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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
+Taste, and of the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty, etc., by Frances
+Reynolds, et al
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, and of the Origin of
+our Ideas of Beauty, etc.
+
+Author: Frances Reynolds
+
+Release Date: September 17, 2004  [eBook #13485]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE
+PRINCIPLES OF TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY, ETC.***
+
+
+E-text prepared by S. R. Ellison, David Starner, and the Project Gutenberg
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team
+
+
+
+
+
+AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF
+OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY, ETC.
+
+by
+
+Frances Reynolds
+
+1785
+
+With an Introduction by James L. Clifford
+
+
+
+The Augustan Reprint Society
+
+
+Frances Reynolds 
+
+_An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, 
+and of the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty, etc._
+(1785)
+
+With an Introduction by James L. Clifford
+
+Publication 27
+
+Los Angeles
+William Andrews Clark Memorial Library
+University of California
+1951
+
+
+_GENERAL EDITORS_
+
+H. RICHARD ARCHER, _Clark Memorial Library_
+RICHARD C. BOYS, _University of Michigan_
+EDWARD NILES HOOKER, _University of California, Los Angeles_
+JOHN LOFTIS, _University of California, Los Angeles_
+
+_ASSISTANT EDITORS_
+
+W. EARL BRITTON, _University of Michigan_
+
+_ADVISORY EDITORS_
+
+EMMETT L. AVERY, _State College of Washington_
+BENJAMIN BOYCE, _Duke University_
+LOUIS I. BREDVOLD, _University of Michigan_
+CLEANTH BROOKS, _Yale University_
+JAMES L. CLIFFORD, _Columbia University_
+ARTHUR FRIEDMAN, _University of Chicago_
+SAMUEL H. MONK, _University of Minnesota_
+ERNEST MOSSNER, _University of Texas_
+JAMES SUTHERLAND, _Queen Mary College, London_
+H.T. SWEDENBERG, JR., _University of California, Los Angeles_
+
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+Since the early nineteenth century it has been known that Frances
+Reynolds, the sister of Sir Joshua, was the author of an essay on
+taste, which she had printed but did not publish. Yet persistent
+search failed to turn up a single copy. It remained one of those lost
+pieces which every research scholar hoped someday to discover.
+
+In 1935 it appeared that the search was over. Among some manuscripts
+of Mrs. Thrale-Piozzi, long hidden in Wales, was found a printed copy
+of an anonymous _Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, and of
+the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty_, which seemed to be the lost essay.
+The date was correct; the _Enquiry_ was dedicated to Mrs. Montagu; it
+contained a quotation from Dr. Johnson; and, best of all, there was
+attached to the pamphlet a copy (in an unidentified handwriting) of
+Johnson's well-known letter to Miss Reynolds concerning her essay.
+
+Only one thing stood squarely in the way of the identification. James
+Northcote in his _Life of Sir Joshua Reynolds_, published in 1818 (II,
+116-19), after describing Johnson's connection with the manuscript,
+gives two pages of short excerpts. Most of the quotations are general
+statements such as "Dress is the strong indication of the moral
+character" or "The fine arts comprehend all that is excellent in the
+moral system, and, at the same time, open every path that tends to the
+corruption of moral excellence." Unfortunately none of these excerpts
+appears directly in the _Enquiry_. Although some of the ideas are
+similar, the wording and specific details are different. By no stretch
+of the imagination could they be considered to come from the same
+piece. Thus Northcote blocked the solution of the mystery for nearly
+fifteen years.
+
+Recently, however, evidence has turned up which makes the attribution
+a certainty. It is now obvious that Northcote must have been mistaken
+in the source of his quotations. Writing as he did many years after
+the events he was describing, Northcote either had found a copy of
+the first draft of Miss Reynolds' essay, or erroneously quoted from
+another anonymous piece which he assumed was by Miss Reynolds. In any
+event he was not quoting from the final version which she wished the
+world to see.
+
+The story of Miss Reynolds' attempts to publish her essay can at
+last be pieced together from various bits of evidence, some hitherto
+unpublished. Just when the essay was written is uncertain. All that
+we know is that a preliminary version was submitted to the rigorous
+criticism of Dr. Johnson in 1781. Johnson, who had corrected some of
+her verses in red ink the year before, commented on 21 July 1781:
+
+    There is in these such force of comprehension, and such nicety
+    of observation as Locke or Pascal might be proud of. This I
+    say with intention to have you think that I speak my opinion.
+
+    They cannot however be printed in their present state. Many
+    of your notions seem not very clear in your own mind, many are
+    not sufficiently developed and expanded for the common reader;
+    the expression almost every where wants to be made clearer and
+    smoother. You may by revisal and improvement make it a very
+    elegant and curious work.[1]
+
+But Miss Reynolds was not easily discouraged, and Johnson wrote again
+on 8 April 1782:
+
+    Your work is full of very penetrating meditation, and very
+    forcible sentiment. I read it with a full perception of the
+    sublime, with wonder and terrour, but I cannot think of any
+    profit from it; it seems not born to be popular.
+
+    Your system of the mental fabric is exceedingly obscure, and
+    without more attention than will be willingly bestowed,
+    is unintelligible. The Ideas of Beauty will be more easily
+    understood, and are often charming. I was delighted with the
+    different beauty of different ages.
+
+    I would make it produce something if I could but I have indeed
+    no hope. If a Bookseller would buy it at all, as it must be
+    published without a name, he would give nothing for it worth
+    your acceptance.[2]
+
+In passing it might be pointed out that this letter has previously not
+been associated with Miss Reynolds' essay on taste, largely because
+the available text of the letter has been so faulty. Where Johnson
+wrote "The Ideas of Beauty," obviously referring to the second section
+of the _Enquiry_, Croker, followed by G.B. Hill, printed "The plans
+of Burnaby." To this Hill added a note; "Burnaby, I conjecture, was a
+character in the book," with the result that scholars have fruitlessly
+been searching ever since for the fictitious Mr. Burnaby, One more
+example of the dangers of using nineteenth-century transcripts!
+
+Evidently Johnson's stringent objections temporarily halted her plans,
+for we hear nothing more about the essay for two years. Meanwhile, as
+appears from a later letter, she showed it to Bennett Langton, hoping
+in vain for his help. Nevertheless, she was determined to go ahead and
+print the work, even at her own expense. Johnson, still counted upon
+for aid, wrote to her on 12 April 1784:
+
+    I am not yet able to wait on you, but I can do your business
+    commodiously enough. You must send me the copy to show the
+    printer. If you will come to tea this afternoon we will talk
+    together about it.[3]
+
+On 30 April he commented further: "Mr. Allen has looked over the
+papers and thinks one hundred copies will come to five pounds."
+Something, however, made her suspicious of his advice, and on 28 May
+there came an end to Johnson's connection with the matter. He wrote:
+"I have returned your papers, and am glad that you laid aside the
+thought of printing them."
+
+But Miss Reynolds had no intention of permanently giving up her
+project. Instead she rewrote parts of the essay which had displeased
+her critics, and shortly after Johnson's death proceeded to have 250
+copies privately printed, with a dedication to Mrs. Montagu. With
+Johnson gone, "The Queen of the Bluestockings" must have appeared the
+next best patron. That Mrs. Montagu, while no doubt flattered by the
+dedication, was herself not overly enthusiastic about the essay may
+be gathered from a letter written to her by Miss Reynolds on 12 July
+1785. Miss Reynolds began by insisting that "the slightest hint" of
+disapprobation on the part of Mrs. Montagu would "consign the work to
+oblivion"; then continued:
+
+    I never did entertain any desire to publish it, tho I might
+    to sell it. And my desire of printing it, originated from a
+    motive which tho' vain I allow, is an natural vanity I wishd
+    to leave behind me a respectable memorial of my existence,
+    which I then flatterd myself this would be. Ten impressions or
+    twenty at the most, were all I wishd to have taken off. Why I
+    had so many as 250 was because Dr. Johnson advised me to print
+    that number, and to sell them, to stand the sale of them was
+    his expression, but I must do Dr. Johnson the justice to say,
+    that, that advice was given me with a proviso that no person
+    was in the secret but himself, for on my informing him to
+    the contrary, he declined or seemd to decline the affair of
+    getting them printed for me, which I perceiving sent to him
+    for the manuscript, foolishly entertaining a slight suspicion
+    which I much reproach myself for, that some other motives
+    besides the want of merit in the work had influenced this
+    change of behaviour. Unluckily from the beginning I made too
+    great allowance in its favour, from an opinion I had con
+    too of Dr. Johnsons being strongly prejudiced against womens
+    literary productions. But I deceived myself. He was sincere,
+    he judged justly of the work, and his opinion exactly
+    corresponded with yours![4]
+
+Not that she regretted the cost of printing the 250 copies. That was a
+minor consideration. She concluded:
+
+    If I ever should shew it to any person it will be to Mr.
+    Langton, from a motive of wishing him to see the alteration I
+    have made in it for the better, since he saw it, and as it is
+    also since Dr. Johnson saw it, and particularly that part
+    he most objected to, my belief that I had obviated that
+    objection, is another apology for my printing it.
+
+To this Mrs. Montagu returned a wordy and diffuse reply, commenting
+that "having for many years past left off all metaphysical studies,"
+she was "not a competent judge of any work on subjects of that
+nature," yet insisting that she doubted if contemporary readers would
+like it. It was obvious that Mrs. Montagu refused to be a party to
+further dissemination of the printed copies. And there the matter
+rested for almost three more years.
+
+The wish to have some of the copies read by the general public proved
+too strong, and on 15 April 1788 Miss Reynolds wrote again to Mrs.
+Montagu, asking her aid in recovering a letter, or transcription of a
+letter, of Johnson's:
+
+    It is of great importance to me the recovery of this letter
+    particularly so as I perceive I must not presume to hope for
+    the only patronage that could countervail the loss of Dr.
+    Johnsons, should I ever be induced to publish the work. I
+    do not mean that I would publish the letter, but that the
+    testimony it conveys of Dr. Johnsons approbation, would be
+    highly advantageous to me in the disposal of the copy to
+    a Bookseller, indeed _approbation_ is an improper Word,
+    inadequate to the
+    praises he bestows on the work, I durst not repeat his
+    expressions tho I well remember them. Some friendly strictures
+    also the letter contained, all these I remember I transcribed
+    verbatim in a letter I sent to you in the beginning of the
+    year 82. they begin
+
+    Many of your notions seem not to be very clear in your own
+    imagination....[5]
+
+It was not until the next year that with the help of James Northcote
+she finally made active preparations to have the work published. As
+Miss Reynolds wrote to Mrs. Montagu on 5 February,
+
+    I forgot to say that Mr. Nurse recommended Mr. Northcote to a
+    Mr. Bladen in Paternoster Row for a Publisher, but I sent
+    in the utmost haste to him to prevent his taking any steps
+    towards so disgraceful a place as I imagine that to be so
+    incongruous.[6]
+
+In preparation for the new printing, Miss Reynolds had further revised
+her essay, and in order to enhance the value of the piece for general
+readers she decided to add three letters from Johnson of which she
+chanced to have copies. Totally unconnected with the essay, one was
+to Sir Joseph Banks concerning the motto for his goat's collar; the
+others concerned the unfortunate Dr. Dodd. But before going ahead she
+again asked the advice of her patroness. Mrs. Montagu replied:
+
+    I do not see that there is any objection to publishing the 3
+    letters, but I own I think Dr Johnson judges too lightly of
+    the crime of forgery ... I believe the tenderness of sentiment
+    Dr Johnson expresses for Dr Dodd in his afflictions will do
+    him honour in the eyes of the Publick, & therefore as his
+    friend you may with propriety publish the letters.[7]
+
+Mrs. Montagu concluded, "I wish some name that would do more honour to
+your work was to appear in the dedication, but to be presented to
+the publick with such a mark of Mrs Reynolds' friendly regard, will
+certainly be esteemed an honour...."
+
+Sometime between February and July 1789 the _Enquiry_ was reprinted,
+this time by J. Smeeton (copies of this version may be found in the
+Bodleian Library and the Library of Congress). The terminal date for
+the reprinting is established by the fact that the three letters
+of Johnson which were appended to the essay were reprinted without
+comment in the July issue of the _European Magazine_.
+
+Just where Miss Reynolds secured copies of the Johnson letters is
+not certain. It is suggestive, however, that the letter to Banks had
+originally been sent under cover to Sir Joshua Reynolds and that Sir
+Joshua's copy is now among the Boswell papers at Yale University.
+There would have been ample opportunity for Frances Reynolds also to
+have secured a copy. And the letter to Charles Jenkinson of 20 June
+1777 and to Dr. Dodd of 26 June were of the sort that an enterprising
+lady might well have wheedled copies from the Doctor. The important
+point is that the inclusion of the letters in the 1789 printing of the
+_Enquiry_ provides incontrovertible proof of Miss Reynolds' connection
+with the piece.
+
+For this second printing the entire pamphlet was reset, with
+numerous minor changes of wording and punctuation, but with no major
+alterations in meaning. In general the textual improvements are such
+as a bluestocking lady might well wish to make. It will be noted that
+on pages 25 and 49 of the copy here reproduced someone has made minor
+changes in wording in ink. These corrections are made in the later
+printing. Moreover, at the end of the 1789 version there is an errata
+list, indicating three alterations from the 1785 text which were
+mistakes. The Dedication remained unchanged, but the geometrical
+illustration was now placed facing the beginning of Chapter I.
+
+The _Enquiry_ was written in what is now recognized as one of the most
+exciting periods in the history of aesthetics, the late eighteenth
+century being a crucial point in the gradual shift from absolute
+classical standards to the relative approaches of the next age. Most
+of the important thinkers of the day--Hume, Burke, Lord Kames, Adam
+Smith, among others--were thinking deeply about the problem of taste.
+And if Miss Reynolds' essay is not one of the most perceptive of the
+discussions, it is at least one of the liveliest.
+
+In brief, the _Enquiry_ is what one might expect from an intelligent
+amateur, from one not a professional writer, yet one who has given
+much thought to the problems of aesthetics. Of course, many of the
+ideas are derivative, with echoes of the "moral sense" of Hutcheson,
+the "line of grace" of Hogarth, and the terrible sublime of Burke. The
+three divisions of the essay--the development of a mental system, the
+origin of our ideas of Beauty, and the analysis of taste--follow the
+customary pattern of eighteenth-century discussions. Yet the piece
+is no slavish refurbishing of old phrases. It is packed with fresh
+arguments and novel suggestions. If these are not always completely
+coherent or logical, they do represent original thinking.
+
+Twentieth-century readers may be astonished by some of the ideas:
+witness the claim that Negroes could never arrive at true taste,
+because their eyes were so accustomed to objects diametrically
+opposite to taste. As a further example of Miss Reynolds' occasionally
+muddled thinking there is the development of her initial assumption.
+While the groundwork of man is perfection, this perfection has been
+blemished and man is impelled to recapture it in the sublime. Yet
+instead of analyzing this impulse, Miss Reynolds appears to take it
+for granted. Nor does she consider how perfection is to be achieved
+in taste, preferring to conclude with a diatribe in the manner of
+Rousseau on the depravity of the times and the corrupting effect of
+the arts. (For this and many of the following comments I am indebted
+to Mr. Ralph Cohen of the College of the City of New York.)
+
+The cause of some of the ambiguities in her discussion may perhaps be
+traced to a rather careless use of terms. At one time "instinct"
+or "impulsion," the moral force driving man toward perfection, is a
+potentiality developed by cultivation, and at another a force that
+is created by cultivation. Although the sublime is the apex of her
+mathematically-definite program and is a moral quality attained by
+the few, every human being has his point of sublimity in the idea of
+a Supreme Being. On the one hand, beauty is a preconceived idea in
+the human species; on the other it is not preconceived, but developed.
+Finally, the rules of art are perceptions of moral virtue, yet art
+which exhibits these rules can corrupt.
+
+It is easy to pick flaws in Miss Reynolds' thinking, for the lack of
+sustained logic which Johnson early recognized is apparent at every
+turn. Yet for students of the history of ideas the _Enquiry_ contains
+much of interest. As a painter, Miss Reynolds throughout stresses the
+visual, a concentration which leads her to several valuable insights.
+She divides form into two categories, masculine and feminine, but
+makes a novel use of these Ciceronian divisions. All non-human
+objects--flowers, animals, etc.--are seen as exhibiting male or female
+attributes. It might almost be said that with this anthropomorphic
+approach she is attempting to develop a "philosophical" basis for the
+pathetic fallacy. Furthermore, if the human is used to measure beauty
+in the non-human, the implication is that man, not God, is the measure
+of beauty. By setting up man as the mediator between the material and
+the divine, she points to the concentration in the next century on
+human values.
+
+When discussing the _Enquiry_ in his book on the _Sublime_, Samuel
+Monk pointed out certain other tendencies which fore-shadow the
+coming Romantic revolt. This shift may also be noted in Miss Reynolds'
+extension of countenance, the reflection of internal virtue, to mean
+"form," and the extension of internal virtue to mean "disposition,"
+"object," or content. In developing this form-content division, she
+stumbles on a key criticism of associationism: "From association of
+ideas, any object may be pleasing, though absolutely devoid of beauty,
+and displeasing with it. The form is _then_ out of the question; it is
+some _real_ good or evil, with which the object, but not its form, is
+associated." This notion that associationism leads away from the
+work of art as such is a perceptive comment. Her notion that form and
+disposition (or content) must correspond in order to give aesthetic
+pleasure suggests, though the terms are different, certain of
+Coleridge's basic ideas.
+
+One other point might be stressed: Miss Reynolds takes an extreme
+moralistic position toward the arts. Again and again it is insisted
+that taste and beauty are moral attributes, not purely aesthetic
+concepts. Chapter II ends with the ringing statement: "Of this I
+am certain, that true refinement is the effect of true virtue; that
+virtue is truth, and good; and that beauty dwells in them, and they
+in her." And the next chapter begins: "Taste seems to be an inherent
+impulsive tendency of the soul towards true good." On the other
+hand, she sees that the arts are not to be encouraged because such
+encouragement is apt to lead to the destruction of moral virtue--the
+desire for fame and wealth. The value of art as education is dismissed
+as of importance only to the few; the dangers of encouragement will
+imperil the many. "Though the arts are thus beneficial to the growing
+principles of taste, respecting a few individuals, it is well known
+that their establishment in every nation has had a contrary effect on
+the community in general...."
+
+To conclude: despite its many deficiencies Frances Reynolds' _Enquiry_
+is worth reading. It serves admirably to mirror the conflicting
+eighteenth-century theories out of which our own aesthetic concepts
+have been formed.
+
+  James L. Clifford
+  Columbia University
+
+
+
+
+Notes to the Introduction
+
+
+1. _Letters_, II, 223-24; corrected from original letter in possession
+of Professor F.W. Hilles of Yale University, who has given invaluable
+aid in the present investigation.
+
+2. _Letters_, II, 249-50, corrected from the original by Dr. R.W.
+Chapman.
+
+3. Copy in possession of Mrs. Doreen Ashworth, Windlesham, Surrey.
+
+4. Original in Huntington Library.
+
+5. Original in possession of Mrs. Ashworth.
+
+6. Rough draft in possession of Mrs. Ashworth.
+
+7. Original in possession of Professor F.W. Hilles.
+
+
+
+
+AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES of TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF
+OUR IDEAS of BEAUTY, &c.
+
+
+
+    Sunt certi denique fines,
+  Quos ultra citraquč nequit consistere rectum.
+    HOR.
+
+
+
+To Mrs. MONTAGU.
+
+
+MADAM,
+
+Were I not prompted by gratitude, admiration, and affection, to
+dedicate to you the best produce of my abilities, which I imagine this
+to be, yet, as the subject, of which it particularly treats, is moral
+excellence, the universal voice of mankind, with whom your very name
+is synonymous with virtue itself, must plead my apology for taking
+this liberty. Besides, madam, it was natural for me, as an author, to
+with to avail myself of the advantage, which this address affords
+me, of prepossessing the minds of my readers with an example of that
+perfection to which all my arguments tend, as a preparative, or aid,
+to their better comprehending my meaning.
+
+The influence of virtue is every way beneficial! Your character,
+not only secures me from all imputation of flattery, but this public
+avowal of my admiration of its excellence conveys an honourable
+testimony of the consistency of my principles; having endeavoured to
+inculcate, that the love and esteem of true virtue is true honour. And
+I may add, that the sweet gratification I feel, in the indulging the
+strongest and best propension of my nature, in thus expatiating in its
+praise, is true pleasure, true happiness.
+
+I am, Madam,
+
+    Your obliged,
+
+      Most obedient,
+
+  And most humble, servant,
+
+  The AUTHOR.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+A SKETCH of the MENTAL SYSTEM respecting our Perceptions of Taste, &c.
+
+
+The mind of man, introspecting itself, seems, as it were, (in
+conjunction with the inscrutable principles of nature,) placed in the
+central point of the creation: from whence, impelled by her energetic
+powers and illumined by her light, the intellectual faculties, like
+rays, shoot forth in direct tendency to their ultimate point of
+perfection; and, as they advance, each individual mind imperceptibly
+imbibes the influence and light of each, and is by this imbibition
+alone enabled to approach it.
+
+But, though the light of nature and of reason direct the human mind
+to perfection, or true good, yet, being in its progress perpetually
+impeded by adventitious causes, casual occurrences, &c. &c. which
+induce false opinions of good and evil, its progressive powers
+generally stop at a middle point between mere uncultivated nature and
+perfection, a medium which constitutes what we call common sense, and
+which, in degree, seems as distant from the perfection of the mental
+faculties as common form is from the perfection of form, _beauty_.
+
+
+[Illustration:
+           SUBLIMITY.
+               |
+             GRACE
+               |
+        BEAUTY | TRUTH
+               |
+  COMMON SENSE | COMMON FORM
+               |
+            NATURE]
+
+
+On meditating on this subject, and marking the progressive stages
+or degrees of human excellence, the great leading general truths,
+or mental rests, as I may call them, _the common, the beautiful, the
+graceful, and the sublime_, I have been naturally led to form a kind
+of diagrammatic representation of their respective distances, &c. &c.
+which I present to my reader on the opposite page, requesting him to
+refer to it now and then as he goes on, in order to facilitate his
+comprehension of my meaning.
+
+And here it may be necessary to premise, that, however whimsical and
+absurd this delineation may appear to my reader, something analogous
+to the thought may be found in the works of many eminent philosophers,
+particularly in those of Bacon[A] and of Locke:[B] the latter
+suggesting that the whole system of morality might be reduced to
+mathematical demonstration; and the former, in his treatise on the
+Advancement of Learning, gives a description of the stages of science
+very much resembling my delineation of the stages of intellectual
+perfection, or taste.
+
+[Footnote A: Advancement of Learning, Book 2d.]
+
+[Footnote B: Essay on human Understanding, Chap. 3d, Book the 4th, and
+Chap. 12th, same Book, Sect. 8th.]
+
+It could have been no dishonour to me to have been led by such
+conductors! Yet, as the truth cannot dishonour me neither, I must
+aver, that my little system was projected, and brought to the exact
+state it now is in, without my having the least apprehension that any
+thing similar had been suggested before by any person whatever; nor
+have I, in consequence of the discovery I have lately made of the
+opinions of these respectable authors, added or omitted a single
+thought in my treatise. But to return from my digression.
+
+In the exact center of my circle of humanity, I have placed nature,
+or the springs of the intellectual powers, which tend, in a
+straight line, to its boundary; and, on its boundary, I have placed
+demonstrable beauty and truth, and the utmost power of rules; and,
+midway; I have placed common sense and common form, half deriving
+their existence from pure nature, and half from its highest
+cultivation, as far as art or rules can teach. A conjunction which
+would itself be the perfection of humanity, but that it is mixed with
+all that is not nature, and all that is not art, and thereby made
+mediocrity, i.e. _common sense_.
+
+The intellectual powers, arriving at the limit of my common circle,
+i.e. at the limit of the basis of my pyramidical system, where I
+have placed the fixed proportions of beauty and of truth, (if they
+progress,) mount up as a flame, with undulating[A] motion, refining
+as they advance, and terminate in the pinnacle, or ultimate point,
+_sublimity_; forming in the imagination the figure of a pyramid,
+or cone, from the limit of whose base, (on which, as I have before
+observed, I have placed demonstrable truth and beauty, the utmost
+power of rules, &c.) from that limit up to the ultimate point of
+sublimity, I call the region of intellectual pleasure, genius, or
+taste; and in its center I place grace, whose influence pervades,
+cheers, and nourishes, every part of it, an object which, in this
+ideal region, is similar in its situation and degree to that of common
+sense in the common or fundamental region. Grace seems to partake
+of the perception both of beauty and of sublimity, as common sense
+partakes of nature and of art. Grace is the characteristic object or
+general form of the ideal region, and its perception is the general
+limit of the powers of imagination or taste. Few, very few, attain to
+the point of sublimity; the _ne plus ultra_ of human conception! the
+alpha and omega. The sentiment of sublimity sinks into the source of
+nature, and that of the source of nature mounts to the sentiment of
+sublimity, each point seeming to each the cause and the effect; the
+origin and the end!
+
+[Footnote A: I use that expression, because it is the peculiar motion
+of grace as well as of a flame.]
+
+Having thus drawn the outline of my pyramidical mental system, I
+propose to expatiate a little on each point or stage throughout the
+great characteristic line of intellectual power.
+
+The first point The exact center, _nature_, or the origin of our
+intellectual faculties, admits of no investigation, its idea, as I
+have observed before, loses itself in the sentiment of sublimity,
+and we see nothing; and therefore I pass on to an object which is
+perceptible, _the common general character of humanity_, _exterior and
+inferior_. I have placed them on a line, because their ideas are so
+analogous, that they unite in one.
+
+
+Section 1. _Common Sense and common Form_.
+
+Perfection seems to be the ground-work both of common sense and
+of common form; and, what prevents each from being perfect, is the
+adventitious blemishes, the additions to, and the diminutions from,
+what is perfect, making the too little and the too large. But, these
+defects being distributed in, small portions throughout the general
+common form and common mind, they constitute an object, whether
+visible or intellectual, between perfection and imperfection, namely,
+that of mediocrity, neither exciting admiration nor disgust. And, as
+experience gives the general idea of the common and true appearance
+of the human form, as well to the rustic as to the most enlightened
+philosopher, so consequently does it enable him to see deformity, or
+what is an unusual appearance in that form.
+
+But, though unusual defects seem to be evident to every eye, it is
+only to the man of taste and nice discernment that the same degree of
+unusual beauties are equally perceptible; which corresponds with my
+opinion, that the ground-work of humanity is perfection, and that its
+blemishes only tinge its pure white, not discolour it so much, but,
+when held at a distance, i.e. in abstract idea, it is still a white,
+like a sheet of paper, or cloth of the most perfect white, regularly
+checkered over with a variety of figures of every colour, and placed
+at a distance, appearing to the eye a white, a mezzo common white;
+and, as any unusual figure, I mean unusually large and opaque, on this
+mezzo ground, would be more conspicuous than any of a greater degree
+of transparency or a more perfect white could be by an absence of any
+of the figures; so any degree of deformity is, more opposite to the
+general common form than beauty, and any degree of insanity is more
+opposite to common sense than intellectual excellence.
+
+And, (to continue my allusion,) as those tints, or blemishes, which
+obscure the ground, must be discharged to make a perfect white, so
+must the artist, in creating beauty, discharge the blemishes that
+tinge and obscure the human form, and which give it the character of
+mediocrity, till the perfect white, or total absence of defect, or
+beauty, result.
+
+Common sense seems to be diffusive truth, and common form diffusive
+beauty; and, as this diffusion is always existing with us, externally
+and internally, it is no wonder that we should more easily perceive
+what is in opposition to it, _evil_, than what is in unison with it,
+_good_.
+
+On a line with common form and common sense I place common ease of
+body and of mind: unfelt health, unfelt good, or that arising to the
+degree of _satisfaction_ and _content_; in fine, whatever we call
+_commonly_ good, and requisite for the well-being of humanity.
+
+
+Section 2. _Beauty and Truth_.
+
+I mean that beauty which is demonstrable truth, and that truth which
+is demonstrable beauty. _Exactitude. Completion. The just medium. The
+satisfactory rest of the mind. Perfection_. A point, indeed, in which
+the mind cannot rest! It must go forward or backward. If the latter,
+it relapses into the dominion of error; if the former, if assumes
+the charms of _design_, or _intention_. The artist, arrived at the
+ultimate limit of rules, or demonstrable truth, stands, as it were,
+between the visible and invisible world; between that of sense and
+intellect; the common and the uncommon; and his productions will be a
+conjunction of both. He looks back through all the variety of common
+nature, and reviews, through the medium of truth and beauty, the
+various objects it exhibits; and on its spotless ground, i.e. the
+abstract idea of nature without defects, can only exist in idea,
+he arranges those objects, objects, so as they may best produce the
+effects he aims at in his art. He does not attempt to obliterate
+any character in the common circle of nature; but, following her
+own oeconomy, he endeavours, by juxtaposition, &c. to make each
+subservient to each in creating delight, and giving beauty to the
+_whole_. But, to descend from the abstract general idea to the
+particular idea of beauty, or idea of a particular form:
+
+We discard every thing, that is not beauty, to compose beauty; but
+every thing that is not beauty is not therefore deformity. The wrong
+we see in each individual we do not call deformity: when it is so, it
+stands on the limit of the common circle, in opposition to beauty.
+
+From common form seem to originate beauty and deformity; and, as they
+recede from each other in opposite directions, they become less and
+less like their parent, _common form_, but never totally unlike; for
+it is their likeness to that form that constitutes the one beauty, and
+the other deformity; for, were there no resemblance in deformity
+to the common form, it would be a different species, and no longer
+disgust; and none in beauty, it would no longer please.
+
+There is no particular common form, but which, to create beauty, an
+artist, who studies the perfection of the human form, must improve in
+some, if not in every part; to effect which, considered as mere form
+only, rules will suffice, but, considered as grace, it must express a
+sentiment that no rules can give!
+
+That all feel the same sentiment of admiration for that which they
+think the most perfect, however the objects may differ, has induced
+some to believe that beauty is an arbitrary idea, and that it exists
+only in the imagination! But does it follow, that, because it is not
+possible for the savage or the man of taste to judge of any object
+but as experience enables him to judge, that therefore there is no
+preeminence in that form which is beauty to the one above that which
+is beauty to the other?
+
+Somewhere there must exist, whether perceived or not, the perfection,
+or highest point of excellence of the human form respecting
+proportion; and somewhere there must exist, or does at times exist,
+the highest excellence of its expression, i.e. the moral charm of the
+human countenance, _grace_.
+
+The artist, who has only seen the beauty of his own nation, will from
+that form his standard of perfection. But, when he comes to extend his
+enquiry, when he has viewed the beauty of other nations, particularly
+that form and that expression which the Grecian artists (who were
+probably on a line with the Grecian philosophers) modelled from their
+ideas of beauty! he will quit his partiality for the beauty of his own
+country, and prefer that of the Grecian, which I imagine is preferable
+to that of the whole world! The only criterion to prove it so, I mean
+its form, would be to select from every nation the most perfect in it,
+and from that number to choose the most perfect, were this possible
+to be done, respecting the external form of beauty: it could not
+respecting the internal expression of beauty, _grace_; for who shall
+be the world's arbiter of the ne plus ultra of grace!
+
+That the artists of all ages and of all nations have terminated their
+enquiries after beauty in that of the Grecian form is the highest
+proof that can be given of its superior excellence to that of all the
+world!
+
+Common form, as I have observed before, is so much nearer beauty than
+deformity, that it is, in abstract idea, the model to compose beauty
+of form from. The _universal_ appearance of nature is, to every eye,
+right, fit, faultless, &c. therefore, if every part of the copy be the
+same, particularly, I mean, in the _human_ form, beauty of form must
+result.
+
+The beauty of every part of the human body, forming a _perfect_ whole,
+is analogous to an instrument of music in perfect concord, and mere
+exactitude of proportion in its parts, exclusive of the idea of mind,
+would, I imagine, have no more effect upon the spectator than the mere
+concord of the strings of an instrument has on the hearer; it amounts
+to no more than blameless right, nor, till influenced by sentiment,
+can it go farther.
+
+But, as we are incapable of separating the idea of the human form from
+the human mind, and as the touch of an instrument in perfect concord
+gives a presentiment of harmony, so does the perception of the
+concordance of the parts of a beautiful form give a perception of
+grace. The mind, as I have observed before, cannot rest in fixed
+perfection, the _Spotless white_; and its natural transition from
+beauty must be into the region of grace.
+
+
+Section 3. _Grace_.
+
+The principles, which constitute grace, genius, or taste, are one;
+which is denominated grace in the object, genius in the production of
+the object, and taste in the perception of it.
+
+The existence of grace _seems_ to depend more upon the character of
+mental than of corporeal beauty. All its motions seem to indicate and,
+to be regulated by the utmost delicacy of sentiment! I have placed it
+between the highest sentiment of the human mind, _sublmity_, that
+no rules can teach, and the highest sentiment that rules can teach,
+_exact beauty_, the two extremes of the vrai reel and the vrai ideal.
+Grace seems, as it were, to hang between the influence of both; the
+irregular sublime giving character and relief to the negative and
+determined qualities of beauty; and beauty, i.e. truth, confining
+within due bounds the eccentric qualities of sublimity, forming, both
+to sight and in idea, orderly variety, _the waving line_, neither
+straight nor crooked. The waving line is the symbol, or memento, as
+I may say, of grace, wherever it is seen in whatever form, animate or
+inanimate; and may be justly styled the line of taste or grace!
+
+The perception of grace seems not to be intirely new nor intirely
+familiar to us; but is, as it were, what we have had a presentiment of
+in the mind, without examining it, and which the graceful object, or
+action, &c. calls forth to our view. Being so much our own idea, we
+like to behold it, to dwell upon it; and yet, not being a familiar
+idea, it creates a pleasing mild degree of admiration.
+
+Grace seems half celestial; for all the virtues accompany, indeed
+compose, the perception; for none, I imagine, can have a perception of
+grace that has none of the charms of virtue.
+
+The sentiment of grace, caused by the motion of beauty, music, poetry,
+beneficence, compassion, &c. may be ranked as the highest intellectual
+pleasure the mind is capable of perceiving, and brings with it a sort
+of undetermined consciousness of the delicacy of our own perceptions
+in making the discovery, a degree of that glorying that Longinus
+observes always accompanies the perception of the sublime.
+
+You can no more define grace than you can happiness. The mind cannot
+so stedfastly behold it as to investigate its real properties. Grace
+is indeed the point of happiness in the ideal region, both because it
+arises spontaneously, without effort, &c. and because it seems partly
+_within_ our own power, and partly _without_ it.
+
+As common sense, in my fundamental circle, seems diffusive truth, so
+grace, in my ideal circle, seems diffusive sublimity; every perception
+of the former seems to be tinged, as it were, with the colour of the
+latter.
+
+
+Section 4. _Sublimity_.
+
+Where pure grace ends, the awe of the sublime begins, composed of the
+influence of pain, of pleasure, of grace, and deformity, playing into
+each other, that the mind is unable to determine which to call it,
+pain, pleasure, or terror. Without a conjunction of these powers there
+could be no sublimity.
+
+Those only who have passed through the degrees, _common sense, truth_
+and _grace_, i.e. the sentiment of grace, can have a sentiment of
+sublimity. It is the mild admiration of grace raised to _wonder_
+and _astonishment_; to a sentiment of _power_ out of _our power_ to
+produce or control. Grace must have been as familiar to the intellect,
+in order to discover sublimity, as common sense in the common region
+must have been to the discovery of truth and beauty. In fine, genius,
+or taste, which is the sentiment of grace, and which I have called the
+common sense of the ideal region, can alone discover the true sublime.
+
+It is a pinnacle of beatitude bordering upon horror, deformity,
+madness! an eminence from whence the mind, that dares to look farther,
+is lost! It seems to stand, or rather to waver, between certainty
+and uncertainty, between security and destruction. It is the point of
+terror, of undetermined fear, of undetermined power!
+
+The idea of the supreme Being is, I imagine, in every breast, from the
+clown to the greatest philosopher, his point of sublimity!
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+On the ORIGIN of our IDEAS of BEAUTY.
+
+
+In proportion as the principles of beauty exist in the common form,
+undetermined to the common eye, so do they exist in common sense,
+undetermined to the common mind. It is cultivation that calls them
+into view, gives them a determined form, creates the object, and the
+perception, that
+
+                     'Truth and good are one,
+  And beauty dwells in them, and they in her.'
+    AKENSIDE.
+
+But, though all truth resolves into one truth, one beauty, one
+good, as all colours resolve into one light; though the scientifical
+intellectual colours, classes, or leading principles of science, the
+_physical_, the _moral_, the _metaphysical_, &c. &c. resolve into
+intellectual light, beauty, or good; it is, I imagine, the moral
+truth, that is the characteristic truth of beauty: for, were we to
+analyse the pleasing emotions we feel at the sight of beauty, we
+should, I imagine, find them composed of our most refined moral
+affections; and hence the universal interesting charm of beauty. And,
+as those affections refine by culture, hence the different degrees of
+the sentiments which beauty creates in the rustic, and in the man of
+taste. The former perceives only the physical charm of beauty, the
+freshness of colour, the bloom of youth, &c. but, to the man of taste,
+the physical pleases only through the medium of the moral: _the body
+charms because the soul is seen_; beauty, in his breast, is the source
+from whence _endless streams of fair ideas flow_, extending throughout
+the whole region of taste, no object of which but is more or less
+related to the principles of human beauty. But taste, though a subject
+almost inseparable from that of beauty, I must forbear to enlarge upon
+in this chapter, as I propose to make it the particular subject of my
+next.
+
+It is but at that period, at which we begin to perceive the charms of
+moral virtue, that we begin to perceive the real charms of beauty. It
+is true, a man may attain, by experience, the knowledge of its just
+proportions; without that concomitant sentiment. He may be unconscious
+of the characteristic moral charm resulting from the whole. And
+an artist, I imagine, by the habitual practice of the rules which
+constitute beauty, may produce forms which charm the moral sense of
+others, without being conscious of it himself; the utmost limit of
+the rules of the imitative arts being so intimately united with the
+intuitive principles of taste, or refined moral sense, that the mind
+in general cannot distinguish where the one ends or the other begins.
+The artist, who separates them, _leans on the second cause_ instead of
+the first.
+
+As the strongest proof that the moral sense is the governing principle
+of beauty, we may remark, that the human form, from infancy to
+old age, has its peculiar beauty annexed to it from the virtue
+or affection that nature gives it, and which it exhibits in the
+countenance. The negative virtue, innocence, is the beauty of the
+child. The more formed virtues, benevolence, generosity, compassion,
+&c. are the virtues of youth, and its beauty. The fixed and determined
+virtues, justice, temperance, fortitude, &c. compose the beauty of
+manhood. The philosophic and religious cast of countenance is the
+beauty of old age. Now, were any of these expressions misapplied, i.e.
+commuted, they would disgust rather than please: without congruity
+there could be no virtue; without virtue, no beauty, no sentiment of
+taste.
+
+And thus the beauty of each sex is seen only through the medium of
+the virtues belonging to each. The beauty of the masculine sex is seen
+only through the medium of the masculine virtues; the beauty of the
+feminine only through the medium of the feminine. The moral sense
+gives each its distinct portion of the same virtues, but draws a line
+which neither can pass without a diminution of their specific
+beauty. The softness and mildness of the feminine expression would
+be displeasing in a man. The robust and determined expression of
+the rigid virtues, justice, fortitude, &c. would be displeasing in a
+woman. However perfect the Form, if an incongruity that touches the
+well-being of humanity mingles with the idea, the Form will not afford
+the pleasing perception of beauty: though the eye may be capable of
+seeing its regularity, &c. so far is it from pleasing, that it is
+the more disgusting from its semblance to virtue, because that that
+semblance is a contradiction to her laws.
+
+May it not be owing to these expressions, so familiar to every eye,
+that the general sense of good taste eternally exists? They are the
+legible characters of human excellence, no where visible but in the
+human countenance, every observation of which improves and confirms
+the moral sentiment, or image of beauty, implanted by nature in the
+mind of man.
+
+The origin of the idea of beauty is the same in every breast, savage
+and civilized. Every nation's characteristic Form or expression of
+beauty will be a representation, or portrait, of their characteristic
+virtue, their happiness, their good. Thus, in the opinion of the wild
+savage, that face or form will be the most beautiful that assimilates
+with his idea of savage virtues, corporeal strength, courage, &c.
+_perfections that are placed in bones and nerves_: as that of the most
+cultivated nations, witness the Grecians, will indicate or portray the
+most refined mental virtues. And hence we may conclude, if there be
+any dignity, any truth, any beauty, in virtue, there must be a _real_
+difference, _superior_ and _inferior_ characteristic power of pleasing
+in the exterior of the human form.
+
+It is cultivation that gives birth to beauty as well as to virtue,
+by calling forth the visible object to correspond with the invisible
+intellectual object. In the face or form of an idiot, or the lowest
+rustic, there is no beauty; and, supposing a nation of idiots, and
+that they never could improve in mental beauty, they never could, I
+imagine, improve in corporeal, even though their natural form was upon
+an equality with the rest of mankind; for, without sentiment, they
+could not only be incapable of expressing any sentiment analogous to
+beauty, but, wanting the surrounding influence of a moral system, i.e.
+of the general influence of education on the exterior, they could not
+suppress or veil a semblance incongruous with beauty. What no person
+felt no person could teach.
+
+In cultivated nations, every precept for exterior appearance, from the
+first rudiments of the dancing-master to the motion of grace, has for
+its object _mind_, that is, a desire to impress upon the spectator a
+favourable idea of our mental character; but, passed the true point of
+cultivation, they lose with the sentiment of mental excellence that of
+true beauty; witness the exterior artificial appearance of humanity
+in a neighbouring nation, which probably is on a par with the most
+uncultivated rustic. The one does not enough for nature, the other
+too much. But, as the former has an object before him, to which nature
+herself directs him, the other is receding from it; and, as it is more
+agreeable, more easy, and more natural, to the human mind, to learn
+than to unlearn, I should sooner expect the most uncultivated nation,
+the negro excepted, to arrive at taste in true beauty than them. The
+negro-race seems to be the farthest removed from the line of true
+cultivation of any of the human species; their defect of form and
+complexion being, I imagine, as strong an obstacle to their acquiring
+true taste (the produce of mental cultivation) as any natural defect
+they may have in their intellectual faculties. For if, as I have
+observed, the total want of cultivation would preclude external
+beauty, the total want of external beauty would preclude the power
+of cultivation. It appears to me inconceivable, that the negro-race
+supposing their mental powers were upon a level with other nations,
+could ever arrive at true taste, when their eye is accustomed _only_
+to objects so diametrically opposite to taste as the face and form of
+negroes are! Our being used or not used to the object cannot make us
+perceive any similarity in the lineaments of their countenance to the
+lineaments, if I may so say, of our refined virtues and affections,
+which alone constitute beauty; and therefore I am induced to believe
+that they are a lower order of human beings than the Europeans.
+
+Beauty is an assemblage of every human charm; yet what we call the
+_agreeable_ is often more captivating.
+
+The agreeable, in person, is composed of beauties and defects, as is
+the common form, but differently composed. The beauties and defects
+of the latter are blended into the idea of mediocrity; those of the
+former are always distinct and perceptible, contrasting each other,
+they engage the attention, and create a kind of pleasing _re-creation_
+to the mental faculties; and, in proportion as we can bring them
+to unite with our governing principles of pleasure, they create
+affection, which gives the person a more fascinating charm than beauty
+itself.
+
+It is the mental character that is the moving principle of affection;
+and any strong peculiarity, that contradicts not the moral sense,
+i.e. that is not _unnatural_, gives the object an accessary charm, and
+raises the affection to passion. The object is at once the common and
+the uncommon; an union, which constitutes all we call excellent, all
+we admire!
+
+The perception of the charms of the agreeable seem to be wrought up
+to excellence by the operation of our own powers. We ourselves
+have blended its beauties and defects into the sentiment of beauty,
+_pleasure_; and hence, probably, the strength and durability of the
+passion which it creates. Beauty, on the contrary, is composed to our
+hands, _full_, _perfect_, and _intire_; its idea is also a compound of
+the common and the uncommon, being at once like and unlike the general
+form; but inherently it has no contrast, and therefore affords no
+recreation, no pleasing exercise, to the mental faculties; there is
+nothing to re-create, nothing to wish; and hence the instability
+of the passion which it inspires. Perfect beauty is, like perfect
+happiness, lost as soon as it is attained.
+
+It is, I imagine, to the principles of the masculine and the feminine
+character, that we owe the perception of beauty or taste, in any
+object whatever, throughout all nature and all art that imitates
+nature; and, in objects which differ from the human form, the
+principles must be in the extreme, because the object is then merely
+symbolical. Thus, the meekness of the lamb, and the high-spirited
+prancing steed; the gentle dove, and the impetuous eagle; the placid
+lake, and the swelling ocean; the lowly valley, and the aspiring
+mountain. It is the feminine character that is the sweetest, the most
+interesting, image of beauty; the masculine partakes of the sublime.
+Thus it will be found, that, in every object that is universally
+pleasing, there exist principles which are analogous to those that
+constitute beauty in the human species; and that its appearance does
+always, in some degree, move the affections, though the mind may be
+unconscious of its similitude to any idea in which the affections are
+concerned. But the test of the object's possessing the principles
+of beauty is when we are able to assimilate its appearance with
+some amiable interesting affection; and, according as that affection
+prevails in the breast of the spectator, it will appear with an
+additional power of pleasing.
+
+From association of ideas, any object may be pleasing, though
+absolutely devoid of beauty, and displeasing with it. The form is
+_then_ out of the question; it is some _real_ good or evil, with which
+the object, but not its form, is associated.
+
+It is observable, that those animals I have mentioned (and I imagine
+all animals that are symbolical of our affections have the same) have
+a double character of beauty, or reference to the affection that is
+moved: i.e. their form and their disposition, exactly corresponding
+with each other. Probably on that union depends their power of
+pleasing; their _form alone_, so different from human beauty, could
+not sufficiently engage the attention, or afford the interesting
+perception, which the consistency of truth does, in the _intire_ of an
+object.
+
+Every object of taste has _at least_ a double reference to mental
+pleasure, whether the object, in the philosophical scale of our
+perceptions, belongs to those of _sense_ or _intellect_. Thus, the
+beauty of the rose would not certainly be so perceptible to us,
+wanting its fragrance, and, with a nauseous smell, would not probably
+be admitted, as I may say, into the rank of _agreeableness_, though
+it is in reality a beautiful and pleasing object; nor, supposing the
+thistle, or any other ugly flower, possessed of the fragrance of the
+rose, should we therefore think it an object of taste, any more than
+we can think the form of an elephant beautiful, though endued with
+almost intellectual beauty.
+
+In the form and colour of flowers, there appears to me a striking
+analogy to the character of human beauty. They afford an ocular
+demonstration, in the pleasure with which we contemplate their
+particular forms, that the pleasure, we receive from the beauty of the
+human form, originates from mental character: witness the charm of
+the infant, innocence of the snow-drop, of the soft elegance of the
+hyacinth, &c. and, on the contrary, our dis-relish of the gaudy tulip,
+the robust, unmeaning, masculine, piony, hollyhock, &c. &c.
+
+It is, I imagine, from a resemblance to some pre-conceived idea of
+beauty in the human species, that we are particularly pleased with
+the sight of one flower more than with another, though the mind
+is unconscious of the cause. And thus the pleasure, caused by the
+apparent beauty of every object throughout the system of human
+perception, is, according to my sentiment of that pleasure, the same
+intellectual principle, _moral good_, however diversified, modified,
+and diminished, even to an unconsciousness or almost imperceptible
+degree of relation to it. In fine, the true principles of beauty, in
+every object, may be all _resolved_ into the same principle. But to
+conclude.
+
+I have no more doubt that the principles of beauty are moral, than
+that the principles of happiness are moral. It is the perception of
+true beauty, in its various modifications, that makes up the sum
+of human happiness; and hence the diversity of opinions concerning
+beauty, but which, however diverse, are never contradictory, but as
+mens opinions in morals are so; for every view of beauty assimilates
+with some good, and of course must be in unison.
+
+If, in the human system, there exists a principle which constitutes
+true pleasure, that principle must be that which constitutes human
+excellence; and, if the visible object which excites true pleasure
+must necessarily possess the principles of true pleasure, then must
+every object, which universally and invariably pleases, be relative to
+the principle that constitutes human excellence, morality.
+
+Whatever appears, to each individual, the most excellent in the human
+system, at once constitutes his idea of _happiness_, of _morality_,
+and of _beauty_; and all mankind, I imagine, would agree in the same
+idea, had all the same opportunities of seeing and knowing what was
+excellent.
+
+As I imagine the difference in national beauty is marked by the
+difference in national morals, so, of course, must the difference of
+the opinions of individuals on the subject of beauty be. In fine,
+as the moral sense of mankind is coarse or refined, so will be their
+taste of beauty.
+
+Of this I am certain, that true refinement is the effect of true
+virtue; that virtue is truth, and good; and that beauty dwells in
+them, and they in her.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+On TASTE.
+
+
+Taste seems to be an inherent impulsive tendency of the soul towards
+true good, given by nature to all alike, and which improves in its
+sentiment as the reasoning faculties improve in their knowledge of
+what _is_ true good.
+
+All the human faculties are, as one may say, constituents of the
+principle or faculty of taste. But its perception seems to be shared
+between the judgement and the imagination: to the former seems to
+belong the truth, or good, of an object of taste; to the latter its
+beauty or grace; and the stamina vitć, or radical principles of taste,
+exist, I imagine, in the natural affections of the soul.
+
+What the impulsive spring is, which moves the affections invariably to
+perceive pleasure in the perception of good and beauty, and disgust
+in the perception of evil or deformity, I leave to my metaphysical
+readers to determine. I am afraid to give it an appellation so
+incongruous to the general idea of taste, as that of conscience.
+
+Yet, however absurd it may appear, I will venture to say, that, if
+my readers will give themselves the trouble to analyse the grateful
+sensation or sentiment, we call _taste_ i.e. their sentiment of what
+is truly good, beautiful, right, just, ornamental, honourable, &c.
+&c. they will find it to originate from, and end in, some moral or
+religious principle. Indeed, some objects (the highest in the scale of
+our perceptions of excellence) bring with them an immediate conviction
+of the truth of this assertion; witness the devotional sentiment which
+the view of the main ocean inspires; the rising and setting sun; the
+contemplation of the celestial orbs, &c. witness the noblest object
+of the creation, when viewed in his highest character. Does not the
+perception of human excellence immediately relate to the source of all
+excellence?
+
+The general diffusion of intellectual light, throughout mankind,
+constitutes rationality; and the aggregated excellence, or light of
+rationality, constitutes morality. It is, I imagine, in this second
+or purified light, that taste begins to exist. It is at this period of
+cultivation that the mind begins to perceive its true good; that the
+natural affections rectify, methodize, and refine, in a word, become
+moral affections, through whose medium, i.e. the _moral sense_, the
+soul perceives every object of taste.
+
+Taste is intellectual pleasure, an approving sense of truth, of good,
+and of beauty. The latter seems the visible or ostensible principle
+of the two former, and is that in which the universal idea of taste is
+comprised. All are pleased with the sight of beauty; but all are by
+no means sensible that the principles that make it pleasing, that
+constitute a form beautiful, are those, or, to be more intelligible,
+relate to those, that constitute man's highest excellence, his first
+interest, his chief good. Few, indeed, even among those who possess
+taste, if they have not accustomed themselves to investigate its
+principles, will readily conceive that they are thus deeply rooted
+in the mental frame. Indeed, the generality of mankind seem rather to
+think that taste has no principles at all, or, if any, that they begin
+and end with the prevailing mode, fashion, &c. of the times; a notion
+which, though in the highest degree absurd, corroborates my opinion,
+that the universal perception of taste (the true and the false) exists
+in the idea of honour.
+
+The compound word, or phrase, _le vrai idéal_, universally adopted to
+denote an object of taste, is the most exact and literal definition of
+its sentiment that can be conceived; for it implies the union of
+the judgement and the imagination, without which there could be no
+sentiment of taste. The judgement, as I observed, perceives the truth
+of the object, the imagination its beauty; they may be said to relate
+to each other, in the perception of an object of taste, as a luminous
+polish does to the substance from whence it proceeds: the substance
+can exist without its polish, but the polish cannot exist without its
+substance. The perception of taste seems to me, if I may so express
+myself, to be illusive, but not erroneous; in a word, to exist in our
+idea of true honour, i.e. in the polish, lustre, or ornament, of true
+virtue.
+
+As the universal idea or sentiment of taste is honour, so the
+universal object of its perception is ornament, from the object, whose
+excellence we contemplate as an ornament or honour to human nature, to
+every object which in the slightest degree indicates the influence
+of that excellence. Take away the idea of that influence in the moral
+sphere, and taste is annihilated; and, in the natural sphere, take
+away the idea of divine influence, and taste cannot exist. Every
+sentiment of taste, as I observed before, ultimately relates to the
+one or to the other of these principles; indeed, strictly speaking, as
+the moral relates to the divine, it may be said ultimately to do the
+same.
+
+In the progress of civilization, the polishing principle, which I call
+taste, is chiefly found in the highest sphere of life, highest both
+for internal and external advantages, wealth accelerates the last
+degree of cultivation, by giving efficacy to the principles of true
+honour; but it also accelerates its corruption, by giving efficacy
+to the principles of false honour, by which the true loses its
+distinction, becomes less and less apparent, nay, by degrees, less and
+less real. Wealth becoming the object of honour, every principle of
+true taste must be reversed. Hence the _dire polish_ of the obdurate
+heart, repelling the force of nature. Hence avarice and profusion,
+dissipation, luxurious banqueting, &c. supersede the love of oeconomy,
+domestic comfort, the sweet reciprocation of the natural affections,
+&c. &c. Hence the greatest evils of society: the sorrows of the
+virtuous poor, _the spurns that patient merit of the unworthy takes_,
+in a word, the general corruption of morals, and, of course, of true
+taste!
+
+The vulgar, who are strangers to the internal principles of honour,
+always annex their ideas of taste to the external appearances of the
+highest rank of life, which being easily acquired, particularly that
+of dress, the prevalency of modes and fashions, however absurd,
+is universally adopted. Those of false taste adopt them to attract
+notice; those of true taste, to avoid it. But, at this present, the
+difficulty of avoiding singularity in dress is, I imagine, much to be
+lamented by women of taste and virtue, the prevailing mode of feminine
+attire being diametrically opposite to every principle of feminine
+excellence; a melancholy proof of our being arrived at the last stage
+of depravity!
+
+I could expatiate largely on this subject, but it would be
+inconsistent with my plan, which the reader may perceive, throughout
+the whole work, to be a mere outline only.
+
+The three grand co-existing principles of taste, virtue, honour, and
+ornament, run through all its perceptions. Their triple union cannot
+be broken; but taste is nominally distinguished by the one or the
+other, according as its objects, situations, circumstances, &c. vary.
+Ornament and honour seem the public character of taste; virtue to be
+the private and domestic, where, though unperceived by the vulgar,
+to the eye of taste[A] she appears in her highest ornament, highest
+honour.
+
+[Footnote A: Truth can only judge itself. BACON.]
+
+Taste seems to comprize three orders or degrees in its universal
+comprehension.
+
+The first is composed of those objects which immediately relate to the
+divinity, among which man claims the preeminence, when viewed in his
+highest character: witness the inexpressible charm which the natural
+virtuous affections of the soul inspire, when moved by some strong
+impulse, such as parental tenderness, filial piety, friendship, &c.
+&c. &c. Do they not unite the moral sentiment to the dďvine?
+
+The second is in the immediate external effects of true taste, or
+moral virtue, in the social sphere; the order, beauty, and honour,
+which every object derives from its influence; and, of course, its
+sentiment must be intimately related to moral excellence.
+
+The third and last degree is general ornament and honour, appearing
+in fashions, arts of decoration, &c. &c. objects which seeming not
+immediately to affect the interests of humanity, the taste they
+exhibit in this sphere appears as an uncertain light, sometimes bright
+and sometimes obscured; or rather as refracted rays of taste, broken
+by the general love of novelty and superfluity; two principles which,
+though they are, to a certain degree, essential to exterior ornament,
+and the sentiment of true taste, are those in which taste always
+begins to corrupt. To illustrate my meaning: true ornament seems
+equally to partake of the idea of utility and superfluity, and every
+sentiment of taste seems equally to partake of the idea of novelty and
+of custom; for, were the object perfectly familiar to us, we should
+feel no degree of admiration, without which we could feel no sentiment
+of taste; and, were it totally new, unlike any thing we had ever seen,
+it would excite wonder instead of admiration, which is a sentiment as
+distant from taste as the love of fame is from the love of honour.
+
+This sphere, the last in my scale of the perceptions of taste, and
+which borders upon every thing that is contrary to its laws, is
+properly the sphere of Fancy, who seems an undisciplined offspring of
+Taste; sometimes sporting within the bounds of parental authority, and
+sometimes beyond them. Fancy seems to bear the same affinity to Taste
+as Pleasure does to Happiness.
+
+Every object of taste is relative to some principle of excellence
+from which it derives its power of pleasing; of course, the highest
+sentiment of taste must exist in the relative principle to our highest
+object of excellence.
+
+True ornament is, to the eye, what eloquence is to the ear: their
+principles throughout are one, the truth or beauty of which exists in
+its exact relation or adaptation to the object it adorns, constituting
+the _just_, the _true_, the _beautiful_, objects, or qualities,
+which, in the conscious eye of taste, _relate_ to moral beauty. The
+perception of the first relation, i.e. the adaptation of any thing
+ornamental to the object it adorns, may, in a great measure, be
+learned by habit and general observation; but the higher relation,
+the second concoction (as one may say) of its principles, the moral
+relation, is the immediate operation of taste.
+
+Ornament and harmonious sound are pleasing to the corporeal sense,
+but, when wanting a relative object, please but for a short time; and,
+if incongruously joined to an object, i.e. to one with which it can
+have no relation, will, as soon as the understanding perceives the
+incongruity, become a principle of disgust.
+
+As the virtues differ, in some degree, as the character of the sexes
+differ,[A] of course so must the sentiment of taste differ. To the
+man I would give the laws of taste; to the woman, its sensibility. The
+taste of the former seems more derived from reason; that of the
+latter from instinct: witness their impulsive maternal affection; that
+inherent ornament of their sex, modesty; their tender susceptibility
+of the benevolent virtues, pity, compassion, &c. &c.
+
+[Footnote A: Vide page 23.]
+
+Taste, however, is as far removed from mere instinct as from mere
+reason. I only mean to say, that the taste of the masculine character
+is rather on the side of reason, or the understanding; that of the
+feminine on the side of instinct, and, let me add, imagination. The
+taste of the one and of the other seems to differ as justice does from
+mercy, as modesty from virtue, as grace from sublimity, &c. &c. And,
+as exterior feminine grace is the most perfect visible object of
+taste, the highest degree of feminine excellence, externally and
+internally united, must of course constitute woman, the most perfect
+existing object of taste in the creation.
+
+The cultivation of the social moral affections is the cultivation
+of taste, and the domestic sphere is the true and almost only one
+in which it can appear in its highest dignity. It is peculiarly
+appropriated to feminine taste, and I may say it is _absolutely_
+the only one in which it can appear in its true lustre. True taste,
+particularly the feminine, is retired, calm, modest; it is the private
+honour of the heart, and is, I imagine, incompatible with the love of
+fame.
+
+In the present state of society, taste seems to be equally excluded
+from the highest and from the lowest sphere of life. The one seems
+to be too much encumbered with artificial imaginary necessities; the
+other too much encumbered with the real and natural necessities of
+life, to attend to its cultivation. It is in the former that taste is
+universally thought to reside, which is because the idea of taste
+is inseparable from that of honour. It is that, indeed, in which the
+general taste of the nation is exhibited. It is its _face_, as I may
+say, which expresses the internal character of the heart.
+
+In this sphere, namely, the most exalted station of mankind, what true
+taste it does exhibit is placed in the strongest point of view; its
+contrary principles are also the same, particularly so to those who
+have been rightly educated at a distance from it; to such, the wrong
+will instruct as much as the right; but sure I am, that it is not,
+at this _period_, the proper sphere for the infant mind to expand and
+improve in. The wrong will be too familiar to the mind to disgust;
+and the right, which I imagine is chiefly confined to the _records_
+of taste in the fine arts, will be too remote (wanting the preparatory
+love of nature and virtue) to please.
+
+It is not, I imagine, from objects of excellence in the arts, that
+the mind receives the first impressions of taste, though from them
+the impressions, we have already received, may be strengthened and
+improved. The truths they exhibit awaken the recollection of what
+has pleased us in nature; and we exult in the confirmation of our
+judgement and taste on finding those objects represented, by genius,
+in their best and fairest light. Of course, the excellence we perceive
+in the fine arts, which is always relative to moral excellence, must
+tend to the improvement of taste.[A]
+
+[Footnote A: L'esprit de l'homme est naturellement plein d'un nombre
+infini d'idées confuses du vrai, que souvent il n'entrevoit qu'ŕ demi;
+et rien ne lui est plus agréable, que lorsqu'on lui offre quelqu'une
+de ces idées bien éclaircie et mise dans un beau jour. BOILEAU,
+Préface.]
+
+But, though the arts are thus beneficial to the growing principles
+of taste, reflecting a few individuals, it is well known that their
+establishment in every nation has had a contrary effect on the
+community in general; for, in proportion to the encouragement given
+them, as that encouragement immediately promotes two of the most
+pernicious principles that can affect the human heart, the most
+destructive of moral virtue, namely, the love of fame and the love of
+riches, the general diffusion of corruption must ensue, and of course
+the extinction of the natural principles of taste, or relish of the
+human soul of what is truly beautiful, truly honourable, truly good.
+
+To conclude. I will not presume to say, that a man without taste is
+without virtue; but I think I may venture to say, that it is only
+as he can have virtue without loving virtue, that he can have virtue
+without having taste; the definition of taste being, according to my
+apprehension of its perception, the _love_ of virtue. And, as that
+love springs from, and tends to, the source of all virtue, all good,
+may I not add, that it is but as a man can be religious without
+devotion, that a man can be religious without taste? the sentiment
+of devotion seeming to be, an aggregation of our most virtuous, most
+refined, conscious, energies of soul, in the awful vertical point of
+sublimity.
+
+  'From thee, great God, we spring, to thee we tend,
+  Path, motive, guide, original, and end!'
+
+    JOHNSON.
+
+
+
+
+THE END.
+
+
+
+
+William Andrews Clark Memorial Library: University of California
+THE AUGUSTAN REPRINT SOCIETY
+
+_General Editors_
+
+H. RICHARD ARCHER, _Clark Memorial Library_
+R.C. BOYS, _University of Michigan_
+E.N. HOOKER, _University of California, Los Angeles_
+JOHN LOFTIS, _University of California, Los Angeles_
+
+The society exists to make available inexpensive reprints (usually
+facsimile reproductions) of rare seventeenth and eighteenth century
+works.
+
+The editorial policy of the Society continues unchanged. As in the past,
+the editors welcome suggestions concerning publications.
+
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+the general editors. Membership fee continues $2.50 per year. British
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+Oxford, England. 
+
+
+Publications for the fifth year [1950-1951]
+
+(_At least six items, most of them from the following list, will be
+reprinted.)
+
+FRANCES REYNOLDS (?): _An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste,
+and of the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty, &c._ (1785). Introduction by
+James L. Clifford.
+
+THOMAS BAKER: _The Fine Lady's Airs_ (1709). Introduction by John
+Harrington Smith.
+
+DANIEL DEFOE: _Vindication of the Press_ (1718). Introduction by Ortho
+Clinton Williams.
+
+JOHN EVELYN: _An Apologie for the Royal Party_ (1659); _A Panegyric to
+Charles the Second_ (1661). Introduction by Geoffery Keynes.
+
+CHARLES MACKLIN: _Man of the World_ (1781). Introduction by Dougald
+MacMillan.
+
+_Prefaces to Fiction_. Selected and with an Introduction by Benjamin
+Boyce.
+
+THOMAS SPRAT: _Poems_.
+
+SIR WILLIAM PETTY: _The Advice of W.P. to Mr. Samuel Hartlib for the
+Advancement of some particular Parts of Learning_ (1648).
+
+THOMAS GRAY: _An Elegy Wrote in a Country Church Yard_ (1751).
+(Facsimile of first edition and of portions of Gray's manuscripts of
+the poem).
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+  To the Augustan Reprint Society     _Subscriber's Name and Address:_
+  _William Andrews Clark Memorial Library
+  2205 West Adams Boulevard
+  Los Angeles 18, California_
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+
+
+PUBLICATIONS OF THE AUGUSTAN REPRINT SOCIETY
+
+
+First Year (1946-1947)
+
+1. Richard Blackmore's _Essay upon Wit_ (1716), and Addison's
+_Freeholder_ No. 45 (1716).
+
+2. Samuel Cobb's _Of Poetry_ and _Discourse on Criticism_ (1707).
+
+3. _Letter to A.H. Esq.; concerning the Stage_ (1698), and Richard
+Willis' _Occasional Paper No. IX_ (1698). (OUT OF PRINT)
+
+4. _Essay on Wit_ (1748), together with Characters by Flecknoe, and
+Joseph Warton's _Adventurer_ Nos. 127 and 133. (OUT OF PRINT)
+
+5. Samuel Wesley's _Epistle to a Friend Concerning Poetry_ (1700) and
+_Essay on Heroic Poetry_ (1693).
+
+6. _Representation of the Impiety and Immorality of the Stage_(1704)
+and _Some Thoughts Concerning the Stage_ (1704).
+
+
+Second Year (1947-1948)
+
+7. John Gay's _The Present State of Wit_ (1711); and a section on Wit
+from _The English Theophrastus_ (1702).
+
+8. Rapin's _De Carmine Pastorali_, translated by Creech (1684).
+
+9. T. Hanmer's (?) _Some Remarks on the Tragedy of Hamlet_ (1736).
+
+10. Corbyn Morris _Essay towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit,
+etc_. (1744).
+
+11. Thomas Purney's _Discourse on the Pastoral_ (1717).
+
+12. Essays on the Stage, selected, with an Introduction by Joseph Wood
+Krutch.
+
+
+Third Year (1948-1949)
+
+13. Sir John Falstaff (pseud.), _The Theatre_ (1720).
+
+14. Edward Moore's _The Gamester_ (1753).
+
+15. John Oldmixon's _Reflections on Dr. Swift's Letter to Harley_
+(1712); and Arthur Mainwaring's _The British Academy_ (1712).
+
+16. Nevil Payne's _Fatal Jealousy_ (1673).
+
+17. Nicholas Rowe's _Some Account of the Life of Mr. William
+Shakespear_ (1709).
+
+18. Aaron Hill's Preface to _The Creation_; and Thomas Brereton's
+Preface to _Esther_.
+
+
+Fourth Year (1949-1950)
+
+19. Susanna Centlivre's _The Busie Body_ (1709).
+
+20. Lewis Theobald's _Preface to The Works of Shakespeare_ (1734).
+
+21. _Critical Remarks on Sir Charles Gradison, Clarissa, and Pamela_
+(1754).
+
+22. Samuel Johnson's _The Vanity of Human Wishes_ (1749) and Two
+_Rambler_ papers (1750).
+
+23. John Dryden's _His Majesties Declaration Defended_ (1681).
+
+24. Pierre Nicole's _An Essay on True and Apparent Beauty in Which
+from Settled Principles is Rendered the Grounds for Choosing and
+Rejecting Epigrams_, translated by J.V. Cunningham.
+
+
+
+
+
+***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES
+OF TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY, ETC.***
+
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@@ -0,0 +1,1973 @@
+The Project Gutenberg eBook, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
+Taste, and of the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty, etc., by Frances
+Reynolds, et al
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, and of the Origin of
+our Ideas of Beauty, etc.
+
+Author: Frances Reynolds
+
+Release Date: September 17, 2004  [eBook #13485]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII)
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE
+PRINCIPLES OF TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY, ETC.***
+
+
+E-text prepared by S. R. Ellison, David Starner, and the Project Gutenberg
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team
+
+
+
+
+
+AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF
+OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY, ETC.
+
+by
+
+Frances Reynolds
+
+1785
+
+With an Introduction by James L. Clifford
+
+
+
+
+The Augustan Reprint Society
+
+
+Frances Reynolds 
+
+_An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, 
+and of the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty, etc._
+(1785)
+
+With an Introduction by James L. Clifford
+
+Publication 27
+
+Los Angeles
+William Andrews Clark Memorial Library
+University of California
+1951
+
+
+_GENERAL EDITORS_
+
+H. RICHARD ARCHER, _Clark Memorial Library_
+RICHARD C. BOYS, _University of Michigan_
+EDWARD NILES HOOKER, _University of California, Los Angeles_
+JOHN LOFTIS, _University of California, Los Angeles_
+
+_ASSISTANT EDITORS_
+
+W. EARL BRITTON, _University of Michigan_
+
+_ADVISORY EDITORS_
+
+EMMETT L. AVERY, _State College of Washington_
+BENJAMIN BOYCE, _Duke University_
+LOUIS I. BREDVOLD, _University of Michigan_
+CLEANTH BROOKS, _Yale University_
+JAMES L. CLIFFORD, _Columbia University_
+ARTHUR FRIEDMAN, _University of Chicago_
+SAMUEL H. MONK, _University of Minnesota_
+ERNEST MOSSNER, _University of Texas_
+JAMES SUTHERLAND, _Queen Mary College, London_
+H.T. SWEDENBERG, JR., _University of California, Los Angeles_
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+Since the early nineteenth century it has been known that Frances
+Reynolds, the sister of Sir Joshua, was the author of an essay on
+taste, which she had printed but did not publish. Yet persistent
+search failed to turn up a single copy. It remained one of those lost
+pieces which every research scholar hoped someday to discover.
+
+In 1935 it appeared that the search was over. Among some manuscripts
+of Mrs. Thrale-Piozzi, long hidden in Wales, was found a printed copy
+of an anonymous _Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, and of
+the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty_, which seemed to be the lost essay.
+The date was correct; the _Enquiry_ was dedicated to Mrs. Montagu; it
+contained a quotation from Dr. Johnson; and, best of all, there was
+attached to the pamphlet a copy (in an unidentified handwriting) of
+Johnson's well-known letter to Miss Reynolds concerning her essay.
+
+Only one thing stood squarely in the way of the identification. James
+Northcote in his _Life of Sir Joshua Reynolds_, published in 1818 (II,
+116-19), after describing Johnson's connection with the manuscript,
+gives two pages of short excerpts. Most of the quotations are general
+statements such as "Dress is the strong indication of the moral
+character" or "The fine arts comprehend all that is excellent in the
+moral system, and, at the same time, open every path that tends to the
+corruption of moral excellence." Unfortunately none of these excerpts
+appears directly in the _Enquiry_. Although some of the ideas are
+similar, the wording and specific details are different. By no stretch
+of the imagination could they be considered to come from the same
+piece. Thus Northcote blocked the solution of the mystery for nearly
+fifteen years.
+
+Recently, however, evidence has turned up which makes the attribution
+a certainty. It is now obvious that Northcote must have been mistaken
+in the source of his quotations. Writing as he did many years after
+the events he was describing, Northcote either had found a copy of
+the first draft of Miss Reynolds' essay, or erroneously quoted from
+another anonymous piece which he assumed was by Miss Reynolds. In any
+event he was not quoting from the final version which she wished the
+world to see.
+
+The story of Miss Reynolds' attempts to publish her essay can at
+last be pieced together from various bits of evidence, some hitherto
+unpublished. Just when the essay was written is uncertain. All that
+we know is that a preliminary version was submitted to the rigorous
+criticism of Dr. Johnson in 1781. Johnson, who had corrected some of
+her verses in red ink the year before, commented on 21 July 1781:
+
+    There is in these such force of comprehension, and such nicety
+    of observation as Locke or Pascal might be proud of. This I
+    say with intention to have you think that I speak my opinion.
+
+    They cannot however be printed in their present state. Many
+    of your notions seem not very clear in your own mind, many are
+    not sufficiently developed and expanded for the common reader;
+    the expression almost every where wants to be made clearer and
+    smoother. You may by revisal and improvement make it a very
+    elegant and curious work.[1]
+
+But Miss Reynolds was not easily discouraged, and Johnson wrote again
+on 8 April 1782:
+
+    Your work is full of very penetrating meditation, and very
+    forcible sentiment. I read it with a full perception of the
+    sublime, with wonder and terrour, but I cannot think of any
+    profit from it; it seems not born to be popular.
+
+    Your system of the mental fabric is exceedingly obscure, and
+    without more attention than will be willingly bestowed,
+    is unintelligible. The Ideas of Beauty will be more easily
+    understood, and are often charming. I was delighted with the
+    different beauty of different ages.
+
+    I would make it produce something if I could but I have indeed
+    no hope. If a Bookseller would buy it at all, as it must be
+    published without a name, he would give nothing for it worth
+    your acceptance.[2]
+
+In passing it might be pointed out that this letter has previously not
+been associated with Miss Reynolds' essay on taste, largely because
+the available text of the letter has been so faulty. Where Johnson
+wrote "The Ideas of Beauty," obviously referring to the second section
+of the _Enquiry_, Croker, followed by G.B. Hill, printed "The plans
+of Burnaby." To this Hill added a note; "Burnaby, I conjecture, was a
+character in the book," with the result that scholars have fruitlessly
+been searching ever since for the fictitious Mr. Burnaby, One more
+example of the dangers of using nineteenth-century transcripts!
+
+Evidently Johnson's stringent objections temporarily halted her plans,
+for we hear nothing more about the essay for two years. Meanwhile, as
+appears from a later letter, she showed it to Bennett Langton, hoping
+in vain for his help. Nevertheless, she was determined to go ahead and
+print the work, even at her own expense. Johnson, still counted upon
+for aid, wrote to her on 12 April 1784:
+
+    I am not yet able to wait on you, but I can do your business
+    commodiously enough. You must send me the copy to show the
+    printer. If you will come to tea this afternoon we will talk
+    together about it.[3]
+
+On 30 April he commented further: "Mr. Allen has looked over the
+papers and thinks one hundred copies will come to five pounds."
+Something, however, made her suspicious of his advice, and on 28 May
+there came an end to Johnson's connection with the matter. He wrote:
+"I have returned your papers, and am glad that you laid aside the
+thought of printing them."
+
+But Miss Reynolds had no intention of permanently giving up her
+project. Instead she rewrote parts of the essay which had displeased
+her critics, and shortly after Johnson's death proceeded to have 250
+copies privately printed, with a dedication to Mrs. Montagu. With
+Johnson gone, "The Queen of the Bluestockings" must have appeared the
+next best patron. That Mrs. Montagu, while no doubt flattered by the
+dedication, was herself not overly enthusiastic about the essay may
+be gathered from a letter written to her by Miss Reynolds on 12 July
+1785. Miss Reynolds began by insisting that "the slightest hint" of
+disapprobation on the part of Mrs. Montagu would "consign the work to
+oblivion"; then continued:
+
+    I never did entertain any desire to publish it, tho I might
+    to sell it. And my desire of printing it, originated from a
+    motive which tho' vain I allow, is an natural vanity I wishd
+    to leave behind me a respectable memorial of my existence,
+    which I then flatterd myself this would be. Ten impressions or
+    twenty at the most, were all I wishd to have taken off. Why I
+    had so many as 250 was because Dr. Johnson advised me to print
+    that number, and to sell them, to stand the sale of them was
+    his expression, but I must do Dr. Johnson the justice to say,
+    that, that advice was given me with a proviso that no person
+    was in the secret but himself, for on my informing him to
+    the contrary, he declined or seemd to decline the affair of
+    getting them printed for me, which I perceiving sent to him
+    for the manuscript, foolishly entertaining a slight suspicion
+    which I much reproach myself for, that some other motives
+    besides the want of merit in the work had influenced this
+    change of behaviour. Unluckily from the beginning I made too
+    great allowance in its favour, from an opinion I had con
+    too of Dr. Johnsons being strongly prejudiced against womens
+    literary productions. But I deceived myself. He was sincere,
+    he judged justly of the work, and his opinion exactly
+    corresponded with yours![4]
+
+Not that she regretted the cost of printing the 250 copies. That was a
+minor consideration. She concluded:
+
+    If I ever should shew it to any person it will be to Mr.
+    Langton, from a motive of wishing him to see the alteration I
+    have made in it for the better, since he saw it, and as it is
+    also since Dr. Johnson saw it, and particularly that part
+    he most objected to, my belief that I had obviated that
+    objection, is another apology for my printing it.
+
+To this Mrs. Montagu returned a wordy and diffuse reply, commenting
+that "having for many years past left off all metaphysical studies,"
+she was "not a competent judge of any work on subjects of that
+nature," yet insisting that she doubted if contemporary readers would
+like it. It was obvious that Mrs. Montagu refused to be a party to
+further dissemination of the printed copies. And there the matter
+rested for almost three more years.
+
+The wish to have some of the copies read by the general public proved
+too strong, and on 15 April 1788 Miss Reynolds wrote again to Mrs.
+Montagu, asking her aid in recovering a letter, or transcription of a
+letter, of Johnson's:
+
+    It is of great importance to me the recovery of this letter
+    particularly so as I perceive I must not presume to hope for
+    the only patronage that could countervail the loss of Dr.
+    Johnsons, should I ever be induced to publish the work. I
+    do not mean that I would publish the letter, but that the
+    testimony it conveys of Dr. Johnsons approbation, would be
+    highly advantageous to me in the disposal of the copy to
+    a Bookseller, indeed _approbation_ is an improper Word,
+    inadequate to the
+    praises he bestows on the work, I durst not repeat his
+    expressions tho I well remember them. Some friendly strictures
+    also the letter contained, all these I remember I transcribed
+    verbatim in a letter I sent to you in the beginning of the
+    year 82. they begin
+
+    Many of your notions seem not to be very clear in your own
+    imagination....[5]
+
+It was not until the next year that with the help of James Northcote
+she finally made active preparations to have the work published. As
+Miss Reynolds wrote to Mrs. Montagu on 5 February,
+
+    I forgot to say that Mr. Nurse recommended Mr. Northcote to a
+    Mr. Bladen in Paternoster Row for a Publisher, but I sent
+    in the utmost haste to him to prevent his taking any steps
+    towards so disgraceful a place as I imagine that to be so
+    incongruous.[6]
+
+In preparation for the new printing, Miss Reynolds had further revised
+her essay, and in order to enhance the value of the piece for general
+readers she decided to add three letters from Johnson of which she
+chanced to have copies. Totally unconnected with the essay, one was
+to Sir Joseph Banks concerning the motto for his goat's collar; the
+others concerned the unfortunate Dr. Dodd. But before going ahead she
+again asked the advice of her patroness. Mrs. Montagu replied:
+
+    I do not see that there is any objection to publishing the 3
+    letters, but I own I think Dr Johnson judges too lightly of
+    the crime of forgery ... I believe the tenderness of sentiment
+    Dr Johnson expresses for Dr Dodd in his afflictions will do
+    him honour in the eyes of the Publick, & therefore as his
+    friend you may with propriety publish the letters.[7]
+
+Mrs. Montagu concluded, "I wish some name that would do more honour to
+your work was to appear in the dedication, but to be presented to
+the publick with such a mark of Mrs Reynolds' friendly regard, will
+certainly be esteemed an honour...."
+
+Sometime between February and July 1789 the _Enquiry_ was reprinted,
+this time by J. Smeeton (copies of this version may be found in the
+Bodleian Library and the Library of Congress). The terminal date for
+the reprinting is established by the fact that the three letters
+of Johnson which were appended to the essay were reprinted without
+comment in the July issue of the _European Magazine_.
+
+Just where Miss Reynolds secured copies of the Johnson letters is
+not certain. It is suggestive, however, that the letter to Banks had
+originally been sent under cover to Sir Joshua Reynolds and that Sir
+Joshua's copy is now among the Boswell papers at Yale University.
+There would have been ample opportunity for Frances Reynolds also to
+have secured a copy. And the letter to Charles Jenkinson of 20 June
+1777 and to Dr. Dodd of 26 June were of the sort that an enterprising
+lady might well have wheedled copies from the Doctor. The important
+point is that the inclusion of the letters in the 1789 printing of the
+_Enquiry_ provides incontrovertible proof of Miss Reynolds' connection
+with the piece.
+
+For this second printing the entire pamphlet was reset, with
+numerous minor changes of wording and punctuation, but with no major
+alterations in meaning. In general the textual improvements are such
+as a bluestocking lady might well wish to make. It will be noted that
+on pages 25 and 49 of the copy here reproduced someone has made minor
+changes in wording in ink. These corrections are made in the later
+printing. Moreover, at the end of the 1789 version there is an errata
+list, indicating three alterations from the 1785 text which were
+mistakes. The Dedication remained unchanged, but the geometrical
+illustration was now placed facing the beginning of Chapter I.
+
+The _Enquiry_ was written in what is now recognized as one of the most
+exciting periods in the history of aesthetics, the late eighteenth
+century being a crucial point in the gradual shift from absolute
+classical standards to the relative approaches of the next age. Most
+of the important thinkers of the day--Hume, Burke, Lord Kames, Adam
+Smith, among others--were thinking deeply about the problem of taste.
+And if Miss Reynolds' essay is not one of the most perceptive of the
+discussions, it is at least one of the liveliest.
+
+In brief, the _Enquiry_ is what one might expect from an intelligent
+amateur, from one not a professional writer, yet one who has given
+much thought to the problems of aesthetics. Of course, many of the
+ideas are derivative, with echoes of the "moral sense" of Hutcheson,
+the "line of grace" of Hogarth, and the terrible sublime of Burke. The
+three divisions of the essay--the development of a mental system, the
+origin of our ideas of Beauty, and the analysis of taste--follow the
+customary pattern of eighteenth-century discussions. Yet the piece
+is no slavish refurbishing of old phrases. It is packed with fresh
+arguments and novel suggestions. If these are not always completely
+coherent or logical, they do represent original thinking.
+
+Twentieth-century readers may be astonished by some of the ideas:
+witness the claim that Negroes could never arrive at true taste,
+because their eyes were so accustomed to objects diametrically
+opposite to taste. As a further example of Miss Reynolds' occasionally
+muddled thinking there is the development of her initial assumption.
+While the groundwork of man is perfection, this perfection has been
+blemished and man is impelled to recapture it in the sublime. Yet
+instead of analyzing this impulse, Miss Reynolds appears to take it
+for granted. Nor does she consider how perfection is to be achieved
+in taste, preferring to conclude with a diatribe in the manner of
+Rousseau on the depravity of the times and the corrupting effect of
+the arts. (For this and many of the following comments I am indebted
+to Mr. Ralph Cohen of the College of the City of New York.)
+
+The cause of some of the ambiguities in her discussion may perhaps be
+traced to a rather careless use of terms. At one time "instinct"
+or "impulsion," the moral force driving man toward perfection, is a
+potentiality developed by cultivation, and at another a force that
+is created by cultivation. Although the sublime is the apex of her
+mathematically-definite program and is a moral quality attained by
+the few, every human being has his point of sublimity in the idea of
+a Supreme Being. On the one hand, beauty is a preconceived idea in
+the human species; on the other it is not preconceived, but developed.
+Finally, the rules of art are perceptions of moral virtue, yet art
+which exhibits these rules can corrupt.
+
+It is easy to pick flaws in Miss Reynolds' thinking, for the lack of
+sustained logic which Johnson early recognized is apparent at every
+turn. Yet for students of the history of ideas the _Enquiry_ contains
+much of interest. As a painter, Miss Reynolds throughout stresses the
+visual, a concentration which leads her to several valuable insights.
+She divides form into two categories, masculine and feminine, but
+makes a novel use of these Ciceronian divisions. All non-human
+objects--flowers, animals, etc.--are seen as exhibiting male or female
+attributes. It might almost be said that with this anthropomorphic
+approach she is attempting to develop a "philosophical" basis for the
+pathetic fallacy. Furthermore, if the human is used to measure beauty
+in the non-human, the implication is that man, not God, is the measure
+of beauty. By setting up man as the mediator between the material and
+the divine, she points to the concentration in the next century on
+human values.
+
+When discussing the _Enquiry_ in his book on the _Sublime_, Samuel
+Monk pointed out certain other tendencies which fore-shadow the
+coming Romantic revolt. This shift may also be noted in Miss Reynolds'
+extension of countenance, the reflection of internal virtue, to mean
+"form," and the extension of internal virtue to mean "disposition,"
+"object," or content. In developing this form-content division, she
+stumbles on a key criticism of associationism: "From association of
+ideas, any object may be pleasing, though absolutely devoid of beauty,
+and displeasing with it. The form is _then_ out of the question; it is
+some _real_ good or evil, with which the object, but not its form, is
+associated." This notion that associationism leads away from the
+work of art as such is a perceptive comment. Her notion that form and
+disposition (or content) must correspond in order to give aesthetic
+pleasure suggests, though the terms are different, certain of
+Coleridge's basic ideas.
+
+One other point might be stressed: Miss Reynolds takes an extreme
+moralistic position toward the arts. Again and again it is insisted
+that taste and beauty are moral attributes, not purely aesthetic
+concepts. Chapter II ends with the ringing statement: "Of this I
+am certain, that true refinement is the effect of true virtue; that
+virtue is truth, and good; and that beauty dwells in them, and they
+in her." And the next chapter begins: "Taste seems to be an inherent
+impulsive tendency of the soul towards true good." On the other
+hand, she sees that the arts are not to be encouraged because such
+encouragement is apt to lead to the destruction of moral virtue--the
+desire for fame and wealth. The value of art as education is dismissed
+as of importance only to the few; the dangers of encouragement will
+imperil the many. "Though the arts are thus beneficial to the growing
+principles of taste, respecting a few individuals, it is well known
+that their establishment in every nation has had a contrary effect on
+the community in general...."
+
+To conclude: despite its many deficiencies Frances Reynolds' _Enquiry_
+is worth reading. It serves admirably to mirror the conflicting
+eighteenth-century theories out of which our own aesthetic concepts
+have been formed.
+
+  James L. Clifford
+  Columbia University
+
+
+
+
+Notes to the Introduction
+
+
+1. _Letters_, II, 223-24; corrected from original letter in possession
+of Professor F.W. Hilles of Yale University, who has given invaluable
+aid in the present investigation.
+
+2. _Letters_, II, 249-50, corrected from the original by Dr. R.W.
+Chapman.
+
+3. Copy in possession of Mrs. Doreen Ashworth, Windlesham, Surrey.
+
+4. Original in Huntington Library.
+
+5. Original in possession of Mrs. Ashworth.
+
+6. Rough draft in possession of Mrs. Ashworth.
+
+7. Original in possession of Professor F.W. Hilles.
+
+
+
+
+AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES of TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF
+OUR IDEAS of BEAUTY, &c.
+
+
+
+    Sunt certi denique fines,
+  Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.
+    HOR.
+
+
+
+To Mrs. MONTAGU.
+
+
+MADAM,
+
+Were I not prompted by gratitude, admiration, and affection, to
+dedicate to you the best produce of my abilities, which I imagine this
+to be, yet, as the subject, of which it particularly treats, is moral
+excellence, the universal voice of mankind, with whom your very name
+is synonymous with virtue itself, must plead my apology for taking
+this liberty. Besides, madam, it was natural for me, as an author, to
+with to avail myself of the advantage, which this address affords
+me, of prepossessing the minds of my readers with an example of that
+perfection to which all my arguments tend, as a preparative, or aid,
+to their better comprehending my meaning.
+
+The influence of virtue is every way beneficial! Your character,
+not only secures me from all imputation of flattery, but this public
+avowal of my admiration of its excellence conveys an honourable
+testimony of the consistency of my principles; having endeavoured to
+inculcate, that the love and esteem of true virtue is true honour. And
+I may add, that the sweet gratification I feel, in the indulging the
+strongest and best propension of my nature, in thus expatiating in its
+praise, is true pleasure, true happiness.
+
+I am, Madam,
+
+    Your obliged,
+
+      Most obedient,
+
+  And most humble, servant,
+
+  The AUTHOR.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+A SKETCH of the MENTAL SYSTEM respecting our Perceptions of Taste, &c.
+
+
+The mind of man, introspecting itself, seems, as it were, (in
+conjunction with the inscrutable principles of nature,) placed in the
+central point of the creation: from whence, impelled by her energetic
+powers and illumined by her light, the intellectual faculties, like
+rays, shoot forth in direct tendency to their ultimate point of
+perfection; and, as they advance, each individual mind imperceptibly
+imbibes the influence and light of each, and is by this imbibition
+alone enabled to approach it.
+
+But, though the light of nature and of reason direct the human mind
+to perfection, or true good, yet, being in its progress perpetually
+impeded by adventitious causes, casual occurrences, &c. &c. which
+induce false opinions of good and evil, its progressive powers
+generally stop at a middle point between mere uncultivated nature and
+perfection, a medium which constitutes what we call common sense, and
+which, in degree, seems as distant from the perfection of the mental
+faculties as common form is from the perfection of form, _beauty_.
+
+
+[Illustration:
+           SUBLIMITY.
+               |
+             GRACE
+               |
+        BEAUTY | TRUTH
+               |
+  COMMON SENSE | COMMON FORM
+               |
+            NATURE]
+
+
+On meditating on this subject, and marking the progressive stages
+or degrees of human excellence, the great leading general truths,
+or mental rests, as I may call them, _the common, the beautiful, the
+graceful, and the sublime_, I have been naturally led to form a kind
+of diagrammatic representation of their respective distances, &c. &c.
+which I present to my reader on the opposite page, requesting him to
+refer to it now and then as he goes on, in order to facilitate his
+comprehension of my meaning.
+
+And here it may be necessary to premise, that, however whimsical and
+absurd this delineation may appear to my reader, something analogous
+to the thought may be found in the works of many eminent philosophers,
+particularly in those of Bacon[A] and of Locke:[B] the latter
+suggesting that the whole system of morality might be reduced to
+mathematical demonstration; and the former, in his treatise on the
+Advancement of Learning, gives a description of the stages of science
+very much resembling my delineation of the stages of intellectual
+perfection, or taste.
+
+[Footnote A: Advancement of Learning, Book 2d.]
+
+[Footnote B: Essay on human Understanding, Chap. 3d, Book the 4th, and
+Chap. 12th, same Book, Sect. 8th.]
+
+It could have been no dishonour to me to have been led by such
+conductors! Yet, as the truth cannot dishonour me neither, I must
+aver, that my little system was projected, and brought to the exact
+state it now is in, without my having the least apprehension that any
+thing similar had been suggested before by any person whatever; nor
+have I, in consequence of the discovery I have lately made of the
+opinions of these respectable authors, added or omitted a single
+thought in my treatise. But to return from my digression.
+
+In the exact center of my circle of humanity, I have placed nature,
+or the springs of the intellectual powers, which tend, in a
+straight line, to its boundary; and, on its boundary, I have placed
+demonstrable beauty and truth, and the utmost power of rules; and,
+midway; I have placed common sense and common form, half deriving
+their existence from pure nature, and half from its highest
+cultivation, as far as art or rules can teach. A conjunction which
+would itself be the perfection of humanity, but that it is mixed with
+all that is not nature, and all that is not art, and thereby made
+mediocrity, i.e. _common sense_.
+
+The intellectual powers, arriving at the limit of my common circle,
+i.e. at the limit of the basis of my pyramidical system, where I
+have placed the fixed proportions of beauty and of truth, (if they
+progress,) mount up as a flame, with undulating[A] motion, refining
+as they advance, and terminate in the pinnacle, or ultimate point,
+_sublimity_; forming in the imagination the figure of a pyramid,
+or cone, from the limit of whose base, (on which, as I have before
+observed, I have placed demonstrable truth and beauty, the utmost
+power of rules, &c.) from that limit up to the ultimate point of
+sublimity, I call the region of intellectual pleasure, genius, or
+taste; and in its center I place grace, whose influence pervades,
+cheers, and nourishes, every part of it, an object which, in this
+ideal region, is similar in its situation and degree to that of common
+sense in the common or fundamental region. Grace seems to partake
+of the perception both of beauty and of sublimity, as common sense
+partakes of nature and of art. Grace is the characteristic object or
+general form of the ideal region, and its perception is the general
+limit of the powers of imagination or taste. Few, very few, attain to
+the point of sublimity; the _ne plus ultra_ of human conception! the
+alpha and omega. The sentiment of sublimity sinks into the source of
+nature, and that of the source of nature mounts to the sentiment of
+sublimity, each point seeming to each the cause and the effect; the
+origin and the end!
+
+[Footnote A: I use that expression, because it is the peculiar motion
+of grace as well as of a flame.]
+
+Having thus drawn the outline of my pyramidical mental system, I
+propose to expatiate a little on each point or stage throughout the
+great characteristic line of intellectual power.
+
+The first point The exact center, _nature_, or the origin of our
+intellectual faculties, admits of no investigation, its idea, as I
+have observed before, loses itself in the sentiment of sublimity,
+and we see nothing; and therefore I pass on to an object which is
+perceptible, _the common general character of humanity_, _exterior and
+inferior_. I have placed them on a line, because their ideas are so
+analogous, that they unite in one.
+
+
+Section 1. _Common Sense and common Form_.
+
+Perfection seems to be the ground-work both of common sense and
+of common form; and, what prevents each from being perfect, is the
+adventitious blemishes, the additions to, and the diminutions from,
+what is perfect, making the too little and the too large. But, these
+defects being distributed in, small portions throughout the general
+common form and common mind, they constitute an object, whether
+visible or intellectual, between perfection and imperfection, namely,
+that of mediocrity, neither exciting admiration nor disgust. And, as
+experience gives the general idea of the common and true appearance
+of the human form, as well to the rustic as to the most enlightened
+philosopher, so consequently does it enable him to see deformity, or
+what is an unusual appearance in that form.
+
+But, though unusual defects seem to be evident to every eye, it is
+only to the man of taste and nice discernment that the same degree of
+unusual beauties are equally perceptible; which corresponds with my
+opinion, that the ground-work of humanity is perfection, and that its
+blemishes only tinge its pure white, not discolour it so much, but,
+when held at a distance, i.e. in abstract idea, it is still a white,
+like a sheet of paper, or cloth of the most perfect white, regularly
+checkered over with a variety of figures of every colour, and placed
+at a distance, appearing to the eye a white, a mezzo common white;
+and, as any unusual figure, I mean unusually large and opaque, on this
+mezzo ground, would be more conspicuous than any of a greater degree
+of transparency or a more perfect white could be by an absence of any
+of the figures; so any degree of deformity is, more opposite to the
+general common form than beauty, and any degree of insanity is more
+opposite to common sense than intellectual excellence.
+
+And, (to continue my allusion,) as those tints, or blemishes, which
+obscure the ground, must be discharged to make a perfect white, so
+must the artist, in creating beauty, discharge the blemishes that
+tinge and obscure the human form, and which give it the character of
+mediocrity, till the perfect white, or total absence of defect, or
+beauty, result.
+
+Common sense seems to be diffusive truth, and common form diffusive
+beauty; and, as this diffusion is always existing with us, externally
+and internally, it is no wonder that we should more easily perceive
+what is in opposition to it, _evil_, than what is in unison with it,
+_good_.
+
+On a line with common form and common sense I place common ease of
+body and of mind: unfelt health, unfelt good, or that arising to the
+degree of _satisfaction_ and _content_; in fine, whatever we call
+_commonly_ good, and requisite for the well-being of humanity.
+
+
+Section 2. _Beauty and Truth_.
+
+I mean that beauty which is demonstrable truth, and that truth which
+is demonstrable beauty. _Exactitude. Completion. The just medium. The
+satisfactory rest of the mind. Perfection_. A point, indeed, in which
+the mind cannot rest! It must go forward or backward. If the latter,
+it relapses into the dominion of error; if the former, if assumes
+the charms of _design_, or _intention_. The artist, arrived at the
+ultimate limit of rules, or demonstrable truth, stands, as it were,
+between the visible and invisible world; between that of sense and
+intellect; the common and the uncommon; and his productions will be a
+conjunction of both. He looks back through all the variety of common
+nature, and reviews, through the medium of truth and beauty, the
+various objects it exhibits; and on its spotless ground, i.e. the
+abstract idea of nature without defects, can only exist in idea,
+he arranges those objects, objects, so as they may best produce the
+effects he aims at in his art. He does not attempt to obliterate
+any character in the common circle of nature; but, following her
+own oeconomy, he endeavours, by juxtaposition, &c. to make each
+subservient to each in creating delight, and giving beauty to the
+_whole_. But, to descend from the abstract general idea to the
+particular idea of beauty, or idea of a particular form:
+
+We discard every thing, that is not beauty, to compose beauty; but
+every thing that is not beauty is not therefore deformity. The wrong
+we see in each individual we do not call deformity: when it is so, it
+stands on the limit of the common circle, in opposition to beauty.
+
+From common form seem to originate beauty and deformity; and, as they
+recede from each other in opposite directions, they become less and
+less like their parent, _common form_, but never totally unlike; for
+it is their likeness to that form that constitutes the one beauty, and
+the other deformity; for, were there no resemblance in deformity
+to the common form, it would be a different species, and no longer
+disgust; and none in beauty, it would no longer please.
+
+There is no particular common form, but which, to create beauty, an
+artist, who studies the perfection of the human form, must improve in
+some, if not in every part; to effect which, considered as mere form
+only, rules will suffice, but, considered as grace, it must express a
+sentiment that no rules can give!
+
+That all feel the same sentiment of admiration for that which they
+think the most perfect, however the objects may differ, has induced
+some to believe that beauty is an arbitrary idea, and that it exists
+only in the imagination! But does it follow, that, because it is not
+possible for the savage or the man of taste to judge of any object
+but as experience enables him to judge, that therefore there is no
+preeminence in that form which is beauty to the one above that which
+is beauty to the other?
+
+Somewhere there must exist, whether perceived or not, the perfection,
+or highest point of excellence of the human form respecting
+proportion; and somewhere there must exist, or does at times exist,
+the highest excellence of its expression, i.e. the moral charm of the
+human countenance, _grace_.
+
+The artist, who has only seen the beauty of his own nation, will from
+that form his standard of perfection. But, when he comes to extend his
+enquiry, when he has viewed the beauty of other nations, particularly
+that form and that expression which the Grecian artists (who were
+probably on a line with the Grecian philosophers) modelled from their
+ideas of beauty! he will quit his partiality for the beauty of his own
+country, and prefer that of the Grecian, which I imagine is preferable
+to that of the whole world! The only criterion to prove it so, I mean
+its form, would be to select from every nation the most perfect in it,
+and from that number to choose the most perfect, were this possible
+to be done, respecting the external form of beauty: it could not
+respecting the internal expression of beauty, _grace_; for who shall
+be the world's arbiter of the ne plus ultra of grace!
+
+That the artists of all ages and of all nations have terminated their
+enquiries after beauty in that of the Grecian form is the highest
+proof that can be given of its superior excellence to that of all the
+world!
+
+Common form, as I have observed before, is so much nearer beauty than
+deformity, that it is, in abstract idea, the model to compose beauty
+of form from. The _universal_ appearance of nature is, to every eye,
+right, fit, faultless, &c. therefore, if every part of the copy be the
+same, particularly, I mean, in the _human_ form, beauty of form must
+result.
+
+The beauty of every part of the human body, forming a _perfect_ whole,
+is analogous to an instrument of music in perfect concord, and mere
+exactitude of proportion in its parts, exclusive of the idea of mind,
+would, I imagine, have no more effect upon the spectator than the mere
+concord of the strings of an instrument has on the hearer; it amounts
+to no more than blameless right, nor, till influenced by sentiment,
+can it go farther.
+
+But, as we are incapable of separating the idea of the human form from
+the human mind, and as the touch of an instrument in perfect concord
+gives a presentiment of harmony, so does the perception of the
+concordance of the parts of a beautiful form give a perception of
+grace. The mind, as I have observed before, cannot rest in fixed
+perfection, the _Spotless white_; and its natural transition from
+beauty must be into the region of grace.
+
+
+Section 3. _Grace_.
+
+The principles, which constitute grace, genius, or taste, are one;
+which is denominated grace in the object, genius in the production of
+the object, and taste in the perception of it.
+
+The existence of grace _seems_ to depend more upon the character of
+mental than of corporeal beauty. All its motions seem to indicate and,
+to be regulated by the utmost delicacy of sentiment! I have placed it
+between the highest sentiment of the human mind, _sublmity_, that
+no rules can teach, and the highest sentiment that rules can teach,
+_exact beauty_, the two extremes of the vrai reel and the vrai ideal.
+Grace seems, as it were, to hang between the influence of both; the
+irregular sublime giving character and relief to the negative and
+determined qualities of beauty; and beauty, i.e. truth, confining
+within due bounds the eccentric qualities of sublimity, forming, both
+to sight and in idea, orderly variety, _the waving line_, neither
+straight nor crooked. The waving line is the symbol, or memento, as
+I may say, of grace, wherever it is seen in whatever form, animate or
+inanimate; and may be justly styled the line of taste or grace!
+
+The perception of grace seems not to be intirely new nor intirely
+familiar to us; but is, as it were, what we have had a presentiment of
+in the mind, without examining it, and which the graceful object, or
+action, &c. calls forth to our view. Being so much our own idea, we
+like to behold it, to dwell upon it; and yet, not being a familiar
+idea, it creates a pleasing mild degree of admiration.
+
+Grace seems half celestial; for all the virtues accompany, indeed
+compose, the perception; for none, I imagine, can have a perception of
+grace that has none of the charms of virtue.
+
+The sentiment of grace, caused by the motion of beauty, music, poetry,
+beneficence, compassion, &c. may be ranked as the highest intellectual
+pleasure the mind is capable of perceiving, and brings with it a sort
+of undetermined consciousness of the delicacy of our own perceptions
+in making the discovery, a degree of that glorying that Longinus
+observes always accompanies the perception of the sublime.
+
+You can no more define grace than you can happiness. The mind cannot
+so stedfastly behold it as to investigate its real properties. Grace
+is indeed the point of happiness in the ideal region, both because it
+arises spontaneously, without effort, &c. and because it seems partly
+_within_ our own power, and partly _without_ it.
+
+As common sense, in my fundamental circle, seems diffusive truth, so
+grace, in my ideal circle, seems diffusive sublimity; every perception
+of the former seems to be tinged, as it were, with the colour of the
+latter.
+
+
+Section 4. _Sublimity_.
+
+Where pure grace ends, the awe of the sublime begins, composed of the
+influence of pain, of pleasure, of grace, and deformity, playing into
+each other, that the mind is unable to determine which to call it,
+pain, pleasure, or terror. Without a conjunction of these powers there
+could be no sublimity.
+
+Those only who have passed through the degrees, _common sense, truth_
+and _grace_, i.e. the sentiment of grace, can have a sentiment of
+sublimity. It is the mild admiration of grace raised to _wonder_
+and _astonishment_; to a sentiment of _power_ out of _our power_ to
+produce or control. Grace must have been as familiar to the intellect,
+in order to discover sublimity, as common sense in the common region
+must have been to the discovery of truth and beauty. In fine, genius,
+or taste, which is the sentiment of grace, and which I have called the
+common sense of the ideal region, can alone discover the true sublime.
+
+It is a pinnacle of beatitude bordering upon horror, deformity,
+madness! an eminence from whence the mind, that dares to look farther,
+is lost! It seems to stand, or rather to waver, between certainty
+and uncertainty, between security and destruction. It is the point of
+terror, of undetermined fear, of undetermined power!
+
+The idea of the supreme Being is, I imagine, in every breast, from the
+clown to the greatest philosopher, his point of sublimity!
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+On the ORIGIN of our IDEAS of BEAUTY.
+
+
+In proportion as the principles of beauty exist in the common form,
+undetermined to the common eye, so do they exist in common sense,
+undetermined to the common mind. It is cultivation that calls them
+into view, gives them a determined form, creates the object, and the
+perception, that
+
+                     'Truth and good are one,
+  And beauty dwells in them, and they in her.'
+    AKENSIDE.
+
+But, though all truth resolves into one truth, one beauty, one
+good, as all colours resolve into one light; though the scientifical
+intellectual colours, classes, or leading principles of science, the
+_physical_, the _moral_, the _metaphysical_, &c. &c. resolve into
+intellectual light, beauty, or good; it is, I imagine, the moral
+truth, that is the characteristic truth of beauty: for, were we to
+analyse the pleasing emotions we feel at the sight of beauty, we
+should, I imagine, find them composed of our most refined moral
+affections; and hence the universal interesting charm of beauty. And,
+as those affections refine by culture, hence the different degrees of
+the sentiments which beauty creates in the rustic, and in the man of
+taste. The former perceives only the physical charm of beauty, the
+freshness of colour, the bloom of youth, &c. but, to the man of taste,
+the physical pleases only through the medium of the moral: _the body
+charms because the soul is seen_; beauty, in his breast, is the source
+from whence _endless streams of fair ideas flow_, extending throughout
+the whole region of taste, no object of which but is more or less
+related to the principles of human beauty. But taste, though a subject
+almost inseparable from that of beauty, I must forbear to enlarge upon
+in this chapter, as I propose to make it the particular subject of my
+next.
+
+It is but at that period, at which we begin to perceive the charms of
+moral virtue, that we begin to perceive the real charms of beauty. It
+is true, a man may attain, by experience, the knowledge of its just
+proportions; without that concomitant sentiment. He may be unconscious
+of the characteristic moral charm resulting from the whole. And
+an artist, I imagine, by the habitual practice of the rules which
+constitute beauty, may produce forms which charm the moral sense of
+others, without being conscious of it himself; the utmost limit of
+the rules of the imitative arts being so intimately united with the
+intuitive principles of taste, or refined moral sense, that the mind
+in general cannot distinguish where the one ends or the other begins.
+The artist, who separates them, _leans on the second cause_ instead of
+the first.
+
+As the strongest proof that the moral sense is the governing principle
+of beauty, we may remark, that the human form, from infancy to
+old age, has its peculiar beauty annexed to it from the virtue
+or affection that nature gives it, and which it exhibits in the
+countenance. The negative virtue, innocence, is the beauty of the
+child. The more formed virtues, benevolence, generosity, compassion,
+&c. are the virtues of youth, and its beauty. The fixed and determined
+virtues, justice, temperance, fortitude, &c. compose the beauty of
+manhood. The philosophic and religious cast of countenance is the
+beauty of old age. Now, were any of these expressions misapplied, i.e.
+commuted, they would disgust rather than please: without congruity
+there could be no virtue; without virtue, no beauty, no sentiment of
+taste.
+
+And thus the beauty of each sex is seen only through the medium of
+the virtues belonging to each. The beauty of the masculine sex is seen
+only through the medium of the masculine virtues; the beauty of the
+feminine only through the medium of the feminine. The moral sense
+gives each its distinct portion of the same virtues, but draws a line
+which neither can pass without a diminution of their specific
+beauty. The softness and mildness of the feminine expression would
+be displeasing in a man. The robust and determined expression of
+the rigid virtues, justice, fortitude, &c. would be displeasing in a
+woman. However perfect the Form, if an incongruity that touches the
+well-being of humanity mingles with the idea, the Form will not afford
+the pleasing perception of beauty: though the eye may be capable of
+seeing its regularity, &c. so far is it from pleasing, that it is
+the more disgusting from its semblance to virtue, because that that
+semblance is a contradiction to her laws.
+
+May it not be owing to these expressions, so familiar to every eye,
+that the general sense of good taste eternally exists? They are the
+legible characters of human excellence, no where visible but in the
+human countenance, every observation of which improves and confirms
+the moral sentiment, or image of beauty, implanted by nature in the
+mind of man.
+
+The origin of the idea of beauty is the same in every breast, savage
+and civilized. Every nation's characteristic Form or expression of
+beauty will be a representation, or portrait, of their characteristic
+virtue, their happiness, their good. Thus, in the opinion of the wild
+savage, that face or form will be the most beautiful that assimilates
+with his idea of savage virtues, corporeal strength, courage, &c.
+_perfections that are placed in bones and nerves_: as that of the most
+cultivated nations, witness the Grecians, will indicate or portray the
+most refined mental virtues. And hence we may conclude, if there be
+any dignity, any truth, any beauty, in virtue, there must be a _real_
+difference, _superior_ and _inferior_ characteristic power of pleasing
+in the exterior of the human form.
+
+It is cultivation that gives birth to beauty as well as to virtue,
+by calling forth the visible object to correspond with the invisible
+intellectual object. In the face or form of an idiot, or the lowest
+rustic, there is no beauty; and, supposing a nation of idiots, and
+that they never could improve in mental beauty, they never could, I
+imagine, improve in corporeal, even though their natural form was upon
+an equality with the rest of mankind; for, without sentiment, they
+could not only be incapable of expressing any sentiment analogous to
+beauty, but, wanting the surrounding influence of a moral system, i.e.
+of the general influence of education on the exterior, they could not
+suppress or veil a semblance incongruous with beauty. What no person
+felt no person could teach.
+
+In cultivated nations, every precept for exterior appearance, from the
+first rudiments of the dancing-master to the motion of grace, has for
+its object _mind_, that is, a desire to impress upon the spectator a
+favourable idea of our mental character; but, passed the true point of
+cultivation, they lose with the sentiment of mental excellence that of
+true beauty; witness the exterior artificial appearance of humanity
+in a neighbouring nation, which probably is on a par with the most
+uncultivated rustic. The one does not enough for nature, the other
+too much. But, as the former has an object before him, to which nature
+herself directs him, the other is receding from it; and, as it is more
+agreeable, more easy, and more natural, to the human mind, to learn
+than to unlearn, I should sooner expect the most uncultivated nation,
+the negro excepted, to arrive at taste in true beauty than them. The
+negro-race seems to be the farthest removed from the line of true
+cultivation of any of the human species; their defect of form and
+complexion being, I imagine, as strong an obstacle to their acquiring
+true taste (the produce of mental cultivation) as any natural defect
+they may have in their intellectual faculties. For if, as I have
+observed, the total want of cultivation would preclude external
+beauty, the total want of external beauty would preclude the power
+of cultivation. It appears to me inconceivable, that the negro-race
+supposing their mental powers were upon a level with other nations,
+could ever arrive at true taste, when their eye is accustomed _only_
+to objects so diametrically opposite to taste as the face and form of
+negroes are! Our being used or not used to the object cannot make us
+perceive any similarity in the lineaments of their countenance to the
+lineaments, if I may so say, of our refined virtues and affections,
+which alone constitute beauty; and therefore I am induced to believe
+that they are a lower order of human beings than the Europeans.
+
+Beauty is an assemblage of every human charm; yet what we call the
+_agreeable_ is often more captivating.
+
+The agreeable, in person, is composed of beauties and defects, as is
+the common form, but differently composed. The beauties and defects
+of the latter are blended into the idea of mediocrity; those of the
+former are always distinct and perceptible, contrasting each other,
+they engage the attention, and create a kind of pleasing _re-creation_
+to the mental faculties; and, in proportion as we can bring them
+to unite with our governing principles of pleasure, they create
+affection, which gives the person a more fascinating charm than beauty
+itself.
+
+It is the mental character that is the moving principle of affection;
+and any strong peculiarity, that contradicts not the moral sense,
+i.e. that is not _unnatural_, gives the object an accessary charm, and
+raises the affection to passion. The object is at once the common and
+the uncommon; an union, which constitutes all we call excellent, all
+we admire!
+
+The perception of the charms of the agreeable seem to be wrought up
+to excellence by the operation of our own powers. We ourselves
+have blended its beauties and defects into the sentiment of beauty,
+_pleasure_; and hence, probably, the strength and durability of the
+passion which it creates. Beauty, on the contrary, is composed to our
+hands, _full_, _perfect_, and _intire_; its idea is also a compound of
+the common and the uncommon, being at once like and unlike the general
+form; but inherently it has no contrast, and therefore affords no
+recreation, no pleasing exercise, to the mental faculties; there is
+nothing to re-create, nothing to wish; and hence the instability
+of the passion which it inspires. Perfect beauty is, like perfect
+happiness, lost as soon as it is attained.
+
+It is, I imagine, to the principles of the masculine and the feminine
+character, that we owe the perception of beauty or taste, in any
+object whatever, throughout all nature and all art that imitates
+nature; and, in objects which differ from the human form, the
+principles must be in the extreme, because the object is then merely
+symbolical. Thus, the meekness of the lamb, and the high-spirited
+prancing steed; the gentle dove, and the impetuous eagle; the placid
+lake, and the swelling ocean; the lowly valley, and the aspiring
+mountain. It is the feminine character that is the sweetest, the most
+interesting, image of beauty; the masculine partakes of the sublime.
+Thus it will be found, that, in every object that is universally
+pleasing, there exist principles which are analogous to those that
+constitute beauty in the human species; and that its appearance does
+always, in some degree, move the affections, though the mind may be
+unconscious of its similitude to any idea in which the affections are
+concerned. But the test of the object's possessing the principles
+of beauty is when we are able to assimilate its appearance with
+some amiable interesting affection; and, according as that affection
+prevails in the breast of the spectator, it will appear with an
+additional power of pleasing.
+
+From association of ideas, any object may be pleasing, though
+absolutely devoid of beauty, and displeasing with it. The form is
+_then_ out of the question; it is some _real_ good or evil, with which
+the object, but not its form, is associated.
+
+It is observable, that those animals I have mentioned (and I imagine
+all animals that are symbolical of our affections have the same) have
+a double character of beauty, or reference to the affection that is
+moved: i.e. their form and their disposition, exactly corresponding
+with each other. Probably on that union depends their power of
+pleasing; their _form alone_, so different from human beauty, could
+not sufficiently engage the attention, or afford the interesting
+perception, which the consistency of truth does, in the _intire_ of an
+object.
+
+Every object of taste has _at least_ a double reference to mental
+pleasure, whether the object, in the philosophical scale of our
+perceptions, belongs to those of _sense_ or _intellect_. Thus, the
+beauty of the rose would not certainly be so perceptible to us,
+wanting its fragrance, and, with a nauseous smell, would not probably
+be admitted, as I may say, into the rank of _agreeableness_, though
+it is in reality a beautiful and pleasing object; nor, supposing the
+thistle, or any other ugly flower, possessed of the fragrance of the
+rose, should we therefore think it an object of taste, any more than
+we can think the form of an elephant beautiful, though endued with
+almost intellectual beauty.
+
+In the form and colour of flowers, there appears to me a striking
+analogy to the character of human beauty. They afford an ocular
+demonstration, in the pleasure with which we contemplate their
+particular forms, that the pleasure, we receive from the beauty of the
+human form, originates from mental character: witness the charm of
+the infant, innocence of the snow-drop, of the soft elegance of the
+hyacinth, &c. and, on the contrary, our dis-relish of the gaudy tulip,
+the robust, unmeaning, masculine, piony, hollyhock, &c. &c.
+
+It is, I imagine, from a resemblance to some pre-conceived idea of
+beauty in the human species, that we are particularly pleased with
+the sight of one flower more than with another, though the mind
+is unconscious of the cause. And thus the pleasure, caused by the
+apparent beauty of every object throughout the system of human
+perception, is, according to my sentiment of that pleasure, the same
+intellectual principle, _moral good_, however diversified, modified,
+and diminished, even to an unconsciousness or almost imperceptible
+degree of relation to it. In fine, the true principles of beauty, in
+every object, may be all _resolved_ into the same principle. But to
+conclude.
+
+I have no more doubt that the principles of beauty are moral, than
+that the principles of happiness are moral. It is the perception of
+true beauty, in its various modifications, that makes up the sum
+of human happiness; and hence the diversity of opinions concerning
+beauty, but which, however diverse, are never contradictory, but as
+mens opinions in morals are so; for every view of beauty assimilates
+with some good, and of course must be in unison.
+
+If, in the human system, there exists a principle which constitutes
+true pleasure, that principle must be that which constitutes human
+excellence; and, if the visible object which excites true pleasure
+must necessarily possess the principles of true pleasure, then must
+every object, which universally and invariably pleases, be relative to
+the principle that constitutes human excellence, morality.
+
+Whatever appears, to each individual, the most excellent in the human
+system, at once constitutes his idea of _happiness_, of _morality_,
+and of _beauty_; and all mankind, I imagine, would agree in the same
+idea, had all the same opportunities of seeing and knowing what was
+excellent.
+
+As I imagine the difference in national beauty is marked by the
+difference in national morals, so, of course, must the difference of
+the opinions of individuals on the subject of beauty be. In fine,
+as the moral sense of mankind is coarse or refined, so will be their
+taste of beauty.
+
+Of this I am certain, that true refinement is the effect of true
+virtue; that virtue is truth, and good; and that beauty dwells in
+them, and they in her.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+On TASTE.
+
+
+Taste seems to be an inherent impulsive tendency of the soul towards
+true good, given by nature to all alike, and which improves in its
+sentiment as the reasoning faculties improve in their knowledge of
+what _is_ true good.
+
+All the human faculties are, as one may say, constituents of the
+principle or faculty of taste. But its perception seems to be shared
+between the judgement and the imagination: to the former seems to
+belong the truth, or good, of an object of taste; to the latter its
+beauty or grace; and the stamina vitae, or radical principles of taste,
+exist, I imagine, in the natural affections of the soul.
+
+What the impulsive spring is, which moves the affections invariably to
+perceive pleasure in the perception of good and beauty, and disgust
+in the perception of evil or deformity, I leave to my metaphysical
+readers to determine. I am afraid to give it an appellation so
+incongruous to the general idea of taste, as that of conscience.
+
+Yet, however absurd it may appear, I will venture to say, that, if
+my readers will give themselves the trouble to analyse the grateful
+sensation or sentiment, we call _taste_ i.e. their sentiment of what
+is truly good, beautiful, right, just, ornamental, honourable, &c.
+&c. they will find it to originate from, and end in, some moral or
+religious principle. Indeed, some objects (the highest in the scale of
+our perceptions of excellence) bring with them an immediate conviction
+of the truth of this assertion; witness the devotional sentiment which
+the view of the main ocean inspires; the rising and setting sun; the
+contemplation of the celestial orbs, &c. witness the noblest object
+of the creation, when viewed in his highest character. Does not the
+perception of human excellence immediately relate to the source of all
+excellence?
+
+The general diffusion of intellectual light, throughout mankind,
+constitutes rationality; and the aggregated excellence, or light of
+rationality, constitutes morality. It is, I imagine, in this second
+or purified light, that taste begins to exist. It is at this period of
+cultivation that the mind begins to perceive its true good; that the
+natural affections rectify, methodize, and refine, in a word, become
+moral affections, through whose medium, i.e. the _moral sense_, the
+soul perceives every object of taste.
+
+Taste is intellectual pleasure, an approving sense of truth, of good,
+and of beauty. The latter seems the visible or ostensible principle
+of the two former, and is that in which the universal idea of taste is
+comprised. All are pleased with the sight of beauty; but all are by
+no means sensible that the principles that make it pleasing, that
+constitute a form beautiful, are those, or, to be more intelligible,
+relate to those, that constitute man's highest excellence, his first
+interest, his chief good. Few, indeed, even among those who possess
+taste, if they have not accustomed themselves to investigate its
+principles, will readily conceive that they are thus deeply rooted
+in the mental frame. Indeed, the generality of mankind seem rather to
+think that taste has no principles at all, or, if any, that they begin
+and end with the prevailing mode, fashion, &c. of the times; a notion
+which, though in the highest degree absurd, corroborates my opinion,
+that the universal perception of taste (the true and the false) exists
+in the idea of honour.
+
+The compound word, or phrase, _le vrai ideal_, universally adopted to
+denote an object of taste, is the most exact and literal definition of
+its sentiment that can be conceived; for it implies the union of
+the judgement and the imagination, without which there could be no
+sentiment of taste. The judgement, as I observed, perceives the truth
+of the object, the imagination its beauty; they may be said to relate
+to each other, in the perception of an object of taste, as a luminous
+polish does to the substance from whence it proceeds: the substance
+can exist without its polish, but the polish cannot exist without its
+substance. The perception of taste seems to me, if I may so express
+myself, to be illusive, but not erroneous; in a word, to exist in our
+idea of true honour, i.e. in the polish, lustre, or ornament, of true
+virtue.
+
+As the universal idea or sentiment of taste is honour, so the
+universal object of its perception is ornament, from the object, whose
+excellence we contemplate as an ornament or honour to human nature, to
+every object which in the slightest degree indicates the influence
+of that excellence. Take away the idea of that influence in the moral
+sphere, and taste is annihilated; and, in the natural sphere, take
+away the idea of divine influence, and taste cannot exist. Every
+sentiment of taste, as I observed before, ultimately relates to the
+one or to the other of these principles; indeed, strictly speaking, as
+the moral relates to the divine, it may be said ultimately to do the
+same.
+
+In the progress of civilization, the polishing principle, which I call
+taste, is chiefly found in the highest sphere of life, highest both
+for internal and external advantages, wealth accelerates the last
+degree of cultivation, by giving efficacy to the principles of true
+honour; but it also accelerates its corruption, by giving efficacy
+to the principles of false honour, by which the true loses its
+distinction, becomes less and less apparent, nay, by degrees, less and
+less real. Wealth becoming the object of honour, every principle of
+true taste must be reversed. Hence the _dire polish_ of the obdurate
+heart, repelling the force of nature. Hence avarice and profusion,
+dissipation, luxurious banqueting, &c. supersede the love of oeconomy,
+domestic comfort, the sweet reciprocation of the natural affections,
+&c. &c. Hence the greatest evils of society: the sorrows of the
+virtuous poor, _the spurns that patient merit of the unworthy takes_,
+in a word, the general corruption of morals, and, of course, of true
+taste!
+
+The vulgar, who are strangers to the internal principles of honour,
+always annex their ideas of taste to the external appearances of the
+highest rank of life, which being easily acquired, particularly that
+of dress, the prevalency of modes and fashions, however absurd,
+is universally adopted. Those of false taste adopt them to attract
+notice; those of true taste, to avoid it. But, at this present, the
+difficulty of avoiding singularity in dress is, I imagine, much to be
+lamented by women of taste and virtue, the prevailing mode of feminine
+attire being diametrically opposite to every principle of feminine
+excellence; a melancholy proof of our being arrived at the last stage
+of depravity!
+
+I could expatiate largely on this subject, but it would be
+inconsistent with my plan, which the reader may perceive, throughout
+the whole work, to be a mere outline only.
+
+The three grand co-existing principles of taste, virtue, honour, and
+ornament, run through all its perceptions. Their triple union cannot
+be broken; but taste is nominally distinguished by the one or the
+other, according as its objects, situations, circumstances, &c. vary.
+Ornament and honour seem the public character of taste; virtue to be
+the private and domestic, where, though unperceived by the vulgar,
+to the eye of taste[A] she appears in her highest ornament, highest
+honour.
+
+[Footnote A: Truth can only judge itself. BACON.]
+
+Taste seems to comprize three orders or degrees in its universal
+comprehension.
+
+The first is composed of those objects which immediately relate to the
+divinity, among which man claims the preeminence, when viewed in his
+highest character: witness the inexpressible charm which the natural
+virtuous affections of the soul inspire, when moved by some strong
+impulse, such as parental tenderness, filial piety, friendship, &c.
+&c. &c. Do they not unite the moral sentiment to the divine?
+
+The second is in the immediate external effects of true taste, or
+moral virtue, in the social sphere; the order, beauty, and honour,
+which every object derives from its influence; and, of course, its
+sentiment must be intimately related to moral excellence.
+
+The third and last degree is general ornament and honour, appearing
+in fashions, arts of decoration, &c. &c. objects which seeming not
+immediately to affect the interests of humanity, the taste they
+exhibit in this sphere appears as an uncertain light, sometimes bright
+and sometimes obscured; or rather as refracted rays of taste, broken
+by the general love of novelty and superfluity; two principles which,
+though they are, to a certain degree, essential to exterior ornament,
+and the sentiment of true taste, are those in which taste always
+begins to corrupt. To illustrate my meaning: true ornament seems
+equally to partake of the idea of utility and superfluity, and every
+sentiment of taste seems equally to partake of the idea of novelty and
+of custom; for, were the object perfectly familiar to us, we should
+feel no degree of admiration, without which we could feel no sentiment
+of taste; and, were it totally new, unlike any thing we had ever seen,
+it would excite wonder instead of admiration, which is a sentiment as
+distant from taste as the love of fame is from the love of honour.
+
+This sphere, the last in my scale of the perceptions of taste, and
+which borders upon every thing that is contrary to its laws, is
+properly the sphere of Fancy, who seems an undisciplined offspring of
+Taste; sometimes sporting within the bounds of parental authority, and
+sometimes beyond them. Fancy seems to bear the same affinity to Taste
+as Pleasure does to Happiness.
+
+Every object of taste is relative to some principle of excellence
+from which it derives its power of pleasing; of course, the highest
+sentiment of taste must exist in the relative principle to our highest
+object of excellence.
+
+True ornament is, to the eye, what eloquence is to the ear: their
+principles throughout are one, the truth or beauty of which exists in
+its exact relation or adaptation to the object it adorns, constituting
+the _just_, the _true_, the _beautiful_, objects, or qualities,
+which, in the conscious eye of taste, _relate_ to moral beauty. The
+perception of the first relation, i.e. the adaptation of any thing
+ornamental to the object it adorns, may, in a great measure, be
+learned by habit and general observation; but the higher relation,
+the second concoction (as one may say) of its principles, the moral
+relation, is the immediate operation of taste.
+
+Ornament and harmonious sound are pleasing to the corporeal sense,
+but, when wanting a relative object, please but for a short time; and,
+if incongruously joined to an object, i.e. to one with which it can
+have no relation, will, as soon as the understanding perceives the
+incongruity, become a principle of disgust.
+
+As the virtues differ, in some degree, as the character of the sexes
+differ,[A] of course so must the sentiment of taste differ. To the
+man I would give the laws of taste; to the woman, its sensibility. The
+taste of the former seems more derived from reason; that of the
+latter from instinct: witness their impulsive maternal affection; that
+inherent ornament of their sex, modesty; their tender susceptibility
+of the benevolent virtues, pity, compassion, &c. &c.
+
+[Footnote A: Vide page 23.]
+
+Taste, however, is as far removed from mere instinct as from mere
+reason. I only mean to say, that the taste of the masculine character
+is rather on the side of reason, or the understanding; that of the
+feminine on the side of instinct, and, let me add, imagination. The
+taste of the one and of the other seems to differ as justice does from
+mercy, as modesty from virtue, as grace from sublimity, &c. &c. And,
+as exterior feminine grace is the most perfect visible object of
+taste, the highest degree of feminine excellence, externally and
+internally united, must of course constitute woman, the most perfect
+existing object of taste in the creation.
+
+The cultivation of the social moral affections is the cultivation
+of taste, and the domestic sphere is the true and almost only one
+in which it can appear in its highest dignity. It is peculiarly
+appropriated to feminine taste, and I may say it is _absolutely_
+the only one in which it can appear in its true lustre. True taste,
+particularly the feminine, is retired, calm, modest; it is the private
+honour of the heart, and is, I imagine, incompatible with the love of
+fame.
+
+In the present state of society, taste seems to be equally excluded
+from the highest and from the lowest sphere of life. The one seems
+to be too much encumbered with artificial imaginary necessities; the
+other too much encumbered with the real and natural necessities of
+life, to attend to its cultivation. It is in the former that taste is
+universally thought to reside, which is because the idea of taste
+is inseparable from that of honour. It is that, indeed, in which the
+general taste of the nation is exhibited. It is its _face_, as I may
+say, which expresses the internal character of the heart.
+
+In this sphere, namely, the most exalted station of mankind, what true
+taste it does exhibit is placed in the strongest point of view; its
+contrary principles are also the same, particularly so to those who
+have been rightly educated at a distance from it; to such, the wrong
+will instruct as much as the right; but sure I am, that it is not,
+at this _period_, the proper sphere for the infant mind to expand and
+improve in. The wrong will be too familiar to the mind to disgust;
+and the right, which I imagine is chiefly confined to the _records_
+of taste in the fine arts, will be too remote (wanting the preparatory
+love of nature and virtue) to please.
+
+It is not, I imagine, from objects of excellence in the arts, that
+the mind receives the first impressions of taste, though from them
+the impressions, we have already received, may be strengthened and
+improved. The truths they exhibit awaken the recollection of what
+has pleased us in nature; and we exult in the confirmation of our
+judgement and taste on finding those objects represented, by genius,
+in their best and fairest light. Of course, the excellence we perceive
+in the fine arts, which is always relative to moral excellence, must
+tend to the improvement of taste.[A]
+
+[Footnote A: L'esprit de l'homme est naturellement plein d'un nombre
+infini d'idees confuses du vrai, que souvent il n'entrevoit qu'a demi;
+et rien ne lui est plus agreable, que lorsqu'on lui offre quelqu'une
+de ces idees bien eclaircie et mise dans un beau jour. BOILEAU,
+Preface.]
+
+But, though the arts are thus beneficial to the growing principles
+of taste, reflecting a few individuals, it is well known that their
+establishment in every nation has had a contrary effect on the
+community in general; for, in proportion to the encouragement given
+them, as that encouragement immediately promotes two of the most
+pernicious principles that can affect the human heart, the most
+destructive of moral virtue, namely, the love of fame and the love of
+riches, the general diffusion of corruption must ensue, and of course
+the extinction of the natural principles of taste, or relish of the
+human soul of what is truly beautiful, truly honourable, truly good.
+
+To conclude. I will not presume to say, that a man without taste is
+without virtue; but I think I may venture to say, that it is only
+as he can have virtue without loving virtue, that he can have virtue
+without having taste; the definition of taste being, according to my
+apprehension of its perception, the _love_ of virtue. And, as that
+love springs from, and tends to, the source of all virtue, all good,
+may I not add, that it is but as a man can be religious without
+devotion, that a man can be religious without taste? the sentiment
+of devotion seeming to be, an aggregation of our most virtuous, most
+refined, conscious, energies of soul, in the awful vertical point of
+sublimity.
+
+  'From thee, great God, we spring, to thee we tend,
+  Path, motive, guide, original, and end!'
+
+    JOHNSON.
+
+
+THE END.
+
+
+
+
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+Library, 2205 West Adams Blvd., Los Angeles 18, California.
+Correspondence concerning editoral matters may be addressed to any of
+the general editors. Membership fee continues $2.50 per year. British
+and European subscribers should address B.H. Blackwell, Broad Street,
+Oxford, England. 
+
+
+Publications for the fifth year [1950-1951]
+
+(_At least six items, most of them from the following list, will be
+reprinted.)
+
+FRANCES REYNOLDS (?): _An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste,
+and of the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty, &c._ (1785). Introduction by
+James L. Clifford.
+
+THOMAS BAKER: _The Fine Lady's Airs_ (1709). Introduction by John
+Harrington Smith.
+
+DANIEL DEFOE: _Vindication of the Press_ (1718). Introduction by Ortho
+Clinton Williams.
+
+JOHN EVELYN: _An Apologie for the Royal Party_ (1659); _A Panegyric to
+Charles the Second_ (1661). Introduction by Geoffery Keynes.
+
+CHARLES MACKLIN: _Man of the World_ (1781). Introduction by Dougald
+MacMillan.
+
+_Prefaces to Fiction_. Selected and with an Introduction by Benjamin
+Boyce.
+
+THOMAS SPRAT: _Poems_.
+
+SIR WILLIAM PETTY: _The Advice of W.P. to Mr. Samuel Hartlib for the
+Advancement of some particular Parts of Learning_ (1648).
+
+THOMAS GRAY: _An Elegy Wrote in a Country Church Yard_ (1751).
+(Facsimile of first edition and of portions of Gray's manuscripts of
+the poem).
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+  To the Augustan Reprint Society     _Subscriber's Name and Address:_
+  _William Andrews Clark Memorial Library
+  2205 West Adams Boulevard
+  Los Angeles 18, California_
+
+  _As_ MEMBERSHIP FEE _I enclose for the years marked:_
+  The current year                         $ 2.50
+  The current & the 4th year                 5.00
+  The current, 3rd, & 4th year               7.50
+  The current, 2nd, 3rd, & 4th year         10.00
+  The current, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, & 4th year    11.50
+    (_Publications no. 3 & 4 are out of print_)
+
+Make check or money order payable to THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
+OF CALIFORNIA.
+
+NOTE: _All income of the Society is devoted to defraying cost of
+printing and mailing_.
+
+_William Andrews Clark Memorial Library_
+
+
+PUBLICATIONS OF THE AUGUSTAN REPRINT SOCIETY
+
+
+First Year (1946-1947)
+
+1. Richard Blackmore's _Essay upon Wit_ (1716), and Addison's
+_Freeholder_ No. 45 (1716).
+
+2. Samuel Cobb's _Of Poetry_ and _Discourse on Criticism_ (1707).
+
+3. _Letter to A.H. Esq.; concerning the Stage_ (1698), and Richard
+Willis' _Occasional Paper No. IX_ (1698). (OUT OF PRINT)
+
+4. _Essay on Wit_ (1748), together with Characters by Flecknoe, and
+Joseph Warton's _Adventurer_ Nos. 127 and 133. (OUT OF PRINT)
+
+5. Samuel Wesley's _Epistle to a Friend Concerning Poetry_ (1700) and
+_Essay on Heroic Poetry_ (1693).
+
+6. _Representation of the Impiety and Immorality of the Stage_(1704)
+and _Some Thoughts Concerning the Stage_ (1704).
+
+
+Second Year (1947-1948)
+
+7. John Gay's _The Present State of Wit_ (1711); and a section on Wit
+from _The English Theophrastus_ (1702).
+
+8. Rapin's _De Carmine Pastorali_, translated by Creech (1684).
+
+9. T. Hanmer's (?) _Some Remarks on the Tragedy of Hamlet_ (1736).
+
+10. Corbyn Morris _Essay towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit,
+etc_. (1744).
+
+11. Thomas Purney's _Discourse on the Pastoral_ (1717).
+
+12. Essays on the Stage, selected, with an Introduction by Joseph Wood
+Krutch.
+
+
+Third Year (1948-1949)
+
+13. Sir John Falstaff (pseud.), _The Theatre_ (1720).
+
+14. Edward Moore's _The Gamester_ (1753).
+
+15. John Oldmixon's _Reflections on Dr. Swift's Letter to Harley_
+(1712); and Arthur Mainwaring's _The British Academy_ (1712).
+
+16. Nevil Payne's _Fatal Jealousy_ (1673).
+
+17. Nicholas Rowe's _Some Account of the Life of Mr. William
+Shakespear_ (1709).
+
+18. Aaron Hill's Preface to _The Creation_; and Thomas Brereton's
+Preface to _Esther_.
+
+
+Fourth Year (1949-1950)
+
+19. Susanna Centlivre's _The Busie Body_ (1709).
+
+20. Lewis Theobald's _Preface to The Works of Shakespeare_ (1734).
+
+21. _Critical Remarks on Sir Charles Gradison, Clarissa, and Pamela_
+(1754).
+
+22. Samuel Johnson's _The Vanity of Human Wishes_ (1749) and Two
+_Rambler_ papers (1750).
+
+23. John Dryden's _His Majesties Declaration Defended_ (1681).
+
+24. Pierre Nicole's _An Essay on True and Apparent Beauty in Which
+from Settled Principles is Rendered the Grounds for Choosing and
+Rejecting Epigrams_, translated by J.V. Cunningham.
+
+
+
+
+***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES
+OF TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY, ETC.***
+
+
+******* This file should be named 13485.txt or 13485.zip *******
+
+
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+https://www.gutenberg.org/1/3/4/8/13485
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