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diff --git a/old/130.txt b/old/130.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..001be3b --- /dev/null +++ b/old/130.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6242 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Orthodoxy, by G. K. Chesterton + + +************************************************************* +THERE IS AN IMPROVED HTML EDITION OF THIS TITLE WITH A LINKED +TABLE OF CONTENTS WHICH MAY BE VIEWED AS EBOOK (# 16769) at https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/16769 +************************************************************* + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Orthodoxy + + +Author: G. K. Chesterton + + + +Release Date: May, 1994 [eBook #130] +[Most recently updated: September 26, 2005] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ORTHODOXY*** + + +This etext was proofread by Martin Ward and compared against a separate +copy scanned by Mike Perry. + + + +ORTHODOXY + +by + +GILBERT K. CHESTERTON + + + + + + + +PREFACE + + + This book is meant to be a companion to "Heretics," and to +put the positive side in addition to the negative. Many critics +complained of the book called "Heretics" because it merely criticised +current philosophies without offering any alternative philosophy. +This book is an attempt to answer the challenge. It is unavoidably +affirmative and therefore unavoidably autobiographical. The writer has +been driven back upon somewhat the same difficulty as that which beset +Newman in writing his Apologia; he has been forced to be egotistical +only in order to be sincere. While everything else may be different +the motive in both cases is the same. It is the purpose of the writer +to attempt an explanation, not of whether the Christian Faith can +be believed, but of how he personally has come to believe it. +The book is therefore arranged upon the positive principle of a riddle +and its answer. It deals first with all the writer's own solitary +and sincere speculations and then with all the startling style in +which they were all suddenly satisfied by the Christian Theology. +The writer regards it as amounting to a convincing creed. But if +it is not that it is at least a repeated and surprising coincidence. + + Gilbert K. Chesterton. + + + + + +CONTENTS + + + I. Introduction in Defence of Everything Else + II. The Maniac + III. The Suicide of Thought + IV. The Ethics of Elfland + V. The Flag of the World + VI. The Paradoxes of Christianity + VII. The Eternal Revolution +VIII. The Romance of Orthodoxy + IX. Authority and the Adventurer + + + + + +ORTHODOXY + + + +I INTRODUCTION IN DEFENCE OF EVERYTHING ELSE + + + THE only possible excuse for this book is that it is an answer +to a challenge. Even a bad shot is dignified when he accepts a duel. +When some time ago I published a series of hasty but sincere papers, +under the name of "Heretics," several critics for whose intellect +I have a warm respect (I may mention specially Mr. G.S.Street) +said that it was all very well for me to tell everybody to affirm +his cosmic theory, but that I had carefully avoided supporting my +precepts with example. "I will begin to worry about my philosophy," +said Mr. Street, "when Mr. Chesterton has given us his." +It was perhaps an incautious suggestion to make to a person +only too ready to write books upon the feeblest provocation. +But after all, though Mr. Street has inspired and created this book, +he need not read it. If he does read it, he will find that in +its pages I have attempted in a vague and personal way, in a set +of mental pictures rather than in a series of deductions, to state +the philosophy in which I have come to believe. I will not call it +my philosophy; for I did not make it. God and humanity made it; +and it made me. + + I have often had a fancy for writing a romance about an English +yachtsman who slightly miscalculated his course and discovered England +under the impression that it was a new island in the South Seas. +I always find, however, that I am either too busy or too lazy to +write this fine work, so I may as well give it away for the purposes +of philosophical illustration. There will probably be a general +impression that the man who landed (armed to the teeth and talking +by signs) to plant the British flag on that barbaric temple which +turned out to be the Pavilion at Brighton, felt rather a fool. +I am not here concerned to deny that he looked a fool. But if you +imagine that he felt a fool, or at any rate that the sense of folly +was his sole or his dominant emotion, then you have not studied +with sufficient delicacy the rich romantic nature of the hero +of this tale. His mistake was really a most enviable mistake; +and he knew it, if he was the man I take him for. What could +be more delightful than to have in the same few minutes all the +fascinating terrors of going abroad combined with all the humane +security of coming home again? What could be better than to have +all the fun of discovering South Africa without the disgusting +necessity of landing there? What could be more glorious than to +brace one's self up to discover New South Wales and then realize, +with a gush of happy tears, that it was really old South Wales. +This at least seems to me the main problem for philosophers, and is +in a manner the main problem of this book. How can we contrive +to be at once astonished at the world and yet at home in it? +How can this queer cosmic town, with its many-legged citizens, +with its monstrous and ancient lamps, how can this world give us +at once the fascination of a strange town and the comfort and honour +of being our own town? + + To show that a faith or a philosophy is true from every +standpoint would be too big an undertaking even for a much bigger +book than this; it is necessary to follow one path of argument; +and this is the path that I here propose to follow. I wish to set +forth my faith as particularly answering this double spiritual need, +the need for that mixture of the familiar and the unfamiliar +which Christendom has rightly named romance. For the very word +"romance" has in it the mystery and ancient meaning of Rome. +Any one setting out to dispute anything ought always to begin by +saying what he does not dispute. Beyond stating what he proposes +to prove he should always state what he does not propose to prove. +The thing I do not propose to prove, the thing I propose to take +as common ground between myself and any average reader, is this +desirability of an active and imaginative life, picturesque and full +of a poetical curiosity, a life such as western man at any rate always +seems to have desired. If a man says that extinction is better +than existence or blank existence better than variety and adventure, +then he is not one of the ordinary people to whom I am talking. +If a man prefers nothing I can give him nothing. But nearly all +people I have ever met in this western society in which I live +would agree to the general proposition that we need this life +of practical romance; the combination of something that is strange +with something that is secure. We need so to view the world as to +combine an idea of wonder and an idea of welcome. We need to be +happy in this wonderland without once being merely comfortable. +It is THIS achievement of my creed that I shall chiefly pursue in +these pages. + + But I have a peculiar reason for mentioning the man in +a yacht, who discovered England. For I am that man in a yacht. +I discovered England. I do not see how this book can avoid +being egotistical; and I do not quite see (to tell the truth) +how it can avoid being dull. Dulness will, however, free me from +the charge which I most lament; the charge of being flippant. +Mere light sophistry is the thing that I happen to despise most of +all things, and it is perhaps a wholesome fact that this is the thing +of which I am generally accused. I know nothing so contemptible +as a mere paradox; a mere ingenious defence of the indefensible. +If it were true (as has been said) that Mr. Bernard Shaw lived +upon paradox, then he ought to be a mere common millionaire; +for a man of his mental activity could invent a sophistry every +six minutes. It is as easy as lying; because it is lying. +The truth is, of course, that Mr. Shaw is cruelly hampered by the +fact that he cannot tell any lie unless he thinks it is the truth. +I find myself under the same intolerable bondage. I never in my life +said anything merely because I thought it funny; though of course, +I have had ordinary human vainglory, and may have thought it funny +because I had said it. It is one thing to describe an interview +with a gorgon or a griffin, a creature who does not exist. +It is another thing to discover that the rhinoceros does exist +and then take pleasure in the fact that he looks as if he didn't. +One searches for truth, but it may be that one pursues instinctively +the more extraordinary truths. And I offer this book with the +heartiest sentiments to all the jolly people who hate what I write, +and regard it (very justly, for all I know), as a piece of poor +clowning or a single tiresome joke. + + For if this book is a joke it is a joke against me. +I am the man who with the utmost daring discovered what had been +discovered before. If there is an element of farce in what follows, +the farce is at my own expense; for this book explains how I fancied I +was the first to set foot in Brighton and then found I was the last. +It recounts my elephantine adventures in pursuit of the obvious. +No one can think my case more ludicrous than I think it myself; +no reader can accuse me here of trying to make a fool of him: +I am the fool of this story, and no rebel shall hurl me from +my throne. I freely confess all the idiotic ambitions of the end +of the nineteenth century. I did, like all other solemn little boys, +try to be in advance of the age. Like them I tried to be some ten +minutes in advance of the truth. And I found that I was eighteen +hundred years behind it. I did strain my voice with a painfully +juvenile exaggeration in uttering my truths. And I was punished +in the fittest and funniest way, for I have kept my truths: +but I have discovered, not that they were not truths, but simply that +they were not mine. When I fancied that I stood alone I was really +in the ridiculous position of being backed up by all Christendom. +It may be, Heaven forgive me, that I did try to be original; +but I only succeeded in inventing all by myself an inferior copy +of the existing traditions of civilized religion. The man from +the yacht thought he was the first to find England; I thought I was +the first to find Europe. I did try to found a heresy of my own; +and when I had put the last touches to it, I discovered that it +was orthodoxy. + + It may be that somebody will be entertained by the account +of this happy fiasco. It might amuse a friend or an enemy to +read how I gradually learnt from the truth of some stray legend +or from the falsehood of some dominant philosophy, things that I +might have learnt from my catechism--if I had ever learnt it. +There may or may not be some entertainment in reading how I +found at last in an anarchist club or a Babylonian temple what I +might have found in the nearest parish church. If any one is +entertained by learning how the flowers of the field or the +phrases in an omnibus, the accidents of politics or the pains +of youth came together in a certain order to produce a certain +conviction of Christian orthodoxy, he may possibly read this book. +But there is in everything a reasonable division of labour. +I have written the book, and nothing on earth would induce me to read it. + + I add one purely pedantic note which comes, as a note +naturally should, at the beginning of the book. These essays are +concerned only to discuss the actual fact that the central Christian +theology (sufficiently summarized in the Apostles' Creed) is the +best root of energy and sound ethics. They are not intended +to discuss the very fascinating but quite different question +of what is the present seat of authority for the proclamation +of that creed. When the word "orthodoxy" is used here it means +the Apostles' Creed, as understood by everybody calling himself +Christian until a very short time ago and the general historic +conduct of those who held such a creed. I have been forced by +mere space to confine myself to what I have got from this creed; +I do not touch the matter much disputed among modern Christians, +of where we ourselves got it. This is not an ecclesiastical treatise +but a sort of slovenly autobiography. But if any one wants my +opinions about the actual nature of the authority, Mr. G.S.Street +has only to throw me another challenge, and I will write him another book. + + + +II THE MANIAC + + + Thoroughly worldly people never understand even the world; +they rely altogether on a few cynical maxims which are not true. +Once I remember walking with a prosperous publisher, who made +a remark which I had often heard before; it is, indeed, almost a +motto of the modern world. Yet I had heard it once too often, +and I saw suddenly that there was nothing in it. The publisher +said of somebody, "That man will get on; he believes in himself." +And I remember that as I lifted my head to listen, my eye caught +an omnibus on which was written "Hanwell." I said to him, +"Shall I tell you where the men are who believe most in themselves? +For I can tell you. I know of men who believe in themselves more +colossally than Napoleon or Caesar. I know where flames the fixed +star of certainty and success. I can guide you to the thrones of +the Super-men. The men who really believe in themselves are all in +lunatic asylums." He said mildly that there were a good many men after +all who believed in themselves and who were not in lunatic asylums. +"Yes, there are," I retorted, "and you of all men ought to know them. +That drunken poet from whom you would not take a dreary tragedy, +he believed in himself. That elderly minister with an epic from +whom you were hiding in a back room, he believed in himself. +If you consulted your business experience instead of your ugly +individualistic philosophy, you would know that believing in himself +is one of the commonest signs of a rotter. Actors who can't +act believe in themselves; and debtors who won't pay. It would +be much truer to say that a man will certainly fail, because he +believes in himself. Complete self-confidence is not merely a sin; +complete self-confidence is a weakness. Believing utterly in one's +self is a hysterical and superstitious belief like believing in +Joanna Southcote: the man who has it has `Hanwell' written on his +face as plain as it is written on that omnibus." And to all this +my friend the publisher made this very deep and effective reply, +"Well, if a man is not to believe in himself, in what is he to believe?" +After a long pause I replied, "I will go home and write a book in answer +to that question." This is the book that I have written in answer +to it. + + But I think this book may well start where our argument started-- +in the neighbourhood of the mad-house. Modern masters of science are +much impressed with the need of beginning all inquiry with a fact. +The ancient masters of religion were quite equally impressed with +that necessity. They began with the fact of sin--a fact as practical +as potatoes. Whether or no man could be washed in miraculous +waters, there was no doubt at any rate that he wanted washing. +But certain religious leaders in London, not mere materialists, +have begun in our day not to deny the highly disputable water, +but to deny the indisputable dirt. Certain new theologians dispute +original sin, which is the only part of Christian theology which can +really be proved. Some followers of the Reverend R.J.Campbell, in +their almost too fastidious spirituality, admit divine sinlessness, +which they cannot see even in their dreams. But they essentially +deny human sin, which they can see in the street. The strongest +saints and the strongest sceptics alike took positive evil as the +starting-point of their argument. If it be true (as it certainly is) +that a man can feel exquisite happiness in skinning a cat, +then the religious philosopher can only draw one of two deductions. +He must either deny the existence of God, as all atheists do; or he +must deny the present union between God and man, as all Christians do. +The new theologians seem to think it a highly rationalistic solution +to deny the cat. + + In this remarkable situation it is plainly not now possible +(with any hope of a universal appeal) to start, as our fathers did, +with the fact of sin. This very fact which was to them (and is to me) +as plain as a pikestaff, is the very fact that has been specially +diluted or denied. But though moderns deny the existence of sin, +I do not think that they have yet denied the existence of a +lunatic asylum. We all agree still that there is a collapse of +the intellect as unmistakable as a falling house. Men deny hell, +but not, as yet, Hanwell. For the purpose of our primary argument +the one may very well stand where the other stood. I mean that as +all thoughts and theories were once judged by whether they tended +to make a man lose his soul, so for our present purpose all modern +thoughts and theories may be judged by whether they tend to make +a man lose his wits. + + It is true that some speak lightly and loosely of insanity +as in itself attractive. But a moment's thought will show that if +disease is beautiful, it is generally some one else's disease. +A blind man may be picturesque; but it requires two eyes to see +the picture. And similarly even the wildest poetry of insanity can +only be enjoyed by the sane. To the insane man his insanity is +quite prosaic, because it is quite true. A man who thinks himself +a chicken is to himself as ordinary as a chicken. A man who thinks +he is a bit of glass is to himself as dull as a bit of glass. +It is the homogeneity of his mind which makes him dull, and which +makes him mad. It is only because we see the irony of his idea +that we think him even amusing; it is only because he does not see +the irony of his idea that he is put in Hanwell at all. In short, +oddities only strike ordinary people. Oddities do not strike +odd people. This is why ordinary people have a much more exciting time; +while odd people are always complaining of the dulness of life. +This is also why the new novels die so quickly, and why the old +fairy tales endure for ever. The old fairy tale makes the hero +a normal human boy; it is his adventures that are startling; +they startle him because he is normal. But in the modern +psychological novel the hero is abnormal; the centre is not central. +Hence the fiercest adventures fail to affect him adequately, +and the book is monotonous. You can make a story out of a hero +among dragons; but not out of a dragon among dragons. The fairy +tale discusses what a sane man will do in a mad world. The sober +realistic novel of to-day discusses what an essential lunatic will +do in a dull world. + + Let us begin, then, with the mad-house; from this evil and fantastic +inn let us set forth on our intellectual journey. Now, if we are +to glance at the philosophy of sanity, the first thing to do in the +matter is to blot out one big and common mistake. There is a notion +adrift everywhere that imagination, especially mystical imagination, +is dangerous to man's mental balance. Poets are commonly spoken of as +psychologically unreliable; and generally there is a vague association +between wreathing laurels in your hair and sticking straws in it. +Facts and history utterly contradict this view. Most of the very +great poets have been not only sane, but extremely business-like; +and if Shakespeare ever really held horses, it was because he was much +the safest man to hold them. Imagination does not breed insanity. +Exactly what does breed insanity is reason. Poets do not go mad; +but chess-players do. Mathematicians go mad, and cashiers; +but creative artists very seldom. I am not, as will be seen, +in any sense attacking logic: I only say that this danger does +lie in logic, not in imagination. Artistic paternity is as +wholesome as physical paternity. Moreover, it is worthy of remark +that when a poet really was morbid it was commonly because he had +some weak spot of rationality on his brain. Poe, for instance, +really was morbid; not because he was poetical, but because he +was specially analytical. Even chess was too poetical for him; +he disliked chess because it was full of knights and castles, +like a poem. He avowedly preferred the black discs of draughts, +because they were more like the mere black dots on a diagram. +Perhaps the strongest case of all is this: that only one great English +poet went mad, Cowper. And he was definitely driven mad by logic, +by the ugly and alien logic of predestination. Poetry was not +the disease, but the medicine; poetry partly kept him in health. +He could sometimes forget the red and thirsty hell to which his +hideous necessitarianism dragged him among the wide waters and +the white flat lilies of the Ouse. He was damned by John Calvin; +he was almost saved by John Gilpin. Everywhere we see that men +do not go mad by dreaming. Critics are much madder than poets. +Homer is complete and calm enough; it is his critics who tear him +into extravagant tatters. Shakespeare is quite himself; it is only +some of his critics who have discovered that he was somebody else. +And though St. John the Evangelist saw many strange monsters in +his vision, he saw no creature so wild as one of his own commentators. +The general fact is simple. Poetry is sane because it floats +easily in an infinite sea; reason seeks to cross the infinite sea, +and so make it finite. The result is mental exhaustion, +like the physical exhaustion of Mr. Holbein. To accept everything +is an exercise, to understand everything a strain. The poet only +desires exaltation and expansion, a world to stretch himself in. +The poet only asks to get his head into the heavens. It is the logician +who seeks to get the heavens into his head. And it is his head +that splits. + + It is a small matter, but not irrelevant, that this striking +mistake is commonly supported by a striking misquotation. We have +all heard people cite the celebrated line of Dryden as "Great genius +is to madness near allied." But Dryden did not say that great genius +was to madness near allied. Dryden was a great genius himself, +and knew better. It would have been hard to find a man more romantic +than he, or more sensible. What Dryden said was this, "Great wits +are oft to madness near allied"; and that is true. It is the pure +promptitude of the intellect that is in peril of a breakdown. +Also people might remember of what sort of man Dryden was talking. +He was not talking of any unworldly visionary like Vaughan or +George Herbert. He was talking of a cynical man of the world, +a sceptic, a diplomatist, a great practical politician. Such men +are indeed to madness near allied. Their incessant calculation +of their own brains and other people's brains is a dangerous trade. +It is always perilous to the mind to reckon up the mind. A flippant +person has asked why we say, "As mad as a hatter." A more flippant +person might answer that a hatter is mad because he has to measure +the human head. + + And if great reasoners are often maniacal, it is equally true +that maniacs are commonly great reasoners. When I was engaged +in a controversy with the CLARION on the matter of free will, +that able writer Mr. R.B.Suthers said that free will was lunacy, +because it meant causeless actions, and the actions of a lunatic +would be causeless. I do not dwell here upon the disastrous lapse +in determinist logic. Obviously if any actions, even a lunatic's, +can be causeless, determinism is done for. If the chain of +causation can be broken for a madman, it can be broken for a man. +But my purpose is to point out something more practical. +It was natural, perhaps, that a modern Marxian Socialist should not +know anything about free will. But it was certainly remarkable that +a modern Marxian Socialist should not know anything about lunatics. +Mr. Suthers evidently did not know anything about lunatics. +The last thing that can be said of a lunatic is that his actions +are causeless. If any human acts may loosely be called causeless, +they are the minor acts of a healthy man; whistling as he walks; +slashing the grass with a stick; kicking his heels or rubbing +his hands. It is the happy man who does the useless things; +the sick man is not strong enough to be idle. It is exactly such +careless and causeless actions that the madman could never understand; +for the madman (like the determinist) generally sees too much cause +in everything. The madman would read a conspiratorial significance +into those empty activities. He would think that the lopping +of the grass was an attack on private property. He would think +that the kicking of the heels was a signal to an accomplice. +If the madman could for an instant become careless, he would +become sane. Every one who has had the misfortune to talk with people +in the heart or on the edge of mental disorder, knows that their +most sinister quality is a horrible clarity of detail; a connecting +of one thing with another in a map more elaborate than a maze. +If you argue with a madman, it is extremely probable that you will +get the worst of it; for in many ways his mind moves all the quicker +for not being delayed by the things that go with good judgment. +He is not hampered by a sense of humour or by charity, or by the dumb +certainties of experience. He is the more logical for losing certain +sane affections. Indeed, the common phrase for insanity is in this +respect a misleading one. The madman is not the man who has lost +his reason. The madman is the man who has lost everything except +his reason. + + The madman's explanation of a thing is always complete, and often +in a purely rational sense satisfactory. Or, to speak more strictly, +the insane explanation, if not conclusive, is at least unanswerable; +this may be observed specially in the two or three commonest kinds +of madness. If a man says (for instance) that men have a conspiracy +against him, you cannot dispute it except by saying that all the men +deny that they are conspirators; which is exactly what conspirators +would do. His explanation covers the facts as much as yours. +Or if a man says that he is the rightful King of England, it is no +complete answer to say that the existing authorities call him mad; +for if he were King of England that might be the wisest thing for the +existing authorities to do. Or if a man says that he is Jesus Christ, +it is no answer to tell him that the world denies his divinity; +for the world denied Christ's. + + Nevertheless he is wrong. But if we attempt to trace his error +in exact terms, we shall not find it quite so easy as we had supposed. +Perhaps the nearest we can get to expressing it is to say this: +that his mind moves in a perfect but narrow circle. A small circle +is quite as infinite as a large circle; but, though it is quite +as infinite, it is not so large. In the same way the insane explanation +is quite as complete as the sane one, but it is not so large. +A bullet is quite as round as the world, but it is not the world. +There is such a thing as a narrow universality; there is such +a thing as a small and cramped eternity; you may see it in many +modern religions. Now, speaking quite externally and empirically, +we may say that the strongest and most unmistakable MARK of madness +is this combination between a logical completeness and a spiritual +contraction. The lunatic's theory explains a large number of things, +but it does not explain them in a large way. I mean that if you +or I were dealing with a mind that was growing morbid, we should be +chiefly concerned not so much to give it arguments as to give it air, +to convince it that there was something cleaner and cooler outside +the suffocation of a single argument. Suppose, for instance, +it were the first case that I took as typical; suppose it were +the case of a man who accused everybody of conspiring against him. +If we could express our deepest feelings of protest and appeal +against this obsession, I suppose we should say something like this: +"Oh, I admit that you have your case and have it by heart, +and that many things do fit into other things as you say. I admit +that your explanation explains a great deal; but what a great deal it +leaves out! Are there no other stories in the world except yours; +and are all men busy with your business? Suppose we grant the details; +perhaps when the man in the street did not seem to see you it was +only his cunning; perhaps when the policeman asked you your name it +was only because he knew it already. But how much happier you would +be if you only knew that these people cared nothing about you! +How much larger your life would be if your self could become smaller +in it; if you could really look at other men with common curiosity +and pleasure; if you could see them walking as they are in their +sunny selfishness and their virile indifference! You would begin +to be interested in them, because they were not interested in you. +You would break out of this tiny and tawdry theatre in which your +own little plot is always being played, and you would find yourself +under a freer sky, in a street full of splendid strangers." +Or suppose it were the second case of madness, that of a man who +claims the crown, your impulse would be to answer, "All right! +Perhaps you know that you are the King of England; but why do you care? +Make one magnificent effort and you will be a human being and look +down on all the kings of the earth." Or it might be the third case, +of the madman who called himself Christ. If we said what we felt, +we should say, "So you are the Creator and Redeemer of the world: +but what a small world it must be! What a little heaven you must inhabit, +with angels no bigger than butterflies! How sad it must be to be God; +and an inadequate God! Is there really no life fuller and no love +more marvellous than yours; and is it really in your small and painful +pity that all flesh must put its faith? How much happier you would be, +how much more of you there would be, if the hammer of a higher God +could smash your small cosmos, scattering the stars like spangles, +and leave you in the open, free like other men to look up as well +as down!" + + And it must be remembered that the most purely practical science +does take this view of mental evil; it does not seek to argue with it +like a heresy but simply to snap it like a spell. Neither modern +science nor ancient religion believes in complete free thought. +Theology rebukes certain thoughts by calling them blasphemous. +Science rebukes certain thoughts by calling them morbid. For example, +some religious societies discouraged men more or less from thinking +about sex. The new scientific society definitely discourages men from +thinking about death; it is a fact, but it is considered a morbid fact. +And in dealing with those whose morbidity has a touch of mania, +modern science cares far less for pure logic than a dancing Dervish. +In these cases it is not enough that the unhappy man should desire truth; +he must desire health. Nothing can save him but a blind hunger +for normality, like that of a beast. A man cannot think himself +out of mental evil; for it is actually the organ of thought that has +become diseased, ungovernable, and, as it were, independent. He can +only be saved by will or faith. The moment his mere reason moves, +it moves in the old circular rut; he will go round and round his +logical circle, just as a man in a third-class carriage on the Inner +Circle will go round and round the Inner Circle unless he performs +the voluntary, vigorous, and mystical act of getting out at Gower Street. +Decision is the whole business here; a door must be shut for ever. +Every remedy is a desperate remedy. Every cure is a miraculous cure. +Curing a madman is not arguing with a philosopher; it is casting +out a devil. And however quietly doctors and psychologists may go +to work in the matter, their attitude is profoundly intolerant-- +as intolerant as Bloody Mary. Their attitude is really this: +that the man must stop thinking, if he is to go on living. +Their counsel is one of intellectual amputation. If thy HEAD +offend thee, cut it off; for it is better, not merely to enter +the Kingdom of Heaven as a child, but to enter it as an imbecile, +rather than with your whole intellect to be cast into hell-- +or into Hanwell. + + Such is the madman of experience; he is commonly a reasoner, +frequently a successful reasoner. Doubtless he could be vanquished +in mere reason, and the case against him put logically. But it can +be put much more precisely in more general and even aesthetic terms. +He is in the clean and well-lit prison of one idea: he is +sharpened to one painful point. He is without healthy hesitation +and healthy complexity. Now, as I explain in the introduction, +I have determined in these early chapters to give not so much +a diagram of a doctrine as some pictures of a point of view. And I +have described at length my vision of the maniac for this reason: +that just as I am affected by the maniac, so I am affected by most +modern thinkers. That unmistakable mood or note that I hear +from Hanwell, I hear also from half the chairs of science and seats +of learning to-day; and most of the mad doctors are mad doctors +in more senses than one. They all have exactly that combination we +have noted: the combination of an expansive and exhaustive reason +with a contracted common sense. They are universal only in the +sense that they take one thin explanation and carry it very far. +But a pattern can stretch for ever and still be a small pattern. +They see a chess-board white on black, and if the universe is paved +with it, it is still white on black. Like the lunatic, they cannot +alter their standpoint; they cannot make a mental effort and suddenly +see it black on white. + + Take first the more obvious case of materialism. As an explanation +of the world, materialism has a sort of insane simplicity. It has +just the quality of the madman's argument; we have at once the sense +of it covering everything and the sense of it leaving everything out. +Contemplate some able and sincere materialist, as, for instance, +Mr. McCabe, and you will have exactly this unique sensation. +He understands everything, and everything does not seem +worth understanding. His cosmos may be complete in every rivet +and cog-wheel, but still his cosmos is smaller than our world. +Somehow his scheme, like the lucid scheme of the madman, seems unconscious +of the alien energies and the large indifference of the earth; +it is not thinking of the real things of the earth, of fighting +peoples or proud mothers, or first love or fear upon the sea. +The earth is so very large, and the cosmos is so very small. +The cosmos is about the smallest hole that a man can hide his head in. + + It must be understood that I am not now discussing the relation +of these creeds to truth; but, for the present, solely their relation +to health. Later in the argument I hope to attack the question of +objective verity; here I speak only of a phenomenon of psychology. +I do not for the present attempt to prove to Haeckel that materialism +is untrue, any more than I attempted to prove to the man who thought +he was Christ that he was labouring under an error. I merely remark +here on the fact that both cases have the same kind of completeness +and the same kind of incompleteness. You can explain a man's +detention at Hanwell by an indifferent public by saying that it +is the crucifixion of a god of whom the world is not worthy. +The explanation does explain. Similarly you may explain the order +in the universe by saying that all things, even the souls of men, +are leaves inevitably unfolding on an utterly unconscious tree-- +the blind destiny of matter. The explanation does explain, +though not, of course, so completely as the madman's. But the point +here is that the normal human mind not only objects to both, +but feels to both the same objection. Its approximate statement +is that if the man in Hanwell is the real God, he is not much +of a god. And, similarly, if the cosmos of the materialist is the +real cosmos, it is not much of a cosmos. The thing has shrunk. +The deity is less divine than many men; and (according to Haeckel) +the whole of life is something much more grey, narrow, and trivial +than many separate aspects of it. The parts seem greater than +the whole. + + + For we must remember that the materialist philosophy (whether +true or not) is certainly much more limiting than any religion. +In one sense, of course, all intelligent ideas are narrow. +They cannot be broader than themselves. A Christian is only +restricted in the same sense that an atheist is restricted. +He cannot think Christianity false and continue to be a Christian; +and the atheist cannot think atheism false and continue to be +an atheist. But as it happens, there is a very special sense +in which materialism has more restrictions than spiritualism. +Mr. McCabe thinks me a slave because I am not allowed to believe +in determinism. I think Mr. McCabe a slave because he is not +allowed to believe in fairies. But if we examine the two vetoes we +shall see that his is really much more of a pure veto than mine. +The Christian is quite free to believe that there is a considerable +amount of settled order and inevitable development in the universe. +But the materialist is not allowed to admit into his spotless machine +the slightest speck of spiritualism or miracle. Poor Mr. McCabe +is not allowed to retain even the tiniest imp, though it might be +hiding in a pimpernel. The Christian admits that the universe is +manifold and even miscellaneous, just as a sane man knows that he +is complex. The sane man knows that he has a touch of the beast, +a touch of the devil, a touch of the saint, a touch of the citizen. +Nay, the really sane man knows that he has a touch of the madman. +But the materialist's world is quite simple and solid, just as +the madman is quite sure he is sane. The materialist is sure +that history has been simply and solely a chain of causation, +just as the interesting person before mentioned is quite sure that +he is simply and solely a chicken. Materialists and madmen never +have doubts. + + Spiritual doctrines do not actually limit the mind as do +materialistic denials. Even if I believe in immortality I need not think +about it. But if I disbelieve in immortality I must not think about it. +In the first case the road is open and I can go as far as I like; +in the second the road is shut. But the case is even stronger, +and the parallel with madness is yet more strange. For it was our +case against the exhaustive and logical theory of the lunatic that, +right or wrong, it gradually destroyed his humanity. Now it is the charge +against the main deductions of the materialist that, right or wrong, +they gradually destroy his humanity; I do not mean only kindness, +I mean hope, courage, poetry, initiative, all that is human. +For instance, when materialism leads men to complete fatalism (as it +generally does), it is quite idle to pretend that it is in any sense +a liberating force. It is absurd to say that you are especially +advancing freedom when you only use free thought to destroy free will. +The determinists come to bind, not to loose. They may well call +their law the "chain" of causation. It is the worst chain that ever +fettered a human being. You may use the language of liberty, +if you like, about materialistic teaching, but it is obvious that this +is just as inapplicable to it as a whole as the same language when +applied to a man locked up in a mad-house. You may say, if you like, +that the man is free to think himself a poached egg. But it is +surely a more massive and important fact that if he is a poached egg +he is not free to eat, drink, sleep, walk, or smoke a cigarette. +Similarly you may say, if you like, that the bold determinist +speculator is free to disbelieve in the reality of the will. +But it is a much more massive and important fact that he is not +free to raise, to curse, to thank, to justify, to urge, to punish, +to resist temptations, to incite mobs, to make New Year resolutions, +to pardon sinners, to rebuke tyrants, or even to say "thank you" +for the mustard. + + In passing from this subject I may note that there is a queer +fallacy to the effect that materialistic fatalism is in some way +favourable to mercy, to the abolition of cruel punishments or +punishments of any kind. This is startlingly the reverse of the truth. +It is quite tenable that the doctrine of necessity makes no difference +at all; that it leaves the flogger flogging and the kind friend +exhorting as before. But obviously if it stops either of them it +stops the kind exhortation. That the sins are inevitable does not +prevent punishment; if it prevents anything it prevents persuasion. +Determinism is quite as likely to lead to cruelty as it is certain +to lead to cowardice. Determinism is not inconsistent with the +cruel treatment of criminals. What it is (perhaps) inconsistent +with is the generous treatment of criminals; with any appeal to +their better feelings or encouragement in their moral struggle. +The determinist does not believe in appealing to the will, but he does +believe in changing the environment. He must not say to the sinner, +"Go and sin no more," because the sinner cannot help it. But he +can put him in boiling oil; for boiling oil is an environment. +Considered as a figure, therefore, the materialist has the fantastic +outline of the figure of the madman. Both take up a position +at once unanswerable and intolerable. + + Of course it is not only of the materialist that all this is true. +The same would apply to the other extreme of speculative logic. +There is a sceptic far more terrible than he who believes that +everything began in matter. It is possible to meet the sceptic +who believes that everything began in himself. He doubts not the +existence of angels or devils, but the existence of men and cows. +For him his own friends are a mythology made up by himself. +He created his own father and his own mother. This horrible +fancy has in it something decidedly attractive to the somewhat +mystical egoism of our day. That publisher who thought that men +would get on if they believed in themselves, those seekers after +the Superman who are always looking for him in the looking-glass, +those writers who talk about impressing their personalities instead +of creating life for the world, all these people have really only +an inch between them and this awful emptiness. Then when this +kindly world all round the man has been blackened out like a lie; +when friends fade into ghosts, and the foundations of the world fail; +then when the man, believing in nothing and in no man, is alone +in his own nightmare, then the great individualistic motto shall +be written over him in avenging irony. The stars will be only dots +in the blackness of his own brain; his mother's face will be only +a sketch from his own insane pencil on the walls of his cell. +But over his cell shall be written, with dreadful truth, "He believes +in himself." + + + All that concerns us here, however, is to note that this +panegoistic extreme of thought exhibits the same paradox as the +other extreme of materialism. It is equally complete in theory +and equally crippling in practice. For the sake of simplicity, +it is easier to state the notion by saying that a man can believe +that he is always in a dream. Now, obviously there can be no positive +proof given to him that he is not in a dream, for the simple reason +that no proof can be offered that might not be offered in a dream. +But if the man began to burn down London and say that his housekeeper +would soon call him to breakfast, we should take him and put him +with other logicians in a place which has often been alluded to in +the course of this chapter. The man who cannot believe his senses, +and the man who cannot believe anything else, are both insane, +but their insanity is proved not by any error in their argument, +but by the manifest mistake of their whole lives. They have both +locked themselves up in two boxes, painted inside with the sun +and stars; they are both unable to get out, the one into the +health and happiness of heaven, the other even into the health +and happiness of the earth. Their position is quite reasonable; +nay, in a sense it is infinitely reasonable, just as a threepenny +bit is infinitely circular. But there is such a thing as a mean +infinity, a base and slavish eternity. It is amusing to notice +that many of the moderns, whether sceptics or mystics, have taken +as their sign a certain eastern symbol, which is the very symbol +of this ultimate nullity. When they wish to represent eternity, +they represent it by a serpent with his tail in his mouth. There is +a startling sarcasm in the image of that very unsatisfactory meal. +The eternity of the material fatalists, the eternity of the +eastern pessimists, the eternity of the supercilious theosophists +and higher scientists of to-day is, indeed, very well presented +by a serpent eating his tail, a degraded animal who destroys even himself. + + This chapter is purely practical and is concerned with what +actually is the chief mark and element of insanity; we may say +in summary that it is reason used without root, reason in the void. +The man who begins to think without the proper first principles goes mad; +he begins to think at the wrong end. And for the rest of these pages +we have to try and discover what is the right end. But we may ask +in conclusion, if this be what drives men mad, what is it that keeps +them sane? By the end of this book I hope to give a definite, +some will think a far too definite, answer. But for the moment it +is possible in the same solely practical manner to give a general +answer touching what in actual human history keeps men sane. +Mysticism keeps men sane. As long as you have mystery you have health; +when you destroy mystery you create morbidity. The ordinary man has +always been sane because the ordinary man has always been a mystic. +He has permitted the twilight. He has always had one foot in earth +and the other in fairyland. He has always left himself free to doubt +his gods; but (unlike the agnostic of to-day) free also to believe +in them. He has always cared more for truth than for consistency. +If he saw two truths that seemed to contradict each other, +he would take the two truths and the contradiction along with them. +His spiritual sight is stereoscopic, like his physical sight: +he sees two different pictures at once and yet sees all the better +for that. Thus he has always believed that there was such a thing +as fate, but such a thing as free will also. Thus he believed +that children were indeed the kingdom of heaven, but nevertheless +ought to be obedient to the kingdom of earth. He admired youth +because it was young and age because it was not. It is exactly +this balance of apparent contradictions that has been the whole +buoyancy of the healthy man. The whole secret of mysticism is this: +that man can understand everything by the help of what he does +not understand. The morbid logician seeks to make everything lucid, +and succeeds in making everything mysterious. The mystic allows +one thing to be mysterious, and everything else becomes lucid. +The determinist makes the theory of causation quite clear, +and then finds that he cannot say "if you please" to the housemaid. +The Christian permits free will to remain a sacred mystery; but because +of this his relations with the housemaid become of a sparkling and +crystal clearness. He puts the seed of dogma in a central darkness; +but it branches forth in all directions with abounding natural health. +As we have taken the circle as the symbol of reason and madness, +we may very well take the cross as the symbol at once of mystery and +of health. Buddhism is centripetal, but Christianity is centrifugal: +it breaks out. For the circle is perfect and infinite in its nature; +but it is fixed for ever in its size; it can never be larger +or smaller. But the cross, though it has at its heart a collision +and a contradiction, can extend its four arms for ever without +altering its shape. Because it has a paradox in its centre it can +grow without changing. The circle returns upon itself and is bound. +The cross opens its arms to the four winds; it is a signpost for free +travellers. + + Symbols alone are of even a cloudy value in speaking of this +deep matter; and another symbol from physical nature will express +sufficiently well the real place of mysticism before mankind. +The one created thing which we cannot look at is the one thing in +the light of which we look at everything. Like the sun at noonday, +mysticism explains everything else by the blaze of its own +victorious invisibility. Detached intellectualism is (in the +exact sense of a popular phrase) all moonshine; for it is light +without heat, and it is secondary light, reflected from a dead world. +But the Greeks were right when they made Apollo the god both of +imagination and of sanity; for he was both the patron of poetry +and the patron of healing. Of necessary dogmas and a special creed +I shall speak later. But that transcendentalism by which all men +live has primarily much the position of the sun in the sky. +We are conscious of it as of a kind of splendid confusion; +it is something both shining and shapeless, at once a blaze and +a blur. But the circle of the moon is as clear and unmistakable, +as recurrent and inevitable, as the circle of Euclid on a blackboard. +For the moon is utterly reasonable; and the moon is the mother +of lunatics and has given to them all her name. + + + +III THE SUICIDE OF THOUGHT + + + The phrases of the street are not only forcible but subtle: +for a figure of speech can often get into a crack too small for +a definition. Phrases like "put out" or "off colour" might have +been coined by Mr. Henry James in an agony of verbal precision. +And there is no more subtle truth than that of the everyday phrase +about a man having "his heart in the right place." It involves the +idea of normal proportion; not only does a certain function exist, +but it is rightly related to other functions. Indeed, the negation +of this phrase would describe with peculiar accuracy the somewhat morbid +mercy and perverse tenderness of the most representative moderns. +If, for instance, I had to describe with fairness the character +of Mr. Bernard Shaw, I could not express myself more exactly +than by saying that he has a heroically large and generous heart; +but not a heart in the right place. And this is so of the typical +society of our time. + + The modern world is not evil; in some ways the modern +world is far too good. It is full of wild and wasted virtues. +When a religious scheme is shattered (as Christianity was shattered +at the Reformation), it is not merely the vices that are let loose. +The vices are, indeed, let loose, and they wander and do damage. +But the virtues are let loose also; and the virtues wander +more wildly, and the virtues do more terrible damage. The modern +world is full of the old Christian virtues gone mad. The virtues +have gone mad because they have been isolated from each other +and are wandering alone. Thus some scientists care for truth; +and their truth is pitiless. Thus some humanitarians only care +for pity; and their pity (I am sorry to say) is often untruthful. +For example, Mr. Blatchford attacks Christianity because he is mad +on one Christian virtue: the merely mystical and almost irrational +virtue of charity. He has a strange idea that he will make it +easier to forgive sins by saying that there are no sins to forgive. +Mr. Blatchford is not only an early Christian, he is the only +early Christian who ought really to have been eaten by lions. +For in his case the pagan accusation is really true: his mercy +would mean mere anarchy. He really is the enemy of the human race-- +because he is so human. As the other extreme, we may take +the acrid realist, who has deliberately killed in himself all +human pleasure in happy tales or in the healing of the heart. +Torquemada tortured people physically for the sake of moral truth. +Zola tortured people morally for the sake of physical truth. +But in Torquemada's time there was at least a system that could +to some extent make righteousness and peace kiss each other. +Now they do not even bow. But a much stronger case than these two of +truth and pity can be found in the remarkable case of the dislocation +of humility. + + It is only with one aspect of humility that we are here concerned. +Humility was largely meant as a restraint upon the arrogance +and infinity of the appetite of man. He was always outstripping +his mercies with his own newly invented needs. His very power +of enjoyment destroyed half his joys. By asking for pleasure, +he lost the chief pleasure; for the chief pleasure is surprise. +Hence it became evident that if a man would make his world large, +he must be always making himself small. Even the haughty visions, +the tall cities, and the toppling pinnacles are the creations +of humility. Giants that tread down forests like grass are +the creations of humility. Towers that vanish upwards above +the loneliest star are the creations of humility. For towers +are not tall unless we look up at them; and giants are not giants +unless they are larger than we. All this gigantesque imagination, +which is, perhaps, the mightiest of the pleasures of man, is at bottom +entirely humble. It is impossible without humility to enjoy anything-- +even pride. + + But what we suffer from to-day is humility in the wrong place. +Modesty has moved from the organ of ambition. Modesty has settled +upon the organ of conviction; where it was never meant to be. +A man was meant to be doubtful about himself, but undoubting about +the truth; this has been exactly reversed. Nowadays the part +of a man that a man does assert is exactly the part he ought not +to assert--himself. The part he doubts is exactly the part he +ought not to doubt--the Divine Reason. Huxley preached a humility +content to learn from Nature. But the new sceptic is so humble +that he doubts if he can even learn. Thus we should be wrong if we +had said hastily that there is no humility typical of our time. +The truth is that there is a real humility typical of our time; +but it so happens that it is practically a more poisonous humility +than the wildest prostrations of the ascetic. The old humility was +a spur that prevented a man from stopping; not a nail in his boot +that prevented him from going on. For the old humility made a man +doubtful about his efforts, which might make him work harder. +But the new humility makes a man doubtful about his aims, which will make +him stop working altogether. + + At any street corner we may meet a man who utters the frantic +and blasphemous statement that he may be wrong. Every day one +comes across somebody who says that of course his view may not +be the right one. Of course his view must be the right one, +or it is not his view. We are on the road to producing a race +of men too mentally modest to believe in the multiplication table. +We are in danger of seeing philosophers who doubt the law of gravity +as being a mere fancy of their own. Scoffers of old time were too +proud to be convinced; but these are too humble to be convinced. +The meek do inherit the earth; but the modern sceptics are too meek +even to claim their inheritance. It is exactly this intellectual +helplessness which is our second problem. + + The last chapter has been concerned only with a fact of observation: +that what peril of morbidity there is for man comes rather from +his reason than his imagination. It was not meant to attack the +authority of reason; rather it is the ultimate purpose to defend it. +For it needs defence. The whole modern world is at war with reason; +and the tower already reels. + + The sages, it is often said, can see no answer to the riddle +of religion. But the trouble with our sages is not that they +cannot see the answer; it is that they cannot even see the riddle. +They are like children so stupid as to notice nothing paradoxical +in the playful assertion that a door is not a door. The modern +latitudinarians speak, for instance, about authority in religion +not only as if there were no reason in it, but as if there had never +been any reason for it. Apart from seeing its philosophical basis, +they cannot even see its historical cause. Religious authority +has often, doubtless, been oppressive or unreasonable; just as +every legal system (and especially our present one) has been +callous and full of a cruel apathy. It is rational to attack +the police; nay, it is glorious. But the modern critics of religious +authority are like men who should attack the police without ever +having heard of burglars. For there is a great and possible peril +to the human mind: a peril as practical as burglary. Against it +religious authority was reared, rightly or wrongly, as a barrier. +And against it something certainly must be reared as a barrier, +if our race is to avoid ruin. + + That peril is that the human intellect is free to destroy itself. +Just as one generation could prevent the very existence of the next +generation, by all entering a monastery or jumping into the sea, so one +set of thinkers can in some degree prevent further thinking by teaching +the next generation that there is no validity in any human thought. +It is idle to talk always of the alternative of reason and faith. +Reason is itself a matter of faith. It is an act of faith to assert +that our thoughts have any relation to reality at all. If you are +merely a sceptic, you must sooner or later ask yourself the question, +"Why should ANYTHING go right; even observation and deduction? +Why should not good logic be as misleading as bad logic? +They are both movements in the brain of a bewildered ape?" +The young sceptic says, "I have a right to think for myself." +But the old sceptic, the complete sceptic, says, "I have no right +to think for myself. I have no right to think at all." + + There is a thought that stops thought. That is the only thought +that ought to be stopped. That is the ultimate evil against which +all religious authority was aimed. It only appears at the end of +decadent ages like our own: and already Mr. H.G.Wells has raised its +ruinous banner; he has written a delicate piece of scepticism called +"Doubts of the Instrument." In this he questions the brain itself, +and endeavours to remove all reality from all his own assertions, +past, present, and to come. But it was against this remote ruin +that all the military systems in religion were originally ranked +and ruled. The creeds and the crusades, the hierarchies and the +horrible persecutions were not organized, as is ignorantly said, +for the suppression of reason. They were organized for the difficult +defence of reason. Man, by a blind instinct, knew that if once +things were wildly questioned, reason could be questioned first. +The authority of priests to absolve, the authority of popes to define +the authority, even of inquisitors to terrify: these were all only dark +defences erected round one central authority, more undemonstrable, +more supernatural than all--the authority of a man to think. +We know now that this is so; we have no excuse for not knowing it. +For we can hear scepticism crashing through the old ring of authorities, +and at the same moment we can see reason swaying upon her throne. +In so far as religion is gone, reason is going. For they are both +of the same primary and authoritative kind. They are both methods +of proof which cannot themselves be proved. And in the act of +destroying the idea of Divine authority we have largely destroyed +the idea of that human authority by which we do a long-division sum. +With a long and sustained tug we have attempted to pull the mitre +off pontifical man; and his head has come off with it. + + Lest this should be called loose assertion, it is perhaps +desirable, though dull, to run rapidly through the chief modern +fashions of thought which have this effect of stopping thought itself. +Materialism and the view of everything as a personal illusion have +some such effect; for if the mind is mechanical, thought cannot be +very exciting, and if the cosmos is unreal, there is nothing to think +about. But in these cases the effect is indirect and doubtful. In +some cases it is direct and clear; notably in the case of what is +generally called evolution. + + Evolution is a good example of that modern intelligence which, +if it destroys anything, destroys itself. Evolution is either +an innocent scientific description of how certain earthly things +came about; or, if it is anything more than this, it is an attack +upon thought itself. If evolution destroys anything, it does not +destroy religion but rationalism. If evolution simply means that +a positive thing called an ape turned very slowly into a positive +thing called a man, then it is stingless for the most orthodox; +for a personal God might just as well do things slowly as quickly, +especially if, like the Christian God, he were outside time. +But if it means anything more, it means that there is no such +thing as an ape to change, and no such thing as a man for him +to change into. It means that there is no such thing as a thing. +At best, there is only one thing, and that is a flux of everything +and anything. This is an attack not upon the faith, but upon +the mind; you cannot think if there are no things to think about. +You cannot think if you are not separate from the subject of thought. +Descartes said, "I think; therefore I am." The philosophic evolutionist +reverses and negatives the epigram. He says, "I am not; therefore I +cannot think." + + Then there is the opposite attack on thought: that urged by +Mr. H.G.Wells when he insists that every separate thing is "unique," +and there are no categories at all. This also is merely destructive. +Thinking means connecting things, and stops if they cannot be connected. +It need hardly be said that this scepticism forbidding thought +necessarily forbids speech; a man cannot open his mouth without +contradicting it. Thus when Mr. Wells says (as he did somewhere), +"All chairs are quite different," he utters not merely a misstatement, +but a contradiction in terms. If all chairs were quite different, +you could not call them "all chairs." + + Akin to these is the false theory of progress, which maintains +that we alter the test instead of trying to pass the test. +We often hear it said, for instance, "What is right in one age +is wrong in another." This is quite reasonable, if it means that +there is a fixed aim, and that certain methods attain at certain +times and not at other times. If women, say, desire to be elegant, +it may be that they are improved at one time by growing fatter and +at another time by growing thinner. But you cannot say that they +are improved by ceasing to wish to be elegant and beginning to wish +to be oblong. If the standard changes, how can there be improvement, +which implies a standard? Nietzsche started a nonsensical idea that +men had once sought as good what we now call evil; if it were so, +we could not talk of surpassing or even falling short of them. +How can you overtake Jones if you walk in the other direction? +You cannot discuss whether one people has succeeded more in being +miserable than another succeeded in being happy. It would be +like discussing whether Milton was more puritanical than a pig +is fat. + + It is true that a man (a silly man) might make change itself his +object or ideal. But as an ideal, change itself becomes unchangeable. +If the change-worshipper wishes to estimate his own progress, he must +be sternly loyal to the ideal of change; he must not begin to flirt +gaily with the ideal of monotony. Progress itself cannot progress. +It is worth remark, in passing, that when Tennyson, in a wild and rather +weak manner, welcomed the idea of infinite alteration in society, +he instinctively took a metaphor which suggests an imprisoned tedium. +He wrote-- + + "Let the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves +of change." + +He thought of change itself as an unchangeable groove; and so it is. +Change is about the narrowest and hardest groove that a man can +get into. + + The main point here, however, is that this idea of a fundamental +alteration in the standard is one of the things that make thought +about the past or future simply impossible. The theory of a +complete change of standards in human history does not merely +deprive us of the pleasure of honouring our fathers; it deprives +us even of the more modern and aristocratic pleasure of despising them. + + This bald summary of the thought-destroying forces of our +time would not be complete without some reference to pragmatism; +for though I have here used and should everywhere defend the +pragmatist method as a preliminary guide to truth, there is an extreme +application of it which involves the absence of all truth whatever. +My meaning can be put shortly thus. I agree with the pragmatists +that apparent objective truth is not the whole matter; that there +is an authoritative need to believe the things that are necessary +to the human mind. But I say that one of those necessities +precisely is a belief in objective truth. The pragmatist tells +a man to think what he must think and never mind the Absolute. +But precisely one of the things that he must think is the Absolute. +This philosophy, indeed, is a kind of verbal paradox. Pragmatism is +a matter of human needs; and one of the first of human needs +is to be something more than a pragmatist. Extreme pragmatism +is just as inhuman as the determinism it so powerfully attacks. +The determinist (who, to do him justice, does not pretend to be +a human being) makes nonsense of the human sense of actual choice. +The pragmatist, who professes to be specially human, makes nonsense +of the human sense of actual fact. + + To sum up our contention so far, we may say that the most +characteristic current philosophies have not only a touch of mania, +but a touch of suicidal mania. The mere questioner has knocked +his head against the limits of human thought; and cracked it. +This is what makes so futile the warnings of the orthodox and the +boasts of the advanced about the dangerous boyhood of free thought. +What we are looking at is not the boyhood of free thought; it is +the old age and ultimate dissolution of free thought. It is vain +for bishops and pious bigwigs to discuss what dreadful things will +happen if wild scepticism runs its course. It has run its course. +It is vain for eloquent atheists to talk of the great truths that +will be revealed if once we see free thought begin. We have seen +it end. It has no more questions to ask; it has questioned itself. +You cannot call up any wilder vision than a city in which men +ask themselves if they have any selves. You cannot fancy a more +sceptical world than that in which men doubt if there is a world. +It might certainly have reached its bankruptcy more quickly +and cleanly if it had not been feebly hampered by the application +of indefensible laws of blasphemy or by the absurd pretence +that modern England is Christian. But it would have reached the +bankruptcy anyhow. Militant atheists are still unjustly persecuted; +but rather because they are an old minority than because they +are a new one. Free thought has exhausted its own freedom. +It is weary of its own success. If any eager freethinker now hails +philosophic freedom as the dawn, he is only like the man in Mark +Twain who came out wrapped in blankets to see the sun rise and was +just in time to see it set. If any frightened curate still says +that it will be awful if the darkness of free thought should spread, +we can only answer him in the high and powerful words of Mr. Belloc, +"Do not, I beseech you, be troubled about the increase of forces +already in dissolution. You have mistaken the hour of the night: +it is already morning." We have no more questions left to ask. +We have looked for questions in the darkest corners and on the +wildest peaks. We have found all the questions that can be found. +It is time we gave up looking for questions and began looking +for answers. + + But one more word must be added. At the beginning of this +preliminary negative sketch I said that our mental ruin has +been wrought by wild reason, not by wild imagination. A man +does not go mad because he makes a statue a mile high, but he +may go mad by thinking it out in square inches. Now, one school +of thinkers has seen this and jumped at it as a way of renewing +the pagan health of the world. They see that reason destroys; +but Will, they say, creates. The ultimate authority, they say, +is in will, not in reason. The supreme point is not why +a man demands a thing, but the fact that he does demand it. +I have no space to trace or expound this philosophy of Will. +It came, I suppose, through Nietzsche, who preached something +that is called egoism. That, indeed, was simpleminded enough; +for Nietzsche denied egoism simply by preaching it. To preach +anything is to give it away. First, the egoist calls life a war +without mercy, and then he takes the greatest possible trouble to +drill his enemies in war. To preach egoism is to practise altruism. +But however it began, the view is common enough in current literature. +The main defence of these thinkers is that they are not thinkers; +they are makers. They say that choice is itself the divine thing. +Thus Mr. Bernard Shaw has attacked the old idea that men's acts +are to be judged by the standard of the desire of happiness. +He says that a man does not act for his happiness, but from his will. +He does not say, "Jam will make me happy," but "I want jam." +And in all this others follow him with yet greater enthusiasm. +Mr. John Davidson, a remarkable poet, is so passionately excited +about it that he is obliged to write prose. He publishes a short +play with several long prefaces. This is natural enough in Mr. Shaw, +for all his plays are prefaces: Mr. Shaw is (I suspect) the only man +on earth who has never written any poetry. But that Mr. Davidson (who +can write excellent poetry) should write instead laborious metaphysics +in defence of this doctrine of will, does show that the doctrine +of will has taken hold of men. Even Mr. H.G.Wells has half spoken +in its language; saying that one should test acts not like a thinker, +but like an artist, saying, "I FEEL this curve is right," or "that +line SHALL go thus." They are all excited; and well they may be. +For by this doctrine of the divine authority of will, they think they +can break out of the doomed fortress of rationalism. They think they +can escape. + + But they cannot escape. This pure praise of volition ends +in the same break up and blank as the mere pursuit of logic. +Exactly as complete free thought involves the doubting of thought itself, +so the acceptation of mere "willing" really paralyzes the will. +Mr. Bernard Shaw has not perceived the real difference between the old +utilitarian test of pleasure (clumsy, of course, and easily misstated) +and that which he propounds. The real difference between the test +of happiness and the test of will is simply that the test of +happiness is a test and the other isn't. You can discuss whether +a man's act in jumping over a cliff was directed towards happiness; +you cannot discuss whether it was derived from will. Of course +it was. You can praise an action by saying that it is calculated +to bring pleasure or pain to discover truth or to save the soul. +But you cannot praise an action because it shows will; for to say +that is merely to say that it is an action. By this praise of will +you cannot really choose one course as better than another. And yet +choosing one course as better than another is the very definition +of the will you are praising. + + The worship of will is the negation of will. To admire mere +choice is to refuse to choose. If Mr. Bernard Shaw comes up to me and +says, "Will something," that is tantamount to saying, "I do not mind +what you will," and that is tantamount to saying, "I have no will in +the matter." You cannot admire will in general, because the essence +of will is that it is particular. A brilliant anarchist like Mr. John +Davidson feels an irritation against ordinary morality, and therefore +he invokes will--will to anything. He only wants humanity to want +something. But humanity does want something. It wants ordinary +morality. He rebels against the law and tells us to will something or +anything. But we have willed something. We have willed the law +against which he rebels. + + All the will-worshippers, from Nietzsche to Mr. Davidson, +are really quite empty of volition. They cannot will, they can +hardly wish. And if any one wants a proof of this, it can be found +quite easily. It can be found in this fact: that they always talk +of will as something that expands and breaks out. But it is quite +the opposite. Every act of will is an act of self-limitation. To +desire action is to desire limitation. In that sense every act +is an act of self-sacrifice. When you choose anything, you reject +everything else. That objection, which men of this school used +to make to the act of marriage, is really an objection to every act. +Every act is an irrevocable selection and exclusion. Just as when +you marry one woman you give up all the others, so when you take +one course of action you give up all the other courses. If you +become King of England, you give up the post of Beadle in Brompton. +If you go to Rome, you sacrifice a rich suggestive life in Wimbledon. +It is the existence of this negative or limiting side of will that +makes most of the talk of the anarchic will-worshippers little +better than nonsense. For instance, Mr. John Davidson tells us +to have nothing to do with "Thou shalt not"; but it is surely obvious +that "Thou shalt not" is only one of the necessary corollaries +of "I will." "I will go to the Lord Mayor's Show, and thou shalt +not stop me." Anarchism adjures us to be bold creative artists, +and care for no laws or limits. But it is impossible to be +an artist and not care for laws and limits. Art is limitation; +the essence of every picture is the frame. If you draw a giraffe, +you must draw him with a long neck. If, in your bold creative way, +you hold yourself free to draw a giraffe with a short neck, +you will really find that you are not free to draw a giraffe. +The moment you step into the world of facts, you step into a world +of limits. You can free things from alien or accidental laws, +but not from the laws of their own nature. You may, if you like, +free a tiger from his bars; but do not free him from his stripes. +Do not free a camel of the burden of his hump: you may be freeing him +from being a camel. Do not go about as a demagogue, encouraging triangles +to break out of the prison of their three sides. If a triangle +breaks out of its three sides, its life comes to a lamentable end. +Somebody wrote a work called "The Loves of the Triangles"; +I never read it, but I am sure that if triangles ever were loved, +they were loved for being triangular. This is certainly the case +with all artistic creation, which is in some ways the most +decisive example of pure will. The artist loves his limitations: +they constitute the THING he is doing. The painter is glad +that the canvas is flat. The sculptor is glad that the clay +is colourless. + + In case the point is not clear, an historic example may illustrate +it. The French Revolution was really an heroic and decisive thing, +because the Jacobins willed something definite and limited. +They desired the freedoms of democracy, but also all the vetoes +of democracy. They wished to have votes and NOT to have titles. +Republicanism had an ascetic side in Franklin or Robespierre +as well as an expansive side in Danton or Wilkes. Therefore they +have created something with a solid substance and shape, the square +social equality and peasant wealth of France. But since then the +revolutionary or speculative mind of Europe has been weakened by +shrinking from any proposal because of the limits of that proposal. +Liberalism has been degraded into liberality. Men have tried +to turn "revolutionise" from a transitive to an intransitive verb. +The Jacobin could tell you not only the system he would rebel against, +but (what was more important) the system he would NOT rebel against, +the system he would trust. But the new rebel is a Sceptic, +and will not entirely trust anything. He has no loyalty; therefore he +can never be really a revolutionist. And the fact that he doubts +everything really gets in his way when he wants to denounce anything. +For all denunciation implies a moral doctrine of some kind; and the +modern revolutionist doubts not only the institution he denounces, +but the doctrine by which he denounces it. Thus he writes one book +complaining that imperial oppression insults the purity of women, +and then he writes another book (about the sex problem) in which he +insults it himself. He curses the Sultan because Christian girls lose +their virginity, and then curses Mrs. Grundy because they keep it. +As a politician, he will cry out that war is a waste of life, +and then, as a philosopher, that all life is waste of time. +A Russian pessimist will denounce a policeman for killing a peasant, +and then prove by the highest philosophical principles that the +peasant ought to have killed himself. A man denounces marriage +as a lie, and then denounces aristocratic profligates for treating +it as a lie. He calls a flag a bauble, and then blames the +oppressors of Poland or Ireland because they take away that bauble. +The man of this school goes first to a political meeting, where he +complains that savages are treated as if they were beasts; then he +takes his hat and umbrella and goes on to a scientific meeting, +where he proves that they practically are beasts. In short, +the modern revolutionist, being an infinite sceptic, is always +engaged in undermining his own mines. In his book on politics he +attacks men for trampling on morality; in his book on ethics he +attacks morality for trampling on men. Therefore the modern man +in revolt has become practically useless for all purposes of revolt. +By rebelling against everything he has lost his right to rebel +against anything. + + It may be added that the same blank and bankruptcy can be observed +in all fierce and terrible types of literature, especially in satire. +Satire may be mad and anarchic, but it presupposes an admitted +superiority in certain things over others; it presupposes a standard. +When little boys in the street laugh at the fatness of some +distinguished journalist, they are unconsciously assuming a standard +of Greek sculpture. They are appealing to the marble Apollo. +And the curious disappearance of satire from our literature is +an instance of the fierce things fading for want of any principle +to be fierce about. Nietzsche had some natural talent for sarcasm: +he could sneer, though he could not laugh; but there is always something +bodiless and without weight in his satire, simply because it has not +any mass of common morality behind it. He is himself more preposterous +than anything he denounces. But, indeed, Nietzsche will stand very +well as the type of the whole of this failure of abstract violence. +The softening of the brain which ultimately overtook him was not +a physical accident. If Nietzsche had not ended in imbecility, +Nietzscheism would end in imbecility. Thinking in isolation +and with pride ends in being an idiot. Every man who will +not have softening of the heart must at last have softening of the brain. + + This last attempt to evade intellectualism ends in intellectualism, +and therefore in death. The sortie has failed. The wild worship of +lawlessness and the materialist worship of law end in the same void. +Nietzsche scales staggering mountains, but he turns up ultimately +in Tibet. He sits down beside Tolstoy in the land of nothing +and Nirvana. They are both helpless--one because he must not +grasp anything, and the other because he must not let go of anything. +The Tolstoyan's will is frozen by a Buddhist instinct that all +special actions are evil. But the Nietzscheite's will is quite +equally frozen by his view that all special actions are good; +for if all special actions are good, none of them are special. +They stand at the crossroads, and one hates all the roads and +the other likes all the roads. The result is--well, some things +are not hard to calculate. They stand at the cross-roads. + + Here I end (thank God) the first and dullest business +of this book--the rough review of recent thought. After this I +begin to sketch a view of life which may not interest my reader, +but which, at any rate, interests me. In front of me, as I close +this page, is a pile of modern books that I have been turning +over for the purpose--a pile of ingenuity, a pile of futility. +By the accident of my present detachment, I can see the inevitable smash +of the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Tolstoy, Nietzsche and Shaw, +as clearly as an inevitable railway smash could be seen from +a balloon. They are all on the road to the emptiness of the asylum. +For madness may be defined as using mental activity so as to reach +mental helplessness; and they have nearly reached it. He who +thinks he is made of glass, thinks to the destruction of thought; +for glass cannot think. So he who wills to reject nothing, +wills the destruction of will; for will is not only the choice +of something, but the rejection of almost everything. And as I +turn and tumble over the clever, wonderful, tiresome, and useless +modern books, the title of one of them rivets my eye. It is called +"Jeanne d'Arc," by Anatole France. I have only glanced at it, +but a glance was enough to remind me of Renan's "Vie de Jesus." +It has the same strange method of the reverent sceptic. It discredits +supernatural stories that have some foundation, simply by telling +natural stories that have no foundation. Because we cannot believe +in what a saint did, we are to pretend that we know exactly what +he felt. But I do not mention either book in order to criticise it, +but because the accidental combination of the names called up two +startling images of Sanity which blasted all the books before me. +Joan of Arc was not stuck at the cross-roads, either by rejecting +all the paths like Tolstoy, or by accepting them all like Nietzsche. +She chose a path, and went down it like a thunderbolt. Yet Joan, +when I came to think of her, had in her all that was true either in +Tolstoy or Nietzsche, all that was even tolerable in either of them. +I thought of all that is noble in Tolstoy, the pleasure in plain +things, especially in plain pity, the actualities of the earth, +the reverence for the poor, the dignity of the bowed back. +Joan of Arc had all that and with this great addition, that she +endured poverty as well as admiring it; whereas Tolstoy is only a +typical aristocrat trying to find out its secret. And then I thought +of all that was brave and proud and pathetic in poor Nietzsche, +and his mutiny against the emptiness and timidity of our time. +I thought of his cry for the ecstatic equilibrium of danger, his hunger +for the rush of great horses, his cry to arms. Well, Joan of Arc +had all that, and again with this difference, that she did not +praise fighting, but fought. We KNOW that she was not afraid +of an army, while Nietzsche, for all we know, was afraid of a cow. +Tolstoy only praised the peasant; she was the peasant. Nietzsche only +praised the warrior; she was the warrior. She beat them both at +their own antagonistic ideals; she was more gentle than the one, +more violent than the other. Yet she was a perfectly practical person +who did something, while they are wild speculators who do nothing. +It was impossible that the thought should not cross my mind that she +and her faith had perhaps some secret of moral unity and utility +that has been lost. And with that thought came a larger one, +and the colossal figure of her Master had also crossed the theatre +of my thoughts. The same modern difficulty which darkened the +subject-matter of Anatole France also darkened that of Ernest Renan. +Renan also divided his hero's pity from his hero's pugnacity. +Renan even represented the righteous anger at Jerusalem as a mere +nervous breakdown after the idyllic expectations of Galilee. +As if there were any inconsistency between having a love for +humanity and having a hatred for inhumanity! Altruists, with thin, +weak voices, denounce Christ as an egoist. Egoists (with +even thinner and weaker voices) denounce Him as an altruist. +In our present atmosphere such cavils are comprehensible enough. +The love of a hero is more terrible than the hatred of a tyrant. +The hatred of a hero is more generous than the love of a philanthropist. +There is a huge and heroic sanity of which moderns can only collect +the fragments. There is a giant of whom we see only the lopped +arms and legs walking about. They have torn the soul of Christ +into silly strips, labelled egoism and altruism, and they are +equally puzzled by His insane magnificence and His insane meekness. +They have parted His garments among them, and for His vesture they +have cast lots; though the coat was without seam woven from the top +throughout. + + + +IV THE ETHICS OF ELFLAND + + + When the business man rebukes the idealism of his office-boy, it +is commonly in some such speech as this: "Ah, yes, when one is young, +one has these ideals in the abstract and these castles in the air; +but in middle age they all break up like clouds, and one comes down +to a belief in practical politics, to using the machinery one has +and getting on with the world as it is." Thus, at least, venerable and +philanthropic old men now in their honoured graves used to talk to me +when I was a boy. But since then I have grown up and have discovered +that these philanthropic old men were telling lies. What has really +happened is exactly the opposite of what they said would happen. +They said that I should lose my ideals and begin to believe in the +methods of practical politicians. Now, I have not lost my ideals +in the least; my faith in fundamentals is exactly what it always was. +What I have lost is my old childlike faith in practical politics. +I am still as much concerned as ever about the Battle of Armageddon; +but I am not so much concerned about the General Election. +As a babe I leapt up on my mother's knee at the mere mention +of it. No; the vision is always solid and reliable. The vision +is always a fact. It is the reality that is often a fraud. +As much as I ever did, more than I ever did, I believe in Liberalism. +But there was a rosy time of innocence when I believed in Liberals. + + I take this instance of one of the enduring faiths because, +having now to trace the roots of my personal speculation, +this may be counted, I think, as the only positive bias. +I was brought up a Liberal, and have always believed in democracy, +in the elementary liberal doctrine of a self-governing humanity. +If any one finds the phrase vague or threadbare, I can only pause +for a moment to explain that the principle of democracy, as I +mean it, can be stated in two propositions. The first is this: +that the things common to all men are more important than the +things peculiar to any men. Ordinary things are more valuable +than extraordinary things; nay, they are more extraordinary. +Man is something more awful than men; something more strange. +The sense of the miracle of humanity itself should be always more vivid +to us than any marvels of power, intellect, art, or civilization. +The mere man on two legs, as such, should be felt as something more +heartbreaking than any music and more startling than any caricature. +Death is more tragic even than death by starvation. Having a nose +is more comic even than having a Norman nose. + + This is the first principle of democracy: that the essential +things in men are the things they hold in common, not the things +they hold separately. And the second principle is merely this: +that the political instinct or desire is one of these things +which they hold in common. Falling in love is more poetical than +dropping into poetry. The democratic contention is that government +(helping to rule the tribe) is a thing like falling in love, +and not a thing like dropping into poetry. It is not something +analogous to playing the church organ, painting on vellum, +discovering the North Pole (that insidious habit), looping the loop, +being Astronomer Royal, and so on. For these things we do not wish +a man to do at all unless he does them well. It is, on the contrary, +a thing analogous to writing one's own love-letters or blowing +one's own nose. These things we want a man to do for himself, +even if he does them badly. I am not here arguing the truth of any +of these conceptions; I know that some moderns are asking to have +their wives chosen by scientists, and they may soon be asking, +for all I know, to have their noses blown by nurses. I merely +say that mankind does recognize these universal human functions, +and that democracy classes government among them. In short, +the democratic faith is this: that the most terribly important things +must be left to ordinary men themselves--the mating of the sexes, +the rearing of the young, the laws of the state. This is democracy; +and in this I have always believed. + + But there is one thing that I have never from my youth up been +able to understand. I have never been able to understand where people +got the idea that democracy was in some way opposed to tradition. +It is obvious that tradition is only democracy extended through time. +It is trusting to a consensus of common human voices rather than to +some isolated or arbitrary record. The man who quotes some German +historian against the tradition of the Catholic Church, for instance, +is strictly appealing to aristocracy. He is appealing to the +superiority of one expert against the awful authority of a mob. +It is quite easy to see why a legend is treated, and ought to be treated, +more respectfully than a book of history. The legend is generally +made by the majority of people in the village, who are sane. +The book is generally written by the one man in the village who is mad. +Those who urge against tradition that men in the past were ignorant +may go and urge it at the Carlton Club, along with the statement +that voters in the slums are ignorant. It will not do for us. +If we attach great importance to the opinion of ordinary men in great +unanimity when we are dealing with daily matters, there is no reason +why we should disregard it when we are dealing with history or fable. +Tradition may be defined as an extension of the franchise. +Tradition means giving votes to the most obscure of all classes, +our ancestors. It is the democracy of the dead. Tradition refuses +to submit to the small and arrogant oligarchy of those who merely +happen to be walking about. All democrats object to men being +disqualified by the accident of birth; tradition objects to their +being disqualified by the accident of death. Democracy tells us +not to neglect a good man's opinion, even if he is our groom; +tradition asks us not to neglect a good man's opinion, even if he is +our father. I, at any rate, cannot separate the two ideas of democracy +and tradition; it seems evident to me that they are the same idea. +We will have the dead at our councils. The ancient Greeks voted +by stones; these shall vote by tombstones. It is all quite regular +and official, for most tombstones, like most ballot papers, are marked +with a cross. + + I have first to say, therefore, that if I have had a bias, it was +always a bias in favour of democracy, and therefore of tradition. +Before we come to any theoretic or logical beginnings I am content +to allow for that personal equation; I have always been more +inclined to believe the ruck of hard-working people than to believe +that special and troublesome literary class to which I belong. +I prefer even the fancies and prejudices of the people who see +life from the inside to the clearest demonstrations of the people +who see life from the outside. I would always trust the old wives' +fables against the old maids' facts. As long as wit is mother wit it +can be as wild as it pleases. + + Now, I have to put together a general position, and I pretend +to no training in such things. I propose to do it, therefore, +by writing down one after another the three or four fundamental +ideas which I have found for myself, pretty much in the way +that I found them. Then I shall roughly synthesise them, +summing up my personal philosophy or natural religion; then I +shall describe my startling discovery that the whole thing had +been discovered before. It had been discovered by Christianity. +But of these profound persuasions which I have to recount in order, +the earliest was concerned with this element of popular tradition. +And without the foregoing explanation touching tradition and +democracy I could hardly make my mental experience clear. As it is, +I do not know whether I can make it clear, but I now propose to try. + + My first and last philosophy, that which I believe in with +unbroken certainty, I learnt in the nursery. I generally learnt it +from a nurse; that is, from the solemn and star-appointed priestess +at once of democracy and tradition. The things I believed most then, +the things I believe most now, are the things called fairy tales. +They seem to me to be the entirely reasonable things. They are +not fantasies: compared with them other things are fantastic. +Compared with them religion and rationalism are both abnormal, +though religion is abnormally right and rationalism abnormally wrong. +Fairyland is nothing but the sunny country of common sense. +It is not earth that judges heaven, but heaven that judges earth; +so for me at least it was not earth that criticised elfland, +but elfland that criticised the earth. I knew the magic beanstalk +before I had tasted beans; I was sure of the Man in the Moon before I +was certain of the moon. This was at one with all popular tradition. +Modern minor poets are naturalists, and talk about the bush or the brook; +but the singers of the old epics and fables were supernaturalists, +and talked about the gods of brook and bush. That is what the moderns +mean when they say that the ancients did not "appreciate Nature," +because they said that Nature was divine. Old nurses do not +tell children about the grass, but about the fairies that dance +on the grass; and the old Greeks could not see the trees for +the dryads. + + But I deal here with what ethic and philosophy come from being +fed on fairy tales. If I were describing them in detail I could +note many noble and healthy principles that arise from them. +There is the chivalrous lesson of "Jack the Giant Killer"; that giants +should be killed because they are gigantic. It is a manly mutiny +against pride as such. For the rebel is older than all the kingdoms, +and the Jacobin has more tradition than the Jacobite. There is the +lesson of "Cinderella," which is the same as that of the Magnificat-- +EXALTAVIT HUMILES. There is the great lesson of "Beauty and the Beast"; +that a thing must be loved BEFORE it is loveable. There is the +terrible allegory of the "Sleeping Beauty," which tells how the human +creature was blessed with all birthday gifts, yet cursed with death; +and how death also may perhaps be softened to a sleep. But I am +not concerned with any of the separate statutes of elfland, but with +the whole spirit of its law, which I learnt before I could speak, +and shall retain when I cannot write. I am concerned with a certain +way of looking at life, which was created in me by the fairy tales, +but has since been meekly ratified by the mere facts. + + It might be stated this way. There are certain sequences +or developments (cases of one thing following another), which are, +in the true sense of the word, reasonable. They are, in the true +sense of the word, necessary. Such are mathematical and merely +logical sequences. We in fairyland (who are the most reasonable +of all creatures) admit that reason and that necessity. +For instance, if the Ugly Sisters are older than Cinderella, +it is (in an iron and awful sense) NECESSARY that Cinderella is +younger than the Ugly Sisters. There is no getting out of it. +Haeckel may talk as much fatalism about that fact as he pleases: +it really must be. If Jack is the son of a miller, a miller is +the father of Jack. Cold reason decrees it from her awful throne: +and we in fairyland submit. If the three brothers all ride horses, +there are six animals and eighteen legs involved: that is true +rationalism, and fairyland is full of it. But as I put my head over +the hedge of the elves and began to take notice of the natural world, +I observed an extraordinary thing. I observed that learned men +in spectacles were talking of the actual things that happened-- +dawn and death and so on--as if THEY were rational and inevitable. +They talked as if the fact that trees bear fruit were just as NECESSARY +as the fact that two and one trees make three. But it is not. +There is an enormous difference by the test of fairyland; which is +the test of the imagination. You cannot IMAGINE two and one not +making three. But you can easily imagine trees not growing fruit; +you can imagine them growing golden candlesticks or tigers hanging +on by the tail. These men in spectacles spoke much of a man +named Newton, who was hit by an apple, and who discovered a law. +But they could not be got to see the distinction between a true law, +a law of reason, and the mere fact of apples falling. If the apple hit +Newton's nose, Newton's nose hit the apple. That is a true necessity: +because we cannot conceive the one occurring without the other. +But we can quite well conceive the apple not falling on his nose; +we can fancy it flying ardently through the air to hit some other nose, +of which it had a more definite dislike. We have always in our fairy +tales kept this sharp distinction between the science of mental relations, +in which there really are laws, and the science of physical facts, +in which there are no laws, but only weird repetitions. We believe +in bodily miracles, but not in mental impossibilities. We believe +that a Bean-stalk climbed up to Heaven; but that does not at all +confuse our convictions on the philosophical question of how many beans +make five. + + Here is the peculiar perfection of tone and truth in the +nursery tales. The man of science says, "Cut the stalk, and the apple +will fall"; but he says it calmly, as if the one idea really led up +to the other. The witch in the fairy tale says, "Blow the horn, +and the ogre's castle will fall"; but she does not say it as if it +were something in which the effect obviously arose out of the cause. +Doubtless she has given the advice to many champions, and has seen many +castles fall, but she does not lose either her wonder or her reason. +She does not muddle her head until it imagines a necessary mental +connection between a horn and a falling tower. But the scientific +men do muddle their heads, until they imagine a necessary mental +connection between an apple leaving the tree and an apple reaching +the ground. They do really talk as if they had found not only +a set of marvellous facts, but a truth connecting those facts. +They do talk as if the connection of two strange things physically +connected them philosophically. They feel that because one +incomprehensible thing constantly follows another incomprehensible +thing the two together somehow make up a comprehensible thing. +Two black riddles make a white answer. + + In fairyland we avoid the word "law"; but in the land of science +they are singularly fond of it. Thus they will call some interesting +conjecture about how forgotten folks pronounced the alphabet, +Grimm's Law. But Grimm's Law is far less intellectual than +Grimm's Fairy Tales. The tales are, at any rate, certainly tales; +while the law is not a law. A law implies that we know the nature +of the generalisation and enactment; not merely that we have noticed +some of the effects. If there is a law that pick-pockets shall go +to prison, it implies that there is an imaginable mental connection +between the idea of prison and the idea of picking pockets. +And we know what the idea is. We can say why we take liberty +from a man who takes liberties. But we cannot say why an egg can +turn into a chicken any more than we can say why a bear could turn +into a fairy prince. As IDEAS, the egg and the chicken are further +off from each other than the bear and the prince; for no egg in +itself suggests a chicken, whereas some princes do suggest bears. +Granted, then, that certain transformations do happen, it is essential +that we should regard them in the philosophic manner of fairy tales, +not in the unphilosophic manner of science and the "Laws of Nature." +When we are asked why eggs turn to birds or fruits fall in autumn, +we must answer exactly as the fairy godmother would answer +if Cinderella asked her why mice turned to horses or her clothes +fell from her at twelve o'clock. We must answer that it is MAGIC. +It is not a "law," for we do not understand its general formula. +It is not a necessity, for though we can count on it happening +practically, we have no right to say that it must always happen. +It is no argument for unalterable law (as Huxley fancied) that we +count on the ordinary course of things. We do not count on it; +we bet on it. We risk the remote possibility of a miracle as we +do that of a poisoned pancake or a world-destroying comet. +We leave it out of account, not because it is a miracle, and therefore +an impossibility, but because it is a miracle, and therefore +an exception. All the terms used in the science books, "law," +"necessity," "order," "tendency," and so on, are really unintellectual, +because they assume an inner synthesis, which we do not possess. +The only words that ever satisfied me as describing Nature are the +terms used in the fairy books, "charm," "spell," "enchantment." +They express the arbitrariness of the fact and its mystery. +A tree grows fruit because it is a MAGIC tree. Water runs downhill +because it is bewitched. The sun shines because it is bewitched. + + I deny altogether that this is fantastic or even mystical. +We may have some mysticism later on; but this fairy-tale language +about things is simply rational and agnostic. It is the only way +I can express in words my clear and definite perception that one +thing is quite distinct from another; that there is no logical +connection between flying and laying eggs. It is the man who +talks about "a law" that he has never seen who is the mystic. +Nay, the ordinary scientific man is strictly a sentimentalist. +He is a sentimentalist in this essential sense, that he is soaked +and swept away by mere associations. He has so often seen birds +fly and lay eggs that he feels as if there must be some dreamy, +tender connection between the two ideas, whereas there is none. +A forlorn lover might be unable to dissociate the moon from lost love; +so the materialist is unable to dissociate the moon from the tide. +In both cases there is no connection, except that one has seen +them together. A sentimentalist might shed tears at the smell +of apple-blossom, because, by a dark association of his own, +it reminded him of his boyhood. So the materialist professor (though +he conceals his tears) is yet a sentimentalist, because, by a dark +association of his own, apple-blossoms remind him of apples. But the +cool rationalist from fairyland does not see why, in the abstract, +the apple tree should not grow crimson tulips; it sometimes does in +his country. + + This elementary wonder, however, is not a mere fancy derived +from the fairy tales; on the contrary, all the fire of the fairy +tales is derived from this. Just as we all like love tales because +there is an instinct of sex, we all like astonishing tales because +they touch the nerve of the ancient instinct of astonishment. +This is proved by the fact that when we are very young children +we do not need fairy tales: we only need tales. Mere life is +interesting enough. A child of seven is excited by being told that +Tommy opened a door and saw a dragon. But a child of three is excited +by being told that Tommy opened a door. Boys like romantic tales; +but babies like realistic tales--because they find them romantic. +In fact, a baby is about the only person, I should think, to whom +a modern realistic novel could be read without boring him. +This proves that even nursery tales only echo an almost pre-natal +leap of interest and amazement. These tales say that apples were +golden only to refresh the forgotten moment when we found that they +were green. They make rivers run with wine only to make us remember, +for one wild moment, that they run with water. I have said that this +is wholly reasonable and even agnostic. And, indeed, on this point +I am all for the higher agnosticism; its better name is Ignorance. +We have all read in scientific books, and, indeed, in all romances, +the story of the man who has forgotten his name. This man walks +about the streets and can see and appreciate everything; only he +cannot remember who he is. Well, every man is that man in the story. +Every man has forgotten who he is. One may understand the cosmos, +but never the ego; the self is more distant than any star. +Thou shalt love the Lord thy God; but thou shalt not know thyself. +We are all under the same mental calamity; we have all forgotten +our names. We have all forgotten what we really are. All that we +call common sense and rationality and practicality and positivism +only means that for certain dead levels of our life we forget +that we have forgotten. All that we call spirit and art and +ecstasy only means that for one awful instant we remember that +we forget. + + But though (like the man without memory in the novel) we walk the +streets with a sort of half-witted admiration, still it is admiration. +It is admiration in English and not only admiration in Latin. +The wonder has a positive element of praise. This is the next +milestone to be definitely marked on our road through fairyland. +I shall speak in the next chapter about optimists and pessimists +in their intellectual aspect, so far as they have one. Here I am only +trying to describe the enormous emotions which cannot be described. +And the strongest emotion was that life was as precious as it +was puzzling. It was an ecstasy because it was an adventure; +it was an adventure because it was an opportunity. The goodness +of the fairy tale was not affected by the fact that there might be +more dragons than princesses; it was good to be in a fairy tale. +The test of all happiness is gratitude; and I felt grateful, +though I hardly knew to whom. Children are grateful when Santa +Claus puts in their stockings gifts of toys or sweets. Could I +not be grateful to Santa Claus when he put in my stockings the gift +of two miraculous legs? We thank people for birthday presents +of cigars and slippers. Can I thank no one for the birthday present +of birth? + + There were, then, these two first feelings, indefensible and +indisputable. The world was a shock, but it was not merely shocking; +existence was a surprise, but it was a pleasant surprise. In fact, +all my first views were exactly uttered in a riddle that stuck +in my brain from boyhood. The question was, "What did the first +frog say?" And the answer was, "Lord, how you made me jump!" +That says succinctly all that I am saying. God made the frog jump; +but the frog prefers jumping. But when these things are settled +there enters the second great principle of the fairy philosophy. + + Any one can see it who will simply read "Grimm's Fairy Tales" +or the fine collections of Mr. Andrew Lang. For the pleasure +of pedantry I will call it the Doctrine of Conditional Joy. +Touchstone talked of much virtue in an "if"; according to elfin ethics +all virtue is in an "if." The note of the fairy utterance always is, +"You may live in a palace of gold and sapphire, if you do not say +the word `cow'"; or "You may live happily with the King's daughter, +if you do not show her an onion." The vision always hangs upon a veto. +All the dizzy and colossal things conceded depend upon one small +thing withheld. All the wild and whirling things that are let +loose depend upon one thing that is forbidden. Mr. W.B.Yeats, +in his exquisite and piercing elfin poetry, describes the elves +as lawless; they plunge in innocent anarchy on the unbridled horses +of the air-- + + "Ride on the crest of the dishevelled tide, And dance +upon the mountains like a flame." + +It is a dreadful thing to say that Mr. W.B.Yeats does not +understand fairyland. But I do say it. He is an ironical Irishman, +full of intellectual reactions. He is not stupid enough to +understand fairyland. Fairies prefer people of the yokel type +like myself; people who gape and grin and do as they are told. +Mr. Yeats reads into elfland all the righteous insurrection of his +own race. But the lawlessness of Ireland is a Christian lawlessness, +founded on reason and justice. The Fenian is rebelling against +something he understands only too well; but the true citizen of +fairyland is obeying something that he does not understand at all. +In the fairy tale an incomprehensible happiness rests upon an +incomprehensible condition. A box is opened, and all evils fly out. +A word is forgotten, and cities perish. A lamp is lit, and love +flies away. A flower is plucked, and human lives are forfeited. +An apple is eaten, and the hope of God is gone. + + This is the tone of fairy tales, and it is certainly not +lawlessness or even liberty, though men under a mean modern tyranny +may think it liberty by comparison. People out of Portland +Gaol might think Fleet Street free; but closer study will prove +that both fairies and journalists are the slaves of duty. +Fairy godmothers seem at least as strict as other godmothers. +Cinderella received a coach out of Wonderland and a coachman out +of nowhere, but she received a command--which might have come out +of Brixton--that she should be back by twelve. Also, she had a +glass slipper; and it cannot be a coincidence that glass is so common +a substance in folk-lore. This princess lives in a glass castle, +that princess on a glass hill; this one sees all things in a mirror; +they may all live in glass houses if they will not throw stones. +For this thin glitter of glass everywhere is the expression of the fact +that the happiness is bright but brittle, like the substance most +easily smashed by a housemaid or a cat. And this fairy-tale sentiment +also sank into me and became my sentiment towards the whole world. +I felt and feel that life itself is as bright as the diamond, +but as brittle as the window-pane; and when the heavens were +compared to the terrible crystal I can remember a shudder. +I was afraid that God would drop the cosmos with a crash. + + Remember, however, that to be breakable is not the same as to +be perishable. Strike a glass, and it will not endure an instant; +simply do not strike it, and it will endure a thousand years. +Such, it seemed, was the joy of man, either in elfland or on earth; +the happiness depended on NOT DOING SOMETHING which you could at any +moment do and which, very often, it was not obvious why you should +not do. Now, the point here is that to ME this did not seem unjust. +If the miller's third son said to the fairy, "Explain why I +must not stand on my head in the fairy palace," the other might +fairly reply, "Well, if it comes to that, explain the fairy palace." +If Cinderella says, "How is it that I must leave the ball at twelve?" +her godmother might answer, "How is it that you are going there +till twelve?" If I leave a man in my will ten talking elephants +and a hundred winged horses, he cannot complain if the conditions +partake of the slight eccentricity of the gift. He must not look +a winged horse in the mouth. And it seemed to me that existence +was itself so very eccentric a legacy that I could not complain +of not understanding the limitations of the vision when I did +not understand the vision they limited. The frame was no stranger +than the picture. The veto might well be as wild as the vision; +it might be as startling as the sun, as elusive as the waters, +as fantastic and terrible as the towering trees. + + For this reason (we may call it the fairy godmother philosophy) +I never could join the young men of my time in feeling what they +called the general sentiment of REVOLT. I should have resisted, +let us hope, any rules that were evil, and with these and their +definition I shall deal in another chapter. But I did not feel +disposed to resist any rule merely because it was mysterious. +Estates are sometimes held by foolish forms, the breaking of a stick +or the payment of a peppercorn: I was willing to hold the huge +estate of earth and heaven by any such feudal fantasy. It could not +well be wilder than the fact that I was allowed to hold it at all. +At this stage I give only one ethical instance to show my meaning. +I could never mix in the common murmur of that rising generation +against monogamy, because no restriction on sex seemed so odd and +unexpected as sex itself. To be allowed, like Endymion, to make +love to the moon and then to complain that Jupiter kept his own +moons in a harem seemed to me (bred on fairy tales like Endymion's) +a vulgar anti-climax. Keeping to one woman is a small price for +so much as seeing one woman. To complain that I could only be +married once was like complaining that I had only been born once. +It was incommensurate with the terrible excitement of which one +was talking. It showed, not an exaggerated sensibility to sex, +but a curious insensibility to it. A man is a fool who complains +that he cannot enter Eden by five gates at once. Polygamy is a lack +of the realization of sex; it is like a man plucking five pears +in mere absence of mind. The aesthetes touched the last insane +limits of language in their eulogy on lovely things. The thistledown +made them weep; a burnished beetle brought them to their knees. +Yet their emotion never impressed me for an instant, for this reason, +that it never occurred to them to pay for their pleasure in any +sort of symbolic sacrifice. Men (I felt) might fast forty days +for the sake of hearing a blackbird sing. Men might go through fire +to find a cowslip. Yet these lovers of beauty could not even keep +sober for the blackbird. They would not go through common Christian +marriage by way of recompense to the cowslip. Surely one might +pay for extraordinary joy in ordinary morals. Oscar Wilde said +that sunsets were not valued because we could not pay for sunsets. +But Oscar Wilde was wrong; we can pay for sunsets. We can pay for them +by not being Oscar Wilde. + + Well, I left the fairy tales lying on the floor of the nursery, +and I have not found any books so sensible since. I left the +nurse guardian of tradition and democracy, and I have not found +any modern type so sanely radical or so sanely conservative. +But the matter for important comment was here: that when I +first went out into the mental atmosphere of the modern world, +I found that the modern world was positively opposed on two points +to my nurse and to the nursery tales. It has taken me a long time +to find out that the modern world is wrong and my nurse was right. +The really curious thing was this: that modern thought contradicted +this basic creed of my boyhood on its two most essential doctrines. +I have explained that the fairy tales founded in me two convictions; +first, that this world is a wild and startling place, which might +have been quite different, but which is quite delightful; second, +that before this wildness and delight one may well be modest and +submit to the queerest limitations of so queer a kindness. But I +found the whole modern world running like a high tide against both +my tendernesses; and the shock of that collision created two sudden +and spontaneous sentiments, which I have had ever since and which, +crude as they were, have since hardened into convictions. + + First, I found the whole modern world talking scientific fatalism; +saying that everything is as it must always have been, being unfolded +without fault from the beginning. The leaf on the tree is green +because it could never have been anything else. Now, the fairy-tale +philosopher is glad that the leaf is green precisely because it +might have been scarlet. He feels as if it had turned green an +instant before he looked at it. He is pleased that snow is white +on the strictly reasonable ground that it might have been black. +Every colour has in it a bold quality as of choice; the red of garden +roses is not only decisive but dramatic, like suddenly spilt blood. +He feels that something has been DONE. But the great determinists +of the nineteenth century were strongly against this native +feeling that something had happened an instant before. In fact, +according to them, nothing ever really had happened since the beginning +of the world. Nothing ever had happened since existence had happened; +and even about the date of that they were not very sure. + + The modern world as I found it was solid for modern Calvinism, +for the necessity of things being as they are. But when I came +to ask them I found they had really no proof of this unavoidable +repetition in things except the fact that the things were repeated. +Now, the mere repetition made the things to me rather more weird +than more rational. It was as if, having seen a curiously shaped +nose in the street and dismissed it as an accident, I had then +seen six other noses of the same astonishing shape. I should have +fancied for a moment that it must be some local secret society. +So one elephant having a trunk was odd; but all elephants having +trunks looked like a plot. I speak here only of an emotion, +and of an emotion at once stubborn and subtle. But the repetition +in Nature seemed sometimes to be an excited repetition, like that of +an angry schoolmaster saying the same thing over and over again. +The grass seemed signalling to me with all its fingers at once; +the crowded stars seemed bent upon being understood. The sun would +make me see him if he rose a thousand times. The recurrences of the +universe rose to the maddening rhythm of an incantation, and I began +to see an idea. + + All the towering materialism which dominates the modern mind +rests ultimately upon one assumption; a false assumption. It is +supposed that if a thing goes on repeating itself it is probably dead; +a piece of clockwork. People feel that if the universe was personal +it would vary; if the sun were alive it would dance. This is a +fallacy even in relation to known fact. For the variation in human +affairs is generally brought into them, not by life, but by death; +by the dying down or breaking off of their strength or desire. +A man varies his movements because of some slight element of failure +or fatigue. He gets into an omnibus because he is tired of walking; +or he walks because he is tired of sitting still. But if his life +and joy were so gigantic that he never tired of going to Islington, +he might go to Islington as regularly as the Thames goes to Sheerness. +The very speed and ecstasy of his life would have the stillness +of death. The sun rises every morning. I do not rise every morning; +but the variation is due not to my activity, but to my inaction. +Now, to put the matter in a popular phrase, it might be true that +the sun rises regularly because he never gets tired of rising. +His routine might be due, not to a lifelessness, but to a rush +of life. The thing I mean can be seen, for instance, in children, +when they find some game or joke that they specially enjoy. A child +kicks his legs rhythmically through excess, not absence, of life. +Because children have abounding vitality, because they are in spirit +fierce and free, therefore they want things repeated and unchanged. +They always say, "Do it again"; and the grown-up person does it +again until he is nearly dead. For grown-up people are not strong +enough to exult in monotony. But perhaps God is strong enough +to exult in monotony. It is possible that God says every morning, +"Do it again" to the sun; and every evening, "Do it again" to the moon. +It may not be automatic necessity that makes all daisies alike; +it may be that God makes every daisy separately, but has never got tired +of making them. It may be that He has the eternal appetite of infancy; +for we have sinned and grown old, and our Father is younger than we. +The repetition in Nature may not be a mere recurrence; it may be +a theatrical ENCORE. Heaven may ENCORE the bird who laid an egg. +If the human being conceives and brings forth a human child instead +of bringing forth a fish, or a bat, or a griffin, the reason may not +be that we are fixed in an animal fate without life or purpose. +It may be that our little tragedy has touched the gods, that they +admire it from their starry galleries, and that at the end of every +human drama man is called again and again before the curtain. +Repetition may go on for millions of years, by mere choice, and at +any instant it may stop. Man may stand on the earth generation +after generation, and yet each birth be his positively last +appearance. + + This was my first conviction; made by the shock of my childish +emotions meeting the modern creed in mid-career. I had always vaguely +felt facts to be miracles in the sense that they are wonderful: +now I began to think them miracles in the stricter sense that they +were WILFUL. I mean that they were, or might be, repeated exercises +of some will. In short, I had always believed that the world +involved magic: now I thought that perhaps it involved a magician. +And this pointed a profound emotion always present and sub-conscious; +that this world of ours has some purpose; and if there is a purpose, +there is a person. I had always felt life first as a story: +and if there is a story there is a story-teller. + + But modern thought also hit my second human tradition. +It went against the fairy feeling about strict limits and conditions. +The one thing it loved to talk about was expansion and largeness. +Herbert Spencer would have been greatly annoyed if any one had +called him an imperialist, and therefore it is highly regrettable +that nobody did. But he was an imperialist of the lowest type. +He popularized this contemptible notion that the size of the solar +system ought to over-awe the spiritual dogma of man. Why should +a man surrender his dignity to the solar system any more than to +a whale? If mere size proves that man is not the image of God, +then a whale may be the image of God; a somewhat formless image; +what one might call an impressionist portrait. It is quite futile +to argue that man is small compared to the cosmos; for man was +always small compared to the nearest tree. But Herbert Spencer, +in his headlong imperialism, would insist that we had in some +way been conquered and annexed by the astronomical universe. +He spoke about men and their ideals exactly as the most insolent +Unionist talks about the Irish and their ideals. He turned mankind +into a small nationality. And his evil influence can be seen even +in the most spirited and honourable of later scientific authors; +notably in the early romances of Mr. H.G.Wells. Many moralists +have in an exaggerated way represented the earth as wicked. +But Mr. Wells and his school made the heavens wicked. We should lift +up our eyes to the stars from whence would come our ruin. + + But the expansion of which I speak was much more evil than all this. +I have remarked that the materialist, like the madman, is in prison; +in the prison of one thought. These people seemed to think it +singularly inspiring to keep on saying that the prison was very large. +The size of this scientific universe gave one no novelty, no relief. +The cosmos went on for ever, but not in its wildest constellation +could there be anything really interesting; anything, for instance, +such as forgiveness or free will. The grandeur or infinity +of the secret of its cosmos added nothing to it. It was like +telling a prisoner in Reading gaol that he would be glad to hear +that the gaol now covered half the county. The warder would +have nothing to show the man except more and more long corridors +of stone lit by ghastly lights and empty of all that is human. +So these expanders of the universe had nothing to show us except +more and more infinite corridors of space lit by ghastly suns +and empty of all that is divine. + + In fairyland there had been a real law; a law that could be broken, +for the definition of a law is something that can be broken. +But the machinery of this cosmic prison was something that could +not be broken; for we ourselves were only a part of its machinery. +We were either unable to do things or we were destined to do them. +The idea of the mystical condition quite disappeared; one can neither +have the firmness of keeping laws nor the fun of breaking them. +The largeness of this universe had nothing of that freshness and +airy outbreak which we have praised in the universe of the poet. +This modern universe is literally an empire; that is, it was vast, +but it is not free. One went into larger and larger windowless rooms, +rooms big with Babylonian perspective; but one never found the smallest +window or a whisper of outer air. + + Their infernal parallels seemed to expand with distance; +but for me all good things come to a point, swords for instance. +So finding the boast of the big cosmos so unsatisfactory to my +emotions I began to argue about it a little; and I soon found that +the whole attitude was even shallower than could have been expected. +According to these people the cosmos was one thing since it had +one unbroken rule. Only (they would say) while it is one thing, +it is also the only thing there is. Why, then, should one worry +particularly to call it large? There is nothing to compare it with. +It would be just as sensible to call it small. A man may say, +"I like this vast cosmos, with its throng of stars and its crowd +of varied creatures." But if it comes to that why should not a +man say, "I like this cosy little cosmos, with its decent number +of stars and as neat a provision of live stock as I wish to see"? +One is as good as the other; they are both mere sentiments. +It is mere sentiment to rejoice that the sun is larger than the earth; +it is quite as sane a sentiment to rejoice that the sun is no larger +than it is. A man chooses to have an emotion about the largeness +of the world; why should he not choose to have an emotion about +its smallness? + + It happened that I had that emotion. When one is fond of +anything one addresses it by diminutives, even if it is an elephant +or a life-guardsman. The reason is, that anything, however huge, +that can be conceived of as complete, can be conceived of as small. +If military moustaches did not suggest a sword or tusks a tail, +then the object would be vast because it would be immeasurable. But the +moment you can imagine a guardsman you can imagine a small guardsman. +The moment you really see an elephant you can call it "Tiny." +If you can make a statue of a thing you can make a statuette of it. +These people professed that the universe was one coherent thing; +but they were not fond of the universe. But I was frightfully fond +of the universe and wanted to address it by a diminutive. I often +did so; and it never seemed to mind. Actually and in truth I did feel +that these dim dogmas of vitality were better expressed by calling +the world small than by calling it large. For about infinity there +was a sort of carelessness which was the reverse of the fierce and pious +care which I felt touching the pricelessness and the peril of life. +They showed only a dreary waste; but I felt a sort of sacred thrift. +For economy is far more romantic than extravagance. To them stars +were an unending income of halfpence; but I felt about the golden sun +and the silver moon as a schoolboy feels if he has one sovereign and +one shilling. + + These subconscious convictions are best hit off by the colour +and tone of certain tales. Thus I have said that stories of magic +alone can express my sense that life is not only a pleasure but a +kind of eccentric privilege. I may express this other feeling of +cosmic cosiness by allusion to another book always read in boyhood, +"Robinson Crusoe," which I read about this time, and which owes +its eternal vivacity to the fact that it celebrates the poetry +of limits, nay, even the wild romance of prudence. Crusoe is a man +on a small rock with a few comforts just snatched from the sea: +the best thing in the book is simply the list of things saved from +the wreck. The greatest of poems is an inventory. Every kitchen +tool becomes ideal because Crusoe might have dropped it in the sea. +It is a good exercise, in empty or ugly hours of the day, +to look at anything, the coal-scuttle or the book-case, and think +how happy one could be to have brought it out of the sinking ship +on to the solitary island. But it is a better exercise still +to remember how all things have had this hair-breadth escape: +everything has been saved from a wreck. Every man has had one +horrible adventure: as a hidden untimely birth he had not been, +as infants that never see the light. Men spoke much in my boyhood +of restricted or ruined men of genius: and it was common to say +that many a man was a Great Might-Have-Been. To me it is a more +solid and startling fact that any man in the street is a Great +Might-Not-Have-Been. + + But I really felt (the fancy may seem foolish) as if all the order +and number of things were the romantic remnant of Crusoe's ship. +That there are two sexes and one sun, was like the fact that there +were two guns and one axe. It was poignantly urgent that none should +be lost; but somehow, it was rather fun that none could be added. +The trees and the planets seemed like things saved from the wreck: +and when I saw the Matterhorn I was glad that it had not been overlooked +in the confusion. I felt economical about the stars as if they were +sapphires (they are called so in Milton's Eden): I hoarded the hills. +For the universe is a single jewel, and while it is a natural cant +to talk of a jewel as peerless and priceless, of this jewel it is +literally true. This cosmos is indeed without peer and without price: +for there cannot be another one. + + Thus ends, in unavoidable inadequacy, the attempt to utter the +unutterable things. These are my ultimate attitudes towards life; +the soils for the seeds of doctrine. These in some dark way I +thought before I could write, and felt before I could think: +that we may proceed more easily afterwards, I will roughly recapitulate +them now. I felt in my bones; first, that this world does not +explain itself. It may be a miracle with a supernatural explanation; +it may be a conjuring trick, with a natural explanation. +But the explanation of the conjuring trick, if it is to satisfy me, +will have to be better than the natural explanations I have heard. +The thing is magic, true or false. Second, I came to feel as if magic +must have a meaning, and meaning must have some one to mean it. +There was something personal in the world, as in a work of art; +whatever it meant it meant violently. Third, I thought this +purpose beautiful in its old design, in spite of its defects, +such as dragons. Fourth, that the proper form of thanks to it +is some form of humility and restraint: we should thank God +for beer and Burgundy by not drinking too much of them. We owed, +also, an obedience to whatever made us. And last, and strangest, +there had come into my mind a vague and vast impression that in some +way all good was a remnant to be stored and held sacred out of some +primordial ruin. Man had saved his good as Crusoe saved his goods: +he had saved them from a wreck. All this I felt and the age gave me +no encouragement to feel it. And all this time I had not even thought +of Christian theology. + + + +V THE FLAG OF THE WORLD + + + When I was a boy there were two curious men running about +who were called the optimist and the pessimist. I constantly used +the words myself, but I cheerfully confess that I never had any +very special idea of what they meant. The only thing which might +be considered evident was that they could not mean what they said; +for the ordinary verbal explanation was that the optimist thought +this world as good as it could be, while the pessimist thought +it as bad as it could be. Both these statements being obviously +raving nonsense, one had to cast about for other explanations. +An optimist could not mean a man who thought everything right and +nothing wrong. For that is meaningless; it is like calling everything +right and nothing left. Upon the whole, I came to the conclusion +that the optimist thought everything good except the pessimist, +and that the pessimist thought everything bad, except himself. +It would be unfair to omit altogether from the list the mysterious +but suggestive definition said to have been given by a little girl, +"An optimist is a man who looks after your eyes, and a pessimist +is a man who looks after your feet." I am not sure that this is not +the best definition of all. There is even a sort of allegorical truth +in it. For there might, perhaps, be a profitable distinction drawn +between that more dreary thinker who thinks merely of our contact +with the earth from moment to moment, and that happier thinker +who considers rather our primary power of vision and of choice +of road. + + But this is a deep mistake in this alternative of the optimist +and the pessimist. The assumption of it is that a man criticises +this world as if he were house-hunting, as if he were being shown +over a new suite of apartments. If a man came to this world from +some other world in full possession of his powers he might discuss +whether the advantage of midsummer woods made up for the disadvantage +of mad dogs, just as a man looking for lodgings might balance +the presence of a telephone against the absence of a sea view. +But no man is in that position. A man belongs to this world before +he begins to ask if it is nice to belong to it. He has fought for +the flag, and often won heroic victories for the flag long before he +has ever enlisted. To put shortly what seems the essential matter, +he has a loyalty long before he has any admiration. + + In the last chapter it has been said that the primary feeling +that this world is strange and yet attractive is best expressed +in fairy tales. The reader may, if he likes, put down the next +stage to that bellicose and even jingo literature which commonly +comes next in the history of a boy. We all owe much sound morality +to the penny dreadfuls. Whatever the reason, it seemed and still +seems to me that our attitude towards life can be better expressed +in terms of a kind of military loyalty than in terms of criticism +and approval. My acceptance of the universe is not optimism, +it is more like patriotism. It is a matter of primary loyalty. +The world is not a lodging-house at Brighton, which we are to +leave because it is miserable. It is the fortress of our family, +with the flag flying on the turret, and the more miserable it +is the less we should leave it. The point is not that this world +is too sad to love or too glad not to love; the point is that +when you do love a thing, its gladness is a reason for loving it, +and its sadness a reason for loving it more. All optimistic thoughts +about England and all pessimistic thoughts about her are alike +reasons for the English patriot. Similarly, optimism and pessimism +are alike arguments for the cosmic patriot. + + Let us suppose we are confronted with a desperate thing--say +Pimlico. If we think what is really best for Pimlico we shall find +the thread of thought leads to the throne or the mystic and the +arbitrary. It is not enough for a man to disapprove of Pimlico: in +that case he will merely cut his throat or move to Chelsea. Nor, +certainly, is it enough for a man to approve of Pimlico: for then +it will remain Pimlico, which would be awful. The only way out of +it seems to be for somebody to love Pimlico: to love it with a +transcendental tie and without any earthly reason. If there arose a +man who loved Pimlico, then Pimlico would rise into ivory towers and +golden pinnacles; Pimlico would attire herself as a woman does when +she is loved. For decoration is not given to hide horrible things: +but to decorate things already adorable. A mother does not give her +child a blue bow because he is so ugly without it. A lover does not +give a girl a necklace to hide her neck. If men loved Pimlico as +mothers love children, arbitrarily, because it is THEIRS, Pimlico in a +year or two might be fairer than Florence. Some readers will say that +this is a mere fantasy. I answer that this is the actual history of +mankind. This, as a fact, is how cities did grow great. Go back to +the darkest roots of civilization and you will find them knotted round +some sacred stone or encircling some sacred well. People first paid +honour to a spot and afterwards gained glory for it. Men did not love +Rome because she was great. She was great because they had loved her. + + The eighteenth-century theories of the social contract have +been exposed to much clumsy criticism in our time; in so far +as they meant that there is at the back of all historic government +an idea of content and co-operation, they were demonstrably right. +But they really were wrong, in so far as they suggested that men +had ever aimed at order or ethics directly by a conscious exchange +of interests. Morality did not begin by one man saying to another, +"I will not hit you if you do not hit me"; there is no trace +of such a transaction. There IS a trace of both men having said, +"We must not hit each other in the holy place." They gained their +morality by guarding their religion. They did not cultivate courage. +They fought for the shrine, and found they had become courageous. +They did not cultivate cleanliness. They purified themselves for +the altar, and found that they were clean. The history of the Jews +is the only early document known to most Englishmen, and the facts can +be judged sufficiently from that. The Ten Commandments which have been +found substantially common to mankind were merely military commands; +a code of regimental orders, issued to protect a certain ark across +a certain desert. Anarchy was evil because it endangered the sanctity. +And only when they made a holy day for God did they find they had made +a holiday for men. + + If it be granted that this primary devotion to a place or thing +is a source of creative energy, we can pass on to a very peculiar fact. +Let us reiterate for an instant that the only right optimism is a sort +of universal patriotism. What is the matter with the pessimist? +I think it can be stated by saying that he is the cosmic anti-patriot. +And what is the matter with the anti-patriot? I think it can be stated, +without undue bitterness, by saying that he is the candid friend. +And what is the matter with the candid friend? There we strike +the rock of real life and immutable human nature. + + I venture to say that what is bad in the candid friend +is simply that he is not candid. He is keeping something back-- +his own gloomy pleasure in saying unpleasant things. He has +a secret desire to hurt, not merely to help. This is certainly, +I think, what makes a certain sort of anti-patriot irritating to +healthy citizens. I do not speak (of course) of the anti-patriotism +which only irritates feverish stockbrokers and gushing actresses; +that is only patriotism speaking plainly. A man who says that +no patriot should attack the Boer War until it is over is not +worth answering intelligently; he is saying that no good son +should warn his mother off a cliff until she has fallen over it. +But there is an anti-patriot who honestly angers honest men, +and the explanation of him is, I think, what I have suggested: +he is the uncandid candid friend; the man who says, "I am sorry +to say we are ruined," and is not sorry at all. And he may be said, +without rhetoric, to be a traitor; for he is using that ugly knowledge +which was allowed him to strengthen the army, to discourage people +from joining it. Because he is allowed to be pessimistic as a +military adviser he is being pessimistic as a recruiting sergeant. +Just in the same way the pessimist (who is the cosmic anti-patriot) +uses the freedom that life allows to her counsellors to lure away +the people from her flag. Granted that he states only facts, it is +still essential to know what are his emotions, what is his motive. +It may be that twelve hundred men in Tottenham are down with smallpox; +but we want to know whether this is stated by some great philosopher +who wants to curse the gods, or only by some common clergyman who wants +to help the men. + + The evil of the pessimist is, then, not that he chastises gods +and men, but that he does not love what he chastises--he has not +this primary and supernatural loyalty to things. What is the evil +of the man commonly called an optimist? Obviously, it is felt +that the optimist, wishing to defend the honour of this world, +will defend the indefensible. He is the jingo of the universe; +he will say, "My cosmos, right or wrong." He will be less inclined +to the reform of things; more inclined to a sort of front-bench +official answer to all attacks, soothing every one with assurances. +He will not wash the world, but whitewash the world. All this +(which is true of a type of optimist) leads us to the one really +interesting point of psychology, which could not be explained +without it. + + We say there must be a primal loyalty to life: the only +question is, shall it be a natural or a supernatural loyalty? +If you like to put it so, shall it be a reasonable or an +unreasonable loyalty? Now, the extraordinary thing is that the +bad optimism (the whitewashing, the weak defence of everything) +comes in with the reasonable optimism. Rational optimism leads +to stagnation: it is irrational optimism that leads to reform. +Let me explain by using once more the parallel of patriotism. +The man who is most likely to ruin the place he loves is exactly +the man who loves it with a reason. The man who will improve +the place is the man who loves it without a reason. If a man loves +some feature of Pimlico (which seems unlikely), he may find himself +defending that feature against Pimlico itself. But if he simply loves +Pimlico itself, he may lay it waste and turn it into the New Jerusalem. +I do not deny that reform may be excessive; I only say that it is the +mystic patriot who reforms. Mere jingo self-contentment is commonest +among those who have some pedantic reason for their patriotism. +The worst jingoes do not love England, but a theory of England. +If we love England for being an empire, we may overrate the success +with which we rule the Hindoos. But if we love it only for being +a nation, we can face all events: for it would be a nation even +if the Hindoos ruled us. Thus also only those will permit their +patriotism to falsify history whose patriotism depends on history. +A man who loves England for being English will not mind how she arose. +But a man who loves England for being Anglo-Saxon may go against +all facts for his fancy. He may end (like Carlyle and Freeman) +by maintaining that the Norman Conquest was a Saxon Conquest. +He may end in utter unreason--because he has a reason. A man who +loves France for being military will palliate the army of 1870. +But a man who loves France for being France will improve the army +of 1870. This is exactly what the French have done, and France is +a good instance of the working paradox. Nowhere else is patriotism +more purely abstract and arbitrary; and nowhere else is reform more +drastic and sweeping. The more transcendental is your patriotism, +the more practical are your politics. + + Perhaps the most everyday instance of this point is in the case +of women; and their strange and strong loyalty. Some stupid people +started the idea that because women obviously back up their own +people through everything, therefore women are blind and do not +see anything. They can hardly have known any women. The same women +who are ready to defend their men through thick and thin are (in +their personal intercourse with the man) almost morbidly lucid +about the thinness of his excuses or the thickness of his head. +A man's friend likes him but leaves him as he is: his wife loves him +and is always trying to turn him into somebody else. Women who are +utter mystics in their creed are utter cynics in their criticism. +Thackeray expressed this well when he made Pendennis' mother, +who worshipped her son as a god, yet assume that he would go wrong +as a man. She underrated his virtue, though she overrated his value. +The devotee is entirely free to criticise; the fanatic can safely +be a sceptic. Love is not blind; that is the last thing that it is. +Love is bound; and the more it is bound the less it is blind. + + This at least had come to be my position about all that +was called optimism, pessimism, and improvement. Before any +cosmic act of reform we must have a cosmic oath of allegiance. +A man must be interested in life, then he could be disinterested +in his views of it. "My son give me thy heart"; the heart must +be fixed on the right thing: the moment we have a fixed heart we +have a free hand. I must pause to anticipate an obvious criticism. +It will be said that a rational person accepts the world as mixed +of good and evil with a decent satisfaction and a decent endurance. +But this is exactly the attitude which I maintain to be defective. +It is, I know, very common in this age; it was perfectly put in those +quiet lines of Matthew Arnold which are more piercingly blasphemous +than the shrieks of Schopenhauer-- + +"Enough we live:--and if a life, With large results so little rife, +Though bearable, seem hardly worth This pomp of worlds, this pain +of birth." + + I know this feeling fills our epoch, and I think it freezes +our epoch. For our Titanic purposes of faith and revolution, +what we need is not the cold acceptance of the world as a compromise, +but some way in which we can heartily hate and heartily love it. +We do not want joy and anger to neutralize each other and produce a +surly contentment; we want a fiercer delight and a fiercer discontent. +We have to feel the universe at once as an ogre's castle, +to be stormed, and yet as our own cottage, to which we can return +at evening. + + No one doubts that an ordinary man can get on with this world: +but we demand not strength enough to get on with it, but strength +enough to get it on. Can he hate it enough to change it, +and yet love it enough to think it worth changing? Can he look +up at its colossal good without once feeling acquiescence? +Can he look up at its colossal evil without once feeling despair? +Can he, in short, be at once not only a pessimist and an optimist, +but a fanatical pessimist and a fanatical optimist? Is he enough of a +pagan to die for the world, and enough of a Christian to die to it? +In this combination, I maintain, it is the rational optimist who fails, +the irrational optimist who succeeds. He is ready to smash the whole +universe for the sake of itself. + + I put these things not in their mature logical sequence, but as +they came: and this view was cleared and sharpened by an accident +of the time. Under the lengthening shadow of Ibsen, an argument +arose whether it was not a very nice thing to murder one's self. +Grave moderns told us that we must not even say "poor fellow," +of a man who had blown his brains out, since he was an enviable person, +and had only blown them out because of their exceptional excellence. +Mr. William Archer even suggested that in the golden age there +would be penny-in-the-slot machines, by which a man could kill +himself for a penny. In all this I found myself utterly hostile +to many who called themselves liberal and humane. Not only is +suicide a sin, it is the sin. It is the ultimate and absolute evil, +the refusal to take an interest in existence; the refusal to take +the oath of loyalty to life. The man who kills a man, kills a man. +The man who kills himself, kills all men; as far as he is concerned +he wipes out the world. His act is worse (symbolically considered) +than any rape or dynamite outrage. For it destroys all buildings: +it insults all women. The thief is satisfied with diamonds; +but the suicide is not: that is his crime. He cannot be bribed, +even by the blazing stones of the Celestial City. The thief +compliments the things he steals, if not the owner of them. +But the suicide insults everything on earth by not stealing it. +He defiles every flower by refusing to live for its sake. +There is not a tiny creature in the cosmos at whom his death +is not a sneer. When a man hangs himself on a tree, the leaves +might fall off in anger and the birds fly away in fury: +for each has received a personal affront. Of course there may be +pathetic emotional excuses for the act. There often are for rape, +and there almost always are for dynamite. But if it comes to clear +ideas and the intelligent meaning of things, then there is much +more rational and philosophic truth in the burial at the cross-roads +and the stake driven through the body, than in Mr. Archer's suicidal +automatic machines. There is a meaning in burying the suicide apart. +The man's crime is different from other crimes--for it makes even +crimes impossible. + + About the same time I read a solemn flippancy by some free thinker: +he said that a suicide was only the same as a martyr. The open +fallacy of this helped to clear the question. Obviously a suicide +is the opposite of a martyr. A martyr is a man who cares so much +for something outside him, that he forgets his own personal life. +A suicide is a man who cares so little for anything outside him, +that he wants to see the last of everything. One wants something +to begin: the other wants everything to end. In other words, +the martyr is noble, exactly because (however he renounces the world +or execrates all humanity) he confesses this ultimate link with life; +he sets his heart outside himself: he dies that something may live. +The suicide is ignoble because he has not this link with being: +he is a mere destroyer; spiritually, he destroys the universe. +And then I remembered the stake and the cross-roads, and the queer +fact that Christianity had shown this weird harshness to the suicide. +For Christianity had shown a wild encouragement of the martyr. +Historic Christianity was accused, not entirely without reason, +of carrying martyrdom and asceticism to a point, desolate +and pessimistic. The early Christian martyrs talked of death +with a horrible happiness. They blasphemed the beautiful duties +of the body: they smelt the grave afar off like a field of flowers. +All this has seemed to many the very poetry of pessimism. Yet there +is the stake at the crossroads to show what Christianity thought of +the pessimist. + + This was the first of the long train of enigmas with which +Christianity entered the discussion. And there went with it a +peculiarity of which I shall have to speak more markedly, as a note +of all Christian notions, but which distinctly began in this one. +The Christian attitude to the martyr and the suicide was not what is +so often affirmed in modern morals. It was not a matter of degree. +It was not that a line must be drawn somewhere, and that the +self-slayer in exaltation fell within the line, the self-slayer +in sadness just beyond it. The Christian feeling evidently +was not merely that the suicide was carrying martyrdom too far. +The Christian feeling was furiously for one and furiously against +the other: these two things that looked so much alike were at +opposite ends of heaven and hell. One man flung away his life; +he was so good that his dry bones could heal cities in pestilence. +Another man flung away life; he was so bad that his bones would +pollute his brethren's. I am not saying this fierceness was right; +but why was it so fierce? + + Here it was that I first found that my wandering feet were +in some beaten track. Christianity had also felt this opposition +of the martyr to the suicide: had it perhaps felt it for the +same reason? Had Christianity felt what I felt, but could not +(and cannot) express--this need for a first loyalty to things, +and then for a ruinous reform of things? Then I remembered +that it was actually the charge against Christianity that it +combined these two things which I was wildly trying to combine. +Christianity was accused, at one and the same time, of being +too optimistic about the universe and of being too pessimistic +about the world. The coincidence made me suddenly stand still. + + An imbecile habit has arisen in modern controversy of saying +that such and such a creed can be held in one age but cannot +be held in another. Some dogma, we are told, was credible +in the twelfth century, but is not credible in the twentieth. +You might as well say that a certain philosophy can be believed +on Mondays, but cannot be believed on Tuesdays. You might as well +say of a view of the cosmos that it was suitable to half-past three, +but not suitable to half-past four. What a man can believe +depends upon his philosophy, not upon the clock or the century. +If a man believes in unalterable natural law, he cannot believe +in any miracle in any age. If a man believes in a will behind law, +he can believe in any miracle in any age. Suppose, for the sake +of argument, we are concerned with a case of thaumaturgic healing. +A materialist of the twelfth century could not believe it any more +than a materialist of the twentieth century. But a Christian +Scientist of the twentieth century can believe it as much as a +Christian of the twelfth century. It is simply a matter of a man's +theory of things. Therefore in dealing with any historical answer, +the point is not whether it was given in our time, but whether it +was given in answer to our question. And the more I thought about +when and how Christianity had come into the world, the more I felt +that it had actually come to answer this question. + + It is commonly the loose and latitudinarian Christians who pay +quite indefensible compliments to Christianity. They talk as if +there had never been any piety or pity until Christianity came, +a point on which any mediaeval would have been eager to correct them. +They represent that the remarkable thing about Christianity was that it +was the first to preach simplicity or self-restraint, or inwardness +and sincerity. They will think me very narrow (whatever that means) +if I say that the remarkable thing about Christianity was that it +was the first to preach Christianity. Its peculiarity was that it +was peculiar, and simplicity and sincerity are not peculiar, +but obvious ideals for all mankind. Christianity was the answer +to a riddle, not the last truism uttered after a long talk. +Only the other day I saw in an excellent weekly paper of Puritan tone +this remark, that Christianity when stripped of its armour of dogma +(as who should speak of a man stripped of his armour of bones), +turned out to be nothing but the Quaker doctrine of the Inner Light. +Now, if I were to say that Christianity came into the world +specially to destroy the doctrine of the Inner Light, that would +be an exaggeration. But it would be very much nearer to the truth. +The last Stoics, like Marcus Aurelius, were exactly the people +who did believe in the Inner Light. Their dignity, their weariness, +their sad external care for others, their incurable internal care +for themselves, were all due to the Inner Light, and existed only +by that dismal illumination. Notice that Marcus Aurelius insists, +as such introspective moralists always do, upon small things done +or undone; it is because he has not hate or love enough to make +a moral revolution. He gets up early in the morning, just as our +own aristocrats living the Simple Life get up early in the morning; +because such altruism is much easier than stopping the games +of the amphitheatre or giving the English people back their land. +Marcus Aurelius is the most intolerable of human types. He is an +unselfish egoist. An unselfish egoist is a man who has pride without +the excuse of passion. Of all conceivable forms of enlightenment +the worst is what these people call the Inner Light. Of all horrible +religions the most horrible is the worship of the god within. +Any one who knows any body knows how it would work; any one who knows +any one from the Higher Thought Centre knows how it does work. +That Jones shall worship the god within him turns out ultimately +to mean that Jones shall worship Jones. Let Jones worship the sun +or moon, anything rather than the Inner Light; let Jones worship +cats or crocodiles, if he can find any in his street, but not +the god within. Christianity came into the world firstly in order +to assert with violence that a man had not only to look inwards, +but to look outwards, to behold with astonishment and enthusiasm +a divine company and a divine captain. The only fun of being +a Christian was that a man was not left alone with the Inner Light, +but definitely recognized an outer light, fair as the sun, clear as +the moon, terrible as an army with banners. + + All the same, it will be as well if Jones does not worship the sun +and moon. If he does, there is a tendency for him to imitate them; +to say, that because the sun burns insects alive, he may burn +insects alive. He thinks that because the sun gives people sun-stroke, +he may give his neighbour measles. He thinks that because the moon +is said to drive men mad, he may drive his wife mad. This ugly side +of mere external optimism had also shown itself in the ancient world. +About the time when the Stoic idealism had begun to show the +weaknesses of pessimism, the old nature worship of the ancients had +begun to show the enormous weaknesses of optimism. Nature worship +is natural enough while the society is young, or, in other words, +Pantheism is all right as long as it is the worship of Pan. +But Nature has another side which experience and sin are not slow +in finding out, and it is no flippancy to say of the god Pan that he +soon showed the cloven hoof. The only objection to Natural Religion +is that somehow it always becomes unnatural. A man loves Nature +in the morning for her innocence and amiability, and at nightfall, +if he is loving her still, it is for her darkness and her cruelty. +He washes at dawn in clear water as did the Wise Man of the Stoics, +yet, somehow at the dark end of the day, he is bathing in hot +bull's blood, as did Julian the Apostate. The mere pursuit of +health always leads to something unhealthy. Physical nature must +not be made the direct object of obedience; it must be enjoyed, +not worshipped. Stars and mountains must not be taken seriously. +If they are, we end where the pagan nature worship ended. +Because the earth is kind, we can imitate all her cruelties. +Because sexuality is sane, we can all go mad about sexuality. +Mere optimism had reached its insane and appropriate termination. +The theory that everything was good had become an orgy of everything +that was bad. + + On the other side our idealist pessimists were represented +by the old remnant of the Stoics. Marcus Aurelius and his friends +had really given up the idea of any god in the universe and looked +only to the god within. They had no hope of any virtue in nature, +and hardly any hope of any virtue in society. They had not enough +interest in the outer world really to wreck or revolutionise it. +They did not love the city enough to set fire to it. Thus the +ancient world was exactly in our own desolate dilemma. The only +people who really enjoyed this world were busy breaking it up; +and the virtuous people did not care enough about them to knock +them down. In this dilemma (the same as ours) Christianity suddenly +stepped in and offered a singular answer, which the world eventually +accepted as THE answer. It was the answer then, and I think it is +the answer now. + + This answer was like the slash of a sword; it sundered; +it did not in any sense sentimentally unite. Briefly, it divided +God from the cosmos. That transcendence and distinctness of the +deity which some Christians now want to remove from Christianity, +was really the only reason why any one wanted to be a Christian. +It was the whole point of the Christian answer to the unhappy pessimist +and the still more unhappy optimist. As I am here only concerned +with their particular problem, I shall indicate only briefly this +great metaphysical suggestion. All descriptions of the creating +or sustaining principle in things must be metaphorical, because they +must be verbal. Thus the pantheist is forced to speak of God +in all things as if he were in a box. Thus the evolutionist has, +in his very name, the idea of being unrolled like a carpet. +All terms, religious and irreligious, are open to this charge. +The only question is whether all terms are useless, or whether one can, +with such a phrase, cover a distinct IDEA about the origin of things. +I think one can, and so evidently does the evolutionist, or he would +not talk about evolution. And the root phrase for all Christian +theism was this, that God was a creator, as an artist is a creator. +A poet is so separate from his poem that he himself speaks of it +as a little thing he has "thrown off." Even in giving it forth he +has flung it away. This principle that all creation and procreation +is a breaking off is at least as consistent through the cosmos as the +evolutionary principle that all growth is a branching out. A woman +loses a child even in having a child. All creation is separation. +Birth is as solemn a parting as death. + + It was the prime philosophic principle of Christianity that +this divorce in the divine act of making (such as severs the poet +from the poem or the mother from the new-born child) was the true +description of the act whereby the absolute energy made the world. +According to most philosophers, God in making the world enslaved it. +According to Christianity, in making it, He set it free. +God had written, not so much a poem, but rather a play; a play he +had planned as perfect, but which had necessarily been left to human +actors and stage-managers, who had since made a great mess of it. +I will discuss the truth of this theorem later. Here I have only +to point out with what a startling smoothness it passed the dilemma +we have discussed in this chapter. In this way at least one could +be both happy and indignant without degrading one's self to be either +a pessimist or an optimist. On this system one could fight all +the forces of existence without deserting the flag of existence. +One could be at peace with the universe and yet be at war with +the world. St. George could still fight the dragon, however big +the monster bulked in the cosmos, though he were bigger than the +mighty cities or bigger than the everlasting hills. If he were as +big as the world he could yet be killed in the name of the world. +St. George had not to consider any obvious odds or proportions in +the scale of things, but only the original secret of their design. +He can shake his sword at the dragon, even if it is everything; +even if the empty heavens over his head are only the huge arch of its +open jaws. + + And then followed an experience impossible to describe. +It was as if I had been blundering about since my birth with two +huge and unmanageable machines, of different shapes and without +apparent connection--the world and the Christian tradition. +I had found this hole in the world: the fact that one must +somehow find a way of loving the world without trusting it; +somehow one must love the world without being worldly. I found this +projecting feature of Christian theology, like a sort of hard spike, +the dogmatic insistence that God was personal, and had made a world +separate from Himself. The spike of dogma fitted exactly into +the hole in the world--it had evidently been meant to go there-- +and then the strange thing began to happen. When once these two +parts of the two machines had come together, one after another, +all the other parts fitted and fell in with an eerie exactitude. +I could hear bolt after bolt over all the machinery falling +into its place with a kind of click of relief. Having got one +part right, all the other parts were repeating that rectitude, +as clock after clock strikes noon. Instinct after instinct was +answered by doctrine after doctrine. Or, to vary the metaphor, +I was like one who had advanced into a hostile country to take +one high fortress. And when that fort had fallen the whole country +surrendered and turned solid behind me. The whole land was lit up, +as it were, back to the first fields of my childhood. All those blind +fancies of boyhood which in the fourth chapter I have tried in vain +to trace on the darkness, became suddenly transparent and sane. +I was right when I felt that roses were red by some sort of choice: +it was the divine choice. I was right when I felt that I would +almost rather say that grass was the wrong colour than say it must +by necessity have been that colour: it might verily have been +any other. My sense that happiness hung on the crazy thread of a +condition did mean something when all was said: it meant the whole +doctrine of the Fall. Even those dim and shapeless monsters of +notions which I have not been able to describe, much less defend, +stepped quietly into their places like colossal caryatides +of the creed. The fancy that the cosmos was not vast and void, +but small and cosy, had a fulfilled significance now, for anything +that is a work of art must be small in the sight of the artist; +to God the stars might be only small and dear, like diamonds. +And my haunting instinct that somehow good was not merely a tool to +be used, but a relic to be guarded, like the goods from Crusoe's ship-- +even that had been the wild whisper of something originally wise, for, +according to Christianity, we were indeed the survivors of a wreck, +the crew of a golden ship that had gone down before the beginning of +the world. + + But the important matter was this, that it entirely reversed +the reason for optimism. And the instant the reversal was made it +felt like the abrupt ease when a bone is put back in the socket. +I had often called myself an optimist, to avoid the too evident +blasphemy of pessimism. But all the optimism of the age had been +false and disheartening for this reason, that it had always been +trying to prove that we fit in to the world. The Christian +optimism is based on the fact that we do NOT fit in to the world. +I had tried to be happy by telling myself that man is an animal, +like any other which sought its meat from God. But now I really +was happy, for I had learnt that man is a monstrosity. I had been +right in feeling all things as odd, for I myself was at once worse +and better than all things. The optimist's pleasure was prosaic, +for it dwelt on the naturalness of everything; the Christian +pleasure was poetic, for it dwelt on the unnaturalness of everything +in the light of the supernatural. The modern philosopher had told +me again and again that I was in the right place, and I had still +felt depressed even in acquiescence. But I had heard that I was in +the WRONG place, and my soul sang for joy, like a bird in spring. +The knowledge found out and illuminated forgotten chambers in the dark +house of infancy. I knew now why grass had always seemed to me +as queer as the green beard of a giant, and why I could feel homesick +at home. + + + +VI THE PARADOXES OF CHRISTIANITY + + + The real trouble with this world of ours is not that it is an +unreasonable world, nor even that it is a reasonable one. The commonest +kind of trouble is that it is nearly reasonable, but not quite. +Life is not an illogicality; yet it is a trap for logicians. +It looks just a little more mathematical and regular than it is; +its exactitude is obvious, but its inexactitude is hidden; +its wildness lies in wait. I give one coarse instance of what I mean. +Suppose some mathematical creature from the moon were to reckon +up the human body; he would at once see that the essential thing +about it was that it was duplicate. A man is two men, he on the +right exactly resembling him on the left. Having noted that there +was an arm on the right and one on the left, a leg on the right +and one on the left, he might go further and still find on each side +the same number of fingers, the same number of toes, twin eyes, +twin ears, twin nostrils, and even twin lobes of the brain. +At last he would take it as a law; and then, where he found a heart +on one side, would deduce that there was another heart on the other. +And just then, where he most felt he was right, he would be wrong. + + It is this silent swerving from accuracy by an inch that is +the uncanny element in everything. It seems a sort of secret +treason in the universe. An apple or an orange is round enough +to get itself called round, and yet is not round after all. +The earth itself is shaped like an orange in order to lure some +simple astronomer into calling it a globe. A blade of grass is +called after the blade of a sword, because it comes to a point; +but it doesn't. Everywhere in things there is this element of the +quiet and incalculable. It escapes the rationalists, but it never +escapes till the last moment. From the grand curve of our earth it +could easily be inferred that every inch of it was thus curved. +It would seem rational that as a man has a brain on both sides, +he should have a heart on both sides. Yet scientific men are still +organizing expeditions to find the North Pole, because they are +so fond of flat country. Scientific men are also still organizing +expeditions to find a man's heart; and when they try to find it, +they generally get on the wrong side of him. + + Now, actual insight or inspiration is best tested by whether it +guesses these hidden malformations or surprises. If our mathematician +from the moon saw the two arms and the two ears, he might deduce +the two shoulder-blades and the two halves of the brain. But if he +guessed that the man's heart was in the right place, then I should +call him something more than a mathematician. Now, this is exactly +the claim which I have since come to propound for Christianity. +Not merely that it deduces logical truths, but that when it suddenly +becomes illogical, it has found, so to speak, an illogical truth. +It not only goes right about things, but it goes wrong (if one +may say so) exactly where the things go wrong. Its plan suits +the secret irregularities, and expects the unexpected. It is simple +about the simple truth; but it is stubborn about the subtle truth. +It will admit that a man has two hands, it will not admit (though all +the Modernists wail to it) the obvious deduction that he has two hearts. +It is my only purpose in this chapter to point this out; to show +that whenever we feel there is something odd in Christian theology, +we shall generally find that there is something odd in the truth. + + I have alluded to an unmeaning phrase to the effect that +such and such a creed cannot be believed in our age. Of course, +anything can be believed in any age. But, oddly enough, there really +is a sense in which a creed, if it is believed at all, can be +believed more fixedly in a complex society than in a simple one. +If a man finds Christianity true in Birmingham, he has actually clearer +reasons for faith than if he had found it true in Mercia. For the more +complicated seems the coincidence, the less it can be a coincidence. +If snowflakes fell in the shape, say, of the heart of Midlothian, +it might be an accident. But if snowflakes fell in the exact shape +of the maze at Hampton Court, I think one might call it a miracle. +It is exactly as of such a miracle that I have since come to feel +of the philosophy of Christianity. The complication of our modern +world proves the truth of the creed more perfectly than any of +the plain problems of the ages of faith. It was in Notting Hill +and Battersea that I began to see that Christianity was true. +This is why the faith has that elaboration of doctrines and details +which so much distresses those who admire Christianity without +believing in it. When once one believes in a creed, one is proud +of its complexity, as scientists are proud of the complexity +of science. It shows how rich it is in discoveries. If it is right +at all, it is a compliment to say that it's elaborately right. +A stick might fit a hole or a stone a hollow by accident. +But a key and a lock are both complex. And if a key fits a lock, +you know it is the right key. + + But this involved accuracy of the thing makes it very difficult +to do what I now have to do, to describe this accumulation of truth. +It is very hard for a man to defend anything of which he is +entirely convinced. It is comparatively easy when he is only +partially convinced. He is partially convinced because he has +found this or that proof of the thing, and he can expound it. +But a man is not really convinced of a philosophic theory when he +finds that something proves it. He is only really convinced when he +finds that everything proves it. And the more converging reasons he +finds pointing to this conviction, the more bewildered he is if asked +suddenly to sum them up. Thus, if one asked an ordinary intelligent man, +on the spur of the moment, "Why do you prefer civilization to savagery?" +he would look wildly round at object after object, and would only be +able to answer vaguely, "Why, there is that bookcase . . . and the +coals in the coal-scuttle . . . and pianos . . . and policemen." +The whole case for civilization is that the case for it is complex. +It has done so many things. But that very multiplicity of proof +which ought to make reply overwhelming makes reply impossible. + + There is, therefore, about all complete conviction a kind +of huge helplessness. The belief is so big that it takes a long +time to get it into action. And this hesitation chiefly arises, +oddly enough, from an indifference about where one should begin. +All roads lead to Rome; which is one reason why many people never +get there. In the case of this defence of the Christian conviction +I confess that I would as soon begin the argument with one thing +as another; I would begin it with a turnip or a taximeter cab. +But if I am to be at all careful about making my meaning clear, +it will, I think, be wiser to continue the current arguments +of the last chapter, which was concerned to urge the first of +these mystical coincidences, or rather ratifications. All I had +hitherto heard of Christian theology had alienated me from it. +I was a pagan at the age of twelve, and a complete agnostic by the +age of sixteen; and I cannot understand any one passing the age +of seventeen without having asked himself so simple a question. +I did, indeed, retain a cloudy reverence for a cosmic deity +and a great historical interest in the Founder of Christianity. +But I certainly regarded Him as a man; though perhaps I thought that, +even in that point, He had an advantage over some of His modern critics. +I read the scientific and sceptical literature of my time--all of it, +at least, that I could find written in English and lying about; +and I read nothing else; I mean I read nothing else on any other +note of philosophy. The penny dreadfuls which I also read +were indeed in a healthy and heroic tradition of Christianity; +but I did not know this at the time. I never read a line of +Christian apologetics. I read as little as I can of them now. +It was Huxley and Herbert Spencer and Bradlaugh who brought me +back to orthodox theology. They sowed in my mind my first wild +doubts of doubt. Our grandmothers were quite right when they said +that Tom Paine and the free-thinkers unsettled the mind. They do. +They unsettled mine horribly. The rationalist made me question +whether reason was of any use whatever; and when I had finished +Herbert Spencer I had got as far as doubting (for the first time) +whether evolution had occurred at all. As I laid down the last of +Colonel Ingersoll's atheistic lectures the dreadful thought broke +across my mind, "Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian." I was +in a desperate way. + + This odd effect of the great agnostics in arousing doubts +deeper than their own might be illustrated in many ways. +I take only one. As I read and re-read all the non-Christian +or anti-Christian accounts of the faith, from Huxley to Bradlaugh, +a slow and awful impression grew gradually but graphically +upon my mind--the impression that Christianity must be a most +extraordinary thing. For not only (as I understood) had Christianity +the most flaming vices, but it had apparently a mystical talent +for combining vices which seemed inconsistent with each other. +It was attacked on all sides and for all contradictory reasons. +No sooner had one rationalist demonstrated that it was too far +to the east than another demonstrated with equal clearness that it +was much too far to the west. No sooner had my indignation died +down at its angular and aggressive squareness than I was called up +again to notice and condemn its enervating and sensual roundness. +In case any reader has not come across the thing I mean, I will give +such instances as I remember at random of this self-contradiction +in the sceptical attack. I give four or five of them; there are +fifty more. + + Thus, for instance, I was much moved by the eloquent attack +on Christianity as a thing of inhuman gloom; for I thought +(and still think) sincere pessimism the unpardonable sin. +Insincere pessimism is a social accomplishment, rather agreeable +than otherwise; and fortunately nearly all pessimism is insincere. +But if Christianity was, as these people said, a thing purely +pessimistic and opposed to life, then I was quite prepared to blow +up St. Paul's Cathedral. But the extraordinary thing is this. +They did prove to me in Chapter I. (to my complete satisfaction) +that Christianity was too pessimistic; and then, in Chapter II., +they began to prove to me that it was a great deal too optimistic. +One accusation against Christianity was that it prevented men, +by morbid tears and terrors, from seeking joy and liberty in the bosom +of Nature. But another accusation was that it comforted men with a +fictitious providence, and put them in a pink-and-white nursery. +One great agnostic asked why Nature was not beautiful enough, +and why it was hard to be free. Another great agnostic objected +that Christian optimism, "the garment of make-believe woven by +pious hands," hid from us the fact that Nature was ugly, and that +it was impossible to be free. One rationalist had hardly done +calling Christianity a nightmare before another began to call it +a fool's paradise. This puzzled me; the charges seemed inconsistent. +Christianity could not at once be the black mask on a white world, +and also the white mask on a black world. The state of the Christian +could not be at once so comfortable that he was a coward to cling +to it, and so uncomfortable that he was a fool to stand it. +If it falsified human vision it must falsify it one way or another; +it could not wear both green and rose-coloured spectacles. +I rolled on my tongue with a terrible joy, as did all young men +of that time, the taunts which Swinburne hurled at the dreariness of +the creed-- + + "Thou hast conquered, O pale Galilaean, the world has grown +gray with Thy breath." + +But when I read the same poet's accounts of paganism (as +in "Atalanta"), I gathered that the world was, if possible, +more gray before the Galilean breathed on it than afterwards. +The poet maintained, indeed, in the abstract, that life itself +was pitch dark. And yet, somehow, Christianity had darkened it. +The very man who denounced Christianity for pessimism was himself +a pessimist. I thought there must be something wrong. And it did +for one wild moment cross my mind that, perhaps, those might not be +the very best judges of the relation of religion to happiness who, +by their own account, had neither one nor the other. + + It must be understood that I did not conclude hastily that the +accusations were false or the accusers fools. I simply deduced +that Christianity must be something even weirder and wickeder +than they made out. A thing might have these two opposite vices; +but it must be a rather queer thing if it did. A man might be too fat +in one place and too thin in another; but he would be an odd shape. +At this point my thoughts were only of the odd shape of the Christian +religion; I did not allege any odd shape in the rationalistic mind. + + Here is another case of the same kind. I felt that a strong +case against Christianity lay in the charge that there is something +timid, monkish, and unmanly about all that is called "Christian," +especially in its attitude towards resistance and fighting. +The great sceptics of the nineteenth century were largely virile. +Bradlaugh in an expansive way, Huxley, in a reticent way, +were decidedly men. In comparison, it did seem tenable that there +was something weak and over patient about Christian counsels. +The Gospel paradox about the other cheek, the fact that priests +never fought, a hundred things made plausible the accusation +that Christianity was an attempt to make a man too like a sheep. +I read it and believed it, and if I had read nothing different, +I should have gone on believing it. But I read something very different. +I turned the next page in my agnostic manual, and my brain turned +up-side down. Now I found that I was to hate Christianity not for +fighting too little, but for fighting too much. Christianity, it seemed, +was the mother of wars. Christianity had deluged the world with blood. +I had got thoroughly angry with the Christian, because he never +was angry. And now I was told to be angry with him because his +anger had been the most huge and horrible thing in human history; +because his anger had soaked the earth and smoked to the sun. +The very people who reproached Christianity with the meekness and +non-resistance of the monasteries were the very people who reproached +it also with the violence and valour of the Crusades. It was the +fault of poor old Christianity (somehow or other) both that Edward +the Confessor did not fight and that Richard Coeur de Leon did. +The Quakers (we were told) were the only characteristic Christians; +and yet the massacres of Cromwell and Alva were characteristic +Christian crimes. What could it all mean? What was this Christianity +which always forbade war and always produced wars? What could +be the nature of the thing which one could abuse first because it +would not fight, and second because it was always fighting? +In what world of riddles was born this monstrous murder and this +monstrous meekness? The shape of Christianity grew a queerer shape +every instant. + + I take a third case; the strangest of all, because it involves +the one real objection to the faith. The one real objection to the +Christian religion is simply that it is one religion. The world is +a big place, full of very different kinds of people. Christianity (it +may reasonably be said) is one thing confined to one kind of people; +it began in Palestine, it has practically stopped with Europe. +I was duly impressed with this argument in my youth, and I was much +drawn towards the doctrine often preached in Ethical Societies-- +I mean the doctrine that there is one great unconscious church of +all humanity founded on the omnipresence of the human conscience. +Creeds, it was said, divided men; but at least morals united them. +The soul might seek the strangest and most remote lands and ages +and still find essential ethical common sense. It might find +Confucius under Eastern trees, and he would be writing "Thou +shalt not steal." It might decipher the darkest hieroglyphic on +the most primeval desert, and the meaning when deciphered would +be "Little boys should tell the truth." I believed this doctrine +of the brotherhood of all men in the possession of a moral sense, +and I believe it still--with other things. And I was thoroughly +annoyed with Christianity for suggesting (as I supposed) +that whole ages and empires of men had utterly escaped this light +of justice and reason. But then I found an astonishing thing. +I found that the very people who said that mankind was one church +from Plato to Emerson were the very people who said that morality +had changed altogether, and that what was right in one age was wrong +in another. If I asked, say, for an altar, I was told that we +needed none, for men our brothers gave us clear oracles and one creed +in their universal customs and ideals. But if I mildly pointed +out that one of men's universal customs was to have an altar, +then my agnostic teachers turned clean round and told me that men +had always been in darkness and the superstitions of savages. +I found it was their daily taunt against Christianity that it was +the light of one people and had left all others to die in the dark. +But I also found that it was their special boast for themselves +that science and progress were the discovery of one people, +and that all other peoples had died in the dark. Their chief insult +to Christianity was actually their chief compliment to themselves, +and there seemed to be a strange unfairness about all their relative +insistence on the two things. When considering some pagan or agnostic, +we were to remember that all men had one religion; when considering +some mystic or spiritualist, we were only to consider what absurd +religions some men had. We could trust the ethics of Epictetus, +because ethics had never changed. We must not trust the ethics +of Bossuet, because ethics had changed. They changed in two +hundred years, but not in two thousand. + + This began to be alarming. It looked not so much as if +Christianity was bad enough to include any vices, but rather +as if any stick was good enough to beat Christianity with. +What again could this astonishing thing be like which people +were so anxious to contradict, that in doing so they did not mind +contradicting themselves? I saw the same thing on every side. +I can give no further space to this discussion of it in detail; +but lest any one supposes that I have unfairly selected three +accidental cases I will run briefly through a few others. +Thus, certain sceptics wrote that the great crime of Christianity +had been its attack on the family; it had dragged women to the +loneliness and contemplation of the cloister, away from their homes +and their children. But, then, other sceptics (slightly more advanced) +said that the great crime of Christianity was forcing the family +and marriage upon us; that it doomed women to the drudgery of their +homes and children, and forbade them loneliness and contemplation. +The charge was actually reversed. Or, again, certain phrases in the +Epistles or the marriage service, were said by the anti-Christians +to show contempt for woman's intellect. But I found that the +anti-Christians themselves had a contempt for woman's intellect; +for it was their great sneer at the Church on the Continent that +"only women" went to it. Or again, Christianity was reproached +with its naked and hungry habits; with its sackcloth and dried peas. +But the next minute Christianity was being reproached with its pomp +and its ritualism; its shrines of porphyry and its robes of gold. +It was abused for being too plain and for being too coloured. +Again Christianity had always been accused of restraining sexuality +too much, when Bradlaugh the Malthusian discovered that it restrained +it too little. It is often accused in the same breath of prim +respectability and of religious extravagance. Between the covers +of the same atheistic pamphlet I have found the faith rebuked +for its disunion, "One thinks one thing, and one another," +and rebuked also for its union, "It is difference of opinion +that prevents the world from going to the dogs." In the same +conversation a free-thinker, a friend of mine, blamed Christianity +for despising Jews, and then despised it himself for being Jewish. + + I wished to be quite fair then, and I wish to be quite fair now; +and I did not conclude that the attack on Christianity was all wrong. +I only concluded that if Christianity was wrong, it was very +wrong indeed. Such hostile horrors might be combined in one thing, +but that thing must be very strange and solitary. There are men +who are misers, and also spendthrifts; but they are rare. There are +men sensual and also ascetic; but they are rare. But if this mass +of mad contradictions really existed, quakerish and bloodthirsty, +too gorgeous and too thread-bare, austere, yet pandering preposterously +to the lust of the eye, the enemy of women and their foolish refuge, +a solemn pessimist and a silly optimist, if this evil existed, +then there was in this evil something quite supreme and unique. +For I found in my rationalist teachers no explanation of such +exceptional corruption. Christianity (theoretically speaking) +was in their eyes only one of the ordinary myths and errors of mortals. +THEY gave me no key to this twisted and unnatural badness. +Such a paradox of evil rose to the stature of the supernatural. +It was, indeed, almost as supernatural as the infallibility of the Pope. +An historic institution, which never went right, is really quite +as much of a miracle as an institution that cannot go wrong. +The only explanation which immediately occurred to my mind was that +Christianity did not come from heaven, but from hell. Really, if Jesus +of Nazareth was not Christ, He must have been Antichrist. + + And then in a quiet hour a strange thought struck me like a still +thunderbolt. There had suddenly come into my mind another explanation. +Suppose we heard an unknown man spoken of by many men. Suppose we +were puzzled to hear that some men said he was too tall and some +too short; some objected to his fatness, some lamented his leanness; +some thought him too dark, and some too fair. One explanation (as +has been already admitted) would be that he might be an odd shape. +But there is another explanation. He might be the right shape. +Outrageously tall men might feel him to be short. Very short men +might feel him to be tall. Old bucks who are growing stout might +consider him insufficiently filled out; old beaux who were growing +thin might feel that he expanded beyond the narrow lines of elegance. +Perhaps Swedes (who have pale hair like tow) called him a dark man, +while negroes considered him distinctly blonde. Perhaps (in short) +this extraordinary thing is really the ordinary thing; at least +the normal thing, the centre. Perhaps, after all, it is Christianity +that is sane and all its critics that are mad--in various ways. +I tested this idea by asking myself whether there was about any +of the accusers anything morbid that might explain the accusation. +I was startled to find that this key fitted a lock. For instance, +it was certainly odd that the modern world charged Christianity +at once with bodily austerity and with artistic pomp. But then +it was also odd, very odd, that the modern world itself combined +extreme bodily luxury with an extreme absence of artistic pomp. +The modern man thought Becket's robes too rich and his meals too poor. +But then the modern man was really exceptional in history; no man before +ever ate such elaborate dinners in such ugly clothes. The modern man +found the church too simple exactly where modern life is too complex; +he found the church too gorgeous exactly where modern life is too dingy. +The man who disliked the plain fasts and feasts was mad on entrees. +The man who disliked vestments wore a pair of preposterous trousers. +And surely if there was any insanity involved in the matter at all it +was in the trousers, not in the simply falling robe. If there was any +insanity at all, it was in the extravagant entrees, not in the bread +and wine. + + I went over all the cases, and I found the key fitted so far. +The fact that Swinburne was irritated at the unhappiness of Christians +and yet more irritated at their happiness was easily explained. +It was no longer a complication of diseases in Christianity, +but a complication of diseases in Swinburne. The restraints +of Christians saddened him simply because he was more hedonist +than a healthy man should be. The faith of Christians angered +him because he was more pessimist than a healthy man should be. +In the same way the Malthusians by instinct attacked Christianity; +not because there is anything especially anti-Malthusian about +Christianity, but because there is something a little anti-human +about Malthusianism. + + Nevertheless it could not, I felt, be quite true that Christianity +was merely sensible and stood in the middle. There was really +an element in it of emphasis and even frenzy which had justified +the secularists in their superficial criticism. It might be wise, +I began more and more to think that it was wise, but it was not +merely worldly wise; it was not merely temperate and respectable. +Its fierce crusaders and meek saints might balance each other; +still, the crusaders were very fierce and the saints were very meek, +meek beyond all decency. Now, it was just at this point of the +speculation that I remembered my thoughts about the martyr and +the suicide. In that matter there had been this combination between +two almost insane positions which yet somehow amounted to sanity. +This was just such another contradiction; and this I had already +found to be true. This was exactly one of the paradoxes in which +sceptics found the creed wrong; and in this I had found it right. +Madly as Christians might love the martyr or hate the suicide, +they never felt these passions more madly than I had felt them long +before I dreamed of Christianity. Then the most difficult and +interesting part of the mental process opened, and I began to trace +this idea darkly through all the enormous thoughts of our theology. +The idea was that which I had outlined touching the optimist and +the pessimist; that we want not an amalgam or compromise, but both +things at the top of their energy; love and wrath both burning. +Here I shall only trace it in relation to ethics. But I need not +remind the reader that the idea of this combination is indeed central +in orthodox theology. For orthodox theology has specially insisted +that Christ was not a being apart from God and man, like an elf, +nor yet a being half human and half not, like a centaur, but both +things at once and both things thoroughly, very man and very God. +Now let me trace this notion as I found it. + + All sane men can see that sanity is some kind of equilibrium; +that one may be mad and eat too much, or mad and eat too little. +Some moderns have indeed appeared with vague versions of progress and +evolution which seeks to destroy the MESON or balance of Aristotle. +They seem to suggest that we are meant to starve progressively, +or to go on eating larger and larger breakfasts every morning for ever. +But the great truism of the MESON remains for all thinking men, +and these people have not upset any balance except their own. +But granted that we have all to keep a balance, the real interest +comes in with the question of how that balance can be kept. +That was the problem which Paganism tried to solve: that was +the problem which I think Christianity solved and solved in a very +strange way. + + Paganism declared that virtue was in a balance; Christianity +declared it was in a conflict: the collision of two passions +apparently opposite. Of course they were not really inconsistent; +but they were such that it was hard to hold simultaneously. +Let us follow for a moment the clue of the martyr and the suicide; +and take the case of courage. No quality has ever so much addled +the brains and tangled the definitions of merely rational sages. +Courage is almost a contradiction in terms. It means a strong desire +to live taking the form of a readiness to die. "He that will lose +his life, the same shall save it," is not a piece of mysticism +for saints and heroes. It is a piece of everyday advice for +sailors or mountaineers. It might be printed in an Alpine guide +or a drill book. This paradox is the whole principle of courage; +even of quite earthly or quite brutal courage. A man cut off by +the sea may save his life if he will risk it on the precipice. + + He can only get away from death by continually stepping within +an inch of it. A soldier surrounded by enemies, if he is to cut +his way out, needs to combine a strong desire for living with a +strange carelessness about dying. He must not merely cling to life, +for then he will be a coward, and will not escape. He must not merely +wait for death, for then he will be a suicide, and will not escape. +He must seek his life in a spirit of furious indifference to it; +he must desire life like water and yet drink death like wine. +No philosopher, I fancy, has ever expressed this romantic riddle +with adequate lucidity, and I certainly have not done so. +But Christianity has done more: it has marked the limits of it +in the awful graves of the suicide and the hero, showing the distance +between him who dies for the sake of living and him who dies for the +sake of dying. And it has held up ever since above the European +lances the banner of the mystery of chivalry: the Christian courage, +which is a disdain of death; not the Chinese courage, which is a +disdain of life. + + And now I began to find that this duplex passion was the Christian +key to ethics everywhere. Everywhere the creed made a moderation +out of the still crash of two impetuous emotions. Take, for instance, +the matter of modesty, of the balance between mere pride and +mere prostration. The average pagan, like the average agnostic, +would merely say that he was content with himself, but not insolently +self-satisfied, that there were many better and many worse, +that his deserts were limited, but he would see that he got them. +In short, he would walk with his head in the air; but not necessarily +with his nose in the air. This is a manly and rational position, +but it is open to the objection we noted against the compromise +between optimism and pessimism--the "resignation" of Matthew Arnold. +Being a mixture of two things, it is a dilution of two things; +neither is present in its full strength or contributes its full colour. +This proper pride does not lift the heart like the tongue of trumpets; +you cannot go clad in crimson and gold for this. On the other hand, +this mild rationalist modesty does not cleanse the soul with fire +and make it clear like crystal; it does not (like a strict and +searching humility) make a man as a little child, who can sit at +the feet of the grass. It does not make him look up and see marvels; +for Alice must grow small if she is to be Alice in Wonderland. Thus it +loses both the poetry of being proud and the poetry of being humble. +Christianity sought by this same strange expedient to save both +of them. + + It separated the two ideas and then exaggerated them both. +In one way Man was to be haughtier than he had ever been before; +in another way he was to be humbler than he had ever been before. +In so far as I am Man I am the chief of creatures. In so far +as I am a man I am the chief of sinners. All humility that had +meant pessimism, that had meant man taking a vague or mean view +of his whole destiny--all that was to go. We were to hear no more +the wail of Ecclesiastes that humanity had no pre-eminence over +the brute, or the awful cry of Homer that man was only the saddest +of all the beasts of the field. Man was a statue of God walking +about the garden. Man had pre-eminence over all the brutes; +man was only sad because he was not a beast, but a broken god. +The Greek had spoken of men creeping on the earth, as if clinging +to it. Now Man was to tread on the earth as if to subdue it. +Christianity thus held a thought of the dignity of man that could only +be expressed in crowns rayed like the sun and fans of peacock plumage. +Yet at the same time it could hold a thought about the abject smallness +of man that could only be expressed in fasting and fantastic submission, +in the gray ashes of St. Dominic and the white snows of St. Bernard. +When one came to think of ONE'S SELF, there was vista and void enough +for any amount of bleak abnegation and bitter truth. There the +realistic gentleman could let himself go--as long as he let himself go +at himself. There was an open playground for the happy pessimist. +Let him say anything against himself short of blaspheming the original +aim of his being; let him call himself a fool and even a damned +fool (though that is Calvinistic); but he must not say that fools +are not worth saving. He must not say that a man, QUA man, +can be valueless. Here, again in short, Christianity got over the +difficulty of combining furious opposites, by keeping them both, +and keeping them both furious. The Church was positive on both points. +One can hardly think too little of one's self. One can hardly think +too much of one's soul. + + Take another case: the complicated question of charity, +which some highly uncharitable idealists seem to think quite easy. +Charity is a paradox, like modesty and courage. Stated baldly, +charity certainly means one of two things--pardoning unpardonable acts, +or loving unlovable people. But if we ask ourselves (as we did +in the case of pride) what a sensible pagan would feel about such +a subject, we shall probably be beginning at the bottom of it. +A sensible pagan would say that there were some people one could forgive, +and some one couldn't: a slave who stole wine could be laughed at; +a slave who betrayed his benefactor could be killed, and cursed +even after he was killed. In so far as the act was pardonable, +the man was pardonable. That again is rational, and even refreshing; +but it is a dilution. It leaves no place for a pure horror of injustice, +such as that which is a great beauty in the innocent. And it leaves +no place for a mere tenderness for men as men, such as is the whole +fascination of the charitable. Christianity came in here as before. +It came in startlingly with a sword, and clove one thing from another. +It divided the crime from the criminal. The criminal we must forgive +unto seventy times seven. The crime we must not forgive at all. +It was not enough that slaves who stole wine inspired partly anger +and partly kindness. We must be much more angry with theft than before, +and yet much kinder to thieves than before. There was room for wrath +and love to run wild. And the more I considered Christianity, +the more I found that while it had established a rule and order, +the chief aim of that order was to give room for good things to run +wild. + + Mental and emotional liberty are not so simple as they look. +Really they require almost as careful a balance of laws and conditions +as do social and political liberty. The ordinary aesthetic anarchist +who sets out to feel everything freely gets knotted at last in a +paradox that prevents him feeling at all. He breaks away from home +limits to follow poetry. But in ceasing to feel home limits he has +ceased to feel the "Odyssey." He is free from national prejudices +and outside patriotism. But being outside patriotism he is outside +"Henry V." Such a literary man is simply outside all literature: +he is more of a prisoner than any bigot. For if there is a wall +between you and the world, it makes little difference whether you +describe yourself as locked in or as locked out. What we want +is not the universality that is outside all normal sentiments; +we want the universality that is inside all normal sentiments. +It is all the difference between being free from them, as a man +is free from a prison, and being free of them as a man is free of +a city. I am free from Windsor Castle (that is, I am not forcibly +detained there), but I am by no means free of that building. +How can man be approximately free of fine emotions, able to swing +them in a clear space without breakage or wrong? THIS was the +achievement of this Christian paradox of the parallel passions. +Granted the primary dogma of the war between divine and diabolic, +the revolt and ruin of the world, their optimism and pessimism, +as pure poetry, could be loosened like cataracts. + + St. Francis, in praising all good, could be a more shouting +optimist than Walt Whitman. St. Jerome, in denouncing all evil, +could paint the world blacker than Schopenhauer. Both passions +were free because both were kept in their place. The optimist could +pour out all the praise he liked on the gay music of the march, +the golden trumpets, and the purple banners going into battle. +But he must not call the fight needless. The pessimist might draw +as darkly as he chose the sickening marches or the sanguine wounds. +But he must not call the fight hopeless. So it was with all the +other moral problems, with pride, with protest, and with compassion. +By defining its main doctrine, the Church not only kept seemingly +inconsistent things side by side, but, what was more, allowed them +to break out in a sort of artistic violence otherwise possible +only to anarchists. Meekness grew more dramatic than madness. +Historic Christianity rose into a high and strange COUP DE THEATRE +of morality--things that are to virtue what the crimes of Nero are +to vice. The spirits of indignation and of charity took terrible +and attractive forms, ranging from that monkish fierceness that +scourged like a dog the first and greatest of the Plantagenets, +to the sublime pity of St. Catherine, who, in the official shambles, +kissed the bloody head of the criminal. Poetry could be acted as +well as composed. This heroic and monumental manner in ethics has +entirely vanished with supernatural religion. They, being humble, +could parade themselves: but we are too proud to be prominent. +Our ethical teachers write reasonably for prison reform; but we +are not likely to see Mr. Cadbury, or any eminent philanthropist, +go into Reading Gaol and embrace the strangled corpse before it +is cast into the quicklime. Our ethical teachers write mildly +against the power of millionaires; but we are not likely to see +Mr. Rockefeller, or any modern tyrant, publicly whipped in Westminster +Abbey. + + Thus, the double charges of the secularists, though throwing +nothing but darkness and confusion on themselves, throw a real light on +the faith. It is true that the historic Church has at once emphasised +celibacy and emphasised the family; has at once (if one may put it so) +been fiercely for having children and fiercely for not having children. +It has kept them side by side like two strong colours, red and white, +like the red and white upon the shield of St. George. It has +always had a healthy hatred of pink. It hates that combination +of two colours which is the feeble expedient of the philosophers. +It hates that evolution of black into white which is tantamount to +a dirty gray. In fact, the whole theory of the Church on virginity +might be symbolized in the statement that white is a colour: +not merely the absence of a colour. All that I am urging here can +be expressed by saying that Christianity sought in most of these +cases to keep two colours coexistent but pure. It is not a mixture +like russet or purple; it is rather like a shot silk, for a shot +silk is always at right angles, and is in the pattern of the cross. + + So it is also, of course, with the contradictory charges +of the anti-Christians about submission and slaughter. It IS true +that the Church told some men to fight and others not to fight; +and it IS true that those who fought were like thunderbolts +and those who did not fight were like statues. All this simply +means that the Church preferred to use its Supermen and to use +its Tolstoyans. There must be SOME good in the life of battle, +for so many good men have enjoyed being soldiers. There must be +SOME good in the idea of non-resistance, for so many good men seem +to enjoy being Quakers. All that the Church did (so far as that goes) +was to prevent either of these good things from ousting the other. +They existed side by side. The Tolstoyans, having all the scruples +of monks, simply became monks. The Quakers became a club instead +of becoming a sect. Monks said all that Tolstoy says; they poured +out lucid lamentations about the cruelty of battles and the vanity +of revenge. But the Tolstoyans are not quite right enough to run +the whole world; and in the ages of faith they were not allowed +to run it. The world did not lose the last charge of Sir James +Douglas or the banner of Joan the Maid. And sometimes this pure +gentleness and this pure fierceness met and justified their juncture; +the paradox of all the prophets was fulfilled, and, in the soul +of St. Louis, the lion lay down with the lamb. But remember that +this text is too lightly interpreted. It is constantly assured, +especially in our Tolstoyan tendencies, that when the lion lies +down with the lamb the lion becomes lamb-like. But that is brutal +annexation and imperialism on the part of the lamb. That is simply +the lamb absorbing the lion instead of the lion eating the lamb. +The real problem is--Can the lion lie down with the lamb and still +retain his royal ferocity? THAT is the problem the Church attempted; +THAT is the miracle she achieved. + + This is what I have called guessing the hidden eccentricities +of life. This is knowing that a man's heart is to the left and not +in the middle. This is knowing not only that the earth is round, +but knowing exactly where it is flat. Christian doctrine detected +the oddities of life. It not only discovered the law, but it +foresaw the exceptions. Those underrate Christianity who say that +it discovered mercy; any one might discover mercy. In fact every +one did. But to discover a plan for being merciful and also severe-- +THAT was to anticipate a strange need of human nature. For no one +wants to be forgiven for a big sin as if it were a little one. +Any one might say that we should be neither quite miserable nor +quite happy. But to find out how far one MAY be quite miserable +without making it impossible to be quite happy--that was a discovery +in psychology. Any one might say, "Neither swagger nor grovel"; +and it would have been a limit. But to say, "Here you can swagger +and there you can grovel"--that was an emancipation. + + This was the big fact about Christian ethics; the discovery +of the new balance. Paganism had been like a pillar of marble, +upright because proportioned with symmetry. Christianity was like +a huge and ragged and romantic rock, which, though it sways on its +pedestal at a touch, yet, because its exaggerated excrescences +exactly balance each other, is enthroned there for a thousand years. +In a Gothic cathedral the columns were all different, but they were +all necessary. Every support seemed an accidental and fantastic support; +every buttress was a flying buttress. So in Christendom apparent +accidents balanced. Becket wore a hair shirt under his gold +and crimson, and there is much to be said for the combination; +for Becket got the benefit of the hair shirt while the people in +the street got the benefit of the crimson and gold. It is at least +better than the manner of the modern millionaire, who has the black +and the drab outwardly for others, and the gold next his heart. +But the balance was not always in one man's body as in Becket's; +the balance was often distributed over the whole body of Christendom. +Because a man prayed and fasted on the Northern snows, flowers could +be flung at his festival in the Southern cities; and because fanatics +drank water on the sands of Syria, men could still drink cider in the +orchards of England. This is what makes Christendom at once so much +more perplexing and so much more interesting than the Pagan empire; +just as Amiens Cathedral is not better but more interesting than +the Parthenon. If any one wants a modern proof of all this, +let him consider the curious fact that, under Christianity, +Europe (while remaining a unity) has broken up into individual nations. +Patriotism is a perfect example of this deliberate balancing +of one emphasis against another emphasis. The instinct of the +Pagan empire would have said, "You shall all be Roman citizens, +and grow alike; let the German grow less slow and reverent; +the Frenchmen less experimental and swift." But the instinct +of Christian Europe says, "Let the German remain slow and reverent, +that the Frenchman may the more safely be swift and experimental. +We will make an equipoise out of these excesses. The absurdity +called Germany shall correct the insanity called France." + + Last and most important, it is exactly this which explains +what is so inexplicable to all the modern critics of the history +of Christianity. I mean the monstrous wars about small points +of theology, the earthquakes of emotion about a gesture or a word. +It was only a matter of an inch; but an inch is everything when you +are balancing. The Church could not afford to swerve a hair's breadth +on some things if she was to continue her great and daring experiment +of the irregular equilibrium. Once let one idea become less powerful +and some other idea would become too powerful. It was no flock of sheep +the Christian shepherd was leading, but a herd of bulls and tigers, +of terrible ideals and devouring doctrines, each one of them strong +enough to turn to a false religion and lay waste the world. +Remember that the Church went in specifically for dangerous ideas; +she was a lion tamer. The idea of birth through a Holy Spirit, +of the death of a divine being, of the forgiveness of sins, +or the fulfilment of prophecies, are ideas which, any one can see, +need but a touch to turn them into something blasphemous or ferocious. +The smallest link was let drop by the artificers of the Mediterranean, +and the lion of ancestral pessimism burst his chain in the forgotten +forests of the north. Of these theological equalisations I have +to speak afterwards. Here it is enough to notice that if some +small mistake were made in doctrine, huge blunders might be made +in human happiness. A sentence phrased wrong about the nature +of symbolism would have broken all the best statues in Europe. +A slip in the definitions might stop all the dances; might wither +all the Christmas trees or break all the Easter eggs. Doctrines had +to be defined within strict limits, even in order that man might +enjoy general human liberties. The Church had to be careful, +if only that the world might be careless. + + This is the thrilling romance of Orthodoxy. People have fallen +into a foolish habit of speaking of orthodoxy as something heavy, +humdrum, and safe. There never was anything so perilous or so exciting +as orthodoxy. It was sanity: and to be sane is more dramatic than to +be mad. It was the equilibrium of a man behind madly rushing horses, +seeming to stoop this way and to sway that, yet in every attitude +having the grace of statuary and the accuracy of arithmetic. +The Church in its early days went fierce and fast with any warhorse; +yet it is utterly unhistoric to say that she merely went mad along +one idea, like a vulgar fanaticism. She swerved to left and right, +so exactly as to avoid enormous obstacles. She left on one hand +the huge bulk of Arianism, buttressed by all the worldly powers +to make Christianity too worldly. The next instant she was swerving +to avoid an orientalism, which would have made it too unworldly. +The orthodox Church never took the tame course or accepted +the conventions; the orthodox Church was never respectable. It would +have been easier to have accepted the earthly power of the Arians. +It would have been easy, in the Calvinistic seventeenth century, +to fall into the bottomless pit of predestination. It is easy to be +a madman: it is easy to be a heretic. It is always easy to let +the age have its head; the difficult thing is to keep one's own. +It is always easy to be a modernist; as it is easy to be a snob. +To have fallen into any of those open traps of error and exaggeration +which fashion after fashion and sect after sect set along the +historic path of Christendom--that would indeed have been simple. +It is always simple to fall; there are an infinity of angles at +which one falls, only one at which one stands. To have fallen into +any one of the fads from Gnosticism to Christian Science would indeed +have been obvious and tame. But to have avoided them all has been +one whirling adventure; and in my vision the heavenly chariot flies +thundering through the ages, the dull heresies sprawling and prostrate, +the wild truth reeling but erect. + + + +VII THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION + + + The following propositions have been urged: First, that some +faith in our life is required even to improve it; second, that some +dissatisfaction with things as they are is necessary even in order +to be satisfied; third, that to have this necessary content +and necessary discontent it is not sufficient to have the obvious +equilibrium of the Stoic. For mere resignation has neither the +gigantic levity of pleasure nor the superb intolerance of pain. +There is a vital objection to the advice merely to grin and bear it. +The objection is that if you merely bear it, you do not grin. +Greek heroes do not grin: but gargoyles do--because they are Christian. +And when a Christian is pleased, he is (in the most exact sense) +frightfully pleased; his pleasure is frightful. Christ prophesied +the whole of Gothic architecture in that hour when nervous and +respectable people (such people as now object to barrel organs) +objected to the shouting of the gutter-snipes of Jerusalem. +He said, "If these were silent, the very stones would cry out." +Under the impulse of His spirit arose like a clamorous chorus the +facades of the mediaeval cathedrals, thronged with shouting faces +and open mouths. The prophecy has fulfilled itself: the very stones +cry out. + + If these things be conceded, though only for argument, +we may take up where we left it the thread of the thought of the +natural man, called by the Scotch (with regrettable familiarity), +"The Old Man." We can ask the next question so obviously in front +of us. Some satisfaction is needed even to make things better. +But what do we mean by making things better? Most modern talk on +this matter is a mere argument in a circle--that circle which we +have already made the symbol of madness and of mere rationalism. +Evolution is only good if it produces good; good is only good if it +helps evolution. The elephant stands on the tortoise, and the tortoise +on the elephant. + + Obviously, it will not do to take our ideal from the principle +in nature; for the simple reason that (except for some human +or divine theory), there is no principle in nature. For instance, +the cheap anti-democrat of to-day will tell you solemnly that +there is no equality in nature. He is right, but he does not see +the logical addendum. There is no equality in nature; also there +is no inequality in nature. Inequality, as much as equality, +implies a standard of value. To read aristocracy into the anarchy +of animals is just as sentimental as to read democracy into it. +Both aristocracy and democracy are human ideals: the one saying +that all men are valuable, the other that some men are more valuable. +But nature does not say that cats are more valuable than mice; +nature makes no remark on the subject. She does not even say +that the cat is enviable or the mouse pitiable. We think the cat +superior because we have (or most of us have) a particular philosophy +to the effect that life is better than death. But if the mouse +were a German pessimist mouse, he might not think that the cat +had beaten him at all. He might think he had beaten the cat by +getting to the grave first. Or he might feel that he had actually +inflicted frightful punishment on the cat by keeping him alive. +Just as a microbe might feel proud of spreading a pestilence, +so the pessimistic mouse might exult to think that he was renewing +in the cat the torture of conscious existence. It all depends +on the philosophy of the mouse. You cannot even say that there +is victory or superiority in nature unless you have some doctrine +about what things are superior. You cannot even say that the cat +scores unless there is a system of scoring. You cannot even say +that the cat gets the best of it unless there is some best to +be got. + + We cannot, then, get the ideal itself from nature, +and as we follow here the first and natural speculation, we will +leave out (for the present) the idea of getting it from God. +We must have our own vision. But the attempts of most moderns +to express it are highly vague. + + Some fall back simply on the clock: they talk as if mere +passage through time brought some superiority; so that even a man +of the first mental calibre carelessly uses the phrase that human +morality is never up to date. How can anything be up to date?-- +a date has no character. How can one say that Christmas +celebrations are not suitable to the twenty-fifth of a month? +What the writer meant, of course, was that the majority is behind +his favourite minority--or in front of it. Other vague modern +people take refuge in material metaphors; in fact, this is the chief +mark of vague modern people. Not daring to define their doctrine +of what is good, they use physical figures of speech without stint +or shame, and, what is worst of all, seem to think these cheap +analogies are exquisitely spiritual and superior to the old morality. +Thus they think it intellectual to talk about things being "high." +It is at least the reverse of intellectual; it is a mere phrase +from a steeple or a weathercock. "Tommy was a good boy" is a pure +philosophical statement, worthy of Plato or Aquinas. "Tommy lived +the higher life" is a gross metaphor from a ten-foot rule. + + This, incidentally, is almost the whole weakness of Nietzsche, +whom some are representing as a bold and strong thinker. +No one will deny that he was a poetical and suggestive thinker; +but he was quite the reverse of strong. He was not at all bold. +He never put his own meaning before himself in bald abstract words: +as did Aristotle and Calvin, and even Karl Marx, the hard, +fearless men of thought. Nietzsche always escaped a question +by a physical metaphor, like a cheery minor poet. He said, +"beyond good and evil," because he had not the courage to say, +"more good than good and evil," or, "more evil than good and evil." +Had he faced his thought without metaphors, he would have seen that it +was nonsense. So, when he describes his hero, he does not dare to say, +"the purer man," or "the happier man," or "the sadder man," for all +these are ideas; and ideas are alarming. He says "the upper man," +or "over man," a physical metaphor from acrobats or alpine climbers. +Nietzsche is truly a very timid thinker. He does not really know +in the least what sort of man he wants evolution to produce. +And if he does not know, certainly the ordinary evolutionists, +who talk about things being "higher," do not know either. + + Then again, some people fall back on sheer submission +and sitting still. Nature is going to do something some day; +nobody knows what, and nobody knows when. We have no reason for acting, +and no reason for not acting. If anything happens it is right: +if anything is prevented it was wrong. Again, some people try +to anticipate nature by doing something, by doing anything. +Because we may possibly grow wings they cut off their legs. +Yet nature may be trying to make them centipedes for all they know. + + Lastly, there is a fourth class of people who take whatever +it is that they happen to want, and say that that is the ultimate +aim of evolution. And these are the only sensible people. +This is the only really healthy way with the word evolution, +to work for what you want, and to call THAT evolution. The only +intelligible sense that progress or advance can have among men, +is that we have a definite vision, and that we wish to make +the whole world like that vision. If you like to put it so, +the essence of the doctrine is that what we have around us is the +mere method and preparation for something that we have to create. +This is not a world, but rather the material for a world. +God has given us not so much the colours of a picture as the colours +of a palette. But he has also given us a subject, a model, +a fixed vision. We must be clear about what we want to paint. +This adds a further principle to our previous list of principles. +We have said we must be fond of this world, even in order to change it. +We now add that we must be fond of another world (real or imaginary) +in order to have something to change it to. + + We need not debate about the mere words evolution or progress: +personally I prefer to call it reform. For reform implies form. +It implies that we are trying to shape the world in a particular image; +to make it something that we see already in our minds. Evolution is +a metaphor from mere automatic unrolling. Progress is a metaphor from +merely walking along a road--very likely the wrong road. But reform +is a metaphor for reasonable and determined men: it means that we +see a certain thing out of shape and we mean to put it into shape. +And we know what shape. + + Now here comes in the whole collapse and huge blunder of our age. +We have mixed up two different things, two opposite things. +Progress should mean that we are always changing the world to suit +the vision. Progress does mean (just now) that we are always changing +the vision. It should mean that we are slow but sure in bringing +justice and mercy among men: it does mean that we are very swift +in doubting the desirability of justice and mercy: a wild page +from any Prussian sophist makes men doubt it. Progress should mean +that we are always walking towards the New Jerusalem. It does mean +that the New Jerusalem is always walking away from us. We are not +altering the real to suit the ideal. We are altering the ideal: +it is easier. + + Silly examples are always simpler; let us suppose a man wanted +a particular kind of world; say, a blue world. He would have no +cause to complain of the slightness or swiftness of his task; +he might toil for a long time at the transformation; he could +work away (in every sense) until all was blue. He could have +heroic adventures; the putting of the last touches to a blue tiger. +He could have fairy dreams; the dawn of a blue moon. But if he +worked hard, that high-minded reformer would certainly (from his own +point of view) leave the world better and bluer than he found it. +If he altered a blade of grass to his favourite colour every day, +he would get on slowly. But if he altered his favourite colour +every day, he would not get on at all. If, after reading a +fresh philosopher, he started to paint everything red or yellow, +his work would be thrown away: there would be nothing to show except +a few blue tigers walking about, specimens of his early bad manner. +This is exactly the position of the average modern thinker. +It will be said that this is avowedly a preposterous example. +But it is literally the fact of recent history. The great and grave +changes in our political civilization all belonged to the early +nineteenth century, not to the later. They belonged to the black +and white epoch when men believed fixedly in Toryism, in Protestantism, +in Calvinism, in Reform, and not unfrequently in Revolution. +And whatever each man believed in he hammered at steadily, +without scepticism: and there was a time when the Established +Church might have fallen, and the House of Lords nearly fell. +It was because Radicals were wise enough to be constant and consistent; +it was because Radicals were wise enough to be Conservative. +But in the existing atmosphere there is not enough time and tradition +in Radicalism to pull anything down. There is a great deal of truth +in Lord Hugh Cecil's suggestion (made in a fine speech) that the era +of change is over, and that ours is an era of conservation and repose. +But probably it would pain Lord Hugh Cecil if he realized (what +is certainly the case) that ours is only an age of conservation +because it is an age of complete unbelief. Let beliefs fade fast +and frequently, if you wish institutions to remain the same. +The more the life of the mind is unhinged, the more the machinery +of matter will be left to itself. The net result of all our +political suggestions, Collectivism, Tolstoyanism, Neo-Feudalism, +Communism, Anarchy, Scientific Bureaucracy--the plain fruit of all +of them is that the Monarchy and the House of Lords will remain. +The net result of all the new religions will be that the Church +of England will not (for heaven knows how long) be disestablished. +It was Karl Marx, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, Cunninghame Grahame, Bernard Shaw +and Auberon Herbert, who between them, with bowed gigantic backs, +bore up the throne of the Archbishop of Canterbury. + + We may say broadly that free thought is the best of all the +safeguards against freedom. Managed in a modern style the emancipation +of the slave's mind is the best way of preventing the emancipation +of the slave. Teach him to worry about whether he wants to be free, +and he will not free himself. Again, it may be said that this +instance is remote or extreme. But, again, it is exactly true of +the men in the streets around us. It is true that the negro slave, +being a debased barbarian, will probably have either a human affection +of loyalty, or a human affection for liberty. But the man we see +every day--the worker in Mr. Gradgrind's factory, the little clerk +in Mr. Gradgrind's office--he is too mentally worried to believe +in freedom. He is kept quiet with revolutionary literature. +He is calmed and kept in his place by a constant succession of +wild philosophies. He is a Marxian one day, a Nietzscheite the +next day, a Superman (probably) the next day; and a slave every day. +The only thing that remains after all the philosophies is the factory. +The only man who gains by all the philosophies is Gradgrind. +It would be worth his while to keep his commercial helotry supplied +with sceptical literature. And now I come to think of it, of course, +Gradgrind is famous for giving libraries. He shows his sense. +All modern books are on his side. As long as the vision of heaven +is always changing, the vision of earth will be exactly the same. +No ideal will remain long enough to be realized, or even partly realized. +The modern young man will never change his environment; for he will +always change his mind. + + This, therefore, is our first requirement about the ideal towards +which progress is directed; it must be fixed. Whistler used to make +many rapid studies of a sitter; it did not matter if he tore up +twenty portraits. But it would matter if he looked up twenty times, +and each time saw a new person sitting placidly for his portrait. +So it does not matter (comparatively speaking) how often humanity fails +to imitate its ideal; for then all its old failures are fruitful. +But it does frightfully matter how often humanity changes its ideal; +for then all its old failures are fruitless. The question therefore +becomes this: How can we keep the artist discontented with his pictures +while preventing him from being vitally discontented with his art? +How can we make a man always dissatisfied with his work, yet always +satisfied with working? How can we make sure that the portrait +painter will throw the portrait out of window instead of taking +the natural and more human course of throwing the sitter out +of window? + + A strict rule is not only necessary for ruling; it is also necessary +for rebelling. This fixed and familiar ideal is necessary to any +sort of revolution. Man will sometimes act slowly upon new ideas; +but he will only act swiftly upon old ideas. If I am merely +to float or fade or evolve, it may be towards something anarchic; +but if I am to riot, it must be for something respectable. This is +the whole weakness of certain schools of progress and moral evolution. +They suggest that there has been a slow movement towards morality, +with an imperceptible ethical change in every year or at every instant. +There is only one great disadvantage in this theory. It talks of a slow +movement towards justice; but it does not permit a swift movement. +A man is not allowed to leap up and declare a certain state of things +to be intrinsically intolerable. To make the matter clear, it is better +to take a specific example. Certain of the idealistic vegetarians, +such as Mr. Salt, say that the time has now come for eating no meat; +by implication they assume that at one time it was right to eat meat, +and they suggest (in words that could be quoted) that some day +it may be wrong to eat milk and eggs. I do not discuss here the +question of what is justice to animals. I only say that whatever +is justice ought, under given conditions, to be prompt justice. +If an animal is wronged, we ought to be able to rush to his rescue. +But how can we rush if we are, perhaps, in advance of our time? How can +we rush to catch a train which may not arrive for a few centuries? +How can I denounce a man for skinning cats, if he is only now what I +may possibly become in drinking a glass of milk? A splendid and insane +Russian sect ran about taking all the cattle out of all the carts. +How can I pluck up courage to take the horse out of my hansom-cab, +when I do not know whether my evolutionary watch is only a little +fast or the cabman's a little slow? Suppose I say to a sweater, +"Slavery suited one stage of evolution." And suppose he answers, +"And sweating suits this stage of evolution." How can I answer if there +is no eternal test? If sweaters can be behind the current morality, +why should not philanthropists be in front of it? What on earth +is the current morality, except in its literal sense--the morality +that is always running away? + + Thus we may say that a permanent ideal is as necessary to the +innovator as to the conservative; it is necessary whether we wish +the king's orders to be promptly executed or whether we only wish +the king to be promptly executed. The guillotine has many sins, +but to do it justice there is nothing evolutionary about it. +The favourite evolutionary argument finds its best answer in +the axe. The Evolutionist says, "Where do you draw the line?" +the Revolutionist answers, "I draw it HERE: exactly between your +head and body." There must at any given moment be an abstract +right and wrong if any blow is to be struck; there must be something +eternal if there is to be anything sudden. Therefore for all +intelligible human purposes, for altering things or for keeping +things as they are, for founding a system for ever, as in China, +or for altering it every month as in the early French Revolution, +it is equally necessary that the vision should be a fixed vision. +This is our first requirement. + + When I had written this down, I felt once again the presence +of something else in the discussion: as a man hears a church bell +above the sound of the street. Something seemed to be saying, +"My ideal at least is fixed; for it was fixed before the foundations +of the world. My vision of perfection assuredly cannot be altered; +for it is called Eden. You may alter the place to which you +are going; but you cannot alter the place from which you have come. +To the orthodox there must always be a case for revolution; +for in the hearts of men God has been put under the feet of Satan. +In the upper world hell once rebelled against heaven. But in this +world heaven is rebelling against hell. For the orthodox there +can always be a revolution; for a revolution is a restoration. +At any instant you may strike a blow for the perfection which +no man has seen since Adam. No unchanging custom, no changing +evolution can make the original good any thing but good. +Man may have had concubines as long as cows have had horns: +still they are not a part of him if they are sinful. Men may +have been under oppression ever since fish were under water; +still they ought not to be, if oppression is sinful. The chain may +seem as natural to the slave, or the paint to the harlot, as does +the plume to the bird or the burrow to the fox; still they are not, +if they are sinful. I lift my prehistoric legend to defy all +your history. Your vision is not merely a fixture: it is a fact." +I paused to note the new coincidence of Christianity: but I +passed on. + + I passed on to the next necessity of any ideal of progress. +Some people (as we have said) seem to believe in an automatic +and impersonal progress in the nature of things. But it is clear +that no political activity can be encouraged by saying that progress +is natural and inevitable; that is not a reason for being active, +but rather a reason for being lazy. If we are bound to improve, +we need not trouble to improve. The pure doctrine of progress +is the best of all reasons for not being a progressive. But it +is to none of these obvious comments that I wish primarily to +call attention. + + The only arresting point is this: that if we suppose +improvement to be natural, it must be fairly simple. The world +might conceivably be working towards one consummation, but hardly +towards any particular arrangement of many qualities. To take +our original simile: Nature by herself may be growing more blue; +that is, a process so simple that it might be impersonal. But Nature +cannot be making a careful picture made of many picked colours, +unless Nature is personal. If the end of the world were mere +darkness or mere light it might come as slowly and inevitably +as dusk or dawn. But if the end of the world is to be a piece +of elaborate and artistic chiaroscuro, then there must be design +in it, either human or divine. The world, through mere time, +might grow black like an old picture, or white like an old coat; +but if it is turned into a particular piece of black and white art-- +then there is an artist. + + If the distinction be not evident, I give an ordinary instance. We +constantly hear a particularly cosmic creed from the modern humanitarians; + +I use the word humanitarian in the ordinary sense, as meaning one +who upholds the claims of all creatures against those of humanity. +They suggest that through the ages we have been growing more and +more humane, that is to say, that one after another, groups or +sections of beings, slaves, children, women, cows, or what not, +have been gradually admitted to mercy or to justice. They say +that we once thought it right to eat men (we didn't); but I am not +here concerned with their history, which is highly unhistorical. +As a fact, anthropophagy is certainly a decadent thing, not a +primitive one. It is much more likely that modern men will eat +human flesh out of affectation than that primitive man ever ate +it out of ignorance. I am here only following the outlines of +their argument, which consists in maintaining that man has been +progressively more lenient, first to citizens, then to slaves, +then to animals, and then (presumably) to plants. I think it wrong +to sit on a man. Soon, I shall think it wrong to sit on a horse. +Eventually (I suppose) I shall think it wrong to sit on a chair. +That is the drive of the argument. And for this argument it can +be said that it is possible to talk of it in terms of evolution or +inevitable progress. A perpetual tendency to touch fewer and fewer +things might--one feels, be a mere brute unconscious tendency, +like that of a species to produce fewer and fewer children. +This drift may be really evolutionary, because it is stupid. + + Darwinism can be used to back up two mad moralities, +but it cannot be used to back up a single sane one. The kinship +and competition of all living creatures can be used as a reason for +being insanely cruel or insanely sentimental; but not for a healthy +love of animals. On the evolutionary basis you may be inhumane, +or you may be absurdly humane; but you cannot be human. That you +and a tiger are one may be a reason for being tender to a tiger. +Or it may be a reason for being as cruel as the tiger. It is one way +to train the tiger to imitate you, it is a shorter way to imitate +the tiger. But in neither case does evolution tell you how to treat +a tiger reasonably, that is, to admire his stripes while avoiding +his claws. + + If you want to treat a tiger reasonably, you must go back to +the garden of Eden. For the obstinate reminder continued to recur: +only the supernatural has taken a sane view of Nature. The essence +of all pantheism, evolutionism, and modern cosmic religion is really +in this proposition: that Nature is our mother. Unfortunately, if you +regard Nature as a mother, you discover that she is a step-mother. The +main point of Christianity was this: that Nature is not our mother: +Nature is our sister. We can be proud of her beauty, since we have +the same father; but she has no authority over us; we have to admire, +but not to imitate. This gives to the typically Christian pleasure +in this earth a strange touch of lightness that is almost frivolity. +Nature was a solemn mother to the worshippers of Isis and Cybele. +Nature was a solemn mother to Wordsworth or to Emerson. +But Nature is not solemn to Francis of Assisi or to George Herbert. +To St. Francis, Nature is a sister, and even a younger sister: +a little, dancing sister, to be laughed at as well as loved. + + This, however, is hardly our main point at present; I have admitted +it only in order to show how constantly, and as it were accidentally, +the key would fit the smallest doors. Our main point is here, +that if there be a mere trend of impersonal improvement in Nature, +it must presumably be a simple trend towards some simple triumph. +One can imagine that some automatic tendency in biology might work +for giving us longer and longer noses. But the question is, +do we want to have longer and longer noses? I fancy not; +I believe that we most of us want to say to our noses, "thus far, +and no farther; and here shall thy proud point be stayed:" +we require a nose of such length as may ensure an interesting face. +But we cannot imagine a mere biological trend towards producing +interesting faces; because an interesting face is one particular +arrangement of eyes, nose, and mouth, in a most complex relation +to each other. Proportion cannot be a drift: it is either +an accident or a design. So with the ideal of human morality +and its relation to the humanitarians and the anti-humanitarians. +It is conceivable that we are going more and more to keep our hands +off things: not to drive horses; not to pick flowers. We may +eventually be bound not to disturb a man's mind even by argument; +not to disturb the sleep of birds even by coughing. The ultimate +apotheosis would appear to be that of a man sitting quite still, +nor daring to stir for fear of disturbing a fly, nor to eat for fear +of incommoding a microbe. To so crude a consummation as that we +might perhaps unconsciously drift. But do we want so crude +a consummation? Similarly, we might unconsciously evolve along +the opposite or Nietzschian line of development--superman crushing +superman in one tower of tyrants until the universe is smashed +up for fun. But do we want the universe smashed up for fun? +Is it not quite clear that what we really hope for is one particular +management and proposition of these two things; a certain amount +of restraint and respect, a certain amount of energy and mastery? +If our life is ever really as beautiful as a fairy-tale, we shall +have to remember that all the beauty of a fairy-tale lies in this: +that the prince has a wonder which just stops short of being fear. +If he is afraid of the giant, there is an end of him; but also if he +is not astonished at the giant, there is an end of the fairy-tale. The +whole point depends upon his being at once humble enough to wonder, +and haughty enough to defy. So our attitude to the giant of the world +must not merely be increasing delicacy or increasing contempt: +it must be one particular proportion of the two--which is exactly right. +We must have in us enough reverence for all things outside us +to make us tread fearfully on the grass. We must also have enough +disdain for all things outside us, to make us, on due occasion, +spit at the stars. Yet these two things (if we are to be good +or happy) must be combined, not in any combination, but in one +particular combination. The perfect happiness of men on the earth +(if it ever comes) will not be a flat and solid thing, like the +satisfaction of animals. It will be an exact and perilous balance; +like that of a desperate romance. Man must have just enough faith +in himself to have adventures, and just enough doubt of himself to +enjoy them. + + This, then, is our second requirement for the ideal of progress. +First, it must be fixed; second, it must be composite. It must not +(if it is to satisfy our souls) be the mere victory of some one thing +swallowing up everything else, love or pride or peace or adventure; +it must be a definite picture composed of these elements in their best +proportion and relation. I am not concerned at this moment to deny +that some such good culmination may be, by the constitution of things, +reserved for the human race. I only point out that if this composite +happiness is fixed for us it must be fixed by some mind; for only +a mind can place the exact proportions of a composite happiness. +If the beatification of the world is a mere work of nature, then it +must be as simple as the freezing of the world, or the burning +up of the world. But if the beatification of the world is not +a work of nature but a work of art, then it involves an artist. +And here again my contemplation was cloven by the ancient voice +which said, "I could have told you all this a long time ago. +If there is any certain progress it can only be my kind of progress, +the progress towards a complete city of virtues and dominations +where righteousness and peace contrive to kiss each other. +An impersonal force might be leading you to a wilderness of perfect +flatness or a peak of perfect height. But only a personal God can +possibly be leading you (if, indeed, you are being led) to a city +with just streets and architectural proportions, a city in which each +of you can contribute exactly the right amount of your own colour +to the many coloured coat of Joseph." + + Twice again, therefore, Christianity had come in with the exact +answer that I required. I had said, "The ideal must be fixed," +and the Church had answered, "Mine is literally fixed, for it +existed before anything else." I said secondly, "It must be +artistically combined, like a picture"; and the Church answered, +"Mine is quite literally a picture, for I know who painted it." +Then I went on to the third thing, which, as it seemed to me, +was needed for an Utopia or goal of progress. And of all the three it +is infinitely the hardest to express. Perhaps it might be put thus: +that we need watchfulness even in Utopia, lest we fall from Utopia +as we fell from Eden. + + We have remarked that one reason offered for being a progressive +is that things naturally tend to grow better. But the only real +reason for being a progressive is that things naturally tend +to grow worse. The corruption in things is not only the best +argument for being progressive; it is also the only argument +against being conservative. The conservative theory would really +be quite sweeping and unanswerable if it were not for this one fact. +But all conservatism is based upon the idea that if you leave +things alone you leave them as they are. But you do not. +If you leave a thing alone you leave it to a torrent of change. +If you leave a white post alone it will soon be a black post. If you +particularly want it to be white you must be always painting it again; +that is, you must be always having a revolution. Briefly, if you +want the old white post you must have a new white post. But this +which is true even of inanimate things is in a quite special and +terrible sense true of all human things. An almost unnatural vigilance +is really required of the citizen because of the horrible rapidity +with which human institutions grow old. It is the custom in passing +romance and journalism to talk of men suffering under old tyrannies. +But, as a fact, men have almost always suffered under new tyrannies; +under tyrannies that had been public liberties hardly twenty +years before. Thus England went mad with joy over the patriotic +monarchy of Elizabeth; and then (almost immediately afterwards) +went mad with rage in the trap of the tyranny of Charles the First. +So, again, in France the monarchy became intolerable, not just +after it had been tolerated, but just after it had been adored. +The son of Louis the well-beloved was Louis the guillotined. +So in the same way in England in the nineteenth century the Radical +manufacturer was entirely trusted as a mere tribune of the people, +until suddenly we heard the cry of the Socialist that he was a tyrant +eating the people like bread. So again, we have almost up to the +last instant trusted the newspapers as organs of public opinion. +Just recently some of us have seen (not slowly, but with a start) +that they are obviously nothing of the kind. They are, by the nature +of the case, the hobbies of a few rich men. We have not any need +to rebel against antiquity; we have to rebel against novelty. +It is the new rulers, the capitalist or the editor, who really hold +up the modern world. There is no fear that a modern king will +attempt to override the constitution; it is more likely that he +will ignore the constitution and work behind its back; he will take +no advantage of his kingly power; it is more likely that he will +take advantage of his kingly powerlessness, of the fact that he +is free from criticism and publicity. For the king is the most +private person of our time. It will not be necessary for any one +to fight again against the proposal of a censorship of the press. +We do not need a censorship of the press. We have a censorship by +the press. + + This startling swiftness with which popular systems turn +oppressive is the third fact for which we shall ask our perfect theory +of progress to allow. It must always be on the look out for every +privilege being abused, for every working right becoming a wrong. +In this matter I am entirely on the side of the revolutionists. +They are really right to be always suspecting human institutions; +they are right not to put their trust in princes nor in any child +of man. The chieftain chosen to be the friend of the people +becomes the enemy of the people; the newspaper started to tell +the truth now exists to prevent the truth being told. Here, I say, +I felt that I was really at last on the side of the revolutionary. +And then I caught my breath again: for I remembered that I was once +again on the side of the orthodox. + + Christianity spoke again and said: "I have always maintained +that men were naturally backsliders; that human virtue tended of its +own nature to rust or to rot; I have always said that human beings +as such go wrong, especially happy human beings, especially proud +and prosperous human beings. This eternal revolution, this suspicion +sustained through centuries, you (being a vague modern) call the +doctrine of progress. If you were a philosopher you would call it, +as I do, the doctrine of original sin. You may call it the cosmic +advance as much as you like; I call it what it is--the Fall." + + I have spoken of orthodoxy coming in like a sword; here I +confess it came in like a battle-axe. For really (when I came to +think of it) Christianity is the only thing left that has any real +right to question the power of the well-nurtured or the well-bred. +I have listened often enough to Socialists, or even to democrats, +saying that the physical conditions of the poor must of necessity make +them mentally and morally degraded. I have listened to scientific +men (and there are still scientific men not opposed to democracy) +saying that if we give the poor healthier conditions vice and wrong +will disappear. I have listened to them with a horrible attention, +with a hideous fascination. For it was like watching a man +energetically sawing from the tree the branch he is sitting on. +If these happy democrats could prove their case, they would strike +democracy dead. If the poor are thus utterly demoralized, it may +or may not be practical to raise them. But it is certainly quite +practical to disfranchise them. If the man with a bad bedroom cannot +give a good vote, then the first and swiftest deduction is that he +shall give no vote. The governing class may not unreasonably say: +"It may take us some time to reform his bedroom. But if he is the +brute you say, it will take him very little time to ruin our country. +Therefore we will take your hint and not give him the chance." +It fills me with horrible amusement to observe the way in which the +earnest Socialist industriously lays the foundation of all aristocracy, +expatiating blandly upon the evident unfitness of the poor to rule. +It is like listening to somebody at an evening party apologising +for entering without evening dress, and explaining that he had +recently been intoxicated, had a personal habit of taking off +his clothes in the street, and had, moreover, only just changed +from prison uniform. At any moment, one feels, the host might say +that really, if it was as bad as that, he need not come in at all. +So it is when the ordinary Socialist, with a beaming face, +proves that the poor, after their smashing experiences, cannot be +really trustworthy. At any moment the rich may say, "Very well, +then, we won't trust them," and bang the door in his face. +On the basis of Mr. Blatchford's view of heredity and environment, +the case for the aristocracy is quite overwhelming. If clean homes +and clean air make clean souls, why not give the power (for the +present at any rate) to those who undoubtedly have the clean air? +If better conditions will make the poor more fit to govern themselves, +why should not better conditions already make the rich more fit +to govern them? On the ordinary environment argument the matter is +fairly manifest. The comfortable class must be merely our vanguard +in Utopia. + + Is there any answer to the proposition that those who have +had the best opportunities will probably be our best guides? +Is there any answer to the argument that those who have breathed +clean air had better decide for those who have breathed foul? +As far as I know, there is only one answer, and that answer +is Christianity. Only the Christian Church can offer any rational +objection to a complete confidence in the rich. For she has maintained +from the beginning that the danger was not in man's environment, +but in man. Further, she has maintained that if we come to talk of a +dangerous environment, the most dangerous environment of all is the +commodious environment. I know that the most modern manufacture has +been really occupied in trying to produce an abnormally large needle. +I know that the most recent biologists have been chiefly anxious +to discover a very small camel. But if we diminish the camel +to his smallest, or open the eye of the needle to its largest--if, +in short, we assume the words of Christ to have meant the very least +that they could mean, His words must at the very least mean this-- +that rich men are not very likely to be morally trustworthy. +Christianity even when watered down is hot enough to boil all modern +society to rags. The mere minimum of the Church would be a deadly +ultimatum to the world. For the whole modern world is absolutely +based on the assumption, not that the rich are necessary (which is +tenable), but that the rich are trustworthy, which (for a Christian) +is not tenable. You will hear everlastingly, in all discussions +about newspapers, companies, aristocracies, or party politics, +this argument that the rich man cannot be bribed. The fact is, +of course, that the rich man is bribed; he has been bribed already. +That is why he is a rich man. The whole case for Christianity is that +a man who is dependent upon the luxuries of this life is a corrupt man, +spiritually corrupt, politically corrupt, financially corrupt. +There is one thing that Christ and all the Christian saints +have said with a sort of savage monotony. They have said simply +that to be rich is to be in peculiar danger of moral wreck. +It is not demonstrably un-Christian to kill the rich as violators +of definable justice. It is not demonstrably un-Christian to crown +the rich as convenient rulers of society. It is not certainly +un-Christian to rebel against the rich or to submit to the rich. +But it is quite certainly un-Christian to trust the rich, to regard +the rich as more morally safe than the poor. A Christian may +consistently say, "I respect that man's rank, although he takes bribes." +But a Christian cannot say, as all modern men are saying at lunch +and breakfast, "a man of that rank would not take bribes." +For it is a part of Christian dogma that any man in any rank may +take bribes. It is a part of Christian dogma; it also happens by +a curious coincidence that it is a part of obvious human history. +When people say that a man "in that position" would be incorruptible, +there is no need to bring Christianity into the discussion. Was Lord +Bacon a bootblack? Was the Duke of Marlborough a crossing sweeper? +In the best Utopia, I must be prepared for the moral fall of any man +in any position at any moment; especially for my fall from my position +at this moment. + + Much vague and sentimental journalism has been poured out +to the effect that Christianity is akin to democracy, and most +of it is scarcely strong or clear enough to refute the fact that +the two things have often quarrelled. The real ground upon which +Christianity and democracy are one is very much deeper. The one +specially and peculiarly un-Christian idea is the idea of Carlyle-- +the idea that the man should rule who feels that he can rule. +Whatever else is Christian, this is heathen. If our faith comments +on government at all, its comment must be this--that the man should +rule who does NOT think that he can rule. Carlyle's hero may say, +"I will be king"; but the Christian saint must say "Nolo episcopari." +If the great paradox of Christianity means anything, it means this-- +that we must take the crown in our hands, and go hunting in dry +places and dark corners of the earth until we find the one man +who feels himself unfit to wear it. Carlyle was quite wrong; +we have not got to crown the exceptional man who knows he can rule. +Rather we must crown the much more exceptional man who knows he +can't. + + Now, this is one of the two or three vital defences of +working democracy. The mere machinery of voting is not democracy, +though at present it is not easy to effect any simpler democratic method. +But even the machinery of voting is profoundly Christian in this +practical sense--that it is an attempt to get at the opinion of those +who would be too modest to offer it. It is a mystical adventure; +it is specially trusting those who do not trust themselves. +That enigma is strictly peculiar to Christendom. There is nothing +really humble about the abnegation of the Buddhist; the mild Hindoo +is mild, but he is not meek. But there is something psychologically +Christian about the idea of seeking for the opinion of the obscure +rather than taking the obvious course of accepting the opinion +of the prominent. To say that voting is particularly Christian may +seem somewhat curious. To say that canvassing is Christian may seem +quite crazy. But canvassing is very Christian in its primary idea. +It is encouraging the humble; it is saying to the modest man, +"Friend, go up higher." Or if there is some slight defect +in canvassing, that is in its perfect and rounded piety, it is only +because it may possibly neglect to encourage the modesty of the canvasser. + + Aristocracy is not an institution: aristocracy is a sin; +generally a very venial one. It is merely the drift or slide +of men into a sort of natural pomposity and praise of the powerful, +which is the most easy and obvious affair in the world. + + It is one of the hundred answers to the fugitive perversion +of modern "force" that the promptest and boldest agencies are +also the most fragile or full of sensibility. The swiftest things +are the softest things. A bird is active, because a bird is soft. +A stone is helpless, because a stone is hard. The stone must +by its own nature go downwards, because hardness is weakness. +The bird can of its nature go upwards, because fragility is force. +In perfect force there is a kind of frivolity, an airiness that can +maintain itself in the air. Modern investigators of miraculous +history have solemnly admitted that a characteristic of the great +saints is their power of "levitation." They might go further; +a characteristic of the great saints is their power of levity. +Angels can fly because they can take themselves lightly. +This has been always the instinct of Christendom, and especially +the instinct of Christian art. Remember how Fra Angelico represented +all his angels, not only as birds, but almost as butterflies. +Remember how the most earnest mediaeval art was full of light +and fluttering draperies, of quick and capering feet. It was +the one thing that the modern Pre-raphaelites could not imitate +in the real Pre-raphaelites. Burne-Jones could never recover +the deep levity of the Middle Ages. In the old Christian pictures +the sky over every figure is like a blue or gold parachute. +Every figure seems ready to fly up and float about in the heavens. +The tattered cloak of the beggar will bear him up like the rayed +plumes of the angels. But the kings in their heavy gold and the proud +in their robes of purple will all of their nature sink downwards, +for pride cannot rise to levity or levitation. Pride is the downward +drag of all things into an easy solemnity. One "settles down" +into a sort of selfish seriousness; but one has to rise to a gay +self-forgetfulness. A man "falls" into a brown study; he reaches up +at a blue sky. Seriousness is not a virtue. It would be a heresy, +but a much more sensible heresy, to say that seriousness is a vice. +It is really a natural trend or lapse into taking one's self gravely, +because it is the easiest thing to do. It is much easier to +write a good TIMES leading article than a good joke in PUNCH. +For solemnity flows out of men naturally; but laughter is a leap. +It is easy to be heavy: hard to be light. Satan fell by the force of +gravity. + + Now, it is the peculiar honour of Europe since it has been Christian +that while it has had aristocracy it has always at the back of its heart +treated aristocracy as a weakness--generally as a weakness that must +be allowed for. If any one wishes to appreciate this point, let him +go outside Christianity into some other philosophical atmosphere. +Let him, for instance, compare the classes of Europe with the castes +of India. There aristocracy is far more awful, because it is far +more intellectual. It is seriously felt that the scale of classes +is a scale of spiritual values; that the baker is better than the +butcher in an invisible and sacred sense. But no Christianity, +not even the most ignorant or perverse, ever suggested that a baronet +was better than a butcher in that sacred sense. No Christianity, +however ignorant or extravagant, ever suggested that a duke would +not be damned. In pagan society there may have been (I do not know) +some such serious division between the free man and the slave. +But in Christian society we have always thought the gentleman +a sort of joke, though I admit that in some great crusades +and councils he earned the right to be called a practical joke. +But we in Europe never really and at the root of our souls took +aristocracy seriously. It is only an occasional non-European +alien (such as Dr. Oscar Levy, the only intelligent Nietzscheite) +who can even manage for a moment to take aristocracy seriously. +It may be a mere patriotic bias, though I do not think so, but it +seems to me that the English aristocracy is not only the type, +but is the crown and flower of all actual aristocracies; it has all +the oligarchical virtues as well as all the defects. It is casual, +it is kind, it is courageous in obvious matters; but it has one +great merit that overlaps even these. The great and very obvious +merit of the English aristocracy is that nobody could possibly take +it seriously. + + In short, I had spelled out slowly, as usual, the need for +an equal law in Utopia; and, as usual, I found that Christianity +had been there before me. The whole history of my Utopia has the +same amusing sadness. I was always rushing out of my architectural +study with plans for a new turret only to find it sitting up there +in the sunlight, shining, and a thousand years old. For me, in the +ancient and partly in the modern sense, God answered the prayer, +"Prevent us, O Lord, in all our doings." Without vanity, I really +think there was a moment when I could have invented the marriage +vow (as an institution) out of my own head; but I discovered, +with a sigh, that it had been invented already. But, since it would +be too long a business to show how, fact by fact and inch by inch, +my own conception of Utopia was only answered in the New Jerusalem, +I will take this one case of the matter of marriage as indicating +the converging drift, I may say the converging crash of all the rest. + + When the ordinary opponents of Socialism talk about +impossibilities and alterations in human nature they always miss +an important distinction. In modern ideal conceptions of society +there are some desires that are possibly not attainable: but there +are some desires that are not desirable. That all men should live +in equally beautiful houses is a dream that may or may not be attained. +But that all men should live in the same beautiful house is not +a dream at all; it is a nightmare. That a man should love all old +women is an ideal that may not be attainable. But that a man should +regard all old women exactly as he regards his mother is not only +an unattainable ideal, but an ideal which ought not to be attained. +I do not know if the reader agrees with me in these examples; +but I will add the example which has always affected me most. +I could never conceive or tolerate any Utopia which did not leave to me +the liberty for which I chiefly care, the liberty to bind myself. +Complete anarchy would not merely make it impossible to have +any discipline or fidelity; it would also make it impossible +to have any fun. To take an obvious instance, it would not be +worth while to bet if a bet were not binding. The dissolution +of all contracts would not only ruin morality but spoil sport. +Now betting and such sports are only the stunted and twisted +shapes of the original instinct of man for adventure and romance, +of which much has been said in these pages. And the perils, rewards, +punishments, and fulfilments of an adventure must be real, or +the adventure is only a shifting and heartless nightmare. If I bet +I must be made to pay, or there is no poetry in betting. If I challenge +I must be made to fight, or there is no poetry in challenging. +If I vow to be faithful I must be cursed when I am unfaithful, +or there is no fun in vowing. You could not even make a fairy tale +from the experiences of a man who, when he was swallowed by a whale, +might find himself at the top of the Eiffel Tower, or when he +was turned into a frog might begin to behave like a flamingo. +For the purpose even of the wildest romance results must be real; +results must be irrevocable. Christian marriage is the great +example of a real and irrevocable result; and that is why it +is the chief subject and centre of all our romantic writing. +And this is my last instance of the things that I should ask, +and ask imperatively, of any social paradise; I should ask to be kept +to my bargain, to have my oaths and engagements taken seriously; +I should ask Utopia to avenge my honour on myself. + + All my modern Utopian friends look at each other rather doubtfully, +for their ultimate hope is the dissolution of all special ties. +But again I seem to hear, like a kind of echo, an answer from beyond +the world. "You will have real obligations, and therefore real +adventures when you get to my Utopia. But the hardest obligation +and the steepest adventure is to get there." + + + +VIII THE ROMANCE OF ORTHODOXY + + + It is customary to complain of the bustle and strenuousness +of our epoch. But in truth the chief mark of our epoch is +a profound laziness and fatigue; and the fact is that the real +laziness is the cause of the apparent bustle. Take one quite +external case; the streets are noisy with taxicabs and motorcars; +but this is not due to human activity but to human repose. +There would be less bustle if there were more activity, if people +were simply walking about. Our world would be more silent if it +were more strenuous. And this which is true of the apparent physical +bustle is true also of the apparent bustle of the intellect. +Most of the machinery of modern language is labour-saving machinery; +and it saves mental labour very much more than it ought. +Scientific phrases are used like scientific wheels and piston-rods +to make swifter and smoother yet the path of the comfortable. +Long words go rattling by us like long railway trains. We know they +are carrying thousands who are too tired or too indolent to walk +and think for themselves. It is a good exercise to try for once +in a way to express any opinion one holds in words of one syllable. +If you say "The social utility of the indeterminate sentence is +recognized by all criminologists as a part of our sociological +evolution towards a more humane and scientific view of punishment," +you can go on talking like that for hours with hardly a movement +of the gray matter inside your skull. But if you begin "I wish +Jones to go to gaol and Brown to say when Jones shall come out," +you will discover, with a thrill of horror, that you are obliged +to think. The long words are not the hard words, it is the short +words that are hard. There is much more metaphysical subtlety in the +word "damn" than in the word "degeneration." + + But these long comfortable words that save modern people the toil +of reasoning have one particular aspect in which they are especially +ruinous and confusing. This difficulty occurs when the same long word +is used in different connections to mean quite different things. +Thus, to take a well-known instance, the word "idealist" has +one meaning as a piece of philosophy and quite another as a piece +of moral rhetoric. In the same way the scientific materialists +have had just reason to complain of people mixing up "materialist" +as a term of cosmology with "materialist" as a moral taunt. +So, to take a cheaper instance, the man who hates "progressives" +in London always calls himself a "progressive" in South Africa. + + A confusion quite as unmeaning as this has arisen in connection +with the word "liberal" as applied to religion and as applied +to politics and society. It is often suggested that all Liberals +ought to be freethinkers, because they ought to love everything that +is free. You might just as well say that all idealists ought to be +High Churchmen, because they ought to love everything that is high. +You might as well say that Low Churchmen ought to like Low Mass, +or that Broad Churchmen ought to like broad jokes. The thing is +a mere accident of words. In actual modern Europe a freethinker +does not mean a man who thinks for himself. It means a man who, +having thought for himself, has come to one particular class +of conclusions, the material origin of phenomena, the impossibility +of miracles, the improbability of personal immortality and so on. +And none of these ideas are particularly liberal. Nay, indeed almost +all these ideas are definitely illiberal, as it is the purpose +of this chapter to show. + + In the few following pages I propose to point out as rapidly +as possible that on every single one of the matters most strongly +insisted on by liberalisers of theology their effect upon social +practice would be definitely illiberal. Almost every contemporary +proposal to bring freedom into the church is simply a proposal +to bring tyranny into the world. For freeing the church now +does not even mean freeing it in all directions. It means +freeing that peculiar set of dogmas loosely called scientific, +dogmas of monism, of pantheism, or of Arianism, or of necessity. +And every one of these (and we will take them one by one) +can be shown to be the natural ally of oppression. In fact, it is +a remarkable circumstance (indeed not so very remarkable when one +comes to think of it) that most things are the allies of oppression. +There is only one thing that can never go past a certain point +in its alliance with oppression--and that is orthodoxy. I may, +it is true, twist orthodoxy so as partly to justify a tyrant. +But I can easily make up a German philosophy to justify him entirely. + + Now let us take in order the innovations that are the notes +of the new theology or the modernist church. We concluded the last +chapter with the discovery of one of them. The very doctrine which +is called the most old-fashioned was found to be the only safeguard +of the new democracies of the earth. The doctrine seemingly +most unpopular was found to be the only strength of the people. +In short, we found that the only logical negation of oligarchy +was in the affirmation of original sin. So it is, I maintain, +in all the other cases. + + I take the most obvious instance first, the case of miracles. +For some extraordinary reason, there is a fixed notion that it +is more liberal to disbelieve in miracles than to believe +in them. Why, I cannot imagine, nor can anybody tell me. +For some inconceivable cause a "broad" or "liberal" clergyman always +means a man who wishes at least to diminish the number of miracles; +it never means a man who wishes to increase that number. It always +means a man who is free to disbelieve that Christ came out of His grave; +it never means a man who is free to believe that his own aunt came +out of her grave. It is common to find trouble in a parish because +the parish priest cannot admit that St. Peter walked on water; +yet how rarely do we find trouble in a parish because the clergyman +says that his father walked on the Serpentine? And this is not +because (as the swift secularist debater would immediately retort) +miracles cannot be believed in our experience. It is not because +"miracles do not happen," as in the dogma which Matthew Arnold recited +with simple faith. More supernatural things are ALLEGED to have +happened in our time than would have been possible eighty years ago. +Men of science believe in such marvels much more than they did: +the most perplexing, and even horrible, prodigies of mind and spirit +are always being unveiled in modern psychology. Things that the old +science at least would frankly have rejected as miracles are hourly +being asserted by the new science. The only thing which is still +old-fashioned enough to reject miracles is the New Theology. +But in truth this notion that it is "free" to deny miracles has +nothing to do with the evidence for or against them. It is a lifeless +verbal prejudice of which the original life and beginning was not +in the freedom of thought, but simply in the dogma of materialism. +The man of the nineteenth century did not disbelieve in the +Resurrection because his liberal Christianity allowed him to doubt it. +He disbelieved in it because his very strict materialism did not allow +him to believe it. Tennyson, a very typical nineteenth century man, +uttered one of the instinctive truisms of his contemporaries when he +said that there was faith in their honest doubt. There was indeed. +Those words have a profound and even a horrible truth. In their +doubt of miracles there was a faith in a fixed and godless fate; +a deep and sincere faith in the incurable routine of the cosmos. +The doubts of the agnostic were only the dogmas of the monist. + + Of the fact and evidence of the supernatural I will +speak afterwards. Here we are only concerned with this clear point; +that in so far as the liberal idea of freedom can be said to be +on either side in the discussion about miracles, it is obviously +on the side of miracles. Reform or (in the only tolerable sense) +progress means simply the gradual control of matter by mind. +A miracle simply means the swift control of matter by mind. If you +wish to feed the people, you may think that feeding them miraculously +in the wilderness is impossible--but you cannot think it illiberal. +If you really want poor children to go to the seaside, you cannot +think it illiberal that they should go there on flying dragons; +you can only think it unlikely. A holiday, like Liberalism, only means +the liberty of man. A miracle only means the liberty of God. +You may conscientiously deny either of them, but you cannot call +your denial a triumph of the liberal idea. The Catholic Church +believed that man and God both had a sort of spiritual freedom. +Calvinism took away the freedom from man, but left it to God. +Scientific materialism binds the Creator Himself; it chains up +God as the Apocalypse chained the devil. It leaves nothing free +in the universe. And those who assist this process are called the +"liberal theologians." + + This, as I say, is the lightest and most evident case. +The assumption that there is something in the doubt of miracles akin +to liberality or reform is literally the opposite of the truth. +If a man cannot believe in miracles there is an end of the matter; +he is not particularly liberal, but he is perfectly honourable +and logical, which are much better things. But if he can believe +in miracles, he is certainly the more liberal for doing so; +because they mean first, the freedom of the soul, and secondly, +its control over the tyranny of circumstance. Sometimes this truth +is ignored in a singularly naive way, even by the ablest men. +For instance, Mr. Bernard Shaw speaks with hearty old-fashioned +contempt for the idea of miracles, as if they were a sort of breach +of faith on the part of nature: he seems strangely unconscious +that miracles are only the final flowers of his own favourite tree, +the doctrine of the omnipotence of will. Just in the same way he calls +the desire for immortality a paltry selfishness, forgetting that he +has just called the desire for life a healthy and heroic selfishness. +How can it be noble to wish to make one's life infinite and yet +mean to wish to make it immortal? No, if it is desirable that man +should triumph over the cruelty of nature or custom, then miracles +are certainly desirable; we will discuss afterwards whether they +are possible. + + But I must pass on to the larger cases of this curious error; +the notion that the "liberalising" of religion in some way helps +the liberation of the world. The second example of it can be found +in the question of pantheism--or rather of a certain modern attitude +which is often called immanentism, and which often is Buddhism. +But this is so much more difficult a matter that I must approach it +with rather more preparation. + + The things said most confidently by advanced persons to +crowded audiences are generally those quite opposite to the fact; +it is actually our truisms that are untrue. Here is a case. +There is a phrase of facile liberality uttered again and again +at ethical societies and parliaments of religion: "the religions +of the earth differ in rites and forms, but they are the same in +what they teach." It is false; it is the opposite of the fact. +The religions of the earth do not greatly differ in rites and forms; +they do greatly differ in what they teach. It is as if a man +were to say, "Do not be misled by the fact that the CHURCH TIMES +and the FREETHINKER look utterly different, that one is painted +on vellum and the other carved on marble, that one is triangular +and the other hectagonal; read them and you will see that they say +the same thing." The truth is, of course, that they are alike in +everything except in the fact that they don't say the same thing. +An atheist stockbroker in Surbiton looks exactly like a Swedenborgian +stockbroker in Wimbledon. You may walk round and round them +and subject them to the most personal and offensive study without +seeing anything Swedenborgian in the hat or anything particularly +godless in the umbrella. It is exactly in their souls that they +are divided. So the truth is that the difficulty of all the creeds +of the earth is not as alleged in this cheap maxim: that they agree +in meaning, but differ in machinery. It is exactly the opposite. +They agree in machinery; almost every great religion on earth works +with the same external methods, with priests, scriptures, altars, +sworn brotherhoods, special feasts. They agree in the mode +of teaching; what they differ about is the thing to be taught. +Pagan optimists and Eastern pessimists would both have temples, +just as Liberals and Tories would both have newspapers. Creeds that +exist to destroy each other both have scriptures, just as armies +that exist to destroy each other both have guns. + + The great example of this alleged identity of all human religions +is the alleged spiritual identity of Buddhism and Christianity. +Those who adopt this theory generally avoid the ethics of most +other creeds, except, indeed, Confucianism, which they like +because it is not a creed. But they are cautious in their praises +of Mahommedanism, generally confining themselves to imposing +its morality only upon the refreshment of the lower classes. +They seldom suggest the Mahommedan view of marriage (for which +there is a great deal to be said), and towards Thugs and fetish +worshippers their attitude may even be called cold. But in the +case of the great religion of Gautama they feel sincerely a similarity. + + Students of popular science, like Mr. Blatchford, are always +insisting that Christianity and Buddhism are very much alike, +especially Buddhism. This is generally believed, and I believed +it myself until I read a book giving the reasons for it. +The reasons were of two kinds: resemblances that meant nothing +because they were common to all humanity, and resemblances which +were not resemblances at all. The author solemnly explained that +the two creeds were alike in things in which all creeds are alike, +or else he described them as alike in some point in which they +are quite obviously different. Thus, as a case of the first class, +he said that both Christ and Buddha were called by the divine voice +coming out of the sky, as if you would expect the divine voice +to come out of the coal-cellar. Or, again, it was gravely urged +that these two Eastern teachers, by a singular coincidence, both had +to do with the washing of feet. You might as well say that it was +a remarkable coincidence that they both had feet to wash. And the +other class of similarities were those which simply were not similar. +Thus this reconciler of the two religions draws earnest attention +to the fact that at certain religious feasts the robe of the Lama +is rent in pieces out of respect, and the remnants highly valued. +But this is the reverse of a resemblance, for the garments of Christ +were not rent in pieces out of respect, but out of derision; +and the remnants were not highly valued except for what they would +fetch in the rag shops. It is rather like alluding to the obvious +connection between the two ceremonies of the sword: when it taps +a man's shoulder, and when it cuts off his head. It is not at all +similar for the man. These scraps of puerile pedantry would indeed +matter little if it were not also true that the alleged philosophical +resemblances are also of these two kinds, either proving too much +or not proving anything. That Buddhism approves of mercy or of +self-restraint is not to say that it is specially like Christianity; +it is only to say that it is not utterly unlike all human existence. +Buddhists disapprove in theory of cruelty or excess because all +sane human beings disapprove in theory of cruelty or excess. +But to say that Buddhism and Christianity give the same philosophy +of these things is simply false. All humanity does agree that we are +in a net of sin. Most of humanity agrees that there is some way out. +But as to what is the way out, I do not think that there are two +institutions in the universe which contradict each other so flatly +as Buddhism and Christianity. + + Even when I thought, with most other well-informed, though +unscholarly, people, that Buddhism and Christianity were alike, +there was one thing about them that always perplexed me; +I mean the startling difference in their type of religious art. +I do not mean in its technical style of representation, +but in the things that it was manifestly meant to represent. +No two ideals could be more opposite than a Christian saint +in a Gothic cathedral and a Buddhist saint in a Chinese temple. +The opposition exists at every point; but perhaps the shortest +statement of it is that the Buddhist saint always has his eyes shut, +while the Christian saint always has them very wide open. +The Buddhist saint has a sleek and harmonious body, but his eyes +are heavy and sealed with sleep. The mediaeval saint's body is +wasted to its crazy bones, but his eyes are frightfully alive. +There cannot be any real community of spirit between forces that +produced symbols so different as that. Granted that both images +are extravagances, are perversions of the pure creed, it must be +a real divergence which could produce such opposite extravagances. +The Buddhist is looking with a peculiar intentness inwards. +The Christian is staring with a frantic intentness outwards. If we +follow that clue steadily we shall find some interesting things. + + A short time ago Mrs. Besant, in an interesting essay, +announced that there was only one religion in the world, that all +faiths were only versions or perversions of it, and that she was +quite prepared to say what it was. According to Mrs. Besant this +universal Church is simply the universal self. It is the doctrine +that we are really all one person; that there are no real walls of +individuality between man and man. If I may put it so, she does not +tell us to love our neighbours; she tells us to be our neighbours. +That is Mrs. Besant's thoughtful and suggestive description of +the religion in which all men must find themselves in agreement. +And I never heard of any suggestion in my life with which I more +violently disagree. I want to love my neighbour not because he is I, +but precisely because he is not I. I want to adore the world, +not as one likes a looking-glass, because it is one's self, +but as one loves a woman, because she is entirely different. +If souls are separate love is possible. If souls are united love +is obviously impossible. A man may be said loosely to love himself, +but he can hardly fall in love with himself, or, if he does, it must +be a monotonous courtship. If the world is full of real selves, +they can be really unselfish selves. But upon Mrs. Besant's principle +the whole cosmos is only one enormously selfish person. + + It is just here that Buddhism is on the side of modern pantheism +and immanence. And it is just here that Christianity is on the +side of humanity and liberty and love. Love desires personality; +therefore love desires division. It is the instinct of Christianity +to be glad that God has broken the universe into little pieces, +because they are living pieces. It is her instinct to say "little +children love one another" rather than to tell one large person +to love himself. This is the intellectual abyss between Buddhism +and Christianity; that for the Buddhist or Theosophist personality +is the fall of man, for the Christian it is the purpose of God, +the whole point of his cosmic idea. The world-soul of the Theosophists +asks man to love it only in order that man may throw himself into it. +But the divine centre of Christianity actually threw man out of it +in order that he might love it. The oriental deity is like a giant +who should have lost his leg or hand and be always seeking to find it; +but the Christian power is like some giant who in a strange +generosity should cut off his right hand, so that it might of its +own accord shake hands with him. We come back to the same tireless +note touching the nature of Christianity; all modern philosophies +are chains which connect and fetter; Christianity is a sword which +separates and sets free. No other philosophy makes God actually +rejoice in the separation of the universe into living souls. +But according to orthodox Christianity this separation between God +and man is sacred, because this is eternal. That a man may love God +it is necessary that there should be not only a God to be loved, +but a man to love him. All those vague theosophical minds for whom +the universe is an immense melting-pot are exactly the minds which +shrink instinctively from that earthquake saying of our Gospels, +which declare that the Son of God came not with peace but with a +sundering sword. The saying rings entirely true even considered +as what it obviously is; the statement that any man who preaches real +love is bound to beget hate. It is as true of democratic fraternity +as a divine love; sham love ends in compromise and common philosophy; +but real love has always ended in bloodshed. Yet there is another +and yet more awful truth behind the obvious meaning of this utterance +of our Lord. According to Himself the Son was a sword separating +brother and brother that they should for an aeon hate each other. +But the Father also was a sword, which in the black beginning +separated brother and brother, so that they should love each other +at last. + + This is the meaning of that almost insane happiness in the +eyes of the mediaeval saint in the picture. This is the meaning +of the sealed eyes of the superb Buddhist image. The Christian +saint is happy because he has verily been cut off from the world; +he is separate from things and is staring at them in astonishment. +But why should the Buddhist saint be astonished at things?-- +since there is really only one thing, and that being impersonal can +hardly be astonished at itself. There have been many pantheist poems +suggesting wonder, but no really successful ones. The pantheist +cannot wonder, for he cannot praise God or praise anything as really +distinct from himself. Our immediate business here, however, is with +the effect of this Christian admiration (which strikes outwards, +towards a deity distinct from the worshipper) upon the general +need for ethical activity and social reform. And surely its +effect is sufficiently obvious. There is no real possibility +of getting out of pantheism, any special impulse to moral action. +For pantheism implies in its nature that one thing is as good +as another; whereas action implies in its nature that one thing +is greatly preferable to another. Swinburne in the high summer +of his scepticism tried in vain to wrestle with this difficulty. +In "Songs before Sunrise," written under the inspiration of Garibaldi +and the revolt of Italy he proclaimed the newer religion and the +purer God which should wither up all the priests of the world: + +"What doest thou now Looking Godward to cry I am I, +thou art thou, I am low, thou art high, I am thou that thou +seekest to find him, find thou but thyself, thou art I." + + Of which the immediate and evident deduction is that tyrants +are as much the sons of God as Garibaldis; and that King Bomba +of Naples having, with the utmost success, "found himself" +is identical with the ultimate good in all things. The truth is +that the western energy that dethrones tyrants has been directly +due to the western theology that says "I am I, thou art thou." +The same spiritual separation which looked up and saw a good king in +the universe looked up and saw a bad king in Naples. The worshippers +of Bomba's god dethroned Bomba. The worshippers of Swinburne's god +have covered Asia for centuries and have never dethroned a tyrant. +The Indian saint may reasonably shut his eyes because he is +looking at that which is I and Thou and We and They and It. +It is a rational occupation: but it is not true in theory and not +true in fact that it helps the Indian to keep an eye on Lord Curzon. +That external vigilance which has always been the mark of Christianity +(the command that we should WATCH and pray) has expressed itself +both in typical western orthodoxy and in typical western politics: +but both depend on the idea of a divinity transcendent, different +from ourselves, a deity that disappears. Certainly the most sagacious +creeds may suggest that we should pursue God into deeper and deeper +rings of the labyrinth of our own ego. But only we of Christendom +have said that we should hunt God like an eagle upon the mountains: +and we have killed all monsters in the chase. + + Here again, therefore, we find that in so far as we value +democracy and the self-renewing energies of the west, we are much +more likely to find them in the old theology than the new. +If we want reform, we must adhere to orthodoxy: especially in this +matter (so much disputed in the counsels of Mr. R.J.Campbell), +the matter of insisting on the immanent or the transcendent deity. +By insisting specially on the immanence of God we get introspection, +self-isolation, quietism, social indifference--Tibet. By insisting +specially on the transcendence of God we get wonder, curiosity, +moral and political adventure, righteous indignation--Christendom. +Insisting that God is inside man, man is always inside himself. +By insisting that God transcends man, man has transcended himself. + + If we take any other doctrine that has been called old-fashioned +we shall find the case the same. It is the same, for instance, +in the deep matter of the Trinity. Unitarians (a sect never to be +mentioned without a special respect for their distinguished intellectual +dignity and high intellectual honour) are often reformers by the +accident that throws so many small sects into such an attitude. +But there is nothing in the least liberal or akin to reform in +the substitution of pure monotheism for the Trinity. The complex +God of the Athanasian Creed may be an enigma for the intellect; +but He is far less likely to gather the mystery and cruelty +of a Sultan than the lonely god of Omar or Mahomet. The god +who is a mere awful unity is not only a king but an Eastern king. +The HEART of humanity, especially of European humanity, is certainly +much more satisfied by the strange hints and symbols that gather +round the Trinitarian idea, the image of a council at which mercy +pleads as well as justice, the conception of a sort of liberty +and variety existing even in the inmost chamber of the world. +For Western religion has always felt keenly the idea "it is not +well for man to be alone." The social instinct asserted itself +everywhere as when the Eastern idea of hermits was practically expelled +by the Western idea of monks. So even asceticism became brotherly; +and the Trappists were sociable even when they were silent. +If this love of a living complexity be our test, it is certainly +healthier to have the Trinitarian religion than the Unitarian. +For to us Trinitarians (if I may say it with reverence)--to us God +Himself is a society. It is indeed a fathomless mystery of theology, +and even if I were theologian enough to deal with it directly, it would +not be relevant to do so here. Suffice it to say here that this triple +enigma is as comforting as wine and open as an English fireside; +that this thing that bewilders the intellect utterly quiets the heart: +but out of the desert, from the dry places and the dreadful suns, +come the cruel children of the lonely God; the real Unitarians who +with scimitar in hand have laid waste the world. For it is not well +for God to be alone. + + Again, the same is true of that difficult matter of the danger +of the soul, which has unsettled so many just minds. To hope +for all souls is imperative; and it is quite tenable that their +salvation is inevitable. It is tenable, but it is not specially +favourable to activity or progress. Our fighting and creative society +ought rather to insist on the danger of everybody, on the fact +that every man is hanging by a thread or clinging to a precipice. +To say that all will be well anyhow is a comprehensible remark: +but it cannot be called the blast of a trumpet. Europe ought rather +to emphasize possible perdition; and Europe always has emphasized it. +Here its highest religion is at one with all its cheapest romances. +To the Buddhist or the eastern fatalist existence is a science +or a plan, which must end up in a certain way. But to a Christian +existence is a STORY, which may end up in any way. In a thrilling +novel (that purely Christian product) the hero is not eaten +by cannibals; but it is essential to the existence of the thrill +that he MIGHT be eaten by cannibals. The hero must (so to speak) +be an eatable hero. So Christian morals have always said to the man, +not that he would lose his soul, but that he must take care that he +didn't. In Christian morals, in short, it is wicked to call a man +"damned": but it is strictly religious and philosophic to call +him damnable. + + All Christianity concentrates on the man at the cross-roads. +The vast and shallow philosophies, the huge syntheses of humbug, +all talk about ages and evolution and ultimate developments. +The true philosophy is concerned with the instant. Will a man +take this road or that?--that is the only thing to think about, +if you enjoy thinking. The aeons are easy enough to think about, +any one can think about them. The instant is really awful: +and it is because our religion has intensely felt the instant, +that it has in literature dealt much with battle and in theology +dealt much with hell. It is full of DANGER, like a boy's book: +it is at an immortal crisis. There is a great deal of real similarity +between popular fiction and the religion of the western people. +If you say that popular fiction is vulgar and tawdry, you only say +what the dreary and well-informed say also about the images in the +Catholic churches. Life (according to the faith) is very like a +serial story in a magazine: life ends with the promise (or menace) +"to be continued in our next." Also, with a noble vulgarity, +life imitates the serial and leaves off at the exciting moment. +For death is distinctly an exciting moment. + + But the point is that a story is exciting because it has in it +so strong an element of will, of what theology calls free-will. +You cannot finish a sum how you like. But you can finish a story +how you like. When somebody discovered the Differential Calculus +there was only one Differential Calculus he could discover. +But when Shakespeare killed Romeo he might have married him to +Juliet's old nurse if he had felt inclined. And Christendom has +excelled in the narrative romance exactly because it has insisted +on the theological free-will. It is a large matter and too much +to one side of the road to be discussed adequately here; but this +is the real objection to that torrent of modern talk about treating +crime as disease, about making a prison merely a hygienic environment +like a hospital, of healing sin by slow scientific methods. +The fallacy of the whole thing is that evil is a matter of active +choice whereas disease is not. If you say that you are going to cure +a profligate as you cure an asthmatic, my cheap and obvious answer is, +"Produce the people who want to be asthmatics as many people want +to be profligates." A man may lie still and be cured of a malady. +But he must not lie still if he wants to be cured of a sin; +on the contrary, he must get up and jump about violently. +The whole point indeed is perfectly expressed in the very word +which we use for a man in hospital; "patient" is in the passive mood; +"sinner" is in the active. If a man is to be saved from influenza, +he may be a patient. But if he is to be saved from forging, +he must be not a patient but an IMPATIENT. He must be personally +impatient with forgery. All moral reform must start in the active +not the passive will. + + Here again we reach the same substantial conclusion. In so far +as we desire the definite reconstructions and the dangerous revolutions +which have distinguished European civilization, we shall not discourage +the thought of possible ruin; we shall rather encourage it. +If we want, like the Eastern saints, merely to contemplate how right +things are, of course we shall only say that they must go right. +But if we particularly want to MAKE them go right, we must insist +that they may go wrong. + + Lastly, this truth is yet again true in the case of the common +modern attempts to diminish or to explain away the divinity of Christ. +The thing may be true or not; that I shall deal with before I end. +But if the divinity is true it is certainly terribly revolutionary. +That a good man may have his back to the wall is no more than we +knew already; but that God could have his back to the wall is a boast +for all insurgents for ever. Christianity is the only religion +on earth that has felt that omnipotence made God incomplete. +Christianity alone has felt that God, to be wholly God, +must have been a rebel as well as a king. Alone of all creeds, +Christianity has added courage to the virtues of the Creator. +For the only courage worth calling courage must necessarily mean +that the soul passes a breaking point--and does not break. +In this indeed I approach a matter more dark and awful than it +is easy to discuss; and I apologise in advance if any of my +phrases fall wrong or seem irreverent touching a matter which the +greatest saints and thinkers have justly feared to approach. +But in that terrific tale of the Passion there is a distinct emotional +suggestion that the author of all things (in some unthinkable way) +went not only through agony, but through doubt. It is written, +"Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." No; but the Lord thy God may +tempt Himself; and it seems as if this was what happened in Gethsemane. +In a garden Satan tempted man: and in a garden God tempted God. +He passed in some superhuman manner through our human horror +of pessimism. When the world shook and the sun was wiped out of heaven, +it was not at the crucifixion, but at the cry from the cross: +the cry which confessed that God was forsaken of God. And now let +the revolutionists choose a creed from all the creeds and a god from all +the gods of the world, carefully weighing all the gods of inevitable +recurrence and of unalterable power. They will not find another god +who has himself been in revolt. Nay, (the matter grows too difficult +for human speech,) but let the atheists themselves choose a god. +They will find only one divinity who ever uttered their isolation; +only one religion in which God seemed for an instant to be +an atheist. + + These can be called the essentials of the old orthodoxy, +of which the chief merit is that it is the natural fountain of +revolution and reform; and of which the chief defect is that it +is obviously only an abstract assertion. Its main advantage +is that it is the most adventurous and manly of all theologies. +Its chief disadvantage is simply that it is a theology. It can always +be urged against it that it is in its nature arbitrary and in the air. +But it is not so high in the air but that great archers spend their +whole lives in shooting arrows at it--yes, and their last arrows; +there are men who will ruin themselves and ruin their civilization +if they may ruin also this old fantastic tale. This is the last +and most astounding fact about this faith; that its enemies will +use any weapon against it, the swords that cut their own fingers, +and the firebrands that burn their own homes. Men who begin to fight +the Church for the sake of freedom and humanity end by flinging +away freedom and humanity if only they may fight the Church. +This is no exaggeration; I could fill a book with the instances of it. +Mr. Blatchford set out, as an ordinary Bible-smasher, to prove +that Adam was guiltless of sin against God; in manoeuvring so as to +maintain this he admitted, as a mere side issue, that all the tyrants, +from Nero to King Leopold, were guiltless of any sin against humanity. +I know a man who has such a passion for proving that he will have no +personal existence after death that he falls back on the position +that he has no personal existence now. He invokes Buddhism and says +that all souls fade into each other; in order to prove that he +cannot go to heaven he proves that he cannot go to Hartlepool. +I have known people who protested against religious education with +arguments against any education, saying that the child's mind must +grow freely or that the old must not teach the young. I have known +people who showed that there could be no divine judgment by showing +that there can be no human judgment, even for practical purposes. +They burned their own corn to set fire to the church; they smashed +their own tools to smash it; any stick was good enough to beat it with, +though it were the last stick of their own dismembered furniture. +We do not admire, we hardly excuse, the fanatic who wrecks this +world for love of the other. But what are we to say of the fanatic +who wrecks this world out of hatred of the other? He sacrifices +the very existence of humanity to the non-existence of God. +He offers his victims not to the altar, but merely to assert +the idleness of the altar and the emptiness of the throne. +He is ready to ruin even that primary ethic by which all things live, +for his strange and eternal vengeance upon some one who never lived +at all. + + And yet the thing hangs in the heavens unhurt. Its opponents +only succeed in destroying all that they themselves justly hold dear. +They do not destroy orthodoxy; they only destroy political +and common courage sense. They do not prove that Adam was not +responsible to God; how could they prove it? They only prove +(from their premises) that the Czar is not responsible to Russia. +They do not prove that Adam should not have been punished by God; +they only prove that the nearest sweater should not be punished by men. +With their oriental doubts about personality they do not make certain +that we shall have no personal life hereafter; they only make +certain that we shall not have a very jolly or complete one here. +With their paralysing hints of all conclusions coming out wrong +they do not tear the book of the Recording Angel; they only make +it a little harder to keep the books of Marshall & Snelgrove. +Not only is the faith the mother of all worldly energies, but its foes +are the fathers of all worldly confusion. The secularists have not +wrecked divine things; but the secularists have wrecked secular things, +if that is any comfort to them. The Titans did not scale heaven; +but they laid waste the world. + + + +IX AUTHORITY AND THE ADVENTURER + + + The last chapter has been concerned with the contention that +orthodoxy is not only (as is often urged) the only safe guardian of +morality or order, but is also the only logical guardian of liberty, +innovation and advance. If we wish to pull down the prosperous +oppressor we cannot do it with the new doctrine of human perfectibility; +we can do it with the old doctrine of Original Sin. If we want +to uproot inherent cruelties or lift up lost populations we cannot +do it with the scientific theory that matter precedes mind; we can +do it with the supernatural theory that mind precedes matter. +If we wish specially to awaken people to social vigilance and +tireless pursuit of practise, we cannot help it much by insisting +on the Immanent God and the Inner Light: for these are at best +reasons for contentment; we can help it much by insisting on the +transcendent God and the flying and escaping gleam; for that means +divine discontent. If we wish particularly to assert the idea +of a generous balance against that of a dreadful autocracy we +shall instinctively be Trinitarian rather than Unitarian. If we +desire European civilization to be a raid and a rescue, we shall +insist rather that souls are in real peril than that their peril is +ultimately unreal. And if we wish to exalt the outcast and the crucified, +we shall rather wish to think that a veritable God was crucified, +rather than a mere sage or hero. Above all, if we wish to protect +the poor we shall be in favour of fixed rules and clear dogmas. +The RULES of a club are occasionally in favour of the poor member. +The drift of a club is always in favour of the rich one. + + And now we come to the crucial question which truly concludes +the whole matter. A reasonable agnostic, if he has happened to agree +with me so far, may justly turn round and say, "You have found +a practical philosophy in the doctrine of the Fall; very well. +You have found a side of democracy now dangerously neglected wisely +asserted in Original Sin; all right. You have found a truth in +the doctrine of hell; I congratulate you. You are convinced that +worshippers of a personal God look outwards and are progressive; +I congratulate them. But even supposing that those doctrines +do include those truths, why cannot you take the truths and leave +the doctrines? Granted that all modern society is trusting +the rich too much because it does not allow for human weakness; +granted that orthodox ages have had a great advantage because +(believing in the Fall) they did allow for human weakness, why cannot +you simply allow for human weakness without believing in the Fall? +If you have discovered that the idea of damnation represents +a healthy idea of danger, why can you not simply take the idea +of danger and leave the idea of damnation? If you see clearly +the kernel of common-sense in the nut of Christian orthodoxy, +why cannot you simply take the kernel and leave the nut? +Why cannot you (to use that cant phrase of the newspapers which I, +as a highly scholarly agnostic, am a little ashamed of using) +why cannot you simply take what is good in Christianity, what you can +define as valuable, what you can comprehend, and leave all the rest, +all the absolute dogmas that are in their nature incomprehensible?" +This is the real question; this is the last question; and it is a +pleasure to try to answer it. + + The first answer is simply to say that I am a rationalist. +I like to have some intellectual justification for my intuitions. +If I am treating man as a fallen being it is an intellectual +convenience to me to believe that he fell; and I find, for some odd +psychological reason, that I can deal better with a man's exercise +of freewill if I believe that he has got it. But I am in this matter +yet more definitely a rationalist. I do not propose to turn this +book into one of ordinary Christian apologetics; I should be glad +to meet at any other time the enemies of Christianity in that more +obvious arena. Here I am only giving an account of my own growth +in spiritual certainty. But I may pause to remark that the more I +saw of the merely abstract arguments against the Christian cosmology +the less I thought of them. I mean that having found the moral +atmosphere of the Incarnation to be common sense, I then looked +at the established intellectual arguments against the Incarnation +and found them to be common nonsense. In case the argument should +be thought to suffer from the absence of the ordinary apologetic I +will here very briefly summarise my own arguments and conclusions +on the purely objective or scientific truth of the matter. + + If I am asked, as a purely intellectual question, why I believe +in Christianity, I can only answer, "For the same reason that an +intelligent agnostic disbelieves in Christianity." I believe in it +quite rationally upon the evidence. But the evidence in my case, +as in that of the intelligent agnostic, is not really in this or that +alleged demonstration; it is in an enormous accumulation of small +but unanimous facts. The secularist is not to be blamed because +his objections to Christianity are miscellaneous and even scrappy; +it is precisely such scrappy evidence that does convince the mind. +I mean that a man may well be less convinced of a philosophy +from four books, than from one book, one battle, one landscape, +and one old friend. The very fact that the things are of different +kinds increases the importance of the fact that they all point +to one conclusion. Now, the non-Christianity of the average +educated man to-day is almost always, to do him justice, made up +of these loose but living experiences. I can only say that my +evidences for Christianity are of the same vivid but varied kind +as his evidences against it. For when I look at these various +anti-Christian truths, I simply discover that none of them are true. +I discover that the true tide and force of all the facts flows +the other way. Let us take cases. Many a sensible modern man +must have abandoned Christianity under the pressure of three such +converging convictions as these: first, that men, with their shape, +structure, and sexuality, are, after all, very much like beasts, +a mere variety of the animal kingdom; second, that primeval religion +arose in ignorance and fear; third, that priests have blighted societies +with bitterness and gloom. Those three anti-Christian arguments +are very different; but they are all quite logical and legitimate; +and they all converge. The only objection to them (I discover) +is that they are all untrue. If you leave off looking at books +about beasts and men, if you begin to look at beasts and men then +(if you have any humour or imagination, any sense of the frantic +or the farcical) you will observe that the startling thing is not +how like man is to the brutes, but how unlike he is. It is the +monstrous scale of his divergence that requires an explanation. +That man and brute are like is, in a sense, a truism; but that being +so like they should then be so insanely unlike, that is the shock +and the enigma. That an ape has hands is far less interesting to the +philosopher than the fact that having hands he does next to nothing +with them; does not play knuckle-bones or the violin; does not carve +marble or carve mutton. People talk of barbaric architecture and +debased art. But elephants do not build colossal temples of ivory +even in a roccoco style; camels do not paint even bad pictures, +though equipped with the material of many camel's-hair brushes. +Certain modern dreamers say that ants and bees have a society superior +to ours. They have, indeed, a civilization; but that very truth +only reminds us that it is an inferior civilization. Who ever +found an ant-hill decorated with the statues of celebrated ants? +Who has seen a bee-hive carved with the images of gorgeous queens +of old? No; the chasm between man and other creatures may have +a natural explanation, but it is a chasm. We talk of wild animals; +but man is the only wild animal. It is man that has broken out. +All other animals are tame animals; following the rugged respectability +of the tribe or type. All other animals are domestic animals; +man alone is ever undomestic, either as a profligate or a monk. +So that this first superficial reason for materialism is, if anything, +a reason for its opposite; it is exactly where biology leaves off that +all religion begins. + + It would be the same if I examined the second of the three chance +rationalist arguments; the argument that all that we call divine +began in some darkness and terror. When I did attempt to examine +the foundations of this modern idea I simply found that there +were none. Science knows nothing whatever about pre-historic man; +for the excellent reason that he is pre-historic. A few professors +choose to conjecture that such things as human sacrifice were once +innocent and general and that they gradually dwindled; but there is +no direct evidence of it, and the small amount of indirect evidence +is very much the other way. In the earliest legends we have, +such as the tales of Isaac and of Iphigenia, human sacrifice +is not introduced as something old, but rather as something new; +as a strange and frightful exception darkly demanded by the gods. +History says nothing; and legends all say that the earth was kinder +in its earliest time. There is no tradition of progress; but the whole +human race has a tradition of the Fall. Amusingly enough, indeed, +the very dissemination of this idea is used against its authenticity. +Learned men literally say that this pre-historic calamity cannot +be true because every race of mankind remembers it. I cannot keep +pace with these paradoxes. + + And if we took the third chance instance, it would be the same; +the view that priests darken and embitter the world. I look at the +world and simply discover that they don't. Those countries in Europe +which are still influenced by priests, are exactly the countries +where there is still singing and dancing and coloured dresses and art +in the open-air. Catholic doctrine and discipline may be walls; +but they are the walls of a playground. Christianity is the only +frame which has preserved the pleasure of Paganism. We might fancy +some children playing on the flat grassy top of some tall island +in the sea. So long as there was a wall round the cliff's edge +they could fling themselves into every frantic game and make the +place the noisiest of nurseries. But the walls were knocked down, +leaving the naked peril of the precipice. They did not fall over; +but when their friends returned to them they were all huddled in +terror in the centre of the island; and their song had ceased. + + Thus these three facts of experience, such facts as go to make +an agnostic, are, in this view, turned totally round. I am left saying, +"Give me an explanation, first, of the towering eccentricity of man +among the brutes; second, of the vast human tradition of some +ancient happiness; third, of the partial perpetuation of such pagan +joy in the countries of the Catholic Church." One explanation, +at any rate, covers all three: the theory that twice was the natural +order interrupted by some explosion or revelation such as people +now call "psychic." Once Heaven came upon the earth with a power +or seal called the image of God, whereby man took command of Nature; +and once again (when in empire after empire men had been found wanting) +Heaven came to save mankind in the awful shape of a man. +This would explain why the mass of men always look backwards; +and why the only corner where they in any sense look forwards is +the little continent where Christ has His Church. I know it will +be said that Japan has become progressive. But how can this be an +answer when even in saying "Japan has become progressive," we really +only mean, "Japan has become European"? But I wish here not so much +to insist on my own explanation as to insist on my original remark. +I agree with the ordinary unbelieving man in the street in being +guided by three or four odd facts all pointing to something; +only when I came to look at the facts I always found they pointed +to something else. + + I have given an imaginary triad of such ordinary anti-Christian +arguments; if that be too narrow a basis I will give on the spur +of the moment another. These are the kind of thoughts which in +combination create the impression that Christianity is something weak +and diseased. First, for instance, that Jesus was a gentle creature, +sheepish and unworldly, a mere ineffectual appeal to the world; second, +that Christianity arose and flourished in the dark ages of ignorance, +and that to these the Church would drag us back; third, that the people +still strongly religious or (if you will) superstitious--such people +as the Irish--are weak, unpractical, and behind the times. +I only mention these ideas to affirm the same thing: that when I +looked into them independently I found, not that the conclusions +were unphilosophical, but simply that the facts were not facts. +Instead of looking at books and pictures about the New Testament I +looked at the New Testament. There I found an account, not in the +least of a person with his hair parted in the middle or his hands +clasped in appeal, but of an extraordinary being with lips of thunder +and acts of lurid decision, flinging down tables, casting out devils, +passing with the wild secrecy of the wind from mountain isolation to a +sort of dreadful demagogy; a being who often acted like an angry god-- +and always like a god. Christ had even a literary style of his own, +not to be found, I think, elsewhere; it consists of an almost furious +use of the A FORTIORI. His "how much more" is piled one upon +another like castle upon castle in the clouds. The diction used +ABOUT Christ has been, and perhaps wisely, sweet and submissive. +But the diction used by Christ is quite curiously gigantesque; +it is full of camels leaping through needles and mountains hurled +into the sea. Morally it is equally terrific; he called himself +a sword of slaughter, and told men to buy swords if they sold their +coats for them. That he used other even wilder words on the side +of non-resistance greatly increases the mystery; but it also, +if anything, rather increases the violence. We cannot even explain +it by calling such a being insane; for insanity is usually along one +consistent channel. The maniac is generally a monomaniac. Here we +must remember the difficult definition of Christianity already given; +Christianity is a superhuman paradox whereby two opposite passions +may blaze beside each other. The one explanation of the Gospel +language that does explain it, is that it is the survey of one +who from some supernatural height beholds some more startling synthesis. + + I take in order the next instance offered: the idea that +Christianity belongs to the Dark Ages. Here I did not satisfy myself +with reading modern generalisations; I read a little history. +And in history I found that Christianity, so far from belonging to the +Dark Ages, was the one path across the Dark Ages that was not dark. +It was a shining bridge connecting two shining civilizations. +If any one says that the faith arose in ignorance and savagery +the answer is simple: it didn't. It arose in the Mediterranean +civilization in the full summer of the Roman Empire. The world +was swarming with sceptics, and pantheism was as plain as the sun, +when Constantine nailed the cross to the mast. It is perfectly true +that afterwards the ship sank; but it is far more extraordinary that +the ship came up again: repainted and glittering, with the cross +still at the top. This is the amazing thing the religion did: +it turned a sunken ship into a submarine. The ark lived under the load +of waters; after being buried under the debris of dynasties and clans, +we arose and remembered Rome. If our faith had been a mere fad +of the fading empire, fad would have followed fad in the twilight, +and if the civilization ever re-emerged (and many such have +never re-emerged) it would have been under some new barbaric flag. +But the Christian Church was the last life of the old society and +was also the first life of the new. She took the people who were +forgetting how to make an arch and she taught them to invent the +Gothic arch. In a word, the most absurd thing that could be said +of the Church is the thing we have all heard said of it. How can +we say that the Church wishes to bring us back into the Dark Ages? +The Church was the only thing that ever brought us out of them. + + I added in this second trinity of objections an idle instance +taken from those who feel such people as the Irish to be weakened +or made stagnant by superstition. I only added it because this +is a peculiar case of a statement of fact that turns out to be +a statement of falsehood. It is constantly said of the Irish that +they are impractical. But if we refrain for a moment from looking +at what is said about them and look at what is DONE about them, +we shall see that the Irish are not only practical, but quite +painfully successful. The poverty of their country, the minority +of their members are simply the conditions under which they were asked +to work; but no other group in the British Empire has done so much +with such conditions. The Nationalists were the only minority +that ever succeeded in twisting the whole British Parliament sharply +out of its path. The Irish peasants are the only poor men in these +islands who have forced their masters to disgorge. These people, +whom we call priest-ridden, are the only Britons who will not be +squire-ridden. And when I came to look at the actual Irish character, +the case was the same. Irishmen are best at the specially +HARD professions--the trades of iron, the lawyer, and the soldier. +In all these cases, therefore, I came back to the same conclusion: +the sceptic was quite right to go by the facts, only he had not +looked at the facts. The sceptic is too credulous; he believes +in newspapers or even in encyclopedias. Again the three questions +left me with three very antagonistic questions. The average sceptic +wanted to know how I explained the namby-pamby note in the Gospel, +the connection of the creed with mediaeval darkness and the political +impracticability of the Celtic Christians. But I wanted to ask, +and to ask with an earnestness amounting to urgency, "What is this +incomparable energy which appears first in one walking the earth +like a living judgment and this energy which can die with a dying +civilization and yet force it to a resurrection from the dead; +this energy which last of all can inflame a bankrupt peasantry +with so fixed a faith in justice that they get what they ask, +while others go empty away; so that the most helpless island +of the Empire can actually help itself?" + + There is an answer: it is an answer to say that the energy +is truly from outside the world; that it is psychic, or at least +one of the results of a real psychical disturbance. The highest +gratitude and respect are due to the great human civilizations such +as the old Egyptian or the existing Chinese. Nevertheless it is +no injustice for them to say that only modern Europe has exhibited +incessantly a power of self-renewal recurring often at the shortest +intervals and descending to the smallest facts of building or costume. +All other societies die finally and with dignity. We die daily. +We are always being born again with almost indecent obstetrics. +It is hardly an exaggeration to say that there is in historic +Christendom a sort of unnatural life: it could be explained as a +supernatural life. It could be explained as an awful galvanic life +working in what would have been a corpse. For our civilization OUGHT +to have died, by all parallels, by all sociological probability, +in the Ragnorak of the end of Rome. That is the weird inspiration +of our estate: you and I have no business to be here at all. We are +all REVENANTS; all living Christians are dead pagans walking about. +Just as Europe was about to be gathered in silence to Assyria +and Babylon, something entered into its body. And Europe has had +a strange life--it is not too much to say that it has had the JUMPS-- +ever since. + + I have dealt at length with such typical triads of doubt in order +to convey the main contention--that my own case for Christianity is +rational; but it is not simple. It is an accumulation of varied +facts, like the attitude of the ordinary agnostic. But the ordinary +agnostic has got his facts all wrong. He is a non-believer for a +multitude of reasons; but they are untrue reasons. He doubts because +the Middle Ages were barbaric, but they weren't; because Darwinism is +demonstrated, but it isn't; because miracles do not happen, but they +do; because monks were lazy, but they were very industrious; because +nuns are unhappy, but they are particularly cheerful; because +Christian art was sad and pale, but it was picked out in peculiarly +bright colours and gay with gold; because modern science is moving +away from the supernatural, but it isn't, it is moving towards the +supernatural with the rapidity of a railway train. + + But among these million facts all flowing one way there is, +of course, one question sufficiently solid and separate to be +treated briefly, but by itself; I mean the objective occurrence +of the supernatural. In another chapter I have indicated the fallacy +of the ordinary supposition that the world must be impersonal because it +is orderly. A person is just as likely to desire an orderly thing +as a disorderly thing. But my own positive conviction that personal +creation is more conceivable than material fate, is, I admit, +in a sense, undiscussable. I will not call it a faith or an intuition, +for those words are mixed up with mere emotion, it is strictly +an intellectual conviction; but it is a PRIMARY intellectual +conviction like the certainty of self of the good of living. +Any one who likes, therefore, may call my belief in God merely mystical; +the phrase is not worth fighting about. But my belief that miracles +have happened in human history is not a mystical belief at all; I believe +in them upon human evidences as I do in the discovery of America. +Upon this point there is a simple logical fact that only requires +to be stated and cleared up. Somehow or other an extraordinary +idea has arisen that the disbelievers in miracles consider them +coldly and fairly, while believers in miracles accept them only +in connection with some dogma. The fact is quite the other way. +The believers in miracles accept them (rightly or wrongly) because they +have evidence for them. The disbelievers in miracles deny them +(rightly or wrongly) because they have a doctrine against them. +The open, obvious, democratic thing is to believe an old apple-woman +when she bears testimony to a miracle, just as you believe an old +apple-woman when she bears testimony to a murder. The plain, +popular course is to trust the peasant's word about the ghost +exactly as far as you trust the peasant's word about the landlord. +Being a peasant he will probably have a great deal of healthy +agnosticism about both. Still you could fill the British Museum with +evidence uttered by the peasant, and given in favour of the ghost. +If it comes to human testimony there is a choking cataract of human +testimony in favour of the supernatural. If you reject it, you can +only mean one of two things. You reject the peasant's story about +the ghost either because the man is a peasant or because the story +is a ghost story. That is, you either deny the main principle +of democracy, or you affirm the main principle of materialism-- +the abstract impossibility of miracle. You have a perfect right +to do so; but in that case you are the dogmatist. It is we +Christians who accept all actual evidence--it is you rationalists +who refuse actual evidence being constrained to do so by your creed. +But I am not constrained by any creed in the matter, and looking +impartially into certain miracles of mediaeval and modern times, +I have come to the conclusion that they occurred. All argument +against these plain facts is always argument in a circle. If I say, +"Mediaeval documents attest certain miracles as much as they attest +certain battles," they answer, "But mediaevals were superstitious"; +if I want to know in what they were superstitious, the only +ultimate answer is that they believed in the miracles. If I say "a +peasant saw a ghost," I am told, "But peasants are so credulous." +If I ask, "Why credulous?" the only answer is--that they see ghosts. +Iceland is impossible because only stupid sailors have seen it; +and the sailors are only stupid because they say they have seen Iceland. +It is only fair to add that there is another argument that the +unbeliever may rationally use against miracles, though he himself +generally forgets to use it. + + He may say that there has been in many miraculous stories +a notion of spiritual preparation and acceptance: in short, +that the miracle could only come to him who believed in it. +It may be so, and if it is so how are we to test it? If we are +inquiring whether certain results follow faith, it is useless +to repeat wearily that (if they happen) they do follow faith. +If faith is one of the conditions, those without faith have a +most healthy right to laugh. But they have no right to judge. +Being a believer may be, if you like, as bad as being drunk; +still if we were extracting psychological facts from drunkards, +it would be absurd to be always taunting them with having been drunk. +Suppose we were investigating whether angry men really saw a red +mist before their eyes. Suppose sixty excellent householders swore +that when angry they had seen this crimson cloud: surely it would +be absurd to answer "Oh, but you admit you were angry at the time." +They might reasonably rejoin (in a stentorian chorus), "How the blazes +could we discover, without being angry, whether angry people see red?" +So the saints and ascetics might rationally reply, "Suppose that the +question is whether believers can see visions--even then, if you +are interested in visions it is no point to object to believers." +You are still arguing in a circle--in that old mad circle with which this +book began. + + The question of whether miracles ever occur is a question of +common sense and of ordinary historical imagination: not of any final +physical experiment. One may here surely dismiss that quite brainless +piece of pedantry which talks about the need for "scientific conditions" +in connection with alleged spiritual phenomena. If we are asking +whether a dead soul can communicate with a living it is ludicrous +to insist that it shall be under conditions in which no two living +souls in their senses would seriously communicate with each other. +The fact that ghosts prefer darkness no more disproves the existence +of ghosts than the fact that lovers prefer darkness disproves the +existence of love. If you choose to say, "I will believe that Miss +Brown called her fiance a periwinkle or, any other endearing term, +if she will repeat the word before seventeen psychologists," +then I shall reply, "Very well, if those are your conditions, +you will never get the truth, for she certainly will not say it." +It is just as unscientific as it is unphilosophical to be surprised +that in an unsympathetic atmosphere certain extraordinary sympathies +do not arise. It is as if I said that I could not tell if there +was a fog because the air was not clear enough; or as if I insisted +on perfect sunlight in order to see a solar eclipse. + + As a common-sense conclusion, such as those to which we come +about sex or about midnight (well knowing that many details must +in their own nature be concealed) I conclude that miracles do happen. +I am forced to it by a conspiracy of facts: the fact that the men who +encounter elves or angels are not the mystics and the morbid dreamers, +but fishermen, farmers, and all men at once coarse and cautious; +the fact that we all know men who testify to spiritualistic incidents +but are not spiritualists, the fact that science itself admits +such things more and more every day. Science will even admit +the Ascension if you call it Levitation, and will very likely admit +the Resurrection when it has thought of another word for it. +I suggest the Regalvanisation. But the strongest of all is +the dilemma above mentioned, that these supernatural things are +never denied except on the basis either of anti-democracy or of +materialist dogmatism--I may say materialist mysticism. The sceptic +always takes one of the two positions; either an ordinary man need +not be believed, or an extraordinary event must not be believed. +For I hope we may dismiss the argument against wonders attempted +in the mere recapitulation of frauds, of swindling mediums or +trick miracles. That is not an argument at all, good or bad. +A false ghost disproves the reality of ghosts exactly as much as +a forged banknote disproves the existence of the Bank of England-- +if anything, it proves its existence. + + Given this conviction that the spiritual phenomena do occur +(my evidence for which is complex but rational), we then collide +with one of the worst mental evils of the age. The greatest +disaster of the nineteenth century was this: that men began +to use the word "spiritual" as the same as the word "good." +They thought that to grow in refinement and uncorporeality was +to grow in virtue. When scientific evolution was announced, +some feared that it would encourage mere animality. It did worse: +it encouraged mere spirituality. It taught men to think that so long +as they were passing from the ape they were going to the angel. +But you can pass from the ape and go to the devil. A man of genius, +very typical of that time of bewilderment, expressed it perfectly. +Benjamin Disraeli was right when he said he was on the side of +the angels. He was indeed; he was on the side of the fallen angels. +He was not on the side of any mere appetite or animal brutality; +but he was on the side of all the imperialism of the princes +of the abyss; he was on the side of arrogance and mystery, +and contempt of all obvious good. Between this sunken pride +and the towering humilities of heaven there are, one must suppose, +spirits of shapes and sizes. Man, in encountering them, +must make much the same mistakes that he makes in encountering +any other varied types in any other distant continent. It must +be hard at first to know who is supreme and who is subordinate. +If a shade arose from the under world, and stared at Piccadilly, +that shade would not quite understand the idea of an ordinary +closed carriage. He would suppose that the coachman on the box +was a triumphant conqueror, dragging behind him a kicking and +imprisoned captive. So, if we see spiritual facts for the first time, +we may mistake who is uppermost. It is not enough to find the gods; +they are obvious; we must find God, the real chief of the gods. +We must have a long historic experience in supernatural phenomena-- +in order to discover which are really natural. In this light I +find the history of Christianity, and even of its Hebrew origins, +quite practical and clear. It does not trouble me to be told +that the Hebrew god was one among many. I know he was, without any +research to tell me so. Jehovah and Baal looked equally important, +just as the sun and the moon looked the same size. It is only +slowly that we learn that the sun is immeasurably our master, +and the small moon only our satellite. Believing that there +is a world of spirits, I shall walk in it as I do in the world +of men, looking for the thing that I like and think good. +Just as I should seek in a desert for clean water, or toil at +the North Pole to make a comfortable fire, so I shall search the +land of void and vision until I find something fresh like water, +and comforting like fire; until I find some place in eternity, +where I am literally at home. And there is only one such place to +be found. + + I have now said enough to show (to any one to whom such +an explanation is essential) that I have in the ordinary arena +of apologetics, a ground of belief. In pure records of experiment (if +these be taken democratically without contempt or favour) there is +evidence first, that miracles happen, and second that the nobler +miracles belong to our tradition. But I will not pretend that this curt +discussion is my real reason for accepting Christianity instead of taking +the moral good of Christianity as I should take it out of Confucianism. + + I have another far more solid and central ground for submitting +to it as a faith, instead of merely picking up hints from it +as a scheme. And that is this: that the Christian Church in its +practical relation to my soul is a living teacher, not a dead one. +It not only certainly taught me yesterday, but will almost certainly +teach me to-morrow. Once I saw suddenly the meaning of the shape +of the cross; some day I may see suddenly the meaning of the shape +of the mitre. One fine morning I saw why windows were pointed; +some fine morning I may see why priests were shaven. Plato has +told you a truth; but Plato is dead. Shakespeare has startled you +with an image; but Shakespeare will not startle you with any more. +But imagine what it would be to live with such men still living, +to know that Plato might break out with an original lecture to-morrow, +or that at any moment Shakespeare might shatter everything with a +single song. The man who lives in contact with what he believes +to be a living Church is a man always expecting to meet Plato +and Shakespeare to-morrow at breakfast. He is always expecting +to see some truth that he has never seen before. There is one +only other parallel to this position; and that is the parallel +of the life in which we all began. When your father told you, +walking about the garden, that bees stung or that roses smelt sweet, +you did not talk of taking the best out of his philosophy. When the +bees stung you, you did not call it an entertaining coincidence. +When the rose smelt sweet you did not say "My father is a rude, +barbaric symbol, enshrining (perhaps unconsciously) the deep +delicate truths that flowers smell." No: you believed your father, +because you had found him to be a living fountain of facts, a thing +that really knew more than you; a thing that would tell you truth +to-morrow, as well as to-day. And if this was true of your father, +it was even truer of your mother; at least it was true of mine, +to whom this book is dedicated. Now, when society is in a rather +futile fuss about the subjection of women, will no one say how much +every man owes to the tyranny and privilege of women, to the fact +that they alone rule education until education becomes futile: +for a boy is only sent to be taught at school when it is too late +to teach him anything. The real thing has been done already, +and thank God it is nearly always done by women. Every man +is womanised, merely by being born. They talk of the masculine woman; +but every man is a feminised man. And if ever men walk to Westminster +to protest against this female privilege, I shall not join +their procession. + + For I remember with certainty this fixed psychological fact; +that the very time when I was most under a woman's authority, +I was most full of flame and adventure. Exactly because when my +mother said that ants bit they did bite, and because snow did +come in winter (as she said); therefore the whole world was to me +a fairyland of wonderful fulfilments, and it was like living in +some Hebraic age, when prophecy after prophecy came true. I went +out as a child into the garden, and it was a terrible place to me, +precisely because I had a clue to it: if I had held no clue it would +not have been terrible, but tame. A mere unmeaning wilderness is +not even impressive. But the garden of childhood was fascinating, +exactly because everything had a fixed meaning which could be found +out in its turn. Inch by inch I might discover what was the object +of the ugly shape called a rake; or form some shadowy conjecture +as to why my parents kept a cat. + + So, since I have accepted Christendom as a mother and not +merely as a chance example, I have found Europe and the world +once more like the little garden where I stared at the symbolic +shapes of cat and rake; I look at everything with the old elvish +ignorance and expectancy. This or that rite or doctrine may look +as ugly and extraordinary as a rake; but I have found by experience +that such things end somehow in grass and flowers. A clergyman may +be apparently as useless as a cat, but he is also as fascinating, +for there must be some strange reason for his existence. I give +one instance out of a hundred; I have not myself any instinctive +kinship with that enthusiasm for physical virginity, which has +certainly been a note of historic Christianity. But when I look +not at myself but at the world, I perceive that this enthusiasm +is not only a note of Christianity, but a note of Paganism, a note +of high human nature in many spheres. The Greeks felt virginity +when they carved Artemis, the Romans when they robed the vestals, +the worst and wildest of the great Elizabethan playwrights clung to +the literal purity of a woman as to the central pillar of the world. +Above all, the modern world (even while mocking sexual innocence) +has flung itself into a generous idolatry of sexual innocence-- +the great modern worship of children. For any man who loves children +will agree that their peculiar beauty is hurt by a hint of physical sex. +With all this human experience, allied with the Christian authority, +I simply conclude that I am wrong, and the church right; or rather +that I am defective, while the church is universal. It takes +all sorts to make a church; she does not ask me to be celibate. +But the fact that I have no appreciation of the celibates, +I accept like the fact that I have no ear for music. The best +human experience is against me, as it is on the subject of Bach. +Celibacy is one flower in my father's garden, of which I have +not been told the sweet or terrible name. But I may be told it +any day. + + This, therefore, is, in conclusion, my reason for accepting +the religion and not merely the scattered and secular truths out +of the religion. I do it because the thing has not merely told this +truth or that truth, but has revealed itself as a truth-telling thing. +All other philosophies say the things that plainly seem to be true; +only this philosophy has again and again said the thing that does +not seem to be true, but is true. Alone of all creeds it is +convincing where it is not attractive; it turns out to be right, +like my father in the garden. Theosophists for instance will preach +an obviously attractive idea like re-incarnation; but if we wait +for its logical results, they are spiritual superciliousness and the +cruelty of caste. For if a man is a beggar by his own pre-natal sins, +people will tend to despise the beggar. But Christianity preaches +an obviously unattractive idea, such as original sin; but when we +wait for its results, they are pathos and brotherhood, and a thunder +of laughter and pity; for only with original sin we can at once pity +the beggar and distrust the king. Men of science offer us health, +an obvious benefit; it is only afterwards that we discover +that by health, they mean bodily slavery and spiritual tedium. +Orthodoxy makes us jump by the sudden brink of hell; it is only +afterwards that we realise that jumping was an athletic exercise +highly beneficial to our health. It is only afterwards that we +realise that this danger is the root of all drama and romance. +The strongest argument for the divine grace is simply its ungraciousness. +The unpopular parts of Christianity turn out when examined to be +the very props of the people. The outer ring of Christianity +is a rigid guard of ethical abnegations and professional priests; +but inside that inhuman guard you will find the old human life +dancing like children, and drinking wine like men; for Christianity +is the only frame for pagan freedom. But in the modern philosophy +the case is opposite; it is its outer ring that is obviously +artistic and emancipated; its despair is within. + + And its despair is this, that it does not really believe +that there is any meaning in the universe; therefore it cannot +hope to find any romance; its romances will have no plots. A man +cannot expect any adventures in the land of anarchy. But a man can +expect any number of adventures if he goes travelling in the land +of authority. One can find no meanings in a jungle of scepticism; +but the man will find more and more meanings who walks through +a forest of doctrine and design. Here everything has a story tied +to its tail, like the tools or pictures in my father's house; +for it is my father's house. I end where I began--at the right end. +I have entered at last the gate of all good philosophy. I have come +into my second childhood. + + But this larger and more adventurous Christian universe has +one final mark difficult to express; yet as a conclusion of the whole +matter I will attempt to express it. All the real argument about +religion turns on the question of whether a man who was born upside +down can tell when he comes right way up. The primary paradox of +Christianity is that the ordinary condition of man is not his sane +or sensible condition; that the normal itself is an abnormality. +That is the inmost philosophy of the Fall. In Sir Oliver Lodge's +interesting new Catechism, the first two questions were: +"What are you?" and "What, then, is the meaning of the Fall of Man?" +I remember amusing myself by writing my own answers to the questions; +but I soon found that they were very broken and agnostic answers. +To the question, "What are you?" I could only answer, "God knows." +And to the question, "What is meant by the Fall?" I could answer +with complete sincerity, "That whatever I am, I am not myself." +This is the prime paradox of our religion; something that we have +never in any full sense known, is not only better than ourselves, +but even more natural to us than ourselves. And there is really +no test of this except the merely experimental one with which these +pages began, the test of the padded cell and the open door. It is only +since I have known orthodoxy that I have known mental emancipation. +But, in conclusion, it has one special application to the ultimate idea +of joy. + + It is said that Paganism is a religion of joy and Christianity +of sorrow; it would be just as easy to prove that Paganism is pure +sorrow and Christianity pure joy. Such conflicts mean nothing and +lead nowhere. Everything human must have in it both joy and sorrow; +the only matter of interest is the manner in which the two things +are balanced or divided. And the really interesting thing is this, +that the pagan was (in the main) happier and happier as he approached +the earth, but sadder and sadder as he approached the heavens. +The gaiety of the best Paganism, as in the playfulness of Catullus +or Theocritus, is, indeed, an eternal gaiety never to be forgotten +by a grateful humanity. But it is all a gaiety about the facts of life, +not about its origin. To the pagan the small things are as sweet +as the small brooks breaking out of the mountain; but the broad things +are as bitter as the sea. When the pagan looks at the very core of the +cosmos he is struck cold. Behind the gods, who are merely despotic, +sit the fates, who are deadly. Nay, the fates are worse than deadly; +they are dead. And when rationalists say that the ancient world +was more enlightened than the Christian, from their point of view +they are right. For when they say "enlightened" they mean darkened +with incurable despair. It is profoundly true that the ancient world +was more modern than the Christian. The common bond is in the fact +that ancients and moderns have both been miserable about existence, +about everything, while mediaevals were happy about that at least. +I freely grant that the pagans, like the moderns, were only miserable +about everything--they were quite jolly about everything else. +I concede that the Christians of the Middle Ages were only at +peace about everything--they were at war about everything else. +But if the question turn on the primary pivot of the cosmos, +then there was more cosmic contentment in the narrow and bloody +streets of Florence than in the theatre of Athens or the open garden +of Epicurus. Giotto lived in a gloomier town than Euripides, +but he lived in a gayer universe. + + The mass of men have been forced to be gay about the little things, +but sad about the big ones. Nevertheless (I offer my last dogma +defiantly) it is not native to man to be so. Man is more himself, +man is more manlike, when joy is the fundamental thing in him, +and grief the superficial. Melancholy should be an innocent interlude, +a tender and fugitive frame of mind; praise should be the permanent +pulsation of the soul. Pessimism is at best an emotional half-holiday; +joy is the uproarious labour by which all things live. Yet, according to +the apparent estate of man as seen by the pagan or the agnostic, +this primary need of human nature can never be fulfilled. +Joy ought to be expansive; but for the agnostic it must be contracted, +it must cling to one corner of the world. Grief ought to be +a concentration; but for the agnostic its desolation is spread +through an unthinkable eternity. This is what I call being born +upside down. The sceptic may truly be said to be topsy-turvy; +for his feet are dancing upwards in idle ecstasies, while his brain +is in the abyss. To the modern man the heavens are actually below +the earth. The explanation is simple; he is standing on his head; +which is a very weak pedestal to stand on. But when he has found +his feet again he knows it. Christianity satisfies suddenly +and perfectly man's ancestral instinct for being the right way up; +satisfies it supremely in this; that by its creed joy becomes +something gigantic and sadness something special and small. +The vault above us is not deaf because the universe is an idiot; +the silence is not the heartless silence of an endless and aimless world. +Rather the silence around us is a small and pitiful stillness like +the prompt stillness in a sick-room. We are perhaps permitted tragedy +as a sort of merciful comedy: because the frantic energy of divine +things would knock us down like a drunken farce. We can take our +own tears more lightly than we could take the tremendous levities +of the angels. So we sit perhaps in a starry chamber of silence, +while the laughter of the heavens is too loud for us to hear. + + Joy, which was the small publicity of the pagan, is the gigantic +secret of the Christian. And as I close this chaotic volume I open +again the strange small book from which all Christianity came; and I +am again haunted by a kind of confirmation. The tremendous figure +which fills the Gospels towers in this respect, as in every other, +above all the thinkers who ever thought themselves tall. His pathos +was natural, almost casual. The Stoics, ancient and modern, +were proud of concealing their tears. He never concealed His tears; +He showed them plainly on His open face at any daily sight, such as +the far sight of His native city. Yet He concealed something. +Solemn supermen and imperial diplomatists are proud of restraining +their anger. He never restrained His anger. He flung furniture +down the front steps of the Temple, and asked men how they expected +to escape the damnation of Hell. Yet He restrained something. +I say it with reverence; there was in that shattering personality +a thread that must be called shyness. There was something that He hid +from all men when He went up a mountain to pray. There was something +that He covered constantly by abrupt silence or impetuous isolation. +There was some one thing that was too great for God to show us when +He walked upon our earth; and I have sometimes fancied that it was +His mirth. + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ORTHODOXY*** + + +******* This file should be named 130.txt or 130.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/3/130 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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