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diff --git a/13485-0.txt b/13485-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7242a4a --- /dev/null +++ b/13485-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1573 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13485 *** + +AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF +OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY, ETC. + +by + +Frances Reynolds + +1785 + +With an Introduction by James L. Clifford + + + +The Augustan Reprint Society + + +Frances Reynolds + +_An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, +and of the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty, etc._ +(1785) + +With an Introduction by James L. Clifford + +Publication 27 + +Los Angeles +William Andrews Clark Memorial Library +University of California +1951 + + +_GENERAL EDITORS_ + +H. RICHARD ARCHER, _Clark Memorial Library_ +RICHARD C. BOYS, _University of Michigan_ +EDWARD NILES HOOKER, _University of California, Los Angeles_ +JOHN LOFTIS, _University of California, Los Angeles_ + +_ASSISTANT EDITORS_ + +W. EARL BRITTON, _University of Michigan_ + +_ADVISORY EDITORS_ + +EMMETT L. AVERY, _State College of Washington_ +BENJAMIN BOYCE, _Duke University_ +LOUIS I. BREDVOLD, _University of Michigan_ +CLEANTH BROOKS, _Yale University_ +JAMES L. CLIFFORD, _Columbia University_ +ARTHUR FRIEDMAN, _University of Chicago_ +SAMUEL H. MONK, _University of Minnesota_ +ERNEST MOSSNER, _University of Texas_ +JAMES SUTHERLAND, _Queen Mary College, London_ +H.T. SWEDENBERG, JR., _University of California, Los Angeles_ + + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +Since the early nineteenth century it has been known that Frances +Reynolds, the sister of Sir Joshua, was the author of an essay on +taste, which she had printed but did not publish. Yet persistent +search failed to turn up a single copy. It remained one of those lost +pieces which every research scholar hoped someday to discover. + +In 1935 it appeared that the search was over. Among some manuscripts +of Mrs. Thrale-Piozzi, long hidden in Wales, was found a printed copy +of an anonymous _Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, and of +the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty_, which seemed to be the lost essay. +The date was correct; the _Enquiry_ was dedicated to Mrs. Montagu; it +contained a quotation from Dr. Johnson; and, best of all, there was +attached to the pamphlet a copy (in an unidentified handwriting) of +Johnson's well-known letter to Miss Reynolds concerning her essay. + +Only one thing stood squarely in the way of the identification. James +Northcote in his _Life of Sir Joshua Reynolds_, published in 1818 (II, +116-19), after describing Johnson's connection with the manuscript, +gives two pages of short excerpts. Most of the quotations are general +statements such as "Dress is the strong indication of the moral +character" or "The fine arts comprehend all that is excellent in the +moral system, and, at the same time, open every path that tends to the +corruption of moral excellence." Unfortunately none of these excerpts +appears directly in the _Enquiry_. Although some of the ideas are +similar, the wording and specific details are different. By no stretch +of the imagination could they be considered to come from the same +piece. Thus Northcote blocked the solution of the mystery for nearly +fifteen years. + +Recently, however, evidence has turned up which makes the attribution +a certainty. It is now obvious that Northcote must have been mistaken +in the source of his quotations. Writing as he did many years after +the events he was describing, Northcote either had found a copy of +the first draft of Miss Reynolds' essay, or erroneously quoted from +another anonymous piece which he assumed was by Miss Reynolds. In any +event he was not quoting from the final version which she wished the +world to see. + +The story of Miss Reynolds' attempts to publish her essay can at +last be pieced together from various bits of evidence, some hitherto +unpublished. Just when the essay was written is uncertain. All that +we know is that a preliminary version was submitted to the rigorous +criticism of Dr. Johnson in 1781. Johnson, who had corrected some of +her verses in red ink the year before, commented on 21 July 1781: + + There is in these such force of comprehension, and such nicety + of observation as Locke or Pascal might be proud of. This I + say with intention to have you think that I speak my opinion. + + They cannot however be printed in their present state. Many + of your notions seem not very clear in your own mind, many are + not sufficiently developed and expanded for the common reader; + the expression almost every where wants to be made clearer and + smoother. You may by revisal and improvement make it a very + elegant and curious work.[1] + +But Miss Reynolds was not easily discouraged, and Johnson wrote again +on 8 April 1782: + + Your work is full of very penetrating meditation, and very + forcible sentiment. I read it with a full perception of the + sublime, with wonder and terrour, but I cannot think of any + profit from it; it seems not born to be popular. + + Your system of the mental fabric is exceedingly obscure, and + without more attention than will be willingly bestowed, + is unintelligible. The Ideas of Beauty will be more easily + understood, and are often charming. I was delighted with the + different beauty of different ages. + + I would make it produce something if I could but I have indeed + no hope. If a Bookseller would buy it at all, as it must be + published without a name, he would give nothing for it worth + your acceptance.[2] + +In passing it might be pointed out that this letter has previously not +been associated with Miss Reynolds' essay on taste, largely because +the available text of the letter has been so faulty. Where Johnson +wrote "The Ideas of Beauty," obviously referring to the second section +of the _Enquiry_, Croker, followed by G.B. Hill, printed "The plans +of Burnaby." To this Hill added a note; "Burnaby, I conjecture, was a +character in the book," with the result that scholars have fruitlessly +been searching ever since for the fictitious Mr. Burnaby, One more +example of the dangers of using nineteenth-century transcripts! + +Evidently Johnson's stringent objections temporarily halted her plans, +for we hear nothing more about the essay for two years. Meanwhile, as +appears from a later letter, she showed it to Bennett Langton, hoping +in vain for his help. Nevertheless, she was determined to go ahead and +print the work, even at her own expense. Johnson, still counted upon +for aid, wrote to her on 12 April 1784: + + I am not yet able to wait on you, but I can do your business + commodiously enough. You must send me the copy to show the + printer. If you will come to tea this afternoon we will talk + together about it.[3] + +On 30 April he commented further: "Mr. Allen has looked over the +papers and thinks one hundred copies will come to five pounds." +Something, however, made her suspicious of his advice, and on 28 May +there came an end to Johnson's connection with the matter. He wrote: +"I have returned your papers, and am glad that you laid aside the +thought of printing them." + +But Miss Reynolds had no intention of permanently giving up her +project. Instead she rewrote parts of the essay which had displeased +her critics, and shortly after Johnson's death proceeded to have 250 +copies privately printed, with a dedication to Mrs. Montagu. With +Johnson gone, "The Queen of the Bluestockings" must have appeared the +next best patron. That Mrs. Montagu, while no doubt flattered by the +dedication, was herself not overly enthusiastic about the essay may +be gathered from a letter written to her by Miss Reynolds on 12 July +1785. Miss Reynolds began by insisting that "the slightest hint" of +disapprobation on the part of Mrs. Montagu would "consign the work to +oblivion"; then continued: + + I never did entertain any desire to publish it, tho I might + to sell it. And my desire of printing it, originated from a + motive which tho' vain I allow, is an natural vanity I wishd + to leave behind me a respectable memorial of my existence, + which I then flatterd myself this would be. Ten impressions or + twenty at the most, were all I wishd to have taken off. Why I + had so many as 250 was because Dr. Johnson advised me to print + that number, and to sell them, to stand the sale of them was + his expression, but I must do Dr. Johnson the justice to say, + that, that advice was given me with a proviso that no person + was in the secret but himself, for on my informing him to + the contrary, he declined or seemd to decline the affair of + getting them printed for me, which I perceiving sent to him + for the manuscript, foolishly entertaining a slight suspicion + which I much reproach myself for, that some other motives + besides the want of merit in the work had influenced this + change of behaviour. Unluckily from the beginning I made too + great allowance in its favour, from an opinion I had con + too of Dr. Johnsons being strongly prejudiced against womens + literary productions. But I deceived myself. He was sincere, + he judged justly of the work, and his opinion exactly + corresponded with yours![4] + +Not that she regretted the cost of printing the 250 copies. That was a +minor consideration. She concluded: + + If I ever should shew it to any person it will be to Mr. + Langton, from a motive of wishing him to see the alteration I + have made in it for the better, since he saw it, and as it is + also since Dr. Johnson saw it, and particularly that part + he most objected to, my belief that I had obviated that + objection, is another apology for my printing it. + +To this Mrs. Montagu returned a wordy and diffuse reply, commenting +that "having for many years past left off all metaphysical studies," +she was "not a competent judge of any work on subjects of that +nature," yet insisting that she doubted if contemporary readers would +like it. It was obvious that Mrs. Montagu refused to be a party to +further dissemination of the printed copies. And there the matter +rested for almost three more years. + +The wish to have some of the copies read by the general public proved +too strong, and on 15 April 1788 Miss Reynolds wrote again to Mrs. +Montagu, asking her aid in recovering a letter, or transcription of a +letter, of Johnson's: + + It is of great importance to me the recovery of this letter + particularly so as I perceive I must not presume to hope for + the only patronage that could countervail the loss of Dr. + Johnsons, should I ever be induced to publish the work. I + do not mean that I would publish the letter, but that the + testimony it conveys of Dr. Johnsons approbation, would be + highly advantageous to me in the disposal of the copy to + a Bookseller, indeed _approbation_ is an improper Word, + inadequate to the + praises he bestows on the work, I durst not repeat his + expressions tho I well remember them. Some friendly strictures + also the letter contained, all these I remember I transcribed + verbatim in a letter I sent to you in the beginning of the + year 82. they begin + + Many of your notions seem not to be very clear in your own + imagination....[5] + +It was not until the next year that with the help of James Northcote +she finally made active preparations to have the work published. As +Miss Reynolds wrote to Mrs. Montagu on 5 February, + + I forgot to say that Mr. Nurse recommended Mr. Northcote to a + Mr. Bladen in Paternoster Row for a Publisher, but I sent + in the utmost haste to him to prevent his taking any steps + towards so disgraceful a place as I imagine that to be so + incongruous.[6] + +In preparation for the new printing, Miss Reynolds had further revised +her essay, and in order to enhance the value of the piece for general +readers she decided to add three letters from Johnson of which she +chanced to have copies. Totally unconnected with the essay, one was +to Sir Joseph Banks concerning the motto for his goat's collar; the +others concerned the unfortunate Dr. Dodd. But before going ahead she +again asked the advice of her patroness. Mrs. Montagu replied: + + I do not see that there is any objection to publishing the 3 + letters, but I own I think Dr Johnson judges too lightly of + the crime of forgery ... I believe the tenderness of sentiment + Dr Johnson expresses for Dr Dodd in his afflictions will do + him honour in the eyes of the Publick, & therefore as his + friend you may with propriety publish the letters.[7] + +Mrs. Montagu concluded, "I wish some name that would do more honour to +your work was to appear in the dedication, but to be presented to +the publick with such a mark of Mrs Reynolds' friendly regard, will +certainly be esteemed an honour...." + +Sometime between February and July 1789 the _Enquiry_ was reprinted, +this time by J. Smeeton (copies of this version may be found in the +Bodleian Library and the Library of Congress). The terminal date for +the reprinting is established by the fact that the three letters +of Johnson which were appended to the essay were reprinted without +comment in the July issue of the _European Magazine_. + +Just where Miss Reynolds secured copies of the Johnson letters is +not certain. It is suggestive, however, that the letter to Banks had +originally been sent under cover to Sir Joshua Reynolds and that Sir +Joshua's copy is now among the Boswell papers at Yale University. +There would have been ample opportunity for Frances Reynolds also to +have secured a copy. And the letter to Charles Jenkinson of 20 June +1777 and to Dr. Dodd of 26 June were of the sort that an enterprising +lady might well have wheedled copies from the Doctor. The important +point is that the inclusion of the letters in the 1789 printing of the +_Enquiry_ provides incontrovertible proof of Miss Reynolds' connection +with the piece. + +For this second printing the entire pamphlet was reset, with +numerous minor changes of wording and punctuation, but with no major +alterations in meaning. In general the textual improvements are such +as a bluestocking lady might well wish to make. It will be noted that +on pages 25 and 49 of the copy here reproduced someone has made minor +changes in wording in ink. These corrections are made in the later +printing. Moreover, at the end of the 1789 version there is an errata +list, indicating three alterations from the 1785 text which were +mistakes. The Dedication remained unchanged, but the geometrical +illustration was now placed facing the beginning of Chapter I. + +The _Enquiry_ was written in what is now recognized as one of the most +exciting periods in the history of aesthetics, the late eighteenth +century being a crucial point in the gradual shift from absolute +classical standards to the relative approaches of the next age. Most +of the important thinkers of the day--Hume, Burke, Lord Kames, Adam +Smith, among others--were thinking deeply about the problem of taste. +And if Miss Reynolds' essay is not one of the most perceptive of the +discussions, it is at least one of the liveliest. + +In brief, the _Enquiry_ is what one might expect from an intelligent +amateur, from one not a professional writer, yet one who has given +much thought to the problems of aesthetics. Of course, many of the +ideas are derivative, with echoes of the "moral sense" of Hutcheson, +the "line of grace" of Hogarth, and the terrible sublime of Burke. The +three divisions of the essay--the development of a mental system, the +origin of our ideas of Beauty, and the analysis of taste--follow the +customary pattern of eighteenth-century discussions. Yet the piece +is no slavish refurbishing of old phrases. It is packed with fresh +arguments and novel suggestions. If these are not always completely +coherent or logical, they do represent original thinking. + +Twentieth-century readers may be astonished by some of the ideas: +witness the claim that Negroes could never arrive at true taste, +because their eyes were so accustomed to objects diametrically +opposite to taste. As a further example of Miss Reynolds' occasionally +muddled thinking there is the development of her initial assumption. +While the groundwork of man is perfection, this perfection has been +blemished and man is impelled to recapture it in the sublime. Yet +instead of analyzing this impulse, Miss Reynolds appears to take it +for granted. Nor does she consider how perfection is to be achieved +in taste, preferring to conclude with a diatribe in the manner of +Rousseau on the depravity of the times and the corrupting effect of +the arts. (For this and many of the following comments I am indebted +to Mr. Ralph Cohen of the College of the City of New York.) + +The cause of some of the ambiguities in her discussion may perhaps be +traced to a rather careless use of terms. At one time "instinct" +or "impulsion," the moral force driving man toward perfection, is a +potentiality developed by cultivation, and at another a force that +is created by cultivation. Although the sublime is the apex of her +mathematically-definite program and is a moral quality attained by +the few, every human being has his point of sublimity in the idea of +a Supreme Being. On the one hand, beauty is a preconceived idea in +the human species; on the other it is not preconceived, but developed. +Finally, the rules of art are perceptions of moral virtue, yet art +which exhibits these rules can corrupt. + +It is easy to pick flaws in Miss Reynolds' thinking, for the lack of +sustained logic which Johnson early recognized is apparent at every +turn. Yet for students of the history of ideas the _Enquiry_ contains +much of interest. As a painter, Miss Reynolds throughout stresses the +visual, a concentration which leads her to several valuable insights. +She divides form into two categories, masculine and feminine, but +makes a novel use of these Ciceronian divisions. All non-human +objects--flowers, animals, etc.--are seen as exhibiting male or female +attributes. It might almost be said that with this anthropomorphic +approach she is attempting to develop a "philosophical" basis for the +pathetic fallacy. Furthermore, if the human is used to measure beauty +in the non-human, the implication is that man, not God, is the measure +of beauty. By setting up man as the mediator between the material and +the divine, she points to the concentration in the next century on +human values. + +When discussing the _Enquiry_ in his book on the _Sublime_, Samuel +Monk pointed out certain other tendencies which fore-shadow the +coming Romantic revolt. This shift may also be noted in Miss Reynolds' +extension of countenance, the reflection of internal virtue, to mean +"form," and the extension of internal virtue to mean "disposition," +"object," or content. In developing this form-content division, she +stumbles on a key criticism of associationism: "From association of +ideas, any object may be pleasing, though absolutely devoid of beauty, +and displeasing with it. The form is _then_ out of the question; it is +some _real_ good or evil, with which the object, but not its form, is +associated." This notion that associationism leads away from the +work of art as such is a perceptive comment. Her notion that form and +disposition (or content) must correspond in order to give aesthetic +pleasure suggests, though the terms are different, certain of +Coleridge's basic ideas. + +One other point might be stressed: Miss Reynolds takes an extreme +moralistic position toward the arts. Again and again it is insisted +that taste and beauty are moral attributes, not purely aesthetic +concepts. Chapter II ends with the ringing statement: "Of this I +am certain, that true refinement is the effect of true virtue; that +virtue is truth, and good; and that beauty dwells in them, and they +in her." And the next chapter begins: "Taste seems to be an inherent +impulsive tendency of the soul towards true good." On the other +hand, she sees that the arts are not to be encouraged because such +encouragement is apt to lead to the destruction of moral virtue--the +desire for fame and wealth. The value of art as education is dismissed +as of importance only to the few; the dangers of encouragement will +imperil the many. "Though the arts are thus beneficial to the growing +principles of taste, respecting a few individuals, it is well known +that their establishment in every nation has had a contrary effect on +the community in general...." + +To conclude: despite its many deficiencies Frances Reynolds' _Enquiry_ +is worth reading. It serves admirably to mirror the conflicting +eighteenth-century theories out of which our own aesthetic concepts +have been formed. + + James L. Clifford + Columbia University + + + + +Notes to the Introduction + + +1. _Letters_, II, 223-24; corrected from original letter in possession +of Professor F.W. Hilles of Yale University, who has given invaluable +aid in the present investigation. + +2. _Letters_, II, 249-50, corrected from the original by Dr. R.W. +Chapman. + +3. Copy in possession of Mrs. Doreen Ashworth, Windlesham, Surrey. + +4. Original in Huntington Library. + +5. Original in possession of Mrs. Ashworth. + +6. Rough draft in possession of Mrs. Ashworth. + +7. Original in possession of Professor F.W. Hilles. + + + + +AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES of TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF +OUR IDEAS of BEAUTY, &c. + + + + Sunt certi denique fines, + Quos ultra citraquè nequit consistere rectum. + HOR. + + + +To Mrs. MONTAGU. + + +MADAM, + +Were I not prompted by gratitude, admiration, and affection, to +dedicate to you the best produce of my abilities, which I imagine this +to be, yet, as the subject, of which it particularly treats, is moral +excellence, the universal voice of mankind, with whom your very name +is synonymous with virtue itself, must plead my apology for taking +this liberty. Besides, madam, it was natural for me, as an author, to +with to avail myself of the advantage, which this address affords +me, of prepossessing the minds of my readers with an example of that +perfection to which all my arguments tend, as a preparative, or aid, +to their better comprehending my meaning. + +The influence of virtue is every way beneficial! Your character, +not only secures me from all imputation of flattery, but this public +avowal of my admiration of its excellence conveys an honourable +testimony of the consistency of my principles; having endeavoured to +inculcate, that the love and esteem of true virtue is true honour. And +I may add, that the sweet gratification I feel, in the indulging the +strongest and best propension of my nature, in thus expatiating in its +praise, is true pleasure, true happiness. + +I am, Madam, + + Your obliged, + + Most obedient, + + And most humble, servant, + + The AUTHOR. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +A SKETCH of the MENTAL SYSTEM respecting our Perceptions of Taste, &c. + + +The mind of man, introspecting itself, seems, as it were, (in +conjunction with the inscrutable principles of nature,) placed in the +central point of the creation: from whence, impelled by her energetic +powers and illumined by her light, the intellectual faculties, like +rays, shoot forth in direct tendency to their ultimate point of +perfection; and, as they advance, each individual mind imperceptibly +imbibes the influence and light of each, and is by this imbibition +alone enabled to approach it. + +But, though the light of nature and of reason direct the human mind +to perfection, or true good, yet, being in its progress perpetually +impeded by adventitious causes, casual occurrences, &c. &c. which +induce false opinions of good and evil, its progressive powers +generally stop at a middle point between mere uncultivated nature and +perfection, a medium which constitutes what we call common sense, and +which, in degree, seems as distant from the perfection of the mental +faculties as common form is from the perfection of form, _beauty_. + + +[Illustration: + SUBLIMITY. + | + GRACE + | + BEAUTY | TRUTH + | + COMMON SENSE | COMMON FORM + | + NATURE] + + +On meditating on this subject, and marking the progressive stages +or degrees of human excellence, the great leading general truths, +or mental rests, as I may call them, _the common, the beautiful, the +graceful, and the sublime_, I have been naturally led to form a kind +of diagrammatic representation of their respective distances, &c. &c. +which I present to my reader on the opposite page, requesting him to +refer to it now and then as he goes on, in order to facilitate his +comprehension of my meaning. + +And here it may be necessary to premise, that, however whimsical and +absurd this delineation may appear to my reader, something analogous +to the thought may be found in the works of many eminent philosophers, +particularly in those of Bacon[A] and of Locke:[B] the latter +suggesting that the whole system of morality might be reduced to +mathematical demonstration; and the former, in his treatise on the +Advancement of Learning, gives a description of the stages of science +very much resembling my delineation of the stages of intellectual +perfection, or taste. + +[Footnote A: Advancement of Learning, Book 2d.] + +[Footnote B: Essay on human Understanding, Chap. 3d, Book the 4th, and +Chap. 12th, same Book, Sect. 8th.] + +It could have been no dishonour to me to have been led by such +conductors! Yet, as the truth cannot dishonour me neither, I must +aver, that my little system was projected, and brought to the exact +state it now is in, without my having the least apprehension that any +thing similar had been suggested before by any person whatever; nor +have I, in consequence of the discovery I have lately made of the +opinions of these respectable authors, added or omitted a single +thought in my treatise. But to return from my digression. + +In the exact center of my circle of humanity, I have placed nature, +or the springs of the intellectual powers, which tend, in a +straight line, to its boundary; and, on its boundary, I have placed +demonstrable beauty and truth, and the utmost power of rules; and, +midway; I have placed common sense and common form, half deriving +their existence from pure nature, and half from its highest +cultivation, as far as art or rules can teach. A conjunction which +would itself be the perfection of humanity, but that it is mixed with +all that is not nature, and all that is not art, and thereby made +mediocrity, i.e. _common sense_. + +The intellectual powers, arriving at the limit of my common circle, +i.e. at the limit of the basis of my pyramidical system, where I +have placed the fixed proportions of beauty and of truth, (if they +progress,) mount up as a flame, with undulating[A] motion, refining +as they advance, and terminate in the pinnacle, or ultimate point, +_sublimity_; forming in the imagination the figure of a pyramid, +or cone, from the limit of whose base, (on which, as I have before +observed, I have placed demonstrable truth and beauty, the utmost +power of rules, &c.) from that limit up to the ultimate point of +sublimity, I call the region of intellectual pleasure, genius, or +taste; and in its center I place grace, whose influence pervades, +cheers, and nourishes, every part of it, an object which, in this +ideal region, is similar in its situation and degree to that of common +sense in the common or fundamental region. Grace seems to partake +of the perception both of beauty and of sublimity, as common sense +partakes of nature and of art. Grace is the characteristic object or +general form of the ideal region, and its perception is the general +limit of the powers of imagination or taste. Few, very few, attain to +the point of sublimity; the _ne plus ultra_ of human conception! the +alpha and omega. The sentiment of sublimity sinks into the source of +nature, and that of the source of nature mounts to the sentiment of +sublimity, each point seeming to each the cause and the effect; the +origin and the end! + +[Footnote A: I use that expression, because it is the peculiar motion +of grace as well as of a flame.] + +Having thus drawn the outline of my pyramidical mental system, I +propose to expatiate a little on each point or stage throughout the +great characteristic line of intellectual power. + +The first point The exact center, _nature_, or the origin of our +intellectual faculties, admits of no investigation, its idea, as I +have observed before, loses itself in the sentiment of sublimity, +and we see nothing; and therefore I pass on to an object which is +perceptible, _the common general character of humanity_, _exterior and +inferior_. I have placed them on a line, because their ideas are so +analogous, that they unite in one. + + +Section 1. _Common Sense and common Form_. + +Perfection seems to be the ground-work both of common sense and +of common form; and, what prevents each from being perfect, is the +adventitious blemishes, the additions to, and the diminutions from, +what is perfect, making the too little and the too large. But, these +defects being distributed in, small portions throughout the general +common form and common mind, they constitute an object, whether +visible or intellectual, between perfection and imperfection, namely, +that of mediocrity, neither exciting admiration nor disgust. And, as +experience gives the general idea of the common and true appearance +of the human form, as well to the rustic as to the most enlightened +philosopher, so consequently does it enable him to see deformity, or +what is an unusual appearance in that form. + +But, though unusual defects seem to be evident to every eye, it is +only to the man of taste and nice discernment that the same degree of +unusual beauties are equally perceptible; which corresponds with my +opinion, that the ground-work of humanity is perfection, and that its +blemishes only tinge its pure white, not discolour it so much, but, +when held at a distance, i.e. in abstract idea, it is still a white, +like a sheet of paper, or cloth of the most perfect white, regularly +checkered over with a variety of figures of every colour, and placed +at a distance, appearing to the eye a white, a mezzo common white; +and, as any unusual figure, I mean unusually large and opaque, on this +mezzo ground, would be more conspicuous than any of a greater degree +of transparency or a more perfect white could be by an absence of any +of the figures; so any degree of deformity is, more opposite to the +general common form than beauty, and any degree of insanity is more +opposite to common sense than intellectual excellence. + +And, (to continue my allusion,) as those tints, or blemishes, which +obscure the ground, must be discharged to make a perfect white, so +must the artist, in creating beauty, discharge the blemishes that +tinge and obscure the human form, and which give it the character of +mediocrity, till the perfect white, or total absence of defect, or +beauty, result. + +Common sense seems to be diffusive truth, and common form diffusive +beauty; and, as this diffusion is always existing with us, externally +and internally, it is no wonder that we should more easily perceive +what is in opposition to it, _evil_, than what is in unison with it, +_good_. + +On a line with common form and common sense I place common ease of +body and of mind: unfelt health, unfelt good, or that arising to the +degree of _satisfaction_ and _content_; in fine, whatever we call +_commonly_ good, and requisite for the well-being of humanity. + + +Section 2. _Beauty and Truth_. + +I mean that beauty which is demonstrable truth, and that truth which +is demonstrable beauty. _Exactitude. Completion. The just medium. The +satisfactory rest of the mind. Perfection_. A point, indeed, in which +the mind cannot rest! It must go forward or backward. If the latter, +it relapses into the dominion of error; if the former, if assumes +the charms of _design_, or _intention_. The artist, arrived at the +ultimate limit of rules, or demonstrable truth, stands, as it were, +between the visible and invisible world; between that of sense and +intellect; the common and the uncommon; and his productions will be a +conjunction of both. He looks back through all the variety of common +nature, and reviews, through the medium of truth and beauty, the +various objects it exhibits; and on its spotless ground, i.e. the +abstract idea of nature without defects, can only exist in idea, +he arranges those objects, objects, so as they may best produce the +effects he aims at in his art. He does not attempt to obliterate +any character in the common circle of nature; but, following her +own oeconomy, he endeavours, by juxtaposition, &c. to make each +subservient to each in creating delight, and giving beauty to the +_whole_. But, to descend from the abstract general idea to the +particular idea of beauty, or idea of a particular form: + +We discard every thing, that is not beauty, to compose beauty; but +every thing that is not beauty is not therefore deformity. The wrong +we see in each individual we do not call deformity: when it is so, it +stands on the limit of the common circle, in opposition to beauty. + +From common form seem to originate beauty and deformity; and, as they +recede from each other in opposite directions, they become less and +less like their parent, _common form_, but never totally unlike; for +it is their likeness to that form that constitutes the one beauty, and +the other deformity; for, were there no resemblance in deformity +to the common form, it would be a different species, and no longer +disgust; and none in beauty, it would no longer please. + +There is no particular common form, but which, to create beauty, an +artist, who studies the perfection of the human form, must improve in +some, if not in every part; to effect which, considered as mere form +only, rules will suffice, but, considered as grace, it must express a +sentiment that no rules can give! + +That all feel the same sentiment of admiration for that which they +think the most perfect, however the objects may differ, has induced +some to believe that beauty is an arbitrary idea, and that it exists +only in the imagination! But does it follow, that, because it is not +possible for the savage or the man of taste to judge of any object +but as experience enables him to judge, that therefore there is no +preeminence in that form which is beauty to the one above that which +is beauty to the other? + +Somewhere there must exist, whether perceived or not, the perfection, +or highest point of excellence of the human form respecting +proportion; and somewhere there must exist, or does at times exist, +the highest excellence of its expression, i.e. the moral charm of the +human countenance, _grace_. + +The artist, who has only seen the beauty of his own nation, will from +that form his standard of perfection. But, when he comes to extend his +enquiry, when he has viewed the beauty of other nations, particularly +that form and that expression which the Grecian artists (who were +probably on a line with the Grecian philosophers) modelled from their +ideas of beauty! he will quit his partiality for the beauty of his own +country, and prefer that of the Grecian, which I imagine is preferable +to that of the whole world! The only criterion to prove it so, I mean +its form, would be to select from every nation the most perfect in it, +and from that number to choose the most perfect, were this possible +to be done, respecting the external form of beauty: it could not +respecting the internal expression of beauty, _grace_; for who shall +be the world's arbiter of the ne plus ultra of grace! + +That the artists of all ages and of all nations have terminated their +enquiries after beauty in that of the Grecian form is the highest +proof that can be given of its superior excellence to that of all the +world! + +Common form, as I have observed before, is so much nearer beauty than +deformity, that it is, in abstract idea, the model to compose beauty +of form from. The _universal_ appearance of nature is, to every eye, +right, fit, faultless, &c. therefore, if every part of the copy be the +same, particularly, I mean, in the _human_ form, beauty of form must +result. + +The beauty of every part of the human body, forming a _perfect_ whole, +is analogous to an instrument of music in perfect concord, and mere +exactitude of proportion in its parts, exclusive of the idea of mind, +would, I imagine, have no more effect upon the spectator than the mere +concord of the strings of an instrument has on the hearer; it amounts +to no more than blameless right, nor, till influenced by sentiment, +can it go farther. + +But, as we are incapable of separating the idea of the human form from +the human mind, and as the touch of an instrument in perfect concord +gives a presentiment of harmony, so does the perception of the +concordance of the parts of a beautiful form give a perception of +grace. The mind, as I have observed before, cannot rest in fixed +perfection, the _Spotless white_; and its natural transition from +beauty must be into the region of grace. + + +Section 3. _Grace_. + +The principles, which constitute grace, genius, or taste, are one; +which is denominated grace in the object, genius in the production of +the object, and taste in the perception of it. + +The existence of grace _seems_ to depend more upon the character of +mental than of corporeal beauty. All its motions seem to indicate and, +to be regulated by the utmost delicacy of sentiment! I have placed it +between the highest sentiment of the human mind, _sublmity_, that +no rules can teach, and the highest sentiment that rules can teach, +_exact beauty_, the two extremes of the vrai reel and the vrai ideal. +Grace seems, as it were, to hang between the influence of both; the +irregular sublime giving character and relief to the negative and +determined qualities of beauty; and beauty, i.e. truth, confining +within due bounds the eccentric qualities of sublimity, forming, both +to sight and in idea, orderly variety, _the waving line_, neither +straight nor crooked. The waving line is the symbol, or memento, as +I may say, of grace, wherever it is seen in whatever form, animate or +inanimate; and may be justly styled the line of taste or grace! + +The perception of grace seems not to be intirely new nor intirely +familiar to us; but is, as it were, what we have had a presentiment of +in the mind, without examining it, and which the graceful object, or +action, &c. calls forth to our view. Being so much our own idea, we +like to behold it, to dwell upon it; and yet, not being a familiar +idea, it creates a pleasing mild degree of admiration. + +Grace seems half celestial; for all the virtues accompany, indeed +compose, the perception; for none, I imagine, can have a perception of +grace that has none of the charms of virtue. + +The sentiment of grace, caused by the motion of beauty, music, poetry, +beneficence, compassion, &c. may be ranked as the highest intellectual +pleasure the mind is capable of perceiving, and brings with it a sort +of undetermined consciousness of the delicacy of our own perceptions +in making the discovery, a degree of that glorying that Longinus +observes always accompanies the perception of the sublime. + +You can no more define grace than you can happiness. The mind cannot +so stedfastly behold it as to investigate its real properties. Grace +is indeed the point of happiness in the ideal region, both because it +arises spontaneously, without effort, &c. and because it seems partly +_within_ our own power, and partly _without_ it. + +As common sense, in my fundamental circle, seems diffusive truth, so +grace, in my ideal circle, seems diffusive sublimity; every perception +of the former seems to be tinged, as it were, with the colour of the +latter. + + +Section 4. _Sublimity_. + +Where pure grace ends, the awe of the sublime begins, composed of the +influence of pain, of pleasure, of grace, and deformity, playing into +each other, that the mind is unable to determine which to call it, +pain, pleasure, or terror. Without a conjunction of these powers there +could be no sublimity. + +Those only who have passed through the degrees, _common sense, truth_ +and _grace_, i.e. the sentiment of grace, can have a sentiment of +sublimity. It is the mild admiration of grace raised to _wonder_ +and _astonishment_; to a sentiment of _power_ out of _our power_ to +produce or control. Grace must have been as familiar to the intellect, +in order to discover sublimity, as common sense in the common region +must have been to the discovery of truth and beauty. In fine, genius, +or taste, which is the sentiment of grace, and which I have called the +common sense of the ideal region, can alone discover the true sublime. + +It is a pinnacle of beatitude bordering upon horror, deformity, +madness! an eminence from whence the mind, that dares to look farther, +is lost! It seems to stand, or rather to waver, between certainty +and uncertainty, between security and destruction. It is the point of +terror, of undetermined fear, of undetermined power! + +The idea of the supreme Being is, I imagine, in every breast, from the +clown to the greatest philosopher, his point of sublimity! + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +On the ORIGIN of our IDEAS of BEAUTY. + + +In proportion as the principles of beauty exist in the common form, +undetermined to the common eye, so do they exist in common sense, +undetermined to the common mind. It is cultivation that calls them +into view, gives them a determined form, creates the object, and the +perception, that + + 'Truth and good are one, + And beauty dwells in them, and they in her.' + AKENSIDE. + +But, though all truth resolves into one truth, one beauty, one +good, as all colours resolve into one light; though the scientifical +intellectual colours, classes, or leading principles of science, the +_physical_, the _moral_, the _metaphysical_, &c. &c. resolve into +intellectual light, beauty, or good; it is, I imagine, the moral +truth, that is the characteristic truth of beauty: for, were we to +analyse the pleasing emotions we feel at the sight of beauty, we +should, I imagine, find them composed of our most refined moral +affections; and hence the universal interesting charm of beauty. And, +as those affections refine by culture, hence the different degrees of +the sentiments which beauty creates in the rustic, and in the man of +taste. The former perceives only the physical charm of beauty, the +freshness of colour, the bloom of youth, &c. but, to the man of taste, +the physical pleases only through the medium of the moral: _the body +charms because the soul is seen_; beauty, in his breast, is the source +from whence _endless streams of fair ideas flow_, extending throughout +the whole region of taste, no object of which but is more or less +related to the principles of human beauty. But taste, though a subject +almost inseparable from that of beauty, I must forbear to enlarge upon +in this chapter, as I propose to make it the particular subject of my +next. + +It is but at that period, at which we begin to perceive the charms of +moral virtue, that we begin to perceive the real charms of beauty. It +is true, a man may attain, by experience, the knowledge of its just +proportions; without that concomitant sentiment. He may be unconscious +of the characteristic moral charm resulting from the whole. And +an artist, I imagine, by the habitual practice of the rules which +constitute beauty, may produce forms which charm the moral sense of +others, without being conscious of it himself; the utmost limit of +the rules of the imitative arts being so intimately united with the +intuitive principles of taste, or refined moral sense, that the mind +in general cannot distinguish where the one ends or the other begins. +The artist, who separates them, _leans on the second cause_ instead of +the first. + +As the strongest proof that the moral sense is the governing principle +of beauty, we may remark, that the human form, from infancy to +old age, has its peculiar beauty annexed to it from the virtue +or affection that nature gives it, and which it exhibits in the +countenance. The negative virtue, innocence, is the beauty of the +child. The more formed virtues, benevolence, generosity, compassion, +&c. are the virtues of youth, and its beauty. The fixed and determined +virtues, justice, temperance, fortitude, &c. compose the beauty of +manhood. The philosophic and religious cast of countenance is the +beauty of old age. Now, were any of these expressions misapplied, i.e. +commuted, they would disgust rather than please: without congruity +there could be no virtue; without virtue, no beauty, no sentiment of +taste. + +And thus the beauty of each sex is seen only through the medium of +the virtues belonging to each. The beauty of the masculine sex is seen +only through the medium of the masculine virtues; the beauty of the +feminine only through the medium of the feminine. The moral sense +gives each its distinct portion of the same virtues, but draws a line +which neither can pass without a diminution of their specific +beauty. The softness and mildness of the feminine expression would +be displeasing in a man. The robust and determined expression of +the rigid virtues, justice, fortitude, &c. would be displeasing in a +woman. However perfect the Form, if an incongruity that touches the +well-being of humanity mingles with the idea, the Form will not afford +the pleasing perception of beauty: though the eye may be capable of +seeing its regularity, &c. so far is it from pleasing, that it is +the more disgusting from its semblance to virtue, because that that +semblance is a contradiction to her laws. + +May it not be owing to these expressions, so familiar to every eye, +that the general sense of good taste eternally exists? They are the +legible characters of human excellence, no where visible but in the +human countenance, every observation of which improves and confirms +the moral sentiment, or image of beauty, implanted by nature in the +mind of man. + +The origin of the idea of beauty is the same in every breast, savage +and civilized. Every nation's characteristic Form or expression of +beauty will be a representation, or portrait, of their characteristic +virtue, their happiness, their good. Thus, in the opinion of the wild +savage, that face or form will be the most beautiful that assimilates +with his idea of savage virtues, corporeal strength, courage, &c. +_perfections that are placed in bones and nerves_: as that of the most +cultivated nations, witness the Grecians, will indicate or portray the +most refined mental virtues. And hence we may conclude, if there be +any dignity, any truth, any beauty, in virtue, there must be a _real_ +difference, _superior_ and _inferior_ characteristic power of pleasing +in the exterior of the human form. + +It is cultivation that gives birth to beauty as well as to virtue, +by calling forth the visible object to correspond with the invisible +intellectual object. In the face or form of an idiot, or the lowest +rustic, there is no beauty; and, supposing a nation of idiots, and +that they never could improve in mental beauty, they never could, I +imagine, improve in corporeal, even though their natural form was upon +an equality with the rest of mankind; for, without sentiment, they +could not only be incapable of expressing any sentiment analogous to +beauty, but, wanting the surrounding influence of a moral system, i.e. +of the general influence of education on the exterior, they could not +suppress or veil a semblance incongruous with beauty. What no person +felt no person could teach. + +In cultivated nations, every precept for exterior appearance, from the +first rudiments of the dancing-master to the motion of grace, has for +its object _mind_, that is, a desire to impress upon the spectator a +favourable idea of our mental character; but, passed the true point of +cultivation, they lose with the sentiment of mental excellence that of +true beauty; witness the exterior artificial appearance of humanity +in a neighbouring nation, which probably is on a par with the most +uncultivated rustic. The one does not enough for nature, the other +too much. But, as the former has an object before him, to which nature +herself directs him, the other is receding from it; and, as it is more +agreeable, more easy, and more natural, to the human mind, to learn +than to unlearn, I should sooner expect the most uncultivated nation, +the negro excepted, to arrive at taste in true beauty than them. The +negro-race seems to be the farthest removed from the line of true +cultivation of any of the human species; their defect of form and +complexion being, I imagine, as strong an obstacle to their acquiring +true taste (the produce of mental cultivation) as any natural defect +they may have in their intellectual faculties. For if, as I have +observed, the total want of cultivation would preclude external +beauty, the total want of external beauty would preclude the power +of cultivation. It appears to me inconceivable, that the negro-race +supposing their mental powers were upon a level with other nations, +could ever arrive at true taste, when their eye is accustomed _only_ +to objects so diametrically opposite to taste as the face and form of +negroes are! Our being used or not used to the object cannot make us +perceive any similarity in the lineaments of their countenance to the +lineaments, if I may so say, of our refined virtues and affections, +which alone constitute beauty; and therefore I am induced to believe +that they are a lower order of human beings than the Europeans. + +Beauty is an assemblage of every human charm; yet what we call the +_agreeable_ is often more captivating. + +The agreeable, in person, is composed of beauties and defects, as is +the common form, but differently composed. The beauties and defects +of the latter are blended into the idea of mediocrity; those of the +former are always distinct and perceptible, contrasting each other, +they engage the attention, and create a kind of pleasing _re-creation_ +to the mental faculties; and, in proportion as we can bring them +to unite with our governing principles of pleasure, they create +affection, which gives the person a more fascinating charm than beauty +itself. + +It is the mental character that is the moving principle of affection; +and any strong peculiarity, that contradicts not the moral sense, +i.e. that is not _unnatural_, gives the object an accessary charm, and +raises the affection to passion. The object is at once the common and +the uncommon; an union, which constitutes all we call excellent, all +we admire! + +The perception of the charms of the agreeable seem to be wrought up +to excellence by the operation of our own powers. We ourselves +have blended its beauties and defects into the sentiment of beauty, +_pleasure_; and hence, probably, the strength and durability of the +passion which it creates. Beauty, on the contrary, is composed to our +hands, _full_, _perfect_, and _intire_; its idea is also a compound of +the common and the uncommon, being at once like and unlike the general +form; but inherently it has no contrast, and therefore affords no +recreation, no pleasing exercise, to the mental faculties; there is +nothing to re-create, nothing to wish; and hence the instability +of the passion which it inspires. Perfect beauty is, like perfect +happiness, lost as soon as it is attained. + +It is, I imagine, to the principles of the masculine and the feminine +character, that we owe the perception of beauty or taste, in any +object whatever, throughout all nature and all art that imitates +nature; and, in objects which differ from the human form, the +principles must be in the extreme, because the object is then merely +symbolical. Thus, the meekness of the lamb, and the high-spirited +prancing steed; the gentle dove, and the impetuous eagle; the placid +lake, and the swelling ocean; the lowly valley, and the aspiring +mountain. It is the feminine character that is the sweetest, the most +interesting, image of beauty; the masculine partakes of the sublime. +Thus it will be found, that, in every object that is universally +pleasing, there exist principles which are analogous to those that +constitute beauty in the human species; and that its appearance does +always, in some degree, move the affections, though the mind may be +unconscious of its similitude to any idea in which the affections are +concerned. But the test of the object's possessing the principles +of beauty is when we are able to assimilate its appearance with +some amiable interesting affection; and, according as that affection +prevails in the breast of the spectator, it will appear with an +additional power of pleasing. + +From association of ideas, any object may be pleasing, though +absolutely devoid of beauty, and displeasing with it. The form is +_then_ out of the question; it is some _real_ good or evil, with which +the object, but not its form, is associated. + +It is observable, that those animals I have mentioned (and I imagine +all animals that are symbolical of our affections have the same) have +a double character of beauty, or reference to the affection that is +moved: i.e. their form and their disposition, exactly corresponding +with each other. Probably on that union depends their power of +pleasing; their _form alone_, so different from human beauty, could +not sufficiently engage the attention, or afford the interesting +perception, which the consistency of truth does, in the _intire_ of an +object. + +Every object of taste has _at least_ a double reference to mental +pleasure, whether the object, in the philosophical scale of our +perceptions, belongs to those of _sense_ or _intellect_. Thus, the +beauty of the rose would not certainly be so perceptible to us, +wanting its fragrance, and, with a nauseous smell, would not probably +be admitted, as I may say, into the rank of _agreeableness_, though +it is in reality a beautiful and pleasing object; nor, supposing the +thistle, or any other ugly flower, possessed of the fragrance of the +rose, should we therefore think it an object of taste, any more than +we can think the form of an elephant beautiful, though endued with +almost intellectual beauty. + +In the form and colour of flowers, there appears to me a striking +analogy to the character of human beauty. They afford an ocular +demonstration, in the pleasure with which we contemplate their +particular forms, that the pleasure, we receive from the beauty of the +human form, originates from mental character: witness the charm of +the infant, innocence of the snow-drop, of the soft elegance of the +hyacinth, &c. and, on the contrary, our dis-relish of the gaudy tulip, +the robust, unmeaning, masculine, piony, hollyhock, &c. &c. + +It is, I imagine, from a resemblance to some pre-conceived idea of +beauty in the human species, that we are particularly pleased with +the sight of one flower more than with another, though the mind +is unconscious of the cause. And thus the pleasure, caused by the +apparent beauty of every object throughout the system of human +perception, is, according to my sentiment of that pleasure, the same +intellectual principle, _moral good_, however diversified, modified, +and diminished, even to an unconsciousness or almost imperceptible +degree of relation to it. In fine, the true principles of beauty, in +every object, may be all _resolved_ into the same principle. But to +conclude. + +I have no more doubt that the principles of beauty are moral, than +that the principles of happiness are moral. It is the perception of +true beauty, in its various modifications, that makes up the sum +of human happiness; and hence the diversity of opinions concerning +beauty, but which, however diverse, are never contradictory, but as +mens opinions in morals are so; for every view of beauty assimilates +with some good, and of course must be in unison. + +If, in the human system, there exists a principle which constitutes +true pleasure, that principle must be that which constitutes human +excellence; and, if the visible object which excites true pleasure +must necessarily possess the principles of true pleasure, then must +every object, which universally and invariably pleases, be relative to +the principle that constitutes human excellence, morality. + +Whatever appears, to each individual, the most excellent in the human +system, at once constitutes his idea of _happiness_, of _morality_, +and of _beauty_; and all mankind, I imagine, would agree in the same +idea, had all the same opportunities of seeing and knowing what was +excellent. + +As I imagine the difference in national beauty is marked by the +difference in national morals, so, of course, must the difference of +the opinions of individuals on the subject of beauty be. In fine, +as the moral sense of mankind is coarse or refined, so will be their +taste of beauty. + +Of this I am certain, that true refinement is the effect of true +virtue; that virtue is truth, and good; and that beauty dwells in +them, and they in her. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +On TASTE. + + +Taste seems to be an inherent impulsive tendency of the soul towards +true good, given by nature to all alike, and which improves in its +sentiment as the reasoning faculties improve in their knowledge of +what _is_ true good. + +All the human faculties are, as one may say, constituents of the +principle or faculty of taste. But its perception seems to be shared +between the judgement and the imagination: to the former seems to +belong the truth, or good, of an object of taste; to the latter its +beauty or grace; and the stamina vitæ, or radical principles of taste, +exist, I imagine, in the natural affections of the soul. + +What the impulsive spring is, which moves the affections invariably to +perceive pleasure in the perception of good and beauty, and disgust +in the perception of evil or deformity, I leave to my metaphysical +readers to determine. I am afraid to give it an appellation so +incongruous to the general idea of taste, as that of conscience. + +Yet, however absurd it may appear, I will venture to say, that, if +my readers will give themselves the trouble to analyse the grateful +sensation or sentiment, we call _taste_ i.e. their sentiment of what +is truly good, beautiful, right, just, ornamental, honourable, &c. +&c. they will find it to originate from, and end in, some moral or +religious principle. Indeed, some objects (the highest in the scale of +our perceptions of excellence) bring with them an immediate conviction +of the truth of this assertion; witness the devotional sentiment which +the view of the main ocean inspires; the rising and setting sun; the +contemplation of the celestial orbs, &c. witness the noblest object +of the creation, when viewed in his highest character. Does not the +perception of human excellence immediately relate to the source of all +excellence? + +The general diffusion of intellectual light, throughout mankind, +constitutes rationality; and the aggregated excellence, or light of +rationality, constitutes morality. It is, I imagine, in this second +or purified light, that taste begins to exist. It is at this period of +cultivation that the mind begins to perceive its true good; that the +natural affections rectify, methodize, and refine, in a word, become +moral affections, through whose medium, i.e. the _moral sense_, the +soul perceives every object of taste. + +Taste is intellectual pleasure, an approving sense of truth, of good, +and of beauty. The latter seems the visible or ostensible principle +of the two former, and is that in which the universal idea of taste is +comprised. All are pleased with the sight of beauty; but all are by +no means sensible that the principles that make it pleasing, that +constitute a form beautiful, are those, or, to be more intelligible, +relate to those, that constitute man's highest excellence, his first +interest, his chief good. Few, indeed, even among those who possess +taste, if they have not accustomed themselves to investigate its +principles, will readily conceive that they are thus deeply rooted +in the mental frame. Indeed, the generality of mankind seem rather to +think that taste has no principles at all, or, if any, that they begin +and end with the prevailing mode, fashion, &c. of the times; a notion +which, though in the highest degree absurd, corroborates my opinion, +that the universal perception of taste (the true and the false) exists +in the idea of honour. + +The compound word, or phrase, _le vrai idéal_, universally adopted to +denote an object of taste, is the most exact and literal definition of +its sentiment that can be conceived; for it implies the union of +the judgement and the imagination, without which there could be no +sentiment of taste. The judgement, as I observed, perceives the truth +of the object, the imagination its beauty; they may be said to relate +to each other, in the perception of an object of taste, as a luminous +polish does to the substance from whence it proceeds: the substance +can exist without its polish, but the polish cannot exist without its +substance. The perception of taste seems to me, if I may so express +myself, to be illusive, but not erroneous; in a word, to exist in our +idea of true honour, i.e. in the polish, lustre, or ornament, of true +virtue. + +As the universal idea or sentiment of taste is honour, so the +universal object of its perception is ornament, from the object, whose +excellence we contemplate as an ornament or honour to human nature, to +every object which in the slightest degree indicates the influence +of that excellence. Take away the idea of that influence in the moral +sphere, and taste is annihilated; and, in the natural sphere, take +away the idea of divine influence, and taste cannot exist. Every +sentiment of taste, as I observed before, ultimately relates to the +one or to the other of these principles; indeed, strictly speaking, as +the moral relates to the divine, it may be said ultimately to do the +same. + +In the progress of civilization, the polishing principle, which I call +taste, is chiefly found in the highest sphere of life, highest both +for internal and external advantages, wealth accelerates the last +degree of cultivation, by giving efficacy to the principles of true +honour; but it also accelerates its corruption, by giving efficacy +to the principles of false honour, by which the true loses its +distinction, becomes less and less apparent, nay, by degrees, less and +less real. Wealth becoming the object of honour, every principle of +true taste must be reversed. Hence the _dire polish_ of the obdurate +heart, repelling the force of nature. Hence avarice and profusion, +dissipation, luxurious banqueting, &c. supersede the love of oeconomy, +domestic comfort, the sweet reciprocation of the natural affections, +&c. &c. Hence the greatest evils of society: the sorrows of the +virtuous poor, _the spurns that patient merit of the unworthy takes_, +in a word, the general corruption of morals, and, of course, of true +taste! + +The vulgar, who are strangers to the internal principles of honour, +always annex their ideas of taste to the external appearances of the +highest rank of life, which being easily acquired, particularly that +of dress, the prevalency of modes and fashions, however absurd, +is universally adopted. Those of false taste adopt them to attract +notice; those of true taste, to avoid it. But, at this present, the +difficulty of avoiding singularity in dress is, I imagine, much to be +lamented by women of taste and virtue, the prevailing mode of feminine +attire being diametrically opposite to every principle of feminine +excellence; a melancholy proof of our being arrived at the last stage +of depravity! + +I could expatiate largely on this subject, but it would be +inconsistent with my plan, which the reader may perceive, throughout +the whole work, to be a mere outline only. + +The three grand co-existing principles of taste, virtue, honour, and +ornament, run through all its perceptions. Their triple union cannot +be broken; but taste is nominally distinguished by the one or the +other, according as its objects, situations, circumstances, &c. vary. +Ornament and honour seem the public character of taste; virtue to be +the private and domestic, where, though unperceived by the vulgar, +to the eye of taste[A] she appears in her highest ornament, highest +honour. + +[Footnote A: Truth can only judge itself. BACON.] + +Taste seems to comprize three orders or degrees in its universal +comprehension. + +The first is composed of those objects which immediately relate to the +divinity, among which man claims the preeminence, when viewed in his +highest character: witness the inexpressible charm which the natural +virtuous affections of the soul inspire, when moved by some strong +impulse, such as parental tenderness, filial piety, friendship, &c. +&c. &c. Do they not unite the moral sentiment to the dïvine? + +The second is in the immediate external effects of true taste, or +moral virtue, in the social sphere; the order, beauty, and honour, +which every object derives from its influence; and, of course, its +sentiment must be intimately related to moral excellence. + +The third and last degree is general ornament and honour, appearing +in fashions, arts of decoration, &c. &c. objects which seeming not +immediately to affect the interests of humanity, the taste they +exhibit in this sphere appears as an uncertain light, sometimes bright +and sometimes obscured; or rather as refracted rays of taste, broken +by the general love of novelty and superfluity; two principles which, +though they are, to a certain degree, essential to exterior ornament, +and the sentiment of true taste, are those in which taste always +begins to corrupt. To illustrate my meaning: true ornament seems +equally to partake of the idea of utility and superfluity, and every +sentiment of taste seems equally to partake of the idea of novelty and +of custom; for, were the object perfectly familiar to us, we should +feel no degree of admiration, without which we could feel no sentiment +of taste; and, were it totally new, unlike any thing we had ever seen, +it would excite wonder instead of admiration, which is a sentiment as +distant from taste as the love of fame is from the love of honour. + +This sphere, the last in my scale of the perceptions of taste, and +which borders upon every thing that is contrary to its laws, is +properly the sphere of Fancy, who seems an undisciplined offspring of +Taste; sometimes sporting within the bounds of parental authority, and +sometimes beyond them. Fancy seems to bear the same affinity to Taste +as Pleasure does to Happiness. + +Every object of taste is relative to some principle of excellence +from which it derives its power of pleasing; of course, the highest +sentiment of taste must exist in the relative principle to our highest +object of excellence. + +True ornament is, to the eye, what eloquence is to the ear: their +principles throughout are one, the truth or beauty of which exists in +its exact relation or adaptation to the object it adorns, constituting +the _just_, the _true_, the _beautiful_, objects, or qualities, +which, in the conscious eye of taste, _relate_ to moral beauty. The +perception of the first relation, i.e. the adaptation of any thing +ornamental to the object it adorns, may, in a great measure, be +learned by habit and general observation; but the higher relation, +the second concoction (as one may say) of its principles, the moral +relation, is the immediate operation of taste. + +Ornament and harmonious sound are pleasing to the corporeal sense, +but, when wanting a relative object, please but for a short time; and, +if incongruously joined to an object, i.e. to one with which it can +have no relation, will, as soon as the understanding perceives the +incongruity, become a principle of disgust. + +As the virtues differ, in some degree, as the character of the sexes +differ,[A] of course so must the sentiment of taste differ. To the +man I would give the laws of taste; to the woman, its sensibility. The +taste of the former seems more derived from reason; that of the +latter from instinct: witness their impulsive maternal affection; that +inherent ornament of their sex, modesty; their tender susceptibility +of the benevolent virtues, pity, compassion, &c. &c. + +[Footnote A: Vide page 23.] + +Taste, however, is as far removed from mere instinct as from mere +reason. I only mean to say, that the taste of the masculine character +is rather on the side of reason, or the understanding; that of the +feminine on the side of instinct, and, let me add, imagination. The +taste of the one and of the other seems to differ as justice does from +mercy, as modesty from virtue, as grace from sublimity, &c. &c. And, +as exterior feminine grace is the most perfect visible object of +taste, the highest degree of feminine excellence, externally and +internally united, must of course constitute woman, the most perfect +existing object of taste in the creation. + +The cultivation of the social moral affections is the cultivation +of taste, and the domestic sphere is the true and almost only one +in which it can appear in its highest dignity. It is peculiarly +appropriated to feminine taste, and I may say it is _absolutely_ +the only one in which it can appear in its true lustre. True taste, +particularly the feminine, is retired, calm, modest; it is the private +honour of the heart, and is, I imagine, incompatible with the love of +fame. + +In the present state of society, taste seems to be equally excluded +from the highest and from the lowest sphere of life. The one seems +to be too much encumbered with artificial imaginary necessities; the +other too much encumbered with the real and natural necessities of +life, to attend to its cultivation. It is in the former that taste is +universally thought to reside, which is because the idea of taste +is inseparable from that of honour. It is that, indeed, in which the +general taste of the nation is exhibited. It is its _face_, as I may +say, which expresses the internal character of the heart. + +In this sphere, namely, the most exalted station of mankind, what true +taste it does exhibit is placed in the strongest point of view; its +contrary principles are also the same, particularly so to those who +have been rightly educated at a distance from it; to such, the wrong +will instruct as much as the right; but sure I am, that it is not, +at this _period_, the proper sphere for the infant mind to expand and +improve in. The wrong will be too familiar to the mind to disgust; +and the right, which I imagine is chiefly confined to the _records_ +of taste in the fine arts, will be too remote (wanting the preparatory +love of nature and virtue) to please. + +It is not, I imagine, from objects of excellence in the arts, that +the mind receives the first impressions of taste, though from them +the impressions, we have already received, may be strengthened and +improved. The truths they exhibit awaken the recollection of what +has pleased us in nature; and we exult in the confirmation of our +judgement and taste on finding those objects represented, by genius, +in their best and fairest light. Of course, the excellence we perceive +in the fine arts, which is always relative to moral excellence, must +tend to the improvement of taste.[A] + +[Footnote A: L'esprit de l'homme est naturellement plein d'un nombre +infini d'idées confuses du vrai, que souvent il n'entrevoit qu'à demi; +et rien ne lui est plus agréable, que lorsqu'on lui offre quelqu'une +de ces idées bien éclaircie et mise dans un beau jour. BOILEAU, +Préface.] + +But, though the arts are thus beneficial to the growing principles +of taste, reflecting a few individuals, it is well known that their +establishment in every nation has had a contrary effect on the +community in general; for, in proportion to the encouragement given +them, as that encouragement immediately promotes two of the most +pernicious principles that can affect the human heart, the most +destructive of moral virtue, namely, the love of fame and the love of +riches, the general diffusion of corruption must ensue, and of course +the extinction of the natural principles of taste, or relish of the +human soul of what is truly beautiful, truly honourable, truly good. + +To conclude. I will not presume to say, that a man without taste is +without virtue; but I think I may venture to say, that it is only +as he can have virtue without loving virtue, that he can have virtue +without having taste; the definition of taste being, according to my +apprehension of its perception, the _love_ of virtue. And, as that +love springs from, and tends to, the source of all virtue, all good, +may I not add, that it is but as a man can be religious without +devotion, that a man can be religious without taste? the sentiment +of devotion seeming to be, an aggregation of our most virtuous, most +refined, conscious, energies of soul, in the awful vertical point of +sublimity. + + 'From thee, great God, we spring, to thee we tend, + Path, motive, guide, original, and end!' + + JOHNSON. + + + + +THE END. + + + + +William Andrews Clark Memorial Library: University of California +THE AUGUSTAN REPRINT SOCIETY + +_General Editors_ + +H. RICHARD ARCHER, _Clark Memorial Library_ +R.C. BOYS, _University of Michigan_ +E.N. HOOKER, _University of California, Los Angeles_ +JOHN LOFTIS, _University of California, Los Angeles_ + +The society exists to make available inexpensive reprints (usually +facsimile reproductions) of rare seventeenth and eighteenth century +works. + +The editorial policy of the Society continues unchanged. As in the past, +the editors welcome suggestions concerning publications. + +All correspondence concerning subscriptions in the United States and +Canada should be addressed to the William Andrews Clark Memorial +Library, 2205 West Adams Blvd., Los Angeles 18, California. +Correspondence concerning editoral matters may be addressed to any of +the general editors. Membership fee continues $2.50 per year. British +and European subscribers should address B.H. Blackwell, Broad Street, +Oxford, England. + + +Publications for the fifth year [1950-1951] + +(_At least six items, most of them from the following list, will be +reprinted.) + +FRANCES REYNOLDS (?): _An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, +and of the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty, &c._ (1785). Introduction by +James L. Clifford. + +THOMAS BAKER: _The Fine Lady's Airs_ (1709). Introduction by John +Harrington Smith. + +DANIEL DEFOE: _Vindication of the Press_ (1718). Introduction by Ortho +Clinton Williams. + +JOHN EVELYN: _An Apologie for the Royal Party_ (1659); _A Panegyric to +Charles the Second_ (1661). Introduction by Geoffery Keynes. + +CHARLES MACKLIN: _Man of the World_ (1781). Introduction by Dougald +MacMillan. + +_Prefaces to Fiction_. Selected and with an Introduction by Benjamin +Boyce. + +THOMAS SPRAT: _Poems_. + +SIR WILLIAM PETTY: _The Advice of W.P. to Mr. Samuel Hartlib for the +Advancement of some particular Parts of Learning_ (1648). + +THOMAS GRAY: _An Elegy Wrote in a Country Church Yard_ (1751). +(Facsimile of first edition and of portions of Gray's manuscripts of +the poem). + + * * * * * + + To the Augustan Reprint Society _Subscriber's Name and Address:_ + _William Andrews Clark Memorial Library + 2205 West Adams Boulevard + Los Angeles 18, California_ + + _As_ MEMBERSHIP FEE _I enclose for the years marked:_ + The current year $ 2.50 + The current & the 4th year 5.00 + The current, 3rd, & 4th year 7.50 + The current, 2nd, 3rd, & 4th year 10.00 + The current, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, & 4th year 11.50 + (_Publications no. 3 & 4 are out of print_) + +Make check or money order payable to THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY +OF CALIFORNIA. + +NOTE: _All income of the Society is devoted to defraying cost of +printing and mailing_. + +_William Andrews Clark Memorial Library_ + + +PUBLICATIONS OF THE AUGUSTAN REPRINT SOCIETY + + +First Year (1946-1947) + +1. Richard Blackmore's _Essay upon Wit_ (1716), and Addison's +_Freeholder_ No. 45 (1716). + +2. Samuel Cobb's _Of Poetry_ and _Discourse on Criticism_ (1707). + +3. _Letter to A.H. Esq.; concerning the Stage_ (1698), and Richard +Willis' _Occasional Paper No. IX_ (1698). (OUT OF PRINT) + +4. _Essay on Wit_ (1748), together with Characters by Flecknoe, and +Joseph Warton's _Adventurer_ Nos. 127 and 133. (OUT OF PRINT) + +5. Samuel Wesley's _Epistle to a Friend Concerning Poetry_ (1700) and +_Essay on Heroic Poetry_ (1693). + +6. _Representation of the Impiety and Immorality of the Stage_(1704) +and _Some Thoughts Concerning the Stage_ (1704). + + +Second Year (1947-1948) + +7. John Gay's _The Present State of Wit_ (1711); and a section on Wit +from _The English Theophrastus_ (1702). + +8. Rapin's _De Carmine Pastorali_, translated by Creech (1684). + +9. T. Hanmer's (?) _Some Remarks on the Tragedy of Hamlet_ (1736). + +10. Corbyn Morris _Essay towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit, +etc_. (1744). + +11. Thomas Purney's _Discourse on the Pastoral_ (1717). + +12. Essays on the Stage, selected, with an Introduction by Joseph Wood +Krutch. + + +Third Year (1948-1949) + +13. Sir John Falstaff (pseud.), _The Theatre_ (1720). + +14. Edward Moore's _The Gamester_ (1753). + +15. John Oldmixon's _Reflections on Dr. Swift's Letter to Harley_ +(1712); and Arthur Mainwaring's _The British Academy_ (1712). + +16. Nevil Payne's _Fatal Jealousy_ (1673). + +17. Nicholas Rowe's _Some Account of the Life of Mr. William +Shakespear_ (1709). + +18. Aaron Hill's Preface to _The Creation_; and Thomas Brereton's +Preface to _Esther_. + + +Fourth Year (1949-1950) + +19. Susanna Centlivre's _The Busie Body_ (1709). + +20. Lewis Theobald's _Preface to The Works of Shakespeare_ (1734). + +21. _Critical Remarks on Sir Charles Gradison, Clarissa, and Pamela_ +(1754). + +22. Samuel Johnson's _The Vanity of Human Wishes_ (1749) and Two +_Rambler_ papers (1750). + +23. John Dryden's _His Majesties Declaration Defended_ (1681). + +24. Pierre Nicole's _An Essay on True and Apparent Beauty in Which +from Settled Principles is Rendered the Grounds for Choosing and +Rejecting Epigrams_, translated by J.V. Cunningham. + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13485 *** |