cri._ This, by Jupiter! Socrates.
+
+12. _Socr._ What, then, if the laws should say, "Socrates, was it not
+agreed between us that you should abide by the judgments which the city
+should pronounce?" And if we should wonder at their speaking thus,
+perhaps they would say, "Wonder not, Socrates, at what we say, but
+answer, since you are accustomed to make use of questions and answers.
+For, come, what charge have you against us and the city, that you
+attempt to destroy us? Did we not first give you being? and did not your
+father, through us, take your mother to wife and beget you? Say, then,
+do you find fault with those laws among us that relate to marriage as
+being bad?" I should say, "I do not find fault with them." "Do you with
+those that relate to your nurture when born, and the education with
+which you were instructed? Or did not the laws, ordained on this point,
+enjoin rightly, in requiring your father to instruct you in music and
+gymnastic exercises?" I should say, rightly. Well, then, since you were
+born, nurtured, and educated through our means, can you say, first of
+all, that you are not both our offspring and our slave, as well you as
+your ancestors? And if this be so, do you think that there are equal
+rights between us? and whatever we attempt to do to you, do you think
+you may justly do to us in turn? Or had you not equal rights with your
+father, or master, if you happened to have one, so as to return what you
+suffered, neither to retort when found fault with, nor, when stricken,
+to strike again, nor many other things of the kind; but that with your
+country and the laws you may do so; so that if we attempt to destroy
+you, thinking it to be just, you also should endeavor, so far as you are
+able, in return, to destroy us, the laws, and your country; and in doing
+this will you say that you act justly--you who, in reality, make virtue
+your chief object? Or are you so wise as not to know that one's country
+is more honorable, venerable, and sacred, and more highly prized both by
+gods, and men possessed of understanding, than mother and father, and
+all other progenitors; and that one ought to reverence, submit to, and
+appease one's country, when angry, rather than one's father; and either
+persuade it or do what it orders, and to suffer quietly if it bids one
+suffer, whether to be beaten, or put in bonds; or if it sends one out to
+battle there to be wounded or slain, this must be done; for justice so
+requires, and one must not give way, or retreat, or leave one's post;
+but that both in war and in a court of justice, and everywhere one must
+do what one's city and country enjoin, or persuade it in such manner as
+justice allows; but that to offer violence either to one's mother or
+father is not holy, much less to one's country? What shall we say to
+these things, Crito? That the laws speak the truth, or not?
+
+_Cri._ It seems so to me.
+
+13. _Socr._ "Consider, then, Socrates," the laws perhaps might say,
+"whether we say truly that in what you are now attempting you are
+attempting to do what is not just toward us. For we, having given you
+birth, nurtured, instructed you, and having imparted to you and all
+other citizens all the good in our power, still proclaim, by giving the
+power to every Athenian who pleases, when he has arrived at years of
+discretion, and become acquainted with the business of the state, and
+us, the laws, that any one who is not satisfied with us may take his
+property, and go wherever he pleases. And if any one of you wishes to go
+to a colony, if he is not satisfied with us and the city, or to migrate
+and settle in another country, none of us, the laws, hinder or forbid
+him going whithersoever he pleases, taking with him all his property.
+But whoever continues with us after he has seen the manner in which we
+administer justice, and in other respects govern the city, we now say
+that he has in fact entered into a compact with us to do what we order;
+and we affirm that he who does not obey is in three respects guilty of
+injustice--because he does not obey us who gave him being, and because
+he does not obey us who nurtured him, and because, having made a compact
+that he would obey us, he neither does so, nor does he persuade us if we
+do any thing wrongly; though we propose for his consideration, and do
+not rigidly command him to do what we order, but leave him the choice of
+one of two things, either to persuade us, or to do what we require, and
+yet he does neither of these."
+
+14. "And we say that you, O Socrates! will be subject to these charges
+if you accomplish your design, and that not least of the Athenians, but
+most so of all." And if I should ask, "For what reason?" they would
+probably justly retort on me by saying that, among all the Athenians, I
+especially made this compact with them. For they would say, "Socrates,
+we have strong proof of this, that you were satisfied both with us and
+the city; for, of all the Athenians, you especially would never have
+dwelt in it if it had not been especially agreeable to you; for you
+never went out of the city to any of the public spectacles, except once
+to the Isthmian games, nor anywhere else, except on military service,
+nor have you ever gone abroad as other men do, nor had you ever had any
+desire to become acquainted with any other city or other laws, but we
+and our city were sufficient for you; so strongly were you attached to
+us, and so far did you consent to submit to our government, both in
+other respects and in begetting children in this city, in consequence of
+your being satisfied with it. Moreover, in your very trial, it was in
+your power to have imposed on yourself a sentence of exile, if you
+pleased, and might then have done, with the consent of the city, what
+you now attempt against its consent. Then, indeed, you boasted yourself
+as not being grieved if you must needs die; but you preferred, as you
+said, death to exile. Now, however, you are neither ashamed of those
+professions, nor do you revere us, the laws, since you endeavor to
+destroy us, and you act as the vilest slave would act, by endeavoring to
+make your escape contrary to the conventions and the compacts by which
+you engaged to submit to our government. First, then, therefore, answer
+us this, whether we speak the truth or not in affirming that you agreed
+to be governed by us in deed, though not in word?" What shall we say to
+this, Crito? Can we do otherwise than assent?
+
+_Cri._ We must needs do so, Socrates.
+
+_Socr._ "What else, then," they will say, "are you doing but violating
+the conventions and compacts which you made with us, though you did not
+enter into them from compulsion or through deception, or from being
+compelled to determine in a short time but during the space of seventy
+years, in which you might have departed if you had been dissatisfied
+with us, and the compacts had not appeared to you to be just? You,
+however, preferred neither Lacedæmon nor Crete, which you several times
+said are governed by good laws, nor any other of the Grecian or
+barbarian cities; but you have been less out of Athens than the lame and
+the blind, and other maimed persons. So much, it is evident, were you
+satisfied with the city and us, the laws, beyond the rest of the
+Athenians; for who can be satisfied with a city without laws? But now
+will you not abide by your compacts? You will, if you are persuaded by
+us, Socrates, and will not make yourself ridiculous by leaving the
+city."
+
+15. "For consider, by violating these compacts and offending against any
+of them, what good you will do to yourself or your friends. For that
+your friends will run the risk of being themselves banished, and
+deprived of the rights of citizenship, or of forfeiting their property,
+is pretty clear. And as for yourself, if you should go to one of the
+neighboring cities, either Thebes or Megara, for both are governed by
+good laws, you will go there, Socrates, as an enemy to their polity; and
+such as have any regard for their country will look upon you with
+suspicion, regarding you as a corrupter of the laws; and you will
+confirm the opinion of the judges, so that they will appear to have
+condemned you rightly, for whose is a corrupter of the laws will appear
+in all likelihood to be a corrupter of youths and weak-minded men. Will
+you, then, avoid these well-governed cities, and the best-ordered men?
+And should you do so, will it be worth your while to live? Or will you
+approach them, and have the effrontery to converse with them, Socrates,
+on subjects the same as you did here--that virtue and justice, legal
+institutions and laws, should be most highly valued by men? And do you
+not think that this conduct of Socrates would be very indecorous? You
+must think so. But you will keep clear of these places, and go to
+Thessaly, to Crito's friends, for there are the greatest disorder and
+licentiousness; and perhaps they will gladly hear you relating how
+drolly you escaped from prison, clad in some dress or covered with a
+skin, or in some other disguise such as fugitives are wont to dress
+themselves in, having so changed your usual appearance. And will no one
+say that you, though an old man, with but a short time to live, in all
+probability, have dared to have such a base desire of life as to violate
+the most sacred laws? Perhaps not, should you not offend any one. But if
+you should, you will hear, Socrates, many things utterly unworthy of
+you. You will live, too, in a state of abject dependence on all men,
+and as their slave. But what will you do in Thessaly besides feasting,
+as if you had gone to Thessaly to a banquet? And what will become of
+those discourses about justice and all other virtues? But do you wish to
+live for the sake of your children, that you may rear and educate them?
+What then? Will you take them to Thessaly, and there rear and educate
+them, making them aliens to their country, that they may owe you this
+obligation too? Or, if not so, being reared here, will they be better
+reared and educated while you are living, though not with them, for your
+friends will take care of them? Whether, if you go to Thessaly, will
+they take care of them, but if you go to Hades will they not take care
+of them? If, however, any advantage is to be derived from those that say
+they are your friends, we must think they will."
+
+16. "Then, O Socrates! be persuaded by us who have nurtured you, and do
+not set a higher value on your children, or on life, or on any thing
+else than justice, that, when you arrive in Hades, you may have all this
+to say in your defense before those who have dominion there. For neither
+here in this life, if you do what is proposed, does it appear to be
+better, or more just, or more holy to yourself, or any of your friends;
+nor will it be better for you when you arrive there. But now you depart,
+if you do depart, unjustly treated, not by us, the laws, but by men; but
+should you escape, having thus disgracefully returned injury for injury,
+and evil for evil, having violated your own compacts and conventions
+which you made with us, and having done evil to those to whom you least
+of all should have done it--namely, yourself, your friends, your
+country, and us--both we shall be indignant with you as long as you
+live, and there our brothers, the laws in Hades, will not receive you
+favorably knowing that you attempted, so far as you were able, to
+destroy us. Let not Crito, then, persuade you to do what he advises,
+rather than we."
+
+17. These things, my dear friend Crito, be assured, I seem to hear as
+the votaries of Cybele[11] seem to hear the flutes. And the sound of
+these words booms in my ear, and makes me incapable of hearing any thing
+else. Be sure, then, so long as I retain my present opinions, if you
+should say any thing contrary to these, you will speak in vain. If,
+however, you think that you can prevail at all, say on.
+
+_Cri._ But, Socrates, I have nothing to say.
+
+_Socr._ Desist, then, Crito, and let us pursue this course, since this
+way the deity leads us.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+  [6] See the Phædo sec 1.
+
+  [7] A promontory at the southern extremity of Attica
+
+  [8] The Eleven
+
+  [9] See Homer's "Iliad," 1 IX, v 363
+
+  [10] That is to say, the principle which we had laid down in former
+    discussions that no regard is to be had to popular opinion, is still
+    found to hold good.
+
+  [11] The Corybantes, priests of Cybele, who in their solemn festivals
+    made such a noise with flutes that the hearers could hear no other
+    sound.
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE PHÆDO.
+
+
+This dialogue presents us with an account of the manner In which
+Socrates spent the last day of his, life, and how he met his death. The
+main subject is that of the soul's immortality, which Socrates takes
+upon himself to prove with as much certainty as it is possible for the
+human mind to arrive at. The question itself, though none could be
+better suited to the occasion, arises simply and naturally from the
+general conversation that precedes it.
+
+When his friends visit him in the morning for the purpose of spending
+this his last day with him, they find him sitting up in bed, and rubbing
+his leg, which had just been freed from bonds. He remarks on the
+unaccountable alternation and connection between pleasure and pain, and
+adds that Æsop, had he observed it, would have made a fable from it.
+This remark reminds Cebes of Socrates's having put some of Æsop's fables
+into metre since his imprisonment, and he asks, for the satisfaction of
+the poet Evenus, what has induced him to do so. Socrates explains his
+reason, and concludes by bidding him tell Evenus to follow him as soon
+as he can. Simmias expresses his surprise at this message, on which
+Socrates asks, "Is not Evenus a philosopher?" and on the question being
+answered in the affirmative, he says that he or any philosopher would be
+willing to die, though perhaps he would not commit violence on himself.
+This, again, seems a contradiction to Simmias; but Socrates explains it
+by showing that our souls are placed in the body by God, and may not
+leave it without his permission. Whereupon Cebes objects that in that
+case foolish men only would wish to die, and quit the service of the
+best of masters, to which Simmias agrees. Socrates, therefore, proposes
+to plead his cause before them, and to show that there is a great
+probability that after this life he shall go into the presence of God
+and good men, and be happy in proportion to the purity of his own mind.
+
+He begins[12] by stating that philosophy itself is nothing else than a
+preparation for and meditation on death. Death and philosophy have this
+in common: death separates the soul from the body; philosophy draws off
+the mind from bodily things to the contemplation of truth and virtue:
+for he is not a true philosopher who is led away by bodily pleasures,
+since the senses are the source of ignorance and all evil. The mind,
+therefore, is entirely occupied in meditating on death, and freeing
+itself as much as possible from the body. How, then, can such a man be
+afraid of death? He who grieves at the approach of death can not be a
+true lover of wisdom, but is a lover of his body. And, indeed, most men
+are temperate through intemperance; that is to say, they abstain from
+some pleasures that they may the more easily and permanently enjoy
+others. They embrace only a shadow of virtue, not virtue itself, since
+they estimate the value of all things by the pleasures they afford.
+Whereas the philosopher purifies his mind from all such things, and
+pursues virtue and wisdom for their own sakes. This course Socrates
+himself has pursued to the utmost of his ability, with what success he
+should shortly know; and on these grounds he did not repine at leaving
+his friends in this world, being persuaded that in another he should
+meet with good masters and good friends.
+
+Upon this Cebes[13] says that he agrees with all else that had been
+said, but can not help entertaining doubts of what will become of the
+soul when separated from the body, for the common opinion is that it is
+dispersed and vanishes like breath or smoke, and no longer exists
+anywhere. Socrates, therefore, proposes to inquire into the probability
+of the case, a fit employment for him under his present circumstances.
+
+His first argument[14] is drawn from the ancient belief prevalent among
+men, that souls departing hence exist in Hades, and are produced again
+from the dead. If this be true, it must follow that our souls are there,
+for they could not be produced again if they did not exist; and its
+truth is confirmed by this, that it is a general law of nature that
+contraries are produced from contraries--the greater from the less,
+strong from weak, slow from swift, heat from cold, and in like manner
+life from death, and vice versa. To explain this more clearly, he
+proceeds to show that what is changed passes from one state to another,
+and so undergoes three different states--first, the actual state; then
+the transition; and, thirdly, the new state; as from a state of sleep,
+by awaking to being awake. In like manner birth is a transition from a
+state of death to life, and dying from life to death; so that the soul,
+by the act of dying, only passes to another state. If it were not so,
+all nature would in time become dead, just as if people did not awake
+out of sleep all would at last be buried in eternal sleep. Whence the
+conclusion is that the souls of men are not annihilated by death.
+
+Cebes[15] agrees to this reasoning, and adds that he is further
+convinced, of its truth by calling to mind an argument used by Socrates
+on former occasions, that knowledge is nothing but reminiscence; and if
+this is so, the soul must have existed, and had knowledge, before it
+became united to the body.
+
+But in case Simmias should not yet be satisfied, Socrates[16] proceeds
+to enlarge on this, his second argument, drawn from reminiscence. We
+daily find that we are carried from the knowledge of one thing to
+another. Things perceived by the eyes, ears, and other senses bring up
+the thought of other things; thus the sight of a lyre or a garment
+reminds us of a friend, and not only are we thus reminded of sensible
+objects, but of things which are comprehended by the mind alone, and
+have no sensitive existence. For we have formed in our minds an idea of
+abstract equality, of the beautiful, the just, the good; in short, of
+every thing which we say exists without the aid of the senses, for we
+use them only in the perception of individual things; whence it follows
+that the mind did not acquire this knowledge in this life, but must have
+had it before, and therefore the soul must have existed before.
+
+Simmias and Cebes[17] both agree in admitting that Socrates has proved
+the pre-existence of the soul, but insist that he has not shown it to be
+immortal, for that nothing hinders but that, according to the popular
+opinion, it may be dispersed at the dissolution of the body. To which
+Socrates replies, that if their former admissions are joined to his last
+argument, the immortality, as well as the pre-existence, of the soul has
+been sufficiently proved. For if it is true that any thing living is
+produced from that which is dead, then the soul must exist after death,
+otherwise it could not be produced again.
+
+However, to remove the apprehension that the soul may be dispersed by a
+wind, as it were, Socrates proceeds, in his third argument,[18] to
+examine that doubt more thoroughly. What, then, is meant by being
+dispersed but being dissolved into its parts? In order, therefore, to a
+thing being capable of dispersion it must be compounded of parts. Now,
+there are two kinds of things--one compounded, the other simple The
+former kind is subject to change, the latter not, and can be
+comprehended by the mind alone. The one is visible, the other invisible;
+and the soul, which is invisible, when it employs the bodily senses,
+wanders and is confused, but when it abstracts itself from the body it
+attains to the knowledge of that which is eternal, immortal, and
+unchangeable. The soul, therefore, being uncompounded and invisible,
+must be indissoluble; that is to say, immortal.
+
+Still Simmias and Cebes[19] are unconvinced. The former objects that the
+soul, according to Socrates's own showing, is nothing but a harmony
+resulting from a combination of the parts of the body, and so may perish
+with the body, as the harmony of a lyre does when the lyre itself is
+broken. And Cebes, though he admits that the soul is more durable than
+the body, yet objects that it is not, therefore, of necessity immortal,
+but may in time wear out; and it is by no means clear that this is not
+its last period.
+
+These objections produce a powerful effect on the rest of the company;
+but Socrates, undismayed, exhorts them not to suffer themselves to be
+deterred from seeking the truth by any difficulties they may meet with;
+and then proceeds[20] to show, in a moment, the fallacy of Simmias's
+objection. It was before admitted, he says, that the soul existed before
+the body; but harmony is produced after the lyre is formed, so that the
+two cases are totally different. And, further, there are various degrees
+of harmony, but every soul is as much a soul as any other. But, then,
+what will a person who holds this doctrine, that the soul is harmony,
+say of virtue and vice in the soul? Will he call them another kind of
+harmony and discord? If so, he will contradict himself; for it is
+admitted that one soul is not more or less a soul than another, and
+therefore one can not he more or less harmonized than another, and one
+could not admit of a greater degree of virtue or vice than another; and
+indeed a soul, being harmony, could not partake of vice at all, which is
+discord.
+
+Socrates, having thus satisfactorily answered the argument adduced by
+Simmias, goes on to rebut that of Cebes,[21] who objected that the soul
+might in time wear out. In order to do this, he relates that, when a
+young man, he attempted to investigate the causes of all things, why
+they exist and why they perish; and in the course of his researches,
+finding the futility of attributing the existence of things to what are
+called natural causes, he resolved on endeavoring to find out the
+reasons of things. He therefore assumed that there are a certain
+abstract beauty and goodness and magnitude, and so of all other things;
+the truth of which being granted, he thinks he shall be able to prove
+that the soul is immortal.
+
+This, then, being conceded by Cebes, Socrates[22] argues that every
+thing that is beautiful is so from partaking of abstract beauty, and
+great from partaking of magnitude, and little from partaking of
+littleness. Now, it is impossible, he argues, that contraries can exist
+in the same thing at the same time; for instance, the same thing can not
+possess both magnitude and littleness, but one will withdraw at the
+approach of the other; and not only so, but things which, though not
+contrary to each other, yet always contain contraries within themselves,
+can not co-exist; for instance, the number three has no contrary, yet
+it contains within itself the idea of odd, which is the contrary of
+even, and so three never can become even; in like manner, heat while it
+is heat can never admit the idea of its contrary, cold. Now, if this
+method of reasoning is applied to the soul, it will be found to be
+immortal; for life and death are contraries, and never can co-exist; but
+wherever the soul is, there is life: so that it contains within itself
+that which is contrary to death, and consequently can never admit of
+death; therefore it is immortal.
+
+With this he closes his arguments in support of the soul's immortality.
+Cebes owns himself convinced, but Simmias, though he is unable to make
+any objection to the soundness of Socrates's reasoning, can not help
+still entertaining doubts on the subject. If, however, the soul is
+immortal, Socrates proceeds,[23] great need is there in this life to
+endeavor to become as wise and good as possible. For if death were a
+deliverance from every thing, it would be a great gain for the wicked;
+but since the soul appears to be immortal, it must go to the place
+suited to its nature. For it is said that each person's demon conducts
+him to a place where he receives sentence according to his deserts.
+
+He then[24] draws a fanciful picture of the various regions of the
+earth, to which the good and the bad will respectively go after death,
+and exhorts his friends to use every endeavor to acquire virtue and
+wisdom in this life, "for," he adds, "the reward is noble, and the hope
+great."
+
+Having thus brought his subject to a conclusion, Socrates proposes to
+bathe himself, in order not to trouble others to wash his dead body.
+Crito thereupon asks if he has any commands to give, and especially how
+he would be buried, to which he, with his usual cheerfulness, makes
+answer, "Just as you please, if only you can catch me;" and then,
+smiling, he reminds them that after death he shall be no longer with
+them, and begs the others of the party to be sureties to Crito for his
+absence from the body, as they had been before bound for his presence
+before his judges.
+
+After he had bathed, and taken leave of his children and the women of
+his family the officer of the Eleven comes in to intimate to him that it
+is now time to drink the poison. Crito urges a little delay, as the sun
+had not yet set; but Socrates refuses to make himself ridiculous by
+showing such a fondness for life. The man who is to administer the
+poison is therefore sent for; and on his holding out the cup, Socrates,
+neither trembling nor changing color or countenance at all, but, as he
+was wont, looking steadfastly at the man, asked if he might make a
+libation to any one; and being told that no more poison than enough had
+been mixed, he simply prayed that his departure from this to another
+world might be happy, and then drank off the poison, readily and calmly.
+His friends, who had hitherto with difficulty restrained themselves,
+could no longer control the outward expressions of grief, to which
+Socrates said, "What are you doing, my friends? I, for this reason,
+chiefly, sent away the women, that they might not commit any folly of
+this kind; for I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. Be
+quiet, therefore, and bear up."
+
+When he had walked about for a while his legs began to grow heavy, so he
+lay down on his back; and his body, from the feet upward, gradually grew
+cold and stiff. His last words were, "Crito, we owe a cock to
+Æsculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not neglect it."
+
+"This," concludes Phædo, "was the end of our friend--a man, as we may
+say, the best of all his time, that we have known, and, moreover, the
+most wise and just."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+  [12] Sec. 21-39.
+
+  [13] Sec. 39, 40.
+
+  [14] Sec. 40-46.
+
+  [15] Sec. 47.
+
+  [16] Sec. 48-57.
+
+  [17] Sec. 55-59.
+
+  [18] Sec. 61-75.
+
+  [19] Sec. 76-84.
+
+  [20] Sec. 93-99.
+
+  [21] Sec. 100-112.
+
+  [22] Sec. 112-128.
+
+  [23] Sec. 129-131.
+
+  [24] Sec. 132-145.
+
+
+
+
+PHÆDO;
+OR,
+THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
+
+
+FIRST ECHECRATES, PHÆDO.
+THEN SOCRATES, APOLLODORUS, CEBES, SIMMIAS, AND CRITO.
+
+_Ech._ Were you personally present, Phædo, with Socrates on that day
+when he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear an account of it
+from some one else?
+
+_Phæd._ I was there myself, Echecrates.
+
+_Ech._ What, then, did he say before his death, and how did he die? for
+I should be glad to hear: for scarcely any citizen of Phlius[25] ever
+visits Athens now, nor has any stranger for a long time come from thence
+who was able to give us a clear account of the particulars, except that
+he had died from drinking poison; but he was unable to tell us any thing
+more.
+
+2. _Phæd._ And did you not hear about the trial--how it went off?
+
+_Ech._ Yes; some one told me this; and I wondered that, as it took
+place so long ago, he appears to have died long afterward. What was the
+reason of this, Phædo?
+
+_Phæd._ An accidental circumstance happened in his favor, Echecrates;
+for the poop of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos chanced to be
+crowned on the day before the trial.
+
+_Ech._ But what is this ship?
+
+_Phæd._ It is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus formerly
+conveyed the fourteen boys and girls to Crete, and saved both them and
+himself. They, therefore, made a vow to Apollo on that occasion, as it
+is said, that if they were saved they would every year dispatch a solemn
+embassy to Delos; which, from that time to the present, they send yearly
+to the god. 3. When they begin the preparations for this solemn embassy,
+they have a law that the city shall be purified during this period, and
+that no public execution shall take place until the ship has reached
+Delos, and returned to Athens; and this occasionally takes a long time,
+when the winds happen to impede their passage. The commencement of the
+embassy is when the priest of Apollo has crowned the poop of the ship.
+And this was done, as I said, on the day before the trial: on this
+account Socrates had a long interval in prison between the trial and his
+death.
+
+4. _Ech._ And what, Phædo, were the circumstances of his death? What was
+said and done? and who of his friends were with him? or would not the
+magistrates allow them to be present, but did he die destitute of
+friends?
+
+_Phæd._ By no means; but some, indeed several, were present.
+
+_Ech._ Take the trouble, then, to relate to me all the particulars as
+clearly as you can, unless you have any pressing business.
+
+_Phæd._ I am at leisure, and will endeavor to give you a full account;
+for to call Socrates to mind, whether speaking myself or listening to
+some one else, is always most delightful to me.
+
+5. _Ech._ And indeed, Phædo, you have others to listen to you who are of
+the same mind. However, endeavor to relate every thing as accurately as
+you can.
+
+_Phæd._ I was, indeed, wonderfully affected by being present, for I was
+not impressed with a feeling of pity, like one present at the death of a
+friend; for the man appeared to me to be happy, Echecrates, both from
+his manner and discourse, so fearlessly and nobly did he meet his death:
+so much so, that it occurred to me that in going to Hades he was not
+going without a divine destiny, but that when he arrived there he would
+be happy, if any one ever was. For this reason I was entirely
+uninfluenced by any feeling of pity, as would seem likely to be the case
+with one present on so mournful an occasion; nor was I affected by
+pleasure from being engaged in philosophical discussions, as was our
+custom; for our conversation was of that kind. But an altogether
+unaccountable feeling possessed me, a kind of unusual mixture compounded
+of pleasure and pain together, when I considered that he was immediately
+about to die. And all of us who were present were affected in much the
+same manner, at one time laughing, at another weeping--one of us
+especially, Apollodorus, for you know the man and his manner.
+
+_Ech._ How should I not?
+
+6. _Phæd._ He, then, was entirely overcome by these emotions; and I,
+too, was troubled, as well as the others.
+
+_Ech._ But who were present, Phædo?
+
+_Phæd._ Of his fellow-countrymen, this Apollodorus was present, and
+Critobulus, and his father, Crito; moreover, Hermogenes, Epigenes,
+Æschines and Antisthenes; Ctesippus the Pæanian, Menexenus, and some
+others of his countrymen, were also there: Plato, I think, was sick.
+
+_Ech._ Were any strangers present?
+
+_Phæd._ Yes; Simmias, the Theban, Cebes and Phædondes; and from Megara,
+Euclides and Terpsion.
+
+7. _Ech._ But what! were not Aristippus and Cleombrotus present?
+
+_Phæd._ No, for they were said to be at Ægina.
+
+_Ech._ Was any one else there?
+
+_Phæd._ I think that these were nearly all who were present.
+
+_Ech._ Well, now, what do you say was the subject of conversation?
+
+_Phæd._ I will endeavor to relate the whole to you from the beginning.
+On the preceding days I and the others were constantly in the habit of
+visiting Socrates, meeting early in the morning at the court house where
+the trial took place, for it was near the prison. 8. Here, then, we
+waited every day till the prison was opened, conversing with each other,
+for it was not opened very early; but as soon as it was opened we went
+in to Socrates, and usually spent the day with him. On that occasion,
+however, we met earlier than usual; for on the preceding day, when we
+left the prison in the evening, we heard that the ship had arrived from
+Delos. We therefore urged each other to come as early as possible to the
+accustomed place. Accordingly we came; and the porter, who used to admit
+us, coming out, told us to wait, and not to enter until he had called
+us. "For," he said, "the Eleven are now freeing Socrates from his bonds,
+and announcing to him that he must die to-day." But in no long time he
+returned, and bade us enter.
+
+9. When we entered, we found Socrates just freed from his bonds, and
+Xantippe, you know her, holding his little boy, and sitting by him. As
+soon as Xantippe saw us she wept aloud, and said such things as women
+usually do on such occasions--as, "Socrates, your friends will now
+converse with you for the last time, and you with them." But Socrates,
+looking towards Crito, said: "Crito, let some one take her home." Upon
+which some of Crito's attendants led her away, wailing and beating
+herself.
+
+But Socrates, sitting up in bed, drew up his leg, and rubbed it with his
+hand, and as he rubbed it, said: "What an unaccountable thing, my
+friends, that seems to be, which men call pleasure! and how wonderfully
+is it related toward that which appears to be its contrary, pain, in
+that they will not both be present to a man at the same time! Yet if any
+one pursues and attains the one, he is almost always compelled to
+receive the other, as if they were both united together from one head."
+
+10. "And it seems tome," he said, "that if Æsop had observed this he
+would have made a fable from it, how the deity, wishing to reconcile
+these warring principles, when he could not do so, united their heads
+together, and from hence whomsoever the one visits the other attends
+immediately after; as appears to be the case with me, since I suffered
+pain in my leg before from the chain, but now pleasure seems to have
+succeeded."
+
+Hereupon Cebes, interrupting him, said: "By Jupiter! Socrates, you have
+done well in reminding me; with respect to the poems which you made, by
+putting into metre those Fables of Æsop and the hymn to Apollo, several
+other persons asked me, and especially Evenus recently, with what design
+you made them after you came here, whereas before you had never made
+any. 11. If therefore, you care at all that I should be able to answer
+Evenus, when he asks me again--for I am sure he will do so--tell me
+what I must say to him."
+
+"Tell him the truth, then, Cebes," he replied, "that I did not make them
+from a wish to compete with him, or his poems, for I knew that this
+would be no easy matter; but that I might discover the meaning of
+certain dreams, and discharge my conscience, if this should happen to be
+the music which they have often ordered me to apply myself to. For they
+were to the following purport: often in my past life the same dream
+visited me, appearing at different times in different forms, yet always
+saying the same thing--'Socrates,' it said, 'apply yourself to and
+practice music.' 12. And I formerly supposed that it exhorted and
+encouraged me to continue the pursuit I was engaged in, as those who
+cheer on racers, so that the dream encouraged me to continue the pursuit
+I was engaged in--namely, to apply myself to music, since philosophy is
+the highest music, and I was devoted to it. But now since my trial took
+place, and the festival of the god retarded my death, it appeared to me
+that if by chance the dream so frequently enjoined me to apply myself to
+popular music, I ought not to disobey it, but do so, for that it would
+be safer for me not to depart hence before I had discharged my
+conscience by making some poems in obedience to the dream. Thus, then, I
+first of all composed a hymn to the god whose festival was present; and
+after the god, considering that a poet, if he means to be a poet, ought
+to make fables, and not discourses, and knowing that I was not skilled
+in making fables, I therefore put into verse those Fables of Æsop, which
+were at hand, and were known to me, and which first occurred to me."
+
+13. "Tell this, then, to Evenus, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and if he
+is wise, to follow me as soon as he can. But I depart, as it seems,
+to-day; for so the Athenians order."
+
+To this Simmias said, "What is this, Socrates, which you exhort Evenus
+to do? for I often meet with him; and, from what I know of him, I am
+pretty certain that he will not at all be willing to comply with your
+advice."
+
+"What, then," said he, "is not Evenus a philosopher?"
+
+"To me he seems to be so," said Simmias.
+
+"Then he will be willing," rejoined Socrates, "and so will every one who
+worthily engages in this study. Perhaps, indeed, he will not commit
+violence on himself; for that, they say, is not allowable." And as he
+said this he let down his leg from the bed on the ground, and in this
+posture continued during the remainder of the discussion.
+
+Cebes then asked him, "What do you mean, Socrates, by saying that it is
+not lawful to commit violence on one's self, but that a philosopher
+should be willing to follow one who is dying?"
+
+14. "What, Cebes! have not you and Simmias, who have conversed
+familiarly with Philolaus[26] on this subject, heard?"
+
+"Nothing very clearly, Socrates."
+
+"I, however, speak only from hearsay; what, then, I have heard I have no
+scruple in telling. And perhaps it is most becoming for one who is about
+to travel there to inquire and speculate about the journey thither, what
+kind we think it is. What else can one do in the interval before
+sunset?"
+
+"Why, then, Socrates, do they say that it is not allowable to kill one's
+self? for I, as you asked just now, have heard both Philolaus, when he
+lived with us, and several others, say that it was not right to do this;
+but I never heard any thing clear upon the subject from any one."
+
+15. "Then, you should consider it attentively," said Socrates, "for
+perhaps you may hear. Probably, however, it will appear wonderful to
+you, if this alone, of all other things, is a universal truth,[27] and
+it never happens to a man, as is the case in all other things, that at
+some times and to some persons only it is better to die than to live;
+yet that these men for whom it is better to die--this probably will
+appear wonderful to you--may not without impiety do this good to
+themselves, but must await another benefactor."
+
+16. Then Cebes, gently smiling, said, speaking in his own dialect,[28]
+"Jove be witness!"
+
+"And, indeed," said Socrates, "it would appear to be unreasonable; yet
+still, perhaps, it has some reason on its side. The maxim, indeed, given
+on this subject in the mystical doctrines,[29] that we men are in a kind
+of prison, and that we ought not to free ourselves from it and escape,
+appears to me difficult to be understood, and not easy to penetrate.
+This, however, appears to me, Cebes, to be well said: that the gods take
+care of us, and that we men are one of their possessions. Does it not
+seem so to you?"
+
+"It does," replied Cebes.
+
+"Therefore," said he, "if one of your slaves were to kill himself,
+without your having intimated that you wished him to die, should you not
+be angry with him, and should you not punish him if you could?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+"Perhaps, then, in this point of view, it is not unreasonable to assert
+that a man ought not to kill himself before the deity lays him under a
+necessity of doing so, such as that now laid on me."
+
+17. "This, indeed," said Cebes, "appears to be probable. But what you
+said just now, Socrates, that philosophers should be very willing to
+die, appears to be an absurdity, if what we said just now is agreeable
+to reason--that it is God who takes care of us, and that we are his
+property. For that the wisest men should not be grieved at leaving that
+service in which they govern them who are the best of all
+masters--namely, the gods--is not consistent with reason; for surely he
+can not think that he will take better care of himself when he has
+become free. But a foolish man might perhaps think thus, that he should
+fly from his master, and would not reflect that he ought not to fly from
+a good one, but should cling to him as much as possible; therefore he
+would fly against all reason; but a man of sense would desire to be
+constantly with one better than himself. Thus, Socrates, the contrary of
+what you just now said is likely to be the case; for it becomes the wise
+to be grieved at dying, but the foolish to rejoice."
+
+18. Socrates, on hearing this, appeared to me to be pleased with the
+pertinacity of Cebes, and, looking toward us, said, "Cebes, you see,
+always searches out arguments, and is not at all willing to admit at
+once any thing one has said."
+
+Whereupon Simmias replied, "But, indeed, Socrates, Cebes appears to me
+now to say something to the purpose; for with what design should men
+really wise fly from masters who are better than themselves, and so
+readily leave them? And Cebes appears to me to direct his argument
+against you, because you so easily endure to abandon both us and those
+good rulers, as you yourself confess, the gods."
+
+"You speak justly," said Socrates, "for I think you mean that I ought to
+make my defense to this charge, as if I were in a court of justice."
+
+"Certainly," replied Simmias.
+
+19. "Come, then," said he, "I will endeavor to defend myself more
+successfully before you than before the judges. For," he proceeded,
+"Simmias and Cebes, if I did not think that I should go, first of all,
+among other deities who are both wise and good, and, next, among men who
+have departed this life, better than any here, I should be wrong in not
+grieving at death; but now, be assured, I hope to go among good men,
+though I would not positively assert it. That, however, I shall go among
+gods who are perfectly good masters, be assured I can positively assert
+this, if I can any thing of the kind. So that, on this account, I am not
+so much troubled, but I entertain a good hope that something awaits
+those who die, and that, as was said long since, it will be far better
+for the good than the evil."
+
+20. "What, then, Socrates," said Simmias, "would you go away keeping
+this persuasion to yourself, or would you impart it to us? For this good
+appears to me to be also common to us; and at the same time it will be
+an apology for you, if you can persuade us to believe what you say."
+
+"I will endeavor to do so," he said. "But first let us attend to Crito
+here, and see what it is he seems to have for some time wished to say."
+
+"What else, Socrates," said Crito, "but what he who is to give you the
+poison told me some time ago, that I should tell you to speak as little
+as possible? For he says that men become too much heated by speaking,
+and that nothing of this kind ought to interfere with the poison; and
+that, otherwise, those who did so were sometimes compelled to drink two
+or three times."
+
+To which Socrates replied, "Let him alone, and let him attend to his own
+business, and prepare to give it me twice, or, if occasion require, even
+thrice."
+
+21. "I was almost certain what you would say," answered Crito, "but he
+has been some time pestering me."
+
+"Never mind him," he rejoined.
+
+"But now I wish to render an account to you, my judges, of the reason
+why a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy, when he is
+about to die, appears to me, on good grounds, to have confidence, and to
+entertain a firm hope that the greatest good will befall him in the
+other world when he has departed this life. How, then, this comes to
+pass, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavor to explain."
+
+"For as many as rightly apply themselves to philosophy seem to have left
+all others in ignorance, that they aim at nothing else than to die and
+be dead. If this, then, is true, it would surely be absurd to be anxious
+about nothing else than this during their whole life, but, when it
+arrives, to be grieved at what they have been long anxious about and
+aimed at."
+
+22. Upon this, Simmias, smiling, said, "By Jupiter! Socrates, though I
+am not now at all inclined to smile, you have made me do so; for I think
+that the multitude, if they heard this, would think it was very well
+said in reference to philosophers, and that our countrymen particularly
+would agree with you, that true philosophers do desire death, and that
+they are by no means ignorant that they deserve to suffer it."
+
+"And, indeed, Simmias, they would speak the truth, except in asserting
+that they are not ignorant; for they are ignorant of the sense in which
+true philosophers desire to die, and in what sense they deserve death,
+and what kind of death. But," he said, "let us take leave of them, and
+speak to one another. Do we think that death is any thing?"
+
+"Certainly," replied Simmias.
+
+23. "Is it any thing else than the separation of the soul from the
+body? And is not this to die, for the body to be apart by itself
+separated from the soul, and for the soul to subsist apart by itself
+separated from the body? Is death any thing else than this?"
+
+"No, but this," he replied.
+
+"Consider, then, my good friend, whether you are of the same opinion as
+I; for thus, I think, we shall understand better the subject we are
+considering. Does it appear to you to be becoming in a philosopher to be
+anxious about pleasures, as they are called, such as meats and drinks?"
+
+"By no means, Socrates," said Simmias.
+
+"But what? about the pleasures of love?"
+
+"Not at all."
+
+24. "What, then? Does such a man appear to you to think other bodily
+indulgences of value? For instance, does he seem to you to value or
+despise the possession of magnificent garments and sandals, and other
+ornaments of the body except so far as necessity compels him to use
+them?"
+
+"The true philosopher," he answered, "appears to me to despise them."
+
+"Does not, then," he continued, "the whole employment of such a man
+appear to you to be, not about the body, but to separate himself from it
+as much as possible, and be occupied about his soul?"
+
+"It does."
+
+"First of all, then, in such matters, does not the philosopher, above
+all other men, evidently free his soul as much as he can from communion
+with the body?"
+
+"It appears so."
+
+25. "And it appears, Simmias, to the generality of men, that he who
+takes no pleasure in such things, and who does not use them, does not
+deserve to live; but that he nearly approaches to death who cares
+nothing for the pleasures that subsist through the body."
+
+"You speak very truly."
+
+"But what with respect to the acquisition of wisdom? Is the body an
+impediment, or not, if any one takes it with him as a partner in the
+search? What I mean is this: Do sight and hearing convey any truth to
+men, or are they such as the poets constantly sing, who say that we
+neither hear nor see any thing with accuracy? If, however, these bodily
+senses are neither accurate nor clear, much less can the others be so;
+for they are all far inferior to these. Do they not seem so to you?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+26. "When, then," said he, "does the soul light on the truth? for when
+it attempts to consider any thing in conjunction with the body, it is
+plain that it is then led astray by it."
+
+"You say truly."
+
+"Must it not, then, be by reasoning, if at all, that any of the things
+that really are become known to it?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"And surely the soul then reasons best when none of these things disturb
+it--neither hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor pleasure of any kind; but
+it retires as much as possible within itself, taking leave of the body;
+and, so far as it can, not communicating or being in contact with it, it
+aims at the discovery of that which is."
+
+"Such is the case."
+
+"Does not, then, the soul of the philosopher, in these cases, despise
+the body, and flee from it, and seek to retire within itself?"
+
+"It appears so."
+
+27. "But what as to such things as these, Simmias? Do we say that
+justice itself is something or nothing?"
+
+"We say it is something, by Jupiter!"
+
+"And that beauty and goodness are something?"
+
+"How not?"
+
+"Now, then, have you ever seen any thing of this kind with your eyes?"
+
+"By no means," he replied.
+
+"Did you ever lay hold of them by any other bodily sense? But I speak
+generally, as of magnitude, health, strength and, in a word, of the
+essence of every thing; that is to say, what each is. Is, then, the
+exact truth of these perceived by means of the body, or is it thus,
+whoever among us habituates himself to reflect most deeply and
+accurately on each several thing about which he is considering, he will
+make the nearest approach to the knowledge of it?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+28. "Would not he, then, do this with the utmost purity, who should in
+the highest degree approach each subject by means of the mere mental
+faculties, neither employing the sight in conjunction with the
+reflective faculty, nor introducing any other sense together with
+reasoning; but who, using pure reflection by itself, should attempt to
+search out each essence purely by itself, freed as much as possible from
+the eyes and ears, and, in a word, from the whole body, as disturbing
+the soul, and not suffering it to acquire truth and wisdom, when it is
+in communion with it. Is not he the person, Simmias, if any one can, who
+will arrive at the knowledge of that which is?"
+
+29. "You speak with wonderful truth, Socrates," replied Simmias.
+
+"Wherefore," he said, "it necessarily follows from all this that some
+such opinion as this should be entertained by genuine philosophers, so
+that they should speak among themselves as follows: 'A by-path, as it
+were, seems to lead us on in our researches undertaken by reason,'
+because so long as we are encumbered with the body, and our soul is
+contaminated with such an evil, we can never fully attain to what we
+desire; and this, we say, is truth. For the body subjects us to
+innumerable hinderances on account of its necessary support; and,
+moreover, if any diseases befall us, they impede us in our search after
+that which is; and it fills us with longings, desires, fears, all kinds
+of fancies, and a multitude of absurdities, so that, as it is said in
+real truth, by reason of the body it is never possible for us to make
+any advances in wisdom. 30. For nothing else than the body and its
+desires occasion wars, seditions, and contests; for all wars among us
+arise on account of our desire to acquire wealth: and we are compelled
+to acquire wealth on account of the body, being enslaved to its service;
+and consequently on all these accounts we are hindered in the pursuit of
+philosophy. But the worst of all is, that if it leaves us any leisure,
+and we apply ourselves to the consideration of any subject, it
+constantly obtrudes itself in the midst of our researches, and occasions
+trouble and disturbance, and confounds us so that we are not able, by
+reason of it, to discern the truth. It has, then, in reality been
+demonstrated to us that if we are ever to know any thing purely, we must
+be separated from the body, and contemplate the things themselves by the
+mere soul; and then, as it seems, we shall obtain that which we desire,
+and which we profess ourselves to be lovers of--wisdom--when we are
+dead, as reason shows, but not while we are alive. 31. For if it is not
+possible to know any thing purely in conjunction with the body, one of
+these two things must follow, either that we can never acquire
+knowledge, or only after we are dead; for then the soul will subsist
+apart by itself, separate from the body, but not before. And while we
+live we shall thus, as it seems, approach nearest to knowledge, if we
+hold no intercourse or communion at all with the body, except what
+absolute necessity requires, nor suffer ourselves to be polluted by its
+nature, but purify ourselves from it, until God himself shall release
+us. And thus being pure, and freed from the folly of body, we shall in
+all likelihood be with others like ourselves, and shall of ourselves
+know the whole real essence, and that probably is truth; for it is not
+allowable for the impure to attain to the pure. Such things, I think,
+Simmias, all true lovers of wisdom must both think and say to one
+another. Does it not seem so to you?"
+
+"Most assuredly, Socrates."
+
+32. "If this, then," said Socrates, "is true, my friend, there is great
+hope for one who arrives where I am going, there, if anywhere, to
+acquire that in perfection for the sake of which we have taken so much
+pains during our past life; so that the journey now appointed me is set
+out upon with good hope, and will be so by any other man who thinks that
+his mind has been, as it were, purified."
+
+"Certainly," said Simmias.
+
+"But does not purification consist in this, as was said in a former part
+of our discourse, in separating as much as possible the soul from the
+body, and in accustoming it to gather and collect itself by itself on
+all sides apart from the body, and to dwell, so far as it can, both now
+and hereafter, alone by itself, delivered, as it were, from the shackles
+of the body?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+33. "Is this, then, called death, this deliverance and separation of the
+soul from the body?"
+
+"Assuredly," he answered.
+
+"But, as we affirmed, those who pursue philosophy rightly are especially
+and alone desirous to deliver it; and this is the very study of
+philosophers, the deliverance and separation of the soul from the body,
+is it not?"
+
+"It appears so."
+
+"Then, as I said at first, would it not be ridiculous for a man who has
+endeavored throughout his life to live as near as possible to death,
+then, when death arrives, to grieve? would not this be ridiculous?"
+
+"How should it not?"
+
+"In reality, then, Simmias," he continued, "those who pursue philosophy
+rightly, study to die; and to them, of all men, death is least
+formidable. Judge from this. Since they altogether hate the body and
+desire to keep the soul by itself, would it not be irrational if, when
+this comes to pass, they should be afraid and grieve, and not be glad to
+go to that place where, on their arrival, they may hope to obtain that
+which they longed for throughout life? But they longed for wisdom, and
+to be freed from association with that which they hated. 34. Have many
+of their own accord wished to descend into Hades, on account of human
+objects of affection, their wives and sons, induced by this very hope of
+their seeing and being with those whom they have loved? and shall one
+who really loves wisdom, and firmly cherishes this very hope, that he
+shall nowhere else attain it in a manner worthy of the name, except in
+Hades, be grieved at dying, and not gladly go there? We must think that
+he would gladly go, my friend, if he be in truth a philosopher; for he
+will be firmly persuaded of this, that he will nowhere else than there
+attain wisdom in its purity; and if this be so, would it not be very
+irrational, as I just now said, if such a man were to be afraid of
+death?"
+
+"Very much so, by Jupiter!" he replied.
+
+35. "Would not this, then," he resumed, "be a sufficient proof to you
+with respect to a man whom you should see grieved when about to die,
+that he was not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of his body? And this
+same person is probably a lover of riches and a lover of honor, one or
+both of these."
+
+"It certainly is as you say," he replied.
+
+"Does not, then," he said, "that which is called fortitude, Simmias,
+eminently belong to philosophers?"
+
+"By all means," he answered.
+
+"And temperance, also, which even the multitude call temperance, and
+which consists in not being carried away by the passions, but in holding
+them in contempt, and keeping them in subjection, does not this belong
+to those only who most despise the body, and live in the study of
+philosophy?"
+
+"Necessarily so," he replied.
+
+36. "For," he continued, "if you will consider the fortitude and
+temperance of others, they will appear to you to be absurd."
+
+"How so, Socrates?"
+
+"Do you know," he said, "that all others consider death among the great
+evils?"
+
+"They do indeed," he answered.
+
+"Then, do the brave among them endure death when they do endure it,
+through dread of greater evils?"
+
+"It is so."
+
+"All men, therefore, except philosophers, are brave through being afraid
+and fear; though it is absurd that any one should be brave through fear
+and cowardice."
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But what, are not those among them who keep their passions in
+subjection affected in the same way? and are they not temperate through
+a kind of intemperance? And although we may say, perhaps, that this is
+impossible, nevertheless the manner in which they are affected with
+respect to this silly temperance resembles this, for, fearing to be
+deprived of other pleasures, and desiring them, they abstain from some,
+being mastered by others. And though they call intemperance the being
+governed by pleasures, yet it happens to them that, by being mastered by
+some pleasures, they master others, and this is similar to what was just
+now said, that in a certain manner they become temperate through
+intemperance."
+
+"So it seems,"
+
+37. "My dear Simmias, consider that this is not a right exchange for
+virtue, to barter pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, fear for
+fear, and the greater for the lesser, like pieces of money, but that
+that alone is the right coin, for which we ought to barter all these
+things, wisdom, and for this and with this everything is in reality
+bought and sold Fortitude, temperance and justice, and, in a word true
+virtue, subsist with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears, and everything
+else of the kind, are present or absent, but when separated from wisdom
+and changed one for another, consider whether such virtue is not a mere
+outline and in reality servile, possessing neither soundness nor truth.
+But the really true virtue is a purification from all such things, and
+temperance, justice, fortitude and wisdom itself, are a kind of
+initiatory purification 38. And those who instituted the mysteries for
+us appear to have been by no means contemptible, but in reality to have
+intimated long since that whoever shall arrive in Hades unexpiated and
+uninitiated shall lie in mud, but he that arrives there purified and
+initiated shall dwell with the gods 'For there are,' say those who
+preside at the mysteries, 'many wand-bearers, but few inspired'. These
+last, in my opinion, are no other than those who have pursued philosophy
+rightly that I might be of their number. I have to the utmost of my
+ability left no means untried, but have endeavored to the utmost of my
+power. But whether I have endeavored rightly, and have in any respect
+succeeded, on arriving there I shall know clearly, if it please
+God--very shortly, as it appears to me."
+
+39. "Such, then, Simmias and Cebes," he added, "is the defense I make,
+for that I, on good grounds, do not repine or grieve at leaving you and
+my masters here, being persuaded that there, no less than here, I shall
+meet with good masters and friends. But to the multitude this is
+incredible If, however, I have succeeded better with you in my defense
+than I did with the Athenian judges, it is well."
+
+When Socrates had thus spoken, Cebes, taking up the discussion, said
+"Socrates, all the rest appears to me to be said rightly, but what you
+have said respecting the soul will occasion much incredulity in many
+from the apprehension that when it is separated from the body it no
+longer exists anywhere, but is destroyed and perishes on the very day in
+which a man dies, and that immediately it is separated and goes out from
+the body it is dispersed, and vanishes like breath or smoke, and is no
+longer anywhere, since if it remained anywhere united in itself, and
+freed from those evils which you have just now enumerated, there would
+be an abundant and good hope, Socrates, that what you say is true 40.
+But this probably needs no little persuasion and proof, that the soul of
+a man who dies exists, and possesses activity and intelligence."
+
+"You say truly, Cebes," said Socrates, "but what shall we do? Are you
+willing that we should converse on these points, whether such is
+probably the case or not?"
+
+"Indeed," replied Cebes, "I should gladly hear your opinion on these
+matters."
+
+"I do not think," said Socrates, "that any one who should now hear us,
+even though he were a comic poet, would say that I am talking idly, or
+discoursing on subjects that do not concern me. If you please, then, we
+will examine into it. Let us consider it in this point of view, whether
+the souls of men who are dead exist in Hades, or not. This is an ancient
+saying, which we now call to mind, that souls departing hence exist
+there, and return hither again, and are produced from the dead. 41. And
+if this is so, that the living are produced again from the dead, can
+there be any other consequence than that our souls are there? for surely
+they could not be produced again if they did not exist; and this would
+be sufficient proof that these things are so, if it should in reality be
+evident that the living are produced from no other source than the dead.
+But if this is not the case, there will be need of other arguments."
+
+"Certainly," said Cebes.
+
+"You must not, then," he continued, "consider this only with respect to
+men, if you wish to ascertain it with greater certainty, but also with
+respect to all animals and plants, and, in a word, with respect to every
+thing that is subject to generation. Let us see whether they are not all
+so produced, no otherwise than contraries from contraries, wherever they
+have any such quality; as, for instance, the honorable is contrary to
+the base, and the just to the unjust, and so with ten thousand other
+things. 42. Let us consider this, then, whether it is necessary that all
+things which have a contrary should be produced from nothing else than
+their contrary. As, for instance, when any thing becomes greater, is it
+not necessary that, from being previously smaller, it afterward became
+greater?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"And if it becomes smaller, will it not, from being previously greater,
+afterward become smaller?"
+
+"It is so," he replied.
+
+"And from stronger, weaker? and from slower, swifter?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"What, then? If any thing becomes worse, must it not become so from
+better? and if more just, from more unjust?"
+
+"How should it not?"
+
+"We have then," he said, "sufficiently determined this, that all things
+are thus produced, contraries from contraries?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"What next? Is there also something of this kind in them; for instance,
+between all two contraries a mutual twofold production, from one to the
+other, and from that other back again? for between a greater thing and a
+smaller there are increase and decrease, and do we not accordingly call
+the one to increase, the other to decrease?"
+
+"Yes," he replied.
+
+43. "And must not to be separated and commingled, to grow cold and to
+grow warm, and every thing in the same manner, even though sometimes we
+have not names to designate them, yet in fact be everywhere thus
+circumstanced, of necessity, as to be produced from each other, and be
+subject to a reciprocal generation?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+"What, then?" said Socrates, "has life any contrary, as waking has its
+contrary, sleeping?"
+
+"Certainly," he answered.
+
+"What?"
+
+"Death," he replied.
+
+"Are not these, then, produced from each other, since they are
+contraries; and are not the modes by which they are produced two-fold
+intervening between these two?"
+
+"How should it be otherwise?"
+
+"I then," continued Socrates, "will describe to you one pair of the
+contraries which I have just now mentioned, both what it is and its mode
+of production: and do you describe to me the other. I say that one is to
+sleep, the other to awake; and from sleeping awaking is produced, and
+from awaking sleeping, and that the modes of their production are, the
+one to fall asleep, the other to be roused. 44. Have I sufficiently
+explained this to you or not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Do you, then," he said, "describe to me in the same manner with respect
+to life and death? Do you not say that life is contrary to death?"
+
+"I do."
+
+"And that they are produced from each other?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"What, then, is produced from life?"
+
+"Death," he replied.
+
+"What, then," said he "is produced from death?"
+
+"I must needs confess," he replied, "that life is."
+
+"From the dead, then, O Cebes! living things and living men are
+produced."
+
+"It appears so," he said.
+
+"Our souls, therefore," said Socrates, "exist in Hades."
+
+"So it seems."
+
+"With respect, then, to their mode of production, is not one of them
+very clear? for to die surely is clear, is it not?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+"What, then, shall we do?" he continued; "shall we not find a
+corresponding contrary mode of production, or will nature be defective
+in this? Or must we discover a contrary mode of production to dying?"
+
+"By all means," he said.
+
+"What is this?"
+
+"To revive."
+
+"Therefore," he proceeded, "if there is such a thing as to revive, will
+not this reviving be a mode of production from the dead to the living?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Thus, then, we have agreed that the living are produced from the dead,
+no less than the dead from the living; but, this being the case, there
+appears to me sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must
+necessarily exist somewhere, from whence they are again produced."
+
+45. "It appears to me, Socrates," he said "that this must necessarily
+follow from what has been admitted."
+
+"See now, O Cebes!" he said, "that we have not agreed on these things
+improperly, as it appears to me; for if one class of things were not
+constantly given back in the place of another, revolving, as it were, in
+a circle, but generation were direct from one thing alone into its
+opposite, and did not turn round again to the other, or retrace its
+course, do you know that all things would at length have the same form,
+be in the same state, and cease to be produced?"
+
+"How say you?" he asked.
+
+"It is by no means difficult," he replied, "to understand what I mean;
+if, for instance, there should be such a thing as falling asleep, but no
+reciprocal waking again produced from a state of sleep, you know that at
+length all things would show the fable of Endymion to be a jest, and it
+would be thought nothing at all of, because everything else would be in
+the same state as he--namely, asleep. And if all things were mingled
+together, but never separated, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be
+verified, 'all things would be together.' 46. Likewise, my dear Cebes,
+if all things that partake of life should die, and after they are dead
+should remain in this state of death, and not revive again, would it not
+necessarily follow that at length all things should be dead, and nothing
+alive? For if living beings are produced from other things, and living
+beings die, what could prevent their being all absorbed in death?"
+
+"Nothing whatever, I think, Socrates," replied Cebes; "but you appear to
+me to speak the exact truth."
+
+"For, Cebes," he continued, "as it seems to me, such undoubtedly is the
+case, and we have not admitted these things under a delusion, for it is
+in reality true that there is a reviving again, that the living are
+produced from the dead, that the souls of the dead exist, and that the
+condition of the good is better, and of the evil worse."
+
+47. "And, indeed," said Cebes, interrupting him, "according to that
+doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently in the habit of advancing,
+if it is true, that our learning is nothing else than reminiscence,
+according to this it is surely necessary that we must at some former
+time have learned what we now remember. But this is impossible, unless
+our soul existed somewhere before it came into this human form; so that
+from hence, also, the soul appears to be something immortal."
+
+"But, Cebes," said Simmias, interrupting him, "what proofs are there of
+these things? Remind me of them, for I do not very well remember them at
+present."
+
+48. "It is proved," said Cebes, "by one argument, and that a most
+beautiful one, that men, when questioned (if one questions them
+properly) of themselves, describe all things as they are, however, if
+they had not innate knowledge and right reason, they would never be
+able to do this. Moreover, if one leads them to diagrams, or any thing
+else of the kind, it is then most clearly apparent that this is the
+case."
+
+"But if you are not persuaded in this way, Simmias," said Socrates, "see
+if you will agree with us in considering the matter thus. For do you
+doubt how that which is called learning is reminiscence?"
+
+"I do not doubt," said Simmias; "but I require this very thing of which
+we are speaking, to be reminded; and, indeed, from what Cebes has begun
+to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded; nevertheless, however,
+I should like to hear now how you would attempt to prove it."
+
+"I do it thus" he replied: "we admit, surely, that if any one be
+reminded of any thing, he must needs have known that thing at some time
+or other before."
+
+"Certainly," he said.
+
+49. "Do we, then, admit this also, that when knowledge comes in a
+certain manner it is reminiscence? But the manner I mean is this: if any
+one, upon seeing or hearing, or perceiving through the medium of any
+other sense, some particular thing, should not only know that, but also
+form an idea of something else, of which the knowledge is not the same,
+but different, should we not justly say that he remembered that of which
+he received the idea?"
+
+"How mean you?"
+
+"For instance, the knowledge of a man is different from that of a lyre."
+
+"How not?"
+
+"Do you not know, then, that lovers when they see a lyre, or a garment,
+or any thing else which their favorite is accustomed to use, are thus
+affected; they both recognize the lyre, and receive in their minds the
+form of the person to whom the lyre belonged? This is reminiscence: just
+as any one, seeing Simmias, is often reminded of Cebes, and so in an
+infinite number of similar instances."
+
+"An infinite number, indeed, by Jupiter!" said Simmias.
+
+"Is not, then," he said, "something of this sort a kind of reminiscence,
+especially when one is thus affected with respect to things which, from
+lapse of time, and not thinking of them, one has now forgotten?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+50. "But what?" he continued. "Does it happen that when one sees a
+painted horse or a painted lyre one is reminded of a man, and that when
+one sees a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Cebes?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"And does it not also happen that on seeing a picture of Simmias one is
+reminded of Simmias himself?"
+
+"It does, indeed," he replied.
+
+"Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that reminiscence
+arises partly from things like, and partly from things unlike?"
+
+"It does."
+
+"But when one is reminded by things like, is it not necessary that one
+should be thus further affected, so as to perceive whether, as regards
+likeness, this falls short or not of the thing of which one has been
+reminded?"
+
+"It is necessary," he replied.
+
+"Consider, then," said Socrates, "if the case is thus. Do we allow that
+there is such a thing as equality? I do not mean of one log with
+another, nor one stone with another, nor any thing else of this kind,
+but something altogether different from all these--abstract equality; do
+we allow that there is any such thing, or not?"
+
+"By Jupiter! we most assuredly do allow it," replied Simmias.
+
+51. "And do we know what it is itself?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+"Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things
+we have just now mentioned, and that from seeing logs, or stones, or
+other things of the kind, equal, we have from these formed an idea of
+that which is different from these--for does it not appear to you to be
+different? Consider the matter thus. Do not stones that are equal, and
+logs sometimes that are the same, appear at one time equal, and at
+another not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But what? Does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? or
+equality inequality?"
+
+"Never, Socrates, at any time."
+
+"These equal things, then," he said, "and abstract equality, are not the
+same?"
+
+"By no means, Socrates, as it appears."
+
+"However, from these equal things," he said, "which are different from
+that abstract equality, have you not formed your idea and derived your
+knowledge of it?"
+
+"You speak most truly," he replied.
+
+"Is it not, therefore, from its being like or unlike them?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But it makes no difference," he said. "When, therefore, on seeing one
+thing, you form, from the sight of it, the notion of another, whether
+like or unlike, this," he said, "must necessarily be reminiscence."
+
+"Certainly."
+
+52. "What, then, as to this?" he continued. "Are we affected in any such
+way with regard to logs and the equal things we have just now spoken of?
+And do they appear to us to be equal in the same manner as abstract
+equality itself is, or do they fall short in some degree, or not at
+all, of being such as equality itself is?"
+
+"They fall far short," he replied.
+
+"Do we admit, then, that when one, on beholding some particular thing,
+perceives that it aims, as that which I now see, at being like something
+else that exists, but falls short of it, and can not become such as that
+is, but is inferior to it--do we admit that he who perceives this must
+necessarily have had a previous knowledge of that which he says it
+resembles, though imperfectly?"
+
+"It is necessary."
+
+"What, then? Are we affected in some such way, or not, with respect to
+things equal and abstract equality itself?"
+
+"Assuredly."
+
+"It is necessary, therefore, that we must have known abstract equality
+before the time when, on first seeing equal things, we perceived that
+they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in doing so."
+
+"Such is the case."
+
+53. "Moreover, we admit this too, that we perceived this, and could not
+possibly perceive it by any other means than the sight, or touch, or
+some other of the senses, for I say the same of them all."
+
+"For they are the same, Socrates, so far as, our argument is concerned."
+
+"However, we must perceive, by means of the senses, that all things
+which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality, and yet fall
+short of it; or how shall we say it is?"
+
+"Even so."
+
+"Before, then, we began to see, and hear, and use our other senses, we
+must have had a knowledge of equality itself--what it is, if we were to
+refer to it those equal things that come under the senses, and observe
+that all such things aim at resembling that, but fall far short of it."
+
+"This necessarily follows, Socrates, from what has been already said."
+
+"But did we not, as soon as we were born, see and hear, and possess our
+other senses?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But, we have said, before we possessed these, we must have had a
+knowledge of abstract equality?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"We must have had it, then, as it seems, before we were born."
+
+"It seems so."
+
+54. "If, therefore, having this before we were born, we were born
+possessing it, we knew, both before we were born and as soon as we were
+born, not only the equal and the greater and smaller, but all things of
+the kind; for our present discussion is not more respecting equality
+than the beautiful itself, the good, the just, and the holy, and, in one
+word, respecting every thing which we mark with the seal of existence,
+both in the questions we ask and the answers we give. So that we must
+necessarily have had a knowledge of all these before we were born."
+
+"Such is the case."
+
+"And if, having once had it, we did not constantly forget it, we should
+always be born with this knowledge, and should always retain it through
+life. For to know is this, when one has got a knowledge of any thing, to
+retain and not lose it; for do we not call this oblivion, Simmias, the
+loss of knowledge?"
+
+"Assuredly, Socrates," he replied.
+
+55. "But if, having had it before we were born, we lose it at our
+birth, and afterward, through exercising the senses about these things,
+we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed, would not that
+which we call learning be a recovery of our own knowledge? And in saying
+that this is to remember, should we not say rightly?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"For this appeared to be possible, for one having perceived any thing,
+either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense, to form an
+idea of something different from this, which he had forgotten, and with
+which this was connected by being unlike or like. So that, as I said,
+one of these two things must follow: either we are all born with this
+knowledge, and we retain it through life, or those whom we say learn
+afterward do nothing else than remember, and this learning will be
+reminiscence."
+
+"Such, certainly, is the case, Socrates."
+
+56. "Which, then, do you choose, Simmias: that we are born with
+knowledge, or that we afterward remember what we had formerly known?"
+
+"At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose."
+
+"But what? Are you able to choose in this case, and what do you think
+about it? Can a man who possesses knowledge give a reason for the things
+that he knows, or not?"
+
+"He needs must be able to do so, Socrates," he replied.
+
+"And do all men appear to you to be able to give a reason for the things
+of which we have just now been speaking?"
+
+"I wish they could," said Simmias; "but I am much more afraid that at
+this time to-morrow there will no longer be any one able to do this
+properly."
+
+"Do not all men, then, Simmias," he said, "seem to you to know these
+things?"
+
+"By no means."
+
+"Do they remember, then, what they once learned?"
+
+"Necessarily so."
+
+"When did our souls receive this knowledge? Not surely, since we were
+born into the world."
+
+"Assuredly not."
+
+"Before, then?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"Our souls, therefore, Simmias, existed before they were in a human
+form, separate from bodies, and possessed intelligence."
+
+57. "Unless, Socrates, we receive this knowledge at our birth, for this
+period yet remains."
+
+"Be it so, my friend. But at what other time do we lose it? for we are
+not born with it, as we have just now admitted. Do we lose it, then, at
+the very time in which we receive it? Or can you mention any other
+time?"
+
+"By no means, Socrates; I was not aware that I was saying nothing to the
+purpose."
+
+"Does the case then stand thus with us, Simmias?" he proceeded: "If
+those things which we are continually talking about really exist, the
+beautiful, the good, and every such essence, and to this we refer all
+things that come under the senses, as finding it to have a prior
+existence, and to be our own, and if we compare these things to it, it
+necessarily follows, that as these exist, so likewise our soul exists
+even before we are born; but if these do not exist, this discussion will
+have been undertaken in vain, is it not so? And is there not an equal
+necessity both that these things should exist, and our souls also,
+before we are born; and if not the former, neither the latter?"
+
+58. "Most assuredly, Socrates," said Simmias, "there appears to me to be
+the same necessity; and the argument admirably tends to prove that our
+souls exist before we are born, just as that essence does which you have
+now mentioned. For I hold nothing so clear to me as this, that all such
+things most certainly exist, as the beautiful, the good, and all the
+rest that you just now spoke of; and, so far as I am concerned, the case
+is sufficiently demonstrated."
+
+"But how does it appear to Cebes?" said Socrates; "for it is necessary
+to persuade Cebes too."
+
+"He is sufficiently persuaded, I think," said Simmias, "although he is
+the most pertinacious of men in distrusting arguments. Yet I think he is
+sufficiently persuaded of this, that our soul existed before we were
+born. But whether, when we are dead, it will still exist does not appear
+to me to have been demonstrated, Socrates," he continued; "but that
+popular doubt, which Cebes just now mentioned, still stands in our way,
+whether, when a man dies, the soul is not dispersed, and this is the end
+of its existence. 59. For what hinders it being born, and formed from
+some other source, and existing before it came into a human body, and
+yet, when it has come, and is separated from this body, its then also
+dying itself, and being destroyed?"
+
+"You say well, Simmias," said Cebes; "for it appears that only one half
+of what is necessary has been demonstrated--namely, that our soul
+existed before we were born; but it is necessary to demonstrate further,
+that when we are dead it will exist no less than before we were born, if
+the demonstration is to be made complete."
+
+"This has been even now demonstrated, Simmias and Cebes," said Socrates,
+"if you will only connect this last argument with that which we before
+assented to, that every thing living is produced from that which is
+dead. For if the soul exists before, and it is necessary for it when it
+enters into life, and is born, to be produced from nothing else than
+death, and from being dead, how is it not necessary for it also to
+exist after death, since it must needs be produced again? 60. What you
+require, then, has been already demonstrated. However, both you and
+Simmias appear to me as if you wished to sift this argument more
+thoroughly, and to be afraid, like children, lest, on the soul's
+departure from the body, the winds should blow it away and disperse it,
+especially if one should happen to die, not in a calm, but in a violent
+storm."
+
+Upon this Cebes, smiling, said, "Endeavor to teach us better, Socrates,
+as if we were afraid, or rather not as if we were afraid, though perhaps
+there is some boy[30] within us who has such a dread. Let us, then,
+endeavor to persuade him not to be afraid of death, as of hobgoblins."
+
+"But you must charm him every day," said Socrates, "until you have
+quieted his fears."
+
+"But whence, Socrates," he said, "can we procure a skillful charmer for
+such a case, now that you are about to leave us?"
+
+61. "Greece is wide, Cebes," he replied, "and in it surely there are
+skillful men. There are also many barbarous nations, all of which you
+should search through, seeking such a charmer, sparing neither money nor
+toil, as there is nothing on which you can more seasonably spend your
+money. You should also seek for him among yourselves; for perhaps you
+could not easily find any more competent than yourselves to do this."
+
+"This shall be done," said Cebes; "but, if it is agreeable to you, let
+us return to the point from whence we digressed."
+
+"It will be agreeable to me, for how should it not?"
+
+"You say well," rejoined Cebes.
+
+"We ought, then," said Socrates, "to ask ourselves some such question
+as this: to what kind of thing it appertains to be thus
+affected--namely, to be dispersed--and for what we ought to fear, lest
+it should be so affected, and for what not. And after this we should
+consider which of the two the soul is, and in the result should either
+be confident or fearful for our soul."
+
+"You speak truly," said he.
+
+62. "Does it not, then, appertain to that which is formed by
+composition, and is naturally compounded, to be thus affected, to be
+dissolved in the same manner as that in which it was compounded; and if
+there is any thing not compounded, does it not appertain to this alone,
+if to any thing, not to be thus affected?"
+
+"It appears to me to be so," said Cebes.
+
+"Is it not most probable, then, that things which are always the same,
+and in the same state, are uncompounded, but that things which are
+constantly changing, and are never in the same state, are compounded?"
+
+"To me it appears so."
+
+"Let us return, then," he said, "to the subjects on which we before
+discoursed. Whether is essence itself, of which we gave this account
+that it exists, both in our questions and answers, always the same, or
+does it sometimes change? Does equality itself, the beautiful itself,
+and each several thing which is, ever undergo any change, however small?
+Or does each of them which exists, being an unmixed essence by itself,
+continue always the same, and in the same state, and never undergo any
+variation at all under any circumstances?"
+
+"They must of necessity continue the same and in the same state,
+Socrates," said Cebes.
+
+63. "But what shall we say of the many beautiful things, such as men,
+horses, garments, or other things of the kind, whether equal or
+beautiful, or of all things synonymous with them? Do they continue the
+same, or, quite contrary to the former, are they never at any time, so
+to say, the same, either with respect to themselves or one another?"
+
+"These, on the other hand," replied Cebes, "never continue the same."
+
+"These, then, you can touch, or see, or perceive by the other senses;
+but those that continue the same, you can not apprehend in any other way
+than by the exercise of thought; for such things are invisible, and are
+not seen?"
+
+"You say what is strictly true," replied Cebes.
+
+64. "We may assume, then, if you please," he continued, "that there are
+two species of things; the one visible, the other invisible?"
+
+"We may," he said.
+
+"And the invisible always continuing the same, but the visible never the
+same?"
+
+"This, too," he said, "we may assume."
+
+"Come, then," he asked, "is there anything else belonging to us than, on
+the one hand, body, and, on the other, soul?"
+
+"Nothing else," he replied.
+
+"To which species, then, shall we say the body is more like, and more
+nearly allied?"
+
+"It is clear to everyone," he said, "that it is to the visible."
+
+"But what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?"
+
+"It is not visible to men, Socrates," he replied.
+
+"But we speak of things which are visible, or not so, to the nature of
+men; or to some other nature, think you?"
+
+"To that of men."
+
+"What, then, shall we say of the soul--that it is visible, or not
+visible?"
+
+"Not visible."
+
+"Is it, then, invisible?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"The soul, then, is more like the invisible than the body; and the body,
+the visible?"
+
+"It must needs be so, Socrates."
+
+65. "And did we not, some time since, say this too, that the soul, when
+it employs the body to examine any thing, either by means of the sight
+or hearing, or any other sense (for to examine any thing by means of the
+body is to do so by the senses), is then drawn by the body to things
+that never continue the same, and wanders and is confused, and reels as
+if intoxicated, through coming into contact with things of this kind?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But when it examines anything by itself, does it approach that which is
+pure, eternal, immortal, and unchangeable, and, as being allied to it,
+continue constantly with it, so long as it subsists by itself, and has
+the power, and does it cease from its wandering, and constantly continue
+the same with respect to those things, through coming into contact with
+things of this kind? And is this affection of the soul called wisdom?"
+
+"You speak," he said, "in every respect, well and truly, Socrates."
+
+"To which species of the two, then, both from what was before and now
+said, does the soul appear to you to be more like and more nearly
+allied?"
+
+66. "Every one, I think, would allow, Socrates," he replied, "even the
+dullest person, from this method of reasoning, that the soul is in every
+respect more like that which continues constantly the same than that
+which does not so."
+
+"But what as to the body?"
+
+"It is more like the other."
+
+"Consider it also thus, that, when soul and body are together, nature
+enjoins the latter to be subservient and obey, the former to rule and
+exercise dominion. And, in this way, which of the two appears to you to
+be like the divine, and which the mortal? Does it not appear to you to
+be natural that the divine should rule and command, but the mortal obey
+and be subservient?"
+
+"To me it does so."
+
+"Which, then, does the soul resemble?"
+
+"It is clear, Socrates, that the soul resembles the divine; but the
+body, the mortal."
+
+"Consider, then, Cebes," said he, "whether, from all that has been said,
+these conclusions follow, that the soul is most like that which is
+divine, immortal, intelligent, uniform, indissoluble, and which always
+continues in the same state; but that the body, on the other hand, is
+most like that which is human, mortal, unintelligent, multiform,
+dissoluble, and which never continues in the same state. Can we say any
+thing against this, my dear Cebes, to show that it is not so?"
+
+"We can not."
+
+67. "What, then? Since these things are so, does it not appertain to the
+body to be quickly dissolved, but to the soul, on the contrary, to be
+altogether indissoluble or nearly so?"
+
+"How not?"
+
+"You perceive, however," he said, "that when a man dies, the visible
+part of him, the body, which is exposed to sight, and which we call a
+corpse, to which it appertains to be dissolved, to fall asunder and be
+dispersed, does not immediately undergo any of these affections, but
+remains for a considerable time, and especially so if any one should die
+with his body in full vigor, and at a corresponding age;[31] for when
+the body has collapsed and been embalmed, as those that are embalmed in
+Egypt, it remains almost entire for an incredible length of time; and
+some parts of the body, even though it does decay, such as the bones and
+nerves, and every thing of that kind, are, nevertheless, as one may say,
+immortal. Is it not so?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+68. "Can the soul, then, which is invisible, and which goes to another
+place like itself, excellent, pure and invisible, and therefore truly
+called the invisible world,[32] to the presence of a good and wise God
+(whither, if God will, my soul also must shortly go)--can this soul of
+ours, I ask, being such and of such a nature, when separated from the
+body, be immediately dispersed and destroyed, as most men assert? Far
+from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias. But the case is much rather thus: if
+it is separated in a pure state, taking nothing of the body with it, as
+not having willingly communicated with it in the present life, but
+having shunned it, and gathered itself within itself, as constantly
+studying this (but this is nothing else than to pursue philosophy
+aright, and in reality to study how to die easily), would not this be to
+study how to die?"
+
+"Most assuredly."
+
+"Does not the soul, then, when in this state, depart to that which
+resembles itself, the invisible, the divine, immortal and wise? And on
+its arrival there, is it not its lot to be happy, free from error,
+ignorance, fears, wild passions, and all the other evils to which human
+nature is subject; and, as is said of the initiated, does it not in
+truth pass the rest of its time with the gods? Must we affirm that it is
+so, Cebes, or otherwise?"
+
+"So, by Jupiter!" said Cebes.
+
+69. "But, I think, if it departs from the body polluted and impure, as
+having constantly held communion with the body, and having served and
+loved it, and been bewitched by it, through desires and pleasures, so as
+to think that there is nothing real except what is corporeal, which one
+can touch and see, and drink and eat, and employ for sensual purposes;
+but what is dark and invisible to the eyes, which is intellectual and
+apprehended by philosophy, having been accustomed to hate, fear, and
+shun this, do you think that a soul thus affected can depart from the
+body by itself, and uncontaminated?"
+
+"By no means whatever," he replied.
+
+"But I think it will be impressed with that which is corporeal, which
+the intercourse and communion of the body, through constant association
+and great attention, have made natural to it."
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"We must think, my dear Cebes, that this is ponderous and heavy, earthly
+and visible, by possessing which such a soul is weighed down, and drawn
+again into the visible world through dread of the invisible and of
+Hades, wandering, as it is said, among monuments and tombs, about which,
+indeed, certain shadowy phantoms of souls have been seen, being such
+images as those souls produced which have not departed pure from the
+body, but which partake of the visible; on which account, also, they are
+visible."
+
+"That is probable, Socrates."
+
+70. "Probable indeed, Cebes; and not that these are the souls of the
+good, but of the wicked, which are compelled to wander about such
+places, paying the penalty of their former conduct, which was evil; and
+they wander about so long until, through the desire of the corporeal
+nature that accompanies them, they are again united to a body; and they
+are united, as is probable, to animals having the same habits as those
+they have given themselves up to during life."
+
+"But what do you say these are, Socrates?"
+
+"For instance, those who have given themselves up to gluttony,
+wantonness and drinking, and have put no restraint on themselves, will
+probably be clothed in the form of asses and brutes of that kind. Do you
+not think so?"
+
+"You say what is very probable."
+
+"And that such as have set great value on injustice, tyranny and rapine,
+will be clothed in the species of wolves, hawks and kites! Where else
+can we say such souls go?"
+
+"Without doubt," said Cebes, "into such as these."
+
+"Is it not, then, evident," he continued, "as to the rest, whither each
+will go, according to the resemblances of their several pursuits?"
+
+71. "It is evident," he replied. "How not?"
+
+"Of these, then," he said, "are not they the most happy, and do they not
+go to the best place, who have practiced that social and civilized
+virtue which they call temperance and justice, and which is produced
+from habit and exercise, without philosophy and reflection?"
+
+"In what respect are these the most happy?"
+
+"Because it is probable that these should again migrate into a
+corresponding civilized and peaceable kind of animals, such as bees
+perhaps, or wasps, or ants, or even into the same human species again,
+and from these become moderate men."
+
+"It is probable."
+
+"But it is not lawful for any one who has not studied philosophy, and
+departed this life perfectly pure, to pass into the rank of gods, but
+only for the true lover of wisdom. And on this account, my friends
+Simmias and Cebes, those who philosophize rightly, abstain from all
+bodily desires, and persevere in doing so, and do not give themselves up
+to them, not fearing the loss of property and poverty, as the generality
+of men and the lovers of wealth; nor, again, dreading disgrace and
+ignominy, like those who are lovers of power and honor, do they then
+abstain from them."
+
+"For it would not become them to do so, Socrates," says Cebes.
+
+72. "It would not, by Jupiter!" he rejoined. "Wherefore, Cebes, they who
+care at all for their soul, and do not spend their lives in the culture
+of their bodies, despising all these, proceed not in the same way with
+them, as being ignorant whither they are going, but, being convinced
+that they ought not to act contrary to philosophy, but in accordance
+with the freedom and purification she affords, they give themselves up
+to her direction, following her wherever she leads."
+
+"How, Socrates?"
+
+"I will tell you," he replied. "The lovers of wisdom know that
+philosophy, receiving their soul plainly bound and glued to the body,
+and compelled to view things through this, as through a prison, and not
+directly by herself, and sunk in utter ignorance, and perceiving, too,
+the strength of the prison, that it arises from desire, so that he who
+is bound as much as possible assists in binding himself. 73. I say,
+then, the lovers of wisdom know that philosophy, receiving their soul in
+this state, gently exhorts it, and endeavors to free it, by showing that
+the view of things by means of the eyes is full of deception, as also is
+that through the ears and the other senses; persuading an abandonment
+of these so far as it is not absolutely necessary to use them, and
+advising the soul to be collected and concentrated within itself, and to
+believe nothing else than herself, with respect to what she herself
+understands of things that have a real subsistence; and to consider
+nothing true which she views through the medium of others, and which
+differ under different aspects;[32] for that a thing of this kind is
+sensible and visible, but that what she herself perceives is
+intelligible and invisible. The soul of the true philosopher, therefore,
+thinking that she ought not to oppose this deliverance, accordingly
+abstains as much as possible from pleasures and desires, griefs and
+fears, considering that when any one is exceedingly delighted or
+alarmed, grieved or influenced by desire, he does not merely suffer such
+evil from these things as one might suppose, such as either being sick
+or wasting his property through indulging his desires; but that which is
+the greatest evil, and the worst of all, this he suffers, and is not
+conscious of it."
+
+"But what is this evil, Socrates?" said Cebes.
+
+74. "That the soul of every man is compelled to be either vehemently
+delighted or grieved about some particular thing, and, at the same time,
+to consider that the thing about which it is thus strongly affected is
+most real and most true, though it is not so. But these are chiefly
+visible objects, are they not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"In this state of affection, then, is not the soul especially shackled
+by the body?"
+
+"How so?"
+
+"Because each pleasure and pain, having a nail, as it were, nails the
+soul to the body, and fastens it to it, and causes it to become
+corporeal, deeming those things to be true whatever the body asserts to
+be so. For, in consequence of its forming the same opinions with the
+body, and delighting in the same things, it is compelled, I think, to
+possess similar manners, and to be similarly nourished; so that it can
+never pass into Hades in a pure state, but must ever depart polluted by
+the body, and so quickly falls again into another body, and grows up as
+if it were sown, and consequently is deprived of all association with
+that which is divine, and pure, and uniform."
+
+"You speak most truly, Socrates," said Cebes.
+
+75. "For these reasons, therefore, Cebes, those who are truly lovers of
+wisdom are moderate and resolute, and not for the reasons that most
+people say. Do you think as they do?"
+
+"Assuredly not."
+
+"No, truly. But the soul of a philosopher would reason thus, and would
+not think that philosophy ought to set it free, and that when it is
+freed it should give itself up again to pleasures and pains, to bind it
+down again, and make her work void, weaving a kind of Penelope's web the
+reverse way. On the contrary, effecting a calm of the passions, and
+following the guidance of reason, and being always intent on this,
+contemplating that which is true and divine, and not subject to opinion;
+and being nourished by it, it thinks that it ought to live in this
+manner as long as it does live, and that when it dies it shall go to a
+kindred essence, and one like itself, and shall be free from human
+evils. From such a regimen as this the soul has no occasion to fear,
+Simmias and Cebes, while it strictly attends to these things, lest,
+being torn to pieces at its departure from the body, it should be blown
+about and dissipated by the winds, and no longer have an existence
+anywhere."
+
+76. When Socrates had thus spoken, a long silence ensued; and Socrates
+himself was pondering upon what had been said, as he appeared, and so
+did most of us; but Cebes and Simmias were conversing a little while
+with each other. At length Socrates, perceiving them, said, "What think
+you of what has been said? Does it appear to you to have been proved
+sufficiently? for many doubts and objections still remain if any one
+will examine them thoroughly. If, then, you are considering some other
+subject, I have nothing to say; but if you are doubting about this, do
+not hesitate both yourselves to speak and express your opinion, if it
+appears to you in any respect that it might have been argued better, and
+to call me in again to your assistance, if you think you can be at all
+benefited by my help."
+
+Upon this Simmias said, "Indeed, Socrates, I will tell you the truth:
+for some time each of us, being in doubt, has been urging and exhorting
+the other to question you, from a desire to hear our doubts solved; but
+we were afraid of giving you trouble, lest it should be disagreeable to
+you in your present circumstances."
+
+77. But he, upon hearing this, gently smiled, and said, "Bless me,
+Simmias; with difficulty, indeed, could I persuade other men that I do
+not consider my present condition a calamity, since I am not able to
+persuade even you; but you are afraid lest I should be more morose now
+than during the former part of my life. And, as it seems, I appear to
+you to be inferior to swans with respect to divination, who, when they
+perceive that they must needs die, though they have been used to sing
+before, sing then more than ever, rejoicing that they are about to
+depart to that deity whose servants they are. But men, through their
+own fear of death, belie the swans too, and say that they, lamenting
+their death, sing their last song through grief; and they do not
+consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold, or is afflicted
+with any other pain, not even the nightingale, or swallow, or the
+hoopoes, which, they say, sing lamenting through grief. But neither do
+these birds appear to me to sing through sorrow, nor yet do swans; but,
+in my opinion, belonging to Apollo, they are prophetic, and, foreseeing
+the blessings of Hades, they sing and rejoice on that day more
+excellently than at any preceding time. 78. But I, too, consider myself
+to be a fellow-servant of the swans, and sacred to the same god; and
+that I have received the power of divination from our common master no
+less than they, and that I do not depart from this life with less
+spirits than they. On this account, therefore, it is right that you
+should both speak and ask whatever you please, so long as the Athenian
+Eleven permit."
+
+"You say well," said Simmias, "and both I will tell you what are my
+doubts, and he, in turn, how far he does not assent to what has been
+said. For it appears to me, Socrates, probably as it does to you with
+respect to these matters, that to know them clearly in the present life
+is either impossible or very difficult: on the other hand, however, not
+to test what has been said of them in every possible way, so as not to
+desist until, on examining them in every point of view, one has
+exhausted every effort, is the part of a very weak man. For we ought,
+with respect to these things, either to learn from others how they stand
+or to discover them for one's self; or, if both these are impossible,
+then, taking the best of human reasonings and that which is the most
+difficult to be confuted, and embarking on this, as one who risks
+himself on a raft, so to sail through life, unless one could be carried
+more safely, and with less risk, on a surer conveyance, or some divine
+reason. 79. I, therefore, shall not now be ashamed to question you,
+since you bid me do so, nor shall I blame myself hereafter for not
+having now told you what I think; for to me, Socrates, when I consider
+the matter, both with myself and with Cebes, what has been said does not
+appear to have been sufficiently proved."
+
+Then said Socrates, "Perhaps, my friend, you have the truth on your
+side; but tell me in what respect it was not sufficiently proved."
+
+"In this," he answered, "because any one might use the same argument
+with respect to harmony, and a lyre, and its chords, that harmony is
+something invisible and incorporeal, very beautiful and divine, in a
+well-modulated lyre; but the lyre and its chords are bodies, and of
+corporeal form, compounded and earthly, and akin to that which is
+mortal. When any one, then, has either broken the lyre, or cut or burst
+the chords, he might maintain from the same reasoning as yours that it
+is necessary the harmony should still exist and not be destroyed; for
+there could be no possibility that the lyre should subsist any longer
+when the chords are burst; and that the chords, which are of a mortal
+nature, should subsist, but that the harmony, which is of the same
+nature and akin to that which is divine and immortal, should become
+extinct, and perish before that which is mortal; but he might say that
+the harmony must needs subsist somewhere, and that the wood and chords
+must decay before it can undergo any change. 80. For I think, Socrates,
+that you yourself have arrived at this conclusion, that we consider the
+soul to be pretty much of this kind--namely, that our body being
+compacted and held together by heat and cold, dryness and moisture, and
+other such qualities, our soul is the fusion and harmony of these, when
+they are well and duly combined with each other. If, then, the soul is a
+kind of harmony, it is evident that when our bodies are unduly relaxed
+or strained, through diseases and other maladies, the soul must, of
+necessity, immediately perish, although it is most divine, just as other
+harmonies which subsist in sounds or in the various works of artisans;
+but that the remains of the body of each person last for a long time,
+till they are either burned or decayed. Consider, then, what we shall
+say to this reasoning, if any one should maintain that the soul, being a
+fusion of the several qualities in the body, perishes first in that
+which is called death."
+
+81. Socrates, therefore, looking steadfastly at us, as he was generally
+accustomed to do, and smiling, said, "Simmias indeed speaks justly. If,
+then, any one of you is more prompt than I am, why does he not answer,
+for he seems to have handled my argument not badly? It appears to me,
+however, that before we make our reply we should first hear from Cebes,
+what he, too, objects to our argument, in order that, some time
+intervening, we may consider what we shall say, and then when we have
+heard them, we may give up to them, if they appear to speak agreeably to
+truth; or, if not, we may then uphold our own argument. Come, then,
+Cebes," he continued, "say what it is that disturbs you, so as to cause
+your unbelief."
+
+"I will tell you," said Cebes; "the argument seems to me to rest where
+it was, and to be liable to the same objection that we mentioned before.
+For, that our soul existed even before It came into this present form, I
+do not deny has been very elegantly, and, if it is not too much to say
+so, very fully, demonstrated; but that it still exists anywhere when we
+are dead does not appear to me to have been clearly proved; nor do I
+give in to the objection of Simmias, that the soul is not stronger and
+more durable than the body, for it appears to me to excel very far all
+things of this kind. 82. 'Why, then,' reason might say, 'do you still
+disbelieve? for, since you see that when a man dies his weaker part
+still exists, does it not appear to you to be necessary that the more
+durable part should still be preserved during this period?' Consider,
+then, whether I say any thing to the purpose in reply to this. For I,
+too, as well as Simmias, as it seems, stand in need of an illustration;
+for the argument appears to me to have been put thus, as if any one
+should advance this argument about an aged weaver who had died, that the
+man has not yet perished, but perhaps still exists somewhere; and, as a
+proof, should exhibit the garment which he wore and had woven himself,
+that it is entire and has not perished; and if any one should disbelieve
+him, he would ask, which of the two is the more durable, the species of
+a man or of a garment, that is constantly in use and being worn; then,
+should any one answer that the species of man is much more durable, he
+would think it demonstrated that, beyond all question, the man is
+preserved, since that which is less durable has not perished. 83. But I
+do not think, Simmias, that this is the case, and do you consider what I
+say, for every one must think that he who argues thus argues, foolishly.
+For this weaver, having worn and woven many such garments, perished
+after almost all of them, but before the last, I suppose; and yet it
+does not on this account follow any the more that a man is inferior to
+or weaker than a garment. And I think, the soul might admit this same
+illustration with respect to the body, and he who should say the same
+things concerning them would appear to me to speak correctly, that the
+soul is more durable, but the body weaker and less durable; for he would
+say that each soul wears out many bodies, especially if it lives many
+years; for if the body wastes and is dissolved while the man still
+lives, but the soul continually weaves anew what is worn out, it must
+necessarily follow that when the soul is dissolved it must then have on
+its last garment, and perish before this alone; but when the soul has
+perished the body would show the weakness of its nature, and quickly rot
+and vanish. 84. So that it is not by any means right to place implicit
+reliance on this argument, and to believe that when we die our soul
+still exists somewhere. For, if any one should concede to him who admits
+even more than you do, and should grant to him that not only did our
+soul exist before we were born, but that even when we die nothing
+hinders the souls of some of us from still existing, and continuing to
+exist hereafter, and from being often born, and dying again--for so
+strong is it by nature, that it can hold out against repeated births--if
+he granted this, he would not yet concede that it does not exhaust
+itself in its many births, and at length perish altogether in some one
+of the deaths. But he would say that no one knows this death and
+dissolution of the body, which brings destruction to the soul; for it is
+impossible for any one of us to perceive it. If, however, this be the
+case, it follows that every one who is confident at the approach of
+death is foolishly confident, unless he is able to prove that the soul
+is absolutely immortal and imperishable; otherwise it necessarily
+follows that he who is about to die must be alarmed for his soul, lest
+in its present disunion from the body it should entirely perish."
+
+85. Upon this, all of us who had heard them speaking were disagreeably
+affected, as we afterward mentioned to each other; because, after we had
+been fully persuaded by the former arguments, they seemed to disturb us
+anew, and to cast us into a distrust, not only of the arguments already
+adduced, but of such as might afterward be urged, for fear lest we
+should not be fit judges of anything, or lest the things themselves
+should be incredible.
+
+_Echec._ By the gods! Phædo, I can readily excuse you; for, while I am
+now hearing you, it occurs to me to ask myself some such question as
+this: What arguments can we any longer believe? since the argument which
+Socrates advanced, and which was exceedingly credible, has now fallen
+into discredit. For this argument, that our soul is a kind of harmony,
+produces a wonderful impression on me, both now and always, and in being
+mentioned, it has reminded me, as it were, that I, too, was formerly of
+the same opinion; so that I stand in need again, as if from the very
+beginning, of some other argument which may persuade me that the soul of
+one who dies does not die with the body. Tell me, therefore, by Jupiter!
+how Socrates followed up the argument; and whether he, too, as you
+confess was the case with yourselves, seemed disconcerted at all, or
+not, but calmly maintained his position; and maintained it sufficiently
+or defectively. Relate everything to me as accurately as you can.
+
+86. _Phæd._ Indeed, Echecrates, though I have often admired Socrates, I
+was never more delighted than at being with him on that occasion. That
+he should be able to say something is perhaps not at all surprising; but
+I especially admired this in him--first of all, that he listened to the
+argument of the young men so sweetly, affably, and approvingly; in the
+next place, that he so quickly perceived how we were affected by their
+arguments; and, lastly, that he cured us so well and recalled us, when
+we were put to flight, as it were, and vanquished, and encouraged us to
+accompany him, and consider the argument with him.
+
+_Echec._ How was that?
+
+_Phæd._ I will tell you: I happened to be sitting at his right hand,
+near the bed, upon a low seat, but he himself sat much higher than I.
+Stroking my head, then, and laying hold of the hair that hung on my
+neck--for he used, often, to play with my hairs--"To-morrow," he said,
+"perhaps, Phædo, you will cut off these beautiful locks?"
+
+"It seems likely, Socrates," said I.
+
+87. "Not if you are persuaded by me."
+
+"Why so?" I asked.
+
+"To-day," he replied, "both I ought to cut off mine and you yours, if
+our argument must die, and we are unable to revive it. And I, if I were
+you, and the arguments were to escape me, would take an oath, as the
+Argives do, not to suffer my hair to grow until I had renewed the
+contest, and vanquished the arguments of Simmias and Cebes."
+
+"But," I said, "even Hercules himself is said not to have been a match
+for two."
+
+"Call upon me, then," he said, "as your Iolaus, while it is yet day."
+
+"I do call on you, then," I said, "not as Hercules upon Iolaus, but as
+Iolaus upon Hercules."
+
+"It will make no difference," he replied. "But, first of all, we must
+beware lest we meet with some mischance."
+
+"What?" I asked.
+
+"That we do not become," he answered, "haters of reasoning, as some
+become haters of men; for no greater evil can happen to any one than to
+hate reasoning. 88. But hatred of reasoning and hatred of mankind both
+spring from the same source. For hatred of mankind is produced in us
+from having placed too great reliance on some one without sufficient
+knowledge of him, and from having considered him to be a man altogether
+true, sincere, and faithful, and then, after a little while, finding him
+depraved and unfaithful, and after him another. And when a man has
+often experienced this, and especially from those whom he considered his
+most intimate and best friends, at length, having frequently stumbled,
+he hates all men, and thinks that there is no soundness at all in any of
+them. Have you not perceived that this happens so?"
+
+"Certainly," I replied.
+
+"Is it not a shame?" he said "And is it not evident that such a one
+attempts to deal with men without sufficient knowledge of human affairs?
+For if he had dealt with them with competent knowledge, as the case
+really is, so he would have considered that the good and the bad are
+each very few in number, and that those between both are most numerous."
+
+89. "How say you?" I asked.
+
+"In the same manner," he replied, "as with things very little and very
+large Do you think that any thing is more rare than to find a very large
+on a very little man, or dog, or any thing else? and, again, swift or
+slow, beautiful or ugly, white or black? Do you not perceive that of all
+such things the extremes are rare and few, but that the intermediate are
+abundant and numerous?"
+
+"Certainly," I replied.
+
+"Do you not think, then," he continued, "that if a contest in wickedness
+were proposed, even here very few would be found pre-eminent?"
+
+"It is probable," I said.
+
+"It is so," he said, "but in this respect reasonings do not resemble
+men, for I was just now following you as my leader, but in this they do
+resemble them, when any one believes in any argument as true without
+being skilled in the art of reasoning, and then shortly afterward it
+appears to him to be false, at one time being so and at another time
+not, and so on with one after another,[34] and especially they who
+devote themselves to controversial arguments, you are aware, at length
+think they have become very wise and have alone discovered that there is
+nothing sound and stable either in things or reasonings but that all
+things that exist, as is the case with the Euripus, are in a constant
+state of flux and reflux, and never continue in any one condition for
+any length of time."
+
+"You speak perfectly true," I said.
+
+90. "Would it not, then, Phædo" he said "be a sad thing if, when there
+is a true and sound reasoning, and such as one can understand, one
+should then, through lighting upon such arguments as appear to be at one
+time true and at another false, not blame one's self and one's own want
+of skill, but at length, through grief, should anxiously transfer the
+blame from one's self to the arguments, and thereupon pass the rest of
+one's life in hating and reviling arguments and so be depraved of the
+truth and knowledge of things that exist?"
+
+"By Jupiter!" I said, "it would be sad, indeed."
+
+"In the first place, then," he said, "let us beware of this, and let us
+not admit into our souls the notion that there appears to be nothing
+sound in reasoning, but much rather that we are not yet in a sound
+condition, and that we ought vigorously and strenuously to endeavor to
+become sound, you and the others, on account of your whole future life,
+but I, on account of my death, since I am in danger, at the present
+time, of not behaving as becomes a philosopher with respect to this very
+subject, but as a wrangler, like those who are utterly uninformed 91.
+For they, when they dispute about any thing, care nothing at all for the
+subject about which the discussion is, but are anxious about this, that
+what they have themselves advanced shall appear true to the persons
+present. And I seem to myself on the present occasion to differ from
+them only in this respect, for I shall not be anxious to make what I say
+appear true to those who are present, except that may happen by the way,
+but that it may appear certainly to be so to myself. For I thus reason,
+my dear friend, and observe how interestedly. If what I say be true, it
+is well to be persuaded of it, but if nothing remains to one that is
+dead, I shall, at least, during the interval before death be less
+disagreeable to those present by my lamentations. But this ignorance of
+mine will not continue long, for that would be bad, but will shortly be
+put an end to. Thus prepared, then, Simmias and Cebes," he continued, "I
+now proceed to my argument. Do you, however, if you will be persuaded by
+me, pay little attention to Socrates, but much more to the truth, and if
+I appear to you to say any thing true, assent to it, but if not, oppose
+me with all your might, taking good care that in my zeal I do not
+deceive both myself and you, and, like a bee, depart leaving my sting
+behind."
+
+92. "But let us proceed," he said "First of all, remind me of what you
+said, if I should appear to have forgotten it For Simmias, as I think,
+is in doubt, and fears lest the soul, though more divine and beautiful
+than the body, should perish before it, as being a species of harmony.
+But Cebes appeared to me to grant me this, that the soul is more durable
+than the body, but he argued that it is uncertain to every one, whether
+when the soul has worn out many bodies and that repeatedly, it does
+not, on leaving the last body, itself also perish, so that this very
+thing is death, the destruction of the soul, since the body never ceases
+decaying Are not these the things, Simmias and Cebes, which we have to
+inquire into?"
+
+They both agreed that they were.
+
+"Whether, then," he continued "do you reject all our former arguments,
+or some of them only, and not others?"
+
+"Some we do," they replied, "and others not."
+
+"What, then," he proceeded, "do you say about that argument in which we
+asserted that knowledge is reminiscence, and that, this being the case,
+our soul must necessarily have existed somewhere before it was inclosed
+in the body?"
+
+93. "I, indeed," replied Cebes "was both then wonderfully persuaded by
+it, and now persist in it, as in no other argument."
+
+"And I, too," said Simmias, "am of the same mind, and should very much
+wonder if I should ever think otherwise on that point."
+
+"Then," Socrates said, "you must needs think otherwise, my Theban
+friend, if this opinion holds good, that harmony is something
+compounded, and that the soul is a kind of harmony that results from the
+parts compacted together in the body. For surely you will not allow
+yourself to say that harmony was composed prior to the things from which
+it required to be composed Would you allow this?"
+
+"By no means, Socrates" he replied.
+
+"Do you perceive, then," he said, "that this result from what you say,
+when you assert that the soul existed before it came into a human form
+and body, but that it was composed from things that did not yet exist?
+For harmony is not such as that to which you compare it, but first the
+lyre, and the chords, and the sounds yet unharmonized, exist, and, last
+of all, harmony is produced, and first perishes. How, then, will this
+argument accord with that?"
+
+"Not at all," said Simmias.
+
+94. "And yet," he said, "if in any argument, there ought to be an
+accordance in one respecting harmony."
+
+"There ought," said Simmias.
+
+"This of yours, however," he said, "is not in accordance. Consider,
+then, which of these two statements do you prefer--that knowledge is
+reminiscence, or the soul harmony?"
+
+"The former by far, Socrates," he replied; "for the latter occurred to
+me without demonstration, through a certain probability and speciousness
+whence most men derive their opinions. But I am well aware that
+arguments which draw their demonstrations from probabilities are idle;
+and, unless one is on one's guard against them, they are very deceptive,
+both in geometry and all other subjects. But the argument respecting
+reminiscence and knowledge may be said to have been demonstrated by a
+satisfactory hypothesis. For in this way it was said that our soul
+existed before it came into the body, because the essence that bears the
+appellation of 'that which is' belongs to it. But of this, as I persuade
+myself, I am fully and rightly convinced. It is therefore necessary, as
+it seems, that I should neither allow myself nor any one else to
+maintain that the soul is harmony."
+
+95. "But what, Simmias," said he, "if you consider it thus? Does it
+appear to you to appertain to harmony, or to any other composition, to
+subsist in any other way than the very things do of which it is
+composed?"
+
+"By no means."
+
+"And indeed, as I think, neither to do any thing, nor suffer any thing
+else, besides what they do or suffer."
+
+He agreed.
+
+"It does not, therefore, appertain to harmony to take the lead of the
+things of which it is composed, but to follow them."
+
+He assented.
+
+"It is, then, far from being the case that harmony is moved or sends
+forth sounds contrariwise, or is in any other respect opposed to its
+parts?"
+
+"Far, indeed," he said.
+
+"What, then? Is not every harmony naturally harmony, so far as it has
+been made to accord?"
+
+"I do not understand you," he replied.
+
+"Whether," he said, "if it should be in a greater degree and more fully
+made to accord, supposing that were possible, would the harmony be
+greater and more full; but if in a less degree and less fully, then
+would it be inferior and less full?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Is this, then, the case with the soul that, even in the smallest
+extent, one soul is more fully and in a greater degree, or less fully
+and in a less degree, this very thing, a soul, than another?"
+
+"In no respect whatever," he replied.
+
+96. "Well, then," he said, "by Jupiter! is one soul said to possess
+intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and another folly and vice, and
+to be bad? and is this said with truth?"
+
+"With truth, certainly."
+
+"Of those, then, who maintain that the soul is harmony, what will any
+one say that these things are in the soul, virtue and vice? Will he call
+them another kind of harmony and discord, and say that the one, the good
+soul, is harmonized, and, being harmony, contains within itself another
+harmony, but that the other is discordant, and does not contain within
+itself another harmony?"
+
+"I am unable to say," replied Simmias; "but it is clear that he who
+maintains that opinion would say something of the kind."
+
+"But it has been already granted," said he, "that one soul is not more
+or less a soul than another; and this is an admission that one harmony
+is not to a greater degree or more fully, or to a less degree or less
+fully, a harmony, than another; is it not so?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"And that that which is neither more or less harmony is neither more nor
+less harmonized: is it so?"
+
+"It is."
+
+"But does that which is neither more or less harmonized partake of more
+or less harmony, or an equal amount?"
+
+"An equal amount."
+
+97. "A soul, therefore, since it is not more or less this very thing, a
+soul, than another, is not more or less harmonized?"
+
+"Even so."
+
+"Such, then, being its condition, it can not partake of a greater degree
+of discord or harmony?"
+
+"Certainly not."
+
+"And, again, such being its condition, can one soul partake of a greater
+degree of vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord, and virtue
+harmony?"
+
+"It can not."
+
+"Or rather, surely, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul will
+partake of vice, if it is harmony; for doubtless harmony, which is
+perfectly such, can never partake of discord?"
+
+"Certainly not."
+
+"Neither, therefore, can a soul which is perfectly a soul partake of
+vice."
+
+"How can it, from what has been already said?"
+
+"From this reasoning, then, all souls of all animals will be equally
+good, if, at least, they are by nature equally this very thing, souls?"
+
+"It appears so to me, Socrates," he said.
+
+"And does it appear to you," he said, "to have been thus rightly argued,
+and that the argument would lead to this result, if the hypothesis were
+correct, that the soul is harmony?"
+
+98. "On no account whatever," he replied.
+
+"But what," said he, "of all the things that are in man? Is there any
+thing else that you say bears rule except the soul, especially if it be
+wise?"
+
+"I should say not."
+
+"Whether by yielding to the passions in the body, or by opposing them?
+My meaning is this: for instance, when heat and thirst are present, by
+drawing it the contrary way, so as to hinder it from drinking; and when
+hunger is present, by hindering it from eating; and in ten thousand
+other instances we see the soul opposing the desires of the body. Do we
+not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But have we not before allowed that if the soul were harmony, it would
+never utter a sound contrary to the tension, relaxation, vibration, or
+any other affection to which its component parts are subject, but would
+follow, and never govern them?"
+
+"We did allow it," he replied, "for how could we do otherwise?"
+
+"What, then? Does not the soul now appear to act quite the contrary,
+ruling over all the parts from which any one might say it subsists, and
+resisting almost all of them through the whole of life, and exercising
+dominion over them in all manner of ways; punishing some more severely
+even with pain, both by gymnastics and medicine, and others more mildly;
+partly threatening, and partly admonishing the desires, angers and
+fears, as if, being itself of a different nature, it were conversing
+with something quite different? 99. Just as Homer has done in the
+Odyssey,[35] where he speaks of Ulysses--'Having struck his breast, he
+chid his heart in the following words: Bear up, my heart; ere this thou
+hast borne far worse.' Do you think that he composed this in the belief
+that the soul was harmony, and capable of being led by the passions of
+the body, and not rather that it was able to lead and govern them, as
+being something much more divine than to be compared with harmony?"
+
+"By Jupiter! Socrates, it appears so to me."
+
+"Therefore, my excellent friend, it is on no account correct for us to
+say that the soul is a kind of harmony; for, as it appears, we should
+neither agree with Homer, that divine poet, nor with ourselves."
+
+"Such is the case," he replied.
+
+"Be it so, then," said Socrates, "we have already, as it seems,
+sufficiently appeased this Theban harmony. But how, Cebes, and by what
+arguments, shall we appease this Cadmus?"[36]
+
+100. "You appear to me," replied Cebes, "to be likely to find out; for
+you have made out this argument against harmony wonderfully beyond my
+expectation. For when Simmias was saying what his doubts were, I
+wondered very much whether any one would be able to answer his
+reasoning. It, therefore, appeared to me unaccountable that he did not
+withstand the very first onset of your argument. I should not,
+therefore, be surprised if the arguments of Cadmus met with the same
+fate."
+
+"My good friend," said Socrates, "do not speak so boastfully, lest some
+envious power should overthrow the argument that is about to be urged.
+These things, however, will be cared for by the deity; but let us,
+meeting hand to hand, in the manner of Homer, try whether you say any
+thing to the purpose. This, then, is the sum of what you inquire you
+require it to be proved that our soul is imperishable and immortal; if a
+philosopher that is about to die, full of confidence and hope that after
+death he shall be far happier than if he had died after leading a
+different kind of life, shall not entertain this confidence foolishly
+and vainly. 101. But to show that the soul is something strong and
+divine, and that it existed before we men were born, you say not at all
+hinders, but that all these things may evince, not its immortality, but
+that the soul is durable, and existed an immense space of time before,
+and knew and did many things. But that, for all this, it was not at all
+the more immortal, but that its very entrance into the body of a man was
+the beginning of its destruction, as if it were a disease; so that it
+passes through this life in wretchedness, and at last perishes in that
+which is called death. But you say that it is of no consequence whether
+it comes into a body once or often, with respect to our occasion of
+fear; for it is right he should be afraid, unless he is foolish, who
+does not know, and can not give a reason to prove, that the soul is
+immortal. Such, I think, Cebes, is the sum of what you say; and I
+purposely repeat it often, that nothing may escape us, and, if you
+please, you may add to or take from it."
+
+Cebes replied, "I do not wish at present either to take from or add to
+it; that is what I mean."
+
+102. Socrates, then having paused for some time, and considered
+something within himself, said, "You inquire into no easy matter, Cebes;
+for it is absolutely necessary to discuss the whole question of
+generation and corruption. If you please, then, I will relate to you
+what happened to me with reference to them; and afterward, if any thing
+that I shall say shall appear to you useful toward producing conviction
+on the subject you are now treating of, make use of it."
+
+"I do indeed wish it," replied Cebes.
+
+"Hear my relation, then. When I was a young man, Cebes, I was
+wonderfully desirous of that wisdom which they call a history of nature;
+for it appeared to me to be a very sublime thing to know the causes of
+every thing--why each thing is generated, why it perishes, and why it
+exists. And I often tossed myself upward and downward, considering first
+such things as these, whether when heat and cold have undergone a
+certain corruption, as some say, then animals are formed; and whether
+the blood is that by means of which we think, or air, or fire, or none
+of these, but that it is the brain that produces the perceptions of
+hearing, seeing, and smelling; and that from these come memory and
+opinion; and from memory and opinion, when in a state of rest, in the
+same way knowledge is produced. 103. And, again, considering the
+corruptions of these, and the affections incidental to the heavens and
+the earth, I at length appeared to myself so unskillful in these
+speculations that nothing could be more so. But I will give you a
+sufficient proof of this; for I then became, by these very speculations,
+so very blind with respect to things which I knew clearly before, as it
+appeared to myself and others, that I unlearned even the things which I
+thought I knew before, both on many other subjects and also this, why a
+man grows. For, before, I thought this was evident to every one--that it
+proceeds from eating and drinking; for that, when, from the food, flesh
+is added to flesh, bone to bone, and so on in the same proportion, what
+is proper to them is added to the several other parts, then the bulk
+which was small becomes afterward large, and thus that a little man
+becomes a big one. Such was my opinion at that time. Does it appear to
+you correct?"
+
+"To me it does," said Cebes.
+
+104. "Consider this further. I thought that I had formed a right
+opinion, when, on seeing a tall man standing by a short one, I judged
+that he was taller by the head, and in like manner, one horse than
+another; and, still more clearly than this, ten appeared to me to be
+more than eight by two being added to them, and that two cubits are
+greater than one cubit by exceeding it a half."
+
+"But now," said Cebes, "what think you of these matters?"
+
+"By Jupiter!" said he, "I am far from thinking that I know the cause of
+these, for that I can not even persuade myself of this: when a person
+has added one to one, whether the one to which the addition has been
+made has become two, or whether that which has been added, and that to
+which the addition has been made, have become two by the addition of the
+one to the other. For I wonder if, when each of these was separate from
+the other, each was one, and they were not yet two; but when they have
+approached nearer each other this should be the cause of their becoming
+two--namely, the union by which they have been placed nearer one
+another. 105. Nor yet, if any person should divide one, am I able to
+persuade myself that this, their division, is the cause of its becoming
+two. For this cause is the contrary to the former one of their becoming
+two; for then it was because they were brought nearer to each other, and
+the one was added to the other; but now it is because one is removed and
+separated from the other. Nor do I yet persuade myself that I know why
+one is one, nor, in a word, why any thing else is produced, or perishes,
+or exists, according to this method of proceeding; but I mix up another
+method of my own at random, for this I can on no account give in to."
+
+"But, having once heard a person reading from a book, written, as he
+said, by Anaxagoras, and which said that it is intelligence that sets in
+order and is the cause of all things, I was delighted with this cause,
+and it appeared to me in a manner to be well that intelligence should be
+the cause of all things, and I considered with myself, if this is so,
+that the regulating intelligence orders all things, and disposes each in
+such way as will be best for it. 106. If any one, then, should desire to
+discover the cause of every thing, in what way it is produced, or
+perishes, or exists, he must discover this respecting it--in what way it
+is best for it either to exist, or to suffer, or do any thing else. From
+this mode of reasoning, then, it is proper that a man should consider
+nothing else, both with respect to himself and others, than what is most
+excellent and best; and it necessarily follows that this same person
+must also know that which is worst, for that the knowledge of both of
+them is the same. Thus reasoning with myself, I was delighted to think I
+had found in Anaxagoras a preceptor who would instruct me in the causes
+of things, agreeably to my own mind, and that he would inform me, first,
+whether the earth is flat or round, and, when he had informed me,
+would, moreover, explain the cause and necessity of its being so,
+arguing on the principle of the better, and showing that it is better
+for it to be such as it is; and if he should say that it is in the
+middle, that he would, moreover, explain how it is better for it to be
+in the middle; and if he should make all this clear to me, I was
+prepared no longer to require any other species of cause. 107. I was in
+like manner prepared to inquire respecting the sun and moon and the
+other stars, with respect to their velocities in reference to each
+other, and their revolutions and other conditions, in what way it is
+better for both to act and be affected as it does and is. For I never
+thought that after he had said that these things were set in order by
+intelligence, he would introduce any other cause for them than that it
+is best for them to be as they are. Hence, I thought, that in assigning
+the cause to each of them, and to all in common, he would explain that
+which is best for each, and the common good of all. And I would not have
+given up my hopes for a good deal; but, having taken up his books with
+great eagerness, I read through them as quickly as I could, that I might
+as soon as possible know the best and the worst."
+
+108. "From this wonderful hope, however, my friend, I was speedily
+thrown down, when, as I advance and read over his works, I meet with a
+man who makes no use of intelligence, nor assigns any causes for the
+ordering of all things, but makes the causes to consist of air, ether,
+and water, and many other things equally absurd. And he appeared to me
+to be very like one who should say that whatever Socrates does he does
+by intelligence, and then, attempting to describe the causes of each
+particular action, should say, first of all, that for this reason I am
+now sitting here, because my body is composed of bones and sinews and
+that the bones are hard, and have joints separate from each other, but
+that the sinews, being capable of tension and contraction, cover the
+bones, together with the flesh and skin which contain them. The bones,
+therefore, being suspended in their sockets, the nerves, relaxing and
+tightening, enable me to bend my limbs as I now do, and from this cause
+I sit here bent up. 109. And if, again, he should assign other similar
+causes for my conversing with you, assigning as causes voice, and air,
+and hearing, and ten thousand other things of the kind, omitting to
+mention the real causes, that since it appeared better to the Athenians
+to condemn me, I therefore thought it better to sit here, and more just
+to remain and submit to the punishment which they have ordered; for, by
+the dog! I think these sinews and bones would have been long ago either
+in Megara or Boeotia, borne thither by an opinion of that which is best,
+if I had not thought it more just and honorable to submit to whatever
+sentence the city might order than to flee and run stealthily away. But
+to call such things causes is too absurd. But if any one should say that
+without possessing such things as bones and sinews, and whatever else I
+have, I could not do what I pleased, he would speak the truth; but to
+say that I do as I do through them, and that I act thus by intelligence,
+and not from the choice of what is best, would be a great and extreme
+disregard of reason. 110. For this would be not to be able to
+distinguish that the real cause is one thing, and that another, without
+which a cause could not be a cause; which, indeed, the generality of men
+appear to me to do, fumbling, as it were, in the dark, and making use of
+strange names, so as to denominate them as the very cause. Wherefore one
+encompassing the earth with a vortex from heaven makes the earth remain
+fixed; but another, as if it were a broad trough, rests it upon the air
+as its base; but the power by which these things are now so disposed
+that they may be placed in the best manner possible, this they neither
+inquire into, nor do they think that it requires any superhuman
+strength; but they think they will some time or other find out an Atlas
+stronger and more immortal than this, and more capable of containing all
+things; and in reality, the good, and that which ought to hold them
+together and contain them, they take no account of at all. I, then,
+should most gladly have become the disciple of any one who would teach
+me of such a cause, in what way it is. But when I was disappointed of
+this, and was neither able to discover it myself, nor to learn it from
+another, do you wish, Cebes, that I should show you in what way I set
+out upon a second voyage in search of the cause?"
+
+111. "I wish it exceedingly," he replied.
+
+"It appeared to me, then," said he, "after this, when I was wearied with
+considering things that exist, that I ought to beware lest I should
+suffer in the same way as they do who look at and examine an eclipse of
+the sun, for some lose the sight of their eyes, unless they behold its
+image in water, or some similar medium. And I was affected with a
+similar feeling, and was afraid lest I should be utterly blinded in my
+soul through beholding things with the eyes, and endeavoring to grasp
+them by means of the several senses. It seemed to me, therefore, that I
+ought to have recourse to reasons, and to consider in them the truth of
+things. Perhaps, however, this similitude of mine may in some respect be
+incorrect; for I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in
+their reasons considers them in their images, more than he does who
+views them in their effects. However, I proceeded thus, and on each
+occasion laying down the reason, which I deem to be the strongest,
+whatever things appear to me to accord with this I regard as true, both
+with respect to the cause and every thing else; but such as do not
+accord I regard as not true. 112. But I wish to explain my meaning to
+you in a clearer manner; for I think that you do not yet understand me."
+
+"No, by Jupiter!" said Cebes, "not well."
+
+"However," continued he, "I am now saying nothing new, but what I have
+always at other times, and in a former part of this discussion, never
+ceased to say. I proceed, then, to attempt to explain to you that
+species of cause which I have busied myself about, and return again to
+those well-known subjects, and set out from them, laying down as an
+hypothesis, that there is a certain abstract beauty, and goodness, and
+magnitude, and so of all other things; which if you grant me, and allow
+that they do exist, I hope that I shall be able from these to explain
+the cause to you, and to discover that the soul is immortal."
+
+"But," said Cebes, "since I grant you this, you may draw your conclusion
+at once."
+
+"But consider," he said, "what follows from thence, and see if you can
+agree with me. For it appears to me that if there is any thing else
+beautiful besides beauty itself, it is not beautiful for any other
+reason than because it partakes of that abstract beauty; and I say the
+same of every thing. Do you admit such a cause?"
+
+"I do admit it," he replied.
+
+113. "I do not yet understand," he continued, "nor am I able to
+conceive, those other wise causes; but if any one should tell me why any
+thing is beautiful, either because it has a blooming florid color, or
+figure, or any thing else of the kind, I dismiss all other reasons, for
+I am confounded by them all; but I simply, wholly, and perhaps
+foolishly, confine myself to this, that nothing else causes it to be
+beautiful except either the presence or communication of that abstract
+beauty, by whatever means and in whatever way communicated; for I can
+not yet affirm this with certainty, but only that by means of beauty all
+beautiful things become beautiful. For this appears to me the safest
+answer to give both to myself and others; and adhering to this, I think
+that I shall never fall, but that it is a safe answer both for me and
+any one else to give--that by means of beauty beautiful things become
+beautiful. Does it not also seem so to you?"
+
+"It does."
+
+"And that by magnitude great things become great, and greater things,
+greater; and by littleness less things become less?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+114. "You would not, then, approve of it, if any one said that one
+person is greater than another by the head, and that the less is less by
+the very same thing; but you would maintain that you mean nothing else
+than that every thing that is greater than another is greater by nothing
+else than magnitude, and that it is greater on this account--that is, on
+account of magnitude; and that the less is less by nothing else than
+littleness, and on this account less--that is, on account of littleness;
+being afraid, I think, lest some opposite argument should meet you if
+you should say that any one is greater and less by the head; as, first,
+that the greater is greater, and the less less, by the very same thing;
+and, next, that the greater is greater by the head, which is small; and
+that it is monstrous to suppose that any one is great through something
+small. Should you not be afraid of this?"
+
+To which said Cebes, smilingly, "Indeed, I should."
+
+"Should you not, then," he continued, "be afraid to say that ten is more
+than eight by two, and for this cause exceeds it, and not by number,
+and on account of number? and that two cubits are greater than one cubit
+by half, and not by magnitude (for the fear is surely the same)?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+115. "What, then? When one has been added to one, would you not beware
+of saying that the addition is the cause of its being two, or division
+when it has been divided; and would you not loudly assert that you know
+no other way in which each thing subsists, than by partaking of the
+peculiar essence of each of which it partakes, and that in these cases
+you can assign no other cause of its becoming two than its partaking of
+duality; and that such things as are to become two must needs partake of
+this, and what is to become one, of unity; but these divisions and
+additions, and other such subtleties, you would dismiss, leaving them to
+be given as answers by persons wiser than yourself; whereas you,
+fearing, as it is said, your own shadow and inexperience, would adhere
+to this safe hypothesis, and answer accordingly? But if any one should
+assail this hypothesis of yours, would you not dismiss him, and refrain
+from answering him till you had considered the consequences resulting
+from it, whether in your opinion they agree with or differ from each
+other? But when it should be necessary for you to give a reason for it,
+would you give one in a similar way, by again laying down another
+hypothesis, which should appear the best of higher principles, until you
+arrived at something satisfactory; but, at the same time, you would
+avoid making confusion, as disputants do, in treating of the first
+principle and the results arising from it, if you really desire to
+arrive at the truth of things? 116. For they, perhaps, make no account
+at all of this, nor pay any attention to it; for they are able, through
+their wisdom, to mingle all things together, and at the same time please
+themselves. But you, if you are a philosopher, would act, I think, as I
+now describe."
+
+"You speak most truly," said Simmias and Cebes together.
+
+_Echec._ By Jupiter! Phædo, they said so with good reason; for he
+appears to me to have explained these things with wonderful clearness,
+even to one endued with a small degree of intelligence.
+
+_Phæd._ Certainly, Echecrates, and so it appeared to all who were
+present.
+
+_Echec._ And so it appears to me, who was absent, and now hear it
+related. But what was said after this?
+
+As well as I remember, when these things had been granted him, and it
+was allowed that each several idea exists of itself,[37] and that other
+things partaking of them receive their denomination from them, he next
+asked: "If, then," he said, "you admit that things are so, whether, when
+you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates, but less than Phædo, do
+you not then say that magnitude and littleness are both in Simmias?"
+
+"I do."
+
+117. "And yet," he said, "you must confess that Simmias's exceeding
+Socrates is not actually true in the manner in which the words express
+it; for Simmias does not naturally exceed Socrates in that he is
+Simmias, but in consequence of the magnitude which he happens to have;
+nor, again, does he exceed Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but
+because Socrates possesses littleness in comparison with his magnitude?"
+
+"True."
+
+"Nor, again, is Simmias exceeded by Phædo, because Phædo is Phædo, but
+because Phædo possesses magnitude in comparison with Simmias's
+littleness?"
+
+"It is so."
+
+"Thus, then, Simmias has the appellation of being both little and great,
+being between both, by exceeding the littleness of one through his own
+magnitude, and to the other yielding a magnitude that exceeds his own
+littleness." And at the same time, smiling, he said, "I seem to speak
+with the precision of a short-hand writer; however, it is as I say."
+
+He allowed it.
+
+118. "But I say it for this reason, wishing you to be of the same
+opinion as myself. For it appears to me, not only that magnitude itself
+is never disposed to be at the same time great and little, but that
+magnitude in us never admits the little nor is disposed to be exceeded,
+but one of two things, either to flee and withdraw when its contrary,
+the little, approaches it, or, when it has actually come, to perish; but
+that it is not disposed, by sustaining and receiving littleness, to be
+different from what it was. Just as I, having received and sustained
+littleness, and still continuing the person that I am, am this same
+little person; but that, while it is great, never endures to be little.
+And, in like manner, the little that is in us is not disposed at any
+time to become or to be great, nor is any thing else among contraries,
+while it continues what it was, at the same time disposed to become and
+to be its contrary; but in this contingency it either departs or
+perishes."
+
+119. "It appears so to me," said Cebes, "in every respect."
+
+But some one of those present, on hearing this, I do not clearly
+remember who he was, said, "By the gods! was not the very contrary of
+what is now asserted admitted in the former part of our discussion, that
+the greater is produced from the less, and the less from the greater,
+and, in a word, that the very production of contraries is from
+contraries? But now it appears to me to be asserted that this can never
+be the case."
+
+Upon this Socrates, having leaned his head forward and listened, said,
+"You have reminded me in a manly way; you do not, however, perceive the
+difference between what is now and what was then asserted. For then it
+was said that a contrary thing is produced from a contrary; but now,
+that a contrary can never become contrary to itself--neither that which
+is in us, nor that which is in nature. For then, my friend, we spoke of
+things that have contraries, calling them by the appellation of those
+things; but now we are speaking of those very things from the presence
+of which things so called receive their appellation, and of these very
+things we say that they are never disposed to admit of production from
+each other." 120. And, at the same time looking at Cebes, "Has anything
+that has been said, Cebes, disturbed you?"
+
+"Indeed," said Cebes, "I am not at all so disposed; however, I by no
+means say that there are not many things that disturb me."
+
+"Then," he continued, "we have quite agreed to this, that a contrary can
+never be contrary to itself."
+
+"Most certainly," he replied.
+
+"But, further," he said, "consider whether you will agree with me in
+this also. Do you call heat and cold any thing?"
+
+"I do."
+
+"The same as snow and fire?"
+
+"By Jupiter! I do not."
+
+"But heat is something different from fire, and cold something different
+from snow?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"But this, I think, is apparent to you--that snow, while it is snow, can
+never, when it has admitted heat, as we said before, continue to be what
+it was, snow and hot; but, on the approach of heat, it must either
+withdraw or perish?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"And, again, that fire, when cold approaches it, must either depart or
+perish; but that it will never endure, when it has admitted coldness, to
+continue what it was, fire and cold?"
+
+121. "You speak truly," he said.
+
+"It happens, then," he continued, "with respect to some of such things,
+that not only is the idea itself always thought worthy of the same
+appellation, but likewise something else which is not, indeed, that idea
+itself, but constantly retains its form so long as it exists. What I
+mean will perhaps be clearer in the following examples: the odd in
+number must always possess the name by which we now call it, must it
+not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Must it alone, of all things--for this I ask--or is there any thing
+else which is not the same as the odd, but yet which we must always call
+odd, together with its own name, because it is so constituted by nature
+that it can never be without the odd? But this, I say, is the case with
+the number three, and many others. For consider with respect to the
+number three: does it not appear to you that it must always be called by
+its own name, as well as by that of the odd, which is not the same as
+the number three? Yet such is the nature of the number three, five, and
+the entire half of number, that though they are not the same as the odd,
+yet each of them is always odd. And, again, two and four, and the whole
+other series of number, though not the same as the even, are
+nevertheless each of them always even: do you admit this, or not?"
+
+122. "How should I not?" he replied.
+
+"Observe then," said he, "what I wish to prove. It is this--that it
+appears not only that these contraries do not admit each other, but that
+even such things as are not contrary to each other, and yet always
+possess contraries, do not appear to admit that idea which is contrary
+to the idea that exists in themselves, but, when it approaches, perish
+or depart. Shall we not allow that the number three would first perish,
+and suffer any thing whatever, rather than endure, while it is still
+three, to become even?"
+
+"Most certainly," said Cebes.
+
+"And yet," said he, "the number two is not contrary to three."
+
+"Surely not."
+
+"Not only, then, do ideas that are contrary never allow the approach of
+each other, but some other things also do not allow the approach of
+contraries."
+
+"You say very truly," he replied.
+
+"Do you wish, then," he said, "that, if we are able, we should define
+what these things are?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Would they not then, Cebes," he said, "be such things as, whatever they
+occupy, compel that thing not only to retain its own idea, but also that
+of something which is always a contrary?"
+
+"How do you mean?"
+
+123. "As we just now said. For you know, surely, that whatever things
+the idea of three occupies must of necessity not only be three, but also
+odd?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"To such a thing, then, we assert, that the idea contrary to that form
+which constitutes this can never come."
+
+"It can not."
+
+"But did the odd make it so?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"And is the contrary to this the idea of the even?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"The idea of the even, then, will never come to the three?"
+
+"No, surely."
+
+"Three, then, has no part in the even?"
+
+"None whatever."
+
+"The number three is uneven?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"What, therefore, I said should be defined--namely, what things they are
+which, though not contrary to some particular thing, yet do not admit of
+the contrary itself; as, in the present instance, the number three,
+though not contrary to the even, does not any the more admit it, for it
+always brings the contrary with it, just as the number two does to the
+odd, fire to cold, and many other particulars. Consider, then, whether
+you would thus define, not only that a contrary does not admit a
+contrary, but also that that which brings with it a contrary to that to
+which it approaches will never admit the contrary of that which it
+brings with it. 124. But call it to mind again, for it will not be
+useless to hear it often repeated. Five will not admit the idea of the
+even, nor ten, its double, that of the odd. This double, then, though it
+is itself contrary to something else,[38] yet will not admit the idea of
+the odd, nor will half as much again, nor other things of the kind, such
+as the half and the third part, admit the idea of the whole, if you
+follow me, and agree with me that it is so."
+
+"I entirely agree with you," he said, "and follow you."
+
+"Tell me again, then," he said, "from the beginning; and do not answer
+me in the terms in which I put the question, but in different ones,
+imitating my example. For I say this because, besides that safe mode of
+answering which I mentioned at first,[39] from what has now been said, I
+see another no less safe one. For if you should ask me what that is
+which, if it be in the body, will cause it to be hot, I should not give
+you that safe but unlearned answer, that it is heat, but one more
+elegant, from what we have just now said, that it is fire; nor, if you
+should ask me what that is which, if it be in the body, will cause it to
+be diseased, should I say that it is disease, but fever; nor if you
+should ask what that is which, if it be in number, will cause it to be
+odd, should I say that it is unevenness, but unity; and so with other
+things. But consider whether you sufficiently understand what I mean."
+
+125. "Perfectly so," he replied.
+
+"Answer me, then," he said, "what that is which, when it is in the body,
+the body will be alive?"
+
+"Soul," he replied.
+
+"Is not this, then, always the case?"
+
+"How should it not be?" said he.
+
+"Does the soul, then, always bring life to whatever it occupies?"
+
+"It does indeed," he replied.
+
+"Whether, then, is there any thing contrary to life or not?"
+
+"There is," he replied.
+
+"What?"
+
+"Death."
+
+"The soul, then, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings
+with it, as has been already allowed?"
+
+"Most assuredly," replied Cebes.
+
+"What, then? How do we denominate that which does not admit the idea of
+the even?"
+
+"Uneven," he replied.
+
+"And that which does not admit the just, nor the musical?"
+
+"Unmusical," he said, "and unjust."
+
+"Be it so. But what do we call that which does not admit death?"
+
+"Immortal," he replied.
+
+"Therefore, does not the soul admit death?"
+
+"No."
+
+"Is the soul, then, immortal?"
+
+"Immortal."
+
+126. "Be it so," he said. "Shall we say, then, that this has been now
+demonstrated? or how think you?"
+
+"Most completely, Socrates."
+
+"What, then," said he, "Cebes, if it were necessary for the uneven to be
+imperishable, would the number three be otherwise than imperishable?"
+
+"How should it not?"
+
+"If, therefore, it were also necessary that what is without heat should
+be imperishable, when any one should introduce heat to snow, would not
+the snow withdraw itself, safe and unmelted? For it would not perish;
+nor yet would it stay and admit the heat."
+
+"You say truly," he replied.
+
+"In like manner, I think, if that which is insusceptible of cold were
+imperishable, that when any thing cold approached the fire, it would
+neither be extinguished nor perish, but would depart quite safe."
+
+"Of necessity," he said.
+
+"Must we not, then, of necessity," he continued, "speak thus of that
+which is immortal? if that which is immortal is imperishable, it is
+impossible for the soul to perish, when death approaches it. For, from
+what has been said already, it will not admit death, nor will ever be
+dead; just as we said that three will never be even, nor, again, will
+the odd; nor will fire be cold, nor yet the heat that is in fire. 127.
+But some one may say, what hinders, though the odd can never become even
+by the approach of the even, as we have allowed, yet, when the odd is
+destroyed, that the even should succeed in its place? We could not
+contend with him who should make this objection that it is not
+destroyed, for the uneven is not imperishable; since, if this were
+granted us, we might easily have contended that, on the approach of the
+even, the odd and the three depart; and we might have contended in the
+same way with respect to fire, heat, and the rest, might we not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Wherefore, with respect to the immortal, if we have allowed that it is
+imperishable, the soul, in addition to its being immortal, must also be
+imperishable; if not, there will be need of other arguments."
+
+"But there is no need," he said, "so far as that is concerned; for
+scarcely could any thing not admit of corruption, if that which is
+immortal and eternal is liable to it."
+
+128. "The deity, indeed, I think," said Socrates, "and the idea itself
+of life, and if anything else is immortal, must be allowed by all beings
+to be incapable of dissolution."
+
+"By Jupiter!" he replied, "by all men, indeed, and still more, as I
+think, by the gods."
+
+"Since, then, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, can the
+soul, since it is immortal, be any thing else than imperishable?"
+
+"It must, of necessity, be so."
+
+"When, therefore, death approaches a man, the mortal part of him, as it
+appears, dies, but the immortal part departs safe and uncorrupted,
+having withdrawn itself from death?"
+
+"It appears so."
+
+"The soul, therefore," he said, "Cebes, is most certainly immortal and
+imperishable, and our souls will really exist in Hades."
+
+"Therefore, Socrates," he said, "I have nothing further to say against
+this, nor any reason for doubting your arguments. But if Simmias here,
+or any one else, has any thing to say, it were well for him not to be
+silent; for I know not to what other opportunity beyond the present any
+one can defer it, who wishes either to speak or hear about these
+things."
+
+"But, indeed," said Simmias, "neither have I any reason to doubt what
+has been urged; yet, from the magnitude of the subject discussed, and
+from my low opinion of human weakness, I am compelled still to retain a
+doubt within myself with respect to what has been said."
+
+"Not only so, Simmias," said Socrates, "but you say this well; and,
+moreover, the first hypotheses, even though they are credible to you,
+should nevertheless be examined more carefully; and if you should
+investigate them sufficiently, I think you will follow my reasoning as
+far as it is possible for man to do so; and if this very point becomes
+clear, you will inquire no further."
+
+"You speak truly," he said.
+
+"But it is right, my friends," he said, "that we should consider this---
+that if the soul is immortal, it requires our care not only for the
+present time, which we call life, but for all time; and the danger would
+now appear to be dreadful if one should neglect it. 130. For if death
+were a deliverance from every thing, it would be a great gain for the
+wicked, when they die, to be delivered at the same time from the body,
+and from their vices together with the soul; but now, since it appears
+to be immortal, it can have no other refuge from evils, nor safety,
+except by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul goes to
+Hades possessing nothing else than its discipline and education, which
+are said to be of the greatest advantage or detriment to the dead, on
+the very beginning of his journey thither. For, thus, it is said that
+each person's demon who was assigned to him while living, when he dies
+conducts him to some place, where they that are assembled together must
+receive sentence, and then proceed to Hades with that guide who has been
+ordered to conduct them from hence thither. But there having received
+their deserts, and having remained the appointed time, another guide
+brings them back hither again, after many and long revolutions of time.
+The journey, then, is not such as the Telephus of Æschylus describes it;
+for he says that a simple path leads to Hades; but it appears to me to
+be neither simple nor one, for there would be no need of guides, nor
+could any one ever miss the way, if there were but one. But now it
+appears to have many divisions and windings; and this I conjecture from
+our religious and funeral rites.[40] 131. The well-ordered and wise
+soul, then, both follows, and is not ignorant of its present condition;
+but that which through passion clings to the body, as I said before,
+having longingly fluttered about it for a long time, and about its
+visible place,[41] after vehement resistance and great suffering, is
+forcibly and with great difficulty led away by its appointed demon. And
+when it arrives at the place where the others are, impure and having
+done any such thing as the committal of unrighteous murders or other
+similar actions, which are kindred to these, and are the deeds of
+kindred souls, every one shuns it and turns away from it, and will be
+neither its fellow-traveler nor guide; but it wanders about, oppressed
+with every kind of helplessness, until certain periods have elapsed; and
+when these are completed, it is carried, of necessity, to an abode
+suitable to it. But the soul which has passed through life with purity
+and moderation, having obtained the gods for its fellow-travelers and
+guides, settles each in the place suited to it. 132. There are, indeed,
+many and wonderful places in the earth, and it is itself neither of such
+a kind nor of such a magnitude as is supposed by those who are
+accustomed to speak of the earth, as I have been persuaded by a certain
+person."
+
+Whereupon Simmias said, "How mean you, Socrates? For I, too, have heard
+many things about the earth--not, however, those things which have
+obtained your belief. I would, therefore, gladly hear them."
+
+"Indeed, Simmias, the art of Glaucus[42] does not seem to me to be
+required to relate what these things are. That they are true, however,
+appears to me more than the art of Glaucus can prove, and, besides, I
+should probably not be able to do it; and even if I did know how, what
+remains to me of life, Simmias, seems insufficient for the length of the
+subject. However, the form of the earth, such as I am persuaded it is,
+and the different places in it, nothing hinders me from telling."
+
+"But that will be enough," said Simmias.
+
+"I am persuaded, then," said he, "in the first place, that, if the earth
+is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a spherical form, it has no
+need of air, nor of any other similar force, to prevent it from falling;
+but that the similarity of the heavens to themselves on every side, and
+the equilibrium of the earth itself, are sufficient to support it; for a
+thing in a state of equilibrium when placed in the middle of something
+that presses it equally on all sides can not incline more or less on any
+side, but, being equally affected all around, remains unmoved. 133. In
+the first place, then," he said, "I am persuaded of this."
+
+"And very properly so," said Simmias.
+
+"Yet, further," said he, "that it is very large, and that we who inhabit
+some small portion of it, from the river Phasis to the pillars of
+Hercules, dwell about the sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh; and
+that many others elsewhere dwell in many similar places, for that there
+are everywhere about the earth many hollows of various forms and sizes
+into which there is a confluence of water, mist and air; but that the
+earth itself, being pure, is situated in the pure heavens, in which are
+the stars, and which most persons who are accustomed to speak about such
+things call ether; of which these things are the sediment, and are
+continually flowing into the hollow parts of the earth. 134. That we are
+ignorant, then, that we are dwelling in its hollows, and imagine that we
+inhabit the upper parts of the earth, just as if any one dwelling in the
+bottom of the sea should think that he dwelt on the sea, and, beholding
+the sun and the other stars through the water, should imagine that the
+sea was the heavens; but, through sloth and weakness, should never have
+reached the surface of the sea; nor, having emerged and risen up from
+the sea to this region, have seen how much more pure and more beautiful
+it is than the place where he is, nor has heard of it from any one else
+who has seen it. This, then, is the very condition in which we are; for,
+dwelling in some hollow of the earth, we think that we dwell on the
+surface of it, and call the air heaven, as if the stars moved through
+this, being heaven itself. But this is because, by reason of our
+weakness and sloth, we are unable to reach to the summit of the air.
+Since, if any one could arrive at its summit, or, becoming winged, could
+fly up thither, or, emerging from hence, he would see--just as with us,
+fishes, emerging from the sea, behold what is here, so any one would
+behold the things there; and if his nature were able to endure the
+contemplation, he would know that that is the true heaven, and the true
+light, and the true earth. 135. For this earth and these stones, and the
+whole region here, are decayed and corroded, as things in the sea by the
+saltness; for nothing of any value grows in the sea, nor, in a word,
+does it contain any thing perfect; but there are caverns and sand, and
+mud in abundance, and filth, in whatever parts of the sea there is
+earth, nor are they at all worthy to be compared with the beautiful
+things with us. But, on the other hand, those things in the upper
+regions of the earth would appear far more to excel the things with us.
+For, if we may tell a beautiful fable, it is well worth hearing,
+Simmias, what kind the things are on the earth beneath the heavens."
+
+"Indeed, Socrates," said Simmias, "we should be very glad to hear that
+fable."
+
+136. "First of all, then, my friend," he continued, "this earth, if any
+one should survey it from above, is said to have the appearance of
+balls covered with twelve different pieces of leather, variegated and
+distinguished with colors, of which the colors found here, and which
+painters use, are, as it were, copies. But there the whole earth is
+composed of such, and far more brilliant and pure than these; for one
+part of it is purple, and of wonderful beauty, part of a golden color,
+and part of white, more white than chalk or snow, and, in like manner,
+composed of other colors, and those more in number and more beautiful
+than any we have ever beheld. And those very hollow parts of the earth,
+though filled with water and air, exhibit a certain species of color,
+shining among the variety of other colors, so that one continually
+variegated aspect presents itself to the view. In this earth, being
+such, all things that grow, grow in a manner proportioned to its
+nature--trees, flowers and fruits; and, again, in like manner, its
+mountains and stones possess, in the same proportion, smoothness and
+transparency, and more beautiful colors; of which the well-known stones
+here that are so highly prized are but fragments, such as
+sardine-stones, jaspers, and emeralds, and all of that kind. But there,
+there is nothing subsists that is not of this character, and even more
+beautiful than these. 137. But the reason of this is, because the stones
+there are pure, and not eaten up and decayed, like those here, by
+rottenness and saltness, which flow down hither together, and which
+produce deformity and disease in the stones and the earth, and in other
+things, even animals and plants. But that earth is adorned with all
+these, and, moreover, with gold and silver, and other things of the
+kind: for they are naturally conspicuous, being numerous and large, and
+in all parts of the earth; so that to behold it is a sight for the
+blessed. There are also many other animals and men upon it, some
+dwelling in mid-earth, others about the air, as we do about the sea, and
+others in islands which the air flows round, and which are near the
+continent; and, in one word, what water and the sea are to us, for our
+necessities, the air is to them; and what air is to us, that ether is to
+them. 138. But their seasons are of such a temperament that they are
+free from disease, and live for a much longer time than those here, and
+surpass us in sight, hearing, and smelling, and every thing of this
+kind, as much as air excels water, and ether air, in purity. Moreover,
+they have abodes and temples of the gods, in which gods really dwell,
+and voices and oracles, and sensible visions of the gods, and such-like
+intercourse with them; the sun, too, and moon, and stars, are seen by
+them such as they really are, and their felicity in other respects is
+correspondent with these things."
+
+"And, such, indeed, is the nature of the whole earth, and the parts
+about the earth; but there are many places all round it throughout its
+cavities, some deeper and more open than that in which we dwell; but
+others that are deeper have a less chasm than our region, and others are
+shallower in depth than it is here, and broader. 139. But all these are
+in many places perforated one into another under the earth, some with
+narrower and some with wider channels, and have passages through, by
+which a great quantity of water flows from one into another, as into
+basins, and there are immense bulks of ever-flowing rivers under the
+earth, both of hot and cold water, and a great quantity of fire, and
+mighty rivers of fire, and many of liquid mire, some purer, and some
+more miry, as in Sicily there are rivers of mud that flow before the
+lava, and the lava itself, and from these the several places are filled,
+according as the overflow from time to time happens to come to each of
+them. But all these move up and down, as it were, by a certain
+oscillation existing in the earth. And this oscillation proceeds from
+such natural cause as this; one of the chasms of the earth is
+exceedingly large, and perforated through the entire earth, and is that
+which Homer[43] speaks of, 'very far off, where is the most profound
+abyss beneath the earth,' which elsewhere both he and many other poets
+have called Tartarus. For into this chasm all rivers flow together, and
+from it flow out again; but they severally derive their character from
+the earth through which they flow. 140. And the reason why all streams
+flow out from thence, and flow into it, is because this liquid has
+neither bottom nor base. Therefore, it oscillates and fluctuates up and
+down, and the air and the wind around it do the same; for they accompany
+it both when it rushes to those parts of the earth, and when to these.
+And as in respiration the flowing breath is continually breathed out and
+drawn in, so there the wind oscillating with the liquid causes certain
+vehement and irresistible winds both as it enters and goes out. When,
+therefore, the water rushing in descends to the place which we call the
+lower region, it flows through the earth into the streams there, and
+fills them, just as men pump up water. But when again it leaves those
+regions and rushes hither, it again fills the rivers here; and these,
+when filled, flow through channels and through the earth, and, having
+severally reached the several places to which they are journeying, they
+make seas, lakes, rivers, and fountains. 141. Then, sinking again from
+thence beneath the earth, some of them having gone round longer and more
+numerous places, and others round fewer and shorter, they again
+discharge themselves into Tartarus--some much lower than they were drawn
+up, others only a little so; but all of them flow in again beneath the
+point at which they flowed out. And some issue out directly opposite the
+place by which they flow in, others on the same side. There are also
+some which, having gone round altogether in a circle, folding themselves
+once or several times round the earth, like serpents, when they have
+descended as low as possible, discharge themselves again; and it is
+possible for them to descend on either side as far as the middle, but
+not beyond; for in each direction there is an acclivity to the streams
+both ways."
+
+"Now, there are many other large and various streams; but among this
+great number there are four certain streams, of which the largest, and
+that which flows most outwardly round the earth, is called Ocean; but
+directly opposite this, and flowing in a contrary direction, is Acheron,
+which flows through other desert places, and, moreover, passing under
+the earth, reaches the Acherusian lake, where the souls of most who die
+arrive; and, having remained there for certain destined periods, some
+longer and some shorter, are again sent forth into the generations of
+animals. 142. A third river issues midway between these, and, near its
+source, falls into a vast region, burning with abundance of fire, and
+forms a lake larger than our sea, boiling with water and mud. From hence
+it proceeds in a circle, turbulent and muddy, and, folding itself round
+it, reaches both other places and the extremity of the Acherusian lake,
+but does not mingle with its water; but, folding itself oftentimes
+beneath the earth, it discharges itself into the lower parts of
+Tartarus. And this is the river which they call Pyriphlegethon, whose
+burning streams emit dissevered fragments in whatever part of the earth
+they happen to be. Opposite to this, again, the fourth river first falls
+into a place dreadful and savage, as it is said, having its whole color
+like cyanus:[44] this they call Stygian, and the lake which the river
+forms by its discharge, Styx. This river, having fallen in here, and
+received awful power in the water, sinking beneath the earth, proceeds,
+folding itself round, in an opposite course to Pyriphlegethon, and meets
+it in the Acherusian lake from, a contrary direction. Neither does the
+water of this river mingle with any other; but it, too, having gone
+round in a circle, discharges itself into Tartarus, opposite to
+Pyriphlegethon. Its name, as the poets say, is Cocytus."
+
+143. "These things being thus constituted, when the dead arrive at the
+place to which their demon leads them severally, first of all they are
+judged, as well those who have lived well and piously, as those who have
+not. And those who appear to have passed a middle kind of life,
+proceeding to Acheron, and embarking in the vessels they have, on these
+arrive at the lake, and there dwell; and when they are purified, and
+have suffered punishment for the iniquities they may have committed,
+they are set free, and each receives the reward of his good deeds,
+according to his deserts. But those who appear to be incurable, through
+the magnitude of their offenses, either from having committed many and
+great sacrileges, or many unjust and lawless murders, or other similar
+crimes, these a suitable destiny hurls into Tartarus, whence they never
+come forth. 144. But those who appear to have been guilty of curable yet
+great offenses--such as those who, through anger, have committed any
+violence against father or mother, and have lived the remainder of their
+life in a state of penitence, or they who have become homicides in a
+similar manner--these must, of necessity, fall into Tartarus. But after
+they have fallen, and have been there for a year, the wave casts them
+forth, the homicides into Cocytus, but the parricides and matricides
+into Pyriphlegethon. But when, being borne along, they arrive at the
+Acherusian lake, there they cry out to and invoke, some those whom they
+slew, others those whom they injured, and, invoking them, they entreat
+and implore them to suffer them to go out into the lake, and to receive
+them, and if they persuade them, they go out, and are freed from their
+sufferings, but if not, they are borne back to Tartarus, and thence
+again to the rivers. And they do not cease from suffering this until
+they have persuaded those whom they have injured, for this sentence was
+imposed on them by the judges. 145. But those who are found to have
+lived an eminently holy life, these are they who, being freed and set at
+large from these regions in the earth as from a prison, arrive at the
+pure abode above, and dwell on the upper parts of the earth. And among
+these, they who have sufficiently purified themselves by philosophy
+shall live without bodies, throughout all future time, and shall arrive
+at habitations yet more beautiful than these which it is neither easy to
+describe, nor at present is there sufficient time for the purpose."
+
+"But, for the sake of these things which we have described, we should
+use every endeavor, Simmias, so as to acquire virtue and wisdom in this
+life, for the reward is noble, and the hope great."
+
+"To affirm positively, indeed, that these things are exactly as I have
+described them does not become a man of sense. That, however, either
+this, or something of the kind, takes place with respect to our souls
+and their habitations--since our soul is certainly immortal--this
+appears to me most fitting to be believed, and worthy the hazard for one
+who trusts in its reality; for the hazard is noble, and it is right to
+allure ourselves with such things, as with enchantments, for which
+reason I have prolonged my story to such a length. 146. On account of
+these things, then, a man ought to be confident about his soul who,
+during this life, has disregarded all the pleasures and ornaments of the
+body as foreign from his nature, and who, having thought that they do
+more harm than good, has zealously applied himself to the acquirement of
+knowledge, and who, having adorned his soul, not with a foreign, but its
+own proper ornament--temperance, justice, fortitude, freedom, and
+truth--thus waits for his passage to Hades, as one who is ready to
+depart whenever destiny shall summon him. You, then," he continued,
+"Simmias and Cebes, and the rest, will each of you depart at some future
+time, but now destiny summons me, as a tragic writer would say, and it
+is nearly time for me to betake myself to the bath, for it appears to me
+to be better to drink the poison after I have bathed myself, and not to
+trouble the women with washing my dead body."
+
+147. When he had thus spoken, Crito said, "So be it, Socrates, but what
+commands have you to give to these or to me, either respecting your
+children, or any other matter, in attending to which we can most oblige
+you?"
+
+"What I always say, Crito," he replied, "nothing new that by taking care
+of yourselves you will oblige both me and mine, and yourselves, whatever
+you do, though you should not now promise it, and if you neglect
+yourselves, and will not live, as it were, in the footsteps of what has
+been now and formerly said, even though you should promise much at
+present, and that earnestly, you will do no good at all."
+
+"We will endeavor, then, so to do," he said. "But how shall we bury
+you?"
+
+"Just as you please," he said, "if only you can catch me, and I do not
+escape from you." 148. And, at the same time smiling gently, and looking
+round on us, he said, "I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that I am
+that Socrates who is now conversing with you, and who methodizes each
+part of the discourse; but he thinks that I am he whom he will shortly
+behold dead, and asks how he should bury me. But that which I some time
+since argued at length, that when I have drunk the poison I shall no
+longer remain with you, but shall depart to some happy state of the
+blessed, this I seem to have urged to him in vain, though I meant at the
+same time to console both you and myself. Be ye, then, my sureties to
+Crito," he said, "in an obligation contrary to that which he made to the
+judges (for he undertook that I should remain); but do you be sureties
+that, when I die, I shall not remain, but shall depart, that Crito may
+more easily bear it; and, when he sees my body either burned or buried,
+may not be afflicted for me, as if I suffered from some dreadful thing;
+nor say at my interment that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or
+is buried. 149. For be well assured," he said, "most excellent Crito,
+that to speak improperly is not only culpable as to the thing itself,
+but likewise occasions some injury to our souls. You must have a good
+courage, then, and say that you bury my body, and bury it in such a
+manner as is pleasing to you, and as you think is most agreeable to our
+laws."
+
+When he had said thus, he rose, and went into a chamber to bathe, and
+Crito followed him, but he directed us to wait for him. We waited,
+therefore, conversing among ourselves about what had been said, and
+considering it again, and sometimes speaking about our calamity, how
+severe it would be to us, sincerely thinking that, like those who are
+deprived of a father, we should pass the rest of our life as orphans.
+When he had bathed, and his children were brought to him (for he had
+two little sons and one grown up), and the women belonging to his family
+were come, having conversed with them in the presence of Crito, and
+given them such injunctions as he wished, he directed the women and
+children to go away, and then returned to us. And it was now near
+sunset; for he spent a considerable time within. 150. But when he came
+from bathing he sat down, and did not speak much afterward; then the
+officer of the Eleven came in, and, standing near him, said, "Socrates,
+I shall not have to find that fault with you that I do with others, that
+they are angry with me, and curse me, when, by order of the archons, I
+bid them drink the poison. But you, on all other occasions during the
+time you have been here, I have found to be the most noble, meek, and
+excellent man of all that ever came into this place; and, therefore, I
+am now well convinced that you will not be angry with me (for you know
+who are to blame), but with them. Now, then (for you know what I came to
+announce to you), farewell, and endeavor to bear what is inevitable as
+easily as possible." And at the same time, bursting into tears, he
+turned away and withdrew.
+
+151. And Socrates, looking after him, said, "And thou, too, farewell. We
+will do as you direct." At the same time turning to us, he said, "How
+courteous the man is! During the whole time I have been here he has
+visited me, and conversed with me sometimes, and proved the worthiest of
+men; and now how generously he weeps for me! But come, Crito, let us
+obey him, and let some one bring the poison, if it is ready pounded; but
+if not, let the man pound it."
+
+Then Crito said, "But I think, Socrates, that the sun is still on the
+mountains, and has not yet set. Besides, I know that others have drunk
+the poison very late, after it had been announced to them, and have
+supped and drunk freely, and some even have enjoyed the objects of their
+love. Do not hasten, then, for there is yet time."
+
+Upon this Socrates replied, "These men whom you mention, Crito, do these
+things with good reason, for they think they shall gain by so doing; and
+I, too, with good reason, shall not do so; for I think I shall gain
+nothing by drinking a little later, except to become ridiculous to
+myself, in being so fond of life, and sparing of it, when none any
+longer remains. Go then," he said, "obey, and do not resist."
+
+152. Crito, having heard this, nodded to the boy that stood near. And
+the boy, having gone out and staid for some time, came, bringing with
+him the man that was to administer the poison, who brought it ready
+pounded in a cup. And Socrates, on seeing the man, said, "Well, my good
+friend, as you are skilled in these matters, what must I do?"
+
+"Nothing else," he replied, "than, when you have drunk it, walk about
+until there is a heaviness in your legs; then lie down: thus it will do
+its purpose." And at the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. And
+he having received it very cheerfully, Echecrates neither trembling, nor
+changing at all in color or countenance, but, as he was wont, looking
+steadfastly at the man, said, "What say you of this potion, with respect
+to making a libation to any one, is it lawful or not?"
+
+"We only pound so much, Socrates," he said, "as we think sufficient to
+drink."
+
+153. "I understand you," he said; "but it is certainly both lawful and
+right to pray to the gods, that my departure hence thither may be happy;
+which, therefore, I pray, and so may it be." And as he said this, he
+drank it off readily and calmly. Thus far, most of us were with
+difficulty able to restrain ourselves from weeping; but when we saw him
+drinking, and having finished the draught, we could do so no longer;
+but, in spite of myself, the tears came in full torrent, so that,
+covering my face, I wept for myself; for I did not weep for him, but for
+my own fortune, in being deprived of such a friend. But Crito, even
+before me, when he could not restrain his tears, had risen up. 154. But
+Apollodorus, even before this, had not ceased weeping; and then,
+bursting into an agony of grief, weeping and lamenting, he pierced the
+heart of every one present, except Socrates himself. But he said, "What
+are you doing, my admirable friends? I, indeed, for this reason chiefly,
+sent away the women, that they might not commit any folly of this kind.
+For I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. Be quiet,
+therefore, and bear up."
+
+When we heard this, we were ashamed, and restrained our tears. But he,
+having walked about, when he said that his legs were growing heavy, lay
+down on his back; for the man had so directed him. And, at the same
+time, he who gave the poison taking hold of him, after a short interval,
+examined his feet and legs; and then, having pressed his foot hard, he
+asked if he felt it: he said that he did not. And after this he pressed
+his thighs; and, thus going higher, he showed us that he was growing
+cold and stiff. Then Socrates touched himself, and said that when the
+poison reached his heart he should then depart. 155. But now the parts
+around the lower belly were almost cold; when, uncovering himself, for
+he had been covered over, he said (and they were his last words),
+"Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius; pay it, therefore; and do not
+neglect it."
+
+"It shall be done," said Crito; "but consider whether you have any thing
+else to say."
+
+To this question he gave no reply; but, shortly after, he gave a
+convulsive movement, and the man covered him, and his eyes were fixed;
+and Crito, perceiving it, closed his mouth and eyes.
+
+This, Echecrates, was the end of our friend,--a man, as we may say, the
+best of all of his time that we have known, and, moreover, the most wise
+and just.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+  [25] Phlius, to which Echecrates belonged, was a town of Sicyonia, in
+    Peloponnesus.
+
+  [26] A Pythagorean of Crotona.
+
+  [27] Namely, "that it is better to die than to live."
+
+  [28] Hitto, Boetian for hioto.
+
+  [29] Of Pythagoras.
+
+  [30] Some boyish spirit.
+
+  [31] That is, at a time of life when the body is in full vigor.
+
+  [32] In the original there is a play on the words Haides and
+    haeides, which I can only attempt to retain by departing from
+    the usual rendering of the former word.
+
+  [33] By this I understand him to mean that the soul alone can perceive
+    the truth, but the senses, as they are different, receive and convey
+    different impressions of the same thing; thus, the eye receives one
+    impression of an object, the ear a totally different one.
+
+  [34] kai ahythis eteros kai eteros, that is, "with one argument
+    after another" Though Cousin translates it _et successivement tout
+    different de luimeme_ and Ast, _et rursus alia atque alia_, which
+    may be taken in either sense, yet it appears to me to mean that,
+    when a man repeatedly discovers the fallacy of arguments which he
+    before believed to be true, he distrusts reasoning altogether, just
+    as one who meets with friend after friend who proves unfaithful
+    becomes a misanthrope.
+
+  [35] Lib. xx, v. 7.
+
+  [36] Harmony was the wife of Cadmus, the founder of Thebes; Socrates,
+    therefore, compares his two Theban friends, Simmias and Cebes, with
+    them, and says that, having overcome Simmias, the advocate of
+    Harmony, he must now deal with Cebes, who is represented by Cadmus.
+
+  [37] einai ti, literally, "is something."
+
+  [38] That is, to single.
+
+  [39] Sec. 113.
+
+  [40] It is difficult to express the distinction between osia
+    and nomima. The former word seems to have reference to the souls of
+    the dead; the latter, to their bodies.
+
+  [41] Its place of interment.
+
+  [42] A proverb meaning "a matter of great difficulty."
+
+  [43] "Iliad," lib. viii., v. 14.
+
+  [44] A metallic substance of a deep-blue color, frequently mentioned by
+    the earliest Grecian writers, but of which the nature is unknown.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato
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+PH&AElig;DO OF SOCRATES, by PLATO.</title>
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+Project Gutenberg's Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates
+
+Author: Plato
+
+Release Date: October 12, 2004 [EBook #13726]
+
+Language: English
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+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
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+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK APOLOGY, CRITO, AND PHAEDO ***
+
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+</pre>
+
+<div class="titlepage"><a class='pagenumber' name='page1' id=
+'page1'></a> <a name='apology_crito_and_phaedo_of_socrates' id=
+'apology_crito_and_phaedo_of_socrates'></a>
+
+<h1><span class='smalltext'>Plato's</span><br>
+ Apology, Crito And Ph&aelig;do<br>
+ Of<br>
+ Socrates.</h1>
+
+<br class="noncss">
+
+
+<div class='titleelement'>Literally Translated By
+
+<div class='contributor'>Henry Cary, M.A.,</div>
+
+<span class="emphasis">Worcester College, Oxford</span></div>
+
+<br class="noncss">
+
+
+<div class='titleelement'>With An Introduction By
+
+<div class='contributor'>Edward Brooks, jr.</div>
+</div>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="toc"><a class='pagenumber' name='page2' id='page2'></a>
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page3' id='page3'></a> <a name=
+'contents' id='contents'></a>
+
+<h2>Contents.</h2>
+
+<div class="tocitem"><a href='#introduction'>Introduction</a></div>
+
+<div class="tocitem"><a href='#the_apology_of_socrates'>The Apology
+Of Socrates</a></div>
+
+<div class="tocitem"><a href=
+'#introduction_to_the_crito'>Introduction to the crito</a></div>
+
+<div class="tocitem"><a href=
+'#crito_or_the_duty_of_a_citizen'>Crito; Or, The Duty Of A
+Citizen</a></div>
+
+<div class="tocitem"><a href=
+'#introduction_to_the_phaedo'>Introduction To The
+Ph&aelig;do</a></div>
+
+<div class="tocitem"><a href=
+'#phaedo_or_the_immortality_of_the_soul'>Ph&aelig;do; Or, The
+Immortality Of The Soul</a></div>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="introduction"><a class='pagenumber' name='page4' id=
+'page4'></a> <a class='pagenumber' name='page5' id='page5'></a> <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page6' id='page6'></a> <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page7' id='page7'></a> <a name=
+'introduction'></a>
+
+<h2>Introduction.</h2>
+
+<p>Of all writers of speculative philosophy, both ancient and
+modern, there is probably no one who has attained so eminent a
+position as Plato. What Homer was to Epic poetry, what Cicero and
+Demosthenes were to oratory, and what Shakespeare was to the drama
+of England, Plato was to ancient philosophy, not unapproachable nor
+unapproached, but possessing an inexplicable but unquestioned
+supremacy.</p>
+
+<p>The authentic records of his life are meagre, and much that has
+been written concerning him is of a speculative nature. He was born
+at Athens in the year 427 B.C. His father's name was Ariston, and
+his mother's family, which claimed its descent from Solon, included
+among its members many Athenian notables, among whom was Oritias,
+one of the thirty tyrants.</p>
+
+<p>In his early youth Plato applied himself to poetry and painting,
+both of which pursuits he relinquished to become the disciple and
+follower of Socrates. It is said that his name was originally
+Aristocles, but that it was changed to Plato on account of the
+breadth of his shoulders and forehead. He is also said to have been
+an expert wrestler and to have taken part in several important
+battles.</p>
+
+<p>He was the devoted friend and pupil of Socrates, and during the
+imprisonment of his master he attended him <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page8' id='page8'></a> constantly, and committed to writing
+his last discourses on the immortality of the soul.</p>
+
+<p>After the death of Socrates it is supposed that Plato took
+refuge with Euclides in Megara, and subsequently extended his
+travels into Magna Graecia and Egypt.</p>
+
+<p>Upon his return to Athens he taught those who came to him for
+instruction in the grove named Academus, near the Cephisus, and
+thus founded the first great philosophical school, over which he
+continued to preside until the day of his death. Above the entrance
+to this grove was inscribed the legend: "Let no one ignorant of
+geometry enter here." Here he was attended by persons of every
+description, among the more illustrious of whom were Aristotle,
+Lycurgus, Demosthenes and Isocrates.</p>
+
+<p>There is a story to the effect that Plato three times visited
+Sicily, once upon the invitation of the elder Dionysius, and twice
+at the earnest solicitations of the younger. The former he is said
+to have so seriously offended as to cause the tyrant to have him
+seized on his return home and sold as a slave, from which state of
+bondage he was, however, released by Anicerius of Cyrene.</p>
+
+<p>The people of his time thought more of him than they did of all
+their other philosophers, and called him the Divine Plato. So great
+was the regard and veneration for him that it was considered better
+to err with Plato than be right with any one else.</p>
+
+<p>The writings of Plato are numerous, and most of them are in the
+form of dialogues. The following pages contain translations of
+three of his works, viz.: "The Apologia," "The Crito" and "The
+Ph&aelig;do," all of <a class='pagenumber' name='page9' id=
+'page9'></a>which have reference to the trial, imprisonment and
+death of Socrates.</p>
+
+<p>"The Apologia" represents Socrates on trial for his life,
+undertaking his own defence, though unaccustomed to the language of
+the courts, the occasion being, as he says, the first time he has
+ever been before a court of justice, though seventy years of age.
+Plato was present at the trial, and no doubt gives us the very
+arguments used by the accused. Two charges were brought against
+Socrates&mdash;one that he did not believe in the gods recognized
+by the State, the other that he had corrupted the Athenian youth by
+his teachings. Socrates does not have recourse to the ordinary
+methods adopted by orators on similar occasions. He prefers to
+stand upon his own integrity and innocence, uninfluenced by the
+fear of that imaginary evil, death. He, therefore, does not firmly
+grapple with either of the charges preferred against him. He
+neither denies nor confesses the first accusation, but shows that
+in several instances he conformed to the religious customs of his
+country, and that he believes in God more than he fears man. The
+second charge he meets by a cross-examination of his accuser,
+Melitus, whom he reduces to the dilemma of charging him with
+corrupting the youth designedly, which would be absurd, or with
+doing so undesignedly, for which he could not be liable to
+punishment.</p>
+
+<p>His defence, however, avails him nothing, and he is condemned by
+the judges to die by drinking the poisonous hemlock. In the closing
+part of "The Apologia" Socrates is represented as commenting upon
+the sentence which has been passed upon him, and as expressing his
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page10' id='page10'></a>belief that in
+going to his death he is only passing to a better and a happier
+life.</p>
+
+<p>In "The Crito" Socrates is represented in conversation with a
+friend of his named Crito, who had been present at his trial, and
+who had offered to assist Socrates in paying a fine, had a fine
+been the sentence imposed. Crito visits Socrates in his confinement
+to bring to him the intelligence that the ship, the arrival of
+which was to be the signal for his death upon the following day,
+would arrive forthwith, and to urge him to adopt the means of
+escape which had already been prepared. Socrates promises to follow
+the advice of Crito if, upon a full discussion of the matter, it
+seems right to do so. In the conversation which ensues Socrates
+argues that it is wrong to return evil for evil and that the
+obligations which a citizen owes to his State are more binding than
+those which a child owes his parents or a slave his master, and,
+therefore, it is his duty to submit to the laws of Athens at
+whatever cost to himself. Crito has no answer to make to this
+argument, and Socrates thereupon decides to submit to his fate.</p>
+
+<p>Plato is said to have had two objects in writing this dialogue:
+First, to acquit Socrates of the charge of corrupting the Athenian
+youth; and, second, to establish the fact that it is necessary
+under all circumstances to submit to the established laws of his
+country.</p>
+
+<p>"The Ph&aelig;do" relates the manner in which Socrates spent the
+last day of his life and the circumstances attending his death. He
+is visited by a number of his friends, among whom are Ph&aelig;do,
+Simmias and Crito. When his friends arrive they find him sitting
+upon a bed <a class='pagenumber' name='page11' id='page11'></a>
+rubbing his legs, which have just been released from bonds. He
+remarks upon the unaccountable connection between pleasure and
+pain, and from this the conversation gradually turns to a
+consideration of the question of the immortality of the soul. He
+convinces his listeners of the pre-existence of the soul; but they
+are still skeptical as to its immortality, urging that its
+pre-existence and the fact that it is more durable than the body
+does not preclude the possibility of its being mortal. Socrates,
+however, argues that contraries cannot exist in the same thing at
+the same time, as, for example, the same object cannot partake of
+both magnitude and littleness at the same time. In like manner,
+heat while it is heat can never admit the idea of cold. Life and
+death are contraries and can never coexist; but wherever there is
+life there is soul, so that the soul contains that which is
+contrary to death and can never admit death; consequently the soul
+is immortal.</p>
+
+<p>Having convinced his listeners, Socrates bathes and takes leave
+of his children and the women of his family. Thereupon the officer
+appears and tells him it is time for him to drink the poison. At
+this his friends commence to weep and are rebuked by Socrates for
+their weakness. He drinks the poison calmly and without hesitation,
+and then begins to walk about, still conversing with his friends.
+His limbs soon grow stiff and heavy and he lays himself down upon
+his back. His last words are: "Crito, we owe a cock to
+&AElig;sculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not neglect it."</p>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="book"><a class='pagenumber' name='page12' id=
+'page12'></a> <a class='pagenumber' name='page13' id='page13'></a>
+<a name='the_apology_of_socrates'></a>
+
+<h2>The Apology Of Socrates.</h2>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec1" name=
+"apology_sec1"></a>I know not, O Athenians! how far you have been
+influenced by my accusers for my part, in listening to them I
+almost forgot myself, so plausible were their arguments however, so
+to speak, they have said nothing true. But of the many falsehoods
+which they uttered I wondered at one of them especially, that in
+which they said that you ought to be on your guard lest you should
+be deceived by me, as being eloquent in speech. For that they are
+not ashamed of being forthwith convicted by me in fact, when I
+shall show that I am not by any means eloquent, this seemed to me
+the most shameless thing in them, unless indeed they call him
+eloquent who speaks the truth. For, if they mean this, then I would
+allow that I am an orator, but not after their fashion for they, as
+I affirm, have said nothing true, but from me you shall hear the
+whole truth. Not indeed, Athenians, arguments highly wrought, as
+theirs were, with choice phrases and expressions, nor adorned, but
+you shall hear a speech uttered without premeditation in such words
+as first present themselves. For I am confident that what I say
+will be just, and let none of you expect otherwise, for surely it
+would not become my time of life to come before you like a youth
+with a got up speech. Above all things, <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page14' id='page14'></a>therefore, I beg and implore this of you,
+O Athenians! if you hear me defending myself in the same language
+as that in which I am accustomed to speak both in the forum at the
+counters, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, not to be
+surprised or disturbed on this account. For the case is this: I now
+for the first time come before a court of justice, though more than
+seventy years old; I am therefore utterly a stranger to the
+language here. As, then, if I were really a stranger, you would
+have pardoned me if I spoke in the language and the manner in which
+I had been educated, so now I ask this of you as an act of justice,
+as it appears to me, to disregard the manner of my speech, for
+perhaps it may be somewhat worse, and perhaps better, and to
+consider this only, and to give your attention to this, whether I
+speak what is just or not; for this is the virtue of a judge, but
+of an orator to speak the truth.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec2" name=
+"apology_sec2">2</a>. First, then, O Athenians! I am right in
+defending myself against the first false accusations alleged
+against me, and my first accusers, and then against the latest
+accusations, and the latest accusers. For many have been accusers
+of me to you, and for many years, who have asserted nothing true,
+of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his party, although
+they too are formidable; but those are still more formidable,
+Athenians, who, laying hold of many of you from childhood, have
+persuaded you, and accused me of what is not true: "that there is
+one Socrates, a wise man, who occupies himself about celestial
+matters, and has explored every thing under the earth, and makes
+the worse appear the better reason." Those, O Athenians! who have
+spread abroad this report are my formidable accusers; for they who
+hear them think that such as search into these things do not
+believe that there are gods. In the next place, these accusers are
+numerous, and have accused me now for <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page15' id='page15'></a>a long time; moreover, they said these
+things to you at that time of life in which you were most
+credulous, when you were boys and some of you youths, and they
+accused me altogether in my absence, when there was no one to
+defend me. But the most unreasonable thing of all is, that it is
+not possible to learn and mention their names, except that one of
+them happens to be a comic poet.<a id="footnotetag1" name=
+"footnotetag1" href="#footnote1"><sup>1</sup></a> Such, however,
+as, influenced by envy and calumny, have persuaded you, and those
+who, being themselves persuaded, have persuaded others, all these
+are most difficult to deal with; for it is not possible to bring
+any of them forward here, nor to confute any; but it is altogether
+necessary to fight, as it were with a shadow, in making my defense,
+and to convict when there is no one to answer. Consider, therefore,
+as I have said, that my accusers are twofold, some who have lately
+accused me, and others long since, whom I have made mention of; and
+believe that I ought to defend myself against these first; for you
+heard them accusing me first, and much more than these last.</p>
+
+<p>Well. I must make my defense, then, O Athenians! and endeavor in
+this so short a space of time to remove from your minds the calumny
+which you have long entertained. I wish, indeed, it might be so, if
+it were at all better both for you and me, and that in making my
+defense I could effect something more advantageous still: I think,
+however, that it will be difficult, and I am not entirely ignorant
+what the difficulty is. Nevertheless, let this turn out as may be
+pleasing to God, I must obey the law and make my defense.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec3" name=
+"apology_sec3">3</a>. Let us, then, repeat from the beginning what
+the accusation is from which the calumny against me has arisen, <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page16' id='page16'></a>and relying on
+which Melitus has preferred this indictment against me. Well. What,
+then, do they who charge me say in their charge? For it is
+necessary to read their deposition as of public accusers. "Socrates
+acts wickedly, and is criminally curious in searching into things
+under the earth, and in the heavens, and in making the worse appear
+the better cause, and in teaching these same things to others."
+Such is the accusation: for such things you have yourselves seen in
+the comedy of Aristophanes, one Socrates there carried about,
+saying that he walks in the air, and acting many other
+buffooneries, of which I understand nothing whatever. Nor do I say
+this as disparaging such a science, if there be any one skilled in
+such things, only let me not be prosecuted by Melitus on a charge
+of this kind; but I say it, O Athenians! because I have nothing to
+do with such matters. And I call upon most of you as witnesses of
+this, and require you to inform and tell each other, as many of you
+as have ever heard me conversing; and there are many such among
+you. Therefore tell each other, if any one of you has ever heard me
+conversing little or much on such subjects. And from this you will
+know that other things also, which the multitude assert of me, are
+of a similar nature.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec4" name=
+"apology_sec4">4</a>. However not one of these things is true; nor,
+if you have heard from any one that I attempt to teach men, and
+require payment, is this true. Though this, indeed, appears to me
+to be an honorable thing, if one should be able to instruct men,
+like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, and Hippias the
+Elean. For each of these, O Athenians! is able, by going through
+the several cities, to persuade the young men, who can attach
+themselves gratuitously to such of their own fellow-citizens as
+they please, to abandon their fellow-citizens and associate with
+them, giving <a class='pagenumber' name='page17' id=
+'page17'></a>them money and thanks besides. There is also another
+wise man here, a Parian, who, I hear, is staying in the city. For I
+happened to visit a person who spends more money on the sophists
+than all others together: I mean Callias, son of Hipponicus. I
+therefore asked him, for he has two sons, "Callias," I said, "if
+your two sons were colts or calves, we should have had to choose a
+master for them, and hire a person who would make them excel in
+such qualities as belong to their nature; and he would have been a
+groom or an agricultural laborer. But now, since your sons are men,
+what master do you intend to choose for them? Who is there skilled
+in the qualities that become a man and a citizen? For I suppose you
+must have considered this, since you have sons. Is there any one,"
+I said, "or not?" "Certainly," he answered. "Who is he?" said I,
+"and whence does he come? and on what terms does he teach?" He
+replied, "Evenus the Parian, Socrates, for five min&aelig;." And I
+deemed Evenus happy, if he really possesses this art, and teaches
+admirably. And I too should think highly of myself, and be very
+proud, if I possessed this knowledge, but I possess it not, O
+Athenians.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec5" name=
+"apology_sec5">5</a>. Perhaps, one of you may now object: "But,
+Socrates, what have you done, then? Whence have these calumnies
+against you arisen? For surely if you had not busied yourself more
+than others, such a report and story would never have got abroad,
+unless you had done something different from what most men do. Tell
+us, therefore, what it is, that we may not pass a hasty judgment on
+you." He who speaks thus appears to me to speak justly, and I will
+endeavor to show you what it is that has occasioned me this
+character and imputation. Listen, then: to some of you perhaps I
+shall appear to jest, yet be assured that I shall tell you the
+whole truth. For I, O Athenians! have acquired this character <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page18' id='page18'></a>through nothing
+else than a certain wisdom. Of what kind, then, is this wisdom?
+Perhaps it is merely human wisdom. For in this, in truth, I appear
+to be wise. They probably, whom I have just now mentioned,
+possessed a wisdom more than human, otherwise I know not what to
+say about it; for I am not acquainted with it, and whosoever says I
+am, speaks falsely, and for the purpose of calumniating me. But, O
+Athenians! do not cry out against me, even though I should seem to
+you to speak somewhat arrogantly. For the account which I am going
+to give you is not my own; but I shall refer to an authority whom
+you will deem worthy of credit. For I shall adduce to you the god
+at Delphi as a witness of my wisdom, if I have any, and of what it
+is. You doubtless know Ch&aelig;repho: he was my associate from
+youth, and the associate of most of you; he accompanied you in your
+late exile, and returned with you. You know, then, what kind of a
+man Ch&aelig;repho was, how earnest in whatever he undertook.
+Having once gone to Delphi, he ventured to make the following
+inquiry of the oracle (and, as I said, O Athenians! do not cry
+out), for he asked if there was any one wiser than I. The Pythian
+thereupon answered that there was not one wiser; and of this, his
+brother here will give you proofs, since he himself is dead.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec6" name=
+"apology_sec6">6</a>. Consider, then, why I mention these things:
+it is because I am going to show you whence the calumny against me
+arose. For when I heard this, I reasoned thus with myself, What
+does the god mean? What enigma is this? For I am not conscious to
+myself that I am wise, either much or little. What, then, does he
+mean by saying that I am the wisest? For assuredly he does not
+speak falsely: that he could not do. And for a long time I was in
+doubt what he meant; afterward, with considerable difficulty, I had
+recourse <a class='pagenumber' name='page19' id='page19'></a>to the
+following method of searching out his meaning. I went to one of
+those who have the character of being wise, thinking that there, if
+anywhere, I should confute the oracle, and show in answer to the
+response that This man is wiser than I, though you affirmed that I
+was the wisest. Having, then, examined this man (for there is no
+occasion to mention his name; he was, however, one of our great
+politicians, in examining whom I felt as I proceed to describe, O
+Athenians!), having fallen into conversation with him, this man
+appeared to be wise in the opinion of most other men, and
+especially in his own opinion, though in fact he was not so. I
+thereupon endeavored to show him that he fancied himself to be
+wise, but really was not. Hence I became odious, both to him and to
+many others who were present. When I left him, I reasoned thus with
+myself: I am wiser than this man, for neither of us appears to know
+anything great and good; but he fancies he knows something,
+although he knows nothing; whereas I, as I do not know anything, so
+I do not fancy I do. In this trifling particular, then, I appear to
+be wiser than he, because I do not fancy I know what I do not know.
+After that I went to another who was thought to be wiser than the
+former, and formed the very same opinion. Hence I became odious to
+him and to many others.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec7" name=
+"apology_sec7">7</a>. After this I went to others in turn,
+perceiving indeed, and grieving and alarmed, that I was making
+myself odious; however, it appeared necessary to regard the oracle
+of the god as of the greatest moment, and that, in order to
+discover its meaning, I must go to all who had the reputation of
+possessing any knowledge. And by the dog, O Athenians! for I must
+tell you the truth, I came to some such conclusion as this: those
+who bore the highest reputation appeared to me to be most
+deficient, in my researches in obedience <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page20' id='page20'></a>to the god, and others who were
+considered inferior more nearly approaching to the possession of
+understanding. But I must relate to you my wandering, and the
+labors which I underwent, in order that the oracle might prove
+incontrovertible. For after the politicians I went to the poets, as
+well the tragic as the dithyrambic and others, expecting that here
+I should in very fact find myself more ignorant than they. Taking
+up, therefore, some of their poems, which appeared to me most
+elaborately finished, I questioned them as to their meaning, that
+at the same time I might learn something from them. I am ashamed, O
+Athenians! to tell you the truth; however, it must be told. For, in
+a word, almost all who were present could have given a better
+account of them than those by whom they had been composed. I soon
+discovered this, therefore, with regard to the poets, that they do
+not effect their object by wisdom, but by a certain natural
+inspiration, and under the influence of enthusiasm, like prophets
+and seers; for these also say many fine things, but they understand
+nothing that they say. The poets appeared to me to be affected in a
+similar manner; and at the same time I perceived that they
+considered themselves, on account of their poetry, to be the wisest
+of men in other things, in which they were not. I left them,
+therefore, under the persuasion that I was superior to them, in the
+same way that I was to the politicians.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec8" name=
+"apology_sec8">8</a>. At last, therefore, I went to the artisans.
+For I was conscious to myself that I knew scarcely anything, but I
+was sure that I should find them possessed of much beautiful
+knowledge. And in this I was not deceived; for they knew things
+which I did not, and in this respect they were wiser than I. But, O
+Athenians! even the best workmen appeared to me to have fallen into
+the same error as the poets; for each, because he excelled in the
+practice of his art, thought <a class='pagenumber' name='page21'
+id='page21'></a>that he was very wise in other most important
+matters, and this mistake of theirs obscured the wisdom that they
+really possessed. I therefore asked myself, in behalf of the
+oracle, whether I should prefer to continue as I am, possessing
+none, either of their wisdom or their ignorance, or to have both as
+they have. I answered, therefore, to myself and to the oracle, that
+it was better for me to continue as I am.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec9" name=
+"apology_sec9">9</a>. From this investigation, then, O Athenians!
+many enmities have arisen against me, and those the most grievous
+and severe, so that many calumnies have sprung from them, and among
+them this appellation of being wise; for those who are from time to
+time present think that I am wise in those things, with respect to
+which I expose the ignorance of others. The god, however, O
+Athenians! appears to be really wise, and to mean this by his
+oracle: that human wisdom is worth little or nothing; and it is
+clear that he did not say this to Socrates, but made use of my
+name, putting me forward as an example, as if he had said, that man
+is the wisest among you, who, like Socrates, knows that he is in
+reality worth nothing with respect to wisdom. Still, therefore, I
+go about and search and inquire into these things, in obedience to
+the god, both among citizens and strangers, if I think any one of
+them is wise; and when he appears to me not to be so, I take the
+part of the god, and show that he is not wise. And, in consequence
+of this occupation, I have no leisure to attend in any considerable
+degree to the affairs of the state or my own; but I am in the
+greatest poverty through my devotion to the service of the god.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec10" name=
+"apology_sec10">10</a>. In addition to this, young men, who have
+much leisure and belong to the wealthiest families, following me of
+their own accord, take great delight in hearing men put to the
+test, and often imitate me, and themselves attempt to <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page22' id='page22'></a>put others to the test;
+and then, I think, they find a great abundance of men who fancy
+they know something, although they know little or nothing. Hence
+those who are put to the test by them are angry with me, and not
+with them, and say that "there is one Socrates, a most pestilent
+fellow, who corrupts the youth." And when any one asks them by
+doing or teaching what, they have nothing to say, for they do not
+know; but, that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say such
+things as are ready at hand against all philosophers; "that he
+searches into things in heaven and things under the earth, that he
+does not believe there are gods, and that he makes the worse appear
+the better reason." For they would not, I think, be willing to tell
+the truth that they have been detected in pretending to possess
+knowledge, whereas they know nothing. Therefore, I think, being
+ambitions and vehement and numerous, and speaking systematically
+and persuasively about me, they have filled your ears, for a long
+time and diligently calumniating me. From among these, Melitus,
+Anytus and Lycon have attacked me; Melitus being angry on account
+of the poets, Anytus on account of the artisans and politicians,
+and Lycon on account of the rhetoricians. So that, as I said in the
+beginning, I should wonder if I were able in so short a time to
+remove from your minds a calumny that has prevailed so long. This,
+O Athenians! is the truth; and I speak it without concealing or
+disguising anything from you, much or little; though I very well
+know that by so doing I shall expose myself to odium. This,
+however, is a proof that I speak the truth, and that this is the
+nature of the calumny against me, and that these are its causes.
+And if you will investigate the matter, either now or hereafter,
+you will find it to be so.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec11" name=
+"apology_sec11">11</a>. With respect, then, to the charges which my
+first accusers <a class='pagenumber' name='page23' id=
+'page23'></a>have alleged against me, let this be a sufficient
+apology to you. To Melitus, that good and patriotic man, as he
+says, and to my later accusers, I will next endeavor to give an
+answer; and here, again, as there are different accusers, let us
+take up their deposition. It is pretty much as follows: "Socrates,"
+it says, "acts unjustly in corrupting the youth, and in not
+believing in those gods in whom the city believes, but in other
+strange divinities." Such is the accusation; let us examine each
+particular of it. It says that I act unjustly in corrupting the
+youth. But I, O Athenians! say that Melitus acts unjustly, because
+he jests on serious subjects, rashly putting men upon trial, under
+pretense of being zealous and solicitous about things in which he
+never at any time took any concern. But that this is the case I
+will endeavor to prove to you.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec12" name=
+"apology_sec12">12</a>. Come, then, Melitus, tell me, do you not
+consider it of the greatest importance that the youth should be
+made as virtuous as possible?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> I do.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Well, now, tell the
+judges who it is that makes them better, for it is evident that you
+know, since it concerns you so much; for, having detected me in
+corrupting them, as you say, you have cited me here, and accused
+me: come, then, say, and inform the judges who it is that makes
+them better. Do you see, Melitus, that you are silent, and have
+nothing to say? But does it not appear to you to be disgraceful,
+and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you never took any
+concern about the matter? But tell me, friend, who makes them
+better?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> The laws.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> I do not ask this, most
+excellent sir, but what man, who surely must first know this very
+thing, the laws?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> These, Socrates, the
+judges.</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page24' id='page24'></a><span class=
+"speakername">Socr.</span> How say you, Melitus? Are these able to
+instruct the youth, and make them better?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> Certainly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Whether all, or some of
+them, and others not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> All.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> You say well, by Juno!
+and have found a great abundance of those that confer benefit. But
+what further? Can these hearers make them better, or not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> They, too, can.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> And what of the
+senators?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> The senators, also.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> But, Melitus, do those
+who attend the public assemblies corrupt the younger men? or do
+they all make them better?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> They too.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> All the Athenians,
+therefore, as it seems, make them honorable and good, except me;
+but I alone corrupt them. Do you say so?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> I do assert this very
+thing.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> You charge me with great
+ill-fortune. But answer me: does it appear to you to be the same,
+with respect to horses? Do all men make them better, and is there
+only some one that spoils them? or does quite the contrary of this
+take place? Is there some one person who can make them better, or
+very few; that is, the trainers? But if the generality of men
+should meddle with and make use of horses, do they spoil them? Is
+not this the case, Melitus, both with respect to horses and all
+other animals? It certainly is so, whether you and Anytus deny it
+or not. For it would be a great good-fortune for the youth if only
+one person corrupted, and the rest benefited them. However,
+Melitus, you have sufficiently shown that you never bestowed any
+care upon youth; and you clearly evince your own negligence, <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page25' id='page25'></a>in that you have
+never paid any attention to the things with respect to which you
+accuse me.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec13" name=
+"apology_sec13">13</a>. Tell us further, Melitus, in the name of
+Jupiter, whether is it better to dwell with good or bad citizens?
+Answer, my friend; for I ask you nothing difficult. Do not the bad
+work some evil to those that are continually near them, but the
+good some good?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> Certainly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Is there any one that
+wishes to be injured rather than benefited by his associates?
+Answer, good man; for the law requires you to answer. Is there any
+one who wishes to be injured?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> No, surely.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Come, then, whether do
+you accuse me here, as one that corrupts the youth, and makes them
+more depraved, designedly or undesignedly?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> Designedly, I say.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> What, then, Melitus, are
+you at your time of life so much wiser than I at my time of life,
+as to know that the evil are always working some evil to those that
+are most near to them, and the good some good; but I have arrived
+at such a pitch of ignorance as not to know that if I make any one
+of my associates depraved, I shall be in danger of receiving some
+evil from him; and yet I designedly bring about this so great evil,
+as you say? In this I can not believe you, Melitus, nor do I think
+would any other man in the world. But either I do not corrupt the
+youth, or, if I do corrupt them, I do it undesignedly: so that in
+both cases you speak falsely. But if I corrupt them undesignedly,
+for such involuntary offenses it is not usual to accuse one here,
+but to take one apart, and teach and admonish one. For it is
+evident that if I am taught, I shall cease doing what I do
+undesignedly. But you shunned me, and were not willing <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page26' id='page26'></a>to associate with and
+instruct me; but you accuse me here, where it is usual to accuse
+those who need punishment, and not instruction.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec14" name=
+"apology_sec14">14</a>. Thus, then, O Athenians! this now is clear
+that I have said; that Melitus never paid any attention to these
+matters, much or little. However, tell us, Melitus, how you say I
+corrupt the youth? Is it not evidently, according to the indictment
+which you have preferred, by teaching them not to believe in the
+gods in whom the city believes, but in other strange deities? Do
+you not say that, by teaching these things, I corrupt the
+youth?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> Certainly I do say so.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> By those very gods,
+therefore, Melitus, of whom the discussion now is, speak still more
+clearly both to me and to these men. For I can not understand
+whether you say that I teach them to believe that there are certain
+gods (and in that case I do believe that there are gods, and am not
+altogether an atheist, nor in this respect to blame), not, however,
+those which the city believes in, but others; and this it is that
+you accuse me of, that I introduce others. Or do you say outright
+that I do not myself believe that there are gods, and that I teach
+others the same?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> I say this: that you do
+not believe in any gods at all.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> O wonderful Melitus, how
+come you to say this? Do I not, then, like the rest of mankind,
+believe that the sun and moon are gods?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> No, by Jupiter, O judges!
+for he says that the sun is a stone, and the moon an earth.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> You fancy that you are
+accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Melitus, and thus you put a slight on
+these men, and suppose them to be so illiterate as not to know that
+the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomene are full of such assertions.
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page27' id='page27'></a>And the young,
+moreover, learn these things from me, which they might purchase for
+a drachma, at most, in the orchestra, and so ridicule Socrates, if
+he pretended they were his own, especially since they are so
+absurd? I ask then, by Jupiter, do I appear to you to believe that
+there is no god?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> No, by Jupiter, none
+whatever.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> You say what is
+incredible, Melitus, and that, as appears to me, even to yourself.
+For this man, O Athenians! appears to me to be very insolent and
+intemperate and to have preferred this indictment through downright
+insolence, intemperance, and wantonness. For he seems, as it were,
+to have composed an enigma for the purpose of making an experiment.
+Whether will Socrates the wise know that I am jesting, and
+contradict myself, or shall I deceive him and all who hear me? For,
+in my opinion, he clearly contradicts himself in the indictment, as
+if he should say, Socrates is guilty of wrong in not believing that
+there are gods, and in believing that there are gods. And this,
+surely, is the act of one who is trifling.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec15" name=
+"apology_sec15">15</a>. Consider with me now, Athenians, in what
+respect he appears to me to say so. And do you, Melitus, answer me;
+and do ye, as I besought you at the outset, remember not to make an
+uproar if I speak after my usual manner.</p>
+
+<p>Is there any man, Melitus, who believes that there are human
+affairs, but does not believe that there are men? Let him answer,
+judges, and not make so much noise. Is there any one who does not
+believe that there are horses, but that there are things pertaining
+to horses? or who does not believe that there are pipers, but that
+there are things pertaining to pipes? There is not, O best of men!
+for since you are not willing to answer, I say it to you and to all
+here present. But answer to this at least: is there any one who <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page28' id='page28'></a>believes that
+there are things relating to demons, but does not believe that
+there are demons?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> There is not.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> How obliging you are in
+having hardly answered; though compelled by these judges! You
+assert, then, that I do believe and teach things relating to
+demons, whether they be new or old; therefore, according to your
+admission, I do believe in things relating to demons, and this you
+have sworn in the bill of indictment. If, then, I believe in things
+relating to demons, there is surely an absolute necessity that I
+should believe that there are demons. Is it not so? It is. For I
+suppose you to assent, since you do not answer. But with respect to
+demons, do we not allow that they are gods, or the children of
+gods? Do you admit this or not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Mel.</span> Certainly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Since, then, I allow that
+there are demons, as you admit, if demons are a kind of gods, this
+is the point in which I say you speak enigmatically and divert
+yourself in saying that I do not allow there are gods, and again
+that I do allow there are, since I allow that there are demons? But
+if demons are the children of gods, spurious ones, either from
+nymphs or any others, of whom they are reported to be, what man can
+think that there are sons of gods, and yet that there are not gods?
+For it would be just as absurd as if any one should think that
+there are mules, the offspring of horses and asses, but should not
+think there are horses and asses. However, Melitus, it can not be
+otherwise than that you have preferred this indictment for the
+purpose of trying me, or because you were at a loss what real crime
+to allege against me; for that you should persuade any man who has
+the smallest degree of sense that the same person can think that
+there are things relating to demons and to <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page29' id='page29'></a>gods, and yet that there are neither
+demons, nor gods, not heroes, is utterly impossible.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec16" name=
+"apology_sec16">16</a>. That I am not guilty, then, O Athenians!
+according to the indictment of Melitus, appears to me not to
+require a lengthened defense; but what I have said is sufficient.
+And as to what I said at the beginning, that there is a great
+enmity toward me among the multitude, be assured it is true. And
+this it is which will condemn me, if I am condemned, not Melitus,
+nor Anytus, but the calumny and envy of the multitude, which have
+already condemned many others, and those good men, and will, I
+think, condemn others also; for there is no danger that it will
+stop with me.</p>
+
+<p>Perhaps, however, some one may say, "Are you not ashamed,
+Socrates, to have pursued a study from which you are now in danger
+of dying?" To such a person I should answer with good reason, You
+do not say well, friend, if you think that a man, who is even of
+the least value, ought to take into the account the risk of life or
+death, and ought not to consider that alone when be performs any
+action, whether he is acting justly or unjustly, and the part of a
+good man or bad man. For, according to your reasoning, all those
+demi-gods that died at Troy would be vile characters, as well all
+the rest as the son of Thetis, who so far despised danger in
+comparison of submitting to disgrace, that when his mother, who was
+a goddess, spoke to him, in his impatience to kill Hector,
+something to this effect, as I think,<a id="footnotetag2" name=
+"footnotetag2" href="#footnote2"><sup>2</sup></a> "My son, if you
+revenge the death of your friend Patroclus, and slay Hector, you
+will yourself die, for," she said, "death awaits you immediately
+after Hector;" but he, on hearing this, despised death and danger,
+and dreading much more to live as a coward, and not avenge his <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page30' id='page30'></a>friend, said, "May
+I die immediately when I have inflicted punishment on the guilty,
+that I may not stay here an object of ridicule, by the curved
+ships, a burden to the ground?"&mdash;do you think that he cared
+for death and danger? For thus it is, O Athenians! in truth:
+wherever any one has posted himself, either thinking it to be
+better, or has been posted by his chief, there, as it appears to
+me, he ought to remain and meet danger, taking no account either of
+death or anything else in comparison with disgrace.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec17" name=
+"apology_sec17">17</a>. I then should be acting strangely, O
+Athenians! if, when the generals whom you chose to command me
+assigned me my post at Potid&aelig;a, at Amphipolis, and at Delium,
+I then remained where they posted me, like any other person, and
+encountered the danger of death; but when the deity, as I thought
+and believed, assigned it as my duty to pass my life in the study
+of philosophy, and examining myself and others, I should on that
+occasion, through fear of death or any thing else whatsoever,
+desert my post, strange indeed would it be; and then, in truth, any
+one might justly bring me to trial, and accuse me of not believing
+in the gods, from disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and
+thinking myself to be wise when I am not. For to fear death, O
+Athenians! is nothing else than to appear to be wise, without being
+so; for it is to appear to know what one does not know. For no one
+knows but that death is the greatest of all good to man; but men
+fear it, as if they well knew that it is the greatest of evils. And
+how is not this the most reprehensible ignorance, to think that one
+knows what one does not know? But I, O Athenians! in this, perhaps,
+differ from most men; and if I should say that I am in any thing
+wiser than another, it would be in this, that not having a
+competent knowledge of the things in Hades, I also think that I
+have not such knowledge. But to act unjustly, and to disobey my
+superior, <a class='pagenumber' name='page31' id=
+'page31'></a>whether God or man, I know is evil and base. I shall
+never, therefore, fear or shun things which, for aught I know,
+maybe good, before evils which I know to be evils. So that, even if
+you should now dismiss me, not yielding to the instances of Anytus,
+who said that either I should not<a id="footnotetag3" name=
+"footnotetag3" href="#footnote3"><sup>3</sup></a> appear here at
+all, or that, if I did appear, it was impossible not to put me to
+death, telling you that if I escaped, your sons, studying what
+Socrates teaches, would all be utterly corrupted; if you should
+address me thus, "Socrates, we shall not now yield to Anytus, but
+dismiss you, on this condition, however, that you no longer
+persevere in your researches nor study philosophy; and if hereafter
+you are detected in so doing, you shall die"&mdash;if, as I said,
+you should dismiss, me on these terms, I should say to you, "O
+Athenians! I honor and love you; but I shall obey God rather than
+you; and so long as I breathe and am able, I shall not cease
+studying philosophy, and exhorting you and warning any one of you I
+may happen to meet, saying, as I have been accustomed to do: 'O
+best of men! seeing you are an Athenian, of a city the most
+powerful and most renowned for wisdom and strength, are you not
+ashamed of being careful for riches, how you may acquire them in
+greatest abundance, and for glory, and honor, but care not nor take
+any thought for wisdom and truth, and for your soul, how it maybe
+made most perfect?'" And if any one of you should question my
+assertion, and affirm that he does care for these things, I shall
+not at once let him go, nor depart, but I shall question him, sift
+and prove him. And if he should appear to me not to possess virtue,
+but to pretend that he does, I shall reproach him for that he sets
+the least value on things of the greatest worth, but the highest on
+things that are worthless. Thus I shall act to all <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page32' id='page32'></a>whom I meet, both young
+and old, stranger and citizen, but rather to you, my
+fellow-citizens, because ye are more nearly allied to me. For be
+well assured, this the deity commands. And I think that no greater
+good has ever befallen you in the city than my zeal for the service
+of the god. For I go about doing nothing else than persuading you,
+both young and old, to take no care either for the body, or for
+riches, prior to or so much as for the soul, how it may be made
+most perfect, telling you that virtue does not spring from riches,
+but riches and all other human blessings, both private and public,
+from virtue. If, then, by saying these things, I corrupt the youth,
+these things must be mischievous; but if any one says that I speak
+other things than these, he misleads you.<a id="footnotetag4" name=
+"footnotetag4" href="#footnote4"><sup>4</sup></a> Therefore I must
+say, O Athenians! either yield to Anytus, or do not, either dismiss
+me or not, since I shall not act otherwise, even though I must die
+many deaths.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec18" name=
+"apology_sec18">18</a>. Murmur not, O Athenians! but continue to
+attend to my request, not to murmur at what I say, but to listen,
+for, as I think, you will derive benefit from listening. For I am
+going to say other things to you, at which, perhaps, you will raise
+a clamor; but on no account do so. Be well assured, then, if you
+put me to death, being such a man as I say I am, you will not
+injure me more than yourselves. For neither will Melitus nor Anytus
+harm me; nor have they the power; for I do not think that it is
+possible for a better man to be injured by a worse. He may perhaps
+have me condemned to death, or banished, or deprived of civil
+rights; and he or others may perhaps consider these as mighty
+evils; I, how ever, do not consider them so, but that it is much
+more so to do what he is now doing, to endeavor to put a man to
+death unjustly. Now, therefore, O Athenians! <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page33' id='page33'></a>I am far from making a defense on my
+behalf, as any one might think, but I do so on your own behalf,
+lest by condemning me you should offend at all with respect to the
+gift of the deity to you. For, if you should put me to death, you
+will not easily find such another, though it may be ridiculous to
+say so, altogether attached by the deity to this city as to a
+powerful and generous horse, somewhat sluggish from his size, and
+requiring to be roused by a gad-fly; so the deity appears to have
+united me, being such a person as I am, to the city, that I may
+rouse you, and persuade and reprove every one of you, nor ever
+cease besetting you throughout the whole day. Such another man, O
+Athenians! will not easily be found; therefore, if you will take my
+advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, being irritated like
+drowsy persons who are roused from sleep, will strike me, and,
+yielding to Anytus, will unthinkingly condemn me to death; and then
+you will pass the rest of your life in sleep, unless the deity,
+caring for you, should send some one else to you. But that I am a
+person who has been given by the deity to this city, you may
+discern from hence; for it is not like the ordinary conduct of men,
+that I should have neglected all my own affairs, and suffered my
+private interest to be neglected for so many years, and that I
+should constantly attend to your concerns, addressing myself to
+each of you separately, like a father, or elder brother, persuading
+you to the pursuit of virtue. And if I had derived any profit from
+this course, and had received pay for my exhortations, there would
+have been some reason for my conduct; but now you see yourselves
+that my accusers, who have so shamelessly calumniated me in
+everything else, have not had the impudence to charge me with this,
+and to bring witnesses to prove that I ever either exacted or
+demanded any reward. And I think I <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page34' id='page34'></a>produce a sufficient proof that I speak
+the truth, namely, my poverty.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec19" name=
+"apology_sec19">19</a>. Perhaps, however, it may appear absurd that
+I, going about, thus advise you in private and make myself busy,
+but never venture to present myself in public before your
+assemblies and give advice to the city. The cause of this is that
+which you have often and in many places heard me mention; because I
+am moved by a certain divine and spiritual influence, which also
+Melitus, through mockery, has set out in the indictment. This began
+with me from childhood, being a kind of voice which, when present,
+always diverts me from what I am about to do, but never urges me
+on. This it is which opposed my meddling in public politics; and it
+appears to me to have opposed me very properly. For be well
+assured, O Athenians! if I had long since attempted to intermeddle
+with politics, I should have perished long ago, and should not have
+at all benefited you or myself. And be not angry with me for
+speaking the truth. For it is not possible that any man should be
+safe who sincerely opposes either you, or any other multitude, and
+who prevents many unjust and illegal actions from being committed
+in a city; but it is necessary that he who in earnest contends for
+justice, if he will be safe for but a short time, should live
+privately, and take no part in public affairs.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec20" name=
+"apology_sec20">20</a>. I will give you strong proofs of this, not
+words, but what you value, facts. Hear, then, what has happened to
+me, that you may know that I would not yield to any one contrary to
+what is just, through fear of death, at the same time by not
+yielding I must perish. I shall tell you what will be displeasing
+and wearisome,<a id="footnotetag5" name="footnotetag5" href=
+"#footnote5"><sup>5</sup></a> yet true. For I, O <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page35' id='page35'></a>Athenians! never bore
+any other magisterial office in the city, but have been a senator:
+and our Antiochean tribe happened to supply the Prytanes when you
+chose to condemn in a body the ten generals who had not taken off
+those that perished in the sea-fight, in violation of the law, as
+you afterward all thought. At that time I alone of the Prytanes
+opposed your doing anything contrary to the laws, and I voted
+against you; and when the orators were ready to denounce me, and to
+carry me before a magistrate, and you urged and cheered them on, I
+thought I ought rather to meet the danger with law and justice on
+my side, than through fear of imprisonment or death, to take part
+with you in your unjust designs. And this happened while the city
+was governed by a democracy. But when it became an oligarchy, the
+Thirty, having sent for me with four others to the Tholus, ordered
+us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, that he might be put
+to death; and they gave many similar orders to many others, wishing
+to involve as many as they could in guilt. Then, however, I showed,
+not in word but in deed, that I did not care for death, if the
+expression be not too rude, in the smallest degree; but that all my
+care was to do nothing unjust or unholy. For that government,
+strong as it was, did not so overawe me as to make me commit an
+unjust action; but when we came out from the Tholus, the four went
+to Salamis, and brought back Leon; but I went away home. And
+perhaps for this I should have been put to death, if that
+government had not been speedily broken up. And of this you can
+have many witnesses.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec21" name=
+"apology_sec21">21</a>. Do you think, then, that I should have
+survived so <a class='pagenumber' name='page36' id=
+'page36'></a>many years if I had engaged in public affairs, and,
+acting as becomes a good man, had aided the cause of justice, and,
+as I ought, had deemed this of the highest importance? Far from it,
+O Athenians! nor would any other man have done so. But I, through
+the whole of my life, if I have done anything in public, shall be
+found to be a man, and the very same in private, who has never made
+a concession to any one contrary to justice, neither to any other,
+nor to any one of these whom my calumniators say are my disciples.
+I, however, was never the preceptor of any one; but if any one
+desired to hear me speaking, and to see me busied about my own
+mission, whether he were young or old, I never refused him. Nor do
+I discourse when I receive money, and not when I do not receive
+any, but I allow both rich and poor alike to question me, and, if
+any one wishes it, to answer me and hear what I have to say. And
+for these, whether any one proves to be a good man or not, I cannot
+justly be responsible, because I never either promised them any
+instruction or taught them at all. But if any one says that he has
+ever learned or heard anything from me in private which all others
+have not, be well assured that he does not speak the truth.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec22" name=
+"apology_sec22">22</a>. But why do some delight to spend so long a
+time with me? Ye have heard, O Athenians! I have told you the whole
+truth, that they delight to hear those closely questioned who think
+that they are wise but are not; for this is by no means
+disagreeable. But this duty, as I say, has been enjoined me by the
+deity, by oracles, by dreams, and by every mode by which any other
+divine decree has ever enjoined anything to man to do. These
+things, O Athenians! are both true, and easily confuted if not
+true. For if I am now corrupting some of the youths, and have
+already corrupted others, it were fitting, surely, that if any of
+them, <a class='pagenumber' name='page37' id='page37'></a>having
+become advanced in life, had discovered that I gave them bad advice
+when they were young, they should now rise up against me, accuse
+me, and have me punished; or if they were themselves unwilling to
+do this, some of their kindred, their fathers, or brothers, or
+other relatives, if their kinsman have ever sustained any damage
+from me, should now call it to mind. Many of them, however, are
+here present, whom I see: first, Crito, my contemporary and
+fellow-burgher, father of this Critobulus; then Lysanias of
+Sphettus, father of this &AElig;schines; again, Antiphon of
+Cephisus, father of Epigenes. There are those others, too, whose
+brothers maintained the same intimacy with me, namely, Nicostratus,
+son of Theodotus, brother of Theodotus&mdash;Theodotus indeed is
+dead, so that he could not deprecate his brother's
+proceedings&mdash;and Paralus here, son of Demodocus, whose brother
+was Theages; and Adimantus, son of Ariston, whose brother is this
+Plato; and &AElig;antodorus, whose brother is this Apollodorus. I
+could also mention many others to you, some one of whom certainly
+Melitus ought to have adduced in his speech as a witness. If,
+however, he then forgot to do so, let him now adduce them; I give
+him leave to do so, and let him say it, if he has anything of the
+kind to allege. But, quite contrary to this, you will find, O
+Athenians! all ready to assist me, who have corrupted and injured
+their relatives, as Melitus and Anytus say. For those who have been
+themselves corrupted might perhaps have some reason for assisting
+me; but those who have not been corrupted, men now advanced in
+life, their relatives, what other reason can they have for
+assisting me, except that right and just one, that they know that
+Melitus speaks falsely, and that I speak the truth.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec23" name=
+"apology_sec23">23</a>. Well, then, Athenians, these are pretty
+much the things I have to say in my defense, and others perhaps of
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page38' id='page38'></a>the same kind.
+Perhaps, however, some among you will be indignant on recollecting
+his own case, if he, when engaged in a cause far less than this,
+implored and besought the judges with many tears, bringing forward
+his children in order that he might excite their utmost compassion,
+and many others of his relatives and friends, whereas I do none of
+these things, although I may appear to be incurring the extremity
+of danger. Perhaps, therefore, some one, taking notice of this, may
+become more determined against me, and, being enraged at this very
+conduct of mine, may give his vote under the influence of anger.
+If, then, any one of you is thus affected&mdash;I do not, however,
+suppose that there is&mdash;but if there should be, I think I may
+reasonably say to him: "I, too, O best of men, have relatives; for,
+to make use of that saying of Homer, I am not sprung from an oak,
+nor from a rock, but from men, so that I, too, O Athenians! have
+relatives, and three sons, one now grown up, and two boys: I shall
+not, however, bring any one of them forward and implore you to
+acquit me." Why, then, shall I not do this? Not from contumacy, O
+Athenians! nor disrespect toward you. Whether or not I am undaunted
+at the prospect of death is another question; but, out of regard to
+my own character, and yours, and that of the whole city, it does
+not appear to me to be honorable that I should do any thing of this
+kind at my age, and with the reputation I have, whether true or
+false. For it is commonly agreed that Socrates in some respects
+excels the generality of men. If, then, those among you who appear
+to excel either in wisdom, or fortitude, or any other virtue
+whatsoever, should act in such a manner as I have often seen some
+when they have been brought to trial, it would be shameful, who
+appearing indeed to be something, have conducted themselves in a
+surprising manner, as thinking they should suffer something <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page39' id='page39'></a>dreadful by dying,
+and as if they would be immortal if you did not put them to death.
+Such men appear to me to bring disgrace on the city, so that any
+stranger might suppose that such of the Athenians as excel in
+virtue, and whom they themselves choose in preference to themselves
+for magistracies and other honors, are in no respect superior to
+women. For these things, O Athenians! neither ought we to do who
+have attained to any height of reputation, nor, should we do them,
+ought you to suffer us; but you should make this manifest, that you
+will much rather condemn him who introduces these piteous dramas,
+and makes the city ridiculous, than him who quietly awaits your
+decision.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec24" name=
+"apology_sec24">24</a>. But, reputation apart, O Athenians! it does
+not appear to me to be right to entreat a judge, or to escape by
+entreaty; but one ought to inform and persuade him. For a judge
+does not sit for the purpose of administering justice out of favor,
+but that he may judge rightly, and he is sworn not to show favor to
+whom he pleases, but that he will decide according to the laws. It
+is, therefore, right that neither should we accustom you, nor
+should you accustom yourselves, to violate your oaths; for in so
+doing neither of us would act righteously. Think not then, O
+Athenians! that I ought to adopt such a course toward you as I
+neither consider honorable, nor just, nor holy, as well, by
+Jupiter! on any other occasion, and now especially when I am
+accused of impiety by this Melitus. For clearly, if I should
+persuade you, and by my entreaties should put a constraint on you
+who are bound by an oath, I should teach you to think that there
+are no gods, and in reality, while making my defense, should accuse
+myself of not believing in the gods. This, however, is far from
+being the case; for I believe, O Athenians! as none of my accusers
+do, and I leave it to you and <a class='pagenumber' name='page40'
+id='page40'></a>to the deity to judge concerning me in such way as
+will be best both for me and for you.</p>
+
+<p>[Socrates here concludes his defense, and, the votes being
+taken, he is declared guilty by a majority of voices. He thereupon
+resumes his address.]</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec25" name=
+"apology_sec25">25</a>. That I should not be grieved, O Athenians!
+at what has happened&mdash;namely, that you have condemned
+me&mdash;as well many other circumstances concur in bringing to
+pass; and, moreover this, that what has happened has not happened
+contrary to my expectation; but I much rather wonder at the number
+of votes on either side. For I did not expect that I should be
+condemned by so small a number, but by a large majority; but now,
+as it seems, if only three more votes had changed sides, I should
+have been acquitted. So far as Melitus is concerned, as it appears
+to me, I have been already acquitted; and not only have I been
+acquitted, but it is clear to every one that had not Anytus and
+Lycon come forward to accuse me, he would have been fined a
+thousand drachmas, for not having obtained a fifth part of the
+votes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec26" name=
+"apology_sec26">26</a>. The man, then, awards me the penalty of
+death. Well. But what shall I, on my part, O Athenians! award
+myself? Is it not clear that it will be such as I deserve? What,
+then, is that? Do I deserve to suffer, or to pay a fine? for that I
+have purposely during my life not remained quiet, but neglecting
+what most men seek after, money-making, domestic concerns, military
+command, popular oratory, and, moreover, all the magistracies,
+conspiracies, and cabals that are met with in the city, thinking
+that I was in reality too upright a man to be safe if I took part
+in such things, I therefore did not apply myself to those pursuits,
+by attending to which I should have been of no service either to
+you or to myself; but in order to confer the greatest benefit on
+each of you privately, as I affirm, I thereupon applied myself to
+that <a class='pagenumber' name='page41' id='page41'></a>object,
+endeavoring to persuade every one of you not to take any care of
+his own affairs before he had taken care of himself in what way he
+may become the best and wisest, nor of the affairs of the city
+before he took care of the city itself; and that he should attend
+to other things in the same manner. What treatment, then, do I
+deserve, seeing I am such a man? Some reward, O Athenians! if, at
+least, I am to be estimated according to my real deserts; and,
+moreover, such a reward as would be suitable to me. What, then, is
+suitable to a poor man, a benefactor, and who has need of leisure
+in order to give you good advice? There is nothing so suitable, O
+Athenians! as that such a man should be maintained in the
+Prytaneum, and this much more than if one of you had been
+victorious at the Olympic games in a horserace, or in the two or
+four horsed chariot race: for such a one makes you appear to be
+happy, but I, to be so; and he does not need support, but I do. If,
+therefore, I must award a sentence according to my just deserts, I
+award this, maintenance in the Prytaneum.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec27" name=
+"apology_sec27">27</a>. Perhaps, however, in speaking to you thus,
+I appear to you to speak in the same presumptuous manner as I did
+respecting commiseration and entreaties; but such is not the case,
+O Athenians! it is rather this: I am persuaded that I never
+designedly injured any man, though I can not persuade you of this,
+for we have conversed with each other but for a short time. For if
+there were the same law with you as with other men, that in capital
+cases the trial should list not only one day, but many, I think you
+would be persuaded; but it is not easy in a short time to do away
+with, great calumnies. Being persuaded, then, that I have injured
+no one, I am far from intending to injure myself, and of
+pronouncing against myself that I am deserving of punishment, and
+from awarding myself any thing of the kind. <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page42' id='page42'></a>Through fear of what? lest I should
+suffer that which Melitus awards me, of which I say I know not
+whether it he good or evil? Instead of this, shall I choose what I
+well know to be evil, and award that? Shall I choose imprisonment?
+And why should I live in prison, a slave to the established
+magistracy, the Eleven? Shall I choose a fine, and to be imprisoned
+until I have paid it? But this is the same as that which I just now
+mentioned, for I have not money to pay it. Shall I, then, award
+myself exile? For perhaps you would consent to this award. I should
+indeed be very fond of life, O Athenians! if I were so devoid of
+reason as not to be able to reflect that you, who are my
+fellow-citizens, have been unable to endure my manner of life and
+discourses, but they have become so burdensome and odious to you
+that you now seek to be rid of them: others, however, will easily
+bear them. Far from it, O Athenians! A fine life it would be for me
+at my age to go out wandering, and driven from city to city, and so
+to live. For I well know that, wherever I may go, the youth will
+listen to me when I speak, as they do here. And if I repulse them,
+they will themselves drive me out, persuading the elders; and if I
+do not repulse them, their fathers and kindred will banish me on
+their account.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec28" name=
+"apology_sec28">28</a>. Perhaps, however, some one will say, Can
+you not, Socrates, when you have gone from us, live a silent and
+quiet life? This is the most difficult thing of all to persuade
+some of you. For if I say that that would be to disobey the deity,
+and that, therefore, it is impossible for me to live quietly, you
+would not believe me, thinking I spoke ironically. If, on the other
+hand, I say that this is the greatest good to man, to discourse
+daily on virtue, and other things which you have heard me
+discussing, examining both myself and others, but that a life
+without investigation is <a class='pagenumber' name='page43' id=
+'page43'></a>not worth living for, still less would you believe me
+if I said this. Such, however, is the case, as I affirm, O
+Athenians! though it is not easy to persuade you. And at the same
+time I am not accustomed to think myself deserving of any ill. If,
+indeed, I were rich, I would amerce myself in such a sum as I
+should be able to pay; for then I should have suffered no harm, but
+now&mdash;for I can not, unless you are willing to amerce me in
+such a sum as I am able to pay. But perhaps I could pay you a mina
+of silver: in that sum, then, I amerce myself. But Plato here, O
+Athenians! and Crito Critobulus, and Apollodorus bid me amerce
+myself in thirty min&aelig;, and they offer to be sureties. I
+amerce myself, then, to you in that sum; and they will be
+sufficient sureties for the money.</p>
+
+<p>[The judges now proceeded to pass the sentence, and condemned
+Socrates to death; whereupon he continued:]</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec29" name=
+"apology_sec29">29</a>. For the sake of no long space of time, O
+Athenians! you will incur the character and reproach at the hands
+of those who wish to defame the city, of having put that wise man,
+Socrates, to death. For those who wish to defame you will assert
+that I am wise, though I am not. If, then, you had waited for a
+short time, this would have happened of its own accord; for observe
+my age, that it is far advanced in life, and near death. But I say
+this not to you all, but to those only who have condemned me to
+die. And I say this, too, to the same persons. Perhaps you think, O
+Athenians! that I have been convicted through the want of
+arguments, by which I might have persuaded you, had I thought it
+right to do and say any thing, so that I might escape punishment.
+Far otherwise: I have been convicted through want indeed, yet not
+of arguments, but of audacity and impudence, and of the inclination
+to say such things to you as would have been most agreeable for you
+to hear, <a class='pagenumber' name='page44' id='page44'></a>had I
+lamented and bewailed and done and said many other things unworthy
+of me, as I affirm, but such as you are accustomed to hear from
+others. But neither did I then think that I ought, for the sake of
+avoiding danger, to do any thing unworthy of a freeman, nor do I
+now repent of having so defended myself; but I should much rather
+choose to die, having so defended myself, than to live in that way.
+For neither in a trial nor in battle is it right that I or any one
+else should employ every possible means whereby he may avoid death;
+for in battle it is frequently evident that a man might escape
+death by laying down his arms, and throwing himself on the mercy of
+his pursuers. And there are many other devices in every danger, by
+which to avoid death, if a man dares to do and say every thing. But
+this is not difficult, O Athenians! to escape death; but it is much
+more difficult to avoid depravity, for it runs swifter than death.
+And now I, being slow and aged, am overtaken by the slower of the
+two; but my accusers, being strong and active, have been overtaken
+by the swifter, wickedness. And now I depart, condemned by you to
+death; but they condemned by truth, as guilty of iniquity and
+injustice: and I abide my sentence, and so do they. These things,
+perhaps, ought so to be, and I think that they are for the
+best.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec30" name=
+"apology_sec30">30</a>. In the next place, I desire to predict to
+you who have condemned me, what will be your fate; for I am now in
+that condition in which men most frequently prophesy&mdash;namely,
+when they are about to die. I say, then, to you, O Athenians! who
+have condemned me to death, that immediately after my death a
+punishment will overtake you, far more severe, by Jupiter! than
+that which you have inflicted on me. For you have done this,
+thinking you should be freed from the necessity of giving an
+account of your lives. The very contrary, however, as I affirm,
+will happen to you. <a class='pagenumber' name='page45' id=
+'page45'></a>Your accusers will be more numerous, whom I have now
+restrained, though you did not perceive it; and they will be more
+severe, inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more
+indignant. For if you think that by putting men to death you will
+restrain any one from upbraiding you because you do not live well,
+you are much mistaken; for this method of escape is neither
+possible nor honorable; but that other is most honorable and most
+easy, not to put a check upon others, but for a man to take heed to
+himself how he may be most perfect. Having predicted thus much to
+those of you who have condemned me, I take my leave of you.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec31" name=
+"apology_sec31">31</a>. But with you who have voted for my
+acquittal I would gladly hold converse on what has now taken place,
+while the magistrates are busy, and I am not yet carried to the
+place where I must die. Stay with me, then, so long, O Athenians!
+for nothing hinders our conversing with each other, while we are
+permitted to do so; for I wish to make known to you, as being my
+friends, the meaning of that which has just now befallen me. To me,
+then, O my judges! and in calling you judges I call you
+rightly&mdash;a strange thing has happened. For the wonted
+prophetic voice of my guardian deity on every former occasion, even
+in the most trifling affairs, opposed me if I was about to do any
+thing wrong; but now that has befallen me which ye yourselves
+behold, and which any one would think, and which is supposed to be
+the extremity of evil; yet neither when I departed from home in the
+morning did the warning of the god oppose me, nor when I came up
+here to the place of trial, nor in my address when I was about to
+say any thing; yet on other occasions it has frequently restrained
+me in the midst of speaking. But now it has never, throughout this
+proceeding, opposed me, either in what I did or said. What, then,
+do I suppose to be the cause of this? I will tell you: what <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page46' id='page46'></a>has befallen me
+appears to be a blessing; and it is impossible that we think
+rightly who suppose that death is an evil. A great proof of this to
+me is the fact that it is impossible but that the accustomed signal
+should have opposed me, unless I had been about to meet with some
+good.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec32" name=
+"apology_sec32">32</a>. Moreover, we may hence conclude that there
+is great hope that death is a blessing. For to die is one of two
+things: for either the dead may be annihilated, and have no
+sensation of any thing whatever; or, as it is said, there are a
+certain change and passage of the soul from one place to another.
+And if it is a privation of all sensation, as it were a sleep in
+which the sleeper has no dream, death would be a wonderful gain.
+For I think that if any one, having selected a night in which he
+slept so soundly as not to have had a dream, and having compared
+this night with all the other nights and days of his life, should
+be required, on consideration, to say how many days and nights he
+had passed better and more pleasantly than this night throughout
+his life, I think that not only a private person, but even the
+great king himself, would find them easy to number, in comparison
+with other days and nights. If, therefore, death is a thing of this
+kind, I say it is a gain; for thus all futurity appears to be
+nothing more than one night. But if, on the other hand, death is a
+removal from hence to another place, and what is said be true, that
+all the dead are there, what greater blessing can there be than
+this, my judges? For if, on arriving at Hades, released from these
+who pretend to be judges, one shall find those who are true judges,
+and who are said to judge there, Minos and Rhadamanthus,
+&AElig;acus and Triptolemus, and such others of the demi-gods as
+were just during their own life, would this be a sad removal? At
+what price would you not estimate a conference with Orpheus and
+Mus&aelig;us, Hesiod <a class='pagenumber' name='page47' id=
+'page47'></a>and Homer? I indeed should be willing to die often, if
+this be true. For to me the sojourn there would be admirable, when
+I should meet with Palamedes, and Ajax, son of Telamon, and any
+other of the ancients who has died by an unjust sentence. The
+comparing my sufferings with theirs would, I think, be no
+unpleasing occupation. But the greatest pleasure would be to spend
+my time in questioning and examining the people there as I have
+done those here, and discovering who among them is wise, and who
+fancies himself to be so, but is not. At what price, my judges,
+would not any one estimate the opportunity of questioning him who
+led that mighty army against Troy, or Ulysses, or Sisyphus, or ten
+thousand others whom one might mention both men and
+women&mdash;with whom to converse and associate, and to question
+them, would be an inconceivable happiness? Surely for that the
+judges there do not condemn to death; for in other respects those
+who live there are more happy than those who are here, and are
+henceforth immortal, if, at least, what is said be true.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="apology_sec33" name=
+"apology_sec33">33</a>. You, therefore, O my judges! ought to
+entertain good hopes with respect to death, and to meditate on this
+one truth, that to a good man nothing is evil, neither while living
+nor when dead, nor are his concerns neglected by the gods. And what
+has befallen me is not the effect of chance; but this is clear to
+me, that now to die, and be freed from my cares is better for me On
+this account the warning in no way turned me aside; and I bear no
+resentment toward those who condemned me, or against my accusers,
+although they did not condemn and accuse me with this intention,
+but thinking to injure me: in this they deserve to be blamed.</p>
+
+<p>Thus much, however, I beg of them. Punish my sons when they grow
+up, O judges! paining them as I have pained you, if they appear to
+you to care for riches or anything <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page48' id='page48'></a>else before virtue; and if they think
+themselves to be something when they are nothing, reproach them as
+I have done you, for not attending to what they ought, and for
+conceiving themselves to be something when they are worth nothing.
+If ye do this, both I and my sons shall have met with just
+treatment at your hands.</p>
+
+<p>But it is now time to depart&mdash;for me to die, for you to
+live. But which of us is going to a better state is unknown to
+every one but God.</p>
+
+<h3>Footnotes</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote1" name="footnote1" href=
+"#footnotetag1">1</a>: Aristophanes.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote2" name="footnote2" href=
+"#footnotetag2">2</a>: "Iliad," lib. xviii. ver. 94, etc.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote3" name="footnote3" href=
+"#footnotetag3">3</a>: See the "Crito," sec. <a href=
+"#crito_sec5">5</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote4" name="footnote4" href=
+"#footnotetag4">4</a>: <span class=
+"greek">&Omicron;&upsilon;&delta;&epsilon;&nu;
+&lambda;&epsilon;&gamma;&epsilon;&iota;</span>, literally, "he says
+nothing:" <span class="french">on se trompe, ou l'on vous
+impose</span>, <span class="emphasis">Cousin</span>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote5" name="footnote5" href=
+"#footnotetag5">5</a>: But for the authority of Stallbaum, I should
+have translated <span class=
+"greek">&delta;&iota;&kappa;&alpha;&nu;&iota;&kappa;&alpha;</span>
+"forensic;" that is, such arguments as an advocate would use in a
+court of justice.</div>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="introduction"><a name='introduction_to_the_crito' id=
+'introduction_to_the_crito'></a><a class='pagenumber' name='page49'
+id='page49'></a>
+
+<h2>Introduction To The Crito.</h2>
+
+<p>It has been remarked by Stallbaum that Plato had a twofold
+design in this dialogue&mdash;one, and that the primary one, to
+free Socrates from the imputation of having attempted to corrupt
+the Athenian youth; the other, to establish the principle that
+under all circumstances it is the duty of a good citizen to obey
+the laws of his country. These two points, however, are so closely
+interwoven with each other, that the general principle appears only
+to be illustrated by the example of Socrates.</p>
+
+<p>Crito was one of those friends of Socrates who had been present
+at his trial, and had offered to assist in paying a fine, had a
+fine been imposed instead of the sentence of death. He appears to
+have frequently visited his friend in prison after his
+condemnation; and now, having obtained access to his cell very
+early in the morning, finds him composed in a quiet sleep. He
+brings intelligence that the ship, the arrival of which would be
+the signal for his death on the following day, is expected to
+arrive forthwith, and takes occasion to entreat Socrates to make
+his escape, the means of which were already prepared. Socrates
+thereupon, having promised to follow the advice of Crito if, after
+the matter had been fully discussed, it should appear to be right
+to do so, proposes to consider the duty of a citizen toward his
+country; and having established the divine principle that it is
+wrong to return evil for evil, goes on to show that the obligations
+of a citizen to his country are even more binding <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page50' id='page50'></a>than those of a child to
+its parent, or a slave to his master, and that therefore it is his
+duty to obey the established laws, at whatever cost to himself.</p>
+
+<p>At length Crito admits that he has no answer to make, and
+Socrates resolves to submit himself to the will of Providence.</p>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="book"><a name='crito_or_the_duty_of_a_citizen' id=
+'crito_or_the_duty_of_a_citizen'></a><a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page51' id='page51'></a>
+
+<h2>Crito;<br>
+ Or,<br>
+ The Duty Of A Citizen.</h2>
+
+<p>SOCRATES, CRITO.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec1" name=
+"crito_sec1"></a><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Why have
+you come at this hour, Crito? Is it not very early?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It is.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> About what time?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Scarce day-break.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> I wonder how the keeper
+of the prison came to admit you.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> He is familiar with me,
+Socrates, from my having frequently come hither; and he is under
+some obligations to me.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Have you just now come,
+or some time since?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> A considerable time
+since.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Why, then, did you not
+wake me at once, instead of sitting down by me in silence?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> By Jupiter! Socrates, I
+should not myself like to be so long awake, and in such affliction.
+But I have been for some time wondering at you, perceiving how
+sweetly you slept; and I purposely did not awake you, that you
+might pass your time as pleasantly as possible. And, indeed, I <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page52' id='page52'></a>have often before
+throughout your whole life considered you happy in your
+disposition, but far more so in the present calamity, seeing how
+easily and meekly you bear it.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> However, Crito, it would
+be disconsonant for a man at my time of life to repine because he
+must needs die.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> But others, Socrates, at
+your age have been involved in similar calamities, yet their age
+has not hindered their repining at their present fortune.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> So it is. But why did you
+come so early?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Bringing sad tidings,
+Socrates, not sad to you, as it appears, but to me, and all your
+friends, sad and heavy, and which I, I think, shall bear worst of
+all.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> What tidings? Has the
+ship<a id="footnotetag6" name="footnotetag6" href=
+"#footnote6"><sup>6</sup></a> arrived from Delos, on the arrival of
+which I must die?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It has not yet arrived,
+but it appears to me that it will come to-day, from what certain
+persons report who have come from Sunium,<a id="footnotetag7" name=
+"footnotetag7" href="#footnote7"><sup>7</sup></a> and left it
+there. It is clear, therefore, from these messengers, that it will
+come to day, and consequently it will be necessary, Socrates, for
+you to die to-morrow.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec2" name=
+"crito_sec2">2</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> But with
+good fortune, Crito, and if so it please the gods, so be it. I do
+not think, however, that it will come to day.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Whence do you form this
+conjecture?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> I will tell you. I must
+die on the day after that on which the ship arrives.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> So they say<a id=
+"footnotetag8" name="footnotetag8" href=
+"#footnote8"><sup>8</sup></a> who have the control of these
+things.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> I do not think, then,
+that it will come to-day, but to-morrow. I conjecture this from a
+dream which I had <a class='pagenumber' name='page53' id=
+'page53'></a>this very night, not long ago, and you seem very
+opportunely to have refrained from waking me.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> But what was this
+dream?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> A beautiful and majestic
+woman, clad in white garments seemed to approach me, and to call to
+me and say, "Socrates, three days hence you will reach fertile
+Pythia"<a id="footnotetag9" name="footnotetag9" href=
+"#footnote9"><sup>9</sup></a>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> What a strange dream,
+Socrates!</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Very clear, however, as
+it appears to me, Crito.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec3" name=
+"crito_sec3">3</a>. <span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Very much
+so, as it seems. But, my dear Socrates, even now be persuaded by
+me, and save yourself. For if you die, not only a single calamity
+will befall me, but, besides being deprived of such a friend as I
+shall never meet with again, I shall also appear to many who do not
+know you and me well, when I might have saved you had I been
+willing to spend my money, to have neglected to do so. And what
+character can be more disgraceful than this&mdash;to appear to
+value one's riches more than one's friends? For the generality of
+men will not be persuaded that you were unwilling to depart hence,
+when we urged you to it.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> But why, my dear Crito,
+should we care so much for the opinion of the many? For the most
+worthy men, whom we ought rather to regard, will think that matters
+have transpired as they really have.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Yet you see, Socrates,
+that it is necessary to attend to the opinion of the many. For the
+very circumstances of the present case show that the multitude are
+able to effect not only the smallest evils, but even the greatest,
+if any one is calumniated to them.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Would, O Crito that the
+multitude could effect the greatest evils, that they might also
+effect the greatest good, for then it would be well. But now they
+can do neither; <a class='pagenumber' name='page54' id=
+'page54'></a>for they can make a man neither wise nor foolish; but
+they do whatever chances.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec4" name=
+"crito_sec4">4</a>. <span class="speakername">Cri.</span> So let it
+be, then. But answer me this, Socrates: are you not anxious for me
+and other friends, lest, if you should escape from hence, informers
+should give us trouble, as having secretly carried you off, and so
+we should be compelled either to lose all our property, or a very
+large sum, or to suffer something else besides this? For, if you
+fear any thing of the kind, dismiss your fears; for we are
+justified in running the risk to save you&mdash;and, if need be,
+even a greater risk than this. But be persuaded by me, and do not
+refuse.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> I am anxious about this,
+Crito, and about many other things.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Do not fear this, however;
+for the sum is not large on receipt of which certain persons are
+willing to save you, and take you hence. In the next place, do you
+not see how cheap these informers are, so that there would be no
+need of a large sum for them? My fortune is at your service,
+sufficient, I think, for the purpose; then if, out of regard to me,
+you do not think right to spend my money, these strangers here are
+ready to spend theirs. One of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought
+with him a sufficient sum for the very purpose. Cebes, too, is
+ready, and very many others. So that, as I said, do not, through
+fears of this kind, hesitate to save yourself, nor let what you
+said in court give you any trouble, that if you went from hence you
+would not know what to do with yourself. For in many places, and
+wherever you go, men will love you; and if you are disposed to go
+to Thessaly, I have friends there who will esteem you very highly,
+and will insure your safety, so that no one in Thessaly will molest
+you.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec5" name=
+"crito_sec5">5</a>. Moreover, Socrates, you do not appear to me to
+pursue <a class='pagenumber' name='page55' id='page55'></a>a just
+course in giving yourself up when you might be saved; and you press
+on the very results with respect to yourself which your enemies
+would press, and have pressed, in their anxiety to destroy you.
+Besides this, too, you appear to me to betray your own sons, whom,
+when it is in your power to rear and educate them, you will
+abandon, and, so far as you are concerned, they will meet with such
+a fate as chance brings them, and, as is probable, they will meet
+with such things as orphans are wont to experience in a state of
+orphanage. Surely one ought not to have children, or one should go
+through the toil of rearing and instructing them. But you appear to
+me to have chosen the most indolent course; though you ought to
+have chosen such a course as a good and brave man would have done,
+since you profess to have made virtue your study through the whole
+of your life; so that I am ashamed both for you and for us who are
+your friends, lest this whole affair of yours should seem to be the
+effect of cowardice on our part&mdash;your appearing to stand your
+trial in the court, since you appeared when it was in your power
+not to have done so, the very manner in which the trial was
+conducted, and this last circumstance, as it were, a ridiculous
+consummation of the whole business; your appearing to have escaped
+from us through our indolence and cowardice, who did not save you;
+nor did you save yourself, when it was practicable and possible,
+had we but exerted ourselves a little. Think of these things,
+therefore, Socrates, and beware, lest, besides the evil <span
+class="emphasis">that will result</span>, they be disgraceful both
+to you and to us; advise, then, with yourself; though, indeed,
+there is no longer time for advising&mdash;your resolve should be
+already made. And there is but one plan; for in the following night
+the whole must be accomplished. If we delay, it will be impossible
+and no longer practicable. By all means, <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page56' id='page56'></a>therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by
+me, and on no account refuse.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec6" name=
+"crito_sec6">6</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> My dear
+Crito, your zeal would be very commendable were it united with
+right principle; otherwise, by how much the more earnest it is, by
+so much is it the more sad. We must consider, therefore, whether
+this plan should be adopted or not. For I not now only, but always,
+am a person who will obey nothing within me but reason, according
+as it appears to me on mature deliberation to be best. And the
+reasons which I formerly professed I can not now reject, because
+this misfortune has befallen me; but they appear to me in much the
+same light, and I respect and honor them as before; so that if we
+are unable to adduce any better at the present time, be assured
+that I shall not give in to you, even though the power of the
+multitude should endeavor to terrify us like children, by
+threatening more than it does now, bonds and death, and
+confiscation of property. How, therefore, may we consider the
+matter most conveniently? First of all, if we recur to the argument
+which you used about opinions, whether on former occasions it was
+rightly resolved or not, that we ought to pay attention to some
+opinions, and to others not; or whether, before it was necessary
+that I should die, it was rightly resolved; but now it has become
+clear that it was said idly for argument's sake, though in reality
+it was merely jest and trifling. I desire then, Crito, to consider,
+in common with you, whether it will appear to me in a different
+light, now that I am in this condition, or the same, and whether we
+shall give it up or yield to it. It was said, I think, on former
+occasions, by those who were thought to speak seriously, as I just
+now observed, that of the opinions which men entertain some should
+be very highly esteemed and others not. By the gods! Crito, does
+not this appear to you to be well said? For you, <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page57' id='page57'></a>in all human
+probability, are out of all danger of dying to-morrow, and the
+present calamity will not lead your judgment astray. Consider,
+then; does it not appear to you to have been rightly settled that
+we ought not to respect all the opinions of men, but some we
+should, and others not? Nor yet the opinions of all men, but of
+some we should, and of others not? What say you? Is not this
+rightly resolved?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It is.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Therefore we should
+respect the good, but not the bad?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Yes.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> And are not the good
+those of the wise, and the bad those of the foolish?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> How can it be
+otherwise?</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec7" name=
+"crito_sec7">7</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Come,
+then: how, again, were the following points settled? Does a man who
+practices gymnastic exercises and applies himself to them, pay
+attention to the praise and censure and opinion of every one, or of
+that one man only who happens to be a physician, or teacher of the
+exercises?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Of that one only.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> He ought, therefore, to
+fear the censures and covet the praises of that one, but not those
+of the multitude.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Clearly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> He ought, therefore, so
+to practice and exercise himself, and to eat and drink, as seems
+fitting to the one who presides and knows, rather than to all
+others together.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It is so.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Well, then, if he
+disobeys the one, and disregards his opinion and praise, but
+respects that of the multitude and of those who know nothing, will
+he not suffer some evil?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> How should he not?</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page58' id='page58'></a><span class=
+"speakername">Socr.</span> But what is this evil? Whither does it
+tend, and on what part of him that disobeys will it fall?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Clearly on his body, for
+this it ruins.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> You say well. The case is
+the same, too, Crito, with all other things, not to go through them
+all. With respect then, to things just and unjust, base and
+honorable, good and evil, about which we are now consulting, ought
+we to follow the opinion of the multitude, and to respect it, or
+that of one, if there is any one who understands, whom we ought to
+reverence and respect rather than all others together? And if we do
+not obey him, shall we not corrupt and injure that part of
+ourselves which becomes better by justice, but is ruined by
+injustice? Or is this nothing?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> I agree with you,
+Socrates.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec8" name=
+"crito_sec8">8</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Come,
+then, if we destroy that which becomes better by what is wholesome,
+but is impaired by what is unwholesome, through being persuaded by
+those who do not understand, can we enjoy life when that is
+impaired? And this is the body we are speaking of, is it not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Yes.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Can we, then, enjoy life
+with a diseased and impaired body?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> By no means.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> But can we enjoy life
+when that is impaired which injustice ruins but justice benefits?
+Or do we think that to be of less value than the body, whatever
+part of us it may be, about which injustice and justice are
+concerned'</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> By no means.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> But of more value?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Much more.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> We must not then, my
+excellent friend, so much regard what the multitude will say of us,
+but what he will say who understands the just and the unjust, the
+one, even <a class='pagenumber' name='page59' id='page59'></a>truth
+itself. So that at first you did not set out with a right
+principle, when you laid it down that we ought to regard the
+opinion of the multitude with respect to things just and honorable
+and good, and their contraries. How ever, some one may say, are not
+the multitude able to put us to death?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> This, too, is clear,
+Socrates, any one might say so.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> You say truly. But, my
+admirable friend, this principle which we have just discussed
+appears to me to be the same as it was before<a id="footnotetag10"
+name="footnotetag10" href="#footnote10"><sup>10</sup></a>. And
+consider this, moreover, whether it still holds good with us or
+not, that we are not to be anxious about living but about living
+well.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It does hold good.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> And does this hold good
+or not, that to live well and Honorable and justly are the same
+thing?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It does.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec9" name=
+"crito_sec9">9</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> From
+what has been admitted, then, this consideration arises, whether it
+is just or not that I should endeavor to leave this place without
+the permission of the Athenians. And should it appear to be just,
+we will make the attempt, but if not, we will give it up. But as to
+the considerations which you mention, of an outlay of money,
+reputation, and the education of children, beware, Crito, lest such
+considerations as these in reality belong to these multitudes, who
+rashly put one to death, and would restore one to life, if they
+could do so, without any reason at all. But we, since reason so
+requires, must consider nothing else than what we just now
+mentioned, whether we shall act justly in paying money and
+contracting obligations to those <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page60' id='page60'></a>who will lead me hence, as well they who
+lead me as we who are led hence, or whether, in truth, we shall not
+act unjustly in doing all these things. And if we should appear in
+so doing to be acting unjustly, observe that we must not consider
+whether from remaining here and continuing quiet we must needs die,
+or suffer any thing else, rather than whether we shall be acting
+unjustly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> You appear to me to speak
+wisely, Socrates, but see what we are to do.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Let us consider the
+matter together, my friend, and if you have any thing to object to
+what I say, make good your objection, and I will yield to you, but
+if not, cease, my excellent friend, to urge upon me the same thing
+so often, that I ought to depart hence against the will of the
+Athenians. For I highly esteem your endeavors to persuade me thus
+to act, so long as it is not against my will Consider, then, the
+beginning of our inquiry, whether it is stated to your entire
+satisfaction, and endeavor to answer the question put to you
+exactly as you think right.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> I will endeavor to do
+so.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec10" name=
+"crito_sec10">10</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Say
+we, then, that we should on no account deliberately commit
+injustice, or may we commit injustice under certain circumstances,
+under others not? Or is it on no account either good or honorable
+to commit injustice, as we have often agreed on former occasions,
+and as we just now said? Or have all those our former admissions
+been dissipated in these few days, and have we, Crito, old men as
+we are, been for a long time seriously conversing with each other
+without knowing that we in no respect differ from children? Or does
+the case, beyond all question, stand as we then determined? Whether
+the multitude allow it or not, and whether we must suffer a more
+severe or a milder punishment than this, still is injustice on
+every account <a class='pagenumber' name='page61' id=
+'page61'></a>both evil and disgraceful to him who commits it? Do we
+admit this, or not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> We do admit it.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> On no account, therefore,
+ought we to act unjustly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Surely not.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Neither ought one who is
+injured to return the injury, as the multitude think, since it is
+on no account right to act unjustly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It appears not.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> What, then? Is it right
+to do evil, Crito, or not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> Surely it is not right,
+Socrates.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> But what? To do evil in
+return when one has been evil-entreated, is that right, or not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> By no means.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> For to do evil to men
+differs in no respect from committing injustice.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> You say truly.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> It is not right,
+therefore, to return an injury, or to do evil to any man, however
+one may have suffered from him. But take care, Crito, that in
+allowing these things you do not allow them contrary to your
+opinion, for I know that to some few only these things both do
+appear, and will appear, to be true. They, then, to whom these
+things appear true, and they to whom they do not, have no sentiment
+in common, and must needs despise each other, while they look to
+each other's opinions. Consider well, then, whether you coincide
+and think with me, and whether we can begin our deliberations from
+this point&mdash;that it is never right either to do an injury or
+to return an injury, or when one has been evil-entreated, to
+revenge one's self by doing evil in return, or do you dissent from,
+and not coincide in this principle? For so it appears to me, both
+long since and now, but if you in any respect think otherwise, say
+so and <a class='pagenumber' name='page62' id='page62'></a>inform
+me. But if you persist in your former opinions, hear what
+follows.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> I do persist in them, and
+think with you. Speak on, then.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> I say next, then, or
+rather I ask; whether when a man has promised to do things that are
+just he ought to do them, or evade his promise?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> He ought to do them.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec11" name=
+"crito_sec11">11</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span>
+Observe, then, what follows. By departing hence without the leave
+of the city, are we not doing evil to some, and that to those to
+whom we ought least of all to do it, or not? And do we abide by
+what we agreed on as being just, or do we not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> I am unable to answer your
+question, Socrates; for I do not understand it.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Then, consider it thus.
+If, while we were preparing to run away, or by whatever name we
+should call it, the laws and commonwealth should come, and,
+presenting themselves before us, should say, "Tell me, Socrates,
+what do you purpose doing? Do you design any thing else by this
+proceeding in which you are engaged than to destroy us, the laws,
+and the whole city, so far as you are able? Or do you think it
+possible for that city any longer to subsist, and not be subverted,
+in which judgments that are passed have no force, but are set aside
+and destroyed by private persons?"&mdash;what should we say, Crito,
+to these and similar remonstrances? For any one, especially an
+orator, would have much to say on the violation of the law, which
+enjoins that judgments passed shall be enforced. Shall we say to
+them that the city has done us an injustice, and not passed a right
+sentence? Shall we say this, or what else?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> This, by Jupiter!
+Socrates.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec12" name=
+"crito_sec12">12</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span> What,
+then, if the laws should say, "Socrates, <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page63' id='page63'></a>was it not agreed between us that you
+should abide by the judgments which the city should pronounce?" And
+if we should wonder at their speaking thus, perhaps they would say,
+"Wonder not, Socrates, at what we say, but answer, since you are
+accustomed to make use of questions and answers. For, come, what
+charge have you against us and the city, that you attempt to
+destroy us? Did we not first give you being? and did not your
+father, through us, take your mother to wife and beget you? Say,
+then, do you find fault with those laws among us that relate to
+marriage as being bad?" I should say, "I do not find fault with
+them." "Do you with those that relate to your nurture when born,
+and the education with which you were instructed? Or did not the
+laws, ordained on this point, enjoin rightly, in requiring your
+father to instruct you in music and gymnastic exercises?" I should
+say, rightly. Well, then, since you were born, nurtured, and
+educated through our means, can you say, first of all, that you are
+not both our offspring and our slave, as well you as your
+ancestors? And if this be so, do you think that there are equal
+rights between us? and whatever we attempt to do to you, do you
+think you may justly do to us in turn? Or had you not equal rights
+with your father, or master, if you happened to have one, so as to
+return what you suffered, neither to retort when found fault with,
+nor, when stricken, to strike again, nor many other things of the
+kind; but that with your country and the laws you may do so; so
+that if we attempt to destroy you, thinking it to be just, you also
+should endeavor, so far as you are able, in return, to destroy us,
+the laws, and your country; and in doing this will you say that you
+act justly&mdash;you who, in reality, make virtue your chief
+object? Or are you so wise as not to know that one's country is
+more honorable, venerable, and sacred, and more highly prized both
+by <a class='pagenumber' name='page64' id='page64'></a>gods, and
+men possessed of understanding, than mother and father, and all
+other progenitors; and that one ought to reverence, submit to, and
+appease one's country, when angry, rather than one's father; and
+either persuade it or do what it orders, and to suffer quietly if
+it bids one suffer, whether to be beaten, or put in bonds; or if it
+sends one out to battle there to be wounded or slain, this must be
+done; for justice so requires, and one must not give way, or
+retreat, or leave one's post; but that both in war and in a court
+of justice, and everywhere one must do what one's city and country
+enjoin, or persuade it in such manner as justice allows; but that
+to offer violence either to one's mother or father is not holy,
+much less to one's country? What shall we say to these things,
+Crito? That the laws speak the truth, or not?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> It seems so to me.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec13" name=
+"crito_sec13">13</a>. <span class="speakername">Socr.</span>
+"Consider, then, Socrates," the laws perhaps might say, "whether we
+say truly that in what you are now attempting you are attempting to
+do what is not just toward us. For we, having given you birth,
+nurtured, instructed you, and having imparted to you and all other
+citizens all the good in our power, still proclaim, by giving the
+power to every Athenian who pleases, when he has arrived at years
+of discretion, and become acquainted with the business of the
+state, and us, the laws, that any one who is not satisfied with us
+may take his property, and go wherever he pleases. And if any one
+of you wishes to go to a colony, if he is not satisfied with us and
+the city, or to migrate and settle in another country, none of us,
+the laws, hinder or forbid him going whithersoever he pleases,
+taking with him all his property. But whoever continues with us
+after he has seen the manner in which we administer justice, and in
+other respects govern the city, we now say that <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page65' id='page65'></a>he has in fact entered
+into a compact with us to do what we order; and we affirm that he
+who does not obey is in three respects guilty of
+injustice&mdash;because he does not obey us who gave him being, and
+because he does not obey us who nurtured him, and because, having
+made a compact that he would obey us, he neither does so, nor does
+he persuade us if we do any thing wrongly; though we propose for
+his consideration, and do not rigidly command him to do what we
+order, but leave him the choice of one of two things, either to
+persuade us, or to do what we require, and yet he does neither of
+these."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec14" name=
+"crito_sec14">14</a>. "And we say that you, O Socrates! will be
+subject to these charges if you accomplish your design, and that
+not least of the Athenians, but most so of all." And if I should
+ask, "For what reason?" they would probably justly retort on me by
+saying that, among all the Athenians, I especially made this
+compact with them. For they would say, "Socrates, we have strong
+proof of this, that you were satisfied both with us and the city;
+for, of all the Athenians, you especially would never have dwelt in
+it if it had not been especially agreeable to you; for you never
+went out of the city to any of the public spectacles, except once
+to the Isthmian games, nor anywhere else, except on military
+service, nor have you ever gone abroad as other men do, nor had you
+ever had any desire to become acquainted with any other city or
+other laws, but we and our city were sufficient for you; so
+strongly were you attached to us, and so far did you consent to
+submit to our government, both in other respects and in begetting
+children in this city, in consequence of your being satisfied with
+it. Moreover, in your very trial, it was in your power to have
+imposed on yourself a sentence of exile, if you pleased, and might
+then have done, with the consent of the city, <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page66' id='page66'></a>what you now attempt against its
+consent. Then, indeed, you boasted yourself as not being grieved if
+you must needs die; but you preferred, as you said, death to exile.
+Now, however, you are neither ashamed of those professions, nor do
+you revere us, the laws, since you endeavor to destroy us, and you
+act as the vilest slave would act, by endeavoring to make your
+escape contrary to the conventions and the compacts by which you
+engaged to submit to our government. First, then, therefore, answer
+us this, whether we speak the truth or not in affirming that you
+agreed to be governed by us in deed, though not in word?" What
+shall we say to this, Crito? Can we do otherwise than assent?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> We must needs do so,
+Socrates.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> "What else, then," they
+will say, "are you doing but violating the conventions and compacts
+which you made with us, though you did not enter into them from
+compulsion or through deception, or from being compelled to
+determine in a short time but during the space of seventy years, in
+which you might have departed if you had been dissatisfied with us,
+and the compacts had not appeared to you to be just? You, however,
+preferred neither Laced&aelig;mon nor Crete, which you several
+times said are governed by good laws, nor any other of the Grecian
+or barbarian cities; but you have been less out of Athens than the
+lame and the blind, and other maimed persons. So much, it is
+evident, were you satisfied with the city and us, the laws, beyond
+the rest of the Athenians; for who can be satisfied with a city
+without laws? But now will you not abide by your compacts? You
+will, if you are persuaded by us, Socrates, and will not make
+yourself ridiculous by leaving the city."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec15" name=
+"crito_sec15">15</a>. "For consider, by violating these compacts
+and offending against any of them, what good you will do to <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page67' id='page67'></a>yourself or your
+friends. For that your friends will run the risk of being
+themselves banished, and deprived of the rights of citizenship, or
+of forfeiting their property, is pretty clear. And as for yourself,
+if you should go to one of the neighboring cities, either Thebes or
+Megara, for both are governed by good laws, you will go there,
+Socrates, as an enemy to their polity; and such as have any regard
+for their country will look upon you with suspicion, regarding you
+as a corrupter of the laws; and you will confirm the opinion of the
+judges, so that they will appear to have condemned you rightly, for
+whose is a corrupter of the laws will appear in all likelihood to
+be a corrupter of youths and weak-minded men. Will you, then, avoid
+these well-governed cities, and the best-ordered men? And should
+you do so, will it be worth your while to live? Or will you
+approach them, and have the effrontery to converse with them,
+Socrates, on subjects the same as you did here&mdash;that virtue
+and justice, legal institutions and laws, should be most highly
+valued by men? And do you not think that this conduct of Socrates
+would be very indecorous? You must think so. But you will keep
+clear of these places, and go to Thessaly, to Crito's friends, for
+there are the greatest disorder and licentiousness; and perhaps
+they will gladly hear you relating how drolly you escaped from
+prison, clad in some dress or covered with a skin, or in some other
+disguise such as fugitives are wont to dress themselves in, having
+so changed your usual appearance. And will no one say that you,
+though an old man, with but a short time to live, in all
+probability, have dared to have such a base desire of life as to
+violate the most sacred laws? Perhaps not, should you not offend
+any one. But if you should, you will hear, Socrates, many things
+utterly unworthy of you. You will live, too, in a state of abject
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page68' id='page68'></a>dependence on
+all men, and as their slave. But what will you do in Thessaly
+besides feasting, as if you had gone to Thessaly to a banquet? And
+what will become of those discourses about justice and all other
+virtues? But do you wish to live for the sake of your children,
+that you may rear and educate them? What then? Will you take them
+to Thessaly, and there rear and educate them, making them aliens to
+their country, that they may owe you this obligation too? Or, if
+not so, being reared here, will they be better reared and educated
+while you are living, though not with them, for your friends will
+take care of them? Whether, if you go to Thessaly, will they take
+care of them, but if you go to Hades will they not take care of
+them? If, however, any advantage is to be derived from those that
+say they are your friends, we must think they will."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec16" name=
+"crito_sec16">16</a>. "Then, O Socrates! be persuaded by us who
+have nurtured you, and do not set a higher value on your children,
+or on life, or on any thing else than justice, that, when you
+arrive in Hades, you may have all this to say in your defense
+before those who have dominion there. For neither here in this
+life, if you do what is proposed, does it appear to be better, or
+more just, or more holy to yourself, or any of your friends; nor
+will it be better for you when you arrive there. But now you
+depart, if you do depart, unjustly treated, not by us, the laws,
+but by men; but should you escape, having thus disgracefully
+returned injury for injury, and evil for evil, having violated your
+own compacts and conventions which you made with us, and having
+done evil to those to whom you least of all should have done
+it&mdash;namely, yourself, your friends, your country, and
+us&mdash;both we shall be indignant with you as long as you live,
+and there our brothers, the laws in Hades, will not receive you
+favorably knowing that you attempted, so far as you <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page69' id='page69'></a>were able, to destroy
+us. Let not Crito, then, persuade you to do what he advises, rather
+than we."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="crito_sec17" name=
+"crito_sec17">17</a>. These things, my dear friend Crito, be
+assured, I seem to hear as the votaries of Cybele<a id=
+"footnotetag11" name="footnotetag11" href=
+"#footnote11"><sup>11</sup></a> seem to hear the flutes. And the
+sound of these words booms in my ear, and makes me incapable of
+hearing any thing else. Be sure, then, so long as I retain my
+present opinions, if you should say any thing contrary to these,
+you will speak in vain. If, however, you think that you can prevail
+at all, say on.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Cri.</span> But, Socrates, I have
+nothing to say.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Socr.</span> Desist, then, Crito, and
+let us pursue this course, since this way the deity leads us.</p>
+
+<h3>Footnotes</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote6" name="footnote6" href=
+"#footnotetag6">6</a>: See the Ph&aelig;do sec <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec1">1</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote7" name="footnote7" href=
+"#footnotetag7">7</a>: A promontory at the southern extremity of
+Attica</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote8" name="footnote8" href=
+"#footnotetag8">8</a>: The Eleven</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote9" name="footnote9" href=
+"#footnotetag9">9</a>: See Homer's "Iliad," 1 IX, v 363</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote10" name="footnote10" href=
+"#footnotetag10">10</a>: That is to say, the principle which we had
+laid down in former discussions that no regard is to be had to
+popular opinion, is still found to hold good.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote11" name="footnote11" href=
+"#footnotetag11">11</a>: The Corybantes, priests of Cybele, who in
+their solemn festivals made such a noise with flutes that the
+hearers could hear no other sound.</div>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="introduction"><a name='introduction_to_the_phaedo' id=
+'introduction_to_the_phaedo'></a><a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page70' id='page70'></a>
+
+<h2>Introduction To The Ph&aelig;do.</h2>
+
+<p>This dialogue presents us with an account of the manner In which
+Socrates spent the last day of his, life, and how he met his death.
+The main subject is that of the soul's immortality, which Socrates
+takes upon himself to prove with as much certainty as it is
+possible for the human mind to arrive at. The question itself,
+though none could be better suited to the occasion, arises simply
+and naturally from the general conversation that precedes it.</p>
+
+<p>When his friends visit him in the morning for the purpose of
+spending this his last day with him, they find him sitting up in
+bed, and rubbing his leg, which had just been freed from bonds. He
+remarks on the unaccountable alternation and connection between
+pleasure and pain, and adds that &AElig;sop, had he observed it,
+would have made a fable from it. This remark reminds Cebes of
+Socrates's having put some of &AElig;sop's fables into metre since
+his imprisonment, and he asks, for the satisfaction of the poet
+Evenus, what has induced him to do so. Socrates explains his
+reason, and concludes by bidding him tell Evenus to follow him as
+soon as he can. Simmias expresses his surprise at this message, on
+which Socrates asks, "Is not Evenus a philosopher?" and on the
+question being answered in the affirmative, he says that he or any
+philosopher would be willing to die, though perhaps he would not
+commit violence on himself. This, again, seems a contradiction to
+Simmias; but Socrates explains it by showing that our souls <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page71' id='page71'></a>are placed in the
+body by God, and may not leave it without his permission. Whereupon
+Cebes objects that in that case foolish men only would wish to die,
+and quit the service of the best of masters, to which Simmias
+agrees. Socrates, therefore, proposes to plead his cause before
+them, and to show that there is a great probability that after this
+life he shall go into the presence of God and good men, and be
+happy in proportion to the purity of his own mind.</p>
+
+<p>He begins<a id="footnotetag12" name="footnotetag12" href=
+"#footnote12"><sup>12</sup></a> by stating that philosophy itself
+is nothing else than a preparation for and meditation on death.
+Death and philosophy have this in common: death separates the soul
+from the body; philosophy draws off the mind from bodily things to
+the contemplation of truth and virtue: for he is not a true
+philosopher who is led away by bodily pleasures, since the senses
+are the source of ignorance and all evil. The mind, therefore, is
+entirely occupied in meditating on death, and freeing itself as
+much as possible from the body. How, then, can such a man be afraid
+of death? He who grieves at the approach of death can not be a true
+lover of wisdom, but is a lover of his body. And, indeed, most men
+are temperate through intemperance; that is to say, they abstain
+from some pleasures that they may the more easily and permanently
+enjoy others. They embrace only a shadow of virtue, not virtue
+itself, since they estimate the value of all things by the
+pleasures they afford. Whereas the philosopher purifies his mind
+from all such things, and pursues virtue and wisdom for their own
+sakes. This course Socrates himself has pursued to the utmost of
+his ability, with what success he should shortly know; and on these
+grounds he did not repine at leaving his friends in this world,
+being persuaded that in another he should meet with good masters
+and good friends.</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page72' id='page72'></a>Upon this
+Cebes<a id="footnotetag13" name="footnotetag13" href=
+"#footnote13"><sup>13</sup></a> says that he agrees with all else
+that had been said, but can not help entertaining doubts of what
+will become of the soul when separated from the body, for the
+common opinion is that it is dispersed and vanishes like breath or
+smoke, and no longer exists anywhere. Socrates, therefore, proposes
+to inquire into the probability of the case, a fit employment for
+him under his present circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>His first argument<a id="footnotetag14" name="footnotetag14"
+href="#footnote14"><sup>14</sup></a> is drawn from the ancient
+belief prevalent among men, that souls departing hence exist in
+Hades, and are produced again from the dead. If this be true, it
+must follow that our souls are there, for they could not be
+produced again if they did not exist; and its truth is confirmed by
+this, that it is a general law of nature that contraries are
+produced from contraries&mdash;the greater from the less, strong
+from weak, slow from swift, heat from cold, and in like manner life
+from death, and vice versa. To explain this more clearly, he
+proceeds to show that what is changed passes from one state to
+another, and so undergoes three different states&mdash;first, the
+actual state; then the transition; and, thirdly, the new state; as
+from a state of sleep, by awaking to being awake. In like manner
+birth is a transition from a state of death to life, and dying from
+life to death; so that the soul, by the act of dying, only passes
+to another state. If it were not so, all nature would in time
+become dead, just as if people did not awake out of sleep all would
+at last be buried in eternal sleep. Whence the conclusion is that
+the souls of men are not annihilated by death.</p>
+
+<p>Cebes<a id="footnotetag15" name="footnotetag15" href=
+"#footnote15"><sup>15</sup></a> agrees to this reasoning, and adds
+that he is further convinced, of its truth by calling to mind an
+argument used by Socrates on former occasions, that knowledge is <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page73' id='page73'></a>nothing but
+reminiscence; and if this is so, the soul must have existed, and
+had knowledge, before it became united to the body.</p>
+
+<p>But in case Simmias should not yet be satisfied, Socrates<a id=
+"footnotetag16" name="footnotetag16" href=
+"#footnote16"><sup>16</sup></a> proceeds to enlarge on this, his
+second argument, drawn from reminiscence. We daily find that we are
+carried from the knowledge of one thing to another. Things
+perceived by the eyes, ears, and other senses bring up the thought
+of other things; thus the sight of a lyre or a garment reminds us
+of a friend, and not only are we thus reminded of sensible objects,
+but of things which are comprehended by the mind alone, and have no
+sensitive existence. For we have formed in our minds an idea of
+abstract equality, of the beautiful, the just, the good; in short,
+of every thing which we say exists without the aid of the senses,
+for we use them only in the perception of individual things; whence
+it follows that the mind did not acquire this knowledge in this
+life, but must have had it before, and therefore the soul must have
+existed before.</p>
+
+<p>Simmias and Cebes<a id="footnotetag17" name="footnotetag17"
+href="#footnote17"><sup>17</sup></a> both agree in admitting that
+Socrates has proved the pre-existence of the soul, but insist that
+he has not shown it to be immortal, for that nothing hinders but
+that, according to the popular opinion, it may be dispersed at the
+dissolution of the body. To which Socrates replies, that if their
+former admissions are joined to his last argument, the immortality,
+as well as the pre-existence, of the soul has been sufficiently
+proved. For if it is true that any thing living is produced from
+that which is dead, then the soul must exist after death, otherwise
+it could not be produced again.</p>
+
+<p>However, to remove the apprehension that the soul may be
+dispersed by a wind, as it were, Socrates proceeds, in his <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page74' id='page74'></a>third argument,<a
+id="footnotetag18" name="footnotetag18" href=
+"#footnote18"><sup>18</sup></a> to examine that doubt more
+thoroughly. What, then, is meant by being dispersed but being
+dissolved into its parts? In order, therefore, to a thing being
+capable of dispersion it must be compounded of parts. Now, there
+are two kinds of things&mdash;one compounded, the other simple The
+former kind is subject to change, the latter not, and can be
+comprehended by the mind alone. The one is visible, the other
+invisible; and the soul, which is invisible, when it employs the
+bodily senses, wanders and is confused, but when it abstracts
+itself from the body it attains to the knowledge of that which is
+eternal, immortal, and unchangeable. The soul, therefore, being
+uncompounded and invisible, must be indissoluble; that is to say,
+immortal.</p>
+
+<p>Still Simmias and Cebes<a id="footnotetag19" name=
+"footnotetag19" href="#footnote19"><sup>19</sup></a> are
+unconvinced. The former objects that the soul, according to
+Socrates's own showing, is nothing but a harmony resulting from a
+combination of the parts of the body, and so may perish with the
+body, as the harmony of a lyre does when the lyre itself is broken.
+And Cebes, though he admits that the soul is more durable than the
+body, yet objects that it is not, therefore, of necessity immortal,
+but may in time wear out; and it is by no means clear that this is
+not its last period.</p>
+
+<p>These objections produce a powerful effect on the rest of the
+company; but Socrates, undismayed, exhorts them not to suffer
+themselves to be deterred from seeking the truth by any
+difficulties they may meet with; and then proceeds<a id=
+"footnotetag20" name="footnotetag20" href=
+"#footnote20"><sup>20</sup></a> to show, in a moment, the fallacy
+of Simmias's objection. It was before admitted, he says, that the
+soul existed before the body; but harmony is produced after the
+lyre is formed, so that the two cases are totally different. And,
+further, there are various degrees of harmony, but every soul is as
+much a soul as any other. But, then, what will a person <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page75' id='page75'></a>who holds this doctrine,
+that the soul is harmony, say of virtue and vice in the soul? Will
+he call them another kind of harmony and discord? If so, he will
+contradict himself; for it is admitted that one soul is not more or
+less a soul than another, and therefore one can not he more or less
+harmonized than another, and one could not admit of a greater
+degree of virtue or vice than another; and indeed a soul, being
+harmony, could not partake of vice at all, which is discord.</p>
+
+<p>Socrates, having thus satisfactorily answered the argument
+adduced by Simmias, goes on to rebut that of Cebes,<a id=
+"footnotetag21" name="footnotetag21" href=
+"#footnote21"><sup>21</sup></a> who objected that the soul might in
+time wear out. In order to do this, he relates that, when a young
+man, he attempted to investigate the causes of all things, why they
+exist and why they perish; and in the course of his researches,
+finding the futility of attributing the existence of things to what
+are called natural causes, he resolved on endeavoring to find out
+the reasons of things. He therefore assumed that there are a
+certain abstract beauty and goodness and magnitude, and so of all
+other things; the truth of which being granted, he thinks he shall
+be able to prove that the soul is immortal.</p>
+
+<p>This, then, being conceded by Cebes, Socrates<a id=
+"footnotetag22" name="footnotetag22" href=
+"#footnote22"><sup>22</sup></a> argues that every thing that is
+beautiful is so from partaking of abstract beauty, and great from
+partaking of magnitude, and little from partaking of littleness.
+Now, it is impossible, he argues, that contraries can exist in the
+same thing at the same time; for instance, the same thing can not
+possess both magnitude and littleness, but one will withdraw at the
+approach of the other; and not only so, but things which, though
+not contrary to each other, yet always contain contraries within
+themselves, can not co-exist; for instance, <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page76' id='page76'></a>the number three has no contrary, yet
+it contains within itself the idea of odd, which is the contrary of
+even, and so three never can become even; in like manner, heat
+while it is heat can never admit the idea of its contrary, cold.
+Now, if this method of reasoning is applied to the soul, it will be
+found to be immortal; for life and death are contraries, and never
+can co-exist; but wherever the soul is, there is life: so that it
+contains within itself that which is contrary to death, and
+consequently can never admit of death; therefore it is
+immortal.</p>
+
+<p>With this he closes his arguments in support of the soul's
+immortality. Cebes owns himself convinced, but Simmias, though he
+is unable to make any objection to the soundness of Socrates's
+reasoning, can not help still entertaining doubts on the subject.
+If, however, the soul is immortal, Socrates proceeds,<a id=
+"footnotetag23" name="footnotetag23" href=
+"#footnote23"><sup>23</sup></a> great need is there in this life to
+endeavor to become as wise and good as possible. For if death were
+a deliverance from every thing, it would be a great gain for the
+wicked; but since the soul appears to be immortal, it must go to
+the place suited to its nature. For it is said that each person's
+demon conducts him to a place where he receives sentence according
+to his deserts.</p>
+
+<p>He then<a id="footnotetag24" name="footnotetag24" href=
+"#footnote24"><sup>24</sup></a> draws a fanciful picture of the
+various regions of the earth, to which the good and the bad will
+respectively go after death, and exhorts his friends to use every
+endeavor to acquire virtue and wisdom in this life, "for," he adds,
+"the reward is noble, and the hope great."</p>
+
+<p>Having thus brought his subject to a conclusion, Socrates
+proposes to bathe himself, in order not to trouble others to wash
+his dead body. Crito thereupon asks if he has any commands to give,
+and especially how he would be buried, to which he, with his usual
+cheerfulness, makes answer, "<a class='pagenumber' name='page77'
+id='page77'></a>Just as you please, if only you can catch me;" and
+then, smiling, he reminds them that after death he shall be no
+longer with them, and begs the others of the party to be sureties
+to Crito for his absence from the body, as they had been before
+bound for his presence before his judges.</p>
+
+<p>After he had bathed, and taken leave of his children and the
+women of his family the officer of the Eleven comes in to intimate
+to him that it is now time to drink the poison. Crito urges a
+little delay, as the sun had not yet set; but Socrates refuses to
+make himself ridiculous by showing such a fondness for life. The
+man who is to administer the poison is therefore sent for; and on
+his holding out the cup, Socrates, neither trembling nor changing
+color or countenance at all, but, as he was wont, looking
+steadfastly at the man, asked if he might make a libation to any
+one; and being told that no more poison than enough had been mixed,
+he simply prayed that his departure from this to another world
+might be happy, and then drank off the poison, readily and calmly.
+His friends, who had hitherto with difficulty restrained
+themselves, could no longer control the outward expressions of
+grief, to which Socrates said, "What are you doing, my friends? I,
+for this reason, chiefly, sent away the women, that they might not
+commit any folly of this kind; for I have heard that it is right to
+die with good omens. Be quiet, therefore, and bear up."</p>
+
+<p>When he had walked about for a while his legs began to grow
+heavy, so he lay down on his back; and his body, from the feet
+upward, gradually grew cold and stiff. His last words were, "Crito,
+we owe a cock to &AElig;sculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not
+neglect it."</p>
+
+<p>"This," concludes Ph&aelig;do, "was the end of our
+friend&mdash;a man, as we may say, the best of all his time, that
+we have known, and, moreover, the most wise and just."</p>
+
+<h3>Footnotes</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote12" name="footnote12" href=
+"#footnotetag12">12</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec21">21-39</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote13" name="footnote13" href=
+"#footnotetag13">13</a>: Sec. <a href="#phaedo_sec39">39,
+40</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote14" name="footnote14" href=
+"#footnotetag14">14</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec40">40-46</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote15" name="footnote15" href=
+"#footnotetag15">15</a>: Sec. <a href="#phaedo_sec47">47</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote16" name="footnote16" href=
+"#footnotetag16">16</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec48">48-57</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote17" name="footnote17" href=
+"#footnotetag17">17</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec55">55-59</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote18" name="footnote18" href=
+"#footnotetag18">18</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec61">61-75</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote19" name="footnote19" href=
+"#footnotetag19">19</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec76">76-84</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote20" name="footnote20" href=
+"#footnotetag20">20</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec93">93-99</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote21" name="footnote21" href=
+"#footnotetag21">21</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec100">100-112</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote22" name="footnote22" href=
+"#footnotetag22">22</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec112">112-128</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote23" name="footnote23" href=
+"#footnotetag23">23</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec129">129-131</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote24" name="footnote24" href=
+"#footnotetag24">24</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec132">132-145</a>.</div>
+
+<hr>
+</div>
+
+<div class="book"><a name='phaedo_or_the_immortality_of_the_soul'
+id='phaedo_or_the_immortality_of_the_soul'></a><a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page78' id='page78'></a>
+
+<h2>Ph&aelig;do;<br>
+ Or,<br>
+ The Immortality Of The Soul.</h2>
+
+FIRST ECHECRATES, PH&AElig;DO.<br>
+ THEN SOCRATES, APOLLODORUS, CEBES, SIMMIAS, AND CRITO.
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec1" name=
+"phaedo_sec1"></a><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> Were you
+personally present, Ph&aelig;do, with Socrates on that day when he
+drank the poison in prison, or did you hear an account of it from
+some one else?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> I was there myself,
+Echecrates.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> What, then, did he say
+before his death, and how did he die? for I should be glad to hear:
+for scarcely any citizen of Phlius<a id="footnotetag25" name=
+"footnotetag25" href="#footnote25"><sup>25</sup></a> ever visits
+Athens now, nor has any stranger for a long time come from thence
+who was able to give us a clear account of the particulars, except
+that he had died from drinking poison; but he was unable to tell us
+any thing more.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec2" name=
+"phaedo_sec2">2</a>. <span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span>
+And did you not hear about the trial&mdash;how it went off?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> Yes; some one told me
+this; and I wondered that, <a class='pagenumber' name='page79' id=
+'page79'></a>as it took place so long ago, he appears to have died
+long afterward. What was the reason of this, Ph&aelig;do?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> An accidental
+circumstance happened in his favor, Echecrates; for the poop of the
+ship which the Athenians send to Delos chanced to be crowned on the
+day before the trial.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> But what is this ship?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> It is the ship, as
+the Athenians say, in which Theseus formerly conveyed the fourteen
+boys and girls to Crete, and saved both them and himself. They,
+therefore, made a vow to Apollo on that occasion, as it is said,
+that if they were saved they would every year dispatch a solemn
+embassy to Delos; which, from that time to the present, they send
+yearly to the god. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec3" name=
+"phaedo_sec3">3</a>. When they begin the preparations for this
+solemn embassy, they have a law that the city shall be purified
+during this period, and that no public execution shall take place
+until the ship has reached Delos, and returned to Athens; and this
+occasionally takes a long time, when the winds happen to impede
+their passage. The commencement of the embassy is when the priest
+of Apollo has crowned the poop of the ship. And this was done, as I
+said, on the day before the trial: on this account Socrates had a
+long interval in prison between the trial and his death.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec4" name=
+"phaedo_sec4">4</a>. <span class="speakername">Ech.</span> And
+what, Ph&aelig;do, were the circumstances of his death? What was
+said and done? and who of his friends were with him? or would not
+the magistrates allow them to be present, but did he die destitute
+of friends?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> By no means; but
+some, indeed several, were present.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> Take the trouble, then, to
+relate to me all the particulars as clearly as you can, unless you
+have any pressing business.</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page80' id='page80'></a><span class=
+"speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> I am at leisure, and will endeavor
+to give you a full account; for to call Socrates to mind, whether
+speaking myself or listening to some one else, is always most
+delightful to me.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec5" name=
+"phaedo_sec5">5</a>. <span class="speakername">Ech.</span> And
+indeed, Ph&aelig;do, you have others to listen to you who are of
+the same mind. However, endeavor to relate every thing as
+accurately as you can.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> I was, indeed,
+wonderfully affected by being present, for I was not impressed with
+a feeling of pity, like one present at the death of a friend; for
+the man appeared to me to be happy, Echecrates, both from his
+manner and discourse, so fearlessly and nobly did he meet his
+death: so much so, that it occurred to me that in going to Hades he
+was not going without a divine destiny, but that when he arrived
+there he would be happy, if any one ever was. For this reason I was
+entirely uninfluenced by any feeling of pity, as would seem likely
+to be the case with one present on so mournful an occasion; nor was
+I affected by pleasure from being engaged in philosophical
+discussions, as was our custom; for our conversation was of that
+kind. But an altogether unaccountable feeling possessed me, a kind
+of unusual mixture compounded of pleasure and pain together, when I
+considered that he was immediately about to die. And all of us who
+were present were affected in much the same manner, at one time
+laughing, at another weeping&mdash;one of us especially,
+Apollodorus, for you know the man and his manner.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> How should I not?</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec6" name=
+"phaedo_sec6">6</a>. <span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span>
+He, then, was entirely overcome by these emotions; and I, too, was
+troubled, as well as the others.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> But who were present,
+Ph&aelig;do?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> Of his
+fellow-countrymen, this Apollodorus was present, and Critobulus,
+and his father, Crito; moreover, <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page81' id='page81'></a>Hermogenes, Epigenes, &AElig;schines and
+Antisthenes; Ctesippus the P&aelig;anian, Menexenus, and some
+others of his countrymen, were also there: Plato, I think, was
+sick.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> Were any strangers
+present?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> Yes; Simmias, the
+Theban, Cebes and Ph&aelig;dondes; and from Megara, Euclides and
+Terpsion.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec7" name=
+"phaedo_sec7">7</a>. <span class="speakername">Ech.</span> But
+what! were not Aristippus and Cleombrotus present?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> No, for they were
+said to be at &AElig;gina.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> Was any one else
+there?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> I think that these
+were nearly all who were present.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ech.</span> Well, now, what do you say
+was the subject of conversation?</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> I will endeavor to
+relate the whole to you from the beginning. On the preceding days I
+and the others were constantly in the habit of visiting Socrates,
+meeting early in the morning at the court house where the trial
+took place, for it was near the prison. <a class="sectionnumber"
+id="phaedo_sec8" name="phaedo_sec8">8</a>. Here, then, we waited
+every day till the prison was opened, conversing with each other,
+for it was not opened very early; but as soon as it was opened we
+went in to Socrates, and usually spent the day with him. On that
+occasion, however, we met earlier than usual; for on the preceding
+day, when we left the prison in the evening, we heard that the ship
+had arrived from Delos. We therefore urged each other to come as
+early as possible to the accustomed place. Accordingly we came; and
+the porter, who used to admit us, coming out, told us to wait, and
+not to enter until he had called us. "For," he said, "the Eleven
+are now freeing Socrates from his bonds, and announcing to him that
+he must die to-day." But in no long time he returned, and bade us
+enter.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec9" name=
+"phaedo_sec9">9</a>. When we entered, we found Socrates just freed
+from <a class='pagenumber' name='page82' id='page82'></a>his bonds,
+and Xantippe, you know her, holding his little boy, and sitting by
+him. As soon as Xantippe saw us she wept aloud, and said such
+things as women usually do on such occasions&mdash;as, "Socrates,
+your friends will now converse with you for the last time, and you
+with them." But Socrates, looking towards Crito, said: "Crito, let
+some one take her home." Upon which some of Crito's attendants led
+her away, wailing and beating herself.</p>
+
+<p>But Socrates, sitting up in bed, drew up his leg, and rubbed it
+with his hand, and as he rubbed it, said: "What an unaccountable
+thing, my friends, that seems to be, which men call pleasure! and
+how wonderfully is it related toward that which appears to be its
+contrary, pain, in that they will not both be present to a man at
+the same time! Yet if any one pursues and attains the one, he is
+almost always compelled to receive the other, as if they were both
+united together from one head."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec10" name=
+"phaedo_sec10">10</a>. "And it seems tome," he said, "that if
+&AElig;sop had observed this he would have made a fable from it,
+how the deity, wishing to reconcile these warring principles, when
+he could not do so, united their heads together, and from hence
+whomsoever the one visits the other attends immediately after; as
+appears to be the case with me, since I suffered pain in my leg
+before from the chain, but now pleasure seems to have
+succeeded."</p>
+
+<p>Hereupon Cebes, interrupting him, said: "By Jupiter! Socrates,
+you have done well in reminding me; with respect to the poems which
+you made, by putting into metre those Fables of &AElig;sop and the
+hymn to Apollo, several other persons asked me, and especially
+Evenus recently, with what design you made them after you came
+here, whereas before you had never made any. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec11" name="phaedo_sec11">11</a>. If
+therefore, you care at all that I should be able to answer Evenus,
+when he asks me <a class='pagenumber' name='page83' id=
+'page83'></a>again&mdash;for I am sure he will do so&mdash;tell me
+what I must say to him."</p>
+
+<p>"Tell him the truth, then, Cebes," he replied, "that I did not
+make them from a wish to compete with him, or his poems, for I knew
+that this would be no easy matter; but that I might discover the
+meaning of certain dreams, and discharge my conscience, if this
+should happen to be the music which they have often ordered me to
+apply myself to. For they were to the following purport: often in
+my past life the same dream visited me, appearing at different
+times in different forms, yet always saying the same
+thing&mdash;'Socrates,' it said, 'apply yourself to and practice
+music.' <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec12" name=
+"phaedo_sec12">12</a>. And I formerly supposed that it exhorted and
+encouraged me to continue the pursuit I was engaged in, as those
+who cheer on racers, so that the dream encouraged me to continue
+the pursuit I was engaged in&mdash;namely, to apply myself to
+music, since philosophy is the highest music, and I was devoted to
+it. But now since my trial took place, and the festival of the god
+retarded my death, it appeared to me that if by chance the dream so
+frequently enjoined me to apply myself to popular music, I ought
+not to disobey it, but do so, for that it would be safer for me not
+to depart hence before I had discharged my conscience by making
+some poems in obedience to the dream. Thus, then, I first of all
+composed a hymn to the god whose festival was present; and after
+the god, considering that a poet, if he means to be a poet, ought
+to make fables, and not discourses, and knowing that I was not
+skilled in making fables, I therefore put into verse those Fables
+of &AElig;sop, which were at hand, and were known to me, and which
+first occurred to me."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec13" name=
+"phaedo_sec13">13</a>. "Tell this, then, to Evenus, Cebes, and bid
+him farewell, and if he is wise, to follow me as soon as he can.
+But I depart, as it seems, to-day; for so the Athenians order."</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page84' id='page84'></a>To this
+Simmias said, "What is this, Socrates, which you exhort Evenus to
+do? for I often meet with him; and, from what I know of him, I am
+pretty certain that he will not at all be willing to comply with
+your advice."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then," said he, "is not Evenus a philosopher?"</p>
+
+<p>"To me he seems to be so," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"Then he will be willing," rejoined Socrates, "and so will every
+one who worthily engages in this study. Perhaps, indeed, he will
+not commit violence on himself; for that, they say, is not
+allowable." And as he said this he let down his leg from the bed on
+the ground, and in this posture continued during the remainder of
+the discussion.</p>
+
+<p>Cebes then asked him, "What do you mean, Socrates, by saying
+that it is not lawful to commit violence on one's self, but that a
+philosopher should be willing to follow one who is dying?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec14" name=
+"phaedo_sec14">14</a>. "What, Cebes! have not you and Simmias, who
+have conversed familiarly with Philolaus<a id="footnotetag26" name=
+"footnotetag26" href="#footnote26"><sup>26</sup></a> on this
+subject, heard?"</p>
+
+<p>"Nothing very clearly, Socrates."</p>
+
+<p>"I, however, speak only from hearsay; what, then, I have heard I
+have no scruple in telling. And perhaps it is most becoming for one
+who is about to travel there to inquire and speculate about the
+journey thither, what kind we think it is. What else can one do in
+the interval before sunset?"</p>
+
+<p>"Why, then, Socrates, do they say that it is not allowable to
+kill one's self? for I, as you asked just now, have heard both
+Philolaus, when he lived with us, and several others, say that it
+was not right to do this; but I never heard any thing clear upon
+the subject from any one."</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page85' id='page85'></a><a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec15" name="phaedo_sec15">15</a>.
+"Then, you should consider it attentively," said Socrates, "for
+perhaps you may hear. Probably, however, it will appear wonderful
+to you, if this alone, of all other things, is a universal truth,<a
+id="footnotetag27" name="footnotetag27" href=
+"#footnote27"><sup>27</sup></a> and it never happens to a man, as
+is the case in all other things, that at some times and to some
+persons only it is better to die than to live; yet that these men
+for whom it is better to die&mdash;this probably will appear
+wonderful to you&mdash;may not without impiety do this good to
+themselves, but must await another benefactor."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec16" name=
+"phaedo_sec16">16</a>. Then Cebes, gently smiling, said, speaking
+in his own dialect,<a id="footnotetag28" name="footnotetag28" href=
+"#footnote28"><sup>28</sup></a> "Jove be witness!"</p>
+
+<p>"And, indeed," said Socrates, "it would appear to be
+unreasonable; yet still, perhaps, it has some reason on its side.
+The maxim, indeed, given on this subject in the mystical
+doctrines,<a id="footnotetag29" name="footnotetag29" href=
+"#footnote29"><sup>29</sup></a> that we men are in a kind of
+prison, and that we ought not to free ourselves from it and escape,
+appears to me difficult to be understood, and not easy to
+penetrate. This, however, appears to me, Cebes, to be well said:
+that the gods take care of us, and that we men are one of their
+possessions. Does it not seem so to you?"</p>
+
+<p>"It does," replied Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore," said he, "if one of your slaves were to kill
+himself, without your having intimated that you wished him to die,
+should you not be angry with him, and should you not punish him if
+you could?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Perhaps, then, in this point of view, it is not unreasonable to
+assert that a man ought not to kill himself before the deity lays
+him under a necessity of doing so, such as that now laid on
+me."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec17" name=
+"phaedo_sec17">17</a>. "This, indeed," said Cebes, "appears to be
+probable. <a class='pagenumber' name='page86' id='page86'></a>But
+what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers should be very
+willing to die, appears to be an absurdity, if what we said just
+now is agreeable to reason&mdash;that it is God who takes care of
+us, and that we are his property. For that the wisest men should
+not be grieved at leaving that service in which they govern them
+who are the best of all masters&mdash;namely, the gods&mdash;is not
+consistent with reason; for surely he can not think that he will
+take better care of himself when he has become free. But a foolish
+man might perhaps think thus, that he should fly from his master,
+and would not reflect that he ought not to fly from a good one, but
+should cling to him as much as possible; therefore he would fly
+against all reason; but a man of sense would desire to be
+constantly with one better than himself. Thus, Socrates, the
+contrary of what you just now said is likely to be the case; for it
+becomes the wise to be grieved at dying, but the foolish to
+rejoice."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec18" name=
+"phaedo_sec18">18</a>. Socrates, on hearing this, appeared to me to
+be pleased with the pertinacity of Cebes, and, looking toward us,
+said, "Cebes, you see, always searches out arguments, and is not at
+all willing to admit at once any thing one has said."</p>
+
+<p>Whereupon Simmias replied, "But, indeed, Socrates, Cebes appears
+to me now to say something to the purpose; for with what design
+should men really wise fly from masters who are better than
+themselves, and so readily leave them? And Cebes appears to me to
+direct his argument against you, because you so easily endure to
+abandon both us and those good rulers, as you yourself confess, the
+gods."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak justly," said Socrates, "for I think you mean that I
+ought to make my defense to this charge, as if I were in a court of
+justice."</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page87' id='page87'></a>Certainly,"
+replied Simmias.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec19" name=
+"phaedo_sec19">19</a>. "Come, then," said he, "I will endeavor to
+defend myself more successfully before you than before the judges.
+For," he proceeded, "Simmias and Cebes, if I did not think that I
+should go, first of all, among other deities who are both wise and
+good, and, next, among men who have departed this life, better than
+any here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death; but now, be
+assured, I hope to go among good men, though I would not positively
+assert it. That, however, I shall go among gods who are perfectly
+good masters, be assured I can positively assert this, if I can any
+thing of the kind. So that, on this account, I am not so much
+troubled, but I entertain a good hope that something awaits those
+who die, and that, as was said long since, it will be far better
+for the good than the evil."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec20" name=
+"phaedo_sec20">20</a>. "What, then, Socrates," said Simmias, "would
+you go away keeping this persuasion to yourself, or would you
+impart it to us? For this good appears to me to be also common to
+us; and at the same time it will be an apology for you, if you can
+persuade us to believe what you say."</p>
+
+<p>"I will endeavor to do so," he said. "But first let us attend to
+Crito here, and see what it is he seems to have for some time
+wished to say."</p>
+
+<p>"What else, Socrates," said Crito, "but what he who is to give
+you the poison told me some time ago, that I should tell you to
+speak as little as possible? For he says that men become too much
+heated by speaking, and that nothing of this kind ought to
+interfere with the poison; and that, otherwise, those who did so
+were sometimes compelled to drink two or three times."</p>
+
+<p>To which Socrates replied, "Let him alone, and let him attend to
+his own business, and prepare to give it me twice, or, if occasion
+require, even thrice."</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page88' id='page88'></a><a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec21" name="phaedo_sec21">21</a>. "I
+was almost certain what you would say," answered Crito, "but he has
+been some time pestering me."</p>
+
+<p>"Never mind him," he rejoined.</p>
+
+<p>"But now I wish to render an account to you, my judges, of the
+reason why a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy,
+when he is about to die, appears to me, on good grounds, to have
+confidence, and to entertain a firm hope that the greatest good
+will befall him in the other world when he has departed this life.
+How, then, this comes to pass, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavor
+to explain."</p>
+
+<p>"For as many as rightly apply themselves to philosophy seem to
+have left all others in ignorance, that they aim at nothing else
+than to die and be dead. If this, then, is true, it would surely be
+absurd to be anxious about nothing else than this during their
+whole life, but, when it arrives, to be grieved at what they have
+been long anxious about and aimed at."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec22" name=
+"phaedo_sec22">22</a>. Upon this, Simmias, smiling, said, "By
+Jupiter! Socrates, though I am not now at all inclined to smile,
+you have made me do so; for I think that the multitude, if they
+heard this, would think it was very well said in reference to
+philosophers, and that our countrymen particularly would agree with
+you, that true philosophers do desire death, and that they are by
+no means ignorant that they deserve to suffer it."</p>
+
+<p>"And, indeed, Simmias, they would speak the truth, except in
+asserting that they are not ignorant; for they are ignorant of the
+sense in which true philosophers desire to die, and in what sense
+they deserve death, and what kind of death. But," he said, "let us
+take leave of them, and speak to one another. Do we think that
+death is any thing?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," replied Simmias.</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page89' id='page89'></a><a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec23" name="phaedo_sec23">23</a>. "Is
+it any thing else than the separation of the soul from the body?
+And is not this to die, for the body to be apart by itself
+separated from the soul, and for the soul to subsist apart by
+itself separated from the body? Is death any thing else than
+this?"</p>
+
+<p>"No, but this," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Consider, then, my good friend, whether you are of the same
+opinion as I; for thus, I think, we shall understand better the
+subject we are considering. Does it appear to you to be becoming in
+a philosopher to be anxious about pleasures, as they are called,
+such as meats and drinks?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means, Socrates," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"But what? about the pleasures of love?"</p>
+
+<p>"Not at all."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec24" name=
+"phaedo_sec24">24</a>. "What, then? Does such a man appear to you
+to think other bodily indulgences of value? For instance, does he
+seem to you to value or despise the possession of magnificent
+garments and sandals, and other ornaments of the body except so far
+as necessity compels him to use them?"</p>
+
+<p>"The true philosopher," he answered, "appears to me to despise
+them."</p>
+
+<p>"Does not, then," he continued, "the whole employment of such a
+man appear to you to be, not about the body, but to separate
+himself from it as much as possible, and be occupied about his
+soul?"</p>
+
+<p>"It does."</p>
+
+<p>"First of all, then, in such matters, does not the philosopher,
+above all other men, evidently free his soul as much as he can from
+communion with the body?"</p>
+
+<p>"It appears so."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec25" name=
+"phaedo_sec25">25</a>. "And it appears, Simmias, to the generality
+of men, that he who takes no pleasure in such things, and who does
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page90' id='page90'></a>not use them,
+does not deserve to live; but that he nearly approaches to death
+who cares nothing for the pleasures that subsist through the
+body."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak very truly."</p>
+
+<p>"But what with respect to the acquisition of wisdom? Is the body
+an impediment, or not, if any one takes it with him as a partner in
+the search? What I mean is this: Do sight and hearing convey any
+truth to men, or are they such as the poets constantly sing, who
+say that we neither hear nor see any thing with accuracy? If,
+however, these bodily senses are neither accurate nor clear, much
+less can the others be so; for they are all far inferior to these.
+Do they not seem so to you?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec26" name=
+"phaedo_sec26">26</a>. "When, then," said he, "does the soul light
+on the truth? for when it attempts to consider any thing in
+conjunction with the body, it is plain that it is then led astray
+by it."</p>
+
+<p>"You say truly."</p>
+
+<p>"Must it not, then, be by reasoning, if at all, that any of the
+things that really are become known to it?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"And surely the soul then reasons best when none of these things
+disturb it&mdash;neither hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor pleasure
+of any kind; but it retires as much as possible within itself,
+taking leave of the body; and, so far as it can, not communicating
+or being in contact with it, it aims at the discovery of that which
+is."</p>
+
+<p>"Such is the case."</p>
+
+<p>"Does not, then, the soul of the philosopher, in these cases,
+despise the body, and flee from it, and seek to retire within
+itself?"</p>
+
+<p>"It appears so."</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page91' id='page91'></a><a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec27" name="phaedo_sec27">27</a>. "But
+what as to such things as these, Simmias? Do we say that justice
+itself is something or nothing?"</p>
+
+<p>"We say it is something, by Jupiter!"</p>
+
+<p>"And that beauty and goodness are something?"</p>
+
+<p>"How not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Now, then, have you ever seen any thing of this kind with your
+eyes?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Did you ever lay hold of them by any other bodily sense? But I
+speak generally, as of magnitude, health, strength and, in a word,
+of the essence of every thing; that is to say, what each is. Is,
+then, the exact truth of these perceived by means of the body, or
+is it thus, whoever among us habituates himself to reflect most
+deeply and accurately on each several thing about which he is
+considering, he will make the nearest approach to the knowledge of
+it?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec28" name=
+"phaedo_sec28">28</a>. "Would not he, then, do this with the utmost
+purity, who should in the highest degree approach each subject by
+means of the mere mental faculties, neither employing the sight in
+conjunction with the reflective faculty, nor introducing any other
+sense together with reasoning; but who, using pure reflection by
+itself, should attempt to search out each essence purely by itself,
+freed as much as possible from the eyes and ears, and, in a word,
+from the whole body, as disturbing the soul, and not suffering it
+to acquire truth and wisdom, when it is in communion with it. Is
+not he the person, Simmias, if any one can, who will arrive at the
+knowledge of that which is?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec29" name=
+"phaedo_sec29">29</a>. "You speak with wonderful truth, Socrates,"
+replied Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"Wherefore," he said, "it necessarily follows from all <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page92' id='page92'></a>this that some such
+opinion as this should be entertained by genuine philosophers, so
+that they should speak among themselves as follows: 'A by-path, as
+it were, seems to lead us on in our researches undertaken by
+reason,' because so long as we are encumbered with the body, and
+our soul is contaminated with such an evil, we can never fully
+attain to what we desire; and this, we say, is truth. For the body
+subjects us to innumerable hinderances on account of its necessary
+support; and, moreover, if any diseases befall us, they impede us
+in our search after that which is; and it fills us with longings,
+desires, fears, all kinds of fancies, and a multitude of
+absurdities, so that, as it is said in real truth, by reason of the
+body it is never possible for us to make any advances in wisdom. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec30" name="phaedo_sec30">30</a>.
+For nothing else than the body and its desires occasion wars,
+seditions, and contests; for all wars among us arise on account of
+our desire to acquire wealth: and we are compelled to acquire
+wealth on account of the body, being enslaved to its service; and
+consequently on all these accounts we are hindered in the pursuit
+of philosophy. But the worst of all is, that if it leaves us any
+leisure, and we apply ourselves to the consideration of any
+subject, it constantly obtrudes itself in the midst of our
+researches, and occasions trouble and disturbance, and confounds us
+so that we are not able, by reason of it, to discern the truth. It
+has, then, in reality been demonstrated to us that if we are ever
+to know any thing purely, we must be separated from the body, and
+contemplate the things themselves by the mere soul; and then, as it
+seems, we shall obtain that which we desire, and which we profess
+ourselves to be lovers of&mdash;wisdom&mdash;when we are dead, as
+reason shows, but not while we are alive. <a class="sectionnumber"
+id="phaedo_sec31" name="phaedo_sec31">31</a>. For if it is not
+possible to know any thing purely in conjunction with the body, one
+of these two things must follow, either that we can never acquire
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page93' id='page93'></a>knowledge, or
+only after we are dead; for then the soul will subsist apart by
+itself, separate from the body, but not before. And while we live
+we shall thus, as it seems, approach nearest to knowledge, if we
+hold no intercourse or communion at all with the body, except what
+absolute necessity requires, nor suffer ourselves to be polluted by
+its nature, but purify ourselves from it, until God himself shall
+release us. And thus being pure, and freed from the folly of body,
+we shall in all likelihood be with others like ourselves, and shall
+of ourselves know the whole real essence, and that probably is
+truth; for it is not allowable for the impure to attain to the
+pure. Such things, I think, Simmias, all true lovers of wisdom must
+both think and say to one another. Does it not seem so to you?"</p>
+
+<p>"Most assuredly, Socrates."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec32" name=
+"phaedo_sec32">32</a>. "If this, then," said Socrates, "is true, my
+friend, there is great hope for one who arrives where I am going,
+there, if anywhere, to acquire that in perfection for the sake of
+which we have taken so much pains during our past life; so that the
+journey now appointed me is set out upon with good hope, and will
+be so by any other man who thinks that his mind has been, as it
+were, purified."</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"But does not purification consist in this, as was said in a
+former part of our discourse, in separating as much as possible the
+soul from the body, and in accustoming it to gather and collect
+itself by itself on all sides apart from the body, and to dwell, so
+far as it can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, delivered,
+as it were, from the shackles of the body?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec33" name=
+"phaedo_sec33">33</a>. "Is this, then, called death, this
+deliverance and separation of the soul from the body?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page94' id='page94'></a>Assuredly,"
+he answered.</p>
+
+<p>"But, as we affirmed, those who pursue philosophy rightly are
+especially and alone desirous to deliver it; and this is the very
+study of philosophers, the deliverance and separation of the soul
+from the body, is it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"It appears so."</p>
+
+<p>"Then, as I said at first, would it not be ridiculous for a man
+who has endeavored throughout his life to live as near as possible
+to death, then, when death arrives, to grieve? would not this be
+ridiculous?"</p>
+
+<p>"How should it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"In reality, then, Simmias," he continued, "those who pursue
+philosophy rightly, study to die; and to them, of all men, death is
+least formidable. Judge from this. Since they altogether hate the
+body and desire to keep the soul by itself, would it not be
+irrational if, when this comes to pass, they should be afraid and
+grieve, and not be glad to go to that place where, on their
+arrival, they may hope to obtain that which they longed for
+throughout life? But they longed for wisdom, and to be freed from
+association with that which they hated. <a class="sectionnumber"
+id="phaedo_sec34" name="phaedo_sec34">34</a>. Have many of their
+own accord wished to descend into Hades, on account of human
+objects of affection, their wives and sons, induced by this very
+hope of their seeing and being with those whom they have loved? and
+shall one who really loves wisdom, and firmly cherishes this very
+hope, that he shall nowhere else attain it in a manner worthy of
+the name, except in Hades, be grieved at dying, and not gladly go
+there? We must think that he would gladly go, my friend, if he be
+in truth a philosopher; for he will be firmly persuaded of this,
+that he will nowhere else than there attain wisdom in its purity;
+and if this be so, would it not be very irrational, as I just now
+said, if such a man were to be afraid of death?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page95' id='page95'></a>Very much
+so, by Jupiter!" he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec35" name=
+"phaedo_sec35">35</a>. "Would not this, then," he resumed, "be a
+sufficient proof to you with respect to a man whom you should see
+grieved when about to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom, but a
+lover of his body? And this same person is probably a lover of
+riches and a lover of honor, one or both of these."</p>
+
+<p>"It certainly is as you say," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Does not, then," he said, "that which is called fortitude,
+Simmias, eminently belong to philosophers?"</p>
+
+<p>"By all means," he answered.</p>
+
+<p>"And temperance, also, which even the multitude call temperance,
+and which consists in not being carried away by the passions, but
+in holding them in contempt, and keeping them in subjection, does
+not this belong to those only who most despise the body, and live
+in the study of philosophy?"</p>
+
+<p>"Necessarily so," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec36" name=
+"phaedo_sec36">36</a>. "For," he continued, "if you will consider
+the fortitude and temperance of others, they will appear to you to
+be absurd."</p>
+
+<p>"How so, Socrates?"</p>
+
+<p>"Do you know," he said, "that all others consider death among
+the great evils?"</p>
+
+<p>"They do indeed," he answered.</p>
+
+<p>"Then, do the brave among them endure death when they do endure
+it, through dread of greater evils?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is so."</p>
+
+<p>"All men, therefore, except philosophers, are brave through
+being afraid and fear; though it is absurd that any one should be
+brave through fear and cowardice."</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"But what, are not those among them who keep their <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page96' id='page96'></a>passions in subjection
+affected in the same way? and are they not temperate through a kind
+of intemperance? And although we may say, perhaps, that this is
+impossible, nevertheless the manner in which they are affected with
+respect to this silly temperance resembles this, for, fearing to be
+deprived of other pleasures, and desiring them, they abstain from
+some, being mastered by others. And though they call intemperance
+the being governed by pleasures, yet it happens to them that, by
+being mastered by some pleasures, they master others, and this is
+similar to what was just now said, that in a certain manner they
+become temperate through intemperance."</p>
+
+<p>"So it seems,"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec37" name=
+"phaedo_sec37">37</a>. "My dear Simmias, consider that this is not
+a right exchange for virtue, to barter pleasures for pleasures,
+pains for pains, fear for fear, and the greater for the lesser,
+like pieces of money, but that that alone is the right coin, for
+which we ought to barter all these things, wisdom, and for this and
+with this everything is in reality bought and sold Fortitude,
+temperance and justice, and, in a word true virtue, subsist with
+wisdom, whether pleasures and fears, and everything else of the
+kind, are present or absent, but when separated from wisdom and
+changed one for another, consider whether such virtue is not a mere
+outline and in reality servile, possessing neither soundness nor
+truth. But the really true virtue is a purification from all such
+things, and temperance, justice, fortitude and wisdom itself, are a
+kind of initiatory purification <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec38" name="phaedo_sec38">38</a>. And those who instituted
+the mysteries for us appear to have been by no means contemptible,
+but in reality to have intimated long since that whoever shall
+arrive in Hades unexpiated and uninitiated shall lie in mud, but he
+that arrives there purified and initiated shall dwell with the gods
+'For there are,' say those <a class='pagenumber' name='page97' id=
+'page97'></a>who preside at the mysteries, 'many wand-bearers, but
+few inspired'. These last, in my opinion, are no other than those
+who have pursued philosophy rightly that I might be of their
+number. I have to the utmost of my ability left no means untried,
+but have endeavored to the utmost of my power. But whether I have
+endeavored rightly, and have in any respect succeeded, on arriving
+there I shall know clearly, if it please God&mdash;very shortly, as
+it appears to me."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec39" name=
+"phaedo_sec39">39</a>. "Such, then, Simmias and Cebes," he added,
+"is the defense I make, for that I, on good grounds, do not repine
+or grieve at leaving you and my masters here, being persuaded that
+there, no less than here, I shall meet with good masters and
+friends. But to the multitude this is incredible If, however, I
+have succeeded better with you in my defense than I did with the
+Athenian judges, it is well."</p>
+
+<p>When Socrates had thus spoken, Cebes, taking up the discussion,
+said "Socrates, all the rest appears to me to be said rightly, but
+what you have said respecting the soul will occasion much
+incredulity in many from the apprehension that when it is separated
+from the body it no longer exists anywhere, but is destroyed and
+perishes on the very day in which a man dies, and that immediately
+it is separated and goes out from the body it is dispersed, and
+vanishes like breath or smoke, and is no longer anywhere, since if
+it remained anywhere united in itself, and freed from those evils
+which you have just now enumerated, there would be an abundant and
+good hope, Socrates, that what you say is true <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec40" name="phaedo_sec40">40</a>. But
+this probably needs no little persuasion and proof, that the soul
+of a man who dies exists, and possesses activity and
+intelligence."</p>
+
+<p>"You say truly, Cebes," said Socrates, "but what shall we do?
+Are you willing that we should converse on these points, whether
+such is probably the case or not?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page98' id='page98'></a>Indeed,"
+replied Cebes, "I should gladly hear your opinion on these
+matters."</p>
+
+<p>"I do not think," said Socrates, "that any one who should now
+hear us, even though he were a comic poet, would say that I am
+talking idly, or discoursing on subjects that do not concern me. If
+you please, then, we will examine into it. Let us consider it in
+this point of view, whether the souls of men who are dead exist in
+Hades, or not. This is an ancient saying, which we now call to
+mind, that souls departing hence exist there, and return hither
+again, and are produced from the dead. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec41" name="phaedo_sec41">41</a>. And if this is so, that
+the living are produced again from the dead, can there be any other
+consequence than that our souls are there? for surely they could
+not be produced again if they did not exist; and this would be
+sufficient proof that these things are so, if it should in reality
+be evident that the living are produced from no other source than
+the dead. But if this is not the case, there will be need of other
+arguments."</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"You must not, then," he continued, "consider this only with
+respect to men, if you wish to ascertain it with greater certainty,
+but also with respect to all animals and plants, and, in a word,
+with respect to every thing that is subject to generation. Let us
+see whether they are not all so produced, no otherwise than
+contraries from contraries, wherever they have any such quality;
+as, for instance, the honorable is contrary to the base, and the
+just to the unjust, and so with ten thousand other things. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec42" name="phaedo_sec42">42</a>.
+Let us consider this, then, whether it is necessary that all things
+which have a contrary should be produced from nothing else than
+their contrary. As, for instance, when any thing becomes greater,
+is it not necessary that, from being previously smaller, it
+afterward became greater?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page99' id='page99'></a>Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"And if it becomes smaller, will it not, from being previously
+greater, afterward become smaller?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is so," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"And from stronger, weaker? and from slower, swifter?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then? If any thing becomes worse, must it not become so
+from better? and if more just, from more unjust?"</p>
+
+<p>"How should it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"We have then," he said, "sufficiently determined this, that all
+things are thus produced, contraries from contraries?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"What next? Is there also something of this kind in them; for
+instance, between all two contraries a mutual twofold production,
+from one to the other, and from that other back again? for between
+a greater thing and a smaller there are increase and decrease, and
+do we not accordingly call the one to increase, the other to
+decrease?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec43" name=
+"phaedo_sec43">43</a>. "And must not to be separated and
+commingled, to grow cold and to grow warm, and every thing in the
+same manner, even though sometimes we have not names to designate
+them, yet in fact be everywhere thus circumstanced, of necessity,
+as to be produced from each other, and be subject to a reciprocal
+generation?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"What, then?" said Socrates, "has life any contrary, as waking
+has its contrary, sleeping?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he answered.</p>
+
+<p>"What?"</p>
+
+<p>"Death," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page100' id='page100'></a>Are not
+these, then, produced from each other, since they are contraries;
+and are not the modes by which they are produced two-fold
+intervening between these two?"</p>
+
+<p>"How should it be otherwise?"</p>
+
+<p>"I then," continued Socrates, "will describe to you one pair of
+the contraries which I have just now mentioned, both what it is and
+its mode of production: and do you describe to me the other. I say
+that one is to sleep, the other to awake; and from sleeping awaking
+is produced, and from awaking sleeping, and that the modes of their
+production are, the one to fall asleep, the other to be roused. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec44" name="phaedo_sec44">44</a>.
+Have I sufficiently explained this to you or not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Do you, then," he said, "describe to me in the same manner with
+respect to life and death? Do you not say that life is contrary to
+death?"</p>
+
+<p>"I do."</p>
+
+<p>"And that they are produced from each other?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then, is produced from life?"</p>
+
+<p>"Death," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"What, then," said he "is produced from death?"</p>
+
+<p>"I must needs confess," he replied, "that life is."</p>
+
+<p>"From the dead, then, O Cebes! living things and living men are
+produced."</p>
+
+<p>"It appears so," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"Our souls, therefore," said Socrates, "exist in Hades."</p>
+
+<p>"So it seems."</p>
+
+<p>"With respect, then, to their mode of production, is not one of
+them very clear? for to die surely is clear, is it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"What, then, shall we do?" he continued; "shall we not <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page101' id='page101'></a>find a corresponding
+contrary mode of production, or will nature be defective in this?
+Or must we discover a contrary mode of production to dying?"</p>
+
+<p>"By all means," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"What is this?"</p>
+
+<p>"To revive."</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore," he proceeded, "if there is such a thing as to
+revive, will not this reviving be a mode of production from the
+dead to the living?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Thus, then, we have agreed that the living are produced from
+the dead, no less than the dead from the living; but, this being
+the case, there appears to me sufficient proof that the souls of
+the dead must necessarily exist somewhere, from whence they are
+again produced."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec45" name=
+"phaedo_sec45">45</a>. "It appears to me, Socrates," he said "that
+this must necessarily follow from what has been admitted."</p>
+
+<p>"See now, O Cebes!" he said, "that we have not agreed on these
+things improperly, as it appears to me; for if one class of things
+were not constantly given back in the place of another, revolving,
+as it were, in a circle, but generation were direct from one thing
+alone into its opposite, and did not turn round again to the other,
+or retrace its course, do you know that all things would at length
+have the same form, be in the same state, and cease to be
+produced?"</p>
+
+<p>"How say you?" he asked.</p>
+
+<p>"It is by no means difficult," he replied, "to understand what I
+mean; if, for instance, there should be such a thing as falling
+asleep, but no reciprocal waking again produced from a state of
+sleep, you know that at length all things would show the fable of
+Endymion to be a jest, and it would be thought nothing at all of,
+because everything else would be in the same state as
+he&mdash;namely, asleep. And if all <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page102' id='page102'></a>things were mingled together, but never
+separated, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be verified, 'all
+things would be together.' <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec46" name="phaedo_sec46">46</a>. Likewise, my dear Cebes,
+if all things that partake of life should die, and after they are
+dead should remain in this state of death, and not revive again,
+would it not necessarily follow that at length all things should be
+dead, and nothing alive? For if living beings are produced from
+other things, and living beings die, what could prevent their being
+all absorbed in death?"</p>
+
+<p>"Nothing whatever, I think, Socrates," replied Cebes; "but you
+appear to me to speak the exact truth."</p>
+
+<p>"For, Cebes," he continued, "as it seems to me, such undoubtedly
+is the case, and we have not admitted these things under a
+delusion, for it is in reality true that there is a reviving again,
+that the living are produced from the dead, that the souls of the
+dead exist, and that the condition of the good is better, and of
+the evil worse."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec47" name=
+"phaedo_sec47">47</a>. "And, indeed," said Cebes, interrupting him,
+"according to that doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently in
+the habit of advancing, if it is true, that our learning is nothing
+else than reminiscence, according to this it is surely necessary
+that we must at some former time have learned what we now remember.
+But this is impossible, unless our soul existed somewhere before it
+came into this human form; so that from hence, also, the soul
+appears to be something immortal."</p>
+
+<p>"But, Cebes," said Simmias, interrupting him, "what proofs are
+there of these things? Remind me of them, for I do not very well
+remember them at present."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec48" name=
+"phaedo_sec48">48</a>. "It is proved," said Cebes, "by one
+argument, and that a most beautiful one, that men, when questioned
+(if one questions them properly) of themselves, describe all things
+as they are, however, if they had not innate knowledge and <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page103' id='page103'></a>right reason,
+they would never be able to do this. Moreover, if one leads them to
+diagrams, or any thing else of the kind, it is then most clearly
+apparent that this is the case."</p>
+
+<p>"But if you are not persuaded in this way, Simmias," said
+Socrates, "see if you will agree with us in considering the matter
+thus. For do you doubt how that which is called learning is
+reminiscence?"</p>
+
+<p>"I do not doubt," said Simmias; "but I require this very thing
+of which we are speaking, to be reminded; and, indeed, from what
+Cebes has begun to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded;
+nevertheless, however, I should like to hear now how you would
+attempt to prove it."</p>
+
+<p>"I do it thus" he replied: "we admit, surely, that if any one be
+reminded of any thing, he must needs have known that thing at some
+time or other before."</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he said.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec49" name=
+"phaedo_sec49">49</a>. "Do we, then, admit this also, that when
+knowledge comes in a certain manner it is reminiscence? But the
+manner I mean is this: if any one, upon seeing or hearing, or
+perceiving through the medium of any other sense, some particular
+thing, should not only know that, but also form an idea of
+something else, of which the knowledge is not the same, but
+different, should we not justly say that he remembered that of
+which he received the idea?"</p>
+
+<p>"How mean you?"</p>
+
+<p>"For instance, the knowledge of a man is different from that of
+a lyre."</p>
+
+<p>"How not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Do you not know, then, that lovers when they see a lyre, or a
+garment, or any thing else which their favorite is accustomed to
+use, are thus affected; they both recognize the lyre, and receive
+in their minds the form of the person to whom the lyre belonged?
+This is reminiscence: just as any <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page104' id='page104'></a>one, seeing Simmias, is often reminded
+of Cebes, and so in an infinite number of similar instances."</p>
+
+<p>"An infinite number, indeed, by Jupiter!" said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"Is not, then," he said, "something of this sort a kind of
+reminiscence, especially when one is thus affected with respect to
+things which, from lapse of time, and not thinking of them, one has
+now forgotten?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec50" name=
+"phaedo_sec50">50</a>. "But what?" he continued. "Does it happen
+that when one sees a painted horse or a painted lyre one is
+reminded of a man, and that when one sees a picture of Simmias one
+is reminded of Cebes?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"And does it not also happen that on seeing a picture of Simmias
+one is reminded of Simmias himself?"</p>
+
+<p>"It does, indeed," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that
+reminiscence arises partly from things like, and partly from things
+unlike?"</p>
+
+<p>"It does."</p>
+
+<p>"But when one is reminded by things like, is it not necessary
+that one should be thus further affected, so as to perceive
+whether, as regards likeness, this falls short or not of the thing
+of which one has been reminded?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is necessary," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Consider, then," said Socrates, "if the case is thus. Do we
+allow that there is such a thing as equality? I do not mean of one
+log with another, nor one stone with another, nor any thing else of
+this kind, but something altogether different from all
+these&mdash;abstract equality; do we allow that there is any such
+thing, or not?"</p>
+
+<p>"By Jupiter! we most assuredly do allow it," replied
+Simmias.</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page105' id='page105'></a><a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec51" name="phaedo_sec51">51</a>. "And
+do we know what it is itself?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? Is it not from the
+things we have just now mentioned, and that from seeing logs, or
+stones, or other things of the kind, equal, we have from these
+formed an idea of that which is different from these&mdash;for does
+it not appear to you to be different? Consider the matter thus. Do
+not stones that are equal, and logs sometimes that are the same,
+appear at one time equal, and at another not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"But what? Does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? or
+equality inequality?"</p>
+
+<p>"Never, Socrates, at any time."</p>
+
+<p>"These equal things, then," he said, "and abstract equality, are
+not the same?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means, Socrates, as it appears."</p>
+
+<p>"However, from these equal things," he said, "which are
+different from that abstract equality, have you not formed your
+idea and derived your knowledge of it?"</p>
+
+<p>"You speak most truly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Is it not, therefore, from its being like or unlike them?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"But it makes no difference," he said. "When, therefore, on
+seeing one thing, you form, from the sight of it, the notion of
+another, whether like or unlike, this," he said, "must necessarily
+be reminiscence."</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec52" name=
+"phaedo_sec52">52</a>. "What, then, as to this?" he continued. "Are
+we affected in any such way with regard to logs and the equal
+things we have just now spoken of? And do they appear to us to be
+equal in the same manner as abstract equality itself <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page106' id='page106'></a>is, or do they fall
+short in some degree, or not at all, of being such as equality
+itself is?"</p>
+
+<p>"They fall far short," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Do we admit, then, that when one, on beholding some particular
+thing, perceives that it aims, as that which I now see, at being
+like something else that exists, but falls short of it, and can not
+become such as that is, but is inferior to it&mdash;do we admit
+that he who perceives this must necessarily have had a previous
+knowledge of that which he says it resembles, though
+imperfectly?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is necessary."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then? Are we affected in some such way, or not, with
+respect to things equal and abstract equality itself?"</p>
+
+<p>"Assuredly."</p>
+
+<p>"It is necessary, therefore, that we must have known abstract
+equality before the time when, on first seeing equal things, we
+perceived that they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in
+doing so."</p>
+
+<p>"Such is the case."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec53" name=
+"phaedo_sec53">53</a>. "Moreover, we admit this too, that we
+perceived this, and could not possibly perceive it by any other
+means than the sight, or touch, or some other of the senses, for I
+say the same of them all."</p>
+
+<p>"For they are the same, Socrates, so far as, our argument is
+concerned."</p>
+
+<p>"However, we must perceive, by means of the senses, that all
+things which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality,
+and yet fall short of it; or how shall we say it is?"</p>
+
+<p>"Even so."</p>
+
+<p>"Before, then, we began to see, and hear, and use our other
+senses, we must have had a knowledge of equality itself&mdash;what
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page107' id='page107'></a>it is, if we
+were to refer to it those equal things that come under the senses,
+and observe that all such things aim at resembling that, but fall
+far short of it."</p>
+
+<p>"This necessarily follows, Socrates, from what has been already
+said."</p>
+
+<p>"But did we not, as soon as we were born, see and hear, and
+possess our other senses?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"But, we have said, before we possessed these, we must have had
+a knowledge of abstract equality?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"We must have had it, then, as it seems, before we were
+born."</p>
+
+<p>"It seems so."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec54" name=
+"phaedo_sec54">54</a>. "If, therefore, having this before we were
+born, we were born possessing it, we knew, both before we were born
+and as soon as we were born, not only the equal and the greater and
+smaller, but all things of the kind; for our present discussion is
+not more respecting equality than the beautiful itself, the good,
+the just, and the holy, and, in one word, respecting every thing
+which we mark with the seal of existence, both in the questions we
+ask and the answers we give. So that we must necessarily have had a
+knowledge of all these before we were born."</p>
+
+<p>"Such is the case."</p>
+
+<p>"And if, having once had it, we did not constantly forget it, we
+should always be born with this knowledge, and should always retain
+it through life. For to know is this, when one has got a knowledge
+of any thing, to retain and not lose it; for do we not call this
+oblivion, Simmias, the loss of knowledge?"</p>
+
+<p>"Assuredly, Socrates," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec55" name=
+"phaedo_sec55">55</a>. "But if, having had it before we were born,
+we lose <a class='pagenumber' name='page108' id='page108'></a>it at
+our birth, and afterward, through exercising the senses about these
+things, we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed,
+would not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own
+knowledge? And in saying that this is to remember, should we not
+say rightly?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"For this appeared to be possible, for one having perceived any
+thing, either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense,
+to form an idea of something different from this, which he had
+forgotten, and with which this was connected by being unlike or
+like. So that, as I said, one of these two things must follow:
+either we are all born with this knowledge, and we retain it
+through life, or those whom we say learn afterward do nothing else
+than remember, and this learning will be reminiscence."</p>
+
+<p>"Such, certainly, is the case, Socrates."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec56" name=
+"phaedo_sec56">56</a>. "Which, then, do you choose, Simmias: that
+we are born with knowledge, or that we afterward remember what we
+had formerly known?"</p>
+
+<p>"At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose."</p>
+
+<p>"But what? Are you able to choose in this case, and what do you
+think about it? Can a man who possesses knowledge give a reason for
+the things that he knows, or not?"</p>
+
+<p>"He needs must be able to do so, Socrates," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"And do all men appear to you to be able to give a reason for
+the things of which we have just now been speaking?"</p>
+
+<p>"I wish they could," said Simmias; "but I am much more afraid
+that at this time to-morrow there will no longer be any one able to
+do this properly."</p>
+
+<p>"Do not all men, then, Simmias," he said, "seem to you to know
+these things?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page109' id='page109'></a>By no
+means."</p>
+
+<p>"Do they remember, then, what they once learned?"</p>
+
+<p>"Necessarily so."</p>
+
+<p>"When did our souls receive this knowledge? Not surely, since we
+were born into the world."</p>
+
+<p>"Assuredly not."</p>
+
+<p>"Before, then?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"Our souls, therefore, Simmias, existed before they were in a
+human form, separate from bodies, and possessed intelligence."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec57" name=
+"phaedo_sec57">57</a>. "Unless, Socrates, we receive this knowledge
+at our birth, for this period yet remains."</p>
+
+<p>"Be it so, my friend. But at what other time do we lose it? for
+we are not born with it, as we have just now admitted. Do we lose
+it, then, at the very time in which we receive it? Or can you
+mention any other time?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means, Socrates; I was not aware that I was saying
+nothing to the purpose."</p>
+
+<p>"Does the case then stand thus with us, Simmias?" he proceeded:
+"If those things which we are continually talking about really
+exist, the beautiful, the good, and every such essence, and to this
+we refer all things that come under the senses, as finding it to
+have a prior existence, and to be our own, and if we compare these
+things to it, it necessarily follows, that as these exist, so
+likewise our soul exists even before we are born; but if these do
+not exist, this discussion will have been undertaken in vain, is it
+not so? And is there not an equal necessity both that these things
+should exist, and our souls also, before we are born; and if not
+the former, neither the latter?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec58" name=
+"phaedo_sec58">58</a>. "Most assuredly, Socrates," said Simmias,
+"there appears to me to be the same necessity; and the argument <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page110' id='page110'></a>admirably tends
+to prove that our souls exist before we are born, just as that
+essence does which you have now mentioned. For I hold nothing so
+clear to me as this, that all such things most certainly exist, as
+the beautiful, the good, and all the rest that you just now spoke
+of; and, so far as I am concerned, the case is sufficiently
+demonstrated."</p>
+
+<p>"But how does it appear to Cebes?" said Socrates; "for it is
+necessary to persuade Cebes too."</p>
+
+<p>"He is sufficiently persuaded, I think," said Simmias, "although
+he is the most pertinacious of men in distrusting arguments. Yet I
+think he is sufficiently persuaded of this, that our soul existed
+before we were born. But whether, when we are dead, it will still
+exist does not appear to me to have been demonstrated, Socrates,"
+he continued; "but that popular doubt, which Cebes just now
+mentioned, still stands in our way, whether, when a man dies, the
+soul is not dispersed, and this is the end of its existence. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec59" name="phaedo_sec59">59</a>.
+For what hinders it being born, and formed from some other source,
+and existing before it came into a human body, and yet, when it has
+come, and is separated from this body, its then also dying itself,
+and being destroyed?"</p>
+
+<p>"You say well, Simmias," said Cebes; "for it appears that only
+one half of what is necessary has been demonstrated&mdash;namely,
+that our soul existed before we were born; but it is necessary to
+demonstrate further, that when we are dead it will exist no less
+than before we were born, if the demonstration is to be made
+complete."</p>
+
+<p>"This has been even now demonstrated, Simmias and Cebes," said
+Socrates, "if you will only connect this last argument with that
+which we before assented to, that every thing living is produced
+from that which is dead. For if the soul exists before, and it is
+necessary for it when it enters into life, and is born, to be
+produced from nothing else than <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page111' id='page111'></a>death, and from being dead, how is it
+not necessary for it also to exist after death, since it must needs
+be produced again? <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec60" name=
+"phaedo_sec60">60</a>. What you require, then, has been already
+demonstrated. However, both you and Simmias appear to me as if you
+wished to sift this argument more thoroughly, and to be afraid,
+like children, lest, on the soul's departure from the body, the
+winds should blow it away and disperse it, especially if one should
+happen to die, not in a calm, but in a violent storm."</p>
+
+<p>Upon this Cebes, smiling, said, "Endeavor to teach us better,
+Socrates, as if we were afraid, or rather not as if we were afraid,
+though perhaps there is some boy<a id="footnotetag30" name=
+"footnotetag30" href="#footnote30"><sup>30</sup></a> within us who
+has such a dread. Let us, then, endeavor to persuade him not to be
+afraid of death, as of hobgoblins."</p>
+
+<p>"But you must charm him every day," said Socrates, "until you
+have quieted his fears."</p>
+
+<p>"But whence, Socrates," he said, "can we procure a skillful
+charmer for such a case, now that you are about to leave us?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec61" name=
+"phaedo_sec61">61</a>. "Greece is wide, Cebes," he replied, "and in
+it surely there are skillful men. There are also many barbarous
+nations, all of which you should search through, seeking such a
+charmer, sparing neither money nor toil, as there is nothing on
+which you can more seasonably spend your money. You should also
+seek for him among yourselves; for perhaps you could not easily
+find any more competent than yourselves to do this."</p>
+
+<p>"This shall be done," said Cebes; "but, if it is agreeable to
+you, let us return to the point from whence we digressed."</p>
+
+<p>"It will be agreeable to me, for how should it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"You say well," rejoined Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"We ought, then," said Socrates, "to ask ourselves some <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page112' id='page112'></a>such question as
+this: to what kind of thing it appertains to be thus
+affected&mdash;namely, to be dispersed&mdash;and for what we ought
+to fear, lest it should be so affected, and for what not. And after
+this we should consider which of the two the soul is, and in the
+result should either be confident or fearful for our soul."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak truly," said he.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec62" name=
+"phaedo_sec62">62</a>. "Does it not, then, appertain to that which
+is formed by composition, and is naturally compounded, to be thus
+affected, to be dissolved in the same manner as that in which it
+was compounded; and if there is any thing not compounded, does it
+not appertain to this alone, if to any thing, not to be thus
+affected?"</p>
+
+<p>"It appears to me to be so," said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"Is it not most probable, then, that things which are always the
+same, and in the same state, are uncompounded, but that things
+which are constantly changing, and are never in the same state, are
+compounded?"</p>
+
+<p>"To me it appears so."</p>
+
+<p>"Let us return, then," he said, "to the subjects on which we
+before discoursed. Whether is essence itself, of which we gave this
+account that it exists, both in our questions and answers, always
+the same, or does it sometimes change? Does equality itself, the
+beautiful itself, and each several thing which is, ever undergo any
+change, however small? Or does each of them which exists, being an
+unmixed essence by itself, continue always the same, and in the
+same state, and never undergo any variation at all under any
+circumstances?"</p>
+
+<p>"They must of necessity continue the same and in the same state,
+Socrates," said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec63" name=
+"phaedo_sec63">63</a>. "But what shall we say of the many beautiful
+things, such as men, horses, garments, or other things of the kind,
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page113' id='page113'></a>whether equal
+or beautiful, or of all things synonymous with them? Do they
+continue the same, or, quite contrary to the former, are they never
+at any time, so to say, the same, either with respect to themselves
+or one another?"</p>
+
+<p>"These, on the other hand," replied Cebes, "never continue the
+same."</p>
+
+<p>"These, then, you can touch, or see, or perceive by the other
+senses; but those that continue the same, you can not apprehend in
+any other way than by the exercise of thought; for such things are
+invisible, and are not seen?"</p>
+
+<p>"You say what is strictly true," replied Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec64" name=
+"phaedo_sec64">64</a>. "We may assume, then, if you please," he
+continued, "that there are two species of things; the one visible,
+the other invisible?"</p>
+
+<p>"We may," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"And the invisible always continuing the same, but the visible
+never the same?"</p>
+
+<p>"This, too," he said, "we may assume."</p>
+
+<p>"Come, then," he asked, "is there anything else belonging to us
+than, on the one hand, body, and, on the other, soul?"</p>
+
+<p>"Nothing else," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"To which species, then, shall we say the body is more like, and
+more nearly allied?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is clear to everyone," he said, "that it is to the
+visible."</p>
+
+<p>"But what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is not visible to men, Socrates," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"But we speak of things which are visible, or not so, to the
+nature of men; or to some other nature, think you?"</p>
+
+<p>"To that of men."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then, shall we say of the soul&mdash;that it is visible,
+or not visible?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page114' id='page114'></a>Not
+visible."</p>
+
+<p>"Is it, then, invisible?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"The soul, then, is more like the invisible than the body; and
+the body, the visible?"</p>
+
+<p>"It must needs be so, Socrates."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec65" name=
+"phaedo_sec65">65</a>. "And did we not, some time since, say this
+too, that the soul, when it employs the body to examine any thing,
+either by means of the sight or hearing, or any other sense (for to
+examine any thing by means of the body is to do so by the senses),
+is then drawn by the body to things that never continue the same,
+and wanders and is confused, and reels as if intoxicated, through
+coming into contact with things of this kind?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"But when it examines anything by itself, does it approach that
+which is pure, eternal, immortal, and unchangeable, and, as being
+allied to it, continue constantly with it, so long as it subsists
+by itself, and has the power, and does it cease from its wandering,
+and constantly continue the same with respect to those things,
+through coming into contact with things of this kind? And is this
+affection of the soul called wisdom?"</p>
+
+<p>"You speak," he said, "in every respect, well and truly,
+Socrates."</p>
+
+<p>"To which species of the two, then, both from what was before
+and now said, does the soul appear to you to be more like and more
+nearly allied?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec66" name=
+"phaedo_sec66">66</a>. "Every one, I think, would allow, Socrates,"
+he replied, "even the dullest person, from this method of
+reasoning, that the soul is in every respect more like that which
+continues constantly the same than that which does not so."</p>
+
+<p>"But what as to the body?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page115' id='page115'></a>It is
+more like the other."</p>
+
+<p>"Consider it also thus, that, when soul and body are together,
+nature enjoins the latter to be subservient and obey, the former to
+rule and exercise dominion. And, in this way, which of the two
+appears to you to be like the divine, and which the mortal? Does it
+not appear to you to be natural that the divine should rule and
+command, but the mortal obey and be subservient?"</p>
+
+<p>"To me it does so."</p>
+
+<p>"Which, then, does the soul resemble?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is clear, Socrates, that the soul resembles the divine; but
+the body, the mortal."</p>
+
+<p>"Consider, then, Cebes," said he, "whether, from all that has
+been said, these conclusions follow, that the soul is most like
+that which is divine, immortal, intelligent, uniform, indissoluble,
+and which always continues in the same state; but that the body, on
+the other hand, is most like that which is human, mortal,
+unintelligent, multiform, dissoluble, and which never continues in
+the same state. Can we say any thing against this, my dear Cebes,
+to show that it is not so?"</p>
+
+<p>"We can not."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec67" name=
+"phaedo_sec67">67</a>. "What, then? Since these things are so, does
+it not appertain to the body to be quickly dissolved, but to the
+soul, on the contrary, to be altogether indissoluble or nearly
+so?"</p>
+
+<p>"How not?"</p>
+
+<p>"You perceive, however," he said, "that when a man dies, the
+visible part of him, the body, which is exposed to sight, and which
+we call a corpse, to which it appertains to be dissolved, to fall
+asunder and be dispersed, does not immediately undergo any of these
+affections, but remains for a considerable time, and especially so
+if any one should die <a class='pagenumber' name='page116' id=
+'page116'></a>with his body in full vigor, and at a corresponding
+age;<a id="footnotetag31" name="footnotetag31" href=
+"#footnote31"><sup>31</sup></a> for when the body has collapsed and
+been embalmed, as those that are embalmed in Egypt, it remains
+almost entire for an incredible length of time; and some parts of
+the body, even though it does decay, such as the bones and nerves,
+and every thing of that kind, are, nevertheless, as one may say,
+immortal. Is it not so?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec68" name=
+"phaedo_sec68">68</a>. "Can the soul, then, which is invisible, and
+which goes to another place like itself, excellent, pure and
+invisible, and therefore truly called the invisible world,<a id=
+"footnotetag32" name="footnotetag32" href=
+"#footnote32"><sup>32</sup></a> to the presence of a good and wise
+God (whither, if God will, my soul also must shortly go)&mdash;can
+this soul of ours, I ask, being such and of such a nature, when
+separated from the body, be immediately dispersed and destroyed, as
+most men assert? Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias. But the
+case is much rather thus: if it is separated in a pure state,
+taking nothing of the body with it, as not having willingly
+communicated with it in the present life, but having shunned it,
+and gathered itself within itself, as constantly studying this (but
+this is nothing else than to pursue philosophy aright, and in
+reality to study how to die easily), would not this be to study how
+to die?"</p>
+
+<p>"Most assuredly."</p>
+
+<p>"Does not the soul, then, when in this state, depart to that
+which resembles itself, the invisible, the divine, immortal and
+wise? And on its arrival there, is it not its lot to be happy, free
+from error, ignorance, fears, wild passions, and all the other
+evils to which human nature is subject; <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page117' id='page117'></a>and, as is said of the initiated, does
+it not in truth pass the rest of its time with the gods? Must we
+affirm that it is so, Cebes, or otherwise?"</p>
+
+<p>"So, by Jupiter!" said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec69" name=
+"phaedo_sec69">69</a>. "But, I think, if it departs from the body
+polluted and impure, as having constantly held communion with the
+body, and having served and loved it, and been bewitched by it,
+through desires and pleasures, so as to think that there is nothing
+real except what is corporeal, which one can touch and see, and
+drink and eat, and employ for sensual purposes; but what is dark
+and invisible to the eyes, which is intellectual and apprehended by
+philosophy, having been accustomed to hate, fear, and shun this, do
+you think that a soul thus affected can depart from the body by
+itself, and uncontaminated?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means whatever," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"But I think it will be impressed with that which is corporeal,
+which the intercourse and communion of the body, through constant
+association and great attention, have made natural to it."</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"We must think, my dear Cebes, that this is ponderous and heavy,
+earthly and visible, by possessing which such a soul is weighed
+down, and drawn again into the visible world through dread of the
+invisible and of Hades, wandering, as it is said, among monuments
+and tombs, about which, indeed, certain shadowy phantoms of souls
+have been seen, being such images as those souls produced which
+have not departed pure from the body, but which partake of the
+visible; on which account, also, they are visible."</p>
+
+<p>"That is probable, Socrates."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec70" name=
+"phaedo_sec70">70</a>. "Probable indeed, Cebes; and not that these
+are the souls of the good, but of the wicked, which are compelled
+<a class='pagenumber' name='page118' id='page118'></a>to wander
+about such places, paying the penalty of their former conduct,
+which was evil; and they wander about so long until, through the
+desire of the corporeal nature that accompanies them, they are
+again united to a body; and they are united, as is probable, to
+animals having the same habits as those they have given themselves
+up to during life."</p>
+
+<p>"But what do you say these are, Socrates?"</p>
+
+<p>"For instance, those who have given themselves up to gluttony,
+wantonness and drinking, and have put no restraint on themselves,
+will probably be clothed in the form of asses and brutes of that
+kind. Do you not think so?"</p>
+
+<p>"You say what is very probable."</p>
+
+<p>"And that such as have set great value on injustice, tyranny and
+rapine, will be clothed in the species of wolves, hawks and kites!
+Where else can we say such souls go?"</p>
+
+<p>"Without doubt," said Cebes, "into such as these."</p>
+
+<p>"Is it not, then, evident," he continued, "as to the rest,
+whither each will go, according to the resemblances of their
+several pursuits?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec71" name=
+"phaedo_sec71">71</a>. "It is evident," he replied. "How not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Of these, then," he said, "are not they the most happy, and do
+they not go to the best place, who have practiced that social and
+civilized virtue which they call temperance and justice, and which
+is produced from habit and exercise, without philosophy and
+reflection?"</p>
+
+<p>"In what respect are these the most happy?"</p>
+
+<p>"Because it is probable that these should again migrate into a
+corresponding civilized and peaceable kind of animals, such as bees
+perhaps, or wasps, or ants, or even into the same human species
+again, and from these become moderate men."</p>
+
+<p>"It is probable."</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page119' id='page119'></a>But it is
+not lawful for any one who has not studied philosophy, and departed
+this life perfectly pure, to pass into the rank of gods, but only
+for the true lover of wisdom. And on this account, my friends
+Simmias and Cebes, those who philosophize rightly, abstain from all
+bodily desires, and persevere in doing so, and do not give
+themselves up to them, not fearing the loss of property and
+poverty, as the generality of men and the lovers of wealth; nor,
+again, dreading disgrace and ignominy, like those who are lovers of
+power and honor, do they then abstain from them."</p>
+
+<p>"For it would not become them to do so, Socrates," says
+Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec72" name=
+"phaedo_sec72">72</a>. "It would not, by Jupiter!" he rejoined.
+"Wherefore, Cebes, they who care at all for their soul, and do not
+spend their lives in the culture of their bodies, despising all
+these, proceed not in the same way with them, as being ignorant
+whither they are going, but, being convinced that they ought not to
+act contrary to philosophy, but in accordance with the freedom and
+purification she affords, they give themselves up to her direction,
+following her wherever she leads."</p>
+
+<p>"How, Socrates?"</p>
+
+<p>"I will tell you," he replied. "The lovers of wisdom know that
+philosophy, receiving their soul plainly bound and glued to the
+body, and compelled to view things through this, as through a
+prison, and not directly by herself, and sunk in utter ignorance,
+and perceiving, too, the strength of the prison, that it arises
+from desire, so that he who is bound as much as possible assists in
+binding himself. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec73" name=
+"phaedo_sec73">73</a>. I say, then, the lovers of wisdom know that
+philosophy, receiving their soul in this state, gently exhorts it,
+and endeavors to free it, by showing that the view of things by
+means of the eyes is full of deception, as also is that through the
+ears and the <a class='pagenumber' name='page120' id=
+'page120'></a>other senses; persuading an abandonment of these so
+far as it is not absolutely necessary to use them, and advising the
+soul to be collected and concentrated within itself, and to believe
+nothing else than herself, with respect to what she herself
+understands of things that have a real subsistence; and to consider
+nothing true which she views through the medium of others, and
+which differ under different aspects;<a id="footnotetag33" name=
+"footnotetag33" href="#footnote33"><sup>33</sup></a> for that a
+thing of this kind is sensible and visible, but that what she
+herself perceives is intelligible and invisible. The soul of the
+true philosopher, therefore, thinking that she ought not to oppose
+this deliverance, accordingly abstains as much as possible from
+pleasures and desires, griefs and fears, considering that when any
+one is exceedingly delighted or alarmed, grieved or influenced by
+desire, he does not merely suffer such evil from these things as
+one might suppose, such as either being sick or wasting his
+property through indulging his desires; but that which is the
+greatest evil, and the worst of all, this he suffers, and is not
+conscious of it."</p>
+
+<p>"But what is this evil, Socrates?" said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec74" name=
+"phaedo_sec74">74</a>. "That the soul of every man is compelled to
+be either vehemently delighted or grieved about some particular
+thing, and, at the same time, to consider that the thing about
+which it is thus strongly affected is most real and most true,
+though it is not so. But these are chiefly visible objects, are
+they not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"In this state of affection, then, is not the soul especially
+shackled by the body?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page121' id='page121'></a>How
+so?"</p>
+
+<p>"Because each pleasure and pain, having a nail, as it were,
+nails the soul to the body, and fastens it to it, and causes it to
+become corporeal, deeming those things to be true whatever the body
+asserts to be so. For, in consequence of its forming the same
+opinions with the body, and delighting in the same things, it is
+compelled, I think, to possess similar manners, and to be similarly
+nourished; so that it can never pass into Hades in a pure state,
+but must ever depart polluted by the body, and so quickly falls
+again into another body, and grows up as if it were sown, and
+consequently is deprived of all association with that which is
+divine, and pure, and uniform."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak most truly, Socrates," said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec75" name=
+"phaedo_sec75">75</a>. "For these reasons, therefore, Cebes, those
+who are truly lovers of wisdom are moderate and resolute, and not
+for the reasons that most people say. Do you think as they do?"</p>
+
+<p>"Assuredly not."</p>
+
+<p>"No, truly. But the soul of a philosopher would reason thus, and
+would not think that philosophy ought to set it free, and that when
+it is freed it should give itself up again to pleasures and pains,
+to bind it down again, and make her work void, weaving a kind of
+Penelope's web the reverse way. On the contrary, effecting a calm
+of the passions, and following the guidance of reason, and being
+always intent on this, contemplating that which is true and divine,
+and not subject to opinion; and being nourished by it, it thinks
+that it ought to live in this manner as long as it does live, and
+that when it dies it shall go to a kindred essence, and one like
+itself, and shall be free from human evils. From such a regimen as
+this the soul has no occasion to fear, Simmias and Cebes, while it
+strictly attends to these things, lest, <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page122' id='page122'></a>being torn to pieces at its departure
+from the body, it should be blown about and dissipated by the
+winds, and no longer have an existence anywhere."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec76" name=
+"phaedo_sec76">76</a>. When Socrates had thus spoken, a long
+silence ensued; and Socrates himself was pondering upon what had
+been said, as he appeared, and so did most of us; but Cebes and
+Simmias were conversing a little while with each other. At length
+Socrates, perceiving them, said, "What think you of what has been
+said? Does it appear to you to have been proved sufficiently? for
+many doubts and objections still remain if any one will examine
+them thoroughly. If, then, you are considering some other subject,
+I have nothing to say; but if you are doubting about this, do not
+hesitate both yourselves to speak and express your opinion, if it
+appears to you in any respect that it might have been argued
+better, and to call me in again to your assistance, if you think
+you can be at all benefited by my help."</p>
+
+<p>Upon this Simmias said, "Indeed, Socrates, I will tell you the
+truth: for some time each of us, being in doubt, has been urging
+and exhorting the other to question you, from a desire to hear our
+doubts solved; but we were afraid of giving you trouble, lest it
+should be disagreeable to you in your present circumstances."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec77" name=
+"phaedo_sec77">77</a>. But he, upon hearing this, gently smiled,
+and said, "Bless me, Simmias; with difficulty, indeed, could I
+persuade other men that I do not consider my present condition a
+calamity, since I am not able to persuade even you; but you are
+afraid lest I should be more morose now than during the former part
+of my life. And, as it seems, I appear to you to be inferior to
+swans with respect to divination, who, when they perceive that they
+must needs die, though they have been used to sing before, sing
+then more than ever, rejoicing that they are about to depart to
+that <a class='pagenumber' name='page123' id='page123'></a>deity
+whose servants they are. But men, through their own fear of death,
+belie the swans too, and say that they, lamenting their death, sing
+their last song through grief; and they do not consider that no
+bird sings when it is hungry or cold, or is afflicted with any
+other pain, not even the nightingale, or swallow, or the hoopoes,
+which, they say, sing lamenting through grief. But neither do these
+birds appear to me to sing through sorrow, nor yet do swans; but,
+in my opinion, belonging to Apollo, they are prophetic, and,
+foreseeing the blessings of Hades, they sing and rejoice on that
+day more excellently than at any preceding time. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec78" name="phaedo_sec78">78</a>. But
+I, too, consider myself to be a fellow-servant of the swans, and
+sacred to the same god; and that I have received the power of
+divination from our common master no less than they, and that I do
+not depart from this life with less spirits than they. On this
+account, therefore, it is right that you should both speak and ask
+whatever you please, so long as the Athenian Eleven permit."</p>
+
+<p>"You say well," said Simmias, "and both I will tell you what are
+my doubts, and he, in turn, how far he does not assent to what has
+been said. For it appears to me, Socrates, probably as it does to
+you with respect to these matters, that to know them clearly in the
+present life is either impossible or very difficult: on the other
+hand, however, not to test what has been said of them in every
+possible way, so as not to desist until, on examining them in every
+point of view, one has exhausted every effort, is the part of a
+very weak man. For we ought, with respect to these things, either
+to learn from others how they stand or to discover them for one's
+self; or, if both these are impossible, then, taking the best of
+human reasonings and that which is the most difficult to be
+confuted, and embarking on this, as one who risks himself on a
+raft, so to sail through life, unless <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page124' id='page124'></a>one could be carried more safely, and
+with less risk, on a surer conveyance, or some divine reason. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec79" name="phaedo_sec79">79</a>.
+I, therefore, shall not now be ashamed to question you, since you
+bid me do so, nor shall I blame myself hereafter for not having now
+told you what I think; for to me, Socrates, when I consider the
+matter, both with myself and with Cebes, what has been said does
+not appear to have been sufficiently proved."</p>
+
+<p>Then said Socrates, "Perhaps, my friend, you have the truth on
+your side; but tell me in what respect it was not sufficiently
+proved."</p>
+
+<p>"In this," he answered, "because any one might use the same
+argument with respect to harmony, and a lyre, and its chords, that
+harmony is something invisible and incorporeal, very beautiful and
+divine, in a well-modulated lyre; but the lyre and its chords are
+bodies, and of corporeal form, compounded and earthly, and akin to
+that which is mortal. When any one, then, has either broken the
+lyre, or cut or burst the chords, he might maintain from the same
+reasoning as yours that it is necessary the harmony should still
+exist and not be destroyed; for there could be no possibility that
+the lyre should subsist any longer when the chords are burst; and
+that the chords, which are of a mortal nature, should subsist, but
+that the harmony, which is of the same nature and akin to that
+which is divine and immortal, should become extinct, and perish
+before that which is mortal; but he might say that the harmony must
+needs subsist somewhere, and that the wood and chords must decay
+before it can undergo any change. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec80" name="phaedo_sec80">80</a>. For I think, Socrates,
+that you yourself have arrived at this conclusion, that we consider
+the soul to be pretty much of this kind&mdash;namely, that our body
+being compacted and held together by heat and cold, dryness and
+moisture, and other <a class='pagenumber' name='page125' id=
+'page125'></a>such qualities, our soul is the fusion and harmony of
+these, when they are well and duly combined with each other. If,
+then, the soul is a kind of harmony, it is evident that when our
+bodies are unduly relaxed or strained, through diseases and other
+maladies, the soul must, of necessity, immediately perish, although
+it is most divine, just as other harmonies which subsist in sounds
+or in the various works of artisans; but that the remains of the
+body of each person last for a long time, till they are either
+burned or decayed. Consider, then, what we shall say to this
+reasoning, if any one should maintain that the soul, being a fusion
+of the several qualities in the body, perishes first in that which
+is called death."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec81" name=
+"phaedo_sec81">81</a>. Socrates, therefore, looking steadfastly at
+us, as he was generally accustomed to do, and smiling, said,
+"Simmias indeed speaks justly. If, then, any one of you is more
+prompt than I am, why does he not answer, for he seems to have
+handled my argument not badly? It appears to me, however, that
+before we make our reply we should first hear from Cebes, what he,
+too, objects to our argument, in order that, some time intervening,
+we may consider what we shall say, and then when we have heard
+them, we may give up to them, if they appear to speak agreeably to
+truth; or, if not, we may then uphold our own argument. Come, then,
+Cebes," he continued, "say what it is that disturbs you, so as to
+cause your unbelief."</p>
+
+<p>"I will tell you," said Cebes; "the argument seems to me to rest
+where it was, and to be liable to the same objection that we
+mentioned before. For, that our soul existed even before It came
+into this present form, I do not deny has been very elegantly, and,
+if it is not too much to say so, very fully, demonstrated; but that
+it still exists anywhere when we are dead does not appear to me to
+have been clearly proved; nor do I give in to the objection of
+Simmias, that <a class='pagenumber' name='page126' id=
+'page126'></a>the soul is not stronger and more durable than the
+body, for it appears to me to excel very far all things of this
+kind. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec82" name=
+"phaedo_sec82">82</a>. 'Why, then,' reason might say, 'do you still
+disbelieve? for, since you see that when a man dies his weaker part
+still exists, does it not appear to you to be necessary that the
+more durable part should still be preserved during this period?'
+Consider, then, whether I say any thing to the purpose in reply to
+this. For I, too, as well as Simmias, as it seems, stand in need of
+an illustration; for the argument appears to me to have been put
+thus, as if any one should advance this argument about an aged
+weaver who had died, that the man has not yet perished, but perhaps
+still exists somewhere; and, as a proof, should exhibit the garment
+which he wore and had woven himself, that it is entire and has not
+perished; and if any one should disbelieve him, he would ask, which
+of the two is the more durable, the species of a man or of a
+garment, that is constantly in use and being worn; then, should any
+one answer that the species of man is much more durable, he would
+think it demonstrated that, beyond all question, the man is
+preserved, since that which is less durable has not perished. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec83" name="phaedo_sec83">83</a>.
+But I do not think, Simmias, that this is the case, and do you
+consider what I say, for every one must think that he who argues
+thus argues, foolishly. For this weaver, having worn and woven many
+such garments, perished after almost all of them, but before the
+last, I suppose; and yet it does not on this account follow any the
+more that a man is inferior to or weaker than a garment. And I
+think, the soul might admit this same illustration with respect to
+the body, and he who should say the same things concerning them
+would appear to me to speak correctly, that the soul is more
+durable, but the body weaker and less durable; for he would say
+that each soul wears out many bodies, especially <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page127' id='page127'></a>if it lives many
+years; for if the body wastes and is dissolved while the man still
+lives, but the soul continually weaves anew what is worn out, it
+must necessarily follow that when the soul is dissolved it must
+then have on its last garment, and perish before this alone; but
+when the soul has perished the body would show the weakness of its
+nature, and quickly rot and vanish. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec84" name="phaedo_sec84">84</a>. So that it is not by any
+means right to place implicit reliance on this argument, and to
+believe that when we die our soul still exists somewhere. For, if
+any one should concede to him who admits even more than you do, and
+should grant to him that not only did our soul exist before we were
+born, but that even when we die nothing hinders the souls of some
+of us from still existing, and continuing to exist hereafter, and
+from being often born, and dying again&mdash;for so strong is it by
+nature, that it can hold out against repeated births&mdash;if he
+granted this, he would not yet concede that it does not exhaust
+itself in its many births, and at length perish altogether in some
+one of the deaths. But he would say that no one knows this death
+and dissolution of the body, which brings destruction to the soul;
+for it is impossible for any one of us to perceive it. If, however,
+this be the case, it follows that every one who is confident at the
+approach of death is foolishly confident, unless he is able to
+prove that the soul is absolutely immortal and imperishable;
+otherwise it necessarily follows that he who is about to die must
+be alarmed for his soul, lest in its present disunion from the body
+it should entirely perish."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec85" name=
+"phaedo_sec85">85</a>. Upon this, all of us who had heard them
+speaking were disagreeably affected, as we afterward mentioned to
+each other; because, after we had been fully persuaded by the
+former arguments, they seemed to disturb us anew, and to cast us
+into a distrust, not only of the arguments already <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page128' id='page128'></a>adduced, but of such
+as might afterward be urged, for fear lest we should not be fit
+judges of anything, or lest the things themselves should be
+incredible.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Echec.</span> By the gods!
+Ph&aelig;do, I can readily excuse you; for, while I am now hearing
+you, it occurs to me to ask myself some such question as this: What
+arguments can we any longer believe? since the argument which
+Socrates advanced, and which was exceedingly credible, has now
+fallen into discredit. For this argument, that our soul is a kind
+of harmony, produces a wonderful impression on me, both now and
+always, and in being mentioned, it has reminded me, as it were,
+that I, too, was formerly of the same opinion; so that I stand in
+need again, as if from the very beginning, of some other argument
+which may persuade me that the soul of one who dies does not die
+with the body. Tell me, therefore, by Jupiter! how Socrates
+followed up the argument; and whether he, too, as you confess was
+the case with yourselves, seemed disconcerted at all, or not, but
+calmly maintained his position; and maintained it sufficiently or
+defectively. Relate everything to me as accurately as you can.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec86" name=
+"phaedo_sec86">86</a>. <span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span>
+Indeed, Echecrates, though I have often admired Socrates, I was
+never more delighted than at being with him on that occasion. That
+he should be able to say something is perhaps not at all
+surprising; but I especially admired this in him&mdash;first of
+all, that he listened to the argument of the young men so sweetly,
+affably, and approvingly; in the next place, that he so quickly
+perceived how we were affected by their arguments; and, lastly,
+that he cured us so well and recalled us, when we were put to
+flight, as it were, and vanquished, and encouraged us to accompany
+him, and consider the argument with him.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Echec.</span> How was that?</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page129' id='page129'></a><span
+class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> I will tell you: I happened
+to be sitting at his right hand, near the bed, upon a low seat, but
+he himself sat much higher than I. Stroking my head, then, and
+laying hold of the hair that hung on my neck&mdash;for he used,
+often, to play with my hairs&mdash;"To-morrow," he said, "perhaps,
+Ph&aelig;do, you will cut off these beautiful locks?"</p>
+
+<p>"It seems likely, Socrates," said I.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec87" name=
+"phaedo_sec87">87</a>. "Not if you are persuaded by me."</p>
+
+<p>"Why so?" I asked.</p>
+
+<p>"To-day," he replied, "both I ought to cut off mine and you
+yours, if our argument must die, and we are unable to revive it.
+And I, if I were you, and the arguments were to escape me, would
+take an oath, as the Argives do, not to suffer my hair to grow
+until I had renewed the contest, and vanquished the arguments of
+Simmias and Cebes."</p>
+
+<p>"But," I said, "even Hercules himself is said not to have been a
+match for two."</p>
+
+<p>"Call upon me, then," he said, "as your Iolaus, while it is yet
+day."</p>
+
+<p>"I do call on you, then," I said, "not as Hercules upon Iolaus,
+but as Iolaus upon Hercules."</p>
+
+<p>"It will make no difference," he replied. "But, first of all, we
+must beware lest we meet with some mischance."</p>
+
+<p>"What?" I asked.</p>
+
+<p>"That we do not become," he answered, "haters of reasoning, as
+some become haters of men; for no greater evil can happen to any
+one than to hate reasoning. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec88" name="phaedo_sec88">88</a>. But hatred of reasoning
+and hatred of mankind both spring from the same source. For hatred
+of mankind is produced in us from having placed too great reliance
+on some one without sufficient knowledge of him, and from having
+considered him to be a man altogether true, sincere, and faithful,
+and then, after a little while, finding him depraved and <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page130' id='page130'></a>unfaithful, and after
+him another. And when a man has often experienced this, and
+especially from those whom he considered his most intimate and best
+friends, at length, having frequently stumbled, he hates all men,
+and thinks that there is no soundness at all in any of them. Have
+you not perceived that this happens so?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," I replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Is it not a shame?" he said "And is it not evident that such a
+one attempts to deal with men without sufficient knowledge of human
+affairs? For if he had dealt with them with competent knowledge, as
+the case really is, so he would have considered that the good and
+the bad are each very few in number, and that those between both
+are most numerous."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec89" name=
+"phaedo_sec89">89</a>. "How say you?" I asked.</p>
+
+<p>"In the same manner," he replied, "as with things very little
+and very large Do you think that any thing is more rare than to
+find a very large on a very little man, or dog, or any thing else?
+and, again, swift or slow, beautiful or ugly, white or black? Do
+you not perceive that of all such things the extremes are rare and
+few, but that the intermediate are abundant and numerous?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," I replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Do you not think, then," he continued, "that if a contest in
+wickedness were proposed, even here very few would be found
+pre-eminent?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is probable," I said.</p>
+
+<p>"It is so," he said, "but in this respect reasonings do not
+resemble men, for I was just now following you as my leader, but in
+this they do resemble them, when any one believes in any argument
+as true without being skilled in the art of reasoning, and then
+shortly afterward it appears to him to be false, at one time being
+so and at another time <a class='pagenumber' name='page131' id=
+'page131'></a>not, and so on with one after another,<a id=
+"footnotetag34" name="footnotetag34" href=
+"#footnote34"><sup>34</sup></a> and especially they who devote
+themselves to controversial arguments, you are aware, at length
+think they have become very wise and have alone discovered that
+there is nothing sound and stable either in things or reasonings
+but that all things that exist, as is the case with the Euripus,
+are in a constant state of flux and reflux, and never continue in
+any one condition for any length of time."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak perfectly true," I said.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec90" name=
+"phaedo_sec90">90</a>. "Would it not, then, Ph&aelig;do" he said
+"be a sad thing if, when there is a true and sound reasoning, and
+such as one can understand, one should then, through lighting upon
+such arguments as appear to be at one time true and at another
+false, not blame one's self and one's own want of skill, but at
+length, through grief, should anxiously transfer the blame from
+one's self to the arguments, and thereupon pass the rest of one's
+life in hating and reviling arguments and so be depraved of the
+truth and knowledge of things that exist?"</p>
+
+<p>"By Jupiter!" I said, "it would be sad, indeed."</p>
+
+<p>"In the first place, then," he said, "let us beware of this, and
+let us not admit into our souls the notion that there appears to be
+nothing sound in reasoning, but much rather that we are not yet in
+a sound condition, and that we ought vigorously and strenuously to
+endeavor to become sound, you and the others, on account of your
+whole future life, but I, on account of my death, since I am in
+danger, at the <a class='pagenumber' name='page132' id=
+'page132'></a>present time, of not behaving as becomes a
+philosopher with respect to this very subject, but as a wrangler,
+like those who are utterly uninformed <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec91" name="phaedo_sec91">91</a>. For they, when they
+dispute about any thing, care nothing at all for the subject about
+which the discussion is, but are anxious about this, that what they
+have themselves advanced shall appear true to the persons present.
+And I seem to myself on the present occasion to differ from them
+only in this respect, for I shall not be anxious to make what I say
+appear true to those who are present, except that may happen by the
+way, but that it may appear certainly to be so to myself. For I
+thus reason, my dear friend, and observe how interestedly. If what
+I say be true, it is well to be persuaded of it, but if nothing
+remains to one that is dead, I shall, at least, during the interval
+before death be less disagreeable to those present by my
+lamentations. But this ignorance of mine will not continue long,
+for that would be bad, but will shortly be put an end to. Thus
+prepared, then, Simmias and Cebes," he continued, "I now proceed to
+my argument. Do you, however, if you will be persuaded by me, pay
+little attention to Socrates, but much more to the truth, and if I
+appear to you to say any thing true, assent to it, but if not,
+oppose me with all your might, taking good care that in my zeal I
+do not deceive both myself and you, and, like a bee, depart leaving
+my sting behind."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec92" name=
+"phaedo_sec92">92</a>. "But let us proceed," he said "First of all,
+remind me of what you said, if I should appear to have forgotten it
+For Simmias, as I think, is in doubt, and fears lest the soul,
+though more divine and beautiful than the body, should perish
+before it, as being a species of harmony. But Cebes appeared to me
+to grant me this, that the soul is more durable than the body, but
+he argued that it is uncertain to every one, whether when the soul
+has worn out many bodies <a class='pagenumber' name='page133' id=
+'page133'></a>and that repeatedly, it does not, on leaving the last
+body, itself also perish, so that this very thing is death, the
+destruction of the soul, since the body never ceases decaying Are
+not these the things, Simmias and Cebes, which we have to inquire
+into?"</p>
+
+<p>They both agreed that they were.</p>
+
+<p>"Whether, then," he continued "do you reject all our former
+arguments, or some of them only, and not others?"</p>
+
+<p>"Some we do," they replied, "and others not."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then," he proceeded, "do you say about that argument in
+which we asserted that knowledge is reminiscence, and that, this
+being the case, our soul must necessarily have existed somewhere
+before it was inclosed in the body?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec93" name=
+"phaedo_sec93">93</a>. "I, indeed," replied Cebes "was both then
+wonderfully persuaded by it, and now persist in it, as in no other
+argument."</p>
+
+<p>"And I, too," said Simmias, "am of the same mind, and should
+very much wonder if I should ever think otherwise on that
+point."</p>
+
+<p>"Then," Socrates said, "you must needs think otherwise, my
+Theban friend, if this opinion holds good, that harmony is
+something compounded, and that the soul is a kind of harmony that
+results from the parts compacted together in the body. For surely
+you will not allow yourself to say that harmony was composed prior
+to the things from which it required to be composed Would you allow
+this?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means, Socrates" he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Do you perceive, then," he said, "that this result from what
+you say, when you assert that the soul existed before it came into
+a human form and body, but that it was composed from things that
+did not yet exist? For harmony is not such as that to which you
+compare it, but first the <a class='pagenumber' name='page134' id=
+'page134'></a>lyre, and the chords, and the sounds yet
+unharmonized, exist, and, last of all, harmony is produced, and
+first perishes. How, then, will this argument accord with
+that?"</p>
+
+<p>"Not at all," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec94" name=
+"phaedo_sec94">94</a>. "And yet," he said, "if in any argument,
+there ought to be an accordance in one respecting harmony."</p>
+
+<p>"There ought," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"This of yours, however," he said, "is not in accordance.
+Consider, then, which of these two statements do you
+prefer&mdash;that knowledge is reminiscence, or the soul
+harmony?"</p>
+
+<p>"The former by far, Socrates," he replied; "for the latter
+occurred to me without demonstration, through a certain probability
+and speciousness whence most men derive their opinions. But I am
+well aware that arguments which draw their demonstrations from
+probabilities are idle; and, unless one is on one's guard against
+them, they are very deceptive, both in geometry and all other
+subjects. But the argument respecting reminiscence and knowledge
+may be said to have been demonstrated by a satisfactory hypothesis.
+For in this way it was said that our soul existed before it came
+into the body, because the essence that bears the appellation of
+'that which is' belongs to it. But of this, as I persuade myself, I
+am fully and rightly convinced. It is therefore necessary, as it
+seems, that I should neither allow myself nor any one else to
+maintain that the soul is harmony."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec95" name=
+"phaedo_sec95">95</a>. "But what, Simmias," said he, "if you
+consider it thus? Does it appear to you to appertain to harmony, or
+to any other composition, to subsist in any other way than the very
+things do of which it is composed?"</p>
+
+<p>"By no means."</p>
+
+<p>"And indeed, as I think, neither to do any thing, nor suffer any
+thing else, besides what they do or suffer."</p>
+
+<p><a class='pagenumber' name='page135' id='page135'></a>He
+agreed.</p>
+
+<p>"It does not, therefore, appertain to harmony to take the lead
+of the things of which it is composed, but to follow them."</p>
+
+<p>He assented.</p>
+
+<p>"It is, then, far from being the case that harmony is moved or
+sends forth sounds contrariwise, or is in any other respect opposed
+to its parts?"</p>
+
+<p>"Far, indeed," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"What, then? Is not every harmony naturally harmony, so far as
+it has been made to accord?"</p>
+
+<p>"I do not understand you," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Whether," he said, "if it should be in a greater degree and
+more fully made to accord, supposing that were possible, would the
+harmony be greater and more full; but if in a less degree and less
+fully, then would it be inferior and less full?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Is this, then, the case with the soul that, even in the
+smallest extent, one soul is more fully and in a greater degree, or
+less fully and in a less degree, this very thing, a soul, than
+another?"</p>
+
+<p>"In no respect whatever," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec96" name=
+"phaedo_sec96">96</a>. "Well, then," he said, "by Jupiter! is one
+soul said to possess intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and
+another folly and vice, and to be bad? and is this said with
+truth?"</p>
+
+<p>"With truth, certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Of those, then, who maintain that the soul is harmony, what
+will any one say that these things are in the soul, virtue and
+vice? Will he call them another kind of harmony and discord, and
+say that the one, the good soul, is harmonized, and, being harmony,
+contains within itself another <a class='pagenumber' name='page136'
+id='page136'></a>harmony, but that the other is discordant, and
+does not contain within itself another harmony?"</p>
+
+<p>"I am unable to say," replied Simmias; "but it is clear that he
+who maintains that opinion would say something of the kind."</p>
+
+<p>"But it has been already granted," said he, "that one soul is
+not more or less a soul than another; and this is an admission that
+one harmony is not to a greater degree or more fully, or to a less
+degree or less fully, a harmony, than another; is it not so?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"And that that which is neither more or less harmony is neither
+more nor less harmonized: is it so?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is."</p>
+
+<p>"But does that which is neither more or less harmonized partake
+of more or less harmony, or an equal amount?"</p>
+
+<p>"An equal amount."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec97" name=
+"phaedo_sec97">97</a>. "A soul, therefore, since it is not more or
+less this very thing, a soul, than another, is not more or less
+harmonized?"</p>
+
+<p>"Even so."</p>
+
+<p>"Such, then, being its condition, it can not partake of a
+greater degree of discord or harmony?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly not."</p>
+
+<p>"And, again, such being its condition, can one soul partake of a
+greater degree of vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord,
+and virtue harmony?"</p>
+
+<p>"It can not."</p>
+
+<p>"Or rather, surely, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul
+will partake of vice, if it is harmony; for doubtless harmony,
+which is perfectly such, can never partake of discord?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly not."</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page137' id='page137'></a>Neither,
+therefore, can a soul which is perfectly a soul partake of
+vice."</p>
+
+<p>"How can it, from what has been already said?"</p>
+
+<p>"From this reasoning, then, all souls of all animals will be
+equally good, if, at least, they are by nature equally this very
+thing, souls?"</p>
+
+<p>"It appears so to me, Socrates," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"And does it appear to you," he said, "to have been thus rightly
+argued, and that the argument would lead to this result, if the
+hypothesis were correct, that the soul is harmony?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec98" name=
+"phaedo_sec98">98</a>. "On no account whatever," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"But what," said he, "of all the things that are in man? Is
+there any thing else that you say bears rule except the soul,
+especially if it be wise?"</p>
+
+<p>"I should say not."</p>
+
+<p>"Whether by yielding to the passions in the body, or by opposing
+them? My meaning is this: for instance, when heat and thirst are
+present, by drawing it the contrary way, so as to hinder it from
+drinking; and when hunger is present, by hindering it from eating;
+and in ten thousand other instances we see the soul opposing the
+desires of the body. Do we not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"But have we not before allowed that if the soul were harmony,
+it would never utter a sound contrary to the tension, relaxation,
+vibration, or any other affection to which its component parts are
+subject, but would follow, and never govern them?"</p>
+
+<p>"We did allow it," he replied, "for how could we do
+otherwise?"</p>
+
+<p>"What, then? Does not the soul now appear to act quite the
+contrary, ruling over all the parts from which any one <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page138' id='page138'></a>might say it subsists,
+and resisting almost all of them through the whole of life, and
+exercising dominion over them in all manner of ways; punishing some
+more severely even with pain, both by gymnastics and medicine, and
+others more mildly; partly threatening, and partly admonishing the
+desires, angers and fears, as if, being itself of a different
+nature, it were conversing with something quite different? <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec99" name="phaedo_sec99">99</a>.
+Just as Homer has done in the Odyssey,<a id="footnotetag35" name=
+"footnotetag35" href="#footnote35"><sup>35</sup></a> where he
+speaks of Ulysses&mdash;'Having struck his breast, he chid his
+heart in the following words: Bear up, my heart; ere this thou hast
+borne far worse.' Do you think that he composed this in the belief
+that the soul was harmony, and capable of being led by the passions
+of the body, and not rather that it was able to lead and govern
+them, as being something much more divine than to be compared with
+harmony?"</p>
+
+<p>"By Jupiter! Socrates, it appears so to me."</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore, my excellent friend, it is on no account correct for
+us to say that the soul is a kind of harmony; for, as it appears,
+we should neither agree with Homer, that divine poet, nor with
+ourselves."</p>
+
+<p>"Such is the case," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Be it so, then," said Socrates, "we have already, as it seems,
+sufficiently appeased this Theban harmony. But how, Cebes, and by
+what arguments, shall we appease this Cadmus?"<a id="footnotetag36"
+name="footnotetag36" href="#footnote36"><sup>36</sup></a></p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec100" name=
+"phaedo_sec100">100</a>. "You appear to me," replied Cebes, "to be
+likely to find out; for you have made out this argument against
+harmony wonderfully beyond my expectation. For when Simmias <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page139' id='page139'></a>was saying what
+his doubts were, I wondered very much whether any one would be able
+to answer his reasoning. It, therefore, appeared to me
+unaccountable that he did not withstand the very first onset of
+your argument. I should not, therefore, be surprised if the
+arguments of Cadmus met with the same fate."</p>
+
+<p>"My good friend," said Socrates, "do not speak so boastfully,
+lest some envious power should overthrow the argument that is about
+to be urged. These things, however, will be cared for by the deity;
+but let us, meeting hand to hand, in the manner of Homer, try
+whether you say any thing to the purpose. This, then, is the sum of
+what you inquire you require it to be proved that our soul is
+imperishable and immortal; if a philosopher that is about to die,
+full of confidence and hope that after death he shall be far
+happier than if he had died after leading a different kind of life,
+shall not entertain this confidence foolishly and vainly. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec101" name="phaedo_sec101">101</a>.
+But to show that the soul is something strong and divine, and that
+it existed before we men were born, you say not at all hinders, but
+that all these things may evince, not its immortality, but that the
+soul is durable, and existed an immense space of time before, and
+knew and did many things. But that, for all this, it was not at all
+the more immortal, but that its very entrance into the body of a
+man was the beginning of its destruction, as if it were a disease;
+so that it passes through this life in wretchedness, and at last
+perishes in that which is called death. But you say that it is of
+no consequence whether it comes into a body once or often, with
+respect to our occasion of fear; for it is right he should be
+afraid, unless he is foolish, who does not know, and can not give a
+reason to prove, that the soul is immortal. Such, I think, Cebes,
+is the sum of what you say; and I purposely repeat it often, that
+nothing <a class='pagenumber' name='page140' id='page140'></a>may
+escape us, and, if you please, you may add to or take from it."</p>
+
+<p>Cebes replied, "I do not wish at present either to take from or
+add to it; that is what I mean."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec102" name=
+"phaedo_sec102">102</a>. Socrates, then having paused for some
+time, and considered something within himself, said, "You inquire
+into no easy matter, Cebes; for it is absolutely necessary to
+discuss the whole question of generation and corruption. If you
+please, then, I will relate to you what happened to me with
+reference to them; and afterward, if any thing that I shall say
+shall appear to you useful toward producing conviction on the
+subject you are now treating of, make use of it."</p>
+
+<p>"I do indeed wish it," replied Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"Hear my relation, then. When I was a young man, Cebes, I was
+wonderfully desirous of that wisdom which they call a history of
+nature; for it appeared to me to be a very sublime thing to know
+the causes of every thing&mdash;why each thing is generated, why it
+perishes, and why it exists. And I often tossed myself upward and
+downward, considering first such things as these, whether when heat
+and cold have undergone a certain corruption, as some say, then
+animals are formed; and whether the blood is that by means of which
+we think, or air, or fire, or none of these, but that it is the
+brain that produces the perceptions of hearing, seeing, and
+smelling; and that from these come memory and opinion; and from
+memory and opinion, when in a state of rest, in the same way
+knowledge is produced. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec103"
+name="phaedo_sec103">103</a>. And, again, considering the
+corruptions of these, and the affections incidental to the heavens
+and the earth, I at length appeared to myself so unskillful in
+these speculations that nothing could be more so. But I will give
+you a sufficient proof of this; for I then became, by these very
+speculations, <a class='pagenumber' name='page141' id=
+'page141'></a>so very blind with respect to things which I knew
+clearly before, as it appeared to myself and others, that I
+unlearned even the things which I thought I knew before, both on
+many other subjects and also this, why a man grows. For, before, I
+thought this was evident to every one&mdash;that it proceeds from
+eating and drinking; for that, when, from the food, flesh is added
+to flesh, bone to bone, and so on in the same proportion, what is
+proper to them is added to the several other parts, then the bulk
+which was small becomes afterward large, and thus that a little man
+becomes a big one. Such was my opinion at that time. Does it appear
+to you correct?"</p>
+
+<p>"To me it does," said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec104" name=
+"phaedo_sec104">104</a>. "Consider this further. I thought that I
+had formed a right opinion, when, on seeing a tall man standing by
+a short one, I judged that he was taller by the head, and in like
+manner, one horse than another; and, still more clearly than this,
+ten appeared to me to be more than eight by two being added to
+them, and that two cubits are greater than one cubit by exceeding
+it a half."</p>
+
+<p>"But now," said Cebes, "what think you of these matters?"</p>
+
+<p>"By Jupiter!" said he, "I am far from thinking that I know the
+cause of these, for that I can not even persuade myself of this:
+when a person has added one to one, whether the one to which the
+addition has been made has become two, or whether that which has
+been added, and that to which the addition has been made, have
+become two by the addition of the one to the other. For I wonder
+if, when each of these was separate from the other, each was one,
+and they were not yet two; but when they have approached nearer
+each other this should be the cause of their becoming
+two&mdash;namely, the union by which they have been placed <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page142' id='page142'></a>nearer one
+another. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec105" name=
+"phaedo_sec105">105</a>. Nor yet, if any person should divide one,
+am I able to persuade myself that this, their division, is the
+cause of its becoming two. For this cause is the contrary to the
+former one of their becoming two; for then it was because they were
+brought nearer to each other, and the one was added to the other;
+but now it is because one is removed and separated from the other.
+Nor do I yet persuade myself that I know why one is one, nor, in a
+word, why any thing else is produced, or perishes, or exists,
+according to this method of proceeding; but I mix up another method
+of my own at random, for this I can on no account give in to."</p>
+
+<p>"But, having once heard a person reading from a book, written,
+as he said, by Anaxagoras, and which said that it is intelligence
+that sets in order and is the cause of all things, I was delighted
+with this cause, and it appeared to me in a manner to be well that
+intelligence should be the cause of all things, and I considered
+with myself, if this is so, that the regulating intelligence orders
+all things, and disposes each in such way as will be best for it.
+<a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec106" name=
+"phaedo_sec106">106</a>. If any one, then, should desire to
+discover the cause of every thing, in what way it is produced, or
+perishes, or exists, he must discover this respecting it&mdash;in
+what way it is best for it either to exist, or to suffer, or do any
+thing else. From this mode of reasoning, then, it is proper that a
+man should consider nothing else, both with respect to himself and
+others, than what is most excellent and best; and it necessarily
+follows that this same person must also know that which is worst,
+for that the knowledge of both of them is the same. Thus reasoning
+with myself, I was delighted to think I had found in Anaxagoras a
+preceptor who would instruct me in the causes of things, agreeably
+to my own mind, and that he would inform me, first, whether the
+earth is flat or round, <a class='pagenumber' name='page143' id=
+'page143'></a>and, when he had informed me, would, moreover,
+explain the cause and necessity of its being so, arguing on the
+principle of the better, and showing that it is better for it to be
+such as it is; and if he should say that it is in the middle, that
+he would, moreover, explain how it is better for it to be in the
+middle; and if he should make all this clear to me, I was prepared
+no longer to require any other species of cause. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec107" name="phaedo_sec107">107</a>. I
+was in like manner prepared to inquire respecting the sun and moon
+and the other stars, with respect to their velocities in reference
+to each other, and their revolutions and other conditions, in what
+way it is better for both to act and be affected as it does and is.
+For I never thought that after he had said that these things were
+set in order by intelligence, he would introduce any other cause
+for them than that it is best for them to be as they are. Hence, I
+thought, that in assigning the cause to each of them, and to all in
+common, he would explain that which is best for each, and the
+common good of all. And I would not have given up my hopes for a
+good deal; but, having taken up his books with great eagerness, I
+read through them as quickly as I could, that I might as soon as
+possible know the best and the worst."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec108" name=
+"phaedo_sec108">108</a>. "From this wonderful hope, however, my
+friend, I was speedily thrown down, when, as I advance and read
+over his works, I meet with a man who makes no use of intelligence,
+nor assigns any causes for the ordering of all things, but makes
+the causes to consist of air, ether, and water, and many other
+things equally absurd. And he appeared to me to be very like one
+who should say that whatever Socrates does he does by intelligence,
+and then, attempting to describe the causes of each particular
+action, should say, first of all, that for this reason I am now
+sitting here, because my body is composed of bones and sinews <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page144' id='page144'></a>and that the
+bones are hard, and have joints separate from each other, but that
+the sinews, being capable of tension and contraction, cover the
+bones, together with the flesh and skin which contain them. The
+bones, therefore, being suspended in their sockets, the nerves,
+relaxing and tightening, enable me to bend my limbs as I now do,
+and from this cause I sit here bent up. <a class="sectionnumber"
+id="phaedo_sec109" name="phaedo_sec109">109</a>. And if, again, he
+should assign other similar causes for my conversing with you,
+assigning as causes voice, and air, and hearing, and ten thousand
+other things of the kind, omitting to mention the real causes, that
+since it appeared better to the Athenians to condemn me, I
+therefore thought it better to sit here, and more just to remain
+and submit to the punishment which they have ordered; for, by the
+dog! I think these sinews and bones would have been long ago either
+in Megara or Boeotia, borne thither by an opinion of that which is
+best, if I had not thought it more just and honorable to submit to
+whatever sentence the city might order than to flee and run
+stealthily away. But to call such things causes is too absurd. But
+if any one should say that without possessing such things as bones
+and sinews, and whatever else I have, I could not do what I
+pleased, he would speak the truth; but to say that I do as I do
+through them, and that I act thus by intelligence, and not from the
+choice of what is best, would be a great and extreme disregard of
+reason. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec110" name=
+"phaedo_sec110">110</a>. For this would be not to be able to
+distinguish that the real cause is one thing, and that another,
+without which a cause could not be a cause; which, indeed, the
+generality of men appear to me to do, fumbling, as it were, in the
+dark, and making use of strange names, so as to denominate them as
+the very cause. Wherefore one encompassing the earth with a vortex
+from heaven makes the earth remain fixed; but another, as if it
+were a broad trough, rests it upon the <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page145' id='page145'></a>air as its base; but the power by which
+these things are now so disposed that they may be placed in the
+best manner possible, this they neither inquire into, nor do they
+think that it requires any superhuman strength; but they think they
+will some time or other find out an Atlas stronger and more
+immortal than this, and more capable of containing all things; and
+in reality, the good, and that which ought to hold them together
+and contain them, they take no account of at all. I, then, should
+most gladly have become the disciple of any one who would teach me
+of such a cause, in what way it is. But when I was disappointed of
+this, and was neither able to discover it myself, nor to learn it
+from another, do you wish, Cebes, that I should show you in what
+way I set out upon a second voyage in search of the cause?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec111" name=
+"phaedo_sec111">111</a>. "I wish it exceedingly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"It appeared to me, then," said he, "after this, when I was
+wearied with considering things that exist, that I ought to beware
+lest I should suffer in the same way as they do who look at and
+examine an eclipse of the sun, for some lose the sight of their
+eyes, unless they behold its image in water, or some similar
+medium. And I was affected with a similar feeling, and was afraid
+lest I should be utterly blinded in my soul through beholding
+things with the eyes, and endeavoring to grasp them by means of the
+several senses. It seemed to me, therefore, that I ought to have
+recourse to reasons, and to consider in them the truth of things.
+Perhaps, however, this similitude of mine may in some respect be
+incorrect; for I do not altogether admit that he who considers
+things in their reasons considers them in their images, more than
+he does who views them in their effects. However, I proceeded thus,
+and on each occasion laying down the reason, which I deem to be the
+strongest, whatever <a class='pagenumber' name='page146' id=
+'page146'></a>things appear to me to accord with this I regard as
+true, both with respect to the cause and every thing else; but such
+as do not accord I regard as not true. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec112" name="phaedo_sec112">112</a>. But I wish to explain
+my meaning to you in a clearer manner; for I think that you do not
+yet understand me."</p>
+
+<p>"No, by Jupiter!" said Cebes, "not well."</p>
+
+<p>"However," continued he, "I am now saying nothing new, but what
+I have always at other times, and in a former part of this
+discussion, never ceased to say. I proceed, then, to attempt to
+explain to you that species of cause which I have busied myself
+about, and return again to those well-known subjects, and set out
+from them, laying down as an hypothesis, that there is a certain
+abstract beauty, and goodness, and magnitude, and so of all other
+things; which if you grant me, and allow that they do exist, I hope
+that I shall be able from these to explain the cause to you, and to
+discover that the soul is immortal."</p>
+
+<p>"But," said Cebes, "since I grant you this, you may draw your
+conclusion at once."</p>
+
+<p>"But consider," he said, "what follows from thence, and see if
+you can agree with me. For it appears to me that if there is any
+thing else beautiful besides beauty itself, it is not beautiful for
+any other reason than because it partakes of that abstract beauty;
+and I say the same of every thing. Do you admit such a cause?"</p>
+
+<p>"I do admit it," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec113" name=
+"phaedo_sec113">113</a>. "I do not yet understand," he continued,
+"nor am I able to conceive, those other wise causes; but if any one
+should tell me why any thing is beautiful, either because it has a
+blooming florid color, or figure, or any thing else of the kind, I
+dismiss all other reasons, for I am confounded by them all; but I
+simply, wholly, and perhaps foolishly, confine myself to this, that
+nothing else causes it to be beautiful <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page147' id='page147'></a>except either the presence or
+communication of that abstract beauty, by whatever means and in
+whatever way communicated; for I can not yet affirm this with
+certainty, but only that by means of beauty all beautiful things
+become beautiful. For this appears to me the safest answer to give
+both to myself and others; and adhering to this, I think that I
+shall never fall, but that it is a safe answer both for me and any
+one else to give&mdash;that by means of beauty beautiful things
+become beautiful. Does it not also seem so to you?"</p>
+
+<p>"It does."</p>
+
+<p>"And that by magnitude great things become great, and greater
+things, greater; and by littleness less things become less?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec114" name=
+"phaedo_sec114">114</a>. "You would not, then, approve of it, if
+any one said that one person is greater than another by the head,
+and that the less is less by the very same thing; but you would
+maintain that you mean nothing else than that every thing that is
+greater than another is greater by nothing else than magnitude, and
+that it is greater on this account&mdash;that is, on account of
+magnitude; and that the less is less by nothing else than
+littleness, and on this account less&mdash;that is, on account of
+littleness; being afraid, I think, lest some opposite argument
+should meet you if you should say that any one is greater and less
+by the head; as, first, that the greater is greater, and the less
+less, by the very same thing; and, next, that the greater is
+greater by the head, which is small; and that it is monstrous to
+suppose that any one is great through something small. Should you
+not be afraid of this?"</p>
+
+<p>To which said Cebes, smilingly, "Indeed, I should."</p>
+
+<p>"Should you not, then," he continued, "be afraid to say that ten
+is more than eight by two, and for this cause exceeds <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page148' id='page148'></a>it, and not by number,
+and on account of number? and that two cubits are greater than one
+cubit by half, and not by magnitude (for the fear is surely the
+same)?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec115" name=
+"phaedo_sec115">115</a>. "What, then? When one has been added to
+one, would you not beware of saying that the addition is the cause
+of its being two, or division when it has been divided; and would
+you not loudly assert that you know no other way in which each
+thing subsists, than by partaking of the peculiar essence of each
+of which it partakes, and that in these cases you can assign no
+other cause of its becoming two than its partaking of duality; and
+that such things as are to become two must needs partake of this,
+and what is to become one, of unity; but these divisions and
+additions, and other such subtleties, you would dismiss, leaving
+them to be given as answers by persons wiser than yourself; whereas
+you, fearing, as it is said, your own shadow and inexperience,
+would adhere to this safe hypothesis, and answer accordingly? But
+if any one should assail this hypothesis of yours, would you not
+dismiss him, and refrain from answering him till you had considered
+the consequences resulting from it, whether in your opinion they
+agree with or differ from each other? But when it should be
+necessary for you to give a reason for it, would you give one in a
+similar way, by again laying down another hypothesis, which should
+appear the best of higher principles, until you arrived at
+something satisfactory; but, at the same time, you would avoid
+making confusion, as disputants do, in treating of the first
+principle and the results arising from it, if you really desire to
+arrive at the truth of things? <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec116" name="phaedo_sec116">116</a>. For they, perhaps,
+make no account at all of this, nor pay any attention to it; for
+they are able, through their wisdom, to mingle all things together,
+and at the same time please themselves. But you, <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page149' id='page149'></a>if you are a
+philosopher, would act, I think, as I now describe."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak most truly," said Simmias and Cebes together.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Echec.</span> By Jupiter! Ph&aelig;do,
+they said so with good reason; for he appears to me to have
+explained these things with wonderful clearness, even to one endued
+with a small degree of intelligence.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Ph&aelig;d.</span> Certainly,
+Echecrates, and so it appeared to all who were present.</p>
+
+<p><span class="speakername">Echec.</span> And so it appears to me,
+who was absent, and now hear it related. But what was said after
+this?</p>
+
+<p>As well as I remember, when these things had been granted him,
+and it was allowed that each several idea exists of itself,<a id=
+"footnotetag37" name="footnotetag37" href=
+"#footnote37"><sup>37</sup></a> and that other things partaking of
+them receive their denomination from them, he next asked: "If,
+then," he said, "you admit that things are so, whether, when you
+say that Simmias is greater than Socrates, but less than
+Ph&aelig;do, do you not then say that magnitude and littleness are
+both in Simmias?"</p>
+
+<p>"I do."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec117" name=
+"phaedo_sec117">117</a>. "And yet," he said, "you must confess that
+Simmias's exceeding Socrates is not actually true in the manner in
+which the words express it; for Simmias does not naturally exceed
+Socrates in that he is Simmias, but in consequence of the magnitude
+which he happens to have; nor, again, does he exceed Socrates
+because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates possesses
+littleness in comparison with his magnitude?"</p>
+
+<p>"True."</p>
+
+<p>"Nor, again, is Simmias exceeded by Ph&aelig;do, because <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page150' id='page150'></a>Ph&aelig;do is
+Ph&aelig;do, but because Ph&aelig;do possesses magnitude in
+comparison with Simmias's littleness?"</p>
+
+<p>"It is so."</p>
+
+<p>"Thus, then, Simmias has the appellation of being both little
+and great, being between both, by exceeding the littleness of one
+through his own magnitude, and to the other yielding a magnitude
+that exceeds his own littleness." And at the same time, smiling, he
+said, "I seem to speak with the precision of a short-hand writer;
+however, it is as I say."</p>
+
+<p>He allowed it.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec118" name=
+"phaedo_sec118">118</a>. "But I say it for this reason, wishing you
+to be of the same opinion as myself. For it appears to me, not only
+that magnitude itself is never disposed to be at the same time
+great and little, but that magnitude in us never admits the little
+nor is disposed to be exceeded, but one of two things, either to
+flee and withdraw when its contrary, the little, approaches it, or,
+when it has actually come, to perish; but that it is not disposed,
+by sustaining and receiving littleness, to be different from what
+it was. Just as I, having received and sustained littleness, and
+still continuing the person that I am, am this same little person;
+but that, while it is great, never endures to be little. And, in
+like manner, the little that is in us is not disposed at any time
+to become or to be great, nor is any thing else among contraries,
+while it continues what it was, at the same time disposed to become
+and to be its contrary; but in this contingency it either departs
+or perishes."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec119" name=
+"phaedo_sec119">119</a>. "It appears so to me," said Cebes, "in
+every respect."</p>
+
+<p>But some one of those present, on hearing this, I do not clearly
+remember who he was, said, "By the gods! was not the very contrary
+of what is now asserted admitted in the former part of our
+discussion, that the greater is produced <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page151' id='page151'></a>from the less, and the less from
+the greater, and, in a word, that the very production of contraries
+is from contraries? But now it appears to me to be asserted that
+this can never be the case."</p>
+
+<p>Upon this Socrates, having leaned his head forward and listened,
+said, "You have reminded me in a manly way; you do not, however,
+perceive the difference between what is now and what was then
+asserted. For then it was said that a contrary thing is produced
+from a contrary; but now, that a contrary can never become contrary
+to itself&mdash;neither that which is in us, nor that which is in
+nature. For then, my friend, we spoke of things that have
+contraries, calling them by the appellation of those things; but
+now we are speaking of those very things from the presence of which
+things so called receive their appellation, and of these very
+things we say that they are never disposed to admit of production
+from each other." <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec120" name=
+"phaedo_sec120">120</a>. And, at the same time looking at Cebes,
+"Has anything that has been said, Cebes, disturbed you?"</p>
+
+<p>"Indeed," said Cebes, "I am not at all so disposed; however, I
+by no means say that there are not many things that disturb
+me."</p>
+
+<p>"Then," he continued, "we have quite agreed to this, that a
+contrary can never be contrary to itself."</p>
+
+<p>"Most certainly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"But, further," he said, "consider whether you will agree with
+me in this also. Do you call heat and cold any thing?"</p>
+
+<p>"I do."</p>
+
+<p>"The same as snow and fire?"</p>
+
+<p>"By Jupiter! I do not."</p>
+
+<p>"But heat is something different from fire, and cold something
+different from snow?"</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page152' id='page152'></a>Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"But this, I think, is apparent to you&mdash;that snow, while it
+is snow, can never, when it has admitted heat, as we said before,
+continue to be what it was, snow and hot; but, on the approach of
+heat, it must either withdraw or perish?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"And, again, that fire, when cold approaches it, must either
+depart or perish; but that it will never endure, when it has
+admitted coldness, to continue what it was, fire and cold?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec121" name=
+"phaedo_sec121">121</a>. "You speak truly," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"It happens, then," he continued, "with respect to some of such
+things, that not only is the idea itself always thought worthy of
+the same appellation, but likewise something else which is not,
+indeed, that idea itself, but constantly retains its form so long
+as it exists. What I mean will perhaps be clearer in the following
+examples: the odd in number must always possess the name by which
+we now call it, must it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Must it alone, of all things&mdash;for this I ask&mdash;or is
+there any thing else which is not the same as the odd, but yet
+which we must always call odd, together with its own name, because
+it is so constituted by nature that it can never be without the
+odd? But this, I say, is the case with the number three, and many
+others. For consider with respect to the number three: does it not
+appear to you that it must always be called by its own name, as
+well as by that of the odd, which is not the same as the number
+three? Yet such is the nature of the number three, five, and the
+entire half of number, that though they are not the same as the
+odd, yet each of them is always odd. And, again, two and four, and
+the whole other series of number, though not the same <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page153' id='page153'></a>as the even, are
+nevertheless each of them always even: do you admit this, or
+not?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec122" name=
+"phaedo_sec122">122</a>. "How should I not?" he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Observe then," said he, "what I wish to prove. It is
+this&mdash;that it appears not only that these contraries do not
+admit each other, but that even such things as are not contrary to
+each other, and yet always possess contraries, do not appear to
+admit that idea which is contrary to the idea that exists in
+themselves, but, when it approaches, perish or depart. Shall we not
+allow that the number three would first perish, and suffer any
+thing whatever, rather than endure, while it is still three, to
+become even?"</p>
+
+<p>"Most certainly," said Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"And yet," said he, "the number two is not contrary to
+three."</p>
+
+<p>"Surely not."</p>
+
+<p>"Not only, then, do ideas that are contrary never allow the
+approach of each other, but some other things also do not allow the
+approach of contraries."</p>
+
+<p>"You say very truly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Do you wish, then," he said, "that, if we are able, we should
+define what these things are?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Would they not then, Cebes," he said, "be such things as,
+whatever they occupy, compel that thing not only to retain its own
+idea, but also that of something which is always a contrary?"</p>
+
+<p>"How do you mean?"</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec123" name=
+"phaedo_sec123">123</a>. "As we just now said. For you know,
+surely, that whatever things the idea of three occupies must of
+necessity not only be three, but also odd?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page154' id='page154'></a>To such a
+thing, then, we assert, that the idea contrary to that form which
+constitutes this can never come."</p>
+
+<p>"It can not."</p>
+
+<p>"But did the odd make it so?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"And is the contrary to this the idea of the even?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"The idea of the even, then, will never come to the three?"</p>
+
+<p>"No, surely."</p>
+
+<p>"Three, then, has no part in the even?"</p>
+
+<p>"None whatever."</p>
+
+<p>"The number three is uneven?"</p>
+
+<p>"Yes."</p>
+
+<p>"What, therefore, I said should be defined&mdash;namely, what
+things they are which, though not contrary to some particular
+thing, yet do not admit of the contrary itself; as, in the present
+instance, the number three, though not contrary to the even, does
+not any the more admit it, for it always brings the contrary with
+it, just as the number two does to the odd, fire to cold, and many
+other particulars. Consider, then, whether you would thus define,
+not only that a contrary does not admit a contrary, but also that
+that which brings with it a contrary to that to which it approaches
+will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec124" name=
+"phaedo_sec124">124</a>. But call it to mind again, for it will not
+be useless to hear it often repeated. Five will not admit the idea
+of the even, nor ten, its double, that of the odd. This double,
+then, though it is itself contrary to something else,<a id=
+"footnotetag38" name="footnotetag38" href=
+"#footnote38"><sup>38</sup></a> yet will not admit the idea of the
+odd, nor will half as much again, nor other things of the kind,
+such as the <a class='pagenumber' name='page155' id=
+'page155'></a>half and the third part, admit the idea of the whole,
+if you follow me, and agree with me that it is so."</p>
+
+<p>"I entirely agree with you," he said, "and follow you."</p>
+
+<p>"Tell me again, then," he said, "from the beginning; and do not
+answer me in the terms in which I put the question, but in
+different ones, imitating my example. For I say this because,
+besides that safe mode of answering which I mentioned at first,<a
+id="footnotetag39" name="footnotetag39" href=
+"#footnote39"><sup>39</sup></a> from what has now been said, I see
+another no less safe one. For if you should ask me what that is
+which, if it be in the body, will cause it to be hot, I should not
+give you that safe but unlearned answer, that it is heat, but one
+more elegant, from what we have just now said, that it is fire;
+nor, if you should ask me what that is which, if it be in the body,
+will cause it to be diseased, should I say that it is disease, but
+fever; nor if you should ask what that is which, if it be in
+number, will cause it to be odd, should I say that it is
+unevenness, but unity; and so with other things. But consider
+whether you sufficiently understand what I mean."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec125" name=
+"phaedo_sec125">125</a>. "Perfectly so," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Answer me, then," he said, "what that is which, when it is in
+the body, the body will be alive?"</p>
+
+<p>"Soul," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Is not this, then, always the case?"</p>
+
+<p>"How should it not be?" said he.</p>
+
+<p>"Does the soul, then, always bring life to whatever it
+occupies?"</p>
+
+<p>"It does indeed," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Whether, then, is there any thing contrary to life or not?"</p>
+
+<p>"There is," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"What?"</p>
+
+<p>"Death."</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page156' id='page156'></a>The soul,
+then, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with
+it, as has been already allowed?"</p>
+
+<p>"Most assuredly," replied Cebes.</p>
+
+<p>"What, then? How do we denominate that which does not admit the
+idea of the even?"</p>
+
+<p>"Uneven," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"And that which does not admit the just, nor the musical?"</p>
+
+<p>"Unmusical," he said, "and unjust."</p>
+
+<p>"Be it so. But what do we call that which does not admit
+death?"</p>
+
+<p>"Immortal," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore, does not the soul admit death?"</p>
+
+<p>"No."</p>
+
+<p>"Is the soul, then, immortal?"</p>
+
+<p>"Immortal."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec126" name=
+"phaedo_sec126">126</a>. "Be it so," he said. "Shall we say, then,
+that this has been now demonstrated? or how think you?"</p>
+
+<p>"Most completely, Socrates."</p>
+
+<p>"What, then," said he, "Cebes, if it were necessary for the
+uneven to be imperishable, would the number three be otherwise than
+imperishable?"</p>
+
+<p>"How should it not?"</p>
+
+<p>"If, therefore, it were also necessary that what is without heat
+should be imperishable, when any one should introduce heat to snow,
+would not the snow withdraw itself, safe and unmelted? For it would
+not perish; nor yet would it stay and admit the heat."</p>
+
+<p>"You say truly," he replied.</p>
+
+<p>"In like manner, I think, if that which is insusceptible of cold
+were imperishable, that when any thing cold approached the fire, it
+would neither be extinguished nor perish, but would depart quite
+safe."</p>
+
+<p>"<a class='pagenumber' name='page157' id='page157'></a>Of
+necessity," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"Must we not, then, of necessity," he continued, "speak thus of
+that which is immortal? if that which is immortal is imperishable,
+it is impossible for the soul to perish, when death approaches it.
+For, from what has been said already, it will not admit death, nor
+will ever be dead; just as we said that three will never be even,
+nor, again, will the odd; nor will fire be cold, nor yet the heat
+that is in fire. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec127" name=
+"phaedo_sec127">127</a>. But some one may say, what hinders, though
+the odd can never become even by the approach of the even, as we
+have allowed, yet, when the odd is destroyed, that the even should
+succeed in its place? We could not contend with him who should make
+this objection that it is not destroyed, for the uneven is not
+imperishable; since, if this were granted us, we might easily have
+contended that, on the approach of the even, the odd and the three
+depart; and we might have contended in the same way with respect to
+fire, heat, and the rest, might we not?"</p>
+
+<p>"Certainly."</p>
+
+<p>"Wherefore, with respect to the immortal, if we have allowed
+that it is imperishable, the soul, in addition to its being
+immortal, must also be imperishable; if not, there will be need of
+other arguments."</p>
+
+<p>"But there is no need," he said, "so far as that is concerned;
+for scarcely could any thing not admit of corruption, if that which
+is immortal and eternal is liable to it."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec128" name=
+"phaedo_sec128">128</a>. "The deity, indeed, I think," said
+Socrates, "and the idea itself of life, and if anything else is
+immortal, must be allowed by all beings to be incapable of
+dissolution."</p>
+
+<p>"By Jupiter!" he replied, "by all men, indeed, and still more,
+as I think, by the gods."</p>
+
+<p>"Since, then, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page158' id='page158'></a>can the soul,
+since it is immortal, be any thing else than imperishable?"</p>
+
+<p>"It must, of necessity, be so."</p>
+
+<p>"When, therefore, death approaches a man, the mortal part of
+him, as it appears, dies, but the immortal part departs safe and
+uncorrupted, having withdrawn itself from death?"</p>
+
+<p>"It appears so."</p>
+
+<p>"The soul, therefore," he said, "Cebes, is most certainly
+immortal and imperishable, and our souls will really exist in
+Hades."</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore, Socrates," he said, "I have nothing further to say
+against this, nor any reason for doubting your arguments. But if
+Simmias here, or any one else, has any thing to say, it were well
+for him not to be silent; for I know not to what other opportunity
+beyond the present any one can defer it, who wishes either to speak
+or hear about these things."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec129" name=
+"phaedo_sec129">129</a>. "But, indeed," said Simmias, "neither have
+I any reason to doubt what has been urged; yet, from the magnitude
+of the subject discussed, and from my low opinion of human
+weakness, I am compelled still to retain a doubt within myself with
+respect to what has been said."</p>
+
+<p>"Not only so, Simmias," said Socrates, "but you say this well;
+and, moreover, the first hypotheses, even though they are credible
+to you, should nevertheless be examined more carefully; and if you
+should investigate them sufficiently, I think you will follow my
+reasoning as far as it is possible for man to do so; and if this
+very point becomes clear, you will inquire no further."</p>
+
+<p>"You speak truly," he said.</p>
+
+<p>"But it is right, my friends," he said, "that we should consider
+this&mdash;- that if the soul is immortal, it requires our <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page159' id='page159'></a>care not only
+for the present time, which we call life, but for all time; and the
+danger would now appear to be dreadful if one should neglect it. <a
+class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec130" name=
+"phaedo_sec130">130</a>. For if death were a deliverance from every
+thing, it would be a great gain for the wicked, when they die, to
+be delivered at the same time from the body, and from their vices
+together with the soul; but now, since it appears to be immortal,
+it can have no other refuge from evils, nor safety, except by
+becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul goes to Hades
+possessing nothing else than its discipline and education, which
+are said to be of the greatest advantage or detriment to the dead,
+on the very beginning of his journey thither. For, thus, it is said
+that each person's demon who was assigned to him while living, when
+he dies conducts him to some place, where they that are assembled
+together must receive sentence, and then proceed to Hades with that
+guide who has been ordered to conduct them from hence thither. But
+there having received their deserts, and having remained the
+appointed time, another guide brings them back hither again, after
+many and long revolutions of time. The journey, then, is not such
+as the Telephus of &AElig;schylus describes it; for he says that a
+simple path leads to Hades; but it appears to me to be neither
+simple nor one, for there would be no need of guides, nor could any
+one ever miss the way, if there were but one. But now it appears to
+have many divisions and windings; and this I conjecture from our
+religious and funeral rites.<a id="footnotetag40" name=
+"footnotetag40" href="#footnote40"><sup>40</sup></a> <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec131" name="phaedo_sec131">131</a>.
+The well-ordered and wise soul, then, both follows, and is not
+ignorant of its present condition; but that which through passion
+clings <a class='pagenumber' name='page160' id='page160'></a>to the
+body, as I said before, having longingly fluttered about it for a
+long time, and about its visible place,<a id="footnotetag41" name=
+"footnotetag41" href="#footnote41"><sup>41</sup></a> after vehement
+resistance and great suffering, is forcibly and with great
+difficulty led away by its appointed demon. And when it arrives at
+the place where the others are, impure and having done any such
+thing as the committal of unrighteous murders or other similar
+actions, which are kindred to these, and are the deeds of kindred
+souls, every one shuns it and turns away from it, and will be
+neither its fellow-traveler nor guide; but it wanders about,
+oppressed with every kind of helplessness, until certain periods
+have elapsed; and when these are completed, it is carried, of
+necessity, to an abode suitable to it. But the soul which has
+passed through life with purity and moderation, having obtained the
+gods for its fellow-travelers and guides, settles each in the place
+suited to it. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec132" name=
+"phaedo_sec132">132</a>. There are, indeed, many and wonderful
+places in the earth, and it is itself neither of such a kind nor of
+such a magnitude as is supposed by those who are accustomed to
+speak of the earth, as I have been persuaded by a certain
+person."</p>
+
+<p>Whereupon Simmias said, "How mean you, Socrates? For I, too,
+have heard many things about the earth&mdash;not, however, those
+things which have obtained your belief. I would, therefore, gladly
+hear them."</p>
+
+<p>"Indeed, Simmias, the art of Glaucus<a id="footnotetag42" name=
+"footnotetag42" href="#footnote42"><sup>42</sup></a> does not seem
+to me to be required to relate what these things are. That they are
+true, however, appears to me more than the art of Glaucus can
+prove, and, besides, I should probably not be able to do it; and
+even if I did know how, what remains to me of life, Simmias, seems
+insufficient for the length of the <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page161' id='page161'></a>subject. However, the form of the earth,
+such as I am persuaded it is, and the different places in it,
+nothing hinders me from telling."</p>
+
+<p>"But that will be enough," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"I am persuaded, then," said he, "in the first place, that, if
+the earth is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a spherical
+form, it has no need of air, nor of any other similar force, to
+prevent it from falling; but that the similarity of the heavens to
+themselves on every side, and the equilibrium of the earth itself,
+are sufficient to support it; for a thing in a state of equilibrium
+when placed in the middle of something that presses it equally on
+all sides can not incline more or less on any side, but, being
+equally affected all around, remains unmoved. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec133" name="phaedo_sec133">133</a>. In
+the first place, then," he said, "I am persuaded of this."</p>
+
+<p>"And very properly so," said Simmias.</p>
+
+<p>"Yet, further," said he, "that it is very large, and that we who
+inhabit some small portion of it, from the river Phasis to the
+pillars of Hercules, dwell about the sea, like ants or frogs about
+a marsh; and that many others elsewhere dwell in many similar
+places, for that there are everywhere about the earth many hollows
+of various forms and sizes into which there is a confluence of
+water, mist and air; but that the earth itself, being pure, is
+situated in the pure heavens, in which are the stars, and which
+most persons who are accustomed to speak about such things call
+ether; of which these things are the sediment, and are continually
+flowing into the hollow parts of the earth. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec134" name="phaedo_sec134">134</a>.
+That we are ignorant, then, that we are dwelling in its hollows,
+and imagine that we inhabit the upper parts of the earth, just as
+if any one dwelling in the bottom of the sea should think that he
+dwelt on the sea, and, beholding the sun and the other stars
+through the water, should imagine <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page162' id='page162'></a>that the sea was the heavens; but,
+through sloth and weakness, should never have reached the surface
+of the sea; nor, having emerged and risen up from the sea to this
+region, have seen how much more pure and more beautiful it is than
+the place where he is, nor has heard of it from any one else who
+has seen it. This, then, is the very condition in which we are;
+for, dwelling in some hollow of the earth, we think that we dwell
+on the surface of it, and call the air heaven, as if the stars
+moved through this, being heaven itself. But this is because, by
+reason of our weakness and sloth, we are unable to reach to the
+summit of the air. Since, if any one could arrive at its summit,
+or, becoming winged, could fly up thither, or, emerging from hence,
+he would see&mdash;just as with us, fishes, emerging from the sea,
+behold what is here, so any one would behold the things there; and
+if his nature were able to endure the contemplation, he would know
+that that is the true heaven, and the true light, and the true
+earth. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec135" name=
+"phaedo_sec135">135</a>. For this earth and these stones, and the
+whole region here, are decayed and corroded, as things in the sea
+by the saltness; for nothing of any value grows in the sea, nor, in
+a word, does it contain any thing perfect; but there are caverns
+and sand, and mud in abundance, and filth, in whatever parts of the
+sea there is earth, nor are they at all worthy to be compared with
+the beautiful things with us. But, on the other hand, those things
+in the upper regions of the earth would appear far more to excel
+the things with us. For, if we may tell a beautiful fable, it is
+well worth hearing, Simmias, what kind the things are on the earth
+beneath the heavens."</p>
+
+<p>"Indeed, Socrates," said Simmias, "we should be very glad to
+hear that fable."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec136" name=
+"phaedo_sec136">136</a>. "First of all, then, my friend," he
+continued, "this earth, if any one should survey it from above, is
+said to have <a class='pagenumber' name='page163' id=
+'page163'></a>the appearance of balls covered with twelve different
+pieces of leather, variegated and distinguished with colors, of
+which the colors found here, and which painters use, are, as it
+were, copies. But there the whole earth is composed of such, and
+far more brilliant and pure than these; for one part of it is
+purple, and of wonderful beauty, part of a golden color, and part
+of white, more white than chalk or snow, and, in like manner,
+composed of other colors, and those more in number and more
+beautiful than any we have ever beheld. And those very hollow parts
+of the earth, though filled with water and air, exhibit a certain
+species of color, shining among the variety of other colors, so
+that one continually variegated aspect presents itself to the view.
+In this earth, being such, all things that grow, grow in a manner
+proportioned to its nature&mdash;trees, flowers and fruits; and,
+again, in like manner, its mountains and stones possess, in the
+same proportion, smoothness and transparency, and more beautiful
+colors; of which the well-known stones here that are so highly
+prized are but fragments, such as sardine-stones, jaspers, and
+emeralds, and all of that kind. But there, there is nothing
+subsists that is not of this character, and even more beautiful
+than these. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec137" name=
+"phaedo_sec137">137</a>. But the reason of this is, because the
+stones there are pure, and not eaten up and decayed, like those
+here, by rottenness and saltness, which flow down hither together,
+and which produce deformity and disease in the stones and the
+earth, and in other things, even animals and plants. But that earth
+is adorned with all these, and, moreover, with gold and silver, and
+other things of the kind: for they are naturally conspicuous, being
+numerous and large, and in all parts of the earth; so that to
+behold it is a sight for the blessed. There are also many other
+animals and men upon it, some dwelling in mid-earth, others about
+the air, as we do about the sea, and others <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page164' id='page164'></a>in islands which the air flows
+round, and which are near the continent; and, in one word, what
+water and the sea are to us, for our necessities, the air is to
+them; and what air is to us, that ether is to them. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec138" name="phaedo_sec138">138</a>.
+But their seasons are of such a temperament that they are free from
+disease, and live for a much longer time than those here, and
+surpass us in sight, hearing, and smelling, and every thing of this
+kind, as much as air excels water, and ether air, in purity.
+Moreover, they have abodes and temples of the gods, in which gods
+really dwell, and voices and oracles, and sensible visions of the
+gods, and such-like intercourse with them; the sun, too, and moon,
+and stars, are seen by them such as they really are, and their
+felicity in other respects is correspondent with these things."</p>
+
+<p>"And, such, indeed, is the nature of the whole earth, and the
+parts about the earth; but there are many places all round it
+throughout its cavities, some deeper and more open than that in
+which we dwell; but others that are deeper have a less chasm than
+our region, and others are shallower in depth than it is here, and
+broader. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec139" name=
+"phaedo_sec139">139</a>. But all these are in many places
+perforated one into another under the earth, some with narrower and
+some with wider channels, and have passages through, by which a
+great quantity of water flows from one into another, as into
+basins, and there are immense bulks of ever-flowing rivers under
+the earth, both of hot and cold water, and a great quantity of
+fire, and mighty rivers of fire, and many of liquid mire, some
+purer, and some more miry, as in Sicily there are rivers of mud
+that flow before the lava, and the lava itself, and from these the
+several places are filled, according as the overflow from time to
+time happens to come to each of them. But all these move up and
+down, as it were, by a certain oscillation existing in the earth.
+And this oscillation proceeds from such <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page165' id='page165'></a>natural cause as this; one of the chasms
+of the earth is exceedingly large, and perforated through the
+entire earth, and is that which Homer<a id="footnotetag43" name=
+"footnotetag43" href="#footnote43"><sup>43</sup></a> speaks of,
+'very far off, where is the most profound abyss beneath the earth,'
+which elsewhere both he and many other poets have called Tartarus.
+For into this chasm all rivers flow together, and from it flow out
+again; but they severally derive their character from the earth
+through which they flow. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec140" name="phaedo_sec140">140</a>. And the reason why
+all streams flow out from thence, and flow into it, is because this
+liquid has neither bottom nor base. Therefore, it oscillates and
+fluctuates up and down, and the air and the wind around it do the
+same; for they accompany it both when it rushes to those parts of
+the earth, and when to these. And as in respiration the flowing
+breath is continually breathed out and drawn in, so there the wind
+oscillating with the liquid causes certain vehement and
+irresistible winds both as it enters and goes out. When, therefore,
+the water rushing in descends to the place which we call the lower
+region, it flows through the earth into the streams there, and
+fills them, just as men pump up water. But when again it leaves
+those regions and rushes hither, it again fills the rivers here;
+and these, when filled, flow through channels and through the
+earth, and, having severally reached the several places to which
+they are journeying, they make seas, lakes, rivers, and fountains.
+<a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec141" name=
+"phaedo_sec141">141</a>. Then, sinking again from thence beneath
+the earth, some of them having gone round longer and more numerous
+places, and others round fewer and shorter, they again discharge
+themselves into Tartarus&mdash;some much lower than they were drawn
+up, others only a little so; but all of them flow in again beneath
+the point at which they flowed out. And some issue out directly
+opposite the place <a class='pagenumber' name='page166' id=
+'page166'></a>by which they flow in, others on the same side. There
+are also some which, having gone round altogether in a circle,
+folding themselves once or several times round the earth, like
+serpents, when they have descended as low as possible, discharge
+themselves again; and it is possible for them to descend on either
+side as far as the middle, but not beyond; for in each direction
+there is an acclivity to the streams both ways."</p>
+
+<p>"Now, there are many other large and various streams; but among
+this great number there are four certain streams, of which the
+largest, and that which flows most outwardly round the earth, is
+called Ocean; but directly opposite this, and flowing in a contrary
+direction, is Acheron, which flows through other desert places,
+and, moreover, passing under the earth, reaches the Acherusian
+lake, where the souls of most who die arrive; and, having remained
+there for certain destined periods, some longer and some shorter,
+are again sent forth into the generations of animals. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec142" name="phaedo_sec142">142</a>. A
+third river issues midway between these, and, near its source,
+falls into a vast region, burning with abundance of fire, and forms
+a lake larger than our sea, boiling with water and mud. From hence
+it proceeds in a circle, turbulent and muddy, and, folding itself
+round it, reaches both other places and the extremity of the
+Acherusian lake, but does not mingle with its water; but, folding
+itself oftentimes beneath the earth, it discharges itself into the
+lower parts of Tartarus. And this is the river which they call
+Pyriphlegethon, whose burning streams emit dissevered fragments in
+whatever part of the earth they happen to be. Opposite to this,
+again, the fourth river first falls into a place dreadful and
+savage, as it is said, having its whole color like cyanus:<a id=
+"footnotetag44" name="footnotetag44" href=
+"#footnote44"><sup>44</sup></a> this they call Stygian, and the
+lake which the <a class='pagenumber' name='page167' id=
+'page167'></a>river forms by its discharge, Styx. This river,
+having fallen in here, and received awful power in the water,
+sinking beneath the earth, proceeds, folding itself round, in an
+opposite course to Pyriphlegethon, and meets it in the Acherusian
+lake from, a contrary direction. Neither does the water of this
+river mingle with any other; but it, too, having gone round in a
+circle, discharges itself into Tartarus, opposite to
+Pyriphlegethon. Its name, as the poets say, is Cocytus."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec143" name=
+"phaedo_sec143">143</a>. "These things being thus constituted, when
+the dead arrive at the place to which their demon leads them
+severally, first of all they are judged, as well those who have
+lived well and piously, as those who have not. And those who appear
+to have passed a middle kind of life, proceeding to Acheron, and
+embarking in the vessels they have, on these arrive at the lake,
+and there dwell; and when they are purified, and have suffered
+punishment for the iniquities they may have committed, they are set
+free, and each receives the reward of his good deeds, according to
+his deserts. But those who appear to be incurable, through the
+magnitude of their offenses, either from having committed many and
+great sacrileges, or many unjust and lawless murders, or other
+similar crimes, these a suitable destiny hurls into Tartarus,
+whence they never come forth. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec144" name="phaedo_sec144">144</a>. But those who appear
+to have been guilty of curable yet great offenses&mdash;such as
+those who, through anger, have committed any violence against
+father or mother, and have lived the remainder of their life in a
+state of penitence, or they who have become homicides in a similar
+manner&mdash;these must, of necessity, fall into Tartarus. But
+after they have fallen, and have been there for a year, the wave
+casts them forth, <a class='pagenumber' name='page168' id=
+'page168'></a>the homicides into Cocytus, but the parricides and
+matricides into Pyriphlegethon. But when, being borne along, they
+arrive at the Acherusian lake, there they cry out to and invoke,
+some those whom they slew, others those whom they injured, and,
+invoking them, they entreat and implore them to suffer them to go
+out into the lake, and to receive them, and if they persuade them,
+they go out, and are freed from their sufferings, but if not, they
+are borne back to Tartarus, and thence again to the rivers. And
+they do not cease from suffering this until they have persuaded
+those whom they have injured, for this sentence was imposed on them
+by the judges. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec145" name=
+"phaedo_sec145">145</a>. But those who are found to have lived an
+eminently holy life, these are they who, being freed and set at
+large from these regions in the earth as from a prison, arrive at
+the pure abode above, and dwell on the upper parts of the earth.
+And among these, they who have sufficiently purified themselves by
+philosophy shall live without bodies, throughout all future time,
+and shall arrive at habitations yet more beautiful than these which
+it is neither easy to describe, nor at present is there sufficient
+time for the purpose."</p>
+
+<p>"But, for the sake of these things which we have described, we
+should use every endeavor, Simmias, so as to acquire virtue and
+wisdom in this life, for the reward is noble, and the hope
+great."</p>
+
+<p>"To affirm positively, indeed, that these things are exactly as
+I have described them does not become a man of sense. That,
+however, either this, or something of the kind, takes place with
+respect to our souls and their habitations&mdash;since our soul is
+certainly immortal&mdash;this appears to me most fitting to be
+believed, and worthy the hazard for one who trusts in its reality;
+for the hazard is noble, and it is right to allure ourselves with
+such things, as with enchantments, <a class='pagenumber' name=
+'page169' id='page169'></a>for which reason I have prolonged my
+story to such a length. <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec146"
+name="phaedo_sec146">146</a>. On account of these things, then, a
+man ought to be confident about his soul who, during this life, has
+disregarded all the pleasures and ornaments of the body as foreign
+from his nature, and who, having thought that they do more harm
+than good, has zealously applied himself to the acquirement of
+knowledge, and who, having adorned his soul, not with a foreign,
+but its own proper ornament&mdash;temperance, justice, fortitude,
+freedom, and truth&mdash;thus waits for his passage to Hades, as
+one who is ready to depart whenever destiny shall summon him. You,
+then," he continued, "Simmias and Cebes, and the rest, will each of
+you depart at some future time, but now destiny summons me, as a
+tragic writer would say, and it is nearly time for me to betake
+myself to the bath, for it appears to me to be better to drink the
+poison after I have bathed myself, and not to trouble the women
+with washing my dead body."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec147" name=
+"phaedo_sec147">147</a>. When he had thus spoken, Crito said, "So
+be it, Socrates, but what commands have you to give to these or to
+me, either respecting your children, or any other matter, in
+attending to which we can most oblige you?"</p>
+
+<p>"What I always say, Crito," he replied, "nothing new that by
+taking care of yourselves you will oblige both me and mine, and
+yourselves, whatever you do, though you should not now promise it,
+and if you neglect yourselves, and will not live, as it were, in
+the footsteps of what has been now and formerly said, even though
+you should promise much at present, and that earnestly, you will do
+no good at all."</p>
+
+<p>"We will endeavor, then, so to do," he said. "But how shall we
+bury you?"</p>
+
+<p>"Just as you please," he said, "if only you can catch <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page170' id='page170'></a>me, and I do not
+escape from you." <a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec148" name=
+"phaedo_sec148">148</a>. And, at the same time smiling gently, and
+looking round on us, he said, "I cannot persuade Crito, my friends,
+that I am that Socrates who is now conversing with you, and who
+methodizes each part of the discourse; but he thinks that I am he
+whom he will shortly behold dead, and asks how he should bury me.
+But that which I some time since argued at length, that when I have
+drunk the poison I shall no longer remain with you, but shall
+depart to some happy state of the blessed, this I seem to have
+urged to him in vain, though I meant at the same time to console
+both you and myself. Be ye, then, my sureties to Crito," he said,
+"in an obligation contrary to that which he made to the judges (for
+he undertook that I should remain); but do you be sureties that,
+when I die, I shall not remain, but shall depart, that Crito may
+more easily bear it; and, when he sees my body either burned or
+buried, may not be afflicted for me, as if I suffered from some
+dreadful thing; nor say at my interment that Socrates is laid out,
+or is carried out, or is buried. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec149" name="phaedo_sec149">149</a>. For be well assured,"
+he said, "most excellent Crito, that to speak improperly is not
+only culpable as to the thing itself, but likewise occasions some
+injury to our souls. You must have a good courage, then, and say
+that you bury my body, and bury it in such a manner as is pleasing
+to you, and as you think is most agreeable to our laws."</p>
+
+<p>When he had said thus, he rose, and went into a chamber to
+bathe, and Crito followed him, but he directed us to wait for him.
+We waited, therefore, conversing among ourselves about what had
+been said, and considering it again, and sometimes speaking about
+our calamity, how severe it would be to us, sincerely thinking
+that, like those who are deprived of a father, we should pass the
+rest of our life as orphans. When he had bathed, and his children
+were <a class='pagenumber' name='page171' id='page171'></a>brought
+to him (for he had two little sons and one grown up), and the women
+belonging to his family were come, having conversed with them in
+the presence of Crito, and given them such injunctions as he
+wished, he directed the women and children to go away, and then
+returned to us. And it was now near sunset; for he spent a
+considerable time within. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec150" name="phaedo_sec150">150</a>. But when he came from
+bathing he sat down, and did not speak much afterward; then the
+officer of the Eleven came in, and, standing near him, said,
+"Socrates, I shall not have to find that fault with you that I do
+with others, that they are angry with me, and curse me, when, by
+order of the archons, I bid them drink the poison. But you, on all
+other occasions during the time you have been here, I have found to
+be the most noble, meek, and excellent man of all that ever came
+into this place; and, therefore, I am now well convinced that you
+will not be angry with me (for you know who are to blame), but with
+them. Now, then (for you know what I came to announce to you),
+farewell, and endeavor to bear what is inevitable as easily as
+possible." And at the same time, bursting into tears, he turned
+away and withdrew.</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec151" name=
+"phaedo_sec151">151</a>. And Socrates, looking after him, said,
+"And thou, too, farewell. We will do as you direct." At the same
+time turning to us, he said, "How courteous the man is! During the
+whole time I have been here he has visited me, and conversed with
+me sometimes, and proved the worthiest of men; and now how
+generously he weeps for me! But come, Crito, let us obey him, and
+let some one bring the poison, if it is ready pounded; but if not,
+let the man pound it."</p>
+
+<p>Then Crito said, "But I think, Socrates, that the sun is still
+on the mountains, and has not yet set. Besides, I know that others
+have drunk the poison very late, after it <a class='pagenumber'
+name='page172' id='page172'></a>had been announced to them, and
+have supped and drunk freely, and some even have enjoyed the
+objects of their love. Do not hasten, then, for there is yet
+time."</p>
+
+<p>Upon this Socrates replied, "These men whom you mention, Crito,
+do these things with good reason, for they think they shall gain by
+so doing; and I, too, with good reason, shall not do so; for I
+think I shall gain nothing by drinking a little later, except to
+become ridiculous to myself, in being so fond of life, and sparing
+of it, when none any longer remains. Go then," he said, "obey, and
+do not resist."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec152" name=
+"phaedo_sec152">152</a>. Crito, having heard this, nodded to the
+boy that stood near. And the boy, having gone out and staid for
+some time, came, bringing with him the man that was to administer
+the poison, who brought it ready pounded in a cup. And Socrates, on
+seeing the man, said, "Well, my good friend, as you are skilled in
+these matters, what must I do?"</p>
+
+<p>"Nothing else," he replied, "than, when you have drunk it, walk
+about until there is a heaviness in your legs; then lie down: thus
+it will do its purpose." And at the same time he held out the cup
+to Socrates. And he having received it very cheerfully, Echecrates
+neither trembling, nor changing at all in color or countenance,
+but, as he was wont, looking steadfastly at the man, said, "What
+say you of this potion, with respect to making a libation to any
+one, is it lawful or not?"</p>
+
+<p>"We only pound so much, Socrates," he said, "as we think
+sufficient to drink."</p>
+
+<p><a class="sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec153" name=
+"phaedo_sec153">153</a>. "I understand you," he said; "but it is
+certainly both lawful and right to pray to the gods, that my
+departure hence thither may be happy; which, therefore, I pray, and
+so may it be." And as he said this, he drank it off readily and
+calmly. Thus far, most of us were with difficulty able <a class=
+'pagenumber' name='page173' id='page173'></a>to restrain ourselves
+from weeping; but when we saw him drinking, and having finished the
+draught, we could do so no longer; but, in spite of myself, the
+tears came in full torrent, so that, covering my face, I wept for
+myself; for I did not weep for him, but for my own fortune, in
+being deprived of such a friend. But Crito, even before me, when he
+could not restrain his tears, had risen up. <a class=
+"sectionnumber" id="phaedo_sec154" name="phaedo_sec154">154</a>.
+But Apollodorus, even before this, had not ceased weeping; and
+then, bursting into an agony of grief, weeping and lamenting, he
+pierced the heart of every one present, except Socrates himself.
+But he said, "What are you doing, my admirable friends? I, indeed,
+for this reason chiefly, sent away the women, that they might not
+commit any folly of this kind. For I have heard that it is right to
+die with good omens. Be quiet, therefore, and bear up."</p>
+
+<p>When we heard this, we were ashamed, and restrained our tears.
+But he, having walked about, when he said that his legs were
+growing heavy, lay down on his back; for the man had so directed
+him. And, at the same time, he who gave the poison taking hold of
+him, after a short interval, examined his feet and legs; and then,
+having pressed his foot hard, he asked if he felt it: he said that
+he did not. And after this he pressed his thighs; and, thus going
+higher, he showed us that he was growing cold and stiff. Then
+Socrates touched himself, and said that when the poison reached his
+heart he should then depart. <a class="sectionnumber" id=
+"phaedo_sec155" name="phaedo_sec155">155</a>. But now the parts
+around the lower belly were almost cold; when, uncovering himself,
+for he had been covered over, he said (and they were his last
+words), "Crito, we owe a cock to &AElig;sculapius; pay it,
+therefore; and do not neglect it."</p>
+
+<p>"It shall be done," said Crito; "but consider whether you have
+any thing else to say."</p>
+
+<p>To this question he gave no reply; but, shortly after, he <a
+class='pagenumber' name='page174' id='page174'></a>gave a
+convulsive movement, and the man covered him, and his eyes were
+fixed; and Crito, perceiving it, closed his mouth and eyes.</p>
+
+<p>This, Echecrates, was the end of our friend,&mdash;a man, as we
+may say, the best of all of his time that we have known, and,
+moreover, the most wise and just.</p>
+
+<h3>Footnotes</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote25" name="footnote25" href=
+"#footnotetag25">25</a>: Phlius, to which Echecrates belonged, was
+a town of Sicyonia, in Peloponnesus.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote26" name="footnote26" href=
+"#footnotetag26">26</a>: A Pythagorean of Crotona.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote27" name="footnote27" href=
+"#footnotetag27">27</a>: Namely, "that it is better to die than to
+live."</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote28" name="footnote28" href=
+"#footnotetag28">28</a>: <span class=
+"greek">&#7993;&tau;&tau;&omega;</span>, Boetian for <span class=
+"greek">&#7985;&omicron;&tau;&omega;</span>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote29" name="footnote29" href=
+"#footnotetag29">29</a>: Of Pythagoras.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote30" name="footnote30" href=
+"#footnotetag30">30</a>: Some boyish spirit.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote31" name="footnote31" href=
+"#footnotetag31">31</a>: That is, at a time of life when the body
+is in full vigor.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote32" name="footnote32" href=
+"#footnotetag32">32</a>: In the original there is a play on the
+words <span class="greek">&#7945;&iota;&delta;&eta;&sigmaf;</span>
+and <span class=
+"greek">&#7937;&epsilon;&#7985;&delta;&eta;&sigmaf;</span>, which I
+can only attempt to retain by departing from the usual rendering of
+the former word.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote33" name="footnote33" href=
+"#footnotetag33">33</a>: By this I understand him to mean that the
+soul alone can perceive the truth, but the senses, as they are
+different, receive and convey different impressions of the same
+thing; thus, the eye receives one impression of an object, the ear
+a totally different one.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote34" name="footnote34" href=
+"#footnotetag34">34</a>: <span class="greek">&kappa;&alpha;&iota;
+&alpha;&#8017;&theta;&iota;&sigmaf;
+&epsilon;&tau;&epsilon;&rho;&omicron;&sigmaf; &kappa;&alpha;&iota;
+&epsilon;&tau;&epsilon;&rho;&omicron;&sigmaf;</span>, that is,
+"with one argument after another" Though Cousin translates it <span
+class="french">et successivement tout different de luimeme</span>
+and Ast, <span class="latin">et rursus alia atque alia</span>,
+which may be taken in either sense, yet it appears to me to mean
+that, when a man repeatedly discovers the fallacy of arguments
+which he before believed to be true, he distrusts reasoning
+altogether, just as one who meets with friend after friend who
+proves unfaithful becomes a misanthrope.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote35" name="footnote35" href=
+"#footnotetag35">35</a>: Lib. xx, v. 7.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote36" name="footnote36" href=
+"#footnotetag36">36</a>: Harmony was the wife of Cadmus, the
+founder of Thebes; Socrates, therefore, compares his two Theban
+friends, Simmias and Cebes, with them, and says that, having
+overcome Simmias, the advocate of Harmony, he must now deal with
+Cebes, who is represented by Cadmus.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote37" name="footnote37" href=
+"#footnotetag37">37</a>: <span class=
+"greek">&epsilon;&#7985;&nu;&alpha;&iota; &tau;&iota;</span>,
+literally, "is something."</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote38" name="footnote38" href=
+"#footnotetag38">38</a>: That is, to single.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote39" name="footnote39" href=
+"#footnotetag39">39</a>: Sec. <a href=
+"#phaedo_sec113">113</a>.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote40" name="footnote40" href=
+"#footnotetag40">40</a>: It is difficult to express the distinction
+between <span class="greek">&omicron;&sigma;&iota;&alpha;</span>
+and <span class="greek">&nu;&omicron;&mu;&iota;&mu;&alpha;</span>.
+The former word seems to have reference to the souls of the dead;
+the latter, to their bodies.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote41" name="footnote41" href=
+"#footnotetag41">41</a>: Its place of interment.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote42" name="footnote42" href=
+"#footnotetag42">42</a>: A proverb meaning "a matter of great
+difficulty."</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote43" name="footnote43" href=
+"#footnotetag43">43</a>: "Iliad," lib. viii., v. 14.</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><a id="footnote44" name="footnote44" href=
+"#footnotetag44">44</a>: A metallic substance of a deep-blue color,
+frequently mentioned by the earliest Grecian writers, but of which
+the nature is unknown.</div>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
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+Project Gutenberg's Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates
+
+Author: Plato
+
+Release Date: October 12, 2004 [EBook #13726]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK APOLOGY, CRITO, AND PHAEDO ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Jussi Kukkonen and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+PLATO'S
+
+APOLOGY, CRITO AND PHAEDO
+OF
+SOCRATES.
+
+
+
+
+Literally Translated By
+
+HENRY CARY, M.A.,
+_Worcester College, Oxford_
+
+
+
+
+With An Introduction By
+
+EDWARD BROOKS, JR.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO
+
+CRITO; OR, THE DUTY OF A CITIZEN
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDO
+
+PHAEDO; OR, THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+
+Of all writers of speculative philosophy, both ancient and modern, there
+is probably no one who has attained so eminent a position as Plato. What
+Homer was to Epic poetry, what Cicero and Demosthenes were to oratory,
+and what Shakespeare was to the drama of England, Plato was to ancient
+philosophy, not unapproachable nor unapproached, but possessing an
+inexplicable but unquestioned supremacy.
+
+The authentic records of his life are meagre, and much that has been
+written concerning him is of a speculative nature. He was born at Athens
+in the year 427 B.C. His father's name was Ariston, and his mother's
+family, which claimed its descent from Solon, included among its members
+many Athenian notables, among whom was Oritias, one of the thirty
+tyrants.
+
+In his early youth Plato applied himself to poetry and painting, both of
+which pursuits he relinquished to become the disciple and follower of
+Socrates. It is said that his name was originally Aristocles, but that
+it was changed to Plato on account of the breadth of his shoulders and
+forehead. He is also said to have been an expert wrestler and to have
+taken part in several important battles.
+
+He was the devoted friend and pupil of Socrates, and during the
+imprisonment of his master he attended him constantly, and committed to
+writing his last discourses on the immortality of the soul.
+
+After the death of Socrates it is supposed that Plato took refuge with
+Euclides in Megara, and subsequently extended his travels into Magna
+Graecia and Egypt.
+
+Upon his return to Athens he taught those who came to him for
+instruction in the grove named Academus, near the Cephisus, and thus
+founded the first great philosophical school, over which he continued to
+preside until the day of his death. Above the entrance to this grove was
+inscribed the legend: "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here." Here
+he was attended by persons of every description, among the more
+illustrious of whom were Aristotle, Lycurgus, Demosthenes and Isocrates.
+
+There is a story to the effect that Plato three times visited Sicily,
+once upon the invitation of the elder Dionysius, and twice at the
+earnest solicitations of the younger. The former he is said to have so
+seriously offended as to cause the tyrant to have him seized on his
+return home and sold as a slave, from which state of bondage he was,
+however, released by Anicerius of Cyrene.
+
+The people of his time thought more of him than they did of all their
+other philosophers, and called him the Divine Plato. So great was the
+regard and veneration for him that it was considered better to err with
+Plato than be right with any one else.
+
+The writings of Plato are numerous, and most of them are in the form of
+dialogues. The following pages contain translations of three of his
+works, viz.: "The Apologia," "The Crito" and "The Phaedo," all of which
+have reference to the trial, imprisonment and death of Socrates.
+
+"The Apologia" represents Socrates on trial for his life, undertaking
+his own defence, though unaccustomed to the language of the courts, the
+occasion being, as he says, the first time he has ever been before a
+court of justice, though seventy years of age. Plato was present at the
+trial, and no doubt gives us the very arguments used by the accused. Two
+charges were brought against Socrates--one that he did not believe in
+the gods recognized by the State, the other that he had corrupted the
+Athenian youth by his teachings. Socrates does not have recourse to the
+ordinary methods adopted by orators on similar occasions. He prefers to
+stand upon his own integrity and innocence, uninfluenced by the fear of
+that imaginary evil, death. He, therefore, does not firmly grapple with
+either of the charges preferred against him. He neither denies nor
+confesses the first accusation, but shows that in several instances he
+conformed to the religious customs of his country, and that he believes
+in God more than he fears man. The second charge he meets by a
+cross-examination of his accuser, Melitus, whom he reduces to the
+dilemma of charging him with corrupting the youth designedly, which
+would be absurd, or with doing so undesignedly, for which he could not
+be liable to punishment.
+
+His defence, however, avails him nothing, and he is condemned by the
+judges to die by drinking the poisonous hemlock. In the closing part of
+"The Apologia" Socrates is represented as commenting upon the sentence
+which has been passed upon him, and as expressing his belief that in
+going to his death he is only passing to a better and a happier life.
+
+In "The Crito" Socrates is represented in conversation with a friend of
+his named Crito, who had been present at his trial, and who had offered
+to assist Socrates in paying a fine, had a fine been the sentence
+imposed. Crito visits Socrates in his confinement to bring to him the
+intelligence that the ship, the arrival of which was to be the signal
+for his death upon the following day, would arrive forthwith, and to
+urge him to adopt the means of escape which had already been prepared.
+Socrates promises to follow the advice of Crito if, upon a full
+discussion of the matter, it seems right to do so. In the conversation
+which ensues Socrates argues that it is wrong to return evil for evil
+and that the obligations which a citizen owes to his State are more
+binding than those which a child owes his parents or a slave his master,
+and, therefore, it is his duty to submit to the laws of Athens at
+whatever cost to himself. Crito has no answer to make to this argument,
+and Socrates thereupon decides to submit to his fate.
+
+Plato is said to have had two objects in writing this dialogue: First,
+to acquit Socrates of the charge of corrupting the Athenian youth; and,
+second, to establish the fact that it is necessary under all
+circumstances to submit to the established laws of his country.
+
+"The Phaedo" relates the manner in which Socrates spent the last day of
+his life and the circumstances attending his death. He is visited by a
+number of his friends, among whom are Phaedo, Simmias and Crito. When his
+friends arrive they find him sitting upon a bed rubbing his legs, which
+have just been released from bonds. He remarks upon the unaccountable
+connection between pleasure and pain, and from this the conversation
+gradually turns to a consideration of the question of the immortality of
+the soul. He convinces his listeners of the pre-existence of the soul;
+but they are still skeptical as to its immortality, urging that its
+pre-existence and the fact that it is more durable than the body does
+not preclude the possibility of its being mortal. Socrates, however,
+argues that contraries cannot exist in the same thing at the same time,
+as, for example, the same object cannot partake of both magnitude and
+littleness at the same time. In like manner, heat while it is heat can
+never admit the idea of cold. Life and death are contraries and can
+never coexist; but wherever there is life there is soul, so that the
+soul contains that which is contrary to death and can never admit death;
+consequently the soul is immortal.
+
+Having convinced his listeners, Socrates bathes and takes leave of his
+children and the women of his family. Thereupon the officer appears and
+tells him it is time for him to drink the poison. At this his friends
+commence to weep and are rebuked by Socrates for their weakness. He
+drinks the poison calmly and without hesitation, and then begins to walk
+about, still conversing with his friends. His limbs soon grow stiff and
+heavy and he lays himself down upon his back. His last words are:
+"Crito, we owe a cock to AEsculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not
+neglect it."
+
+
+
+
+THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.
+
+
+I know not, O Athenians! how far you have been influenced by my accusers
+for my part, in listening to them I almost forgot myself, so plausible
+were their arguments however, so to speak, they have said nothing true.
+But of the many falsehoods which they uttered I wondered at one of them
+especially, that in which they said that you ought to be on your guard
+lest you should be deceived by me, as being eloquent in speech. For that
+they are not ashamed of being forthwith convicted by me in fact, when I
+shall show that I am not by any means eloquent, this seemed to me the
+most shameless thing in them, unless indeed they call him eloquent who
+speaks the truth. For, if they mean this, then I would allow that I am
+an orator, but not after their fashion for they, as I affirm, have said
+nothing true, but from me you shall hear the whole truth. Not indeed,
+Athenians, arguments highly wrought, as theirs were, with choice phrases
+and expressions, nor adorned, but you shall hear a speech uttered
+without premeditation in such words as first present themselves. For I
+am confident that what I say will be just, and let none of you expect
+otherwise, for surely it would not become my time of life to come before
+you like a youth with a got up speech. Above all things, therefore, I
+beg and implore this of you, O Athenians! if you hear me defending
+myself in the same language as that in which I am accustomed to speak
+both in the forum at the counters, where many of you have heard me, and
+elsewhere, not to be surprised or disturbed on this account. For the
+case is this: I now for the first time come before a court of justice,
+though more than seventy years old; I am therefore utterly a stranger to
+the language here. As, then, if I were really a stranger, you would have
+pardoned me if I spoke in the language and the manner in which I had
+been educated, so now I ask this of you as an act of justice, as it
+appears to me, to disregard the manner of my speech, for perhaps it may
+be somewhat worse, and perhaps better, and to consider this only, and to
+give your attention to this, whether I speak what is just or not; for
+this is the virtue of a judge, but of an orator to speak the truth.
+
+2. First, then, O Athenians! I am right in defending myself against the
+first false accusations alleged against me, and my first accusers, and
+then against the latest accusations, and the latest accusers. For many
+have been accusers of me to you, and for many years, who have asserted
+nothing true, of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his party,
+although they too are formidable; but those are still more formidable,
+Athenians, who, laying hold of many of you from childhood, have
+persuaded you, and accused me of what is not true: "that there is one
+Socrates, a wise man, who occupies himself about celestial matters, and
+has explored every thing under the earth, and makes the worse appear the
+better reason." Those, O Athenians! who have spread abroad this report
+are my formidable accusers; for they who hear them think that such as
+search into these things do not believe that there are gods. In the next
+place, these accusers are numerous, and have accused me now for a long
+time; moreover, they said these things to you at that time of life in
+which you were most credulous, when you were boys and some of you
+youths, and they accused me altogether in my absence, when there was no
+one to defend me. But the most unreasonable thing of all is, that it is
+not possible to learn and mention their names, except that one of them
+happens to be a comic poet.[1] Such, however, as, influenced by envy and
+calumny, have persuaded you, and those who, being themselves persuaded,
+have persuaded others, all these are most difficult to deal with; for it
+is not possible to bring any of them forward here, nor to confute any;
+but it is altogether necessary to fight, as it were with a shadow, in
+making my defense, and to convict when there is no one to answer.
+Consider, therefore, as I have said, that my accusers are twofold, some
+who have lately accused me, and others long since, whom I have made
+mention of; and believe that I ought to defend myself against these
+first; for you heard them accusing me first, and much more than these
+last.
+
+Well. I must make my defense, then, O Athenians! and endeavor in this so
+short a space of time to remove from your minds the calumny which you
+have long entertained. I wish, indeed, it might be so, if it were at all
+better both for you and me, and that in making my defense I could effect
+something more advantageous still: I think, however, that it will be
+difficult, and I am not entirely ignorant what the difficulty is.
+Nevertheless, let this turn out as may be pleasing to God, I must obey
+the law and make my defense.
+
+3. Let us, then, repeat from the beginning what the accusation is from
+which the calumny against me has arisen, and relying on which Melitus
+has preferred this indictment against me. Well. What, then, do they who
+charge me say in their charge? For it is necessary to read their
+deposition as of public accusers. "Socrates acts wickedly, and is
+criminally curious in searching into things under the earth, and in the
+heavens, and in making the worse appear the better cause, and in
+teaching these same things to others." Such is the accusation: for such
+things you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes, one
+Socrates there carried about, saying that he walks in the air, and
+acting many other buffooneries, of which I understand nothing whatever.
+Nor do I say this as disparaging such a science, if there be any one
+skilled in such things, only let me not be prosecuted by Melitus on a
+charge of this kind; but I say it, O Athenians! because I have nothing
+to do with such matters. And I call upon most of you as witnesses of
+this, and require you to inform and tell each other, as many of you as
+have ever heard me conversing; and there are many such among you.
+Therefore tell each other, if any one of you has ever heard me
+conversing little or much on such subjects. And from this you will know
+that other things also, which the multitude assert of me, are of a
+similar nature.
+
+4. However not one of these things is true; nor, if you have heard from
+any one that I attempt to teach men, and require payment, is this true.
+Though this, indeed, appears to me to be an honorable thing, if one
+should be able to instruct men, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the
+Cean, and Hippias the Elean. For each of these, O Athenians! is able, by
+going through the several cities, to persuade the young men, who can
+attach themselves gratuitously to such of their own fellow-citizens as
+they please, to abandon their fellow-citizens and associate with them,
+giving them money and thanks besides. There is also another wise man
+here, a Parian, who, I hear, is staying in the city. For I happened to
+visit a person who spends more money on the sophists than all others
+together: I mean Callias, son of Hipponicus. I therefore asked him, for
+he has two sons, "Callias," I said, "if your two sons were colts or
+calves, we should have had to choose a master for them, and hire a
+person who would make them excel in such qualities as belong to their
+nature; and he would have been a groom or an agricultural laborer. But
+now, since your sons are men, what master do you intend to choose for
+them? Who is there skilled in the qualities that become a man and a
+citizen? For I suppose you must have considered this, since you have
+sons. Is there any one," I said, "or not?" "Certainly," he answered.
+"Who is he?" said I, "and whence does he come? and on what terms does he
+teach?" He replied, "Evenus the Parian, Socrates, for five minae." And I
+deemed Evenus happy, if he really possesses this art, and teaches
+admirably. And I too should think highly of myself, and be very proud,
+if I possessed this knowledge, but I possess it not, O Athenians.
+
+5. Perhaps, one of you may now object: "But, Socrates, what have you
+done, then? Whence have these calumnies against you arisen? For surely
+if you had not busied yourself more than others, such a report and story
+would never have got abroad, unless you had done something different
+from what most men do. Tell us, therefore, what it is, that we may not
+pass a hasty judgment on you." He who speaks thus appears to me to speak
+justly, and I will endeavor to show you what it is that has occasioned
+me this character and imputation. Listen, then: to some of you perhaps I
+shall appear to jest, yet be assured that I shall tell you the whole
+truth. For I, O Athenians! have acquired this character through nothing
+else than a certain wisdom. Of what kind, then, is this wisdom? Perhaps
+it is merely human wisdom. For in this, in truth, I appear to be wise.
+They probably, whom I have just now mentioned, possessed a wisdom more
+than human, otherwise I know not what to say about it; for I am not
+acquainted with it, and whosoever says I am, speaks falsely, and for the
+purpose of calumniating me. But, O Athenians! do not cry out against me,
+even though I should seem to you to speak somewhat arrogantly. For the
+account which I am going to give you is not my own; but I shall refer to
+an authority whom you will deem worthy of credit. For I shall adduce to
+you the god at Delphi as a witness of my wisdom, if I have any, and of
+what it is. You doubtless know Chaerepho: he was my associate from youth,
+and the associate of most of you; he accompanied you in your late exile,
+and returned with you. You know, then, what kind of a man Chaerepho was,
+how earnest in whatever he undertook. Having once gone to Delphi, he
+ventured to make the following inquiry of the oracle (and, as I said, O
+Athenians! do not cry out), for he asked if there was any one wiser than
+I. The Pythian thereupon answered that there was not one wiser; and of
+this, his brother here will give you proofs, since he himself is dead.
+
+6. Consider, then, why I mention these things: it is because I am going
+to show you whence the calumny against me arose. For when I heard this,
+I reasoned thus with myself, What does the god mean? What enigma is
+this? For I am not conscious to myself that I am wise, either much or
+little. What, then, does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For
+assuredly he does not speak falsely: that he could not do. And for a
+long time I was in doubt what he meant; afterward, with considerable
+difficulty, I had recourse to the following method of searching out his
+meaning. I went to one of those who have the character of being wise,
+thinking that there, if anywhere, I should confute the oracle, and show
+in answer to the response that This man is wiser than I, though you
+affirmed that I was the wisest. Having, then, examined this man (for
+there is no occasion to mention his name; he was, however, one of our
+great politicians, in examining whom I felt as I proceed to describe, O
+Athenians!), having fallen into conversation with him, this man appeared
+to be wise in the opinion of most other men, and especially in his own
+opinion, though in fact he was not so. I thereupon endeavored to show
+him that he fancied himself to be wise, but really was not. Hence I
+became odious, both to him and to many others who were present. When I
+left him, I reasoned thus with myself: I am wiser than this man, for
+neither of us appears to know anything great and good; but he fancies he
+knows something, although he knows nothing; whereas I, as I do not know
+anything, so I do not fancy I do. In this trifling particular, then, I
+appear to be wiser than he, because I do not fancy I know what I do not
+know. After that I went to another who was thought to be wiser than the
+former, and formed the very same opinion. Hence I became odious to him
+and to many others.
+
+7. After this I went to others in turn, perceiving indeed, and grieving
+and alarmed, that I was making myself odious; however, it appeared
+necessary to regard the oracle of the god as of the greatest moment, and
+that, in order to discover its meaning, I must go to all who had the
+reputation of possessing any knowledge. And by the dog, O Athenians! for
+I must tell you the truth, I came to some such conclusion as this: those
+who bore the highest reputation appeared to me to be most deficient, in
+my researches in obedience to the god, and others who were considered
+inferior more nearly approaching to the possession of understanding. But
+I must relate to you my wandering, and the labors which I underwent, in
+order that the oracle might prove incontrovertible. For after the
+politicians I went to the poets, as well the tragic as the dithyrambic
+and others, expecting that here I should in very fact find myself more
+ignorant than they. Taking up, therefore, some of their poems, which
+appeared to me most elaborately finished, I questioned them as to their
+meaning, that at the same time I might learn something from them. I am
+ashamed, O Athenians! to tell you the truth; however, it must be told.
+For, in a word, almost all who were present could have given a better
+account of them than those by whom they had been composed. I soon
+discovered this, therefore, with regard to the poets, that they do not
+effect their object by wisdom, but by a certain natural inspiration, and
+under the influence of enthusiasm, like prophets and seers; for these
+also say many fine things, but they understand nothing that they say.
+The poets appeared to me to be affected in a similar manner; and at the
+same time I perceived that they considered themselves, on account of
+their poetry, to be the wisest of men in other things, in which they
+were not. I left them, therefore, under the persuasion that I was
+superior to them, in the same way that I was to the politicians.
+
+8. At last, therefore, I went to the artisans. For I was conscious to
+myself that I knew scarcely anything, but I was sure that I should find
+them possessed of much beautiful knowledge. And in this I was not
+deceived; for they knew things which I did not, and in this respect they
+were wiser than I. But, O Athenians! even the best workmen appeared to
+me to have fallen into the same error as the poets; for each, because he
+excelled in the practice of his art, thought that he was very wise in
+other most important matters, and this mistake of theirs obscured the
+wisdom that they really possessed. I therefore asked myself, in behalf
+of the oracle, whether I should prefer to continue as I am, possessing
+none, either of their wisdom or their ignorance, or to have both as they
+have. I answered, therefore, to myself and to the oracle, that it was
+better for me to continue as I am.
+
+9. From this investigation, then, O Athenians! many enmities have arisen
+against me, and those the most grievous and severe, so that many
+calumnies have sprung from them, and among them this appellation of
+being wise; for those who are from time to time present think that I am
+wise in those things, with respect to which I expose the ignorance of
+others. The god, however, O Athenians! appears to be really wise, and to
+mean this by his oracle: that human wisdom is worth little or nothing;
+and it is clear that he did not say this to Socrates, but made use of my
+name, putting me forward as an example, as if he had said, that man is
+the wisest among you, who, like Socrates, knows that he is in reality
+worth nothing with respect to wisdom. Still, therefore, I go about and
+search and inquire into these things, in obedience to the god, both
+among citizens and strangers, if I think any one of them is wise; and
+when he appears to me not to be so, I take the part of the god, and show
+that he is not wise. And, in consequence of this occupation, I have no
+leisure to attend in any considerable degree to the affairs of the state
+or my own; but I am in the greatest poverty through my devotion to the
+service of the god.
+
+10. In addition to this, young men, who have much leisure and belong to
+the wealthiest families, following me of their own accord, take great
+delight in hearing men put to the test, and often imitate me, and
+themselves attempt to put others to the test; and then, I think, they
+find a great abundance of men who fancy they know something, although
+they know little or nothing. Hence those who are put to the test by them
+are angry with me, and not with them, and say that "there is one
+Socrates, a most pestilent fellow, who corrupts the youth." And when any
+one asks them by doing or teaching what, they have nothing to say, for
+they do not know; but, that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say
+such things as are ready at hand against all philosophers; "that he
+searches into things in heaven and things under the earth, that he does
+not believe there are gods, and that he makes the worse appear the
+better reason." For they would not, I think, be willing to tell the
+truth that they have been detected in pretending to possess knowledge,
+whereas they know nothing. Therefore, I think, being ambitions and
+vehement and numerous, and speaking systematically and persuasively
+about me, they have filled your ears, for a long time and diligently
+calumniating me. From among these, Melitus, Anytus and Lycon have
+attacked me; Melitus being angry on account of the poets, Anytus on
+account of the artisans and politicians, and Lycon on account of the
+rhetoricians. So that, as I said in the beginning, I should wonder if I
+were able in so short a time to remove from your minds a calumny that
+has prevailed so long. This, O Athenians! is the truth; and I speak it
+without concealing or disguising anything from you, much or little;
+though I very well know that by so doing I shall expose myself to odium.
+This, however, is a proof that I speak the truth, and that this is the
+nature of the calumny against me, and that these are its causes. And if
+you will investigate the matter, either now or hereafter, you will find
+it to be so.
+
+11. With respect, then, to the charges which my first accusers have
+alleged against me, let this be a sufficient apology to you. To Melitus,
+that good and patriotic man, as he says, and to my later accusers, I
+will next endeavor to give an answer; and here, again, as there are
+different accusers, let us take up their deposition. It is pretty much
+as follows: "Socrates," it says, "acts unjustly in corrupting the youth,
+and in not believing in those gods in whom the city believes, but in
+other strange divinities." Such is the accusation; let us examine each
+particular of it. It says that I act unjustly in corrupting the youth.
+But I, O Athenians! say that Melitus acts unjustly, because he jests on
+serious subjects, rashly putting men upon trial, under pretense of being
+zealous and solicitous about things in which he never at any time took
+any concern. But that this is the case I will endeavor to prove to you.
+
+12. Come, then, Melitus, tell me, do you not consider it of the greatest
+importance that the youth should be made as virtuous as possible?
+
+_Mel._ I do.
+
+_Socr._ Well, now, tell the judges who it is that makes them better, for
+it is evident that you know, since it concerns you so much; for, having
+detected me in corrupting them, as you say, you have cited me here, and
+accused me: come, then, say, and inform the judges who it is that makes
+them better. Do you see, Melitus, that you are silent, and have nothing
+to say? But does it not appear to you to be disgraceful, and a
+sufficient proof of what I say, that you never took any concern about
+the matter? But tell me, friend, who makes them better?
+
+_Mel._ The laws.
+
+_Socr._ I do not ask this, most excellent sir, but what man, who surely
+must first know this very thing, the laws?
+
+_Mel._ These, Socrates, the judges.
+
+_Socr._ How say you, Melitus? Are these able to instruct the youth, and
+make them better?
+
+_Mel._ Certainly.
+
+_Socr._ Whether all, or some of them, and others not?
+
+_Mel._ All.
+
+_Socr._ You say well, by Juno! and have found a great abundance of those
+that confer benefit. But what further? Can these hearers make them
+better, or not?
+
+_Mel._ They, too, can.
+
+_Socr._ And what of the senators?
+
+_Mel._ The senators, also.
+
+_Socr._ But, Melitus, do those who attend the public assemblies corrupt
+the younger men? or do they all make them better?
+
+_Mel._ They too.
+
+_Socr._ All the Athenians, therefore, as it seems, make them honorable
+and good, except me; but I alone corrupt them. Do you say so?
+
+_Mel._ I do assert this very thing.
+
+_Socr._ You charge me with great ill-fortune. But answer me: does it
+appear to you to be the same, with respect to horses? Do all men make
+them better, and is there only some one that spoils them? or does quite
+the contrary of this take place? Is there some one person who can make
+them better, or very few; that is, the trainers? But if the generality
+of men should meddle with and make use of horses, do they spoil them? Is
+not this the case, Melitus, both with respect to horses and all other
+animals? It certainly is so, whether you and Anytus deny it or not. For
+it would be a great good-fortune for the youth if only one person
+corrupted, and the rest benefited them. However, Melitus, you have
+sufficiently shown that you never bestowed any care upon youth; and you
+clearly evince your own negligence, in that you have never paid any
+attention to the things with respect to which you accuse me.
+
+13. Tell us further, Melitus, in the name of Jupiter, whether is it
+better to dwell with good or bad citizens? Answer, my friend; for I ask
+you nothing difficult. Do not the bad work some evil to those that are
+continually near them, but the good some good?
+
+_Mel._ Certainly.
+
+_Socr._ Is there any one that wishes to be injured rather than benefited
+by his associates? Answer, good man; for the law requires you to answer.
+Is there any one who wishes to be injured?
+
+_Mel._ No, surely.
+
+_Socr._ Come, then, whether do you accuse me here, as one that corrupts
+the youth, and makes them more depraved, designedly or undesignedly?
+
+_Mel._ Designedly, I say.
+
+_Socr._ What, then, Melitus, are you at your time of life so much wiser
+than I at my time of life, as to know that the evil are always working
+some evil to those that are most near to them, and the good some good;
+but I have arrived at such a pitch of ignorance as not to know that if I
+make any one of my associates depraved, I shall be in danger of
+receiving some evil from him; and yet I designedly bring about this so
+great evil, as you say? In this I can not believe you, Melitus, nor do I
+think would any other man in the world. But either I do not corrupt the
+youth, or, if I do corrupt them, I do it undesignedly: so that in both
+cases you speak falsely. But if I corrupt them undesignedly, for such
+involuntary offenses it is not usual to accuse one here, but to take one
+apart, and teach and admonish one. For it is evident that if I am
+taught, I shall cease doing what I do undesignedly. But you shunned me,
+and were not willing to associate with and instruct me; but you accuse
+me here, where it is usual to accuse those who need punishment, and not
+instruction.
+
+14. Thus, then, O Athenians! this now is clear that I have said; that
+Melitus never paid any attention to these matters, much or little.
+However, tell us, Melitus, how you say I corrupt the youth? Is it not
+evidently, according to the indictment which you have preferred, by
+teaching them not to believe in the gods in whom the city believes, but
+in other strange deities? Do you not say that, by teaching these things,
+I corrupt the youth?
+
+_Mel._ Certainly I do say so.
+
+_Socr._ By those very gods, therefore, Melitus, of whom the discussion
+now is, speak still more clearly both to me and to these men. For I can
+not understand whether you say that I teach them to believe that there
+are certain gods (and in that case I do believe that there are gods, and
+am not altogether an atheist, nor in this respect to blame), not,
+however, those which the city believes in, but others; and this it is
+that you accuse me of, that I introduce others. Or do you say outright
+that I do not myself believe that there are gods, and that I teach
+others the same?
+
+_Mel._ I say this: that you do not believe in any gods at all.
+
+_Socr._ O wonderful Melitus, how come you to say this? Do I not, then,
+like the rest of mankind, believe that the sun and moon are gods?
+
+_Mel._ No, by Jupiter, O judges! for he says that the sun is a stone,
+and the moon an earth.
+
+_Socr._ You fancy that you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Melitus, and
+thus you put a slight on these men, and suppose them to be so illiterate
+as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomene are full of
+such assertions. And the young, moreover, learn these things from me,
+which they might purchase for a drachma, at most, in the orchestra, and
+so ridicule Socrates, if he pretended they were his own, especially
+since they are so absurd? I ask then, by Jupiter, do I appear to you to
+believe that there is no god?
+
+_Mel._ No, by Jupiter, none whatever.
+
+_Socr._ You say what is incredible, Melitus, and that, as appears to me,
+even to yourself. For this man, O Athenians! appears to me to be very
+insolent and intemperate and to have preferred this indictment through
+downright insolence, intemperance, and wantonness. For he seems, as it
+were, to have composed an enigma for the purpose of making an
+experiment. Whether will Socrates the wise know that I am jesting, and
+contradict myself, or shall I deceive him and all who hear me? For, in
+my opinion, he clearly contradicts himself in the indictment, as if he
+should say, Socrates is guilty of wrong in not believing that there are
+gods, and in believing that there are gods. And this, surely, is the act
+of one who is trifling.
+
+15. Consider with me now, Athenians, in what respect he appears to me to
+say so. And do you, Melitus, answer me; and do ye, as I besought you at
+the outset, remember not to make an uproar if I speak after my usual
+manner.
+
+Is there any man, Melitus, who believes that there are human affairs,
+but does not believe that there are men? Let him answer, judges, and not
+make so much noise. Is there any one who does not believe that there are
+horses, but that there are things pertaining to horses? or who does not
+believe that there are pipers, but that there are things pertaining to
+pipes? There is not, O best of men! for since you are not willing to
+answer, I say it to you and to all here present. But answer to this at
+least: is there any one who believes that there are things relating to
+demons, but does not believe that there are demons?
+
+_Mel._ There is not.
+
+_Socr._ How obliging you are in having hardly answered; though compelled
+by these judges! You assert, then, that I do believe and teach things
+relating to demons, whether they be new or old; therefore, according to
+your admission, I do believe in things relating to demons, and this you
+have sworn in the bill of indictment. If, then, I believe in things
+relating to demons, there is surely an absolute necessity that I should
+believe that there are demons. Is it not so? It is. For I suppose you to
+assent, since you do not answer. But with respect to demons, do we not
+allow that they are gods, or the children of gods? Do you admit this or
+not?
+
+_Mel._ Certainly.
+
+_Socr._ Since, then, I allow that there are demons, as you admit, if
+demons are a kind of gods, this is the point in which I say you speak
+enigmatically and divert yourself in saying that I do not allow there
+are gods, and again that I do allow there are, since I allow that there
+are demons? But if demons are the children of gods, spurious ones,
+either from nymphs or any others, of whom they are reported to be, what
+man can think that there are sons of gods, and yet that there are not
+gods? For it would be just as absurd as if any one should think that
+there are mules, the offspring of horses and asses, but should not think
+there are horses and asses. However, Melitus, it can not be otherwise
+than that you have preferred this indictment for the purpose of trying
+me, or because you were at a loss what real crime to allege against me;
+for that you should persuade any man who has the smallest degree of
+sense that the same person can think that there are things relating to
+demons and to gods, and yet that there are neither demons, nor gods,
+not heroes, is utterly impossible.
+
+16. That I am not guilty, then, O Athenians! according to the indictment
+of Melitus, appears to me not to require a lengthened defense; but what
+I have said is sufficient. And as to what I said at the beginning, that
+there is a great enmity toward me among the multitude, be assured it is
+true. And this it is which will condemn me, if I am condemned, not
+Melitus, nor Anytus, but the calumny and envy of the multitude, which
+have already condemned many others, and those good men, and will, I
+think, condemn others also; for there is no danger that it will stop
+with me.
+
+Perhaps, however, some one may say, "Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to
+have pursued a study from which you are now in danger of dying?" To such
+a person I should answer with good reason, You do not say well, friend,
+if you think that a man, who is even of the least value, ought to take
+into the account the risk of life or death, and ought not to consider
+that alone when be performs any action, whether he is acting justly or
+unjustly, and the part of a good man or bad man. For, according to your
+reasoning, all those demi-gods that died at Troy would be vile
+characters, as well all the rest as the son of Thetis, who so far
+despised danger in comparison of submitting to disgrace, that when his
+mother, who was a goddess, spoke to him, in his impatience to kill
+Hector, something to this effect, as I think,[2] "My son, if you revenge
+the death of your friend Patroclus, and slay Hector, you will yourself
+die, for," she said, "death awaits you immediately after Hector;" but
+he, on hearing this, despised death and danger, and dreading much more
+to live as a coward, and not avenge his friend, said, "May I die
+immediately when I have inflicted punishment on the guilty, that I may
+not stay here an object of ridicule, by the curved ships, a burden to
+the ground?"--do you think that he cared for death and danger? For thus
+it is, O Athenians! in truth: wherever any one has posted himself,
+either thinking it to be better, or has been posted by his chief, there,
+as it appears to me, he ought to remain and meet danger, taking no
+account either of death or anything else in comparison with disgrace.
+
+17. I then should be acting strangely, O Athenians! if, when the
+generals whom you chose to command me assigned me my post at Potidaea, at
+Amphipolis, and at Delium, I then remained where they posted me, like
+any other person, and encountered the danger of death; but when the
+deity, as I thought and believed, assigned it as my duty to pass my life
+in the study of philosophy, and examining myself and others, I should on
+that occasion, through fear of death or any thing else whatsoever,
+desert my post, strange indeed would it be; and then, in truth, any one
+might justly bring me to trial, and accuse me of not believing in the
+gods, from disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking myself to
+be wise when I am not. For to fear death, O Athenians! is nothing else
+than to appear to be wise, without being so; for it is to appear to know
+what one does not know. For no one knows but that death is the greatest
+of all good to man; but men fear it, as if they well knew that it is the
+greatest of evils. And how is not this the most reprehensible ignorance,
+to think that one knows what one does not know? But I, O Athenians! in
+this, perhaps, differ from most men; and if I should say that I am in
+any thing wiser than another, it would be in this, that not having a
+competent knowledge of the things in Hades, I also think that I have not
+such knowledge. But to act unjustly, and to disobey my superior,
+whether God or man, I know is evil and base. I shall never, therefore,
+fear or shun things which, for aught I know, maybe good, before evils
+which I know to be evils. So that, even if you should now dismiss me,
+not yielding to the instances of Anytus, who said that either I should
+not[3] appear here at all, or that, if I did appear, it was impossible
+not to put me to death, telling you that if I escaped, your sons,
+studying what Socrates teaches, would all be utterly corrupted; if you
+should address me thus, "Socrates, we shall not now yield to Anytus, but
+dismiss you, on this condition, however, that you no longer persevere in
+your researches nor study philosophy; and if hereafter you are detected
+in so doing, you shall die"--if, as I said, you should dismiss, me on
+these terms, I should say to you, "O Athenians! I honor and love you;
+but I shall obey God rather than you; and so long as I breathe and am
+able, I shall not cease studying philosophy, and exhorting you and
+warning any one of you I may happen to meet, saying, as I have been
+accustomed to do: 'O best of men! seeing you are an Athenian, of a city
+the most powerful and most renowned for wisdom and strength, are you not
+ashamed of being careful for riches, how you may acquire them in
+greatest abundance, and for glory, and honor, but care not nor take any
+thought for wisdom and truth, and for your soul, how it maybe made most
+perfect?'" And if any one of you should question my assertion, and
+affirm that he does care for these things, I shall not at once let him
+go, nor depart, but I shall question him, sift and prove him. And if he
+should appear to me not to possess virtue, but to pretend that he does,
+I shall reproach him for that he sets the least value on things of the
+greatest worth, but the highest on things that are worthless. Thus I
+shall act to all whom I meet, both young and old, stranger and citizen,
+but rather to you, my fellow-citizens, because ye are more nearly allied
+to me. For be well assured, this the deity commands. And I think that no
+greater good has ever befallen you in the city than my zeal for the
+service of the god. For I go about doing nothing else than persuading
+you, both young and old, to take no care either for the body, or for
+riches, prior to or so much as for the soul, how it may be made most
+perfect, telling you that virtue does not spring from riches, but riches
+and all other human blessings, both private and public, from virtue. If,
+then, by saying these things, I corrupt the youth, these things must be
+mischievous; but if any one says that I speak other things than these,
+he misleads you.[4] Therefore I must say, O Athenians! either yield to
+Anytus, or do not, either dismiss me or not, since I shall not act
+otherwise, even though I must die many deaths.
+
+18. Murmur not, O Athenians! but continue to attend to my request, not
+to murmur at what I say, but to listen, for, as I think, you will derive
+benefit from listening. For I am going to say other things to you, at
+which, perhaps, you will raise a clamor; but on no account do so. Be
+well assured, then, if you put me to death, being such a man as I say I
+am, you will not injure me more than yourselves. For neither will
+Melitus nor Anytus harm me; nor have they the power; for I do not think
+that it is possible for a better man to be injured by a worse. He may
+perhaps have me condemned to death, or banished, or deprived of civil
+rights; and he or others may perhaps consider these as mighty evils; I,
+how ever, do not consider them so, but that it is much more so to do
+what he is now doing, to endeavor to put a man to death unjustly. Now,
+therefore, O Athenians! I am far from making a defense on my behalf, as
+any one might think, but I do so on your own behalf, lest by condemning
+me you should offend at all with respect to the gift of the deity to
+you. For, if you should put me to death, you will not easily find such
+another, though it may be ridiculous to say so, altogether attached by
+the deity to this city as to a powerful and generous horse, somewhat
+sluggish from his size, and requiring to be roused by a gad-fly; so the
+deity appears to have united me, being such a person as I am, to the
+city, that I may rouse you, and persuade and reprove every one of you,
+nor ever cease besetting you throughout the whole day. Such another man,
+O Athenians! will not easily be found; therefore, if you will take my
+advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, being irritated like drowsy
+persons who are roused from sleep, will strike me, and, yielding to
+Anytus, will unthinkingly condemn me to death; and then you will pass
+the rest of your life in sleep, unless the deity, caring for you, should
+send some one else to you. But that I am a person who has been given by
+the deity to this city, you may discern from hence; for it is not like
+the ordinary conduct of men, that I should have neglected all my own
+affairs, and suffered my private interest to be neglected for so many
+years, and that I should constantly attend to your concerns, addressing
+myself to each of you separately, like a father, or elder brother,
+persuading you to the pursuit of virtue. And if I had derived any profit
+from this course, and had received pay for my exhortations, there would
+have been some reason for my conduct; but now you see yourselves that my
+accusers, who have so shamelessly calumniated me in everything else,
+have not had the impudence to charge me with this, and to bring
+witnesses to prove that I ever either exacted or demanded any reward.
+And I think I produce a sufficient proof that I speak the truth,
+namely, my poverty.
+
+19. Perhaps, however, it may appear absurd that I, going about, thus
+advise you in private and make myself busy, but never venture to present
+myself in public before your assemblies and give advice to the city. The
+cause of this is that which you have often and in many places heard me
+mention; because I am moved by a certain divine and spiritual influence,
+which also Melitus, through mockery, has set out in the indictment. This
+began with me from childhood, being a kind of voice which, when present,
+always diverts me from what I am about to do, but never urges me on.
+This it is which opposed my meddling in public politics; and it appears
+to me to have opposed me very properly. For be well assured, O
+Athenians! if I had long since attempted to intermeddle with politics, I
+should have perished long ago, and should not have at all benefited you
+or myself. And be not angry with me for speaking the truth. For it is
+not possible that any man should be safe who sincerely opposes either
+you, or any other multitude, and who prevents many unjust and illegal
+actions from being committed in a city; but it is necessary that he who
+in earnest contends for justice, if he will be safe for but a short
+time, should live privately, and take no part in public affairs.
+
+20. I will give you strong proofs of this, not words, but what you
+value, facts. Hear, then, what has happened to me, that you may know
+that I would not yield to any one contrary to what is just, through fear
+of death, at the same time by not yielding I must perish. I shall tell
+you what will be displeasing and wearisome,[5] yet true. For I, O
+Athenians! never bore any other magisterial office in the city, but
+have been a senator: and our Antiochean tribe happened to supply the
+Prytanes when you chose to condemn in a body the ten generals who had
+not taken off those that perished in the sea-fight, in violation of the
+law, as you afterward all thought. At that time I alone of the Prytanes
+opposed your doing anything contrary to the laws, and I voted against
+you; and when the orators were ready to denounce me, and to carry me
+before a magistrate, and you urged and cheered them on, I thought I
+ought rather to meet the danger with law and justice on my side, than
+through fear of imprisonment or death, to take part with you in your
+unjust designs. And this happened while the city was governed by a
+democracy. But when it became an oligarchy, the Thirty, having sent for
+me with four others to the Tholus, ordered us to bring Leon the
+Salaminian from Salamis, that he might be put to death; and they gave
+many similar orders to many others, wishing to involve as many as they
+could in guilt. Then, however, I showed, not in word but in deed, that I
+did not care for death, if the expression be not too rude, in the
+smallest degree; but that all my care was to do nothing unjust or
+unholy. For that government, strong as it was, did not so overawe me as
+to make me commit an unjust action; but when we came out from the
+Tholus, the four went to Salamis, and brought back Leon; but I went away
+home. And perhaps for this I should have been put to death, if that
+government had not been speedily broken up. And of this you can have
+many witnesses.
+
+21. Do you think, then, that I should have survived so many years if I
+had engaged in public affairs, and, acting as becomes a good man, had
+aided the cause of justice, and, as I ought, had deemed this of the
+highest importance? Far from it, O Athenians! nor would any other man
+have done so. But I, through the whole of my life, if I have done
+anything in public, shall be found to be a man, and the very same in
+private, who has never made a concession to any one contrary to justice,
+neither to any other, nor to any one of these whom my calumniators say
+are my disciples. I, however, was never the preceptor of any one; but if
+any one desired to hear me speaking, and to see me busied about my own
+mission, whether he were young or old, I never refused him. Nor do I
+discourse when I receive money, and not when I do not receive any, but I
+allow both rich and poor alike to question me, and, if any one wishes
+it, to answer me and hear what I have to say. And for these, whether any
+one proves to be a good man or not, I cannot justly be responsible,
+because I never either promised them any instruction or taught them at
+all. But if any one says that he has ever learned or heard anything from
+me in private which all others have not, be well assured that he does
+not speak the truth.
+
+22. But why do some delight to spend so long a time with me? Ye have
+heard, O Athenians! I have told you the whole truth, that they delight
+to hear those closely questioned who think that they are wise but are
+not; for this is by no means disagreeable. But this duty, as I say, has
+been enjoined me by the deity, by oracles, by dreams, and by every mode
+by which any other divine decree has ever enjoined anything to man to
+do. These things, O Athenians! are both true, and easily confuted if not
+true. For if I am now corrupting some of the youths, and have already
+corrupted others, it were fitting, surely, that if any of them, having
+become advanced in life, had discovered that I gave them bad advice when
+they were young, they should now rise up against me, accuse me, and have
+me punished; or if they were themselves unwilling to do this, some of
+their kindred, their fathers, or brothers, or other relatives, if their
+kinsman have ever sustained any damage from me, should now call it to
+mind. Many of them, however, are here present, whom I see: first, Crito,
+my contemporary and fellow-burgher, father of this Critobulus; then
+Lysanias of Sphettus, father of this AEschines; again, Antiphon of
+Cephisus, father of Epigenes. There are those others, too, whose
+brothers maintained the same intimacy with me, namely, Nicostratus, son
+of Theodotus, brother of Theodotus--Theodotus indeed is dead, so that he
+could not deprecate his brother's proceedings--and Paralus here, son of
+Demodocus, whose brother was Theages; and Adimantus, son of Ariston,
+whose brother is this Plato; and AEantodorus, whose brother is this
+Apollodorus. I could also mention many others to you, some one of whom
+certainly Melitus ought to have adduced in his speech as a witness. If,
+however, he then forgot to do so, let him now adduce them; I give him
+leave to do so, and let him say it, if he has anything of the kind to
+allege. But, quite contrary to this, you will find, O Athenians! all
+ready to assist me, who have corrupted and injured their relatives, as
+Melitus and Anytus say. For those who have been themselves corrupted
+might perhaps have some reason for assisting me; but those who have not
+been corrupted, men now advanced in life, their relatives, what other
+reason can they have for assisting me, except that right and just one,
+that they know that Melitus speaks falsely, and that I speak the truth.
+
+23. Well, then, Athenians, these are pretty much the things I have to
+say in my defense, and others perhaps of the same kind. Perhaps,
+however, some among you will be indignant on recollecting his own case,
+if he, when engaged in a cause far less than this, implored and besought
+the judges with many tears, bringing forward his children in order that
+he might excite their utmost compassion, and many others of his
+relatives and friends, whereas I do none of these things, although I may
+appear to be incurring the extremity of danger. Perhaps, therefore, some
+one, taking notice of this, may become more determined against me, and,
+being enraged at this very conduct of mine, may give his vote under the
+influence of anger. If, then, any one of you is thus affected--I do not,
+however, suppose that there is--but if there should be, I think I may
+reasonably say to him: "I, too, O best of men, have relatives; for, to
+make use of that saying of Homer, I am not sprung from an oak, nor from
+a rock, but from men, so that I, too, O Athenians! have relatives, and
+three sons, one now grown up, and two boys: I shall not, however, bring
+any one of them forward and implore you to acquit me." Why, then, shall I
+not do this? Not from contumacy, O Athenians! nor disrespect toward you.
+Whether or not I am undaunted at the prospect of death is another
+question; but, out of regard to my own character, and yours, and that of
+the whole city, it does not appear to me to be honorable that I should
+do any thing of this kind at my age, and with the reputation I have,
+whether true or false. For it is commonly agreed that Socrates in some
+respects excels the generality of men. If, then, those among you who
+appear to excel either in wisdom, or fortitude, or any other virtue
+whatsoever, should act in such a manner as I have often seen some when
+they have been brought to trial, it would be shameful, who appearing
+indeed to be something, have conducted themselves in a surprising
+manner, as thinking they should suffer something dreadful by dying, and
+as if they would be immortal if you did not put them to death. Such men
+appear to me to bring disgrace on the city, so that any stranger might
+suppose that such of the Athenians as excel in virtue, and whom they
+themselves choose in preference to themselves for magistracies and other
+honors, are in no respect superior to women. For these things, O
+Athenians! neither ought we to do who have attained to any height of
+reputation, nor, should we do them, ought you to suffer us; but you
+should make this manifest, that you will much rather condemn him who
+introduces these piteous dramas, and makes the city ridiculous, than him
+who quietly awaits your decision.
+
+24. But, reputation apart, O Athenians! it does not appear to me to be
+right to entreat a judge, or to escape by entreaty; but one ought to
+inform and persuade him. For a judge does not sit for the purpose of
+administering justice out of favor, but that he may judge rightly, and
+he is sworn not to show favor to whom he pleases, but that he will
+decide according to the laws. It is, therefore, right that neither
+should we accustom you, nor should you accustom yourselves, to violate
+your oaths; for in so doing neither of us would act righteously. Think
+not then, O Athenians! that I ought to adopt such a course toward you as
+I neither consider honorable, nor just, nor holy, as well, by Jupiter!
+on any other occasion, and now especially when I am accused of impiety
+by this Melitus. For clearly, if I should persuade you, and by my
+entreaties should put a constraint on you who are bound by an oath, I
+should teach you to think that there are no gods, and in reality, while
+making my defense, should accuse myself of not believing in the gods.
+This, however, is far from being the case; for I believe, O Athenians!
+as none of my accusers do, and I leave it to you and to the deity to
+judge concerning me in such way as will be best both for me and for you.
+
+[Socrates here concludes his defense, and, the votes being taken, he is
+declared guilty by a majority of voices. He thereupon resumes his
+address.]
+
+25. That I should not be grieved, O Athenians! at what has
+happened--namely, that you have condemned me--as well many other
+circumstances concur in bringing to pass; and, moreover this, that what
+has happened has not happened contrary to my expectation; but I much
+rather wonder at the number of votes on either side. For I did not
+expect that I should be condemned by so small a number, but by a large
+majority; but now, as it seems, if only three more votes had changed
+sides, I should have been acquitted. So far as Melitus is concerned, as
+it appears to me, I have been already acquitted; and not only have I
+been acquitted, but it is clear to every one that had not Anytus and
+Lycon come forward to accuse me, he would have been fined a thousand
+drachmas, for not having obtained a fifth part of the votes.
+
+26. The man, then, awards me the penalty of death. Well. But what shall
+I, on my part, O Athenians! award myself? Is it not clear that it will
+be such as I deserve? What, then, is that? Do I deserve to suffer, or to
+pay a fine? for that I have purposely during my life not remained quiet,
+but neglecting what most men seek after, money-making, domestic
+concerns, military command, popular oratory, and, moreover, all the
+magistracies, conspiracies, and cabals that are met with in the city,
+thinking that I was in reality too upright a man to be safe if I took
+part in such things, I therefore did not apply myself to those pursuits,
+by attending to which I should have been of no service either to you or
+to myself; but in order to confer the greatest benefit on each of you
+privately, as I affirm, I thereupon applied myself to that object,
+endeavoring to persuade every one of you not to take any care of his own
+affairs before he had taken care of himself in what way he may become
+the best and wisest, nor of the affairs of the city before he took care
+of the city itself; and that he should attend to other things in the
+same manner. What treatment, then, do I deserve, seeing I am such a man?
+Some reward, O Athenians! if, at least, I am to be estimated according
+to my real deserts; and, moreover, such a reward as would be suitable to
+me. What, then, is suitable to a poor man, a benefactor, and who has
+need of leisure in order to give you good advice? There is nothing so
+suitable, O Athenians! as that such a man should be maintained in the
+Prytaneum, and this much more than if one of you had been victorious at
+the Olympic games in a horserace, or in the two or four horsed chariot
+race: for such a one makes you appear to be happy, but I, to be so; and
+he does not need support, but I do. If, therefore, I must award a
+sentence according to my just deserts, I award this, maintenance in the
+Prytaneum.
+
+27. Perhaps, however, in speaking to you thus, I appear to you to speak
+in the same presumptuous manner as I did respecting commiseration and
+entreaties; but such is not the case, O Athenians! it is rather this: I
+am persuaded that I never designedly injured any man, though I can not
+persuade you of this, for we have conversed with each other but for a
+short time. For if there were the same law with you as with other men,
+that in capital cases the trial should list not only one day, but many,
+I think you would be persuaded; but it is not easy in a short time to do
+away with, great calumnies. Being persuaded, then, that I have injured
+no one, I am far from intending to injure myself, and of pronouncing
+against myself that I am deserving of punishment, and from awarding
+myself any thing of the kind. Through fear of what? lest I should
+suffer that which Melitus awards me, of which I say I know not whether
+it he good or evil? Instead of this, shall I choose what I well know to
+be evil, and award that? Shall I choose imprisonment? And why should I
+live in prison, a slave to the established magistracy, the Eleven? Shall
+I choose a fine, and to be imprisoned until I have paid it? But this is
+the same as that which I just now mentioned, for I have not money to pay
+it. Shall I, then, award myself exile? For perhaps you would consent to
+this award. I should indeed be very fond of life, O Athenians! if I were
+so devoid of reason as not to be able to reflect that you, who are my
+fellow-citizens, have been unable to endure my manner of life and
+discourses, but they have become so burdensome and odious to you that
+you now seek to be rid of them: others, however, will easily bear them.
+Far from it, O Athenians! A fine life it would be for me at my age to go
+out wandering, and driven from city to city, and so to live. For I well
+know that, wherever I may go, the youth will listen to me when I speak,
+as they do here. And if I repulse them, they will themselves drive me
+out, persuading the elders; and if I do not repulse them, their fathers
+and kindred will banish me on their account.
+
+28. Perhaps, however, some one will say, Can you not, Socrates, when you
+have gone from us, live a silent and quiet life? This is the most
+difficult thing of all to persuade some of you. For if I say that that
+would be to disobey the deity, and that, therefore, it is impossible for
+me to live quietly, you would not believe me, thinking I spoke
+ironically. If, on the other hand, I say that this is the greatest good
+to man, to discourse daily on virtue, and other things which you have
+heard me discussing, examining both myself and others, but that a life
+without investigation is not worth living for, still less would you
+believe me if I said this. Such, however, is the case, as I affirm, O
+Athenians! though it is not easy to persuade you. And at the same time I
+am not accustomed to think myself deserving of any ill. If, indeed, I
+were rich, I would amerce myself in such a sum as I should be able to
+pay; for then I should have suffered no harm, but now--for I can not,
+unless you are willing to amerce me in such a sum as I am able to pay.
+But perhaps I could pay you a mina of silver: in that sum, then, I
+amerce myself. But Plato here, O Athenians! and Crito Critobulus, and
+Apollodorus bid me amerce myself in thirty minae, and they offer to be
+sureties. I amerce myself, then, to you in that sum; and they will be
+sufficient sureties for the money.
+
+[The judges now proceeded to pass the sentence, and condemned Socrates
+to death; whereupon he continued:]
+
+29. For the sake of no long space of time, O Athenians! you will incur
+the character and reproach at the hands of those who wish to defame the
+city, of having put that wise man, Socrates, to death. For those who
+wish to defame you will assert that I am wise, though I am not. If,
+then, you had waited for a short time, this would have happened of its
+own accord; for observe my age, that it is far advanced in life, and
+near death. But I say this not to you all, but to those only who have
+condemned me to die. And I say this, too, to the same persons. Perhaps
+you think, O Athenians! that I have been convicted through the want of
+arguments, by which I might have persuaded you, had I thought it right
+to do and say any thing, so that I might escape punishment. Far
+otherwise: I have been convicted through want indeed, yet not of
+arguments, but of audacity and impudence, and of the inclination to say
+such things to you as would have been most agreeable for you to hear,
+had I lamented and bewailed and done and said many other things
+unworthy of me, as I affirm, but such as you are accustomed to hear from
+others. But neither did I then think that I ought, for the sake of
+avoiding danger, to do any thing unworthy of a freeman, nor do I now
+repent of having so defended myself; but I should much rather choose to
+die, having so defended myself, than to live in that way. For neither in
+a trial nor in battle is it right that I or any one else should employ
+every possible means whereby he may avoid death; for in battle it is
+frequently evident that a man might escape death by laying down his
+arms, and throwing himself on the mercy of his pursuers. And there are
+many other devices in every danger, by which to avoid death, if a man
+dares to do and say every thing. But this is not difficult, O Athenians!
+to escape death; but it is much more difficult to avoid depravity, for
+it runs swifter than death. And now I, being slow and aged, am overtaken
+by the slower of the two; but my accusers, being strong and active, have
+been overtaken by the swifter, wickedness. And now I depart, condemned
+by you to death; but they condemned by truth, as guilty of iniquity and
+injustice: and I abide my sentence, and so do they. These things,
+perhaps, ought so to be, and I think that they are for the best.
+
+30. In the next place, I desire to predict to you who have condemned me,
+what will be your fate; for I am now in that condition in which men most
+frequently prophesy--namely, when they are about to die. I say, then, to
+you, O Athenians! who have condemned me to death, that immediately after
+my death a punishment will overtake you, far more severe, by Jupiter!
+than that which you have inflicted on me. For you have done this,
+thinking you should be freed from the necessity of giving an account of
+your lives. The very contrary, however, as I affirm, will happen to you.
+Your accusers will be more numerous, whom I have now restrained, though
+you did not perceive it; and they will be more severe, inasmuch as they
+are younger, and you will be more indignant. For if you think that by
+putting men to death you will restrain any one from upbraiding you
+because you do not live well, you are much mistaken; for this method of
+escape is neither possible nor honorable; but that other is most
+honorable and most easy, not to put a check upon others, but for a man
+to take heed to himself how he may be most perfect. Having predicted
+thus much to those of you who have condemned me, I take my leave of you.
+
+31. But with you who have voted for my acquittal I would gladly hold
+converse on what has now taken place, while the magistrates are busy,
+and I am not yet carried to the place where I must die. Stay with me,
+then, so long, O Athenians! for nothing hinders our conversing with each
+other, while we are permitted to do so; for I wish to make known to you,
+as being my friends, the meaning of that which has just now befallen me.
+To me, then, O my judges! and in calling you judges I call you
+rightly--a strange thing has happened. For the wonted prophetic voice of
+my guardian deity on every former occasion, even in the most trifling
+affairs, opposed me if I was about to do any thing wrong; but now that
+has befallen me which ye yourselves behold, and which any one would
+think, and which is supposed to be the extremity of evil; yet neither
+when I departed from home in the morning did the warning of the god
+oppose me, nor when I came up here to the place of trial, nor in my
+address when I was about to say any thing; yet on other occasions it has
+frequently restrained me in the midst of speaking. But now it has never,
+throughout this proceeding, opposed me, either in what I did or said.
+What, then, do I suppose to be the cause of this? I will tell you: what
+has befallen me appears to be a blessing; and it is impossible that we
+think rightly who suppose that death is an evil. A great proof of this
+to me is the fact that it is impossible but that the accustomed signal
+should have opposed me, unless I had been about to meet with some good.
+
+32. Moreover, we may hence conclude that there is great hope that death
+is a blessing. For to die is one of two things: for either the dead may
+be annihilated, and have no sensation of any thing whatever; or, as it
+is said, there are a certain change and passage of the soul from one
+place to another. And if it is a privation of all sensation, as it were
+a sleep in which the sleeper has no dream, death would be a wonderful
+gain. For I think that if any one, having selected a night in which he
+slept so soundly as not to have had a dream, and having compared this
+night with all the other nights and days of his life, should be
+required, on consideration, to say how many days and nights he had
+passed better and more pleasantly than this night throughout his life, I
+think that not only a private person, but even the great king himself,
+would find them easy to number, in comparison with other days and
+nights. If, therefore, death is a thing of this kind, I say it is a
+gain; for thus all futurity appears to be nothing more than one night.
+But if, on the other hand, death is a removal from hence to another
+place, and what is said be true, that all the dead are there, what
+greater blessing can there be than this, my judges? For if, on arriving
+at Hades, released from these who pretend to be judges, one shall find
+those who are true judges, and who are said to judge there, Minos and
+Rhadamanthus, AEacus and Triptolemus, and such others of the demi-gods as
+were just during their own life, would this be a sad removal? At what
+price would you not estimate a conference with Orpheus and Musaeus,
+Hesiod and Homer? I indeed should be willing to die often, if this be
+true. For to me the sojourn there would be admirable, when I should meet
+with Palamedes, and Ajax, son of Telamon, and any other of the ancients
+who has died by an unjust sentence. The comparing my sufferings with
+theirs would, I think, be no unpleasing occupation. But the greatest
+pleasure would be to spend my time in questioning and examining the
+people there as I have done those here, and discovering who among them
+is wise, and who fancies himself to be so, but is not. At what price, my
+judges, would not any one estimate the opportunity of questioning him
+who led that mighty army against Troy, or Ulysses, or Sisyphus, or ten
+thousand others whom one might mention both men and women--with whom to
+converse and associate, and to question them, would be an inconceivable
+happiness? Surely for that the judges there do not condemn to death; for
+in other respects those who live there are more happy than those who are
+here, and are henceforth immortal, if, at least, what is said be true.
+
+33. You, therefore, O my judges! ought to entertain good hopes with
+respect to death, and to meditate on this one truth, that to a good man
+nothing is evil, neither while living nor when dead, nor are his
+concerns neglected by the gods. And what has befallen me is not the
+effect of chance; but this is clear to me, that now to die, and be freed
+from my cares is better for me On this account the warning in no way
+turned me aside; and I bear no resentment toward those who condemned me,
+or against my accusers, although they did not condemn and accuse me with
+this intention, but thinking to injure me: in this they deserve to be
+blamed.
+
+Thus much, however, I beg of them. Punish my sons when they grow up, O
+judges! paining them as I have pained you, if they appear to you to care
+for riches or anything else before virtue; and if they think themselves
+to be something when they are nothing, reproach them as I have done you,
+for not attending to what they ought, and for conceiving themselves to
+be something when they are worth nothing. If ye do this, both I and my
+sons shall have met with just treatment at your hands.
+
+But it is now time to depart--for me to die, for you to live. But which
+of us is going to a better state is unknown to every one but God.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+  [1] Aristophanes.
+
+  [2] "Iliad," lib. xviii. ver. 94, etc.
+
+  [3] See the "Crito," sec. 5.
+
+  [4] ouden legei, literally, "he says nothing:" on se trompe, ou
+    l'on vous impose, _Cousin_.
+
+  [5] But for the authority of Stallbaum, I should have translated
+    dikanika "forensic;" that is, such arguments as an advocate would use
+    in a court of justice.
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO.
+
+
+It has been remarked by Stallbaum that Plato had a twofold design in
+this dialogue--one, and that the primary one, to free Socrates from the
+imputation of having attempted to corrupt the Athenian youth; the other,
+to establish the principle that under all circumstances it is the duty
+of a good citizen to obey the laws of his country. These two points,
+however, are so closely interwoven with each other, that the general
+principle appears only to be illustrated by the example of Socrates.
+
+Crito was one of those friends of Socrates who had been present at his
+trial, and had offered to assist in paying a fine, had a fine been
+imposed instead of the sentence of death. He appears to have frequently
+visited his friend in prison after his condemnation; and now, having
+obtained access to his cell very early in the morning, finds him
+composed in a quiet sleep. He brings intelligence that the ship, the
+arrival of which would be the signal for his death on the following day,
+is expected to arrive forthwith, and takes occasion to entreat Socrates
+to make his escape, the means of which were already prepared. Socrates
+thereupon, having promised to follow the advice of Crito if, after the
+matter had been fully discussed, it should appear to be right to do so,
+proposes to consider the duty of a citizen toward his country; and
+having established the divine principle that it is wrong to return evil
+for evil, goes on to show that the obligations of a citizen to his
+country are even more binding than those of a child to its parent, or a
+slave to his master, and that therefore it is his duty to obey the
+established laws, at whatever cost to himself.
+
+At length Crito admits that he has no answer to make, and Socrates
+resolves to submit himself to the will of Providence.
+
+
+
+
+CRITO;
+OR,
+THE DUTY OF A CITIZEN.
+
+
+SOCRATES, CRITO.
+
+_Socr._ Why have you come at this hour, Crito? Is it not very early?
+
+_Cri._ It is.
+
+_Socr._ About what time?
+
+_Cri._ Scarce day-break.
+
+_Socr._ I wonder how the keeper of the prison came to admit you.
+
+_Cri._ He is familiar with me, Socrates, from my having frequently come
+hither; and he is under some obligations to me.
+
+_Socr._ Have you just now come, or some time since?
+
+_Cri._ A considerable time since.
+
+_Socr._ Why, then, did you not wake me at once, instead of sitting down
+by me in silence?
+
+_Cri._ By Jupiter! Socrates, I should not myself like to be so long
+awake, and in such affliction. But I have been for some time wondering
+at you, perceiving how sweetly you slept; and I purposely did not awake
+you, that you might pass your time as pleasantly as possible. And,
+indeed, I have often before throughout your whole life considered you
+happy in your disposition, but far more so in the present calamity,
+seeing how easily and meekly you bear it.
+
+_Socr._ However, Crito, it would be disconsonant for a man at my time of
+life to repine because he must needs die.
+
+_Cri._ But others, Socrates, at your age have been involved in similar
+calamities, yet their age has not hindered their repining at their
+present fortune.
+
+_Socr._ So it is. But why did you come so early?
+
+_Cri._ Bringing sad tidings, Socrates, not sad to you, as it appears,
+but to me, and all your friends, sad and heavy, and which I, I think,
+shall bear worst of all.
+
+_Socr._ What tidings? Has the ship[6] arrived from Delos, on the arrival
+of which I must die?
+
+_Cri._ It has not yet arrived, but it appears to me that it will come
+to-day, from what certain persons report who have come from Sunium,[7]
+and left it there. It is clear, therefore, from these messengers, that
+it will come to day, and consequently it will be necessary, Socrates,
+for you to die to-morrow.
+
+2. _Socr._ But with good fortune, Crito, and if so it please the gods,
+so be it. I do not think, however, that it will come to day.
+
+_Cri._ Whence do you form this conjecture?
+
+_Socr._ I will tell you. I must die on the day after that on which the
+ship arrives.
+
+_Cri._ So they say[8] who have the control of these things.
+
+_Socr._ I do not think, then, that it will come to-day, but to-morrow. I
+conjecture this from a dream which I had this very night, not long ago,
+and you seem very opportunely to have refrained from waking me.
+
+_Cri._ But what was this dream?
+
+_Socr._ A beautiful and majestic woman, clad in white garments seemed to
+approach me, and to call to me and say, "Socrates, three days hence you
+will reach fertile Pythia"[9].
+
+_Cri._ What a strange dream, Socrates!
+
+_Socr._ Very clear, however, as it appears to me, Crito.
+
+3. _Cri._ Very much so, as it seems. But, my dear Socrates, even now be
+persuaded by me, and save yourself. For if you die, not only a single
+calamity will befall me, but, besides being deprived of such a friend as
+I shall never meet with again, I shall also appear to many who do not
+know you and me well, when I might have saved you had I been willing to
+spend my money, to have neglected to do so. And what character can be
+more disgraceful than this--to appear to value one's riches more than
+one's friends? For the generality of men will not be persuaded that you
+were unwilling to depart hence, when we urged you to it.
+
+_Socr._ But why, my dear Crito, should we care so much for the opinion
+of the many? For the most worthy men, whom we ought rather to regard,
+will think that matters have transpired as they really have.
+
+_Cri._ Yet you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to attend to the
+opinion of the many. For the very circumstances of the present case show
+that the multitude are able to effect not only the smallest evils, but
+even the greatest, if any one is calumniated to them.
+
+_Socr._ Would, O Crito that the multitude could effect the greatest
+evils, that they might also effect the greatest good, for then it would
+be well. But now they can do neither; for they can make a man neither
+wise nor foolish; but they do whatever chances.
+
+4. _Cri._ So let it be, then. But answer me this, Socrates: are you not
+anxious for me and other friends, lest, if you should escape from hence,
+informers should give us trouble, as having secretly carried you off,
+and so we should be compelled either to lose all our property, or a very
+large sum, or to suffer something else besides this? For, if you fear
+any thing of the kind, dismiss your fears; for we are justified in
+running the risk to save you--and, if need be, even a greater risk than
+this. But be persuaded by me, and do not refuse.
+
+_Socr._ I am anxious about this, Crito, and about many other things.
+
+_Cri._ Do not fear this, however; for the sum is not large on receipt of
+which certain persons are willing to save you, and take you hence. In
+the next place, do you not see how cheap these informers are, so that
+there would be no need of a large sum for them? My fortune is at your
+service, sufficient, I think, for the purpose; then if, out of regard to
+me, you do not think right to spend my money, these strangers here are
+ready to spend theirs. One of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought with
+him a sufficient sum for the very purpose. Cebes, too, is ready, and
+very many others. So that, as I said, do not, through fears of this
+kind, hesitate to save yourself, nor let what you said in court give you
+any trouble, that if you went from hence you would not know what to do
+with yourself. For in many places, and wherever you go, men will love
+you; and if you are disposed to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who
+will esteem you very highly, and will insure your safety, so that no one
+in Thessaly will molest you.
+
+5. Moreover, Socrates, you do not appear to me to pursue a just course
+in giving yourself up when you might be saved; and you press on the very
+results with respect to yourself which your enemies would press, and
+have pressed, in their anxiety to destroy you. Besides this, too, you
+appear to me to betray your own sons, whom, when it is in your power to
+rear and educate them, you will abandon, and, so far as you are
+concerned, they will meet with such a fate as chance brings them, and,
+as is probable, they will meet with such things as orphans are wont to
+experience in a state of orphanage. Surely one ought not to have
+children, or one should go through the toil of rearing and instructing
+them. But you appear to me to have chosen the most indolent course;
+though you ought to have chosen such a course as a good and brave man
+would have done, since you profess to have made virtue your study
+through the whole of your life; so that I am ashamed both for you and
+for us who are your friends, lest this whole affair of yours should seem
+to be the effect of cowardice on our part--your appearing to stand your
+trial in the court, since you appeared when it was in your power not to
+have done so, the very manner in which the trial was conducted, and this
+last circumstance, as it were, a ridiculous consummation of the whole
+business; your appearing to have escaped from us through our indolence
+and cowardice, who did not save you; nor did you save yourself, when it
+was practicable and possible, had we but exerted ourselves a little.
+Think of these things, therefore, Socrates, and beware, lest, besides
+the evil _that will result_, they be disgraceful both to you and to us;
+advise, then, with yourself; though, indeed, there is no longer time for
+advising--your resolve should be already made. And there is but one
+plan; for in the following night the whole must be accomplished. If we
+delay, it will be impossible and no longer practicable. By all means,
+therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and on no account refuse.
+
+6. _Socr._ My dear Crito, your zeal would be very commendable were it
+united with right principle; otherwise, by how much the more earnest it
+is, by so much is it the more sad. We must consider, therefore, whether
+this plan should be adopted or not. For I not now only, but always, am a
+person who will obey nothing within me but reason, according as it
+appears to me on mature deliberation to be best. And the reasons which I
+formerly professed I can not now reject, because this misfortune has
+befallen me; but they appear to me in much the same light, and I respect
+and honor them as before; so that if we are unable to adduce any better
+at the present time, be assured that I shall not give in to you, even
+though the power of the multitude should endeavor to terrify us like
+children, by threatening more than it does now, bonds and death, and
+confiscation of property. How, therefore, may we consider the matter
+most conveniently? First of all, if we recur to the argument which you
+used about opinions, whether on former occasions it was rightly resolved
+or not, that we ought to pay attention to some opinions, and to others
+not; or whether, before it was necessary that I should die, it was
+rightly resolved; but now it has become clear that it was said idly for
+argument's sake, though in reality it was merely jest and trifling. I
+desire then, Crito, to consider, in common with you, whether it will
+appear to me in a different light, now that I am in this condition, or
+the same, and whether we shall give it up or yield to it. It was said, I
+think, on former occasions, by those who were thought to speak
+seriously, as I just now observed, that of the opinions which men
+entertain some should be very highly esteemed and others not. By the
+gods! Crito, does not this appear to you to be well said? For you, in
+all human probability, are out of all danger of dying to-morrow, and the
+present calamity will not lead your judgment astray. Consider, then;
+does it not appear to you to have been rightly settled that we ought not
+to respect all the opinions of men, but some we should, and others not?
+Nor yet the opinions of all men, but of some we should, and of others
+not? What say you? Is not this rightly resolved?
+
+_Cri._ It is.
+
+_Socr._ Therefore we should respect the good, but not the bad?
+
+_Cri._ Yes.
+
+_Socr._ And are not the good those of the wise, and the bad those of the
+foolish?
+
+_Cri._ How can it be otherwise?
+
+7. _Socr._ Come, then: how, again, were the following points settled?
+Does a man who practices gymnastic exercises and applies himself to
+them, pay attention to the praise and censure and opinion of every one,
+or of that one man only who happens to be a physician, or teacher of the
+exercises?
+
+_Cri._ Of that one only.
+
+_Socr._ He ought, therefore, to fear the censures and covet the praises
+of that one, but not those of the multitude.
+
+_Cri._ Clearly.
+
+_Socr._ He ought, therefore, so to practice and exercise himself, and to
+eat and drink, as seems fitting to the one who presides and knows,
+rather than to all others together.
+
+_Cri._ It is so.
+
+_Socr._ Well, then, if he disobeys the one, and disregards his opinion
+and praise, but respects that of the multitude and of those who know
+nothing, will he not suffer some evil?
+
+_Cri._ How should he not?
+
+_Socr._ But what is this evil? Whither does it tend, and on what part
+of him that disobeys will it fall?
+
+_Cri._ Clearly on his body, for this it ruins.
+
+_Socr._ You say well. The case is the same, too, Crito, with all other
+things, not to go through them all. With respect then, to things just
+and unjust, base and honorable, good and evil, about which we are now
+consulting, ought we to follow the opinion of the multitude, and to
+respect it, or that of one, if there is any one who understands, whom we
+ought to reverence and respect rather than all others together? And if
+we do not obey him, shall we not corrupt and injure that part of
+ourselves which becomes better by justice, but is ruined by injustice?
+Or is this nothing?
+
+_Cri._ I agree with you, Socrates.
+
+8. _Socr._ Come, then, if we destroy that which becomes better by what
+is wholesome, but is impaired by what is unwholesome, through being
+persuaded by those who do not understand, can we enjoy life when that is
+impaired? And this is the body we are speaking of, is it not?
+
+_Cri._ Yes.
+
+_Socr._ Can we, then, enjoy life with a diseased and impaired body?
+
+_Cri._ By no means.
+
+_Socr._ But can we enjoy life when that is impaired which injustice
+ruins but justice benefits? Or do we think that to be of less value than
+the body, whatever part of us it may be, about which injustice and
+justice are concerned'
+
+_Cri._ By no means.
+
+_Socr._ But of more value?
+
+_Cri._ Much more.
+
+_Socr._ We must not then, my excellent friend, so much regard what the
+multitude will say of us, but what he will say who understands the just
+and the unjust, the one, even truth itself. So that at first you did
+not set out with a right principle, when you laid it down that we ought
+to regard the opinion of the multitude with respect to things just and
+honorable and good, and their contraries. How ever, some one may say,
+are not the multitude able to put us to death?
+
+_Cri._ This, too, is clear, Socrates, any one might say so.
+
+_Socr._ You say truly. But, my admirable friend, this principle which we
+have just discussed appears to me to be the same as it was before[10].
+And consider this, moreover, whether it still holds good with us or not,
+that we are not to be anxious about living but about living well.
+
+_Cri._ It does hold good.
+
+_Socr._ And does this hold good or not, that to live well and Honorable
+and justly are the same thing?
+
+_Cri._ It does.
+
+9. _Socr._ From what has been admitted, then, this consideration arises,
+whether it is just or not that I should endeavor to leave this place
+without the permission of the Athenians. And should it appear to be
+just, we will make the attempt, but if not, we will give it up. But as
+to the considerations which you mention, of an outlay of money,
+reputation, and the education of children, beware, Crito, lest such
+considerations as these in reality belong to these multitudes, who
+rashly put one to death, and would restore one to life, if they could do
+so, without any reason at all. But we, since reason so requires, must
+consider nothing else than what we just now mentioned, whether we shall
+act justly in paying money and contracting obligations to those who
+will lead me hence, as well they who lead me as we who are led hence, or
+whether, in truth, we shall not act unjustly in doing all these things.
+And if we should appear in so doing to be acting unjustly, observe that
+we must not consider whether from remaining here and continuing quiet we
+must needs die, or suffer any thing else, rather than whether we shall
+be acting unjustly.
+
+_Cri._ You appear to me to speak wisely, Socrates, but see what we are
+to do.
+
+_Socr._ Let us consider the matter together, my friend, and if you have
+any thing to object to what I say, make good your objection, and I will
+yield to you, but if not, cease, my excellent friend, to urge upon me
+the same thing so often, that I ought to depart hence against the will
+of the Athenians. For I highly esteem your endeavors to persuade me thus
+to act, so long as it is not against my will Consider, then, the
+beginning of our inquiry, whether it is stated to your entire
+satisfaction, and endeavor to answer the question put to you exactly as
+you think right.
+
+_Cri._ I will endeavor to do so.
+
+10. _Socr._ Say we, then, that we should on no account deliberately
+commit injustice, or may we commit injustice under certain
+circumstances, under others not? Or is it on no account either good or
+honorable to commit injustice, as we have often agreed on former
+occasions, and as we just now said? Or have all those our former
+admissions been dissipated in these few days, and have we, Crito, old
+men as we are, been for a long time seriously conversing with each other
+without knowing that we in no respect differ from children? Or does the
+case, beyond all question, stand as we then determined? Whether the
+multitude allow it or not, and whether we must suffer a more severe or a
+milder punishment than this, still is injustice on every account both
+evil and disgraceful to him who commits it? Do we admit this, or not?
+
+_Cri._ We do admit it.
+
+_Socr._ On no account, therefore, ought we to act unjustly.
+
+_Cri._ Surely not.
+
+_Socr._ Neither ought one who is injured to return the injury, as the
+multitude think, since it is on no account right to act unjustly.
+
+_Cri._ It appears not.
+
+_Socr._ What, then? Is it right to do evil, Crito, or not?
+
+_Cri._ Surely it is not right, Socrates.
+
+_Socr._ But what? To do evil in return when one has been evil-entreated,
+is that right, or not?
+
+_Cri._ By no means.
+
+_Socr._ For to do evil to men differs in no respect from committing
+injustice.
+
+_Cri._ You say truly.
+
+_Socr._ It is not right, therefore, to return an injury, or to do evil
+to any man, however one may have suffered from him. But take care,
+Crito, that in allowing these things you do not allow them contrary to
+your opinion, for I know that to some few only these things both do
+appear, and will appear, to be true. They, then, to whom these things
+appear true, and they to whom they do not, have no sentiment in common,
+and must needs despise each other, while they look to each other's
+opinions. Consider well, then, whether you coincide and think with me,
+and whether we can begin our deliberations from this point--that it is
+never right either to do an injury or to return an injury, or when one
+has been evil-entreated, to revenge one's self by doing evil in return,
+or do you dissent from, and not coincide in this principle? For so it
+appears to me, both long since and now, but if you in any respect think
+otherwise, say so and inform me. But if you persist in your former
+opinions, hear what follows.
+
+_Cri._ I do persist in them, and think with you. Speak on, then.
+
+_Socr._ I say next, then, or rather I ask; whether when a man has
+promised to do things that are just he ought to do them, or evade his
+promise?
+
+_Cri._ He ought to do them.
+
+11. _Socr._ Observe, then, what follows. By departing hence without the
+leave of the city, are we not doing evil to some, and that to those to
+whom we ought least of all to do it, or not? And do we abide by what we
+agreed on as being just, or do we not?
+
+_Cri._ I am unable to answer your question, Socrates; for I do not
+understand it.
+
+_Socr._ Then, consider it thus. If, while we were preparing to run away,
+or by whatever name we should call it, the laws and commonwealth should
+come, and, presenting themselves before us, should say, "Tell me,
+Socrates, what do you purpose doing? Do you design any thing else by
+this proceeding in which you are engaged than to destroy us, the laws,
+and the whole city, so far as you are able? Or do you think it possible
+for that city any longer to subsist, and not be subverted, in which
+judgments that are passed have no force, but are set aside and destroyed
+by private persons?"--what should we say, Crito, to these and similar
+remonstrances? For any one, especially an orator, would have much to say
+on the violation of the law, which enjoins that judgments passed shall
+be enforced. Shall we say to them that the city has done us an
+injustice, and not passed a right sentence? Shall we say this, or what
+else?
+
+_Cri._ This, by Jupiter! Socrates.
+
+12. _Socr._ What, then, if the laws should say, "Socrates, was it not
+agreed between us that you should abide by the judgments which the city
+should pronounce?" And if we should wonder at their speaking thus,
+perhaps they would say, "Wonder not, Socrates, at what we say, but
+answer, since you are accustomed to make use of questions and answers.
+For, come, what charge have you against us and the city, that you
+attempt to destroy us? Did we not first give you being? and did not your
+father, through us, take your mother to wife and beget you? Say, then,
+do you find fault with those laws among us that relate to marriage as
+being bad?" I should say, "I do not find fault with them." "Do you with
+those that relate to your nurture when born, and the education with
+which you were instructed? Or did not the laws, ordained on this point,
+enjoin rightly, in requiring your father to instruct you in music and
+gymnastic exercises?" I should say, rightly. Well, then, since you were
+born, nurtured, and educated through our means, can you say, first of
+all, that you are not both our offspring and our slave, as well you as
+your ancestors? And if this be so, do you think that there are equal
+rights between us? and whatever we attempt to do to you, do you think
+you may justly do to us in turn? Or had you not equal rights with your
+father, or master, if you happened to have one, so as to return what you
+suffered, neither to retort when found fault with, nor, when stricken,
+to strike again, nor many other things of the kind; but that with your
+country and the laws you may do so; so that if we attempt to destroy
+you, thinking it to be just, you also should endeavor, so far as you are
+able, in return, to destroy us, the laws, and your country; and in doing
+this will you say that you act justly--you who, in reality, make virtue
+your chief object? Or are you so wise as not to know that one's country
+is more honorable, venerable, and sacred, and more highly prized both by
+gods, and men possessed of understanding, than mother and father, and
+all other progenitors; and that one ought to reverence, submit to, and
+appease one's country, when angry, rather than one's father; and either
+persuade it or do what it orders, and to suffer quietly if it bids one
+suffer, whether to be beaten, or put in bonds; or if it sends one out to
+battle there to be wounded or slain, this must be done; for justice so
+requires, and one must not give way, or retreat, or leave one's post;
+but that both in war and in a court of justice, and everywhere one must
+do what one's city and country enjoin, or persuade it in such manner as
+justice allows; but that to offer violence either to one's mother or
+father is not holy, much less to one's country? What shall we say to
+these things, Crito? That the laws speak the truth, or not?
+
+_Cri._ It seems so to me.
+
+13. _Socr._ "Consider, then, Socrates," the laws perhaps might say,
+"whether we say truly that in what you are now attempting you are
+attempting to do what is not just toward us. For we, having given you
+birth, nurtured, instructed you, and having imparted to you and all
+other citizens all the good in our power, still proclaim, by giving the
+power to every Athenian who pleases, when he has arrived at years of
+discretion, and become acquainted with the business of the state, and
+us, the laws, that any one who is not satisfied with us may take his
+property, and go wherever he pleases. And if any one of you wishes to go
+to a colony, if he is not satisfied with us and the city, or to migrate
+and settle in another country, none of us, the laws, hinder or forbid
+him going whithersoever he pleases, taking with him all his property.
+But whoever continues with us after he has seen the manner in which we
+administer justice, and in other respects govern the city, we now say
+that he has in fact entered into a compact with us to do what we order;
+and we affirm that he who does not obey is in three respects guilty of
+injustice--because he does not obey us who gave him being, and because
+he does not obey us who nurtured him, and because, having made a compact
+that he would obey us, he neither does so, nor does he persuade us if we
+do any thing wrongly; though we propose for his consideration, and do
+not rigidly command him to do what we order, but leave him the choice of
+one of two things, either to persuade us, or to do what we require, and
+yet he does neither of these."
+
+14. "And we say that you, O Socrates! will be subject to these charges
+if you accomplish your design, and that not least of the Athenians, but
+most so of all." And if I should ask, "For what reason?" they would
+probably justly retort on me by saying that, among all the Athenians, I
+especially made this compact with them. For they would say, "Socrates,
+we have strong proof of this, that you were satisfied both with us and
+the city; for, of all the Athenians, you especially would never have
+dwelt in it if it had not been especially agreeable to you; for you
+never went out of the city to any of the public spectacles, except once
+to the Isthmian games, nor anywhere else, except on military service,
+nor have you ever gone abroad as other men do, nor had you ever had any
+desire to become acquainted with any other city or other laws, but we
+and our city were sufficient for you; so strongly were you attached to
+us, and so far did you consent to submit to our government, both in
+other respects and in begetting children in this city, in consequence of
+your being satisfied with it. Moreover, in your very trial, it was in
+your power to have imposed on yourself a sentence of exile, if you
+pleased, and might then have done, with the consent of the city, what
+you now attempt against its consent. Then, indeed, you boasted yourself
+as not being grieved if you must needs die; but you preferred, as you
+said, death to exile. Now, however, you are neither ashamed of those
+professions, nor do you revere us, the laws, since you endeavor to
+destroy us, and you act as the vilest slave would act, by endeavoring to
+make your escape contrary to the conventions and the compacts by which
+you engaged to submit to our government. First, then, therefore, answer
+us this, whether we speak the truth or not in affirming that you agreed
+to be governed by us in deed, though not in word?" What shall we say to
+this, Crito? Can we do otherwise than assent?
+
+_Cri._ We must needs do so, Socrates.
+
+_Socr._ "What else, then," they will say, "are you doing but violating
+the conventions and compacts which you made with us, though you did not
+enter into them from compulsion or through deception, or from being
+compelled to determine in a short time but during the space of seventy
+years, in which you might have departed if you had been dissatisfied
+with us, and the compacts had not appeared to you to be just? You,
+however, preferred neither Lacedaemon nor Crete, which you several times
+said are governed by good laws, nor any other of the Grecian or
+barbarian cities; but you have been less out of Athens than the lame and
+the blind, and other maimed persons. So much, it is evident, were you
+satisfied with the city and us, the laws, beyond the rest of the
+Athenians; for who can be satisfied with a city without laws? But now
+will you not abide by your compacts? You will, if you are persuaded by
+us, Socrates, and will not make yourself ridiculous by leaving the
+city."
+
+15. "For consider, by violating these compacts and offending against any
+of them, what good you will do to yourself or your friends. For that
+your friends will run the risk of being themselves banished, and
+deprived of the rights of citizenship, or of forfeiting their property,
+is pretty clear. And as for yourself, if you should go to one of the
+neighboring cities, either Thebes or Megara, for both are governed by
+good laws, you will go there, Socrates, as an enemy to their polity; and
+such as have any regard for their country will look upon you with
+suspicion, regarding you as a corrupter of the laws; and you will
+confirm the opinion of the judges, so that they will appear to have
+condemned you rightly, for whose is a corrupter of the laws will appear
+in all likelihood to be a corrupter of youths and weak-minded men. Will
+you, then, avoid these well-governed cities, and the best-ordered men?
+And should you do so, will it be worth your while to live? Or will you
+approach them, and have the effrontery to converse with them, Socrates,
+on subjects the same as you did here--that virtue and justice, legal
+institutions and laws, should be most highly valued by men? And do you
+not think that this conduct of Socrates would be very indecorous? You
+must think so. But you will keep clear of these places, and go to
+Thessaly, to Crito's friends, for there are the greatest disorder and
+licentiousness; and perhaps they will gladly hear you relating how
+drolly you escaped from prison, clad in some dress or covered with a
+skin, or in some other disguise such as fugitives are wont to dress
+themselves in, having so changed your usual appearance. And will no one
+say that you, though an old man, with but a short time to live, in all
+probability, have dared to have such a base desire of life as to violate
+the most sacred laws? Perhaps not, should you not offend any one. But if
+you should, you will hear, Socrates, many things utterly unworthy of
+you. You will live, too, in a state of abject dependence on all men,
+and as their slave. But what will you do in Thessaly besides feasting,
+as if you had gone to Thessaly to a banquet? And what will become of
+those discourses about justice and all other virtues? But do you wish to
+live for the sake of your children, that you may rear and educate them?
+What then? Will you take them to Thessaly, and there rear and educate
+them, making them aliens to their country, that they may owe you this
+obligation too? Or, if not so, being reared here, will they be better
+reared and educated while you are living, though not with them, for your
+friends will take care of them? Whether, if you go to Thessaly, will
+they take care of them, but if you go to Hades will they not take care
+of them? If, however, any advantage is to be derived from those that say
+they are your friends, we must think they will."
+
+16. "Then, O Socrates! be persuaded by us who have nurtured you, and do
+not set a higher value on your children, or on life, or on any thing
+else than justice, that, when you arrive in Hades, you may have all this
+to say in your defense before those who have dominion there. For neither
+here in this life, if you do what is proposed, does it appear to be
+better, or more just, or more holy to yourself, or any of your friends;
+nor will it be better for you when you arrive there. But now you depart,
+if you do depart, unjustly treated, not by us, the laws, but by men; but
+should you escape, having thus disgracefully returned injury for injury,
+and evil for evil, having violated your own compacts and conventions
+which you made with us, and having done evil to those to whom you least
+of all should have done it--namely, yourself, your friends, your
+country, and us--both we shall be indignant with you as long as you
+live, and there our brothers, the laws in Hades, will not receive you
+favorably knowing that you attempted, so far as you were able, to
+destroy us. Let not Crito, then, persuade you to do what he advises,
+rather than we."
+
+17. These things, my dear friend Crito, be assured, I seem to hear as
+the votaries of Cybele[11] seem to hear the flutes. And the sound of
+these words booms in my ear, and makes me incapable of hearing any thing
+else. Be sure, then, so long as I retain my present opinions, if you
+should say any thing contrary to these, you will speak in vain. If,
+however, you think that you can prevail at all, say on.
+
+_Cri._ But, Socrates, I have nothing to say.
+
+_Socr._ Desist, then, Crito, and let us pursue this course, since this
+way the deity leads us.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+  [6] See the Phaedo sec 1.
+
+  [7] A promontory at the southern extremity of Attica
+
+  [8] The Eleven
+
+  [9] See Homer's "Iliad," 1 IX, v 363
+
+  [10] That is to say, the principle which we had laid down in former
+    discussions that no regard is to be had to popular opinion, is still
+    found to hold good.
+
+  [11] The Corybantes, priests of Cybele, who in their solemn festivals
+    made such a noise with flutes that the hearers could hear no other
+    sound.
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDO.
+
+
+This dialogue presents us with an account of the manner In which
+Socrates spent the last day of his, life, and how he met his death. The
+main subject is that of the soul's immortality, which Socrates takes
+upon himself to prove with as much certainty as it is possible for the
+human mind to arrive at. The question itself, though none could be
+better suited to the occasion, arises simply and naturally from the
+general conversation that precedes it.
+
+When his friends visit him in the morning for the purpose of spending
+this his last day with him, they find him sitting up in bed, and rubbing
+his leg, which had just been freed from bonds. He remarks on the
+unaccountable alternation and connection between pleasure and pain, and
+adds that AEsop, had he observed it, would have made a fable from it.
+This remark reminds Cebes of Socrates's having put some of AEsop's fables
+into metre since his imprisonment, and he asks, for the satisfaction of
+the poet Evenus, what has induced him to do so. Socrates explains his
+reason, and concludes by bidding him tell Evenus to follow him as soon
+as he can. Simmias expresses his surprise at this message, on which
+Socrates asks, "Is not Evenus a philosopher?" and on the question being
+answered in the affirmative, he says that he or any philosopher would be
+willing to die, though perhaps he would not commit violence on himself.
+This, again, seems a contradiction to Simmias; but Socrates explains it
+by showing that our souls are placed in the body by God, and may not
+leave it without his permission. Whereupon Cebes objects that in that
+case foolish men only would wish to die, and quit the service of the
+best of masters, to which Simmias agrees. Socrates, therefore, proposes
+to plead his cause before them, and to show that there is a great
+probability that after this life he shall go into the presence of God
+and good men, and be happy in proportion to the purity of his own mind.
+
+He begins[12] by stating that philosophy itself is nothing else than a
+preparation for and meditation on death. Death and philosophy have this
+in common: death separates the soul from the body; philosophy draws off
+the mind from bodily things to the contemplation of truth and virtue:
+for he is not a true philosopher who is led away by bodily pleasures,
+since the senses are the source of ignorance and all evil. The mind,
+therefore, is entirely occupied in meditating on death, and freeing
+itself as much as possible from the body. How, then, can such a man be
+afraid of death? He who grieves at the approach of death can not be a
+true lover of wisdom, but is a lover of his body. And, indeed, most men
+are temperate through intemperance; that is to say, they abstain from
+some pleasures that they may the more easily and permanently enjoy
+others. They embrace only a shadow of virtue, not virtue itself, since
+they estimate the value of all things by the pleasures they afford.
+Whereas the philosopher purifies his mind from all such things, and
+pursues virtue and wisdom for their own sakes. This course Socrates
+himself has pursued to the utmost of his ability, with what success he
+should shortly know; and on these grounds he did not repine at leaving
+his friends in this world, being persuaded that in another he should
+meet with good masters and good friends.
+
+Upon this Cebes[13] says that he agrees with all else that had been
+said, but can not help entertaining doubts of what will become of the
+soul when separated from the body, for the common opinion is that it is
+dispersed and vanishes like breath or smoke, and no longer exists
+anywhere. Socrates, therefore, proposes to inquire into the probability
+of the case, a fit employment for him under his present circumstances.
+
+His first argument[14] is drawn from the ancient belief prevalent among
+men, that souls departing hence exist in Hades, and are produced again
+from the dead. If this be true, it must follow that our souls are there,
+for they could not be produced again if they did not exist; and its
+truth is confirmed by this, that it is a general law of nature that
+contraries are produced from contraries--the greater from the less,
+strong from weak, slow from swift, heat from cold, and in like manner
+life from death, and vice versa. To explain this more clearly, he
+proceeds to show that what is changed passes from one state to another,
+and so undergoes three different states--first, the actual state; then
+the transition; and, thirdly, the new state; as from a state of sleep,
+by awaking to being awake. In like manner birth is a transition from a
+state of death to life, and dying from life to death; so that the soul,
+by the act of dying, only passes to another state. If it were not so,
+all nature would in time become dead, just as if people did not awake
+out of sleep all would at last be buried in eternal sleep. Whence the
+conclusion is that the souls of men are not annihilated by death.
+
+Cebes[15] agrees to this reasoning, and adds that he is further
+convinced, of its truth by calling to mind an argument used by Socrates
+on former occasions, that knowledge is nothing but reminiscence; and if
+this is so, the soul must have existed, and had knowledge, before it
+became united to the body.
+
+But in case Simmias should not yet be satisfied, Socrates[16] proceeds
+to enlarge on this, his second argument, drawn from reminiscence. We
+daily find that we are carried from the knowledge of one thing to
+another. Things perceived by the eyes, ears, and other senses bring up
+the thought of other things; thus the sight of a lyre or a garment
+reminds us of a friend, and not only are we thus reminded of sensible
+objects, but of things which are comprehended by the mind alone, and
+have no sensitive existence. For we have formed in our minds an idea of
+abstract equality, of the beautiful, the just, the good; in short, of
+every thing which we say exists without the aid of the senses, for we
+use them only in the perception of individual things; whence it follows
+that the mind did not acquire this knowledge in this life, but must have
+had it before, and therefore the soul must have existed before.
+
+Simmias and Cebes[17] both agree in admitting that Socrates has proved
+the pre-existence of the soul, but insist that he has not shown it to be
+immortal, for that nothing hinders but that, according to the popular
+opinion, it may be dispersed at the dissolution of the body. To which
+Socrates replies, that if their former admissions are joined to his last
+argument, the immortality, as well as the pre-existence, of the soul has
+been sufficiently proved. For if it is true that any thing living is
+produced from that which is dead, then the soul must exist after death,
+otherwise it could not be produced again.
+
+However, to remove the apprehension that the soul may be dispersed by a
+wind, as it were, Socrates proceeds, in his third argument,[18] to
+examine that doubt more thoroughly. What, then, is meant by being
+dispersed but being dissolved into its parts? In order, therefore, to a
+thing being capable of dispersion it must be compounded of parts. Now,
+there are two kinds of things--one compounded, the other simple The
+former kind is subject to change, the latter not, and can be
+comprehended by the mind alone. The one is visible, the other invisible;
+and the soul, which is invisible, when it employs the bodily senses,
+wanders and is confused, but when it abstracts itself from the body it
+attains to the knowledge of that which is eternal, immortal, and
+unchangeable. The soul, therefore, being uncompounded and invisible,
+must be indissoluble; that is to say, immortal.
+
+Still Simmias and Cebes[19] are unconvinced. The former objects that the
+soul, according to Socrates's own showing, is nothing but a harmony
+resulting from a combination of the parts of the body, and so may perish
+with the body, as the harmony of a lyre does when the lyre itself is
+broken. And Cebes, though he admits that the soul is more durable than
+the body, yet objects that it is not, therefore, of necessity immortal,
+but may in time wear out; and it is by no means clear that this is not
+its last period.
+
+These objections produce a powerful effect on the rest of the company;
+but Socrates, undismayed, exhorts them not to suffer themselves to be
+deterred from seeking the truth by any difficulties they may meet with;
+and then proceeds[20] to show, in a moment, the fallacy of Simmias's
+objection. It was before admitted, he says, that the soul existed before
+the body; but harmony is produced after the lyre is formed, so that the
+two cases are totally different. And, further, there are various degrees
+of harmony, but every soul is as much a soul as any other. But, then,
+what will a person who holds this doctrine, that the soul is harmony,
+say of virtue and vice in the soul? Will he call them another kind of
+harmony and discord? If so, he will contradict himself; for it is
+admitted that one soul is not more or less a soul than another, and
+therefore one can not he more or less harmonized than another, and one
+could not admit of a greater degree of virtue or vice than another; and
+indeed a soul, being harmony, could not partake of vice at all, which is
+discord.
+
+Socrates, having thus satisfactorily answered the argument adduced by
+Simmias, goes on to rebut that of Cebes,[21] who objected that the soul
+might in time wear out. In order to do this, he relates that, when a
+young man, he attempted to investigate the causes of all things, why
+they exist and why they perish; and in the course of his researches,
+finding the futility of attributing the existence of things to what are
+called natural causes, he resolved on endeavoring to find out the
+reasons of things. He therefore assumed that there are a certain
+abstract beauty and goodness and magnitude, and so of all other things;
+the truth of which being granted, he thinks he shall be able to prove
+that the soul is immortal.
+
+This, then, being conceded by Cebes, Socrates[22] argues that every
+thing that is beautiful is so from partaking of abstract beauty, and
+great from partaking of magnitude, and little from partaking of
+littleness. Now, it is impossible, he argues, that contraries can exist
+in the same thing at the same time; for instance, the same thing can not
+possess both magnitude and littleness, but one will withdraw at the
+approach of the other; and not only so, but things which, though not
+contrary to each other, yet always contain contraries within themselves,
+can not co-exist; for instance, the number three has no contrary, yet
+it contains within itself the idea of odd, which is the contrary of
+even, and so three never can become even; in like manner, heat while it
+is heat can never admit the idea of its contrary, cold. Now, if this
+method of reasoning is applied to the soul, it will be found to be
+immortal; for life and death are contraries, and never can co-exist; but
+wherever the soul is, there is life: so that it contains within itself
+that which is contrary to death, and consequently can never admit of
+death; therefore it is immortal.
+
+With this he closes his arguments in support of the soul's immortality.
+Cebes owns himself convinced, but Simmias, though he is unable to make
+any objection to the soundness of Socrates's reasoning, can not help
+still entertaining doubts on the subject. If, however, the soul is
+immortal, Socrates proceeds,[23] great need is there in this life to
+endeavor to become as wise and good as possible. For if death were a
+deliverance from every thing, it would be a great gain for the wicked;
+but since the soul appears to be immortal, it must go to the place
+suited to its nature. For it is said that each person's demon conducts
+him to a place where he receives sentence according to his deserts.
+
+He then[24] draws a fanciful picture of the various regions of the
+earth, to which the good and the bad will respectively go after death,
+and exhorts his friends to use every endeavor to acquire virtue and
+wisdom in this life, "for," he adds, "the reward is noble, and the hope
+great."
+
+Having thus brought his subject to a conclusion, Socrates proposes to
+bathe himself, in order not to trouble others to wash his dead body.
+Crito thereupon asks if he has any commands to give, and especially how
+he would be buried, to which he, with his usual cheerfulness, makes
+answer, "Just as you please, if only you can catch me;" and then,
+smiling, he reminds them that after death he shall be no longer with
+them, and begs the others of the party to be sureties to Crito for his
+absence from the body, as they had been before bound for his presence
+before his judges.
+
+After he had bathed, and taken leave of his children and the women of
+his family the officer of the Eleven comes in to intimate to him that it
+is now time to drink the poison. Crito urges a little delay, as the sun
+had not yet set; but Socrates refuses to make himself ridiculous by
+showing such a fondness for life. The man who is to administer the
+poison is therefore sent for; and on his holding out the cup, Socrates,
+neither trembling nor changing color or countenance at all, but, as he
+was wont, looking steadfastly at the man, asked if he might make a
+libation to any one; and being told that no more poison than enough had
+been mixed, he simply prayed that his departure from this to another
+world might be happy, and then drank off the poison, readily and calmly.
+His friends, who had hitherto with difficulty restrained themselves,
+could no longer control the outward expressions of grief, to which
+Socrates said, "What are you doing, my friends? I, for this reason,
+chiefly, sent away the women, that they might not commit any folly of
+this kind; for I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. Be
+quiet, therefore, and bear up."
+
+When he had walked about for a while his legs began to grow heavy, so he
+lay down on his back; and his body, from the feet upward, gradually grew
+cold and stiff. His last words were, "Crito, we owe a cock to
+AEsculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not neglect it."
+
+"This," concludes Phaedo, "was the end of our friend--a man, as we may
+say, the best of all his time, that we have known, and, moreover, the
+most wise and just."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+  [12] Sec. 21-39.
+
+  [13] Sec. 39, 40.
+
+  [14] Sec. 40-46.
+
+  [15] Sec. 47.
+
+  [16] Sec. 48-57.
+
+  [17] Sec. 55-59.
+
+  [18] Sec. 61-75.
+
+  [19] Sec. 76-84.
+
+  [20] Sec. 93-99.
+
+  [21] Sec. 100-112.
+
+  [22] Sec. 112-128.
+
+  [23] Sec. 129-131.
+
+  [24] Sec. 132-145.
+
+
+
+
+PHAEDO;
+OR,
+THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
+
+
+FIRST ECHECRATES, PHAEDO.
+THEN SOCRATES, APOLLODORUS, CEBES, SIMMIAS, AND CRITO.
+
+_Ech._ Were you personally present, Phaedo, with Socrates on that day
+when he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear an account of it
+from some one else?
+
+_Phaed._ I was there myself, Echecrates.
+
+_Ech._ What, then, did he say before his death, and how did he die? for
+I should be glad to hear: for scarcely any citizen of Phlius[25] ever
+visits Athens now, nor has any stranger for a long time come from thence
+who was able to give us a clear account of the particulars, except that
+he had died from drinking poison; but he was unable to tell us any thing
+more.
+
+2. _Phaed._ And did you not hear about the trial--how it went off?
+
+_Ech._ Yes; some one told me this; and I wondered that, as it took
+place so long ago, he appears to have died long afterward. What was the
+reason of this, Phaedo?
+
+_Phaed._ An accidental circumstance happened in his favor, Echecrates;
+for the poop of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos chanced to be
+crowned on the day before the trial.
+
+_Ech._ But what is this ship?
+
+_Phaed._ It is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus formerly
+conveyed the fourteen boys and girls to Crete, and saved both them and
+himself. They, therefore, made a vow to Apollo on that occasion, as it
+is said, that if they were saved they would every year dispatch a solemn
+embassy to Delos; which, from that time to the present, they send yearly
+to the god. 3. When they begin the preparations for this solemn embassy,
+they have a law that the city shall be purified during this period, and
+that no public execution shall take place until the ship has reached
+Delos, and returned to Athens; and this occasionally takes a long time,
+when the winds happen to impede their passage. The commencement of the
+embassy is when the priest of Apollo has crowned the poop of the ship.
+And this was done, as I said, on the day before the trial: on this
+account Socrates had a long interval in prison between the trial and his
+death.
+
+4. _Ech._ And what, Phaedo, were the circumstances of his death? What was
+said and done? and who of his friends were with him? or would not the
+magistrates allow them to be present, but did he die destitute of
+friends?
+
+_Phaed._ By no means; but some, indeed several, were present.
+
+_Ech._ Take the trouble, then, to relate to me all the particulars as
+clearly as you can, unless you have any pressing business.
+
+_Phaed._ I am at leisure, and will endeavor to give you a full account;
+for to call Socrates to mind, whether speaking myself or listening to
+some one else, is always most delightful to me.
+
+5. _Ech._ And indeed, Phaedo, you have others to listen to you who are of
+the same mind. However, endeavor to relate every thing as accurately as
+you can.
+
+_Phaed._ I was, indeed, wonderfully affected by being present, for I was
+not impressed with a feeling of pity, like one present at the death of a
+friend; for the man appeared to me to be happy, Echecrates, both from
+his manner and discourse, so fearlessly and nobly did he meet his death:
+so much so, that it occurred to me that in going to Hades he was not
+going without a divine destiny, but that when he arrived there he would
+be happy, if any one ever was. For this reason I was entirely
+uninfluenced by any feeling of pity, as would seem likely to be the case
+with one present on so mournful an occasion; nor was I affected by
+pleasure from being engaged in philosophical discussions, as was our
+custom; for our conversation was of that kind. But an altogether
+unaccountable feeling possessed me, a kind of unusual mixture compounded
+of pleasure and pain together, when I considered that he was immediately
+about to die. And all of us who were present were affected in much the
+same manner, at one time laughing, at another weeping--one of us
+especially, Apollodorus, for you know the man and his manner.
+
+_Ech._ How should I not?
+
+6. _Phaed._ He, then, was entirely overcome by these emotions; and I,
+too, was troubled, as well as the others.
+
+_Ech._ But who were present, Phaedo?
+
+_Phaed._ Of his fellow-countrymen, this Apollodorus was present, and
+Critobulus, and his father, Crito; moreover, Hermogenes, Epigenes,
+AEschines and Antisthenes; Ctesippus the Paeanian, Menexenus, and some
+others of his countrymen, were also there: Plato, I think, was sick.
+
+_Ech._ Were any strangers present?
+
+_Phaed._ Yes; Simmias, the Theban, Cebes and Phaedondes; and from Megara,
+Euclides and Terpsion.
+
+7. _Ech._ But what! were not Aristippus and Cleombrotus present?
+
+_Phaed._ No, for they were said to be at AEgina.
+
+_Ech._ Was any one else there?
+
+_Phaed._ I think that these were nearly all who were present.
+
+_Ech._ Well, now, what do you say was the subject of conversation?
+
+_Phaed._ I will endeavor to relate the whole to you from the beginning.
+On the preceding days I and the others were constantly in the habit of
+visiting Socrates, meeting early in the morning at the court house where
+the trial took place, for it was near the prison. 8. Here, then, we
+waited every day till the prison was opened, conversing with each other,
+for it was not opened very early; but as soon as it was opened we went
+in to Socrates, and usually spent the day with him. On that occasion,
+however, we met earlier than usual; for on the preceding day, when we
+left the prison in the evening, we heard that the ship had arrived from
+Delos. We therefore urged each other to come as early as possible to the
+accustomed place. Accordingly we came; and the porter, who used to admit
+us, coming out, told us to wait, and not to enter until he had called
+us. "For," he said, "the Eleven are now freeing Socrates from his bonds,
+and announcing to him that he must die to-day." But in no long time he
+returned, and bade us enter.
+
+9. When we entered, we found Socrates just freed from his bonds, and
+Xantippe, you know her, holding his little boy, and sitting by him. As
+soon as Xantippe saw us she wept aloud, and said such things as women
+usually do on such occasions--as, "Socrates, your friends will now
+converse with you for the last time, and you with them." But Socrates,
+looking towards Crito, said: "Crito, let some one take her home." Upon
+which some of Crito's attendants led her away, wailing and beating
+herself.
+
+But Socrates, sitting up in bed, drew up his leg, and rubbed it with his
+hand, and as he rubbed it, said: "What an unaccountable thing, my
+friends, that seems to be, which men call pleasure! and how wonderfully
+is it related toward that which appears to be its contrary, pain, in
+that they will not both be present to a man at the same time! Yet if any
+one pursues and attains the one, he is almost always compelled to
+receive the other, as if they were both united together from one head."
+
+10. "And it seems tome," he said, "that if AEsop had observed this he
+would have made a fable from it, how the deity, wishing to reconcile
+these warring principles, when he could not do so, united their heads
+together, and from hence whomsoever the one visits the other attends
+immediately after; as appears to be the case with me, since I suffered
+pain in my leg before from the chain, but now pleasure seems to have
+succeeded."
+
+Hereupon Cebes, interrupting him, said: "By Jupiter! Socrates, you have
+done well in reminding me; with respect to the poems which you made, by
+putting into metre those Fables of AEsop and the hymn to Apollo, several
+other persons asked me, and especially Evenus recently, with what design
+you made them after you came here, whereas before you had never made
+any. 11. If therefore, you care at all that I should be able to answer
+Evenus, when he asks me again--for I am sure he will do so--tell me
+what I must say to him."
+
+"Tell him the truth, then, Cebes," he replied, "that I did not make them
+from a wish to compete with him, or his poems, for I knew that this
+would be no easy matter; but that I might discover the meaning of
+certain dreams, and discharge my conscience, if this should happen to be
+the music which they have often ordered me to apply myself to. For they
+were to the following purport: often in my past life the same dream
+visited me, appearing at different times in different forms, yet always
+saying the same thing--'Socrates,' it said, 'apply yourself to and
+practice music.' 12. And I formerly supposed that it exhorted and
+encouraged me to continue the pursuit I was engaged in, as those who
+cheer on racers, so that the dream encouraged me to continue the pursuit
+I was engaged in--namely, to apply myself to music, since philosophy is
+the highest music, and I was devoted to it. But now since my trial took
+place, and the festival of the god retarded my death, it appeared to me
+that if by chance the dream so frequently enjoined me to apply myself to
+popular music, I ought not to disobey it, but do so, for that it would
+be safer for me not to depart hence before I had discharged my
+conscience by making some poems in obedience to the dream. Thus, then, I
+first of all composed a hymn to the god whose festival was present; and
+after the god, considering that a poet, if he means to be a poet, ought
+to make fables, and not discourses, and knowing that I was not skilled
+in making fables, I therefore put into verse those Fables of AEsop, which
+were at hand, and were known to me, and which first occurred to me."
+
+13. "Tell this, then, to Evenus, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and if he
+is wise, to follow me as soon as he can. But I depart, as it seems,
+to-day; for so the Athenians order."
+
+To this Simmias said, "What is this, Socrates, which you exhort Evenus
+to do? for I often meet with him; and, from what I know of him, I am
+pretty certain that he will not at all be willing to comply with your
+advice."
+
+"What, then," said he, "is not Evenus a philosopher?"
+
+"To me he seems to be so," said Simmias.
+
+"Then he will be willing," rejoined Socrates, "and so will every one who
+worthily engages in this study. Perhaps, indeed, he will not commit
+violence on himself; for that, they say, is not allowable." And as he
+said this he let down his leg from the bed on the ground, and in this
+posture continued during the remainder of the discussion.
+
+Cebes then asked him, "What do you mean, Socrates, by saying that it is
+not lawful to commit violence on one's self, but that a philosopher
+should be willing to follow one who is dying?"
+
+14. "What, Cebes! have not you and Simmias, who have conversed
+familiarly with Philolaus[26] on this subject, heard?"
+
+"Nothing very clearly, Socrates."
+
+"I, however, speak only from hearsay; what, then, I have heard I have no
+scruple in telling. And perhaps it is most becoming for one who is about
+to travel there to inquire and speculate about the journey thither, what
+kind we think it is. What else can one do in the interval before
+sunset?"
+
+"Why, then, Socrates, do they say that it is not allowable to kill one's
+self? for I, as you asked just now, have heard both Philolaus, when he
+lived with us, and several others, say that it was not right to do this;
+but I never heard any thing clear upon the subject from any one."
+
+15. "Then, you should consider it attentively," said Socrates, "for
+perhaps you may hear. Probably, however, it will appear wonderful to
+you, if this alone, of all other things, is a universal truth,[27] and
+it never happens to a man, as is the case in all other things, that at
+some times and to some persons only it is better to die than to live;
+yet that these men for whom it is better to die--this probably will
+appear wonderful to you--may not without impiety do this good to
+themselves, but must await another benefactor."
+
+16. Then Cebes, gently smiling, said, speaking in his own dialect,[28]
+"Jove be witness!"
+
+"And, indeed," said Socrates, "it would appear to be unreasonable; yet
+still, perhaps, it has some reason on its side. The maxim, indeed, given
+on this subject in the mystical doctrines,[29] that we men are in a kind
+of prison, and that we ought not to free ourselves from it and escape,
+appears to me difficult to be understood, and not easy to penetrate.
+This, however, appears to me, Cebes, to be well said: that the gods take
+care of us, and that we men are one of their possessions. Does it not
+seem so to you?"
+
+"It does," replied Cebes.
+
+"Therefore," said he, "if one of your slaves were to kill himself,
+without your having intimated that you wished him to die, should you not
+be angry with him, and should you not punish him if you could?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+"Perhaps, then, in this point of view, it is not unreasonable to assert
+that a man ought not to kill himself before the deity lays him under a
+necessity of doing so, such as that now laid on me."
+
+17. "This, indeed," said Cebes, "appears to be probable. But what you
+said just now, Socrates, that philosophers should be very willing to
+die, appears to be an absurdity, if what we said just now is agreeable
+to reason--that it is God who takes care of us, and that we are his
+property. For that the wisest men should not be grieved at leaving that
+service in which they govern them who are the best of all
+masters--namely, the gods--is not consistent with reason; for surely he
+can not think that he will take better care of himself when he has
+become free. But a foolish man might perhaps think thus, that he should
+fly from his master, and would not reflect that he ought not to fly from
+a good one, but should cling to him as much as possible; therefore he
+would fly against all reason; but a man of sense would desire to be
+constantly with one better than himself. Thus, Socrates, the contrary of
+what you just now said is likely to be the case; for it becomes the wise
+to be grieved at dying, but the foolish to rejoice."
+
+18. Socrates, on hearing this, appeared to me to be pleased with the
+pertinacity of Cebes, and, looking toward us, said, "Cebes, you see,
+always searches out arguments, and is not at all willing to admit at
+once any thing one has said."
+
+Whereupon Simmias replied, "But, indeed, Socrates, Cebes appears to me
+now to say something to the purpose; for with what design should men
+really wise fly from masters who are better than themselves, and so
+readily leave them? And Cebes appears to me to direct his argument
+against you, because you so easily endure to abandon both us and those
+good rulers, as you yourself confess, the gods."
+
+"You speak justly," said Socrates, "for I think you mean that I ought to
+make my defense to this charge, as if I were in a court of justice."
+
+"Certainly," replied Simmias.
+
+19. "Come, then," said he, "I will endeavor to defend myself more
+successfully before you than before the judges. For," he proceeded,
+"Simmias and Cebes, if I did not think that I should go, first of all,
+among other deities who are both wise and good, and, next, among men who
+have departed this life, better than any here, I should be wrong in not
+grieving at death; but now, be assured, I hope to go among good men,
+though I would not positively assert it. That, however, I shall go among
+gods who are perfectly good masters, be assured I can positively assert
+this, if I can any thing of the kind. So that, on this account, I am not
+so much troubled, but I entertain a good hope that something awaits
+those who die, and that, as was said long since, it will be far better
+for the good than the evil."
+
+20. "What, then, Socrates," said Simmias, "would you go away keeping
+this persuasion to yourself, or would you impart it to us? For this good
+appears to me to be also common to us; and at the same time it will be
+an apology for you, if you can persuade us to believe what you say."
+
+"I will endeavor to do so," he said. "But first let us attend to Crito
+here, and see what it is he seems to have for some time wished to say."
+
+"What else, Socrates," said Crito, "but what he who is to give you the
+poison told me some time ago, that I should tell you to speak as little
+as possible? For he says that men become too much heated by speaking,
+and that nothing of this kind ought to interfere with the poison; and
+that, otherwise, those who did so were sometimes compelled to drink two
+or three times."
+
+To which Socrates replied, "Let him alone, and let him attend to his own
+business, and prepare to give it me twice, or, if occasion require, even
+thrice."
+
+21. "I was almost certain what you would say," answered Crito, "but he
+has been some time pestering me."
+
+"Never mind him," he rejoined.
+
+"But now I wish to render an account to you, my judges, of the reason
+why a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy, when he is
+about to die, appears to me, on good grounds, to have confidence, and to
+entertain a firm hope that the greatest good will befall him in the
+other world when he has departed this life. How, then, this comes to
+pass, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavor to explain."
+
+"For as many as rightly apply themselves to philosophy seem to have left
+all others in ignorance, that they aim at nothing else than to die and
+be dead. If this, then, is true, it would surely be absurd to be anxious
+about nothing else than this during their whole life, but, when it
+arrives, to be grieved at what they have been long anxious about and
+aimed at."
+
+22. Upon this, Simmias, smiling, said, "By Jupiter! Socrates, though I
+am not now at all inclined to smile, you have made me do so; for I think
+that the multitude, if they heard this, would think it was very well
+said in reference to philosophers, and that our countrymen particularly
+would agree with you, that true philosophers do desire death, and that
+they are by no means ignorant that they deserve to suffer it."
+
+"And, indeed, Simmias, they would speak the truth, except in asserting
+that they are not ignorant; for they are ignorant of the sense in which
+true philosophers desire to die, and in what sense they deserve death,
+and what kind of death. But," he said, "let us take leave of them, and
+speak to one another. Do we think that death is any thing?"
+
+"Certainly," replied Simmias.
+
+23. "Is it any thing else than the separation of the soul from the
+body? And is not this to die, for the body to be apart by itself
+separated from the soul, and for the soul to subsist apart by itself
+separated from the body? Is death any thing else than this?"
+
+"No, but this," he replied.
+
+"Consider, then, my good friend, whether you are of the same opinion as
+I; for thus, I think, we shall understand better the subject we are
+considering. Does it appear to you to be becoming in a philosopher to be
+anxious about pleasures, as they are called, such as meats and drinks?"
+
+"By no means, Socrates," said Simmias.
+
+"But what? about the pleasures of love?"
+
+"Not at all."
+
+24. "What, then? Does such a man appear to you to think other bodily
+indulgences of value? For instance, does he seem to you to value or
+despise the possession of magnificent garments and sandals, and other
+ornaments of the body except so far as necessity compels him to use
+them?"
+
+"The true philosopher," he answered, "appears to me to despise them."
+
+"Does not, then," he continued, "the whole employment of such a man
+appear to you to be, not about the body, but to separate himself from it
+as much as possible, and be occupied about his soul?"
+
+"It does."
+
+"First of all, then, in such matters, does not the philosopher, above
+all other men, evidently free his soul as much as he can from communion
+with the body?"
+
+"It appears so."
+
+25. "And it appears, Simmias, to the generality of men, that he who
+takes no pleasure in such things, and who does not use them, does not
+deserve to live; but that he nearly approaches to death who cares
+nothing for the pleasures that subsist through the body."
+
+"You speak very truly."
+
+"But what with respect to the acquisition of wisdom? Is the body an
+impediment, or not, if any one takes it with him as a partner in the
+search? What I mean is this: Do sight and hearing convey any truth to
+men, or are they such as the poets constantly sing, who say that we
+neither hear nor see any thing with accuracy? If, however, these bodily
+senses are neither accurate nor clear, much less can the others be so;
+for they are all far inferior to these. Do they not seem so to you?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+26. "When, then," said he, "does the soul light on the truth? for when
+it attempts to consider any thing in conjunction with the body, it is
+plain that it is then led astray by it."
+
+"You say truly."
+
+"Must it not, then, be by reasoning, if at all, that any of the things
+that really are become known to it?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"And surely the soul then reasons best when none of these things disturb
+it--neither hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor pleasure of any kind; but
+it retires as much as possible within itself, taking leave of the body;
+and, so far as it can, not communicating or being in contact with it, it
+aims at the discovery of that which is."
+
+"Such is the case."
+
+"Does not, then, the soul of the philosopher, in these cases, despise
+the body, and flee from it, and seek to retire within itself?"
+
+"It appears so."
+
+27. "But what as to such things as these, Simmias? Do we say that
+justice itself is something or nothing?"
+
+"We say it is something, by Jupiter!"
+
+"And that beauty and goodness are something?"
+
+"How not?"
+
+"Now, then, have you ever seen any thing of this kind with your eyes?"
+
+"By no means," he replied.
+
+"Did you ever lay hold of them by any other bodily sense? But I speak
+generally, as of magnitude, health, strength and, in a word, of the
+essence of every thing; that is to say, what each is. Is, then, the
+exact truth of these perceived by means of the body, or is it thus,
+whoever among us habituates himself to reflect most deeply and
+accurately on each several thing about which he is considering, he will
+make the nearest approach to the knowledge of it?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+28. "Would not he, then, do this with the utmost purity, who should in
+the highest degree approach each subject by means of the mere mental
+faculties, neither employing the sight in conjunction with the
+reflective faculty, nor introducing any other sense together with
+reasoning; but who, using pure reflection by itself, should attempt to
+search out each essence purely by itself, freed as much as possible from
+the eyes and ears, and, in a word, from the whole body, as disturbing
+the soul, and not suffering it to acquire truth and wisdom, when it is
+in communion with it. Is not he the person, Simmias, if any one can, who
+will arrive at the knowledge of that which is?"
+
+29. "You speak with wonderful truth, Socrates," replied Simmias.
+
+"Wherefore," he said, "it necessarily follows from all this that some
+such opinion as this should be entertained by genuine philosophers, so
+that they should speak among themselves as follows: 'A by-path, as it
+were, seems to lead us on in our researches undertaken by reason,'
+because so long as we are encumbered with the body, and our soul is
+contaminated with such an evil, we can never fully attain to what we
+desire; and this, we say, is truth. For the body subjects us to
+innumerable hinderances on account of its necessary support; and,
+moreover, if any diseases befall us, they impede us in our search after
+that which is; and it fills us with longings, desires, fears, all kinds
+of fancies, and a multitude of absurdities, so that, as it is said in
+real truth, by reason of the body it is never possible for us to make
+any advances in wisdom. 30. For nothing else than the body and its
+desires occasion wars, seditions, and contests; for all wars among us
+arise on account of our desire to acquire wealth: and we are compelled
+to acquire wealth on account of the body, being enslaved to its service;
+and consequently on all these accounts we are hindered in the pursuit of
+philosophy. But the worst of all is, that if it leaves us any leisure,
+and we apply ourselves to the consideration of any subject, it
+constantly obtrudes itself in the midst of our researches, and occasions
+trouble and disturbance, and confounds us so that we are not able, by
+reason of it, to discern the truth. It has, then, in reality been
+demonstrated to us that if we are ever to know any thing purely, we must
+be separated from the body, and contemplate the things themselves by the
+mere soul; and then, as it seems, we shall obtain that which we desire,
+and which we profess ourselves to be lovers of--wisdom--when we are
+dead, as reason shows, but not while we are alive. 31. For if it is not
+possible to know any thing purely in conjunction with the body, one of
+these two things must follow, either that we can never acquire
+knowledge, or only after we are dead; for then the soul will subsist
+apart by itself, separate from the body, but not before. And while we
+live we shall thus, as it seems, approach nearest to knowledge, if we
+hold no intercourse or communion at all with the body, except what
+absolute necessity requires, nor suffer ourselves to be polluted by its
+nature, but purify ourselves from it, until God himself shall release
+us. And thus being pure, and freed from the folly of body, we shall in
+all likelihood be with others like ourselves, and shall of ourselves
+know the whole real essence, and that probably is truth; for it is not
+allowable for the impure to attain to the pure. Such things, I think,
+Simmias, all true lovers of wisdom must both think and say to one
+another. Does it not seem so to you?"
+
+"Most assuredly, Socrates."
+
+32. "If this, then," said Socrates, "is true, my friend, there is great
+hope for one who arrives where I am going, there, if anywhere, to
+acquire that in perfection for the sake of which we have taken so much
+pains during our past life; so that the journey now appointed me is set
+out upon with good hope, and will be so by any other man who thinks that
+his mind has been, as it were, purified."
+
+"Certainly," said Simmias.
+
+"But does not purification consist in this, as was said in a former part
+of our discourse, in separating as much as possible the soul from the
+body, and in accustoming it to gather and collect itself by itself on
+all sides apart from the body, and to dwell, so far as it can, both now
+and hereafter, alone by itself, delivered, as it were, from the shackles
+of the body?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+33. "Is this, then, called death, this deliverance and separation of the
+soul from the body?"
+
+"Assuredly," he answered.
+
+"But, as we affirmed, those who pursue philosophy rightly are especially
+and alone desirous to deliver it; and this is the very study of
+philosophers, the deliverance and separation of the soul from the body,
+is it not?"
+
+"It appears so."
+
+"Then, as I said at first, would it not be ridiculous for a man who has
+endeavored throughout his life to live as near as possible to death,
+then, when death arrives, to grieve? would not this be ridiculous?"
+
+"How should it not?"
+
+"In reality, then, Simmias," he continued, "those who pursue philosophy
+rightly, study to die; and to them, of all men, death is least
+formidable. Judge from this. Since they altogether hate the body and
+desire to keep the soul by itself, would it not be irrational if, when
+this comes to pass, they should be afraid and grieve, and not be glad to
+go to that place where, on their arrival, they may hope to obtain that
+which they longed for throughout life? But they longed for wisdom, and
+to be freed from association with that which they hated. 34. Have many
+of their own accord wished to descend into Hades, on account of human
+objects of affection, their wives and sons, induced by this very hope of
+their seeing and being with those whom they have loved? and shall one
+who really loves wisdom, and firmly cherishes this very hope, that he
+shall nowhere else attain it in a manner worthy of the name, except in
+Hades, be grieved at dying, and not gladly go there? We must think that
+he would gladly go, my friend, if he be in truth a philosopher; for he
+will be firmly persuaded of this, that he will nowhere else than there
+attain wisdom in its purity; and if this be so, would it not be very
+irrational, as I just now said, if such a man were to be afraid of
+death?"
+
+"Very much so, by Jupiter!" he replied.
+
+35. "Would not this, then," he resumed, "be a sufficient proof to you
+with respect to a man whom you should see grieved when about to die,
+that he was not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of his body? And this
+same person is probably a lover of riches and a lover of honor, one or
+both of these."
+
+"It certainly is as you say," he replied.
+
+"Does not, then," he said, "that which is called fortitude, Simmias,
+eminently belong to philosophers?"
+
+"By all means," he answered.
+
+"And temperance, also, which even the multitude call temperance, and
+which consists in not being carried away by the passions, but in holding
+them in contempt, and keeping them in subjection, does not this belong
+to those only who most despise the body, and live in the study of
+philosophy?"
+
+"Necessarily so," he replied.
+
+36. "For," he continued, "if you will consider the fortitude and
+temperance of others, they will appear to you to be absurd."
+
+"How so, Socrates?"
+
+"Do you know," he said, "that all others consider death among the great
+evils?"
+
+"They do indeed," he answered.
+
+"Then, do the brave among them endure death when they do endure it,
+through dread of greater evils?"
+
+"It is so."
+
+"All men, therefore, except philosophers, are brave through being afraid
+and fear; though it is absurd that any one should be brave through fear
+and cowardice."
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But what, are not those among them who keep their passions in
+subjection affected in the same way? and are they not temperate through
+a kind of intemperance? And although we may say, perhaps, that this is
+impossible, nevertheless the manner in which they are affected with
+respect to this silly temperance resembles this, for, fearing to be
+deprived of other pleasures, and desiring them, they abstain from some,
+being mastered by others. And though they call intemperance the being
+governed by pleasures, yet it happens to them that, by being mastered by
+some pleasures, they master others, and this is similar to what was just
+now said, that in a certain manner they become temperate through
+intemperance."
+
+"So it seems,"
+
+37. "My dear Simmias, consider that this is not a right exchange for
+virtue, to barter pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, fear for
+fear, and the greater for the lesser, like pieces of money, but that
+that alone is the right coin, for which we ought to barter all these
+things, wisdom, and for this and with this everything is in reality
+bought and sold Fortitude, temperance and justice, and, in a word true
+virtue, subsist with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears, and everything
+else of the kind, are present or absent, but when separated from wisdom
+and changed one for another, consider whether such virtue is not a mere
+outline and in reality servile, possessing neither soundness nor truth.
+But the really true virtue is a purification from all such things, and
+temperance, justice, fortitude and wisdom itself, are a kind of
+initiatory purification 38. And those who instituted the mysteries for
+us appear to have been by no means contemptible, but in reality to have
+intimated long since that whoever shall arrive in Hades unexpiated and
+uninitiated shall lie in mud, but he that arrives there purified and
+initiated shall dwell with the gods 'For there are,' say those who
+preside at the mysteries, 'many wand-bearers, but few inspired'. These
+last, in my opinion, are no other than those who have pursued philosophy
+rightly that I might be of their number. I have to the utmost of my
+ability left no means untried, but have endeavored to the utmost of my
+power. But whether I have endeavored rightly, and have in any respect
+succeeded, on arriving there I shall know clearly, if it please
+God--very shortly, as it appears to me."
+
+39. "Such, then, Simmias and Cebes," he added, "is the defense I make,
+for that I, on good grounds, do not repine or grieve at leaving you and
+my masters here, being persuaded that there, no less than here, I shall
+meet with good masters and friends. But to the multitude this is
+incredible If, however, I have succeeded better with you in my defense
+than I did with the Athenian judges, it is well."
+
+When Socrates had thus spoken, Cebes, taking up the discussion, said
+"Socrates, all the rest appears to me to be said rightly, but what you
+have said respecting the soul will occasion much incredulity in many
+from the apprehension that when it is separated from the body it no
+longer exists anywhere, but is destroyed and perishes on the very day in
+which a man dies, and that immediately it is separated and goes out from
+the body it is dispersed, and vanishes like breath or smoke, and is no
+longer anywhere, since if it remained anywhere united in itself, and
+freed from those evils which you have just now enumerated, there would
+be an abundant and good hope, Socrates, that what you say is true 40.
+But this probably needs no little persuasion and proof, that the soul of
+a man who dies exists, and possesses activity and intelligence."
+
+"You say truly, Cebes," said Socrates, "but what shall we do? Are you
+willing that we should converse on these points, whether such is
+probably the case or not?"
+
+"Indeed," replied Cebes, "I should gladly hear your opinion on these
+matters."
+
+"I do not think," said Socrates, "that any one who should now hear us,
+even though he were a comic poet, would say that I am talking idly, or
+discoursing on subjects that do not concern me. If you please, then, we
+will examine into it. Let us consider it in this point of view, whether
+the souls of men who are dead exist in Hades, or not. This is an ancient
+saying, which we now call to mind, that souls departing hence exist
+there, and return hither again, and are produced from the dead. 41. And
+if this is so, that the living are produced again from the dead, can
+there be any other consequence than that our souls are there? for surely
+they could not be produced again if they did not exist; and this would
+be sufficient proof that these things are so, if it should in reality be
+evident that the living are produced from no other source than the dead.
+But if this is not the case, there will be need of other arguments."
+
+"Certainly," said Cebes.
+
+"You must not, then," he continued, "consider this only with respect to
+men, if you wish to ascertain it with greater certainty, but also with
+respect to all animals and plants, and, in a word, with respect to every
+thing that is subject to generation. Let us see whether they are not all
+so produced, no otherwise than contraries from contraries, wherever they
+have any such quality; as, for instance, the honorable is contrary to
+the base, and the just to the unjust, and so with ten thousand other
+things. 42. Let us consider this, then, whether it is necessary that all
+things which have a contrary should be produced from nothing else than
+their contrary. As, for instance, when any thing becomes greater, is it
+not necessary that, from being previously smaller, it afterward became
+greater?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"And if it becomes smaller, will it not, from being previously greater,
+afterward become smaller?"
+
+"It is so," he replied.
+
+"And from stronger, weaker? and from slower, swifter?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"What, then? If any thing becomes worse, must it not become so from
+better? and if more just, from more unjust?"
+
+"How should it not?"
+
+"We have then," he said, "sufficiently determined this, that all things
+are thus produced, contraries from contraries?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"What next? Is there also something of this kind in them; for instance,
+between all two contraries a mutual twofold production, from one to the
+other, and from that other back again? for between a greater thing and a
+smaller there are increase and decrease, and do we not accordingly call
+the one to increase, the other to decrease?"
+
+"Yes," he replied.
+
+43. "And must not to be separated and commingled, to grow cold and to
+grow warm, and every thing in the same manner, even though sometimes we
+have not names to designate them, yet in fact be everywhere thus
+circumstanced, of necessity, as to be produced from each other, and be
+subject to a reciprocal generation?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+"What, then?" said Socrates, "has life any contrary, as waking has its
+contrary, sleeping?"
+
+"Certainly," he answered.
+
+"What?"
+
+"Death," he replied.
+
+"Are not these, then, produced from each other, since they are
+contraries; and are not the modes by which they are produced two-fold
+intervening between these two?"
+
+"How should it be otherwise?"
+
+"I then," continued Socrates, "will describe to you one pair of the
+contraries which I have just now mentioned, both what it is and its mode
+of production: and do you describe to me the other. I say that one is to
+sleep, the other to awake; and from sleeping awaking is produced, and
+from awaking sleeping, and that the modes of their production are, the
+one to fall asleep, the other to be roused. 44. Have I sufficiently
+explained this to you or not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Do you, then," he said, "describe to me in the same manner with respect
+to life and death? Do you not say that life is contrary to death?"
+
+"I do."
+
+"And that they are produced from each other?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"What, then, is produced from life?"
+
+"Death," he replied.
+
+"What, then," said he "is produced from death?"
+
+"I must needs confess," he replied, "that life is."
+
+"From the dead, then, O Cebes! living things and living men are
+produced."
+
+"It appears so," he said.
+
+"Our souls, therefore," said Socrates, "exist in Hades."
+
+"So it seems."
+
+"With respect, then, to their mode of production, is not one of them
+very clear? for to die surely is clear, is it not?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+"What, then, shall we do?" he continued; "shall we not find a
+corresponding contrary mode of production, or will nature be defective
+in this? Or must we discover a contrary mode of production to dying?"
+
+"By all means," he said.
+
+"What is this?"
+
+"To revive."
+
+"Therefore," he proceeded, "if there is such a thing as to revive, will
+not this reviving be a mode of production from the dead to the living?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Thus, then, we have agreed that the living are produced from the dead,
+no less than the dead from the living; but, this being the case, there
+appears to me sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must
+necessarily exist somewhere, from whence they are again produced."
+
+45. "It appears to me, Socrates," he said "that this must necessarily
+follow from what has been admitted."
+
+"See now, O Cebes!" he said, "that we have not agreed on these things
+improperly, as it appears to me; for if one class of things were not
+constantly given back in the place of another, revolving, as it were, in
+a circle, but generation were direct from one thing alone into its
+opposite, and did not turn round again to the other, or retrace its
+course, do you know that all things would at length have the same form,
+be in the same state, and cease to be produced?"
+
+"How say you?" he asked.
+
+"It is by no means difficult," he replied, "to understand what I mean;
+if, for instance, there should be such a thing as falling asleep, but no
+reciprocal waking again produced from a state of sleep, you know that at
+length all things would show the fable of Endymion to be a jest, and it
+would be thought nothing at all of, because everything else would be in
+the same state as he--namely, asleep. And if all things were mingled
+together, but never separated, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be
+verified, 'all things would be together.' 46. Likewise, my dear Cebes,
+if all things that partake of life should die, and after they are dead
+should remain in this state of death, and not revive again, would it not
+necessarily follow that at length all things should be dead, and nothing
+alive? For if living beings are produced from other things, and living
+beings die, what could prevent their being all absorbed in death?"
+
+"Nothing whatever, I think, Socrates," replied Cebes; "but you appear to
+me to speak the exact truth."
+
+"For, Cebes," he continued, "as it seems to me, such undoubtedly is the
+case, and we have not admitted these things under a delusion, for it is
+in reality true that there is a reviving again, that the living are
+produced from the dead, that the souls of the dead exist, and that the
+condition of the good is better, and of the evil worse."
+
+47. "And, indeed," said Cebes, interrupting him, "according to that
+doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently in the habit of advancing,
+if it is true, that our learning is nothing else than reminiscence,
+according to this it is surely necessary that we must at some former
+time have learned what we now remember. But this is impossible, unless
+our soul existed somewhere before it came into this human form; so that
+from hence, also, the soul appears to be something immortal."
+
+"But, Cebes," said Simmias, interrupting him, "what proofs are there of
+these things? Remind me of them, for I do not very well remember them at
+present."
+
+48. "It is proved," said Cebes, "by one argument, and that a most
+beautiful one, that men, when questioned (if one questions them
+properly) of themselves, describe all things as they are, however, if
+they had not innate knowledge and right reason, they would never be
+able to do this. Moreover, if one leads them to diagrams, or any thing
+else of the kind, it is then most clearly apparent that this is the
+case."
+
+"But if you are not persuaded in this way, Simmias," said Socrates, "see
+if you will agree with us in considering the matter thus. For do you
+doubt how that which is called learning is reminiscence?"
+
+"I do not doubt," said Simmias; "but I require this very thing of which
+we are speaking, to be reminded; and, indeed, from what Cebes has begun
+to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded; nevertheless, however,
+I should like to hear now how you would attempt to prove it."
+
+"I do it thus" he replied: "we admit, surely, that if any one be
+reminded of any thing, he must needs have known that thing at some time
+or other before."
+
+"Certainly," he said.
+
+49. "Do we, then, admit this also, that when knowledge comes in a
+certain manner it is reminiscence? But the manner I mean is this: if any
+one, upon seeing or hearing, or perceiving through the medium of any
+other sense, some particular thing, should not only know that, but also
+form an idea of something else, of which the knowledge is not the same,
+but different, should we not justly say that he remembered that of which
+he received the idea?"
+
+"How mean you?"
+
+"For instance, the knowledge of a man is different from that of a lyre."
+
+"How not?"
+
+"Do you not know, then, that lovers when they see a lyre, or a garment,
+or any thing else which their favorite is accustomed to use, are thus
+affected; they both recognize the lyre, and receive in their minds the
+form of the person to whom the lyre belonged? This is reminiscence: just
+as any one, seeing Simmias, is often reminded of Cebes, and so in an
+infinite number of similar instances."
+
+"An infinite number, indeed, by Jupiter!" said Simmias.
+
+"Is not, then," he said, "something of this sort a kind of reminiscence,
+especially when one is thus affected with respect to things which, from
+lapse of time, and not thinking of them, one has now forgotten?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+50. "But what?" he continued. "Does it happen that when one sees a
+painted horse or a painted lyre one is reminded of a man, and that when
+one sees a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Cebes?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"And does it not also happen that on seeing a picture of Simmias one is
+reminded of Simmias himself?"
+
+"It does, indeed," he replied.
+
+"Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that reminiscence
+arises partly from things like, and partly from things unlike?"
+
+"It does."
+
+"But when one is reminded by things like, is it not necessary that one
+should be thus further affected, so as to perceive whether, as regards
+likeness, this falls short or not of the thing of which one has been
+reminded?"
+
+"It is necessary," he replied.
+
+"Consider, then," said Socrates, "if the case is thus. Do we allow that
+there is such a thing as equality? I do not mean of one log with
+another, nor one stone with another, nor any thing else of this kind,
+but something altogether different from all these--abstract equality; do
+we allow that there is any such thing, or not?"
+
+"By Jupiter! we most assuredly do allow it," replied Simmias.
+
+51. "And do we know what it is itself?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+"Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things
+we have just now mentioned, and that from seeing logs, or stones, or
+other things of the kind, equal, we have from these formed an idea of
+that which is different from these--for does it not appear to you to be
+different? Consider the matter thus. Do not stones that are equal, and
+logs sometimes that are the same, appear at one time equal, and at
+another not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But what? Does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? or
+equality inequality?"
+
+"Never, Socrates, at any time."
+
+"These equal things, then," he said, "and abstract equality, are not the
+same?"
+
+"By no means, Socrates, as it appears."
+
+"However, from these equal things," he said, "which are different from
+that abstract equality, have you not formed your idea and derived your
+knowledge of it?"
+
+"You speak most truly," he replied.
+
+"Is it not, therefore, from its being like or unlike them?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But it makes no difference," he said. "When, therefore, on seeing one
+thing, you form, from the sight of it, the notion of another, whether
+like or unlike, this," he said, "must necessarily be reminiscence."
+
+"Certainly."
+
+52. "What, then, as to this?" he continued. "Are we affected in any such
+way with regard to logs and the equal things we have just now spoken of?
+And do they appear to us to be equal in the same manner as abstract
+equality itself is, or do they fall short in some degree, or not at
+all, of being such as equality itself is?"
+
+"They fall far short," he replied.
+
+"Do we admit, then, that when one, on beholding some particular thing,
+perceives that it aims, as that which I now see, at being like something
+else that exists, but falls short of it, and can not become such as that
+is, but is inferior to it--do we admit that he who perceives this must
+necessarily have had a previous knowledge of that which he says it
+resembles, though imperfectly?"
+
+"It is necessary."
+
+"What, then? Are we affected in some such way, or not, with respect to
+things equal and abstract equality itself?"
+
+"Assuredly."
+
+"It is necessary, therefore, that we must have known abstract equality
+before the time when, on first seeing equal things, we perceived that
+they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in doing so."
+
+"Such is the case."
+
+53. "Moreover, we admit this too, that we perceived this, and could not
+possibly perceive it by any other means than the sight, or touch, or
+some other of the senses, for I say the same of them all."
+
+"For they are the same, Socrates, so far as, our argument is concerned."
+
+"However, we must perceive, by means of the senses, that all things
+which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality, and yet fall
+short of it; or how shall we say it is?"
+
+"Even so."
+
+"Before, then, we began to see, and hear, and use our other senses, we
+must have had a knowledge of equality itself--what it is, if we were to
+refer to it those equal things that come under the senses, and observe
+that all such things aim at resembling that, but fall far short of it."
+
+"This necessarily follows, Socrates, from what has been already said."
+
+"But did we not, as soon as we were born, see and hear, and possess our
+other senses?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But, we have said, before we possessed these, we must have had a
+knowledge of abstract equality?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"We must have had it, then, as it seems, before we were born."
+
+"It seems so."
+
+54. "If, therefore, having this before we were born, we were born
+possessing it, we knew, both before we were born and as soon as we were
+born, not only the equal and the greater and smaller, but all things of
+the kind; for our present discussion is not more respecting equality
+than the beautiful itself, the good, the just, and the holy, and, in one
+word, respecting every thing which we mark with the seal of existence,
+both in the questions we ask and the answers we give. So that we must
+necessarily have had a knowledge of all these before we were born."
+
+"Such is the case."
+
+"And if, having once had it, we did not constantly forget it, we should
+always be born with this knowledge, and should always retain it through
+life. For to know is this, when one has got a knowledge of any thing, to
+retain and not lose it; for do we not call this oblivion, Simmias, the
+loss of knowledge?"
+
+"Assuredly, Socrates," he replied.
+
+55. "But if, having had it before we were born, we lose it at our
+birth, and afterward, through exercising the senses about these things,
+we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed, would not that
+which we call learning be a recovery of our own knowledge? And in saying
+that this is to remember, should we not say rightly?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"For this appeared to be possible, for one having perceived any thing,
+either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense, to form an
+idea of something different from this, which he had forgotten, and with
+which this was connected by being unlike or like. So that, as I said,
+one of these two things must follow: either we are all born with this
+knowledge, and we retain it through life, or those whom we say learn
+afterward do nothing else than remember, and this learning will be
+reminiscence."
+
+"Such, certainly, is the case, Socrates."
+
+56. "Which, then, do you choose, Simmias: that we are born with
+knowledge, or that we afterward remember what we had formerly known?"
+
+"At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose."
+
+"But what? Are you able to choose in this case, and what do you think
+about it? Can a man who possesses knowledge give a reason for the things
+that he knows, or not?"
+
+"He needs must be able to do so, Socrates," he replied.
+
+"And do all men appear to you to be able to give a reason for the things
+of which we have just now been speaking?"
+
+"I wish they could," said Simmias; "but I am much more afraid that at
+this time to-morrow there will no longer be any one able to do this
+properly."
+
+"Do not all men, then, Simmias," he said, "seem to you to know these
+things?"
+
+"By no means."
+
+"Do they remember, then, what they once learned?"
+
+"Necessarily so."
+
+"When did our souls receive this knowledge? Not surely, since we were
+born into the world."
+
+"Assuredly not."
+
+"Before, then?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"Our souls, therefore, Simmias, existed before they were in a human
+form, separate from bodies, and possessed intelligence."
+
+57. "Unless, Socrates, we receive this knowledge at our birth, for this
+period yet remains."
+
+"Be it so, my friend. But at what other time do we lose it? for we are
+not born with it, as we have just now admitted. Do we lose it, then, at
+the very time in which we receive it? Or can you mention any other
+time?"
+
+"By no means, Socrates; I was not aware that I was saying nothing to the
+purpose."
+
+"Does the case then stand thus with us, Simmias?" he proceeded: "If
+those things which we are continually talking about really exist, the
+beautiful, the good, and every such essence, and to this we refer all
+things that come under the senses, as finding it to have a prior
+existence, and to be our own, and if we compare these things to it, it
+necessarily follows, that as these exist, so likewise our soul exists
+even before we are born; but if these do not exist, this discussion will
+have been undertaken in vain, is it not so? And is there not an equal
+necessity both that these things should exist, and our souls also,
+before we are born; and if not the former, neither the latter?"
+
+58. "Most assuredly, Socrates," said Simmias, "there appears to me to be
+the same necessity; and the argument admirably tends to prove that our
+souls exist before we are born, just as that essence does which you have
+now mentioned. For I hold nothing so clear to me as this, that all such
+things most certainly exist, as the beautiful, the good, and all the
+rest that you just now spoke of; and, so far as I am concerned, the case
+is sufficiently demonstrated."
+
+"But how does it appear to Cebes?" said Socrates; "for it is necessary
+to persuade Cebes too."
+
+"He is sufficiently persuaded, I think," said Simmias, "although he is
+the most pertinacious of men in distrusting arguments. Yet I think he is
+sufficiently persuaded of this, that our soul existed before we were
+born. But whether, when we are dead, it will still exist does not appear
+to me to have been demonstrated, Socrates," he continued; "but that
+popular doubt, which Cebes just now mentioned, still stands in our way,
+whether, when a man dies, the soul is not dispersed, and this is the end
+of its existence. 59. For what hinders it being born, and formed from
+some other source, and existing before it came into a human body, and
+yet, when it has come, and is separated from this body, its then also
+dying itself, and being destroyed?"
+
+"You say well, Simmias," said Cebes; "for it appears that only one half
+of what is necessary has been demonstrated--namely, that our soul
+existed before we were born; but it is necessary to demonstrate further,
+that when we are dead it will exist no less than before we were born, if
+the demonstration is to be made complete."
+
+"This has been even now demonstrated, Simmias and Cebes," said Socrates,
+"if you will only connect this last argument with that which we before
+assented to, that every thing living is produced from that which is
+dead. For if the soul exists before, and it is necessary for it when it
+enters into life, and is born, to be produced from nothing else than
+death, and from being dead, how is it not necessary for it also to
+exist after death, since it must needs be produced again? 60. What you
+require, then, has been already demonstrated. However, both you and
+Simmias appear to me as if you wished to sift this argument more
+thoroughly, and to be afraid, like children, lest, on the soul's
+departure from the body, the winds should blow it away and disperse it,
+especially if one should happen to die, not in a calm, but in a violent
+storm."
+
+Upon this Cebes, smiling, said, "Endeavor to teach us better, Socrates,
+as if we were afraid, or rather not as if we were afraid, though perhaps
+there is some boy[30] within us who has such a dread. Let us, then,
+endeavor to persuade him not to be afraid of death, as of hobgoblins."
+
+"But you must charm him every day," said Socrates, "until you have
+quieted his fears."
+
+"But whence, Socrates," he said, "can we procure a skillful charmer for
+such a case, now that you are about to leave us?"
+
+61. "Greece is wide, Cebes," he replied, "and in it surely there are
+skillful men. There are also many barbarous nations, all of which you
+should search through, seeking such a charmer, sparing neither money nor
+toil, as there is nothing on which you can more seasonably spend your
+money. You should also seek for him among yourselves; for perhaps you
+could not easily find any more competent than yourselves to do this."
+
+"This shall be done," said Cebes; "but, if it is agreeable to you, let
+us return to the point from whence we digressed."
+
+"It will be agreeable to me, for how should it not?"
+
+"You say well," rejoined Cebes.
+
+"We ought, then," said Socrates, "to ask ourselves some such question
+as this: to what kind of thing it appertains to be thus
+affected--namely, to be dispersed--and for what we ought to fear, lest
+it should be so affected, and for what not. And after this we should
+consider which of the two the soul is, and in the result should either
+be confident or fearful for our soul."
+
+"You speak truly," said he.
+
+62. "Does it not, then, appertain to that which is formed by
+composition, and is naturally compounded, to be thus affected, to be
+dissolved in the same manner as that in which it was compounded; and if
+there is any thing not compounded, does it not appertain to this alone,
+if to any thing, not to be thus affected?"
+
+"It appears to me to be so," said Cebes.
+
+"Is it not most probable, then, that things which are always the same,
+and in the same state, are uncompounded, but that things which are
+constantly changing, and are never in the same state, are compounded?"
+
+"To me it appears so."
+
+"Let us return, then," he said, "to the subjects on which we before
+discoursed. Whether is essence itself, of which we gave this account
+that it exists, both in our questions and answers, always the same, or
+does it sometimes change? Does equality itself, the beautiful itself,
+and each several thing which is, ever undergo any change, however small?
+Or does each of them which exists, being an unmixed essence by itself,
+continue always the same, and in the same state, and never undergo any
+variation at all under any circumstances?"
+
+"They must of necessity continue the same and in the same state,
+Socrates," said Cebes.
+
+63. "But what shall we say of the many beautiful things, such as men,
+horses, garments, or other things of the kind, whether equal or
+beautiful, or of all things synonymous with them? Do they continue the
+same, or, quite contrary to the former, are they never at any time, so
+to say, the same, either with respect to themselves or one another?"
+
+"These, on the other hand," replied Cebes, "never continue the same."
+
+"These, then, you can touch, or see, or perceive by the other senses;
+but those that continue the same, you can not apprehend in any other way
+than by the exercise of thought; for such things are invisible, and are
+not seen?"
+
+"You say what is strictly true," replied Cebes.
+
+64. "We may assume, then, if you please," he continued, "that there are
+two species of things; the one visible, the other invisible?"
+
+"We may," he said.
+
+"And the invisible always continuing the same, but the visible never the
+same?"
+
+"This, too," he said, "we may assume."
+
+"Come, then," he asked, "is there anything else belonging to us than, on
+the one hand, body, and, on the other, soul?"
+
+"Nothing else," he replied.
+
+"To which species, then, shall we say the body is more like, and more
+nearly allied?"
+
+"It is clear to everyone," he said, "that it is to the visible."
+
+"But what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?"
+
+"It is not visible to men, Socrates," he replied.
+
+"But we speak of things which are visible, or not so, to the nature of
+men; or to some other nature, think you?"
+
+"To that of men."
+
+"What, then, shall we say of the soul--that it is visible, or not
+visible?"
+
+"Not visible."
+
+"Is it, then, invisible?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"The soul, then, is more like the invisible than the body; and the body,
+the visible?"
+
+"It must needs be so, Socrates."
+
+65. "And did we not, some time since, say this too, that the soul, when
+it employs the body to examine any thing, either by means of the sight
+or hearing, or any other sense (for to examine any thing by means of the
+body is to do so by the senses), is then drawn by the body to things
+that never continue the same, and wanders and is confused, and reels as
+if intoxicated, through coming into contact with things of this kind?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But when it examines anything by itself, does it approach that which is
+pure, eternal, immortal, and unchangeable, and, as being allied to it,
+continue constantly with it, so long as it subsists by itself, and has
+the power, and does it cease from its wandering, and constantly continue
+the same with respect to those things, through coming into contact with
+things of this kind? And is this affection of the soul called wisdom?"
+
+"You speak," he said, "in every respect, well and truly, Socrates."
+
+"To which species of the two, then, both from what was before and now
+said, does the soul appear to you to be more like and more nearly
+allied?"
+
+66. "Every one, I think, would allow, Socrates," he replied, "even the
+dullest person, from this method of reasoning, that the soul is in every
+respect more like that which continues constantly the same than that
+which does not so."
+
+"But what as to the body?"
+
+"It is more like the other."
+
+"Consider it also thus, that, when soul and body are together, nature
+enjoins the latter to be subservient and obey, the former to rule and
+exercise dominion. And, in this way, which of the two appears to you to
+be like the divine, and which the mortal? Does it not appear to you to
+be natural that the divine should rule and command, but the mortal obey
+and be subservient?"
+
+"To me it does so."
+
+"Which, then, does the soul resemble?"
+
+"It is clear, Socrates, that the soul resembles the divine; but the
+body, the mortal."
+
+"Consider, then, Cebes," said he, "whether, from all that has been said,
+these conclusions follow, that the soul is most like that which is
+divine, immortal, intelligent, uniform, indissoluble, and which always
+continues in the same state; but that the body, on the other hand, is
+most like that which is human, mortal, unintelligent, multiform,
+dissoluble, and which never continues in the same state. Can we say any
+thing against this, my dear Cebes, to show that it is not so?"
+
+"We can not."
+
+67. "What, then? Since these things are so, does it not appertain to the
+body to be quickly dissolved, but to the soul, on the contrary, to be
+altogether indissoluble or nearly so?"
+
+"How not?"
+
+"You perceive, however," he said, "that when a man dies, the visible
+part of him, the body, which is exposed to sight, and which we call a
+corpse, to which it appertains to be dissolved, to fall asunder and be
+dispersed, does not immediately undergo any of these affections, but
+remains for a considerable time, and especially so if any one should die
+with his body in full vigor, and at a corresponding age;[31] for when
+the body has collapsed and been embalmed, as those that are embalmed in
+Egypt, it remains almost entire for an incredible length of time; and
+some parts of the body, even though it does decay, such as the bones and
+nerves, and every thing of that kind, are, nevertheless, as one may say,
+immortal. Is it not so?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+68. "Can the soul, then, which is invisible, and which goes to another
+place like itself, excellent, pure and invisible, and therefore truly
+called the invisible world,[32] to the presence of a good and wise God
+(whither, if God will, my soul also must shortly go)--can this soul of
+ours, I ask, being such and of such a nature, when separated from the
+body, be immediately dispersed and destroyed, as most men assert? Far
+from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias. But the case is much rather thus: if
+it is separated in a pure state, taking nothing of the body with it, as
+not having willingly communicated with it in the present life, but
+having shunned it, and gathered itself within itself, as constantly
+studying this (but this is nothing else than to pursue philosophy
+aright, and in reality to study how to die easily), would not this be to
+study how to die?"
+
+"Most assuredly."
+
+"Does not the soul, then, when in this state, depart to that which
+resembles itself, the invisible, the divine, immortal and wise? And on
+its arrival there, is it not its lot to be happy, free from error,
+ignorance, fears, wild passions, and all the other evils to which human
+nature is subject; and, as is said of the initiated, does it not in
+truth pass the rest of its time with the gods? Must we affirm that it is
+so, Cebes, or otherwise?"
+
+"So, by Jupiter!" said Cebes.
+
+69. "But, I think, if it departs from the body polluted and impure, as
+having constantly held communion with the body, and having served and
+loved it, and been bewitched by it, through desires and pleasures, so as
+to think that there is nothing real except what is corporeal, which one
+can touch and see, and drink and eat, and employ for sensual purposes;
+but what is dark and invisible to the eyes, which is intellectual and
+apprehended by philosophy, having been accustomed to hate, fear, and
+shun this, do you think that a soul thus affected can depart from the
+body by itself, and uncontaminated?"
+
+"By no means whatever," he replied.
+
+"But I think it will be impressed with that which is corporeal, which
+the intercourse and communion of the body, through constant association
+and great attention, have made natural to it."
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"We must think, my dear Cebes, that this is ponderous and heavy, earthly
+and visible, by possessing which such a soul is weighed down, and drawn
+again into the visible world through dread of the invisible and of
+Hades, wandering, as it is said, among monuments and tombs, about which,
+indeed, certain shadowy phantoms of souls have been seen, being such
+images as those souls produced which have not departed pure from the
+body, but which partake of the visible; on which account, also, they are
+visible."
+
+"That is probable, Socrates."
+
+70. "Probable indeed, Cebes; and not that these are the souls of the
+good, but of the wicked, which are compelled to wander about such
+places, paying the penalty of their former conduct, which was evil; and
+they wander about so long until, through the desire of the corporeal
+nature that accompanies them, they are again united to a body; and they
+are united, as is probable, to animals having the same habits as those
+they have given themselves up to during life."
+
+"But what do you say these are, Socrates?"
+
+"For instance, those who have given themselves up to gluttony,
+wantonness and drinking, and have put no restraint on themselves, will
+probably be clothed in the form of asses and brutes of that kind. Do you
+not think so?"
+
+"You say what is very probable."
+
+"And that such as have set great value on injustice, tyranny and rapine,
+will be clothed in the species of wolves, hawks and kites! Where else
+can we say such souls go?"
+
+"Without doubt," said Cebes, "into such as these."
+
+"Is it not, then, evident," he continued, "as to the rest, whither each
+will go, according to the resemblances of their several pursuits?"
+
+71. "It is evident," he replied. "How not?"
+
+"Of these, then," he said, "are not they the most happy, and do they not
+go to the best place, who have practiced that social and civilized
+virtue which they call temperance and justice, and which is produced
+from habit and exercise, without philosophy and reflection?"
+
+"In what respect are these the most happy?"
+
+"Because it is probable that these should again migrate into a
+corresponding civilized and peaceable kind of animals, such as bees
+perhaps, or wasps, or ants, or even into the same human species again,
+and from these become moderate men."
+
+"It is probable."
+
+"But it is not lawful for any one who has not studied philosophy, and
+departed this life perfectly pure, to pass into the rank of gods, but
+only for the true lover of wisdom. And on this account, my friends
+Simmias and Cebes, those who philosophize rightly, abstain from all
+bodily desires, and persevere in doing so, and do not give themselves up
+to them, not fearing the loss of property and poverty, as the generality
+of men and the lovers of wealth; nor, again, dreading disgrace and
+ignominy, like those who are lovers of power and honor, do they then
+abstain from them."
+
+"For it would not become them to do so, Socrates," says Cebes.
+
+72. "It would not, by Jupiter!" he rejoined. "Wherefore, Cebes, they who
+care at all for their soul, and do not spend their lives in the culture
+of their bodies, despising all these, proceed not in the same way with
+them, as being ignorant whither they are going, but, being convinced
+that they ought not to act contrary to philosophy, but in accordance
+with the freedom and purification she affords, they give themselves up
+to her direction, following her wherever she leads."
+
+"How, Socrates?"
+
+"I will tell you," he replied. "The lovers of wisdom know that
+philosophy, receiving their soul plainly bound and glued to the body,
+and compelled to view things through this, as through a prison, and not
+directly by herself, and sunk in utter ignorance, and perceiving, too,
+the strength of the prison, that it arises from desire, so that he who
+is bound as much as possible assists in binding himself. 73. I say,
+then, the lovers of wisdom know that philosophy, receiving their soul in
+this state, gently exhorts it, and endeavors to free it, by showing that
+the view of things by means of the eyes is full of deception, as also is
+that through the ears and the other senses; persuading an abandonment
+of these so far as it is not absolutely necessary to use them, and
+advising the soul to be collected and concentrated within itself, and to
+believe nothing else than herself, with respect to what she herself
+understands of things that have a real subsistence; and to consider
+nothing true which she views through the medium of others, and which
+differ under different aspects;[32] for that a thing of this kind is
+sensible and visible, but that what she herself perceives is
+intelligible and invisible. The soul of the true philosopher, therefore,
+thinking that she ought not to oppose this deliverance, accordingly
+abstains as much as possible from pleasures and desires, griefs and
+fears, considering that when any one is exceedingly delighted or
+alarmed, grieved or influenced by desire, he does not merely suffer such
+evil from these things as one might suppose, such as either being sick
+or wasting his property through indulging his desires; but that which is
+the greatest evil, and the worst of all, this he suffers, and is not
+conscious of it."
+
+"But what is this evil, Socrates?" said Cebes.
+
+74. "That the soul of every man is compelled to be either vehemently
+delighted or grieved about some particular thing, and, at the same time,
+to consider that the thing about which it is thus strongly affected is
+most real and most true, though it is not so. But these are chiefly
+visible objects, are they not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"In this state of affection, then, is not the soul especially shackled
+by the body?"
+
+"How so?"
+
+"Because each pleasure and pain, having a nail, as it were, nails the
+soul to the body, and fastens it to it, and causes it to become
+corporeal, deeming those things to be true whatever the body asserts to
+be so. For, in consequence of its forming the same opinions with the
+body, and delighting in the same things, it is compelled, I think, to
+possess similar manners, and to be similarly nourished; so that it can
+never pass into Hades in a pure state, but must ever depart polluted by
+the body, and so quickly falls again into another body, and grows up as
+if it were sown, and consequently is deprived of all association with
+that which is divine, and pure, and uniform."
+
+"You speak most truly, Socrates," said Cebes.
+
+75. "For these reasons, therefore, Cebes, those who are truly lovers of
+wisdom are moderate and resolute, and not for the reasons that most
+people say. Do you think as they do?"
+
+"Assuredly not."
+
+"No, truly. But the soul of a philosopher would reason thus, and would
+not think that philosophy ought to set it free, and that when it is
+freed it should give itself up again to pleasures and pains, to bind it
+down again, and make her work void, weaving a kind of Penelope's web the
+reverse way. On the contrary, effecting a calm of the passions, and
+following the guidance of reason, and being always intent on this,
+contemplating that which is true and divine, and not subject to opinion;
+and being nourished by it, it thinks that it ought to live in this
+manner as long as it does live, and that when it dies it shall go to a
+kindred essence, and one like itself, and shall be free from human
+evils. From such a regimen as this the soul has no occasion to fear,
+Simmias and Cebes, while it strictly attends to these things, lest,
+being torn to pieces at its departure from the body, it should be blown
+about and dissipated by the winds, and no longer have an existence
+anywhere."
+
+76. When Socrates had thus spoken, a long silence ensued; and Socrates
+himself was pondering upon what had been said, as he appeared, and so
+did most of us; but Cebes and Simmias were conversing a little while
+with each other. At length Socrates, perceiving them, said, "What think
+you of what has been said? Does it appear to you to have been proved
+sufficiently? for many doubts and objections still remain if any one
+will examine them thoroughly. If, then, you are considering some other
+subject, I have nothing to say; but if you are doubting about this, do
+not hesitate both yourselves to speak and express your opinion, if it
+appears to you in any respect that it might have been argued better, and
+to call me in again to your assistance, if you think you can be at all
+benefited by my help."
+
+Upon this Simmias said, "Indeed, Socrates, I will tell you the truth:
+for some time each of us, being in doubt, has been urging and exhorting
+the other to question you, from a desire to hear our doubts solved; but
+we were afraid of giving you trouble, lest it should be disagreeable to
+you in your present circumstances."
+
+77. But he, upon hearing this, gently smiled, and said, "Bless me,
+Simmias; with difficulty, indeed, could I persuade other men that I do
+not consider my present condition a calamity, since I am not able to
+persuade even you; but you are afraid lest I should be more morose now
+than during the former part of my life. And, as it seems, I appear to
+you to be inferior to swans with respect to divination, who, when they
+perceive that they must needs die, though they have been used to sing
+before, sing then more than ever, rejoicing that they are about to
+depart to that deity whose servants they are. But men, through their
+own fear of death, belie the swans too, and say that they, lamenting
+their death, sing their last song through grief; and they do not
+consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold, or is afflicted
+with any other pain, not even the nightingale, or swallow, or the
+hoopoes, which, they say, sing lamenting through grief. But neither do
+these birds appear to me to sing through sorrow, nor yet do swans; but,
+in my opinion, belonging to Apollo, they are prophetic, and, foreseeing
+the blessings of Hades, they sing and rejoice on that day more
+excellently than at any preceding time. 78. But I, too, consider myself
+to be a fellow-servant of the swans, and sacred to the same god; and
+that I have received the power of divination from our common master no
+less than they, and that I do not depart from this life with less
+spirits than they. On this account, therefore, it is right that you
+should both speak and ask whatever you please, so long as the Athenian
+Eleven permit."
+
+"You say well," said Simmias, "and both I will tell you what are my
+doubts, and he, in turn, how far he does not assent to what has been
+said. For it appears to me, Socrates, probably as it does to you with
+respect to these matters, that to know them clearly in the present life
+is either impossible or very difficult: on the other hand, however, not
+to test what has been said of them in every possible way, so as not to
+desist until, on examining them in every point of view, one has
+exhausted every effort, is the part of a very weak man. For we ought,
+with respect to these things, either to learn from others how they stand
+or to discover them for one's self; or, if both these are impossible,
+then, taking the best of human reasonings and that which is the most
+difficult to be confuted, and embarking on this, as one who risks
+himself on a raft, so to sail through life, unless one could be carried
+more safely, and with less risk, on a surer conveyance, or some divine
+reason. 79. I, therefore, shall not now be ashamed to question you,
+since you bid me do so, nor shall I blame myself hereafter for not
+having now told you what I think; for to me, Socrates, when I consider
+the matter, both with myself and with Cebes, what has been said does not
+appear to have been sufficiently proved."
+
+Then said Socrates, "Perhaps, my friend, you have the truth on your
+side; but tell me in what respect it was not sufficiently proved."
+
+"In this," he answered, "because any one might use the same argument
+with respect to harmony, and a lyre, and its chords, that harmony is
+something invisible and incorporeal, very beautiful and divine, in a
+well-modulated lyre; but the lyre and its chords are bodies, and of
+corporeal form, compounded and earthly, and akin to that which is
+mortal. When any one, then, has either broken the lyre, or cut or burst
+the chords, he might maintain from the same reasoning as yours that it
+is necessary the harmony should still exist and not be destroyed; for
+there could be no possibility that the lyre should subsist any longer
+when the chords are burst; and that the chords, which are of a mortal
+nature, should subsist, but that the harmony, which is of the same
+nature and akin to that which is divine and immortal, should become
+extinct, and perish before that which is mortal; but he might say that
+the harmony must needs subsist somewhere, and that the wood and chords
+must decay before it can undergo any change. 80. For I think, Socrates,
+that you yourself have arrived at this conclusion, that we consider the
+soul to be pretty much of this kind--namely, that our body being
+compacted and held together by heat and cold, dryness and moisture, and
+other such qualities, our soul is the fusion and harmony of these, when
+they are well and duly combined with each other. If, then, the soul is a
+kind of harmony, it is evident that when our bodies are unduly relaxed
+or strained, through diseases and other maladies, the soul must, of
+necessity, immediately perish, although it is most divine, just as other
+harmonies which subsist in sounds or in the various works of artisans;
+but that the remains of the body of each person last for a long time,
+till they are either burned or decayed. Consider, then, what we shall
+say to this reasoning, if any one should maintain that the soul, being a
+fusion of the several qualities in the body, perishes first in that
+which is called death."
+
+81. Socrates, therefore, looking steadfastly at us, as he was generally
+accustomed to do, and smiling, said, "Simmias indeed speaks justly. If,
+then, any one of you is more prompt than I am, why does he not answer,
+for he seems to have handled my argument not badly? It appears to me,
+however, that before we make our reply we should first hear from Cebes,
+what he, too, objects to our argument, in order that, some time
+intervening, we may consider what we shall say, and then when we have
+heard them, we may give up to them, if they appear to speak agreeably to
+truth; or, if not, we may then uphold our own argument. Come, then,
+Cebes," he continued, "say what it is that disturbs you, so as to cause
+your unbelief."
+
+"I will tell you," said Cebes; "the argument seems to me to rest where
+it was, and to be liable to the same objection that we mentioned before.
+For, that our soul existed even before It came into this present form, I
+do not deny has been very elegantly, and, if it is not too much to say
+so, very fully, demonstrated; but that it still exists anywhere when we
+are dead does not appear to me to have been clearly proved; nor do I
+give in to the objection of Simmias, that the soul is not stronger and
+more durable than the body, for it appears to me to excel very far all
+things of this kind. 82. 'Why, then,' reason might say, 'do you still
+disbelieve? for, since you see that when a man dies his weaker part
+still exists, does it not appear to you to be necessary that the more
+durable part should still be preserved during this period?' Consider,
+then, whether I say any thing to the purpose in reply to this. For I,
+too, as well as Simmias, as it seems, stand in need of an illustration;
+for the argument appears to me to have been put thus, as if any one
+should advance this argument about an aged weaver who had died, that the
+man has not yet perished, but perhaps still exists somewhere; and, as a
+proof, should exhibit the garment which he wore and had woven himself,
+that it is entire and has not perished; and if any one should disbelieve
+him, he would ask, which of the two is the more durable, the species of
+a man or of a garment, that is constantly in use and being worn; then,
+should any one answer that the species of man is much more durable, he
+would think it demonstrated that, beyond all question, the man is
+preserved, since that which is less durable has not perished. 83. But I
+do not think, Simmias, that this is the case, and do you consider what I
+say, for every one must think that he who argues thus argues, foolishly.
+For this weaver, having worn and woven many such garments, perished
+after almost all of them, but before the last, I suppose; and yet it
+does not on this account follow any the more that a man is inferior to
+or weaker than a garment. And I think, the soul might admit this same
+illustration with respect to the body, and he who should say the same
+things concerning them would appear to me to speak correctly, that the
+soul is more durable, but the body weaker and less durable; for he would
+say that each soul wears out many bodies, especially if it lives many
+years; for if the body wastes and is dissolved while the man still
+lives, but the soul continually weaves anew what is worn out, it must
+necessarily follow that when the soul is dissolved it must then have on
+its last garment, and perish before this alone; but when the soul has
+perished the body would show the weakness of its nature, and quickly rot
+and vanish. 84. So that it is not by any means right to place implicit
+reliance on this argument, and to believe that when we die our soul
+still exists somewhere. For, if any one should concede to him who admits
+even more than you do, and should grant to him that not only did our
+soul exist before we were born, but that even when we die nothing
+hinders the souls of some of us from still existing, and continuing to
+exist hereafter, and from being often born, and dying again--for so
+strong is it by nature, that it can hold out against repeated births--if
+he granted this, he would not yet concede that it does not exhaust
+itself in its many births, and at length perish altogether in some one
+of the deaths. But he would say that no one knows this death and
+dissolution of the body, which brings destruction to the soul; for it is
+impossible for any one of us to perceive it. If, however, this be the
+case, it follows that every one who is confident at the approach of
+death is foolishly confident, unless he is able to prove that the soul
+is absolutely immortal and imperishable; otherwise it necessarily
+follows that he who is about to die must be alarmed for his soul, lest
+in its present disunion from the body it should entirely perish."
+
+85. Upon this, all of us who had heard them speaking were disagreeably
+affected, as we afterward mentioned to each other; because, after we had
+been fully persuaded by the former arguments, they seemed to disturb us
+anew, and to cast us into a distrust, not only of the arguments already
+adduced, but of such as might afterward be urged, for fear lest we
+should not be fit judges of anything, or lest the things themselves
+should be incredible.
+
+_Echec._ By the gods! Phaedo, I can readily excuse you; for, while I am
+now hearing you, it occurs to me to ask myself some such question as
+this: What arguments can we any longer believe? since the argument which
+Socrates advanced, and which was exceedingly credible, has now fallen
+into discredit. For this argument, that our soul is a kind of harmony,
+produces a wonderful impression on me, both now and always, and in being
+mentioned, it has reminded me, as it were, that I, too, was formerly of
+the same opinion; so that I stand in need again, as if from the very
+beginning, of some other argument which may persuade me that the soul of
+one who dies does not die with the body. Tell me, therefore, by Jupiter!
+how Socrates followed up the argument; and whether he, too, as you
+confess was the case with yourselves, seemed disconcerted at all, or
+not, but calmly maintained his position; and maintained it sufficiently
+or defectively. Relate everything to me as accurately as you can.
+
+86. _Phaed._ Indeed, Echecrates, though I have often admired Socrates, I
+was never more delighted than at being with him on that occasion. That
+he should be able to say something is perhaps not at all surprising; but
+I especially admired this in him--first of all, that he listened to the
+argument of the young men so sweetly, affably, and approvingly; in the
+next place, that he so quickly perceived how we were affected by their
+arguments; and, lastly, that he cured us so well and recalled us, when
+we were put to flight, as it were, and vanquished, and encouraged us to
+accompany him, and consider the argument with him.
+
+_Echec._ How was that?
+
+_Phaed._ I will tell you: I happened to be sitting at his right hand,
+near the bed, upon a low seat, but he himself sat much higher than I.
+Stroking my head, then, and laying hold of the hair that hung on my
+neck--for he used, often, to play with my hairs--"To-morrow," he said,
+"perhaps, Phaedo, you will cut off these beautiful locks?"
+
+"It seems likely, Socrates," said I.
+
+87. "Not if you are persuaded by me."
+
+"Why so?" I asked.
+
+"To-day," he replied, "both I ought to cut off mine and you yours, if
+our argument must die, and we are unable to revive it. And I, if I were
+you, and the arguments were to escape me, would take an oath, as the
+Argives do, not to suffer my hair to grow until I had renewed the
+contest, and vanquished the arguments of Simmias and Cebes."
+
+"But," I said, "even Hercules himself is said not to have been a match
+for two."
+
+"Call upon me, then," he said, "as your Iolaus, while it is yet day."
+
+"I do call on you, then," I said, "not as Hercules upon Iolaus, but as
+Iolaus upon Hercules."
+
+"It will make no difference," he replied. "But, first of all, we must
+beware lest we meet with some mischance."
+
+"What?" I asked.
+
+"That we do not become," he answered, "haters of reasoning, as some
+become haters of men; for no greater evil can happen to any one than to
+hate reasoning. 88. But hatred of reasoning and hatred of mankind both
+spring from the same source. For hatred of mankind is produced in us
+from having placed too great reliance on some one without sufficient
+knowledge of him, and from having considered him to be a man altogether
+true, sincere, and faithful, and then, after a little while, finding him
+depraved and unfaithful, and after him another. And when a man has
+often experienced this, and especially from those whom he considered his
+most intimate and best friends, at length, having frequently stumbled,
+he hates all men, and thinks that there is no soundness at all in any of
+them. Have you not perceived that this happens so?"
+
+"Certainly," I replied.
+
+"Is it not a shame?" he said "And is it not evident that such a one
+attempts to deal with men without sufficient knowledge of human affairs?
+For if he had dealt with them with competent knowledge, as the case
+really is, so he would have considered that the good and the bad are
+each very few in number, and that those between both are most numerous."
+
+89. "How say you?" I asked.
+
+"In the same manner," he replied, "as with things very little and very
+large Do you think that any thing is more rare than to find a very large
+on a very little man, or dog, or any thing else? and, again, swift or
+slow, beautiful or ugly, white or black? Do you not perceive that of all
+such things the extremes are rare and few, but that the intermediate are
+abundant and numerous?"
+
+"Certainly," I replied.
+
+"Do you not think, then," he continued, "that if a contest in wickedness
+were proposed, even here very few would be found pre-eminent?"
+
+"It is probable," I said.
+
+"It is so," he said, "but in this respect reasonings do not resemble
+men, for I was just now following you as my leader, but in this they do
+resemble them, when any one believes in any argument as true without
+being skilled in the art of reasoning, and then shortly afterward it
+appears to him to be false, at one time being so and at another time
+not, and so on with one after another,[34] and especially they who
+devote themselves to controversial arguments, you are aware, at length
+think they have become very wise and have alone discovered that there is
+nothing sound and stable either in things or reasonings but that all
+things that exist, as is the case with the Euripus, are in a constant
+state of flux and reflux, and never continue in any one condition for
+any length of time."
+
+"You speak perfectly true," I said.
+
+90. "Would it not, then, Phaedo" he said "be a sad thing if, when there
+is a true and sound reasoning, and such as one can understand, one
+should then, through lighting upon such arguments as appear to be at one
+time true and at another false, not blame one's self and one's own want
+of skill, but at length, through grief, should anxiously transfer the
+blame from one's self to the arguments, and thereupon pass the rest of
+one's life in hating and reviling arguments and so be depraved of the
+truth and knowledge of things that exist?"
+
+"By Jupiter!" I said, "it would be sad, indeed."
+
+"In the first place, then," he said, "let us beware of this, and let us
+not admit into our souls the notion that there appears to be nothing
+sound in reasoning, but much rather that we are not yet in a sound
+condition, and that we ought vigorously and strenuously to endeavor to
+become sound, you and the others, on account of your whole future life,
+but I, on account of my death, since I am in danger, at the present
+time, of not behaving as becomes a philosopher with respect to this very
+subject, but as a wrangler, like those who are utterly uninformed 91.
+For they, when they dispute about any thing, care nothing at all for the
+subject about which the discussion is, but are anxious about this, that
+what they have themselves advanced shall appear true to the persons
+present. And I seem to myself on the present occasion to differ from
+them only in this respect, for I shall not be anxious to make what I say
+appear true to those who are present, except that may happen by the way,
+but that it may appear certainly to be so to myself. For I thus reason,
+my dear friend, and observe how interestedly. If what I say be true, it
+is well to be persuaded of it, but if nothing remains to one that is
+dead, I shall, at least, during the interval before death be less
+disagreeable to those present by my lamentations. But this ignorance of
+mine will not continue long, for that would be bad, but will shortly be
+put an end to. Thus prepared, then, Simmias and Cebes," he continued, "I
+now proceed to my argument. Do you, however, if you will be persuaded by
+me, pay little attention to Socrates, but much more to the truth, and if
+I appear to you to say any thing true, assent to it, but if not, oppose
+me with all your might, taking good care that in my zeal I do not
+deceive both myself and you, and, like a bee, depart leaving my sting
+behind."
+
+92. "But let us proceed," he said "First of all, remind me of what you
+said, if I should appear to have forgotten it For Simmias, as I think,
+is in doubt, and fears lest the soul, though more divine and beautiful
+than the body, should perish before it, as being a species of harmony.
+But Cebes appeared to me to grant me this, that the soul is more durable
+than the body, but he argued that it is uncertain to every one, whether
+when the soul has worn out many bodies and that repeatedly, it does
+not, on leaving the last body, itself also perish, so that this very
+thing is death, the destruction of the soul, since the body never ceases
+decaying Are not these the things, Simmias and Cebes, which we have to
+inquire into?"
+
+They both agreed that they were.
+
+"Whether, then," he continued "do you reject all our former arguments,
+or some of them only, and not others?"
+
+"Some we do," they replied, "and others not."
+
+"What, then," he proceeded, "do you say about that argument in which we
+asserted that knowledge is reminiscence, and that, this being the case,
+our soul must necessarily have existed somewhere before it was inclosed
+in the body?"
+
+93. "I, indeed," replied Cebes "was both then wonderfully persuaded by
+it, and now persist in it, as in no other argument."
+
+"And I, too," said Simmias, "am of the same mind, and should very much
+wonder if I should ever think otherwise on that point."
+
+"Then," Socrates said, "you must needs think otherwise, my Theban
+friend, if this opinion holds good, that harmony is something
+compounded, and that the soul is a kind of harmony that results from the
+parts compacted together in the body. For surely you will not allow
+yourself to say that harmony was composed prior to the things from which
+it required to be composed Would you allow this?"
+
+"By no means, Socrates" he replied.
+
+"Do you perceive, then," he said, "that this result from what you say,
+when you assert that the soul existed before it came into a human form
+and body, but that it was composed from things that did not yet exist?
+For harmony is not such as that to which you compare it, but first the
+lyre, and the chords, and the sounds yet unharmonized, exist, and, last
+of all, harmony is produced, and first perishes. How, then, will this
+argument accord with that?"
+
+"Not at all," said Simmias.
+
+94. "And yet," he said, "if in any argument, there ought to be an
+accordance in one respecting harmony."
+
+"There ought," said Simmias.
+
+"This of yours, however," he said, "is not in accordance. Consider,
+then, which of these two statements do you prefer--that knowledge is
+reminiscence, or the soul harmony?"
+
+"The former by far, Socrates," he replied; "for the latter occurred to
+me without demonstration, through a certain probability and speciousness
+whence most men derive their opinions. But I am well aware that
+arguments which draw their demonstrations from probabilities are idle;
+and, unless one is on one's guard against them, they are very deceptive,
+both in geometry and all other subjects. But the argument respecting
+reminiscence and knowledge may be said to have been demonstrated by a
+satisfactory hypothesis. For in this way it was said that our soul
+existed before it came into the body, because the essence that bears the
+appellation of 'that which is' belongs to it. But of this, as I persuade
+myself, I am fully and rightly convinced. It is therefore necessary, as
+it seems, that I should neither allow myself nor any one else to
+maintain that the soul is harmony."
+
+95. "But what, Simmias," said he, "if you consider it thus? Does it
+appear to you to appertain to harmony, or to any other composition, to
+subsist in any other way than the very things do of which it is
+composed?"
+
+"By no means."
+
+"And indeed, as I think, neither to do any thing, nor suffer any thing
+else, besides what they do or suffer."
+
+He agreed.
+
+"It does not, therefore, appertain to harmony to take the lead of the
+things of which it is composed, but to follow them."
+
+He assented.
+
+"It is, then, far from being the case that harmony is moved or sends
+forth sounds contrariwise, or is in any other respect opposed to its
+parts?"
+
+"Far, indeed," he said.
+
+"What, then? Is not every harmony naturally harmony, so far as it has
+been made to accord?"
+
+"I do not understand you," he replied.
+
+"Whether," he said, "if it should be in a greater degree and more fully
+made to accord, supposing that were possible, would the harmony be
+greater and more full; but if in a less degree and less fully, then
+would it be inferior and less full?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Is this, then, the case with the soul that, even in the smallest
+extent, one soul is more fully and in a greater degree, or less fully
+and in a less degree, this very thing, a soul, than another?"
+
+"In no respect whatever," he replied.
+
+96. "Well, then," he said, "by Jupiter! is one soul said to possess
+intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and another folly and vice, and
+to be bad? and is this said with truth?"
+
+"With truth, certainly."
+
+"Of those, then, who maintain that the soul is harmony, what will any
+one say that these things are in the soul, virtue and vice? Will he call
+them another kind of harmony and discord, and say that the one, the good
+soul, is harmonized, and, being harmony, contains within itself another
+harmony, but that the other is discordant, and does not contain within
+itself another harmony?"
+
+"I am unable to say," replied Simmias; "but it is clear that he who
+maintains that opinion would say something of the kind."
+
+"But it has been already granted," said he, "that one soul is not more
+or less a soul than another; and this is an admission that one harmony
+is not to a greater degree or more fully, or to a less degree or less
+fully, a harmony, than another; is it not so?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"And that that which is neither more or less harmony is neither more nor
+less harmonized: is it so?"
+
+"It is."
+
+"But does that which is neither more or less harmonized partake of more
+or less harmony, or an equal amount?"
+
+"An equal amount."
+
+97. "A soul, therefore, since it is not more or less this very thing, a
+soul, than another, is not more or less harmonized?"
+
+"Even so."
+
+"Such, then, being its condition, it can not partake of a greater degree
+of discord or harmony?"
+
+"Certainly not."
+
+"And, again, such being its condition, can one soul partake of a greater
+degree of vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord, and virtue
+harmony?"
+
+"It can not."
+
+"Or rather, surely, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul will
+partake of vice, if it is harmony; for doubtless harmony, which is
+perfectly such, can never partake of discord?"
+
+"Certainly not."
+
+"Neither, therefore, can a soul which is perfectly a soul partake of
+vice."
+
+"How can it, from what has been already said?"
+
+"From this reasoning, then, all souls of all animals will be equally
+good, if, at least, they are by nature equally this very thing, souls?"
+
+"It appears so to me, Socrates," he said.
+
+"And does it appear to you," he said, "to have been thus rightly argued,
+and that the argument would lead to this result, if the hypothesis were
+correct, that the soul is harmony?"
+
+98. "On no account whatever," he replied.
+
+"But what," said he, "of all the things that are in man? Is there any
+thing else that you say bears rule except the soul, especially if it be
+wise?"
+
+"I should say not."
+
+"Whether by yielding to the passions in the body, or by opposing them?
+My meaning is this: for instance, when heat and thirst are present, by
+drawing it the contrary way, so as to hinder it from drinking; and when
+hunger is present, by hindering it from eating; and in ten thousand
+other instances we see the soul opposing the desires of the body. Do we
+not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"But have we not before allowed that if the soul were harmony, it would
+never utter a sound contrary to the tension, relaxation, vibration, or
+any other affection to which its component parts are subject, but would
+follow, and never govern them?"
+
+"We did allow it," he replied, "for how could we do otherwise?"
+
+"What, then? Does not the soul now appear to act quite the contrary,
+ruling over all the parts from which any one might say it subsists, and
+resisting almost all of them through the whole of life, and exercising
+dominion over them in all manner of ways; punishing some more severely
+even with pain, both by gymnastics and medicine, and others more mildly;
+partly threatening, and partly admonishing the desires, angers and
+fears, as if, being itself of a different nature, it were conversing
+with something quite different? 99. Just as Homer has done in the
+Odyssey,[35] where he speaks of Ulysses--'Having struck his breast, he
+chid his heart in the following words: Bear up, my heart; ere this thou
+hast borne far worse.' Do you think that he composed this in the belief
+that the soul was harmony, and capable of being led by the passions of
+the body, and not rather that it was able to lead and govern them, as
+being something much more divine than to be compared with harmony?"
+
+"By Jupiter! Socrates, it appears so to me."
+
+"Therefore, my excellent friend, it is on no account correct for us to
+say that the soul is a kind of harmony; for, as it appears, we should
+neither agree with Homer, that divine poet, nor with ourselves."
+
+"Such is the case," he replied.
+
+"Be it so, then," said Socrates, "we have already, as it seems,
+sufficiently appeased this Theban harmony. But how, Cebes, and by what
+arguments, shall we appease this Cadmus?"[36]
+
+100. "You appear to me," replied Cebes, "to be likely to find out; for
+you have made out this argument against harmony wonderfully beyond my
+expectation. For when Simmias was saying what his doubts were, I
+wondered very much whether any one would be able to answer his
+reasoning. It, therefore, appeared to me unaccountable that he did not
+withstand the very first onset of your argument. I should not,
+therefore, be surprised if the arguments of Cadmus met with the same
+fate."
+
+"My good friend," said Socrates, "do not speak so boastfully, lest some
+envious power should overthrow the argument that is about to be urged.
+These things, however, will be cared for by the deity; but let us,
+meeting hand to hand, in the manner of Homer, try whether you say any
+thing to the purpose. This, then, is the sum of what you inquire you
+require it to be proved that our soul is imperishable and immortal; if a
+philosopher that is about to die, full of confidence and hope that after
+death he shall be far happier than if he had died after leading a
+different kind of life, shall not entertain this confidence foolishly
+and vainly. 101. But to show that the soul is something strong and
+divine, and that it existed before we men were born, you say not at all
+hinders, but that all these things may evince, not its immortality, but
+that the soul is durable, and existed an immense space of time before,
+and knew and did many things. But that, for all this, it was not at all
+the more immortal, but that its very entrance into the body of a man was
+the beginning of its destruction, as if it were a disease; so that it
+passes through this life in wretchedness, and at last perishes in that
+which is called death. But you say that it is of no consequence whether
+it comes into a body once or often, with respect to our occasion of
+fear; for it is right he should be afraid, unless he is foolish, who
+does not know, and can not give a reason to prove, that the soul is
+immortal. Such, I think, Cebes, is the sum of what you say; and I
+purposely repeat it often, that nothing may escape us, and, if you
+please, you may add to or take from it."
+
+Cebes replied, "I do not wish at present either to take from or add to
+it; that is what I mean."
+
+102. Socrates, then having paused for some time, and considered
+something within himself, said, "You inquire into no easy matter, Cebes;
+for it is absolutely necessary to discuss the whole question of
+generation and corruption. If you please, then, I will relate to you
+what happened to me with reference to them; and afterward, if any thing
+that I shall say shall appear to you useful toward producing conviction
+on the subject you are now treating of, make use of it."
+
+"I do indeed wish it," replied Cebes.
+
+"Hear my relation, then. When I was a young man, Cebes, I was
+wonderfully desirous of that wisdom which they call a history of nature;
+for it appeared to me to be a very sublime thing to know the causes of
+every thing--why each thing is generated, why it perishes, and why it
+exists. And I often tossed myself upward and downward, considering first
+such things as these, whether when heat and cold have undergone a
+certain corruption, as some say, then animals are formed; and whether
+the blood is that by means of which we think, or air, or fire, or none
+of these, but that it is the brain that produces the perceptions of
+hearing, seeing, and smelling; and that from these come memory and
+opinion; and from memory and opinion, when in a state of rest, in the
+same way knowledge is produced. 103. And, again, considering the
+corruptions of these, and the affections incidental to the heavens and
+the earth, I at length appeared to myself so unskillful in these
+speculations that nothing could be more so. But I will give you a
+sufficient proof of this; for I then became, by these very speculations,
+so very blind with respect to things which I knew clearly before, as it
+appeared to myself and others, that I unlearned even the things which I
+thought I knew before, both on many other subjects and also this, why a
+man grows. For, before, I thought this was evident to every one--that it
+proceeds from eating and drinking; for that, when, from the food, flesh
+is added to flesh, bone to bone, and so on in the same proportion, what
+is proper to them is added to the several other parts, then the bulk
+which was small becomes afterward large, and thus that a little man
+becomes a big one. Such was my opinion at that time. Does it appear to
+you correct?"
+
+"To me it does," said Cebes.
+
+104. "Consider this further. I thought that I had formed a right
+opinion, when, on seeing a tall man standing by a short one, I judged
+that he was taller by the head, and in like manner, one horse than
+another; and, still more clearly than this, ten appeared to me to be
+more than eight by two being added to them, and that two cubits are
+greater than one cubit by exceeding it a half."
+
+"But now," said Cebes, "what think you of these matters?"
+
+"By Jupiter!" said he, "I am far from thinking that I know the cause of
+these, for that I can not even persuade myself of this: when a person
+has added one to one, whether the one to which the addition has been
+made has become two, or whether that which has been added, and that to
+which the addition has been made, have become two by the addition of the
+one to the other. For I wonder if, when each of these was separate from
+the other, each was one, and they were not yet two; but when they have
+approached nearer each other this should be the cause of their becoming
+two--namely, the union by which they have been placed nearer one
+another. 105. Nor yet, if any person should divide one, am I able to
+persuade myself that this, their division, is the cause of its becoming
+two. For this cause is the contrary to the former one of their becoming
+two; for then it was because they were brought nearer to each other, and
+the one was added to the other; but now it is because one is removed and
+separated from the other. Nor do I yet persuade myself that I know why
+one is one, nor, in a word, why any thing else is produced, or perishes,
+or exists, according to this method of proceeding; but I mix up another
+method of my own at random, for this I can on no account give in to."
+
+"But, having once heard a person reading from a book, written, as he
+said, by Anaxagoras, and which said that it is intelligence that sets in
+order and is the cause of all things, I was delighted with this cause,
+and it appeared to me in a manner to be well that intelligence should be
+the cause of all things, and I considered with myself, if this is so,
+that the regulating intelligence orders all things, and disposes each in
+such way as will be best for it. 106. If any one, then, should desire to
+discover the cause of every thing, in what way it is produced, or
+perishes, or exists, he must discover this respecting it--in what way it
+is best for it either to exist, or to suffer, or do any thing else. From
+this mode of reasoning, then, it is proper that a man should consider
+nothing else, both with respect to himself and others, than what is most
+excellent and best; and it necessarily follows that this same person
+must also know that which is worst, for that the knowledge of both of
+them is the same. Thus reasoning with myself, I was delighted to think I
+had found in Anaxagoras a preceptor who would instruct me in the causes
+of things, agreeably to my own mind, and that he would inform me, first,
+whether the earth is flat or round, and, when he had informed me,
+would, moreover, explain the cause and necessity of its being so,
+arguing on the principle of the better, and showing that it is better
+for it to be such as it is; and if he should say that it is in the
+middle, that he would, moreover, explain how it is better for it to be
+in the middle; and if he should make all this clear to me, I was
+prepared no longer to require any other species of cause. 107. I was in
+like manner prepared to inquire respecting the sun and moon and the
+other stars, with respect to their velocities in reference to each
+other, and their revolutions and other conditions, in what way it is
+better for both to act and be affected as it does and is. For I never
+thought that after he had said that these things were set in order by
+intelligence, he would introduce any other cause for them than that it
+is best for them to be as they are. Hence, I thought, that in assigning
+the cause to each of them, and to all in common, he would explain that
+which is best for each, and the common good of all. And I would not have
+given up my hopes for a good deal; but, having taken up his books with
+great eagerness, I read through them as quickly as I could, that I might
+as soon as possible know the best and the worst."
+
+108. "From this wonderful hope, however, my friend, I was speedily
+thrown down, when, as I advance and read over his works, I meet with a
+man who makes no use of intelligence, nor assigns any causes for the
+ordering of all things, but makes the causes to consist of air, ether,
+and water, and many other things equally absurd. And he appeared to me
+to be very like one who should say that whatever Socrates does he does
+by intelligence, and then, attempting to describe the causes of each
+particular action, should say, first of all, that for this reason I am
+now sitting here, because my body is composed of bones and sinews and
+that the bones are hard, and have joints separate from each other, but
+that the sinews, being capable of tension and contraction, cover the
+bones, together with the flesh and skin which contain them. The bones,
+therefore, being suspended in their sockets, the nerves, relaxing and
+tightening, enable me to bend my limbs as I now do, and from this cause
+I sit here bent up. 109. And if, again, he should assign other similar
+causes for my conversing with you, assigning as causes voice, and air,
+and hearing, and ten thousand other things of the kind, omitting to
+mention the real causes, that since it appeared better to the Athenians
+to condemn me, I therefore thought it better to sit here, and more just
+to remain and submit to the punishment which they have ordered; for, by
+the dog! I think these sinews and bones would have been long ago either
+in Megara or Boeotia, borne thither by an opinion of that which is best,
+if I had not thought it more just and honorable to submit to whatever
+sentence the city might order than to flee and run stealthily away. But
+to call such things causes is too absurd. But if any one should say that
+without possessing such things as bones and sinews, and whatever else I
+have, I could not do what I pleased, he would speak the truth; but to
+say that I do as I do through them, and that I act thus by intelligence,
+and not from the choice of what is best, would be a great and extreme
+disregard of reason. 110. For this would be not to be able to
+distinguish that the real cause is one thing, and that another, without
+which a cause could not be a cause; which, indeed, the generality of men
+appear to me to do, fumbling, as it were, in the dark, and making use of
+strange names, so as to denominate them as the very cause. Wherefore one
+encompassing the earth with a vortex from heaven makes the earth remain
+fixed; but another, as if it were a broad trough, rests it upon the air
+as its base; but the power by which these things are now so disposed
+that they may be placed in the best manner possible, this they neither
+inquire into, nor do they think that it requires any superhuman
+strength; but they think they will some time or other find out an Atlas
+stronger and more immortal than this, and more capable of containing all
+things; and in reality, the good, and that which ought to hold them
+together and contain them, they take no account of at all. I, then,
+should most gladly have become the disciple of any one who would teach
+me of such a cause, in what way it is. But when I was disappointed of
+this, and was neither able to discover it myself, nor to learn it from
+another, do you wish, Cebes, that I should show you in what way I set
+out upon a second voyage in search of the cause?"
+
+111. "I wish it exceedingly," he replied.
+
+"It appeared to me, then," said he, "after this, when I was wearied with
+considering things that exist, that I ought to beware lest I should
+suffer in the same way as they do who look at and examine an eclipse of
+the sun, for some lose the sight of their eyes, unless they behold its
+image in water, or some similar medium. And I was affected with a
+similar feeling, and was afraid lest I should be utterly blinded in my
+soul through beholding things with the eyes, and endeavoring to grasp
+them by means of the several senses. It seemed to me, therefore, that I
+ought to have recourse to reasons, and to consider in them the truth of
+things. Perhaps, however, this similitude of mine may in some respect be
+incorrect; for I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in
+their reasons considers them in their images, more than he does who
+views them in their effects. However, I proceeded thus, and on each
+occasion laying down the reason, which I deem to be the strongest,
+whatever things appear to me to accord with this I regard as true, both
+with respect to the cause and every thing else; but such as do not
+accord I regard as not true. 112. But I wish to explain my meaning to
+you in a clearer manner; for I think that you do not yet understand me."
+
+"No, by Jupiter!" said Cebes, "not well."
+
+"However," continued he, "I am now saying nothing new, but what I have
+always at other times, and in a former part of this discussion, never
+ceased to say. I proceed, then, to attempt to explain to you that
+species of cause which I have busied myself about, and return again to
+those well-known subjects, and set out from them, laying down as an
+hypothesis, that there is a certain abstract beauty, and goodness, and
+magnitude, and so of all other things; which if you grant me, and allow
+that they do exist, I hope that I shall be able from these to explain
+the cause to you, and to discover that the soul is immortal."
+
+"But," said Cebes, "since I grant you this, you may draw your conclusion
+at once."
+
+"But consider," he said, "what follows from thence, and see if you can
+agree with me. For it appears to me that if there is any thing else
+beautiful besides beauty itself, it is not beautiful for any other
+reason than because it partakes of that abstract beauty; and I say the
+same of every thing. Do you admit such a cause?"
+
+"I do admit it," he replied.
+
+113. "I do not yet understand," he continued, "nor am I able to
+conceive, those other wise causes; but if any one should tell me why any
+thing is beautiful, either because it has a blooming florid color, or
+figure, or any thing else of the kind, I dismiss all other reasons, for
+I am confounded by them all; but I simply, wholly, and perhaps
+foolishly, confine myself to this, that nothing else causes it to be
+beautiful except either the presence or communication of that abstract
+beauty, by whatever means and in whatever way communicated; for I can
+not yet affirm this with certainty, but only that by means of beauty all
+beautiful things become beautiful. For this appears to me the safest
+answer to give both to myself and others; and adhering to this, I think
+that I shall never fall, but that it is a safe answer both for me and
+any one else to give--that by means of beauty beautiful things become
+beautiful. Does it not also seem so to you?"
+
+"It does."
+
+"And that by magnitude great things become great, and greater things,
+greater; and by littleness less things become less?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+114. "You would not, then, approve of it, if any one said that one
+person is greater than another by the head, and that the less is less by
+the very same thing; but you would maintain that you mean nothing else
+than that every thing that is greater than another is greater by nothing
+else than magnitude, and that it is greater on this account--that is, on
+account of magnitude; and that the less is less by nothing else than
+littleness, and on this account less--that is, on account of littleness;
+being afraid, I think, lest some opposite argument should meet you if
+you should say that any one is greater and less by the head; as, first,
+that the greater is greater, and the less less, by the very same thing;
+and, next, that the greater is greater by the head, which is small; and
+that it is monstrous to suppose that any one is great through something
+small. Should you not be afraid of this?"
+
+To which said Cebes, smilingly, "Indeed, I should."
+
+"Should you not, then," he continued, "be afraid to say that ten is more
+than eight by two, and for this cause exceeds it, and not by number,
+and on account of number? and that two cubits are greater than one cubit
+by half, and not by magnitude (for the fear is surely the same)?"
+
+"Certainly," he replied.
+
+115. "What, then? When one has been added to one, would you not beware
+of saying that the addition is the cause of its being two, or division
+when it has been divided; and would you not loudly assert that you know
+no other way in which each thing subsists, than by partaking of the
+peculiar essence of each of which it partakes, and that in these cases
+you can assign no other cause of its becoming two than its partaking of
+duality; and that such things as are to become two must needs partake of
+this, and what is to become one, of unity; but these divisions and
+additions, and other such subtleties, you would dismiss, leaving them to
+be given as answers by persons wiser than yourself; whereas you,
+fearing, as it is said, your own shadow and inexperience, would adhere
+to this safe hypothesis, and answer accordingly? But if any one should
+assail this hypothesis of yours, would you not dismiss him, and refrain
+from answering him till you had considered the consequences resulting
+from it, whether in your opinion they agree with or differ from each
+other? But when it should be necessary for you to give a reason for it,
+would you give one in a similar way, by again laying down another
+hypothesis, which should appear the best of higher principles, until you
+arrived at something satisfactory; but, at the same time, you would
+avoid making confusion, as disputants do, in treating of the first
+principle and the results arising from it, if you really desire to
+arrive at the truth of things? 116. For they, perhaps, make no account
+at all of this, nor pay any attention to it; for they are able, through
+their wisdom, to mingle all things together, and at the same time please
+themselves. But you, if you are a philosopher, would act, I think, as I
+now describe."
+
+"You speak most truly," said Simmias and Cebes together.
+
+_Echec._ By Jupiter! Phaedo, they said so with good reason; for he
+appears to me to have explained these things with wonderful clearness,
+even to one endued with a small degree of intelligence.
+
+_Phaed._ Certainly, Echecrates, and so it appeared to all who were
+present.
+
+_Echec._ And so it appears to me, who was absent, and now hear it
+related. But what was said after this?
+
+As well as I remember, when these things had been granted him, and it
+was allowed that each several idea exists of itself,[37] and that other
+things partaking of them receive their denomination from them, he next
+asked: "If, then," he said, "you admit that things are so, whether, when
+you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates, but less than Phaedo, do
+you not then say that magnitude and littleness are both in Simmias?"
+
+"I do."
+
+117. "And yet," he said, "you must confess that Simmias's exceeding
+Socrates is not actually true in the manner in which the words express
+it; for Simmias does not naturally exceed Socrates in that he is
+Simmias, but in consequence of the magnitude which he happens to have;
+nor, again, does he exceed Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but
+because Socrates possesses littleness in comparison with his magnitude?"
+
+"True."
+
+"Nor, again, is Simmias exceeded by Phaedo, because Phaedo is Phaedo, but
+because Phaedo possesses magnitude in comparison with Simmias's
+littleness?"
+
+"It is so."
+
+"Thus, then, Simmias has the appellation of being both little and great,
+being between both, by exceeding the littleness of one through his own
+magnitude, and to the other yielding a magnitude that exceeds his own
+littleness." And at the same time, smiling, he said, "I seem to speak
+with the precision of a short-hand writer; however, it is as I say."
+
+He allowed it.
+
+118. "But I say it for this reason, wishing you to be of the same
+opinion as myself. For it appears to me, not only that magnitude itself
+is never disposed to be at the same time great and little, but that
+magnitude in us never admits the little nor is disposed to be exceeded,
+but one of two things, either to flee and withdraw when its contrary,
+the little, approaches it, or, when it has actually come, to perish; but
+that it is not disposed, by sustaining and receiving littleness, to be
+different from what it was. Just as I, having received and sustained
+littleness, and still continuing the person that I am, am this same
+little person; but that, while it is great, never endures to be little.
+And, in like manner, the little that is in us is not disposed at any
+time to become or to be great, nor is any thing else among contraries,
+while it continues what it was, at the same time disposed to become and
+to be its contrary; but in this contingency it either departs or
+perishes."
+
+119. "It appears so to me," said Cebes, "in every respect."
+
+But some one of those present, on hearing this, I do not clearly
+remember who he was, said, "By the gods! was not the very contrary of
+what is now asserted admitted in the former part of our discussion, that
+the greater is produced from the less, and the less from the greater,
+and, in a word, that the very production of contraries is from
+contraries? But now it appears to me to be asserted that this can never
+be the case."
+
+Upon this Socrates, having leaned his head forward and listened, said,
+"You have reminded me in a manly way; you do not, however, perceive the
+difference between what is now and what was then asserted. For then it
+was said that a contrary thing is produced from a contrary; but now,
+that a contrary can never become contrary to itself--neither that which
+is in us, nor that which is in nature. For then, my friend, we spoke of
+things that have contraries, calling them by the appellation of those
+things; but now we are speaking of those very things from the presence
+of which things so called receive their appellation, and of these very
+things we say that they are never disposed to admit of production from
+each other." 120. And, at the same time looking at Cebes, "Has anything
+that has been said, Cebes, disturbed you?"
+
+"Indeed," said Cebes, "I am not at all so disposed; however, I by no
+means say that there are not many things that disturb me."
+
+"Then," he continued, "we have quite agreed to this, that a contrary can
+never be contrary to itself."
+
+"Most certainly," he replied.
+
+"But, further," he said, "consider whether you will agree with me in
+this also. Do you call heat and cold any thing?"
+
+"I do."
+
+"The same as snow and fire?"
+
+"By Jupiter! I do not."
+
+"But heat is something different from fire, and cold something different
+from snow?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"But this, I think, is apparent to you--that snow, while it is snow, can
+never, when it has admitted heat, as we said before, continue to be what
+it was, snow and hot; but, on the approach of heat, it must either
+withdraw or perish?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"And, again, that fire, when cold approaches it, must either depart or
+perish; but that it will never endure, when it has admitted coldness, to
+continue what it was, fire and cold?"
+
+121. "You speak truly," he said.
+
+"It happens, then," he continued, "with respect to some of such things,
+that not only is the idea itself always thought worthy of the same
+appellation, but likewise something else which is not, indeed, that idea
+itself, but constantly retains its form so long as it exists. What I
+mean will perhaps be clearer in the following examples: the odd in
+number must always possess the name by which we now call it, must it
+not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Must it alone, of all things--for this I ask--or is there any thing
+else which is not the same as the odd, but yet which we must always call
+odd, together with its own name, because it is so constituted by nature
+that it can never be without the odd? But this, I say, is the case with
+the number three, and many others. For consider with respect to the
+number three: does it not appear to you that it must always be called by
+its own name, as well as by that of the odd, which is not the same as
+the number three? Yet such is the nature of the number three, five, and
+the entire half of number, that though they are not the same as the odd,
+yet each of them is always odd. And, again, two and four, and the whole
+other series of number, though not the same as the even, are
+nevertheless each of them always even: do you admit this, or not?"
+
+122. "How should I not?" he replied.
+
+"Observe then," said he, "what I wish to prove. It is this--that it
+appears not only that these contraries do not admit each other, but that
+even such things as are not contrary to each other, and yet always
+possess contraries, do not appear to admit that idea which is contrary
+to the idea that exists in themselves, but, when it approaches, perish
+or depart. Shall we not allow that the number three would first perish,
+and suffer any thing whatever, rather than endure, while it is still
+three, to become even?"
+
+"Most certainly," said Cebes.
+
+"And yet," said he, "the number two is not contrary to three."
+
+"Surely not."
+
+"Not only, then, do ideas that are contrary never allow the approach of
+each other, but some other things also do not allow the approach of
+contraries."
+
+"You say very truly," he replied.
+
+"Do you wish, then," he said, "that, if we are able, we should define
+what these things are?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Would they not then, Cebes," he said, "be such things as, whatever they
+occupy, compel that thing not only to retain its own idea, but also that
+of something which is always a contrary?"
+
+"How do you mean?"
+
+123. "As we just now said. For you know, surely, that whatever things
+the idea of three occupies must of necessity not only be three, but also
+odd?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"To such a thing, then, we assert, that the idea contrary to that form
+which constitutes this can never come."
+
+"It can not."
+
+"But did the odd make it so?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"And is the contrary to this the idea of the even?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"The idea of the even, then, will never come to the three?"
+
+"No, surely."
+
+"Three, then, has no part in the even?"
+
+"None whatever."
+
+"The number three is uneven?"
+
+"Yes."
+
+"What, therefore, I said should be defined--namely, what things they are
+which, though not contrary to some particular thing, yet do not admit of
+the contrary itself; as, in the present instance, the number three,
+though not contrary to the even, does not any the more admit it, for it
+always brings the contrary with it, just as the number two does to the
+odd, fire to cold, and many other particulars. Consider, then, whether
+you would thus define, not only that a contrary does not admit a
+contrary, but also that that which brings with it a contrary to that to
+which it approaches will never admit the contrary of that which it
+brings with it. 124. But call it to mind again, for it will not be
+useless to hear it often repeated. Five will not admit the idea of the
+even, nor ten, its double, that of the odd. This double, then, though it
+is itself contrary to something else,[38] yet will not admit the idea of
+the odd, nor will half as much again, nor other things of the kind, such
+as the half and the third part, admit the idea of the whole, if you
+follow me, and agree with me that it is so."
+
+"I entirely agree with you," he said, "and follow you."
+
+"Tell me again, then," he said, "from the beginning; and do not answer
+me in the terms in which I put the question, but in different ones,
+imitating my example. For I say this because, besides that safe mode of
+answering which I mentioned at first,[39] from what has now been said, I
+see another no less safe one. For if you should ask me what that is
+which, if it be in the body, will cause it to be hot, I should not give
+you that safe but unlearned answer, that it is heat, but one more
+elegant, from what we have just now said, that it is fire; nor, if you
+should ask me what that is which, if it be in the body, will cause it to
+be diseased, should I say that it is disease, but fever; nor if you
+should ask what that is which, if it be in number, will cause it to be
+odd, should I say that it is unevenness, but unity; and so with other
+things. But consider whether you sufficiently understand what I mean."
+
+125. "Perfectly so," he replied.
+
+"Answer me, then," he said, "what that is which, when it is in the body,
+the body will be alive?"
+
+"Soul," he replied.
+
+"Is not this, then, always the case?"
+
+"How should it not be?" said he.
+
+"Does the soul, then, always bring life to whatever it occupies?"
+
+"It does indeed," he replied.
+
+"Whether, then, is there any thing contrary to life or not?"
+
+"There is," he replied.
+
+"What?"
+
+"Death."
+
+"The soul, then, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings
+with it, as has been already allowed?"
+
+"Most assuredly," replied Cebes.
+
+"What, then? How do we denominate that which does not admit the idea of
+the even?"
+
+"Uneven," he replied.
+
+"And that which does not admit the just, nor the musical?"
+
+"Unmusical," he said, "and unjust."
+
+"Be it so. But what do we call that which does not admit death?"
+
+"Immortal," he replied.
+
+"Therefore, does not the soul admit death?"
+
+"No."
+
+"Is the soul, then, immortal?"
+
+"Immortal."
+
+126. "Be it so," he said. "Shall we say, then, that this has been now
+demonstrated? or how think you?"
+
+"Most completely, Socrates."
+
+"What, then," said he, "Cebes, if it were necessary for the uneven to be
+imperishable, would the number three be otherwise than imperishable?"
+
+"How should it not?"
+
+"If, therefore, it were also necessary that what is without heat should
+be imperishable, when any one should introduce heat to snow, would not
+the snow withdraw itself, safe and unmelted? For it would not perish;
+nor yet would it stay and admit the heat."
+
+"You say truly," he replied.
+
+"In like manner, I think, if that which is insusceptible of cold were
+imperishable, that when any thing cold approached the fire, it would
+neither be extinguished nor perish, but would depart quite safe."
+
+"Of necessity," he said.
+
+"Must we not, then, of necessity," he continued, "speak thus of that
+which is immortal? if that which is immortal is imperishable, it is
+impossible for the soul to perish, when death approaches it. For, from
+what has been said already, it will not admit death, nor will ever be
+dead; just as we said that three will never be even, nor, again, will
+the odd; nor will fire be cold, nor yet the heat that is in fire. 127.
+But some one may say, what hinders, though the odd can never become even
+by the approach of the even, as we have allowed, yet, when the odd is
+destroyed, that the even should succeed in its place? We could not
+contend with him who should make this objection that it is not
+destroyed, for the uneven is not imperishable; since, if this were
+granted us, we might easily have contended that, on the approach of the
+even, the odd and the three depart; and we might have contended in the
+same way with respect to fire, heat, and the rest, might we not?"
+
+"Certainly."
+
+"Wherefore, with respect to the immortal, if we have allowed that it is
+imperishable, the soul, in addition to its being immortal, must also be
+imperishable; if not, there will be need of other arguments."
+
+"But there is no need," he said, "so far as that is concerned; for
+scarcely could any thing not admit of corruption, if that which is
+immortal and eternal is liable to it."
+
+128. "The deity, indeed, I think," said Socrates, "and the idea itself
+of life, and if anything else is immortal, must be allowed by all beings
+to be incapable of dissolution."
+
+"By Jupiter!" he replied, "by all men, indeed, and still more, as I
+think, by the gods."
+
+"Since, then, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, can the
+soul, since it is immortal, be any thing else than imperishable?"
+
+"It must, of necessity, be so."
+
+"When, therefore, death approaches a man, the mortal part of him, as it
+appears, dies, but the immortal part departs safe and uncorrupted,
+having withdrawn itself from death?"
+
+"It appears so."
+
+"The soul, therefore," he said, "Cebes, is most certainly immortal and
+imperishable, and our souls will really exist in Hades."
+
+"Therefore, Socrates," he said, "I have nothing further to say against
+this, nor any reason for doubting your arguments. But if Simmias here,
+or any one else, has any thing to say, it were well for him not to be
+silent; for I know not to what other opportunity beyond the present any
+one can defer it, who wishes either to speak or hear about these
+things."
+
+"But, indeed," said Simmias, "neither have I any reason to doubt what
+has been urged; yet, from the magnitude of the subject discussed, and
+from my low opinion of human weakness, I am compelled still to retain a
+doubt within myself with respect to what has been said."
+
+"Not only so, Simmias," said Socrates, "but you say this well; and,
+moreover, the first hypotheses, even though they are credible to you,
+should nevertheless be examined more carefully; and if you should
+investigate them sufficiently, I think you will follow my reasoning as
+far as it is possible for man to do so; and if this very point becomes
+clear, you will inquire no further."
+
+"You speak truly," he said.
+
+"But it is right, my friends," he said, "that we should consider this---
+that if the soul is immortal, it requires our care not only for the
+present time, which we call life, but for all time; and the danger would
+now appear to be dreadful if one should neglect it. 130. For if death
+were a deliverance from every thing, it would be a great gain for the
+wicked, when they die, to be delivered at the same time from the body,
+and from their vices together with the soul; but now, since it appears
+to be immortal, it can have no other refuge from evils, nor safety,
+except by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul goes to
+Hades possessing nothing else than its discipline and education, which
+are said to be of the greatest advantage or detriment to the dead, on
+the very beginning of his journey thither. For, thus, it is said that
+each person's demon who was assigned to him while living, when he dies
+conducts him to some place, where they that are assembled together must
+receive sentence, and then proceed to Hades with that guide who has been
+ordered to conduct them from hence thither. But there having received
+their deserts, and having remained the appointed time, another guide
+brings them back hither again, after many and long revolutions of time.
+The journey, then, is not such as the Telephus of AEschylus describes it;
+for he says that a simple path leads to Hades; but it appears to me to
+be neither simple nor one, for there would be no need of guides, nor
+could any one ever miss the way, if there were but one. But now it
+appears to have many divisions and windings; and this I conjecture from
+our religious and funeral rites.[40] 131. The well-ordered and wise
+soul, then, both follows, and is not ignorant of its present condition;
+but that which through passion clings to the body, as I said before,
+having longingly fluttered about it for a long time, and about its
+visible place,[41] after vehement resistance and great suffering, is
+forcibly and with great difficulty led away by its appointed demon. And
+when it arrives at the place where the others are, impure and having
+done any such thing as the committal of unrighteous murders or other
+similar actions, which are kindred to these, and are the deeds of
+kindred souls, every one shuns it and turns away from it, and will be
+neither its fellow-traveler nor guide; but it wanders about, oppressed
+with every kind of helplessness, until certain periods have elapsed; and
+when these are completed, it is carried, of necessity, to an abode
+suitable to it. But the soul which has passed through life with purity
+and moderation, having obtained the gods for its fellow-travelers and
+guides, settles each in the place suited to it. 132. There are, indeed,
+many and wonderful places in the earth, and it is itself neither of such
+a kind nor of such a magnitude as is supposed by those who are
+accustomed to speak of the earth, as I have been persuaded by a certain
+person."
+
+Whereupon Simmias said, "How mean you, Socrates? For I, too, have heard
+many things about the earth--not, however, those things which have
+obtained your belief. I would, therefore, gladly hear them."
+
+"Indeed, Simmias, the art of Glaucus[42] does not seem to me to be
+required to relate what these things are. That they are true, however,
+appears to me more than the art of Glaucus can prove, and, besides, I
+should probably not be able to do it; and even if I did know how, what
+remains to me of life, Simmias, seems insufficient for the length of the
+subject. However, the form of the earth, such as I am persuaded it is,
+and the different places in it, nothing hinders me from telling."
+
+"But that will be enough," said Simmias.
+
+"I am persuaded, then," said he, "in the first place, that, if the earth
+is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a spherical form, it has no
+need of air, nor of any other similar force, to prevent it from falling;
+but that the similarity of the heavens to themselves on every side, and
+the equilibrium of the earth itself, are sufficient to support it; for a
+thing in a state of equilibrium when placed in the middle of something
+that presses it equally on all sides can not incline more or less on any
+side, but, being equally affected all around, remains unmoved. 133. In
+the first place, then," he said, "I am persuaded of this."
+
+"And very properly so," said Simmias.
+
+"Yet, further," said he, "that it is very large, and that we who inhabit
+some small portion of it, from the river Phasis to the pillars of
+Hercules, dwell about the sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh; and
+that many others elsewhere dwell in many similar places, for that there
+are everywhere about the earth many hollows of various forms and sizes
+into which there is a confluence of water, mist and air; but that the
+earth itself, being pure, is situated in the pure heavens, in which are
+the stars, and which most persons who are accustomed to speak about such
+things call ether; of which these things are the sediment, and are
+continually flowing into the hollow parts of the earth. 134. That we are
+ignorant, then, that we are dwelling in its hollows, and imagine that we
+inhabit the upper parts of the earth, just as if any one dwelling in the
+bottom of the sea should think that he dwelt on the sea, and, beholding
+the sun and the other stars through the water, should imagine that the
+sea was the heavens; but, through sloth and weakness, should never have
+reached the surface of the sea; nor, having emerged and risen up from
+the sea to this region, have seen how much more pure and more beautiful
+it is than the place where he is, nor has heard of it from any one else
+who has seen it. This, then, is the very condition in which we are; for,
+dwelling in some hollow of the earth, we think that we dwell on the
+surface of it, and call the air heaven, as if the stars moved through
+this, being heaven itself. But this is because, by reason of our
+weakness and sloth, we are unable to reach to the summit of the air.
+Since, if any one could arrive at its summit, or, becoming winged, could
+fly up thither, or, emerging from hence, he would see--just as with us,
+fishes, emerging from the sea, behold what is here, so any one would
+behold the things there; and if his nature were able to endure the
+contemplation, he would know that that is the true heaven, and the true
+light, and the true earth. 135. For this earth and these stones, and the
+whole region here, are decayed and corroded, as things in the sea by the
+saltness; for nothing of any value grows in the sea, nor, in a word,
+does it contain any thing perfect; but there are caverns and sand, and
+mud in abundance, and filth, in whatever parts of the sea there is
+earth, nor are they at all worthy to be compared with the beautiful
+things with us. But, on the other hand, those things in the upper
+regions of the earth would appear far more to excel the things with us.
+For, if we may tell a beautiful fable, it is well worth hearing,
+Simmias, what kind the things are on the earth beneath the heavens."
+
+"Indeed, Socrates," said Simmias, "we should be very glad to hear that
+fable."
+
+136. "First of all, then, my friend," he continued, "this earth, if any
+one should survey it from above, is said to have the appearance of
+balls covered with twelve different pieces of leather, variegated and
+distinguished with colors, of which the colors found here, and which
+painters use, are, as it were, copies. But there the whole earth is
+composed of such, and far more brilliant and pure than these; for one
+part of it is purple, and of wonderful beauty, part of a golden color,
+and part of white, more white than chalk or snow, and, in like manner,
+composed of other colors, and those more in number and more beautiful
+than any we have ever beheld. And those very hollow parts of the earth,
+though filled with water and air, exhibit a certain species of color,
+shining among the variety of other colors, so that one continually
+variegated aspect presents itself to the view. In this earth, being
+such, all things that grow, grow in a manner proportioned to its
+nature--trees, flowers and fruits; and, again, in like manner, its
+mountains and stones possess, in the same proportion, smoothness and
+transparency, and more beautiful colors; of which the well-known stones
+here that are so highly prized are but fragments, such as
+sardine-stones, jaspers, and emeralds, and all of that kind. But there,
+there is nothing subsists that is not of this character, and even more
+beautiful than these. 137. But the reason of this is, because the stones
+there are pure, and not eaten up and decayed, like those here, by
+rottenness and saltness, which flow down hither together, and which
+produce deformity and disease in the stones and the earth, and in other
+things, even animals and plants. But that earth is adorned with all
+these, and, moreover, with gold and silver, and other things of the
+kind: for they are naturally conspicuous, being numerous and large, and
+in all parts of the earth; so that to behold it is a sight for the
+blessed. There are also many other animals and men upon it, some
+dwelling in mid-earth, others about the air, as we do about the sea, and
+others in islands which the air flows round, and which are near the
+continent; and, in one word, what water and the sea are to us, for our
+necessities, the air is to them; and what air is to us, that ether is to
+them. 138. But their seasons are of such a temperament that they are
+free from disease, and live for a much longer time than those here, and
+surpass us in sight, hearing, and smelling, and every thing of this
+kind, as much as air excels water, and ether air, in purity. Moreover,
+they have abodes and temples of the gods, in which gods really dwell,
+and voices and oracles, and sensible visions of the gods, and such-like
+intercourse with them; the sun, too, and moon, and stars, are seen by
+them such as they really are, and their felicity in other respects is
+correspondent with these things."
+
+"And, such, indeed, is the nature of the whole earth, and the parts
+about the earth; but there are many places all round it throughout its
+cavities, some deeper and more open than that in which we dwell; but
+others that are deeper have a less chasm than our region, and others are
+shallower in depth than it is here, and broader. 139. But all these are
+in many places perforated one into another under the earth, some with
+narrower and some with wider channels, and have passages through, by
+which a great quantity of water flows from one into another, as into
+basins, and there are immense bulks of ever-flowing rivers under the
+earth, both of hot and cold water, and a great quantity of fire, and
+mighty rivers of fire, and many of liquid mire, some purer, and some
+more miry, as in Sicily there are rivers of mud that flow before the
+lava, and the lava itself, and from these the several places are filled,
+according as the overflow from time to time happens to come to each of
+them. But all these move up and down, as it were, by a certain
+oscillation existing in the earth. And this oscillation proceeds from
+such natural cause as this; one of the chasms of the earth is
+exceedingly large, and perforated through the entire earth, and is that
+which Homer[43] speaks of, 'very far off, where is the most profound
+abyss beneath the earth,' which elsewhere both he and many other poets
+have called Tartarus. For into this chasm all rivers flow together, and
+from it flow out again; but they severally derive their character from
+the earth through which they flow. 140. And the reason why all streams
+flow out from thence, and flow into it, is because this liquid has
+neither bottom nor base. Therefore, it oscillates and fluctuates up and
+down, and the air and the wind around it do the same; for they accompany
+it both when it rushes to those parts of the earth, and when to these.
+And as in respiration the flowing breath is continually breathed out and
+drawn in, so there the wind oscillating with the liquid causes certain
+vehement and irresistible winds both as it enters and goes out. When,
+therefore, the water rushing in descends to the place which we call the
+lower region, it flows through the earth into the streams there, and
+fills them, just as men pump up water. But when again it leaves those
+regions and rushes hither, it again fills the rivers here; and these,
+when filled, flow through channels and through the earth, and, having
+severally reached the several places to which they are journeying, they
+make seas, lakes, rivers, and fountains. 141. Then, sinking again from
+thence beneath the earth, some of them having gone round longer and more
+numerous places, and others round fewer and shorter, they again
+discharge themselves into Tartarus--some much lower than they were drawn
+up, others only a little so; but all of them flow in again beneath the
+point at which they flowed out. And some issue out directly opposite the
+place by which they flow in, others on the same side. There are also
+some which, having gone round altogether in a circle, folding themselves
+once or several times round the earth, like serpents, when they have
+descended as low as possible, discharge themselves again; and it is
+possible for them to descend on either side as far as the middle, but
+not beyond; for in each direction there is an acclivity to the streams
+both ways."
+
+"Now, there are many other large and various streams; but among this
+great number there are four certain streams, of which the largest, and
+that which flows most outwardly round the earth, is called Ocean; but
+directly opposite this, and flowing in a contrary direction, is Acheron,
+which flows through other desert places, and, moreover, passing under
+the earth, reaches the Acherusian lake, where the souls of most who die
+arrive; and, having remained there for certain destined periods, some
+longer and some shorter, are again sent forth into the generations of
+animals. 142. A third river issues midway between these, and, near its
+source, falls into a vast region, burning with abundance of fire, and
+forms a lake larger than our sea, boiling with water and mud. From hence
+it proceeds in a circle, turbulent and muddy, and, folding itself round
+it, reaches both other places and the extremity of the Acherusian lake,
+but does not mingle with its water; but, folding itself oftentimes
+beneath the earth, it discharges itself into the lower parts of
+Tartarus. And this is the river which they call Pyriphlegethon, whose
+burning streams emit dissevered fragments in whatever part of the earth
+they happen to be. Opposite to this, again, the fourth river first falls
+into a place dreadful and savage, as it is said, having its whole color
+like cyanus:[44] this they call Stygian, and the lake which the river
+forms by its discharge, Styx. This river, having fallen in here, and
+received awful power in the water, sinking beneath the earth, proceeds,
+folding itself round, in an opposite course to Pyriphlegethon, and meets
+it in the Acherusian lake from, a contrary direction. Neither does the
+water of this river mingle with any other; but it, too, having gone
+round in a circle, discharges itself into Tartarus, opposite to
+Pyriphlegethon. Its name, as the poets say, is Cocytus."
+
+143. "These things being thus constituted, when the dead arrive at the
+place to which their demon leads them severally, first of all they are
+judged, as well those who have lived well and piously, as those who have
+not. And those who appear to have passed a middle kind of life,
+proceeding to Acheron, and embarking in the vessels they have, on these
+arrive at the lake, and there dwell; and when they are purified, and
+have suffered punishment for the iniquities they may have committed,
+they are set free, and each receives the reward of his good deeds,
+according to his deserts. But those who appear to be incurable, through
+the magnitude of their offenses, either from having committed many and
+great sacrileges, or many unjust and lawless murders, or other similar
+crimes, these a suitable destiny hurls into Tartarus, whence they never
+come forth. 144. But those who appear to have been guilty of curable yet
+great offenses--such as those who, through anger, have committed any
+violence against father or mother, and have lived the remainder of their
+life in a state of penitence, or they who have become homicides in a
+similar manner--these must, of necessity, fall into Tartarus. But after
+they have fallen, and have been there for a year, the wave casts them
+forth, the homicides into Cocytus, but the parricides and matricides
+into Pyriphlegethon. But when, being borne along, they arrive at the
+Acherusian lake, there they cry out to and invoke, some those whom they
+slew, others those whom they injured, and, invoking them, they entreat
+and implore them to suffer them to go out into the lake, and to receive
+them, and if they persuade them, they go out, and are freed from their
+sufferings, but if not, they are borne back to Tartarus, and thence
+again to the rivers. And they do not cease from suffering this until
+they have persuaded those whom they have injured, for this sentence was
+imposed on them by the judges. 145. But those who are found to have
+lived an eminently holy life, these are they who, being freed and set at
+large from these regions in the earth as from a prison, arrive at the
+pure abode above, and dwell on the upper parts of the earth. And among
+these, they who have sufficiently purified themselves by philosophy
+shall live without bodies, throughout all future time, and shall arrive
+at habitations yet more beautiful than these which it is neither easy to
+describe, nor at present is there sufficient time for the purpose."
+
+"But, for the sake of these things which we have described, we should
+use every endeavor, Simmias, so as to acquire virtue and wisdom in this
+life, for the reward is noble, and the hope great."
+
+"To affirm positively, indeed, that these things are exactly as I have
+described them does not become a man of sense. That, however, either
+this, or something of the kind, takes place with respect to our souls
+and their habitations--since our soul is certainly immortal--this
+appears to me most fitting to be believed, and worthy the hazard for one
+who trusts in its reality; for the hazard is noble, and it is right to
+allure ourselves with such things, as with enchantments, for which
+reason I have prolonged my story to such a length. 146. On account of
+these things, then, a man ought to be confident about his soul who,
+during this life, has disregarded all the pleasures and ornaments of the
+body as foreign from his nature, and who, having thought that they do
+more harm than good, has zealously applied himself to the acquirement of
+knowledge, and who, having adorned his soul, not with a foreign, but its
+own proper ornament--temperance, justice, fortitude, freedom, and
+truth--thus waits for his passage to Hades, as one who is ready to
+depart whenever destiny shall summon him. You, then," he continued,
+"Simmias and Cebes, and the rest, will each of you depart at some future
+time, but now destiny summons me, as a tragic writer would say, and it
+is nearly time for me to betake myself to the bath, for it appears to me
+to be better to drink the poison after I have bathed myself, and not to
+trouble the women with washing my dead body."
+
+147. When he had thus spoken, Crito said, "So be it, Socrates, but what
+commands have you to give to these or to me, either respecting your
+children, or any other matter, in attending to which we can most oblige
+you?"
+
+"What I always say, Crito," he replied, "nothing new that by taking care
+of yourselves you will oblige both me and mine, and yourselves, whatever
+you do, though you should not now promise it, and if you neglect
+yourselves, and will not live, as it were, in the footsteps of what has
+been now and formerly said, even though you should promise much at
+present, and that earnestly, you will do no good at all."
+
+"We will endeavor, then, so to do," he said. "But how shall we bury
+you?"
+
+"Just as you please," he said, "if only you can catch me, and I do not
+escape from you." 148. And, at the same time smiling gently, and looking
+round on us, he said, "I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that I am
+that Socrates who is now conversing with you, and who methodizes each
+part of the discourse; but he thinks that I am he whom he will shortly
+behold dead, and asks how he should bury me. But that which I some time
+since argued at length, that when I have drunk the poison I shall no
+longer remain with you, but shall depart to some happy state of the
+blessed, this I seem to have urged to him in vain, though I meant at the
+same time to console both you and myself. Be ye, then, my sureties to
+Crito," he said, "in an obligation contrary to that which he made to the
+judges (for he undertook that I should remain); but do you be sureties
+that, when I die, I shall not remain, but shall depart, that Crito may
+more easily bear it; and, when he sees my body either burned or buried,
+may not be afflicted for me, as if I suffered from some dreadful thing;
+nor say at my interment that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or
+is buried. 149. For be well assured," he said, "most excellent Crito,
+that to speak improperly is not only culpable as to the thing itself,
+but likewise occasions some injury to our souls. You must have a good
+courage, then, and say that you bury my body, and bury it in such a
+manner as is pleasing to you, and as you think is most agreeable to our
+laws."
+
+When he had said thus, he rose, and went into a chamber to bathe, and
+Crito followed him, but he directed us to wait for him. We waited,
+therefore, conversing among ourselves about what had been said, and
+considering it again, and sometimes speaking about our calamity, how
+severe it would be to us, sincerely thinking that, like those who are
+deprived of a father, we should pass the rest of our life as orphans.
+When he had bathed, and his children were brought to him (for he had
+two little sons and one grown up), and the women belonging to his family
+were come, having conversed with them in the presence of Crito, and
+given them such injunctions as he wished, he directed the women and
+children to go away, and then returned to us. And it was now near
+sunset; for he spent a considerable time within. 150. But when he came
+from bathing he sat down, and did not speak much afterward; then the
+officer of the Eleven came in, and, standing near him, said, "Socrates,
+I shall not have to find that fault with you that I do with others, that
+they are angry with me, and curse me, when, by order of the archons, I
+bid them drink the poison. But you, on all other occasions during the
+time you have been here, I have found to be the most noble, meek, and
+excellent man of all that ever came into this place; and, therefore, I
+am now well convinced that you will not be angry with me (for you know
+who are to blame), but with them. Now, then (for you know what I came to
+announce to you), farewell, and endeavor to bear what is inevitable as
+easily as possible." And at the same time, bursting into tears, he
+turned away and withdrew.
+
+151. And Socrates, looking after him, said, "And thou, too, farewell. We
+will do as you direct." At the same time turning to us, he said, "How
+courteous the man is! During the whole time I have been here he has
+visited me, and conversed with me sometimes, and proved the worthiest of
+men; and now how generously he weeps for me! But come, Crito, let us
+obey him, and let some one bring the poison, if it is ready pounded; but
+if not, let the man pound it."
+
+Then Crito said, "But I think, Socrates, that the sun is still on the
+mountains, and has not yet set. Besides, I know that others have drunk
+the poison very late, after it had been announced to them, and have
+supped and drunk freely, and some even have enjoyed the objects of their
+love. Do not hasten, then, for there is yet time."
+
+Upon this Socrates replied, "These men whom you mention, Crito, do these
+things with good reason, for they think they shall gain by so doing; and
+I, too, with good reason, shall not do so; for I think I shall gain
+nothing by drinking a little later, except to become ridiculous to
+myself, in being so fond of life, and sparing of it, when none any
+longer remains. Go then," he said, "obey, and do not resist."
+
+152. Crito, having heard this, nodded to the boy that stood near. And
+the boy, having gone out and staid for some time, came, bringing with
+him the man that was to administer the poison, who brought it ready
+pounded in a cup. And Socrates, on seeing the man, said, "Well, my good
+friend, as you are skilled in these matters, what must I do?"
+
+"Nothing else," he replied, "than, when you have drunk it, walk about
+until there is a heaviness in your legs; then lie down: thus it will do
+its purpose." And at the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. And
+he having received it very cheerfully, Echecrates neither trembling, nor
+changing at all in color or countenance, but, as he was wont, looking
+steadfastly at the man, said, "What say you of this potion, with respect
+to making a libation to any one, is it lawful or not?"
+
+"We only pound so much, Socrates," he said, "as we think sufficient to
+drink."
+
+153. "I understand you," he said; "but it is certainly both lawful and
+right to pray to the gods, that my departure hence thither may be happy;
+which, therefore, I pray, and so may it be." And as he said this, he
+drank it off readily and calmly. Thus far, most of us were with
+difficulty able to restrain ourselves from weeping; but when we saw him
+drinking, and having finished the draught, we could do so no longer;
+but, in spite of myself, the tears came in full torrent, so that,
+covering my face, I wept for myself; for I did not weep for him, but for
+my own fortune, in being deprived of such a friend. But Crito, even
+before me, when he could not restrain his tears, had risen up. 154. But
+Apollodorus, even before this, had not ceased weeping; and then,
+bursting into an agony of grief, weeping and lamenting, he pierced the
+heart of every one present, except Socrates himself. But he said, "What
+are you doing, my admirable friends? I, indeed, for this reason chiefly,
+sent away the women, that they might not commit any folly of this kind.
+For I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. Be quiet,
+therefore, and bear up."
+
+When we heard this, we were ashamed, and restrained our tears. But he,
+having walked about, when he said that his legs were growing heavy, lay
+down on his back; for the man had so directed him. And, at the same
+time, he who gave the poison taking hold of him, after a short interval,
+examined his feet and legs; and then, having pressed his foot hard, he
+asked if he felt it: he said that he did not. And after this he pressed
+his thighs; and, thus going higher, he showed us that he was growing
+cold and stiff. Then Socrates touched himself, and said that when the
+poison reached his heart he should then depart. 155. But now the parts
+around the lower belly were almost cold; when, uncovering himself, for
+he had been covered over, he said (and they were his last words),
+"Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius; pay it, therefore; and do not
+neglect it."
+
+"It shall be done," said Crito; "but consider whether you have any thing
+else to say."
+
+To this question he gave no reply; but, shortly after, he gave a
+convulsive movement, and the man covered him, and his eyes were fixed;
+and Crito, perceiving it, closed his mouth and eyes.
+
+This, Echecrates, was the end of our friend,--a man, as we may say, the
+best of all of his time that we have known, and, moreover, the most wise
+and just.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+  [25] Phlius, to which Echecrates belonged, was a town of Sicyonia, in
+    Peloponnesus.
+
+  [26] A Pythagorean of Crotona.
+
+  [27] Namely, "that it is better to die than to live."
+
+  [28] Hitto, Boetian for hioto.
+
+  [29] Of Pythagoras.
+
+  [30] Some boyish spirit.
+
+  [31] That is, at a time of life when the body is in full vigor.
+
+  [32] In the original there is a play on the words Haides and
+    haeides, which I can only attempt to retain by departing from
+    the usual rendering of the former word.
+
+  [33] By this I understand him to mean that the soul alone can perceive
+    the truth, but the senses, as they are different, receive and convey
+    different impressions of the same thing; thus, the eye receives one
+    impression of an object, the ear a totally different one.
+
+  [34] kai ahythis eteros kai eteros, that is, "with one argument
+    after another" Though Cousin translates it _et successivement tout
+    different de luimeme_ and Ast, _et rursus alia atque alia_, which
+    may be taken in either sense, yet it appears to me to mean that,
+    when a man repeatedly discovers the fallacy of arguments which he
+    before believed to be true, he distrusts reasoning altogether, just
+    as one who meets with friend after friend who proves unfaithful
+    becomes a misanthrope.
+
+  [35] Lib. xx, v. 7.
+
+  [36] Harmony was the wife of Cadmus, the founder of Thebes; Socrates,
+    therefore, compares his two Theban friends, Simmias and Cebes, with
+    them, and says that, having overcome Simmias, the advocate of
+    Harmony, he must now deal with Cebes, who is represented by Cadmus.
+
+  [37] einai ti, literally, "is something."
+
+  [38] That is, to single.
+
+  [39] Sec. 113.
+
+  [40] It is difficult to express the distinction between osia
+    and nomima. The former word seems to have reference to the souls of
+    the dead; the latter, to their bodies.
+
+  [41] Its place of interment.
+
+  [42] A proverb meaning "a matter of great difficulty."
+
+  [43] "Iliad," lib. viii., v. 14.
+
+  [44] A metallic substance of a deep-blue color, frequently mentioned by
+    the earliest Grecian writers, but of which the nature is unknown.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
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