1 files changed, 4381 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/old/1346-0.txt b/old/1346-0.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d80c8c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/old/1346-0.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4381 @@
+The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, by Karl Marx
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
+most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
+whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
+of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
+www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you
+will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before
+using this eBook.
+
+Title: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
+
+Author: Karl Marx
+
+Translator: Daniel de Leon
+
+Release Date: June, 1998 [eBook #1346]
+[Most recently updated: April 19, 2021]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: UTF-8
+
+Produced by: An Anonymous Volunteer and David Widger
+
+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE ***
+
+
+
+
+The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
+
+by Karl Marx
+
+
+Contents
+
+ Translator’s Preface
+ I.
+ II.
+ III.
+ IV.
+ V.
+ VI.
+ VII.
+
+
+
+
+Translator’s Preface
+
+
+“The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” is one of Karl Marx’ most
+profound and most brilliant monographs. It may be considered the best
+work extant on the philosophy of history, with an eye especially upon
+the history of the Movement of the Proletariat, together with the
+bourgeois and other manifestations that accompany the same, and the
+tactics that such conditions dictate.
+
+The recent populist uprising; the more recent “Debs Movement”; the
+thousand and one utopian and chimerical notions that are flaring up;
+the capitalist maneuvers; the hopeless, helpless grasping after straws,
+that characterize the conduct of the bulk of the working class; all of
+these, together with the empty-headed, ominous figures that are
+springing into notoriety for a time and have their day, mark the
+present period of the Labor Movement in the nation a critical one. The
+best information acquirable, the best mental training obtainable are
+requisite to steer through the existing chaos that the death-tainted
+social system of today creates all around us. To aid in this needed
+information and mental training, this instructive work is now made
+accessible to English readers, and is commended to the serious study of
+the serious.
+
+The teachings contained in this work are hung on an episode in recent
+French history. With some this fact may detract of its value. A
+pedantic, supercilious notion is extensively abroad among us that we
+are an “Anglo Saxon” nation; and an equally pedantic, supercilious
+habit causes many to look to England for inspiration, as from a racial
+birthplace. Nevertheless, for weal or for woe, there is no such thing
+extant as “Anglo-Saxon”—of all nations, said to be “Anglo-Saxon,” in
+the United States least. What we still have from England, much as
+appearances may seem to point the other way, is not of our
+bone-and-marrow, so to speak, but rather partakes of the nature of
+“importations.” We are no more English on account of them than we are
+Chinese because we all drink tea.
+
+Of all European nations, France is the on to which we come nearest.
+Besides its republican form of government—the directness of its
+history, the unity of its actions, the sharpness that marks its
+internal development, are all characteristics that find their parallel
+her best, and vice versa. In all essentials the study of modern French
+history, particularly when sketched by such a master hand as Marx’, is
+the most valuable one for the acquisition of that historic, social and
+biologic insight that our country stands particularly in need of, and
+that will be inestimable during the approaching critical days.
+
+For the assistance of those who, unfamiliar with the history of France,
+may be confused by some of the terms used by Marx, the following
+explanations may prove aidful:
+
+On the 18th Brumaire (Nov. 9th), the post-revolutionary development of
+affairs in France enabled the first Napoleon to take a step that led
+with inevitable certainty to the imperial throne. The circumstance that
+fifty and odd years later similar events aided his nephew, Louis
+Bonaparte, to take a similar step with a similar result, gives the name
+to this work—“The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.”
+
+As to the other terms and allusions that occur, the following sketch
+will suffice:
+
+Upon the overthrow of the first Napoleon came the restoration of the
+Bourbon throne (Louis XVIII, succeeded by Charles X). In July, 1830, an
+uprising of the upper tier of the bourgeoisie, or capitalist class—the
+aristocracy of finance—overthrew the Bourbon throne, or landed
+aristocracy, and set up the throne of Orleans, a younger branch of the
+house of Bourbon, with Louis Philippe as king. From the month in which
+this revolution occurred, Louis Philippe’s monarchy is called the “July
+Monarchy.” In February, 1848, a revolt of a lower tier of the
+capitalist class—the industrial bourgeoisie—against the aristocracy of
+finance, in turn dethroned Louis Philippe. The affair, also named from
+the month in which it took place, is the “February Revolution”. “The
+Eighteenth Brumaire” starts with that event.
+
+Despite the inapplicableness to our affairs of the political names and
+political leadership herein described, both these names and leaderships
+are to such an extent the products of an economic-social development
+that has here too taken place with even greater sharpens, and they have
+their present or threatened counterparts here so completely, that, by
+the light of this work of Marx’, we are best enabled to understand our
+own history, to know whence we came, and whither we are going and how
+to conduct ourselves.
+
+D.D.L. New York, Sept. 12, 1897
+
+
+
+
+THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+
+Hegel says somewhere that that great historic facts and personages
+recur twice. He forgot to add: “Once as tragedy, and again as farce.”
+Caussidiere for Danton, Louis Blanc for Robespierre, the “Mountain” of
+1848-51 for the “Mountain” of 1793-05, the Nephew for the Uncle. The
+identical caricature marks also the conditions under which the second
+edition of the eighteenth Brumaire is issued.
+
+Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole
+cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out
+of such as he finds close at hand. The tradition of all past
+generations weighs like an alp upon the brain of the living. At the
+very time when men appear engaged in revolutionizing things and
+themselves, in bringing about what never was before, at such very
+epochs of revolutionary crisis do they anxiously conjure up into their
+service the spirits of the past, assume their names, their battle
+cries, their costumes to enact a new historic scene in such
+time-honored disguise and with such borrowed language Thus did Luther
+masquerade as the Apostle Paul; thus did the revolution of 1789-1814
+drape itself alternately as Roman Republic and as Roman Empire; nor did
+the revolution of 1818 know what better to do than to parody at one
+time the year 1789, at another the revolutionary traditions of 1793-95.
+Thus does the beginner, who has acquired a new language, keep on
+translating it back into his own mother tongue; only then has he
+grasped the spirit of the new language and is able freely to express
+himself therewith when he moves in it without recollections of the old,
+and has forgotten in its use his own hereditary tongue.
+
+When these historic configurations of the dead past are closely
+observed a striking difference is forthwith noticeable. Camille
+Desmoulins, Danton, Robespierre, St. Juste, Napoleon, the heroes as
+well as the parties and the masses of the old French revolution,
+achieved in Roman costumes and with Roman phrases the task of their
+time: the emancipation and the establishment of modern bourgeois
+society. One set knocked to pieces the old feudal groundwork and mowed
+down the feudal heads that had grown upon it; Napoleon brought about,
+within France, the conditions under which alone free competition could
+develop, the partitioned lands be exploited, the nation’s unshackled
+powers of industrial production be utilized; while, beyond the French
+frontier, he swept away everywhere the establishments of feudality, so
+far as requisite, to furnish the bourgeois social system of France with
+fit surroundings of the European continent, and such as were in keeping
+with the times. Once the new social establishment was set on foot, the
+antediluvian giants vanished, and, along with them, the resuscitated
+Roman world—the Brutuses, Gracchi, Publicolas, the Tribunes, the
+Senators, and Caesar himself. In its sober reality, bourgeois society
+had produced its own true interpretation in the Says, Cousins,
+Royer-Collards, Benjamin Constants and Guizots; its real generals sat
+behind the office desks; and the mutton-head of Louis XVIII was its
+political lead. Wholly absorbed in the production of wealth and in the
+peaceful fight of competition, this society could no longer understand
+that the ghosts of the days of Rome had watched over its cradle. And
+yet, lacking in heroism as bourgeois society is, it nevertheless had
+stood in need of heroism, of self-sacrifice, of terror, of civil war,
+and of bloody battle fields to bring it into the world. Its gladiators
+found in the stern classic traditions of the Roman republic the ideals
+and the form, the self-deceptions, that they needed in order to conceal
+from themselves the narrow bourgeois substance of their own struggles,
+and to keep their passion up to the height of a great historic tragedy.
+Thus, at another stage of development a century before, did Cromwell
+and the English people draw from the Old Testament the language,
+passions and illusions for their own bourgeois revolution. When the
+real goal was reached, when the remodeling of English society was
+accomplished, Locke supplanted Habakuk.
+
+Accordingly, the reviving of the dead in those revolutions served the
+purpose of glorifying the new struggles, not of parodying the old; it
+served the purpose of exaggerating to the imagination the given task,
+not to recoil before its practical solution; it served the purpose of
+rekindling the revolutionary spirit, not to trot out its ghost.
+
+In 1848-51 only the ghost of the old revolution wandered about, from
+Marrast the “Republicain en gaunts jaunes,” [#1 Silk-stocking
+republican] who disguised himself in old Bailly, down to the
+adventurer, who hid his repulsively trivial features under the iron
+death mask of Napoleon. A whole people, that imagines it has imparted
+to itself accelerated powers of motion through a revolution, suddenly
+finds itself transferred back to a dead epoch, and, lest there be any
+mistake possible on this head, the old dates turn up again; the old
+calendars; the old names; the old edicts, which long since had sunk to
+the level of the antiquarian’s learning; even the old bailiffs, who had
+long seemed mouldering with decay. The nation takes on the appearance
+of that crazy Englishman in Bedlam, who imagines he is living in the
+days of the Pharaohs, and daily laments the hard work that he must do
+in the Ethiopian mines as gold digger, immured in a subterranean
+prison, with a dim lamp fastened on his head, behind him the slave
+overseer with a long whip, and, at the mouths of the mine a mob of
+barbarous camp servants who understand neither the convicts in the
+mines nor one another, because they do not speak a common language.
+“And all this,” cries the crazy Englishman, “is demanded of me, the
+free-born Englishman, in order to make gold for old Pharaoh.” “In order
+to pay off the debts of the Bonaparte family”—sobs the French nation.
+The Englishman, so long as he was in his senses, could not rid himself
+of the rooted thought making gold. The Frenchmen, so long as they were
+busy with a revolution, could not rid then selves of the Napoleonic
+memory, as the election of December 10th proved. They longed to escape
+from the dangers of revolution back to the flesh pots of Egypt; the 2d
+of December, 1851 was the answer. They have not merely the character of
+the old Napoleon, but the old Napoleon himself—caricatured as he needs
+must appear in the middle of the nineteenth century.
+
+The social revolution of the nineteenth century can not draw its poetry
+from the past, it can draw that only from the future. It cannot start
+upon its work before it has stricken off all superstition concerning
+the past. Former revolutions require historic reminiscences in order to
+intoxicate themselves with their own issues. The revolution of the
+nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead in order to reach
+its issue. With the former, the phrase surpasses the substance; with
+this one, the substance surpasses the phrase.
+
+The February revolution was a surprisal; old society was taken
+unawares; and the people proclaimed this political stroke a great
+historic act whereby the new era was opened. On the 2d of December, the
+February revolution is jockeyed by the trick of a false player, and
+what seems to be overthrown is no longer the monarchy, but the liberal
+concessions which had been wrung from it by centuries of struggles.
+Instead of society itself having conquered a new point, only the State
+appears to have returned to its oldest form, to the simply brazen rule
+of the sword and the club. Thus, upon the “coup de main” of February,
+1848, comes the response of the “coup de tete” December, 1851. So won,
+so lost. Meanwhile, the interval did not go by unutilized. During the
+years 1848-1851, French society retrieved in abbreviated, because
+revolutionary, method the lessons and teachings, which—if it was to be
+more than a disturbance of the surface—should have preceded the
+February revolution, had it developed in regular order, by rule, so to
+say. Now French society seems to have receded behind its point of
+departure; in fact, however, it was compelled to first produce its own
+revolutionary point of departure, the situation, circumstances,
+conditions, under which alone the modern revolution is in earnest.
+
+Bourgeois revolutions, like those of the eighteenth century, rush
+onward rapidly from success to success, their stage effects outbid one
+another, men and things seem to be set in flaming brilliants, ecstasy
+is the prevailing spirit; but they are short-lived, they reach their
+climax speedily, then society relapses into a long fit of nervous
+reaction before it learns how to appropriate the fruits of its period
+of feverish excitement. Proletarian revolutions, on the contrary, such
+as those of the nineteenth century, criticize themselves constantly;
+constantly interrupt themselves in their own course; come back to what
+seems to have been accomplished, in order to start over anew; scorn
+with cruel thoroughness the half measures, weaknesses and meannesses of
+their first attempts; seem to throw down their adversary only in order
+to enable him to draw fresh strength from the earth, and again, to rise
+up against them in more gigantic stature; constantly recoil in fear
+before the undefined monster magnitude of their own objects—until
+finally that situation is created which renders all retreat impossible,
+and the conditions themselves cry out:
+
+“Hic Rhodus, hic salta!”
+[#2 Here is Rhodes, leap here! An allusion to Aesop’s Fables.]
+
+
+Every observer of average intelligence; even if he failed to follow
+step by step the course of French development, must have anticipated
+that an unheard of fiasco was in store for the revolution. It was
+enough to hear the self-satisfied yelpings of victory wherewith the
+Messieurs Democrats mutually congratulated one another upon the pardons
+of May 2d, 1852. Indeed, May 2d had become a fixed idea in their heads;
+it had become a dogma with them—something like the day on which Christ
+was to reappear and the Millennium to begin had formed in the heads of
+the Chiliasts. Weakness had, as it ever does, taken refuge in the
+wonderful; it believed the enemy was overcome if, in its imagination,
+it hocus-pocused him away; and it lost all sense of the present in the
+imaginary apotheosis of the future, that was at hand, and of the deeds,
+that it had “in petto,” but which it did not yet want to bring to the
+scratch. The heroes, who ever seek to refute their established
+incompetence by mutually bestowing their sympathy upon one another and
+by pulling together, had packed their satchels, taken their laurels in
+advance payments and were just engaged in the work of getting
+discounted “in partibus,” on the stock exchange, the republics for
+which, in the silence of their unassuming dispositions, they had
+carefully organized the government personnel. The 2d of December struck
+them like a bolt from a clear sky; and the peoples, who, in periods of
+timid despondency, gladly allow their hidden fears to be drowned by the
+loudest screamers, will perhaps have become convinced that the days are
+gone by when the cackling of geese could save the Capitol.
+
+The constitution, the national assembly, the dynastic parties, the blue
+and the red republicans, the heroes from Africa, the thunder from the
+tribune, the flash-lightnings from the daily press, the whole
+literature, the political names and the intellectual celebrities, the
+civil and the criminal law, the “liberte’, egalite’, fraternite’,”
+together with the 2d of May 1852—all vanished like a phantasmagoria
+before the ban of one man, whom his enemies themselves do not pronounce
+an adept at witchcraft. Universal suffrage seems to have survived only
+for a moment, to the end that, before the eyes of the whole world, it
+should make its own testament with its own hands, and, in the name of
+the people, declare: “All that exists deserves to perish.”
+
+It is not enough to say, as the Frenchmen do, that their nation was
+taken by surprise. A nation, no more than a woman, is excused for the
+unguarded hour when the first adventurer who comes along can do
+violence to her. The riddle is not solved by such shifts, it is only
+formulated in other words. There remains to be explained how a nation
+of thirty-six millions can be surprised by three swindlers, and taken
+to prison without resistance.
+
+Let us recapitulate in general outlines the phases which the French
+revolution of February 24th, 1848, to December, 1851, ran through.
+
+Three main periods are unmistakable:
+
+First—The February period;
+
+Second—The period of constituting the republic, or of the constitutive
+national assembly (May 4, 1848, to May 29th, 1849);
+
+Third—The period of the constitutional republic, or of the legislative
+national assembly (May 29, 1849, to December 2, 1851).
+
+The first period, from February 24, or the downfall of Louis Philippe,
+to May 4, 1848, the date of the assembling of the constitutive
+assembly—the February period proper—may be designated as the prologue
+of the revolution. It officially expressed its own character in this,
+that the government which it improvised declared itself “provisional;”
+and, like the government, everything that was broached, attempted, or
+uttered, pronounced itself provisional. Nobody and nothing dared to
+assume the right of permanent existence and of an actual fact. All the
+elements that had prepared or determined the revolution—dynastic
+opposition, republican bourgeoisie, democratic-republican small
+traders’ class, social-democratic labor element—all found
+“provisionally” their place in the February government.
+
+It could not be otherwise. The February days contemplated originally a
+reform of the suffrage laws, whereby the area of the politically
+privileged among the property-holding class was to be extended, while
+the exclusive rule of the aristocracy of finance was to be overthrown.
+When however, it came to a real conflict, when the people mounted the
+barricades, when the National Guard stood passive, when the army
+offered no serious resistance, and the kingdom ran away, then the
+republic seemed self-understood. Each party interpreted it in its own
+sense. Won, arms in hand, by the proletariat, they put upon it the
+stamp of their own class, and proclaimed the social republic. Thus the
+general purpose of modern revolutions was indicated, a purpose,
+however, that stood in most singular contradiction to every thing that,
+with the material at hand, with the stage of enlightenment that the
+masses had reached, and under existing circumstances and conditions,
+could be immediately used. On the other hand, the claims of all the
+other elements, that had cooperated in the revolution of February, were
+recognized by the lion’s share that they received in the government.
+Hence, in no period do we find a more motley mixture of high-sounding
+phrases together with actual doubt and helplessness; of more
+enthusiastic reform aspirations, together with a more slavish adherence
+to the old routine; more seeming harmony permeating the whole of
+society together with a deeper alienation of its several elements.
+While the Parisian proletariat was still gloating over the sight of the
+great perspective that had disclosed itself to their view, and was
+indulging in seriously meant discussions over the social problems, the
+old powers of society had groomed themselves, had gathered together,
+had deliberated and found an unexpected support in the mass of the
+nation—the peasants and small traders—all of whom threw themselves on a
+sudden upon the political stage, after the barriers of the July
+monarchy had fallen down.
+
+The second period, from May 4, 1848, to the end of May, 1849, is the
+period of the constitution, of the founding of the bourgeois republic
+immediately after the February days, not only was the dynastic
+opposition surprised by the republicans, and the republicans by the
+Socialists, but all France was surprised by Paris. The national
+assembly, that met on May 4, 1848, to frame a constitution, was the
+outcome of the national elections; it represented the nation. It was a
+living protest against the assumption of the February days, and it was
+intended to bring the results of the revolution back to the bourgeois
+measure. In vain did the proletariat of Paris, which forthwith
+understood the character of this national assembly, endeavor, a few
+days after its meeting; on May 15, to deny its existence by force, to
+dissolve it, to disperse the organic apparition, in which the reacting
+spirit of the nation was threatening them, and thus reduce it back to
+its separate component parts. As is known, the 15th of May had no other
+result than that of removing Blanqui and his associates, i.e. the real
+leaders of the proletarian party, from the public scene for the whole
+period of the cycle which we are here considering.
+
+Upon the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe, only the bourgeois
+republic could follow; that is to say, a limited portion of the
+bourgeoisie having ruled under the name of the king, now the whole
+bourgeoisie was to rule under the name of the people. The demands of
+the Parisian proletariat are utopian tom-fooleries that have to be done
+away with. To this declaration of the constitutional national assembly,
+the Paris proletariat answers with the June insurrection, the most
+colossal event in the history of European civil wars. The bourgeois
+republic won. On its side stood the aristocracy of finance, the
+industrial bourgeoisie; the middle class; the small traders’ class; the
+army; the slums, organized as Guarde Mobile; the intellectual
+celebrities, the parsons’ class, and the rural population. On the side
+of the Parisian proletariat stood none but itself. Over 3,000
+insurgents were massacred, after the victory 15,000 were transported
+without trial. With this defeat, the proletariat steps to the
+background on the revolutionary stage. It always seeks to crowd
+forward, so soon as the movement seems to acquire new impetus, but with
+ever weaker effort and ever smaller results; So soon as any of the
+above lying layers of society gets into revolutionary fermentation, it
+enters into alliance therewith and thus shares all the defeats which
+the several parties successively suffer. But these succeeding blows
+become ever weaker the more generally they are distributed over the
+whole surface of society. The more important leaders of the
+Proletariat, in its councils, and the press, fall one after another
+victims of the courts, and ever more questionable figures step to the
+front. It partly throws itself it upon doctrinaire experiments,
+“co-operative banking” and “labor exchange” schemes; in other words,
+movements, in which it goes into movements in which it gives up the
+task of revolutionizing the old world with its own large collective
+weapons and on the contrary, seeks to bring about its emancipation,
+behind the back of society, in private ways, within the narrow bounds
+of its own class conditions, and, consequently, inevitably fails. The
+proletariat seems to be able neither to find again the revolutionary
+magnitude within itself nor to draw new energy from the newly formed
+alliances until all the classes, with whom it contended in June, shall
+lie prostrate along with itself. But in all these defeats, the
+proletariat succumbs at least with the honor that attaches to great
+historic struggles; not France alone, all Europe trembles before the
+June earthquake, while the successive defeats inflicted upon the higher
+classes are bought so easily that they need the brazen exaggeration of
+the victorious party itself to be at all able to pass muster as an
+event; and these defeats become more disgraceful the further removed
+the defeated party stands from the proletariat.
+
+True enough, the defeat of the June insurgents prepared, leveled the
+ground, upon which the bourgeois republic could be founded and erected;
+but it, at the same time, showed that there are in Europe other issues
+besides that of “Republic or Monarchy.” It revealed the fact that here
+the Bourgeois Republic meant the unbridled despotism of one class over
+another. It proved that, with nations enjoying an older civilization,
+having developed class distinctions, modern conditions of production,
+an intellectual consciousness, wherein all traditions of old have been
+dissolved through the work of centuries, that with such countries the
+republic means only the political revolutionary form of bourgeois
+society, not its conservative form of existence, as is the case in the
+United States of America, where, true enough, the classes already
+exist, but have not yet acquired permanent character, are in constant
+flux and reflux, constantly changing their elements and yielding them
+up to one another where the modern means of production, instead of
+coinciding with a stagnant population, rather compensate for the
+relative scarcity of heads and hands; and, finally, where the
+feverishly youthful life of material production, which has to
+appropriate a new world to itself, has so far left neither time nor
+opportunity to abolish the illusions of old. [#3 This was written at
+the beginning of 1852.]
+
+All classes and parties joined hands in the June days in a “Party of
+Order” against the class of the proletariat, which was designated as
+the “Party of Anarchy,” of Socialism, of Communism. They claimed to
+have “saved” society against the “enemies of society.” They gave out
+the slogans of the old social order—“Property, Family, Religion,
+Order”—as the passwords for their army, and cried out to the
+counter-revolutionary crusaders: “In this sign thou wilt conquer!” From
+that moment on, so soon as any of the numerous parties, which had
+marshaled themselves under this sign against the June insurgents,
+tries, in turn, to take the revolutionary field in the interest of its
+own class, it goes down in its turn before the cry: “Property, Family,
+Religion, Order.” Thus it happens that “society is saved” as often as
+the circle of its ruling class is narrowed, as often as a more
+exclusive interest asserts itself over the general. Every demand for
+the most simple bourgeois financial reform, for the most ordinary
+liberalism, for the most commonplace republicanism, for the flattest
+democracy, is forthwith punished as an “assault upon society,” and is
+branded as “Socialism.” Finally the High Priests of “Religion and
+Order” themselves are kicked off their tripods; are fetched out of
+their beds in the dark; hurried into patrol wagons, thrust into jail or
+sent into exile; their temple is razed to the ground, their mouths are
+sealed, their pen is broken, their law torn to pieces in the name of
+Religion, of Family, of Property, and of Order. Bourgeois, fanatic on
+the point of “Order,” are shot down on their own balconies by drunken
+soldiers, forfeit their family property, and their houses are bombarded
+for pastime—all in the name of Property, of Family, of Religion, and of
+Order. Finally, the refuse of bourgeois society constitutes the “holy
+phalanx of Order,” and the hero Crapulinsky makes his entry into the
+Tuileries as the “Savior of Society.”
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+
+Let us resume the thread of events.
+
+The history of the Constitutional National Assembly from the June days
+on, is the history of the supremacy and dissolution of the republican
+bourgeois party, the party which is known under several names of
+“Tricolor Republican,” “True Republican,” “Political Republican,”
+“Formal Republican,” etc., etc. Under the bourgeois monarchy of Louis
+Philippe, this party had constituted the Official Republican
+Opposition, and consequently had been a recognized element in the then
+political world. It had its representatives in the Chambers, and
+commanded considerable influence in the press. Its Parisian organ, the
+“National,” passed, in its way, for as respectable a paper as the
+“Journal des Debats.” This position in the constitutional monarchy
+corresponded to its character. The party was not a fraction of the
+bourgeoisie, held together by great and common interests, and marked by
+special business requirements. It was a coterie of bourgeois with
+republican ideas—writers, lawyers, officers and civil employees, whose
+influence rested upon the personal antipathies of the country for Louis
+Philippe, upon reminiscences of the old Republic, upon the republican
+faith of a number of enthusiasts, and, above all, upon the spirit of
+French patriotism, whose hatred of the treaties of Vienna and of the
+alliance with England kept them perpetually on the alert. The
+“National” owed a large portion of its following under Louis Philippe
+to this covert imperialism, that, later under the republic, could stand
+up against it as a deadly competitor in the person of Louis Bonaparte.
+The paper fought the aristocracy of finance just the same as did the
+rest of the bourgeois opposition. The polemic against the budget, which
+in France, was closely connected with the opposition to the aristocracy
+of finance, furnished too cheap a popularity and too rich a material
+for Puritanical leading articles, not to be exploited. The industrial
+bourgeoisie was thankful to it for its servile defense of the French
+tariff system, which, however, the paper had taken up, more out of
+patriotic than economic reasons; the whole bourgeois class was thankful
+to it for its vicious denunciations of Communism and Socialism. For the
+rest, the party of the “National” was purely republican, i.e. it
+demanded a republican instead of a monarchic form of bourgeois
+government; above all, it demanded for the bourgeoisie the lion’s share
+of the government. As to how this transformation was to be
+accomplished, the party was far from being clear. What, however, was
+clear as day to it and was openly declared at the reform banquets
+during the last days of Louis Philippe’s reign, was its unpopularity
+with the democratic middle class, especially with the revolutionary
+proletariat. These pure republicans, as pure republicans go, were at
+first on the very point of contenting themselves with the regency of
+the Duchess of Orleans, when the February revolution broke out, and
+when it gave their best known representatives a place in the
+provisional government. Of course, they enjoyed from the start the
+confidence of the bourgeoisie and of the majority of the Constitutional
+National Assembly. The Socialist elements of the Provisional Government
+were promptly excluded from the Executive Committee which the Assembly
+had elected upon its convening, and the party of the “National”
+subsequently utilized the outbreak of the June insurrection to dismiss
+this Executive Committee also, and thus rid itself of its nearest
+rivals—the small traders’ class or democratic republicans
+(Ledru-Rollin, etc.). Cavaignac, the General of the bourgeois
+republican party, who commanded at the battle of June, stepped into the
+place of the Executive Committee with a sort of dictatorial power.
+Marrast, former editor-in-chief of the “National”, became permanent
+President of the Constitutional National Assembly, and the
+Secretaryship of State, together with all the other important posts,
+devolved upon the pure republicans.
+
+The republican bourgeois party, which since long had looked upon itself
+as the legitimate heir of the July monarchy, thus found itself
+surpassed in its own ideal; but it came to power, not as it had dreamed
+under Louis Philippe, through a liberal revolt of the bourgeoisie
+against the throne, but through a grape-shot-and-canistered mutiny of
+the proletariat against Capital. That which it imagined to be the most
+revolutionary, came about as the most counter-revolutionary event. The
+fruit fell into its lap, but it fell from the Tree of Knowledge, not
+from the Tree of Life.
+
+The exclusive power of the bourgeois republic lasted only from June 24
+to the 10th of December, 1848. It is summed up in the framing of a
+republican constitution and in the state of siege of Paris.
+
+The new Constitution was in substance only a republicanized edition of
+the constitutional charter of 1830. The limited suffrage of the July
+monarchy, which excluded even a large portion of the bourgeoisie from
+political power, was irreconcilable with the existence of the bourgeois
+republic. The February revolution had forthwith proclaimed direct and
+universal suffrage in place of the old law. The bourgeois republic
+could not annul this act. They had to content themselves with tacking
+to it the limitation a six months’ residence. The old organization of
+the administrative law, of municipal government, of court procedures of
+the army, etc., remained untouched, or, where the constitution did
+change them, the change affected their index, not their subject; their
+name, not their substance.
+
+The inevitable “General Staff” of the “freedoms” of 1848—personal
+freedom, freedom of the press, of speech, of association and of
+assemblage, freedom of instruction, of religion, etc.—received a
+constitutional uniform that rendered them invulnerable. Each of these
+freedoms is proclaimed the absolute right of the French citizen, but
+always with the gloss that it is unlimited in so far only as it be not
+curtailed by the “equal rights of others,” and by the “public safety,”
+or by the “laws,” which are intended to effect this harmony. For
+instance:
+
+“Citizens have the right of association, of peaceful and unarmed
+assemblage, of petitioning, and of expressing their opinions through
+the press or otherwise. The enjoyment of these rights has no limitation
+other than the equal rights of others and the public safety.” (Chap.
+II. of the French Constitution, Section 8.)
+
+“Education is free. The freedom of education shall be enjoyed under the
+conditions provided by law, and under the supervision of the State.”
+(Section 9.)
+
+“The domicile of the citizen is inviolable, except under the forms
+prescribed by law.” (Chap. I., Section 3), etc., etc.
+
+The Constitution, it will be noticed, constantly alludes to future
+organic laws, that are to carry out the glosses, and are intended to
+regulate the enjoyment of these unabridged freedoms, to the end that
+they collide neither with one another nor with the public safety. Later
+on, the organic laws are called into existence by the “Friends of
+Order,” and all the above named freedoms are so regulated that, in
+their enjoyment, the bourgeoisie encounter no opposition from the like
+rights of the other classes. Wherever the bourgeoisie wholly
+interdicted these rights to “others,” or allowed them their enjoyment
+under conditions that were but so many police snares, it was always
+done only in the interest of the “public safety,” i. e., of the
+bourgeoisie, as required by the Constitution.
+
+Hence it comes that both sides—the “Friends of Order,” who abolished
+all those freedoms, as, well as the democrats, who had demanded them
+all—appeal with full right to the Constitution: Each paragraph of the
+Constitution contains its own antithesis, its own Upper and Lower
+House—freedom as a generalization, the abolition of freedom as a
+specification. Accordingly, so long as the name of freedom was
+respected, and only its real enforcement was prevented in a legal way,
+of course the constitutional existence of freedom remained uninjured,
+untouched, however completely its common existence might be
+extinguished.
+
+This Constitution, so ingeniously made invulnerable, was, however, like
+Achilles, vulnerable at one point: not in its heel, but in its head, or
+rather, in the two heads into which it ran out—the Legislative
+Assembly, on the one hand, and the President on the other. Run through
+the Constitution and it will be found that only those paragraphs
+wherein the relation of the President to the Legislative Assembly is
+defined, are absolute, positive, uncontradictory, undistortable.
+
+Here the bourgeois republicans were concerned in securing their own
+position. Articles 45-70 of the Constitution are so framed that the
+National Assembly can constitutionally remove the President, but the
+President can set aside the National Assembly only unconstitutionally,
+he can set it aside only by setting aside the Constitution itself.
+Accordingly, by these provisions, the National Assembly challenges its
+own violent destruction. It not only consecrates, like the character of
+1830, the division of powers, but it extends this feature to an
+unbearably contradictory extreme. The “play of constitutional powers,”
+as Guizot styled the clapper-clawings between the legislative and the
+executive powers, plays permanent “vabanque” in the Constitution of
+1848. On the one side, 750 representatives of the people, elected and
+qualified for re-election by universal suffrage, who constitute an
+uncontrollable, indissoluble, indivisible National Assembly, a National
+Assembly that enjoys legislative omnipotence, that decides in the last
+instance over war, peace and commercial treaties, that alone has the
+power to grant amnesties, and that, through its perpetuity, continually
+maintains the foreground on the stage; on the other, a President, clad
+with all the attributes of royalty, with the right to appoint and
+remove his ministers independently from the national assembly, holding
+in his hands all the means of executive power, the dispenser of all
+posts, and thereby the arbiter of at least one and a half million
+existences in France, so many being dependent upon the 500,000 civil
+employees and upon the officers of all grades. He has the whole armed
+power behind him. He enjoys the privilege of granting pardons to
+individual criminals; suspending the National Guards; of removing with
+the consent of the Council of State the general, cantonal and municipal
+Councilmen, elected by the citizens themselves. The initiative and
+direction of all negotiations with foreign countries are reserved to
+him. While the Assembly itself is constantly acting upon the stage, and
+is exposed to the critically vulgar light of day, he leads a hidden
+life in the Elysian fields, only with Article 45 of the Constitution
+before his eyes and in his heart daily calling out to him, “Frere, il
+faut mourir!” [#1 Brother, you must die!] Your power expires on the
+second Sunday of the beautiful month of May, in the fourth year after
+your election! The glory is then at an end; the play is not performed
+twice; and, if you have any debts, see to it betimes that you pay them
+off with the 600,000 francs that the Constitution has set aside for
+you, unless, perchance, you should prefer traveling to Clichy [#2 The
+debtors’ prison.] on the second Monday of the beautiful month of May.
+
+While the Constitution thus clothes the President with actual power, it
+seeks to secure the moral power to the National Assembly. Apart from
+the circumstance that it is impossible to create a moral power through
+legislative paragraphs, the Constitution again neutralizes itself in
+that it causes the President to be chosen by all the Frenchmen through
+direct suffrage. While the votes of France are splintered to pieces
+upon the 750 members of the National Assembly they are here, on the
+contrary, concentrated upon one individual. While each separate
+Representative represents only this or that party, this or that city,
+this or that dunghill, or possibly only the necessity of electing some
+one Seven-hundred-and-fiftieth or other, with whom neither the issue
+nor the man is closely considered, that one, the President, on the
+contrary, is the elect of the nation, and the act of his election is
+the trump card, that, the sovereign people plays out once every four
+years. The elected National Assembly stands in a metaphysical, but the
+elected President in a personal, relation to the nation. True enough,
+the National Assembly presents in its several Representatives the
+various sides of the national spirit, but, in the President, this
+spirit is incarnated. As against the National Assembly, the President
+possesses a sort of divine right, he is by the grace of the people.
+
+Thetis, the sea-goddess, had prophesied to Achilles that he would die
+in the bloom of youth. The Constitution, which had its weak spot, like
+Achilles, had also, like Achilles, the presentiment that it would
+depart by premature death. It was enough for the pure republicans,
+engaged at the work of framing a constitution, to cast a glance from
+the misty heights of their ideal republic down upon the profane world
+in order to realize how the arrogance of the royalists, of the
+Bonapartists, of the democrats, of the Communists, rose daily, together
+with their own discredit, and in the same measure as they approached
+the completion of their legislative work of art, without Thetis having
+for this purpose to leave the sea and impart the secret to them. They
+ought to outwit fate by means of constitutional artifice, through
+Section 111 of the Constitution, according to which every motion to
+revise the Constitution had to be discussed three successive times
+between each of which a full month was to elapse and required at least
+a three-fourths majority, with the additional proviso that not less
+than 500 members of the National Assembly voted. They thereby only made
+the impotent attempt, still to exercise as a parliamentary minority, to
+which in their mind’s eye they prophetically saw themselves reduced, a
+power, that, at this very time, when they still disposed over the
+parliamentary majority and over all the machinery of government, was
+daily slipping from their weak hands.
+
+Finally, the Constitution entrusts itself for safe keeping, in a
+melodramatic paragraph, “to the watchfulness and patriotism of the
+whole French people, and of each individual Frenchman,” after having
+just before, in another paragraph entrusted the “watchful” and the
+“patriotic” themselves to the tender, inquisitorial attention of the
+High Court, instituted by itself.
+
+That was the Constitution of 1848, which on, the 2d of December, 1851,
+was not overthrown by one head, but tumbled down at the touch of a mere
+hat; though, true enough, that hat was a three-cornered Napoleon hat.
+
+While the bourgeois’ republicans were engaged in the Assembly with the
+work of splicing this Constitution, of discussing and voting,
+Cavaignac, on the outside, maintained the state of siege of Paris. The
+state of siege of Paris was the midwife of the constitutional assembly,
+during its republican pains of travail. When the Constitution is later
+on swept off the earth by the bayonet, it should not be forgotten that
+it was by the bayonet, likewise—and the bayonet turned against the
+people, at that—that it had to be protected in its mother’s womb, and
+that by the bayonet it had to be planted on earth. The ancestors of
+these “honest republicans” had caused their symbol, the tricolor, to
+make the tour of Europe. These, in their turn also made a discovery,
+which all of itself, found its way over the whole continent, but, with
+ever renewed love, came back to France, until, by this time, if had
+acquired the right of citizenship in one-half of her Departments—the
+state of siege. A wondrous discovery this was, periodically applied at
+each succeeding crisis in the course of the French revolution. But the
+barrack and the bivouac, thus periodically laid on the head of French
+society, to compress her brain and reduce her to quiet; the sabre and
+the musket, periodically made to perform the functions of judges and of
+administrators, of guardians and of censors, of police officers and of
+watchmen; the military moustache and the soldier’s jacket, periodically
+heralded as the highest wisdom and guiding stars of society;—were not
+all of these, the barrack and the bivouac, the sabre and the musket,
+the moustache and the soldier’s jacket bound, in the end, to hit upon
+the idea that they might as well save society once for all, by
+proclaiming their own regime as supreme, and relieve bourgeois society
+wholly of the care of ruling itself? The barrack and the bivouac, the
+sabre and the musket, the moustache and the soldier’s jacket were all
+the more bound to hit upon this idea, seeing that they could then also
+expect better cash payment for their increased deserts, while at the
+merely periodic states of siege and the transitory savings of society
+at the behest of this or that bourgeois faction, very little solid
+matter fell to them except some dead and wounded, besides some friendly
+bourgeois grimaces. Should not the military, finally, in and for its
+own interest, play the game of “state of siege,” and simultaneously
+besiege the bourgeois exchanges? Moreover, it must not be forgotten,
+and be it observed in passing, that Col. Bernard, the same President of
+the Military Committee, who, under Cavaignac, helped to deport 15,000
+insurgents without trial, moves at this period again at the head of the
+Military Committees now active in Paris.
+
+Although the honest, the pure republicans built with the state of siege
+the nursery in which the Praetorian guards of December 2, 1851, were to
+be reared, they, on the other hand, deserve praise in that, instead of
+exaggerating the feeling of patriotism, as under Louis Philippe, now;
+they themselves are in command of the national power, they crawl before
+foreign powers; instead of making Italy free, they allow her to be
+reconquered by Austrians and Neapolitans. The election of Louis
+Bonaparte for President on December 10, 1848, put an end to the
+dictatorship of Cavaignac and to the constitutional assembly.
+
+In Article 44 of the Constitution it is said “The President of the
+French Republic must never have lost his status as a French citizen.”
+The first President of the French Republic, L. N. Bonaparte, had not
+only lost his status as a French citizen, had not only been an English
+special constable, but was even a naturalized Swiss citizen.
+
+In the previous chapter I have explained the meaning of the election of
+December 10. I shall not here return to it. Suffice it here to say that
+it was a reaction of the farmers’ class, who had been expected to pay
+the costs of the February revolution, against the other classes of the
+nation: it was a reaction of the country against the city. It met with
+great favor among the soldiers, to whom the republicans of the
+“National” had brought neither fame nor funds; among the great
+bourgeoisie, who hailed Bonaparte as a bridge to the monarchy; and
+among the proletarians and small traders, who hailed him as a scourge
+to Cavaignac. I shall later have occasion to enter closer into the
+relation of the farmers to the French revolution.
+
+The epoch between December 20, 1848, and the dissolution of the
+constitutional assembly in May, 1849, embraces the history of the
+downfall of the bourgeois republicans. After they had founded a
+republic for the bourgeoisie, had driven the revolutionary proletariat
+from the field and had meanwhile silenced the democratic middle class,
+they are themselves shoved aside by the mass of the bourgeoisie who
+justly appropriate this republic as their property. This bourgeois mass
+was Royalist, however. A part thereof, the large landed proprietors,
+had ruled under the restoration, hence, was Legitimist; the other part,
+the aristocrats of finance and the large industrial capitalists, had
+ruled under the July monarchy, hence, was Orleanist. The high
+functionaries of the Army, of the University, of the Church, in the
+civil service, of the Academy and of the press, divided themselves on
+both sides, although in unequal parts. Here, in the bourgeois republic,
+that bore neither the name of Bourbon, nor of Orleans, but the name of
+Capital, they had found the form of government under which they could
+all rule in common. Already the June insurrection had united them all
+into a “Party of Order.” The next thing to do was to remove the
+bourgeois republicans who still held the seats in the National
+Assembly. As brutally as these pure republicans had abused their own
+physical power against the people, so cowardly, low-spirited,
+disheartened, broken, powerless did they yield, now when the issue was
+the maintenance of their own republicanism and their own legislative
+rights against the Executive power and the royalists I need not here
+narrate the shameful history of their dissolution. It was not a
+downfall, it was extinction. Their history is at an end for all time.
+In the period that follows, they figure, whether within or without the
+Assembly, only as memories—memories that seem again to come to life so
+soon as the question is again only the word “Republic,” and as often as
+the revolutionary conflict threatens to sink down to the lowest level.
+In passing, I might observe that the journal which gave to this party
+its name, the “National,” goes over to Socialism during the following
+period.
+
+Before we close this period, we must look back upon the two powers, one
+of destroys the other on December 2, 1851, while, from December 20,
+1848, down to the departure of the constitutional assembly, they live
+marital relations. We mean Louis Bonaparte, on the-one hand, on the
+other, the party of the allied royalists; of Order, and of the large
+bourgeoisie.
+
+At the inauguration of his presidency, Bonaparte forthwith framed a
+ministry out of the party of Order, at whose head he placed Odillon
+Barrot, be it noted, the old leader of the liberal wing of the
+parliamentary bourgeoisie. Mr. Barrot had finally hunted down a seat in
+the ministry, the spook of which had been pursuing him since 1830; and
+what is more, he had the chairmanship in this ministry, although not,
+as he had imagined under Louis Philippe, the promoted leader of the
+parliamentary opposition, but with the commission to kill a parliament,
+and, moreover, as an ally of all his arch enemies, the Jesuits and the
+Legitimists. Finally he leads the bride home, but only after she has
+been prostituted. As to Bonaparte, he seemed to eclipse himself
+completely. The party of Order acted for him.
+
+Immediately at the first session of the ministry the expedition to Rome
+was decided upon, which it was there agreed, was to be carried out
+behind I the back of the National Assembly, and the funds for which, it
+was equally agreed, were to be wrung from the Assembly under false
+pretences. Thus the start was made with a swindle on the National
+Assembly, together with a secret conspiracy with the absolute foreign
+powers against the revolutionary Roman republic. In the same way, and
+with a similar maneuver, did Bonaparte prepare his stroke of December 2
+against the royalist legislature and its constitutional republic. Let
+it not be forgotten that the same party, which, on December 20, 1848,
+constituted Bonaparte’s ministry, constituted also, on December 2,
+1851, the majority of the legislative National Assembly.
+
+In August the constitutive assembly decided not to dissolve until it
+had prepared and promulgated a whole series of organic laws, intended
+to supplement the Constitution. The party of Order proposed to the
+assembly, through Representative Rateau, on January 6, 1849, to let the
+Organic laws go, and rather to order its own dissolution. Not the
+ministry alone, with Mr. Odillon Barrot at its head, but all the
+royalist members of the National Assembly were also at this time
+hectoring to it that its dissolution was necessary for the restoration
+of the public credit, for the consolidation of order, to put an end to
+the existing uncertain and provisional, and establish a definite state
+of things; they claimed that its continued existence hindered the
+effectiveness of the new Government, that it sought to prolong its life
+out of pure malice, and that the country was tired of it. Bonaparte
+took notice of all these invectives hurled at the legislative power, he
+learned them by heart, and, on December 21, 1851, he showed the
+parliamentary royalists that he had learned from them. He repeated
+their own slogans against themselves.
+
+The Barrot ministry and the party of Order went further. They called
+all over France for petitions to the National Assembly in which that
+body was politely requested to disappear. Thus they led the people’s
+unorganic masses to the fray against the National Assembly, i.e., the
+constitutionally organized expression of people itself. They taught
+Bonaparte, to appeal from the parliamentary body to the people.
+Finally, on January 29, 1849, the day arrived when the constitutional
+assembly was to decide about its own dissolution. On that day the body
+found its building occupied by the military; Changarnier, the General
+of the party of Order, in whose hands was joined the supreme command of
+both the National Guards and the regulars, held that day a great
+military review, as though a battle were imminent; and the coalized
+royalists declared threateningly to the constitutional assembly that
+force would be applied if it did not act willingly. It was willing, and
+chaffered only for a very short respite. What else was the 29th of
+January, 1849, than the “coup d’etat” of December 2, 1851, only
+executed by the royalists with Napoleon’s aid against the republican
+National Assembly? These gentlemen did not notice, or did not want to
+notice, that Napoleon utilized the 29th of January, 1849, to cause a
+part of the troops to file before him in front of the Tuileries, and
+that he seized with avidity this very first open exercise of the
+military against the parliamentary power in order to hint at Caligula.
+The allied royalists saw only their own Changarnier.
+
+Another reason that particularly moved the party of Order forcibly to
+shorten the term of the constitutional assembly were the organic laws,
+the laws that were to supplement the Constitution, as, for instance,
+the laws on education, on religion, etc. The allied royalists had every
+interest in framing these laws themselves, and not allowing them to be
+framed by the already suspicious republicans. Among these organic laws,
+there was, however, one on the responsibility of the President of the
+republic. In 1851 the Legislature was just engaged in framing such a
+law when Bonaparte forestalled that political stroke by his own of
+December 2. What all would not the coalized royalists have given in
+their winter parliamentary campaign of 1851, had they but found this
+“Responsibility law” ready made, and framed at that, by the suspicious,
+the vicious republican Assembly!
+
+After, on January 29, 1849, the constitutive assembly had itself broken
+its last weapon, the Barrot ministry and the “Friends of Order”
+harassed it to death, left nothing undone to humiliate it, and wrung
+from its weakness, despairing of itself, laws that cost it the last
+vestige of respect with the public. Bonaparte, occupied with his own
+fixed Napoleonic idea, was audacious enough openly to exploit this
+degradation of the parliamentary power: When the National Assembly, on
+May 8, 1849, passed a vote of censure upon the Ministry on account of
+the occupation of Civita-Vecchia by Oudinot, and ordered that the Roman
+expedition be brought back to its alleged purpose, Bonaparte published
+that same evening in the “Moniteur” a letter to Oudinot, in which he
+congratulated him on his heroic feats, and already, in contrast with
+the quill-pushing parliamentarians, posed as the generous protector of
+the Army. The royalists smiled at this. They took him simply for their
+dupe. Finally, as Marrast, the President of the constitutional
+assembly, believed on a certain occasion the safety of the body to be
+in danger, and, resting on the Constitution, made a requisition upon a
+Colonel, together with his regiment, the Colonel refused obedience,
+took refuge behind the “discipline,” and referred Marrast to
+Changarnier, who scornfully sent him off with the remark that he did
+not like “bayonettes intelligentes.” [#1 Intelligent bayonets] In
+November, 1851, as the coalized royalists wanted to begin the decisive
+struggle with Bonaparte, they sought, by means of their notorious
+“Questors Bill,” to enforce the principle of the right of the President
+of the National Assembly to issue direct requisitions for troops. One
+of their Generals, Leflo, supported the motion. In vain did Changarnier
+vote for it, or did Thiers render homage to the cautious wisdom of the
+late constitutional assembly. The Minister of War, St. Arnaud, answered
+him as Changarnier had answered Marrast—and he did so amidst the
+plaudits of the Mountain.
+
+Thus did the party of Order itself, when as yet it was not the National
+Assembly, when as yet it was only a Ministry, brand the parliamentary
+regime. And yet this party objects vociferously when the 2d of
+December, 1851, banishes that regime from France!
+
+We wish it a happy journey.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+
+On May 29, 1849, the legislative National Assembly convened. On
+December 2, 1851, it was broken up. This period embraces the term of
+the Constitutional or Parliamentary public.
+
+In the first French revolution, upon the reign of the
+Constitutionalists succeeds that of the Girondins; and upon the reign
+of the Girondins follows that of the Jacobins. Each of these parties in
+succession rests upon its more advanced element. So soon as it has
+carried the revolution far enough not to be able to keep pace with,
+much less march ahead of it, it is shoved aside by its more daring
+allies, who stand behind it, and it is sent to the guillotine. Thus the
+revolution moves along an upward line.
+
+Just the reverse in 1848. The proletarian party appears as an appendage
+to the small traders’ or democratic party; it is betrayed by the latter
+and allowed to fall on April 16, May 15, and in the June days. In its
+turn, the democratic party leans upon the shoulders of the bourgeois
+republicans; barely do the bourgeois republicans believe themselves
+firmly in power, than they shake off these troublesome associates for
+the purpose of themselves leaning upon the shoulders of the party of
+Order. The party of Order draws in its shoulders, lets the bourgeois
+republicans tumble down heels over head, and throws itself upon the
+shoulders of the armed power. Finally, still of the mind that it is
+sustained by the shoulders of the armed power, the party of Order
+notices one fine morning that these shoulders have turned into
+bayonets. Each party kicks backward at those that are pushing forward,
+and leans forward upon those that are crowding backward; no wonder
+that, in this ludicrous posture, each loses its balance, and, after
+having cut the unavoidable grimaces, breaks down amid singular
+somersaults. Accordingly, the revolution moves along a downward line.
+It finds itself in this retreating motion before the last
+February-barricade is cleared away, and the first governmental
+authority of the revolution has been constituted.
+
+The period we now have before us embraces the motliest jumble of crying
+contradictions: constitutionalists, who openly conspire against the
+Constitution; revolutionists, who admittedly are constitutional; a
+National Assembly that wishes to be omnipotent yet remains
+parliamentary; a Mountain, that finds its occupation in submission,
+that parries its present defeats with prophecies of future victories;
+royalists, who constitute the “patres conscripti” of the republic, and
+are compelled by the situation to uphold abroad the hostile monarchic
+houses, whose adherents they are, while in France they support the
+republic that they hate; an Executive power that finds its strength in
+its very weakness, and its dignity in the contempt that it inspires; a
+republic, that is nothing else than the combined infamy of two
+monarchies—the Restoration and the July Monarchy—with an imperial
+label; unions, whose first clause is disunion; struggles, whose first
+law is in-decision; in the name of peace, barren and hollow agitation;
+in the name of the revolution, solemn sermonizings on peace; passions
+without truth; truths without passion; heroes without heroism; history
+without events; development, whose only moving force seems to be the
+calendar, and tiresome by the constant reiteration of the same tensions
+and relaxes; contrasts, that seem to intensify themselves periodically,
+only in order to wear themselves off and collapse without a solution;
+pretentious efforts made for show, and bourgeois frights at the danger
+of the destruction of the world, simultaneous with the carrying on of
+the pettiest intrigues and the performance of court comedies by the
+world’s saviours, who, in their “laisser aller,” recall the Day of
+Judgment not so much as the days of the Fronde; the official collective
+genius of France brought to shame by the artful stupidity of a single
+individual; the collective will of the nation, as often as it speaks
+through the general suffrage, seeking its true expression in the
+prescriptive enemies of the public interests until it finally finds it
+in the arbitrary will of a filibuster. If ever a slice from history is
+drawn black upon black, it is this. Men and events appear as reversed
+“Schlemihls,” [#1 The hero In Chamisso’s “Peter Schiemihi,” who loses
+his own shadow.] as shadows, the bodies of which have been lost. The
+revolution itself paralyzes its own apostles, and equips only its
+adversaries with passionate violence. When the “Red Spectre,”
+constantly conjured up and exorcised by the counter-revolutionists
+finally does appear, it does not appear with the Anarchist Phrygian cap
+on its head, but in the uniform of Order, in the Red Breeches of the
+French Soldier.
+
+We saw that the Ministry, which Bonaparte installed on December 20,
+1849, the day of his “Ascension,” was a ministry of the party of Order,
+of the Legitimist and Orleanist coalition. The Barrot-Falloux ministry
+had weathered the republican constitutive convention, whose term of
+life it had shortened with more or less violence, and found itself
+still at the helm. Changamier, the General of the allied royalists
+continued to unite in his person the command-in-chief of the First
+Military Division and of the Parisian National Guard. Finally, the
+general elections had secured the large majority in the National
+Assembly to the party of Order. Here the Deputies and Peers of Louis
+Phillipe met a saintly crowd of Legitimists, for whose benefit numerous
+ballots of the nation had been converted into admission tickets to the
+political stage. The Bonapartist representatives were too thinly sowed
+to be able to build an independent parliamentary party. They appeared
+only as “mauvaise queue” [#2 Practical joke] played upon the party of
+Order. Thus the party of Order was in possession of the Government, of
+the Army, and of the legislative body, in short, of the total power of
+the State, morally strengthened by the general elections, that caused
+their sovereignty to appear as the will of the people, and by the
+simultaneous victory of the counter-revolution on the whole continent
+of Europe.
+
+Never did party open its campaign with larger means at its disposal and
+under more favorable auspices.
+
+The shipwrecked pure republicans found themselves in the legislative
+National Assembly melted down to a clique of fifty men, with the
+African Generals Cavaignac, Lamorciere and Bedeau at its head. The
+great Opposition party was, however, formed by the Mountain. This
+parliamentary baptismal name was given to itself by the Social
+Democratic party. It disposed of more than two hundred votes out of the
+seven hundred and fifty in the National Assembly, and, hence, was at
+least just as powerful as any one of the three factions of the party of
+Order. Its relative minority to the total royalist coalition seemed
+counterbalanced by special circumstances. Not only did the Departmental
+election returns show that it had gained a considerable following among
+the rural population, but, furthermore, it numbered almost all the
+Paris Deputies in its camp; the Army had, by the election of three
+under-officers, made a confession of democratic faith; and the leader
+of the Mountain, Ledru-Rollin had in contrast to all the
+representatives of the party of Order, been raised to the rank of the
+“parliamentary nobility” by five Departments, who combined their
+suffrages upon him. Accordingly, in view of the inevitable collisions
+of the royalists among themselves, on the one hand, and of the whole
+party of Order with Bonaparte, on the other, the Mountain seemed on May
+29,1849, to have before it all the elements of success. A fortnight
+later, it had lost everything, its honor included.
+
+Before we follow this parliamentary history any further, a few
+observations are necessary, in order to avoid certain common deceptions
+concerning the whole character of the epoch that lies before us.
+According to the view of the democrats, the issue, during the period of
+the legislative National Assembly, was, the same as during the period
+of the constitutive assembly, simply the struggle between republicans
+and royalists; the movement itself was summed up by them in the
+catch-word Reaction—night, in which all cats are grey, and allows them
+to drawl out their drowsy commonplaces. Indeed, at first sight, the
+party of Order presents the appearance of a tangle of royalist
+factions, that, not only intrigue against each other, each aiming to
+raise its own Pretender to the throne, and exclude the Pretender of the
+Opposite party, but also are all united in a common hatred for and
+common attacks against the “Republic.” On its side, the Mountain
+appears, in counter-distinction to the royalist conspiracy, as the
+representative of the “Republic.” The party of Order seems constantly
+engaged in a “Reaction,” which, neither more nor less than in Prussia,
+is directed against the press, the right of association and the like,
+and is enforced by brutal police interventions on the part of the
+bureaucracy, the police and the public prosecutor—just as in Prussia;
+the Mountain on the contrary, is engaged with equal assiduity in
+parrying these attacks, and thus in defending the “eternal rights of
+man”—as every so-called people’s party has more or less done for the
+last hundred and fifty years. At a closer inspection, however, of the
+situation and of the parties, this superficial appearance, which veils
+the Class Struggle, together with the peculiar physiognomy of this
+period, vanishes wholly.
+
+Legitimists and Orleanists constituted, as said before, the two large
+factions of the party of Order. What held these two factions to their
+respective Pretenders, and inversely kept them apart from each other,
+what else was it but the lily and the tricolor, the House of Bourbon
+and the house of Orleans, different shades of royalty? Under the
+Bourbons, Large Landed Property ruled together with its parsons and
+lackeys; under the Orleanist, it was the high finance, large industry,
+large commerce, i.e., Capital, with its retinue of lawyers, professors
+and orators. The Legitimate kingdom was but the political expression
+for the hereditary rule of the landlords, as the July monarchy was bur
+the political expression for the usurped rule of the bourgeois
+upstarts. What, accordingly, kept these two factions apart was no
+so-called set of principles, it was their material conditions for
+life—two different sorts of property—; it was the old antagonism of the
+City and the Country, the rivalry between Capital and Landed property.
+That simultaneously old recollections; personal animosities, fears and
+hopes; prejudices and illusions; sympathies and antipathies;
+convictions, faith and principles bound these factions to one House or
+the other, who denies it? Upon the several forms of property, upon the
+social conditions of existence, a whole superstructure is reared of
+various and peculiarly shaped feelings, illusions, habits of thought
+and conceptions of life. The whole class produces and shapes these out
+of its material foundation and out of the corresponding social
+conditions. The individual unit to whom they flow through tradition and
+education, may fancy that they constitute the true reasons for and
+premises of his conduct. Although Orleanists and Legitimists, each of
+these factions, sought to make itself and the other believe that what
+kept the two apart was the attachment of each to its respective royal
+House; nevertheless, facts proved later that it rather was their
+divided interest that forbade the union of the two royal Houses. As, in
+private life, the distinction is made between what a man thinks of
+himself and says, and that which he really is and does, so, all the
+more, must the phrases and notions of parties in historic struggles be
+distinguished from the real organism, and their real interests, their
+notions and their reality. Orleanists and Legitimists found themselves
+in the republic beside each other with equal claims. Each side wishing,
+in opposition to the other, to carry out the restoration of its own
+royal House, meant nothing else than that each of the two great
+Interests into which the bourgeoisie is divided—Land and Capital—sought
+to restore its own supremacy and the subordinacy of the other. We speak
+of two bourgeois interests because large landed property, despite its
+feudal coquetry and pride of race, has become completely bourgeois
+through the development of modern society. Thus did the Tories of
+England long fancy that they were enthusiastic for the Kingdom, the
+Church and the beauties of the old English Constitution, until the day
+of danger wrung from them the admission that their enthusiasm was only
+for Ground Rent.
+
+The coalized royalists carried on their intrigues against each other in
+the press, in Ems, in Clarmont—outside of the parliament. Behind the
+scenes, they don again their old Orleanist and Legitimist liveries, and
+conduct their old tourneys; on the public stage, however, in their
+public acts, as a great parliamentary party, they dispose of their
+respective royal houses with mere courtesies, adjourn “in infinitum”
+the restoration of the monarchy. Their real business is transacted as
+Party of Order, i. e., under a Social, not a Political title; as
+representatives of the bourgeois social system; not as knights of
+traveling princesses, but as the bourgeois class against the other
+classes; not as royalists against republicans. Indeed, as party of
+Order they exercised a more unlimited and harder dominion over the
+other classes of society than ever before either under the restoration
+or the July monarchy-a thing possible only under the form of a
+parliamentary republic, because under this form alone could the two
+large divisions of the French bourgeoisie be united; in other words,
+only under this form could they place on the order of business the
+sovereignty of their class, in lieu of the regime of a privileged
+faction of the same. If, this notwithstanding, they are seen as the
+party of Order to insult the republic and express their antipathy for
+it, it happened not out of royalist traditions only: Instinct taught
+them that while, indeed, the republic completes their authority, it at
+the same time undermined their social foundation, in that, without
+intermediary, without the mask of the crown, without being able to turn
+aside the national interest by means of its subordinate struggles among
+its own conflicting elements and with the crown, the republic is
+compelled to stand up sharp against the subjugated classes, and wrestle
+with them. It was a sense of weakness that caused them to recoil before
+the unqualified demands of their own class rule, and to retreat to the
+less complete, less developed, and, for that very reason, less
+dangerous forms of the same. As often, on the contrary, as the allied
+royalists come into conflict with the Pretender who stands before
+them—with Bonaparte—, as often as they believe their parliamentary
+omnipotence to be endangered by the Executive, in other words, as often
+as they must trot out the political title of their authority, they step
+up as Republicans, not as Royalists—and this is done from the Orleanist
+Thiers, who warns the National Assembly that the republic divides them
+least, down to Legitimist Berryer, who, on December 2, 1851, the scarf
+of the tricolor around him, harangues the people assembled before the
+Mayor’s building of the Tenth Arrondissement, as a tribune in the name
+of the Republic; the echo, however, derisively answering back to him:
+“Henry V.! Henry V!” [#3 The candidate of the Bourbons, or Legitimists,
+for the throne.]
+
+However, against the allied bourgeois, a coalition was made between the
+small traders and the workingmen—the so-called Social Democratic party.
+The small traders found themselves ill rewarded after the June days of
+1848; they saw their material interests endangered, and the democratic
+guarantees, that were to uphold their interests, made doubtful. Hence,
+they drew closer to the workingmen. On the other hand, their
+parliamentary representatives—the Mountain—, after being shoved aside
+during the dictatorship of the bourgeois republicans, had, during the
+last half of the term of the constitutive convention, regained their
+lost popularity through the struggle with Bonaparte and the royalist
+ministers. They had made an alliance with the Socialist leaders. During
+February, 1849, reconciliation banquets were held. A common program was
+drafted, joint election committees were empanelled, and fusion
+candidates were set up. The revolutionary point was thereby broken off
+from the social demands of the proletariat and a democratic turn given
+to them; while, from the democratic claims of the small traders’ class,
+the mere political form was rubbed off and the Socialist point was
+pushed forward. Thus came the Social Democracy about. The new Mountain,
+the result of this combination, contained, with the exception of some
+figures from the working class and some Socialist sectarians, the
+identical elements of the old Mountain, only numerically stronger. In
+the course of events it had, however, changed, together with the class
+that it represented. The peculiar character of the Social Democracy is
+summed up in this that democratic-republican institutions are demanded
+as the means, not to remove the two extremes—Capital and Wage-slavery—,
+but in order to weaken their antagonism and transform them into a
+harmonious whole. However different the methods may be that are
+proposed for the accomplishment of this object, however much the object
+itself may be festooned with more or less revolutionary fancies, the
+substance remains the same. This substance is the transformation of
+society upon democratic lines, but a transformation within the
+boundaries of the small traders’ class. No one must run away with the
+narrow notion that the small traders’ class means on principle to
+enforce a selfish class interest. It believes rather that the special
+conditions for its own emancipation are the general conditions under
+which alone modern society can be saved and the class struggle avoided.
+Likewise must we avoid running away with the notion that the Democratic
+Representatives are all “shopkeepers,” or enthuse for these. They
+may—by education and individual standing—be as distant from them as
+heaven is from earth. That which makes them representatives of the
+small traders’ class is that they do not intellectually leap the bounds
+which that class itself does not leap in practical life; that,
+consequently, they are theoretically driven to the same problems and
+solutions, to which material interests and social standing practically
+drive the latter. Such, in fact, is at all times the relation of the
+“political” and the “literary” representatives of a class to the class
+they represent.
+
+After the foregoing explanations, it goes with-out saying that, while
+the Mountain is constantly wrestling for the republic and the so-called
+“rights of man,” neither the republic nor the “rights of man” is its
+real goal, as little as an army, whose weapons it is sought to deprive
+it of and that defends itself, steps on the field of battle simply in
+order to remain in possession of implements of warfare.
+
+The party of Order provoked the Mountain immediately upon the convening
+of the assembly. The bourgeoisie now felt the necessity of disposing of
+the democratic small traders’ class, just as a year before it had
+understood the necessity of putting an end to the revolutionary
+proletariat.
+
+But the position of the foe had changed. The strength of the
+proletarian party was on the streets; that of the small traders’ class
+was in the National Assembly itself. The point was, accordingly, to
+wheedle them out of the National Assembly into the street, and to have
+them break their parliamentary power themselves, before time and
+opportunity could consolidate them. The Mountain jumped with loose
+reins into the trap.
+
+The bombardment of Rome by the French troops was the bait thrown at the
+Mountain. It violated Article V. of the Constitution, which forbade the
+French republic to use its forces against the liberties of other
+nations; besides, Article IV. forbade all declaration of war by the
+Executive without the consent of the National Assembly; furthermore,
+the constitutive assembly had censured the Roman expedition by its
+resolution of May 8. Upon these grounds, Ledru-Rollin submitted on June
+11, 1849, a motion impeaching Bonaparte and his Ministers. Instigated
+by the wasp-stings of Thiers, he even allowed himself to be carried
+away to the point of threatening to defend the Constitution by all
+means, even arms in hand. The Mountain rose as one man, and repeated
+the challenge. On June 12, the National Assembly rejected the notion to
+impeach, and the Mountain left the parliament. The events of June 13
+are known: the proclamation by a part of the Mountain pronouncing
+Napoleon and his Ministers “outside the pale of the Constitution”; the
+street parades of the democratic National Guards, who, unarmed as they
+were, flew apart at contact with the troops of Changarnier; etc., etc.
+Part of the Mountain fled abroad, another part was assigned to the High
+Court of Bourges, and a parliamentary regulation placed the rest under
+the school-master supervision of the President of the National
+Assembly. Paris was again put under a state of siege; and the
+democratic portion of the National Guards was disbanded. Thus the
+influence of the Mountain in parliament was broken, together with the
+power; of the small traders’ class in Paris.
+
+Lyons, where the 13th of June had given the signal to a bloody labor
+uprising, was, together with the five surrounding Departments, likewise
+pronounced in state of siege, a condition that continues down to this
+moment. [#4 January, 1852]
+
+The bulk of the Mountain had left its vanguard in the lurch by refusing
+their signatures to the proclamation; the press had deserted: only two
+papers dared to publish the pronunciamento; the small traders had
+betrayed their Representatives: the National Guards stayed away, or,
+where they did turn up, hindered the raising of barricades; the
+Representatives had duped the small traders: nowhere were the alleged
+affiliated members from the Army to be seen; finally, instead of
+gathering strength from them, the democratic party had infected the
+proletariat with its own weakness, and, as usual with democratic feats,
+the leaders had the satisfaction of charging “their people” with
+desertion, and the people had the satisfaction of charging their
+leaders with fraud.
+
+Seldom was an act announced with greater noise than the campaign
+contemplated by the Mountain; seldom was an event trumpeted ahead with
+more certainty and longer beforehand than the “inevitable victory of
+the democracy.” This is evident: the democrats believe in the trombones
+before whose blasts the walls of Jericho fall together; as often as
+they stand before the walls of despotism, they seek to imitate the
+miracle. If the Mountain wished to win in parliament, it should not
+appeal to arms; if it called to arms in parliament, it should not
+conduct itself parliamentarily on the street; if the friendly
+demonstration was meant seriously, it was silly not to foresee that it
+would meet with a warlike reception; if it was intended for actual war,
+it was rather original to lay aside the weapons with which war had to
+be conducted. But the revolutionary threats of the middle class and of
+their democratic representatives are mere attempts to frighten an
+adversary; when they have run themselves into a blind alley, when they
+have sufficiently compromised themselves and are compelled to execute
+their threats, the thing is done in a hesitating manner that avoids
+nothing so much as the means to the end, and catches at pretexts to
+succumb. The bray of the overture, that announces the fray, is lost in
+a timid growl so soon as this is to start; the actors cease to take
+themselves seriously, and the performance falls flat like an inflated
+balloon that is pricked with a needle.
+
+No party exaggerates to itself the means at its disposal more than the
+democratic, none deceives itself with greater heedlessness on the
+situation. A part of the Army voted for it, thereupon the Mountain is
+of the opinion that the Army would revolt in its favor. And by what
+occasion? By an occasion, that, from the standpoint of the troops,
+meant nothing else than that the revolutionary soldiers should take the
+part of the soldiers of Rome against French soldiers. On the other
+hand, the memory of June, 1848, was still too fresh not to keep alive a
+deep aversion on the part of the proletariat towards the National
+Guard, and a strong feeling of mistrust on the part of the leaders of
+the secret societies for the democratic leaders. In order to balance
+these differences, great common interests at stake were needed. The
+violation of an abstract constitutional paragraph could not supply such
+interests. Had not the constitution been repeatedly violated, according
+to the assurances of the democrats themselves? Had not the most popular
+papers branded them as a counter-revolutionary artifice? But the
+democrat—by reason of his representing the middle class, that is to
+say, a Transition Class, in which the interests of two other classes
+are mutually dulled—, imagines himself above all class contrast. The
+democrats grant that opposed to them stands a privileged class, but
+they, together with the whole remaining mass of the nation, constitute
+the “PEOPLE.” What they represent is the “people’s rights”; their
+interests are the “people’s interests.” Hence, they do not consider
+that, at an impending struggle, they need to examine the interests and
+attitude of the different classes. They need not too seriously weigh
+their own means. All they have to do is to give the signal in order to
+have the “people” fall upon the “oppressors” with all its inexhaustible
+resources. If, thereupon, in the execution, their interests turn out to
+be uninteresting, and their power to be impotence, it is ascribed
+either to depraved sophists, who split up the “undivisible people” into
+several hostile camps; or to the army being too far brutalized and
+blinded to appreciate the pure aims of the democracy as its own best;
+or to some detail in the execution that wrecks the whole plan; or,
+finally, to an unforeseen accident that spoiled the game this time. At
+all events, the democrat comes out of the disgraceful defeat as
+immaculate as he went innocently into it, and with the refreshed
+conviction that he must win; not that he himself and his party must
+give up their old standpoint, but that, on the contrary, conditions
+must come to his aid.
+
+For all this, one must not picture to himself the decimated, broken,
+and, by the new parliamentary regulation, humbled Mountain altogether
+too unhappy. If June 13 removed its leaders, it, on the other hand,
+made room for new ones of inferior capacity, who are flattered by their
+new position. If their impotence in parliament could no longer be
+doubted, they were now justified to limit their activity to outbursts
+of moral indignation. If the party of Order pretended to see in them,
+as the last official representatives of the revolution, all the horrors
+of anarchy incarnated, they were free to appear all the more flat and
+modest in reality. Over June 13 they consoled themselves with the
+profound expression: “If they but dare to assail universal suffrage . .
+. then . . . then we will show who we are!” Nous verrons. [#5 We shall
+see.]
+
+As to the “Mountaineers,” who had fled abroad, it suffices here to say
+that Ledru-Rollin—he having accomplished the feat of hopelessly
+ruining, in barely a fortnight, the powerful party at whose head he
+stood—, found himself called upon to build up a French government “in
+partibus;” that his figure, at a distance, removed from the field of
+action, seemed to gain in size in the measure that the level of the
+revolution sank and the official prominences of official France became
+more and more dwarfish; that he could figure as republican Pretender
+for 1852, and periodically issued to the Wallachians and other peoples
+circulars in which “despot of the continent” is threatened with the
+feats that he and his allies had in contemplation. Was Proudhon wholly
+wrong when he cried out to these gentlemen: “Vous n’êtes que des
+blaqueurs”? [#6 You are nothing but fakirs.]
+
+The party of Order had, on June 13, not only broken up the Mountain, it
+had also established the Subordination of the Constitution to the
+Majority Decisions of the National Assembly. So, indeed, did the
+republic understand it, to—wit, that the bourgeois ruled here in
+parliamentary form, without, as in the monarchy, finding a check in the
+veto of the Executive power, or the liability of parliament to
+dissolution. It was a “parliamentary republic,” as Thiers styled it.
+But if, on June 13, the bourgeoisie secured its omnipotence within the
+parliament building, did it not also strike the parliament itself, as
+against the Executive and the people, with incurable weakness by
+excluding its most popular part? By giving up numerous Deputies,
+without further ceremony to the mercies of the public prosecutor, it
+abolished its own parliamentary inviolability. The humiliating
+regulation, that it subjected the Mountain to, raised the President of
+the republic in the same measure that it lowered the individual
+Representatives of the people. By branding an insurrection in defense
+of the Constitution as anarchy, and as a deed looking to the overthrow
+of society, it interdicted to itself all appeal to insurrection
+whenever the Executive should violate the Constitution against it. And,
+indeed, the irony of history wills it that the very General, who by
+order of Bonaparte bombarded Rome, and thus gave the immediate occasion
+to the constitutional riot of June 13, that Oudinot, on December 22,
+1851, is the one imploringly and vainly to be offered to the people by
+the party of Order as the General of the Constitution. Another hero of
+June 13, Vieyra, who earned praise from the tribune of the National
+Assembly for the brutalities that he had committed in the democratic
+newspaper offices at the head of a gang of National Guards in the hire
+of the high finance—this identical Vieyra was initiated in the
+conspiracy of Bonaparte, and contributed materially in cutting off all
+protection that could come to the National Assembly, in the hour of its
+agony, from the side of the National Guard.
+
+June 13 had still another meaning. The Mountain had wanted to place
+Bonaparte under charges. Their defeat was, accordingly, a direct
+victory of Bonaparte; it was his personal triumph over his democratic
+enemies. The party of Order fought for the victory, Bonaparte needed
+only to pocket it. He did so. On June 14, a proclamation was to be read
+on the walls of Paris wherein the President, as it were, without his
+connivance, against his will, driven by the mere force of
+circumstances, steps forward from his cloisterly seclusion like
+misjudged virtue, complains of the calumnies of his antagonists, and,
+while seeming to identify his own person with the cause of order,
+rather identifies the cause of order with his own person. Besides this,
+the National Assembly had subsequently approved the expedition against
+Rome; Bonaparte, however, had taken the initiative in the affair. After
+he had led the High Priest Samuel back into the Vatican, he could hope
+as King David to occupy the Tuileries. He had won the parson-interests
+over to himself.
+
+The riot of June 13 limited itself, as we have seen, to a peaceful
+street procession. There were, consequently, no laurels to be won from
+it. Nevertheless, in these days, poor in heroes and events, the party
+of Order converted this bloodless battle into a second Austerlitz.
+Tribune and press lauded the army as the power of order against the
+popular multitude, and the impotence of anarchy; and Changarnier as the
+“bulwark of society”—a mystification that he finally believed in
+himself. Underhand, however, the corps that seemed doubtful were
+removed from Paris; the regiments whose suffrage had turned out most
+democratic were banished from France to Algiers the restless heads
+among the troops were consigned to penal quarters; finally, the
+shutting out of the press from the barracks, and of the barracks from
+contact with the citizens was systematically carried out.
+
+We stand here at the critical turning point in the history of the
+French National Guard. In 1830, it had decided the downfall of the
+restoration. Under Louis Philippe, every riot failed, at which the
+National Guard stood on the side of the troops. When, in the February
+days of 1848, it showed itself passive against the uprising and
+doubtful toward Louis Philippe himself, he gave himself up for lost.
+Thus the conviction cast root that a revolution could not win without,
+nor the Army against the National Guard. This was the superstitious
+faith of the Army in bourgeois omnipotence. The June days of 1548, when
+the whole National Guard, jointly with the regular troops, threw down
+the insurrection, had confirmed the superstition. After the
+inauguration of Bonaparte’s administration, the position of the
+National Guard sank somewhat through the unconstitutional joining of
+their command with the command of the First Military Division in the
+person of Changarnier.
+
+As the command of the National Guard appeared here merely an attribute
+of the military commander-in-chief, so did the Guard itself appear only
+as an appendage of the regular troops. Finally, on June 13, the
+National Guard was broken up, not through its partial dissolution only,
+that from that date forward was periodically repeated at all points of
+France, leaving only wrecks of its former self behind. The
+demonstration of June 13 was, above all, a demonstration of the
+National Guards. True, they had not carried their arms, but they had
+carried their uniforms against the Army—and the talisman lay just in
+these uniforms. The Army then learned that this uniform was but a
+woolen rag, like any other. The spell was broken. In the June days of
+1848, bourgeoisie and small traders were united as National Guard with
+the Army against the proletariat; on June 13, 1849, the bourgeoisie had
+the small traders’ National Guard broken up; on December 2, 1851, the
+National Guard of the bourgeoisie itself vanished, and Bonaparte
+attested the fact when he subsequently signed the decree for its
+disbandment. Thus the bourgeoisie had itself broken its last weapon
+against the army, from the moment when the small traders’ class no
+longer stood as a vassal behind, but as a rebel before it; indeed, it
+was bound to do so, as it was bound to destroy with its own hand all
+its means of defence against absolutism, so soon as itself was
+absolute.
+
+In the meantime, the party of Order celebrated the recovery of a power
+that seemed lost in 1848 only in order that, freed from its trammels in
+1849, it be found again through invectives against the republic and the
+Constitution; through the malediction of all future, present and past
+revolutions, that one included which its own leaders had made; and,
+finally, in laws by which the press was gagged, the right of
+association destroyed, and the stage of siege regulated as an organic
+institution. The National Assembly then adjourned from the middle of
+August to the middle of October, after it had appointed a Permanent
+Committee for the period of its absence. During these vacations, the
+Legitimists intrigued with Ems; the Orleanists with Claremont;
+Bonaparte through princely excursions; the Departmental Councilmen in
+conferences over the revision of the Constitution;—occurrences, all of
+which recurred regularly at the periodical vacations of the National
+Assembly, and upon which I shall not enter until they have matured into
+events. Be it here only observed that the National Assembly was
+impolitic in vanishing from the stage for long intervals, and leaving
+in view, at the head of the republic, only one, however sorry,
+figure—Louis Bonaparte’s—, while, to the public scandal, the party of
+Order broke up into its own royalist component parts, that pursued
+their conflicting aspirations after the restoration. As often as,
+during these vacations the confusing noise of the parliament was
+hushed, and its body was dissolved in the nation, it was unmistakably
+shown that only one thing was still wanting to complete the true figure
+of the republic: to make the vacation of the National Assembly
+permanent, and substitute its inscription—“Liberty, Equality,
+Fraternity”—by the unequivocal words, “Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery”.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+
+The National Assembly reconvened in the middle of October. On November
+1, Bonaparte surprised it with a message, in which he announced the
+dismissal of the Barrot-Falloux Ministry, and the framing of a new.
+Never have lackeys been chased from service with less ceremony than
+Bonaparte did his ministers. The kicks, that were eventually destined
+for the National Assembly, Barrot & Company received in the meantime.
+
+The Barrot Ministry was, as we have seen, composed of Legitimists and
+Orleanists; it was a Ministry of the party of Order. Bonaparte needed
+that Ministry in order to dissolve the republican constituent assembly,
+to effect the expedition against Rome, and to break up the democratic
+party. He had seemingly eclipsed himself behind this Ministry, yielded
+the reins to the hands of the party of Order, and assumed the modest
+mask, which, under Louis Philippe, had been worn by the responsible
+overseer of the newspapers—the mask of “homme de paille.” [#1 Man of
+straw] Now he threw off the mask, it being no longer the light curtain
+behind which he could conceal, but the Iron Mask, which prevented him
+from revealing his own physiognomy. He had instituted the Barrot
+Ministry in order to break up the republican National Assembly in the
+name of the party of Order; he now dismissed it in order to declare his
+own name independent of the parliament of the party of Order.
+
+There was no want of plausible pretexts for this dismissal. The Barrot
+Ministry had neglected even the forms of decency that would have
+allowed the president of the republic to appear as a power along with
+the National Assembly. For instance, during the vacation of the
+National Assembly, Bonaparte published a letter to Edgar Ney, in which
+he seemed to disapprove the liberal attitude of the Pope, just as, in
+opposition to the constitutive assembly, he had published a letter, in
+which he praised Oudinot for his attack upon the Roman republic; when
+the National Assembly came to vote on the budget for the Roman
+expedition, Victor Hugo, out of pretended liberalism, brought up that
+letter for discussion; the party of Order drowned this notion of
+Bonaparte’s under exclamations of contempt and incredulity as though
+notions of Bonaparte could not possibly have any political weight;—and
+none of the Ministers took up the gauntlet for him. On another
+occasion, Barrot, with his well-known hollow pathos, dropped, from the
+speakers’ tribune in the Assembly, words of indignation upon the
+“abominable machinations,” which, according to him, went on in the
+immediate vicinity of the President. Finally, while the Ministry
+obtained from the National Assembly a widow’s pension for the Duchess
+of Orleans, it denied every motion to raise the Presidential civil
+list;—and, in Bonaparte, be it always remembered, the Imperial
+Pretender was so closely blended with the impecunious adventurer, that
+the great idea of his being destined to restore the Empire was ever
+supplemented by that other, to-wit, that the French people was destined
+to pay his debts.
+
+The Barrot-Falloux Ministry was the first and last parliamentary
+Ministry that Bonaparte called into life. Its dismissal marks,
+accordingly, a decisive period. With the Ministry, the party of Order
+lost, never to regain, an indispensable post to the maintenance of the
+parliamentary regime,—the handle to the Executive power. It is readily
+understood that, in a country like France, where the Executive disposes
+over an army of more than half a million office-holders, and,
+consequently, keeps permanently a large mass of interests and
+existences in the completest dependence upon itself; where the
+Government surrounds, controls, regulates, supervises and guards
+society, from its mightiest acts of national life, down to its most
+insignificant motions; from its common life, down to the private life
+of each individual; where, due to such extraordinary centralization,
+this body of parasites acquires a ubiquity and omniscience, a quickened
+capacity for motion and rapidity that finds an analogue only in the
+helpless lack of self-reliance, in the unstrung weakness of the body
+social itself;—that in such a country the National Assembly lost, with
+the control of the ministerial posts, all real influence; unless it
+simultaneously simplified the administration; if possible, reduced the
+army of office-holders; and, finally, allowed society and public
+opinion to establish its own organs, independent of government
+censorship. But the Material Interest of the French bourgeoisie is most
+intimately bound up in maintenance of just such a large and extensively
+ramified governmental machine. There the bourgeoisie provides for its
+own superfluous membership; and supplies, in the shape of government
+salaries, what it can not pocket in the form of profit, interest, rent
+and fees. On the other hand, its Political Interests daily compel it to
+increase the power of repression, i.e., the means and the personnel of
+the government; it is at the same time forced to conduct an
+uninterrupted warfare against public opinion, and, full of suspicion,
+to hamstring and lame the independent organs of society—whenever it
+does not succeed in amputating them wholly. Thus the bourgeoisie of
+France was forced by its own class attitude, on the one hand, to
+destroy the conditions for all parliamentary power, its own included,
+and, on the other, to render irresistible the Executive power that
+stood hostile to it.
+
+The new Ministry was called the d’Hautpoul Ministry. Not that General
+d’Hautpoul had gained the rank of Ministerial President. Along with
+Barrot, Bonaparte abolished this dignity, which, it must be granted,
+condemned the President of the republic to the legal nothingness of a
+constitutional kind, of a constitutional king at that, without throne
+and crown, without sceptre and without sword, without irresponsibility,
+without the imperishable possession of the highest dignity in the
+State, and, what was most untoward of all—without a civil list. The
+d’Hautpoul Ministry numbered only one man of parliamentary reputation,
+the Jew Fould, one of the most notorious members of the high finance.
+To him fell the portfolio of finance. Turn to the Paris stock
+quotations, and it will be found that from November 1, 1849, French
+stocks fall and rise with the falling and rising of the Bonapartist
+shares. While Bonaparte had thus found his ally in the Bourse, he at
+the same time took possession of the Police through the appointment of
+Carlier as Prefect of Police.
+
+But the consequences of the change of Ministry could reveal themselves
+only in the course of events. So far, Bonaparte had taken only one step
+forward, to be all the more glaringly driven back. Upon his harsh
+message, followed the most servile declarations of submissiveness to
+the National Assembly. As often as the Ministers made timid attempts to
+introduce his own personal hobbies as bills, they themselves seemed
+unwilling and compelled only by their position to run the comic
+errands, of whose futility they were convinced in advance. As often as
+Bonaparte blabbed out his plans behind the backs of his Ministers, and
+sported his “idees napoleoniennes,” [#2 Napoleonic ideas.] his own
+Ministers disavowed him from the speakers’ tribune in the National
+Assembly. His aspirations after usurpation seemed to become audible
+only to the end that the ironical laughter of his adversaries should
+not die out. He deported himself like an unappreciated genius, whom the
+world takes for a simpleton. Never did lie enjoy in fuller measure the
+contempt of all classes than at this period. Never did the bourgeoisie
+rule more absolutely; never did it more boastfully display the insignia
+of sovereignty.
+
+It is not here my purpose to write the history of its legislative
+activity, which is summed up in two laws passed during this period: the
+law reestablishing the duty on wine, and the laws on education, to
+suppress infidelity. While the drinking of wine was made difficult to
+the Frenchmen, all the more bounteously was the water of pure life
+poured out to them. Although in the law on the duty on wine the
+bourgeoisie declares the old hated French tariff system to be
+inviolable, it sought, by means of the laws on education, to secure the
+old good will of the masses that made the former bearable. One wonders
+to see the Orleanists, the liberal bourgeois, these old apostles of
+Voltarianism and of eclectic philosophy, entrusting the supervision of
+the French intellect to their hereditary enemies, the Jesuits. But,
+while Orleanists and Legitimists could part company on the question of
+the Pretender to the crown, they understood full well that their joint
+reign dictated the joining of the means of oppression of two distinct
+epochs; that the means of subjugation of the July monarchy had to be
+supplemented with and strengthened by the means of subjugation of the
+restoration.
+
+The farmers, deceived in all their expectations, more than ever ground
+down by the law scale of the price of corn, on the one hand, and, on
+the other, by the growing load of taxation and mortgages, began to stir
+in the Departments. They were answered by the systematic baiting of the
+school masters, whom the Government subjected to the clergy; by the
+systematic baiting of the Mayors, whom it subjected to the Prefects;
+and by a system of espionage to which all were subjected. In Paris and
+the large towns, the reaction itself carries the physiognomy of its own
+epoch; it irritates more than it cows; in the country, it becomes low,
+moan, petty, tiresome, vexatious,—in a word, it becomes “gensdarme.” It
+is easily understood how three years of the gensdarme regime,
+sanctified by the regime of the clergyman, was bound to demoralize
+unripe masses.
+
+Whatever the mass of passion and declamation, that the party of Order
+expended from the speakers’ tribune in the National Assembly against
+the minority, its speech remained monosyllabic, like that of the
+Christian, whose speech was to be “Aye, aye; nay, nay.” It was
+monosyllabic, whether from the tribune or the press; dull as a
+conundrum, whose solution is known beforehand. Whether the question was
+the right of petition or the duty on wine, the liberty of the press or
+free trade, clubs or municipal laws, protection of individual freedom
+or the regulation of national economy, the slogan returns ever again,
+the theme is monotonously the same, the verdict is ever ready and
+unchanged: Socialism! Even bourgeois liberalism is pronounced
+socialistic; socialistic, alike, is pronounced popular education; and,
+likewise, socialistic national financial reform. It was socialistic to
+build a railroad where already a canal was; and it was socialistic to
+defend oneself with a stick when attacked with a sword.
+
+This was not a mere form of speech, a fashion, nor yet party tactics.
+The bourgeoisie perceives correctly that all the weapons, which it
+forged against feudalism, turn their edges against itself; that all the
+means of education, which it brought forth, rebel against its own
+civilization; that all the gods, which it made, have fallen away from
+it. It understands that all its so-called citizens’ rights and
+progressive organs assail and menace its class rule, both in its social
+foundation and its political superstructure—consequently, have become
+“socialistic.” It justly scents in this menace and assault the secret
+of Socialism, whose meaning and tendency it estimates more correctly
+than the spurious, so-called Socialism, is capable of estimating
+itself, and which, consequently, is unable to understand how it is that
+the bourgeoisie obdurately shuts up its ears to it, alike whether it
+sentimentally whines about the sufferings of humanity; or announces in
+Christian style the millennium and universal brotherhood; or twaddles
+humanistically about the soul, culture and freedom; or doctrinally
+matches out a system of harmony and wellbeing for all classes. What,
+however, the bourgeoisie does not understand is the consequence that
+its own parliamentary regime, its own political reign, is also of
+necessity bound to fall under the general ban of “socialistic.” So long
+as the rule of the bourgeoisie is not fully organized, has not acquired
+its purely political character, the contrast with the other classes
+cannot come into view in all its sharpness; and, where it does come
+into view, it cannot take that dangerous turn that converts every
+conflict with the Government into a conflict with Capital. When,
+however, the French bourgeoisie began to realize in every pulsation of
+society a menace to “peace,” how could it, at the head of society,
+pretend to uphold the regime of unrest, its own regime, the
+parliamentary regime, which, according to the expression of one of its
+own orators, lives in struggle, and through struggle? The parliamentary
+regime lives on discussion,—how can it forbid discussion? Every single
+interest, every single social institution is there converted into
+general thoughts, is treated as a thought,—how could any interest or
+institution claim to be above thought, and impose itself as an article
+of faith? The orators’ conflict in the tribune calls forth the conflict
+of the rowdies in the press the debating club in parliament is
+necessarily supplemented by debating clubs in the salons and the
+barrooms; the representatives, who are constantly appealing to popular
+opinion, justify popular opinion in expressing its real opinion in
+petitions. The parliamentary regime leaves everything to the decision
+of majorities,—how can the large majorities beyond parliament be
+expected not to wish to decide? If, from above, they hear the fiddle
+screeching, what else is to be expected than that those below should
+dance?
+
+Accordingly, by now persecuting as Socialist what formerly it had
+celebrated as Liberal, the bourgeoisie admits that its own interest
+orders it to raise itself above the danger of self government; that, in
+order to restore rest to the land, its own bourgeois parliament must,
+before all, be brought to rest; that, in order to preserve its social
+power unhurt, its political power must be broken; that the private
+bourgeois can continue to exploit the other classes and rejoice in
+“property,” “family,” “religion” and “order” only under the condition
+that his own class be condemned to the same political nullity of the
+other classes, that, in order to save their purse, the crown must be
+knocked off their heads, and the sword that was to shield them, must at
+the same time be hung over their heads as a sword of Damocles.
+
+In the domain of general bourgeois interests, the National Assembly
+proved itself so barren, that, for instance, the discussion over the
+Paris-Avignon railroad, opened in the winter of 1850, was not yet ripe
+for a vote on December 2, 1851. Wherever it did not oppress or was
+reactionary, the bourgeoisie was smitten with incurable barrenness.
+
+While Bonaparte’s Ministry either sought to take the initiative of laws
+in the spirit of the party of Order, or even exaggerated their severity
+in their enforcement and administration, he, on his part, sought to win
+popularity by means of childishly silly propositions, to exhibit the
+contrast between himself and the National Assembly, and to hint at a
+secret plan, held in reserve and only through circumstances temporarily
+prevented from disclosing its hidden treasures to the French people. Of
+this nature was the proposition to decree a daily extra pay of four
+sous to the under-officers; so, likewise, the proposition for a “word
+of honor” loan bank for working-men. To have money given and money
+borrowed—that was the perspective that he hoped to cajole the masses
+with. Presents and loans—to that was limited the financial wisdom of
+the slums, the high as well as the low; to that were limited the
+springs which Bonaparte knew how to set in motion. Never did Pretender
+speculate more dully upon the dullness of the masses.
+
+Again and again did the National Assembly fly into a passion at these
+unmistakable attempts to win popularity at its expense, and at the
+growing danger that this adventurer, lashed on by debts and
+unrestrained by reputation, might venture upon some desperate act. The
+strained relations between the party of Order and the President had
+taken on a threatening aspect, when an unforeseen event threw him back,
+rueful into its arms. We mean the supplementary elections of March,
+1850. These elections took place to fill the vacancies created in the
+National Assembly, after June 13, by imprisonment and exile. Paris
+elected only Social-Democratic candidates; it even united the largest
+vote upon one of the insurgents of June, 1848,—Deflotte. In this way
+the small traders’ world of Paris, now allied with the proletariat,
+revenged itself for the defeat of June 13, 1849. It seemed to have
+disappeared from the field of battle at the hour of danger only to step
+on it again at a more favorable opportunity, with increased forces for
+the fray, and with a bolder war cry. A circumstance seemed to heighten
+the danger of this electoral victory. The Army voted in Paris for a
+June insurgent against Lahitte, a Minister of Bonaparte’s, and, in the
+Departments, mostly for the candidates of the Mountain, who, there
+also, although not as decisively as in Paris, maintained the upper hand
+over their adversaries.
+
+Bonaparte suddenly saw himself again face to face with the revolution.
+As on January 29, 1849, as on June 13, 1849, on May 10, 1850, he
+vanished again behind the party of Order. He bent low; he timidly
+apologized; he offered to appoint any Ministry whatever at the behest
+of the parliamentary majority; he even implored the Orleanist and
+Legitimist party leaders—the Thiers, Berryers, Broglies, Moles, in
+short, the so-called burgraves—to take hold of the helm of State in
+person. The party of Order did not know how to utilize this
+opportunity, that was never to return. Instead of boldly taking
+possession of the proffered power, it did not even force Bonaparte to
+restore the Ministry dismissed on November 1; it contented itself with
+humiliating him with its pardon, and with affiliating Mr. Baroche to
+the d’Hautpoul Ministry. This Baroche had, as Public Prosecutor,
+stormed before the High Court at Bourges, once against the
+revolutionists of May 15, another time against the Democrats of June
+13, both times on the charge of “attentats” against the National
+Assembly. None of Bonaparte’s Ministers contributed later more towards
+the degradation of the National Assembly; and, after December 2, 1851,
+we meet him again as the comfortably stalled and dearly paid
+Vice-President of the Senate. He had spat into the soup of the
+revolutionists for Bonaparte to eat it.
+
+On its part, the Social Democratic party seemed only to look for
+pretexts in order to make its own victory doubtful, and to dull its
+edge. Vidal, one of the newly elected Paris representatives, was
+returned for Strassburg also. He was induced to decline the seat for
+Paris and accept the one for Strassburg. Thus, instead of giving a
+definite character to their victory at the hustings, and thereby
+compelling the party of Order forthwith to contest it in parliament;
+instead of thus driving the foe to battle at the season of popular
+enthusiasm and of a favorable temper in the Army, the democratic party
+tired out Paris with a new campaign during the months of March and
+April; it allowed the excited popular passions to wear themselves out
+in this second provisional electoral play it allowed the revolutionary
+vigor to satiate itself with constitutional successes, and lose its
+breath in petty intrigues, hollow declamation and sham moves; it gave
+the bourgeoisie time to collect itself and make its preparations
+finally, it allowed the significance of the March elections to find a
+sentimentally weakening commentary at the subsequent April election in
+the victory of Eugene Sue. In one word, it turned the 10th of March
+into an April Fool.
+
+The parliamentary majority perceived the weakness of its adversary. Its
+seventeen burgraves—Bonaparte had left to it the direction of and
+responsibility for the attack—, framed a new election law, the moving
+of which was entrusted to Mr. Faucher, who had applied for the honor.
+On May 8, he introduced the new law whereby universal suffrage was
+abolished; a three years residence in the election district imposed as
+a condition for voting; and, finally, the proof of this residence made
+dependent, for the working-man, upon the testimony of his employer.
+
+As revolutionarily as the democrats had agitated and stormed during the
+constitutional struggles, so constitutionally did they, now, when it
+was imperative to attest, arms in hand, the earnestness of their late
+electoral victories, preach order, “majestic calmness,” lawful conduct,
+i. e., blind submission to the will of the counter-revolution, which
+revealed itself as law. During the debate, the Mountain put the party
+of Order to shame by maintaining the passionless attitude of the
+law-abiding burger, who upholds the principle of law against
+revolutionary passions; and by twitting the party of Order with the
+fearful reproach of proceeding in a revolutionary manner. Even the
+newly elected deputies took pains to prove by their decent and
+thoughtful deportment what an act of misjudgment it was to decry them
+as anarchists, or explain their election as a victory of the
+revolution. The new election law was passed on May 31. The Mountain
+contented itself with smuggling a protest into the pockets of the
+President of the Assembly. To the election law followed a new press
+law, whereby the revolutionary press was completely done away with. It
+had deserved its fate. The “National” and the “Presse,” two bourgeois
+organs, remained after this deluge the extreme outposts of the
+revolution.
+
+We have seen how, during March and April, the democratic leaders did
+everything to involve the people of Paris in a sham battle, and how,
+after May 8, they did everything to keep it away from a real battle. We
+may not here forget that the year 1850 was one of the most brilliant
+years of industrial and commercial prosperity; consequently, that the
+Parisian proletariat was completely employed. But the election law of
+May 31, 1850 excluded them from all participation in political power;
+it cut the field of battle itself from under them; it threw the
+workingmen back into the state of pariahs, which they had occupied
+before the February revolution. In allowing themselves, in sight of
+such an occurrence, to be led by the democrats, and in forgetting the
+revolutionary interests of their class through temporary comfort, the
+workingmen abdicated the honor of being a conquering power; they
+submitted to their fate; they proved that the defeat of June, 1848, had
+incapacitated them from resistance for many a year to come finally,
+that the historic process must again, for the time being, proceed over
+their heads. As to the small traders’ democracy, which, on June 13, had
+cried out: “If they but dare to assail universal suffrage . . . then .
+. . then we will show who we are!”—they now consoled themselves with
+the thought that the counter-revolutionary blow, which had struck them,
+was no blow at all, and that the law of May 31 was no law. On May 2,
+1852, according to them, every Frenchman would appear at the hustings,
+in one hand the ballot, in the other the sword. With this prophecy they
+set their hearts at ease. Finally, the Army was punished by its
+superiors for the elections of May and April, 1850, as it was punished
+for the election of May 29, 1849. This time, however, it said to itself
+determinately: “The revolution shall not cheat us a third time.”
+
+The law of May 31, 1850, was the “coup d’etat” of the bourgeoisie. All
+its previous conquests over the revolution had only a temporary
+character: they became uncertain the moment the National Assembly
+stepped off the stage; they depended upon the accident of general
+elections, and the history of the elections since 1848 proved
+irrefutably that, in the same measure as the actual reign of the
+bourgeoisie gathered strength, its moral reign over the masses wore
+off. Universal suffrage pronounced itself on May 10 pointedly against
+the reign of the bourgeoisie; the bourgeoisie answered with the
+banishment of universal suffrage. The law of May 31 was, accordingly,
+one of the necessities of the class struggle. On the other hand, the
+constitution required a minimum of two million votes for the valid
+ejection of the President of the republic. If none of the Presidential
+candidates polled this minimum, then the National Assembly was to elect
+the President out of the three candidates polling the highest votes. At
+the time that the constitutive body made this law, ten million voters
+were registered on the election rolls. In its opinion, accordingly,
+one-fifth of the qualified voters sufficed to make a choice for
+President valid. The law of May 31 struck at least three million voters
+off the rolls, reduced the number of qualified voters to seven
+millions, and yet, not withstanding, it kept the lawful minimum at two
+millions for the election of a President. Accordingly, it raised the
+lawful minimum from a fifth to almost a third of the qualified voters,
+i.e., it did all it could to smuggle the Presidential election out of
+the hands of the people into those of the National Assembly. Thus, by
+the election law of May 31, the party of Order seemed to have doubly
+secured its empire, in that it placed the election of both the National
+Assembly and the President of the republic in the keeping of the stable
+portion of society.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+
+The strife immediately broke out again between the National Assembly
+and Bonaparte, so soon as the revolutionary crisis was weathered, and
+universal suffrage was abolished.
+
+The Constitution had fixed the salary of Bonaparte at 600,000 francs.
+Barely half a year after his installation, he succeeded in raising this
+sum to its double: Odillon Barrot had wrung from the constitutive
+assembly a yearly allowance of 600,000 francs for so-called
+representation expenses. After June 13, Bonaparte hinted at similar
+solicitations, to which, however, Barrot then turned a deaf ear. Now,
+after May 31, he forthwith utilized the favorable moment, and caused
+his ministers to move a civil list of three millions in the National
+Assembly. A long adventurous, vagabond career had gifted him with the
+best developed antennae for feeling out the weak moments when he could
+venture upon squeezing money from his bourgeois. He carried on regular
+blackmail. The National Assembly had maimed the sovereignty of the
+people with his aid and his knowledge: he now threatened to denounce
+its crime to the tribunal of the people, if it did not pull out its
+purse and buy his silence with three millions annually. It had robbed
+three million Frenchmen of the suffrage: for every Frenchman thrown
+“out of circulation,” he demanded a franc “in circulation.” He, the
+elect of six million, demanded indemnity for the votes he had been
+subsequently cheated of. The Committee of the National Assembly turned
+the importunate fellow away. The Bonapartist press threatened: Could
+the National Assembly break with the President of the republic at a
+time when it had broken definitely and on principle with the mass of
+the nation? It rejected the annual civil list, but granted, for this
+once, an allowance of 2,160,000 francs. Thus it made itself guilty of
+the double weakness of granting the money, and, at the same time,
+showing by its anger that it did so only unwillingly. We shall
+presently see to what use Bonaparte put the money. After this
+aggravating after-play, that followed upon the heels of the abolition
+of universal suffrage, and in which Bonaparte exchanged his humble
+attitude of the days of the crisis of March and April for one of
+defiant impudence towards the usurping parliament, the National
+Assembly adjourned for three months, from August 11, to November 11. It
+left behind in its place a Permanent Committee of 18 members that
+contained no Bonapartist, but did contain a few moderate republicans.
+The Permanent Committee of the year 1849 had numbered only men of order
+and Bonapartists. At that time, however, the party of Order declared
+itself in permanence against the revolution; now the parliamentary
+republic declared itself in permanence against the President. After the
+law of May 31, only this rival still confronted the party of Order.
+
+When the National Assembly reconvened in November, 1850, instead of its
+former petty skirmishes with the President, a great headlong struggle,
+a struggle for life between the two powers, seemed to have become
+inevitable.
+
+As in the year 1849, the party of Order had during this year’s
+vacation, dissolved into its two separate factions, each occupied with
+its own restoration intrigues, which had received new impetus from the
+death of Louis Philippe. The Legitimist King, Henry V, had even
+appointed a regular Ministry, that resided in Paris, and in which sat
+members of the Permanent Committee. Hence, Bonaparte was, on his part,
+justified in making tours through the French Departments, and—according
+to the disposition of the towns that he happened to be gladdening with
+his presence—some times covertly, other times more openly blabbing out
+his own restoration plans, and gaining votes for himself On these
+excursions, which the large official “Moniteur” and the small private
+“Moniteurs” of Bonaparte were, of course, bound to celebrate as
+triumphal marches, he was constantly accompanied by affiliated members
+of the “Society of December 10” This society dated from the year 1849.
+Under the pretext of founding a benevolent association, the
+slum-proletariat of Paris was organized into secret sections, each
+section led by Bonapartist agents, with a Bonapartist General at the
+head of all. Along with ruined roues of questionable means of support
+and questionable antecedents, along with the foul and
+adventures-seeking dregs of the bourgeoisie, there were vagabonds,
+dismissed soldiers, discharged convicts, runaway galley slaves,
+sharpers, jugglers, lazzaroni, pickpockets, sleight-of-hand performers,
+gamblers, procurers, keepers of disorderly houses, porters, literati,
+organ grinders, rag pickers, scissors grinders, tinkers, beggars—in
+short, that whole undefined, dissolute, kicked-about mass that the
+Frenchmen style “la Boheme” With this kindred element, Bonaparte formed
+the stock of the “Society of December 10,” a “benevolent association”
+in so far as, like Bonaparte himself, all its members felt the need of
+being benevolent to themselves at the expense of the toiling nation.
+The Bonaparte, who here constitutes himself Chief of the
+Slum-Proletariat; who only here finds again in plenteous form the
+interests which he personally pursues; who, in this refuse, offal and
+wreck of all classes, recognizes the only class upon which he can
+depend unconditionally;—this is the real Bonaparte, the Bonaparte
+without qualification. An old and crafty roue, he looks upon the
+historic life of nations, upon their great and public acts, as comedies
+in the ordinary sense, as a carnival, where the great costumes, words
+and postures serve only as masks for the pettiest chicaneries. So, on
+the occasion of his expedition against Strassburg when a trained Swiss
+vulture impersonated the Napoleonic eagle; so, again, on the occasion
+of his raid upon Boulogne, when he struck a few London lackeys into
+French uniform: they impersonated the army; [#1 Under the reign of
+Louis Philippe, Bonaparte made two attempts to restore the throne of
+Napoleon: one in October, 1836, in an expedition from Switzerland upon
+Strassburg and one in August, 1840, in an expedition from England upon
+Boulogne.] and so now, in his “Society of December 10,” he collects
+10,000 loafers who are to impersonate the people as Snug the Joiner
+does the lion. At a period when the bourgeoisie itself is playing the
+sheerest comedy, but in the most solemn manner in the world, without
+doing violence to any of the pedantic requirements of French dramatic
+etiquette, and is itself partly deceived by, partly convinced of, the
+solemnity of its own public acts, the adventurer, who took the comedy
+for simple comedy, was bound to win. Only after he has removed his
+solemn opponent, when he himself takes seriously his own role of
+emperor, and, with the Napoleonic mask on, imagines he impersonates the
+real Napoleon, only then does he become the victim of his own peculiar
+conception of history—the serious clown, who no longer takes history
+for a comedy, but a comedy for history. What the national work-shops
+were to the socialist workingmen, what the “Gardes mobiles” were to the
+bourgeois republicans, that was to Bonaparte the “Society of December
+10,”—a force for partisan warfare peculiar to himself. On his journeys,
+the divisions of the Society, packed away on the railroads, improvised
+an audience for him, performed public enthusiasm, shouted “vive
+l’Empereur,” insulted and clubbed the republicans,—all, of course,
+under the protection of the police. On his return stages to Paris, this
+rabble constituted his vanguard, it forestalled or dispersed
+counter-demonstrations. The “Society of December 10” belonged to him,
+it was his own handiwork, his own thought. Whatever else he
+appropriates, the power of circumstances places in his hands; whatever
+else he does, either circumstances do for him, or he is content to copy
+from the deeds of others, but he posing before the citizens with the
+official phrases about “Order,” “Religion,” “Family,” “Property,” and,
+behind him, the secret society of skipjacks and picaroons, the society
+of disorder, of prostitution, and of theft,—that is Bonaparte himself
+as the original author; and the history of the “Society of December 10”
+is his own history. Now, then, it happened that Representatives
+belonging to the party of order occasionally got under the clubs of the
+Decembrists. Nay, more. Police Commissioner Yon, who had been assigned
+to the National Assembly, and was charged with the guardianship of its
+safety, reported to the Permanent Committee upon the testimony of one
+Alais, that a Section of the Decembrists had decided on the murder of
+General Changarnier and of Dupin, the President of the National
+Assembly, and had already settled upon the men to execute the decree.
+One can imagine the fright of Mr. Dupin. A parliamentary inquest over
+the “Society of December 10,” i. e., the profanation of the Bonapartist
+secret world now seemed inevitable. Just before the reconvening of the
+National Assembly, Bonaparte circumspectly dissolved his Society, of
+course, on paper only. As late as the end of 1851, Police Prefect
+Carlier vainly sought, in an exhaustive memorial, to move him to the
+real dissolution of the Decembrists.
+
+The “Society of December 10” was to remain the private army of
+Bonaparte until he should have succeeded in converting the public Army
+into a “Society of December 10.” Bonaparte made the first attempt in
+this direction shortly after the adjournment of the National Assembly,
+and he did so with the money which he had just wrung from it. As a
+fatalist, he lives devoted to the conviction that there are certain
+Higher Powers, whom man, particularly the soldier, cannot resist. First
+among these Powers he numbers cigars and champagne, cold poultry and
+garlic-sausage. Accordingly, in the apartments of the Elysee, he
+treated first the officers and under-officers to cigars and champagne,
+to cold poultry and garlic-sausage. On October 3, he repeats this
+manoeuvre with the rank and file of the troops by the review of St.
+Maur; and, on October 10, the same manoeuvre again, upon a larger
+scale, at the army parade of Satory. The Uncle bore in remembrance the
+campaigns of Alexander in Asia: the Nephew bore in remembrance the
+triumphal marches of Bacchus in the same country. Alexander was,
+indeed, a demigod; but Bacchus was a full-fledged god, and the patron
+deity, at that, of the “Society of December 10.”
+
+After the review of October 3, the Permanent Committee summoned the
+Minister of War, d’Hautpoul, before it. He promised that such breaches
+of discipline should not recur. We have seen how, on October 10th,
+Bonaparte kept d’Hautpoul’s word. At both reviews Changarnier had
+commanded as Commander-in-chief of the Army of Paris. He, at once
+member of the Permanent Committee, Chief of the National Guard, the
+“Savior” of January 29, and June 13, the “Bulwark of Society,”
+candidate of the Party of Order for the office of President, the
+suspected Monk of two monarchies,—he had never acknowledged his
+subordination to the Minister of War, had ever openly scoffed at the
+republican Constitution, and had pursued Bonaparte with a protection
+that was ambiguously distinguished. Now he became zealous for the
+discipline in opposition to Bonaparte. While, on October 10, a part of
+the cavalry cried: “Vive Napoleon! Vivent les saucissons;” [#2 Long
+live Napoleon! Long live the sausages!] Changarnier saw to it that at
+least the infantry, which filed by under the command of his friend
+Neumeyer, should observe an icy silence. In punishment, the Minister of
+War, at the instigation of Bonaparte, deposed General Neumeyer from his
+post in Paris, under the pretext of providing for him as
+Commander-in-chief of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Military Divisions.
+Neumeyer declined the exchange, and had, in consequence, to give his
+resignation. On his part, Changarnier published on November 2, an
+order, wherein he forbade the troops to indulge, while under arms, in
+any sort of political cries or demonstrations. The papers devoted to
+the Elysee interests attacked Changarnier; the papers of the party of
+Order attacked Bonaparte; the Permanent Committee held frequent secret
+sessions, at which it was repeatedly proposed to declare the fatherland
+in danger; the Army seemed divided into two hostile camps, with two
+hostile staffs; one at the Elysee, where Bonaparte, the other at the
+Tuileries, where Changarnier resided. All that seemed wanting for the
+signal of battle to sound was the convening of the National Assembly.
+The French public looked upon the friction between Bonaparte and
+Changarnier in the light of the English journalist, who characterized
+it in these words: “The political servant girls of France are mopping
+away the glowing lava of the revolution with old mops, and they scold
+each other while doing their work.”
+
+Meanwhile, Bonaparte hastened to depose the Minister of War,
+d’Hautpoul; to expedite him heels over head to Algiers; and to appoint
+in his place General Schramm as Minister of War. On November 12, he
+sent to the National Assembly a message of American excursiveness,
+overloaded with details, redolent of order, athirst for conciliation,
+resignful to the Constitution, dealing with all and everything, only
+not with the burning questions of the moment. As if in passing he
+dropped the words that according to the express provisions of the
+Constitution, the President alone disposes over the Army. The message
+closed with the following high-sounding protestations:
+
+“France demands, above all things, peace . . . Alone bound by an oath,
+I shall keep myself within the narrow bounds marked out by it to me . .
+. As to me, elected by the people, and owing my power to it alone, I
+shall always submit to its lawfully expressed will. Should you at this
+session decide upon the revision of the Constitution, a Constitutional
+Convention will regulate the position of the Executive power. If you do
+not, then, the people will, in 1852, solemnly announce its decision.
+But, whatever the solution may be that the future has in store, let us
+arrive at an understanding to the end that never may passion, surprise
+or violence decide over the fate of a great nation. . . . That which,
+above all, bespeaks my attention is, not who will, in 1852, rule over
+France, but to so devote the time at my disposal that the interval may
+pass by with-out agitation and disturbance. I have straightforwardly
+opened my heart to you, you will answer my frankness with your
+confidence, my good efforts with your co-operation. God will do the
+rest.”
+
+The honnete, hypocritically temperate, commonplace-virtuous language of
+the bourgeoisie reveals its deep meaning in the mouth of the
+self-appointed ruler of the “Society of December 10,” and of the
+picnic-hero of St. Maur and Satory.
+
+The burgraves of the party of Order did not for a moment deceive
+themselves on the confidence that this unbosoming deserved. They were
+long blase on oaths; they numbered among themselves veterans and
+virtuosi of perjury. The passage about the army did not, however,
+escape them. They observed with annoyance that the message, despite its
+prolix enumeration of the lately enacted laws, passed, with affected
+silence, over the most important of all, the election law, and,
+moreover, in case no revision of the Constitution was held, left the
+choice of the President, in 1852, with the people. The election law was
+the ball-and-chain to the feet of the party of Order, that hindered
+them from walking, and now assuredly from storming. Furthermore, by the
+official disbandment of the “Society of December 10,” and the dismissal
+of the Minister of War, d’Hautpoul, Bonaparte had, with his own hands,
+sacrificed the scapegoats on the altar of the fatherland. He had turned
+off the expected collision. Finally, the party of Order itself
+anxiously sought to avoid every decisive conflict with the Executive,
+to weaken and to blur it over. Fearing to lose its conquests over the
+revolution, it let its rival gather the fruits thereof. “France
+demands, above all things, peace,” with this language had the party of
+Order been apostrophizing the revolution, since February; with this
+language did Bonaparte’s message now apostrophize the party of Order:
+“France demands, above all things, peace.” Bonaparte committed acts
+that aimed at usurpation, but the party of Order committed a
+“disturbance of the peace,” if it raised the hue and cry, and explained
+them hypochrondriacally. The sausages of Satory were mouse-still when
+nobody talked about them;—France demands, above all things, “peace.”
+Accordingly, Bonaparte demanded that he be let alone; and the
+parliamentary party was lamed with a double fear: the fear of
+re-conjuring up the revolutionary disturbance of the peace, and the
+fear of itself appearing as the disturber of the peace in the eyes of
+its own class, of the bourgeosie. Seeing that, above all things, France
+demanded peace, the party of Order did not dare, after Bonaparte had
+said “peace” in his message, to answer “war.” The public, who had
+promised to itself the pleasure of seeing great scenes of scandal at
+the opening of the National Assembly, was cheated out of its
+expectations. The opposition deputies, who demanded the submission of
+the minutes of the Permanent Committee over the October occurrences,
+were outvoted. All debate that might excite was fled from on principle.
+The labors of the National Assembly during November and December, 1850,
+were without interest.
+
+Finally, toward the end of December, began a guerilla warfare about
+certain prerogatives of the parliament. The movement sank into the mire
+of petty chicaneries on the prerogative of the two powers, since, with
+the abolition of universal suffrage, the bourgeoisie had done away with
+the class struggle.
+
+A judgment for debt had been secured against Mauguin, one of the
+Representatives. Upon inquiry by the President of the Court, the
+Minister of Justice, Rouher, declared that an order of arrest should be
+made out without delay. Manguin was, accordingly, cast into the
+debtors’ prison. The National Assembly bristled up when it heard of the
+“attentat.” It not only ordered his immediate release, but had him
+forcibly taken out of Clichy the same evening by its own greffier. In
+order, nevertheless, to shield its belief in the “sacredness of private
+property,” and also with the ulterior thought of opening, in case of
+need, an asylum for troublesome Mountainers, it declared the
+imprisonment of a Representative for debt to be permissible upon its
+previous consent. It forgot to decree that the President also could be
+locked up for debt. By its act, it wiped out the last semblance of
+inviolability that surrounded the members of its own body.
+
+It will be remembered that, upon the testimony of one Allais, Police
+Commissioner Yon had charged a Section of Decembrists with a plan to
+murder Dupin and Changarnier. With an eye upon that, the questors
+proposed at the very first session, that the parliament organize a
+police force of its own, paid for out of the private budget of the
+National Assembly itself, and wholly independent of the Police
+Prefects. The Minister of the Interior, Baroche, protested against this
+trespass on his preserves. A miserable compromise followed, according
+to which the Police Commissioner of the Assembly was to be paid out of
+its own private budget and was to be subject to the appointment and
+dismissal of its own questors, but only upon previous agreement with
+the Minister of the Interior. In the meantime Allais had been
+prosecuted by the Government. It was an easy thing in Court, to present
+his testimony in the light of a mystification, and, through the mouth
+of the Public Prosecutor, to throw Dupin, Changarnier, Yon, together
+with the whole National Assembly, into a ridiculous light. Thereupon,
+on December 29, Minister Baroche writes a letter to Dupin, in which he
+demands the dismissal of Yon. The Committee of the National Assembly
+decides to keep Yon in office; nevertheless, the National Assembly,
+frightened by its own violence in the affair of Mauguin, and
+accustomed, every time it has shied a blow at the Executive, to receive
+back from it two in exchange, does not sanction this decision. It
+dismisses Yon in reward for his zeal in office, and robs itself of a
+parliamentary prerogative, indispensable against a person who does not
+decide by night to execute by day, but decides by day and executes by
+night.
+
+We have seen how, during the months of November and December, under
+great and severe provocations, the National Assembly evaded and refused
+the combat with the Executive power. Now we see it compelled to accept
+it on the smallest occasions. In the affair of Mauguin, it confirms in
+principle the liability of a Representative to imprisonment for debt,
+but to itself reserves the power of allowing the principle to be
+applied only to the Representatives whom it dislikes,-and for this
+infamous privilege we see it wrangling with the Minister of Justice.
+Instead of utilizing the alleged murder plan to the end of fastening an
+inquest upon the “Society of December 10,” and of exposing Bonaparte
+beyond redemption before France and his true figure, as the head of the
+slum-proletariat of Paris, it allows the collision to sink to a point
+where the only issue between itself and the Minister of the Interior
+is. Who has jurisdiction over the appointment and dismissal of a Police
+Commissioner? Thus we see the party of Order, during this whole period,
+compelled by its ambiguous position to wear out and fritter away its
+conflict with the Executive power in small quarrels about jurisdiction,
+in chicaneries, in pettifogging, in boundary disputes, and to turn the
+stalest questions of form into the very substance of its activity. It
+dares not accept the collision at the moment when it involves a
+principle, when the Executive power has really given itself a blank,
+and when the cause of the National Assembly would be the cause of the
+nation. It would thereby have issued to the nation an order of march;
+and it feared nothing so much as that the nation should move. Hence, on
+these occasions, it rejects the motions of the Mountain, and proceeds
+to the order of the day. After the issue has in this way lost all
+magnitude, the Executive power quietly awaits the moment when it can
+take it up again upon small and insignificant occasions; when, so to
+say, the issue offers only a parliamentary local interest. Then does
+the repressed valor of the party of Order break forth, then it tears
+away the curtain from the scene, then it denounces the President, then
+it declares the republic to be in danger,—but then all its pathos
+appears stale, and the occasion for the quarrel a hypocritical pretext,
+or not at all worth the effort. The parliamentary tempest becomes a
+tempest in a tea-pot, the struggle an intrigue, the collision a
+scandal. While the revolutionary classes gloat with sardonic laughter
+over the humiliation of the National Assembly—they, of course, being as
+enthusiastic for the prerogatives of the parliament as that body is for
+public freedom—the bourgeoisie, outside of the parliament, does not
+understand how the bourgeoisie, inside of the parliament, can squander
+its time with such petty bickerings, and can endanger peace by such
+wretched rivalries with the President. It is puzzled at a strategy that
+makes peace the very moment when everybody expects battles, and that
+attacks the very moment everybody believes peace has been concluded.
+
+On December 20, Pascal Duprat interpellated the Minister of the
+Interior on the “Goldbar Lottery.” This lottery was a “Daughter from
+Elysium”; Bonaparte, together with his faithful, had given her birth;
+and Police Prefect Carlier had placed her under his official
+protection, although the French law forbade all lotteries, with the
+exception of games for benevolent purposes. Seven million tickets, a
+franc a piece, and the profit ostensibly destined to the shipping of
+Parisian vagabonds to California. Golden dreams were to displace the
+Socialist dreams of the Parisian proletariat; the tempting prospect of
+a prize was to displace the doctrinal right to labor. Of course, the
+workingmen of Paris did not recognize in the lustre of the California
+gold bars the lack-lustre francs that had been wheedled out of their
+pockets. In the main, however, the scheme was an unmitigated swindle.
+The vagabonds, who meant to open California gold mines without taking
+the pains to leave Paris, were Bonaparte himself and his Round Table of
+desperate insolvents. The three millions granted by the National
+Assembly were rioted away; the Treasury had to be refilled somehow or
+another. In vain did Bonaparte open a national subscription, at the
+head of which he himself figured with a large sum, for the
+establishment of so-called “cites ouvrieres.” [#3 Work cities.] The
+hard-hearted bourgeois waited, distrustful, for the payment of his own
+shares; and, as this, of course, never took place, the speculation in
+Socialist castles in the air fell flat. The gold bars drew better.
+Bonaparte and his associates did not content themselves with putting
+into their own pockets part of the surplus of the seven millions over
+and above the bars that were to be drawn; they manufactured false
+tickets; they sold, of Number 10 alone, fifteen to twenty lots—a
+financial operation fully in the spirit of the “Society of December
+10”! The National Assembly did not here have before it the fictitious
+President of the Republic, but Bonaparte himself in flesh and blood.
+Here it could catch him in the act, not in conflict with the
+Constitution, but with the penal code. When, upon Duprat’s
+interpellation, the National Assembly went over to the order of the
+day, this did not happen simply because Girardin’s motion to declare
+itself “satisfied” reminded the party of Order of its own systematic
+corruption: the bourgeois, above all the bourgeois who has been
+inflated into a statesman, supplements his practical meanness with
+theoretical pompousness. As statesman, he becomes, like the Government
+facing him, a superior being, who can be fought only in a higher, more
+exalted manner.
+
+Bonaparte-who, for the very reason of his being a “bohemian,” a
+princely slum-proletarian, had over the scampish bourgeois the
+advantage that he could carry on the fight after the Assembly itself
+had carried him with its own hands over the slippery ground of the
+military banquets, of the reviews, of the “Society of December 10,”
+and, finally, of the penal code-now saw that the moment had arrived
+when he could move from the seemingly defensive to the offensive. He
+was but little troubled by the intermediate and trifling defeats of the
+Minister of Justice, of the Minister of War, of the Minister of the
+Navy, of the Minister of Finance, whereby the National Assembly
+indicated its growling displeasure. Not only did he prevent the
+Ministers from resigning, and thus recognizing the subordination of the
+executive power to the Parliament; he could now accomplish what during
+the vacation of the National Assembly he had commenced, the separation
+of the military power from the Assembly—the deposition of Changarnier.
+
+An Elysee paper published an order, issued during the month of May,
+ostensibly to the First Military Division, and, hence, proceeding from
+Changarnier, wherein the officers were recommended, in case of an
+uprising, to give no quarter to the traitors in their own ranks, to
+shoot them down on the spot, and to refuse troops to the National
+Assembly, should it make a requisition for such. On January 3, 1851,
+the Cabinet was interpellated on this order. The Cabinet demands for
+the examination of the affair at first three months, then one week,
+finally only twenty-four hours’ time. The Assembly orders an immediate
+explanation Changarnier rises and declares that this order never
+existed; he adds that he would ever hasten to respond to the calls of
+the National Assembly, and that, in case of a collision, they could
+count upon him. The Assembly receives his utterances with inexpressible
+applause, and decrees a vote of confidence to him. It thereby resign
+its own powers; it decrees its own impotence and the omnipotence of the
+Army by committing itself to the private protection of a general. But
+the general, in turn, deceives himself when he places at the Assembly’s
+disposal and against Bonaparte a power that he holds only as a fief
+from that same Bonaparte, and when, on his part, he expects protection
+from this Parliament, from his protege’, itself needful of protection.
+But Changarnier has faith in the mysterious power with which since
+January, 1849, he had been clad by the bourgeoisie. He takes himself
+for the Third Power, standing beside the other Powers of Government. He
+shares the faith of all the other heroes, or rather saints, of this
+epoch, whose greatness consists but in the interested good opinion that
+their own party holds of them, and who shrink into every-day figures so
+soon as circumstances invite them to perform miracles. Infidelity is,
+indeed, the deadly enemy of these supposed heroes and real saints.
+Hence their virtuously proud indignation at the unenthusiastic wits and
+scoffers.
+
+That same evening the Ministers were summoned to the Elysee; Bonaparte
+presses the removal of Changarnier; five Ministers refuse to sign the
+order; the “Moniteur” announces a Ministerial crisis; and the party of
+Order threatens the formation of a Parliamentary army under the command
+of Changarnier. The party of Order had the constitutional power hereto.
+It needed only to elect Changarnier President of the National Assembly
+in order to make a requisition for whatever military forces it needed
+for its own safety. It could do this all the more safely, seeing that
+Changarnier still stood at the head of the Army and of the Parisian
+National Guard, and only lay in wait to be summoned, together with the
+Army. The Bonapartist press did not even dare to question the right of
+the National Assembly to issue a direct requisition for troops;—a legal
+scruple, that, under the given circumstances, did not promise success.
+That the Army would have obeyed the orders of the National Assembly is
+probable, when it is considered that Bonaparte had to look eight days
+all over Paris to find two generals—Baraguay d’Hilliers and St. Jean
+d’Angley—who declared themselves ready to countersign the order
+cashiering Changamier. That, however, the party of Order would have
+found in its own ranks and in the parliament the requisite vote for
+such a decision is more than doubtful, when it is considered that,
+eight days later, 286 votes pulled away from it, and that, as late as
+December, 1851, at the last decisive hour, the Mountain rejected a
+similar proposition. Nevertheless, the burgraves might still have
+succeeded in driving the mass of their party to an act of heroism,
+consisting in feeling safe behind a forest of bayonets, and in
+accepting the services of the Army, which found itself deserted in its
+camp. Instead of this, the Messieurs Burgraves betook themselves to the
+Elysee on the evening of January 6, with the view of inducing
+Bonaparte, by means of politic words and considerations, to drop the
+removal of Changarnier. Him whom we must convince we recognize as the
+master of the situation. Bonaparte, made to feel secure by this step,
+appoints on January 12 a new Ministry, in which the leaders of the old,
+Fould and Baroche, are retained. St Jean d’Angley becomes Minister of
+War; the “Moniteur” announces the decree cashiering Changarnier; his
+command is divided up between Baraguay d’Hilliers, who receives the
+First Division, and Perrot, who is placed over the National Guard. The
+“Bulwark of Society” is turned down; and, although no dog barks over
+the event, in the Bourses the stock quotations rise.
+
+By repelling the Army, that, in Changarnier’s person, put itself at its
+disposal, and thus irrevocably stood up against the President, the
+party of Order declares that the bourgeoisie has lost its vocation to
+reign. Already there was no parliamentary Ministry. By losing,
+furthermore, the handle to the Army and to the National Guard, what
+instrument of force was there left to the National Assembly in order to
+maintain both the usurped power of the parliament over the people, and
+its constitutional power over the President? None. All that was left to
+it was the appeal to peaceful principles, that itself had always
+explained as “general rules” merely, to be prescribed to third parties,
+and only in order to enable itself to move all the more freely. With
+the removal of Changarnier, with the transfer of the military power to
+Bonaparte, closes the first part of the period that we are considering,
+the period of the struggle between the party of Order and the Executive
+power. The war between the two powers is now openly declared; it is
+conducted openly; but only after the party of Order has lost both arms
+and soldier. With-out a Ministry, without any army, without a people,
+without the support of public opinion; since its election law of May
+31, no longer the representative of the sovereign nation sans eyes,
+sans ears, sans teeth, sans everything, the National Assembly had
+gradually converted itself into a French Parliament of olden days, that
+must leave all action to the Government, and content itself with
+growling remonstrances “post festum.” [#4 After the act is done; after
+the fact.]
+
+The party of Order receives the new Ministry with a storm of
+indignation. General Bedeau calls to mind the mildness of the Permanent
+Committee during the vacation, and the excessive prudence with which it
+had renounced the privilege of disclosing its minutes. Now, the
+Minister of the Interior himself insists upon the disclosure of these
+minutes, that have now, of course, become dull as stagnant waters,
+reveal no new facts, and fall without making the slightest effect upon
+the blase public. Upon Remusat’s proposition, the National Assembly
+retreats into its Committees, and appoints a “Committee on
+Extraordinary Measures.” Paris steps all the less out of the ruts of
+its daily routine, seeing that business is prosperous at the time, the
+manufactories busy, the prices of cereals low, provisions abundant, the
+savings banks receiving daily new deposits. The “extraordinary
+measures,” that the parliament so noisily announced fizzle out on
+January 18 in a vote of lack of confidence against the Ministry,
+without General Changarnier’s name being even mentioned. The party of
+Order was forced to frame its motion in that way so as to secure the
+votes of the republicans, because, of all the acts of the Ministry,
+Changarnier’s dismissal only was the very one they approved, while the
+party of Order cannot in fact, condemn the other Ministerial acts which
+it had itself dictated. The January 18 vote of lack of confidence was
+decided by 415 ayes against 286 nays. It was, accordingly put through
+by a coalition of the uncompromising Legitimists and Orleanists with
+the pure republicans and the Mountain. Thus it revealed the fact that,
+in its conflicts with Bonaparte, not only the Ministry, not only the
+Army, but also its independent parliamentary majority; that a troop of
+Representatives had deserted its camp out of a fanatic zeal for
+harmony, out of fear of fight, out of lassitude, out of family
+considerations for the salaries of relatives in office, out of
+speculations on vacancies in the Ministry (Odillon Barrot), or out of
+that unmitigated selfishness that causes the average bourgeois to be
+ever inclined to sacrifice the interests of his class to this or that
+private motive. The Bonapartist Representatives belonged from the start
+to the party of Order only in the struggle against the revolution. The
+leader of the Catholic party, Montalembert, already then threw his
+influence in the scale of Bonaparte, since he despaired of the vitality
+of the parliamentary party. Finally, the leaders of this party itself,
+Thiers and Berryer—the Orleanist and the Legitimist—were compelled to
+proclaim themselves openly as republicans; to admit that their heart
+favored royalty, but their head the republic; that their parliamentary
+republic was the only possible form for the rule of the bourgeoisie
+Thus were they compelled to brand, before the eyes of the bourgeois
+class itself, as an intrigue—as dangerous as it was senseless—the
+restoration plans, which they continued to pursue indefatigably behind
+the back of the parliament.
+
+The January 18 vote of lack of confidence struck the Ministers, not the
+President. But it was not the Ministry, it was the President who had
+deposed Changarnier. Should the party of Order place Bonaparte himself
+under charges? On account of his restoration hankerings? These only
+supplemented their own. On account of his conspiracy at the military
+reviews and of the “Society of December 10”? They had long since buried
+these subjects under simple orders of business. On account of the
+discharge of the hero of January 29 and June 13, of the man who, in
+May, 1850, threatened, in case of riot, to set Paris on fire at all its
+four corners? Their allies of the Mountain and Cavaignac did not even
+allow them to console the fallen “Bulwark of Society” with an official
+testimony of their sympathy. They themselves could not deny the
+constitutional right of the President to remove a General. They stormed
+only because he made an unparliamentary use of his constitutional
+right. Had they not themselves constantly made an unconstitutional use
+of their parliamentary prerogative, notably by the abolition of
+universal suffrage? Consequently they were reminded to move exclusively
+within parliamentary bounds. Indeed, it required that peculiar disease,
+a disease that, since 1848, has raged over the whole continent,
+“Parliamentary Idiocy,”—that fetters those whom it infects to an
+imaginary world, and robs them of all sense, all remembrance, all
+understanding of the rude outside world;—it required this
+“Parliamentary Idiocy” in order that the party of Order, which had,
+with its own hands, destroyed all the conditions for parliamentary
+power, and, in its struggle with the other classes, was obliged to
+destroy them, still should consider its parliamentary victories as
+victories, and imagine it hit the President by striking his Ministers.
+They only afforded him an opportunity to humble the National Assembly
+anew in the eyes of the nation. On January 20, the “Moniteur” announced
+that the whole the dismissal of the whole Ministry was accepted. Under
+the pretext that none of the parliamentary parties had any longer the
+majority—as proved by the January 18 vote, that fruit of the coalition
+between mountain and royalists—, and, in order to await the
+re-formation of a majority, Bonaparte appointed a so-called transition
+Ministry, of whom no member belonged to the parliament-altogether
+wholly unknown and insignificant individuals; a Ministry of mere clerks
+and secretaries. The party of Order could now wear itself out in the
+game with these puppets; the Executive power no longer considered it
+worth the while to be seriously represented in the National Assembly.
+By this act Bonaparte concentrated the whole executive power all the
+more securely in his own person; he had all the freer elbow-room to
+exploit the same to his own ends, the more his Ministers became mere
+supernumeraries.
+
+The party of Order, now allied with the Mountain, revenged itself by
+rejecting the Presidential endowment project of 1,800.000 francs, which
+the chief of the “Society of December 10” had compelled his Ministerial
+clerks to present to the Assembly. This time a majority of only 102
+votes carried the day accordingly since January 18, 27 more votes had
+fallen off: the dissolution of the party of Order was making progress.
+Lest any one might for a moment be deceived touching the meaning of its
+coalition with the Mountain, the party of Order simultaneously scorned
+even to consider a motion, signed by 189 members of the Mountain, for a
+general amnesty to political criminals. It was enough that the Minister
+of the Interior, one Baisse, declared that the national tranquility was
+only in appearance, in secret there reigned deep agitation, in secret,
+ubiquitous societies were organized, the democratic papers were
+preparing to reappear, the reports from the Departments were
+unfavorable, the fugitives of Geneva conducted a conspiracy via Lyons
+through the whole of southern France, France stood on the verge of an
+industrial and commercial crisis, the manufacturers of Roubaix were
+working shorter hours, the prisoners of Belle Isle had mutinied;—it was
+enough that even a mere Baisse should conjure up the “Red Spectre” for
+the party of Order to reject without discussion a motion that would
+have gained for the National Assembly a tremendous popularity, and
+thrown Bonaparte back into its arms. Instead of allowing itself to be
+intimidated by the Executive power with the perspective of fresh
+disturbances, the party of Order should rather have allowed a little
+elbow-room to the class struggle, in order to secure the dependence of
+the Executive upon itself. But it did not feel itself equal to the task
+of playing with fire.
+
+Meanwhile, the so-called transition Ministry vegetated along until the
+middle of April. Bonaparte tired out and fooled the National Assembly
+with constantly new Ministerial combinations. Now he seemed to intend
+constructing a republican Ministry with Lamartine and Billault; then, a
+parliamentary one with the inevitable Odillon Barrot, whose name must
+never be absent when a dupe is needed; then again, a Legitimist, with
+Batismenil and Lenoist d’Azy; and yet again, an Orleansist, with
+Malleville. While thus throwing the several factions of the party of
+Order into strained relations with one another, and alarming them all
+with the prospect of a republican Ministry, together with the
+there-upon inevitable restoration of universal suffrage, Bonaparte
+simultaneously raises in the bourgeoisie the conviction that his
+sincere efforts for a parliamentary Ministry are wrecked upon the
+irreconcilable antagonism of the royalist factions. All the while the
+bourgeoisie was clamoring louder and louder for a “strong Government,”
+and was finding it less and less pardonable to leave France “without an
+administration,” in proportion as a general commercial crisis seemed to
+be under way and making recruits for Socialism in the cities, as did
+the ruinously low price of grain in the rural districts. Trade became
+daily duller; the unemployed hands increased perceptibly; in Paris, at
+least 10,000 workingmen were without bread; in Rouen, Muehlhausen,
+Lyons, Roubaix, Tourcoign, St. Etienue, Elbeuf, etc., numerous
+factories stood idle. Under these circumstances Bonaparte could venture
+to restore, on April 11, the Ministry of January 18; Messieurs Rouher,
+Fould, Baroche, etc., reinforced by Mr. Leon Faucher, whom the
+constitutive assembly had, during its last days, unanimously, with the
+exception of five Ministerial votes, branded with a vote of censure for
+circulating false telegraphic dispatches. Accordingly, the National
+Assembly had won a victory on January 18 over the Ministry, it had, for
+the period of three months, been battling with Bonaparte, and all this
+merely to the end that, on April 11, Fould and Baroche should be able
+to take up the Puritan Faucher as third in their ministerial league.
+
+In November, 1849, Bonaparte had satisfied himself with an
+Unparliamentary, in January, 1851, with an Extra-Parliamentary, on
+April 11, he felt strong enough to form an Anti-Parliamentary Ministry,
+that harmoniously combined within itself the votes of lack of
+confidence of both assemblies-the constitutive and the legislative, the
+republican and the royalist. This ministerial progression was a
+thermometer by which the parliament could measure the ebbing
+temperature of its own life. This had sunk so low by the end of April
+that, at a personal interview, Persigny could invite Changarnier to go
+over to the camp of the President. Bonaparte, he assured Changarnier,
+considered the influence of the National Assembly to be wholly
+annihilated, and already the proclamation was ready, that was to be
+published after the steadily contemplated, but again accidentally
+postponed “coup d’etat.” Changarnier communicated this announcement of
+its death to the leaders of the party of Order; but who was there to
+believe a bed-bug bite could kill? The parliament, however beaten,
+however dissolved, however death-tainted it was, could not persuade
+itself to see, in the duel with the grotesque chief of the “Society of
+December 10,” anything but a duel with a bed-bug. But Bonaparte
+answered the party of Order as Agesilaus did King Agis: “I seem to you
+an ant; but shall one day be a lion.”
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+
+The coalition with the Mountain and the pure republicans, to which the
+party of Order found itself condemned in its fruitless efforts to keep
+possession of the military and to reconquer supreme control over the
+Executive power, proved conclusively that it had forfeited its
+independent parliamentary majority. The calendar and clock merely gave,
+on May 29, the signal for its complete dissolution. With May 29
+commenced the last year of the life of the National Assembly. It now
+had to decide for the unchanged continuance or the revision of the
+Constitution. But a revision of the Constitution meant not only the
+definitive supremacy of either the bourgeoisie of the small traders’
+democracy, of either democracy or proletarian anarchy, of either a
+parliamentary republic or Bonaparte, it meant also either Orleans or
+Bourbon! Thus fell into the very midst of the parliament the apple of
+discord, around which the conflict of interests, that cut up the party
+of Order into hostile factions, was to kindle into an open
+conflagration. The party of Order was a combination of heterogeneous
+social substances. The question of revision raised a political
+temperature, in which the product was reduced to its original
+components.
+
+The interest of the Bonapartists in the revision was simple: they were
+above all concerned in the abolition of Article 45, which forbade
+Bonaparte’s reelection and the prolongation of his term. Not less
+simple seemed to be the position of the republicans; they rejected all
+revision, seeing in that only a general conspiracy against the
+republic; as they disposed over more than one-fourth of the votes in
+the National Assembly, and, according to the Constitution, a
+three-fourths majority was requisite to revise and to call a revisory
+convention, they needed only to count their own votes to be certain of
+victory. Indeed, they were certain of it.
+
+Over and against these clear-cut positions, the party of Order found
+itself tangled in inextricable contradictions. If it voted against the
+revision, it endangered the “status quo,” by leaving to Bonaparte only
+one expedient—that of violence and handing France over, on May 2, 1852,
+at the very time of election, a prey to revolutionary anarchy, with a
+President whose authority was at an end; with a parliament that the
+party had long ceased to own, and with a people that it meant to
+re-conquer. If it voted constitutionally for a revision, it knew that
+it voted in vain and would constitutionally have to go under before the
+veto of the republicans. If, unconstitutionally, it pronounced a simple
+majority binding, it could hope to control the revolution only in case
+it surrendered unconditionally to the domination of the Executive
+power: it then made Bonaparte master of the Constitution, of the
+revision and of itself. A merely partial revision, prolonging the term
+of the President, opened the way to imperial usurpation; a general
+revision, shortening the existence of the republic, threw the dynastic
+claims into an inevitable conflict: the conditions for a Bourbon and
+those for an Orleanist restoration were not only different, they
+mutually excluded each other.
+
+The parliamentary republic was more than a neutral ground on which the
+two factions of the French bourgeoisie—Legitimists and Orleanists,
+large landed property and manufacture—could lodge together with equal
+rights. It was the indispensable condition for their common reign, the
+only form of government in which their common class interest could
+dominate both the claims of their separate factions and all the other
+classes of society. As royalists, they relapsed into their old
+antagonism into the struggle for the overlordship of either landed
+property or of money; and the highest expression of this antagonism,
+its personification, were the two kings themselves, their dynasties.
+Hence the resistance of the party of Order to the recall of the
+Bourbons.
+
+The Orleanist Representative Creton moved periodically in 1849, 1850
+and 1851 the repeal of the decree of banishment against the royal
+families; as periodically did the parliament present the spectacle of
+an Assembly of royalists who stubbornly shut to their banished kings
+the door through which they could return home. Richard III murdered
+Henry VI, with the remark that he was too good for this world, and
+belonged in heaven. They declared France too bad to have her kings back
+again. Forced by the power of circumstances, they had become
+republicans, and repeatedly sanctioned the popular mandate that exiled
+their kings from France.
+
+The revision of the Constitution, and circumstances compelled its
+consideration, at once made uncertain not only the republic itself, but
+also the joint reign of the two bourgeois factions; and it revived,
+with the possibility of the monarchy, both the rivalry of interests
+which these two factions had alternately allowed to preponderate, and
+the struggle for the supremacy of the one over the other. The diplomats
+of the party of Order believed they could allay the struggle by a
+combination of the two dynasties through a so-called fusion of the
+royalist parties and their respective royal houses. The true fusion of
+the restoration and the July monarchy was, however, the parliamentary
+republic, in which the Orleanist and Legitimist colors were dissolved,
+and the bourgeois species vanished in the plain bourgeois, in the
+bourgeois genus. Now however, the plan was to turn the Orleanist
+Legitimist and the Legitimist Orleanist. The kingship, in which their
+antagonism was personified, was to incarnate their unity, the
+expression of their exclusive faction interests was to become the
+expression of their common class interest; the monarchy was to
+accomplish what only the abolition of two monarchies—the republic could
+and did accomplish. This was the philosopher’s stone, for the finding
+of which the doctors of the party of Order were breaking their heads.
+As though the Legitimate monarchy ever could be the monarchy of the
+industrial bourgeoisie, or the bourgeois monarchy the monarchy of the
+hereditary landed aristocracy! As though landed property and industry
+could fraternize under one crown, where the crown could fall only upon
+one head, the head of the older or the younger brother! As though
+industry could at all deal upon a footing of equality with landed
+property, so long as landed property did not decide itself to become
+industrial. If Henry V were to die tomorrow, the Count of Paris would
+not, therefore, become the king of the Legitimists, unless he ceased to
+be the King of the Orleanists. Nevertheless, the fusion philosophers,
+who became louder in the measure that the question of revision stepped
+to the fore, who had provided themselves with a daily organ in the
+“Assemblee Nationale,” who, even at this very moment (February, 1852)
+are again at work, explained the whole difficulty by the opposition and
+rivalries of the two dynasties. The attempts to reconcile the family of
+Orleans with Henry V., begun since the death of Louis Philippe, but, as
+all these dynastic intrigues carried on only during the vacation of the
+National Assembly, between acts, behind the scenes, more as a
+sentimental coquetry with the old superstition than as a serious
+affair, were now raised by the party of Order to the dignity of a great
+State question, and were conducted upon the public stage, instead of,
+as heretofore in the amateurs’ theater. Couriers flew from Paris to
+Venice, from Venice to Claremont, from Claremont to Paris. The Duke of
+Chambord issues a manifesto in which he announces not his own, but the
+“national” restoration, “with the aid of all the members of his
+family.” The Oleanist Salvandy throws himself at the feet of Henry V.
+The Legitimist leaders Berryer, Benoit d’Azy, St. Priest travel to
+Claremont, to persuade the Orleans; but in vain. The fusionists learn
+too late that the interests of the two bourgeois factions neither lose
+in exclusiveness nor gain in pliancy where they sharpen to a point in
+the form of family interests, of the interests of the two royal houses.
+When Henry V. recognized the Count of Paris as his successor—the only
+success that the fusion could at best score—the house of Orleans
+acquired no claim that the childlessness of Henry V. had not already
+secured to it; but, on the other hand, it lost all the claims that it
+had conquered by the July revolution. It renounced its original claims,
+all the title, that, during a struggle nearly one hundred years long,
+it had wrested from the older branch of the Bourbons; it bartered away
+its historic prerogative, the prerogative of its family-tree. Fusion,
+accordingly, amounted to nothing else than the resignation of the house
+of Orleans, its Legitimist resignation, a repentful return from the
+Protestant State Church into the Catholic;—a return, at that, that did
+not even place it on the throne that it had lost, but on the steps of
+the throne on which it was born. The old Orleanist Ministers Guizot,
+Duchatel, etc., who likewise hastened to Claremont, to advocate the
+fusion, represented in fact only the nervous reaction of the July
+monarchy; despair, both in the citizen kingdom and the kingdom of
+citizens; the superstitious belief in legitimacy as the last amulet
+against anarchy. Mediators, in their imagination, between Orleans and
+Bourbon, they were in reality but apostate Orleanists, and as such were
+they received by the Prince of Joinville. The virile, bellicose part of
+the Orleanists, on the contrary—Thiers, Baze, etc.—, persuaded the
+family of Louis Philippe all the easier that, seeing every plan for the
+immediate restoration of the monarchy presupposed the fusion of the two
+dynasties, and every plan for fusion the resignation of the house of
+Orleans, it corresponded, on the contrary, wholly with the tradition of
+its ancestors to recognize the republic for the time being, and to wait
+until circumstances permitted I the conversion of the Presidential
+chair into a throne. Joinville’s candidacy was set afloat as a rumor,
+public curiosity was held in suspense, and a few months later, after
+the revision was rejected, openly proclaimed in September.
+
+Accordingly, the essay of a royalist fusion between Orleanists and
+Legitimists did not miscarry only, it broke up their parliamentary
+fusion, the republican form that they had adopted in common, and it
+decomposed the party of Order into its original components. But the
+wider the breach became between Venice and Claremont, the further they
+drifted away from each I other, and the greater the progress made by
+the Joinville agitation, all the more active and earnest became the
+negotiations between Faucher, the Minister of Bonaparte, and the
+Legitimists.
+
+The dissolution of the party of Order went beyond its original
+elements. Each of the two large factions fell in turn into new
+fragments. It was as if all the old political shades, that formerly
+fought and crowded one another within each of the two circles—be it
+that of the Legitimists or that of the Orleanists—, had been thawed out
+like dried infusoria by contact with water; as if they had recovered
+enough vitality to build their own groups and assert their own
+antagonisms. The Legitimists dreamed they were back amidst the quarrels
+between the Tuileries and the pavilion Marsan, between Villele and
+Polignac; the Orleanists lived anew through the golden period of the
+tourneys between Guizot, Mole, Broglie, Thiers, and Odillon Barrot.
+
+That portion of the party of Order—eager for a revision of the
+Constitution but disagreed upon the extent of revision—made up of the
+Legitimists under Berryer and Falloux and of those under Laroche
+Jacquelein, together with the tired-out Orleanists under Mole, Broglie,
+Montalembert and Odillon Barrot, united with the Bonapartist
+Representatives in the following indefinite and loosely drawn motion:
+
+“The undersigned Representatives, with the end in view of restoring to
+the nation the full exercise of her sovereignty, move that the
+Constitution be revised.”
+
+At the same time, however, they unanimously declared through their
+spokesman, Tocqueville, that the National Assembly had not the right to
+move the abolition of the republic, that right being vested only in a
+Constitutional Convention. For the rest, the Constitution could be
+revised only in a “legal” way, that is to say, only in case a
+three-fourths majority decided in favor of revision, as prescribed by
+the Constitution. After a six days’ stormy debate, the revision was
+rejected on July 19, as was to be foreseen. In its favor 446 votes were
+cast, against it 278. The resolute Oleanists, Thiers, Changarnier,
+etc., voted with the republicans and the Mountain.
+
+Thus the majority of the parliament pronounced itself against the
+Constitution, while the Constitution itself pronounced itself for the
+minority, and its decision binding. But had not the party of Order on
+May 31, 1850, had it not on June 13, 1849, subordinated the
+Constitution to the parliamentary majority? Did not the whole republic
+they had been hitherto having rest upon the subordination of the
+Constitutional clauses to the majority decisions of the parliament? Had
+they not left to the democrats the Old Testament superstitious belief
+in the letter of the law, and had they not chastised the democrats
+therefor? At this moment, however, revision meant nothing else than the
+continuance of the Presidential power, as the continuance of the
+Constitution meant nothing else than the deposition of Bonaparte. The
+parliament had pronounced itself for him, but the Constitution
+pronounced itself against the parliament. Accordingly, he acted both in
+the sense of the parliament when he tore up the Constitution, and in
+the sense of the Constitution when he chased away the parliament.
+
+The parliament pronounced the Constitution, and, thereby, also, its own
+reign, “outside of the pale of the majority”; by its decision, it
+repealed the Constitution, and continued the Presidential power, and it
+at once declared that neither could the one live nor the other die so
+long as itself existed. The feet of those who were to bury it stood at
+the door. While it was debating the subject of revision, Bonaparte
+removed General Baraguay d’Hilliers, who showed himself irresolute,
+from the command of the First Military Division, and appointed in his
+place General Magnan, the conqueror of Lyon; the hero of the December
+days, one of his own creatures, who already under Louis Philippe, on
+the occasion of the Boulogne expedition, had somewhat compromised
+himself in his favor.
+
+By its decision on the revision, the party of Order proved that it knew
+neither how to rule nor how to obey; neither how to live nor how to
+die; neither how to bear with the republic nor how to overthrow it;
+neither how to maintain the Constitution nor how to throw it overboard;
+neither how to co-operate with the President nor how to break with him.
+From what quarter did it then, look to for the solution of all the
+existing perplexities? From the calendar, from the course of events. It
+ceased to assume the control of events. It, accordingly, invited events
+to don its authority and also the power to which in its struggle with
+the people, it had yielded one attribute after another until it finally
+stood powerless before the same. To the end that the Executive be able
+all the more freely to formulate his plan of campaign against it,
+strengthen his means of attack, choose his tools, fortify his
+positions, the party of Order decided, in the very midst of this
+critical moment, to step off the stage, and adjourn for three months,
+from August 10 to November 4.
+
+Not only was the parliamentary party dissolved into its two great
+factions, not only was each of these dissolved within itself, but the
+party of Order, inside of the parliament, was at odds with the party of
+Order, outside of the parliament. The learned speakers and writers of
+the bourgeoisie, their tribunes and their press, in short, the
+ideologists of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie itself, the
+representatives and the represented, stood estranged from, and no
+longer understood one another.
+
+The Legitimists in the provinces, with their cramped horizon and their
+boundless enthusiasm, charged their parliamentary leaders Berryer and
+Falloux with desertion to the Bonapartist camp, and with apostacy from
+Henry V. Their lilymind [#1 An allusion to the lilies of the Bourbon
+coat-of-arms] believed in the fall of man, but not in diplomacy.
+
+More fatal and completer, though different, was the breach between the
+commercial bourgeoisie and its politicians. It twitted them, not as the
+Legitimists did theirs, with having apostatized from their principle,
+but, on the contrary, with adhering to principles that had become
+useless.
+
+I have already indicated that, since the entry of Fould in the
+Ministry, that portion of the commercial bourgeoisie that had enjoyed
+the lion’s share in Louis Philippe’s reign, to-wit, the aristocracy of
+finance, had become Bonapartist. Fould not only represented Bonaparte’s
+interests at the Bourse, he represented also the interests of the
+Bourse with Bonaparte. A passage from the London “Economist,” the
+European organ of the aristocracy of finance, described most strikingly
+the attitude of this class. In its issue of February 1, 1851, its Paris
+correspondent writes: “Now we have it stated from numerous quarters
+that France wishes above all things for repose. The President declares
+it in his message to the Legislative Assembly; it is echoed from the
+tribune; it is asserted in the journals; it is announced from the
+pulpit; it is demonstrated by the sensitiveness of the public funds at
+the least prospect of disturbance, and their firmness the instant it is
+made manifest that the Executive is far superior in wisdom and power to
+the factious ex-officials of all former governments.”
+
+In its issue of November 29, 1851, the “Economist” declares
+editorially: “The President is now recognized as the guardian of order
+on every Stock Exchange of Europe.” Accordingly, the Aristocracy of
+Finance condemned the parliamentary strife of the party of Order with
+the Executive as a “disturbance of order,” and hailed every victory of
+the President over its reputed representatives as a “victory of order.”
+Under “aristocracy of finance” must not, however, be understood merely
+the large bond negotiators and speculators in government securities, of
+whom it may be readily understood that their interests and the
+interests of the Government coincide. The whole modern money trade, the
+whole banking industry, is most intimately interwoven with the public
+credit. Part of their business capital requires to be invested in
+interest-bearing government securities that are promptly convertible
+into money; their deposits, i. e., the capital placed at their disposal
+and by them distributed among merchants and industrial establishments,
+flow partly out of the dividends on government securities. The whole
+money market, together with the priests of this market, is part and
+parcel of this “aristocracy of finance” at every epoch when the
+stability of the government is to them synonymous with “Moses and his
+prophets.” This is so even before things have reached the present stage
+when every deluge threatens to carry away the old governments
+themselves.
+
+But the industrial Bourgeoisie also, in its fanaticism for order, was
+annoyed at the quarrels of the Parliamentary party of Order with the
+Executive. Thiers, Anglas, Sainte Beuve, etc., received, after their
+vote of January 18, on the occasion of the discharge of Changarnier,
+public reprimands from their constituencies, located in the industrial
+districts, branding their coalition with the Mountain as an act of high
+treason to the cause of order. Although, true enough, the boastful,
+vexatious and petty intrigues, through which the struggle of the party
+of Order with the President manifested itself, deserved no better
+reception, yet notwithstanding, this bourgeois party, that expects of
+its representatives to allow the military power to pass without
+resistance out of the hands of their own Parliament into those of an
+adventurous Pretender, is not worth even the intrigues that were wasted
+in its behalf. It showed that the struggle for the maintenance of their
+public interests, of their class interests, of their political power
+only incommoded and displeased them, as a disturbance of their private
+business.
+
+The bourgeois dignitaries of the provincial towns, the magistrates,
+commercial judges, etc., with hardly any exception, received Bonaparte
+everywhere on his excursions in the most servile manner, even when, as
+in Dijon, he attacked the National Assembly and especially the party of
+Order without reserve.
+
+Business being brisk, as still at the beginning of 1851, the commercial
+bourgeoisie stormed against every Parliamentary strife, lest business
+be put out of temper. Business being dull, as from the end of February,
+1851, on, the bourgeoisie accused the Parliamentary strifes as the
+cause of the stand-still, and clamored for quiet in order that business
+may revive. The debates on revision fell just in the bad times. Seeing
+the question now was the to be or not to be of the existing form of
+government, the bourgeoisie felt itself all the more justified in
+demanding of its Representatives that they put an end to this
+tormenting provisional status, and preserve the “status quo.” This was
+no contradiction. By putting an end to the provisional status, it
+understood its continuance, the indefinite putting off of the moment
+when a final decision had to be arrived at. The “status quo” could be
+preserved in only one of two ways: either by the prolongation of
+Bonaparte’s term of office or by his constitutional withdrawal and the
+election of Cavaignac. A part of the bourgeoisie preferred the latter
+solution, and knew no better advice to give their Representatives than
+to be silent, to avoid the burning point. If their Representatives did
+not speak, so argued they, Bonaparte would not act. They desired an
+ostrich Parliament that would hide its head, in order not to be seen.
+Another part of the bourgeoisie preferred that Bonaparte, being once in
+the Presidential chair, be left in the Presidential chair, in order
+that everything might continue to run in the old ruts. They felt
+indignant that their Parliament did not openly break the Constitution
+and resign without further ado. The General Councils of the
+Departments, these provisional representative bodies of the large
+bourgeoisie, who had adjourned during the vacation of the National
+Assembly since August 25, pronounced almost unanimously for revision,
+that is to say, against the Parliament and for Bonaparte.
+
+Still more unequivocally than in its falling out with its Parliamentary
+Representatives, did the bourgeoisie exhibit its wrath at its literary
+Representatives, its own press. The verdicts of the bourgeois juries,
+inflicting excessive fines and shameless sentences of imprisonment for
+every attack of the bourgeois press upon the usurping aspirations of
+Bonaparte, for every attempt of the press to defend the political
+rights of the bourgeoisie against the Executive power, threw, not
+France alone, but all Europe into amazement.
+
+While on the one hand, as I have indicated, the Parliamentary party of
+Order ordered itself to keep the peace by screaming for peace; and
+while it pronounced the political rule of the bourgeoisie
+irreconcilable with the safety and the existence of the bourgeoisie, by
+destroying with its own hands in its struggle with the other classes of
+society all the conditions for its own, the Parliamentary regime; on
+the other hand, the mass of the bourgeoisie, outside of the Parliament,
+urged Bonaparte—by its servility towards the President, by its insults
+to the Parliament, by the brutal treatment of its own press—to suppress
+and annihilate its speaking and writing organs, its politicians and its
+literati, its orators’ tribune and its press, to the end that, under
+the protection of a strong and unhampered Government, it might ply its
+own private pursuits in safety. It declared unmistakably that it longed
+to be rid of its own political rule, in order to escape the troubles
+and dangers of ruling.
+
+And this bourgeoisie, that had rebelled against even the Parliamentary
+and literary contest for the supremacy of its own class, that had
+betrayed its leaders in this contest, it now has the effrontery to
+blame the proletariat for not having risen in its defence in a bloody
+struggle, in a struggle for life! Those bourgeois, who at every turn
+sacrificed their common class interests to narrow and dirty private
+interests, and who demanded a similar sacrifice from their own
+Representatives, now whine that the proletariat has sacrificed their
+idea-political to its own material interests! This bourgeois class now
+strikes the attitude of a pure soul, misunderstood and abandoned, at a
+critical moment, by the proletariat, that has been misled by the
+Socialists. And its cry finds a general echo in the bourgeois world. Of
+course, I do not refer to German crossroad politicians and kindred
+blockheads. I refer, for instance, to the “Economist,” which, as late
+as November 29, 1851, that is to say, four days before the “coup
+d’etat” pronounced Bonaparte the “Guardian of Order” and Thiers and
+Berryer “Anarchists,” and as early as December 27, 1851, after
+Bonaparte had silenced those very Anarchists, cries out about the
+treason committed by “the ignorant, untrained and stupid proletaires
+against the skill, knowledge, discipline, mental influence,
+intellectual resources an moral weight of the middle and upper ranks.”
+The stupid, ignorant and contemptible mass was none other than the
+bourgeoisie itself.
+
+France had, indeed; experienced a sort of commercial crisis in 1851. At
+the end of February, there was a falling off of exports as compared
+with 1850; in March, business languished and factories shut down; in
+April, the condition of the industrial departments seemed as desperate
+as after the February days; in May, business did not yet pick up; as
+late as June 28, the reports of the Bank of France revealed through a
+tremendous increase of deposits and an equal decrease of loans on
+exchange notes, the standstill of production; not until the middle of
+October did a steady improvement of business set in. The French
+bourgeoisie accounted for this stagnation of business with purely
+political reasons; it imputed the dull times to the strife between the
+Parliament and the Executive power, to the uncertainty of a provisional
+form of government, to the alarming prospects of May 2, 1852. I shall
+not deny that all these causes did depress some branches of industry in
+Paris and in the Departments. At any rate, this effect of political
+circumstances was only local and trifling. Is there any other proof
+needed than that the improvement in business set in at the very time
+when the political situation was growing worse, when the political
+horizon was growing darker, and when at every moment a stroke of
+lightning was expected out of the Elysee—in the middle of October? The
+French bourgeois, whose “skill, knowledge, mental influence and
+intellectual resources,” reach no further than his nose, could,
+moreover, during the whole period of the Industrial Exposition in
+London, have struck with his nose the cause of his own business misery.
+At the same time that, in France, the factories were being closed,
+commercial failures broke out in England. While the industrial panic
+reached its height during April and May in France, in England the
+commercial panic reached its height in April and May. The same as the
+French, the English woolen industries suffered, and, as the French, so
+did the English silk manufacture. Though the English cotton factories
+went on working, it, nevertheless, was not with the same old profit of
+1849 and 1850. The only difference was this: that in France, the crisis
+was an industrial, in England it was a commercial one; that while in
+France the factories stood still, they spread themselves in England,
+but under less favorable circumstances than they had done the years
+just previous; that, in France, the export, in England, the import
+trade suffered the heaviest blows. The common cause, which, as a matter
+of fact, is not to be looked for with-in the bounds of the French
+political horizon, was obvious. The years 1849 and 1850 were years of
+the greatest material prosperity, and of an overproduction that did not
+manifest itself until 1851. This was especially promoted at the
+beginning of 1851 by the prospect of the Industrial Exposition; and, as
+special causes, there were added, first, the failure of the cotton crop
+of 1850 and 1851; second, the certainty of a larger cotton crop than
+was expected: first, the rise, then the sudden drop; in short, the
+oscillations of the cotton market. The crop of raw silk in France had
+been below the average. Finally, the manufacture of woolen goods had
+received such an increment since 1849, that the production of wool
+could not keep step with it, and the price of the raw material rose
+greatly out of proportion to the price of the manufactured goods.
+Accordingly, we have here in the raw material of three staple articles
+a threefold material for a commercial crisis. Apart from these special
+circumstances, the seeming crisis of the year 1851 was, after all,
+nothing but the halt that overproduction and overspeculation make
+regularly in the course of the industrial cycle, before pulling all
+their forces together in order to rush feverishly over the last
+stretch, and arrive again at their point of departure—the General
+Commercial Crisis. At such intervals in the history of trade,
+commercial failures break out in England, while, in France, industry
+itself is stopped, partly because it is compelled to retreat through
+the competition of the English, that, at such times becomes resistless
+in all markets, and partly because, as an industry of luxuries, it is
+affected with preference by every stoppage of trade. Thus, besides the
+general crisis, France experiences her own national crises, which,
+how-ever, are determined by and conditioned upon the general state of
+the world’s market much more than by local French influences. It will
+not be devoid of interest to contrast the prejudgment of the French
+bourgeois with the judgment of the English bourgeois. One of the
+largest Liverpool firms writes in its yearly report of trade for 1851:
+“Few years have more completely disappointed the expectations
+entertained at their beginning than the year that has just passed;
+instead of the great prosperity, that was unanimously looked forward
+to, it proved itself one of the most discouraging years during the last
+quarter of a century. This applies, of course, only to the mercantile,
+not to the industrial classes. And yet, surely there were grounds at
+the beginning of the year from which to draw a contrary conclusion; the
+stock of products was scanty, capital was abundant, provisions cheap, a
+rich autumn was assured, there was uninterrupted peace on the continent
+and no political and financial disturbances at home; indeed, never were
+the wings of trade more unshackled. . . . What is this unfavorable
+result to be ascribed to? We believe to excessive trade in imports as
+well as exports. If our merchants do not themselves rein in their
+activity, nothing can keep us going, except a panic every three years.”
+
+Imagine now the French bourgeois, in the midst of this business panic,
+having his trade-sick brain tortured, buzzed at and deafened with
+rumors of a “coup d’etat” and the restoration of universal suffrage;
+with the struggle between the Legislature and the Executive; with the
+Fronde warfare between Orleanists and Legitimists; with communistic
+conspiracies in southern France; with alleged Jacqueries [#2 Peasant
+revolts] in the Departments of Nievre and Cher; with the advertisements
+of the several candidates for President; with “social solutions”
+huckstered about by the journals; with the threats of the republicans
+to uphold, arms in hand, the Constitution and universal suffrage; with
+the gospels, according to the emigrant heroes “in partibus,” who
+announced the destruction of the world for May 2,—imagine that, and one
+can understand how the bourgeois, in this unspeakable and noisy
+confusion of fusion, revision, prorogation, constitution, conspiracy,
+coalition, emigration, usurpation and revolution, blurts out at his
+parliamentary republic: “Rather an End With Fright, Than a Fright
+Without End.”
+
+Bonaparte understood this cry. His perspicacity was sharpened by the
+growing anxiety of the creditors’ class, who, with every sunset, that
+brought nearer the day of payment, the 2d of May, 1852, saw in the
+motion of the stars a protest against their earthly drafts. They had
+become regular astrologers The National Assembly had cut off
+Bonaparte’s hope of a constitutional prolongation of his term; the
+candidature of the Prince of Joinville tolerated no further
+vacillation.
+
+If ever an event cast its shadow before it long before its occurrence,
+it was Bonaparte’s “coup d’etat.” Already on January 29, 1849, barely a
+month after his election, he had made to Changarnier a proposition to
+that effect. His own Prime Minister. Odillon Barrot, had covertly, in
+1849, and Thiers openly in the winter of 1850, revealed the scheme of
+the “coup d’etat.” In May, 1851, Persigny had again sought to win
+Changarnier over to the “coup,” and the “Miessager de l’Assemblee”
+newspaper had published this conversation. At every parliamentary
+storm, the Bonapartist papers threatened a “coup,” and the nearer the
+crisis approached, all the louder grew their tone. At the orgies, that
+Bonaparte celebrated every night with a swell mob of males and females,
+every time the hour of midnight drew nigh and plenteous libations had
+loosened the tongues and heated the minds of the revelers, the “coup”
+was resolved upon for the next morning. Swords were then drawn, glasses
+clinked, the Representatives were thrown out at the windows, the
+imperial mantle fell upon the shoulders of Bonaparte, until the next
+morning again drove away the spook, and astonished Paris learned, from
+not very reserved Vestals and indiscreet Paladins, the danger it had
+once more escaped. During the months of September and October, the
+rumors of a “coup d’etat” tumbled close upon one another’s heels. At
+the same time the shadow gathered color, like a confused daguerreotype.
+Follow the issues of the European daily press for the months of
+September and October, and items like this will be found literally:
+
+“Rumors of a ‘coup’ fill Paris. The capital, it is said, is to be
+filled with troops by night and the next morning decrees are to be
+issued dissolving the National Assembly, placing the Department of the
+Seine in state of siege restoring universal suffrage, and appealing to
+the people. Bonaparte is rumored to be looking for Ministers to execute
+these illegal decrees.”
+
+The newspaper correspondence that brought this news always close
+ominously with “postponed.” The “coup” was ever the fixed idea of
+Bonaparte. With this idea he had stepped again upon French soil. It had
+such full possession of him that he was constantly betraying and
+blabbing it out. He was so weak that he was as constantly giving it up
+again. The shadow of the “coup” had become so familiar a spectre to the
+Parisians, that they refused to believe it when it finally did appear
+in flesh and blood. Consequently, it was neither the reticent
+backwardness of the chief of the “Society of December 10,” nor an
+unthought of surprise of the National Assembly that caused the success
+of the “coup.” When it succeeded, it did so despite his indiscretion
+and with its anticipation—a necessary, unavoidable result of the
+development that had preceded.
+
+On October 10, Bonaparte announced to his Ministers his decision to
+restore universal suffrage; on the 16th day they handed in their
+resignations; on the 26th Paris learned of the formation of the
+Thorigny Ministry. The Prefect of Police, Carlier, was simultaneously
+replaced by Maupas; and the chief of the First Military Division
+Magnan, concentrated the most reliable regiments in the capital. On
+November 4, the National Assembly re-opened its sessions. There was
+nothing left for it to do but to repeat, in short recapitulation, the
+course it had traversed, and to prove that it had been buried only
+after it had expired. The first post that it had forfeited in the
+struggle with the Executive was the Ministry. It had solemnly to admit
+this loss by accepting as genuine the Thorigny Ministry, which was but
+a pretence. The permanent Committee had received Mr. Giraud with
+laughter when he introduced himself in the name of the new Ministers.
+So weak a Ministry for so strong a measure as the restoration of
+universal suffrage! The question, however, then was to do nothing in,
+everything against the parliament.
+
+On the very day of its re-opening, the National Assembly received the
+message from Bonaparte demanding the restoration of universal suffrage
+and the repeal of the law of May 31, 1850. On the same day, his
+Ministers introduced a decree to that effect. The Assembly promptly
+rejected the motion of urgency made by the Ministers, but repealed the
+law itself, on November 13, by a vote of 355 against 348. Thus it once
+more tore to pieces its own mandate, once more certified to the fact
+that it had transformed itself from a freely chosen representative body
+of the nation into the usurpatory parliament of a class; it once more
+admitted that it had itself severed the muscles that connected the
+parliamentary head with the body of the nation.
+
+While the Executive power appealed from the National Assembly to the
+people by its motion for the restoration of universal suffrage, the
+Legislative power appealed from the people to the Army by its
+“Questors’ Bill.” This bill was to establish its right to immediate
+requisitions for troops, to build up a parliamentary army. By thus
+appointing the Army umpire between itself and the people, between
+itself and Bonaparte; by thus recognizing the Army as the decisive
+power in the State, the National Assembly was constrained to admit that
+it had long given up all claim to supremacy. By debating the right to
+make requisitions for troops, instead of forthwith collecting them, it
+betrayed its own doubts touching its own power. By thus subsequently
+rejecting the “Questors’ Bill,” it publicly confessed it impotence. The
+bill fell through with a minority of 108 votes; the Mountain had,
+accordingly, thrown the casting vote It now found itself in the
+predicament of Buridan’s donkey, not, indeed, between two sacks of hay,
+forced to decide which of the two was the more attractive, but between
+two showers of blows, forced to decide which of the two was the harder;
+fear of Changarnier, on one side, fear of Bonaparte, on the other. It
+must be admitted the position was not a heroic one.
+
+On November 18, an amendment was moved to the Act, passed by the party
+of Order, on municipal elections to the effect that, instead of three
+years, a domicile of one year should suffice. The amendment was lost by
+a single vote—but this vote, it soon transpired, was a mistake. Owing
+to the divisions within its own hostile factions, the party of Order
+had long since forfeited its independent parliamentary majority. It was
+now plain that there was no longer any majority in the parliament. The
+National Assembly had become impotent even to decide. Its atomic parts
+were no longer held together by any cohesive power; it had expended its
+last breath, it was dead.
+
+Finally, the mass of the bourgeoisie outside of the parliament was once
+more solemnly to confirm its rupture with the bourgeoisie inside of the
+parliament a few days before the catastrophe. Thiers, as a
+parliamentary hero conspicuously smitten by that incurable
+disease—Parliamentary Idiocy—, had hatched out jointly with the Council
+of State, after the death of the parliament, a new parliamentary
+intrigue in the shape of a “Responsibility Law,” that was intended to
+lock up the President within the walls of the Constitution. The same
+as, on September 15, Bonaparte bewitched the fishwives, like a second
+Massaniello, on the occasion of laying the corner-stone for the Market
+of Paris,—though, it must be admitted, one fishwife was equal to
+seventeen Burgraves in real power—; the same as, after the introduction
+of the “Questors’ Bill,” he enthused the lieutenants, who were being
+treated at the Elysee;—so, likewise, did he now, on November 25, carry
+away with him the industrial bourgeoisie, assembled at the Circus, to
+receive from his hands the prize-medals that had been awarded at the
+London Industrial Exposition. I here reproduce the typical part of his
+speech, from the “Journal des Debats”:
+
+“With such unhoped for successes, I am justified to repeat how great
+the French republic would be if she were only allowed to pursue her
+real interests, and reform her institutions, instead of being
+constantly disturbed in this by demagogues, on one side, and, on the
+other, by monarchic hallucinations. (Loud, stormy and continued
+applause from all parts of the amphitheater). The monarchic
+hallucinations hamper all progress and all serious departments of
+industry. Instead of progress, we have struggle only. Men, formerly the
+most zealous supporters of royal authority and prerogative, become the
+partisans of a convention that has no purpose other than to weaken an
+authority that is born of universal suffrage. (Loud and prolonged
+applause). We see men, who have suffered most from the revolution and
+complained bitterest of it, provoking a new one for the sole purpose of
+putting fetters on the will of the nation. . . . I promise you peace
+for the future.” (Bravo! Bravo! Stormy bravos.)
+
+Thus the industrial bourgeoisie shouts its servile “Bravo!” to the
+“coup d’etat” of December 2, to the destruction of the parliament, to
+the downfall of their own reign, to the dictatorship of Bonaparte. The
+rear of the applause of November 25 was responded to by the roar of
+cannon on December 4, and the house of Mr. Sallandrouze, who had been
+loudest in applauding, was the one demolished by most of the bombs.
+
+Cromwell, when he dissolved the Long Parliament, walked alone into its
+midst, pulled out his watch in order that the body should not continue
+to exist one minute beyond the term fixed for it by him, and drove out
+each individual member with gay and humorous invectives. Napoleon,
+smaller than his prototype, at least went on the 18th Brumaire into the
+legislative body, and, though in a tremulous voice, read to it its
+sentence of death. The second Bonaparte, who, moreover, found himself
+in possession of an executive power very different from that of either
+Cromwell or Napoleon, did not look for his model in the annals of
+universal history, but in the annals of the “Society of December 10,”
+in the annals of criminal jurisprudence. He robs the Bank of France of
+twenty-five million francs; buys General Magnan with one million and
+the soldiers with fifteen francs and a drink to each; comes secretly
+together with his accomplices like a thief by night; has the houses of
+the most dangerous leaders in the parliament broken into; Cavalignac,
+Lamorciere, Leflo, Changarnier, Charras, Thiers, Baze, etc., taken out
+of their beds; the principal places of Paris, the building of the
+parliament included, occupied with troops; and, early the next morning,
+loud-sounding placards posted on all the walls proclaiming the
+dissolution of the National Assembly and of the Council of State, the
+restoration of universal suffrage, and the placing of the Department of
+the Seine under the state of siege. In the same way he shortly after
+sneaked into the “Moniteur” a false document, according to which
+influential parliamentary names had grouped themselves round him in a
+Committee of the Nation.
+
+Amidst cries of “Long live the Republic!”, the rump-parliament,
+assembled at the Mayor’s building of the Tenth Arrondissement, and
+composed mainly of Legitimists and Orleanists, resolves to depose
+Bonaparte; it harangues in vain the gaping mass gathered before the
+building, and is finally dragged first, under the escort of African
+sharpshooters, to the barracks of Orsay, and then bundled into
+convicts’ wagons and transported to the prisons of Mazas, Ham and
+Vincennes. Thus ended the party of Order, the Legislative Assembly and
+the February revolution.
+
+Before hastening to the end, let us sum up shortly the plan of its
+history:
+
+I.—First Period. From February 24 to May 4, 1848. February period.
+Prologue. Universal fraternity swindle.
+
+II.—Second Period. Period in which the republic is constituted, and of
+the Constitutive National Assembly.
+
+1. May 4 to June 25, 1848. Struggle of all the classes against the
+house of Mr. proletariat. Defeat of the proletariat in the June days.
+
+2. June 25 to December 10, 1848. Dictatorship of the pure bourgeois
+republicans. Drafting of the Constitution. The state of siege hangs
+over Paris. The Bourgeois dictatorship set aside on December 10 by the
+election of Bonaparte as President.
+
+3. December 20, 1848, to May 20, 1849. Struggle of the Constitutive
+Assembly with Bonaparte and with the united party of Order. Death of
+the Constitutive Assembly. Downfall of the republican bourgeoisie.
+
+III.—Third Period. Period of the constitutional republic and of the
+Legislative National Assembly.
+
+1. May 29 to June 13, 1849. Struggle of the small traders’, middle
+class with the bourgeoisie and with Bonaparte. Defeat of the small
+traders’ democracy.
+
+2. June 13, 1849, to May, 1850. Parliamentary dictatorship of the party
+of Order. Completes its reign by the abolition of universal suffrage,
+but loses the parliamentary Ministry.
+
+3. May 31, 1850, to December 2, 1851. Struggle between the
+parliamentary bourgeoisie and Bonaparte.
+
+a. May 31, 1850, to January 12, 1851. The parliament loses the supreme
+command over the Army.
+
+b. January 12 to April 11, 1851. The parliament succumbs in the
+attempts to regain possession of the administrative power. The party of
+Order loses its independent parliamentary majority. Its coalition with
+the republicans and the Mountain.
+
+c. April 11 to October 9, 1851. Attempts at revision, fusion and
+prorogation. The party of Order dissolves into its component parts. The
+breach between the bourgeois parliament and the bourgeois press, on the
+one hand, and the bourgeois mass, on the other, becomes permanent.
+
+d. October 9 to December 2, 1851. Open breach between the parliament
+and the executive power. It draws up its own decree of death, and goes
+under, left in the lurch by its own class, by the Army, and by all the
+other classes. Downfall of the parliamentary regime and of the reign of
+the bourgeoisie. Bonaparte’s triumph. Parody of the imperialist
+restoration.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+
+The Social Republic appeared as a mere phrase, as a prophecy on the
+threshold of the February Revolution; it was smothered in the blood of
+the Parisian proletariat during the days of 1848 but it stalks about as
+a spectre throughout the following acts of the drama. The Democratic
+Republic next makes its bow; it goes out in a fizzle on June 13, 1849,
+with its runaway small traders; but, on fleeing, it scatters behind it
+all the more bragging announcements of what it means do to. The
+Parliamentary Republic, together with the bourgeoisie, then
+appropriates the whole stage; it lives its life to the full extent of
+its being; but the 2d of December, 1851, buries it under the
+terror-stricken cry of the allied royalists: “Long live the Republic!”
+
+The French bourgeoisie reared up against the reign of the working
+proletariat;—it brought to power the slum-proletariat, with the chief
+of the “Society of December 10” at its head. It kept France in
+breathless fear over the prospective terror of “red anarchy;”—Bonaparte
+discounted the prospect when, on December 4, he had the leading
+citizens of the Boulevard Montmartre and the Boulevard des Italiens
+shot down from their windows by the grog-inspired “Army of Order.” It
+made the apotheosis of the sabre; now the sabre rules it. It destroyed
+the revolutionary press;—now its own press is annihilated. It placed
+public meetings under police surveillance;—now its own salons are
+subject to police inspection. It disbanded the democratic National
+Guards;—now its own National Guard is disbanded. It instituted the
+state of siege;—now itself is made subject thereto. It supplanted the
+jury by military commissions;—now military commissions supplant its own
+juries. It subjected the education of the people to the parsons’
+interests;—the parsons’ interests now subject it to their own systems.
+It ordered transportations without trial;—now itself is transported
+without trial. It suppressed every movement of society with physical
+force;—now every movement of its own class is suppressed by physical
+force. Out of enthusiasm for the gold bag, it rebelled against its own
+political leaders and writers;—now, its political leaders and writers
+are set aside, but the gold hag is plundered, after the mouth of the
+bourgeoisie has been gagged and its pen broken. The bourgeoisie
+tirelessly shouted to the revolution, in the language of St. Orsenius
+to the Christians: “Fuge, Tace, Quiesce!”—flee, be silent, submit!—;
+Bonaparte shouts to the bourgeoisie: “Fuge, Tace, Oniesce!”—flee, be
+silent, submit!
+
+The French bourgeoisie had long since solved Napoleon’s dilemma: “Dans
+cinquante ans l’Europe sera republicaine ou cosaque.” [#1 Within fifty
+years Europe will be either republican or Cossack.] It found the
+solution in the “republique cosaque.” [#2 Cossack republic.] No Circe
+distorted with wicked charms the work of art of the bourgeois republic
+into a monstrosity. That republic lost nothing but the appearance of
+decency. The France of to-day was ready-made within the womb of the
+Parliamentary republic. All that was wanted was a bayonet thrust, in
+order that the bubble burst, and the monster leap forth to sight.
+
+Why did not the Parisian proletariat rise after the 2d of December?
+
+The downfall of the bourgeoisie was as yet merely decreed; the decree
+was not yet executed. Any earnest uprising of the proletariat would
+have forthwith revived this bourgeoisie, would have brought on its
+reconciliation with the army, and would have insured a second June rout
+to the workingmen.
+
+On December 4, the proletariat was incited to fight by Messrs.
+Bourgeois & Small-Trader. On the evening of that day, several legions
+of the National Guard promised to appear armed and uniformed on the
+place of battle. This arose from the circumstance that Messrs.
+Bourgeois & Small-Trader had got wind that, in one of his decrees of
+December 2, Bonaparte abolished the secret ballot, and ordered them to
+enter the words “Yes” and “No” after their names in the official
+register. Bonaparte took alarm at the stand taken on December 4. During
+the night he caused placards to be posted on all the street corners of
+Paris, announcing the restoration of the secret ballot. Messrs.
+Bourgeois & Small-Trader believed they had gained their point. The
+absentees, the next morning, were Messieurs. Bourgeois & Small-Trader.
+
+During the night of December 1 and 2, the Parisian proletariat was
+robbed of its leaders and chiefs of barricades by a raid of
+Bonaparte’s. An army without officers, disinclined by the recollections
+of June, 1848 and 1849, and May, 1850, to fight under the banner of the
+Montagnards, it left to its vanguard, the secret societies, the work of
+saving the insurrectionary honor of Paris, which the bourgeoisie had
+yielded to the soldiery so submissively that Bonaparte was later
+justified in disarming the National Guard upon the scornful ground that
+he feared their arms would be used against themselves by the
+Anarchists!
+
+“C’est Ic triomphe complet et definitif du Socialism!” Thus did Guizot
+characterize the 2d of December. But, although the downfall of the
+parliamentary republic carries with it the germ of the triumph of the
+proletarian revolution, its immediate and tangible result was the
+triumph of Bonaparte over parliament, of the Executive over the
+Legislative power, of force without phrases over the force of phrases.
+In the parliament, the nation raised its collective will to the dignity
+of law, i.e., it raised the law of the ruling class to the dignity of
+its collective will. Before the Executive power, the nation abdicates
+all will of its own, and submits to the orders of an outsider of
+Authority. In contrast with the Legislative, the Executive power
+expresses the heteronomy of the nation in contrast with its autonomy.
+Accordingly, France seems to have escaped the despotism of a class only
+in order to fall under the despotism of an individual, under the
+authority, at that of an individual without authority The struggle
+seems to settle down to the point where all classes drop down on their
+knees, equally impotent and equally dumb.
+
+All the same, the revolution is thoroughgoing. It still is on its
+passage through purgatory. It does its work methodically: Down to
+December 2, 1851, it had fulfilled one-half of its programme, it now
+fulfils the other half. It first ripens the power of the Legislature
+into fullest maturity in order to be able to overthrow it. Now that it
+has accomplished that, the revolution proceeds to ripen the power of
+the Executive into equal maturity; it reduces this power to its purest
+expression; isolates it; places it before itself as the sole subject
+for reproof in order to concentrate against it all the revolutionary
+forces of destruction. When the revolution shall have accomplished this
+second part of its preliminary programme, Europe will jump up from her
+seat to exclaim: “Well hast thou grubbed, old mole!”
+
+The Executive power, with its tremendous bureaucratic and military
+organization; with its wide-spreading and artificial machinery of
+government—an army of office-holders, half a million strong, together
+with a military force of another million men—; this fearful body of
+parasites, that coils itself like a snake around French society,
+stopping all its pores, originated at the time of the absolute
+monarchy, along with the decline of feudalism, which it helped to
+hasten. The princely privileges of the landed proprietors and cities
+were transformed into so many at-tributes of the Executive power; the
+feudal dignitaries into paid office-holders; and the confusing design
+of conflicting medieval seigniories, into the well regulated plan of a
+government, work is subdivided and centralized as in the factory. The
+first French revolution, having as a mission to sweep away all local,
+territorial, urban and provincial special privileges, with the object
+of establishing the civic unity of the nation, was hound to develop
+what the absolute monarchy had begun—the work of centralization,
+together with the range, the attributes and the menials of government.
+Napoleon completed this governmental machinery. The Legitimist and the
+July Monarchy contribute nothing thereto, except a greater subdivision
+of labor, that grew in the same measure as the division and subdivision
+of labor within bourgeois society raised new groups and interests,
+i.e., new material for the administration of government. Each Common
+interest was in turn forthwith removed from society, set up against it
+as a higher Collective interest, wrested from the individual activity
+of the members of society, and turned into a subject for governmental
+administration, from the bridges, the school house and the communal
+property of a village community, up to the railroads, the national
+wealth and the national University of France. Finally, the
+parliamentary republic found itself, in its struggle against the
+revolution, compelled, with its repressive measures, to strengthen the
+means and the centralization of the government. Each overturn, instead
+of breaking up, carried this machine to higher perfection. The parties,
+that alternately wrestled for supremacy, looked upon the possession of
+this tremendous governmental structure as the principal spoils of their
+victory.
+
+Nevertheless, under the absolute monarchy, was only the means whereby
+the first revolution, and under Napoleon, to prepare the class rule of
+the bourgeoisie; under the restoration, under Louis Philippe, and under
+the parliamentary republic, it was the instrument of the ruling class,
+however eagerly this class strained after autocracy. Not before the
+advent of the second Bonaparte does the government seem to have made
+itself fully independent. The machinery of government has by this time
+so thoroughly fortified itself against society, that the chief of the
+“Society of December 10” is thought good enough to be at its head; a
+fortune-hunter, run in from abroad, is raised on its shield by a
+drunken soldiery, bought by himself with liquor and sausages, and whom
+he is forced ever again to throw sops to. Hence the timid despair, the
+sense of crushing humiliation and degradation that oppresses the breast
+of France and makes her to choke. She feels dishonored.
+
+And yet the French Government does not float in the air. Bonaparte
+represents an economic class, and that the most numerous in the
+commonweal of France—the Allotment Farmer. [#4 The first French
+Revolution distributed the bulk of the territory of France, held at the
+time by the feudal lords, in small patches among the cultivators of the
+soil. This allotment of lands created the French farmer class.]
+
+As the Bourbons are the dynasty of large landed property, as the
+Orleans are the dynasty of money, so are the Bonapartes the dynasty of
+the farmer, i.e. of the French masses. Not the Bonaparte, who threw
+himself at the feet of the bourgeois parliament, but the Bonaparte, who
+swept away the bourgeois parliament, is the elect of this farmer class.
+For three years the cities had succeeded in falsifying the meaning of
+the election of December 10, and in cheating the farmer out of the
+restoration of the Empire. The election of December 10, 1848, is not
+carried out until the “coup d’etat” of December 2, 1851.
+
+The allotment farmers are an immense mass, whose individual members
+live in identical conditions, without, however, entering into manifold
+relations with one another. Their method of production isolates them
+from one another, instead of drawing them into mutual intercourse. This
+isolation is promoted by the poor means of communication in France,
+together with the poverty of the farmers themselves. Their field of
+production, the small allotment of land that each cultivates, allows no
+room for a division of labor, and no opportunity for the application of
+science; in other words, it shuts out manifoldness of development,
+diversity of talent, and the luxury of social relations. Every single
+farmer family is almost self-sufficient; itself produces directly the
+greater part of what it consumes; and it earns its livelihood more by
+means of an interchange with nature than by intercourse with society.
+We have the allotted patch of land, the farmer and his family;
+alongside of that another allotted patch of land, another farmer and
+another family. A bunch of these makes up a village; a bunch of
+villages makes up a Department. Thus the large mass of the French
+nation is constituted by the simple addition of equal magnitudes—much
+as a bag with potatoes constitutes a potato-bag. In so far as millions
+of families live under economic conditions that separate their mode of
+life, their interests and their culture from those of the other
+classes, and that place them in an attitude hostile toward the latter,
+they constitute a class; in so far as there exists only a local
+connection among these farmers, a connection which the individuality
+and exclusiveness of their interests prevent from generating among them
+any unity of interest, national connections, and political
+organization, they do not constitute a class. Consequently, they are
+unable to assert their class interests in their own name, be it by a
+parliament or by convention. They can not represent one another, they
+must themselves be represented. Their representative must at the same
+time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited
+governmental power, that protects them from above, bestows rain and
+sunshine upon them. Accordingly, the political influence of the
+allotment farmer finds its ultimate expression in an Executive power
+that subjugates the commonweal to its own autocratic will.
+
+Historic tradition has given birth to the superstition among the French
+farmers that a man named Napoleon would restore to them all manner of
+glory. Now, then, an individual turns I up, who gives himself out as
+that man because, obedient to the “Code Napoleon,” which provides that
+“La recherche de la paternite est interdite,” [#5 The inquiry into
+paternity is forbidden.] he carries the name of Napoleon. [#6 L. N.
+Bonaparte is said to have been an illegitimate son.] After a
+vagabondage of twenty years, and a series of grotesque adventures, the
+myth is verified, and that man becomes the Emperor of the French. The
+rooted thought of the Nephew becomes a reality because it coincided
+with the rooted thought of the most numerous class among the French.
+
+“But,” I shall be objected to, “what about the farmers’ uprisings over
+half France, the raids of the Army upon the farmers, the wholesale
+imprisonment and transportation of farmers?”
+
+Indeed, since Louis XIV., France has not experienced such persecutions
+of the farmer on the ground of his demagogic machinations.
+
+But this should be well understood: The Bonaparte dynasty does not
+represent the revolutionary, it represents the conservative farmer; it
+does not represent the farmer, who presses beyond his own economic
+conditions, his little allotment of land it represents him rather who
+would confirm these conditions; it does not represent the rural
+population, that, thanks to its own inherent energy, wishes, jointly
+with the cities to overthrow the old order, it represents, on the
+contrary, the rural population that, hide-bound in the old order, seeks
+to see itself, together with its allotments, saved and favored by the
+ghost of the Empire; it represents, not the intelligence, but the
+superstition of the farmer; not his judgment, but his bias; not his
+future, but his past; not his modern Cevennes; [#7 The Cevennes were
+the theater of the most numerous revolutionary uprisings of the farmer
+class.] but his modern Vendee. [#8 La Vendee was the theater of
+protracted reactionary uprisings of the farmer class under the first
+Revolution.]
+
+The three years’ severe rule of the parliamentary republic had freed a
+part of the French farmers from the Napoleonic illusion, and, though
+even only superficially; had revolutionized them The bourgeoisie threw
+them, however, violently back every time that they set themselves in
+motion. Under the parliamentary republic, the modern wrestled with the
+traditional consciousness of the French farmer. The process went on in
+the form of a continuous struggle between the school teachers and the
+parsons;—the bourgeoisie knocked the school teachers down. For the
+first time, the farmer made an effort to take an independent stand in
+the government of the country; this manifested itself in the prolonged
+conflicts of the Mayors with the Prefects;—the bourgeoisie deposed the
+Mayors. Finally, during period of the parliamentary republic, the
+farmers of several localities rose against their own product, the
+Army;—the bourgeoisie punished them with states of siege and
+executions. And this is the identical bourgeoisie, that now howls over
+the “stupidity of the masses,” over the “vile multitude,” which, it
+claims, betrayed it to Bonaparte. Itself has violently fortified the
+imperialism of the farmer class; it firmly maintained the conditions
+that Constitute the birth-place of this farmer-religion. Indeed, the
+bourgeoisie has every reason to fear the stupidity of the masses—so
+long as they remain conservative; and their intelligence—so soon as
+they become revolutionary.
+
+In the revolts that took place after the “coup d’etat” a part of the
+French farmers protested, arms in hand, against their own vote of
+December 10, 1848. The school house had, since 1848, sharpened their
+wits. But they had bound themselves over to the nether world of
+history, and history kept them to their word. Moreover, the majority of
+this population was still so full of prejudices that, just in the
+“reddest” Departments, it voted openly for Bonaparte. The National
+Assembly prevented, as it thought, this population from walking; the
+farmers now snapped the fetters which the cities had struck upon the
+will of the country districts. In some places they even indulged the
+grotesque hallucination of a “Convention together with a Napoleon.”
+
+After the first revolution had converted the serf farmers into
+freeholders, Napoleon fixed and regulated the conditions under which,
+unmolested, they could exploit the soil of France, that had just fallen
+into their hands, and expiate the youthful passion for property. But
+that which now bears the French farmer down is that very allotment of
+land, it is the partition of the soil, the form of ownership, which
+Napoleon had consolidated. These are the material condition that turned
+French feudal peasant into a small or allotment farmer, and Napoleon
+into an Emperor. Two generations have sufficed to produce the
+inevitable result the progressive deterioration of agriculture, and the
+progressive encumbering of the agriculturist The “Napoleonic” form of
+ownership, which, at the beginning of the nineteenth century was the
+condition for the emancipation and enrichment of the French rural
+population, has, in the course of the century, developed into the law
+of their enslavement and pauperism. Now, then, this very law is the
+first of the “idees Napoleoniennes,” which the second Bonaparte must
+uphold. If he still shares with the farmers the illusion of seeking,
+not in the system of the small allotment itself, but outside of that
+system, in the influence of secondary conditions, the cause of their
+ruin, his experiments are bound to burst like soap-bubbles against the
+modern system of production.
+
+The economic development of the allotment system has turned bottom
+upward the relation of the farmer to the other classes of society.
+Under Napoleon, the parceling out of the agricultural lands into small
+allotments supplemented in the country the free competition and the
+incipient large production of the cities. The farmer class was the
+ubiquitous protest against the aristocracy of land, just then
+overthrown. The roots that the system of small allotments cast into the
+soil of France, deprived feudalism of all nutriment. Its boundary-posts
+constituted the natural buttress of the bourgeoisie against every
+stroke of the old overlords. But in the course of the nineteenth
+century, the City Usurer stepped into the shoes of the Feudal Lord, the
+Mortgage substituted the Feudal Duties formerly yielded by the soil,
+bourgeois Capital took the place of the aristocracy of Landed Property.
+The former allotments are now only a pretext that allows the capitalist
+class to draw profit, interest and rent from agricultural lands, and to
+leave to the farmer himself the task of seeing to it that he knock out
+his wages. The mortgage indebtedness that burdens the soil of France
+imposes upon the French farmer class they payment of an interest as
+great as the annual interest on the whole British national debt. In
+this slavery of capital, whither its development drives it
+irresistibly, the allotment system has transformed the mass of the
+French nation into troglodytes. Sixteen million farmers (women and
+children included), house in hovels most of which have only one
+opening, some two, and the few most favored ones three. Windows are to
+a house what the five senses are to the head. The bourgeois social
+order, which, at the beginning of the century, placed the State as a
+sentinel before the newly instituted allotment, and that manured this
+with laurels, has become a vampire that sucks out its heart-blood and
+its very brain, and throws it into the alchemist’s pot of capital. The
+“Code Napoleon” is now but the codex of execution, of sheriff’s sales
+and of intensified taxation. To the four million (children, etc.,
+included) official paupers, vagabonds, criminals and prostitutes, that
+France numbers, must be added five million souls who hover over the
+precipice of life, and either sojourn in the country itself, or float
+with their rags and their children from the country to the cities, and
+from the cities back to the country. Accordingly, the interests of the
+farmers are no longer, as under Napoleon, in harmony but in conflict
+with the interests of the bourgeoisie, i.e., with capital; they find
+their natural allies and leaders among the urban proletariat, whose
+mission is the overthrow of the bourgeois social order. But the “strong
+and unlimited government”—and this is the second of the “idees
+Napoleoniennes,” which the second Napoleon has to carried out—, has for
+its mission the forcible defence of this very “material” social order,
+a “material order” that furnishes the slogan in Bonaparte’s
+proclamations against the farmers in revolt.
+
+Along with the mortgage, imposed by capital upon the farmer’s
+allotment, this is burdened by taxation. Taxation is the fountain of
+life to the bureaucracy, the Army, the parsons and the court, in short
+to the whole apparatus of the Executive power. A strong government, and
+heavy taxes are identical. The system of ownership, involved in the
+system of allotments lends itself by nature for the groundwork of a
+powerful and numerous bureaucracy: it produces an even level of
+conditions and of persons over the whole surface of the country; it,
+therefore, allows the exercise of an even influence upon all parts of
+this even mass from a high central point downwards: it annihilates the
+aristocratic gradations between the popular masses and the Government;
+it, consequently, calls from all sides for the direct intervention of
+the Government and for the intervention of the latter’s immediate
+organs; and, finally, it produces an unemployed excess of population,
+that finds no room either in the country or in the cities, that,
+consequently, snatches after public office as a sort of dignified alms,
+and provokes the creation of further offices. With the new markets,
+which he opened at the point of the bayonet, and with the plunder of
+the continent, Napoleon returned to the farmer class with interest the
+taxes wrung from them. These taxes were then a goad to the industry of
+the farmer, while now, on the contrary, they rob his industry of its
+last source of support, and completely sap his power to resist poverty.
+Indeed, an enormous bureaucracy, richly gallooned and well fed is that
+“idee Napoleonienne” that above all others suits the requirements of
+the second Bonaparte. How else should it be, seeing he is forced to
+raise alongside of the actual classes of society, an artificial class,
+to which the maintenance of his own regime must be a knife-and-fork
+question? One of his first financial operations was, accordingly, the
+raising of the salaries of the government employees to their former
+standard and the creation of new sinecures.
+
+Another “idee Napoleonienne” is the rule of the parsons as an
+instrument of government. But while the new-born allotment, in harmony
+with society, in its dependence upon the powers of nature, and in its
+subordination to the authority that protected it from above, was
+naturally religious, the debt-broken allotment, on the contrary, at
+odds with society and authority, and driven beyond its own narrow
+bounds, becomes as naturally irreligious. Heaven was quite a pretty
+gift thrown in with the narrow strip of land that had just been won,
+all the more as it makes the weather; it, however, becomes an insult
+from the moment it is forced upon the farmer as a substitute for his
+allotment. Then the parson appears merely as the anointed blood-hound
+of the earthly police,—yet another “idee Napoleonienne.” The expedition
+against Rome will next time take place in France, but in a reverse
+sense from that of M. de Montalembert.
+
+Finally, the culminating point of the “idees Napoleoniennes” is the
+preponderance of the Army. The Army was the “point of honor” with the
+allotment farmers: it was themselves turned into masters, defending
+abroad their newly established property, glorifying their recently
+conquered nationality, plundering and revolutionizing the world. The
+uniform was their State costume; war was their poetry; the allotment,
+expanded and rounded up in their phantasy, was the fatherland; and
+patriotism became the ideal form of property. But the foe, against whom
+the French farmer must now defend his property, are not the Cossacks,
+they are the sheriffs and the tax collectors. The allotment no longer
+lies in the so-called fatherland, but in the register of mortgages. The
+Army itself no longer is the flower of the youth of the farmers, it is
+the swamp-blossom of the slum-proletariat of the farmer class. It
+consists of “remplacants,” substitutes, just as the second Bonaparte
+himself is but a “remplacant,” a substitute, for Napoleon. Its feats of
+heroism are now performed in raids instituted against farmers and in
+the service of the police;—and when the internal contradictions of his
+own system shall drive the chief of the “Society of December 10” across
+the French frontier, that Army will, after a few bandit-raids, gather
+no laurels but only hard knocks.
+
+It is evident that all the “idees Napoleoniennes” are the ideas of the
+undeveloped and youthfully fresh allotment; they are an absurdity for
+the allotment that now survives. They are only the hallucinations of
+its death struggle; words turned to hollow phrases, spirits turned to
+spooks. But this parody of the Empire was requisite in order to free
+the mass of the French nation from the weight of tradition, and to
+elaborate sharply the contrast between Government and Society. Along
+with the progressive decay of the allotment, the governmental
+structure, reared upon it, breaks down. The centralization of
+Government, required by modern society, rises only upon the ruins of
+the military and bureaucratic governmental machinery that was forged in
+contrast to feudalism.
+
+The conditions of the French farmers’ class solve to us the riddle of
+the general elections of December 20 and 21, that led the second
+Bonaparte to the top of Sinai, not to receive, but to decree laws.
+
+The bourgeoisie had now, manifestly, no choice but to elect Bonaparte.
+When at the Council of Constance, the puritans complained of the sinful
+life of the Popes, and moaned about the need of a reform in morals,
+Cardinal d’Ailly thundered into their faces: “Only the devil in his Own
+person can now save the Catholic Church, and you demand angels.” So,
+likewise, did the French bourgeoisie cry out after the “coup d’etat”:
+“Only the chief of the ‘Society of December 10’ can now save bourgeois
+society, only theft can save property, only perjury religion, only
+bastardy the family, only disorder order!”
+
+Bonaparte, as autocratic Executive power, fulfills his mission to
+secure “bourgeois order.” But the strength of this bourgeois order lies
+in the middle class. He feels himself the representative of the middle
+class, and issues his decrees in that sense. Nevertheless, he is
+something only because he has broken the political power of this class,
+and daily breaks it anew. Hence he feels himself the adversary of the
+political and the literary power of the middle class. But, by
+protecting their material, he nourishes anew their political power.
+Consequently, the cause must be kept alive, but the result, wherever it
+manifests itself, swept out of existence. But this procedure is
+impossible without slight mistakings of causes and effects, seeing that
+both, in their mutual action and reaction, lose their distinctive
+marks. Thereupon, new decrees, that blur the line of distinction.
+Bonaparte, furthermore, feels himself, as against the bourgeoisie, the
+representative of the farmer and the people in general, who, within
+bourgeois society, is to render the lower classes of society happy. To
+this end, new decrees, intended to exploit the “true Socialists,”
+together with their governmental wisdom. But, above all, Bonaparte
+feels himself the chief of the “Society of December 10,” the
+representative of the slum-proletariat, to which he himself, his
+immediate surroundings, his Government, and his army alike belong, the
+main object with all of whom is to be good to themselves, and draw
+Californian tickets out of the national treasury. An he affirms his
+chieftainship of the “Society of December 10” with decrees, without
+decrees, and despite decrees.
+
+This contradictory mission of the man explains the contradictions of
+his own Government, and that confused groping about, that now seeks to
+win, then to humiliate now this class and then that, and finishes by
+arraying against itself all the classes; whose actual insecurity
+constitutes a highly comical contrast with the imperious, categoric
+style of the Government acts, copied closely from the Uncle.
+
+Industry and commerce, i.e., the business of the middle class, are to
+be made to blossom in hot-house style under the “strong Government.”
+Loans for a number of railroad grants. But the Bonapartist
+slum-proletariat is to enrich itself. Peculation is carried on with
+railroad concessions on the Bourse by the initiated; but no capital is
+forthcoming for the railroads. The bank then pledges itself to make
+advances upon railroad stock; but the bank is itself to be exploited;
+hence, it must be cajoled; it is released of the obligation to publish
+its reports weekly. Then follows a leonine treaty between the bank and
+the Government. The people are to be occupied: public works are
+ordered; but the public works raise the tax rates upon the people;
+thereupon the taxes are reduced by an attack upon the national
+bond-holders through the conversion of the five per cent “rentes” [#9
+The name of the French national bonds.] into four-and-halves. Yet the
+middle class must again be tipped: to this end, the tax on wine is
+doubled for the people, who buy it at retail, and is reduced to
+one-half for the middle class, that drink it at wholesale. Genuine
+labor organizations are dissolved, but promises are made of future
+wonders to accrue from organization. The farmers are to be helped:
+mortgage-banks are set up that must promote the indebtedness; of the
+farmer and the concentration of property but again, these banks are to
+be utilized especially to the end of squeezing money out of the
+confiscated estates of the House of Orleans; no capitalist will listen
+to this scheme, which, moreover, is not mentioned in the decree; the
+mortgage bank remains a mere decree, etc., etc.
+
+Bonaparte would like to appear as the patriarchal benefactor of all
+classes; but he can give to none without taking from the others. As was
+said of the Duke of Guise, at the time of the Fronde, that he was the
+most obliging man in France because he had converted all his estates
+into bonds upon himself for his Parisians, so would Napoleon like to be
+the most obliging man in France and convert all property and all labor
+of France into a personal bond upon himself. He would like to steal the
+whole of France to make a present thereof to France, or rather to be
+able to purchase France back again with French money;—as chief of the
+“Society of December 10,” he must purchase that which is to be his. All
+the State institutions, the Senate, the Council of State, the
+Legislature, the Legion of Honor, the Soldiers’ decorations, the public
+baths, the public buildings, the railroads, the General Staff of the
+National Guard, exclusive of the rank and file, the confiscated estates
+of the House of Orleans,—all are converted into institutions for
+purchase and sale. Every place in the Army and the machinery of
+Government becomes a purchasing power. The most important thing,
+however, in this process, whereby France is taken to be given back to
+herself, are the percentages that, in the transfer, drop into the hands
+of the chief and the members of the “Society of December 10.” The
+witticisms with which the Countess of L., the mistress of de Morny,
+characterized the confiscations of the Orleanist estates: “C’est le
+premier vol de l’aigle,” [#10 “It is the first flight of the eagle” The
+French word “vol” means theft as well as flight.] fits every fight of
+the eagle that is rather a crow. He himself and his followers daily
+call out to themselves, like the Italian Carthusian monk in the legend
+does to the miser, who displayfully counted the goods on which he could
+live for many years to come: “Tu fai conto sopra i beni, bisogna prima
+far il conto sopra gli anni.” [#11 “You count your property you should
+rather count the years left to you.”] In order not to make a mistake in
+the years, they count by minutes. A crowd of fellows, of the best among
+whom all that can be said is that one knows not whence he comes—a
+noisy, restless “Boheme,” greedy after plunder, that crawls about in
+gallooned frocks with the same grotesque dignity as Soulonque’s [#12
+Soulonque was the negro Emperor of the short-lived negro Empire of
+Hayti.] Imperial dignitaries—, thronged the court crowded the
+ministries, and pressed upon the head of the Government and of the
+Army. One can picture to himself this upper crust of the “Society of
+December 10” by considering that Veron Crevel [#13 Crevel is a
+character of Balzac, drawn after Dr. Veron, the proprietor of the
+“Constitutional” newspaper, as a type of the dissolute Parisian
+Philistine.] is their preacher of morality, and Granier de Cassagnac
+their thinker. When Guizot, at the time he was Minister, employed this
+Granier on an obscure sheet against the dynastic opposition, he used to
+praise him with the term: “C’est le roi des droles.” [#14 “He Is the
+king of the clowns.”] It were a mistake to recall the days of the
+Regency or of Louis XV. by the court and the kit of Louis Bonaparte’s:
+“Often did France have a mistress-administration, but never yet an
+administration of kept men.” [#15 Madame de Girardin.]
+
+Harassed by the contradictory demands of his situation, and compelled,
+like a sleight-of-hands performer, to keep, by means of constant
+surprises, the eyes of the public riveted upon himself as the
+substitute of Napoleon, compelled, consequently, everyday to accomplish
+a sort of “coup” on a small scale, Bonaparte throws the whole bourgeois
+social system into disorder; he broaches everything that seemed
+unbroachable by the revolution of 1848; he makes one set people patient
+under the revolution and another anxious for it; he produces anarchy
+itself in the name of order by rubbing off from the whole machinery of
+Government the veneer of sanctity, by profaning it, by rendering it at
+once nauseating and laughable. He rehearses in Paris the cult of the
+sacred coat of Trier with the cult of the Napoleonic Imperial mantle.
+But when the Imperial Mantle shall have finally fallen upon the
+shoulders of Louis Bonaparte, then will also the iron statue of
+Napoleon drop down from the top of the Vendome column. [#16 A prophecy
+that a few years later, after Bonaparte’s coronation as Emperor, was
+literally fulfilled. By order of Emperor Louis Napoleon, the military
+statue of the Napoleon that originally surmounted the Vendome was taken
+down and replaced by one of first Napoleon in imperial robes.]
+
+
+
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE ***
+
+***** This file should be named 1346-0.txt or 1346-0.zip *****
+This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
+    https://www.gutenberg.org/1/3/4/1346/
+
+Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will
+be renamed.
+
+Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright
+law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works,
+so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the
+United States without permission and without paying copyright
+royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part
+of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm
+concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark,
+and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following
+the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use
+of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
+copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very
+easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation
+of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project
+Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away--you may
+do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected
+by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark
+license, especially commercial redistribution.
+
+START: FULL LICENSE
+
+THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
+PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
+
+To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
+distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
+(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full
+Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at
+www.gutenberg.org/license.
+
+Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+
+1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
+and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
+(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all
+the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or
+destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your
+possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a
+Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound
+by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the
+person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph
+1.E.8.
+
+1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be
+used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
+agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few
+things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See
+paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this
+agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
+
+1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the
+Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection
+of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual
+works in the collection are in the public domain in the United
+States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the
+United States and you are located in the United States, we do not
+claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing,
+displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as
+all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope
+that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting
+free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm
+works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the
+Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily
+comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the
+same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when
+you share it without charge with others.
+
+1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
+what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are
+in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States,
+check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this
+agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing,
+distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any
+other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no
+representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any
+country other than the United States.
+
+1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
+
+1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other
+immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear
+prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work
+on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the
+phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed,
+performed, viewed, copied or distributed:
+
+  This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
+  most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
+  restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
+  under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
+  eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
+  United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
+  you are located before using this eBook.
+
+1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is
+derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not
+contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the
+copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in
+the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are
+redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply
+either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or
+obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm
+trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
+
+1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
+with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
+must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any
+additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms
+will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works
+posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the
+beginning of this work.
+
+1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
+work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.
+
+1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
+electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
+prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
+active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm License.
+
+1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
+compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including
+any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access
+to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format
+other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official
+version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm website
+(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense
+to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means
+of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain
+Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the
+full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
+
+1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
+performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
+unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
+
+1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
+access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+provided that:
+
+* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
+  the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
+  you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed
+  to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has
+  agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project
+  Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid
+  within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are
+  legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty
+  payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project
+  Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in
+  Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg
+  Literary Archive Foundation."
+
+* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
+  you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
+  does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+  License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
+  copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue
+  all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm
+  works.
+
+* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of
+  any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
+  electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of
+  receipt of the work.
+
+* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
+  distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than
+are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing
+from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of
+the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the Foundation as set
+forth in Section 3 below.
+
+1.F.
+
+1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
+effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
+works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project
+Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may
+contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate
+or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
+intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or
+other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
+cannot be read by your equipment.
+
+1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
+of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
+liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
+fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
+LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
+PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
+TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
+LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
+INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+DAMAGE.
+
+1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
+defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
+receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
+written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you
+received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium
+with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you
+with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in
+lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person
+or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
+opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If
+the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing
+without further opportunities to fix the problem.
+
+1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
+in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO
+OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
+
+1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
+warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
+damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement
+violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the
+agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or
+limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or
+unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the
+remaining provisions.
+
+1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
+trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
+providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in
+accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the
+production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses,
+including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of
+the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this
+or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or
+additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any
+Defect you cause.
+
+Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
+electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
+computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It
+exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations
+from people in all walks of life.
+
+Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
+assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
+goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
+remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
+and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future
+generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see
+Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at
+www.gutenberg.org
+
+Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit
+501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
+state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
+Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
+number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by
+U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.
+
+The Foundation's business office is located at 809 North 1500 West,
+Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up
+to date contact information can be found at the Foundation's website
+and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact
+
+Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without
+widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
+increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
+freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest
+array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations
+($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
+status with the IRS.
+
+The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
+charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
+States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
+considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
+with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations
+where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND
+DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular
+state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate
+
+While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
+have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
+against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
+approach us with offers to donate.
+
+International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
+any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
+outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
+
+Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation
+methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other
+ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To
+donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate
+
+Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+
+Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be
+freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
+distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of
+volunteer support.
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
+editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in
+the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not
+necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper
+edition.
+
+Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
+facility: www.gutenberg.org
+
+This website includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
+including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
+subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
+
+