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diff --git a/old/1347-h.zip b/old/1347-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..24d39fc --- /dev/null +++ b/old/1347-h.zip diff --git a/old/1347-h/1347-h.htm b/old/1347-h/1347-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bc24565 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/1347-h/1347-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,6010 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> + <head> + <title> + A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson, by Edouard Le Roy + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} + +</style> + </head> + <body> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + +Project Gutenberg's A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson, by Edouard le Roy + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson + +Author: Edouard le Roy + +Translator: Vincent Benson + +Release Date: August 13, 2008 [EBook #1347] +Last Updated: February 7, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A NEW PHILOSOPHY: HENRI BERGSON *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + A NEW PHILOSOPHY: HENRI BERGSON + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + by Edouard le Roy + </h2> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Translated from the French by Vincent Benson + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> <a name="link2H_PREF" id="link2H_PREF"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Preface + </h2> + <p> + This little book is due to two articles published under the same title in + the "Revue des Deux Mondes", 1st and 15th February 1912. + </p> + <p> + Their object was to present Mr Bergson's philosophy to the public at + large, giving as short a sketch as possible, and describing, without too + minute details, the general trend of his movement. These articles I have + here reprinted intact. But I have added, in the form of continuous notes, + some additional explanations on points which did not come within the scope + of investigation in the original sketch. + </p> + <p> + I need hardly add that my work, though thus far complete, does not in any + way claim to be a profound critical study. Indeed, such a study, dealing + with a thinker who has not yet said his last word, would today be + premature. I have simply aimed at writing an introduction which will make + it easier to read and understand Mr Bergson's works, and serve as a + preliminary guide to those who desire initiation in the new philosophy. + </p> + <p> + I have therefore firmly waived all the paraphernalia of technical + discussions, and have made no comparisons, learned or otherwise, between + Mr Bergson's teaching and that of older philosophies. + </p> + <p> + I can conceive no better method of misunderstanding the point at issue, I + mean the simple unity of productive intuition, than that of pigeon-holing + names of systems, collecting instances of resemblance, making up + analogies, and specifying ingredients. An original philosophy is not meant + to be studied as a mosaic which takes to pieces, a compound which + analyses, or a body which dissects. On the contrary, it is by considering + it as a living act, not as a rather clever discourse, by examining the + peculiar excellence of its soul rather than the formation of its body, + that the inquirer will succeed in understanding it. Properly speaking, I + have only applied to Mr Bergson the method which he himself justifiably + prescribes in a recent article ("Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale", + November 1911), the only method, in fact, which is in all senses of the + word fully "exact." I shall none the less be glad if these brief pages can + be of any interest to professional philosophers, and have endeavoured, as + far as possible, to allow them to trace, under the concise formulae + employed, the scheme which I have refused to develop. + </p> + <p> + It has become evident to me that even today the interpretation of Mr + Bergson's position is in many cases full of faults, which it would + undoubtedly be worth while to assist in removing. I may or may not have + succeeded in my attempt, but such, at any rate, is the precise end I had + in view. + </p> + <p> + In conclusion, I may say that I have not had the honour of being Mr + Bergson's pupil; and, at the time when I became acquainted with his + outlook, my own direct reflection on science and life had already produced + in me similar trains of thought. I found in his work the striking + realisation of a presentiment and a desire. This "correspondence," which I + have not exaggerated, proved at once a help and a hindrance to me in + entering into the exact comprehension of so profoundly original a + doctrine. The reader will thus understand that I think it in place to + quote my authority to him in the following lines which Mr Bergson kindly + wrote me after the publication of the articles reproduced in this volume: + "Underneath and beyond the method you have caught the intention and the + spirit...Your study could not be more conscientious or true to the + original. As it advances, condensation increases in a marked degree: the + reader becomes aware that the explanation is undergoing a progressive + involution similar to the involution by which we determine the reality of + Time. To produce this feeling, much more has been necessary than a close + study of my works: it has required deep sympathy of thought, the power, in + fact, of rethinking the subject in a personal and original manner. Nowhere + is this sympathy more in evidence than in your concluding pages, where in + a few words you point out the possibilities of further developments of the + doctrine. In this direction I should myself say exactly what you have + said." + </p> + <p> + Paris, 28th March 1912. + </p> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h2> + Contents + </h2> + <table summary="" style="margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto"> + <tr> + <td> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_PREF"> Preface </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> GENERAL VIEW </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0003"> I. Method. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0004"> II. Teaching. </a> + </p> + <br /> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0005"> ADDITIONAL EXPLANATIONS </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0006"> I. Mr Bergson's Work and the General + Directions of Contemporary Thought. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0007"> II. Immediacy. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0008"> III. Theory of Perception. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0009"> IV. Critique of Language. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0010"> V. The Problem of Consciousness. Duration + and Liberty. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0011"> VI. The Problem of Evolution: Life and + Matter. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0012"> VII. The Problem of Knowledge: Analysis + and Intuition. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0013"> VIII. Conclusion. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0014"> Index. </a> + </p> + </td> + </tr> + </table> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <h2> + GENERAL VIEW + </h2> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> <br /><br /> + </p> + <h2> + I. Method. + </h2> + <p> + There is a thinker whose name is today on everybody's lips, who is deemed + by acknowledged philosophers worthy of comparison with the greatest, and + who, with his pen as well as his brain, has overleapt all technical + obstacles, and won himself a reading both outside and inside the schools. + Beyond any doubt, and by common consent, Mr Henri Bergson's work will + appear to future eyes among the most characteristic, fertile, and glorious + of our era. It marks a never-to-be-forgotten date in history; it opens up + a phase of metaphysical thought; it lays down a principle of development + the limits of which are indeterminable; and it is after cool + consideration, with full consciousness of the exact value of words, that + we are able to pronounce the revolution which it effects equal in + importance to that effected by Kant, or even by Socrates. + </p> + <p> + Everybody, indeed, has become aware of this more or less clearly. Else how + are we to explain, except through such recognition, the sudden striking + spread of this new philosophy which, by its learned rigorism, precluded + the likelihood of so rapid a triumph? + </p> + <p> + Twenty years have sufficed to make its results felt far beyond traditional + limits: and now its influence is alive and working from one pole of + thought to the other; and the active leaven contained in it can be seen + already extending to the most varied and distant spheres: in social and + political spheres, where from opposite points, and not without certain + abuses, an attempt is already being made to wrench it in contrary + directions; in the sphere of religious speculation, where it has been more + legitimately summoned to a distinguished, illuminative, and beneficent + career; in the sphere of pure science, where, despite old separatist + prejudices, the ideas sown are pushing up here and there; and lastly, in + the sphere of art, where there are indications that it is likely to help + certain presentiments, which have till now remained obscure, to become + conscious of themselves. The moment is favourable to a study of Mr + Bergson's philosophy; but in the face of so many attempted methods of + employment, some of them a trifle premature, the point of paramount + importance, applying Mr Bergson's own method to himself, is to study his + philosophy in itself, for itself, in its profound trend and its + authenticated action, without claiming to enlist it in the ranks of any + cause whatsoever. + </p> + <p> + I. + </p> + <p> + Mr Bergson's readers will undergo at almost every page they read an + intense and singular experience. The curtain drawn between ourselves and + reality, enveloping everything including ourselves in its illusive folds, + seems of a sudden to fall, dissipated by enchantment, and display to the + mind depths of light till then undreamt, in which reality itself, + contemplated face to face for the first time, stands fully revealed. The + revelation is overpowering, and once vouchsafed will never afterwards be + forgotten. + </p> + <p> + Nothing can convey to the reader the effects of this direct and intimate + mental vision. Everything which he thought he knew already finds new birth + and vigour in the clear light of morning: on all hands, in the glow of + dawn, new intuitions spring up and open out; we feel them big with + infinite consequences, heavy and saturated with life. Each of them is no + sooner blown than it appears fertile for ever. And yet there is nothing + paradoxical or disturbing in the novelty. It is a reply to our + expectation, an answer to some dim hope. So vivid is the impression of + truth, that afterwards we are even ready to believe we recognise the + revelation as if we had always darkly anticipated it in some mysterious + twilight at the back of consciousness. + </p> + <p> + Afterwards, no doubt, in certain cases, incertitude reappears, sometimes + even decided objections. The reader, who at first was under a magic spell, + corrects his thought, or at least hesitates. What he has seen is still at + bottom so new, so unexpected, so far removed from familiar conceptions. + For this surging wave of thought our mind contains none of those ready-cut + channels which render comprehension easy. But whether, in the long run, we + each of us give or refuse complete or partial adhesion, all of us, at + least, have received a regenerating shock, an internal upheaval not + readily silenced: the network of our intellectual habits is broken; + henceforth a new leaven works and ferments in us; we shall no longer think + as we used to think; and be we pupils or critics, we cannot mistake the + fact that we have here a principle of integral renewal for ancient + philosophy and its old and timeworn problems. + </p> + <p> + It is obviously impossible to sketch in brief all the aspects and all the + wealth of so original a work. Still less shall I be able to answer here + the many questions which arise. I must decide to pass rapidly over the + technical detail of clear, closely-argued, and penetrating discussions; + over the scope and exactness of the evidence borrowed from the most + diverse positive sciences; over the marvellous dexterity of the + psychological analysis; over the magic of a style which can call up what + words cannot express. The solidity of the construction will not be + evidenced in these pages, nor its austere and subtle beauty. But what I do + at all costs wish to bring out, in shorter form, in this new philosophy, + is its directing idea and general movement. + </p> + <p> + In such an undertaking, where the end is to understand rather than to + judge, criticism ought to take second place. It is more profitable to + attempt to feel oneself into the heart of the teaching, to relive its + genesis, to perceive the principle of organic unity, to come at the + mainspring. Let our reading be a course of meditation which we live. The + only true homage we can render to the masters of thought consists in + ourselves thinking, as far as we can do so, in their train, under their + inspiration, and along the paths which they have opened up. + </p> + <p> + In the case before us this road is landmarked by several books which it + will be sufficient to study one after the other, and take successively as + the text of our reflections. + </p> + <p> + In 1889 Mr Bergson made his appearance with an "Essay on the Immediate + Data of Consciousness". + </p> + <p> + This was his doctor's thesis. Taking up his position inside the human + personality, in its inmost mind, he endeavoured to lay hold of the depths + of life and free action in their commonly overlooked and fugitive + originality. + </p> + <p> + Some years later, in 1896, passing this time to the externals of + consciousness, the contact surface between things and the ego, he + published "Matter and Memory", a masterly study of perception and + recollection, which he himself put forward as an inquiry into the relation + between body and mind. In 1907 he followed with "Creative Evolution", in + which the new metaphysic was outlined in its full breadth, and developed + with a wealth of suggestion and perspective opening upon the distances of + infinity; universal evolution, the meaning of life, the nature of mind and + matter, of intelligence and instinct, were the great problems here + treated, ending in a general critique of knowledge and a completely + original definition of philosophy. + </p> + <p> + These will be our guides which we shall carefully follow, step by step. It + is not, I must confess, without some apprehension that I undertake the + task of summing up so much research, and of condensing into a few pages so + many and such new conclusions. + </p> + <p> + Mr Bergson excels, even on points of least significance, in producing the + feeling of unfathomed depths and infinite levels. Never has anyone better + understood how to fulfil the philosopher's first task, in pointing out the + hidden mystery in everything. With him we see all at once the concrete + thickness and inexhaustible extension of the most familiar reality, which + has always been before our eyes, where before we were aware only of the + external film. + </p> + <p> + Do not imagine that this is simply a poetical delusion. We must be + grateful if the philosopher uses exquisite language and writes in a style + which abounds in living images. These are rare qualities. But let us avoid + being duped by a show of printed matter: these unannotated pages are + supported by positive science submitted to the most minute inspection. One + day, in 1901, at the French Philosophical Society, Mr Bergson related the + genesis of "Matter and Memory". + </p> + <p> + "Twelve years or so before its appearance, I had set myself the following + problem: 'What would be the teaching of the physiology and pathology of + today upon the ancient question of the connection between physical and + moral to an unprejudiced mind, determined to forget all speculation in + which it has indulged on this point, determined also to neglect, in the + enunciations of philosophers, all that is not pure and simple statement of + fact?' I set myself to solve the problem, and I very soon perceived that + the question was susceptible of a provisional solution, and even of + precise formulation, only if restricted to the problem of memory. In + memory itself I was forced to determine bounds which I had afterwards to + narrow considerably. After confining myself to the recollection of words I + saw that the problem, as stated, was still too broad, and that, to put the + question in its most precise and interesting form, I should have to + substitute the recollection of the sound of words. The literature on + aphasia is enormous. I took five years to sift it. And I arrived at this + conclusion, that between the psychological fact and its corresponding + basis in the brain there must be a relation which answers to none of the + ready-made concepts furnished us by philosophy." + </p> + <p> + Certain characteristics of Mr Bergson's manner will be remarked + throughout: his provisional effort of forgetfulness to recreate a new and + untrammelled mind; his mixture of positive inquiry and bold invention; his + stupendous reading; his vast pioneer work carried on with indefatigable + patience; his constant correction by criticism, informed of the minutest + details and swift to follow up each of them at every turn. With a problem + which would at first have seemed secondary and incomplete, but which + reappears as the subject deepens and is thereby metamorphosed, he connects + his entire philosophy; and so well does he blend the whole and breathe + upon it the breath of life that the final statement leaves the reader with + an impression of sovereign ease. + </p> + <p> + Examples will be necessary to enable us, even to a feeble extent, to + understand this proceeding better. But before we come to examples, a + preliminary question requires examination. In the preface to his first + "Essay" Mr Bergson defined the principle of a method which was afterwards + to reappear in its identity throughout his various works; and we must + recall the terms he employed. + </p> + <p> + "We are forced to express ourselves in words, and we think, most often, in + space. To put it another way, language compels us to establish between our + ideas the same clear and precise distinctions, and the same break in + continuity, as between material objects. This assimilation is useful in + practical life and necessary in most sciences. But we are right in asking + whether the insuperable difficulties of certain philosophical problems do + not arise from the fact that we persist in placing non-spatial phenomena + next one another in space, and whether, if we did away with the vulgar + illustrations round which we dispute, we should not sometimes put an end + to the dispute." + </p> + <p> + That is to say, it is stated to be the philosopher's duty from the outset + to renounce the usual forms of analytic and synthetic thought, and to + achieve a direct intuitional effort which shall put him in immediate + contact with reality. Without doubt it is this question of method which + demands our first attention. It is the leading question. Mr Bergson + himself presents his works as "essays" which do not aim at "solving the + greatest problems all at once," but seek merely "to define the method and + disclose the possibility of applying it on some essential points." + (Preface to "Creative Evolution".) It is also a delicate question, for it + dominates all the rest, and decides whether we shall fully understand what + is to follow. + </p> + <p> + We must therefore pause here a moment. To direct us in this preliminary + study we have an admirable "Introduction to Metaphysis", which appeared as + an article in the "Metaphysical and Moral Review" (January 1903): a short + but marvellously suggestive memoire, constituting the best preface to the + reading of the books themselves. We may say in passing, that we should be + grateful to Mr Bergson if he would have it bound in volume form, along + with some other articles which are scarcely to be had at all today. + </p> + <p> + II. + </p> + <p> + Every philosophy, prior to taking shape in a group of co-ordinated theses, + presents itself, in its initial stage, as an attitude, a frame of mind, a + method. Nothing can be more important than to study this starting-point, + this elementary act of direction and movement, if we wish afterwards to + arrive at the precise shade of meaning of the subsequent teaching. Here is + really the fountain-head of thought; it is here that the form of the + future system is determined, and here that contact with reality takes + effect. + </p> + <p> + The last point, particularly, is vital. To return to the direct view of + things beyond all figurative symbols, to descend into the inmost depths of + being, to watch the throbbing life in its pure state, and listen to the + secret rhythm of its inmost breath, to measure it, at least so far as + measurement is possible, has always been the philosopher's ambition; and + the new philosophy has not departed from this ideal. But in what light + does it regard its task? That is the first point to clear up. For the + problem is complex, and the goal distant. + </p> + <p> + "We are made as much, and more, for action than for thought," says Mr + Bergson; "or rather, when we follow our natural impulse, it is to act that + we think." ("L'Evolution Creatrice", page 321.) And again, "What we + ordinarily call a fact is not reality such as it would appear to an + immediate intuition, but an adaptation of reality to practical interests + and the demands of social life." ("Matiere et Memoire", page 201.) Hence + the question which takes precedence of all others is: to distinguish in + our common representation of the world, the fact in its true sense from + the combinations which we have introduced in view of action and language. + </p> + <p> + Now, to rediscover nature in her fresh springs of reality, it is not + sufficient to abandon the images and conceptions invented by human + initiative; still less is it sufficient to fling ourselves into the + torrent of brute sensations. By so doing we are in danger of dissolving + our thought in dream or quenching it in night. + </p> + <p> + Above all, we are in danger of committal to a path which it is impossible + to follow. The philosopher is not free to begin the work of knowledge + again upon other planes, with a mind which would be adequate to the new + and virgin issue of a simple writ of oblivion. + </p> + <p> + At the time when critical reflection begins, we have already been long + engaged in action and science, by the training of individual life, as by + hereditary and racial experience, our faculties of perception and + conception, our senses and our understanding, have contracted habits, + which are by this time unconscious and instinctive; we are haunted by all + kinds of ideas and principles, so familiar today that they even pass + unobserved. But what is it all worth? + </p> + <p> + Does it, in its present state, help us to know the nature of a + disinterested intuition? + </p> + <p> + Nothing but a methodical examination of consciousness can tell us that; + and it will take more than a renunciation of explicit knowledge to + recreate in us a new mind, capable of grasping the bare fact exactly as it + is: what we require is perhaps a penetrating reform, a kind of conversion. + </p> + <p> + The rational and perceptive function we term our intelligence emerges from + darkness through a slowly lifting dawn. During this twilight period it has + lived, worked, acted, fashioned and informed itself. On the threshold of + philosophical speculation it is full of more or less concealed beliefs, + which are literally prejudices, and branded with a secret mark influencing + its every movement. Here is an actual situation. Exemption from it is + beyond anyone's province. Whether we will or no, we are from the beginning + of our inquiry immersed in a doctrine which disguises nature to us, and + already at bottom constitutes a complete metaphysic. This we term + common-sense, and positive science is itself only an extension and + refinement of it. What is the value of this work performed without clear + consciousness or critical attention? Does it bring us into true relation + with things, into relation with pure consciousness? + </p> + <p> + This is our first and inevitable doubt, which requires solution. + </p> + <p> + But it would be a quixotic proceeding first to make a void in our mind, + and afterwards to admit into it, one by one, after investigation, such and + such a concept, or such and such a principle. The illusion of the clean + sweep and total reconstruction can never be too vigorously condemned. + </p> + <p> + Is it from the void that we set out to think? Do we think in void, and + with nothing? Common ideas of necessity form the groundwork for the + broidery of our advanced thought. Further, even if we succeeded in our + impossible task, should we, in so doing, have corrected the causes of + error which are today graven upon the very structure of our intelligence, + such as our past life has made it? These errors would not cease to act + imperceptibly upon the work of revision intended to apply the remedy. + </p> + <p> + It is from within, by an effort of immanent purgation, that the necessary + reform must be brought about. And philosophy's first task is to institute + critical reflection upon the obscure beginnings of thought, with a view to + shedding light upon its spontaneous virgin condition, but without any vain + claim to lift it out of the current in which it is actually plunged. + </p> + <p> + One conclusion is already plain: the groundwork of common-sense is sure, + but the form is suspicious. + </p> + <p> + In common-sense is contained, at any rate virtually and in embryo, all + that can ever be attained of reality, for reality is verification, not + construction. + </p> + <p> + Everything has its starting-point in construction and verification. Thus + philosophical research can only be a conscious and deliberate return to + the facts of primal intuition. But common-sense, being prepossessed in a + practical direction, has doubtless subjected these facts to a process of + interested alteration, which is artificial in proportion to the labour + bestowed. Such is Mr Bergson's fundamental hypothesis, and it is + far-reaching. "Many metaphysical difficulties probably arise from our + habit of confounding speculation and practice; or of pushing an idea in + the direction of utility, when we think we fathom it in theory; or, + lastly, of employing in thought the forms of action." (Preface to "Matter + and Memory". First edition.) + </p> + <p> + The work of reform will consist therefore in freeing our intelligence from + its utilitarian habits, by endeavouring at the outset to become clearly + conscious of them. + </p> + <p> + Notice how far presumption is in favour of our hypothesis. Whether we + regard organic life in the genesis and preservation of the individual, or + in the evolution of species, we see its natural direction to be towards + utility: but the effort of thought comes after the effort of life; it is + not added from outside, it is the continuance and the flower of the former + effort. Must we not expect from this that it will preserve its former + habits? And what do we actually observe? The first gleam of human + intelligence in prehistoric times is revealed to us by an industry; the + cut flint of the primitive caves marks the first stage of the road which + was one day to end in the most sublime philosophies. Again, every science + has begun by practical arts. Indeed, our science of today, however + disinterested it may have become, remains none the less in close relation + with the demands of our action; it permits us to speak of and to handle + things rather than to see them in their intimate and profound nature. + Analysis, when applied to our operations of knowledge, shows us that our + understanding parcels out, arrests, and quantifies, whereas reality, as it + appears to immediate intuition, is a moving series, a flux of blended + qualities. + </p> + <p> + That is to say, our understanding solidifies all that it touches. Have we + not here exactly the essential postulates of action and speech? To speak, + as to act, we must have separable elements, terms and objects which remain + inert while the operation goes on, maintaining between themselves the + constant relations which find their most perfect and ideal presentment in + mathematics. + </p> + <p> + Everything tends, then, to incline us towards the hypothesis in question. + Let us regard it henceforward as expressing a fact. + </p> + <p> + The forms of knowledge elaborated by common-sense were not originally + intended to allow us to see reality as it is. + </p> + <p> + Their task was rather, and remains so, to enable us to grasp its practical + aspect. It is for that they are made, not for philosophical speculation. + </p> + <p> + Now these forms nevertheless have existed in us as inveterate habits, soon + becoming unconscious, even when we have reached the point of desiring + knowledge for its own sake. + </p> + <p> + But in this new stage they preserve the bias of their original utilitarian + function, and carry this mark with them everywhere, leaving it upon the + fresh tasks which we are fain to make them accomplish. + </p> + <p> + An inner reform is therefore imperative today, if we are to succeed in + unearthing and sifting, in our perception of nature, under the veinstone + of practical symbolism, the true intuitional content. + </p> + <p> + This attempt at return to the standpoint of pure contemplation and + disinterested experience is a task very different from the task of + science. It is one thing to regard more and more or less and less closely + with the eyes made for us by utilitarian evolution: it is another to + labour at remaking for ourselves eyes capable of seeing, in order to see, + and not in order to live. + </p> + <p> + Philosophy understood in this manner—and we shall see more and more + clearly as we go on that there is no other legitimate method of + understanding it—demands from us an almost violent act of reform and + conversion. + </p> + <p> + The mind must turn round upon itself, invert the habitual direction of its + thought, climb the hill down which its instinct towards action has carried + it, and go to seek experience at its source, "above the critical bend + where it inclines towards our practical use and becomes, properly + speaking, human experience." ("Matter and Memory", page 203.) In short, by + a twin effort of criticism and expansion, it must pass outside + common-sense and synthetic understanding to return to pure intuition. + </p> + <p> + Philosophy consists in reliving the immediate over again, and in + interpreting our rational science and everyday perception by its light. + That, at least, is the first stage. We shall find afterwards that that is + not all. + </p> + <p> + Here is a genuinely new conception of philosophy. Here, for the first + time, philosophy is made specifically distinct from science, yet remains + no less positive. + </p> + <p> + What science really does is to preserve the general attitude of + common-sense, with its apparatus of forms and principles. + </p> + <p> + It is true that science develops and perfects it, refines and extends it, + and even now and again corrects it. But science does not change either the + direction or the essential steps. + </p> + <p> + In this philosophy, on the contrary, what is at first suspected and + finally modified, is the setting of the points before the journey begins. + </p> + <p> + Not that, in saying so, we mean to condemn science; but we must recognise + its just limits. The methods of science proper are in their place and + appropriate, and lead to a knowledge which is true (though still + symbolical), so long as the object studied is the world of practical + action, or, to put it briefly, the world of inert matter. + </p> + <p> + But soul, life, and activity escape it, and yet these are the spring and + ultimate basis of everything: and it is the appreciation of this fact, + with what it entails, that is new. And yet, new as Mr Bergson's conception + of philosophy may deservedly appear, it does not any the less, from + another point of view, deserve to be styled classic and traditional. + </p> + <p> + What it really defines is not so much a particular philosophy as + philosophy itself, in its original function. + </p> + <p> + Everywhere in history we find its secret current at its task. + </p> + <p> + All great philosophers have had glimpses of it, and employed it in moments + of discovery. Only as a general rule they have not clearly recognised what + they were doing, and so have soon turned aside. + </p> + <p> + But on this point I cannot insist without going into lengthy detail, and + am obliged to refer the reader to the fourth chapter of "Creative + Evolution", where he will find the whole question dealt with. + </p> + <p> + One remark, however, has still to be made. Philosophy, according to Mr + Bergson's conception, implies and demands time; it does not aim at + completion all at once, for the mental reform in question is of the kind + which requires gradual fulfilment. The truth which it involves does not + set out to be a non-temporal essence, which a sufficiently powerful genius + would be able, under pressure, to perceive in its entirety at one view; + and that again seems to be very new. + </p> + <p> + I do not, of course, wish to abuse systems of philosophy. Each of them is + an experience of thought, a moment in the life of thought, a method of + exploring reality, a reagent which reveals an aspect. Truth undergoes + analysis into systems as does light into colours. + </p> + <p> + But the mere name system calls up the static idea of a finished building. + Here there is nothing of the kind. The new philosophy desires to be a + proceeding as much as, and even more than, to be a system. It insists on + being lived as well as thought. It demands that thought should work at + living its true life, an inner life related to itself, effective, active, + and creative, but not on that account directed towards external action. + "And," says Mr Bergson, "it can only be constructed by the collective and + progressive effort of many thinkers, and of many observers, completing, + correcting, and righting one another." (Preface to "Creative Evolution".) + </p> + <p> + Let us see how it begins, and what is its generating act. + </p> + <p> + III. + </p> + <p> + How are we to attain the immediate? How are we to realise this perception + of pure fact which we stated to be the philosopher's first step? + </p> + <p> + Unless we can clear up this doubt, the end proposed will remain to our + gaze an abstract and lifeless ideal. This is, then, the point which + requires instant explanation. For there is a serious difficulty in which + the very employment of the word "immediate" might lead us astray. + </p> + <p> + The immediate, in the sense which concerns us, is not at all, or at least + is no longer for us the passive experience, the indefinable something + which we should inevitably receive, provided we opened our eyes and + abstained from reflection. + </p> + <p> + As a matter of fact, we cannot abstain from reflection: reflection is + today part of our very vision; it comes into play as soon as we open our + eyes. So that, to come on the trail of the immediate, there must be effort + and work. How are we to guide this effort? In what will this work consist? + By what sign shall we be able to recognise that the result has been + obtained? + </p> + <p> + These are the questions to be cleared up. Mr Bergson speaks of them + chiefly in connection with the realities of consciousness, or, more + generally speaking, of life. And it is here, in fact, that the + consequences are most weighty and far-reaching. We shall need to refer to + them again in detail. But to simplify my explanation, I will here choose + another example: that of inert matter, of the perception on which the + physical is based. It is in this case that the divergence between common + perception and pure perception, however real it may be, assumes least + proportions. + </p> + <p> + Therefore it appears most in place in the sketch I desire to trace of an + exceedingly complex work, where I can only hope, evidently, to indicate + the main lines and general direction. + </p> + <p> + We readily believe that when we cast our eyes upon surrounding objects, we + enter into them unresistingly and apprehend them all at once in their + intrinsic nature. Perception would thus be nothing but simple passive + registration. But nothing could be more untrue, if we are speaking of the + perception which we employ without profound criticism in the course of our + daily life. What we here take to be pure fact is, on the contrary, the + last term in a highly complicated series of mental operations. And this + term contains as much of us as of things. + </p> + <p> + In fact, all concrete perception comes up for analysis as an indissoluble + mixture of construction and fact, in which the fact is only revealed + through the construction, and takes on its complexion. We all know by + experience how incapable the uneducated person is of explaining the simple + appearance of the least fact, without embodying a crowd of false + interpretations. We know to a less extent, but it is also true, that the + most enlightened and adroit person proceeds in just the same manner: his + interpretation is better, but it is still interpretation. + </p> + <p> + That is why accurate observation is so difficult; we see or we do not see, + we notice such and such an aspect, we read this or that, according to our + state of consciousness at the time, according to the direction of the + investigation on which we are engaged. + </p> + <p> + Who was it defined art as nature seen through a mind? Perception, too, is + an art. + </p> + <p> + This art has its processes, its conventions, and its tools. Go into a + laboratory and study one of those complex instruments which make our + senses finer or more powerful; each of them is literally a sheaf of + materialised theories, and by means of it all acquired science is brought + to bear on each new observation of the student. In exactly the same way + our organs of sense are actual instruments constructed by the unconscious + work of the mind in the course of biological evolution; they too sum up + and give concrete form and expression to a system of enlightening + theories. But that is not all. The most elementary psychology shows us the + amount of thought, in the correct sense of the term, recollection, or + inference, which enters into what we should be tempted to call pure + perception. + </p> + <p> + Establishment of fact is not the simple reception of the faithful imprint + of that fact; it is invariably interpreted, systematised, and placed in + pre-existing forms which constitute veritable theoretical frames. That is + why the child has to learn to perceive. There is an education of the + senses which he acquires by long training. One day, which aid of habit, he + will almost cease to see things: a few lines, a few glimpses, a few simple + signs noted in a brief passing glance, will enable him to recognise them; + and he will hardly retain any more of reality than its schemes and + symbols. + </p> + <p> + "Perception," says Mr Bergson on this subject, "becomes in the end only an + opportunity of recollection." ("Matter and Memory", page 59.) + </p> + <p> + All concrete perception, it is true, is directed less upon the present + than the past. The part of pure perception in it is small, and immediately + covered and almost buried by the contribution of memory. + </p> + <p> + This infinitesimal part acts as a bait. It is a summons to recollection, + challenging us to extract from our previous experience, and construct with + our acquired wealth a system of images which permits us to read the + experience of the moment. + </p> + <p> + With our scheme of interpretation thus constituted we encounter the few + fugitive traits which we have actually perceived. If the theory we have + elaborated adapts itself, and succeeds in accounting for, connecting, and + making sense of these traits, we shall finally have a perception properly + so called. + </p> + <p> + Perception then, in the usual sense of the word, is the resolution of a + problem, the verification of a theory. + </p> + <p> + Thus are explained "errors of the senses," which are in reality errors of + interpretation. Thus too, and in the same manner, we have the explanation + of dreams. + </p> + <p> + Let us take a simple example. When you read a book, do you spell each + syllable, one by one, to group the syllables afterwards into words, and + the words into phrases, thus travelling from print to meaning? Not at all: + you grasp a few letters accurately, a few downstrokes in their graphical + outline; then you guess the remainder, travelling in the reverse + direction, from a probable meaning to the print which you are + interpreting. This is what causes mistakes in reading, and the well-known + difficulty in seeing printing errors. + </p> + <p> + This observation is confirmed by curious experiments. Write some everyday + phrase or other on a blackboard; let there be a few intentional mistakes + here and there, a letter or two altered, or left out. Place the words in a + dark room in front of a person who, of course, does not know what has been + written. Then turn on the light without allowing the observer sufficient + time to spell the writing. + </p> + <p> + In spite of this, he will in most cases read the entire phrase, without + hesitation or difficulty. + </p> + <p> + He has restored what was missing, or corrected what was at fault. + </p> + <p> + Now, ask him what letters he is certain he saw, and you will find he will + tell you an omitted or altered letter as well as a letter actually + written. + </p> + <p> + The observer then thinks he sees in broad light a letter which is not + there, if that letter, in virtue of the general sense, ought to appear in + the phrase. But you can go further, and vary the experiment. + </p> + <p> + Suppose we write the word "tumult" correctly. After doing so, to direct + the memory of the observer into a certain trend of recollection, call out + in his ear, during the short time the light is turned on, another word of + different meaning, for example, the word "railway." + </p> + <p> + The observer will read "tunnel"; that is to say, a word, the graphical + outline of which is like that of the written word, but connected in sense + with the order of recollection called up. + </p> + <p> + In this mistake in reading, as in the spontaneous correction of the + previous experiment, we see very clearly that perception is always the + fulfilment of guesswork. + </p> + <p> + It is the direction of this work that we are concerned to determine. + </p> + <p> + According to the popular idea, perception has a completely speculative + interest: it is pure knowledge. Therein lies the fundamental mistake. + </p> + <p> + Notice first of all how much more probable it is, a priori, that the work + of perception, just as any other natural and spontaneous work, should have + a utilitarian signification. + </p> + <p> + "Life," says Mr Bergson with justice, "is the acceptance from objects of + nothing but the useful impression, with the response of the appropriate + reactions." ("Laughter", page 154.) + </p> + <p> + And this view receives striking objective confirmation if, with the author + of "Matter and Memory", we follow the progress of the perceptive functions + along the animal series from the protoplasm to the higher vertebrates; or + if, with him, we analyse the task of the body, and discover that the + nervous system is manifested in its very structure as, before all, an + instrument of action. Have we not already besides proof of this in the + fact that each of us always appears in his own eyes to occupy the centre + of the world he perceives? + </p> + <p> + The "Riquet" of Anatole France voices Mr Bergson's view: "I am always in + the centre of everything, and men and beasts and things, for or against + me, range themselves around." + </p> + <p> + But direct analysis leads us still more plainly to the same conclusion. + </p> + <p> + Let us take the perception of bodies. It is easy to show—and I + regret that I cannot here reproduce Mr Bergson's masterly demonstration—that + the division of matter into distinct objects with sharp outlines is + produced by a selection of images which is completely relative to our + practical needs. + </p> + <p> + "The distinct outlines which we assign to an object, and which bestow upon + it its individuality, are nothing but the graph of a certain kind of + influence which we should be able to employ at a certain point in space: + it is the plan of our future actions which is submitted to our eyes, as in + a mirror, when we perceive the surfaces and edges of things. Remove this + action, and in consequence the high roads which it makes for itself in + advance by perception, in the web of reality, and the individuality of the + body will be reabsorbed in the universal interaction which is without + doubt reality itself." Which is tantamount to saying that "rough bodies + are cut in the material of nature by a perception of which the scissors + follow, in some sort, the dotted line along which the action would pass." + ("Creative Evolution", page 12.) + </p> + <p> + Bodies independent of common experience do not then appear, to an + attentive criticism, as veritable realities which would have an existence + in themselves. They are only centres of co-ordination for our actions. Or, + if you prefer it, "our needs are so many shafts of light which, when + played upon the continuity of perceptible qualities, produce in them the + outline of distinct bodies." ("Matter and Memory", page 220.) Does not + science too, after its own fashion, resolve the atom into a centre of + intersecting relations, which finally extend by degrees to the entire + universe in an indissoluble interpenetration? + </p> + <p> + A qualitative continuity, imperceptibly shaded off, over which pass + quivers that here and there converge, is the image by which we are forced + to recognise a superior degree of reality. + </p> + <p> + But is this perceptible material, this qualitative continuity, the pure + fact in matter? Not yet. Perception, we said just now, is always in + reality complicated by memory. There is more truth in this than we had + seen. Reality is not a motionless spectrum, extending to our view its + infinite shades; it might rather be termed a leaping flame in the + spectrum. All is in passage, in process of becoming. + </p> + <p> + On this flux consciousness concentrates at long intervals, each time + condensing into one "quality" an immense period of the inner history of + things. "In just this way the thousand successive positions of a runner + contract into one single symbolic attitude, which our eye perceives, which + art reproduces, and which becomes for everybody the representation of a + man running." ("Matter and Memory", page 233.) + </p> + <p> + In the same way again, a red light, continuing one second, embodies such a + large number of elementary pulsations that it would take 25,000 years of + our time to see its distinct passage. From here springs the subjectivity + of our perception. The different qualities correspond, roughly speaking, + to the different rhythms of contraction or dilution, to the different + degrees of inner tension in the perceiving consciousness. + </p> + <p> + Pushing the case to its limits, and imagining a complete expansion, matter + would resolve into colourless disturbances, and become the "pure matter" + of the natural philosopher. + </p> + <p> + Let us now unite in one single continuity the different periods of the + preceding dialectic. Vibration, qualities, and bodies are none of them + reality by themselves; but all the same they are part of reality. And + absolute reality would be the whole of these degrees and moments, and many + others as well, no doubt. Or rather, to secure absolute intuition of + matter, we should have on the one hand to get rid of all that our + practical needs have constructed, restore on the other all the effective + tendencies they have extinguished, follow the complete scale of + qualitative concentrations and dilutions, and pass, by a kind of sympathy, + into the incessantly moving play of all the possible innumerable + contractions or resolutions; with the result that in the end we should + succeed, by a simultaneous view as it were, in grasping, according to + their infinitely various modes, the phases of this matter which, though at + present latent, admit of "perception." + </p> + <p> + Thus, in the case before us, absolute knowledge is found to be the result + of integral experience; and though we cannot attain the term, we see at + any rate in what direction we should have to work to reach it. + </p> + <p> + Now it must be stated that our realisable knowledge is at every moment + partial and limited rather than exterior and relative, for our effective + perception is related to matter in itself as the part to the whole. Our + least perceptions are actually based on pure perception, and "we are aware + of the elementary disturbances which constitute matter, in the perceptible + quality in which they suffer contraction, as we are aware of the beating + of our heart in the general feeling that we have of living." ("The Journal + of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods", 7th July 1910.) + </p> + <p> + But the preoccupation of practical action, coming between reality and + ourselves, produces the fragmentary world of common-sense, much as an + absorbing medium resolves into separate rays the continuous spectrum of a + luminous body; whilst the rhythm of duration, and the degree of tension + peculiar to our consciousness, limit us to the apprehension of certain + qualities only. + </p> + <p> + What then have we to do to progress towards absolute knowledge? Not to + quit experience: quite the contrary; but to extend it and diversify it by + science, while, at the same time, by criticism, we correct in it the + disturbing effects of action, and finally quicken all the results thus + obtained by an effort of sympathy which will make us familiar with the + object until we feel its profound throbbing and its inner wealth. + </p> + <p> + In connection with this last vital point, which is decisive, call to mind + a celebrated page of Sainte-Beuve where he defines his method: "Enter into + your author, make yourself at home in him, produce him under his different + aspects, make him live, move, and speak as he must have done; follow him + to his fireside and in his domestic habits, as closely as you can... + </p> + <p> + "Study him, turn him round and round, ask him questions at your leisure; + place him before you...Every feature will appear in its turn, and take the + place of the man himself in this expression... + </p> + <p> + "An individual reality will gradually blend with and become incarnate in + the vague, abstract, and general type...There is our man..." Yes, that is + exactly what we want: it could not be better put. Transpose this page from + the literary to the metaphysical order, and you have intuition, as defined + by Mr Bergson. You have the return to immediacy. + </p> + <p> + But a new problem then arises: Is not our intuition of immediacy in danger + of remaining inexpressible? For our language has been formed in view of + practical life, not of pure knowledge. + </p> + <p> + IV. + </p> + <p> + The immediate perception of reality is not all; we have still to translate + this perception into intelligible language, into a connected chain of + concepts; failing which, it would seem, we should not have knowledge in + the strict sense of the word, we should not have truth. + </p> + <p> + Without language, intuition, supposing it came to birth, would remain + intransmissible and incommunicable, and would perish in a solitary cry. By + language alone are we enabled to submit it to a positive test: the letter + is the ballast of the mind, the body which allows it to act, and in acting + to scatter the unreal delusions of dream. + </p> + <p> + The act of pure intuition demands so great an inner tension from thought + that it can only be very rare and very fugitive: a few rapid gleams here + and there; and these dawning glimpses must be sustained, and afterwards + united, and that again is the work of language. + </p> + <p> + But while language is thus necessary, no less necessary is a criticism of + ordinary language, and of the methods familiar to the understanding. These + forms of reflected knowledge, these processes of analysis really convey + secretly all the postulates of practical action. But it is imperative that + language should translate, not betray; that the body of formulae should + not stifle the soul of intuition. We shall see in what the work of reform + and conversion imposed on the philosopher precisely consists. + </p> + <p> + The attitude of the ordinary proceedings of common thought can be stated + in a few words. Place the object studied before yourself as an exterior + "thing." Then place yourself outside it, in perspective, at points of + vantage on a circumference, whence you can only see the object of your + investigation at a distance, with such interval as would be sufficient for + the contemplation of a picture; in short, move round the object instead of + entering boldly into it. But these proceedings lead to what I shall term + analysis by concepts; that is to say, the attempt to resolve all reality + into general ideas. + </p> + <p> + What are concepts and abstract ideas really, but distant and simplified + views, species of model drawings, giving only a few summary features of + their object, which vary according to direction and angle? By means of + them we claim to determine the object from outside, as if, in order to + know it, it were sufficient to enclose it in a system of logical sides and + angles. + </p> + <p> + And perhaps in this way we do really grasp it, perhaps we do establish its + precise description, but we do not penetrate it. + </p> + <p> + Concepts translate relations resulting from comparisons by which each + object is finally expressed as a function of what it is not. They + dismember it, divide it up piece by piece, and mount it in various frames. + They lay hold of it only by ends and corners, by resemblances and + differences. Is not that obviously what is done by the converting theories + which explain the soul by the body, life by matter, quality by movements, + space itself by pure number? Is not that what is done generally by all + criticisms, all doctrines which connect one idea to another, or to a group + of other ideas? + </p> + <p> + In this way we reach only the surface of things, the reciprocal contacts, + mutual intersections, and parts common, but not the organic unity nor the + inner essence. + </p> + <p> + In vain we multiply our points of view, our perspectives and plane + projections: no accumulation of this kind will reconstruct the concrete + solid. We can pass from an object directly perceived to the pictures which + represent it, the prints which represent the pictures, the scheme + representing the prints, because each stage contains less than the one + before, and is obtained from it by simple diminution. + </p> + <p> + But, inversely, you may take all the schemes, prints, pictures you like—supposing + that it is not absurd to conceive as given what is by nature interminable + and inexhaustible, lending itself to indefinite enumeration and endless + development and multiplicity—but you will never recompose the + profound and original unity of the source. + </p> + <p> + How, by forcing yourself to seek the object outside itself, where it + certainly is not, except in echo and reflection, would you ever find its + intimate and specific reality? You are but condemning yourself to + symbolism, for one "thing" can only be in another symbolically. + </p> + <p> + To go further still, your knowledge of things will remain irremediably + relative, relative to the symbols selected and the points of view adopted. + Everything will happen as in a movement of which the appearance and + formula vary with the spot from which you regard it, with the marks to + which you relate it. + </p> + <p> + Absolute revelation is only given to the man who passes into the object, + flings himself upon its stream, and lives within its rhythm. The thesis + which maintains the inevitable relativity of all human knowledge + originates mainly from the metaphors employed to describe the act of + knowledge. The subject occupies this point, the object that; how are we to + span the distance? Our perceptory organs fill the interval; how are we to + grasp anything but what reaches us in the receiver at the end of the wire? + </p> + <p> + The mind itself is a projecting lantern playing a shaft of light on + nature; how should it do otherwise than tint nature its own colour? + </p> + <p> + But these difficulties all arise out of the spatial metaphors employed; + and these metaphors in their turn do little but illustrate and translate + the common method of analysis by concepts: and this method is essentially + regulated by the practical needs of action and language. + </p> + <p> + The philosopher must adopt an attitude entirely inverse; not keep at a + distance from things, but listen in a manner to their inward breathing, + and, above all, supply the effort of sympathy by which he establishes + himself in the object, becomes on intimate terms with it, tunes himself to + its rhythm, and, in a word, lives it. There is really nothing mysterious + or strange in this. + </p> + <p> + Consider your daily judgments in matters of art, profession, or sport. + </p> + <p> + Between knowledge by theory and knowledge by experience, between + understanding by external analogy and perception by profound intuition, + what difference and divergence there is! + </p> + <p> + Who has absolute knowledge of a machine, the student who analyses it in + mechanical theorems, or the engineer who has lived in comradeship with it, + even to sharing the physical sensation of its laboured or easy working, + who feels the play of its inner muscles, its likes and dislikes, who notes + its movements and the task before it, as the machine itself would do were + it conscious, for whom it has become an extension of his own body, a new + sensori-motor organ, a group of prearranged gestures and automatic habits? + </p> + <p> + The student's knowledge is more useful to the builder, and I do not wish + to claim that we should ever neglect it; but the only true knowledge is + that of the engineer. And what I have just said does not concern material + objects only. Who has absolute knowledge of religion, he who analyses it + in psychology, sociology, history, and metaphysics, or he who, from + within, by a living experience, participates in its essence and holds + communion with its duration? + </p> + <p> + But the external nature of the knowledge obtained by conceptual analysis + is only its least fault. There are others still more serious. + </p> + <p> + If concepts actually express what is common, general, unspecific, what + should make us feel the need of recasting them when we apply them to a new + object? + </p> + <p> + Does not their ground, their utility, and their interest exactly consist + in sparing us this labour? + </p> + <p> + We regard them as elaborated once for all. They are building-material, + ready-hewn blocks, which we have only to bring together. They are atoms, + simple elements—a mathematician would say prime factors—capable + of associating with infinity, but without undergoing any inner + modification in contact with it. They admit linkage; they can be attached + externally, but they leave the aggregate as they went into it. + </p> + <p> + Juxtaposition and arrangement are the geometrical operations which typify + the work of knowledge in such a case; or else we must fall back on + metaphors from some mental chemistry, such as proportioning and + combination. + </p> + <p> + In all cases, the method is still that of alignment and blending of + pre-existent concepts. + </p> + <p> + Now the mere fact of proceeding thus is equivalent to setting up the + concept as a symbol of an abstract class. That being done, explanation of + a thing is no more than showing it in the intersection of several classes, + partaking of each of them in definite proportions: which is the same as + considering it sufficiently expressed by a list of general frames into + which it will go. The unknown is then, on principle, and in virtue of this + theory, referred to the already known; and it thereby becomes impossible + ever to grasp any true novelty or any irreducible originality. + </p> + <p> + On principle, once more, we claim to reconstruct nature with pure symbols; + and it thereby becomes impossible ever to reach its concrete reality, "the + invisible and present soul." + </p> + <p> + This intuitional coinage in fixed standard concepts, this creation of an + easily handled intellectual cash, is no doubt of evident practical + utility. For knowledge in the usual sense of the word is not a + disinterested operation; it consists in finding out what profit we can + draw from an object, how we are to conduct ourselves towards it, what + label we can suitably attach to it, under what already known class it + comes, to what degree it is deserving of this or that title which + determines an attitude we must take up, or a step we must perform. Our end + is to place the object in its approximate class, having regard to + advantageous employment or to everyday language. Then, and only then, we + find our pigeon-holes all ready-made; and the same parcel of reagents + meets all cases. A universal catechism is here in existence to meet every + research; its different clauses define so many unshifting points of view, + from which we regard each object, and our study is subsequently limited to + applying a kind of nomenclature to the preconstructed frames. + </p> + <p> + Once again the philosopher has to proceed in exactly the opposite + direction. He has not to confine himself to ready-made business concepts, + of the ordinary kind, suits cut to an average model, which fit nobody + because they almost fit everybody; but he has to work to measure, + incessantly renew his plant, continually recreate his mind, and meet each + new problem with a fresh adaptive effort. He must not go from concepts to + things, as if each of them were only the cutting-point of several + concurrent generalities, an ideal centre of intersecting abstractions; on + the contrary, he must go from things to concepts, incessantly creating new + thoughts, and incessantly recasting the old. + </p> + <p> + There could be no solution of the problem in a more or less ingenious + mosaic or tessellation of rigid concepts, pre-existing to be employed. We + need plastic fluid, supple and living concepts, capable of being + continually modelled on reality, of delicately following its infinite + curves. The philosopher's task is then to create concepts much more than + to combine them. And each of the concepts he creates must remain open and + adjustable, ready for the necessary renewal and adaptation, like a method + or a programme: it must be the arrow pointing to a path which descends + from intuition to language, not a boundary marking a terminus. In this way + only does philosophy remain what it ought to be: the examination into the + consciousness of the human mind, the effort towards enlargement and depth + which it attempts unremittingly, in order to advance beyond its present + intellectual condition. + </p> + <p> + Do you want an example? I will take that of human personality. The ego is + one; the ego is many: no one contests this double formula. But everything + admits of it; and what is its lesson to us? Observe what is bound to + happen to the two concepts of unity and multiplicity, by the mere fact + that we take them for general frames independent of the reality contained, + for detached language admitting empty and blank definition, always + representable by the same word, no matter what the circumstances: they are + no longer living and coloured ideas, but abstract, motionless, and neutral + forms, without shades or gradations, without distinction of case, + characterising two points of view from which you can observe anything and + everything. This being so, how could the application of these forms help + us to grasp the original and peculiar nature of the unity and multiplicity + of the ego? Still further, how could we, between two such entities, + statically defined by their opposition, ever imagine a synthesis? + Correctly speaking, the interesting question is not whether there is + unity, multiplicity, combination, one with the other, but to see what sort + of unity, multiplicity, or combination realises the case in point; above + all, to understand how the living person is at once multiple unity and one + multiplicity, how these two poles of conceptual dissociation are + connected, how these two diverging branches of abstraction join at the + roots. The interesting point, in a word, is not the two symbolical + colourless marks indicating the two ends of the spectrum; it is the + continuity between, with its changing wealth of colouring, and the double + progress of shades which resolve it into red and violet. + </p> + <p> + But it is impossible to arrive at this concrete transition unless we begin + from direct intuition and descend to the analysing concepts. + </p> + <p> + Again, the same duty of reversing our familiar attitude, of inverting our + customary proceeding, becomes ours for another reason. The conceptual + atomism of common thought leads it to place movement in a lower order than + rest, fact in a lower order than becoming. According to common thought, + movement is added to the atom, as a supplementary accident to a body + previously at rest; and, by becoming, the pre-existent terms are strung + together like pearls on a necklace. It delights in rest, and endeavours to + bring to rest all that moves. Immobility appears to it to be the base of + existence. It decomposes and pulverises every change and every phenomenon, + until it finds the invariable element in them. It is immobility which it + esteems as primary, fundamental, intelligible of itself; and motion, on + the contrary, which it seeks to explain as a function of immobility. And + so it tends, out of progresses and transitions, to make things. To see + distinctly, it appears to need a dead halt. What indeed are concepts but + logical look-out stations along the path of becoming? what are they but + motionless external views, taken at intervals, of an uninterrupted stream + of movement? + </p> + <p> + Each of them isolates and fixes an aspect, "as the instantaneous lightning + flashes on a storm-scene in the darkness." ("Matter and Memory", page + 209.) + </p> + <p> + Placed together, they make a net laid in advance, a strong meshwork in + which the human intelligence posts itself securely to spy the flux of + reality, and seize it as it passes. Such a proceeding is made for the + practical world, and is out of place in the speculative. Everywhere we are + trying to find constants, identities, non-variants, states; and we imagine + ideal science as an open eye which gazes for ever upon objects that do not + move. The constant is the concrete support demanded by our action: the + matter upon which we operate must not escape our grasp and slip through + our hands, if we are to be able to work it. The constant, again, is the + element of language, in which the word represents its inert permanence, in + which it constitutes the solid fulcrum, the foundation and landmark of + dialectic progress, being that which can be discarded by the mind, whose + attention is thus free for other tasks. In this respect analysis by + concepts is the natural method of common-sense. It consists in asking from + time to time what point the object studied has reached, what it has + become, in order to see what one could derive from it, or what it is + fitting to say of it. + </p> + <p> + But this method has only a practical reach. Reality, which in its essence + is becoming, passes through our concepts without ever letting itself be + caught, as a moving body passes fixed points. When we filter it, we retain + only its deposit, the result of the becoming drifted down to us. + </p> + <p> + Do the dams, canals, and buoys make the current of the river? Do the + festoons of dead seaweed ranged along the sand make the rising tide? Let + us beware of confounding the stream of becoming with the sharp outline of + its result. Analysis by concepts is a cinematograph method, and it is + plain that the inner organisation of the movement is not seen in the + moving pictures. Every moment we have fixed views of moving objects. With + such conceptual sections taken in the stream of continuity, however many + we accumulate, should we ever reconstruct the movement itself, the dynamic + connection, the march of the images, the transition from one view to + another? This capacity for movement must be contained in the picture + apparatus, and must therefore be given in addition to the views + themselves; and nothing can better prove how, after all, movement is never + explicable except by itself, never grasped except in itself. + </p> + <p> + But if we take movement as our principle, it is, on the contrary, + possible, and even easy, to slacken speed by imperceptible degrees, and + stop dead. + </p> + <p> + From a dead stop we shall never get our movement again; but rest can very + well be conceived as the limit of movement, as its arrest or extinction; + for rest is less than movement. + </p> + <p> + In this way the true philosophical method, which is the inverse of the + common method, consists in taking up a position from the very outset in + the bosom of becoming, in adopting its changing curves and variable + tension, in sympathising with the rhythm of its genesis, in perceiving all + existence from within, as a growth, in following it in its inner + generation; in short, in promoting movement to fundamental reality, and, + inversely, in degrading fixed states to the rank of secondary and derived + reality. + </p> + <p> + And thus, to come back to the example of the human personality, the + philosopher must seek in the ego not so much a ready-made unity or + multiplicity as, if I may venture the expression, two antagonistic and + correlative movements of unification and plurification. + </p> + <p> + There is then a radical difference between philosophic intuition and + conceptual analysis. The latter delights in the play of dialectic, in + fountains of knowledge, where it is interested only in the immovable + basins; the former goes back to the source of the concepts, and seeks to + possess it where it gushes out. Analysis cuts the channels; intuition + supplies the water. Intuition acquires and analysis expends. + </p> + <p> + It is not a question of banning analysis; science could not do without it, + and philosophy could not do without science. But we must reserve for it + its normal place and its just task. + </p> + <p> + Concepts are the deposited sediment of intuition: intuition produces the + concepts, not the concepts intuition. From the heart of intuition you will + have no difficulty in seeing how it splits up and analyses into concepts, + concepts of such and such a kind or such and such a shade. But by + successive analyses you will never reconstruct the least intuition, just + as, no matter how you distribute water, you will never reconstruct the + reservoir in its original condition. + </p> + <p> + Begin from intuition: it is a summit from which we can descend by infinite + slopes; it is a picture which we can place in an infinite number of + frames. But all the frames together will not recompose the picture, and + the lower ends of all the slopes will not explain how they meet at the + summit. Intuition is a necessary beginning; it is the impulse which sets + the analysis in motion, and gives it direction; it is the sounding which + brings it to solid bottom; the soul which assures its unity. "I shall + never understand how black and white interpenetrate, if I have not seen + grey, but I understand without trouble, after once seeing grey, how we can + regard it from the double point of view of black and white." + ("Introduction to Metaphysics.") + </p> + <p> + Here are some letters which you can arrange in chains in a thousand ways: + the indivisible sense running along the chain, and making one phrase of + it, is the original cause of the writing, not its consequence. Thus it is + with intuition in relation to analysis. But beginnings and generative + activities are the proper object of the philosopher. Thus the conversion + and reform incumbent on him consist essentially in a transition from the + analytic to the intuitive point of view. + </p> + <p> + The result is that the chosen instrument of philosophic thought is + metaphor; and of metaphor we know Mr Bergson to be an incomparable master. + What we have to do, he says himself, is "to elicit a certain active force + which in most men is liable to be trammelled by mental habits more useful + to life," to awaken in them the feeling of the immediate, original, and + concrete. But "many different images, borrowed from very different orders + of things, can, by their convergent action, direct consciousness to the + precise point where there is a certain intuition to be seized. By choosing + images as unlike as possible, we prevent any one of them from usurping the + place of the intuition it is intended to call up, since it would in that + case be immediately routed by its rivals. In making them all, despite + their different aspects, demand of our mind the same kind of attention, + and in some way the same degree of tension, we accustom our consciousness + little by little to a quite peculiar and well-determined disposition, + precisely the one which it ought to adopt to appear to itself unmasked." + ("Introduction to Metaphysics".) + </p> + <p> + Strictly speaking, the intuition of immediacy is inexpressible. But it can + be suggested and called up. How? By ringing it round with concurrent + metaphors. Our aim is to modify the habits of imagination in ourselves + which are opposed to a simple and direct view, to break through the + mechanical imagery in which we have allowed ourselves to be caught; and it + is by awakening other imagery and other habits that we can succeed in so + doing. + </p> + <p> + But then, you will say, where is the difference between philosophy and + art, between metaphysical and aesthetic intuition? Art also tends to + reveal nature to us, to suggest to us a direct vision of it, to lift the + veil of illusion which hides us from ourselves; and aesthetic intuition + is, in its own way, perception of immediacy. We revive the feeling of + reality obliterated by habit, we summon the deep and penetrating soul of + things: the object is the same in both cases; and the means are also the + same; images and metaphors. Is Mr Bergson only a poet, and does his work + amount to nothing but the introduction of impressionism in metaphysics? + </p> + <p> + It is an old objection. If the truth be told, Mr Bergson's immense + scientific knowledge should be sufficient refutation. + </p> + <p> + Only those who have not read the mass of carefully proved and positive + discussions could give way thus to the impressions of art awakened by what + is truly a magic style. But we can go further and put it better. + </p> + <p> + That there are analogies between philosophy and art, between metaphysical + and aesthetic intuition, is unquestionable and uncontested. + </p> + <p> + At the same time, the analogies must not be allowed to hide the + differences. + </p> + <p> + Art is, to a certain extent, philosophy previous to analysis, previous to + criticism and science; the aesthetic intuition is metaphysical intuition + in process of birth, bounded by dream, not proceeding to the test of + positive verification. Reciprocally, philosophy is the art which follows + upon science, and takes account of it, the art which uses the results of + analysis as its material, and submits itself to the demands of stern + criticism; metaphysical intuition is the aesthetic intuition verified, + systematised, ballasted by the language of reason. + </p> + <p> + Philosophy then differs from art in two essential points: first of all, it + rests upon, envelops, and supposes science; secondly, it implies a test of + verification in its strict meaning. Instead of stopping at the acts of + common-sense, it completes them with all the contributions of analysis and + scientific investigation. + </p> + <p> + We said just now of common-sense that, in its inmost depths, it possesses + reality: that is only quite exact when we mean common-sense developed in + positive science; and that is why philosophy takes the results of science + as its basis, for each of these results, like the facts and data of common + perception, opens a way for critical penetration towards the immediate. + Just now I was comparing the two kinds of knowledge which the theorist and + the engineer can have of a machine, and I allowed the advantage of + absolute knowledge to practical experience, whilst theory seemed to me + mainly relative to the constructive industry. That is true, and I do not + go back upon it. But the most experienced engineer, who did not know the + mechanism of his machine, who possessed only unanalysed feelings about it, + would have only an artist's, not a philosopher's knowledge. For absolute + intuition, in the full sense of the word, we must have integral + experience; that is to say, a living application of rational theory no + less than of working technique. + </p> + <p> + To journey towards living intuition, starting from complete science and + complete sensation, is the philosopher's task; and this task is governed + by standards unknown to art. + </p> + <p> + Metaphysical intuition offers a victorious resistance to the test of + thorough and continued experiment, to the test of calculation as to that + of working, to the complete experiment which brings into play all the + various deoxidising agents of criticism; it shows itself capable of + withstanding analysis without dissolving or succumbing; it abounds in + concepts which satisfy the understanding, and exalt it; in a word, it + creates light and truth on all mental planes; and these characteristics + are sufficient to distinguish it in a profound degree from aesthetic + intuition. + </p> + <p> + The latter is only the prophetic type of the former, a dream or + presentiment, a veiled and still uncertain dawn, a twilight myth preceding + and proclaiming, in the half-darkness, the full day of positive + revelation... + </p> + <p> + Every philosophy has two faces, and must be studied in two movements—method + and teaching. + </p> + <p> + These are its two moments, its two aspects, no doubt co-ordinate and + mutually dependent, but none the less distinct. + </p> + <p> + We have just examined the method of the new philosophy inaugurated by Mr + Bergson. To what teaching has this method led us, and to what can we + foresee that it will lead us? + </p> + <p> + This is what we have still to find. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0004" id="link2H_4_0004"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + II. Teaching. + </h2> + <p> + The sciences properly so called, those that are by agreement termed + positive, present themselves as so many external and circumferential + points from which we view reality. They leave us on the outside of things, + and confine themselves to investigating from a distance. + </p> + <p> + The views they give us resemble the brief perspectives of a town which we + obtain in looking at it from different angles on the surrounding hills. + </p> + <p> + Less even than that: for very soon, by increasing abstraction, the + coloured views give place to regular lines, and even to simple + conventional notes, which are more practical in use and waste less time. + And so the sciences remain prisoners of the symbol, and all the inevitable + relativity involved in its use. But philosophy claims to pierce within + reality, establish itself in the object, follow its thousand turns and + folds, obtain from it a direct and immediate feeling, and penetrate right + into the concrete depths of its heart; it is not content with an analysis, + but demands an intuition. + </p> + <p> + Now there is one existence which, at the outset, we know better and more + surely than any other; there is a privileged case in which the effort of + sympathetic revelation is natural and almost easy to us; there is one + reality at least which we grasp from within, which we perceive in its deep + and internal content. This reality is ourselves. It is typical of all + reality, and our study may fitly begin here. Psychology puts us in direct + contact with it, and metaphysics attempt to generalise this contact. But + such a generalisation can only be attempted if, to begin with, we are + familiar with reality at the point where we have immediate access to it. + </p> + <p> + The path of thought which the philosopher must take is from the inner to + the outer being. + </p> + <p> + I. + </p> + <p> + "Know thyself": the old maxim has remained the motto of philosophy since + Socrates, the motto at least which marks its initial moment, when, + inclining towards the depth of the subject, it commences its true work of + penetration, whilst science continues to extend on the surface. Each + philosophy in turn has commented upon and applied this old motto. But Mr + Bergson, more than anyone else, has given it, as he does everything else + he takes up, a new and profound meaning. What was the current + interpretation before him? Speaking only of the last century, we may say + that, under the influence of Kant, criticism had till now been principally + engaged in unravelling the contribution of the subject in the act of + consciousness, in establishing our perception of things through certain + representative forms borrowed from our own constitution. Such was, even + yesterday, the authenticated way of regarding the problem. And it is + precisely this attitude which Mr Bergson, by a volte-face which will + remain familiar to him in the course of his researches, reverses from the + outset. + </p> + <p> + "It has appeared to me," says he, ("Essay on the Immediate Data of + Consciousness", Conclusion.) "that there was ground for setting oneself + the inverse problem, and asking whether the most apparent states of the + ego itself, which we think we grasp directly, are not most of the time + perceived through certain forms borrowed from the outer world, which in + this way gives us back what we have lent it. A priori, it seems fairly + probable that this is what goes on. For supposing that the forms of which + we are speaking, to which we adapt matter, come entirely from the mind, it + seems difficult to apply them constantly to objects without soon producing + the colouring of the objects in the forms; therefore in using these forms + for the knowledge of our own personality, we risk taking a reflection of + the frame in which we place them—that is, actually, the external + world—for the very colouring of the ego. But we can go further, and + state that forms applicable to things cannot be entirely our own work; + that they must result from a compromise between matter and mind; that if + we give much to this matter, we doubtless receive something from it; and + that, in this way, when we try to possess ourselves again after an + excursion into the outer world, we no longer have our hands free." + </p> + <p> + To avoid such a consequence, there is, we must admit, a conceivable + loophole. It consists in maintaining on principle an absolute analogy, an + exact similitude between internal reality and external objects. The forms + which suit the one would then also suit the other. + </p> + <p> + But it must be observed that such a principle constitutes in the highest + degree a metaphysical thesis which it would be on all hands illegal to + assert previously as a postulate of method. Secondly, and above all, it + must be observed that on this head experience is decisive, and manifests + more plainly every day the failure of the theories which try to assimilate + the world of consciousness to that of matter, to copy psychology from + physics. We have here two different "orders." The apparatus of the first + does not admit of being employed in the second. Hence the necessity of the + attitude adopted by Mr Bergson. We have an effort to make, a work of + reform to undertake, to lift the veil of symbols which envelops our usual + representation of the ego, and thus conceals us from our own view, in + order to find out what we are in reality, immediately, in our inmost + selves. This effort and this work are necessary, because, "in order to + contemplate the ego in its original purity, psychology must eliminate or + correct certain forms which bear the visible mark of the outer world." + ("Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness", Conclusion.) What are + these forms? Let us confine ourselves to the most important. Things appear + to us as numerable units, placed side by side in space. They compose + numerical and spatial multiplicity, a dust of terms between which + geometrical ties are established. + </p> + <p> + But space and number are the two forms of immobility, the two schemes of + analysis, by which we must not let ourselves be obsessed. I do not say + that there is no place to give them, even in the internal world. But the + more deeply we enter into the heart of psychological life, the less they + are in place. + </p> + <p> + The fact is, there are several planes of consciousness, situated at + different depths, marking all the intervening degrees between pure thought + and bodily action, and each mental phenomenon interests all these planes + simultaneously, and is thus repeated in a thousand higher tones, like the + harmonies of one and the same note. + </p> + <p> + Or, if you prefer it, the life of the spirit is not the uniform + transparent surface of a mere; rather it is a gushing spring which, at + first pent in, spreads upwards and outwards, like a sheaf of corn, passing + through many different states, from the dark and concentrated welling of + the source to the gleam of the scattered tumbling spray; and each of its + moods presents in its turn a similar character, being itself only a thread + within the whole. Such without doubt is the central and activating idea of + the admirable book entitled "Matter and Memory". I cannot possibly + condense its substance here, or convey its astonishing synthetic power, + which succeeds in contracting a complete metaphysic, and in gripping it so + firmly that the examination ends by passing to the discussion of a few + humble facts relative to the philosophy of the brain! But its technical + severity and its very conciseness, combined with the wealth it contains, + render it irresumable; and I can only in a few words indicate its + conclusions. + </p> + <p> + First of all, however little we pride ourselves on positive method, we + must admit the existence of an internal world, of a spiritual activity + distinct from matter and its mechanism. No chemistry of the brain, no + dance of atoms, is equivalent to the least thought, or indeed to the least + sensation. + </p> + <p> + Some, it is true, have brought forward a thesis of parallelism, according + to which each mental phenomenon corresponds point by point to a phenomenon + in the brain, without adding anything to it, without influencing its + course, merely translating it into another tongue, so that a glance + sufficiently penetrating to follow the molecular revolutions and the + fluxes of nervous production in their least episodes would immediately + read the inmost secrets of the associated consciousness. + </p> + <p> + But no one will deny that a thesis of this kind is only in reality a + hypothesis, that it goes enormously beyond the certain data of current + biology, and that it can only be formulated by anticipating future + discoveries in a preconceived direction. Let us be candid: it is not + really a thesis of positive science, but a metaphysical thesis in the + unpleasant meaning of the term. Taking it at its best, its worth today + could only be one of intelligibleness. And intelligible it is not. + </p> + <p> + How are we to understand a consciousness destitute of activity and + consequently without connection with reality, a kind of phosphorescence + which emphasises the lines of vibration in the brain, and renders in + miraculous duplicate, by its mysterious and useless light, certain + phenomena already complete without it? + </p> + <p> + One day Mr Bergson came down into the arena of dialectic, and, talking to + his opponents in their own language, pulled their "psycho-physiological + paralogism" to pieces before their eyes; it is only by confounding in one + and the same argument two systems of incompatible notations, idealism and + realism, that we succeed in enunciating the parallelist thesis. This + reasoning went home, all the more as it was adapted to the usual form of + discussions between philosophers. But a more positive and more categorical + proof is to be found all through "Matter and Memory". From the precise + example of recollection analysed to its lowest depths, Mr Bergson + completely grasps and measures the divergence between soul and body, + between mind and matter. Then, putting into practice what he said + elsewhere about the creation of new concepts, he arrives at the conclusion—these + are his own expressions—that between the psychological fact and its + counterpart in the brain there must be a relation sui generis, which is + neither the determination of the one by the other, nor their reciprocal + independence, nor the production of the latter by the former, nor of the + former by the latter, nor their simple parallel concomitance; in short, a + relation which answers to none of the ready-made concepts which + abstraction puts at our service, but which may be approximately formulated + in these terms: ("Report of the French Philosophical Society", meeting, + 2nd May 1901.) + </p> + <p> + "Given a psychological state, that part of the state which admits of play, + the part which would be translated by an attitude of the body or by bodily + actions, is represented in the brain; the remainder is independent of it, + and has no equivalent in the brain. So that to one and the same state of + the brain there may be many different psychological states which + correspond, though not all kinds of states. They are psychological states + which all have in common the same motor scheme. Into one and the same + frame many pictures may go, but not all pictures. Let us take a lofty + abstract philosophical thought. We do not conceive it without adding to it + an image representing it, which we place beneath. + </p> + <p> + "We do not represent the image to ourselves, again, without supporting it + by a design which resumes its leading features. We do not imagine this + design itself without imagining and, in so doing, sketching certain + movements which would reproduce it. It is this sketch, and this sketch + only, which is represented in the brain. Frame the sketch, there is a + margin for the image. Frame the image again, there remains a margin, and a + still larger margin, for the thought. The thought is thus relatively free + and indeterminate in relation to the activity which conditions it in the + brain, for this activity expresses only the motive articulation of the + idea, and the articulation may be the same for ideas absolutely different. + And yet it is not complete liberty nor absolute indetermination, since any + kind of idea, taken at hazard, would not present the articulation desired. + </p> + <p> + "In short, none of the simple concepts furnished us by philosophy could + express the relation we seek, but this relation appears with tolerable + clearness to result from experiment." + </p> + <p> + The same analysis of facts tells us how the planes of consciousness, of + which I spoke just now, are arranged, the law by which they are + distributed, and the meaning which attaches to their disposition. Let us + neglect the intervening multiples, and look only at the extreme poles of + the series. + </p> + <p> + We are inclined to imagine too abrupt a severance between gesture and + dream, between action and thought, between body and mind. There are not + two plane surfaces, without thickness or transition, placed one above the + other on different levels; it is by an imperceptible degradation of + increasing depth, and decreasing materiality, that we pass from one term + to the other. + </p> + <p> + And the characteristics are continually changing in the course of the + transition. Thus our initial problem confronts us again, more acutely than + ever: are the forms of number and space equally suitable on all planes of + consciousness? + </p> + <p> + Let us consider the most external of these planes of life, and one which + is in contact with the outer world, the one which receives directly the + impressions of external reality. We live as a rule on the surface of + ourselves, in the numerical and spatial dispersion of language and + gesture. Our deeper ego is covered as it were with a tough crust, hardened + in action: it is a skein of motionless and numerable habits, side by side, + and of distinct and solid things, with sharp outlines and mechanical + relations. And it is for the representation of the phenomena which occur + within this dead rind that space and number are valid. + </p> + <p> + For we have to live, I mean live our common daily life, with our body, + with our customary mechanism rather than with our true depths. Our + attention is therefore most often directed by a natural inclination to the + practical worth and useful function of our internal states, to the public + object of which they are the sign, to the effect they produce externally, + to the gestures by which we express them in space. A social average of + individual modalities interests us more than the incommunicable + originality of our deeper life. The words of language besides offer us so + many symbolic centres round which crystallise groups of motor mechanisms + set up by habit, the only usual elements of our internal determinations. + Now, contact with society has rendered these motor mechanisms practically + identical in all men. Hence, whether it be a question of sensation, + feeling, or ideas, we have these neutral dry and colourless residua, which + spread lifeless over the surface of ourselves, "like dead leaves on the + water of a pond." ("Essay on the Immediate Data," page 102.) + </p> + <p> + Thus the progress we have lived falls into the rank of a thing that can be + handled. Space and number lay hold of it. And soon all that remains of + what was movement and life is combinations formed and annulled, and forces + mechanically composed in a whole of juxtaposed atoms, and to represent + this whole a collection of petrified concepts, manipulated in dialectic + like counters. + </p> + <p> + Quite different appears the true inner reality, and quite different are + its profound characteristics. To begin with, it contains nothing + quantitative; the intensity of a psychological state is not a magnitude, + nor can it be measured. The "Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness" + begins with the proof of this leading statement. If it is a question of a + simple state, such as a sensation of light or weight, the intensity is + measured by a certain quality of shade which indicates to us + approximately, by an association of ideas and thanks to our acquired + experience, the magnitude of the objective cause from which it proceeds. + If, on the contrary, it is a question of a complex state, such as those + impressions of profound joy or sorrow which lay hold of us entirely, + invading and overwhelming us, what we call their intensity expresses only + the confused feeling of a qualitative progress, and increasing wealth. + "Take, for example, an obscure desire, which has gradually become a + profound passion. You will see that the feeble intensity of this desire + consisted first of all in the fact that it seemed to you isolated and in a + way foreign to all the rest of your inner life. But little by little it + penetrated a larger number of psychic elements, dyeing them, so to speak, + its own colour; and now you find your point of view on things as a whole + appears to you to have changed. Is it not true that you become aware of a + profound passion, once it has taken root, by the fact that the same + objects no longer produce the same impression upon you? All your + sensations, all your ideas, appear to you refreshed by it; it is like a + new childhood." (Loc. cit., page 6.) + </p> + <p> + There is here none of the homogeneity which is the property of magnitude, + and the necessary condition of measurement, giving a view of the less in + the bosom of the more. The element of number has vanished, and with it + numerical multiplicity extended in space. Our inner states form a + qualitative continuity; they are prolonged and blended into one another; + they are grouped in harmonies, each note of which contains an echo of the + whole; they are encircled by an innumerable degradation of halos, which + gradually colour the total content of consciousness; they live each in the + bosom of his fellow. + </p> + <p> + "I am the scent of roses," were the words Condillac put in the mouth of + his statue; and these words translate the immediate truth exactly, as soon + as observation becomes naive and simple enough to attain pure fact. In a + passing breath I breathe my childhood; in the rustle of leaves, in a ray + of moonlight, I find an infinite series of reflections and dreams. A + thought, a feeling, an act, may reveal a complete soul. My ideas, my + sensations, are like me. How would such facts be possible, if the multiple + unity of the ego did not present the essential characteristic of vibrating + in its entirety in the depths of each of the parts descried or rather + determined in it by analysis? All physical determinations envelop and + imply each other reciprocally. And the fact that the soul is thus present + in its entirety in each of its acts, its feelings, for example, or its + ideas in its sensations, its recollections in its percepts, its + inclinations in its obvious states, is the justifying principle of + metaphors, the source of all poetry, the truth which modern philosophy + proclaims with more force every day under the name of immanence of + thought, the fact which explains our moral responsibility with regard to + our affections and our beliefs themselves; and finally, it is the best of + us, since it is this which ensures our being able to surrender ourselves, + genuinely and unreservedly, and this which constitutes the real unity of + our person. + </p> + <p> + Let us push still further into the hidden retreat of the soul. Here we are + in these regions of twilight and dream, where our ego takes shape, where + the spring within us gushes up, in the warm secrecy of the darkness which + ushers our trembling being into birth. Distinctions fail us. Words are + useless now. We hear the wells of consciousness at their mysterious task + like an invisible shiver of running water through the mossy shadow of the + caves. I dissolve in the joy of becoming. I abandon myself to the delight + of being a pulsing reality. I no longer know whether I see scents, breathe + sounds, or smell colours. Do I love? Do I think? The question has no + longer a meaning for me. I am, in my complete self, each of my attitudes, + each of my changes. It is not my sight which is indistinct or my attention + which is idle. It is I who have resumed contact with pure reality, whose + essential movement admits no form of number. He who thus makes the really + "deep" and "inner" effort necessary to becoming—were it only for an + elusive moment—discovers, under the simplest appearance, + inexhaustible sources of unsuspected wealth; the rhythm of his duration + becomes amplified and refined; his acts become more conscious; and in what + seemed to him at first sudden severance or instantaneous pulsation he + discovers complex transitions imperceptibly shaded off, musical + transitions full of unexpected repetitions and threaded movements. + </p> + <p> + Thus, the deeper we go in consciousness, the less suitable become these + schemes of separation and fixity existing in spatial and numerical forms. + The inner world is that of pure quality. There is no measurable + homogeneity, no collection of atomically constructed elements. The + phenomena distinguished in it by analysis are not composing units, but + phases. And it is only when they reach the surface, when they come in + contact with the external world, when they are incarnated in language or + gesture, that the categories of matter become adapted to them. In its true + nature, reality appears as an uninterrupted flow, an impalpable shiver of + fluid changing tones, a perpetual flux of waves which ebb and break and + dissolve into one another without shock or jar. Everything is ceaseless + change; and the state which appears the most stable is already change, + since it continues and grows old. Constant quantities are represented only + by the materialisation of habit or by means of practical symbols. And it + is on this point that Mr Bergson rightly insists. ("Creative Evolution", + page 3.) + </p> + <p> + "The apparent discontinuity of psychological life is due, then, to the + fact that our attention is concentrated on it in a series of discontinuous + acts; where there is only a gentle slope, we think we see, when we follow + the broken line of our attention, the steps of a staircase. It is true + that our psychological life is full of surprises. A thousand incidents + arise which seem to contrast with what precedes them, and not to be + connected with what follows. But the gap in their appearances stands out + against the continuous background on which they are represented, and to + which they owe the very intervals that separate them; they are the + drumbeats which break into the symphony at intervals. Our attention is + fixed upon them because they interest it more, but each of them proceeds + from the fluid mass of our entire psychological existence. Each of them is + only the brightest point in a moving zone which understands all that we + feel, think, wish; in fact, all that we are at a given moment. It is this + zone which really constitutes our state. But we may observe that states + defined in this way are not distinct elements. They are an endless stream + of mutual continuity." + </p> + <p> + And do not think that perhaps such a description represents only or + principally our life of feeling. Reason and thought share the same + characteristic, as soon as we penetrate their living depth, whether it be + a question of creative invention or of those primordial judgments which + direct our activity. If they evidence greater stability, it is in + permanence of direction, because our past remains present to us. + </p> + <p> + For we are endowed with memory, and that perhaps is, on the whole, our + most profound characteristic. It is by memory we enlarge ourselves and + draw continually upon the wealth of our treasuries. Hence comes the + completely original nature of the change which constitutes us. But it is + here that we must shake off familiar representations! Common-sense cannot + think in terms of movement. It forges a static conception of it, and + destroys it by arresting it under pretext of seeing it better. To define + movement as a series of positions, with a generating law, with a + time-table or correspondence sheet between places and times, is surely a + ready-made presentation. Are we not confusing the trajectory and its + performance, the points traversed and the traversing of the points, the + result of the genesis of the result; in short, the quantitative distance + over which the flight extends, and the qualitative flight which puts this + distance behind it? In this way the very mobility which is the essence of + movement vanishes. There is the same common mistake about time. Analytic + and synthetic thought can see in time only a string of coincidences, each + of them instantaneous, a logical series of relations. It imagines the + whole of it to be a graduated slide-rule, in which the luminous point + called the present is the geometrical index. + </p> + <p> + Thus it gives form to time in space, "a kind of fourth dimension," ("Essay + on the Immediate Data".) or at least it reduces it to nothing more than an + abstract scheme of succession, "a stream without bottom or sides, flowing + without determinable strength, in an indefinable direction." + ("Introduction to Metaphysics".) It requires time to be homogeneous, and + every homogeneous medium is space, "for as homogeneity consists here in + the absence of any quality, it is not clear how two forms of homogeneity + could be distinguished one from the other." ("Essay on the Immediate + Data", page 74.) + </p> + <p> + Quite different appears real duration, the duration which is lived. It is + pure heterogeneity. It contains a thousand different degrees of tension or + relaxation, and its rhythm varies without end. The magic silence of calm + nights or the wild disorder of a tempest, the still joy of ecstasy or the + tumult of passion unchained, a steep climb towards a difficult truth or a + gentle descent from a luminous principle to consequences which easily + follow, a moral crisis or a shooting pain, call up intuitions admitting no + comparison with one another. We have here no series of moments, but + prolonged and interpenetrating phases; their sequence is not a + substitution of one point for another, but rather resembles a musical + resolution of harmony into harmony. And of this ever-new melody which + constitutes our inner life every moment contains a resonance or an echo of + past moments. "What are we really, what is our character, except the + condensation of the history which we have lived since our birth, even + before our birth, since we bring with us our prenatal dispositions? + Without doubt we think only with a small part of our past; but it is with + our complete past, including our original bias of soul, that we desire, + wish, and act." ("Creative Evolution", pages 5-6.) This is what makes our + duration irreversible, and its novelty perpetual, for each of the states + through which it passes envelops the recollection of all past states. And + thus we see, in the end, how, for a being endowed with memory, "existence + consists in change, change in ripening, ripening in endless + self-creation." ("Creative Evolution", page 8.) + </p> + <p> + With this formula we face the capital problem in which psychology and + metaphysics meet, that of liberty. The solution given by Mr Bergson marks + one of the culminating points of his philosophy. It is from this summit + that he finds light thrown on the riddle of inner being. And it is the + centre where all the lines of his research converge. + </p> + <p> + What is liberty? What must we understand by this word? Beware of the + answer you are going to give. Every definition, in the strict sense of the + term, will imply the determinist thesis in advance, since, under pain of + going round in a circle, it will be bound to express liberty as a function + of what it is not. Either psychological liberty is an illusive appearance, + or, if it is real, we can only grasp it by intuition, not by analysis, in + the light of an immediate feeling. For a reality is verified, not + constructed; and we are now or never in one of those situations where the + philosopher's task is to create some new concept, instead of abiding by a + combination of previous elements. + </p> + <p> + Man is free, says common-sense, in so far as his action depends only on + himself. "We are free," says Mr Bergson, ("Essay on the Immediate Data of + Consciousness", page 131.) "when our acts proceed from our entire + personality, when they express it, when they exhibit that indefinable + resemblance to it which we find occasionally between the artist and his + work." That is all we need seek; two conceptions which are equivalent to + each other, two concordant formulae. It is true that this amounts to + determining the free act by its very originality, in the etymological + sense of the word: which is at bottom only another way of declaring it + incommensurable with every concept, and reluctant to be confined by any + definition. But, after all, is not that the only true immediate fact? + </p> + <p> + That our spiritual life is genuine action, capable of independence, + initiative, and irreducible novelty, not mere result produced from + outside, not simple extension of external mechanism, that it is so much + ours as to constitute every moment, for him who can see, an essentially + incomparable and new invention, is exactly what represents for us the name + of liberty. Understood thus, and decidedly it is like this that we must + understand it, liberty is a profound thing: we seek it only in those + moments of high and solemn choice which come into our life, not in the + petty familiar actions which their very insignificance submits to all + surrounding influences, to every wandering breeze. Liberty is rare; many + live and die and have never known it. Liberty is a thing which contains an + infinite number of degrees and shades; it is measured by our capacity for + the inner life. Liberty is a thing which goes on in us unceasingly: our + liberty is potential rather than actual. And lastly, it is a thing of + duration, not of space and number, not the work of moments or decrees. The + free act is the act which has been long in preparing, the act which is + heavy with our whole history, and falls like a ripe fruit from our past + life. + </p> + <p> + But how are we to establish positive verification of these views? How are + we to do away with the danger of illusion? The proof will in this case + result from a criticism of adverse theories, along with direct observation + of psychological reality freed from the deceptive forms which warp the + common perception of it. And it will here be an easy task to resume Mr + Bergson's reasoning in a few words. + </p> + <p> + The first obstacle which confronts affirmation of our liberty comes from + physical determinism. Positive science, we are told, presents the universe + to us as an immense homogeneous transformation, maintaining an exact + equivalence between departure and arrival. How can we possibly have after + that the genuine creation which we require in the act we call free? + </p> + <p> + The answer is that the universality of the mechanism is at bottom only a + hypothesis which is still awaiting demonstration. On the one hand it + includes the parallelist conception which we have recognised as effete. + And on the other it is plain that it is not self-sufficient. At least it + requires that somewhere or other there should be a principle of position + giving once for all what will afterwards be maintained. In actual fact, + the course of phenomena displays three tendencies: a tendency to + conservation, beyond question; but also a tendency to collapse, as in the + diminution of energy; and a tendency to progress, as in biological + evolution. To make conservation the sole law of matter implies an + arbitrary decree, denoting only those aspects of reality which will count + for anything. By what right do we thus exclude, with vital effort, even + the feeling of liberty which in us is so vigorous? + </p> + <p> + We might say, it is true, that our spiritual life, if it is not a simple + extension of external mechanism, yet proceeds according to an internal + mechanism equally severe, but of a different order. This would bring us to + the hypothesis of a kind of psychological mechanism; and in many respects + this seems to be the common-sense hypothesis. I need not dwell upon it, + after the numerous criticisms already made. Inner reality—which does + not admit number—is not a sequence of distinct terms, allowing a + disconnected waste of absolute causality. + </p> + <p> + And the mechanism of which we dream has no true sense—for, after + all, it has a sense—except in relation to the superficial phenomena + which take place in our dead rind, in relation to the automaton which we + are in daily life. I am ready to admit that it explains our common + actions, but here it is our profound consciousness which is in question, + not the play of our materialised habits. + </p> + <p> + Without insisting, then, too strongly on this mongrel conception, let us + pass to the direct examination of inner psychological reality. Everything + is ready for the conclusion. Our duration, which is continually + accumulating itself, and always introducing some irreducible new factor, + prevents any kind of state, even if superficially identical, from + repeating itself in depth. "We shall never again have the soul we had this + evening." Each of our moments remains essentially unique. It is something + new added to the surviving past; not only new, but unable to be foreseen. + </p> + <p> + For how can we speak of foresight which is not simple conjecture, how can + we conceive an absolute extrinsic determination, when the act in birth + only makes one with the finished sum of its conditions, when these + conditions are complete only on the threshold of the action beginning, + including the fresh and irreducible contribution added by its very date in + our history? We can only explain afterwards, we can only foresee when it + is too late, in retrospect, when the accomplished action has fallen into + the plan of matter. + </p> + <p> + Thus our inner life is a work of enduring creation: of phases which mature + slowly, and conclude at long intervals the decisive moments of + emancipating discovery. Undoubtedly matter is there, under the forms of + habit, threatening us with automatism, seeking at every moment to devour + us, stealing a march on us whenever we forget. But matter represents in us + only the waste of existence, the mortal fall of weakened reality, the + swoon of the creative action falling back inert; while the depths of our + being still pulse with the liberty which, in its true function, employs + mechanism itself only as a means of action. + </p> + <p> + Now, does not this conception make a singular exception of us in nature, + an empire within an empire? That is the question we have yet to + investigate. + </p> + <p> + II. + </p> + <p> + We have just attempted to grasp what being is in ourselves; and we have + found that it is becoming, progress, and growth, that it is a creative + process which never ceases to labour incessantly; in a word, that it is + duration. Must we come to the same conclusion about external being, about + existence in general? + </p> + <p> + Let us consider that external reality which is nearest us, our body. It is + known to us both externally by our perceptions and internally by our + affections. It is then a privileged case for our inquiry. In addition, and + by analogy, we shall at the same time study the other living bodies which + everyday induction shows us to be more or less like our own. What are the + distinctive characteristics of these new realities? Each of them possesses + a genuine individuality to a far greater degree than inorganic objects; + whilst the latter are hardly limited at all except in relation to the + needs of the former, and so do not constitute beings in themselves, the + former evidence a powerful internal unity which is only further emphasised + by their prodigious complication, and form wholes with are naturally + complete. These wholes are not collections of juxtaposed parts: they are + organisms; that is to say, systems of connected functions, in which each + detail implies the whole, and where the various elements interpenetrate. + These organisms change and modify continually; we say of them not only + that they are, but that they live; and their life is mutability itself, a + flight, a perpetual flux. This uninterrupted flight cannot in any way be + compared to a geometrical movement; it is a rhythmic succession of phases, + each of which contains the resonance of all those which come before; each + state lives on in the state following; the life of the body is memory; the + living being accumulates its past, makes a snowball of itself, serves as + an open register for time, ripens, and grows old. Despite all + resemblances, the living body always remains, in some measure, an + absolutely original and unique invention, for there are not two specimens + exactly alike; and, among inert objects, it appears as the reservoir of + indetermination, the centre of spontaneity, contingence, and genuine + action, as if in the course of phenomena nothing really new could be + produced except by its agency. + </p> + <p> + Such are the characteristic tendencies of life, such the aspects which it + presents to immediate observation. Whether spiritual activity + unconsciously presides over biological evolution, or whether it simply + prolongs it, we always find here and there the essential features of + duration. + </p> + <p> + But I spoke just now of "individuality." Is it really one of the + distinctive marks of life? We know how difficult it is to define it + accurately. Nowhere, not even in man, is it fully realised; and there are + beings in existence in which it seems a complete illusion, though every + part of them reproduces their complete unity. + </p> + <p> + True, but we are now dealing with biology, in which geometrical precision + is inadmissible, where reality is defined not so much by the possession of + certain characteristics as by its tendency to accentuate them. It is as a + tendency that individuality is more particularly manifested; and if we + look at it in this light, no one can deny that it does constitute one of + the fundamental tendencies of life. Only the truth is that the tendency to + individuality remains always and everywhere counterbalanced, and therefore + limited, by an opposing tendency, the tendency to association, and above + all to reproduction. This necessitates a correction in our analysis. + Nature, in many respects, seems to take no interest in individuals. "Life + appears to be a current passing from one germ to another through the + medium of a developed organism." ("Creative Evolution", page 29.) + </p> + <p> + It seems as if the organism played the part of a thoroughfare. What is + important is rather the continuity of progress of which the individuals + are only transitory phases. Between these phases again there are no sharp + severances; each phase resolves and melts imperceptibly into that which + follows. Is not the real problem of heredity to know how, and up to what + point, a new individual breaks away from the individuals which produced + it? Is not the real mystery of heredity the difference, not the + resemblance, occurring between one term and another? + </p> + <p> + Whatever be its solution, all the individual phases mutually extend and + interpenetrate one another. There is a racial memory by which the past is + continually accumulated and preserved. Life's history is embodied in its + present. And that is really the ultimate reason of the perpetual novelty + which surprised us just now. The characteristics of biological evolution + are thus the same as those of human progress. Once again we find the very + stuff of reality in duration. "We must not then speak any longer of life + in general as an abstraction, or a mere heading under which we write down + all living beings." ("Creative Evolution", page 28.) On the contrary, to + it belongs the primordial function of reality. It is a very real current + transmitted from generation to generation, organising and passing through + bodies, without failing or becoming exhausted in any one of them. + </p> + <p> + We may, already, then, draw one conclusion: Reality, at bottom, is + becoming. But such a thesis runs counter to all our familiar ideas. It is + imperative that we should submit it to the test of critical examination + and positive verification. + </p> + <p> + One system of metaphysics, I said some time ago, underlies common-sense, + animating and informing it. According to this system, which is the inverse + of that which we have just intimated, reality in its very depths is fixity + and permanence. This is the completely static conception which sees in + being exactly the opposite of becoming: we cannot become, it seems to say, + except in so far as we are not. It does not, however, mean to deny + movement. But it represents it as fluctuation round invariable types, as a + whirling but captive eddy. Every phenomenon appears to it as a + transformation which ends where it began, and the result is that the world + takes the form of an eternal equilibrium in which "nothing is created, + nothing destroyed." The idea does not need much forcing to end in the old + supposition of a cyclic return which restores everything to its original + conditions. Everything is thus conceived in astronomical periods. All that + is left of the universe henceforward is a whirl of atoms in which nothing + counts but certain fixed quantities translated by our systems of + equations; the rest has vanished "in algebraical smoke." There is + therefore nothing more or less in the effect than in the group of causes; + and the causal relation moves towards identity as towards its asymptote. + </p> + <p> + Such a view of nature is open to many objections, even if it were only a + question of inorganised matter. Simple physics already betoken the + insufficiency of a purely mechanic conception. The stream of phenomena + flows in an irreversible direction and obeys a determined rhythm. "If I + wish to prepare myself a glass of sugar and water, I may do what I like, + but I must wait for my sugar to melt." ("Creative Evolution", page 10.) + Here are facts which pure mechanism does not take into account, regarding + as it does only statically conceived relations, and making time into a + measure only, something like a common denominator of concrete successions, + a certain number of coincidences from which all true duration remains + absent, which would remain unchanged even if the world's history, instead + of opening out in consecutive phases, were to be unfolded before our eyes + all at once like a fan. Do we not indeed speak today of aging and atomic + separation. If the quantity of energy is preserved, at least its quality + is continually deteriorating. By the side of something which remains + constant, the world also contains something which is being used up, + dissipated, exhausted, decomposed. + </p> + <p> + Further still, a specimen of metal, in its molecular structure, preserves + an indelible trace of the treatment it has undergone; natural philosophers + tell us that there is a "memory of solids." These are all very positive + facts which pure mechanism passes over. In addition, must we not first of + all postulate what will afterwards be preserved or deteriorated? Whence we + get another aspect of things: that of genesis and creation; and in reality + we register the ascending effort of life as a reality no less startling + than mechanic inertia. + </p> + <p> + Finally, we have a double movement of ascent and descent: such is what + life and matter appear to immediate observation. These two currents meet + each other, and grapple. It is the drama of evolution, of which Mr Bergson + once gave a masterly explanation, in stating the high place which man + fills in nature: + </p> + <p> + "I cannot regard the general evolution and progress of life in the whole + of the organised world, the co-ordination and subordination of vital + functions to one another in the same living being, the relations which + psychology and physiology combined seem bound to establish between brain + activity and thought in man, without arriving at this conclusion, that + life is an immense effort attempted by thought to obtain of matter + something which matter does not wish to give it. Matter is inert; it is + the seat of necessity; it proceeds mechanically. It seems as if thought + seeks to profit by this mechanical inclination in matter to utilise it for + actions, and thus to convert all the creative energy it contains, at least + all that this energy possesses which admits of play and external + extraction, into contingent movements in space and events in time which + cannot be foreseen. With laborious research it piles up complications to + make liberty out of necessity, to compose for itself a matter so subtile, + and so mobile, that liberty, by a veritable physical paradox, and thanks + to an effort which cannot last long, succeeds in maintaining its + equilibrium on this very mobility. + </p> + <p> + "But it is caught in the snare. The eddy on which it was poised seizes and + drags it down. It becomes prisoner of the mechanism it has set up. + Automatism lays hold of it, and life, inevitably forgetting the end which + it had determined, which was only to be a means in view of a superior end, + is entirely used up in an effort to preserve itself by itself. From the + humblest of organised beings to the higher vertebrates which come + immediately before man, we witness an attempt which is always foiled and + always resumed with more and more art. Man has triumphed; with difficulty, + it is true, and so incompletely that a moment's lapse and inattention on + his part surrender him to automatism again. But he has triumphed..." + ("Report of the French Philosophical Society", meeting, 2nd May 1901.) + </p> + <p> + And Mr Bergson adds in another place: ("Creative Evolution", pages + 286-287.) "With man consciousness breaks the chain. In man and in man only + it obtains its freedom. The whole history of life, till man, had been the + history of an effort of consciousness to lift matter, and of the more or + less complete crushing of consciousness by matter falling upon it again. + The enterprise was paradoxical; if indeed we can speak here, except + paradoxically, of enterprise and effort. The task was to take matter, + which is necessity itself, and create an instrument of liberty, construct + a mechanical system to triumph over mechanism, to employ the determinism + of nature to pass through the meshes of the net it had spread. But + everywhere, except in man, consciousness let itself be caught in the net + of which it sought to traverse the meshes. It remained taken in the + mechanisms it had set up. The automatism which it claimed to be drawing + towards liberty enfolds it and drags it down. It has not the strength to + get away, because the energy with which it had supplied itself for action + is almost entirely employed in maintaining the exceedingly subtile and + essentially unstable equilibrium into which it has brought matter. But man + does not merely keep his machine going, he succeeds in using it as it + pleases him. + </p> + <p> + "He owes it without doubt to the superiority of his brain, which allows + him to construct an unlimited number of motor mechanisms, to oppose new + habits to old time after time, and to master automatism by dividing it + against itself. He owes it to his language, which furnishes consciousness + with an immaterial body in which to become incarnate, thus dispensing it + from depending exclusively upon material bodies, the flux of which would + drag it down and soon engulf it. He owes it to social life, which stores + and preserves efforts as language stores thought, thereby fixing a mean + level to which individuals will rise with ease, and which, by means of + this initial impulse, prevents average individuals from going to sleep and + urges better people to rise higher. But our brain, our society, and our + language are only the varied outer signs of one and the same internal + superiority. Each after its fashion, they tell us the unique and + exceptional success which life has won at a given moment of its evolution. + They translate the difference in nature, and not in degree only, which + separates man from the rest of the animal world. They let us see that if, + at the end of the broad springboard from which life took off, all others + came down, finding the cord stretched too high, man alone has leapt the + obstacle." + </p> + <p> + But man is not on that account isolated in nature: "As the smallest grain + of dust forms part of our entire solar system, and is involved along with + it in this undivided downward movement which is materiality itself, so all + organised beings from the humblest to the highest, from the first origins + of life to the times in which we live, and in all places as at all times, + do but demonstrate to our eyes a unique impulse contrary to the movement + of matter, and, in itself, indivisible. All living beings are connected, + and all yield to the same formidable thrust. The animal is supported by + the plant, man rides the animal, and the whole of humanity in space and + time is an immense army galloping by the side of each of us, before and + behind us, in a spirited charge which can upset all resistance, and leap + many obstacles, perhaps even death." ("Creative Evolution", pages + 293-294.) + </p> + <p> + We see with what broad and far-reaching conclusions the new philosophy + closes. In the forcible poetry of the pages just quoted its original + accent rings deep and pure. Some of its leading theses, moreover, are + noted here. But now we must discover the solid foundation of underlying + fact. + </p> + <p> + Let us take first the fact of biological evolution. Why has it been + selected as the basis of the system? Is it really a fact, or is it only a + more or less conjectural and plausible theory? + </p> + <p> + Notice in the first instance that the argument from evolution appears at + least as a weapon of co-ordination and research admitted in our day by all + philosophers, rejected only on the inspiration of preconceived ideas which + are completely unscientific; and that it succeeds in the task allotted to + it is doubtless already the proof that it responds to some part of + reality. And besides, we can go further. "The idea of transformism is + already contained in germ in the natural classification of organised + beings. The naturalist brings resembling organisms together, divides the + group into sub-groups, within which the resemblance is still greater, and + so on; throughout the operation, the characteristics of the group appear + as general themes upon which each of the sub-groups executes its + particular variations. + </p> + <p> + "Now this is precisely the relation we find in the animal world and in the + vegetable world between that which produces and what is produced; on the + canvas bequeathed by the ancestor to his posterity, and possessed in + common by them, each broiders his original pattern." ("Creative + Evolution", pages 24-25.) + </p> + <p> + We may, it is true, ask ourselves whether the genealogical method permits + results so far divergent as those presented to us by variety of species. + But embryology answers by showing us the highest and most complex forms of + life attained every day from very elementary forms; and palaeontology, as + it develops, allows us to witness the same spectacle in the universal + history of life, as if the succession of phases through which the embryo + passes were only a recollection and an epitome of the complete past whence + it has come. In addition, the phenomena of sudden changes, recently + observed, help us to understand more easily the conception which obtrudes + itself under so many heads, by diminishing the importance of the apparent + lacunae in genealogical continuity. Thus the trend of all our experience + is the same. + </p> + <p> + Now there are some certainties which are only centres of concurrent + probabilities; there are some truths determined only by succession of + facts, but yet, by their intersection and convergence, sufficiently + determined. + </p> + <p> + "That is how we measure the distance from an inaccessible point, by + regarding it time after time from the points to which we have access." + ("Report of the French Philosophical Society", meeting, 2nd May 1901.) + </p> + <p> + Is not that the case here? The affirmative seems all the more inevitable + inasmuch as the language of transformism is the only language known to the + biology of today. Evolution can, it is true, be transposed, but not + suppressed, since in any actual state there would always remain this + striking fact that the living forms met with as remains in geological + layers are ranged by the natural affinity of their characteristics in an + order of succession parallel to the succession of the ages. We are not + really then inventing a hypothesis in beginning with the affirmation of + evolution. But what we have to do is to appreciate its object. + </p> + <p> + Evolution! We meet the word everywhere today. But how rare is the true + idea! Let us ask the astronomers who originate cosmogonical hypotheses, + and invent a primitive nebula, the natural philosophers who dream that by + the deterioration of energy and the dissipation of movement the material + world will obtain final rest in the inertia of a homogeneous equilibrium, + let us ask the biologists and psychologists who are enemies of fixed + species and inquisitive about ancestral history. What they are anxious to + discern in evolution is the persistent influence of an initial cause once + given, the attraction of a fixed end, a collection of laws before the + eternity of which change becomes negligible like an appearance. Now he who + thinks of the universe as a construction of unchangeable relations denies + by his method the evolution of which he speaks, since he transforms it + into a calculable effect necessarily produced by a regulated play of + generating conditions, since he implicitly admits the illusive character + of a becoming which adds nothing to what is given. + </p> + <p> + Finality itself, if he keeps the name, does not save him from his error, + for finality in his eyes is nothing but an efficient cause projected into + the future. So we see him fixing stages, marking periods, inserting means, + putting in milestones, continually destroying movement by halting it + before his gaze. And we all do the same by instinctive inclination. Our + concept of law, in its classical form, is not general: it represents only + the law of co-existence and of mechanism, the static relation between two + numerically disconnected terms; and in order to grasp evolution we shall + doubtless have to invent a new type of law: law in duration, dynamic + relation. For we can, and we must, conceive that there is an evolution of + natural laws; that these laws never define anything but a momentary state + of things; that they are in reality like streaks determined in the flux of + becoming by the meeting of contrary currents. "Laws," says Monsieur + Boutroux, "are the bed down which passes the torrent of facts; they have + dug it, though they follow it." Yet we see the common theories of + evolution appealing to the concepts of the present to describe the past, + forcing them back to prehistoric times, and beyond the reasoning of today, + placing at the beginning what is only conceivable in the mind of the + contemporary thinker; in a word, imagining the same laws as always + existing and always observed. This is the method which Mr Bergson so + justly criticises in Spencer: that of reconstructing evolution with + fragments of its product. + </p> + <p> + If we wish thoroughly to grasp the reality of things, we must think + otherwise. Neither of these ready-made concepts, mechanism and finality, + is in place, because both of them imply the same postulate, viz. that + "everything is given," either at the beginning or at the end, whilst + evolution is nothing if it is not, on the contrary, "that which gives." + Let us take care not to confound evolution and development. There is the + stumbling-block of the usual transformist theories, and Mr Bergson devotes + to it a closely argued and singularly penetrating criticism, by an example + which he analyses in detail. ("Creative Evolution", chapter i.) These + theories either do not explain the birth of variation, and limit + themselves to an attempt to make us understand how, once born, it becomes + fixed, or else through need of adaptation they look for a conception of + its birth. But in both cases they fail. + </p> + <p> + "The truth is that adaptation explains the windings of the movement of + evolution, but not the general directions of the movement, still less the + movement itself. The road which leads to the town is certainly obliged to + climb the hills and go down the slopes; it adapts itself to the accidents + of the ground; but the accidents of the ground are not the cause of the + road, any more than they have imparted its direction." ("Creative + Evolution", pages 111-112.) + </p> + <p> + At the bottom of all these errors there are only prejudices of practical + action. That is of course why every work appears to be an outside + construction beginning with previous elements; a phase of anticipation + followed by a phase of execution, calculation, and art, an effective + projecting cause, and a concerted goal, a mechanism which hurls to a + finality which aims. But the genuine explanation must be sought elsewhere. + And Mr Bergson makes this plain by two admirable analyses in which he + takes to pieces the common ideas of disorder and nothingness in order to + explain their meaning relative to our proceedings in industry or language. + </p> + <p> + Let us come back to facts, to immediate experience, and try to translate + its pure data simply. What are the characteristics of vital evolution? + First of all it is a dynamic continuity, a continuity of qualitative + progress; next, it is essentially a duration, an irreversible rhythm, a + work of inner maturation. By the memory inherent in it, the whole of its + past lives on and accumulates, the whole of its past remains for ever + present to it; which is tantamount to saying that it is experience. + </p> + <p> + It is also an effort of perpetual invention, a generation of continual + novelty, indeducible and capable of defying all anticipation, as it defies + all repetition. We see it at its task of research in the groping attempts + exhibited by the long-sought genesis of species; we see it triumphant in + the originality of the least state of consciousness, of the least body, of + the tiniest cell, of which the infinity of times and spaces does not offer + two identical specimens. + </p> + <p> + But the reef which lies in its way, and on which too often it founders, is + habit; habit would be a better and more powerful means of action if it + remained free, but in so far as it congeals and becomes materialised, is a + hindrance and an obstacle. First of all we have the average types round + which fluctuates an action which is decreasing and becoming reduced in + breadth. Then we have the residual organs, the proofs of dead life, the + encrustations from which the stream of consciousness gradually ebbs; and + finally we have the inert gear from which all real life has disappeared, + the masses of shipwrecked "things" rearing their spectral outlines where + once rolled the open sea of mind. The concept of mechanism suits the + phenomena which occur within the zone of wreckage, on this shore of + fixities and corpses. But life itself is rather finality, if not in the + anthropomorphic sense of premeditated design, plan, or programme, at least + in this sense, that it is a continually renewed effort of growth and + liberation. And it is from here we get Mr Bergson's formulae: vital + impetus and creative evolution. + </p> + <p> + In this conception of being consciousness is everywhere, as original and + fundamental reality, always present in a myriad degrees of tension or + sleep, and under infinitely various rhythms. + </p> + <p> + The vital impulse consists in a "demand for creation"; life in its + humblest stage already constitutes a spiritual activity; and its effort + sends out a current of ascending realisation which again determines the + counter-current of matter. Thus all reality is contained in a double + movement of ascent and descent. The first only, which translates an inner + work of creative maturation, is essentially durable; the second might, in + strictness, be almost instantaneous, like that of an escaping spring; but + the one imposes its rhythm on the other. From this point of view mind and + matter appear not as two things opposed to each other, as static terms in + fixed antithesis, but rather as two inverse directions of movement; and, + in certain respects, we must therefore speak not so much of matter or mind + as of spiritualisation and materialisation, the latter resulting + automatically from a simple interruption of the former. "Consciousness or + superconsciousness is the rocket, the extinguished remains of which fall + into matter." ("Creative Evolution", page 283.) + </p> + <p> + What image of universal evolution is then suggested? Not a cascade of + deduction, nor a system of stationary pulsations, but a fountain which + spreads like a sheaf of corn and is partially arrested, or at least + hindered and delayed, by the falling spray. The fountain itself, the + reality which is created, is vital activity, of which spiritual activity + represents the highest form; and the spray which falls is the creative act + which falls, it is reality which is undone, it is matter and inertia. In a + word, the supreme law of genesis and fall, the double play of which + constitutes the universe, comprises a psychological formula. + </p> + <p> + Everything begins in the manner of an invention, as the fruit of duration + and creative genius, by liberty, by pure mind; then comes habit, a kind of + body, as the body is already a group of habits; and habit, taking root, + being a work of consciousness which escapes it and turns against it, is + little by little degraded into mechanism in which the soul is buried. + </p> + <p> + III. + </p> + <p> + The main lines and general perspective of Mr Bergson's philosophy now + perhaps begin to appear. Certainly I am the first to feel how powerless a + slender resume really is to translate all its wealth and all its strength. + </p> + <p> + At least I wish I could have contributed to making its movement, and what + I may call its rhythm, clearer to perception. It is from the books of the + master himself that a more complete revelation must be sought. And the few + words which I am still going to add as conclusion are only intended to + sketch the principal consequences of the doctrine, and allow its distant + reach to be seen. + </p> + <p> + The evolution of life would be a very simple and easy thing to understand + if it were fulfilled along one single trajectory and followed a straight + path. "But we are here dealing with a shell which has immediately burst + into fragments, which, being themselves species of shells, have again + burst into fragments destined to burst again, and so on for a very long + time." ("Creative Evolution", page 107.) It is, in fact, the property of a + tendency to develop itself in the expansion which analyses it. As for the + causes of this dispersion into kingdoms, then into species, and finally + into individuals, we can distinguish two series: the resistance which + matter opposes to the current of life sent through it, and the explosive + force—due to an unstable equilibrium of tendencies—carried by + the vital impulse within itself. Both unite in making the thrust of life + divide in more and more diverging but complementary directions, each + emphasising some distinct aspect of its original wealth. Mr Bergson + confines himself to the branches of the first order—plant, animal, + and man. And in the course of a minute and searching discussion he shows + us the characteristics of these lines in the moods or qualities signified + by the three words—torpor, instinct, and intelligence: the vegetable + kingdom constructing and storing explosives which the animal expends, and + man creating a nervous system for himself which permits him to convert the + expense into analysis. Let us leave aside, as we must, the many suggestive + views scattered lavishly about, the many flashes of light which fall on + all faces of the problem, and let us confine ourselves to seeing how we + get a theory of knowledge from this doctrine. There we have yet another + proof of the striking and fertile originality of the new philosophy. + </p> + <p> + More than one objection has been brought against Mr Bergson on this head. + That is quite natural: how could such a novelty be exactly understood at + once? It is also very desirable; it is the demands for enlightenment which + lead a doctrine to full consciousness of itself, to precision and + perfection. But we must be afraid of false objections, those which arise + from an obstinate translation of the new philosophy into an old language + steeped in a different metaphysic. With what has Mr Bergson been + reproached? With misunderstanding reason, with ruining positive science, + with being caught in the illusion of getting knowledge otherwise than by + intelligence, or of thinking otherwise than by thought; in short, of + falling into a vicious circle by making intellectualism turn round upon + itself. Not one of these reproaches has any foundation. + </p> + <p> + Let us begin by a few preliminary remarks to clear the ground. First of + all, there is one ridiculous objection which I quote only to record. I + mean that which suspects at the bottom of the theories which we are going + to discuss some dark background, some prepossession of irrational + mysticism. On the contrary, the truth is, we have here perhaps better than + anywhere, the spectacle of pure thought face to face with things. But it + is a complete thought, not thought reduced to some partial functions, but + sufficiently sure of its critical power to sacrifice none of its + resources. Here, we may say, really is the genuine positivism, which + reinstates all spiritual reality. It does not in any way lead to a + misunderstanding or depreciation of science. Even where contingency and + relativity are most visible in it, in the domain of inert matter, Mr + Bergson goes so far as to say that physical science touches an absolute. + It is true that it touches this absolute rather than sees it. More + particularly it perceives all its reactions on a system of representative + forms which it presents to it, and observes the effect on the veil of + theory with which it envelops it. At certain moments, all the same, the + veil becomes almost transparent. And in any case the scholar's thought + guesses and grazes reality in the curve drawn by the succession of its + increasing syntheses. But there are two orders of science. Formerly it was + from the mathematician that we borrowed the ideal of evidence. Hence came + the inclination always to seek the most certain knowledge from the most + abstract side. The temptation was to make a kind of less severe and + rigorous mathematics of biology itself. Now if such a method suits the + study of inert matter because in a manner geometrical, so much so that our + knowledge of it thus acquired is more incomplete than inexact, this is not + at all the case for the things of life. Here, if we were to conduct + scientific research always in the same grooves and according to the same + formulae, we should immediately encounter symbolism and relativity. For + life is progress, whilst the geometrical method is commensurable only with + things. Mr Bergson is aware of this; and his rare merit has been to + disengage specific originality from biology, while elevating it to a + typical and standard science. + </p> + <p> + But let us come to the heart of the problem. What was Kant's point of + departure in the theory of knowledge? In seeking to define the structure + of the mind according to the traces of itself which it must have left in + its works, and in proceeding by a reflective analysis ascending from a + fact to its conditions, he could only regard intelligence as a thing made, + a fixed system of categories and principles. + </p> + <p> + Mr Bergson adopts an inverse attitude. Intelligence is a product of + evolution: we see it slowly and uninterruptedly constructed along a line + which rises through the vertebrates to man. Such a point of view is the + only one which conforms to the real nature of things, and the actual + conditions of reality; the more we think of it, the more we perceive that + the theory of knowledge and the theory of life are bound up with one + another. Now what do we conclude from this point of view? Life, considered + in the direction of "knowledge," evolves on two diverging lines which at + first are confused, then gradually separate, and finally end in two + opposed forms of organisation, intelligence and instinct. Several contrary + potentialities interpenetrated at their common source, but of this source + each of these kinds of activity preserves or rather accentuates only one + tendency; and it will be easy to mark its dual character. + </p> + <p> + Instinct is sympathy; it has no clear consciousness of itself; it does not + know how to reflect; it is hardly capable of varying its steps; but it + operates with incomparable certainty because it remains lodged in things, + in communion with their rhythm and with inner feeling of them. The history + of animals in this respect supplies many remarkable examples which Mr + Bergson analyses and discusses in detail. As much might be said of the + work which produces a living body, and of the effort which presides over + its growth, maintenance, and functions. Take a natural philosopher who has + long breathed the atmosphere of the laboratory, who has by long practice + acquired what we call "experience"; he has a kind of intimate feeling for + his instruments, their resources, their movements, their working + tendencies; he perceives them as extensions of himself; he possesses them + as groups of habitual actions, thus discoursing by manipulations as easily + and spontaneously as others discourse in calculation. Doubtless that is + only an image; but transpose it and generalise it, and it will help you to + understand the kind of action which divines instinct. But intelligence is + something quite different. We are talking, of course, of the analytic and + synthetic intelligence which we use in our acts of current thought, which + works throughout our daily action and forms the fundamental thread of our + scientific operations. I need not here go back to the criticism of its + ordinary proceedings. But I must now note the service which suits them, + the domain in which they apply and are valid, and what they teach us + thereby about the meaning, reach, and natural task of intelligence. + </p> + <p> + Whilst instinct vibrates in sympathetic harmony with life, it is about + inert matter that intelligence is granted; it is a rider to our faculty of + action; it triumphs in geometry; it feels at home among the objects in + which our industry finds its supports and its tools. In a word, "our logic + is primarily the logic of solids." (Preface to "Creative Evolution".) But + if we enter the vital order its incompetence is manifestly apparent. + </p> + <p> + It is very important that deduction should be so impotent in biology. + Still more impotent is it perhaps in matters of art or religion; whilst, + on the contrary, it works marvels so long as it has only to foresee + movements or transformations in bodies. What does this mean, if not that + intelligence and materiality go together, that language with its analytic + steps is regulated by the movements of matter? Philosophy once again then + must leave it behind, for the duty of philosophy is to consider everything + in its relation to life. + </p> + <p> + Do not conclude, however, that the philosopher's duty is to renounce + intelligence, place it under tutelage, or abandon it to the blind + suggestions of feeling and will. It has not even the right to do so. + Instinct, with us who have evolved along the grooves of intelligence, has + remained too weak to be sufficient for us. Besides, intelligence is the + only path by which light could dawn in the bosom of primitive darkness. + But let us look at present reality in all its complexity, all its wealth. + Round intelligence itself exists a halo of instinct. This halo represents + the remains of the first nebulous vapour at the expense of which + intelligence was constituted like a brilliantly condensed nucleus; and it + is still today the atmosphere which gives it life, the fringe of touch, + and delicate probing, inspiring contact and divining sympathy, which we + see in play in the phenomena of discovery, as also in the acts of that + "attention to life," and that "sense of reality" which is the soul of good + sense, so widely distinct from common-sense. And the peculiar task of the + philosopher is to reabsorb intelligence in instinct, or rather to + reinstate instinct in intelligence; or better still, to win back to the + heart of intelligence all the initial resources which it must have + sacrificed. This is what is meant by return to the primitive, and the + immediate, to reality and life. This is the meaning of intuition. + </p> + <p> + Certainly the task is difficult. We at once suspect a vicious circle. How + can we go beyond intelligence except by intelligence itself? We are + apparently inside our thought, as incapable of coming out of it as is a + balloon of rising above the atmosphere. True, but on this reasoning we + could just as well prove that it is impossible for us to acquire any new + habit whatsoever, impossible for life to grow and go beyond itself + continually. + </p> + <p> + We must avoid drawing false conclusions from the simile of the balloon. + The question here is to know what are the real limits of the atmosphere. + It is certain that the synthetic and critical intelligence, left to its + own strength, remains imprisoned in a circle from which there is no + escape. + </p> + <p> + But action removes the barrier. If intelligence accepts the risk of taking + the leap into the phosphorescent fluid which bathes it, and to which it is + not altogether foreign, since it has broken off from it and in it dwell + the complementary powers of the understanding, intelligence will soon + become adapted and so will only be lost for a moment to reappear greater, + stronger, and of fuller content. It is action again under the name of + experience which removes the danger of illusion or giddiness, it is action + which verifies; by a practical demonstration, by an effort of enduring + maturation which tests the idea in intimate contact with reality and + judges it by its fruits. + </p> + <p> + It always falls therefore to intelligence to pronounce the grand verdict + in the sense that only that can be called true which will finally satisfy + it; but we mean an intelligence duly enlarged and transformed by the very + effect of the action it has lived. Thus the objection of "irrationalism" + directed against the new philosophy falls to the ground. + </p> + <p> + The objection of "non-morality" fares no better. But is has been made, and + people have thought fit to accuse Mr Bergson's work of being the too calm + production of an intelligence too indifferent, too coldly lucid, too + exclusively curious to see and understand, untroubled and unthrilled by + the universal drama of life, by the tragic reality of evil. On the other + hand, not without contradiction, the new philosophy has been called + "romantic," and people have tried to find in it the essential traits of + romanticism: its predilection for feeling and imagination, its unique + anxiety for vital intensity, its recognised right to all which is to be, + whence its radical inability to establish a hierarchy of moral + qualifications. Strange reproach! The system in question is not yet + presented to us as a finished system. Its author manifests a plain desire + to classify his problems. And he is certainly right in proceeding so: + there is a time for everything, and on occasion we must learn to be just + an eye focussed upon being. But that does not at all exclude the + possibility of future works, treating in due order of the problem of human + destiny, and perhaps even in the work so far completed we may descry some + attempts to bring this future within ken. + </p> + <p> + But universal evolution, though creative, is not for all that quixotic or + anarchist. It forms a sequence. It is a becoming with direction, + undoubtedly due, not to the attraction of a clearly preconceived goal, or + the guidance of an outer law, but to the actual tendency of the original + thrust. In spite of the stationary eddies or momentary backwashes we + observe here and there, its stream moves in a definite direction, ever + swelling and broadening. For the spectator who regards the general sweep + of the current, evolution is growth. On the other hand, he who thinks this + growth now ended is under a simple delusion: "The gates of the future + stand wide open." ("Creative Evolution", page 114.) In the stage at + present attained man is leading; he marks the culminating point at which + creation continues; in him, life has already succeeded, at least up to a + certain point; from him onwards it advances with consciousness capable of + reflection; is it not for that very reason responsible for the result? + Life, according to the new philosophy, is a continual creation of what is + new: new—be it well understood—in the sense of growth and + progress in relation to what has gone before. Life, in a word, is mental + travel, ascent in a path of growing spiritualisation. Such at least is the + intense desire, and such the first tendency which launched and still + inspires it. But it may faint, halt, or travel down the hill. This is an + undeniable fact; and once recognised does it not awake in us the + presentiment of a directing law immanent in vital effort, a law doubtless + not to be found in any code, nor yet binding through the stern behest of + mechanical necessity, but a law which finds definition at every moment, + and at every moment also marks a direction of progress, being as it were + the shifting tangent to the curve of becoming? + </p> + <p> + Let us did that according to the new philosophy the whole of our past + survives for ever in us, and by means of us results in action. It is then + literally true that our acts do to a certain extent involve the whole + universe, and its whole history: the act which we make it accomplish will + exist henceforward for ever, and will for ever tinge universal duration + with its indelible shade. Does not that imply an imperious, urgent, + solemn, and tragic problem of action? Nay, more; memory makes a persistent + reality of evil, as of good. Where are we to find the means to abolish and + reabsorb the evil? What in the individual is called memory becomes + tradition and joint responsibility in the race. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, a directing law is immanent in life, but in the shape + of an appeal to endless transcendence. In dealing with this future + transcendent to our daily life, with this further shore of present + experience, where are we to seek the inspiring strength? And is there not + ground for asking ourselves whether intuitions have not arisen here and + there in the course of history, lighting up the dark road of the future + for us with a prophetic ray of dawn? It is at this point that the new + philosophy would find place for the problem of religion. + </p> + <p> + But this word "religion," which has not come once so far from Mr Bergson's + pen, coming now from mine, warns me that it is time to end. No man today + would be justified in foreseeing the conclusions to which the doctrine of + creative evolution will one day undoubtedly lead on this point. More than + any other, I must forget here what I myself may have elsewhere tried to do + in this order of ideas. But it was impossible not to feel the approach of + the temptation. Mr Bergson's work is extraordinarily suggestive. His + books, so measured in tone, so tranquil in harmony, awaken in us a mystery + of presentiment and imagination; they reach the hidden retreats where the + springs of consciousness well up. Long after we have closed them we are + shaken within; strangely moved, we listen to the deepening echo, passing + on and on. However valuable already their explicit contents may be, they + reach still further than they aimed. It is impossible to tell what latent + germs they foster. It is impossible to guess what lies behind the + boundless distance of the horizons they expose. But this at least is sure: + these books have verily begun a new work in the history of human thought. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0005" id="link2H_4_0005"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + ADDITIONAL EXPLANATIONS + </h2> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0006" id="link2H_4_0006"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + I. Mr Bergson's Work and the General Directions of Contemporary Thought. + </h2> + <p> + A broad survey of the new philosophy was bound to be somewhat rapid and + summary; and now that this is completed it will doubtless not be + superfluous to come back, on the same plan as before, to some more + important or more difficult individual points, and to examine by + themselves the most prominent centres on which we should focus the light + of our attention. Not that I intend to probe in minute detail the folds + and turns of a doctrine which admits of infinite development: how can I + claim to exhaust a work of such profound thought that the least passing + example employed takes its place as a particular study? Still less do I + wish to undertake a kind of analytic resume; no undertaking could be less + profitable than that of arranging paragraph headings to repeat too + briefly, and therefore obscurely, what a thinker has said without any + extravagance of language, yet with every requisite explanation. + </p> + <p> + The critic's true task, as I understand it, in no way consists in drawing + up a table of contents strewn with qualifying notes. His task is to read + and enable others to read between the lines, between the chapters, and + between the successive works, what constitutes the dynamic tie between + them, all that the linear form of writing and language has not allowed the + author himself to elucidate. + </p> + <p> + His task is, as far as possible, to master the accompaniment of underlying + thought which produced the resonant atmosphere of the inquirer's + intuition, the rhythm and toning of the image, resulting in the shade of + light which falls upon his vision. His task, in a word, is to help + understanding, and therefore to point out and anticipate the + misunderstandings to be feared. Now it seems to me that there are a few + points round which the errors of interpretation more naturally gather, + producing some astounding misconceptions of Mr Bergson's philosophy. It is + these points only that I propose to clear up. But at the same time I shall + use the opportunity to supply information about authorities, which I have + hitherto deliberately omitted, to avoid riddling with references pages + which were primarily intended to impart a general impression. + </p> + <p> + Let us begin by glancing at the milieu of thought in which Mr Bergson's + philosophy must have had birth. For the last thirty years new currents are + traceable. In what direction do they go? And what distance have they + already gone? What, in short, are the intellectual characteristics of our + time? We must endeavour to distinguish the deeper tendencies, those which + herald and prepare and near future. + </p> + <p> + One of the essential and frequently cited features of the generation in + which Taine and Renan were the most prominent leaders was the passionate, + enthusiastic, somewhat exclusive and intolerant cult of positive science. + This science, in its days of pride, was considered unique, displayed on a + plane by itself, always uniformly competent, capable of gripping any + object whatever with the same strength, and of inserting it in the thread + of one and the same unbroken connection. The dream of that time, despite + all verbal palliations, was a universal science of mathematics: + mathematics, of course, with their bare and brutal rigour softened and + shaded off, where feasible; if possible, supple and sensitive; in ideal, + delicate, buoyant, and judicious; but mathematics governed from end to end + by an equal necessity. Conceived as the sole mistress of truth, this + science was expected in days to come to fulfil all the needs of man, and + unreservedly to take the place of ancient spiritual discipline. Genuine + philosophy had had its day: all metaphysics seemed deception and fantasy, + a simple play of empty formulae or puerile dreams, a mythical procession + of abstraction and phantom; religion itself paled before science, as + poetry of the grey morning before the splendour of the rising sun. + </p> + <p> + However, after all this pride came the turn of humility, and humility of + the very lowest. This deified science, borne down in its hour of triumph + by too heavy a weight, had necessarily been recognised as powerless to go + beyond the order of relations, and radically incapable of telling us the + origin, end, and basis of things. It analysed the conditions of phenomena, + but was ill-suited ever to grasp any real cause, or any deep essence. + Further, it became the Unknowable, before which the human mind could only + halt in despair. And in this way destitution arose out of ambition itself, + since thought, after trusting too exclusively to its geometrical strength, + was compelled at the end of its effort to confess itself beaten when + confronted with the only questions to which no man may ever be + indifferent. + </p> + <p> + This double attitude is no longer that of the contemporary generation. The + prestige of illusion has vanished. In the religion of science we see now + nothing but idolatry. The haughty affirmation of yesterday appears today, + not as expressing a positive fact or a result duly established, but as + bringing forward a thesis of perilous and unconscious metaphysics. Let us + go even further. If true intelligence is mental expansion and aptitude for + understanding widely different things, each in its originality, to the + same degree, we must say that the claim to reduce reality to one only of + its modes, to know it in one only of its forms, is an unintelligent claim. + That is, in brief formula, the verdict of the present generation. Not, of + course, that it in any way misconceives or disdains the true value of + science, whether as an instrument of action for the conquest of nature, or + as intelligible language, allowing us to know our whereabouts in things + and "talk" them. + </p> + <p> + It is aware that in all circumstances positive methods have their evidence + to produce, and that, where they pronounce within the limits of their + power, nothing can stand against their verdict. But it considers first of + all that science was conceived of late under much too stiff and narrow a + form, under the obsession of too abstract a mathematical ideal which + corresponds to one aspect of reality only, and that the shallowest. And it + considers afterwards that science, even when broadened and made flexible, + being concerned only with what is, with fact and datum, remains radically + powerless to solve the problem of human life. Nowhere does science + penetrate to the very depth of things, and there is nothing in the world + but "things." + </p> + <p> + Experience has shown where the dream of universal mathematics leads us. + Number is driven to the heart of phenomena and nature dissected with this + delicate scalpel. Speaking in more general terms, we adopt spatial + relation as the perfect example of intelligible relation. I do not wish to + deny the use of such a method now and again, the services it may render, + or the beauty of construction peculiar to the systems it inspires. But we + must see what price we pay for these advantages. Do we choose geometry for + an informing and regulating science? The more we advance towards the + concrete and the living, the more we feel the necessity of altering the + pure mathematical type. The sciences, as they get further from inert + matter, unless they agree to reform, pale and weaken; they become vague, + impotent, anaemic; they touch little but the trite surface of their + object, the body, not the soul; in them symbolism, artifice, and + relativity become increasingly evident; at length, arbitrary and + conventional elements crop up and devour them. In a word, the claim to + treat the living as inert matter conduces to the misconception in life of + life itself, and the retention of nothing but the material waste. + </p> + <p> + This experience furnishes us with a lesson. There is not so much one + science as several sciences, each distinguished by an autonomous method, + and divided into two great kingdoms. + </p> + <p> + Let us therefore from the outset follow Mr Bergson in tracing a very sharp + line of demarcation between the inert and the living. Two orders of + knowledge will thereby become separate, one in which the frames of + geometrical understanding are in place, the other where new means and a + new attitude are required. The essential task of the present hour will now + appear to us in a precise light; it will henceforward consist, without any + disregard of a glorious past, in an effort to found as specifically + distinct methods of instruction those sciences which take for objects the + successive moments of life in its different degrees, biology, psychology, + sociology;—then in an effort to reconstruct, setting out from these + new sciences and according to their spirit, the like of what ancient + philosophy had attempted, setting out from geometry and mechanics. By so + doing we shall succeed in throwing knowledge open to receive all the + wealth of reality, while at the same time we shall reinstate the sense of + mystery and the thrill of higher anxieties. A further result will be that + the phantom of the Unknowable will be exorcised, since it no longer + represents anything but the relative and momentary limit of each method, + the portion of being which escapes its partial grip. + </p> + <p> + This is one of the first controlling ideas of the contemporary generation. + Others result from it. More particularly, it is for the same body of + motives, in the same sense, and with the same restrictions, that we + distrust intellectualism; I mean the tendency to live uniquely by + intelligence, to think as if the whole of thought consisted in analytic, + clear and reasoning understanding. + </p> + <p> + Once again, it is not a question of some blind abandonment to sentiment, + imagination, or will, nor do we claim to restrict the legitimate rights of + intellectuality in judgment. But around critical reason there is a + quickening atmosphere in which dwell the powers of intuition, there is a + half-light of gradual tones in which insertion into reality is effected. + If by rationalism we mean the attitude which consists in cabining + ourselves within the zone of geometrical light in which language evolves, + we must admit that rationalism supposes something other than itself, that + it hangs suspended by a generating act which escapes it. + </p> + <p> + The method therefore which we seek to employ everywhere today is + experience; but complete experience, anxious to neglect no aspect of being + nor any resource of mind; shaded experience, not extending on the surface + only, in a homogeneous and uniform manner; on the contrary, an experience + distributed in depth over multiple planes, adopting a thousand different + forms to adapt itself to the different kinds of problems; in short, a + creative and informing experience, a veritable genesis, a genuine action + of thought, a work and movement of life by which the guiding principles, + forms of intelligibility, and criteria of verification obtain birth and + stability in habits. And here again it is by borrowing Mr Bergson's own + formula from him that we shall most accurately describe the new spirit. + </p> + <p> + That the attitude and fundamental procedure of this new spirit are in no + way a return to scepticism or a reaction against thought cannot be better + demonstrated than by this resurrection of metaphysics, this renaissance of + idealism, which is certainly one of the most distinctive features of our + epoch. Undoubtedly philosophy in France has never known so prosperous and + so pregnant a moment. Notwithstanding, it is not a return to the old + dreams of dialectic construction. Everything is regarded from the point of + view of life, and there is a tendency more and more to recognise the + primacy of spiritual activity. But we wish to understand and employ this + activity and this life in all its wealth, in all its degrees, and by all + its functions: we wish to think with the whole of thought, and go to the + truth with the whole of our soul; and the reason of which we recognise the + sovereign weight is reason laden with its complete past history. + </p> + <p> + And what is that, really, but realism? By realism I mean the gift of + ourselves to reality, the work of concrete realisation, the effort to + convert every idea into action, to regulate the idea by the action as much + as the action by the idea, to live what we think and think what we live. + But that is positivism, you will say; certainly it is positivism. But how + changed! Far from considering as positive only that which can be an object + of sensation or calculation, we begin by greeting the great spiritual + realities with this title. The deep and living aspiration of our day is in + everything to seek the soul, the soul which specifies and quickens, seek + it by an effort towards the revealing sympathy which is genuine + intelligence, seek it in the concrete, without dissolving thought in + dreams or language, without losing contact with the body or critical + control, seek it, in fine, as the most real and genuine part of being. + </p> + <p> + Hence its return to questions which were lately declared out of date and + closed; hence its taste for problems of aesthetics and morality, its close + siege of social and religious problems, its homesickness for a faith + harmonising the powers of action and the powers of thought; hence its + restless desire to hark back to tradition and discipline. + </p> + <p> + A new philosophy was required to answer this new way of looking at things. + Already, in 1867, Ravaisson in his celebrated "Report" wrote these + prophetic lines: "Many signs permit us to foresee in the near future a + philosophical epoch of which the general character will be the + predominance of what may be called spiritualist realism or positivism, + having as generating principle the consciousness which the mind has in + itself of an existence recognised as being the source and support of every + other existence, being none other than its action." + </p> + <p> + This prophetic view was further commented on in a work where Mr Bergson + speaks with just praise of this shrewd and penetrating sense of what was + coming: "What could be bolder or more novel than to come and predict to + the physicists that the inert will be explained by the living, to + biologists that life will only be understood by thought, to philosophers + that generalities are not philosophic?" ("Notice on the Life and Works of + M. Felix Ravaisson-Molien", in the Reports of the Academy of Moral and + Political Sciences, 1904.) + </p> + <p> + But let us give each his due. What Ravaisson had only anticipated Mr + Bergson himself accomplishes, with a precision which gives body to the + impalpable and floating breath of first inspiration, with a depth which + renews both proof and theses alike, with a creative originality which + prevents the critic who is anxious for justice and precision from + insisting on any researches establishing connection of thought. + </p> + <p> + One reason for the popularity today enjoyed by this new philosophy is + doubtless to be found in the very tendencies of the milieu in which it is + produced and in the aspirations which work it. But, after once remarking + these desires, we must further not forget that Mr Bergson has contributed + more than anyone else to awaken them, determine them, and make them become + conscious of themselves. Let us therefore try to understand in itself and + by itself the work of genius of which just now we were seeking the dawning + gleams. What synthetic formula will be best able to tell us the essential + direction of its movement? I will borrow it from the author himself: "It + seems to me," he writes, ("Philosophic Intuition" in the "Revue de + Metaphysique et de Morale", November 1911.) "that metaphysics are trying + at this moment to simplify themselves, to come nearer to life." Every + philosophy tends to become incarnate in a system which constitutes for it + a kind of body of analysis. + </p> + <p> + Regarded literally, it appears to be an infinite complication, a complex + construction with a thousand alcoves of high architecture, "in which + measures have been taken to provide ample lodging for all problems." + (Ibid.) Do not let us be deceived by this appearance: it signifies only + that language is incommensurable with thought, that speech admits of + endless multiplication in approximations incapable of exhausting their + object. But before constructing such a body for itself, all philosophy is + a soul, a mind, and begins with the simple unity of a generating + intuition. Here is the fitting point at which to see its essence; this is + what determines it much better than its conceptual expression, which is + always contingent and incomplete. "A philosophy worthy of the name has + never said but one thing; and that thing it has rather attempted to say + than actually said. And it has only said one thing, because it has only + seen one point: and that was not so much vision as contact; this contact + supplied an impulse, this impulse a movement, and if this movement, which + is a kind of vortex of a certain particular form, is only visible to our + eyes by what it has picked up on its path, it is no less true that other + dust might equally well have been raised, and that it would still have + been the same vortex." ("Philosophic Intuition" in the "Revue de + Metaphysique et de Morale", November 1911.) + </p> + <p> + Hence comes the fact that a philosophy is at bottom much more independent + of its natal environment than one might at first suppose; hence also the + fact that ancient philosophies, though apparently relative to a science + which is out of date, remain always living and worthy of study. + </p> + <p> + What, then, is the original intuition of Mr Bergson's philosophy, the + creative intuition whence it comes forth? We cannot hesitate long: it is + the intuition of duration. That is the perspective centre to which we must + indefatigably return; that is the principle which we must labour to expose + in its full light; and that is, finally, the source of light which will + illumine us. Now a philosophy is not only an expressed intuition; it is + further and above all an acting intuition, gradually determined and + realised, and tested by its explanatory works; and it is by its fruits + that we can understand and judge it. Hence the review upon which we are + entering. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0007" id="link2H_4_0007"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + II. Immediacy. + </h2> + <p> + The philosopher's first duty is in clear language to declare his + starting-point, with what a mathematician would call the "tangent to the + origin" of the path along which he is travelling, as afterwards the + critic's first duty is to describe this initial attitude. I have therefore + first of all to indicate the directing idea of the new philosophy. But it + is not a question of extracting a quintessence, or of fencing the soul of + doctrine within a few summary formulae. A system is not to be resumed in a + phrase, for every proposition isolated is a proposition falsified. I wish + merely to elucidate the methodical principle which inspires the beginning + of Mr Bergson's philosophy. + </p> + <p> + To philosophy itself falls the task and belongs the right to define itself + gradually as it becomes constituted. On this point, an anticipation of + experience seems hardly possible; here, as elsewhere, the finding of a + synthetic formula is a final rather than preliminary question. However, we + are obliged from the outset of the work to determine the programme of the + inquiry, if only to direct our research. It is the same on the threshold + of every science. There, it is true, the analogy ceases. For in any + science properly speaking the determination of beginning consists in the + indication of an object, and a matter, and beyond that, to each new object + a new science reciprocally corresponds, the existence of the one involving + the legitimacy of the other. But if the various sciences—I mean the + positive sciences—divide different objects thus between them, + philosophy cannot, in its turn, come forward as a particular science, + having a distinct object, the designation of which would be sufficient to + characterise and circumscribe it. Such was always the traditional + conception: such will ours continue to be. For, as a matter of fact, every + object has a philosophy and all matter can be regarded philosophically. In + short, philosophy is chiefly a way of perceiving and thinking, an attitude + and a proceeding: the peculiar and specific in it is more an intuition + than a content, a spirit rather than a domain. + </p> + <p> + What, then, is the characteristic function of philosophy, at least its + initial function, that which marks its opening? + </p> + <p> + To criticise the works of knowledge spontaneously effected; that is to + say, to scrutinise their direction, reach, and conditions: that is today + the unanimous answer of philosophers when questioned about the goal of + their labours. In other terms, what they study is not so much such and + such a particular "thing" as the relation of mind to each of the realities + to be studied. Their object, if we must employ the word, is knowledge + itself, it is the act of knowing regarded from the point of view of its + meaning and value. Philosophy thus appears as a new "order" of knowledge, + co-extensive with what is knowable, as a kind of knowledge of the second + degree, in which it is less a question of learning than of understanding, + in which we aim at progressing in depth rather than in extent; not effort + to extend the quantity of knowledge, but reflection on the quality of this + knowledge. Spontaneous thought—vulgar or scientific—is a + direct, simple, and practical thought turned towards things and partial to + useful results; seeking what is formulable rather than what is true, or at + least so fond of formulae which can be handled, manipulated, or + transmitted, that it is always tempted to see the truth in them; a thought + which, moreover, sets out from more or less unguarded postulates, abandons + itself to the motive impulses of habits contracted, and goes straight on + indefinitely without self-examination. Philosophy, on the contrary, + desires to be thought about thought, thought retracing its life and work, + knowledge labouring to know itself, fact which aspires to fact about + itself, mental effort to become free, to become entirely transparent and + luminous in its own eyes, and, if need be, to effect self-reform by + dissipating its natural illusions. What we have before our eyes then are + the initial postulates themselves, the first spontaneous thoughts, the + obscure origins of reason; and we are proceeding towards a point of + departure rather than arrival. + </p> + <p> + The new philosophy does not refuse to carry out this first critical task; + but it carries it out in its own way after determining more precisely the + real conditions of the problem. At the hour when methodical research + begins, the philosopher's mind is not clean-swept; and it would be + chimerical to wish to place oneself from the beginning, by some act of + transcendence, outside common thought. This thought cannot be inspected + and judged from outside. It constitutes, whether we wish it or no, the + sole concrete and positive point of departure. Let us add that + common-sense constitutes also our sole point of insertion into reality. It + can only then be a question of purifying it, not in any way of replacing + it. But we must distinguish in it what is pure fact, and what is ulterior + arrangement, in order to see what are the problems which really are + presented, and what are, on the contrary, the false problems, the illusory + problems, those which relate only to our artifices of language. + </p> + <p> + The search for facts is then the first necessary moment of all philosophy. + </p> + <p> + But common thought comes before us at the outset as a piece of very + composite alluvial ground. It is a beginning of positive science, and also + a residue of all philosophical opinions which have had some vogue. That, + however, is not its primary basis. Primum vivere, deinde philosophari, + says the proverb. In certain respects, "speculation is a luxury, whilst + action is a necessity." ("Creative Evolution", page 47.) But "life + requires us to apprehend things in the relation they have to our needs." + ("Laughter", page 154.) Hence comes the fundamental utilitarianism of + common-sense. Therefore if we wish to define it in itself and for itself, + and no longer as a first approximation of such and such a system of + metaphysics, it appears to us no longer as rudimentary science and + philosophy, but as an organisation of thought in view of practical life. + Thus it is that outside all speculative opinion it is effectively lived by + all. Its proper language, we may say, is the language of customary + perception and mechanical fabrication, therefore a language relative to + action, made to express action, modelled upon action, translating things + by the relations they maintain to our action; I mean our corporal and + synthetic action, which very evidently implies thought, since it is a + question of the action of a reasonable being, but which thus contains a + thought which is itself eminently practical. + </p> + <p> + However, we are here regarding common-sense considered as a source of + fact. Its utilitarianism then becomes a kind of spontaneous metaphysics + from which we must detach ourselves. But is it not the very task of + positive science to execute this work of purification? Nothing of the + kind, despite appearances and despite intentions. Let us examine more + closely. The general categories of common thought, according to Mr + Bergson, ("Philosophic Intuition" in the "Metaphysical and Moral Review", + November 1911, page 825.) remain those of science; the main roads traced + by our senses through the continuity of reality are still those along + which science will pass; perception is an infant science and science an + adult perception; so much so that customary knowledge and scientific + knowledge, both of them destined to prepare our action upon things, are of + necessity two visions of the same kind, though of unequal precision and + reach. It does not follow that science does not practise a certain + disinterestedness as far as immediate mechanical utility is concerned; it + does not follow that it has no value as knowledge. But it does not set + itself genuinely free from the habits contracted in common experience, and + to inform its research it preserves the postulates of common-sense; so + that it always grasps things by their "actable" side, by their point of + contact with our faculty for action, under the forms by which we handle + them conceptually or practically, and all it attains of reality is that by + which nature is a possible object of language or industry. + </p> + <p> + Let us turn now towards another aspect of natural thought, to discover in + it the germ of the necessary criticism. By the side of "common-sense," + which is the first rough-draft of positive science, there is "good sense," + which differs from it profoundly, and marks the beginning of what we shall + later on call philosophic intuition. (Cf. an address on "Good Sense and + Classical Studies", delivered by Mr Bergson at the Concours general prize + distribution, 30th July 1895.) It is a sense of what is real, concrete, + original, living, an art of equilibrium and precision, a fine touch for + complexities, continually feeling like the antennae of some insects. It + contains a certain distrust of the logical faculty in respect of itself; + it wages incessant war upon intellectual automatism, upon ready-made ideas + and linear deduction; above all, it is anxious to locate and to weigh, + without any oversights; it arrests the development of every principle and + every method at the precise point where too brutal an application would + offend the delicacy of reality; at every moment it collects the whole of + our experience and organises it in view of the present. It is, in a word, + thought which keeps its freedom, activity which remains awake, suppleness + of attitude, attention to life, an ever-renewed adjustment to suit + ever-new situations. + </p> + <p> + Its revealing virtue is derived from this moving contact with fact, and + this living effort of sympathy. This is what we must tend to transpose + from the practical to the speculative order. + </p> + <p> + What, then, will be for us the beginning of philosophy? After taking + cognisance of common utilitarianism, and to emerge from the relativity in + which it buries us, we seek a departure-point, a criterion, something + which decides the raising of inquiry. Where are we to find such a + principle, except in the very action of thought; I mean, this time, its + action of profound life independent of all practical aim? We shall thus + only be imitating the example of Descartes when solving the problem of + temporary doubt. What we shall term return to the immediate, the + primitive, the pure fact, will be the taking of each perception considered + as an act lived, a coloured moment of the Cogito, and this will be for us + a criterion and departure-point. + </p> + <p> + Let us specify this point. Immediate data or primitive data or pure data + are apprehended by us under forms of disinterested action; I mean that + they are first of all lived rather than conceived, that before becoming + material for science, they appear as moments of life; in brief, that + perception of them precedes their use. + </p> + <p> + It is at this stage previous to language that we are by these pure data in + intimate communion with reality itself, and the whole of our critical task + is to return to them through a regressive analysis, the goal of which is + gradually to make our clear intelligence equal to our primordial + intuition. The latter already constitutes a thought, a preconceptual + thought which is the intrinsic light of action, which is action itself so + far as it is luminous. Thus there is no question here of restricting in + any degree the part played by thought, but only of distinguishing between + the perceptive and theoretic functions of mind. + </p> + <p> + What is "the image" of which Mr Bergson speaks at the beginning of "Matter + and Mind" except, when grasped in its first movement, the flash of + conscious existence "in which the act of knowledge coincides with the + generating act of reality"? ("Report of the French Philosophical Society", + philosophical vocabulary, article "Immediate".) + </p> + <p> + Let us forget all philosophical controversies about realism and idealism; + let us try to reconstruct for ourselves a simplicity, a virginal and + candid glance, freeing us from the habits contracted in the course of + practical life. These then are our "images": not things presented + externally, nor states felt internally, not portraits of exterior beings + nor projections of internal moods, but appearances, in the etymological + sense of the word, appearances lived simply, without our being + distinguished from them, as yet neither subjective nor objective, marking + a moment of consciousness previous to the work of reflection, from which + proceeds the duality of subject and object. And such also, in every order, + appear the "immediate feelings"; as action in birth, previous to language. + (Cf. "Matter and Memory", Foreword to the 7th edition.) + </p> + <p> + Why depart from the immediate thus conceived as action and life? Because + it is quite impossible to do otherwise, for every initial fact can be only + such a pulsation of consciousness in its lived act, and the fundamental + and primitive direction of the least word, were it in an enunciation of a + problem or a doubt, can only be such a direction of life and action. And + we must certainly accord to this immediacy a value of absolute knowledge, + since it realises the coincidence of being and knowledge. + </p> + <p> + But let us not think that the perception of immediacy is simple passive + perception, that it is sufficient to open our eyes to obtain it, today + when our utilitarian education is completed and has passed into the state + of habit. There is a difference between common experience and the initial + action of life; the first is a practical limitation of the second. Hence + it follows that a previous criticism is necessary to return from one to + the other, a criticism always in activity, always open as a way of + progressive investigation, always ready for the reiteration and the + renewal of effort. + </p> + <p> + In this task of purification there is doubtless always to be feared an + illusion of remaining in the primitive stage. By what criteria, by what + signs can we recognise that we have touched the goal? Pure fact is shown + to be such on the one hand because it remains independent of all + theoretical symbolism, because the critique of language allows it to exist + thus as an indissoluble residue, because we are unable not to "live" it, + even when we free ourselves from the anxiety of utility; on the other + hand, because it dominates all systems, and imposes itself equally upon + them all as the common source from which they derive by diverging + analyses, and in which they become reconciled. Assuredly, to attain it, to + extricate it, we must appeal to the revelations of science, to the + exercise of deliberate thought. But this employment of analysis against + analysis does not in any way constitute a circle, for it tends only to + destroy prejudices which have become unconscious: it is a simple artifice + destined to break off habits and to scatter illusions by changing the + points of view. Once set free, once again become capable of direct and + simple view, what we accept as fact is what bears no trace of synthetic + elaboration. It is true that here a last objection presents itself: how + shall we think this limit, purely given, to any degree at all in fact, if + it must precede all language? + </p> + <p> + The answer is easy. Why speak thus of limit? This word has two senses: at + one time it designates a last term in a series of approximations, and at + another a certain internal character of convergence, a certain quality of + progression. + </p> + <p> + Now, it is the second sense only which suits the case before us. Immediacy + contains no matter statically defined, and no thing. The notion of fact is + quite relative. What is fact in one case may become construction in + another. For example, the percepts of common experience are facts for the + physicist, and constructions for the philosopher; the same applies to a + table of numerical results, for the scholar who is trying to establish a + theory, or for the observer and the psychologist. We may then conceive a + series in which each term is fact in relation to those which follow it, + and constructed in relation to those which precede it. The expression + "primitive fact" then determines not so much a final object as a direction + of thought, a movement of critical retrogression, a journey from the most + to the least elaborate, and the "contact with pure immediacy" is only the + effort, more and more prolonged, to convert the elements of experience + into real and profound action. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0008" id="link2H_4_0008"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + III. Theory of Perception. + </h2> + <p> + Of what the work of return to immediacy consists, and how the intuition + which it calls up reveals absolute fact, we shall see by an example, if we + study more closely a capital point of Mr Bergson's philosophy, the theory + of external perception. + </p> + <p> + If the act of perceiving realises the lived communion of the subject and + object in the image, we must admit that here we have the perfect knowledge + which we wish to obtain always: we resign ourselves to conception only for + want of perception, and our ideal is to convert all conception into + perception. Doubtless we might define philosophy by this same ideal, as an + effort to expand our perceptive power until we render it capable of + grasping all the wealth and all the depth of reality at a single glance. + Too true it is that such an ideal remains inaccessible to us. Something, + however, is given us already in aesthetic intuition. Mr Bergson has + pointed it out in some admirable pages, ("Laughter", pages 153-161.) and + has explained to us also how philosophy pursues an analogous end. (First + lecture on "The Perception of Change", delivered at Oxford, 26th May + 1911.) + </p> + <p> + But philosophy must be conceived as an art implying science and criticism, + all experience and all reason. It is when we look at metaphysics in this + way that they become a positive order of veritable knowledge. Kant has + conclusively established that what lies beyond language can only be + attained by direct vision, not by dialectic progress. His mistake was that + he afterwards believed such a vision for ever impossible; and whence did + this mistake arise, if not from the fact that, for his new vision, he + exacted intuitive faculties quite different from those at man's disposal. + Here again the artist will be our example and model. He appeals to no + transcendent sense, but detaches common-sense from its utilitarian + prejudices. Let us do the same: we shall obtain a similar result without + lying ourselves open to Kant's objections. This work is everywhere + possible, and it is, par excellence, the work of philosophy: let us try + then to sketch it in relation to the perception of matter. + </p> + <p> + We must distinguish two senses of the word "perception." This word means + first of all simple apprehension of immediacy, grasp of primitive fact. + When we use it in this sense, we will agree to say pure perception. It is + perhaps in place to see in it nothing but a limit which concrete + experience never presents unmixed, a direction of research rather than the + possession of a thing. + </p> + <p> + However that may be, the first sense is the fundamental sense, and what it + designates must be at the root of all ordinary perception; I mean, of + every mental operation which results in the construction of a percept: a + term formed by analogy with concept, representing the result of a complex + work of analysis and synthesis, with judgment from externals. We live the + images in an act of pure perception, whilst the objects of ordinary + perception are, for example, the bodies of which we speak in common + language. + </p> + <p> + With regard to the relation of the two senses which we have just + distinguished, common opinion seems very precise. It might be thus + resumed: at the point of departure we have simple sensations, similar to + qualitative atoms (this is the part of pure perception), and afterwards + their arrangement into connected systems, which are percepts. + </p> + <p> + But criticism does not authorise this manner of looking at it. Nowhere + does knowledge begin by separate elements. Such elements are always a + product of analysis. So there is a problem to solve to regain the basis of + pure perception which is hidden and obscured by our familiar percepts. + </p> + <p> + Do not suppose that the solution of this problem is easy. One method only + is of any use: to plunge into reality, to become immersed in it, in a + long-pursued effort to assimilate all the records of common-sense and + positive science. "For we do not obtain an intuition of reality, that is + to say, an intellectual sympathy with its inmost content, unless we have + gained its confidence by long companionship with its superficial + manifestations. And it is not a question merely of assimilating the + leading facts; we must accumulate and melt them down into such an enormous + mass that we are sure, in this fusion, of neutralising in one another all + the preconceived and premature ideas which observers may have + unconsciously allowed to form the sediment of their observations. Thus, + and only thus, is crude materiality to be disengaged from known facts." + ("Introduction to Metaphysics" in the "Metaphysical and Moral Review", + January 1903. For the correct interpretation of this passage + ("intellectual sympathy") it must not be forgotten that before "Creative + Evolution", Mr Bergson employed the word "intelligence" in a wider + acceptation, more akin to that commonly received.) + </p> + <p> + A directing principle controls this work and reintroduces order and + convergence, after dispensing with them at the outset; viz. that, contrary + to common opinion, perception as practised in the course of daily life, + "natural" perception does not aim at a goal of disinterested knowledge, + but one of practical utility, or rather, if it is knowledge, it is only + knowledge elaborated in view of action and speech. + </p> + <p> + Need we repeat here the proofs by which we have already established in the + most positive manner that such is really the meaning of ordinary + perception, the underlying reason which causes it to take the place of + pure perception? We perceive by habit only what is useful to us, what + interests us practically; very often, too, we think we are perceiving when + we are merely inferring, as for example when we seem to see a distance in + depth, a succession of planes, of which in reality we judge by differences + of colouring or relief. + </p> + <p> + Our senses supplement one another. A slow education has gradually taught + us to co-ordinate their impressions, especially those of touch to those of + vision. (H. Bergson, "Note on the Psychological Origins of Our Belief in + the Law of Causality". Vol. i. of the "Library of the International + Philosophical Congress", 1900.) + </p> + <p> + Theoretical forms come between nature and us: a veil of symbols envelops + reality; thus, finally, we no longer see things themselves, we are content + to read the labels on them. + </p> + <p> + Moreover, our perception appears to analysis completely saturated with + memories, and that in view of our practical insertion in the present. I + will not come back to this point which has been so lucidly explained by Mr + Bergson in a lecture on "Dream" ("Report of the International + Psychological Institute", May 1901.) and an article on "Intellectual + Effort", ("Philosophical Review", January 1902.) the reading of which + cannot be too strongly recommended as an introduction to the first chapter + of "Matter and Memory", in which further arguments are to be found. I will + only add one remark, following Mr Bergson, as always: perception is not + simply contemplation, but consciousness of an original visual emotion + combined with a complete group of actions in embryo, gestures in outline, + and the graze of movement within, by which we prepare to grasp the object, + describe its lines, test its functions, sound it, move it, and handle it + in a thousand ways. (This is attested by the facts of apraxia or psychic + blindness. Cf. "Matter and Memory", chapter ii.) + </p> + <p> + From the preceding observations springs the utilitarian and practical + nature of common perception. Let us attempt now to see of what the + elaboration which it makes reality undergo consists. This time I am + summing up the fourth chapter of "Matter and Memory". First of all, we + choose between the images, emphasising the strong, extinguishing the weak, + although both have, a priori, the same interest for pure knowledge; we + make this choice above all by according preference to impressions of + touch, which are the most useful from the practical point of view. This + selection determines the parcelling up of matter into independent bodies, + and the artificial character of our proceeding is thus made plain. Does + not science, indeed, conclude in the same way, showing us—as soon as + she frees herself even to a small extent from common-sense—full + continuity re-established by "moving strata," and all bodies resolved into + stationary waves and knots of intersecting fluxes? Already, then, we shall + be nearer pure perception if we cease to consider anything but the + perceptible stuff in which numerically distinct percepts are cut. Even + there, however, a utilitarian division continues. Our senses are + instruments of abstraction, each of them discerning a possible path of + action. We may say that corporal life functions in the manner of an + absorbing milieu, which determines the disconnected scale of simple + qualities by extinguishing most of the perceptible radiations. In short, + the scale of sensations, with its numerical aspect, is nothing but the + spectrum of our practical activity. Commonly we perceive only averages and + wholes, which we contract into distinct "qualities". Let us disengage from + this rhythm what is peculiar to ourselves. + </p> + <p> + Above all, let us strive to disengage ourselves from homogeneous space, + this substratum of fixity, this arbitrary scheme of measurement and + division, which, to our greater advantage, subtends the natural, + qualitative, and undivided extension of images. (We usually represent + homogeneous space as previous to the heterogeneous extension of images: as + a kind of empty room which we furnish with percepts. We must reverse this + order, and conceive, on the contrary, that extension precedes space.) And + we shall finally have pure perception in so far as it is accessible to us. + </p> + <p> + There is no disputing the absolute value of this pure perception. The + impotence of speculative reason, as demonstrated by Kant, is perhaps, at + bottom, only the impotence of an intelligence in bondage to certain + necessities of the corporal life, and exercised upon a matter which it has + had to disorganise for the satisfaction of our needs. Our knowledge of + things is then no longer relative to the fundamental structure of our + mind, but only to its superficial and acquired habits, to the contingent + form which it takes on from our corporal functions and our lower needs. + </p> + <p> + The relativity of knowledge is therefore not final. In unmaking what our + needs have made we re-establish intuition in its original purity, and + resume contact with reality. ("Matter and Memory", page 203.) + </p> + <p> + That is how things are really presented. Here we are confronted by the + moving continuity of images. Pure perception is complete perception. From + it we pass to ordinary perception by diminution, throwing shadows here and + there: the reality perceived by common-sense is nothing else actually than + universal interaction rendered visible by its very interruption at certain + points. + </p> + <p> + Whence we have this double conclusion already formulated higher up: the + relation of perception to matter is that of the part to the whole, and our + consciousness is rather limited than relative. It must be stated that + primarily we perceive things in themselves, not in us; the subjectivity of + our current perception comes from our work of outlining it in the bosom of + reality, but the root of pure perception plunges into full objectivity. + If, at each point of matter, we were to succeed in possessing the stream + of total interaction of which it marks a wave, and if we were to succeed + in seeing the multiplicity of these points as a qualitative heterogeneous + flux without number or severance, we should coincide with reality itself. + It is true that such an ideal, while inaccessible on the one hand, would + not succeed on the other without risk to knowledge; in fact, says Mr + Bergson, ("Matter and Memory", page 38.) "to perceive all the influences + of all the points of all bodies would be to descend to the state of + material object." + </p> + <p> + But a solution of this double difficulty remains possible, a dynamic and + approximate solution, which consists in looking for the absolute intuition + of matter in such a mobilisation of our perspective faculties that we + become capable of following, according to the circumstances, all the paths + of virtual perception of which the common anxiety for the practical has + made us choose one only, and capable of realising all the infinitely + different modes of qualification and discernment. + </p> + <p> + But we have still to see how this "complete experience" can be practically + thought. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0009" id="link2H_4_0009"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + IV. Critique of Language. + </h2> + <p> + The perception of reality does not obtain the full value of knowledge, + except when once socialised, once made the common property of men, and + thereby also tested and verified. + </p> + <p> + There is one means only of doing that; viz. to analyse it into manageable + and portable concepts. By language I mean the product of this + conceptualisation. Thus language is necessary; for we must always speak, + were it only to utter the impotence of words. Not less necessary is a + critique of spontaneous language, of the laws which govern it, of the + postulates which it embraces, of the methods which convey its implicit + doctrines. Synthetic forms are actually theories already; they effect an + adaptation of reality to the demands of practical use. If it is impossible + to escape them, it is at least fitting not to employ them except with due + knowledge, and when properly warned against the illusion of the false + problems which they might arouse. + </p> + <p> + Let us first of all consider thought in itself, in its concrete life. What + are the principal characteristics, the essential steps? We readily say, + analysis and synthesis. + </p> + <p> + Nothing can be known except in contrast, correlation, or negation of + another thing; and the act of knowledge, considered in itself, is + unification. Thus number appears as a fundamental category, as an absolute + condition of intelligibility; some go so far as to regard atomism as a + necessary method. But that is inexact. No doubt the use of number and the + resulting atomism are imposed by definition, we might say, on the thought + which proceeds by conceptual analysis, and then by unifying construction; + that is to say, on synthetic thought. But, in greater depth, thought is + dynamic continuity and duration. Its essential work does not consist in + discerning and afterwards in assembling ready-made elements. Let us see in + it rather a kind of creative maturation, and let us attempt to grasp the + nature of this causal activity. (H. Bergson, "Intellectual Effort" in the + "Philosophical Review", January 1902.) + </p> + <p> + The act of thought is always a complex play of moving representations, an + evolution of life in which incessant inner reactions occur. That is to + say, it is movement. But there are several planes of thought, from + intuition to language, and we must distinguish between the thought which + moves on the surface among terms displayed on a single plane, and the + thought with goes deeper and deeper from one plane to another. + </p> + <p> + We do not think solely by concepts or images; we think, first of all, + according to Mr Bergson's expression, by dynamic schemes. What is a + dynamic scheme? It is motive rather than representative, inexpressible in + itself, but a source of language containing not so much the images or + concepts in which it will develop as the indication of the path to be + followed in order to obtain them. It is not so much system as movement, + progress, genesis; it does not mark the gaze directed upon the various + points of one plane of deliberate contemplation so much as an effort to + pass through successive planes of thought in a direction leading from + intuition to analysis. We might define it by its function of calling up + images and concepts, representations which, for one and the same scheme, + are neither strictly determined nor anything in particular in themselves, + concurrent representations which have in common one and the same logical + power. + </p> + <p> + The representations called up form a body to the scheme, and the relation + of the scheme to the concepts and images which it calls up resembles, + mutatis mutandis, the relation pointed out by Mr Bergson between an idea + and its basis in the brain. In short, it is the very act of creative + thought which the dynamic scheme interprets, the act not yet fixed in + "results." + </p> + <p> + Nothing is easier than to illustrate the existence of this scheme. Let us + merely remark a few facts of current observation. Recall, for example, the + suggestive anxiety we experience when we seek to remember a name; the + precise syllables of the name still escape us, but we feel them + approaching, and already we possess something of them, since we + immediately reject those which do not answer to a certain direction of + expectancy; and by endeavouring to secure a more intimate feeling of this + direction we suddenly arouse the desired recollection. + </p> + <p> + In the same way, what does it mean to have the sense of a complex + situation in active life, if not that we perceive it, not as a static + group of explicit details, but as a meeting of powers allied or hostile, + convergent or divergent, directed towards this or that, of which the + aggregate whole tends of itself to awaken in us the initial reactions + which analyse it? + </p> + <p> + In the same way again, how do we learn, how can we assimilate a vast + system of conceits or images? Our task is not to concentrate an + enumerative attention on each individual factor; we should never get away + from them, the weight would be too heavy. + </p> + <p> + What we entrust to memory is really a dynamic scheme permitting us to + "regain" what we should not have succeeded in "retaining." In reality our + only "knowledge" is through such a scheme, which contains in the state of + potential implication an inexhaustible multiplicity ready to be developed + in actual representations. + </p> + <p> + How, finally, is any discovery made? Finding is solving a problem; and to + solve a problem we must always begin by supposing it solved. But of what + does such a hypothesis consist? + </p> + <p> + It is not an anticipated view of the solution, for then all would be at an + end; nor is it a simple formula putting in the present indicative what the + enunciation expressed in the future or the imperative, for then nothing + would be begun. It is exactly a dynamic scheme; that is to say, a method + in the state of directed tension; and often, the discovery once realised + as theory or system, capable of unending developments and resurrections, + remains by the best of itself a method and a dynamic scheme. + </p> + <p> + But one last example will perhaps reveal the truth still more. "Anyone who + has attempted literary composition knows well that when the subject has + been long studied, all the documents collected, all the notes taken, we + need, to embark on the actual work of composition, something more, an + effort, often very painful, to place oneself suddenly in the very heart of + the subject, and to seek as deep down as possible an impulse to which + afterwards we shall only have to let ourselves go. This impulse, once + received, projects the mind on a road where it finds both the information + which it had collected and a thousand other details as well; it develops + and analyses itself in terms, the enumeration of which would have no end; + the further we advance, the more we discover; we shall never succeed in + saying everything; and yet, if we turn sharply round towards the impulse + we feel behind ourselves, to grasp it, it escapes; for it was not a thing + but a direction of movement, and though indefinitely extensible, it is + simplicity itself." (H. Bergson, "Metaphysical and Moral Review", January + 1903. The whole critique of language is implicitly contained in this + "Introduction to Metaphysics".) + </p> + <p> + The thought, then, which proceeds from one representation to another in + one and the same plane is one kind; that which follows one and the same + conceptual direction through descending planes is another. Creative and + fertile thought is the thought which adopts the second kind of work. The + ideal is a continual oscillation from one plane to the other, a restless + alternative of intuitive concentration and conceptual expansion. But our + idleness takes exception to this, for the feeling of effort appears + precisely in the traject from the dynamic scheme to the images and + concepts, in the passing from one plane of thought to another. + </p> + <p> + Thus the natural tendency is to remain in the last of these planes, that + of language. We know what dangers threaten us there. + </p> + <p> + Suppose we have some idea or other and the word representing it. Do not + suppose that to this word there is one corresponding sense only, nor even + a finished group of various distinct and rigorously separable senses. On + the contrary, there is a whole scale corresponding, a complete continuous + spectrum of unstable meanings which tend unceasingly to resolve into one + another. Dictionaries attempt to illuminate them. The task is impossible. + They co-ordinate a few guiding marks; but who shall say what infinite + transitions underlie them? + </p> + <p> + A word designates rather a current of thought than one or several halts on + a logical path. Here again a dynamic continuity exists previous to the + parcelling out of the acceptations. What, then, should be the attitude of + the mind? + </p> + <p> + A supple moving attitude more attentive to the curve of change than to the + possible halting-points along the road. But this is not the case at all; + the effort would be too great, and what happens, on the contrary, is this. + For the spectrum a chromatic scale of uniform tints is very quickly + substituted. This is in itself an undesirable simplification, for it is + impossible to reconstitute the infinity of real shades by combinations of + fundamental colours each representing the homogeneous shore, which each + region of the spectrum finally becomes. + </p> + <p> + However cleverly we proportion these averages, we get, at most, some + vulgar counterfeit: orange, for example, is not a mixture of yellow and + red, although this mixture may recall to those who have known it elsewhere + the simple and original sensation of orange. Again, a second + simplification, still more undesirable, succeeds the first. + </p> + <p> + There are no longer any colours at all; black lines serve as guide-marks. + We are therefore with pure concepts decidedly in full symbolism. And it is + with symbols that we shall henceforward be trying to reconstruct reality. + </p> + <p> + I need not go back to the general characteristics or the inconveniences of + this method. Concepts resemble photographic views; concrete thickness + escapes them. However exact, varied, or numerous we suppose them, they can + certainly recall their object, but not reveal it to any one who had not + had any direct intuition of it. Nothing is easier than to trace the plan + of a body in four dimensions; all the same, this drawing does not admit + "visualisation in space" as is the case with ordinary bodies, for want of + a previous intuition which it would awaken: thus it is with concepts in + relation to reality. Like photographs and like plans, they are extracted + from reality, but we are not able to say that they were contained in it; + and many of them besides are not so much as extracts; they are simple + systematised notes, in fact, notes made upon notes. In other terms, + concepts do not represent pieces, parts, or elements of reality. Literally + they are nothing but simple symbolic notations. To wish to make integral + factors of them would be as strange an illusion as that of seeing in the + co-ordinates of a geometric point the constitutive essence of that point. + </p> + <p> + We do not make things with symbols, any more than we should reconstruct a + picture with the qualifications which classify it. + </p> + <p> + Whence, then, comes the natural inclination of thought towards the + concept? From the fact that thought delights in artifices which facilitate + analysis and language. + </p> + <p> + The first of these artifices is that from which results the possibility of + decomposition or recomposition according to arbitrary laws. For that we + need a previous substitution of symbols for things. Nothing demonstrates + this better than the celebrated arguments which we owe to Zeno of Elea. Mr + Bergson returns to the discussion of them over and over again. ("Essay on + the Immediate Data", pages 85-86; "Matter and Memory", pages 211-213, + "Creative Evolution", pages 333-337.) + </p> + <p> + The nerve of the reasoning there consists in the evident absurdity there + would be in conceiving an inexhaustible exhausted, an unachievable + achieved; in short, a total actually completed, and yet obtained by the + successive addition of an infinite number of terms. + </p> + <p> + But the question is to know whether a movement can be considered as a + numerical multiplicity. Virtual divisibility there is, no doubt, but not + actual division; divisibility is indefinite, whereas an actual division, + if it respects the inner articulations of reality, is bound to halt at a + limited number of phases. + </p> + <p> + What we divide and measure is the track of the movement once accomplished, + not the movement itself: it is the trajectory, not the traject. In the + trajectory we can count endless positions; that is to say, possible halts. + Let us not suppose that the moving body meets these elements all + ready-marked. Hence what the Eleatic dialectic illustrates is a case of + incommensurability; the radical inability of analysis to end a certain + task; our powerlessness to explain the fact of the transit, if we apply to + it such and such modes of numerical decomposition or recomposition, which + are valid only for space; the impossibility of conceiving becoming as + susceptible of being cut up into arbitrary segments, and afterwards + reconstructed by summing of terms according to some law or other; in + short, it is the nature of movement, which is without division, number, or + concept. + </p> + <p> + But thought delights in analyses regulated by the sole consideration of + easy language; hence its tendency to an arithmetic and geometry of + concepts, in spite of the disastrous consequences; and thus the Eleatic + paradox is no less instructive in its specious character than in the + solution which it embodies. + </p> + <p> + At bottom, natural thought, I mean thought which abandons itself to its + double inclination of synthetic idleness and useful industry, is a thought + haunted by anxieties of the operating manual, anxieties of fabrication. + </p> + <p> + What does it care about the fluxes of reality and dynamic depths? It is + only interested in the outcrops scattered here and there over the firm + soil of the practical, and it solidifies "terms" like stakes plunged in a + moving ground. Hence comes the configuration of its spontaneous logic to a + geometry of solids, and hence come concepts, the instantaneous moments + taken in transitions. + </p> + <p> + Scientific thought, again, preserves the same habits and the same + preferences. It seeks only what repeats, what can be counted. Everywhere, + when it theorises, it tends to establish static relations between + composing unities which form a homogeneous and disconnected multiplicity. + </p> + <p> + Its very instruments bias it in that direction. The apparatus of the + laboratory really grasps nothing but arrangement and coincidence; in a + word, states not transitions. Even in cases of contrary appearance, for + example, when we determine a weight by observing the oscillation of a + balance and not its rest, we are interested in regular recurrence, in a + symmetry, in something therefore which is of the nature of an equilibrium + and a fixity all the same. The reason of it is that science, like + common-sense, although in a manner a little different, aims only in actual + fact at obtaining finished and workable results. + </p> + <p> + Let us imagine reality under the figure of a curve, a rhythmic succession + of phases of which our concepts mark so many tangents. There is contact at + one point, but at one point only. Thus our logic is valid as infinitesimal + analysis, just as the geometry of the straight line allows us to define + each state of curve. It is thus, for example, that vitality maintains a + relation of momentary tangency to the physico-chemical structure. If we + study this relation and analogous relations, this fact remains + indisputably legitimate. Let us not think, however, that such a study, + even when repeated in as many points as we wish, can ever suffice. + </p> + <p> + We must afterwards by genuine integration attain moving continuity. That + is exactly the task represented by the return to intuition, with its + proper instrument, the dynamic scheme. From this tangential point of view + we try to grasp the genesis of the curve as envelope, or rather, and + better still, the birth of successive tangents as instantaneous + directions. Speaking non-metaphorically, we cling to genetic methods of + conceptualisation and proceed from the generating principle to its + conceptual derivatives. + </p> + <p> + But our thought finds it very difficult to sustain such an effort long. It + is partial to rectilineal deduction, actual becoming horrifies it. It + desires immediately to find "things" sharply determined and very clear. + That is why immediately a tangent is constructed, it follows its movement + in a straight line to infinity. Thus are produced limit-concepts, the + ultimate terms, the atoms of language. As a rule they go in pairs, in + antithetic couples, every analysis being dichotomy, since the discernment + of one path of abstraction determines in contrast, as a complementary + remainder, the opposite path of direction. Hence, according to the + selection effected among concepts, and the relative weight which is + attributed to them, we get the antinomies between which a philosophy of + analysis must for ever remain oscillating and torn in sunder. Hence comes + the parcelling up of metaphysics into systems, and its appearance of + regulated play "between antagonistic schools which get up on the stage + together, each to win applause in turn." (H. Bergson, "Report of the + French Philosophical Society", meeting, 2nd May 1901.) + </p> + <p> + The method followed to find a genuine solution must be inverse; not + dialectic combination of pre-existing concepts, but, setting out from a + direct and really lived intuition, a descent to ever new concepts along + dynamic schemes which remain open. From the same intuition spring many + concepts: "As the wind which rushes into the crossroads divides into + diverging currents of air, which are all only one and the same gust." + ("Creative Evolution", page 55.) + </p> + <p> + The antinomies are resolved genetically, whilst in the plane of language + they remain irreducible. With a heterogeneity of shades, when we mix the + tints and neutralise them by one another, we easily create homogeneity; + but take the result of this work, that is to say, the average final + colour, and it will be impossible to reconstitute the wealth of the + original. + </p> + <p> + Do you desire a precise example of the work we must accomplish? Take that + of change; (Cf. two lectures delivered by Mr Bergson at Oxford on "The + Perception of Change", 26th and 27th May 1911.) no other is more + significant or clearer. It shows us two necessary movements in the reform + of our habits of imagination or conception. + </p> + <p> + Let us try first of all to familiarise ourselves with the images which + show us the fixity deriving from becoming. + </p> + <p> + Two colliding waves, two rollers meeting, typify rest by extinction and + interference. With the movement of a stone, and the fluidity of running + water, we form the instantaneous position of a ricochet. The very movement + of the stone, seen in the successive positions of the tangent to the + trajectory, is stationary to our view. + </p> + <p> + What is dynamic stability, except non-variation arising from variation + itself? Equilibrium is produced from speed. A man running solidifies the + moving ground. In short, two moving bodies regulated by each other become + fixed in relation to each other. + </p> + <p> + After this, let us try to perceive change in itself, and then represent it + to ourselves according to its specific and original nature. + </p> + <p> + The common conception needs reform on two principal points: + </p> + <p> + (1) All change is revealed in the light of immediate intuition, not as a + numerical series of states, but a rhythm of phases, each of which + constitutes an indivisible act, in such a way that each change has its + natural inner articulations, forbidding us to break it up according to + arbitrary laws, like a homogeneous length. + </p> + <p> + (2) Change is self-sufficient; it has no need of a support, a moving body, + a "thing" in motion. There is no vehicle, no substance, no spatial + receptacle, resembling a theatre-scene, no material dummy successively + draped in coloured stuffs; on the contrary, it is the body or the atom + which should be subordinately defined as symbols of completed becoming. + </p> + <p> + Of movement thus conceived, indivisible and substantial, what better image + can we have than a musical evolution, a phrase in melody? That is how we + must work to conceive reality. If such a conception at first appears + obscure, let us credit experience, for ideas are gradually illuminated by + the very use we make of them, "the clarity of a concept being hardly + anything, at bottom, but the assurance once obtained that we can handle it + profitably." (H. Bergson, "Introduction to Metaphysics".) + </p> + <p> + If we require to reach a conception of this kind with regard to change, + the Eleatic dialectic is there to establish it beyond dispute, and + positive science comes to the same conclusion, since it shows us + everywhere nothing but movements placed upon movements, never fixed + "things," except as temporary symbols of what we leave at a given moment + outside the field of study. + </p> + <p> + In any case, the difficulty of such a conception need not stop us; it is + little more than a difficulty of the imaginative order. And as for the + conception itself, or rather the corresponding intuition, it will share + the fate of all its predecessors: to our contemporaries it will be a + scandal, a century later a stroke of genius, after some centuries common + evidence, and finally an instinctive axiom. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0010" id="link2H_4_0010"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + V. The Problem of Consciousness. Duration and Liberty. + </h2> + <p> + Armed with the method we have just described, Mr Bergson turned first of + all toward the problem of the ego: taking up his position in the centre of + mind, he has attempted to establish its independent reality by examining + its profound nature. + </p> + <p> + The first chapter of the "Essay on the Immediate Data" contains a decisive + criticism of the conceptions which claim to introduce number and measure + into the domain of the facts of consciousness. + </p> + <p> + Not that it is our business to reject as false the notion of psychological + intensity; but this notion demands interpretation, and the least that we + can say against the attempt to turn it into a notion of size is that in + doing so we are misunderstanding the specific character of the object + studied. The same reproach must be levelled against association of ideas, + the system of mechanical psychology of which the type is presented us by + Taine and Stuart Mill. Already in chapters ii. and iii. of the "Essay", + and again all through "Matter and Memory", the system is riddled with + objections, each of which would be sufficient to show its radical flaw. + All the aspects, all the phenomena of mental life come up for successive + review. In respect of each of them we have an illustration of the + insufficiency of the atomism which seeks to recompose the soul with fixed + elements, by a massing of units exterior to one another, everywhere and + always the same: this is a grammatical philosophy which believes reality + to be composed of parts which admit of number just as language is made of + words placed side by side; it is a materialist philosophy which improperly + transfers the proceedings of the physical sciences to the sciences of the + inner life. + </p> + <p> + On the contrary, we must represent the state of consciousness to ourselves + as variable according to the whole of which it forms a part. Here and + there, although it always bears the same name, it is no longer the same + thing. "The more the ego becomes itself again, the more also do its states + of consciousness, instead of being in juxtaposition, penetrate one + another, blend with one another, and tinge one another with the colouring + of all the rest. Thus each of us has his manner of loving or hating, and + this love or hate reflect our entire personality." ("Essay on the + Immediate Data", pages 125-126.) + </p> + <p> + At bottom Mr Bergson is bringing forward the necessity, in the case before + us, of substituting a new notion of continuous qualitative heterogeneity + for the old notion of numerical and spatial continuity. Above all, he is + emphasising the still more imperious necessity of regarding each state as + a phase in duration; and we are here touching on his principal and leading + intuition, the intuition of real duration. + </p> + <p> + Historically this was Mr Bergson's starting-point and the origin of his + thought: a criticism of time under the form in which common-sense imagines + it, in which science employs it. He was the first to notice the fact that + scientific time has no "duration." Our equations really express only + static relations between simultaneous phenomena; even the differential + quotients they may contain in reality mark nothing but present tendencies; + no change would take place in our calculations if the time were given in + advance, instantaneously fulfilled, like a linear whole of points in + numerical order, with no more genuine duration than that contained in the + numerical succession. Even in astronomy there is less anticipation than + judgment of constancy and stability, the phenomena being almost strictly + periodic, while the hazard of prediction bears only upon the minute + divergence between the actual phenomenon and the exact period attributed + to it. Notice under what figure common-sense imagines time: as an inert + receptacle, a homogeneous milieu, neutral and indifferent; in fact, a kind + of space. + </p> + <p> + The scholar makes use of a like image; for he defines time by its + measurement, and all measurement implies interpretation in space. For the + scholar the hour is not an interval, but a coincidence, an instantaneous + arrangement, and time is resolved into a dust of fixities, as in those + pneumatic clocks in which the hand moves forward in jerks, marking nothing + but a sequence of pauses. + </p> + <p> + Such symbols are sufficient, at least for a first approximation, when it + is only a question of matter, the mechanism of which, strictly considered, + contains nothing "durable." But in biology and psychology quite different + characteristics become essential; age and memory, heterogeneity of musical + phases, irreversible rhythm "which cannot be lengthened or shortened at + will." ("Creative Evolution", page 10.) + </p> + <p> + Then it is that the return of time becomes necessary to duration. How are + we to describe this duration? It is a melodious evolution of moments, each + of which contains the resonance of those preceding and announces the one + which is going to follow; it is a process of enriching which never ceases, + and a perpetual appearance of novelty; it is an indivisible, qualitative, + and organic becoming, foreign to space, refractory to number. + </p> + <p> + Summon the image of a stream of consciousness passing through the + continuity of the spectrum, and becoming tinged successively with each of + its shades. Or rather imagine a symphony having feeling of itself, and + creating itself; that is how we should conceive duration. + </p> + <p> + That duration thus conceived is really the basis of ourselves Mr Bergson + proves by a thousand examples, and by a marvellous employment of the + introspective method which he has helped to make so popular. We cannot + quote these admirable analyses here. A single one will serve as model, + specially selected as referring to one of the most ordinary moments of our + life, to show plainly that the perception of real duration always + accompanies us in secret. + </p> + <p> + "At the moment when I write these lines a clock near me is striking the + hour; but my distracted ear is only aware of it after several strokes have + already sounded; that is, I have not counted them. And yet an effort of + introspective attention enables me to total the four strokes already + struck and add them to those which I hear. If I then withdraw into myself + and carefully question myself about what has just happened, I become aware + that the first four sounds had struck my ear and even moved my + consciousness, but that the sensations produced by each of them, instead + of following in juxtaposition, had blended into one another in such a way + as to endow the whole with a peculiar aspect and make of it a kind of + musical phrase. In order to estimate in retrospect the number of strokes + which have sounded, I attempted to reconstitute this phrase in thought: my + imagination struck one, then two, then three, and so long as it had not + reached the exact number four, my sensibility, on being questioned, + replied that the total effect differed in quality. It had therefore noted + the succession of the four strokes in a way of its own, but quite + otherwise than by addition, and without bringing in the image of a + juxtaposition of distinct terms. In fact, the number of strokes struck was + perceived as quality, not as quantity: duration is thus presented to + immediate consciousness, and preserves this form so long as it does not + give place to a symbolical representation drawn from space." ("Essay on + the Immediate Data", pages 95-96.) + </p> + <p> + And now are we to believe that return to the feeling of real duration + consists in letting ourselves go, and allowing ourselves an idle + relaxation in dream or dissolution in sensation, "as a shepherd dozing + watches the water flow"? Or are we even to believe, as has been + maintained, that the intuition of duration reduces "to the spasm of + delight of the mollusc basking in the sun"? This is a complete mistake! We + should fall back into the misconceptions which I was pointing out in + connection with immediacy in general; we should be forgetting that there + are several rhythms of duration, as there are several kinds of + consciousness; and finally, we should be misunderstanding the character of + a creative invention perpetually renewed, which is that of our inner life. + </p> + <p> + For it is in duration that we are free, not in spatialised time, as all + determinist conceptions suppose in contradiction. + </p> + <p> + I shall not go back to the proofs of this thesis; they were condensed some + way back after the third chapter of the "Essay on the Immediate Data". But + I will borrow from Mr Bergson himself a few complementary explanations, in + order, as far as possible, to forestall any misunderstanding. "The word + liberty," he says, "has for me a sense intermediate between those which we + assign as a rule to the two terms liberty and free-will. On one hand, I + believe that liberty consists in being entirely oneself, in acting in + conformity with oneself; it is then, to a certain degree, the 'moral + liberty' of philosophers, the independence of the person with regard to + everything other than itself. But that is not quite this liberty, since + the independence I am describing has not always a moral character. + Further, it does not consist in depending on oneself as an effect depends + on the cause which of necessity determines it. In this, I should come back + to the sense of 'free-will.' And yet I do not accept this sense completely + either, since free-will, in the usual meaning of the term, implies the + equal possibility of two contraries, and on my theory we cannot formulate, + or even conceive in this case the thesis of the equal possibility of the + two contraries, without falling into grave error about the nature of time. + I might say then, that the object of my thesis, on this particular point, + has been precisely to find a position intermediate between 'moral liberty' + and 'free-will.' Liberty, such as I understand it, is situated between + these two terms, but not at equal distances from both. If I were obliged + to blend it with one of the two, I should select 'free-will.'" ("Report of + the French Philosophical Society", philosophical vocabulary, article + "Liberty".) + </p> + <p> + After all, when we place ourselves in the perspective of homogeneous time; + that is to say, when we substitute for the real and profound ego its image + refracted through space, the act necessarily appears either as the + resultant of a mechanical composition of elements, or as an + incomprehensible creation ex nihilo. + </p> + <p> + "We have supposed that there is a third course to pursue; that is, to + place ourselves back in pure duration...Then we seemed to see action arise + from its antecedents by an evolution sui generis, in such a way that we + discover in this action the antecedents which explain it, while at the + same time it adds something absolutely new to them, being an advance upon + them as the fruit upon the flower. Liberty is in no way reduced thereby, + as has been said, to obvious spontaneity. At most this would be the case + in the animal world, where the psychological life is principally that of + the affections. But in the case of man, a thinking being, the free act can + be called a synthesis of feelings and ideas, and the evolution which leads + to it a reasonable evolution." ("Matter and Memory", page 205.) + </p> + <p> + Finally, in a most important letter, ("Report of the French Philosophical + Society", meeting, 26th February 1903.) Mr Bergson becomes a little more + precise still. We must certainly not confuse the affirmation of liberty + with the negation of physical determinism; "for there is more in this + affirmation than in this negation." All the same, liberty supposes a + certain contingence. It is "psychological causality itself," which must + not be represented after the model of physical causality. + </p> + <p> + In opposition to the latter, it implies that between two moments of a + conscious being there is not an equivalence admitting of deduction, that + in the transition from one to the other there is a genuine creation. + Without doubt the free act is not without explanatory reasons. + </p> + <p> + "But these reasons have determined us only at the moment when they have + become determining; that is, at the moment when the act was virtually + accomplished, and the creation of which I speak is entirely contained in + the progress by which these reasons have become determining." It is true + that all this implies a certain independence of mental life in relation to + the mechanism of matter; and that is why Mr Bergson was obliged to set + himself the problem of the relations between body and mind. + </p> + <p> + We know that the solution of this problem is the principal object of + "Matter and Memory". The thesis of psycho-physiological parallelism is + there peremptorily refuted. + </p> + <p> + The method which Mr Bergson has followed to do so will be found set out by + himself in a communication to the French Philosophical Society, which it + is important to study as introduction. ("Report" of meeting, 2nd May + 1901.) The paralogism included in the very enunciation of the parallelist + thesis is explained in a memoire presented to the Geneva International + Philosophical Congress in 1904. ("Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale", + November 1904.) But the actual proof is made by the analysis of the + memoire which fills chapters ii. and iii. of the work cited above. (An + extremely suggestive resume of these theses will be found in the second + lecture on "The Perception of Change".) It is there established, by the + most positive arguments, (Instead of brutally connecting the two extremes + of matter and mind, one regarded in its highest action, the other in its + most rudimentary mechanism, thus dooming to certain failure any attempt to + explain their actual union, Mr Bergson studies their living contact at the + point of intersection marked by the phenomena of perception and memory: he + compares the higher point of matter—the brain—and the lower + point of mind—certain recollections—and it is between these + two neighbouring points that he notes a difference, by a method no longer + dialectic but experimental.) that all our past is self-preserved in us, + that this preservation only makes one with the musical character of + duration, with the indivisible nature of change, but that one part only is + conscious of it, the part concerned with action, to which present + conceptions supply a body of actuality. + </p> + <p> + What we call our present must be conceived neither as a mathematical point + nor as a segment with precise limits: it is the moment of our history + brought out by our attention to life, and nothing, in strict justice, + would prevent it from extending to the whole of this history. It is not + recollection then, but forgetfulness which demands explanation. + </p> + <p> + According to a dictum of Ravaisson, of which Mr Bergson makes use, the + explanation must be sought in the body: "it is materiality which causes + forgetfulness in us." + </p> + <p> + There are, in fact, several planes of memory, from "pure recollection" not + yet interpreted in distinct images down to the same recollection + actualised in embryo sensations and movements begun; and we descend from + the one to the other, from the life of simple "dream" to the life of + practical "drama," along "dynamic schemes." The last of these planes is + the body; a simple instrument of action, a bundle of motive habits, a + group of mechanisms which mind has set up to act. How does it operate in + the work of memory? The task of the brain is every moment to thrust back + into unconsciousness all that part of our past which is not at the time + useful. Minute study of facts shows that the brain is employed in choosing + from the past, in diminishing, simplifying, and extracting from it all + that can contribute to present experience; but it is not concerned to + preserve it. In short, the brain can only explain absences, not presences. + That is why the analysis of memory illustrates the reality of mind, and + its independence relative to matter. Thus is determined the relation of + soul to body, the penetrating point which it inserts and drives into the + plane of action. "Mind borrows from matter perceptions from which it + derives its nourishment, and gives them back to it in the form of + movement, on which it has impressed its liberty." ("Matter and Memory", + page 279.) + </p> + <p> + This, then, is how the cycle of research closes, by returning to the + initial problem, the problem of perception. In the two opposing systems by + which attempts have been made to solve it, Mr Bergson discovers a common + postulate, resulting in a common impotence. From the idealistic point of + view we do not succeed in explaining how a world is expressed externally, + nor from the realistic point of view how an ego is expressed internally. + And this double failure comes again from the underlying hypothesis, + according to which the duality of the subject and object is conceived as + primitive, radical, and static. Our duty is diametrically opposed. We have + to consider this duality as gradually elaborated, and the problem + concerning it must be first stated, and then solved as a function of time + rather than of space. Our representation begins by being impersonal, and + it is only later that it adopts our body as centre. We emerge gradually + from universal reality, and our realising roots are always sunk in it. But + this reality in itself is already consciousness, and the first moment of + perception always puts us back into the initial state previous to the + separation of the subject and object. It is by the work of life, and by + action, that this separation is effected, created, accentuated, and fixed. + And the common mistake of realism and idealism is to believe it effected + in advance, whereas it is relatively second to perception. + </p> + <p> + Hence comes the absolute value of immediate intuition. For from what + source could an irreducible relativity be produced in it? It would be + absurd to make it depend on the constitution of our brain, since our brain + itself, so far as it is a group of images, is only a part of the universe, + presenting the same characteristics as the whole; and in so far as it is a + group of mechanisms become habits, is only a result of the initial action + of life, of original perceptive discernment. And, on the other hand, no + less absurd would be the fear that the subject can ever be excluded or + eliminated from its own knowledge, since, in reality, the subject, like + the object, is in perception, not perception in the subject—at least + not primitively. So that it is by a trick of speech that the theses of + fundamental relativity take root: they vanish when we return to immediacy; + that is to say, when we present problems as they ought to be presented, in + terms which do not suppose any conceptual analysis yet accomplished. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0011" id="link2H_4_0011"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VI. The Problem of Evolution: Life and Matter. + </h2> + <p> + After the problem of consciousness Mr Bergson was bound to approach that + of evolution, for psychological liberty is only truly conceivable if it + begins in some measure with the first pulsation of corporal life. "Either + sensation has no raison d'etre or it is a beginning of liberty"; that is + what the "Essay on the Immediate Data" (Page 25.) already told us. + </p> + <p> + It was easy then to foresee the necessity of a general theoretical frame + in which our duration might take a position which would render it more + intelligible by removing its appearance of singular exception. + </p> + <p> + Thus in 1901, I wrote ("Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale", May 1901) + with regard to the new philosophy considered as a philosophy of becoming: + "It has been prepared by contemporary evolution, which is investigates and + perfects, sifting it from its ore of materialism, and turning it into + genuine metaphysics. Is not this the philosophy suited to the century of + history? Perhaps it indicates that a period has arrived in which + mathematics, losing its role as the regulating science, is about to give + place to biology." This is the programme carried out, in what an original + manner we are well aware, by the doctrine of Creative Evolution. + </p> + <p> + When we examine ancient knowledge, one characteristic of it is at once + visible. It studies little but certain privileged moments of changing + reality, certain stable forms, certain states of equilibrium. Ancient + geometry, for example, is almost always limited to the static + consideration of figures already traced. Modern science is quite + different. Has not the greatest progress which it has realised in the + mathematical order really been the invention of infinitesimal analysis; + that is to say, an effort to substitute the process for the resultant, to + follow the moving generation of phenomena and magnitudes in its + continuity, to place oneself along becoming at any moment whatsoever, or + rather, by degrees at all successive moments? This fundamental tendency, + coupled with the development of biological research, was bound to incline + it towards a doctrine of evolution; and hence the success of Spencer. + </p> + <p> + But time, which is everywhere in modern science the chief variable, is + only a time-length, indefinitely and arbitrarily divisible. There is no + genuine duration, nothing really tending to evolution in Spencer's + evolution: no more than there is in the periodic working of a turbine or + in the stationary tremble of a diapason. Is not this what is emphasised by + the perpetual employment of mechanical images and vulgar engineering + metaphors, the least fault of which is to suppose a homogeneous time, and + a motionless theatre of change which is at bottom only space? "In such a + doctrine we still talk of time, we pronounce the word, but we hardly think + of the thing; for time is here robbed of all effect." ("Creative + Evolution", page 42.) + </p> + <p> + Whence comes a latent materialism, ready to grasp the chance of + self-expression. Whence the automatic return to the dream of universal + arithmetic, which Laplace, Du Bois-Reymond, and Huxley have expressed with + such precision. (Ibid., page 41.) + </p> + <p> + In order to escape such consequences we must, with Mr Bergson, reintroduce + real duration, that is to say, creative duration into evolution, we must + conceive life according to the mode exhibited with regard to change in + general. And it is science itself which calls us to this task. What does + science actually tell us when we let it speak instead of prescribing to it + answers which conform to our preferences? Vitality, at every point of its + becoming, is a tangent to physico-chemical mechanism. But + physico-chemistry does not reveal its secret any more than the straight + line produces the curve. + </p> + <p> + Consider the development of an embryo. It summarises the history of + species; ontogenesis, we are told, reproduces phylogenesis. And what do we + observe then? + </p> + <p> + Now that a long sequence of centuries is contracted for us into a short + period, and that our view is thus capable of a synthesis which before was + too difficult, we see appearing the rhythmic organisation, the musical + character, which the slowness of the transitions at first prevented us + from seeing. In each state of the embryo there is something besides an + instantaneous structure, something besides a conservative play of actions + and reactions; there is a tendency, a direction, an effort, a creative + activity. The stage traversed is less interesting than the traversing + itself; this again is an act of generating impulse, rather than an effect + of mechanical inertia. So must the case be, by analogy, with general + evolution. We have there, as it were, a vision of biological duration in + miniature; expansion and relaxation of its tension bring its homogeneity + to notice, but at the same time, properly speaking, evolution disappears. + </p> + <p> + And further, Mr Bergson establishes by direct and positive arguments that + life is genuine creation. A similar conclusion is presented as the + envelope of his whole doctrine. + </p> + <p> + It is imposed first of all by immediate evidence, for we cannot deny that + the history of life is revealed to us under the aspect of a progress and + an ascent. And this impulse implies initiative and choice, constituting an + effort which we are not authorised by the facts to pronounce fatalistic: + "A simple glance at the fossil species shows us that life could have done + without evolution, or could have evolved only within very restricted + limits, had it chosen the far easier path open to it of becoming cramped + in its primitive forms; certain Foraminifera have not varied since the + silurian period; the Lingulae, looking unmoved upon the innumerable + revolutions which have upheaved our planet, are today what they were in + the most distant times of the palaeozoic era." ("Creative Evolution", page + 111.) Moreover, if, in us, life is indisputably creation and liberty, how + would it not, to some extent, be so in universal nature? "Whatever be the + inmost essence of what is and what is being made, we are of it: ("Revue de + Metaphysique et de Morale", November 1911.) a conclusion by analogy is + therefore legitimate. But above all, this conclusion is verified by its + aptitude for solving problems of detail, and for taking account of + observed facts, and in this respect I regret that I can only refer the + reader to the whole body of admirable discussions and analyses drawn up by + Mr Bergson with regard to "the plant and the animal," or "the development + of animal life."" ("Creative Evolution", chapter ii.) + </p> + <p> + As regards matter, two main laws stand out from the whole of our science, + relative to its nature and its phenomena: a law of conservation and a law + of degradation. On the one hand, we have mechanism, repetition, inertia, + constants, and invariants: the play of the material world, from the point + of view of quantity, offers us the aspect of an immense transformation + without gain or loss, a homogeneous transformation tending to maintain in + itself an exact equivalence between the departure and arrival point. On + the other hand, from the point of view of quality, we have something which + is being used up, lowered, degraded, exhausted: energy expended, movement + dissipated, constructions breaking up, weights falling, levels becoming + equalised, and differences effaced. The travel of the material world + appears then as a loss, a movement of fall and descent. + </p> + <p> + In addition, there is only a tendency to conservation, a tendency which is + never realised except imperfectly; while, on the contrary, we notice that + the failure of the vital impulse is most infallibly interpreted by the + appearance of mechanism. Reality falling asleep or breaking up is the + figure under which we finally observe matter: matter then is secondary. + </p> + <p> + Finally, according to Mr Bergson, matter is defined as a kind of descent; + this descent as the interruption of an ascent; this ascent itself as + growth; and thus a principle of creation is at the base of things. + </p> + <p> + Such a view seems obscure and disturbing to the mathematical + understanding. It cannot accustom itself to the idea of a becoming which + is more than a simple change of distribution, and more than a simple + expression of latent wealth. When confronted with such an idea, it always + harks back to its eternal question: How has something come out of nothing? + The question is false; for the idea of nothing is only a pseudo-idea. + Nothing is unthinkable, since to think nothing is necessarily to think or + not to think something; and according to Mr Bergson's formula, (Cf. the + discussion on existence and non-existence in chapter iv. of "Creative + Evolution", pages 298-322.) "the representation of void is always a full + representation." When I say: "There is nothing," it is not that I perceive + a "nothing." I never perceive except what is. But I have not perceived + what I was seeking, what I was expecting, and I express my deception in + the language of my desire. Or else I am speaking a language of + construction, implying that I do not yet possess what I intend to make. + </p> + <p> + Let us abruptly forget these idols of practical action and language. The + becoming of evolution will then appear to us in its true light, as phases + of gradual maturation, rounded at intervals by crises of creative + discovery. Continuity and discontinuity will thus admit possibility of + reconciliation, the one as an aspect of ascent towards the future, the + other as an aspect of retrospection after the event. And we shall see that + the same key will in addition disclose to us the theory of knowledge. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0012" id="link2H_4_0012"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VII. The Problem of Knowledge: Analysis and Intuition. + </h2> + <p> + We know what importance has been attached since Kant to the problem of + reason: it would seem sometimes that all future philosophy is a return to + it; that it is no longer called to speak of anything else. Besides, what + we understand by reason, in the broad sense, is, in the human mind, the + power of light, the essential operation of which is defined as an act of + directing synthesis, unifying the experience and rendering it by that very + fact intelligible. Every movement of thought shows this power in exercise. + To bring it everywhere to the front would be the proper task of + philosophy; at least it is in this manner that we understand it today. But + from what point of view and by what method do we ordinarily construct this + theory of knowledge? + </p> + <p> + The spontaneous works of mind, perception, science, art, and morality are + the departure-point of the inquiry and its initial matter. We do not ask + ourselves whether but how they are possible, what they imply, and what + they suppose; a regressive analysis attempts by critical reflection to + discern in them their principles and requisites. The task, in short, is to + reascend from production to producing activity, which we regard as + sufficiently revealed by its natural products. + </p> + <p> + Philosophy, in consequence, is no longer anything but the science of + problems already solved, the science which is confined to saying why + knowledge is knowledge and action action, of such and such a kind, and + such and such a quality. And in consequence also reason can no longer + appear anything but an original datum postulated as a simple fact, as a + complete system come down ready-made from heaven, at bottom a kind of + non-temporal essence, definable without respect to duration, evolution, or + history, of which all genesis and all progress are absurd. In vain do we + persist in maintaining that it is originally an act; we always come round + to the fact that the method followed compels us to consider this act only + when once accomplished, and when once expressed in results. The inevitable + consequence is that we imprison ourselves hopelessly in the affirmation of + Kantian relativism. + </p> + <p> + Such a system can only be true as a partial and temporary truth: at the + most, it is a moment of truth. "If we read the "Critique of Pure Reason" + closely, we become aware that Kant has made the critique, not of reason in + general, but of a reason fashioned to the habits and demands of Cartesian + mechanism or Newtonian physics." (H. Bergson, "Report of French + Philosophical Society", meeting, 2nd May 1901.) Moreover, he plainly + studies only adult reason, its present state, a plane of thought, a + sectional view of becoming. For Kant, men progress perhaps in reason, but + reason itself has no duration: it is the fixed spot, the atmosphere of + dead eternity in which every mental action is displayed. But this could + not be the final and complete truth. Is it not a fact that human + intelligence has been slowly constituted in the course of biological + evolution? To know it, we have not so much to separate it statically from + its works, as to replace it in its history. + </p> + <p> + Let us begin with life, since, in any case, whether we will or no, it is + always in life and by life that we are. + </p> + <p> + Life is not a brute force, a blind mechanism, from which one could never + conceive that thought would spring. From its first pulsation, life is + consciousness, spiritual activity, creative effort tending towards + liberty; that is, discernment already luminous, although the quality is at + first faint and diffused. In other terms, life is at bottom of the + psychological nature of a tendency. But "the essence of a tendency is to + develop in sheaf-form, creating, by the mere fact of its growth, diverging + directions between which its impulse will be divided." ("Creative + Evolution", page 108.) + </p> + <p> + Along these different paths the complementary potentialities are produced + and intensified, separating in the very process, their original + interpretation being possible only in the state of birth. One of them ends + in what we call intelligence. This latter therefore has become gradually + detached from a less intense but fuller luminous condition, of which it + has retained only certain characteristics to accentuate them. + </p> + <p> + We see that we must conceive the word mind—or, if we prefer the + word, thought—as extending beyond intelligence. Pure intelligence, + or the faculty of critical reflection and conceptual analysis, represents + only one form of thought in its entirety, a function, a determination or + particular adaptation, the part organised in view of practical action, the + part consolidated as language. What are its characteristics? It + understands only what is discontinuous, inert, and fixed, that which has + neither change nor duration; it bathes in an atmosphere of spatiality; it + uses mathematics continually; it feels at home only among "things," and + everything is reduced by it to solid atoms; it is naturally "materialist," + owing to the very fact that it naturally grasps "forms" only. What do we + mean by that except that its object of election is the mechanism of + matter? But it supposes life; it only remains living itself by continual + loans from a vaster and fuller activity from which it is sprung. And this + return to complementary powers is what we call intuition. + </p> + <p> + From this point of view it becomes easy to escape Kantian relativity. We + are confronted by an intelligence which is doubtless no longer a faculty + universally competent, but which, on the contrary, possesses in its own + domain a greater power of penetration. It is arranged for action. Now + action would not be able to move in irreality. Intelligence, then, makes + us acquainted, if not with all reality, at least with some of it, namely + that part by which reality is a possible object of mechanical or synthetic + action. + </p> + <p> + More profoundly, intuition falls into analysis as life into matter: they + are two aspects of the same movement. That is why, "provided we only + consider the general form of physics, we can say that it touches the + absolute." ("Creative Evolution", page 216.) + </p> + <p> + In other terms, language and mechanism are regulated by each other. This + explains at once the success of mathematical science in the order of + matter, and its non-success in the order of life. + </p> + <p> + For, when confronted with life, intelligence fails. "Being a deposit of + the evolutive movement along its path, how could it be applied throughout + the evolutive movement itself? We might as well claim that the part equals + the whole, that the effect can absorb its cause into itself, or that the + pebble left on the shore outlines the form of the wave which brought it." + (Preface to "Creative Evolution".) + </p> + <p> + Is not that as good as saying that life is unknowable? Must we conclude + that it is impossible to understand it? + </p> + <p> + "We should be forced to do so, if life had employed all the psychic + potentialities it contains in making pure understandings; that is to say, + in preparing mathematicians. But the line of evolution which ends in man + is not the only one. By other divergent ways other forms of consciousness + have developed, which have not been able to free themselves from external + constraint, nor regain the victory over themselves as intelligence has + done, but which, none the less for that, also express something immanent + and essential in the movement of evolution. + </p> + <p> + "By bringing them into connection with one another, and making them + afterwards amalgamate with intelligence, should we not thus obtain a + consciousness co-extensive with life, and capable, by turning sharply + round upon the vital thrust which it feels behind it, of obtaining a + complete, though doubtless vanishing vision?" ("Creative Evolution", + Preface.) It is precisely in this that the act of philosophic intuition + consists. "We shall be told that, even so, we do not get beyond our + intelligence, since it is with our intelligence, and through our + intelligence, that we observe all the other forms of consciousness. And we + should be right in saying so, if we were pure intelligences, if there had + not remained round our conceptual and logical thought a vague nebula, made + of the very substance at the expense of which the luminous nucleus, which + we call intelligence, has been formed. In it reside certain complementary + powers of the understanding, of which we have only a confused feeling when + we remain shut up in ourselves, but which will become illumined and + distinct when they perceive themselves at work, so to speak, in the + evolution of nature. They will thus learn what effort they have to make to + become more intense, and to expand in the actual direction of life." + ("Creative Evolution", Preface.) Does that mean abandonment to instinct, + and descent with it into infra-consciousness again? By no means. On the + contrary, our task is to bring instinct to enrich intelligence, to become + free and illumined in it; and this ascent towards super-consciousness is + possible in the flash of an intuitive act, as it is sometimes possible for + the eye to perceive, as a pale and fugitive gleam, beyond what we properly + term light, the ultra-violet rays of the spectrum. + </p> + <p> + Can we say of such a doctrine that it seeks to go, or that it goes + "against intelligence"? Nothing authorises such an accusation, for + limitation of a sphere is not misappreciation of every legitimate + exercise. But intelligence is not the whole of thought, and its natural + products do not completely exhaust or manifest our power of light. + </p> + <p> + Besides, that intelligence and reason are not things completed, for ever + arrested in their inner structure, that they evolve and expand, is a fact: + the place of discovery is precisely the residual fringe of which we were + speaking above. In this respect, the history of thought would furnish + examples in plenty. Intuitions at first obscure, and only anticipated, + facts originally admitting no comparison, and as it were irrational, + become instructive and luminous by the fruitful use made of them, and by + the fertility which they manifest. In order to grasp the complex content + of reality, the mind must do itself violence, must awaken its sleeping + powers of revealing sympathy, must expand till it becomes adapted to what + formerly shocked its habits so much as almost to seem contradictory to it. + Such a task, moreover, is possible: we work out its differential every + moment, and its complete whole appears in the sequence of centuries. + </p> + <p> + At bottom, the new theory of knowledge has nothing new in it except the + demand that all the facts shall be taken into account: it renews duration + in the thinking mind, and places itself at the point of view of creative + invention, not only at that of subsequent demonstration. Hence its + conception of experience, which, for it, is not simple information, fitted + into pre-existing frames, but elaboration of the frames themselves. + </p> + <p> + Hence the problem of reason changes its aspect. A great mistake has been + made in thinking that Mr Bergson's doctrine misunderstands it: to deny it + and to place it are two different things. In its inmost essence, reason is + the demand for unity; that is why it is displayed as a faculty of + synthesis, and why its essential act is presented as apperception of + relation. It is unifying activity, not so much by a dialectic of + harmonious construction as by a view of reciprocal implication. But all + that, however shaded we suppose it, entails a previous analysis. Therefore + if we place ourselves in a perspective of intuition, I mean, of complete + perception, the demand for reason appears second only, without being + deprived, however, of its true task: it is an echo and a recollection, an + appeal and a promise of profound continuity, our original anticipation and + our final hope, in the bosom of the elementary atomism which characterises + the transitory region of language; and reason thus marks the zone of + contact between intelligence and instinct. + </p> + <p> + Is thought only possible under the law of number? Does reality only become + an object of knowledge as a system of distinct but regulated factors and + moments? Do ideas exist only by their mutual relations, which first of all + oppose them and afterwards force intelligence to move endlessly from one + term to another? If such were the case, reason would certainly be first, + as alone making an intelligible continuity out of discontinuous perception + and restoring total unity to each temporary part by a synthetic dialectic. + But all this really has meaning only after analysis has taken place. The + demand for rational unity constitutes in the bosom of atomism something + like a murmur of deep underlying continuity: it expresses in the very + language of atomism, atomism's basic irreality. There is no question of + misunderstanding reason, but only of putting it in its proper place. In a + perspective of complete intuition nothing would require to be unified. + Reason would then be reabsorbed in perception. That is to say, its present + task is to measure and correct in us the limits, gaps, and weaknesses of + the perceptive faculty. In this respect not a man of us thinks of denying + it its task. But we try with Mr Bergson to reduce this task to its true + worth and genuine importance. For we are decidedly tired of hearing + "Reason" invoked in solemn and moving tones, as if to write the venerable + name with the largest of capital R's were a magic solution of all + problems. + </p> + <p> + Mind, in fact, sets out from unity rather than arrives at it; and the + order which it appears to discover subsequently in an experience which at + first is manifold and incoherent is only a refraction of the original + unity through the prism of a spontaneous analysis. Mr Bergson admirably + points out ("Creative Evolution", pages 240-244 and 252-257.) that there + are two types of order, geometric and vital, the one a static hierarchy of + relations, the other a musical continuity of moments. These two types are + opposed, as space to duration and matter to mind; but the negation of one + coincides with the position of the other. It is therefore impossible to + abolish both at once. The idea of disorder does not correspond to any + genuine reality. It is essentially relative, and arises only when we do + not meet the type of order which we were expecting; and then it expresses + our deception in the language of our expectation, the absence of the + expected order being equivalent, from the practical point of view, to the + absence of all order. Regarded in itself, this notion is only a verbal + entity, unduly taking form as the common basis of two antithetic types. + How therefore do we come to speak of a "perceptible diversity" which mind + has to regulate and unify? This is only true at most of the disjointed + experience employed by common-sense. Reason, accepting this preliminary + analysis, and proceeding to language, seeks to organise it according to + the mathematical type. But it is the vital type which corresponds to + absolute reality, at least when it is a question of the Whole; and only + intuition has re-access to it, by soaring above synthetic dissociations. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0013" id="link2H_4_0013"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VIII. Conclusion. + </h2> + <p> + As my last word and closing formula I come back to the leitmotiv of my + whole study: Mr Bergson's philosophy is a philosophy of duration. + </p> + <p> + Let us regard it from this point of view, as contact with creative effort, + if we wish to conceive aright the original notions which it proposes to us + about liberty, life, and intuition. + </p> + <p> + Let us say once more that it appears as the enthronement of positive + metaphysics: positive, that is to say, capable of continuous, regular, and + collective progress, no longer forcibly divided into irreducible schools, + "each of which retains its place, chooses its dice, and begins a + never-ending match with the rest." ("Introduction to Metaphysics" in the + "Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale", January 1903. Psychology, according + to Mr Bergson, studies the human mind in so far as it operates in a useful + manner to a practical end; metaphysics represent the effort of this same + mind to free itself from the conditions of useful action, and regain + possession of itself as pure creative energy. Now experience, the + experience of the laboratory, allows us to measure with more and more + accuracy the divergence between these two planes of life; hence the + positive character of the new metaphysics.) + </p> + <p> + Let us next say that until the present moment it constitutes the only + doctrine which is truly a metaphysic of experience, since no other, at + bottom, explains why thought, in its work of discovery and verification, + remains in subjection to a law of probation by durable action. We have now + only to show how it evades certain criticisms which have been levelled + against its tendencies. + </p> + <p> + Some have wanted to see in it a kind of atheist monism. Mr Bergson has + answered this point himself. What he rejects, and what he is right in + rejecting, are the doctrines which confine themselves to personifying the + unity of nature or the unity of knowledge in God as motionless first + cause. God would really be nothing, since he would do nothing. But he + adds: "The considerations put forward in my "Essay on the Immediate Data" + result in an illustration of the fact of liberty; those of "Matter and + Memory" lead us, I hope, to put our finger on mental reality; those of + "Creative Evolution" present creation as a fact: from all this we derive a + clear idea of a free and creating God, producing matter and life at once, + whose creative effort is continued, in a vital direction, by the evolution + of species and the construction of human personalities." (Letter to P. de + Tonquedec, published in the "Studies" of 20th February 1912, and quoted + here as found in the "Annals of Christian Philosophy", March 1912.) How + can we help finding in these words, according to the actual expression of + the author, the most categorical refutation "of monism and pantheism in + general"? + </p> + <p> + Now to go further and become more precise, Mr Bergson points out that we + must "approach problems of quite a different kind, those of morality." + About these new problems the author of "Creative Evolution" has as yet + said nothing; and he will say nothing, so long as his method does not lead + him, on this point, to results as positive, after their manner, as those + of his other works, because he does not consider that mere subjective + opinions are in place in philosophy. He therefore denies nothing; he is + waiting and searching, always in the same spirit: what more could we ask + of him? + </p> + <p> + One thing only is possible today: to discern in the doctrine already + existing the points of a moral and religious philosophy which present + themselves in advance for ultimate insertion. + </p> + <p> + This is what we are permitted to attempt. But let us fully understand what + is at issue. The question is only to know whether, as has been claimed, + there is incompatibility between Mr Bergson's point of view and the + religious or moral point of view; whether the premisses laid down block + the road to all future development in the direction before us; or whether, + on the contrary, such a development is invited by some parts at least of + the previous work. The question is not to find in this work the necessary + and sufficient bases, the already formed and visible lineaments of what + will one day complete it. To imagine that the religious and moral problem + is bound to be regarded by Mr Bergson as arising when it is too late for + revision, as admitting proposition and solution only as functions of a + previous theoretical philosophy beyond which we should not go; that in his + eyes the solution of this problem will be deduced from principles already + laid down without any call for the introduction of new facts or new points + of view, without any need to begin from a new intuition; that his view + precludes all considerations of strictly spiritual life, of inner and + profound action, regarding things in relation to God and in an eternal + perspective: such a view would be illegitimate and unreasonable, first of + all, because Mr Bergson has said nothing of the kind, and secondly, + because it is contrary to all his tendencies. + </p> + <p> + After the "Essay on the Immediate Data" critics proceeded to confine him + in an irreducible static dualism; after "Matter and Memory" they condemned + him as failing for ever to explain the juxtaposition of the two points of + view, utility and truth: why should we require that after "Creative + Evolution" he should be forbidden to think anything new, or distinguish, + for example, different orders of life? + </p> + <p> + The problems must be approached one after the other, and, in the solution + of each of them, it is proper to introduce only the necessary elements. + But each result is only "temporarily final." Let us lose the strange habit + of asking an author continually to do something other than he has done, + or, in what he has done, to give us the whole of his thought. + </p> + <p> + Till now, Mr Bergson has always considered each new problem according to + its specific and original nature, and, to solve it, he has always supplied + a new effort of autonomous adaptation: why should it be otherwise for the + future? I seek vainly for the decree forbidding him the right to study the + problem of biological evolution in itself, and for the necessity which + compels him to abide now by the premisses contained in his past work. (For + Mr Bergson, the religious sentiment, as the sentiment of obligation, + contains a basis of "immediate datum" rendering it indissoluble and + irreducible.) + </p> + <p> + The only point which we have to examine is this: will the moral and + religious question compel Mr Bergson to break with the conclusions of his + previous studies, and can we not, on the contrary, foresee points of + general agreement? + </p> + <p> + In the depths of ourselves we find liberty; in the depths of universal + being we find a demand for creation. Since evolution is creative, each of + its moments works for the production of an indeducible and transcendent + future. This future must not be regarded as a simple development of the + present, a simple expression of germs already given. Consequently we have + no authority for saying that there is for ever only one order of life, + only one plane of action, only one rhythm of duration, only one + perspective of existence. And if disconnections and abrupt leaps are + visible in the economy of the past—from matter to life, from the + animal to man—we have no authority again for claiming that we cannot + observe today something analogous in the very essence of human life, that + the point of view of the flesh, and the point of view of the spirit, the + point of view of reason, and the point of view of charity are a + homogeneous extension of it. And apart from that, taking life in its first + tendency, and in the general direction of its current, it is ascent, + growth, upward effort, and a work of spiritualising and emancipating + creation: by that we might define Good, for Good is a path rather than a + thing. + </p> + <p> + But life may fail, halt, or travel downwards. "Life in general is mobility + itself; the particular manifestations of life accept this mobility only + with regret, and constantly fall behind. While it is always going forward, + they would be glad to mark time. Evolution in general would take place as + far as possible in a straight line; special evolution is a circular + advance. Like dust-eddies raised by the passing wind, living bodies are + self-pivoted and hung in the full breeze of life." ("Creative Evolution", + page 139.) Each species, each individual, each function tends to take + itself as its end; mechanism, habit, body, and letter, which are, strictly + speaking, pure instruments, actually become principles of death. Thus it + comes about that life is exhausted in efforts towards self-preservation, + allows itself to be converted by matter into captive eddies, sometimes + even abandons itself to the inertia of the weight which it ought to raise, + and surrenders to the downward current which constitutes the essence of + materiality: it is thus that Evil would be defined, as the direction of + travel opposed to Good. Now, with man, thought, reflection, and clear + consciousness appear. At the same time also properly moral qualifications + appear: good becomes duty, evil becomes sin. At this precise moment, a new + problem begins, demanding the soundings of a new intuition, yet connected + at clear and visible points with previous problems. + </p> + <p> + This is the philosophy which some are pleased to say is closed by nature + to all problems of a certain order, problems of reason or problems of + morality. There is no doctrine, on the contrary, which is more open, and + none which, in actual fact, lends itself better to further extension. + </p> + <p> + It is not my duty to state here what I believe can be extracted from it. + Still less is it my duty to try to foresee what Mr Bergson's conclusions + will be. Let us confine ourselves to taking it in what it has expressly + given us of itself. From this point of view, which is that of pure + knowledge, I must again, as I conclude, emphasise its exceptional + importance and its infinite reach. It is possible not to understand it. + Such is frequently the case: thus it always has been in the past, each + time that a truly new intuition has arisen among men; thus it will be + until the inevitable day when disciples more respectful of the letter than + the spirit will turn it, alas, into a new scholastic. What does it matter! + The future is there; despite misconceptions, despite incomprehensions, + there is henceforth the departure-point of all speculative philosophy; + each day increases the number of minds which recognise it; and it is + better not to dwell upon the proofs of several of those who are unable or + unwilling to see it. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0014" id="link2H_4_0014"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + Index. + </h2> + <h3> + Absolute, the. + </h3> + <p> + Adaptation, value of. + </p> + <p> + Analysis, conceptual, contrasted with intuition. + </p> + <p> + Appearances. + </p> + <p> + Art, and philosophy. + </p> + <p> + Atomism. + </p> + <p> + Automatism. + </p> + <p> + Automaton, of daily life. + </p> + <p> + Being, as becoming. + </p> + <p> + Brain, work of. + </p> + <p> + Causality, psychological. + </p> + <p> + Change. + </p> + <p> + Common-sense. + </p> + <p> + Concepts, analysis by and functions of, as symbols, creation of, as + general frames, practical reach of, inferior to intuition, further + discussed. + </p> + <p> + Consciousness. + </p> + <p> + Conservation, law of. + </p> + <p> + Constants, search for, represented. + </p> + <p> + Continuity, qualitative. + </p> + <p> + Criticism, of language. + </p> + <p> + Deduction, impotence of. + </p> + <p> + Degradation, law of. + </p> + <p> + Determinism, physical. + </p> + <p> + Discontinuity, apparent. + </p> + <p> + Disorder. + </p> + <p> + Du Bois-Reymond. + </p> + <p> + Duration, real, perpetually new, and thought, and time, pure. + </p> + <p> + Dynamic connection, schemes. + </p> + <p> + Ego, encrustations of the. + </p> + <p> + Eleatic dialectic. + </p> + <p> + Embryology, evidence of. + </p> + <p> + Evil, a reality. + </p> + <p> + Evolution, drama of, biological, value and meaning of, not indispensable, + distinguished from development, as dynamic continuity, as activity, + further discussed. + </p> + <p> + Existence, as change. + </p> + <p> + Experience. + </p> + <p> + Fact. + </p> + <p> + Freedom. + </p> + <p> + Free-will. + </p> + <p> + Genesis, law of. + </p> + <p> + Good, a reality, a path. + </p> + <p> + Habit, as obstacle. + </p> + <p> + Heredity. + </p> + <p> + Heterogeneity. + </p> + <p> + Homogeneity, absence of. + </p> + <p> + Huxley. + </p> + <p> + Images. + </p> + <p> + Immediacy. + </p> + <p> + Immediate, the. + </p> + <p> + Inert, the. + </p> + <p> + Instinct, is sympathy, contrasted with intelligence. + </p> + <p> + Intellectualism, distrusted. + </p> + <p> + Intelligence, product of evolution, and instinct, broad meaning of. + </p> + <p> + Intuition, as starting-point, intransmissible without language, aesthetic, + triumph of, and duration, and analysis. + </p> + <p> + Intuitional effort, content. + </p> + <p> + Kant, his point of departure, conclusions of, escape from. + </p> + <p> + Knowledge, absolute, utilitarian nature of, new theory of. + </p> + <p> + Language, dangers of. + </p> + <p> + Laplace. + </p> + <p> + Law, concept of. + </p> + <p> + Liberty, personal importance of. + </p> + <p> + Life, tendencies of, is finality, is progress, further discussed. + </p> + <p> + Limit-concepts. + </p> + <p> + Materialism. + </p> + <p> + Mechanism, psychological, failure of. + </p> + <p> + Memory, problem of, perception complicated by, importance of, racial, + planes of, memory of solids. + </p> + <p> + Metaphor, justification of. + </p> + <p> + Method, philosophical. + </p> + <p> + Mill, Stuart. + </p> + <p> + Motor-schemes, mechanisms. + </p> + <p> + Mysticism. + </p> + <p> + Non-morality. + </p> + <p> + Nothingness. + </p> + <p> + Number. + </p> + <p> + Ontogenesis. + </p> + <p> + Palaeontology, evidence of. + </p> + <p> + Parallelism. + </p> + <p> + Paralogism. + </p> + <p> + Perception, an art, affected by memory, further explained, fulfilment of + guesswork, utilitarian signification, subjectivity of, pure and ordinary, + further discussed, relation to matter, perception of immediacy. + </p> + <p> + Philosophy, duty of, function of. + </p> + <p> + Phylogenesis. + </p> + <p> + Planes, of consciousness. + </p> + <p> + Progress, and reality. + </p> + <p> + Quality, and inner world. + </p> + <p> + Quantity, and quality. + </p> + <p> + Rationalism. + </p> + <p> + Ravaisson. + </p> + <p> + Realism. + </p> + <p> + Reality, contact with, a flux, recognition of, absolute, elusive nature + of, personal, essentially qualitative, pure, inner, contrasting views + about, further discussed. + </p> + <p> + Reason. + </p> + <p> + Relation, between mind and matter. + </p> + <p> + Religion, its place in philosophy. + </p> + <p> + Renan. + </p> + <p> + Romanticism. + </p> + <p> + Schemes, dynamic. + </p> + <p> + Science, prisoner of symbolism, cult of, impotence of. + </p> + <p> + Sense, good, and common-sense. + </p> + <p> + Space. + </p> + <p> + Spencer, criticism of, success and weakness of. + </p> + <p> + Spiritualism. + </p> + <p> + Symbolism. + </p> + <p> + Sympathy. + </p> + <p> + Taine. + </p> + <p> + Thought, methods of common. + </p> + <p> + Time, required by Mr Bergson's philosophy, in space, and common-sense, and + duration. + </p> + <p> + Torpor. + </p> + <p> + Transformism, errors of. + </p> + <p> + Utility, as goal of perception. + </p> + <p> + Variation. + </p> + <p> + Zeno of Elea. + </p> + <p> + Zone, of feeling. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson, by Edouard le Roy + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A NEW PHILOSOPHY: HENRI BERGSON *** + +***** This file should be named 1347-h.htm or 1347-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/3/4/1347/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson + +Author: Edouard le Roy + +Translator: Vincent Benson + +Posting Date: August 13, 2008 [EBook #1347] +Release Date: June, 1998 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A NEW PHILOSOPHY: HENRI BERGSON *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +A NEW PHILOSOPHY: HENRI BERGSON + +by Edouard le Roy + +Translated from the French by Vincent Benson + + + + +Preface + +This little book is due to two articles published under the same title +in the "Revue des Deux Mondes", 1st and 15th February 1912. + +Their object was to present Mr Bergson's philosophy to the public at +large, giving as short a sketch as possible, and describing, without too +minute details, the general trend of his movement. These articles I +have here reprinted intact. But I have added, in the form of continuous +notes, some additional explanations on points which did not come within +the scope of investigation in the original sketch. + +I need hardly add that my work, though thus far complete, does not in +any way claim to be a profound critical study. Indeed, such a study, +dealing with a thinker who has not yet said his last word, would today +be premature. I have simply aimed at writing an introduction which will +make it easier to read and understand Mr Bergson's works, and serve as a +preliminary guide to those who desire initiation in the new philosophy. + +I have therefore firmly waived all the paraphernalia of technical +discussions, and have made no comparisons, learned or otherwise, between +Mr Bergson's teaching and that of older philosophies. + +I can conceive no better method of misunderstanding the point at +issue, I mean the simple unity of productive intuition, than that of +pigeon-holing names of systems, collecting instances of resemblance, +making up analogies, and specifying ingredients. An original philosophy +is not meant to be studied as a mosaic which takes to pieces, a compound +which analyses, or a body which dissects. On the contrary, it is by +considering it as a living act, not as a rather clever discourse, by +examining the peculiar excellence of its soul rather than the formation +of its body, that the inquirer will succeed in understanding it. +Properly speaking, I have only applied to Mr Bergson the method which +he himself justifiably prescribes in a recent article ("Revue de +Metaphysique et de Morale", November 1911), the only method, in fact, +which is in all senses of the word fully "exact." I shall none the less +be glad if these brief pages can be of any interest to professional +philosophers, and have endeavoured, as far as possible, to allow them +to trace, under the concise formulae employed, the scheme which I have +refused to develop. + +It has become evident to me that even today the interpretation of Mr +Bergson's position is in many cases full of faults, which it would +undoubtedly be worth while to assist in removing. I may or may not have +succeeded in my attempt, but such, at any rate, is the precise end I had +in view. + +In conclusion, I may say that I have not had the honour of being Mr +Bergson's pupil; and, at the time when I became acquainted with his +outlook, my own direct reflection on science and life had already +produced in me similar trains of thought. I found in his work +the striking realisation of a presentiment and a desire. This +"correspondence," which I have not exaggerated, proved at once a help +and a hindrance to me in entering into the exact comprehension of so +profoundly original a doctrine. The reader will thus understand that I +think it in place to quote my authority to him in the following lines +which Mr Bergson kindly wrote me after the publication of the articles +reproduced in this volume: "Underneath and beyond the method you have +caught the intention and the spirit...Your study could not be more +conscientious or true to the original. As it advances, condensation +increases in a marked degree: the reader becomes aware that the +explanation is undergoing a progressive involution similar to the +involution by which we determine the reality of Time. To produce this +feeling, much more has been necessary than a close study of my works: it +has required deep sympathy of thought, the power, in fact, of rethinking +the subject in a personal and original manner. Nowhere is this sympathy +more in evidence than in your concluding pages, where in a few words you +point out the possibilities of further developments of the doctrine. In +this direction I should myself say exactly what you have said." + +Paris, 28th March 1912. + + +CONTENTS + +Preface + + +GENERAL VIEW + + +I. Method. + +Scope of Henri Bergson's Philosophy. Material and Authorities. +Investigation of Common-sense. Value of Science. Perception Discussed. +Practical Life and Reality. Concepts and Symbolism. Intuition and +Analysis. Use of Metaphor. The Philosopher's Task. + + +II. Teaching. + +The Ego. Space and Number. Parallelism. Henri Bergson's View of Mind +and Matter. Qualitative Continuity. Memory. Real Duration Heterogeneous. +Liberty and Determinism. Meaning of Reality. Evolution and Automatism. +Triumph of Man. The Vital Impulse. Objections Refuted. Place of Religion +in the New Philosophy. + + +ADDITIONAL EXPLANATIONS + +I. Henri Bergson's Work and the General Directions of Contemporary +Thought. + +Mathematics and Philosophy. The Inert and the Living. Realism and +Positivism. Henri Bergson and the Intuition of Duration. + + +II. Immediacy. + +Necessity of Criticism. Utilitarianism of Common-sense. Perception of +Immediacy. + + +III. Theory of Perception. + +Pure and Ordinary Perception. Kant's Position. Relation of Perception to +Matter. Complete Experience. + + +IV. Critique of Language. + +Dynamic Schemes. Dangers of Language. The Eleatic Dialectic. Scientific +Thought and the Task of Intuition. Discussion of Change. + + +V. The Problem of Consciousness: Duration and Liberty. + +States as Phases in Duration. The Scientific View of Time. Duration +and Freedom. Liberty and Determinism in the Light of Henri Bergson's +Philosophy. + + +VI. The Problem of Evolution: Life and Matter. + +Evolution and Creation. Laws of Conservation and Degradation. Quantity +and Quality. Secondary Value of Matter. + + +VII. The Problem of Knowledge: Analysis and Intuition. + +Difficulties of Kant's Position. Insufficiency of Intelligence. Henri +Bergson and the Problem of Reason. Geometric and Vital Types of Order. + + +VIII. Conclusion. + +Moral and Religious Problems. Henri Bergson's Position. + + + + +A NEW PHILOSOPHY + + + + +GENERAL VIEW + + + + +I. Method. + +There is a thinker whose name is today on everybody's lips, who is +deemed by acknowledged philosophers worthy of comparison with the +greatest, and who, with his pen as well as his brain, has overleapt all +technical obstacles, and won himself a reading both outside and inside +the schools. Beyond any doubt, and by common consent, Mr Henri Bergson's +work will appear to future eyes among the most characteristic, fertile, +and glorious of our era. It marks a never-to-be-forgotten date in +history; it opens up a phase of metaphysical thought; it lays down a +principle of development the limits of which are indeterminable; and it +is after cool consideration, with full consciousness of the exact value +of words, that we are able to pronounce the revolution which it effects +equal in importance to that effected by Kant, or even by Socrates. + +Everybody, indeed, has become aware of this more or less clearly. Else +how are we to explain, except through such recognition, the sudden +striking spread of this new philosophy which, by its learned rigorism, +precluded the likelihood of so rapid a triumph? + +Twenty years have sufficed to make its results felt far beyond +traditional limits: and now its influence is alive and working from one +pole of thought to the other; and the active leaven contained in it can +be seen already extending to the most varied and distant spheres: +in social and political spheres, where from opposite points, and not +without certain abuses, an attempt is already being made to wrench it +in contrary directions; in the sphere of religious speculation, where +it has been more legitimately summoned to a distinguished, illuminative, +and beneficent career; in the sphere of pure science, where, despite old +separatist prejudices, the ideas sown are pushing up here and there; +and lastly, in the sphere of art, where there are indications that it +is likely to help certain presentiments, which have till now remained +obscure, to become conscious of themselves. The moment is favourable to +a study of Mr Bergson's philosophy; but in the face of so many attempted +methods of employment, some of them a trifle premature, the point of +paramount importance, applying Mr Bergson's own method to himself, is +to study his philosophy in itself, for itself, in its profound trend and +its authenticated action, without claiming to enlist it in the ranks of +any cause whatsoever. + + +I. + +Mr Bergson's readers will undergo at almost every page they read an +intense and singular experience. The curtain drawn between ourselves +and reality, enveloping everything including ourselves in its illusive +folds, seems of a sudden to fall, dissipated by enchantment, and display +to the mind depths of light till then undreamt, in which reality itself, +contemplated face to face for the first time, stands fully revealed. The +revelation is overpowering, and once vouchsafed will never afterwards be +forgotten. + +Nothing can convey to the reader the effects of this direct and intimate +mental vision. Everything which he thought he knew already finds new +birth and vigour in the clear light of morning: on all hands, in the +glow of dawn, new intuitions spring up and open out; we feel them big +with infinite consequences, heavy and saturated with life. Each of them +is no sooner blown than it appears fertile for ever. And yet there is +nothing paradoxical or disturbing in the novelty. It is a reply to our +expectation, an answer to some dim hope. So vivid is the impression of +truth, that afterwards we are even ready to believe we recognise the +revelation as if we had always darkly anticipated it in some mysterious +twilight at the back of consciousness. + +Afterwards, no doubt, in certain cases, incertitude reappears, sometimes +even decided objections. The reader, who at first was under a magic +spell, corrects his thought, or at least hesitates. What he has seen +is still at bottom so new, so unexpected, so far removed from familiar +conceptions. For this surging wave of thought our mind contains none of +those ready-cut channels which render comprehension easy. But whether, +in the long run, we each of us give or refuse complete or partial +adhesion, all of us, at least, have received a regenerating shock, an +internal upheaval not readily silenced: the network of our intellectual +habits is broken; henceforth a new leaven works and ferments in us; we +shall no longer think as we used to think; and be we pupils or critics, +we cannot mistake the fact that we have here a principle of integral +renewal for ancient philosophy and its old and timeworn problems. + +It is obviously impossible to sketch in brief all the aspects and all +the wealth of so original a work. Still less shall I be able to answer +here the many questions which arise. I must decide to pass rapidly +over the technical detail of clear, closely-argued, and penetrating +discussions; over the scope and exactness of the evidence borrowed from +the most diverse positive sciences; over the marvellous dexterity of the +psychological analysis; over the magic of a style which can call up +what words cannot express. The solidity of the construction will not be +evidenced in these pages, nor its austere and subtle beauty. But what +I do at all costs wish to bring out, in shorter form, in this new +philosophy, is its directing idea and general movement. + +In such an undertaking, where the end is to understand rather than to +judge, criticism ought to take second place. It is more profitable to +attempt to feel oneself into the heart of the teaching, to relive its +genesis, to perceive the principle of organic unity, to come at the +mainspring. Let our reading be a course of meditation which we live. +The only true homage we can render to the masters of thought consists in +ourselves thinking, as far as we can do so, in their train, under their +inspiration, and along the paths which they have opened up. + +In the case before us this road is landmarked by several books which it +will be sufficient to study one after the other, and take successively +as the text of our reflections. + +In 1889 Mr Bergson made his appearance with an "Essay on the Immediate +Data of Consciousness". + +This was his doctor's thesis. Taking up his position inside the human +personality, in its inmost mind, he endeavoured to lay hold of the +depths of life and free action in their commonly overlooked and fugitive +originality. + +Some years later, in 1896, passing this time to the externals of +consciousness, the contact surface between things and the ego, he +published "Matter and Memory", a masterly study of perception and +recollection, which he himself put forward as an inquiry into the +relation between body and mind. In 1907 he followed with "Creative +Evolution", in which the new metaphysic was outlined in its full +breadth, and developed with a wealth of suggestion and perspective +opening upon the distances of infinity; universal evolution, the meaning +of life, the nature of mind and matter, of intelligence and instinct, +were the great problems here treated, ending in a general critique of +knowledge and a completely original definition of philosophy. + +These will be our guides which we shall carefully follow, step by step. +It is not, I must confess, without some apprehension that I undertake +the task of summing up so much research, and of condensing into a few +pages so many and such new conclusions. + +Mr Bergson excels, even on points of least significance, in producing +the feeling of unfathomed depths and infinite levels. Never has anyone +better understood how to fulfil the philosopher's first task, in +pointing out the hidden mystery in everything. With him we see all at +once the concrete thickness and inexhaustible extension of the most +familiar reality, which has always been before our eyes, where before we +were aware only of the external film. + +Do not imagine that this is simply a poetical delusion. We must be +grateful if the philosopher uses exquisite language and writes in a +style which abounds in living images. These are rare qualities. But +let us avoid being duped by a show of printed matter: these unannotated +pages are supported by positive science submitted to the most minute +inspection. One day, in 1901, at the French Philosophical Society, Mr +Bergson related the genesis of "Matter and Memory". + +"Twelve years or so before its appearance, I had set myself the +following problem: 'What would be the teaching of the physiology and +pathology of today upon the ancient question of the connection between +physical and moral to an unprejudiced mind, determined to forget all +speculation in which it has indulged on this point, determined also to +neglect, in the enunciations of philosophers, all that is not pure and +simple statement of fact?' I set myself to solve the problem, and I +very soon perceived that the question was susceptible of a provisional +solution, and even of precise formulation, only if restricted to the +problem of memory. In memory itself I was forced to determine bounds +which I had afterwards to narrow considerably. After confining myself to +the recollection of words I saw that the problem, as stated, was +still too broad, and that, to put the question in its most precise and +interesting form, I should have to substitute the recollection of the +sound of words. The literature on aphasia is enormous. I took five +years to sift it. And I arrived at this conclusion, that between the +psychological fact and its corresponding basis in the brain there must +be a relation which answers to none of the ready-made concepts furnished +us by philosophy." + +Certain characteristics of Mr Bergson's manner will be remarked +throughout: his provisional effort of forgetfulness to recreate a +new and untrammelled mind; his mixture of positive inquiry and bold +invention; his stupendous reading; his vast pioneer work carried on with +indefatigable patience; his constant correction by criticism, informed +of the minutest details and swift to follow up each of them at every +turn. With a problem which would at first have seemed secondary and +incomplete, but which reappears as the subject deepens and is thereby +metamorphosed, he connects his entire philosophy; and so well does he +blend the whole and breathe upon it the breath of life that the final +statement leaves the reader with an impression of sovereign ease. + +Examples will be necessary to enable us, even to a feeble extent, to +understand this proceeding better. But before we come to examples, a +preliminary question requires examination. In the preface to his +first "Essay" Mr Bergson defined the principle of a method which was +afterwards to reappear in its identity throughout his various works; and +we must recall the terms he employed. + +"We are forced to express ourselves in words, and we think, most often, +in space. To put it another way, language compels us to establish +between our ideas the same clear and precise distinctions, and the same +break in continuity, as between material objects. This assimilation +is useful in practical life and necessary in most sciences. But we +are right in asking whether the insuperable difficulties of certain +philosophical problems do not arise from the fact that we persist in +placing non-spatial phenomena next one another in space, and whether, +if we did away with the vulgar illustrations round which we dispute, we +should not sometimes put an end to the dispute." + +That is to say, it is stated to be the philosopher's duty from the +outset to renounce the usual forms of analytic and synthetic thought, +and to achieve a direct intuitional effort which shall put him in +immediate contact with reality. Without doubt it is this question of +method which demands our first attention. It is the leading question. +Mr Bergson himself presents his works as "essays" which do not aim at +"solving the greatest problems all at once," but seek merely "to define +the method and disclose the possibility of applying it on some essential +points." (Preface to "Creative Evolution".) It is also a delicate +question, for it dominates all the rest, and decides whether we shall +fully understand what is to follow. + +We must therefore pause here a moment. To direct us in this preliminary +study we have an admirable "Introduction to Metaphysis", which appeared +as an article in the "Metaphysical and Moral Review" (January 1903): a +short but marvellously suggestive memoire, constituting the best preface +to the reading of the books themselves. We may say in passing, that we +should be grateful to Mr Bergson if he would have it bound in volume +form, along with some other articles which are scarcely to be had at all +today. + + +II. + +Every philosophy, prior to taking shape in a group of co-ordinated +theses, presents itself, in its initial stage, as an attitude, a frame +of mind, a method. Nothing can be more important than to study this +starting-point, this elementary act of direction and movement, if +we wish afterwards to arrive at the precise shade of meaning of the +subsequent teaching. Here is really the fountain-head of thought; it +is here that the form of the future system is determined, and here that +contact with reality takes effect. + +The last point, particularly, is vital. To return to the direct view of +things beyond all figurative symbols, to descend into the inmost depths +of being, to watch the throbbing life in its pure state, and listen to +the secret rhythm of its inmost breath, to measure it, at least so far +as measurement is possible, has always been the philosopher's ambition; +and the new philosophy has not departed from this ideal. But in what +light does it regard its task? That is the first point to clear up. For +the problem is complex, and the goal distant. + +"We are made as much, and more, for action than for thought," says Mr +Bergson; "or rather, when we follow our natural impulse, it is to act +that we think." ("L'Evolution Creatrice", page 321.) And again, "What +we ordinarily call a fact is not reality such as it would appear to an +immediate intuition, but an adaptation of reality to practical interests +and the demands of social life." ("Matiere et Memoire", page 201.) Hence +the question which takes precedence of all others is: to distinguish in +our common representation of the world, the fact in its true sense +from the combinations which we have introduced in view of action and +language. + +Now, to rediscover nature in her fresh springs of reality, it is not +sufficient to abandon the images and conceptions invented by human +initiative; still less is it sufficient to fling ourselves into the +torrent of brute sensations. By so doing we are in danger of dissolving +our thought in dream or quenching it in night. + +Above all, we are in danger of committal to a path which it is +impossible to follow. The philosopher is not free to begin the work of +knowledge again upon other planes, with a mind which would be adequate +to the new and virgin issue of a simple writ of oblivion. + +At the time when critical reflection begins, we have already been long +engaged in action and science, by the training of individual life, as +by hereditary and racial experience, our faculties of perception and +conception, our senses and our understanding, have contracted habits, +which are by this time unconscious and instinctive; we are haunted by +all kinds of ideas and principles, so familiar today that they even pass +unobserved. But what is it all worth? + +Does it, in its present state, help us to know the nature of a +disinterested intuition? + +Nothing but a methodical examination of consciousness can tell us that; +and it will take more than a renunciation of explicit knowledge to +recreate in us a new mind, capable of grasping the bare fact exactly +as it is: what we require is perhaps a penetrating reform, a kind of +conversion. + +The rational and perceptive function we term our intelligence emerges +from darkness through a slowly lifting dawn. During this twilight period +it has lived, worked, acted, fashioned and informed itself. On the +threshold of philosophical speculation it is full of more or less +concealed beliefs, which are literally prejudices, and branded with a +secret mark influencing its every movement. Here is an actual situation. +Exemption from it is beyond anyone's province. Whether we will or no, +we are from the beginning of our inquiry immersed in a doctrine which +disguises nature to us, and already at bottom constitutes a complete +metaphysic. This we term common-sense, and positive science is itself +only an extension and refinement of it. What is the value of this work +performed without clear consciousness or critical attention? Does +it bring us into true relation with things, into relation with pure +consciousness? + +This is our first and inevitable doubt, which requires solution. + +But it would be a quixotic proceeding first to make a void in our mind, +and afterwards to admit into it, one by one, after investigation, such +and such a concept, or such and such a principle. The illusion of +the clean sweep and total reconstruction can never be too vigorously +condemned. + +Is it from the void that we set out to think? Do we think in void, and +with nothing? Common ideas of necessity form the groundwork for the +broidery of our advanced thought. Further, even if we succeeded in our +impossible task, should we, in so doing, have corrected the causes +of error which are today graven upon the very structure of our +intelligence, such as our past life has made it? These errors would not +cease to act imperceptibly upon the work of revision intended to apply +the remedy. + +It is from within, by an effort of immanent purgation, that the +necessary reform must be brought about. And philosophy's first task is +to institute critical reflection upon the obscure beginnings of thought, +with a view to shedding light upon its spontaneous virgin condition, +but without any vain claim to lift it out of the current in which it is +actually plunged. + +One conclusion is already plain: the groundwork of common-sense is sure, +but the form is suspicious. + +In common-sense is contained, at any rate virtually and in embryo, all +that can ever be attained of reality, for reality is verification, not +construction. + +Everything has its starting-point in construction and verification. Thus +philosophical research can only be a conscious and deliberate return to +the facts of primal intuition. But common-sense, being prepossessed in a +practical direction, has doubtless subjected these facts to a process of +interested alteration, which is artificial in proportion to the labour +bestowed. Such is Mr Bergson's fundamental hypothesis, and it is +far-reaching. "Many metaphysical difficulties probably arise from our +habit of confounding speculation and practice; or of pushing an idea +in the direction of utility, when we think we fathom it in theory; +or, lastly, of employing in thought the forms of action." (Preface to +"Matter and Memory". First edition.) + +The work of reform will consist therefore in freeing our intelligence +from its utilitarian habits, by endeavouring at the outset to become +clearly conscious of them. + +Notice how far presumption is in favour of our hypothesis. Whether we +regard organic life in the genesis and preservation of the individual, +or in the evolution of species, we see its natural direction to be +towards utility: but the effort of thought comes after the effort of +life; it is not added from outside, it is the continuance and the flower +of the former effort. Must we not expect from this that it will preserve +its former habits? And what do we actually observe? The first gleam +of human intelligence in prehistoric times is revealed to us by an +industry; the cut flint of the primitive caves marks the first stage +of the road which was one day to end in the most sublime philosophies. +Again, every science has begun by practical arts. Indeed, our science of +today, however disinterested it may have become, remains none the less +in close relation with the demands of our action; it permits us to speak +of and to handle things rather than to see them in their intimate and +profound nature. Analysis, when applied to our operations of knowledge, +shows us that our understanding parcels out, arrests, and quantifies, +whereas reality, as it appears to immediate intuition, is a moving +series, a flux of blended qualities. + +That is to say, our understanding solidifies all that it touches. Have +we not here exactly the essential postulates of action and speech? To +speak, as to act, we must have separable elements, terms and objects +which remain inert while the operation goes on, maintaining between +themselves the constant relations which find their most perfect and +ideal presentment in mathematics. + +Everything tends, then, to incline us towards the hypothesis in +question. Let us regard it henceforward as expressing a fact. + +The forms of knowledge elaborated by common-sense were not originally +intended to allow us to see reality as it is. + +Their task was rather, and remains so, to enable us to grasp its +practical aspect. It is for that they are made, not for philosophical +speculation. + +Now these forms nevertheless have existed in us as inveterate habits, +soon becoming unconscious, even when we have reached the point of +desiring knowledge for its own sake. + +But in this new stage they preserve the bias of their original +utilitarian function, and carry this mark with them everywhere, leaving +it upon the fresh tasks which we are fain to make them accomplish. + +An inner reform is therefore imperative today, if we are to succeed in +unearthing and sifting, in our perception of nature, under the veinstone +of practical symbolism, the true intuitional content. + +This attempt at return to the standpoint of pure contemplation and +disinterested experience is a task very different from the task of +science. It is one thing to regard more and more or less and less +closely with the eyes made for us by utilitarian evolution: it is +another to labour at remaking for ourselves eyes capable of seeing, in +order to see, and not in order to live. + +Philosophy understood in this manner--and we shall see more and +more clearly as we go on that there is no other legitimate method of +understanding it--demands from us an almost violent act of reform and +conversion. + +The mind must turn round upon itself, invert the habitual direction of +its thought, climb the hill down which its instinct towards action has +carried it, and go to seek experience at its source, "above the critical +bend where it inclines towards our practical use and becomes, properly +speaking, human experience." ("Matter and Memory", page 203.) In short, +by a twin effort of criticism and expansion, it must pass outside +common-sense and synthetic understanding to return to pure intuition. + +Philosophy consists in reliving the immediate over again, and in +interpreting our rational science and everyday perception by its light. +That, at least, is the first stage. We shall find afterwards that that +is not all. + +Here is a genuinely new conception of philosophy. Here, for the first +time, philosophy is made specifically distinct from science, yet remains +no less positive. + +What science really does is to preserve the general attitude of +common-sense, with its apparatus of forms and principles. + +It is true that science develops and perfects it, refines and extends +it, and even now and again corrects it. But science does not change +either the direction or the essential steps. + +In this philosophy, on the contrary, what is at first suspected and +finally modified, is the setting of the points before the journey +begins. + +Not that, in saying so, we mean to condemn science; but we must +recognise its just limits. The methods of science proper are in their +place and appropriate, and lead to a knowledge which is true (though +still symbolical), so long as the object studied is the world of +practical action, or, to put it briefly, the world of inert matter. + +But soul, life, and activity escape it, and yet these are the spring and +ultimate basis of everything: and it is the appreciation of this +fact, with what it entails, that is new. And yet, new as Mr Bergson's +conception of philosophy may deservedly appear, it does not any the +less, from another point of view, deserve to be styled classic and +traditional. + +What it really defines is not so much a particular philosophy as +philosophy itself, in its original function. + +Everywhere in history we find its secret current at its task. + +All great philosophers have had glimpses of it, and employed it in +moments of discovery. Only as a general rule they have not clearly +recognised what they were doing, and so have soon turned aside. + +But on this point I cannot insist without going into lengthy detail, +and am obliged to refer the reader to the fourth chapter of "Creative +Evolution", where he will find the whole question dealt with. + +One remark, however, has still to be made. Philosophy, according to +Mr Bergson's conception, implies and demands time; it does not aim at +completion all at once, for the mental reform in question is of the kind +which requires gradual fulfilment. The truth which it involves does +not set out to be a non-temporal essence, which a sufficiently powerful +genius would be able, under pressure, to perceive in its entirety at one +view; and that again seems to be very new. + +I do not, of course, wish to abuse systems of philosophy. Each of them +is an experience of thought, a moment in the life of thought, a method +of exploring reality, a reagent which reveals an aspect. Truth undergoes +analysis into systems as does light into colours. + +But the mere name system calls up the static idea of a finished +building. Here there is nothing of the kind. The new philosophy desires +to be a proceeding as much as, and even more than, to be a system. +It insists on being lived as well as thought. It demands that thought +should work at living its true life, an inner life related to itself, +effective, active, and creative, but not on that account directed +towards external action. "And," says Mr Bergson, "it can only be +constructed by the collective and progressive effort of many thinkers, +and of many observers, completing, correcting, and righting one +another." (Preface to "Creative Evolution".) + +Let us see how it begins, and what is its generating act. + + +III. + +How are we to attain the immediate? How are we to realise this +perception of pure fact which we stated to be the philosopher's first +step? + +Unless we can clear up this doubt, the end proposed will remain to our +gaze an abstract and lifeless ideal. This is, then, the point which +requires instant explanation. For there is a serious difficulty in which +the very employment of the word "immediate" might lead us astray. + +The immediate, in the sense which concerns us, is not at all, or at +least is no longer for us the passive experience, the indefinable +something which we should inevitably receive, provided we opened our +eyes and abstained from reflection. + +As a matter of fact, we cannot abstain from reflection: reflection is +today part of our very vision; it comes into play as soon as we open +our eyes. So that, to come on the trail of the immediate, there must be +effort and work. How are we to guide this effort? In what will this work +consist? By what sign shall we be able to recognise that the result has +been obtained? + +These are the questions to be cleared up. Mr Bergson speaks of them +chiefly in connection with the realities of consciousness, or, +more generally speaking, of life. And it is here, in fact, that the +consequences are most weighty and far-reaching. We shall need to refer +to them again in detail. But to simplify my explanation, I will here +choose another example: that of inert matter, of the perception on which +the physical is based. It is in this case that the divergence between +common perception and pure perception, however real it may be, assumes +least proportions. + +Therefore it appears most in place in the sketch I desire to trace of an +exceedingly complex work, where I can only hope, evidently, to indicate +the main lines and general direction. + +We readily believe that when we cast our eyes upon surrounding objects, +we enter into them unresistingly and apprehend them all at once in their +intrinsic nature. Perception would thus be nothing but simple passive +registration. But nothing could be more untrue, if we are speaking of +the perception which we employ without profound criticism in the +course of our daily life. What we here take to be pure fact is, on +the contrary, the last term in a highly complicated series of mental +operations. And this term contains as much of us as of things. + +In fact, all concrete perception comes up for analysis as an +indissoluble mixture of construction and fact, in which the fact is only +revealed through the construction, and takes on its complexion. We all +know by experience how incapable the uneducated person is of explaining +the simple appearance of the least fact, without embodying a crowd of +false interpretations. We know to a less extent, but it is also true, +that the most enlightened and adroit person proceeds in just the same +manner: his interpretation is better, but it is still interpretation. + +That is why accurate observation is so difficult; we see or we do not +see, we notice such and such an aspect, we read this or that, according +to our state of consciousness at the time, according to the direction of +the investigation on which we are engaged. + +Who was it defined art as nature seen through a mind? Perception, too, +is an art. + +This art has its processes, its conventions, and its tools. Go into a +laboratory and study one of those complex instruments which make our +senses finer or more powerful; each of them is literally a sheaf of +materialised theories, and by means of it all acquired science is +brought to bear on each new observation of the student. In exactly the +same way our organs of sense are actual instruments constructed by the +unconscious work of the mind in the course of biological evolution; +they too sum up and give concrete form and expression to a system +of enlightening theories. But that is not all. The most elementary +psychology shows us the amount of thought, in the correct sense of the +term, recollection, or inference, which enters into what we should be +tempted to call pure perception. + +Establishment of fact is not the simple reception of the faithful +imprint of that fact; it is invariably interpreted, systematised, and +placed in pre-existing forms which constitute veritable theoretical +frames. That is why the child has to learn to perceive. There is an +education of the senses which he acquires by long training. One day, +which aid of habit, he will almost cease to see things: a few lines, a +few glimpses, a few simple signs noted in a brief passing glance, will +enable him to recognise them; and he will hardly retain any more of +reality than its schemes and symbols. + +"Perception," says Mr Bergson on this subject, "becomes in the end only +an opportunity of recollection." ("Matter and Memory", page 59.) + +All concrete perception, it is true, is directed less upon the +present than the past. The part of pure perception in it is small, and +immediately covered and almost buried by the contribution of memory. + +This infinitesimal part acts as a bait. It is a summons to recollection, +challenging us to extract from our previous experience, and construct +with our acquired wealth a system of images which permits us to read the +experience of the moment. + +With our scheme of interpretation thus constituted we encounter the few +fugitive traits which we have actually perceived. If the theory we have +elaborated adapts itself, and succeeds in accounting for, connecting, +and making sense of these traits, we shall finally have a perception +properly so called. + +Perception then, in the usual sense of the word, is the resolution of a +problem, the verification of a theory. + +Thus are explained "errors of the senses," which are in reality errors +of interpretation. Thus too, and in the same manner, we have the +explanation of dreams. + +Let us take a simple example. When you read a book, do you spell each +syllable, one by one, to group the syllables afterwards into words, and +the words into phrases, thus travelling from print to meaning? Not at +all: you grasp a few letters accurately, a few downstrokes in their +graphical outline; then you guess the remainder, travelling in the +reverse direction, from a probable meaning to the print which you +are interpreting. This is what causes mistakes in reading, and the +well-known difficulty in seeing printing errors. + +This observation is confirmed by curious experiments. Write some +everyday phrase or other on a blackboard; let there be a few intentional +mistakes here and there, a letter or two altered, or left out. Place the +words in a dark room in front of a person who, of course, does not +know what has been written. Then turn on the light without allowing the +observer sufficient time to spell the writing. + +In spite of this, he will in most cases read the entire phrase, without +hesitation or difficulty. + +He has restored what was missing, or corrected what was at fault. + +Now, ask him what letters he is certain he saw, and you will find he +will tell you an omitted or altered letter as well as a letter actually +written. + +The observer then thinks he sees in broad light a letter which is not +there, if that letter, in virtue of the general sense, ought to appear +in the phrase. But you can go further, and vary the experiment. + +Suppose we write the word "tumult" correctly. After doing so, to direct +the memory of the observer into a certain trend of recollection, call +out in his ear, during the short time the light is turned on, another +word of different meaning, for example, the word "railway." + +The observer will read "tunnel"; that is to say, a word, the graphical +outline of which is like that of the written word, but connected in +sense with the order of recollection called up. + +In this mistake in reading, as in the spontaneous correction of the +previous experiment, we see very clearly that perception is always the +fulfilment of guesswork. + +It is the direction of this work that we are concerned to determine. + +According to the popular idea, perception has a completely speculative +interest: it is pure knowledge. Therein lies the fundamental mistake. + +Notice first of all how much more probable it is, a priori, that the +work of perception, just as any other natural and spontaneous work, +should have a utilitarian signification. + +"Life," says Mr Bergson with justice, "is the acceptance from objects of +nothing but the useful impression, with the response of the appropriate +reactions." ("Laughter", page 154.) + +And this view receives striking objective confirmation if, with the +author of "Matter and Memory", we follow the progress of the perceptive +functions along the animal series from the protoplasm to the higher +vertebrates; or if, with him, we analyse the task of the body, and +discover that the nervous system is manifested in its very structure as, +before all, an instrument of action. Have we not already besides proof +of this in the fact that each of us always appears in his own eyes to +occupy the centre of the world he perceives? + +The "Riquet" of Anatole France voices Mr Bergson's view: "I am always in +the centre of everything, and men and beasts and things, for or against +me, range themselves around." + +But direct analysis leads us still more plainly to the same conclusion. + +Let us take the perception of bodies. It is easy to show--and I regret +that I cannot here reproduce Mr Bergson's masterly demonstration--that +the division of matter into distinct objects with sharp outlines is +produced by a selection of images which is completely relative to our +practical needs. + +"The distinct outlines which we assign to an object, and which bestow +upon it its individuality, are nothing but the graph of a certain kind +of influence which we should be able to employ at a certain point in +space: it is the plan of our future actions which is submitted to our +eyes, as in a mirror, when we perceive the surfaces and edges of things. +Remove this action, and in consequence the high roads which it makes +for itself in advance by perception, in the web of reality, and +the individuality of the body will be reabsorbed in the universal +interaction which is without doubt reality itself." Which is tantamount +to saying that "rough bodies are cut in the material of nature by a +perception of which the scissors follow, in some sort, the dotted line +along which the action would pass." ("Creative Evolution", page 12.) + +Bodies independent of common experience do not then appear, to an +attentive criticism, as veritable realities which would have an +existence in themselves. They are only centres of co-ordination for our +actions. Or, if you prefer it, "our needs are so many shafts of light +which, when played upon the continuity of perceptible qualities, produce +in them the outline of distinct bodies." ("Matter and Memory", page +220.) Does not science too, after its own fashion, resolve the atom into +a centre of intersecting relations, which finally extend by degrees to +the entire universe in an indissoluble interpenetration? + +A qualitative continuity, imperceptibly shaded off, over which pass +quivers that here and there converge, is the image by which we are +forced to recognise a superior degree of reality. + +But is this perceptible material, this qualitative continuity, the pure +fact in matter? Not yet. Perception, we said just now, is always in +reality complicated by memory. There is more truth in this than we had +seen. Reality is not a motionless spectrum, extending to our view +its infinite shades; it might rather be termed a leaping flame in the +spectrum. All is in passage, in process of becoming. + +On this flux consciousness concentrates at long intervals, each time +condensing into one "quality" an immense period of the inner history of +things. "In just this way the thousand successive positions of a runner +contract into one single symbolic attitude, which our eye perceives, +which art reproduces, and which becomes for everybody the representation +of a man running." ("Matter and Memory", page 233.) + +In the same way again, a red light, continuing one second, embodies such +a large number of elementary pulsations that it would take 25,000 +years of our time to see its distinct passage. From here springs the +subjectivity of our perception. The different qualities correspond, +roughly speaking, to the different rhythms of contraction or +dilution, to the different degrees of inner tension in the perceiving +consciousness. + +Pushing the case to its limits, and imagining a complete expansion, +matter would resolve into colourless disturbances, and become the "pure +matter" of the natural philosopher. + +Let us now unite in one single continuity the different periods of the +preceding dialectic. Vibration, qualities, and bodies are none of them +reality by themselves; but all the same they are part of reality. And +absolute reality would be the whole of these degrees and moments, and +many others as well, no doubt. Or rather, to secure absolute intuition +of matter, we should have on the one hand to get rid of all that our +practical needs have constructed, restore on the other all the effective +tendencies they have extinguished, follow the complete scale of +qualitative concentrations and dilutions, and pass, by a kind of +sympathy, into the incessantly moving play of all the possible +innumerable contractions or resolutions; with the result that in the +end we should succeed, by a simultaneous view as it were, in grasping, +according to their infinitely various modes, the phases of this matter +which, though at present latent, admit of "perception." + +Thus, in the case before us, absolute knowledge is found to be the +result of integral experience; and though we cannot attain the term, we +see at any rate in what direction we should have to work to reach it. + +Now it must be stated that our realisable knowledge is at every moment +partial and limited rather than exterior and relative, for our effective +perception is related to matter in itself as the part to the whole. Our +least perceptions are actually based on pure perception, and "we are +aware of the elementary disturbances which constitute matter, in the +perceptible quality in which they suffer contraction, as we are aware of +the beating of our heart in the general feeling that we have of living." +("The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods", 7th +July 1910.) + +But the preoccupation of practical action, coming between reality and +ourselves, produces the fragmentary world of common-sense, much as an +absorbing medium resolves into separate rays the continuous spectrum +of a luminous body; whilst the rhythm of duration, and the degree of +tension peculiar to our consciousness, limit us to the apprehension of +certain qualities only. + +What then have we to do to progress towards absolute knowledge? Not to +quit experience: quite the contrary; but to extend it and diversify it +by science, while, at the same time, by criticism, we correct in it the +disturbing effects of action, and finally quicken all the results thus +obtained by an effort of sympathy which will make us familiar with the +object until we feel its profound throbbing and its inner wealth. + +In connection with this last vital point, which is decisive, call to +mind a celebrated page of Sainte-Beuve where he defines his method: +"Enter into your author, make yourself at home in him, produce him under +his different aspects, make him live, move, and speak as he must have +done; follow him to his fireside and in his domestic habits, as closely +as you can... + +"Study him, turn him round and round, ask him questions at your leisure; +place him before you...Every feature will appear in its turn, and take +the place of the man himself in this expression... + +"An individual reality will gradually blend with and become incarnate in +the vague, abstract, and general type...There is our man..." Yes, that +is exactly what we want: it could not be better put. Transpose this page +from the literary to the metaphysical order, and you have intuition, as +defined by Mr Bergson. You have the return to immediacy. + +But a new problem then arises: Is not our intuition of immediacy in +danger of remaining inexpressible? For our language has been formed in +view of practical life, not of pure knowledge. + + +IV. + +The immediate perception of reality is not all; we have still to +translate this perception into intelligible language, into a connected +chain of concepts; failing which, it would seem, we should not have +knowledge in the strict sense of the word, we should not have truth. + +Without language, intuition, supposing it came to birth, would remain +intransmissible and incommunicable, and would perish in a solitary cry. +By language alone are we enabled to submit it to a positive test: the +letter is the ballast of the mind, the body which allows it to act, and +in acting to scatter the unreal delusions of dream. + +The act of pure intuition demands so great an inner tension from thought +that it can only be very rare and very fugitive: a few rapid gleams here +and there; and these dawning glimpses must be sustained, and afterwards +united, and that again is the work of language. + +But while language is thus necessary, no less necessary is a criticism +of ordinary language, and of the methods familiar to the understanding. +These forms of reflected knowledge, these processes of analysis really +convey secretly all the postulates of practical action. But it is +imperative that language should translate, not betray; that the body of +formulae should not stifle the soul of intuition. We shall see in what +the work of reform and conversion imposed on the philosopher precisely +consists. + +The attitude of the ordinary proceedings of common thought can be stated +in a few words. Place the object studied before yourself as an exterior +"thing." Then place yourself outside it, in perspective, at points of +vantage on a circumference, whence you can only see the object of your +investigation at a distance, with such interval as would be sufficient +for the contemplation of a picture; in short, move round the object +instead of entering boldly into it. But these proceedings lead to what I +shall term analysis by concepts; that is to say, the attempt to resolve +all reality into general ideas. + +What are concepts and abstract ideas really, but distant and simplified +views, species of model drawings, giving only a few summary features of +their object, which vary according to direction and angle? By means of +them we claim to determine the object from outside, as if, in order to +know it, it were sufficient to enclose it in a system of logical sides +and angles. + +And perhaps in this way we do really grasp it, perhaps we do establish +its precise description, but we do not penetrate it. + +Concepts translate relations resulting from comparisons by which each +object is finally expressed as a function of what it is not. They +dismember it, divide it up piece by piece, and mount it in various +frames. They lay hold of it only by ends and corners, by resemblances +and differences. Is not that obviously what is done by the converting +theories which explain the soul by the body, life by matter, quality +by movements, space itself by pure number? Is not that what is done +generally by all criticisms, all doctrines which connect one idea to +another, or to a group of other ideas? + +In this way we reach only the surface of things, the reciprocal +contacts, mutual intersections, and parts common, but not the organic +unity nor the inner essence. + +In vain we multiply our points of view, our perspectives and plane +projections: no accumulation of this kind will reconstruct the concrete +solid. We can pass from an object directly perceived to the pictures +which represent it, the prints which represent the pictures, the scheme +representing the prints, because each stage contains less than the one +before, and is obtained from it by simple diminution. + +But, inversely, you may take all the schemes, prints, pictures you +like--supposing that it is not absurd to conceive as given what is by +nature interminable and inexhaustible, lending itself to indefinite +enumeration and endless development and multiplicity--but you will never +recompose the profound and original unity of the source. + +How, by forcing yourself to seek the object outside itself, where it +certainly is not, except in echo and reflection, would you ever find +its intimate and specific reality? You are but condemning yourself to +symbolism, for one "thing" can only be in another symbolically. + +To go further still, your knowledge of things will remain irremediably +relative, relative to the symbols selected and the points of view +adopted. Everything will happen as in a movement of which the appearance +and formula vary with the spot from which you regard it, with the marks +to which you relate it. + +Absolute revelation is only given to the man who passes into the object, +flings himself upon its stream, and lives within its rhythm. The +thesis which maintains the inevitable relativity of all human knowledge +originates mainly from the metaphors employed to describe the act of +knowledge. The subject occupies this point, the object that; how are we +to span the distance? Our perceptory organs fill the interval; how are +we to grasp anything but what reaches us in the receiver at the end of +the wire? + +The mind itself is a projecting lantern playing a shaft of light on +nature; how should it do otherwise than tint nature its own colour? + +But these difficulties all arise out of the spatial metaphors employed; +and these metaphors in their turn do little but illustrate and +translate the common method of analysis by concepts: and this method is +essentially regulated by the practical needs of action and language. + +The philosopher must adopt an attitude entirely inverse; not keep at a +distance from things, but listen in a manner to their inward breathing, +and, above all, supply the effort of sympathy by which he establishes +himself in the object, becomes on intimate terms with it, tunes himself +to its rhythm, and, in a word, lives it. There is really nothing +mysterious or strange in this. + +Consider your daily judgments in matters of art, profession, or sport. + +Between knowledge by theory and knowledge by experience, between +understanding by external analogy and perception by profound intuition, +what difference and divergence there is! + +Who has absolute knowledge of a machine, the student who analyses it in +mechanical theorems, or the engineer who has lived in comradeship with +it, even to sharing the physical sensation of its laboured or easy +working, who feels the play of its inner muscles, its likes and +dislikes, who notes its movements and the task before it, as the machine +itself would do were it conscious, for whom it has become an extension +of his own body, a new sensori-motor organ, a group of prearranged +gestures and automatic habits? + +The student's knowledge is more useful to the builder, and I do not wish +to claim that we should ever neglect it; but the only true knowledge +is that of the engineer. And what I have just said does not concern +material objects only. Who has absolute knowledge of religion, he who +analyses it in psychology, sociology, history, and metaphysics, or he +who, from within, by a living experience, participates in its essence +and holds communion with its duration? + +But the external nature of the knowledge obtained by conceptual analysis +is only its least fault. There are others still more serious. + +If concepts actually express what is common, general, unspecific, what +should make us feel the need of recasting them when we apply them to a +new object? + +Does not their ground, their utility, and their interest exactly consist +in sparing us this labour? + +We regard them as elaborated once for all. They are building-material, +ready-hewn blocks, which we have only to bring together. They are atoms, +simple elements--a mathematician would say prime factors--capable of +associating with infinity, but without undergoing any inner modification +in contact with it. They admit linkage; they can be attached externally, +but they leave the aggregate as they went into it. + +Juxtaposition and arrangement are the geometrical operations which +typify the work of knowledge in such a case; or else we must fall back +on metaphors from some mental chemistry, such as proportioning and +combination. + +In all cases, the method is still that of alignment and blending of +pre-existent concepts. + +Now the mere fact of proceeding thus is equivalent to setting up the +concept as a symbol of an abstract class. That being done, explanation +of a thing is no more than showing it in the intersection of several +classes, partaking of each of them in definite proportions: which is +the same as considering it sufficiently expressed by a list of general +frames into which it will go. The unknown is then, on principle, and +in virtue of this theory, referred to the already known; and it thereby +becomes impossible ever to grasp any true novelty or any irreducible +originality. + +On principle, once more, we claim to reconstruct nature with pure +symbols; and it thereby becomes impossible ever to reach its concrete +reality, "the invisible and present soul." + +This intuitional coinage in fixed standard concepts, this creation of +an easily handled intellectual cash, is no doubt of evident practical +utility. For knowledge in the usual sense of the word is not a +disinterested operation; it consists in finding out what profit we can +draw from an object, how we are to conduct ourselves towards it, what +label we can suitably attach to it, under what already known class +it comes, to what degree it is deserving of this or that title which +determines an attitude we must take up, or a step we must perform. Our +end is to place the object in its approximate class, having regard to +advantageous employment or to everyday language. Then, and only then, +we find our pigeon-holes all ready-made; and the same parcel of reagents +meets all cases. A universal catechism is here in existence to meet +every research; its different clauses define so many unshifting points +of view, from which we regard each object, and our study is subsequently +limited to applying a kind of nomenclature to the preconstructed frames. + +Once again the philosopher has to proceed in exactly the opposite +direction. He has not to confine himself to ready-made business +concepts, of the ordinary kind, suits cut to an average model, which fit +nobody because they almost fit everybody; but he has to work to measure, +incessantly renew his plant, continually recreate his mind, and meet +each new problem with a fresh adaptive effort. He must not go from +concepts to things, as if each of them were only the cutting-point +of several concurrent generalities, an ideal centre of intersecting +abstractions; on the contrary, he must go from things to concepts, +incessantly creating new thoughts, and incessantly recasting the old. + +There could be no solution of the problem in a more or less ingenious +mosaic or tessellation of rigid concepts, pre-existing to be employed. +We need plastic fluid, supple and living concepts, capable of being +continually modelled on reality, of delicately following its infinite +curves. The philosopher's task is then to create concepts much more than +to combine them. And each of the concepts he creates must remain open +and adjustable, ready for the necessary renewal and adaptation, like +a method or a programme: it must be the arrow pointing to a path which +descends from intuition to language, not a boundary marking a terminus. +In this way only does philosophy remain what it ought to be: the +examination into the consciousness of the human mind, the effort towards +enlargement and depth which it attempts unremittingly, in order to +advance beyond its present intellectual condition. + +Do you want an example? I will take that of human personality. The +ego is one; the ego is many: no one contests this double formula. But +everything admits of it; and what is its lesson to us? Observe what is +bound to happen to the two concepts of unity and multiplicity, by +the mere fact that we take them for general frames independent of the +reality contained, for detached language admitting empty and blank +definition, always representable by the same word, no matter what +the circumstances: they are no longer living and coloured ideas, but +abstract, motionless, and neutral forms, without shades or gradations, +without distinction of case, characterising two points of view from +which you can observe anything and everything. This being so, how +could the application of these forms help us to grasp the original and +peculiar nature of the unity and multiplicity of the ego? Still further, +how could we, between two such entities, statically defined by +their opposition, ever imagine a synthesis? Correctly speaking, the +interesting question is not whether there is unity, multiplicity, +combination, one with the other, but to see what sort of unity, +multiplicity, or combination realises the case in point; above all, +to understand how the living person is at once multiple unity and +one multiplicity, how these two poles of conceptual dissociation are +connected, how these two diverging branches of abstraction join at +the roots. The interesting point, in a word, is not the two symbolical +colourless marks indicating the two ends of the spectrum; it is the +continuity between, with its changing wealth of colouring, and the +double progress of shades which resolve it into red and violet. + +But it is impossible to arrive at this concrete transition unless we +begin from direct intuition and descend to the analysing concepts. + +Again, the same duty of reversing our familiar attitude, of inverting +our customary proceeding, becomes ours for another reason. The +conceptual atomism of common thought leads it to place movement in a +lower order than rest, fact in a lower order than becoming. According +to common thought, movement is added to the atom, as a supplementary +accident to a body previously at rest; and, by becoming, the +pre-existent terms are strung together like pearls on a necklace. +It delights in rest, and endeavours to bring to rest all that moves. +Immobility appears to it to be the base of existence. It decomposes +and pulverises every change and every phenomenon, until it finds +the invariable element in them. It is immobility which it esteems +as primary, fundamental, intelligible of itself; and motion, on the +contrary, which it seeks to explain as a function of immobility. And +so it tends, out of progresses and transitions, to make things. To see +distinctly, it appears to need a dead halt. What indeed are concepts but +logical look-out stations along the path of becoming? what are they +but motionless external views, taken at intervals, of an uninterrupted +stream of movement? + +Each of them isolates and fixes an aspect, "as the instantaneous +lightning flashes on a storm-scene in the darkness." ("Matter and +Memory", page 209.) + +Placed together, they make a net laid in advance, a strong meshwork in +which the human intelligence posts itself securely to spy the flux of +reality, and seize it as it passes. Such a proceeding is made for the +practical world, and is out of place in the speculative. Everywhere we +are trying to find constants, identities, non-variants, states; and we +imagine ideal science as an open eye which gazes for ever upon objects +that do not move. The constant is the concrete support demanded by our +action: the matter upon which we operate must not escape our grasp and +slip through our hands, if we are to be able to work it. The constant, +again, is the element of language, in which the word represents its +inert permanence, in which it constitutes the solid fulcrum, the +foundation and landmark of dialectic progress, being that which can be +discarded by the mind, whose attention is thus free for other tasks. In +this respect analysis by concepts is the natural method of common-sense. +It consists in asking from time to time what point the object studied +has reached, what it has become, in order to see what one could derive +from it, or what it is fitting to say of it. + +But this method has only a practical reach. Reality, which in its +essence is becoming, passes through our concepts without ever letting +itself be caught, as a moving body passes fixed points. When we filter +it, we retain only its deposit, the result of the becoming drifted down +to us. + +Do the dams, canals, and buoys make the current of the river? Do the +festoons of dead seaweed ranged along the sand make the rising tide? Let +us beware of confounding the stream of becoming with the sharp outline +of its result. Analysis by concepts is a cinematograph method, and it +is plain that the inner organisation of the movement is not seen in the +moving pictures. Every moment we have fixed views of moving objects. +With such conceptual sections taken in the stream of continuity, however +many we accumulate, should we ever reconstruct the movement itself, the +dynamic connection, the march of the images, the transition from one +view to another? This capacity for movement must be contained in the +picture apparatus, and must therefore be given in addition to the views +themselves; and nothing can better prove how, after all, movement is +never explicable except by itself, never grasped except in itself. + +But if we take movement as our principle, it is, on the contrary, +possible, and even easy, to slacken speed by imperceptible degrees, and +stop dead. + +From a dead stop we shall never get our movement again; but rest can +very well be conceived as the limit of movement, as its arrest or +extinction; for rest is less than movement. + +In this way the true philosophical method, which is the inverse of the +common method, consists in taking up a position from the very outset +in the bosom of becoming, in adopting its changing curves and variable +tension, in sympathising with the rhythm of its genesis, in perceiving +all existence from within, as a growth, in following it in its inner +generation; in short, in promoting movement to fundamental reality, +and, inversely, in degrading fixed states to the rank of secondary and +derived reality. + +And thus, to come back to the example of the human personality, the +philosopher must seek in the ego not so much a ready-made unity or +multiplicity as, if I may venture the expression, two antagonistic and +correlative movements of unification and plurification. + +There is then a radical difference between philosophic intuition and +conceptual analysis. The latter delights in the play of dialectic, in +fountains of knowledge, where it is interested only in the immovable +basins; the former goes back to the source of the concepts, and seeks +to possess it where it gushes out. Analysis cuts the channels; intuition +supplies the water. Intuition acquires and analysis expends. + +It is not a question of banning analysis; science could not do without +it, and philosophy could not do without science. But we must reserve for +it its normal place and its just task. + +Concepts are the deposited sediment of intuition: intuition produces the +concepts, not the concepts intuition. From the heart of intuition you +will have no difficulty in seeing how it splits up and analyses into +concepts, concepts of such and such a kind or such and such a shade. But +by successive analyses you will never reconstruct the least intuition, +just as, no matter how you distribute water, you will never reconstruct +the reservoir in its original condition. + +Begin from intuition: it is a summit from which we can descend by +infinite slopes; it is a picture which we can place in an infinite +number of frames. But all the frames together will not recompose the +picture, and the lower ends of all the slopes will not explain how +they meet at the summit. Intuition is a necessary beginning; it is the +impulse which sets the analysis in motion, and gives it direction; it is +the sounding which brings it to solid bottom; the soul which assures its +unity. "I shall never understand how black and white interpenetrate, +if I have not seen grey, but I understand without trouble, after once +seeing grey, how we can regard it from the double point of view of black +and white." ("Introduction to Metaphysics.") + +Here are some letters which you can arrange in chains in a thousand +ways: the indivisible sense running along the chain, and making one +phrase of it, is the original cause of the writing, not its consequence. +Thus it is with intuition in relation to analysis. But beginnings and +generative activities are the proper object of the philosopher. Thus +the conversion and reform incumbent on him consist essentially in a +transition from the analytic to the intuitive point of view. + +The result is that the chosen instrument of philosophic thought is +metaphor; and of metaphor we know Mr Bergson to be an incomparable +master. What we have to do, he says himself, is "to elicit a certain +active force which in most men is liable to be trammelled by mental +habits more useful to life," to awaken in them the feeling of the +immediate, original, and concrete. But "many different images, borrowed +from very different orders of things, can, by their convergent action, +direct consciousness to the precise point where there is a certain +intuition to be seized. By choosing images as unlike as possible, we +prevent any one of them from usurping the place of the intuition it is +intended to call up, since it would in that case be immediately routed +by its rivals. In making them all, despite their different aspects, +demand of our mind the same kind of attention, and in some way the same +degree of tension, we accustom our consciousness little by little to a +quite peculiar and well-determined disposition, precisely the one which +it ought to adopt to appear to itself unmasked." ("Introduction to +Metaphysics".) + +Strictly speaking, the intuition of immediacy is inexpressible. But it +can be suggested and called up. How? By ringing it round with concurrent +metaphors. Our aim is to modify the habits of imagination in ourselves +which are opposed to a simple and direct view, to break through the +mechanical imagery in which we have allowed ourselves to be caught; and +it is by awakening other imagery and other habits that we can succeed in +so doing. + +But then, you will say, where is the difference between philosophy and +art, between metaphysical and aesthetic intuition? Art also tends to +reveal nature to us, to suggest to us a direct vision of it, to lift the +veil of illusion which hides us from ourselves; and aesthetic intuition +is, in its own way, perception of immediacy. We revive the feeling of +reality obliterated by habit, we summon the deep and penetrating soul of +things: the object is the same in both cases; and the means are also the +same; images and metaphors. Is Mr Bergson only a poet, and does his work +amount to nothing but the introduction of impressionism in metaphysics? + +It is an old objection. If the truth be told, Mr Bergson's immense +scientific knowledge should be sufficient refutation. + +Only those who have not read the mass of carefully proved and positive +discussions could give way thus to the impressions of art awakened by +what is truly a magic style. But we can go further and put it better. + +That there are analogies between philosophy and art, between +metaphysical and aesthetic intuition, is unquestionable and uncontested. + +At the same time, the analogies must not be allowed to hide the +differences. + +Art is, to a certain extent, philosophy previous to analysis, previous +to criticism and science; the aesthetic intuition is metaphysical +intuition in process of birth, bounded by dream, not proceeding to the +test of positive verification. Reciprocally, philosophy is the art which +follows upon science, and takes account of it, the art which uses the +results of analysis as its material, and submits itself to the demands +of stern criticism; metaphysical intuition is the aesthetic intuition +verified, systematised, ballasted by the language of reason. + +Philosophy then differs from art in two essential points: first of all, +it rests upon, envelops, and supposes science; secondly, it implies a +test of verification in its strict meaning. Instead of stopping at the +acts of common-sense, it completes them with all the contributions of +analysis and scientific investigation. + +We said just now of common-sense that, in its inmost depths, it +possesses reality: that is only quite exact when we mean common-sense +developed in positive science; and that is why philosophy takes the +results of science as its basis, for each of these results, like +the facts and data of common perception, opens a way for critical +penetration towards the immediate. Just now I was comparing the two +kinds of knowledge which the theorist and the engineer can have of a +machine, and I allowed the advantage of absolute knowledge to +practical experience, whilst theory seemed to me mainly relative to the +constructive industry. That is true, and I do not go back upon it. But +the most experienced engineer, who did not know the mechanism of his +machine, who possessed only unanalysed feelings about it, would have +only an artist's, not a philosopher's knowledge. For absolute intuition, +in the full sense of the word, we must have integral experience; that is +to say, a living application of rational theory no less than of working +technique. + +To journey towards living intuition, starting from complete science and +complete sensation, is the philosopher's task; and this task is governed +by standards unknown to art. + +Metaphysical intuition offers a victorious resistance to the test of +thorough and continued experiment, to the test of calculation as to that +of working, to the complete experiment which brings into play all the +various deoxidising agents of criticism; it shows itself capable of +withstanding analysis without dissolving or succumbing; it abounds in +concepts which satisfy the understanding, and exalt it; in a word, it +creates light and truth on all mental planes; and these characteristics +are sufficient to distinguish it in a profound degree from aesthetic +intuition. + +The latter is only the prophetic type of the former, a dream or +presentiment, a veiled and still uncertain dawn, a twilight myth +preceding and proclaiming, in the half-darkness, the full day of +positive revelation... + +Every philosophy has two faces, and must be studied in two +movements--method and teaching. + +These are its two moments, its two aspects, no doubt co-ordinate and +mutually dependent, but none the less distinct. + +We have just examined the method of the new philosophy inaugurated by +Mr Bergson. To what teaching has this method led us, and to what can we +foresee that it will lead us? + +This is what we have still to find. + + + + +II. Teaching. + +The sciences properly so called, those that are by agreement termed +positive, present themselves as so many external and circumferential +points from which we view reality. They leave us on the outside of +things, and confine themselves to investigating from a distance. + +The views they give us resemble the brief perspectives of a town which +we obtain in looking at it from different angles on the surrounding +hills. + +Less even than that: for very soon, by increasing abstraction, +the coloured views give place to regular lines, and even to simple +conventional notes, which are more practical in use and waste less +time. And so the sciences remain prisoners of the symbol, and all the +inevitable relativity involved in its use. But philosophy claims to +pierce within reality, establish itself in the object, follow its +thousand turns and folds, obtain from it a direct and immediate feeling, +and penetrate right into the concrete depths of its heart; it is not +content with an analysis, but demands an intuition. + +Now there is one existence which, at the outset, we know better and more +surely than any other; there is a privileged case in which the effort +of sympathetic revelation is natural and almost easy to us; there is one +reality at least which we grasp from within, which we perceive in its +deep and internal content. This reality is ourselves. It is typical of +all reality, and our study may fitly begin here. Psychology puts us +in direct contact with it, and metaphysics attempt to generalise this +contact. But such a generalisation can only be attempted if, to begin +with, we are familiar with reality at the point where we have immediate +access to it. + +The path of thought which the philosopher must take is from the inner to +the outer being. + + +I. + +"Know thyself": the old maxim has remained the motto of philosophy +since Socrates, the motto at least which marks its initial moment, when, +inclining towards the depth of the subject, it commences its true work +of penetration, whilst science continues to extend on the surface. Each +philosophy in turn has commented upon and applied this old motto. But Mr +Bergson, more than anyone else, has given it, as he does everything +else he takes up, a new and profound meaning. What was the current +interpretation before him? Speaking only of the last century, we may +say that, under the influence of Kant, criticism had till now been +principally engaged in unravelling the contribution of the subject +in the act of consciousness, in establishing our perception of things +through certain representative forms borrowed from our own constitution. +Such was, even yesterday, the authenticated way of regarding the +problem. And it is precisely this attitude which Mr Bergson, by a +volte-face which will remain familiar to him in the course of his +researches, reverses from the outset. + +"It has appeared to me," says he, ("Essay on the Immediate Data of +Consciousness", Conclusion.) "that there was ground for setting oneself +the inverse problem, and asking whether the most apparent states of the +ego itself, which we think we grasp directly, are not most of the time +perceived through certain forms borrowed from the outer world, which in +this way gives us back what we have lent it. A priori, it seems fairly +probable that this is what goes on. For supposing that the forms of +which we are speaking, to which we adapt matter, come entirely from the +mind, it seems difficult to apply them constantly to objects without +soon producing the colouring of the objects in the forms; therefore +in using these forms for the knowledge of our own personality, we +risk taking a reflection of the frame in which we place them--that is, +actually, the external world--for the very colouring of the ego. But +we can go further, and state that forms applicable to things cannot be +entirely our own work; that they must result from a compromise between +matter and mind; that if we give much to this matter, we doubtless +receive something from it; and that, in this way, when we try to possess +ourselves again after an excursion into the outer world, we no longer +have our hands free." + +To avoid such a consequence, there is, we must admit, a conceivable +loophole. It consists in maintaining on principle an absolute analogy, +an exact similitude between internal reality and external objects. The +forms which suit the one would then also suit the other. + +But it must be observed that such a principle constitutes in the highest +degree a metaphysical thesis which it would be on all hands illegal to +assert previously as a postulate of method. Secondly, and above all, it +must be observed that on this head experience is decisive, and manifests +more plainly every day the failure of the theories which try to +assimilate the world of consciousness to that of matter, to copy +psychology from physics. We have here two different "orders." The +apparatus of the first does not admit of being employed in the second. +Hence the necessity of the attitude adopted by Mr Bergson. We have +an effort to make, a work of reform to undertake, to lift the veil of +symbols which envelops our usual representation of the ego, and thus +conceals us from our own view, in order to find out what we are in +reality, immediately, in our inmost selves. This effort and this work +are necessary, because, "in order to contemplate the ego in its original +purity, psychology must eliminate or correct certain forms which bear +the visible mark of the outer world." ("Essay on the Immediate Data +of Consciousness", Conclusion.) What are these forms? Let us confine +ourselves to the most important. Things appear to us as numerable +units, placed side by side in space. They compose numerical and spatial +multiplicity, a dust of terms between which geometrical ties are +established. + +But space and number are the two forms of immobility, the two schemes of +analysis, by which we must not let ourselves be obsessed. I do not say +that there is no place to give them, even in the internal world. But the +more deeply we enter into the heart of psychological life, the less they +are in place. + +The fact is, there are several planes of consciousness, situated at +different depths, marking all the intervening degrees between pure +thought and bodily action, and each mental phenomenon interests all +these planes simultaneously, and is thus repeated in a thousand higher +tones, like the harmonies of one and the same note. + +Or, if you prefer it, the life of the spirit is not the uniform +transparent surface of a mere; rather it is a gushing spring which, +at first pent in, spreads upwards and outwards, like a sheaf of corn, +passing through many different states, from the dark and concentrated +welling of the source to the gleam of the scattered tumbling spray; and +each of its moods presents in its turn a similar character, being itself +only a thread within the whole. Such without doubt is the central and +activating idea of the admirable book entitled "Matter and Memory". I +cannot possibly condense its substance here, or convey its astonishing +synthetic power, which succeeds in contracting a complete metaphysic, +and in gripping it so firmly that the examination ends by passing to +the discussion of a few humble facts relative to the philosophy of the +brain! But its technical severity and its very conciseness, combined +with the wealth it contains, render it irresumable; and I can only in a +few words indicate its conclusions. + +First of all, however little we pride ourselves on positive method, we +must admit the existence of an internal world, of a spiritual activity +distinct from matter and its mechanism. No chemistry of the brain, no +dance of atoms, is equivalent to the least thought, or indeed to the +least sensation. + +Some, it is true, have brought forward a thesis of parallelism, +according to which each mental phenomenon corresponds point by point +to a phenomenon in the brain, without adding anything to it, without +influencing its course, merely translating it into another tongue, +so that a glance sufficiently penetrating to follow the molecular +revolutions and the fluxes of nervous production in their least +episodes would immediately read the inmost secrets of the associated +consciousness. + +But no one will deny that a thesis of this kind is only in reality a +hypothesis, that it goes enormously beyond the certain data of current +biology, and that it can only be formulated by anticipating future +discoveries in a preconceived direction. Let us be candid: it is not +really a thesis of positive science, but a metaphysical thesis in the +unpleasant meaning of the term. Taking it at its best, its worth today +could only be one of intelligibleness. And intelligible it is not. + +How are we to understand a consciousness destitute of activity and +consequently without connection with reality, a kind of phosphorescence +which emphasises the lines of vibration in the brain, and renders in +miraculous duplicate, by its mysterious and useless light, certain +phenomena already complete without it? + +One day Mr Bergson came down into the arena of dialectic, and, +talking to his opponents in their own language, pulled their +"psycho-physiological paralogism" to pieces before their eyes; it +is only by confounding in one and the same argument two systems of +incompatible notations, idealism and realism, that we succeed in +enunciating the parallelist thesis. This reasoning went home, all +the more as it was adapted to the usual form of discussions between +philosophers. But a more positive and more categorical proof is to +be found all through "Matter and Memory". From the precise example of +recollection analysed to its lowest depths, Mr Bergson completely grasps +and measures the divergence between soul and body, between mind and +matter. Then, putting into practice what he said elsewhere about the +creation of new concepts, he arrives at the conclusion--these are his +own expressions--that between the psychological fact and its counterpart +in the brain there must be a relation sui generis, which is neither +the determination of the one by the other, nor their reciprocal +independence, nor the production of the latter by the former, nor of the +former by the latter, nor their simple parallel concomitance; in short, +a relation which answers to none of the ready-made concepts which +abstraction puts at our service, but which may be approximately +formulated in these terms: ("Report of the French Philosophical +Society", meeting, 2nd May 1901.) + +"Given a psychological state, that part of the state which admits of +play, the part which would be translated by an attitude of the body +or by bodily actions, is represented in the brain; the remainder is +independent of it, and has no equivalent in the brain. So that to +one and the same state of the brain there may be many different +psychological states which correspond, though not all kinds of states. +They are psychological states which all have in common the same motor +scheme. Into one and the same frame many pictures may go, but not all +pictures. Let us take a lofty abstract philosophical thought. We do +not conceive it without adding to it an image representing it, which we +place beneath. + +"We do not represent the image to ourselves, again, without supporting +it by a design which resumes its leading features. We do not imagine +this design itself without imagining and, in so doing, sketching certain +movements which would reproduce it. It is this sketch, and this sketch +only, which is represented in the brain. Frame the sketch, there is a +margin for the image. Frame the image again, there remains a margin, and +a still larger margin, for the thought. The thought is thus relatively +free and indeterminate in relation to the activity which conditions it +in the brain, for this activity expresses only the motive articulation +of the idea, and the articulation may be the same for ideas +absolutely different. And yet it is not complete liberty nor absolute +indetermination, since any kind of idea, taken at hazard, would not +present the articulation desired. + +"In short, none of the simple concepts furnished us by philosophy could +express the relation we seek, but this relation appears with tolerable +clearness to result from experiment." + +The same analysis of facts tells us how the planes of consciousness, +of which I spoke just now, are arranged, the law by which they are +distributed, and the meaning which attaches to their disposition. Let us +neglect the intervening multiples, and look only at the extreme poles of +the series. + +We are inclined to imagine too abrupt a severance between gesture and +dream, between action and thought, between body and mind. There are not +two plane surfaces, without thickness or transition, placed one above +the other on different levels; it is by an imperceptible degradation of +increasing depth, and decreasing materiality, that we pass from one term +to the other. + +And the characteristics are continually changing in the course of the +transition. Thus our initial problem confronts us again, more acutely +than ever: are the forms of number and space equally suitable on all +planes of consciousness? + +Let us consider the most external of these planes of life, and one which +is in contact with the outer world, the one which receives directly the +impressions of external reality. We live as a rule on the surface of +ourselves, in the numerical and spatial dispersion of language and +gesture. Our deeper ego is covered as it were with a tough crust, +hardened in action: it is a skein of motionless and numerable habits, +side by side, and of distinct and solid things, with sharp outlines and +mechanical relations. And it is for the representation of the phenomena +which occur within this dead rind that space and number are valid. + +For we have to live, I mean live our common daily life, with our body, +with our customary mechanism rather than with our true depths. Our +attention is therefore most often directed by a natural inclination to +the practical worth and useful function of our internal states, to the +public object of which they are the sign, to the effect they produce +externally, to the gestures by which we express them in space. A +social average of individual modalities interests us more than the +incommunicable originality of our deeper life. The words of language +besides offer us so many symbolic centres round which crystallise groups +of motor mechanisms set up by habit, the only usual elements of our +internal determinations. Now, contact with society has rendered these +motor mechanisms practically identical in all men. Hence, whether it be +a question of sensation, feeling, or ideas, we have these neutral +dry and colourless residua, which spread lifeless over the surface of +ourselves, "like dead leaves on the water of a pond." ("Essay on the +Immediate Data," page 102.) + +Thus the progress we have lived falls into the rank of a thing that can +be handled. Space and number lay hold of it. And soon all that remains +of what was movement and life is combinations formed and annulled, and +forces mechanically composed in a whole of juxtaposed atoms, and to +represent this whole a collection of petrified concepts, manipulated in +dialectic like counters. + +Quite different appears the true inner reality, and quite different +are its profound characteristics. To begin with, it contains nothing +quantitative; the intensity of a psychological state is not a +magnitude, nor can it be measured. The "Essay on the Immediate Data of +Consciousness" begins with the proof of this leading statement. If it +is a question of a simple state, such as a sensation of light or weight, +the intensity is measured by a certain quality of shade which indicates +to us approximately, by an association of ideas and thanks to our +acquired experience, the magnitude of the objective cause from which it +proceeds. If, on the contrary, it is a question of a complex state, +such as those impressions of profound joy or sorrow which lay hold of +us entirely, invading and overwhelming us, what we call their intensity +expresses only the confused feeling of a qualitative progress, and +increasing wealth. "Take, for example, an obscure desire, which has +gradually become a profound passion. You will see that the feeble +intensity of this desire consisted first of all in the fact that it +seemed to you isolated and in a way foreign to all the rest of your +inner life. But little by little it penetrated a larger number of +psychic elements, dyeing them, so to speak, its own colour; and now +you find your point of view on things as a whole appears to you to have +changed. Is it not true that you become aware of a profound passion, +once it has taken root, by the fact that the same objects no longer +produce the same impression upon you? All your sensations, all your +ideas, appear to you refreshed by it; it is like a new childhood." (Loc. +cit., page 6.) + +There is here none of the homogeneity which is the property of +magnitude, and the necessary condition of measurement, giving a view of +the less in the bosom of the more. The element of number has vanished, +and with it numerical multiplicity extended in space. Our inner states +form a qualitative continuity; they are prolonged and blended into one +another; they are grouped in harmonies, each note of which contains an +echo of the whole; they are encircled by an innumerable degradation of +halos, which gradually colour the total content of consciousness; they +live each in the bosom of his fellow. + +"I am the scent of roses," were the words Condillac put in the mouth of +his statue; and these words translate the immediate truth exactly, as +soon as observation becomes naive and simple enough to attain pure fact. +In a passing breath I breathe my childhood; in the rustle of leaves, in +a ray of moonlight, I find an infinite series of reflections and dreams. +A thought, a feeling, an act, may reveal a complete soul. My ideas, +my sensations, are like me. How would such facts be possible, if the +multiple unity of the ego did not present the essential characteristic +of vibrating in its entirety in the depths of each of the parts descried +or rather determined in it by analysis? All physical determinations +envelop and imply each other reciprocally. And the fact that the soul +is thus present in its entirety in each of its acts, its feelings, +for example, or its ideas in its sensations, its recollections in its +percepts, its inclinations in its obvious states, is the justifying +principle of metaphors, the source of all poetry, the truth which +modern philosophy proclaims with more force every day under the name of +immanence of thought, the fact which explains our moral responsibility +with regard to our affections and our beliefs themselves; and finally, +it is the best of us, since it is this which ensures our being able +to surrender ourselves, genuinely and unreservedly, and this which +constitutes the real unity of our person. + +Let us push still further into the hidden retreat of the soul. Here we +are in these regions of twilight and dream, where our ego takes shape, +where the spring within us gushes up, in the warm secrecy of the +darkness which ushers our trembling being into birth. Distinctions fail +us. Words are useless now. We hear the wells of consciousness at their +mysterious task like an invisible shiver of running water through the +mossy shadow of the caves. I dissolve in the joy of becoming. I abandon +myself to the delight of being a pulsing reality. I no longer know +whether I see scents, breathe sounds, or smell colours. Do I love? Do I +think? The question has no longer a meaning for me. I am, in my complete +self, each of my attitudes, each of my changes. It is not my sight which +is indistinct or my attention which is idle. It is I who have resumed +contact with pure reality, whose essential movement admits no form of +number. He who thus makes the really "deep" and "inner" effort necessary +to becoming--were it only for an elusive moment--discovers, under the +simplest appearance, inexhaustible sources of unsuspected wealth; the +rhythm of his duration becomes amplified and refined; his acts become +more conscious; and in what seemed to him at first sudden severance or +instantaneous pulsation he discovers complex transitions imperceptibly +shaded off, musical transitions full of unexpected repetitions and +threaded movements. + +Thus, the deeper we go in consciousness, the less suitable become these +schemes of separation and fixity existing in spatial and numerical +forms. The inner world is that of pure quality. There is no measurable +homogeneity, no collection of atomically constructed elements. The +phenomena distinguished in it by analysis are not composing units, but +phases. And it is only when they reach the surface, when they come in +contact with the external world, when they are incarnated in language +or gesture, that the categories of matter become adapted to them. In +its true nature, reality appears as an uninterrupted flow, an impalpable +shiver of fluid changing tones, a perpetual flux of waves which ebb and +break and dissolve into one another without shock or jar. Everything is +ceaseless change; and the state which appears the most stable is already +change, since it continues and grows old. Constant quantities are +represented only by the materialisation of habit or by means of +practical symbols. And it is on this point that Mr Bergson rightly +insists. ("Creative Evolution", page 3.) + +"The apparent discontinuity of psychological life is due, then, to +the fact that our attention is concentrated on it in a series of +discontinuous acts; where there is only a gentle slope, we think we +see, when we follow the broken line of our attention, the steps of a +staircase. It is true that our psychological life is full of surprises. +A thousand incidents arise which seem to contrast with what precedes +them, and not to be connected with what follows. But the gap in their +appearances stands out against the continuous background on which they +are represented, and to which they owe the very intervals that separate +them; they are the drumbeats which break into the symphony at intervals. +Our attention is fixed upon them because they interest it more, but +each of them proceeds from the fluid mass of our entire psychological +existence. Each of them is only the brightest point in a moving zone +which understands all that we feel, think, wish; in fact, all that we +are at a given moment. It is this zone which really constitutes our +state. But we may observe that states defined in this way are not +distinct elements. They are an endless stream of mutual continuity." + +And do not think that perhaps such a description represents only or +principally our life of feeling. Reason and thought share the same +characteristic, as soon as we penetrate their living depth, whether it +be a question of creative invention or of those primordial judgments +which direct our activity. If they evidence greater stability, it is in +permanence of direction, because our past remains present to us. + +For we are endowed with memory, and that perhaps is, on the whole, our +most profound characteristic. It is by memory we enlarge ourselves and +draw continually upon the wealth of our treasuries. Hence comes the +completely original nature of the change which constitutes us. But it +is here that we must shake off familiar representations! Common-sense +cannot think in terms of movement. It forges a static conception of it, +and destroys it by arresting it under pretext of seeing it better. To +define movement as a series of positions, with a generating law, with a +time-table or correspondence sheet between places and times, is surely +a ready-made presentation. Are we not confusing the trajectory and its +performance, the points traversed and the traversing of the points, the +result of the genesis of the result; in short, the quantitative distance +over which the flight extends, and the qualitative flight which puts +this distance behind it? In this way the very mobility which is the +essence of movement vanishes. There is the same common mistake about +time. Analytic and synthetic thought can see in time only a string of +coincidences, each of them instantaneous, a logical series of relations. +It imagines the whole of it to be a graduated slide-rule, in which the +luminous point called the present is the geometrical index. + +Thus it gives form to time in space, "a kind of fourth dimension," +("Essay on the Immediate Data".) or at least it reduces it to nothing +more than an abstract scheme of succession, "a stream without bottom +or sides, flowing without determinable strength, in an indefinable +direction." ("Introduction to Metaphysics".) It requires time to be +homogeneous, and every homogeneous medium is space, "for as homogeneity +consists here in the absence of any quality, it is not clear how two +forms of homogeneity could be distinguished one from the other." ("Essay +on the Immediate Data", page 74.) + +Quite different appears real duration, the duration which is lived. +It is pure heterogeneity. It contains a thousand different degrees of +tension or relaxation, and its rhythm varies without end. The magic +silence of calm nights or the wild disorder of a tempest, the still joy +of ecstasy or the tumult of passion unchained, a steep climb towards +a difficult truth or a gentle descent from a luminous principle to +consequences which easily follow, a moral crisis or a shooting pain, +call up intuitions admitting no comparison with one another. We have +here no series of moments, but prolonged and interpenetrating phases; +their sequence is not a substitution of one point for another, but +rather resembles a musical resolution of harmony into harmony. And +of this ever-new melody which constitutes our inner life every moment +contains a resonance or an echo of past moments. "What are we really, +what is our character, except the condensation of the history which we +have lived since our birth, even before our birth, since we bring with +us our prenatal dispositions? Without doubt we think only with a small +part of our past; but it is with our complete past, including our +original bias of soul, that we desire, wish, and act." ("Creative +Evolution", pages 5-6.) This is what makes our duration irreversible, +and its novelty perpetual, for each of the states through which it +passes envelops the recollection of all past states. And thus we see, +in the end, how, for a being endowed with memory, "existence consists +in change, change in ripening, ripening in endless self-creation." +("Creative Evolution", page 8.) + +With this formula we face the capital problem in which psychology and +metaphysics meet, that of liberty. The solution given by Mr Bergson +marks one of the culminating points of his philosophy. It is from this +summit that he finds light thrown on the riddle of inner being. And it +is the centre where all the lines of his research converge. + +What is liberty? What must we understand by this word? Beware of the +answer you are going to give. Every definition, in the strict sense of +the term, will imply the determinist thesis in advance, since, under +pain of going round in a circle, it will be bound to express liberty +as a function of what it is not. Either psychological liberty is +an illusive appearance, or, if it is real, we can only grasp it by +intuition, not by analysis, in the light of an immediate feeling. For a +reality is verified, not constructed; and we are now or never in one +of those situations where the philosopher's task is to create some new +concept, instead of abiding by a combination of previous elements. + +Man is free, says common-sense, in so far as his action depends only on +himself. "We are free," says Mr Bergson, ("Essay on the Immediate Data +of Consciousness", page 131.) "when our acts proceed from our entire +personality, when they express it, when they exhibit that indefinable +resemblance to it which we find occasionally between the artist and his +work." That is all we need seek; two conceptions which are equivalent +to each other, two concordant formulae. It is true that this amounts to +determining the free act by its very originality, in the etymological +sense of the word: which is at bottom only another way of declaring it +incommensurable with every concept, and reluctant to be confined by any +definition. But, after all, is not that the only true immediate fact? + +That our spiritual life is genuine action, capable of independence, +initiative, and irreducible novelty, not mere result produced from +outside, not simple extension of external mechanism, that it is so much +ours as to constitute every moment, for him who can see, an essentially +incomparable and new invention, is exactly what represents for us the +name of liberty. Understood thus, and decidedly it is like this that +we must understand it, liberty is a profound thing: we seek it only in +those moments of high and solemn choice which come into our life, not +in the petty familiar actions which their very insignificance submits to +all surrounding influences, to every wandering breeze. Liberty is rare; +many live and die and have never known it. Liberty is a thing which +contains an infinite number of degrees and shades; it is measured by +our capacity for the inner life. Liberty is a thing which goes on in us +unceasingly: our liberty is potential rather than actual. And lastly, it +is a thing of duration, not of space and number, not the work of moments +or decrees. The free act is the act which has been long in preparing, +the act which is heavy with our whole history, and falls like a ripe +fruit from our past life. + +But how are we to establish positive verification of these views? How +are we to do away with the danger of illusion? The proof will in this +case result from a criticism of adverse theories, along with direct +observation of psychological reality freed from the deceptive forms +which warp the common perception of it. And it will here be an easy task +to resume Mr Bergson's reasoning in a few words. + +The first obstacle which confronts affirmation of our liberty comes +from physical determinism. Positive science, we are told, presents the +universe to us as an immense homogeneous transformation, maintaining +an exact equivalence between departure and arrival. How can we possibly +have after that the genuine creation which we require in the act we call +free? + +The answer is that the universality of the mechanism is at bottom only +a hypothesis which is still awaiting demonstration. On the one hand it +includes the parallelist conception which we have recognised as effete. +And on the other it is plain that it is not self-sufficient. At least it +requires that somewhere or other there should be a principle of position +giving once for all what will afterwards be maintained. In actual +fact, the course of phenomena displays three tendencies: a tendency to +conservation, beyond question; but also a tendency to collapse, as in +the diminution of energy; and a tendency to progress, as in biological +evolution. To make conservation the sole law of matter implies an +arbitrary decree, denoting only those aspects of reality which will +count for anything. By what right do we thus exclude, with vital effort, +even the feeling of liberty which in us is so vigorous? + +We might say, it is true, that our spiritual life, if it is not a simple +extension of external mechanism, yet proceeds according to an internal +mechanism equally severe, but of a different order. This would bring +us to the hypothesis of a kind of psychological mechanism; and in many +respects this seems to be the common-sense hypothesis. I need not +dwell upon it, after the numerous criticisms already made. Inner +reality--which does not admit number--is not a sequence of distinct +terms, allowing a disconnected waste of absolute causality. + +And the mechanism of which we dream has no true sense--for, after all, +it has a sense--except in relation to the superficial phenomena which +take place in our dead rind, in relation to the automaton which we are +in daily life. I am ready to admit that it explains our common actions, +but here it is our profound consciousness which is in question, not the +play of our materialised habits. + +Without insisting, then, too strongly on this mongrel conception, let +us pass to the direct examination of inner psychological reality. +Everything is ready for the conclusion. Our duration, which is +continually accumulating itself, and always introducing some irreducible +new factor, prevents any kind of state, even if superficially identical, +from repeating itself in depth. "We shall never again have the soul we +had this evening." Each of our moments remains essentially unique. It is +something new added to the surviving past; not only new, but unable to +be foreseen. + +For how can we speak of foresight which is not simple conjecture, how +can we conceive an absolute extrinsic determination, when the act in +birth only makes one with the finished sum of its conditions, when these +conditions are complete only on the threshold of the action beginning, +including the fresh and irreducible contribution added by its very date +in our history? We can only explain afterwards, we can only foresee when +it is too late, in retrospect, when the accomplished action has fallen +into the plan of matter. + +Thus our inner life is a work of enduring creation: of phases which +mature slowly, and conclude at long intervals the decisive moments of +emancipating discovery. Undoubtedly matter is there, under the forms of +habit, threatening us with automatism, seeking at every moment to devour +us, stealing a march on us whenever we forget. But matter represents in +us only the waste of existence, the mortal fall of weakened reality, the +swoon of the creative action falling back inert; while the depths of our +being still pulse with the liberty which, in its true function, employs +mechanism itself only as a means of action. + +Now, does not this conception make a singular exception of us in +nature, an empire within an empire? That is the question we have yet to +investigate. + + +II. + +We have just attempted to grasp what being is in ourselves; and we have +found that it is becoming, progress, and growth, that it is a creative +process which never ceases to labour incessantly; in a word, that it +is duration. Must we come to the same conclusion about external being, +about existence in general? + +Let us consider that external reality which is nearest us, our body. It +is known to us both externally by our perceptions and internally by our +affections. It is then a privileged case for our inquiry. In addition, +and by analogy, we shall at the same time study the other living bodies +which everyday induction shows us to be more or less like our own. What +are the distinctive characteristics of these new realities? Each of them +possesses a genuine individuality to a far greater degree than inorganic +objects; whilst the latter are hardly limited at all except in +relation to the needs of the former, and so do not constitute beings in +themselves, the former evidence a powerful internal unity which is only +further emphasised by their prodigious complication, and form wholes +with are naturally complete. These wholes are not collections of +juxtaposed parts: they are organisms; that is to say, systems of +connected functions, in which each detail implies the whole, and where +the various elements interpenetrate. These organisms change and modify +continually; we say of them not only that they are, but that they live; +and their life is mutability itself, a flight, a perpetual flux. This +uninterrupted flight cannot in any way be compared to a geometrical +movement; it is a rhythmic succession of phases, each of which contains +the resonance of all those which come before; each state lives on in +the state following; the life of the body is memory; the living being +accumulates its past, makes a snowball of itself, serves as an open +register for time, ripens, and grows old. Despite all resemblances, the +living body always remains, in some measure, an absolutely original and +unique invention, for there are not two specimens exactly alike; and, +among inert objects, it appears as the reservoir of indetermination, +the centre of spontaneity, contingence, and genuine action, as if in the +course of phenomena nothing really new could be produced except by its +agency. + +Such are the characteristic tendencies of life, such the aspects +which it presents to immediate observation. Whether spiritual activity +unconsciously presides over biological evolution, or whether it simply +prolongs it, we always find here and there the essential features of +duration. + +But I spoke just now of "individuality." Is it really one of the +distinctive marks of life? We know how difficult it is to define it +accurately. Nowhere, not even in man, is it fully realised; and there +are beings in existence in which it seems a complete illusion, though +every part of them reproduces their complete unity. + +True, but we are now dealing with biology, in which geometrical +precision is inadmissible, where reality is defined not so much by the +possession of certain characteristics as by its tendency to accentuate +them. It is as a tendency that individuality is more particularly +manifested; and if we look at it in this light, no one can deny that +it does constitute one of the fundamental tendencies of life. Only +the truth is that the tendency to individuality remains always and +everywhere counterbalanced, and therefore limited, by an opposing +tendency, the tendency to association, and above all to reproduction. +This necessitates a correction in our analysis. Nature, in many +respects, seems to take no interest in individuals. "Life appears to +be a current passing from one germ to another through the medium of a +developed organism." ("Creative Evolution", page 29.) + +It seems as if the organism played the part of a thoroughfare. What is +important is rather the continuity of progress of which the individuals +are only transitory phases. Between these phases again there are no +sharp severances; each phase resolves and melts imperceptibly into that +which follows. Is not the real problem of heredity to know how, and up +to what point, a new individual breaks away from the individuals which +produced it? Is not the real mystery of heredity the difference, not the +resemblance, occurring between one term and another? + +Whatever be its solution, all the individual phases mutually extend and +interpenetrate one another. There is a racial memory by which the past +is continually accumulated and preserved. Life's history is embodied +in its present. And that is really the ultimate reason of the perpetual +novelty which surprised us just now. The characteristics of biological +evolution are thus the same as those of human progress. Once again we +find the very stuff of reality in duration. "We must not then speak any +longer of life in general as an abstraction, or a mere heading under +which we write down all living beings." ("Creative Evolution", page 28.) +On the contrary, to it belongs the primordial function of reality. It +is a very real current transmitted from generation to generation, +organising and passing through bodies, without failing or becoming +exhausted in any one of them. + +We may, already, then, draw one conclusion: Reality, at bottom, is +becoming. But such a thesis runs counter to all our familiar ideas. +It is imperative that we should submit it to the test of critical +examination and positive verification. + +One system of metaphysics, I said some time ago, underlies common-sense, +animating and informing it. According to this system, which is the +inverse of that which we have just intimated, reality in its very depths +is fixity and permanence. This is the completely static conception which +sees in being exactly the opposite of becoming: we cannot become, it +seems to say, except in so far as we are not. It does not, however, mean +to deny movement. But it represents it as fluctuation round invariable +types, as a whirling but captive eddy. Every phenomenon appears to it as +a transformation which ends where it began, and the result is that the +world takes the form of an eternal equilibrium in which "nothing is +created, nothing destroyed." The idea does not need much forcing to end +in the old supposition of a cyclic return which restores everything to +its original conditions. Everything is thus conceived in astronomical +periods. All that is left of the universe henceforward is a whirl of +atoms in which nothing counts but certain fixed quantities translated by +our systems of equations; the rest has vanished "in algebraical smoke." +There is therefore nothing more or less in the effect than in the group +of causes; and the causal relation moves towards identity as towards its +asymptote. + +Such a view of nature is open to many objections, even if it were only +a question of inorganised matter. Simple physics already betoken the +insufficiency of a purely mechanic conception. The stream of phenomena +flows in an irreversible direction and obeys a determined rhythm. "If I +wish to prepare myself a glass of sugar and water, I may do what I like, +but I must wait for my sugar to melt." ("Creative Evolution", page +10.) Here are facts which pure mechanism does not take into account, +regarding as it does only statically conceived relations, and making +time into a measure only, something like a common denominator of +concrete successions, a certain number of coincidences from which all +true duration remains absent, which would remain unchanged even if the +world's history, instead of opening out in consecutive phases, were to +be unfolded before our eyes all at once like a fan. Do we not indeed +speak today of aging and atomic separation. If the quantity of energy +is preserved, at least its quality is continually deteriorating. By +the side of something which remains constant, the world also contains +something which is being used up, dissipated, exhausted, decomposed. + +Further still, a specimen of metal, in its molecular structure, +preserves an indelible trace of the treatment it has undergone; natural +philosophers tell us that there is a "memory of solids." These are all +very positive facts which pure mechanism passes over. In addition, +must we not first of all postulate what will afterwards be preserved or +deteriorated? Whence we get another aspect of things: that of genesis +and creation; and in reality we register the ascending effort of life as +a reality no less startling than mechanic inertia. + +Finally, we have a double movement of ascent and descent: such is what +life and matter appear to immediate observation. These two currents +meet each other, and grapple. It is the drama of evolution, of which +Mr Bergson once gave a masterly explanation, in stating the high place +which man fills in nature: + +"I cannot regard the general evolution and progress of life in the whole +of the organised world, the co-ordination and subordination of vital +functions to one another in the same living being, the relations which +psychology and physiology combined seem bound to establish between brain +activity and thought in man, without arriving at this conclusion, that +life is an immense effort attempted by thought to obtain of matter +something which matter does not wish to give it. Matter is inert; it is +the seat of necessity; it proceeds mechanically. It seems as if thought +seeks to profit by this mechanical inclination in matter to utilise it +for actions, and thus to convert all the creative energy it contains, at +least all that this energy possesses which admits of play and external +extraction, into contingent movements in space and events in time which +cannot be foreseen. With laborious research it piles up complications +to make liberty out of necessity, to compose for itself a matter so +subtile, and so mobile, that liberty, by a veritable physical paradox, +and thanks to an effort which cannot last long, succeeds in maintaining +its equilibrium on this very mobility. + +"But it is caught in the snare. The eddy on which it was poised seizes +and drags it down. It becomes prisoner of the mechanism it has set up. +Automatism lays hold of it, and life, inevitably forgetting the end +which it had determined, which was only to be a means in view of a +superior end, is entirely used up in an effort to preserve itself by +itself. From the humblest of organised beings to the higher vertebrates +which come immediately before man, we witness an attempt which is always +foiled and always resumed with more and more art. Man has triumphed; +with difficulty, it is true, and so incompletely that a moment's lapse +and inattention on his part surrender him to automatism again. But +he has triumphed..." ("Report of the French Philosophical Society", +meeting, 2nd May 1901.) + +And Mr Bergson adds in another place: ("Creative Evolution", pages +286-287.) "With man consciousness breaks the chain. In man and in man +only it obtains its freedom. The whole history of life, till man, had +been the history of an effort of consciousness to lift matter, and of +the more or less complete crushing of consciousness by matter falling +upon it again. The enterprise was paradoxical; if indeed we can speak +here, except paradoxically, of enterprise and effort. The task was to +take matter, which is necessity itself, and create an instrument of +liberty, construct a mechanical system to triumph over mechanism, to +employ the determinism of nature to pass through the meshes of the net +it had spread. But everywhere, except in man, consciousness let itself +be caught in the net of which it sought to traverse the meshes. It +remained taken in the mechanisms it had set up. The automatism which it +claimed to be drawing towards liberty enfolds it and drags it down. It +has not the strength to get away, because the energy with which it had +supplied itself for action is almost entirely employed in maintaining +the exceedingly subtile and essentially unstable equilibrium into which +it has brought matter. But man does not merely keep his machine going, +he succeeds in using it as it pleases him. + +"He owes it without doubt to the superiority of his brain, which allows +him to construct an unlimited number of motor mechanisms, to oppose new +habits to old time after time, and to master automatism by dividing +it against itself. He owes it to his language, which furnishes +consciousness with an immaterial body in which to become incarnate, thus +dispensing it from depending exclusively upon material bodies, the flux +of which would drag it down and soon engulf it. He owes it to social +life, which stores and preserves efforts as language stores thought, +thereby fixing a mean level to which individuals will rise with +ease, and which, by means of this initial impulse, prevents average +individuals from going to sleep and urges better people to rise higher. +But our brain, our society, and our language are only the varied outer +signs of one and the same internal superiority. Each after its fashion, +they tell us the unique and exceptional success which life has won at a +given moment of its evolution. They translate the difference in nature, +and not in degree only, which separates man from the rest of the animal +world. They let us see that if, at the end of the broad springboard from +which life took off, all others came down, finding the cord stretched +too high, man alone has leapt the obstacle." + +But man is not on that account isolated in nature: "As the smallest +grain of dust forms part of our entire solar system, and is involved +along with it in this undivided downward movement which is materiality +itself, so all organised beings from the humblest to the highest, from +the first origins of life to the times in which we live, and in all +places as at all times, do but demonstrate to our eyes a unique impulse +contrary to the movement of matter, and, in itself, indivisible. All +living beings are connected, and all yield to the same formidable +thrust. The animal is supported by the plant, man rides the animal, and +the whole of humanity in space and time is an immense army galloping by +the side of each of us, before and behind us, in a spirited charge which +can upset all resistance, and leap many obstacles, perhaps even death." +("Creative Evolution", pages 293-294.) + +We see with what broad and far-reaching conclusions the new philosophy +closes. In the forcible poetry of the pages just quoted its original +accent rings deep and pure. Some of its leading theses, moreover, are +noted here. But now we must discover the solid foundation of underlying +fact. + +Let us take first the fact of biological evolution. Why has it been +selected as the basis of the system? Is it really a fact, or is it only +a more or less conjectural and plausible theory? + +Notice in the first instance that the argument from evolution appears at +least as a weapon of co-ordination and research admitted in our day by +all philosophers, rejected only on the inspiration of preconceived ideas +which are completely unscientific; and that it succeeds in the task +allotted to it is doubtless already the proof that it responds to +some part of reality. And besides, we can go further. "The idea of +transformism is already contained in germ in the natural classification +of organised beings. The naturalist brings resembling organisms +together, divides the group into sub-groups, within which the +resemblance is still greater, and so on; throughout the operation, the +characteristics of the group appear as general themes upon which each of +the sub-groups executes its particular variations. + +"Now this is precisely the relation we find in the animal world and in +the vegetable world between that which produces and what is produced; on +the canvas bequeathed by the ancestor to his posterity, and possessed +in common by them, each broiders his original pattern." ("Creative +Evolution", pages 24-25.) + +We may, it is true, ask ourselves whether the genealogical method +permits results so far divergent as those presented to us by variety +of species. But embryology answers by showing us the highest and most +complex forms of life attained every day from very elementary forms; and +palaeontology, as it develops, allows us to witness the same spectacle +in the universal history of life, as if the succession of phases through +which the embryo passes were only a recollection and an epitome of the +complete past whence it has come. In addition, the phenomena of sudden +changes, recently observed, help us to understand more easily the +conception which obtrudes itself under so many heads, by diminishing the +importance of the apparent lacunae in genealogical continuity. Thus the +trend of all our experience is the same. + +Now there are some certainties which are only centres of concurrent +probabilities; there are some truths determined only by succession of +facts, but yet, by their intersection and convergence, sufficiently +determined. + +"That is how we measure the distance from an inaccessible point, by +regarding it time after time from the points to which we have access." +("Report of the French Philosophical Society", meeting, 2nd May 1901.) + +Is not that the case here? The affirmative seems all the more inevitable +inasmuch as the language of transformism is the only language known to +the biology of today. Evolution can, it is true, be transposed, but not +suppressed, since in any actual state there would always remain this +striking fact that the living forms met with as remains in geological +layers are ranged by the natural affinity of their characteristics in an +order of succession parallel to the succession of the ages. We are not +really then inventing a hypothesis in beginning with the affirmation of +evolution. But what we have to do is to appreciate its object. + +Evolution! We meet the word everywhere today. But how rare is the true +idea! Let us ask the astronomers who originate cosmogonical hypotheses, +and invent a primitive nebula, the natural philosophers who dream that +by the deterioration of energy and the dissipation of movement the +material world will obtain final rest in the inertia of a homogeneous +equilibrium, let us ask the biologists and psychologists who are enemies +of fixed species and inquisitive about ancestral history. What they +are anxious to discern in evolution is the persistent influence of an +initial cause once given, the attraction of a fixed end, a collection +of laws before the eternity of which change becomes negligible like +an appearance. Now he who thinks of the universe as a construction of +unchangeable relations denies by his method the evolution of which he +speaks, since he transforms it into a calculable effect necessarily +produced by a regulated play of generating conditions, since he +implicitly admits the illusive character of a becoming which adds +nothing to what is given. + +Finality itself, if he keeps the name, does not save him from his error, +for finality in his eyes is nothing but an efficient cause projected +into the future. So we see him fixing stages, marking periods, inserting +means, putting in milestones, continually destroying movement by halting +it before his gaze. And we all do the same by instinctive inclination. +Our concept of law, in its classical form, is not general: it represents +only the law of co-existence and of mechanism, the static relation +between two numerically disconnected terms; and in order to grasp +evolution we shall doubtless have to invent a new type of law: law in +duration, dynamic relation. For we can, and we must, conceive that there +is an evolution of natural laws; that these laws never define anything +but a momentary state of things; that they are in reality like streaks +determined in the flux of becoming by the meeting of contrary currents. +"Laws," says Monsieur Boutroux, "are the bed down which passes the +torrent of facts; they have dug it, though they follow it." Yet we +see the common theories of evolution appealing to the concepts of the +present to describe the past, forcing them back to prehistoric times, +and beyond the reasoning of today, placing at the beginning what is +only conceivable in the mind of the contemporary thinker; in a word, +imagining the same laws as always existing and always observed. This +is the method which Mr Bergson so justly criticises in Spencer: that of +reconstructing evolution with fragments of its product. + +If we wish thoroughly to grasp the reality of things, we must think +otherwise. Neither of these ready-made concepts, mechanism and finality, +is in place, because both of them imply the same postulate, viz. that +"everything is given," either at the beginning or at the end, whilst +evolution is nothing if it is not, on the contrary, "that which gives." +Let us take care not to confound evolution and development. There is +the stumbling-block of the usual transformist theories, and Mr Bergson +devotes to it a closely argued and singularly penetrating criticism, by +an example which he analyses in detail. ("Creative Evolution", chapter +i.) These theories either do not explain the birth of variation, and +limit themselves to an attempt to make us understand how, once born, +it becomes fixed, or else through need of adaptation they look for a +conception of its birth. But in both cases they fail. + +"The truth is that adaptation explains the windings of the movement of +evolution, but not the general directions of the movement, still less +the movement itself. The road which leads to the town is certainly +obliged to climb the hills and go down the slopes; it adapts itself to +the accidents of the ground; but the accidents of the ground are not +the cause of the road, any more than they have imparted its direction." +("Creative Evolution", pages 111-112.) + +At the bottom of all these errors there are only prejudices of practical +action. That is of course why every work appears to be an outside +construction beginning with previous elements; a phase of anticipation +followed by a phase of execution, calculation, and art, an effective +projecting cause, and a concerted goal, a mechanism which hurls to +a finality which aims. But the genuine explanation must be sought +elsewhere. And Mr Bergson makes this plain by two admirable analyses in +which he takes to pieces the common ideas of disorder and nothingness in +order to explain their meaning relative to our proceedings in industry +or language. + +Let us come back to facts, to immediate experience, and try to translate +its pure data simply. What are the characteristics of vital evolution? +First of all it is a dynamic continuity, a continuity of qualitative +progress; next, it is essentially a duration, an irreversible rhythm, a +work of inner maturation. By the memory inherent in it, the whole of its +past lives on and accumulates, the whole of its past remains for ever +present to it; which is tantamount to saying that it is experience. + +It is also an effort of perpetual invention, a generation of continual +novelty, indeducible and capable of defying all anticipation, as it +defies all repetition. We see it at its task of research in the groping +attempts exhibited by the long-sought genesis of species; we see it +triumphant in the originality of the least state of consciousness, of +the least body, of the tiniest cell, of which the infinity of times and +spaces does not offer two identical specimens. + +But the reef which lies in its way, and on which too often it founders, +is habit; habit would be a better and more powerful means of action if +it remained free, but in so far as it congeals and becomes materialised, +is a hindrance and an obstacle. First of all we have the average types +round which fluctuates an action which is decreasing and becoming +reduced in breadth. Then we have the residual organs, the proofs of dead +life, the encrustations from which the stream of consciousness gradually +ebbs; and finally we have the inert gear from which all real life has +disappeared, the masses of shipwrecked "things" rearing their spectral +outlines where once rolled the open sea of mind. The concept of +mechanism suits the phenomena which occur within the zone of wreckage, +on this shore of fixities and corpses. But life itself is rather +finality, if not in the anthropomorphic sense of premeditated design, +plan, or programme, at least in this sense, that it is a continually +renewed effort of growth and liberation. And it is from here we get Mr +Bergson's formulae: vital impetus and creative evolution. + +In this conception of being consciousness is everywhere, as original and +fundamental reality, always present in a myriad degrees of tension or +sleep, and under infinitely various rhythms. + +The vital impulse consists in a "demand for creation"; life in its +humblest stage already constitutes a spiritual activity; and its effort +sends out a current of ascending realisation which again determines the +counter-current of matter. Thus all reality is contained in a double +movement of ascent and descent. The first only, which translates an +inner work of creative maturation, is essentially durable; the second +might, in strictness, be almost instantaneous, like that of an escaping +spring; but the one imposes its rhythm on the other. From this point of +view mind and matter appear not as two things opposed to each other, as +static terms in fixed antithesis, but rather as two inverse directions +of movement; and, in certain respects, we must therefore speak not so +much of matter or mind as of spiritualisation and materialisation, the +latter resulting automatically from a simple interruption of the former. +"Consciousness or superconsciousness is the rocket, the extinguished +remains of which fall into matter." ("Creative Evolution", page 283.) + +What image of universal evolution is then suggested? Not a cascade of +deduction, nor a system of stationary pulsations, but a fountain which +spreads like a sheaf of corn and is partially arrested, or at least +hindered and delayed, by the falling spray. The fountain itself, the +reality which is created, is vital activity, of which spiritual activity +represents the highest form; and the spray which falls is the creative +act which falls, it is reality which is undone, it is matter and +inertia. In a word, the supreme law of genesis and fall, the double play +of which constitutes the universe, comprises a psychological formula. + +Everything begins in the manner of an invention, as the fruit of +duration and creative genius, by liberty, by pure mind; then comes +habit, a kind of body, as the body is already a group of habits; and +habit, taking root, being a work of consciousness which escapes it and +turns against it, is little by little degraded into mechanism in which +the soul is buried. + + +III. + +The main lines and general perspective of Mr Bergson's philosophy now +perhaps begin to appear. Certainly I am the first to feel how powerless +a slender resume really is to translate all its wealth and all its +strength. + +At least I wish I could have contributed to making its movement, and +what I may call its rhythm, clearer to perception. It is from the books +of the master himself that a more complete revelation must be sought. +And the few words which I am still going to add as conclusion are only +intended to sketch the principal consequences of the doctrine, and allow +its distant reach to be seen. + +The evolution of life would be a very simple and easy thing to +understand if it were fulfilled along one single trajectory and followed +a straight path. "But we are here dealing with a shell which has +immediately burst into fragments, which, being themselves species of +shells, have again burst into fragments destined to burst again, and so +on for a very long time." ("Creative Evolution", page 107.) It is, in +fact, the property of a tendency to develop itself in the expansion +which analyses it. As for the causes of this dispersion into kingdoms, +then into species, and finally into individuals, we can distinguish two +series: the resistance which matter opposes to the current of life sent +through it, and the explosive force--due to an unstable equilibrium of +tendencies--carried by the vital impulse within itself. Both unite +in making the thrust of life divide in more and more diverging but +complementary directions, each emphasising some distinct aspect of its +original wealth. Mr Bergson confines himself to the branches of the +first order--plant, animal, and man. And in the course of a minute and +searching discussion he shows us the characteristics of these lines in +the moods or qualities signified by the three words--torpor, instinct, +and intelligence: the vegetable kingdom constructing and storing +explosives which the animal expends, and man creating a nervous system +for himself which permits him to convert the expense into analysis. Let +us leave aside, as we must, the many suggestive views scattered lavishly +about, the many flashes of light which fall on all faces of the problem, +and let us confine ourselves to seeing how we get a theory of knowledge +from this doctrine. There we have yet another proof of the striking and +fertile originality of the new philosophy. + +More than one objection has been brought against Mr Bergson on this +head. That is quite natural: how could such a novelty be exactly +understood at once? It is also very desirable; it is the demands for +enlightenment which lead a doctrine to full consciousness of itself, +to precision and perfection. But we must be afraid of false objections, +those which arise from an obstinate translation of the new philosophy +into an old language steeped in a different metaphysic. With what has +Mr Bergson been reproached? With misunderstanding reason, with ruining +positive science, with being caught in the illusion of getting knowledge +otherwise than by intelligence, or of thinking otherwise than +by thought; in short, of falling into a vicious circle by making +intellectualism turn round upon itself. Not one of these reproaches has +any foundation. + +Let us begin by a few preliminary remarks to clear the ground. First of +all, there is one ridiculous objection which I quote only to record. +I mean that which suspects at the bottom of the theories which we are +going to discuss some dark background, some prepossession of irrational +mysticism. On the contrary, the truth is, we have here perhaps better +than anywhere, the spectacle of pure thought face to face with things. +But it is a complete thought, not thought reduced to some partial +functions, but sufficiently sure of its critical power to sacrifice none +of its resources. Here, we may say, really is the genuine positivism, +which reinstates all spiritual reality. It does not in any way lead to a +misunderstanding or depreciation of science. Even where contingency and +relativity are most visible in it, in the domain of inert matter, Mr +Bergson goes so far as to say that physical science touches an absolute. +It is true that it touches this absolute rather than sees it. +More particularly it perceives all its reactions on a system of +representative forms which it presents to it, and observes the effect +on the veil of theory with which it envelops it. At certain moments, +all the same, the veil becomes almost transparent. And in any case the +scholar's thought guesses and grazes reality in the curve drawn by the +succession of its increasing syntheses. But there are two orders of +science. Formerly it was from the mathematician that we borrowed the +ideal of evidence. Hence came the inclination always to seek the most +certain knowledge from the most abstract side. The temptation was to +make a kind of less severe and rigorous mathematics of biology itself. +Now if such a method suits the study of inert matter because in a manner +geometrical, so much so that our knowledge of it thus acquired is more +incomplete than inexact, this is not at all the case for the things of +life. Here, if we were to conduct scientific research always in the +same grooves and according to the same formulae, we should immediately +encounter symbolism and relativity. For life is progress, whilst the +geometrical method is commensurable only with things. Mr Bergson +is aware of this; and his rare merit has been to disengage specific +originality from biology, while elevating it to a typical and standard +science. + +But let us come to the heart of the problem. What was Kant's point of +departure in the theory of knowledge? In seeking to define the structure +of the mind according to the traces of itself which it must have left in +its works, and in proceeding by a reflective analysis ascending from +a fact to its conditions, he could only regard intelligence as a thing +made, a fixed system of categories and principles. + +Mr Bergson adopts an inverse attitude. Intelligence is a product of +evolution: we see it slowly and uninterruptedly constructed along a line +which rises through the vertebrates to man. Such a point of view is the +only one which conforms to the real nature of things, and the actual +conditions of reality; the more we think of it, the more we perceive +that the theory of knowledge and the theory of life are bound up with +one another. Now what do we conclude from this point of view? Life, +considered in the direction of "knowledge," evolves on two diverging +lines which at first are confused, then gradually separate, and finally +end in two opposed forms of organisation, intelligence and instinct. +Several contrary potentialities interpenetrated at their common source, +but of this source each of these kinds of activity preserves or rather +accentuates only one tendency; and it will be easy to mark its dual +character. + +Instinct is sympathy; it has no clear consciousness of itself; it does +not know how to reflect; it is hardly capable of varying its steps; but +it operates with incomparable certainty because it remains lodged in +things, in communion with their rhythm and with inner feeling of them. +The history of animals in this respect supplies many remarkable examples +which Mr Bergson analyses and discusses in detail. As much might be +said of the work which produces a living body, and of the effort which +presides over its growth, maintenance, and functions. Take a natural +philosopher who has long breathed the atmosphere of the laboratory, who +has by long practice acquired what we call "experience"; he has a +kind of intimate feeling for his instruments, their resources, their +movements, their working tendencies; he perceives them as extensions +of himself; he possesses them as groups of habitual actions, thus +discoursing by manipulations as easily and spontaneously as others +discourse in calculation. Doubtless that is only an image; but transpose +it and generalise it, and it will help you to understand the kind of +action which divines instinct. But intelligence is something quite +different. We are talking, of course, of the analytic and synthetic +intelligence which we use in our acts of current thought, which works +throughout our daily action and forms the fundamental thread of our +scientific operations. I need not here go back to the criticism of its +ordinary proceedings. But I must now note the service which suits them, +the domain in which they apply and are valid, and what they teach us +thereby about the meaning, reach, and natural task of intelligence. + +Whilst instinct vibrates in sympathetic harmony with life, it is about +inert matter that intelligence is granted; it is a rider to our faculty +of action; it triumphs in geometry; it feels at home among the objects +in which our industry finds its supports and its tools. In a word, +"our logic is primarily the logic of solids." (Preface to "Creative +Evolution".) But if we enter the vital order its incompetence is +manifestly apparent. + +It is very important that deduction should be so impotent in biology. +Still more impotent is it perhaps in matters of art or religion; whilst, +on the contrary, it works marvels so long as it has only to foresee +movements or transformations in bodies. What does this mean, if not +that intelligence and materiality go together, that language with its +analytic steps is regulated by the movements of matter? Philosophy +once again then must leave it behind, for the duty of philosophy is to +consider everything in its relation to life. + +Do not conclude, however, that the philosopher's duty is to renounce +intelligence, place it under tutelage, or abandon it to the blind +suggestions of feeling and will. It has not even the right to do so. +Instinct, with us who have evolved along the grooves of intelligence, +has remained too weak to be sufficient for us. Besides, intelligence +is the only path by which light could dawn in the bosom of primitive +darkness. But let us look at present reality in all its complexity, all +its wealth. Round intelligence itself exists a halo of instinct. This +halo represents the remains of the first nebulous vapour at the expense +of which intelligence was constituted like a brilliantly condensed +nucleus; and it is still today the atmosphere which gives it life, the +fringe of touch, and delicate probing, inspiring contact and divining +sympathy, which we see in play in the phenomena of discovery, as also in +the acts of that "attention to life," and that "sense of reality" which +is the soul of good sense, so widely distinct from common-sense. And +the peculiar task of the philosopher is to reabsorb intelligence in +instinct, or rather to reinstate instinct in intelligence; or better +still, to win back to the heart of intelligence all the initial +resources which it must have sacrificed. This is what is meant by return +to the primitive, and the immediate, to reality and life. This is the +meaning of intuition. + +Certainly the task is difficult. We at once suspect a vicious circle. +How can we go beyond intelligence except by intelligence itself? We are +apparently inside our thought, as incapable of coming out of it as is a +balloon of rising above the atmosphere. True, but on this reasoning we +could just as well prove that it is impossible for us to acquire any +new habit whatsoever, impossible for life to grow and go beyond itself +continually. + +We must avoid drawing false conclusions from the simile of the balloon. +The question here is to know what are the real limits of the atmosphere. +It is certain that the synthetic and critical intelligence, left to +its own strength, remains imprisoned in a circle from which there is no +escape. + +But action removes the barrier. If intelligence accepts the risk of +taking the leap into the phosphorescent fluid which bathes it, and to +which it is not altogether foreign, since it has broken off from it and +in it dwell the complementary powers of the understanding, intelligence +will soon become adapted and so will only be lost for a moment to +reappear greater, stronger, and of fuller content. It is action again +under the name of experience which removes the danger of illusion or +giddiness, it is action which verifies; by a practical demonstration, +by an effort of enduring maturation which tests the idea in intimate +contact with reality and judges it by its fruits. + +It always falls therefore to intelligence to pronounce the grand verdict +in the sense that only that can be called true which will finally +satisfy it; but we mean an intelligence duly enlarged and transformed +by the very effect of the action it has lived. Thus the objection of +"irrationalism" directed against the new philosophy falls to the ground. + +The objection of "non-morality" fares no better. But is has been made, +and people have thought fit to accuse Mr Bergson's work of being the too +calm production of an intelligence too indifferent, too coldly lucid, +too exclusively curious to see and understand, untroubled and unthrilled +by the universal drama of life, by the tragic reality of evil. On the +other hand, not without contradiction, the new philosophy has been +called "romantic," and people have tried to find in it the essential +traits of romanticism: its predilection for feeling and imagination, its +unique anxiety for vital intensity, its recognised right to all which +is to be, whence its radical inability to establish a hierarchy of moral +qualifications. Strange reproach! The system in question is not yet +presented to us as a finished system. Its author manifests a plain +desire to classify his problems. And he is certainly right in proceeding +so: there is a time for everything, and on occasion we must learn to be +just an eye focussed upon being. But that does not at all exclude the +possibility of future works, treating in due order of the problem of +human destiny, and perhaps even in the work so far completed we may +descry some attempts to bring this future within ken. + +But universal evolution, though creative, is not for all that quixotic +or anarchist. It forms a sequence. It is a becoming with direction, +undoubtedly due, not to the attraction of a clearly preconceived goal, +or the guidance of an outer law, but to the actual tendency of the +original thrust. In spite of the stationary eddies or momentary +backwashes we observe here and there, its stream moves in a definite +direction, ever swelling and broadening. For the spectator who regards +the general sweep of the current, evolution is growth. On the other +hand, he who thinks this growth now ended is under a simple delusion: +"The gates of the future stand wide open." ("Creative Evolution", page +114.) In the stage at present attained man is leading; he marks the +culminating point at which creation continues; in him, life has already +succeeded, at least up to a certain point; from him onwards it advances +with consciousness capable of reflection; is it not for that very reason +responsible for the result? Life, according to the new philosophy, is +a continual creation of what is new: new--be it well understood--in the +sense of growth and progress in relation to what has gone before. +Life, in a word, is mental travel, ascent in a path of growing +spiritualisation. Such at least is the intense desire, and such the +first tendency which launched and still inspires it. But it may faint, +halt, or travel down the hill. This is an undeniable fact; and once +recognised does it not awake in us the presentiment of a directing law +immanent in vital effort, a law doubtless not to be found in any code, +nor yet binding through the stern behest of mechanical necessity, but +a law which finds definition at every moment, and at every moment also +marks a direction of progress, being as it were the shifting tangent to +the curve of becoming? + +Let us did that according to the new philosophy the whole of our past +survives for ever in us, and by means of us results in action. It is +then literally true that our acts do to a certain extent involve +the whole universe, and its whole history: the act which we make it +accomplish will exist henceforward for ever, and will for ever tinge +universal duration with its indelible shade. Does not that imply an +imperious, urgent, solemn, and tragic problem of action? Nay, more; +memory makes a persistent reality of evil, as of good. Where are we to +find the means to abolish and reabsorb the evil? What in the individual +is called memory becomes tradition and joint responsibility in the race. + +On the other hand, a directing law is immanent in life, but in the +shape of an appeal to endless transcendence. In dealing with this future +transcendent to our daily life, with this further shore of present +experience, where are we to seek the inspiring strength? And is there +not ground for asking ourselves whether intuitions have not arisen here +and there in the course of history, lighting up the dark road of the +future for us with a prophetic ray of dawn? It is at this point that the +new philosophy would find place for the problem of religion. + +But this word "religion," which has not come once so far from Mr +Bergson's pen, coming now from mine, warns me that it is time to end. No +man today would be justified in foreseeing the conclusions to which the +doctrine of creative evolution will one day undoubtedly lead on this +point. More than any other, I must forget here what I myself may have +elsewhere tried to do in this order of ideas. But it was impossible +not to feel the approach of the temptation. Mr Bergson's work is +extraordinarily suggestive. His books, so measured in tone, so tranquil +in harmony, awaken in us a mystery of presentiment and imagination; they +reach the hidden retreats where the springs of consciousness well up. +Long after we have closed them we are shaken within; strangely moved, +we listen to the deepening echo, passing on and on. However valuable +already their explicit contents may be, they reach still further than +they aimed. It is impossible to tell what latent germs they foster. It +is impossible to guess what lies behind the boundless distance of the +horizons they expose. But this at least is sure: these books have verily +begun a new work in the history of human thought. + + + + +ADDITIONAL EXPLANATIONS + + + + +I. Mr Bergson's Work and the General Directions of Contemporary Thought. + +A broad survey of the new philosophy was bound to be somewhat rapid +and summary; and now that this is completed it will doubtless not be +superfluous to come back, on the same plan as before, to some more +important or more difficult individual points, and to examine by +themselves the most prominent centres on which we should focus the light +of our attention. Not that I intend to probe in minute detail the folds +and turns of a doctrine which admits of infinite development: how can I +claim to exhaust a work of such profound thought that the least passing +example employed takes its place as a particular study? Still less do +I wish to undertake a kind of analytic resume; no undertaking could be +less profitable than that of arranging paragraph headings to repeat too +briefly, and therefore obscurely, what a thinker has said without any +extravagance of language, yet with every requisite explanation. + +The critic's true task, as I understand it, in no way consists in +drawing up a table of contents strewn with qualifying notes. His task +is to read and enable others to read between the lines, between the +chapters, and between the successive works, what constitutes the dynamic +tie between them, all that the linear form of writing and language has +not allowed the author himself to elucidate. + +His task is, as far as possible, to master the accompaniment of +underlying thought which produced the resonant atmosphere of the +inquirer's intuition, the rhythm and toning of the image, resulting in +the shade of light which falls upon his vision. His task, in a word, +is to help understanding, and therefore to point out and anticipate the +misunderstandings to be feared. Now it seems to me that there are a few +points round which the errors of interpretation more naturally gather, +producing some astounding misconceptions of Mr Bergson's philosophy. It +is these points only that I propose to clear up. But at the same time I +shall use the opportunity to supply information about authorities, which +I have hitherto deliberately omitted, to avoid riddling with references +pages which were primarily intended to impart a general impression. + +Let us begin by glancing at the milieu of thought in which Mr Bergson's +philosophy must have had birth. For the last thirty years new currents +are traceable. In what direction do they go? And what distance have they +already gone? What, in short, are the intellectual characteristics of +our time? We must endeavour to distinguish the deeper tendencies, those +which herald and prepare and near future. + +One of the essential and frequently cited features of the generation +in which Taine and Renan were the most prominent leaders was the +passionate, enthusiastic, somewhat exclusive and intolerant cult of +positive science. This science, in its days of pride, was considered +unique, displayed on a plane by itself, always uniformly competent, +capable of gripping any object whatever with the same strength, and of +inserting it in the thread of one and the same unbroken connection. +The dream of that time, despite all verbal palliations, was a universal +science of mathematics: mathematics, of course, with their bare and +brutal rigour softened and shaded off, where feasible; if possible, +supple and sensitive; in ideal, delicate, buoyant, and judicious; but +mathematics governed from end to end by an equal necessity. Conceived as +the sole mistress of truth, this science was expected in days to come +to fulfil all the needs of man, and unreservedly to take the place of +ancient spiritual discipline. Genuine philosophy had had its day: +all metaphysics seemed deception and fantasy, a simple play of empty +formulae or puerile dreams, a mythical procession of abstraction and +phantom; religion itself paled before science, as poetry of the grey +morning before the splendour of the rising sun. + +However, after all this pride came the turn of humility, and humility of +the very lowest. This deified science, borne down in its hour of triumph +by too heavy a weight, had necessarily been recognised as powerless to +go beyond the order of relations, and radically incapable of telling +us the origin, end, and basis of things. It analysed the conditions of +phenomena, but was ill-suited ever to grasp any real cause, or any deep +essence. Further, it became the Unknowable, before which the human mind +could only halt in despair. And in this way destitution arose out of +ambition itself, since thought, after trusting too exclusively to its +geometrical strength, was compelled at the end of its effort to confess +itself beaten when confronted with the only questions to which no man +may ever be indifferent. + +This double attitude is no longer that of the contemporary generation. +The prestige of illusion has vanished. In the religion of science we see +now nothing but idolatry. The haughty affirmation of yesterday appears +today, not as expressing a positive fact or a result duly established, +but as bringing forward a thesis of perilous and unconscious +metaphysics. Let us go even further. If true intelligence is mental +expansion and aptitude for understanding widely different things, each +in its originality, to the same degree, we must say that the claim to +reduce reality to one only of its modes, to know it in one only of its +forms, is an unintelligent claim. That is, in brief formula, the +verdict of the present generation. Not, of course, that it in any +way misconceives or disdains the true value of science, whether as an +instrument of action for the conquest of nature, or as intelligible +language, allowing us to know our whereabouts in things and "talk" them. + +It is aware that in all circumstances positive methods have their +evidence to produce, and that, where they pronounce within the limits of +their power, nothing can stand against their verdict. But it considers +first of all that science was conceived of late under much too stiff and +narrow a form, under the obsession of too abstract a mathematical +ideal which corresponds to one aspect of reality only, and that +the shallowest. And it considers afterwards that science, even when +broadened and made flexible, being concerned only with what is, with +fact and datum, remains radically powerless to solve the problem of +human life. Nowhere does science penetrate to the very depth of things, +and there is nothing in the world but "things." + +Experience has shown where the dream of universal mathematics leads us. +Number is driven to the heart of phenomena and nature dissected with +this delicate scalpel. Speaking in more general terms, we adopt spatial +relation as the perfect example of intelligible relation. I do not wish +to deny the use of such a method now and again, the services it may +render, or the beauty of construction peculiar to the systems it +inspires. But we must see what price we pay for these advantages. Do +we choose geometry for an informing and regulating science? The more +we advance towards the concrete and the living, the more we feel the +necessity of altering the pure mathematical type. The sciences, as they +get further from inert matter, unless they agree to reform, pale and +weaken; they become vague, impotent, anaemic; they touch little but +the trite surface of their object, the body, not the soul; in them +symbolism, artifice, and relativity become increasingly evident; at +length, arbitrary and conventional elements crop up and devour them. In +a word, the claim to treat the living as inert matter conduces to the +misconception in life of life itself, and the retention of nothing but +the material waste. + +This experience furnishes us with a lesson. There is not so much one +science as several sciences, each distinguished by an autonomous method, +and divided into two great kingdoms. + +Let us therefore from the outset follow Mr Bergson in tracing a very +sharp line of demarcation between the inert and the living. Two orders +of knowledge will thereby become separate, one in which the frames of +geometrical understanding are in place, the other where new means and a +new attitude are required. The essential task of the present hour will +now appear to us in a precise light; it will henceforward consist, +without any disregard of a glorious past, in an effort to found as +specifically distinct methods of instruction those sciences which take +for objects the successive moments of life in its different degrees, +biology, psychology, sociology;--then in an effort to reconstruct, +setting out from these new sciences and according to their spirit, the +like of what ancient philosophy had attempted, setting out from geometry +and mechanics. By so doing we shall succeed in throwing knowledge open +to receive all the wealth of reality, while at the same time we shall +reinstate the sense of mystery and the thrill of higher anxieties. +A further result will be that the phantom of the Unknowable will be +exorcised, since it no longer represents anything but the relative and +momentary limit of each method, the portion of being which escapes its +partial grip. + +This is one of the first controlling ideas of the contemporary +generation. Others result from it. More particularly, it is for the same +body of motives, in the same sense, and with the same restrictions, that +we distrust intellectualism; I mean the tendency to live uniquely by +intelligence, to think as if the whole of thought consisted in analytic, +clear and reasoning understanding. + +Once again, it is not a question of some blind abandonment to sentiment, +imagination, or will, nor do we claim to restrict the legitimate rights +of intellectuality in judgment. But around critical reason there is a +quickening atmosphere in which dwell the powers of intuition, there is a +half-light of gradual tones in which insertion into reality is effected. +If by rationalism we mean the attitude which consists in cabining +ourselves within the zone of geometrical light in which language +evolves, we must admit that rationalism supposes something other than +itself, that it hangs suspended by a generating act which escapes it. + +The method therefore which we seek to employ everywhere today is +experience; but complete experience, anxious to neglect no aspect of +being nor any resource of mind; shaded experience, not extending on the +surface only, in a homogeneous and uniform manner; on the contrary, +an experience distributed in depth over multiple planes, adopting a +thousand different forms to adapt itself to the different kinds of +problems; in short, a creative and informing experience, a veritable +genesis, a genuine action of thought, a work and movement of life by +which the guiding principles, forms of intelligibility, and criteria of +verification obtain birth and stability in habits. And here again it +is by borrowing Mr Bergson's own formula from him that we shall most +accurately describe the new spirit. + +That the attitude and fundamental procedure of this new spirit are in +no way a return to scepticism or a reaction against thought cannot +be better demonstrated than by this resurrection of metaphysics, this +renaissance of idealism, which is certainly one of the most distinctive +features of our epoch. Undoubtedly philosophy in France has never known +so prosperous and so pregnant a moment. Notwithstanding, it is not +a return to the old dreams of dialectic construction. Everything is +regarded from the point of view of life, and there is a tendency more +and more to recognise the primacy of spiritual activity. But we wish to +understand and employ this activity and this life in all its wealth, +in all its degrees, and by all its functions: we wish to think with the +whole of thought, and go to the truth with the whole of our soul; and +the reason of which we recognise the sovereign weight is reason laden +with its complete past history. + +And what is that, really, but realism? By realism I mean the gift of +ourselves to reality, the work of concrete realisation, the effort to +convert every idea into action, to regulate the idea by the action as +much as the action by the idea, to live what we think and think what we +live. But that is positivism, you will say; certainly it is positivism. +But how changed! Far from considering as positive only that which can +be an object of sensation or calculation, we begin by greeting the great +spiritual realities with this title. The deep and living aspiration of +our day is in everything to seek the soul, the soul which specifies and +quickens, seek it by an effort towards the revealing sympathy which +is genuine intelligence, seek it in the concrete, without dissolving +thought in dreams or language, without losing contact with the body or +critical control, seek it, in fine, as the most real and genuine part of +being. + +Hence its return to questions which were lately declared out of date +and closed; hence its taste for problems of aesthetics and morality, +its close siege of social and religious problems, its homesickness for a +faith harmonising the powers of action and the powers of thought; hence +its restless desire to hark back to tradition and discipline. + +A new philosophy was required to answer this new way of looking at +things. Already, in 1867, Ravaisson in his celebrated "Report" wrote +these prophetic lines: "Many signs permit us to foresee in the near +future a philosophical epoch of which the general character will be the +predominance of what may be called spiritualist realism or positivism, +having as generating principle the consciousness which the mind has in +itself of an existence recognised as being the source and support of +every other existence, being none other than its action." + +This prophetic view was further commented on in a work where Mr Bergson +speaks with just praise of this shrewd and penetrating sense of what was +coming: "What could be bolder or more novel than to come and predict +to the physicists that the inert will be explained by the living, to +biologists that life will only be understood by thought, to philosophers +that generalities are not philosophic?" ("Notice on the Life and Works +of M. Felix Ravaisson-Molien", in the Reports of the Academy of Moral +and Political Sciences, 1904.) + +But let us give each his due. What Ravaisson had only anticipated Mr +Bergson himself accomplishes, with a precision which gives body to the +impalpable and floating breath of first inspiration, with a depth which +renews both proof and theses alike, with a creative originality which +prevents the critic who is anxious for justice and precision from +insisting on any researches establishing connection of thought. + +One reason for the popularity today enjoyed by this new philosophy is +doubtless to be found in the very tendencies of the milieu in which +it is produced and in the aspirations which work it. But, after once +remarking these desires, we must further not forget that Mr Bergson has +contributed more than anyone else to awaken them, determine them, +and make them become conscious of themselves. Let us therefore try to +understand in itself and by itself the work of genius of which just now +we were seeking the dawning gleams. What synthetic formula will be best +able to tell us the essential direction of its movement? I will borrow +it from the author himself: "It seems to me," he writes, ("Philosophic +Intuition" in the "Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale", November 1911.) +"that metaphysics are trying at this moment to simplify themselves, to +come nearer to life." Every philosophy tends to become incarnate in a +system which constitutes for it a kind of body of analysis. + +Regarded literally, it appears to be an infinite complication, a complex +construction with a thousand alcoves of high architecture, "in which +measures have been taken to provide ample lodging for all problems." +(Ibid.) Do not let us be deceived by this appearance: it signifies only +that language is incommensurable with thought, that speech admits of +endless multiplication in approximations incapable of exhausting their +object. But before constructing such a body for itself, all philosophy +is a soul, a mind, and begins with the simple unity of a generating +intuition. Here is the fitting point at which to see its essence; this +is what determines it much better than its conceptual expression, which +is always contingent and incomplete. "A philosophy worthy of the name +has never said but one thing; and that thing it has rather attempted to +say than actually said. And it has only said one thing, because it has +only seen one point: and that was not so much vision as contact; this +contact supplied an impulse, this impulse a movement, and if this +movement, which is a kind of vortex of a certain particular form, is +only visible to our eyes by what it has picked up on its path, it is no +less true that other dust might equally well have been raised, and that +it would still have been the same vortex." ("Philosophic Intuition" in +the "Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale", November 1911.) + +Hence comes the fact that a philosophy is at bottom much more +independent of its natal environment than one might at first suppose; +hence also the fact that ancient philosophies, though apparently +relative to a science which is out of date, remain always living and +worthy of study. + +What, then, is the original intuition of Mr Bergson's philosophy, the +creative intuition whence it comes forth? We cannot hesitate long: it +is the intuition of duration. That is the perspective centre to which we +must indefatigably return; that is the principle which we must labour +to expose in its full light; and that is, finally, the source of light +which will illumine us. Now a philosophy is not only an expressed +intuition; it is further and above all an acting intuition, gradually +determined and realised, and tested by its explanatory works; and it is +by its fruits that we can understand and judge it. Hence the review upon +which we are entering. + + + + +II. Immediacy. + +The philosopher's first duty is in clear language to declare his +starting-point, with what a mathematician would call the "tangent to +the origin" of the path along which he is travelling, as afterwards +the critic's first duty is to describe this initial attitude. I have +therefore first of all to indicate the directing idea of the new +philosophy. But it is not a question of extracting a quintessence, or of +fencing the soul of doctrine within a few summary formulae. A system +is not to be resumed in a phrase, for every proposition isolated is +a proposition falsified. I wish merely to elucidate the methodical +principle which inspires the beginning of Mr Bergson's philosophy. + +To philosophy itself falls the task and belongs the right to define +itself gradually as it becomes constituted. On this point, an +anticipation of experience seems hardly possible; here, as elsewhere, +the finding of a synthetic formula is a final rather than preliminary +question. However, we are obliged from the outset of the work to +determine the programme of the inquiry, if only to direct our research. +It is the same on the threshold of every science. There, it is true, the +analogy ceases. For in any science properly speaking the determination +of beginning consists in the indication of an object, and a matter, and +beyond that, to each new object a new science reciprocally corresponds, +the existence of the one involving the legitimacy of the other. But if +the various sciences--I mean the positive sciences--divide different +objects thus between them, philosophy cannot, in its turn, come forward +as a particular science, having a distinct object, the designation of +which would be sufficient to characterise and circumscribe it. Such was +always the traditional conception: such will ours continue to be. For, +as a matter of fact, every object has a philosophy and all matter can +be regarded philosophically. In short, philosophy is chiefly a way of +perceiving and thinking, an attitude and a proceeding: the peculiar and +specific in it is more an intuition than a content, a spirit rather than +a domain. + +What, then, is the characteristic function of philosophy, at least its +initial function, that which marks its opening? + +To criticise the works of knowledge spontaneously effected; that is to +say, to scrutinise their direction, reach, and conditions: that is today +the unanimous answer of philosophers when questioned about the goal of +their labours. In other terms, what they study is not so much such +and such a particular "thing" as the relation of mind to each of the +realities to be studied. Their object, if we must employ the word, is +knowledge itself, it is the act of knowing regarded from the point of +view of its meaning and value. Philosophy thus appears as a new "order" +of knowledge, co-extensive with what is knowable, as a kind of knowledge +of the second degree, in which it is less a question of learning than +of understanding, in which we aim at progressing in depth rather than in +extent; not effort to extend the quantity of knowledge, but reflection +on the quality of this knowledge. Spontaneous thought--vulgar or +scientific--is a direct, simple, and practical thought turned towards +things and partial to useful results; seeking what is formulable rather +than what is true, or at least so fond of formulae which can be handled, +manipulated, or transmitted, that it is always tempted to see the truth +in them; a thought which, moreover, sets out from more or less unguarded +postulates, abandons itself to the motive impulses of habits contracted, +and goes straight on indefinitely without self-examination. Philosophy, +on the contrary, desires to be thought about thought, thought retracing +its life and work, knowledge labouring to know itself, fact which +aspires to fact about itself, mental effort to become free, to become +entirely transparent and luminous in its own eyes, and, if need be, to +effect self-reform by dissipating its natural illusions. What we have +before our eyes then are the initial postulates themselves, the +first spontaneous thoughts, the obscure origins of reason; and we are +proceeding towards a point of departure rather than arrival. + +The new philosophy does not refuse to carry out this first critical +task; but it carries it out in its own way after determining more +precisely the real conditions of the problem. At the hour when +methodical research begins, the philosopher's mind is not clean-swept; +and it would be chimerical to wish to place oneself from the beginning, +by some act of transcendence, outside common thought. This thought +cannot be inspected and judged from outside. It constitutes, whether we +wish it or no, the sole concrete and positive point of departure. Let us +add that common-sense constitutes also our sole point of insertion into +reality. It can only then be a question of purifying it, not in any way +of replacing it. But we must distinguish in it what is pure fact, and +what is ulterior arrangement, in order to see what are the problems +which really are presented, and what are, on the contrary, the false +problems, the illusory problems, those which relate only to our +artifices of language. + +The search for facts is then the first necessary moment of all +philosophy. + +But common thought comes before us at the outset as a piece of very +composite alluvial ground. It is a beginning of positive science, and +also a residue of all philosophical opinions which have had some +vogue. That, however, is not its primary basis. Primum vivere, deinde +philosophari, says the proverb. In certain respects, "speculation is a +luxury, whilst action is a necessity." ("Creative Evolution", page 47.) +But "life requires us to apprehend things in the relation they have +to our needs." ("Laughter", page 154.) Hence comes the fundamental +utilitarianism of common-sense. Therefore if we wish to define it in +itself and for itself, and no longer as a first approximation of +such and such a system of metaphysics, it appears to us no longer as +rudimentary science and philosophy, but as an organisation of thought in +view of practical life. Thus it is that outside all speculative opinion +it is effectively lived by all. Its proper language, we may say, is the +language of customary perception and mechanical fabrication, therefore +a language relative to action, made to express action, modelled upon +action, translating things by the relations they maintain to our action; +I mean our corporal and synthetic action, which very evidently implies +thought, since it is a question of the action of a reasonable being, but +which thus contains a thought which is itself eminently practical. + +However, we are here regarding common-sense considered as a source of +fact. Its utilitarianism then becomes a kind of spontaneous metaphysics +from which we must detach ourselves. But is it not the very task of +positive science to execute this work of purification? Nothing of the +kind, despite appearances and despite intentions. Let us examine more +closely. The general categories of common thought, according to Mr +Bergson, ("Philosophic Intuition" in the "Metaphysical and Moral +Review", November 1911, page 825.) remain those of science; the main +roads traced by our senses through the continuity of reality are still +those along which science will pass; perception is an infant science +and science an adult perception; so much so that customary knowledge and +scientific knowledge, both of them destined to prepare our action upon +things, are of necessity two visions of the same kind, though of unequal +precision and reach. It does not follow that science does not practise +a certain disinterestedness as far as immediate mechanical utility is +concerned; it does not follow that it has no value as knowledge. But it +does not set itself genuinely free from the habits contracted in common +experience, and to inform its research it preserves the postulates of +common-sense; so that it always grasps things by their "actable" side, +by their point of contact with our faculty for action, under the forms +by which we handle them conceptually or practically, and all it attains +of reality is that by which nature is a possible object of language or +industry. + +Let us turn now towards another aspect of natural thought, to +discover in it the germ of the necessary criticism. By the side of +"common-sense," which is the first rough-draft of positive science, +there is "good sense," which differs from it profoundly, and marks the +beginning of what we shall later on call philosophic intuition. (Cf. an +address on "Good Sense and Classical Studies", delivered by Mr Bergson +at the Concours general prize distribution, 30th July 1895.) It is a +sense of what is real, concrete, original, living, an art of equilibrium +and precision, a fine touch for complexities, continually feeling like +the antennae of some insects. It contains a certain distrust of the +logical faculty in respect of itself; it wages incessant war upon +intellectual automatism, upon ready-made ideas and linear deduction; +above all, it is anxious to locate and to weigh, without any oversights; +it arrests the development of every principle and every method at the +precise point where too brutal an application would offend the delicacy +of reality; at every moment it collects the whole of our experience and +organises it in view of the present. It is, in a word, thought which +keeps its freedom, activity which remains awake, suppleness of +attitude, attention to life, an ever-renewed adjustment to suit ever-new +situations. + +Its revealing virtue is derived from this moving contact with fact, and +this living effort of sympathy. This is what we must tend to transpose +from the practical to the speculative order. + +What, then, will be for us the beginning of philosophy? After taking +cognisance of common utilitarianism, and to emerge from the relativity +in which it buries us, we seek a departure-point, a criterion, something +which decides the raising of inquiry. Where are we to find such a +principle, except in the very action of thought; I mean, this time, its +action of profound life independent of all practical aim? We shall thus +only be imitating the example of Descartes when solving the problem +of temporary doubt. What we shall term return to the immediate, +the primitive, the pure fact, will be the taking of each perception +considered as an act lived, a coloured moment of the Cogito, and this +will be for us a criterion and departure-point. + +Let us specify this point. Immediate data or primitive data or pure data +are apprehended by us under forms of disinterested action; I mean that +they are first of all lived rather than conceived, that before becoming +material for science, they appear as moments of life; in brief, that +perception of them precedes their use. + +It is at this stage previous to language that we are by these pure data +in intimate communion with reality itself, and the whole of our critical +task is to return to them through a regressive analysis, the goal +of which is gradually to make our clear intelligence equal to our +primordial intuition. The latter already constitutes a thought, a +preconceptual thought which is the intrinsic light of action, which is +action itself so far as it is luminous. Thus there is no question here +of restricting in any degree the part played by thought, but only of +distinguishing between the perceptive and theoretic functions of mind. + +What is "the image" of which Mr Bergson speaks at the beginning of +"Matter and Mind" except, when grasped in its first movement, the flash +of conscious existence "in which the act of knowledge coincides with +the generating act of reality"? ("Report of the French Philosophical +Society", philosophical vocabulary, article "Immediate".) + +Let us forget all philosophical controversies about realism and +idealism; let us try to reconstruct for ourselves a simplicity, a +virginal and candid glance, freeing us from the habits contracted in +the course of practical life. These then are our "images": not things +presented externally, nor states felt internally, not portraits of +exterior beings nor projections of internal moods, but appearances, in +the etymological sense of the word, appearances lived simply, without +our being distinguished from them, as yet neither subjective nor +objective, marking a moment of consciousness previous to the work of +reflection, from which proceeds the duality of subject and object. And +such also, in every order, appear the "immediate feelings"; as action in +birth, previous to language. (Cf. "Matter and Memory", Foreword to the +7th edition.) + +Why depart from the immediate thus conceived as action and life? Because +it is quite impossible to do otherwise, for every initial fact can +be only such a pulsation of consciousness in its lived act, and the +fundamental and primitive direction of the least word, were it in an +enunciation of a problem or a doubt, can only be such a direction of +life and action. And we must certainly accord to this immediacy a value +of absolute knowledge, since it realises the coincidence of being and +knowledge. + +But let us not think that the perception of immediacy is simple passive +perception, that it is sufficient to open our eyes to obtain it, today +when our utilitarian education is completed and has passed into the +state of habit. There is a difference between common experience and +the initial action of life; the first is a practical limitation of +the second. Hence it follows that a previous criticism is necessary to +return from one to the other, a criticism always in activity, always +open as a way of progressive investigation, always ready for the +reiteration and the renewal of effort. + +In this task of purification there is doubtless always to be feared an +illusion of remaining in the primitive stage. By what criteria, by what +signs can we recognise that we have touched the goal? Pure fact is +shown to be such on the one hand because it remains independent of all +theoretical symbolism, because the critique of language allows it to +exist thus as an indissoluble residue, because we are unable not to +"live" it, even when we free ourselves from the anxiety of utility; on +the other hand, because it dominates all systems, and imposes itself +equally upon them all as the common source from which they derive by +diverging analyses, and in which they become reconciled. Assuredly, +to attain it, to extricate it, we must appeal to the revelations of +science, to the exercise of deliberate thought. But this employment of +analysis against analysis does not in any way constitute a circle, for +it tends only to destroy prejudices which have become unconscious: it is +a simple artifice destined to break off habits and to scatter illusions +by changing the points of view. Once set free, once again become capable +of direct and simple view, what we accept as fact is what bears no trace +of synthetic elaboration. It is true that here a last objection presents +itself: how shall we think this limit, purely given, to any degree at +all in fact, if it must precede all language? + +The answer is easy. Why speak thus of limit? This word has two senses: +at one time it designates a last term in a series of approximations, +and at another a certain internal character of convergence, a certain +quality of progression. + +Now, it is the second sense only which suits the case before us. +Immediacy contains no matter statically defined, and no thing. The +notion of fact is quite relative. What is fact in one case may become +construction in another. For example, the percepts of common experience +are facts for the physicist, and constructions for the philosopher; the +same applies to a table of numerical results, for the scholar who is +trying to establish a theory, or for the observer and the psychologist. +We may then conceive a series in which each term is fact in relation +to those which follow it, and constructed in relation to those which +precede it. The expression "primitive fact" then determines not so +much a final object as a direction of thought, a movement of critical +retrogression, a journey from the most to the least elaborate, and +the "contact with pure immediacy" is only the effort, more and more +prolonged, to convert the elements of experience into real and profound +action. + + + + +III. Theory of Perception. + +Of what the work of return to immediacy consists, and how the intuition +which it calls up reveals absolute fact, we shall see by an example, if +we study more closely a capital point of Mr Bergson's philosophy, the +theory of external perception. + +If the act of perceiving realises the lived communion of the subject +and object in the image, we must admit that here we have the perfect +knowledge which we wish to obtain always: we resign ourselves to +conception only for want of perception, and our ideal is to convert all +conception into perception. Doubtless we might define philosophy by this +same ideal, as an effort to expand our perceptive power until we render +it capable of grasping all the wealth and all the depth of reality at a +single glance. Too true it is that such an ideal remains inaccessible to +us. Something, however, is given us already in aesthetic intuition. Mr +Bergson has pointed it out in some admirable pages, ("Laughter", +pages 153-161.) and has explained to us also how philosophy pursues an +analogous end. (First lecture on "The Perception of Change", delivered +at Oxford, 26th May 1911.) + +But philosophy must be conceived as an art implying science and +criticism, all experience and all reason. It is when we look at +metaphysics in this way that they become a positive order of veritable +knowledge. Kant has conclusively established that what lies beyond +language can only be attained by direct vision, not by dialectic +progress. His mistake was that he afterwards believed such a vision for +ever impossible; and whence did this mistake arise, if not from the fact +that, for his new vision, he exacted intuitive faculties quite different +from those at man's disposal. Here again the artist will be our +example and model. He appeals to no transcendent sense, but detaches +common-sense from its utilitarian prejudices. Let us do the same: we +shall obtain a similar result without lying ourselves open to Kant's +objections. This work is everywhere possible, and it is, par excellence, +the work of philosophy: let us try then to sketch it in relation to the +perception of matter. + +We must distinguish two senses of the word "perception." This word means +first of all simple apprehension of immediacy, grasp of primitive fact. +When we use it in this sense, we will agree to say pure perception. +It is perhaps in place to see in it nothing but a limit which concrete +experience never presents unmixed, a direction of research rather than +the possession of a thing. + +However that may be, the first sense is the fundamental sense, and what +it designates must be at the root of all ordinary perception; I mean, of +every mental operation which results in the construction of a percept: +a term formed by analogy with concept, representing the result of a +complex work of analysis and synthesis, with judgment from externals. +We live the images in an act of pure perception, whilst the objects of +ordinary perception are, for example, the bodies of which we speak in +common language. + +With regard to the relation of the two senses which we have just +distinguished, common opinion seems very precise. It might be thus +resumed: at the point of departure we have simple sensations, similar to +qualitative atoms (this is the part of pure perception), and afterwards +their arrangement into connected systems, which are percepts. + +But criticism does not authorise this manner of looking at it. Nowhere +does knowledge begin by separate elements. Such elements are always a +product of analysis. So there is a problem to solve to regain the +basis of pure perception which is hidden and obscured by our familiar +percepts. + +Do not suppose that the solution of this problem is easy. One method +only is of any use: to plunge into reality, to become immersed in it, in +a long-pursued effort to assimilate all the records of common-sense and +positive science. "For we do not obtain an intuition of reality, that is +to say, an intellectual sympathy with its inmost content, unless we +have gained its confidence by long companionship with its superficial +manifestations. And it is not a question merely of assimilating the +leading facts; we must accumulate and melt them down into such an +enormous mass that we are sure, in this fusion, of neutralising in one +another all the preconceived and premature ideas which observers may +have unconsciously allowed to form the sediment of their observations. +Thus, and only thus, is crude materiality to be disengaged from known +facts." ("Introduction to Metaphysics" in the "Metaphysical and Moral +Review", January 1903. For the correct interpretation of this passage +("intellectual sympathy") it must not be forgotten that before "Creative +Evolution", Mr Bergson employed the word "intelligence" in a wider +acceptation, more akin to that commonly received.) + +A directing principle controls this work and reintroduces order and +convergence, after dispensing with them at the outset; viz. that, +contrary to common opinion, perception as practised in the course of +daily life, "natural" perception does not aim at a goal of disinterested +knowledge, but one of practical utility, or rather, if it is knowledge, +it is only knowledge elaborated in view of action and speech. + +Need we repeat here the proofs by which we have already established in +the most positive manner that such is really the meaning of ordinary +perception, the underlying reason which causes it to take the place of +pure perception? We perceive by habit only what is useful to us, what +interests us practically; very often, too, we think we are perceiving +when we are merely inferring, as for example when we seem to see a +distance in depth, a succession of planes, of which in reality we judge +by differences of colouring or relief. + +Our senses supplement one another. A slow education has gradually taught +us to co-ordinate their impressions, especially those of touch to those +of vision. (H. Bergson, "Note on the Psychological Origins of Our Belief +in the Law of Causality". Vol. i. of the "Library of the International +Philosophical Congress", 1900.) + +Theoretical forms come between nature and us: a veil of symbols envelops +reality; thus, finally, we no longer see things themselves, we are +content to read the labels on them. + +Moreover, our perception appears to analysis completely saturated with +memories, and that in view of our practical insertion in the present. I +will not come back to this point which has been so lucidly explained +by Mr Bergson in a lecture on "Dream" ("Report of the International +Psychological Institute", May 1901.) and an article on "Intellectual +Effort", ("Philosophical Review", January 1902.) the reading of which +cannot be too strongly recommended as an introduction to the first +chapter of "Matter and Memory", in which further arguments are to be +found. I will only add one remark, following Mr Bergson, as always: +perception is not simply contemplation, but consciousness of an original +visual emotion combined with a complete group of actions in embryo, +gestures in outline, and the graze of movement within, by which we +prepare to grasp the object, describe its lines, test its functions, +sound it, move it, and handle it in a thousand ways. (This is attested +by the facts of apraxia or psychic blindness. Cf. "Matter and Memory", +chapter ii.) + +From the preceding observations springs the utilitarian and practical +nature of common perception. Let us attempt now to see of what the +elaboration which it makes reality undergo consists. This time I am +summing up the fourth chapter of "Matter and Memory". First of all, we +choose between the images, emphasising the strong, extinguishing +the weak, although both have, a priori, the same interest for pure +knowledge; we make this choice above all by according preference to +impressions of touch, which are the most useful from the practical point +of view. This selection determines the parcelling up of matter into +independent bodies, and the artificial character of our proceeding is +thus made plain. Does not science, indeed, conclude in the same way, +showing us--as soon as she frees herself even to a small extent from +common-sense--full continuity re-established by "moving strata," and all +bodies resolved into stationary waves and knots of intersecting fluxes? +Already, then, we shall be nearer pure perception if we cease to +consider anything but the perceptible stuff in which numerically +distinct percepts are cut. Even there, however, a utilitarian division +continues. Our senses are instruments of abstraction, each of them +discerning a possible path of action. We may say that corporal life +functions in the manner of an absorbing milieu, which determines the +disconnected scale of simple qualities by extinguishing most of the +perceptible radiations. In short, the scale of sensations, with its +numerical aspect, is nothing but the spectrum of our practical activity. +Commonly we perceive only averages and wholes, which we contract into +distinct "qualities". Let us disengage from this rhythm what is peculiar +to ourselves. + +Above all, let us strive to disengage ourselves from homogeneous space, +this substratum of fixity, this arbitrary scheme of measurement and +division, which, to our greater advantage, subtends the natural, +qualitative, and undivided extension of images. (We usually represent +homogeneous space as previous to the heterogeneous extension of images: +as a kind of empty room which we furnish with percepts. We must reverse +this order, and conceive, on the contrary, that extension precedes +space.) And we shall finally have pure perception in so far as it is +accessible to us. + +There is no disputing the absolute value of this pure perception. The +impotence of speculative reason, as demonstrated by Kant, is perhaps, +at bottom, only the impotence of an intelligence in bondage to certain +necessities of the corporal life, and exercised upon a matter which it +has had to disorganise for the satisfaction of our needs. Our knowledge +of things is then no longer relative to the fundamental structure of our +mind, but only to its superficial and acquired habits, to the contingent +form which it takes on from our corporal functions and our lower needs. + +The relativity of knowledge is therefore not final. In unmaking what our +needs have made we re-establish intuition in its original purity, and +resume contact with reality. ("Matter and Memory", page 203.) + +That is how things are really presented. Here we are confronted by the +moving continuity of images. Pure perception is complete perception. +From it we pass to ordinary perception by diminution, throwing shadows +here and there: the reality perceived by common-sense is nothing +else actually than universal interaction rendered visible by its very +interruption at certain points. + +Whence we have this double conclusion already formulated higher up: the +relation of perception to matter is that of the part to the whole, and +our consciousness is rather limited than relative. It must be stated +that primarily we perceive things in themselves, not in us; the +subjectivity of our current perception comes from our work of outlining +it in the bosom of reality, but the root of pure perception plunges into +full objectivity. If, at each point of matter, we were to succeed in +possessing the stream of total interaction of which it marks a wave, and +if we were to succeed in seeing the multiplicity of these points as a +qualitative heterogeneous flux without number or severance, we should +coincide with reality itself. It is true that such an ideal, while +inaccessible on the one hand, would not succeed on the other without +risk to knowledge; in fact, says Mr Bergson, ("Matter and Memory", page +38.) "to perceive all the influences of all the points of all bodies +would be to descend to the state of material object." + +But a solution of this double difficulty remains possible, a dynamic +and approximate solution, which consists in looking for the absolute +intuition of matter in such a mobilisation of our perspective faculties +that we become capable of following, according to the circumstances, +all the paths of virtual perception of which the common anxiety for the +practical has made us choose one only, and capable of realising all the +infinitely different modes of qualification and discernment. + +But we have still to see how this "complete experience" can be +practically thought. + + + + +IV. Critique of Language. + +The perception of reality does not obtain the full value of knowledge, +except when once socialised, once made the common property of men, and +thereby also tested and verified. + +There is one means only of doing that; viz. to analyse it into +manageable and portable concepts. By language I mean the product of this +conceptualisation. Thus language is necessary; for we must always speak, +were it only to utter the impotence of words. Not less necessary is a +critique of spontaneous language, of the laws which govern it, of the +postulates which it embraces, of the methods which convey its implicit +doctrines. Synthetic forms are actually theories already; they effect +an adaptation of reality to the demands of practical use. If it is +impossible to escape them, it is at least fitting not to employ them +except with due knowledge, and when properly warned against the illusion +of the false problems which they might arouse. + +Let us first of all consider thought in itself, in its concrete life. +What are the principal characteristics, the essential steps? We readily +say, analysis and synthesis. + +Nothing can be known except in contrast, correlation, or negation +of another thing; and the act of knowledge, considered in itself, +is unification. Thus number appears as a fundamental category, as an +absolute condition of intelligibility; some go so far as to regard +atomism as a necessary method. But that is inexact. No doubt the use +of number and the resulting atomism are imposed by definition, we might +say, on the thought which proceeds by conceptual analysis, and then by +unifying construction; that is to say, on synthetic thought. But, in +greater depth, thought is dynamic continuity and duration. Its essential +work does not consist in discerning and afterwards in assembling +ready-made elements. Let us see in it rather a kind of creative +maturation, and let us attempt to grasp the nature of this causal +activity. (H. Bergson, "Intellectual Effort" in the "Philosophical +Review", January 1902.) + +The act of thought is always a complex play of moving representations, +an evolution of life in which incessant inner reactions occur. That is +to say, it is movement. But there are several planes of thought, from +intuition to language, and we must distinguish between the thought which +moves on the surface among terms displayed on a single plane, and the +thought with goes deeper and deeper from one plane to another. + +We do not think solely by concepts or images; we think, first of all, +according to Mr Bergson's expression, by dynamic schemes. What is a +dynamic scheme? It is motive rather than representative, inexpressible +in itself, but a source of language containing not so much the images +or concepts in which it will develop as the indication of the path to be +followed in order to obtain them. It is not so much system as movement, +progress, genesis; it does not mark the gaze directed upon the various +points of one plane of deliberate contemplation so much as an effort to +pass through successive planes of thought in a direction leading from +intuition to analysis. We might define it by its function of calling up +images and concepts, representations which, for one and the same +scheme, are neither strictly determined nor anything in particular in +themselves, concurrent representations which have in common one and the +same logical power. + +The representations called up form a body to the scheme, and the +relation of the scheme to the concepts and images which it calls up +resembles, mutatis mutandis, the relation pointed out by Mr Bergson +between an idea and its basis in the brain. In short, it is the very act +of creative thought which the dynamic scheme interprets, the act not yet +fixed in "results." + +Nothing is easier than to illustrate the existence of this scheme. +Let us merely remark a few facts of current observation. Recall, for +example, the suggestive anxiety we experience when we seek to remember +a name; the precise syllables of the name still escape us, but we feel +them approaching, and already we possess something of them, since we +immediately reject those which do not answer to a certain direction of +expectancy; and by endeavouring to secure a more intimate feeling of +this direction we suddenly arouse the desired recollection. + +In the same way, what does it mean to have the sense of a complex +situation in active life, if not that we perceive it, not as a static +group of explicit details, but as a meeting of powers allied or hostile, +convergent or divergent, directed towards this or that, of which the +aggregate whole tends of itself to awaken in us the initial reactions +which analyse it? + +In the same way again, how do we learn, how can we assimilate a +vast system of conceits or images? Our task is not to concentrate an +enumerative attention on each individual factor; we should never get +away from them, the weight would be too heavy. + +What we entrust to memory is really a dynamic scheme permitting us to +"regain" what we should not have succeeded in "retaining." In reality +our only "knowledge" is through such a scheme, which contains in the +state of potential implication an inexhaustible multiplicity ready to be +developed in actual representations. + +How, finally, is any discovery made? Finding is solving a problem; and +to solve a problem we must always begin by supposing it solved. But of +what does such a hypothesis consist? + +It is not an anticipated view of the solution, for then all would be +at an end; nor is it a simple formula putting in the present indicative +what the enunciation expressed in the future or the imperative, for then +nothing would be begun. It is exactly a dynamic scheme; that is to say, +a method in the state of directed tension; and often, the discovery +once realised as theory or system, capable of unending developments +and resurrections, remains by the best of itself a method and a dynamic +scheme. + +But one last example will perhaps reveal the truth still more. "Anyone +who has attempted literary composition knows well that when the subject +has been long studied, all the documents collected, all the notes taken, +we need, to embark on the actual work of composition, something more, an +effort, often very painful, to place oneself suddenly in the very heart +of the subject, and to seek as deep down as possible an impulse to which +afterwards we shall only have to let ourselves go. This impulse, +once received, projects the mind on a road where it finds both the +information which it had collected and a thousand other details as well; +it develops and analyses itself in terms, the enumeration of which would +have no end; the further we advance, the more we discover; we shall +never succeed in saying everything; and yet, if we turn sharply round +towards the impulse we feel behind ourselves, to grasp it, it escapes; +for it was not a thing but a direction of movement, and though +indefinitely extensible, it is simplicity itself." (H. Bergson, +"Metaphysical and Moral Review", January 1903. The whole critique of +language is implicitly contained in this "Introduction to Metaphysics".) + +The thought, then, which proceeds from one representation to another in +one and the same plane is one kind; that which follows one and the same +conceptual direction through descending planes is another. Creative and +fertile thought is the thought which adopts the second kind of work. The +ideal is a continual oscillation from one plane to the other, a restless +alternative of intuitive concentration and conceptual expansion. But +our idleness takes exception to this, for the feeling of effort appears +precisely in the traject from the dynamic scheme to the images and +concepts, in the passing from one plane of thought to another. + +Thus the natural tendency is to remain in the last of these planes, that +of language. We know what dangers threaten us there. + +Suppose we have some idea or other and the word representing it. Do not +suppose that to this word there is one corresponding sense only, nor +even a finished group of various distinct and rigorously separable +senses. On the contrary, there is a whole scale corresponding, a +complete continuous spectrum of unstable meanings which tend unceasingly +to resolve into one another. Dictionaries attempt to illuminate them. +The task is impossible. They co-ordinate a few guiding marks; but who +shall say what infinite transitions underlie them? + +A word designates rather a current of thought than one or several halts +on a logical path. Here again a dynamic continuity exists previous +to the parcelling out of the acceptations. What, then, should be the +attitude of the mind? + +A supple moving attitude more attentive to the curve of change than to +the possible halting-points along the road. But this is not the case at +all; the effort would be too great, and what happens, on the contrary, +is this. For the spectrum a chromatic scale of uniform tints is very +quickly substituted. This is in itself an undesirable simplification, +for it is impossible to reconstitute the infinity of real shades by +combinations of fundamental colours each representing the homogeneous +shore, which each region of the spectrum finally becomes. + +However cleverly we proportion these averages, we get, at most, some +vulgar counterfeit: orange, for example, is not a mixture of yellow +and red, although this mixture may recall to those who have known it +elsewhere the simple and original sensation of orange. Again, a second +simplification, still more undesirable, succeeds the first. + +There are no longer any colours at all; black lines serve as +guide-marks. We are therefore with pure concepts decidedly in full +symbolism. And it is with symbols that we shall henceforward be trying +to reconstruct reality. + +I need not go back to the general characteristics or the inconveniences +of this method. Concepts resemble photographic views; concrete thickness +escapes them. However exact, varied, or numerous we suppose them, they +can certainly recall their object, but not reveal it to any one who had +not had any direct intuition of it. Nothing is easier than to trace the +plan of a body in four dimensions; all the same, this drawing does not +admit "visualisation in space" as is the case with ordinary bodies, +for want of a previous intuition which it would awaken: thus it is with +concepts in relation to reality. Like photographs and like plans, they +are extracted from reality, but we are not able to say that they were +contained in it; and many of them besides are not so much as extracts; +they are simple systematised notes, in fact, notes made upon notes. In +other terms, concepts do not represent pieces, parts, or elements of +reality. Literally they are nothing but simple symbolic notations. To +wish to make integral factors of them would be as strange an illusion as +that of seeing in the co-ordinates of a geometric point the constitutive +essence of that point. + +We do not make things with symbols, any more than we should reconstruct +a picture with the qualifications which classify it. + +Whence, then, comes the natural inclination of thought towards the +concept? From the fact that thought delights in artifices which +facilitate analysis and language. + +The first of these artifices is that from which results the possibility +of decomposition or recomposition according to arbitrary laws. For +that we need a previous substitution of symbols for things. Nothing +demonstrates this better than the celebrated arguments which we owe to +Zeno of Elea. Mr Bergson returns to the discussion of them over and over +again. ("Essay on the Immediate Data", pages 85-86; "Matter and Memory", +pages 211-213, "Creative Evolution", pages 333-337.) + +The nerve of the reasoning there consists in the evident absurdity +there would be in conceiving an inexhaustible exhausted, an unachievable +achieved; in short, a total actually completed, and yet obtained by the +successive addition of an infinite number of terms. + +But the question is to know whether a movement can be considered as a +numerical multiplicity. Virtual divisibility there is, no doubt, but not +actual division; divisibility is indefinite, whereas an actual division, +if it respects the inner articulations of reality, is bound to halt at a +limited number of phases. + +What we divide and measure is the track of the movement once +accomplished, not the movement itself: it is the trajectory, not the +traject. In the trajectory we can count endless positions; that is to +say, possible halts. Let us not suppose that the moving body meets these +elements all ready-marked. Hence what the Eleatic dialectic illustrates +is a case of incommensurability; the radical inability of analysis +to end a certain task; our powerlessness to explain the fact of +the transit, if we apply to it such and such modes of numerical +decomposition or recomposition, which are valid only for space; the +impossibility of conceiving becoming as susceptible of being cut up into +arbitrary segments, and afterwards reconstructed by summing of terms +according to some law or other; in short, it is the nature of movement, +which is without division, number, or concept. + +But thought delights in analyses regulated by the sole consideration +of easy language; hence its tendency to an arithmetic and geometry of +concepts, in spite of the disastrous consequences; and thus the Eleatic +paradox is no less instructive in its specious character than in the +solution which it embodies. + +At bottom, natural thought, I mean thought which abandons itself to +its double inclination of synthetic idleness and useful industry, is +a thought haunted by anxieties of the operating manual, anxieties of +fabrication. + +What does it care about the fluxes of reality and dynamic depths? It is +only interested in the outcrops scattered here and there over the firm +soil of the practical, and it solidifies "terms" like stakes plunged in +a moving ground. Hence comes the configuration of its spontaneous logic +to a geometry of solids, and hence come concepts, the instantaneous +moments taken in transitions. + +Scientific thought, again, preserves the same habits and the same +preferences. It seeks only what repeats, what can be counted. +Everywhere, when it theorises, it tends to establish static relations +between composing unities which form a homogeneous and disconnected +multiplicity. + +Its very instruments bias it in that direction. The apparatus of the +laboratory really grasps nothing but arrangement and coincidence; in a +word, states not transitions. Even in cases of contrary appearance, for +example, when we determine a weight by observing the oscillation of a +balance and not its rest, we are interested in regular recurrence, in +a symmetry, in something therefore which is of the nature of an +equilibrium and a fixity all the same. The reason of it is that science, +like common-sense, although in a manner a little different, aims only in +actual fact at obtaining finished and workable results. + +Let us imagine reality under the figure of a curve, a rhythmic +succession of phases of which our concepts mark so many tangents. There +is contact at one point, but at one point only. Thus our logic is valid +as infinitesimal analysis, just as the geometry of the straight line +allows us to define each state of curve. It is thus, for example, +that vitality maintains a relation of momentary tangency to the +physico-chemical structure. If we study this relation and analogous +relations, this fact remains indisputably legitimate. Let us not think, +however, that such a study, even when repeated in as many points as we +wish, can ever suffice. + +We must afterwards by genuine integration attain moving continuity. That +is exactly the task represented by the return to intuition, with its +proper instrument, the dynamic scheme. From this tangential point of +view we try to grasp the genesis of the curve as envelope, or rather, +and better still, the birth of successive tangents as instantaneous +directions. Speaking non-metaphorically, we cling to genetic methods +of conceptualisation and proceed from the generating principle to its +conceptual derivatives. + +But our thought finds it very difficult to sustain such an effort long. +It is partial to rectilineal deduction, actual becoming horrifies it. It +desires immediately to find "things" sharply determined and very +clear. That is why immediately a tangent is constructed, it follows +its movement in a straight line to infinity. Thus are produced +limit-concepts, the ultimate terms, the atoms of language. As a rule +they go in pairs, in antithetic couples, every analysis being dichotomy, +since the discernment of one path of abstraction determines in contrast, +as a complementary remainder, the opposite path of direction. Hence, +according to the selection effected among concepts, and the relative +weight which is attributed to them, we get the antinomies between which +a philosophy of analysis must for ever remain oscillating and torn in +sunder. Hence comes the parcelling up of metaphysics into systems, and +its appearance of regulated play "between antagonistic schools which get +up on the stage together, each to win applause in turn." (H. Bergson, +"Report of the French Philosophical Society", meeting, 2nd May 1901.) + +The method followed to find a genuine solution must be inverse; not +dialectic combination of pre-existing concepts, but, setting out from a +direct and really lived intuition, a descent to ever new concepts along +dynamic schemes which remain open. From the same intuition spring many +concepts: "As the wind which rushes into the crossroads divides into +diverging currents of air, which are all only one and the same gust." +("Creative Evolution", page 55.) + +The antinomies are resolved genetically, whilst in the plane of language +they remain irreducible. With a heterogeneity of shades, when we mix the +tints and neutralise them by one another, we easily create homogeneity; +but take the result of this work, that is to say, the average final +colour, and it will be impossible to reconstitute the wealth of the +original. + +Do you desire a precise example of the work we must accomplish? Take +that of change; (Cf. two lectures delivered by Mr Bergson at Oxford on +"The Perception of Change", 26th and 27th May 1911.) no other is more +significant or clearer. It shows us two necessary movements in the +reform of our habits of imagination or conception. + +Let us try first of all to familiarise ourselves with the images which +show us the fixity deriving from becoming. + +Two colliding waves, two rollers meeting, typify rest by extinction and +interference. With the movement of a stone, and the fluidity of running +water, we form the instantaneous position of a ricochet. The very +movement of the stone, seen in the successive positions of the tangent +to the trajectory, is stationary to our view. + +What is dynamic stability, except non-variation arising from variation +itself? Equilibrium is produced from speed. A man running solidifies +the moving ground. In short, two moving bodies regulated by each other +become fixed in relation to each other. + +After this, let us try to perceive change in itself, and then represent +it to ourselves according to its specific and original nature. + +The common conception needs reform on two principal points: + +(1) All change is revealed in the light of immediate intuition, not as +a numerical series of states, but a rhythm of phases, each of which +constitutes an indivisible act, in such a way that each change has its +natural inner articulations, forbidding us to break it up according to +arbitrary laws, like a homogeneous length. + +(2) Change is self-sufficient; it has no need of a support, a moving +body, a "thing" in motion. There is no vehicle, no substance, no spatial +receptacle, resembling a theatre-scene, no material dummy successively +draped in coloured stuffs; on the contrary, it is the body or the atom +which should be subordinately defined as symbols of completed becoming. + +Of movement thus conceived, indivisible and substantial, what better +image can we have than a musical evolution, a phrase in melody? That +is how we must work to conceive reality. If such a conception at first +appears obscure, let us credit experience, for ideas are gradually +illuminated by the very use we make of them, "the clarity of a concept +being hardly anything, at bottom, but the assurance once obtained +that we can handle it profitably." (H. Bergson, "Introduction to +Metaphysics".) + +If we require to reach a conception of this kind with regard to change, +the Eleatic dialectic is there to establish it beyond dispute, and +positive science comes to the same conclusion, since it shows us +everywhere nothing but movements placed upon movements, never fixed +"things," except as temporary symbols of what we leave at a given moment +outside the field of study. + +In any case, the difficulty of such a conception need not stop us; it is +little more than a difficulty of the imaginative order. And as for the +conception itself, or rather the corresponding intuition, it will share +the fate of all its predecessors: to our contemporaries it will be a +scandal, a century later a stroke of genius, after some centuries common +evidence, and finally an instinctive axiom. + + + + +V. The Problem of Consciousness. Duration and Liberty. + +Armed with the method we have just described, Mr Bergson turned first of +all toward the problem of the ego: taking up his position in the centre +of mind, he has attempted to establish its independent reality by +examining its profound nature. + +The first chapter of the "Essay on the Immediate Data" contains a +decisive criticism of the conceptions which claim to introduce number +and measure into the domain of the facts of consciousness. + +Not that it is our business to reject as false the notion of +psychological intensity; but this notion demands interpretation, and the +least that we can say against the attempt to turn it into a notion of +size is that in doing so we are misunderstanding the specific character +of the object studied. The same reproach must be levelled against +association of ideas, the system of mechanical psychology of which the +type is presented us by Taine and Stuart Mill. Already in chapters ii. +and iii. of the "Essay", and again all through "Matter and Memory", the +system is riddled with objections, each of which would be sufficient to +show its radical flaw. All the aspects, all the phenomena of mental life +come up for successive review. In respect of each of them we have +an illustration of the insufficiency of the atomism which seeks to +recompose the soul with fixed elements, by a massing of units exterior +to one another, everywhere and always the same: this is a grammatical +philosophy which believes reality to be composed of parts which admit +of number just as language is made of words placed side by side; it is a +materialist philosophy which improperly transfers the proceedings of the +physical sciences to the sciences of the inner life. + +On the contrary, we must represent the state of consciousness to +ourselves as variable according to the whole of which it forms a part. +Here and there, although it always bears the same name, it is no longer +the same thing. "The more the ego becomes itself again, the more also +do its states of consciousness, instead of being in juxtaposition, +penetrate one another, blend with one another, and tinge one another +with the colouring of all the rest. Thus each of us has his manner of +loving or hating, and this love or hate reflect our entire personality." +("Essay on the Immediate Data", pages 125-126.) + +At bottom Mr Bergson is bringing forward the necessity, in the case +before us, of substituting a new notion of continuous qualitative +heterogeneity for the old notion of numerical and spatial continuity. +Above all, he is emphasising the still more imperious necessity of +regarding each state as a phase in duration; and we are here touching on +his principal and leading intuition, the intuition of real duration. + +Historically this was Mr Bergson's starting-point and the origin of +his thought: a criticism of time under the form in which common-sense +imagines it, in which science employs it. He was the first to notice +the fact that scientific time has no "duration." Our equations really +express only static relations between simultaneous phenomena; even the +differential quotients they may contain in reality mark nothing but +present tendencies; no change would take place in our calculations if +the time were given in advance, instantaneously fulfilled, like a linear +whole of points in numerical order, with no more genuine duration than +that contained in the numerical succession. Even in astronomy there +is less anticipation than judgment of constancy and stability, the +phenomena being almost strictly periodic, while the hazard of prediction +bears only upon the minute divergence between the actual phenomenon and +the exact period attributed to it. Notice under what figure common-sense +imagines time: as an inert receptacle, a homogeneous milieu, neutral and +indifferent; in fact, a kind of space. + +The scholar makes use of a like image; for he defines time by its +measurement, and all measurement implies interpretation in space. +For the scholar the hour is not an interval, but a coincidence, an +instantaneous arrangement, and time is resolved into a dust of fixities, +as in those pneumatic clocks in which the hand moves forward in jerks, +marking nothing but a sequence of pauses. + +Such symbols are sufficient, at least for a first approximation, when +it is only a question of matter, the mechanism of which, strictly +considered, contains nothing "durable." But in biology and psychology +quite different characteristics become essential; age and memory, +heterogeneity of musical phases, irreversible rhythm "which cannot be +lengthened or shortened at will." ("Creative Evolution", page 10.) + +Then it is that the return of time becomes necessary to duration. +How are we to describe this duration? It is a melodious evolution of +moments, each of which contains the resonance of those preceding and +announces the one which is going to follow; it is a process of enriching +which never ceases, and a perpetual appearance of novelty; it is an +indivisible, qualitative, and organic becoming, foreign to space, +refractory to number. + +Summon the image of a stream of consciousness passing through the +continuity of the spectrum, and becoming tinged successively with each +of its shades. Or rather imagine a symphony having feeling of itself, +and creating itself; that is how we should conceive duration. + +That duration thus conceived is really the basis of ourselves Mr Bergson +proves by a thousand examples, and by a marvellous employment of the +introspective method which he has helped to make so popular. We cannot +quote these admirable analyses here. A single one will serve as model, +specially selected as referring to one of the most ordinary moments of +our life, to show plainly that the perception of real duration always +accompanies us in secret. + +"At the moment when I write these lines a clock near me is striking the +hour; but my distracted ear is only aware of it after several strokes +have already sounded; that is, I have not counted them. And yet an +effort of introspective attention enables me to total the four strokes +already struck and add them to those which I hear. If I then withdraw +into myself and carefully question myself about what has just happened, +I become aware that the first four sounds had struck my ear and even +moved my consciousness, but that the sensations produced by each of +them, instead of following in juxtaposition, had blended into one +another in such a way as to endow the whole with a peculiar aspect and +make of it a kind of musical phrase. In order to estimate in retrospect +the number of strokes which have sounded, I attempted to reconstitute +this phrase in thought: my imagination struck one, then two, then three, +and so long as it had not reached the exact number four, my sensibility, +on being questioned, replied that the total effect differed in quality. +It had therefore noted the succession of the four strokes in a way of +its own, but quite otherwise than by addition, and without bringing in +the image of a juxtaposition of distinct terms. In fact, the number of +strokes struck was perceived as quality, not as quantity: duration is +thus presented to immediate consciousness, and preserves this form so +long as it does not give place to a symbolical representation drawn from +space." ("Essay on the Immediate Data", pages 95-96.) + +And now are we to believe that return to the feeling of real duration +consists in letting ourselves go, and allowing ourselves an idle +relaxation in dream or dissolution in sensation, "as a shepherd +dozing watches the water flow"? Or are we even to believe, as has been +maintained, that the intuition of duration reduces "to the spasm of +delight of the mollusc basking in the sun"? This is a complete mistake! +We should fall back into the misconceptions which I was pointing out in +connection with immediacy in general; we should be forgetting that +there are several rhythms of duration, as there are several kinds of +consciousness; and finally, we should be misunderstanding the character +of a creative invention perpetually renewed, which is that of our inner +life. + +For it is in duration that we are free, not in spatialised time, as all +determinist conceptions suppose in contradiction. + +I shall not go back to the proofs of this thesis; they were condensed +some way back after the third chapter of the "Essay on the Immediate +Data". But I will borrow from Mr Bergson himself a few complementary +explanations, in order, as far as possible, to forestall any +misunderstanding. "The word liberty," he says, "has for me a sense +intermediate between those which we assign as a rule to the two terms +liberty and free-will. On one hand, I believe that liberty consists +in being entirely oneself, in acting in conformity with oneself; it +is then, to a certain degree, the 'moral liberty' of philosophers, the +independence of the person with regard to everything other than +itself. But that is not quite this liberty, since the independence I +am describing has not always a moral character. Further, it does not +consist in depending on oneself as an effect depends on the cause which +of necessity determines it. In this, I should come back to the sense of +'free-will.' And yet I do not accept this sense completely either, +since free-will, in the usual meaning of the term, implies the equal +possibility of two contraries, and on my theory we cannot formulate, or +even conceive in this case the thesis of the equal possibility of the +two contraries, without falling into grave error about the nature of +time. I might say then, that the object of my thesis, on this particular +point, has been precisely to find a position intermediate between 'moral +liberty' and 'free-will.' Liberty, such as I understand it, is situated +between these two terms, but not at equal distances from both. If I were +obliged to blend it with one of the two, I should select 'free-will.'" +("Report of the French Philosophical Society", philosophical vocabulary, +article "Liberty".) + +After all, when we place ourselves in the perspective of homogeneous +time; that is to say, when we substitute for the real and profound ego +its image refracted through space, the act necessarily appears either +as the resultant of a mechanical composition of elements, or as an +incomprehensible creation ex nihilo. + +"We have supposed that there is a third course to pursue; that is, to +place ourselves back in pure duration...Then we seemed to see action +arise from its antecedents by an evolution sui generis, in such a way +that we discover in this action the antecedents which explain it, while +at the same time it adds something absolutely new to them, being an +advance upon them as the fruit upon the flower. Liberty is in no way +reduced thereby, as has been said, to obvious spontaneity. At most this +would be the case in the animal world, where the psychological life is +principally that of the affections. But in the case of man, a thinking +being, the free act can be called a synthesis of feelings and ideas, and +the evolution which leads to it a reasonable evolution." ("Matter and +Memory", page 205.) + +Finally, in a most important letter, ("Report of the French +Philosophical Society", meeting, 26th February 1903.) Mr Bergson +becomes a little more precise still. We must certainly not confuse the +affirmation of liberty with the negation of physical determinism; "for +there is more in this affirmation than in this negation." All the same, +liberty supposes a certain contingence. It is "psychological causality +itself," which must not be represented after the model of physical +causality. + +In opposition to the latter, it implies that between two moments of a +conscious being there is not an equivalence admitting of deduction, that +in the transition from one to the other there is a genuine creation. +Without doubt the free act is not without explanatory reasons. + +"But these reasons have determined us only at the moment when they have +become determining; that is, at the moment when the act was virtually +accomplished, and the creation of which I speak is entirely contained in +the progress by which these reasons have become determining." It is true +that all this implies a certain independence of mental life in relation +to the mechanism of matter; and that is why Mr Bergson was obliged to +set himself the problem of the relations between body and mind. + +We know that the solution of this problem is the principal object of +"Matter and Memory". The thesis of psycho-physiological parallelism is +there peremptorily refuted. + +The method which Mr Bergson has followed to do so will be found set out +by himself in a communication to the French Philosophical Society, which +it is important to study as introduction. ("Report" of meeting, 2nd +May 1901.) The paralogism included in the very enunciation of the +parallelist thesis is explained in a memoire presented to the Geneva +International Philosophical Congress in 1904. ("Revue de Metaphysique et +de Morale", November 1904.) But the actual proof is made by the analysis +of the memoire which fills chapters ii. and iii. of the work cited +above. (An extremely suggestive resume of these theses will be found +in the second lecture on "The Perception of Change".) It is there +established, by the most positive arguments, (Instead of brutally +connecting the two extremes of matter and mind, one regarded in its +highest action, the other in its most rudimentary mechanism, thus +dooming to certain failure any attempt to explain their actual union, Mr +Bergson studies their living contact at the point of intersection marked +by the phenomena of perception and memory: he compares the higher +point of matter--the brain--and the lower point of mind--certain +recollections--and it is between these two neighbouring points that he +notes a difference, by a method no longer dialectic but experimental.) +that all our past is self-preserved in us, that this preservation only +makes one with the musical character of duration, with the indivisible +nature of change, but that one part only is conscious of it, the part +concerned with action, to which present conceptions supply a body of +actuality. + +What we call our present must be conceived neither as a mathematical +point nor as a segment with precise limits: it is the moment of our +history brought out by our attention to life, and nothing, in strict +justice, would prevent it from extending to the whole of this +history. It is not recollection then, but forgetfulness which demands +explanation. + +According to a dictum of Ravaisson, of which Mr Bergson makes use, the +explanation must be sought in the body: "it is materiality which causes +forgetfulness in us." + +There are, in fact, several planes of memory, from "pure recollection" +not yet interpreted in distinct images down to the same recollection +actualised in embryo sensations and movements begun; and we descend from +the one to the other, from the life of simple "dream" to the life of +practical "drama," along "dynamic schemes." The last of these planes is +the body; a simple instrument of action, a bundle of motive habits, a +group of mechanisms which mind has set up to act. How does it operate in +the work of memory? The task of the brain is every moment to thrust back +into unconsciousness all that part of our past which is not at the +time useful. Minute study of facts shows that the brain is employed in +choosing from the past, in diminishing, simplifying, and extracting +from it all that can contribute to present experience; but it is not +concerned to preserve it. In short, the brain can only explain absences, +not presences. That is why the analysis of memory illustrates the +reality of mind, and its independence relative to matter. Thus is +determined the relation of soul to body, the penetrating point which it +inserts and drives into the plane of action. "Mind borrows from matter +perceptions from which it derives its nourishment, and gives them back +to it in the form of movement, on which it has impressed its liberty." +("Matter and Memory", page 279.) + +This, then, is how the cycle of research closes, by returning to the +initial problem, the problem of perception. In the two opposing systems +by which attempts have been made to solve it, Mr Bergson discovers a +common postulate, resulting in a common impotence. From the idealistic +point of view we do not succeed in explaining how a world is expressed +externally, nor from the realistic point of view how an ego is expressed +internally. And this double failure comes again from the underlying +hypothesis, according to which the duality of the subject and object is +conceived as primitive, radical, and static. Our duty is diametrically +opposed. We have to consider this duality as gradually elaborated, and +the problem concerning it must be first stated, and then solved as a +function of time rather than of space. Our representation begins by +being impersonal, and it is only later that it adopts our body as +centre. We emerge gradually from universal reality, and our realising +roots are always sunk in it. But this reality in itself is already +consciousness, and the first moment of perception always puts us back +into the initial state previous to the separation of the subject and +object. It is by the work of life, and by action, that this separation +is effected, created, accentuated, and fixed. And the common mistake of +realism and idealism is to believe it effected in advance, whereas it is +relatively second to perception. + +Hence comes the absolute value of immediate intuition. For from what +source could an irreducible relativity be produced in it? It would be +absurd to make it depend on the constitution of our brain, since our +brain itself, so far as it is a group of images, is only a part of the +universe, presenting the same characteristics as the whole; and in so +far as it is a group of mechanisms become habits, is only a result of +the initial action of life, of original perceptive discernment. And, on +the other hand, no less absurd would be the fear that the subject +can ever be excluded or eliminated from its own knowledge, since, in +reality, the subject, like the object, is in perception, not perception +in the subject--at least not primitively. So that it is by a trick of +speech that the theses of fundamental relativity take root: they vanish +when we return to immediacy; that is to say, when we present problems as +they ought to be presented, in terms which do not suppose any conceptual +analysis yet accomplished. + + + + +VI. The Problem of Evolution: Life and Matter. + +After the problem of consciousness Mr Bergson was bound to approach that +of evolution, for psychological liberty is only truly conceivable if +it begins in some measure with the first pulsation of corporal life. +"Either sensation has no raison d'etre or it is a beginning of liberty"; +that is what the "Essay on the Immediate Data" (Page 25.) already told +us. + +It was easy then to foresee the necessity of a general theoretical frame +in which our duration might take a position which would render it more +intelligible by removing its appearance of singular exception. + +Thus in 1901, I wrote ("Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale", May +1901) with regard to the new philosophy considered as a philosophy of +becoming: "It has been prepared by contemporary evolution, which is +investigates and perfects, sifting it from its ore of materialism, and +turning it into genuine metaphysics. Is not this the philosophy suited +to the century of history? Perhaps it indicates that a period has +arrived in which mathematics, losing its role as the regulating science, +is about to give place to biology." This is the programme carried +out, in what an original manner we are well aware, by the doctrine of +Creative Evolution. + +When we examine ancient knowledge, one characteristic of it is at once +visible. It studies little but certain privileged moments of changing +reality, certain stable forms, certain states of equilibrium. +Ancient geometry, for example, is almost always limited to the static +consideration of figures already traced. Modern science is quite +different. Has not the greatest progress which it has realised in the +mathematical order really been the invention of infinitesimal analysis; +that is to say, an effort to substitute the process for the resultant, +to follow the moving generation of phenomena and magnitudes in its +continuity, to place oneself along becoming at any moment whatsoever, or +rather, by degrees at all successive moments? This fundamental tendency, +coupled with the development of biological research, was bound to +incline it towards a doctrine of evolution; and hence the success of +Spencer. + +But time, which is everywhere in modern science the chief variable, is +only a time-length, indefinitely and arbitrarily divisible. There is +no genuine duration, nothing really tending to evolution in Spencer's +evolution: no more than there is in the periodic working of a turbine or +in the stationary tremble of a diapason. Is not this what is emphasised +by the perpetual employment of mechanical images and vulgar engineering +metaphors, the least fault of which is to suppose a homogeneous time, +and a motionless theatre of change which is at bottom only space? "In +such a doctrine we still talk of time, we pronounce the word, but we +hardly think of the thing; for time is here robbed of all effect." +("Creative Evolution", page 42.) + +Whence comes a latent materialism, ready to grasp the chance of +self-expression. Whence the automatic return to the dream of universal +arithmetic, which Laplace, Du Bois-Reymond, and Huxley have expressed +with such precision. (Ibid., page 41.) + +In order to escape such consequences we must, with Mr Bergson, +reintroduce real duration, that is to say, creative duration into +evolution, we must conceive life according to the mode exhibited with +regard to change in general. And it is science itself which calls us +to this task. What does science actually tell us when we let it speak +instead of prescribing to it answers which conform to our +preferences? Vitality, at every point of its becoming, is a tangent to +physico-chemical mechanism. But physico-chemistry does not reveal its +secret any more than the straight line produces the curve. + +Consider the development of an embryo. It summarises the history of +species; ontogenesis, we are told, reproduces phylogenesis. And what do +we observe then? + +Now that a long sequence of centuries is contracted for us into a short +period, and that our view is thus capable of a synthesis which before +was too difficult, we see appearing the rhythmic organisation, the +musical character, which the slowness of the transitions at first +prevented us from seeing. In each state of the embryo there is something +besides an instantaneous structure, something besides a conservative +play of actions and reactions; there is a tendency, a direction, an +effort, a creative activity. The stage traversed is less interesting +than the traversing itself; this again is an act of generating impulse, +rather than an effect of mechanical inertia. So must the case be, by +analogy, with general evolution. We have there, as it were, a vision +of biological duration in miniature; expansion and relaxation of its +tension bring its homogeneity to notice, but at the same time, properly +speaking, evolution disappears. + +And further, Mr Bergson establishes by direct and positive arguments +that life is genuine creation. A similar conclusion is presented as the +envelope of his whole doctrine. + +It is imposed first of all by immediate evidence, for we cannot deny +that the history of life is revealed to us under the aspect of a +progress and an ascent. And this impulse implies initiative and choice, +constituting an effort which we are not authorised by the facts to +pronounce fatalistic: "A simple glance at the fossil species shows us +that life could have done without evolution, or could have evolved only +within very restricted limits, had it chosen the far easier path open to +it of becoming cramped in its primitive forms; certain Foraminifera have +not varied since the silurian period; the Lingulae, looking unmoved upon +the innumerable revolutions which have upheaved our planet, are today +what they were in the most distant times of the palaeozoic era." +("Creative Evolution", page 111.) Moreover, if, in us, life is +indisputably creation and liberty, how would it not, to some extent, be +so in universal nature? "Whatever be the inmost essence of what is and +what is being made, we are of it: ("Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale", +November 1911.) a conclusion by analogy is therefore legitimate. But +above all, this conclusion is verified by its aptitude for solving +problems of detail, and for taking account of observed facts, and in +this respect I regret that I can only refer the reader to the whole body +of admirable discussions and analyses drawn up by Mr Bergson with regard +to "the plant and the animal," or "the development of animal life."" +("Creative Evolution", chapter ii.) + +As regards matter, two main laws stand out from the whole of our +science, relative to its nature and its phenomena: a law of conservation +and a law of degradation. On the one hand, we have mechanism, +repetition, inertia, constants, and invariants: the play of the material +world, from the point of view of quantity, offers us the aspect of +an immense transformation without gain or loss, a homogeneous +transformation tending to maintain in itself an exact equivalence +between the departure and arrival point. On the other hand, from the +point of view of quality, we have something which is being used up, +lowered, degraded, exhausted: energy expended, movement dissipated, +constructions breaking up, weights falling, levels becoming equalised, +and differences effaced. The travel of the material world appears then +as a loss, a movement of fall and descent. + +In addition, there is only a tendency to conservation, a tendency which +is never realised except imperfectly; while, on the contrary, we notice +that the failure of the vital impulse is most infallibly interpreted by +the appearance of mechanism. Reality falling asleep or breaking up +is the figure under which we finally observe matter: matter then is +secondary. + +Finally, according to Mr Bergson, matter is defined as a kind of +descent; this descent as the interruption of an ascent; this ascent +itself as growth; and thus a principle of creation is at the base of +things. + +Such a view seems obscure and disturbing to the mathematical +understanding. It cannot accustom itself to the idea of a becoming which +is more than a simple change of distribution, and more than a simple +expression of latent wealth. When confronted with such an idea, it +always harks back to its eternal question: How has something come out +of nothing? The question is false; for the idea of nothing is only +a pseudo-idea. Nothing is unthinkable, since to think nothing is +necessarily to think or not to think something; and according to Mr +Bergson's formula, (Cf. the discussion on existence and non-existence in +chapter iv. of "Creative Evolution", pages 298-322.) "the representation +of void is always a full representation." When I say: "There is +nothing," it is not that I perceive a "nothing." I never perceive +except what is. But I have not perceived what I was seeking, what I was +expecting, and I express my deception in the language of my desire. Or +else I am speaking a language of construction, implying that I do not +yet possess what I intend to make. + +Let us abruptly forget these idols of practical action and language. +The becoming of evolution will then appear to us in its true light, as +phases of gradual maturation, rounded at intervals by crises of creative +discovery. Continuity and discontinuity will thus admit possibility of +reconciliation, the one as an aspect of ascent towards the future, the +other as an aspect of retrospection after the event. And we shall +see that the same key will in addition disclose to us the theory of +knowledge. + + + + +VII. The Problem of Knowledge: Analysis and Intuition. + +We know what importance has been attached since Kant to the problem of +reason: it would seem sometimes that all future philosophy is a return +to it; that it is no longer called to speak of anything else. Besides, +what we understand by reason, in the broad sense, is, in the human mind, +the power of light, the essential operation of which is defined as an +act of directing synthesis, unifying the experience and rendering it by +that very fact intelligible. Every movement of thought shows this power +in exercise. To bring it everywhere to the front would be the proper +task of philosophy; at least it is in this manner that we understand it +today. But from what point of view and by what method do we ordinarily +construct this theory of knowledge? + +The spontaneous works of mind, perception, science, art, and morality +are the departure-point of the inquiry and its initial matter. We do not +ask ourselves whether but how they are possible, what they imply, and +what they suppose; a regressive analysis attempts by critical reflection +to discern in them their principles and requisites. The task, in short, +is to reascend from production to producing activity, which we regard as +sufficiently revealed by its natural products. + +Philosophy, in consequence, is no longer anything but the science of +problems already solved, the science which is confined to saying why +knowledge is knowledge and action action, of such and such a kind, and +such and such a quality. And in consequence also reason can no longer +appear anything but an original datum postulated as a simple fact, as +a complete system come down ready-made from heaven, at bottom a kind of +non-temporal essence, definable without respect to duration, evolution, +or history, of which all genesis and all progress are absurd. In vain do +we persist in maintaining that it is originally an act; we always come +round to the fact that the method followed compels us to consider this +act only when once accomplished, and when once expressed in results. The +inevitable consequence is that we imprison ourselves hopelessly in the +affirmation of Kantian relativism. + +Such a system can only be true as a partial and temporary truth: at the +most, it is a moment of truth. "If we read the "Critique of Pure Reason" +closely, we become aware that Kant has made the critique, not of reason +in general, but of a reason fashioned to the habits and demands of +Cartesian mechanism or Newtonian physics." (H. Bergson, "Report of +French Philosophical Society", meeting, 2nd May 1901.) Moreover, +he plainly studies only adult reason, its present state, a plane of +thought, a sectional view of becoming. For Kant, men progress perhaps +in reason, but reason itself has no duration: it is the fixed spot, the +atmosphere of dead eternity in which every mental action is displayed. +But this could not be the final and complete truth. Is it not a fact +that human intelligence has been slowly constituted in the course of +biological evolution? To know it, we have not so much to separate it +statically from its works, as to replace it in its history. + +Let us begin with life, since, in any case, whether we will or no, it is +always in life and by life that we are. + +Life is not a brute force, a blind mechanism, from which one could never +conceive that thought would spring. From its first pulsation, life +is consciousness, spiritual activity, creative effort tending towards +liberty; that is, discernment already luminous, although the quality is +at first faint and diffused. In other terms, life is at bottom of the +psychological nature of a tendency. But "the essence of a tendency is +to develop in sheaf-form, creating, by the mere fact of its growth, +diverging directions between which its impulse will be divided." +("Creative Evolution", page 108.) + +Along these different paths the complementary potentialities are +produced and intensified, separating in the very process, their original +interpretation being possible only in the state of birth. One of them +ends in what we call intelligence. This latter therefore has become +gradually detached from a less intense but fuller luminous condition, of +which it has retained only certain characteristics to accentuate them. + +We see that we must conceive the word mind--or, if we prefer the word, +thought--as extending beyond intelligence. Pure intelligence, or the +faculty of critical reflection and conceptual analysis, represents only +one form of thought in its entirety, a function, a determination or +particular adaptation, the part organised in view of practical action, +the part consolidated as language. What are its characteristics? It +understands only what is discontinuous, inert, and fixed, that which has +neither change nor duration; it bathes in an atmosphere of spatiality; +it uses mathematics continually; it feels at home only among "things," +and everything is reduced by it to solid atoms; it is naturally +"materialist," owing to the very fact that it naturally grasps "forms" +only. What do we mean by that except that its object of election is the +mechanism of matter? But it supposes life; it only remains living itself +by continual loans from a vaster and fuller activity from which it +is sprung. And this return to complementary powers is what we call +intuition. + +From this point of view it becomes easy to escape Kantian relativity. We +are confronted by an intelligence which is doubtless no longer a faculty +universally competent, but which, on the contrary, possesses in its own +domain a greater power of penetration. It is arranged for action. Now +action would not be able to move in irreality. Intelligence, then, makes +us acquainted, if not with all reality, at least with some of it, +namely that part by which reality is a possible object of mechanical or +synthetic action. + +More profoundly, intuition falls into analysis as life into matter: they +are two aspects of the same movement. That is why, "provided we only +consider the general form of physics, we can say that it touches the +absolute." ("Creative Evolution", page 216.) + +In other terms, language and mechanism are regulated by each other. This +explains at once the success of mathematical science in the order of +matter, and its non-success in the order of life. + +For, when confronted with life, intelligence fails. "Being a deposit +of the evolutive movement along its path, how could it be applied +throughout the evolutive movement itself? We might as well claim that +the part equals the whole, that the effect can absorb its cause into +itself, or that the pebble left on the shore outlines the form of the +wave which brought it." (Preface to "Creative Evolution".) + +Is not that as good as saying that life is unknowable? Must we conclude +that it is impossible to understand it? + +"We should be forced to do so, if life had employed all the psychic +potentialities it contains in making pure understandings; that is to +say, in preparing mathematicians. But the line of evolution which ends +in man is not the only one. By other divergent ways other forms +of consciousness have developed, which have not been able to free +themselves from external constraint, nor regain the victory over +themselves as intelligence has done, but which, none the less for +that, also express something immanent and essential in the movement of +evolution. + +"By bringing them into connection with one another, and making them +afterwards amalgamate with intelligence, should we not thus obtain a +consciousness co-extensive with life, and capable, by turning sharply +round upon the vital thrust which it feels behind it, of obtaining a +complete, though doubtless vanishing vision?" ("Creative Evolution", +Preface.) It is precisely in this that the act of philosophic intuition +consists. "We shall be told that, even so, we do not get beyond our +intelligence, since it is with our intelligence, and through our +intelligence, that we observe all the other forms of consciousness. And +we should be right in saying so, if we were pure intelligences, if +there had not remained round our conceptual and logical thought a vague +nebula, made of the very substance at the expense of which the luminous +nucleus, which we call intelligence, has been formed. In it reside +certain complementary powers of the understanding, of which we have only +a confused feeling when we remain shut up in ourselves, but which will +become illumined and distinct when they perceive themselves at work, so +to speak, in the evolution of nature. They will thus learn what effort +they have to make to become more intense, and to expand in the actual +direction of life." ("Creative Evolution", Preface.) Does that mean +abandonment to instinct, and descent with it into infra-consciousness +again? By no means. On the contrary, our task is to bring instinct to +enrich intelligence, to become free and illumined in it; and this ascent +towards super-consciousness is possible in the flash of an intuitive +act, as it is sometimes possible for the eye to perceive, as a pale and +fugitive gleam, beyond what we properly term light, the ultra-violet +rays of the spectrum. + +Can we say of such a doctrine that it seeks to go, or that it goes +"against intelligence"? Nothing authorises such an accusation, for +limitation of a sphere is not misappreciation of every legitimate +exercise. But intelligence is not the whole of thought, and its natural +products do not completely exhaust or manifest our power of light. + +Besides, that intelligence and reason are not things completed, for ever +arrested in their inner structure, that they evolve and expand, is a +fact: the place of discovery is precisely the residual fringe of which +we were speaking above. In this respect, the history of thought would +furnish examples in plenty. Intuitions at first obscure, and only +anticipated, facts originally admitting no comparison, and as it were +irrational, become instructive and luminous by the fruitful use made of +them, and by the fertility which they manifest. In order to grasp the +complex content of reality, the mind must do itself violence, must +awaken its sleeping powers of revealing sympathy, must expand till it +becomes adapted to what formerly shocked its habits so much as almost +to seem contradictory to it. Such a task, moreover, is possible: we work +out its differential every moment, and its complete whole appears in the +sequence of centuries. + +At bottom, the new theory of knowledge has nothing new in it except +the demand that all the facts shall be taken into account: it renews +duration in the thinking mind, and places itself at the point of view of +creative invention, not only at that of subsequent demonstration. Hence +its conception of experience, which, for it, is not simple information, +fitted into pre-existing frames, but elaboration of the frames +themselves. + +Hence the problem of reason changes its aspect. A great mistake has been +made in thinking that Mr Bergson's doctrine misunderstands it: to deny +it and to place it are two different things. In its inmost essence, +reason is the demand for unity; that is why it is displayed as a faculty +of synthesis, and why its essential act is presented as apperception +of relation. It is unifying activity, not so much by a dialectic of +harmonious construction as by a view of reciprocal implication. But +all that, however shaded we suppose it, entails a previous analysis. +Therefore if we place ourselves in a perspective of intuition, I mean, +of complete perception, the demand for reason appears second only, +without being deprived, however, of its true task: it is an echo and +a recollection, an appeal and a promise of profound continuity, our +original anticipation and our final hope, in the bosom of the elementary +atomism which characterises the transitory region of language; and +reason thus marks the zone of contact between intelligence and instinct. + +Is thought only possible under the law of number? Does reality only +become an object of knowledge as a system of distinct but regulated +factors and moments? Do ideas exist only by their mutual relations, +which first of all oppose them and afterwards force intelligence to move +endlessly from one term to another? If such were the case, reason would +certainly be first, as alone making an intelligible continuity out of +discontinuous perception and restoring total unity to each temporary +part by a synthetic dialectic. But all this really has meaning +only after analysis has taken place. The demand for rational unity +constitutes in the bosom of atomism something like a murmur of deep +underlying continuity: it expresses in the very language of atomism, +atomism's basic irreality. There is no question of misunderstanding +reason, but only of putting it in its proper place. In a perspective +of complete intuition nothing would require to be unified. Reason would +then be reabsorbed in perception. That is to say, its present task is +to measure and correct in us the limits, gaps, and weaknesses of the +perceptive faculty. In this respect not a man of us thinks of denying +it its task. But we try with Mr Bergson to reduce this task to its true +worth and genuine importance. For we are decidedly tired of hearing +"Reason" invoked in solemn and moving tones, as if to write the +venerable name with the largest of capital R's were a magic solution of +all problems. + +Mind, in fact, sets out from unity rather than arrives at it; and the +order which it appears to discover subsequently in an experience which +at first is manifold and incoherent is only a refraction of the original +unity through the prism of a spontaneous analysis. Mr Bergson admirably +points out ("Creative Evolution", pages 240-244 and 252-257.) that there +are two types of order, geometric and vital, the one a static hierarchy +of relations, the other a musical continuity of moments. These two types +are opposed, as space to duration and matter to mind; but the negation +of one coincides with the position of the other. It is therefore +impossible to abolish both at once. The idea of disorder does not +correspond to any genuine reality. It is essentially relative, and +arises only when we do not meet the type of order which we were +expecting; and then it expresses our deception in the language of our +expectation, the absence of the expected order being equivalent, from +the practical point of view, to the absence of all order. Regarded in +itself, this notion is only a verbal entity, unduly taking form as the +common basis of two antithetic types. How therefore do we come to speak +of a "perceptible diversity" which mind has to regulate and unify? +This is only true at most of the disjointed experience employed +by common-sense. Reason, accepting this preliminary analysis, +and proceeding to language, seeks to organise it according to the +mathematical type. But it is the vital type which corresponds to +absolute reality, at least when it is a question of the Whole; and only +intuition has re-access to it, by soaring above synthetic dissociations. + + + + +VIII. Conclusion. + +As my last word and closing formula I come back to the leitmotiv of my +whole study: Mr Bergson's philosophy is a philosophy of duration. + +Let us regard it from this point of view, as contact with creative +effort, if we wish to conceive aright the original notions which it +proposes to us about liberty, life, and intuition. + +Let us say once more that it appears as the enthronement of positive +metaphysics: positive, that is to say, capable of continuous, regular, +and collective progress, no longer forcibly divided into irreducible +schools, "each of which retains its place, chooses its dice, and begins +a never-ending match with the rest." ("Introduction to Metaphysics" +in the "Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale", January 1903. Psychology, +according to Mr Bergson, studies the human mind in so far as it operates +in a useful manner to a practical end; metaphysics represent the effort +of this same mind to free itself from the conditions of useful action, +and regain possession of itself as pure creative energy. Now experience, +the experience of the laboratory, allows us to measure with more and +more accuracy the divergence between these two planes of life; hence the +positive character of the new metaphysics.) + +Let us next say that until the present moment it constitutes the only +doctrine which is truly a metaphysic of experience, since no other, at +bottom, explains why thought, in its work of discovery and verification, +remains in subjection to a law of probation by durable action. We +have now only to show how it evades certain criticisms which have been +levelled against its tendencies. + +Some have wanted to see in it a kind of atheist monism. Mr Bergson has +answered this point himself. What he rejects, and what he is right in +rejecting, are the doctrines which confine themselves to personifying +the unity of nature or the unity of knowledge in God as motionless first +cause. God would really be nothing, since he would do nothing. But he +adds: "The considerations put forward in my "Essay on the Immediate +Data" result in an illustration of the fact of liberty; those of "Matter +and Memory" lead us, I hope, to put our finger on mental reality; those +of "Creative Evolution" present creation as a fact: from all this we +derive a clear idea of a free and creating God, producing matter and +life at once, whose creative effort is continued, in a vital +direction, by the evolution of species and the construction of human +personalities." (Letter to P. de Tonquedec, published in the "Studies" +of 20th February 1912, and quoted here as found in the "Annals of +Christian Philosophy", March 1912.) How can we help finding in these +words, according to the actual expression of the author, the most +categorical refutation "of monism and pantheism in general"? + +Now to go further and become more precise, Mr Bergson points out that we +must "approach problems of quite a different kind, those of morality." +About these new problems the author of "Creative Evolution" has as yet +said nothing; and he will say nothing, so long as his method does not +lead him, on this point, to results as positive, after their manner, +as those of his other works, because he does not consider that mere +subjective opinions are in place in philosophy. He therefore denies +nothing; he is waiting and searching, always in the same spirit: what +more could we ask of him? + +One thing only is possible today: to discern in the doctrine already +existing the points of a moral and religious philosophy which present +themselves in advance for ultimate insertion. + +This is what we are permitted to attempt. But let us fully understand +what is at issue. The question is only to know whether, as has been +claimed, there is incompatibility between Mr Bergson's point of view and +the religious or moral point of view; whether the premisses laid down +block the road to all future development in the direction before us; or +whether, on the contrary, such a development is invited by some parts at +least of the previous work. The question is not to find in this work +the necessary and sufficient bases, the already formed and visible +lineaments of what will one day complete it. To imagine that the +religious and moral problem is bound to be regarded by Mr Bergson as +arising when it is too late for revision, as admitting proposition and +solution only as functions of a previous theoretical philosophy beyond +which we should not go; that in his eyes the solution of this problem +will be deduced from principles already laid down without any call for +the introduction of new facts or new points of view, without any need to +begin from a new intuition; that his view precludes all considerations +of strictly spiritual life, of inner and profound action, regarding +things in relation to God and in an eternal perspective: such a view +would be illegitimate and unreasonable, first of all, because Mr Bergson +has said nothing of the kind, and secondly, because it is contrary to +all his tendencies. + +After the "Essay on the Immediate Data" critics proceeded to confine +him in an irreducible static dualism; after "Matter and Memory" they +condemned him as failing for ever to explain the juxtaposition of the +two points of view, utility and truth: why should we require that after +"Creative Evolution" he should be forbidden to think anything new, or +distinguish, for example, different orders of life? + +The problems must be approached one after the other, and, in the +solution of each of them, it is proper to introduce only the necessary +elements. But each result is only "temporarily final." Let us lose the +strange habit of asking an author continually to do something other +than he has done, or, in what he has done, to give us the whole of his +thought. + +Till now, Mr Bergson has always considered each new problem according +to its specific and original nature, and, to solve it, he has always +supplied a new effort of autonomous adaptation: why should it be +otherwise for the future? I seek vainly for the decree forbidding him +the right to study the problem of biological evolution in itself, +and for the necessity which compels him to abide now by the premisses +contained in his past work. (For Mr Bergson, the religious sentiment, +as the sentiment of obligation, contains a basis of "immediate datum" +rendering it indissoluble and irreducible.) + +The only point which we have to examine is this: will the moral and +religious question compel Mr Bergson to break with the conclusions of +his previous studies, and can we not, on the contrary, foresee points of +general agreement? + +In the depths of ourselves we find liberty; in the depths of universal +being we find a demand for creation. Since evolution is creative, +each of its moments works for the production of an indeducible and +transcendent future. This future must not be regarded as a simple +development of the present, a simple expression of germs already given. +Consequently we have no authority for saying that there is for ever +only one order of life, only one plane of action, only one rhythm of +duration, only one perspective of existence. And if disconnections and +abrupt leaps are visible in the economy of the past--from matter to +life, from the animal to man--we have no authority again for claiming +that we cannot observe today something analogous in the very essence of +human life, that the point of view of the flesh, and the point of view +of the spirit, the point of view of reason, and the point of view of +charity are a homogeneous extension of it. And apart from that, taking +life in its first tendency, and in the general direction of its current, +it is ascent, growth, upward effort, and a work of spiritualising and +emancipating creation: by that we might define Good, for Good is a path +rather than a thing. + +But life may fail, halt, or travel downwards. "Life in general is +mobility itself; the particular manifestations of life accept this +mobility only with regret, and constantly fall behind. While it is +always going forward, they would be glad to mark time. Evolution in +general would take place as far as possible in a straight line; special +evolution is a circular advance. Like dust-eddies raised by the passing +wind, living bodies are self-pivoted and hung in the full breeze of +life." ("Creative Evolution", page 139.) Each species, each individual, +each function tends to take itself as its end; mechanism, habit, body, +and letter, which are, strictly speaking, pure instruments, actually +become principles of death. Thus it comes about that life is exhausted +in efforts towards self-preservation, allows itself to be converted +by matter into captive eddies, sometimes even abandons itself to the +inertia of the weight which it ought to raise, and surrenders to the +downward current which constitutes the essence of materiality: it is +thus that Evil would be defined, as the direction of travel opposed +to Good. Now, with man, thought, reflection, and clear consciousness +appear. At the same time also properly moral qualifications appear: good +becomes duty, evil becomes sin. At this precise moment, a new problem +begins, demanding the soundings of a new intuition, yet connected at +clear and visible points with previous problems. + +This is the philosophy which some are pleased to say is closed by nature +to all problems of a certain order, problems of reason or problems of +morality. There is no doctrine, on the contrary, which is more open, and +none which, in actual fact, lends itself better to further extension. + +It is not my duty to state here what I believe can be extracted from it. +Still less is it my duty to try to foresee what Mr Bergson's conclusions +will be. Let us confine ourselves to taking it in what it has expressly +given us of itself. From this point of view, which is that of pure +knowledge, I must again, as I conclude, emphasise its exceptional +importance and its infinite reach. It is possible not to understand it. +Such is frequently the case: thus it always has been in the past, each +time that a truly new intuition has arisen among men; thus it will be +until the inevitable day when disciples more respectful of the letter +than the spirit will turn it, alas, into a new scholastic. What does +it matter! The future is there; despite misconceptions, despite +incomprehensions, there is henceforth the departure-point of all +speculative philosophy; each day increases the number of minds which +recognise it; and it is better not to dwell upon the proofs of several +of those who are unable or unwilling to see it. + + + + +Index. + +Absolute, the. + +Adaptation, value of. + +Analysis, conceptual, contrasted with intuition. + +Appearances. + +Art, and philosophy. + +Atomism. + +Automatism. + +Automaton, of daily life. + +Being, as becoming. + +Brain, work of. + +Causality, psychological. + +Change. + +Common-sense. + +Concepts, analysis by and functions of, as symbols, creation of, as +general frames, practical reach of, inferior to intuition, further +discussed. + +Consciousness. + +Conservation, law of. + +Constants, search for, represented. + +Continuity, qualitative. + +Criticism, of language. + +Deduction, impotence of. + +Degradation, law of. + +Determinism, physical. + +Discontinuity, apparent. + +Disorder. + +Du Bois-Reymond. + +Duration, real, perpetually new, and thought, and time, pure. + +Dynamic connection, schemes. + +Ego, encrustations of the. + +Eleatic dialectic. + +Embryology, evidence of. + +Evil, a reality. + +Evolution, drama of, biological, value and meaning of, not +indispensable, distinguished from development, as dynamic continuity, as +activity, further discussed. + +Existence, as change. + +Experience. + +Fact. + +Freedom. + +Free-will. + +Genesis, law of. + +Good, a reality, a path. + +Habit, as obstacle. + +Heredity. + +Heterogeneity. + +Homogeneity, absence of. + +Huxley. + +Images. + +Immediacy. + +Immediate, the. + +Inert, the. + +Instinct, is sympathy, contrasted with intelligence. + +Intellectualism, distrusted. + +Intelligence, product of evolution, and instinct, broad meaning of. + +Intuition, as starting-point, intransmissible without language, +aesthetic, triumph of, and duration, and analysis. + +Intuitional effort, content. + +Kant, his point of departure, conclusions of, escape from. + +Knowledge, absolute, utilitarian nature of, new theory of. + +Language, dangers of. + +Laplace. + +Law, concept of. + +Liberty, personal importance of. + +Life, tendencies of, is finality, is progress, further discussed. + +Limit-concepts. + +Materialism. + +Mechanism, psychological, failure of. + +Memory, problem of, perception complicated by, importance of, racial, +planes of, memory of solids. + +Metaphor, justification of. + +Method, philosophical. + +Mill, Stuart. + +Motor-schemes, mechanisms. + +Mysticism. + +Non-morality. + +Nothingness. + +Number. + +Ontogenesis. + +Palaeontology, evidence of. + +Parallelism. + +Paralogism. + +Perception, an art, affected by memory, further explained, fulfilment +of guesswork, utilitarian signification, subjectivity of, pure +and ordinary, further discussed, relation to matter, perception of +immediacy. + +Philosophy, duty of, function of. + +Phylogenesis. + +Planes, of consciousness. + +Progress, and reality. + +Quality, and inner world. + +Quantity, and quality. + +Rationalism. + +Ravaisson. + +Realism. + +Reality, contact with, a flux, recognition of, absolute, elusive nature +of, personal, essentially qualitative, pure, inner, contrasting views +about, further discussed. + +Reason. + +Relation, between mind and matter. + +Religion, its place in philosophy. + +Renan. + +Romanticism. + +Schemes, dynamic. + +Science, prisoner of symbolism, cult of, impotence of. + +Sense, good, and common-sense. + +Space. + +Spencer, criticism of, success and weakness of. + +Spiritualism. + +Symbolism. + +Sympathy. + +Taine. + +Thought, methods of common. + +Time, required by Mr Bergson's philosophy, in space, and common-sense, +and duration. + +Torpor. + +Transformism, errors of. + +Utility, as goal of perception. + +Variation. + +Zeno of Elea. + +Zone, of feeling. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson, by Edouard le Roy + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A NEW PHILOSOPHY: HENRI BERGSON *** + +***** This file should be named 1347.txt or 1347.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/3/4/1347/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson + +by + +Edouard le Roy + + +Translated from the French by + +Vincent Benson + + + + +Preface + +This little book is due to two articles published under the same title in +the "Revue des Deux Mondes", 1st and 15th February 1912. + +Their object was to present Mr Bergson's philosophy to the public at large, +giving as short a sketch as possible, and describing, without too minute +details, the general trend of his movement. These articles I have here +reprinted intact. But I have added, in the form of continuous notes, some +additional explanations on points which did not come within the scope of +investigation in the original sketch. + +I need hardly add that my work, though thus far complete, does not in any +way claim to be a profound critical study. Indeed, such a study, dealing +with a thinker who has not yet said his last word, would today be +premature. I have simply aimed at writing an introduction which will make +it easier to read and understand Mr Bergson's works, and serve as a +preliminary guide to those who desire initiation in the new philosophy. + +I have therefore firmly waived all the paraphernalia of technical +discussions, and have made no comparisons, learned or otherwise, between Mr +Bergson's teaching and that of older philosophies. + +I can conceive no better method of misunderstanding the point at issue, I +mean the simple unity of productive intuition, than that of pigeon-holing +names of systems, collecting instances of resemblance, making up analogies, +and specifying ingredients. An original philosophy is not meant to be +studied as a mosaic which takes to pieces, a compound which analyses, or a +body which dissects. On the contrary, it is by considering it as a living +act, not as a rather clever discourse, by examining the peculiar excellence +of its soul rather than the formation of its body, that the inquirer will +succeed in understanding it. Properly speaking, I have only applied to Mr +Bergson the method which he himself justifiably prescribes in a recent +article ("Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale", November 1911), the only +method, in fact, which is in all senses of the word fully "exact." I shall +none the less be glad if these brief pages can be of any interest to +professional philosophers, and have endeavoured, as far as possible, to +allow them to trace, under the concise formulae employed, the scheme which +I have refused to develop. + +It has become evident to me that even today the interpretation of Mr +Bergson's position is in many cases full of faults, which it would +undoubtedly be worth while to assist in removing. I may or may not have +succeeded in my attempt, but such, at any rate, is the precise end I had in +view. + +In conclusion, I may say that I have not had the honour of being Mr +Bergson's pupil; and, at the time when I became acquainted with his +outlook, my own direct reflection on science and life had already produced +in me similar trains of thought. I found in his work the striking +realisation of a presentiment and a desire. This "correspondence," which I +have not exaggerated, proved at once a help and a hindrance to me in +entering into the exact comprehension of so profoundly original a doctrine. +The reader will thus understand that I think it in place to quote my +authority to him in the following lines which Mr Bergson kindly wrote me +after the publication of the articles reproduced in this volume: +"Underneath and beyond the method you have caught the intention and the +spirit...Your study could not be more conscientious or true to the +original. As it advances, condensation increases in a marked degree: the +reader becomes aware that the explanation is undergoing a progressive +involution similar to the involution by which we determine the reality of +Time. To produce this feeling, much more has been necessary than a close +study of my works: it has required deep sympathy of thought, the power, in +fact, of rethinking the subject in a personal and original manner. Nowhere +is this sympathy more in evidence than in your concluding pages, where in a +few words you point out the possibilities of further developments of the +doctrine. In this direction I should myself say exactly what you have +said." + +Paris, 28th March 1912. + + +CONTENTS + +Preface + + +GENERAL VIEW + + +I. Method. + +Scope of Henri Bergson's Philosophy. Material and Authorities. +Investigation of Common-sense. Value of Science. Perception Discussed. +Practical Life and Reality. Concepts and Symbolism. Intuition and +Analysis. Use of Metaphor. The Philosopher's Task. + + +II. Teaching. + +The Ego. Space and Number. Parallelism. Henri Bergson's View of Mind and +Matter. Qualitative Continuity. Memory. Real Duration Heterogeneous. +Liberty and Determinism. Meaning of Reality. Evolution and Automatism. +Triumph of Man. The Vital Impulse. Objections Refuted. Place of Religion +in the New Philosophy. + + + +ADDITIONAL EXPLANATIONS + + +I. Henri Bergson's Work and the General Directions of Contemporary +Thought. + +Mathematics and Philosophy. The Inert and the Living. Realism and +Positivism. Henri Bergson and the Intuition of Duration. + + +II. Immediacy. + +Necessity of Criticism. Utilitarianism of Common-sense. Perception of +Immediacy. + + +III. Theory of Perception. + +Pure and Ordinary Perception. Kant's Position. Relation of Perception to +Matter. Complete Experience. + + +IV. Critique of Language. + +Dynamic Schemes. Dangers of Language. The Eleatic Dialectic. Scientific +Thought and the Task of Intuition. Discussion of Change. + + +V. The Problem of Consciousness: Duration and Liberty. + +States as Phases in Duration. The Scientific View of Time. Duration and +Freedom. Liberty and Determinism in the Light of Henri Bergson's +Philosophy. + + +VI. The Problem of Evolution: Life and Matter. + +Evolution and Creation. Laws of Conservation and Degradation. Quantity +and Quality. Secondary Value of Matter. + + +VII. The Problem of Knowledge: Analysis and Intuition. + +Difficulties of Kant's Position. Insufficiency of Intelligence. Henri +Bergson and the Problem of Reason. Geometric and Vital Types of Order. + + +VIII. Conclusion. + +Moral and Religious Problems. Henri Bergson's Position. + + +A NEW PHILOSOPHY + +GENERAL VIEW + + +I. Method. + +There is a thinker whose name is today on everybody's lips, who is deemed +by acknowledged philosophers worthy of comparison with the greatest, and +who, with his pen as well as his brain, has overleapt all technical +obstacles, and won himself a reading both outside and inside the schools. +Beyond any doubt, and by common consent, Mr Henri Bergson's work will +appear to future eyes among the most characteristic, fertile, and glorious +of our era. It marks a never-to-be-forgotten date in history; it opens up +a phase of metaphysical thought; it lays down a principle of development +the limits of which are indeterminable; and it is after cool consideration, +with full consciousness of the exact value of words, that we are able to +pronounce the revolution which it effects equal in importance to that +effected by Kant, or even by Socrates. + +Everybody, indeed, has become aware of this more or less clearly. Else how +are we to explain, except through such recognition, the sudden striking +spread of this new philosophy which, by its learned rigorism, precluded the +likelihood of so rapid a triumph? + +Twenty years have sufficed to make its results felt far beyond traditional +limits: and now its influence is alive and working from one pole of +thought to the other; and the active leaven contained in it can be seen +already extending to the most varied and distant spheres: in social and +political spheres, where from opposite points, and not without certain +abuses, an attempt is already being made to wrench it in contrary +directions; in the sphere of religious speculation, where it has been more +legitimately summoned to a distinguished, illuminative, and beneficent +career; in the sphere of pure science, where, despite old separatist +prejudices, the ideas sown are pushing up here and there; and lastly, in +the sphere of art, where there are indications that it is likely to help +certain presentiments, which have till now remained obscure, to become +conscious of themselves. The moment is favourable to a study of Mr +Bergson's philosophy; but in the face of so many attempted methods of +employment, some of them a trifle premature, the point of paramount +importance, applying Mr Bergson's own method to himself, is to study his +philosophy in itself, for itself, in its profound trend and its +authenticated action, without claiming to enlist it in the ranks of any +cause whatsoever. + + +I. + +Mr Bergson's readers will undergo at almost every page they read an intense +and singular experience. The curtain drawn between ourselves and reality, +enveloping everything including ourselves in its illusive folds, seems of a +sudden to fall, dissipated by enchantment, and display to the mind depths +of light till then undreamt, in which reality itself, contemplated face to +face for the first time, stands fully revealed. The revelation is +overpowering, and once vouchsafed will never afterwards be forgotten. + +Nothing can convey to the reader the effects of this direct and intimate +mental vision. Everything which he thought he knew already finds new birth +and vigour in the clear light of morning: on all hands, in the glow of +dawn, new intuitions spring up and open out; we feel them big with infinite +consequences, heavy and saturated with life. Each of them is no sooner +blown than it appears fertile for ever. And yet there is nothing +paradoxical or disturbing in the novelty. It is a reply to our +expectation, an answer to some dim hope. So vivid is the impression of +truth, that afterwards we are even ready to believe we recognise the +revelation as if we had always darkly anticipated it in some mysterious +twilight at the back of consciousness. + +Afterwards, no doubt, in certain cases, incertitude reappears, sometimes +even decided objections. The reader, who at first was under a magic spell, +corrects his thought, or at least hesitates. What he has seen is still at +bottom so new, so unexpected, so far removed from familiar conceptions. +For this surging wave of thought our mind contains none of those ready-cut +channels which render comprehension easy. But whether, in the long run, we +each of us give or refuse complete or partial adhesion, all of us, at +least, have received a regenerating shock, an internal upheaval not readily +silenced: the network of our intellectual habits is broken; henceforth a +new leaven works and ferments in us; we shall no longer think as we used to +think; and be we pupils or critics, we cannot mistake the fact that we have +here a principle of integral renewal for ancient philosophy and its old and +timeworn problems. + +It is obviously impossible to sketch in brief all the aspects and all the +wealth of so original a work. Still less shall I be able to answer here +the many questions which arise. I must decide to pass rapidly over the +technical detail of clear, closely-argued, and penetrating discussions; +over the scope and exactness of the evidence borrowed from the most diverse +positive sciences; over the marvellous dexterity of the psychological +analysis; over the magic of a style which can call up what words cannot +express. The solidity of the construction will not be evidenced in these +pages, nor its austere and subtle beauty. But what I do at all costs wish +to bring out, in shorter form, in this new philosophy, is its directing +idea and general movement. + +In such an undertaking, where the end is to understand rather than to +judge, criticism ought to take second place. It is more profitable to +attempt to feel oneself into the heart of the teaching, to relive its +genesis, to perceive the principle of organic unity, to come at the +mainspring. Let our reading be a course of meditation which we live. The +only true homage we can render to the masters of thought consists in +ourselves thinking, as far as we can do so, in their train, under their +inspiration, and along the paths which they have opened up. + +In the case before us this road is landmarked by several books which it +will be sufficient to study one after the other, and take successively as +the text of our reflections. + +In 1889 Mr Bergson made his appearance with an "Essay on the Immediate Data +of Consciousness". + +This was his doctor's thesis. Taking up his position inside the human +personality, in its inmost mind, he endeavoured to lay hold of the depths +of life and free action in their commonly overlooked and fugitive +originality. + +Some years later, in 1896, passing this time to the externals of +consciousness, the contact surface between things and the ego, he published +"Matter and Memory", a masterly study of perception and recollection, which +he himself put forward as an inquiry into the relation between body and +mind. In 1907 he followed with "Creative Evolution", in which the new +metaphysic was outlined in its full breadth, and developed with a wealth of +suggestion and perspective opening upon the distances of infinity; +universal evolution, the meaning of life, the nature of mind and matter, of +intelligence and instinct, were the great problems here treated, ending in +a general critique of knowledge and a completely original definition of +philosophy. + +These will be our guides which we shall carefully follow, step by step. It +is not, I must confess, without some apprehension that I undertake the task +of summing up so much research, and of condensing into a few pages so many +and such new conclusions. + +Mr Bergson excels, even on points of least significance, in producing the +feeling of unfathomed depths and infinite levels. Never has anyone better +understood how to fulfil the philosopher's first task, in pointing out the +hidden mystery in everything. With him we see all at once the concrete +thickness and inexhaustible extension of the most familiar reality, which +has always been before our eyes, where before we were aware only of the +external film. + +Do not imagine that this is simply a poetical delusion. We must be +grateful if the philosopher uses exquisite language and writes in a style +which abounds in living images. These are rare qualities. But let us +avoid being duped by a show of printed matter: these unannotated pages are +supported by positive science submitted to the most minute inspection. One +day, in 1901, at the French Philosophical Society, Mr Bergson related the +genesis of "Matter and Memory". + +"Twelve years or so before its appearance, I had set myself the following +problem: 'What would be the teaching of the physiology and pathology of +today upon the ancient question of the connection between physical and +moral to an unprejudiced mind, determined to forget all speculation in +which it has indulged on this point, determined also to neglect, in the +enunciations of philosophers, all that is not pure and simple statement of +fact?' I set myself to solve the problem, and I very soon perceived that +the question was susceptible of a provisional solution, and even of precise +formulation, only if restricted to the problem of memory. In memory itself +I was forced to determine bounds which I had afterwards to narrow +considerably. After confining myself to the recollection of words I saw +that the problem, as stated, was still too broad, and that, to put the +question in its most precise and interesting form, I should have to +substitute the recollection of the sound of words. The literature on +aphasia is enormous. I took five years to sift it. And I arrived at this +conclusion, that between the psychological fact and its corresponding basis +in the brain there must be a relation which answers to none of the ready- +made concepts furnished us by philosophy." + +Certain characteristics of Mr Bergson's manner will be remarked throughout: +his provisional effort of forgetfulness to recreate a new and untrammelled +mind; his mixture of positive inquiry and bold invention; his stupendous +reading; his vast pioneer work carried on with indefatigable patience; his +constant correction by criticism, informed of the minutest details and +swift to follow up each of them at every turn. With a problem which would +at first have seemed secondary and incomplete, but which reappears as the +subject deepens and is thereby metamorphosed, he connects his entire +philosophy; and so well does he blend the whole and breathe upon it the +breath of life that the final statement leaves the reader with an +impression of sovereign ease. + +Examples will be necessary to enable us, even to a feeble extent, to +understand this proceeding better. But before we come to examples, a +preliminary question requires examination. In the preface to his first +"Essay" Mr Bergson defined the principle of a method which was afterwards +to reappear in its identity throughout his various works; and we must +recall the terms he employed. + +"We are forced to express ourselves in words, and we think, most often, in +space. To put it another way, language compels us to establish between our +ideas the same clear and precise distinctions, and the same break in +continuity, as between material objects. This assimilation is useful in +practical life and necessary in most sciences. But we are right in asking +whether the insuperable difficulties of certain philosophical problems do +not arise from the fact that we persist in placing non-spatial phenomena +next one another in space, and whether, if we did away with the vulgar +illustrations round which we dispute, we should not sometimes put an end to +the dispute." + +That is to say, it is stated to be the philosopher's duty from the outset +to renounce the usual forms of analytic and synthetic thought, and to +achieve a direct intuitional effort which shall put him in immediate +contact with reality. Without doubt it is this question of method which +demands our first attention. It is the leading question. Mr Bergson +himself presents his works as "essays" which do not aim at "solving the +greatest problems all at once," but seek merely "to define the method and +disclose the possibility of applying it on some essential points." +(Preface to "Creative Evolution".) It is also a delicate question, for it +dominates all the rest, and decides whether we shall fully understand what +is to follow. + +We must therefore pause here a moment. To direct us in this preliminary +study we have an admirable "Introduction to Metaphysis", which appeared as +an article in the "Metaphysical and Moral Review" (January 1903): a short +but marvellously suggestive memoire, constituting the best preface to the +reading of the books themselves. We may say in passing, that we should be +grateful to Mr Bergson if he would have it bound in volume form, along with +some other articles which are scarcely to be had at all today. + + +II. + +Every philosophy, prior to taking shape in a group of co-ordinated theses, +presents itself, in its initial stage, as an attitude, a frame of mind, a +method. Nothing can be more important than to study this starting-point, +this elementary act of direction and movement, if we wish afterwards to +arrive at the precise shade of meaning of the subsequent teaching. Here is +really the fountain-head of thought; it is here that the form of the future +system is determined, and here that contact with reality takes effect. + +The last point, particularly, is vital. To return to the direct view of +things beyond all figurative symbols, to descend into the inmost depths of +being, to watch the throbbing life in its pure state, and listen to the +secret rhythm of its inmost breath, to measure it, at least so far as +measurement is possible, has always been the philosopher's ambition; and +the new philosophy has not departed from this ideal. But in what light +does it regard its task? That is the first point to clear up. For the +problem is complex, and the goal distant. + +"We are made as much, and more, for action than for thought," says Mr +Bergson; "or rather, when we follow our natural impulse, it is to act that +we think." ("L'Evolution Creatrice", page 321.) And again, "What we +ordinarily call a fact is not reality such as it would appear to an +immediate intuition, but an adaptation of reality to practical interests +and the demands of social life." ("Matiere et Memoire", page 201.) Hence +the question which takes precedence of all others is: to distinguish in +our common representation of the world, the fact in its true sense from the +combinations which we have introduced in view of action and language. + +Now, to rediscover nature in her fresh springs of reality, it is not +sufficient to abandon the images and conceptions invented by human +initiative; still less is it sufficient to fling ourselves into the torrent +of brute sensations. By so doing we are in danger of dissolving our +thought in dream or quenching it in night. + +Above all, we are in danger of committal to a path which it is impossible +to follow. The philosopher is not free to begin the work of knowledge +again upon other planes, with a mind which would be adequate to the new and +virgin issue of a simple writ of oblivion. + +At the time when critical reflection begins, we have already been long +engaged in action and science, by the training of individual life, as by +hereditary and racial experience, our faculties of perception and +conception, our senses and our understanding, have contracted habits, which +are by this time unconscious and instinctive; we are haunted by all kinds +of ideas and principles, so familiar today that they even pass unobserved. +But what is it all worth? + +Does it, in its present state, help us to know the nature of a +disinterested intuition? + +Nothing but a methodical examination of consciousness can tell us that; and +it will take more than a renunciation of explicit knowledge to recreate in +us a new mind, capable of grasping the bare fact exactly as it is: what we +require is perhaps a penetrating reform, a kind of conversion. + +The rational and perceptive function we term our intelligence emerges from +darkness through a slowly lifting dawn. During this twilight period it has +lived, worked, acted, fashioned and informed itself. On the threshold of +philosophical speculation it is full of more or less concealed beliefs, +which are literally prejudices, and branded with a secret mark influencing +its every movement. Here is an actual situation. Exemption from it is +beyond anyone's province. Whether we will or no, we are from the beginning +of our inquiry immersed in a doctrine which disguises nature to us, and +already at bottom constitutes a complete metaphysic. This we term common- +sense, and positive science is itself only an extension and refinement of +it. What is the value of this work performed without clear consciousness +or critical attention? Does it bring us into true relation with things, +into relation with pure consciousness? + +This is our first and inevitable doubt, which requires solution. + +But it would be a quixotic proceeding first to make a void in our mind, and +afterwards to admit into it, one by one, after investigation, such and such +a concept, or such and such a principle. The illusion of the clean sweep +and total reconstruction can never be too vigorously condemned. + +Is it from the void that we set out to think? Do we think in void, and +with nothing? Common ideas of necessity form the groundwork for the +broidery of our advanced thought. Further, even if we succeeded in our +impossible task, should we, in so doing, have corrected the causes of error +which are today graven upon the very structure of our intelligence, such as +our past life has made it? These errors would not cease to act +imperceptibly upon the work of revision intended to apply the remedy. + +It is from within, by an effort of immanent purgation, that the necessary +reform must be brought about. And philosophy's first task is to institute +critical reflection upon the obscure beginnings of thought, with a view to +shedding light upon its spontaneous virgin condition, but without any vain +claim to lift it out of the current in which it is actually plunged. + +One conclusion is already plain: the groundwork of common-sense is sure, +but the form is suspicious. + +In common-sense is contained, at any rate virtually and in embryo, all that +can ever be attained of reality, for reality is verification, not +construction. + +Everything has its starting-point in construction and verification. Thus +philosophical research can only be a conscious and deliberate return to the +facts of primal intuition. But common-sense, being prepossessed in a +practical direction, has doubtless subjected these facts to a process of +interested alteration, which is artificial in proportion to the labour +bestowed. Such is Mr Bergson's fundamental hypothesis, and it is far- +reaching. "Many metaphysical difficulties probably arise from our habit of +confounding speculation and practice; or of pushing an idea in the +direction of utility, when we think we fathom it in theory; or, lastly, of +employing in thought the forms of action." (Preface to "Matter and +Memory". First edition.) + +The work of reform will consist therefore in freeing our intelligence from +its utilitarian habits, by endeavouring at the outset to become clearly +conscious of them. + +Notice how far presumption is in favour of our hypothesis. Whether we +regard organic life in the genesis and preservation of the individual, or +in the evolution of species, we see its natural direction to be towards +utility: but the effort of thought comes after the effort of life; it is +not added from outside, it is the continuance and the flower of the former +effort. Must we not expect from this that it will preserve its former +habits? And what do we actually observe? The first gleam of human +intelligence in prehistoric times is revealed to us by an industry; the cut +flint of the primitive caves marks the first stage of the road which was +one day to end in the most sublime philosophies. Again, every science has +begun by practical arts. Indeed, our science of today, however +disinterested it may have become, remains none the less in close relation +with the demands of our action; it permits us to speak of and to handle +things rather than to see them in their intimate and profound nature. +Analysis, when applied to our operations of knowledge, shows us that our +understanding parcels out, arrests, and quantifies, whereas reality, as it +appears to immediate intuition, is a moving series, a flux of blended +qualities. + +That is to say, our understanding solidifies all that it touches. Have we +not here exactly the essential postulates of action and speech? To speak, +as to act, we must have separable elements, terms and objects which remain +inert while the operation goes on, maintaining between themselves the +constant relations which find their most perfect and ideal presentment in +mathematics. + +Everything tends, then, to incline us towards the hypothesis in question. +Let us regard it henceforward as expressing a fact. + +The forms of knowledge elaborated by common-sense were not originally +intended to allow us to see reality as it is. + +Their task was rather, and remains so, to enable us to grasp its practical +aspect. It is for that they are made, not for philosophical speculation. + +Now these forms nevertheless have existed in us as inveterate habits, soon +becoming unconscious, even when we have reached the point of desiring +knowledge for its own sake. + +But in this new stage they preserve the bias of their original utilitarian +function, and carry this mark with them everywhere, leaving it upon the +fresh tasks which we are fain to make them accomplish. + +An inner reform is therefore imperative today, if we are to succeed in +unearthing and sifting, in our perception of nature, under the veinstone of +practical symbolism, the true intuitional content. + +This attempt at return to the standpoint of pure contemplation and +disinterested experience is a task very different from the task of science. +It is one thing to regard more and more or less and less closely with the +eyes made for us by utilitarian evolution: it is another to labour at +remaking for ourselves eyes capable of seeing, in order to see, and not in +order to live. + +Philosophy understood in this manner--and we shall see more and more +clearly as we go on that there is no other legitimate method of +understanding it--demands from us an almost violent act of reform and +conversion. + +The mind must turn round upon itself, invert the habitual direction of its +thought, climb the hill down which its instinct towards action has carried +it, and go to seek experience at its source, "above the critical bend where +it inclines towards our practical use and becomes, properly speaking, human +experience." ("Matter and Memory", page 203.) In short, by a twin effort +of criticism and expansion, it must pass outside common-sense and synthetic +understanding to return to pure intuition. + +Philosophy consists in reliving the immediate over again, and in +interpreting our rational science and everyday perception by its light. +That, at least, is the first stage. We shall find afterwards that that is +not all. + +Here is a genuinely new conception of philosophy. Here, for the first +time, philosophy is made specifically distinct from science, yet remains no +less positive. + +What science really does is to preserve the general attitude of common- +sense, with its apparatus of forms and principles. + +It is true that science develops and perfects it, refines and extends it, +and even now and again corrects it. But science does not change either the +direction or the essential steps. + +In this philosophy, on the contrary, what is at first suspected and finally +modified, is the setting of the points before the journey begins. + +Not that, in saying so, we mean to condemn science; but we must recognise +its just limits. The methods of science proper are in their place and +appropriate, and lead to a knowledge which is true (though still +symbolical), so long as the object studied is the world of practical +action, or, to put it briefly, the world of inert matter. + +But soul, life, and activity escape it, and yet these are the spring and +ultimate basis of everything: and it is the appreciation of this fact, +with what it entails, that is new. And yet, new as Mr Bergson's conception +of philosophy may deservedly appear, it does not any the less, from another +point of view, deserve to be styled classic and traditional. + +What it really defines is not so much a particular philosophy as philosophy +itself, in its original function. + +Everywhere in history we find its secret current at its task. + +All great philosophers have had glimpses of it, and employed it in moments +of discovery. Only as a general rule they have not clearly recognised what +they were doing, and so have soon turned aside. + +But on this point I cannot insist without going into lengthy detail, and am +obliged to refer the reader to the fourth chapter of "Creative Evolution", +where he will find the whole question dealt with. + +One remark, however, has still to be made. Philosophy, according to Mr +Bergson's conception, implies and demands time; it does not aim at +completion all at once, for the mental reform in question is of the kind +which requires gradual fulfilment. The truth which it involves does not +set out to be a non-temporal essence, which a sufficiently powerful genius +would be able, under pressure, to perceive in its entirety at one view; and +that again seems to be very new. + +I do not, of course, wish to abuse systems of philosophy. Each of them is +an experience of thought, a moment in the life of thought, a method of +exploring reality, a reagent which reveals an aspect. Truth undergoes +analysis into systems as does light into colours. + +But the mere name system calls up the static idea of a finished building. +Here there is nothing of the kind. The new philosophy desires to be a +proceeding as much as, and even more than, to be a system. It insists on +being lived as well as thought. It demands that thought should work at +living its true life, an inner life related to itself, effective, active, +and creative, but not on that account directed towards external action. +"And," says Mr Bergson, "it can only be constructed by the collective and +progressive effort of many thinkers, and of many observers, completing, +correcting, and righting one another." (Preface to "Creative Evolution".) + +Let us see how it begins, and what is its generating act. + + +III. + +How are we to attain the immediate? How are we to realise this perception +of pure fact which we stated to be the philosopher's first step? + +Unless we can clear up this doubt, the end proposed will remain to our gaze +an abstract and lifeless ideal. This is, then, the point which requires +instant explanation. For there is a serious difficulty in which the very +employment of the word "immediate" might lead us astray. + +The immediate, in the sense which concerns us, is not at all, or at least +is no longer for us the passive experience, the indefinable something which +we should inevitably receive, provided we opened our eyes and abstained +from reflection. + +As a matter of fact, we cannot abstain from reflection: reflection is +today part of our very vision; it comes into play as soon as we open our +eyes. So that, to come on the trail of the immediate, there must be effort +and work. How are we to guide this effort? In what will this work +consist? By what sign shall we be able to recognise that the result has +been obtained? + +These are the questions to be cleared up. Mr Bergson speaks of them +chiefly in connection with the realities of consciousness, or, more +generally speaking, of life. And it is here, in fact, that the +consequences are most weighty and far-reaching. We shall need to refer to +them again in detail. But to simplify my explanation, I will here choose +another example: that of inert matter, of the perception on which the +physical is based. It is in this case that the divergence between common +perception and pure perception, however real it may be, assumes least +proportions. + +Therefore it appears most in place in the sketch I desire to trace of an +exceedingly complex work, where I can only hope, evidently, to indicate the +main lines and general direction. + +We readily believe that when we cast our eyes upon surrounding objects, we +enter into them unresistingly and apprehend them all at once in their +intrinsic nature. Perception would thus be nothing but simple passive +registration. But nothing could be more untrue, if we are speaking of the +perception which we employ without profound criticism in the course of our +daily life. What we here take to be pure fact is, on the contrary, the +last term in a highly complicated series of mental operations. And this +term contains as much of us as of things. + +In fact, all concrete perception comes up for analysis as an indissoluble +mixture of construction and fact, in which the fact is only revealed +through the construction, and takes on its complexion. We all know by +experience how incapable the uneducated person is of explaining the simple +appearance of the least fact, without embodying a crowd of false +interpretations. We know to a less extent, but it is also true, that the +most enlightened and adroit person proceeds in just the same manner: his +interpretation is better, but it is still interpretation. + +That is why accurate observation is so difficult; we see or we do not see, +we notice such and such an aspect, we read this or that, according to our +state of consciousness at the time, according to the direction of the +investigation on which we are engaged. + +Who was it defined art as nature seen through a mind? Perception, too, is +an art. + +This art has its processes, its conventions, and its tools. Go into a +laboratory and study one of those complex instruments which make our senses +finer or more powerful; each of them is literally a sheaf of materialised +theories, and by means of it all acquired science is brought to bear on +each new observation of the student. In exactly the same way our organs of +sense are actual instruments constructed by the unconscious work of the +mind in the course of biological evolution; they too sum up and give +concrete form and expression to a system of enlightening theories. But +that is not all. The most elementary psychology shows us the amount of +thought, in the correct sense of the term, recollection, or inference, +which enters into what we should be tempted to call pure perception. + +Establishment of fact is not the simple reception of the faithful imprint +of that fact; it is invariably interpreted, systematised, and placed in +pre-existing forms which constitute veritable theoretical frames. That is +why the child has to learn to perceive. There is an education of the +senses which he acquires by long training. One day, which aid of habit, he +will almost cease to see things: a few lines, a few glimpses, a few simple +signs noted in a brief passing glance, will enable him to recognise them; +and he will hardly retain any more of reality than its schemes and symbols. + +"Perception," says Mr Bergson on this subject, "becomes in the end only an +opportunity of recollection." ("Matter and Memory", page 59.) + +All concrete perception, it is true, is directed less upon the present than +the past. The part of pure perception in it is small, and immediately +covered and almost buried by the contribution of memory. + +This infinitesimal part acts as a bait. It is a summons to recollection, +challenging us to extract from our previous experience, and construct with +our acquired wealth a system of images which permits us to read the +experience of the moment. + +With our scheme of interpretation thus constituted we encounter the few +fugitive traits which we have actually perceived. If the theory we have +elaborated adapts itself, and succeeds in accounting for, connecting, and +making sense of these traits, we shall finally have a perception properly +so called. + +Perception then, in the usual sense of the word, is the resolution of a +problem, the verification of a theory. + +Thus are explained "errors of the senses," which are in reality errors of +interpretation. Thus too, and in the same manner, we have the explanation +of dreams. + +Let us take a simple example. When you read a book, do you spell each +syllable, one by one, to group the syllables afterwards into words, and the +words into phrases, thus travelling from print to meaning? Not at all: +you grasp a few letters accurately, a few downstrokes in their graphical +outline; then you guess the remainder, travelling in the reverse direction, +from a probable meaning to the print which you are interpreting. This is +what causes mistakes in reading, and the well-known difficulty in seeing +printing errors. + +This observation is confirmed by curious experiments. Write some everyday +phrase or other on a blackboard; let there be a few intentional mistakes +here and there, a letter or two altered, or left out. Place the words in a +dark room in front of a person who, of course, does not know what has been +written. Then turn on the light without allowing the observer sufficient +time to spell the writing. + +In spite of this, he will in most cases read the entire phrase, without +hesitation or difficulty. + +He has restored what was missing, or corrected what was at fault. + +Now, ask him what letters he is certain he saw, and you will find he will +tell you an omitted or altered letter as well as a letter actually written. + +The observer then thinks he sees in broad light a letter which is not +there, if that letter, in virtue of the general sense, ought to appear in +the phrase. But you can go further, and vary the experiment. + +Suppose we write the word "tumult" correctly. After doing so, to direct +the memory of the observer into a certain trend of recollection, call out +in his ear, during the short time the light is turned on, another word of +different meaning, for example, the word "railway." + +The observer will read "tunnel"; that is to say, a word, the graphical +outline of which is like that of the written word, but connected in sense +with the order of recollection called up. + +In this mistake in reading, as in the spontaneous correction of the +previous experiment, we see very clearly that perception is always the +fulfilment of guesswork. + +It is the direction of this work that we are concerned to determine. + +According to the popular idea, perception has a completely speculative +interest: it is pure knowledge. Therein lies the fundamental mistake. + +Notice first of all how much more probable it is, a priori, that the work +of perception, just as any other natural and spontaneous work, should have +a utilitarian signification. + +"Life," says Mr Bergson with justice, "is the acceptance from objects of +nothing but the useful impression, with the response of the appropriate +reactions." ("Laughter", page 154.) + +And this view receives striking objective confirmation if, with the author +of "Matter and Memory", we follow the progress of the perceptive functions +along the animal series from the protoplasm to the higher vertebrates; or +if, with him, we analyse the task of the body, and discover that the +nervous system is manifested in its very structure as, before all, an +instrument of action. Have we not already besides proof of this in the +fact that each of us always appears in his own eyes to occupy the centre of +the world he perceives? + +The "Riquet" of Anatole France voices Mr Bergson's view: "I am always in +the centre of everything, and men and beasts and things, for or against me, +range themselves around." + +But direct analysis leads us still more plainly to the same conclusion. + +Let us take the perception of bodies. It is easy to show--and I regret +that I cannot here reproduce Mr Bergson's masterly demonstration--that the +division of matter into distinct objects with sharp outlines is produced by +a selection of images which is completely relative to our practical needs. + +"The distinct outlines which we assign to an object, and which bestow upon +it its individuality, are nothing but the graph of a certain kind of +influence which we should be able to employ at a certain point in space: +it is the plan of our future actions which is submitted to our eyes, as in +a mirror, when we perceive the surfaces and edges of things. Remove this +action, and in consequence the high roads which it makes for itself in +advance by perception, in the web of reality, and the individuality of the +body will be reabsorbed in the universal interaction which is without doubt +reality itself." Which is tantamount to saying that "rough bodies are cut +in the material of nature by a perception of which the scissors follow, in +some sort, the dotted line along which the action would pass." ("Creative +Evolution", page 12.) + +Bodies independent of common experience do not then appear, to an attentive +criticism, as veritable realities which would have an existence in +themselves. They are only centres of co-ordination for our actions. Or, +if you prefer it, "our needs are so many shafts of light which, when played +upon the continuity of perceptible qualities, produce in them the outline +of distinct bodies." ("Matter and Memory", page 220.) Does not science +too, after its own fashion, resolve the atom into a centre of intersecting +relations, which finally extend by degrees to the entire universe in an +indissoluble interpenetration? + +A qualitative continuity, imperceptibly shaded off, over which pass quivers +that here and there converge, is the image by which we are forced to +recognise a superior degree of reality. + +But is this perceptible material, this qualitative continuity, the pure +fact in matter? Not yet. Perception, we said just now, is always in +reality complicated by memory. There is more truth in this than we had +seen. Reality is not a motionless spectrum, extending to our view its +infinite shades; it might rather be termed a leaping flame in the spectrum. +All is in passage, in process of becoming. + +On this flux consciousness concentrates at long intervals, each time +condensing into one "quality" an immense period of the inner history of +things. "In just this way the thousand successive positions of a runner +contract into one single symbolic attitude, which our eye perceives, which +art reproduces, and which becomes for everybody the representation of a man +running." ("Matter and Memory", page 233.) + +In the same way again, a red light, continuing one second, embodies such a +large number of elementary pulsations that it would take 25,000 years of +our time to see its distinct passage. From here springs the subjectivity +of our perception. The different qualities correspond, roughly speaking, +to the different rhythms of contraction or dilution, to the different +degrees of inner tension in the perceiving consciousness. + +Pushing the case to its limits, and imagining a complete expansion, matter +would resolve into colourless disturbances, and become the "pure matter" of +the natural philosopher. + +Let us now unite in one single continuity the different periods of the +preceding dialectic. Vibration, qualities, and bodies are none of them +reality by themselves; but all the same they are part of reality. And +absolute reality would be the whole of these degrees and moments, and many +others as well, no doubt. Or rather, to secure absolute intuition of +matter, we should have on the one hand to get rid of all that our practical +needs have constructed, restore on the other all the effective tendencies +they have extinguished, follow the complete scale of qualitative +concentrations and dilutions, and pass, by a kind of sympathy, into the +incessantly moving play of all the possible innumerable contractions or +resolutions; with the result that in the end we should succeed, by a +simultaneous view as it were, in grasping, according to their infinitely +various modes, the phases of this matter which, though at present latent, +admit of "perception." + +Thus, in the case before us, absolute knowledge is found to be the result +of integral experience; and though we cannot attain the term, we see at any +rate in what direction we should have to work to reach it. + +Now it must be stated that our realisable knowledge is at every moment +partial and limited rather than exterior and relative, for our effective +perception is related to matter in itself as the part to the whole. Our +least perceptions are actually based on pure perception, and "we are aware +of the elementary disturbances which constitute matter, in the perceptible +quality in which they suffer contraction, as we are aware of the beating of +our heart in the general feeling that we have of living." ("The Journal of +Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods", 7th July 1910.) + +But the preoccupation of practical action, coming between reality and +ourselves, produces the fragmentary world of common-sense, much as an +absorbing medium resolves into separate rays the continuous spectrum of a +luminous body; whilst the rhythm of duration, and the degree of tension +peculiar to our consciousness, limit us to the apprehension of certain +qualities only. + +What then have we to do to progress towards absolute knowledge? Not to +quit experience: quite the contrary; but to extend it and diversify it by +science, while, at the same time, by criticism, we correct in it the +disturbing effects of action, and finally quicken all the results thus +obtained by an effort of sympathy which will make us familiar with the +object until we feel its profound throbbing and its inner wealth. + +In connection with this last vital point, which is decisive, call to mind a +celebrated page of Sainte-Beuve where he defines his method: "Enter into +your author, make yourself at home in him, produce him under his different +aspects, make him live, move, and speak as he must have done; follow him to +his fireside and in his domestic habits, as closely as you can... + +"Study him, turn him round and round, ask him questions at your leisure; +place him before you...Every feature will appear in its turn, and take the +place of the man himself in this expression... + +"An individual reality will gradually blend with and become incarnate in +the vague, abstract, and general type...There is our man..." Yes, that is +exactly what we want: it could not be better put. Transpose this page +from the literary to the metaphysical order, and you have intuition, as +defined by Mr Bergson. You have the return to immediacy. + +But a new problem then arises: Is not our intuition of immediacy in danger +of remaining inexpressible? For our language has been formed in view of +practical life, not of pure knowledge. + + +IV. + +The immediate perception of reality is not all; we have still to translate +this perception into intelligible language, into a connected chain of +concepts; failing which, it would seem, we should not have knowledge in the +strict sense of the word, we should not have truth. + +Without language, intuition, supposing it came to birth, would remain +intransmissible and incommunicable, and would perish in a solitary cry. By +language alone are we enabled to submit it to a positive test: the letter +is the ballast of the mind, the body which allows it to act, and in acting +to scatter the unreal delusions of dream. + +The act of pure intuition demands so great an inner tension from thought +that it can only be very rare and very fugitive: a few rapid gleams here +and there; and these dawning glimpses must be sustained, and afterwards +united, and that again is the work of language. + +But while language is thus necessary, no less necessary is a criticism of +ordinary language, and of the methods familiar to the understanding. These +forms of reflected knowledge, these processes of analysis really convey +secretly all the postulates of practical action. But it is imperative that +language should translate, not betray; that the body of formulae should not +stifle the soul of intuition. We shall see in what the work of reform and +conversion imposed on the philosopher precisely consists. + +The attitude of the ordinary proceedings of common thought can be stated in +a few words. Place the object studied before yourself as an exterior +"thing." Then place yourself outside it, in perspective, at points of +vantage on a circumference, whence you can only see the object of your +investigation at a distance, with such interval as would be sufficient for +the contemplation of a picture; in short, move round the object instead of +entering boldly into it. But these proceedings lead to what I shall term +analysis by concepts; that is to say, the attempt to resolve all reality +into general ideas. + +What are concepts and abstract ideas really, but distant and simplified +views, species of model drawings, giving only a few summary features of +their object, which vary according to direction and angle? By means of +them we claim to determine the object from outside, as if, in order to know +it, it were sufficient to enclose it in a system of logical sides and +angles. + +And perhaps in this way we do really grasp it, perhaps we do establish its +precise description, but we do not penetrate it. + +Concepts translate relations resulting from comparisons by which each +object is finally expressed as a function of what it is not. They +dismember it, divide it up piece by piece, and mount it in various frames. +They lay hold of it only by ends and corners, by resemblances and +differences. Is not that obviously what is done by the converting theories +which explain the soul by the body, life by matter, quality by movements, +space itself by pure number? Is not that what is done generally by all +criticisms, all doctrines which connect one idea to another, or to a group +of other ideas? + +In this way we reach only the surface of things, the reciprocal contacts, +mutual intersections, and parts common, but not the organic unity nor the +inner essence. + +In vain we multiply our points of view, our perspectives and plane +projections: no accumulation of this kind will reconstruct the concrete +solid. We can pass from an object directly perceived to the pictures which +represent it, the prints which represent the pictures, the scheme +representing the prints, because each stage contains less than the one +before, and is obtained from it by simple diminution. + +But, inversely, you may take all the schemes, prints, pictures you like-- +supposing that it is not absurd to conceive as given what is by nature +interminable and inexhaustible, lending itself to indefinite enumeration +and endless development and multiplicity--but you will never recompose the +profound and original unity of the source. + +How, by forcing yourself to seek the object outside itself, where it +certainly is not, except in echo and reflection, would you ever find its +intimate and specific reality? You are but condemning yourself to +symbolism, for one "thing" can only be in another symbolically. + +To go further still, your knowledge of things will remain irremediably +relative, relative to the symbols selected and the points of view adopted. +Everything will happen as in a movement of which the appearance and formula +vary with the spot from which you regard it, with the marks to which you +relate it. + +Absolute revelation is only given to the man who passes into the object, +flings himself upon its stream, and lives within its rhythm. The thesis +which maintains the inevitable relativity of all human knowledge originates +mainly from the metaphors employed to describe the act of knowledge. The +subject occupies this point, the object that; how are we to span the +distance? Our perceptory organs fill the interval; how are we to grasp +anything but what reaches us in the receiver at the end of the wire? + +The mind itself is a projecting lantern playing a shaft of light on nature; +how should it do otherwise than tint nature its own colour? + +But these difficulties all arise out of the spatial metaphors employed; and +these metaphors in their turn do little but illustrate and translate the +common method of analysis by concepts: and this method is essentially +regulated by the practical needs of action and language. + +The philosopher must adopt an attitude entirely inverse; not keep at a +distance from things, but listen in a manner to their inward breathing, +and, above all, supply the effort of sympathy by which he establishes +himself in the object, becomes on intimate terms with it, tunes himself to +its rhythm, and, in a word, lives it. There is really nothing mysterious +or strange in this. + +Consider your daily judgments in matters of art, profession, or sport. + +Between knowledge by theory and knowledge by experience, between +understanding by external analogy and perception by profound intuition, +what difference and divergence there is! + +Who has absolute knowledge of a machine, the student who analyses it in +mechanical theorems, or the engineer who has lived in comradeship with it, +even to sharing the physical sensation of its laboured or easy working, who +feels the play of its inner muscles, its likes and dislikes, who notes its +movements and the task before it, as the machine itself would do were it +conscious, for whom it has become an extension of his own body, a new +sensori-motor organ, a group of prearranged gestures and automatic habits? + +The student's knowledge is more useful to the builder, and I do not wish to +claim that we should ever neglect it; but the only true knowledge is that +of the engineer. And what I have just said does not concern material +objects only. Who has absolute knowledge of religion, he who analyses it +in psychology, sociology, history, and metaphysics, or he who, from within, +by a living experience, participates in its essence and holds communion +with its duration? + +But the external nature of the knowledge obtained by conceptual analysis is +only its least fault. There are others still more serious. + +If concepts actually express what is common, general, unspecific, what +should make us feel the need of recasting them when we apply them to a new +object? + +Does not their ground, their utility, and their interest exactly consist in +sparing us this labour? + +We regard them as elaborated once for all. They are building-material, +ready-hewn blocks, which we have only to bring together. They are atoms, +simple elements--a mathematician would say prime factors--capable of +associating with infinity, but without undergoing any inner modification in +contact with it. They admit linkage; they can be attached externally, but +they leave the aggregate as they went into it. + +Juxtaposition and arrangement are the geometrical operations which typify +the work of knowledge in such a case; or else we must fall back on +metaphors from some mental chemistry, such as proportioning and +combination. + +In all cases, the method is still that of alignment and blending of pre- +existent concepts. + +Now the mere fact of proceeding thus is equivalent to setting up the +concept as a symbol of an abstract class. That being done, explanation of +a thing is no more than showing it in the intersection of several classes, +partaking of each of them in definite proportions: which is the same as +considering it sufficiently expressed by a list of general frames into +which it will go. The unknown is then, on principle, and in virtue of this +theory, referred to the already known; and it thereby becomes impossible +ever to grasp any true novelty or any irreducible originality. + +On principle, once more, we claim to reconstruct nature with pure symbols; +and it thereby becomes impossible ever to reach its concrete reality, "the +invisible and present soul." + +This intuitional coinage in fixed standard concepts, this creation of an +easily handled intellectual cash, is no doubt of evident practical utility. +For knowledge in the usual sense of the word is not a disinterested +operation; it consists in finding out what profit we can draw from an +object, how we are to conduct ourselves towards it, what label we can +suitably attach to it, under what already known class it comes, to what +degree it is deserving of this or that title which determines an attitude +we must take up, or a step we must perform. Our end is to place the object +in its approximate class, having regard to advantageous employment or to +everyday language. Then, and only then, we find our pigeon-holes all +ready-made; and the same parcel of reagents meets all cases. A universal +catechism is here in existence to meet every research; its different +clauses define so many unshifting points of view, from which we regard each +object, and our study is subsequently limited to applying a kind of +nomenclature to the preconstructed frames. + +Once again the philosopher has to proceed in exactly the opposite +direction. He has not to confine himself to ready-made business concepts, +of the ordinary kind, suits cut to an average model, which fit nobody +because they almost fit everybody; but he has to work to measure, +incessantly renew his plant, continually recreate his mind, and meet each +new problem with a fresh adaptive effort. He must not go from concepts to +things, as if each of them were only the cutting-point of several +concurrent generalities, an ideal centre of intersecting abstractions; on +the contrary, he must go from things to concepts, incessantly creating new +thoughts, and incessantly recasting the old. + +There could be no solution of the problem in a more or less ingenious +mosaic or tessellation of rigid concepts, pre-existing to be employed. We +need plastic fluid, supple and living concepts, capable of being +continually modelled on reality, of delicately following its infinite +curves. The philosopher's task is then to create concepts much more than +to combine them. And each of the concepts he creates must remain open and +adjustable, ready for the necessary renewal and adaptation, like a method +or a programme: it must be the arrow pointing to a path which descends +from intuition to language, not a boundary marking a terminus. In this way +only does philosophy remain what it ought to be: the examination into the +consciousness of the human mind, the effort towards enlargement and depth +which it attempts unremittingly, in order to advance beyond its present +intellectual condition. + +Do you want an example? I will take that of human personality. The ego is +one; the ego is many: no one contests this double formula. But everything +admits of it; and what is its lesson to us? Observe what is bound to +happen to the two concepts of unity and multiplicity, by the mere fact that +we take them for general frames independent of the reality contained, for +detached language admitting empty and blank definition, always +representable by the same word, no matter what the circumstances: they are +no longer living and coloured ideas, but abstract, motionless, and neutral +forms, without shades or gradations, without distinction of case, +characterising two points of view from which you can observe anything and +everything. This being so, how could the application of these forms help +us to grasp the original and peculiar nature of the unity and multiplicity +of the ego? Still further, how could we, between two such entities, +statically defined by their opposition, ever imagine a synthesis? +Correctly speaking, the interesting question is not whether there is unity, +multiplicity, combination, one with the other, but to see what sort of +unity, multiplicity, or combination realises the case in point; above all, +to understand how the living person is at once multiple unity and one +multiplicity, how these two poles of conceptual dissociation are connected, +how these two diverging branches of abstraction join at the roots. The +interesting point, in a word, is not the two symbolical colourless marks +indicating the two ends of the spectrum; it is the continuity between, with +its changing wealth of colouring, and the double progress of shades which +resolve it into red and violet. + +But it is impossible to arrive at this concrete transition unless we begin +from direct intuition and descend to the analysing concepts. + +Again, the same duty of reversing our familiar attitude, of inverting our +customary proceeding, becomes ours for another reason. The conceptual +atomism of common thought leads it to place movement in a lower order than +rest, fact in a lower order than becoming. According to common thought, +movement is added to the atom, as a supplementary accident to a body +previously at rest; and, by becoming, the pre-existent terms are strung +together like pearls on a necklace. It delights in rest, and endeavours to +bring to rest all that moves. Immobility appears to it to be the base of +existence. It decomposes and pulverises every change and every phenomenon, +until it finds the invariable element in them. It is immobility which it +esteems as primary, fundamental, intelligible of itself; and motion, on the +contrary, which it seeks to explain as a function of immobility. And so it +tends, out of progresses and transitions, to make things. To see +distinctly, it appears to need a dead halt. What indeed are concepts but +logical look-out stations along the path of becoming? what are they but +motionless external views, taken at intervals, of an uninterrupted stream +of movement? + +Each of them isolates and fixes an aspect, "as the instantaneous lightning +flashes on a storm-scene in the darkness." ("Matter and Memory", page +209.) + +Placed together, they make a net laid in advance, a strong meshwork in +which the human intelligence posts itself securely to spy the flux of +reality, and seize it as it passes. Such a proceeding is made for the +practical world, and is out of place in the speculative. Everywhere we are +trying to find constants, identities, non-variants, states; and we imagine +ideal science as an open eye which gazes for ever upon objects that do not +move. The constant is the concrete support demanded by our action: the +matter upon which we operate must not escape our grasp and slip through our +hands, if we are to be able to work it. The constant, again, is the +element of language, in which the word represents its inert permanence, in +which it constitutes the solid fulcrum, the foundation and landmark of +dialectic progress, being that which can be discarded by the mind, whose +attention is thus free for other tasks. In this respect analysis by +concepts is the natural method of common-sense. It consists in asking from +time to time what point the object studied has reached, what it has become, +in order to see what one could derive from it, or what it is fitting to say +of it. + +But this method has only a practical reach. Reality, which in its essence +is becoming, passes through our concepts without ever letting itself be +caught, as a moving body passes fixed points. When we filter it, we retain +only its deposit, the result of the becoming drifted down to us. + +Do the dams, canals, and buoys make the current of the river? Do the +festoons of dead seaweed ranged along the sand make the rising tide? Let +us beware of confounding the stream of becoming with the sharp outline of +its result. Analysis by concepts is a cinematograph method, and it is +plain that the inner organisation of the movement is not seen in the moving +pictures. Every moment we have fixed views of moving objects. With such +conceptual sections taken in the stream of continuity, however many we +accumulate, should we ever reconstruct the movement itself, the dynamic +connection, the march of the images, the transition from one view to +another? This capacity for movement must be contained in the picture +apparatus, and must therefore be given in addition to the views themselves; +and nothing can better prove how, after all, movement is never explicable +except by itself, never grasped except in itself. + +But if we take movement as our principle, it is, on the contrary, possible, +and even easy, to slacken speed by imperceptible degrees, and stop dead. + +From a dead stop we shall never get our movement again; but rest can very +well be conceived as the limit of movement, as its arrest or extinction; +for rest is less than movement. + +In this way the true philosophical method, which is the inverse of the +common method, consists in taking up a position from the very outset in the +bosom of becoming, in adopting its changing curves and variable tension, in +sympathising with the rhythm of its genesis, in perceiving all existence +from within, as a growth, in following it in its inner generation; in +short, in promoting movement to fundamental reality, and, inversely, in +degrading fixed states to the rank of secondary and derived reality. + +And thus, to come back to the example of the human personality, the +philosopher must seek in the ego not so much a ready-made unity or +multiplicity as, if I may venture the expression, two antagonistic and +correlative movements of unification and plurification. + +There is then a radical difference between philosophic intuition and +conceptual analysis. The latter delights in the play of dialectic, in +fountains of knowledge, where it is interested only in the immovable +basins; the former goes back to the source of the concepts, and seeks to +possess it where it gushes out. Analysis cuts the channels; intuition +supplies the water. Intuition acquires and analysis expends. + +It is not a question of banning analysis; science could not do without it, +and philosophy could not do without science. But we must reserve for it +its normal place and its just task. + +Concepts are the deposited sediment of intuition: intuition produces the +concepts, not the concepts intuition. From the heart of intuition you will +have no difficulty in seeing how it splits up and analyses into concepts, +concepts of such and such a kind or such and such a shade. But by +successive analyses you will never reconstruct the least intuition, just +as, no matter how you distribute water, you will never reconstruct the +reservoir in its original condition. + +Begin from intuition: it is a summit from which we can descend by infinite +slopes; it is a picture which we can place in an infinite number of frames. +But all the frames together will not recompose the picture, and the lower +ends of all the slopes will not explain how they meet at the summit. +Intuition is a necessary beginning; it is the impulse which sets the +analysis in motion, and gives it direction; it is the sounding which brings +it to solid bottom; the soul which assures its unity. "I shall never +understand how black and white interpenetrate, if I have not seen grey, but +I understand without trouble, after once seeing grey, how we can regard it +from the double point of view of black and white." ("Introduction to +Metaphysics.") + +Here are some letters which you can arrange in chains in a thousand ways: +the indivisible sense running along the chain, and making one phrase of it, +is the original cause of the writing, not its consequence. Thus it is with +intuition in relation to analysis. But beginnings and generative +activities are the proper object of the philosopher. Thus the conversion +and reform incumbent on him consist essentially in a transition from the +analytic to the intuitive point of view. + +The result is that the chosen instrument of philosophic thought is +metaphor; and of metaphor we know Mr Bergson to be an incomparable master. +What we have to do, he says himself, is "to elicit a certain active force +which in most men is liable to be trammelled by mental habits more useful +to life," to awaken in them the feeling of the immediate, original, and +concrete. But "many different images, borrowed from very different orders +of things, can, by their convergent action, direct consciousness to the +precise point where there is a certain intuition to be seized. By choosing +images as unlike as possible, we prevent any one of them from usurping the +place of the intuition it is intended to call up, since it would in that +case be immediately routed by its rivals. In making them all, despite +their different aspects, demand of our mind the same kind of attention, and +in some way the same degree of tension, we accustom our consciousness +little by little to a quite peculiar and well-determined disposition, +precisely the one which it ought to adopt to appear to itself unmasked." +("Introduction to Metaphysics".) + +Strictly speaking, the intuition of immediacy is inexpressible. But it can +be suggested and called up. How? By ringing it round with concurrent +metaphors. Our aim is to modify the habits of imagination in ourselves +which are opposed to a simple and direct view, to break through the +mechanical imagery in which we have allowed ourselves to be caught; and it +is by awakening other imagery and other habits that we can succeed in so +doing. + +But then, you will say, where is the difference between philosophy and art, +between metaphysical and aesthetic intuition? Art also tends to reveal +nature to us, to suggest to us a direct vision of it, to lift the veil of +illusion which hides us from ourselves; and aesthetic intuition is, in its +own way, perception of immediacy. We revive the feeling of reality +obliterated by habit, we summon the deep and penetrating soul of things: +the object is the same in both cases; and the means are also the same; +images and metaphors. Is Mr Bergson only a poet, and does his work amount +to nothing but the introduction of impressionism in metaphysics? + +It is an old objection. If the truth be told, Mr Bergson's immense +scientific knowledge should be sufficient refutation. + +Only those who have not read the mass of carefully proved and positive +discussions could give way thus to the impressions of art awakened by what +is truly a magic style. But we can go further and put it better. + +That there are analogies between philosophy and art, between metaphysical +and aesthetic intuition, is unquestionable and uncontested. + +At the same time, the analogies must not be allowed to hide the +differences. + +Art is, to a certain extent, philosophy previous to analysis, previous to +criticism and science; the aesthetic intuition is metaphysical intuition in +process of birth, bounded by dream, not proceeding to the test of positive +verification. Reciprocally, philosophy is the art which follows upon +science, and takes account of it, the art which uses the results of +analysis as its material, and submits itself to the demands of stern +criticism; metaphysical intuition is the aesthetic intuition verified, +systematised, ballasted by the language of reason. + +Philosophy then differs from art in two essential points: first of all, it +rests upon, envelops, and supposes science; secondly, it implies a test of +verification in its strict meaning. Instead of stopping at the acts of +common-sense, it completes them with all the contributions of analysis and +scientific investigation. + +We said just now of common-sense that, in its inmost depths, it possesses +reality: that is only quite exact when we mean common-sense developed in +positive science; and that is why philosophy takes the results of science +as its basis, for each of these results, like the facts and data of common +perception, opens a way for critical penetration towards the immediate. +Just now I was comparing the two kinds of knowledge which the theorist and +the engineer can have of a machine, and I allowed the advantage of absolute +knowledge to practical experience, whilst theory seemed to me mainly +relative to the constructive industry. That is true, and I do not go back +upon it. But the most experienced engineer, who did not know the mechanism +of his machine, who possessed only unanalysed feelings about it, would have +only an artist's, not a philosopher's knowledge. For absolute intuition, +in the full sense of the word, we must have integral experience; that is to +say, a living application of rational theory no less than of working +technique. + +To journey towards living intuition, starting from complete science and +complete sensation, is the philosopher's task; and this task is governed by +standards unknown to art. + +Metaphysical intuition offers a victorious resistance to the test of +thorough and continued experiment, to the test of calculation as to that of +working, to the complete experiment which brings into play all the various +deoxidising agents of criticism; it shows itself capable of withstanding +analysis without dissolving or succumbing; it abounds in concepts which +satisfy the understanding, and exalt it; in a word, it creates light and +truth on all mental planes; and these characteristics are sufficient to +distinguish it in a profound degree from aesthetic intuition. + +The latter is only the prophetic type of the former, a dream or +presentiment, a veiled and still uncertain dawn, a twilight myth preceding +and proclaiming, in the half-darkness, the full day of positive +revelation... + +Every philosophy has two faces, and must be studied in two movements-- +method and teaching. + +These are its two moments, its two aspects, no doubt co-ordinate and +mutually dependent, but none the less distinct. + +We have just examined the method of the new philosophy inaugurated by Mr +Bergson. To what teaching has this method led us, and to what can we +foresee that it will lead us? + +This is what we have still to find. + + + +II. Teaching. + +The sciences properly so called, those that are by agreement termed +positive, present themselves as so many external and circumferential points +from which we view reality. They leave us on the outside of things, and +confine themselves to investigating from a distance. + +The views they give us resemble the brief perspectives of a town which we +obtain in looking at it from different angles on the surrounding hills. + +Less even than that: for very soon, by increasing abstraction, the +coloured views give place to regular lines, and even to simple conventional +notes, which are more practical in use and waste less time. And so the +sciences remain prisoners of the symbol, and all the inevitable relativity +involved in its use. But philosophy claims to pierce within reality, +establish itself in the object, follow its thousand turns and folds, obtain +from it a direct and immediate feeling, and penetrate right into the +concrete depths of its heart; it is not content with an analysis, but +demands an intuition. + +Now there is one existence which, at the outset, we know better and more +surely than any other; there is a privileged case in which the effort of +sympathetic revelation is natural and almost easy to us; there is one +reality at least which we grasp from within, which we perceive in its deep +and internal content. This reality is ourselves. It is typical of all +reality, and our study may fitly begin here. Psychology puts us in direct +contact with it, and metaphysics attempt to generalise this contact. But +such a generalisation can only be attempted if, to begin with, we are +familiar with reality at the point where we have immediate access to it. + +The path of thought which the philosopher must take is from the inner to +the outer being. + + +I. + +"Know thyself": the old maxim has remained the motto of philosophy since +Socrates, the motto at least which marks its initial moment, when, +inclining towards the depth of the subject, it commences its true work of +penetration, whilst science continues to extend on the surface. Each +philosophy in turn has commented upon and applied this old motto. But Mr +Bergson, more than anyone else, has given it, as he does everything else he +takes up, a new and profound meaning. What was the current interpretation +before him? Speaking only of the last century, we may say that, under the +influence of Kant, criticism had till now been principally engaged in +unravelling the contribution of the subject in the act of consciousness, in +establishing our perception of things through certain representative forms +borrowed from our own constitution. Such was, even yesterday, the +authenticated way of regarding the problem. And it is precisely this +attitude which Mr Bergson, by a volte-face which will remain familiar to +him in the course of his researches, reverses from the outset. + +"It has appeared to me," says he, ("Essay on the Immediate Data of +Consciousness", Conclusion.) "that there was ground for setting oneself the +inverse problem, and asking whether the most apparent states of the ego +itself, which we think we grasp directly, are not most of the time +perceived through certain forms borrowed from the outer world, which in +this way gives us back what we have lent it. A priori, it seems fairly +probable that this is what goes on. For supposing that the forms of which +we are speaking, to which we adapt matter, come entirely from the mind, it +seems difficult to apply them constantly to objects without soon producing +the colouring of the objects in the forms; therefore in using these forms +for the knowledge of our own personality, we risk taking a reflection of +the frame in which we place them--that is, actually, the external world-- +for the very colouring of the ego. But we can go further, and state that +forms applicable to things cannot be entirely our own work; that they must +result from a compromise between matter and mind; that if we give much to +this matter, we doubtless receive something from it; and that, in this way, +when we try to possess ourselves again after an excursion into the outer +world, we no longer have our hands free." + +To avoid such a consequence, there is, we must admit, a conceivable +loophole. It consists in maintaining on principle an absolute analogy, an +exact similitude between internal reality and external objects. The forms +which suit the one would then also suit the other. + +But it must be observed that such a principle constitutes in the highest +degree a metaphysical thesis which it would be on all hands illegal to +assert previously as a postulate of method. Secondly, and above all, it +must be observed that on this head experience is decisive, and manifests +more plainly every day the failure of the theories which try to assimilate +the world of consciousness to that of matter, to copy psychology from +physics. We have here two different "orders." The apparatus of the first +does not admit of being employed in the second. Hence the necessity of the +attitude adopted by Mr Bergson. We have an effort to make, a work of +reform to undertake, to lift the veil of symbols which envelops our usual +representation of the ego, and thus conceals us from our own view, in order +to find out what we are in reality, immediately, in our inmost selves. +This effort and this work are necessary, because, "in order to contemplate +the ego in its original purity, psychology must eliminate or correct +certain forms which bear the visible mark of the outer world." ("Essay on +the Immediate Data of Consciousness", Conclusion.) What are these forms? +Let us confine ourselves to the most important. Things appear to us as +numerable units, placed side by side in space. They compose numerical and +spatial multiplicity, a dust of terms between which geometrical ties are +established. + +But space and number are the two forms of immobility, the two schemes of +analysis, by which we must not let ourselves be obsessed. I do not say +that there is no place to give them, even in the internal world. But the +more deeply we enter into the heart of psychological life, the less they +are in place. + +The fact is, there are several planes of consciousness, situated at +different depths, marking all the intervening degrees between pure thought +and bodily action, and each mental phenomenon interests all these planes +simultaneously, and is thus repeated in a thousand higher tones, like the +harmonies of one and the same note. + +Or, if you prefer it, the life of the spirit is not the uniform transparent +surface of a mere; rather it is a gushing spring which, at first pent in, +spreads upwards and outwards, like a sheaf of corn, passing through many +different states, from the dark and concentrated welling of the source to +the gleam of the scattered tumbling spray; and each of its moods presents +in its turn a similar character, being itself only a thread within the +whole. Such without doubt is the central and activating idea of the +admirable book entitled "Matter and Memory". I cannot possibly condense +its substance here, or convey its astonishing synthetic power, which +succeeds in contracting a complete metaphysic, and in gripping it so firmly +that the examination ends by passing to the discussion of a few humble +facts relative to the philosophy of the brain! But its technical severity +and its very conciseness, combined with the wealth it contains, render it +irresumable; and I can only in a few words indicate its conclusions. + +First of all, however little we pride ourselves on positive method, we must +admit the existence of an internal world, of a spiritual activity distinct +from matter and its mechanism. No chemistry of the brain, no dance of +atoms, is equivalent to the least thought, or indeed to the least +sensation. + +Some, it is true, have brought forward a thesis of parallelism, according +to which each mental phenomenon corresponds point by point to a phenomenon +in the brain, without adding anything to it, without influencing its +course, merely translating it into another tongue, so that a glance +sufficiently penetrating to follow the molecular revolutions and the fluxes +of nervous production in their least episodes would immediately read the +inmost secrets of the associated consciousness. + +But no one will deny that a thesis of this kind is only in reality a +hypothesis, that it goes enormously beyond the certain data of current +biology, and that it can only be formulated by anticipating future +discoveries in a preconceived direction. Let us be candid: it is not +really a thesis of positive science, but a metaphysical thesis in the +unpleasant meaning of the term. Taking it at its best, its worth today +could only be one of intelligibleness. And intelligible it is not. + +How are we to understand a consciousness destitute of activity and +consequently without connection with reality, a kind of phosphorescence +which emphasises the lines of vibration in the brain, and renders in +miraculous duplicate, by its mysterious and useless light, certain +phenomena already complete without it? + +One day Mr Bergson came down into the arena of dialectic, and, talking to +his opponents in their own language, pulled their "psycho-physiological +paralogism" to pieces before their eyes; it is only by confounding in one +and the same argument two systems of incompatible notations, idealism and +realism, that we succeed in enunciating the parallelist thesis. This +reasoning went home, all the more as it was adapted to the usual form of +discussions between philosophers. But a more positive and more categorical +proof is to be found all through "Matter and Memory". From the precise +example of recollection analysed to its lowest depths, Mr Bergson +completely grasps and measures the divergence between soul and body, +between mind and matter. Then, putting into practice what he said +elsewhere about the creation of new concepts, he arrives at the conclusion- +-these are his own expressions--that between the psychological fact and its +counterpart in the brain there must be a relation sui generis, which is +neither the determination of the one by the other, nor their reciprocal +independence, nor the production of the latter by the former, nor of the +former by the latter, nor their simple parallel concomitance; in short, a +relation which answers to none of the ready-made concepts which abstraction +puts at our service, but which may be approximately formulated in these +terms: ("Report of the French Philosophical Society", meeting, 2nd May +1901.) + +"Given a psychological state, that part of the state which admits of play, +the part which would be translated by an attitude of the body or by bodily +actions, is represented in the brain; the remainder is independent of it, +and has no equivalent in the brain. So that to one and the same state of +the brain there may be many different psychological states which +correspond, though not all kinds of states. They are psychological states +which all have in common the same motor scheme. Into one and the same +frame many pictures may go, but not all pictures. Let us take a lofty +abstract philosophical thought. We do not conceive it without adding to it +an image representing it, which we place beneath. + +"We do not represent the image to ourselves, again, without supporting it +by a design which resumes its leading features. We do not imagine this +design itself without imagining and, in so doing, sketching certain +movements which would reproduce it. It is this sketch, and this sketch +only, which is represented in the brain. Frame the sketch, there is a +margin for the image. Frame the image again, there remains a margin, and a +still larger margin, for the thought. The thought is thus relatively free +and indeterminate in relation to the activity which conditions it in the +brain, for this activity expresses only the motive articulation of the +idea, and the articulation may be the same for ideas absolutely different. +And yet it is not complete liberty nor absolute indetermination, since any +kind of idea, taken at hazard, would not present the articulation desired. + +"In short, none of the simple concepts furnished us by philosophy could +express the relation we seek, but this relation appears with tolerable +clearness to result from experiment." + +The same analysis of facts tells us how the planes of consciousness, of +which I spoke just now, are arranged, the law by which they are +distributed, and the meaning which attaches to their disposition. Let us +neglect the intervening multiples, and look only at the extreme poles of +the series. + +We are inclined to imagine too abrupt a severance between gesture and +dream, between action and thought, between body and mind. There are not +two plane surfaces, without thickness or transition, placed one above the +other on different levels; it is by an imperceptible degradation of +increasing depth, and decreasing materiality, that we pass from one term to +the other. + +And the characteristics are continually changing in the course of the +transition. Thus our initial problem confronts us again, more acutely than +ever: are the forms of number and space equally suitable on all planes of +consciousness? + +Let us consider the most external of these planes of life, and one which is +in contact with the outer world, the one which receives directly the +impressions of external reality. We live as a rule on the surface of +ourselves, in the numerical and spatial dispersion of language and gesture. +Our deeper ego is covered as it were with a tough crust, hardened in +action: it is a skein of motionless and numerable habits, side by side, +and of distinct and solid things, with sharp outlines and mechanical +relations. And it is for the representation of the phenomena which occur +within this dead rind that space and number are valid. + +For we have to live, I mean live our common daily life, with our body, with +our customary mechanism rather than with our true depths. Our attention is +therefore most often directed by a natural inclination to the practical +worth and useful function of our internal states, to the public object of +which they are the sign, to the effect they produce externally, to the +gestures by which we express them in space. A social average of individual +modalities interests us more than the incommunicable originality of our +deeper life. The words of language besides offer us so many symbolic +centres round which crystallise groups of motor mechanisms set up by habit, +the only usual elements of our internal determinations. Now, contact with +society has rendered these motor mechanisms practically identical in all +men. Hence, whether it be a question of sensation, feeling, or ideas, we +have these neutral dry and colourless residua, which spread lifeless over +the surface of ourselves, "like dead leaves on the water of a pond." +("Essay on the Immediate Data," page 102.) + +Thus the progress we have lived falls into the rank of a thing that can be +handled. Space and number lay hold of it. And soon all that remains of +what was movement and life is combinations formed and annulled, and forces +mechanically composed in a whole of juxtaposed atoms, and to represent this +whole a collection of petrified concepts, manipulated in dialectic like +counters. + +Quite different appears the true inner reality, and quite different are its +profound characteristics. To begin with, it contains nothing quantitative; +the intensity of a psychological state is not a magnitude, nor can it be +measured. The "Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness" begins with +the proof of this leading statement. If it is a question of a simple +state, such as a sensation of light or weight, the intensity is measured by +a certain quality of shade which indicates to us approximately, by an +association of ideas and thanks to our acquired experience, the magnitude +of the objective cause from which it proceeds. If, on the contrary, it is +a question of a complex state, such as those impressions of profound joy or +sorrow which lay hold of us entirely, invading and overwhelming us, what we +call their intensity expresses only the confused feeling of a qualitative +progress, and increasing wealth. "Take, for example, an obscure desire, +which has gradually become a profound passion. You will see that the +feeble intensity of this desire consisted first of all in the fact that it +seemed to you isolated and in a way foreign to all the rest of your inner +life. But little by little it penetrated a larger number of psychic +elements, dyeing them, so to speak, its own colour; and now you find your +point of view on things as a whole appears to you to have changed. Is it +not true that you become aware of a profound passion, once it has taken +root, by the fact that the same objects no longer produce the same +impression upon you? All your sensations, all your ideas, appear to you +refreshed by it; it is like a new childhood." (Loc. cit., page 6.) + +There is here none of the homogeneity which is the property of magnitude, +and the necessary condition of measurement, giving a view of the less in +the bosom of the more. The element of number has vanished, and with it +numerical multiplicity extended in space. Our inner states form a +qualitative continuity; they are prolonged and blended into one another; +they are grouped in harmonies, each note of which contains an echo of the +whole; they are encircled by an innumerable degradation of halos, which +gradually colour the total content of consciousness; they live each in the +bosom of his fellow. + +"I am the scent of roses," were the words Condillac put in the mouth of his +statue; and these words translate the immediate truth exactly, as soon as +observation becomes naive and simple enough to attain pure fact. In a +passing breath I breathe my childhood; in the rustle of leaves, in a ray of +moonlight, I find an infinite series of reflections and dreams. A thought, +a feeling, an act, may reveal a complete soul. My ideas, my sensations, +are like me. How would such facts be possible, if the multiple unity of +the ego did not present the essential characteristic of vibrating in its +entirety in the depths of each of the parts descried or rather determined +in it by analysis? All physical determinations envelop and imply each +other reciprocally. And the fact that the soul is thus present in its +entirety in each of its acts, its feelings, for example, or its ideas in +its sensations, its recollections in its percepts, its inclinations in its +obvious states, is the justifying principle of metaphors, the source of all +poetry, the truth which modern philosophy proclaims with more force every +day under the name of immanence of thought, the fact which explains our +moral responsibility with regard to our affections and our beliefs +themselves; and finally, it is the best of us, since it is this which +ensures our being able to surrender ourselves, genuinely and unreservedly, +and this which constitutes the real unity of our person. + +Let us push still further into the hidden retreat of the soul. Here we are +in these regions of twilight and dream, where our ego takes shape, where +the spring within us gushes up, in the warm secrecy of the darkness which +ushers our trembling being into birth. Distinctions fail us. Words are +useless now. We hear the wells of consciousness at their mysterious task +like an invisible shiver of running water through the mossy shadow of the +caves. I dissolve in the joy of becoming. I abandon myself to the delight +of being a pulsing reality. I no longer know whether I see scents, breathe +sounds, or smell colours. Do I love? Do I think? The question has no +longer a meaning for me. I am, in my complete self, each of my attitudes, +each of my changes. It is not my sight which is indistinct or my attention +which is idle. It is I who have resumed contact with pure reality, whose +essential movement admits no form of number. He who thus makes the really +"deep" and "inner" effort necessary to becoming--were it only for an +elusive moment--discovers, under the simplest appearance, inexhaustible +sources of unsuspected wealth; the rhythm of his duration becomes amplified +and refined; his acts become more conscious; and in what seemed to him at +first sudden severance or instantaneous pulsation he discovers complex +transitions imperceptibly shaded off, musical transitions full of +unexpected repetitions and threaded movements. + +Thus, the deeper we go in consciousness, the less suitable become these +schemes of separation and fixity existing in spatial and numerical forms. +The inner world is that of pure quality. There is no measurable +homogeneity, no collection of atomically constructed elements. The +phenomena distinguished in it by analysis are not composing units, but +phases. And it is only when they reach the surface, when they come in +contact with the external world, when they are incarnated in language or +gesture, that the categories of matter become adapted to them. In its true +nature, reality appears as an uninterrupted flow, an impalpable shiver of +fluid changing tones, a perpetual flux of waves which ebb and break and +dissolve into one another without shock or jar. Everything is ceaseless +change; and the state which appears the most stable is already change, +since it continues and grows old. Constant quantities are represented only +by the materialisation of habit or by means of practical symbols. And it +is on this point that Mr Bergson rightly insists. ("Creative Evolution", +page 3.) + +"The apparent discontinuity of psychological life is due, then, to the fact +that our attention is concentrated on it in a series of discontinuous acts; +where there is only a gentle slope, we think we see, when we follow the +broken line of our attention, the steps of a staircase. It is true that +our psychological life is full of surprises. A thousand incidents arise +which seem to contrast with what precedes them, and not to be connected +with what follows. But the gap in their appearances stands out against the +continuous background on which they are represented, and to which they owe +the very intervals that separate them; they are the drumbeats which break +into the symphony at intervals. Our attention is fixed upon them because +they interest it more, but each of them proceeds from the fluid mass of our +entire psychological existence. Each of them is only the brightest point +in a moving zone which understands all that we feel, think, wish; in fact, +all that we are at a given moment. It is this zone which really +constitutes our state. But we may observe that states defined in this way +are not distinct elements. They are an endless stream of mutual +continuity." + +And do not think that perhaps such a description represents only or +principally our life of feeling. Reason and thought share the same +characteristic, as soon as we penetrate their living depth, whether it be a +question of creative invention or of those primordial judgments which +direct our activity. If they evidence greater stability, it is in +permanence of direction, because our past remains present to us. + +For we are endowed with memory, and that perhaps is, on the whole, our most +profound characteristic. It is by memory we enlarge ourselves and draw +continually upon the wealth of our treasuries. Hence comes the completely +original nature of the change which constitutes us. But it is here that we +must shake off familiar representations! Common-sense cannot think in +terms of movement. It forges a static conception of it, and destroys it by +arresting it under pretext of seeing it better. To define movement as a +series of positions, with a generating law, with a time-table or +correspondence sheet between places and times, is surely a ready-made +presentation. Are we not confusing the trajectory and its performance, the +points traversed and the traversing of the points, the result of the +genesis of the result; in short, the quantitative distance over which the +flight extends, and the qualitative flight which puts this distance behind +it? In this way the very mobility which is the essence of movement +vanishes. There is the same common mistake about time. Analytic and +synthetic thought can see in time only a string of coincidences, each of +them instantaneous, a logical series of relations. It imagines the whole +of it to be a graduated slide-rule, in which the luminous point called the +present is the geometrical index. + +Thus it gives form to time in space, "a kind of fourth dimension," ("Essay +on the Immediate Data".) or at least it reduces it to nothing more than an +abstract scheme of succession, "a stream without bottom or sides, flowing +without determinable strength, in an indefinable direction." +("Introduction to Metaphysics".) It requires time to be homogeneous, and +every homogeneous medium is space, "for as homogeneity consists here in the +absence of any quality, it is not clear how two forms of homogeneity could +be distinguished one from the other." ("Essay on the Immediate Data", page +74.) + +Quite different appears real duration, the duration which is lived. It is +pure heterogeneity. It contains a thousand different degrees of tension or +relaxation, and its rhythm varies without end. The magic silence of calm +nights or the wild disorder of a tempest, the still joy of ecstasy or the +tumult of passion unchained, a steep climb towards a difficult truth or a +gentle descent from a luminous principle to consequences which easily +follow, a moral crisis or a shooting pain, call up intuitions admitting no +comparison with one another. We have here no series of moments, but +prolonged and interpenetrating phases; their sequence is not a substitution +of one point for another, but rather resembles a musical resolution of +harmony into harmony. And of this ever-new melody which constitutes our +inner life every moment contains a resonance or an echo of past moments. +"What are we really, what is our character, except the condensation of the +history which we have lived since our birth, even before our birth, since +we bring with us our prenatal dispositions? Without doubt we think only +with a small part of our past; but it is with our complete past, including +our original bias of soul, that we desire, wish, and act." ("Creative +Evolution", pages 5-6.) This is what makes our duration irreversible, and +its novelty perpetual, for each of the states through which it passes +envelops the recollection of all past states. And thus we see, in the end, +how, for a being endowed with memory, "existence consists in change, change +in ripening, ripening in endless self-creation." ("Creative Evolution", +page 8.) + +With this formula we face the capital problem in which psychology and +metaphysics meet, that of liberty. The solution given by Mr Bergson marks +one of the culminating points of his philosophy. It is from this summit +that he finds light thrown on the riddle of inner being. And it is the +centre where all the lines of his research converge. + +What is liberty? What must we understand by this word? Beware of the +answer you are going to give. Every definition, in the strict sense of the +term, will imply the determinist thesis in advance, since, under pain of +going round in a circle, it will be bound to express liberty as a function +of what it is not. Either psychological liberty is an illusive appearance, +or, if it is real, we can only grasp it by intuition, not by analysis, in +the light of an immediate feeling. For a reality is verified, not +constructed; and we are now or never in one of those situations where the +philosopher's task is to create some new concept, instead of abiding by a +combination of previous elements. + +Man is free, says common-sense, in so far as his action depends only on +himself. "We are free," says Mr Bergson, ("Essay on the Immediate Data of +Consciousness", page 131.) "when our acts proceed from our entire +personality, when they express it, when they exhibit that indefinable +resemblance to it which we find occasionally between the artist and his +work." That is all we need seek; two conceptions which are equivalent to +each other, two concordant formulae. It is true that this amounts to +determining the free act by its very originality, in the etymological sense +of the word: which is at bottom only another way of declaring it +incommensurable with every concept, and reluctant to be confined by any +definition. But, after all, is not that the only true immediate fact? + +That our spiritual life is genuine action, capable of independence, +initiative, and irreducible novelty, not mere result produced from outside, +not simple extension of external mechanism, that it is so much ours as to +constitute every moment, for him who can see, an essentially incomparable +and new invention, is exactly what represents for us the name of liberty. +Understood thus, and decidedly it is like this that we must understand it, +liberty is a profound thing: we seek it only in those moments of high and +solemn choice which come into our life, not in the petty familiar actions +which their very insignificance submits to all surrounding influences, to +every wandering breeze. Liberty is rare; many live and die and have never +known it. Liberty is a thing which contains an infinite number of degrees +and shades; it is measured by our capacity for the inner life. Liberty is +a thing which goes on in us unceasingly: our liberty is potential rather +than actual. And lastly, it is a thing of duration, not of space and +number, not the work of moments or decrees. The free act is the act which +has been long in preparing, the act which is heavy with our whole history, +and falls like a ripe fruit from our past life. + +But how are we to establish positive verification of these views? How are +we to do away with the danger of illusion? The proof will in this case +result from a criticism of adverse theories, along with direct observation +of psychological reality freed from the deceptive forms which warp the +common perception of it. And it will here be an easy task to resume Mr +Bergson's reasoning in a few words. + +The first obstacle which confronts affirmation of our liberty comes from +physical determinism. Positive science, we are told, presents the universe +to us as an immense homogeneous transformation, maintaining an exact +equivalence between departure and arrival. How can we possibly have after +that the genuine creation which we require in the act we call free? + +The answer is that the universality of the mechanism is at bottom only a +hypothesis which is still awaiting demonstration. On the one hand it +includes the parallelist conception which we have recognised as effete. +And on the other it is plain that it is not self-sufficient. At least it +requires that somewhere or other there should be a principle of position +giving once for all what will afterwards be maintained. In actual fact, +the course of phenomena displays three tendencies: a tendency to +conservation, beyond question; but also a tendency to collapse, as in the +diminution of energy; and a tendency to progress, as in biological +evolution. To make conservation the sole law of matter implies an +arbitrary decree, denoting only those aspects of reality which will count +for anything. By what right do we thus exclude, with vital effort, even +the feeling of liberty which in us is so vigorous? + +We might say, it is true, that our spiritual life, if it is not a simple +extension of external mechanism, yet proceeds according to an internal +mechanism equally severe, but of a different order. This would bring us to +the hypothesis of a kind of psychological mechanism; and in many respects +this seems to be the common-sense hypothesis. I need not dwell upon it, +after the numerous criticisms already made. Inner reality--which does not +admit number--is not a sequence of distinct terms, allowing a disconnected +waste of absolute causality. + +And the mechanism of which we dream has no true sense--for, after all, it +has a sense--except in relation to the superficial phenomena which take +place in our dead rind, in relation to the automaton which we are in daily +life. I am ready to admit that it explains our common actions, but here it +is our profound consciousness which is in question, not the play of our +materialised habits. + +Without insisting, then, too strongly on this mongrel conception, let us +pass to the direct examination of inner psychological reality. Everything +is ready for the conclusion. Our duration, which is continually +accumulating itself, and always introducing some irreducible new factor, +prevents any kind of state, even if superficially identical, from repeating +itself in depth. "We shall never again have the soul we had this evening." +Each of our moments remains essentially unique. It is something new added +to the surviving past; not only new, but unable to be foreseen. + +For how can we speak of foresight which is not simple conjecture, how can +we conceive an absolute extrinsic determination, when the act in birth only +makes one with the finished sum of its conditions, when these conditions +are complete only on the threshold of the action beginning, including the +fresh and irreducible contribution added by its very date in our history? +We can only explain afterwards, we can only foresee when it is too late, in +retrospect, when the accomplished action has fallen into the plan of +matter. + +Thus our inner life is a work of enduring creation: of phases which mature +slowly, and conclude at long intervals the decisive moments of emancipating +discovery. Undoubtedly matter is there, under the forms of habit, +threatening us with automatism, seeking at every moment to devour us, +stealing a march on us whenever we forget. But matter represents in us +only the waste of existence, the mortal fall of weakened reality, the swoon +of the creative action falling back inert; while the depths of our being +still pulse with the liberty which, in its true function, employs mechanism +itself only as a means of action. + +Now, does not this conception make a singular exception of us in nature, an +empire within an empire? That is the question we have yet to investigate. + + + +II. + +We have just attempted to grasp what being is in ourselves; and we have +found that it is becoming, progress, and growth, that it is a creative +process which never ceases to labour incessantly; in a word, that it is +duration. Must we come to the same conclusion about external being, about +existence in general? + +Let us consider that external reality which is nearest us, our body. It is +known to us both externally by our perceptions and internally by our +affections. It is then a privileged case for our inquiry. In addition, +and by analogy, we shall at the same time study the other living bodies +which everyday induction shows us to be more or less like our own. What +are the distinctive characteristics of these new realities? Each of them +possesses a genuine individuality to a far greater degree than inorganic +objects; whilst the latter are hardly limited at all except in relation to +the needs of the former, and so do not constitute beings in themselves, the +former evidence a powerful internal unity which is only further emphasised +by their prodigious complication, and form wholes with are naturally +complete. These wholes are not collections of juxtaposed parts: they are +organisms; that is to say, systems of connected functions, in which each +detail implies the whole, and where the various elements interpenetrate. +These organisms change and modify continually; we say of them not only that +they are, but that they live; and their life is mutability itself, a +flight, a perpetual flux. This uninterrupted flight cannot in any way be +compared to a geometrical movement; it is a rhythmic succession of phases, +each of which contains the resonance of all those which come before; each +state lives on in the state following; the life of the body is memory; the +living being accumulates its past, makes a snowball of itself, serves as an +open register for time, ripens, and grows old. Despite all resemblances, +the living body always remains, in some measure, an absolutely original and +unique invention, for there are not two specimens exactly alike; and, among +inert objects, it appears as the reservoir of indetermination, the centre +of spontaneity, contingence, and genuine action, as if in the course of +phenomena nothing really new could be produced except by its agency. + +Such are the characteristic tendencies of life, such the aspects which it +presents to immediate observation. Whether spiritual activity +unconsciously presides over biological evolution, or whether it simply +prolongs it, we always find here and there the essential features of +duration. + +But I spoke just now of "individuality." Is it really one of the +distinctive marks of life? We know how difficult it is to define it +accurately. Nowhere, not even in man, is it fully realised; and there are +beings in existence in which it seems a complete illusion, though every +part of them reproduces their complete unity. + +True, but we are now dealing with biology, in which geometrical precision +is inadmissible, where reality is defined not so much by the possession of +certain characteristics as by its tendency to accentuate them. It is as a +tendency that individuality is more particularly manifested; and if we look +at it in this light, no one can deny that it does constitute one of the +fundamental tendencies of life. Only the truth is that the tendency to +individuality remains always and everywhere counterbalanced, and therefore +limited, by an opposing tendency, the tendency to association, and above +all to reproduction. This necessitates a correction in our analysis. +Nature, in many respects, seems to take no interest in individuals. "Life +appears to be a current passing from one germ to another through the medium +of a developed organism." ("Creative Evolution", page 29.) + +It seems as if the organism played the part of a thoroughfare. What is +important is rather the continuity of progress of which the individuals are +only transitory phases. Between these phases again there are no sharp +severances; each phase resolves and melts imperceptibly into that which +follows. Is not the real problem of heredity to know how, and up to what +point, a new individual breaks away from the individuals which produced it? +Is not the real mystery of heredity the difference, not the resemblance, +occurring between one term and another? + +Whatever be its solution, all the individual phases mutually extend and +interpenetrate one another. There is a racial memory by which the past is +continually accumulated and preserved. Life's history is embodied in its +present. And that is really the ultimate reason of the perpetual novelty +which surprised us just now. The characteristics of biological evolution +are thus the same as those of human progress. Once again we find the very +stuff of reality in duration. "We must not then speak any longer of life +in general as an abstraction, or a mere heading under which we write down +all living beings." ("Creative Evolution", page 28.) On the contrary, to +it belongs the primordial function of reality. It is a very real current +transmitted from generation to generation, organising and passing through +bodies, without failing or becoming exhausted in any one of them. + +We may, already, then, draw one conclusion: Reality, at bottom, is +becoming. But such a thesis runs counter to all our familiar ideas. It is +imperative that we should submit it to the test of critical examination and +positive verification. + +One system of metaphysics, I said some time ago, underlies common-sense, +animating and informing it. According to this system, which is the inverse +of that which we have just intimated, reality in its very depths is fixity +and permanence. This is the completely static conception which sees in +being exactly the opposite of becoming: we cannot become, it seems to say, +except in so far as we are not. It does not, however, mean to deny +movement. But it represents it as fluctuation round invariable types, as a +whirling but captive eddy. Every phenomenon appears to it as a +transformation which ends where it began, and the result is that the world +takes the form of an eternal equilibrium in which "nothing is created, +nothing destroyed." The idea does not need much forcing to end in the old +supposition of a cyclic return which restores everything to its original +conditions. Everything is thus conceived in astronomical periods. All +that is left of the universe henceforward is a whirl of atoms in which +nothing counts but certain fixed quantities translated by our systems of +equations; the rest has vanished "in algebraical smoke." There is +therefore nothing more or less in the effect than in the group of causes; +and the causal relation moves towards identity as towards its asymptote. + +Such a view of nature is open to many objections, even if it were only a +question of inorganised matter. Simple physics already betoken the +insufficiency of a purely mechanic conception. The stream of phenomena +flows in an irreversible direction and obeys a determined rhythm. "If I +wish to prepare myself a glass of sugar and water, I may do what I like, +but I must wait for my sugar to melt." ("Creative Evolution", page 10.) +Here are facts which pure mechanism does not take into account, regarding +as it does only statically conceived relations, and making time into a +measure only, something like a common denominator of concrete successions, +a certain number of coincidences from which all true duration remains +absent, which would remain unchanged even if the world's history, instead +of opening out in consecutive phases, were to be unfolded before our eyes +all at once like a fan. Do we not indeed speak today of aging and atomic +separation. If the quantity of energy is preserved, at least its quality +is continually deteriorating. By the side of something which remains +constant, the world also contains something which is being used up, +dissipated, exhausted, decomposed. + +Further still, a specimen of metal, in its molecular structure, preserves +an indelible trace of the treatment it has undergone; natural philosophers +tell us that there is a "memory of solids." These are all very positive +facts which pure mechanism passes over. In addition, must we not first of +all postulate what will afterwards be preserved or deteriorated? Whence we +get another aspect of things: that of genesis and creation; and in reality +we register the ascending effort of life as a reality no less startling +than mechanic inertia. + +Finally, we have a double movement of ascent and descent: such is what +life and matter appear to immediate observation. These two currents meet +each other, and grapple. It is the drama of evolution, of which Mr Bergson +once gave a masterly explanation, in stating the high place which man fills +in nature: + +"I cannot regard the general evolution and progress of life in the whole of +the organised world, the co-ordination and subordination of vital functions +to one another in the same living being, the relations which psychology and +physiology combined seem bound to establish between brain activity and +thought in man, without arriving at this conclusion, that life is an +immense effort attempted by thought to obtain of matter something which +matter does not wish to give it. Matter is inert; it is the seat of +necessity; it proceeds mechanically. It seems as if thought seeks to +profit by this mechanical inclination in matter to utilise it for actions, +and thus to convert all the creative energy it contains, at least all that +this energy possesses which admits of play and external extraction, into +contingent movements in space and events in time which cannot be foreseen. +With laborious research it piles up complications to make liberty out of +necessity, to compose for itself a matter so subtile, and so mobile, that +liberty, by a veritable physical paradox, and thanks to an effort which +cannot last long, succeeds in maintaining its equilibrium on this very +mobility. + +"But it is caught in the snare. The eddy on which it was poised seizes and +drags it down. It becomes prisoner of the mechanism it has set up. +Automatism lays hold of it, and life, inevitably forgetting the end which +it had determined, which was only to be a means in view of a superior end, +is entirely used up in an effort to preserve itself by itself. From the +humblest of organised beings to the higher vertebrates which come +immediately before man, we witness an attempt which is always foiled and +always resumed with more and more art. Man has triumphed; with difficulty, +it is true, and so incompletely that a moment's lapse and inattention on +his part surrender him to automatism again. But he has triumphed..." +("Report of the French Philosophical Society", meeting, 2nd May 1901.) + +And Mr Bergson adds in another place: ("Creative Evolution", pages 286- +287.) "With man consciousness breaks the chain. In man and in man only it +obtains its freedom. The whole history of life, till man, had been the +history of an effort of consciousness to lift matter, and of the more or +less complete crushing of consciousness by matter falling upon it again. +The enterprise was paradoxical; if indeed we can speak here, except +paradoxically, of enterprise and effort. The task was to take matter, +which is necessity itself, and create an instrument of liberty, construct a +mechanical system to triumph over mechanism, to employ the determinism of +nature to pass through the meshes of the net it had spread. But +everywhere, except in man, consciousness let itself be caught in the net of +which it sought to traverse the meshes. It remained taken in the +mechanisms it had set up. The automatism which it claimed to be drawing +towards liberty enfolds it and drags it down. It has not the strength to +get away, because the energy with which it had supplied itself for action +is almost entirely employed in maintaining the exceedingly subtile and +essentially unstable equilibrium into which it has brought matter. But man +does not merely keep his machine going, he succeeds in using it as it +pleases him. + +"He owes it without doubt to the superiority of his brain, which allows him +to construct an unlimited number of motor mechanisms, to oppose new habits +to old time after time, and to master automatism by dividing it against +itself. He owes it to his language, which furnishes consciousness with an +immaterial body in which to become incarnate, thus dispensing it from +depending exclusively upon material bodies, the flux of which would drag it +down and soon engulf it. He owes it to social life, which stores and +preserves efforts as language stores thought, thereby fixing a mean level +to which individuals will rise with ease, and which, by means of this +initial impulse, prevents average individuals from going to sleep and urges +better people to rise higher. But our brain, our society, and our language +are only the varied outer signs of one and the same internal superiority. +Each after its fashion, they tell us the unique and exceptional success +which life has won at a given moment of its evolution. They translate the +difference in nature, and not in degree only, which separates man from the +rest of the animal world. They let us see that if, at the end of the broad +springboard from which life took off, all others came down, finding the +cord stretched too high, man alone has leapt the obstacle." + +But man is not on that account isolated in nature: "As the smallest grain +of dust forms part of our entire solar system, and is involved along with +it in this undivided downward movement which is materiality itself, so all +organised beings from the humblest to the highest, from the first origins +of life to the times in which we live, and in all places as at all times, +do but demonstrate to our eyes a unique impulse contrary to the movement of +matter, and, in itself, indivisible. All living beings are connected, and +all yield to the same formidable thrust. The animal is supported by the +plant, man rides the animal, and the whole of humanity in space and time is +an immense army galloping by the side of each of us, before and behind us, +in a spirited charge which can upset all resistance, and leap many +obstacles, perhaps even death." ("Creative Evolution", pages 293-294.) + +We see with what broad and far-reaching conclusions the new philosophy +closes. In the forcible poetry of the pages just quoted its original +accent rings deep and pure. Some of its leading theses, moreover, are +noted here. But now we must discover the solid foundation of underlying +fact. + +Let us take first the fact of biological evolution. Why has it been +selected as the basis of the system? Is it really a fact, or is it only a +more or less conjectural and plausible theory? + +Notice in the first instance that the argument from evolution appears at +least as a weapon of co-ordination and research admitted in our day by all +philosophers, rejected only on the inspiration of preconceived ideas which +are completely unscientific; and that it succeeds in the task allotted to +it is doubtless already the proof that it responds to some part of reality. +And besides, we can go further. "The idea of transformism is already +contained in germ in the natural classification of organised beings. The +naturalist brings resembling organisms together, divides the group into +sub-groups, within which the resemblance is still greater, and so on; +throughout the operation, the characteristics of the group appear as +general themes upon which each of the sub-groups executes its particular +variations. + +"Now this is precisely the relation we find in the animal world and in the +vegetable world between that which produces and what is produced; on the +canvas bequeathed by the ancestor to his posterity, and possessed in common +by them, each broiders his original pattern." ("Creative Evolution", pages +24-25.) + +We may, it is true, ask ourselves whether the genealogical method permits +results so far divergent as those presented to us by variety of species. +But embryology answers by showing us the highest and most complex forms of +life attained every day from very elementary forms; and palaeontology, as +it develops, allows us to witness the same spectacle in the universal +history of life, as if the succession of phases through which the embryo +passes were only a recollection and an epitome of the complete past whence +it has come. In addition, the phenomena of sudden changes, recently +observed, help us to understand more easily the conception which obtrudes +itself under so many heads, by diminishing the importance of the apparent +lacunae in genealogical continuity. Thus the trend of all our experience +is the same. + +Now there are some certainties which are only centres of concurrent +probabilities; there are some truths determined only by succession of +facts, but yet, by their intersection and convergence, sufficiently +determined. + +"That is how we measure the distance from an inaccessible point, by +regarding it time after time from the points to which we have access." +("Report of the French Philosophical Society", meeting, 2nd May 1901.) + +Is not that the case here? The affirmative seems all the more inevitable +inasmuch as the language of transformism is the only language known to the +biology of today. Evolution can, it is true, be transposed, but not +suppressed, since in any actual state there would always remain this +striking fact that the living forms met with as remains in geological +layers are ranged by the natural affinity of their characteristics in an +order of succession parallel to the succession of the ages. We are not +really then inventing a hypothesis in beginning with the affirmation of +evolution. But what we have to do is to appreciate its object. + +Evolution! We meet the word everywhere today. But how rare is the true +idea! Let us ask the astronomers who originate cosmogonical hypotheses, +and invent a primitive nebula, the natural philosophers who dream that by +the deterioration of energy and the dissipation of movement the material +world will obtain final rest in the inertia of a homogeneous equilibrium, +let us ask the biologists and psychologists who are enemies of fixed +species and inquisitive about ancestral history. What they are anxious to +discern in evolution is the persistent influence of an initial cause once +given, the attraction of a fixed end, a collection of laws before the +eternity of which change becomes negligible like an appearance. Now he who +thinks of the universe as a construction of unchangeable relations denies +by his method the evolution of which he speaks, since he transforms it into +a calculable effect necessarily produced by a regulated play of generating +conditions, since he implicitly admits the illusive character of a becoming +which adds nothing to what is given. + +Finality itself, if he keeps the name, does not save him from his error, +for finality in his eyes is nothing but an efficient cause projected into +the future. So we see him fixing stages, marking periods, inserting means, +putting in milestones, continually destroying movement by halting it before +his gaze. And we all do the same by instinctive inclination. Our concept +of law, in its classical form, is not general: it represents only the law +of co-existence and of mechanism, the static relation between two +numerically disconnected terms; and in order to grasp evolution we shall +doubtless have to invent a new type of law: law in duration, dynamic +relation. For we can, and we must, conceive that there is an evolution of +natural laws; that these laws never define anything but a momentary state +of things; that they are in reality like streaks determined in the flux of +becoming by the meeting of contrary currents. "Laws," says Monsieur +Boutroux, "are the bed down which passes the torrent of facts; they have +dug it, though they follow it." Yet we see the common theories of +evolution appealing to the concepts of the present to describe the past, +forcing them back to prehistoric times, and beyond the reasoning of today, +placing at the beginning what is only conceivable in the mind of the +contemporary thinker; in a word, imagining the same laws as always existing +and always observed. This is the method which Mr Bergson so justly +criticises in Spencer: that of reconstructing evolution with fragments of +its product. + +If we wish thoroughly to grasp the reality of things, we must think +otherwise. Neither of these ready-made concepts, mechanism and finality, +is in place, because both of them imply the same postulate, viz. that +"everything is given," either at the beginning or at the end, whilst +evolution is nothing if it is not, on the contrary, "that which gives." +Let us take care not to confound evolution and development. There is the +stumbling-block of the usual transformist theories, and Mr Bergson devotes +to it a closely argued and singularly penetrating criticism, by an example +which he analyses in detail. ("Creative Evolution", chapter i.) These +theories either do not explain the birth of variation, and limit themselves +to an attempt to make us understand how, once born, it becomes fixed, or +else through need of adaptation they look for a conception of its birth. +But in both cases they fail. + +"The truth is that adaptation explains the windings of the movement of +evolution, but not the general directions of the movement, still less the +movement itself. The road which leads to the town is certainly obliged to +climb the hills and go down the slopes; it adapts itself to the accidents +of the ground; but the accidents of the ground are not the cause of the +road, any more than they have imparted its direction." ("Creative +Evolution", pages 111-112.) + +At the bottom of all these errors there are only prejudices of practical +action. That is of course why every work appears to be an outside +construction beginning with previous elements; a phase of anticipation +followed by a phase of execution, calculation, and art, an effective +projecting cause, and a concerted goal, a mechanism which hurls to a +finality which aims. But the genuine explanation must be sought elsewhere. +And Mr Bergson makes this plain by two admirable analyses in which he takes +to pieces the common ideas of disorder and nothingness in order to explain +their meaning relative to our proceedings in industry or language. + +Let us come back to facts, to immediate experience, and try to translate +its pure data simply. What are the characteristics of vital evolution? +First of all it is a dynamic continuity, a continuity of qualitative +progress; next, it is essentially a duration, an irreversible rhythm, a +work of inner maturation. By the memory inherent in it, the whole of its +past lives on and accumulates, the whole of its past remains for ever +present to it; which is tantamount to saying that it is experience. + +It is also an effort of perpetual invention, a generation of continual +novelty, indeducible and capable of defying all anticipation, as it defies +all repetition. We see it at its task of research in the groping attempts +exhibited by the long-sought genesis of species; we see it triumphant in +the originality of the least state of consciousness, of the least body, of +the tiniest cell, of which the infinity of times and spaces does not offer +two identical specimens. + +But the reef which lies in its way, and on which too often it founders, is +habit; habit would be a better and more powerful means of action if it +remained free, but in so far as it congeals and becomes materialised, is a +hindrance and an obstacle. First of all we have the average types round +which fluctuates an action which is decreasing and becoming reduced in +breadth. Then we have the residual organs, the proofs of dead life, the +encrustations from which the stream of consciousness gradually ebbs; and +finally we have the inert gear from which all real life has disappeared, +the masses of shipwrecked "things" rearing their spectral outlines where +once rolled the open sea of mind. The concept of mechanism suits the +phenomena which occur within the zone of wreckage, on this shore of +fixities and corpses. But life itself is rather finality, if not in the +anthropomorphic sense of premeditated design, plan, or programme, at least +in this sense, that it is a continually renewed effort of growth and +liberation. And it is from here we get Mr Bergson's formulae: vital +impetus and creative evolution. + +In this conception of being consciousness is everywhere, as original and +fundamental reality, always present in a myriad degrees of tension or +sleep, and under infinitely various rhythms. + +The vital impulse consists in a "demand for creation"; life in its humblest +stage already constitutes a spiritual activity; and its effort sends out a +current of ascending realisation which again determines the counter-current +of matter. Thus all reality is contained in a double movement of ascent +and descent. The first only, which translates an inner work of creative +maturation, is essentially durable; the second might, in strictness, be +almost instantaneous, like that of an escaping spring; but the one imposes +its rhythm on the other. From this point of view mind and matter appear +not as two things opposed to each other, as static terms in fixed +antithesis, but rather as two inverse directions of movement; and, in +certain respects, we must therefore speak not so much of matter or mind as +of spiritualisation and materialisation, the latter resulting automatically +from a simple interruption of the former. "Consciousness or +superconsciousness is the rocket, the extinguished remains of which fall +into matter." ("Creative Evolution", page 283.) + +What image of universal evolution is then suggested? Not a cascade of +deduction, nor a system of stationary pulsations, but a fountain which +spreads like a sheaf of corn and is partially arrested, or at least +hindered and delayed, by the falling spray. The fountain itself, the +reality which is created, is vital activity, of which spiritual activity +represents the highest form; and the spray which falls is the creative act +which falls, it is reality which is undone, it is matter and inertia. In a +word, the supreme law of genesis and fall, the double play of which +constitutes the universe, comprises a psychological formula. + +Everything begins in the manner of an invention, as the fruit of duration +and creative genius, by liberty, by pure mind; then comes habit, a kind of +body, as the body is already a group of habits; and habit, taking root, +being a work of consciousness which escapes it and turns against it, is +little by little degraded into mechanism in which the soul is buried. + + +III. + +The main lines and general perspective of Mr Bergson's philosophy now +perhaps begin to appear. Certainly I am the first to feel how powerless a +slender resume really is to translate all its wealth and all its strength. + +At least I wish I could have contributed to making its movement, and what I +may call its rhythm, clearer to perception. It is from the books of the +master himself that a more complete revelation must be sought. And the few +words which I am still going to add as conclusion are only intended to +sketch the principal consequences of the doctrine, and allow its distant +reach to be seen. + +The evolution of life would be a very simple and easy thing to understand +if it were fulfilled along one single trajectory and followed a straight +path. "But we are here dealing with a shell which has immediately burst +into fragments, which, being themselves species of shells, have again burst +into fragments destined to burst again, and so on for a very long time." +("Creative Evolution", page 107.) It is, in fact, the property of a +tendency to develop itself in the expansion which analyses it. As for the +causes of this dispersion into kingdoms, then into species, and finally +into individuals, we can distinguish two series: the resistance which +matter opposes to the current of life sent through it, and the explosive +force--due to an unstable equilibrium of tendencies--carried by the vital +impulse within itself. Both unite in making the thrust of life divide in +more and more diverging but complementary directions, each emphasising some +distinct aspect of its original wealth. Mr Bergson confines himself to the +branches of the first order--plant, animal, and man. And in the course of +a minute and searching discussion he shows us the characteristics of these +lines in the moods or qualities signified by the three words--torpor, +instinct, and intelligence: the vegetable kingdom constructing and storing +explosives which the animal expends, and man creating a nervous system for +himself which permits him to convert the expense into analysis. Let us +leave aside, as we must, the many suggestive views scattered lavishly +about, the many flashes of light which fall on all faces of the problem, +and let us confine ourselves to seeing how we get a theory of knowledge +from this doctrine. There we have yet another proof of the striking and +fertile originality of the new philosophy. + +More than one objection has been brought against Mr Bergson on this head. +That is quite natural: how could such a novelty be exactly understood at +once? It is also very desirable; it is the demands for enlightenment which +lead a doctrine to full consciousness of itself, to precision and +perfection. But we must be afraid of false objections, those which arise +from an obstinate translation of the new philosophy into an old language +steeped in a different metaphysic. With what has Mr Bergson been +reproached? With misunderstanding reason, with ruining positive science, +with being caught in the illusion of getting knowledge otherwise than by +intelligence, or of thinking otherwise than by thought; in short, of +falling into a vicious circle by making intellectualism turn round upon +itself. Not one of these reproaches has any foundation. + +Let us begin by a few preliminary remarks to clear the ground. First of +all, there is one ridiculous objection which I quote only to record. I +mean that which suspects at the bottom of the theories which we are going +to discuss some dark background, some prepossession of irrational +mysticism. On the contrary, the truth is, we have here perhaps better than +anywhere, the spectacle of pure thought face to face with things. But it +is a complete thought, not thought reduced to some partial functions, but +sufficiently sure of its critical power to sacrifice none of its resources. +Here, we may say, really is the genuine positivism, which reinstates all +spiritual reality. It does not in any way lead to a misunderstanding or +depreciation of science. Even where contingency and relativity are most +visible in it, in the domain of inert matter, Mr Bergson goes so far as to +say that physical science touches an absolute. It is true that it touches +this absolute rather than sees it. More particularly it perceives all its +reactions on a system of representative forms which it presents to it, and +observes the effect on the veil of theory with which it envelops it. At +certain moments, all the same, the veil becomes almost transparent. And in +any case the scholar's thought guesses and grazes reality in the curve +drawn by the succession of its increasing syntheses. But there are two +orders of science. Formerly it was from the mathematician that we borrowed +the ideal of evidence. Hence came the inclination always to seek the most +certain knowledge from the most abstract side. The temptation was to make +a kind of less severe and rigorous mathematics of biology itself. Now if +such a method suits the study of inert matter because in a manner +geometrical, so much so that our knowledge of it thus acquired is more +incomplete than inexact, this is not at all the case for the things of +life. Here, if we were to conduct scientific research always in the same +grooves and according to the same formulae, we should immediately encounter +symbolism and relativity. For life is progress, whilst the geometrical +method is commensurable only with things. Mr Bergson is aware of this; and +his rare merit has been to disengage specific originality from biology, +while elevating it to a typical and standard science. + +But let us come to the heart of the problem. What was Kant's point of +departure in the theory of knowledge? In seeking to define the structure +of the mind according to the traces of itself which it must have left in +its works, and in proceeding by a reflective analysis ascending from a fact +to its conditions, he could only regard intelligence as a thing made, a +fixed system of categories and principles. + +Mr Bergson adopts an inverse attitude. Intelligence is a product of +evolution: we see it slowly and uninterruptedly constructed along a line +which rises through the vertebrates to man. Such a point of view is the +only one which conforms to the real nature of things, and the actual +conditions of reality; the more we think of it, the more we perceive that +the theory of knowledge and the theory of life are bound up with one +another. Now what do we conclude from this point of view? Life, +considered in the direction of "knowledge," evolves on two diverging lines +which at first are confused, then gradually separate, and finally end in +two opposed forms of organisation, intelligence and instinct. Several +contrary potentialities interpenetrated at their common source, but of this +source each of these kinds of activity preserves or rather accentuates only +one tendency; and it will be easy to mark its dual character. + +Instinct is sympathy; it has no clear consciousness of itself; it does not +know how to reflect; it is hardly capable of varying its steps; but it +operates with incomparable certainty because it remains lodged in things, +in communion with their rhythm and with inner feeling of them. The history +of animals in this respect supplies many remarkable examples which Mr +Bergson analyses and discusses in detail. As much might be said of the +work which produces a living body, and of the effort which presides over +its growth, maintenance, and functions. Take a natural philosopher who has +long breathed the atmosphere of the laboratory, who has by long practice +acquired what we call "experience"; he has a kind of intimate feeling for +his instruments, their resources, their movements, their working +tendencies; he perceives them as extensions of himself; he possesses them +as groups of habitual actions, thus discoursing by manipulations as easily +and spontaneously as others discourse in calculation. Doubtless that is +only an image; but transpose it and generalise it, and it will help you to +understand the kind of action which divines instinct. But intelligence is +something quite different. We are talking, of course, of the analytic and +synthetic intelligence which we use in our acts of current thought, which +works throughout our daily action and forms the fundamental thread of our +scientific operations. I need not here go back to the criticism of its +ordinary proceedings. But I must now note the service which suits them, +the domain in which they apply and are valid, and what they teach us +thereby about the meaning, reach, and natural task of intelligence. + +Whilst instinct vibrates in sympathetic harmony with life, it is about +inert matter that intelligence is granted; it is a rider to our faculty of +action; it triumphs in geometry; it feels at home among the objects in +which our industry finds its supports and its tools. In a word, "our logic +is primarily the logic of solids." (Preface to "Creative Evolution".) But +if we enter the vital order its incompetence is manifestly apparent. + +It is very important that deduction should be so impotent in biology. +Still more impotent is it perhaps in matters of art or religion; whilst, on +the contrary, it works marvels so long as it has only to foresee movements +or transformations in bodies. What does this mean, if not that +intelligence and materiality go together, that language with its analytic +steps is regulated by the movements of matter? Philosophy once again then +must leave it behind, for the duty of philosophy is to consider everything +in its relation to life. + +Do not conclude, however, that the philosopher's duty is to renounce +intelligence, place it under tutelage, or abandon it to the blind +suggestions of feeling and will. It has not even the right to do so. +Instinct, with us who have evolved along the grooves of intelligence, has +remained too weak to be sufficient for us. Besides, intelligence is the +only path by which light could dawn in the bosom of primitive darkness. +But let us look at present reality in all its complexity, all its wealth. +Round intelligence itself exists a halo of instinct. This halo represents +the remains of the first nebulous vapour at the expense of which +intelligence was constituted like a brilliantly condensed nucleus; and it +is still today the atmosphere which gives it life, the fringe of touch, and +delicate probing, inspiring contact and divining sympathy, which we see in +play in the phenomena of discovery, as also in the acts of that "attention +to life," and that "sense of reality" which is the soul of good sense, so +widely distinct from common-sense. And the peculiar task of the +philosopher is to reabsorb intelligence in instinct, or rather to reinstate +instinct in intelligence; or better still, to win back to the heart of +intelligence all the initial resources which it must have sacrificed. This +is what is meant by return to the primitive, and the immediate, to reality +and life. This is the meaning of intuition. + +Certainly the task is difficult. We at once suspect a vicious circle. How +can we go beyond intelligence except by intelligence itself? We are +apparently inside our thought, as incapable of coming out of it as is a +balloon of rising above the atmosphere. True, but on this reasoning we +could just as well prove that it is impossible for us to acquire any new +habit whatsoever, impossible for life to grow and go beyond itself +continually. + +We must avoid drawing false conclusions from the simile of the balloon. +The question here is to know what are the real limits of the atmosphere. +It is certain that the synthetic and critical intelligence, left to its own +strength, remains imprisoned in a circle from which there is no escape. + +But action removes the barrier. If intelligence accepts the risk of taking +the leap into the phosphorescent fluid which bathes it, and to which it is +not altogether foreign, since it has broken off from it and in it dwell the +complementary powers of the understanding, intelligence will soon become +adapted and so will only be lost for a moment to reappear greater, +stronger, and of fuller content. It is action again under the name of +experience which removes the danger of illusion or giddiness, it is action +which verifies; by a practical demonstration, by an effort of enduring +maturation which tests the idea in intimate contact with reality and judges +it by its fruits. + +It always falls therefore to intelligence to pronounce the grand verdict in +the sense that only that can be called true which will finally satisfy it; +but we mean an intelligence duly enlarged and transformed by the very +effect of the action it has lived. Thus the objection of "irrationalism" +directed against the new philosophy falls to the ground. + +The objection of "non-morality" fares no better. But is has been made, and +people have thought fit to accuse Mr Bergson's work of being the too calm +production of an intelligence too indifferent, too coldly lucid, too +exclusively curious to see and understand, untroubled and unthrilled by the +universal drama of life, by the tragic reality of evil. On the other hand, +not without contradiction, the new philosophy has been called "romantic," +and people have tried to find in it the essential traits of romanticism: +its predilection for feeling and imagination, its unique anxiety for vital +intensity, its recognised right to all which is to be, whence its radical +inability to establish a hierarchy of moral qualifications. Strange +reproach! The system in question is not yet presented to us as a finished +system. Its author manifests a plain desire to classify his problems. And +he is certainly right in proceeding so: there is a time for everything, +and on occasion we must learn to be just an eye focussed upon being. But +that does not at all exclude the possibility of future works, treating in +due order of the problem of human destiny, and perhaps even in the work so +far completed we may descry some attempts to bring this future within ken. + +But universal evolution, though creative, is not for all that quixotic or +anarchist. It forms a sequence. It is a becoming with direction, +undoubtedly due, not to the attraction of a clearly preconceived goal, or +the guidance of an outer law, but to the actual tendency of the original +thrust. In spite of the stationary eddies or momentary backwashes we +observe here and there, its stream moves in a definite direction, ever +swelling and broadening. For the spectator who regards the general sweep +of the current, evolution is growth. On the other hand, he who thinks this +growth now ended is under a simple delusion: "The gates of the future +stand wide open." ("Creative Evolution", page 114.) In the stage at +present attained man is leading; he marks the culminating point at which +creation continues; in him, life has already succeeded, at least up to a +certain point; from him onwards it advances with consciousness capable of +reflection; is it not for that very reason responsible for the result? +Life, according to the new philosophy, is a continual creation of what is +new: new--be it well understood--in the sense of growth and progress in +relation to what has gone before. Life, in a word, is mental travel, +ascent in a path of growing spiritualisation. Such at least is the intense +desire, and such the first tendency which launched and still inspires it. +But it may faint, halt, or travel down the hill. This is an undeniable +fact; and once recognised does it not awake in us the presentiment of a +directing law immanent in vital effort, a law doubtless not to be found in +any code, nor yet binding through the stern behest of mechanical necessity, +but a law which finds definition at every moment, and at every moment also +marks a direction of progress, being as it were the shifting tangent to the +curve of becoming? + +Let us did that according to the new philosophy the whole of our past +survives for ever in us, and by means of us results in action. It is then +literally true that our acts do to a certain extent involve the whole +universe, and its whole history: the act which we make it accomplish will +exist henceforward for ever, and will for ever tinge universal duration +with its indelible shade. Does not that imply an imperious, urgent, +solemn, and tragic problem of action? Nay, more; memory makes a persistent +reality of evil, as of good. Where are we to find the means to abolish and +reabsorb the evil? What in the individual is called memory becomes +tradition and joint responsibility in the race. + +On the other hand, a directing law is immanent in life, but in the shape of +an appeal to endless transcendence. In dealing with this future +transcendent to our daily life, with this further shore of present +experience, where are we to seek the inspiring strength? And is there not +ground for asking ourselves whether intuitions have not arisen here and +there in the course of history, lighting up the dark road of the future for +us with a prophetic ray of dawn? It is at this point that the new +philosophy would find place for the problem of religion. + +But this word "religion," which has not come once so far from Mr Bergson's +pen, coming now from mine, warns me that it is time to end. No man today +would be justified in foreseeing the conclusions to which the doctrine of +creative evolution will one day undoubtedly lead on this point. More than +any other, I must forget here what I myself may have elsewhere tried to do +in this order of ideas. But it was impossible not to feel the approach of +the temptation. Mr Bergson's work is extraordinarily suggestive. His +books, so measured in tone, so tranquil in harmony, awaken in us a mystery +of presentiment and imagination; they reach the hidden retreats where the +springs of consciousness well up. Long after we have closed them we are +shaken within; strangely moved, we listen to the deepening echo, passing on +and on. However valuable already their explicit contents may be, they +reach still further than they aimed. It is impossible to tell what latent +germs they foster. It is impossible to guess what lies behind the +boundless distance of the horizons they expose. But this at least is sure: +these books have verily begun a new work in the history of human thought. + + + +ADDITIONAL EXPLANATIONS + + +I. Mr Bergson's Work and the General Directions of Contemporary Thought. + +A broad survey of the new philosophy was bound to be somewhat rapid and +summary; and now that this is completed it will doubtless not be +superfluous to come back, on the same plan as before, to some more +important or more difficult individual points, and to examine by themselves +the most prominent centres on which we should focus the light of our +attention. Not that I intend to probe in minute detail the folds and turns +of a doctrine which admits of infinite development: how can I claim to +exhaust a work of such profound thought that the least passing example +employed takes its place as a particular study? Still less do I wish to +undertake a kind of analytic resume; no undertaking could be less +profitable than that of arranging paragraph headings to repeat too briefly, +and therefore obscurely, what a thinker has said without any extravagance +of language, yet with every requisite explanation. + +The critic's true task, as I understand it, in no way consists in drawing +up a table of contents strewn with qualifying notes. His task is to read +and enable others to read between the lines, between the chapters, and +between the successive works, what constitutes the dynamic tie between +them, all that the linear form of writing and language has not allowed the +author himself to elucidate. + +His task is, as far as possible, to master the accompaniment of underlying +thought which produced the resonant atmosphere of the inquirer's intuition, +the rhythm and toning of the image, resulting in the shade of light which +falls upon his vision. His task, in a word, is to help understanding, and +therefore to point out and anticipate the misunderstandings to be feared. +Now it seems to me that there are a few points round which the errors of +interpretation more naturally gather, producing some astounding +misconceptions of Mr Bergson's philosophy. It is these points only that I +propose to clear up. But at the same time I shall use the opportunity to +supply information about authorities, which I have hitherto deliberately +omitted, to avoid riddling with references pages which were primarily +intended to impart a general impression. + +Let us begin by glancing at the milieu of thought in which Mr Bergson's +philosophy must have had birth. For the last thirty years new currents are +traceable. In what direction do they go? And what distance have they +already gone? What, in short, are the intellectual characteristics of our +time? We must endeavour to distinguish the deeper tendencies, those which +herald and prepare and near future. + +One of the essential and frequently cited features of the generation in +which Taine and Renan were the most prominent leaders was the passionate, +enthusiastic, somewhat exclusive and intolerant cult of positive science. +This science, in its days of pride, was considered unique, displayed on a +plane by itself, always uniformly competent, capable of gripping any object +whatever with the same strength, and of inserting it in the thread of one +and the same unbroken connection. The dream of that time, despite all +verbal palliations, was a universal science of mathematics: mathematics, +of course, with their bare and brutal rigour softened and shaded off, where +feasible; if possible, supple and sensitive; in ideal, delicate, buoyant, +and judicious; but mathematics governed from end to end by an equal +necessity. Conceived as the sole mistress of truth, this science was +expected in days to come to fulfil all the needs of man, and unreservedly +to take the place of ancient spiritual discipline. Genuine philosophy had +had its day: all metaphysics seemed deception and fantasy, a simple play +of empty formulae or puerile dreams, a mythical procession of abstraction +and phantom; religion itself paled before science, as poetry of the grey +morning before the splendour of the rising sun. + +However, after all this pride came the turn of humility, and humility of +the very lowest. This deified science, borne down in its hour of triumph +by too heavy a weight, had necessarily been recognised as powerless to go +beyond the order of relations, and radically incapable of telling us the +origin, end, and basis of things. It analysed the conditions of phenomena, +but was ill-suited ever to grasp any real cause, or any deep essence. +Further, it became the Unknowable, before which the human mind could only +halt in despair. And in this way destitution arose out of ambition itself, +since thought, after trusting too exclusively to its geometrical strength, +was compelled at the end of its effort to confess itself beaten when +confronted with the only questions to which no man may ever be indifferent. + +This double attitude is no longer that of the contemporary generation. The +prestige of illusion has vanished. In the religion of science we see now +nothing but idolatry. The haughty affirmation of yesterday appears today, +not as expressing a positive fact or a result duly established, but as +bringing forward a thesis of perilous and unconscious metaphysics. Let us +go even further. If true intelligence is mental expansion and aptitude for +understanding widely different things, each in its originality, to the same +degree, we must say that the claim to reduce reality to one only of its +modes, to know it in one only of its forms, is an unintelligent claim. +That is, in brief formula, the verdict of the present generation. Not, of +course, that it in any way misconceives or disdains the true value of +science, whether as an instrument of action for the conquest of nature, or +as intelligible language, allowing us to know our whereabouts in things and +"talk" them. + +It is aware that in all circumstances positive methods have their evidence +to produce, and that, where they pronounce within the limits of their +power, nothing can stand against their verdict. But it considers first of +all that science was conceived of late under much too stiff and narrow a +form, under the obsession of too abstract a mathematical ideal which +corresponds to one aspect of reality only, and that the shallowest. And it +considers afterwards that science, even when broadened and made flexible, +being concerned only with what is, with fact and datum, remains radically +powerless to solve the problem of human life. Nowhere does science +penetrate to the very depth of things, and there is nothing in the world +but "things." + +Experience has shown where the dream of universal mathematics leads us. +Number is driven to the heart of phenomena and nature dissected with this +delicate scalpel. Speaking in more general terms, we adopt spatial +relation as the perfect example of intelligible relation. I do not wish to +deny the use of such a method now and again, the services it may render, or +the beauty of construction peculiar to the systems it inspires. But we +must see what price we pay for these advantages. Do we choose geometry for +an informing and regulating science? The more we advance towards the +concrete and the living, the more we feel the necessity of altering the +pure mathematical type. The sciences, as they get further from inert +matter, unless they agree to reform, pale and weaken; they become vague, +impotent, anaemic; they touch little but the trite surface of their object, +the body, not the soul; in them symbolism, artifice, and relativity become +increasingly evident; at length, arbitrary and conventional elements crop +up and devour them. In a word, the claim to treat the living as inert +matter conduces to the misconception in life of life itself, and the +retention of nothing but the material waste. + +This experience furnishes us with a lesson. There is not so much one +science as several sciences, each distinguished by an autonomous method, +and divided into two great kingdoms. + +Let us therefore from the outset follow Mr Bergson in tracing a very sharp +line of demarcation between the inert and the living. Two orders of +knowledge will thereby become separate, one in which the frames of +geometrical understanding are in place, the other where new means and a new +attitude are required. The essential task of the present hour will now +appear to us in a precise light; it will henceforward consist, without any +disregard of a glorious past, in an effort to found as specifically +distinct methods of instruction those sciences which take for objects the +successive moments of life in its different degrees, biology, psychology, +sociology;--then in an effort to reconstruct, setting out from these new +sciences and according to their spirit, the like of what ancient philosophy +had attempted, setting out from geometry and mechanics. By so doing we +shall succeed in throwing knowledge open to receive all the wealth of +reality, while at the same time we shall reinstate the sense of mystery and +the thrill of higher anxieties. A further result will be that the phantom +of the Unknowable will be exorcised, since it no longer represents anything +but the relative and momentary limit of each method, the portion of being +which escapes its partial grip. + +This is one of the first controlling ideas of the contemporary generation. +Others result from it. More particularly, it is for the same body of +motives, in the same sense, and with the same restrictions, that we +distrust intellectualism; I mean the tendency to live uniquely by +intelligence, to think as if the whole of thought consisted in analytic, +clear and reasoning understanding. + +Once again, it is not a question of some blind abandonment to sentiment, +imagination, or will, nor do we claim to restrict the legitimate rights of +intellectuality in judgment. But around critical reason there is a +quickening atmosphere in which dwell the powers of intuition, there is a +half-light of gradual tones in which insertion into reality is effected. +If by rationalism we mean the attitude which consists in cabining ourselves +within the zone of geometrical light in which language evolves, we must +admit that rationalism supposes something other than itself, that it hangs +suspended by a generating act which escapes it. + +The method therefore which we seek to employ everywhere today is +experience; but complete experience, anxious to neglect no aspect of being +nor any resource of mind; shaded experience, not extending on the surface +only, in a homogeneous and uniform manner; on the contrary, an experience +distributed in depth over multiple planes, adopting a thousand different +forms to adapt itself to the different kinds of problems; in short, a +creative and informing experience, a veritable genesis, a genuine action of +thought, a work and movement of life by which the guiding principles, forms +of intelligibility, and criteria of verification obtain birth and stability +in habits. And here again it is by borrowing Mr Bergson's own formula from +him that we shall most accurately describe the new spirit. + +That the attitude and fundamental procedure of this new spirit are in no +way a return to scepticism or a reaction against thought cannot be better +demonstrated than by this resurrection of metaphysics, this renaissance of +idealism, which is certainly one of the most distinctive features of our +epoch. Undoubtedly philosophy in France has never known so prosperous and +so pregnant a moment. Notwithstanding, it is not a return to the old +dreams of dialectic construction. Everything is regarded from the point of +view of life, and there is a tendency more and more to recognise the +primacy of spiritual activity. But we wish to understand and employ this +activity and this life in all its wealth, in all its degrees, and by all +its functions: we wish to think with the whole of thought, and go to the +truth with the whole of our soul; and the reason of which we recognise the +sovereign weight is reason laden with its complete past history. + +And what is that, really, but realism? By realism I mean the gift of +ourselves to reality, the work of concrete realisation, the effort to +convert every idea into action, to regulate the idea by the action as much +as the action by the idea, to live what we think and think what we live. +But that is positivism, you will say; certainly it is positivism. But how +changed! Far from considering as positive only that which can be an object +of sensation or calculation, we begin by greeting the great spiritual +realities with this title. The deep and living aspiration of our day is in +everything to seek the soul, the soul which specifies and quickens, seek it +by an effort towards the revealing sympathy which is genuine intelligence, +seek it in the concrete, without dissolving thought in dreams or language, +without losing contact with the body or critical control, seek it, in fine, +as the most real and genuine part of being. + +Hence its return to questions which were lately declared out of date and +closed; hence its taste for problems of aesthetics and morality, its close +siege of social and religious problems, its homesickness for a faith +harmonising the powers of action and the powers of thought; hence its +restless desire to hark back to tradition and discipline. + +A new philosophy was required to answer this new way of looking at things. +Already, in 1867, Ravaisson in his celebrated "Report" wrote these +prophetic lines: "Many signs permit us to foresee in the near future a +philosophical epoch of which the general character will be the predominance +of what may be called spiritualist realism or positivism, having as +generating principle the consciousness which the mind has in itself of an +existence recognised as being the source and support of every other +existence, being none other than its action." + +This prophetic view was further commented on in a work where Mr Bergson +speaks with just praise of this shrewd and penetrating sense of what was +coming: "What could be bolder or more novel than to come and predict to +the physicists that the inert will be explained by the living, to +biologists that life will only be understood by thought, to philosophers +that generalities are not philosophic?" ("Notice on the Life and Works of +M. Felix Ravaisson-Molien", in the Reports of the Academy of Moral and +Political Sciences, 1904.) + +But let us give each his due. What Ravaisson had only anticipated Mr +Bergson himself accomplishes, with a precision which gives body to the +impalpable and floating breath of first inspiration, with a depth which +renews both proof and theses alike, with a creative originality which +prevents the critic who is anxious for justice and precision from insisting +on any researches establishing connection of thought. + +One reason for the popularity today enjoyed by this new philosophy is +doubtless to be found in the very tendencies of the milieu in which it is +produced and in the aspirations which work it. But, after once remarking +these desires, we must further not forget that Mr Bergson has contributed +more than anyone else to awaken them, determine them, and make them become +conscious of themselves. Let us therefore try to understand in itself and +by itself the work of genius of which just now we were seeking the dawning +gleams. What synthetic formula will be best able to tell us the essential +direction of its movement? I will borrow it from the author himself: "It +seems to me," he writes, ("Philosophic Intuition" in the "Revue de +Metaphysique et de Morale", November 1911.) "that metaphysics are trying at +this moment to simplify themselves, to come nearer to life." Every +philosophy tends to become incarnate in a system which constitutes for it a +kind of body of analysis. + +Regarded literally, it appears to be an infinite complication, a complex +construction with a thousand alcoves of high architecture, "in which +measures have been taken to provide ample lodging for all problems." +(Ibid.) Do not let us be deceived by this appearance: it signifies only +that language is incommensurable with thought, that speech admits of +endless multiplication in approximations incapable of exhausting their +object. But before constructing such a body for itself, all philosophy is +a soul, a mind, and begins with the simple unity of a generating intuition. +Here is the fitting point at which to see its essence; this is what +determines it much better than its conceptual expression, which is always +contingent and incomplete. "A philosophy worthy of the name has never said +but one thing; and that thing it has rather attempted to say than actually +said. And it has only said one thing, because it has only seen one point: +and that was not so much vision as contact; this contact supplied an +impulse, this impulse a movement, and if this movement, which is a kind of +vortex of a certain particular form, is only visible to our eyes by what it +has picked up on its path, it is no less true that other dust might equally +well have been raised, and that it would still have been the same vortex." +("Philosophic Intuition" in the "Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale", +November 1911.) + +Hence comes the fact that a philosophy is at bottom much more independent +of its natal environment than one might at first suppose; hence also the +fact that ancient philosophies, though apparently relative to a science +which is out of date, remain always living and worthy of study. + +What, then, is the original intuition of Mr Bergson's philosophy, the +creative intuition whence it comes forth? We cannot hesitate long: it is +the intuition of duration. That is the perspective centre to which we must +indefatigably return; that is the principle which we must labour to expose +in its full light; and that is, finally, the source of light which will +illumine us. Now a philosophy is not only an expressed intuition; it is +further and above all an acting intuition, gradually determined and +realised, and tested by its explanatory works; and it is by its fruits that +we can understand and judge it. Hence the review upon which we are +entering. + + +II. Immediacy. + +The philosopher's first duty is in clear language to declare his starting- +point, with what a mathematician would call the "tangent to the origin" of +the path along which he is travelling, as afterwards the critic's first +duty is to describe this initial attitude. I have therefore first of all +to indicate the directing idea of the new philosophy. But it is not a +question of extracting a quintessence, or of fencing the soul of doctrine +within a few summary formulae. A system is not to be resumed in a phrase, +for every proposition isolated is a proposition falsified. I wish merely +to elucidate the methodical principle which inspires the beginning of Mr +Bergson's philosophy. + +To philosophy itself falls the task and belongs the right to define itself +gradually as it becomes constituted. On this point, an anticipation of +experience seems hardly possible; here, as elsewhere, the finding of a +synthetic formula is a final rather than preliminary question. However, we +are obliged from the outset of the work to determine the programme of the +inquiry, if only to direct our research. It is the same on the threshold +of every science. There, it is true, the analogy ceases. For in any +science properly speaking the determination of beginning consists in the +indication of an object, and a matter, and beyond that, to each new object +a new science reciprocally corresponds, the existence of the one involving +the legitimacy of the other. But if the various sciences--I mean the +positive sciences--divide different objects thus between them, philosophy +cannot, in its turn, come forward as a particular science, having a +distinct object, the designation of which would be sufficient to +characterise and circumscribe it. Such was always the traditional +conception: such will ours continue to be. For, as a matter of fact, +every object has a philosophy and all matter can be regarded +philosophically. In short, philosophy is chiefly a way of perceiving and +thinking, an attitude and a proceeding: the peculiar and specific in it is +more an intuition than a content, a spirit rather than a domain. + +What, then, is the characteristic function of philosophy, at least its +initial function, that which marks its opening? + +To criticise the works of knowledge spontaneously effected; that is to say, +to scrutinise their direction, reach, and conditions: that is today the +unanimous answer of philosophers when questioned about the goal of their +labours. In other terms, what they study is not so much such and such a +particular "thing" as the relation of mind to each of the realities to be +studied. Their object, if we must employ the word, is knowledge itself, it +is the act of knowing regarded from the point of view of its meaning and +value. Philosophy thus appears as a new "order" of knowledge, co-extensive +with what is knowable, as a kind of knowledge of the second degree, in +which it is less a question of learning than of understanding, in which we +aim at progressing in depth rather than in extent; not effort to extend the +quantity of knowledge, but reflection on the quality of this knowledge. +Spontaneous thought--vulgar or scientific--is a direct, simple, and +practical thought turned towards things and partial to useful results; +seeking what is formulable rather than what is true, or at least so fond of +formulae which can be handled, manipulated, or transmitted, that it is +always tempted to see the truth in them; a thought which, moreover, sets +out from more or less unguarded postulates, abandons itself to the motive +impulses of habits contracted, and goes straight on indefinitely without +self-examination. Philosophy, on the contrary, desires to be thought about +thought, thought retracing its life and work, knowledge labouring to know +itself, fact which aspires to fact about itself, mental effort to become +free, to become entirely transparent and luminous in its own eyes, and, if +need be, to effect self-reform by dissipating its natural illusions. What +we have before our eyes then are the initial postulates themselves, the +first spontaneous thoughts, the obscure origins of reason; and we are +proceeding towards a point of departure rather than arrival. + +The new philosophy does not refuse to carry out this first critical task; +but it carries it out in its own way after determining more precisely the +real conditions of the problem. At the hour when methodical research +begins, the philosopher's mind is not clean-swept; and it would be +chimerical to wish to place oneself from the beginning, by some act of +transcendence, outside common thought. This thought cannot be inspected +and judged from outside. It constitutes, whether we wish it or no, the +sole concrete and positive point of departure. Let us add that common- +sense constitutes also our sole point of insertion into reality. It can +only then be a question of purifying it, not in any way of replacing it. +But we must distinguish in it what is pure fact, and what is ulterior +arrangement, in order to see what are the problems which really are +presented, and what are, on the contrary, the false problems, the illusory +problems, those which relate only to our artifices of language. + +The search for facts is then the first necessary moment of all philosophy. + +But common thought comes before us at the outset as a piece of very +composite alluvial ground. It is a beginning of positive science, and also +a residue of all philosophical opinions which have had some vogue. That, +however, is not its primary basis. Primum vivere, deinde philosophari, +says the proverb. In certain respects, "speculation is a luxury, whilst +action is a necessity." ("Creative Evolution", page 47.) But "life +requires us to apprehend things in the relation they have to our needs." +("Laughter", page 154.) Hence comes the fundamental utilitarianism of +common-sense. Therefore if we wish to define it in itself and for itself, +and no longer as a first approximation of such and such a system of +metaphysics, it appears to us no longer as rudimentary science and +philosophy, but as an organisation of thought in view of practical life. +Thus it is that outside all speculative opinion it is effectively lived by +all. Its proper language, we may say, is the language of customary +perception and mechanical fabrication, therefore a language relative to +action, made to express action, modelled upon action, translating things by +the relations they maintain to our action; I mean our corporal and +synthetic action, which very evidently implies thought, since it is a +question of the action of a reasonable being, but which thus contains a +thought which is itself eminently practical. + +However, we are here regarding common-sense considered as a source of fact. +Its utilitarianism then becomes a kind of spontaneous metaphysics from +which we must detach ourselves. But is it not the very task of positive +science to execute this work of purification? Nothing of the kind, despite +appearances and despite intentions. Let us examine more closely. The +general categories of common thought, according to Mr Bergson, +("Philosophic Intuition" in the "Metaphysical and Moral Review", November +1911, page 825.) remain those of science; the main roads traced by our +senses through the continuity of reality are still those along which +science will pass; perception is an infant science and science an adult +perception; so much so that customary knowledge and scientific knowledge, +both of them destined to prepare our action upon things, are of necessity +two visions of the same kind, though of unequal precision and reach. It +does not follow that science does not practise a certain disinterestedness +as far as immediate mechanical utility is concerned; it does not follow +that it has no value as knowledge. But it does not set itself genuinely +free from the habits contracted in common experience, and to inform its +research it preserves the postulates of common-sense; so that it always +grasps things by their "actable" side, by their point of contact with our +faculty for action, under the forms by which we handle them conceptually or +practically, and all it attains of reality is that by which nature is a +possible object of language or industry. + +Let us turn now towards another aspect of natural thought, to discover in +it the germ of the necessary criticism. By the side of "common-sense," +which is the first rough-draft of positive science, there is "good sense," +which differs from it profoundly, and marks the beginning of what we shall +later on call philosophic intuition. (Cf. an address on "Good Sense and +Classical Studies", delivered by Mr Bergson at the Concours general prize +distribution, 30th July 1895.) It is a sense of what is real, concrete, +original, living, an art of equilibrium and precision, a fine touch for +complexities, continually feeling like the antennae of some insects. It +contains a certain distrust of the logical faculty in respect of itself; it +wages incessant war upon intellectual automatism, upon ready-made ideas and +linear deduction; above all, it is anxious to locate and to weigh, without +any oversights; it arrests the development of every principle and every +method at the precise point where too brutal an application would offend +the delicacy of reality; at every moment it collects the whole of our +experience and organises it in view of the present. It is, in a word, +thought which keeps its freedom, activity which remains awake, suppleness +of attitude, attention to life, an ever-renewed adjustment to suit ever-new +situations. + +Its revealing virtue is derived from this moving contact with fact, and +this living effort of sympathy. This is what we must tend to transpose +from the practical to the speculative order. + +What, then, will be for us the beginning of philosophy? After taking +cognisance of common utilitarianism, and to emerge from the relativity in +which it buries us, we seek a departure-point, a criterion, something which +decides the raising of inquiry. Where are we to find such a principle, +except in the very action of thought; I mean, this time, its action of +profound life independent of all practical aim? We shall thus only be +imitating the example of Descartes when solving the problem of temporary +doubt. What we shall term return to the immediate, the primitive, the pure +fact, will be the taking of each perception considered as an act lived, a +coloured moment of the Cogito, and this will be for us a criterion and +departure-point. + +Let us specify this point. Immediate data or primitive data or pure data +are apprehended by us under forms of disinterested action; I mean that they +are first of all lived rather than conceived, that before becoming material +for science, they appear as moments of life; in brief, that perception of +them precedes their use. + +It is at this stage previous to language that we are by these pure data in +intimate communion with reality itself, and the whole of our critical task +is to return to them through a regressive analysis, the goal of which is +gradually to make our clear intelligence equal to our primordial intuition. +The latter already constitutes a thought, a preconceptual thought which is +the intrinsic light of action, which is action itself so far as it is +luminous. Thus there is no question here of restricting in any degree the +part played by thought, but only of distinguishing between the perceptive +and theoretic functions of mind. + +What is "the image" of which Mr Bergson speaks at the beginning of "Matter +and Mind" except, when grasped in its first movement, the flash of +conscious existence "in which the act of knowledge coincides with the +generating act of reality"? ("Report of the French Philosophical Society", +philosophical vocabulary, article "Immediate".) + +Let us forget all philosophical controversies about realism and idealism; +let us try to reconstruct for ourselves a simplicity, a virginal and candid +glance, freeing us from the habits contracted in the course of practical +life. These then are our "images": not things presented externally, nor +states felt internally, not portraits of exterior beings nor projections of +internal moods, but appearances, in the etymological sense of the word, +appearances lived simply, without our being distinguished from them, as yet +neither subjective nor objective, marking a moment of consciousness +previous to the work of reflection, from which proceeds the duality of +subject and object. And such also, in every order, appear the "immediate +feelings"; as action in birth, previous to language. (Cf. "Matter and +Memory", Foreword to the 7th edition.) + +Why depart from the immediate thus conceived as action and life? Because +it is quite impossible to do otherwise, for every initial fact can be only +such a pulsation of consciousness in its lived act, and the fundamental and +primitive direction of the least word, were it in an enunciation of a +problem or a doubt, can only be such a direction of life and action. And +we must certainly accord to this immediacy a value of absolute knowledge, +since it realises the coincidence of being and knowledge. + +But let us not think that the perception of immediacy is simple passive +perception, that it is sufficient to open our eyes to obtain it, today when +our utilitarian education is completed and has passed into the state of +habit. There is a difference between common experience and the initial +action of life; the first is a practical limitation of the second. Hence +it follows that a previous criticism is necessary to return from one to the +other, a criticism always in activity, always open as a way of progressive +investigation, always ready for the reiteration and the renewal of effort. + +In this task of purification there is doubtless always to be feared an +illusion of remaining in the primitive stage. By what criteria, by what +signs can we recognise that we have touched the goal? Pure fact is shown +to be such on the one hand because it remains independent of all +theoretical symbolism, because the critique of language allows it to exist +thus as an indissoluble residue, because we are unable not to "live" it, +even when we free ourselves from the anxiety of utility; on the other hand, +because it dominates all systems, and imposes itself equally upon them all +as the common source from which they derive by diverging analyses, and in +which they become reconciled. Assuredly, to attain it, to extricate it, we +must appeal to the revelations of science, to the exercise of deliberate +thought. But this employment of analysis against analysis does not in any +way constitute a circle, for it tends only to destroy prejudices which have +become unconscious: it is a simple artifice destined to break off habits +and to scatter illusions by changing the points of view. Once set free, +once again become capable of direct and simple view, what we accept as fact +is what bears no trace of synthetic elaboration. It is true that here a +last objection presents itself: how shall we think this limit, purely +given, to any degree at all in fact, if it must precede all language? + +The answer is easy. Why speak thus of limit? This word has two senses: +at one time it designates a last term in a series of approximations, and at +another a certain internal character of convergence, a certain quality of +progression. + +Now, it is the second sense only which suits the case before us. Immediacy +contains no matter statically defined, and no thing. The notion of fact is +quite relative. What is fact in one case may become construction in +another. For example, the percepts of common experience are facts for the +physicist, and constructions for the philosopher; the same applies to a +table of numerical results, for the scholar who is trying to establish a +theory, or for the observer and the psychologist. We may then conceive a +series in which each term is fact in relation to those which follow it, and +constructed in relation to those which precede it. The expression +"primitive fact" then determines not so much a final object as a direction +of thought, a movement of critical retrogression, a journey from the most +to the least elaborate, and the "contact with pure immediacy" is only the +effort, more and more prolonged, to convert the elements of experience into +real and profound action. + + + +III. Theory of Perception. + +Of what the work of return to immediacy consists, and how the intuition +which it calls up reveals absolute fact, we shall see by an example, if we +study more closely a capital point of Mr Bergson's philosophy, the theory +of external perception. + +If the act of perceiving realises the lived communion of the subject and +object in the image, we must admit that here we have the perfect knowledge +which we wish to obtain always: we resign ourselves to conception only for +want of perception, and our ideal is to convert all conception into +perception. Doubtless we might define philosophy by this same ideal, as an +effort to expand our perceptive power until we render it capable of +grasping all the wealth and all the depth of reality at a single glance. +Too true it is that such an ideal remains inaccessible to us. Something, +however, is given us already in aesthetic intuition. Mr Bergson has +pointed it out in some admirable pages, ("Laughter", pages 153-161.) and +has explained to us also how philosophy pursues an analogous end. (First +lecture on "The Perception of Change", delivered at Oxford, 26th May 1911.) + +But philosophy must be conceived as an art implying science and criticism, +all experience and all reason. It is when we look at metaphysics in this +way that they become a positive order of veritable knowledge. Kant has +conclusively established that what lies beyond language can only be +attained by direct vision, not by dialectic progress. His mistake was that +he afterwards believed such a vision for ever impossible; and whence did +this mistake arise, if not from the fact that, for his new vision, he +exacted intuitive faculties quite different from those at man's disposal. +Here again the artist will be our example and model. He appeals to no +transcendent sense, but detaches common-sense from its utilitarian +prejudices. Let us do the same: we shall obtain a similar result without +lying ourselves open to Kant's objections. This work is everywhere +possible, and it is, par excellence, the work of philosophy: let us try +then to sketch it in relation to the perception of matter. + +We must distinguish two senses of the word "perception." This word means +first of all simple apprehension of immediacy, grasp of primitive fact. +When we use it in this sense, we will agree to say pure perception. It is +perhaps in place to see in it nothing but a limit which concrete experience +never presents unmixed, a direction of research rather than the possession +of a thing. + +However that may be, the first sense is the fundamental sense, and what it +designates must be at the root of all ordinary perception; I mean, of every +mental operation which results in the construction of a percept: a term +formed by analogy with concept, representing the result of a complex work +of analysis and synthesis, with judgment from externals. We live the +images in an act of pure perception, whilst the objects of ordinary +perception are, for example, the bodies of which we speak in common +language. + +With regard to the relation of the two senses which we have just +distinguished, common opinion seems very precise. It might be thus +resumed: at the point of departure we have simple sensations, similar to +qualitative atoms (this is the part of pure perception), and afterwards +their arrangement into connected systems, which are percepts. + +But criticism does not authorise this manner of looking at it. Nowhere +does knowledge begin by separate elements. Such elements are always a +product of analysis. So there is a problem to solve to regain the basis of +pure perception which is hidden and obscured by our familiar percepts. + +Do not suppose that the solution of this problem is easy. One method only +is of any use: to plunge into reality, to become immersed in it, in a +long-pursued effort to assimilate all the records of common-sense and +positive science. "For we do not obtain an intuition of reality, that is +to say, an intellectual sympathy with its inmost content, unless we have +gained its confidence by long companionship with its superficial +manifestations. And it is not a question merely of assimilating the +leading facts; we must accumulate and melt them down into such an enormous +mass that we are sure, in this fusion, of neutralising in one another all +the preconceived and premature ideas which observers may have unconsciously +allowed to form the sediment of their observations. Thus, and only thus, +is crude materiality to be disengaged from known facts." ("Introduction to +Metaphysics" in the "Metaphysical and Moral Review", January 1903. For the +correct interpretation of this passage ("intellectual sympathy") it must +not be forgotten that before "Creative Evolution", Mr Bergson employed the +word "intelligence" in a wider acceptation, more akin to that commonly +received.) + +A directing principle controls this work and reintroduces order and +convergence, after dispensing with them at the outset; viz. that, contrary +to common opinion, perception as practised in the course of daily life, +"natural" perception does not aim at a goal of disinterested knowledge, but +one of practical utility, or rather, if it is knowledge, it is only +knowledge elaborated in view of action and speech. + +Need we repeat here the proofs by which we have already established in the +most positive manner that such is really the meaning of ordinary +perception, the underlying reason which causes it to take the place of pure +perception? We perceive by habit only what is useful to us, what interests +us practically; very often, too, we think we are perceiving when we are +merely inferring, as for example when we seem to see a distance in depth, a +succession of planes, of which in reality we judge by differences of +colouring or relief. + +Our senses supplement one another. A slow education has gradually taught +us to co-ordinate their impressions, especially those of touch to those of +vision. (H. Bergson, "Note on the Psychological Origins of Our Belief in +the Law of Causality". Vol. i. of the "Library of the International +Philosophical Congress", 1900.) + +Theoretical forms come between nature and us: a veil of symbols envelops +reality; thus, finally, we no longer see things themselves, we are content +to read the labels on them. + +Moreover, our perception appears to analysis completely saturated with +memories, and that in view of our practical insertion in the present. I +will not come back to this point which has been so lucidly explained by Mr +Bergson in a lecture on "Dream" ("Report of the International Psychological +Institute", May 1901.) and an article on "Intellectual Effort", +("Philosophical Review", January 1902.) the reading of which cannot be too +strongly recommended as an introduction to the first chapter of "Matter and +Memory", in which further arguments are to be found. I will only add one +remark, following Mr Bergson, as always: perception is not simply +contemplation, but consciousness of an original visual emotion combined +with a complete group of actions in embryo, gestures in outline, and the +graze of movement within, by which we prepare to grasp the object, describe +its lines, test its functions, sound it, move it, and handle it in a +thousand ways. (This is attested by the facts of apraxia or psychic +blindness. Cf. "Matter and Memory", chapter ii.) + +From the preceding observations springs the utilitarian and practical +nature of common perception. Let us attempt now to see of what the +elaboration which it makes reality undergo consists. This time I am +summing up the fourth chapter of "Matter and Memory". First of all, we +choose between the images, emphasising the strong, extinguishing the weak, +although both have, a priori, the same interest for pure knowledge; we make +this choice above all by according preference to impressions of touch, +which are the most useful from the practical point of view. This selection +determines the parcelling up of matter into independent bodies, and the +artificial character of our proceeding is thus made plain. Does not +science, indeed, conclude in the same way, showing us--as soon as she frees +herself even to a small extent from common-sense--full continuity re- +established by "moving strata," and all bodies resolved into stationary +waves and knots of intersecting fluxes? Already, then, we shall be nearer +pure perception if we cease to consider anything but the perceptible stuff +in which numerically distinct percepts are cut. Even there, however, a +utilitarian division continues. Our senses are instruments of abstraction, +each of them discerning a possible path of action. We may say that +corporal life functions in the manner of an absorbing milieu, which +determines the disconnected scale of simple qualities by extinguishing most +of the perceptible radiations. In short, the scale of sensations, with its +numerical aspect, is nothing but the spectrum of our practical activity. +Commonly we perceive only averages and wholes, which we contract into +distinct "qualities". Let us disengage from this rhythm what is peculiar +to ourselves. + +Above all, let us strive to disengage ourselves from homogeneous space, +this substratum of fixity, this arbitrary scheme of measurement and +division, which, to our greater advantage, subtends the natural, +qualitative, and undivided extension of images. (We usually represent +homogeneous space as previous to the heterogeneous extension of images: as +a kind of empty room which we furnish with percepts. We must reverse this +order, and conceive, on the contrary, that extension precedes space.) And +we shall finally have pure perception in so far as it is accessible to us. + +There is no disputing the absolute value of this pure perception. The +impotence of speculative reason, as demonstrated by Kant, is perhaps, at +bottom, only the impotence of an intelligence in bondage to certain +necessities of the corporal life, and exercised upon a matter which it has +had to disorganise for the satisfaction of our needs. Our knowledge of +things is then no longer relative to the fundamental structure of our mind, +but only to its superficial and acquired habits, to the contingent form +which it takes on from our corporal functions and our lower needs. + +The relativity of knowledge is therefore not final. In unmaking what our +needs have made we re-establish intuition in its original purity, and +resume contact with reality. ("Matter and Memory", page 203.) + +That is how things are really presented. Here we are confronted by the +moving continuity of images. Pure perception is complete perception. From +it we pass to ordinary perception by diminution, throwing shadows here and +there: the reality perceived by common-sense is nothing else actually than +universal interaction rendered visible by its very interruption at certain +points. + +Whence we have this double conclusion already formulated higher up: the +relation of perception to matter is that of the part to the whole, and our +consciousness is rather limited than relative. It must be stated that +primarily we perceive things in themselves, not in us; the subjectivity of +our current perception comes from our work of outlining it in the bosom of +reality, but the root of pure perception plunges into full objectivity. +If, at each point of matter, we were to succeed in possessing the stream of +total interaction of which it marks a wave, and if we were to succeed in +seeing the multiplicity of these points as a qualitative heterogeneous flux +without number or severance, we should coincide with reality itself. It is +true that such an ideal, while inaccessible on the one hand, would not +succeed on the other without risk to knowledge; in fact, says Mr Bergson, +("Matter and Memory", page 38.) "to perceive all the influences of all the +points of all bodies would be to descend to the state of material object." + +But a solution of this double difficulty remains possible, a dynamic and +approximate solution, which consists in looking for the absolute intuition +of matter in such a mobilisation of our perspective faculties that we +become capable of following, according to the circumstances, all the paths +of virtual perception of which the common anxiety for the practical has +made us choose one only, and capable of realising all the infinitely +different modes of qualification and discernment. + +But we have still to see how this "complete experience" can be practically +thought. + + +IV. Critique of Language. + +The perception of reality does not obtain the full value of knowledge, +except when once socialised, once made the common property of men, and +thereby also tested and verified. + +There is one means only of doing that; viz. to analyse it into manageable +and portable concepts. By language I mean the product of this +conceptualisation. Thus language is necessary; for we must always speak, +were it only to utter the impotence of words. Not less necessary is a +critique of spontaneous language, of the laws which govern it, of the +postulates which it embraces, of the methods which convey its implicit +doctrines. Synthetic forms are actually theories already; they effect an +adaptation of reality to the demands of practical use. If it is impossible +to escape them, it is at least fitting not to employ them except with due +knowledge, and when properly warned against the illusion of the false +problems which they might arouse. + +Let us first of all consider thought in itself, in its concrete life. What +are the principal characteristics, the essential steps? We readily say, +analysis and synthesis. + +Nothing can be known except in contrast, correlation, or negation of +another thing; and the act of knowledge, considered in itself, is +unification. Thus number appears as a fundamental category, as an absolute +condition of intelligibility; some go so far as to regard atomism as a +necessary method. But that is inexact. No doubt the use of number and the +resulting atomism are imposed by definition, we might say, on the thought +which proceeds by conceptual analysis, and then by unifying construction; +that is to say, on synthetic thought. But, in greater depth, thought is +dynamic continuity and duration. Its essential work does not consist in +discerning and afterwards in assembling ready-made elements. Let us see in +it rather a kind of creative maturation, and let us attempt to grasp the +nature of this causal activity. (H. Bergson, "Intellectual Effort" in the +"Philosophical Review", January 1902.) + +The act of thought is always a complex play of moving representations, an +evolution of life in which incessant inner reactions occur. That is to +say, it is movement. But there are several planes of thought, from +intuition to language, and we must distinguish between the thought which +moves on the surface among terms displayed on a single plane, and the +thought with goes deeper and deeper from one plane to another. + +We do not think solely by concepts or images; we think, first of all, +according to Mr Bergson's expression, by dynamic schemes. What is a +dynamic scheme? It is motive rather than representative, inexpressible in +itself, but a source of language containing not so much the images or +concepts in which it will develop as the indication of the path to be +followed in order to obtain them. It is not so much system as movement, +progress, genesis; it does not mark the gaze directed upon the various +points of one plane of deliberate contemplation so much as an effort to +pass through successive planes of thought in a direction leading from +intuition to analysis. We might define it by its function of calling up +images and concepts, representations which, for one and the same scheme, +are neither strictly determined nor anything in particular in themselves, +concurrent representations which have in common one and the same logical +power. + +The representations called up form a body to the scheme, and the relation +of the scheme to the concepts and images which it calls up resembles, +mutatis mutandis, the relation pointed out by Mr Bergson between an idea +and its basis in the brain. In short, it is the very act of creative +thought which the dynamic scheme interprets, the act not yet fixed in +"results." + +Nothing is easier than to illustrate the existence of this scheme. Let us +merely remark a few facts of current observation. Recall, for example, the +suggestive anxiety we experience when we seek to remember a name; the +precise syllables of the name still escape us, but we feel them +approaching, and already we possess something of them, since we immediately +reject those which do not answer to a certain direction of expectancy; and +by endeavouring to secure a more intimate feeling of this direction we +suddenly arouse the desired recollection. + +In the same way, what does it mean to have the sense of a complex situation +in active life, if not that we perceive it, not as a static group of +explicit details, but as a meeting of powers allied or hostile, convergent +or divergent, directed towards this or that, of which the aggregate whole +tends of itself to awaken in us the initial reactions which analyse it? + +In the same way again, how do we learn, how can we assimilate a vast system +of conceits or images? Our task is not to concentrate an enumerative +attention on each individual factor; we should never get away from them, +the weight would be too heavy. + +What we entrust to memory is really a dynamic scheme permitting us to +"regain" what we should not have succeeded in "retaining." In reality our +only "knowledge" is through such a scheme, which contains in the state of +potential implication an inexhaustible multiplicity ready to be developed +in actual representations. + +How, finally, is any discovery made? Finding is solving a problem; and to +solve a problem we must always begin by supposing it solved. But of what +does such a hypothesis consist? + +It is not an anticipated view of the solution, for then all would be at an +end; nor is it a simple formula putting in the present indicative what the +enunciation expressed in the future or the imperative, for then nothing +would be begun. It is exactly a dynamic scheme; that is to say, a method +in the state of directed tension; and often, the discovery once realised as +theory or system, capable of unending developments and resurrections, +remains by the best of itself a method and a dynamic scheme. + +But one last example will perhaps reveal the truth still more. "Anyone who +has attempted literary composition knows well that when the subject has +been long studied, all the documents collected, all the notes taken, we +need, to embark on the actual work of composition, something more, an +effort, often very painful, to place oneself suddenly in the very heart of +the subject, and to seek as deep down as possible an impulse to which +afterwards we shall only have to let ourselves go. This impulse, once +received, projects the mind on a road where it finds both the information +which it had collected and a thousand other details as well; it develops +and analyses itself in terms, the enumeration of which would have no end; +the further we advance, the more we discover; we shall never succeed in +saying everything; and yet, if we turn sharply round towards the impulse we +feel behind ourselves, to grasp it, it escapes; for it was not a thing but +a direction of movement, and though indefinitely extensible, it is +simplicity itself." (H. Bergson, "Metaphysical and Moral Review", January +1903. The whole critique of language is implicitly contained in this +"Introduction to Metaphysics".) + +The thought, then, which proceeds from one representation to another in one +and the same plane is one kind; that which follows one and the same +conceptual direction through descending planes is another. Creative and +fertile thought is the thought which adopts the second kind of work. The +ideal is a continual oscillation from one plane to the other, a restless +alternative of intuitive concentration and conceptual expansion. But our +idleness takes exception to this, for the feeling of effort appears +precisely in the traject from the dynamic scheme to the images and +concepts, in the passing from one plane of thought to another. + +Thus the natural tendency is to remain in the last of these planes, that of +language. We know what dangers threaten us there. + +Suppose we have some idea or other and the word representing it. Do not +suppose that to this word there is one corresponding sense only, nor even a +finished group of various distinct and rigorously separable senses. On the +contrary, there is a whole scale corresponding, a complete continuous +spectrum of unstable meanings which tend unceasingly to resolve into one +another. Dictionaries attempt to illuminate them. The task is impossible. +They co-ordinate a few guiding marks; but who shall say what infinite +transitions underlie them? + +A word designates rather a current of thought than one or several halts on +a logical path. Here again a dynamic continuity exists previous to the +parcelling out of the acceptations. What, then, should be the attitude of +the mind? + +A supple moving attitude more attentive to the curve of change than to the +possible halting-points along the road. But this is not the case at all; +the effort would be too great, and what happens, on the contrary, is this. +For the spectrum a chromatic scale of uniform tints is very quickly +substituted. This is in itself an undesirable simplification, for it is +impossible to reconstitute the infinity of real shades by combinations of +fundamental colours each representing the homogeneous shore, which each +region of the spectrum finally becomes. + +However cleverly we proportion these averages, we get, at most, some vulgar +counterfeit: orange, for example, is not a mixture of yellow and red, +although this mixture may recall to those who have known it elsewhere the +simple and original sensation of orange. Again, a second simplification, +still more undesirable, succeeds the first. + +There are no longer any colours at all; black lines serve as guide-marks. +We are therefore with pure concepts decidedly in full symbolism. And it is +with symbols that we shall henceforward be trying to reconstruct reality. + +I need not go back to the general characteristics or the inconveniences of +this method. Concepts resemble photographic views; concrete thickness +escapes them. However exact, varied, or numerous we suppose them, they can +certainly recall their object, but not reveal it to any one who had not had +any direct intuition of it. Nothing is easier than to trace the plan of a +body in four dimensions; all the same, this drawing does not admit +"visualisation in space" as is the case with ordinary bodies, for want of a +previous intuition which it would awaken: thus it is with concepts in +relation to reality. Like photographs and like plans, they are extracted +from reality, but we are not able to say that they were contained in it; +and many of them besides are not so much as extracts; they are simple +systematised notes, in fact, notes made upon notes. In other terms, +concepts do not represent pieces, parts, or elements of reality. Literally +they are nothing but simple symbolic notations. To wish to make integral +factors of them would be as strange an illusion as that of seeing in the +co-ordinates of a geometric point the constitutive essence of that point. + +We do not make things with symbols, any more than we should reconstruct a +picture with the qualifications which classify it. + +Whence, then, comes the natural inclination of thought towards the concept? +From the fact that thought delights in artifices which facilitate analysis +and language. + +The first of these artifices is that from which results the possibility of +decomposition or recomposition according to arbitrary laws. For that we +need a previous substitution of symbols for things. Nothing demonstrates +this better than the celebrated arguments which we owe to Zeno of Elea. Mr +Bergson returns to the discussion of them over and over again. ("Essay on +the Immediate Data", pages 85-86; "Matter and Memory", pages 211-213, +"Creative Evolution", pages 333-337.) + +The nerve of the reasoning there consists in the evident absurdity there +would be in conceiving an inexhaustible exhausted, an unachievable +achieved; in short, a total actually completed, and yet obtained by the +successive addition of an infinite number of terms. + +But the question is to know whether a movement can be considered as a +numerical multiplicity. Virtual divisibility there is, no doubt, but not +actual division; divisibility is indefinite, whereas an actual division, if +it respects the inner articulations of reality, is bound to halt at a +limited number of phases. + +What we divide and measure is the track of the movement once accomplished, +not the movement itself: it is the trajectory, not the traject. In the +trajectory we can count endless positions; that is to say, possible halts. +Let us not suppose that the moving body meets these elements all ready- +marked. Hence what the Eleatic dialectic illustrates is a case of +incommensurability; the radical inability of analysis to end a certain +task; our powerlessness to explain the fact of the transit, if we apply to +it such and such modes of numerical decomposition or recomposition, which +are valid only for space; the impossibility of conceiving becoming as +susceptible of being cut up into arbitrary segments, and afterwards +reconstructed by summing of terms according to some law or other; in short, +it is the nature of movement, which is without division, number, or +concept. + +But thought delights in analyses regulated by the sole consideration of +easy language; hence its tendency to an arithmetic and geometry of +concepts, in spite of the disastrous consequences; and thus the Eleatic +paradox is no less instructive in its specious character than in the +solution which it embodies. + +At bottom, natural thought, I mean thought which abandons itself to its +double inclination of synthetic idleness and useful industry, is a thought +haunted by anxieties of the operating manual, anxieties of fabrication. + +What does it care about the fluxes of reality and dynamic depths? It is +only interested in the outcrops scattered here and there over the firm soil +of the practical, and it solidifies "terms" like stakes plunged in a moving +ground. Hence comes the configuration of its spontaneous logic to a +geometry of solids, and hence come concepts, the instantaneous moments +taken in transitions. + +Scientific thought, again, preserves the same habits and the same +preferences. It seeks only what repeats, what can be counted. Everywhere, +when it theorises, it tends to establish static relations between composing +unities which form a homogeneous and disconnected multiplicity. + +Its very instruments bias it in that direction. The apparatus of the +laboratory really grasps nothing but arrangement and coincidence; in a +word, states not transitions. Even in cases of contrary appearance, for +example, when we determine a weight by observing the oscillation of a +balance and not its rest, we are interested in regular recurrence, in a +symmetry, in something therefore which is of the nature of an equilibrium +and a fixity all the same. The reason of it is that science, like common- +sense, although in a manner a little different, aims only in actual fact at +obtaining finished and workable results. + +Let us imagine reality under the figure of a curve, a rhythmic succession +of phases of which our concepts mark so many tangents. There is contact at +one point, but at one point only. Thus our logic is valid as infinitesimal +analysis, just as the geometry of the straight line allows us to define +each state of curve. It is thus, for example, that vitality maintains a +relation of momentary tangency to the physico-chemical structure. If we +study this relation and analogous relations, this fact remains indisputably +legitimate. Let us not think, however, that such a study, even when +repeated in as many points as we wish, can ever suffice. + +We must afterwards by genuine integration attain moving continuity. That +is exactly the task represented by the return to intuition, with its proper +instrument, the dynamic scheme. From this tangential point of view we try +to grasp the genesis of the curve as envelope, or rather, and better still, +the birth of successive tangents as instantaneous directions. Speaking +non-metaphorically, we cling to genetic methods of conceptualisation and +proceed from the generating principle to its conceptual derivatives. + +But our thought finds it very difficult to sustain such an effort long. It +is partial to rectilineal deduction, actual becoming horrifies it. It +desires immediately to find "things" sharply determined and very clear. +That is why immediately a tangent is constructed, it follows its movement +in a straight line to infinity. Thus are produced limit-concepts, the +ultimate terms, the atoms of language. As a rule they go in pairs, in +antithetic couples, every analysis being dichotomy, since the discernment +of one path of abstraction determines in contrast, as a complementary +remainder, the opposite path of direction. Hence, according to the +selection effected among concepts, and the relative weight which is +attributed to them, we get the antinomies between which a philosophy of +analysis must for ever remain oscillating and torn in sunder. Hence comes +the parcelling up of metaphysics into systems, and its appearance of +regulated play "between antagonistic schools which get up on the stage +together, each to win applause in turn." (H. Bergson, "Report of the +French Philosophical Society", meeting, 2nd May 1901.) + +The method followed to find a genuine solution must be inverse; not +dialectic combination of pre-existing concepts, but, setting out from a +direct and really lived intuition, a descent to ever new concepts along +dynamic schemes which remain open. From the same intuition spring many +concepts: "As the wind which rushes into the crossroads divides into +diverging currents of air, which are all only one and the same gust." +("Creative Evolution", page 55.) + +The antinomies are resolved genetically, whilst in the plane of language +they remain irreducible. With a heterogeneity of shades, when we mix the +tints and neutralise them by one another, we easily create homogeneity; but +take the result of this work, that is to say, the average final colour, and +it will be impossible to reconstitute the wealth of the original. + +Do you desire a precise example of the work we must accomplish? Take that +of change; (Cf. two lectures delivered by Mr Bergson at Oxford on "The +Perception of Change", 26th and 27th May 1911.) no other is more +significant or clearer. It shows us two necessary movements in the reform +of our habits of imagination or conception. + +Let us try first of all to familiarise ourselves with the images which show +us the fixity deriving from becoming. + +Two colliding waves, two rollers meeting, typify rest by extinction and +interference. With the movement of a stone, and the fluidity of running +water, we form the instantaneous position of a ricochet. The very movement +of the stone, seen in the successive positions of the tangent to the +trajectory, is stationary to our view. + +What is dynamic stability, except non-variation arising from variation +itself? Equilibrium is produced from speed. A man running solidifies the +moving ground. In short, two moving bodies regulated by each other become +fixed in relation to each other. + +After this, let us try to perceive change in itself, and then represent it +to ourselves according to its specific and original nature. + +The common conception needs reform on two principal points: + +(1) All change is revealed in the light of immediate intuition, not as a +numerical series of states, but a rhythm of phases, each of which +constitutes an indivisible act, in such a way that each change has its +natural inner articulations, forbidding us to break it up according to +arbitrary laws, like a homogeneous length. + +(2) Change is self-sufficient; it has no need of a support, a moving body, +a "thing" in motion. There is no vehicle, no substance, no spatial +receptacle, resembling a theatre-scene, no material dummy successively +draped in coloured stuffs; on the contrary, it is the body or the atom +which should be subordinately defined as symbols of completed becoming. + +Of movement thus conceived, indivisible and substantial, what better image +can we have than a musical evolution, a phrase in melody? That is how we +must work to conceive reality. If such a conception at first appears +obscure, let us credit experience, for ideas are gradually illuminated by +the very use we make of them, "the clarity of a concept being hardly +anything, at bottom, but the assurance once obtained that we can handle it +profitably." (H. Bergson, "Introduction to Metaphysics".) + +If we require to reach a conception of this kind with regard to change, the +Eleatic dialectic is there to establish it beyond dispute, and positive +science comes to the same conclusion, since it shows us everywhere nothing +but movements placed upon movements, never fixed "things," except as +temporary symbols of what we leave at a given moment outside the field of +study. + +In any case, the difficulty of such a conception need not stop us; it is +little more than a difficulty of the imaginative order. And as for the +conception itself, or rather the corresponding intuition, it will share the +fate of all its predecessors: to our contemporaries it will be a scandal, +a century later a stroke of genius, after some centuries common evidence, +and finally an instinctive axiom. + + + +V. The Problem of Consciousness. Duration and Liberty. + +Armed with the method we have just described, Mr Bergson turned first of +all toward the problem of the ego: taking up his position in the centre of +mind, he has attempted to establish its independent reality by examining +its profound nature. + +The first chapter of the "Essay on the Immediate Data" contains a decisive +criticism of the conceptions which claim to introduce number and measure +into the domain of the facts of consciousness. + +Not that it is our business to reject as false the notion of psychological +intensity; but this notion demands interpretation, and the least that we +can say against the attempt to turn it into a notion of size is that in +doing so we are misunderstanding the specific character of the object +studied. The same reproach must be levelled against association of ideas, +the system of mechanical psychology of which the type is presented us by +Taine and Stuart Mill. Already in chapters ii. and iii. of the "Essay", +and again all through "Matter and Memory", the system is riddled with +objections, each of which would be sufficient to show its radical flaw. +All the aspects, all the phenomena of mental life come up for successive +review. In respect of each of them we have an illustration of the +insufficiency of the atomism which seeks to recompose the soul with fixed +elements, by a massing of units exterior to one another, everywhere and +always the same: this is a grammatical philosophy which believes reality +to be composed of parts which admit of number just as language is made of +words placed side by side; it is a materialist philosophy which improperly +transfers the proceedings of the physical sciences to the sciences of the +inner life. + +On the contrary, we must represent the state of consciousness to ourselves +as variable according to the whole of which it forms a part. Here and +there, although it always bears the same name, it is no longer the same +thing. "The more the ego becomes itself again, the more also do its states +of consciousness, instead of being in juxtaposition, penetrate one another, +blend with one another, and tinge one another with the colouring of all the +rest. Thus each of us has his manner of loving or hating, and this love or +hate reflect our entire personality." ("Essay on the Immediate Data", +pages 125-126.) + +At bottom Mr Bergson is bringing forward the necessity, in the case before +us, of substituting a new notion of continuous qualitative heterogeneity +for the old notion of numerical and spatial continuity. Above all, he is +emphasising the still more imperious necessity of regarding each state as a +phase in duration; and we are here touching on his principal and leading +intuition, the intuition of real duration. + +Historically this was Mr Bergson's starting-point and the origin of his +thought: a criticism of time under the form in which common-sense imagines +it, in which science employs it. He was the first to notice the fact that +scientific time has no "duration." Our equations really express only +static relations between simultaneous phenomena; even the differential +quotients they may contain in reality mark nothing but present tendencies; +no change would take place in our calculations if the time were given in +advance, instantaneously fulfilled, like a linear whole of points in +numerical order, with no more genuine duration than that contained in the +numerical succession. Even in astronomy there is less anticipation than +judgment of constancy and stability, the phenomena being almost strictly +periodic, while the hazard of prediction bears only upon the minute +divergence between the actual phenomenon and the exact period attributed to +it. Notice under what figure common-sense imagines time: as an inert +receptacle, a homogeneous milieu, neutral and indifferent; in fact, a kind +of space. + +The scholar makes use of a like image; for he defines time by its +measurement, and all measurement implies interpretation in space. For the +scholar the hour is not an interval, but a coincidence, an instantaneous +arrangement, and time is resolved into a dust of fixities, as in those +pneumatic clocks in which the hand moves forward in jerks, marking nothing +but a sequence of pauses. + +Such symbols are sufficient, at least for a first approximation, when it is +only a question of matter, the mechanism of which, strictly considered, +contains nothing "durable." But in biology and psychology quite different +characteristics become essential; age and memory, heterogeneity of musical +phases, irreversible rhythm "which cannot be lengthened or shortened at +will." ("Creative Evolution", page 10.) + +Then it is that the return of time becomes necessary to duration. How are +we to describe this duration? It is a melodious evolution of moments, each +of which contains the resonance of those preceding and announces the one +which is going to follow; it is a process of enriching which never ceases, +and a perpetual appearance of novelty; it is an indivisible, qualitative, +and organic becoming, foreign to space, refractory to number. + +Summon the image of a stream of consciousness passing through the +continuity of the spectrum, and becoming tinged successively with each of +its shades. Or rather imagine a symphony having feeling of itself, and +creating itself; that is how we should conceive duration. + +That duration thus conceived is really the basis of ourselves Mr Bergson +proves by a thousand examples, and by a marvellous employment of the +introspective method which he has helped to make so popular. We cannot +quote these admirable analyses here. A single one will serve as model, +specially selected as referring to one of the most ordinary moments of our +life, to show plainly that the perception of real duration always +accompanies us in secret. + +"At the moment when I write these lines a clock near me is striking the +hour; but my distracted ear is only aware of it after several strokes have +already sounded; that is, I have not counted them. And yet an effort of +introspective attention enables me to total the four strokes already struck +and add them to those which I hear. If I then withdraw into myself and +carefully question myself about what has just happened, I become aware that +the first four sounds had struck my ear and even moved my consciousness, +but that the sensations produced by each of them, instead of following in +juxtaposition, had blended into one another in such a way as to endow the +whole with a peculiar aspect and make of it a kind of musical phrase. In +order to estimate in retrospect the number of strokes which have sounded, I +attempted to reconstitute this phrase in thought: my imagination struck +one, then two, then three, and so long as it had not reached the exact +number four, my sensibility, on being questioned, replied that the total +effect differed in quality. It had therefore noted the succession of the +four strokes in a way of its own, but quite otherwise than by addition, and +without bringing in the image of a juxtaposition of distinct terms. In +fact, the number of strokes struck was perceived as quality, not as +quantity: duration is thus presented to immediate consciousness, and +preserves this form so long as it does not give place to a symbolical +representation drawn from space." ("Essay on the Immediate Data", pages +95-96.) + +And now are we to believe that return to the feeling of real duration +consists in letting ourselves go, and allowing ourselves an idle relaxation +in dream or dissolution in sensation, "as a shepherd dozing watches the +water flow"? Or are we even to believe, as has been maintained, that the +intuition of duration reduces "to the spasm of delight of the mollusc +basking in the sun"? This is a complete mistake! We should fall back into +the misconceptions which I was pointing out in connection with immediacy in +general; we should be forgetting that there are several rhythms of +duration, as there are several kinds of consciousness; and finally, we +should be misunderstanding the character of a creative invention +perpetually renewed, which is that of our inner life. + +For it is in duration that we are free, not in spatialised time, as all +determinist conceptions suppose in contradiction. + +I shall not go back to the proofs of this thesis; they were condensed some +way back after the third chapter of the "Essay on the Immediate Data". But +I will borrow from Mr Bergson himself a few complementary explanations, in +order, as far as possible, to forestall any misunderstanding. "The word +liberty," he says, "has for me a sense intermediate between those which we +assign as a rule to the two terms liberty and free-will. On one hand, I +believe that liberty consists in being entirely oneself, in acting in +conformity with oneself; it is then, to a certain degree, the 'moral +liberty' of philosophers, the independence of the person with regard to +everything other than itself. But that is not quite this liberty, since +the independence I am describing has not always a moral character. +Further, it does not consist in depending on oneself as an effect depends +on the cause which of necessity determines it. In this, I should come back +to the sense of 'free-will.' And yet I do not accept this sense completely +either, since free-will, in the usual meaning of the term, implies the +equal possibility of two contraries, and on my theory we cannot formulate, +or even conceive in this case the thesis of the equal possibility of the +two contraries, without falling into grave error about the nature of time. +I might say then, that the object of my thesis, on this particular point, +has been precisely to find a position intermediate between 'moral liberty' +and 'free-will.' Liberty, such as I understand it, is situated between +these two terms, but not at equal distances from both. If I were obliged +to blend it with one of the two, I should select 'free-will.'" ("Report of +the French Philosophical Society", philosophical vocabulary, article +"Liberty".) + +After all, when we place ourselves in the perspective of homogeneous time; +that is to say, when we substitute for the real and profound ego its image +refracted through space, the act necessarily appears either as the +resultant of a mechanical composition of elements, or as an +incomprehensible creation ex nihilo. + +"We have supposed that there is a third course to pursue; that is, to place +ourselves back in pure duration...Then we seemed to see action arise from +its antecedents by an evolution sui generis, in such a way that we discover +in this action the antecedents which explain it, while at the same time it +adds something absolutely new to them, being an advance upon them as the +fruit upon the flower. Liberty is in no way reduced thereby, as has been +said, to obvious spontaneity. At most this would be the case in the animal +world, where the psychological life is principally that of the affections. +But in the case of man, a thinking being, the free act can be called a +synthesis of feelings and ideas, and the evolution which leads to it a +reasonable evolution." ("Matter and Memory", page 205.) + +Finally, in a most important letter, ("Report of the French Philosophical +Society", meeting, 26th February 1903.) Mr Bergson becomes a little more +precise still. We must certainly not confuse the affirmation of liberty +with the negation of physical determinism; "for there is more in this +affirmation than in this negation." All the same, liberty supposes a +certain contingence. It is "psychological causality itself," which must +not be represented after the model of physical causality. + +In opposition to the latter, it implies that between two moments of a +conscious being there is not an equivalence admitting of deduction, that in +the transition from one to the other there is a genuine creation. Without +doubt the free act is not without explanatory reasons. + +"But these reasons have determined us only at the moment when they have +become determining; that is, at the moment when the act was virtually +accomplished, and the creation of which I speak is entirely contained in +the progress by which these reasons have become determining." It is true +that all this implies a certain independence of mental life in relation to +the mechanism of matter; and that is why Mr Bergson was obliged to set +himself the problem of the relations between body and mind. + +We know that the solution of this problem is the principal object of +"Matter and Memory". The thesis of psycho-physiological parallelism is +there peremptorily refuted. + +The method which Mr Bergson has followed to do so will be found set out by +himself in a communication to the French Philosophical Society, which it is +important to study as introduction. ("Report" of meeting, 2nd May 1901.) +The paralogism included in the very enunciation of the parallelist thesis +is explained in a memoire presented to the Geneva International +Philosophical Congress in 1904. ("Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale", +November 1904.) But the actual proof is made by the analysis of the +memoire which fills chapters ii. and iii. of the work cited above. (An +extremely suggestive resume of these theses will be found in the second +lecture on "The Perception of Change".) It is there established, by the +most positive arguments, (Instead of brutally connecting the two extremes +of matter and mind, one regarded in its highest action, the other in its +most rudimentary mechanism, thus dooming to certain failure any attempt to +explain their actual union, Mr Bergson studies their living contact at the +point of intersection marked by the phenomena of perception and memory: he +compares the higher point of matter--the brain--and the lower point of +mind--certain recollections--and it is between these two neighbouring +points that he notes a difference, by a method no longer dialectic but +experimental.) that all our past is self-preserved in us, that this +preservation only makes one with the musical character of duration, with +the indivisible nature of change, but that one part only is conscious of +it, the part concerned with action, to which present conceptions supply a +body of actuality. + +What we call our present must be conceived neither as a mathematical point +nor as a segment with precise limits: it is the moment of our history +brought out by our attention to life, and nothing, in strict justice, would +prevent it from extending to the whole of this history. It is not +recollection then, but forgetfulness which demands explanation. + +According to a dictum of Ravaisson, of which Mr Bergson makes use, the +explanation must be sought in the body: "it is materiality which causes +forgetfulness in us." + +There are, in fact, several planes of memory, from "pure recollection" not +yet interpreted in distinct images down to the same recollection actualised +in embryo sensations and movements begun; and we descend from the one to +the other, from the life of simple "dream" to the life of practical +"drama," along "dynamic schemes." The last of these planes is the body; a +simple instrument of action, a bundle of motive habits, a group of +mechanisms which mind has set up to act. How does it operate in the work +of memory? The task of the brain is every moment to thrust back into +unconsciousness all that part of our past which is not at the time useful. +Minute study of facts shows that the brain is employed in choosing from the +past, in diminishing, simplifying, and extracting from it all that can +contribute to present experience; but it is not concerned to preserve it. +In short, the brain can only explain absences, not presences. That is why +the analysis of memory illustrates the reality of mind, and its +independence relative to matter. Thus is determined the relation of soul +to body, the penetrating point which it inserts and drives into the plane +of action. "Mind borrows from matter perceptions from which it derives its +nourishment, and gives them back to it in the form of movement, on which it +has impressed its liberty." ("Matter and Memory", page 279.) + +This, then, is how the cycle of research closes, by returning to the +initial problem, the problem of perception. In the two opposing systems by +which attempts have been made to solve it, Mr Bergson discovers a common +postulate, resulting in a common impotence. From the idealistic point of +view we do not succeed in explaining how a world is expressed externally, +nor from the realistic point of view how an ego is expressed internally. +And this double failure comes again from the underlying hypothesis, +according to which the duality of the subject and object is conceived as +primitive, radical, and static. Our duty is diametrically opposed. We +have to consider this duality as gradually elaborated, and the problem +concerning it must be first stated, and then solved as a function of time +rather than of space. Our representation begins by being impersonal, and +it is only later that it adopts our body as centre. We emerge gradually +from universal reality, and our realising roots are always sunk in it. But +this reality in itself is already consciousness, and the first moment of +perception always puts us back into the initial state previous to the +separation of the subject and object. It is by the work of life, and by +action, that this separation is effected, created, accentuated, and fixed. +And the common mistake of realism and idealism is to believe it effected in +advance, whereas it is relatively second to perception. + +Hence comes the absolute value of immediate intuition. For from what +source could an irreducible relativity be produced in it? It would be +absurd to make it depend on the constitution of our brain, since our brain +itself, so far as it is a group of images, is only a part of the universe, +presenting the same characteristics as the whole; and in so far as it is a +group of mechanisms become habits, is only a result of the initial action +of life, of original perceptive discernment. And, on the other hand, no +less absurd would be the fear that the subject can ever be excluded or +eliminated from its own knowledge, since, in reality, the subject, like the +object, is in perception, not perception in the subject--at least not +primitively. So that it is by a trick of speech that the theses of +fundamental relativity take root: they vanish when we return to immediacy; +that is to say, when we present problems as they ought to be presented, in +terms which do not suppose any conceptual analysis yet accomplished. + + + +VI. The Problem of Evolution: Life and Matter. + +After the problem of consciousness Mr Bergson was bound to approach that of +evolution, for psychological liberty is only truly conceivable if it begins +in some measure with the first pulsation of corporal life. "Either +sensation has no raison d'etre or it is a beginning of liberty"; that is +what the "Essay on the Immediate Data" (Page 25.) already told us. + +It was easy then to foresee the necessity of a general theoretical frame in +which our duration might take a position which would render it more +intelligible by removing its appearance of singular exception. + +Thus in 1901, I wrote ("Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale", May 1901) with +regard to the new philosophy considered as a philosophy of becoming: "It +has been prepared by contemporary evolution, which is investigates and +perfects, sifting it from its ore of materialism, and turning it into +genuine metaphysics. Is not this the philosophy suited to the century of +history? Perhaps it indicates that a period has arrived in which +mathematics, losing its role as the regulating science, is about to give +place to biology." This is the programme carried out, in what an original +manner we are well aware, by the doctrine of Creative Evolution. + +When we examine ancient knowledge, one characteristic of it is at once +visible. It studies little but certain privileged moments of changing +reality, certain stable forms, certain states of equilibrium. Ancient +geometry, for example, is almost always limited to the static consideration +of figures already traced. Modern science is quite different. Has not the +greatest progress which it has realised in the mathematical order really +been the invention of infinitesimal analysis; that is to say, an effort to +substitute the process for the resultant, to follow the moving generation +of phenomena and magnitudes in its continuity, to place oneself along +becoming at any moment whatsoever, or rather, by degrees at all successive +moments? This fundamental tendency, coupled with the development of +biological research, was bound to incline it towards a doctrine of +evolution; and hence the success of Spencer. + +But time, which is everywhere in modern science the chief variable, is only +a time-length, indefinitely and arbitrarily divisible. There is no genuine +duration, nothing really tending to evolution in Spencer's evolution: no +more than there is in the periodic working of a turbine or in the +stationary tremble of a diapason. Is not this what is emphasised by the +perpetual employment of mechanical images and vulgar engineering metaphors, +the least fault of which is to suppose a homogeneous time, and a motionless +theatre of change which is at bottom only space? "In such a doctrine we +still talk of time, we pronounce the word, but we hardly think of the +thing; for time is here robbed of all effect." ("Creative Evolution", page +42.) + +Whence comes a latent materialism, ready to grasp the chance of self- +expression. Whence the automatic return to the dream of universal +arithmetic, which Laplace, Du Bois-Reymond, and Huxley have expressed with +such precision. (Ibid., page 41.) + +In order to escape such consequences we must, with Mr Bergson, reintroduce +real duration, that is to say, creative duration into evolution, we must +conceive life according to the mode exhibited with regard to change in +general. And it is science itself which calls us to this task. What does +science actually tell us when we let it speak instead of prescribing to it +answers which conform to our preferences? Vitality, at every point of its +becoming, is a tangent to physico-chemical mechanism. But physico- +chemistry does not reveal its secret any more than the straight line +produces the curve. + +Consider the development of an embryo. It summarises the history of +species; ontogenesis, we are told, reproduces phylogenesis. And what do we +observe then? + +Now that a long sequence of centuries is contracted for us into a short +period, and that our view is thus capable of a synthesis which before was +too difficult, we see appearing the rhythmic organisation, the musical +character, which the slowness of the transitions at first prevented us from +seeing. In each state of the embryo there is something besides an +instantaneous structure, something besides a conservative play of actions +and reactions; there is a tendency, a direction, an effort, a creative +activity. The stage traversed is less interesting than the traversing +itself; this again is an act of generating impulse, rather than an effect +of mechanical inertia. So must the case be, by analogy, with general +evolution. We have there, as it were, a vision of biological duration in +miniature; expansion and relaxation of its tension bring its homogeneity to +notice, but at the same time, properly speaking, evolution disappears. + +And further, Mr Bergson establishes by direct and positive arguments that +life is genuine creation. A similar conclusion is presented as the +envelope of his whole doctrine. + +It is imposed first of all by immediate evidence, for we cannot deny that +the history of life is revealed to us under the aspect of a progress and an +ascent. And this impulse implies initiative and choice, constituting an +effort which we are not authorised by the facts to pronounce fatalistic: +"A simple glance at the fossil species shows us that life could have done +without evolution, or could have evolved only within very restricted +limits, had it chosen the far easier path open to it of becoming cramped in +its primitive forms; certain Foraminifera have not varied since the +silurian period; the Lingulae, looking unmoved upon the innumerable +revolutions which have upheaved our planet, are today what they were in the +most distant times of the palaeozoic era." ("Creative Evolution", page +111.) Moreover, if, in us, life is indisputably creation and liberty, how +would it not, to some extent, be so in universal nature? "Whatever be the +inmost essence of what is and what is being made, we are of it: ("Revue de +Metaphysique et de Morale", November 1911.) a conclusion by analogy is +therefore legitimate. But above all, this conclusion is verified by its +aptitude for solving problems of detail, and for taking account of observed +facts, and in this respect I regret that I can only refer the reader to the +whole body of admirable discussions and analyses drawn up by Mr Bergson +with regard to "the plant and the animal," or "the development of animal +life." ("Creative Evolution", chapter ii.) + +As regards matter, two main laws stand out from the whole of our science, +relative to its nature and its phenomena: a law of conservation and a law +of degradation. On the one hand, we have mechanism, repetition, inertia, +constants, and invariants: the play of the material world, from the point +of view of quantity, offers us the aspect of an immense transformation +without gain or loss, a homogeneous transformation tending to maintain in +itself an exact equivalence between the departure and arrival point. On +the other hand, from the point of view of quality, we have something which +is being used up, lowered, degraded, exhausted: energy expended, movement +dissipated, constructions breaking up, weights falling, levels becoming +equalised, and differences effaced. The travel of the material world +appears then as a loss, a movement of fall and descent. + +In addition, there is only a tendency to conservation, a tendency which is +never realised except imperfectly; while, on the contrary, we notice that +the failure of the vital impulse is most infallibly interpreted by the +appearance of mechanism. Reality falling asleep or breaking up is the +figure under which we finally observe matter: matter then is secondary. + +Finally, according to Mr Bergson, matter is defined as a kind of descent; +this descent as the interruption of an ascent; this ascent itself as +growth; and thus a principle of creation is at the base of things. + +Such a view seems obscure and disturbing to the mathematical understanding. +It cannot accustom itself to the idea of a becoming which is more than a +simple change of distribution, and more than a simple expression of latent +wealth. When confronted with such an idea, it always harks back to its +eternal question: How has something come out of nothing? The question is +false; for the idea of nothing is only a pseudo-idea. Nothing is +unthinkable, since to think nothing is necessarily to think or not to think +something; and according to Mr Bergson's formula, (Cf. the discussion on +existence and non-existence in chapter iv. of "Creative Evolution", pages +298-322.) "the representation of void is always a full representation." +When I say: "There is nothing," it is not that I perceive a "nothing." I +never perceive except what is. But I have not perceived what I was +seeking, what I was expecting, and I express my deception in the language +of my desire. Or else I am speaking a language of construction, implying +that I do not yet possess what I intend to make. + +Let us abruptly forget these idols of practical action and language. The +becoming of evolution will then appear to us in its true light, as phases +of gradual maturation, rounded at intervals by crises of creative +discovery. Continuity and discontinuity will thus admit possibility of +reconciliation, the one as an aspect of ascent towards the future, the +other as an aspect of retrospection after the event. And we shall see that +the same key will in addition disclose to us the theory of knowledge. + + +VII. The Problem of Knowledge: Analysis and Intuition. + +We know what importance has been attached since Kant to the problem of +reason: it would seem sometimes that all future philosophy is a return to +it; that it is no longer called to speak of anything else. Besides, what +we understand by reason, in the broad sense, is, in the human mind, the +power of light, the essential operation of which is defined as an act of +directing synthesis, unifying the experience and rendering it by that very +fact intelligible. Every movement of thought shows this power in exercise. +To bring it everywhere to the front would be the proper task of philosophy; +at least it is in this manner that we understand it today. But from what +point of view and by what method do we ordinarily construct this theory of +knowledge? + +The spontaneous works of mind, perception, science, art, and morality are +the departure-point of the inquiry and its initial matter. We do not ask +ourselves whether but how they are possible, what they imply, and what they +suppose; a regressive analysis attempts by critical reflection to discern +in them their principles and requisites. The task, in short, is to +reascend from production to producing activity, which we regard as +sufficiently revealed by its natural products. + +Philosophy, in consequence, is no longer anything but the science of +problems already solved, the science which is confined to saying why +knowledge is knowledge and action action, of such and such a kind, and such +and such a quality. And in consequence also reason can no longer appear +anything but an original datum postulated as a simple fact, as a complete +system come down ready-made from heaven, at bottom a kind of non-temporal +essence, definable without respect to duration, evolution, or history, of +which all genesis and all progress are absurd. In vain do we persist in +maintaining that it is originally an act; we always come round to the fact +that the method followed compels us to consider this act only when once +accomplished, and when once expressed in results. The inevitable +consequence is that we imprison ourselves hopelessly in the affirmation of +Kantian relativism. + +Such a system can only be true as a partial and temporary truth: at the +most, it is a moment of truth. "If we read the "Critique of Pure Reason" +closely, we become aware that Kant has made the critique, not of reason in +general, but of a reason fashioned to the habits and demands of Cartesian +mechanism or Newtonian physics." (H. Bergson, "Report of French +Philosophical Society", meeting, 2nd May 1901.) Moreover, he plainly +studies only adult reason, its present state, a plane of thought, a +sectional view of becoming. For Kant, men progress perhaps in reason, but +reason itself has no duration: it is the fixed spot, the atmosphere of +dead eternity in which every mental action is displayed. But this could +not be the final and complete truth. Is it not a fact that human +intelligence has been slowly constituted in the course of biological +evolution? To know it, we have not so much to separate it statically from +its works, as to replace it in its history. + +Let us begin with life, since, in any case, whether we will or no, it is +always in life and by life that we are. + +Life is not a brute force, a blind mechanism, from which one could never +conceive that thought would spring. From its first pulsation, life is +consciousness, spiritual activity, creative effort tending towards liberty; +that is, discernment already luminous, although the quality is at first +faint and diffused. In other terms, life is at bottom of the psychological +nature of a tendency. But "the essence of a tendency is to develop in +sheaf-form, creating, by the mere fact of its growth, diverging directions +between which its impulse will be divided." ("Creative Evolution", page +108.) + +Along these different paths the complementary potentialities are produced +and intensified, separating in the very process, their original +interpretation being possible only in the state of birth. One of them ends +in what we call intelligence. This latter therefore has become gradually +detached from a less intense but fuller luminous condition, of which it has +retained only certain characteristics to accentuate them. + +We see that we must conceive the word mind--or, if we prefer the word, +thought--as extending beyond intelligence. Pure intelligence, or the +faculty of critical reflection and conceptual analysis, represents only one +form of thought in its entirety, a function, a determination or particular +adaptation, the part organised in view of practical action, the part +consolidated as language. What are its characteristics? It understands +only what is discontinuous, inert, and fixed, that which has neither change +nor duration; it bathes in an atmosphere of spatiality; it uses mathematics +continually; it feels at home only among "things," and everything is +reduced by it to solid atoms; it is naturally "materialist," owing to the +very fact that it naturally grasps "forms" only. What do we mean by that +except that its object of election is the mechanism of matter? But it +supposes life; it only remains living itself by continual loans from a +vaster and fuller activity from which it is sprung. And this return to +complementary powers is what we call intuition. + +From this point of view it becomes easy to escape Kantian relativity. We +are confronted by an intelligence which is doubtless no longer a faculty +universally competent, but which, on the contrary, possesses in its own +domain a greater power of penetration. It is arranged for action. Now +action would not be able to move in irreality. Intelligence, then, makes +us acquainted, if not with all reality, at least with some of it, namely +that part by which reality is a possible object of mechanical or synthetic +action. + +More profoundly, intuition falls into analysis as life into matter: they +are two aspects of the same movement. That is why, "provided we only +consider the general form of physics, we can say that it touches the +absolute." ("Creative Evolution", page 216.) + +In other terms, language and mechanism are regulated by each other. This +explains at once the success of mathematical science in the order of +matter, and its non-success in the order of life. + +For, when confronted with life, intelligence fails. "Being a deposit of +the evolutive movement along its path, how could it be applied throughout +the evolutive movement itself? We might as well claim that the part equals +the whole, that the effect can absorb its cause into itself, or that the +pebble left on the shore outlines the form of the wave which brought it." +(Preface to "Creative Evolution".) + +Is not that as good as saying that life is unknowable? Must we conclude +that it is impossible to understand it? + +"We should be forced to do so, if life had employed all the psychic +potentialities it contains in making pure understandings; that is to say, +in preparing mathematicians. But the line of evolution which ends in man +is not the only one. By other divergent ways other forms of consciousness +have developed, which have not been able to free themselves from external +constraint, nor regain the victory over themselves as intelligence has +done, but which, none the less for that, also express something immanent +and essential in the movement of evolution. + +"By bringing them into connection with one another, and making them +afterwards amalgamate with intelligence, should we not thus obtain a +consciousness co-extensive with life, and capable, by turning sharply round +upon the vital thrust which it feels behind it, of obtaining a complete, +though doubtless vanishing vision?" ("Creative Evolution", Preface.) It +is precisely in this that the act of philosophic intuition consists. "We +shall be told that, even so, we do not get beyond our intelligence, since +it is with our intelligence, and through our intelligence, that we observe +all the other forms of consciousness. And we should be right in saying so, +if we were pure intelligences, if there had not remained round our +conceptual and logical thought a vague nebula, made of the very substance +at the expense of which the luminous nucleus, which we call intelligence, +has been formed. In it reside certain complementary powers of the +understanding, of which we have only a confused feeling when we remain shut +up in ourselves, but which will become illumined and distinct when they +perceive themselves at work, so to speak, in the evolution of nature. They +will thus learn what effort they have to make to become more intense, and +to expand in the actual direction of life." ("Creative Evolution", +Preface.) Does that mean abandonment to instinct, and descent with it into +infra-consciousness again? By no means. On the contrary, our task is to +bring instinct to enrich intelligence, to become free and illumined in it; +and this ascent towards super-consciousness is possible in the flash of an +intuitive act, as it is sometimes possible for the eye to perceive, as a +pale and fugitive gleam, beyond what we properly term light, the ultra- +violet rays of the spectrum. + +Can we say of such a doctrine that it seeks to go, or that it goes "against +intelligence"? Nothing authorises such an accusation, for limitation of a +sphere is not misappreciation of every legitimate exercise. But +intelligence is not the whole of thought, and its natural products do not +completely exhaust or manifest our power of light. + +Besides, that intelligence and reason are not things completed, for ever +arrested in their inner structure, that they evolve and expand, is a fact: +the place of discovery is precisely the residual fringe of which we were +speaking above. In this respect, the history of thought would furnish +examples in plenty. Intuitions at first obscure, and only anticipated, +facts originally admitting no comparison, and as it were irrational, become +instructive and luminous by the fruitful use made of them, and by the +fertility which they manifest. In order to grasp the complex content of +reality, the mind must do itself violence, must awaken its sleeping powers +of revealing sympathy, must expand till it becomes adapted to what formerly +shocked its habits so much as almost to seem contradictory to it. Such a +task, moreover, is possible: we work out its differential every moment, +and its complete whole appears in the sequence of centuries. + +At bottom, the new theory of knowledge has nothing new in it except the +demand that all the facts shall be taken into account: it renews duration +in the thinking mind, and places itself at the point of view of creative +invention, not only at that of subsequent demonstration. Hence its +conception of experience, which, for it, is not simple information, fitted +into pre-existing frames, but elaboration of the frames themselves. + +Hence the problem of reason changes its aspect. A great mistake has been +made in thinking that Mr Bergson's doctrine misunderstands it: to deny it +and to place it are two different things. In its inmost essence, reason is +the demand for unity; that is why it is displayed as a faculty of +synthesis, and why its essential act is presented as apperception of +relation. It is unifying activity, not so much by a dialectic of +harmonious construction as by a view of reciprocal implication. But all +that, however shaded we suppose it, entails a previous analysis. Therefore +if we place ourselves in a perspective of intuition, I mean, of complete +perception, the demand for reason appears second only, without being +deprived, however, of its true task: it is an echo and a recollection, an +appeal and a promise of profound continuity, our original anticipation and +our final hope, in the bosom of the elementary atomism which characterises +the transitory region of language; and reason thus marks the zone of +contact between intelligence and instinct. + +Is thought only possible under the law of number? Does reality only become +an object of knowledge as a system of distinct but regulated factors and +moments? Do ideas exist only by their mutual relations, which first of all +oppose them and afterwards force intelligence to move endlessly from one +term to another? If such were the case, reason would certainly be first, +as alone making an intelligible continuity out of discontinuous perception +and restoring total unity to each temporary part by a synthetic dialectic. +But all this really has meaning only after analysis has taken place. The +demand for rational unity constitutes in the bosom of atomism something +like a murmur of deep underlying continuity: it expresses in the very +language of atomism, atomism's basic irreality. There is no question of +misunderstanding reason, but only of putting it in its proper place. In a +perspective of complete intuition nothing would require to be unified. +Reason would then be reabsorbed in perception. That is to say, its present +task is to measure and correct in us the limits, gaps, and weaknesses of +the perceptive faculty. In this respect not a man of us thinks of denying +it its task. But we try with Mr Bergson to reduce this task to its true +worth and genuine importance. For we are decidedly tired of hearing +"Reason" invoked in solemn and moving tones, as if to write the venerable +name with the largest of capital R's were a magic solution of all problems. + +Mind, in fact, sets out from unity rather than arrives at it; and the order +which it appears to discover subsequently in an experience which at first +is manifold and incoherent is only a refraction of the original unity +through the prism of a spontaneous analysis. Mr Bergson admirably points +out ("Creative Evolution", pages 240-244 and 252-257.) that there are two +types of order, geometric and vital, the one a static hierarchy of +relations, the other a musical continuity of moments. These two types are +opposed, as space to duration and matter to mind; but the negation of one +coincides with the position of the other. It is therefore impossible to +abolish both at once. The idea of disorder does not correspond to any +genuine reality. It is essentially relative, and arises only when we do +not meet the type of order which we were expecting; and then it expresses +our deception in the language of our expectation, the absence of the +expected order being equivalent, from the practical point of view, to the +absence of all order. Regarded in itself, this notion is only a verbal +entity, unduly taking form as the common basis of two antithetic types. +How therefore do we come to speak of a "perceptible diversity" which mind +has to regulate and unify? This is only true at most of the disjointed +experience employed by common-sense. Reason, accepting this preliminary +analysis, and proceeding to language, seeks to organise it according to the +mathematical type. But it is the vital type which corresponds to absolute +reality, at least when it is a question of the Whole; and only intuition +has re-access to it, by soaring above synthetic dissociations. + + + +VIII. Conclusion. + +As my last word and closing formula I come back to the leitmotiv of my +whole study: Mr Bergson's philosophy is a philosophy of duration. + +Let us regard it from this point of view, as contact with creative effort, +if we wish to conceive aright the original notions which it proposes to us +about liberty, life, and intuition. + +Let us say once more that it appears as the enthronement of positive +metaphysics: positive, that is to say, capable of continuous, regular, and +collective progress, no longer forcibly divided into irreducible schools, +"each of which retains its place, chooses its dice, and begins a never- +ending match with the rest." ("Introduction to Metaphysics" in the "Revue +de Metaphysique et de Morale", January 1903. Psychology, according to Mr +Bergson, studies the human mind in so far as it operates in a useful manner +to a practical end; metaphysics represent the effort of this same mind to +free itself from the conditions of useful action, and regain possession of +itself as pure creative energy. Now experience, the experience of the +laboratory, allows us to measure with more and more accuracy the divergence +between these two planes of life; hence the positive character of the new +metaphysics.) + +Let us next say that until the present moment it constitutes the only +doctrine which is truly a metaphysic of experience, since no other, at +bottom, explains why thought, in its work of discovery and verification, +remains in subjection to a law of probation by durable action. We have now +only to show how it evades certain criticisms which have been levelled +against its tendencies. + +Some have wanted to see in it a kind of atheist monism. Mr Bergson has +answered this point himself. What he rejects, and what he is right in +rejecting, are the doctrines which confine themselves to personifying the +unity of nature or the unity of knowledge in God as motionless first cause. +God would really be nothing, since he would do nothing. But he adds: "The +considerations put forward in my "Essay on the Immediate Data" result in an +illustration of the fact of liberty; those of "Matter and Memory" lead us, +I hope, to put our finger on mental reality; those of "Creative Evolution" +present creation as a fact: from all this we derive a clear idea of a free +and creating God, producing matter and life at once, whose creative effort +is continued, in a vital direction, by the evolution of species and the +construction of human personalities." (Letter to P. de Tonquedec, +published in the "Studies" of 20th February 1912, and quoted here as found +in the "Annals of Christian Philosophy", March 1912.) How can we help +finding in these words, according to the actual expression of the author, +the most categorical refutation "of monism and pantheism in general"? + +Now to go further and become more precise, Mr Bergson points out that we +must "approach problems of quite a different kind, those of morality." +About these new problems the author of "Creative Evolution" has as yet said +nothing; and he will say nothing, so long as his method does not lead him, +on this point, to results as positive, after their manner, as those of his +other works, because he does not consider that mere subjective opinions are +in place in philosophy. He therefore denies nothing; he is waiting and +searching, always in the same spirit: what more could we ask of him? + +One thing only is possible today: to discern in the doctrine already +existing the points of a moral and religious philosophy which present +themselves in advance for ultimate insertion. + +This is what we are permitted to attempt. But let us fully understand what +is at issue. The question is only to know whether, as has been claimed, +there is incompatibility between Mr Bergson's point of view and the +religious or moral point of view; whether the premisses laid down block the +road to all future development in the direction before us; or whether, on +the contrary, such a development is invited by some parts at least of the +previous work. The question is not to find in this work the necessary and +sufficient bases, the already formed and visible lineaments of what will +one day complete it. To imagine that the religious and moral problem is +bound to be regarded by Mr Bergson as arising when it is too late for +revision, as admitting proposition and solution only as functions of a +previous theoretical philosophy beyond which we should not go; that in his +eyes the solution of this problem will be deduced from principles already +laid down without any call for the introduction of new facts or new points +of view, without any need to begin from a new intuition; that his view +precludes all considerations of strictly spiritual life, of inner and +profound action, regarding things in relation to God and in an eternal +perspective: such a view would be illegitimate and unreasonable, first of +all, because Mr Bergson has said nothing of the kind, and secondly, because +it is contrary to all his tendencies. + +After the "Essay on the Immediate Data" critics proceeded to confine him in +an irreducible static dualism; after "Matter and Memory" they condemned him +as failing for ever to explain the juxtaposition of the two points of view, +utility and truth: why should we require that after "Creative Evolution" +he should be forbidden to think anything new, or distinguish, for example, +different orders of life? + +The problems must be approached one after the other, and, in the solution +of each of them, it is proper to introduce only the necessary elements. +But each result is only "temporarily final." Let us lose the strange habit +of asking an author continually to do something other than he has done, or, +in what he has done, to give us the whole of his thought. + +Till now, Mr Bergson has always considered each new problem according to +its specific and original nature, and, to solve it, he has always supplied +a new effort of autonomous adaptation: why should it be otherwise for the +future? I seek vainly for the decree forbidding him the right to study the +problem of biological evolution in itself, and for the necessity which +compels him to abide now by the premisses contained in his past work. (For +Mr Bergson, the religious sentiment, as the sentiment of obligation, +contains a basis of "immediate datum" rendering it indissoluble and +irreducible.) + +The only point which we have to examine is this: will the moral and +religious question compel Mr Bergson to break with the conclusions of his +previous studies, and can we not, on the contrary, foresee points of +general agreement? + +In the depths of ourselves we find liberty; in the depths of universal +being we find a demand for creation. Since evolution is creative, each of +its moments works for the production of an indeducible and transcendent +future. This future must not be regarded as a simple development of the +present, a simple expression of germs already given. Consequently we have +no authority for saying that there is for ever only one order of life, only +one plane of action, only one rhythm of duration, only one perspective of +existence. And if disconnections and abrupt leaps are visible in the +economy of the past--from matter to life, from the animal to man--we have +no authority again for claiming that we cannot observe today something +analogous in the very essence of human life, that the point of view of the +flesh, and the point of view of the spirit, the point of view of reason, +and the point of view of charity are a homogeneous extension of it. And +apart from that, taking life in its first tendency, and in the general +direction of its current, it is ascent, growth, upward effort, and a work +of spiritualising and emancipating creation: by that we might define Good, +for Good is a path rather than a thing. + +But life may fail, halt, or travel downwards. "Life in general is mobility +itself; the particular manifestations of life accept this mobility only +with regret, and constantly fall behind. While it is always going forward, +they would be glad to mark time. Evolution in general would take place as +far as possible in a straight line; special evolution is a circular +advance. Like dust-eddies raised by the passing wind, living bodies are +self-pivoted and hung in the full breeze of life." ("Creative Evolution", +page 139.) Each species, each individual, each function tends to take +itself as its end; mechanism, habit, body, and letter, which are, strictly +speaking, pure instruments, actually become principles of death. Thus it +comes about that life is exhausted in efforts towards self-preservation, +allows itself to be converted by matter into captive eddies, sometimes even +abandons itself to the inertia of the weight which it ought to raise, and +surrenders to the downward current which constitutes the essence of +materiality: it is thus that Evil would be defined, as the direction of +travel opposed to Good. Now, with man, thought, reflection, and clear +consciousness appear. At the same time also properly moral qualifications +appear: good becomes duty, evil becomes sin. At this precise moment, a +new problem begins, demanding the soundings of a new intuition, yet +connected at clear and visible points with previous problems. + +This is the philosophy which some are pleased to say is closed by nature to +all problems of a certain order, problems of reason or problems of +morality. There is no doctrine, on the contrary, which is more open, and +none which, in actual fact, lends itself better to further extension. + +It is not my duty to state here what I believe can be extracted from it. +Still less is it my duty to try to foresee what Mr Bergson's conclusions +will be. Let us confine ourselves to taking it in what it has expressly +given us of itself. From this point of view, which is that of pure +knowledge, I must again, as I conclude, emphasise its exceptional +importance and its infinite reach. It is possible not to understand it. +Such is frequently the case: thus it always has been in the past, each +time that a truly new intuition has arisen among men; thus it will be until +the inevitable day when disciples more respectful of the letter than the +spirit will turn it, alas, into a new scholastic. What does it matter! +The future is there; despite misconceptions, despite incomprehensions, +there is henceforth the departure-point of all speculative philosophy; each +day increases the number of minds which recognise it; and it is better not +to dwell upon the proofs of several of those who are unable or unwilling to +see it. + + +Index. + +Absolute, the. + +Adaptation, value of. + +Analysis, conceptual, contrasted with intuition. + +Appearances. + +Art, and philosophy. + +Atomism. + +Automatism. + +Automaton, of daily life. + +Being, as becoming. + +Brain, work of. + +Causality, psychological. + +Change. + +Common-sense. + +Concepts, analysis by and functions of, as symbols, creation of, as general +frames, practical reach of, inferior to intuition, further discussed. + +Consciousness. + +Conservation, law of. + +Constants, search for, represented. + +Continuity, qualitative. + +Criticism, of language. + +Deduction, impotence of. + +Degradation, law of. + +Determinism, physical. + +Discontinuity, apparent. + +Disorder. + +Du Bois-Reymond. + +Duration, real, perpetually new, and thought, and time, pure. + +Dynamic connection, schemes. + +Ego, encrustations of the. + +Eleatic dialectic. + +Embryology, evidence of. + +Evil, a reality. + +Evolution, drama of, biological, value and meaning of, not indispensable, +distinguished from development, as dynamic continuity, as activity, further +discussed. + +Existence, as change. + +Experience. + +Fact. + +Freedom. + +Free-will. + +Genesis, law of. + +Good, a reality, a path. + +Habit, as obstacle. + +Heredity. + +Heterogeneity. + +Homogeneity, absence of. + +Huxley. + +Images. + +Immediacy. + +Immediate, the. + +Inert, the. + +Instinct, is sympathy, contrasted with intelligence. + +Intellectualism, distrusted. + +Intelligence, product of evolution, and instinct, broad meaning of. + +Intuition, as starting-point, intransmissible without language, aesthetic, +triumph of, and duration, and analysis. + +Intuitional effort, content. + +Kant, his point of departure, conclusions of, escape from. + +Knowledge, absolute, utilitarian nature of, new theory of. + +Language, dangers of. + +Laplace. + +Law, concept of. + +Liberty, personal importance of. + +Life, tendencies of, is finality, is progress, further discussed. + +Limit-concepts. + +Materialism. + +Mechanism, psychological, failure of. + +Memory, problem of, perception complicated by, importance of, racial, +planes of, memory of solids. + +Metaphor, justification of. + +Method, philosophical. + +Mill, Stuart. + +Motor-schemes, mechanisms. + +Mysticism. + +Non-morality. + +Nothingness. + +Number. + +Ontogenesis. + +Palaeontology, evidence of. + +Parallelism. + +Paralogism. + +Perception, an art, affected by memory, further explained, fulfilment of +guesswork, utilitarian signification, subjectivity of, pure and ordinary, +further discussed, relation to matter, perception of immediacy. + +Philosophy, duty of, function of. + +Phylogenesis. + +Planes, of consciousness. + +Progress, and reality. + +Quality, and inner world. + +Quantity, and quality. + +Rationalism. + +Ravaisson. + +Realism. + +Reality, contact with, a flux, recognition of, absolute, elusive nature of, +personal, essentially qualitative, pure, inner, contrasting views about, +further discussed. + +Reason. + +Relation, between mind and matter. + +Religion, its place in philosophy. + +Renan. + +Romanticism. + +Schemes, dynamic. + +Science, prisoner of symbolism, cult of, impotence of. + +Sense, good, and common-sense. + +Space. + +Spencer, criticism of, success and weakness of. + +Spiritualism. + +Symbolism. + +Sympathy. + +Taine. + +Thought, methods of common. + +Time, required by Mr Bergson's philosophy, in space, and common-sense, and +duration. + +Torpor. + +Transformism, errors of. + +Utility, as goal of perception. + +Variation. + +Zeno of Elea. + +Zone, of feeling. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson + diff --git a/old/old/anphb10.zip b/old/old/anphb10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f25a16b --- /dev/null +++ b/old/old/anphb10.zip |