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diff --git a/old/13561.txt b/old/13561.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..362889d --- /dev/null +++ b/old/13561.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10211 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Browning as a Philosophical and Religious +Teacher, by Henry Jones + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher + +Author: Henry Jones + +Release Date: September 30, 2004 [eBook #13561] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BROWNING AS A PHILOSOPHICAL AND +RELIGIOUS TEACHER*** + + +E-text prepared by Jonathan Ingram, Leonard Johnson, and the Project +Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team + + + +BROWNING AS A PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS TEACHER + +by + +HENRY JONES + +Professor of Philosophy in the University of Glasgow + + + + + + + +[Illustration: ROBERT BROWNING.] + + + +THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO +MY DEAR FRIENDS + +MISS HARRIET MACARTHUR +AND +MISS JANE MACARTHUR. + + + + +PREFACE + + +The purpose of this book is to deal with Browning, not simply as a poet, +but rather as the exponent of a system of ideas on moral and religious +subjects, which may fairly be called a philosophy. I am conscious that +it is a wrong to a poet to neglect, or even to subordinate, the artistic +aspect of his work. At least, it would be a wrong, if our final judgment +on his poetry were to be determined on such a method. But there is a +place for everything; and, even in the case of a great poet, there is +sometimes an advantage in attempting to estimate the value of what he +has said, apart from the form in which he has said it. And of all modern +poets, Browning is the one who most obviously invites and justifies such +a method of treatment. For, in the first place, he is clearly one of +that class of poets who are also prophets. He was never merely "the idle +singer of an empty day," but one for whom poetic enthusiasm was +intimately bound up with religious faith, and who spoke "in numbers," +not merely "because the numbers came," but because they were for him the +necessary vehicle of an inspiring thought. If it is the business of +philosophy to analyze and interpret all the great intellectual forces +that mould the thought of an age, it cannot neglect the works of one who +has exercised, and is exercising so powerful an influence on the moral +and religious life of the present generation. + +In the second place, as will be seen in the sequel, Browning has himself +led the way towards such a philosophical interpretation of his work. +For, even in his earlier poems, he not seldom crossed the line that +divides the poet from the philosopher, and all but broke through the +strict limits of art in the effort to express--and we might even say to +preach--his own idealistic faith. In his later works he did this almost +without any disguise, raising philosophical problems, and discussing all +the _pros_ and _cons_ of their solution, with no little subtlety and +dialectical skill. In some of these poems we might even seem to be +receiving a philosophical lesson, in place of a poetic inspiration, if +it were not for those powerful imaginative utterances, those winged +words, which Browning has always in reserve, to close the ranks of his +argument. If the question is stated in a prosaic form, the final answer, +as in the ancient oracle, is in the poetic language of the gods. + +From this point of view I have endeavoured to give a connected account +of Browning's ideas, especially of his ideas on religion and morality, +and to estimate their value. In order to do so, it was necessary to +discuss the philosophical validity of the principles on which his +doctrine is more or less consciously based. The more immediately +philosophical chapters are the second, seventh, and ninth; but they will +not be found unintelligible by those who have reflected on the +difficulties of the moral and religious life, even although they may be +unacquainted with the methods and language of the schools. + +I have received much valuable help in preparing this work for the press +from my colleague, Professor G.B. Mathews, and still more from Professor +Edward Caird. I owe them both a deep debt of gratitude. + +HENRY JONES. + +1891. + + + + +CONTENTS. + + +CHAPTER I. +INTRODUCTION + +CHAPTER II. +ON THE NEED OF A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE + +CHAPTER III. +BROWNING'S PLACE IN ENGLISH POETRY + +CHAPTER IV. +BROWNING'S OPTIMISM + +CHAPTER V. +OPTIMISM AND ETHICS: THEIR CONTRADICTION + +CHAPTER VI. +BROWNING'S TREATMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE +OF LOVE + +CHAPTER VII. +BROWNING'S IDEALISM, AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL +JUSTIFICATION + +CHAPTER VIII. +BROWNING'S SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM +OF EVIL + +CHAPTER IX. +A CRITICISM OF BROWNING'S VIEW OF +THE FAILURE OF KNOWLEDGE + +CHAPTER X. +THE HEART AND THE HEAD.--LOVE AND +REASON + +CHAPTER XI. +CONCLUSION + + + + +ROBERT BROWNING. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +INTRODUCTION. + + + "Grau, theurer Freund, ist alle Theorie, + Und gruen des Lebens goldner Baum." (_Faust_.) + +There is a saying of Hegel's, frequently quoted, that "a great man +condemns the world to the task of explaining him." The condemnation is a +double one, and it generally falls heaviest on the great man himself, +who has to submit to explanation; and, probably, the last refinement of +this species of cruelty is to expound a poet. I therefore begin with an +apology in both senses of the term. I acknowledge that no commentator on +art has a right to be heard, if he is not aware of the subordinate and +temporary nature of his office. At the very best he is only a guide to +the beautiful object, and he must fall back in silence so soon as he has +led his company into its presence. He may perhaps suggest "the line of +vision," or fix the point of view, from which we can best hope to do +justice to the artist's work, by appropriating his intention and +comprehending his idea; but if he seeks to serve the ends of art, he +will not attempt to do anything more. + +In order to do even this successfully, it is essential that every +judgment passed should be exclusively ruled by the principles which +govern art. "Fine art is not real art till it is free"; that is, till +its value is recognized as lying wholly within itself. And it is not, +unfortunately, altogether unnecessary to insist that, so far from +enhancing the value of an artist's work, we only degrade it into mere +means, subordinate it to uses alien, and therefore antagonistic to its +perfection, if we try to show that it gives pleasure, or refinement, or +moral culture. There is no doubt that great poetry has all these uses, +but the reader can enjoy them only on condition of forgetting them; for +they are effects that follow the sense of its beauty. Art, morality, +religion, is each supreme in its own sphere; the beautiful is not more +beautiful because it is also moral, nor is a painting great because its +subject is religious. It is true that their spheres overlap, and art is +never at its best except when it is a beautiful representation of the +good; nevertheless the points of view of the artist and of the ethical +teacher are quite different, and consequently also the elements within +which they work and the truth they reveal. + +In attempting, therefore, to discover Robert Browning's philosophy of +life, I do not pretend that my treatment of him is adequate. Browning +is, first of all, a poet; it is only as a poet that he can be finally +judged; and the greatness of a poet is to be measured by the extent to +which his writings are a revelation of what is beautiful. + +I undertake a different and a humbler task, conscious of its +limitations, and aware that I can hardly avoid doing some violence to +the artist. What I shall seek in the poet's writings is not beauty, but +truth; and although truth is beautiful, and beauty is truth, still the +poetic and philosophic interpretation of life are not to be confused. +Philosophy must separate the matter from the form. Its synthesis comes +through analysis, and analysis is destructive of beauty, as it is of all +life. Art, therefore, resists the violence of the critical methods of +philosophy, and the feud between them, of which Plato speaks, will last +through all time. The beauty of form and the music of speech which +criticism destroys, and to which philosophy is, at the best, +indifferent, are essential to poetry. When we leave them out of account +we miss the ultimate secret of poetry, for they cling to the meaning and +penetrate it with their charm. Thought and its expression are +inseparable in poetry, as they never are in philosophy; hence, in the +former, the loss of the expression is the loss of truth. The pure idea +that dwells in a poem is suffused in the poetic utterance, as sunshine +breaks into beauty in the mist, as life beats and blushes in the flesh, +or as an impassioned thought breathes in a thinker's face. + +But, although art and philosophy are supreme, each in its own realm, and +neither can be subordinated to the uses of the other, they may help each +other. They are independent, but not rival powers of the world of mind. +Not only is the interchange of truth possible between them; but each may +show and give to the other all its treasures, and be none the poorer +itself. "It is in works of art that some nations have deposited the +profoundest intuitions and ideas of their hearts." Job and Isaiah, +AEschylus and Sophocles, Shakespeare and Goethe, were first of all poets. +Mankind is indebted to them in the first place for revealing beauty; but +it also owes to them much insight into the facts and principles of the +moral world. It would be an unutterable loss to the ethical thinker and +the philosopher, if this region were closed against them, so that they +could no longer seek in the poets the inspiration and light that lead to +goodness and truth. In our own day, almost above all others, we need the +poets for these ethical and religious purposes. For the utterances of +the dogmatic teacher of religion have been divested of much of their +ancient authority; and the moral philosopher is often regarded either as +a vendor of commonplaces or as the votary of a discredited science, +whose primary principles are matter of doubt and debate. There are not a +few educated Englishmen who find in the poets, and in the poets alone, +the expression of their deepest convictions concerning the profoundest +interests of life. They read the poets for fresh inspiration, partly, no +doubt, because the passion and rapture of poetry lull criticism and +soothe the questioning spirit into acquiescence. + + +But there are further reasons; for the poets of England are greater than +its moral philosophers; and it is of the nature of the poetic art that, +while eschewing system, it presents the strife between right and wrong +in concrete character, and therefore with a fulness and truth impossible +to the abstract thought of science. + + "A poet never dreams: + We prose folk do: we miss the proper duct + For thoughts on things unseen."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Fifine at the Fair_, lxxxviii.] + +It is true that philosophy endeavours to correct this fragmentariness by +starting from the unity of the whole. But it can never quite get rid of +an element of abstraction and reach down to the concrete individual. + +The making of character is so complex a process that the poetic +representation of it, with its subtle suggestiveness, is always more +complete and realistic than any possible philosophic analysis. Science +can deal only with aspects and abstractions, and its method becomes more +and more inadequate as its matter grows more concrete, unless it +proceeds from the unity in which all the aspects are held together. In +the case of life, and still more so in that of human conduct, the whole +must precede the part, and the moral science must, therefore, more than +any other, partake of the nature of poetry; for it must start from +living spirit, go from the heart outwards, in order to detect the +meaning of the actions of man. + +On this account, poetry is peculiarly helpful to the ethical +investigator, because it always treats the particular thing as a +microcosm. It is the great corrective of the onesidedness of science +with its harsh method of analysis and distinction. It is a witness to +the unity of man and the world. Every object which art touches into +beauty, becomes in the very act a whole. The thing that is beautiful is +always complete, the embodiment of something absolutely valuable, the +product and the source of love; and the beloved object is all the world +for the lover--beyond all praise, because it is above all comparison. + + "Then why not witness, calmly gazing, + If earth holds aught--speak truth--above her? + Above this tress, and this, I touch + But cannot praise, I love so much!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Song_ (Dramatic Lyrics).] + +This characteristic of the work of art brings with it an important +practical consequence, because being complete, it appeals to the whole +man. + +"Poetry," it has been well said, is "the idealized and monumental +utterance of the deepest feelings." And poetic feelings, it must not be +forgotten, _are_ deepest; that is, they are the afterglow of the +fullest activity of a complete soul, and not shallow titillations, or +surface pleasures, such as the palate knows. Led by poetry, the +intellect so sees truth that it glows with it, and the will is stirred +to deeds of heroism. For there is hardly any fact so mean, but that when +intensified by emotion, it grows poetic; as there is hardly any man so +unimaginative, but that when struck with a great sorrow, or moved by a +great passion, he is endowed for a moment with the poet's speech. A +poetic fact, one may almost say, is just any fact at its best. Art, it +is true, looks at its object through a medium, but it always seems its +inmost meaning. In Lear, Othello, Hamlet, in Falstaff and Touchstone, +there is a revelation of the inner truth of human life beyond the power +of moral science to bestow. We do well to seek philosophy in the poets, +for though they teach only by hints and parables, they nevertheless +reflect the concrete truth of life, as it is half revealed and half +concealed in facts. On the other hand, the reflective process of +philosophy may help poetry; for, as we shall show, there is a near +kinship between them. Even the critical analyst, while severing element +from element, may help art and serve the poet's ends, provided he does +not in his analysis of parts forget the whole. His function, though +humble and merely preliminary to full poetic enjoyment, is not +unimportant. To appreciate the grandeur of the unity of the work of art, +there must be knowledge of the parts combined. It is quite true that the +guide in the gallery is prone to be too talkative, and there are many +who can afford to turn the commentator out of doors, especially if he +moralizes. But, after all, man is not pure sensibility, any more than he +is pure reason. And the aesthete will not lose if he occasionally allows +those whom he may think less sensitive than himself to the charm of +rhythmic phrase, to direct sober attention to the principles which lie +embedded in all great poetry. At the worst, to seek for truth in poetry +is a protest against the constant tendency to read it for the sake of +the emotions which it stirs, the tendency to make it a refined amusement +and nothing more. That is a deeper wrong to art than any which the +theoretical moralist can inflict. Of the two, it is better to read +poetry for ethical doctrines than for fine sensations; for poetry +purifies the passions only when it lifts the reader into the sphere of +truths that are universal. + +The task of interpreting a poet may be undertaken in different ways. One +of these, with which we have been made familiar by critics of +Shakespeare and of Browning himself, is to analyze each poem by itself +and regard it as the artistic embodiment of some central idea; the other +is to attempt, without dealing separately with each poem, to reach the +poet's own point of view, and to reveal the sovereign truths which rule +his mind. It is this latter way that I shall try to follow. + +Such dominant or even despotic thoughts it is possible to discover in +all our great poets, except perhaps Shakespeare, whose universality +baffles every classifier. As a rule, the English poets have been caught +up, and inspired, by the exceeding grandeur of some single idea, in +whose service they spend themselves with that prodigal thrift which +finds life in giving it. Such an idea gives them a fresh way of looking +at the world, so that the world grows young again with their new +interpretation. In the highest instances, poets may become makers of +epochs; they reform as well as reveal; for ideas are never dead things, +"but grow in the hand that grasps them." In them lies the energy of a +nation's life, and we comprehend that life only when we make clear to +ourselves the thoughts which inspire it. It is thus true, in the deepest +sense, that those who make the songs of a people make its history. In +all true poets there are hints for a larger philosophy of life. But, in +order to discover it, we must know the truths which dominate them, and +break into music in their poems. + +Whether it is always possible, and whether it is at any time fair to a +poet to define the idea which inspires him, I shall not inquire at +present. No doubt, the interpretation of a poet from first principles +carries us beyond the limits of art; and by insisting on the unity of +his work, more may be attributed to him, or demanded from him, than he +properly owns. To make such a demand is to require that poetry should be +philosophy as well, which, owing to its method of intuition, it can +never be. Nevertheless, among English poets there is no one who lends +himself so easily, or so justly, to this way of treatment as Browning. +Much of his poetry trembles on the verge of the abyss which is supposed +to separate art from philosophy; and, as I shall try to show, there was +in the poet a growing tendency to turn the power of dialectic on the +pre-suppositions of his art. Yet, even Browning puts great difficulties +in the way of a critic, who seeks to draw a philosophy of life from his +poems. It is not by any means an easy task to lift the truths he utters +under the stress of poetic emotion into the region of placid +contemplation, or to connect them into a system, by means of the +principle from which he makes his departure. + +The first of these difficulties arises from the extent and variety of +his work. He was prodigal of poetic ideas, and wrote for fifty years on +nature, art, and man, like a magnificent spendthrift of spiritual +treasures. So great a store of knowledge lay at his hand, so real and +informed with sympathy, that we can scarcely find any great literature +which he has not ransacked, any phase of life which is not represented +in his poems. All kinds of men and women, in every station in life, and +at every stage of evil and goodness, crowd his pages. There are few +forms of human character he has not studied, and each individual he has +so caught at the supreme moment of his life, and in the hardest stress +of circumstance, that the inmost working of his nature is revealed. The +wealth is bewildering, and it is hard to follow the central thought, +"the imperial chord, which steadily underlies the accidental mists of +music springing thence."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Fifine at the Fair_.] + +A second and still graver difficulty lies in the fact that his poetry, +as he repeatedly insisted, is "always dramatic in principle, and so many +utterances of so many imaginary persons, not mine."[B] In his earlier +works, especially, Browning is creative rather than reflective, a Maker +rather than a Seer; and his creations stand aloof from him, working out +their fate in an outer world. We often lose the poet in the imaginative +characters, into whom he penetrates with his keen artistic intuition, +and within whom he lies as a necessity revealing itself in their actions +and words. It is not easy anywhere to separate the elements, so that we +can say with certainty, "Here I catch the poet, there lies his +material." The identification of the work and worker is too intimate, +and the realization of the imaginary personage is too complete. + +[Footnote B: Pref. to _Pauline_, 1888.] + +In regard to the dramatic interpretation of his poetry, Browning has +manifested a peculiar sensitiveness. In his Preface to _Pauline_ and in +several of his poems--notably _The Mermaid_, the _House_, and the +_Shop_--he explicitly cuts himself free from his work. He knew that +direct self-revealment on the part of the poet violates the spirit of +the drama. "With this same key Shakespeare unlocked his heart," said +Wordsworth; "Did Shakespeare?" characteristically answers Browning, "If +so, the less Shakespeare he!" And of himself he asks: + + "Which of you did I enable + Once to slip inside my breast, + There to catalogue and label + What I like least, what love best, + Hope and fear, believe and doubt of, + Seek and shun, respect--deride? + Who has right to make a rout of + Rarities he found inside?"[A] + +[Footnote A: _At the Mermaid_.] + +He repudiates all kinship with Byron and his subjective ways, and +refuses to be made king by the hands which anointed him. "He will not +give his woes an airing, and has no plague that claims respect." Both as +man and poet, in virtue of the native, sunny, outer-air healthiness of +his character, every kind of subjectivity is repulsive to him. He hands +to his readers "his work, his scroll, theirs to take or leave: his soul +he proffers not." For him "shop was shop only"; and though he dealt in +gems, and throws + + "You choice of jewels, every one, + Good, better, best, star, moon, and sun,"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Shop_.] + +he still _lived_ elsewhere, and had "stray thoughts and fancies +fugitive" not meant for the open market. The poems in which Browning has +spoken without the disguise of another character are very few. There are +hardly more than two or three of much importance which can be considered +as directly reflecting his own ideas, namely, _Christmas Eve_ and +_Easter Day, La Saisiaz_, and _One Word More_--unless, spite of the +poet's warning, we add _Pauline_. + +But, although the dramatic element in Browning's poetry renders it +difficult to construct his character from his works, while this is +comparatively easy in the case of Wordsworth or Byron; and although it +throws a shade of uncertainty on every conclusion we might draw as to +any specific doctrine held by him, still Browning lives in a certain +atmosphere, and looks at his characters through a medium, whose subtle +influence makes all his work indisputably _his_. The light he throws on +his men and women is not the unobtrusive light of day, which reveals +objects, but not itself. Though a true dramatist, he is not objective +like Shakespeare and Scott, whose characters seem never to have had an +author. The reader feels, rather, that Browning himself attends him +through all the sights and wonders of the world of man; he never escapes +the sense of the presence of the poet's powerful personality, or of the +great convictions on which he has based his life. Browning has, at +bottom, only one way of looking at the world, and one way of treating +his objects; one point of view, and one artistic method. Nay, further, +he has one supreme interest, which he pursues everywhere with a +constancy shown by hardly any other poet; and, in consequence, his works +have a unity and a certain originality, which make them in many ways a +unique contribution to English literature. + +This characteristic, which no critic has missed, and which generally +goes by the name of "the metaphysical element" in his poetry, makes it +the more imperative to form a clear view of his ruling conceptions. No +poet, least of all a dramatic poet, goes about seeking concrete vehicles +for ready-made ideas, or attempts to dress a philosophy in metaphors; +and Browning, as an artist, is interested first of all in the object +which he renders beautiful for its own sole sake, and not in any +abstract idea it illustrates. Still, it is true in a peculiar sense in +his case, that the eye of the poet brings with it what it sees. He is, +as a rule, conscious of no theory, and does not construct a poem for its +explication; he rather strikes his ideas out of his material, as the +sculptor reveals the breathing life in the stone. Nevertheless, it may +be shown that a theory rules him from behind, and that profound +convictions arise in the heart and rush along the blood at the moment of +creation, using his soul as an instrument of expression to his age and +people. + +Of no English poet, except Shakespeare, can we say with approximate +truth that he is the poet of all times. The subjective breath of their +own epoch dims the mirror which they hold up to nature. Missing by their +limitation the highest universality, they can only be understood in +their setting. It adds but little to our knowledge of Shakespeare's work +to regard him as the great Elizabethan; there is nothing temporary in +his dramas, except petty incidents and external trappings--so truly did +he dwell amidst the elements constituting man in every age and clime. +But this cannot be said of any other poet, not even of Chaucer or +Spenser, far less of Milton, or Pope or Wordsworth. In their case, the +artistic form and the material, the idea and its expression, the beauty +and the truth, are to some extent separable. We can distinguish in +Milton between the Puritanic theology which is perishable, and the art +whose beauty can never pass away. The former fixes his kinship with his +own age, gives him a definite place in the evolution of English life; +the latter is independent of time, a thing which has supreme worth in +itself. + +Nor can it be doubted that the same holds good of Browning. He also is +ruled by the ideas of his own age. It may not be altogether possible for +us, "who are partners of his motion and mixed up with his career," to +allow for the influence of these ideas, and to distinguish between that +which is evanescent and that which is permanent in his work; still I +must try to do so; for it is the condition of comprehending him, and of +appropriating the truth and beauty he came to reveal. And if his +nearness to ourselves makes this more difficult, it also makes it more +imperative. For there is no doubt that, with Carlyle, he is the +interpreter of our time, reflecting its confused strength and chaotic +wealth. He is the high priest of our age, standing at the altar for us, +and giving utterance to our needs and aspirations, our fears and faith. +By understanding him, we shall, to some degree, understand ourselves and +the power which is silently moulding us to its purposes. + +It is because I thus regard Browning as not merely a poet but a prophet, +that I think I am entitled to seek in him, as in Isaiah or Aeschylus, a +solution, or a help to the solution, of the problems that press upon us +when we reflect upon man, his place in the world and his destiny. He has +given us indirectly, and as a poet gives, a philosophy of life; he has +interpreted the world anew in the light of a dominant idea; and it will +be no little gain if we can make clear to ourselves those constitutive +principles on which his view of the world rests. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +ON THE NEED OF A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE. + + "Art,--which I may style the love of loving, rage + Of knowing, seeing, feeling the absolute truth of things + For truth's sake, whole and sole, not any good, truth brings + The knower, seer, feeler, beside,--instinctive Art + Must fumble for the whole, once fixing on a part + However poor, surpass the fragment, and aspire + To reconstruct thereby the ultimate entire."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Fifine at the Fair_, xliv.] + +No English poet has spoken more impressively than Browning on the +weightier matters of morality and religion, or sought with more +earnestness to meet the difficulties which arise when we try to +penetrate to their ultimate principles. His way of poetry is, I think, +fundamentally different from that of any other of our great writers. He +often seems to be roused into speech, rather by the intensity of his +spiritual convictions than by the subtle incitements of poetic +sensibility. His convictions caught fire, and truth became beauty for +him; not beauty, truth, as with Keats or Shelley. He is swayed by ideas, +rather than by sublime moods. Beneath the endless variety of his poems, +there are permanent principles, or "colligating conceptions," as science +calls them; and although these are expressed by the way of emotion, they +are held by him with all the resources of his reason. + +His work, though intuitive and perceptive as to form, "gaining God by +first leap" as all true art must do, leaves the impression, when +regarded as a whole, of an articulated system. It is a view of man's +life and destiny that can be maintained, not only during the impassioned +moods of poetry, but in the very presence of criticism and doubt. His +faith, like Pompilia's, is held fast "despite the plucking fiend." He +has given to us something more than intuitive glimpses into, the +mysteries of man's character. Throughout his life he held up the steady +light of an optimistic conception of the world, and by its means +injected new vigour into English ethical thought. In his case, +therefore, it is not an immaterial question, but one almost forced upon +us, whether we are to take his ethical doctrine and inspiring optimism +as valid truths, or to regard them merely as subjective opinions held by +a religious poet. Are they creations of a powerful imagination, and +nothing more? Do they give to the hopes and aspirations that rise so +irrepressibly in the heart of man anything better than an appearance of +validity, which will prove illusory the moment the cold light of +critical inquiry is turned upon them? + +It is to this unity of his work that I would attribute, in the main, the +impressiveness of his deliverances on morality and religion. And this +unity justifies us, I think, in applying to Browning's view of life +methods of criticism that would be out of place with any other English +poet. It is one of his unique characteristics, as already hinted, that +he has endeavoured to give us a complete and reasoned view of the +ethical nature of man, and of his relation to the world--has sought, in +fact, to establish a philosophy of life. In his case, not without +injustice, it is true, but with less injustice than in the case of any +other poet, we may disregard, _for our purposes_, the artistic method of +his thought, and lay stress on its content only. He has a right to a +place amongst philosophers, as Plato has to a place amongst poets. There +is such deliberate earnestness and systematic consistency in his +teaching, that Hegel can scarcely be said to have maintained that "The +Rational is the Real" with greater intellectual tenacity, than Browning +held to his view of life. He sought, in fact, to establish an Idealism; +and that Idealism, like Kant's and Fichte's, has its last basis in the +moral consciousness. + +But, even if it be considered that it is not altogether just to apply +these critical tests to the poet's teaching, and to make him pay the +penalty for assuming a place amongst philosophers, it is certain that +what he says of man's spiritual life cannot be rightly valued, till it +is regarded in the light of his guiding principles. We shall miss much +of what is best in him, even as a poet, if, for instance, we regard his +treatment of love merely as the expression of elevated passion, or his +optimism as based upon mere hope. Love was to him rather an indwelling +element in the world, present, like power, in everything. + + "From the first, Power was--I knew. + Life has made clear to me + That, strive but for closer view, + Love were as plain to see."[A] + +[Footnote: A _Reverie--Asolando_.] + +Love yielded to him, as Reason did to Hegel, a fundamental exposition of +the nature of things. Or, to express the same thing in another way, it +was a deliberate hypothesis, which he sought to apply to facts and to +test by their means, almost in the same manner as that in which natural +science applies and tests its principles. + +That Browning's ethical and religious ideas were for him something +different from, and perhaps more than, mere poetic sentiments, will, I +believe, be scarcely denied. That he held a deliberate theory, and held +it with greater and greater difficulty as he became older, and as his +dialectical tendencies grew and threatened to wreck his artistic +freedom, is evident to any one who regards his work as a whole. But it +will not be admitted so readily that anything other than harm can issue +from an attempt to deal with him as if he were a philosopher. Even if it +be allowed that he held and expressed a definite theory, will it retain +any value if we take it out of the region of poetry and impassioned +religious faith, into the frigid zone of philosophical inquiry? Could +any one maintain, apart from the intoxication of religious and poetic +sentiment, that the essence of existence is love? As long as we remain +within the realm of imagination, it may be argued, we may find in our +poet's great sayings both solacement and strength, both rest and an +impulse towards higher moral endeavour; but if we seek to treat them as +theories of facts, and turn upon them the light of the understanding, +will they not inevitably prove to be hallucinations? Poetry, we think, +has its own proper place and function. It is an invaluable anodyne to +the cark and care of reflective thought; an opiate which, by steeping +the critical intellect in slumber, sets the soul free to rise on the +wings of religious faith. But reason breaks the spell; and the world of +poetry, and religion--a world which to them is always beautiful and good +with God's presence--becomes a system of inexorable laws, dead, +mechanical, explicable in strict truth, as an equipoise of constantly +changing forms of energy. + +There is, at the present time, a widespread belief that we had better +keep poetry and religion beyond the reach of critical investigation, if +we set any store by them. Faith and reason are thought to be finally +divorced. It is an article of the common creed that every attempt which +the world has made to bring them together has resulted in denial, or at +the best in doubt, regarding all supersensuous facts. The one condition +of leading a full life, of maintaining a living relation between +ourselves and both the spiritual and material elements of our existence, +is to make our lives an alternating rhythm of the head and heart, to +distinguish with absolute clearness between the realm of reason and that +of faith. + +Now, such an assumption would be fatal to any attempt like the present, +to find truth in poetry; and I must, therefore, try to meet it before +entering upon a statement and criticism of Browning's view of life. I +cannot admit that the difficulties of placing the facts of man's +spiritual life on a rational basis are so great as to justify the +assertion that there is no such basis, or that it is not discoverable by +man. Surely, it is unreasonable to make intellectual death the condition +of spiritual life. If such a condition were imposed on man, it must +inevitably defeat its own purpose; for man cannot possibly continue to +live a divided life, and persist in believing that for which his reason +knows no defence. We must, in the long run, either rationalize our faith +in morality and religion, or abandon them as illusions. And we should at +least hesitate to deny that reason--in spite of its apparent failure in +the past to justify our faith in the principles of spiritual life--may +yet, as it becomes aware of its own nature and the might which dwells in +it, find beauty and goodness, nay, God himself, in the world. We should +at least hesitate to condemn man to choose between irreflective +ignorance and irreligion, or to lock the intellect and the highest +emotions of our nature and principles of our life, in a mortal struggle. +Poetry and religion may, after all, be truer then prose, and have +something to tell the world that science, which is often ignorant of its +own limits, cannot teach. + +The failure of philosophy in the past, even if it were as complete as is +believed by persons ignorant of its history, is no argument against its +success in the future. Such persons have never known that the world of +thought like that of action makes a stepping stone of its dead self. He +who presumes to decide what passes the power of man's thought, or to +prescribe absolute limits to human knowledge, is rash, to say the least; +and he has neither caught the most important of the lessons of modern +science, nor been lifted to the level of its inspiration. For science +has done one thing greater than to unlock the secrets of nature. It has +revealed something of the might of reason, and given new grounds for the +faith, which in all ages has inspired the effort to know,--the faith +that the world is an intelligible structure, meant to be penetrated by +the thought of man. Can it be that nature is an "open secret," but that +man, and he alone, must remain an enigma? Or does he not rather bear +within himself the key to every problem which he solves, and is it not +_his_ thought which penetrates the secrets of nature? The success of +science, in reducing to law the most varied and apparently unconnected +facts, should dispel any suspicion which attaches to the attempt to +gather these laws under still wider ones, and to interpret the world in +the light of the highest principles. And this is precisely what poetry +and religion and philosophy do, each in its own way. They carry the work +of the sciences into wider regions, and that, as I shall try to show, by +methods which, in spite of many external differences, are fundamentally +at one with those which the sciences employ. + +There is only one way of giving the quietus to the metaphysics of poets +and philosophers, and of showing the futility of a philosophy of life, +or of any scientific explanation of religion and morals. It is to show +that there is some radical absurdity in the very attempt. Till this is +done, the human mind will not give up problems of weighty import, +however hard it may be to solve them. The world refused to believe +Socrates when he pronounced a science of nature impossible, and +centuries of failure did not break man's courage. Science, it is true, +has given up some problems as insoluble; it will not now try to +construct a perpetually moving machine, or to square the circle. But it +has given them up, not because they are difficult, but because they are +unreasonable tasks. The problems have a surd or irrational element in +them; and to solve them would be to bring reason into collision with +itself. + +Now, whatever may be the difficulties of establishing a theory of life, +or a philosophy, it has never been shown to be an unreasonable task to +attempt it. One might, on the contrary, expect, _prima facie_, that in +a world progressively proved to be intelligible to man, man himself +would be no exception. It is impossible that the "light in him should be +darkness," or that the thought which reveals the order of the world +should be itself chaotic. + +The need for philosophy is just the ultimate form of the need for +knowledge; and the truths which philosophy brings to light are implied +in every rational explanation of things. The only choice we can have is +between a conscious metaphysics and an unconscious one, between +hypotheses which we have examined and whose limitations we know, and +hypotheses which rule us from behind, as pure prejudices do. It is +because of this that the empiric is so dogmatic, and the ignorant man so +certain of the truth of his opinion. They do not know their postulates, +nor are they aware that there is no interpretation of an object which +does not finally point to a theory of being. We understand no joint or +ligament, except in relation to the whole organism, and no fact, or +event, except by finding a place for it in the context of our +experience. The history of the pebble can be given, only in the light of +the story of the earth, as it is told by the whole of geology. We must +begin very far back, and bring our widest principles to bear upon the +particular thing, if we wish really to know what it is. It is a law that +explains, and laws are always universal. All our knowledge, even the +most broken and inconsistent, streams from some fundamental conception, +in virtue of which all the variety of objects constitute one world, one +orderly kosmos, even to the meanest mind. It is true that the central +thought, be it rich or poor, must, like the sun's light, be broken +against particular facts. But there is no need of forgetting the real +source of knowledge, or of deeming that its progress is a synthesis +without law, or an addition of fact to fact without any guiding +principles. + +Now, it is the characteristic of poetry and philosophy that they keep +alive our consciousness of these primary, uniting principles. They +always dwell in the presence of the idea which makes their object _one_. +To them the world is always, and necessarily, a harmonious whole, as it +is also to the religious spirit. It is because of this that the universe +is a thing of beauty for the poet, a revelation of God's goodness to the +devout soul, and a manifestation of absolute reason to the philosopher. +Art, religion, and philosophy fail or flourish together. The age of +prose and scepticism appears when the sense of the presence of the whole +in the particular facts of the world and of life has been dulled. And +there is a necessity in this; for if the conception of the world as a +whole is held to be impossible, if philosophy is a futility, then +poetry will be a vain sentiment and religion a delusion. + +Nor will the failure of thought, when once demonstrated in these upper +regions, be confined to them. On the contrary, it will spread downwards +to science and ordinary knowledge, as mountain mists blot out the +valleys. For every synthesis of fact to fact, every attempt to know, +however humble and limited, is inspired by a secret faith in the unity +of the world. Each of the sciences works within its own region, and +colligates its details in the light of its own hypothesis; and all the +sciences taken together presuppose the presence in the world of a +principle that binds it into an orderly totality. Scientific explorers +know that they are all working towards the same centre. And, ever and +anon, as the isolated thinker presses home his own hypothesis, he finds +his thought beating on the limits of his science, and suggesting some +wider hypothesis. The walls that separate the sciences are wearing thin, +and at times light penetrates from one to the other. So that to their +votaries, at least, the faith is progressively justified, that there is +a meeting point for the sciences, a central truth in which the dispersed +rays will again be gathered together. In fact, all the sciences are +working together under the guidance of a principle common to them all, +although it may not be consciously known and no attempt is made to +define it. In science, as in philosophy and art and religion, there is a +principle of unity, which, though latent, is really prior to all +explanation of particular matters of fact. + +In truth, man has only one way of knowing. There is no fundamental +difference between scientific and philosophic procedure. We always light +up facts by means of general laws. The fall of the stone was a perfect +enigma, a universally unintelligible bit of experience, till the +majestic imagination of Newton conceived the idea of universal +gravitation. Wherever mind successfully invades the realm of chaos, +poetry, the sense of the whole, comes first. There is the intuitive +flash, the penetrative glimpse, got no one knows exactly whence--though +we do know that it comes neither from the dead facts nor from the vacant +region of _a priori_ thought, but somehow from the interaction of both +these elements of knowledge. After the intuitive flash comes the slow +labour of proof, the application of the principle to details. And that +application transforms both the principle and the details, so that the +former is enriched with content and the latter are made intelligible--a +veritable conquest and valid possession for mankind. And in this labour +of proof, science and philosophy alike take their share. + +Philosophy may be said to come midway between poetry and science, and to +partake of the nature of both. On the one side it deals, like poetry, +with ideals of knowledge, and announces truths which it does not +completely verify; on the other, it leaves to science the task of +articulating its principles in facts, though it begins the articulation +itself. It reveals subsidiary principles, and is, at the same time, a +witness for the unity of the categories of science. We may say, if we +wish, that its principles are mere hypotheses. But so are the ideas +which underlie the most practical of the sciences; so is every forecast +of genius by virtue of which knowledge is extended; so is every +principle of knowledge not completely worked out. To say that philosophy +is hypothetical implies no charge, other than that which can be +levelled, in the same sense, against the most solid body of scientific +knowledge in the world. The fruitful question in each case alike is, how +far, if at all, does the hypothesis enable us to understand particular +facts. + +The more careful of our scientific thinkers are well aware of the limits +under which they work and of the hypothetical character of their +results. "I take Euclidean space, and the existence of material +particles and elemental energy for granted," says the physicist; "deny +them, and I am helpless; grant them, and I shall establish quantitative +relations between the different forms of this elemental energy, and make +it tractable and tame to man's uses. All I teach depends upon my +hypothesis. In it is the secret of all the power I wield. I do not +pretend to say what this elemental energy is. I make no declaration +regarding the actual nature of things; and all questions as to the +ultimate origin or final destination of the world are beyond the scope +of my inquiry. I am ruled by my hypothesis; I regard phenomena _from my +point of view_; and my right to do so I substantiate by the practical +and theoretical results which follow." The language of geology, +chemistry, zoology, and even mathematics is the same. They all start +from a hypothesis; they are all based on an imaginative conception, and +in this sense their votaries are poets, who see the unity of being throb +in the particular fact. + +Now, so far as the particular sciences are concerned, I presume that no +one will deny the supreme power of these colligating ideas. The sciences +do not grow by a process of empiricism, which rambles tentatively and +blindly from fact to fact, unguided of any hypothesis. But if they do +not, if, on the contrary, each science is ruled by its own hypothesis, +and uses that hypothesis to bind its facts together, then the question +arises, are there no wider colligating principles amongst these +hypotheses themselves? Are the sciences independent of each other, or +is their independence only surface appearance? This is the question +which philosophy asks, and the sciences themselves by their progress +suggest a positive answer to it. + +The knowledge of the world which the sciences are building is not a +chaotic structure. By their apparently independent efforts, the outer +kosmos is gradually reproduced in the mind of man, and the temple of +truth is silently rising. We may not as yet be able to connect wing with +wing, or to declare definitely the law of the whole. The logical order +of the hypotheses of the various sciences, the true connection of these +categories of constructive thought, may yet be uncertain. But, still, +there _is_ such an order and connection: the whole building has its +plan, which becomes more and more intelligible as it approaches to its +completion. Beneath all the differences, there are fundamental +principles which give to human thought a definite unity of movement and +direction. There are architectonic conceptions which are guiding, not +only the different sciences, but all the modes of thought of an age. +There are intellectual media, "working hypotheses," by means of which +successive centuries observe all that they see; and these far-reaching +constructive principles divide the history of mankind into distinct +stages. In a word, there are dynasties of great ideas, such as the idea +of development in our own day; and these successively ascend the throne +of mind, and hold a sway over human thought which is well-nigh absolute. + +Now, if this is so, is it certain that all _knowledge_ of these ruling +conceptions is impossible? In other words, is the attempt to construct a +philosophy absurd? To say that it is, to deny the possibility of +catching any glimpse of those regulative ideas, which determine the main +tendencies of human thought, is to place the supreme directorate of the +human intelligence in the hands of a necessity which, _for us_, is +blind. For, an order that is hidden is equivalent to chance, so far as +knowledge is concerned; and if we believe it to exist, we do so in the +face of the fact that all we see, and all we _can_ see, is the opposite +of order, namely lawlessness. Human knowledge, on this view, would be +subjected to law in its details and compartments, but to disorder as a +whole. Thinking men would be organized into regiments; but the regiments +would not constitute an army, nor would there be any unity of movement +in the attack on the realm of ignorance. + +But, such is not the conclusion to which the study of human history +leads, especially when we observe its movements on a large scale. On the +contrary, it is found that history falls into great epochs, each of +which has its own peculiar characteristics. Ages, as well as nations and +individuals, have features of their own, special and definite modes of +thinking and acting. The movement of thought in each age has its own +direction, which is determined by some characteristic and fundamental +idea, that fulfils for it the part of a working hypothesis in a +particular science. It is the prerogative of the greatest leaders of +thought in an age to catch a glimpse of this ruling idea when it first +makes its appearance; and it is their function, not only to discover it, +but also to reveal it to others. And, in this way, they are at once the +exponents of their time, and its prophets. They reveal that which is +already a latent but active power--"a tendency"; but they reveal it to a +generation which will see the truth for itself, only after the potency +which lies in it has manifested itself in national institutions and +habits of thought and action. _After_ the prophets have left us, we +believe what they have said; as long as they are with us, they are +voices crying in the wilderness. + +Now, these great ideas, these harmonies of the world of mind, first +strike upon the ear of the poet. They seem to break into the +consciousness of man by the way of emotion. They possess the seer; he is +divinely mad, and he utters words whose meaning passes his own calmer +comprehension. What we find in Goethe, we find also in a manner in +Browning: an insight which is also foresight, a dim and partial +consciousness of the truth about to be, sending its light before it, and +anticipating all systematic reflection. It is an insight which appears +to be independent of all method; but it is in nature, though not in +sweep and expanse, akin to the intuitive leap by which the scientific +explorer lights upon his new hypothesis. We can find no other law for +it, than that sensitiveness to the beauty and truth hidden in facts, +which much reflection on them generates for genius. For these great +minds the "muddy vesture" is worn thin by thought, and they hear the +immortal music. + +The poet soon passes his glowing torch into the hands of the +philosopher. After Aeschylus and Sophocles, come Plato and Aristotle. +The intuitive flash grows into a fixed light, which rules the day. The +great idea, when reflected upon, becomes a system. When the light of +such an idea is steadily held on human affairs, it breaks into endless +forms of beauty and truth. The content of the idea is gradually evolved; +hypotheses spring out of it, which are accepted as principles, rule the +mind of an age, and give it its work and its character. In this way, +Hobbes and Locke laid down, or at least defined, the boundaries within +which moved the thought of the eighteenth century; and no one acquainted +with the poetic and philosophic thought of Germany, from Lessing to +Goethe and from Kant to Hegel, can fail to find therein the source and +spring of the constitutive principles of our own intellectual, social, +political, and religious life. The virtues and the vices of the +aristocracy of the world of mind penetrate downwards. The works of the +poets and philosophers, so far from being filled with impracticable +dreams, are repositories of great suggestions which the world adopts for +its guidance. The poets and philosophers lay no railroads and invent no +telephones; but they, nevertheless, bring about that attitude towards +nature, man and God, and generate those moods of the general mind, from +which issue, not only the scientific, but also the social, political and +religious forces of the age. + +It is mainly on this account that I cannot treat the supreme utterances +of Browning lightly, or think it an idle task to try to connect them +into a philosophy of life. In his optimism of love, in his supreme +confidence in man's destiny and sense of the infinite height of the +moral horizon of humanity, in his courageous faith in the good, and his +profound conviction of the evanescence of evil, there lies a vital +energy whose inspiring power we are yet destined to feel. Until a spirit +kindred to his own arises, able to push the battle further into the same +region, much of the practical task of the age that is coming will +consist in living out in detail the ideas to which he has given +expression. + +I contend, then, not merely for a larger charity, but for a truer view +of the facts of history than is evinced by those who set aside the poets +and philosophers as mere dreamers, and conceive that the sciences alone +occupy the region of valid thought in all its extent. There is a +universal brotherhood of which all who think are members. Not only do +they all contribute to man's victory over his environment and himself, +but they contribute in a manner which is substantially the same. There +are many points of superficial distinction between the processes of +philosophy and science, and between both and the method of poetry; but +the inner movement, if one may so express it, is identical in all. It is +time to have done with the notion that philosophers occupy a +transcendent region beyond experience, or spin spiritual cocoons by _a +priori_ methods, and with the view that scientific men are mere +empirics, building their structures from below by an _a posteriori_ way +of thought, without the help of any ruling conceptions. All alike +endeavour to interpret experience, but none of them get their principles +from it. + + "But, friends, + Truth is within ourselves; it takes no rise + From outward things, whate'er you may believe." + +There is room and need for the higher synthesis of philosophy and +poetry, as well as for the more palpable and, at the same time, more +narrow colligating conceptions of the systematic sciences. The +quantitative relations between material objects, which are investigated +by mathematics and physics, do not exhaust the realm of the knowable, so +as to leave no place for the poet's, or the philosopher's view of the +world. The scientific investigator who, like Mr. Tyndall, so far forgets +the limitations of his province as to use his natural data as premises +for religious or irreligious conclusions, is as illogical as the popular +preacher, who attacks scientific conclusions because they are not +consistent with his theological presuppositions. Looking only at their +primary aspects, we cannot say that religious presuppositions and the +scientific interpretation of facts are either consistent or +inconsistent: they are simply different. Their harmony or discord can +come only when the higher principles of philosophy have been fully +developed, and when the departmental ideas of the various sciences are +organized into a view of the world as a whole. And this is a task which +has not as yet been accomplished. The forces from above and below have +not met. When they do meet, they will assuredly find that they are +friends, and not foes. For philosophy can articulate its supreme +conception only by interaction with the sciences; and, on the other +hand, the progress of science, and the effectiveness of its division of +labour, are ultimately conditioned by its sensitiveness to the hints, +given by poets and philosophers, of those wider principles in virtue of +which the world is conceived as a unity. There are many, indeed, who +cannot see the wood for the trees, as there are others who cannot see +the trees for the wood. Carlyle cared nothing though science were able +to turn a sunbeam on its axis; Ruskin sees little in the advance of +invention except more slag-hills. And scientific men have not been slow +to return with interest the scorn of the moralists. But a more +comprehensive view of the movement of human knowledge will show that +none labour in vain. For its movement is that of a thing which _grows_! +and in growth there is always movement towards both unity and +difference. Science, in pursuing truth into greater and greater detail, +is constrained by its growing consciousness of the unlimited wealth of +its material, to divide and isolate its interests more and more; and +thus, at the same time, the need for the poets and philosophers is +growing deeper, their task is becoming more difficult of achievement, +and a greater triumph in so far as it is achieved. Both science and +philosophy are working towards a more concrete view of the world as an +articulated whole. If we cannot quite say with Browning that "poets +never dream," we may yet admit with gratitude that their dreams are an +inspiration. + + "Sorrow is hard to bear, and doubt is slow to clear. + Each sufferer says his say, his scheme of the weal and woe: + But God has a few of us whom he whispers in the ear; + The rest may reason and welcome: 'tis we musicians know."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Abt Vogler_.] + +And side by side with the poetry that grasps the truth in immediate +intuition, there is also the uniting activity of philosophy, which, +catching up its hints, carries "back our scattered knowledge of the +facts and laws of nature to the principle upon which they rest; and, on +the other hand, develops that principle so as to fill all the details of +knowledge with a significance which they cannot have in themselves, but +only as seen _sub specie aeternitatis_."[B] + +[Footnote B: _The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time_, by +Professor Caird.] + +So far we have spoken of the function of philosophy in the +interpretation of the phenomena of the outer world. It bears witness to +the unity of knowledge, and strives by the constructive criticism of the +categories of science to render that unity explicit. Its function is, no +doubt, valid and important, for it is evident that man cannot rest +content with fragmentary knowledge. But still, it might be objected that +it is premature at present to endeavour to formulate that unity. +Physics, chemistry, biology, and the other sciences, while they +necessarily presuppose the unity of knowledge, and attempt in their own +way and in their own sphere to discover it, are making very satisfactory +headway without raising any of the desperate questions of metaphysics as +to its ultimate nature. For them it is not likely to matter for a long +time to come whether Optimism or Pessimism, Materialism or Idealism, or +none of them, be true. In any case the principles they establish are +valid. Physical relations always remain true; "ginger will be hot i' the +mouth, and there will be more cakes and ale." It is only when the +sciences break down beneath the weight of knowledge and prove themselves +inadequate, that it becomes necessary or advantageous to seek for more +comprehensive principles. At present is it not better to persevere in +the way of science, than to be seduced from it by the desire to solve +ultimate problems, which, however reasonable and pressing, seem to be +beyond our power to answer? + +Such reasonings are not convincing; still, so far as natural science is +concerned, they seem to indicate that there might be no great harm in +ignoring, for a time, its dependence on the wider aspects of human +thought. There is no department of nature so limited, but that it may +more than satisfy the largest ambition of the individual for knowledge. +But this attitude of indifference to ultimate questions is liable at any +moment to be disturbed. + + "Just when we are safest, there's a sunset-touch, + A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death, + A chorus-ending from Euripides,-- + And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears + As old and new at once as nature's self, + To rap and knock and enter in our soul, + Take hands and dance there, a fantastic ring, + Round the ancient idol, on his base again,-- + The grand Perhaps! We look on helplessly. + There the old misgivings, crooked questions are."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Bishop Blougram's Apology._] + +Amongst the facts of our experience which cry most loudly for some kind +of solution, are those of our own inner life. We are in pressing need of +a "working hypothesis" wherewith to understand ourselves, as well as of +a theory which will explain the revolution of the planets, or the +structure of an oyster. And this self of ours intrudes everywhere. It is +only by resolutely shutting our eyes, that we can forget the part it +plays even in the outer world of natural science. So active is it in the +constitution of things, so dependent is their nature on the nature of +our knowing faculties, that scientific men themselves admit that their +surest results are only hypothetical. Their truth depends on laws of +thought which natural science does not investigate. + +But quite apart from this doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, which +is generally first acknowledged and then ignored, every man, the worst +and the best alike, is constrained to take some _practical_ attitude +towards his fellows. Man is never alone with nature, and the connections +with his fellows which sustain his intelligent life, are liable to bring +him into trouble, if they are not to some degree understood. + + "There's power in me," said Bishop Blougram, "and will to dominate + Which I must exercise, they hurt me else." + +The impulse to know is only a phase of the more general impulse to act +and to be. The specialist's devotion to his science is his answer to a +demand, springing from his practical need, that he realize himself +through action. He does not construct his edifice of knowledge, as the +bird is supposed to build its nest, without any consciousness of an end +to be attained thereby. Even if, like Lessing, he values the pursuit of +truth for its own sake, still what stings him into effort is the sense +that in truth only can he find the means of satisfying and realizing +himself. Beneath all man's activities, as their very spring and source, +there lies some dim conception of an end to be attained. This is his +moral consciousness, which no neglect will utterly suppress. All human +effort, the effort to know like every other, conceals within it a +reference to some good, conceived at the time as supreme and complete; +and this, in turn, contains a theory both of man's self and of the +universe on which he must impress his image. Every man must have his +philosophy of life, simply because he must act; though, in many cases, +that philosophy may be latent and unconscious, or, at least, not a +definite object of reflection. The most elementary question directed at +his moral consciousness will at once elicit the universal element. We +cannot ask whether an action be right or wrong without awakening all the +echoes of metaphysics. As there is no object on the earth's surface +whose equilibrium is not fixed by its relation to the earth's centre, so +the most elementary moral judgment, the simplest choice, the most +irrational vagaries of a will calling itself free and revelling in its +supposed lawlessness, are dominated by the conception of a universal +good. Everything that a man does is an attempt to articulate his view of +this good, with a particular content. Hence, man as a moral agent is +always the centre of his own horizon, and stands right beneath the +zenith. Little as he may be aware of it, his relation between himself +and his supreme good is direct. And he orders his whole world from his +point of view, just as he regards East and West as meeting at the spot +on which he stands. Whether he will or not, he cannot but regard the +universe of men and objects as the instrument of his purposes. He +extracts all its interest and meaning from himself. His own shadow falls +upon it all. If he is selfish, that is, if he interprets the self that +is in him as vulturous, then the whole outer world and his fellow-men +fall for him into the category of carrion, or not-carrion. If he knows +himself as spirit, as the energy of love or reason, if the prime +necessity he recognizes within himself is the necessity to be good, then +the universe becomes for him an instrument wherewith moral character is +evolved. In all cases alike, his life-work is an effort to rob the world +of its alien character, and to translate it into terms of himself. + +We are in the habit of fixing a chasm between a man's deeds and his +metaphysical, moral, and religious creed; and even of thinking that he +can get on "in a sufficiently prosperous manner," without any such +creed. Can we not digest without a theory of peptics, or do justice +without constructing an ideal state? The truest answer, though it is an +answer easily misunderstood, is that we cannot. In the sphere of +morality, at least, action, depends on knowledge: Socrates was right in +saying that virtuous conduct ignorant of its end is accidental. Man's +action, so far as it is good or evil, is shot through and through with +his intelligence. And once we clearly distinguish between belief and +profession, between the motives which really impel our actions and the +psychological account of them with which we may deceive ourselves and +others, we shall be obliged to confess that we always act our creed. A +man's conduct, just because he is man, is generated by his view of +himself and his world. He who cheats his neighbour believes in +tortuosity, and, as Carlyle says, has the Supreme Quack for his God. No +one ever acted without some dim, though perhaps foolish enough, +half-belief that the world was at his back; whether he plots good or +evil he always has God as an accomplice. And this is why character +cannot be really bettered by any peddling process. Moralists and +preachers are right in insisting on the need of a new life, that is, of +a new principle, as the basis of any real improvement; and such a +principle necessarily carries in it a new attitude towards men, and a +new interpretation of the moral agent himself and of his world. + +Thus, wherever we touch the practical life of man, we are at once +referred to a metaphysic. His creed is the heart of his character, and +it beats as a pulse in every action. Hence, when we deal with moral +life, we _must_ start from the centre. In our intellectual life, it is +not obviously unreasonable to suppose that there is no need of +endeavouring to reach upward to a constructive idea, which makes the +universe one, but when we act, such self-deception is not possible. As a +moral agent, and a moral agent man always is, he not only may, but must +have his working hypothesis, and that hypothesis must be all-inclusive. +As there are natural laws which connect man's physical movements with +the whole system of nature, so there are spiritual relations which +connect him with the whole spiritual universe; and spiritual relations +are always direct. + +Now it follows from this, that, whenever we consider man as a moral +agent, that is, as an agent who converts ideas into actual things, the +need of a philosophy becomes evident. Instead of condemning ideal +interpretations of the universe as useless dreams, the foolish products +of an ambition of thought which refuses to respect the limits of the +human intellect, we shall understand that philosophers and poets are +really striving with greater clearness of vision, and in a more +sustained manner, to perform the task which all men are obliged to +perform in some way or other. Man subsists as a natural being only on +condition of comprehending, to some degree, the conditions of his +natural life, and the laws of his natural environment. From earliest +youth upwards, he is learning that fire will burn and water drown, and +that he can play with the elements with safety only within the sphere +lit up by his intelligence. Nature will not pardon the blunders of +ignorance, nor tamely submit to every hasty construction. And this truth +is still more obvious in relation to man's moral life. Here, too, and in +a pre-eminent degree, conduct waits on intelligence. Deep will only +answer unto deep; and great characters only come with much meditation on +the things that are highest. And, on the other hand, the misconstruction +of life's meaning flings man back upon himself, and makes his action +nugatory. Byronism was driven "howling home again," says the poet. The +universe will not be interpreted in terms of sense, nor be treated as +carrion, as Carlyle said. There is no rest in the "Everlasting No," +because it is a wrong view of man and of the world. Or rather, the +negative is not everlasting; and man is driven onwards by despair, +through the "Centre of Indifference," till he finds a "Universal Yea"--a +true view of his relation to the universe. + +There is given to men the largest choice to do or to let alone, at every +step in life. But there is one necessity which they cannot escape, +because they carry it within them. They absolutely must try to make the +world their home, find some kind of reconciling idea between themselves +and the forces amidst which they move, have some kind of working +hypothesis of life. Nor is it possible to admit that they will find rest +till they discover a true hypothesis. If they do not seek it by +reflection--if, in their ardour to penetrate into the secrets of nature, +they forget themselves; if they allow the supreme facts of their moral +life to remain in the confusion of tradition, and seek to compromise the +demands of their spirit by sacrificing to the idols of their childhood's +faith; if they fortify themselves in the indifference of +agnosticism,--they must reap the harvest of their irreflection. +Ignorance is not harmless in matters of character any more than in the +concerns of our outer life. There are in national and in individual +history seasons of despair, and that despair, when it is deepest, is +ever found to be the shadow of moral failure--the result of going out +into action with a false view of the purpose of human life, and a wrong +conception of man's destiny. At such times, the people have not +understood themselves or their environment, and, in consequence, they +come into collision with their own welfare. There is no experiment so +dangerous to an age or people, as that of relegating to the common +ignorance of unreasoning faith the deep concerns of moral conduct; and +there is no attitude more pitiable than that which leads it to turn a +deaf ear and the lip of contempt towards those philosophers who carry +the spirit of scientific inquiry into these higher regions, and +endeavour to establish for mankind, by the irrefragable processes of +reason, those principles on which rest all the great elements of man's +destiny. We cannot act without a theory of life; and to whom shall we +look for such a theory, except to those who, undaunted by the +difficulties of the task, ask once more, and strive to answer, those +problems which man cannot entirely escape, as long as he continues to +think and act? + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +BROWNING'S PLACE IN ENGLISH POETRY. + + + "But there's a great contrast between him and me. He seems + very content with life, and takes much satisfaction in the + world. It's a very strange and curious spectacle to behold + a man in these days so confidently cheerful." (_Carlyle_.) + +It has been said of Carlyle, who may for many reasons be considered as +our poet's twin figure, that he laid the foundations of his world of +thought in _Sartor Resartus_, and never enlarged them. His _Orientirung_ +was over before he was forty years old--as is, indeed, the case with +most men. After that period there was no fundamental change in his view +of the world; nothing which can be called a new idea disturbed his +outline sketch of the universe. He lived afterwards only to fill it in, +showing with ever greater detail the relations of man to man in history, +and emphasizing with greater grimness the war of good and evil in human +action. There is evidence, it is true, that the formulae from which he +more or less consciously set forth, ultimately proved too narrow for +him, and we find him beating himself in vain against their limitations; +still, on the whole, Carlyle speculated within the range and influence +of principles adopted early in life, and never abandoned for higher or +richer ideas, or substantially changed. + +In these respects, there is considerable resemblance between Carlyle and +Browning. Browning, indeed, fixed his point of view and chose his +battleground still earlier; and he held it resolutely to his life's +close. In his _Pauline_ and in his Epilogue to _Asolando_ we catch the +triumphant tone of a single idea, which, during all the long interval, +had never sunk into silence. Like + + "The wise thrush, he sings each song twice over, + Lest you should think he never could recapture + The first fine careless rapture!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Home Thoughts from Abroad_.] + +Moreover, these two poets, if I may be permitted to call Carlyle a poet, +taught the same truth. They were both witnesses to the presence of God +in the spirit of man, and looked at this life in the light of another +and a higher; or rather, they penetrated through the husk of time and +saw that eternity is even here, a tranquil element underlying the noisy +antagonisms of man's earthly life. Both of them, like Plato's +philosopher, made their home in the sunlight of ideal truth: they were +not denizens of the cave taking the things of sense for those of +thought, shadows for realities, echoes for the voices of men. + +But, while Carlyle fought his way into this region, Browning found +himself in it from the first; while Carlyle bought his freedom with a +great sum, the poet "was free born." Carlyle saw the old world faith +break up around him, and its fragments never ceased to embarrass his +path. He was _at_ the point of transition, present at the collision of +the old and new, and in the midst of the confusion. He, more than any +other English writer, was the instrument of the change from the Deism of +the eighteenth century and the despair which followed it, into the +larger faith of our own. But, for Browning, there was a new heaven and a +new earth, and old things had passed away. This notable contrast between +the two men, arising at once from their disposition and their moral +environment, had far-reaching effects on their lives and their writings. +But their affinity was deeper than the difference, for they are +essentially heirs and exponents of the same movement in English thought. + +The main characteristic of that movement is that it is both moral and +religious, a devotion to God and the active service of man, a +recognition at once of the rights of nature and of spirit. It does not, +on the one hand, raise the individual as a natural being to the throne +of the universe, and make all forces social, political, and spiritual +stoop to his rights; nor does it, on the other hand, deny these rights, +or make the individual a mere instrument of society. It at least +attempts to reconcile the fundamental facts of human nature, without +compromising any of them. It cannot be called either individualistic or +socialistic; but it strives to be both at once, so that both man and +society mean more to this age than they ever did before. The narrow +formulae that cramped the thought of the period which preceded ours have +been broken through. No one can pass from the hedonists and +individualists to Carlyle and Browning without feeling that these two +men are representatives of new forces in politics, in religion, and in +literature,--forces which will undoubtedly effect momentous changes +before they are caught again and fixed in creeds. + +That a new epoch in English thought was veritably opened by them is +indicated by the surprise and bewilderment they occasioned at their +first appearance. Carlyle had Emerson to break his loneliness and +Browning had Rossetti; but, to most other men at that day, _Sartor_ and +_Pauline_ were all but unintelligible. The general English reader could +make little of the strange figures that had broken into the realm of +literature; and the value and significance of their work, as well as its +originality, will be recognized better by ourselves if we take a hurried +glance at the times which lay behind them. Its main worth will be found +to lie in the fact that they strove to bring together again certain +fundamental elements, on which the moral life of man must always rest, +and which had fallen asunder in the ages which preceded their own. + +The whole-hearted, instinctive life of the Elizabethan age was narrowed +and deepened into the severe one-sidedness of Puritanism, which cast on +the bright earth the sombre shadow of a life to come. England was given +up for a time to a magnificent half-truth. It did not + + "Wait + The slow and sober uprise all around + O' the building," + +but + + "Ran up right to roof + A sudden marvel, piece of perfectness."[A] + +[Footnote A:_Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau._] + +After Puritanism came Charles the Second and the rights of the flesh, +which rights were gradually clarified, till they contradicted themselves +in the benevolent self-seeking of altruistic hedonism. David Hume led +the world out of the shadow of eternity, and showed that it was only an +object of the five senses; or of six, if we add that of "hunger." The +divine element was explained away, and the proper study of mankind was, +not man, as that age thought, but man reduced to his beggarly +elements--a being animated solely by the sensuous springs of pleasure +and pain, which should properly, as Carlyle thought, go on all fours, +and not lay claim to the dignity of being moral. All things were reduced +to what they seemed, robbed of their suggestiveness, changed into +definite, sharp-edged, mutually exclusive particulars. The world was an +aggregate of isolated facts, or, at the best, a mechanism into which +particulars were fitted by force; and society was a gathering of mere +individuals, repelling each other by their needs and greed, with a ring +of natural necessity to bind them together. It was a fit time for +political economy to supplant ethics. There was nowhere an ideal which +could lift man above his natural self, and teach him, by losing it, to +find a higher life. And, as a necessary consequence, religion gave way +to naturalism and poetry to prose. + +After this age of prose came our own day. The new light first flushed +the modern world in the writings of the philosopher-poets of Germany: +Kant and Lessing, Fichte and Schiller, Goethe and Hegel. They brought +about the Copernican change. For them this world of the five senses, of +space and time and natural cause, instead of being the fixed centre +around which all things revolved, was explicable only in its relation to +a system which was spiritual; and man found his meaning in his +connection with society, the life of which stretched endlessly far back +into the past and forward into the future. Psychology gave way to +metaphysics. The universal element in the thought of man was revealed. +Instead of mechanism there was life. A new spirit of poetry and +philosophy brought God back into the world, revealed his incarnation in +the mind of man, and changed nature into a pellucid garment within which +throbbed the love divine. The antagonism of hard alternatives was at an +end; the universe was spirit-woven and every smallest object was "filled +full of magical music, as they freight a star with light." There were no +longer two worlds, but one; for "the other" world penetrated this, and +was revealed in it: thought and sense, spirit and nature, were +reconciled. These thinkers made room for man, as against the Puritans, +and for God, as against their successors. Instead of the hopeless +struggle of ascetic morality, which divides man against himself, they +awakened him to that sense of his reconciliation with his ideal which +religion gives: "Psyche drinks its stream and forgets her sorrows." + +Now, this is just the soil where art blooms. For what is beauty but the +harmony of thought and sense, a universal meaning caught and tamed in +the particular? To the poet each little flower that blooms has endless +worth, and is regarded as perfect and complete; for he sees that the +spirit of the whole dwells in it. It whispers to him the mystery of the +infinite; it is a pulse in which beats the universal heart. The true +poet finds God everywhere; for the ideal is actual wherever beauty +dwells. And there is the closest affinity between art and religion, as +its history proves, from Job and Isaiah, Homer and Aeschylus, to our own +poet; for both art and religion lift us, each in its own way, above +one-sidedness and limitation, to the region of the universal. The one +draws God to man, brings perfection _here_, and reaches its highest form +in the joyous life of Greece, where the natural world was clothed with +almost supernatural beauty; the other lifts man to God, and finds this +life good because it reflects and suggests the greater life that is to +be. Both poetry and religion are a reconciliation and a satisfaction; +both lift man above the contradictions of limited existence, and place +him in the region of peace--where, + + "with an eye made quiet by the power + Of harmony, and the deep power of joy, + He sees into the life of things."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Tintern Abbey._] + +In this sense, it will be always true of the poet, as it is of the +religious man, that + + "the world, + The beauty and the wonder and the power, + The shapes of things, their colours, lights and shades, + Changes, surprises,"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Fra Lippo Lippi_.] + +lead him back to God, who made it all. + +He is essentially a witness to the divine element in the world. + +It is the rediscovery of this divine element, after its expulsion by the +age of Deism and doubt, that has given to this century its poetic +grandeur. Unless we regard Burke as the herald of the new era, we may +say that England first felt the breath of the returning spirit in the +poems of Shelley and Wordsworth. + + "The One remains, the many change and pass; + Heaven's light for ever shines, earth's shadows fly; + Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass, + Stains the white radiance of eternity, + Until death tramples it to fragments."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Adonais_.] + +"And I have felt," says Wordsworth, + + "A presence that disturbs me with the joy + Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime + Of something far more deeply interfused, + Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, + And the round ocean and the living air, + And the blue sky, and in the mind of man: + A motion and a spirit, that impels + All thinking things, all objects of all thought, + And rolls through all things."[C] + +[Footnote C: _Tintern Abbey_.] + +Such notes as these could not be struck by Pope, nor be understood by +the age of prose. Still they are only the prelude of the fuller song of +Browning. Whether he be a greater poet than these or not,--a question +whose answer can benefit nothing, for each poet has his own worth, and +reflects by his own facet the universal truth--his poetry contains in it +larger elements, and the promise of a deeper harmony from the harsher +discords of his more stubborn material. Even where their spheres touch, +Browning held by the artistic truth in a different manner. To Shelley, +perhaps the most intensely spiritual of all our poets, + + "That light whose smile kindles the universe, + That beauty in which all things work and move," + +was an impassioned sentiment, a glorious intoxication; to Browning it +was a conviction, reasoned and willed, possessing the whole man, and +held in the sober moments when the heart is silent. "The heavy and the +weary weight of all this unintelligible world" was lightened for +Wordsworth, only when he was far from the haunts of men, and free from +the "dreary intercourse of daily life"; but Browning weaved his song of +hope right amidst the wail and woe of man's sin and wretchedness. For +Wordsworth "sensations sweet, felt in the blood and felt along the +heart, passed into his purer mind with tranquil restoration," and issued +"in a serene and blessed mood"; but Browning's poetry is not merely the +poetry of the emotions however sublimated. He starts with the hard +repellent fact, crushes by sheer force of thought its stubborn rind, +presses into it, and brings forth the truth at its heart. The greatness +of Browning's poetry is in its perceptive grip: and in nothing is he +more original than in the manner in which he takes up his task, and +assumes his artistic function. In his postponement of feeling to thought +we recognize a new poetic method, the significance of which we cannot +estimate as yet. But, although we may fail to apprehend the meaning of +the new method he employs, we cannot fail to perceive the fact, which is +not less striking, that the region from which he quarries his material +is new. + +And yet he does not break away abruptly from his predecessors. His +kinship with them, in that he recognizes the presence of God in nature, +is everywhere evident. We quote one passage, scarcely to be surpassed by +any of our poets, as indicative of his power of dealing with the +supernaturalism of nature. + + "The centre-fire heaves underneath the earth, + And the earth changes like a human face; + The molten ore burst up among the rocks, + Winds into the stone's heart, outbranches bright + In hidden mines, spots barren river-beds, + Crumbles into fine sand where sunbeams bask-- + God joys therein. The wroth sea's waves are edged + With foam, white as the bitter lip of hate, + When, in the solitary waste, strange groups + Of young volcanos come up, cyclops-like, + Staring together with their eyes on flame-- + God tastes a pleasure in their uncouth pride. + Then all is still; earth is a wintry clod: + But spring-wind, like a dancing psaltress, passes + Over its breast to waken it, rare verdure + Buds tenderly upon rough banks, between + The withered tree-roots and the cracks of frost, + Like a smile striving with a wrinkled face. + + * * * * * + + "Above, birds fly in merry flocks, the lark + Soars up and up, shivering for very joy; + Afar the ocean sleeps; white fishing gulls + Flit where the strand is purple with its tribe + Of nested limpets; savage creatures seek + Their loves in wood and plain--and God renews + His ancient rapture. Thus He dwells in all, + From life's minute beginnings, up at last + To man--the consummation of this scheme + Of being, the completion of this sphere of life."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Paracelsus._] + +Such passages as these contain neither the rapt, reflective calm of +Wordsworth's solemn tones, nor the ethereal intoxication of Shelley's +spirit-music; but there is in them the same consciousness of the +infinite meaning of natural facts. And beyond this, there is also, in +the closing lines, a hint of a new region for art. Shelley and +Wordsworth were the poets of Nature, as all truly say; Browning was the +poet of the human soul. For Shelley, the beauty in which all things work +and move was well-nigh "quenched by the eclipsing curse of the birth of +man"; and Wordsworth lived beneath the habitual sway of fountains, +meadows, hills and groves, while he kept grave watch o'er man's +mortality, and saw the shades of the prison-house gather round him. From +the life of man they garnered nought but mad indignation, or mellowed +sadness. It was a foolish and furious strife with unknown powers fought +in the dark, from which the poet kept aloof, for he could not see that +God dwelt amidst the chaos. But Browning found "harmony in immortal +souls, spite of the muddy vesture of decay." He found nature crowned in +man, though man was mean and miserable. At the heart of the most +wretched abortion of wickedness there was the mark of the loving touch +of God. Shelley turned away from man; Wordsworth paid him rare visits, +like those of a being from a strange world, made wise and sad with +looking at him from afar; Browning dwelt with him. He was a comrade in +the fight, and ever in the van of man's endeavour bidding him be of good +cheer. He was a witness for God in the midmost dark, where meet in +deathless struggle the elemental powers of right and wrong. For God is +present for him, not only in the order and beauty of nature, but in the +world of will and thought. Beneath the caprice and wilful lawlessness of +individual action, he saw a beneficent purpose which cannot fail, but +"has its way with man, not he with it." + +Now this was a new world for poetry to enter into; a new depth to +penetrate with hope; and Browning was the first of modern poets to + + "Stoop + Into the vast and unexplored abyss, + Strenuously beating + The silent boundless regions of the sky." + +It is also a new world for religion and morality; and to understand it +demands a deeper insight into the fundamental elements of human life. + +To show this in a proximately adequate manner, we should be obliged, as +already hinted, to connect the poet's work, not merely with that of his +English predecessors, but with the deeper and more comprehensive +movement of the thought of Germany since the time of Kant. It would be +necessary to indicate how, by breaking a way through the narrow creeds +and equally narrow scepticism of the previous age, the new spirit +extended the horizon of man's active and contemplative life, and made +him free of the universe, and the repository of the past conquests of +his race. It proposed to man the great task of solving the problem of +humanity, but it strengthened him with its past achievement, and +inspired him with the conviction of its boundless progress. It is not +that the significance of the individual or the meaning of his endeavour +is lost. Under this new view, man has still to fight for his own hand, +and it is still recognized that spirit is always burdened with its own +fate and cannot share its responsibility. Morality does not give way to +religion or pass into it, and there is a sense in which the individual +is always alone in the sphere of duty. + +But from this new point of view the individual is re-explained for us, +and we begin to understand that he is the focus of a light which is +universal, "one more incarnation of the mind of God." His moral task is +no longer to seek his own in the old sense, but to elevate humanity; for +it is only by taking this circuit that he can come to his own. Such a +task as this is a sufficiently great one to occupy all time; but it is +to humanity in him that the task belongs, and it will therefore be +achieved. This is no new one-sidedness. It does not mean, to those who +comprehend it, the supplanting of the individual thought by the +collective thought, or the substitution of humanity for man. The +universal is _in_ the particular, the fact _is_ the law. There is no +collision between the whole and the part, for the whole lives in the +part. As each individual plant has its own life and beauty and worth, +although the universe has conspired to bring it into being; so also, and +in a far higher degree, man has his own duty and his own dignity, +although he is but the embodiment of forces, natural and spiritual, +which have come from the endless past. Like a letter in a word, or a +word in a sentence, he gets his meaning from his context; _but the +sentence is meaningless without him_. "Rays from all round converge in +him," and he has no power except that which has been lent to him; but +all the same, nay, all the more, he must + + "Think as if man never thought before! + Act as if all creation hung attent + On the acting of such faculty as his."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau._] + +His responsibility, his individuality, is not less, but greater, in that +he can, in his thought and moral action, command the forces that the +race has stored for him. The great man speaks the thought of his people, +and his invocations as their priest are just the expression of their +dumb yearnings. And even the mean and insignificant man is what he is, +in virtue of the humanity which is blurred and distorted within him; and +he can shed his insignificance and meanness, only by becoming a truer +vehicle for that humanity. + +Thus, when spirit is spiritually discerned, it is seen that man is bound +to man in a union closer than any physical organism can show; while "the +individual," in the old sense of a being _opposed_ to society and +_opposed_ to the world, is found to be a fiction of abstract thought, +not discoverable anywhere, because not real. And, on the other hand, +society is no longer "collective," but so organic that the whole is +potentially in every part--an organism _of_ organisms. + +The influence of this organic idea in every department of thought which +concerns itself with man is not to be measured. It is already fast +changing all the practical sciences of man--economics, politics, ethics +and religion. The material, being newly interpreted, is wrought into a +new purpose, and revelation is once more bringing about a reformation. +But human action in its ethical aspect is, above all, charged with a new +significance. The idea of duty has received an expansion almost +illimitable, and man himself has thereby attained new worth and +dignity--for what is duty except a dignity and opportunity, man's chance +of being good? When we contrast this view of the life of man as the life +of humanity in him, with the old individualism, we may say that morality +also has at last, in Bacon's phrase, passed from the narrow seas into +the open ocean. And after all, the greatest achievement of our age may +be not that it has established the sciences of nature, but that it has +made possible the science of man. We have, at length, reached a point of +view from which we may hope to understand ourselves. Law, order, +continuity, in human action--the essential pre-conditions of a moral +science--were beyond the reach of an individualistic theory. It left to +ethical writers no choice but that of either sacrificing man to law, or +law to man; of denying either the particular or the universal element in +his nature. Naturalism did the first. Intuitionism, the second. The +former made human action the _re_action of a natural agent on the +incitement of natural forces. It made man a mere object, a _thing_ +capable of being affected by other things through his faculty of being +pained or pleased; an object acting in obedience to motives that had an +external origin, just like any other object. The latter theory cut man +free from the world and his fellows, endowed him with a will that had no +law, and a conscience that was dogmatic; and thereby succeeded in +stultifying both law and morality. + +But this new consciousness of the relation of man to mankind and the +world takes him out of his isolation and still leaves him free. It +relates men to one another in a humanity, which is incarnated anew in +each of them. It elevates the individual above the distinctions of time; +it treasures up the past in him as the active energy of his knowledge +and morality in the present, and also as the potency of the ideal life +of the future. On this view, the individual and the race are possible +only through each other. + +This fundamental change in our way of looking at the life of man is +bound to abolish the ancient landmarks and bring confusion for a time. +Out of the new conception, _i.e.,_ out of the idea of evolution, has +sprung the tumult as well as the strength of our time. The present age +is moved with thoughts beyond the reach of its powers: great aspirations +for the well-being of the people and high ideals of social welfare flash +across its mind, to be followed again by thicker darkness. There is +hardly any limit to its despair or hope. It has a far larger faith in +the destiny of man than any of its predecessors, and yet it is _sure_ of +hardly anything--except that the ancient rules of human life are false. +Individualism is now detected as scepticism and moral chaos in disguise. +We know that the old methods are no longer of use. We cannot now cut +ourselves free of the fate of others. The confused cries for help that +are heard on every hand are recognized as the voices of our brethren; +and we now know that our fate is involved in theirs, and that the +problem of their welfare is also ours. We grapple with social questions +at last, and recognize that the issues of life and death lie in the +solution of these enigmas. Legislators and economists, teachers of +religion and socialists, are all alike social reformers. Philanthropy +has taken a deeper meaning; and all sects bear its banner. But their +forces are beaten back by the social wretchedness, for they have not +found the sovereign remedy of a great idea; and the result is in many +ways sad enough. Our social remedies often work mischief; for we degrade +those whom we would elevate, and in our charity forget justice. We +insist on the rights of the people and the duties of the privileged +classes, and thereby tend to teach greed to those for whom we labour, +and goodness to those whom we condemn. The task that lies before us is +plain: we want the welfare of the people as a whole. But we fail to +grasp the complex social elements together, and our very remedies tend +to sunder them. We know that the public good will not be obtained by +separating man from man, securing each unit in a charmed circle of +personal rights, and protecting it from others by isolation. We must +find a place for the individual within the social organism, and we know +now that this organism has not, as our fathers seemed to think, the +simple constitution of a wooden doll. Society is not put together +mechanically, and the individual cannot be outwardly attached to it, if +he is to be helped, He must rather share its life, be the heir of the +wealth it has garnered for him in the past, and participate in its +onward movement. Between this new social ideal and our attainment, +between the magnitude of our social duties and the resources of +intellect and will at our command, there lies a chasm which we despair +of bridging over. + +The characteristics of this epoch faithfully reflect themselves in the +pages of Carlyle, with whose thoughts those of Browning are immediately +connected. It was Carlyle who first effectively revealed to England the +continuity of human life, and the magnitude of the issues of individual +action. Seeing the infinite in the finite, living under a continued +sense of the mystery that surrounds man, he flung explosive negations +amidst the narrow formulae of the social and religious orthodoxy of his +day, blew down the blinding walls of ethical individualism, and, amidst +much smoke and din, showed his English readers something of the +greatness of the moral world. He gave us a philosophy of clothes, +penetrated through symbols to the immortal ideas, condemned all +shibboleths, and revealed the soul of humanity behind the external modes +of man's activity. He showed us, in a word, that the world is spiritual, +that loyalty to duty is the foundation of all human good, and that +national welfare rests on character. After reading him, it is impossible +for any one who reflects on the nature of duty to ask, "Am I my +brother's keeper?" He not only imagined, but knew, how "all things the +minutest that man does, minutely influence all men, and the very look of +his face blesses or curses whom-so it lights on, and so generates ever +new blessing or new cursing. I say, there is not a Red Indian, hunting +by Lake Winnipeg, can quarrel with his squaw, but the whole world must +smart for it: will not the price of beaver rise? It is a mathematical +fact that the casting of this pebble from my hand alters the centre of +gravity of the universe." Carlyle dealt the deathblow to the +"laissez-faire" theory rampant in his day, and made each individual +responsible for the race. He has demonstrated that the sphere of duty +does not terminate with ourselves and our next-door neighbours. There +will be no pure air for the correctest Levite to breathe, till the laws +of sanitation have been applied to the moral slums. "Ye are my +brethren," said he, and he adds, as if conscious of his too denunciatory +way of dealing with them, "hence my rage and sorrow." + +But his consciousness of brotherhood with all men brought only despair +for him. He saw clearly the responsibility of man, but not the dignity +which that implies; he felt the weight of the burden of humanity upon +his own soul, and it crushed him, for he forgot that all the good of the +world was there to help him bear it, and that "One with God is a +majority." He taught only the half-truth, that all men are united on the +side of duty, and that the spiritual life of each is conditional on +striving to save all. But he neglected the complement of this truth, and +forgot the greatness of the beings on whom so great a duty could be +laid. He therefore dignifies humanity only to degrade it again. The +"twenty millions" each must try to save "are mostly fools." But how +fools, when they can have such a task? Is it not true, on the contrary, +that no man ever saw a duty beyond his strength, and that "man can +because he ought" and ought only because he can? The evils an individual +cannot overcome are the moral opportunities of his fellows. The good are +not lone workers of God's purposes, and there is no need of despair. +Carlyle, like the ancient prophet, was too conscious of his own mission, +and too forgetful of that of others. "I have been very jealous for the +Lord God of hosts; because the children of Israel have forgotten Thy +covenant, thrown down Thine alters, and slain Thy prophets, and I, even +I only, am left; and they seek my life, to take it away." He needed, +beside the consciousness of his prophetic function, a consciousness of +brotherhood with humbler workers. "Yet I have left Me seven thousand in +Israel, all the knees which have not bowed unto Baal, and every mouth +which hath not kissed him." It would have helped him had he remembered, +that there were on all sides other workers engaged on the temple not +made with hands, although he could not hear the sound of their hammers +for the din he made himself. It would have changed his despair into joy, +and his pity into a higher moral quality, had he been able to believe +that, amidst all the millions against whom he hurled his anathemas, +there is no one who, let him do what he will, is not constrained to +illustrate either the folly and wretchedness of sin, or the glory of +goodness. It is not given to any one, least of all to the wicked, to +hold back the onward movement of the race, or to destroy the impulse for +good which is planted within it. + +But Carlyle saw only one side of the truth about man's moral nature and +destiny. He knew, as the ancient prophets did, that evil is potential +wreck; and he taxed the power of metaphor to the utmost to indicate, how +wrong gradually takes root, and ripens into putrescence and +self-combustion, in obedience to a necessity which is absolute. That +morality is the essence of things, that wrong _must_ prove its +weakness, that right is the only might, is reiterated and illustrated on +all his pages; they are now commonplaces of speculation on matters of +history, if not conscious practical principles which guide its makers. +But Carlyle never inquired into the character of this moral necessity, +and he overlooked the beneficence which places death at the heart of +sin. He never saw wrong except on its way to execution, or in the death +throes; but he did not look in the face of the gentle power that led it +on to death. He saw the necessity which rules history, but not the +beneficent character of that necessity. + +The same limitations marred his view of duty, which was his greatest +revelation to his age. He felt its categorical authority and its binding +force. But the power which imposed the duty was an alien power, awful in +majesty, infinite in might, a "great task-master"; and the duty itself +was an outer law, written in letters of flame across the high heavens, +in comparison with which man's action at its best sank into failure. His +only virtue is obedience, and his last rendering even of himself is +"unprofitable servant." In this he has much of the combined strength and +weakness of the old Scottish Calvinism. "He stands between the +individual and the Infinite without hope or guide. He has a constant +disposition to crush the human being by comparing him with God," said +Mazzini, with marvellous penetration. "From his lips, at times so +daring, we seem to hear every instant the cry of the Breton Mariner--'My +God protect me! My bark is so small, and Thy ocean so vast.'" His +reconciliation of God and man was incomplete: God seemed to him to have +manifested Himself _to_ man but not _in_ man. He did not see that "the +Eternity which is before and behind us is also within us." + +But the moral law which commands is just the reflection of the +aspirations of progressive man, who always creates his own horizon. The +extension of duty is the objective counterpart of man's growth; a proof +of victory and not of failure, a sign that man is mounting upwards. And, +if so, it is irrational to infer the impossibility of success from the +magnitude of the demands of a moral law, which is itself the promise of +a better future. The hard problems set for us by our social environment +are recognized as set by ourselves; for, in matters of morality, the eye +sees only what the heart prompts. The very statement of the difficulty +contains the potency of its solution; for evil, when understood, is on +the way towards being overcome, and the good, when seen, contains the +promise of its own fulfilment. It is ignorance which is ruinous, as when +the cries of humanity beat against a deaf ear; and we can take a +comfort, denied to Carlyle, from the fact that he has made us awake to +our social duties. He has let loose the confusion upon us, and it is +only natural that we should at first be overcome by a sense of +bewildered helplessness. But this very sense contains the germ of hope, +and England is struggling to its feet to wrestle with its wrongs. +Carlyle has brought us within sight of our future, and we are now taking +a step into it. He has been our guide in the wilderness; but he died +there, and was denied the view from Pisgah. + +Now, this view was given to Robert Browning, and he broke out into a +song of victory, whose strains will give strength and comfort to many in +the coming time. That his solution of the evils of life is not final, +may at once be admitted. There are elements in the problem of which he +has taken no account, and which will force those who seek light on the +deeper mysteries of man's moral nature, to go beyond anything that the +poet has to say. Even the poet himself grows, at least in some +directions, less confident of the completeness of his triumph as he +grows older. His faith in the good does not fail, but it is the faith of +one who confesses to ignorance, and links himself to his finitude. +Still, so thorough is his conviction of the moral purpose of life, of +the certainty of the good towards which man is moving, and of the +beneficence of the power which is at work everywhere in the world, that +many of his poems ring like the triumphant songs of Luther. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +BROWNING'S OPTIMISM. + + + "Gladness be with thee, Helper of the World! + I think this is the authentic sign and seal + Of Godship, that it ever waxes glad, + And more glad, until gladness blossoms, bursts + Into a rage to suffer for mankind, + And recommence at sorrow."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Balaustion's Adventure_.] + +I have tried to show that one of the distinctive features of the present +era is the stress it lays on the worth of the moral life of man, and the +new significance it has given to that life by its view of the continuity +of history. This view finds expression, on its social and ethical side, +in the pages of Carlyle and Browning: both of whom are interested +exclusively, one may almost say, in the evolution of human character; +and both of whom, too, regard that evolution as the realization by man +of the purposes, greater than man's, which rule in the world. And, +although neither of them developed the organic view of humanity, which +is implied in their doctrines, into an explicit philosophy, still the +moral life of the individual is for each of them the infinite life in +the finite. The meaning of the universe is moral, its last might is +rightness; and the task of man is to catch up that meaning, convert it +into his own motive, and thereby make it the source of his actions, the +inmost principle of his life. This, fully grasped, will bring the finite +and the infinite, morality and religion, together, and reconcile them. + +But the reconciliation which Carlyle sought to effect was incomplete on +every side--even within the sphere of duty, with which alone, as +moralist, he specially concerned himself. The moral law was imposed upon +man by a higher power, in the presence of whom man was awed and crushed; +for that power had stinted man's endowment, and set him to fight a +hopeless battle against endless evil. God was everywhere around man, and +the universe was just the expression of His will--a will inexorably bent +on the good, so that evil could not prevail; but God was not _within_ +man, except as a voice of conscience issuing imperatives and threats. An +infinite duty was laid upon a finite being, and its weight made him +break out into a cry of despair. + +Browning, however, not only sought to bring about the reconciliation, +but succeeded, in so far as that is possible _in terms of mere feeling_. +His poetry contains suggestions that the moral will without is also a +force within man; that the power which makes for righteousness in the +world has penetrated into, or rather manifests itself _as_, man. +Intelligence and will, the reason which apprehends the nature of things, +and the original impulse of self-conscious life which issues in action, +are God's power in man; so that God is realizing Himself in the deeds of +man, and human history is just His return to Himself. Outer law and +inner motive are, for the poet, manifestations of the same beneficent +purpose; and instead of duty in the sense of an autocratic imperative, +or beneficent tyranny, he finds, deep beneath man's foolishness and sin, +a constant tendency towards the good which is bound up with the very +nature of man's reason and will. If man could only understand himself he +would find without him no limiting necessity, but the manifestation of a +law which is one with his own essential being. A beneficent power has +loaded the dice, according to the epigram, so that the chances of +failure and victory are not even; for man's nature is itself a divine +endowment, one with the power that rules his life, and man must finally +reach through error to truth, and through sin to holiness. In the +language of theology, it may be said that the moral process is the +spiritual incarnation of God; it is God's goodness as love, effecting +itself in human action. Hence Carlyle's cry of despair is turned by +Browning into a song of victory. While the former regards the struggle +between good and evil as a fixed battle, in which the forces are +immovably interlocked, the latter has the consciousness of battling +against a retreating foe; and the conviction of coming triumph gives +joyous vigour to every stroke. Browning lifted morality into an +optimism, and translated its battle into song. This was the distinctive +mark and mission which give to him such power of moral inspiration. + +In order, however, to estimate the value of this feature of the poet's +work, it is necessary to look more closely into the character of his +faith in the good. Merely to attribute to him an optimistic creed is to +say very little; for the worth, or worthlessness, of such a creed +depends upon its content--upon its fidelity to the facts of human life, +the clearness of its consciousness of the evils it confronts, and the +intensity of its realism. + +There is a sense, and that a true one, in which it may be said that all +men are optimists; for such a faith is implied in every conscious and +deliberate action of man. There is no deed which is not an attempt to +realize an ideal; whenever man acts he seeks a good, however ruinously +he may misunderstand its nature. Final and absolute disbelief in an +ultimate good in the sphere of morals, like absolute scepticism in the +sphere of knowledge, is a disguised self-contradiction, and therefore an +impossibility in fact. The one stultifies action, and asserts an effect +without any cause, or even contrary to the cause; the other stultifies +intellectual activity: and both views imply that the critic has so +escaped the conditions of human life, as to be able to pass a +condemnatory judgment upon them. The belief that a harmonious relation +between the self-conscious agent and the supreme good is possible, +underlies the practical activity of man; just as the belief in the unity +of thought and being underlies his intellectual activity. A moral +order--that is, an order of rational ends--is postulated in all human +actions, and we act at all only in virtue of it,--just as truly as we +move and work only in virtue of the forces which make the spheres +revolve, or think by help of the meaning which presses upon us from the +thought-woven world, through all the pores of sense. A true ethics, like +a true psychology, or a true science of nature, must lean upon +metaphysics, and it cannot pretend to start _ab initio_. We live in the +Copernican age, which puts the individual in a system, in obedience to +whose laws he finds his welfare. And this is simply the assertion of an +optimistic creed, for it implies a harmonious world. + +But, though this is true, it must be remembered that this faith is a +prophetic anticipation, rather than acquired knowledge. We are only on +the way towards reconstructing in thought the fact which we are, or +towards bringing into clear knowledge the elemental power which +manifests itself within us as thought, desire, and deed. And, until this +is achieved, we have no full right to an optimistic creed. The +revelation of the unity which pervades all things, even in the natural +world, will be the last attainment of science; and the reconciliation of +nature and man and God is still further in the future, and will be the +last triumph of philosophy. During all the interval the world will be a +scene of warring elements; and poetry, religion, and philosophy can only +hold forth a promise, and give to man a foretaste of ultimate victory. +And in this state of things even _their_ assurance often falters. Faith +lapses into doubt, poetry becomes a wail for a lost god, and its votary +exhibits, "through Europe to the AEtolian shore, the pageant of his +bleeding heart." The optimistic faith is, as a rule, only a hope and a +desire, a "Grand Perhaps," which knows no defence against the critical +understanding, and sinks dumb when questioned. If, in the form of a +religious conviction, its assurance is more confident, then, too often, +it rests upon the treacherous foundations of authoritative ignorance, +which crumble into dust beneath the blows of awakened and liberated +reason. Nay, if by the aid of philosophy we turn our optimism into a +faith held by reason, a fact before which the intellect, as well as the +heart, worships and grows glad, it still is for most of us only a +general hypothesis, a mere leap to God which spurns the intermediate +steps, a universal without content, a bare form that lacks reality. + +Such an optimism, such a plunge into the pure blue and away from facts, +was Emerson's. Caroline Fox tells a story of him and Carlyle which +reveals this very pointedly. It seems that Carlyle once led the serene +philosopher through the abominations of the streets of London at +midnight, asking him with grim humour at every few steps, "Do you +believe in the devil _now_?" Emerson replied that the more he saw of the +English people the greater and better he thought them. This little +incident lays bare the limits of both these great men. Where the one +saw, the other was blind. To the one there was the misery and the +universal mirk; to the other, the pure white beam was scarcely broken. +Carlyle believed in the good, beyond all doubt: he fought his great +battle in its strength and won, but "he was sorely wounded." Emerson was +Sir Galahad, blind to all but the Holy Grail, his armour spotless-white, +his virtue cloistered and unbreathed, his race won without the dust and +heat. But his optimism was too easy to be satisfactory. His victory was +not won in the enemy's citadel, where sin sits throned amidst the chaos, +but in the placid upper air of poetic imagination. And, in consequence, +Emerson can only convince the converted; and his song is not heard in +the dark, nor does it cheer the wayfarer on the muddy highway, along +which burthened humanity meanly toils. + +But Browning's optimism is more earnest and real than any pious hope, or +dogmatic belief, or benevolent theory held by a placid philosopher, +protected against contact with the sins and sorrows of man as by an +invisible garment of contemplative holiness. It is a conviction which +has sustained shocks of criticism and the test of facts; and it +therefore, both for the poet and his readers, fulfils a mission beyond +the reach of any easy trust in a mystic good. Its power will be felt and +its value recognized by those who have themselves confronted the +contradictions of human life and known their depths. + +No lover of Browning's poetry can miss the vigorous manliness of the +poet's own bearing, or fail to recognize the strength that flows from +his joyous, fearless personality, and the might of his intellect and +heart. "When British literature," said Carlyle of Scott and Cobbett, +"lay all puking and sprawling in Wertherism, Byronism and other +Sentimentalisms, nature was kind enough to send us two healthy men." And +he breaks out into a eulogy of mere health, of "the just balance of +faculties that radiates a glad light outwards, enlightening and +embellishing all things." But he finds it easy to account for the health +of these men: they had never faced the mystery of existence. Such +healthiness we find in Browning, although he wrote with Carlyle at his +side, and within earshot of the infinite wail of this moral fatalist. +And yet, the word health is inadequate to convey the depth of the joyous +meaning which the poet found in the world. His optimism was not a +constitutional and irreflective hopefulness, to be accounted for on the +ground that "the great mystery of existence was not great to him: did +not drive him into rocky solitudes to wrestle with it for an answer, to +be answered or to perish." There are, indeed, certain rash and foolish +persons who pretend to trace Browning's optimism to his mixed descent; +but there is a "pause in the leading and the light" of those wiseacres, +who pretend to trace moral and mental characteristics to physiological +antecedents. They cannot quite catch a great man in the making, nor, +even by the help of evolution, say anything wiser about genius than that +"the wind bloweth where it listeth." No doubt the poet's optimism +indicates a native sturdiness of head and heart. He had the invaluable +endowment of a pre-disposition to see the sunny side of life, and a +native tendency to revolt against that subjectivity, which is the root +of our misery in all its forms. He had little respect for the +_Welt-schmerz,_ and can scarcely be civil to the hero of the bleeding +heart. + + "Sinning, sorrowing, despairing, + Body-ruined, spirit-wrecked-- + Should I give my woes an airing,-- + Where's one plague that claims respect? + + "Have you found your life distasteful? + My life did, and does, smack sweet. + Was your youth of pleasure wasteful? + Mine I saved and hold complete. + Do your joys with age diminish? + When mine fail me I'll complain. + Must in death your daylight finish? + My sun sets to rise again. + + * * * * * + + "I find earth not grey but rosy, + Heaven not grim but fair of hue. + Do I stoop? I pluck a posy. + Do I stand and stare? All's blue."[A] + +[Footnote A: _At the Mermaid_.] + +Browning was no doubt least of all men inclined to pout at his "plain +bun"; on the contrary, he was awake to the grandeur of his inheritance, +and valued most highly "his life-rent of God's universe with the tasks +it offered and the tools to do them with." But his optimism sent its +roots deeper than any "disposition"; it penetrated beyond mere health +of body and mind, as it did beyond a mere sentiment of God's goodness. +Optimisms resting on these bases are always weak; for the former leaves +man naked and sensitive to the evils that crowd round him when the +powers of body and mind decay, and the latter is, at best, useful only +for the individual who possesses it, and it breaks down under the stress +of criticism and doubt. Browning's optimism is a great element in +English literature, because it opposes with such strength the shocks +that come from both these quarters. His joyousness is the reflection _in +feeling_ of a conviction as to the nature of things, which he had +verified in the darkest details of human life, and established for +himself in the face of the gravest objections that his intellect was +able to call forth. In fact, its value lies, above all, in this,--that +it comes after criticism, after the condemnation which Byron and Carlyle +had passed, each from his own point of view, on the world and on man. + +The need of an optimism is one of the penalties which reflection brings. +Natural life takes the goodness of things for granted; but reflection +disturbs the placid contentment and sets man at variance with his world. +The fruit of the tree of knowledge always reveals his nakedness to man; +he is turned out of the paradise of unconsciousness and doomed to force +Nature, now conceived as a step-dame, to satisfy needs which are now +first felt. Optimism is the expression of man's new reconciliation with +his world; as the opposite doctrine of pessimism is the consciousness of +an unresolved contradiction. Both are a judgment passed upon the world, +from the point of view of its adequacy or inadequacy to meet demands, +arising from needs which the individual has discovered in himself. + +Now, as I have tried to show, one of the main characteristics of the +opening years of the present era was its deeper intuition of the +significance of human life, and, therefore, by implication, of its wants +and claims. The spiritual nature of man, lost sight of during the +preceding age, was re-discovered; and the first and immediate +consequence was that man, as man, attained infinite worth. "Man was born +free," cried Rousseau, with a conviction which swept all before it; "he +has original, inalienable, and supreme rights against all things which +can set themselves against him." And Rousseau's countrymen believed him. +There was not a _Sans-culotte_ amongst them all but held his head high, +being creation's lord; and history can scarcely show a parallel to their +great burst of joy and hope, as they ran riot in their new-found +inheritance, from which they had so long been excluded. They flung +themselves upon the world, as if they would "glut their sense" upon it. + + "Expend + Eternity upon its shows, + Flung them as freely as one rose + Out of a summer's opulence."[A] + +[Footnote A:_Easter Day_.] + +But the very discovery that man is spirit, which is the source of all +his rights, is also an implicit discovery that he has outgrown the +resources of the natural world. The infinite hunger of a soul cannot be +satisfied with the things of sense. The natural world is too limited +even for Carlyle's shoe-black; nor is it surprising that Byron should +find it a waste, and dolefully proclaim his disappointment to +much-admiring mankind. Now, both Carlyle and Browning apprehended the +cause of the discontent, and both endured the Byronic utterance of it +with considerable impatience. "Art thou nothing other than a vulture, +then," asks the former, "that fliest through the universe seeking after +somewhat _to eat,_ and shrieking dolefully because carrion enough is not +given thee? Close thy Byron, open thy Goethe." + + "Huntsman Common Sense + Came to the rescue, bade prompt thwack of thong dispense + Quiet i' the kennel: taught that ocean might be blue, + And rolling and much more, and yet the soul have, too, + Its touch of God's own flame, which He may so expand + 'Who measured the waters i' the hollow of His hand' + That ocean's self shall dry, turn dew-drop in respect + Of all-triumphant fire, matter with intellect + Once fairly matched."[A] + +[Footnote A:_Fifine at the Fair_, lxvii.] + +But Carlyle was always more able to detect the disease than to suggest +the remedy. He had, indeed, "a glimpse of it." "There is in man a Higher +than love of Happiness: he can do without Happiness, and instead thereof +find Blessedness." But the glimpse was misleading, for it penetrated no +further than the first negative step. The "Everlasting Yea" was, after +all, only a deeper "No!" only _Entsagung_, renunciation: "the fraction +of life can be increased in value not so much by increasing your +numerator as by lessening your denominator." Blessed alone is he that +expecteth nothing. The holy of holies, where man hears whispered the +mystery of life, is "the sanctuary of sorrow." "What Act of Legislature +was there that _thou_ shouldst be Happy? A little while ago thou hadst +no right to _be_ at all. What if thou wert born and predestined not to +be Happy, but to be Unhappy? Nay, is not 'life itself a disease, +knowledge the symptom of derangement'? Have not the poets sung 'Hymns to +the Night' as if Night were nobler than Day; as if Day were but a small +motley-coloured veil spread transiently over the infinite bosom of +Night, and did but deform and hide from us its pure transparent eternal +deeps." "We, the whole species of Mankind, and our whole existence and +history, are but a floating speck in the illimitable ocean of the All +... borne this way and that way by its deep-swelling tides, and grand +ocean currents, of which what faintest chance is there that we should +ever exhaust the significance, ascertain the goings and comings? A +region of Doubt, therefore, hovers for ever in the back-ground.... Only +on a canvas of Darkness, such is man's way of being, could the +many-coloured picture of our Life paint itself and shine." + +In such passages as these, there is far deeper pessimism than in +anything which Byron could experience or express. Scepticism is directed +by Carlyle, not against the natural elements of life--the mere sensuous +outworks, but against the citadel of thought itself. Self-consciousness, +or the reflecting interpretation by man of himself and his world, the +very activity that lifts him above animal existence and makes him man, +instead of being a divine endowment, is declared to be a disease, a +poisonous subjectivity destructive of all good. The discovery that man +is spirit and no vulture, which was due to Carlyle himself more than to +any other English writer of his age, seemed, after all, to be a great +calamity; for it led to the renunciation of happiness, and filled man +with yearnings after a better than happiness, but left him nothing +wherewith they might be satisfied, except "the duty next to hand." And +the duty next to hand, as interpreted by Carlyle, is a means of +suppressing by action, not idle speech only, but thought itself. But, if +this be true, the highest in man is set against itself. And what kind of +action remains possible to a "speck on the illimitable ocean, borne this +way and that way by its deep-swelling tides"? "Here on earth we are +soldiers, fighting in a foreign land; that understand not the plan of +the campaign, and have no need to understand it, seeing what is at our +hand to be done." But there is one element of still deeper gloom in this +blind fighting; it is fought for a foreign cause. It is God's cause and +not ours, or ours only in so far as it has been despotically imposed +upon us; and it is hard to discover from Carlyle what interest we can +have in the victory. Duty is to him a menace--like the duty of a slave, +were that possible. It lacks the element which alone can make it +imperative to a free being, namely, that it be recognized as _his_ good, +and that the outer law become his inner motive. The moral law is rarely +looked at by Carlyle as a beneficent revelation, and still more rarely +as the condition which, if fulfilled, will reconcile man with nature and +with God. And consequently, he can draw little strength from religion; +for it is only love that can cast out fear. + +To sum up all in a word, Carlyle regarded evil as having penetrated into +the inmost recesses of man's being. Thought was disease; morality was +blind obedience to a foreign authority; religion was awe of an +Unknowable, with whom man can claim no kinship. Man's nature was +discovered to be spiritual, only on the side of its Wants. It was an +endowment of a hunger which nothing could satisfy--not the infinite, +because it is too great, not the finite, because it is too little; not +God, because He is too far above man, not nature, because it is too far +beneath him. We are unable to satisfy ourselves with the things of +sense, and are also "shut out of the heaven of spirit." What have been +called, "the three great terms of thought"--the World, Self, and +God--have fallen asunder in his teaching. It is the difficulty of +reconciling these which brings despair, while optimism is evidently the +consciousness of their harmony. + +Now, these evils which reflection has revealed, and which are so much +deeper than those of mere sensuous disappointment, can only be removed +by deeper reflection. The harmony of the world of man's experience, +which has been broken by "the comprehensive curse of sceptical despair," +can, as Goethe teaches us, be restored only by thought-- + + "In thine own soul, build it up again." + +The complete refutation of Carlyle's pessimistic view can only come, by +reinterpreting each of the contradicting terms in the light of a higher +conception. We must have a deeper grasp and a new view of the Self, the +World, and God. And such a view can be given adequately only by +philosophy. Reason alone can justify the faith that has been disturbed +by reflection, and re-establish its authority. + +How, then, it may be asked, can a poet be expected to turn back the +forces of a scepticism, which have been thus armed with the weapons of +dialectic? Can anything avail in this region except explicit +demonstration? A poet never demonstrates, but perceives; art is not a +process, but a result; truth for it is immediate, and it neither admits +nor demands any logical connection of ideas. The standard-bearers and +the trumpeters may be necessary to kindle the courage of the army and to +lead it on to victory, but the fight must be won by the thrust of sword +and pike. Man needs more than the intuitions of the great poets, if he +is to maintain solid possession of the truth. + +Now, I am prepared to admit the force of this objection, and I shall +endeavour in the sequel to prove that, in order to establish optimism, +more is needed than Browning can give, even when interpreted in the most +sympathetic way. His doctrine is offered in terms of art, and it cannot +have any demonstrative force without violating the limits of art. In +some of his poems, however,--for instance, in _La Saisiaz, Ferishtatis +Fancies_ and the _Parleyings_, Browning sought to advance definite +proofs of the theories which he held. He appears before us at times +armed _cap-a-pie,_ like a philosopher. Still, it is not when he argues +that Browning proves: it is when he sees, as a poet sees. It is not by +means of logical demonstrations that he helps us to meet the despair of +Carlyle, or contributes to the establishment of a better faith. +Browning's proofs are least convincing when he was most aware of his +philosophical presuppositions; and a philosophical critic could well +afford to agree with the critic of art, in relegating the demonstrating +portions of his poems to the chaotic limbo lying between philosophy and +poetry. + +When, however, he forgets his philosophy, and speaks as poet and +religious man, when he is dominated by that sovereign thought which gave +unity to his life-work, and which, therefore, seemed to lie deeper in +him than the necessities of his art and to determine his poetic +function, his utterances have a far higher significance. For he so lifts +the artistic object into the region of pure thought, and makes sense and +reason so to interpenetrate, that the old metaphors of "the noble lie" +and "the truth beneath the veil" seem no longer to help. He seems to +show us the truth so vividly and simply, that we are less willing to +make art and philosophy mutually exclusive, although their methods +differ. Like some of the greatest philosophers, and notably Plato and +Hegel, he constrains us to doubt, whether the distinction penetrates low +beneath the surface; for philosophy, too, when at its best, is a +thinking of things together. In their light we begin to ask, whether it +is not possible that the interpretation of the world in terms of spirit, +which is the common feature of both Hegel's philosophy and Browning's +poetry, does not necessarily bring with it a settlement of the ancient +feud between these two modes of thought. + +But, in any case, Browning's utterances, especially those which he makes +when he is most poet and least philosopher, have something of the +convincing impressiveness of a reasoned system of optimism. And this +comes, as already suggested, from his loyalty to a single idea, which +gives unity to all his work. That idea we may, in the end, be obliged to +treat not only as a hypothesis--for all principles of reconciliation, +even those of the sciences, as long as knowledge is incomplete, must be +regarded as hypotheses--but also as a hypothesis which he had no right +to assume. It may be that in the end we shall be obliged to say of him, +as of so many others-- + + "See the sage, with the hunger for the truth, + And see his system that's all true, except + The one weak place, that's stanchioned by a lie!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau._] + +It may be that the religious form, through which he generally reaches +his convictions, is not freed from a dogmatic element, which so +penetrates his thought as to vitiate it as a philosophy. Nevertheless, +it answered for the poet all the uses of a philosophy, and it may do the +same for many who are distrustful of the systems of the schools, and who +are "neither able to find a faith nor to do without one." It contains +far-reaching hints of a reconciliation of the elements of discord in our +lives, and a suggestion of a way in which it may be demonstrated, that +an optimistic theory is truer to facts than any scepticism or +agnosticism, with the despair that they necessarily bring. + +For Browning not only advanced a principle, whereby, as he conceived, +man might again be reconciled to the world and God, and all things be +viewed as the manifestation of a power that is benevolent; he also +sought to apply his principle to the facts of life. He illustrates his +fundamental hypothesis by means of these facts; and he tests its +validity with the persistence and impressive candour of a scientific +investigator. His optimism is not that of an eclectic, who can ignore +inconvenient difficulties. It is not an attempt to justify the whole by +neglecting details, or to make wrong seem right by reference to a +far-off result, in which the steps of the process are forgotten. He +stakes the value of his view of life on its power to meet _all_ facts; +one fact, ultimately irreconcilable with his hypothesis, will, he knows, +destroy it. + + + "All the same, + Of absolute and irretrievable black,--black's soul of black + Beyond white's power to disintensify,-- + Of that I saw no sample: such may wreck + My life and ruin my philosophy + Tomorrow, doubtless."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Bean Stripe_--_Ferishtah's Fancies_.] + +He knew that, to justify God, he had to justify _all_ His ways to man; +that if the good rules at all, it rules absolutely; and that a single +exception would confute his optimism. + + "So, gazing up, in my youth, at love + As seen through power, ever above + All modes which make it manifest, + My soul brought all to a single test-- + That He, the Eternal First and Last, + Who, in His power, had so surpassed + All man conceives of what is might,-- + Whose wisdom, too, showed infinite, + --Would prove as infinitely good; + Would never, (my soul understood,) + With power to work all love desires, + Bestow e'en less than man requires."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Christmas Eve_.] + + "No: love which, on earth, amid all the shows of it, + Has ever been seen the sole good of life in it, + The love, ever growing there, spite of the strife in it, + Shall arise, made perfect, from death's repose of it. + And I shall behold Thee, face to face, + O God, and in Thy light retrace + How in all I loved here, still wast Thou!"[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid_.] + +We can scarcely miss the emphasis of the poet's own conviction in these +passages, or in the assertion that,-- + + "The acknowledgment of God in Christ + Accepted by thy reason, solves for thee + All questions in the earth and out of it, + And has so far advanced thee to be wise."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Death in the Desert_.] + +Consequently, there is a defiant and aggressive element in his attitude. +Strengthened with an unfaltering faith in the supreme Good, this knight +of the Holy Spirit goes forth over all the world seeking out wrongs. "He +has," said Dr. Westcott, "dared to look on the darkest and meanest forms +of action and passion, from which we commonly and rightly turn our eyes, +and he has brought back for us from this universal survey a conviction +of hope." I believe, further, that it was in order to justify this +conviction that he set out on his quest. His interest in vice--in +malice, cruelty, ignorance, brutishness, meanness, the irrational +perversity of a corrupt disposition, and the subtleties of philosophic +and aesthetic falsehood--was no morbid curiosity. Browning was no +"painter of dirt"; no artist can portray filth for filth's sake, and +remain an artist. He crowds his pages with criminals, because he sees +deeper than their crimes. He describes evil without "palliation or +reserve," and allows it to put forth all its might, in order that he +may, in the end, show it to be subjected to God's purposes. He confronts +evil in order to force it to give up the good, which is all the reality +that is in it. He conceives it as his mission to prove that evil is +"stuff for transmuting," and that there is nought in the world. + + + "But, touched aright, prompt yields each particle its tongue + Of elemental flame--no matter whence flame sprung, + From gums and spice, or else from straw and rottenness." + +All we want is-- + + "The power to make them burn, express + What lights and warms henceforth, leaves only ash behind, + Howe'er the chance."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Fifine at the Fair_.] + +He had Pompilia's faith. + + "And still, as the day wore, the trouble grew, + Whereby I guessed there would be born a star." + +He goes forth in the might of his faith in the power of good, as if he +wished once for all to try the resources of evil at their uttermost, and +pass upon it a complete and final condemnation. With this view, he seeks +evil in its own haunts. He creates Guido, the subtlest and most powerful +compound of vice in our literature--except Iago, perhaps--merely in +order that we may see evil at its worst; and he places him in an +environment suited to his nature, as if he was carrying out an +_experimentum crucis_. The + + "Midmost blotch of black + Discernible in the group of clustered crimes + Huddling together in the cave they call + Their palace."[B] + +[Footnote B: _The Ring and the Book--The Pope_, 869-872.] + +Beside him are his brothers, each with his own "tint of hell"; his +mistress, on whose face even Pompilia saw the glow of the nether pit +"flash and fade"; and his mother-- + + "The gaunt grey nightmare in the furthest smoke, + The hag that gave these three abortions birth, + Unmotherly mother and unwomanly + Woman, that near turns motherhood to shame, + Womanliness to loathing"[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book--The Pope_, 911-915.] + +Such "denizens o' the cave now cluster round Pompilia and heat the +furnace sevenfold." While she + + "Sent prayer like incense up + To God the strong, God the beneficent, + God ever mindful in all strife and strait, + Who, for our own good, makes the need extreme, + Till at the last He puts forth might and saves."[B] + +[Footnote B: _The Ring and the Book_--_Pompilia_, 1384-1388.] + +In these lines we feel the poet's purpose, constant throughout the whole +poem. We know all the while that with him at our side we can travel +safely through the depths of the Inferno--for the flames bend back from +him; and it is only what we expect as the result of it all, that there +should come + + "A bolt from heaven to cleave roof and clear place, + . . . . then flood + And purify the scene with outside day-- + Which yet, in the absolutest drench of dark, + Ne'er wants its witness, some stray beauty-beam + To the despair of hell."[C] + +[Footnote C: _The Ring and the Book_--_The Pope_, 996-1003.] + +The superabundant strength of Browning's conviction in the supremacy of +the good, which led him in _The Ring and the Book_ to depict criminals +at their worst, forced him later on in his life to exhibit evil in +another form. The real meaning and value of such poems as _Fifine at the +Fair, Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau, Red Cotton Nightcap Country, +Ferishtah's Francies_, and others, can only be determined by a careful +and complete analysis of each of them. But they have one characteristic +so prominent, and so new in poetry, that the most careless reader cannot +fail to detect it. Action and dramatic treatment give place to a +discussion which is metaphysical; instead of the conflict of motives +within a character, the stress and strain of passion and will in +collision with circumstances, there is reflection on action after it has +passed, and the conflict of subtle arguments on the ethical value of +motives and ways of conduct, which the ordinary moral consciousness +condemns without hesitation. All agree that these poems represent a new +departure in poetry, and some consider that in them the poet, in thus +dealing with metaphysical abstractions, has overleapt the boundaries of +the poetic art. To such critics, this later period seems the period of +his decadence, in which the casuistical tendencies, which had already +appeared in _Bishop Blougram's Apology, Mr. Sludge the Medium_, and +other poems, have overwhelmed his art, and his intellect, in its pride +of strength, has grown wanton. _Fifine at the Fair is_ said to be "a +defence of inconstancy, or of the right of experiment in love." Its +hero, who is "a modern gentleman, a refined, cultured, musical, artistic +and philosophic person, of high attainments, lofty aspirations, strong +emotions, and capricious will," produces arguments "wide in range, of +profound significance and infinite ingenuity," to defend and justify +immoral intercourse with a gipsy trull. The poem consists of the +speculations of a libertine, who coerces into his service truth and +sophistry, and "a superabounding wealth of thought and imagery," and +with no further purpose on the poet's part than the dramatic delineation +of character. _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau_ is spoken of in a similar +manner as the justification, by reference to the deepest principles of +morality, of compromise, hypocrisy, lying, and a selfishness that +betrays every cause to the individual's meanest welfare. The object of +the poet is "by no means to prove black white, or white black, or to +make the worse appear the better reason, but to bring a seeming monster +and perplexing anomaly under the common laws of nature, by showing how +it has grown to be what it is, and how it can with more or less +self-delusion reconcile itself to itself." + +I am not able to accept this as a complete explanation of the intention +of the poet, except with reference to _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau._ The +_Prince_ is a psychological study, like _Mr. Sludge the Medium,_ and +_Bishop Blougram_. No doubt he had the interest of a dramatist in the +hero of _Fifine at the Fair_ and in the hero of _Red Cotton Nightcap +Country;_ but, in these poems, his dramatic interest is itself +determined by an ethical purpose, which is equally profound. His meeting +with the gipsy at Pornic, and the spectacle of her unscrupulous audacity +in vice, not only "sent his fancy roaming," but opened out before him +the fundamental problems of life. What I would find, therefore, in +_Fifine at the Fair_ is not the casuistic defence of an artistic and +speculative libertine, but an earnest attempt on the part of the poet to +prove, + + "That, through the outward sign, the inward grace allures, + And sparks from heaven transpierce earth's coarsest covertures,-- + All by demonstrating the value of Fifine."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Fifine at the Fair_, xxviii.] + +Within his scheme of the universal good he seeks to find a place even +for this gipsy creature, who traffics "in just what we most pique us +that we keep." Having, in the _Ring and the Book_, challenged evil at +its worst as it manifests itself practically in concrete characters and +external action, and having wrung from it the victory of the good, in +_Fifine_ and in his other later poems he meets it again in the region of +dialectic. In this sphere of metaphysical ethics, evil has assumed a +more dangerous form, especially for an artist. His optimistic faith has +driven the poet into a realm into which poetry never ventured before. +His battle is now, not with flesh and blood, but with the subtler powers +of darkness grown vocal and argumentative, and threatening to turn the +poet's faith in good into a defence of immorality, and to justify the +worst evil by what is highest of all. Having indicated in outward fact +"the need," as well as the "transiency of sin and death," he seeks here +to prove that need, and seems, thereby, to degrade the highest truth of +religion into a defence of the worst wickedness. + +No doubt the result is sufficiently repulsive to the abstract moralist, +who is apt to find in _Fifine_ nothing but a casuistical and shameless +justification of evil, which is blasphemy against goodness itself. We +are made to "discover," for instance, that + + "There was just + Enough and not too much of hate, love, greed and lust, + Could one discerningly but hold the balance, shift + The weight from scale to scale, do justice to the drift + Of nature, and explain the glories by the shames + Mixed up in man, one stuff miscalled by different names."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Fifine at the Fair_, cviii.] + +We are told that-- + + "Force, guile were arms which earned + My praise, not blame at all." + +Confronted with such utterances as these, it is only natural that, +rather than entangle the poet in them, we should regard them as the +sophistries of a philosophical Don Juan, powerful enough, under the +stress of self-defence, to confuse the distinctions of right and wrong. +But, as we shall try to show in the next chapter, such an apparent +justification of evil cannot be avoided by a reflective optimist; and it +is implicitly contained even in those religious utterances of _Rabbi Ben +Ezra, Christmas Eve_, and _A Death in the Desert_, with which we not +only identify the poet but ourselves, in so far as we share his faith +that + + "God's in His heaven,-- + All's right with the world." + +The poet had far too much speculative acumen to be ignorant of this, and +too much boldness and strength of conviction in the might of the good, +to refuse to confront the issues that sprang from it. In his later +poems, as in his earlier ones, he is endeavouring to justify the ways of +God to man; and the difficulties which surround him are not those of a +casuist, but the stubborn questionings of a spirit, whose religious +faith is thoroughly earnest and fearless. To a spirit so loyal to the +truth, and so bold to follow its leading, the suppression of such +problems is impossible; and, consequently, it was inevitable that he +should use the whole strength of his dialectic to try those fundamental +principles, on which the moral life of man is based. And it is this, I +believe, which we find in _Fifine_, as in _Ferishtah's Fancies_ and the +_Parleyings_; not an exhibition of the argumentative subtlety of a mind +whose strength has become lawless, and which spends itself in +intellectual gymnastics, that have no place within the realm of either +the beautiful or the true. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +OPTIMISM AND ETHICS: THEIR CONTRADICTION. + + + "Our remedies oft in ourselves do lie, + Which we ascribe to heaven. The fated sky + Gives us free scope; only doth backward pull + Our slow designs, when we ourselves are dull. + + * * * * * + + "But most it is presumption in us, when + The help of heaven we count the act of men."[A] + +[Footnote A: _All's Well that Ends Well_.] + +I have tried to show that one of the ruling conceptions of Browning's +view of life is that the Good is absolute, and that it reveals itself in +all the events of human life. By means of this conception, he +endeavoured to bring together the elements which had fallen asunder in +the sensational and moral pessimism of Byron and Carlyle. In other +words, through the re-interpreting power which lies in this fundamental +thought when it is soberly held and fearlessly applied, he sought to +reconcile man with the world and with God, and thereby with himself. And +the governing motive, whether the conscious motive or not, of Browning's +poetry, the secret impulse which led him to dramatise the conflicts and +antagonisms of human life, was the necessity of finding in them evidence +of the presence of this absolute Good. + +Browning's optimism was deep and comprehensive enough to reject all +compromise. His faith in the good seemed to rise with the demands that +were made upon it by the misery and wickedness of man, and the +apparently purposeless waste of life and its resources. There was in it +a deliberate earnestness which led him to grapple, not only with the +concrete difficulties of individual life, but with those also that +spring from reflection and theory. + +The test of a philosophic optimism, as of any optimism which is more +than a pious sentiment, must finally lie in its power to reveal the +presence of the good in actual individual evils. But there are +difficulties still nearer than those presented by concrete facts, +difficulties arising out of the very suggestion that evil is a form of +good. Such speculative difficulties must be met by a reflective mind, +before it can follow out the application of an optimistic theory to +particular facts. Now, Browning's creed, at least as he held it in his +later years, was not merely the allowable exaggeration of an ecstatic +religious sentiment, the impassioned conviction of a God-intoxicated +man. It was deliberately presented as a solution of moral problems, and +was intended to serve as a theory of the spiritual nature of things. It +is, therefore, justly open to the same kind of criticism as that to +which a philosophic doctrine is exposed. The poet deprived himself of +the refuge, legitimate enough to the intuitive method of art, when, in +his later works, he not only offered a dramatic solution of the problem +of life, but definitely attempted to meet the difficulties of +speculative ethics. + +In this chapter I shall point out some of these difficulties, and then +proceed to show how the poet proposed to solve them. + +A thorough-going optimism, in that it subdues all things to the idea of +the supreme Good, and denies to evil the right even to dispute the +absoluteness of its sway, naturally seems to imply a pantheistic theory +of the world. And Browning's insistence on the presence of the highest +in all things may easily be regarded as a mere revival of the oldest and +crudest attempts at finding their unity in God. For if _all_, as he +says, is for the best, there seems to be no room left for the +differences apparent in the world, and the variety which gives it beauty +and worth. Particular existences would seem to be illusory and +evanescent phenomena, the creations of human imagination, itself a +delusive appearance. The infinite, on this view, stands over against the +finite, and it overpowers and consumes it; and the optimism, implied in +the phrase that "God is all," turns at once into a pessimism. For, as +soon as we inquire into the meaning of this "all," we find that it is +only a negation of everything we can know or be. Such a pantheism as +this is self-contradictory; for, while seeming to level all things +upwards to a manifestation of the divine, it really levels all downwards +to the level of mere unqualified being, a stagnant and empty unknowable. +It leaves only a choice between akosmism and atheism, and, at the same +time, it makes each of the alternatives impossible. For, in explaining +the world it abolishes it, and in abolishing the world it empties itself +of all signification; so that the Godhood which it attempts to establish +throughout the whole realm of being, is found to mean nothing. "It is +the night, in which all cows are black." + +The optimistic creed, which the poet strove to teach, must, therefore, +not only establish the immanence of God, but show in some way how such +immanence is consistent with the existence of particular things. His +doctrine that there is no failure, or folly, or wickedness, or misery, +but conceals within it, at its heart, a divine element; that there is no +incident in human history which is not a pulsation of the life of the +highest, and which has not its place in a scheme of universal good, must +leave room for the moral life of man, and all the risks which morality +brings with it. Otherwise, optimism is impossible. For a God who, in +filling the universe with His presence, encroaches on the freedom and +extinguishes the independence of man, precludes the possibility of all +that is best for man--namely, moral achievement. Life, deprived of its +moral purpose, is worthless to the poet, and so, in consequence, is all +that exists in order to maintain that life. Optimism and ethics seem +thus to come into immediate collision. The former, finding the presence +of God in all things, seems to leave no room for man; and the latter +seems to set man to work out his own destiny in solitude, and to give +him supreme and absolute authority over his own life; so that any +character which he forms, be it good or bad, is entirely the product of +his own activity. So far as his life is culpable or praiseworthy, in +other words, so far as we pass any moral judgment upon it, we +necessarily think of it as the revelation of a self, that is, of an +independent will, which cannot divide its responsibility. There may be, +and indeed there always is for every individual, a hereditary +predisposition and a soliciting environment, tendencies which are his +inheritance from a remote past, and which rise to the surface in his own +life; in other words, the life of the individual is always led within +the larger sweep of the life of humanity. He is part of a whole, and has +his place fixed, and his function predetermined, by a power which is +greater than his own. But, if we are to call him good or evil, if he is +to aspire and repent and strive, in a word, if he is to have any _moral_ +character, he cannot be merely a part of a system; there must be +something within him which is superior to circumstances, and which +makes him master of his own fate. His natural history may begin with the +grey dawn of primal being, but his moral history begins with himself, +from the time when he first reacted upon the world in which he is +placed, and transformed his natural relations into will and character. +For who can be responsible for what he did not will? What could a moral +imperative mean, what could an "ought" signify, to a being who was only +a temporary embodiment of forces, who are prior to, and independent of +himself? It would seem, therefore, as if morality were irreconcilable +with optimism. The moral life of man cannot be the manifestation of a +divine benevolence whose purpose is necessary; it is a trust laid upon +himself, which he may either violate or keep. It surpasses divine +goodness, "tho' matched with equal power" to _make_ man good, as it has +made the flowers beautiful. From this point of view, spiritual +attainment, whether intellectual or moral, is man's own, a spontaneous +product. Just as God is conceived as all in all in the universe, so man +is all in all within the sphere of duty; for the kingdom of heaven is +within. In both cases alike, there is absolute exclusion of external +interference. + +For this reason, it has often seemed both to philosophers and +theologians, as if the world were too confined to hold within it both +God and man. In the East, the consciousness of the infinite seemed at +times to leave no room for the finite; and in the West, where the +consciousness of the finite and interest therein is strongest, and man +strives and aspires, a Deism arose which set God at a distance, and +allowed Him to interfere in the fate of man only by a benevolent +miracle. Nor is this collision of pantheism and freedom, nay of religion +and morality, confined to the theoretical region. This difficulty is not +merely the punishment of an over-bold and over-ambitious philosophy, +which pries too curiously into the mystery of being. It lies at the very +threshold of all reflection on the facts of the moral life. Even +children feel the mystery of God's permitting sin, and embarrass their +helpless parents with the contradiction between absolute benevolence and +the miseries and cruelties of life. "A vain interminable controversy," +says Teufels-droeckh, "which arises in every soul since the beginning of +the world: and in every soul, that would pass from idle suffering into +actual endeavouring, must be put an end to. The most, in our own time, +have to go content with a simple, incomplete enough Suppression of this +controversy: to a few Solution of it is indispensable." + +Solution, and not Suppression, is what Browning sought; he did, in fact, +propound a solution, which, whether finally satisfactory or not, at +least carries us beyond the easy compromises of ordinary religious and +ethical teaching. He does not deny the universality of God's beneficence +or power, and divide the realm of being between Him and the adversary: +nor, on the other hand, does he limit man's freedom, and stultify ethics +by extracting the sting of reality from sin. To limit God, he knew, was +to deny Him; and, whatever the difficulties he felt in regarding the +absolute Spirit as realising itself in man, he could not be content to +reduce man into a temporary phantom, an evanescent embodiment of +"spiritual" or natural forces, that take a fleeting form in him as they +pursue their onward way. + +Browning held with equal tenacity to the idea of a universal benevolent +order, and to the idea of the moral freedom of man within it. He was +driven in opposite directions by two beliefs, both of which he knew to +be essential to the life of man as spirit, and both of which he +illustrates throughout his poems with an endless variety of poetic +expression. He endeavoured to find God in man and still to leave man +free. His optimistic faith sought reconciliation with morality. The +vigour of his ethical doctrine is as pre-eminent, as the fulness of his +conviction of the absolute sway of the Good. Side by side with his +doctrine that there is no failure, no wretchedness of corruption that +does not conceal within it a germ of goodness, is his sense of the evil +of sin, of the infinite earnestness of man's moral warfare, and of the +surpassing magnitude of the issues at stake for each individual soul. So +powerful is his interest in man as a moral agent, that he sees nought +else in the world of any deep concern. "My stress lay," he said in his +preface to _Sordello_ (1863), "on the incidents in the development of a +soul: little else is worth study. I, at least, always thought so--you, +with many known and unknown to me, think so--others may one day think +so." And this development of a soul is not at any time regarded by the +poet as a peaceful process, like the growth of a plant or animal. +Although he thinks of the life of man as the gradual realization of a +divine purpose within him, he does not suppose it to take place in +obedience to a tranquil necessity. Man advances morally by fighting his +way inch by inch, and he gains nothing except through conflict. He does +not become good as the plant grows into maturity. "The kingdom of heaven +suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force." + + "No, when the fight begins within himself, + A man's worth something. God stoops o'er his head, + Satan looks up between his feet,--both tug-- + He's left, himself, i' the middle: the soul awakes + And grows. Prolong that battle through this life! + Never leave growing till the life to come."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Bishop Blougram_.] + +Man is no idle spectator of the conflict of the forces of right and +wrong; Browning never loses the individual in the throng, or sinks him +into his age or race. And although the poet ever bears within him the +certainty of victory for the good, he calls his fellows to the fight as +if the fate of all hung on the valour of each. The struggle is always +personal, individual like the duels of the Homeric heroes. + +It is under the guise of warfare that morality always presents itself to +Browning. It is not a mere equilibrium of qualities--the measured, +self-contained, statuesque ethics of the Greeks, nor the asceticism and +self-restraint of Puritanism, nor the peaceful evolution of Goethe's +artistic morality: it is valour in the battle of life. His code contains +no negative commandments, and no limitations; but he bids each man let +out all the power that is within him, and throw himself upon life with +the whole energy of his being. It is better even to seek evil with one's +whole mind, than to be lukewarm in goodness. Whether you seek good or +evil, and play for the counter or the coin, stake it boldly! + + "Let a man contend to the uttermost + For his life's set prize, be it what it will! + + "The counter our lovers staked was lost + As surely as if it were lawful coin: + And the sin I impute to each frustrate ghost + + "Is, the unlit lamp and the ungirt loin + Though the end in sight was a vice, I say. + You, of the virtue (we issue join) + How strive you?--'_De te fabula!_'"[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Statue and the Bust_.] + +Indifference and spiritual lassitude are, to the poet, the worst of +sins. "Go!" says the Pope to Pompilia's pseudo-parents, + + "Never again elude the choice of tints! + White shall not neutralize the black, nor good + Compensate bad in man, absolve him so: + Life's business being just the terrible choice."[B] + +[Footnote B: _The Ring and the Book--The Pope_, 1235-1238.] + +In all the greater characters of _The Ring and the Book_, this intensity +of vigour in good and evil flashes out upon us. Even Pompilia, the most +gentle of all his creations, at the first prompting of the instinct of +motherhood, rises to the law demanding resistance, and casts off the old +passivity. + + "Dutiful to the foolish parents first, + Submissive next to the bad husband,--nay, + Tolerant of those meaner miserable + That did his hests, eked out the dole of pain ";[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid_., 1052-1055.] + +she is found + + "Sublime in new impatience with the foe." + + "I did for once see right, do right, give tongue + The adequate protest: for a worm must turn + If it would have its wrong observed by God. + I did spring up, attempt to thrust aside + That ice-block 'twixt the sun and me, lay low + The neutralizer of all good and truth."[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book--Pompilia_, 1591-1596.] + + "Yet, shame thus rank and patent, I struck, bare, + At foe from head to foot in magic mail, + And off it withered, cobweb armoury + Against the lightning! 'Twas truth singed the lies + And saved me."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_., 1637-1641.] + +Beneath the mature wisdom of the Pope, amidst the ashes of old age, +there sleeps the same fire. He is as truly a warrior priest as +Caponsacchi himself, and his matured experience only muffles his vigour. +Wearied with his life-long labour, we see him gather himself together +"in God's name," to do His will on earth once more with concentrated +might. + + "I smite + With my whole strength once more, ere end my part, + Ending, so far as man may, this offence."[C] + +[Footnote C: _The Ring and the Book--The Pope_, 1958-1960.] + +Nor, spite of doubts, the promptings of mercy, the friends plucking his +sleeve to stay his arm, does he fear "to handle a lie roughly"; or +shrink from sending the criminal to his account, though it be but one +day before he himself is called before the judgment seat. The same +energy, the same spirit of bold conflict, animates Guido's adoption of +evil for his good. At all but the last moment of his life of monstrous +crime, just before he hears the echo of the feet of the priests, who +descend the stair to lead him to his death, "he repeats his evil deed in +will." + + "Nor is it in me to unhate my hates,-- + I use up my last strength to strike once more + Old Pietro in the wine-house-gossip-face, + To trample underfoot the whine and wile + Of beast Violante,--and I grow one gorge + To loathingly reject Pompilia's pale + Poison my hasty hunger took for food."[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book_--_Guido_, 2400-2406.] + +If there be any concrete form of evil with which the poet's optimism is +not able to cope, any irretrievable black "beyond white's power to +disintensify," it is the refusal to take a definite stand and resolute +for either virtue or vice; the hesitancy and compromise of a life that +is loyal to nothing, not even to its own selfishness. The cool self-love +of the old English moralists, which "reduced the game of life to +principles," and weighed good and evil in the scales of prudence, is to +our poet the deepest damnation. + + "Saint Eldobert--I much approve his mode; + With sinner Vertgalant I sympathize; + But histrionic Sganarelle, who prompts + While pulling back, refuses yet concedes,-- + + * * * * * + + "Surely, one should bid pack that mountebank!" + +In him, even + + "thickheads ought to recognize + The Devil, that old stager, at his trick + Of general utility, who leads + Downward, perhaps, but fiddles all the way!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Red Cotton Nightcap Country._] + +For the bold sinner, who chooses and sustains his part to the end, the +poet has hope. Indeed, the resolute choice is itself the beginning of +hope; for, let a man only give _himself_ to anything, wreak _himself_ on +the world in the intensity of his hate, set all sail before the gusts of +passion and "range from Helen to Elvire, frenetic to be free," let him +rise into a decisive self-assertion against the stable order of the +moral world, and he cannot fail to discover the nature of the task he +has undertaken, and the meaning of the power without, against which he +has set himself. If there be sufficient strength in a man to vent +himself in action, and "try conclusions with the world," he will then +learn that it has another destiny than to be the instrument of evil. +Self-assertion taken by itself is good; indeed, it is the very law of +every life, human and other. + + "Each lie + Redounded to the praise of man, was victory + Man's nature had both right to get and might to gain."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Fifine at the Fair_, cxxviii.] + +But it leads to the revelation of a higher law than that of selfishness. +The very assertion of the self which leads into evil, ultimately leaves +the self assertion futile. There is the disappointment of utter failure; +the sinner is thrown back upon himself empty-handed. He finds himself +subjected, even when sinning, + + "To the reign + Of other quite as real a nature, that saw fit + To have its way with man, not man his way with it."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Fifine at the Fair_, cxxviii.] + + "Poor pabulum for pride when the first love is found + Last also! and, so far from realizing gain, + Each step aside just proves divergency in vain. + The wanderer brings home no profit from his quest + Beyond the sad surmise that keeping house were best + Could life begin anew."[B] + +[Footnote B:_Ibid_. cxxix.] + +The impossibility of living a divided life, of enjoying at once the +sweets of the flesh on the "Turf," and the security of the "Towers," is +the text of _Red Cotton Nightcap Country_. The sordid hero of the poem +is gradually driven to choose between the alternatives. The best of his +luck, the poet thinks, was the + + "Rough but wholesome shock, + An accident which comes to kill or cure, + A jerk which mends a dislocated joint!"[C] + +[Footnote C: _Red Cotton Nightcap Country_.] + +The continuance of disguise and subterfuge, and the retention of "the +first falsehood," are ultimately made impossible to Leonce Miranda: + + "Thus by a rude in seeming--rightlier judged + Beneficent surprise, publicity + Stopped further fear and trembling, and what tale + Cowardice thinks a covert: one bold splash + Into the mid-shame, and the shiver ends, + Though cramp and drowning may begin perhaps."[D] + +[Footnote D: _Ibid_.] + +In the same spirit he finds Miranda's suicidal leap the best deed +possible for _him_. + + "'Mad!' 'No! sane, I say. + Such being the conditions of his life, + Such end of life was not irrational. + Hold a belief, you only half-believe, + With all-momentous issues either way,-- + And I advise you imitate this leap, + Put faith to proof, be cured or killed at once!'"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Red Cotton Nightcap Country_.] + +Thus it is the decisive deed that gains the poet's approval. He finds +the universe a great plot against a pied morality. Even Guido claims +some kind of regard from him, since "hate," as Pompilia said, "was the +truth of him." In that very hate we find, beneath his endless +subterfuges, something real, at last. And since, through his hate, he is +frankly measuring his powers against the good at work in the world, +there cannot remain any doubt of the issue. To bring the rival forces +face to face is just what is wanted. + + "I felt quite sure that God had set + Himself to Satan; who would spend + A minute's mistrust on the end?"[B] + +[Footnote B:_Count Gismond_.] + +It is the same respect for strenuous action and dislike of compromise, +that inspired the pathetic lines in which he condemns the Lost Leader, +who broke "From the van and the free-men, and sunk to the rear and the +slaves." For the good pursues its work without him. + + "We shall march prospering,--not thro' his presence; + Songs may inspirit us,--not from his lyre; + Deeds will be done,--while he boasts his quiescence, + Still bidding crouch whom the rest bade aspire: + _Blot out his name_, then, record one lost soul more, + One task more declined, one more footpath untrod, + One more devil's triumph and sorrow for angels, + One wrong more to man, one more insult to God!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _The List Leader_.] + +Everywhere Browning's ethical teaching has this characteristic feature +of vigorous decisiveness. As Dr. Westcott has said, "No room is left for +indifference or neutrality. There is no surrender to an idle optimism. A +part must be taken and maintained. The spirit in which Luther said +'_Pecca fortiter_' finds in him powerful expression." Browning is +emphatically the poet-militant, and the prophet of struggling manhood. +His words are like trumpet-calls sounded in the van of man's struggle, +wafted back by the winds, and heard through all the din of conflict by +his meaner brethren, who are obscurely fighting for the good in the +throng and crush of life. We catch the tones of this heart-strengthening +music in the earliest poems he sung: nor did his courage fail, or vigour +wane, as the shades of night gathered round him. In the latest of all +his poems, he still speaks of + + "One who never turned his back but marched breast forward, + Never doubted clouds would break, + Never dreamed, though right were worsted, wrong would triumph, + Held we fall to rise, are baffled to fight better, + Sleep to wake." + + "No, at noon-day in the bustle of man's work-time + Greet the unseen with a cheer! + Bid him forward, breast and back as either should be, + 'Strive and thrive'! cry 'Speed!--fight on, fare ever + There as here.'"[A] + +[Footnote A: Epilogue to _Asolande_.] + +These are fit words to close such a life. His last act is a kind of +re-enlistment in the service of the good; the joyous venturing forth on +a new war under new conditions and in lands unknown, by a heroic man who +is sure of himself and sure of his cause. + +But now comes the great difficulty. How can the poet combine such +earnestness in the moral struggle with so deep a conviction of the +ultimate nothingness of evil, and of the complete victory of the good? +Again and again we have found him pronounce such victory to be +absolutely necessary and inevitable. His belief in God, his trust in His +love and might, will brook no limit anywhere. His conviction is that the +power of the good subjects evil itself to its authority. + + "My own hope is, a sun will pierce + The thickest cloud earth ever stretched; + That, after Last, returns the First, + Though a wide compass round be fetched; + That what began best, can't end worst. + Nor what God blessed once, prove accurst."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Apparent Failure_.] + +It is the poet himself and not merely the sophistic aesthete of _Fifine_ +that speaks:-- + + "Partake my confidence! No creature's made so mean + But that, some way, it boasts, could we investigate, + Its supreme worth: fulfils, by ordinance of fate, + Its momentary task, gets glory all its own, + Tastes triumph in the world, pre-eminent, alone." + + * * * * * + + "As firm is my belief, quick sense perceives the same + Self-vindicating flash illustrate every man + And woman of our mass, and prove, throughout the plan, + No detail but, in place allotted it, was prime + And perfect."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Fifine at the Fair_, xxix.] + +But if so,--if Helen, Fifine, Guido, find themselves within the plan, +fulfilling, after all, the task allotted to them in the universal +scheme, how can we condemn them? Must we not plainly either modify our +optimism and keep our faith in God within bounds, or, on the other hand, +make every failure "apparent" only, sin a phantom, and the distinction +between right and wrong a helpful illusion that stings man to +effort--but an illusion all the same? + + "What but the weakness in a Faith supplies + The incentive to humanity, no strength + Absolute, irresistible comforts. + How can man love but what he yearns to help?"[B] + +[Footnote B: _The Ring and the Book--The Pope_, 1649-1652.] + +Where is the need, nay, the possibility, of self-sacrifice, except where +there is misery? How can good, the good which is highest, find itself, +and give utterance and actuality to the power that slumbers within it, +except as resisting evil? Are not good and evil relative? Is not every +criminal, when really known, working out in his own way the salvation of +himself and the world? Why cannot he, then, take his stand on his right +to move towards the good by any path that best pleases himself: since +move he must. It is easy for the religious conscience to admit with +Pippa that + + "All service ranks the same with God-- + With God, whose puppets, best and worst, + Are we: there is no last or first."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Pippa Passes_.] + +But, if so, why do we admire her sweet pre-eminence in moral beauty, and +in what is she really better than Ottima? The doctrine that + + "God's in His heaven-- + All's right with the world!"[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +finds its echo in every devout spirit from the beginning of the world: +it is of the very essence of religion. But what of its moral +consequences? Religion, when thoroughly consistent, is the triumphant +reconciliation of all contradictions. It is optimism, the justification +of things as the process of evolving the good; and its peace and joy are +just the outcome of the conviction, won by faith, that the ideal is +actual, and that every detail of life is, in its own place, illumined +with divine goodness. But morality is the condemnation of things as they +are, by reference to a conception of a good which ought to be. The +absolute identification of the actual and ideal extinguishes morality, +either in something lower or something higher. But the moral ideal, when +reached, turns at once into a stepping-stone, a dead self; and the good +formulates itself anew as an ideal in the future. So that morality is +the sphere of discrepancy, and the moral life a progressive realization +of a good that can never be complete. It would thus seem to be +irreconcilably different from religion, which must, in some way or +other, find the good to be present, actual, absolute, without shadow of +change, or hint of limit or imperfection. + +How, then, does the poet deal with the apparently fundamental +discrepancy between religion, which postulates the absolute and +universal supremacy of God, and morality, which postulates the absolute +supremacy of man within the sphere of his own action, in so far as it is +called right or wrong? + +This difficulty, in one or other of its forms, is, perhaps, the most +pressing in modern philosophy. It is the problem of the possibility of +rising above the "Either, Or" of discrepant conceptions, to a position +which grasps the alternatives together in a higher idea. It is at bottom +the question, whether we can have a philosophy at all; or whether we +must fall back once more into compromise, and the scepticism and despair +which it always brings with it. + +It is just because Browning does not compromise between the contending +truths that he is instructive. The value of his solution of the problem +corresponds accurately to the degree in which he holds both the +absoluteness of God's presence in history, and the complete independence +of the moral consciousness. He refused to degrade either God or man. In +the name of religion, he refuses to say that "a purpose of reason is +visible in the social and legal structures of mankind"--_only_ "on the +whole "; and in the name of morality, he refuses to "assert the +perfection of the actual world" as it is, and by implication to stultify +all human endeavour. He knew the vice of compromising, and strove to +hold both the truths in their fulness. + +That he did not compromise God's love or power, and make it dominant +merely "on the whole," leaving within His realm, which is universal, a +limbo for the "lost," is evident to the most casual reader. + + "This doctrine, which one healthy view of things, + One sane sight of the general ordinance-- + Nature,--and its particular object,--man,-- + Which one mere eyecast at the character + Of Who made these and gave man sense to boot, + Had dissipated once and evermore,-- + This doctrine I have dosed our flock withal. + Why? Because none believed it."[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Inn Album_.] + +"O'er-punished wrong grows right," Browning says. Hell is, for him, the +consciousness of opportunities neglected, arrested growth; and even +that, in turn, is the beginning of a better life. + + "However near I stand in His regard, + So much the nearer had I stood by steps + Offered the feet which rashly spurned their help. + That I call Hell; why further punishment?"[B] + +[Footnote B: _A Camel-Driver._] + +Another ordinary view, according to which evil is self-destructive, and +ends with the annihilation of its servant, he does not so decisively +reject. At least, in a passage of wonderful poetic and philosophic +power, which he puts into the mouth of Caponsacchi, he describes Guido +as gradually lapsing towards the chaos, which is lower then created +existence. He observes him + + "Not to die so much as slide out of life, + Pushed by the general horror and common hate + Low, lower,--left o' the very ledge of things, + I seem to see him catch convulsively, + One by one at all honest forms of life, + At reason, order, decency and use, + To cramp him and get foothold by at least; + And still they disengage them from _his_ clutch. + + * * * * * + + "And thus I see him slowly and surely edged + Off all the table-land whence life upsprings + Aspiring to be immortality." + +There he loses him in the loneliness, silence and dusk-- + + "At the horizontal line, creation's verge. + From what just is to absolute nothingness."[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book--Giuseppe Caponsacchi_, 1911-1931.] + +But the matchless moral insight of the Pope leads to a different +conclusion, and the poet again retrieves his faith. The Pope puts his +first trust "in the suddenness of Guido's fate," and hopes that the +truth may "be flashed out by the blow of death, and Guido see one +instant and be saved." Nor is his trust vain. "The end comes," said Dr. +Westcott. "The ministers of death claim him. In his agony he summons +every helper whom he has known or heard of-- + + "'Abate,--Cardinal,--Christ,--Maria,--God--' + +"and then the light breaks through the blackest gloom: + + "'Pompilia! will you let them murder me?' + +"In this supreme moment he has known what love is, and, knowing it, has +begun to feel it. The cry, like the intercession of the rich man in +Hades, is a promise of a far-off deliverance." + +But even beyond this hope, which is the last for most men, the Pope had +still another. + + "Else I avert my face, nor follow him + Into that sad obscure sequestered state + Where God unmakes but to remake the soul + He else made first in vain: _which must not be_."[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book--The Pope_, 2129-2132.] + +This phrase, "which must not be," seems to me to carry in it the +irrefragable conviction of the poet himself. The same faith in the +future appears in the words in which Pompilia addresses her priest. + + "O lover of my life, O soldier-saint, + No work begun shall ever pause for death! + Love will be helpful to me more and more + I' the coming course, the new path I must tread, + My weak hand in thy strong hand, strong for that!"[B] + +[Footnote B: _The Ring and the Seek--Pompilia_, 1786-1790.] + +For the poet, the death of man brings no change in the purpose of God; +nor does it, or aught else, fix a limit to His power, or stultify by +failure the end implied in all God's work, nature no less than man +himself--to wit, that every soul shall learn the lesson of goodness, and +reflect the devine life in desire, intelligence, and will. + +Equally emphatic, on some sides at least, is Browning's rejection of +those compromises, with which the one-sided religious consciousness +threatens the existence of the moral life. At times, indeed, he seems to +teach, as man's best and highest, a passive acquiescence in the divine +benevolence; and he uses the dangerous metaphor of the clay and potter's +wheel. _Rabbi Ben Ezra_ bids us feel + + "Why time spins fast, why passive lies our clay"; + +and his prayer is, + + "So, take and use Thy work: + Amend what flaws may lurk, + What strain o' the stuff, what warpings past the aim! + My times be in Thy hand! + Perfect the cup as planned! + Let age approve of youth, and death complete the same!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Rabbi Ben Ezra_.] + +But this attitude of quiescent trust, which is so characteristic of +religion, is known by the poet to be only a phase of man's best life. It +is a temporary resting-place for the pilgrim: "the country of Beulah, +whose air is very sweet and pleasant, where he may solace himself for a +season." But, "the way lies directly through it," and the pilgrim, +"being a little strengthened and better able to bear his sickness," has +to go forward on his journey. Browning's characteristic doctrine on this +matter is not acquiescence and resignation. "Leave God the way" has, in +his view, its counterpart and condition--"Have you the will!" + + "For a worm must turn + If it would have its wrong observed by God."[B] + +[Footnote B: _The Ring and the Book--Pompilia,_ 1592-1593.] + +The root of Browning's joy is in the need of progress towards an +infinitely high goal. He rejoices + + "that man is hurled + From change to change unceasingly, + His soul's wings never furled." + +The bliss of endeavour, the infinite worth of the consciousness of +failure, with its evidence of coming triumph, "the spark which disturbs +our clod," these are the essence of his optimistic interpretation of +human life, and also of his robust ethical doctrine. + + "Then, welcome each rebuff + That turns earth's smoothness rough, + Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand but go! + Be our joys three-parts pain! + Strive, and hold cheap the strain; + Learn, nor account the pang; dare, never grudge the throe!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Rabbi Ben Ezra._] + +And he prolongs the battle beyond time, for the battle is the moral life +and man's best, and therefore God's best in man. The struggle upward +from the brute, may, indeed end with death. But this only means that man +"has learned the uses of the flesh," and there are in him other +potencies to evolve: + + "Other heights in other lives, God willing." + +Death is the summing up of this life's meaning, stored strength for new +adventure. + +"The future I may face now I have proved the past;" and, in view of it, +Browning is + + "Fearless and unperplexed + When I wage battle next, + What weapons to select, what armour to indue." + +He is sure that it will be a battle, and a winning one. There is no +limiting here of man's possibility, or confining of man's endeavour +after goodness. + + "Strive and Thrive! cry 'Speed,' fight on, fare ever + There as here," + +are the last words which came from his pen. + +Now, it may fairly be argued that these allusions to what death may +mean, and what may lie beyond death, valuable as they may be as poetry, +cannot help in philosophy. They do not solve the problem of the relation +between morality and religion, but merely continue the antagonism +between them into a life beyond, of which we have no experience. If the +problem is to be solved, it must be solved as it is stated for us in the +present world. + +This objection is valid, so far as it goes. But Browning's treatment is +valuable all the same, in so far as it indicates his unwillingness to +limit or compromise the conflicting truths. He, by implication, rejects +the view, ordinarily held without being examined, that the moral life is +preliminary to the joy and rest of religion; a brief struggle, to be +followed by a sudden lift out of it into some serene sphere, where man +will lead an angel's life, which knows no imperfection and therefore no +growth. He refuses to make morality an accident in man's history and "to +put man in the place of God," by identifying the process with the ideal; +he also refuses to make man's struggle, and God's achievement within +man, mutually exclusive alternatives. As I shall show in the sequel, +movement towards an ideal, actualizing but never actualized, is for the +poet the very nature of man. And to speak about either God or man (or +even the absolute philosopher) as "the last term of a development" has +no meaning to him. We are not first moral and then religious, first +struggling with evil and then conscious of overcoming it. God is with us +in the battle, and the victory is in every blow. + +But there lies a deeper difficulty than this in the way of reconciling +morality and religion, or the presence of both God and man in human +action. Morality, in so far as it is achievement, might conceivably be +immediately identified with the process of an absolute good; but +morality is always a consciousness of failure as well. Its very essence +and verve is the conviction that the ideal is not actual. And the higher +a man's spiritual attainment, the more impressive is his view of the +evil of the world, and of the greatness of the work pressing to be done. +"Say not ye, there are yet four months, and then cometh harvest? Behold +I say unto you, 'Lift up your eyes and look on the fields; for they are +white already to harvest.'" It looks like blasphemy against morality to +say "that God lives in eternity and has, therefore, plenty of time." +Morality destroys one's contentment with the world; and its language +seems to be, "God is not here, but there; the kingdom is still to come." + +Nor does it rest with condemning the world. It also finds flaws in its +own highest achievement; so that we seem ever "To mock ourselves in all +that's best of us." The beginning of the spiritual life seems just to +consist in a consciousness of complete failure, and that consciousness +ever grows deeper. + +This is well illustrated in Browning's account of Caponsacchi; from the +time when Pompilia's smile first "glowed" upon him, and set him-- + + "Thinking how my life + Had shaken under me--broken short indeed + And showed the gap 'twixt what is, what should be-- + And into what abysm the soul may slip"--[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book_--_Giuseppe Caponsacchi_, 485-488.] + +up to the time when his pure love for her revealed to him something of +the grandeur of goodness, and led him to define his ideal and also to +express his despair. + + "To have to do with nothing but the true, + The good, the eternal--and these, not alone + In the main current of the general life, + But small experiences of every day, + Concerns of the particular hearth and home: + To learn not only by a comet's rush + But a rose's birth--not by the grandeur, God, + But the comfort, Christ. _All this_ how _far away_ + Mere delectation, meet for a minute's dream!"[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid._ 2089-2097.] + +So illimitably beyond his strength is such a life, that he finds himself +like the drudging student who + + "Trims his lamp, + Opens his Plutarch, puts him in the place + Of Roman, Grecian; draws the patched gown close, + Dreams, 'Thus should I fight, save or rule the world!'-- + Then smilingly, contentedly, awakes + To the old solitary nothingness."[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book_--_Giuseppe Caponsacchi_, 2098-2103.] + +The moral world with its illimitable horizon had Opened out around him, +the voice of the new commandment bidding him "be perfect as his Father +in heaven is perfect" had destroyed his peace, and made imperative a +well nigh hopeless struggle; and, as he compares himself at his best +with the new ideal, he breaks out into the cry, + + "O great, just, good God! Miserable Me!" + +This humility and contrition, this discontent verging on hopelessness, +constituted, as we have seen, the characteristic attitude of Carlyle; +and it represents a true and, in fact, an indispensable element of man's +moral life. + +But this self-condemnation in the face of the moral law is nothing more +than an element, and must not be taken either for the whole truth or for +the most fundamental one. It is because it is taken as fundamental and +final that the discrepancy between morality and religion is held to be +absolute, and the consciousness of evil is turned against faith in the +Good. It is an abstract way of thinking that makes us deduce, from the +transcendent height of the moral ideal, the impossibility of attaining +goodness, and the failure of God's purpose in man. And this is what +Carlyle did. He stopped short at the consciousness of imperfection, and +he made no attempt to account for it. He took it as a complete fact, and +therefore drew a sharp line of distinction between the human and the +divine. And, so far, he was right; for, if we look no further than this +negative side, it is emphatically absurd to identify man, be he +"philosopher" or not, with the Absolute. "Why callest thou Me good? +there is none good save One, that is God." The "ought" _must_ stand +above _all_ human attainment, and declare that "whatever is, is wrong." +But whence comes the ought itself, the ideal which condemns us? Is it +not also immanent in the fact it condemns? + +"Who is not acute enough," asks Hegel, "to see a great deal in his +surroundings which is really far from being what it ought to be?" And +who also, we may add, has not enough of the generalizing faculty, often +mistaken for a philosophical one, to extend this condemnation over the +whole of "this best of all possible worlds"? But what is this +"ought-to-be," which has such potency in it that all things confronted +with it lose their worth? + +The first answer is, that it is an idea which men, and particularly good +men, carry with them. But a little consideration will show that it +cannot be a mere idea. It must be something more valid than a capricious +product of the individual imagination. For we cannot wisely condemn +things because they do not happen to answer to any casual conception +which we may choose to elevate into a criterion. A criterion must have +objective validity. It must be an idea _of_ something and not an empty +notion; and that something must, at the worst, be possible. Nay, when we +consider all that is involved in it, it becomes obvious that a true +ideal--an ideal which is a valid criterion--must be not only possible +but real, and, indeed, more real than that which is condemned by +reference to it. Absolute pessimism has in it the same contradiction as +absolute scepticism has,--in fact, it is only its practical counterpart; +for both scepticism and pessimism involve the assumption that it is +possible to reach a position outside the realm of being, from which it +may be condemned as a whole. But the rift between actual and ideal must +fall within the real or intelligible world, do what the pessimists will; +and a condemnation of man which is not based on a principle realized by +humanity, is a fiction of abstract thought, which lays stress on the +actuality of the imperfect and treats the perfect as if it were as good +as nothing, which it cannot be. In other words, this way of regarding +human life isolates the passing phenomenon, and does not look to that +which reveals itself in it and causes it to pass away. Confining +ourselves, however, for the present, to the ideal in morality, we can +easily see that, in that sphere at least, the actual and ideal change +places; and that the latter contrasts with the former as the real with +the phenomenal. For, in the first place, the moral ideal is something +more than a mere idea not yet realized. It is more even than a _true_ +idea; for no mere knowledge, however true, has such intimate relation to +the self-consciousness of man as his moral ideal. A mathematical axiom, +and the statement of a physical law, express what is true; but they do +not occupy the same place in our mind as a moral principle. Such a +principle is an ideal, as well as an idea. It is an idea which has +causative potency in it. It supplies motives, it is an incentive to +action, and, though in one sense a thing of the future, it is also the +actual spring and source of present activity. In so far as the agent +acts, as Kant put it, not according to laws, but according to an _idea_ +of law (and a responsible agent always acts in this manner), the ideal +is as truly actualized in him as the physical law is actualized in the +physical fact, or the vegetable life in the plant. In fact, the ideal of +a moral being is his life. All his actions are its manifestations. And, +just as the physical fact is not seen as it really is, nor its reality +proved, till science has penetrated through the husk of the sensuous +phenomenon, and grasped it in thought as an instance of a law; so an +individual's actions are not understood, and can have no moral meaning +whatsoever, except in the light of the purpose which gave them being. We +know the man only when we know his creed. His reality is what he +believes in; that is, it is his ideal. + +It is the consciousness that the ideal is the real which explains the +fact of contrition. To become morally awakened is to become conscious of +the vanity and nothingness of the past life, as confronted with the new +ideal implied in it. The past life is something to be cast aside as +false show, just because the self that experienced it was not realized +in it. It is for this reason that the moral agent sets himself against +it, and desires to annihilate all its claims upon him by undergoing its +punishment, and drinking to the dregs its cup of bitterness. Thus his +true life lies in the realization of his ideal, and his advance towards +it is his coming to himself. Only in attaining to it does he attain +reality, and the only realization possible for him in the present is +just the consciousness of the potency of the ideal. To him to live is to +realize his ideal. It is a power that irks, till it finds expression in +moral habits that accord with its nature, _i.e._, till the spirit has, +out of its environment, created a body adequate to itself. + +The condemnation of self which characterizes all moral life and is the +condition of moral progress, must not, therefore, be regarded as a +complete truth. For the very condemnation implies the actual presence of +something better. Both of the terms--both the criterion and the fact +which is condemned by it--fall within the same individual life. Man +cannot, therefore, without injustice, condemn himself in all that he is; +for the condemnation is itself a witness to the activity of that good of +which he despairs. Hence, the threatening majesty of the moral +imperative is nothing but the shadow of man's own dignity; and moral +contrition, and even the complete despair of the pessimistic theory, +when rightly understood, are recognized as unwilling witnesses to the +authority and the actuality of the highest good. And, on the other hand, +the highest good cannot be regarded as a mere phantom, without +nullifying all our condemnation of the self and the world. + +The legitimate deduction from the height of man's moral ideal is thus +found to be, not, as Carlyle thought, the weakness and worthlessness of +human nature, but its promise and native dignity: and in a healthy moral +consciousness it produces, not despair, but faith and joy. For, as has +been already suggested in a previous chapter, the authority of the moral +law over man is rooted in man's endowment. Its imperative is nothing but +the voice of the future self, bidding the present self aspire, while its +reproof is only the expression of a moral aspiration which has +misunderstood itself. Contrition is not a bad moral state which should +bring despair, but a good state, full of promise of one that is still +better. It is, in fact, just the first step which the ideal takes in its +process of self-realization: "the sting that bids nor sit, nor stand, +but go!" + +The moral ideal thus, like every other ideal, even that which we regard +as present in natural life, contains a certain guarantee of its own +fulfilment. It is essentially an active thing, an energy, a movement +upwards. It may, indeed, be urged that the guarantee is imperfect. +Ideals tend to self-realization, but the tendency may remain +unfulfilled. Men have some ideals which they never reach, and others +which, at first sight at least, it were better for them not to reach. +The goal may never be attained, or it may prove "a ruin like the rest." +And, as long as man is moral, the ideal is not, and cannot be, fully +reached, Morality necessarily implies a rift within human nature, a +contradiction between what is and what ought to be; although neither the +rift nor the contradiction is absolute. There might seem for this reason +to be no way of bringing optimism and ethics together, of reconciling +what is and what ought to be. + +My answer to these difficulties must at this stage be very brief and +incomplete. That the moral good, if attained, should itself prove vain +is a plain self-contradiction. For moral good has no meaning except in +so far as it is conceived as the highest good. The question. "Why should +I be moral," has no answer, because it is self-contradictory. The moral +ideal contains its justification in itself, and requires to lean on +nothing else. + +But it is not easy to prove that it is attainable. In one sense it is +not attainable, at least under the conditions of human life which fall +within our experience, from which alone we have a right to speak. For, +as I shall strive to show in a succeeding chapter, the essence of man's +life as spiritual, that is as intelligent and moral, is its +self-realizing activity. Intellectual and moral life is progress, +although it is the progress of an ideal which is real and complete, the +return of the infinite to itself through the finite. The cessation of +the progress of the ideal in man, whereby man interprets the world in +terms of himself and makes it the instrument of his purposes, is +intellectual and moral death. From one point of view, therefore, this +spiritual life, or moral and intellectual activity, is inspired at every +step by the consciousness of a "beyond" not possessed, of an unsolved +contradiction between the self and the not-self, of a good that ought to +be and is not. The last word, or rather the last word _but one_, +regarding man is "failure." + +But failure is the last word but one, as the poet well knew. "What's +come to perfection perishes," he tells us. From this point of view the +fact that perfection is not reached, merely means that the process is +not ended. "It seethes with the morrow for us and more." The recognition +of failure implies more effort and higher progress, and contains a +suggestion of an absolute good, and even a proof of its active presence. +"The beyond," for knowledge and morality, is the Land of Promise. And +the promise is not a false one; for the "land" is possessed. The +recognition of the fact to be known, the statement of the problem, is +the first step in its solution; and the consciousness of the moral ideal +not attained is the first step in its self-actualizing progress. Had man +not come so far, he would not have known the further difficulty, or +recognized the higher good. To say that the moral ideal is never +attained, is thus only a half-truth. We must add to it the fact that it +is always being attained; nay, that it is always present as an active +reality, attaining itself, evolving its own content. Or, to return to +the previous metaphor, the land of promise is possessed, although the +possession always reveals a still better beyond, which is again a land +of promise. + +While, therefore, it must always remain true that knowledge does not +reach absolute reality, nor morality absolute goodness, this cannot be +used as an argument against optimism, except on the presupposition that +mental and moral activity are a disease. And this is a contradiction in +terms. If the ideal is in itself good, the process whereby it is +attained is good; if the process in itself is evil, the ideal it seeks +is evil, and therefore the condemnation of the actual by reference to it +is absurd. And, on the other hand, to postulate as best the identity of +ideal and actual, so that no process is necessary, is to assume a point +of view where both optimism and pessimism are meaningless, for there is +no criterion. As Aristotle teaches us, we have no right either to praise +or to blame the highest. A process, such as morality is, which is not +the self-manifestation of an actual idea, and an ideal which does not +reveal its potencies in its passing forms, are both fictions of +one-sided thought. The process is not the ideal, but its manifestation; +and the ideal is not the process, but the principle which is its source +and guide. + +But if the process cannot be thus immediately identified with the ideal, +or "man take the place of God," or "human self-consciousness be confused +with the absolute self-consciousness," far less can they be separated. +The infinitely high ideal of perfect knowledge and perfect goodness, +implied in the Christian command, "Be ye perfect as your Father in +heaven is perfect," is an ideal, just because the unity of what is and +what ought to be is deeper than their difference. The recognition of the +limit of our knowledge, or the imperfection of our moral character, is a +direct witness to the fact that there is more to be known and a better +to be achieved. The negative implies the affirmative, and is its effect. +Man's confession of the limitation of his knowledge is made on the +supposition that the universe of facts, in all its infinitely rich +complexity, is meant to be known; and his confession of moral +imperfection is made by reference to a good which is absolute, and which +yet may be and ought to be his. The good in morality is necessarily +supreme and perfect. A good that is "merely human," "relative to man's +nature," in the sense of not being true goodness, is a phantom of +confused thinking. Morality demands "_the_ good," and not a simulacrum +or make-shift. The distinction between right and wrong, and with it all +moral aspiration, contrition, and repentance, would otherwise become +meaningless. What can a seeming good avail to a moral agent? There is no +better or worse among merely apparent excellencies, and of phantoms it +matters not which is chosen. And, in a similar way, the distinction +between true and false in knowledge, and the common condemnation of +human knowledge as merely of phenomena, implies the absolute unity of +thought and being, and the knowledge of that unity as a fact. There is +no true or false amongst merely apparent facts. + +But, if the ideal of man as a spiritual being is conceived as perfect, +then it follows not only that its attainment is possible, but that it is +necessary. The guarantee of its own fulfilment which an ideal carries +with it as an ideal, that is, as a potency in process of fulfilment, +becomes complete when that ideal is absolute. "If God be for us, who can +be against us?" The absolute good, in the language of Emerson, is "too +good not to be true." If such an ideal be latent in the nature of man, +it brings the order of the universe over to his side. For it implies a +kinship between him, as a spiritual being, and the whole of existence. +The stars in their courses fight for him. In other words, the moral +ideal means nothing, if it does not imply a law which is universal. It +is a law which exists already, whether man recognizes it or not; it is +the might in things, a law of which "no jot or tittle can in any wise +pass away." The individual does not institute the moral law; he finds it +to be written both within and without him. His part is to recognize, not +to create it; to make it valid in his own life and so to identify +himself with it, that his service of it may be perfect freedom. + +We thus conclude that morality, and even the self-condemnation, +contrition, and consciousness of failure which it brings with it as +phases of its growth, are witnesses of the presence, and the actual +product of an absolute good in man. Morality, in other words, rests +upon, and is the self-evolution of the religious principle in man. + +A similar line of proof would show that religion implies morality. An +absolute good is not conceivable, except in relation to the process +whereby it manifests itself. In the language of theology, we may say +that God must create and redeem the world in order to be God; or that +creation and redemption,--the outflow of the universe from God as its +source, and its return to Him through the salvation of mankind,--reveal +to us the nature of God. Apart from this outgoing of the infinite to the +finite and its return to itself through it, the name God would be an +empty word, signifying a something unintelligible dwelling in the void +beyond the realm of being. But religion, as we have seen, is the +recognition not of an unknown but of the absolute good as real; the +joyous consciousness of the presence of God in all things. And morality, +in that it is the realization of an ideal which is perfect, is the +process whereby the absolute good actualizes itself in man. It is true +that the ideal cannot be identified with the process; for it is the +principle of the process, and therefore more than it. Man does not reach +"the last term of development," for there is no last term to a being +whose essence is progressive activity. He does not therefore take the +place of God, and his self-consciousness is never the absolute +self-consciousness. But still, in so far as his life is a progress +towards the true and good, it is the process of truth and goodness +within him. It is the activity of the ideal. It is God lifting man up to +Himself, or, in the language of philosophy, "returning to Himself in +history." And yet it is at the same time man's effort after goodness. +Man is not a mere "vessel of divine grace," or a passive recipient of +the highest bounty. All man's goodness is necessarily man's achievement. +And the realization by the ideal of itself is man's achievement of it. +For it is his ideal. The law without is also the law within. It is the +law within because it is recognized as the law without. Thus, the moral +consciousness passes into the religious consciousness. The performance +of duty is the willing service of the absolute good; and, as such, it +involves also the recognition of a purpose that cannot fail. It is both +activity and faith, both a struggle and a consciousness of victory, both +morality and religion. We cannot, therefore, treat these as alternative +phases of man's life. There is not first the pain of the moral struggle, +and then the joy and rest of religion. The meat and drink is "to do the +will of Him that sent Me, to finish His work." Heaven is the service of +the good. "There is nothing in the world or out of it that can be called +unconditionally good, except the good will." The process of willing--the +moral activity--is its own reward; "the only jewel that shines in its +own light." + +It may seem to some to be presumptuous thus to identify the divine and +the human; but to separate them makes both morality and religion +impossible. It robs morality of its ideal, and makes God a mere name for +the "unknown." Those who think that this identification degrades the +divine, misapprehend the nature of spirit; and forget that it is of its +essence to communicate itself. And goodness and truth do not become less +when shared; they grow greater. Spiritual possessions imply community +wherein there is no exclusion; and to the Christian the glory of God is +His communication of Himself. Hence the so-called religious humility, +which makes God different in nature from His work, really degrades the +object of its worship. It puts mere power above the gifts of spirit, and +it indicates that the worshipper has not been emancipated from the +slavishness, which makes a fetish of its God. Such a religion is not +free, and the development of man destroys it. + + "I never realized God's birth before-- + How He grew likest God in being born."[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book--Pompilia_, 1690-1691.] + +The intense love of the young mother drew the divine and the human +together, and set at nought the contrast which prose ever draws between +them. This thought of the unity of God and man is one which has frequent +utterance from the poet when his religious spirit is most deeply moved; +for it is the characteristic of religious feeling that it abolishes all +sense of separation. It removes all the limitations of finitude and +lifts man into rapturous unity with the God he adores; and it gives such +completeness to his life that it seems to him to be a joyous pulse of +the life that is absolute. The feeling of unity may be an illusion. This +we cannot discuss here; but, in any case, it is a feeling essential to +religion. And the philosophy which seeks to lift this feeling into clear +consciousness and to account for its existence, cannot but recognize +that it implies and presupposes the essential affinity of the divine +nature with the nature of man. + +Thus, both from the side of morality and from that of religion, we are +brought to recognize the unity of God with man as a spiritual being. The +moral ideal is man's idea of perfection, that is, his idea of God. While +theology and philosophy are often occupied with the vain task of +bridging a chasm between the finite and the infinite, which they assume +to be separated, the supreme facts of the life of man as a spirit spring +from their unity. In other words, morality and religion are but +different manifestations of the same principle. The good that man +effects is, at the same time, the working of God within him. The +activity that man is, + + "tending up, + Holds, is upheld by, God, and ends the man + Upward in that dread point of intercourse + Nor needs a place, for it returns to Him."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Death in the Desert_.] + + "God, perchance, + Grants each new man, by some as new a mode, + Inter-communication with Himself + Wreaking on finiteness infinitude."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau._] + +And while man's moral endeavour is thus recognized as the activity of +God within him, it is also implied that the divine being can be known +only as revealed, and incarnated, if one may so say, in a perfect human +character. It was a permanent conviction of Browning, that + + "the acknowledgment of God in Christ + Accepted by thy reason, solves for thee + All questions in the earth and out of it." + +So far from regarding the Power in the world which makes for +righteousness, as "not-ourselves," as Matthew Arnold did in his haste, +that Power is known to be the man's true self and more, and morality is +the gradual process whereby its content is evolved. And man's state of +perfection, which is symbolized for the intelligent by the term Heaven, +is, for Browning, + + "The equalizing, ever and anon, + In momentary rapture, great with small, + Omniscience with intelligency, God + With man--the thunder glow from pole to pole + Abolishing, a blissful moment-space, + Great cloud alike and small cloud, in one fire-- + As sure to ebb as sure again to flow + When the new receptivity deserves + The new completion."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau_.] + +Thus, therefore, does the poet wed the divine strength with human +weakness; and the principle of unity, thus conceived, gives him at once +his moral strenuousness and that ever present foretaste of victory, +which we may call his religious optimism. + +Whether this principle receives adequate expression from the poet, we +shall inquire in the next chapter. For on this depends its worth as a +solution of the enigma of man's moral life. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +BROWNING'S TREATMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LOVE. + + + "God! Thou art Love! I build my faith on that!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Paracelsus_] + +It may be well before going further to gather together the results so +far reached. + +Browning was aware of the conflict of the religious and moral +consciousness, but he did not hesitate to give to each of them its most +uncompromising utterance. And it is on this account that he is +instructive; for, whatever may be the value of compromise in practical +affairs, there is no doubt that it has never done anything to advance +human thought. His religion is an optimistic faith, a peaceful +consciousness of the presence of the highest in man, and therefore in +all other things. Yet he does not hesitate to represent the moral life +as a struggle with evil, and a movement through error towards a highest +good which is never finally realized. He sees that the contradiction is +not an absolute one, but that a good man is always both moral and +religious, and, in every good act he does, transcends their difference. +He knew that the ideal apart from the process is nothing, and that "a +God beyond the stars" is simply the unknowable. But he knew, too, that +the ideal is not _merely_ the process, but also that which starts the +process, guides it, and comes to itself through it. God, emptied of +human elements, is a mere name; but, at the same time, the process of +human evolution does not exhaust the idea of God. The process by itself, +_i.e._, mere morality, is a conception of a fragment, a fiction of +abstract thought; it is a movement which has no beginning or end; and in +it neither the head nor the heart of man could find contentment. He is +driven by ethics into philosophy, and by morality into religion. + +It was in this way that Browning found himself compelled to trace back +the moral process to its origin, and to identify the moral law with the +nature of God. It is this that gives value to his view of moral +progress, as reaching beyond death to a higher stage of being, for which +man's attainments in this life are only preliminary. + + "What's time? Leave Now for dogs and apes, + Man has Forever."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Grammarian's Funeral_.] + +There are other "adventures brave and new" for man, "more lives yet," +other ways of warfare, other depths of goodness and heights of love. The +poet lifts the moral ideal into infinitude, and removes all limits to +the possibility and necessity of being good. Nay, the process itself is +good. Moral activity is its own bountiful reward; for moral progress, +which means struggle, is the best thing in the world or out of it. To +end such a process, to stop that activity, were therefore evil. But it +cannot end, for it is the self-manifestation of the divine life. There +is plenty of way to make, for the ideal is absolute goodness. The +process cannot exhaust the absolute, and it is impossible that man +should be God. And yet this process is the process of the absolute, the +working of the ideal, the presence of the highest in man as a living +power realizing itself in his acts and in his thoughts. And the absolute +cannot fail; not in man, for the process is the evolution of his +essential nature; and not in the world, for that is but the necessary +instrument of the evolution. By lifting the moral ideal of man to +infinitude, the poet has identified it with the nature of God, and made +it the absolute law of things. + +Now, this idea of the identity of the human and the divine is a +perfectly familiar Christian idea. + + "Thence shall I, approved + A man, for aye removed + From the developed brute; a God though in the germ."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Rabbi Ben Ezra._] + +This idea is involved in the ordinary expressions of religious thought. +But, nevertheless, both theology and philosophy shrink from giving to it +a clear and unembarrassed utterance. Instead of rising to the sublime +boldness of the Nazarene Teacher, they set up prudential differences +between God and man--differences not of degree only but of nature; and, +in consequence, God is reduced into an unknowable absolute, and man is +made incapable not only of moral, but also of intellectual life. The +poet himself has proved craven-hearted in this, as we shall see. He, +too, sets up insurmountable barriers between the divine and the human, +and thereby weakens both his religious and his moral convictions. His +moral inspiration is greatest just where his religious enthusiasm is +most intense. In _Rabbi Ben Ezra, The Death in the Desert_, and _The +Ring and the Book_, there prevails a constant sense of the community of +God and man within the realm of goodness; and the world itself, "with +its dread machinery of sin and sorrow," is made to join the great +conspiracy, whose purpose is at once the evolution of man's character, +and the realization of the will of God. + + "So, the All-Great, were the All-Loving too-- + So, through the thunder comes a human voice + Saying, 'O heart I made, a heart beats here! + Face, my hands fashioned, see it in myself! + Thou hast no power nor may'st conceive of mine, + But love I gave thee, with myself to love, + And thou must love Me who have died for thee.'"[A] + +[Footnote A: _An Epistle from Karshish_.] + +But, if we follow Browning's thoughts in his later and more reflective +poems, such as _Ferishtah's_ _Fancies_ for instance, it will not be +possible to hold that the poet altogether realized the importance for +both morality and religion alike, of the idea of the actual immanence of +God in man. In these poems he seems to have abandoned it in favour of +the hypotheses of a more timid philosophy. But, if his religious faith +had not been embarrassed by certain dogmatic presuppositions of which he +could not free himself, he might have met more successfully some of the +difficulties which later reflection revealed to him, and might have been +able to set a true value on that "philosophy," which betrayed his faith +while appearing to support it. + +But, before trying to criticize the principle by means of which Browning +sought to reconcile the moral and religious elements of human life, it +may be well to give it a more explicit and careful statement. + +What, then, is that principle of unity between the divine and the human? +How can we interpret the life of man as God's life in man, so that man, +in attaining the moral ideal proper to his own nature, is at the same +time fulfilling ends which may justly be called divine? + +The poet, in early life and in late life alike, has one answer to this +question--an answer given with the confidence of complete conviction. +The meeting-point of God and man is love. Love, in other words, is, for +the poet, the supreme principle both of morality and religion. Love, +once for all, solves that contradiction between them which, both in +theory and in practice, has embarrassed the world for so many ages. Love +is the sublimest conception attainable by man; a life inspired by it is +the most perfect form of goodness he can conceive; therefore, love is, +at the same moment, man's moral ideal, and the very essence of Godhood. +A life actuated by love is divine, whatever other limitations it may +have. Such is the perfection and glory of this emotion, when it has been +translated into a self-conscious motive, and become the energy of an +intelligent will, that it lifts him who owns it to the sublimest height +of being. + + "For the loving worm within its clod, + Were diviner than a loveless God + Amid his worlds, I will dare to say."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Christmas Eve_.] + +So excellent is this emotion that, if man, who has this power to love, +did not find the same power in God, then man would excel Him, and the +creature and Creator change parts. + + "Do I find love so full in my nature, God's ultimate gift, + That I doubt His own love can compete with it? Here, the parts shift? + Here, the creature surpass the Creator,--the end what Began?"[B] + +[Footnote B: _Saul_.] + +Not so, says David, and with him no doubt the poet himself. God is +Himself the source and fulness of love. + + "Tis Thou, God, that givest, 'tis I who receive: + In the first is the last, in Thy will is my power to believe. + All's one gift." + + * * * * * + + "Would I suffer for him that I love? So would'st Thou,--so wilt Thou! + So shall crown Thee, the topmost, ineffablest, uttermost crown-- + And Thy love fill infinitude wholly, nor leave up nor down + One spot for the creature to stand in!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Saul_.] + +And this same love not only constitutes the nature of God and the moral +ideal of man, but it is also the purpose and essence of all created +being, both animate and inanimate. + + "This world's no blot for us, + Nor blank; it means intensely and means good."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Fra Lippo Lippi_.] + + "O world, as God has made it! All is beauty: + And knowing this is love, and love is duty, + What further may be sought for or declared?" + +In this world then "all's love, yet all's law." God permits nothing to +break through its universal sway, even the very wickedness and misery of +life are brought into the scheme of good, and, when rightly understood, +reveal themselves as its means. + + "I can believe this dread machinery + Of sin and sorrow, would confound me else, + Devised--all pain, at most expenditure + Of pain by Who devised pain--to evolve, + By new machinery in counterpart, + The moral qualities of man--how else?-- + To make him love in turn and be beloved, + Creative and self-sacrificing too, + And thus eventually Godlike."[C] + +[Footnote C: _The Ring and the Book--The Pope_, 1375-1383.] + +The poet thus brings the natural world, the history of man, and the +nature of God, within the limits of the same conception. The idea of +love solves for Browning all the enigmas of human life and thought. + + "The thing that seems + Mere misery, under human schemes, + Becomes, regarded by the light + Of love, as very near, or quite + As good a gift as joy before."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Easter Day_.] + +Taking Browning's work as a whole, it is scarcely possible to deny that +this is at once the supreme motive of his art, and the principle on +which his moral and religious doctrine rests. He is always strong and +convincing when he is dealing with this theme. It was evidently his own +deepest conviction, and it gave him the courage to face the evils of the +world, and the power as an artist to "contrive his music from its +moans." It plays, in his philosophy of life, the part that Reason fills +for Hegel, or the Blind Will for Schopenhauer; and he is as fearless as +they are in reducing all phenomena into forms of the activity of his +first principle. Love not only gave him firm footing amid the wash and +welter of the present world, where time spins fast, life fleets, and all +is change, but it made him look forward with joy to "the immortal +course"; for, to him, all the universe is love-woven. All life is but +treading the "love-way," and no wanderer can finally lose it. "The +way-faring men, though fools, shall not err therein." + +Since love has such an important place in Browning's theory of life, it +is necessary to see what he means by it. For love has had for different +individuals, ages and nations, a very different significance; and almost +every great poet has given it a different interpretation. And this is +not unnatural. For love is a passion which, beginning with youth and the +hey-day of the blood, expands with the expanding life, and takes new +forms of beauty and goodness at every stage. And this is equally true, +whether we speak of the individual or of the human race. + +Love is no accident in man's history, nor a passing emotion. It is +rather a constitutive element of man's nature, fundamental and necessary +as his intelligence. And, like everything native and constitutive, it is +obedient to the law of evolution, which is the law of man's being; and +it passes, therefore, through ever varying forms. To it--if we may for +the moment make a distinction between the theoretical and practical +life, or between ideas and their causative potency--must be attributed +the constructive power which has built the world of morality, with its +intangible but most real relations which bind man to man and age to age. +It is the author of the organic institutions which, standing between the +individual and the rudeness of nature, awaken in him the need, and give +him the desire and the faculty, of attaining higher things than physical +satisfaction. Man is meant to act as well as to think, to be virtuous as +well as to have knowledge. It is possible that reverence for the +intellect may have led men, at times, to attribute the evolution of the +race too exclusively to the theoretic consciousness, forgetting that, +along with reason, there co-operates a twin power in all that is wisest +and best in us, and that a heart which can love, is as essential a +pre-condition of all worthy attainment, as an intellect which can see. +Love and reason[A] are equally primal powers in man, and they reflect +might into each other: for love increases knowledge, and knowledge love. +It is their combined power that gives interest and meaning to the facts +of life, and transmutes them into a moral and intellectual order. They, +together, are lifting man out of the isolation and chaos of subjectivity +into membership in a spiritual kingdom, where collision and exclusion +are impossible, and all are at once kings and subjects. + +[Footnote A: It would be more correct to say the reason that is loving +or the love that is rational; for, though there is distinction, there is +no dualism.] + +And, just as reason is present as a transmuting power in the sensational +life of the infancy of the individual and race, so is love present +amidst the confused and chaotic activity of the life that knows no law +other than its own changing emotions. Both make for order, and both grow +with it. Both love and reason have travelled a long way in the history +of man. The patriot's passion for his country, the enthusiasm of pity +and helpfulness towards all suffering which marks the man of God, are as +far removed from the physical attraction of sex for sex, and the mere +liking of the eye and ear, as is the intellectual power of the sage from +the vulpine cunning of the savage. "For," as Emerson well said, "it is a +fire that, kindling its first embers in the narrow nook of a private +bosom, caught from a wandering spark out of another heart, glows and +enlarges until it warms and beams upon multitudes of men and women, upon +the universal heart of all, and so lights up the world and all nature +with its generous flames." Both love and reason alike pass through stage +after stage, always away from the particularity of selfishness and +ignorance, into larger and larger cycles of common truth and goodness, +towards the full realization of knowledge and benevolence, which is the +inheritance of emancipated man. In this transition, the sensuous play of +feeling within man, and the sensitive responses to external stimuli, are +made more and more organic to ends which are universal, that is, to +spiritual ends. Love, which in its earliest form, seems to be the +natural yearning of brute for brute, appearing and disappearing at the +suggestion of physical needs, passes into an idealized sentiment, into +an emotion of the soul, into a principle of moral activity which +manifests itself in a permanent outflow of helpful deeds for man. It +represents, when thus sublimated, one side at least of the expansion of +the self, which culminates when the world beats in the pulse of the +individual, and the joys and sorrows, the defeats and victories of +mankind are felt by him as his own. It is no longer dependent merely on +the incitement of youth, grace, beauty, whether of body or character; it +transcends all limitations of sex and age, and finds objects on which it +can spend itself in all that God has made, even in that which has +violated its own law of life and become mean and pitiful. It becomes a +love of fallen humanity, and an ardour to save it by becoming the +conscious and permanent motive of all men. The history of this evolution +of love has been written by the poets. Every phase through which this +ever-deepening emotion has passed, every form which this primary power +has taken in its growth, has received from them its own proper +expression. They have made even the grosser instincts lyric with beauty; +and, ascending with their theme, they have sung the pure passion of soul +for soul, its charm and its strength, its idealism and heroism, up to +the point at which, in Browning, it transcends the limits of finite +existence, sheds all its earthly vesture, and becomes a spiritual +principle of religious aspiration and self-surrender to God. + +Browning nowhere shows his native strength more clearly than in his +treatment of love. He has touched this world-old theme--which almost +every poet has handled, and handled in his highest manner--with that +freshness and insight, which is possible only to the inborn originality +of genius. Other poets have, in some ways, given to love a more +exquisite utterance, and rendered its sweetness, and tenderness, and +charm with a lighter grace. It may even be admitted that there are poets +whose verses have echoed more faithfully the fervour and intoxication of +passion, and who have shown greater power of interpreting it in the +light of a mystic idealism. But, in one thing, Browning stands alone. He +has given to love a moral significance, a place and power amongst those +substantial elements on which rest the dignity of man's being and the +greatness of his destiny, in a way which is, I believe, without example +in any other poet. And he has done this by means of that moral and +religious earnestness, which pervades all his poetry. The one object of +supreme interest to him is the development of the soul, and his +penetrative insight revealed to him the power to love as the paramount +fact in that development. To love, he repeatedly tells us, is the sole +and supreme object of man's life; it is the one lesson which he has to +learn on earth; and, love once learnt, in what way matters little, "it +leaves completion in the soul." Love we dare not, and, indeed, cannot +absolutely miss. No man can be absolutely selfish and be man. + + "Beneath the veriest ash, there hides a spark of soul + Which, quickened by love's breath, may yet pervade the whole + O' the grey, and, free again, be fire; of worth the same, + Howe'er produced, for, great or little, flame is flame."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Fifine at the Fair_, xliii.] + +Love, once evoked, once admitted into the soul, + + "adds worth to worth, + As wine enriches blood, and straightway sends it forth, + Conquering and to conquer, through all eternity, + That's battle without end."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_. liv.] + +This view of the significance of love grew on Browning as his knowledge +of man's nature and destiny became fuller and deeper, while, at the same +time, his trust in the intellect became less. Even in _Paracelsus_ he +reveals love, not as a sentiment or intoxicating passion, as one might +expect from a youthful poet, but as one of the great fundamental +"faculties" of man. Love, "blind, oft-failing, half-enlightened, +often-chequered trust," though it be, still makes man + + "The heir of hopes too fair to turn out false." + +In that poem, love is definitely lifted by the poet to the level of +knowledge. Intellectual gain, apart from love, is folly and futility, +worthless for the individual and worthless to the race. "Mind is nothing +but disease," Paracelsus cries in the bitterness of his disappointment, +"and natural health is ignorance"; and he asks of the mad poet who +"loved too rashly," + + "Are we not halves of one dissevered world, + Whom this strange chance unites once more? Part? Never! + Till thou the lover, know; and I, the knower, + Love--until both are saved."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Paracelsus_.] + +And, at the end of the poem, Paracelsus, coming to an understanding with +himself as to the gain and loss of life, proclaims with his last +strength the truth he had missed throughout his great career, namely, +the supreme worth of love. + + "I saw Aprile--my Aprile there! + And as the poor melodious wretch disburthened + His heart, and moaned his weakness in my ear, + I learned my own deep error; love's undoing + Taught me the worth of love in man's estate, + And what proportion love should hold with power + In his right constitution; love preceding + Power, and with much power, always much more love; + Love still too straitened in his present means, + And earnest for new power to set love free." + +As long as he hated men, or, in his passionate pursuit of truth, was +indifferent to their concerns, it was not strange that he saw no good in +men and failed to help them. Knowledge without love is not _true_ +knowledge, but folly and weakness. + +But, great as is the place given to love in _Paracelsus_, it is far less +than that given to it in the poet's later works. In _Ferishtah's +Fancies_ and _La Saisiaz_ it is no longer rivalled by knowledge; nor +even in _Easter Day_, where the voice beside the poet proclaiming that + + "Life is done, + Time ends, Eternity's begun," + +gives a final pronouncement upon the purposes of the life of man. The +world of sense--of beauty and art, of knowledge and truth, are given to +man, but none of them satisfy his spirit; they merely sting with hunger +for something better. "Deficiency gapes every side," till love is known +as the essence and worth of all things. + + "Is this thy final choice? + Love is the best? 'Tis somewhat late! + And all thou dost enumerate + Of power and beauty in the world, + The righteousness of love was curled + Inextricably round about. + Love lay within it and without, + To clasp thee,--but in vain! Thy soul + Still shrunk from Him who made the whole, + Still set deliberate aside + His love!--Now take love! Well betide + Thy tardy conscience!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Easter Day._] + +In his later reflective poems, in which he deals with the problems of +life in the spirit of a metaphysician, seeking a definite answer to the +questions of the intelligence, he declares the reason for his preference +of love to knowledge. In _La Saisiaz_ he states that man's love is God's +too, a spark from His central fire; but man's knowledge is man's only. +Knowledge is finite, limited and tinged with sense. The truth we reach +at best is only truth _for us_, relative, distorted. We are for ever +kept from the fact which is supposed to be given; our intellects play +about it; sense and even intellect itself are interposing media, which +we must use, and yet, in using them, we only fool ourselves with +semblances. The poet has now grown so cautious that he will not declare +his own knowledge to be valid for any other man. David Hume could +scarcely be more suspicious of the human intellect; nor Berkeley more +surely persuaded of the purely subjective nature of its attainments. In +fact, the latter relied on human knowledge in a way impossible to +Browning, for he regarded it as the language of spirit speaking to +spirit. Out of his experience, Browning says, + + "There crowds conjecture manifold. + But, as knowledge, this comes only,--things may be as I behold + Or may not be, but, without me and above me, things there are; + I myself am what I know not--ignorance which proves no bar + To the knowledge that I am, and, since I am, can recognize + What to me is pain and pleasure: this is sure, the rest--surmise."[A] + +[Footnote A: _La Saisiaz_.] + +Thought itself, for aught he knows, may be afflicted with a kind of +colour-blindness; and he knows no appeal when one affirms "green as +grass," and another contradicts him with "red as grass." Under such +circumstances, it is not strange that Browning should decline to speak +except for himself, and that he will + + "Nowise dare to play the spokesman for my brothers strong or weak," + +or that he will far less presume to pronounce for God, and pretend that +the truth finds utterance from lips of clay-- + + "Pass off human lisp as echo of the sphere-song out of reach." + + "Have I knowledge? Confounded it shrivels at Wisdom laid bare! + Have I forethought? how purblind, how blank, to the Infinite Care! + + * * * * * + + "And thus looking within and around me, I ever renew + (With that stoop of the soul, which in bending upraises it too) + The submission of man's nothing-perfect to God's all-complete, + As by each new obeisance in spirit, I climb to His feet."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Saul_, III.] + +But David finds in himself one faculty so supreme in worth that he keeps +it in abeyance-- + + "Lest, insisting to claim and parade in it, wot ye, I worst + E'en the Giver in one gift.--Behold, I could love if I durst! + But I sink the pretension as fearing a man may o'ertake + God's own speed in the one way of love: I abstain for love's sake."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Saul_, III.] + +This faculty of love, so far from being tainted with finitude, like +knowledge; so far from being mere man's, or a temporary and deceptive +power given to man for temporary uses, by a Creator who has another +ineffably higher way of loving, as He has of truth, is itself divine. In +contrast with the activity of love, Omnipotence itself dwindles into +insignificance, and creation sinks into a puny exercise of power. Love, +in a word, is the highest good; and, as such, it has all its worth in +itself, and gives to all other things what worth they have. God Himself +gains the "ineffable crown" by showing love and saving the weak. It is +the power divine, the central energy of God's being. + +Browning never forgets this moral or religious quality of love. So pure +is this emotion to the poet, "so perfect in whiteness, that it will not +take pollution; but, ermine-like, is armed from dishonour by its own +soft snow." In the corruptest hearts, amidst the worst sensuality, love +is still a power divine, making for all goodness. Even when it is +kindled into flame by an illicit touch, and wars against the life of the +family, which is its own product, its worth is supreme. He who has +learned to love in any way, has "caught God's secret." How he has caught +it, whom he loves, whether or not he is loved in return, all these +things matter little. The paramount question on which hangs man's fate +is, has he learned to love another, any other, Fifine or Elvire. "She +has lost me," said the unloved lover; "I have gained her. Her soul's +mine." + +The supreme worth of love, the mere emotion itself, however called into +activity, secures it against all taint. No one who understands Browning +in the least, can accuse him of touching with a rash hand the sanctity +of the family; rather he places it on the basis of its own principle, +and thereby makes for it the strongest defence. Such love as he speaks +of, however irregular its manifestation or sensuous its setting, can +never be confounded with lust--"hell's own blue tint." It is further +removed from lust even than asceticism. It has not even a negative +attitude towards the flesh; but finds the flesh to be "stuff for +transmuting," and reduces it to the uses of the spirit. The love which +is sung by Browning is more pure and free, and is set in a higher +altitude than anything that can be reached by the way of negation. It is +a consecration of the undivided self, so that "soul helps not flesh +more, than flesh helps soul." It is not only a spiritual and divine +emotion, but it also "shows a heart within blood-tinctured with a veined +humanity." + + "Be a God and hold me + With a charm! + Be a man and hold me + With thine arm! + + "Teach me, only teach, Love! + As I ought + I will speak thy speech, Love! + Think thy thought-- + + "Meet, if thou require it, + Both demands, + Laying flesh and spirit + In thy hands."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Woman's Last Word_.] + +True love is always an infinite giving, which holds nothing back. It is +a spendthrift, magnificent in its recklessness, squandering the very +essence of the self upon its object, and by doing so, in the end +enriching the self beyond all counting. For in loving, the individual +becomes re-impersonated in another; the distinction of Me and Thee is +swept away, and there pulses in two individuals one warm life. + + "If two lives join, there is oft a scar + They are one and one with a shadowy third; + One near one is too far. + + "A moment after, and hands unseen + Were hanging the night around us fast; + But we knew that a bar was broken between + Life and life: we were mixed at last + In spite of the mortal screen."[B] + +[Footnote B: _By the Fireside_.] + +The throwing down of the limits that wall a man within himself, the +mingling of his own deepest interests with those of others, always marks +love; be it love of man for maid, parent for child, or patriot for his +country. It opens an outlet into the pure air of the world of objects, +and enables man to escape from the stuffed and poisonous atmosphere of +his narrow self. It is a streaming outwards of the inmost treasures of +the spirit, a consecration of its best activities to the welfare of +others. And when this is known to be the native quality and quintessence +of love, no one can regard it anywhere, or at any time, as out of place. +"Prize-lawful or prize-lawless" it is ever a flower, even though it +grow, like the love of the hero of _Turf and Towers_, in slime. Lust, +fleshly desire, which has been too often miscalled love, is its worst +perversion. Love spends itself for another, and seeks satisfaction only +in another's good. But last uses up others for its own worst purposes, +wastes its object, and turns the current of life back inwards, into the +slush and filth of selfish pleasure. The distinction between love and +its perversion, which is impossible in the naive life of an animal, +ought to be clear enough to all, and probably is. Nor should the sexual +impulse in human beings be confused with fleshly desire, and treated as +if it were merely natural, "the mere lust of life" common to all living +things,--"that strive," as Spinoza put it, "to persevere in existing." +For there is no purely natural impulse in man; all that he is, is +transfused with spirit, whether he will or no. He cannot act as a mere +animal, because he cannot leave his rational nature behind him. + +He cannot desire as an innocent brute desires: his desire is always love +or lust. We have as little right to say that the wisdom of the sage is +_nothing but_ the purblind savagery of a Terra del Fuegian, as we have +to assert that love is _nothing but_ a sexual impulse. That impulse +rather, when its potency is set free, will show itself, at first +confusedly, but with more and more clearness as it expands, to be the +yearning of soul for soul. It puts us "in training for a love which +knows not sex, nor person, nor partiality; but which seeks virtue and +wisdom everywhere, to the end of increasing virtue and wisdom." The +height to which this passion lifts man, is just what makes possible the +fall into a sensuality and excess of brutishness, in comparison with +which animal life is a paradise of innocence. + +If this is clearly recognized, many of the idle questions of casuistry +that are sometimes raised regarding sexual love and marriage will cease +to trouble. For these questions generally presuppose the lowest possible +view of this passion. Browning shows us how to follow with serene +security the pure light of the emotion of love, amidst all the confused +lawlessness of lustful passion, and through all the intricacies of human +character. Love, he thinks, is never illicit, never unwise, except when +it is disloyal to itself; it never ruins, but always strives to enrich +its object. Bacon quotes with approval a saying "That it is impossible +to love, and to be wise." Browning asserts that it is impossible to love +and _not_ be wise. It is a power that, according to the Christian idea +which the poet adopts, has infinite goodness for its source, and that, +even in its meanest expression, is always feeling its way back to its +origin, flowing again into the ocean whence it came. + +So sparklingly pure is this passion that it could exorcise the evil and +turn old to new, even in the case of Leonce Miranda. At least Browning, +in this poem, strives to show that, being true love, though the love of +an unclean man for an unclean woman, it was a power at war with the +sordid elements of that sordid life. Love has always the same potency, +flame is always flame, + + "no matter whence flame sprung, + From gums and spice, or else from straw and rottenness."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Fifine at the Fair_, lv.] + + "Let her but love you, + All else you disregard! what else can be? + You know how love is incompatible + With falsehood--purifies, assimilates + All other passions to itself."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Colombe's Birthday._] + + "Ne'er wrong yourself so far as quote the world + And say, love can go unrequited here! + You will have blessed him to his whole life's end-- + Low passions hindered, baser cares kept back, + All goodness cherished where you dwelt--and dwell."[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid_.] + +But, while love is always a power lifting a man upwards to the level of +its own origin from whatever depths of degradation, its greatest potency +can reveal itself only in characters intrinsically pure, such as +Pompilia and Caponsacchi. Like mercy and every other spiritual gift, it +is mightiest in the mighty. In the good and great of the earth love is +veritably seen to be God's own energy; + + "Who never is dishonoured in the spark + He gave us from His fire of fires, and bade + Remember whence it sprang, nor be afraid + While that burns on, though all the rest grow dark."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Any Wife to Any Husband_, III.] + +It were almost an endless task to recount the ways in which Browning +exhibits the moralizing power of love: how it is for him the +quintessence of all goodness; the motive, and inspiring cause, of every +act in the world that is completely right; and how, on that account, it +is the actual working in the man of the ideal of all perfection. This +doctrine of love is, in my opinion, the richest vein of pure ore in +Browning's poetry. + +But it remains to follow briefly our poet's treatment of love in another +direction--as a principle present, not only in God as creative and +redeeming Power, and in man as the highest motive and energy of the +moral life, but also in the outer world, in the "material" universe. In +the view of the poet, the whole creation is nothing but love incarnate, +a pulsation from the divine heart. Love is the source of all law and of +all beauty. "Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night speaketh +knowledge. There is no speech or language where their voice is not +heard." And our poet speaks as if he had caught the meaning of the +language, and believes that all things speak of love--the love of God. + +"I think," says the heroine of the _Inn Album_, + + "Womanliness means only motherhood; + All love begins and ends there,--roams enough, + But, having run the circle, rests at home."[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Inn Album_.] + +And Browning detects something of this motherhood everywhere. He finds +it as + + "Some cause + Such as is put into a tree, which turns + Away from the north wind with what nest it holds."[B] + +[Footnote B: _The Ring and the Book_--_Canon Caponsacchi_, 1374-1376.] + +The Pope--who, if any one, speaks for Browning--declares that + + "Brute and bird, reptile and the fly, + Ay and, I nothing doubt, even tree, shrub, plant + And flower o' the field, are all in a common pact + To worthily defend the trust of trusts, + Life from the Ever Living."[C] + +[Footnote C: _The Ring and the Book--The Pope_, 1076-1081.] + +"Because of motherhood," said the minor pope in _Ivan Ivanovitch_, + + "each male + Yields to his partner place, sinks proudly in the scale: + His strength owned weakness, wit--folly, and courage--fear, + Beside the female proved males's mistress--only here + The fox-dam, hunger-pined, will slay the felon sire + Who dares assault her whelp." + +The betrayal of the mother's trust is the "unexampled sin," which scares +the world and shames God. + + "I hold that, failing human sense, + The very earth had oped, sky fallen, to efface + Humanity's new wrong, motherhood's first disgrace."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Ivan Ivanovitch_.] + +This instinct of love, which binds brute-parent to brute-offspring, is a +kind of spiritual law in the natural world: it, like all law, guarantees +the continuity and unity of the world, and it is scarcely akin to merely +physical attraction. No doubt its basis is physical; it has an organism +of flesh and blood for its vehicle and instrument: but mathematical +physics cannot explain it, nor can it be detected by chemical tests. +Rather, with the poet, we are to regard brute affection as a kind of +rude outline of human love; as a law in nature, which, when understood +by man and adopted as his rule of conduct, becomes the essence and +potency of his moral life. + +Thus Browning regards love as an omnipresent good. There is nothing, he +tells us in _Fifine_, which cannot reflect it; even moral putridity +becomes phosphorescent, "and sparks from heaven transpierce earth's +coarsest covertures." + + "There is no good of life but love--but love! + What else looks good, is some shade flung from love, + Love gilds it, gives it worth."[B] + +[Footnote B: _In a balcony_.] + +There is no fact which, if seen to the heart, will not prove itself to +have love for its purpose, and, therefore, for its substance. And it is +on this account that everything finds its place in a kosmos and that +there is + + "No detail but, in place allotted it, was prime + And perfect."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Fifine at the Fair_. xxxi.] + +Every event in the history of the world and of man is explicable, as the +bursting into new form of this elemental, all-pervading power. The +permanence in change of nature, the unity in variety, the strength which +clothes itself in beauty, are all manifestations of love. Nature is not +merely natural; matter and life's minute beginnings, are more than they +seem. Paracelsus said that he knew and felt + + "What God is, what we are, + What life is--how God tastes an infinite joy + In finite ways--one everlasting bliss, + From whom all being emanates, all power + Proceeds: in whom is life for evermore, + Yet whom existence in its lowest form + Includes."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Paracelsus_.] + +The scheme of love does not begin with man, he is rather its +consummation. + + "Whose attributes had here and there + Been scattered o'er the visible world before, + Asking to be combined, dim fragments meant + To be united in some wondrous whole, + Imperfect qualities throughout creation, + Suggesting some one creature yet to make, + Some point where all those scattered rays should meet + Convergent in the faculties of man. + + * * * * * + + "Hints and previsions of which faculties, + Are strewn confusedly everywhere about + The inferior natures, and all lead up higher, + All shape out divinely the superior race, + The heir of hopes too fair to turn out false, + And man appears at last."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Paracelsus_.] + +Power, knowledge, love, all these are found in the world, in which + + "All tended to mankind, + And, man produced, all has its end thus far: + But, in completed man begins anew + A tendency to God."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +For man, being intelligent, flings back his light on all that went +before, + + "Illustrates all the inferior grades, explains + Each back step in the circle."[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid_. 189.] + +He gives voice to the mute significance of Nature, and lets in the light +on its blind groping. + + "Man, once descried, imprints for ever + His presence on all lifeless things." + +And how is this interpretation achieved? By penetrating behind force, +power, mechanism, and even intelligence, thinks the poet, to a purpose +which is benevolent, a reason which is all embracing and rooted in love. +The magnificent failure of Paracelsus came from missing this last step. +His transcendent hunger for knowledge was not satisfied, not because +human knowledge is essentially an illusion or mind disease, but because +his knowledge did not reach the final truth of things, which is love. +For love alone makes the heart wise, to know the secret of all being. +This is the ultimate hypothesis in the light of which alone man can +catch a glimpse of the general direction and intent of the universal +movement in the world and man. Dying, Paracelsus, taught by Aprile, +caught a glimpse of this elemental "love-force," in which alone lies the +clue to every problem, and the promise of the final satisfaction of the +human spirit. Failing in this knowledge, man may know many things, but +nothing truly; for all such knowledge stays with outward shows. It is +love alone that puts man in the right relation to his fellows and to the +world, and removes the distortion which fills life with sorrow, and +makes it + + "Only a scene + Of degradation, ugliness and tears, + The record of disgraces best forgotten, + A sullen page in human chronicles + Fit to erase."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Paracelsus_.] + +But in the light of love, man "sees a good in evil, and a hope in ill +success," and recognizes that mankind are + + "All with a touch of nobleness, despite + Their error, upward tending all though weak; + Like plants in mines which never saw the sun, + But dream of him, and guess where he may be, + And do their best to climb and get to him."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +"All this I knew not," adds Paracelsus, "and I failed. Let men take the +lesson and press this lamp of love, 'God's lamp, close to their +breasts'; its splendour, soon or late, will pierce the gloom," and show +that the universe is a transparent manifestation of His beneficence. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +BROWNING'S IDEALISM, AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION. + + + "Master, explain this incongruity! + When I dared question, 'It is beautiful, + But is it true?' thy answer was, 'In truth + Lives Beauty.'"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Shah Abbas_.] + +We have now seen how Browning sought to explain all things as +manifestations of the principle of love; how he endeavoured to bring all +the variety of finite existence, and even the deep discrepancies of good +and evil, under the sway of one idea. I have already tried to show that +all human thought is occupied with the same task: science, art, +philosophy, and even the most ordinary common-sense, are all, in their +different ways, seeking for constant laws amongst changing facts. Nay, +we may even go so far as to say that all the activity of man, the +practical as well as the theoretical, is an attempt to establish a +_modus vivendi_ between his environment and himself. And such an attempt +rests on the assumption that there is some ground common to both of the +struggling powers within and without, some principle that manifests +itself both in man and in nature. So that all men are philosophers to +the extent of postulating a unity, which is deeper than all differences; +and all are alike trying to discover, in however limited or ignorant a +way, what that unity is. If this fact were more constantly kept in view, +the effort of philosophers to bring the ultimate colligating principles +of thought into clear consciousness would not, at the outset at least, +be regarded with so much suspicion. For the philosopher differs from the +practical man of the world, not so much in the nature of the task which +he is trying to accomplish, as in the distinct and conscious purpose +with which he enters upon it. + +Now, I think that those, who, like Browning, offer an explicitly +optimistic idea of the relation between man and the world, have a +special right to a respectful hearing; for it can scarcely be denied +that their optimistic explanation is invaluable, _if it is true_-- + + "So might we safely mock at what unnerves + Faith now, be spared the sapping fear's increase + That haply evil's strife with good shall cease + Never on earth."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Bernard de Mandeville_.] + +Despair is a great clog to good work for the world, and pessimists, as a +rule, have shown much more readiness than optimists to let evil have its +unimpeded way. Having found, like Schopenhauer, that "Life is an awkward +business," they "determine to spend life in reflecting on it," or at +least in moaning about it. The world's helpers have been men of another +mould; and the contrast between Fichte and Schopenhauer is suggestive of +a general truth:--"Fichte, in the bright triumphant flight of his +idealism, supported by faith in a moral order of the world which works +for righteousness, turning his back on the darker ethics of self-torture +and mortification, and rushing into the political and social fray, +proclaiming the duties of patriotism, idealizing the soldier, +calling to and exercising an active philanthrophy, living with +his nation, and continually urging it upwards to higher levels of +self-realization--Schopenhauer recurring to the idea of asceticism, +preaching the blessedness of the quiescence of all will, disparaging +efforts to save the nation or elevate the masses, and holding that each +has enough to do in raising his own self from its dull engrossment in +lower things to an absorption in that pure, passionless being which lies +far beyond all, even the so-called highest, pursuits of practical +life."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Schopenhauer_, by Prof. Wallace.] + +A pessimism, which is nothing more than flippant fault-finding, +frequently gains a cheap reputation for wisdom; and, on the other hand, +an optimism, which is really the result of much reflection and +experience, may be regarded as the product of a superficial spirit that +has never known the deeper evils of life. But, if pessimism be true, it +differs from other truths by its uselessness; for, even if it saves man +from the bitterness of petty disappointments, it does so only by making +the misery universal. There is no need to specify, when "_All_ is +vanity." The drowning man does not feel the discomfort of being wet. But +yet, if we reflect on the problem of evil, we shall find that there is +no neutral ground, and shall ultimately be driven to choose between +pessimism and its opposite. Nor, on the other hand, is the suppression +of the problem of evil possible, except at a great cost. It presents +itself anew in the mind of every thinking man; and some kind of solution +of it, or at least some definite way of meeting its difficulty, is +involved in the attitude which every man assumes towards life and its +tasks. + +It is not impossible that there may be as much to be said for Browning's +joy in life and his love of it, as there is for his predecessor's rage +and sorrow. Browning certainly thought that there was; and he held his +view consistently to the end. We cannot, therefore, do justice to the +poet without dealing critically with the principle on which he has based +his faith, and observing how far it is applicable to the facts of human +life. As I have previously said, he strives hard to come into fair +contact with the misery of man in all its sadness; and, after doing so, +he claims, not as a matter of poetic sentiment, but as a matter of +strict truth, that good is the heart and reality of it all. It is true +that he cannot demonstrate the truth of his principle by reference to +all the facts, any more than the scientific man can justify his +hypothesis in every detail; but he holds it as a faith which reason can +justify and experience establish, although not in every isolated +phenomenon. The good may, he holds, be seen actually at work in the +world, and its process will be more fully known, as human life advances +towards its goal. + + "Though Master keep aloof, + Signs of His presence multiply from roof + To basement of the building."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Francis Furini_.] + +Thus Browning bases his view upon experience, and finds firm footing for +his faith in the present; although he acknowledges that the "profound of +ignorance surges round his rockspit of self-knowledge." + + "Enough that now, + Here where I stand, this moment's me and mine, + Shows me what is, permits me to divine + What shall be."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +"Since we know love we know enough"; for in love, he confidently thinks +we have the key to all the mystery of being. + +Now, what is to be made of an optimism of this kind, which is based upon +love and which professes to start from experience, or to be legitimately +and rationally derived from it? + +If such a view be taken seriously, as I propose doing, we must be +prepared to meet at the outset with some very grave difficulties. The +first of these is that it is an interpretation of facts by a human +emotion. To say that love blushes in the rose, or breaks into beauty in +the clouds, that it shows its strength in the storm, and sets the stars +in the sky, and that it is in all things the source of order and law, +may imply a principle of supreme worth both to poetry and religion; but +when we are asked to take it as a metaphysical explanation of facts, we +are prone, like the judges of Caponsacchi, not to "levity, or to +anything indecorous"-- + + "Only--I think I apprehend the mood: + There was the blameless shrug, permissible smirk, + The pen's pretence at play with the pursed mouth, + The titter stifled in the hollow palm + Which rubbed the eye-brow and caressed the nose, + When I first told my tale; they meant, you know-- + 'The sly one, all this we are bound believe! + Well, he can say no other than what he says.'"[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book--Canon Caponsacchi_, 14-20.] + +We are sufficiently willing to let the doctrine be held as a pious +opinion. The faith that "all's love yet all's law," like many another +illusion, if not hugged too closely, may comfort man's nakedness. But if +we are asked to substitute this view for that which the sciences +suggest,--if we are asked to put "Love" in the place of physical energy, +and, by assuming it as a principle, to regard as unreal all the infinite +misery of humanity and the degradation of intellect and character from +which it arises, common-sense seems at once to take the side of the +doleful sage of Chelsea. When the optimist postulates that the state of +the world, were it rightly understood, is completely satisfactory, +reason seems to be brought to a stand; and if poetry and religion +involve such a postulate, they are taken to be ministering to the +emotions at the expense of the intellect. + +Browning, however, was not a mere sentimentalist who could satisfy his +heart without answering the questions of his intellect. Nor is his view +without support--at least, as regards the substance of it. The presence +of an idealistic element in things is recognized even by ordinary +thought; and no man's world is so poor that it would not be poorer still +for him, if it were reduced by the abstract sciences of nature into a +mere manifestation of physical force. Such a world Richter compares to +an empty eye-socket. + +The great result of speculation since the time of Kant is to teach us to +recognize that objects are essentially related to mind, and that the +principles which rule our thought enter, so to speak, into the +constitution of the things we know. A very slight acquaintance with the +history even of psychology, especially in modern times, shows that facts +are more and more retracted into thought. This science, which began with +a sufficiently common-sense view, not only of the reality and solidity +of the things of the outer world, but of their opposition to, or +independence of thought, is now thinning that world down into a mere +shadow--a something which excites sensation. It shows that external +things as we know them, and we are not concerned in any others, are, to +a very great extent, the product of our thinking activities. No one will +now subscribe to the Lockian or Humean view, of images impressed by +objects on mind: the object which "impresses" has first to be made by +mind, out of the results of nervous excitation. In a word, modern +psychology as well as modern metaphysics, is demonstrating more and more +fully the dependence of the world, as it is known, on the nature and +activity of man's mind. Every explanation of the world is found to be, +in this sense, idealistic; and in this respect, there is no difference +whatsoever between the interpretation given by science and that of +poetry, or religion, or philosophy. If we say that a thing is a +"substance," or has "a cause"; if, with the physicist, we assert the +principle of the transmutation of energy, or make use of the idea of +evolution with the biologist or geologist; nay, if we speak of time and +space with the mathematician, we use principles of unity derived from +self-consciousness, and interpret nature in terms of ourselves, just as +truly as the poet or philosopher, who makes love, or reason, the +constitutive element in things. If the practical man of the world +charges the poet and philosopher with living amidst phantoms, he can be +answered with a "_Tu quoque_." "How easy," said Emerson, "it is to show +the materialist that he also is a phantom walking and working amid +phantoms, and that he need only ask a question or two beyond his daily +questions to find his solid universe proving dim and impalpable before +his sense." + +"Sense," which seems to show directly that the world is a solid reality, +not dependent in any way on thought, is found not to be reliable. All +science is nothing but an appeal to thought from ordinary sensuous +opinion. It is an attempt to find the reality of things by thinking +about them; and this reality, when it is found, turns out to be a law. +But laws are ideas; though, if they are true ideas, they represent not +merely thoughts in the mind, but also real principles, which manifest +themselves in the objects of the outer world, as well as in the +thinker's mind. + +It is not possible in such a work as this, to give a carefully reasoned +proof of this view of the relation of thought and things, or to repeat +the argument of Kant. I must be content with merely referring to it, as +showing that the principles in virtue of which we think, are the +principles in virtue of which objects as we know them exist; and we +cannot be concerned with any other objects. The laws which scientific +investigation discovers are not only ideas that can be written in books, +but also principles which explain the nature of things. In other words, +the hypotheses of the natural sciences, or their categories, are points +of view in the light of which the external world can be regarded as +governed by uniform laws. And these constructive principles, which lift +the otherwise disconnected world into an intelligible system, are +revelations of the nature of intelligence, and only on that account +principles for explaining the world. + + "To know, + Rather consists in opening out a way + Whence the imprisoned splendour may escape, + Than in effecting entry for a light + Supposed to be without."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Paracelsus_.] + +In this sense, it may be said that all knowledge is anthropomorphic; and +in this respect there is no difference between the physics, which speaks +of energy as the essence of things, and the poetry, which speaks of love +as the ultimate principle of reality. Between such scientific and +idealistic explanations there is not even the difference that the one +begins without and the other within, or that the one is objective and +the other subjective. The true distinction is that the principles upon +which the latter proceed are less abstract than those of science. +"Reason" and "love" are higher principles for the explanation of the +nature of things than "substance" or "cause"; but both are forms of the +unity of thought. And if the latter seem to have nothing to do with the +self, it is only because they are inadequate to express its full +character. On the other hand, the higher categories, or ideas of reason, +seem to be merely anthropomorphic, and, therefore, ill-suited to explain +nature, because the relation of nature to intelligence is habitually +neglected by ordinary thought, which has not pressed its problems far +enough to know that such higher categories can alone satisfy the demand +for truth. + +But natural science is gradually driven from the lower to the higher +categories, or, in other words, it is learning to take a more and more +idealistic view of nature. It is moving very slowly, because it is a +long labour to exhaust the uses of an instrument of thought; and it is +only at great intervals in the history of the human intellect, that we +find the need of a change of categories. But, as already hinted, there +is no doubt that science is becoming increasingly aware of the +conditions, under which alone its results may be held as valid. At +first, it drove "mind" out of the realm of nature, and offered to +explain both it and man in physical and mathematical terms. But, in our +day, the man of science has become too cautious to make such rash +extensions of the principles he uses. He is more inclined to limit +himself to his special field, and he refuses to make any declaration as +to the ultimate nature of things. He holds himself apart from +materialism, as he does from idealism. I think I may even go further, +and say that the fatal flaw of materialism has been finally detected, +and that the essential relativity of all objects to thought is all but +universally acknowledged. + +The common notion that science gives a complete view of truth, to which +we may appeal as refuting idealism, is untenable. Science itself will +not support the appeal, but will direct the appellant to another court. +Perhaps, rather, it would be truer to say that its attitude is one of +doubt whether or not any court, philosophical or other, can give any +valid decision on the matter. Confining themselves to the region of +material phenomena, scientific men generally leave to common ignorance, +or to moral and theological tradition, all the interests and activities +of man, other than those which are physical or physiological. And some +of them are even aware, that if they could find the physical equation of +man, or, through their knowledge of physiology, actually produce in man +the sensations, thoughts, and notions now ascribed to the intelligent +life within him, the question of the spiritual or material nature of man +and the world, would remain precisely where it was. The explanation +would still begin with mind and end there. The principles of the +materialistic explanation of the world would still be derived from +intelligence; mind would still underlie all it explained, and completed +science would still be, in this sense, anthropomorphic. The charge of +anthropomorphism thus falls to the ground, because it would prove too +much. It is a weapon which cuts the hand that wields it. And, as +directed against idealism, it only shows that he who uses it has +inadequate notions both of the nature of the self and of the world, and +is not aware that each gets meaning, only as an exponent of the other. + +On the whole, we may say that it is not men of science who now assail +philosophy, because it gives an idealistic explanation of the world, so +much as unsystematic dabblers in matters of thought. The best men of +science, rather, show a tendency to acquiesce in a kind of dualism of +matter and spirit, and to leave morality and religion, art and +philosophy to pursue their own ends undisturbed. Mr. Huxley, for +instance, and some others, offer two philosophical solutions, one +proceeding from the material world and the other from the sensations and +other "facts of consciousness." They say that we may either explain man +as a natural phenomenon, or the world as a mental one. + +But it is a little difficult not to ask which of these explanations is +true. Both of them cannot well be, seeing that they are different. And +neither of them can be adopted without very serious consequences. It +would require considerable hardihood to suggest that natural science +should be swept away in favour of psychology, which would be done if the +one view held by Mr. Huxley were true. And, in my opinion, it requires +quite as much hardihood to suggest the adoption of a theory that makes +morality and religion illusory, which would be done were the other view +valid. + +As a matter of fact, however, such an attitude can scarcely be held by +any one who is interested _both_ in the success of natural science and +in the spiritual development of mankind. We are constrained rather to +say that, if these rival lines of thought lead us to deny either the +outer world of things, or the world of thought and morality, then they +must both be wrong. They are not "explanations" but false theories, if +they lead to such conclusions as these. And, instead of holding them up +to the world as the final triumph of human thought, we should sweep them +into the dust-bin, and seek for some better explanation from a new point +of view. + +And, indeed, a better explanation is sought, and sought not only by +idealists, but by scientific men themselves,--did they only comprehend +their own main tendency and method. The impulse towards unity, which is +the very essence of thought, if it is baulked in one direction by a +hopeless dualism, just breaks out in another. Subjective idealism, that +is, the theory that things are nothing but phenomena of the individual's +consciousness, that the world is really all inside the philosopher, is +now known by most people to end in self-contradiction; and materialism +is also known to begin with it. And there are not many people sanguine +enough to believe with Mr. Huxley and Mr. Herbert Spencer, that, if we +add two self-contradictory theories together, or hold them alternately, +we shall find the truth. Modern science, that is, the science which does +not philosophize, and modern philosophy are with tolerable unanimity +denying this absolute dualism. They do not know of any thought that is +not of things, or of any things that are not for thought. It is +necessarily assumed that, in some way or other, the gap between things +and thought is got over by knowledge. How the connection is brought +about may not be known; but, that there is the connection between real +things and true thoughts, no one can well deny. It is an ill-starred +perversity which leads men to deny such a connection, merely because +they have not found out how it is established. + +A new category of thought has taken possession of the thought of our +time--a category which is fatal to dualism. The idea of development is +breaking down the division between mind and matter, as it is breaking +down all other absolute divisions. Geology, astronomy, and physics at +one extreme, biology, psychology, and philosophy at the other, combine +in asserting the idea of the universe as a unity which is always +evolving its content, and bringing its secret potencies to the light. It +is true that these sciences have not linked hands as yet. We cannot get +from chemistry to biology without a leap, or from physiology to +psychology without another. But no one will postulate a rift right +through being. The whole tendency of modern science implies the opposite +of such a conception. History is striving to trace continuity between +the civilized man and the savage. Psychology is making towards a +junction with physiology and general biology, biology with chemistry, +and chemistry with physics. That there is an unbroken continuity in +existence is becoming a postulate of modern science, almost as truly as +the "universality of law" or "the uniformity of nature." Nor is the +postulate held less firmly because the evidence for the continuity of +nature is not yet complete. Chemistry has not yet quite lapsed into +physics; biology at present shows no sign of giving up its +characteristic conception of life, and the former science is as yet +quite unable to deal with that peculiar phenomenon. The facts of +consciousness have not been resolved into nervous action, and, so far, +mind has not been shown to be a secretion of brain. Nevertheless, all +these sciences are beating against the limits which separate them, and +new suggestions of connection between natural life and its inorganic +environment are continually discovered. The sciences are boring towards +each other, and the dividing strata are wearing thin; so that it seems +reasonable to expect that, with the growth of knowledge, an unbroken way +upwards may be discovered, from the lowest and simplest stages of +existence to the highest and most complex forms of self-conscious life. + +Now, to those persons who are primarily interested in the ethical and +religious phenomena of man's life, the idea of abolishing the chasm +between spirit and nature is viewed with no little apprehension. It is +supposed that if evolution were established as a universal law, and the +unity of being were proved, the mental and moral life of man would be +degraded into a complex manifestation of mere physical force. And we +even find religious men rejoicing at the failure of science to bridge +the gap between the inorganic and the organic, and between natural and +self-conscious life; as if the validity of religion depended upon the +maintenance of their separating boundaries. But no religion that is free +from superstitious elements has anything to gain from the failure of +knowledge to relate things to each other. It is difficult to see how +breaks in the continuity of being can be established, when every living +plant confutes the absolute difference between the organic and +inorganic, and, by the very fact of living, turns the latter into the +former; and it is difficult to deny the continuity of "mind and matter," +when every human being is relating himself to the outer world in all his +thoughts and actions. And religion is the very last form of thought +which could profit from such a proof of absolute distinctions, were it +possible. In fact, as we have seen, religion, in so far as it demands a +perfect and absolute being as the object of worship, is vitally +concerned in maintaining the unity of the world. It must assume that +matter, in its degree, reveals the same principle which, in a higher +form, manifests itself in spirit. + +But closer investigation will show that the real ground for such +apprehension does not lie in the continuity of existence, which +evolution implies; for religion itself postulates the same thing. The +apprehension springs, rather, from the idea that the continuity asserted +by evolution, is obtained by resolving the higher forms of existence +into the lower. It is believed that, if the application of development +to facts were successfully carried out, the organic would be shown to be +nothing but complex inorganic forces, mental life nothing but a +physiological process, and religion, morality, and art, nothing but +products of the highly complex motion of highly complex aggregates of +physical atoms. + +It seems to me quite natural that science should be regarded as tending +towards such a materialistic conclusion. This is the view which many +scientific investigators have themselves taken of their work; and some +of their philosophical exponents, notably Mr. Herbert Spencer, have, +with more or less inconsistency, interpreted the idea of evolution in +this manner. But, it may be well to bear in mind that science is +generally far more successful in employing its constructive ideas, than +it is in rendering an account of them. In fact, it is not its business +to examine its categories: that task properly belongs to philosophy, and +it is not a superfluous one. But, so long as the employment of the +categories in the special province of a particular science yields valid +results, scientific explorers and those who attach, and rightly attach, +so much value to their discoveries, are very unwilling to believe that +these categories are not valid universally. The warning voice of +philosophy is not heeded, when it charges natural science with applying +its conceptions to materials to which they are inadequate; and its +examination of the categories of thought is regarded as an innocent, but +also a useless, activity. For, it is argued, what good can arise from +the analysis of our working ideas? The world looked for causes, and +found them, when it was very young; but, up to the time of David Hume, +no one had shown what causality meant, and the explanation which he +offered is now rejected by modern science, as definitely as it is +rejected by philosophy. Meantime, while philosophy is still engaged in +exposing the fallacies of the theory of association as held by Hume, +science has gone beyond this category altogether; it is now establishing +a theory of the conservation of energy, which supplants the law of +causality by tracing it into a deeper law of nature. + +There is some force in this argument, but it cuts both ways. For, even +if it be admitted that the category was successfully applied in the +past, it is also admitted that it was applied without being understood; +and it cannot now be questioned that the philosophers were right in +rejecting it as the final explanation of the relation of objects to each +other, and in pointing to other and higher connecting ideas. And this +consideration should go some way towards convincing evolutionists that, +though they may be able successfully to apply the idea of development to +particular facts, this does not guarantee the soundness of their view of +it as an instrument of thought, or of the nature of the final results +which it is destined to achieve. Hence, without any disparagement to the +new extension which science has received by the use of this new idea, it +may be maintained that the ordinary view of its tendency and mission is +erroneous. + +"The prevailing method of explaining the world," says Professor Caird, +"may be described as an attempt to level 'downwards.' The doctrine of +development, interpreted as that idea usually is interpreted, supports +this view, as making it necessary to trace back higher and more complex +to lower or simpler forms of being; for the most obvious way of +accomplishing this task is to show analytically that there is really +nothing more in the former than in the latter."[A] "Divorced from +matter," asks Professor Tyndall, "where is life to be found? Whatever +our _faith_ may say our _knowledge_ shows them to be indissolubly +joined. Every meal we eat, and every cup we drink, illustrates the +mysterious _control of Mind by Matter_. Trace the line of life backwards +and see it approaching more and more to what we call the _purely +physical condition_."[B] And then, rising to the height of his subject, +or even above it, he proclaims, "By an intellectual necessity I cross +the boundary of the experimental evidence, and discern in that Matter +which we, in our ignorance of its latent powers, and notwithstanding our +professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with +opprobrium, the promise and potency of all terrestrial life."[C] A +little further on, speaking in the name of science, and on behalf of his +scientific fellow-workers (with what right is a little doubtful), he +adds--"We claim, and we shall wrest, from theology, the entire domain of +cosmological theory. All schemes and systems which thus infringe upon +the domain of science, must, _in so far as they do this,_ submit to its +control, and relinquish all thought of controlling it." But if science +is to control the knowable world, he generously leaves the remainder for +religion. He will not deprive it of a faith in "a Power absolutely +inscrutable to the intellect of man. As little in our days as in the +days of Job can a man by searching find this Power out." And, now that +he has left this empty sphere of the unknown to religion, he feels +justified in adding, "There is, you will observe, no very rank +materialism here." + +[Footnote A: _The Critical Philosophy of Kant_, Vol. I. p. 34] + +[Footnote B: _Address to the British Association_, 1874, p. 54.] + +[Footnote C: _Belfast Address_, 1874.] + + "Yet they did not abolish the gods, but they sent them well out + of the way, + With the rarest of nectar to drink, and blue fields of nothing + to sway."[A] + +[Footnote A: Clerk Maxwell: "_Notes of the President's Address,_" +British Association, 1874.] + +Now these declarations of Mr. Tyndall are, to say the least, somewhat +ambiguous and shadowy. Yet, when he informs us that eating and drinking +"illustrate the control of mind by matter," and "that the line of life +traced backwards leads towards a purely physical condition," it is a +little difficult to avoid the conclusion that he regards science as +destined. + + "To tread the world + Into a paste, and thereof make a smooth + Uniform mound, whereon to plant its flag."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau._] + +For the conclusion of the whole argument seems to be, that all _we know +as facts_ are mere forms of matter; although the stubborn refusal of +consciousness to be resolved into natural force, and its power of +constructing for itself a world of symbols, gives science no little +trouble, and forces it to acknowledge complete ignorance of the nature +of the power from which all comes. + + "So roll things to the level which you love, + That you could stand at ease there and survey + The universal Nothing undisgraced + By pert obtrusion of some old church-spire + I' the distance! "[A] + +[Footnote A: _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau_.] + +Some writers on ethics and religion have adopted the same view of the +goal of the idea of evolution. In consistency with this supposed +tendency of science, to resolve all things into their simplest, and +earliest forms, religion has been traced back to the superstition and +ghost-worship of savages; and then it has been contended that it is, in +essence, nothing more than superstition and ghost-worship. And, in like +manner, morality, with its categorical imperative of duty, has been +traced back, without a break, to the ignorant fear of the vengeance of a +savage chief. A similar process in the same direction reduces the love +divine, of which our poet speaks, into brute lust; somewhat sublimated, +it is true, in its highest forms, but not fundamentally changed. + + "Philosophers deduce you chastity + Or shame, from just the fact that at the first + Whoso embraced a woman in the field, + Threw club down and forewent his brains beside; + So, stood a ready victim in the reach + Of any brother-savage, club in hand. + Hence saw the use of going out of sight + In wood or cave to prosecute his loves."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Bishop Blouhram's Apology_.] + +And when the sacred things of life are treated in this manner--when +moral conduct is showed to be evolved by a continuous process from +"conduct in general," the conduct of an "infusorium or a cephalopod," or +even of wind-mills or water-wheels, it is not surprising if the +authority of the moral law seems to be undermined, and that "devout +souls" are apprehensive of the results of science. "Does law so analyzed +coerce you much?" asks Browning. + +The derivation of spiritual from natural laws thus appears to be fatal +to the former; and religious teachers naturally think that it is +necessary for their cause to snap the links of the chain of evolution, +and, like Professor Drummond, to establish absolute gaps, not only +between the inorganic and the organic worlds, but also between the +self-conscious life of man and the mysterious, spiritual life of Christ, +or God. But it seems to me that, in their antagonism to evolution, +religious teachers are showing the same incapacity to distinguish +between their friends and their foes, which they previously manifested +in their acceptance of the Kantian doctrine of "things in +themselves,"--a doctrine which placed God and the soul beyond the power +of speculative reason either to prove or disprove. It is, however, +already recognized that the attempt of Mansel and Hamilton to degrade +human reason for the behoof of faith was really a veiled agnosticism; +and a little reflection must show that the idea of evolution, truly +interpreted, in no wise threatens the degradation of man, or the +overthrow of his spiritual interests. On the contrary, this idea is, in +all the history of thought, the first constructive hypothesis which is +adequate to the uses of ethics and religion. By means of it, we may hope +to solve many of the problems arising from the nature of knowledge and +moral conduct, which the lower category of cause turned into pure +enigmas. It seems, indeed, to contain the promise of establishing the +science of man, as intelligent, on a firm basis; on which we may raise a +superstructure, comparable in strength and superior in worth, to that of +the science of nature. And, even if the moral science must, like +philosophy, always return to the beginning--must, that is, from the +necessity of its nature, and not from any complete failure--it will +still begin again at a higher level now that the idea of evolution is in +the field. + +It now remains to show in what way the idea of evolution leaves room for +religion and morality; or, in other words, to show how, so far from +degrading man to the level of the brute condition, and running life down +into "purely physical conditions," it contains the promise of +establishing that idealistic view of the world, which is maintained by +art and religion. + +In order to show this, it is necessary that the idea of evolution should +be used fearlessly, and applied to all facts that can in any way come +under it. It must, in other words, be used as a category of thought, +whose application is universal; so that, if it is valid at all as a +theory, it is valid of all finite things. For the question we are +dealing with is not the truth of the hypothesis of a particular science, +but the truth of a hypothesis as to the relation of all objects in the +world, including man himself. We must not be deterred from this +universal application by the fact that we cannot, as yet, prove its +truth in every detail. No scientific hypothesis ever has exhausted its +details. I consider, therefore, that Mr. Tyndall had a complete right to +"cross the boundary of the experimental evidence by an intellectual +necessity"; for the necessity comes from the assumption of a possible +explanation by the aid of the hypothesis. It is no argument against such +a procedure to insist that, as yet, there is no proof of the absolute +continuity of matter and physical life, or that the dead begets the +living. The hypothesis is not disproved by the absence of evidence; it +is only not proved. The connection may be there, although we have not, +as yet, been able to find it. In the face of such difficulties as these, +the scientific investigator has always a right to claim more time; and +his attitude is impregnable as long as he remembers, as Mr. Tyndall did +on the whole, that his hypothesis is a hypothesis. + +But Mr. Tyndall has himself given up this right. He, like Mr. Huxley, +has placed the phenomena of self-consciousness outside of the developing +process, and confined the sphere in which evolution is applicable, to +natural objects. Between objects and the subject, even when both subject +and object are man himself, there lies "an impassable gulf." + +Even to try "to comprehend the connection between thought and thing is +absurd, like the effort of a man trying to lift himself by his own +waist-band." Our states of self-consciousness are symbols only--symbols +of an outside entity, whose real nature we can never know. We know only +these states; we only _infer_ "that anything answering to our +impressions exists outside of ourselves." And it is impossible to +justify even that inference; for, if we can only know states of +consciousness, we cannot say that they are symbols of anything, or that +there is anything to be symbolized. The external world, on this theory, +ceases to exist even as an unknown entity. In triumphantly pointing out +that, in virtue of this psychological view, "There is, you will observe, +no very rank materialism here," Mr. Tyndall forgets that he has +destroyed the basis of all natural science, and reduced evolution into a +law of "an outside entity," of which we can never know anything, and any +inference regarding which violates every law of thought. + +It seems to me quite plain that either this psychological theory, which +Mr. Tyndall has mistaken for a philosophy, is invalid; or else it is +useless to endeavour to propound any view regarding a "nature which is +the phantom of the individual's mind." I prefer the science of Mr. +Tyndall (and of Mr. Huxley, too) to his philosophy; and he would have +escaped materialism more effectively, if he had remained faithful to his +theory of evolution. It is a disloyalty, not only to science, but to +thought, to cast away our categories when they seem to imply +inconvenient consequences. They must be valid universally, if they are +valid at all. + +Mr. Tyndall contends that nature makes man, and he finds evidence in the +fact that we eat and drink, "of the control of mind by matter." Now, it +seems to me, that _if_ nature makes man, then nature makes man's +thoughts also. His sensations, feelings, ideas, notions, being those of +a naturally-evolved agent, are revelations of the potency of the primal +matter, just as truly as are the buds, flowers, and fruits of a tree. No +doubt, we cannot as yet "comprehend the connection" between nervous +action and sensation, any more than we can comprehend the connection +between inorganic and organic existence. But, if the absence of +"experimental evidence" does not disprove the hypothesis in the one +case, it can not disprove it in the other. There are two crucial points +in which the theory has not been established. + +But, in both cases alike, there is the same kind of evidence that the +connection exists; although in neither case can we, as yet, discover +what it is. Plants live by changing inorganic elements into organic +structure; and man is intelligent only in so far as he crosses over the +boundary between subject and object, and knows the world without him. +There is no "impassable gulf separating the subject and object"; if +there were we could not know anything of either. There are not two +worlds--the one of thoughts, the other of things--which are absolutely +exclusive of each other, but one universe in which thought and reality +meet. Mr. Tyndall thinks that it is an inference (and an inference over +an impassable gulf!) that anything answering to our impressions exists +outside ourselves. "The question of the external world is the great +battleground of metaphysics," he quotes approvingly from Mr. J.S. Mill. +But the question of the external world is not whether that world exists; +it is, how are we to account for our knowledge that it does exist. The +inference is not from thoughts to things, nor from things to thoughts, +but from a partially known world to a systematic theory of that world. +Philosophy is not engaged on the foolish enterprise of trying to +discover whether the world exists, or whether we know that it exists; +its problem is how to account for our knowledge. It asks what must the +nature of things be, seeing that they are known; and what is the nature +of thought, seeing that it knows facts? + +There is no hope whatsoever for ethics, or religion, or philosophy--no +hope even for science--in a theory which would apply evolution all the +way up from inorganic matter to life, but which would postulate an +absolute break at consciousness. The connection between thought and +things is there to begin with, whether we can account for it or not; if +it were not, then natural science would be impossible. It would be +palpably irrational even to try to find out the nature of things by +thinking. The only science would be psychology, and even that would be +the science of "symbols of an unknown entity." What symbols of an +unknown can signify, or how an unknown can produce symbols of itself +across an impassable gulf--Mr. Spencer, Mr. Huxley, and Mr. Tyndall have +yet to inform us. + +It is the more necessary to insist on this, because the division between +thought and matter, which is admitted by these writers, is often grasped +at by their opponents, as a means of warding off the results which they +draw from the theory of evolution. When science breaks its sword, +religion assails it, with the fragment. It is not at once evident that +if this chasm were shown to exist, knowledge would be a chimera; for +there would be no outer world at all, not even a phenomenal one, to +supply an object for it. We _must_ postulate the ultimate unity of all +beings with each other and with the mind that knows them, just because +we are intellectual and moral beings; and to destroy this unity is to +"kill reason itself, as it were, in the eye," as Milton said. + +Now, evolution not only postulates unity, or the unbroken continuity of +all existence, but it also negates all differences, except those which +are expressions of that unity. It is not the mere assertion of a +substratum under qualities; but it implies that the substratum +penetrates into the qualities, and manifests itself in them. That which +develops--be it plant, child, or biological kingdom--is, at every stage +from lowest to highest, a concrete unity of all its differences; and in +the whole history of its process its actual content is always the same. +The environment of the plant evokes that content, but it adds nothing to +it. No addition of anything absolutely new, no external aggregation, no +insertion of anything alien into a growing thing, is possible. What it +is now, it was in the beginning; and what it will be, it is now. +Granting the hypothesis of evolution, there can be no quarrel with the +view that the crude beginnings of things, matter in its most nebulous +state, contains potentially all the rich variety of both natural and +spiritual life. + +But this continuity of all existence may be interpreted in two very +different ways. It may lead us either to radically change our notions of +mind and its activities, or "to radically change our notions of matter." +We may take as the principle of explanation, either the beginning, or +the end of the process of development. We may say of the simple and +crass, "There is all that your rich universe really means"; or we may +say of the spiritual activities of man, "This is what your crude +beginning really was." We may explain the complex by the simple, or the +simple by the complex. We may analyze the highest back into the lowest, +or we may follow the lowest, by a process of synthesis, up to the +highest. + +And one of the most important of all questions for morality and religion +is the question, which of these two methods is valid. If out of crass +matter is evolved all animal and spiritual life, does that prove life to +be nothing but matter; or does it not rather show that what we, in our +ignorance, took to be mere matter was really something much greater? If +"crass matter" contains all this promise and potency, by what right do +we still call it "crass"? It is manifestly impossible to treat the +potencies, assumed to lie in a thing that grows, as if they were of no +significance; first, to assert that such potencies exist, in saying that +the object develops; and then, to neglect them, and to regard the effect +as constituted merely of its simplest elements. Either these potencies +are not in the object, or else the object has in it, and is, at the +first, more than it appears to be. Either the object does not grow, or +the lowest stage of its being is no explanation of its true nature. + +If we wish to know what the forms of natural life mean, we look in vain +to their primary state. We must watch the evolution and revelation of +the secret hid in natural life, as it moves through the ascending cycles +of the biological kingdom. The idea of evolution, when it is not +muddled, is synthetic--not analytic; it explains the simplest in the +light of the complex, the beginning in the light of the end, and not +_vice versa_. In a word, it follows the ways of nature, the footsteps of +fact, instead of inventing a wilful backward path of its own. And nature +explains by gradually expanding. If we hearken to nature, and not to the +voice of illusory preconceptions, we shall hear her proclaim at the last +stage, "Here is the meaning of the seedling. Now it is clear what it +really was; for the power which lay dormant has pushed itself into +light, through bud and flower and leaf and fruit." The reality of a +growing thing is its highest form of being. The last explains the first, +but not the first the last. The first is abstract, incomplete, not yet +actual, but mere potency; and we could never know even the potency, +except in the light of its own actualization. + +From this correction of the abstract view of development momentous +consequences follow. If the universe is, as science pronounces, an +organic totality, which is ever converting its promise and potency into +actuality, then we must add that the ultimate interpretation even of +the lowest existence in the world cannot be given except on principles +which are adequate to explain the highest. We must "level up and not +level down": we must not only deny that matter can explain spirit, but +we must say that even matter itself cannot be fully understood, except +as an element in a spiritual world."[A] + +[Footnote A: Professor Caird, _The Critical Philosophy of Kant_, p. 35.] + +That the idea of evolution, even when applied in this consistent way, +has difficulties of its own, it is scarcely necessary to say. But there +is nothing in it which imperils the ethical and religious interests of +humanity, or tends to reduce man into a natural phenomenon. Instead of +degrading man, it lifts nature into a manifestation of spirit. If it +were established, if every link of the endless chain were discovered and +the continuity of existence were irrefragably proved, science would not +overthrow idealism, but it would rather vindicate it. It would justify +_in detail_ the attempt of poetry and religion and philosophy, to +interpret all being as the "transparent vesture" of reason, or love, or +whatever other power in the world is regarded as highest. + +I have now arrived at the conclusion that was sought. I have tried to +show, not only that the attempt to interpret nature in terms of man is +not a superstitious anthropomorphism, but that such an interpretation is +implied in all rational thought. In other words, self-consciousness is +the key to all the problems of nature. Science, in its progress, is +gradually substituting one category for the other, and every one of +these categories is at once a law of thought and a law of things as +known. Each category, successively adopted, lifts nature more to the +level of man; and the last category of modern thought, namely, +development, constrains us so to modify our views of nature, as to +regard it as finally explicable only in the terms of spirit. Thus, the +movement of science is towards idealism. Instead of lowering man, it +elevates nature into a potency of that which is highest and best in man. +It represents the life of man, in the language of philosophy, as the +return of the highest to itself; or in the language of our poet, and of +religion, as a manifestation of infinite love. The explanation of nature +from the principle of love, if it errs, errs "because it is not +anthropomorphic enough," not because it is too anthropomorphic; it is +not too high and concrete a principle, but too low and abstract. + +It now remains to show that the poet, in employing the idea of +evolution, was aware of its upward direction. I have already quoted a +few passages which indicate that he had detected the false use of it. I +shall now quote a few others in which he shows a consciousness of its +true meaning: + + "'Will you have why and wherefore, and the fact + Made plain as pike-staff?' modern Science asks. + 'That mass man sprung from was a jelly-lump + Once on a time; he kept an after course + Through fish and insect, reptile, bird and beast, + Till he attained to be an ape at last, + Or last but one. And if this doctrine shock + In aught the natural pride.'"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau._] + +"Not at all," the poet interrupts the man of science: "Friend, banish +fear!" + + "I like the thought He should have lodged me once + I' the hole, the cave, the hut, the tenement, + The mansion and the palace; made me learn + The feel o' the first, before I found myself + Loftier i' the last."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +This way upward from the lowest stage through every other to the +highest, that is, the way of development, so far from lowering us to the +brute level, is the only way for us to attain to the true highest, +namely, the all-complete. + + "But grant me time, give me the management + And manufacture of a model me, + Me fifty-fold, a prince without a flaw,-- + Why, there's no social grade, the sordidest, + My embryo potentate should brink and scape. + King, all the better he was cobbler once, + He should know, sitting on the throne, how tastes + Life to who sweeps the doorway."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau._] + +But then, unfortunately, we have no time to make our kings in this way, + + "You cut probation short, + And, being half-instructed, on the stage + You shuffle through your part as best you can."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +God, however, "takes time." He makes man pass his apprenticeship in all +the forms of being. Nor does the poet + + "Refuse to follow farther yet + I' the backwardness, repine if tree and flower, + Mountain or streamlet were my dwelling-place + Before I gained enlargement, grew mollusc."[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid_.] + +It is, indeed, only on the supposition of having been thus evolved from +inanimate being that he is able to account + + "For many a thrill + Of kinship, I confess to, with the powers + Called Nature: animate, inanimate, + In parts or in the whole, there's something there + Man-like that somehow meets the man in me."[D] + +[Footnote D: _Ibid_.] + +These passages make it clear that the poet recognized that the idea of +development "levels up," and that he makes an intelligent, and not a +perverted and abstract use of this instrument of thought. He sees each +higher stage carrying within it the lower, the present storing up the +past; he recognizes that the process is a self-enriching one. He knows +it to be no degradation of the higher that it has been in the lower; for +he distinguishes between that life, which is continuous amidst the +fleeting forms, and the temporary tenements, which it makes use of +during the process of ascending. + + "From first to last of lodging, I was I, + And not at all the place that harboured me."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau._] + +When nature is thus looked upon from the point of view of its final +attainment, in the light of the self-consciousness into which it +ultimately breaks, a new dignity is added to every preceding phase. The +lowest ceases to be lowest, except in the sense that its promise is not +fulfilled and its potency not actualized; for, throughout the whole +process, the activity streams from the highest. It is that which is +about to be which guides the growing thing and gives it unity. The final +cause is the efficient cause; the distant purpose is the ever-present +energy; the last is always first. + +Nor does the poet shrink from calling this highest, this last which is +also first, by its highest name,--God. + + "He dwells in all, + From, life's minute beginnings, up at last + To man--the consummation of this scheme + Of being, the completion of this sphere + Of life."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Paracelsus_.] + +"All tended to mankind," he said, after reviewing the whole process of +nature in _Paracelsus_, + + "And, man produced, all has its end thus far: + But in completed man begins anew + A tendency to God."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +There is nowhere a break in the continuity. God is at the beginning, His +rapturous presence is seen in all the processes of nature, His power and +knowledge and love work in the mind of man, and all history is His +revelation of Himself. + +The gap which yawns for ordinary thought between animate and inanimate, +between nature and spirit, between man and God, does not baffle the +poet. At the stage of human life, which is "the grand result" of +nature's blind process, + + "A supplementary reflux of light, + Illustrates all the inferior grades, explains + Each back step in the circle."[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid_.] + +Nature is retracted into thought, built again in mind. + + "Man, once descried, imprints for ever + His presence on all lifeless things."[D] + +[Footnote D: _Ibid_.] + +The self-consciousness of man is the point where "all the scattered rays +meet"; and "the dim fragments," the otherwise meaningless manifold, the +dispersed activities of nature, are lifted into a kosmos by the activity +of intelligence. In its light, the forces of nature are found to be, not +blind nor purposeless, but "hints and previsions" + + "Strewn confusedly everywhere about + The inferior natures, and all lead up higher, + All shape out dimly the superior race, + The heir of hopes too fair to turn out false, + And man appears at last."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Paracelsus_.] + +In this way, and in strict accordance with the principle of evolution, +the poet turns back at each higher stage to re-illumine in a broader +light what went before,--just as we know the seedling after it is grown; +just as, with every advance in life, we interpret the past anew, and +turn the mixed ore of action into pure metal by the reflection which +draws the false from the true. + + "Youth ended, I shall try + My gain or loss thereby; + Leave the fire ashes, what survives is gold: + And I shall weigh the same, + Give life its praise or blame: + Young, all lay in dispute; I shall know, being old."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Rabbi Ben Ezra_.] + +As youth attains its meaning in age, so does the unconscious process of +nature come to its meaning in man And old age, + + "Still within this life + Though lifted o'er its strife," + +is able to + + "Discern, compare, pronounce at last, + This rage was right i' the main, + That acquiescence vain";[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid_.] + +so man is able to penetrate beneath the apparently chaotic play of +phenomena, and find in them law, and beauty, and goodness. The laws +which he finds by thought are not his inventions, but his discoveries. +The harmonies are in the organ, if the artist only knows how to elicit +them. Nay, the connection is still more intimate. It is in the thought +of man that silent nature finds its voice; it blooms into "meaning," +significance, thought, in him, as the plant shows its beauty in the +flower. Nature is making towards humanity, and in humanity it finds +_itself_. + + "Striving to be man, the worm + Mounts through all the spires of form."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Emerson_.] + +The geologist, physicist, chemist, by discovering the laws of nature, do +not bind unconnected phenomena; but they refute the hasty conclusion of +sensuous thought, that the phenomena ever were unconnected. Men of +science do not introduce order into chance and chaos, but show that +there never was chance or chaos. The poet does not make the world +beautiful, but finds the beauty that is dwelling there. Without him, +indeed, the beauty would not be, any more than the life of the tree is +beautiful until it has evolved its potencies into the outward form. +Nevertheless, he is the expression of what was before, and the beauty +was there in potency, awaiting its expression. "Only let his thoughts be +of equal scope, and the frame will suit the picture," said Emerson. + + "The winds + Are henceforth voices, wailing or a shout, + A querulous mutter, or a quick gay laugh, + Never a senseless gust now man is born. + The herded pines commune and have deep thoughts, + A secret they assemble to discuss + When the sun drops behind their trunks. + + * * * * * + + "The morn has enterprise, deep quiet droops + With evening, triumph takes the sunset hour, + Voluptuous transport ripens with the corn + Beneath a warm moon like a happy face."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Paracelsus_.] + +Such is the transmuting power of imagination, that there is "nothing but +doth suffer change into something rich and strange"; and yet the +imagination, when loyal to itself, only sees more deeply into the truth +of things, and gets a closer and fuller hold of facts. + +But, although the human mind thus heals the breach between nature and +spirit, and discovers the latter in the former, still it is not in this +way that Browning finally establishes his idealism. For him, the +principle working in all things is not reason, but love. It is from love +that all being first flowed; into it all returns through man; and in all +"the wide compass which is fetched," through the infinite variety of +forms of being, love is the permanent element and the true essence. +Nature is on its way back to God, gathering treasure as it goes. The +static view is not true to facts; it is development that for the poet +explains the nature of things; and development is the evolution of love. +Love is for Browning the highest, richest conception man can form. It is +our idea of that which is perfect; we cannot even imagine anything +better. And the idea of evolution necessarily explains the world as the +return of the highest to itself. The universe is homeward bound. + +Now, whether love is the highest principle or not, I shall not inquire +at present. My task in this chapter has been to try to show that the +idea of evolution drives us onward towards some highest conception, and +then uses that conception as a principle to explain all things. If man +is veritably higher as a physical organism than the bird or reptile, +then biology, if it proceeds according to the principles of evolution, +_must_ seek the meaning of the latter in the former, and make the whole +kingdom of life a process towards man. "Man is no upstart in the +creation. His limbs are only a more exquisite organization--say rather +the finish--of the rudimental forms that have already been sweeping the +sea and creeping in the mud." And the same way of thought applies to man +as a spiritual agent. If spirit be higher than matter, and if love be +spirit at its best, then the principle of evolution leaves no option to +the scientific thinker, but to regard all things as potentially spirit, +and all the phenomena of the world as manifestations of love. Evolution +necessarily combines all the objects to which it is applied into a +unity. It knits all the infinite forms of natural life into an organism +of organisms, so that it is a universal life which really lives in all +animate beings. "Each animal or vegetable form remembers the next +inferior and predicts the next higher. There is one animal, one plant, +one matter, and one force." In its still wider application by poetry and +philosophy, the idea of evolution gathers all being into one +self-centred totality, and makes all finite existence a movement within, +and a movement of, that final perfection which, although last in order +of time, is first in order of potency,--the _prius_ of all things, the +active energy _in_ all things, and the _reality_ of all things. It is +the doctrine of the immanence of God; and it reveals "the effort of God, +of the supreme intellect, in the extreme frontier of His universe." + +In pronouncing, as Browning frequently does, that "after last comes +first" and "what God once blessed cannot prove accursed"; in the +boldness of the faith whereby he makes all the inferior grades of being +into embodiments of the supreme good; in resolving the evils of human +life, the sorrow, strife, and sin of man into means of man's promotion, +he is only applying, in a thorough manner, the principle on which all +modern speculation rests. His conclusions may shock common-sense; and +they may seem to stultify not only our observation of facts, but the +testimony of our moral consciousness. But I do not know of any principle +of speculation which, when elevated into a universal principle of +thought, will not do the same; and this is why the greatest poets and +philosophers seem to be touched with a divine madness. Still, if this be +madness, there is a method in it. We cannot escape from its logic, +except by denying the idea of evolution--the hypothesis by means of +which modern thought aims, and in the main successfully aims, at +reducing the variety of existence, and the chaos of ordinary experience, +into an order-ruled world and a kosmos of articulated knowledge. + +The new idea of evolution differs from that of universal causation, to +which even the ignorance of our own day has learnt to submit, in this +mainly--it does not leave things on the level on which it finds them. +Both cause and evolution assert the unity of being, which, indeed, every +one must assume--even sceptics and pessimists; but development +represents that unity as self-enriching; so that its true nature is +revealed, only in the highest form of existence which man can conceive. +The attempt of poets and philosophers to establish a universal synthesis +by means of evolution, differs from the work which is done by men of +science, only in the extent of its range and the breadth of its results. +It is not "idealism," but the scepticism which, in our day, conceals its +real nature under the name of dualism or agnosticism, that is at war +with the inner spirit of science. "Not only," we may say of Browning as +it was said of Emerson by Professor Tyndall, "is his religious sense +entirely undaunted by the discoveries of science; but all such +discoveries he comprehends and assimilates. By him scientific +conceptions are continually transmuted into the finer forms and warmer +hues of an ideal world." And this he does without any distortion of the +truth. For natural science, to one who understands its main tendency, +does not militate against philosophy, art, and religion; nor threaten to +overturn a metaphysic whose principle is truth, or beauty, or goodness. +Rather, it is gradually eliminating the discord of fragmentary +existence, and making the harmony of the world more and more audible to +mankind. It is progressively proving that the unity, of which we are all +obscurely conscious from the first, actually holds in the whole region +of its survey. The idea of evolution is reconciling science with art and +religion, in an idealistic conception of the universe. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +BROWNING'S SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL. + + + "Let him, therefore, who would arrive at knowledge of + nature, train his moral sense, let him act and conceive in + accordance with the noble essence of his soul; and, as if + of herself, nature will become open to him. Moral action + is that great and only experiment, in which all riddles of + the most manifold appearances explain themselves."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Novalis_.] + +In the last chapter, I tried to set forth some considerations that +justify the attempt to interpret the world by a spiritual principle. The +conception of development, which modern science and philosophy assume as +a starting-point for their investigation, was shown to imply that the +lowest forms of existence can be explained, only as stages in the +self-realization of that which is highest. This idea "levels upwards," +and points to self-consciousness as the ultimate truth of all things. In +other words, it involves that all interpretation of the world is +anthropomorphic, in the sense that what constitutes thought constitutes +things, and, therefore, that the key to nature is man. + +In propounding this theory of love, and establishing an idealism, +Browning is in agreement with the latest achievement of modern thought. +For, if the principle of evolution be granted, love is a far more +adequate hypothesis for the explanation of the nature of things, than +any purely physical principle. Nay, science itself, in so far as it +presupposes evolution, tends towards an idealism of this type. Whether +love be the best expression for that highest principle, which is +conceived as the truth of being, and whether Browning's treatment of it +is consistent and valid, I do not as yet inquire. Before attempting that +task, it must be seen to what extent, and in what way, he applies the +hypothesis of universal love to the particular facts of life. For the +present, I take it as admitted that the hypothesis is legitimate, as an +hypothesis; it remains to ask, with what success, if any, we may hope, +by its means, to solve the contradictions of life, and to gather its +conflicting phenomena into the unity of an intelligible system. This +task cannot be accomplished within our limits, except in a very partial +manner. I can attempt to meet only a few of the more evident and +pressing difficulties that present themselves, and I can do that only in +a very general way. + +The first of these difficulties, or, rather, the main difficulty from +which all others spring, is that the hypothesis of universal love is +incompatible with the existence of any kind of evil, whether natural or +moral. Of this, Browning was well aware. He knew that he had brought +upon himself the hard task of showing that pain, weakness, ignorance, +failure, doubt, death, misery, and vice, in all their complex forms, can +find their legitimate place in a scheme of love. And there is nothing +more admirable in his attitude, or more inspiring in his teaching, than +the manly frankness with which he endeavours to confront the manifold +miseries of human life, and to constrain them to yield, as their +ultimate meaning and reality, some spark of good. + +But, as we have seen, there is a portion of this task in the discharge +of which Browning is drawn beyond the strict limits of art. Neither the +magnificent boldness of his religious faith, nor the penetration of his +artistic insight, although they enabled him to deal successfully with +the worst samples of human evil, as in _The Ring and the Book_, could +dissipate the gloom which reflection gathers around the general problem. +Art cannot answer the questions of philosophy. The difficulties that +critical reason raises reason alone can lay. Nevertheless, the poet was +forced by his reflective impulse, to meet that problem in the form in +which it presents itself in the region of metaphysics. He was conscious +of the presuppositions within which his art worked, and he sought to +justify them. Into this region we must now follow him, so as to examine +his theory of life, not merely as it is implied in the concrete +creations of his art, but as it is expressed in those later poems, in +which he attempts to deal directly with the speculative difficulties +that crowd around the conception of evil. + +To the critic of a philosophy, there is hardly more than one task of +supreme importance. It is that of determining the precise point from +which the theory he examines takes its departure; for, when the central +conception is clearly grasped, it will be generally found that it rules +all the rest. The superstructure of philosophic edifices is usually put +together in a sufficiently solid manner--it is the foundation that gives +way. Hence Hegel, who, whatever may be thought of his own theory, was +certainly the most profound critic of philosophy since Aristotle, +generally concentrates his attack on the preliminary hypothesis. He +brings down the erroneous system by removing its foundation-stone. His +criticism of Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling may almost be said to +be gathered into a single sentence. + +Browning has made no secret of his central conception. It is the idea of +an immanent or "immundate" love. And that love, we have shown, is +conceived by him as the supreme moral motive, the ultimate essence and +end of all self-conscious activity, the veritable nature of both man and +God. + + "Denn das Leben ist die Liebe, + Und des Lebens Leben Geist." + +His philosophy of human life rests on the idea that it is the +realization of a moral purpose, which is a loving purpose. To him there +is no supreme good, except good character; and the foundation of that +character by man and in man is the ultimate purpose, and, therefore, the +true meaning of all existence. + + "I search but cannot see + What purpose serves the soul that strives, or world it tries + Conclusions with, unless the fruit of victories + Stay, one and all, stored up and guaranteed its own + For ever, by some mode whereby shall be made known + The gain of every life. Death reads the title clear-- + What each soul for itself conquered from out things here: + Since, in the seeing soul, all worth lies, I assert."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Fifine at the Fair_, lv.] + +In this passage, Browning gives expression to an idea which continually +reappears in his pages--that human life, in its essence, is movement to +moral goodness through opposition. His fundamental conception of the +human spirit is that it is a process, and not a fixed fact. "Man," he +says, "was made to grow not stop." + + "Getting increase of knowledge, since he learns + Because he lives, which is to be a man, + Set to instruct himself by his past self."[B] + +[Footnote B: _A Death in the Desert_.] + + "By such confession straight he falls + Into man's place, a thing nor God nor beast, + Made to know that he can know and not more: + Lower than God who knows all and can all, + Higher than beasts which know and can so far + As each beast's limit, perfect to an end, + Nor conscious that they know, nor craving more; + While man knows partly but conceives beside, + Creeps ever on from fancies to the fact, + And in this striving, this converting air + Into a solid he may grasp and use, + Finds progress, man's distinctive mark alone, + Not God's and not the beasts': God is, they are, + Man partly is and wholly hopes to be."[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid_.] + +It were easy to multiply passages which show that his ultimate +deliverance regarding man is, not that he is, nor that he is not, but +that he is ever becoming. Man is ever at the point of contradiction +between the actual and ideal, and moving from the latter to the former. +Strife constitutes him. He is a war of elements; "hurled from change to +change unceasingly." But rest is death; for it is the cessation of the +spiritual activity, whose essence is acquirement, not mere possession, +whether in knowledge or in goodness. + + "Man must pass from old to new, + From vain to real, from mistake to fact, + From what once seemed good, to what now proves best."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Death in the Desert_.] + +Were the movement to stop, and the contradiction between the actual and +ideal reconciled, man would leave man's estate, and pass under "angel's +law." + + "Indulging every instinct of the soul + There, where law, life, joy, impulse are one thing."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +But as long as he is man, he has + + "Somewhat to cast off, somewhat to become." + +In _Paracelsus_, _Fifine at the Fair_, _Red Cotton Nightcap Country_, +and many of his other poems, Browning deals with the problem of human +life from the point of view of development. And it is this point of +view, consistently held, which enables him to throw a new light on the +whole subject of ethics. For, if man be veritably a being in process of +evolution, if he be a permanent that always changes from earliest +childhood to old age, if he be a living thing, a potency in process of +actualization, then no fixed distinctions made with reference to him can +be true. If, for instance, it be asked whether man is rational or +irrational, free or bound, good or evil, God or brute, the true answer, +if he is veritably a being moving from ignorance to knowledge, from +wickedness to virtue, from bondage to freedom, is, that he is at once +neither of these alternatives and both. All hard terms of division, when +applied to a subject which grows, are untrue. If the life of man is a +self-enriching process, if he is _becoming_ good, and rational, and +free, then at no point in the movement is it possible to pass fixed and +definite judgments upon him. He must be estimated by his direction and +momentum, by the whence and whither of his life. There is a sense in +which man is from the first and always good, rational and free; for it +is only by the exercise of reason and freedom that he exists as man. But +there is also a sense in which he is none of these; for he is at the +first only a potency not yet actualized. He is not rational, but +becoming rational; not good, but becoming good; not free, but aspiring +towards freedom. It is his prayer that "in His light, he may see light +truly, and in His service find perfect freedom." + +In this frank assumption of the point of view of development. Browning +suggests the question whether the endless debate regarding freedom, and +necessity, and other moral terms, may not spring from the fact, that +both of the opposing schools of ethics are fundamentally unfaithful to +the subject of their inquiry. They are treating a developing reality +from an abstract point of view, and taking for granted,--what cannot be +true of man, if he grows in intellectual power and moral goodness--that +he is _either_ good or evil, _either_ rational or irrational, _either_ +free or bond, at every moment in the process. They are treating man from +a static, instead of from a kinetic point of view, and forgetting that +it is his business to acquire the moral and intellectual freedom, which +he has potentially from the first-- + + "Some fitter way express + Heart's satisfaction that the Past indeed + Is past, gives way before Life's best and last, + The all-including Future!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Gerard de Lairesse_.] + +But, whether or not the new point of view renders some of the old +disputations of ethics meaningless, it is certain that Browning viewed +moral life as a growth through conflict. + + "What were life + Did soul stand still therein, forego her strife + Through the ambiguous Present to the goal + Of some all-reconciling Future?"[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +To become, to develop, to actualize by reaction against the natural and +moral environment, is the meaning both of the self and of the world it +works upon. "We are here to learn the good of peace through strife, of +love through hate, and reach knowledge by ignorance." + +Now, since the conception of development is a self-contradictory one, +or, in other words, since it necessarily implies the conflict of the +ideal and actual in all life, and in every instant of its history, it +remains for us to determine more fully what are the warring elements in +human nature. What is the nature of this life of man, which, like all +life, is self-evolving; and by conflict with what does the evolution +take place? What is the ideal which condemns the actual, and yet +realizes itself by means of it; and what is the actual which wars +against the ideal, and yet contains it in potency, and reaches towards +it? That human life is conceived by Browning as a moral life, and not a +more refined and complex form of the natural life of plants and +animals--a view which finds its exponents in Herbert Spencer, and other +so-called evolutionists--it is scarcely necessary to assert. It is a +life which determines itself, and determines itself according to an idea +of goodness. That idea, moreover, because it is a _moral ideal_, must be +regarded as the conception of perfect and absolute goodness. Through the +moral end, man is ideally identified with God, who, indeed, is +necessarily conceived as man's moral ideal regarded as already and +eternally real. "God" and the "moral ideal" are, in truth, expressions +of the same idea; they convey the conception of perfect goodness from +different standpoints. And perfect goodness is, to Browning, limitless +love. Pleasure, wisdom, power, and even the beauty which art discovers +and reveals, together with every other inner quality and outer state of +being, have only relative worth. "There is nothing either in the world +or out of it which is unconditionally good, except a good will," said +Kant; and a good will, according to Browning, is a will that wills +lovingly. From love all other goodness is derived. There is earnest +meaning, and not mere sentiment, in the poet's assertion that + + "There is no good of life but love--but love! + What else looks good, is some shade flung from love. + Love gilds it, gives it worth. Be warned by me, + Never you cheat yourself one instant! Love, + Give love, ask only love, and leave the rest!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _In a Balcony_.] + +"Let man's life be true," he adds, "and love's the truth of mine." To +attain this truth, that is, to constitute love into the inmost law of +his being, and permanent source of all his activities, is the task of +man. And Browning defines that love as + + "Yearning to dispense, + Each one its own amount of gain thro' its own mode + Of practising with life." + +There is no need of illustrating further the doctrine, so evident in +Browning, that "love" is the ideal which in man's life makes through +conflict for its own fulfilment. From what has been already said, it is +abundantly plain that love is to him a divine element, which is at war +with all that is lower in man and around him, and which by reaction +against circumstance converts its own mere promise into fruition and +fact. Through love man's nature reaches down to the permanent essence, +amid the fleeting phenomena of the world, and is at one with what is +first and last. As loving he ranks with God. No words are too strong to +represent the intimacy of the relation. For, however limited in range +and tainted with alien qualities human love may be, it is still "a +pin-point rock of His boundless continent." It is not a semblance of the +divine nature, an analogon, or verisimilitude, but the love of God +himself in man: so that man is in this sense an incarnation of the +divine. The Godhood in him constitutes him, so that he cannot become +himself, or attain his own ideal or true nature, except by becoming +perfect as God is perfect. + +But the emphasis thus laid on the divine worth and dignity of human love +is balanced by the stress which the poet places on the frailty and +finitude of every other human attribute. Having elevated the ideal, he +degrades the actual. Knowledge and the intellectual energy which +produces it; art and the love of beauty from which it springs: every +power and every gift, physical and spiritual, other than love, has in it +the fatal flaw of being merely human. All these are so tainted with +creatureship, so limited and conditioned, that it is hardly too much to +say that they are, at their best, deceptive endowments. Thus, the life +of man regarded as a whole is, in its last essence, a combination of +utterly disparate elements. The distinction of the old moralists between +divinity and dust; the absolute dualism of the old ascetics between +flesh and spirit, sense and reason, find their accurate parallel in +Browning's teachings. But he is himself no ascetic, and the line of +distinction he draws does not, like theirs, pass between the flesh and +the spirit. It rather cleaves man's spiritual nature into two portions, +which are absolutely different from each other. A chasm divides the head +from the heart, the intellect from the emotions, the moral and practical +from the perceptive and reflective faculties. And it is this absolute +cleavage that gives to Browning's teaching, both on ethics and religion, +one of its most peculiar characteristics. By keeping it constantly in +sight, we may hope to render intelligible to ourselves the solution he +offers of the problem of evil, and of other fundamental difficulties of +the life of man. For, while Browning's optimism has its original source +in his conception of the unity of God and man, through the Godlike +quality of love--even "the poorest love that was ever offered"--he finds +himself unable to maintain it, except at the expense of degrading man's +knowledge. Thus, his optimism and faith in God is finally based upon +ignorance. If, on the side of love, he insists, almost in the spirit of +a Spinozist, on God's communication of His own substance to man; on the +side of knowledge he may be called an agnostic, in spite of stray +expressions which break through his deliberate theory. While "love gains +God at first leap," + + "Knowledge means + Ever-renewed assurance by defeat + That victory is somehow still to reach."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Pillar at Sebzevar_.] + +A radical flaw runs through our knowing faculty. Human knowledge is not +only incomplete--no one can be so foolish as to deny that--but it is, as +regarded by Browning, essentially inadequate to the nature of fact, and +we must "distrust it, even when it seems demonstrable." No professed +agnostic can condemn the human intellect more utterly than he does. He +pushes the limitedness of human knowledge into a disqualification of it +to reach truth at all; and makes the conditions according to which we +know, or seem to know, into a deceiving necessity, which makes us know +wrongly. + + "To know of, think about,-- + Is all man's sum of faculty effects + When exercised on earth's least atom, Son! + What was, what is, what may such atom be? + No answer!"[B] + +[Footnote B: _A Bean-Stripe_.] + +Thought plays around facts, but never reaches them. Mind intervenes +between itself and its objects, and throws its own shadow upon them; nor +can it penetrate through that shadow, but deals with it as if it were +reality, though it knows all the time that it is not. + +This theory of knowledge, or rather of nescience or no-knowledge, he +gives in _La Saisiaz_, _Ferishtah's Fancies, The Parleyings_, and +_Asolando_--in all his later and more reflective poems, in fact. It +must, I think, be held to be his deliberate and final view--and all the +more so, because, by a peculiar process, he gets from it his defence of +his ethical and religious faith. + +In the first of these poems, Browning, while discussing the problem of +immortality in a purely speculative spirit, and without stipulating, +"Provided answer suits my hopes, not fears," gives a tolerably full +account of that which must be regarded as the principles of his theory +of knowledge. Its importance to his ethical doctrine justifies a +somewhat exhaustive examination of it. + +He finds himself to be "a midway point, between a cause before and an +effect behind--both blanks." Within that narrow space, of the self +hemmed in by two unknowns, all experience is crammed. Out of that +experience crowds all that he knows, and all that he misknows. There +issues from experience-- + + "Conjecture manifold, + But, as knowledge, this comes only--things may be as I behold, + Or may not be, but, without me and above me, things there are; + I myself am what I know not--ignorance which proves no bar + To the knowledge that I am, and, since I am, can recognize + What to me is pain and pleasure: this is sure, the rest--surmise. + If my fellows are or are not, what may please them and what pain,-- + Mere surmise: my own experience--that is knowledge once again."[A] + +[Footnote A: _La Saisiaz_.] + +Experience, then, within which he (and every one else) acknowledges that +all his knowledge is confined, yields him as certain facts--the +consciousness that he is, but not what he is: the consciousness that he +is pleased or pained by things about him, whose real nature is entirely +hidden from him: and, as he tells us just before, the assurance that God +is the thing the self perceives outside itself, + + "A force + Actual e'er its own beginning, operative thro' its course, + Unaffected by its end."[A] + +[Footnote A: _La Saisiaz_.] + +But, even this knowledge, limited as it is to the bare existence of +unknown entities, has the further defect of being merely subjective. The +"experience" from which he draws his conclusions, is his own in an +exclusive sense. His "thinking thing" has, apparently, no elements in +common with the "thinking things" of other selves. He ignores the fact +that there may be general laws of thought, according to which his mind +must act in order to be a mind. Intelligence seems to have no nature, +and may be anything. All questions regarding "those apparent other +mortals" are consequently unanswerable to the poet. "Knowledge stands on +my experience"; and this "my" is totally unrelated to all other Mes. + + "All outside its narrow hem, + Free surmise may sport and welcome! Pleasures, pains affect mankind + Just as they affect myself? Why, here's my neighbour colour-blind, + Eyes like mine to all appearance: 'green as grass' do I affirm? + 'Red as grass' he contradicts me: which employs the proper term?"[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +If there were only they two on earth as tenants, there would be no way +of deciding between them; for, according to his argument, the truth is +apparently decided by majority of opinions. Each individual, equipped +with his own particular kind of senses and reason, gets his own +particular experience, and draws his own particular conclusions from it. +If it be asked whether these conclusions are true or not, the only +answer is that the question is absurd; for, under such conditions, there +cannot be either truth or error. Every one's opinion is its own +criterion. Each man is the measure of all things; "His own world for +every mortal," as the poet puts it. + + "To each mortal peradventure earth becomes a new machine, + Pain and pleasure no more tally in our sense than red and green."[A] + +[Footnote A: _La Saisiaz_.] + +The first result of this subjective view of knowledge is clearly enough +seen by the poet. He is well aware that his convictions regarding the +high matters of human destiny are valid only for himself. + + "Only for myself I speak, + Nowise dare to play the spokesman for my brothers strong and weak."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +Experience, as he interprets it, that is, present consciousness, "this +moment's me and mine," is too narrow a basis for any universal or +objective conclusion. So far as his own inner experience of pain and +pleasure goes, + + "All--for myself--seems ordered wise and well + Inside it,--what reigns outside, who can tell?"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Francis Furini_.] + +But as to the actual world, he can have no opinion, nor, from the good +and evil that apparently play around him, can he deduce either + + "Praise or blame of its contriver, shown a niggard or profuse + In each good or evil issue."[B] + +[Footnote B: _La Saisiaz_.] + +The moral government of the world is a subject, regarding which we are +doomed to absolute ignorance. A theory that it is ruled by the "prince +of the power of the air" has just as much, and just as little, validity +as the more ordinary view held by religious people. Who needs be told + + "The space + Which yields thee knowledge--do its bounds embrace + Well-willing and wise-working, each at height? + Enough: beyond thee lies the infinite-- + Back to thy circumscription!"[C] + +[Footnote C: _Francis Furini_.] + +And our ignorance of God, and the world, and ourselves is matched by a +similar ignorance regarding moral matters. + + "Ignorance overwraps his moral sense, + Winds him about, relaxing, as it wraps, + So much and no more than lets through perhaps + The murmured knowledge--' Ignorance exists.'"[D] + +[Footnote D: _Ibid_.] + +We cannot be certain even of the distinction and conflict of good and +evil in the world. They, too, and the apparent choice between them to +which man is continually constrained, may be mere illusions--phenomena +of the individual consciousness. What remains, then? Nothing but to +"wait." + + "Take the joys and bear the sorrows--neither with extreme concern! + Living here means nescience simply: 'tis next life that helps to + learn."[A] + +[Footnote A: _La Saisiaz_.] + +It is hardly necessary to enter upon any detailed criticism of such a +theory of knowledge as this, which is proffered by the poet. It is well +known by all those who are in some degree acquainted with the history of +philosophy--and it will be easily seen by all who have any critical +acumen--that it leads directly into absolute scepticism. And absolute +scepticism is easily shown to be self-contradictory. For a theory of +nescience, in condemning all knowledge and the faculty of knowledge, +condemns itself. If nothing is true, or if nothing is known, then this +theory itself is not true, or its truth cannot be known. And if this +theory is true, then nothing is true; for this theory, like all others, +is the product of a defective intelligence. In whatsoever way the matter +is put, there is left no standing-ground for the human critic who +condemns human thought. And he cannot well pretend to a footing in a +sphere above man's, or below it. There is thus one presupposition which +every one must make, if he is to propound any doctrine whatsoever, even +if that doctrine be that no doctrine can be valid; it is the +presupposition that knowledge is possible, and that truth can be known. +And this presupposition fills, for modern philosophy, the place of the +_Cogito ergo sum_ of Descartes. It is the starting-point and criterion +of all knowledge. + +It is, at first sight, a somewhat difficult task to account for the +fact, that so keen an intellect as the poet's did not perceive the +conclusion to which his theory of knowledge so directly and necessarily +leads. It is probable, however, that he never critically examined it, +but simply accepted it as equivalent to the common doctrine of the +relativity of knowledge, which, in some form or other, all the schools +of philosophy adopt. But the main reason will be found to lie in the +fact that knowledge was not, to Browning, its own criterion or end. The +primary fact of his philosophy is that human life is a moral process. +His interest in the evolution of character was his deepest interest, as +he informs us; he was an ethical teacher rather than a metaphysician. He +is ever willing to asperse man's intelligence. But that man is a moral +agent he will in no wise doubt. This is his + + "Solid standing-place amid + The wash and welter, whence all doubts are bid + Back to the ledge they break against in foam."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Francis Furini_.] + +His practical maxim was + + "Wholly distrust thy knowledge, then, and trust + As wholly love allied to ignorance! + There lies thy truth and safety."[B] + +[Footnote B: _A Pillar of Sebzevar_.] + +All phenomena must, in some way or other, be reconciled by the poet with +the fundamental and indubitable fact of the progressive moral life of +man. For the fundamental presupposition which a man makes, is +necessarily his criterion of knowledge, and it determines the truth or +illusoriness of all other opinions whatsoever. + +Now, Browning held, not only that no certain knowledge is attainable by +man, but also that such certainty is incompatible with moral life. +Absolute knowledge would, he contends, lift man above the need and the +possibility of making the moral choice, which is our supreme business on +earth. Man can be good or evil, only on condition of being in absolute +uncertainty regarding the true meaning of the facts of nature and the +phenomena of life. + +This somewhat strange doctrine finds the most explicit and full +expression in _La Saisiaz_. "Fancy," amongst the concessions it demands +from "Reason," claims that man should know--not merely surmise or +fear--that every action done in this life awaits its proper and +necessary meed in the next. + + "I also will that man become aware + Life has worth incalculable, every moment that he spends + So much gain or loss for that next life which on this life depends."[A] + +[Footnote A: _La Saisiaz_.] + +But Reason refuses the concession, upon the ground that such sure +knowledge would be destructive of the very distinction between right and +wrong, which the demand implies. The "promulgation of this decree," by +Fancy, "makes both good and evil to cease." Prior to it "earth was man's +probation-place"; but under this decree man is no longer free; for +certain knowledge makes action necessary. + + "Once lay down the law, with Nature's simple 'Such effects succeed + Causes such, and heaven or hell depends upon man's earthly deed + Just as surely as depends the straight or else the crooked line + On his making point meet point or with or else without incline,' + Thenceforth neither good nor evil does man, doing what he must."[A] + +[Footnote A: _La Saisiaz_, 195.] + +If we presuppose that "man, addressed this mode, be sound and sane" (and +we must stipulate sanity, if his actions are to be morally judged at +all)--then a law which binds punishment and reward to action in a +necessary manner, and is known so to bind them, would "obtain prompt and +absolute obedience." There are some "edicts, now styled God's own +nature's," "which to hear means to obey." All the laws relating to the +preservation of life are of this character. And, if the law--"Would'st +thou live again, be just"--were in all ways as stringent as the other +law-- + + "Would'st thou live now, regularly draw thy breath! + For, suspend the operation, straight law's breach results in death"--[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +then no one would disobey it, nor could. "It is the liberty of doing +evil that gives the doing good a grace." And that liberty would be taken +away by complete assurance, that effects follow actions in the moral +world with the necessity seen in the natural sphere. Since, therefore, +man is made to grow, and earth is the place wherein he is to pass +probation and prove his powers, there must remain a certain doubt as to +the issues of his actions; conviction must not be so strong as to carry +with it man's whole nature. "The best I both see and praise, the worst I +follow," is the adage rife in man's mouth regarding his moral conduct. +But, spite of his seeing and praising, + + "he disbelieves + In the heart of him that edict which for truth his head receives."[A] + +[Footnote A: _La Saisiaz_.] + +He has a dim consciousness of ways whereby he may elude the consequences +of his wickedness, and of the possibility of making amends to law. + + "And now, auld Cloots, I ken ye're thinkin', + A certain Bardie's rantin', drinkin', + Some luckless hour will send him linkin' + To your black pit; + But, faith, he'll turn a corner jinkin', + And cheat you yet." + +The more orthodox and less generous individual is prone to agree, as +regards himself, with Burns; but, he sees, most probably, that such an +escape is impossible to others. He has secret solacement in a latent +belief that he himself is an exception. There will be a special method +of dealing with him. He is a "chosen sample"; and "God will think twice +before He damns a man of his quality." It is just because there is such +doubt as to the universality and necessity of the law which connects +actions and consequences in the moral sphere, that man's deeds have an +ethical character; while, to disperse doubt and ignorance by the +assurance of complete knowledge, would take the good from goodness and +the ill from evil. + +In this ingenious manner, the poet turns the imperfect intellect and +delusive knowledge of man to a moral use. Ordinarily, the intellectual +impotence of man is regarded as carrying with it moral incapacity as +well, and the delusiveness of knowledge is one of the strongest +arguments for pessimism. To persons pledged to the support of no theory, +and to those who have the _naivete_, so hard to maintain side by side +with strong doctrinal convictions, it seems amongst the worst of evils +that man should be endowed with fallacious faculties, and cursed with a +futile desire for true knowledge which is so strong, that it cannot be +quenched even in those who believe that truth can never be attained. It +is the very best men of the world who cry + + "Oh, this false for real, + This emptiness which feigns solidity,-- + Ever some grey that's white, and dun that's black,-- + When shall we rest upon the thing itself, + Not on its semblance? Soul--too weak, forsooth, + To cope with fact--wants fiction everywhere! + Mine tires of falsehood: truth at any cost!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Bean-Stripe_.] + +The poet himself was burdened in no small degree with this vain desire +for knowing the truth; and he recognized, too, that he was placed in a +world which seems both real and beautiful, and so well worth knowing. +Yet, it is this very failure of knowledge--a failure which, be it +remembered, is complete and absolute, because, as he thinks, all facts +must turn into phantoms by mere contact with our "relative +intelligences,"--which he constitutes into the basis of his optimistic +faith. + +So high is the dignity and worth of the moral life to Browning, that no +sacrifice is too great to secure it. And, indeed, if it were once +clearly recognized that there is no good thing but goodness, nothing of +supreme worth, except the realization of a loving will, then doubt, +ignorance, and every other form of apparent evil would be fully +justified--provided they were conditions whereby this highest good is +attained. And, to Browning, ignorance was one of the conditions. And +consequently, the dread pause in the music which agnosticism brings, is +only "silence implying sound"; and the vain cry for truth, arising from +the heart of the earth's best men, is only a discord moving towards +resolution into a more rapturous harmony. + +I do not stay here to inquire whether sure knowledge would really have +this disastrous effect of destroying morality, or whether its failure +does not rather imply the impossibility of a moral life. I return to the +question asked at the beginning of this chapter, and which it is now +possible to answer. That question was: How does Browning reconcile his +hypothesis of universal love with the natural and moral evils existing +in the world? + +His answer is quite explicit. The poet solves the problem by casting +doubt upon the facts which threaten his hypothesis. He reduces them into +phenomena, in the sense of phantoms begotten by the human intellect upon +unknown and unknowable realities. + + "Thus much at least is clearly understood-- + Of power does Man possess no particle: + Of knowledge--just so much as shows that still + It ends in ignorance on every side."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Francis Furini_.] + +He is aware of the phenomena of his own consciousness, + + "My soul, and my soul's home, + This body "; + +but he knows not whether "things outside are fact or feigning." And he +heeds little, for in either case they + + "Teach + What good is and what evil,--just the same, + Be feigning or be fact the teacher."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +It is the mixture, or rather the apparent mixture, of shade and light in +life, the conflict of seeming good with seeming evil in the world, that +constitutes the world a probation-place. It is a kind of moral +gymnasium, crowded with phantoms, wherein by exercise man makes moral +muscle. And the vigour of the athlete's struggle is not in the least +abated by the consciousness that all he deals with are phantoms. + + "I have lived, then, done and suffered, loved and hated, learnt and taught + This--there is no reconciling wisdom with a world distraught, + Goodness with triumphant evil, power with failure in the aim, + If--(to my own sense, remember! though none other feel the same!)-- + If you bar me from assuming earth to be a pupil's place, + And life, time--with all their chances, changes,--just probation-space, + Mine, for me."[A] + +[Footnote A: _La Saisiaz_.] + +And the world would not be such a probation-space did we once penetrate +into its inmost secret, and know its phenomena as veritably either good +or evil. There is the need of playing something perilously like a trick +on the human intellect if man is to strive and grow. + + "Here and there a touch + Taught me, betimes, the artifice of things-- + That all about, external to myself, + Was meant to be suspected,--not revealed + Demonstrably a cheat--but half seen through."[B] + +[Footnote B: _A Bean-Stripe._] + +To know objects as they veritably are, might reveal all things as locked +together in a scheme of universal good, so that "white would rule +unchecked along the line." But this would be the greatest of disasters; +for, as moral agents, we cannot do without + + "the constant shade + Cast on life's shine,--the tremor that intrudes + When firmest seems my faith in white."[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid_.] + +The intellectual insight that would penetrate through the vari-colour of +events into the actual presence of the incandescent white of love, which +glows, as hope tells us, in all things, would stultify itself, and lose +its knowledge even of the good. + + "Think! + Could I see plain, be somehow certified + All was illusion--evil far and wide + Was good disguised,--why, out with one huge wipe + Goes knowledge from me. Type needs antitype: + As night needs day, as shine needs shade, so good + Needs evil: how were pity understood + Unless by pain? "[A] + +[Footnote A: _Francis Furini_.] + +Good and evil are relative to each other, and each is known only through +its contrary. + + "For me + (Patience, beseech you!) Knowledge can but be + Of good by knowledge of good's opposite-- + Evil."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +The extinction of one of the terms would be the extinction of the other. +And, in a similar manner, clear knowledge that evil is illusion and that +all things have their place in an infinite divine order would paralyze +all moral effort, as well as stultify itself. + + "Make evident that pain + Permissibly masks pleasure--you abstain + From out-stretch of the finger-tip that saves + A drowning fly."[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid_.] + +Certainty on either side, either that evil is evil for evermore, +irredeemable and absolute, a drench of utter dark not illuminable by +white; or that it is but mere show and semblance, which the good takes +upon itself, would alike be ruinous to man. For both alternatives would +render all striving folly. The right attitude for man is that of +ignorance, complete uncertainty, the equipoise of conflicting +alternatives. He must take his stand on the contradiction. Hope he may +have that all things work together for good. It is right that he should +nourish the faith that the antagonism of evil with good in the world is +only an illusion; but that faith must stop short of the complete +conviction that knowledge would bring. When, therefore, the hypothesis +of universal love is confronted with the evils of life, and we ask how +it can be maintained in the face of the manifold miseries everywhere +apparent, the poet answers, "You do not know, and cannot know, whether +they are evils or not. Your knowledge remains at the surface of things. +You cannot fit them into their true place, or pronounce upon their true +purpose and character; for you see only a small arc of the complete +circle of being. Wait till you see more, and, in the meantime, hope!" + + "Why faith--but to lift the load, + To leaven the lump, where lies + Mind prostrate through knowledge owed + To the loveless Power it tries + To withstand, how vain!"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Reverie_--_Asolando_.] + +And, if we reply in turn, that this necessary ignorance leaves as little +room for his scheme of love as it does for its opposite, he again +answers: "Not so! I appeal from the intellect, which is detected as +incompetent, to the higher court of the moral consciousness. And there I +find the ignorance to be justified: for it is the instrument of a higher +purpose, a means whereby what is best is gained, namely, _Love_." + + "My curls were crowned + In youth with knowledge,--off, alas, crown slipped + Next moment, pushed by better knowledge still + Which nowise proved more constant; gain, to-day, + Was toppling loss to-morrow, lay at last + --Knowledge, the golden?--lacquered ignorance! + As gain--mistrust it! Not as means to gain: + Lacquer we learn by: ... + The prize is in the process: knowledge means + Ever-renewed assurance by defeat + That victory is somehow still to reach, + But love is victory, the prize itself: + Love--trust to! Be rewarded for the trust + In trust's mere act."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Pillar at Sebzevar_.] + +Now, in order to complete our examination of this theory, we must follow +the poet in his attempt to escape from the testimony of the intellect to +that of the heart. In order to make the most of the latter, we find that +Browning, especially in his last work, tends to withdraw his accusation +of utter incompetence on the part of the intellect. He only tends to do +so, it is true. He is tolerably consistent in asserting that we know our +own emotions and the phenomena of our own consciousness; but he is not +consistent in his account of our knowledge, or ignorance, of external +things. On the whole, he asserts that we know nothing of them. But in +_Asolando_ he seems to imply that the evidence of a loveless power in +the world, permitting evil, is irresistible.[A] To say the least, the +testimony of the intellect, such as it is, is more clear and convincing +with regard to evil than it is with regard to good. Within the sphere of +phenomena, to which the intellect is confined, there seems to be, +instead of a benevolent purpose, a world ruled by a power indifferent to +the triumph of evil over good, and either "loveless" or unintelligent. + +[Footnote A: _See passage just quoted._] + + "Life, from birth to death, + Means--either looking back on harm escaped, + Or looking forward to that harm's return + With tenfold power of harming."[B] + +[Footnote B: _A Bean-Stripe._] + +And it is not possible for man to contravene this evidence of faults and +omissions: for, in doing so, he would remove the facts in reaction +against which his moral nature becomes active. What proof is there, +then, that the universal love is no mere dream? None! from the side of +the intellect, answers the poet. Man, who has the will to remove the +ills of life, + + "Stop change, avert decay, + Fix life fast, banish death,"[C] + +[Footnote C: _Reverie_--_Asolando_.] + +has not the power to effect his will; while the Power, whose +limitlessness he recognizes everywhere around him, merely maintains the +world in its remorseless course, and puts forth no helping hand when +good is prone and evil triumphant. "God does nothing." + + "'No sign,'--groaned he,-- + No stirring of God's finger to denote + He wills that right should have supremacy + On earth, not wrong! How helpful could we quote + But one poor instance when He interposed + Promptly and surely and beyond mistake + Between oppression and its victim, closed + Accounts with sin for once, and bade us wake + From our long dream that justice bears no sword, + Or else forgets whereto its sharpness serves.'"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Bernard de Mandeville._] + +But he tells us in his later poems, that there is no answer vouchsafed +to man's cry to the Power, that it should reveal + + "What heals all harm, + Nay, hinders the harm at first, + Saves earth."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Reverie--Asolando._] + +And yet, so far as man can see, there were no bar to the remedy, if +"God's all-mercy" did really "mate His all-potency." + + "How easy it seems,--to sense + Like man's--if somehow met + Power with its match--immense + Love, limitless, unbeset + By hindrance on every side!"[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid_.] + +But that love nowhere makes itself evident. "Power," we recognize, + + "finds nought too hard, + Fulfilling itself all ways, + Unchecked, unchanged; while barred, + Baffled, what good began + Ends evil on every side."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Reverie--Asolando_.] + +Thus, the conclusion to which knowledge inevitably leads us is that mere +power rules. + + "No more than the passive clay + Disputes the potter's act, + Could the whelmed mind disobey + Knowledge, the cataract."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +But if the intellect is thus overwhelmed, so as to be almost passive to +the pessimistic conclusion borne in upon it by "resistless fact," the +heart of man is made of another mould. It revolts against the conclusion +of the intellect, and climbs + + "Through turbidity all between, + From the known to the unknown here, + Heaven's 'Shall be,' from earth's 'Has been.'"[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid_.] + +It grasps a fact beyond the reach of knowledge, namely, the possibility, +or even the certainty, that "power is love." At present there is no +substantiating by knowledge the testimony of the heart; and man has no +better anchorage for his optimism than faith. But the closer view will +come, when even our life on earth will be seen to have within it the +working of love, no less manifest than that of power. + + "When see? When there dawns a day, + If not on the homely earth, + Then, yonder, worlds away, + Where the strange and new have birth, + And Power comes full in play."[D] + +[Footnote D: _Ibid_.] + +Now, what is this evidence of the heart, which is sufficiently cogent +and valid to counterpoise that of the mind; and which gives to "faith," +or "hope," a firm foothold in the very face of the opposing "resistless" +testimony of knowledge? + +Within our experience, to which the poet knows we are entirely confined, +there is a fact, the significance of which we have not as yet examined. +For, plain and irresistible as is the evidence of evil, so plain and +constant is man's recognition of it as evil, and his desire to annul it. +If man's mind is made to acknowledge evil, his moral nature is made so +as to revolt against it. + + "Man's heart is _made_ to judge + Pain deserved nowhere by the common flesh + Our birth-right--bad and good deserve alike + No pain, to human apprehension."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Mihrab Shah_--_Ferishtah's Fancies_.] + +Owing to the limitation of our intelligence, we cannot deny but that + + "In the eye of God + Pain may have purpose and be justified." + +But whether it has its purpose for the supreme intelligence or not, + + "Man's sense avails to only see, in pain, + A hateful chance no man but would avert + Or, failing, needs must pity."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +Man must condemn evil, he cannot acquiesce in its permanence, but is, +spite of his consciousness of ignorance and powerlessness, roused into +constant revolt against it. + + "True, he makes nothing, understands no whit: + Had the initiator-spasm seen fit + Thus doubly to endow him, none the worse + And much the better were the universe. + What does Man see or feel or apprehend + Here, there, and everywhere, but faults to mend, + Omissions to supply,--one wide disease + Of things that are, which Man at once would ease + Had will but power and knowledge?"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Francis Furini_.] + +But the moral worth of man does not suffer the least detraction from his +inability to effect his benevolent purpose. "Things must take will for +deed," as Browning tells us. David is not at all distressed by the +consciousness of his weakness. + + "Why is it I dare + Think but lightly of such impuissance? What stops my despair? + This;--'tis not what man Does which exalts him, but what man Would do."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Saul_.] + +The fact that "his wishes fall through," that he cannot, although +willing, help Saul, "grow poor to enrich him, fill up his life by +starving his own," does not prevent him from regarding his "service as +perfect." The will was there, although it lacked power to effect itself. +The moral worth of an action is complete, if it is willed; and it is +nowise affected by its outer consequences, as both Browning and Kant +teach. The loving will, the inner act of loving, though it can bear no +outward fruit, being debarred by outward impediment, is still a complete +and highest good. + + "But Love is victory, the prize itself: + Love--trust to! Be rewarded for the trust + In trust's mere act. In love success is sure, + Attainment--no delusion, whatso'er + The prize be: apprehended as a prize, + A prize it is."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Pillar at Sebzevar_.] + +Whatever the evil in the world and the impotence of man, his duty and +his dignity in willing to perform it, are ever the same. Though God +neglect the world + + "Man's part + Is plain--to send love forth,--astray, perhaps: + No matter, he has done his part."[B] + +[Footnote B: _The Sun_.] + +Now, this fact of inner experience, which the poet thinks +incontrovertible--the fact that man, every man, necessarily regards +evil, whether natural or moral, as something to be annulled, were it +only possible--is an immediate proof of the indwelling of that which is +highest in man. On this basis, Browning is able to re-establish the +optimism which, from the side of knowledge, he had utterly abandoned. + +The very fact that the world is condemned by man is proof that there +dwells in man something better than the world, whose evidence the +pessimist himself cannot escape. All is not wrong, as long as wrong +_seems_ wrong. The pessimist, in condemning the world, must except +himself. In his very charge against God of having made man in His anger, +there lies a contradiction; for he himself fronts and defies the +outrage. There is no depth of despair which this good cannot illumine +with joyous light, for the despair is itself the reflex of the good. + + "Were earth and all it holds illusions mere, + Only a machine for teaching love and hate, and hope and fear, + + "If this life's conception new life fail to realize-- + Though earth burst and proved a bubble glassing hues of hell, one huge + Reflex of the devil's doings--God's work by no subterfuge,"[A] + +[Footnote A: _La Saisiaz_.] + +still, good is good, and love is its own exceeding great reward. Alone, +in a world abandoned to chaos and infinite night, man is still not +without God, if he loves. In virtue of his love, he himself would be +crowned as God, as the poet often argues, were there no higher love +elsewhere. + + "If he believes + Might can exist with neither will nor love, + In God's case--what he names now Nature's Law-- + While in himself he recognizes love + No less than might and will,"[B] + +[Footnote B: _Death in the Desert_.] + +man takes, and rightly takes, the title of being "First, last, and best +of things." + + "Since if man prove the sole existent thing + Where these combine, whatever their degree, + However weak the might or will or love, + So they be found there, put in evidence-- + He is as surely higher in the scale + Than any might with neither love nor will, + As life, apparent in the poorest midge, + Is marvellous beyond dead Atlas' self, + Given to the nobler midge for resting-place! + Thus, man proves best and highest--God, in fine."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Death in the Desert_.] + +To any one capable of spiritually discerning things, there can be no +difficulty in regarding goodness, however limited and mated with +weakness, as infinitely above all natural power. Divinity will be known +to consist, not in any senseless might, however majestic and miraculous, +but in moral or spiritual perfection. If God were indifferent to the +evil of the world, acquiesced in it without reason, and let it ripen +into all manner of wretchedness, then man, in condemning the world, +though without power to remove the least of its miseries, would be +higher than God. But we have still to account for the possibility of +man's assuming an attitude implied in the consciousness that, while he +is without power, God is without pity, and in the despair which springs +from his hate of evil. How comes it that human nature rises above its +origin, and is able--nay, obliged--to condemn the evil which God +permits? Is man finite in power, a mere implement of a mocking will so +far as knowledge goes, the plaything of remorseless forces, and yet +author and first source of something in himself which invests him with a +dignity that God Himself cannot share? Is the moral consciousness which, +by its very nature, must bear witness against the Power, although it +cannot arrest its pitiless course, or remove the least evil, + + "Man's own work, his birth of heart and brain, + His native grace, no alien gift at all?" + +We are thus caught between the horns of a final dilemma. Either the pity +and love, which make man revolt against all suffering, are man's own +creation; or else God, who made man's heart to love, has given to man +something higher than He owns Himself. But both of these alternatives +are impossible. + + "Here's the touch that breaks the bubble." + +The first alternative is impossible, because man is by definition +powerless, a mere link in the endless chain of causes, incapable of +changing the least part of the scheme of things which he condemns, and +therefore much more unable to initiate, or to bring into a loveless +world abandoned to blind power, the noble might of love. + + "Will of man create? + No more than this my hand, which strewed the beans + Produced them also from its finger-tips."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Bean-Stripe_.] + +All that man is and has is a mere loan; his love no less than his finite +intellect and limited power, has had its origin elsewhere. + + "Back goes creation to its source, source prime + And ultimate, the single and the sole."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +The argument ends by bringing us back + + "To the starting-point,-- + Man's impotency, God's omnipotence, + These stop my answer."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Bean-Stripe_.] + +I shall not pause at present to examine the value of this new form of +the old argument, "_Ex contingentia mundi_." But I may point out in +passing, that the reference of human love to a divine creative source is +accomplished by means of the idea of cause, one of the categories of the +thought which Browning has aspersed. And it is a little difficult to +show why, if we are constrained to doubt our thought, when by the aid of +causality it establishes a connection between finite and finite, we +should regard it as worthy of trust when it connects the finite and the +infinite. In fact, it is all too evident that the poet assumes or denies +the possibility of knowledge, according as it helps or hinders his +ethical doctrine. + +But, if we grant the ascent from the finite to the infinite and regard +man's love as a divine gift--which it may well be although the poet's +argument is invalid--then a new light is thrown upon the being who gave +man this power to love. The "necessity," "the mere power," which alone +could be discerned by observation of the irresistible movement of the +world's events, acquires a new character. Prior to this discovery of +love in man as the work of God-- + + "Head praises, but heart refrains + From loving's acknowledgment. + Whole losses outweigh half-gains: + Earth's good is with evil blent: + Good struggles but evil reigns."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Reverie_--_Asolando_.] + +But love in man is a suggestion of a love without; a proof, in fact, +that God is love, for man's love is God's love in man. The source of the +pity that man shows, and of the apparent evils in the world which excite +it, is the same. The power which called man into being, itself rises up +in man against the wrongs in the world. The voice of the moral +consciousness, approving the good, condemning evil, and striving to +annul it, is the voice of God, and has, therefore, supreme authority. We +do wrong, therefore, in thinking that it is the weakness of man which is +matched against the might of evil in the world, and that we are fighting +a losing battle. It is an incomplete, abstract, untrue view of the facts +of life which puts God as irresistible Power in the outer world, and +forgets that the same irresistible Power works, under the higher form of +love, in the human heart. + + "Is not God now i' the world His power first made? + Is not His love at issue still with sin, + Visibly when a wrong is done on earth? + Love, wrong, and pain, what see I else around?"[B] + +[Footnote B: _A Death in the Desert_.] + +In this way, therefore, the poet argues back from the moral +consciousness of man to the goodness of God. And he finds the ultimate +proof of this goodness in the very pessimism and scepticism and despair, +that come with the view of the apparently infinite waste in the world +and the endless miseries of humanity. The source of this despair, +namely, the recognition of evil and wrong, is just the Godhood in man. +There is no way of accounting for the fact that "Man hates what is and +loves what should be," except by "blending the quality of man with the +quality of God." And "the quality of God" is the fundamental fact in +man's history. Love is the last reality the poet always reaches. Beneath +the pessimism is love: without love of the good there were no +recognition of evil, no condemnation of it, and no despair. + +But the difficulty still remains as to the permission of evil, even +though it should prove in the end to be merely apparent. + + "Wherefore should any evil hap to man-- + From ache of flesh to agony of soul-- + Since God's All-mercy mates All-potency? + Nay, why permits He evil to Himself-- + Man's sin, accounted such? Suppose a world + Purged of all pain, with fit inhabitant-- + Man pure of evil in thought, word, and deed-- + Were it not well? Then, wherefore otherwise?"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Mihrab Shah_.] + +The poet finds an answer to this difficulty in the very nature of moral +goodness, which, as we have seen, he regards as a progressive +realization of an infinitely high ideal. The demand for a world purged +of all pain and sin is really, he teaches us, a demand for a sphere +where + + "Time brings + No hope, no fear: as to-day, shall be + To-morrow: advance or retreat need we + At our stand-still through eternity?"[A] + +[Footnote A: _Rephan_--_Asolando_.] + +What were there to "bless or curse, in such a uniform universe," + + "Where weak and strong, + The wise and the foolish, right and wrong, + Are merged alike in a neutral Best."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +There is a better way of life, thinks Browning, than such a state of +stagnation. + + "Why should I speak? You divine the test. + When the trouble grew in my pregnant breast + A voice said, So would'st thou strive, not rest, + + "Burn and not smoulder, win by worth, + Not rest content with a wealth that's dearth, + Thou art past Rephan, thy place be Earth."[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid_.] + +The discontent of man, the consciousness of sin, evil, pain, is a symbol +of promotion. The peace of the state of nature has been broken for him; +and, although the first consequence be + + "Brow-furrowed old age, youth's hollow cheek,-- + Diseased in the body, sick in soul, + Pinched poverty, satiate wealth,--your whole + Array of despairs,"[D] + +[Footnote D: _Ibid_.] + +still, without them, the best is impossible. They are the conditions of +the moral life, which is essentially progressive. They are the +consequences of the fact that man has been "startled up" + + "by an Infinite + Discovered above and below me--height + And depth alike to attract my flight, + + "Repel my descent: by hate taught love. + Oh, gain were indeed to see above + Supremacy ever--to move, remove, + + "Not reach--aspire yet never attain + To the object aimed at."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Rephan_--_Asolando_.] + +He who places rest above effort, Rephan above the earth, places a +natural good above a moral good, stagnation above progress. The demand +for the absolute extinction of evil betrays ignorance of the nature of +the highest good. For right and wrong are relative. "Type need +antitype." The fact that goodness is best, and that goodness is not a +stagnant state but a progress, a gradual realization, though never +complete, of an infinite ideal, of the perfection of God by a finite +being, necessarily implies the consciousness of sin and evil. As a moral +agent man must set what should be above what is. If he is to aspire and +attain, the actual present must seem to him inadequate, imperfect, +wrong, a state to be abolished in favour of a better. And therefore it +follows that + + "Though wrong were right + Could we but know--still wrong must needs seem wrong + To do right's service, prove men weak or strong, + Choosers of evil or good."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Francis Furini_.] + +The apparent existence of evil is the condition of goodness. And yet it +must only be apparent. For if evil be regarded as veritably evil, it +must remain so for all that man can do; he cannot annihilate any fact +nor change its nature, and all effort would, therefore, be futile. And, +on the other hand, if evil were known as unreal, then there were no need +of moral effort, no quarrel with the present and therefore no +aspiration, and no achievement. That which is man's highest and +best,--namely, a moral life which is a progress--would thus be +impossible, and his existence would be bereft of all meaning and +purpose. And if the highest is impossible then all is wrong, "the goal +being a ruin, so is all the rest." + +The hypothesis of the moral life as progressive is essential to +Browning. + +But if this hypothesis be granted, then all difficulties disappear. The +conception of the endless acquirement of goodness at once postulates the +consciousness of evil, and the consciousness of it as existing in order +to be overcome. Hence the consciousness of it as illusion comes nearest +to the truth. And such a conception is essentially implied by the idea +of morality. To speculative reason, however, it is impossible, as the +poet believes, that evil should thus be at the same time regarded as +both real and unreal. Knowledge leads to despair on every side; for, +whether it takes the evil in the world as seeming or actual, it +stultifies effort, and proves that moral progress, which is best of all +things, is impossible. But the moral consciousness derives its vitality +from this contradiction. It is the meeting-point and conflict of actual +and ideal; and its testimony is indisputable, however inconsistent it +may be with that of knowledge. Acknowledging absolute ignorance of the +outer world, the poet has still a retreat within himself, safe from all +doubt. He has in his own inner experience irrefragable proof + + "How things outside, fact or feigning, teach + What good is and what evil--just the same, + Be feigning or be fact the teacher."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Francis Furini_.] + +The consciousness of being taught goodness by interaction with the +outside unknown is sufficient; it is "a point of vantage" whence he will +not be moved by any contradictions that the intellect may conjure up +against it. And this process of learning goodness, this gradual +realization by man of an ideal infinitely high and absolute in worth, +throws back a light which illumines all the pain and strife and despair, +and shows them all to be steps in the endless "love-way." The +consciousness of evil is thus at once the effect and the condition of +goodness. The unrealized, though ever-realizing good, which brings +despair, is the best fact in man's history; and it should rightly bring, +not despair, but endless joy. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +A CRITICISM OF BROWNING'S VIEW OF THE FAILURE OF KNOWLEDGE. + + + "Der Mensch, da er Geist ist, darf und soll sich selbst + des hoechsten wuerdig achten, von der Groesse und Macht + seines Geistes kann er nicht gross genug denken; und mit + diesem Glauben wird nichts so sproede und hart seyn, das + sich ihm nicht eroeffnete. Das zuerst verborgene und + verschlossene Wesen des Universums hat keine Kraft, die + dem Muthe des Erkennens Widerstand leisten koennte: es muss + sich vor ihm aufthun, und seinen Reichthum und seine + Tiefen ihm vor Augen legen und zum Genusse geben."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Hegel's Inaugural Address at Heidelberg_.] + +Before entering upon a criticism of Browning's theory, as represented in +the last chapter, it may be well to give a brief summary of it. + +The most interesting feature of Browning's proof of his optimistic faith +is his appeal from the intelligence to the moral consciousness. To show +theoretically that evil is merely phenomenal is, in his view, both +impossible and undesirable. It is impossible, because the human +intellect is incapable of knowing anything as it really is, or of +pronouncing upon the ultimate nature of any phenomenon. It is +undesirable, because a theoretical proof of the evanescence of evil +would itself give rise to the greatest of all evils. The best thing in +the world is moral character. Man exists in order to grow better, and +the world exists in order to help him. But moral growth is possible only +through conflict against evil, or what seems to be evil; hence, to +disprove the existence of evil would be to take away the possibility of +learning goodness, to stultify all human effort, and to deprive the +world of its meaning. + +But, if an optimistic doctrine cannot be reached by way of speculative +thought, if the intellect of man cannot see the good in things evil, his +moral consciousness guarantees that all is for the best, and that "the +good is all in all." For, in distinguishing between good and evil, the +moral consciousness sets up an ideal over against the actual. It +conceives of a scheme of goodness which is not realized in the world, +and it condemns the world as it is. Man, as moral being, is so +constituted that he cannot but regard the evil in the world as something +to be annulled. If he had only the power, there would be no pain, no +sorrow, no weakness, no failure, no death. Is man, then, better than the +Power which made the world and let woe gain entrance into it? No! +answers the poet; for man himself is part of that world and the product +of that Power. The Power that made the world also made the moral +consciousness which condemns the world; if it is the source of the evil +in the world, it is also the source of that love in man, which, by +self-expenditure, seeks to remedy it. If the external world is merely an +expression of a remorseless Power, whence comes the love which is the +principle of the moral life in man? The same Power brings the antidote +as well as the bane. And, further, the bane exists for the sake of the +antidote, the wrong for the sake of the remedy. The evil in the world is +means to a higher good, and the only means possible; for it calls into +activity the divine element in man, and thereby contributes to its +realization in his character. It gives the necessary opportunity for the +exercise of love. + +Hence, evil cannot be regarded as ultimately real. It is real only as a +stage in growth, as means to an end; and the means necessarily perishes, +or is absorbed in, the attainment of the end. It has no significance +except by reference to that end. From this point of view, evil is the +resistance which makes progress possible, the negative which gives +meaning to the positive, the darkness that makes day beautiful. This +must not, however, be taken to mean that evil is nothing. It is +resistance; it is negative; it does oppose the good; although its +opposition is finally overcome. If it did not, if evil were unreal, +there would be no possibility of calling forth the moral potency of man, +and the moral life would be a figment. But these two conditions of the +moral life--on the one hand, that the evil of the world must be capable +of being overcome and is there for the purpose of being overcome, and +that it is unreal except as a means to the good; and, on the other hand, +that evil must be actually opposed to the good, if the good is to have +any meaning,--cannot, Browning thinks, be reconciled with each other. It +is manifest that the intellect of man cannot, at the same time, regard +evil as both real and unreal. It must assert the one and deny the other; +or else we must regard its testimony as altogether untrustworthy. But +the first alternative is destructive of the moral consciousness. Moral +life is alike impossible whether we deny or assert the real existence of +evil. The latter alternative stultifies knowledge, and leaves all the +deeper concerns of life--the existence of good and evil, the reality of +the distinction between them, the existence of God, the moral governance +of the world, the destiny of man--in a state of absolute uncertainty. We +must reject the testimony either of the heart or of the head. + +Browning, as we have seen, unhesitatingly adopts the latter alternative. +He remains loyal to the deliverances of his moral consciousness and +accepts as equally valid, beliefs which the intellect finds to be +self-contradictory: holding that knowledge on such matters is +impossible. And he rejects this knowledge, not only because our thoughts +are self-contradictory in themselves, but because the failure of a +speculative solution of these problems is necessary to morality. Clear, +convincing, demonstrative knowledge would destroy morality; and the fact +that the power to attain such knowledge has been withheld from us is to +be regarded rather as an indication of the beneficence of God, who has +not held even ignorance to be too great a price for man to pay for +goodness. + +Knowledge is not the fit atmosphere for morality. It is faith and not +reason, hope and trust but not certainty, that lend vigour to the good +life. We may believe, and rejoice in the belief, that the absolute good +is fulfilling itself in all things, and that even the miseries of life +are really its refracted rays--the light that gains in splendour by +being broken. But we must not, and, indeed, cannot ascend from faith to +knowledge. The heart may trust, and must trust, if it faithfully listens +to its own natural voice; but reason must not demonstrate. Ignorance on +the side of intellect, faith on the side of the emotions; distrust of +knowledge, absolute confidence in love; such is the condition of man's +highest welfare: it is only thus that the purpose of his life, and of +the world which is his instrument, can be achieved. + +No final estimate of the value of this theory of morals and religion can +be made, without examining its philosophical presuppositions. Nor is +such an examination in any way unfair; for it is obvious that Browning +explicitly offers us a philosophical doctrine. He appeals to argument +and not to artistic intuition; he offers a definite theory to which he +claims attention, not on account of any poetic beauty that may lie +within it, but on the ground that it is a true exposition of the moral +nature of man. Kant's _Metaphysic of Ethics_ is not more metaphysical in +intention than the poet's later utterances on the problems of morality. +In _La Saisiaz_, in _Ferishtah's Fancies_, in the _Parleyings_, and, +though less explicitly, in _Asolando_, _Fifine at the Fair_, and _Red +Cotton Nightcap Country_, Browning definitely states, and endeavours to +demonstrate a theory of knowledge, a theory of the relation of knowledge +to morality, and a theory of the nature of evil; and he discusses the +arguments for the immortality of the soul. In these poems his artistic +instinct avails him, not as in his earlier ones, for the discovery of +truth by way of intuition, but for the adornment of doctrines already +derived from a metaphysical repository. His art is no longer free, no +longer its own end, but coerced into an alien service. It has become +illustrative and argumentative, and in being made to subserve +speculative purposes, it has ceased to be creative. Browning has +appealed to philosophy, and philosophy must try his cause. + +Such, then, is Browning's theory; and I need make no further apology for +discussing at some length the validity of the division which it involves +between the intellectual and the moral life of man. Is it possible to +combine the weakness of man's intelligence with the strength of his +moral and religious life, and to find in the former the condition of the +latter? Does human knowledge fail, as the poet considers it to fail? Is +the intelligence of man absolutely incapable of arriving at knowledge of +things as they are? If it does, if man cannot know the truth, can he +attain goodness? These are the questions that must now be answered. + +It is one of the characteristics of recent thought that it distrusts its +own activity: the ancient philosophical "Scepticism" has been revived +and strengthened. Side by side with the sense of the triumphant progress +of natural science, there is a conviction, shared even by scientific +investigators themselves, as well as by religious teachers and by many +students of philosophy, that our knowledge has only limited and relative +value, and that it always stops short of the true nature of things. The +reason of this general conviction lies in the fact that thought has +become aware of its own activity; men realize more clearly than they did +in former times that the apparent constitution of things depends +directly on the character of the intelligence which apprehends them. + +This relativity of things to thought has, not unnaturally, suggested the +idea that the objects of our knowledge are different from objects as +they are. "That the real nature of things is very different from what we +make of them, that thought and thing are divorced, that there is a +fundamental antithesis between them," is, as Hegel said, "the hinge on +which modern philosophy turns." Educated opinion in our day has lost its +naive trust in itself. "The natural belief of man, it is true, ever +gives the lie" to the doctrine that we do not know things. "In common +life," adds Hegel, "we reflect without particularly noting that this is +the process of arriving at the truth, and we think without hesitation +and in the firm belief that thought coincides with things."[A] But, as +soon as attention is directed to the process of thinking, and to the way +in which the process affects our consciousness of the object, it is at +once concluded that thought will never reach reality, that things are +not given to us as they are, but distorted by the medium of sense and +our intelligence, through which they pass. The doctrine of the +relativity of knowledge is thus very generally regarded as equivalent to +the doctrine that there is no true knowledge whatsoever. We know only +phenomena, or appearances; and it is these, and not veritable facts, +that we systematize into sciences. "We can arrange the appearances--the +shadows of our cave--and that, for the practical purposes of the cave, +is all that we require."[B] Not even "earth's least atom" can ever be +known to us as it really is; it is for us, at the best, + +[Footnote A: Wallace's _Translation of Hegel's Logic_, p. 36.] + +[Footnote B: Caird's _Comte_.] + + "An atom with some certain properties + Known about, thought of as occasion needs."[C] + +[Footnote C: _A Bean-Stripe_.] + +In this general distrust of knowledge, however, there are, as might be +expected, many different degrees. Its origin in modern times was, no +doubt, the doctrine of Kant. "This divorce of thing and thought," says +Hegel, "is mainly the work of the critical philosophy and runs counter +to the conviction of all previous ages." And the completeness of the +divorce corresponds, with tolerable accuracy, to the degree in which the +critical philosophy has been understood; for Kant's writings, like those +of all great thinkers, are capable of many interpretations, varying in +depth with the intelligence of the interpreters. + +The most common and general form of this view of the limitation of the +human intelligence is that which places the objects of religious faith +beyond the reach of human knowledge. We find traces of it in much of the +popular theology of our day. The great facts of religion are often +spoken of as lying in an extra-natural sphere, beyond experience, into +which men cannot enter by the native right of reason. It is asserted +that the finite cannot know the infinite, that the nature of God is +unknowable--except by means of a supernatural interference, which gives +to men a new power of spiritual discernment, and "reveals" to them +things which are "above reason," although not contrary to it. The +theologian often shields certain of his doctrines from criticism, on the +ground, as he contends, that there are facts which we must believe, but +which it would be presumptuous for us to pretend to understand or to +demonstrate. They are the proper objects of "faith." + +But this view of the weakness of the intelligence when applied to +supersensuous facts, is held along with an undisturbed conviction of the +validity of our knowledge of ordinary objects. It is believed, in a +word, that there are two kinds of realities,--natural and supernatural; +and that the former is knowable and the latter not. + +It requires, however, no great degree of intellectual acumen to discover +that this denial of the validity of our knowledge of these matters +involves its denial in all its applications. The ordinary knowledge of +natural objects, which we begin by regarding as valid, or, rather, whose +validity is taken for granted without being questioned, depends upon our +ideas of these supersensible objects. In other words, those fundamental +difficulties which pious opinion discovers in the region of theology, +and which, as is thought, fling the human intellect back upon itself +into a consciousness of frailty and finitude, are found to lurk beneath +our ordinary knowledge. Whenever, for instance, we endeavour to know any +object, we find that we are led back along the line of its conditions to +that which unconditionally determines it. For we cannot find the reason +for a particular object in a particular object. We are driven back +endlessly from one to another along the chain of causes; and we can +neither discover the first link nor do without it. The first link must +be a cause of itself, and experience yields none such. Such a cause +would be the unconditioned, and the unconditioned we cannot know. The +final result of thinking is thus to lead us to an unknown; and, in +consequence, all our seeming knowledge is seen to have no intelligible +basis, and, therefore, to be merely hypothetical. If we cannot know God, +we cannot know anything. + +This view is held by the Positivists, and the most popular English +exponent of it is, perhaps, Mr. Herbert Spencer. Its characteristic is +its repudition of both theology and metaphysics as pseudo-sciences, and +its high esteem for science. That esteem is not disturbed by the +confession that "noumenal causes,"--that is, the actual reality of +things,--are unknown; for we can still lay claim to valid knowledge of +the laws of phenomena. Having acknowledged that natural things as known +are merely phenomena, positivism treats them in all respects as if they +were realities; and it rejoices in the triumphant progress of the +natural sciences as if it were a veritable growth of knowledge. It does +not take to heart the phenomenal nature of known objects. But, having +paid its formal compliments to the doctrine of the relativity of all +knowledge, it neglects it altogether. + +Those who understand Kant better carry his scepticism further, and they +complete the divorce between man's knowledge and reality. The process of +knowing, they hold, instead of leading us towards facts, as it was so +long supposed to do, takes us away from them: _i.e._, if either +"towards" or "away from" can have any meaning when applied to two realms +which are absolutely severed from one another. Knowledge is always +concerned with the relations between things; with their likeness, or +unlikeness, their laws, or connections; but these are universals, and +things are individuals. Science knows the laws of things, but not the +things; it reveals how one object affects another, how it is connected +with it; but what are the things themselves, which are connected, it +does not know. The laws are mere forms of thought, "bloodless +categories," and not facts. They may somehow be regarded as explaining +facts, but they must not be identified with the facts. Knowledge is the +sphere of man's thoughts, and is made up of ideas; real things are in +another sphere, which man's thoughts cannot reach. We must distinguish +more clearly than has hitherto been done, between logic as the science +of knowledge, and metaphysics as a science which pretends to reveal the +real nature of things. In a word, we can know thoughts or universals, +but not things or particular existences. "When existence is in question +it is the individual, not the universal, that is real; and the real +individual is not a composite of species and accidents, but is +individual to the inmost fibre of its being." Each object keeps its own +real being to itself. Its inmost secret, its reality, is something that +cannot appear in knowledge. We can only know its manifestations; but +these manifestations are not its reality, nor connected with it. These +belong to the sphere of knowledge, they are parts in a system of +abstract thoughts; they do not exist in that system, or no-system, of +individual realities, each of which, in its veritable being, is itself +only, and connected with nought beside. + +Now, this view of the absolute impossibility of knowing any reality, on +account of the fundamental difference between things and our thoughts +about things, contains a better promise of a true view both of reality +and of knowledge, than any of the previously mentioned half-hearted +theories. It forces us explicitly either to regard every effort to know +as futile, or else to regard it as futile _on this theory of it_. In +other words, we must either give up knowledge or else give up the +account of knowledge advanced by these philosophers. Hitherto, however, +every philosophy that has set itself against the possibility of the +knowledge of reality has had to give way. It has failed to shake the +faith of mankind in its own intellectual endowment, or to arrest, even +for a moment, the attempt by thinking to know things as they are. The +view held by Berkeley, that knowledge is merely subjective, because the +essence of things consists in their being perceived by the individual, +and that they are nothing but his ideas, was refuted by Kant, when he +showed that the very illusion of seeming knowledge was impossible on +that theory. And this later view, which represents knowledge as merely +subjective, on the ground that it is the product of the activity of the +thought of mankind, working according to universal laws, is capable of +being refuted in the same manner. The only difference between the +Berkeleian and this modern speculative theory is that, on the former +view, each individual constructed his own subjective entities or +illusions; while, on the latter, all men, by reason of the universality +of the laws of thought governing their minds, create the same illusion, +the same subjective scheme of ideas. Instead of each having his own +private unreality, as the product of his perceiving activity, they have +all the same, or at least a similar, phantom-world of ideas, as the +result of their thinking. But, in both cases alike, the reality of the +world without is out of reach, and knowledge is a purely subjective +apprehension of a world within. Thoughts are quite different from +things, and no effort of human reason can reveal any community between +them. + +Now, there are certain difficulties which, so far as I know, those who +hold this view have scarcely attempted to meet. The first of these lies +in the obvious fact, that all men at all times consider that this very +process of thinking, which the theory condemns as futile, is the only +way we have of finding out what the reality of things is. Why do we +reflect and think, except in order to pass beyond the illusions of +sensuous appearances to the knowledge of things as they are? Nay, why do +these philosophers themselves reflect, when reflection, instead of +leading to truth, which is knowledge of reality, leads only to ideas, +which, being universal, cannot represent the realities that are said to +be "individual." + +The second is, that the knowledge of "the laws" of things gives to us +practical command over them; although, according to this view, laws are +not things, nor any part of the reality of things, nor even true +representations of things. Our authority over things seems to grow _pari +passu_ with our knowledge. The natural sciences seem to prove by their +practical efficiency, that they are not building up a world of +apparitions, like the real world; but gradually getting inside nature, +learning more and more to wield her powers, and to make them the +instruments of the purposes of man, and the means of his welfare. To +common-sense,--which frequently "divines" truths that it cannot prove, +and, like ballast in a ship, has often given steadiness to human +progress although it is only a dead weight,--the assertion that man +knows nothing is as incredible as that he knows all things. If it is +replied, that the "things" which we seem to dominate by the means of +knowledge are themselves only phenomena, the question arises, what then +are the real things to which they are opposed? What right has any +philosophy to say that there is any reality which no one can in any +sense know? The knowledge that such reality is, is surely a relation +between that reality and consciousness, and, if so, the assertion of an +unknowable reality is self-contradictory. For the conception of it is +the conception of something that is, and at the same time is not, out of +relation to consciousness. + +To say what kind of thing reality is, is a still more remarkable feat, +if reality is unknowable. Reality, being beyond knowledge, why is it +called particular or individual, rather than universal? How is it known +that the true being of things is different from ideas? Surely both of +the terms must be regarded as known to some extent, if they are called +like or unlike, contrasted or compared, opposed or identified. + +But, lastly, this theory has to account for the fact that it constitutes +what is not only unreal, but impossible, into the criterion of what is +actual. If knowledge of reality is altogether different from human +knowledge, how does it come to be its criterion? That knowledge is +inadequate or imperfect can be known, only by contrasting it with its +own proper ideal, whatever that may be. A criticism by reference to a +foreign or irrelevant criterion, or the condemnation of a theory as +imperfect because it does not realize an impossible end, is +unreasonable. All true criticism of an object implies a reference to a +more perfect state of itself. + +We must, then, regard the knowledge of objects as they are, which is +opposed to human knowledge, as, only a completer and fuller form of that +knowledge; or else we must cease to contrast it with our human +knowledge, as valid with invalid, true with phenomenal. Either knowledge +of reality is complete knowledge, or else it is a chimera. And, in +either case, the sharp distinction between the real and the phenomenal +vanishes; and what remains, is not a reality outside of consciousness, +or different from ideas, but a reality related to consciousness, or, in +other words, a knowable reality. "The distinction of objects into +phenomena and noumena, _i.e._, into things that for us exist, and things +that for us do not exist, is an Irish bull in philosophy," said Heine. +To speak of reality as unknowable, or to speak of anything as +unknowable, is to utter a direct self-contradiction; it is to negate in +the predicate what is asserted in the subject. It is a still more +strange perversion to erect this knowable emptiness into a criterion of +knowledge, and to call the latter phenomenal by reference to it. + +These difficulties are so fundamental and so obvious, that the theory of +the phenomenal nature of human knowledge, which, being interpreted, +means that we know nothing, could scarcely maintain its hold, were it +not confused with another fact of human experience, that is apparently +inconsistent with the doctrine that man can know the truth. Side by side +with the faith of ordinary consciousness, that in order to know anything +we must think, or, in other words, that knowledge shows us what things +really are, there is a conviction, strengthened by constant experience, +that we never know things fully. Every investigation into the nature of +an object soon brings us to an enigma, a something more we do not know. +Failing to know this something more, we generally consider that we have +fallen short of reaching the reality of the object. We recognize, as it +has been expressed, that we have been brought to a stand, and we +therefore conclude that we are also brought to the end. We arrive at +what we do not know, and we pronounce that unknown to be unknowable; +that is, we regard it as something different in nature from what we do +know. So far as I can see, the attitude of ordinary thought in regard to +this matter might be fairly represented by saying, that it always begins +by considering objects as capable of being known in their reality, or as +they are, and that experience always proves the attempt to know them as +they are to be a failure. The effort is continued although failure is +the result, and even although that failure be exaggerated and +universalized into that despair of knowledge which we have described. We +are thus confronted with what seems to be a contradiction; a trust and +distrust in knowledge. It can only be solved by doing full justice to +both of the conflicting elements; and then, if possible, by showing that +they are elements, and not the complete, concrete fact, except when held +together. + +From one point of view, it is undeniable that in every object of +perception, we come upon problems that we cannot solve. Science at its +best, and even when dealing with the simplest of things, is forced to +stop short of its final secret. Even when it has discovered its law, +there is still apparently something over and above which science cannot +grasp, and which seems to give to the object its reality. All the +natural sciences concentrated on a bit of iron ore fail to exhaust the +truth in it: there is always a "beyond" in it, something still more +fundamental which is not yet understood. And that something beyond, that +inner essence, that point in which the laws meet and which the sciences +fail to lift into knowledge, is regarded as just the reality of the +thing. Thus the reality is supposed, at the close of every +investigation, to lie outside of knowledge; and conversely, all that we +do know, seeing that it lacks this last element, seems to be only +apparent knowledge, or knowledge of phenomena. + +In this way the process of knowing seems always to stop short at the +critical moment, when the truth is just about to be reached. And those +who dwell on this aspect alone are apt to conclude that man's intellect +is touched with a kind of impotence, which makes it useless when it gets +near the reality. It is like a weapon that snaps at the hilt just when +the battle is hottest. For we seem to be able to know everything but the +reality, and yet apart from the real essence all knowledge seems to be +merely apparent. Physical science penetrates through the outer +appearances of things to their laws, analyzes them into forms of energy, +calculates their action and predicts their effects with certainty. Its +practical power over the forces of nature is so great that it seems to +have got inside her secrets. And yet science will itself acknowledge +that in every simplest object there is an unknown. Its triumphant course +of explaining seems to be always arrested at the threshold of reality. +It has no theory, scarcely an hypothesis, of the actual nature of +things, or of what that is in each object, which constitutes it a real +existence. Natural science, with a scarcely concealed sneer, hands over +to the metaphysician all questions as to the real being of things; and +itself makes the more modest pretension of showing how things behave, +not what they are; what effects follow the original noumenal causes, but +not the veritable nature of these causes. Nor can the metaphysician, in +his turn, do more than suggest a hypothesis as to the nature of the +ultimate reality in things. He cannot detect or demonstrate it in any +particular fact. In a word, every minutest object in the world baffles +the combined powers of all forms of human thought, and holds back its +essence or true being from them. And as long as this true being, or +reality is not known, the knowledge which we seem to have cannot be held +as ultimately true, but is demonstrably a makeshift. + +Having made this confession, there seems to be no alternative but to +postulate an utter discrepancy between human thought and real existence, +or between human knowledge and truth, which is the correspondence of +thing and thought. For, at no point is knowledge found to be in touch +with real being; it is everywhere demonstrably conditioned and relative, +and inadequate to express the true reality of its objects. What remains, +then, except to regard human knowledge as completely untrustworthy, as +merely of phenomena? If we cannot know _any_ reality, does not knowledge +completely fail? + +Now, in dealing with the moral life of man, we saw that the method of +hard alternatives is invalid. The moral life, being progressive, was +shown to be the meeting--point of the ideal and the actual; and the +ideal of perfect goodness was regarded as manifesting itself in actions +which, nevertheless, were never adequate to express it. The good when +achieved was ever condemned as unworthy, and the ideal when attained +ever pressed for more adequate expression in a better character. The +ideal was present as potency, as realizing itself, but it was never +completely realized. The absolute good was never reached in the best +action, and never completely missed in the worst. + +The same conflict of real and unreal was shown to be essential to every +natural life. As long as anything grows it neither completely attains, +nor completely falls away from its ideal. The growing acorn is not an +oak tree, and yet it is not a mere acorn. The child is not the man; and +yet the man is in the child, and only needs to be evolved by interaction +with circumstances. The process of growth is one wherein the ideal is +always present, as a reconstructive power gradually changing its whole +vehicle, or organism, into a more perfect expression of itself. The +ideal is reached in the end, just because it is present in the +beginning; and there is no end as long as growth continues. + +Now, it is evident that knowledge, whether it be that of the individual +man or of the human race, is a thing that grows. The process by means of +which natural science makes progress, or by which the consciousness of +the child expands and deepens into the consciousness of the man, is best +made intelligible from the point of view of evolution. It is like an +organic process, in which each new acquirement finds its place in an old +order, each new fact is brought under the permanent principles of +experience, and absorbed into an intellectual life, which itself, in +turn, grows richer and fuller with every new acquisition. No knowledge +worthy of the name is an aggregation of facts. Wisdom comes by growth. + +Hence, the assertion that knowledge never attains reality, does not +imply that it always misses it. In morals we do not say that a man is +entirely evil, although he never, even in his best actions, attains the +true good. And if the process of knowing is one that presses onward +towards an ideal, that ideal is never completely missed even in the +poorest knowledge. If it grows, the method of fixed alternatives must be +inapplicable to it. The ideal, whatever it may be, must be considered as +active in the present, guiding the whole movement, and gradually +manifesting itself in each of the passing forms, which are used up as +the raw material of new acquirement; and yet no passing form completely +expresses the ideal. + +Nor is it difficult to say what that ideal of knowledge is, although we +cannot define it in any adequate manner. We know that the end of +morality is the _summum bonum_, although we cannot, as long as we are +progressive, define its whole content, or find it fully realized in any +action. Every failure brings new truth, every higher grade of moral +character reveals some new height of goodness to be scaled; the moral +ideal acquires definiteness and content as humanity moves upwards. And +yet the ideal is not entirely unknown even at the first; even to the +most ignorant, it presents itself as a criterion which enables him to +distinguish between right and wrong, evil and goodness, and which guides +his practical life. The same truth holds with regard to knowledge. Its +growth receives its impulse from, and is directed and determined by, +what is conceived as the real world of facts. This truth, namely, that +the ideal knowledge is knowledge of reality, the most subjective +philosopher cannot but acknowledge. It is implied in his condemnation of +knowledge as merely phenomenal, that there is possible a knowledge of +real being. That thought and reality can be brought together, or rather, +that they are always together, is presupposed in all knowledge and in +all experience. The effort to know is the effort to _explain_ the +relation of thought and reality, not to create it. The ideal of perfect +knowledge is present from the first; it generates the effort, directs +it, distinguishes between truth and error. And that which man ever aims +at, whether in the ordinary activities of daily thought, or through the +patient labour of scientific investigation, or in the reflective +self-torture of philosophic thought, is to know the world as it is. No +failure damps the ardour of this endeavour. Relativists, phenomenalists, +agnostics, sceptics, Kantians or Neo-Kantians--all the crowd of thinkers +who cry down the human intellect, and draw a charmed circle around +reality so as to make it unapproachable to the mind of man--ply this +useless labour. They are seeking to penetrate beneath the shows of sense +and the outer husk of phenomena to the truth, which is the meeting-point +of knowledge and reality; they are endeavouring to translate into an +intellectual possession the powers that play within and around them; or, +in other words, to make these powers express themselves in their +thoughts, and supply the content of their spiritual life. The irony, +latent in their endeavour, gives them no pause; they are in some way +content to pursue what they call phantoms, and to try to satisfy their +thirst with the waters of a mirage. This comes from the presence of the +ideal within them, that is, of the implicit unity of reality and +thought, which seeks for explicit and complete manifestation in +knowledge. The reality is present in them as thinking activity, working +towards complete revelation of itself by means of knowledge. And its +presence is real, although the process is never complete. + +In knowledge, as in morals, it is necessary to remember both of the +truths implied in the pursuit of an ideal--that a growing thing not only +always fails to attain, but also always succeeds. The distinction +between truth and error in knowledge is present at every stage in the +effort to attain truth, as the distinction between right and wrong is +present in every phase of the moral life. It is the source of the +intellectual effort. But that distinction cannot be drawn except by +reference to a criterion of truth, which condemns our actual knowledge; +as it is the absolute good, which condemns the present character. The +ideal may be indefinite, and its content confused and poor; but it is +always sufficient for its purpose, always better than the actual +achievement. And, in this sense, reality, the truth, the veritable being +of things, is always reached by the poorest knowledge. As there is no +starved and distorted sapling which is not the embodiment of the +principle of natural life, so the meanest character is the product of an +ideal of goodness, and the most confused opinion of ignorant mankind is +an expression of the reality of things. Without it there would not be +even the semblance of knowledge, not even error and untruth. + +Those who, like Browning, make a division between man's thought and real +things, and regard the sphere of knowledge as touching at no point the +sphere of actual existence, are attributing to the bare human intellect +much more power than it has. They regard mind as creating its phenomenal +knowledge, or the apparent world. For, having separated mind from +reality, it is evident that they cannot avail themselves of any doctrine +of sensations or impressions as a medium between them, or postulate any +other form of connection or means of communication. Connection of any +kind must, in the end, imply some community of nature, and must put the +unity of thought and being--here denied--beneath their difference. +Hence, the world of phenomena which we know, and which as known, does +not seem to consist of realities, must be the product of the unaided +human mind. The intellect, isolated from all real being, has +manufactured the apparent universe, in all its endless wealth. It is a +creative intellect, although it can only create illusions. It evolves +all its products from itself. + +But thought, set to revolve upon its own axis in an empty region, can +produce nothing, not even illusions. And, indeed, those who deny that it +is possible for thought and reality to meet in a unity, have, +notwithstanding, to bring over "something" to the aid of thought. There +must be some effluence from the world of reality, some manifestations of +the thing (though they are not the reality of the thing, nor any part of +the reality, nor connected with the reality!) to assist the mind and +supply it with data. The "phenomenal world" is a hybrid, generated by +thought and "something"--which yet is not reality; for the real world is +a world of things in themselves, altogether beyond thought. By bringing +in these data, it is virtually admitted that the human mind reaches down +into itself in vain for a world, even for a phenomenal one. + +Thought apart from things is quite empty, just as things apart from +thought are blind. Such thought and such reality are mere abstractions, +hypostasized by false metaphysics; they are elements of truth rent +asunder, and destroyed in the rending. The dependence of the +intelligence of man upon reality is direct and complete. The foolishest +dream, that ever played out its panorama beneath a night-cap, came +through the gates of the senses from the actual world. Man is limited to +his material in all that he knows, just as he is ruled by the laws of +thought. He cannot go one step beyond it. To transcend "experience" is +impossible. We have no wings to sustain us in an empty region, and no +need of any. It is as impossible for man to create new ideas, as it is +for him to create new atoms. Our thought is essentially connected with +reality. There is no _mauvais pas_ from thought to things. We do not +need to leap out of ourselves in order to get into the world. We are in +it from the first, both as physical and moral agents, and as thinking +beings. Our thoughts are expressions of the real nature of things, so +far as they go. They may be and are imperfect; they may be and are +confused and inadequate, and express only the superficial aspects and +not "the inmost fibres"; still, they are what they are, in virtue of +"the reality," which finds itself interpreted in them. Severed from that +reality, they would be nothing. + +Thus, the distinction between thought and reality is a distinction +within a deeper unity. And that unity must not be regarded as something +additional to both, or as a third something. It _is_ their unity. It is +both reality and thought: it is existing thought, or reality knowing +itself and existing through its knowledge of self; it is +self-consciousness. The distinguished elements have no existence or +meaning except in their unity. Like the actual and ideal, they have +significance and being, only in their reference to each other. + +There is one more difficulty connected with this matter which I must +touch upon, although the discussion may already be regarded as prolix. +It is acknowledged by every one that the knowledge of the individual, +and his apparent world of realities, grow _pari passu_. Beyond his +sphere of knowledge there is no reality _for him_, not even apparent +reality. But, on the other hand, the real world of existing things +exists all the same whether he knows it or not. It did not begin to be +with any knowledge he may have of it, it does not cease to be with his +extinction, and it is not in any way affected by his valid, or invalid, +reconstruction of it in thought. The world which depends on his thought +is his world, and not the world of really existing things. And this is +true alike of every individual. The world is independent of all human +minds. It existed before them, and will, very possibly, exist after +them. Can we not, therefore, conclude that the real world is independent +of thought, and that it exists without relation to it? + +A short reference to the moral consciousness may suggest the answer to +this difficulty. In morality (as also is the case in knowledge) the +moral ideal, or the objective law of goodness, grows in richness and +fulness of content with the individual who apprehends it. _His_ moral +world is the counterpart of _his_ moral growth as a character. Goodness +_for him_ directly depends upon his recognition of it. Animals, +presumably, have no moral ideal, because they have not the power to +constitute it. In morals, as in knowledge, the mind of man constructs +its own world. And yet, in both alike, the world of truth or of goodness +exists all the same whether the individual knows it or not. He does not +call the moral law into being, but finds it without, and then realizes +it in his own life. The moral law does not vanish and reappear with its +recognition by mankind. It is not subject to the chances and changes of +its life, but a good in itself that is eternal. + +Is it therefore independent of all intelligence? Can goodness be +anything but the law of a self-conscious being? Is it the quality or +motive or ideal of a mere thing? Manifestly not. Its relation to +self-consciousness is essential. With the extinction of +self-consciousness all moral goodness is extinguished. + +The same holds true of reality. The question of the reality or unreality +of things cannot arise except in an intelligence. Animals have neither +illusions nor truths--unless they are self-conscious. The reality, which +man sets over against his own inadequate knowledge, is posited by him; +and it has no meaning whatsoever except in this contrast. And to +endeavour to conceive a reality which no one knows, is to assert a +relative term without its correlative, which is absurd; it is to posit +an ideal which is opposed to nothing actual. + +In this view, so commonly held in our day, that knowledge is subjective +and reality unknowable, we have another example of the falseness and +inconsistency of abstract thinking. If this error be committed, there is +no fundamental gain in saying with Kant, that things are relative to the +thought of all, instead of asserting, with Berkeley or Browning, that +they are relative to the thought of each. The final result is the same. +Things as known, are reduced into mere creations of thought; things as +they are, are regarded as not thoughts, and as partaking in no way of +the nature of thought. And yet "reality" is virtually assumed to be +given at the beginning of knowledge; for the sensations are supposed to +be emanations from it, or roused in consciousness by it. These +sensations, it is said, man does not make, but receives, and receives +from the concealed reality. They flow from it, and are the +manifestations of its activity. Then, in the next moment, reality is +regarded as not given in any way, but as something to be discovered by +the effort of thought; for we always strive to know things, and not +phantoms. Lastly, the knowledge thus acquired being regarded as +imperfect, and experience showing to us continually that every object +has more in it than we know, the reality is pronounced to be unknowable, +and all knowledge is regarded as failure, as acquaintance with mere +phantoms. Thus, in thought, as in morality, the ideal is present at the +beginning, it is an effort after explicit realization, and its process +is never complete. + +Now, all these aspects of the ideal of knowledge, that is, of reality, +are held by the unsophisticated intelligence of man; and abstract +philosophy is not capable of finally getting rid of any one of them. It, +too, holds them _alternately_. Its denial of the possibility of knowing +reality is refuted by its own starting-point; for it begins with a given +something, regarded as real, and its very effort to know is an attempt +to know that reality by thinking. But it forgets these facts, when it is +discovered that knowledge at the best is incomplete. It is thus tossed +from assertion to denial, and from denial to assertion; from one +abstract or one-sided view of reality, to the other. + +When these different aspects of truth are grasped together from the +point of view of evolution, there seems to be a way of escaping the +difficulties to which they give rise. For the ideal must be present at +the beginning, and cannot be present in its fulness till the process is +complete. What is here required is to lift our theory of man's knowledge +to the level of our theory of his moral life, and to treat it frankly as +the process whereby reality manifests itself in the mind of man. In that +way, we shall avoid the absurdities of both of the abstract schools of +philosophy, to both of which alike the native intelligence of man gives +the lie. We shall say neither that man knows nothing, nor that he knows +all; we shall regard his knowledge, neither as purely phenomenal and out +of all contact with reality, nor as an actual identification with the +real being of things in all their complex variety. For, in morality, we +do not say either that the individual is absolutely evil, because his +actions never realize the supreme ideal of goodness; nor, that he is at +the last term of development, and "taking the place of God," because he +lives as "ever in his great Taskmaster's eye." Just as every moral +action, however good, leaves something still to be desiderated, +something that may become a stepping-stone for new movement towards the +ideal which it has failed to actualize; so all our knowledge of an +object leaves something over that we have not apprehended, which is +truer and more real than anything we know, and which in all future +effort we strive to master. And, just as the very effort, to be good +derives its impulse and direction from the ideal of goodness which is +present, and striving for realization; so the effort to know derives its +impulse and direction from the reality which is present, and striving +for complete realization in the thought of man. We know reality +confusedly from the first; and it is because we have attained so much +knowledge, that we strive for greater clearness and fulness. It is by +planting his foot on the world that man travels. It is by opposing his +power to the given reality that his knowledge grows. + +When once we recognize that reality is the ideal of knowledge, we are +able to acknowledge all the truth that is in the doctrine of the +phenomenalists, without falling into their errors and contradictions. We +may go as far as the poet in confessing intellectual impotence, and +roundly call the knowledge of man "lacquered ignorance." "Earth's least +atom" does veritably remain an enigma. Man is actually flung back into +his circumscribed sphere by every fact; and he will continue to be so +flung to the end of time. He will never know reality, nor be able to +hold up in his hand the very heart of the simplest thing in the world. +For the world is an organic totality, and its simplest thing will not be +seen, through and through, till everything is known, till every fact and +event is related to every other under principles which are universal: +just as goodness cannot be fully achieved in any act, till the agent is +in all ways lifted to the level of absolute goodness. Physics cannot +reveal the forces which keep a stone in its place on the earth, till it +has traced the forces that maintain the starry systems in their course. +No fact can be thoroughly known, _i.e._, known in its reality, till the +light of the universe has been focussed upon it: and, on the other hand, +to know any subject through and through would be to explain all being. +The highest law and the essence of the simple fact, the universal and +the particular, can only be known together, in and through one another. +"Reality" in "the least atom" will be known, only when knowledge has +completed its work, and the universe has become a transparent sphere, +penetrated in every direction by the shafts of intelligence. + +But this is only half the truth. If knowledge is never complete, it is +always _completing_; if reality is never known, it is ever _being +known_; if the ideal is never actual, it is always _being actualized_. +The complete failure of knowledge is as impossible as its complete +success. It is at no time severed from reality; it is never its mere +adumbration, nor are its contents mere phenomena. On the contrary, it is +reality partially revealed, the ideal incompletely actualized. Our very +errors are the working of reality within us, and apart from it they +would be impossible. The process towards truth by man is the process of +truth _in_ man; the movement of knowledge towards reality is the movement +of reality into knowledge. A purely subjective consciousness which knows, +such as the poet tried to describe, is a self-contradiction: it would be +a consciousness at once related, and not related, to the actual world. +But man has no need to relate himself to the world. He is already +related, and his task is to understand that relation, or, in other words, +to make both its terms intelligible. Man has no need to go out from +himself to facts; his relation to facts is prior to his distinction from +them. The truth is that he cannot entirely lift himself away from them, +nor suspend his thoughts in the void. In his inmost being he is +creation's voice, and in his knowledge he confusedly murmurs its deep +thoughts. + +Browning was aware of this truth in its application to man's moral +nature. In speaking of the principle of love, he was not tempted to +apply fixed alternatives. On the contrary, he detected in the "poorest +love that was ever offered" the veritable presence of that which is +perfect and complete, though never completely actualized. His interest +in the moral development of man, and his penetrative moral insight, +acting upon, and guided by the truths of the Christian religion, warned +him, on this side, against the absolute separation of the ideal and +actual, the divine and human. Human love, however poor in quality and +limited in range, was to him God's love in man. It was a wave breaking +in the individual of that First Love, which is ever flowing back through +the life of humanity to its primal source. To him all moral endeavour is +the process of this Primal Love; and every man, as he consciously +identifies himself with it, may use the language of Scripture, and say, +"It is not I that live, but Christ lives in me." + +But, on the side of knowledge, he was neither so deeply interested, nor +had he so good a guide to lean upon. Ignorant, according to all +appearances, of the philosophy which has made the Christian maxim, "Die +to live,"--which primarily is only a principle of morality--the basis of +its theory of knowledge, he exaggerated the failure of science to reach +the whole truth as to any particular object, into a qualitative +discrepancy between knowledge and truth. Because knowledge is never +complete, it is always mere lacquered ignorance; and man's apparent +intellectual victories are only conquests in a land of unrealities, or +mere phenomena. He occupies in regard to knowledge, a position strictly +analogous to that of Carlyle, in regard to morality; his intellectual +pessimism is the counterpart of the moral pessimism of his predecessor, +and it springs from the same error. He forgot that the ideal without is +also the power within, which makes for its own manifestation in the mind +of man. + +He opposed the intellect to the world, as Carlyle opposed the weakness +of man to the law of duty; and he neglected the fact that the world was +there for him, only because he knew it, just as Carlyle neglected the +fact that the duty was without, only because it was recognized within. +He strained the difference between the ideal and actual into an absolute +distinction; and, as Carlyle condemned man to strive for a goodness +which he could never achieve, so Browning condemns him to pursue a truth +which he can never attain. In both, the failure is regarded as absolute. +"There is no good in us," has for its counterpart "There is no truth in +us." Both the moralist and the poet dwell on the _negative_ relation of +the ideal and actual, and forget that the negative has no meaning, +except as the expression of a deeper affirmative. Carlyle had to learn +that we know our moral imperfection, only because we are conscious of a +better within us; and Browning had to learn that we are aware of our +ignorance, only because we have the consciousness of fuller truth with +which we contrast our knowledge. Browning, indeed, knew that the +consciousness of evil was itself evidence of the presence of good, that +perfection means death, and progress is life, on the side of morals; but +he has missed the corresponding truth on the side of knowledge. If he +acknowledges that the highest revealed itself to man, on the practical +side, as love; he does not see that it has also manifested itself to +man, on the theoretical side, as reason. The self-communication of the +Infinite is incomplete love is a quality of God, intelligence a quality +of man; hence, on one side, there is no limit to achievement, but on the +other there is impotence. Human nature is absolutely divided against +itself; and the division, as we have already seen, is not between flesh +and spirit, but between a love which is God's own and perfect, and an +intelligence which is merely man's and altogether weak and deceptive. + +This is what makes Browning think it impossible to re-establish faith in +God, except by turning his back on knowledge; but whether it is possible +for him to appeal to the moral consciousness, we shall inquire in the +next chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +THE HEART AND THE HEAD.--LOVE AND REASON. + + + "And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to + play upon the earth, so truth be in the field, we do + injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her + strength. Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew + truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter."[A] + +[Footnote A: Milton's _Areopagitica_.] + +It has been shown that Browning appeals, in defence of his optimistic +faith, from the intellect to the heart. His theory rests on three main +assumptions:--namely (1) that knowledge of the true nature of things is +impossible to man, and that, therefore, it is necessary to find other +and better evidence than the intellect can give for the victory of good +over evil; (2) that the failure of knowledge is a necessary condition of +the moral life, inasmuch as certain knowledge would render all moral +effort either futile or needless; (3) that after the failure of +knowledge there still remains possible a faith of the heart, which can +furnish a sufficient objective basis to morality and religion. The first +of these assumptions I endeavoured to deal with in the last chapter. I +now turn to the remaining two. + +Demonstrative, or certain, or absolute knowledge of the actual nature of +things would, Browning asserts, destroy the very possibility of a moral +life.[A] For such knowledge would show either that evil is evil, or that +evil is good; and, in both cases alike, the benevolent activity of love +would be futile. In the first case, it would be thwarted and arrested by +despair; for, if evil be evil, it must remain evil for aught that man +can do. Man cannot effect a change in the nature of things, nor create a +good in a world dominated by evil. In the second case, the saving effect +of moral love would be unnecessary; for, if evil be only seeming, then +all things are perfect and complete, and there is no need of +interference. It is necessary, therefore, that man should be in a +permanent state of doubt as to the real existence of evil; and, whether +evil does exist or not, it must seem, and only seem to exist to man, in +order that he may devote himself to the service of good.[B] + +[Footnote A: See Chapter VIII., p. 255.] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid_.] + +Now, if this view of the poet be taken in the strict sense in which he +uses it in this argument, it admits of a very easy refutation. It takes +us beyond the bounds of all possible human experience, into an imaginary +region, as to which all assertions are equally valueless. It is +impossible to conceive how the conduct of a being who is moral would be +affected by absolute knowledge; or, indeed, to conceive the existence of +such a being. For morality, as the poet insists, is a process in which +an ideal is gradually realized through conflict with the actual--an +actual which it both produces and transmutes at every stage of the +progress. But complete knowledge would be above all process. Hence we +would have, on Browning's hypothesis, to conceive of a being in whom +perfect knowledge was combined with an undeveloped will. A being so +constituted would be an agglomerate of utterly disparate elements, the +interaction of which in a single character it would be impossible to +make intelligible. + +But, setting aside this point, there is a curious flaw in Browning's +argument, which indicates that he had not distinguished between two +forms of optimism which are essentially different from each +other,--namely, the pantheistic and the Christian. + +To know that evil is only apparent, that pain is only pleasure's mask, +that all forms of wickedness and misery are only illusions of an +incomplete intelligence, would, he argues, arrest all moral action and +stultify love. For love--which necessarily implies need in its +object--is the principle of all right action. In this he argues justly, +for the moral life is essentially a conflict and progress; and, in a +world in which "white ruled unchecked along the line," there would be +neither the need of conflict nor the possibility of progress. And, on +the other hand, if the good were merely a phantom, and evil the reality, +the same destruction of moral activity would follow. "White may not +triumph," in this absolute manner, nor may we "clean abolish, once and +evermore, white's faintest trace." There must be "the constant shade +cast on life's shine." + +All this is true; but the admission of it in no way militates against +the conception of absolutely valid knowledge; nor is it any proof that +we need live in the twilight of perpetual doubt, in order to be moral. +For the knowledge, of which Browning speaks, would be knowledge of a +state of things in which morality would be really impossible; that is, +it would be knowledge of a world in which all was evil or all was good. +On the other hand, valid knowledge of a world in which good and evil are +in conflict, and in which the former is realized through victory over +the latter, would not destroy morality. What is inconsistent with the +moral life is the conception of a world where there is no movement from +evil to good, no evolution of character, but merely the stand-still life +of "Rephan." But absolutely certain knowledge that the good is at issue +with sin in the world, that there is no way of attaining goodness except +through conflict with evil, and that moral life, as the poet so +frequently insists, is a process which converts all actual attainment +into a dead self, from which we can rise to higher things--a self, +therefore, which is relatively evil--would, and does, inspire morality. +It is the deification of evil not negated or overcome, of evil as it is +in itself and apart from all process, which destroys morality. And the +same is equally true of a pantheistic optimism, which asserts that all +things _are_ good. But it is not true of a Christian optimism, which +asserts that all things are _working together for_ good. For such +optimism implies that the process of negating or overcoming evil is +essential to the attainment of goodness; it does not imply that evil, as +evil, is ever good. Evil is unreal, only in the sense that it cannot +withstand the power which is set against it. It is not _mere_ semblance, +a mere negation or absence of being; it is opposed to the good, and its +opposition can be overcome, only by the moral effort which it calls +forth. An optimistic faith of this kind can find room for morality; and, +indeed, it furnishes it with the religious basis it needs. Browning, +however, has confused these two forms of optimism; and, therefore, he +has been driven to condemn knowledge, because he knew no alternative but +that of either making evil eternally real, or making it absolutely +unreal. A third alternative, however, is supplied by the conception of +moral evolution. Knowledge of the conditions on which good can be +attained--a knowledge that amounts to conviction--is the spring of all +moral effort; whereas an attitude of permanent doubt as to the +distinction between good and evil would paralyse it. Such a doubt must +be solved before man can act at all, or choose one end rather than +another. All action implies belief, and the ardour and vigour of moral +action can only come from a belief which is whole-hearted. + +The further assertion, which the poet makes in _La Saisiaz_, and repeats +elsewhere, that sure knowledge of the consequences that follow good and +evil actions would necessarily lead to the choice of good and the +avoidance of evil, and destroy morality by destroying liberty of choice, +raises the whole question of the relation of knowledge and conduct, and +cannot be adequately discussed here. It may be said, however, that it +rests upon a confusion between two forms of necessity: namely, natural +and spiritual necessity. In asserting that knowledge of the consequences +of evil would determine human action in a necessary way, the poet +virtually treats man as if he were a natural being. But the assumption +that man is responsible and liable to punishment, involves that he is +capable of withstanding all such determination. And knowledge does not +and cannot lead to such necessary determination. Reason brings freedom; +for reason constitutes the ends of action. + +It is the constant desire of the good to attain to such a convincing +knowledge of the worth and dignity of the moral law that they shall be +able to make themselves its devoted instruments. Their desire is that +"the good" shall supplant in them all motives that conflict against it, +and be the inner principle, or necessity, of all their actions. Such +complete devotion to the good is expressed, for instance, in the words +of the Hebrew Psalmist: "Thy testimonies have I taken as an heritage for +ever; for they are the rejoicing of my heart. I have inclined mine heart +to perform Thy statutes alway, even unto the end. I hate vain thoughts, +but Thy law do I love." "Nevertheless I live," said the Christian +apostle, "yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now +live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God." In these words +there is expressed that highest form of the moral life, in which the +individual is so identified in desire with his ideal, that he lives only +to actualize it in his character. The natural self is represented as +dead, and the victory of the new principle is viewed as complete. This +full obedience to the ideal is the service of a necessity; but the +necessity is within, and the service is, therefore, perfect freedom. The +authority of the law is absolute, but the law is self-imposed. The whole +man is convinced of its goodness. He has acquired something even fuller +than a mere intellectual demonstration of it; for his knowledge has +ripened into wisdom, possessed his sympathies, and become a disposition +of his heart. And the fulness and certainty of his knowledge, so far +from rendering morality impossible, is its very perfection. To bring +about such a knowledge of the good of goodness and the evil of evil, as +will engender love of the former and hatred of the latter, is the aim of +all moral education. Thus, the history of human life, in so far as it is +progressive, may be concentrated in the saying that it is the ascent +from the power of a necessity which is natural, to the power of a +necessity which is moral. And this latter necessity can come only +through fuller and more convincing knowledge of the law that rules the +world, and is also the inner principle of man's nature. + +There remains now the third element in Browning's view,--namely, that +the faith in the good, implied in morality and religion, can be firmly +established, after knowledge has turned out deceptive, upon the +individual's consciousness of the power of love within himself. In other +words, I must now try to estimate the value of Browning's appeal from +the intellect to the heart. + +Before doing so, however, it may be well to repeat once more that +Browning's condemnation of knowledge, in his philosophical poems, is not +partial or hesitating. On the contrary, he confines it definitely to the +individual's consciousness of his own inner states. + + "Myself I solely recognize. + They, too, may recognize themselves, not me, + For aught I know or care."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Bean-Stripe_. See also _La Saisiaz_.] + +Nor does Browning endeavour to correct this limited testimony of the +intellect as to its own states, by bringing in the miraculous aid of +revelation, or by postulating an unerring moral faculty. He does not +assume an intuitive power of knowing right from wrong; but he maintains +that ignorance enwraps man's moral sense.[B] + +[Footnote B: See Chapter VIII.] + +And, not only are we unable to know the rule of right and wrong in +details, but we cannot know whether there _is_ right or wrong. At times +the poet seems inclined to say that evil is a phenomenon conjured up by +the frail intelligence of man. + + "Man's fancy makes the fault! + Man, with the narrow mind, must cram inside + His finite God's infinitude,--earth's vault + He bids comprise the heavenly far and wide, + Since Man may claim a right to understand + What passes understanding."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Bernard de Mandeville_.] + +God's ways are past finding out. Nay, God Himself is unknown. At times, +indeed, the power to love within man seems to the poet to be a clue to +the nature of the Power without, and God is all but revealed in this +surpassing emotion of the human heart. But, when philosophizing, he +withdraws even this amount of knowledge. He is + + "Assured that, whatsoe'er the quality + Of love's cause, save that love was caused thereby, + This--nigh upon revealment as it seemed + A minute since--defies thy longing looks, + Withdrawn into the unknowable once more."[B] + +[Footnote B: _A Pillar at Sebzevar_.] + +Thus--to sum up Browning's view of knowledge--we are ignorant of the +world; we do not know even whether it is good, or evil, or only their +semblance, that is presented to us in human life; and we know nothing of +God, except that He is the cause of love in man. What greater depth of +agnosticism is possible? + +When the doctrine is put in this bald form, the moral and religious +consciousness of man, on behalf of which the theory was invented, +revolts against it. + +Nevertheless, the distinction made by Browning between the intellectual +and emotional elements of human life is very common in religious +thought. It is not often, indeed, that either the worth of love, or the +weakness of knowledge receives such emphatic expression as that which is +given to them by the poet; but the same general idea of their relation +is often expressed, and still more often implied. Browning differs from +our ordinary teachers mainly in the boldness of his affirmatives and +negatives. They, too, regard the intellect as merely human, and the +emotion of love as divine. They, too, shrink from identifying the reason +of man with the reason of God; even though they may recognize that +morality and religion must postulate some kind of unity between God and +man. They, too, conceive that human knowledge differs _in nature_ from +that of God, while they maintain that human goodness is the same in +nature with that of God, though different in degree and fulness. There +are two _kinds_ of knowledge, but there is only one kind of justice, or +mercy, or loving-kindness. Man must be content with a semblance of a +knowledge of truth; but a semblance of goodness, would be intolerable. +God really reveals Himself to man in morality and religion, and He +communicates to man nothing less than "the divine love." But there is no +such close connection on the side of reason. The religious life of man +is a divine principle, the indwelling of God in him; but there is a +final and fatal defect in man's knowledge. The divine love's +manifestation of itself is ever incomplete, it is true, even in the best +of men; but there is no defect in its nature. + +As a consequence of this doctrine, few religious opinions are more +common at the present day, than that it is necessary to appeal, on all +the high concerns of man's moral and religious life, from the intellect +to the heart. Where we cannot know, we may still feel; and the religious +man may have, in his own feeling of the divine, a more intimate +conviction of the reality of that in which he trusts, than could be +produced by any intellectual process. + + "Enough to say, 'I feel + Love's sure effect, and, being loved, must love + The love its cause behind,--I can and do.'"[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Piller at Sebzevar_.] + +Reason, in trying to scale the heights of truth, falls-back, impotent +and broken, into doubt and despair; not by that way can we come to that +which is best and highest. + + "I found Him not in world or sun, + Or eagle's wing, or insect's eye; + Nor thro' the questions men may try, + The petty cobwebs we have spun."[B] + +[Footnote B: _In Memoriam_.] + +But there is another way to find God and to conquer doubt. + + "If e'er when faith had fall'n asleep, + I heard a voice 'believe no more,' + And heard an ever-breaking-shore + That tumbled in the Godless deep; + + "A warmth within the breast would melt + The freezing reason's colder part, + And like a man in wrath the heart + Stood up and answer'd 'I have felt.'"[A] + +[Footnote A: _In Memoriam_.] + +What, then, I have now to ask, is the meaning and value of this appeal +to emotion? Can love, or emotion in any of its forms, reveal truths to +man which his intellect cannot discover? If so, how? If not, how shall +we account for the general conviction of good men that it can? We have, +in a word, either to justify the appeal to the heart, by explaining how +the heart may utter truths that are hidden from reason; or else to +account for the illusion, by which religious emotion seems to reveal +such truths. + +The first requirement is shown to be unreasonable by the very terms in +which it is made. The intuitive insight of faith, the immediate +conviction of the heart, cannot render, and must not try to render, any +account of itself. Proof is a process; but there is no process in this +direct conviction of truth. Its assertion is just the denial of process; +it is a repudiation of all connections; in such a faith of feeling there +are no cob-web lines relating fact to fact, which doubt could break. +Feeling is the immediate unity of the subject and object. I am pained, +because I cannot rid myself of an element which is already within me; I +am lifted into the emotion of pleasure, or happiness, or bliss, by the +consciousness that I am already at one with an object that fulfils my +longings and satisfies my needs. Hence, there seems to be ground for +saying that, in this instance, the witness cannot lie; for it cannot go +before the fact, as it is itself the effect of the fact. If the emotion +is pleasurable it is the consciousness of the unity within; if it is +painful, of the disunity. In feeling, I am absolutely with myself; and +there seems, therefore, to be no need of attempting to justify, by means +of reason, a faith in God which manifests itself in emotion. The emotion +itself is its own sufficient witness, a direct result of the intimate +union of man with the object of devotion. Nay, we may go further, and +say that the demand is an unjust one, which betrays ignorance of the +true nature of moral intuition and religious feeling. + +I am not concerned to deny the truth that lies in the view here stated; +and no advocate of the dignity of human reason, or of the worth of human +knowledge, is called upon to deny it. There is a sense in which the +conviction of "faith" or "feeling" is more intimate and strong than any +process of proof. But this does not in any wise justify the contention +of those who maintain that we can feel what we do not in any sense know, +or that the heart can testify to that of which the intellect is +absolutely silent. + + "So let us say--not 'Since we know, we love,' + But rather, 'Since we love, we know enough.'"[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Pillar at Sebzevar_.] + +In these two lines there are combined the truth I would acknowledge, and +the error I would confute. Love is, in one way, sufficient knowledge; +or, rather, it is the direct testimony of that completest knowledge, in +which subject and object interpenetrate. For, where love is, all foreign +elements have been eliminated. There is not "one and one with a shadowy +third"; but the object is brought within the self as constituting part +of its very life. This is involved in all the great forms of human +thought--in science and art, no less than in morality and religion. It +is the truth that we love, and only that, which is altogether ours. By +means of love the poet is + + "Made one with Nature. There is heard + His voice in all her music, from the moan + Of thunder to the song of night's sweet bird "; + +and it is because he is made one with her that he is able to reveal her +inmost secrets. "Man," said Fichte, "can will nothing but what he loves; +his love is the sole and at the same time the infallible spring of his +volition, and of all his life's striving and movement." It is only when +we have identified ourselves with an ideal, and made its realization our +own interest, that we strive to attain it. Love is revelation in +knowledge, inspiration in art, motive in morality, and the fulness of +religious joy. + +But, although in this sense love is greater than knowledge, it is a +grave error to separate it from knowledge. In the life of man at least, +the separation of the emotional and intellectual elements extinguishes +both. We cannot know that in which we have no interest. The very effort +to comprehend an object rests on interest, or the feeling of ourselves +in it; so that knowledge, as well as morality, may be said to begin in +love. We cannot know except we love; but, on the other hand, we cannot +love that which we do not in some degree know. Wherever the frontiers of +knowledge may be it is certain that there is nothing beyond them which +can either arouse feeling, or be a steadying centre for it. Emotion is +like a climbing plant. It clings to the tree of knowledge, adding beauty +to its strength. But, without knowledge, it is impossible for man. There +is no feeling which is not also incipient knowledge; for feeling is only +the subjective side of knowledge--that face of the known fact which is +turned inwards. + +If, therefore, the poet's agnosticism were taken literally, and, in his +philosophical poems he obviously means it to be taken literally, it +would lead to a denial of the very principles of religion and morality, +which it was meant to support. His appeal to love would then, strictly +speaking, be an appeal to the love of nothing known, or knowable; and +such love is impossible. For love, if it is to be distinguished from the +organic, impulse of beast towards beast, must have an object. A mere +instinctive activity of benevolence in man, by means of which he +lightened the sorrows of his brethren, if not informed with knowledge, +would have no more moral worth than the grateful warmth of the sun. Such +love as this there may be in the animal creation. If the bird is not +rational, we may say that it builds its nest and lines it for its brood, +pines for its partner and loves it, at the bidding of the returning +spring, in much the same way as the meadows burst into flower. Without +knowledge, the whole process is merely a natural one; or, if it be more, +it is so only in so far as the life of emotion can be regarded as a +foretaste of the life of thought. But such a natural process is not +possible to man. Every activity in him is relative to his +self-consciousness, and takes a new character from that relation. His +love at the best and worst is the love of something that he knows, and +in which he seeks to find himself made rich with new sufficiency. Thus +love can not "ally" itself with ignorance. It is, indeed, an impulse +pressing for the closer communion of the lover with the object of his +love. + + "Like two meteors of expanding flame, + Those spheres instinct with it become the same, + Touch, mingle, are transfigured; ever still + Burning, yet ever inconsumable; + In one another's substance finding food."[A] + +[Footnote A: Shelley's _Epipsychidion_.] + +But, for a being such as Browning describes, who is shut up within the +blind walls of his own self, the self-transcending impulse of love would +be impossible. If man's inner consciousness is to be conceived as a dark +room shutting out the world, upon whose shadowy phenomena the candle of +introspection throws a dim and uncertain light, then he can have no +interest outside of himself; nor can he ever take that first step in +goodness, which carries him beyond his narrow individuality to seek and +find a larger self in others. Morality, even in its lowest form, implies +knowledge, and knowledge of something better than "those _apparent_ +other mortals." With the first dawn of the moral life comes the +consciousness of an ideal, which is not actual; and such a break with +the natural is not possible except to him who has known a better and +desired it. The ethical endeavour of man is the attempt to convert ideas +into actuality; and all his activity as moral agent takes place within +the sphere that is illumined by the light of knowledge. If knowledge +breaks down, there is no law of action which he can obey. The moral law +that must be apprehended, and whose authority must be recognized by man, +either sinks out of being or becomes an illusive phantom, if man is +doomed to ignorance or false knowledge. To extinguish truth is to +extinguish goodness. + +In like manner, religion, which the poet would fain defend for man by +means of agnosticism, becomes impossible, if knowledge be denied. +Religion is not blind emotion; nor can mere feeling, however ecstatic, +ascend to God. Animals feel, but they are not, and cannot be, +religious--unless they can know. The love of God implies knowledge. "I +know Him whom I have believed" is the language of religion. For what is +religion but a conscious identification of the self with One who is +known to fulfil its needs and satisfy its aspirations? Agnosticism is +thus directly destructive of it. We cannot, indeed, prove God as the +conclusion of a syllogism, for He is the primary hypothesis of all +proof. But, nevertheless, we cannot reach Him without knowledge. Emotion +reveals no object, but is consequent upon the revelation of it; feeling +yields no truth, but is the witness of the worth of a truth for the +individual. If man were shut up to mere feeling, even the awe of the +devout agnostic would be impossible. For the Unknowable cannot generate +any emotion. It appears to do so, only because the Unknowable of the +agnostic is not altogether unknown to him; but is a vast, abysmal +"Something," that has occupied with its shadowy presence the field of +his imagination. It is paganism stricken with the plague, and philosophy +afflicted with blindness, that build altars to an unknown God. The +highest and the strongest faith, the deepest trust and the most loving, +come with the fullest knowledge. Indeed, the distinction between the awe +of the agnostic, which is the lowest form of religion, and that highest +form in which perfect love casteth out fear, springs from the fuller +knowledge of the nature of the object of warship, which the latter +implies. Thus, religion and morality grow with the growth of knowledge; +and neither has a worse enemy than ignorance. The human spirit cannot +grow in a one-sided manner. Devotion to great moral ends is possible, +only through the deepening and widening of man's knowledge of the nature +of the world. Those who know God best, render unto Him the purest +service. + +So evident is this, that it seems at first sight to be difficult to +account for that antagonism to the intellect and distrust of its +deliverances, which are so emphatically expressed in the writings of +Browning, and which are marked characteristics of the ordinary religious +opinion of our day. On closer examination, however, we shall discover +that it is not pure emotion, or mere feeling, whose authority is set +above that of reason, but rather the emotion which is the result of +knowledge. The appeal of the religious man from the doubts and +difficulties, which reason levels against "the faith," is really an +appeal to the character that lies behind the emotion. The conviction of +the heart, that refuses to yield to the arguments of the understanding, +is not _mere_ feeling; but, rather, the complex experience of the past +life, that manifests itself in feeling. When an individual, clinging to +his moral or religious faith, says, "I have felt it," he opposes to the +doubt, not his feeling as such, but his personality in all the wealth of +its experience. The appeal to the heart is the appeal to the unproved, +but not, therefore, unauthorized, testimony of the best men at their +best moments, when their vision of truth is clearest. No one pretends +that "the loud and empty voice of untrained passion and prejudice" has +any authority in matters of moral and religious faith; though, in such +cases, "feeling" may lack neither depth nor intensity. If the "feelings" +of the good man were dissociated from his character, and stripped bare +of all the significance they obtain therefrom, their worthlessness would +become apparent. The profound error of condemning knowledge in order to +honour feeling, is hidden only by the fact that the feeling is already +informed and inspired with knowledge. Religious agnosticism, like all +other forms of the theory of nescience, derives its plausibility from +the adventitious help it purloins from the knowledge which it condemns. + +That it is to such feeling that Browning really appeals against +knowledge becomes abundantly evident, when we bear in mind that he +always calls it "love." For love in man is never ignorant. It knows its +object, and is a conscious identification of the self with it. And to +Browning, the object of love, when love is at its best--of that love by +means of which he refutes intellectual pessimism--is mankind. The revolt +of the heart against all evil is a desire for the good of all men. In +other words, his refuge against the assailing doubts which spring from +the intellect, is in the moral consciousness. But that consciousness is +no mere emotion; it is a consciousness which knows the highest good, and +moves in sympathy with it. It is our maturest wisdom; for it is the +manifestation of the presence and activity of the ideal, the fullest +knowledge and the surest. Compared with this, the emotion linked to +ignorance, of which the poet speaks in his philosophic theory, is a very +poor thing. It is poorer than the lowest human love. + +Now, if this higher interpretation of the term "heart" be accepted, it +is easily seen why its authority should seem higher than that of reason; +and particularly, if it be remembered that, while the heart is thus +widened to take in all direct consciousness of the ideal, "the reason" +is reduced to the power of reflection, or mental analysis. "The heart," +in this sense, is the intensest unity of the complex experiences of a +whole life, while "the reason" is taken merely as a faculty which +invents arguments, and provides grounds and evidences; it is what is +called, in the language of German philosophy, the "understanding." Now, +in this sense, the understanding has, at best, only a borrowed +authority. It is the faculty of rules rather than of principles. It is +ever dogmatic, assertive, repellent, hard; and it always advances its +forces in single line. Its logic never convinced any one of truth or +error, unless, beneath the arguments which it advanced, there lay some +deeper principle of concord. Thus, the opposition between "faith and +reason," rightly interpreted, is that between a concrete experience, +instinct with life and conviction, and a mechanical arrangement of +abstract arguments. The quarrel of the heart is not with reason, but +with reasons. "Evidences of Christianity?" said Coleridge; "I am weary +of the word." It is this weariness of evidence, of the endless arguments +_pro_ and _con_, which has caused so many to distrust reason and +knowledge, and which has sometimes driven believers to the dangerous +expedient of making their faith dogmatic and absolute. Nor have the +opponents of "the faith" been slow to seize the opportunity thus offered +them. "From the moment that a religion solicits the aid of philosophy, +its ruin is inevitable," said Heine. "In the attempt at defence, it +prates itself into destruction. Religion, like every absolutism, must +not seek to justify itself. Prometheus is bound to the rock by a silent +force. Yea, Aeschylus permits not personified power to utter a single +word. It must remain mute. The moment that a religion ventures to print +a catechism supported by arguments, the moment that a political +absolutism publishes an official newspaper, both are near their end. But +therein consists our triumph: we have brought our adversaries to speech, +and they must reckon with us."[A] But, we may answer, religion is _not_ +an absolutism; and, therefore, it is _not_ near its end when it ventures +to justify itself. On the contrary, no spiritual power, be it moral or +religious, can maintain its authority, if it assumes a despotic +attitude; for the human spirit inevitably moves towards freedom, and +that movement is the deepest necessity of its nature, which it cannot +escape. "Religion, on the ground of its sanctity, and law, on the ground +of its majesty, often resist the sifting of their claims. But in so +doing, they inevitably awake a not unjust suspicion that their claims +are ill-founded. They can command the unfeigned homage of man, only when +they have shown themselves able to stand the test of free inquiry." + +[Footnote A: _Religion and Philosophy in Germany_.] + +And if it is an error to suppose, with Browning, that the primary truths +of the moral and religious consciousness belong to a region which is +higher than knowledge, and can, from that side, be neither assailed nor +defended; it is also an error to suppose that reason is essentially +antagonistic to them. The facts of morality and religion are precisely +the richest facts of knowledge; and that faith is the most secure which +is most completely illumined by reason. Religion at its best is not a +dogmatic despotism, nor is reason a merely critical and destructive +faculty. If reason is loyal to the truth of religion on which it is +exercised, it will reach beneath all the conflict and clamour of +disputation, to the principle of unity, on which, as we have seen, both +reason and religion rest. + +The "faith" to which religious spirits appeal against all the attacks of +doubt, "the love" of Browning, is really implicit reason; it is +"abbreviated" or concentrated knowledge; it is the manifold experiences +of life focussed into an intense unity. And, on the other hand, the +"reason" which they condemn is what Carlyle calls the logic-chopping +faculty. In taking the side of faith when troubled with difficulties +which they cannot lay, they are really defending the cause of reason +against that of the understanding. For it is quite true that the +understanding, that is, the reason as reflective or critical, can never +bring about either a moral or religious life. It cannot create a +religion, any more than physiology can produce men. The reflection which +brings doubt is always secondary; it can only exercise itself on a given +material. As Hegel frequently pointed out, it is not the function of +moral philosophy to create or to institute a morality or religion, but +to understand them. The facts must first be given; they must be actual +experiences of the human spirit. Moral philosophy and theology differ +from the moral or religious life, in the same way as geology differs +from the earth, or astronomy from the heavenly bodies. The latter are +facts; the former are theories about the facts. Religion is an attitude +of the human spirit towards the highest; morality is the realization of +character; and these are not to be confused with their reflective +interpretations. Much of the difficulty in these matters comes from the +lack of a clear distinction between _beliefs_ and _creeds_. + +Further, not only are the utterances of the heart prior to the +deliverances of the intellect in this sense, but it may also be admitted +that the latter can never do full justice to the contents of the former. +So rich is character in content and so complex is spiritual life, that +we can never, by means of reflection, lift into clear consciousness all +the elements that enter into it. Into the organism of our experience, +which is our faith, there is continually absorbed the subtle influences +of our complex natural and social environment. We grow by means of them, +as the plant grows by feeding on the soil and the sunshine and dew. It +is as impossible for us to set forth, one by one, the truths and errors +which we have thus worked into our mental and moral life, as it is to +keep a reckoning of the physical atoms with which the natural life +builds up the body. Hence, every attempt to justify these truths seems +inadequate; and the defence which the understanding sets up for the +faith, always seems partial and cold. Who ever fully expressed his +deepest convictions? The consciousness of the dignity of the moral law +affected Kant like the view of the starry firmament, and generated a +feeling of the sublime which words could not express; and the religious +ecstasy of the saints cannot be confined within the channels of speech, +but floods the soul with overmastering power, possessing all its +faculties. In this respect, it will always remain true that the greatest +facts of human experience reach beyond all knowledge. Nay, we may add +further, that in this respect the simplest of these facts passes all +understanding. Still, as we have already seen, it is reason that +constitutes them; that which is presented to reason for explanation, in +knowledge and morality and religion, is itself the product of reason. +Reason is the power which, by interaction with our environment, has +generated the whole of our experience. And, just as natural science +interprets the phenomena given to it by ordinary opinion, _i.e._, +interprets and purifies a lower form of knowledge by converting it into +a higher; so the task of reason when it is exercised upon morality and +religion, is simply to evolve, and amplify the meaning of its own +products. The movement from morality and religion to moral philosophy +and the philosophy of religion, is thus a movement from reason to +reason, from the implicit to the explicit, from the germ to the +developed fulness of life and structure. In this matter, as in all +others wherein the human spirit is concerned, that which is first by +nature is last in genesis--[Greek: nika d' ho protos kai teleutaios +dramon.] The whole history of the moral and religious experience of +mankind is comprised in the statement, that the implicit reason which we +call "faith" is ever developing towards full consciousness of itself; +and that, at its first beginning, and throughout the whole ascending +process of this development, the highest is present in it as a +self-manifesting power. + +But this process from the almost instinctive intuitions of the heart +towards the morality and religion of freedom, being a process of +evolution, necessarily involves conflict. There are men, it is true, the +unity of whose moral and religious faith is never completely broken by +doubt; just as there are men who are not forced by the contradictions in +the first interpretation of the world by ordinary experience to attempt +to re-interpret it by means of science and philosophy. + +Throughout their lives they may say like Pompilia-- + + "I know the right place by foot's feel, + I took it and tread firm there; wherefore change?"[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book_--_The Pope_, 1886-1887.] + +Jean Paul Richter said that he knew another way of being happy, beside +that of soaring away so far above the clouds of life, that its miseries +looked small, and the whole external world shrunk into a little child's +garden. It was, "Simply to sink down into this little garden; and there +to nestle yourself so snugly, so homewise, in some furrow, that in +looking out from your warm lark-nest, you likewise can discern no +wolf-dens, charnel-houses, or thunder-rods, but only blades and ears, +every one of which, for the nest-bird, is a tree, and a sun-screen, and +rain-screen." There is a similar way of being good, with a goodness +which, though limited, is pure and perfect in nature. Nay, we may even +admit that such lives are frequently the most complete and beautiful, +just as the fairest flowers grow, not on the tallest trees, but on the +fragile plants at their foot. Nevertheless, even in the case of those +persons who have never broken from the traditional faith of the past, or +felt it to be inadequate, that faith has been silently reconstructed in +a new synthesis of knowledge. Spiritual life cannot come by inheritance; +but every individual must acquire a faith for himself, and turn his +spiritual environment into personal experience. "A man may be a heretic +in the truth," said Milton, "and if he believe things only because his +pastor says so, or the assembly so determines, without knowing other +reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds becomes +his heresy." It is truth to another but tradition to him; it is a creed +and not a conviction. Browning fully recognizes the need of this +conflict-- + + "Is it not this ignoble confidence, + Cowardly hardihood, that dulls and damps, + Makes the old heroism impossible?"[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book--The Pope_, 1848-1850.] + +asks the Pope. The stream of truth when it ceases to flow onward, +becomes a malarious swamp. Movement is the law of life; and knowledge of +the principles of morality and religion, as of all other principles, +must, in order to grow, be felt from time to time as inadequate and +untrue. There are men and ages whose mission is-- + + "to shake + This torpor of assurance from our creed, + Re-introduce the doubt discarded, bring + That formidable danger back, we drove + Long ago to the distance and the dark."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid._, 1853-1856.] + +Such a spirit of criticism seems to many to exercise a merely +destructive power, and those who have not felt the inadequacy of the +inherited faith defend themselves against it, as the enemy of their +lives. But no logic, or assailing doubt, could have power against the +testimony of "the heart," unless it was rooted in deeper and truer +principles than those which it attacked. Nothing can overpower truth +except a larger truth; and, in such a conflict, the truth in the old +view will ultimately take the side of the new, and find its subordinate +position within it. It has happened, not infrequently, as in the case of +the Encyclopaedists, that the explicit truths of reason were more +abstract, that is, less true, than the implicit "faith" which they +assailed. The central truths of religion have often proved themselves to +possess some stubborn, though semi-articulate power, which could +ultimately overcome or subordinate the more partial and explicit truths +of abstract science. It is this that gives plausibility to the idea, +that the testimony of the heart is more reliable than that of the +intellect. But, in this case also, it was really reason that triumphed. +It was the truth which proved itself to be immortal, and not any mere +emotion. The insurrection of the intellect against the heart is quelled, +only when the untruth, or abstract character, of the principle of the +assailants has been made manifest, and when the old faith has yielded up +its unjust gains, and proved its vitality and strength by absorbing the +truth that gave vigour to the attack. Just as in morality it is the +ideal, or the unity of the whole moral life, that breaks up into +differences, so also here it is the implicit faith which, as it grows, +breaks forth into doubts. In both cases alike, the negative movement +which induces despair, is only a phase of a positive process--the +process of reason towards a fuller, a more articulate and complex, +realization of itself. + +Hence it follows that the value and strength of a faith corresponds +accurately to the doubts it has overcome. Those who never went forth to +battle cannot come home heroes. It is only when the earthquake has tried +the towers, and destroyed the sense of security, that + + "Man stands out again, pale, resolute, + Prepared to die,--that is, alive at last. + As we broke up that old faith of the world, + Have we, next age, to break up this the new-- + Faith, in the thing, grown faith in the report-- + Whence need to bravely disbelieve report + Through increased faith i' the thing reports belie?"[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book--The Pope_, 1862-1868.] + +"Well knows he who uses to consider, that our faith and knowledge thrive +by exercise, as well as our limbs and complexion." + +It was, thus, I conclude, a deep speculative error into which Browning +fell, when, in order to substantiate his optimistic faith, he +stigmatized human knowledge as merely apparent. Knowledge does not fail, +except in the sense in which morality also fails; it does not at any +time attain to the ultimate truth, any more than the moral life is in +any of its activities[B] a complete embodiment of the absolute good. It +is not given to man, who is essentially progressive, to reach the +ultimate term of development. For there is no ultimate term: life never +stands still. But, for the same reason, there is no ultimate failure. +The whole history of man is a history of growth. If, however, knowledge +did fail, then morality too must fail; and the appeal which the poet +makes from the intellect to the heart, would be an appeal to mere +emotion. Finally, even if we take a generous view of the poet's meaning, +and put out of consideration the theory he expresses when he is +deliberately philosophizing, there is still no appeal from the reason to +an alien and higher authority. The appeal to "the heart" is, at best, +only an appeal from the understanding to the reason, from a conscious +logic to the more concrete fact constituted by reason, which reflection +has failed to comprehend in its completeness; at its worst, it is an +appeal from truth to prejudice, from belief to dogma. + +[Footnote B: See Chapter IX., p. 291.] + +And in both cases alike, the appeal is futile; for, whether "the heart +be wiser than the head," or not, whether the faith which is assailed be +richer or poorer, truer or more false, than the logic which is directed +against it, an appeal to the heart cannot any longer restore the unity +of the broken life. Once reflection has set in, there is no way of +turning away its destructive might, except by deeper reflection. The +implicit faith of the heart must become the explicit faith of reason. +"There is no final and satisfactory issue from such an endless internal +debate and conflict, until the 'heart' has learnt to speak the language +of the head--_i.e._, until the permanent principles, which underlay and +gave strength to faith, have been brought into the light of distinct +consciousness."[A] + +[Footnote A: Caird's _Comte_.] + +I conclude, therefore, that the poet was right in saying that, in order +to comprehend human character, + + "I needs must blend the quality of man + With quality of God, and so assist + Mere human sight to understand my Life."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Bean-Stripe_--_Ferishtah's Fancies_.] + +But it was a profound error, which contained in it the destruction of +morality and religion, as well as of knowledge, to make "the quality of +God" a love that excludes reason, and the quality of man an intellect +incapable of knowing truth. Such in-congruous elements could never be +combined into the unity of a character. A love that was mere emotion +could not yield a motive for morality, or a principle of religion. A +philosophy of life which is based on agnosticism is an explicit +self-contradiction, which can help no one. We must appeal from Browning +the philosopher to Browning the poet. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +CONCLUSION. + + + "Well, I can fancy how he did it all, + Pouring his soul, with kings and popes to see, + Reaching, that heaven might so replenish him, + Above and through his art--for it gives way; + That arm is wrongly put--and there again-- + A fault to pardon in the drawing's lines, + Its body, so to speak: its soul is right, + He means right--that, a child may understand."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Andrea del Sarto_.] + +I have tried to show that Browning's theory of life, in so far as it is +expressed in his philosophical poems, rests on agnosticism; and that +such a theory is inconsistent with the moral and religious interests of +man. The idea that truth is unattainable was represented by Browning as +a bulwark of the faith, but it proved on examination to be treacherous. +His optimism was found to have no better foundation than personal +conviction, which any one was free to deny, and which the poet could in +no wise prove. The evidence of the heart, to which he appealed, was the +evidence of an emotion severed from intelligence, and, therefore, +without any content whatsoever. "The faith," which he professed, was not +the faith that anticipates and invites proof, but a faith which is +incapable of proof. In casting doubt upon the validity of knowledge, he +degraded the whole spiritual nature of man; for a love that is ignorant +of its object is a blind impulse, and a moral consciousness that does +not know the law is an impossible phantom--a self-contradiction. + +But, although Browning's explicitly philosophical theory of life fails, +there appears in his earlier poems, where his poetical freedom was not +yet trammelled, nor his moral enthusiasm restrained by the stubborn +difficulties of reflective thought, a far truer and richer view. In this +period of pure poetry, his conception of man was less abstract than in +his later works, and his inspiration was more direct and full. The +poet's dialectical ingenuity increased with the growth of his reflective +tendencies; but his relation to the great principles of spiritual life +seemed to become less intimate, and his expression of them more halting. +What we find in his earlier works are vigorous ethical convictions, a +glowing optimistic faith, achieving their fitting expression in +impassioned poetry; what we find in his later works are arguments, +which, however richly adorned with poetic metaphors, have lost the +completeness and energy of life. His poetic fancies are like chaplets +which crown the dead. Lovers of the poet, who seek in his poems for +inspiring expressions of their hope and faith, will always do well in +turning from his militant metaphysics to his art. + +In his case, as in that of many others, spiritual experience was far +richer than the theory which professed to explain it. The task of +lifting his moral convictions into the clear light of conscious +philosophy was beyond his power. The theory of the failure of knowledge, +which he seems to have adopted far too easily from the current doctrine +of the schools, was fundamentally inconsistent with his generous belief +in the moral progress of man; and it maimed the expression of that +belief. The result of his work as a philosopher is a confession of +complete ignorance and the helpless asseveration of a purely dogmatic +faith. + +The fundamental error of the poet's philosophy lies, I believe, in that +severance of feeling and intelligence, love and reason, which finds +expression in _La Saisiaz_, _Ferishtah's Fancies_, _The Parleyings_, and +_Asolando_. Such an absolute division is not to be found in +_Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day_, _Rabbi Ben Ezra_, _A Death in the +Desert_, or in _The Ring and the Book_; nor even in _Fifine at the +Fair_. In these works we are not perplexed by the strange combination of +a nature whose principle is love, and which is capable of infinite +progress, with an intelligence whose best efforts end in ignorance. +Rather, the spirit of man is regarded as one, in all its manifestations; +and, therefore, as progressive on all sides of its activity. The +widening of his knowledge, which is brought about by increasing +experience, is parallel with the deepening and purifying of his moral +life. In all Browning's works, indeed, with the possible exception of +_Paracelsus_, love is conceived as having a place and function of +supreme importance in the development of the soul. Its divine origin and +destiny are never obscured; but knowledge is regarded as merely human, +and, therefore, as falling short of the truth. In _Easter-Day_ it is +definitely contrasted with love, and shown to be incapable of satisfying +the deepest wants of man. It is, at the best, only a means to the higher +purposes of moral activity, and, except in the _Grammarian's Funeral_, +it is nowhere regarded as in itself a worthy end. + + "'Tis one thing to know, and another to practise. + And thence I conclude that the real God-function + Is to furnish a motive and injunction + For practising what we know already."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day_.] + +Even here, there is implied that the motive comes otherwise than by +knowledge; still, taking these earlier poems as a whole, we may say that +in them knowledge is regarded as means to morality and not as in any +sense contrasted with or destructive of it. Man's motives are rational +motives; the ends he seeks are ends conceived and even constituted by +his intelligence, and not purposes blindly followed as by instinct and +impulse. + + "Why live, + Except for love--how love, unless they know?"[B] + +[Footnote B: _The Ring and the Book_--_The Pope_, 1327-1328.] + +asks the Pope. Moral progress is not secured apart from, or in spite of +knowledge. We are not exhorted to reject the verdict of the latter as +illusive, in order to confide in a faith which not only fails to receive +support from the defective intelligence, but maintains its own integrity +only by repudiating the testimony of the reason. In the distinction +between knowledge as means and love as end, it is easy, indeed, to +detect a tendency to degrade the former into a mere temporary expedient, +whereby moral ends may be served. The poet speaks of "such knowledge as +is possible to man." The attitude he assumes towards it is apologetic, +and betrays a keen consciousness of its limitation, and particularly of +its utter inadequacy to represent the infinite. In the speech of the +Pope---which can scarcely be regarded otherwise than as the poet's own +maturest utterance on the great moral and religious questions raised by +the tragedy of Pompilia's death--we find this view vividly expressed:-- + + "O Thou--as represented here to me + In such conception as my soul allows,-- + Under Thy measureless, my atom width!-- + Man's mind, what is it but a convex glass + Wherein are gathered all the scattered points + Picked out of the immensity of sky, + To reunite there, be our heaven for earth, + Our known unknown, our God revealed to man?"[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book_--_The Pope_, 1308-1315.] + +God is "appreciable in His absolute immensity solely by Himself," while, +"by the little mind of man, He is reduced to littleness that suits man's +faculty." In these words, and others that might be quoted, the poet +shows that he is profoundly impressed with the distinction between human +knowledge, and that knowledge which is adequate to the whole nature and +extent of being. And in _Christmas-Eve_ he repudiates with a touch of +scorn, the absolute idealism, which is supposed to identify altogether +human reason with divine reason; and he commends the German critic for +not making + + "The important stumble + Of adding, he, the sage and humble, + Was also one with the Creator."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Christmas-Eve_.] + +Nowhere in Browning, unless we except _Paracelsus_, is there any sign of +an inclination to treat man's knowledge in the same spirit as he deals +with man's love--namely, as a direct emanation from the inmost nature of +God, a divine element that completes and crowns man's life on earth. On +the contrary, he shows a persistent tendency to treat love as a power +higher in nature than reason, and to give to it a supreme place in the +formation of character; and, as he grows older, that tendency grows in +strength. The philosophical poems, in which love is made all in all, and +knowledge is reduced to nescience follow by logical evolution from +principles, the influence of which we can detect even in his earlier +works. Still, in the latter, these principles are only latent, and are +far from holding undisputed sway. Browning was, at first, restrained +from exclusive devotion to abstract views, by the suggestions which the +artistic spirit receives through its immediate contact with the facts of +life. That contact it is very difficult for philosophy to maintain as it +pursues its effort after universal truth. Philosophy is obliged to +analyze in order to define, and, in that process, it is apt to lose +something of that completeness of representation, which belongs to art. +For art is always engaged in presenting the universal in the form of a +particular object of beauty. Its product is a "known unknown," but the +unknown is the unexhausted reality of a fact of intuition. Nor can +analysis ever exhaust it; theory can never catch up art, or explain all +that is in it. On similar grounds, it may be shown that it is impossible +for reason to lay bare all the elements that enter into its first +complex product, which we call faith. In religion, as in art, man is +aware of more than he knows; his articulate logic cannot do justice to +all the truths of the "heart." "The supplementary reflux of light" of +philosophy cannot "illustrate all the inferior grades" of knowledge. Man +will never completely understand himself. + + "I knew, I felt, (perception unexpressed, + Uncomprehended by our narrow thought, + But somehow felt and known in every shift + And change in the spirit,--nay, in every pore + Of the body, even,)--what God is, what we are, + What life is--how God tastes an infinite joy + In infinite ways--one everlasting bliss, + From whom all being emanates, all power + Proceeds."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Paracelsus_.] + +I believe that it is possible, by the help of the intuitions of +Browning's highest artistic period, to bring together again the elements +of his broken faith, and to find in them suggestions of a truer +philosophy of life than anything which the poet himself achieved. +Perhaps, indeed, it is not easy, nor altogether fair, to press the +passionate utterances of his religious rapture into the service of +metaphysics, and to treat the unmeasured language of emotion as the +expression of a definite doctrine. Nevertheless, rather than set forth a +new defence of the faith, which his agnosticism left exposed to the +assaults of doubt and denial, it is better to make Browning correct his +own errors, and to appeal from the metaphysician to the poet, from the +sobriety of the logical understanding to the inspiration of poetry. + +I have already indicated what seems to me to be the defective element in +the poet's philosophy of life. His theory of knowledge is in need of +revision; and what he asserts of human love, should be applied point by +point to human reason. As man is ideally united with the absolute on the +side of moral emotion (if the phrase may be pardoned), so he is ideally +united with the absolute on the side of the intellect. As there is no +difference of _nature_ between God's goodness and man's goodness, so +there is no difference of nature between God's truth and man's truth. +There are not two kinds of righteousness or mercy; there are not two +kinds of truth. Human nature is not "cut in two with a hatchet," as the +poet implies that it is. There is in man a lower and a higher element, +ever at war with each other; still he is not a mixture, or agglomerate, +of the finite and the infinite. A love perfect in nature cannot be +linked to an intelligence imperfect in nature; if it were, the love +would be either a blind impulse or an erring one. Both morality and +religion demand the presence in man of a perfect ideal, which is at war +with his imperfections; but an ideal is possible, only to a being +endowed with a capacity for knowing the truth. In degrading human +knowledge, the poet is disloyal to the fundamental principle of the +Christian faith which he professed--that God can and does manifest +himself in man. + +On the other hand, we are not to take the unity of man with God, of +man's moral ideal with the All-perfect, as implying, on the moral side, +an absolute identification of the finite with the infinite; nor can we +do so on the side of knowledge. Man's moral life and rational activity +in knowledge are the process of the highest. But man is neither first, +nor last; he is not the original author of his love, any more than of +his reason; he is not the divine principle of the whole to which he +belongs, although he is potentially in harmony with it. Both sides of +his being are equally touched with imperfection--his love, no less than +his reason. Perfect love would imply perfect wisdom, as perfect wisdom, +perfect love. But absolute terms are not applicable to man, who is ever +_on the way_ to goodness and truth, progressively manifesting the power +of the ideal that dwells in him, and whose very life is conflict and +acquirement. + + "Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp, + Or what's a heaven for? All is silver-grey + Placid and perfect with my art: the worse."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Andrea del Sarto_.] + +Hardly any conception is more prominent in Browning's writings than +this, of endless progress towards an infinite ideal; although he +occasionally manifests a desire to have done with effort. + + "When a soul has seen + By the means of Evil that Good is best, + And, through earth and its noise, what is heaven's serene,-- + When our faith in the same has stood the test-- + Why, the child grown man, you burn the rod, + The uses of labour are surely done, + There remaineth a rest for the people of God, + And I have had troubles enough, for one."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Old Pictures in Florence_.] + +It is the sense of endless onward movement, the outlook towards an +immortal course, "the life after life in unlimited series," which is so +inspiring in his early poetry. He conceives that we are here, on this +lower earth, just to learn one form, the elementary lesson and alphabet +of goodness, namely, "the uses of the flesh": in other lives, other +achievements. The separation of the soul from its instrument has very +little significance to the poet; for it does not arrest the course of +moral development. + + "No work begun shall ever pause for death." + +The spirit pursues its lone way, on other "adventures brave and new," +but ever towards a good which is complete. + + "Delayed it may be for more lives yet, + Through worlds I shall traverse, not a few: + Much is to learn, much to forget + Ere the time be come for taking you."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Evelyn Hope_.] + +Still the time will come when the awakened need shall be satisfied; for +the need was created in order to be satisfied. + + "Wherefore did I contrive for thee that ear + Hungry for music, and direct thine eye + To where I hold a seven-stringed instrument, + Unless I meant thee to beseech me play?"[B] + +[Footnote B: _Two Camels_.] + +The movement onward is thus a movement in knowledge, as well as in every +other form of good. The lover of Evelyn Hope, looking back in +imagination on the course he has travelled on earth and after, +exclaims-- + + "I have lived (I shall say) so much since then, + Given up myself so many times, + Gained me the gains of various men, + Ransacked the ages, spoiled the climes."[C] + +[Footnote C: _Evelyn Hope_.] + +In these earlier poems, there is not, as in the later ones, a maimed, or +one-sided, evolution--a progress towards perfect love on the side of the +heart, and towards an illusive ideal on the side of the intellect. +Knowledge, too, has its value, and he who lived to settle "_Hoti's_ +business, properly based _Oun_," and who "gave us the doctrine of the +enclitic _De_," was, to the poet, + + "Still loftier than the world suspects, + Living and dying. + + "Here's the top-peak; the multitude below + Live, for they can, there: + This man decided not to Live but Know-- + Bury this man there? + Here--here's his place, where meteors shoot, clouds form, + Lightnings are loosened, + Stars come and go."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Grammarian's Funeral_.] + +No human effort goes to waste, no gift is delusive; but every gift and +every effort has its proper place as a stage in the endless process. The +soul bears in it _all_ its conquests. + + "There shall never be one lost good! What was, shall live as before; + The evil is null, is nought, is silence implying sound; + What was good, shall be good, with, for evil, _so_ much good more; + On the earth the broken arcs; in the heaven, a perfect round."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Abt Vogler_.] + +The "apparent failure" of knowledge, like every apparent failure, is "a +triumph's evidence for the fulness of the days." The doubts that +knowledge brings, instead of implying a defective intelligence doomed to +spend itself on phantom phenomena, sting to progress towards the truth. +He bids us "Learn, nor account the pang; dare, never grudge the throe." + + "Rather I prize the doubt + Low kinds exist without, + Finished and finite clods, untroubled by a spark."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Rabbi Ben Ezra_.] + +Similarly, defects in art, like defects in character, contain the +promise of further achievement. + + "Are they perfect of lineament, perfect of stature? + In both, of such lower types are we + Precisely because of our wider nature; + For time, their's--ours, for eternity. + + "To-day's brief passion limits their range; + It seethes with the morrow for us and more. + They are perfect--how else? They shall never change: + We are faulty--why not? We have time in store."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Old Pictures in Florence_.] + +Prior to the period when a sceptical philosophy came down like a blight, +and destroyed the bloom of his art and faith, he thus recognized that +growing knowledge was an essential condition of growing goodness. +Pompilia shone with a glory that mere knowledge could not give (if there +were such a thing as _mere_ knowledge). + + "Everywhere + I see in the world the intellect of man, + That sword, the energy his subtle spear, + The knowledge which defends him like a shield-- + Everywhere; but they make not up, I think, + The marvel of a soul like thine, earth's flower + She holds up to the softened gaze of God."[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book_--_The Pope_, 1013-1019.] + +But yet she recognized with patient pain the loss she had sustained for +want of knowledge. + + "The saints must bear with me, impute the fault + To a soul i' the bud, so starved by ignorance, + Stinted of warmth, it will not blow this year + Nor recognize the orb which Spring-flowers know."[B] + +[Footnote B: _The Ring and the Book_--_Pompilia_, 1515-1518.] + +Further on in the Pope's soliloquy, the poet shows that, at that time, +he fully recognized the risk of entrusting the spiritual interests of +man to the enthusiasm of elevated feeling, or to the mere intuitions of +a noble heart. Such intuitions will sometimes guide a man happily, as in +the case of Caponsacchi: + + "Since ourselves allow + He has danced, in gaiety of heart, i' the main + The right step through the maze we bade him foot."[C] + +[Footnote C: _The Ring and the Book_--_The Pope_, 1915-1917.] + +But, on the other hand, such impulses, not instructed by knowledge of +the truth, and made steadfast to the laws of the higher life by a +reasoned conviction, lead man rightly only by accident. In such a career +there is no guarantee of constancy; other impulses might lead to other +ways of life. + + "But if his heart had prompted to break loose + And mar the measure? Why, we must submit, + And thank the chance that brought him safe so far. + Will he repeat the prodigy? Perhaps. + Can he teach others how to quit themselves, + Show why this step was right while that were wrong? + How should he? 'Ask your hearts as I asked mine, + And get discreetly through the morrice too; + If your hearts misdirect you,--quit the stage, + And make amends,--be there amends to make.'"[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book_--_The Pope_, 1916-1927.] + +If the heart proved to Caponsacchi a guide to all that is good and +glorious, "the Abate, second in the suite," puts in the testimony of +another experience: "His heart answered to another tune." + + "I have my taste too, and tread no such step! + You choose the glorious life, and may for me! + I like the lowest of life's appetites,-- + So you judge--but the very truth of joy + To my own apprehension which decides."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid._, 1932-1936.] + +Mere emotion is thus an insecure guide to conduct, for its authority can +be equally cited in support of every course of life. No one can say to +his neighbour, "Thou art wrong." Every impulse is right to the +individual who has it, and so long as he has it. _De gustibus non +disputandum_. Without a universal criterion there is no praise or blame. + + "Call me knave and you get yourself called fool! + I live for greed, ambition, lust, revenge; + Attain these ends by force, guile: hypocrite, + To-day, perchance to-morrow recognized + The rational man, the type of common-sense."[C] + +[Footnote C: _Ibid._, 1937-1941.] + +This poem which, both in its moral wisdom and artistic worth, marks the +high tide of Browning's poetic insight, while he is not as yet concerned +with the defence of any theory or the discussion of any abstract +question, contrasts strongly with the later poems, where knowledge is +dissembling ignorance, faith is blind trust, and love is a mere impulse +of the heart. Having failed to meet the difficulties of reflection, the +poet turned upon the intellect. Knowledge becomes to him an offence, and +to save his faith he plucked out his right eye and entered into the +kingdom maimed. In _Rabbi Ben Ezra_ the ascent into another life is +triumphant, like that of a conqueror bearing with him the spoils of +earth; but in the later poems he escapes with a bare belief, and the +loss of all his rich possessions of knowledge, like a shipwrecked +mariner whose goods have been thrown overboard. His philosophy was a +treacherous ally to his faith. + +But there is another consideration which shows that the poet, as artist, +recognized the need of giving to reason a larger function than seems to +be possible according to the theory in his later works. In the early +poems there is no hint of the doctrine that demonstrative knowledge of +the good, and of the necessity of its law, would destroy freedom. On the +contrary, there are suggestions which point to the opposite doctrine, +according to which knowledge is the condition of freedom. + +While in his later poems the poet speaks of love as an impulse--either +blind or bound to erring knowledge--and of the heart as made to love, in +his earlier ones he seems to treat man as free to work out his own +purposes, and act out his own ideals. Browning here finds himself able +to maintain the dependence of man upon God without destroying morality. +He regards man's impulses not as blind instincts, but as falling +_within_ his rational nature, and constituting the forms of its +activity. He recognizes the distinction between a mere impulse, in the +sense of a tendency to act, which is directed by a foreign power, and an +impulse informed, that is, directed by reason. According to this view, +it is reason which at once gives man the independence of foreign +authority, which is implied in morality, and constitutes that affinity +between man and God, which is implied by religion. No doubt, the impulse +to know, like the impulse to love, was put into man: his whole nature is +a gift, and he is therefore, in this sense, completely dependent upon +God--"God's all, man's nought." But, on the other hand, it _is_ a +rational nature which has been put into him, and not an irrational +impulse. Or, rather, the impulse that constitutes his life as man, is +the self-evolving activity of reason. + + "Who speaks of man, then, must not sever + Man's very elements from man."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Christmas-Eve_.] + +However the rational nature of man has come to be, whether by emanation +or creation, it necessarily brings freedom with it, and all its risks +and possibilities. It is of the very essence of reason that it should +find its law within itself. + + "God's all, man's nought: + But also, God, whose pleasure brought + Man into being, stands away + As it were a hand-breadth off, to give + Room for the newly-made to live, + And look at Him from a place apart, + And use his gifts of brain and heart, + Given, indeed, but to keep for ever."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Christmas-Eve_.] + +Thus, while insisting on the absolute priority of God, and the original +receptivity of man; while recognizing that love, reason, and every inner +power and outer opportunity are lent to man, Browning does not forget +what these powers are. Man can only act as man; he must obey his nature, +as the stock or stone or plant obeys its nature. But to act as man is to +act freely, and man's nature is not that of a stock or stone. He is +rational, and cannot but be rational. Hence he can neither be ruled, as +dead matter is ruled, by natural law; nor live, like a bird, the life of +innocent impulse or instinct. He is placed, from the very first, on "the +table land whence life upsprings aspiring to be immortality." He is a +spirit,--responsible because he is free, and free because he is +rational. + + "Man, therefore, stands on his own stock + Of love and power as a pin-point rock, + And, looks to God who ordained divorce + Of the rock from His boundless continent."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Ibid._] + +The divorce is real, although ordained, but it is possible only in so +far as man, by means of reason, constitutes his own ends of action. +Impulse cannot bring it about. It is reason that enables man to free +himself from the despotic authority of outer law, to relate himself to +an inner law, and by reconciling inner and outer to attain to goodness. +Thus reason is the source of all morality. And it also is the principle +of religion, for it implies the highest and fullest manifestation of the +absolute. + +Although the first aspect of self-consciousness is its independence, +which is, in turn, the first condition of morality, still this is only +the first aspect. The rational being plants himself on his own +individuality, stands aloof and alone in the rights of his freedom, _in +order that_ he may set out from thence to take possession, by means of +knowledge and action, of the world in which he is placed. Reason is +potentially absolute, capable of finding itself everywhere. So that in +it man is "honour-clothed and glory-crowned." + + "This is the honour,--that no thing I know, + Feel or conceive, but I can make my own + Somehow, by use of hand, or head, or heart."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau._] + +Man, by his knowledge, overcomes the resistance and hostility of the +world without him, or rather, discovers that there is not hostility, but +affinity between it and himself. + + "This is the glory,--that in all conceived, + Or felt or known, I recognize a mind + Not mine but like mine,--for the double joy,-- + Making all things for me and me for Him."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau_.] + +That which is finite is hemmed in by other things, as well as determined +by them; but the infinite is all-inclusive. There exists for it no other +thing to limit or determine it. There is nothing finally alien or +foreign to reason. Freedom and infinitude, self-determination and +absoluteness, imply each other. In so far as man is free, he is lifted +above the finite. It was God's plan to make man on His own image:-- + + "To create man and then leave him + Able, His own word saith, to grieve Him, + But able to glorify Him too, + As a mere machine could never do, + That prayed or praised, all unaware + Of its fitness for aught but praise or prayer, + Made perfect as a thing of course."[B] + +[Footnote B: _Christmas-Eve_.] + +Man must find his law within himself, be the source of his own activity, +not passive or receptive, but outgoing and effective. + + "Rejoice we are allied + To That which doth provide + And not partake, effect and not receive! + A spark disturbs our clod; + Nearer we hold of God + Who gives, than of His tribes that take, I must believe."[C] + +[Footnote C: _Rabbi Ben Ezra_.] + +This near affinity between the divine and human is just what Browning +seems to repudiate in his later poems, when he speaks as if the +absolute, in order to maintain its own supremacy over man, had to stint +its gifts and endow him only with a defective reason. In the earlier +period of the poet there is far less timidity. He then saw that the +greater the gift, the greater the Giver; that only spirit can reveal +spirit; that "God is glorified in man," and that love is at its fullest +only when it gives itself. + +In insisting on such identity of the human spirit with the divine, our +poet does not at any time run the risk of forgetting that the identity +is not absolute. Absolute identity would be pantheism, which leaves God +lonely and loveless, and extinguishes man, as well as his morality. + + "Man is not God, but hath God's end to serve, + A Master to obey, a course to take, + Somewhat to cast off, somewhat to become."[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Death in the Desert_.] + +Man, at best, only moves _towards_ his ideal: God is conceived as the +ever-existing ideal. God, in short, is the term which signifies for us +the Being who is eternally all in all, and who, therefore, is hidden +from us who are only moving _towards_ perfection, in the excess of the +brightness of His own glory. Nevertheless, as Browning recognizes, the +grandeur of God's perfection is just His outflowing love. And that love +is never complete in its manifestation, till it has given itself. Man's +life, as spirit, is thus one in nature with that of the absolute. But +the unity is not complete, because man is only potentially perfect. He +is the process _of_ the ideal; his life is the divine activity within +him. Still, it is also man's activity. For the process, being the +process of spirit, is a _free_ process--one in which man himself +energizes; so that, in doing God's will, he is doing his own highest +will, and, in obeying the law of his own deepest nature, he is obeying +God. The unity of divine and human within the spiritual life of man is a +real unity, just because man is free; the identity manifests itself +through the difference, and the difference is possible through the +unity. + +Thus, in the light of an ideal which is moral, and therefore perfect--an +ideal gradually realizing itself in a process which is endless--the poet +is able to maintain at once the community between man and God, which is +necessary to religion, and their independence, which is necessary to +morality. The conception of God as giving, which is the main doctrine of +Christianity, and of man as akin with God, is applied by him to the +whole spiritual nature of man, and not merely to his emotion. The +process of evolution is thus a process towards truth, as well as +goodness; in fact, goodness and truth are known as inseparable. +Knowledge, too, is a Divine endowment. "What gift of man is not from God +descended?" What gift of God can be deceptive? + + "Take all in a word: the truth in God's breast + Lies trace for trace upon ours impressed: + Though He is so bright and we so dim, + We are made in His image to witness Him."[A] + +[Footnote A: _Christmas-Eve_.] + +The Pope recognizes clearly the inadequacy of human knowledge; but he +also recognizes that it has a Divine source. + + "Yet my poor spark had for its source, the sun; + Thither I sent the great looks which compel + Light from its fount: all that I do and am + Comes from the truth, or seen or else surmised, + Remembered or divined, as mere man may."[B] + +[Footnote B: _The Ring and the Book_--_The Pope_, 1285-1289.] + +The last words indicate a suspicion of a certain defect in knowledge, +which is not recognized in human love; nevertheless, in these earlier +poems, the poet does not analyze human nature into a finite and +infinite, or seek to dispose of his difficulties by the deceptive +solvent of a dualistic agnosticism. He treats spirit as a unity, and +refuses to set love and reason against each other. Man's _life_, for the +poet, and not merely man's love, begins with God, and returns back to +God in the rapt recognition of God's perfect being by reason, and in the +identification of man's purposes with His by means of will and love. + + "What is left for us, save, in growth + Of soul, to rise up, far past both, + From the gift looking to the giver, + And from the cistern to the river, + And from the finite to infinity + And from man's dust to God's divinity?"[C] + +[Footnote C: _Christmas-Eve_.] + +It is this movement of the absolute in man, this aspiration towards the +full knowledge and perfect goodness which can never be completely +attained, that constitutes man. + + "Man, therefore, thus conditioned, must expect + He could not, what he knows now, know at first: + What he considers that he knows to-day, + Come but to-morrow, he will find mis-known; + Getting increase of knowledge, since he learns + Because he lives, which is to be a man, + Set to instruct himself by his past self: + First, like the brute, obliged by facts to learn, + Next, as man may, obliged by his own mind, + Bent, habit, nature, knowledge turned to law. + God's gift was that man shall conceive of truth + And yearn to gain it, catching at mistake, + As midway help till he reach fact indeed?"[A] + +[Footnote A: _A Death in the Desert_.] + +"Progress," the poet says, is "man's distinctive mark alone." The +endlessness of the progress, the fact that every truth known to-day +seems misknown to-morrow, that every ideal once achieved only points to +another and becomes itself a stepping stone, does not, as in his later +days, bring despair to him. For the consciousness of failure is possible +in knowledge, as in morality, only because there has come a fuller +light. Browning does not, as yet, dwell exclusively on the negative +element in progress, or forget that it is possible only through a deeper +positive. He does not think that, because we turn our backs on what we +have gained, we are therefore not going forward; nay, he asserts the +contrary. Failure, even the failure of knowledge, is triumph's evidence +in these earlier days; and complete failure, the unchecked rule of evil +in any form, is therefore impossible. We deny + + "Recognized truths, obedient to some truth + Unrecognized yet, but perceptible,-- + Correct the portrait by the living face, + Man's God, by God's God in the mind of man."[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book--The Pope_, 1871-1874.] + +Thus the poet ever returns to the conception of God in the mind of man. +God is the beginning and the end; and man is the self-conscious worker +of God's will, the free process whereby the last which is first, returns +to itself. The process, the growth, is man's life and being; and it +falls within the ideal, which is eternal and all in all. The spiritual +life of man, which is both intellectual and moral, is a dying into the +eternal, not to cease to be in it, but to live in it more fully; for +spirits necessarily commune. He dies to the temporal interests and +narrow ends of the exclusive self, and lives an ever-expanding life in +the life of others, manifesting more and more that spiritual principle +which is the life of God, who lives and loves in all things. "God is a +being in whom we exist; with whom we are in principle one; with whom the +human spirit is identical, in the sense that He _is_ all which the human +spirit is capable of becoming."[B] + +[Footnote B: Green's _Prolegomena to Ethics_, p. 198.] + +From this point of view, and in so far as Browning is loyal to the +conception of the community of the divine and human, he is able to +maintain his faith in God, not in spite of knowledge, but through the +very movement of knowledge within him. He is not obliged, as in his +later works, to look for proofs, either in nature, or elsewhere; nor to +argue from the emotion of love in man, to a cause of that emotion. He +needs no syllogistic process to arrive at God; for the very activity of +his own spirit as intelligence, as the reason which thinks and acts, is +the activity of God within him. Scepticism, is impossible, for the very +act of doubting is the activity of reason, and a profession of the +knowledge of the truth. + + "I + Put no such dreadful question to myself, + Within whose circle of experience burns + The central truth, Power, Wisdom, Goodness,--God: + I must outlive a thing ere know it dead: + When I outlive the faith there is a sun, + When I lie, ashes to the very soul,-- + Someone, not I, must wail above the heap, + 'He died in dark whence never morn arose.'"[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book--The Pope_, 1631-1639.] + +And this view of God as immanent in man's experience also forecloses all +possibility of failure. Beneath the failure, the possibility of which is +involved in a moral life, lies the divine element, working through +contradiction to its own fulfilment. Failure is necessary for man, +because he grows: but, for the same reason, the failure is not final. +Thus, the poet, instead of denying the evidence of his intellect as to +the existence of evil, or casting doubt on the distinction between right +and wrong, or reducing the chequered course of human history into a +phantasmagoria of mere mental appearances, can regard the conflict +between good and evil as real and earnest. He can look evil in the face, +recognize its stubborn resistance to the good, and still regard the +victory of the latter as sure and complete. He has not to reduce it into +a phantom, or mere appearance, in order to give it a place within the +divine order. He sees the night, but he also sees the day succeed it. +Man falls into sin, but he cannot rest in it. It is contradictory to his +nature, he cannot content himself with it, and he is driven through it. +Mephistopheles promised more than he could perform, when he undertook to +make Faust declare himself satisfied. There is not within the kingdom of +evil what will satisfy the spirit of man, whose last law is goodness, +whose nature, however obscured, is God's gift of Himself. + + "While I see day succeed the deepest night-- + How can I speak but as I know?--my speech + Must be, throughout the darkness. It will end: + 'The light that did burn, will burn!' Clouds obscure-- + But for which obscuration all were bright? + Too hastily concluded! Sun--suffused, + A cloud may soothe the eye made blind by blaze,-- + Better the very clarity of heaven: + The soft streaks are the beautiful and dear. + What but the weakness in a faith supplies + The incentive to humanity, no strength + Absolute, irresistible, comports? + How can man love but what he yearns to help? + And that which men think weakness within strength, + But angels know for strength and stronger yet-- + What were it else but the first things made new, + But repetition of the miracle, + The divine instance of self-sacrifice + That never ends and aye begins for man? + So, never I miss footing in the maze, + No,--I have light nor fear the dark at all."[A] + +[Footnote A: _The Ring and the Book--The Pope_, 1640-1660.] + +[Illustration] + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BROWNING AS A PHILOSOPHICAL AND +RELIGIOUS TEACHER*** + + +******* This file should be named 13561.txt or 13561.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/1/3/5/6/13561 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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