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diff --git a/12233-0.txt b/12233-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ee70480 --- /dev/null +++ b/12233-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,36301 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 12233 *** + +[Illustration: Portrait of Stonewall Jackson] + + + + +Stonewall Jackson +and the +AMERICAN CIVIL WAR + + +by the late +Colonel G. F. R. HENDERSON, C.B. + +AUTHOR OF “THE BATTLE OF SPICHEREN, A TACTICAL STUDY” +AND “THE CAMPAIGN OF FREDERICKSBURG” + +with an introduction by + +FIELD-MARSHAL THE LATE +RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, +K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., &c. + +IN TWO VOLUMES—VOLUME I + +_WITH PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND PLANS_ +_TO MY FATHER_ + +—::— + + +CONTENTS + + +INTRODUCTION +PREFACE + +Chapter I. WEST POINT +Chapter II. MEXICO. 1846–47 +Chapter III. LEXINGTON. 1851–61 +Chapter IV. SECESSION. 1860–61 +Chapter V. HARPER’S FERRY +Chapter VI. THE FIRST BATTLE OF MANASSAS OR BULL RUN +Chapter VII. ROMNEY +Chapter VIII. KERNSTOWN +Chapter IX. M’DOWELL +Chapter X. WINCHESTER +Chapter XI. CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC +Chapter XII. REVIEW OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN +Chapter XIII. THE SEVEN DAYS. GAINES’ MILL +Chapter XIV. THE SEVEN DAYS. FRAYSER’S FARM AND MALVERN HILL +Chapter XV. CEDAR RUN +Chapter XVI. GROVETON AND THE SECOND MANASSAS +Chapter XVII. THE SECOND MANASSAS (_continued_) +Chapter XVIII. HARPER’S FERRY +Chapter XIX. SHARPSBURG +Chapter XX. FREDERICKSBURG +Chapter XXI. THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA +Chapter XXII. WINTER QUARTERS +Chapter XXIII. CHANCELLORSVILLE +Chapter XXIV. CHANCELLORSVILLE (_continued_) +Chapter XXV. THE SOLDIER AND THE MAN + +INDEX + +ILLUSTRATIONS + +PORTRAITS + + STONEWALL JACKSON, LT.-GENERAL. + STONEWALL JACKSON AT THE AGE OF 24 (_from a daguerreotype_) + + +MAPS + + THE CITY OF MEXICO. + THE UNITED STATES, 1861. + SITUATION, NIGHT OF JULY 17, 1861. + DISPOSITIONS, MORNING OF JULY 21, 1861. + BULL RUN. + SKETCH OF WEST VIRGINIA IN 1861. + THE VALLEY. + SITUATION, NIGHT OF MARCH 21, 1862. + BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN. + SITUATION, APRIL 30, 1862. + BATTLE OF MCDOWELL. + SITUATION, MAY 18, 1862. + BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. + BATTLES OF CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. + ENVIRONS OF RICHMOND + BATTLE OF GAINES’ MILL + THE SEVEN DAYS. JUNE 26–JULY 2, 1862 + BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL + ENVIRONS OF WARRENTON + BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN + SITUATION ON AUGUST 27 (SUNSET), 1862 + SITUATION ON AUGUST 28 (SUNSET), 1862 + POSITIONS ON AUGUST 29, 1862 + GROVETON AND SECOND MANASSAS + POSITIONS ON AUGUST 30, 1862, IN THE ATTACK ON JACKSON + POSITIONS ON AUGUST 30, 1862 + HARPER’S FERRY + SHARPSBURG + POSITIONS DURING THE ATTACKS OF HOOKER AND MANSFIELD AT SHARPSBURG + FREDERICKSBURG + HOOKER’S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN + BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +Before the great Republic of the West had completed a century of +independent national existence, its political fabric was subjected to +the strain of a terrible internecine war. That the true cause of +conflict was the antagonism between the spirit of Federalism and the +theory of “States’ Rights” is very clearly explained in the following +pages, and the author exactly expresses the feeling with which most +Englishmen regard the question of Secession, when he implies that had +he been a New Englander he would have fought to the death to preserve +the Union, while had he been born in Virginia he would have done as +much in defence of a right the South believed inalienable. The war thus +brought about dragged on its weary length from the spring of 1861 to +the same season of 1865. During its progress reputations were made that +will live for ever in American history, and many remarkable men came to +the front. Among these not the least prominent was “Stonewall Jackson,” +who to the renown of a great soldier and unselfish patriot added the +brighter fame of a Christian hero; and to those who would know what +manner of man this Stonewall Jackson was, and why he was so universally +revered, so beloved, so trusted by his men, I can cordially recommend +Colonel Henderson’s delightful volumes. From their perusal I have +derived real pleasure and sound instruction. They have taught me much; +they have made me think still more; and I hope they may do the same for +many others in the British Army. They are worth the closest study, for +few military writers have possessed Colonel Henderson’s grasp of +tactical and strategical principles, or his knowledge of the methods +which have controlled their application by the most famous soldiers, +from Hannibal to Von Moltke. Gifted with a rare power of describing not +only great military events but the localities where they occurred, he +places clearly before his readers, in logical sequence, the +circumstances which brought them about. He has accomplished, too, the +difficult task of combining with a brilliant and critical history of a +great war the life-story of a great commander, of a most singular and +remarkable man. The figure, the character, the idiosyncrasies of the +famous Virginian, as well as the lofty motives which influenced him +throughout, are most sympathetically portrayed. + +There have been few more fitted by natural instincts, by education, by +study, and by self-discipline to become leaders of men than Stonewall +Jackson. From the day he joined that admirable school at West Point he +may be said to have trained himself mentally, morally, and physically, +for the position to which he aspired, and which it would seem he always +believed he would reach. Shy as a lad, reserved as a man, speaking +little but thinking much, he led his own life, devouring the +experiences of great men, as recorded in military history, in order +that when his time came he should be capable of handling his troops as +they did. A man of very simple tastes and habits, but of strong +religious principles, drawn directly from the Bible; a child in purity; +a child in faith; the Almighty always in his thoughts, his stay in +trouble, his guide in every difficulty, Jackson’s individuality was +more striking and more complete than that of all others who played +leading parts in the great tragedy of Secession. The most reckless and +irreligious of the Confederate soldiers were silent in his presence, +and stood awestruck and abashed before this great God-fearing man; and +even in the far-off Northern States the hatred of the formidable +“rebel” was tempered by an irrepressible admiration of his piety, his +sincerity, and his resolution. The passions then naturally excited have +now calmed down, and are remembered no more by a reunited and +chivalrous nation. With that innate love of virtue and real worth which +has always distinguished the American people, there has long been +growing up, even among those who were the fiercest foes of the South, a +feeling of love and reverence for the memory of this great and +true-hearted man of war, who fell in what he firmly believed to be a +sacred cause. The fame of Stonewall Jackson is no longer the exclusive +property of Virginia and the South; it has become the birthright of +every man privileged to call himself an American. + +Colonel Henderson has made a special study of the Secession War, and it +would be difficult, in my opinion, to find a man better qualified in +every respect for the task he has undertaken. I may express the hope +that he will soon give us the history of the war from the death of +Stonewall Jackson to the fall of Richmond. Extending as it did over a +period of four years, and marked by achievements which are a lasting +honour to the Anglo-Saxon name, the struggle of the South for +independence is from every point of view one of the most important +events in the second half of the century, and it should not be left +half told. Until the battle where Stonewall Jackson fell, the tide of +success was flowing, and had borne the flag of the new Confederacy +within sight of the gates of Washington. Colonel Henderson deals only +with what I think may be called the period of Southern victories, for +the tide began to ebb when Jackson fell; and those who read his volumes +will, I am convinced, look forward eagerly to his story of the years +which followed, when Grant, with the skill of a practised strategist, +threw a net round the Confederate capital, drawing it gradually +together until he imprisoned its starving garrison, and compelled Lee, +the ablest commander of his day, to surrender at discretion. + +But the application of strategical and tactical principles, and the +example of noble lives, are not the only or even the most valuable +lessons of great wars. There are lessons which concern nations rather +than individuals; and there are two to be learnt from the Secession War +which are of peculiar value to both England and the United States, +whose armies are comparatively small and raised by voluntary +enlistment. The first is the necessity of maintaining at all times (for +it is impossible to predict what tomorrow may have in store for us) a +well-organised standing army in the highest state of efficiency, and +composed of thoroughly-trained and full-grown men. This army to be +large enough for our military requirements, and adapted to the +character, the habits, and the traditions of the people. It is not +necessary that the whole force should be actually serving during peace: +one half of it, provided it is periodically drilled and exercised, can +be formed into a Reserve; the essential thing is that it should be as +perfect a weapon as can be forged. + +The second lesson is that to hand over to civilians the administration +and organisation of the army, whether in peace or in war, or to allow +them to interfere in the selection of officers for command or +promotion, is most injurious to efficiency; while, during war, to allow +them, no matter how high their political capacity, to dictate to +commanders in the field any line of conduct, after the army has once +received its commission, is simply to ensure disaster. + +The first of these lessons is brought home to us by the opening events +of this unreasonably protracted war. As I have elsewhere said, most +military students will admit that had the United States been able, +early in 1861, to put into the field, in addition to their volunteers, +one Army Corps of regular troops, the war would have ended in a few +months. An enormous expenditure of life and money, as well as a serious +dislocation and loss of trade, would have been thus avoided. Never have +the evil consequences which follow upon the absence of an adequate and +well-organised army been more forcibly exemplified. + +But, alas! when this lesson is preached in a country governed +alternately by rival political parties, and when there is no immediate +prospect of national danger, it falls on deaf ears. The demands made by +the soldiers to put the army on a thoroughly efficient footing are +persistently ignored, for the necessary means are almost invariably +required for some other object, more popular at the moment and in a +parliamentary—or party—sense more useful. The most scathing comment on +such a system of administration is furnished in the story told by +Colonel Henderson. The fearful trials to which the United States were +subjected expose the folly and self-deception of which even +well-meaning party leaders are too often capable. Ministers bluster +about fighting and yet refuse to spend enough money on the army to make +it fit for use; and on both sides of the Atlantic the lessons taught by +the Peninsula, the Crimea, and the Secession War are but seldom +remembered. + +The pleasing notion that, whenever war comes, money can obtain for the +nation all that it requires is still, it would seem, an article of at +least lip-faith with the politicians of the English-speaking race +throughout the world. Gold will certainly buy a nation powder, pills, +and provisions; but no amount of wealth, even when supported by a +patriotic willingness to enlist, can buy discipline, training, and +skilful leading. Without these there can be no such thing as an +efficient army, and success in the field against serious opposition is +merely the idle dream of those who know not war. + +If any nation could improvise an army at short notice it would be the +United States, for its men, all round, are more hardy, more +self-reliant, and quicker to learn than those of older communities. +But, notwithstanding this advantage, both in 1861 and 1898 the United +States failed to create the thoroughly efficient armies so suddenly +required, and in both instances the unnecessary sufferings of the +private soldier were the price paid for the weakness and folly of the +politicians. In 1861 the Governors of the several Northern States were +ordered to call for volunteers to enlist for ninety days, the men +electing their own officers. It was generally believed throughout the +North that all Southern resistance would collapse before the great +armies that would thus be raised. But the troops sent out to crush the +rebellion, when they first came under fire, were soldiers only in +outward garb, and at Bull Run, face to face with shot and shell, they +soon lapsed into the condition of a terrified rabble, and ran away from +another rabble almost equally demoralised; and this, not because they +were cowards, for they were of the same breed as the young regular +soldiers who retreated from the same field in such excellent order, but +because they neither understood what discipline was nor the necessity +for it, and because the staff and regimental officers, with few +exceptions, were untrained and inexperienced. + +Mr. Davis, having prevented the Southern army from following up the +victory at Bull Run, gave the Northern States some breathing time. Mr. +Lincoln was thus able to raise a new army of over 200,000 men for the +projected advance on Richmond. + +The new army was liberally supplied with guns, pontoons, balloons, +hospitals, and waggons; but, with the exception of a few officers +spared from the regular army, it was without trained soldiers to lead +it, or staff officers to move and to administer its Divisions. It must +be admitted, I think, that General McClellan did all that a man could +do in the way of training this huge mass. But when the day came for it +to move forward, it was still unfit for an offensive campaign against a +regular army. To the practised eye of an able and experienced soldier +who accompanied McClellan, the Federal host was an army only in name. +He likened it to a giant lying prone upon the earth, in appearance a +Hercules, but wanting the bone, the muscle, and the nervous +organisation necessary to set the great frame in motion. Even when the +army was landed in the Peninsula, although the process of training and +organisation had been going on for over six months, it was still a most +unwieldy force. Fortunately for the Union, the Confederate army, except +as regards the superior leaders and the cavalry, was hardly more +efficient. + +The United States, fully realising their need of a larger regular army, +are now on the point of increasing their existing force to treble its +present strength. Their troops, like our own, are raised by voluntary +enlistment for a short period of service with the colours. England has +always very great difficulty in filling the ranks even with undeveloped +youths. The United States obtain as many full-grown men as they +require, because they have the wisdom to pay their men well, on a scale +corresponding to the market rate of wages. Here they are fortunate; but +men are not everything, and I will still draw the moral that a nation +is more than blind when it deliberately elects to entrust its defence +to an army that is not as perfect as training and discipline can make +it, that is not led by practised officers, staff and regimental, and +that is not provided with a powerful and efficient artillery. +Overwhelming disaster is in store for such nation if it be attacked by +a large regular army; and when it falls there will be none to pity. To +hang the ministers who led them astray, and who believed they knew +better than any soldier how the army should be administered, will be +but poor consolation to an angry and deluded people. + +Let me now dwell briefly upon the second of the two great national +lessons taught by the Secession War. I shall say nothing here upon +civilian meddling with army organisation and with the selection of +officers for command, but I wish particularly to point out the result +of interference on the part of a legislative assembly or minister with +the plans and dispositions of the generals commanding in the field. +Take first the notorious instance of Mr. Lincoln’s interference with +McClellan in the spring of 1862. McClellan, who was selected to command +the army which was to capture Richmond and end the war, was a soldier +of known ability, and, in my opinion, if he had not been interfered +with by the Cabinet in Washington, he would probably have succeeded. It +is true, as Colonel Henderson has said, that he made a mistake in not +playing up to Lincoln’s susceptibilities with regard to the safety of +the Federal capital. But Lincoln made a far greater mistake in suddenly +reducing McClellan’s army by 40,000 men, and by removing Banks from his +jurisdiction, when the plan of campaign had been approved by the +Cabinet, and it was already too late to change it. It is possible, +considering the political situation, that the garrison of Washington +was too small, and it was certainly inefficient; but the best way of +protecting Washington was to give McClellan the means of advancing +rapidly upon Richmond. Such an advance would have made a Confederate +counterstroke against the Northern capital, or even a demonstration, +impossible. But to take away from McClellan 40,000 men, the very force +with which he intended to turn the Yorktown lines and drive the enemy +back on Richmond, and at the same time to isolate Banks in the +Shenandoah Valley, was simply playing into the enemy’s hands. What +Lincoln did not see was that to divide the Federal army into three +portions, working on three separate lines, was to run a far greater +risk than would be incurred by leaving Washington weakly garrisoned. I +cannot bring myself to believe that he in the least realised all that +was involved in changing a plan of operations so vast as McClellan’s. + +Again, look at the folly of which Mr. Benjamin, the Confederate +Secretary of War, was guilty at the same period. The reader should +carefully study the chapter in which Colonel Henderson describes +Stonewall Jackson’s resignation of his command when his arrangements in +the field were altered, without his cognizance, by the Secretary of +War. + +I should like to emphasise his words: “That the soldier,” he says, “is +but the servant of the statesman, as war is but an instrument of +diplomacy, no educated soldier will deny. Politics must always exercise +a supreme influence on strategy; yet it cannot be gainsaid that +interference with the commander in the field is fraught with the +gravest danger.”[1] + +The absolute truth of this remark is proved, not only by many instances +in his own volumes, but by the history of war in all ages, and the +principle for which Jackson contended when he sent in his resignation +would seem too well founded to be open to the slightest question. Yet +there are those who, oblivious of the fact that neglect of this +principle has been always responsible for protracted wars, for useless +slaughter, and costly failures, still insist on the omniscience of +statesmen; who regard the protest of the soldier as the mere outcome of +injured vanity, and believe that politics must suffer unless the +politician controls strategy as well as the finances. Colonel +Henderson’s pages supply an instructive commentary on these ideas. In +the first three years of the Secession War, when Mr. Lincoln and Mr. +Stanton practically controlled the movements of the Federal forces, the +Confederates were generally successful. Further, the most glorious +epoch of the Confederacy was the critical period of 1862, when Lee was +allowed to exercise the full authority of Commander-in-Chief; and +lastly, the Northern prospects did not begin to brighten until Mr. +Lincoln, in March 1864, with that unselfish intelligence which +distinguished him, abdicated his military functions in favour of +General Grant. And yet while Lee and Grant had a free hand over the +military resources of their respective nations the political situation +suffered no harm whatever, no extravagant demands were made upon the +exchequer, and the Government derived fresh strength from the successes +of the armies. + +The truth is that a certain class of civilians cannot rid themselves of +the suspicion that soldiers are consumed by an inordinate and +bloodthirsty ambition. They cannot understand that a man brought up +from his youth to render loyal obedience is less likely than most +others to run counter to constituted authority. They will not see that +a soldier’s pride in his own army and in the manhood of his own race +tends to make him a devoted patriot. They do not realise that a +commander’s familiarity with war, whether gained by study or +experience, must, unless his ability be limited, enable him to +accommodate his strategy to political exigencies. Nor will they admit +that he can possess a due sense of economy, although none knows better +than an educated soldier the part played in war by a sound and thrifty +administration of the national resources. + +The soldier, on the other hand, knows that his art is most difficult, +that to apply strategical principles correctly experience, study, +knowledge of men, and an intimate acquaintance with questions of +supply, transport, and the movement of masses, are absolutely +necessary. He is aware that what may seem matters of small moment to +the civilian—such as the position of a brigade, the strength of a +garrison, the command of a detachment—may affect the whole course of a +campaign; and consequently, even if he had not the historical examples +of Aulic Councils and other such assemblies to warn him, he would rebel +against the meddling of amateurs. Let it not be forgotten that an +enormous responsibility rests on the shoulders of a commander in the +field: the honour of army committed to his charge, the lives of the +brave men under him, perhaps the existence of his country; and that +failure, even if he can plead that he only obeyed the orders of his +Government, or that he was supplied with inadequate means, will be laid +at his door. McDowell received no mercy after Bull Run, although he had +protested against attacking the Confederates; and it was long before +the reputation of Sir John Moore was cleared in the eyes of the English +people. + +Such, to my mind, are the most important lessons to be drawn from this +history of the first period of the Secession War. But it is not alone +to draw attention to the teaching on these points that I have acceded, +as an old friend, to Colonel Henderson’s request that I should write an +Introduction to his second edition. In these days of sensational +literature and superficial study there is a prejudice against the story +that fills more than one volume. But the reader who opens these pages +is so carried away by the intense interest of the subject, clothed as +it is in forcible and yet graceful language, that he closes them with +regret; and I am only too glad to ask others to share the very great +pleasure I have myself enjoyed in reading them. I know of no book which +will add more largely to the soldier’s knowledge of strategy and the +art of war; and the ordinary reader will find in this Life of Stonewall +Jackson, true and accurate as it is, all the charm and fascination of a +great historical romance. + + [1] Vol. i, p. 206. + + +PREFACE + +To write the life of a great general, to analyse his methods of war and +discipline, to appraise the weight of his responsibilities, and to +measure the extent of his capacity, it would seem essential that the +experience of the writer should have run on parallel lines. An ordinary +soldier, therefore, who notwithstanding his lack of such experience +attempts the task, may be justly accused of something worse than +presumption. But if we were to wait for those who are really qualified +to deal with the achievements of famous captains, we should, as a rule, +remain in ignorance of the lessons of their lives, for men of the +requisite capacity are few in a generation. So the task, if it is to be +done at all, must perforce be left to those who have less knowledge but +more leisure. + +In the present case, however, the mass of contemporary testimony is so +large that any initial disadvantages, I venture to think, will be less +conspicuous than they might otherwise have been. The Official Records +of the War of the Rebellion contain every dispatch, letter, and +message, public or confidential, which has been preserved; and in the +daily correspondence of the generals on both sides, together with the +voluminous reports of officers of all grades, the tale of the campaigns +is written so plain that none can fail to read. Again, Stonewall +Jackson’s military career, either in full or in part, has been narrated +by more than one of his staff officers, whose intercourse with him was +necessarily close and constant; and, in addition, the literature of the +war abounds with articles and sketches contributed by soldiers of all +ranks who, at one time or another, served under his command. It has +been my privilege, moreover, to visit the battle-fields of Virginia +with men who rode by his side when he won his victories, to hear on the +spot the description of his manœuvres, of his bearing under fire, and +of his influence over his troops. I can thus make fairly certain that +my facts are accurate. But in endeavouring to ascertain the strength of +the armies at different periods I have been less fortunate. For the +most part I have rested on the Official Records;[1] it is to be +regretted, however, that, so far as the Confederates are concerned, +there are several gaps in the series of returns, and I have found it +extremely difficult to arrive at a fair estimate of the approximate +strength at any period within these intervals. For instance, the +numbers at Lee’s disposal at the end of August 1862 rest on the basis +of a return dated July 20, and in the meantime several regiments and +batteries had been transferred elsewhere, while others had been added. +I have done my best, however, to trace all such changes; and where +officers and employed men are not included in the returns, I have been +careful to add a normal percentage to the official totals. + +As regards Jackson’s place in history, my labours have been greatly +facilitated by the published opinions of many distinguished +soldiers—American, English, French, and German; and I have endeavoured, +at every step, as the surest means of arriving at a just conclusion, to +compare his conduct of military affairs with that of the acknowledged +masters of war. His private life, from his boyhood onwards, has been so +admirably depicted by his widow,[2] that I have had nothing more to do +than to select from her pages such incidents and letters as appear best +suited to illustrate his character, and to add a few traits and +anecdotes communicated by his personal friends. + +Several biographies have already been published, and that written by +the late Reverend R. L. Dabney, D.D., sometime Major in the Confederate +army, and Jackson’s Chief of the Staff for several months, is so +complete and powerful that the need of a successor is not at once +apparent. This work, however, was brought out before the war had +ceased, and notwithstanding his intimate relations with his hero, it +was impossible for the author to attain that fulness and precision of +statement which the study of the Official Records can alone ensure. Nor +was Dr. Dabney a witness of all the events he so vigorously described. +It is only fitting, however, that I should acknowledge the debt I owe +to a soldier and writer of such conspicuous ability. Not only have I +quoted freely from his pages, but he was good enough, at my request, to +write exhaustive memoranda on many episodes of Jackson’s career. + +Cooke’s Life of Jackson is still popular, and deservedly so; but Cooke, +like Dr. Dabney, had no access to the Official Records, and his +narrative of the battles, picturesque and lifelike as it is, can hardly +be accepted as sober history. On the other hand, the several works of +the late Colonel William Allan, C.S.A., in collaboration with Major +Hotchkiss, C.S.A., are as remarkable for their research and accuracy as +for their military acumen; while the volumes of the Southern Historical +Society, together with the remarkable series of articles entitled +“Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,” written by the leading +participants on either side, are a perfect mine of wealth to the +historical student. I need hardly add that the memoirs and biographies +of both the Federal and Confederate generals, of Lee, Grant, Stuart, +Sherman, Johnston, Longstreet, Beauregard, McClellan, Hancock, +Pendleton and others, are a necessary complement to the Official +Records. + +Nevertheless, with all this mass of information at my command, had it +not been for the exceeding kindness of the friends and comrades of +Stonewall Jackson, I much doubt whether I should have been able to +complete my task. To the late Major Hotchkiss, his trusted staff +officer, whatever of value these volumes may contain is largely due. +Not only did he correct the topographical descriptions, but he +investigated most carefully many disputed points; and in procuring the +evidence of eye-witnesses, and thus enabling me to check and amplify +the statements of previous writers, he was indefatigable. Dr. Hunter +McGuire, Medical Director of Jackson’s successive commands, has given +me much of his valuable time. The Reverend J. P. Smith, D.D., Jackson’s +aide-de-camp, has rendered me great assistance; and from many officers +and men of the Stonewall Brigade, of Jackson’s Division, and of the +Second Army Corps, I have received contributions to this memorial of +their famous chief. Generals Gustavus Smith, Fitzhugh Lee, Stephen D. +Lee, and N. G. Harris, Colonel Williams, Colonel Poague, and R. E. Lee, +Esquire, of Washington, D.C., all formerly of the Confederate States +Army, have supplied me with new matter. Colonel Miller, U.S.A., most +courteously responded to my request for a copy of the services of his +regiment, the First Artillery, in the Mexican war. The late General +John Gibbon, U.S.A., wrote for me his reminiscences of Jackson as a +cadet at West Point, and as a subaltern in Mexico; and many officers +who fought for the Union have given me information as to the tactics +and discipline of the Federal armies. The Reverend J. Graham, D.D., of +Winchester, Virginia; Dr. H. A. White, of Washington and Lee +University, Lexington, Virginia, author of an admirable life of General +Lee; and the Hon. Francis Lawley, once Special Correspondent of the +_Times_ in the Confederate States, have been most kind in replying to +my many questions. To Major-General Hildyard, C.B., late Commandant of +the Staff College, I am indebted for much valuable criticism on the +campaigns of 1862; and my warmest thanks are here tendered to the +Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Lord Wolseley, for much information +and more encouragement. + +I cannot conceal from myself, however, that notwithstanding the +numerous authorities I have been enabled to consult, as well as the +intrinsic interest of my subject, many of the following chapters will +be found excessively dull by civilian readers. Stonewall Jackson’s +military career was not all hard fighting; nor was it on the +battlefield alone that his supreme ability for war was made manifest. +His time and thoughts were more occupied by strategy, that is, by +combinations made out of the enemy’s sight, than by tactics, that is, +by manœuvres executed in the enemy’s presence. But strategy, +unfortunately, is an unpopular science, even among soldiers, requiring +both in practice and in demonstration constant and careful study of the +map, the closest computation of time and space, a grasp of many +factors, and the strictest attention to the various steps in the +problems it presents. At the same time, it is a science which repays +the student, although he may have no direct concern with military +affairs; for not only will a comprehension of its immutable principles +add a new interest to the records of stirring times and great +achievements, but it will make him a more useful citizen. + +In free countries like Great Britain, her colonies, and the United +States, the weight of intelligent opinion, in all matters of moment, +generally turns the scale; and if it were generally understood that, in +regular warfare, success depends on something more than rank and +experience, no Government would dare entrust the command of the army to +any other than the most competent soldier. The campaigns of the Civil +War show how much may be achieved, even with relatively feeble means, +by men who have both studied strategy and have the character necessary +for its successful practice; and they also show, not a whit less +forcibly, what awful sacrifices may be exacted from a nation ignorant +that such a science exists. And such ignorance is widespread. How +seldom do we hear a knowledge of strategy referred to as an +indispensable acquirement in those who aspire to high command? How +often is it repeated, although in so doing the speakers betray their +own shortcomings, that strategy is a mere matter of common-sense? Yet +the plain truth is that strategy is not only the determining factor in +civilised warfare, but that, in order to apply its principles, the +soundest common-sense must be most carefully trained. Of all the +sciences connected with war it is the most difficult. If the names of +the great captains, soldiers and sailors, be recalled, it will be seen +that it is to the breadth of their strategical conceptions rather than +to their tactical skill that they owe their fame. An analysis of the +great wars shows that their course was generally marked by the same +vicissitudes. First we have the great strategist, a Hannibal, or a +Napoleon, or a Lee, triumphing with inferior numbers over adversaries +who are tacticians and nothing more. Then, suddenly, the tide of +victory is checked, and brilliant manœuvres no longer avail. Fabius and +Scipio, Wellington, Nelson, and St. Vincent, Grant, Sherman, and +Farragut, have replaced the mere tacticians; and the superior +resources, wielded with strategical skill, exert their inevitable +effect. Or it may be that fortune is constant throughout to her first +favourite; and that a Marlborough, a Frederick, a Washington, a Moltke, +opposed only by good fighting men, never by an accomplished strategist, +marches from victory to victory. It is impossible, then, to estimate +the ability of any general without considering his strategy. Moreover, +in this age of inventions, of rapid movement, and of still more rapid +communication, the science is more complicated and even more important +than heretofore; and it is deserving, therefore, of far closer +attention, from both soldiers and civilians, than it has hitherto +received. It is for these reasons that I have described and discussed +in such minute detail the strategy of the campaigns with which Jackson +had to do. + +I have only to add that should anything in these pages wound the +susceptibilities of any one of those splendid soldiers and gallant +gentlemen who took part in the Civil War, whether he be Northerner or +Southerner, I here tender him my humblest apologies; assuring him, at +the same time, that while compiling these pages I have always borne in +mind the words of General Grant: “I would like to see truthful history +written. Such history will do full credit to the courage, endurance, +and ability of the American citizen, no matter what section he hailed +from, or in what ranks he fought.” I am very strongly of opinion that +any fair-minded man may feel equal sympathy with both Federal and +Confederate. Both were so absolutely convinced that their cause was +just, that it is impossible to conceive either Northerner or Southerner +acting otherwise than he did. If Stonewall Jackson had been a New +Englander, educated in the belief that secession was rebellion, he +would assuredly have shed the last drop of his blood in defence of the +Union; if Ulysses Grant had been a Virginian, imbibing the doctrine of +States’ rights with his mother’s milk, it is just as certain that he +would have worn the Confederate grey. It is with those Northerners who +would have allowed the Union to be broken, and with those Southerners +who would have tamely surrendered their hereditary rights, that no +Englishman would be willing to claim kinship. + + [1] Referred to in the text as O.R. + + [2] _Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson._ The Prentice Press, Louisville, + Kentucky. + + + + +Chapter I +WEST POINT[1] + + +In the first quarter of the century, on the hills which stand above the +Ohio River, but in different States of the Union, were born two +children, destined, to all appearance, to lives of narrow interests and +thankless toil. They were the sons of poor parents, without influence +or expectations; their native villages, deep in the solitudes of the +West, and remote from the promise and possibilities of great cities, +offered no road to fortune. In the days before the railway, escape from +the wilderness, except for those with long purses, was very difficult; +and for those who remained, if their means were small, the farm and the +store were the only occupations. But a farmer without capital was +little better than a hired hand; trade was confined to the petty +dealings of a country market; and although thrift and energy, even +under such depressing conditions, might eventually win a competence, +the most ardent ambition could hardly hope for more. Never was an +obscure existence more irretrievably marked out than for these children +of the Ohio; and yet, before either had grown grey, the names of +Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, and of Stonewall +Jackson, Lieutenant-General in the Confederate Army, were household +words in both America and Europe. Descendants of the pioneers, those +hardy borderers, half soldiers and half +farmers, who held and reclaimed, through long years of Indian warfare, +the valleys and prairies of the West, they inherited the best +attributes of a frank and valiant race. Simple yet wise, strong yet +gentle, they were gifted with all the qualities which make leaders of +men. Actuated by the highest principles, they both ennobled the cause +for which they fought; and while the opposition of such kindred natures +adds to the dramatic interest of the Civil War, the career of the great +soldier, although a theme perhaps less generally attractive, may be +followed as profitably as that of the great statesmen. Providence dealt +with them very differently. The one was struck down by a mortal wound +before his task was well begun; his life, to all human seeming, was +given in vain, and his name will ever be associated with the mournful +memories of a lost cause and a vanished army. The other, ere he fell +beneath the assassin’s stroke, had seen the abundant fruits of his +mighty labours; his sun set in a cloudless sky. And yet the resemblance +between them is very close. Both dared + +For that sweet mother-land which gave them birth +Nobly to do, nobly to die. Their names, +Graven on memorial columns, are a song +Heard in the future; . . . more than wall +And rampart, their examples reach a hand +Far thro’ all years, and everywhere they meet +And kindle generous purpose, and the strength +To mould it into action pure as theirs. + +Jackson, in one respect, was more fortunate than Lincoln. Although born +to poverty, he came of a Virginia family which was neither unknown nor +undistinguished, and as showing the influences which went to form his +character, its history and traditions may be briefly related. + +It is an article of popular belief that the State of Virginia, the Old +Dominion of the British Crown, owes her fame to the blood of the +English Cavaliers. The idea, however, has small foundation in fact. Not +a few of her great names are derived from a less romantic source, and +the Confederate general, like many of his neighbours in the western +portion of the State, traced his +origin to the Lowlands of Scotland. An ingenious author of the last +century, himself born on Tweed-side, declares that those Scotch +families whose patronymics end in “son,” although numerous and +respectable, and descended, as the distinctive syllable denotes, from +the Vikings, have seldom been pre-eminent either in peace or war. And +certainly, as regards the Jacksons of bygone centuries, the assertion +seems justified. The name is almost unknown to Border history. In +neither lay nor legend has it been preserved; and even in the “black +lists” of the wardens, where the more enterprising of the community +were continually proclaimed as thieves and malefactors, it is seldom +honoured with notice. The omission might be held as evidence that the +family was of peculiar honesty, but, in reality, it is only a proof +that it was insignificant. It is not improbable that the Jacksons were +one of the landless clans, whose only heritages were their rude “peel” +towers, and who, with no acknowledged chief of their own race, +followed, as much for protection as for plunder, the banner of some +more powerful house. In course of time, when the Marches grew peaceful +and morals improved, when cattle-lifting, no longer profitable, ceased +to be an honourable occupation, such humbler marauders drifted away +into the wide world, leaving no trace behind, save the grey ruins of +their grim fortalices, and the incidental mention of some probably +disreputable scion in a chapman’s ballad. Neither mark nor memory of +the Jacksons remains in Scotland. We only know that some members of the +clan, impelled probably by religious persecution, made their way to +Ulster, where a strong colony of Lowlanders had already been +established. + +Under a milder sky and a less drastic government the expatriated Scots +lost nothing of their individuality. Masterful and independent from the +beginning, masterful and independent they remained, inflexible of +purpose, impatient of justice, and staunch to their ideals. Something, +perhaps, they owed to contact with the Celt. Wherever the Ulster folk +have made their home, the breath of the wholesome North has followed +them, preserving +untainted their hereditary virtues. Shrewd, practical, and thrifty, +prosperity has consistently rewarded them; and yet, in common with the +Irishmen of English stock, they have found in the trade of arms the +most congenial outlet for their energies. An abiding love of peace can +hardly be enumerated amongst their more prominent characteristics; and +it is a remarkable fact, which, unless there is some mysterious +property in the air, can only be explained by the intermixture of +races, that Ireland “within the Pale” has been peculiarly prolific of +military genius. As England has bred admirals, so the sister isle has +bred soldiers. The tenacious courage of the Anglo-Saxon, blended with +the spirit of that people which above all others delights in war, has +proved on both sides of the Atlantic a most powerful combination of +martial qualities. The same mixed strain which gave England Wolfe and +Wellington, the Napiers and the Lawrences, has given America some of +her greatest captains; and not the least famous of her Presidents is +that General Jackson who won the battle of New Orleans in 1814. So, +early in the century the name became known beyond the seas; but whether +the same blood ran in the veins of the Confederate general and of the +soldier President is a matter of some doubt. The former, in almost +every single respect, save his warm heart, was the exact converse of +the typical Irishman, the latter had a hot temper and a ready wit. +Both, however, were undeniably fond of fighting, and a letter still +preserved attests that their ancestors had lived in the same parish of +Londonderry.[2] + +1748 John Jackson, the great-grandfather of our hero, landed in America +in 1748, and it was not long before he set his face towards the +wilderness. The emigrants from Ulster appear as a rule to have moved +westward. The States along the coast were already colonised, and, +despite its fertility, the country was little to their taste. But +beyond the border, in the broad Appalachian valley which runs from the +St. Lawrence to Alabama, on the +banks of the great rivers, the Susquehanna, the Ohio, the Cumberland, +and the Tennessee, they found a land after their own heart, a soil with +whose properties they were familiar, the sweet grasses and soft +contours of their native hills. Here, too, there was ample room for +their communities, for the West was as yet but sparsely tenanted. No +inconsiderable number, penetrating far into the interior, settled +eventually about the headwaters of the Potomac and the James. This +highland region was the debatable ground of the United States. So late +as 1756 the State of Virginia extended no further than the crests of +the Blue Ridge. Two hundred miles westward forts flying French colours +dominated the valley of the Ohio, and the wild and inhospitable tract, +a very labyrinth of mountains, which lay between, was held by the +fierce tribes of the “Six Nations” and the Leni-Lenape. Two years later +the French had been driven back to Canada; but it was not till near the +close of the century that the savage was finally dispossessed of his +spacious hunting grounds. + +It was on these green uplands, where fight and foray were as frequent +as once on the Scottish border, that John Jackson and his wife, a +fellow passenger to America, by name Elizabeth Cummins, first pitched +their camp, and here is still the home of their descendants. + +January 21, 1824 In the little town of Clarksburg, now the county-seat +of Harrison, but then no more than a village in the Virginia backwoods, +Thomas Jonathan Jackson was born on January 21, 1824. His father was a +lawyer, clever and popular, who had inherited a comfortable patrimony. +The New World had been generous to the Jacksons. The emigrant of 1748 +left a valuable estate, and his many sons were uniformly prosperous. +Nor was their affluence the reward of energy and thrift alone, for the +lands reclaimed by axe and plough were held by a charter of sword and +musket. The redskin fought hard for his ancestral domains. The +stockaded forts, which stood as a citadel of refuge in every +settlement, were often the scene of fierce attack and weary leaguer, +and the nursing mothers of the frontier families were no strangers to +war and bloodshed. The last great +battle with the Indians east of the Ohio was fought in 1774, but the +military experience of the pioneers was not confined to the warfare of +the border. John Jackson and his sons bore arms in the War of +Independence, and the trained riflemen of West Virginia were welcome +recruits in the colonial ranks. With the exception of the Highlanders +of the ’45, who had been deported in droves to the plantations, no race +had less cause to remain loyal to the Crown than the men of Ulster +blood. Even after the siege of Londonderry they had been proscribed and +persecuted; and in the War of Independence the fiercest enemies of King +George were the descendants of the same Scotch-Irish who had held the +north of Ireland for King William. + +In Washington’s campaigns more than one of the Jacksons won rank and +reputation; and when peace was established they married into +influential families. Nor was the next generation less successful. +Judges, senators, and soldiers upheld the honour of the name, and +proved the worth of the ancestral stock. They were marked, it is said, +by strong and characteristic features, by a warm feeling of clanship, a +capacity for hard work, and a decided love of roving. Some became +hunters, others explorers, and the race is now scattered from Virginia +to Oregon. A passion for litigation was a general failing, and none of +them could resist the fascination of machinery. Every Jackson owned a +mill or factory of some sort—many of them more than one—and their +ventures were not always profitable. Jackson’s father, among others, +found it easier to make money than to keep it. Generous and incautious, +he became deeply involved by becoming security for others; high play +increased his embarrassments; and when he died in 1827 every vestige of +his property was swept away. His young widow, left with three small +children, two sons and a daughter, became dependent on the assistance +of her kinsfolk for a livelihood, and on the charity of the Freemasons +for a roof. When Thomas, her second son, was six years old, she married +a Captain Woodson; but her second matrimonial venture was not more +fortunate than her first. Her husband’s means were small, and necessity +soon compelled her to commit her two boys to the care of their father’s +relatives. + +1831 Within a year the children stood round her dying bed, and at a +very early age our little Virginian found himself a penniless orphan. +But, as he never regretted his poverty, so he never forgot his mother. +To the latest hour of his life he loved to recall her memory, and years +after she had passed away her influence still remained. Her beauty, her +counsels, their last parting, and her happy death, for she was a woman +of deep religious feeling, made a profound impression on him. To his +childhood’s fancy she was the embodiment of every grace; and so strong +had been the sympathy between them, that even in the midst of his +campaigns she was seldom absent from his thoughts. After her death the +children found a home with their father’s half-brother, who had +inherited the family estates, and was one of the largest slave-owners +in the district. Their surroundings, however, could hardly be called +luxurious. Life on the Ohio was very different from life on the coast. +The western counties of Virginia were still practically on the frontier +of the United States. The axe had thinned the interminable woods; mills +were busy on each mountain stream, and the sunny valleys were rich in +fruit and corn. But as yet there was little traffic. Steam had not yet +come to open up the wilderness. The population was small and widely +scattered; and the country was cut off as much by nature as by distance +from the older civilisation of the East. The parallel ranges of the +Alleghenies, with their pathless forests and great canyons, were a +formidable barrier to all intercourse. The West was a world in itself. +The only outlets eastward were the valleys of the Potomac and the +James, the one leading to Washington, the other to Richmond; and so +seldom were they used that the yeomen of the Ohio uplands were almost +as much opposed, both in character and in mode of life, to the planters +beyond the Blue Ridge, as the Covenanters of Bothwell Brig to the +gentlemen of Dundee’s Life Guards. + +Although the sturdy independence and simple habits of +the borderers were not affected by contact with wealthier communities, +isolation was not in every way a blessing. Served by throngs of slaves, +the great landowners of East Virginia found leisure to cultivate the +arts which make life more pleasant. The rambling houses on the banks of +the James, the Rappahannock, and the Potomac, built on the model of +English manors, had their libraries and picture-galleries. A classical +academy was the boast of every town, and a university training was +considered as essential to the son of a planter as to the heir of an +English squire. A true aristocracy, in habit and in lineage, the +gentlemen of Virginia long swayed the councils of the nation, and among +them were many who were intimate with the best representatives of +European culture. Beyond the Alleghenies there were no facilities for +education; and even had opportunities offered few would have had the +leisure to enjoy them. Labour was scarce, either slave or hired. The +owners of farms were their own managers and overseers, and young men +had to serve a practical apprenticeship to lumbering and agriculture. +To this rule, despite his uncle’s wealth, Jackson was no exception. He +had to fight his own battle, to rub shoulders with all sorts and +conditions of men, and to hold his own as best he could. + +It was a hard school, then, in which he grew to manhood. But for that +very reason it was a good school for the future soldier. For a man who +has to push his own way in the world, more especially if he has to +carve it with his sword, a boyhood passed amidst surroundings which +boast of no luxury and demand much endurance, is the best probation. +Von Moltke has recorded that the comfortless routine of the Military +Academy at Copenhagen inured him to privation, and Jackson learned the +great lesson of self-reliance in the rough life of his uncle’s +homestead. + +The story of his early years is soon told. As a blue-eyed child, with +long fair hair, he was curiously thoughtful and exceedingly +affectionate. His temper was generous and cheerful. His truthfulness +was proverbial, and his little sister found in him the kindest of +playmates +and the sturdiest of protectors. He was distinguished, too, for his +politeness, although good manners were by no means rare in the rustic +West. The manly courtesy of the true American is no exotic product; nor +is the universal deference to woman peculiar to any single class. The +farmer of the backwoods might be ignorant of the conventionalities, but +the simplicity and unselfishness which are the root of all good +breeding could be learned in West Virginia as readily as in Richmond. + +Once, tempted by his brother, the boy left his adopted home, and the +two children, for the elder was no more than twelve, wandered down the +Ohio to the Mississippi, and spent the summer on a lonely and malarious +island, cutting wood for passing steamers. No one opposed their going, +and it seems to have been considered quite natural in that independent +community that the veriest urchins should be allowed to seek their +fortunes for themselves. Returning, ragged and fever-stricken, the +little adventurers submitted once more to the routine of the farm and +to the intermittent studies of a country school. After his failure as a +man of business, our small hero showed no further inclination to seek +his fortunes far afield. He was fond of his home. His uncle, attracted +by his steadiness and good sense, treated him more as a companion than +a child; and in everything connected with the farm, as well as in the +sports of the country side, the boy took the keenest interest. Delicate +by nature, with a tendency to consumption inherited from his mother, +his physique and constitution benefited by a life of constant exercise +and wholesome toil. At school he was a leader in every game, and his +proficiency in the saddle proved him a true Virginian. Fox-hunting and +horse-racing were popular amusements, and his uncle not only kept a +stable of well-bred horses, but had a four-mile race-course on his own +grounds. As a light-weight jockey the future general was a useful +member of the household, and it was the opinion of the neighbourhood +that “if a horse had any winning qualities whatever in him, young +Jackson never failed to bring them out.” + +In the management of the estate he learned early to put +his shoulder to the wheel. Transporting timber from the forest to the +saw-mill was one of his most frequent tasks, and tradition records that +if a tree were to be moved from ground of unusual difficulty, or if +there were one more gigantic than the rest, the party of labourers was +put under his control, and the work was sure to be effected. + +One who knew him well has described his character. “He was a youth of +exemplary habits, of indomitable will and undoubted courage. He was not +what is nowadays termed brilliant, but he was one of those untiring, +matter-of-fact persons who would never give up an undertaking until he +accomplished his object. He learned slowly, but what he got into his +head he never forgot. He was not quick to decide, except when excited, +and then, when he made up his mind to do a thing, he did it on short +notice and in quick time. Once, while on his way to school, an +overgrown rustic behaved rudely to one of the school-girls. Jackson +fired up, and told him he must apologise at once or he would thrash +him. The big fellow, supposing that he was more than a match for him, +refused, whereupon Jackson pitched into him, and gave him a severe +pounding.” + +His surroundings, then, although neither refined nor elevating, were +not unwholesome; but of the moral influences to which he was subjected, +so much cannot be said, while the stock of piety that the original +settlers brought with them had not entirely vanished. There was much +irregularity of life; few men gave any thought to religion, and young +Jackson drifted with the tide. Yet there was something that preserved +him from contamination. His uncle, kindest of guardians, though +irreligious and a sportsman, was scrupulously exacting in matters of +integrity and veracity. His associates included the most respectable, +yet the morals of the sporting fraternity of a frontier settlement are +not likely to have been edifying. That his nephew, as he himself +declares, was an ardent frequenter of races, “house-raisings,”[3] and +country dances is hardly surprising, and it is assuredly no ground +whatever for reproach. Nor is it strange that, amid much laxity, he +should have retained +his integrity, that his regard for truth should have remained +untarnished, and that he should have consistently held aloof from all +that was mean and vile. His mother was no mere memory to that +affectionate nature. + +His good qualities, however, would scarcely of themselves have done +more than raise him to a respectable rank amongst the farmers of West +Virginia. A spur was wanting to urge him beyond the limits of so +contracted an existence, and that spur was supplied by an honourable +ambition. Penniless and dependent as he was, he still remembered that +his ancestors had been distinguished beyond the confines of their +native county, and this legitimate pride in his own people, a far-off +reflection, perhaps, of the traditional Scottish attitude towards name +and pedigree, exercised a marked influence on his whole career. “To +prove himself worthy of his forefathers was the purpose of his early +manhood. It gives us a key to many of the singularities of his +character; to his hunger for self-improvement; to his punctilious +observance, from a boy, of the essentials of gentlemanly bearing, and +to the uniform assertion of his self-respect.”[4] + +1841 It was his openly expressed wish for larger advantages than those +offered by a country school that brought about his opportunity. In +1841, at the age of seventeen, he became a constable of the county. A +sort of minor sheriff, he had to execute the decrees of the justices, +to serve their warrants, to collect small debts, and to summon +witnesses. It was a curious office for a boy, but a year or two before +he had been seized with some obscure form of dyspepsia, and the idea +that a life on horseback, which his duties necessitated, might restore +his health, had induced his relatives to obtain the post for him. +Jackson himself seems to have been influenced by the hope that his +salary would help towards his education, and by the wish to become +independent of his uncle’s bounty. His new duties were uncongenial, +but, despite his youth, he faced his responsibilities with a +determination which men of maturer years might well have envied. In +everything +he was scrupulously exact. His accounts were accurately kept; he was +punctuality itself, and his patience was inexhaustible. For two years +he submitted cheerfully to the drudgery of his position, +re-establishing his health, but without advancing a single step towards +the goal of his ambition. But before he was nineteen his hopes were +unexpectedly realised. + +1842 The Military Academy at West Point not only provided, at the +expense of the nation, a sound and liberal education, but offered an +opening to an honourable career. Nominations to cadetships were made by +the Secretary of War, on the recommendation of members of Congress, and +in 1842 a vacancy occurred which was to be filled by a youth from the +Congressional District in which Clarksburg was included. Jackson, +informed of the chance by a friendly blacksmith, eagerly embraced it, +and left no stone unturned to attain his object. Every possible +influence that could be brought to bear on the member for the district +was immediately enlisted. To those who objected that his education was +too imperfect to enable him even to enter the Academy, he replied that +he had the necessary application, that he hoped he had the capacity, +and that he was at least determined to try. His earnestness and courage +won upon all. His application was strongly backed by those who had +learned to value his integrity and exactness, and Mr. Hays, the member +for the district, wrote that he would do all in his power to secure the +appointment. No sooner had the letter been read than Jackson determined +to go at once to Washington, in order that he might be ready to proceed +to West Point without a moment’s delay. Packing a few clothes into a +pair of saddlebags, he mounted his horse, and accompanied by a servant, +who was to bring the animal home, rode off to catch the coach at +Clarksburg. It had already passed, but galloping on, he overtook it at +the next stage, and on his arrival at Washington, Mr. Hays at once +introduced him to the Secretary of War. On presenting him, he explained +the disadvantages of his education, but begged indulgence for him on +account of his pluck and determination. The Secretary plied him with +questions, +but Jackson was not to be diverted from his purpose; and so good was +the impression which he made that he then and there received his +warrant, accompanied by some excellent advice. “Sir,” said the +Secretary, “you have a good name. Go to West Point, and the first man +who insults you, knock him down, and have it charged to my account!” + +Mr. Hays proposed that the new-fledged cadet should stay with him for a +few days in order to see the sights of Washington. But as the Academy +was already in session, Jackson, with a strong appreciation of the +value of time, begged to decline. He was content to ascend to the roof +of the Capitol, then still building, and look once on the magnificent +panorama of which it is the centre. + +At his feet lay the city, with its busy streets and imposing edifices. +To the south ran the Potomac, bearing on its ample tide the snowy sails +of many merchantmen, and spanned by a bridge more than a mile in +length. Over against the Capitol, looking down on that wide-watered +shore, stood the white porch of Arlington, once the property of +Washington, and now the home of a young officer of the United States +army, Robert Edward Lee. Beyond Arlington lay Virginia, Jackson’s +native State, stretching back in leafy hills and verdant pastures, and +far and low upon the western horizon his own mountains loomed faintly +through the summer haze. It was a strange freak of fortune that placed +him at the very outset of his career within sight of the theatre of his +most famous victories. It was a still stranger caprice that was to make +the name of the simple country youth, ill-educated and penniless, as +terrible in Washington as the name of the Black Douglas was once in +Durham and Carlisle. + +1842 It was in July 1842 that one of America’s greatest soldiers first +answered to his name on the parade-ground at West Point. Shy and +silent, clad in Virginia homespun, with the whole of his personal +effects carried in a pair of weather-stained saddle bags, the +impression that he made on his future comrades, as the Secretary of War +appears to have anticipated, was by no means favourable. The West Point +cadets were then, as now, remarkable +for their upright carriage, the neatness of their appointments, and +their soldierly bearing towards their officers and towards each other. +The grey coatee, decorated with bright buttons and broad gold lace, the +shako with tall plumes, the spotless white trousers, set off the trim +young figures to the best advantage; and the full-dress parade of the +cadet battalion, marked by discipline and precision in every movement, +is still one of the most attractive of military spectacles. + +These natty young gentlemen were not slow to detect the superficial +deficiencies of the newcomer. A system of practical joking, carried to +extremes, had long been a feature of West Point life. Jackson, with the +rusticity of the backwoods apparent at every turn, promised the highest +sport. And here it may be written, once for all, that however nearly in +point of character the intended victim reached the heroic standard, his +outward graces were few. His features were well cut, his forehead high, +his mouth small and firm, and his complexion fresh. Yet the ensemble +was not striking, nor was it redeemed by grave eyes and a heavy jaw, a +strong but angular frame, a certain awkwardness of movement, and large +hands and feet. His would-be tormentors, however, soon found they had +mistaken their man. The homespun jacket covered a natural shrewdness +which had been sharpened by responsibility. The readiness of resource +which had characterised the whilom constable was more than a match for +their most ingenious schemes; and baffled by a temper which they were +powerless to disturb, their attempts at persecution, apparently more +productive of amusement to their victim than to themselves, were soon +abandoned. + +Rough as was the life of the Virginia border, it had done something to +fit this unpromising recruit for the give and take of his new +existence. Culture might be lacking in the distant West, but the air +men breathed was at least the blessed breath of independence. Each was +what he made himself. A man’s standing depended on his success in life, +and success was within the reach of all. There, like his neighbours, +Jackson had learned to take his +own part; like them he acknowledged no superiority save that of actual +merit, and believing that the richest prize might be won by energy and +perseverance, without diffidence or misgiving he faced his future. He +knew nothing of the life of the great nation of which he was so +insignificant an atom, of the duties of the army, of the manners of its +officers. He knew only that even as regards education he had an uphill +task before him. He was indeed on the threshold of a new world, with +his own way to make, and apparently no single advantage in his favour. +But he came of a fighting race; he had his own inflexible resolution to +support him, and his determination expressed itself in his very +bearing. Four cadets, three of whom were afterwards Confederate +generals,[5] were standing together when he first entered the gates of +the Academy. “There was about him,” says one of them, “so sturdy an +expression of purpose that I remarked, ‘That fellow looks as if he had +come to stay.’” + +Jackson’s educational deficiencies were more difficult of conquest than +the goodwill of his comrades. His want of previous training placed him +at a great disadvantage. He commenced his career amongst “the +Immortals” (the last section of the class), and it was only by the most +strenuous efforts that he maintained his place. His struggles at the +blackboard were often painful to witness. In the struggle to solve a +problem he invariably covered both his face and uniform with chalk, and +he perspired so freely, even in the coldest weather, that the cadets, +with boyish exaggeration, declared that whenever “the General,” as he +had at once been dubbed in honour of his namesake, the victor of New +Orleans, got a difficult proposition he was certain to flood the +classroom. It was all he could do to pass his first examination.[6] + +“We were studying,” writes a classmate, “algebra and analytical +geometry that winter, and Jackson was very low in his class. Just +before the signal lights out he would pile up his grate with anthracite +coal, and lying prone before it on the floor, would work away at his +lessons by +the glare of the fire, which scorched his very brain, till a late hour +of the night. This evident determination to succeed not only aided his +own efforts directly, but impressed his instructors in his favour. If +he could not master the portion of the text-book assigned for the day, +he would not pass it over, but continued to work at it till he +understood it. Thus it often happened that when he was called out to +repeat his task, he had to reply that he had not yet reached the lesson +of the day, but was employed upon the previous one. There was then no +alternative but to mark him as unprepared, a proceeding which did not +in the least affect his resolution.” + +Despite all drawbacks, his four years at the Academy were years of +steady progress. “The Immortals” were soon left far behind. At the end +of the first twelve months he stood fifty-first in a class of +seventy-two, but when he entered the first class, and commenced the +study of logic, that bugbear to the majority, he shot from near the +foot of the class to the top. In the final examination he came out +seventeenth, notwithstanding that the less successful years were taken +into account, and it was a frequent remark amongst his brother cadets +that if the course had been a year longer he would have come out first. +His own satisfaction was complete. Not only was his perseverance +rewarded by a place sufficiently high to give him a commission in the +artillery, but his cravings for knowledge had been fully gratified. +West Point was much more than a military school. It was a university, +and a university under the very strictest discipline, where the science +of the soldier formed only a portion of the course. Subjects which are +now considered essential to a military education were not taught at +all. The art of war gave place to ethics and engineering; and +mathematics and chemistry were considered of far more importance than +topography and fortification. Yet with French, history, and drawing, it +will be admitted that the course was sufficiently comprehensive. No +cadet was permitted to graduate unless he had reached a high standard +of proficiency. Failures were numerous. In the four years the classes +grew gradually +smaller, and the survival of the fittest was a principle of +administration which was rigidly observed. + +The fact, then, that a man had passed the final examination at West +Point was a sufficient certificate that he had received a thorough +education, that his mental faculties had been strengthened by four +years of hard work, and that he was well equipped to take his place +amongst his fellow men. And it was more than this. Four years of the +strictest discipline, for the cadets were allowed only one vacation +during their whole course, were sufficient to break in even the most +careless and the most slovenly to neatness, obedience, and punctuality. +Such habits are not easily unlearned, and the West Point certificate +was thus a guarantee of qualities that are everywhere useful. It did +not necessarily follow that because a cadet won a commission he +remained a soldier. Many went to civil life, and the Academy was an +excellent school for men who intended to find a career as surveyors or +engineers. The great railway system of the United States was then in +its infancy; its development offered endless possibilities, and the +work of extending civilisation in a vast and rapidly improving country +had perhaps more attraction for the ambitious than the career of arms. +The training and discipline of West Point were not, then, concentrated +in one profession, but were disseminated throughout the States; and it +was with this purpose that the institution of the Academy had been +approved by Congress. + +In the wars with England the militia of the different States had +furnished the means both of resistance and aggression, but their grave +shortcomings, owing principally to the lack of competent officers, had +been painfully conspicuous. After 1814, the principle that the militia +was the first line of defence was still adhered to, and the standing +army was merely maintained as a school for generals and a frontier +guard. It was expected, however, that in case of war the West Point +graduates would supply the national forces with a large number of +officers who, despite their civil avocations, would at least be +familiar with drill and discipline. This fact is to be borne in mind +in view of the Civil War. The demands of the enormous armies then put +into the field were utterly unprecedented, and the supply of West +Pointers was altogether inadequate to meet them; but the influence of +the Military Academy was conspicuous throughout. Not a few of the most +able generals were little more than boys; and yet, as a rule, they were +far superior to those who came from the militia or volunteers. Four +years of strict routine, of constant drill, and implicit subordination, +at the most impressionable period of life, proved a far better training +for command than the desultory and intermittent service of a citizen +army. + +During his stay at West Point Jackson’s development was not all in one +direction. He gained in health and strength. When he joined he had not +yet attained his full height, which fell short of six feet by two +inches. The constant drilling developed his frame. He grew rapidly, and +soon acquired the erect bearing of the soldier; but notwithstanding the +incessant practice in riding, fencing and marching, his anatomical +peculiarities still asserted themselves. It was with great difficulty +that he mastered the elementary process of keeping step, and despite +his youthful proficiency as a jockey, the regulation seat of the +dragoon, to be acquired on the back of a rough cavalry trooper, was an +accomplishment which he never mastered. If it be added that his shyness +never thawed, that he was habitually silent, it is hardly surprising to +find that he had few intimates at the Academy. Caring nothing for the +opinion of others, and tolerant of association rather than seeking it, +his self-contained nature asked neither sympathy nor affection. His +studious habits never left him. His only recreation was a rapid walk in +the intervals of the classes. His whole thoughts and his whole energy +were centred on doing his duty, and passing into the army with all the +credit he could possibly attain. Although he was thoroughly happy at +West Point, life to him, even at that early age, was a serious +business, and most seriously he set about it. + +Still, unsociable and irresponsive as he was, there were those in whose +company he found pleasure, cadets who had +studied subjects not included in the West Point course, and from whom +there was something to be learned. It was an unwritten law of the +Academy that those of the senior year should not make companions of +their juniors. But Jackson paid no heed to the traditionary code of +etiquette. His acquaintances were chosen regardless of standing, as +often from the class below him as his own; and in yet another fashion +his strength of character was displayed. Towards those who were guilty +of dishonourable conduct he was merciless almost to vindictiveness. He +had his own code of right and wrong, and from one who infringed it he +would accept neither apology nor excuse. His musket, which was always +scrupulously clean, was one day replaced by another in most slovenly +order. He called the attention of his captain to his loss, and +described the private mark by which it was to be identified. That +evening, at the inspection of arms, it was found in the hands of +another cadet, who, when taxed with his offence, endeavoured to shield +himself by falsehood. Jackson’s anger was unbounded, and for the moment +his habitual shyness completely disappeared. He declared that such a +creature should not continue a member of the Academy, and demanded that +he should be tried by court-martial and expelled. It was only by means +of the most persevering remonstrances on the part of his comrades and +his officers that he could be induced to waive his right of pressing +the charge. His regard for duty, too, was no less marked than his +respect for truth. During one half-year his room-mate was +orderly-sergeant of his company, and this good-natured if perfunctory +young gentleman often told Jackson that he need not attend the +_réveille_ roll-call, at which every cadet was supposed to answer to +his name. Not once, however, did he avail himself of the privilege.[7] + +At the same time he was not altogether so uncompromising as at first +sight he appeared. At West Point, as in after years, those who saw him +interested or excited noticed that his smile was singularly sweet, and +the cadets knew that it revealed a warm heart within. Whenever, from +sickness or misfortune, a comrade stood in need of +sympathy, Jackson was the first to offer it, and he would devote +himself to his help with a tenderness so womanly that it sometimes +excited ridicule. Sensitive he was not, for of vanity he had not the +slightest taint; but of tact and sensibility he possessed more than his +share. If he was careless of what others thought of him, he thought +much of them. Though no one made more light of pain on his own account, +no one could have more carefully avoided giving pain to others, except +when duty demanded it; and one of his classmates[8] testifies that he +went through the trying ordeal of four years at West Point without ever +having a hard word or bad feeling from cadet or professor. + +Nor did his comrades fail to remember that when he was unjustly blamed +he chose to bear the imputation silently rather than expose those who +were really at fault. And so, even in that lighthearted battalion, his +sterling worth compelled respect. All honoured his efforts and wished +him God-speed. “While there were many,” says Colonel Turnley, “who +seemed to surpass him in intellect, in geniality, and in +good-fellowship, there was no one of our class who more absolutely +possessed the respect and confidence of all; and in the end Old Jack, +as he was always called, with his desperate earnestness, his +unflinching straightforwardness, and his high sense of honour, came to +be regarded by his comrades with something very like affection.” + +One peculiarity cannot be passed by. + +When at study he always sat bolt upright at his table with his book +open before him, and when he was not using pencil and paper to solve a +problem, he would often keep his eyes fixed on the wall or ceiling in +the most profound abstraction. “No one I have ever known,” says a cadet +who shared his barrack-room, “could so perfectly withdraw his mind from +surrounding objects or influences, and so thoroughly involve his whole +being in the subject under consideration. His lessons were uppermost in +his mind, and to thoroughly understand them was always his +determined effort. To make the author’s knowledge his own was ever the +point at which he aimed. This intense application of mind was naturally +strengthened by constant exercise, and month by month, and year by +year, his faculties of perception developed rapidly, until he grasped +with unerring quickness the inceptive points of all ethical and +mathematical problems.” + +This power of abstraction and of application is well worth noting, for +not only was it remarkable in a boy, but, as we shall see hereafter, it +had much to do with the making of the soldier. + +At West Point Jackson was troubled with the return of the obscure +complaint which had already threatened him, and he there began that +rigid observance of the laws of health which afterwards developed to +almost an eccentricity. His peculiar attitude when studying was due to +the fear that if he bent over his work the compression of his internal +organs might increase their tendency to disease. + +And not only did he lay down rules for his physical regimen. A book of +maxims which he drew up at West Point has been preserved, and we learn +that his scrupulous exactness, his punctilious courtesy, and his choice +of companions were the outcome of much deliberation. + +Nothing in this curious volume occurs to show that his thoughts had yet +been turned to religion. It is as free from all reference to the +teachings of Christianity as the maxims of Marcus Aurelius. + +Every line there written shows that at this period of Jackson’s life +devotion to duty was his guiding rule; and, notwithstanding his +remarkable freedom from egotism, the traces of an engrossing ambition +and of absolute self-dependence are everywhere apparent. Many of the +sentiments he would have repudiated in after-life as inconsistent with +humility; but there can be no question that it was a strong and +fearless hand that penned on a conspicuous page the sentence: “You can +be what you resolve to be.” + +Jackson was already a man in years when he passed his final +examination, and here the record of his boyhood +may fitly close. He had made no particular mark at the Academy. + +1846 His memory, in the minds of his comrades, was associated with his +gravity, his silence, his kind heart, and his awkward movements. No one +suspected him of nobler qualities than dogged perseverance and a strict +regard for truth. The officers and sergeants of the cadet battalion +were supplied by the cadets themselves; but Jackson was never promoted. +In the mimic warfare of the playground at Brienne Napoleon was master +of the revels. His capacity for command had already been detected; but +neither comrade nor teacher saw beneath the unpromising exterior of the +West Point student a trace of aught save what was commonplace. + +And yet there is much in the boyhood of Stonewall Jackson that +resembles the boyhood of Napoleon, of all great soldiers the most +original. Both were affectionate. Napoleon lived on bread and water +that he might educate his brothers; Jackson saved his cadet’s pay to +give his sister a silk dress. Both were indefatigable students, +impressed with the conviction that the world was to be conquered by +force of intellect. Jackson, burning his lessons into his brain, is but +the counterpart of the young officer who lodged with a professor of +mathematics that he might attend his classes, and who would wait to +explain the lectures to those who had not clearly understood them. Both +were provincial, neither was prepossessing. If the West Point cadets +laughed at Jackson’s large hands and feet, was not Napoleon, with his +thin legs thrust into enormous boots, saluted by his friend’s children, +on his first appearance in uniform, with the nickname of _Le Chat +Botté_? It is hard to say which was the more laughable: the spare and +bony figure of the cadet, sitting bolt upright like a graven image in a +tight uniform, with his eyes glued to the ceiling of his barrack-room, +or the young man, with gaunt features, round shoulders, and uncombed +hair, who wandered alone about the streets of Paris in 1795. + +They had the same love of method and of order. The accounts of the +Virginian constable was not more scrupulously kept than the ledgers of +Napoleon’s household, nor +could they show a greater regard for economy than the tailor’s bill, +still extant, on which the future Emperor gained a reduction of four +_sous._ But it was not on such trivial lines alone that they run +parallel. An inflexibility of purpose, an absolute disregard of popular +opinion, and an unswerving belief in their own capacity, were +predominant in both. They could say “No.” Neither sought sympathy, and +both felt that they were masters of their own fate. “You can be +whatever you resolve to be” may be well placed alongside the speech of +the brigadier of five-and-twenty: “Have patience. I will command in +Paris presently. What should I do there now?” + +But here the parallel ends. In Jackson, even as a cadet, self was +subordinate to duty. Pride was foreign to his nature. He was incapable +of pretence, and his simplicity was inspired by that disdain of all +meanness which had been his characteristic from a child. His brain was +disturbed by no wild visions; no intemperate ambition confused his +sense of right and wrong. “The essence of his mind,” as has been said +of another of like mould, “was clearness, healthy purity, +incompatibility with fraud in any of its forms.” It was his instinct to +be true and straightforward as it was Napoleon’s to be false and +subtle. And, if, as a youth, he showed no trace of marked intellectual +power; if his instructors saw no sign of masterful resolution and a +genius for command, it was because at West Point, as elsewhere, his +great qualities lay dormant, awaiting the emergency that should call +them forth. + + [1] Copyright 1897 by Longmans, Green, & Co. + + [2] This letter is in the possession of Thomas Jackson Arnold, + Esquire, of Beverly, West Virginia, nephew of General “Stonewall” + Jackson. + + [3] Anglicè, “house-warmings.” + + [4] Dabney, vol. i, p. 29. + + [5] A. P. Hill, G. E. Pickett, and D. H. Maury. + + [6] Communicated by General John Gibbon, U.S.A. + + [7] Communicated by Colonel P. T. Turnley. + + [8] Colonel Turnley. + + + + +Chapter II +MEXICO[1] + + +1846 On June 30, 1846, Jackson received the brevet rank of second +lieutenant of artillery. He was fortunate from the very outset of his +military career. The officers of the United States army, thanks to the +thorough education and Spartan discipline of West Point, were fine +soldiers; but their scope was limited. On the western frontier, far +beyond the confines of civilisation, stood a long line of forts, often +hundreds of miles apart, garrisoned by a few troops of cavalry or +companies of infantry. It is true that there was little chance of +soldierly capacity rusting in these solitary posts. From the borders of +Canada to the banks of the Rio Grande swarmed thousands of savage +warriors, ever watchful for an opportunity to pay back with bloody +interest the aggression of the whites. Murder, robbery, and massacre +followed each other in rapid succession, and the troops were allowed +few intervals of rest. But the warfare was inglorious—a mere series of +petty incidents, the punishment of a raid, or the crushing of an +isolated revolt. The scanty butcher’s bills of the so-called battles +made small appeal to the popular imagination, and the deeds of the +soldiers in the western wilderness, gallant as they might be, aroused +less interest in the States than the conflicts of the police with the +New York mob. But although pursuits which carried the adversaries half +across the continent, forays which were of longer duration than a +European war, and fights against overwhelming odds, where no quarter +was asked or given, kept the American officers constantly employed, +their +training was hardly sufficient for the needs of a great campaign. In +the running fights against Apache or Blackfoot the rules of strategy +and tactics were of small account. The soldier was constrained to +acknowledge the brave and the trapper as his teachers; and Moltke +himself, with all his lore, would have been utterly baffled by the +cunning of the Indian. Before the war of 1845–6 the strength of the +regular army was not more than 8,500 men; and the whole of this force, +with the exception of a few batteries, was scattered in small +detachments along the frontier. The troops were never brought together +in considerable bodies; and although they were well drilled and under +the strictest discipline, neither the commanders nor the staff had the +least experience of handling men in masses. Many of the infantry +officers had never drilled with a whole battalion since they left West +Point. A brigade of cavalry—that is, two or three regiments working +together as a single unit—had never been assembled; and scarcely a +single general had ever commanded a force composed of the three arms, +either on service or on parade. “During my twenty years of service on +the frontier,” said one of the most famous of the Confederate +leaders,[2] “I learned all about commanding fifty United States +dragoons and forgot everything else.” + +Nevertheless, this life of enterprise and hard work, the constant +struggle against nature, for the illimitable space of the inhospitable +wilderness was a more formidable antagonist than the stealthy savage, +benefited the American soldier in more ways than one. He grew +accustomed to danger and privation. He learned to use his wits; to +adapt his means to his end; to depend on his intelligence rather than +on rule. Above all, even the most junior had experience of independent +command before the enemy. A ready assumption of responsibility and a +prompt initiative distinguished the regular officers from the very +outset of the Civil War; and these characteristics had been acquired on +the western prairies. + +But the warfare of the frontier had none of the glamour +of the warfare which is waged with equal arms against an equal enemy, +of the conflict of nation against nation. To bring the foe to bay was a +matter of the utmost difficulty. A fight at close quarters was of rare +occurrence, and the most successful campaign ended in the destruction +of a cluster of dirty wigwams, or the surrender of a handful of +starving savages. In such unsatisfactory service Jackson was not called +upon to take a part. It is doubtful if he ever crossed the Mississippi. +His first experience of campaigning was to be on a field where gleams +of glory were not wanting. The ink on his commission was scarcely dry +when the artillery subaltern was ordered to join his regiment, the +First Artillery, in Mexico. The war with the Southern Republic had +blazed out on the Texan border in 1845, and the American Government had +now decided to carry it into the heart of the hostile territory. With +the cause of quarrel we have no concern. General Grant has condemned +the war as “one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a +weaker nation.”[3] Be this as it may, it is doubtful whether any of +Grant’s brother officers troubled themselves at all with the equity of +invasion. It was enough for them that the expedition meant a struggle +with a numerous enemy, armed and organised on the European model, and +with much experience of war; that it promised a campaign in a country +which was the very region of romance, possessing a lovely climate, +historic cities, and magnificent scenery. The genius of Prescott had +just disentombed from dusty archives the marvellous story of the +Spanish conquest, and the imagination of many a youthful soldier had +been already kindled by his glowing pages. To follow the path of +Cortez, to traverse the golden realms of Montezuma, to look upon the +lakes and palaces of Mexico, the most ancient city of America, to +encamp among the temples of a vanished race, and to hear, while the +fireflies flitted through the perfumed night, the music of the +black-eyed maidens of New Spain—was ever more fascinating prospect +offered to a subaltern of two-and-twenty? + +The companies of the First Artillery which had been +detailed for foreign service were first transferred to Point Isabel, at +the mouth of the Rio Grande. Several engagements had already taken +place. Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Monterey were brilliant +American victories, won by hard fighting over superior numbers; and a +vast extent of territory had been overrun. But the Mexicans were still +unconquered. The provinces they had lost were but the fringe of the +national domains; the heart of the Republic had not yet felt the +pressure of war, and more than six hundred miles of difficult country +intervened between the invaders and the capital. The American proposals +for peace had been summarily rejected. A new President, General Santa +Anna, had been raised to power, and under his vigorous administration +the war threatened to assume a phase sufficiently embarrassing to the +United States. + +Jackson had been attached to a heavy battery, and his first duty was to +transport guns and mortars to the forts which protected Point Isabel. +The prospect of immediate employment before the enemy was small. +Operations had come to a standstill. It was already apparent that a +direct advance upon the capital, through the northern provinces, was an +enterprise which would demand an army much larger than the Government +was disposed to furnish. It seemed as if the First Artillery had come +too late. Jackson was fearful that the war might come to an end before +his regiment should be sent to the front. The shy cadet had a decided +taste for fighting. “I envy you men,” he said to a comrade more +fortunate than himself,[4] “who have been in battle. How I should like +to be in _one_ battle!” His longing for action was soon gratified. +Mexico had no navy and a long sea-board. The fleet of the United States +was strong, their maritime resources ample, and to land an army on a +shorter route to the distant capital was no difficult undertaking. + +General Winfield Scott, who had been sent out as commander-in-chief, +was permitted, early in 1847, to organise a combined naval and military +expedition for the reduction of Vera Cruz, the principal port of the +Republic, +whence a good road leads to Mexico. The line of advance would be thus +reduced to two hundred and sixty miles; and the natural obstacles, +though numerous enough, were far less serious than the deserts which +barred invasion from the north. + +1847 For this enterprise most of the regular regiments were withdrawn +from the Rio Grande; and General Taylor, the hero of Palo Alto and +Monterey, was left with a small army, composed principally of +volunteers, to hold the conquered provinces. Scott’s troops assembled +in the first instance at Tampico. The transports, eighty in number, +having embarked their freight, were directed to rendezvous in the road +stead of Lobos, one hundred and twenty miles north of Vera Cruz; and +when the whole had assembled, the fleet set sail for Los Sacrificios, +the island where Cortez had landed in 1520, three miles south of the +city. The army of invasion, in which the First Regiment of Artillery +was included, consisted of 13,000 men. + +March 9 On the morning of March 9 the sun shone propitiously on the +expedition. The surf-boats, each holding from seventy to eighty men, +were quickly arrayed in line. Then, dashing forward simultaneously, +with the strains of martial music sweeping over the smooth waters of +the bay, they neared the shore. The landing was covered by seven armed +vessels, and as the boats touched the beach the foremost men leaped +into the water and ran up the sandy shore. In one hour General Worth’s +division, numbering 4,500 men, was disembarked; and by the same precise +arrangements the whole army was landed in six hours without accident or +confusion. To the astonishment of the Americans the enemy offered no +resistance, and the troops bivouacked in line of battle on the beach. + +Little more than a mile north, across a waste of sand-hills, rose the +white walls of Vera Cruz. The city was held by 4,000 men, and its +armament was formidable. The troops, however, but partially organised, +were incapable of operations in the open field. The garrison had not +been reinforced. Santa Anna, on learning that the American army on the +Rio Grande had been reduced, had acted with +commendable promptitude. Collecting all the troops that were available +he had marched northwards, expecting, doubtless, to overwhelm Taylor +and still to be in time to prevent Scott from seizing a good harbour. +But distance was against him, and his precautions were inadequate. Even +if he defeated Taylor, he would have to march more than a thousand +miles to encounter Scott, and Vera Cruz was ill provided for a siege. +It was difficult, it is true, for the Mexican general to anticipate the +point at which the Americans would disembark. An army that moves by sea +possesses the advantage that its movements are completely veiled. But +Vera Cruz was decidedly the most probable objective of the invaders, +and, had it been made secure, the venture of the Americans would have +been rendered hazardous. As it was, with Santa Anna’s army far away, +the reduction of the fortress presented little difficulty. An immediate +assault would in all likelihood have proved successful. Scott, however, +decided on a regular siege. His army was small, and a march on the +capital was in prospect. The Government grudged both men and money, and +an assault would have cost more lives than could well be spared. On +March 18 the trenches were completed. Four days later, sufficient heavy +ordnance having been landed, the bombardment was begun. + +March 27 On the 27th the town surrendered; the garrison laid down their +arms, and 400 cannon, many of large calibre, fell into the hands of the +Americans. + +The fall of Vera Cruz was brought about by the heavy artillery, aided +by the sailors, and the First Regiment was continuously engaged. The +Mexican fire, notwithstanding their array of guns, was comparatively +harmless. The garrison attempted no sortie; and only 64 of the +investing force were killed or wounded. Nevertheless, Jackson’s +behaviour under fire attracted notice, and a few months later he was +promoted to first lieutenant “for gallant and meritorious conduct at +the siege of Vera Cruz.”[5] + +Scott had now secured an admirable line of operations; but the +projected march upon the city of Mexico was a far more arduous +undertaking than the capture of the port. The ancient capital of +Montezuma stands high above the sea. The famous valley which surrounds +it is embosomed in the heart of a vast plateau, and the roads which +lead to this lofty region wind by steep gradients over successive +ranges of rugged and precipitous mountains. Between Vera Cruz and the +upland lies a level plain, sixty miles broad, and covered with tropical +forest. Had it been possible to follow up the initial victory by a +rapid advance, Cerro Gordo, the first, and the most difficult, of the +mountain passes, might have been occupied without a blow. Santa Anna, +defeated by Taylor at Buena Vista, but returning hot foot to block +Scott’s path, was still distant, and Cerro Gordo was undefended. But +the progress of the Americans was arrested by the difficulties inherent +in all maritime expeditions. + +An army landing on a hostile coast has to endure a certain period of +inactivity. Under ordinary circumstances, as at Vera Cruz, the process +of disembarking men is rapidly accomplished. The field-guns follow with +but little delay, and a certain proportion of cavalry becomes early +available. But the disembarkation of the impedimenta—the stores, +waggons, hospitals, ammunition, and transport animals—even where ample +facilities exist, demands far more time than the disembarkation of the +fighting force. In the present case, as all the animals had to be +requisitioned in the country, it was not till the middle of April that +supplies and transport sufficient to warrant further movement had been +accumulated; and meanwhile General Santa Anna, halting in the +mountains, had occupied the pass of Cerro Gordo with 13,000 men and 42 +pieces of artillery. The Mexican position was exceedingly strong. The +right rested on a deep ravine, with precipitous cliffs; the left, on +the hill of Cerro Gordo, covered with batteries, and towering to the +height of several hundred feet above the surrounding ridges; while the +front, strongly intrenched, and commanding the +road which wound zigzag fashion up the steep ascent, followed the crest +of a lofty ridge. + +The Americans reached the foot of the pass without difficulty. The +enemy had made no attempt to check their passage through the forest. +Confident in the inaccessibility of his mountain crags, in his numerous +guns and massive breastworks, Santa Anna reserved his strength for +battle on ground of his own selection. + +Several days were consumed in reconnaissance. The engineers, to whom +this duty was generally assigned in the American army, pushed their +explorations to either flank. At length the quick eye of a young +officer, Captain Robert Lee, already noted for his services at Vera +Cruz, discovered a line of approach, hidden from the enemy, by which +the position might be turned. In three days a rough road was +constructed by which guns could be brought to bear on the hill of Cerro +Gordo, and infantry marched round to strike the Mexicans in rear. + +April 18 The attack, delivered at daylight on April 18, was brilliantly +successful. The enemy was completely surprised. Cerro Gordo was stormed +with the bayonet, and Santa Anna’s right, assaulted from a direction +whence he confessed that he had not believed a goat could approach his +lines, was rolled back in confusion on his centre. 1,200 Mexicans were +killed and wounded, and 3,000 captured, together with the whole of +their artillery.[6] The next day the pursuit was pushed with +uncompromising resolution. Amidst pathless mountains, 6,000 feet above +the sea, where every spur formed a strong position, the defeated army +was permitted neither halt nor respite. The American dragoons, +undeterred by numbers, pressed forward along the road, making hundreds +of prisoners, and spreading panic in the broken ranks. + +May 15 The infantry followed, sturdily breasting the long ascent; a +second intrenched position, barring the La Hoya pass, was abandoned on +their approach; the strong castle of Perote, with an armament of 60 +guns and mortars, opened its gates without firing a shot, +and on May 15 the great city of Puebla, surrounded by glens of +astonishing fertility, and only eighty miles from Mexico, was occupied +without resistance. + +At Cerro Gordo the First Artillery were employed as infantry. Their +colours were amongst the first to be planted on the enemy’s +breastworks. But in none of the reports does Jackson’s name occur.[7] +The battle, however, brought him good luck. Captain Magruder, an +officer of his own regiment, who was to win distinction on wider +fields, had captured a Mexican field battery, which Scott presented to +him as a reward for his gallantry. Indian wars had done but little +towards teaching American soldiers the true use of artillery. Against a +rapidly moving enemy, who systematically forebore exposing himself in +mass, and in a country where no roads existed, only the fire-arm was +effective. But already, at Palo Alto and Resaca, against the serried +lines and thronging cavalry of the Mexicans, light field-guns had done +extraordinary execution. The heavy artillery, hitherto the more +favoured service, saw itself eclipsed. The First Regiment, however, had +already been prominent on the fighting line. It had won reputation with +the bayonet at Cerro Gordo, and before Mexico was reached there were +other battles to be fought, and other positions to be stormed. A youth +with a predilection for hard knocks might have been content with the +chances offered to the foot-soldier. But Jackson’s partiality for his +own arm was as marked as was Napoleon’s, and the decisive effect of a +well-placed battery appealed to his instincts with greater force than +the wild rush of a charge of infantry. Skilful manœuvring was more to +his taste than the mere bludgeon work of fighting at close quarters. + +Two subalterns were required for the new battery. The position meant +much hard work, and possibly much discomfort. Magruder was restless and +hot-tempered, and the young officers of artillery showed no eagerness +to go through the campaign as his subordinates. Not so Jackson. He +foresaw that service with a light battery, under +a bold and energetic leader, was likely to present peculiar +opportunities; and with his thorough devotion to duty, his habits of +industry, and his strong sense of self-reliance, he had little fear of +disappointing the expectations of the most exacting superior. “I wanted +to see active service,” he said in after years, “to be near the enemy +in the fight; and when I heard that John Magruder had got his battery I +bent all my energies to be with him, for I knew if any fighting was to +be done, Magruder would be ‘on hand.’” His soldierly ambition won its +due reward. The favours of fortune fall to the men who woo more often +than to those who wait. The barrack-room proverb which declares that +ill-luck follows the volunteer must assuredly have germinated in a +commonplace brain. It is characteristic of men who have cut their way +to fame that they have never allowed the opportunity to escape them. +The successful man pushes to the front and seeks his chance; those of a +temper less ardent wait till duty calls and the call may never come. +Once before, when, despite his manifold disadvantages, he secured his +nomination to West Point, Jackson had shown how readily he recognised +an opening; now, when his comrades held back, he eagerly stepped +forward, to prove anew the truth of the vigorous adage, “Providence +helps those who help themselves.” + +The American army was delayed long at Puebla. Several regiments of +volunteers, who had engaged only for a short term of service, demanded +their discharge, and reinforcements were slow in arriving. + +August 7 It was not until the first week in August that Scott was able +to move upon the capital. The army now numbered 14,000 men. Several +hundred were sick in hospital, and 600 convalescents, together with 600 +effectives, were left to garrison Puebla. The field force was organised +in four divisions: the first, under Major-General Worth; the second, +under Major-General Twiggs; the third, to which Magruder’s battery was +attached, under Major-General Pillow; the fourth (volunteers and +marines), under Major-General Pierce. Four field batteries, a small +brigade of dragoons, and a still +smaller siege train[8] made up a total of 11,500 officers and men. +During the three months that his enemy was idle at Puebla, Santa Anna +had reorganised his army; and 30,000 Mexicans, including a formidable +body of cavalry, fine horsemen and well trained,[9] and a large number +of heavy batteries, were now ready to oppose the advance of the +invaders. + +On August 10 the American army crossed the Rio Frio Mountains, 10,000 +feet above the sea, the highest point between the Atlantic and the +Pacific, and as the troops descended the western slopes the valley of +Mexico first broke upon their view. There, beneath the shadow of her +mighty mountains, capped with eternal snows, stood + +The Imperial city, her far circling walls, +Her garden groves, and stately palaces. + +There lay the broad plain of Tenochtitlan, with all its wealth of light +and colour, the verdure of the forest, the warmer hues of the great +corn-fields, ripening to the harvest, and the sheen and sparkle of the +distant lakes. There it lay, as it burst upon the awe-struck vision of +Cortez and his companions, “bathed in the golden sunshine, stretched +out as it were in slumber, in the arms of the giant hills.” + +On every hand were the signs of a teeming population. White villages +and substantial haciendas glistened in the woodlands; roads broad and +well-travelled crossed the level; and in the clear atmosphere of those +lofty altitudes the vast size of the city was plainly visible. The +whole army of Mexico formed the garrison; hills crowned with batteries +commanded the approaches, while a network of canals on either flank and +a broad area of deep water enhanced the difficulties of manœuvre. The +line of communication, far too long to be maintained by the small force +at Scott’s disposal, had already been abandoned. The army depended for +subsistence on what it could purchase in the country; the sick and +wounded were carried with the troops, and +there was no further reserve of ammunition than that which was packed +in the regimental waggons. Cortez and his four hundred when they +essayed the same enterprise were not more completely isolated, for, +while the Spaniard had staunch allies in the hereditary foes of the +Aztecs, Scott’s nearest supports were at Puebla, eighty miles from +Mexico, and these numbered only 1,200 effective soldiers. The most +adventurous of leaders might well have hesitated ere he plunged into +the great valley, swarming with enemies, and defended by all the +resources of a civilised State. But there was no misgiving in the ranks +of the Americans. With that wholesome contempt for a foreign foe which +has wrought more good than evil for the Anglo-Saxon race, the army +moved forward without a halt. “Recovering,” says Scott, “from the +trance into which the magnificent spectacle had thrown them, probably +not a man in the column failed to say to his neighbour or himself, +‘That splendid city shall soon be ours!’” + +The fortifications which protected Mexico on the east were found to be +impregnable. The high ridge of El Penon, manned by nearly the whole of +Santa Anna’s army, blocked the passage between the lakes, and deep +morasses added to the difficulties of approach. To the south, however, +on the far side of Lake Chalco, lay a more level tract, but accessible +only by roads which the Mexicans deemed impracticable. Despite the +difficulties of the route, the manœuvre of Cerro Gordo was repeated on +a grander scale. + +August 16–18 After a toilsome march of seven-and-twenty miles from +Ayotla, over the spurs of the sierras, the troops reached the great +road which leads to the capital from the south. Across this road was +more than one line of fortifications, to which the Mexican army had +been hurriedly transferred. The hacienda of San Antonio, six miles from +the city, strengthened by field-works and defended by heavy guns, +commanded the highway. To the east was a morass, and beyond the morass +were the blue waters of Lake Chalco; while to the west the Pedregal, a +barren tract of volcanic scoriæ, over whose sharp rocks and deep +fissures neither horse nor vehicle could move, flanked the American +line of march. The morass was absolutely impassable. The gloomy +solitude of the Pedregal, extending to the mountains, five miles +distant, seemed equally forbidding; but the engineer officers came once +more to the rescue. A road across the Pedregal, little better than a +mule track, was discovered by Captain Lee. + +August 19 Under cover of a strong escort it was rapidly improved, and +Pillow’s and Worth’s divisions, accompanied by Magruder’s battery, were +directed to cross the waste of rocks. Beyond the Pedregal was a good +road, approaching the city from the south-west; and by this road the +post of San Antonio might be assailed in rear. + +Overlooking the road, however, as well as the issues from the Pedregal, +was a high ridge, backed by the mountains, and held by 6,000 Mexicans. +Opposite this ridge the Americans came out on cultivated ground, but +all further progress was completely checked. Shortly after midday the +leading brigade, with Magruder’s battery on hand, reached the summit of +a hill within a thousand yards of the enemy’s breastworks. Magruder +came at once into action, and the infantry attempted to push forward. +But the Mexican artillery was far superior, both in number of pieces +and weight of metal, and the ground was eminently unfavourable for +attack. Two-and-twenty heavy cannon swept the front; the right of the +position was secured by a deep ravine; masses of infantry were observed +in rear of the intrenchments, and several regiments of lancers were in +close support. For three hours the battle raged fiercely. On the right +the Americans pushed forward, crossing with extreme difficulty an +outlying angle of the Pedregal, covered with dense scrub, and occupied +the village of Contreras. But elsewhere they made no impression. They +were without cavalry, and Magruder’s guns were far too few and feeble +to keep down the fire of the hostile batteries. “The infantry,” says +Scott, “could not advance in column without being mowed down by grape +and canister, nor advance in line without being ridden down by the +enemy’s numerous horsemen.” Nor were the Mexicans content on this +occasion to remain passively in their works. Both infantry and +cavalry attempted to drive the assailants back upon the Pedregal; and, +although these counterstrokes were successfully repulsed, when darkness +fell the situation of the troops was by no means favourable. Heavy +columns of Mexicans were approaching from the city; the remainder of +the American army was opposite San Antonio, five miles distant, on the +far side of the Pedregal, and no support could be expected. To add to +their discomfort, it rained heavily; the thunder crashed in the +mountains, and torrents of water choked the streams. The men stood in +the darkness drenched and dispirited, and an attack made by a Mexican +battalion induced General Pillow to withdraw Magruder’s battery from +the ridge. The senior subaltern had been killed. 15 gunners and as many +horses had fallen. The slopes were covered with huge boulders, and it +was only by dint of the most strenuous exertions that the guns were +brought down in safety to the lower ground. + +A council of war was then held in Contreras Church, and, contrary to +the traditionary conduct of such conventions, a most desperate +expedient was adopted. The Mexican reinforcements, 12,000 strong, had +halted on the main road, their advanced guard within a few hundred +yards of the village. Leaving two regiments to hold this imposing force +in check, it was determined to make a night march and turn the rear of +the intrenchments on the ridge. The Commander-in-Chief was beyond the +Pedregal, opposite San Antonio, and it was necessary that he should be +informed of the projected movement. + +“I have always understood,” says an officer present in this quarter of +the field, “that what was devised and determined on was suggested by +Captain Lee; at all events the council was closed by his saying that he +desired to return to General Scott with the decision, and that, as it +was late, the decision must be given as soon as possible, since General +Scott wished him to return in time to give directions for co-operation. +During the council, and for hours after, the rain fell in torrents, +whilst the darkness was so intense that one could move only by +groping.” + +The Pedregal was infested by straggling bands of +Mexicans; and yet, over those five miles of desolation, with no guide +but the wind, or an occasional flash of lightning, Lee, unaccompanied +by a single orderly, made his way to Scott’s headquarters. This +perilous adventure was characterised by the Commander-in-Chief as “the +greatest feat of physical and moral courage performed by any individual +during the entire campaign.” + +The night march, although it entailed the passage of a deep ravine, and +was so slow that one company in two hours made no more than four +hundred yards, was completely successful. The Mexicans, trusting to the +strength of their position, and to the presence of the reinforcements, +had neglected to guard their left. The lesson of Cerro Gordo had been +forgotten. The storming parties, guided by the engineers, Lee, +Beauregard, and Gustavus Smith, established themselves, under cover of +the darkness, within five hundred paces of the intrenchments, and as +the day broke the works were carried at the first rush. + +August 20 Seventeen minutes after the signal had been given, the +garrison, attacked in front and rear simultaneously, was completely +dispersed. 800 Mexicans were captured, and nearly as many killed.[10] +The reinforcements, unable to intervene, and probably demoralised by +this unlooked-for defeat, fell back to the village of Churubusco, and +San Antonio was evacuated. The pursuit was hotly pressed. Churubusco +was heavily bombarded. For two hours the American batteries played upon +the church and hacienda, both strongly fortified, and after a +counterstroke had been beaten back a vigorous onslaught, made by the +whole line of battle, compelled the enemy to give way. A brilliant +charge of General Shields’ brigade dispersed their last reserves, and +the whole of the hostile army fled in confusion to the city. The +American cavalry followed at speed, using their sabres freely on the +panic-stricken masses, and one squadron, not hearing the recall, dashed +up to the very gates of the city. Scott’s losses amounted to 1,053, +including 76 officers. The Mexican casualties +were 3,000 prisoners, and 3,250 killed and wounded. 37 field-guns were +abandoned, and, a still more valuable capture, a large supply of +ammunition fell into the hands of the victors. + +Magruder’s battery, it appears, was retained in reserve throughout the +battle of Churubusco, and Jackson’s share in the victory was confined +to the engagement of the previous day. But his small charge of three +guns had been handled with skill and daring. Magruder was more than +satisfied. “In a few moments,” ran his official report, “Lieutenant +Jackson, commanding the second section of the battery, who had opened +fire upon the enemy’s works from a position on the right, hearing our +fire still further in front, advanced in handsome style, and kept up +the fire with equal briskness and effect. His conduct was equally +conspicuous during the whole day, and I cannot too highly commend him +to the Major-General’s favourable consideration.” + +The extreme vigour with which the Americans had prosecuted their +operations now came to an untimely pause. After his double victory at +Contreras and Churubusco, General Scott proposed an armistice. The +whole of the Mexican army had been encountered. It had been decisively +defeated. Its losses, in men and _matériel,_ had been very heavy. The +troops were utterly demoralised. The people were filled with +consternation, and a rapid advance would probably have been followed by +an immediate peace. But Scott was unwilling to drive his foes to +desperation, and he appears to have believed that if they were spared +all further humiliation they would accede without further resistance to +his demands. + +The Mexicans, however, were only playing for time. During the +negotiations, in direct defiance of the terms of the armistice, Santa +Anna strengthened his fortifications, rallied his scattered army, and +prepared once more to confront the invader. Scott’s ultimatum was +rejected, and on September 5 hostilities were renewed. + +September 8 Three days later the position of Molino del Rey, garrisoned +by the choicest of the Mexican troops, was +stormed at dawn. But the enemy had benefited by his respite. The +fighting was desperate. 800 Americans were killed and wounded before +the intrenchments and strong buildings were finally carried; and +although the Mexicans again lost 3,000 men, including two generals, +their spirit of resistance was not yet wholly crushed. + +Driven from their outworks, they had fallen back on a still more +formidable line. Behind the Molino del Rey rose the hill of +Chapultepec, crowned by the great castle which had been the palace of +Montezuma and of the Spanish viceroys, now the military college of the +Republic and the strongest of her fortresses. Three miles from the city +walls, the stronghold completely barred the line of advance on the San +Cosme Gate. Heavy guns mounted on the lofty bastions which encircled +the citadel, commanded every road, and the outflanking movements which +had hitherto set at nought the walls and parapets of the Mexicans were +here impracticable. Still, careful reconnaissance had shown that, with +all its difficulties, this was the most favourable approach for the +invading army. The gates of Belen and San Antonio were beset by +obstacles even more impracticable. The ground over which the troops +would advance to storm the fortress was far firmer than elsewhere, +there was ample space for the American batteries, and if the hill were +taken, the Mexicans, retreating along two narrow causeways, with deep +marshes on either hand, might easily be deprived of all opportunity of +rallying. + +On the night of the 11th four batteries of heavy guns were established +within easy range. On the 12th they opened fire; and the next morning +the American army, covered by the fire of the artillery, advanced to +the assault. + +September 13 In the victory of Molino del Rey, Magruder’s battery had +taken little part. Jackson, posted with his section on the extreme +flank of the line, had dispersed a column of cavalry which threatened a +charge; but, with this brief interlude of action, he had been merely a +spectator. At Chapultepec he was more fortunate. Pillow’s division, to +which the battery was attached, attacked the Mexicans in front, while +Worth’s division assailed them from the +north. The 14th Infantry, connecting the two attacks, moved along a +road which skirts the base of the hill, and Magruder was ordered to +detach a section of his battery in support. Jackson was selected for +the duty, and as he approached the enemy’s position dangers multiplied +at every step. The ground alongside was so marshy that the guns were +unable to leave the road. A Mexican fieldpiece, covered by a +breastwork, raked the causeway from end to end, while from the heights +of Chapultepec cannon of large calibre poured down a destructive fire. +The infantry suffered terribly. It was impossible to advance along the +narrow track; and when the guns were ordered up the situation was in no +way bettered. Nearly every horse was killed or wounded. A deep ditch, +cut across the road, hindered effective action, and the only position +where reply to the enemy’s fire was possible lay beyond this obstacle. +Despite the losses of his command Jackson managed to lift one gun +across by hand. But his men became demoralised. They left their posts. +The example of their lieutenant, walking up and down on the shot-swept +road and exclaiming calmly, “There is no danger: see! I am not hit,” +failed to inspire them with confidence. Many had already fallen. The +infantry, with the exception of a small escort, which held its ground +with difficulty, had disappeared; and General Worth, observing +Jackson’s perilous situation, sent him orders to retire. He replied it +was more dangerous to withdraw than to stand fast, and if they would +give him fifty veterans he would rather attempt the capture of the +breastwork. At this juncture Magruder, losing his horse as he galloped +forward, reached the road. + +The ditch was crowded with soldiers; many wounded; many already dead; +many whose hearts had failed them. Beyond, on the narrow causeway, the +one gun which Jackson had brought across the ditch was still in action. + +Deserted by his gunners, and abandoned by the escort which had been +ordered to support him, the young subaltern still held his ground. With +the sole assistance of a sergeant, +of stauncher mettle than the rest, he was loading and firing his +solitary field-piece, rejoicing, as became the son of a warrior race, +in the hot breath of battle, and still more in the isolation of his +perilous position. To stand alone, in the forefront of the fight, +defying the terrors from which others shrank, was the situation which +of all others he most coveted; and under the walls of Chapultepec, +answering shot for shot, and plying sponge and handspike with desperate +energy, the fierce instincts of the soldier were fully gratified. Nor +was Magruder the man to proffer prudent counsels. A second gun was +hoisted across the ditch; the men rallied; the Mexican artillery was +gradually overpowered, and the breastwork stormed. The crisis of the +struggle was already past. Pillow’s troops had driven the enemy from +their intrenchments at the base of the hill, and beneath the shadows of +the majestic cypresses, which still bear the name of the Grove of +Montezuma, and up the rugged slopes which tower above them, pressed the +assaulting columns. A redoubt which stood midway up the height was +carried. The Mexicans fell back from shelter to shelter; but amid smoke +and flame the scaling ladders were borne across the castle ditch, and +reared against the lofty walls were soon covered with streams of men. +The leaders, hurled from the battlements on to the crowd below, failed +to make good their footing, but there were others to take their places. +The supports came thronging up; the enemy, assailed in front and flank, +drew back disheartened, and after a short struggle the American +colours, displayed upon the keep, announced to the citizens of Mexico +that Chapultepec had been captured. Yet the victory was not complete. +The greater part of the garrison had fled from their intrenchments +before the castle had been stormed; and infantry, cavalry, and +artillery, in wild confusion, were crowding in panic on the causeways. +But their numbers were formidable, and the city, should the army be +rallied, was capable of a protracted defence. Not a moment was to be +lost if the battle was to be decisive of the war. The disorder on +Chapultepec was hardly less than that which existed in the ranks of the +defeated +Mexicans. Many of the stormers had dispersed in search of plunder, and +regiments and brigades had become hopelessly intermingled in the +assault of the rocky hill. Still the pursuit was prompt. Towards the +San Cosme Gate several of the younger officers, a lieutenant by name +Ulysses Grant amongst the foremost, followed the enemy with such men as +they could collect, and Jackson’s guns were soon abreast of the +fighting line. His teams had been destroyed by the fire of the Mexican +batteries. Those of his waggons, posted further to the rear, had +partially escaped. To disengage the dead animals from the limbers and +to replace them by others would have wasted many minutes, and he had +eagerly suggested to Magruder that the guns should be attached to the +waggon-limbers instead of to their own. Permission was given, and in a +few moments his section was thundering past the cliffs of Chapultepec. +Coming into action within close range of the flying Mexicans, every +shot told on their demoralised masses; but before the San Cosme Gate +the enemy made a last effort to avert defeat. Fresh troops were brought +up to man the outworks; the houses and gardens which lined the road +were filled with skirmishers; from the high parapets of the flat +house-tops a hail of bullets struck the head of the pursuing column; +and again and again the American infantry, without cover and with +little space for movement, recoiled from the attack. + +The situation of the invading army, despite the brilliant victory of +Chapultepec, was not yet free from peril. The greater part of the +Mexican forces was still intact. The city contained 180,000 +inhabitants, and General Scott’s battalions had dwindled to the +strength of a small division. In the various battles before the capital +nearly 3,000 officers and men had fallen, and the soldiers who +encompassed the walls of the great metropolis were spent with +fighting.[11] One spark of the stubborn courage which bore Cortez and +his paladins through the hosts of Montezuma might have made of that +stately city a second Saragossa. It was eminently defensible. The +churches, the convents, +the public buildings, constructed with that solidity which is +peculiarly Spanish, formed each of them a fortress. The broad streets, +crossing each other at right angles, rendered concentration at any +threatened point an easy matter, and beyond the walls were broad +ditches and a deep canal. + +Nor was the strength of the city the greatest of Scott’s difficulties. +Vera Cruz, his base of operations, was two hundred and sixty miles +distant; Puebla, his nearest supply-depot, eighty miles. He had +abandoned his communications. His army was dependent for food on a +hostile population. In moving round Lake Chalco, and attacking the city +from the south, he had burned his boats. A siege or an investment were +alike impossible. A short march would place the enemy’s army across his +line of retreat, and nothing would have been easier for the Mexicans +than to block the road where it passes between the sierras and the +lake. Guerillas were already hovering in the hills; one single repulse +before the gates of the capital would have raised the country in rear; +and hemmed in by superior numbers, and harassed by a cavalry which was +at least equal to the task of cutting off supplies, the handful of +Americans must have cut their way through to Puebla or have succumbed +to starvation. + +Such considerations had doubtless been at the root of the temporising +policy which had been pursued after Churubusco. But the uselessness of +half-measures had then been proved. The conviction had become general +that a desperate enterprise could only be pushed to a successful issue +by desperate tactics, and every available battalion was hurried forward +to the assault. Before the San Cosme Gate the pioneers were ordered up, +and within the suburb pick and crowbar forced a passage from house to +house. The guns, moving slowly forward, battered the crumbling masonry +at closest range. The Mexicans were driven back from breastwork to +breastwork; and a mountain howitzer, which Lieutenant Grant had posted +on the tower of a neighbouring church, played with terrible effect, at +a range of two or three hundred yards, on the defenders of the Gate. + +By eight o’clock in the evening the suburb had been cleared, and the +Americans were firmly established within the walls. To the south-east, +before the Belen Gate, another column had been equally successful. +During the night Santa Anna withdrew his troops, and when day dawned +the white flag was seen flying from the citadel. After a sharp fight +with 2,000 convicts whom the fugitive President had released, the +invaders occupied the city, and the war was virtually at an end. From +Cerro Gordo to Chapultepec the power of discipline had triumphed. An +army of 30,000 men, fighting in their own country, and supported by a +numerous artillery, had been defeated by an invading force of one-third +the strength. Yet the Mexicans had shown no lack of courage. “At +Chapultepec and Molino del Rey, as on many other occasions,” says +Grant, “they stood up as well as any troops ever did.”[12] But their +officers were inexperienced; the men were ill-instructed; and against +an army of regular soldiers, well led and obedient, their untutored +valour, notwithstanding their superior numbers, had proved of no avail. +They had early become demoralised. Their strongest positions had been +rendered useless by the able manœuvres of their adversaries. Everywhere +they had been out-generalled. They had never been permitted to fight on +the ground which they had prepared, and in almost every single +engagement they had been surprised. Nor had the Government escaped the +infection which had turned the hearts of the troops to water. + +September 14 The energy of the pursuit after the fall of Chapultepec +had wrought its full effect, and on September 14 the city of Mexico was +surrendered, without further parley, to a force which, all told, +amounted to less than 7,000 men.[13] + +With such portion of his force as had not disbanded Santa Anna +undertook the siege of Puebla; and the guerillas, largely reinforced +from the army, waged a desultory warfare in the mountains. But these +despairing +efforts were without effect upon the occupation of the capital. The +Puebla garrison beat back every attack; and the bands of irregular +horse men were easily dispersed. During these operations Magruder’s +battery remained with headquarters near the capital, and so far as +Jackson was concerned all opportunities for distinction were past. + +February 1848 The peace negotiations were protracted from September to +the following February, and in their camps beyond the walls the +American soldiers were fain to content themselves with their ordinary +duties. + +It cannot be said that Jackson had failed to take advantage of the +opportunities which fortune had thrown in his way. As eagerly as he had +snatched at the chance of employment in the field artillery he had +welcomed the tactical emergency which had given him sole command of his +section at Chapultepec. It was a small charge; but he had utilised it +to the utmost, and it had filled the cup of his ambition to the brim. +Ambitious he certainly was. “He confessed,” says Dabney, “to an +intimate friend that the order of General Pillow, separating his +section on the day of Chapultepec from his captain, had excited his +abiding gratitude; so much so that while the regular officers were +rather inclined to depreciate the general as an unprofessional soldier, +he loved him because he gave him an opportunity to win distinction.” +His friends asked him, long after the war, if he felt no trepidation +when so many were falling round him. He replied: “No; the only anxiety +of which I was conscious during the engagements was a fear lest I +should not meet danger enough to make my conduct conspicuous.” + +[Illustration: Map of the City of Mexico and environs.] + +His share of the glory was more than ample. Contreras gave him the +brevet rank of captain. For his conduct at Chapultepec he was mentioned +in the Commander-in-Chief’s dispatches, and publicly complimented on +his courage. Shortly after the capture of the city, General Scott held +a levée, and amongst others presented to him was Lieutenant Jackson. +When he heard the name, the general drew himself up to his full height, +and, placing his hands behind him, said with affected sternness, “I +don’t +know that I shall shake hands with Mr. Jackson.” Jackson, blushing like +a girl, was overwhelmed with confusion. General Scott, seeing that he +had called the attention of every one in the room, said, “If you can +forgive yourself for the way in which you slaughtered those poor +Mexicans with your guns, I am not sure that I can,” and then held out +his hand. “No greater compliment,” says General Gibbon, “could have +been paid a young officer, and Jackson apparently did not know he had +done anything remarkable till his general told him so.”[14] Magruder +could find no praise high enough for his industry, his capacity, and +his gallantry, and within eighteen months of his first joining his +regiment he was breveted major. Such promotion was phenomenal even in +the Mexican war, and none of his West Point comrades made so great a +stride in rank. His future in his profession was assured. He had +acquired something more than the spurs of a field officer in his seven +months of service. A subaltern, it has been said, learns but little of +the higher art of war in the course of a campaign. His daily work so +engrosses his attention that he has little leisure to reflect on the +lessons in strategy and tactics which unfold themselves before him. +Without maps, and without that information of the enemy’s numbers and +dispositions which alone renders the manœuvres intelligible, it is +difficult, even where the inclination exists, to discuss or criticise +the problems, tactical and strategical, with which the general has to +deal. But siege and battle, long marches and rough roads, gave the +young American officers an insight into the practical difficulties of +war. It is something to have seen how human nature shows itself under +fire; how easily panics may be generated; how positions that seem +impregnable may be rendered weak; to have witnessed the effect of +surprise, and to have realised the strength of a vigorous attack. It is +something, too, if a man learns his own worth in situations of doubt +and danger; and if he finds, as did Jackson, that battle sharpens his +faculties, and makes his self-control more perfect, his judgment +clearer and more prompt, the gain in self-confidence is of the utmost +value. + +Moreover, whether a young soldier learns much or little from his first +campaign depends on his intellectual powers and his previous training. +Jackson’s brain, as his steady progress at West Point proves, was of a +capacity beyond the average. He was naturally reflective. If, at the +Military Academy, he had heard little of war; if, during his service in +Mexico, his knowledge was insufficient to enable him to compare General +Scott’s operations with those of the great captains, he had at least +been trained to think. It is difficult to suppose that his experience +was cast away. He was no thoughtless subaltern, but already an earnest +soldier; and in after times, when he came to study for himself the +campaigns of Washington and Napoleon, we may be certain that the +teaching he found there was made doubly impressive when read by the +light of what he had seen himself. Nor is it mere conjecture to assert +that in his first campaign his experience was of peculiar value to a +future general of the Southern Confederacy. Some of the regiments who +fought under Scott and Taylor were volunteers, civilians, like their +successors in the great Civil War, in all but name, enlisted for the +war only, or even for a shorter term, and serving under their own +officers. Several of these regiments had fought well; others had +behaved indifferently; and the problem of how discipline was to be +maintained in battle amongst these unprofessional soldiers obtruded +itself as unpleasantly in Mexico as it had in the wars with England. +Amongst the regular officers, accustomed to the absolute subordination +of the army, the question provoked perplexity and discussion. + +So small was the military establishment of the States that in case of +any future war, the army, as in Mexico, would be largely composed of +volunteers; and, despite the high intelligence and warlike enthusiasm +of the citizen battalions, it was evident that they were far less +reliable than the regulars. Even General Grant, partial as he was to +the volunteers, admitted the superiority conferred by drill, +discipline, and highly trained officers. “A better army,” he +wrote, “man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one +commanded by General Taylor in the earlier engagements of the Mexican +war.”[15] These troops were all regulars, and they were those who +carried Scott in triumph from the shores of the Gulf to the palace of +Santa Anna. The volunteers had proved themselves exceedingly liable to +panic. Their superior intelligence had not enabled them to master the +instincts of human nature, and, although they had behaved well in camp +and on the march, in battle their discipline had fallen to pieces.[16] +It could hardly be otherwise. Men without ingrained habits of +obedience, who have not been trained to subordinate their will to +another’s, cannot be expected to render implicit obedience in moments +of danger and excitement; nor can they be expected, under such +circumstances, to follow officers in whom they can have but little +confidence. The ideal of battle is a combined effort, directed by a +trained leader. Unless troops are thoroughly well disciplined such +effort is impossible; the leaders are ignored, and the spasmodic action +of the individual is substituted for the concentrated pressure of the +mass. The cavalry which dissolves into a mob before it strikes the +enemy but seldom attains success; and infantry out of hand is hardly +more effective. In the Mexican campaign the volunteers, although on +many occasions they behaved with admirable courage, continually broke +loose from control under the fire of the enemy. As individuals they +fought well; as organised bodies, capable of manœuvring under fire and +of combined effort, they proved to be comparatively worthless. + +So Jackson, observant as he was, gained on Mexican battle-fields some +knowledge of the shortcomings inherent in half-trained troops. And this +was not all. The expedition had demanded the services of nearly every +officer in the army of the United States, and in the toils of the +march, in the close companionship of the camp, in the excitement of +battle, the shrewder spirits probed the characters of their comrades to +the quick. In the history of the Civil War +there are few things more remarkable than the use which was made of the +knowledge thus acquired. The clue to many an enterprise, daring even to +foolhardiness, is to be found in this. A leader so intimately +acquainted with the character of his opponent as to be able to predict +with certainty what he will do under any given circumstances may set +aside with impunity every established rule of war. “All the older +officers, who became conspicuous in the rebellion,” says Grant, “I had +also served with and known in Mexico. The acquaintance thus formed was +of immense service to me in the War of the Rebellion—I mean what I +learned of the characters of those to whom I was afterwards opposed. I +do not pretend to say that all my movements, or even many of them, were +made with special reference to the characteristics of the commander +against whom they were directed. But my appreciation of my enemies was +certainly affected by this knowledge.”[17] + +Many of the generals with whom Jackson became intimately connected, +either as friends or enemies, are named in Scott’s dispatches. +Magruder, Hooker, McDowell, and Ambrose Hill belonged to his own +regiment. McClellan, Beauregard, and Gustavus Smith served on the same +staff as Lee. Joseph E. Johnston, twice severely wounded, was +everywhere conspicuous for dashing gallantry. Shields commanded a +brigade with marked ability. Pope was a staff officer. Lieutenant D. H. +Hill received two brevets. Lieutenant Longstreet, struck down whilst +carrying the colours at Chapultepec, was bracketed for conspicuous +conduct with Lieutenant Pickett. Lieutenant Edward Johnson is mentioned +as having specially distinguished himself in the same battle. Captain +Huger, together with Lieutenants Porter and Reno, did good service with +the artillery, and Lieutenant Ewell had two horses killed under him at +Churubusco. + +So having proved his mettle and “drunk delight of battle with his +peers,” Jackson spent nine pleasant months in the conquered city. The +peace negotiations were protracted. The United States coveted the +auriferous provinces +of California and New Mexico, a tract as large as a European kingdom, +and far more wealthy. Loth to lose their birthright, yet powerless to +resist, the Mexicans could only haggle for a price. The States were not +disposed to be ungenerous, but the transfer of so vast a territory +could not be accomplished in a moment, and the victorious army remained +in occupation of the capital. + +Beneath the shadow of the Stars and Stripes conqueror and conquered +lived in harmony. Mexico was tired of war. Since the downfall of +Spanish rule revolution had followed revolution with startling +rapidity. The beneficent despotism of the great viceroys had been +succeeded by the cruel exactions of petty tyrants, and for many a long +year the country had been ravaged by their armies. The capital itself +had enjoyed but a few brief intervals of peace, and now, although the +bayonets of an alien race were the pledge of their repose, the citizens +revelled in the unaccustomed luxury. Nor were they ungrateful to those +who brought them a respite from alarms and anarchy. Under the mild +administration of the American generals the streets resumed their +wonted aspect. The great markets teemed with busy crowds. Across the +long causeways rolled the creaking waggons, laden with the produce of +far-distant haciendas. Trade was restored, and even the most patriotic +merchants were not proof against the influence of the American dollar. +Between the soldiers and the people was much friendly intercourse. Even +the religious orders did not disdain to offer their hospitality to the +heretics. The uniforms of the victorious army were to be seen at every +festive gathering, and the graceful Mexicañas were by no means +insensible to the admiration of the stalwart Northerners. Those +blue-eyed and fair-haired invaders were not so very terrible after all; +and the beauties of the capital, accustomed to be wooed in liquid +accents and flowery phrases, listened without reluctance to harsher +tones and less polished compliments. Travellers of many races have +borne willing witness to the charms and virtues of the women of Mexico. +“True daughters of Spain,” it has been said, “they unite the grace of +Castile to the vivacity of Andalusia; and more sterling +qualities are by no means wanting. Gentle and refined, unaffectedly +pleasing in manners and conversation, they evince a warmth of heart +which wins for them the respect and esteem of all strangers.” To the +homes made bright by the presence of these fair specimens of womanhood +Scott’s officers were always welcome; and Jackson, for the first time +in his life, found himself within the sphere of feminine attractions. +The effect on the stripling soldier, who, stark fighter as he was, had +seen no more of life than was to be found in a country village or +within the precincts of West Point, may be easily imagined. Who the +magnet was he never confessed; but that he went near losing his heart +to some charming señorita of _sangre azul_ he more than once +acknowledged, and he took much trouble to appear to advantage in her +eyes. The deficiencies in his education which prevented his full +enjoyment of social pleasures were soon made up. He not only learned to +dance, an accomplishment which must have taxed his perseverance to the +utmost, but he spent some months in learning Spanish; and it is +significant that to the end of his life he retained a copious +vocabulary of those tender diminutives which fall so gracefully from +Spanish lips. + +But during his stay in Mexico other and more lasting influences were at +work. Despite the delights of her delicious climate, where the roses +bloom the whole year round, the charms of her romantic scenery, and the +fascinations of her laughter-loving daughters, Jackson’s serious nature +soon asserted itself. The constant round of light amusements and simple +duties grew distasteful. The impress of his mother’s teachings and +example was there to guide him; and his native reverence for all that +was good and true received an unexpected impulse. There were not +wanting in the American army men who had a higher ideal of duty than +mere devotion to the business of their profession. The officer +commanding the First Artillery, Colonel Frank Taylor, possessed that +earnest faith which is not content with solitude. “This good man,” says +Dabney, “was accustomed to labour as a father for the religious welfare +of his young officers, and during the summer +campaign his instructions and prayers had produced so much effect as to +awake an abiding anxiety and spirit of inquiry in Jackson’s mind.” The +latter had little prejudice in favour of any particular sect or church. +There was no State Establishment in the United States. His youth had +been passed in a household where Christianity was practically unknown, +and with characteristic independence he determined to discover for +himself the rule that he should follow. His researches took a course +which his Presbyterian ancestors would assuredly have condemned. But +Jackson’s mind was singularly open, and he was the last man in the +world to yield to prejudice. Soon after peace was declared, he had made +the acquaintance of a number of priests belonging to one of the great +religious orders of the Catholic Church. They had invited him to take +up his quarters with them, and when he determined to examine for +himself into the doctrine of the ancient faith, he applied through them +for an introduction to the Archbishop of Mexico. Several interviews +took place between the aged ecclesiastic and the young soldier. Jackson +departed unsatisfied. He acknowledged that the prelate was a sincere +and devout Christian, and he was impressed as much with his kindness as +his learning. But he left Mexico without any settled convictions on the +subject which now absorbed his thoughts. + +June 12 On June 12, peace having been signed at the end of May, the +last of the American troops marched out of the conquered capital. +Jackson’s battery was sent to Fort Hamilton, on Long Island, seven +miles below New York, and there, with his honours thick upon him, he +settled down to the quiet life of a small garrison. He had gone out to +Mexico a second lieutenant; he had come back a field-officer. He had +won a name in the army, and his native State had enrolled him amongst +her heroes. He had gone out an unformed youth; he had come back a man +and a proved leader of men. He had been known merely as an +indefatigable student and a somewhat unsociable companion. He had come +back with a reputation for daring courage, not only the courage which +glories in swift action and the excitement of the charge, but courage +of an enduring quality. And in that distant country he had won more +than fame. He had already learned something of the vanity of temporal +success. He had gone out with a vague notion of ruling his life in +accordance with moral precepts and philosophic maxims; but he was to be +guided henceforward by loftier principles than even devotion to duty +and regard for honour, and from the path he had marked out for himself +in Mexico he never deviated. + + [1] Copyright 1897 by Longmans, Green, & Co. + + [2] General R. S. Ewell. + + [3] Grant’s _Memoirs_, vol. i, p. 53. + + [4] Lieutenant D. H. Hill, afterwards his brother-in-law. + + [5] He had been promoted second lieutenant on March 3. _Records of the + First Regiment of Artillery._ + + [6] The Americans had about 8,500 men upon the field, and their loss + was 431, including two generals. _Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott._ + + [7] According to the Regimental Records his company (K) was not + engaged in the battle, but only in the pursuit. + + [8] Two 24-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, and two light pieces. + Ripley’s _History of the Mexican War._ + + [9] It is said, however, that their horses were little more than + ponies, and far too light for a charge. Semmes’ _Campaign of General + Scott._ + + [10] 4,500 Americans (rank and file) were engaged, and the losses did + not exceed 50. Scott’s _Memoirs._ + + [11] 862 officers and men fell at Chapultepec. Scott’s _Memoirs._ + + [12] Grant’s _Memoirs_, vol. i, p. 169. + + [13] The total loss in the battles before the capital was 2,703, + including 383 officers. Scott’s _Memoirs._ + + [14] Letter to the author. + + [15] Grant’s _Memoirs_, vol. i, p. 168. + + [16] Ripley’s _History of the Mexican War,_ vol. ii, p. 73 &c.) + + [17] Grant’s _Memoirs,_ vol. i, p. 192. + + + + +Chapter III +LEXINGTON. 1851–1861 + + +1848 Of Jackson’s life at Fort Hamilton there is little to tell. His +friend and mentor, Colonel Taylor, was in command. The chaplain, once +an officer of dragoons, was a man of persuasive eloquence and earnest +zeal; and surrounded by influences which had now become congenial, the +young major of artillery pursued the religious studies he had begun in +Mexico. There was some doubt whether he had been baptised as a child. +He was anxious that no uncertainty should exist as to his adhesion to +Christianity, but he was unwilling that the sacrament should bind him +to any particular sect. + +1849 On the understanding that no surrender of judgment would be +involved, he was baptised and received his first communion in the +Episcopal Church. + +Two years passed without incident, and then Jackson was transferred to +Florida. In his new quarters his stay was brief. + +1851 In March 1851 he was appointed Professor of Artillery Tactics and +Natural Philosophy at the Virginia Military Institute. His success, for +such he deemed it, was due to his own merit. One of his Mexican +comrades, Major D. H. Hill, afterwards his brother-in-law, was a +professor in a neighbouring institution, Washington College, and had +been consulted by the Superintendent of the Institute as to the filling +of the vacant chair. + +Hill remembered what had been said of Jackson at West Point: “If the +course had been one year longer he would have graduated at the head of +his class.” This voluntary testimonial of his brother cadets had not +passed +unheeded. It had weight, as the best evidence of his thoroughness and +application, with the Board of Visitors, and Jackson was unanimously +elected. + +The Military Institute, founded twelve years previously on the model of +West Point, was attended by several hundred youths from Virginia and +other Southern States. At Lexington, in the county of Rockbridge, a +hundred miles west of Richmond, stand the castellated buildings and the +wide parade ground which formed the nursery of so many Confederate +soldiers. To the east rise the lofty masses of the Blue Ridge. To the +north successive ranges of rolling hills, green with copse and +woodland, fall gently to the lower levels; and stretching far away at +their feet, watered by that lovely river which the Indians in melodious +syllables called Shenandoah, “bright daughter of the Stars,” the great +Valley of Virginia, + +Deep-meadowed, happy, fair with orchard lawns +And bowery hollows, + +lies embosomed within its mountain walls. Of all its pleasant market +towns, Lexington is not the least attractive; and in this pastoral +region, where the great forests stand round about the corn-fields, and +the breezes blow untainted from the uplands, had been built the College +which Washington, greatest of Virginians and greatest of American +soldiers, had endowed. Under the shadow of its towers the State had +found an appropriate site for her military school. + +The cadets of the Institute, although they wore a uniform, were taught +by officers of the regular army, were disciplined as soldiers, and +spent some months of their course in camp, were not destined for a +military career. All aspirants for commissions in the United States +army had to pass through West Point; and the training of the State +colleges—for Virginia was not solitary in the possession of such an +institution—however much it may have benefited both the minds and +bodies of the rising generation, was of immediate value only to those +who became officers of the State militia. Still in all essential +respects the Military Institute was +little behind West Point. The discipline was as strict, the drill but +little less precise. The cadets had their own officers and their own +sergeants, and the whole establishment was administered on a military +footing. No pains were spared either by the State or the faculty to +maintain the peculiar character of the school; and the little +battalion, although the members were hardly likely to see service, was +as carefully trained as if each private in the ranks might one day +become a general officer. It was fortunate indeed for Virginia, when +she submitted her destinies to the arbitrament of war, that some +amongst her statesmen had been firm to the conviction that to defend +one’s country is a task not a whit less honourable than to serve her in +the ways of peace. She was unable to avert defeat. But she more than +redeemed her honour; and the efficiency of her troops was in no small +degree due to the training so many of her officers had received at the +Military Institute. + +Still, notwithstanding its practical use to the State, the offer of a +chair at Lexington would probably have attracted but few of Jackson’s +contemporaries. But while campaigning was entirely to his taste, life +in barracks was the reverse. In those unenlightened days to be known as +an able and zealous soldier was no passport to preferment. So long as +an officer escaped censure his promotion was sure; he might reach +without further effort the highest prizes the service offered, and the +chances of the dull and indolent were quite as good as those of the +capable and energetic. The one had no need for, the other no incentive +to, self-improvement, and it was very generally neglected. Unless war +intervened—and nothing seemed more improbable than another +campaign—even a Napoleon would have had to submit to the inevitable. +Jackson caught eagerly at the opportunity of freeing himself from an +unprofitable groove. + +“He believed,” he said, “that a man who had turned, with a good +military reputation, to pursuits of a semi-civilian character, and had +vigorously prosecuted his mental improvement, would have more chance of +success + +in war than those who had remained in the treadmill of the garrison.” + +It was with a view, then, of fitting himself for command that Jackson +broke away from the restraints of regimental life; not because those +restraints were burdensome or distasteful in themselves, but because he +felt that whilst making the machine they might destroy the man. Those +responsible for the efficiency of the United States army had not yet +learned that the mind must be trained as well as the body, that drill +is not the beginning and the end of the soldier’s education, that +unless an officer is trusted with responsibility in peace he is but too +apt to lose all power of initiative in war. That Jackson’s ideas were +sound may be inferred from the fact that many of the most distinguished +generals in the Civil War were men whose previous career had been +analogous to his own.[1] + +His duties at Lexington were peculiar. As Professor of Artillery he was +responsible for little more than the drill of the cadets and their +instruction in the theory of gunnery. The tactics of artillery, as the +word is understood in Europe, he was not called upon to impart. Optics, +mechanics, and astronomy were his special subjects, and he seems +strangely out of place in expounding their dry formulas. + +In the well-stocked library of the Institute he found every opportunity +of increasing his professional knowledge. He was an untiring reader, +and he read to learn. The wars of Napoleon were his constant study. He +was an enthusiastic admirer of his genius; the swiftness, the daring, +and the energy of his movements appealed to his every instinct. +Unfortunately, both for the Institute and his popularity, it was not +his business to lecture on military history. We can well imagine him, +as a teacher of the art of war, describing to the impressionable youths +around +him the dramatic incidents of some famous campaign, following step by +step the skilful strategy that brought about such victories as +Austerlitz and Jena. The advantage would then have been with his +pupils; in the work assigned to him it was the teacher that benefited. +He was by no means successful as an instructor of the higher +mathematics. Although the theories of light and motion were doubtless a +branch of learning which the cadets particularly detested, his methods +of teaching made it even more repellent. A thorough master of his +subject, he lacked altogether the power of aiding others to master it. +No flashes of humour relieved the tedium of his long and +closely-reasoned demonstrations. He never descended to the level of his +pupils’ understanding, nor did he appreciate their difficulties. Facts +presented themselves to his intellect in few lights. As one of his +chief characteristics as a commander was the clearness with which he +perceived the end to be aimed at and the shortest way of reaching it, +so, in his explanations to his stumbling class, he could only repeat +the process by which he himself had solved the problem at issue. We may +well believe that his self-reliant nature, trained to intense +application, overlooked the fact that others, weaker and less gifted, +could not surmount unaided the obstacles which only aroused his own +masterful instincts. Nevertheless, his conscientious industry was not +entirely thrown away. To the brighter intellects in his class he +communicated accurate scholarship; and although the majority lagged far +behind, the thoroughness of his mental drill was most useful, to +himself perhaps even more than to the cadets. + +1854–57 The death of his first wife, daughter of the reverend Dr. +Junkin, President of Washington College, after they had been married +but fourteen months, the solution of his religious difficulties, and +his reception into the Presbyterian Church; a five months’ tour in +Europe, through Scotland, England, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy; his +marriage to Miss Morrison, daughter of a North Carolina clergyman: such +were the chief landmarks of his life at Lexington. Ten years, +with their burden of joy and sorrow, passed away, of intense interest +to the individual, but to the world a story dull and commonplace. +Jackson was by no means a man of mark in Rockbridge county. Although +his early shyness had somewhat worn off, he was still as reserved as he +had been at West Point. His confidence was rarely given outside his own +home. Intimates he had few, either at the Institute or elsewhere. Still +he was not in the least unsociable, and there were many houses where he +was always welcome. The academic atmosphere of Lexington did not +preclude a certain amount of gaiety. The presence of Washington College +and the Military Institute drew together a large number of families +during the summer, and fair visitors thronged the leafy avenues of the +little town. During these pleasant months the officers and cadets, as +became their cloth, were always well to the fore. Recreation was the +order of the day, and a round of entertainments enlivened the +“Commencements.” Major Jackson attended these gatherings with unfailing +regularity, but soon after his arrival he drew the line at dancing, and +musical parties became the limit of his dissipation. He was anything +but a convivial companion. He never smoked, he was a strict +teetotaller, and he never touched a card. His diet, for reasons of +health, was of a most sparing kind; nothing could tempt him to partake +of food between his regular hours, and for many years he abstained from +both tea and coffee. In those peaceful times, moreover, there was +nothing either commanding or captivating about the Professor of +Artillery. His little romance in Mexico had given him no taste for +trivial pleasures; and his somewhat formal manner was not redeemed by +any special charm of feature. The brow and jaw were undoubtedly +powerful; but the eyes were gentle, and the voice so mild and soft as +to belie altogether the set determination of the thin straight lips. +Yet, at the same time, if Jackson was not formed for general society, +he was none the less capable of making himself exceedingly agreeable in +a restricted and congenial circle. Young and old, when once they had +gained his confidence, came under +the spell of his noble nature; and if his friends were few they were +very firm. + +Why Jackson should have preferred the Presbyterian denomination to all +others we are nowhere told. But whatever his reasons may have been, he +was a most zealous and hardworking member of his church. He was not +content with perfunctory attendances at the services. He became a +deacon, and a large portion of his leisure time was devoted to the work +which thus devolved on him. His duties were to collect alms and to +distribute to the destitute, and nothing was permitted to interfere +with their exact performance. He was exceedingly charitable himself—one +tenth of his income was laid aside for the church, and he gave freely +to all causes of benevolence and public enterprise. At the church +meetings, whether for business or prayer, he was a regular attendant, +and between himself and his pastor existed the most confidential +relations. Nor did he consider that this was all that was demanded of +him. In Lexington, as in other Southern towns, there were many poor +negroes, and the condition of these ignorant and helpless creatures, +especially of the children, excited his compassion. Out of his own +means he established a Sunday school, in which he and his wife were the +principal teachers. His friends were asked to send their slaves, and +the experiment was successful. The benches were always crowded, and the +rows of black, bright-eyed faces were a source of as much pride to him +as the martial appearance of the cadet battalion. + +Jackson’s religion entered into every action of his life. No duty, +however trivial, was begun without asking a blessing, or ended without +returning thanks. “He had long cultivated,” he said, “the habit of +connecting the most trivial and customary acts of life with a silent +prayer.” He took the Bible as his guide, and it is possible that his +literal interpretation of its precepts caused many to regard him as a +fanatic. His observance of the Sabbath was hardly in accordance with +ordinary usage. He never read a letter on that day, nor posted one; he +believed that the Government in carrying the mails were violating a +divine +law, and he considered the suppression of such traffic one of the most +important duties of the legislature. Such opinions were uncommon, even +amongst the Presbyterians, and his rigid respect for truth served to +strengthen the impression that he was morbidly scrupulous. If he +unintentionally made a misstatement—even about some trifling matter—as +soon as he discovered his mistake he would lose no time and spare no +trouble in hastening to correct it. “Why, in the name of reason,” he +was asked, “do you walk a mile in the rain for a perfectly unimportant +thing?” “Simply because I have discovered that it was a misstatement, +and I could not sleep comfortably unless I put it right.” + +He had occasion to censure a cadet who had given, as Jackson believed, +the wrong solution of a problem. On thinking the matter over at home he +found that the pupil was right and the teacher wrong. It was late at +night and in the depth of winter, but he immediately started off to the +Institute, some distance from his quarters, and sent for the cadet. The +delinquent, answering with much trepidation the untimely summons, found +himself to his astonishment the recipient of a frank apology. Jackson’s +scruples carried him even further. Persons who interlarded their +conversation with the unmeaning phrase “you know” were often astonished +by the blunt interruption that he did _not_ know; and when he was +entreated at parties or receptions to break through his dietary rules, +and for courtesy’s sake to accept some delicacy, he would always refuse +with the reply that he had “no genius for seeming.” But if he carried +his conscientiousness to extremes, if he laid down stringent rules for +his own governance, he neither set himself up for a model nor did he +attempt to force his convictions upon others. He was always tolerant; +he knew his own faults, and his own temptations, and if he could say +nothing good of a man he would not speak of him at all. But he was by +no means disposed to overlook conduct of which he disapproved, and +undue leniency was a weakness to which he never yielded. If he once +lost confidence or discovered deception on the +part of one he trusted, he withdrew himself as far as possible from any +further dealings with him; and whether with the cadets, or with his +brother-officers, if an offence had been committed of which he was +called upon to take notice, he was absolutely inflexible. Punishment or +report inevitably followed. No excuses, no personal feelings, no +appeals to the suffering which might be brought upon the innocent, were +permitted to interfere with the execution of his duty. + +Such were the chief characteristics of the great Confederate as he +appeared to the little world of Lexington. The tall figure, clad in the +blue uniform of the United States army, always scrupulously neat, +striding to and from the Institute, or standing in the centre of the +parade-ground, while the cadet battalion wheeled and deployed at his +command, was familiar to the whole community. But Jackson’s heart was +not worn on his sleeve. Shy and silent as he was, the knowledge that +even his closest acquaintances had of him was hardly more than +superficial. A man who was always chary of expressing his opinions, +unless they were asked for, who declined argument, and used as few +words as possible, attracted but little notice. A few recognised his +clear good sense; the majority considered that if he said little it was +because he had nothing worth saying. Because he went his own way and +lived by his own rules he was considered eccentric; because he was +sometimes absent-minded, and apt to become absorbed in his own +thoughts, he was set down as unpractical; his literal accuracy of +statement was construed as the mark of a narrow intellect, and his +exceeding modesty served to keep him in the background. + +At the Institute, despite his reputation for courage, he was no +favourite even with the cadets. He was hardly in sympathy with them. +His temper was always equable. Whatever he may have felt he never +betrayed irritation, and in the lecture-room or elsewhere he was +kindness itself; but his own life had been filled from boyhood with +earnest purpose and high ambition. Hard work was more to his taste than +amusement. Time, to his mind, was far +too valuable to be wasted, and he made few allowances for the +thoughtlessness and indolence of irresponsible youth. As a relief +possibly to the educational treadmill, his class delighted in listening +to the story of Contreras and Chapultepec; but there was nothing about +Jackson which corresponded with a boy’s idea of a hero. His aggressive +punctuality, his strict observance of military etiquette, his precise +interpretation of orders, seemed to have as little in common with the +fierce excitement of battle as the uninteresting occupations of the +Presbyterian deacon, who kept a Sunday school for negroes, had with the +reckless gaiety of the traditional _sabreur._ + +“And yet,” says one who know him, “they imbibed the principles he +taught. Slowly and certainly were they trained in the direction which +the teacher wished. Jackson justly believed that the chief value of the +Institute consisted in the habits of system and obedience which it +impressed on the ductile characters of the cadets, and regarded any +relaxation of the rules as tending to destroy its usefulness. His +conscientiousness seemed absurd to the young gentlemen who had no idea +of the importance of military orders or of the implicit obedience which +a good soldier deems it his duty to pay to them. But which was +right—the laughing young cadet or the grave major of artillery? Let the +thousands who in the bitter and arduous struggle of the Civil War were +taught by stern experience the necessity of strict compliance with all +orders, to the very letter, answer the question.”[2] + +[Illustration: Stonewall Jackson] + +“As exact as the multiplication table, and as full of things military +as an arsenal,” was the verdict passed on Jackson by one of his +townsmen, and it appears to have been the opinion of the community at +large. + +Jackson, indeed, was as inarticulate as Cromwell. Like the great +Protector he “lived silent,” and like him he was often misunderstood. +Stories which have been repeated by writer after writer attribute to +him the most grotesque eccentricities of manner, and exhibit his lofty +piety as the harsh intolerance of a fanatic. He has been +represented as the narrowest of Calvinists; and so general was the +belief in his stern and merciless nature that a great poet did not +scruple to link his name with a deed which, had it actually occurred, +would have been one of almost unexampled cruelty. Such calumnies as +Whittier’s “Barbara Frichtie” may possibly have found their source in +the impression made upon some of Jackson’s acquaintances at Lexington, +who, out of all sympathy with his high ideal of life and duty, regarded +him as morose and morbid; and when in after years the fierce and +relentless pursuit of the Confederate general piled the dead high upon +the battle-field, this conception of his character was readily +accepted. As he rose to fame, men listened greedily to those who could +speak of him from personal knowledge; the anecdotes which they related +were quickly distorted; the slightest peculiarities of walk, speech, or +gesture were greatly exaggerated; and even Virginians seemed to vie +with one another in representing the humble and kind-hearted soldier as +the most bigoted of Christians and the most pitiless of men. + +But just as the majority of ridiculous stories which cluster round his +name rest on the very flimsiest foundation, so the popular conception +of his character during his life at Lexington was absolutely erroneous. +It was only within the portals of his home that his real nature +disclosed itself. The simple and pathetic pages in which his widow has +recorded the story of their married life unfold an almost ideal picture +of domestic happiness, unchequered by the faintest glimpse of austerity +or gloom. That quiet home was the abode of much content; the sunshine +of sweet temper flooded every nook and corner; and although the +pervading atmosphere was essentially religious, mirth and laughter were +familiar guests. + +“Those who knew General Jackson only as they saw him in public would +have found it hard to believe that there could be such a transformation +as he exhibited in his domestic life. He luxuriated in the freedom and +liberty of his home, and his buoyancy and joyousness often ran into a +playfulness and abandon that would have been +incredible to those who saw him only when he put on his official +dignity.”[3] It was seldom, indeed, except under his own roof, or in +the company of his intimates, that his reserve was broken through; in +society he was always on his guard, fearful lest any chance word might +be misconstrued or give offence. It is no wonder, then, that Lexington +misjudged him. Nor were those who knew him only when he was absorbed in +the cares of command before the enemy likely to see far below the +surface. The dominant trait in Jackson’s character was his intense +earnestness, and when work was doing, every faculty of his nature was +engrossed in the accomplishment of the task on hand. But precise, +methodical, and matter-of-fact as he appeared, his was no commonplace +and prosaic nature. He had “the delicacy and the tenderness which are +the rarest and most beautiful ornament of the strong.”[4] Beneath his +habitual gravity a vivid imagination, restrained indeed by strong sense +and indulging in no vain visions, was ever at work; and a lofty +enthusiasm, which seldom betrayed itself in words, inspired his whole +being. He was essentially chivalrous. His deference to woman, even in a +land where such deference was still the fashion, was remarkable, and +his sympathy with the oppressed was as deep as his loyalty to Virginia. +He was an ardent lover of nature. The autumnal glories of the forest, +the songs of the birds, the splendours of the sunset, were sources of +unfailing pleasure. More than all, the strength of his imagination +carried him further than the confines of the material world, and he saw +with unclouded vision the radiant heights that lie beyond. + +Jackson, then, was something more than a man of virile temperament; he +was gifted with other qualities than energy, determination, and common +sense. He was not witty. He had no talent for repartee, and the most +industrious collector of anecdotes will find few good things attributed +to him. But he possessed a kindly humour which found vent in playful +expressions of endearment, or in practical jokes of the most innocent +description; and if these outbursts of high spirits were confined to +the +precincts of his own home, they proved at least that neither by +temperament nor principle was he inclined to look upon the darker side. +His eye for a ludicrous situation was very quick, and a joke which told +against himself always caused him the most intense amusement. It is +impossible to read the letters which Mrs. Jackson has published and to +entertain the belief that his temper was ever in the least degree +morose. To use her own words, “they are the overflow of a heart full of +tenderness;” it is true that they seldom omit some reference to that +higher life which both husband and wife were striving hand in hand to +lead, but they are instinct from first to last with the serene +happiness of a contented mind. + +Even more marked than his habitual cheerfulness was his almost feminine +sympathy with the poor and feeble. His servants, as was the universal +rule in Virginia, were his slaves; but his relations with his black +dependents were of almost a paternal character, and his kindness was +repaid by that childlike devotion peculiar to the negro race. More than +one of these servants—so great was his reputation for kindness—had +begged him to buy them from their former owners. Their interests were +his special care; in sickness they received all the attention and +comfort that the house afforded; to his favourite virtues, politeness +and punctuality, they were trained by their master himself, and their +moral education was a task he cheerfully undertook. “There was one +little servant in the family,” says Mrs. Jackson, “whom my husband took +under his sheltering roof at the solicitations of an aged lady; to whom +the child became a care after having been left an orphan. She was not +bright, but he persevered in drilling her into memorising a child’s +catechism, and it was a most amusing picture to see her standing before +him with fixed attention, as if she were straining every nerve, and +reciting her answers with the drop of a curtsey at each word. She had +not been taught to do this, but it was such an effort for her to learn +that she assumed the motion involuntarily.” + +Jackson’s home was childless. A little daughter, born at Lexington, +lived only for a few weeks, and her place +remained unfilled. His sorrow, although he submitted uncomplainingly, +was very bitter, for his love for children was very great. “A +gentleman,” says Mrs. Jackson, “who spent the night with us was +accompanied by his daughter, but four years of age. It was the first +time the child had been separated from her mother, and my husband +suggested that she should be committed to my care during the night, but +she clung to her father. After our guests had both sunk in slumber, the +father was aroused by someone leaning over his little girl and drawing +the covering more closely round her. It was only his thoughtful host, +who felt anxious lest his little guest should miss her mother’s +guardian care under his roof, and could not go to sleep himself until +he was satisfied that all was well with the child.” + +These incidents are little more than trivial. The attributes they +reveal seem of small import. They are not such as go towards building +up a successful career either in war or politics. And yet to arrive at +a true conception of Jackson’s character it is necessary that such +incidents should be recorded. That character will not appear the less +admirable because its strength and energy were tempered by softer +virtues; and when we remember the great soldier teaching a negro child, +or ministering to the comfort of a sick slave, it becomes easy to +understand the feelings with which his veterans regarded him. The quiet +home at Lexington reveals more of the real man than the camps and +conflicts of the Civil War, and no picture of Stonewall Jackson would +be complete without some reference to his domestic life. + +“His life at home,” says his wife, “was perfectly regular and +systematic. He arose about six o’clock, and first knelt in secret +prayer; then he took a cold bath, which was never omitted even in the +coldest days of winter. This was followed by a brisk walk, in rain or +shine. + +“Seven o’clock was the hour for family prayers, which he required all +his servants to attend promptly and regularly. He never waited for +anyone, not even his wife. Breakfast followed prayers, after which he +left immediately for the Institute, his classes opening at eight +o’clock and continuing to eleven. Upon his return home at eleven +o’clock he devoted himself to study until one. The first book he took +up daily was his Bible, which he read with a commentary, and the many +pencil marks upon it showed with what care he bent over its pages. From +his Bible lesson he turned to his text-books. During those hours of +study he would permit no interruption, and stood all the time in front +of a high desk. After dinner he gave himself up for half an hour or +more to leisure and conversation, and this was one of the brightest +periods in his home life. He then went into his garden, or out to his +farm to superintend his servants, and frequently joined them in manual +labour. He would often drive me to the farm, and find a shady spot for +me under the trees, while he attended to the work of the field. When +this was not the case, he always returned in time to take me, if the +weather permitted, for an evening walk or drive. In summer we often +took our drives by moonlight, and in the beautiful Valley of Virginia +the queen of night seemed to shine with more brightness than elsewhere. +When at home he would indulge himself in a season of rest and +recreation after supper, thinking it was injurious to health to go to +work immediately. As it was a rule with him never to use his eyes by +artificial light, he formed the habit of studying mentally for an hour +or so without a book. After going over his lessons in the morning, he +thus reviewed them at night, and in order to abstract his thoughts from +surrounding objects—a habit which he had cultivated to a remarkable +degree—he would, if alone with his wife, ask that he might not be +disturbed by any conversation; he would then take his seat with his +face to the wall, and remain in perfect abstraction until he finished +his mental task. He was very fond of being read to, and much of our +time in the evening was passed in my ministering to him in this way. He +had a library, which, though small, was select, composed chiefly of +scientific, historical, and religious books, with some of a lighter +character, and some in Spanish and French. Nearly all of them were full +of his pencil marks, made with a view to future reference.” Next to the +Bible, history, both ancient +and modern, was his favourite study. Plutarch, Josephus, Rollin, +Robertson, Hallam, Macaulay, and Bancroft were his constant companions. +Shakespeare held an honoured place upon his shelves; and when a novel +fell into his hands he became so absorbed in the story that he +eventually avoided such literature as a waste of time. “I am anxious,” +he wrote to a relative, “to devote myself to study until I shall become +master of my profession.” + +The Jacksons were far from affluent. The professor had nothing but his +salary, and his wife, one of a large family, brought no increase to +their income. But the traditional hospitality of Virginia was a virtue +by no means neglected. He was generous but unostentatious in his mode +of living, and nothing gave him more pleasure than to bid his friends +welcome to his own home. + +His outdoor recreations were healthful but not exciting. The hills +round Lexington teemed with game, the rivers with fish, and shooting +and fishing were the favourite amusements of his colleagues. But +Jackson found no pleasure in rod or gun; and although fond of riding +and a good horseman, he never appears to have joined in any of those +equestrian sports to which the Virginians were much addicted. He +neither followed the hunt nor tilted at the ring. His exercise was +taken after more utilitarian fashion, in the garden or the farm. + +It need hardly be said that such a lover of order and method was +strictly economical, and the wise administration of the farm and +household permitted an annual expenditure on travel. Many of the most +beautiful localities and famous cities of the east and north were +visited in these excursions. Sometimes he wandered with his wife in +search of health; more often the object of their journey was to see +with their own eyes the splendid scenery of their native land. The +associations which were ever connected in Jackson’s mind with his tour +through Europe show how intensely he appreciated the marvels both of +nature and of art. + +“I would advise you,” he wrote to a friend, “never to name my European +trip to me unless you are blest with a superabundance of patience, as +its very mention is calculated +to bring up with it an almost inexhaustible assemblage of grand and +beautiful associations. Passing over the works of the Creator, which +are far the most impressive, it is difficult to conceive of the +influences which even the works of His creatures exercise over the mind +of one who lingers amidst their master productions. Well do I remember +the influence of sculpture upon me during my short stay in Florence, +and how there I began to realise the sentiment of the Florentine: ‘Take +from me my liberty, take what you will, but leave me my statuary, leave +me these entrancing productions of art.’ And similar to this is the +influence of painting.” + +But delightful as were these holiday expeditions, the day of Jackson’s +return to Lexington and his duties never came too soon. In the quiet +routine of his home life, in his work at the Institute, in the +supervision of his farm and garden, in his evenings with his books, and +in the services of his church, he was more than contented. Whatever +remained of soldierly ambition had long been eradicated. Man of action +as he essentially was, he evinced no longing for a wider sphere of +intellectual activity or for a more active existence. Under his own +roof-tree he found all that he desired. “There,” says his wife, “all +that was best in his nature shone forth;” and that temper was surely of +the sweetest which could utter no sterner rebuke than “Ah! that is not +the way to be happy!” + +Nor was it merely his own gentleness of disposition and the many graces +of his charming helpmate that secured so large a degree of peace and +happiness. Jackson’s religion played even a greater part. It was not of +the kind which is more concerned with the terrors of hell than the +glories of paradise. The world to him was no place of woe and +lamentation, its beauties vanity, and its affections a snare. As he +gazed with delight on the gorgeous tints of the autumnal forests, and +the lovely landscapes of his mountain home, so he enjoyed to the utmost +the life and love which had fallen to his lot, and thanked God for that +capacity for happiness with which his nature was so largely gifted. Yet +it cannot be said that he practised no self-denial. His life, in many +respects, was one of constant self-discipline, and +when his time came to sacrifice himself, he submitted without a murmur. +But in his creed fear had no place. His faith was great. It was not, +however, a mere belief in God’s omnipotence and God’s justice, but a +deep and abiding confidence in His infinite compassion and infinite +love; and it created in him an almost startling consciousness of the +nearness and reality of the invisible world. In a letter to his wife it +is revealed in all its strength: + +“You must not be discouraged at the slowness of recovery. Look up to +Him who giveth liberally for faith to be resigned to His divine will, +and trust Him for that measure of health which will most glorify Him, +and advance to the greatest extent your own real happiness. We are +sometimes suffered to be in a state of perplexity that our faith may be +tried and grow stronger. See if you cannot spend a short time after +dark in looking out of your window into space, and meditating upon +heaven, with all its joys unspeakable and full of glory. . . . ‘All +things work together for good’ to God’s children. Try to look up and be +cheerful, and not desponding. Trust our kind Heavenly Father, and by +the eye of faith see that all things are right and for your best +interests. The clouds come, pass over us, and are followed by bright +sunshine; so in God’s moral dealings with us, He permits to have +trouble awhile. But let us, even in the most trying dispensations of +His Providence, be cheered by the brightness which is a little ahead.” + +It would serve no useful purpose to discuss Jackson’s views on +controversial questions. It may be well, however, to correct a common +error. It has been asserted that he was a fatalist, and therefore +careless of a future over which he believed he had no control. Not a +word, however, either in his letters or in his recorded conversations +warrants the assumption. It is true that his favourite maxim was “Duty +is ours, consequences are God’s,” and that knowing “all things work +together for good,” he looked forward to the future without misgiving +or apprehension. + +But none the less he believed implicitly that the destiny of men and of +nations is in their own hands. His faith +was as sane as it was humble, without a touch of that presumptuous +fanaticism which stains the memory of Cromwell, to whom he has been so +often compared. He never imagined, even at the height of his renown, +when victory on victory crowned his banners, that he was “the scourge +of God,” the chosen instrument of His vengeance. He prayed without +ceasing, under fire as in the camp; but he never mistook his own +impulse for a revelation of the divine will. He prayed for help to do +his duty, and he prayed for success. He knew that: + +“More things are wrought by prayer + Than this world dreams of;” + +but he knew, also, that prayer is not always answered in the way which +man would have it. He went into battle with supreme confidence, not, as +has been alleged, that the Lord had delivered the enemy into his hands, +but that whatever happened would be the best that could happen. And he +was as free from cant as from self-deception. It may be said of +Jackson, as has been said so eloquently of the men whom, in some +respects, he closely resembled, that “his Bible was literally food to +his understanding and a guide to his conduct. He saw the visible finger +of God in every incident of life. . . . That which in our day devout +men and women feel in their earnest moments of prayer, the devout +Puritan felt, as a second nature, in his rising up and in his lying +down; in the market-place and in the home; in society and in business; +in Parliament, in Council, and on the field of battle. And feeling +this, the Puritan had no shame in uttering the very words of the Bible +wherein he had learned so to feel; nay, he would have burned with shame +had he faltered in using the words. It is very hard for us now to grasp +what this implies. . . . But there was a generation in which this +phraseology was the natural speech of men.”[5] Of this generation, +although later in time, was Stonewall Jackson. To him such language as +he used in his letters to his wife, in conversation with his intimates, +and not rarely in his official +correspondence, was “the literal assertion of truths which he felt to +the roots of his being,” which absorbed his thoughts, which coloured +every action of his life, and which, from the abundance of his heart, +rose most naturally to his lips. + +There is no need for further allusion to his domestic or religious +life. If in general society Jackson was wanting in geniality; if he was +so little a man of the world that his example lost much of the +influence which, had he stood less aloof from others, it must have +exercised, it was the fruit of his early training, his natural reserve, +and his extreme humility. It is impossible, however, that so pure a +life should have been altogether without reflex upon others. If the +cadets profited but indirectly, the slaves had cause to bless his +practical Christianity; the poor and the widow knew him as a friend, +and his neighbours looked up to him as the soul of sincerity, the enemy +of all that was false and vile. And for himself—what share had those +years of quiet study, of self-communing, and of self-discipline, in +shaping the triumphs of the Confederate arms? The story of his military +career is the reply. + +Men of action have before now deplored the incessant press of business +which leaves them no leisure to think out the problems which may +confront them in the future. Experience is of little value without +reflection, and leisure has its disadvantages. “One can comprehend,” +says Dabney, referring to Jackson’s peculiar form of mental exercise, +“how valuable was the training which his mind received for his work as +a soldier. Command over his attention was formed into a habit which no +tempest of confusion could disturb. His power of abstraction became +unrivalled. His imagination was trained and invigorated until it became +capable of grouping the most extensive and complex considerations. The +power of his mind was drilled like the strength of an athlete, and his +self-concentration became unsurpassed.” + +Such training was undoubtedly the very best foundation for the +intellectual side of a general’s business. War presents a constant +succession of problems to be solved by +mental processes. For some experience and resource supply a ready +solution. Others, involving the movements of large bodies, +considerations of time and space, and the thousand and one +circumstances, such as food, weather, roads, topography, and morale, +which a general must always bear in mind, are composed of so many +factors, that only a brain accustomed to hard thinking can deal with +them successfully. Of this nature are the problems of strategy—those +which confront a general in command of an army or of a detached portion +of an army, and which are worked out on the map. The problems of the +battle-field are of a different order. The natural characteristics +which, when fortified by experience, carry men through any dangerous +enterprise, win the majority of victories. But men may win battles and +be very poor generals. They may be born leaders of men, and yet +absolutely unfitted for independent command. Their courage, coolness, +and common sense may accomplish the enemy’s overthrow on the field, but +with strategical considerations their intellects may be absolutely +incapable of grappling. In the great wars of the early part of the +century Ney and Blucher were probably the best fighting generals of +France and Prussia. But neither could be trusted to conduct a campaign. +Blucher, pre-eminent on the battle-field, knew nothing of the grand +combinations which prepare and complete success. If he was the strong +right hand of the Prussian army, his chief of staff was the brain. +“Gneisenau,” said the old Marshal, “makes the pills which I +administer.” “Ney’s best qualities,” says Jomini, who served long on +his staff, “his heroic valour, his quick _coup d’œil,_ and his energy, +diminished in the same proportion that the extent of his command +increased his responsibility. Admirable on the field of battle, he +displayed less assurance, not only in council, but whenever he was not +actually face to face with the enemy.” It is not of such material as +Ney and Blucher, mistrustful of their own ability, that great captains +are made. Marked intellectual capacity is the chief characteristic of +the most famous soldiers. Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Marlborough, +Washington, Frederick, Napoleon, Wellington, and Nelson were each and +all of +them something more than mere fighting men. Few of their age rivalled +them in strength of intellect. It was this, combined with the best +qualities of Ney and Blucher, that made them masters of strategy, and +lifted them high above those who were tacticians and nothing more; and +it was strength of intellect that Jackson cultivated at Lexington. + +So, in that quiet home amidst the Virginian mountains, the years sped +by, peaceful and uneventful, varied only by the holiday excursions of +successive summers. By day, the lecture at the Institute, the drill of +the cadet battery, the work of the church, the pleasant toil of the +farm and garden. When night fell, and the curtains were drawn across +the windows that looked upon the quiet street, there in that home where +order reigned supreme, where, as the master wished, “each door turned +softly on a golden hinge,” came those hours of thought and analysis +which were to fit him for great deeds. + +The even tenor of this calm existence was broken, however, by an +incident which intensified the bitter feeling which already divided the +Northern and Southern sections of the United States. During the month +of January, 1859, Jackson had marched with the cadet battalion to +Harper’s Ferry, where, on the northern frontier of Virginia, the +fanatic, John Brown, had attempted to raise an insurrection amongst the +negroes, and had been hung after trial in presence of the troops. By +the South Brown was regarded as a madman and a murderer; by many in the +North he was glorified as a martyr; and so acute was the tension that +early in 1860, during a short absence from Lexington, Jackson wrote in +a letter to his wife, “What do you think about the state of the +country? Viewing things at Washington from human appearances, I think +we have great reason for alarm.” A great crisis was indeed at hand. But +if to her who was ever beside him, while the storm clouds were rising +dark and terrible over the fair skies of the prosperous Republic, the +Christian soldier seemed the man best fitted to lead the people, it was +not so outside. None doubted his sincerity or questioned his +resolution, but few had penetrated his reserve. As the playful +tenderness he displayed at home +was never suspected, so the consuming earnestness, the absolute +fearlessness, whether of danger or of responsibility, the utter +disregard of man, and the unquestioning faith in the Almighty, which +made up the individuality which men called Stonewall Jackson, remained +hidden from all but one. + +To his wife his inward graces idealised his outward seeming; but +others, noting his peculiarities, and deceived by his modesty, saw +little that was remarkable and much that was singular in the staid +professor. Few detected, beneath that quiet demeanour and absent +manner, the existence of energy incarnate and an iron will; and still +fewer beheld, in the plain figure of the Presbyterian deacon, the +potential leader of great armies, inspiring the devotion of his +soldiers, and riding in the forefront of victorious battle. + + [1] Amongst these may be mentioned Grant, Sherman, and McClellan. Lee + himself, as an engineer, had but small acquaintance with regimental + life. The men who saved India for England in the Great mutiny were of + the same type. + + [2] Cooke, p. 28. + + [3] _Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson,_ p. 108. + + [4] Marion Crawford. + + [5] _Oliver Cromwell,_ by Frederic Harrison, p. 29. + + + + +Chapter IV +SECESSION. 1860–61 + + +1861 Jackson spent ten years at Lexington, and he was just +five-and-thirty when he left it. For ten years he had seen no more of +military service than the drills of the cadet battalion. He had lost +all touch with the army. His name had been forgotten, except by his +comrades of the Mexican campaign, and he had hardly seen a regular +soldier since he resigned his commission. But, even from a military +point of view, those ten years had not been wasted. His mind had a +wider grasp, and his brain was more active. Striving to fit himself for +such duties as might devolve on him, should he be summoned to the +field, like all great men and all practical men he had gone to the best +masters. In the campaigns of Napoleon he had found instruction in the +highest branch of his profession, and had made his own the methods of +war which the greatest of modern soldiers both preached and practised. +Maturer years and the search for wisdom had steadied his restless +daring; and his devotion to duty, always remarkable, had become a +second nature. His health, under careful and self-imposed treatment, +had much improved, and the year 1861 found him in the prime of physical +and mental vigour. Already it had become apparent that his life at +Lexington was soon to end. The Damascus blade was not to rust upon the +shelf. During the winter of 1860–61 the probability of a conflict +between the free and slave-holding States, that is, between North and +South, had become almost a certainty. South Carolina, Mississippi, +Alabama, Florida, Georgia, +Louisiana, and Texas, had formally seceded from the Union; and +establishing a Provisional Government, with Jefferson Davis as +President, at Montgomery in Alabama, had proclaimed a new Republic, +under the title of the Confederate States of America. In order to +explain Jackson’s attitude at this momentous crisis, it will be +necessary to discuss the action of Virginia, and to investigate the +motives which led her to take the side she did. + +Forces which it was impossible to curb, and which but few detected, +were at the root of the secession movement. The ostensible cause was +the future status of the negro. + +Slavery was recognised in fifteen States of the Union. In the North it +had long been abolished, but this made no difference to its existence +in the South. The States which composed the Union were semi-independent +communities, with their own legislatures, their own magistracies, their +own militia, and the power of the purse. How far their sovereign rights +extended was a matter of contention; but, under the terms of the +Constitution, slavery was a domestic institution, which each individual +State was at liberty to retain or discard at will, and over which the +Federal Government had no control whatever. Congress would have been no +more justified in declaring that the slaves in Virginia were free men +than in demanding that Russian conspirators should be tried by jury. +Nor was the philanthropy of the Northern people, generally speaking, of +an enthusiastic nature. The majority regarded slavery as a necessary +evil; and, if they deplored the reproach to the Republic, they made +little parade of their sentiments. A large number of Southerners +believed it to be the happiest condition for the African race; but the +best men, especially in the border States, of which Virginia was the +principal, would have welcomed emancipation. But neither Northerner nor +Southerner saw a practicable method of giving freedom to the negro. +Such a measure, if carried out in its entirety, meant ruin to the +South. Cotton and tobacco, the principal and most lucrative crops, +required an immense number of hands, and in those hands—his negro +slaves—the capital of the planter was locked up. Emancipation would +have swept the whole of this capital away. Compensation, the remedy +applied by England to Jamaica and South Africa, was hardly to be +thought of. Instead of twenty millions sterling, it would have cost +four hundred millions. It was doubtful, too, if compensation would have +staved off the ruin of the planters. The labour of the free negro, +naturally indolent and improvident, was well known to be most +inefficient as compared with that of the slave. For some years, to say +the least, after emancipation it would have been impossible to work the +plantations except at a heavy loss. Moreover, abolition, in the +judgment of all who knew him, meant ruin to the negro. Under the system +of the plantations, honesty and morality were being gradually instilled +into the coloured race. But these virtues had as yet made little +progress; the Christianity of the slaves was but skin-deep; and if all +restraint were removed, if the old ties were broken, and the influence +of the planter and his family should cease to operate, it was only too +probable that the four millions of Africans would relapse into the +barbaric vices of their original condition. The hideous massacres which +had followed emancipation in San Domingo had not yet been forgotten. It +is little wonder, then, that the majority shrank before a problem +involving such tremendous consequences. + +A party, however, conspicuous both in New England and the West, had +taken abolition for its watchword. Small in numbers, but vehement in +denunciation, its voice was heard throughout the Union. Zeal for +universal liberty rose superior to the Constitution. That instrument +was repudiated as an iniquitous document. The sovereign rights of the +individual States were indignantly denied. Slavery was denounced as the +sum of all villainies, the slave-holder as the worst of tyrants; and no +concealment was made of the intention, should political power be +secured, of compelling the South to set the negroes free. In the autumn +of 1860 came the Presidential election. Hitherto, of the two great +political parties, the Democrats had long ruled the councils of the +nation, and nearly the +whole South was Democratic. The South, as regards population, was +numerically inferior to the North; but the Democratic party had more +than held its own at the ballot-boxes, for the reason that it had many +adherents in the North. So long as the Southern and Northern Democrats +held together, they far outnumbered the Republicans. In 1860, however, +the two sections of the Democratic party split asunder. The +Republicans, favoured by the schism, carried their own candidate, and +Abraham Lincoln became President. South Carolina at once seceded and +the Confederacy was soon afterwards established. + +It is not at first sight apparent why a change of government should +have caused so sudden a disruption of the Union. The Republican party, +however, embraced sections of various shades of thought. One of these, +rising every day to greater prominence, was that which advocated +immediate abolition; and to this section, designated by the South as +“Black Republicans,” the new President was believed to belong. It is +possible that, on his advent to office, the political leaders of the +South, despite the safeguards of the Constitution, saw in the near +future the unconditional emancipation of the slaves; and not only this, +but that the emancipated slaves would receive the right of suffrage, +and be placed on a footing of complete equality with their former +masters.[1] As in many districts the whites were far outnumbered by the +negroes, this was tantamount to transferring all local government into +the hands of the latter, and surrendering the planters to the mercies +of their former bondsmen. + +It is hardly necessary to say that an act of such gross injustice was +never contemplated, except by hysterical abolitionists and those who +truckled for their votes. It was certainly not contemplated by Mr. +Lincoln; and it was hardly likely that a President who had been elected +by a minority of the people would dare, even if he were so inclined, to +assume unconstitutional powers. The Democratic party, taking both +sections together, was still the stronger; +and the Northern Democrats, temporarily severed as they were from their +Southern brethren, would most assuredly have united with them in +resisting any unconstitutional action on the part of the Republicans. + +If, then, it might be asked, slavery ran no risk of unconditional +abolition, why should the Southern political leaders have acted with +such extraordinary precipitation? Why, in a country in which, to all +appearances, the two sections had been cordially united, should the +advent to power of one political party have been the signal for so much +disquietude on the part of the other? Had the presidential seat been +suddenly usurped by an abolitionist tyrant of the type of Robespierre +the South could hardly have exhibited greater apprehension. Few +Americans denied that a permanent Union, such as had been designed by +the founders of the Republic, was the best guarantee of prosperity and +peace. And yet because a certain number of misguided if well-meaning +men clamoured for emancipation, the South chose to bring down in ruin +the splendid fabric which their forefathers had constructed. In thus +refusing to trust the good sense and fair dealing of the Republicans, +it would seem, at a superficial glance, that the course adopted by the +members of the new Confederacy, whether legitimate or not, could not +possibly be justified.[2] + +Unfortunately, something more than mere political rancour was at work. +The areas of slave and of free labour were divided by an artificial +frontier. “Mason and +Dixon’s line,” originally fixed as the boundary between Pennsylvania on +the north and Virginia and Maryland on the south, cut the territory of +the United States into two distinct sections; and, little by little, +these two sections, geographically as well as politically severed, had +resolved themselves into what might almost be termed two distinct +nations. + +Many circumstances tended to increase the cleavage. The South was +purely agricultural; the most prosperous part of the North was purely +industrial. In the South, the great planters formed a landed +aristocracy; the claims of birth were ungrudgingly admitted; class +barriers were, to a certain extent, a recognised part of the social +system, and the sons of the old houses were accepted as the natural +leaders of the people. In the North, on the contrary, the only +aristocracy was that of wealth; and even wealth, apart from merit, had +no hold on the respect of the community. The distinctions of caste were +slight in the extreme. The descendants of the Puritans, of those +English country gentlemen who had preferred to ride with Cromwell +rather than with Rupert, to pray with Baxter rather than with Laud, +made no parade of their ancestry; and among the extreme Republicans +existed an innate but decided aversion to the recognition of social +grades. Moreover, divergent interests demanded different fiscal +treatment. The cotton and tobacco of the South, monopolising the +markets of the world, asked for free trade. The manufacturers of New +England, struggling against foreign competition, were strong +protectionists, and they were powerful enough to enforce their will in +the shape of an oppressive tariff. Thus the planters of Virginia paid +high prices in order that mills might flourish in Connecticut; and the +sovereign States of the South, to their own detriment, were compelled +to contribute to the abundance of the wealthier North. The interests of +labour were not less conflicting. The competition between free and +forced labour, side by side on the same continent, was bound in itself, +sooner or later, to breed dissension; and if it had not yet reached an +acute stage, it had at least +created a certain degree of bitter feeling. But more than all—and the +fact must be borne in mind if the character of the Civil War is to be +fully appreciated—the natural ties which should have linked together +the States on either side of Mason and Dixon’s line had weakened to a +mere mechanical bond. The intercourse between North and South, social +or commercial, was hardly more than that which exists between two +foreign nations. The two sections knew but little of each other, and +that little was not the good points but the bad. + +For more than fifty years after the election of the first President, +while as yet the crust of European tradition overlaid the young shoots +of democracy, the supremacy, social and political, of the great +landowners of the South had been practically undisputed. But when the +young Republic began to take its place amongst the nations, men found +that the wealth and talents which led it forward belonged as much to +the busy cities of New England as to the plantations of Virginia and +the Carolinas; and with the growing sentiment in favour of universal +equality began the revolt against the dominion of a caste. Those who +had carved out their own fortunes by sheer hard work and ability +questioned the superiority of men whose positions were no guarantee of +personal capacity, and whose wealth was not of their own making. Those +who had borne the heat and burden of the day deemed themselves the +equals and more than equals of those who had loitered in the shade; +and, esteeming men for their own worth and not for that of some +forgotten ancestor, they had come to despise those who toiled not +neither did they spin. Tenaciously the Southerners clung to the +supremacy they had inherited from a bygone age. The contempt of the +Northerner was repaid in kind. In the political arena the struggle was +fierce and keen. Mutual hatred, fanned by unscrupulous agitators, +increased in bitterness; and, hindering reconciliation, rose the fatal +barrier of slavery. + +It is true that, prior to 1860, the abolitionists were not numerous in +the North; and it is equally true that by +many of the best men in the South the institution which had been +bequeathed to them was thoroughly detested. Looking back over the years +which have elapsed since the slaves were freed, the errors of the two +factions are sufficiently manifest. If, on the one hand, the +abolitionist, denouncing sternly, in season and out of season, the +existence of slavery on the free soil of America, was unjust and worse +to the slave-owner, who, to say the least, was in no way responsible +for the inhuman and shortsighted policy of a former generation; on the +other hand the high-principled Southerner, although in his heart +deploring the condition of the negro, and sometimes imitating the +example of Washington, whose dying bequest gave freedom to his slaves, +made no attempt to find a remedy.[3] + +The latter had the better excuse. He knew, were emancipation granted, +that years must elapse before the negro could be trained to the +responsibilities of freedom, and that those years would impoverish the +South. It appears to have been forgotten by the abolitionists that all +races upon earth have required a protracted probation to fit them for +the rights of citizenship and the duties of free men. Here was a +people, hardly emerged from the grossest barbarism, and possibly, from +the very beginning, +of inferior natural endowment, on whom they proposed to confer the same +rights without any probation whatsoever. A glance at the world around +them should have induced reflection. The experience of other countries +was not encouraging. Hayti, where the blacks had long been masters of +the soil, was still a pandemonium; and in Jamaica and South Africa the +precipitate action of zealous but unpractical philanthropists had +wrought incalculable mischief. Even Lincoln himself, redemption by +purchase being impracticable, saw no other way out of the difficulty +than the wholesale deportation of the negroes to West Africa. + +In time, perhaps, under the influence of such men as Lincoln and Lee, +the nation might have found a solution of the problem, and North and +South have combined to rid their common country of the curse of human +servitude. But between fanaticism on the one side and helplessness on +the other there was no common ground. The fierce invectives of the +reformers forbade all hope of temperate discussion, and their +unreasoning denunciations only provoked resentment. And this resentment +became the more bitter because in demanding emancipation, either by +fair means or forcible, and in expressing their intention of making it +a national question, the abolitionists were directly striking at a +right which the people of the South held sacred. + +It had never been questioned, hitherto, that the several States of the +Union, so far at least as concerned their domestic institutions, were +each and all of them, under the Constitution, absolutely +self-governing. But the threats which the Black Republicans held out +were tantamount to a proposal to set the Constitution aside. It was +their charter of liberty, therefore, and not only their material +prosperity, which the States that first seceded believed to be +endangered by Lincoln’s election. Ignorant of the temper of the great +mass of the Northern people, as loyal in reality to the Constitution as +themselves, they were only too ready to be convinced that the +denunciations of the abolitionists were the first presage of the storm +that was presently to overwhelm them, to reduce their States to +provinces, to wrest from them the freedom they had +inherited, and to make them hewers of wood and drawers of water to the +detested plutocrats of New England. + +But the gravamen of the indictment against the Southern people is not +that they seceded, but that they seceded in order to preserve and to +perpetuate slavery; or, to put it more forcibly, that the liberty to +enslave others was the right which most they valued. This charge, put +forward by the abolitionists in order to cloak their own revolt against +the Constitution, is true as regards a certain section, but as regards +the South as a nation it is quite untenable, for three-fourths of the +population derived rather injury than benefit from the presence in +their midst of four million serfs.[4] “Had slavery continued, the +system of labour,” says General Grant, “would soon have impoverished +the soil and left the country poor. The non-slave-holder must have left +the country, and the small slave-holder have sold out to his more +fortunate neighbour.”[5] The slaves neither bought nor sold. Their +wants were supplied almost entirely by their own labour; and the local +markets of the South would have drawn far larger profit from a few +thousand white labourers than they did from the multitude of negroes. +It is true that a party in the South, more numerous perhaps among the +political leaders than among the people at large, was averse to +emancipation under any form or shape. There were men who looked upon +their bondsmen as mere beasts of burden, more valuable but hardly more +human than the cattle in their fields, and who would not only have +perpetuated but have extended slavery. There were others who +conscientiously believed that the negro was unfit for freedom, that he +was incapable of self-improvement, and that he was far happier and more +contented as a slave. Among these were ministers of the Gospel, in no +small number, who, appealing to the Old Testament, preached boldly that +the institution was of divine origin, that the coloured race +had been created for servitude, and that to advocate emancipation was +to impugn the wisdom of the Almighty. + +But there were still others, including many of those who were not +slave-owners, who, while they acquiesced in the existence of an +institution for which they were not personally accountable, looked +forward to its ultimate extinction by the voluntary action of the +States concerned. It was impossible as yet to touch the question +openly, for the invectives and injustice of the abolitionists had so +wrought upon the Southern people, that such action would have been +deemed a base surrender to the dictation of the enemy; but they trusted +to time, to the spread of education, and to a feeling in favour of +emancipation which was gradually pervading the whole country.[6] + +The opinions of this party, with which, it may be said, the bulk of the +Northern people was in close sympathy,[7] are perhaps best expressed in +a letter written by Colonel Robert Lee, the head of one of the oldest +families in Virginia, a large landed proprietor and slave-holder, and +the same officer who had won such well-deserved renown in Mexico. “In +this enlightened age,” wrote the future general-in-chief of the +Confederate army, “there are few, I believe, but will acknowledge that +slavery as an institution is a moral and political evil. It is useless +to expatiate on its disadvantages. I think it a greater evil to the +white than to the coloured race, and while my feelings are strongly +interested in the latter, my sympathies are more deeply engaged for the +former. The blacks are immeasurably better off here than in +Africa—morally, socially, and physically. The painful discipline they +are undergoing is necessary for their instruction as a race, and, I +hope, will prepare them for better things. How long their subjection +may be necessary is known and ordered by a merciful Providence. Their +emancipation will sooner result from the mild and +melting influence of Christianity than from the storms and contests of +fiery controversy. This influence, though slow, is sure. The doctrines +and miracles of our Saviour have required nearly two thousand years to +convert but a small part of the human race, and even among Christian +nations what gross errors still exist! While we see the course of the +final abolition of slavery is still onward, and we give it the aid of +our prayers and all justifiable means in our power, we must leave the +progress as well as the result in His hands, who sees the end and who +chooses to work by slow things, and with whom a thousand years are but +as a single day. The abolitionist must know this, and must see that he +has neither the right nor the power of operating except by moral means +and suasion; if he means well to the slave, he must not create angry +feelings in the master. Although he may not approve of the mode by +which it pleases Providence to accomplish its purposes, the result will +nevertheless be the same; and the reason he gives for interference in +what he has no concern holds good for every kind of interference with +our neighbours when we disapprove of their conduct.” + +With this view of the question Jackson was in perfect agreement. “I am +very confident,” says his wife, “that he would never have fought for +the sole object of perpetuating slavery. . . . He found the institution +a responsible and troublesome one, and I have heard him say that he +would prefer to see the negroes free, but he believed that the Bible +taught that slavery was sanctioned by the Creator Himself, who maketh +all men to differ, and instituted laws for the bond and free. He +therefore accepted slavery, as it existed in the South, not as a thing +desirable in itself, but as allowed by Providence for ends which it was +not his business to determine.” + +It may perhaps be maintained that to have had no dealings with “the +accursed thing,” and to have publicly advocated some process of gradual +emancipation, would have been the nobler course. But, setting aside the +teaching of the Churches, and the bitter temper of the time, it should +be remembered that slavery, although its +hardships were admitted, presented itself in no repulsive aspect to the +people of the Confederate States. They regarded it with feelings very +different from those of the abolitionists, whose acquaintance with the +condition they reprobated was small in the extreme. The lot of the +slaves, the Southerners were well aware, was far preferable to that of +the poor and the destitute of great cities, of the victims of the +sweater and the inmates of fever dens. The helpless negro had more +hands to succour him in Virginia than the starving white man in New +England. The children of the plantation enjoyed a far brighter +existence than the children of the slums. The worn and feeble were +maintained by their masters, and the black labourer, looking forward to +an old age of ease and comfort among his own people, was more fortunate +than many a Northern artisan. Moreover, the brutalities ascribed to the +slave-owners as a class were of rare occurrence. The people of the +South were neither less humane nor less moral than the people of the +North or of Europe, and it is absolutely inconceivable that men of high +character and women of gentle nature should have looked with leniency +on cruelty, or have failed to visit the offender with something more +than reprobation. Had the calumnies[8] which were scattered broadcast +by the abolitionists possessed more than a vestige of truth, men like +Lee and Jackson would never have remained silent. In the minds of the +Northern people slavery was associated with atrocious cruelty and +continual suffering. In the eyes of the Southerners, on the other hand, +it was associated with great kindness and the most affectionate +relations between the planters and their bondsmen. And if the +Southerners were blind, it is most difficult to explain the remarkable +fact that throughout the war, although thousands of plantations and +farms, together with thousands of women and children, all of whose male +relatives were in the Confederate armies, were left entirely to the +care of the negroes, both life and property were perfectly secure. + +Such, then, was the attitude of the South towards +slavery. The institution had many advocates, uncompromising and +aggressive, but taking the people as a whole it was rather tolerated +than approved; and, even if no evidence to the contrary were +forthcoming, we should find it hard to believe that a civilised +community would have plunged into revolution in order to maintain it. +There can be no question but that secession was revolution; and +revolutions, as has been well said, are not made for the sake of +“greased cartridges”. To bring about such unanimity of purpose as took +possession of the whole South, such passionate loyalty to the new +Confederacy, such intense determination to resist coercion to the +bitter end, needed some motive of unusual potency, and the perpetuation +of slavery was not a sufficient motive. The great bulk of the +population neither owned slaves nor was connected with those who did; +many favoured emancipation; and the working men, a rapidly increasing +class, were distinctly antagonistic to slave-labour. Moreover, the +Southerners were not only warmly attached to the Union, which they had +done so much to establish, but their pride in their common country, in +its strength, its prestige, and its prosperity, was very great. Why, +then, should they break away? History supplies us with a pertinent +example. + +Previous to 1765 the honour of England was dear to the people of the +American colonies. King George had no more devoted subjects; his +enemies no fiercer foes. And yet it required very little to reverse the +scroll. The right claimed by the Crown to tax the colonists hardly +menaced their material prosperity. A few shillings more or less would +neither have added to the burdens nor have diminished the comforts of a +well-to-do and thrifty people, and there was some justice in the demand +that they should contribute to the defence of the British Empire. But +the demand, as formulated by the Government, involved a principle which +they were unwilling to admit, and in defence of their birthright as +free citizens they flew to arms. So, in defence of the principle of +States’ Rights the Southern people resolved upon secession with all its +consequences. + +It might be said, however, that South Carolina and her +sister States seceded under the threat of a mere faction; that there +was nothing in the attitude of the Federal Government to justify the +apprehension that the Constitution would be set aside; and that their +action, therefore, was neither more nor less than rank rebellion. But, +whether their rights had been infringed or not, a large majority of the +Southern people believed that secession, at any moment and for any +cause, was perfectly legitimate. The several States of the Union, +according to their political creed, were each and all of them sovereign +and independent nations. The Constitution, they held, was nothing more +than a treaty which they had entered into for their own convenience, +and which, in the exercise of their sovereign powers, individually or +collectively, they might abrogate when they pleased. This +interpretation was not admitted in the North, either by Republicans or +Democrats; yet there was nothing in the letter of the Constitution +which denied it, and as regards the spirit of that covenant North and +South held opposite opinions. But both were perfectly sincere, and in +leaving the Union, therefore, and in creating for themselves a new +government, the people of the seceding States considered that they were +absolutely within their right.[9] + +It must be admitted, at the same time, that the action of the States +which first seceded was marked by a petulant haste; and it is only too +probable that the people of these States suffered themselves to be too +easily persuaded that the North meant mischief. It is impossible to +determine how far the professional politician was responsible for the +Civil War. But when we recall the fact that secession followed close on +the overthrow of a faction which had long monopolised the spoils of +office, and that this faction found compensation in the establishment +of a new government, it is not easy to resist the suspicion that the +secession movement was neither more nor less than a conspiracy, hatched +by a clever and unscrupulous cabal. + +It would be unwise, however, to brand the whole, or even the majority, +of the Southern leaders as selfish and +unprincipled. Unless he has real grievances on which to work, or unless +those who listen to him are supremely ignorant, the mere agitator is +powerless; and it is most assuredly incredible that seven millions of +Anglo-Saxons, and Anglo-Saxons of the purest strain—English, Lowland +Scottish, and North Irish—should have been beguiled by silver tongues +of a few ambitious or hare-brained demagogues. The latter undoubtedly +had a share in bringing matters to a crisis. But the South was ripe for +revolution long before the presidential election. The forces which were +at work needed no artificial impulse to propel them forward. It was +instinctively recognised that the nation had outgrown the Constitution; +and it was to this, and not to the attacks upon slavery, that secession +was really due. The North had come to regard the American people as one +nation, and the will of the majority as paramount.[10] The South, on +the other hand, holding, as it had always held, that each State was a +nation in itself, denied _in toto_ that the will of the majority, +except in certain specified cases, had any power whatever; and where +political creeds were in such direct antagonism no compromise was +possible. Moreover, as the action of the abolitionists very plainly +showed, there was a growing tendency in the North to disregard +altogether the rights of the minority. Secession, in fact, was a +protest against mob rule. The weaker community, hopeless of maintaining +its most cherished principles within the Union, was ready to seize the +first pretext for leaving it; and the strength of the popular sentiment +may be measured by the willingness of every class, gentle and simple, +rich and poor, to risk all and to suffer all, in order to free +themselves from bonds which must soon have become unbearable. It is +always difficult to analyse the motives of those by whom revolution is +provoked; but if a whole people acquiesce, it is a certain proof +of the existence of universal apprehension and deep-rooted discontent. +The spirit of self-sacrifice which animated the Confederate South has +been characteristic of every revolution which has been the expression +of a nation’s wrongs, but it has never yet accompanied mere factious +insurrection. + +When, in process of time, the history of Secession comes to be viewed +with the same freedom from prejudice as the history of the seventeenth +and eighteenth centuries, it will be clear that the fourth great +Revolution of the English-speaking race differs in no essential +characteristic from those which preceded it. It was not simply because +the five members were illegally impeached in 1642, the seven bishops +illegally tried in 1688, men shot at Lexington in 1775, or slavery +threatened in 1861, that the people rose. These were the occasions, not +the causes of revolt. In each case a great principle was at stake: in +1642 the liberty of the subject; in 1688 the integrity of the +Protestant faith; in 1775 taxation only with consent of the taxed; in +1861 the sovereignty of the individual States.[11] + +The accuracy of this statement, as already suggested, has been +consistently denied. That the only principle involved in Secession was +the establishment of slavery on a firmer basis, and that the cry of +States’ Rights was raised only by way of securing sympathy, is a very +general opinion. But before it can be accepted, it is necessary to make +several admissions; first, that the Southerners were absolutely callous +to the evils produced by the institution they had determined to make +permanent; second, that they had persuaded themselves, in face of the +tendencies of civilisation, that it was possible to make it permanent; +and third, that they conscientiously held their progress and +prosperity to be dependent on its continued existence. Are we to +believe that the standard of morals and intelligence was so low as +these admissions would indicate? Are we to believe that if they had +been approached in a charitable spirit, that if the Republican party, +disclaiming all right of interference, had offered to aid them in +substituting, by some means which would have provided for the control +of the negro and, at the same time, have prevented an entire collapse +of the social fabric, a system more consonant with humanity, the +Southerners would have still preferred to leave the Union, and by +creating a great slave-power earn the execration of the Christian +world? + +Unless the South be credited with an unusual measure of depravity and +of short-sightedness, the reply can hardly be in the affirmative. And +if it be otherwise, there remains but one explanation of the conduct of +the seceding States—namely the dread that if they remained in the Union +they would not be fairly treated. + +It is futile to argue that the people were dragooned into secession by +the slave-holders. What power had the slave-holders over the great mass +of the population, over the professional classes, over the small +farmer, the mechanic, the tradesman, the labourer? Yet it is constantly +asserted by Northern writers, although the statement is virtually an +admission that only the few were prepared to fight for slavery, that +the Federal sentiment was so strong among the Southerners that +terrorism must have had a large share in turning them into Separatists. +The answer, putting aside the very patent fact that the Southerner was +not easily coerced, is very plain. Undoubtedly, throughout the South +there was much affection for the Union; but so in the first Revolution +there was much loyalty to the Crown, and yet it has never been asserted +that the people of Virginia or of New England were forced into sedition +against their will. The truth is that there were many Southerners who, +in the vain hope of compromise, would have postponed the rupture; but +when the right of secession was questioned, and the right of coercion +was proclaimed, all differences of opinion were swept away, and +the people, thenceforward, were of one heart and mind. The action of +Virginia is a striking illustration. + +The great border State, the most important of those south of Mason and +Dixon’s line, was not a member of the Confederacy when the Provisional +Government was established at Montgomery. Nor did the secession +movement secure any strong measure of approval. In fact, the people of +Virginia, owing to their closer proximity to, and to their more +intimate knowledge of, the North, were by no means inclined to make of +the Black Republican President the bugbear he appeared to the States +which bordered on the Gulf of Mexico. Whilst acknowledging that the +South had grievances, they saw no reason to believe that redress might +not be obtained by constitutional means. At the same time, although +they questioned the expediency, they held no half-hearted opinion as to +the right, of secession, and in their particular case the right seems +undeniable. When the Constitution of the United States was ratified, +Virginia, by the mouth of its Legislature, had solemnly declared “that +the powers granted [to the Federal Government] under the Constitution, +being truly derived from the people of the United States, may be +resumed by them whenever the same shall be perverted to their injury +and oppression.” And this declaration had been more than once +reaffirmed. As already stated, this view of the political status of the +Virginia citizen was not endorsed by the North. Nevertheless, it was +not definitely rejected. The majority of the Northern people held the +Federal Government paramount, but, at the same time, they held that it +had no power either to punish or coerce the individual States. This had +been the attitude of the founders of the Republic, and it is perfectly +clear that their interpretation of the Constitution was this: although +the several States were morally bound to maintain the compact into +which they had voluntarily entered, the obligation, if any one State +chose to repudiate it, could not be legally enforced. Their ideal was a +Union based upon fraternal affection; and in the halcyon days of +Washington’s first presidency, when the long and victorious struggle +against a common enemy was still fresh in men’s minds, and the sun of +liberty shone in an unclouded sky, a +vision so Utopian perhaps seemed capable of realisation. At all events, +the promise of a new era of unbroken peace and prosperity was not to be +sullied by cold precautions against civil dissensions and conflicting +interests. The new order, under which every man was his own sovereign, +would surely strengthen the links of kindly sympathy, and by those +links alone it was believed that the Union would be held together. Such +was the dream of the unselfish patriots who ruled the destinies of the +infant Republic. Such were the ideas that so far influenced their +deliberations that, with all their wisdom, they left a legacy to their +posterity which deluged the land in blood. + +Mr. Lincoln’s predecessor in the presidential chair had publicly +proclaimed that coercion was both illegal and inexpedient; and for the +three months which intervened between the secession of South Carolina +and the inauguration of the Republican President, the Government made +not the slightest attempt to interfere with the peaceable establishment +of the new Confederacy. Not a single soldier reinforced the garrisons +of the military posts in the South. Not a single regiment was recalled +from the western frontiers; and the seceded States, without a word of +protest, were permitted to take possession, with few exceptions, of the +forts, arsenals, navy yards and custom houses which stood on their own +territory. It seemed that the Federal Government was only waiting until +an amicable arrangement might be arrived at as to the terms of +separation. + +If, in addition to the words in which she had assented to the +Constitution, further justification were needed for the belief of +Virginia in the right of secession, it was assuredly to be found in the +apparent want of unanimity on so grave a question even in the +Republican party, and in the acquiescent attitude of the Federal +Government. + +The people of Virginia, however, saw in the election of a Republican +President no immediate danger of the Constitution being “perverted to +their injury and oppression.” The North, generally speaking, regarded +the action of the secessionists with that strange and good-humoured +tolerance with which the American citizen too often regards internal +politics. The common sense of the nation asserted itself in all its +strength. A Union which could only be maintained by force was a strange +and obnoxious idea to the majority. Amid the storm of abuse and insult +in which the two extreme parties indulged, the abolitionists on the one +side, the politicians on the other, Lincoln, + +“The still strong man in a blatant land,” + +stood calm and steadfast, promising justice to the South, and eager for +reconciliation. And Lincoln represented the real temper of the Northern +people. + +So, in the earlier months of 1861, there was no sign whatever that the +Old Dominion might be compelled to use the alternative her original +representatives had reserved. The question of slavery was no longer to +the fore. While reprobating the action of the Confederates, the +President, in his inaugural address (March 4, 1861), had declared that +the Government had no right to interfere with the domestic institutions +of the individual States; and throughout Virginia the feeling was +strong in favour of the Union. Earnest endeavours were made to effect a +compromise, under which the seceded communities might renew the Federal +compact. The Legislature called a Convention of the People to +deliberate on the part that the State should play, and the other States +were invited to join in a Peace Conference at Washington. + +It need hardly be said that during the period of negotiation excitement +rose to the highest pitch. The political situation was the sole theme +of discussion. In Lexington as elsewhere the one absorbing topic ousted +all others, and in Lexington as elsewhere there was much difference of +opinion. But the general sentiment was strongly Unionist, and in the +election of members of the Convention an overwhelming majority had +pronounced against secession. Between the two parties, however, there +were sharp conflicts. A flagstaff flying the national ensign had been +erected in Main Street, Lexington. The cadets fired on the flag, +and substituting the State colours placed a guard over them. Next +morning a report reached the Institute that the local company of +volunteers had driven off the guard, and were about to restore the +Stars and Stripes. It was a holiday, and there were no officers +present. The drums beat to arms. The boys rushed down to their +parade-ground, buckling on their belts, and carrying their rifles. +Ammunition was distributed, and the whole battalion, under the cadet +officers, marched out of the Institute gates, determined to lower the +emblem of Northern tyranny and drive away the volunteers. A collision +would certainly have ensued had not the attacking column been met by +the Commandant. + +In every discussion on the action of the State Jackson had spoken +strongly on the side of the majority. In terse phrase he had summed up +his view of the situation. He was no advocate of secession. He +deprecated the hasty action of South Carolina. “It is better,” he said, +“for the South to fight for her rights in the Union than out of it.” +But much as they loved the Union, the people of Virginia revered still +more the principles inculcated by their forefathers, the right of +secession and the illegality of coercion. And when the proposals of the +Peace Conference came to nothing, when all hope of compromise died +away, and the Federal Government showed no sign of recognising the +Provisional Government, it became evident even to the staunchest +Unionist that civil war could no longer be postponed. From the very +first no shadow of a doubt had existed in Jackson’s mind as to the side +he should espouse, or the course he should pursue. “If I know myself,” +he wrote, “all I am and all I have is at the service of my country.” + +According to his political creed his country was his native State, and +such was the creed of the whole South. In conforming to the Ordinance +of Secession enacted by the legislatures of their own States, the +people, according to their reading of the Constitution, acted as loyal +and patriotic citizens; to resist that ordinance was treason and +rebellion; and in taking up arms “they were not, in their own opinion, +rebels at all; they were defending +their States—that is, the nations to which they conceived themselves to +belong, from invasion and conquest.”[12] + +When, after the incident described above, the cadets marched back to +barracks, it was already so certain that the Stars and Stripes would +soon be torn down from every flagstaff in Virginia that their breach of +discipline was easily condoned. They were addressed by the Commandant, +and amid growing excitement officer after officer, hardly concealing +his sympathy with their action, gave vent to his opinions on the +approaching crisis. Jackson was silent. At length, perhaps in +anticipation of some amusement, for he was known to be a stumbling +speaker, the cadets called on him by name. In answer to the summons he +stood before them, not, as was his wont in public assemblies, with +ill-dissembled shyness and awkward gesture, but with body erect and +eyes sparkling. “Soldiers,” he said, “when they make speeches should +say but few words, and speak them to the point, and I admire, young +gentlemen, the spirit you have shown in rushing to the defence of your +comrades; but I must commend you particularly for the readiness with +which you listened to the counsel and obeyed the commands of your +superior officer. The time may come,” he continued, and the deep tones, +vibrating with unsuspected resolution, held his audience spellbound, +“when your State will need your services; and if that time does come, +then draw your swords and throw away the scabbards.” + +The crisis was not long postponed. Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbour, +the port of South Carolina, was held by a Federal garrison. The State +had demanded its surrender, but no reply had been vouchsafed by +Lincoln. On April 8 a message was conveyed to the Governor of the State +that an attempt would be made to supply the troops with provisions. +This message was telegraphed to Montgomery, still the capital of the +Confederacy, and the Government ordered the reduction of the fort. On +the morning of April 12 the Southern batteries opened fire, and the +next day, when the flames were already scorching the doors +of the magazine, the standard of the Union was hauled down. + +Two days later Lincoln spoke with no uncertain voice. 75,000 militia +were called out to suppress the “rebellion.” The North gave the +President loyal support. The insult to the flag set the blood of the +nation, of Democrat and Republican, aflame. The time for reconciliation +was passed. The Confederates had committed an unpardonable crime. They +had forfeited all title to consideration; and even in the minds of +those Northerners who had shared their political creed the memory of +their grievances was obliterated. + +So far Virginia had given no overt sign of sympathy with the +revolution. But she was now called upon to furnish her quota of +regiments for the Federal army. To have acceded to the demand would +have been to abjure the most cherished principles of her political +existence. As the Federal Government, according to her political faith, +had no jurisdiction whatever within the boundaries of States which had +chosen to secede, it had not the slightest right to maintain a garrison +in Fort Sumter. The action of the Confederacy in enforcing the +withdrawal of the troops was not generally approved of, but it was held +to be perfectly legitimate; and Mr. Lincoln’s appeal to arms, for the +purpose of suppressing what, in the opinion of Virginia, was a strictly +constitutional movement, was instantly and fiercely challenged. + +Neutrality was impossible. She was bound to furnish her tale of troops, +and thus belie her principles; or to secede at once, and reject with a +clean conscience the President’s mandate. On April 17 she chose the +latter, deliberately and with her eyes open, knowing that war would be +the result, and knowing the vast resources of the North. She was +followed by Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina.[13] + +The world has long since done justice to the motives of Cromwell and of +Washington, and signs are not wanting +that before many years have passed it will do justice to the motives of +the Southern people. They were true to their interpretation of the +Constitution; and if the morality of secession may be questioned, if +South Carolina acted with undue haste and without sufficient +provocation, if certain of the Southern politicians desired +emancipation for themselves that they might continue to enslave others, +it can hardly be denied that the action of Virginia was not only fully +justified, but beyond suspicion. The wildest threats of the Black +Republicans, their loudly expressed determination, in defiance of the +Constitution, to abolish slavery, if necessary by the bullet and the +sabre, shook in no degree whatever her loyalty to the Union. Her best +endeavours were exerted to maintain the peace between the hostile +sections; and not till her liberties were menaced did she repudiate a +compact which had become intolerable. It was to preserve the freedom +which her forefathers had bequeathed her, and which she desired to hand +down unsullied to future generations, that she acquiesced in the +revolution. + +The North, in resolving to maintain the Union by force of arms, was +upheld by the belief that she was acting in accordance with the +Constitution. The South, in asserting her independence and resisting +coercion, found moral support in the same conviction, and the +patriotism of those who fought for the Union was neither purer nor more +ardent than the patriotism of those who fought for States’ Rights. Long +ago, a parliament of that nation to which Jackson and so many of his +compatriots owed their origin made petition to the Pope that he should +require the English king “to respect the independence of Scotland, and +to mind his own affairs. So long as a hundred of us are left alive,” +said the signatories, “we will never in any degree be subjected to the +English. It is not for glory, or for riches, or for honour that we +fight, but for liberty alone, which no good man loses but with his +life.” More than five hundred years later, for the same noble cause and +in the same uncompromising spirit, the people of Virginia made appeal +to the God of battles. + + [1] Grant’s _Memoirs,_ vol. i, p. 214. + + [2] I have been somewhat severely taken to task for attaching the + epithets “misguided,” “unpractical,” “fanatical,’ to the + abolitionists. I see no reason, however, to modify my language. It is + too often the case that men of the loftiest ideals seek to attain them + by the most objectionable means, and the maxim “Fiat justitia ruat + cœlum” cannot be literally applied to great affairs. The conversion of + the Mahomedan world to Christianity would be a nobler work than even + the emancipation of the negro, but the missionary who began with + reviling the faithful, and then proceeded to threaten them with fire + and the sword unless they changed their creed, would justly be called + a fanatic. Yet the abolitionists did worse than this, for they incited + the negroes to insurrection. Nor do I think that the question is + affected by the fact that many of the abolitionists were upright, + earnest, and devout. A good man is not necessarily a wise man, and I + remember that Samuel Johnson and John Wesley supported King George + against the American colonists. + + [3] On the publication of the first edition my views on the action of + the abolitionists were traversed by critics whose opinions demand + consideration. They implied that in condemning the unwisdom and + violence of the anti-slavery party, I had not taken into account the + aggressive tendencies of the Southern politicians from 1850 onwards, + that I had ignored the attempts to extend slavery to the Territories, + and that I had overlooked the effect of the Fugitive Slave Law. A + close study of abolitionist literature, however, had made it very + clear to me that the advocates of emancipation, although actuated by + the highest motives, never at any time approached the question in a + conciliatory spirit; and that long before 1850 their fierce cries for + vengeance had roused the very bitterest feelings in the South. In fact + they had already made war inevitable. Draper, the Northern historian, + admits that so early as 1844 “the contest between the abolitionists on + one side and the slave-holders on the other hand had become _a mortal + duel_.” It may be argued, perhaps, that the abolitionists saw that the + slave-power would never yield except to armed force, and that they + therefore showed good judgment in provoking the South into secession + and civil war. But forcing the hand of the Almighty is something more + than a questionable doctrine. + + [4] Of 8.3 million whites in the fifteen slave-holding States, only + 346,000 were slave-holders, and of these 69,000 owned only one negro. + + [5] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. iii, p. 689. + + [6] There is no doubt that a feeling of aversion to slavery was fast + spreading among a numerous and powerful class in the South. In + Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri the number of slaves was decreasing, + and in Delaware the institution had almost disappeared. + + [7] Grant’s _Memoirs,_ p. 214. + + [8] _Uncle Tom’s Cabin_ to wit. + + [9] For an admirable statement of the Southern doctrine, see Ropes’ + _History of the Civil War,_ vol. i, chap. i. + + [10] “The Government had been Federal under the Articles of + Confederation (1781), but the [Northern] people quickly recognised + that that relation was changing under the Constitution (1789). They + began to discern that the power they thought they had delegated was in + fact surrendered, and that henceforth no single State could meet the + general Government as sovereign and equal.” Draper’s _History of the + American Civil War,_ vol. i, p. 286. + + [11] It has been remarked that States’ Rights, as a political + principle, cannot be placed on the same plane as those with which it + is here grouped. History, however, proves conclusively that, although + it may be less vital to the common weal, the right of self-government + is just as deeply cherished. A people that has once enjoyed + independence can seldom be brought to admit that a Union with others + deprives it of the prerogatives of sovereignty, and it would seem that + the treatment of this instinct of nationality is one of the most + delicate and important tasks of statesmanship. + + [12] _History of the Civil War,_ Ropes, chap. i, p. 3. + + [13] Kentucky and Missouri attempted to remain neutral. Maryland was + held in check by the Federal Government, and Delaware sided with the + North. The first three, however, supplied large contingents to the + Confederate armies. + + + + +Chapter V +HARPER’S FERRY + + +1861 Immediately it became apparent that the North was bent upon +re-conquest Jackson offered his sword to his native State. He was +determined to take his share in defending her rights and liberties, +even if it were only as a private soldier. Devotion to Virginia was his +sole motive. He shrank from the horrors of civil strife. The thought +that the land he loved so well was to be deluged with the blood of her +own children, that the happy hearths of America were to be desecrated +by the hideous image of war, stifled the promptings of professional +ambition. “If the general Government,” he said, “should persist in the +measures now threatened, there must be war. It is painful enough to +discover with what unconcern they speak of war, and threaten it. They +do not know its horrors. I have seen enough of it to make me look upon +it as the sum of all evils.” + +The methods he resorted to in order that the conflict might be averted +were characteristic. He proposed to the minister of his church that all +Christian people should be called upon to unite in prayer; and in his +own devotions, says his wife, he asked with importunity that, if it +were God’s will, the whole land might be at peace. + +His work, after the Ordinance of Secession had been passed, was +constant and absorbing. The Governor of Virginia had informed the +Superintendent of the Institute that he should need the services of the +more advanced classes as drill-masters, and that they must be prepared +to leave for Richmond, under the command of Major Jackson, at a +moment’s notice. + +The Lexington Presbytery was holding its spring meeting in the church +which Jackson attended, and some of the members were entertained at his +house; but he found no time to attend a single service—every hour was +devoted to the duty he had in hand. + +On the Saturday of that eventful week he expressed the hope that he +would not be called upon to leave till Monday; and, bidding his wife +dismiss from her thoughts everything pertaining to the war and his +departure, they spent that evening as they had been accustomed, reading +aloud from religious magazines, and studying together the lesson which +was to be taught on the morrow in the Sunday-school. + +But at dawn the next morning came a telegram, directing Major Jackson +to bring the cadets to Richmond immediately. He repaired at once to the +Institute; and at one o’clock, after divine service, at his request, +had been held at the head of the command, the cadet battalion marched +to Staunton, on the Virginia Central Railway, and there took train. + +Camp Lee, the rendezvous of the Virginia army, presented a peculiar if +animated scene. With few exceptions, every man capable of serving in +the field belonged either to the militia or the volunteers. Some of the +companies had a smattering of drill, but the majority were absolutely +untaught, and the whole were without the slightest conception of what +was meant by discipline. And it was difficult to teach them. The +non-commissioned officers and men of the United States army were either +Irish or Germans, without State ties, and they had consequently no +inducement to join the South. With the officers it was different. They +were citizens first, and soldiers afterwards; and as citizens, their +allegiance, so far as those of Southern birth were concerned, was due +to their native States. Out of the twelve hundred graduates of West +Point who, at the beginning of 1861, were still fit for service, a +fourth were Southerners, and these, almost without exception, at once +took service with the Confederacy. But the regular officers were almost +all required for the higher commands, for technical duties, +and the staff; thus very few were left to instruct the volunteers. The +intelligence of the men was high, for every profession and every class +was represented in the ranks, and many of the wealthiest planters +preferred, so earnest was their patriotism, to serve as privates; but +as yet they were merely the elements of a fine army, and nothing more. +Their equipment left as much to be desired as their training. Arms were +far scarcer than men. The limited supply of rifles in the State +arsenals was soon exhausted. Flintlock muskets, converted to percussion +action, were then supplied; but no inconsiderable numbers of +fowling-pieces and shot-guns were to be seen amongst the infantry, +while the cavalry, in default of sabres, carried rude lances fabricated +by country blacksmiths. Some of the troops wore uniform, the blue of +the militia or the grey of the cadet; but many of the companies drilled +and manœuvred in plain clothes; and it was not till three months later, +on the eve of the first great battle, that the whole of the infantry +had received their bayonets and cartridge boxes. + +An assemblage so motley could hardly be called an army; and the daring +of the Government, who, with this _levée en masse_ as their only +bulwark against invasion, had defied a great power, seems at first +sight strongly allied to folly. But there was little cause for +apprehension. The Federal authorities were as yet powerless to enforce +the policy of invasion on which the President had resolved. The great +bulk of the Northern troops were just as far from being soldiers as the +Virginians, and the regular army was too small to be feared. + +The people of the United States had long cherished the Utopian dream +that war was impossible upon their favoured soil. The militia was +considered an archæological absurdity. The regular troops, admirable as +was their work upon the frontier, were far from being a source of +national pride. The uniform was held to be a badge of servitude. The +drunken loafer, bartering his vote for a dollar or a dram, looked down +with the contempt of a sovereign citizen upon men who submitted to the +indignity of discipline; and, in denouncing the expense of a standing +army, unscrupulous politicians found a sure path to popular favour. So, +when secession became something more than a mere threat, the armed +forces of the commonwealth had been reduced almost to extinction; and +when the flag was fired upon, the nation found itself powerless to +resent the insult. The military establishment mustered no more than +16,000 officers and men. There was no reserve, no transport, no +organisation for war, and the troops were scattered in distant +garrisons. The navy consisted of six screw-frigates, only one of which +was in commission, of five steam sloops, some twenty sailing ships, and +a few gun-boats. The majority of the vessels, although well armed, were +out of date. 9,000 officers and men were the extent of the personnel, +and several useful craft, together with more than 1,200 guns, were laid +up in Norfolk dockyard, on the coast of Virginia, within a hundred +miles of Richmond.[1] + +The cause of the Confederacy, although her white population of seven +million souls was smaller by two-thirds than that of the North, was +thus far from hopeless. The North undoubtedly possessed immense +resources. But an efficient army, even when the supply of men and arms +be unlimited, cannot be created in a few weeks, or even in a few +months, least of all an army of invasion. Undisciplined troops, if the +enemy be ill-handled, may possibly stand their ground on the defensive, +as did Jackson’s riflemen at New Orleans, or the colonials at Bunker’s +Hill. But fighting behind earthworks is a very different matter to +making long marches, and executing complicated manœuvres under heavy +fire. Without a trained staff and an efficient administration, an army +is incapable of movement. Even with a well-organised commissariat it is +a most difficult business to keep a marching column supplied with food +and forage; and the problem of transport, unless a railway or +a river be available, taxes the ability of the most experienced leader. +A march of eighty or one hundred miles into an enemy’s country sounds a +simple feat, but unless every detail has been most carefully thought +out, it will not improbably be more disastrous than a lost battle. A +march of two or three hundred miles is a great military operation; a +march of six hundred an enterprise of which there are few examples. To +handle an army in battle is much less difficult than to bring it on to +the field in good condition; and the student of the Civil War may note +with profit how exceedingly chary were the generals, during the first +campaigns, of leaving their magazines. It was not till their auxiliary +services had gained experience that they dared to manœuvre freely; and +the reason lay not only in deficiencies of organisation, but in the +nature of the country. Even for a stationary force, standing on the +defensive, unless immediately backed by a large town or a railway, the +difficulties of bringing up supplies were enormous. For an invading +army, increasing day by day the distance from its base, they became +almost insuperable. In 1861, the population of the United States, +spread over a territory as large as Europe, was less than that of +England, and a great part of that territory was practically unexplored. +Even at the present day their seventy millions are but a handful in +comparison with the size of their dominions, and their extraordinary +material progress is not much more than a scratch on the surface of the +continent. In Europe Nature has long since receded before the works of +man. In America the struggle between them has but just begun; and +except upon the Atlantic seaboard man is almost lost to sight in the +vast spaces he has yet to conquer. In many of the oldest States of the +Union the cities seem set in clearings of the primeval forest. The wild +woodland encroaches on the suburbs, and within easy reach of the very +capital are districts where the Indian hunter might still roam +undisturbed. The traveller lands in a metropolis as large as Paris; +before a few hours have passed he may find himself in a wilderness as +solitary as the Transvaal; and although within the boundaries of the +townships he sees little +that differs from the England of the nineteenth century—beyond them +there is much that resembles the England of the Restoration. Except +over a comparatively small area an army operating in the United States +would meet with the same obstacles as did the soldiers of Cromwell and +Turenne. Roads are few and indifferent; towns few and far between; food +and forage are not easily obtainable, for the country is but partially +cultivated; great rivers, bridged at rare intervals, issue from the +barren solitudes of rugged plateaus; in many low-lying regions a single +storm is sufficient to convert the undrained alluvial into a fetid +swamp, and tracts as large as an English county are covered with +pathless forest. Steam and the telegraph, penetrating even the most +lonely jungles, afford, it is true, such facilities for moving and +feeding large bodies of men that the difficulties presented by untamed +Nature have undoubtedly been much reduced. Nevertheless the whole +country, even to-day, would be essentially different from any European +theatre of war, save the steppes of Russia; and in 1861 railways were +few, and the population comparatively insignificant. + +The impediments, then, in the way of military operations were such as +no soldier of experience would willingly encounter with an improvised +army. It was no petty republic that the North had undertaken to coerce. +The frontiers of the Confederacy were far apart. The coast washed by +the Gulf of Mexico is eight hundred miles south of Harper’s Ferry on +the Potomac; the Rio Grande, the river boundary of Texas, is seventeen +hundred miles west of Charleston on the Atlantic. And over this vast +expanse ran but six continuous lines of railway:— + +_From the Potomac._ + +1. [Washington,] Richmond, Lynchburg, Chattanooga, Memphis, New +Orleans. +2. [Washington,] Richmond, Weldon, Greensboro, Columbia, Atlanta, New +Orleans. + (These connected Richmond with the Mississippi.) + +_From the Ohio._ + +3. Cairo, Memphis, New Orleans. +4. Cairo, Corinth, Mobile. + +5. Louisville, Nashville, Dalton, Atlanta, Mobile. + (These connected the Ohio with the Gulf of Mexico.) +6. Richmond, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah. + (This connected Richmond with the ports on the Atlantic.) + +Although in the Potomac and the Ohio the Federals possessed two +excellent bases of invasion, on which it was easy to accumulate both +men and supplies, the task before them, even had the regular army been +large and well equipped, would have been sufficiently formidable. The +city of Atlanta, which may be considered as the heart of the +Confederacy, was sixty days’ march from the Potomac, the same distance +as Vienna from the English Channel, or Moscow from the Niemen. New +Orleans, the commercial metropolis, was thirty-six days’ march from the +Ohio, the same distance as Berlin from the Moselle. Thus space was all +in favour of the South; even should the enemy overrun her borders, her +principal cities, few in number, were far removed from the hostile +bases, and the important railway junctions were perfectly secure from +sudden attack. And space, especially when means of communication are +scanty, and the country affords few supplies, is the greatest of all +obstacles. The hostile territory must be subjugated piecemeal, state by +state, province by province, as was Asia by Alexander; and after each +victory a new base of supply must be provisioned and secured, no matter +at what cost of time, before a further advance can be attempted. Had +Napoleon in the campaign against Russia remained for the winter at +Smolensko, and firmly established himself in Poland, Moscow might have +been captured and held during the ensuing summer. But the occupation of +Moscow would not have ended the war. Russia in many respects was not +unlike the Confederacy. She had given no hostages to fortune in the +shape of rich commercial towns; she possessed no historic fortresses; +and so offered but few objectives to an invader. If defeated or +retreating, her armies could always find refuge in distant fastnesses. +The climate was severe; the internal trade inconsiderable; to bring the +burden of war home to the mass of the +population was difficult, and to hold the country by force +impracticable. Such were the difficulties which the genius of Napoleon +was powerless to overcome, and Napoleon invaded Russia with half a +million of seasoned soldiers. + +And yet with an army of 75,000 volunteers, and without the least +preparation, the Federal Government was about to attempt an enterprise +of even greater magnitude. The Northern States were not bent merely on +invasion, but on re-conquest; not merely on defeating the hostile +armies, on occupying their capital, and exacting contributions, but on +forcing a proud people to surrender their most cherished principles, to +give up their own government, and to submit themselves, for good and +all, to what was practically a foreign yoke. And this was not all. It +has been well said by a soldier of Napoleon, writing of the war in +Spain, that neither the government nor the army are the real bulwarks +against foreign aggression, but the national character. The downfall of +Austria and of Prussia was practically decided by the first great +battle. The nations yielded without further struggle. Strangers to +freedom, crushed by military absolutism, the prostration of each and +all to an irresponsible despot had paralysed individual energy. Spain, +on the other hand, without an army and without a ruler, but deriving +new strength from each successive defeat, first taught Napoleon that he +was not invincible. And the same spirit of liberty which inspired the +people of the Peninsula inspired, to an even higher degree, the people +of the Confederate States. + +[Illustration: Map of the United States 1861.] For larger view click on +image. + +The Northern States, moreover, were about to make a new departure in +war. The manhood of a country has often been called upon to defend its +borders; but never before had it been proposed to invade a vast +territory with a civilian army, composed, it is true, of the best blood +in the Republic, but without the least tincture of military experience. +Nor did the senior officers, professionals though they were, appear +more fitted for the enterprise than the men they led. The command of a +company or squadron against the redskins was hardly an adequate +probation for the +command of an army,[2] or even a brigade, of raw troops against a +well-armed foe. Had the volunteers been associated with an equal number +of trained and disciplined soldiers, as had been the case in Mexico,[3] +they would have derived both confidence from their presence, and +stability from their example; had there been even an experienced staff, +capable of dealing with large forces, and an efficient commissariat, +capable of rapid expansion, they might have crushed all organised +opposition. But only 3,000 regulars could be drawn from the Western +borders; the staff was as feeble as the commissariat; and so, from a +purely military point of view, the conquest of the South appeared +impossible. Her self-sustaining power was far greater than has been +usually imagined. On the broad prairies of Texas, Arkansas, and +Louisiana ranged innumerable herds. The area under cultivation was +almost equal to that north of the Potomac and the Ohio. The pastoral +districts—the beautiful Valley of Virginia, the great plains of +Georgia, the fertile bottoms of Alabama, were inexhaustible granaries. +The amount of live stock—horses, mules, oxen, and sheep—was actually +larger than in the North; and if the acreage under wheat was less +extensive, the deficiency was more than balanced by the great harvests +of rice and maize.[4] Men of high ability, but profoundly ignorant of +the conditions which govern military operations, prophesied that the +South would be brought back to the Union within ninety days; General +Winfield Scott, on the other hand, Commander-in-Chief of the Federal +armies, declared that its conquest might be achieved “in two or three +years, by a young and able general—a Wolfe, a Desaix, a Hoche—with +300,000 disciplined men kept up to that number.” + +Nevertheless, despite the extent of her territory and her scanty means +of communication, the South was peculiarly vulnerable. Few factories or +foundries had been established +within her frontiers. She manufactured nothing; and not only for all +luxuries, but for almost every necessary of life, she was dependent +upon others. Her cotton and tobacco brought leather and cloth in +exchange from England. Metals, machinery, rails, rolling stock, salt, +and even medicines came, for the most part, from the North. The weapons +which she put into her soldiers’ hands during the first year of the +war, her cannon, powder, and ammunition, were of foreign make. More +than all, her mercantile marine was very small. Her foreign trade was +in the hands of Northern merchants. She had ship-yards, for Norfolk and +Pensacola, both national establishments, were within her boundaries; +but her seafaring population was inconsiderable, and shipbuilding was +almost an unknown industry. Strong on land, she was powerless at sea, +and yet it was on the sea that her prosperity depended. Cotton, the +principal staple of her wealth, demanded free access to the European +markets. But without a navy, and without the means of constructing one, +or of manning the vessels that she might easily have purchased, she was +unable to keep open her communications across the Atlantic. + +Nor was it on the ocean alone that the South was at a disadvantage. The +Mississippi, the main artery of her commerce, which brought the +harvests of the plantations to New Orleans, and which divided her +territory into two distinct portions, was navigable throughout; while +other great rivers and many estuaries, leading into the heart of her +dominions, formed the easiest of highways for the advance of an +invading army. Very early had her fatal weakness been detected. +Immediately Fort Sumter fell, Lincoln had taken measures to isolate the +seceding States, to close every channel by which they could receive +either succour or supplies, and if need be to starve them into +submission. The maritime resources of the Union were so large that the +navy was rapidly expanded. Numbers of trained seamen, recruited from +the merchant service and the fisheries, were at once available. + +The Northern shipbuilders had long been famous; and both men and +vessels, if the necessity should arise, might +be procured in Europe. Judicious indeed was the policy which, at the +very outset of the war, brought the tremendous pressure of the +sea-power to bear against the South; and, had her statesmen possessed +the knowledge of what that pressure meant, they must have realised that +Abraham Lincoln was no ordinary foe. In forcing the Confederates to +become the aggressors, and to fire on the national ensign, he had +created a united North; in establishing a blockade of their coasts he +brought into play a force, which, like the mills of God, “grinds +slowly, but grinds exceeding small.” + +But for the present the Federal navy was far too small to watch three +thousand miles of littoral indented by spacious harbours and secluded +bays, protected in many cases by natural breakwaters, and communicating +by numerous channels with the open sea. Moreover, it was still an even +chance whether cotton became a source of weakness to the Confederacy or +a source of strength. If the markets of Europe were closed to her by +the hostile battle-ships, the credit of the young Republic would +undoubtedly be seriously impaired; but the majority of the Southern +politicians believed that the great powers beyond the Atlantic would +never allow the North to enforce her restrictive policy. England and +France, a large portion of whose population depended for their +livelihood on the harvests of the South, were especially interested; +and England and France, both great maritime States, were not likely to +brook interference with their trade. Nor had the Southern people a high +opinion of Northern patriotism. They could hardly conceive that the +maintenance of the Union, which they themselves considered so light a +bond, had been exalted elsewhere to the height of a sacred principle. +Least of all did they believe that the great Democratic party, which +embraced so large a proportion of the Northern people, and which, for +so many years, had been in close sympathy with themselves, would +support the President in his coercive measures. + +History, moreover, not always an infallible guide, supplied many +plausible arguments to those who sought to forecast the immediate +future. In the War of Independence, +not only had the impracticable nature of the country, especially of the +South, baffled the armies of Great Britain, but the European powers, +actuated by old grudges and commercial jealousy, had come to the aid of +the insurgents. On a theatre of war where trained and well-organised +forces had failed, it was hardly to be expected that raw levies would +succeed; and if England, opposed in 1782 by the fleets of France, +Spain, and Holland, had been compelled to let the colonies go, it was +hardly likely that the North, confronted by the naval strength of +England and France, would long maintain the struggle with the South. +Trusting then to foreign intervention, to the dissensions of their +opponents, and to their own hardihood and unanimity, the Southerners +faced the future with few misgivings. + +At Richmond, finding himself without occupation, Major Jackson +volunteered to assist in the drilling of the new levies. The duty to +which he was first assigned was distasteful. He was an indifferent +draughtsman, and a post in the topographical department was one for +which he was hardly fitted. The appointment, fortunately, was not +confirmed. Some of his friends in the Confederate Congress proposed +that he should be sent to command at Harper’s Ferry, an important +outpost on the northern frontier of Virginia. There was some +opposition, not personal to Jackson and of little moment, but it called +forth a remark that shows the estimation in which he was held by men +who knew him. + +“Who is this Major Jackson?” it was asked. + +“He is one,” was the reply, “who, if you order him to hold a post, will +never leave it alive to be occupied by the enemy.” + +Harper’s Ferry, the spot where the first collision might confidently be +expected, was a charge after Jackson’s own heart. + +April 26 “Last Saturday,” he writes to his wife, “the Governor handed +me my commission as Colonel of Virginia Volunteers, the post I prefer +above all others, and has given me an independent command. Little one, +you must not expect to hear from me very often, as I expect to have +more work than I ever had in the same +length of time before; but don’t be concerned about your husband, for +our kind Heavenly Father will give every needful aid.” + +The garrison at Harper’s Ferry consisted of a large number of +independent companies of infantry, a few light companies, as they were +called, of cavalry, and fifteen smooth-bore cannon of small calibre. +This force numbered 4,500 officers and men, of whom all but 400 were +Virginians. Jackson’s appearance was not hailed with acclamation. The +officers of the State militia had hitherto exercised the functions of +command over the ill-knit concourse of enthusiastic patriots. The +militia, however, was hardly more than a force on paper, and the camps +swarmed with generals and field-officers who were merely civilians in +gaudy uniform. By order of the State Legislature these gentlemen were +now deprived of their fine feathers. Every militia officer above the +rank of captain was deposed; and the Governor of Virginia was +authorised to fill the vacancies. This measure was by no means popular. +Both by officers and men it was denounced as an outrage on freemen and +volunteers; and the companies met in convention for the purpose of +passing denunciatory resolutions. + +Their new commander was a sorry substitute for the brilliant figures he +had superseded. The militia generals had surrounded themselves with a +numerous staff, and on fine afternoons, it was said, the official +display in Harper’s Ferry would have done no discredit to the +Champs-Elysées. Jackson had but two assistants, who, like himself, +still wore the plain blue uniform of the Military Institute. To eyes +accustomed to the splendid trappings and prancing steeds of his +predecessors there seemed an almost painful want of pomp and +circumstance about the colonel of volunteers. There was not a particle +of gold lace about him. He rode a horse as quiet as himself. His seat +in the saddle was ungraceful. His well-worn cadet cap was always tilted +over his eyes; he was sparing of speech; his voice was very quiet, and +he seldom smiled. He made no orations, he held no reviews, and his +orders were remarkable for their brevity. Even with his officers +he had little intercourse. He confided his plans to no one, and not a +single item of information, useful or otherwise, escaped his lips. + +Some members of the Maryland Legislature, a body whom it was important +to conciliate, visited Harper’s Ferry during his tenure of command. +They were received with the utmost politeness, and in return plied the +general with many questions. His answers were unsatisfactory, and at +length one more bold than the rest asked him frankly how many men he +had at his disposal. “Sir,” was the reply, “I should be glad if +President Lincoln thought I had fifty thousand.” Nor was this reticence +observed only towards those whose discretion he mistrusted. He was +silent on principle. In the campaign of 1814, the distribution of the +French troops at a most critical moment was made known to the allies by +the capture of a courier carrying a letter from Napoleon to the +Empress. There was little chance of a letter to Mrs. Jackson, who was +now in North Carolina, falling into the hands of the Federals; but even +in so small a matter Jackson was consistent. + +“You say,” he wrote, “that your husband never writes you any news. I +suppose you mean military news, for I have written you a great deal +about your _sposo_ and how much he loves you. What do you want with +military news? Don’t you know that it is unmilitary and unlike an +officer to write news respecting one’s post? You couldn’t wish your +husband to do an unofficer-like thing, could you?” + +And then, the claims of duty being thus clearly defined, he proceeds to +describe the roses which climbed round the window of his temporary +quarters, adding, with that lover-like devotion which every letter +betrays, “but my sweet little sunny face is what I want to see most of +all.” + +Careful as he was to keep the enemy in the dark, he was exceedingly +particular when he visited his distant posts on the Potomac that his +presence should be unobserved. Had it become known to the Federal +generals that the commander at Harper’s Ferry had reconnoitred a +certain point of passage, a clue might have been given to his designs. +The Confederate officers, therefore, in charge of these posts, +were told that Colonel Jackson did not wish them to recognise him. He +rode out accompanied by a single staff officer, and the men were seldom +aware that the brigadier had been through their camps. + +Never was a commander who fell so far short of the popular idea of a +dashing leader. This quiet gentleman, who came and went unnoticed, who +had nothing to say, and was so anxious to avoid observation, was a type +of soldier unfamiliar to the volunteers. He was duty personified and +nothing more. + +But at the same time the troops instinctively felt that this absence of +ostentation meant hard work. They began to realise the magnitude of the +obligations they had assumed. Soldiering was evidently something more +than a series of brilliant spectacles and social gatherings. Here was a +man in earnest, who looked upon war as a serious business, who was +completely oblivious to what people said or thought; and his example +was not without effect. The conventions came to nothing; and when the +companies were organised in battalions, and some of the deposed +officers were reappointed to command, the men went willingly to work. +Their previous knowledge, even of drill, was of the scantiest. Officers +and men had to begin as recruits, and Jackson was not the man to cut +short essential preliminaries. Seven hours’ drill daily was a heavy tax +upon enthusiasm; but it was severely enforced, and the garrison of the +frontier post soon learned the elements of manœuvre. Discipline was a +lesson more difficult than drill. The military code, in all its rigour, +could not be at once applied to a body of high-spirited and +inexperienced civilians. Undue severity might have produced the very +worst results. The observance, therefore, of those regulations which +were not in themselves essential to efficiency or health was not +insisted on. Lapses in military etiquette were suffered to pass +unnoticed; no attempt was made to draw a hard and fast line between +officers and men; and many things which in a regular army would be +considered grossly irregular were tacitly permitted. Jackson was well +aware that volunteers of the type he commanded needed most delicate and +tactful handling. The chief use of minute regulations and exacting +routine is the creation of the instinct of obedience. Time was wanting +to instil such instinct into the Confederate troops; and the +intelligence and patriotism of the men, largely of high class and good +position, who filled the ranks, might be relied upon to prevent serious +misconduct. Had they been burdened with the constant acknowledgment of +superior authority which becomes a second nature to the regular +soldier, disgust and discontent might have taken the place of high +spirit and good-will. But at the same time wilful misbehaviour was +severely checked. Neglect of duty and insubordination were crimes which +Jackson never forgave, and deliberate disobedience was in his eyes as +unmanly an offence as cowardice. He knew when to be firm as well as +when to relax, and it was not only in the administration of discipline +that he showed his tact. He was the most patient of instructors. So +long as those under him were trying to do their best, no one could have +been kinder or more forbearing; and he constantly urged his officers to +come to his tent when they required explanation as to the details of +their duty. + +Besides discipline and instruction, Jackson had the entire +administration of his command upon his hands. Ammunition was +exceedingly scarce, and he had to provide for the manufacture of +ball-cartridges. Transport there was none, but the great waggons of the +Valley farmers supplied the deficiency. The equipment of the artillery +left much to be desired, and ammunition carts (or caissons) were +constructed by fixing roughly made chests on the running gear of +waggons. The supply and medical services were non-existent, and +everything had to be organised _de novo._ Thus the officer in command +at Harper’s Ferry had his hands full; and in addition to his +administrative labours there was the enemy to be watched, information +to be obtained, and measures of defence to be considered. A glance at +the map will show the responsibilities of Jackson’s position. + +The Virginia of the Confederacy was cut in two by the Blue Ridge, a +chain of mountains three hundred and thirty miles in length, which, +rising in North Carolina, passes +under different names through Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, and +Vermont, and sinks to the level on the Canadian frontier. + +The Blue Ridge varies in height from 2,000 to 6,000 feet. Densely +wooded, it is traversed in Virginia only by the Gaps, through which ran +three railways and several roads. These Gaps were of great strategic +importance, for if they were once secured, a Northern army, moving up +the Valley of the Shenandoah, would find a covered line of approach +towards the Virginia and Tennessee railway, which connected Richmond +with the Mississippi. Nor was this the only advantage it would gain. +From Lexington at its head, to Harper’s Ferry, where it strikes the +Potomac, throughout its whole length of one hundred and forty miles, +the Valley was rich in agricultural produce. Its average width, for it +is bounded on the west by the eastern ranges of the Alleghenies, is not +more than four-and-twenty miles; but there are few districts of the +earth’s surface, of equal extent, more favoured by Nature or more +highly cultivated. It was the granary of Virginia; and not Richmond +only, but the frontier garrisons, depended largely for subsistence on +the farms of the Shenandoah. + +Moreover, if the Valley were occupied by the Federals, North-western +Virginia would be cut off from the Confederacy; and Jackson’s native +mountains, inhabited by a brave and hardy race, would be lost as a +recruiting ground. + +In order, then, to secure the loyalty of the mountaineers, to supply +the armies, and to protect the railways, the retention of the Valley +was of the utmost importance to the Confederacy. The key of the +communication with the North-west was Winchester, the chief town of the +lower Valley, twenty-six miles, in an air-line, south-west of Harper’s +Ferry. From Winchester two highways lead westward, by Romney and +Moorefield; four lead east and south-east, crossing the Blue Ridge by +Snicker’s, Ashby’s, Manassas, and Chester’s Gaps; and the first object +of the Confederate force at Harper’s Ferry was to cover this nucleus of +roads. + +During the month of May the garrison of the frontier +post was undisturbed by the enemy. Lincoln’s first call had been for +75,000 volunteers. On May 3 he asked for an additional 40,000; these +when trained, with 18,000 seamen and a detachment of regulars, would +place at his disposal 150,000 men. The greater part of this force had +assembled at Washington; but a contingent of 10,000 or 12,000 men under +General Patterson, a regular officer of many years’ service, was +collecting in Pennsylvania, and an outpost of 3,000 men was established +at Chambersburg, forty-five miles north of Harper’s Ferry. + +These troops, however, though formidable in numbers, were as +ill-prepared for war as the Confederates, and no immediate movement was +to be anticipated. Not only had the Federal authorities to equip and +organise their levies, but the position of Washington was the cause of +much embarrassment. The District of Columbia—the sixty square miles set +apart for the seat of the Federal Government—lies on the Potomac, fifty +miles south-east of Harper’s Ferry, wedged in between Virginia on the +one side and Maryland on the other. + +The loyalty of Maryland to the Union was more than doubtful. As a +slave-holding State, her sympathies were strongly Southern; and it was +only her geographical situation, north of the Potomac, and with no +strong frontier to protect her from invasion, which had held her back +from joining the Confederacy. As only a single line of railway +connected Washington with the North, passing through Baltimore, the +chief city of Maryland, a very hot-bed of secession sentiment, the +attitude of the State was a matter of the utmost anxiety to the Federal +Government. An attempt to send troops through Baltimore to Washington +had provoked a popular commotion and some bloodshed. Stern measures had +been necessary to keep the railway open. Baltimore was placed under +martial law, and strongly garrisoned. But despite these precautions, +for some weeks the feeling in Maryland was so hostile to the Union that +it was not considered safe for the Northern troops to cross her +territory except in large numbers; and the concentration +at Washington of a force sufficient to defend it was thus attended with +much difficulty. + +A single railroad, too, the Baltimore and Ohio, connected Washington +with the West. Crossing the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry, and following +the course of the river, it ran for one hundred and twenty miles within +the confines of Virginia. Thus the district commanded by Jackson +embraced an artery of supply and communication which was of great +importance to the enemy. The natural course would have been to destroy +the line at once; but the susceptibilities of both Maryland and West +Virginia had to be considered. The stoppage of all traffic on their +main trade route would have done much to alienate the people from the +South, and there was still hope that Maryland might throw in her lot +with her seceded sisters. + +The line was therefore left intact, and the company was permitted to +maintain the regular service of trains, including the mails. For this +privilege, however, Jackson exacted toll. The Confederate railways were +deficient in rolling stock, and he determined to effect a large +transfer from the Baltimore and Ohio. From Point of Rocks, twelve miles +east of Harper’s Ferry, to Martinsburg, fifteen miles west, the line +was double. “The coal traffic along it,” says General Imboden, “was +immense, for the Washington Government was accumulating supplies of +coal on the seaboard. These coal trains passed Harper’s Ferry at all +hours of the day and night, and thus furnished Jackson with a pretext +for arranging a brilliant capture. A detachment was posted at Point of +Rocks, and the 5th Virginia Infantry at Martinsburg. He then complained +to the President of the Baltimore and Ohio that the night trains, +eastward bound, disturbed the repose of his camp, and requested a +change of schedule that would pass all east-bound trains by Harper’s +Ferry between eleven and one o’clock in the daytime. The request was +complied with, and thereafter for several days was heard the constant +roar of passing trains for an hour before and an hour after noon. But +since the ‘empties’ were sent up the road at night, Jackson again +complained that the nuisance was as great as ever, and, as the road had +two tracks, said he must insist that the west-bound trains should pass +during the same hour as those going east. Again he was obliged, and we +then had, for two hours every day, the liveliest railroad in America. + +“One night, as soon as the schedule was working at its best, Jackson +instructed the officer commanding at Point of Rocks to take a force of +men across to the Maryland side of the river the next day at eleven +o’clock, and letting all west-bound trains pass till twelve o’clock, to +permit none to go east. He ordered the reverse to be done at +Martinsburg. + +“Thus he caught all the trains that were going east or west between +these points, and ran them up to Winchester, thirty-two miles on the +branch line, whence they were removed by horse power to the railway at +Strasbourg, eighteen miles further south.”[5] + +May 24 This capture was Jackson’s only exploit whilst in command at +Harper’s Ferry. On May 24 he was relieved by General Joseph E. +Johnston, one of the senior officers of the Confederate army. The +transfer of authority was not, however, at once effected. Johnston +reached Harper’s Ferry in advance of his letter of appointment. Jackson +had not been instructed that he was to hand over his command, and, +strictly conforming to the regulations, he respectfully declined to +vacate his post. Fortunately a communication soon came from General +Lee, commanding the Virginia troops, in which he referred to Johnston +as in command at Harper’s Ferry. Jackson at once recognised this letter +as official evidence that he was superseded, and from that time forth +rendered his superior the most faithful and zealous support. He seems +at first to have expected that he would be sent to North-west Virginia, +and his one ambition at this time was to be selected as the instrument +of saving his native mountains to the South. But the Confederate +Government had other views. At the beginning of June a more compact +organisation was given to the regiments at Harper’s Ferry, and Jackson +was +assigned to the command of the First Brigade of the Army of the +Shenandoah.[6] + +Recruited in the Valley of the Shenandoah and the western mountains, +the brigade consisted of the following regiments:— + +The 2nd Virginia, Colonel Allen. + +The 4th Virginia, Colonel Preston. + +The 5th Virginia, Colonel Harper. + +The 27th Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Echols. + +The 33rd Virginia, Colonel Cummings. + +A battery of artillery, raised in Rockbridge County, was attached to +the brigade. Commanded by the Reverend Dr. Pendleton, the rector of +Lexington, an old West Point graduate, who was afterwards distinguished +as Lee’s chief of artillery, and recruited largely from theological +colleges, it soon became peculiarly efficient.[7] + +No better material for soldiers ever existed than the men of the +Valley. Most of them were of Scotch-Irish descent, but from the more +northern counties came many of English blood, and from those in the +centre of Swiss and German. But whatever their origin, they were +thoroughly well qualified for their new trade. All classes mingled in +the ranks, and all ages; the heirs of the oldest families, and the +humblest of the sons of toil; boys whom it was impossible to keep at +school, and men whose white beards hung below their cross-belts; youths +who had been reared in luxury, and rough hunters from their lonely +cabins. They were a mountain people, nurtured in a wholesome climate, +bred to manly sports, and hardened by the free life of the field and +forest. To social distinctions they gave little heed. They were united +for a common purpose; they had taken arms to defend Virginia and to +maintain her rights; and their patriotism was +proved by the sacrifice of all personal consideration and individual +interest. Nor is the purity of their motives to be questioned. They had +implicit faith in the righteousness of their cause. Slave-owners were +few in the Valley, and the farms were tilled mainly by free labour. The +abolition of negro servitude would have affected but little the +population west of the Blue Ridge. But, nevertheless, west of the Blue +Ridge the doctrine of State Rights was as firmly rooted as in the +Carolinas, the idea that a State could be coerced into remaining within +the Union as fiercely repudiated; and the men of the Valley faced the +gathering hosts of the North in the same spirit that they would have +faced the hosts of a foreign foe. + +In the first weeks of June the military situation became more +threatening. The Union armies were taking shape. The levies of +volunteers seemed sufficiently trained to render reconquest +practicable, and the great wave of invasion had already mounted the +horizon. A force of 25,000 men, based on the Ohio, threatened +North-west Virginia. There had been collisions on the Atlantic +seaboard, where the Federals held Fortress Monroe, a strong citadel +within eighty miles of Richmond, and Richmond had become the capital of +the Confederacy. There had been fighting in Missouri, and the partisans +of the South in that State had already been badly worsted. The vast +power of the North was making itself felt on land, and on the sea had +asserted an ascendency which it never lost. The blue waters of the Gulf +of Mexico were patrolled by a fleet with which the Confederates had no +means of coping. From the sea-wall of Charleston, the great Atlantic +port of the South, the masts of the blockading squadron were visible in +the offing; and beyond the mouths of the Mississippi, closing the +approaches to New Orleans, the long black hulls steamed slowly to and +fro. + +But it was about Manassas Junction—thirty miles south-west of +Washington and barring the road to Richmond—that all interest centred +during the first campaign. Here was posted the main army of the +Confederacy, 20,000 volunteers under General Beauregard, +the Manassas Gap Railway forming an easy means of communication with +the Army of the Shenandoah. + +Johnston’s force had been gradually increased to 10,000 officers and +men. But the general was by no means convinced of the desirability of +holding Harper’s Ferry. The place itself was insignificant. It had +contained an arsenal, but this had been burnt by the Federals when they +evacuated the post; and it was absolutely untenable against attack. To +the east runs the Shenandoah; and immediately above the river stands a +spur of the Blue Ridge, the Loudoun Heights, completely commanding the +little town. Beyond the Potomac is a crest of equal altitude, covered +with forest trees and undergrowth, and bearing the name of the Maryland +Heights. + +Jackson, without waiting for instructions, had taken on himself to hold +and fortify the Maryland Heights. “I am of opinion,” he had written to +General Lee, “that this place should be defended with the spirit which +actuated the defenders of Thermopylæ, and if left to myself such is my +determination. The fall of this place would, I fear, result in the loss +of the north-western part of the State, and who can estimate the moral +power thus gained to the enemy and lost to ourselves?”[8] + +Lee, also, was averse to evacuation. Such a measure, he said, would be +depressing to the cause of the South, and would leave Maryland +isolated. The post, it was true, could be easily turned. By crossing +the Potomac, at Williamsport and Shepherdstown, twenty and ten miles +north-west respectively, the Federals would threaten the communications +of the garrison with Winchester; in case they were attacked, the +Confederates would have to fight with their backs to the Shenandoah, +broad, deep, and unbridged; and the ground westward of Harper’s Ferry +was ill adapted for defence. Attack, in Lee’s opinion, would have been +best met by a resolute offensive.[9] Johnston, however, believed his +troops unfitted for active manœuvres, and he was permitted to choose +his own course. The incident is of small +importance, but it serves to show an identity of opinion between Lee +and Jackson, and a regard for the moral aspect of the situation which +was to make itself manifest, with extraordinary results, at a later +period. + +June 14 On June 14, Johnston destroyed the railway bridge over the +Potomac, removed the machinery that had been rescued from the arsenal, +burned the public buildings, and the next day retired on Winchester. +His immediate opponent, General Patterson, had crossed the Pennsylvania +border, and, moving through Maryland, had occupied Williamsport with +14,000 men. A detachment of Confederate militia had been driven from +Romney, thirty-five miles north-west of Winchester, and the general +forward movement of the enemy had become pronounced. + +June 20 On June 20 Jackson’s brigade was ordered to destroy the +workshops of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway at Martinsburg, together +with the whole of the rolling stock that might there be found, and to +support the cavalry. The first of these tasks, although Martinsburg is +no more than ten miles distant from Williamsport, was easily +accomplished. Four locomotives were sent back to Winchester, drawn by +teams of horses; and several more, together with many waggons, were +given to the flames. The second task demanded no unusual exertions. The +Federals, as yet, manifested no intention of marching upon Winchester, +nor was the Confederate cavalry in need of immediate assistance. The +force numbered 300 sabres. The men were untrained; but they were +first-rate horsemen, they knew every inch of the country, and they were +exceedingly well commanded. Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. B. Stuart, who had +been a captain of dragoons in the United States army, had already given +token of those remarkable qualities which were afterwards to make him +famous. Of an old Virginia family, he was the very type of the +Cavalier, fearless and untiring, “boisterous as March, yet fresh as +May.” + +“Educated at West Point, and trained in Indian fighting in the +prairies, he brought to the great struggle upon which he had now +entered a thorough knowledge of +arms, a bold and fertile conception, and a constitution of body which +enabled him to bear up against fatigues which would have prostrated the +strength of other men. Those who saw him at this time are eloquent in +their description of the energy and the habits of the man. They tell +how he remained almost constantly in the saddle; how he never failed to +instruct personally every squad which went out on picket; how he was +everywhere present, at all hours of the day and night, along the line +which he guarded; and how, by infusing into the raw cavalry his own +activity and watchfulness, he was enabled, in spite of the small force +which he commanded, to observe the whole part of the Potomac from Point +of Rocks to beyond Williamsport. His animal spirits were unconquerable, +his gaiety and humour unfailing; he had a ready jest for all, and made +the forests ring with his songs as he marched at the head of his +column. So great was his activity that General Johnston compared him to +that species of hornet called ‘a yellow jacket,’ and said that ‘he was +no sooner brushed off than he lit back again.’ When the general was +subsequently transferred to the West he wrote to Stuart: ‘How can I +eat, sleep, or rest in peace without you upon the outpost?’”[10] + +No officer in the Confederacy was more trusted by his superiors or more +popular with the men; and Jackson was no more proof than others against +the attractions of his sunny and noble nature. As a soldier, Stuart was +a colleague after his own heart; and, as a man, he was hardly less +congenial. The dashing horseman of eight-and-twenty, who rivalled Murat +in his fondness for gay colours, and to all appearance looked upon war +as a delightful frolic, held a rule of life as strict as that of his +Presbyterian comrade; and outwardly a sharp contrast, inwardly they +were in the closest sympathy. Stuart’s fame as a leader was to be won +in larger fields than those west of the Blue Ridge, and, although +sprung from the same Scotch-Irish stock, he was in no way connected +with the Valley soldiers. But from the very outbreak of the war he was +intimately associated with +Jackson and his men. Fortune seemed to take a curious delight in +bringing them together; they were together in their first skirmish, and +in their last great victory; and now, on the banks of the Potomac, +watching the hostile masses that were assembling on the further shore, +they first learned to know each other’s worth. + +July 2 On July 2 Patterson crossed the river. The movement was at once +reported by Stuart, and Jackson, with the 5th Virginia and a battery, +advanced to meet the enemy. His instructions from Johnston were to +ascertain the strength of the hostile force, and then to retire under +cover of the cavalry. Four regiments of his brigade were therefore left +in camp; the baggage was sent back, and when the 5th Virginia had +marched out a short distance, three of the four guns were halted. Near +Falling Waters, a country church some five miles south of the Potomac, +Patterson’s advanced guard was discovered on the road. The country on +either hand, like the greater part of the Valley, was open, undulating, +and highly cultivated, view and movement being obstructed only by rail +fences and patches of high timber. + +The Virginians were partially concealed by a strip of woodland, and +when the Federal skirmishers, deployed on either side of the highway, +moved forward to the attack, they were received by a heavy and +unexpected fire. As the enemy fell back, a portion of the Confederate +line was thrown forward, occupying a house and barn; and despite the +fire of two guns which the Federals had brought up, the men, with the +impetuous rashness of young troops, dashed out to the attack. But +Jackson intervened. The enemy, who had two brigades of infantry well +closed up, was deploying a heavy force; his skirmishers were again +advancing, and the 5th Virginia, in danger of being outflanked, was +ordered to retire to its first position. The movement was misconstrued +by the Federals, and down the high road, in solid column, came the +pursuing cavalry. A well-aimed shot from the single field-piece +sufficed to check their progress; a confused mass of horsemen went +flying to the rear; and the Confederate gunners turned their attention +to the hostile +battery. Stuart, at the same time, performed a notable feat. He had +moved with fifty troopers to attack the enemy’s right flank, and in +reconnoitring through the woods had become detached for the moment from +his command. As he rode along a winding lane he saw resting in a field +a company of Federal infantry. He still wore the uniform of the United +States army; the enemy suspected nothing, taking him for one of their +own cavalry, and he determined to effect their capture. Riding up to +the fence he bade one of the men remove the bars. This was done with +respectful alacrity, and he then galloped among them, shouting “Throw +down your arms, or you are all dead men!” The stentorian order was at +once obeyed: the raw troops not only dropped their rifles but fell upon +their faces, and the Confederate troopers, coming to their leader’s +aid, marched the whole company as prisoners to the rear. + +So firm was the attitude of Jackson’s command that General Patterson +was thoroughly imposed upon. Slowly and cautiously he pushed out right +and left, and it was not till near noon that the Confederates were +finally ordered to retreat. Beyond desultory skirmishing there was no +further fighting. The 5th Virginia fell back on the main body; Stuart +came in with his string of captives, and leaving the cavalry to watch +the enemy, the First Brigade went into camp some two miles south of +Martinsburg. Patterson reported to his Government that he had been +opposed by 3,500 men, exactly ten times Jackson’s actual number.[11] +The losses on either side were inconsiderable, a few men killed and 10 +or 15 wounded; and if the Confederates carried off 50 prisoners, the +Federals had the satisfaction of burning some tents which Jackson had +been unable to remove. The engagement, however, had the best effect on +the morale of the Southern troops, and they were not so ignorant as to +overlook the skill and coolness with which they had been manœuvred. It +is possible that their commander appeared in an unexpected light, and +that they had watched his behaviour with some amount of curiosity. They +certainly discovered that a +distaste for show and frippery is no indication of an unwarlike spirit. +In the midst of the action, while he was writing a dispatch, a cannon +ball had torn a tree above his head to splinters. Not a muscle moved, +and he wrote on as if he were seated in his own tent. + +July 3 The day after Falling Waters, on Johnston’s recommendation, +Jackson received from General Lee his commission as brigadier-general +in the Confederate army. “My promotion,” he wrote to his wife, “was +beyond what I had anticipated, as I only expected it to be in the +Volunteer forces of the State. One of my greatest desires for +advancement is the gratification it will give my darling, and (the +opportunity) of serving my country more efficiently. I have had all +that I ought to desire in the line of promotion. I should be very +ungrateful if I were not contented, and exceedingly thankful to our +kind Heavenly Father.” + +Of Patterson’s further movements it is unnecessary to speak at length. +The Federal army crawled on to Martinsburg. Halting seven miles +south-west Jackson was reinforced by Johnston’s whole command; and +here, for four days, the Confederates, drawn up in line of battle, +awaited attack. But the Federals stood fast in Martinsburg; and on the +fourth day Johnston withdrew to Winchester. The Virginia soldiers were +bitterly dissatisfied. At first even Jackson chafed. He was eager for +further action. His experiences at Falling Waters had given him no +exalted notion of the enemy’s prowess, and he was ready to engage them +single-handed. “I want my brigade,” he said, “to feel that it can +itself whip Patterson’s whole army, and I believe we can do it.” But +Johnston’s self-control was admirable. He was ready to receive attack, +believing that, in his selected position, he could repulse superior +numbers. But he was deaf to all who clamoured for an offensive +movement, to the murmurs of the men, and to the remonstrances of the +officers. The stone houses of Martinsburg and its walled inclosures +were proof against assault, and promised at most a bloody victory. His +stock of ammunition was scanty in +the extreme; the infantry had but fourteen cartridges apiece; and +although his patience was construed by his troops as a want of +enterprise, he had in truth displayed great daring in offering battle +south of Martinsburg. + +The Federal army at Washington, commanded by General McDowell, amounted +to 50,000 men; a portion of this force was already south of the +Potomac, and Beauregard’s 20,000 Confederates, at Manassas Junction, +were seriously threatened. In West Virginia the enemy had advanced, +moving, fortunately, in the direction of Staunton, at the southern end +of the Valley, and not on Winchester. + +July 11 On July 11, this force of 20,000 men defeated a Confederate +detachment at Rich Mountain, not far from Jackson’s birthplace; and +although it was still in the heart of the Alleghenies, a few marches, +which there were practically no troops to oppose, would give it the +control of the Upper Valley. + +Thus menaced by three columns of invasion, numbering together over +80,000 men, the chances of the Confederates, who mustered no more than +32,000 all told, looked small indeed. But the three Federal columns +were widely separated, and it was possible, by means of the Manassas +Gap Railway, for Johnston and Beauregard to unite with greater rapidity +than their opponents. + +President Davis, acting on the advice of General Lee, had therefore +determined to concentrate the whole available force at Manassas +Junction, and to meet at that point the column advancing from +Washington.[12] The difficulty was for the Army of the Shenandoah to +give Patterson the slip. This could easily have been done while that +officer stood fast at Martinsburg; but, in Lee’s opinion, if the enemy +found that the whole force of the Confederacy was concentrating at +Manassas Junction, the Washington column would remain within its +intrenchments round the capital, and the Confederates “would be put to +the great disadvantage of achieving nothing, and leaving the other +points (Winchester and Staunton) exposed.” The concentration, +therefore, was to be postponed until the Washington column +advanced.[13] + +But by that time Patterson might be close to Winchester or threatening +the Manassas Railway. Johnston had thus a most delicate task before +him; and in view of the superior numbers which the Federals could bring +against Manassas, it was essential that not a man should he wasted in +minor enterprises. The defeat of Patterson, even had it been +practicable, would not have prevented the Washington column from +advancing; and every Confederate rifleman who fell in the Valley would +be one the less at Manassas. + +July 15 On July 15 Patterson left Martinsburg and moved in the +direction of Winchester. On the 16th he remained halted at Bunker’s +Hill, nine miles north; and on the 17th, instead of continuing his +advance, moved to his left and occupied Charlestown. His indecision was +manifest. He, too, had no easy part to play. His instructions were to +hold Johnston in the Valley, while McDowell advanced against +Beauregard. But his instructions were either too definite or not +definite enough, and he himself was overcautious. He believed, and so +did General Scott, that Johnston might be retained at Winchester by +demonstrations—that is, by making a show of strength and by feigned +attacks. For more vigorous action Patterson was not in the least +inclined; and we can hardly wonder if he hesitated to trust his +ill-trained regiments to the confusion and chances of an attack. Even +in that day of raw soldiers and inexperienced leaders his troops had an +unenviable reputation. They had enlisted for three months, and their +term of service was nearly up. Their commander had no influence with +them; and, turning a deaf ear to his appeals, they stubbornly refused +to remain with the colours even for a few days over their term of +service. They were possibly disgusted with the treatment they had +received from the Government. The men had received no pay. Many were +without shoes, and others, according to their general, were “without +pants!” “They cannot march,” he adds, “and, +unless a paymaster goes with them, they will be indecently clad and +have just cause of complaint.”[14] + +Nevertheless, the Federal authorities made a grievous mistake when they +allowed Patterson and his _sans-culottes_ to move to Charlestown. +McDowell marched against Beauregard on the afternoon of the 16th, and +Patterson should have been instructed to attack Johnston at any cost. +Even had the latter been successful, he could hardly have reinforced +the main army in time to meet McDowell. + +July 18 At 1 a.m. on the morning of the 18th Johnston received a +telegram from the President to the effect that McDowell was advancing +on Manassas. Stuart was immediately directed to keep Patterson amused; +and leaving their sick, 1,700 in number, to the care of Winchester, the +troops were ordered to strike tents and prepare to march. No man knew +the object of the movement, and when the regiments passed through +Winchester, marching southward, with their backs to the enemy, the step +was lagging and the men dispirited. A few miles out, as they turned +eastward, the brigades were halted and an order was read to them. “Our +gallant army under General Beauregard is now attacked by overwhelming +numbers. The Commanding General hopes that his troops will step out +like men, and make a forced march to save the country.” The effect of +this stirring appeal was instantaneous. “The soldiers,” says Jackson, +“rent the air with shouts of joy, and all was eagerness and animation.” +The march was resumed, and as mile after mile was passed, although +there was much useless delay and the pace was slow, the faint outlines +of the Blue Ridge, rising high above the Valley, changed imperceptibly +to a mighty wall of rock and forest. As the night came down a long +reach of the Shenandoah crossed the road. The ford was waist-deep, but +the tall Virginians, plunging without hesitation into the strong +current, gained the opposite shore with little loss of time. The guns +and waggons followed in long succession through the darkling waters, +and still the heavy tramp of the toiling column passed eastward through +the quiet fields. +The Blue Ridge was crossed at Ashby’s Gap; and at two o’clock in the +morning, near the little village of Paris, the First Brigade was halted +on the further slope. They had marched over twenty miles, and so great +was their exhaustion that the men sank prostrate on the ground beside +their muskets.[15] They were already sleeping, when an officer reminded +Jackson that there were no pickets round the bivouac. “Let the poor +fellows sleep,” was the reply; “I will guard the camp myself.” And so, +through the watches of the summer night, the general himself stood +sentry over his unconscious troops.[16] + +[Illustration: Map of the situation on the night of July 17th, 1861.] + + [1] Strength of the Federal Navy at different periods:— + March 4, 1861: 42 ships in commission. + December 1, 1861: 264 ships in commission. + December 1, 1862: 427 ships in commission. + December 1, 1863: 588 ships in commission. + December 1, 1864: 671 ships in commission. + + [2] Even after the Peninsular War had enlarged the experience of the + British army, Sir Charles Napier declared that he knew but one general + who could handle 100,000 men, and that was the Duke of Wellington. + + [3] Grant’s _Memoirs,_ vol. i, p. 168. + + [4] Cf. U.S. Census Returns 1860. + + [5] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. i. + + [6] The Virginia troops were merged in the army of the Confederate + States on June 8, 1861. The total strength was 40,000 men and 115 + guns. O.R., vol. ii, p. 928. + + [7] When the battery arrived at Harper’s Ferry, it was quartered in a + church, already occupied by a company called the Grayson Dare-devils, + who, wishing to show their hospitality, assigned the pulpit to Captain + Pendleton as an appropriate lodging. The four guns were at once + christened Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. + + [8] O.R., vol. ii, p. 814. + + [9] _Ibid.,_ pp. 881, 889, 897, 898, 901, 923. + + [10] Cooke, p. 47. + + [11] O.R., vol. ii, p. 157. + + [12] O.R., vol. ii, p. 515. + + [13] O.R., vol. ii, p. 507. + + [14] O.R., vol. ii, pp. 169, 170. + + [15] “The discouragements of that day’s march,” says Johnston, “to one + accustomed to the steady gait of regular soldiers, is indescribable. + The views of military obedience and command then taken both by + officers and men confined their duties and obligations almost + exclusively to the drill-ground and guards. In camps and marches they + were scarcely known. Consequently, frequent and unreasonable delays + caused so slow a rate of marching as to make me despair of joining + General Beauregard in time to aid him.”— Johnston’s _Narrative._ + + [16] Letter to Mrs. Jackson, _Memoirs,_ p. 176. + + + + +Chapter VI +THE FIRST BATTLE OF MANASSAS OR BULL RUN + + +July 19 At the first streak of dawn, Jackson aroused his men and +resumed the march. Before the column gained the plain, Stuart’s cavalry +clattered past, leaving Patterson at Charlestown, in ignorance of his +adversary’s escape, and congratulating himself on the success of his +cautious strategy. At Piedmont, a station at the foot of the Blue +Ridge, trains were waiting for the conveyance of the troops; and at +four o’clock in the afternoon Jackson and his brigade had reached +Manassas Junction. The cavalry, artillery, and waggons moved by road; +and the remainder of Johnston’s infantry was expected to follow the +First Brigade without delay. But in war, unless there has been ample +time for preparation, railways are not always an expeditious means of +travel. The line was single; so short notice had been given that it was +impossible to collect enough rolling-stock; the officials were +inexperienced; there was much mismanagement; and on the morning of +Sunday, July 21, only three brigades of the Army of the +Shenandoah—Jackson’s, Bee’s, and Bartow’s—together with the cavalry and +artillery, had joined Beauregard. Kirby Smith’s brigade, about 1,900 +strong, was still upon the railway. + +The delay might easily have been disastrous. Happily, the Federal +movements were even more tardy. Had the invading army been well +organised, Beauregard would probably have been defeated before Johnston +could have reached him. McDowell had advanced from Washington on the +afternoon of the 16th with 35,000 men. On the morning of the 18th, the +greater part of his force was concentrated +at Centreville, twenty-two miles from Washington, and five and a half +north-east of Manassas Junction. Beauregard’s outposts had already +fallen back to the banks of Bull Run, a stream made difficult by wooded +and precipitous banks, from two to three miles south, and of much the +same width as the Thames at Oxford. + +It would have been possible to have attacked on the morning of the +19th, but the Federal commander was confronted by many obstacles. He +knew little of the country. Although it was almost within sight of the +capital, the maps were indifferent. Guides who could describe roads and +positions from a military point of view were not forthcoming. All +information had to be procured by personal reconnaissance, and few of +his officers had been trained to such work. Moreover, the army was most +unwieldy. 35,000 men, together with ten batteries, and the requisite +train of waggons, was a force far larger than any American officer had +yet set eyes upon; and the movement of such a mass demanded precise +arrangement on the part of the staff, and on the part of the troops +most careful attention to order and punctuality; but of these both +staff and troops were incapable. The invading force might have done +well in a defensive position, which it would have had time to occupy, +and where the supply of food and forage, carried on from stationary +magazines, would have been comparatively easy; but directly it was put +in motion, inexperience and indiscipline stood like giants in the path. +The Federal troops were utterly unfitted for offensive movement, and +both Scott and McDowell had protested against an immediate advance. The +regiments had only been organised in brigades a week previously. They +had never been exercised in mass. Deployment for battle had not yet +been practised, and to deploy 10,000 or 20,000 men for attack is a +difficult operation, even with well-drilled troops and an experienced +staff. Nor were the supply arrangements yet completed. The full +complement of waggons had not arrived, and the drivers on the spot were +as ignorant as they were insubordinate. The troops had received no +instruction in musketry, and many of the regiments +went into action without having once fired their rifles. But the +protests of the generals were of no effect. The Federal Cabinet decided +that in face of the public impatience it was impossible to postpone the +movement. “On to Richmond” was the universal cry. The halls of Congress +resounded with the fervid eloquence of the politicians. The press +teemed with bombastic articles, in which the Northern troops were +favourably compared with the regular armies of Europe, and the need of +discipline and training for the fearless and intelligent +representatives of the sovereign people was scornfully repudiated. +Ignorance of war and contempt for the lessons of history were to cost +the nation dear. + +The march from Washington was a brilliant spectacle. The roads south of +the Potomac were covered with masses of men, well armed and well +clothed, amply furnished with artillery, and led by regular officers. +To the sound of martial music they had defiled before the President. +They were accompanied by scores of carriages. Senators, members of +Congress, and even ladies swelled the long procession. A crowd of +reporters rode beside the columns; and the return of a victorious army +could hardly have been hailed with more enthusiasm than the departure +of these untrained and unblooded volunteers. Yet, pitiful masquerade as +the march must have appeared to a soldier’s eye, the majority of those +who broke camp that summer morning were brave men and good Americans. +To restore the Union, to avenge the insult to their country’s flag, +they had come forward with no other compulsion than the love of their +mother-land. If their self-confidence was supreme and even arrogant, it +was the self-confidence of a strong and a fearless people, and their +patriotism was of the loftiest kind. It would have been easy for the +North, with her enormous wealth, to have organised a vast army of +mercenaries wherewith to crush the South. But no! her sons were not +willing that their country’s honour should be committed to meaner +hands. + +As they advanced into Virginia, the men, animated by their +surroundings, stepped briskly forward, and the +country-side was gay with fantastic uniforms and gorgeous standards. +But the heat was oppressive, and the roads lay deep in dust. Knapsack, +rifle, and blankets became a grievous burden. The excitement died away, +and unbroken to the monotonous exertion of the march the three-months’ +recruits lost all semblance of subordination. The compact array of the +columns was gradually lost, and a tail of laggards, rapidly increasing, +brought up the rear. Regiment mingled with regiment. By each roadside +brook the men fell out in numbers. Every blackberry bush was surrounded +by a knot of stragglers; and, heedless of the orders of those officers +who still attempted to keep them in the ranks, scores of so-called +soldiers sought the cool shade of the surrounding woods.[1] When +darkness fell the army was but six miles from its morning bivouacs; and +it was not till late the next day that the stragglers rejoined their +regiments. + +McDowell had intended to attack at once. “But I could not,” he says, +“get the troops forward earlier than we did. I wished them to go to +Centreville the second day, but when I went to urge them forward, I was +told that it was impossible for the men to march further. They had only +come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and a +half miles further to Centreville, in all a march of twelve and a half +miles; but the men were foot-weary—not so much, I was told, by the +distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the +obstructions in the road, and the slow pace we had to move to avoid +ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, and not +used to carrying even the load of ‘light marching order.’ . . . The +trains, hurriedly gotten together, with horses, waggons, drivers, and +waggon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty +and disorder, and were the cause of a day’s delay in getting the +provisions forward.”[2] + +On the morning of the 18th, in order to attract the enemy’s attention +from his right, a brigade was sent south, +in the direction of Bull Run. The Confederate outposts fell back over +Blackburn’s Ford. The woods about the stream concealed the defenders’ +forces, and the Federals pushed on, bringing artillery into action. Two +Confederate guns, after firing a few shots, were withdrawn under cover, +and the attacking troops reached the ford. Suddenly, from the high +timber on the further bank, volleys of musketry blazed out in their +very faces, and then came proof that some at least of the Federal +regiments were no more to be relied upon in action than on the march. A +portion of the force, despite the strong position of the enemy and the +heavy fire, showed a bold front, but at least one regiment turned and +fled, and was only rallied far in rear. The whole affair was a mistake +on the part of the commander. His troops had been heedlessly pushed +forward, and General Longstreet, commanding the opposing brigade, by +carefully concealing his infantry, had drawn him into an ambuscade. The +results of the action were not without importance. The Federals fell +back with a loss of 83 officers and men, and the Confederates were much +elated at their easy success. Among some of the Northerners, on the +other hand, the sudden check to the advance, and the bold bearing of +the enemy, turned confidence and enthusiasm into irrational +despondency. A regiment and a battery, which had enlisted for three +months and whose time was up, demanded their discharge, and +notwithstanding the appeals of the Secretary of War, “moved to the rear +to the sound of the enemy’s cannon.”[3] + +McDowell’s plans were affected by the behaviour of his troops. He was +still ignorant, so skilfully had the march from the Valley been carried +out, that Johnston had escaped Patterson. He was well aware, however, +that such movement was within the bounds of possibility, yet he found +himself compelled to postpone attack until the 21st. The 19th and 20th +were spent in reconnaissance, and in bringing up supplies; and the lack +of organisation made the issue of rations a long process. But it was +the general’s +want of confidence in his soldiers that was the main cause of delay. + +The Confederates were strongly posted. The bridges and fords across +Bull Run, with the exception of Sudley Ford, a long way up stream to +the Federal right, were obstructed with felled trees, and covered by +rude intrenchments. Even with regular troops a direct attack on a +single point of passage would have been difficult. McDowell’s first +idea was to pass across the front of the defences, and turn the right +at Wolf Run Shoals, five miles south-east of Union Mills. The country, +however, on this flank was found to be unfit for the operations of +large masses, and it was consequently determined to turn the +Confederate left by way of Sudley Springs. + +The Federal army consisted of five divisions of infantry, forty-three +guns, and seven troops of regular cavalry. Nine batteries and eight +companies of infantry were supplied by the United States army, and +there was a small battalion of marines. The strength of the force told +off for the attack amounted to 30,000 all told.[4] + +The Confederates, along the banks of Bull Run, disposed of 26,000 +infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 55 guns. Johnston, who had arrived on the +20th, had assumed command; but, ignorant of the country, he had allowed +Beauregard to make the dispositions for the expected battle. The line +occupied was extensive, six miles in length, stretching from the Stone +Bridge, where the Warrenton highroad crosses Bull Run, on the left, to +the ford at +Union Mills on the right. Besides these two points of passage there +were no less than six fords, to each of which ran a road from +Centreville. The country to the north was undulating and densely +wooded, and it would have been possible for the Federals, especially as +the Southern cavalry was held back south of the stream, to mass before +any one of the fords, unobserved, in superior numbers. Several of the +fords, moreover, were weakly guarded, for Beauregard, who had made up +his mind to attack, had massed the greater part of his army near the +railroad. The Shenandoah troops were in reserve; Bee’s and Bartow’s +brigades between McLean’s and Blackburn’s fords, Jackson’s between +Blackburn’s and Mitchell’s fords, in rear of the right centre. + +The position south of Bull Run, originally selected by General Lee,[5] +was better adapted for defence than for attack. The stream, with its +high banks, ran like the ditch of a fortress along the front; and to +the south was the plateau on which stands Manassas Junction. The +plateau is intersected by several creeks, running through deep +depressions, and dividing the high ground into a series of bold +undulations, level on the top, and with gentle slopes. The most +important of the creeks is Young’s Branch, surrounding on two sides the +commanding eminence crowned by the Henry House, and joining Bull Run a +short distance below the Stone Bridge. That part of the field which +borders on Flat Run, and lies immediately north of Manassas Junction, +is generally thickly wooded; but shortly after passing New Market, the +Manassas-Sudley road, running north-west, emerges into more open +country, and, from the Henry House onward, passes over several parallel +ridges, deep in grass and corn, and studded between with groves of oak +and pine. Here the large fields, without hedges, and scantily fenced, +formed an admirable manœuvre ground; the wide depressions of the +creeks, separating the crests of the ridges by a space of fifteen or +sixteen hundred yards, gave free play to the artillery; the long easy +slopes could be swept by fire, and the groves were no obstruction to +the view. +The left flank of the Confederate position, facing north, on either +side of the Manassas-Sudley road, was thus an ideal battle-field. + +[Illustration: Map showing the dispositions on the morning of July +21st, 1861.] + +July 21, 6.30 a.m. Sunday morning, the 21st of July, broke clear and +warm. Through a miscarriage of orders, the Confederate offensive +movement was delayed; and soon after six o’clock the Federals opened +with musketry and artillery against the small brigade commanded by +Colonel Evans, which held the Stone Bridge on the extreme left of the +Confederate line. An hour later the Shenandoah brigades, Bee’s, +Bartow’s, and Jackson’s, together with Bonham’s, were ordered up in +support. + +8.30 a.m. The attack was feebly pressed, and at 8.30 Evans, observing a +heavy cloud of dust rising above the woods to the north of the +Warrenton road, became satisfied that the movement to his front was but +a feint, and that a column of the enemy was meanwhile marching to turn +his flank by way of Sudley Springs, about two miles north-west. + +9 a.m. Sending back this information to the next brigade, he left four +companies to hold the bridge; and with six companies of riflemen, a +battalion called the Louisiana Tigers, and two six-pounder howitzers, +he moved across Young’s Branch, and took post on the Matthews Hill, a +long ridge, which, at the same elevation, faces the Henry Hill. + +Evans’ soldierly instinct had penetrated the design of the Federal +commander, and his ready assumption of responsibility threw a strong +force across the path of the turning column, and gave time for his +superiors to alter their dispositions and bring up the reserves. + +The Federal force opposite the Stone Bridge consisted of a whole +division; and its commander, General Tyler, had been instructed to +divert attention, by means of a vigorous demonstration, from the march +of Hunter’s and Heintzleman’s divisions to a ford near Sudley Springs. +Part of the Fifth Division was retained in reserve at Centreville, and +part threatened the fords over Bull Run below the Stone Bridge. The +Fourth Division had been left upon the railroad, seven miles in rear of +Centreville, in order to guard the communications with Washington. + +Already, in forming the line of march, there had been much confusion. +The divisions had bivouacked in loose order, without any regard for the +morrow’s movements, and their concentration previous to the advance was +very tedious. The brigades crossed each other’s route; the march was +slow; and the turning column, blocked by Tyler’s division on its way to +the Stone Bridge, was delayed for nearly three hours. + +9.30 a.m. At last, however, Hunter and Heintzleman crossed Sudley Ford; +and after marching a mile in the direction of Manassas Junction, the +leading brigade struck Evans’ riflemen. The Confederates were concealed +by a fringe of woods, and the Federals were twice repulsed. But +supports came crowding up, and Evans sent back for reinforcements. The +fight had lasted for an hour. It was near eleven o’clock, and the check +to the enemy’s advance had given time for the Confederates to form a +line of battle on the Henry Hill. Bee and Bartow, accompanied by +Imboden’s battery, were in position; Hampton’s Legion, a regiment +raised and commanded by an officer who was one of the wealthiest +planters in South Carolina, and who became one of the finest soldiers +in the Confederacy, was not far behind; and Jackson was coming up.[6] + +Again the situation was saved by the prompt initiative of a brigade +commander. Bee had been ordered to support the troops at the Stone +Bridge. Moving forward towards the Henry Hill, he had been informed by +a mounted orderly that the whole Federal army seemed to be moving to +the north-west. A signal officer on the plateau who had caught the +glint of the brass field-pieces which accompanied the hostile column, +still several miles distant, had sent the message. Bee waited for no +further instructions. Ordering Bartow to follow, he climbed the Henry +Hill. The wide and beautiful landscape lay spread before him; Evans’ +small command was nearly a mile distant, on the Matthews +Hill; and on the ridges to the far north-west he saw the glitter of +many bayonets. + +11 a.m. Rapidly placing his battery in position near the Henry House, +Bee formed a line of battle on the crest above Young’s Branch; but very +shortly afterwards, acceding to an appeal for help from Evans, he +hurried his troops forward to the Matthews Hill. His new position +protected the rear of the companies which held the Stone Bridge; and so +long as the bridge was held the two wings of the Federal army were +unable to co-operate. But on the Matthews Hill, the enemy’s strength, +especially in artillery, was overwhelming; and the Confederates were +soon compelled to fall back to the Henry Hill. McDowell had already +sent word to Tyler to force the Stone Bridge; and Sherman’s brigade of +this division, passing the stream by a ford, threatened the flank of +Bee and Evans as they retreated across Young’s Branch. + +The Federals now swarmed over the Matthews Hill; but Imboden’s battery, +which Bee had again posted on the Henry Hill, and Hampton’s Legion, +occupying the Robinson House, a wooden tenement on the open spur which +projects towards the Stone Bridge, covered the retirement of the +discomfited brigades. They were not, however, suffered to fall back +unharassed. + +A long line of guns, following fast upon their tracks, and crossing the +fields at a gallop, came into action on the opposite slope. In vain +Imboden’s gunners, with their pieces well placed behind a swell of +ground, strove to divert their attention from the retreating infantry, +now climbing the slopes of the Henry Hill. The Federal batteries, +powerful in numbers, in discipline, and in materiel, plied their fire +fast. The shells fell in quick succession amongst the disordered ranks +of the Southern regiments, and not all the efforts of their officers +could stay their flight. + +The day seemed lost. Strong masses of Northern infantry were moving +forward past the Stone House on the Warrenton turnpike. Hampton’s +Legion was retiring on the right. Imboden’s battery, with but three +rounds remaining for each piece, galloped back across the Henry Hill, +and +this commanding height, the key of the battle-ground, was abandoned to +the enemy. But help was at hand. Jackson, like Bee and Bartow, had been +ordered to the Stone Bridge. Hearing the heavy fire to his left +increasing in intensity, he had turned the head of his column towards +the most pressing danger, and had sent a messenger to Bee to announce +his coming. As he pushed rapidly forward, part of the troops he +intended to support swept by in disorder to the rear. Imboden’s battery +came dashing back, and that officer, meeting Jackson, expressed with a +profanity which was evidently displeasing to the general his disgust at +being left without support. “I’ll support your battery,” was the brief +reply; “unlimber right here.” + +11.30 a.m. At this moment appeared General Bee, approaching at full +gallop, and he and Jackson met face to face. The latter was cool and +composed; Bee covered with dust and sweat, his sword in his hand, and +his horse foaming. “General,” he said, “they are beating us back!” +“Then, sir, we will give them the bayonet;” the thin lips closed like a +vice, and the First Brigade, pressing up the slope, formed into line on +the eastern edge of the Henry Hill. + +Jackson’s determined bearing inspired Bee with renewed confidence. He +turned bridle and galloped back to the ravine where his officers were +attempting to reform their broken companies. Riding into the midst of +the throng, he pointed with his sword to the Virginia regiments, +deployed in well-ordered array on the height above. “Look!” he shouted, +“there is Jackson standing like a stone wall! Rally behind the +Virginians!” The men took up the cry; and the happy augury of the +expression, applied at a time when defeat seemed imminent and hearts +were failing, was remembered when the danger had passed away. + +The position which Jackson had occupied was the strongest that could be +found. He had not gone forward to the crest which looks down upon +Young’s Branch, and commands the slopes by which the Federals were +advancing. From that crest extended a wide view, and a wide field of +fire; but both flanks would have been exposed. The +Henry House was nothing more than a cottage; neither here nor elsewhere +was there shelter for his riflemen, and they would have been exposed to +the full force of the Federal artillery without power of reply. But on +the eastern edge of the hill, where he had chosen to deploy, ran a belt +of young pines, affording excellent cover, which merged into a dense +oak wood near the Sudley road. + +Along the edge of the pines Jackson placed his regiments, with six guns +to support them. Lying in rear of the guns were the 4th and 27th +Virginia; on the right was the 5th; on the left the 2nd and 33rd. Both +flanks were in the woods, and Stuart, whom Jackson had called upon to +secure his left, was watching the ground beyond the road. To the front, +for a space of five hundred yards, stretched the level crest of the +hill; and the ground beyond the Henry House, dipping to the valley of +Young’s Branch, where the Federals were now gathering, was wholly +unseen. But as the tactics of Wellington so often proved, a position +from which the view is limited, well in rear of a crest line, may be +exceedingly strong for defence, provided that troops who hold it can +use the bayonet. It would be difficult in the extreme for the Federals +to pave the way for their attack with artillery. From the guns on the +Matthews Hill the Virginia regiments were well sheltered, and the range +was long. To do effective work the hostile batteries would have to +cross Young’s Branch, ascend the Henry Hill, and come into action +within five hundred yards of Jackson’s line. Even if they were able to +hold their ground at so short a range, they could make no accurate +practice under the fire of the Confederate marksmen. + +12 noon In rear of Jackson’s line, Bee, Bartow, and Evans were rallying +their men, when Johnston and Beauregard, compelled, by the unexpected +movement of the Federals, to abandon all idea of attack, appeared upon +the Henry Hill. They were accompanied by two batteries of artillery, +Pendleton’s and Alburtis’. The colours of the broken regiments were +ordered to the front, and the men rallied, taking post on Jackson’s +right. The +moment was critical. The blue masses of the Federals, the dust rolling +high above them, were already descending the opposite slopes. The guns +flashed fiercely through the yellow cloud; and the Confederate force +was but a handful. Three brigades had been summoned from the fords; but +the nearest was four miles distant, and many of the troops upon the +plateau were already half-demoralised by retreat. The generals set +themselves to revive the courage of their soldiers. Beauregard galloped +along the line, cheering the regiments in every portion of the field, +and then, with the colour-bearers accompanying him, rode forward to the +crest. Johnston was equally conspicuous. The enemy’s shells were +bursting on every side, and the shouts of the Confederates, recognising +their leaders as they dashed across the front, redoubled the uproar. +Meanwhile, before the centre of his line, with an unconcern which had a +marvellous effect on his untried command, Jackson rode slowly to and +fro. Except that his face was a little paler, and his eyes brighter, he +looked exactly as his men had seen him so often on parade; and as he +passed along the crest above them they heard from time to time the +reassuring words, uttered in a tone which betrayed no trace of +excitement, “Steady, men! steady! all’s well!” + +It was at this juncture, while the confusion of taking up a new +position with shattered and ill-drilled troops was at the highest, that +the battle lulled. The Federal infantry, after defeating Bee and Evans, +had to cross the deep gully and marshy banks of Young’s Branch, to +climb the slope of the Henry Hill, and to form for a fresh attack. Even +with trained soldiers a hot fight is so conducive of disorder, that it +is difficult to initiate a rapid pursuit, and the Northern regiments +were very slow in resuming their formations. At the same time, too, the +fire of their batteries became less heavy. From their position beyond +Young’s Branch the rifled guns had been able to ply the Confederate +lines with shell, and their effective practice had rendered the work of +rallying the troops exceedingly difficult. But when his infantry +advanced, McDowell ordered one half of his artillery, two fine +batteries of regulars, made up +principally of rifled guns, to cross Young’s Branch. This respite was +of the utmost value to the Confederates. The men, encouraged by the +gallant bearing of their leaders, fell in at once upon the colours, and +when Hunter’s regiments appeared on the further rim of the plateau they +were received with a fire which for a moment drove them back. But the +regular batteries were close at hand, and as they came into action the +battle became general on the Henry Hill. The Federals had 16,000 +infantry available; the Confederates no more than 6,500. But the latter +were superior in artillery, 16 pieces confronting 12. The Federal guns, +however, were of heavier calibre; the gunners were old soldiers, and +both friend and foe testify to the accuracy of their fire, their fine +discipline, and staunch endurance. The infantry, on the other hand, was +not well handled. The attack was purely frontal. No attempt whatever +was made to turn the Confederate flanks, although the Stone Bridge, +except for the abattis, was now open, and Johnston’s line might easily +have been taken in reverse. Nor does it appear that the cavalry was +employed to ascertain where the flanks rested. Moreover, instead of +massing the troops for a determined onslaught, driven home by sheer +weight of numbers, the attack was made by successive brigades, those in +rear waiting till those in front had been defeated; and, in the same +manner, the brigades attacked by successive regiments. Such tactics +were inexcusable. It was certainly necessary to push the attack home +before the Confederate reinforcements could get up; and troops who had +never drilled in mass would have taken much time to assume the orthodox +formation of several lines of battle, closely supporting one another. +Yet there was no valid reason, beyond the inexperience of the generals +in dealing with large bodies, that brigades should have been sent into +action piecemeal, or that the flanks of the defence should have been +neglected. The fighting, nevertheless, was fierce. The Federal +regiments, inspirited by their success on the Matthews Hill, advanced +with confidence, and soon pushed forward past the Henry House. “The +contest that ensued,” +says General Imboden, “was terrific. Jackson ordered me to go from +battery to battery and see that the guns were properly aimed and the +fuses cut the right length. This was the work of but a few minutes. On +returning to the left of the line of guns, I stopped to ask General +Jackson’s permission to rejoin my battery. The fight was just then hot +enough to make him feel well. His eyes fairly blazed. He had a way of +throwing up his left hand with the open palm towards the person he was +addressing. And, as he told me to go, he made this gesture. The air was +full of flying missiles, and as he spoke he jerked down his hand, and I +saw that blood was streaming from it. I exclaimed, “General, you are +wounded.” “Only a scratch—a mere scratch,” he replied, and binding it +hastily with a handkerchief, he galloped away along his line.”[7] + +1.30 p.m. When the battle was at its height, and across that narrow +space, not more than five hundred yards in width, the cannon thundered, +and the long lines of infantry struggled for the mastery, the two +Federal batteries, protected by two regiments of infantry on their +right, advanced to a more effective position. The movement was fatal. +Stuart, still guarding the Confederate left, was eagerly awaiting his +opportunity, and now, with 150 troopers, filing through the fences on +Bald Hill, he boldly charged the enemy’s right. The regiment thus +assailed, a body of Zouaves, in blue and scarlet, with white turbans, +was ridden down, and almost at the same moment the 33rd Virginia, +posted on Jackson’s left, charged forward from the copse in which they +had been hidden. The uniforms in the two armies at this time were much +alike, and from the direction of their approach it was difficult at +first for the officers in charge of the Federal batteries to make sure +that the advancing troops were not their own. A moment more and the +doubtful regiment proved its identity by a deadly volley, delivered at +a range of seventy yards. Every gunner was shot down; the teams were +almost annihilated, and several officers fell killed or wounded. The +Zouaves, already much shaken by Stuart’s well-timed +charge, fled down the slopes, dragging with them another regiment of +infantry. + +Three guns alone escaped the marksmen of the 33rd. The remainder stood +upon the field, silent and abandoned, surrounded by dying horses, +midway between the opposing lines. + +This success, however, brought but short relief to the Confederates. +The enemy was not yet done with. Fresh regiments passed to the attack. +The 33rd was driven back, and the thin line upon the plateau was hard +put to it to retain its ground. The Southerners had lost heavily. Bee +and Bartow had been killed, and Hampton wounded. Few reinforcements had +reached the Henry Hill. Stragglers and skulkers were streaming to the +rear. The Federals were thronging forward, and it seemed that the +exhausted defenders must inevitably give way before the successive +blows of superior numbers. The troops were losing confidence. Yet no +thought of defeat crossed Jackson’s mind. “General,” said an officer, +riding hastily towards him, “the day is going against us.” “If you +think so, sir,” was the quiet reply, “you had better not say anything +about it.” And although affairs seemed desperate, in reality the crisis +of the battle had already passed. McDowell had but two brigades +remaining in reserve, and one of these—of Tyler’s division—was still +beyond Bull Run. His troops were thoroughly exhausted; they had been +marching and fighting since midnight; the day was intensely hot; they +had encountered fierce resistance; their rifled batteries had been +silenced, and the Confederate reinforcements were coming up. Two of +Bonham’s regiments had taken post on Jackson’s right, and a heavy force +was approaching on the left. Kirby Smith’s brigade, of the Army of the +Shenandoah, coming up by train, had reached Manassas Junction while the +battle was in progress. It was immediately ordered to the field, and +had been already instructed by Johnston to turn the enemy’s right. + +But before the weight of Smith’s 1,900 bayonets could be thrown into +the scale, the Federals made a vigorous effort to carry the Henry Hill. +Those portions of the Confederate +line which stood on the open ground gave way before them. Some of the +guns, ordered to take up a position from which they could cover the +retreat, were limbering up; and with the exception of the belt of +pines, the plateau was abandoned to the hostile infantry, who were +beginning to press forward at every point. The Federal engineers were +already clearing away the abattis from the Stone Bridge, in order to +give passage to Tyler’s third brigade and a battery of artillery; “and +all were certain,” says McDowell, “that the day was ours.” + +2.45 p.m. Jackson’s men were lying beneath the crest of the plateau. +Only one of his regiments—the 33rd—had as yet been engaged in the open, +and his guns in front still held their own. Riding to the centre of his +line, where the 2nd and 4th Virginia were stationed, he gave orders for +a counterstroke. “Reserve your fire till they come within fifty yards, +then fire and give them the bayonet; and when you charge, yell like +furies!” Right well did the hot Virginian blood respond. Inactive from +the stroke of noon till three o’clock, with the crash and cries of +battle in their ears, and the shells ploughing gaps in their recumbent +ranks, the men were chafing under the stern discipline which held them +back from the conflict they longed to join. The Federals swept on, +extending from the right and left, cheering as they came, and following +the flying batteries in the ardour of success. Suddenly, a long grey +line sprang from the ground in their very faces; a rolling volley threw +them back in confusion; and then, with their fierce shouts pealing high +above the tumult, the 2nd and 4th Virginia, supported by the 5th, +charged forward across the hill. At the same moment that the enemy’s +centre was thus unexpectedly assailed, Kirby Smith’s fresh brigade bore +down upon the flank,[8] and Beauregard, with ready judgment, dispatched +his staff officers to order a general advance. The broken remnants of +Bee, Hampton, and Evans advanced upon Jackson’s right, and victory, +long wavering, crowned the standards of the South. The Federals were +driven past +the guns, now finally abandoned, past the Henry House, and down the +slope. McDowell made one desperate endeavour to stay the rout. Howard’s +brigade was rapidly thrown in. But the centre had been completely +broken by Jackson’s charge; the right was giving way, and the +Confederates, manning the captured guns, turned them on the masses +which covered the fields below. + +Howard, although his men fought bravely, was easily repulsed; in a few +minutes not a single Federal soldier, save the dead and dying, was to +be seen upon the plateau. + +Illustration: Map of the field of Bull Run. For larger view click on +image + +3.30 p.m. A final stand was made by McDowell along Young’s Branch; and +there, at half-past three, a line of battle was once more established, +the battalion of regular infantry forming a strong centre. But another +Confederate brigade, under General Early, had now arrived, and again +the enemy’s right was overthrown, while Beauregard, leaving Jackson, +whose brigade had lost all order and many men in its swift advance, to +hold the plateau, swept forward towards the Matthews Hill. The movement +was decisive. McDowell’s volunteers broke up in the utmost confusion. +The Confederate infantry was in no condition to pursue, but the cavalry +was let loose, and before long the retreat became a panic. The regular +battalion, composed of young soldiers, but led by experienced officers, +alone preserved its discipline, moving steadily in close order through +the throng of fugitives, and checking the pursuing troopers by its firm +and confident bearing. The remainder of the army dissolved into a mob. +It was not that the men were completely demoralised, but simply that +discipline had not become a habit. They had marched as individuals, +going just so far as they pleased, and halting when they pleased; they +had fought as individuals, bravely enough, but with little combination; +and when they found that they were beaten, as individuals they +retreated. “The old soldier,” wrote one of the regular officers a week +later, “feels safe in the ranks, unsafe out of the ranks, and the +greater the danger the more pertinaciously he clings to his place. The +volunteer of three months never attains this instinct of discipline. +Under danger, and +even under mere excitement, he flies away from his ranks, and hopes for +safety in dispersion. At four o’clock in the afternoon of the 21st +there were more than 12,000 volunteers on the battle-field of Bull Run +who had entirely lost their regimental organisation. They could no +longer be handled as troops, for the officers and men were not +together. Men and officers mingled together promiscuously; and it is +worthy of remark that this disorganisation did not result from defeat +or fear, for up to four o’clock we had been uniformly successful. The +instinct of discipline which keeps every man in his place had not been +acquired. We cannot suppose that the enemy had attained a higher degree +of discipline than our own, but they acted on the defensive, and were +not equally exposed to disorganisation.”[9] + +“Cohesion was lost,” says one of McDowell’s staff; “and the men walked +quietly off. There was no special excitement except that arising from +the frantic efforts of officers to stop men who paid little or no +attention to anything that was said; and there was no panic, in the +ordinary sense and meaning of the word, until the retiring soldiers, +guns, waggons, Congressmen and carriages, were fired upon, on the road +east of Bull Run.”[10] + +At Centreville the reserve division stood fast; and the fact that these +troops were proof against the infection of panic and the exaggerated +stories of the fugitives is in itself strong testimony to the native +courage of the soldiery. + +A lack of competent Staff officers, which, earlier in the day, had +prevented an advance on Centreville by the Confederate right, brought +Johnston’s arrangements for pursuit to naught. The cavalry, weak in +numbers, was soon incumbered with squads of prisoners; darkness fell +upon the field, and the defeated army streamed over the roads to +Washington, followed only by its own fears. + +Why the Confederate generals did not follow up their success on the +following day is a question round which controversy raged for many a +year. Deficiencies in +commissariat and transport; the disorganisation of the army after the +victory; the difficulties of a direct attack upon Washington, defended +as it was by a river a mile broad, with but a single bridge, and +patrolled by gunboats; the determination of the Government to limit its +military operations to a passive defence of Confederate territory, have +all been pressed into service as excuses. “Give me 10,000 fresh +troops,” said Jackson, as the surgeon dressed his wound, “and I would +be in Washington to-morrow.” Before twenty-four hours had passed +reinforcements had increased the strength of Johnston’s army to 40,000. +Want of organisation had undoubtedly prevented McDowell from winning a +victory on the 19th or 20th, but pursuit is a far less difficult +business than attack. There was nothing to interfere with a forward +movement. There were supplies along the railway, and if the mechanism +for their distribution and the means for their carriage were wanting, +the counties adjoining the Potomac were rich and fertile. Herds of +bullocks were grazing in the pastures, and the barns of the farmers +were loaded with grain. It was not a long supply train that was +lacking, nor an experienced staff, nor even well-disciplined +battalions; but a general who grasped the full meaning of victory, who +understood how a defeated army, more especially of new troops, yields +at a touch, and who, above all, saw the necessity of giving the North +no leisure to develop her immense resources. For three days Jackson +impatiently awaited the order to advance, and his men were held ready +with three days’ cooked rations in their haversacks. But his superiors +gave no sign, and he was reluctantly compelled to abandon all hope of +reaping the fruits of victory. + +It is true that the Confederates were no more fit for offensive +operations than McDowell’s troops. “Our army,” says General Johnston, +“was more disorganised by victory than that of the United States by +defeat.” But it is to be remembered that if the Southerners had moved +into Maryland, crossing the Potomac by some of the numerous fords near +Harper’s Ferry, they would have found no organised opposition, save the +_débris_ of McDowell’s army, between them +and the Northern capital. On July 26, five days after the battle, the +general who was to succeed McDowell arrived in Washington and rode +round the city. “I found,” he wrote, “no preparations whatever for +defence, not even to the extent of putting the troops in military +position. Not a regiment was properly encamped, not a single avenue of +approach guarded. All was chaos, and the streets, hotels, and bar-rooms +were filled with drunken officers and men, absent from their regiments +without leave, a perfect pandemonium. Many had even gone to their +homes, their flight from Bull Run terminating in New York, or even in +New Hampshire and Maine. There was really nothing to prevent a small +cavalry force from riding into the city. A determined attack would +doubtless have carried Arlington Heights and placed the city at the +mercy of a battery of rifled guns. If the Secessionists attached any +value to the possession of Washington, they committed their greatest +error in not following up the victory of Bull Run.” On the same date, +the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, wrote as follows: “The capture of +Washington seems now to be inevitable; during the whole of Monday and +Tuesday [July 22 and 23] it might have been taken without resistance. +The rout, overthrow, and demoralisation of the whole army were +complete.”[11] + +Of his own share in the battle, either at the time or afterwards, +Jackson said but little. A day or two after the battle an anxious crowd +was gathered round the post-office at Lexington, awaiting intelligence +from the front. A letter was handed to the Reverend Dr. White, who, +recognising the handwriting, exclaimed to the eager groups about him, +“Now we shall know all the facts.” On opening it he found the +following, and no more: + +“My dear Pastor,—In my tent last night, after a fatiguing day’s +service, I remembered that I had failed to send you my contribution to +our coloured Sunday school. Enclosed you will find my check for that +object, which please acknowledge at your earliest convenience, and +oblige yours faithfully, T. J. Jackson.” + +To his wife, however, he was less reserved. “Yesterday,” he wrote, we +“fought a great battle and gained a great victory, for which all the +glory is due to God alone. . . . Whilst great credit is due to other +parts of our gallant army, God made my brigade more instrumental than +any other in repulsing the main attack. This is for your information +only—say nothing about it. Let others speak praise, not myself.” + +Again, on August 5: “And so you think the papers ought to say more +about your husband. My brigade is not a brigade of newspaper +correspondents. I know that the First Brigade was the first to meet and +pass our retreating forces—to push on with no other aid than the smiles +of God; to boldly take up its position with the artillery that was +under my command—to arrest the victorious foe in his onward progress—to +hold him in check until the reinforcements arrived—and finally to +charge bayonets, and, thus advancing, to pierce the enemy’s centre. I +am well satisfied with what it did, and so are my generals, Johnston +and Beauregard. It is not to be expected that I should receive the +credit that Generals Johnston and Beauregard would, because I was under +them; but I am thankful to my ever-kind Heavenly Father that He makes +me content to await His own good time and pleasure for +commendation—knowing that all things work together for my good. If my +brigade can always play so important and useful a part as it did in the +last battle, I trust I shall ever be most grateful. As you think the +papers do not notice me enough, I send a specimen, which you will see +from the upper part of the paper is a ‘leader.’ My darling, never +distrust our God, Who doeth all things well. In due time He will make +manifest all His pleasure, which is all His people should desire. You +must not be concerned at seeing other parts of the army lauded, and my +brigade not mentioned. Truth is mighty and will prevail. When the +official reports are published, if not before, I expect to see justice +done to this noble body of patriots.”[12] + +These letters reveal a generous pride in the valour of his +troops, and a very human love of approbation struggles with the curb +which his religious principles had placed on his ambition. Like Nelson, +he felt perhaps that before long he would have “a Gazette of his own.” +But still, of his own achievements, of his skilful tactics, of his +personal behaviour, of his well-timed orders, he spoke no word, and the +victory was ascribed to a higher power. “The charge of the 2nd and 4th +Virginia,” he wrote in his modest report, “through the blessing of God, +Who gave us the victory, pierced the centre of the enemy.”[13] + +And Jackson’s attitude was that of the Southern people. When the news +of Bull Run reached Richmond, and through the crowds that thronged the +streets passed the tidings of the victory, there was neither wild +excitement nor uproarious joy. No bonfires lit the darkness of the +night; no cannon thundered out salutes; the steeples were silent till +the morrow, and then were heard only the solemn tones that called the +people to prayer. It was resolved, on the day following the battle, by +the Confederate Congress: “That we recognise the hand of the Most High +God, the King of kings and Lord of lords, in the glorious victory with +which He has crowned our arms at Manassas, and that the people of these +Confederate States are invited, by appropriate services on the ensuing +Sabbath, to offer up their united thanksgivings and prayers for this +mighty deliverance.” + +The spoils of Bull Run were large; 1,500 prisoners, 25 guns, ten stand +of colours, several thousand rifles, a large quantity of ammunition and +hospital stores, twenty-six waggons, and several ambulances were left +in the victors’ hands. The Federal losses were 460 killed and 1,124 +wounded; the Confederate, 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, and 13 missing. +The First Brigade suffered more severely than any other in the Southern +army. Of 3,000 officers and men, 488 were killed or wounded, nearly a +fourth of the total loss. + +A few days after the battle Johnston advanced to Centreville, and from +the heights above the broad Potomac his cavalry vedettes looked upon +the spires of Washington. +But it was in vain that the Confederate troopers rode to and fro on the +river bank and watered their horses within sight of the Capitol. The +enemy was not to be beguiled across the protecting stream. But it was +not from fear. Although the disaster had been as crushing as +unexpected, it was bravely met. The President’s demand for another army +was cheerfully complied with. Volunteers poured in from every State. +The men were no longer asked to serve for three months, but for three +years. Washington became transformed into an enormous camp; great +earthworks rose on the surrounding heights; and the training of the new +levies went steadily forward. There was no cry for immediate action. +Men were not wanting who believed that the task of coercion was +impossible. Able statesmen and influential journalists advised the +President to abandon the attempt. But Lincoln, true to the trust which +had been committed to his keeping, never flinched from his resolve that +the Union should be restored. He, too, stood like a wall between his +defeated legions and the victorious foe. Nor was the nation less +determined. The dregs of humiliation had been drained, and though the +draught was bitter it was salutary. The President was sustained with no +half-hearted loyalty. His political opponents raved and threatened; but +under the storm of recrimination the work of reorganising the army went +steadily forward, and the people were content that until the generals +declared the army fit for action the hour of vengeance should be +postponed. + +To the South, Bull Run was a Pyrrhic victory. It relieved Virginia of +the pressure of the invasion; it proved to the world that the attitude +of the Confederacy was something more than the reckless revolt of a +small section; but it led the Government to indulge vain hopes of +foreign intervention, and it increased the universal contempt for the +military qualities of the Northern soldiers. The hasty judgment of the +people construed a single victory as proof of their superior capacity +for war, and the defeat of McDowell’s army was attributed to the +cowardice of his volunteers. The opinion was absolutely erroneous. Some +of the Federal regiments had misbehaved, it is true; seized with sudden +panic, to which all raw troops are peculiarly susceptible, they had +dispersed before the strong counterstroke of the Confederates. But the +majority had displayed a sterling courage. There can be little question +that the spirit of the infantry depends greatly on the staunchness of +the artillery. A single battery, pushed boldly forward into the front +of battle, has often restored the vigour of a wavering line. Although +the losses it inflicts may not be large, the moral effect of its +support is undeniable. So long as the guns hold fast victory seems +possible. But when these useful auxiliaries are driven back or captured +a general depression becomes inevitable. The retreat of the artillery +strikes a chill into the fighting line which is ominous of defeat, and +it is a wise regulation that compels the batteries, even when their +ammunition is exhausted, to stand their ground. The Federal infantry at +Bull Run had seen their artillery overwhelmed, the teams destroyed, the +gunners shot down, and the enemy’s riflemen swarming amongst the +abandoned pieces. But so vigorous had been their efforts to restore the +battle, that the front of the defence had been with difficulty +maintained; the guns, though they were eventually lost, had been +retaken; and without the assistance of their artillery, but exposed to +the fire, at closest range, of more than one battery, the Northern +regiments had boldly pushed forward across the Henry Hill. The +Confederates, during the greater part of the battle, were certainly +outnumbered; but at the close they were the stronger, and the piecemeal +attacks of the Federals neutralised the superiority which the invading +army originally possessed. + +McDowell appears to have employed 18,000 troops in the attack; Johnston +and Beauregard about the same number.[14] + +A comparison of the relative strength of the two armies, considering +that raw troops have a decided advantage on the defensive, detracts, to +a certain degree, from the credit of the victory; and it will hardly be +questioned that had +the tactics of the Federals been better the victory would have been +theirs. The turning movement by Sudley Springs was a skilful manœuvre, +and completely surprised both Johnston and Beauregard. It was +undoubtedly risky, but it was far less dangerous than a direct attack +on the strong position along Bull Run. + +The retention of the Fourth Division between Washington and Centreville +would seem to have been a blunder; another 5,000 men on the field of +battle should certainly have turned the scale. But more men were hardly +wanted. The Federals during the first period of the fight were strong +enough to have seized the Henry Hill. Bee, Bartow, Evans, and Hampton +had been driven in, and Jackson alone stood fast. A strong and +sustained attack, supported by the fire of the regular batteries, must +have succeeded.[15] The Federal regiments, however, were practically +incapable of movement under fire. The least change of position broke +them into fragments; there was much wild firing; it was impossible to +manœuvre; and the courage of individuals proved a sorry substitute for +order and cohesion. The Confederates owed their victory simply and +solely to the fact that their enemies had not yet learned to use their +strength. + +The summer months went by without further fighting on the Potomac; but +the camps at Fairfax and at Centreville saw the army of Manassas +thinned by furloughs and by sickness. The Southern youth had come out +for battle, and the monotonous routine of the outpost line and the +parade-ground was little to their taste. The Government dared not +refuse the numberless applications for leave of absence, the more so +that in the crowded camps the sultry heat of the Virginia woodlands +bred disease of a virulent type. The First Brigade seems to have +escaped from all these evils. Its commander found his health improved +by his life in the open air. His wound +had been painful. A finger was broken, but the hand was saved, and some +temporary inconvenience alone resulted. As he claimed no furlough for +himself, so he permitted no absence from duty among his troops. “I +can’t be absent,” he wrote to his wife, “as my attention is necessary +in preparing my troops for hard fighting, should it be required; and as +my officers and soldiers are not permitted to visit their wives and +families, I ought not to see mine. It might make the troops feel that +they are badly treated, and that I consult my own comfort, regardless +of theirs.” + +In September his wife joined him for a few days at Centreville, and +later came Dr. White, at his invitation, to preach to his command. +Beyond a few fruitless marches to support the cavalry on the outposts, +of active service there was none. But Jackson was not the man to let +the time pass uselessly. He had his whole brigade under his hand, a +force which wanted but one quality to make it an instrument worthy of +the hand that wielded it, and that quality was discipline. Courage and +enthusiasm it possessed in abundance; and when both were untrained the +Confederate was a more useful soldier than the Northerner. In the South +nearly every man was a hunter, accustomed from boyhood to the use of +firearms. Game was abundant, and it was free to all. Sport in one form +or another was the chief recreation of the people, and their pastoral +pursuits left them much leisure for its indulgence. Every great +plantation had its pack of hounds, and fox-hunting, an heirloom from +the English colonists, still flourished. His stud was the pride of +every Southern gentleman, and the love of horse-flesh was inherent in +the whole population. No man walked when he could ride, and hundreds of +fine horsemen, mounted on steeds of famous lineage, recruited the +Confederate squadrons. + +But, despite their skill with the rifle, their hunter’s craft, and +their dashing horsemanship, the first great battle had been hardly won. +The city-bred Northerners, unused to arms and uninured to hardship, had +fought with extraordinary determination; and the same want of +discipline that had driven them in rout to Washington had +dissolved the victorious Confederates into a tumultuous mob.[16] If +Jackson knew the worth of his volunteers, he was no stranger to their +shortcomings. His thoughts might be crystallised in the words of +Wellington, words which should never be forgotten by those nations +which depend for their defence on the services of their citizen +soldiery. + +“They want,” said the great Duke, speaking of the Portuguese in 1809, +“the habits and the spirit of soldiers,—the habits of command on one +side, and of obedience on the other—mutual confidence between officers +and men.” + +In order that during the respite now offered he might instil these +habits into his brigade, Jackson neither took furlough himself nor +granted it to others. His regiments were constantly exercised on the +parade-ground. Shoulder to shoulder they advanced and retired, marched +and countermarched, massed in column, formed line to front or flank, +until they learned to move as a machine, until the limbs obeyed before +the order had passed from ear to brain, until obedience became an +instinct and cohesion a necessity of their nature. They learned to +listen for the word of the officer, to look to him before they moved +hand or foot; and, in that subjection of their own individuality to the +will of their superior, they acquired that steadiness in battle, that +energy on the march, that discipline in quarters which made the First +Brigade worthy of the name it had already won. “Every officer and +soldier,” said their commander, “who is able to do duty ought to be +busily engaged in military preparation by hard drilling, in order that, +through the blessing of God, we may be victorious in the battles which +in His all-wise providence may await us.” + +Jackson’s tactical ideas, as regards the fire of infantry, expressed at +this time, are worth recording. “I rather think,” he said, “that fire +by file [independent firing] is best on the whole, for it gives the +enemy an idea that the +fire is heavier than if it was by company or battalion (volley firing). +Sometimes, however, one may be best, sometimes the other, according to +circumstances. But my opinion is that there ought not to be much firing +at all. My idea is that the best mode of fighting is to reserve your +fire till the enemy get—or you get them—to close quarters. Then deliver +one deadly, deliberate fire—and charge!” + +Although the newspapers did scant justice to the part played by the +brigade in the battle of Bull Run, Bee’s epithet survived, and Jackson +became known as Stonewall throughout the army. To one of his +acquaintances the general revealed the source of his composure under +fire. “Three days after the battle, hearing that Jackson was suffering +from his wound, I rode,” writes Imboden, “to his quarters near +Centreville. Of course the battle was the only topic discussed during +breakfast. ‘General,’ I remarked, ‘how is it that you can keep so cool, +and appear so utterly insensible to danger in such a storm of shell and +bullets as rained about you when your hand was hit?’ He instantly +became grave and reverential in his manner, and answered, in a low tone +of great earnestness: ‘Captain, my religious belief teaches me to feel +as safe in battle as in bed. God has fixed the time for my death. I do +not concern myself about that, but to be always ready, no matter when +it may overtake me.’ He added, after a pause, looking me full in the +face: ‘That is the way all men should live, and then all would be +equally brave.’”[17] + +Although the war upon the borders had not yet touched the cities of the +South, the patriotism of Virginia saw with uneasiness the inroads of +the enemy in that portion of the State which lies beyond the +Alleghenies, especially the north-west. The country was overrun with +Federal soldiers, and part of the population of the district had +declared openly for the Union. In that district was Jackson’s +birth-place, the home of his childhood, and his mother’s grave. His +interest and his affections were bound by many ties to the country and +the people, and in +the autumn of 1861 he had not yet come to believe that they were at +heart disloyal to their native State. A vigorous effort, he believed, +might still restore to the Confederacy a splendid recruiting-ground, +and he made no secret of his desire for employment in that region. The +strategical advantages of this corner of Virginia were clearly +apparent, as will be seen hereafter, to his perception. Along its +western border runs the Ohio, a river navigable to its junction with +the Mississippi, and giving an easy line of communication into the +heart of Kentucky. Through its northern counties passed the Baltimore +and Ohio Railroad, the main line of communication between Washington +and the West; and alongside the railway ran the Chesapeake and Ohio +Canal, a second and most important line of supply. Above all, +projecting as it did towards the great lakes of the North, the +north-western angle, or Virginia Panhandle, narrowed the passage +between East and West to an isthmus not more than a hundred miles in +breadth. With this territory in the possession of the Confederates, the +Federal dominions would be practically cut in two; and in North-western +Virginia, traversed by many ranges of well-nigh pathless mountains, +with few towns and still fewer roads, a small army might defy a large +one with impunity. + +Nov. 4 On November 4 Jackson’s wish was partially granted. He was +assigned to the command of the Shenandoah Valley District, embracing +the northern part of the area between the Alleghenies and the Blue +Ridge. The order was received with gratitude, but dashed by the fact +that he had to depart alone. “Had this communication,” he said to Dr. +White, “not come as an order, I should instantly have declined it, and +continued in command of my brave old brigade.” + +Whether he or his soldiers felt the parting most it is hard to say. +Certain it is that the men had a warm regard for their leader. There +was no more about him at Centreville to attract the popular fancy than +there had been at Harper’s Ferry. When the troops passed in review the +eye of the spectator turned at once to the trim carriage of Johnston +and of Beauregard, to the glittering uniform of Stuart, to the superb +chargers and the martial bearing of young officers fresh from the +Indian frontier. The silent professor, absent and unsmiling, who +dressed as plainly as he lived, had little in common with those dashing +soldiers. The tent where every night the general and his staff gathered +together for their evening devotions, where the conversation ran not on +the merits of horse and hound, on strategy and tactics, but on the +power of faith and the mysteries of the redemption, seemed out of place +in an army of high-spirited youths. But, while they smiled at his +peculiarities, the Confederate soldiers remembered the fierce +counterstroke on the heights above Bull Run. If the Presbyterian +general was earnest in prayer, they knew that he was prompt in battle +and indefatigable in quarters. He had the respect of all men, and from +his own brigade he had something more. Very early in their service, +away by the rippling Shenandoah, they had heard the stories of his +daring in Mexico. They had experienced his skill and coolness at +Falling Waters; they had seen at Bull Run, while the shells burst in +never-ending succession among the pines, the quiet figure riding slowly +to and fro on the crest above them; they had heard the stern command, +“Wait till they come within fifty yards and then give them the +bayonet,” and they had followed him far in that victorious rush into +the receding ranks of their astonished foe. + +Little wonder that these enthusiastic youths, new to the soldier’s +trade, should have been captivated by a nature so strong and fearless. +The Stonewall Brigade had made Jackson a hero, and he had won more from +them than their admiration. His incessant watchfulness for their +comfort and well-being; the patient care with which he instructed them; +his courtesy to the youngest private; the tact and thoughtfulness he +showed in all his relations with them, had won their affection. His +very peculiarities endeared him to them. Old Jack or Stonewall were his +nicknames in the lines of his own command, and stories went round the +camp fire of how he had been seen walking in the woods round +Centreville absorbed in prayer, or lifting +his left hand with that peculiar gesture which the men believed was an +appeal to Heaven, but which, in reality, was made to relieve the pain +of his wounded finger. But while they discussed his oddities, not a man +in the brigade but acknowledged his ability, and when the time came not +a man but regretted his departure. + +His farewell to his troops was a striking scene. The forest, already +donning its gorgeous autumnal robes, shut in the grassy clearing where +the troops were drawn up. There stood the grey columns of the five +regiments, with the colours, already tattered, waving in the mild +November air. The general rode up, their own general, and not a sound +was heard. Motionless and silent they stood, a veritable stone wall, +whilst his eye ran along the ranks and scanned the familiar faces. “I +am not here to make a speech,” he said, “but simply to say farewell. I +first met you at Harper’s Ferry, at the commencement of the war, and I +cannot take leave of you without giving expression to my admiration of +your conduct from that day to this, whether on the march, in the +bivouac, or on the bloody plains of Manassas, where you gained the +well-deserved reputation of having decided the fate of battle. + +“Throughout the broad extent of country through which you have marched, +by your respect for the rights and property of citizens, you have shown +that you are soldiers not only to defend, but able and willing both to +defend and protect. You have already won a brilliant reputation +throughout the army of the whole Confederacy; and I trust, in the +future, by your deeds in the field, and by the assistance of the same +kind Providence who has hitherto favoured our cause, you will win more +victories and add lustre to the reputation you now enjoy. You have +already gained a proud position in the future history of this our +second War of Independence. I shall look with great anxiety to your +future movements, and I trust whenever I shall hear of the First +Brigade on the field of battle, it will be of still nobler deeds +achieved, and higher reputation won!” Then there was a pause; general +and soldiers looked upon each other, and the heart of the leader +went out to those who had followed him with such devotion. He had +spoken his words of formal praise, but both he and they knew the bonds +between them were too strong to be thus coldly severed. For once he +gave way to impulse; his eye kindled, and rising in his stirrups and +throwing the reins upon his horse’s neck, he spoke in tones which +betrayed the proud memories that thronged upon him:— + +“In the Army of the Shenandoah you were the First Brigade! In the Army +of the Potomac you were the First Brigade! In the Second Corps of the +army you are the First Brigade! You are the First Brigade in the +affections of your general, and I hope by your future deeds and bearing +you will be handed down to posterity as the First Brigade in this our +second War of Independence. Farewell!” + +For a moment there was silence; then the pent-up feeling found +expression, and cheer upon cheer burst forth from the ranks of the +Valley regiments. Waving his hand in token of farewell, Jackson +galloped from the field. + +NOTE I + +THE TROOPS EMPLOYED ON THE HENRY HILL + +FEDERAL + +_First Division:_ TYLER + +Brigade Keyes Brigade Sherman Brigade Shenck = 4,500 + +_Second Division:_ HUNTER + +Brigade Porter Brigade Burnside = 6,000 + +_Third Division:_ HEINTZLEMAN + +Brigade Franklin Brigade Wilcox Brigade Howard = 7,500 + +Total 18,000, and 30 guns. + +CONFEDERATE + +_Army of the Shenandoah_ [JOHNSTON] + +Brigade Jackson Brigade Bee Brigade Bartow Brigade Kirby Smith = +8,700 + +_Army of the Potomac_ [BEAUREGARD] + +Brigade Bonham Brigade Cocke Brigade Early 7th Louisiana Regiment 8th +Louisiana Regiment Hampton’s Legion Cavalry = 9,300 + +Total 18,000, and 21 guns. + +NOTE II + +THE COST OF AN INADEQUATE ARMY + + Lord Wolseley has been somewhat severely criticised for asserting + that in the Civil War, “from first to last, the co-operation of + even one army corps (35,000 men) of regular troops would have given + complete victory to whichever side it fought on.” Whatever may be + argued as to the latter period of the conflict, it is impossible + for anyone who understands the power of organisation, of + discipline, of training, and of a proper system of command, to + dispute the accuracy of this statement as regards the year 1861, + that is, for the first eight months. + + It is far too often assumed that the number of able-bodied men is + the true criterion of national strength. In the Confederate States, + for instance, there were probably 750,000 citizens who were liable + for service in the militia, and yet had the United States possessed + a single regular army corps, with a trained staff, an efficient + commissariat, and a fully-organised system of transport, it is + difficult to see how these 750,000 Southerners could have done more + than wage a guerilla warfare. The army corps would have absorbed + into itself the best of the Northern militia and volunteers; the + staff and commissariat would have given them mobility, and 60,000 + or 70,000 men, moving on Richmond directly Sumter fell, with the + speed and certainty which organisation gives, would have marched + from victory to victory. Their 750,000 enemies would never have had + time to arm, to assemble, to organise, to create an army, to train + a staff, or to arrange for their supplies. Each gathering of + volunteers would have been swept away before it had attained + consistency, and Virginia, at least, must have been conquered in + the first few months. + + And matters would have been no different if the army corps had been + directed against the Union. In the Northern States there were over + 2,000,000 men who were liable for service; and yet the Union + States, notwithstanding their superior resources, were just as + vulnerable as the Confederacy. Numbers, even if they amount to + millions, are useless, and worse than useless, without training and + organisation; the more men that are collected on the battle-field, + the more crushing and far-reaching their defeat. Nor can the theory + be sustained that a small army, invading a rich and populous + country, would be “stung to death” by the numbers of its foes, even + if they dared not oppose it in the open field. Of what avail were + the stupendous efforts of the French Republic in 1870 and 1871? + Enormous armies were raised and equipped; the ranks were filled + with brave men; the generals were not unskilful; and yet time after + time they were defeated by the far inferior forces of their + seasoned enemies. Even in America itself, on two occasions, at + Sharpsburg in 1862, and at Gettysburg in 1863, it was admitted by + the North that the Southerners were “within a stone’s throw of + independence.” And yet hundreds of thousands of able-bodied +men had not yet joined the Federal armies. Nor can Spain be quoted as +an instance of an unconquerable nation. Throughout the war with +Napoleon the English armies, not only that under Wellington, but those +at Cadiz, Tarifa, and Gibraltar, afforded solid rallying-points for the +defeated Spaniards, and by a succession of victories inspired the whole +Peninsula with hope and courage. + + The patriot with a rifle may be equal, or even superior, man for + man, to the professional soldier; but even patriots must be fed, + and to win victories they must be able to manœuvre, and to manœuvre + they must have leaders. If it could remain stationary, protected by + earthworks, and supplied by railways, with which the enemy did not + interfere, a host of hastily raised levies, if armed and equipped, + might hold its own against even a regular army. But against troops + which can manœuvre earthworks are useless, as the history of + Sherman’s brilliant operations in 1864 conclusively shows. To win + battles and to protect their country armies must be capable of + counter-manœuvre, and it is when troops are set in motion that the + real difficulty of supplying them begins. + + If it is nothing else, the War of Secession, with its awful + expenditure of blood and treasure, is a most startling + object-lesson in National Insurance. + + [1] Sherman’s _Memoirs,_ vol. i, p. 181. + + [2] O.R., vol. ii, p. 324. McDowell’s Report. + + [3] O.R., vol. ii, p. 324. McDowell’s Report. + + [4] The rifles (muzzle-loaders) used throughout the war by both + Federals and Confederates compare as follows with more modern + weapons:— + + _Sighted to_ _Effective range_ +American +Needle-gun (1866 and 1870) +Chassepôt (1870) +Martini-Henry +Magazine 1,000 yards + 660 yards +1,320 yards +2,100 yards +3,200 yards 250 yards +250 yards +350 yards +400 yards +600 yards + +By effective range is meant the distance where, under ordinary +conditions, the enemy’s losses are sufficient to stop his advance. The +effective range of Brown Bess was about 60 yards. The American rifled +artillery was effective, in clear weather, at 2,000 yards, the +12-pounder smooth-bore at 1,600, the 6-pounder at 1,200. + + [5] O.R., vol. ii, p. 505. + + [6] Hunter and Heintzleman had 13,200 officers and men; Tyler, 12,000. + Bee and Barrow had 3200 officers and men; Hampton, 630; Jackson, + 3,000. + + [7] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. i, p. 236. + + [8] General Kirby Smith being severely wounded, the command of this + brigade devolved upon Colonel Elzey. + + [9] Report of Captain Woodbury, U.S. Engineers, O.R., vol. ii, p. 334. + + [10] General J. B. Fry, _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. i, p. 191. + + [11] _McClellan’s Own Story,_ pp. 66, 67. + + [12] Both Johnston and Beauregard, in their official reports, did full + justice to Jackson and his brigade. + + [13] O.R., vol. ii, p. 482. + + [14] For the strength of divisions and brigades, see the Note at the + end of the chapter. + + [15] “Had an attack,” said General Johnston, “been made in force, with + double line of battle, such as any major-general in the United States + service would now make, we could not have held [the position] for half + an hour, for they would have enveloped us on both flanks.”—_Campaigns + of the Army of the Potomac,_ W. Swinton, p. 58. + + [16] Colonel Williams, of the 5th Virginia, writes that the Stonewall + Brigade was a notable exception to the general disintegration, and + that it was in good condition for immediate service on the morning + after the battle. + + [17] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. i, pp. 122, 123. + + + + +Chapter VII +ROMNEY + + +While the Indian summer still held carnival in the forests of Virginia, +Jackson found himself once more on the Shenandoah. Some regiments of +militia, the greater part of which were armed with flint-lock muskets, +and a few squadrons of irregular cavalry formed his sole command. + +The autumn of 1861 was a comparatively quiet season. The North, silent +but determined, was preparing to put forth her stupendous strength. +Scott had resigned; McDowell had been superseded; but the President had +found a general who had caught the confidence of the nation. In the +same month that had witnessed McDowell’s defeat, a young officer had +gained a cheap victory over a small Confederate force in West Virginia, +and his grandiloquent dispatches had magnified the achievement in the +eyes of the Northern people. He was at once nicknamed the “Young +Napoleon,” and his accession to the chief command of the Federal armies +was enthusiastically approved. General McClellan had been educated at +West Point, and had graduated first of the class in which Jackson was +seventeenth. He had been appointed to the engineers, had served on the +staff in the war with Mexico, and as United States Commissioner with +the Allied armies in the Crimea. In 1857 he resigned, to become +president of a railway company, and when the war broke out he was +commissioned by the State of Ohio as Major-General of Volunteers. His +reputation at the Military Academy and in the regular army had been +high. His ability and industry were unquestioned. His physique was +powerful, and he was a fine horseman. His influence +over his troops was remarkable, and he was emphatically a gentleman. + +It was most fortunate for the Union at this juncture that caution and +method were his distinguishing characteristics. The States had placed +at Lincoln’s disposal sufficient troops to form an army seven times +greater than that which had been defeated at Bull Run. McClellan, +however, had no thought of committing the new levies to an enterprise +for which they were unfitted. He had determined that the army should +make no move till it could do so with the certainty of success, and the +winter months were to be devoted to training and organisation. Nor was +there any cry for immediate action. The experiment of a civilian army +had proved a terrible failure. The nation that had been so confident of +capturing Richmond, was now anxious for the security of Washington. The +war had been in progress for nearly six months, and yet the troops were +manifestly unfit for offensive operations. Even the crude strategists +of the press had become alive to the importance of drill and +discipline. + +October 21 A reconnaissance in force, pushed (contrary to McClellan’s +orders) across the Potomac, was repulsed by General Evans at Ball’s +Bluff with heavy loss; and mismanagement and misconduct were so evident +that the defeat did much towards inculcating patience. + +So the work went on, quietly but surely, the general supported by the +President, and the nation giving men and money without remonstrance. +The South, on the other hand, was still apathetic. The people, deluded +by their decisive victory, underrated the latent strength of their +mighty adversary. They appear to have believed that the earthworks +which had transformed Centreville into a formidable fortress, manned by +the Army of Northern Virginia, as the force under Johnston was now +designated, were sufficient in themselves to end the war. They had not +yet learned that there were many roads to Richmond, and that a passive +defence is no safeguard against a persevering foe. The Government, +expecting much from the intervention of the European Powers, did +nothing to press the +advantage already gained. In vain the generals urged the President to +reinforce the army at Centreville to 60,000 men, and to give it +transport and supplies sufficient to permit the passage of the Potomac +above Washington. + +In vain they pointed out, in answer to the reply that the Government +could furnish neither men nor arms, that large bodies of troops were +retained at points the occupation of which by the enemy would cause +only a local inconvenience. “Was it not possible,” they asked the +President, “by stripping other points to the last they would bear, and +even risking defeat at all other places, to put the Virginian army in +condition for a forward movement? Success,” they said, “in the +neighbourhood of Washington was success everywhere, and it was upon the +north-eastern frontier that all the available force of the Confederacy +should be concentrated.” + +Mr. Davis was immovable. Although Lee, who had been appointed to a +command in West Virginia almost immediately after Bull Run, was no +longer at hand to advise him, he probably saw the strategical +requirements of the situation. That a concentrated attack on a vital +point is a better measure of security than dissemination along a +frontier, that the counter-stroke is the soul of the defence, and that +the true policy of the State which is compelled to take up arms against +a superior foe is to allow that foe no breathing-space, are truisms +which it would be an insult to his ability to say that he did not +realise. But to have surrendered territory to the temporary occupation +of the enemy, in order to seek a problematical victory elsewhere, would +have probably provoked a storm of discontent. The authority of the new +Government was not yet firmly established; nor was the patriotism of +the Southern people so entirely unselfish as to render them willing to +endure minor evils in order to achieve a great result. They were +willing to fight, but they were unwilling that their own States should +be left unprotected. To apply Frederick the Great’s maxim[1] +requires greater strength of will in the statesman than in the soldier. +The cries and complaints of those who find themselves abandoned do not +penetrate to the camp, but they may bring down an administration. It is +easy to contrive excuses for the inaction of the President, and it is +no new thing to find the demands of strategy sacrificed to political +expediency. Nor did the army which had suffered so heavily on the banks +of Bull Run evince any marked desire to be led across the Potomac. +Furloughs were liberally granted. Officers and privates dispersed to +look after their farms and their plantations. The harvests had to be +gathered, the negroes required the master’s eye, and even the counties +of Virginia asked that part of the contingents they had furnished might +be permitted to return to agricultural pursuits. + +The senior generals of the Virginia army were not alone in believing +that the victory they had won would be barren of result unless it were +at once utilised as a basis for further action. Jackson, engrossed as +he was with the training of his command, found time to reflect on the +broader aspects of the war. Before he left for the Shenandoah Valley he +sought an interview with General G. W. Smith, recently appointed to the +command of his division. “Finding me lying down in my tent,” writes +this officer, “he expressed regret that I was sick, and said he had +come to confer with me on a subject of great importance, but would not +then trouble me with it. I told him that I wished to hear whatever he +desired to say, and could rest whilst he was talking. He immediately +sat down on the ground, near the head of the cot on which I was lying, +and entered on the subject of his visit. + +“‘McClellan,’ he said, ‘with his army of recruits, will not attempt to +come out against us this autumn. If we remain inactive they will have +greatly the advantage over us next spring. Their raw recruits will have +then become +an organised army, vastly superior in numbers to our own. We are ready +at the present moment for active operations in the field, while they +are not. We ought to invade their country now, and not wait for them to +make the necessary preparations to invade ours. If the President would +reinforce this army by taking troops from other points not threatened, +and let us make an active campaign of invasion before winter sets in, +McClellan’s raw recruits could not stand against us in the field. + +“‘Crossing the Upper Potomac, occupying Baltimore, and taking +possession of Maryland, we could cut off the communications of +Washington, force the Federal Government to abandon the capital, beat +McClellan’s army if it came out against us in the open country, destroy +industrial establishments wherever we found them, break up the lines of +interior commercial intercourse, close the coal-mines, seize and, if +necessary, destroy the manufactories and commerce of Philadelphia, and +of other large cities in our reach; take and hold the narrow neck of +country between Pittsburg and Lake Erie; subsist mainly the country we +traverse, and making unrelenting war amidst their homes, force the +people of the North to understand what it will cost them to hold the +South in the Union at the bayonet’s point.” + +“He then requested me to use my influence with Generals Johnston and +Beauregard in favour of immediate aggressive operations. I told him +that I was sure that an attempt on my part to exert any influence in +favour of his proposition would do no good. Not content with my answer +he repeated his arguments, dwelling more at length on the advantages of +such strategy to ourselves and its disadvantages to the enemy, and +again urged me to use my influence to secure its adoption. I gave him +the same reply I had already made. + +“After a few minutes’ thought he abruptly said: ‘General, you have not +expressed any opinion in regard to the views I have laid before you. +But I feel assured that you favour them, and I think you ought to do +all in your power to have them carried into effect.’ + +“I then said, ‘I will tell you a secret.’ + +“He replied, ‘Please do not tell me any secret. I would prefer not to +hear it.’ I answered, ‘I must tell it to you, and I have no hesitation +in doing so, because I am certain that it will not be divulged.’ I then +explained to him that these views had already been laid before the +Government, in a conference which had taken place at Fairfax Court +House, in the first days of October, between President Davis, Generals +Johnston, Beauregard, and myself, and told him the result. + +“When I had finished, he rose from the ground, on which he had been +seated, shook my hand warmly, and said, ‘I am sorry, very sorry.’ + +“Without another word he went slowly out to his horse, a few feet in +front of my tent, mounted very deliberately, and rode sadly away. A few +days afterwards he was ordered to the Valley.”[2] + +Nov. 5 It was under such depressing circumstances that Jackson quitted +the army which, boldly used, might have ensured the existence of the +Confederacy. His headquarters were established at Winchester; and, in +communication with Centreville by road, rail, and telegraph, although +sixty miles distant, he was still subordinate to Johnston. The +Confederate front extended from Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock to +Winchester on the Opequon. Jackson’s force, holding the Valley of the +Shenandoah and the line of the Potomac westward of Point of Rocks, was +the extreme outpost on the left, and was connected with the main body +by a detachment at Leesburg, on the other side of the Blue Ridge, under +his brother-in-law, General D. H. Hill. + +At Winchester his wife joined him, and of their first meeting she tells +a pretty story:— + +“It can readily be imagined with what delight General Jackson’s +domestic plans for the winter were hailed by me, and without waiting +for the promised ‘aide’ to be sent on escort, I joined some friends who +were going to Richmond, where I spent a few days to shop, to secure a +passport, and +to await an escort to Winchester. The latter was soon found in a +kind-hearted, absent-minded old clergyman. We travelled by stage coach +from Strasbourg, and were told, before reaching Winchester, that +General Jackson was not there, having gone with his command on an +expedition. It was therefore with a feeling of sad disappointment and +loneliness that I alighted in front of Taylor’s hotel, at midnight, in +the early part of dreary cold December, and no husband to meet me with +a glad welcome. By the dim lamplight I noticed a small group of +soldiers standing in the wide hall, but they remained silent +spectators, and my escort led me up the big stairway, doubtless feeling +disappointed that he still had me on his hands. Just before reaching +the landing I turned to look back, for one figure among the group +looked startlingly familiar, but as he had not come forward, I felt +that I must be mistaken. However, my backward glance revealed an +officer muffled up in a military greatcoat, cap drawn down over his +eyes, following us in rapid pursuit, and by the time we were upon the +top step a pair of strong arms caught me; the captive’s head was thrown +back, and she was kissed again and again by her husband before she +could recover from the delightful surprise he had given her. The good +old minister chuckled gleefully, and was no doubt a sincere sharer in +the joy and relief experienced by his charge. When I asked my husband +why he did not come forward when I got out of the coach, he said he +wanted to assure himself that it was his own wife, as he didn’t want to +commit the blunder of kissing anybody else’s _esposa_!” + +The people amongst whom they found themselves were Virginian to the +core. In Winchester itself the feeling against the North was +exceptionally bitter. The town was no mushroom settlement; its history +stretched back to the old colonial days; the grass-grown intrenchments +on the surrounding hills had been raised by Washington during the +Indian wars, and the traditions of the first struggle for independence +were not yet forgotten. No single section of the South was more +conservative. Although the citizens had been strong Unionists, nowhere +were the principles +which their fathers had respected, the sovereignty of the individual +State and the right of secession, more strongly held, and nowhere had +the hereditary spirit of resistance to coercive legislation blazed up +more fiercely. The soldiers of Bull Run, who had driven the invader +from the soil of Virginia, were the heroes of the hour, and the leader +of the Stonewall Brigade had peculiar claims on the hospitality of the +town. It was to the people of the Valley that he owed his command. +“With one voice,” wrote the Secretary of War, “have they made constant +and urgent appeals that to you, in whom they have confidence, their +defence should be assigned.” + +“The Winchester ladies,” says Mrs. Jackson, “were amongst the most +famous of Virginia housekeepers, and lived in a good deal of +old-fashioned elegance and profusion. The old border town had not then +changed hands with the conflicting armies, as it was destined to do so +many times during the war. Under the rose-coloured light in which I +viewed everything that winter, it seemed to me that no people could +have been more cultivated, attractive, and noble-hearted. Winchester +was rich in happy homes and pleasant people; and the extreme kindness +and appreciation shown to General Jackson by all bound us to them so +closely and warmly that ever after that winter he called the place our +‘war home.’” + +But amid congenial acquaintances and lovely surroundings, with the +tumult of war quiescent, and the domestic happiness so dear to him +restored, Jackson allowed no relaxation either to himself or to his +men. His first care was to train and organise his new regiments. The +ranks were filled with recruits, and to their instruction he devoted +himself with unwearied energy. His small force of cavalry, commanded by +Colonel Turner Ashby, a gentleman of Virginia, whose name was to become +famous in the annals of the Confederacy, he at once despatched to +patrol the frontier. + +Prompt measures were taken to discipline the troops, and that this last +was a task of no little difficulty the following incident suggests. In +the middle of November, to Jackson’s great delight, the Stonewall +Brigade had been +sent to him from Manassas, and after its arrival an order was issued +which forbade all officers leaving the camp except upon passes from +headquarters. A protest was immediately drawn up by the regimental +commanders, and laid before the general. They complained that the +obnoxious order was “an unwarranted assumption of authority, disparaged +their dignity, and detracted from that respect of the force under their +command which was necessary to maintain their authority and enforce +obedience.” Jackson’s reply well illustrates his own idea of +discipline, and of the manner in which it should be upheld. His +adjutant-general wrote as follows to the discontented officers:— + +“The Major-General Commanding desires me to say that the within +combined protest is in violation of army regulations and subversive of +military discipline. He claims the right to give his pickets such +instructions as in his opinion the interests of the service require. + +“Colonels —— and —— on the day that their regiments arrived at their +present encampment, either from incompetency to control their commands, +or from neglect of duty, so permitted their commands to become +disorganised and their officers and men to enter Winchester without +permission, as to render several arrests of officers necessary. + +“If officers desire to have control over their commands, they must +remain habitually with them, industriously attend to their instruction +and comfort, and in battle lead them well, and in such a manner as to +command their admiration. + +“Such officers need not apprehend loss of respect resulting from +inserting in a written pass the words ‘on duty,’ or ‘on private +business,’ should they have occasion to pass the pickets.” + +Even the Stonewall Brigade had yet much to learn. + +At this time Jackson was besieged with numerous applications for +service on his staff. The majority of these were from persons without +experience, and they were made to the wrong man. “My desire,” he wrote, +“is to get a staff specially qualified for their specific duties. I +know Mr. —— personally, and was favourably impressed by him. But if +a person desires office in these times, the best thing for him to do is +to pitch into service somewhere, and work with such energy, skill, and +success as to impress those round him with the conviction that such are +his merits that he must be advanced, or the interests of the service +must suffer. . . . My desire is to make merit the basis of my +recommendations.” + +Social claims had no weight with him whatever. He felt that the +interests at stake were too great to be sacrificed to favouritism or +friendship, and he had seen enough of war to know the importance of +staff work. Nor was he in the unfortunate position of being compelled +to accept the nominees of his superiors. The Confederate authorities +were wise enough to permit their generals to choose for themselves the +instruments on which they would have to rely for the execution of their +designs. Wellington, in 1815, had forced on him by the Horse Guards, in +the teeth of his indignant remonstrances, incompetent officers whom he +did not know and whom he could not trust. Jackson, in a country which +knew little of war, was allowed to please himself. He need appoint no +one without learning all about him, and his inquiries were searching. +Was he intelligent? Was he trustworthy? Was he industrious? Did he get +up early? If a man was wanting in any one of these qualifications he +would reject him, however highly recommended. That his strict +investigations and his insistence on the possession of certain +essential characteristics bore good fruit it is impossible to gainsay. +The absence of mishaps and errors in his often complicated manœuvres is +sufficient proof that he was exceedingly well served by his +subordinates. The influence of a good staff is seldom apparent except +to the initiated. If a combination succeeds, the general gets all the +credit. If it fails, he gets all the blame; and while no agents, +however efficient, can compensate by their own efforts for the weakness +of a conception that is radically unsound, many a brilliant plan has +failed in execution through the inefficiency of the staff. In his +selection of such capable men as his assistants must needs have been +Jackson gave proof that he possessed one at least of the attributes of +a great leader. He was not only a judge of character, but he could +place men in the positions to which they were best suited. His personal +predilections were never allowed to interfere. For some months his +chief of the staff was a Presbyterian clergyman, while his chief +quartermaster was one of the hardest swearers in Virginia. The fact +that the former could combine the duties of spiritual adviser with +those of his official position made him a congenial comrade; but it was +his energy and ability rather than this unusual qualification which +attracted Jackson; and although the profanity of the quartermaster +offended his susceptibilities, their relations were always cordial. It +was to the intelligence of his staff officers, their energy and their +loyalty, that he looked; for the business in hand these qualities were +more important than their morals. + +That a civilian should be found serving as chief of the staff to a +general of division, one of the most important posts in the military +hierarchy, is a curious comment on the organisation of the Confederate +army. The regular officers who had thrown in their lot with the South +had, as a rule, been appointed to commands, and the generals of lower +rank had to seek their staff officers amongst the volunteers. It may be +noticed, however, that Jackson was by no means bigoted in favour of his +own cloth. He showed no anxiety to secure their services on his staff. +He thought many of them unfitted for duties which brought them in +immediate contact with the volunteers. In dealing with such troops, +tact and temper are of more importance than where obedience has become +mechanical, and the claims of rank are instinctively reflected. In all +his campaigns, too, Jackson was practically his own chief of the staff. +He consulted no one. He never divulged his plans. He gave his orders, +and his staff had only to see that these orders were obeyed. His +topographical engineer, his medical director, his commissary and his +quartermaster, were selected, it is true, by reason of their special +qualifications. Captain Hotchkiss, who filled the first position, was a +young man of +twenty-six, whose abilities as a surveyor were well known in the +Valley. Major Harman, his chief quartermaster, was one of the +proprietors of a line of stage coaches and a large farmer, and Major +Hawks, his commissary, was the owner of a carriage manufactory. But the +remainder of his assistants, with the exception of the chief of +artillery, owed their appointments rather to their character than to +their professional abilities. It is not to be understood, at the same +time, that Jackson underrated soldierly acquirements. He left no +complaints on record, like so many of his West Point comrades, of the +ignorance of the volunteer officers, and of the consequent difficulties +which attended every combination. But he was none the less alive to +their deficiencies. Early in 1862, when the military system of the +Confederacy was about to be reorganised, he urged upon the Government, +through the member of Congress for the district where he commanded, +that regimental promotion should not be obtained by seniority, unless +the applicant were approved by a board of examination; and it was due +to his representations that this regulation, to the great benefit of +the army, was shortly afterwards adopted. With all his appreciation of +natural aptitude for the soldier’s trade, so close a student of +Napoleon could scarcely be blind to the fact that the most heroic +character, unsustained by knowledge, is practically useless. If +Napoleon himself, more highly endowed by nature with every military +attribute than any other general of the Christian era, thought it +essential to teach himself his business by incessant study, how much +more is such study necessary for ordinary men? + +But no man was less likely than Jackson to place an exaggerated value +on theoretical acquirements. No one realised more fully that Napoleon’s +character won more victories than Napoleon’s knowledge. The qualities +he demanded in his subordinates were those which were conspicuous in +Napoleon. Who was more industrious than the great Corsican? Who +displayed an intenser energy? Whose intelligence was brighter? Who +understood human nature better, or handled men with more consummate +tact? +These were the very attributes which distinguished Jackson himself. +They are the key-note to his success, more so than his knowledge of +strategy and tactics, of the mechanism of march and battle, and of the +principles of the military art. In selecting his staff officers, +therefore, he deemed character of more importance than erudition. + +The men of the Stonewall Brigade had a saying that Jackson always +marched at dawn, except when he started the night before, and it was +perhaps this habit, which his enemies found so unreasonable, that led +him to lay so much stress on early rising. It is certain that, like +Wellington, he preferred “three o’clock in the morning men.” In a +letter to his wife he says:— + +“If you will vouch for your brother’s being an early riser during the +remainder of the war, I will give him an aide-ship. I do not want to +make an appointment on my staff except of such as are early risers; but +if you will vouch for him to rise regularly at dawn, I will offer him +the position.” + +Another characteristic he looked for was reticence; and it was +undeniably of the utmost importance, especially in an army which spoke +the same language as the enemy, where desertion was not uncommon, and +spies could easily escape detection, that the men who might become +cognisant of the plans of the commander should be gifted with +discretion. Absolute concealment is generally impracticable in a camp. +Maps must be drawn, and reports furnished. Reconnoitring parties must +be sent out, roads examined, positions surveyed, and shelter and +supplies requisitioned in advance. Thus the movements of staff officers +are a clue to the projected movements of the army, and the smallest +hint may set a hundred brains to the work of surmise. There will always +be many who are just as anxious to discover the general’s intentions as +he is to conceal them; and if, by any possibility whatever, the gossip +and guesses of the camp may come to the enemy’s ears, it is well that +curiosity should be baulked. Nor is it undesirable that the privacy of +headquarters should be respected. The vanity of a little brief +authority has before now tempted subordinate officers +to hint at weaknesses on the part of their superiors. Ignorance of war +and of the situation has induced them to criticise and to condemn; and +idle words, greedily listened to, and quickly exaggerated, may easily +destroy the confidence of the soldiery in the abilities of their +leader. + +By the middle of December Jackson’s small army had become fairly +effective. Its duties were simple. To watch the enemy, to keep open the +communication with Manassas, so as to be ready to join the main army +should McClellan advance—such were Johnston’s orders. The Upper Potomac +was held by the enemy in force. General Banks, a volunteer officer, who +was yet to learn more of Stonewall Jackson, was in command. The +headquarters of his division, 18,000 strong, were at Frederick City in +Maryland; but his charge extended seventy-five miles further west, as +far as Cumberland on the Potomac. In addition to Banks, General Kelly +with 5,000 men was at Romney, on the South Branch of the Potomac, +thirty-five miles north-west of Winchester by a good road. The Federal +troops guarding the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and that portion of the +Baltimore and Ohio Railroad which was still intact were necessarily +much dispersed, for the Confederate guerillas were active, and dam and +aqueduct, tunnel and viaduct, offered tempting objectives to Ashby’s +cavalry. Still the force which confronted Jackson was far superior to +his own; the Potomac was broad and bridgeless, and his orders appeared +to impose a defensive attitude. But he was not the man to rest +inactive, no matter what the odds against him, or to watch the enemy’s +growing strength without an endeavour to interfere. Within the limits +of his own command he was permitted every latitude; and he was +determined to apply the aggressive strategy which he was so firmly +convinced should be adopted by the whole army. The Secretary of War, +Mr. Benjamin, in detaching him to the Valley, had asked him to “forward +suggestions as to the means of rendering his measures of defence +effectual.”[3] + +The earliest information he had received on his arrival +at Winchester pointed to the conclusion that the enemy was meditating +an advance by way of Harper’s Ferry. His first suggestion thereupon was +that he should be reinforced by a division under General Loring and a +brigade under Colonel Edward Johnson, which were stationed within the +Alleghanies on the great highways leading to the Ohio, covering +Staunton from the west.[4] His next was to the effect that he should be +permitted to organise an expedition for the recapture and occupation of +Romney. If he could seize this village, the junction of several roads, +more decisive operations would at once become feasible. It has been +said that the force of old associations urged Jackson to drive the +invader from the soil which held his mother’s grave; but, even if we +had not the evidence of his interview with General G. W. Smith,[5] a +glance at the map would in itself be sufficient to assure us that +strategy prevailed with him rather than sentiment. + +The plan of campaign which first suggested itself to him was +sufficiently comprehensive. + +“While the Northern people and the Federal authorities were still a +prey to the demoralisation which had followed Bull Run, he proposed to +advance with 10,000 troops into north-west Virginia, where he would +reclaim the whole country, and summon the inhabitants of Southern +sentiment to join his army. His information was extensive and reliable, +and he did not doubt his ability to recruit between 15,000 and 20,000 +men, enough for his designs. These were bold and simple. While the +enemy was under the impression that his only object was to reclaim and +occupy North-west Virginia, he would move his whole force rapidly +across to the Monongahela, march down upon Pittsburg, destroy the +United States arsenal, and then, in conjunction with Johnston’s army +(which was to cross the Potomac at Leesburg), advance upon Harrisburg, +the +capital of Pennsylvania. From Harrisburg he proposed that the army +should advance upon Philadelphia.”[6] + +These suggestions, however, went no further than his friends in the +Legislative Assembly. Although, for his conduct at Bull Run, he had now +been promoted to major-general, the Lexington professor had as yet no +voice in the councils of the young republic. Nevertheless, the +President read and approved the less ambitious proposal for an attack +on the Federal force at Romney. + +Romney, the county seat of Hampshire, lies in a rich district watered +by the South Branch of the Potomac. For more than a hundred miles, from +source to mouth, the river is bordered by alluvial meadows of +extraordinary fertility. Their prodigal harvests, together with the +sweetness of the upland pastures, make them the paradise of the +grazier; the farms which rest beneath the hills are of manorial +proportions, and the valley of the beautiful South Branch is a land of +easy wealth and old-fashioned plenty. From Romney an excellent road +runs south-east to Winchester, and another south-west by Moorefield and +Franklin to Monterey, where it intersects the great road, constructed +by one of Napoleon’s engineers, that leads from Staunton in the Valley +to Parkersburg on the Ohio. + +When Jackson advocated the occupation of this important point the whole +of West Virginia, between the Alleghenies and the Ohio, was in +possession of the Federals. The army of occupation, under General +Rosecrans, amounted to 27,000 men and over 40 guns; but the troops were +dispersed in detachments from Romney to Gauley Bridge, a distance of +near two hundred miles, their communications were exposed, and, owing +to the mountains, co-operation was almost impracticable. + +[Illustration: Map of West Virginia in 1861.] + +5,000 men, based on Grafton, occupied Romney. + +18,700, based on Clarksburg, occupied the passes south-east of +Beverley. + +9,000, based on the Ohio, were stationed on the Great +Kanawha, a river which is navigable for small steamers to within a few +miles of Gauley Bridge. + +4,000 protected the lines of communication. + +Jackson’s letter to the Secretary of War was as follows:— + +Nov. 20 “Deeply impressed with the importance of absolute secrecy +respecting military operations, I have made it a point to say but +little respecting my proposed movements in the event of sufficient +reinforcements arriving, but since conversing with Lieutenant-Colonel +Preston [his adjutant-general], upon his return from General Loring, +and ascertaining the disposition of the general’s forces, I venture to +respectfully urge that after concentrating all his troops here, an +attempt should be made to capture the Federal forces at Romney. The +attack on Romney would probably induce McClellan to believe that +General Johnston’s army had been so weakened as to justify him in +making an advance on Centreville; but should this not induce him to +advance, I do not believe anything will, during this winter. + +“Should General Johnston be attacked, I would be at once prepared to +reinforce him with my present force, increased by General Loring’s. +After repulsing the enemy at Manassas, let the troops that marched on +Romney return to the Valley, and move rapidly westward to the waters of +the Monongahela and Little Kanawha. I deem it of very great importance +that North-western Virginia be occupied by Confederate troops this +winter. At present it is to be presumed that the enemy are not +expecting an attack there, and the resources of that region, necessary +for the subsistence of our troops, are in greater abundance than in +almost any other season of the year. Postpone the occupation of that +section until spring, and we may expect to find the enemy prepared for +us, and the resources to which I have referred greatly exhausted. I +know that what I have proposed will be an arduous undertaking and +cannot be accomplished without the sacrifice of much personal comfort; +but I feel that the troops will be prepared to make the sacrifice when +animated by the prospects of important +results to our cause, and distinction to themselves. It may be urged +against this plan that the enemy will advance [from Beverley and the +Great Kanawha] on Staunton or Huntersville. I am well satisfied that +such a step would but make their destruction sure. When North-western +Virginia is occupied in force, the Kanawha Valley, unless it be the +lower part of it, must be evacuated by the Federal forces, or otherwise +their safety will be endangered by forcing a column across from the +Little Kanawha between them and the Ohio River. + +“Admitting that the season is too far advanced, or that from other +causes all cannot be accomplished that has been named, yet through the +blessing of God, who has thus far wonderfully prospered our cause, much +more may be expected from General Loring’s troops, according to this +programme, than can be expected from them where they are.”[7] + +This scheme was endorsed by Johnston. “I submit,” he wrote, “that the +troops under General Loring might render valuable services by taking +the field with General Jackson, instead of going into winter quarters +as now proposed.” + +In accordance with Jackson’s suggestion, Loring was ordered to join +him. Edward Johnson, however, was withheld. The Confederate authorities +seem to have considered it injudicious to leave unguarded the mountain +roads which lead into the Valley from the west. Jackson, with a wider +grasp of war, held that concentration at Winchester was a sounder +measure of security. “Should the Federals” (at Beverley), he said, +“take advantage of the withdrawal of Johnson’s troops, and cross the +mountains, so much the worse for them. While they were marching +eastwards, involving themselves amongst interminable obstacles, he +[Jackson] would place himself on their communications and close in +behind them, making their destruction the more certain the further they +advanced towards their imaginary prize.”[8] + +While waiting for Loring, Jackson resolved to complete the education of +his new battalions in the field. The raw +troops who garrisoned the Northern border were not formidable enemies, +and a sudden rush upon some ill-defended post would give to the staff +and soldiery that first taste of success which gives heart and backbone +to inexperienced troops. + +Dec. 6–9 The first enterprise, however, was only partially successful. +The destruction of a dam on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, one of the +main arteries of communication between Washington and the West, by +which coal, hay, and forage reached the Union capital, was the result +of a few days’ hard marching and hard work. Two companies of the +Stonewall Brigade volunteered to go down by night and cut the cribs. +Standing waist deep in the cold water, and under the constant fire of +the enemy, they effected a partial breach; but it was repaired by the +Federals within two days. Jackson’s loss was one man killed. While +engaged in this expedition news reached him of the decisive repulse by +Colonel Edward Johnson of an attack on his position on Alleghany +Mountain. Jackson again asked that this brigade might be sent to his +support, but it was again refused, notwithstanding Johnston’s +endorsement of his request. + +Loring reached Winchester on Christmas Day. Once more the enemy +threatened to advance, and information had been received that he had +been largely strengthened. Jackson was of opinion that the true policy +of the Federals would be to concentrate at Martinsburg, midway between +Romney and Frederick, and “to march on Winchester over a road that +presented no very strong positions.” To counteract such a combination, +he determined to anticipate their movements, and to attack them before +they received additional reinforcements. + +1862. Jan. 1 On January 1, 1862, 9,000 Confederates marched from +Winchester towards the Potomac. Jackson’s first objectives were the +villages of Bath and Hancock, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, held +by Federal garrisons. By dispersing these detachments he would prevent +support being sent to Romney; by cutting the telegraph along the +railroad he would sever the communication between Banks at Frederick +and Rosecrans +in West Virginia, and compel Kelly either to evacuate Romney or fight +him single-handed. To deal with his enemy in detail, to crush his +detachments in succession, and with superior force, such was the +essence of his plan. + +The weather when the expedition started was bright and pleasant, so +much so that the troops, with the improvidence of young soldiers, left +their coats and blankets in the waggons. That very afternoon, however, +the temperature underwent a sudden change. Under cold grey skies the +column scaled the mountain ridges, and on the winter wind came a fierce +storm of snow and hail. In order to conceal the march as far as +possible from the enemy’s observations the brigades had marched by +country roads, and delayed by steep gradients and slippery tracks, it +was not till the next morning that the supply waggons came up. The +troops, hurried suddenly from comfortable winter quarters, suffered +much. The bivouac was as cheerless as the march. Without rations and +without covering, the men lay shivering round the camp fires. The third +day out, even the commander of the Stonewall Brigade took it upon +himself to halt his wearied men. Jackson became restive. Riding along +the column he found his old regiments halted by the roadside, and asked +the reason for the delay. + +“I have halted to let the men cook their rations,” was General +Garnett’s reply. “There is no time for that.” “But it is impossible for +the men to march further without them.” “_I_ never found anything +impossible with this brigade!” and Jackson rode on. His plans admitted +of no delay. He intended to surprise the enemy. In this expectation, +however, he was disappointed. + +Jan. 3 A few miles distant from Bath his advanced guard fell in with a +Federal reconnaissance, and at nightfall the Confederates had not yet +reached the outskirts of the town. Once more they had to bivouac in the +open, and rations, tents, and blankets were still behind. When the day +broke over the Shenandoah Mountains the country was white with snow, +and the sleeping soldiers were covered as with a winding-sheet. After a +hasty meal an attempt was made to surround the village, and to cut off +the retreat +of the garrison. The outflanking movements, made in a blinding storm, +failed in combination. The roads were too bad, the subordinate +commanders too inexperienced; the three hostile regiments escaped +across the river in their boats, and only 16 prisoners were captured. +Still, the advantages of their unexpected movement were not altogether +lost to the Confederates. The Federals, ignorant as yet of the restless +energy of the foe who held command at Winchester, had settled +themselves cosily in winter quarters. The intelligence of Jackson’s +march had come too late to enable them to remove the stores which had +been collected at Bath, and on the night of January 4 the Virginians +revelled in warmth and luxury. The next morning they moved forward to +the river. + +Jan. 5 On the opposite bank stood the village of Hancock, and after a +demand to surrender had been refused, Jackson ordered his batteries to +open fire.[9] Shepherdstown, a little Virginia town south of the +Potomac, had been repeatedly shelled, even when unoccupied by +Confederate troops. In order to intimate that such outrages must cease +a few shells were thrown into Hancock. The next day the bombardment was +resumed, but with little apparent effect; and strong reinforcements +having joined the enemy, Jackson ceased fire and withdrew. A bridge was +already in process of construction two miles above the town, but to +have crossed the river, a wide though shallow stream, in face of a +considerable force, would have been a useless and a costly operation. +The annihilation of the Federal garrison would have scarcely repaid the +Southerners for the loss of life that must have been incurred. At the +same time, while Jackson’s batteries had been at work, his infantry had +done a good deal of mischief. Two regiments had burned the bridge by +which the Baltimore and Ohio Railway crosses the Great Cacapon River, +the canal dam was breached, and many miles of track and telegraph were +destroyed. The enemy’s communications between Frederick and Romney were +thus effectually severed, +and a large amount of captured stores were sent to Winchester. It was +with the design of covering these operations that the bombardment had +been continued, and the summons to surrender was probably no more than +a ruse to attract the attention of the Federal commander from the +attack on the Cacapon Bridge. On the morning of the 7th Jackson moved +southward to Unger’s Store. Here, however, the expedition came to a +standstill. The precaution of rough-shoeing the horses before leaving +Winchester had been neglected, and it was found necessary to refit the +teams and rest the men. + +Jan. 13 After halting for four days the Confederates, on January 13, +renewed their march. The outlook was unpromising. Although cavalry +patrols had been despatched in every direction, a detachment of +militia, which had acted as flank-guard in the direction of Romney +while Jackson was moving to Unger’s Store, had been surprised and +defeated, with the loss of two guns, at Hanging Rock. The weather, too, +grew colder and colder, and the mountain roads were little more than +sheets of ice. The sleet beat fiercely down upon the crawling column. +The men stumbled and fell on the slippery tracks; many waggons were +overturned, and the bloody knees and muzzles of the horses bore painful +witness to the severity of the march. The bivouacs were more +comfortless than before. The provision train lagged far in rear. Axes +there were none; and had not the fence-rails afforded a supply of +firewood, the sufferings of the troops would have been intense. As it +was, despite the example of their commander, they pushed forward but +slowly through the bitter weather. Jackson was everywhere; here, +putting his shoulder to the wheel of a gun that the exhausted team +could no longer move; there, urging the wearied soldiers, or rebuking +the officers for want of energy. Attentive as he was to the health and +comfort of his men in quarters, on the line of march he looked only to +the success of the Confederate arms. The hardships of the winter +operations were to him but a necessary concomitant of his designs, and +it mattered but little if the weak and sickly should succumb. +Commanders who are over-chary of their soldiers’ lives, who forget that +their men have voluntarily offered themselves as food for powder, often +miss great opportunities. To die doing his duty was to Jackson the most +desirable consummation of the soldier’s existence, and where duty was +concerned or victory in doubt he was as careless of life and suffering +as Napoleon himself. The well-being of an individual or even of an army +were as nothing compared with the interests of Virginia. And, in the +end, his indomitable will triumphed over every obstacle. + +Jan. 10 Romney village came at length in sight, lonely and deserted +amid the mountain snows, for the Federal garrison had vanished, +abandoning its camp-equipment and its magazines. + +No pursuit was attempted. Jackson had resolved on further operations. +It was now in his power to strike at the Federal communications, +marching along the Baltimore and Ohio Railway in the direction of +Grafton, seventy-five miles west of Romney. In order to leave all safe +behind him, he determined, as a first step, to destroy the bridge by +which the Baltimore and Ohio Railway crossed the Potomac in the +neighbourhood of Cumberland. The Federal forces at Williamstown and +Frederick drew the greater part of their supplies from the West; and so +serious an interruption in the line of communication would compel them +to give up all thought of offensive enterprises in the Valley. But the +sufferings that his green soldiers had undergone had sapped their +discipline. Loring’s division, nearly two-thirds of the command, was so +discontented as to be untrustworthy. It was useless with such troops to +dream of further movements among the inhospitable hills. Many had +deserted during the march from Unger’s Store; many had succumbed to the +exposure of the bivouacs; and, more than all, the commander had been +disloyal to his superior. Although a regular officer of long service, +he had permitted himself a license of speech which was absolutely +unjustifiable, and throughout the operations had shown his unfitness +for his position. Placed under the command of an officer who had been +his junior in the Army of the United States, his sense of discipline +was +overborne by the slight to his vanity; and not for the first time nor +the last the resentment of a petty mind ruined an enterprise which +would have profited a nation. Compelled to abandon his projected march +against the enemy, Jackson determined to leave a strong garrison in +Romney and the surrounding district, while the remainder of the force +withdrew to Winchester. The two towns were connected by a good +high-road, and by establishing telegraphic communication between them, +he believed that despite the Federal numbers he could maintain his hold +on these important posts. Many precautions were taken to secure Romney +from surprise. Three militia regiments, recruited in the country, and +thus not only familiar with every road, but able to procure ample +information, were posted in the neighbourhood of the town; and with the +militia were left three companies of cavalry, one of which had already +been employed in this region. + +In detailing Loring’s division as the garrison of Romney Jackson seems +to have made a grave mistake. He had much reason to be dissatisfied +with the commander, and the men were already demoralised. Troops unfit +to march against the enemy were not the men to be trusted with the +security of an important outpost, within thirty miles of the Federal +camps at Cumberland, far from their supports, and surrounded by bleak +and lonely mountains. A man of wider sympathy with human weakness, and +with less rigid ideas of discipline, might possibly have arranged +matters so that the Stonewall Brigade might have remained at Romney, +while Loring and his division were transferred to less exacting duties +and more comfortable quarters. But Loring’s division constituted +two-thirds of Jackson’s force, and Romney, more exposed than +Winchester, required the stronger garrison. A general of Loring’s +temper and pretensions would scarcely have submitted to the separation +of his brigades, and would probably have become even more discontented +had Garnett, the leader of the Stonewall Brigade, been left in command +at Romney, while he himself played a subordinate part at Winchester. It +is only too possible, however, that matters +were past mending. The feeble discipline of Loring’s troops had broken +down; their enthusiasm had not been proof against the physical +suffering of these winter operations. + +The Stonewall Brigade, on the other hand, was still staunch. “I am well +assured,” wrote Jackson at this time, “that had an order been issued +for its march, even through the depth of winter and in any direction, +it would have sustained its reputation; for although it was not under +fire during the expedition at Romney, yet the alacrity with which it +responded to the call of duty and overcame obstacles showed that it was +still animated by the same spirit that characterised it at Manassas.” +But Jackson’s old regiments were now tried soldiers, inspirited by the +memories of the great victory they had done so much to win, improved by +association with Johnston’s army, and welded together by a discipline +far stricter than that which obtained in commands like Loring’s. + +Jan. 24 On January 24 Jackson returned to Winchester. His strategy had +been successful. He had driven the enemy across the Potomac. He had +destroyed for a time an important line of supply. He had captured a few +prisoners and many stores; and this with a loss of 4 men killed and 28 +wounded. The Federal forces along the border were far superior to his +own. The dispersion of these forces from Cumberland to Frederick, a +distance of eighty miles, had doubtless been much in his favour. But +when he marched from Winchester he had reason to believe that 8,000 men +were posted at Frederick, 2,000 at Hagerstown, 2,000 at Williamsport, +2,000 at Hancock, and 12,000 at Cumberland and Romney. The actual +effective strength of these garrisons may possibly have been smaller +than had been reported, but such were the numbers which he had to take +into consideration when planning his operations. It would appear from +the map that while he was at Romney, 12,000 Federals might have moved +out from Williamsport and Harper’s Ferry and have cut him off from +Winchester. This danger had to be kept in view. But the enemy had made +no preparations +for crossing the Potomac; the river was a difficult obstacle; and Banks +was not the man to run risks.[10] + +At the same time, while Jackson was in all probability perfectly aware +of the difficulties which Banks refused to face, and counted on that +commander’s hesitation, it must be admitted that his manœuvres had been +daring, and that the mere thought of the enemy’s superior numbers would +have tied down a general of inferior ability to the passive defence of +Winchester. Moreover, the results attained were out of all proportion +to the trifling loss which had been incurred. An important +recruiting-ground had been secured. The development of Union sentiment, +which, since the occupation of Romney by the Federals, had been +gradually increasing along the Upper Potomac, would be checked by the +presence of Southern troops. A base for further operations against the +Federal detachments in West Virginia had been established, and a +fertile region opened to the operations of the Confederate +commissaries. These strategic advantages, however, were by no means +appreciated by the people of Virginia. The sufferings of the troops +appealed more forcibly to their imagination than the prospective +benefit to be derived by the Confederacy. Jackson’s secrecy, as +absolute as that of the grave, had an ill effect. Unable to comprehend +his combinations, even his own officers ascribed his manœuvres to a +restless craving for personal distinction; while civilian wiseacres, +with their ears full of the exaggerated stories of Loring’s stragglers, +saw in the relentless energy with which he had pressed the march on +Romney not only the evidence of a callous indifference to suffering, +but the symptoms of a diseased mind. They refused to consider that the +general had shared the hardships of the troops, faring as simply and +roughly as any private in the ranks. He was charged with partiality to +the Stonewall Brigade. “It was said that he kept it in the rear, while +other troops were constantly thrust into danger; and that now, while +Loring’s command was left in midwinter in an alpine region, almost +within the jaws of a powerful enemy, these favoured regiments were +brought back to the comforts and hospitalities of the town; whereas in +truth, while the forces in Romney were ordered into huts, the brigade +was three miles below Winchester, in tents, and under the most rigid +discipline.”[11] + +It should not be forgotten, however, that Loring’s troops were little +more as yet than a levy of armed civilians, ignorant of war; and this +was one reason the more that during those cruel marches the hand that +held the reins should have been a light one. A leader more genial and +less rigid would have found a means to sustain their courage. Napoleon, +with the captivating familiarity he used so well, would have laughed +the grumblers out of their ill-humour, and have nerved the fainting by +pointing to the glory to be won. Nelson would have struck the chord of +patriotism. Skobeleff, taking the very privates into his confidence, +would have enlisted their personal interest in the success of the +enterprise, and the eccentric speeches of “Father” Suvoroff would have +cheered them like a cordial. There are occasions when both officers and +men are the better for a little humouring, and the march to Romney was +one. A few words of hearty praise, a stirring appeal to their nobler +instincts, a touch of sympathy, might have worked wonders. But whatever +of personal magnetism existed in Stonewall Jackson found no utterance +in words. Whilst his soldiers struggled painfully towards Romney in the +teeth of the winter storm, his lips were never opened save for sharp +rebuke or peremptory order, and Loring’s men had some reason to +complain of his fanatical regard for the very letter of the law. On the +most inclement of those January nights the captain of a Virginia +company, on whose property they happened to have halted, had allowed +them to use the fence-rails for the camp fires. Jackson, ever careful +of private rights, had +issued an order that fences should not be burnt, and the generous donor +was suspended from duty on the charge of giving away his own property +without first asking leave! Well might the soldiers think that their +commander regarded them as mere machines. + +His own men knew his worth. Bull Run had shown them the measure of his +courage and his ability; in a single battle he had won that respect and +confidence which go so far towards establishing discipline. But over +Loring’s men his personal ascendency was not yet established. They had +not yet seen him under fire. The fighting in the Romney campaign had +been confined to skirmishing. Much spoil had been gathered in, but +there were no trophies to show in the shape of guns or colours; no +important victory had raised their self-respect. It is not too much to +say that the silent soldier who insisted on such constant exertion and +such unceasing vigilance was positively hated. + +“They were unaccustomed to a military regimen so energetic as his. +Personally the most modest of men, officially he was the most exacting +of commanders, and his purpose to enforce a thorough performance of +duty, and his stern disapprobation of remissness and self-indulgence +were veiled by no affectations of politeness. Those who came to serve +near his person, if they were not wholly like-minded with himself, +usually underwent, at first, a sort of breaking in, accompanied with no +little chafing to restless spirits. The expedition to Romney was, to +such officers, just such an apprenticeship to Jackson’s methods of +making war. All this was fully known to him; but while he keenly felt +the injustice, he disdained to resent it, or to condescend to any +explanation.”[12] + +Jackson returned to Winchester with no anticipation that the darkest +days of his military life were close at hand. Little Sorrel, the +charger he had ridden at Bull Run, leaving the senior members of the +staff toiling far in rear, had covered forty miles of mountain roads in +one short winter day. “After going to an hotel and divesting +himself of the mud which had bespattered him in his rapid ride, he +proceeded to Dr. Graham’s. In order to give his wife a surprise he had +not intimated when he would return. As soon as the first glad greetings +were over, before taking his seat, with a face all aglow with delight, +he glanced round the room, and was so impressed with the cosy and +cheerful aspect of the fireside, as we all sat round it that winter +evening, that he exclaimed: ‘This is the very essence of comfort.’”[13] + +He had already put aside the unpleasant memories of the expedition, and +had resigned himself to rest content with the measure of success that +had been attained. Romney at least was occupied, and operations might +be effectively resumed at a more propitious season. + +Six days later, however, Jackson received a peremptory message from the +Secretary of War: “Our news indicates that a movement is making to cut +off General Loring’s command; order him back immediately.”[14] + +This order had been issued without reference to General Johnston, +Jackson’s immediate superior, and so marked a departure from ordinary +procedure could not possibly be construed except as a severe reflection +on Jackson’s judgment. Nor could it have other than a most fatal effect +on the discipline of the Valley troops. It had been brought about by +most discreditable means. Loring’s officers had sat in judgment on +their commander. Those who had been granted leave at the close of the +expedition had repaired to Richmond, and had filled the ears of the +Government and the columns of the newspapers with complaints. Those who +remained at Romney formulated their grievance in an official +remonstrance, which Loring was indiscreet enough to approve and +forward. A council of subordinate officers had the effrontery to record +their opinion that “Romney was a place of no strategical importance,” +and to suggest that the division might be “maintained much more +comfortably, at much less expense, and with every military advantage, +at almost any other place.”[15] + +Discomfort was the burden of their complaint. They had been serving +continuously for eight months. Their present position imposed upon them +even greater vigilance and more constant exertion than had hitherto +been demanded of them, and their one thought was to escape from a +situation which they characterised as “one of the most disagreeable and +unfavourable that could well be imagined.” Only a single pertinent +argument was brought forward. The Confederate soldiers had enlisted +only for twelve months, and the Government was about to ask them to +volunteer for the duration of the war. It was urged by Loring’s +officers that with the present prospect before them there was much +doubt that a single man of the division would re-enlist. “With some +regard for its comfort,” added the general, “a large portion, if not +the whole, may be prevailed upon to do so.” + +It does not seem to have occurred to these officers that soldiers in +the near vicinity of the enemy, wherever they may be placed, must +always be subject to privations, and that at any other point of the +Confederate frontier—at Winchester with Jackson, at Leesburg with Hill, +or at Centreville with Johnston—their troops would be exposed to the +same risks and the same discomforts as at Romney. That the occupation +of a dangerous outpost is in itself an honour never entered their +minds; and it would have been more honest, instead of reviling the +climate and the country, had they frankly declared that they had had +enough for the present of active service, and had no mind to make +further sacrifices in the cause for which they had taken arms. + +Jan. 31 With the Secretary’s order Jackson at once complied. Loring was +recalled to Winchester, but before his command arrived Jackson’s +resignation had gone in. + +His letter, forwarded through Johnston, ran as follows: + +“Headquarters, Valley District, Winchester, Va.: +“Jan. 31, 1862 + +“Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War, + “Sir,—Your order, requiring me to direct General Loring to return + with his command to Winchester immediately, has been received and + promptly complied with. + + “With such interference in my command I cannot expect to be of much + service in the field, and, accordingly, respectfully request to be + ordered to report for duty to the Superintendent of the Virginia + Military Institute at Lexington, as has been done in the case of + other professors. Should this application not be granted, I + respectfully request that the President will accept my resignation + from the army.[16] + +The danger apprehended by the Secretary of War, that Loring’s division, +if left at Romney, might be cut off, did not exist. General Lander, an +able and energetic officer, now in command of the Federal force at +Cumberland, had put forward proposals for an active campaign in the +Shenandoah Valley; but there was no possibility of such an enterprise +being immediately undertaken. The Potomac was still a formidable +obstacle; artillery and cavalry were both deficient; the troops were +scattered, and their discipline was indifferent. Lander’s command, +according to his official despatches, was “more like an armed mob than +an army.”[17] Romney, therefore, was in little danger; and Jackson, who +had so lately been in contact with the Federal troops, whose cavalry +patrolled the banks of the Potomac, and who was in constant receipt of +information of the enemy’s attitude and condition, was certainly a +better judge of what was probable than any official in the Confederate +capital. There were doubtless objections to the retention of Romney. An +enormous army, in the intrenched camp at Washington, threatened +Centreville; and in the event of that army advancing, Jackson would be +called upon to reinforce Johnston, just as Johnston had reinforced +Beauregard before Bull Run. With the greater part of his force at +Romney such an operation would be delayed by at least two days. Even +Johnston himself, although careful to leave his subordinate a free +hand, suggested that the occupation of Romney, and the consequent +dispersion of Jackson’s force, might enable the enemy to cut in +effectively between the Valley troops and the main army. It is beyond +question, however, that Jackson had carefully +studied the situation. There was no danger of his forgetting that his +was merely a detached force, or of his overlooking, in the interests of +his own projected operations, the more important interests of the main +army; and if his judgment of the situation differed from that of his +superior, it was because he had been indefatigable in his search for +information. + +He had agents everywhere.[18] His intelligence was more ample than that +supplied by the Confederate spies in Washington itself. No +reinforcements could reach the Federals on the Potomac without his +knowledge. He was always accurately informed of the strength and +movements of their detachments. Nor had he failed to take the +precautions which minimise the evils arising from dissemination. He had +constructed a line of telegraph from Charlestown, within seven miles of +Harper’s Ferry, to Winchester, and another line was to have been +constructed to Romney. He had established relays of couriers through +his district. By this means he could communicate with Hill at Leesburg +in three hours, and by another line of posts with Johnston at +Centreville. + +But his chief reason for believing that Romney might be occupied +without risk to a junction between himself and Johnston lay in the +impassable condition of the Virginia roads. McClellan’s huge army could +not drag its guns and waggons through the slough of mud which lay +between Washington and Centreville. Banks’ command at Frederick was in +no condition for a rapid advance either upon Leesburg or on Winchester; +and it was evident that little was to be feared from Lander until he +had completed the work, on which he was now actively engaged, of +repairing the communications which Jackson’s raid had temporarily +interrupted. With the information we have now before us, it is clear +that Jackson’s view of the situation was absolutely correct; that for +the present Romney might be +advantageously retained, and recruiting pushed forward in this section +of Virginia. If, when McClellan advanced, the Confederates were to +confine themselves to the defensive, the post would undoubtedly have to +be abandoned. But if, instead of tamely surrendering the initiative, +the Government were to adopt the bolder strategy which Jackson had +already advocated, and Johnston’s army, moving westward to the Valley, +were to utilise the natural line of invasion by way of Harper’s Ferry, +the occupation of Romney would secure the flank, and give the invading +force a fertile district from which to draw supplies. + +It was not, however, on the Secretary’s misconception of the situation +that Jackson’s request for relief was based. Nor was it the slur on his +judgment that led him to resign. The injury that had been inflicted by +Mr. Benjamin’s unfortunate letter was not personal to himself. It +affected the whole army. It was a direct blow to discipline, and struck +at the very heart of military efficiency. Not only would Jackson +himself be unable to enforce his authority over troops who had so +successfully defied his orders; but the whole edifice of command, +throughout the length and breadth of the Confederacy, would, if he +tamely submitted to the Secretary’s extraordinary action, be shaken to +its foundations. Johnston, still smarting under Mr. Davis’s rejection +of his strategical views, felt this as acutely as did Jackson. “The +discipline of the army,” he wrote to the Secretary of War, “cannot be +maintained under such circumstances. The direct tendency of such orders +is to insulate the commanding general from his troops, to diminish his +moral as well as his official control, and to harass him with the +constant fear that his most matured plans may be marred by orders from +his Government which it is impossible for him to anticipate.”[19] + +To Jackson he wrote advising the withdrawal of his resignation: “Under +ordinary circumstances a due sense of one’s own dignity, as well as +care for professional character and official rights, would demand such +a course as yours, but the character of this war, the great energy +exhibited +by the Government of the United States, the danger in which our very +existence as an independent people lies, requires sacrifices from us +all who have been educated as soldiers. + +“I receive the information of the order of which you have such cause to +complain from your letter. Is not that as great an official wrong to me +as the order itself to you? Let us dispassionately reason with the +Government on this subject of command, and if we fail to influence its +practice, then ask to be relieved from positions the authority of which +is exercised by the War Department, while the responsibilities are left +to us. + +“I have taken the liberty to detain your letter to make this appeal to +your patriotism, not merely from common feelings of personal regard, +but from the official opinion which makes me regard you as necessary to +the service of the country in your present position.”[20] + +But Johnston, when he wrote, was not aware of the remonstrance of +Loring’s officers. His protest, in his letter to the Secretary of War, +deprecated the action of the department in ignoring the authority of +the military chiefs; it had no reference to the graver evil of yielding +to the representations of irresponsible subordinates. Considering the +circumstances, as he believed them to exist, his advice was doubtless +prudent. But it found Jackson in no compromising mood. + +“Sacrifices!” he exclaimed; “have I not made them? What is my life here +but a daily sacrifice? Nor shall I ever withhold sacrifices for my +country, where they will avail anything. I intend to serve here, +anywhere, in any way I can, even if it be as a private soldier. But if +this method of making war is to prevail, the country is ruined. My duty +to Virginia requires that I shall utter my protest against it in the +most energetic form in my power, and that is to resign. The authorities +at Richmond must be taught a lesson, or the next victims of their +meddling will be Johnston and Lee.” + +Fortunately for the Confederacy, the Virginia officers +possessed a staunch supporter in the Governor of the State. Mr. Letcher +knew Jackson’s worth, and he knew the estimation in which he was +already held by the Virginia people. The battle of Manassas had +attained the dignity of a great historical event, and those whose share +in the victory had been conspicuous were regarded with the same respect +as the heroes of the Revolution. In the spring of 1862 Manassas stood +alone, the supreme incident of the war; its fame was not yet +overshadowed by mightier conflicts, and it had taken rank in the +popular mind with the decisive battles of the world. + +Jackson, at the same time that he addressed Johnston, wrote to Letcher. +It is possible that he anticipated the course the Governor would adopt. +He certainly took care that if a protest were made it should be backed +with convincing argument. + +“The order from the War Department,” he wrote, “was given without +consulting me, and is abandoning to the enemy what has cost much +preparation, expense, and exposure to secure, is in direct conflict +with my military plans, implies a want of confidence in my capacity to +judge when General Loring’s troops should fall back, and is an attempt +to control military operations in details from the Secretary’s desk at +a distance. . . . As a single order like that of the Secretary’s may +destroy the entire fruits of a campaign, I cannot reasonably expect, if +my operations are thus to be interfered with, to be of much service in +the field. . . . If I ever acquired, through the blessing of +Providence, any influence over troops, this undoing my work by the +Secretary may greatly diminish that influence. I regard the recent +expedition as a great success. . . . I desire to say nothing against +the Secretary of War. I take it for granted that he has done what he +believes to be best, but I regard such policy as ruinous.”[21] + +This letter had the desired result. Not content with reminding Jackson +of the effect his resignation would have on the people of Virginia, and +begging him to withdraw it, Governor Letcher took the Secretary of War +to task. Mr. +Benjamin, who had probably acted in ignorance rather than in defiance +of the military necessities, at once gave way. Governor Letcher, +assured that it was not the intention of the Government to interfere +with the plans of the general, withdrew the resignation: Jackson had +already yielded to his representations. + +“In this transaction,” says his chief of the staff, “Jackson gained one +of his most important victories for the Confederate States. Had the +system of encouragement to the insubordination of inferiors, and of +interference with the responsibilities of commanders in the field, +which was initiated in his case, become established, military success +could only have been won by accident. By his firmness the evil usage +was arrested, and a lesson impressed both upon the Government and the +people of the South.”[22] + +That the soldier is but the servant of the statesman, as war is but an +instrument of diplomacy, no educated soldier will deny. Politics must +always exercise a supreme influence on strategy; yet it cannot be +gainsaid that interference with the commanders in the field is fraught +with the gravest danger. Mr. Benjamin’s action was without excuse. In +listening to the malcontents he ignored the claims of discipline. In +cancelling Jackson’s orders he struck a blow at the confidence of the +men in their commander. In directing that Romney should not be held he +decided on a question which was not only purely military, but of which +the man on the spot, actually in touch with the situation and with the +enemy, could alone be judge.[23] Even Johnston, a most able and +experienced soldier, although he was evidently apprehensive that +Jackson’s front was too extended, forbore to do more than warn. Nor was +his interference the crown of Mr. Benjamin’s +offence. The omniscient lawyer asked no advice; but believing, as many +still believe, that neither special knowledge nor practical +acquaintance with the working of the military machine is necessary in +order to manœuvre armies, he had acted entirely on his own initiative. +It was indeed time that he received a lesson. + +Well would it have been for the Confederacy had the President himself +been wise enough to apply the warning to its full extent. We have +already seen that after the victory of Manassas, in his capacity of +Commander-in-Chief, he refused to denude the Southern coasts of their +garrisons in order to reinforce Johnston’s army and strike a decisive +blow in Northern territory. Had he but once recognised that he too was +an amateur, that it was impossible for one man to combine effectively +in his own person the duties of Head of the Government and of +Commander-in-Chief, he would have handed over the management of his +huge armies, and the direction of all military movements, to the most +capable soldier the Confederacy could produce. Capable soldiers were +not wanting; and had the control of military operations been frankly +committed to a trained strategist, and the military resources of the +Southern States been placed unreservedly at the disposal of either Lee +or Johnston, combined operations would have taken the place of +disjointed enterprises, and the full strength of the country have been +concentrated at the decisive point. It can hardly, however, be imputed +as a fault to Mr. Davis that he did not anticipate a system which +achieved such astonishing success in Prussia’s campaigns of ’66 and +’70. It was not through vanity alone that he retained in his own hands +the supreme control of military affairs. The Confederate system of +government was but an imitation of that which existed in the United +States; and in Washington, as in Richmond, the President was not only +Commander-in-Chief in name, but the arbiter on all questions of +strategy and organisation; while, to go still further back, the English +Cabinet had exercised the same power since Parliament became supreme. +The American people may be forgiven for their failure to recognise the +deplorable results of the system they +had inherited from the mother-country. The English people had been +equally blind, and in their case there was no excuse. The mismanagement +of the national resources in the war with France was condoned by the +victories of Wellington. The vicious conceptions of the Government, +responsible for so many useless enterprises, for waste of life, of +treasure, of opportunity, were lost in the blaze of triumph in which +the struggle ended. Forty years later it had been forgotten that the +Cabinet of 1815 had done its best to lose the battle of Waterloo; the +lessons of the great war were disregarded, and the Cabinet of 1853 to +1854 was allowed to work its will on the army of the Crimea. + +It is a significant fact that, during the War of Secession, for the +three years the control of the armies of the North remained in the +hands of the Cabinet the balance of success lay with the Confederates. +But in March 1864 Grant was appointed Commander-in-Chief; Lincoln +abdicated his military functions in his favour, and the Secretary of +War had nothing more to do than to comply with his requisitions. Then, +for the first time, the enormous armies of the Union were manœuvred in +harmonious combination, and the superior force was exerted to its full +effect. Nor is it less significant that during the most critical period +of the 1862 campaign, the most glorious to the Confederacy, Lee was +Commander-in-Chief of the Southern armies. But when Lee left Richmond +for the Northern border, Davis once more assumed supreme control, +retaining it until it was too late to stave off ruin. + +Yet the Southern soldiers had never to complain of such constant +interference on the part of the Cabinet as had the Northern; and to +Jackson it was due that each Confederate general, with few exceptions, +was henceforward left unhampered in his own theatre of operations. His +threat of resignation at least effected this, and, although the +President still managed or mismanaged the grand operations, the +Secretary of War was muzzled. + +It might be objected that in this instance Jackson showed little +respect for the discipline he so rigidly enforced, and that in the +critical situation of the Confederacy +his action was a breach of duty which was almost disloyalty. Without +doubt his resignation would have seriously embarrassed the Government. +To some degree at least the confidence of both the people and the army +in the Administration would have become impaired. But Jackson was +fighting for a principle which was of even more importance than +subordination. Foreseeing as he did the certain results of civilian +meddling, submission to the Secretary’s orders would have been no +virtue. His presence with the army would hardly have counterbalanced +the untrammelled exercise of Mr. Benjamin’s military sagacity, and the +inevitable decay of discipline. It was not the course of a weak man, an +apathetic man, or a selfish man. We may imagine Jackson eating his +heart out at Lexington, while the war was raging on the frontier, and +the Stonewall Brigade was fighting manfully under another leader +against the hosts of the invader. The independence of his country was +the most intense of all his earthly desires; and to leave the forefront +of the fight before that desire had been achieved would have been more +to him than most. He would have sacrificed far more in resigning than +in remaining; and there was always the possibility that a brilliant +success and the rapid termination of the war would place Mr. Benjamin +apparently in the right. How would Jackson look then? What would be the +reputation of the man who had quitted the army, on what would have been +considered a mere point of etiquette, in the very heat of the campaign? +No ordinary man would have faced the alternative, and have risked his +reputation in order to teach the rulers of his country a lesson which +might never reach them. It must be remembered, too, that Jackson had +not yet proved himself indispensable. He had done good work at +Manassas, but so had others. His name was scarcely known beyond the +confines of his own State, and Virginia had several officers of higher +reputation. His immediate superiors knew his value, but the Confederate +authorities, as their action proved, placed little dependence on his +judgment, and in all probability set no special store upon his +services. There was undoubtedly +every chance, had not Governor Letcher intervened, that his resignation +would have been accepted. His letter then to the Secretary of War was +no mere threat, the outcome of injured vanity, but the earnest and +deliberate protest of a man who was ready to sacrifice even his own +good name to benefit his country. + +The negotiations which followed his application to resign occupied some +time. He remained at Winchester, and the pleasant home where he and his +wife had found such kindly welcome was the scene of much discussion. +Governor Letcher was not alone in his endeavours to alter his decision. +Many were the letters that poured in. From every class of Virginians, +from public men and private, came the same appeal. But until he was +convinced that Virginia would suffer by his action, Jackson was deaf to +argument. He had not yet realised the measure of confidence which he +had won. To those who sought to move him by saying that his country +could not spare his services, or by speaking of his hold upon the +troops, he replied that they greatly overestimated his capacity for +usefulness, and that his place would readily be filled by a better man. +That many of his friends were deeply incensed with the Secretary of War +was only natural, and his conduct was bitterly denounced. But Jackson +not only forbore to criticise, but in his presence all criticism was +forbidden. There can be no doubt that he was deeply wounded. He could +be angry when he chose, and his anger was none the less fierce because +it was habitually controlled. He never forgave Davis for his want of +wisdom after Manassas; and indeed, in future campaigns, the President’s +action was sufficient to exasperate the most patriotic of his generals. +But during this time of trouble not a word escaped Jackson which showed +those nearest him that his equanimity was disturbed. Anticipating that +he would be ordered to the Military Institute, he was even delighted, +says his wife, at the prospect of returning home. The reason of his +calmness is not far to seek. He had come to the determination that it +was his duty to resign, not, we may be certain, without prayer and +self-communing, and when Jackson +saw what his duty was, all other considerations were soon dismissed. He +was content to leave the future in higher hands. It had been so with +him when the question of secession was first broached. “It was soon +after the election of 1860,” wrote one of his clerical friends, “when +the country was beginning to heave in the agony of dissolution. We had +just risen from morning prayers in his own house, where at that time I +was a guest. Filled with gloom, I was lamenting in strong language the +condition and prospect of our beloved country. ‘Why,’ said he, ‘should +Christians be disturbed about the dissolution of the Union? It can only +come by God’s permission, and will only be permitted if for His +people’s good. I cannot see why we should be distressed about such +things, whatever be their consequence.’” + +For the next month the Stonewall Brigade and its commander enjoyed a +well-earned rest. The Federals, on Loring’s withdrawal, contented +themselves with holding Romney and Moorefield, and on Johnston’s +recommendation Loring and part of his troops were transferred +elsewhere. The enemy showed no intention of advancing. The season was +against them. The winter was abnormally wet; the Potomac was higher +than it had been for twenty years, and the Virginia roads had +disappeared in mud. In order to encourage re-enlistment amongst the +men, furloughs were liberally granted by the authorities at Richmond, +and for a short season the din of arms was unheard on the Shenandoah. + +This peaceful time was one of unalloyed happiness to Jackson. The +country round Winchester—the gently rolling ridges, surmounted by +groves of forest trees, the great North Mountains to the westward, +rising sharply from the Valley, the cosy villages and comfortable +farms, and, in the clear blue distance to the south, the towering peaks +of the Massanuttons—is a picture not easily forgotten. And the little +town, quiet and old-fashioned, with its ample gardens and red-brick +pavements, is not unworthy of its surroundings. Up a narrow street, +shaded by silver maples, stood the manse, not far from the headquarter +offices; and +here when his daily work was done Jackson found the happiness of a +home, brightened by the winning ways and attractive presence of his +wife. With his host he had much in common. They were members of the +same church, and neither yielded to the other in his high standard of +morality. The great bookcases of the manse were well stocked with +appropriate literature, and the cultured intellect of Dr. Graham met +more than half-way the somewhat abstruse problems with which Jackson’s +powerful brain delighted to wrestle. + +But Jackson and his host, even had they been so inclined, were not +permitted to devote their whole leisure to theological discussion. +Children’s laughter broke in upon their arguments. The young staff +officers, with the bright eyes of the Winchester ladies as a lure, +found a welcome by that hospitable hearth, and the war was not so +absorbing a topic as to drive gaiety afield. + +The sedate manse was like to lose its character. There were times when +the house overflowed with music and with merriment, and sounds at which +a Scotch elder would have shuddered were heard far out in the street. +And the fun and frolic were not confined to the more youthful members +of the household. The Stonewall Brigade would hardly have been +surprised had they seen their general surrounded by ponderous volumes, +gravely investigating the teaching of departed commentators, or joining +with quiet fervour in the family devotions. But had they seen him +running down the stairs with an urchin on his shoulders, laughing like +a schoolboy, they would have refused to credit the evidence of their +senses. + +So the months wore on. “We spent,” says Mrs. Jackson, “as happy a +winter as ever falls to the lot of mortals upon earth.” But the brigade +was not forgotten, nor the enemy. Every day the Virginia regiments +improved in drill and discipline. The scouts were busy on the border, +and not a movement of the Federal forces was unobserved. A vigilant +watch was indeed necessary. The snows had melted and the roads were +slowly +drying. The Army of the Potomac, McClellan’s great host, numbering over +200,000 men, encamped around Washington, hardly more than a day’s march +distant from Centreville, threatened to overwhelm the 82,000 +Confederates who held the intrenchments at Centreville and Manassas +Junction. General Lander was dead, but Shields, a veteran of the +Mexican campaign, had succeeded him, and the force at both Romney and +Frederick had been increased. In the West things were going badly for +the new Republic. The Union troops had overrun Kentucky, Missouri, and +the greater part of Tennessee. A Confederate army had been defeated; +Confederate forts captured; and “the amphibious power” of the North had +already been effectively exerted. Various towns on the Atlantic +seaboard had been occupied. Not one of the European Powers had evinced +a decided intention of espousing the Confederate cause, and the +blockade still exercised its relentless pressure. + +It was not, however, until the end of February that the great host +beyond the Potomac showed symptoms of approaching movement. But it had +long been evident that both Winchester and Centreville must soon be +abandoned. Johnston was as powerless before McClellan as Jackson before +Banks. Even if by bringing fortification to their aid they could hold +their ground against the direct attack of far superior numbers, they +could not prevent their intrenchments being turned. McClellan had at +his disposal the naval resources of the North. It would be no difficult +task to transfer his army by the broad reaches of the Potomac and the +Chesapeake to some point on the Virginia coast, and to intervene +between Centreville and Richmond. At the same time the army of Western +Virginia, which was now under command of General Fremont, might +threaten Jackson in rear by moving on Staunton from Beverley and the +Great Kanawha, while Banks assailed him in front.[24] + +Johnston was already preparing to retreat. Jackson, +reluctant to abandon a single acre of his beloved Valley to the enemy, +was nevertheless constrained to face the possibilities of such a +course. His wife was sent back to her father’s home in the same train +that conveyed his sick to Staunton; baggage and stores were removed to +Mount Jackson, half-way up the Shenandoah Valley, and his little army, +which had now been increased to three brigades, or 4,600 men all told, +was ordered to break up its camps. 38,000 Federals had gradually +assembled between Frederick and Romney. Banks, who commanded the whole +force, was preparing to advance, and his outposts were already +established on the south bank of the Potomac. + +But when the Confederate column filed through the streets of +Winchester, it moved not south but north. + +Such was Jackson’s idea of a retreat. To march towards the enemy, not +away from him; to watch his every movement; to impose upon him with a +bold front; to delay him to the utmost; and to take advantage of every +opportunity that might offer for offensive action. + +Shortly before their departure the troops received a reminder that +their leader brooked no trifling with orders. Intoxicating liquors were +forbidden in the Confederate lines. But the regulation was +systematically evaded, and the friends of the soldiers smuggled in +supplies. When this breach of discipline was discovered, Jackson put a +stop to the traffic by an order which put the punishment on the right +shoulders. “Every waggon that came into camp was to be searched, and if +any liquor were found it was to be spilled out, and the waggon horses +turned over to the quartermaster for the public service.” Nevertheless, +when they left Winchester, so Jackson wrote to his wife, the troops +were in excellent spirits, and their somewhat hypochondriacal general +had never for years enjoyed more perfect health—a blessing for which he +had more reason to be thankful than the Federals. + +Illustration: Map of The Valley For larger view click on image. + +NOTE + +THE EVILS OF CIVILIAN CONTROL + +It is well worth noticing that the interference of both the Union and +Confederate Cabinets was not confined to the movements and location of +the troops. The organisation of the armies was very largely the work of +the civilian authorities, and the advice of the soldiers was very +generally disregarded. The results, it need hardly be said, were +deplorable. The Northern wiseacres considered cavalry an encumbrance +and a staff a mere ornamental appendage. McClellan, in consequence, was +always in difficulties for the want of mounted regiments; and while +many regular officers were retained in the command of batteries and +companies, the important duties of the staff had sometimes to be +assigned to volunteers. The men too, at first, were asked to serve for +three months only; that is, they were permitted to take their discharge +directly they had learned the rudiments of their work. Again, instead +of the ranks of the old regiments being filled up as casualties +occurred, the armies, despite McClellan’s protests, were recruited by +raw regiments, commanded by untrained officers. Mr. Davis, knowing +something of war, certainly showed more wisdom. The organisation of the +army of Northern Virginia was left, in great measure, to General Lee; +so from the very first the Southerners had sufficient cavalry and as +good a staff as could be got together. The soldiers, however, were only +enlisted at first for twelve months; yet “Lee,” says Lord Wolseley, +“pleaded in favour of the engagement being for the duration of the war, +but he pleaded in vain;” and it was not for many months that the +politicians could be induced to cancel the regulation under which the +men elected their officers. The President, too, while the markets of +Europe were still open, neglected to lay in a store of munitions of +war: it was not till May that an order was sent across the seas, and +then only for 10,000 muskets! The commissariat department, moreover, +was responsible to the President and not to the commander of the +armies; this, perhaps, was the worst fault of all. It would seem +impossible that such mistakes, in an intelligent community, should be +permitted to recur. Yet, in face of the fact that only when the +commanders have been given a free hand, as was Marlborough in the Low +Countries, or Wellington in the Peninsula, has the English army been +thoroughly efficient, the opinion is not uncommon in England that +members of Parliament and journalists are far more capable of +organising an army than even the most experienced soldier. + + Since the above was written the war with Spain has given further + proof of how readily even the most intelligent of nations can + forget the lessons of the past. + + [1] “A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent + detachments. Those generals who have had but little experience attempt + to protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with + their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard + against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in smaller misfortunes to avoid + greater.” Frederick the Great’s _Instructions to his Generals._ + + [2] Letter of General G. W. Smith to the author. + + [3] O.R., vol. v, p. 909. + + [4] Loring was at Huntersville, Johnson on Alleghany Mountain, not far + from Monterey. General Lee, unable with an inferior force to drive the + enemy from West Virginia, had been transferred to South Carolina on + November 1. + + [5] _Ante,_ p. 174. + + [6] Cooke, p. 87. + + [7] O.R., vol. v, p. 965. + + [8] Dabney, vol. i, p. 298. + + [9] The Federal commander was granted two hours in which to remove the + women and children. + + [10] “Any attempt,” Banks reported to McClellan, “to intercept the + enemy would have been unsuccessful. . . . It would have resulted in + almost certain failure to cut him off, and have brought an exhausted + force into his presence to fight him in his stronghold at Winchester. + In any case, it promised no positive prospect of success, nor did it + exclude large chances of disaster.”—O.R., vol. v, p. 694. + + [11] Dabney, vol. i, p. 320. + + [12] Dabney, vol. i, p. 321. + + [13] _Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson._ + + [14] O.R., vol. v, p. 1053. + + [15] _Ibid.,_ pp. 1046–8. + + [16] O.R., vol. v, p. 1053. + + [17] _Ibid.,_ pp. 702, 703. + + [18] “I have taken special pains,” he writes on January 17, “to obtain + information respecting General Banks, but I have not been informed of + his having gone east. I will see what can be effected through the + Catholic priests at Martinsburg.”—O.R., vol. v, p. 1036. + + [19] O.R., vol. v, pp. 1057, 1058. + + [20] O.R., vol. v, pp. 1059, 1060. + + [21] _Memoirs,_ pp. 232, 233. + + [22] Dabney, vol. i, p. 327. + + [23] The inexpediency of evacuating Romney was soon made apparent. The + enemy reoccupied the village, seized Moorefield, and, with the valley + of the South Branch in their possession, threatened the rear of Edward + Johnson’s position on the Alleghany Mountain so closely that he was + compelled to retreat. Three fertile counties were thus abandoned to + the enemy, and the Confederate sympathisers in North-west Virginia + were proportionately discouraged. + + [24] Fortunately for the Confederates this army had been reduced to + 18,000 men, and the want of transport, together with the condition of + the mountain roads, kept it stationary until the weather improved. + + + + +Chapter VIII +KERNSTOWN + + +1862. Feb. 27 By the end of February a pontoon bridge had been thrown +across the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry, and Banks had crossed to the +Virginia shore. An army of 38,000 men, including 2,000 cavalry, and +accompanied by 80 pieces of artillery, threatened Winchester. + +President Lincoln was anxious that the town should be occupied. Banks +believed that the opportunity was favourable. “The roads to +Winchester,” he wrote, “are turnpikes and in tolerable condition. The +enemy is weak, demoralised, and depressed.” + +But McClellan, who held command of all the Federal forces, had no mind +to expose even a detachment to defeat. The main Confederate army at +Centreville could, at any moment, dispatch reinforcements by railway to +the Valley, reversing the strategic movement which had won Bull Run; +while the Army of the Potomac, held fast by the mud, could do nothing +to prevent it. Banks was therefore ordered to occupy the line +Charlestown to Martinsburg, some two-and-twenty miles from Winchester, +to cover the reconstruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and to +accumulate supplies preparatory to a further advance. The troops, +however, did not approve such cautious strategy. “Their appetite for +work,” according to their commander, “was very sharp.” Banks himself +was not less eager. “If left to our own discretion,” he wrote to +McClellan’s chief of staff, “the general desire will be to move early.” + +March 9 On March 7 General D. H. Hill, acting under instructions, fell +back from Leesburg, and two days later Johnston, +destroying the railways, abandoned Centreville. The Confederate +General-in-Chief had decided to withdraw to near Orange Court House, +trebling his distance from Washington, and surrendering much territory, +but securing, in return, important strategical advantages. Protected by +the Rapidan, a stream unfordable in spring, he was well placed to meet +a Federal advance, and also, by a rapid march, to anticipate any force +which might be transported by water and landed close to Richmond. + +Jackson was now left isolated in the Valley. The nearest Confederate +infantry were at Culpeper Court House, beyond the Blue Ridge, nearly +sixty miles south-east. In his front, within two easy marches, was an +army just seven times his strength, at Romney another detachment of +several thousand men, and a large force in the Alleghanies. He was in +no hurry, however, to abandon Winchester. + +Johnston had intended that when the main army fell back towards +Richmond his detachments should follow suit. Jackson found a loophole +in his instructions which gave him full liberty of action. + +“I greatly desire,” he wrote to Johnston on March 8, “to hold this +place [Winchester] so far as may be consistent with your views and +plans, and am making arrangements, by constructing works, etc., to make +a stand. Though you desired me some time since to fall back in the +event of yourself and General Hill’s doing so, yet in your letter of +the 5th inst. you say, ‘Delay the enemy as long as you can;’ I have +felt justified in remaining here for the present. + +“And now, General, that Hill has fallen back, can you not send him over +here? I greatly need such an officer; one who can be sent off as +occasion may offer against an exposed detachment of the enemy for the +purpose of capturing it. . . . I believe that if you can spare Hill, +and let him move here at once, you will never have occasion to regret +it. The very idea of reinforcements coming to Winchester would, I +think, be a damper to the enemy, in addition to the fine effect that +would be produced on our own troops, already in fine spirits. But if +you cannot spare +Hill, can you not send me some other troops? If we cannot be successful +in defeating the enemy should he advance, a kind Providence may enable +us to inflict a terrible wound and effect a safe retreat in the event +of having to fall back. I will keep myself on the alert with respect to +communications between us, so as to be able to join you at the earliest +possible moment, if such a movement becomes necessary.”[1] + +This letter is characteristic. When Jackson asked for reinforcements +the cause of the South seemed well-nigh hopeless. Her Western armies +were retiring, defeated and demoralised. Several of her Atlantic towns +had fallen to the Federal navy, assisted by strong landing parties. The +army on which she depended for the defence of Richmond, yielding to the +irresistible presence of far superior numbers, was retreating into the +interior of Virginia. There was not the faintest sign of help from +beyond the sea. The opportunity for a great counterstroke had been +suffered to escape. Her forces were too small for aught but defensive +action, and it was difficult to conceive that she could hold her own +against McClellan’s magnificently appointed host. “Events,” said Davis +at this time, “have cast on our arms and hopes the gloomiest shadows.” +But from the Valley, the northern outpost of the Confederate armies, +where the danger was most threatening and the means of defence the most +inadequate, came not a whisper of apprehension. The troops that held +the border were but a handful, but Jackson knew enough of war to be +aware that victory does not always side with the big battalions. +Neither Johnston nor Davis had yet recognised, as he did, the weak +joint in the Federal harness. Why should the appearance of Hill’s +brigade at Winchester discourage Banks? Johnston had fallen back to the +Rapidan, and there was now no fear of the Confederates detaching troops +suddenly from Manassas. Why should the bare idea that reinforcements +were coming up embarrass the Federals? + +The letter itself does not indeed supply a definite answer. Jackson was +always most guarded in his correspondence; and, if he could possibly +avoid it, he never +made the slightest allusion to the information on which his plans were +based. His staff officers, however, after the campaign was over, were +generally enlightened as to the motive of his actions, and we are thus +enabled to fill the gap.[2] Jackson demanded reinforcements for the one +reason that a blow struck near Winchester would cause alarm in +Washington. The communications of the Federal capital with both the +North and West passed through or close to Harper’s Ferry; and the +passage over the Potomac, which Banks was now covering, was thus the +most sensitive point in the invader’s front. Well aware, as indeed was +every statesman and every general in Virginia, of the state of public +feeling in the North, Jackson saw with more insight than others the +effect that was likely to be produced should the Government, the press, +and the people of the Federal States have reason to apprehend that the +capital of the Union was in danger. + +If the idea of playing on the fears of his opponents by means of the +weak detachment under Jackson ever suggested itself to Johnston, he may +be forgiven if he dismissed it as chimerical. For 7,600 men[3] to +threaten with any useful result a capital which was defended by 250,000 +seemed hardly within the bounds of practical strategy. Johnston had +nevertheless determined to turn the situation to account. In order to +protect the passages of the Upper Potomac, McClellan had been compelled +to disseminate his army. Between his main body south of Washington and +his right wing under Banks was a gap of fifty miles, and this +separation Johnston was determined should be maintained. The President, +to whom he had referred Jackson’s letter, was unable to spare the +reinforcements therein requested, and the defence of the Valley was +left to the 4,600 men encamped at Winchester. Jackson was permitted to +use his own judgment as to his own position, but something more was +required of him than the mere protection of a tract of territory. “He +was to endeavour to employ the invaders in the Valley without exposing +himself to the +danger of defeat, by keeping so near the enemy as to prevent his making +any considerable detachment to reinforce McClellan, but not so near +that he might be compelled to fight.”[4] + +To carry out these instructions Jackson had at his disposal 3,600 +infantry, 600 cavalry, and six batteries of 27 guns. Fortunately, they +were all Virginians, with the exception of one battalion, the First, +which was composed of Irish navvies. + +This force, which had now received the title of the Army of the Valley, +was organised in three brigades:— + +First Brigade (“Stonewall”): +Brigadier-General Garnett 2nd Virginia Regiment + 4th Virginia Regiment + 5th Virginia Regiment +27th Virginia Regiment +33rd Virginia Regiment + +Second Brigade: Colonel Burks 21st Virginia Regiment +42nd Virginia Regiment +48th Virginia Regiment + 1st Regular Battalion (Irish) + +Third Brigade: Colonel Fulkerson 23rd Virginia Regiment +27th Virginia Regiment + +McLaughlin’s Battery +Waters’ Battery +Carpenter’s Battery +Marye’s Battery +Shumaker’s Battery +Ashby’s Regiment of Cavalry +Chew’s Horse-Artillery Battery 8 guns +4 guns +4 guns +4 guns +4 guns + +3 guns + +The infantry were by this time fairly well armed and equipped, but the +field-pieces were mostly smoothbores of small calibre. Of the quality +of the troops Bull Run had been sufficient test. Side by side with the +sons of the old Virginia houses the hunters and yeomen of the Valley +had proved their worth. Their skill as marksmen had stood them in good +stead. Men who had been used from boyhood to shoot squirrels in the +woodland found the Federal soldier a target difficult to miss. +Skirmishing and patrolling came instinctively to those who had stalked +the deer and the bear in the mountain forests; and the simple hardy +life of an +agricultural community was the best probation for the trials of a +campaign. The lack of discipline and of competent regimental officers +might have placed them at a disadvantage had they been opposed to +regulars; but they were already half-broken to the soldier’s trade +before they joined the ranks. They were no strangers to camp and +bivouac, to peril and adventure; their hands could guard their heads. +Quick sight and steady nerve, unfailing vigilance and instant resolve, +the very qualities which their devotion to field-sports fostered, were +those which had so often prevailed in the war of the Revolution over +the mechanical tactics of well-disciplined battalions; and on ground +with which they were perfectly familiar the men of the Shenandoah were +formidable indeed. + +They were essentially rough and ready. Their appearance would hardly +have captivated a martinet. The eye that lingers lovingly on glittering +buttons and spotless belts would have turned away in disdain from +Jackson’s soldiers. There was nothing bright about them but their +rifles. They were as badly dressed, and with as little regard for +uniformity, as the defenders of Torres Vedras or the Army of Italy in +1796. Like Wellington and Napoleon, the Confederate generals cared very +little what their soldiers wore so long as they did their duty. Least +of all can one imagine Stonewall Jackson exercising his mind as to the +cut of a tunic or the polish of a buckle. The only standing order in +the English army of the Peninsula which referred to dress forbade the +wearing of the enemy’s uniform. It was the same in the Army of the +Valley, although at a later period even this order was of necessity +ignored. As their forefathers of the Revolution took post in +Washington’s ranks clad in hunting shirts and leggings, so the +Confederate soldiers preferred the garments spun by their own women to +those supplied them by the State. Grey, of all shades, from light blue +to butter-nut, was the universal colour. The coatee issued in the early +days of the war had already given place to a short-waisted and +single-breasted jacket. The blue _képi_ held out longer. The soft felt +hat which experience soon proved the most serviceable head-dress had +not yet become universal. But the long boots had gone; and strong +brogans, with broad soles and low heels, had been found more +comfortable. Overcoats were soon discarded. “The men came to the +conclusion that the trouble of carrying them on hot days outweighed +their comfort when the cold day arrived. Besides, they found that life +in the open air hardened them to such an extent that changes in +temperature were hardly felt.”[5] Nor did the knapsack long survive. +“It was found to gall the back and shoulders and weary the man before +half the march was accomplished. It did not pay to carry around clean +clothes while waiting for the time to use them.”[6] But the men still +clung to their blankets and waterproof sheets, worn in a roll over the +left shoulder, and the indispensable haversack carried their whole kit. +Tents—except the enemy’s—were rarely seen. The Army of the Valley +generally bivouacked in the woods, the men sleeping in pairs, rolled in +their blankets and rubber sheets. The cooking arrangements were +primitive. A few frying-pans and skillets formed the culinary apparatus +of a company, with a bucket or two in addition, and the frying-pans +were generally carried with their handles stuck in the rifle-barrels! +The tooth-brush was a button-hole ornament, and if, as was sometimes +the case, three days’ rations were served out at a single issue, the +men usually cooked and ate them at once, so as to avoid the labour of +carrying them. + +Such was Jackson’s infantry, a sorry contrast indeed to the soldierly +array of the Federals, with their complete appointments and trim blue +uniforms. But fine feathers, though they may have their use, are hardly +essential to efficiency in the field; and whilst it is absolutely true +that no soldiers ever marched with less to encumber them than the +Confederates, it is no empty boast that none ever marched faster or +held out longer. + +If the artillery, with a most inferior equipment, was less efficient +than the infantry, the cavalry was an invaluable auxiliary. Ashby was +the _beau-idéal_ of a captain of light-horse. His reckless daring, both +across-country and under fire, made him the idol of the army. Nor was +his reputation confined to the Confederate ranks. “I think even our +men,” says a Federal officer, “had a kind of admiration for him, as he +sat unmoved upon his horse, and let them pepper away at him as if he +enjoyed it.” His one shortcoming was his ignorance of drill and +discipline. But in the spring of 1862 these deficiencies were in a fair +way of being rectified. He had already learned something of tactics. In +command of a few hundred mounted riflemen and a section of +horse-artillery he was unsurpassed; and if his men were apt to get out +of hand in battle, his personal activity ensured their strict attention +on the outposts. He thought little of riding seventy or eighty miles +within the day along his picket line, and it is said that he first +recommended himself to Jackson by visiting the Federal camps disguised +as a horse doctor. Jackson placed much dependence on his mounted +troops. Immediately he arrived in the Valley he established his cavalry +outposts far to the front. While the infantry were reposing in their +camps near Winchester, the south bank of the Potomac, forty miles +northward, was closely and incessantly patrolled. The squadrons never +lacked recruits. With the horse-loving Virginians the cavalry was the +favourite arm, and the strength of the regiments was only limited by +the difficulty of obtaining horses. To the sons of the Valley planters +and farmers Ashby’s ranks offered a most attractive career. The +discipline was easy, and there was no time for drill. But of excitement +and adventure there was enough and to spare. Scarcely a day passed +without shots being exchanged at one point or another of the picket +line. There were the enemy’s outposts to be harassed, prisoners to be +taken, bridges to be burnt, and convoys to be captured. Many were the +opportunities for distinction. Jackson demanded something more from his +cavalry than merely guarding the frontier. It was not sufficient for +him to receive warning that the enemy was advancing. He wanted +information from which he could deduce what he intended doing; +information of the strength of his garrisons, of the dispositions of +his camps, of every movement which took place beyond the river. The +cavalry had other and more dangerous duties than vedette and +escort. To penetrate the enemy’s lines, to approach his camps, and +observe his columns—these were the tasks of Ashby’s riders, and in +these they were unrivalled. Many of them were no more than boys; but +their qualifications for such a life were undeniable. A more gallant or +high-spirited body of young soldiers never welcomed the boot and +saddle. Their horses were their own, scions of good Virginian stock, +with the blood of many a well-known sire—Eclipse, Brighteyes, and +Timoleon—in their veins, and they knew how to care for them. They were +acquainted with every country lane and woodland track. They had friends +in every village, and their names were known to every farmer. The night +was no hindrance to them, even in the region of the mountain and the +forest. The hunter’s paths were as familiar to them as the turnpike +roads. They knew the depth and direction of every ford, and could +predict the effect of the weather on stream and track. More admirable +material for the service of intelligence could not possibly have been +found, and Ashby’s audacity in reconnaissance found ready imitators. A +generous rivalry in deeds of daring spread through the command. Bold +enterprises were succeeded by others yet more bold, and, to use the +words of a gentleman who, although he was a veteran of four years’ +service, was but nineteen years of age when Richmond fell, “We thought +no more of riding through the enemy’s bivouacs than of riding round our +fathers’ farms.” So congenial were the duties of the cavalry, so +attractive the life and the associations, that it was no rare thing for +a Virginia gentleman to resign a commission in another arm in order to +join his friends and kinsmen as a private in Ashby’s ranks. And so +before the war had been in progress for many months the fame of the +Virginia cavalry rivalled that of their Revolutionary forbears under +Light-Horse Harry, the friend of Washington and the father of Lee. + +But if the raw material of Jackson’s army was all that could be +desired, no less so was the material of the force opposed to him. The +regiments of Banks’ army corps were recruited as a rule in the Western +States; Ohio, +Indiana, and West Virginia furnished the majority. They too were +hunters and farmers, accustomed to firearms, and skilled in woodcraft. +No hardier infantry marched beneath the Stars and Stripes; the +artillery, armed with a proportion of rifled guns, was more efficient +than that of the Confederates; and in cavalry alone were the Federals +overmatched. In numbers the latter were far superior to Ashby’s +squadrons; in everything else they were immeasurably inferior. +Throughout the North horsemanship was practically an unknown art. The +gentlemen of New England had not inherited the love of their Ironside +ancestors for the saddle and the chase. Even in the forests of the West +men travelled by waggon and hunted on foot. “As cavalry,” says one of +Banks’ brigadiers, “Ashby’s men were greatly superior to ours. In reply +to some orders I had given, my cavalry commander replied, ‘I can’t +catch them, sir; they leap fences and walls like deer; neither our men +nor our horses are so trained.’”[7] + +It was easy enough to fill the ranks of the Northern squadrons. Men +volunteered freely for what they deemed the more dashing branch of the +service, ignorant that its duties were far harder both to learn and to +execute than those of the other arms, and expecting, says a Federal +officer, that the regiment would be accompanied by an itinerant livery +stable! Both horses and men were recruited without the slightest +reference to their fitness for cavalry work. No man was rejected, no +matter what his size or weight, no matter whether he had ever had +anything to do with horseflesh or not, and consequently the proportion +of sick horses was enormous. Moreover, while the Southern troopers +generally carried a firearm, either rifle or shot-gun, some of the +Northern squadrons had only the sabre, and in a wooded country the +firearm was master of the situation. During the first two years of the +war, therefore, the Federal cavalry, generally speaking, were bad +riders and worse horse-masters, unable to move except upon the roads, +and as inefficient on reconnaissance as in action. For an invading +army, information, ample and accurate, is the first requisite. +Operating in a country which, almost invariably, must be better known +to the defenders, bold scouting alone will secure it from ambush and +surprise. Bold scouting was impossible with such mounted troops as +Banks possessed, and throughout the Valley campaign the Northern +general was simply groping in the dark. + +But even had his cavalry been more efficient, it is doubtful whether +Banks would have profited. His appointment was political. He was an +ardent Abolitionist, but he knew nothing whatever of soldiering. He had +begun life as a hand in a cotton factory. By dint of energy and good +brains his rise had been rapid; and although, when the war broke out, +he was still a young man, he had been Governor of Massachusetts and +Speaker of the House of Representatives. What the President expected +when he gave him an army corps it is difficult to divine; what might +have been expected any soldier could have told him. To gratify an +individual, or perhaps to conciliate a political faction, the life of +many a private soldier was sacrificed. Lincoln, it is true, was by no +means solitary in the unwisdom of his selections for command. His rival +in Richmond, it is said, had a fatal penchant for his first wife’s +relations; his political supporters were constantly rewarded by +appointments in the field, and the worst disasters that befell the +Confederacy were due, in great part, to the blunders of officers +promoted for any other reason than efficiency. For Mr. Davis there was +little excuse. He had been educated at West Point. He had served in the +regular army of the United States, and had been Secretary of War at +Washington. Lincoln, on the other hand, knew nothing of war, beyond +what he had learned in a border skirmish, and very little of general +history. He had not yet got rid of the common Anglo-Saxon idea that a +man who has pluck and muscle is already a good soldier, and that the +same qualities which serve in a street-brawl are all that is necessary +to make a general. Nor were historical precedents wanting for the +mistakes of the American statesmen. In both the Peninsula and the +Crimea, lives, treasure, and prestige were as recklessly wasted as in +Virginia; and +staff officers who owed their positions to social influence alone, +generals, useless and ignorant, who succeeded to responsible command by +virtue of seniority and a long purse, were the standing curse of the +English army. At the same time, it may well be questioned whether some +of the regular officers would have done better than Banks. He was no +fool, and if he had not studied the art of war, there have been +barrack-square generals who have showed as much ignorance without +one-quarter his ability. Natural commonsense has often a better chance +of success than a rusty brain, and a mind narrowed by routine. After +serving in twenty campaigns Frederick the Great’s mules were still +mules. On this very theatre of war, in the forests beyond Romney, an +English general had led a detachment of English soldiers to a defeat as +crushing as it was disgraceful, and Braddock was a veteran of many +wars. Here, too, Patterson, an officer of Volunteers who had seen much +service, had allowed Johnston to slip away and join Beauregard on Bull +Run. The Northern people, in good truth, had as yet no reason to place +implicit confidence in the leading of trained soldiers. They had yet to +learn that mere length of service is no test whatever of capacity for +command, and that character fortified by knowledge is the only charm +which attracts success. + +Jackson had already some acquaintance with Banks. During the Romney +expedition the latter had been posted at Frederick with 16,000 men, and +a more enterprising commander would at least have endeavoured to thwart +the Confederate movements. Banks, supine in his camps, made neither +threat nor demonstration. Throughout the winter, Ashby’s troopers had +ridden unmolested along the bank of the Potomac. Lander alone had +worried the Confederate outposts, driven in their advanced detachments, +and drawn supplies from the Virginian farms. Banks had been +over-cautious and inactive, and Jackson had not failed to note his +characteristics. + +March 9 Up to March 9 the Federal general, keeping his cavalry in rear, +had pushed forward no farther than Charlestown and Bunker Hill. On that +day the news reached McClellan that the Confederates were preparing +to abandon Centreville. He at once determined to push forward his whole +army. + +March 12 Banks was instructed to move on Winchester, and on the morning +of the 12th his leading division occupied the town. + +Jackson had withdrawn the previous evening. Twice, on March 7 and again +on the 11th, he had offered battle.[8] His men had remained under arms +all day in the hope that the enemy’s advanced guard might be tempted to +attack. But the activity of Ashby’s cavalry, and the boldness with +which Jackson maintained his position, impressed his adversary with the +conviction that the Confederate force was much greater than it really +was. It was reported in the Federal camps that the enemy’s strength was +from 7,000 to 11,000 men, and that the town was fortified. Jackson’s +force did not amount to half that number, and, according to a Northern +officer, “one could have jumped over his intrenchments as easily as +Remus over the walls of Rome.” + +Jackson abandoned Winchester with extreme reluctance. Besides being the +principal town in that section of the Valley, it was strategically +important to the enemy. Good roads led in every direction, and +communication was easy with Romney and Cumberland to the north-west, +and with Washington and Manassas to the south-east. Placed at +Winchester, Banks could support, or be supported by, the troops in West +Virginia or the army south of Washington. A large and fertile district +would thus be severed from the Confederacy, and the line of invasion +across the Upper Potomac completely blocked. Overwhelming as was the +strength of the Union force, exceeding his own by more than eight to +one, great as was the caution of the Federal leader, it was only an +unlucky accident that restrained Jackson from a resolute endeavour to +at least postpone the capture of the town. He had failed to induce the +enemy’s advanced guard to attack him in position. To attack himself, in +broad daylight, with such vast disproportion of numbers, was out of the +question. His resources, however, were not exhausted. After dark on the +12th, when his troops had left the town, he called a council, +consisting of General Garnett and the regimental commanders of the +Stonewall Brigade, and proposed a night attack on the Federal advance. +When the troops had eaten their supper and rested for some hours, they +were to march to the neighbourhood of the enemy, some four miles north +of Winchester, and make the attack before daylight. The Federal troops +were raw and inexperienced. Prestige was on the side of the +Confederates, and their morale was high. The darkness, the suddenness +and energy of the attack, the lack of drill and discipline, would all +tend to throw the enemy into confusion; and “by the vigorous use of the +bayonet, and the blessing of divine Providence,” Jackson believed that +he would win a signal victory. In the meantime, whilst the council was +assembling, he went off, booted and spurred, to make a hasty call on +Dr. Graham, whose family he found oppressed with the gloom that +overspread the whole town. “He was so buoyant and hopeful himself that +their drooping spirits were revived, and after engaging with them in +family worship, he retired, departing with a cheerful ‘Good evening,’ +merely saying that he intended to dine with them the next day as +usual.” + +When the council met, however, it was found that someone had blundered. +The staff had been at fault. The general had ordered his trains to be +parked immediately south of Winchester, but they had been taken by +those in charge to Kernstown and Newtown, from three to eight miles +distant, and the troops had been marched back to them to get their +rations. + +Jackson learned for the first time, when he met his officers, that his +brigades, instead of being on the outskirts of Winchester, were already +five or six miles away. A march of ten miles would thus be needed to +bring them into contact with the enemy. This fact and the disapproval +of the council caused him to abandon his project. + +Before following his troops he once more went back to Dr. Graham’s. His +cheerful demeanour during his previous visit, although he had been as +reticent as ever as to his plans, had produced a false impression, and +this he thought it his duty to correct. He explained his plans to his +friend, and as he detailed the facts which had induced him to change +them, he repeatedly expressed his reluctance to give up Winchester +without a blow. “With slow and desperate earnestness he said, ‘Let me +think—can I not yet carry my plan into execution?’ As he uttered these +words he grasped the hilt of his sword, and the fierce light that +blazed in his eyes revealed to his companion a new man. The next moment +he dropped his head and released his sword, with the words, ‘No, I must +not do it; it may cost the lives of too many brave men. I must retreat +and wait for a better time.’” He had learned a lesson. “Late in the +evening,” says the medical director of the Valley army, “we withdrew +from Winchester. I rode with the general as we left the place, and as +we reached a high point overlooking the town we both turned to look at +Winchester, now left to the mercy of the Federal soldiers. I think that +a man may sometimes yield to overwhelming emotion, and I was utterly +overcome by the fact that I was leaving all that I held dear on earth; +but my emotion was arrested by one look at Jackson. His face was fairly +blazing with the fire of wrath that was burning in him, and I felt awed +before him. Presently he cried out, in a tone almost savage, ‘That is +the last council of war I will ever hold!’” + +March 18 On leaving Winchester Jackson fell back to Strasburg, eighteen +miles south. There was no immediate pursuit. Banks, in accordance with +his instructions, occupied the town, and awaited further orders. These +came on the 18th,[9] and Shields’ division of 11,000 men with 27 guns +was at once pushed on to Strasburg. Jackson had already withdrawn, +hoping to draw Banks up the Valley, and was now encamped near Mount +Jackson, a strong position twenty-five miles further south, the +indefatigable Ashby still skirmishing with the enemy. The unusual +audacity which prompted the Federal advance was probably due to the +fact that the exact strength of the Confederate force had been +ascertained in Winchester. At all events, all apprehension of attack +had vanished. Jackson’s 4,500 men were considered a _quantité +négligeable,_ a mere corps of observation; and not only was Shields +sent forward without support, but a large portion of Banks’ corps was +ordered to another field. Its _rôle_ as an independent force had +ceased. Its movements were henceforward to be subordinate to those of +the main army, and McClellan designed to bring it into closer +connection with his advance on Richmond. How his design was frustrated, +how he struggled in vain to correct the original dissemination of his +forces, how his right wing was held in a vice by Jackson, and how his +initial errors eventually ruined his campaign, is a strategical lesson +of the highest import. + +From the day McClellan took command the Army of the Potomac had done +practically nothing. Throughout the winter troops had poured into +Washington at the rate of 40,000 a month. At the end of December there +were 148,000 men fit for duty. On March 20 the grand aggregate was +240,000.[10] But during the winter no important enterprise had been +undertaken. The colours of the rebels were still flaunting within sight +of the forts of Washington, and the mouth of the Potomac was securely +closed by Confederate batteries. With a mighty army at their service it +is little wonder that the North became restive and reproached their +general. It is doubtless true that the first thing needful was +organisation. To discipline and consolidate the army so as to make +success assured was unquestionably the wiser policy. The impatience of +a sovereign people, ignorant of war, is not to be lightly yielded to. +At the same time, the desire of a nation cannot be altogether +disregarded. A general who obstinately refuses to place himself in +accord with the political situation forfeits the confidence of his +employers and the cordial support of the Administration. The cry +throughout the North was for action. The President took +it upon himself to issue a series of orders. The army was ordered to +advance on February 22, a date chosen because it was Washington’s +birthday, just as the third and most disastrous assault on Plevna was +delivered on the “name-day” of the Czar. McClellan secured delay. His +plans were not yet ripe. The Virginia roads were still impassable. The +season was not yet sufficiently advanced for active operations, and +that his objections were well founded it is impossible to deny. The +prospect of success depended much upon the weather. Virginia, covered +in many places with dense forests, crossed by many rivers, and with +most indifferent communications, is a most difficult theatre of war, +and the amenities of the Virginian spring are not to be lightly faced. +Napoleon’s fifth element, “mud,” is a most disturbing factor in +military calculations. It is related that a Federal officer, sent out +to reconnoitre a road in a certain district of Virginia, reported that +the road was there, but that he guessed “the bottom had fallen out.” +Moreover, McClellan had reason to believe that the Confederate army at +Manassas was more than double its actual strength. His intelligence +department, controlled, not by a trained staff officer, but by a +well-known detective, estimated Johnston’s force at 115,000 men. In +reality, including the detachment on the Shenandoah, it at no time +exceeded 50,000. But for all this there was no reason whatever for +absolute inactivity. The capture of the batteries which barred the +entrance to the Potomac, the defeat of the Confederate detachments +along the river, the occupation of Winchester or of Leesburg, were all +feasible operations. By such means the impatience of the Northern +people might have been assuaged. A few successes, even on a small +scale, would have raised the _moral_ of the troops and have trained +them to offensive movements. The general would have retained the +confidence of the Administration, and have secured the respect of his +opponents. Jackson had set him the example. His winter expeditions had +borne fruit. The Federal generals opposed to him gave him full credit +for activity. “Much dissatisfaction was expressed by the troops,” says +one of Banks’ brigadiers, “that Jackson was permitted to +get away from Winchester without a fight, and but little heed was paid +to my assurances that this chieftain would be apt, before the war +closed, to give us an entertainment up to the utmost of our +aspirations.”[11] + +It was not only of McClellan’s inactivity that the Government +complained. At the end of February he submitted a plan of operations to +the President, and with that plan Mr. Lincoln totally disagreed. +McClellan, basing his project on the supposition that Johnston had +100,000 men behind formidable intrenchments at Manassas, blocking the +road to Richmond, proposed to transfer 150,000 men to the Virginia +coast by sea; and landing either at Urbanna on the Rappahannock, or at +Fortress Monroe on the Yorktown peninsula, to intervene between the +Confederate army and Richmond, and possibly to capture the Southern +capital before Johnston could get back to save it. + +The plan at first sight seemed promising. But in Lincoln’s eyes it had +this great defect: during the time McClellan was moving round by water +and disembarking his troops—and this, so few were the transports, would +take at least a month—Johnston might make a dash at Washington. The +city had been fortified. A cordon of detached forts surrounded it on a +circumference of thirty miles. The Potomac formed an additional +protection. But a cordon of isolated earthworks does not appeal as an +effective barrier to the civilian mind, and above Point of Rocks the +great river was easy of passage. Even if Washington were absolutely +safe from a _coup de main,_ Lincoln had still good reason for +apprehension. The Union capital was merely the seat of government. It +had no commercial interests. With a population of but 20,000, it was of +no more practical importance than Windsor or Versailles. Compared with +New York, Pittsburg, or Philadelphia, it was little more than a +village. But, in the regard of the Northern people, Washington was the +centre of the Union, the keystone of the national existence. The +Capitol, the White House, the Treasury, were symbols as sacred to the +States as the colours +to a regiment.[12] If the nation was set upon the fall of Richmond, it +was at least as solicitous for the security of its own chief city, and +an administration that permitted that security to be endangered would +have been compelled to bow to the popular clamour. The extraordinary +taxation demanded by the war already pressed heavily on the people. +Stocks were falling rapidly, and the financial situation was almost +critical. It is probable, too, that a blow at Washington would have +done more than destroy all confidence in the Government. England and +France were chafing under the effects of the blockade. The marts of +Europe were hungry for cotton. There was much sympathy beyond seas with +the seceded States; and, should Washington fall, the South, in all +likelihood, would be recognised as an independent nation. Even if the +Great Powers were to refuse her active aid in the shape of fleets and +armies, she would at least have access to the money markets of the +world; and it was possible that neither England nor France would endure +the closing of her ports. With the breaking of the blockade, money, +munitions, and perhaps recruits, would be poured into the Confederacy, +and the difficulty of reconquest would be trebled. The dread of foreign +interference was, therefore, very real; and Lincoln, foreseeing the +panic that would shake the nation should a Confederate army cross the +Potomac at Harper’s Ferry or Point of Rocks, was quite justified in +insisting on the security of Washington being placed beyond a doubt. He +knew, as also did Jackson, that even a mere demonstration against so +vital a point might have the most deplorable effect. Whatever line of +invasion, he asked, might be adopted, let it be one that would cover +Washington. + +Lincoln’s remonstrances, however, had no great weight with McClellan. +The general paid little heed to the political situation. His chief +argument in favour of the expedition by sea had been the strength of +the fortifications at Manassas. Johnston’s retreat on March 9 removed +this obstacle from +his path; but although he immediately marched his whole army in +pursuit, he still remained constant to his favourite idea. The road to +Richmond from Washington involved a march of one hundred miles, over a +difficult country, with a single railway as the line of supply. The +route from the coast, although little shorter, was certainly easier. +Fortress Monroe had remained in Federal hands. Landing under the +shelter of its guns, he would push forward, aided by the navy, to West +Point, the terminus of the York River Railroad, within thirty miles of +Richmond, transporting his supplies by water. Washington, with the +garrison he would leave behind, would in his opinion be quite secure. +The Confederates would be compelled to concentrate for the defence of +their capital, and a resolute endeavour on their part to cross the +Potomac was forbidden by every rule of strategy. Had not Johnston, in +his retreat, burnt the railway bridges? Could there be a surer +indication that he had no intention of returning? + +Such was McClellan’s reasoning, and, putting politics aside, it was +perfectly sound. Lincoln reluctantly yielded, and on March 17 the Army +of the Potomac, withdrawing by successive divisions from Centreville to +Alexandria, began its embarkation for the Peninsula, the region, in +McClellan’s words, “of sandy roads and short land transportation.”[13] +The vessels assembled at Alexandria could only carry 10,000 men, thus +involving at least fifteen voyages to and fro. Yet the +Commander-in-Chief was full of confidence. To the little force in the +Shenandoah Valley, flying southward before Shields, he gave no thought. +It would have been nothing short of miraculous had he even suspected +that 4,500 men, under a professor of the higher mathematics, might +bring to naught the operations of his gigantic host. Jackson was not +even to be followed. Of Banks’ three divisions, Shields’, Sedgwick’s, +and Williams’, that of Shields alone was considered sufficient to +protect Harper’s Ferry, the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, and the +Chesapeake Canal.[14] Banks, with the remainder of his army, was to +move at once to Manassas, and cover the approaches +to Washington east of the Blue Ridge. Sedgwick had already been +detached to join McClellan; and on March 20 Williams’ division began +its march towards Manassas, while Shields fell back on Winchester. + +[Illustration: The situation on the night of March 21st, 1862.] + +March 21 On the evening of the 21st Ashby reported to Jackson that the +enemy was retreating, and information came to hand that a long train of +waggons, containing the baggage of 12,000 men, had left Winchester for +Castleman’s Ferry on the Shenandoah. Further reports indicated that +Banks’ whole force was moving eastward, and Jackson, in accordance with +his instructions to hold the enemy in the Valley, at once pushed +northward.[15] + +March 22 On the 22nd, Ashby, with 280 troopers and 3 horse-artillery +guns, struck Shields’ pickets about a mile south of Winchester. A +skirmish ensued, and the presence of infantry, a battery, and some +cavalry, was ascertained. Shields, who was wounded during the +engagement by a shell, handled his troops ably. His whole division was +in the near neighbourhood, but carefully concealed, and Ashby reported +to Jackson that only four regiments of infantry, besides the guns and +cavalry, remained at Winchester. Information obtained from the +townspeople within the Federal lines confirmed the accuracy of his +estimate. The enemy’s main body, he was told, had already marched, and +the troops which had opposed him were under orders to move to Harper’s +Ferry the next morning. + +March 23 On receipt of this intelligence Jackson hurried forward from +his camp near Woodstock, and that night reached Strasburg. At dawn on +the 23rd four companies were despatched to reinforce Ashby; and under +cover of this advanced guard the whole force followed in the direction +of Kernstown, a tiny village, near which the Federal outposts were +established. At one o’clock the three brigades, wearied by a march of +fourteen miles succeeding one of twenty-two on the previous day, +arrived +upon the field of action. The ranks, however, were sadly weakened, for +many of the men had succumbed to their unusual exertions. Ashby still +confronted the enemy; but the Federals had developed a brigade of +infantry, supported by two batteries and several squadrons, and the +Confederate cavalry were slowly giving ground. On reaching the field +Jackson ordered the troops to bivouac. “Though it was very desirable,” +he wrote, “to prevent the enemy from leaving the Valley, yet I deemed +it best not to attack until morning.” An inspection of the ground, +however, convinced him that delay was impracticable. “Ascertaining,” he +continued, “that the Federals had a position from which our forces +could be seen, I concluded that it would be dangerous to postpone the +attack until next day, as reinforcements might be brought up during the +night.”[16] Ashby was directed to detach half his cavalry[17] under +Major Funsten in order to cover the left flank; and Jackson, +ascertaining that his men were in good spirits at the prospect of +meeting the enemy, made his preparations for fighting his first battle. + +The position occupied by the Federals was by no means ill-adapted for +defence. The country round Winchester, and indeed throughout the Valley +of the Shenandoah, resembles in many of its features an English +landscape. Low ridges, covered with open woods of oak and pine, +overlook green pastures and scattered copses; and the absence of +hedgerows and cottages gives a park-like aspect to the broad acres of +rich blue grass. But the deep lanes and hollow roads of England find +here no counterpart. The tracks are rough and rude, and even the pikes, +as the main thoroughfares are generally called, are flush with the +fields on either hand. The traffic has not yet worn them to a lower +level, and Virginia road-making despises such refinements as cuttings +or embankments. The highways, even the Valley pike itself, the great +road which is inseparably linked with the fame of Stonewall Jackson +and his brigade, are mere ribbons of metal laid on swell and swale. +Fences of the rudest description, zigzags of wooden rails, or walls of +loose stone, are the only boundaries, and the land is parcelled out in +more generous fashion than in an older and more crowded country. More +desirable ground for military operations it would be difficult to find. +There are few obstacles to the movement of cavalry and artillery, while +the woods and undulations, giving ample cover, afford admirable +opportunities for skilful manœuvre. In the spring, however, the +condition of the soil would be a drawback. At the date of the battle +part of the country round Kernstown was under plough, and the whole was +saturated with moisture. Horses sank fetlock-deep in the heavy meadows, +and the rough roads, hardly seen for mud, made marching difficult. + +The Federal front extended on both sides of the Valley turnpike. To the +east was a broad expanse of rolling grassland, stretching away to the +horizon; to the west a low knoll, crowned by a few trees, which goes by +the name of Pritchard’s Hill. Further north was a ridge, covered with +brown woods, behind which lies Winchester. This ridge, nowhere more +than 100 feet in height, runs somewhat obliquely to the road in a +south-westerly direction, and passing within a mile and a half of +Pritchard’s Hill, sinks into the plain three miles south-west of +Kernstown. Some distance beyond this ridge, and separated from it by +the narrow valley of the Opequon, rise the towering bluffs of the North +Mountain, the western boundary of the Valley, sombre with forest from +base to brow. + +On leaving Winchester, Williams’ division had struck due east, passing +through the village of Berryville, and making for Snicker’s Gap in the +Blue Ridge. The Berryville road had thus become of importance to the +garrison of Winchester, for it was from that direction, if they should +become necessary, that reinforcements would arrive. General Kimball, +commanding in Shields’ absence the division which confronted Ashby, had +therefore posted the larger portion of his troops eastward of the pike. +A strong force of infantry, with waving colours, was plainly visible to +the Confederates, and it was seen that the extreme left was protected +by several guns. On the right of the road was a line of skirmishers, +deployed along the base of Pritchard’s Hill, and on the knoll itself +stood two batteries. The wooded ridge to westward was as yet +unoccupied, except by scouting parties. + +Jackson at once determined to turn the enemy’s right. An attack upon +the Federal left would have to be pushed across the open fields and +decided by fair fighting, gun and rifle against gun and rifle, and on +that flank the enemy was prepared for battle. Could he seize the wooded +ridge on his left, the initiative would be his. His opponent would be +compelled to conform to his movements. The advantages of a carefully +selected position would be lost. Instead of receiving attack where he +stood, the Federal general would have to change front to meet it, to +execute movements which he had possibly not foreseen, to fight on +ground with which he was unfamiliar; and, instead of carrying out a +plan which had been previously thought out, to conceive a new one on +the spur of the moment, and to issue immediate orders for a difficult +operation. Hesitation and confusion might ensue; and in place of a +strongly established line, confidently awaiting the advance, isolated +regiments, in all the haste and excitement of rapid movement, or +hurriedly posted in unfavourable positions, would probably oppose the +Confederate onset. Such are the advantages which accrue to the force +which delivers an attack where it is not expected; and, to all +appearance, Jackson’s plan of battle promised to bring them into play +to the very fullest extent. The whole force of the enemy, as reported +by Ashby, was before him, plainly visible. To seize the wooded ridge, +while the cavalry held the Federals fast in front; to pass beyond +Pritchard’s Hill, and to cut the line of retreat on Winchester, seemed +no difficult task. The only danger was the possibility of a +counterstroke while the Confederates were executing their turning +movement. But the enemy, so far as Jackson’s information went, was +rapidly withdrawing from the Valley. The force confronting him was no +more than a rear-guard; and it was improbable in +the extreme that a mere rear-guard would involve itself in a desperate +engagement. The moment its line of retreat was threatened it would +probably fall back. To provide, however, against all emergencies, +Colonel Burks’ brigade of three battalions was left for the present in +rear of Kernstown, and here, too, remained four of the field batteries. +With the remainder of his force, two brigades of infantry and a +battery, Jackson moved off to his left. Two companies of the 5th +Virginia were recruited from Winchester. Early in the day the general +had asked the regiment for a guide familiar with the locality; and, +with the soldier showing the way, the 27th Virginia, with two of +Carpenter’s guns as advanced guard, struck westward by a waggon track +across the meadows, while Ashby pressed the Federals in front of +Kernstown. + +3.45 p.m. The main body followed in two parallel columns, and the line +of march soon brought them within range of the commanding batteries on +Pritchard’s Hill.[18] At a range of little more than a mile the enemy’s +gunners poured a heavy fire on the serried ranks, and Carpenter, +unlimbering near the Opequon Church, sought to distract their aim. + +The Confederate infantry, about 2,000 all told, although moving in +mass, and delayed by fences and marshy ground, passed unscathed under +the storm of shell, and in twenty minutes the advanced guard had seized +the wooded ridge. + +Finding a rocky clearing on the crest, about a mile distant from +Pritchard’s Hill, Jackson sent back for the artillery. Three batteries, +escorted by two of Burke’s battalions, the 21st Virginia and the +Irishmen, pushed across the level as rapidly as the wearied teams could +move. Two guns were dismounted by the Federal fire; but, coming into +action on the ridge, the remainder engaged the hostile batteries with +effect. Meanwhile, breaking their way through the ragged undergrowth of +the bare March woods, the infantry, in two lines, was pressing forward +along the +ridge. On the right was the 27th Virginia, supported by the 21st; on +the left, Fulkerson’s two battalions, with the Stonewall Brigade in +second line. The 5th Virginia remained at the foot of the ridge near +Macauley’s cottage, in order to connect with Ashby. Jackson’s tactics +appeared to be succeeding perfectly. A body of cavalry and infantry, +posted behind Pritchard’s Hill, was seen to be withdrawing, and the +fire of the Federal guns was visibly weakening. + +4.30 p.m. Suddenly, in the woods northward of the Confederate +batteries, was heard a roar of musketry, and the 27th Virginia came +reeling back before the onslaught of superior numbers. But the 21st was +hurried to their assistance; the broken ranks rallied from their +surprise; and a long line of Federal skirmishers, thronging through the +thickets, was twice repulsed by the Southern marksmen.[19] + +Fulkerson, further to the left, was more fortunate than the 27th. +Before he began his advance along the ridge he had deployed his two +battalions under cover, and when the musketry broke out on his right +front, they were moving forward over an open field. Half-way across the +field ran a stone wall or fence, and beyond the wall were seen the +tossing colours and bright bayonets of a line of battle, just emerging +from the woods. Then came a race for the wall, and the Confederates +won. A heavy fire, at the closest range, blazed out in the face of the +charging Federals, and in a few moments the stubble was strewn with +dead and wounded. A Pennsylvania regiment, leaving a colour on the +field, gave way in panic, and the whole of the enemy’s force retreated +to the shelter of the woods. An attempt to turn Jackson’s left was then +easily frustrated; and although the Federals maintained a heavy fire, +Fulkerson’s men held stubbornly to the wall. + +In the centre of the field the Northern riflemen were sheltered by a +bank; their numbers continually increased, +and here the struggle was more severe. The 4th and 33rd Virginia +occupied this portion of the line, and they were without support, for +the 2nd Virginia and the Irish battalion, the last available reserves +upon the ridge, had been already sent forward to reinforce the right. + +The right, too, was hardly pressed. The Confederate infantry had +everywhere to do with superior numbers, and the artillery, in that +wooded ground, could lend but small support. The batteries protected +the right flank, but they could take no share in the struggle to the +front; and yet, as the dusk came on, after two long hours of battle, +the white colours of the Virginia regiments, fixed fast amongst the +rocks, still waved defiant. The long grey line, “a ragged spray of +humanity,” plied the ramrod with still fiercer energy, and pale women +on the hills round Winchester listened in terror to the crashing echoes +of the leafless woods. But the end could not be long delayed. +Ammunition was giving out. Every company which had reached the ridge +had joined the fighting line. The ranks were thinning. Many of the +bravest officers were down, and the Northern regiments, standing +staunchly to their work, had been strongly reinforced. + +Ashby for once had been mistaken. It was no rearguard that barred the +road to Winchester, but Shields’ entire division, numbering at least +9,000 men. A prisoner captured the day before had admitted that the +Confederates were under the impression that Winchester had been +evacuated, and that Jackson had immediately moved forward. Shields, an +able officer, who had commanded a brigade in Mexico, saw his +opportunity. He knew something of his opponent, and anticipating that +he would be eager to attack, had ordered the greater part of his +division to remain concealed. Kimball’s brigade and five batteries were +sent quietly, under cover of the night, to Pritchard’s Hill. Sullivan’s +brigade was posted in support, hidden from view behind a wood. The +cavalry and Tyler’s brigade were held in reserve, north of the town, at +a distance where they were not likely to be observed by the +inhabitants. As soon as the Confederates came in sight, and Kimball +deployed across the pike, Tyler was brought +through the town and placed in rear of Sullivan, at a point where the +road dips down between two parallel ridges. Shields himself, wounded in +the skirmish of the preceding day, was not present at the action, +although responsible for these dispositions, and the command had +devolved on Kimball. That officer, when Jackson’s design became +apparent, ordered Tyler to occupy the wooded ridge; and it was his five +regiments, over 3,000 strong, which had struck so strongly at the +Confederate advance. But although superior in numbers by a third, they +were unable to make headway. Kimball, however, rose to the situation +before it was too late. Recognising that Ashby’s weak attack was +nothing more than a demonstration, he hurried nearly the whole of his +own brigade, followed by three battalions of Sullivan’s, to Tyler’s +aid, leaving a couple of battalions and the artillery to hold the pike. + +“The struggle,” says Shields, “had been for a short time doubtful,”[20] +but this reinforcement of 3,000 bayonets turned the scale. Jackson had +ordered the 5th and 42nd Virginia to the ridge, and a messenger was +sent back to hurry forward the 48th. But it was too late. Before the +5th could reach the heights the centre of the Confederate line was +broken. Garnett, the commander of the Stonewall Brigade, without +referring to the general, who was in another part of the field, had +given the order to fall back. Fulkerson, whose right was now uncovered, +was obliged to conform to the rearward movement, and moving across from +Pritchard’s Hill, two Federal regiments, despite the fire of the +Southern guns, made a vigorous attack on Jackson’s right. The whole +Confederate line, long since dissolved into a crowd of skirmishers, and +with the various regiments much mixed up, fell back, still fighting, +through the woods. Across the clearing, through the clouds of smoke, +came the Northern masses in pursuit. On the extreme right a hot fire of +canister, at a range of two hundred and fifty yards, drove back the +troops that had come from Pritchard’s Hill; but on the wooded ridge +above the artillery was unable to hold its own. The enemy’s riflemen +swarmed in the thickets, +and the batteries fell back. As they limbered up one of the +six-pounders was overturned. Under a hot fire, delivered at not more +than fifty paces distant, the sergeant in charge cut loose the three +remaining horses, but the gun was abandoned to the enemy. + +Jackson, before the Federal reinforcements had made their presence +felt, was watching the progress of the action on the left. Suddenly, to +his astonishment and wrath, he saw the lines of his old brigade falter +and fall back. Galloping to the spot he imperatively ordered Garnett to +hold his ground, and then turned to restore the fight. Seizing a +drummer by the shoulder, he dragged him to a rise of ground, in full +view of the troops, and bade him in curt, quick tones, to “Beat the +rally!” The drum rolled at his order, and with his hand on the +frightened boy’s shoulder, amidst a storm of balls, he tried to check +the flight of his defeated troops. His efforts were useless. His +fighting-line was shattered into fragments; and although, according to +a Federal officer, “many of the brave Virginians lingered in rear of +their retreating comrades, loading as they slowly retired, and rallying +in squads in every ravine and behind every hill—or hiding singly among +the trees,”[21] it was impossible to stay the rout. The enemy was +pressing forward in heavy force, and their shouts of triumph rang from +end to end of the field of battle. No doubt remained as to their +overwhelming numbers, and few generals but would have been glad enough +to escape without tempting fortune further. + +It seemed almost too late to think of even organising a rear-guard. But +Jackson, so far from preparing for retreat, had not yet ceased to think +of victory. The 5th and 42nd Virginia were coming up, a compact force +of 600 bayonets, and a vigorous and sudden counterstroke might yet +change the issue of the day. The reinforcements, however, had not yet +come in sight, and galloping back to meet them he found that instead of +marching resolutely against the enemy, the two regiments had taken post +to the rear, on the crest of a wooded swell, in order to cover the +retreat. On his way to the front the colonel of the 5th Virginia had +received an order from Garnett instructing him to occupy a position +behind which the fighting-line might recover its formation. Jackson was +fain to acquiesce; but the fighting-line was by this time scattered +beyond all hope of rallying; the opportunity for the counterstroke had +passed away, and the battle was irretrievably lost. + +Arrangements were quickly made to enable the broken troops to get away +without further molestation. A battery was ordered to take post at the +foot of the hill, and Funsten’s cavalry was called up from westward of +the ridge. The 42nd Virginia came into line on the right of the 5th, +and covered by a stone wall and thick timber, these two small +regiments, encouraged by the presence of their commander, held stoutly +to their ground. The attack was pressed with reckless gallantry. In +front of the 5th Virginia the colours of the 5th Ohio changed hands no +less than six times, and one of them was pierced by no less than +eight-and-forty bullets. The 84th Pennsylvania was twice repulsed and +twice rallied, but on the fall of its colonel retreated in confusion. +The left of the 14th Indiana broke; but the 13th Indiana now came up, +and “inch by inch,” according to their commanding officer, the +Confederates were pushed back. The 5th Virginia was compelled to give +way before a flanking fire; but the colonel retired the colours to a +short distance, and ordered the regiment to re-form on them. Again the +heavy volleys blazed out in the gathering twilight, and the sheaves of +death grew thicker every moment on the bare hillside. But still the +Federals pressed on, and swinging round both flanks, forced the +Confederate rear-guard from the field, while their cavalry, moving up +the valley of the Opequon, captured several ambulances and cut off some +two or three hundred fugitives. + +As the night began to fall the 5th Virginia, retiring steadily towards +the pike, filed into a narrow lane, fenced by a stone wall, nearly a +mile distant from their last position, and there took post for a final +stand. Their left was commanded by the ridge, and on the heights in the +rear, coming up from the Opequon valley, appeared a large mass of +Northern cavalry. It was a situation sufficiently +uncomfortable. If the ground was too difficult for the horsemen to +charge over in the gathering darkness, a volley from their carbines +could scarcely have failed to clear the wall. “A single ramrod,” it was +said in the Confederate ranks, “would have spitted the whole +battalion.” But not a shot was fired. The pursuit of the Federal +infantry had been stayed in the pathless woods, the cavalry was held in +check by Funsten’s squadrons, and the 5th was permitted to retire +unmolested. + +[Illustration: Map of the Battle of Kernstown, Sunday, March 23rd, +1862.] + +The Confederates, with the exception of Ashby, who halted at +Bartonsville, a farm upon the pike, a mile and a half from the field of +battle, fell back to Newtown, three miles further south, where the +trains had been parked. The men were utterly worn out. Three hours of +fierce fighting against far superior numbers had brought them to the +limit of their endurance. “In the fence corners, under the trees, and +around the waggons they threw themselves down, many too weary to eat, +and forgot, in profound slumber, the trials, the dangers, and the +disappointments of the day.”[22] + +Jackson, when the last sounds of battle had died away, followed his +troops. Halting by a camp-fire, he stood and warmed himself for a time, +and then, remounting, rode back to Bartonsville. Only one staff +officer, his chief commissary, Major Hawks, accompanied him. The rest +had dropped away, overcome by exhaustion. “Turning from the road into +an orchard, he fastened up his horse, and asked his companion if he +could make a fire, adding, ‘We shall have to burn fence-rails +to-night.’ The major soon had a roaring fire, and was making a bed of +rails, when the general wished to know what he was doing. ‘Finding a +place to sleep,’ was the reply. ‘You seem determined to make yourself +and those around you comfortable,’ said Jackson. And knowing the +general had fasted all day, he soon obtained some bread and meat from +the nearest squad of soldiers, and after they had satisfied their +hunger, they slept soundly on the rail-bed in a fence-corner.” + +Such was the battle of Kernstown, in which over +1,200 men were killed and wounded, the half of them Confederates. Two +or three hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the Federals. Nearly +one-fourth of Jackson’s infantry was _hors de combat,_ and he had lost +two guns. His troops were undoubtedly depressed. They had anticipated +an easy victory; the overwhelming strength of the Federals had +surprised them, and their losses had been severe. But no regret +disturbed the slumbers of their leader. He had been defeated, it was +true; but he looked further than the immediate result of the +engagement. “I feel justified in saying,” he wrote in his short report, +“that, though the battle-field is in the possession of the enemy, yet +the most essential fruits of the victory are ours.” As he stood before +the camp-fire near Newtown, wrapped in his long cloak, his hands behind +his back, and stirring the embers with his foot, one of Ashby’s +youngest troopers ventured to interrupt his reverie. “The Yankees don’t +seem willing to quit Winchester, General!” “Winchester is a very +pleasant place to stay in, sir!” was the quick reply. Nothing daunted, +the boy went on: “It was reported that they were retreating, but I +guess they’re retreating after us.” With his eyes still fixed on the +blazing logs: “I think I may say I am satisfied, sir!” was Jackson’s +answer; and with no further notice of the silent circle round the fire, +he stood gazing absently into the glowing flames. After a few minutes +the tall figure turned away, and without another word strode off into +the darkness. + +That Jackson divined the full effect of his attack would be to assert +too much. That he realised that the battle, though a tactical defeat, +was strategically a victory is very evident. He knew something of +Banks, he knew more of McClellan, and the bearing of the Valley on the +defence of Washington had long been uppermost in his thoughts. He had +learned from Napoleon to throw himself into the spirit of his enemy, +and it is not improbable that when he stood before the fire near +Newtown he had already foreseen, in some degree at least, the events +that would follow the news of his attack at Kernstown. + +The outcome of the battle was indeed far-reaching. “Though the battle +had been won,” wrote Shields, “still I could not have believed that +Jackson would have hazarded a decisive engagement, so far from the main +body, without expecting reinforcements; so, to be prepared for such a +contingency, I set to work during the night to bring together all the +troops within my reach. I sent an express after Williams’ division, +requesting the rear brigade, about twenty miles distant, to march all +night and join me in the morning. I swept the posts in rear of almost +all their guards, hurrying them forward by forced marches, to be with +me at daylight.”[23] + +General Banks, hearing of the engagement on his way to Washington, +halted at Harper’s Ferry, and he also ordered Williams’ division to +return at once to Winchester. + +One brigade only,[24] which the order did not reach, continued the +march to Manassas. This counter-movement met with McClellan’s approval. +He now recognised that Jackson’s force, commanded as it was, was +something more than a mere corps of observation, and that it was +essential that it should be crushed. “Your course was right,” he +telegraphed on receiving Banks’ report. “As soon as you are strong +enough push Jackson hard and drive him well beyond Strasburg. . . . The +very moment the thorough defeat of Jackson will permit it, resume the +movement on Manassas, always leaving the whole of Shields’ command at +or near Strasburg and Winchester until the Manassas Gap Railway is +fully repaired. Communicate fully and act vigorously.”[25] + +8,000 men (Williams’ division) were thus temporarily withdrawn from the +force that was to cover Washington from the south. But this was only +the first step. Jackson’s action had forcibly attracted the attention +of the Federal Government to the Upper Potomac. The President was +already contemplating the transfer of Blenker’s division from McClellan +to Fremont; the news of Kernstown decided the +question, and at the end of March these 9,000 men were ordered to West +Virginia, halting at Strasburg, in case Banks should then need them, on +their way.[26] But even this measure did not altogether allay Mr. +Lincoln’s apprehensions. McClellan had assured him, on April 1, that +73,000 men would be left for the defence of the capital and its +approaches. But in the original arrangement, with which the President +had been satisfied, Williams was to have been brought to Manassas, and +Shields alone left in the Shenandoah Valley. Under the new distribution +the President found that the force at Manassas would be decreased by +two brigades; and, at the same time, that while part of the troops +McClellan had promised were not forthcoming, a large portion of those +actually available were good for nothing. The officer left in command +at Washington reported that “nearly all his force was imperfectly +disciplined; that several of the regiments were in a very disorganised +condition; that efficient artillery regiments had been removed from the +forts, and that he had to relieve them with very new infantry +regiments, entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm.”[27] +Lincoln submitted the question to six generals of the regular army, +then present in Washington; and these officers replied that, in their +opinion, “the requirement of the President that this city shall be left +entirely secure has not been fully complied with.”[28] + +On receiving this report, Lincoln ordered the First Army Corps, 37,000 +strong, under General McDowell, to remain at Manassas in place of +embarking for the Peninsula; and thus McClellan, on the eve of his +advance on Richmond, found his original force of 150,000 reduced by +46,000 officers and men. Moreover, not content with detaching McDowell +for a time, Lincoln, the next day, assigned that general to an +independent command, covering the approaches to Washington; Banks, +also, was withdrawn from +McClellan’s control, and directed to defend the Valley. The original +dissemination of the Federal forces was thus gravely accentuated, and +the Confederates had now to deal with four distinct armies, +McClellan’s, McDowell’s, Banks’, and Fremont’s, dependent for +co-operation on the orders of two civilians, President Lincoln and his +Secretary of War. And this was not all. McDowell had been assigned a +most important part in McClellan’s plan of invasion. The road from +Fortress Monroe was barred by the fortifications of Yorktown. These +works could be turned, however, by sending a force up the York River. +But the passage of the stream was debarred to the Federal transports by +a strong fort at Gloucester Point, on the left bank, and the capture of +this work was to be the task of the First Army Corps. No wonder that +McClellan, believing that Johnston commanded 100,000 men, declared that +in his deliberate judgment the success of the Federal cause was +imperilled by the order which detached McDowell from his command. +However inadequately the capital might be defended, it was worse than +folly to interfere with the general’s plans when he was on the eve of +executing them. The best way of defending Washington was for McClellan +to march rapidly on Richmond, and seize his adversary by the throat. By +depriving him of McDowell, Lincoln and his advisers made such a +movement difficult, and the grand army of invasion found itself in a +most embarrassing situation. Such was the effect of a blow struck at +the right place and the right time, though struck by no more than 3,000 +bayonets. + +The battle of Kernstown was undoubtedly well fought. It is true that +Jackson believed that he had no more than four regiments of infantry, a +few batteries, and some cavalry before him. But it was a skilful +manœuvre, which threw three brigades and three batteries, more than +two-thirds of his whole strength, on his opponent’s flank. An ordinary +general would probably have employed only a small portion of his force +in the turning movement. Not so the student of Napoleon. “In the +general’s haversack,” says one of Jackson’s staff, “were always three +books: the Bible, +Napoleon’s Maxims of War, and Webster’s Dictionary—for his spelling was +uncertain—and these books he constantly consulted.” Whether the +chronicles of the Jewish kings threw any light on the tactical problem +involved at Kernstown may be left to the commentators; but there can be +no question as to the Maxims. To hurl overwhelming numbers at the point +where the enemy least expects attack is the whole burden of Napoleon’s +teaching, and there can be no doubt but that the wooded ridge, +unoccupied save by a few scouts, was the weakest point of the defence. + +The manœuvre certainly surprised the Federals, and it very nearly beat +them. Tyler’s brigade was unsupported for nearly an hour and a half. +Had his battalions been less staunch, the tardy reinforcements would +have been too late to save the day. Coming up as they did, not in a +mass so strong as to bear all before it by its own inherent weight, but +in successive battalions, at wide intervals of time, they would +themselves have become involved in a desperate engagement under adverse +circumstances. Nor is Kimball to be blamed that he did not throw +greater weight on Jackson’s turning column at an earlier hour. Like +Shields and Banks, he was unable to believe that Jackson was +unsupported. He expected that the flank attack would be followed up by +one in superior numbers from the front. He could hardly credit that an +inferior force would deliberately move off to a flank, leaving its line +of retreat to be guarded by a few squadrons, weakly supported by +infantry; and the audacity of the assailant had the usual effect of +deceiving the defender. + +Kernstown, moreover, will rank as an example of what determined men can +do against superior numbers. The Confederates on the ridge, throughout +the greater part of the fight, hardly exceeded 2,000 muskets. They were +assailed by 3,000, and proved a match for them. The 3,000 were then +reinforced by at least 3,000 more, whilst Jackson could bring up only +600 muskets to support an already broken line. Nevertheless, these +6,000 Northerners were so roughly handled that there was practically no +pursuit. When the Confederates fell back every one of the +Federal regiments had been engaged, and there were no fresh troops +wherewith to follow them. Jackson was perfectly justified in reporting +that “Night and an indisposition of the enemy to press further +terminated the battle.”[29] + +But the action was attended by features more remarkable than the +stubborn resistance of the Virginia regiments. It is seldom that a +battle so insignificant as Kernstown has been followed by such +extraordinary results. Fortune indeed favoured the Confederates. At the +time of the battle a large portion of McClellan’s army was at sea, and +the attack was delivered at the very moment when it was most dreaded by +the Northern Government. Nor was it to the disadvantage of the +Southerners that the real head of the Federal army was the President, +and that his strategical conceptions were necessarily subservient to +the attitude of the Northern people. These were circumstances purely +fortuitous, and it might seem, therefore, that Jackson merely blundered +into success. But he must be given full credit for recognizing that a +blow at Banks might be fraught with most important consequences. It was +with other ideas than defeating a rear-guard or detaining Banks that he +seized the Kernstown ridge. He was not yet aware of McClellan’s plan of +invasion by sea; but he knew well that any movement that would threaten +Washington must prove embarrassing to the Federal Government; that they +could not afford to leave the Upper Potomac ill secured; and that the +knowledge that an active and enterprising enemy, who had shown himself +determined to take instant advantage of every opportunity, was within +the Valley, would probably cause them to withdraw troops from McClellan +in order to guard the river. A fortnight after the battle, asking for +reinforcements, he wrote, “If Banks is defeated it may greatly retard +McClellan’s movements.”[30] + +Stubborn as had been the fighting of his brigades, Jackson himself was +not entirely satisfied with his officers. When Sullivan and Kimball +came to Tyler’s aid, and a new line of battle threatened to overwhelm +the Stonewall +regiments, Garnett, on his own responsibility, had given the order to +retire. Many of the men, their ammunition exhausted, had fallen to the +rear. The exertions of the march had begun to tell. The enemy’s attacks +had been fiercely pressed, and before the pressure of his fresh +brigades the Confederate power of resistance was strained to +breaking-point. Garnett had behaved with conspicuous gallantry. The +officers of his brigade declared that he was perfectly justified in +ordering a retreat. Jackson thought otherwise, and almost immediately +after the battle he relieved him of his command, placed him under +arrest, and framed charges for his trial by court-martial. He would not +accept the excuse that ammunition had given out. At the time the +Stonewall Brigade gave back the 5th and 42nd Virginia were at hand. The +men had still their bayonets, and he did not consider the means of +victory exhausted until the cold steel had been employed. “He +insisted,” says Dabney, “that a more resolute struggle might have won +the field.”[31] + +Now, in the first place, it must be conceded that Garnett had not the +slightest right to abandon his position without a direct order.[32] In +the second, if we turn to the table of losses furnished by the brigade +commander, we find that in Garnett’s four regiments, numbering 1,100 +officers and men, there fell 153. In addition, 148 were reported +missing, but, according to the official reports, the majority of these +were captured by the Federal cavalry and were unwounded. At most, then, +when he gave the order to retreat, Garnett had lost 200, or rather less +than 20 per cent. + +Such loss was heavy, but by no means excessive. A few months later +hardly a brigade in either army would have given way because every +fifth man had fallen. A year later and the Stonewall regiments would +have considered an action in which they lost 200 men as nothing +more than a skirmish.[33] The truth would seem to be that the Valley +soldiers were not yet blooded. In peace the individual is everything; +material prosperity, self-indulgence, and the preservation of existence +are the general aim. In war the individual is nothing, and men learn +the lesson of self-sacrifice. But it is only gradually, however high +the enthusiasm which inspires the troops, that the ideas of peace +become effaced, and they must be seasoned soldiers who will endure, +without flinching, the losses of Waterloo or Gettysburg. Discipline, +which means the effacement of the individual, does more than break the +soldier to unhesitating obedience; it trains him to die for duty’s +sake, and even the Stonewall Brigade, in the spring of 1862, was not +yet thoroughly disciplined. “The lack of competent and energetic +officers,” writes Jackson’s chief of the staff, “was at this time the +bane of the service. In many there was neither an intelligent +comprehension of their duties nor zeal in their performance. Appointed +by the votes of their neighbours and friends, they would neither +exercise that rigidity in governing, nor that detailed care in +providing for the wants of their men, which are necessary to keep +soldiers efficient. The duties of the drill and the sentry-post were +often negligently performed; and the most profuse waste of ammunition +and other military stores was permitted. It was seldom that these +officers were guilty of cowardice upon the field of battle, but they +were often in the wrong place, fighting as common soldiers when they +should have been directing others. Above all was their inefficiency +marked in their inability to keep their men in the ranks. Absenteeism +grew under them to a monstrous evil, and every poltroon and laggard +found a way of escape. Hence the frequent phenomenon that regiments, +which on the books of the commissary appeared as consumers of 500 or +1,000 rations, were reported as +carrying into action 250 or 300 bayonets.”[34] It is unlikely that this +picture is over-coloured, and it is certainly no reproach to the +Virginia soldiers that their discipline was indifferent. There had not +yet been time to transform a multitude of raw recruits into the +semblance of a regular army. Competent instructors and trained leaders +were few in the extreme, and the work had to be left in inexperienced +hands. One Stonewall Jackson was insufficient to leaven a division of +5,000 men. + +In the second place, Jackson probably remembered that the Stonewall +Brigade at Bull Run, dashing out with the bayonet on the advancing +Federals, had driven them back on their reserves. It seems hardly +probable, had Garnett at Kernstown held his ground a little longer, +that the three regiments still intact could have turned the tide of +battle. But it is not impossible. The Federals had been roughly +handled. Their losses had been heavier than those of the Confederates. +A resolute counterstroke has before now changed the face of battle, and +among unseasoned soldiers panic spreads with extraordinary effect. So +far as can be gathered from the reports, there is no reason to suspect +that the vigour of the Federal battalions was as yet relaxed. But no +one who was not actually present can presume to judge of the temper of +the troops. In every well-contested battle there comes a moment when +the combatants on both sides become exhausted, and the general who at +that moment finds it in his heart to make one more effort will +generally succeed. Such was the experience of Grant, Virginia’s +stoutest enemy.[35] That moment, perhaps, had come at Kernstown; and +Jackson, than whom not Skobeleff himself had clearer vision or cooler +brain in the tumult of battle, may have observed it. It cannot be too +often repeated that numbers go for little on the battle-field. It is +possible that Jackson had in his mind, when he declared that the +victory might yet have been won, the decisive counterstroke at Marengo, +where 20,000 Austrians, pressing forward in pursuit of a defeated +enemy, were utterly overthrown by a +fresh division of 6,000 men supported by four squadrons.[36] + +Tactical unity and _moral_ are factors of far more importance in battle +than mere numerical strength. Troops that have been hotly engaged, even +with success, and whose nerves are wrought up to a high state of +tension, are peculiarly susceptible to surprise. If they have lost +their order, and the men find themselves under strange officers, with +unfamiliar faces beside them, the counterstroke falls with even greater +force. It is at such moments that cavalry still finds its opportunity. +It is at such moments that a resolute charge, pushed home with drums +beating and a loud cheer, may have extraordinary results. On August 6, +1870, on the heights of Wörth, a German _corps d’armée,_ emerging, +after three hours’ fierce fighting, from the great wood on McMahon’s +flank, bore down upon the last stronghold of the French. The troops +were in the utmost confusion. Divisions, brigades, regiments, and +companies were mingled in one motley mass. But the enemy was +retreating; a heavy force of artillery was close at hand, and the +infantry must have numbered at least 10,000 rifles. Suddenly three +battalions of Turcos, numbering no more than 1,500 bayonets, charged +with wild cries, and without firing, down the grassy slope. The Germans +halted, fired a few harmless volleys, and then, turning as one man, +bolted to the shelter of the wood, twelve hundred yards in rear. + +According to an officer of the 14th Indiana, the Federals at Kernstown +were in much the same condition as the Germans at Wörth. “The +Confederates fell back in great disorder, and we advanced in disorder +just as great. Over logs, through woods, over hills and fields, the +brigades, regiments, and companies advanced, in one promiscuous, mixed, +and uncontrollable mass. Officers shouted themselves hoarse in trying +to bring order out of confusion, but +all their efforts were unavailing along the front line, or rather what +ought to have been the front line.”[37] + +Garnett’s conduct was not the only incident connected with Kernstown +that troubled Jackson. March 23 was a Sunday. “You appear much +concerned,” he writes to his wife, “at my attacking on Sunday. I am +greatly concerned too; but I felt it my duty to do it, in consideration +of the ruinous effects that might result from postponing the battle +until the morning. So far as I can see, my course was a wise one; the +best that I could do under the circumstances, though very distasteful +to my feelings; and I hope and pray to our Heavenly Father that I may +never again be circumstanced as on that day. I believed that, so far as +our troops were concerned, necessity and mercy both called for the +battle. I do hope that the war will soon be over, and that I shall +never again be called upon to take the field. Arms is a profession +that, if its principles are adhered to, requires an officer to do what +he fears may be wrong, and yet, according to military experience, must +be done if success is to be attained. And the fact of its being +necessary to success, and being accompanied with success, and that a +departure from it is accompanied with disaster, suggests that it must +be right. Had I fought the battle on Monday instead of Sunday, I fear +our cause would have suffered, whereas, as things turned out, I +consider our cause gained much from the engagement.” + +We may wonder if his wife detected the unsoundness of the argument. To +do wrong—for wrong it was according to her creed—in order that good may +ensue is what it comes to. The literal interpretation of the Scriptural +rule seems to have led her husband into difficulties; but the incident +may serve to show with what earnestness, in every action of his life, +he strove to shape his conduct with what he believed to be his duty. + +It has already been observed that Jackson’s reticence was remarkable. +No general could have been more careful that no inkling of his design +should reach the enemy. He had not the slightest hesitation in +withholding his plans from +even his second in command; special correspondents were rigorously +excluded from his camps; and even with his most confidential friends +his reserve was absolutely impenetrable. During his stay at Winchester, +it was his custom directly he rose to repair to headquarters and open +his correspondence. When he returned to breakfast at Dr. Graham’s there +was much anxiety evinced to hear the news from the front. What the +enemy was doing across the Potomac, scarce thirty miles away, was +naturally of intense interest to the people of the border town. But not +the smallest detail of intelligence, however unimportant, escaped his +lips. To his wife he was as uncommunicative as to the rest. Neither +hint nor suggestion made the least impression, and direct +interrogations were put by with a quiet smile. Nor was he too shy to +suggest to his superiors that silence was golden. In a report to +Johnston, written four days after Kernstown, he administered what can +scarcely be considered other than a snub, delicately expressed but +unmistakable:— + +“It is understood in the Federal army that you have instructed me to +keep the forces now in this district and not permit them to cross the +Blue Ridge, and that this must be done at every hazard, and that for +the purpose of effecting this I made my attack. I have never so much as +intimated such a thing to anyone.”[38] + +It cannot be said that Jackson’s judgment in attacking Shields was at +once appreciated in the South. The defeat, at first, was ranked with +the disasters in the West. But as soon as the effects upon the enemy +were appreciated the tide of popular feeling turned. The gallantry of +the Valley regiments was fully recognised, and the thanks of Congress +were tendered to Jackson and his troops. + +No battle was ever yet fought in exact accordance with the demands of +theory, and Kernstown, great in its results, gives openings to the +critics. Jackson, it is said, attacked with tired troops, on +insufficient information, and contrary to orders. As to the first, it +may be said that his decision +to give the enemy no time to bring up fresh troops was absolutely +justified by events. On hearing of his approach to Kernstown, Banks +immediately countermarched a brigade of Williams’ division from +Castleman’s Ferry. A second brigade was recalled from Snicker’s Gap on +the morning of the 24th, and reached Winchester the same evening, after +a march of six-and-twenty miles. Had attack been deferred, Shields +would have been strongly reinforced. + +As to the second, Jackson had used every means in his power to get +accurate intelligence.[39] Ashby had done his best. Although the +Federals had 780 cavalry present, and every approach to Winchester was +strongly picketed, his scouts had pushed within the Federal lines, and +had communicated with the citizens of Winchester. Their reports were +confirmed, according to Jackson’s despatch, “from a source which had +been remarkable for its reliability,” and for the last two days a +retrograde movement towards Snicker’s Gap had been reported. The +ground, it is true, favoured an ambush. But the strategic situation +demanded instant action. McClellan’s advanced guard was within fifty +miles of Johnston’s position on the Rapidan, and a few days’ march +might bring the main armies into collision. If Jackson was to bring +Banks back to the Valley, and himself join Johnston before the expected +battle, he had no time to spare. Moreover, the information to hand was +quite sufficient to justify him in trusting something to fortune. Even +a defeat, if the attack were resolutely pushed, might have the best +effect. + +The third reproach, that Jackson disobeyed orders, can hardly be +sustained. He was in command of a detached force operating at a +distance from the main army, and Johnston, with a wise discretion, had +given him not orders, +but instructions; that is, the general-in-chief had merely indicated +the purpose for which Jackson’s force had been detached, and left to +his judgment the manner in which that purpose was to be achieved. +Johnston had certainly suggested that he should not expose himself to +the danger of defeat. But when it became clear that he could not retain +the enemy in the Valley unless he closed with him, to have refrained +from attack would have been to disobey the spirit of his instructions. + +Again, when Jackson attacked he had good reason to believe that he ran +no risk of defeat whatever. The force before him was reported as +inferior to his own, and he might well have argued: “To confine myself +to observation will be to confess my weakness, and Banks is not likely +to arrest his march to Manassas because of the presence of an enemy who +dare not attack an insignificant rearguard.” Demonstrations, such as +Johnston had advised, may undoubtedly serve a temporary purpose, but if +protracted the enemy sees through them. On the 22nd, for instance, it +was reported to Banks that the Confederates were advancing. The rear +brigade of Williams’ division was therefore countermarched from +Snicker’s Gap to Berryville; but the other two were suffered to +proceed. Had Jackson remained quiescent in front of Shields, tacitly +admitting his inferiority, the rear brigade would in all probability +have soon been ordered to resume its march; and Lincoln, with no fear +for Washington, would have allowed Blenker and McDowell to join +McClellan. + +Johnston, at least, held that his subordinate was justified. In +publishing the thanks of the Confederate Congress tendered to Jackson +and his division, he expressed, at the same time, “his own sense of +their admirable conduct, by which they fully earned the high reward +bestowed.” + +During the evening of the 23rd the medical director of the Valley army +was ordered to collect vehicles, and send the wounded to the rear +before the troops continued their retreat. Some time after midnight Dr. +McGuire, finding that there were still a large number awaiting removal, +reported the circumstances to the general, adding that he did not know +where to get the means of transport, and that unless some expedient +were discovered the men must be abandoned. Jackson ordered him to +impress carriages in the neighbourhood. “But,” said the surgeon, “that +requires time; can you stay till it has been done?” “Make yourself +easy, sir,” was the reply. “This army stays here until the last man is +removed. Before I leave them to the enemy I will lose many men more.” +Fortunately, before daylight the work was finished. + +NOTE + +The exact losses at Kernstown were as follows:— + +CONFEDERATES + +_By brigade_ _Killed_ _Wounded_ _Missing_ _Total_ +Stonewall Brigade +Burks’ Brigade +Fulkerson’s Brigade +Cavalry +Artillery 40 24 15 1 151 114 76 17 17 152 39 71 + 1 343 177 162 18 18 _By regiments _ +2nd Va. +4th Va. +5th Va. +27th Va. +33rd Va. +21st Va. +42nd Va. +1st Va. +23rd Va. +27th Va. _Strength_ +320 N.C.O. and men +203 N.C.O. and men +450 N.C.O. and men +170 N.C.O. and men +275 N.C.O. and men +270 officers and men +293 officers and men +187 officers and men +177 officers and men +397 N.C.O. and men + 6 + 5 + 9 + 2 + 18 + 7 + 11 + 6 + 3 + 12 + +33 +23 +48 +20 +27 +44 +50 +20 +14 +62 + +51 +48 + 4 +35 +14 + 9 + 9 +21 +32 +39 + +90 +76 +61 +57 +59 +60 +70 +47 +49 +113 + +Total casualties=718 80 k. +375 w. +263 m. including 5 officers +including 22 officers +including 10 officers 13% k. and w. 20% k., w. and m. + +FEDERALS + +Total casualties=590 118 k. +450 w. + 22 m. including 6 officers +including 27 officers + +6% + + According to the reports of his regimental commanders, Jackson took + into battle (including 48th Virginia) 3,087 N.C.O. and men of + infantry, 290 cavalry, and 27 guns. 2,742 infantry, 290 cavalry, + and 18 guns were engaged, and his total strength, including + officers, was probably about 3,500. Shields, in his first report of + the battle, put down the strength of his own division as between + 7,000 and 8,000 men. Four days later he declared that it did not + exceed 7,000, namely 6,000 infantry, 750 cavalry, and 24 guns. It + is probable that only those actually engaged are included in this + estimate, for on March 17 he reported the strength of the troops + which were present at Kernstown six days later as 8374 infantry, + 608 artillerymen, and 780 cavalry; total, 9,752.[40] + + [1] O.R., vol. v, p. 1094. + + [2] Letter from Major Hotchkiss to the author. + + [3] Jackson, 4,600; Hill, 3,000. + + [4] Johnston’s _Narrative._ + + [5] _Soldier Life in the Army of Northern Virginia,_ chap. ii. + + [6] _Ibid._ + + [7] _Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain,_ General G. H. Gordon, p. 136. + + [8] Major Harman, of Jackson’s staff, writing to his brother on March + 6, says: “The general told me last night that the Yankees had 17,000 + men at the two points, Charlestown and Bunker Hill.” On March 8 he + writes: “3,000 effective men is about the number of General Jackson’s + force. The sick, those on furlough, and the deserters from the + militia, reduce him to about that number.”—MS. + + [9] O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 164. + + [10] O.R., vol. xi, part iii, p. 26. + + [11] General G. H. Gordon. + + [12] For an interesting exposition of the views of the soldiers at + Washington, see evidence of General Hitchcock, U.S.A., acting as + Military Adviser to the President, O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 221. + + [13] O.R., vol. xi, part 333, p. 7. + + [14] _Ibid.,_ p. 11. + + [15] A large portion of the Army of the Potomac, awaiting embarkation, + still remained at Centreville. The cavalry had pushed forward towards + the Rapidan, and the Confederates, unable to get information, did not + suspect that McClellan was moving to the Peninsula until March 25. + + [16] O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 381. The staff appears to have been at + fault. It was certainly of the first importance, whether battle was + intended or not, to select a halting-place concealed from the enemy’s + observation. + + [17] 140 sabres. + + [18] No hidden line of approach was available. Movement to the south + was limited by the course of the Opequon. Fulkerson’s brigade, with + Carpenter’s two guns, marched nearest to the enemy; the Stonewall + Brigade was on Fulkerson’s left. + + [19] The Confederate advance was made in the following order:— + +__________ +23rd Va. __________ +37th Va. __________ 4th Va. +__________ 33rd Va. __________ 27th Va. __________ 2nd Va. +__________ 21st Va. __________ Irish Battn. + + [20] O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 341. + + [21] Colonel E. H. C. Cavins, 14th Indiana. _Battles and Leaders,_ + vol. ii, p. 307. + + [22] _Jackson’s Valley Campaign,_ Colonel William Allan, C.S.A., p. + 54. + + [23] O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 341. + + [24] Abercrombie’s, 4,500 men and a battery. The brigade marched to + Warrenton, where it remained until it was transferred to McDowell’s + command. + + [25] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 16. + + [26] Blenker’s division was at Hunter’s Chapel, south of Washington, + when it received the order. + + [27] Report of General Wadsworth; O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 225. + + [28] Letter of Mr. Stanton; O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 726. + + [29] O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 382. + + [30] _Ibid,_ part iii, p. 844. + + [31] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 46. + + [32] He was aware, moreover, that supports were coming up, for the + order to the 5th Virginia was sent through him. Report of Colonel W. + H. Harman, 5th Virginia, O.R., vol. xii, part i, pp. 391, 392. + + [33] On March 5, 1811, in the battle fought on the arid ridges of + Barossa, the numbers were almost identical with those engaged at + Kernstown. Out of 4,000 British soldiers there fell in an hour over + 1,200, and of 9,000 French more than 2,000 were killed or wounded; and + yet, although the victors were twenty-four hours under arms without + food, the issue was never doubtful. + + [34] Dabney, vol. ii, pp. 18, 19. + + [35] Grant’s _Memoirs._ + + [36] The morning after the battle one of the Confederate officers + expressed the opinion that even if the counterstroke had been + successful, the Federal reserves would have arrested it. Jackson + answered, “No, if I had routed the men on the ridge, they would all + have gone off together.” + + [37] Colonel E. H. C. Cavins, _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 307. + + [38] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 840. + + [39] The truth is that in war, accurate intelligence, especially when + two armies are in close contact, is exceedingly difficult to obtain. + At Jena, even after the battle ended, Napoleon believed that the + Prussians had put 80,000 men in line instead of 45,000. The night + before Eylau, misled by the reports of Murat’s cavalry, he was + convinced that the Russians were retreating; and before Ligny he + underestimated Blucher’s strength by 40,000. The curious + misconceptions under which the Germans commenced the battles of + Spicheren, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte will also occur to the + military reader. + + [40] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 4. + + + + +Chapter IX +M’DOWELL + + +The stars were still shining when the Confederates began their retreat +from Kernstown. With the exception of seventy, all the wounded had been +brought in, and the army followed the ambulances as far as Woodstock. + +March 25 There was little attempt on the part of the Federals to +improve their victory. The hard fighting of the Virginians had left its +impress on the generals. Jackson’s numbers were estimated at 15,000, +and Banks, who arrived in time to take direction of the pursuit, +preferred to wait till Williams’ two brigades came up before he moved. +He encamped that night at Cedar Creek, eight miles from Kernstown. The +next day he reached Strasburg. The cavalry pushed on to near Woodstock, +and there, for the time being, the pursuit terminated. Shields, who +remained at Winchester to nurse his wound, sent enthusiastic telegrams +announcing that the retreat was a flight, and that the houses along the +road were filled with Jackson’s dead and dying; yet the truth was that +the Confederates were in nowise pressed, and only the hopeless cases +had been left behind.[1] Had the 2,000 troopers at Banks’ disposal been +sent forward at daybreak on the 24th, something might have been done. +The squadrons, however, incapable of moving across country, were +practically useless in pursuit; and to start even at daybreak was to +start too late. If the fruits of victory are to be secured, the work +must be put in hand whilst the enemy is still reeling under the shock. +A few hours’ delay gives him time to recover his equilibrium, +to organise a rear-guard, and to gain many miles on his rearward march. + +March 26 On the night of the 26th, sixty hours after the battle ceased, +the Federal outposts were established along Tom’s Brook, seventeen +miles from Kernstown. On the opposite bank were Ashby’s cavalry, while +Burks’ brigade lay at Woodstock, six miles further south. The remainder +of the Valley army had reached Mount Jackson. + +These positions were occupied until April 1, and for six whole days +Banks, with 19,000 men, was content to observe a force one-sixth his +strength, which had been defeated by just half the numbers he had now +at his disposal. This was hardly the “vigorous action” which McClellan +had demanded. “As soon as you are strong enough,” he had telegraphed, +“push Jackson hard, drive him well beyond Strasburg, pursuing at least +as far as Woodstock, if possible, with cavalry to Mount Jackson.”[2] + +In vain he reiterated the message on the 27th: “Feel Jackson’s +rear-guard smartly and push him well.” Not a single Federal crossed +Tom’s Brook. “The superb scenery of the Valley,” writes General G. H. +Gordon, a comrade of Jackson’s at West Point, and now commanding the +2nd Massachusetts, one of Banks’ best regiments, “opened before us—the +sparkling waters of the Shenandoah, winding between the parallel +ranges, the groves of cedar and pine that lined its banks, the rolling +surfaces of the Valley, peacefully resting by the mountain side, and +occupied by rich fields and quiet farms. A mile beyond I could see the +rebel cavalry. Sometimes the enemy amused himself by throwing shells at +our pickets, when they were a little too venturesome; but beyond a +feeble show of strength and ugliness, nothing transpired to disturb the +dulness of the camp.”[3] + +Banks, far from all support, and with a cavalry unable to procure +information, was by no means free from apprehension. Johnston had +already fallen back into the interior +of Virginia, and the Army of the Potomac, instead of following him, was +taking ship at Alexandria. Information had reached Strasburg that the +Confederates were behind the Rapidan, with their left at Gordonsville. +Now Gordonsville is sixty-five miles, or four marches, from Mount +Jackson, and there was reason to believe that reinforcements had +already been sent to Jackson from that locality. On March 25 Banks +telegraphed to Mr. Stanton: “Reported by rebel Jackson’s aide (a +prisoner) that they were assured of reinforcements to 30,000, but don’t +credit it.” On March 26: “The enemy is broken, but will rally. Their +purpose is to unite Jackson’s and Longstreet’s[4] forces, some 20,000, +at New Market (seven miles south of Mount Jackson) or Washington (east +of Blue Ridge) in order to operate on either side of the mountains, and +will desire to prevent our junction with the force at Manassas. At +present they will not attack here. It will relieve me greatly to know +how far the enemy (_i.e._ Johnston) will be pressed in front of +Manassas.” On the 27th his news was less alarming: “Enemy is about four +miles below Woodstock. No reinforcement received yet. Jackson has +constant communication with Johnston, who is east of the mountains, +probably at Gordonsville. His pickets are very strong and vigilant, +none of the country people being allowed to pass the lines under any +circumstances. The same rule is applied to troops, stragglers from +Winchester not being permitted to enter their lines. We shall press +them further and quickly.” + +The pressure, however, was postponed; and on the 29th McClellan desired +Banks to ascertain the intentions of the enemy as soon as possible, and +if he were in force to drive him from the Valley of the Shenandoah. +Thus spurred, Banks at last resolved to cross the Rubicon. +“Deficiency,” he replied, “in ammunition for Shields’ artillery detains +us here; expect it hourly, when we shall push Jackson sharply.” It was +not, however, till April 2, four days later, that Mr. Lincoln’s +_protégé_ crossed Tom’s Brook. His advanced guard, after a brisk +skirmish with Ashby, reached the village of Edenburg, ten miles south, +the +same evening. The main body occupied Woodstock, and McClellan +telegraphed that he was “much pleased with the vigorous pursuit!” + +It is not impossible that Banks suspected that McClellan’s +commendations were ironical. In any case, praise had no more effect +upon him than a peremptory order or the promise of reinforcements. He +was instructed to push forward as far as New Market; he was told that +he would be joined by two regiments of cavalry, and that two brigades +of Blenker’s division were marching to Strasburg. But Jackson, although +Ashby had been driven in, still held obstinately to his position, and +from Woodstock and Edenburg Banks refused to move. + +On April 4, becoming independent of McClellan,[5] he at once reported +to the Secretary of War that he hoped “immediately to strike Jackson an +effective blow.” “Immediately,” however, in Banks’ opinion, was capable +of a very liberal interpretation, for it was not till April 17 that he +once more broke up his camps. Well might Gordon write that life at +Edenburg became monotonous! + +It is but fair to mention that during the whole of this time Banks was +much troubled about supply and transport. His magazines were at +Winchester, connected with Harper’s Ferry and Washington by a line of +railway which had been rapidly repaired, and on April 12 this line had +become unserviceable through the spreading of the road-bed.[6] His +waggon train, moreover, had been diverted to Manassas before the fight +at Kernstown, and was several days late in reaching Strasburg. The +country in which he was operating was rich, and requisitions were made +upon the farmers; but in the absence of the waggons, according to his +own report, it was impossible to collect sufficient supplies for a +further advance.[7] The weather, too, had been unfavourable. The first +days of April were like summer. “But hardly,” says +Gordon, “had we begun to feel in harmony with sunny days and blooming +peach trees and warm showers, before a chill came over us, bitter as +the hatred of the women of Virginia: the ground covered with snow, the +air thick with hail, and the mountains hidden in the chilly atmosphere. +Our shivering sentinels on the outer lines met at times the gaze of +half-frozen horsemen of the enemy, peering through the mist to see what +the Yankees had been doing within the last twenty-four hours. It was +hard to believe that we were in the ‘sunny South.’” + +All this, however, was hardly an excuse for absolute inaction. The +Confederate position on the open ridge called Rude’s Hill, two and a +half miles south of Mount Jackson, was certainly strong. It was +defended in front by Mill Creek, swollen by the snows to a turbulent +and unfordable river; and by the North Fork of the Shenandoah. But with +all its natural strength Rude’s Hill was but weakly held, and Banks +knew it. Moreover, it was most unlikely that Jackson would be +reinforced, for Johnston’s army, with the exception of a detachment +under General Ewell, had left Orange Court House for Richmond on April +5. “The enemy,” Banks wrote to McClellan on April 6, “is reduced to +about 6,000 men (_sic_), much demoralised by defeat, desertion, and the +general depression of spirits resting on the Southern army. He is not +in a condition to attack, neither to make a strong resistance, and I do +not believe he will make a determined stand there. I do not believe +Johnston will reinforce him.” If Banks had supplies enough to enable +him to remain at Woodstock, there seems to have been no valid reason +why he should not have been able to drive away a demoralised enemy, and +to hold a position twelve miles further south. + +But the Federal commander, despite his brave words, had not yet got rid +of his misgivings. Jackson had lured him into a most uncomfortable +situation. Between the two branches of the Shenandoah, in the very +centre of the Valley, rises a gigantic mass of mountain ridges, +parallel throughout their length of fifty miles to the Blue Ridge and +the Alleghanies. These are the famous Massanuttons, the +glory of the Valley. The peaks which form their northern faces sink as +abruptly to the level near Strasburg as does the single hill which +looks down on Harrisonburg. Dense forests of oak and pine cover ridge +and ravine, and 2,500 feet below, on either hand, parted by the mighty +barrier, are the dales watered by the Forks of the Shenandoah. That to +the east is the narrower and less open; the Blue Ridge is nowhere more +than ten miles distant from the Massanuttons, and the space between +them, the Luray or the South Fork Valley, through which a single road +leads northward, is clothed by continuous forest. West of the great +mountain, a broad expanse of green pasture and rich arable extends to +the foothills of the Alleghanies, dotted with woods and homesteads, and +here, in the Valley of the North Fork, is freer air and more space for +movement. + +The separation of the two valleys is accentuated by the fact that save +at one point only the Massanuttons are practically impassable. From New +Market, in the western valley, a good road climbs the heights, and +crossing the lofty plateau, sinks sharply down to Luray, the principal +village on the South Fork. Elsewhere precipitous gullies and sheer rock +faces forbid all access to the mountain, and a few hunters’ paths alone +wind tediously through the woods up the steep hillside. Nor are signal +stations to be found on the wide area of unbroken forest which clothes +the summit. Except from the peaks at either end, or from one or two +points on the New Market–Luray road, the view is intercepted by the sea +of foliage and the rolling spurs. + +Striking eastward from Luray, two good roads cross the Blue Ridge; one +running to Culpeper Court House, through Thornton’s Gap; the other +through Fisher’s Gap to Gordonsville. + +It was the Massanuttons that weighed on the mind of Banks. The Valley +of the South Fork gave the Confederates a covered approach against his +line of communications. Issuing from that strait cleft between the +mountains Ashby’s squadrons might at any time sweep down upon his +trains of waggons, his hospitals, and his magazines; and +should Jackson be reinforced, Ashby might be supported by infantry and +guns, and both Strasburg and Winchester be endangered. It was not +within Banks’ power to watch the defile. “His cavalry,” he reported, +“was weak in numbers and spirit, much exhausted with night and day +work.” Good cavalry, he declared, would help incalculably, and he +admitted that in this arm he was greatly inferior to the enemy. + +Nor was he more happy as to the Alleghanies on his right. Frémont was +meditating an advance on Lewisburg, Staunton, and the Virginia and +Tennessee Railway with 25,000 men.[8] One column was to start from +Gauley Bridge, in the Kanawha Valley; the other from the South Branch +of the Potomac. Milroy’s brigade, from Cheat Mountain, had therefore +occupied Monterey, and Schenck’s brigade had marched from Romney to +Moorefield. But Moorefield was thirty miles west of Woodstock, and +between them rose a succession of rugged ridges, within whose deep +valleys the Confederate horsemen might find paths by which to reach to +Banks’ rear. + +It was essential, then, that his communications should be strongly +guarded, and as he advanced up the Valley his force had diminished at +every march. According to his own report he had, on April 6, 16,700 men +fit for duty. Of these 4,100 were detached along the road from +Woodstock to Harper’s Ferry. His effective strength for battle was thus +reduced to 12,600, or, including the troops escorting convoys and the +garrison of Strasburg, to 14,500 men, with 40 pieces of artillery.[9] + +Such were the considerations that influenced the Federal commander. Had +he occupied New Market, as McClellan had desired, he would have secured +the Luray road, have opened the South Fork Valley to his scouts, and +have overcome half the difficulties presented by the Massanuttons. A +vigorous advance would have turned the attention of the Confederates +from his communications to their own; and to drive Jackson from the +Valley was the best method +of protecting the trains and the magazines. But Banks was not inclined +to beard the lion in his den, and on April 16 Jackson had been +unmolested for more than three weeks. Ashby’s troopers were the only +men who had even seen the enemy. Daily that indefatigable soldier had +called to arms the Federal outposts. “Our stay at Edenburg,” says +Gordon, “was a continuous season of artillery brawling and picket +stalking. The creek that separated the outposts was not more than ten +yards wide. About one-fourth of a mile away there was a thick wood, in +which the enemy concealed his batteries until he chose to stir us up, +when he would sneak up behind the cover, open upon us at an unexpected +moment, and retreat rapidly when we replied.” It was doubtless by such +constant evidence of his vigilance that Ashby imposed caution on the +enemy’s reconnoitring parties. The fact remains that Jackson’s camps, +six miles to the rear, were never once alarmed, nor could Banks obtain +any reliable information. + +This period of repose was spent by Jackson in reorganising his +regiments, in writing letters to his wife, and, like his old +class-mate, Gordon, in admiring the scenery. It is not to be supposed +that his enforced inaction was altogether to his taste. With an enemy +within sight of his outposts his bold and aggressive spirit must have +been sorely tried. But with his inferior numbers prudence cried +patience, and he had reason to be well content with the situation. He +had been instructed to prevent Banks from detaching troops to reinforce +McClellan. To attain an object in war the first consideration is to +make no mistakes yourself; the next, to take instant advantage of those +made by your opponent. But compliance with this rule does not embrace +the whole art of generalship. The enemy may be too discreet to commit +himself to risky manœuvres. If the campaigns of the great masters of +war are examined, it will be found that they but seldom adopted a +quiescent attitude, but by one means or another, by acting on their +adversary’s _moral,_ or by creating false impressions, they induced him +to make a false step, and to place himself in a position which made it +easy for them +to attain their object. The greatest general has been defined as “he +who makes the fewest mistakes;” but “he who compels his adversary to +make the most mistakes” is a definition of equal force; and it may even +be questioned whether the general whose imagination is unequal to the +stratagems which bring mistakes about is worthy of the name. He may be +a trustworthy subordinate, but he can scarcely become a great leader. + +Johnston had advised, when, at the beginning of March, the retreat of +the Confederates from Winchester was determined on, that Jackson should +fall back on Front Royal, and thence, if necessary, up the South Fork +of the Shenandoah. His force would thus be in close communication with +the main army behind the Rapidan; and it was contrary, in the +General-in-Chief’s opinion, to all sound discretion to permit the enemy +to attain a point, such as Front Royal, which would render it possible +for him to place himself between them. Jackson, however, declared his +preference for a retreat up the North Fork, in the direction of +Staunton. Why should Banks join McClellan at all? McClellan, so Jackson +calculated, had already more men with him than he could feed; and he +believed, therefore, that Staunton would be Banks’ objective, because, +by seizing that town, he would threaten Edward Johnson’s rear, open the +way for Frémont, and then, crossing the Blue Ridge, place himself so +near the communications of the main army with Richmond that it would be +compelled to fall back to defend them. Nor, in any case, did he agree +with Johnston that the occupation of Front Royal would prevent Banks +leaving the Valley and marching to Manassas. Twenty miles due east of +Winchester is Snicker’s Gap, where a good road crosses the Blue Ridge, +and eight miles south another turnpike leads over Ashby’s Gap. By +either of these Banks could reach Manassas just as rapidly as Jackson +could join Johnston; and, while 4,500 men could scarcely be expected to +detain 20,000, they might very easily be cut off by a portion of the +superior force. + +If a junction with the main army were absolutely necessary, Jackson was +of opinion that the move ought to +be made at once, and the Valley abandoned. If, on the other hand, it +was desirable to keep Banks and McClellan separated, the best means of +doing so was to draw the former up the North Fork; and at Mount +Jackson, covering the New Market to Luray road, the Valley troops would +be as near the Rapidan as if they were at Front Royal.[10] The +strategical advantages which such a position would offer—the isolation +of the troops pursuing him, the chance of striking their communications +from the South Fork Valley, and, if reinforcements were granted, of +cutting off their retreat by a rapid movement from Luray to +Winchester—were always present to Jackson’s mind.[11] + +An additional argument was that at the time when these alternatives +were discussed the road along South Fork was so bad as to make marching +difficult; and it was to this rather than to Jackson’s strategical +conceptions that Johnston appears to have ultimately yielded. + +Be this as it may, the sum of Jackson’s operations was satisfactory in +the extreme. On March 27 he had written to Johnston, “I will try and +draw the enemy on.” On April 16 Banks was exactly where he wished him, +well up the North Fork of the Shenandoah, cut off by the Massanuttons +from Manassas, and by the Alleghanies from Frémont. The two detachments +which held the Valley, his own force at Mount Jackson, and Edward +Johnson’s 2,800 on the Shenandoah Mountain, were in close +communication, and could at any time, if permitted by the higher +authorities, combine against either of the columns which threatened +Staunton. “What I desire,” he said to Mr. Boteler, a friend in the +Confederate Congress, “is to hold the country, as far as practicable, +until we are in a condition to advance; and then, with God’s blessing, +let us make thorough work of it. But let us start right.” + +On April 7 he wrote to his wife as follows:— + +“Your sickness gives me great concern; but so live that it and all your +tribulations may be sanctified to you, remembering that our ‘light +afflictions, which are but for a +moment, work out for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of +glory!’ I trust you and all I have in the hands of a kind Providence, +knowing that all things work together for the good of His people. +Yesterday was a lovely Sabbath day. Although I had not the privilege of +hearing the word of life, yet it felt like a holy Sabbath day, +beautiful, serene, and lovely. All it wanted was the church-bell and +God’s services in the sanctuary to make it complete. Our gallant little +army is increasing in numbers, and my prayer is that it may be an army +of the living God as well as of its country.” + +The troops, notwithstanding their defeat at Kernstown, were in high +spirits. The very slackness of the Federal pursuit had made them aware +that they had inflicted a heavy blow. They had been thanked by Congress +for their valour. The newspapers were full of their praises. Their +comrades were returning from hospital and furlough, and recruits were +rapidly coming in.[12] The mounted branch attracted the majority, and +Ashby’s regiment soon numbered more than 2,000 troopers. Their +commander, however, knew little of discipline. Besides himself there +was but one field-officer for one-and-twenty companies; nor had these +companies any regimental organisation. When Jackson attempted to reduce +this curiously constituted force to order, his path was once more +crossed by the Secretary of War. Mr. Benjamin, dazzled by Ashby’s +exploits, had given him authority to raise and command a force of +independent cavalry. A reference to this authority and a threat of +resignation was Ashby’s reply to Jackson’s orders. “Knowing Ashby’s +ascendency over his men, and finding himself thus deprived of +legitimate power, the general was constrained to pause, and the cavalry +was left unorganised and +undisciplined. One half was rarely available for duty. The remainder +were roaming over the country, imposing upon the generous hospitalities +of the citizens, or lurking in their homes. The exploits of their +famous leader were all performed with a few hundreds, or often scores, +of men, who followed him from personal devotion rather than force of +discipline.”[13] + +By April 15 Jackson’s force had increased to 6,000 men.[14] McClellan +had now landed an army of over 100,000 at Fortress Monroe, on the +Yorktown Peninsula, and Johnston had marched thither to oppose him. The +weather had at last cleared; although the mountain pines stood deep in +snow the roads were in good order; the rivers were once more fordable; +the Manassas Gap Railway had been restored as far as Strasburg, and +Banks took heart of grace. + +April 17 On the 17th his forces were put in motion. One of Ashby’s +companies was surprised and captured. A brigade was sent to turn the +Confederate left by a ford of the North Fork; and when the Virginians, +burning the railway station at Mount Jackson, fell back southwards, the +Federal cavalry seized New Market. + +For the moment the situation of the Valley army was somewhat critical. +When Johnston marched to the Peninsula he had left a force of 8,000 +men, under General Ewell, on the Upper Rappahannock, and with this +force Jackson had been instructed to co-operate. But with the road +across the Massanuttons in his possession Banks could move into the +Luray Valley, and occupying Swift Run Gap with a detachment, cut the +communication between the two Confederate generals. It was essential, +then, that this important pass should be secured, and Jackson’s men +were called on for a forced march. + +April 18 On the morning of the 18th they reached Harrisonburg, +twenty-five miles from Mount Jackson, and halted the same evening at +Peale’s, about six miles east. + +April 19 On the 19th they crossed the Shenandoah at Conrad’s store, and +leaving a detachment to hold the bridge, moved to the foot of Swift Run +Gap, and went into camp in Elk Run Valley. In three days they had +marched over fifty miles. Banks followed with his customary caution, +and when, on the 17th, his cavalry occupied New Market he was +congratulated by the Secretary of War on his “brilliant and successful +operations.” On the 19th he led a detachment across the Massanuttons, +and seized the two bridges over the South Fork at Luray, driving back a +squadron which Jackson had sent to burn them. + +April 22 On the night of the 22nd his cavalry reached Harrisonburg, and +he reported that want of supplies alone prevented him from bringing the +Confederates to bay. + +April 26 On the 26th he sent two of his five brigades to Harrisonburg, +the remainder halting at New Market, and for the last few days, +according to his own dispatches, beef, flour, and forage had been +abundant. Yet it had taken him ten days to march five-and-thirty miles. + +April 20 On April 20 General Edward Johnson, menaced in rear by Banks’ +advance, in flank by the brigade which Frémont had placed at +Moorefield, and in front by Milroy’s brigade, which had advanced from +Monterey, had fallen back from the Shenandoah Mountain to West View, +seven miles west of Staunton; and to all appearance the Federal +prospects were exceedingly favourable. + +Harrisonburg is five-and-twenty miles, or two short marches, north of +Staunton. The hamlet of M’Dowell, now occupied by Milroy, is +seven-and-twenty miles north-west. Proper concert between Banks and +Frémont should therefore have ensured the destruction or retreat of +Edward Johnson, and have placed Staunton, as well as the Virginia +Central Railroad, in their hands. But although not a single picket +stood between his outposts and Staunton, Banks dared not move. By +moving to Elk Run Valley Jackson had barred the way of the Federals +more effectively than if he had intrenched his troops across the +Staunton road. + +South of Harrisonburg, where the Valley widens to five-and-twenty +miles, there was no strong position. And even had such existed, 6,000 +men, of which a third were cavalry, could scarcely have hoped to hold +it permanently against a far superior force. Moreover, cooped up inside +intrenchments, the Army of the Valley would have lost all freedom of +action; and Jackson would have been cut off both from Ewell and from +Richmond. But, although direct intervention was impracticable, he was +none the less resolved that Banks should never set foot in Staunton. +The Elk Run Valley was well adapted for his purpose. Spurs of the Blue +Ridge, steep, pathless, and densely wooded, covered either flank. The +front, protected by the Shenandoah, was very strong. Communication with +both Ewell and Richmond was secure, and so long as he held the bridge +at Conrad’s store he threatened the flank of the Federals should they +advance on Staunton. Strategically the position was by no means +perfect. The Confederates, to use an expression of General Grant’s, +applied to a similar situation, were “in a bottle.” A bold enemy would +have seized the bridge, “corking up” Jackson with a strong detachment, +and have marched on Staunton with his main body. + +“Had Banks been more enterprising,” says Dabney, “this objection would +have been decisive.” But he was not enterprising, and Jackson knew +it.[15]He had had opportunities in plenty of judging his opponent’s +character. The slow advance on Winchester, the long delay at Woodstock, +the cautious approach to New Market, had revealed enough. It was a +month since the battle of Kernstown, and yet the Confederate infantry, +although for the greater part of the time they had been encamped within +a few miles of the enemy’s outposts, had not fired a shot. + +The tardy progress of the Federals from Woodstock to Harrisonburg had +been due rather to the perplexities of +their commander than to the difficulties of supply; and Banks had got +clear of the Massanuttons only to meet with fresh embarrassments. +Jackson’s move to Elk Run Valley was a complete checkmate. His opponent +felt that he was dangerously exposed. McClellan had not yet begun his +advance on Richmond; and, so long as that city was secure from +immediate attack, the Confederates could spare men to reinforce +Jackson. The railway ran within easy reach of Swift Run Gap, and the +troops need not be long absent from the capital. Ewell, too, with a +force of unknown strength, was not far distant. Banks could expect no +help from Frémont. Both generals were anxious to work together, and +plans had been submitted to Washington which would probably have +secured the capture of Staunton and the control of the railway. But the +Secretary of War rejected all advice. Frémont was given to understand +that under no circumstances was he to count on Banks,[16] and the +latter was told to halt at Harrisonburg. “It is not the desire of the +President,” wrote Mr. Stanton on April 26, “that you should prosecute a +further advance towards the south. It is possible that events may make +it necessary to transfer the command of General Shields to the +department of the Rappahannock [_i.e._ to the First Army Corps], and +you are desired to act accordingly.” To crown all, Blenker’s division, +which had reached Winchester, instead of being sent to support Banks, +forty-five miles distant by the Valley turnpike, was ordered to join +Frémont in the Alleghanies by way of Romney, involving a march of one +hundred and twenty miles, over bad roads, before it could reinforce his +advanced brigade. + +Stanton, in writing to Banks, suggested that he should not let his +advanced guard get too far ahead of the main body; but be does not +appear to have seen that the separation of Banks, Frémont, and Blenker, +and the forward position of the two former, which he had determined to +maintain, was even more dangerous.[17] His lesson was to come, for +Jackson, by no means content with arresting Banks’ march, was already +contemplating that general’s destruction. + +The situation demanded instant action, and in order that the import of +Jackson’s movements may be fully realised it is necessary to turn to +the main theatre of war. McClellan, on April 5, with the 60,000 men +already landed, had moved a few miles up the Peninsula. Near the +village of Yorktown, famous for the surrender of Lord Cornwallis and +his army in 1782, he found the road blocked by a line of earthworks and +numerous guns. Magruder, Jackson’s captain in Mexico, was in command; +but Johnston was still on the Rapidan, one hundred and thirty miles +away, and the Confederates had no more than 15,000 men in position. The +flanks, however, were secured by the York and the James rivers, which +here expand to wide estuaries, and the works were strong. Yorktown +proved almost as fatal to the invaders as to their English +predecessors. Before the historic lines their march was suddenly +brought up. McClellan, although his army increased in numbers every +day, declined the swift process of a storm. Personal reconnaissance +convinced him that “instant assault would have been simple folly,” and +he determined to besiege the intrenchments in due form. On April 10 +Johnston’s army began to arrive at Yorktown, and the lines, hitherto +held by a slender garrison, were now manned by 53,000 men. + +The Confederate position was by no means impregnable. The river James +to the south was held by the “Merrimac,” an improvised ironclad of +novel design, which had already wrought terrible destruction amongst +the wooden frigates of the Federals. She was neutralised, however, by +her Northern counterpart, the “Monitor,” and after an indecisive action +she had remained inactive for nearly a month. The York was less +securely guarded. The channel, nearly a mile wide, was barred only by +the fire of two forts; and +that at Gloucester Point, on the north bank, was open to assault from +the land side. Had McClellan disembarked a detachment and carried this +work, which might easily have been done, the river would have been +opened to his gunboats, and Johnston’s lines have become untenable. He +decided, however, notwithstanding that his army was more than 100,000 +strong, that he had no men to spare for such an enterprise. + +Magruder’s bold stand was of infinite service to the Confederate cause. +To both parties time was of the utmost value. The Federals were still +over seventy miles from Richmond; and there was always a possibility, +if their advance were not rapidly pressed, that Johnston might move on +Washington and cause the recall of the army to protect the capital. The +Confederates, on the other hand, had been surprised by the landing of +McClellan’s army. They had been long aware that the flotilla had +sailed, but they had not discovered its destination; the detachments +which first landed were supposed to be reinforcements for the garrison +of the fortress; and when McClellan advanced on Yorktown, Johnston was +far to the west of Richmond. The delay had enabled him to reach the +lines.[18] But at the time Jackson fell back to Elk Run Valley, April +17 to 19, fortune seemed inclining to the Federals. + +Lincoln had been induced to relax his hold on the army corps which he +had held back at Manassas to protect the capital, and McDowell was +already moving on Fredericksburg, sixty miles north of Richmond. Here +he was to be joined by Shields, bringing his force for the field up to +40,000 men; and the fall of Yorktown was to be the signal for his +advance on the Confederate capital. Johnston still held the lines, but +he was outnumbered by more than two to one, and the enemy was +disembarking heavy ordnance. It was evident that the end could not be +long delayed, and +that in case of retreat every single Confederate soldier, from the +Valley and elsewhere, would have to be brought to Richmond for the +decisive battle. Jackson was thus bound to his present position, close +to the railway, and his orders from Johnston confined him to a strictly +defensive attitude. In case Banks advanced eastward he was to combine +with Ewell, and receive attack in the passes of the Blue Ridge. + +Such cautious strategy, to one so fully alive to the opportunity +offered by McClellan’s retention before Yorktown, was by no means +acceptable. When his orders reached him, Jackson was already weaving +plans for the discomfiture of his immediate adversary, and it may be +imagined with what reluctance, although he gave no vent to his chagrin, +he accepted the passive _rôle_ which had been assigned to him. + +No sooner, however, had he reached Elk Run Valley than the telegraph +brought most welcome news. In a moment of unwonted wisdom the +Confederate President had charged General Lee with the control of all +military operations in Virginia, and on April 21 came a letter to +Jackson which foreshadowed the downfall of McClellan and the rout of +the invaders. + +April 21 McDowell’s advance from Manassas had already become known to +the Confederates, and Lee had divined what this movement portended. “I +have no doubt,” he wrote to Jackson, “that an attempt will be made to +occupy Fredericksburg and use it as a base of operations against +Richmond. Our present force there is very small, (2,500 men under +General Field), and cannot be reinforced except by weakening other +corps. If you can use General Ewell’s division in an attack on Banks, +it will prove a great relief to the pressure on Fredericksburg.”[19] + +This view of the situation was in exact agreement with Jackson’s own +views. He had already made preparation for combined action with Ewell. +For some days they had been in active correspondence. The exact route +which Ewell should take to the Blue Ridge had been decided on. The +roads had been reconnoitred. Jackson had supplied +a map identical with his own, and had furnished an officer to act as +guide. A service of couriers had been established across the mountains, +and no precaution had been neglected. Ewell was instructed to bring +five days’ rations. He was warned that there would be no necessity for +a forced march; he was to encamp at cross-roads, and he was to rest on +Sunday.[20] + +April 23 Jackson, replying to Lee, stated that he was only waiting a +favourable occasion to fall on Banks. “My object,” he wrote, “has been +to get in his rear at New Market or Harrisonburg, if he gives me an +opportunity, and this would be the case should he advance on Staunton +with his main body. It appears to me that if I remain quiet a few days +more he will probably make a move in some direction, or send a large +force towards Harrisonburg, and thus enable me, with the blessing of +Providence, to successfully attack his advance. If I am unsuccessful in +driving back his entire force he may be induced to move forward from +New Market, and attempt to follow me through this Gap, where our forces +would have greatly the advantage. . . . + +“Under all the circumstances I will direct General Ewell to move to +Stanardsville. Should Banks remain in the position of yesterday +[cavalry at Harrisonburg; infantry, etc., at New Market] I will try and +seek an opportunity of attacking successfully some part of his army, +and if circumstances justify press forward. My instructions from +General Johnston were to unite with General Ewell near the top of the +Blue Ridge, and give battle. The course I propose would be departing +from General Johnston’s instructions, but I do not believe that Banks +will follow me to the Blue Ridge unless I first engage him, and I doubt +whether he will then.” + +But although authorised to draw Ewell to himself, and to carry out the +project on which his heart was set, he still kept in view the general +situation. After he had dispatched the above letter, a report came in +which led him to believe that Ewell was more needed on the Rappahannock +than in +the Valley. Lee had already informed him that McDowell’s advanced guard +had occupied Falmouth, on the north bank of the river, opposite +Fredericksburg, on April 19, and that General Field had fallen back. + +Jackson, in consequence, permitted Ewell to remain near Gordonsville, +close to the railway; assuring Lee that “he would make arrangements so +as not to be disappointed should Ewell be ordered to +Fredericksburg.”[21] + +Nor was this the only instance in which he demonstrated his breadth of +view. In planning co-operation with Ewell, that general had suggested +that he should take a different road to that which had been recommended +by General Johnston, should necessity for a combined movement arise. +Jackson protested against the route being altered. “General Johnston,” +he wrote, “does not state why he desires you to go (by this road), but +it may be for the purpose of deceiving the enemy with regard to your +ultimate destination, to be more distant from the enemy during the +movement, and also to be in a more favourable position for reinforcing +some other points should it be necessary.” The interests of his own +force, here as always, were subordinated to those of the army which was +defending Richmond. + +April 25 The next information received from General Lee was that the +enemy was collecting in strong force at Fredericksburg. “For this +purpose,” he wrote, “they must weaken other points, and now is the time +to concentrate on any that may be exposed within our reach.” He then +suggested that, if Banks was too strong in numbers and position, +Jackson and Ewell combined should move on Warrenton, where a Federal +force was reported; or that Ewell and Field should attack +Fredericksburg. “The blow,” he added, “wherever struck, must, to be +successful, be sudden and heavy. The troops must be efficient and +light. I cannot pretend at this distance to direct operations depending +on circumstances unknown to me, and requiring the exercise of +discretion and judgment as to time and +execution, but submit these ideas for your consideration.”[22] + +April 26 On April 26, when Banks moved two brigades to Harrisonburg, +Ewell was at once called up to Stanardsville, twelve miles south-east +of Swift Run Gap. No opportunity as yet had offered for attack. “I have +reason to believe,” wrote Jackson to Lee on the 28th, “that Banks has +21,000 men within a day’s march of me.[23] He has moved his main body +from New Market to Harrisonburg, leaving probably a brigade at New +Market, and between that town and the Shenandoah (Luray Gap), to guard +against a force getting in his rear. . . . On yesterday week there were +near 7,000 men in the neighbourhood of Winchester, under Blenker; as +yet I have not heard of their having joined Banks. . . . I propose to +attack Banks in front if you will send me 5,000 more men. . . . Now, as +it appears to me, is the golden opportunity for striking a blow. Until +I hear from you I will watch an opportunity for striking some exposed +point.”[24] + +April 29 The next day, April 29, Jackson suggested, if reinforcements +could not be spared, that one of three plans should be adopted. “Either +to leave Ewell here (Swift Run Gap) to threaten Banks’ rear in the +event of his advancing on Staunton, and move with my command rapidly on +the force in front of General Edward Johnson; or else, co-operating +with Ewell, to attack the enemy’s detached force between New Market and +the Shenandoah, and if successful in this, then to press forward and +get in Banks’ rear at New Market, and thus induce him to fall back; the +third is to pass down the Shenandoah to Sperryvile (east of the Blue +Ridge), and thus threaten Winchester _viâ_ Front Royal. To get in +Banks’ rear with my present force would be rather a dangerous +undertaking, as I would have to cross the river and immediately cross +the Massanutton Mountains, during which the enemy would have the +advantage of position. Of the three plans I give the preference to +attacking the force west of Staunton [Milroy], for, if successful, I +would afterward only have Banks to contend with, and in doing this +would be reinforced by General Edward Johnson, and by that time you +might be able to give me reinforcements, which, united with the troops +under my control, would enable me to defeat Banks. If he should be +routed and his command destroyed, nearly all our own forces here could, +if necessary, cross the Blue Ridge to Warrenton, Fredericksburg, or any +other threatened point.” + +Lee’s reply was to the effect that no reinforcements could be spared, +but that he had carefully considered the three plans of operations +proposed, and that the selection was left to Jackson. + +The Army of the Valley, when the Commander-in-Chief’s letter was +received, had already been put in motion. Three roads lead from +Conrad’s store in the Elk Run Valley to Johnson’s position at West +View; one through Harrisonburg; the second by Port Republic, Cross +Keys, and Mount Sidney; the third, the river road, by Port Republic and +Staunton. The first of these was already occupied by the Federals; the +second was tortuous, and at places almost within view of the enemy’s +camps; while the third, though it was nowhere less than ten miles +distant, ran obliquely across their front. In fact, to all appearance, +Banks with his superior force blocked Jackson’s march on Staunton more +effectively than did Jackson his. + +On the 29th, Ashby, continually watching Banks, made a demonstration in +force towards Harrisonburg. + +[Illustration: Map showing the situation on April 30th, 1862.] + +April 30 On the 30th he drove the Federal cavalry back upon their +camps; and the same afternoon Jackson, leaving Elk Run Valley, which +was immediately occupied by Ewell, with 8,000 men, marched up the river +to Port +Republic. The track, unmetalled and untended, had been turned into a +quagmire by the heavy rains of an ungenial spring, and the troops +marched only five miles, bivouacking by the roadside. May 1 was a day +of continuous rain. The great mountains loomed dimly through the dreary +mist. The streams which rushed down the gorges to the Shenandoah had +swelled to brawling torrents, and in the hollows of the fields the +water stood in sheets. Men and horses floundered through the mud. The +guns sunk axle-deep in the treacherous soil; and it was only by the +help of large detachments of pioneers that the heavy waggons of the +train were able to proceed at all. It was in vain that piles of stones +and brushwood were strewn upon the roadway; the quicksands dragged them +down as fast as they were placed. The utmost exertions carried the army +no more than five miles forward, and the troops bivouacked once more in +the dripping woods. + +May 2 The next day, the third in succession, the struggle with the +elements continued. The whole command was called upon to move the guns +and waggons. The general and his staff were seen dismounted, urging on +the labourers; and Jackson, his uniform bespattered with mud, carried +stones and timbers on his own shoulders. But before nightfall the last +ambulance had been extricated from the slough, and the men, drenched to +the skin, and worn with toil, found a halting-place on firmer ground. +But this halting-place was not on the road to Staunton. Before they +reached Port Republic, instead of crossing the Shenandoah and passing +through the village, the troops had been ordered to change the +direction of their march. The spot selected for their bivouac was at +the foot of Brown’s Gap, not more than twelve miles south-west of the +camp in Elk Run Valley. + +May 3 The next morning the clouds broke. The sun, shining with summer +warmth, ushered in a glorious May day, and the column, turning its back +upon the Valley, took the stony road that led over the Blue Ridge. +Upward and eastward the battalions passed, the great forest of oak and +pine rising high on either hand, until from the eyry of the +mountain-eagles they looked down upon the wide Virginia plains. Far +off, away to the south-east, the trails of white smoke from passing +trains marked the line of the Central Railroad, and the line of march +led directly to the station at Mechum’s River. Both officers and men +were more than bewildered. Save to his adjutant-general, Jackson had +breathed not a whisper of his plan. The soldiers only knew that they +were leaving the Valley, and leaving it in the enemy’s possession. +Winchester, Strasburg, Front Royal, New Market, Harrisonburg, were full +of Northern troops. Staunton alone was yet unoccupied. But Staunton was +closely threatened; and north of Harrisonburg the blue-coated cavalry +were riding far and wide. While the women and old men looked impotently +on, village and mill and farm were at the mercy of the invaders. +Already the Federal commissaries had laid hands on herds and granaries. +It is true that the Northerners waged war like gentlemen; yet for all +that the patriotism of the Valley soldiers was sorely tried. They were +ready to go to Richmond if the time had come; but it was with heavy +hearts that they saw the Blue Ridge rise behind them, and the bivouac +on Mechum’s River was even more cheerless than the sodden woods near +Port Republic. The long lines of cars that awaited them at the station +but confirmed their anticipations. They were evidently wanted at the +capital, and the need was pressing. Still not a word transpired as to +their destination. + +May 4 The next day was Sunday, and Jackson had intended that the troops +should rest. But early in the morning came a message from Edward +Johnson. Frémont’s advanced guard was pushing forward. “After hard +debate with himself,” says Dabney, who accompanied him, “and with sore +reluctance,” Jackson once more sacrificed his scruples and ordered the +command to march. The infantry was to move by rail, the artillery and +waggons by road. To their astonishment and delight the troops then +heard, for the first time, that their destination was not Richmond but +Staunton; and although they were far from understanding the reason for +their circuitous march, they began to suspect that it had not been made +without good purpose. + +If the soldiers had been heavy hearted at the prospect of leaving the +Valley, the people of Staunton had been plunged in the direst grief. +For a long time past they had lived in a pitiable condition of +uncertainty. On April 19 the sick and convalescent of the Valley army +had been removed to Gordonsville. On the same day Jackson had moved to +Elk Run Valley, leaving the road from Harrisonburg completely open; and +Edward Johnson evacuated his position on the Shenandoah Mountain. +Letters from Jackson’s officers, unacquainted with the designs of their +commander, had confirmed the apprehension that the Federals were too +strong to be resisted. On the Saturday of this anxious week had come +the news that the army was crossing the Blue Ridge, and that the Valley +had been abandoned to the enemy. Sunday morning was full of rumours and +excitement. 10,000 Federals, it was reported, were advancing against +Johnson at West View; Banks was moving from Harrisonburg; his cavalry +had been seen from the neighbouring hills, and Staunton believed that +it was to share the fate of Winchester. Suddenly a train full of +soldiers steamed into the station; and as regiment after regiment, clad +in their own Confederate grey, swept through the crowded streets, +confidence in Stonewall Jackson began once more to revive. + +Pickets were immediately posted on all the roads leading to +Harrisonburg, and beyond the line of sentries no one, whatever his +business might be, was allowed to pass. The following day the remainder +of the division arrived, and the junction with Johnson’s brigade was +virtually effected. May 6 was spent in resting the troops, in making +the arrangements for the march, and in getting information. + +May 7 The next morning brought a fresh surprise to both troops and +townsfolk. Banks, so the rumour went, was rapidly approaching; and it +was confidently expected that the twin hills which stand above the +town—christened by some early settler, after two similar heights in +faraway Tyrone, Betsy Bell and Mary Gray—would look down upon a bloody +battle. But instead of taking post to defend the town, the Valley +regiments filed away over the western +hills, heading for the Alleghanies; and Staunton was once more left +unprotected. Jackson, although informed by Ashby that Banks, so far +from moving forward, was actually retiring on New Market, was still +determined to strike first at Milroy, commanding Frémont’s advanced +guard; and there can be little question but that his decision was +correct. As we have seen, he was under the impression that Banks’ +strength was 21,000, a force exceeding the united strength of the +Confederates by 4,200 men.[25] It was undoubtedly sound strategy to +crush the weaker and more exposed of the enemy’s detachments first; and +then, having cleared his own rear and prevented all chance of +combination between Banks and Frémont, to strike the larger. + +There was nothing to be feared from Harrisonburg. Eight days had +elapsed since Jackson had marched from Elk Run; but Banks was still in +blissful ignorance of the blow that threatened Frémont’s advanced +guard. + +On April 28 he had telegraphed to Washington that he was “entirely +secure.” Everything was satisfactory. “The enemy,” he said, “is in no +condition for offensive movements. Our supplies have not been in so +good condition nor my command in so good spirits since we left +Winchester. General Hatch (commanding cavalry) made a reconnaissance in +force yesterday, which resulted in obtaining a complete view of the +enemy’s position. A negro employed in Jackson’s tent came in this +morning, and reports preparation for retreat of Jackson to-day. You +need have no apprehensions for our safety. I think we are just now in a +condition to do all you can desire of us in the Valley—clear the enemy +out permanently.” + +On the 30th, when Ashby repaid with interest Hatch’s reconnaissance in +force, he reported: “All quiet. Some alarm excited by movement of +enemy’s cavalry. It appears to-day that they were in pursuit of a Union +prisoner who escaped to our camp. The day he left Jackson was to be +reinforced by Johnson and attack _viâ_ Luray. Another report says +Jackson is bound for Richmond. This is the fact, I have no doubt. +Jackson is on half-rations, his +supplies having been cut off by our advance. There is nothing to be +done in this Valley this side of Strasburg.” + +The same night, “after full consultation with all leading officers,” he +repeated that his troops were no longer required in the Valley, and +suggested to the Secretary of War that he should be permitted to cross +the Blue Ridge and clear the whole country north of Gordonsville. +“Enemy’s force there is far less than represented in newspapers—not +more than 20,000 at the outside. Jackson’s army is reduced, +demoralised, on half-rations. They are all concentrating for Richmond. +. . . I am now satisfied that it is the most safe and effective +disposition for our corps. I pray your favourable consideration. Such +order will electrify our force.” The force was certainly to be +electrified, but the impulse was not to come from Mr. Secretary +Stanton. + +Banks, it may have been observed, whenever his superiors wanted him to +move, had invariably the best of reasons for halting. At one time +supplies were most difficult to arrange for. At another time the enemy +was being reinforced, and his own numbers were small. But when he was +told to halt, he immediately panted to be let loose. “The enemy was not +half so strong as had been reported;” “His men were never in better +condition;” “Supplies were plentiful.” It is not impossible that Mr. +Stanton had by this time discovered, as was said of a certain +Confederate general, a _protégé_ of the President, that Banks had a +fine career before him until Lincoln “undertook to make of him what the +good Lord hadn’t, a great general.” To the daring propositions of the +late Governor and Speaker, the only reply vouchsafed was an order to +fall back on Strasburg, and to transfer Shields’ division to General +McDowell at Fredericksburg. + +But on May 3, the day Jackson disappeared behind the Blue Ridge, Banks, +to his evident discomfiture, found that his adversary had not retreated +to Richmond after all. The dashing commander, just now so anxious for +one thing or the other, either to clear the Valley or to sweep the +country north of Gordonsville, disappeared. “The +reduced, demoralised” enemy assumed alarming proportions. Nothing was +said about his half-rations; and as Ewell had reached Swift Run Gap +with a force estimated at 12,000 men, while Jackson, according to the +Federal scouts, was still near Port Republic, Banks thought it +impossible to divide his force with safety. + +Stanton’s reply is not on record, but it seems that he permitted Banks +to retain Shields until he arrived at Strasburg; and on May 5 the +Federals fell back to New Market, their commander, misled both by his +cavalry and his spies, believing that Jackson had marched to +Harrisonburg. + +On the 7th, the day that Jackson moved west from Staunton, Banks’ fears +again revived. He was still anxious that Shields should remain with +him. “Our cavalry,” he said, “from near Harrisonburg report to-night +that Jackson occupies that town, and that he has been largely +reinforced. Deserters confirm reports of Jackson’s movements in this +direction.” + +Jackson’s movements at this juncture are full of interest. Friend and +foe were both mystified. Even his own officers might well ask why, in +his march to Staunton, he deliberately adopted the terrible road to +Port Republic. From Elk Run Valley a metalled road passed over the Blue +Ridge to Gordonsville. Staunton by this route was twenty-four miles +further than by Port Republic; but there were no obstacles to rapid +marching. And the command would have arrived no later than it actually +did. Moreover, in moving to Port Republic, eleven miles only from +Harrisonburg, and within sight of the enemy’s patrols, it would seem +that there was considerable risk. Had Banks attacked the bridge whilst +the Confederate artillery was dragging heavily through the mire, the +consequences would probably have been unpleasant. Even if he had not +carried the bridge, the road which Jackson had chosen ran for several +miles over the open plain which lies eastward of the Shenandoah, and +from the commanding bluffs on the western bank his column could have +been effectively shelled without the power of reply. +In moving to Staunton the Confederate commander had three objects in +view:— + +1. To strengthen his own force by combining with Edward Johnson. + +2. To prevent the Federals combining by keeping Banks stationary and +defeating Milroy. + +3. To protect Staunton. + +The real danger that he had to guard against was that Banks, taking +advantage of his absence from the Valley, should move on Staunton. +Knowing his adversary as well as he did, he had no reason to apprehend +attack during his march to Port Republic. But it was not impossible +that when he found out that Jackson had vanished from the Valley, Banks +might take heart and join hands with Milroy. It was necessary, +therefore, in order to prevent Banks moving, that Jackson’s absence +from the Valley should be very short; also, in order to prevent Milroy +either joining Banks or taking Staunton, that Edward Johnson should be +reinforced as rapidly as possible. + +These objects would be attained by making use of the road to Port +Republic. In the first place, Banks would not dare to move towards +Milroy so long as the flank of his line of march was threatened; and in +the second place, from Port Republic to Staunton, by Mechum’s River, +was little more than two days’ march. Within forty-eight hours, +therefore, using the railway, it would be possible to strengthen +Johnson in time to protect Staunton, and to prevent the Federals +uniting. It was unlikely that Banks, even if he heard at once that his +enemy had vanished, would immediately dash forward; and even if he did +he would still have five-and-twenty miles to march before he reached +Staunton. Every precaution had been taken, too, that he should not hear +of the movement across the Blue Ridge till it was too late to take +advantage of it; and, as we have already seen, so late as May 5 he +believed that Jackson was at Harrisonburg. Ashby had done his work +well. + +It might be argued, however, that with an antagonist +so supine as Banks Jackson might have openly marched to Staunton by the +most direct route; in fact, that he need never have left the Valley at +all. But, had he taken the road across the Valley, he would have +advertised his purpose. Milroy would have received long warning of his +approach, and all chance of effecting a surprise would have been lost. + +On April 29, the day on which Jackson began his movement, Richmond was +still safe. The Yorktown lines were intact, held by the 53,000 +Confederates under Johnston; but it was very evident that they could +not be long maintained. + +A large siege train had been brought from Washington, and Johnston had +already learned that in a few days one hundred pieces of the heaviest +ordnance would open fire on his position. His own armament was +altogether inadequate to cope with such ponderous metal. His strength +was not half his adversary’s, and he had determined to retreat without +waiting to have his works demolished. + +But the mighty army in his front was not the only danger. McDowell, +with 35,000 men, had already concentrated near Falmouth. Johnston, in +falling back on Richmond, was in danger of being caught between two +fires, for to oppose McDowell on the Rappahannock Lee had been unable +to assemble more than 12,000 Confederates. + +These facts were all known to Jackson. Whether the march to Mechum’s +River was intended by him to have any further effect on the Federals +than surprising Milroy, and clearing the way for an attack on Banks, it +is impossible to say. It is indisputable, at the same time, that his +sudden disappearance from the Valley disturbed Mr. Stanton. The +Secretary of War had suspected that Jackson’s occupation of Swift Run +Gap meant mischief. McDowell, who had been instructed to cross the +Rappahannock, was ordered in consequence to stand fast at Falmouth, and +was warned that the enemy, amusing McClellan at Yorktown, might make a +sudden dash on either himself or Banks. + +A few days later McDowell reported that Jackson had passed +Gordonsville. The news came from deserters, “very +intelligent men.” The next day he was informed that Shields was to be +transferred to his command, and that he was to bear in mind his +instructions as to the defence of Washington. Banks had already been +ordered back to Strasburg. Now, a few days previously, Stanton had been +talking of co-operation between McClellan and McDowell. Directly he +learned that Jackson was east of the Blue Ridge all thought of +combination was abandoned; McDowell was held back; Shields was sent to +reinforce him; and the possible danger to Washington overrode all other +considerations. + +The weak point of McClellan’s strategy was making itself felt. In +advancing on Richmond by way of the Peninsula he had deliberately +adopted what are called in strategy “the exterior lines.” That is, his +forces were distributed on the arc of a circle, of which Richmond and +the Confederate army were the centre. If, landing on the Peninsula, he +had been able to advance at once upon Richmond, the enemy must have +concentrated for the defence of his capital, and neither Banks nor +Washington would have been disturbed. But the moment his advance was +checked, as it was at Yorktown, the enemy could detach at his leisure +in any direction that he pleased, and McClellan was absolutely unable +to support the threatened point. The strategy of exterior lines +demands, for success, a strong and continuous pressure on the enemy’s +main army, depriving him of the time and the space necessary for +counterstroke. If this is impossible, a skilful foe will at once make +use of his central position. + +Lincoln appears to have had an instinctive apprehension that McClellan +might not be able to exert sufficient pressure to hold Johnston fast, +and it was for this reason that he had fought so strongly against the +Peninsula line of invasion. It was the probability that the +Confederates would use their opportunity with which Stanton had now to +deal, complicated by the fact that their numbers were believed to be +much greater than they really were. Still the problem was not one of +insurmountable difficulty. Banks and Frémont united had 40,000 men, +McDowell over 30,000. A few marches would have brought these forces +into combination. + +Banks and Frémont, occupying Staunton, and moving on Gordonsville, +would have soon taken up communication with McDowell; an army 70,000 +strong, far larger than any force the Confederates could detach against +it, would have threatened Richmond from the north and west, and, at the +same time, would have covered Washington. This plan, though not without +elements of danger, offered some advantages. Nor were soldiers wanting +to advise it. Both Rosecrans and Shields had submitted schemes for such +a combination. Mr. Stanton, however, preferred to control the +chessboard by the light of unaided wisdom; and while McDowell was +unnecessarily strengthened, both Banks and Frémont were dangerously +weakened. + +The only single point where the Secretary showed the slightest sagacity +was in apprehending that the Confederates would make use of their +opportunity, and overwhelm one of the detachments he had so ingeniously +isolated. + +On April 29 Johnston proposed to Davis that his army should be +withdrawn from the Peninsula, and that the North should be invaded by +way of the Valley.[26] Lee, in the name of the President, replied that +some such scheme had been for some time under consideration; and the +burden of his letters, as we have seen, both to Ewell and Jackson, was +that a sudden and heavy blow should be struck at some exposed portion +of the invading armies. Mr. Stanton was so far right; but where the +blow was to be struck he was absolutely unable to divine. + +“It is believed,” he writes to the Assistant Secretary on May 8, “that +a considerable force has been sent toward the Rappahannock and +Shenandoah to move on Washington. Jackson is reinforced strongly. +Telegraph McDowell, Banks, and Hartsuff (at Warrenton) to keep a sharp +look-out. Tell General Hitchcock to see that the force around +Washington is in proper condition.” + +It was indeed unfortunate for the North that at this juncture the +military affairs of the Confederacy should have been placed in the +hands of the clearest-sighted soldier in America. It was an unequal +match, Lincoln and Stanton +against Lee; and the stroke that was to prove the weakness of the +Federal strategy was soon to fall. On May 7 Jackson westward marched in +the following order: Edward Johnson’s regiments led the way, several +miles in advance; the Third and Second Brigades followed; the +Stonewall, under General Winder, a young West Point officer of +exceptional promise, bringing up the rear. “The corps of cadets of the +Virginia Military Institute,” says Dabney, “was also attached to the +expedition; and the spruce equipments and exact drill of the youths, as +they stepped out full of enthusiasm to take their first actual look +upon the horrid visage of war, under their renowned professor, formed a +strong contrast with the war-worn and nonchalant veterans who composed +the army.”[27] + +Eighteen miles west of Staunton a Federal picket was overrun, and in +the pass leading to the Shenandoah Mountain Johnson captured a camp +that had just been abandoned. The Federal rear-guard fired a few +shells, and the Confederates went into bivouac. Johnson had marched +fourteen and Jackson twenty miles. + +That night Milroy concentrated his whole brigade of 3,700 men at +M’Dowell, a little village at the foot of the Bull Pasture Mountain, +and sent back in haste for reinforcements. Frémont’s command was much +strung out. When Milroy had moved from Cheat Mountain through Monterey, +twelve miles west of M’Dowell,[28] the remainder of the army had +started up the South Branch Valley to reinforce him. But snowstorms and +heavy rains had much delayed the march, and Schenck’s brigade had not +advanced beyond Franklin, thirty-four miles north of M’Dowell. Frémont +himself, with a couple of battalions, was approaching Petersburg, +thirty-five miles from Franklin; and Blenker’s division, still further +to the rear, had not yet quitted Romney. + +May 8 “On the following morning,” to quote from Jackson’s report, “the +march was resumed, General Johnson’s brigade still in front. The head +of the column was halted near the top of Bull Pasture Mountain, and +General Johnson, accompanied by a party of thirty men and several +officers, with a view to a reconnaissance of the enemy’s position, +ascended Sitlington’s Hill, an isolated spur on the left of the +turnpike and commanding a full view of the village of M’Dowell. From +this point the position, and to some extent the strength, of the enemy +could be seen. In the valley in which M’Dowell is situated was observed +a considerable force of infantry. To the right, on a height, were two +regiments, but too distant for an effective fire to that point. Almost +a mile in front was a battery supported by infantry. The enemy, +observing a reconnoitring party, sent a small body of skirmishers, +which was promptly met by the men with General Johnson and driven back. +For the purpose of securing the hill all of General Johnson’s regiments +were sent to him.” + +Jackson had no intention of delivering a direct assault on the Federal +position. The ground was altogether unfavourable for attack. The hill +on which his advanced guard was now established was more than two miles +broad from east to west. But it was no plateau. Rugged and precipitous +ridges towered high above the level, and numerous ravines, hidden by +thick timber, seamed the surface of the spur. To the front a slope of +smooth unbroken greensward dropped sharply down; and five hundred feet +below, behind a screen of woods, the Bull Pasture River ran swiftly +through its narrow valley. On the river banks were the Federals; and +beyond the valley the wooded mountains, a very labyrinth of hills, rose +high and higher to the west. To the right was a deep gorge, nearly half +a mile across from cliff to cliff, dividing Sitlington’s Hill from the +heights to northward; and through this dangerous defile ran the +turnpike, eventually debouching on a bridge which was raked by the +Federal guns. To the left the country presented exactly the same +features. Mountain after mountain, ridge after ridge, cleft by shadowy +crevasses, and clothed with great tracts of forest, rolled back in +tortuous masses to the backbone of the Alleghanies; a narrow pass, +leading due westward, marking the route to Monterey and the Ohio River. + +Although commanded by Sitlington’s Hill, the Federal position was +difficult to reach. The river, swollen by rain, protected it in front. +The bridge could only be approached by a single road, with inaccessible +heights on either hand. The village of M’Dowell was crowded with troops +and guns. A low hill five hundred yards beyond the bridge was occupied +by infantry and artillery; long lines of tents were ranged on the level +valley, and the hum of many voices, excited by the appearance of the +enemy, was borne upwards to the heights. Had the Confederate artillery +been brought to the brow of Sitlington’s Hill, the valley would +doubtless soon have become untenable, and the enemy have been compelled +to retire through the mountains. It was by no means easy, however, to +prevent them from getting away unscathed. But Jackson was not the man +to leave the task untried, and to content himself with a mere +cannonade. He had reason to hope that Milroy was ignorant of his +junction with General Johnson, and that he would suppose he had only +the six regiments of the latter with which to deal. The day was far +spent, and the Valley brigades, toiling through the mountains, were +still some miles behind. He proposed, therefore, while his staff +explored the mountains for a track which might lead him the next day to +the rear of the Federal position, merely to hold his ground on +Sitlington’s Hill. + +His immediate opponent, however, was a general of more resource and +energy than Banks. Milroy was at least able to supply himself with +information. On May 7 he had been advised by his scouts and spies that +Jackson and Johnson had combined, and that they were advancing to +attack him at M’Dowell. At 10 a.m. the next day Schenck’s brigade +arrived from Franklin, after a march of thirty-four miles in +twenty-three hours, and a little later the enemy’s scouts were observed +on the lofty crest of Sitlington’s Hill. The day wore on. The Federal +battery, with muzzles elevated and the trails thrust into trenches, +threw occasional shells upon the heights, and parties of skirmishers +were sent across the river to develop the Confederate strength. +Johnson, to whom Jackson had confided the defence of +the position, kept his troops carefully concealed, merely exposing +sufficient numbers to repel the Federal patrols. Late in the afternoon +a staff officer reported to Jackson that he had discovered a rough +mountain track, which, passing through the mountains to the north-west, +crossed the Bull Pasture River and came out upon the road between +M’Dowell and Franklin. Orders had just been issued to move a strong +detachment of artillery and infantry by this track during the night, +when the Federal infantry, who had crossed the bridge under shelter of +the woods, advanced in a strong line of battle up the slopes. Their +scouts had observed what they believed to be preparations for +establishing a battery on the heights, and Milroy and Schenck, with a +view of gaining time for retreat, had determined on attack. Johnson had +six regiments concealed behind the crest, in all about 2,800 men. Two +regiments of the enemy, under 1,000 strong, advanced against his front; +and shortly afterwards three regiments, bringing the numbers of the +attack up to 2,500 rifles, assailed his left. + +The Ohio and West Virginia Regiments, of which the Federal force was +composed, fought with the vigour which always characterised the Western +troops.[29] The lofty heights held by the Confederates were but an +illusory advantage. So steep were the slopes in front that the men, for +the most part, had to stand on the crest to deliver their fire, and +their line stood out in bold relief against the evening sky. “On the +other hand,” says Dabney, “though the Federal troops had to scale the +steep acclivity of the hill, they reaped the usual advantage in such +cases, resulting from the high firing of the Confederates.” The 12th +Georgia, holding the centre of Johnson’s line, displayed more valour +than judgment. Having been advanced at first in front of the crest, +they could not be persuaded to retire to the reverse of the ridge, +where other regiments found partial protection without +sacrificing the efficiency of their fire. Their commander, perceiving +their useless exposure, endeavoured again and again to withdraw them; +but amidst the roar of the musketry his voice was lifted up in vain, +and when by passing along the ranks he persuaded one wing of the +regiment to recede, they rushed again to the front while he was gone to +expostulate with the other. A tall Georgia youth expressed the spirit +of his comrades when he replied the next day to the question why they +did not retreat to the shelter of the ridge: “We did not come all this +way to Virginia to run before Yankees.”[30] Nor was the courage of the +other troops less ardent. The 44th Virginia was placed in reserve, +thirty paces in rear of the centre. “After the battle became animated,” +says the brigadier, “and my attention was otherwise directed, a large +number of the 44th quit their position, and, rushing forward, joined +the 58th and engaged in the fight, while the balance of the regiment +joined some other brigade.”[31] + +The action gradually became so fierce that Jackson sent his Third +Brigade to support the advanced guard. These nine regiments now engaged +sufficed to hold the enemy in check; the Second Brigade, which moved +towards them as darkness fell, was not engaged, and the Stonewall +regiments were still in rear. No counterstroke was delivered. Johnson +himself was wounded, and had to hand over the command; and after four +hours’ fighting the Federals fell back in perfect order under cover of +the night. Nor was there any endeavour to pursue. The Confederate +troops were superior in numbers, but there was much confusion in their +ranks; the cavalry could not act on the steep and broken ground, and +there were other reasons which rendered a night attack undesirable. + +The enemy had been repulsed at every point. The tale of casualties, +nevertheless, was by no means small. 498 Confederates, including 54 +officers, had fallen. The 12th Georgia paid the penalty for its useless +display of valour with the loss of 156 men and 19 officers. The +Federals, on the other hand, favoured by the ground, had no more than +256 killed, wounded, and missing. Only three pieces of artillery took +part in the engagement. These were Federal guns; but so great was the +angle of elevation that but one man on Sitlington’s Hill was struck by +a piece of shell. Jackson, in order to conceal his actual strength, had +declined to order up his artillery. The approach to the position, a +narrow steep ravine, wooded, and filled with boulders, forbade the use +of horses, and the guns must have been dragged up by hand with great +exertion. Moreover, the artillery was destined to form part of the +turning column, and had a long night march before it. + +Illustration: Map of the Battle of Mc.Dowell, Va., Thursday, May 8th, +1862. For larger view click on image. + +“By nine o’clock,” says Dabney, “the roar of the struggle had passed +away, and the green battle-field reposed under the starlight as calmly +as when it had been occupied only by its peaceful herds. Detachments of +soldiers were silently exploring the ground for their wounded comrades, +while, the tired troops were slowly filing off to their bivouac. At +midnight the last sufferer had been removed and the last picket posted; +and then only did Jackson turn to seek a few hours’ repose in a +neighbouring farmhouse. The valley of M’Dowell lay in equal quiet. The +camp-fires of the Federals blazed ostentatiously in long and regular +lines, and their troops seemed wrapped in sleep. At one o’clock the +general reached his quarters, and threw himself upon a bed. When his +mulatto servant, knowing that he had eaten nothing since morning, came +in with food, he said, ’I want none; nothing but sleep,’ and in a few +minutes he was slumbering like a healthy child.” + +It seems, however, that the march of the turning column had already +been countermanded. Putting himself in his enemy’s place, Jackson had +foreseen Milroy’s movements. If the one could move by night, so could +the other; and when he rode out at dawn, the Federals, as he +anticipated, had disappeared. The next day he sent a laconic despatch +to Richmond: “God blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday.” + +This announcement was doubtless received by the people of Virginia, as +Dabney declares, with peculiar delight. +On May 4 Johnston had evacuated Yorktown. On the 5th he had checked the +pursuit at Williamsburg, inflicting heavy losses, but had continued his +retreat. On the 9th Norfolk was abandoned; and on the 11th the +“Merrimac,” grounding in the James, was destroyed by her commander. +“The victory of M’Dowell was the one gleam of brightness athwart all +these clouds.” It must be admitted, however, that the victory was +insignificant. The repulse of 2,500 men by 4,000 was not a remarkable +feat; and it would even appear that M’Dowell might be ranked with the +battles of lost opportunities. A vigorous counterstroke would probably +have destroyed the whole of the attacking force. The riflemen of the +West, however, were not made of the stuff that yields readily to +superior force. The fight for the bridge would have been fierce and +bloody. Twilight had fallen before the Confederate reinforcements +arrived upon the scene; and under such conditions the losses must have +been very heavy. But to lose men was exactly what Jackson wished to +avoid. The object of his manœuvres was the destruction not of Frémont’s +advanced guard, but of Banks’ army; and if his numbers were seriously +reduced it would be impossible to attain that end. Frémont’s brigades, +moreover, protected no vital point. A decisive victory at M’Dowell +would have produced but little effect at Washington. No great results +were to be expected from operations in so distant a section of the +strategic theatre; and Jackson aimed at nothing more than driving the +enemy so far back as to isolate him from Banks. + +May 9 The next morning the small force of cavalry crossed the bridge +and rode cautiously through the mountain passes. The infantry halted +for some hours in M’Dowell in order that rations might be issued, but +the Federals made three-and-twenty miles, and were already too far +ahead to be overtaken. On the 10th and the 11th the Confederates made +forced marches, but the enemy set fire to the forests on the +mountain-side, and this desperate measure proved eminently successful. +“The sky was overcast with volumes of smoke, which wrapped every +distant object in a veil, impenetrable alike to the eyes and telescopes +of the officers. Through this sultry canopy the pursuing army felt its +way cautiously, cannonaded by the enemy from every advantageous +position, while it was protected from ambuscades only by detachments of +skirmishers, who scoured the burning woods on either side of the +highway. The general, often far in advance of the column in his +eagerness to overtake the foe, declared that this was the most adroit +expedient to which a retreating army could resort, and that it entailed +upon him all the disadvantages of a night attack. By slow approaches, +and with constant skirmishing, the Federals were driven back to +Franklin village, and the double darkness of the night and the smoke +arrested the pursuit.”[32] + +May 12 On May 12 Jackson resolved to return to the Valley. Frémont, +with Blenker’s division, was at hand. It was impossible to outflank the +enemy’s position, and time was precious, “for he knew not how soon a +new emergency at Fredericksburg or at Richmond might occasion the +recall of Ewell, and deprive him of the power of striking an effective +blow at Banks.”[33] Half the day was granted to the soldiers as a day +of rest, to compensate for the Sunday spent in the pursuit, and the +following order was issued to the command:— + +“I congratulate you on your recent victory at M’Dowell. I request you +to unite with me in thanksgiving to Almighty God for thus having +crowned your arms with success; and in praying that He will continue to +lead you on from victory to victory, until our independence shall be +established; and make us that people whose God is the Lord. The +chaplains will hold divine service at 10 a.m. on this day, in their +respective regiments.” + +Shortly after noon the march to M’Dowell was resumed. + +May 15 On the 15th the army left the mountains and encamped at Lebanon +Springs, on the road to Harrisonburg. The 16th was spent in camp, the +Confederate President having appointed a day of prayer and +fasting. On the 17th a halt was made at Mount Solon, and here Jackson +was met by Ewell, who had ridden over from Elk Run Valley. Banks had +fallen back to Strasburg, and he was now completely cut off from +Frémont. On the night of the engagement at McDowell Captain Hotchkiss +had been ordered back to the Valley, and, accompanied by a squadron of +Ashby’s cavalry, had blocked the passes by which Frémont could cross +the mountains and support his colleague. “Bridges and culverts were +destroyed, rocks rolled down, and in one instance trees were felled +along the road for nearly a mile.[34] Jackson’s object was thus +thoroughly achieved. All combination between the Federal columns, +except by long and devious routes, had now been rendered impracticable; +and there was little fear that in any operations down the Valley his +own communications would be endangered. The M’Dowell expedition had +neutralised, for the time being, Frémont’s 20,000 men; and Banks was +now isolated, exposed to the combined attack of Jackson, Ewell, and +Edward Johnson. + +One incident remains to be mentioned. During the march to Mount Solon +some companies of the 27th Virginia, who had volunteered for twelve +months, and whose time had expired, demanded their discharge. On this +being refused, as the Conscription Act was now in force, they threw +down their arms, and refused to serve another day. Colonel Grigsby +referred to the General for instructions. Jackson’s face, when the +circumstances were explained, set hard as flint. “Why,” he said, “does +Colonel Grigsby refer to me to learn how to deal with mutineers? He +should shoot them where they stand.” The rest of the regiment was +ordered to parade with loaded muskets; the insubordinate companies were +offered the choice of instant death or instant submission. The men knew +their commander, and at once surrendered. “This,” says Dabney, “was the +last attempt at organised disobedience in the Valley army.” + + [1] Major Harman wrote on March 26 that 150 wounded had been brought + to Woodstock. MS. + + [2] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 16. The telegrams and letters quoted + in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, are from this volume. + + [3] _From Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain,_ p. 133. + + [4] Commanding a division under Johnston. + + [5] On this date McClellan ceased to be Commander-in-Chief. + + [6] The bridges over the railway between Strasburg and Manassas Gap, + which would have made a second line available, had not yet been + repaired. + + [7] On April 3 Jackson wrote that the country around Banks was “very + much drained of forage.” + + [8] See _ante._ + + [9] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 50. + + [10] Dabney, vol. ii, pp. 22, 23. O.R., vol. v, p. 1087. + + [11] Cf letters of April 5. O.R., vol. xii, part iii, pp. 843, 844. + + [12] Congress, on April 16, passed a Conscription Act, under which all + able-bodied whites, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, were + compelled to serve. It was not found necessary, however, except in the + case of three religious denominations, to enforce the Act in the + Valley; and, in dealing with these sectarians, Jackson found a means + of reconciling their scruples with their duty to their State. He + organised them in companies as teamsters, pledging himself to employ + them, so far as practicable, in other ways than fighting. O.R., vol. + xii, part iii, p. 835. + + [13] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 49. + + [14] On April 5 he had over 4,000 infantry. O.R., vol. xii, part iii, + p. 844. The estimate in the text is from Colonel Allan’s _Valley + Campaign,_ p. 64. On April 9, however, he was so short of arms that + 1,000 pikes were ordered from Richmond. “Under Divine blessing,” he + wrote, “we must rely upon the bayonet when firearms cannot be + furnished.” O.R., vol. xii, part iii, pp. 842, 845. + + [15] “My own opinion,” he wrote, when this movement was in + contemplation, “is that Banks will not follow me up to the Blue Ridge. + My desire is, as far as practicable, to hold the Valley, and I hope + that Banks will be deterred from advancing [from New Market] much + further toward Staunton by the apprehension of my returning to New + Market [by Luray], and thus getting in his rear.”—O.R., vol. xii, part + iii, p. 848. + + [16] O.R., vol. xii, p. 104. + + [17] Jackson had recognised all along the mistake the Federals had + made in pushing comparatively small forces up the Valley before + McClellan closed in on Richmond. On April 5, when Banks was at + Woodstock, he wrote: “Banks is very cautious. As he belongs to + McClellan’s army, I suppose that McClellan is at the helm, and that he + would not, even if Banks so desired, permit him to advance much + farther until other parts of his army are farther advanced.” (O.R., + vol. xii, part iii, p. 843). He did not know that at the date he wrote + the President and Mr. Stanton had relieved McClellan at the helm. + + [18] The first detachment of Federals embarked at Alexandria on March + 16, and the army was thereafter transferred to the Peninsula by + successive divisions. On March 25 Johnston was ordered to be ready to + move to Richmond. On April 4 he was ordered to move at once. On that + date 50,000 Federals had landed. + + [19] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 859. + + [20] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, pp. 849, 854, 857. + + [21] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, pp. 863–4. + + [22] Jackson himself showed the same wise self-restraint. In his + communications with Ewell, after that officer had been placed under + his orders, but before they had joined hands, he suggested certain + movements as advisable, but invariably left the ultimate decision to + his subordinate’s judgment. + + [23] On April 30 Banks and Shields, who had been reinforced, numbered + 20,000 effective officers and men, of whom a portion must have been + guarding the communications. Reports of April 30 and May 31. O.R., + vol. xii, part iii. + + [24] It is amusing to note how far, at this time, his staff officers + were from understanding their commander. On this very date one of them + wrote in a private letter: “As sure as you and I live, Jackson is a + cracked man, and the sequel will show it.” A month later he must have + been sorry he had posed as a prophet. + + [25] Jackson, 6,000; Ewell, 8,000; E. Johnson, 2,800. + + [26] O.R., vol. xi, part 3, p. 477. + + [27] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 65. + + [28] See _ante,_ pp. 185, 269, 275. + + [29] Jackson fully recognised the fine fighting qualities of his + compatriots. “As Shields’ brigade (division),” he wrote on April 5, + “is composed principally of Western troops, who are familiar with the + use of arms, we must calculate on hard fighting to oust Banks if + attacked only in front, and may meet with obstinate resistance, + however the attack may be made.” + + [30] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 73. + + [31] Report of Colonel Scott, 44th Virginia Infantry. O.R., vol. xii, + part 1, p. 486. + + [32] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 77. + + [33] _Ibid,_ p. 78. On May 9, in anticipation of a movement down the + Valley, he had ordered thirty days’ forage, besides other supplies, to + be accumulated at Staunton. _Harman MS._ + + [34] Frémont’s Report, O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 11. + + + + +Chapter X +WINCHESTER + + +1862, May That week in May when the Army of the Valley marched back to +the Shenandoah was almost the darkest in the Confederate annals. The +Northern armies, improving daily in discipline and in efficiency, had +attained an ascendency which it seemed impossible to withstand. In +every quarter of the theatre of war success inclined to the Stars and +Stripes. At the end of April New Orleans, the commercial metropolis of +the South, had fallen to the Federal navy. Earlier in the month a great +battle had been fought at Shiloh, in Tennessee; one of the most trusted +of the Confederate commanders had been killed;[1] his troops, after a +gallant struggle, had been repulsed with fearful losses; and the upper +portion of the Mississippi, from the source to Memphis, had fallen +under the control of the invader. The wave of conquest, vast and +irresistible, swept up every navigable river of the South; and if in +the West only the outskirts of her territory were threatened with +destruction, in Virginia the roar of the rising waters was heard at the +very gates of Richmond. McClellan, with 112,000 men, had occupied West +Point at the head of the York River; and on May 16 his advance reached +the White House, on the Pamunkey, twenty miles from the Confederate +capital. McDowell, with 40,000 men, although still north of the +Rappahannock, was but five short marches distant.[2] +The Federal gunboats were steaming up the James; and Johnston’s army, +encamped outside the city, was menaced by thrice its numbers. + +So black was the situation that military stores had already been +removed from the capital, the archives of the Confederacy had been +packed, and Mr. Davis had made arrangements for the departure of his +family. In spite of the protests of the Virginia people the Government +had decided to abandon Richmond. The General Assembly addressed a +resolution to the President requiring him to defend the city, if +necessary, “until not a stone was left upon another.” The City Council, +enthusiastically supported by the citizens, seconded the appeal. A +deputation was sent to Mr. Davis; but while they conferred together, a +messenger rode in with the news that the mastheads of the Federal fleet +could be seen from the neighbouring hills. Davis dismissed the +committee, saying: “This manifestly concludes the matter.” + +The gunboats, however, had still to feel their way up the winding +reaches of the James. Their progress was very slow; there was time to +obstruct the passage, and batteries were hastily improvised. The people +made a mighty effort; and on the commanding heights of Drewry’s Bluff, +six miles below the city, might be seen senators and merchants, bankers +and clergymen, digging parapets and hauling timber, in company with +parties of soldiers and gangs of slaves. Heavy guns were mounted. A +great boom was constructed across the stream. When the ships approached +they were easily driven back, and men once more breathed freely in the +streets of Richmond. The example of the “Unterrified Commonwealth,” as +Virginia has been proudly named, inspired the Government, and it was +determined, come what might, that Richmond should be held. On the land +side it was already fortified. But Lee was unwilling to resign himself +to a siege. McClellan had still to cross the Chickahominy, a stream +which oozes by many channels through treacherous swamps and an +unwholesome jungle; and despite the overwhelming +numbers of the invading armies, it was still possible to strike an +effective blow. + +Few would have seen the opportunity, or, with a great army thundering +at the gates of Richmond, have dared to seize it; but it was not +McClellan and McDowell whom Lee was fighting, not the enormous hosts +which they commanded, nor the vast resources of the North. The power +which gave life and motion to the mighty mechanism of the attack lay +not within the camps that could be seen from the housetops of Richmond +and from the hills round Fredericksburg. Far away to the north, beyond +the Potomac, beneath the shadow of the Capitol at Washington, was the +mainspring of the invader’s strength. The multitudes of armed men that +overran Virginia were no more the inanimate pieces of the chess-board. +The power which controlled them was the Northern President. It was at +Lincoln that Lee was about to strike, at Lincoln and the Northern +people, and an effective blow at the point which people and President +deemed vital might arrest the progress of their armies as surely as if +the Confederates had been reinforced by a hundred thousand men. + +May 16 On May 16 Lee wrote to Jackson: “Whatever movement you make +against Banks, do it speedily, and if successful drive him back towards +the Potomac, and create the impression, as far as possible, that you +design threatening that line.” For this purpose, in addition to Ewell +and Johnson’s forces, the Army of the Valley was to be reinforced by +two brigades, Branch’s and Mahone’s, of which the former had already +reached Gordonsville. + +In this letter the idea of playing on the fears of Lincoln for the +safety of his capital first sees the light, and it is undoubtedly to be +attributed to the brain of Lee. That the same idea had been uppermost +in Jackson’s mind during the whole course of the campaign is proved not +only by the evidence of his chief of the staff, but by his +correspondence with headquarters. “If Banks is defeated,” he had +written on April 5, “it may directly retard McClellan’s movements.” It +is true that nowhere in his correspondence +is the idea of menacing Washington directly mentioned, nor is there the +slightest evidence that he suggested it to Lee. But in his letters to +his superiors he confines himself strictly to the immediate subject, +and on no single occasion does he indulge in speculation on possible +results. In the ability of the Commander-in-Chief he had the most +implicit confidence. “Lee,” he said, “is the only man I know whom I +would follow blindfold,” and he was doubtless assured that the +embarrassments of the Federal Government were as apparent to Lee as to +himself. That the same idea should have suggested itself independently +to both is hardly strange. Both looked further than the enemy’s camps; +both studied the situation in its broadest bearings; both understood +the importance of introducing a disturbing element into the enemy’s +plans; and both were aware that the surest means of winning battles is +to upset the mental equilibrium of the opposing leader. + +Before he reached Mount Solon Jackson had instructed Ewell to call up +Branch’s brigade from Gordonsville. He intended to follow Banks with +the whole force at his disposal, and in these dispositions Lee had +acquiesced. Johnston, however, now at Richmond, had once more resumed +charge of the detached forces, and a good deal of confusion ensued. +Lee, intent on threatening Washington, was of opinion that Banks should +be attacked. Johnston, although at first he favoured such a movement, +does not appear to have realised the effect that might be produced by +an advance to the Potomac. Information had been received that Banks was +constructing intrenchments at Strasburg, and Johnston changed his mind. +He thought the attack too hazardous, and Ewell was directed to cross +the Blue Ridge and march eastward, while Jackson “observed” Banks. + +These orders placed Ewell in a dilemma. Under instructions from Lee he +was to remain with Jackson. Under instructions from Jackson he was +already moving on Luray. Johnston’s orders changed his destination. +Taking horse in haste he rode across the Valley from Swift Run Gap to +Jackson’s camp at Mount Solon. Jackson at once telegraphed to Lee: “I +am of opinion +that an attempt should be made to defeat Banks, but under instructions +from General Johnston I do not feel at liberty to make an attack. +Please answer by telegraph at once.” To Ewell he gave orders that he +should suspend his movement until a reply was received. “As you are in +the Valley district,” he wrote, “you constitute part of my command. . . +. You will please move so as to encamp between New Market and Mount +Jackson on next Wednesday night, unless you receive orders from a +superior officer and of a date subsequent to the 16th instant.” + +[Illustration: Map of the Situation on May 18th, 1862.] + +This order was written at Ewell’s own suggestion. It was for this he +had ridden through the night to Jackson’s camp. + +May 18 Lee’s reply was satisfactory. Johnston had already summoned +Branch to Richmond, but Ewell was to remain; and the next morning, May +18, the Confederates moved forward down the Valley. The two days’ rest +which had been granted to Jackson’s troops had fallen at a useful time. +They had marches to look back on which had tried their endurance to the +utmost. In three days, before and after Kernstown, they had covered +fifty-six miles, and had fought a severe engagement. The struggle with +the mud on the Port Republic was only surpassed by the hardships of the +march to Romney. From Elk Run to Franklin, and from Franklin to Mount +Solon, is just two hundred miles, and these they had traversed in +eighteen days. But the exertions which had been then demanded from them +were trifling in comparison with those which were to come. From Mount +Solon to Winchester is eighty miles by the Valley pike; to Harper’s +Ferry one hundred and ten miles. And Jackson had determined that before +many days had passed the Confederate colours should be carried in +triumph through the streets of Winchester, and that the gleam of his +camp-fires should be reflected in the waters of the Potomac. + +Johnston believed that Banks, behind the earthworks at Strasburg, was +securely sheltered. Jackson saw that his enemy had made a fatal +mistake, and that his earthworks, skilfully and strongly constructed as +they were, were no more than a snare and a delusion. + +Ashby had already moved to New Market; and a strong cordon of pickets +extended along Pugh’s Run near Woodstock, within sight of the Federal +outposts, and cutting off all communication between Strasburg and the +Upper Valley. Ewell’s cavalry regiments, the 2nd and 6th Virginia, held +the Luray Valley, with a detachment east of the Blue Ridge. + +May 20 On the 20th Jackson arrived at New Market, thirty miles from +Mount Solon. Ewell had meanwhile marched to Luray, and the two wings +were now on either side of the Massanuttons. On his way to New Market +Jackson had been joined by the Louisiana brigade of Ewell’s division. +This detachment seems to have been made with the view of inducing Banks +to believe, should information filter through Ashby’s pickets, that the +whole Confederate force was advancing direct on Strasburg. + +The Army of the Valley numbered nearly 17,000 officers and men.[3] +Ewell’s effective strength was 7,500; Johnson’s 2,500; Jackson’s 6,000; +and there were eleven batteries. + +The troops were now organised in two divisions:— + +JACKSON’S DIVISION + + First (Stonewall) Brigade, General Winder: 2nd Virginia, 4th + Virginia, 5th Virginia, 27th Virginia, 33rd Virginia. + Second Brigade, Colonel Campbell: 21st Virginia, 42nd Virginia, + 48th Virginia, 1st Regulars (Irish). + Third Brigade, Colonel Taliaferro: 10th Virginia, 23rd Virginia, + 37th Virginia. + Cavalry, Colonel Ashby: 7th Virginia. + Artillery: 5 batteries (1 horse-artillery), 22 guns. + +EWELL’S DIVISION + + Taylor’s Brigade: 6th Louisiana, 7th Louisiana, 8th Louisiana, 9th + Louisiana, Wheat’s Battalion (Louisiana Tigers). + Trimble’s Brigade: 21st North Carolina, 21st Georgia, 15th Alabama, + 16th Mississippi. + Elzey’s Brigade and Scott’s Brigade: 13th Virginia, 31st Virginia, + 25th Virginia, 12th Georgia. (late Johnson’s), 44th Virginia, 52nd + Virginia, 58th Virginia. + + Maryland Line: 1st Maryland. + Cavalry, General G. H. Steuart: 2nd Virginia, Colonel Munford: 6th + Virginia, Colonel Flournoy. + Artillery: 6 batteries, 26 guns. + +For the first time in his career Jackson found himself in command of a +considerable force. The greater part of the troops were Virginians, and +with these he was personally acquainted. The strange contingents were +Taylor’s and Trimble’s brigades, and Steuart’s cavalry. These had yet +to be broken to his methods of war and discipline. There was no reason, +however, to fear that they would prove less efficient than his own +division. They had as yet seen little fighting, but they were well +commanded. Ewell was a most able soldier, full of dash and daring, who +had seen much service on the Indian frontier. He was an admirable +subordinate, ready to take responsibility if orders were not +forthcoming, and executing his instructions to the letter. His +character was original. His modesty was only equalled by his +eccentricity. “Bright, prominent eyes, a bomb-shaped bald head, and a +nose like that of Francis of Valois, gave him a striking resemblance to +a woodcock; and this was increased by a bird-like habit of putting his +head on one side to utter his quaint speeches. He fancied that he had +some mysterious internal malady, and would eat nothing but frumenty, a +preparation of wheat; and his plaintive way of talking of his disease, +as if he were someone else, was droll in the extreme. “What do you +suppose President Davis made me a major-general for?” beginning with a +sharp accent, ending with a gentle lisp, was a usual question to his +friends. Superbly mounted, he was the boldest of horsemen, invariably +leaving the roads to take timber and water; and with all his oddities, +perhaps in some measure because of them, he was adored by officers and +men.”[4] To Jackson he must have been peculiarly acceptable; not indeed +as an intimate, for Ewell, at this period of the war, was by no means +regenerate, and swore like a cowboy: but he knew the value of time, and +rated celerity of movement as high as did Napoleon. His instructions to +Branch, when the march against Banks was first projected, might have +emanated from Jackson himself: “You cannot bring tents; tent-flies +without poles, or tents cut down to that size, and only as few as are +indispensable. No mess-chests, trunks, etc. It is better to leave these +things where you are than to throw them away after starting. We can get +along without anything but food and ammunition. The road to glory +cannot be followed with much baggage.”[5] + +Trimble, too, was a good officer, an able tactician and a resolute +leader. He had hardly, however, realised as yet that the movements of a +brigade must be subordinated to those of the whole army, and he was +wont to grumble if his troops were held back, or were not allowed to +pursue some local success. Steuart was also a West Pointer, but with +much to learn. Taylor and his Louisianians played so important a part +in the ensuing operations that they deserve more detailed mention. The +command was a mixed one. One of the regiments had been recruited from +the roughs of New Orleans. The 7th and 9th were composed of planters +and sons of planters, the majority of them men of fortune. “The 6th,” +writes the brigadier, “were Irishmen, stout, hardy fellows, turbulent +in camp and requiring a strong hand, but responding to justice and +kindness, and ready to follow their officers to the death. The 8th were +from the Attakapas—Acadians, the race of whom Longfellow sings in +“Evangeline”—a home-loving, simple people; few spoke English, fewer +still had ever moved ten miles from their native cabanas; and the war +to them was a liberal education. They had all the light gaiety of the +Gaul, and, after the manner of their ancestors, were born cooks. A +capital regimental band accompanied them, and whenever weather and +ground permitted, even after long marches, they would waltz and polk in +couples with as much zest as if their arms encircled the supple waists +of the Celestines and Melazies of their native Teche. The Valley +soldiers were largely of the Presbyterian faith, and of a solemn, pious +demeanour, +and looked askance at the caperings of my Creoles, holding them to be +“devices and snares.”’[6] + +Taylor himself had been educated at West Point. He was a man of high +position, of unquestioned ability, an excellent disciplinarian, and a +delightful writer. More than other commanders he had paid great +attention to the marching of his men. He had an eye to those practical +details which a good regimental officer enforces with so much effect. +Boots were properly fitted; the troops were taught the advantages of +cold water, and how to heal abrasions; halts upon the march were made +at frequent intervals, and the men soon held that to fall out on the +march was a disgrace. Before a month “had passed,” he says, “the +brigade had learned how to march, and in the Valley with Jackson +covered long distances without leaving a straggler behind.”[7] + +Jackson’s first meeting with the Louisiana troops has been described by +their commander:— + +“A mounted officer was dispatched to report our approach and select a +camp, which proved to be beyond Jackson’s forces, then lying in the +fields on both sides of the Valley pike. Over 3,000 strong, neat in +fresh clothing of grey with white gaiters, bands playing at the head of +their regiments—not a straggler, but every man in his place, stepping +jauntily as if on parade, though it had marched twenty miles or more—in +open column, with the rays of the declining sun flaming on polished +bayonets, the brigade moved down the hard smooth pike, and wheeled on +to the camping-ground. Jackson’s men, by thousands, had gathered on +either side of the road to see us pass. + +“After attending to necessary camp details, I sought Jackson, whom I +had never met. The mounted officer who had been sent on in advance +pointed out a figure perched on the topmost rail of a fence overlooking +the road and field, and said it was Jackson. Approaching, I saluted and +declared my name and rank, then waited for a response. Before this came +I had time to see a pair of +cavalry boots covering feet of gigantic size, a mangy cap with visor +drawn low, a heavy dark beard and weary eyes, eyes I afterwards saw +filled with intense but never brilliant light. A low gentle voice +inquired the road and distance marched that day. ‘Keezleton road, +six-and-twenty miles.’ ‘You seem to have no stragglers.’ ‘Never allow +straggling.’ ‘You must teach my people; they straggle badly.’ A bow in +reply. Just then my Creoles started their band for a waltz. After a +contemplative suck at a lemon, ‘Thoughtless fellows for serious work’ +came forth. I expressed a hope that the work would not be less well +done because of the gaiety. A return to the lemon gave me the +opportunity to retire. Where Jackson got his lemons ‘No fellow could +find out,’ but he was rarely without one. To have lived twelve miles +from that fruit would have disturbed him as much as it did the witty +dean.”[8] + +May 21 The next day, marching in the grey of the morning, the force +moved north, the Louisianians in advance. Suddenly, after covering a +short distance, the head of the column was turned to the right; and the +troops, who had confidently expected that Strasburg would be the scene +of their next engagement, found themselves moving eastward and crossing +the Massanuttons. The men were utterly at sea as to the intentions of +their commander. Taylor’s brigade had been encamped near Conrad’s +Store, only a few miles distant, not many days before, and they had now +to solve the problem why they should have made three long marches in +order to return to their former position. No word came from Jackson to +enlighten them. From time to time a courier would gallop up, report, +and return to Luray, but the general, absorbed in thought, rode +silently across the mountain, perfectly oblivious of inquiring glances. + +At New Market the troops had been halted at crossroads, and they had +marched by that which they had least expected. The camp at Luray on the +21st presented the same puzzle. One road ran east across the mountains +to Warrenton or Culpeper; a second north to Front Royal +and Winchester; and the men said that halting them in such a position +was an ingenious device of Jackson’s to prevent them fathoming his +plans.[9] + +May 22 The next day, the 22nd, the army, with Ewell leading, moved +quietly down the Luray Valley, and the advanced guard, Taylor’s +Louisianians, a six-pounder battery, and the 6th Virginia Cavalry, +bivouacked that night within ten miles of Front Royal, held by a strong +detachment of Banks’ small army. + +Since they had Left Mount Solon and Elk Run Valley on May 19 the troops +in four days had made just sixty miles. Such celerity of movement was +unfamiliar to both Banks and Stanton, and on the night of the 22nd +neither the Secretary nor the general had the faintest suspicion that +the enemy had as yet passed Harrisonburg. There was serenity at +Washington. On both sides of the Blue Ridge everything was going well. +The attack on Frémont had not been followed up; and McClellan, though +calling urgently for reinforcements, was sanguine of success. Mr. +Lincoln, reassured by Jackson’s retreat from Franklin, had permitted +Shields to march to Falmouth; and McDowell, with a portion of his +troops, had already crossed the Rappahannock. The President of the +Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, an important personage at Washington, +appears to have been alone in his apprehension that a storm was +gathering in the summer sky. “The aspect of affairs in the Valley of +Virginia,” he wrote to Stanton, “is becoming very threatening. . . . +The enterprise and vigour of Jackson are well known. . . . Under the +circumstances will it not be more judicious to order back General +Shields to co-operate with General Banks? Such a movement might be +accomplished in time to prevent disaster.”[10] The Secretary, however, +saw no reason for alarm. His strategical combinations were apparently +working without a hitch. Banks at Strasburg was in a strong position; +and McDowell was about to lend the aid which would enable McClellan to +storm the rebel capital. One of Frémont’s columns, under General Cox, a +most able officer, which was making good progress towards the Virginia +and Tennessee Railroad, had certainly been compelled to halt when +Milroy was driven back to Franklin. Yet the defeated troops were +rapidly reorganising, and Frémont would soon resume his movement. +Milroy’s defeat was considered no more than an incident of _la petite +guerre._ Washington seemed so perfectly secure that the recruiting +offices had been closed, and the President and Secretary, anticipating +the immediate fall of Richmond, left for Fredericksburg the next day. +McDowell was to march on the 26th, and the departure of his fine army +was to be preceded by a grand review. + +Even Banks, though Shields had marched to Fredericksburg, reducing his +force by a half, believed that there was no immediate reason to fear +attack. “I regard it as certain,” he wrote, “that Jackson will move +north as far as New Market . . . a position which enables him to +cooperate with General Ewell, who is still at Swift Run Gap.” Yet he +took occasion to remind Mr. Stanton of the “persistent adherence of +Jackson to the defence of the Valley, and his well-known purpose to +expel the Government troops. This,” he added, “may be assumed as +certain. There is probably no one more fixed and determined purpose in +the whole circle of the enemy’s plans.” Banks had certainly learned +something of Jackson by this time, but he did not yet know all. + +So on this night of May 22 the President and his people were without +fear of what the morrow might bring forth. The end of the rebellion +seemed near at hand. Washington was full of the anticipated triumph. +The crowds passed to and fro in the broad avenues, exchanging +congratulations on the success of the Northern arms and the approaching +downfall of the slaveholders. The theatres were filled with delighted +audiences, who hailed every scoffing allusion to the “Southern +chivalry” with enthusiasm, and gaiety and confidence reigned supreme. +Little dreamt the light-hearted multitude that, in the silent woods of +the Luray Valley, a Confederate army lay asleep beneath the stars. +Little dreamt Lincoln, or Banks, or Stanton, that +not more than seventy miles from Washington, and less than thirty from +Strasburg, the most daring of their enemies, waiting for the dawn to +rise above the mountains, was pouring out his soul in prayer, + +Appealing from his native sod +_In formâ pauperis_ to God: +“Lay bare Thine arm—stretch forth Thy rod. + Amen!” That’s Stonewall’s way. + +It is not always joy that cometh in the morning, least of all to +generals as ignorant as Banks when they have to do with a skilful foe. +It was not altogether Banks’ fault that his position was a bad one. +Stanton had given him a direct order to take post at Strasburg or its +vicinity, and to send two regiments to hold the bridges at Front Royal. +But Banks had made no remonstrance. He had either failed to recognise, +until it was too late, that the force at Front Royal would be exposed +to attack from the Luray Valley, and, if the post fell, that his own +communications with both Winchester and Washington would be at once +endangered; or he had lost favour with the Secretary. For some time +past Mr. Stanton’s telegrams had been cold and peremptory. There had +been no more effusive praise of “cautious vigour” and “interesting +manœuvres;” and Banks had gradually fallen from the command of a large +army corps to the charge of a single division. + +His 10,000 men were thus distributed. At Strasburg were 4,500 infantry, +2,900 cavalry, and 16 guns. At Winchester 850 infantry and 600 cavalry. +Two companies of infantry held Buckton station on the Manassas Gap +Railway, midway between Strasburg and Front Royal.[11] At Rectortown, +east of the Blue Ridge, nineteen miles from Front Royal, was General +Geary with 2,000 infantry and cavalry; these troops, however, were +independent of Banks. + +Front Royal, twelve miles east of Strasburg, was committed to the +charge of Colonel Kenly, of the 1st Maryland Regiment in the Federal +service, and 1,000 rifles and 2 guns were placed at his disposal. The +post itself was +indefensible. To the west and south-west, about three miles distant, +stand the green peaks of the Massanuttons, while to the east the lofty +spurs of the Blue Ridge look down into the village streets. A mile and +a half north the forks of the Shenandoah unite in the broad river that +runs to Harper’s Ferry. The turnpike to Winchester crosses both forks +in succession, at a point where they are divided by a stretch of +meadows a mile in width. In addition to these two bridges, a wooden +viaduct carried the railway over the South Fork, whence, passing +between the North Fork and the Massanuttons, it runs south of the +stream to Strasburg. Kenly had pitched his camp between the town and +the river, covering the bridges, and two companies were on picket +beyond the houses. + +In front were the dense forests which fill the Luray Valley and cover +the foothills of the mountains, and the view of the Federal sentries +was very limited. A strong patrol of 100 infantry and 30 troopers, +which had been sent out on the 20th, had marched eleven miles south, +had bivouacked in the woods, and had captured a Confederate straggler. +The officer in command had obtained information, by questioning +civilians, that Confederate infantry was expected, and this was +confirmed by his prisoner. Banks, however, notwithstanding this report, +could not bring himself to believe that an attack was imminent, and the +cavalry was called back to Strasburg. For this reason Kenly had been +unable to patrol to any distance on the 22nd, and the security of his +camp was practically dependent on the vigilance of his sentries. + +May 23 On the morning of May 23 there was no token of the approaching +storm. The day was intensely hot, and the blue masses of the mountains +shimmered in the summer haze. In the Luray Valley to the south was no +sign of life, save the buzzards sailing lazily above the slumbrous +woods. Suddenly, and without the least warning, a long line of +skirmishers broke forward from the forest. The clear notes of the +Confederate bugles, succeeded by the crash of musketry, woke the echoes +of the Blue Ridge, and the Federal pickets were driven in +confusion through the village. The long roll of the drums beat the +startled camp to arms, and Kenly hastily drew up his slender force upon +a ridge in rear. + +The ground in front of his position was fairly open, and with his two +pieces of artillery he was able to check the first rush of the +Confederate infantry. The guns which had accompanied their advanced +guard were only smooth-bores, and it was some time before a battery +capable of making effective reply to the Federal pieces was brought up. +As soon as it opened fire the Southern infantry was ordered to attack; +and while one regiment, working round through the woods on the enemy’s +left, endeavoured to outflank his guns, four others, in successive +lines, advanced across the plain against his front. The Federals, +undismayed by the disparity of numbers, were fighting bravely, and had +just been reinforced by a squadron of New York regiment, when word was +brought to their commander that a regiment of Southern cavalry had +appeared between the rivers to his right rear. He at once gave the +order to retire. The movement was carried out in good order, under +heavy musketry, and the tents and stores were given to the flames; but +an attempt to fire the bridges failed, for the Louisiana infantry, +rushing recklessly forward, darted into the flames, and extinguished +the burning brands. Sufficient damage was done, however, to render the +passage of the North Fork by the Confederates slow and difficult; and +Kenly took post on Guard Hill, a commanding ridge beyond the stream. +Again there was delay. The smoke of the burning camp, rolling past in +dense volumes, formed an impenetrable screen; the river was deep and +turbulent, with a strong current; and the Federal guns commanded the +single bridge. The cavalry, however, were not long in discovering a +practicable ford. The river was soon alive with horsemen; and, forcing +their way through the swirling waters, four squadrons of the 6th +Virginia, accompanied by Jackson, gained the further bank, and formed +up rapidly for pursuit. The enemy had already retired, and the dust of +the retreating column warn receding fast down the road to Winchester. + +Without waiting for reinforcements, and without artillery, Jackson +urged the 6th Virginia forward. The country through which the turnpike +runs is rolling and well-farmed, and the rail fences on either hand +made movement across the fields by no means easy. But the Confederate +advance was vigorous. The New York cavalry, pressed at every point, +were beginning to waver; and near the little hamlet of Cedarville, some +three miles from his last position, Kenly gave orders for his infantry +to check the pursuit. + +The column had halted. Men were tearing down the fences, and the +companies were forming for battle in the fields, when there was a +sudden outcry, the rolling thunder of many hoofs, and the sharp rattle +of pistol-shots. A dense cloud of dust came whirling down the turnpike, +and emerging from the yellow canopy the New York troopers, riding for +their lives, dashed through the ranks of the startled infantry, while +the Confederate horsemen, extending far to right and left, came surging +on their traces. + +The leading squadron, keeping to the high road, was formed four +abreast, and the deep mass was wedged tightly between the fences. The +foremost files were mowed down by a volley at close range, and here, +for a moment, the attack was checked. But the Virginians meant riding +home. On either flank the supporting squadrons galloped swiftly +forward, and up the road and across the fields, while the earth shook +beneath their tread, swept their charging lines, the men yelling in +their excitement and horses as frenzied as their riders. In vain the +Federal officers tried to deploy their companies. Kenly, calling on +them to rally round the colours, was cut down with a dreadful wound. +The grey troopers fell on them before they could fix bayonets or form a +front, and sabre and revolver found an easy mark in the crowded masses +of panic-stricken infantry. One of the guns was surrounded, and the +gunners were cut to pieces; the other escaped for the moment, but was +soon abandoned; and with the appearance of a fresh Confederate squadron +on the scene Kenly’s whole force dispersed in flight. Through woods and +orchards +the chase went on. Escape was impossible. Hundreds laid down their +arms; and 250 Virginia horsemen, resolutely handled and charging at +exactly the right moment, had the honour of bringing in as prisoners +600 Federals, including 20 officers and a complete section of +artillery. The enemy lost in addition 32 killed and 122 wounded. The +Confederate casualties were 11 killed and 15 wounded, and so sudden and +vigorous was their attack that a Federal colonel estimated their +numbers at 3,000. + +Colonel Flournoy, a most daring officer, led the squadrons to the +charge; but that the opportunity was so instantly utilised was due to +Jackson. “No sooner,” says Dabney, “did he see the enemy than he gave +the order to charge with a voice and air whose peremptory determination +was communicated to the whole party. His quick eye estimated aright the +discouragement of the Federals and their wavering temper. Infusing his +own spirit into his men, he struck the hesitating foe at the decisive +moment, and shattered them.”[12] Yet he took no credit to himself. He +declared afterwards to his staff that he had never, in all his +experience of warfare, seen so gallant and effective a charge of +cavalry, and such commendation, coming from his guarded lips, was the +highest honour that his troopers could have wished. + +While these events were in progress the remainder of the Confederate +cavalry had also been busy. The 7th Virginia had moved to Buckton. The +railway was torn up, the telegraph line cut, and an urgent message to +Banks for reinforcements was intercepted. The two companies of +Pennsylvania infantry, on picket near the station, occupied a log +storehouse and the embankment. Dismounting his command, Ashby, after a +fierce fight, in which two of his best officers were killed, stormed +the building and drove out the garrison. Two locomotives were standing +on the rails with steam up, and by this means the Federals attempted to +escape. Twice they moved out towards Strasbourg, twice they were driven +back by the Confederate carbines, and eventually the two companies +surrendered. + +Jackson’s measures had been carefully thought out. Kenly’s patrols had +failed to discover his advance in the early morning, for at Asbury +Chapel, about three and a half miles south of the Federal outpost line, +he had turned to the right off the Luray road, and plunging into the +woods, had approached Front Royal by a circuitous track, so rough that +the enemy had thought it hardly worth while to watch it. The main body +of the cavalry left the Luray road at McCoy’s Ford, and crossing the +South Fork of the Shenandoah, worked through the forest at the foot of +the Massanuttons. During the night Ashby had withdrawn the 7th +Virginia, with the exception of a few patrols, from in front of Banks, +and joining Jackson, by a rough track across the mountains, before +daybreak, had been directed to cut the communication between Front +Royal and Strasburg. The 6th Virginia had accompanied Jackson, the 2nd, +under Colonel Munford, destroyed the railway bridges eastward of Front +Royal. Had Kenly retreated on Strasburg he would have found Ashby on +his flank. Had reinforcements been despatched from Strasburg they would +have had to deal with Ashby before they could reach Kenly. Had the +Federals attempted to escape by Manassas Gap they would have found +Munford across their path. Meanwhile another party of cavalry had cut +the telegraph between Front Royal and Washington; and a strong +detachment, scouring the country east of the Blue Ridge, checked +Geary’s patrols, and blocked the entrance to the Gap from the direction +of Manassas. Within an hour after his pickets were surprised Kenly was +completely isolated.[13] + +A failure in staff duties marred to some extent the Confederate +success. “A vicious usage,” according to Dabney, “obtained at this time +in the Southern armies. This was the custom of temporarily attaching to +the staff of a general commanding a division or an army a company of +cavalry to do the work of orderlies. By this clumsy contrivance the +organisation of the cavalry regiments was broken up, the men detached +were deprived of all opportunity for drill, and the general had no +evidence whatever of their special fitness for the responsible service +confided to them. Nay, the colonel of cavalry required to furnish them +was most likely to select the least serviceable company. At the time of +the combat of Front Royal the duty of orderlies was performed for +General Jackson by a detachment from one of Ashby’s undisciplined +companies, of whom many were raw youths just recruited and never under +fire. As soon as the Federal pickets were driven in, orders were +despatched to the rear brigades to avoid the laborious route taken by +the advance, and to pursue the direct highway to the town, a level +track of three miles, in place of a steep byway of seven or eight. The +panic-struck boy by whom the orders were sent was seen no more. When +Jackson sent orders to the artillery and rear brigades to hurry the +pursuit, instead of being found near at hand, upon the direct road, +they were at length overtaken toiling over the hills of the useless +circuit, spent with the protracted march. Thus night overtook them by +the time they reached the village. This unfortunate incident taught the +necessity of a picked company of orderlies, selected for their +intelligence and courage, permanently attached to headquarters, and +owing no subordination to any other than the general and his staff. +Such was the usage that afterwards prevailed in the Confederate +armies.[14] + +General Gordon has described with much minuteness how the news of the +disaster was received at Strasburg. The attack had begun at one +o’clock, but it was not till four that Banks was made aware that his +detachment was in jeopardy. Believing that Jackson was at Harrisonburg, +sixty miles distant, he had certainly no cause for immediate +apprehension. The Valley towards Woodstock never looked more peaceful +than on that sleepy summer afternoon; the sentries dawdled on their +posts, and officers and men alike resigned themselves to its restful +influence. Suddenly a mounted orderly dashed violently through the +camp, and Strasburg was aroused. By the road to Buckton Banks hastily +despatched a regiment and two guns. Then came a lull, and many anxious +inquiries: “What is it? Is it Stonewall Jackson, or only a cavalry +raid?” + +A few hours later reports came in from the field of battle, and Banks +telegraphed to Stanton that 5,000 rebels had driven Kenly back on +Middletown. “The force,” he added, “has been gathering in the +mountains, it is said, since Wednesday.” + +But still the Federal general showed no undue alarm. + +“Nothing was done,” says Gordon, “towards sending away to Winchester +any of the immense quantities of public stores collected at Strasburg; +no movement had been made to place our sick in safety. It did not seem +as if Banks interpreted the attack to signify aught of future or +further movement by the enemy, or that it betokened any purpose to cut +us off from Winchester. I was so fully impressed, however, with +Jackson’s purpose, that as soon as night set in I sought Banks at his +headquarters. I laboured long to impress upon him what I thought a +duty, to wit, his immediate retreat upon Winchester, carrying all his +sick and all his supplies that he could transport, and destroying the +remainder. Notwithstanding all my solicitations and entreaties, he +persistently refused to move, ever repeating, “I must develop the force +of the enemy.”[15] + +The force that had been sent out on the Buckton road had been soon +recalled, without securing further information +than that the Confederate pickets were in possession of every road +which led west or north from Front Royal. + +Again did Gordon, at the request of Banks’ chief of the staff, +endeavour to persuade the general to abandon Strasburg. “‘It is not a +retreat,’ he urged, ‘but a true military movement to escape from being +cut off; to prevent stores and sick from falling into the hands of the +enemy.’ Moved with an unusual fire, General Banks, who had met all my +arguments with the single reply, “I must develop the force of the +enemy,’ rising excitedly from his seat, with much warmth and in loud +tones exclaimed, ‘By God, sir, I will not retreat! We have more to +fear, sir, from the opinions of our friends than the bayonets of our +enemies!’ The thought,” continues the brigadier, “so long the subject +of his meditations was at last out. Banks was afraid of being thought +afraid. I rose to take my leave, replying, ‘This, sir, is not a +military reason for occupying a false position.’ It was eleven o’clock +at night when I left him. As I returned through the town I could not +perceive that anybody was troubled with anticipation for the morrow. +The antlers were driving sharp bargains with those who had escaped from +or those who were not amenable to military discipline. The strolling +players were moving crowds to noisy laughter in their canvas booths, +through which the lights gleamed and the music sounded with startling +shrillness. I thought as I turned towards my camp, how unaware are all +of the drama Jackson is preparing for us, and what merriment the +morning will reveal!” + +Fortunately for his own battalions, the brigadier had his camp equipage +and baggage packed and sent off then and there to Winchester, and +though his men had to spend the night unsheltered under persistent +rain, they had reason to bless his foresight a few nights later. + +At midnight a report was received from one of the Front Royal +fugitives: “Kenly is killed. First Maryland cut to pieces. Cavalry +ditto. The enemy’s forces are 15,000 or 20,000 strong, and on the march +to Strasburg.” + +In forwarding this despatch to Washington Banks +remarked that he thought it much exaggerated. At 7 a.m. on the 24th he +told Stanton that the enemy’s force was from 6,000 to 10,000; that it +was probably Ewell’s division, and that Jackson was still in his front +on the Valley turnpike. + +Three hours later he wrote to Gordon, informing him that the enemy had +fallen back to Front Royal during the night, that ample reinforcements +had been promised from Washington, and that the division would remain +in Strasburg until further orders. + +Up to this time he had been convinced that the attack on Front Royal +was merely a raid, and that Jackson would never dare to insert his +whole force between himself and McDowell.[16] Suddenly, by what means +we are not told, he was made aware that the Confederates were in +overwhelming numbers, and that Jackson was in command. + +Scarcely had General Gordon digested the previous communication when an +orderly, galloping furiously to his side, delivered a pencil note from +the chief of staff. “Orders have just been received for the division to +move at once to Middletown, taking such steps to oppose the enemy, +reported to be on the road between Front Royal and Middletown, as may +seem proper.” Banks was electrified at last. Three weeks previously, in +writing to Mr. Stanton, he had expressed his regret that he was “not to +be included in active operations during the summer.” His regret was +wasted. He was about to take part in operations of which the activity, +on his part at least, was more than satisfying. + +Such blindness as Banks had shown is difficult to explain. His latest +information, previous to the attack on Kenly, told him that Jackson’s +trains were arriving at Harrisonburg on the 20th, and he should +certainly have inferred that Jackson was in advance of his waggons. Now +from Harrisonburg across the Massanuttons to Front Royal is fifty-five +miles; so it was well within the bounds of possibility that the +Confederates might reach the +latter village at midday on the 23rd. Moreover, Banks himself had +recognised that Strasburg was an unfavourable position. It is true that +it was fortified, but therein lay the very reason that would induce the +enemy to turn it by Front Royal. Nor did the idea, which seems to have +held possession of his mind throughout the night, that Ewell alone had +been sent to destroy Kenly, and had afterwards fallen back, show much +strategic insight. Front Royal was the weak point in the Federal +position. It was of all things unlikely that a commander, energetic and +skilful as Jackson was well known to be, would, when he had once +advertised his presence, fail to follow up his first blow with his +whole force and the utmost vigour. It is only fair to add that the +Federal authorities were no wiser than their general. At two a.m. on +the morning of the 24th, although the news of Kenly’s disaster had been +fully reported, they still thought that there was time to move fresh +troops to Strasburg from Baltimore and Washington. It seemed incredible +that Jackson could be at Front Royal. “Arrangements are making,” ran +Stanton’s telegram to Banks, “to send you ample reinforcements. Do not +give up the ship before succour can arrive.” + +We may now turn to Jackson. + +Up to the present his operations had been perfectly successful. He had +captured over 700 of the enemy, with a loss of only 40 or 50 to +himself. He had seized stores to the value of three hundred thousand +dollars (60,000 pounds), and a large quantity had been burned by the +enemy. He had turned the intrenched position at Strasburg. He +threatened the Federal line of retreat. Banks was completely at his +mercy, and there seemed every prospect of inflicting on that +ill-starred commander a defeat so decisive as to spread panic in the +council chambers of the Northern capital. + +But the problem was not so simple as it seemed. In the first place, +although the positions of the Federals had been thoroughly examined, +both by staff officers and scouts, the information as to their numbers +was somewhat vague. Banks had actually about 8000 effectives at +Strasburg; +but so far as the Confederates knew it was quite possible that he had +from 12,000 to 15,000. There is nothing more difficult in war than to +get an accurate estimate of the enemy’s numbers, especially when +civilians, ignorant of military affairs, are the chief sources of +information. The agents on whom Jackson depended for intelligence from +within the enemy’s lines were not always selected because of their +military knowledge. “On the march to Front Royal,” says General Taylor, +“we reached a wood extending from the mountain to the river, when a +mounted officer from the rear called Jackson’s attention, who rode back +with him. A moment later there rushed out of the wood a young, rather +well-looking woman, afterwards widely known as Belle Boyd. Breathless +with speed and agitation, some time elapsed before she found her voice. +Then, with much volubility, she said we were near Front Royal; that the +town was filled with Federals, whose camp was on the west side of the +river, where they had guns in position to cover the bridge; that they +believed Jackson to be west of the Massanuttons, near Harrisonburg; +that General Banks was at Winchester, where he was concentrating his +widely scattered forces to meet Jackson’s advance, which was expected +some days later. All this she told with the precision of a staff +officer making a report, and it was true to the letter. Jackson was +possessed of this information before he left New Market, and based his +movements on it; but it was news to me.” + +In the second place, Banks had still the means of escape. He could +hardly prevent the Confederates from seizing Winchester, but he might +at least save his army from annihilation. Jackson’s men were exhausted +and the horses jaded. Since the morning of the 19th the whole army had +marched over eighty, and Ewell’s division over ninety miles. And this +average of seventeen miles a day had been maintained on rough and muddy +roads, crossed by many unbridged streams, and over a high mountain. The +day which had just passed had been especially severe. Ewell, who was in +bivouac at Cedarville, five miles north of Front Royal on the +Winchester +turnpike, had marched more than twenty miles; and Jackson’s own +division, which had made four-and-twenty, was on foot from five in the +morning till nine at night. + +Banks’ natural line of retreat led through Winchester, and the +Confederate advanced guard at Cedarville was two miles nearer that town +than were the Federals at Strasburg. But it was still possible that +Banks, warned by Kenly’s overthrow, might withdraw by night; and even +if he deferred retreat until daylight he might, instead of falling back +on Winchester, strike boldly for Front Royal and escape by Manassas +Gap. Or, lastly, he might remain at Strasburg, at which point he was in +communication, although by a long and circuitous road, with Frémont at +Franklin. + +Jackson had therefore three contingencies to provide against, and +during the night which followed the capture of Front Royal he evolved a +plan which promised to meet them all. Ashby, at daybreak, was to move +with the 7th Virginia cavalry in the direction of Strasburg; and at the +same hour a staff officer, with a small escort, supported by Taylor’s +Louisianians, was to ride towards Middletown, a village five miles +north of Strasburg and thirteen from Winchester, and to report +frequently. The 2nd and 6th Virginia cavalry, under General Steuart, +were to advance to Newtown, also on the Valley turnpike, and eight +miles from Winchester; while Ewell, with Trimble’s brigade and his +artillery, was to move to Nineveh, two miles north of Cedarville, and +there halt, awaiting orders. The remainder of the command was to +concentrate at Cedarville, preparatory to marching on Middletown; and +strong cavalry patrols were to keep close watch on the Strasburg to +Front Royal road.[17] + +6 a.m. From Cedarville to Middletown is no more than seven miles, and +Taylor’s brigade is reported to have moved at six a.m., while Ashby had +presumably already marched. But notwithstanding the fact that Banks’ +infantry did not leave Strasburg till ten a.m., and +that it had five miles to cover before reaching Middletown, when the +Confederates reached the turnpike at that village the Federal main body +had already passed, and only the rear-guard was encountered. + +It seems evident, therefore, that it was not till near noon that +Jackson’s patrols came in sight of Middletown, and that the Confederate +advanced guard had taken at least six hours to cover seven miles. The +country, however, between Cedarville and the Valley turnpike was almost +a continuous forest; and wood-fighting is very slow fighting. The +advance had met with strong resistance. General Gordon had prudently +sent the 29th Pennsylvania to Middletown at an early hour, with orders +to reconnoitre towards Front Royal, and to cover Middletown until the +army had passed through. + +7 a.m. Supported by a section of artillery, the regiment had moved +eastward till it struck the Confederate scouts some four miles out on +the Cedarville road. After a long skirmish it was withdrawn to +Middletown; but the 1st Maine cavalry, and a squadron of the 1st +Vermont, about 400 strong, which had been ordered by Banks to proceed +in the same direction, made a vigorous demonstration, and then fell +back slowly before the advanced guard, showing a bold front, using +their carbines freely, and taking advantage of the woods to impose upon +the enemy. + +10.15 a.m. These manœuvres succeeded in holding the Confederates in +check till after ten o’clock, for the heavy timber concealed the real +strength of the Federals, and although Ashby, with the 7th Virginia, +had marched to the scene of action, the infantry was not yet up. It is +to be remembered that at daybreak the Valley army was by no means +concentrated. Jackson had with him at Cedarville only Ewell’s division, +his own division having halted near Front Royal. This last division, it +appears from the reports, did not leave Front Royal until 8 a.m.; a +sufficiently early hour, considering the condition of the men and +horses, the absence of the trains, and the fact that one of the +brigades had bivouacked four miles south of +the village.[18] It was not, then, till between nine and ten that the +column cleared Cedarville, and Middletown was distant nearly three +hours’ march, by an exceedingly bad road. + +In all probability, if Jackson, at daybreak or soon afterwards, had +marched boldly on Middletown with Ewell’s division, he would have been +able to hold Banks on the Valley turnpike until the rest of his +infantry and artillery arrived. But he had always to bear in mind that +the Federals, finding their retreat on Winchester compromised, might +make a dash for Manassas Gap. Now the road from Strasburg to Manassas +Gap was protected throughout its length by the North Fork of the +Shenandoah; and to attack the Federals on the march, should they take +this road, the Confederates would have to move through Cedarville on +Front Royal. This was the only road by which they could reach the +river, and the bridges at Front Royal were the only available points of +passage. Jackson, it appears, was therefore reluctant to leave +Cedarville, within easy reach of the bridges, until he received +information of his enemy’s designs, and that information, which had to +be sought at a distance, was naturally long in coming. + +Criticism, after the event, is easy; but it certainly seems curious, +with his knowledge of Banks, that Jackson should have believed his +opponent capable of so bold a measure as retreat by way of Manassas +Gap. According to his own report, the feasibility of such a course did +cross Banks’ mind; but it might seem that on this occasion Jackson lost +an opportunity through over-caution. Nevertheless, in desperate +situations even the most inert characters are sometimes capable of +desperate resolutions. + +Although for the time being Banks was permitted to extricate his +infantry from the toils, the remainder of his command was less +fortunate. The general and his brigades reached Winchester in safety, +but the road between that town and Strasburg was a scene of dire +disaster. + +11.30 a.m. Steuart, with the 2nd and 6th Virginia, had struck Newton +before noon, and found a convoy of waggons strung out on the Valley +turnpike. A few shots threw everything into confusion. Many of the +teamsters deserted their posts, and fled towards Winchester or +Strasburg. Waggons were upset, several were captured, and others +plundered. But the triumph of the Confederates was short-lived. The +Federal infantry had already reached Middletown; and Banks sent forward +a regiment of cavalry and a brigade of infantry to clear the way. +Steuart was speedily driven back, and the Northerners resumed their +march. + +12.15 p.m. At some distance behind the infantry came the Federal +cavalry, about 2,000 strong, accompanied by a battery and a small party +of Zouaves; but by the time this force reached Middletown, Ashby, +supported by the Louisiana brigade, had driven in the regiment hitherto +opposed to him, and, emerging from the forest, with infantry and guns +in close support, was bearing down upon the village. The batteries +opened upon the solid columns of the Federal horse. The Louisiana +regiments, deploying at the double, dashed forward, and the Northern +squadrons, penned in the narrow streets, found themselves assailed by a +heavy fire. A desperate attempt was made to escape towards Winchester, +and a whirling cloud of dust through which the sabres gleamed swept +northward up the turnpike. But Ashby’s horsemen, galloping across +country, headed off the fugitives; some of the Confederate infantry +drew an abandoned waggon across the road, and others ran forward to the +roadside fences. At such close quarters the effect of the musketry was +terrible. “In a few moments the turnpike, which had just before teemed +with life, presented a most appalling spectacle of carnage and +destruction. The road was literally obstructed with the mingled and +confused mass of struggling and dying horses and riders. Amongst the +survivors the wildest confusion ensued, and they scattered in disorder +in various directions, leaving some 200 prisoners in the hands of the +Confederates.”[19] Part +dashed back to Strasburg, where the teeming magazines of the Federal +commissaries were already blazing; and part towards the mountains, +flying in small parties by every country track. The rear regiments, +however, still held together. Drawing off westward, in the hope of +gaining the Middle road, and of making his way to Winchester by a +circuitous route, General Hatch, commanding the cavalry brigade, +brought his guns into action on a commanding ridge, about a mile west +of the highway, and still showed a front with his remaining squadrons. +Infantry were with them; more horsemen came thronging up; their numbers +were unknown, and for a moment they looked threatening. The Confederate +batteries trotted forward, and Taylor’s brigade, with the Stonewall and +Campbell’s in support, was ordered to attack; whilst Ashby, accompanied +by the Louisiana Tigers and two batteries, pursued the train of waggons +that was flying over the hills towards Winchester. + +3 p.m. The question now to be solved was whether the cavalry was the +advanced or the rear guard of the Federal army. No message had arrived +from Steuart. But the people of Middletown supplied the information. +They reported that in addition to the convoy a long column of infantry +had passed through the village; and Jackson, directing his infantry to +follow Ashby, sent a message to Ewell to march on Winchester. Some +delay took place before the three brigades, which had now driven back +the Federal cavalry, could be brought back to the turnpike and +reformed; and it was well on in the afternoon when, with the Stonewall +regiments leading, the Confederate infantry pushed forward down the +pike. + +The troops had been on their legs since dawn; some of them, who had +bivouacked south of Front Royal, had already marched sixteen miles, the +Federals had more than two hours’ start, and Winchester was still +twelve miles distant. But the enemy’s cavalry had been routed, and such +as remained of the waggons were practically without a guard. Ashby and +Steuart, with three fine regiments of Virginia cavalry, supported by +the +horse-artillery and other batteries, were well to the front, and “there +was every reason to believe,” to use Jackson’s own words, “that if +Banks reached Winchester, it would be without a train, if not without +an army.” + +But the irregular organisation of the Valley forces proved a bar to the +fulfilment of Jackson’s hopes. On approaching Newtown he found that the +pursuit had been arrested. Two pieces of artillery were engaging a +Federal battery posted beyond the village, but the Confederate guns +were almost wholly unsupported. Ashby had come up with the convoy. A +few rounds of shell had dispersed the escort. The teamsters fled, and +the supply waggons and sutlers’ carts of the Federal army, filled with +luxuries, proved a temptation which the half-starving Confederates were +unable to resist. “Nearly the whole of Ashby’s cavalry and a part of +the infantry under his command had turned aside to pillage. Indeed the +firing had not ceased, in the first onset upon the Federal cavalry at +Middletown, before some of Ashby’s men might have been seen, with a +quickness more suitable to horse-thieves than to soldiers, breaking +from their ranks, seizing each two or three of the captured horses and +making off across the fields. Nor did the men pause until they had +carried their illegal booty to their homes, which were, in some +instances, at the distance of one or two days’ journey. That such +extreme disorders could occur,” adds Dabney, “and that they could be +passed over without a bloody punishment, reveals the curious +inefficiency of officers in the Confederate army.”[20] + +Banks, when the pursuit had so suddenly ceased, had determined to save +the remnant of his train. Three regiments and a couple of batteries +were ordered back from Bartonsville, with Gordon in command; and this +rearguard had not only shown a formidable front, but had actually +driven the infantry that still remained with Ashby out of Newtown, and +into the woods beyond. General Hatch, who had regained the turnpike +with part of his brigade, had now come up; and the addition of six +squadrons of cavalry rendered Gordon’s force capable of stout +resistance. The Federals held a strong position. The Confederates had +present but 50 cavalry, 150 infantry, and 5 guns. Nor was there any +hope of immediate support, for the remainder of the troops were still +several miles in rear, and Steuart’s two regiments appear to have +rejoined General Ewell on the road for Nineveh. + +Shortly before sunset the Confederate artillery was reinforced. The +Stonewall Brigade had also arrived upon the scene; and Gordon, firing +such waggons as he could not carry off, as well as the pontoons, fell +back on Winchester as the night closed in. + +The Confederates had now marched from sixteen to twenty miles, and the +men had not eaten since the early morning. But Jackson had determined +to press the march till he was within striking distance of the hills +which stand round Winchester to the south. It was no time for repose. +The Federals had a garrison at Harper’s Ferry, a garrison at Romney, +detachments along the Baltimore and Ohio Railway; and Washington, +within easy distance of Winchester by rail, was full of troops.[21] A +few hours’ delay, and instead of Banks’ solitary division, a large army +might bar the way to the Potomac. So, with the remnant of Ashby’s +cavalry +in advance, and the Stonewall Brigade in close support, the column +toiled onward through the darkness. But the Federal rear-guard was +exceedingly well handled. The 2nd Massachusetts regiment held the post +of honour, and, taking advantage of stream and ridge, the gallant New +Englanders disputed every mile of road. At Bartonsville, where the +Opequon, a broad and marshy creek, crosses the turnpike, they turned +stubbornly at bay. A heavy volley, suddenly delivered, drove the +Confederate cavalry back in confusion on the infantry supports. The +33rd Virginia was completely broken by the rush of flying horsemen; the +guns were overridden; and Jackson and his staff were left alone upon +the turnpike. In the pitch darkness it was difficult to ascertain the +enemy’s numbers, and the flashes of their rifles, dancing along the top +of the stone walls, were the only clue to their position. The +Confederate column was ordered to deploy, and the Stonewall Brigade, +pushing into the fields on either flank, moved slowly forward over the +swampy ground. The stream proved an impassable obstacle both below and +above the Federal position; but the 27th Virginia, attacking the enemy +in front, drove them back and crossed to the further bank. + +The pursuit, however, had been much delayed; and the Massachusetts +regiment, although ridden into by their own cavalry, fell back in good +order, protected by a strong line of skirmishers on either side of the +turnpike. The Confederate order of march was now changed. Three +companies, who were recruited from the district and knew the ground, +were ordered to the front. The 5th Virginia, four or five hundred yards +from the skirmish line, were to follow in support. The cavalry and guns +were left in rear; and the troops once more took up the line of march. + +For more than an hour they tramped slowly forward. The darkness grew +more intense, and the chaff and laughter—for the soldiers, elated by +success, had hitherto shown no sign of fatigue—died gradually away. +Nothing was to be heard but the clang of accoutrements, the long rumble +of the guns, and the shuffle of weary feet. Men fell in the ranks, +overpowered by sleep or faint with hunger, and the +skirmishers, wading through rank fields of wheat and clover, stumbling +into ditches, and climbing painfully over high stone walls, made tardy +progress. Again and again the enemy’s volleys flashed through the +darkness; but still there was no halt, for at the head of the +regiments, peering eagerly into the darkness, their iron-willed +commander still rode forward, as regardless of the sufferings of his +men as of the bullets of the Federal rear-guard, with but one thought +present to his mind—to bring Banks to battle, and so prevent his escape +from Winchester. The student of Napoleon had not forgotten the pregnant +phrase: “Ask me for anything but time!” The indiscipline of Ashby’s +cavalry had already given Banks a respite; and, undisturbed by his +reverses, the Union general had shown himself capable of daring +measures. Had the Confederates halted at Newtown or at Bartonsville, +the troops would doubtless have been fresher for the next day’s work, +but the morning might have seen Banks far on his way to the Potomac, or +possibly strongly reinforced. + +When the Confederate infantry had met and overthrown their enemy it +would be time enough to think of food and rest. So long as the men +could stand they were to follow on his traces. “I rode with Jackson,” +says General Taylor, “through the darkness. An officer, riding hard, +overtook us, who proved to be the chief quartermaster of the army. He +reported the waggon trains far behind, impeded by a bad road in the +Luray Valley. ‘The ammunition waggons?’ sternly. ‘All right, sir. They +were in advance, and I doubled teams on them and brought them through.’ +‘Ah!’ in a tone of relief. + +“To give countenance to the quartermaster, if such can be given on a +dark night, I remarked jocosely, ‘Never mind the waggons. There are +quantities of stores in Winchester, and the general has invited one to +breakfast there tomorrow.’ Jackson took this seriously, and reached out +to touch me on the arm. Without physical wants himself, he forgot that +others were differently constituted, and paid little heed to +commissariat. But woe to the man who failed +to bring up ammunition. In advance his trains were left behind. In +retreat he would fight for a wheelbarrow.”[22] + +May 25 At Kernstown, behind Hogg Run, the Federal rear-guard halted for +the last time, but after a short engagement fell back on Winchester. It +was now three o’clock, an hour before dawn, and the Massachusetts men +became aware that the enemy had halted. Their skirmishers still pressed +slowly forward, and an occasional shot flashed out in the darkness. But +that noise which once heard on a still night is never forgotten, the +solid tramp of a heavy column on a hard road, like the dull roar of a +distant cataract, had suddenly died away. As the day broke the +Confederate advanced guard, passing Pritchard’s Hill and Kernstown +battlefield, struck the Federal pickets on Parkin’s Hill. In front was +a brook which goes by the name of Abraham’s Creek; beyond the brook +rose the ridge which covers Winchester, and Jackson at last permitted +his men to rest. The coveted heights were within easy grasp. The +Federal army was still in Winchester, and nothing now remained but to +storm the hills, and drive the enemy in panic from the town. + +The Confederates, when the order was given to halt, had dropped where +they stood, and lay sleeping by the roadside. But their commander +permitted himself no repose. For more than an hour, without a cloak to +protect him from the chilling dews, listening to every sound that came +from the front, he stood like a sentinel over the prostrate ranks. As +the dawn rose, in a quiet undertone he gave the word to march. The +order was passed down the column, and, in the dim grey light, the men, +rising from their short slumbers, stiff, cold, and hungry, advanced to +battle. + +Jackson had with him on the turnpike, for the most part south of +Kernstown, his own division, supported by the brigades of Scott and +Elzey and by nine batteries. About a mile eastward on the Front Royal +road was Ewell, with Trimble’s brigade and ten guns. This detachment +had moved on Winchester the preceding evening, +driving in the Federal pickets, and had halted within three miles of +the town. During the night Jackson had sent a staff officer with +instructions to Ewell. The message, although the bearer had to ride +nine-and-twenty miles, by Newton and Nineveh, had reached its +destination in good time; and as the Stonewall Brigade moved silently +past Pritchard’s Hill, Trimble’s brigade advanced abreast of it beyond +the intervening woods. + +On both the Valley turnpike and the Front Royal road the Federals were +favoured by the ground, and their position, although the two wings were +widely separated, had been skilfully selected. On the turnpike and west +of it was Gordon’s brigade of four regiments, strengthened by eight +guns, and by a strong force of cavalry in reserve. Watching the Front +Royal road was Donnelly’s brigade, also of four regiments, with eight +guns and a few squadrons. The line of defence ran along a broken ridge, +lined in many places with stout stone walls, and protected in front by +the winding reaches of Abraham’s Creek. + +Still, strong as was the Federal position, there was little chance of +holding it. Banks had been joined during the night by the larger +portion of his army, and by the garrison of Winchester, but he was +heavily outnumbered. At Front Royal and at Middletown he had lost over +1,500 men; part of his rear-guard had scattered in the mountains, and +it was doubtful if he could now muster more than 6,500 effective +soldiers. In infantry and artillery the Confederates were more than +twice his strength; in cavalry alone were they inferior. + +Jackson’s plan of action was simple. His advanced guard was to hold +Gordon in position; and when Ewell fell on Donnelly, a heavy column +would move round Gordon’s right. + +5 a.m. The Stonewall regiments led the way. The line of heights, west +of the turnpike and commanding Abraham’s Creek, was occupied by the +Federal outposts, and a general advance of the whole brigade, sweeping +across the brook and up the slopes, quickly drove in the pickets. + +But the enemy, whether by skill or good fortune, had +occupied with his main line a position admirably adapted for an +inferior force. Four hundred yards beyond the ridge which the +Confederates had seized rose a second swell of ground; and eight rifled +guns, supported by the 2nd Massachusetts, swept the opposite height at +effective range. + +Jackson immediately ordered up three batteries, posting them behind the +crest; and as the sun rose, drawing up the mist from the little stream, +a fierce duel of artillery began the battle. + +6.30 a.m. The Confederate gunners, harassed by the enemy’s skirmishers, +and overwhelmed with shells, suffered heavily; one battery was +compelled to retire with a loss of 17 men and 9 horses; a second lost +all its officers; and it was not till near seven o’clock that the +enemy’s eight guns, with their infantry escort, were finally driven +back. + +Ewell, meanwhile, had come into action on the right; but the mist was +heavy, and his advanced guard, received with a heavy fire from behind +the stone walls, was driven back with a loss of 80 officers and men. +Then the fog rose heavily, and for nearly an hour the engagement on +this wing died away. + +8 a.m. About eight o’clock Ewell’s batteries again came into action, +and Trimble moved round to take the enemy in flank. But Jackson, +meanwhile, was bringing matters to a crisis on the left. The Federals +still held fast in front; but the Louisiana, Taliaferro’s, and Scott’s +brigades, retained hitherto with Elzey in reserve, were now ordered to +turn the enemy’s flank. Moving to the left in rear of the Stonewall +Brigade, these eleven regiments, three forming a second line, faced to +the front and climbed the heights. + +General Gordon, in anticipation of such a movement, had already +transferred two regiments to his right. The fire of this force, though +delivered at close range, hardly checked the Confederate onset. Closing +the many gaps, and preserving an alignment that would have been +creditable on parade, Taylor and Taliaferro moved swiftly forward over +rocks and walls. The Federal infantry gave way in great disorder. The +cavalry in support essayed a charge, but the Confederates, as the +squadrons rode boldly +towards them, halted where they stood, and the rolling volleys of the +line of battle drove back the horsemen with many empty saddles. Then, +as Taylor resumed his advance, the Stonewall regiments, with Elzey in +close support, rose suddenly from their covert, and the whole line +swept forward across the ridges. The bright sun of the May morning, +dispersing the mists which veiled the field, shone down upon 10,000 +bayonets; and for the first time in the Valley the rebel yell, that +strange fierce cry which heralded the Southern charge, rang high above +the storm of battle. + +[Illustration: Map of the Battle of Winchester, Va., Sunday, May 25th, +1862.] + +It was impossible, before so strong an onset, for the Federals to hold +their ground. Infantry, artillery, and cavalry gave way. From east, +west, and south the grey battalions converged on Winchester; and as the +enemy’s columns, covered by the heavy smoke, disappeared into the +streets, Jackson, no longer the imperturbable tactician, moving his +troops like the pieces on a chess-board, but the very personification +of triumphant victory, dashed forward in advance of his old brigade. +Riding recklessly down a rocky slope he raised himself in his stirrups, +and waving his cap in the direction of the retreating foe, shouted to +his officers to “Press forward to the Potomac!” Elzey’s, the reserve +brigade, was ordered to take up the pursuit; and within the town, where +the storehouses had been already fired, the battle was renewed. The +Federal regiments, with the exception of the 2nd Massachusetts, lost +all order in the narrow streets.[23] The roar of battle followed close; +and with the rattle of musketry, the crash of shells, and the loud +cries of the victors speeding their rapid flight, the Northern infantry +dispersed across the fields. As the Confederates passed through the +town, the people of Winchester, frantic with triumph after their two +months of captivity, rushed out from every doorway to meet the troops; +and with weeping and with laughter, with the 341 blessings of women and +the fierce shouts of men, the soldiers of the Valley were urged forward +in hot pursuit. + +10 a.m. As they emerged from the town, and looked down upon the open +pastures through which the Martinsburg turnpike runs, they saw the +country before them covered with crowds of fugitives. Jackson, still in +advance, turned round to seek his cavalry. From the head of every +street eager columns of infantry were pouring, and, deploying without +waiting orders, were pushing hastily across the fields. But not a +squadron was in sight. Ashby, with the handful of men that still +remained with him, had ridden to Berryville, expecting that the enemy +would attempt to escape by Snicker’s Gap. Steuart, with the two +regiments that had done such service at Front Royal, was with Ewell and +Trimble; but although Donnelly’s regiments could be seen retiring in +good order, they were not followed by a single sabre. + +Despatching an aide-de-camp to order Steuart to the front, Jackson +called up his batteries. The infantry, too, was hurried forward, in +order to prevent the Federals rallying. But after a rapid march of two +hours the interval between the Confederates and the enemy was still +increasing; and it was evident that without cavalry it was useless to +continue the pursuit. Not only was the infantry utterly exhausted, but +the horses of the artillery were worn out; and about five miles out of +Winchester the troops were ordered to halt and bivouac.[24] The +Federals, relieved from the pressure of the hostile fire, gradually +reformed their ranks; and Jackson, notwithstanding the extraordinary +exertions he had demanded from his troops, his own skilful manœuvres, +and the high spirit of his men, saw his opportunity pass away. His +impatience was almost uncontrollable. His staff was dispatched in all +directions to urge forward the remainder of the batteries. “We must +press them to the Potomac!” “Forward to the Potomac!” Such was the +tenor of every order; and at length, as the Federals disappeared in the +far distance, he ordered the +artillery teams to be unhitched, and the gunners, thus mounted, to +pursue the enemy. But before this strange substitute for cavalry had +moved out, the lagging squadrons arrived, and with a few fiery words +they were sent at speed down the Valley turnpike. But it was too late. +Banks, for the second time, was more fortunate than he deserved. + +To the misconduct of Ashby’s troopers, and to the pedantic folly of +General Steuart, the escape of the Federal army must be attributed. + +“Never have I seen an opportunity when it was in the power of cavalry +to reap a richer harvest of the fruits of victory. Had the cavalry +played its part in this pursuit as well as the four companies under +Colonel Flournoy two days before in the pursuit from Front Royal, but a +small portion of Banks’ army would have made its escape to the +Potomac.” + +So runs Jackson’s official report, and when the disorganised condition +of the Federal battalions, as they fled north from Winchester, is +recalled, it is difficult to question the opinion therein expressed. +The precipitate retreat from Strasburg, accompanied by the loss of +waggons and of stores; the concentrated attack of overwhelming numbers, +followed by the disorderly rush through the streets of Winchester, had, +for the time being, dissolved the bonds of discipline. It is true that +some of the Federal regiments held together; but many men were missing; +some fell into the hands of the Confederates, others sought safety by +devious roads, and there can be little doubt but that those who fled to +the Potomac were for the time being utterly demoralised. Had they been +resolutely charged before they had reformed their ranks, their rifles +would no more have saved them from annihilation than they had saved +Kenly’s command at Cedarville. + +But where was the cavalry? Ashby’s 50 men, all that he had been able to +collect, were far away upon the right; out of reach of orders, and in +any case too few for effective use. The two regiments under Steuart, +600 or 700 strong, were the force on which Jackson had depended, and +Steuart had shown himself +incapable of command. He had received Jackson’s message with the reply +that he could obey no orders unless they came through his immediate +superior.[25] Before Ewell could be found, precious time was wasted, +and two hours elapsed before the cavalry took up the chase. But the +Federals had now established strong rear-guards. The whole of their +cavalry, supported by artillery, had been ordered to cover the retreat; +and Steuart, although he picked up numerous prisoners, and followed as +far as Martinsburg, twenty-two miles north of Winchester, found no +opportunity for attack. + +Halting for two and a half hours at Martinsburg, the Federals continued +their retreat at sunset, abandoning the magazines in the town to their +pursuers. Before midnight 3,000 or 4,000 men had arrived at +Williamsport, and by the ford and ferry, supplemented by a few pontoon +boats, the remnant of Banks’ army crossed the broad Potomac. + +Although not a single Confederate squadron had followed him from +Martinsburg, the Northern general, elated by his unexpected escape, +spoke of this operation as if it had been carried out under heavy fire. +“It is seldom,” he reported, “that a river-crossing of such magnitude +is achieved (_sic_) with greater success.” But he added, with more +candour, “there were never more grateful hearts, in the same number of +men, than when at mid-day on the 26th we stood on the opposite shore;” +and then, with the loss of 2,000 men, a hundred waggons, the regimental +transport of his cavalry, nearly 800 sick, and a vast quantity of +stores, to traverse his assertion, he stated that his command “had not +suffered an attack or rout, but had accomplished a premeditated march +of near sixty miles in the face of the enemy, defeating his plans, and +giving him battle wherever he was found!’[26] + +But the Northern people were not to be deceived. The truth was but too +apparent; and long before Banks had found leisure to write his report, +terror had taken possession of the nation. While the soldiers of the +Valley lay round Winchester, reposing from their fatigues, and regaling +themselves on the captured stores, the Governors of thirteen States +were calling on their militia to march to the defence of Washington. +Jackson had struck a deadly blow. Lincoln and Stanton were electrified +even more effectually than Banks. They issued an urgent call for more +troops. “There is no doubt,” wrote Stanton to the Governor of +Massachusetts, “that the enemy in great force are marching on +Washington.” In the cities of the North the panic was indescribable. As +the people came out of church the newsboys were crying, “Defeat of +General Banks! Washington in danger!” The newspaper offices were +surrounded by anxious crowds. In the morning edition of the _New York +Herald_ a leader had appeared which was headed “Fall of Richmond.” The +same evening it was reported that the whole of the rebel army was +marching to the Potomac. Troops were hurried to Harper’s Ferry from +Baltimore and Washington. The railways were ordered to place their +lines at the disposal of the Government. McDowell, on the eve of +starting to join McClellan, was ordered to lay aside the movement, and +to send half his army to the Valley.[27] Frémont, who was about to join +his column from the Great Kanawha, was called upon to support Banks. +McClellan was warned, by the President himself, that the enemy was +making a general movement northward, and that he must either attack +Richmond forthwith or come to the defence of Washington. A reserve +corps of 50,000 men was ordered to be organised at once, and stationed +permanently near the capital; and in one day nearly half a million +American citizens offered their services to save the Union. + +Jackson’s success was as complete as it was sudden. The second +diversion against Washington was as effective as the first, and the +victory at Winchester even more prolific of results than the defeat at +Kernstown. Within four-and-twenty hours the storm-cloud which had been +gathering about Fredericksburg was dispersed. McDowell’s army of 40,000 +men and 100 guns was scattered beyond the hope of speedy concentration. +McClellan, who had pushed forward his left wing across the +Chickahominy, suddenly found himself deprived of the support on which +he counted to secure his right; and Johnston, who had determined to +attack his opponent before that support should arrive, was able to +postpone operations until the situation should become more favourable. + +Immediately after his victory Jackson had sent an officer to Richmond +with dispatches explaining his views, and asking for instructions. Lee, +in reply, requested him to press the enemy, to threaten an invasion of +Maryland, and an assault upon the Federal capital. + +May 28 Early on the 28th, the Stonewall Brigade advanced towards +Harper’s Ferry. At that point, crowded with stores of every +description, 7,000 men and 18 guns, under General Saxton, had already +been assembled. At Charlestown, Winder’s advanced guard struck a +reconnoitring detachment, composed of two regiments, a section of +artillery, and a cavalry regiment. Within twenty minutes the Federals, +already demoralised by the defeat of Banks, were retiring in disorder, +abandoning arms, blankets, and haversacks, along the road, and the +pursuit was continued until their reserves were descried in strong +force on the Bolivar Heights, a low ridge covering Harper’s Ferry from +the south. The same evening Ewell advanced in support of Winder; and, +on the 29th, the Valley army was concentrated near Halltown, with the +exception of the Louisiana brigade, posted near Berryville, the 12th +Georgia, with 2 guns, in occupation of Front Royal, and Ashby, on the +road to Wardensville, watching Frémont. + +During the afternoon the 2nd Virginia Infantry was sent across the +Shenandoah, and occupying the Loudoun +Heights, threatened the enemy’s position on the ridge below. Saxton, in +consequence, withdrew a part of his troops the same night to the left +bank of the Potomac; but Jackson, although Harper’s Ferry and its +magazines might easily have been taken, made no attempt to follow. His +scouts, riding far to east and west, had already informed him that +McDowell and Frémont were in motion to cut off his retreat. Shields’ +division, leading McDowell’s advance from Fredericksburg, was +approaching Manassas Gap; while Frémont, hurrying from Franklin through +the passes of the North Mountain, was ten miles east of Moorefield. +Lee’s instructions had already been carried to the extreme point +consistent with safety, and Jackson determined to retreat by the Valley +turnpike. Not only was it the one road which was not yet closely +threatened, but it was the one road over which the enormous train of +captured stores could be rapidly withdrawn.[28] + +May 29 The next morning, therefore, the main body of the army marched +back to Winchester; Winder, with the Stonewall Brigade and two +batteries, remaining before Harper’s Ferry to hold Saxton in check. +Jackson himself returned to Winchester by the railway, and on the way +he was met by untoward news. As the train neared Winchester a staff +officer, riding at a gallop across the fields, signalled it to stop, +and the general was informed that the 12th Georgia had been driven from +Front Royal, burning the stores, but not the bridges, at Front Royal, +and that Shields’ division was in possession of the village. + +The situation had suddenly become more than critical. Front Royal is +but twelve miles from Strasburg. Not a single Confederate battalion was +within five-and-twenty miles of that town, and Winder was just twice as +far away. The next morning might see the Valley turnpike blocked by +10,000 Federals under Shields. Another 10,000, McDowell’s Second +Division, under General Ord, were already near Front Royal; Frémont, +with 15,000, was +pressing forward from the west; and Banks and Saxton, with the same +number, were moving south from the Potomac. With resolute management it +would seem that 35,000 Federals might have been assembled round +Strasburg by midday of the 31st, and that this force might have been +increased to 50,000 by the evening of June 1.[29] Desperate indeed +appeared the Confederate chances. The waggons which conveyed the spoils +of Martinsburg and Charlestown were still at Winchester, and with them +were more than 2,000 prisoners. With the utmost expedition it seemed +impossible that the Valley army, even if the waggons were abandoned, +could reach Strasburg before the evening of the 31st; and the Stonewall +Brigade, with fifty miles to march, would be four-and-twenty hours +later. Escape, at least by the Valley turnpike, seemed absolutely +impossible. Over Pharaoh and his chariots the waters were already +closing. + +But there is a power in war more potent than mere numbers. The moral +difficulties of a situation may render the proudest display of physical +force of no avail. Uncertainty and apprehension engender timidity and +hesitation, and if the commander is ill at ease the movements of his +troops become slow and halting. And when several armies, converging on +a single point, are separated by distance or by the enemy, when +communication is tedious, and each general is ignorant of his +colleagues’ movements, uncertainty and apprehension are inevitable. +More than ever is this the case when the enemy has a character for +swiftness and audacity, and some unfortunate detachment is still +reeling under the effects of a crushing and unexpected blow. + +Regarding, then, like Napoleon, the difficulties rather than the +numbers of his enemies, Jackson held fast to his purpose, and the +capture of Front Royal disturbed him little. “What news?” he asked +briefly as the staff officer rode up to the carriage door. “Colonel +Connor has been driven back from Front Royal.” Jackson smiled +grimly, but made no reply. His eyes fixed themselves apparently upon +some distant object. Then his preoccupation suddenly disappeared. He +read the dispatch which he held in his hand, tore it in pieces, after +his accustomed fashion, and, leaning forward, rested his head upon his +hands and apparently fell asleep. He soon roused himself, however, and +turning to Mr. Boteler, who tells the story, said: “I am going to send +you to Richmond for reinforcements. Banks has halted at Williamsport, +and is being reinforced from Pennsylvania. Dix (Saxton) is in my front, +and is being reinforced by the Baltimore and Ohio Railway. I have just +received a dispatch informing me of the advance of the enemy upon Front +Royal, which is captured, and Frémont is now advancing towards +Wardensville. Thus, you see, I am nearly surrounded by a very large +force.” + +“What is your own, General?” asked his friend. + +“I will tell you, but you must not repeat what I say, except at +Richmond. To meet this attack I have only 15,000 effective men.” + +“What will you do if they cut you off, General?” + +A moment’s hesitation, and then the cool reply: “I will fall back upon +Maryland for reinforcements.” + +“Jackson,” says Cooke, “was in earnest. If his retreat was cut off he +intended to advance into Maryland, and doubtless make his way straight +to Baltimore and Washington, depending on the Southern sentiment in +that portion of the State to bring him reinforcements.” That the +Federal Government was apprehensive of some such movement is certain. +The wildest rumours were everywhere prevalent. Men throughout the North +wore anxious faces, and it is said that one question, “Where is +Jackson? Has he taken Washington?” was on every lip. The best proof, +however, that a movement on Washington was actually anticipated by the +Federals is the dispatch of the Secretary of War to the Governors of +the different States: “Send forward all the troops that you can, +immediately. Banks completely routed. Intelligence from various +quarters leaves no doubt that the enemy, in great force, are advancing +on Washington. +You will please organise and forward immediately all the volunteer and +militia force in your State.” Further, on receiving the news of Banks’ +defeat, the President had called King’s division of McDowell’s army +corps to defend the capital; and his telegram of May 25 to McClellan, +already alluded to, in which that general was warned that he might have +to return to Washington, is significant of what would have happened had +the Confederates entered Maryland.[30] McClellan’s vast army, in all +human probability, would have been hurriedly re-embarked, and Johnston +have been free to follow Jackson. + +May 31 On the night of the 30th the whole Army of the Valley was +ordered back to Strasburg; and early next morning the prisoners, +escorted by the 21st Virginia, and followed by the convoy of waggons in +double column, covering seven miles of road, led the way. Captain +Hotchkiss was sent with orders to Winder to hasten back to Winchester, +and not to halt till he had made some distance between that place and +Strasburg. “I want you to go to Charlestown,” were Jackson’s +instructions to his staff officer, “and bring up the First Brigade. I +will stay in Winchester until you get here, if I can, but if I cannot, +and the enemy gets here first, you must conduct it around through the +mountains.” + +The march, however, as the general had expected, was made without +molestation, and during the afternoon the main body reached Strasburg, +and camped there for the night. The Stonewall Brigade, meanwhile, had +passed through Winchester, halting near Newtown; the 2nd Virginia +Regiment having marched thirty-five miles, and all the remainder +twenty-eight. Little had been seen of the enemy. Frémont had passed +Wardensville, and, marching through heavy rain, had halted after +nightfall at Cedar Creek, six miles west of Strasburg. On the road to +Front Royal, only a few scouts had been encountered by the Confederate +patrols, for Shields, deceived by a demonstration +which the Louisiana Brigade had made from Winchester, had let the day +pass by without a decisive movement. The difficulties on which Jackson +had counted had weighted the feet of his adversaries with lead.[31] +Frémont, with two-and-twenty miles to march, had suffered Ashby to +delay his progress; and although he had promised Lincoln that he would +be in Strasburg at five o’clock that evening, he had halted on the +mountains six miles distant. Shields, far ahead of the next division, +had done nothing more than push a brigade towards Winchester, and place +strong pickets on every road by which the enemy might approach. Neither +Federal general could communicate with the other, for the country +between them was held by the enemy. Both had been informed of the +other’s whereabouts, but both were uncertain as to the other’s +movements; and the dread of encountering, unsupported, the terrible +weight of Jackson’s onset had sapped their resolution. Both believed +the enemy far stronger than he really was. The fugitives from +Winchester had spread exaggerated reports of the Confederate numbers, +and the prisoners captured at Front Royal had by no means minimised +them.[32] Banks, impressed by the long array of bayonets that had +crowned the ridge at Winchester, rated them at 20,000 infantry, with +cavalry and artillery in addition. Geary, who had retired in hot haste +from Rectortown, burning his tents and stores, had learned, he +reported, from numerous sources that 10,000 cavalry were passing +through Manassas Gap. There were constant rumours that strong +reinforcements were coming up from Richmond, and even McDowell believed +that the army of invasion consisted of 25,000 to 30,000 men. +Frémont’s scouts, as he approached Strasburg, represented the +Confederate force at 30,000 to 60,000.” Shields, before he crossed the +Blue Ridge and found himself in the vicinity of his old opponent, had +condemned the panic that had seized his brother generals, and had told +McDowell that he would clear the Valley with his own division. But when +he reached Front Royal the force that he had scornfully described as +insignificant had swelled to 20,000 men. Troops from Richmond, he +telegraphed, were marching down the Luray Valley; and he urged that he +should be at once supported by two divisions. It cannot be said that +Lincoln and Stanton were to blame for the indecision of the generals. +They had urged Frémont forward to Strasburg, and Shields to Front +Royal. They had informed them, by the telegraph, of each other’s +situation, and had passed on such intelligence of the enemy’s movements +as had been acquired at Harper’s Ferry; and yet, although the +information was sufficiently exact, both Shields and Frémont, just as +Jackson anticipated, held back at the decisive moment. The waters had +been held back, and the Confederates had passed through them dry-shod. +Such is the effect of uncertainty in war; a mighty power in the hands +of a general who understands its scope. + +June 1 On the morning of June 1, Jackson’s only remaining anxiety was +to bring Winder back, and to expedite the retreat of the convoy. Ewell +was therefore ordered to support Ashby, and to hold Frémont in check +until the Stonewall Brigade had passed through Strasburg. The task was +easily accomplished. At seven in the morning the Confederate pickets +were driven in. As they fell back on their supports, the batteries on +both sides came rapidly into action, and the Federal infantry pressed +forward. But musketry replied to musketry, and finding the road blocked +by a line of riflemen, Frémont ordered his troops to occupy a defensive +position on Cedar Creek. “I was entirely ignorant,” he says, “of what +had taken place in the Valley beyond, and it was now evident that +Jackson, in superior force, was at or near Strasburg.” His men, also, +appear to have caught the spirit of irresolution, for a forward +movement on the part of the Confederates drove in Blenker’s Germans +with the greatest ease. “Sheep,” says General Taylor, “would have made +as much resistance as we met. Men decamped without firing, or threw +down their arms and surrendered. Our whole skirmish line was, advancing +briskly. I sought Ewell and reported. We had a fine game before us, and +the temptation to play it was great; but Jackson’s orders were +imperative and wise. He had his stores to save, Shields to guard +against, Lee’s grand strategy to promote. He could not waste time +chasing Frémont.”[33] + +Winder reached Strasburg about noon. The troops that had been facing +Frémont were then withdrawn; and the whole force, now reunited, fell +back on Woodstock; Ashby, with the cavalry, holding his old position on +Tom’s Brook. The retreat was made in full view of the Federal scouts. +On the Confederates retiring from before him, Frémont had pushed +forward a reconnaissance, and Bayard’s cavalry brigade, of McDowell’s +army, came up in the evening on the other flank. But attack was +useless. The Confederate trains were disappearing in the distance, and +heavy masses of all arms were moving slowly south. The Federal horsemen +were unsupported save by a single battery. McDowell, who had reached +Front Royal with part of his Second Division in the morning, had +endeavoured to push Shields forward upon Strasburg. But Shields, +fearing attack, had dispersed his troops to guard the various roads; +and when at last they were assembled, misled by erroneous information, +he had directed them on Winchester. Before the mistake was discovered +the day had passed away. It was not until the next morning that the +Federal columns came into communication, and then Jackson was already +south of Woodstock. + +On Friday morning, May 29, says Allan, “Jackson was in front of +Harper’s Ferry, fifty miles from Strasburg. Frémont was at Fabius, +twenty miles from Strasburg; and Shields was not more than twenty miles +from Strasburg, for his advance entered Front Royal, which is but +twelve miles distant, before mid-day, while McDowell was +following with two divisions. Yet by Sunday night Jackson had marched +between fifty and sixty miles, though encumbered with prisoners and +captured stores, had reached Strasburg before either of his +adversaries, and had passed safely between their armies, while he held +Frémont at bay by a show of force, and blinded and bewildered Shields +by the rapidity of his movements.” + +From the morning of May 19 to the night of June 1, a period of fourteen +days, the Army of the Valley had marched one hundred and seventy miles, +had routed a force of 12,500 men, had threatened the North with +invasion, had drawn off McDowell from Fredericksburg, had seized the +hospitals and supply depots at Front Royal, Winchester,[34] and +Martinsburg, and finally, although surrounded on three sides by 60,000 +men, had brought off a huge convoy without losing a single waggon. + +This remarkable achievement, moreover, had been comparatively +bloodless. The loss of 618 officers and men was a small price to pay +for such results.[35] + +That Jackson’s lucky star was in the ascendant there can be little +doubt. But fortune had far less to do with his success than skill and +insight; and in two instances—the misconduct of his cavalry, and the +surprise of the 12th Georgia—the blind goddess played him false. Not +that he trusted to her favours. “Every movement throughout the whole +period,” says one of his staff officers, “was the result of profound +calculation. He knew what his men could do, and to whom he could +entrust the execution of important orders.”[36] Nor was his danger of +capture, on his retreat from Harper’s Ferry, so great as it appeared. + +May 31 was the crisis of his operations. On that morning, when the +prisoners and the convoy marched out of Winchester, Shields was at +Front Royal. But Shields +was unsupported; Ord’s division was fifteen miles in rear, and Bayard’s +cavalry still further east. Even had he moved boldly on Strasburg he +could hardly have seized the town. The ground was in Jackson’s favour. +The only road available for the Federals was that which runs south of +the North Fork and the bridges had been destroyed. At that point, three +miles east of Strasburg, a small flank-guard might have blocked the way +until the main body of the Confederates had got up. And had Frémont, +instead of halting that evening at Cedar Creek, swept Ashby aside and +pushed forward to join his colleague, the Valley army might easily have +effected its retreat. Winder alone would have been cut off, and Jackson +had provided for that emergency. + +When the embarrassments under which the Federals laboured are laid +bare, the passage of the Confederates between the converging armies +loses something of its extraordinary character. Nevertheless, the +defeat of the Front Royal garrison and the loss of the bridges was +enough to have shaken the strongest nerves. Had Jackson then burnt his +convoy, and released his prisoners, few would have blamed him; and the +tenacity with which he held to his original purpose, the skill with +which he imposed on both Shields and Frémont, are no less admirable +than his perception of his opponents’ difficulties. Well has it been +said: “What gross ignorance of human nature do those declaimers display +who assert that the employing of brute force is the highest +qualification of a general!” + +NOTE + +POSITION OF THE TROOPS, MAY 29 TO JUNE 1 + +_Night of May 29_ + +FEDERALS CONFEDERATES McDowell + Shields, 10,200, Rectorstown. + Ord, 9,000, Thoroughfare Gap. + Bayard, 2,000. Catlett’s Station. +Frémont, 15,000, Fabius. +Saxton, 7,000, Harper’s Ferry. +Banks, 7,000, Williamsport. +Geary, 2,000, Middleburg. Jackson’s Division, 7,200, Halltown. +Ewell’s Division, 5,000, Halltown. +Ashby. 800, Wardensville road. +Taylor’s Brigade, 8,000, Berryville. +12th Georgia Regiment, 460, Front Royal. +2nd Virginia Regiment, 860, Loudoun Heights. + +_Night of May 30_ + +FEDERALS CONFEDERATES McDowell + Shields, 10,200, Front Royal. + Ord, 9,000, Piedmont. + Bayard, 2,000, + Thoroughfare Gap. + King, 10,000, + near Catlett’s Station. +Saxton, 7,000, Harper’s Ferry. +Banks, 8,600, Williamsport. +Freémont, 15,000, Wardensville. +Geary, 2,000, Upperville. Army of Valley, 13,850, Winchester. +Stonewall Brigade, 1,600, Halltown. +2nd Virginia Regiment, 380, + Loudoun Heights. +Ashby, 300, Wardensville Road. + +_Night of May 31_ + +FEDERALS CONFEDERATES McDowell + Shields, Front Royal. + Ord, Manassas Gap. + King, Catlett’s Station. + Bayard, Manassas Gap. +Saxton, Harper’s Ferry. +Banks, Williamsport. +Frémont, Cedar Creek. +Geary, Snicker’s and Ashby’s Gaps. Army of Valley, Strasburg. +Stonewall Brigade, Newtown. +Ashby, Cedar Creek. + +_Night of June 1_ + +FEDERALS CONFEDERATES McDowell + Shields, ten miles south of + Front Royal. + Ord, Front Royal. + King, Haymarket. + Bayard, Buckton. +Saxton, Harper’s Ferry. +Banks, Williamsport. +Frémont, Cedar Creek. +Geary, Snicker’s and Ashby’s Gaps. Army of Valley, Woodstock. Ashby, +Tom’s Brook. + +TOTAL STRENGTH + +Federal 62,000 +Confederate 16,000 + + [1] General A. S. Johnston. + + [2] Directly McClellan closed in on Richmond, McDowell was ordered, as + soon as Shields should join him, to march from Manassas to his + assistance. Lincoln and Stanton had recovered confidence when Jackson + returned to the Valley from Mechum’s Station. + + [3] This estimate is Colonel Allan’s. Cf _The Valley Campaign,_ pp. + 92, 93. Dabney gives 16,000 men. + + [4] _Destruction and Reconstruction,_ General R. Taylor pp. 38, 39. + + [5] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 890. + + [6] _Destruction and Reconstruction,_ pp. 52, 53. + + [7] _Ibid,_ p. 37. + + [8] _Destruction and Reconstruction,_ pp. 54–6. + + [9] Compare instructions to Ewell, _ante,_ p. 281. + + [10] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 201. + + [11] O.R., vol. xii, part i, pp. 523, 560. + + [12] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 95. + + [13] The ingenuous report of a Federal officer engaged at Front Royal + is significant of the effect of the sudden attack of the Confederates. + He was sick at the time, but managed to escape. “By considerable + coaxing,” he wrote, “I obtained an entrance to a house near by. I was + now completely broken down—so much so that the gentleman prepared a + liniment for me, and actually bound up some of my bruises, while the + female portion of the household actually screamed for joy at our + defeat! I was helped to bed, and next morning was taken by Mr. Bitzer + to Winchester in his carriage. He is a gentleman in all particulars, + but his family is the reverse (_sic_). On reaching Winchester I found + things decidedly squally, and concluded to get out. I was carried to + Martinsburg, and being offered by the agent of a luggage train to take + me to Baltimore, I concluded to accept the offer, and took a sleeping + bunk, arriving in Baltimore the next afternoon.” He then proceeded to + Philadelphia, and sent for his physician. Several of his officers whom + he found in the town he immediately sent back to the colours; but as + he believed that “the _moral_ of his regiment was not as it should be” + he remained himself in Philadelphia. + + [14] Dabney, vol. ii, pp. 93, 94. It may be recalled that Wellington + found it necessary to form a corps of the same kind in the Peninsular + War; it is curious that no such organisation exists in regular armies. + + [15] _From Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain,_ pp. 191, 192. + + [16] Article in _Harper’s Weekly_ by Colonel Strother, aide-de-camp to + General Banks. + + [17] Jackson’s Report. O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 703. + + [18] The supply waggons were still eight miles south of Front Royal, + in the Luray Valley. + + [19] Jackson’s Report. O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 704. + + [20] Dabney, vol. ii, pp. 101–2. “The difficulty,” says General + Taylor, speaking of the Confederate cavalry, “of converting raw men + into soldiers is enhanced manifold when they are mounted. Both man and + horse require training, and facilities for rambling, with temptation + to do so, are increased. There was little time, and it may be said + less disposition, to establish camps of instruction. Living on + horseback, fearless and dashing, the men of the South afforded the + best possible material for cavalry. They had every quality but + discipline, and resembled Prince Charming, whose manifold gifts were + rendered useless by the malignant fairy. Assuredly our cavalry + rendered much excellent service, especially when dismounted; and such + able officers as Stuart, Hampton, and the younger Lees in the east, + Forrest, Green, and Wheeler in the West, developed much talent for + war; but their achievements, however distinguished, fell far below the + standard that would have been reached had not the want of discipline + impaired their efforts.”—_Destruction and Reconstruction,_ pp. 70–71. + It is only fair to add, however, that the Confederate troopers had to + supply their own horses, receiving no compensation for their loss by + disease or capture. This in some measure excuses their anxiety to loot + as many chargers as they could lay hands on. + + [21] Twenty regiments of infantry and two regiments of cavalry. O.R., + vol. xii, part iii, p. 313. + + [22] _Destruction and Reconstruction,_ p. 65. + + [23] Banks’ aide-de-camp, Colonel Strother, says, “For several minutes + it looked like the commencement of a Bull Run panic. The stragglers,” + he adds, “rapidly increased in numbers, and many threw down their + arms.” _Harper’s Weekly._ See also Jackson’s Report, O.R., vol. xii, + part i, p. 706. + + [24] The greater part of the troops had marched over thirty miles in + thirty hours, during which time they had been almost continuously + engaged. + + [25] Jackson’s Report. + + [26] Some of Banks’ officers shared his opinion. The captain of the + Zouaves d’Afrique, the general’s body-guard, who had been cut off at + Strasburg, but rejoined on the Potomac, reported that, “incredible as + it may appear, my men marched 141 miles in 47 hours, as measured by + Captain Abert,” and concluded by congratulating Banks upon the success + of his “unparalleled retreat.” The Zouaves, at all events, could not + complain that they had been excluded from “active operations.” Another + officer declared that “we have great reason to be grateful to kind + Providence, and applaud the skill and energy of our commanding + officers for the miraculous escape of our men from utter + annihilation.” O.R., vol. xii, part i, pp. 573, 611. + + [27] Shields’ and Ord’s divisions of infantry, and Bayard’s brigade of + cavalry, numbering all told 21,200 officers and men. + + [28] Jackson, although the harvest was in full swing, had given orders + that all waggons in the valley were to be impressed and sent to + Winchester and Martinsburg. + + [29] For the distribution of the different forces during this period + see Note at end of chapter. + + [30] O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 81. King’s division, when it was found + that Jackson had halted near Winchester, was ordered to Front Royal. + The fourth division, McCall’s, was left to defend Fredericksburg. + + [31] Up to the time that they arrived within striking distance of + Jackson they had acted vigorously, Shields marching eighty miles in + five days, and Frémont seventy over a mountain road. + + [32] According to the Official Records, 156 men were taken by General + Shields. It is said that when Colonel Connor, in command of the 12th + Georgia Regiment, reported to Jackson at Winchester, and gave rather a + sensational account of his defeat, the General looked up, and asked in + his abrupt manner: “Colonel, how many men had you killed?” “None, I am + glad to say, General.” “How many wounded?” “Few or none, sir.” “Do you + call that fighting, sir?” said Jackson, and immediately placed him + under arrest, from which he was not released for several months. + + [33] _Destruction and Reconstruction,_ p. 78. + + [34] Quartermaster’s stores, to the value of £25,000, were captured at + Winchester alone, and 9,354 small arms, besides two guns, were carried + back to Staunton. + + [35] 68 killed; 386 wounded; 3 missing; 156 captured. + + [36] Letter from Major Hotchkiss. + + + + +Chapter XI +CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC + + +By the ignorant and the envious success in war is easily explained +away. The dead military lion, and, for that matter, even the living, is +a fair mark for the heels of a baser animal. The greatest captains have +not escaped the critics. The genius of Napoleon has been belittled on +the ground that each one of his opponents, except Wellington, was only +second-rate. French historians have attributed Wellington’s victories +to the mutual jealousy of the French marshals; and it has been asserted +that Moltke triumphed only because his adversaries blundered. Judged by +this rule few reputations would survive. In war, however, it is as +impossible to avoid error as it is to avoid loss of life; but it is by +no means simple either to detect or to take advantage of mistakes. +Before both Napoleon and Wellington an unsound manœuvre was dangerous +in the extreme. None were so quick to see the slip, none more prompt to +profit by it. Herein, to a very great extent, lay the secret of their +success, and herein lies the true measure of military genius. A general +is not necessarily incapable because he makes a false move; both +Napoleon and Wellington, in the long course of their campaigns, gave +many openings to a resolute foe, and both missed opportunities. Under +ordinary circumstances mistakes may easily escape notice altogether, or +at all events pass unpunished, and the reputation of the leader who +commits them will remain untarnished. But if he is pitted against a +master of war a single false step may lead to irretrievable ruin; and +he will be classed as beneath contempt for a fault which his successful +antagonist may have committed with impunity a hundred times over. + +So Jackson’s escape from Winchester was not due simply to the +inefficiency of the Federal generals, or to the ignorance of the +Federal President. Lincoln was wrong in dispatching McDowell to Front +Royal in order to cut off Jackson. When Shields, in execution of this +order, left Fredericksburg, the Confederates were only five miles north +of Winchester, and had they at once retreated McDowell must have missed +them by many miles. McDowell, hotly protesting, declared, and rightly, +that the movement he had been ordered to execute was strategically +false. “It is impossible,” he said, “that Jackson can have been largely +reinforced. He is merely creating a diversion, and the surest way to +bring him from the lower Valley is for me to move rapidly on Richmond. +In any case, it would be wiser to move on Gordonsville.”[1] His +arguments were unavailing. But when Jackson pressed forward to the +Potomac, it became possible to intercept him, and the President did all +he could to assist his generals. He kept them constantly informed of +the movements of the enemy and of each other. He left them a free hand, +and with an opponent less able his instructions would have probably +brought about complete success. Nor were the generals to blame. They +failed to accomplish the task that had been set them, and they made +mistakes. But the task was difficult; and, if at the critical moment +the hazard of their situation proved too much for their resolution, it +was exactly what might have been expected. The initial error of the +Federals was in sending two detached forces, under men of no particular +strength of character, from opposite points of the compass, to converge +upon an enemy who was believed to be superior to either of them. +Jackson at once recognised the blunder, and foreseeing the consequences +that were certain to ensue, resolved to profit by them. His escape, +then, was the reward of his own sagacity. + +When once the actual position of the Confederates had been determined, +and the dread that reinforcements were coming down the Valley had +passed away, the vigour of the Federal pursuit left nothing to be +desired. + +June 1 Directly it was found that the Confederates had gone south, on +the +afternoon of June 1, Shields was directed on Luray, and that night his +advanced guard was ten miles beyond Front Royal; on the other side of +the Massanuttons, Frémont, with Bayard’s cavalry heading his advance, +moved rapidly on Woodstock. + +The Federal generals, however, had to do with a foe who never relaxed +his vigilance. Whilst Ashby and Ewell, on May 31, were engaged with +Frémont at Cedar Creek, Jackson had expected that Shields would advance +on Strasburg. But not a single infantry soldier was observed on the +Front Royal road throughout the day. Such inaction was suspicious, and +the probability to which it pointed had not escaped the penetration of +the Confederate leader. His line of retreat was the familiar route by +New Market and Harrisonburg to Port Republic, and thence to the Gaps of +the Blue Ridge. There he could secure an unassailable position, within +reach of the railway and of Richmond. But, during the movement, danger +threatened from the valley of the South Fork. Should Shields adopt that +line of advance the White House and Columbia bridges would give him +easy access to New Market; and while Frémont was pressing the +Confederates in rear, their flank might be assailed by fresh foes from +the Luray Gap. And even if the retiring column should pass New Market +in safety, Shields, holding the bridges at Conrad’s Store and Port +Republic, might block the passage to the Blue Ridge. Jackson, looking +at the situation from his enemy’s point of view, came to the conclusion +that a movement up the valley of the South Fork was already in +progress, and that the aim of the Federal commander would be to secure +the bridges. His conjectures hit the mark. + +Before leaving Front Royal Shields ordered his cavalry to march rapidly +up the valley of the South Fork, and seize the bridge at Conrad’s +Store; the White House and Columbia bridges he intended to secure +himself. But Jackson was not to be so easily overreached. + +June 2 On the night of June 2 the Federal cavalry reached Luray, to +find that they had come too late. The White House and Columbia bridges +had both been burned +by a detachment of Confederate horse, and Shields was thus cut off from +New Market. At dawn on the 4th, after a forced night march, his +advanced guard reached Conrad’s Store to find that bridge also gone,[2] +and he was once more foiled. On his arrival at Luray, the sound of +cannon on the other side of the Massanuttons was plainly heard. It +seemed probable that Jackson and Frémont were already in collision; but +Shields, who had written a few hours before to Mr. Stanton that with +supplies and forage he could “stampede the enemy to Richmond,” was +unable to stir a foot to assist his colleague. + +Once again Jackson had turned to account the strategic possibilities of +the Massanuttons and the Shenandoah; and, to increase General Shields’ +embarrassment, the weather had broken. Heavy and incessant rain-storms +submerged the Virginia roads. He was ahead of his supplies; much +hampered by the mud; and the South Fork of the Shenandoah, cutting him +off from Frémont, rolled a volume of rushing water which it was +impossible to bridge without long delay. + +Meanwhile, west of the great mountain, the tide of war, which had swept +with such violence to the Potomac, came surging back. Frémont, by the +rapidity of his pursuit, made full amends for his lack of vigour at +Cedar Creek. A cloud of horsemen filled the space between the hostile +columns. Day after day the quiet farms and sleepy villages on the +Valley turnpike heard the thunder of Ashby’s guns. Every stream that +crossed the road was the scene of a fierce skirmish; and the ripening +corn was trampled under the hoofs of the charging squadrons. On June 2, +the first day of the pursuit, between Strasburg and Woodstock the +Federals, boldly led by Bayard, gained a distinct advantage. A dashing +attack drove in the Confederate rear-guard, swept away the horse +artillery, and sent Ashby’s and Steuart’s regiments, exhausted by +hunger and loss of sleep, flying up the Valley. Many prisoners were +taken, and the pursuit was +only checked by a party of infantry stragglers, whom Ashby had +succeeded in rallying across the road. + +Next day, June 3, the skirmishing was continued; and the Confederates, +burning the bridges across the roads, retreated to Mount Jackson. + +June 4 On the 4th the bridge over the North Fork was given to the +flames, Ashby, whose horse was shot under him, remaining to the last; +and the deep and turbulent river placed an impassable obstacle between +the armies. Under a deluge of rain the Federals attempted to launch +their pontoons; but the boats were swept away by the rising flood, and +it was not till the next morning that the bridge was made. + +June 5 The Confederates had thus gained twenty-four hours’ respite, and +contact was not resumed until the 6th. Jackson, meanwhile, constructing +a ferry at Mount Crawford, had sent his sick and wounded to Staunton, +thus saving them the long _détour_ by Port Republic; and dispatching +his stores and prisoners by the more circuitous route, had passed +through Harrisonburg to Cross Keys, a clump of buildings on Mill Creek, +where, on the night of the 5th, his infantry and artillery, with the +exception of a brigade supporting the cavalry, went into bivouac. + +June 6 On the afternoon of the 6th the Federal cavalry followed Ashby. +Some three miles from Harrisonburg is a tract of forest, crowning a +long ridge; and within the timber the Confederate squadrons occupied a +strong position. The enemy, 800 strong, pursued without precaution, +charged up a gentle hill, and were repulsed by a heavy fire. Then Ashby +let loose his mounted men on the broken ranks, and the Federals were +driven back to within half a mile of Harrisonburg, losing 4 officers +and 30 men. + +Smarting under this defeat, Frémont threw forward a still stronger +force of cavalry, strengthened by two battalions of infantry. Ashby had +already called up a portion of the brigade which supported him, and met +the attack in a clearing of the forest. The fight was fierce. The +Confederates were roughly handled by the Northern riflemen, and the +ranks began to waver. Riding to the front, +where the opposing lines were already at close range, Ashby called upon +his infantry to charge. + +As he gave the order his horse fell heavily to the ground. Leaping to +his feet in an instant, again he shouted, “Charge, men! for God’s sake, +charge!” The regiments rallied, and inspired by his example swept +forward from the wood. But hardly had they left the covert when their +leader fell, shot through the heart. He was speedily avenged. The men +who followed him, despite the heavy fire, dashed at the enemy in front +and flank, and drove them from their ground. The cavalry, meanwhile, +had worked round in rear; the horse artillery found an opportunity for +action; and under cover of the night the Federals fell back on +Harrisonburg. + +The losses of the Union troops were heavy; but the Confederate victory +was dearly purchased. The death of Ashby was a terrible blow to the +Army of the Valley. From the outbreak of the war he had been employed +on the Shenandoah, and from Staunton to the Potomac his was the most +familiar figure in the Confederate ranks. His daring rides on his +famous white charger were already the theme of song and story; and if +the tale of his exploits, as told in camp and farm, sometimes bordered +on the marvellous, the bare truth, stripped of all exaggeration, was +sufficient in itself to make a hero. His reckless courage, his fine +horsemanship, his skill in handling his command, and his power of +stimulating devotion, were not the only attributes which incited +admiration. “With such qualities,” it is said, “were united the utmost +generosity and unselfishness, and a delicacy of feeling equal to a +woman’s.” His loss came home with especial force to Jackson. After the +unfortunate episode in the pursuit from Middletown, he had rated his +cavalry leader in no measured terms for the indiscipline of his +command; and for some days their intercourse, usually most cordial, had +been simply official. Sensitive in the extreme to any reflection upon +himself or his troops, Ashby held aloof; and Jackson, always stern when +a breach of duty was concerned, made no overtures for a renewal of +friendly intercourse. Fortunately, before the fatal fight near +Harrisonburg, they had been fully reconciled; and with no shadow of +remorse Jackson was able to offer his tribute to the dead. Entering the +room in Port Republic, whither the body had been brought, he remained +for a time alone with his old comrade; and in sending an order to his +cavalry, added, “Poor Ashby is dead. He fell gloriously—one of the +noblest men and soldiers in the Confederate army.” A more public +testimony was to come. In his official report he wrote: “The close +relation General Ashby bore to my command for most of the previous +twelve months will justify me in saying that as a partisan officer I +never knew his superior. His daring was proverbial, his powers of +endurance almost incredible, his character heroic, and his sagacity +almost intuitive in divining the purposes and movements of the enemy.” + +On the 6th and 7th the Confederate infantry rested on the banks of Mill +Creek, near Cross Keys. The cavalry, on either flank of the +Massanuttons, watched both Frémont’s camps at Harrisonburg and the slow +advance of Shields; and on the southern peak of the mountains a party +of signallers, under a staff officer, looked down upon the roads which +converged on the Confederate position. + +June 7 June 7 was passed in unwonted quiet. For the first time for +fifteen days since the storming of Front Royal the boom of the guns was +silent. The glory of the summer brooded undisturbed on hill and forest; +and as the escort which followed Ashby to his grave passed down the +quiet country roads, the Valley lay still and peaceful in the sunshine. +Not a single Federal scout observed the melancholy _cortège._ Frémont’s +pursuit had been roughly checked. He was uncertain in which direction +the main body of the Confederates had retreated; and it was not till +evening that a strong force of infantry, reconnoitring through the +woods, struck Jackson’s outposts near the hamlet of Cross Keys. Only a +few shots were exchanged. + +Shields, meanwhile, had concentrated his troops at +Columbia Bridge on the 6th, and presuming that Jackson was standing +fast on the strong position at Rude’s Hill, was preparing to cross the +river. Later in the day a patrol, which had managed to communicate with +Frémont, informed him that Jackson was retreating, and the instructions +he thereupon dispatched to the officer commanding his advanced guard +are worthy of record: + +“The enemy passed New Market on the 5th; Blenker’s division on the 6th +in pursuit. The enemy has flung away everything, and their stragglers +fill the mountain. They need only a movement on the flank to +panic-strike them, and break them into fragments. No man has had such a +chance since the war commenced. You are within thirty miles of a +broken, retreating enemy, who still hangs together. 10,000 Germans are +on his rear, who hang on like bull-dogs. You have only to throw +yourself down on Waynesborough before him, and your cavalry will +capture them by the thousands, seize his train and abundant +supplies.”[3] + +In anticipation, therefore, of an easy triumph, and, to use his own +words, of “thundering down on Jackson’s rear,” Shields, throwing +precaution to the winds, determined to move as rapidly as possible on +Port Republic. He had written to Frémont urging a combined attack on +“the demoralised rebels,” and he thought that together they “would +finish Jackson.” His only anxiety was that the enemy might escape, and +in his haste he neglected the warning of his Corps commander. McDowell, +on dispatching him in pursuit, had directed his attention to the +importance of keeping his division well closed up. Jackson’s +predilection for dealing with exposed detachments had evidently been +noted. Shields’ force, however, owing to the difficulties of the road, +the mud, the quick-sands, and the swollen streams, was already divided +into several distinct fractions. His advanced brigade was south of +Conrad’s Store; a second was some miles in rear, and two were at Luray, +retained at that point in consequence of a report that 8,000 +Confederates were crossing the Blue +Ridge by Thornton’s Gap. To correct this faulty formation before +advancing he thought was not worth while. On the night of June 7 he was +sure of his prey. + +The situation at this juncture was as follows: Shields was stretched +out over five-and-twenty miles of road in the valley of the South Fork; +Frémont was at Harrisonburg; Ewell’s division was near Cross Keys, and +the main body of the Valley Army near Port Republic. + +During his retreat Jackson had kept his attention fixed on Shields. +That ardent Irishman pictured his old enemy flying in confusion, intent +only on escape. He would have been much astonished had he learned the +truth. From the moment Jackson left Strasburg, during the whole time he +was retreating, with the “bull-dogs” at his heels, he was meditating a +counter-stroke, and his victim had already been selected. When Shields +rushed boldly up the valley of the South Fork it seemed that an +opportunity of avenging Kernstown was about to offer. On June 4, the +day that the enemy reached Luray, Ewell was ordered to provide his men +with two days’ cooked rations and to complete their ammunition “for +active service.” The next day, however, it was found that Shields had +halted. Ewell was ordered to stand fast, and Jackson wrote despondently +to Lee: “At present I do not see that I can do much more than rest my +command and devote its time to drilling.” On the 6th, however, he +learned that Shields’ advanced guard had resumed its march; and, like a +tiger crouching in the jungle, he prepared to spring upon his prey. But +Frémont was close at hand, and Shields and Frémont between them +mustered nearly 25,000 men. They were certainly divided by the +Shenandoah; but they were fast converging on Port Republic; and in a +couple of marches, if not actually within sight of each other’s camps, +they would come within hearing of each other’s guns. Yet, +notwithstanding their numbers, Jackson had determined to deal with them +in detail. + +A few miles from the camp at Port Republic was a hill honeycombed with +caverns, known as the Grottoes of the Shenandoah. In the heart of the +limestone Nature has +built herself a palace of many chambers, vast, silent, and magnificent. +But far beyond the beauty of her mysterious halls was the glorious +prospect which lay before the eyes of the Confederate sentries. +Glimmering aisles and dark recesses, where no sunbeam lurks nor summer +wind whispers, compared but ill with those fruitful valleys, watered by +clear brown rivers, and steeped in the glow of a Virginian June. To the +north stood the Massanuttons, with their forests sleeping in the +noon-day; and to the right of the Massanuttons, displaying, in that +transparent atmosphere, every shade of that royal colour from which it +takes its name, the Blue Ridge loomed large against the eastern sky. +Summit after summit, each more delicately pencilled than the last, +receded to the horizon, and beneath their feet, still, dark, and +unbroken as the primeval wilderness, broad leagues of woodland +stretched far away over a lonely land. + +No battle-field boasts a fairer setting than Port Republic; but, lover +of Nature as he was, the region was attractive to Jackson for reasons +of a sterner sort. It was eminently adapted for the purpose he had at +heart. + +1. The South Fork of the Shenandoah is formed by the junction of two +streams, the North and South Rivers; the village of Port Republic lying +on the peninsula between the two. + +2. The bridge crosses the North River just above the junction, carrying +the Harrisonburg road into Port Republic; but the South River, which +cuts off Port Republic from the Luray Valley, is passable only by two +difficult fords. + +3. North of the village, on the left bank of the Shenandoah, a line of +high bluffs, covered with scattered timber, completely commands the +tract of open country which lies between the river and the Blue Ridge, +and across this tract ran the road by which Shields was marching. + +4. Four miles north-west of Port Republic, near the village of Cross +Keys, the road to Harrisonburg crosses Mill Creek, a strong position +for defence. + +By transferring his army across the Shenandoah, and burning the bridge +at Port Republic, Jackson could easily have escaped Frémont, and have +met Shields in the Luray Valley with superior force. But the plain +where the battle must be fought was commanded by the bluffs on the left +bank of the Shenandoah; and should Frémont advance while an engagement +was in progress, even though he could not cross the stream, he might +assail the Confederates in flank with his numerous batteries. In order, +then, to gain time in which to deal with Shields, it was essential that +Frémont should be held back, and this could only be done on the left +bank. Further, if Frémont could be held back until Shields’ force was +annihilated, the former would be isolated. If Jackson could hold the +bridge at Port Republic, and also prevent Frémont reaching the bluffs, +he could recross when he had done with Shields, and fight Frémont +without fear of interruption. + +To reverse the order, and to annihilate Frémont before falling upon +Shields, was out of the question. Whether he advanced against Frémont +or whether he stood still to receive his attack, Jackson’s rear and +communications, threatened by Shields, must be protected by a strong +detachment. It would be thus impossible to meet Frémont with superior +or even equal numbers, and an army weaker on the battlefield could not +make certain of decisive victory. + +Jackson had determined to check Frémont at Mill Creek. But the +situation was still uncertain. Frémont had halted at Harrisonburg, and +it was possible that he might advance no further. So the Confederates +were divided, ready to meet either adversary; Ewell remaining at Cross +Keys, and the Stonewall division encamping near Port Republic. + +June 8 On the morning of June 8, however, it was found that Frémont was +moving. Ewell’s division was already under arms. At 8.30 a.m. his +pickets, about two miles to the front, became engaged, and the +Confederate regiments moved leisurely into position. + +The line ran along the crest of a narrow ridge, commanding an open +valley, through which Mill Creek, an insignificant brook, ran parallel +to the front. The further +slopes, open and unobstructed except for scattered trees and a few +fences, rose gently to a lower ridge, about a mile distant. The ground +held by the Confederates was only partially cleared, and from the Port +Republic road in the centre, at a distance of six hundred yards on +either flank, were woods of heavy timber, enclosing the valley, and +jutting out towards the enemy. The ridge beyond the valley was also +thickly wooded; but here, too, there were open spaces on which +batteries might be deployed; and the forest in rear, where Ashby had +been killed, standing on higher ground, completely concealed the +Federal approach. The pickets, however, had given ample warning of the +coming attack; and when, at 10 a.m., the hostile artillery appeared on +the opposite height, it was received with a heavy fire. “Eight and a +half batteries,” says Frémont, “were brought into action within thirty +minutes.” Against this long array of guns the Confederates massed only +five batteries; but these commanded the open ground, and were all in +action from the first. + +Ewell had with him no more than three brigades. The Louisiana regiments +had bivouacked near Port Republic, and were not yet up. The whole +strength of the troops which held the ridge was no more than 6,000 +infantry, and perhaps 500 cavalry. Frémont had at least 10,000 +infantry, twelve batteries, and 2,000 cavalry. + +It was then against overwhelming numbers that Ewell was asked to hold +his ground, and the remainder of the army was four miles in rear. +Jackson himself was still absent from the field. The arrangements for +carrying out his ambitious plans had met with an unexpected hitch. In +the Luray Valley, from Conrad’s Store northwards, the space between the +Blue Ridge and the Shenandoah was covered for the most part with dense +forest, and through this forest ran the road. Moving beneath the +spreading foliage of oak and hickory, Shields’ advanced brigade was +concealed from the observation of the Confederate cavalry; and the +signallers on the mountain, endangered by Frémont’s movement, had been +withdrawn. + +North of Port Republic, between the foot-hills of the +Blue Ridge and the Shenandoah, lies a level tract of arable and meadow, +nearly a mile wide, and extending for nearly three miles in a northerly +direction. On the plain were the Confederate pickets, furnished by +three companies of Ashby’s regiment, with their patrols on the roads +towards Conrad’s Store; and there seemed little chance that Shields +would be able to reach the fords over the South River, much less the +Port Republic bridge, without long notice being given of his approach. +The cavalry, however, as had been already proved, were not entirely to +be depended on. Jackson, whose headquarters were within the village, +had already mounted his horse to ride forward to Cross Keys, when there +was a distant fire, a sudden commotion in the streets, and a breathless +messenger from the outposts reported that not only had the squadrons on +picket been surprised and scattered, but that the enemy was already +fording the South River. + +Between the two rivers, south-west of Port Republic, were the +Confederate trains, parked in the open fields. Here was Carrington’s +battery, with a small escort; and now the cavalry had fled there were +no other troops, save a single company of the 2nd Virginia, on this +side the Shenandoah. The squadron which headed the Federal advanced +guard was accompanied by two guns. One piece was sent towards the +bridge; the other, unlimbering on the further bank, opened fire on the +church, and the horsemen trotted cautiously forward into the village +street. Jackson, warned of his danger, had already made for the bridge, +and crossing at a gallop escaped capture by the barest margin of time. +His chief of artillery, Colonel Crutchfield, was made prisoner, with +Dr. McGuire and Captain Willis,[4] and his whole staff was dispersed, +save Captain Pendleton, a sterling soldier, though hardly more than a +boy in years. And the danger was not over. With the trains was the +whole of the reserve ammunition, and it seemed that a crushing disaster +was near at hand. The sudden appearance of the enemy caused the +greatest consternation amongst the teamsters; several of the waggons +went off +by the Staunton road; and, had the Federal cavalry come on, the whole +would have been stampeded. But Carrington’s battery was called to the +front by Captain Moore, commanding the company of infantry in the +village. The picket, promptly put into position, opened with a +well-aimed volley, and a few rounds checked the enemy’s advance; the +guns came rapidly and effectively into action, and at this critical +moment Jackson intervened with his usual vigour.[5] From the left bank +of the North River he saw a gun bearing on the bridge, the village +swarming with blue uniforms, and more artillery unlimbering across the +river. He had already sent orders for his infantry to fall in, and a +six-pounder was hurrying to the front. “I was surprised,” said the +officer to whose battery this piece belonged, “to see a gun posted on +the opposite bank. Although I had met a cavalry man who told me that +the enemy were advancing up the river, still I did not think it +possible they could have brought any guns into the place in so short a +time. It thereupon occurred to me that the piece at the bridge might be +one of Carrington’s, whose men had new uniforms something like those we +saw at the bridge. Upon suggesting this to the general, he reflected a +moment, and then riding a few paces to the left and front, he called +out, in a tone loud enough to be heard by the enemy, ‘Bring that gun up +here!’ but getting no reply, he raised himself in his stirrups, and in +a most authoritative and seemingly angry tone he shouted, ‘Bring that +gun up here, I say!’ At this they began to move the trail of the gun so +as to bring it to bear on us, which, when the general perceived, he +turned quickly to the officer in charge of my gun, and said in his +sharp, quick way, ‘Let ’em have it!’ The words had scarcely left his +lips when Lieutenant Brown, who had his piece charged and aimed, sent a +shot right among them, so disconcerting them that theirs in reply went +far above us.”[6] + +The Confederate battalions, some of which had been formed up for +inspection, or for the Sunday service, when the alarm was given, had +now come up, and the 87th Virginia was ordered to capture the gun, and +to clear the village. Without a moment’s hesitation the regiment +charged with a yell across the bridge, and so sudden was the rush that +the Federal artillerymen were surprised. The gun was double-shotted +with canister, and the head of the column should have been swept away. +But the aim was high and the Confederates escaped. Then, as the limber +came forward, the horses, terrified by the heavy fire and the yells of +the charging infantry, became unmanageable; and the gunners, abandoning +the field-piece, fled through the streets of Port Republic. The 87th +rushed forward with a yell. The hostile cavalry, following the gunners, +sought safety by the fords; and as the rout dashed through the shallow +water, the Confederate batteries, coming into action on the high bluffs +west of the Shenandoah, swept the plain below with shot and shell. + +The hostile artillery beyond the stream was quickly overpowered; horses +were shot down wholesale; a second gun was abandoned on the road; a +third, which had only two horses and a driver left, was thrown into a +swamp; and a fourth was found on the field without either team or men. + +The Federal infantry was not more fortunate. Carroll’s brigade of four +regiments was close in rear of the artillery when the Confederate +batteries opened fire. Catching the contagion from the flying cavalry, +it retreated northward in confusion. A second brigade (Tyler’s) came up +in support; but the bluffs beyond the river were now occupied by +Jackson’s infantry; a stream of fire swept the plain; and as Shields’ +advanced guard, followed by the Confederate cavalry, fell back to the +woods whence it had emerged, five miles away on the other flank was +heard the roar of the cannonade which opened the battle of Cross Keys. + +From the hurried flight of the Federals it was evident that Shields’ +main body was not yet up; so, placing two brigades in position to guard +the bridge, Jackson sent +the remainder to Ewell, and then rode to the scene of action. + +Frémont, under cover of his guns, had made his preparations for attack; +but the timidity which he had already displayed when face to face with +Jackson had once more taken possession of his faculties. Vigorous in +pursuit of a flying enemy, when that enemy turned at bay his courage +vanished. The Confederate position was undoubtedly strong, but it was +not impregnable. The woods on either flank gave access under cover to +the central ridge. The superior weight of his artillery was sufficient +to cover an advance across the open; and although he was without maps +or guide, the country was not so intersected as to render manœuvring +impracticable. + +In his official report Frémont lays great stress on the difficulties of +the ground; but reading between the lines it is easy to see that it was +the military situation which overburdened him. The vicious strategy of +converging columns, where intercommunication is tedious and uncertain, +once more exerted its paralysing influence. It was some days since he +had heard anything of Shields. That general’s dispatch, urging a +combined attack, had not yet reached him: whether he had passed Luray +or whether he had been already beaten, Frémont was altogether ignorant; +and, in his opinion, it was quite possible that the whole of the +Confederate army was before him. + +A more resolute commander would probably have decided that the shortest +way out of the dilemma was a vigorous attack. If Shields was within +hearing of the guns—and it was by no means improbable that he was—such +a course was the surest means of securing his co-operation; and even if +no help came, and the Confederates maintained their position, they +might be so crippled as to be unable to pursue. Defeat would not have +been an irreparable misfortune. Washington was secure. Banks, Saxton, +and McDowell held the approaches; and if Frémont himself were beaten +back, the strategic situation could be in no way affected. In fact a +defeat, if it had followed an attack so hotly pressed as to paralyse +Jackson +for the time being, would have been hardly less valuable than a +victory. + +“Fortune,” it has been well said, “loves a daring suitor, and he who +throws down the gauntlet may always count upon his adversary to help +him.” Frémont, however, was more afraid of losing the battle than +anxious to win it. “Taking counsel of his fears,” he would run no +risks. But neither could he abstain from action altogether. An enemy +was in front of him who for seven days had fled before him, and his own +army anticipated an easy triumph. + +So, like many another general who has shrunk from the nettle danger, he +sought refuge in half-measures, the most damning course of all. Of +twenty-four regiments present on the field of battle, five only, of +Blenker’s Germans, were sent forward to the attack. Their onslaught was +directed against the Confederate right; and here, within the woods, +Trimble had posted his brigade in a most advantageous position. A +flat-topped ridge, covered with great oaks, looked down upon a wide +meadow, crossed by a stout fence; and beyond the hollow lay the woods +through which the Federals, already in contact with the Confederate +outposts, were rapidly advancing. The pickets soon gave way, and +crossing the meadow found cover within the thickets, where Trimble’s +three regiments lay concealed. In hot pursuit came the Federal +skirmishers, with the solid lines of their brigade in close support. +Steadily moving forward, they climbed the fence and breasted the gentle +slope beyond. A few scattered shots, fired by the retreating pickets, +were the only indications of the enemy’s presence; the groves beyond +were dark and silent. The skirmishers had reached the crest of the +declivity, and the long wave of bayonets, following close upon their +tracks, was within sixty paces of the covert, when the thickets stirred +suddenly with sound and movement. The Southern riflemen rose swiftly to +their feet. A sheet of fire ran along their line, followed by a crash +that resounded through the woods; and the German regiments, after a +vigorous effort to hold their ground, fell back in disorder across the +clearing. Here, on the further edge, they rallied on their reserves, +and the Confederates, +who had followed up no further than was sufficient to give impetus to +the retreat, were once more withdrawn. + +A quarter of an hour passed, and as the enemy showed no inclination to +attempt a second advance across the meadow, where the dead and wounded +were lying thick, Trimble, sending word to Ewell of his intention, +determined to complete his victory. More skilful than his enemies, he +sent a regiment against their left, to which a convenient ravine gave +easy access, while the troops among the oaks were held back till the +flank attack was fully developed. The unexpected movement completely +surprised the Federal brigadier. Again his troops were driven in, and +the Confederates, now reinforced by six regiments which Ewell had sent +up, forced them with heavy losses through the woods, compelled two +batteries, after a fierce fight, to limber up, routed a brigade which +had been sent by Frémont to support the attack, and pressing slowly but +continuously forward, threw the whole of the enemy’s left wing, +consisting of Blenker’s eleven regiments, back to the shelter of his +line of guns. Trimble had drawn the “bulldog’s” teeth. + +The Confederates had reached the outskirts of the wood. They were a +mile in advance of the batteries in the centre; and the Federal +position, commanding a tract of open ground, was strong in itself and +strongly held. A general counterstroke was outside the scope of +Jackson’s designs. He had still Shields to deal with. The Federal left +wing had been heavily repulsed, but only a portion of Frémont’s force +had been engaged; to press the attack further would undoubtedly have +cost many lives, and even a partial reverse would have interfered with +his comprehensive plan. + +In other quarters of the battle-field the fighting had been +unimportant. The Confederate guns, although heavily outnumbered, held +their ground gallantly for more than five hours; and when they +eventually retired it was from want of ammunition rather than from loss +of _moral._ The waggons which carried their reserve had taken a wrong +road, and at the critical moment there were no +means of replenishing the supply. But so timid were Frémont’s tactics +that the blunder passed unpunished. While the battle on the left was +raging fiercely he had contented himself elsewhere with tapping feebly +at the enemy’s lines. In the centre of the field his skirmishers moved +against Ewell’s batteries, but were routed by a bayonet charge; on the +right, Milroy and Schenck, the two generals who had withstood Jackson +so stubbornly at McDowell, advanced on their own initiative through the +woods. They had driven in the Confederate skirmishers, and had induced +Ewell to strengthen this portion of his line from his reserve, when +they were recalled by Frémont, alarmed by Trimble’s vigorous attack, to +defend the main position. + +The Southerners followed slowly. The day was late, and Ewell, although +his troops were eager to crown their victory, was too cool a soldier to +yield to their impatience; and, as at Cedar Creek, where also he had +driven back the “Dutch” division, so at Cross Keys he rendered the most +loyal support to his commander. Yet he was a dashing fighter, chafing +under the restraint of command, and preferring the excitement of the +foremost line. “On two occasions in the Valley,” says General Taylor, +“during the temporary absence of Jackson, he summoned me to his side, +and immediately rushed forward amongst the skirmishers, where sharp +work was going on. Having refreshed himself, he returned with the hope +that “Old Jack would not catch him at it.”[7] + +How thoroughly Jackson trusted his subordinate may be inferred from the +fact that, although present on the field, he left Ewell to fight his +own battle. The only instructions he gave showed that he had fathomed +the temper of Frémont’s troops. “Let the Federals,” he said, “get very +close before your infantry fire; they won’t stand long.” It was to +Ewell’s dispositions, his wise use of his reserves, and to Trimble’s +ready initiative, that Frémont’s defeat was due. Beyond sending up a +couple of brigades from Port Republic, Jackson gave no orders. His +ambition was of too lofty a +kind to appropriate the honours which another might fairly claim; and, +when once battle had been joined, interference with the plan on which +it was being fought did not commend itself to him as sound generalship. +He was not one of those suspicious commanders who believe that no +subordinate can act intelligently. If he demanded the strictest +compliance with his instructions, he was always content to leave their +execution to the judgment of his generals; and with supreme confidence +in his own capacity, he was still sensible that his juniors in rank +might be just as able. His supervision was constant, but his +interference rare; and it was not till some palpable mistake had been +committed that he assumed direct control of his divisions or brigades. +Nor was any peculiar skill needed to beat back the attack of Frémont. +Nothing proves the Federal leader’s want of confidence more clearly +than the tale of losses. The Confederate casualties amounted to 288, of +which nearly half occurred in Trimble’s counterstroke. The Federal +reports show 684 killed, wounded, and missing, and of these Trimble’s +riflemen accounted for nearly 500, one regiment, the 8th New York, +being almost annihilated; but such losses, although at one point +severe, were altogether insignificant when compared with the total +strength; and it was not the troops who were defeated but the +general.[8] + +Ewell’s division bivouacked within sight of the enemy’s watch-fires, +and within hearing of his outposts; and throughout the night the work +of removing the wounded, friend and foe alike, went on in the sombre +woods. There was work, too, at Port Republic. Jackson, while his men +slept, was all activity. His plans were succeeding admirably. From +Frémont, cowering on the defensive before inferior numbers, there was +little to be feared. It was unlikely that after his repulse he would be +found more enterprising on the morrow; a small force would be +sufficient to arrest his march until Shields had been crushed; and +then, swinging back across the Shenandoah, +the soldiers of the Valley would find ample compensation, in the rout +of their most powerful foe, for the enforced rapidity of their retreat +from Winchester. But to fight two battles in one day, to disappear +completely from Frémont’s ken, and to recross the rivers before he had +time to seize the bridge, were manœuvres of the utmost delicacy, and +needed most careful preparation. + +It was Jackson’s custom, whenever a subordinate was to be entrusted +with an independent mission, to explain the part that he was to play in +a personal interview. By such means he made certain, first, that his +instructions were thoroughly understood; and, second, that there was no +chance of their purport coming to the knowledge of the enemy. Ewell was +first summoned to headquarters, and then Patton, whose brigade, +together with that of Trimble, was to have the task of checking Frémont +the next day. “I found him at 2 a.m.,” says Patton, “actively engaged +in making his dispositions for battle. He immediately proceeded to give +me particular instructions as to the management of the men in covering +the rear, saying: ‘I wish you to throw out all your men, if necessary, +as skirmishers, and to make a great show, so as to cause the enemy to +think the whole army are behind you. Hold your position as well as you +can, then fall back when obliged; take a new position, hold it in the +same way, and I will be back to join you in the morning.’” + +Colonel Patton reminded him that his brigade was a small one, and that +the country between Cross Keys and the Shenandoah offered few +advantages for protracting such manœuvres. He desired, therefore, to +know for how long he would be expected to hold the enemy in check. +Jackson replied, “By the blessing of Providence, I hope to be back by +ten o’clock.”[9] + +These interviews were not the only business which occupied the +commanding general. He arranged for the feeding of his troops before +their march next day,[10] for the +dispositions of his trains and ammunition waggons; and at the rising of +the moon, which occurred about midnight, he was seen on the banks of +the South River, superintending the construction of a bridge to carry +his infantry dryshod across the stream. + +An hour before daybreak he was roused from his short slumbers. Major +Imboden, who was in charge of a mule battery,[11] looking for one of +the staff, entered by mistake the general’s room. + +“I opened the door softly, and discovered Jackson lying on his face +across the bed, fully dressed, with sword, sash, and boots all on. The +low-burnt tallow-candle on the table shed a dim light, yet enough by +which to recognise him. I endeavoured to withdraw without waking him. +He turned over, sat upon the bed, and called out, ‘Who is that?’ + +“He checked my apology with, ‘That is all right. It’s time to be up. I +am glad to see you. Were the men all up as you came through camp?’ + +“‘Yes, General, and cooking.’ + +“‘That’s right; we move at daybreak. Sit down. I want to talk to you.’ + +“I had learned never to ask him questions about his plans, for he would +never answer such to anyone. I therefore waited for him to speak first. +He referred very feelingly to Ashby’s death, and spoke of it as an +irreparable loss. When he paused I said, ‘General, you made a glorious +winding-up of your four weeks with yesterday.’ He replied, ‘Yes, God +blessed our army again yesterday, and I hope with His protection and +blessing we shall do still better to-day.’”[12] Then followed +instructions as to the use of the mule battery in the forests through +which lay Shields’ line of advance. + +Before 5 a.m. the next morning the Stonewall Brigade +had assembled in Port Republic, and was immediately ordered to advance. +On the plain beyond, still dark in the shadow of the mountains, where +the cavalry formed the outposts, the fire of the pickets, which had +been incessant throughout the night, was increasing in intensity. The +Federals were making ready for battle. + +Winder had with him four regiments, about 1,200 strong, and two +batteries. In rear came Taylor with his Louisianians; and Jackson, +leaving Major Dabney to superintend the passage of the river, rode with +the leading brigade. The enemy’s pickets were encountered about a mile +and a half down the river, beyond a strip of woods, on either side of +the Luray road. They were quickly driven in, and the Federal position +became revealed. From the foot-hills of the Blue Ridge, clothed to +their crests with under-growth and timber, the plain, over a mile in +breadth, extended to the Shenandoah. The ground was terraced; the upper +level, immediately beneath the mountain, was densely wooded, and fifty +or sixty feet above the open fields round the Lewis House. Here was the +hostile front. The Federal force was composed of two brigades of +infantry and sixteen guns, not more than 4,000 all told, for Shields, +with the remainder of the division, was still far in rear. The right +rested on the river; the left on a ravine of the upper level, through +which a shallow stream flowed down from the heights above. On the +northern shoulder of this ravine was established a battery of seven +guns, sweeping every yard of the ground beneath, and a country road, +which led directly to the Shenandoah, running between stiff banks and +strongly fenced, was lined with riflemen. Part of the artillery was on +the plain, near the Lewis House, with a section near the river; on the +hillside, beyond the seven guns, two regiments were concealed within +the forest, and in rear of the battery was a third. The position was +strong, and the men who held it were of different calibre from +Blenker’s Germans, and the leaders of stauncher stuff than Frémont. Six +of the seven battalions had fought at Kernstown. Tyler, who on that day +had seen the Confederates retreat before him, was in +command; and neither general nor soldiers had reason to dread the name +of Stonewall Jackson. In the sturdy battalions of Ohio and West +Virginia the Stonewall Brigade were face to face with foemen worthy of +their steel; and when Jackson, anxious to get back to Frémont, ordered +Winder to attack, he set him a formidable task. + +It was first necessary to dislodge the hostile guns. Winder’s two +batteries were insufficient for the work, and two of his four regiments +were ordered into the woods on the terrace, in order to outflank the +battery beyond the stream. This detachment, moving with difficulty +through the thickets, found a stronger force of infantry within the +forest; the guns opened with grape at a range of one hundred yards, and +the Confederates, threatened on either flank, fell back in some +confusion. + +The remainder of Winder’s line had meanwhile met with a decided check. +The enemy along the hollow road was strongly posted. Both guns and +skirmishers were hidden by the embankment; and as the mists of the +morning cleared away, and the sun, rising in splendour above the +mountains, flooded the valley with light, a long line of hostile +infantry, with colours flying and gleaming arms, was seen advancing +steadily into battle. The Federal Commander, observing his opportunity, +had, with rare good judgment, determined on a counterstroke. The +Louisiana brigade was moving up in support of Winder, but it was still +distant. The two regiments which supported the Confederate batteries +were suffering from the heavy artillery fire, and the skirmishers were +already falling back. “Below,” says General Taylor, “Ewell was hurrying +his men over the bridge; but it looked as if we should be doubled up on +him ere he could cross and develop much strength. Jackson was on the +road, a little in advance of his line, where the fire was hottest, with +the reins on his horse’s neck. Summoning a young officer from his +staff, be pointed up the mountain. The head of my approaching column +was turned short up the slope, and within the forest came speedily +to a path which came upon the gorge opposite the battery.[13] + +But, as Taylor’s regiments disappeared within the forest, Winder’s +brigade was left for the moment isolated, bearing up with difficulty +against overwhelming numbers. Ewell’s division had found great +difficulty in crossing the South River. The bridge, a construction of +planks laid on the running gear of waggons, had proved unserviceable. +At the deepest part there was a step of two feet between two axletrees +of different height; and the boards of the higher stage, except one, +had broken from their fastenings. As the men passed over, several were +thrown from their treacherous platform into the rushing stream, until +at length they refused to trust themselves except to the centre plank. +The column of fours was thus reduced to single file; men, guns, and +waggons were huddled in confusion on the river banks; and the officers +present neglected to secure the footway, and refused, despite the order +of Major Dabney, to force their men through the breast-high ford. + +So, while his subordinates were trifling with the time, which, if +Frémont was to be defeated as well as Shields, was of such extreme +importance, Jackson saw his old brigade assailed by superior numbers in +front and flank. The Federals, matching the rifles of the Confederate +marksmen with weapons no less deadly, crossed over the road and bore +down upon the guns. The 7th Louisiana, the rear regiment of Taylor’s +column, was hastily called up, and dashed forward in a vain attempt to +stem the tide. + +A most determined and stubborn conflict now took place, and, as at +Kernstown, at the closest range. The Ohio troops repelled every effort +to drive them back. Winder’s line was thin. Every man was engaged in +the +firing line. The flanks were scourged by bursting shells. The deadly +fire from the road held back the front. Men and officers were falling +fast. The stream of wounded was creeping to the rear; and after thirty +minutes of fierce fighting, the wavering line of the Confederates, +breaking in disorder, fell back upon the guns. The artillery, firing a +final salvo at a range of two hundred yards, was ordered to limber up. +One gun alone, standing solitary between the opposing lines, essayed to +cover the retreat; but the enemy was within a hundred yards, men and +horses were shot down; despite a shower of grape, which rent great gaps +in the crowded ranks, the long blue wave swept on, and leaving the +captured piece in rear, advanced in triumph across the fields. + +In vain two of Ewell’s battalions, hurrying forward to the sound of +battle, were thrown against the flank of the attack. For an instant the +Federal left recoiled, and then, springing forward with still fiercer +energy, dashed back their new antagonists as they had done the rest. In +vain Jackson, galloping to the front, spurred his horse into the +tumult, and called upon his men to rally. Winder’s line, for the time +being at least, had lost all strength and order; and although another +regiment had now come up, the enemy’s fire was still so heavy that it +was impossible to reform the defeated troops, and two fresh Federal +regiments were now advancing to strengthen the attack. Tyler had +ordered his left wing to reinforce the centre and it seemed that the +Confederates would be defeated piecemeal. But at this moment the lines +of the assailant came to a sudden halt; and along the slopes of the +Blue Ridge a heavy crash of musketry, the rapid discharges of the guns, +and the charging yell of the Southern infantry, told of a renewed +attack upon the battery on the mountain side. + +The Louisianians had come up in the very nick of time. Pursuing his +march by the forest path, Taylor had heard the sounds of battle pass +beyond his flank, and the cheers of the Federals proved that Winder was +hard pressed. Rapidly deploying on his advanced guard, which, led by +Colonel Kelley, of the 8th Louisiana, was already in line, he led his +companies across the ravine. Down the broken slopes, covered with great +boulders and scattered trees, the men slipped and stumbled, and then, +splashing through the stream, swarmed up the face of the bank on which +the Federal artillery was in action. Breaking through the undergrowth +they threw themselves on the guns. The attention of the enemy had been +fixed upon the fight that raged over the plain below, and the thick +timber and heavy smoke concealed the approach of Taylor’s regiments. +The surprise, however, was a failure. The trails were swung round in +the new direction, the canister crashed through the laurels, the +supporting infantry rushed forward, and the Southerners were driven +back. Again, as reinforcements crowded over the ravine, they returned +to the charge, and with bayonet and rammer the fight surged to and fro +within the battery. For the second time the Federals cleared their +front; but some of the Louisiana companies, clambering up the mountain +to the right, appeared upon their flank, and once more the stormers, +rallying in the hollow, rushed forward with the bayonet. The battery +was carried, one gun alone escaping, and the Federal commander saw the +key of his position abandoned to the enemy. Not a moment was to be +lost. The bank was nearly a mile in rear of his right and centre, and +commanded his line of retreat at effective range. Sending his reserves +to retake the battery, he directed his attacking line, already pressing +heavily on Winder, to fall back at once. But it was even then too late. +The rest of Ewell’s division had reached the field. One of his brigades +had been ordered to sustain the Lousianians; and across the plain a +long column of infantry and artillery was hurrying northwards from Port +Republic. + +The Stonewall Brigade, relieved of the pressure in front, had already +rallied; and when Tyler’s reserves, with their backs to the river, +advanced to retake the battery, Jackson’s artillery was once more +moving forward. The guns captured by Taylor were turned against the +Federals—Ewell, it is said, indulging to the full his passion for hot +work, serving as a gunner—and within a short space of time +Tyler was in full retreat, and the Confederate cavalry were thundering +on his traces. + +It was half-past ten. For nearly five hours the Federals had held their +ground, and two of Jackson’s best brigades had been severely handled. +Even if Trimble and Patton had been successful in holding Frémont back, +the Valley soldiers were in no condition for a rapid march and a +vigorous attack, and their commander had long since recognised that he +must rest content with a single victory. + +[Illustration: Map of the Battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic, June +8th and 9th, 1862.] + +Before nine o’clock, about the time of Winder’s repulse, finding the +resistance of the enemy more formidable than be had anticipated, he had +recalled his brigades from the opposite bank of the Shenandoah, and had +ordered them to burn the bridge. Trimble and Patton abandoned the +battle-field of the previous day, and fell back to Port Republic. +Hardly a shot was fired during their retreat, and when they took up +their march only a single Federal battery had been seen. Frémont’s +advance was cautious in the extreme. He was actually aware that Shields +had two brigades beyond the river, for a scout had reached him, and +from the ground about Mill Creek the sound of Tyler’s battle could be +plainly heard. But he could get no direct information of what was +passing. The crest of the Massanuttons, although the sun shone bright +on the cliffs below, was shrouded in haze, completely forbidding all +observation; and it was not till near noon, after a march of seven +miles, which began at dawn and was practically unopposed, that Frémont +reached the Shenandoah. There, in the charred and smoking timbers of +the bridge, the groups of Federal prisoners on the plain, the +Confederates gathering the wounded, and the faint rattle of musketry +far down the Luray Valley, he saw the result of his timidity. + +Massing his batteries on the western bluffs, and turning his guns in +impotent wrath upon the plain, he drove the ambulances and their escort +from the field. But the Confederate dead and wounded had already been +removed, and the only effect of his spiteful salvoes was that his +suffering comrades lay under a drenching rain until he retired to +Harrisonburg. By that time many, whom their enemies +would have rescued, had perished miserably, and “not a few of the dead, +with some perchance of the mangled living, were partially devoured by +swine before their burial.”[14] + +The pursuit of Tyler was pressed for nine miles down the river. The +Ohio regiments, dispersed at first by the Confederate artillery, +gathered gradually together, and held the cavalry in check. Near +Conrad’s Store, where Shields, marching in desperate haste to the sound +of the cannonade, had put his two remaining brigades in position across +the road, the chase was stayed. The Federal commander admits that he +was only just in time. Jackson’s horsemen, he says, were enveloping the +column; a crowd of fugitives was rushing to the rear, and his own +cavalry had dispersed. The Confederate army, of which some of the +brigades and nearly the whole artillery had been halted far in rear, +was now withdrawn; but, compelled to move by circuitous paths in order +to avoid the fire of Frémont’s batteries, it was after midnight before +the whole had assembled in Brown’s Gap. More than one of the regiments +had marched over twenty miles and had been heavily engaged. + +Port Republic was the battle most costly to the Army of the Valley +during the whole campaign. Out of 5,900 Confederates engaged 804 were +disabled.[15] The Federal losses were heavier. The killed, wounded, and +missing (including 450 captured) amounted to 1,001, or one-fourth of +Tyler’s strength. + +The success which the Confederates had achieved was undoubtedly +important. The Valley army, posted in Brown’s Gap, was now in direct +communication with Richmond. Not only had its pursuers been roughly +checked, but +the sudden and unexpected counterstroke, delivered by an enemy whom +they believed to be in full flight, had surprised Lincoln and Stanton +as effectively as Shields and Frémont. On June 6, the day Jackson +halted near Port Republic, McCall’s division of McDowell’s Army Corps, +which had been left at Fredericksburg, had been sent to the Peninsula +by water; and two days later McDowell himself, with the remainder of +his force, was directed to join McClellan as speedily as possible +overland. Frémont, on the same date, was instructed to halt at +Harrisonburg, and Shields to march to Fredericksburg. But before +Stanton’s dispatches reached their destination both Frémont and Shields +had been defeated, and the plans of the Northern Cabinet were once more +upset. + +Instead of moving at once on Fredericksburg, and in spite of McDowell’s +remonstrances, Shields was detained at Luray, and Ricketts, who had +succeeded Ord, at Front Royal; while Frémont, deeming himself too much +exposed at Harrisonburg, fell back to Mount Jackson. It was not till +June 20 that Ricketts and Shields were permitted to leave the Valley, +ten days after the order had been issued for McDowell to move on +Richmond. For that space of time, then, his departure was delayed; and +there was worse to come. The great strategist at Richmond had not yet +done with Lincoln. There was still more profit to be derived from the +situation; and from the subsidiary operations in the Valley we may now +turn to the main armies. + +By Jackson’s brilliant manœuvres McDowell had been lured westward at +the very moment he was about to join McClellan. The gap between the two +Federal armies had been widened from five to fifteen marches, while +Jackson at Brown’s Gap was no more than nine marches distant from +Richmond. McClellan, moreover, had been paralysed by the vigour of +Jackson’s blows. + +On May 16, as already related, he had reached White House on the +Pamunkey, twenty miles from the Confederate capital. Ten miles south, +and directly across his path, flowed the Chickahominy, a formidable +obstacle to the march of a large army. + +On the 24th, having already been informed that he was to be reinforced +by McDowell, he was told that the movement of the latter for +Fredericksburg was postponed until the Valley had been cleared. This +change of plan placed him in a most awkward predicament. A portion of +his army, in order to lend a hand to McDowell, had already crossed the +Chickahominy, a river with but few points of passage, and over which, +by reason of the swamps, the construction of military bridges was a +difficult and tedious operation. On May 30, two army corps were south +of the Chickahominy, covering, in a partially intrenched position, the +building of the bridges, while three army corps were still on the +further bank. + +McClellan’s difficulties had not escaped the observation of his +watchful adversaries, and on the morning of May 31 the Federal lines +were heavily attacked by Johnston. The left of the position on the +south side of the Chickahominy was protected by the White Oak Swamp, a +broad and almost impassable morass; but the right, thrown back to the +river, was unprotected by intrenchments, and thinly manned. The defence +of the first line had been assigned to one corps only; the second was +five miles in rear. The assailants should have won an easy triumph. But +if McClellan had shown but little skill in the distribution of his +troops on the defensive, the Confederate arrangements for attack were +even more at fault. The country between Richmond and the Chickahominy +is level and well wooded. It was intersected by several roads, three of +which led directly to the enemy’s position. But the roads were bad, and +a tremendous rain-storm, which broke on the night of the 30th, +transformed the fields into tracts of greasy mud, and rendered the +passage of artillery difficult. The natural obstacles, however, were +not the chief. + +The force detailed for the attack amounted to 40,000 men, or +twenty-three brigades. The Federal works were but five miles from +Richmond, and the Confederates were ordered to advance at dawn. But it +was the first time that an offensive movement on so large a scale had +been +attempted; the woods and swamps made supervision difficult, and the +staff proved unequal to the task of ensuring co-operation. The orders +for attack were badly framed. The subordinate generals did not clearly +comprehend what was expected from them. There were misunderstandings as +to the roads to be followed, and as to who was to command the wings. +The columns crossed, and half the day was wasted in getting into +position. It was not till 1 p.m. that the first gun was fired, and not +till 4 p.m. that the commanding general, stationed with the left wing, +was made acquainted with the progress of his right and centre. When it +was at last delivered, the attack was piecemeal; and although +successful in driving the enemy from his intrenchments, it failed to +drive him from the field. The Federals fell back to a second line of +earthworks, and were strongly reinforced from beyond the river. During +the battle Johnston himself was severely wounded, and the command +devolved on General G. W. Smith. Orders were issued that the attack +should be renewed next morning; but for reasons which have never been +satisfactorily explained, only five of the twenty-three brigades were +actively engaged, and the battle of Seven Pines ended with the +unmolested retreat of the Confederates. Smith fell sick, and General +Lee was ordered by the President to take command of the army in the +field. + +McClellan, thanks to the bad work of the Confederate staff at the +battle of Seven Pines, had now succeeded in securing the passages +across the Chickahominy. But for the present he had given up all idea +of an immediate advance. Two of his army corps had suffered severely, +both in men and in _moral_; the roads were practically impassable for +artillery; the bridges over the Chickahominy had been much injured by +the floods; and it was imperative to re-establish the communications. +Such is his own explanation of his inactivity; but his official +correspondence with the Secretary of War leaves no doubt that his hope +of being reinforced by McDowell was a still more potent reason. During +the first three weeks in June he received repeated assurances from Mr. +Stanton that large bodies of troops were on their way to join him, +and it was for these that he was waiting. This expectant attitude, due +to McDowell’s non-arrival, entailed on him a serious disadvantage. If +he transferred his whole army to the right bank of the Chickahominy, +his line of supply, the railway to West Point, would be exposed; and, +secondly, when McDowell approached from Fredericksburg, it would be +possible for Leo to drive that general back before the Army of the +Potomac could give him direct support, or in any case to cut off all +communication with him. McClellan was consequently compelled to retain +his right wing north of the river; and indeed in so doing he was only +obeying his instructions. On May 18 Stanton had telegraphed: “You are +instructed to co-operate so as to establish this communication [with +McDowell], by extending your right wing north of Richmond.” + +The Federal army, then, whilst awaiting the promised reinforcements, +was divided into two parts by a stream which another storm might render +impassable. It will thus be seen that Jackson’s operations not only +deprived McClellan of the immediate aid of 40,000 men and 100 guns, but +placed him in a most embarrassing situation. “The faulty location of +the Union army,” says General Porter, commanding the Fifth Federal Army +Corps, “was from the first realised by General McClellan, and became +daily an increasing cause of care and anxiety; not the least disturbing +element of which was the impossibility of quickly reinforcing his right +wing or promptly withdrawing it to the south bank.”[16] + +Seeing that the Confederates were no more than 60,000 strong, while the +invading army mustered 100,000, it would seem that the knot should have +been cut by an immediate attack on the Richmond lines. But McClellan, +who had been United States Commissioner in the Crimea, knew something +of the strength of earthworks; and moreover, although the comparatively +feeble numbers developed by the Confederates at Seven Pines should have +enlightened him, he still believed that his enemy’s army was far larger +than his own. So, notwithstanding his danger, he +preferred to postpone his advance till Jackson’s defeat should set +McDowell free. + +Fatal was the mistake which retained McDowell’s divisions in the +Valley, and sent Shields in pursuit of Jackson. While the Federal army, +waiting for reinforcements, lay astride the noisome swamps of the +Chickahominy, Lee was preparing a counterstroke on the largest scale. + +The first thing to do was to reduce the disparity of numbers; and to +effect this troops were to be brought up from the south, Jackson was to +come to Richmond, and McDowell was to be kept away. This last was of +more importance than the rest, and, at the same time, more difficult of +attainment. Jackson was certainly nearer to Richmond than was McDowell; +but to defeat McClellan would take some time, and it was essential that +Jackson should have a long start, and not arrive upon the battlefield +with McDowell on his heels. It was necessary, therefore, that the +greater part of the latter’s force should be detained on the +Shenandoah; and on June 8, while Cross Keys was being fought, Lee wrote +to Jackson: “Should there be nothing requiring your attention in the +Valley, so as to prevent you leaving it in a few days, and you can make +arrangements to deceive the enemy and impress him with the idea of your +presence, please let me know, that you may unite at the decisive moment +with the army near Richmond. Make your arrangements accordingly; but +should an opportunity occur of striking the enemy a successful blow, do +not let it escape you.” + +June 11 At the same time a detachment of 7,000 infantry was ordered to +the Valley. “Your recent successes,” wrote Lee on the 11th, when the +news of Cross Keys and Port Republic had been received, “have been the +cause of the liveliest joy in this army as well as in the country. The +admiration excited by your skill and boldness has been constantly +mingled with solicitude for your situation. The practicability of +reinforcing you has been the subject of gravest consideration. It has +been +determined to do so at the expense of weakening this army. +Brigadier-General Lawton with six regiments from Georgia is on his way +to you, and Brigadier-General Whiting with eight veteran regiments +leaves here to-day. The object is to enable you to crush the forces +opposed to you. Leave your enfeebled troops to watch the country and +guard the passes covered by your cavalry and artillery, and with your +main body, including Ewell’s division and Lawton’s and Whiting’s +commands, move rapidly to Ashland by rail or otherwise, as you may find +most advantageous, and sweep down between the Chickahominy and the +Pamunkey, cutting up the enemy’s communications, etc., while this army +attacks McClellan in front. He will then, I think, be forced to come +out of his intrenchments, where he is strongly posted on the +Chickahominy, and apparently preparing to move by gradual approaches on +Richmond.”[17] + +Before the reinforcements reached the Valley both Frémont and Shields +were out of reach. To have followed them down the Valley would have +been injudicious. Another victory would have doubtless held McDowell +fast, but it would have drawn Jackson too far from Richmond. The +Confederate generals, therefore, in order to impose upon their enemies, +and to maintain the belief that Washington was threatened, had recourse +to stratagem. The departure of Whiting and Lawton for the Valley was +ostentatiously announced. Federal prisoners, about to be dismissed upon +parole, were allowed to see the trains full of soldiers proceeding +westward, to count the regiments. And learn their destination. Thus Lee +played his part in the game of deception, and meanwhile Jackson had +taken active measures to the same end. + +Frémont had retired from Port Republic on the morning of the 10th. On +the 11th the Confederate cavalry, now under Colonel Munford, a worthy +successor of the indefatigable Ashby, crossed the Shenandoah, and +followed the retreating enemy. So active was the pursuit that Frémont +evacuated Harrisonburg, abandoning two hundred wounded +in the hospitals, besides medical and other stores. + +June 14 “Significant demonstrations of the enemy,” to use his own +words, drove him next day from the strong position at Mount Jackson; +and on June 14 he fell back to Strasburg, Banks, who had advanced to +Middletown, being in close support. + +On the 12th the Army of the Valley had once more moved westward, and, +crossing South River, had encamped in the woods near Mount Meridian. +Here for five days, by the sparkling waters of the Shenandoah, the +wearied soldiers rested, while their indefatigable leader employed ruse +after ruse to delude the enemy. The cavalry, though far from support, +was ordered to manœuvre boldly to prevent all information reaching the +Federals, and to follow Frémont so long as he retreated.[18] The +bearers of flags of truce were impressed with the idea that the +Southerners were advancing in great strength. The outpost line was made +as close as possible; no civilians were allowed to pass; and the +troopers, so that they should have nothing to tell it they were +captured, were kept in ignorance of the position of their own infantry. +The general’s real intentions were concealed from everyone except +Colonel Munford. The officers of the staff fared worse than the +remainder of the army. Not only were they debarred from their +commander’s confidence, but they became the unconscious instruments +whereby false intelligence was spread. “The engineers were directed to +prepare a series of maps of the Valley; and all who acquired a +knowledge of this carefully divulged order told their friends in +confidence that Jackson was going at once in pursuit of Frémont. As +those friends told their friends without loss of time, it was soon the +well-settled conviction of everybody that nothing was further from +Jackson’s intention than an evacuation of the Valley.” + +June 17 On June 17 arrived a last letter from Lee:— + +“From your account of the position of the enemy I think it would be +difficult for you to engage him in time to unite with this army in the +battle for Richmond. Frémont +and Shields are apparently retrograding, their troops shaken and +disorganised, and some time will be required to set them again in the +field. If this is so, the sooner you unite with this army the better. +McClellan is being strengthened. . . . There is much sickness in his +ranks, but his reinforcements by far exceed his losses. The present, +therefore, seems to be favourable for a junction of your army and this. +If you agree with me, the sooner you can make arrangements to do so the +better. In moving your troops you could let it be understood that it +was to pursue the enemy in your front. Dispose those to hold the +Valley, so as to deceive the enemy, keeping your cavalry well in their +front, and at the proper time suddenly descending upon the Pamunkey. To +be efficacious the movement must be secret. Let me know the force you +can bring, and be careful to guard from friends and foes your purpose +and your intention of personally leaving the Valley. The country is +full of spies, and our plans are immediately carried to the enemy.”[19] + +The greater part of these instructions Jackson had already carried out +on his own initiative. There remained but to give final directions to +Colonel Munford, who was to hold the Valley, and to set the army in +motion. Munford was instructed to do his best to spread false reports +of an advance to the Potomac. Ewell’s division was ordered to +Charlottesville. The rest of the Valley troops were to follow Ewell; +and Whiting and Lawton, who, in order to bewilder Frémont, had been +marched from Staunton to Mount Meridian, and then back to Staunton, +were to take train to Gordonsville. It was above all things important +that the march should be secret. Not only was it essential that Lincoln +should not be alarmed into reinforcing McClellan, but it was of even +more importance that McClellan should not be alarmed into correcting +the faulty distribution of his army. So long as he remained with half +his force on one bank of the Chickahominy and half on the other, Lee +had a fair chance of concentrating superior numbers against one of the +fractions. But if McClellan, warned of Jackson’s +approach, were to mass his whole force on one bank or the other, there +would be little hope of success for the Confederates. + +The ultimate object of the movement was therefore revealed to no one, +and the most rigorous precautions were adopted to conceal it. Jackson’s +letters from Richmond, in accordance with his own instructions, bore no +more explicit address than “Somewhere.” A long line of cavalry, +occupying every road, covered the front, and prevented anyone, soldier +or civilian, preceding them toward Richmond. Far out to either flank +rode patrols of horsemen, and a strong rear-guard swept before it +campfollowers and stragglers. At night, every road which approached the +bivouacs was strongly picketed, and the troops were prevented from +communicating with the country people. The men were forbidden to ask +the names of the villages through which they passed; and it was ordered +that to all questions they should make the one answer: “I don’t know.” +“This was just as much license as the men wanted,” says an eye-witness, +“and they forthwith knew nothing of the past, present, or future.” An +amusing incident, it is said, grew out of this order. One of General +Hood’s[20] Texans left the ranks on the march, and was climbing a fence +to go to a cherry-tree near at hand, when Jackson rode by and saw him. + +“Where are you going?” asked the general. + +“I don’t know,” replied the soldier. + +“To what command do you belong?” + +“I don’t know.” + +“Well, what State are you from?” + +“I don’t know.” + +“What is the meaning of all this?” asked Jackson of another. + +“Well,” was the reply, “Old Stonewall and General Hood gave orders +yesterday that we were not to know anything until after the next +fight.” + +Jackson laughed and rode on.[21] + +The men themselves, intelligent as they were, were +unable to penetrate their general’s design. When they reached +Charlottesville it was reported in the ranks that the next march would +be northwards, to check a movement of Banks across the Blue Ridge. At +Gordonsville it was supposed that they would move on Washington. + +“I recollect,” says one of the Valley soldiers, “that the pastor of the +Presbyterian church there, with whom Jackson spent the night, told me, +as a profound secret, not to be breathed to mortal man, that we would +move at daybreak on Culpeper Court House to intercept a column of the +enemy coming across the mountains. He said there could be no mistake +about this, for he had it from General Jackson himself. We did move at +daybreak, but instead of moving on Culpeper Court House we marched in +the opposite direction. At Hanover Junction we expected to head towards +Fredericksburg to meet McDowell, and the whole movement was so secretly +conducted that the troops were uncertain of their destination until the +evening of June 26, when they heard A. P. Hill’s guns at +Mechanicsville, and made the woods vibrate with their shouts of +anticipated victory.”[22] + +At Gordonsville a rumour, which proved to be false, arrested the march +of the army for a whole day. On the 21st the leading division arrived +at Frederickshall, fifty miles from Richmond, and there halted for the +Sunday. They had already marched fifty miles, and the main body, +although the railway had been of much service, was still distant. There +was not sufficient rolling stock available to transport all the +infantry simultaneously, and, in any case, the cavalry, artillery, and +waggons must have proceeded by road. The trains, therefore, moving +backwards and forwards along the line, and taking up the rear brigades +in succession, forwarded them in a couple of hours a whole day’s march. +Beyond Frederickshall the line had been destroyed by the enemy’s +cavalry. + +June 28 At 1 a.m. on Monday morning, Jackson, accompanied by a single +orderly, rode to confer with Lee, near Richmond. He was provided with a +pass, which Major Dabney had +been instructed to procure from General Whiting, the next in command, +authorising him to impress horses; and he had resorted to other +expedients to blind his friends. The lady of the house which he had +made his headquarters at Frederickshall had sent to ask if the general +would breakfast with her next morning. He replied that he would be glad +to do so if he were there at breakfast time; and upon her inquiry as to +the time that would be most convenient, he said: “Have it at your usual +time, and send for me when it is ready.” When Mrs. Harris sent for him, +Jim, his coloured servant, replied to the message: “Sh! you don’t +’spec’ to find the general here at this hour, do you? He left here +‘bout midnight, and I ’spec’ by this time he’s whippin’ Banks in the +Valley.” + +During the journey his determination to preserve his incognito was the +cause of some embarrassment. A few miles from his quarters he was +halted by a sentry. It was in vain that he represented that he was an +officer on duty, carrying dispatches. The sentry, one of the Stonewall +Brigade, was inexorable, and quoted Jackson’s own orders. The utmost +that he would concede was that the commander of the picket should be +called. When this officer came he recognised his general. Jackson bound +them both to secrecy, and praising the soldier for his obedience, +continued his ride. Some hours later his horse broke down. Proceeding +to a plantation near the road, he told his orderly to request that a +couple of horses might be supplied for an officer on important duty. It +was still dark, and the indignant proprietor, so unceremoniously +disturbed by two unknown soldiers, who declined to give their names, +refused all aid. After some parley Jackson and his orderly, finding +argument wasted, proceeded to the stables, selected the two best +horses, shifted the saddles, and left their own chargers as a temporary +exchange. + +At three o’clock in the afternoon, after passing rapidly through +Richmond, he reached the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. It is +unfortunate that no record of the meeting that took place has been +preserved. There +were present, besides Lee and Jackson, the three officers whose +divisions were to be employed in the attack upon the Federals, +Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and D. H. Hill. The names of the two former are +associated with almost every Confederate victory won upon the soil of +Virginia. They were trusted by their great leader, and they were +idolised by their men. Like others, they made mistakes; the one was +sometimes slow, the other careless; neither gave the slightest sign +that they were capable of independent command, and both were at times +impatient of control. But, taking them all in all, they were gallant +soldiers, brave to a fault, vigorous in attack, and undaunted by +adverse fortune. Longstreet, sturdy and sedate, his “old war-horse” as +Lee affectionately called him, bore on his broad shoulders the weight +of twenty years’ service in the old army. Hill’s slight figure and +delicate features, instinct with life and energy, were a marked +contrast to the heavier frame and rugged lineaments of his older +colleague. + +Already they were distinguished. In the hottest of the fight they had +won the respect that soldiers so readily accord to valour; yet it is +not on these stubborn fighters, not on their companion, less popular, +but hardly less capable, that the eye of imagination rests. Were some +great painter, gifted with the sense of historic fitness, to place on +his canvas the council in the Virginia homestead, two figures only +would occupy the foreground: the one weary with travel, white with the +dust of many leagues, and bearing on his frayed habiliments the traces +of rough bivouacs and mountain roads; the other, tall, straight, and +stately; still, for all his fifty years, remarkable for his personal +beauty, and endowed with all the simple dignity of a noble character +and commanding intellect. In that humble chamber, where the only +refreshment the Commander-in-Chief could offer was a glass of milk, Lee +and Jackson met for the first time since the war had begun. Lee’s hours +of triumph had yet to come. The South was aware that he was sage in +council; he had yet to prove his mettle in the field. But there was at +least one Virginia soldier who knew his worth. With the prescient +sympathy +of a kindred spirit Jackson had divined his daring and his genius, and +although he held always to his own opinions, he had no will but that of +his great commander. With how absolute a trust his devotion was repaid +one of the brightest pages in the history of Virginia tells us; a year +crowded with victories bears witness to the strength begotten of their +mutual confidence. So long as Lee and Jackson led her armies hope shone +on the standards of the South. Great was the constancy of her people; +wonderful the fortitude of her soldiers; but on the shoulders of her +twin heroes rested the burden of the tremendous struggle. + +To his four major-generals Lee explained his plan of attack, and then, +retiring to his office, left them to arrange the details. It will be +sufficient for the present to state that Jackson’s troops were to +encamp on the night of the 25th east of Ashland, fifteen miles north of +Richmond, between the village and the Virginia Central Railway. The day +following the interview, the 24th, he returned to his command, +rejoining the column at Beaver Dam Station. + +June 24 His advanced guard were now within forty miles of Richmond, +and, so far from McDowell being on his heels, that general was still +north of Fredericksburg. No reinforcements could reach McClellan for +several days; the Confederates were concentrated round Richmond in full +strength; and Lee’s strategy had been entirely successful. Moreover, +with such skill had Jackson’s march been made that the Federal generals +were absolutely ignorant of his whereabouts. McClellan indeed seems to +have had some vague suspicion of his approach; but Lincoln, McDowell, +Banks, Frémont, together with the whole of the Northern people and the +Northern press, believed that he was still west of Gordonsville. +Neither scout, spy, nor patrol was able to penetrate the cordon of +Munford’s outposts. Beyond his pickets, strongly posted at New Market +and Conrad’s Store, all was dim and dark. Had Jackson halted, awaiting +reinforcements? Was he already in motion, marching swiftly and secretly +against some +isolated garrison? Was he planning another dash on Washington, this +time with a larger army at his back? Would his advance be east or west +of the Blue Ridge, across the sources of the Rappahannock, or through +the Alleghanies? Had he 15,000 men or 50,000? + +Such were the questions which obtruded themselves on the Federal +generals, and not one could give a satisfactory reply. That a blow was +preparing, and that it would fall where it was least expected, all men +knew. “We have a determined and enterprising enemy to contend with,” +wrote one of Lincoln’s generals. “Jackson,” said another, “marches +thirty miles a day.” The successive surprises of the Valley campaign +had left their mark; and the correspondence preserved in the Official +Records is in itself the highest tribute to Jackson’s skill. He had +gained something more than the respect of his enemies. He had brought +them to fear his name, and from the Potomac to the Rappahannock +uncertainty and apprehension reigned supreme. Not a patrol was sent out +which did not expect to meet the Confederate columns, pressing swiftly +northward; not a general along the whole line, from Romney to +Fredericksburg, who did not tremble for his own security. + +There was sore trouble on the Shenandoah. The disasters of McDowell and +Front Royal had taught the Federal officers that when the Valley army +was reported to be sixty miles distant, it was probably deploying in +the nearest forest; and with the rout of Winchester still fresh in +their memories they knew that pursuit would be as vigorous as attack +would be sudden. The air was full of rumours, each more alarming than +its predecessor, and all of them contradictory. The reports of the +cavalry, of spies, of prisoners, of deserters, of escaped negroes, told +each a different story. + +Jackson, it was at first reported, had been reinforced to the number of +35,000 men.[23] A few days later his army had swelled to 60,000 with 70 +guns, and he was rebuilding the bridge at Port Republic in order to +follow Frémont. +On June 13 he was believed to be moving through Charlottesville against +one or other of McDowell’s divisions. “He was either going against +Shields at Luray, or King at Catlett’s, or Doubleday at Fredericksburg, +or going to Richmond.” On the 16th it was absolutely certain that he +was within striking distance of Front Royal. On the 18th he had gone to +Richmond, but Ewell was still in the Valley with 40,000 men. On the +19th Banks had no doubt but that another immediate movement down the +Valley was intended “with 80,000 or more.” On the 20th Jackson was said +to be moving on Warrenton, east of the Blue Ridge. On the 22nd +“reliable persons” at Harper’s Ferry had learned that he was about to +attack Banks at Middletown; and on the same day Ewell, who was actually +near Frederickshall, was discovered to be moving on Moorefield! On the +25th Frémont had been informed that large reinforcements had reached +Jackson from Tennessee; and Banks was on the watch for a movement from +the west. Frémont heard that Ewell designed to attack Winchester in +rear, and the threat from so dangerous a quarter made Lincoln anxious. + +“We have no definite information,” wrote Stanton to McClellan, “as to +the numbers or position of Jackson’s force. Within the last two days +the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating +rumours of Jackson’s advance in various directions, with a view to +conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell nor Banks nor +Frémont appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject.” + +This was on June 25, the day the Valley army halted at Ashland; but the +climax was reached on the 28th. For forty-eight hours Jackson had been +fighting McClellan, yet Banks, although “quite confident that he was +not within thirty miles, believed that he was preparing for an attack +on Middletown.” To reach Middletown Jackson would have had to march one +hundred and fifty miles! + +Under the influence of these rumours the movements of the Federal +troops were erratic in the extreme. + +Frémont, who had originally been ordered to remain at Harrisonburg, had +fallen back on Banks at Middletown, +although ordered to Front Royal, was most reluctant to move so far +south. Shields was first ordered to stand fast at Luray, where he would +be reinforced by Ricketts, and was then ordered to fall back on Front +Royal. Reinforcements were ordered to Romney, to Harper’s Ferry, and to +Winchester; and McDowell, who kept his head throughout, struggled in +vain to reunite his scattered divisions. Divining the true drift of the +Confederate strategy, he realised that to protect Washington, and to +rescue McClellan, the surest method was for his own army corps to march +as rapidly as possible to the Chickahominy. But his pleadings were +disregarded. Lincoln and Stanton had not yet discovered that the best +defence is generally a vigorous attack. They had learned nothing from +the Valley campaign, and they were infected with the fears of Banks and +Frémont. Jackson was well on his way to Richmond before Shields and +Ricketts were permitted to cross the Blue Ridge; and it was not till +the 25th that McDowell’s corps was once more concentrated at +Fredericksburg. The Confederates had gained a start of five marches, +and the Northern Government was still ignorant that they had left the +Valley. + +McClellan was equally in the dark. Faint rumours had preceded the march +of Jackson’s army, but he had given them scant credit. On the morning +of the 26th, however, he was rudely enlightened. It was but too clear +that Jackson, strongly reinforced from Richmond, was bearing down upon +his most vulnerable point—his right wing, which, in anticipation of +McDowell’s advance, remained exposed on the north bank of the +Chickahominy. + +Nor was this the sum of his troubles. On this same day, when his +outposts were falling back before superior numbers, and the Valley +regiments were closing round their flank, he received a telegram from +Stanton, informing him that the forces commanded by McDowell, Banks, +and Frémont were to form one army under Major-General Pope; and that +this army was “to attack and overcome the rebel forces under Jackson +and Ewell, and threaten the +enemy in the direction of Charlottesville!” All hope of succour passed +away, and the “Young Napoleon” was left to extricate himself as best he +could, from his many difficulties; difficulties which were due in part +to his own political blindness, in part to the ignorance of Lincoln, +but, in a far larger degree, to the consummate strategy of Lee and +Jackson. + +NOTE + +_The Marches in the Valley Campaign, March 22 to June 25, 1862_ + + _Miles_ March 22 Mount Jackson–Strasburg 28 March + 23 Strasburg–Kernstown–Newtown 18 Battle of + Kernstown March 24–26 Newtown–Mt. Jackson 35 April + 17–19 Mt. Jackson–Elk Run Valley 50 April 30– May + 8 Elk Run Valley–Mechum’s River Station 60 May + 7–8 Staunton–Shenandoah Mt. 32 Battle of M’Dowell + May 9–11 Bull Pasture Mount–Franklin 30 Skirmishes + May 12–15 Franklin–Lebanon Springs 40 May 17 Lebanon + Springs–Bridgewater 18 May 19–20 Bridgewater–New + Market 24 May 1 New Market–Luray 12 May + 22 Luray–Milford 12 May 23 Milford–Front + Royal–Cedarville 22 Action at Front Royal May + 24 Cedarville–Abraham’s Creek 22 Action at + Middletown and Newtown May 25 Abraham’s + Creek–Stevenson’s 7 Battle of Winchester May + 28 Stevenson’s–Charlestown 15 Skirmish May + 29 Charlestown–Halltown 5 Skirmish May + 30 Halltown–Winchester 25 May + 31 Winchester–Strasburg 18 June + 1 Strasburg–Woodstock 12 Skirmish June + 2 Woodstock–Mount Jackson 12 June 3 Mount + Jackson–New Market 7 June 4–5 New Market–Port + Republic 30 June 8 Battle of Cross Keys June + 9 Cross Keys–Brown’s Gap 16 Battle of Port Republic + June 12 Brown’s Gap–Mount Meridian 10 June + 17–25 Mount Meridian–Ashland Station (one rest day) 120 + —— 676 miles in 48 marching days Average 14 miles per + diem + + [1] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, pp. 220, 229 (letter of S. P. Chase). + + [2] Of the existence of the bridge at Port Republic, held by a party + of Confederate cavalry, the Federals do not appear to have been aware. + + [3] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 352. + + [4] All three of these officers escaped from their captors. + + [5] According to General Shields’ account his cavalry had reported to + him that the bridge at Port Republic had been burned, and he had + therefore ordered his advanced guard to take up a defensive position + and prevent the Confederates crossing the Shenandoah River. It was the + head of the detachment which had dispersed the Confederate squadrons. + + [6] Related by Colonel Poague, C.S.A. + + [7] _Destruction and Reconstruction,_ p. 39. + + [8] The Confederates at Kernstown lost 20 per cent.; the Federals at + Port Republic 18 per cent. At Manassas the Stonewall Brigade lost 16 + per cent., at Cross Keys Ewell only lost 8 per cent. and Frémont 5 per + cent. + + [9] _Southern Historical Society Papers,_ vol. ix, p. 372. + + [10] Rations appear to have been short, for General Ewell reports that + when he marched against Shields the next day many of his men had been + without food for four-and-twenty hours. + + [11] The mule battery does not appear to have done much more than + afford the Confederate soldiers an opportunity of airing their wit. + With the air of men anxiously seeking for information they would ask + the gunners whether the mule or the gun was intended to go off first? + and whether the gun was to fire the mule or the mule the gun? + + [12] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 293. + + [13] _Destruction and Reconstruction,_ p. 90. Jackson’s order to the + staff officer (Major Hotchkiss) was brief: “Sweeping with his hand to + the eastward, and then towards the Lewis House, where the Federal guns + were raking the advance, he said: ‘Take General Taylor around and take + that battery.’” + + [14] Dabney, vol. ii. + + [15] The troops actually engaged were as follows:— + +4 Regiments of Winder’s Brigade +The Louisiana Brigade, 5 regiments +Scott’s Brigade, 3 regiments +31st Virginia and 40th Virginia +Artillery (5 batteries) +Cavalry 1,200 +2,500 +900 +600 +300 +400 +——— +5,900 + + [16] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 324. + + [17] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 910. + + [18] “The only true rule for cavalry is to follow as long as the enemy + retreats.”—Jackson to Munford, June 13. + + [19] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 913. + + [20] Whiting’s division. + + [21] Cooke, p. 205. + + [22] Communicated by the Reverend J. W. Jones, D.D. + + [23] The telegrams and letters containing the reports quoted on pages + 399–400 are to be found in O.R., vol. xi, part iii, and vol. xii, part + iii. + + + + +Chapter XII +REVIEW OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN + + +In March, 1862, more than 200,000 Federals were prepared to invade +Virginia. McClellan, before McDowell was withheld, reckoned on placing +150,000 men at West Point. Frémont, in West Virginia, commanded 30,000, +including the force in the Kanawha Valley; and Banks had crossed the +Potomac with over 30,000. + +Less than 60,000 Confederate soldiers were available to oppose this +enormous host, and the numerical disproportion was increased by the +vast material resources of the North. The only advantages which the +Southerners possessed were that they were operating in their own +country, and that their cavalry was the more efficient. Their leaders, +therefore, could count on receiving more ample and more accurate +information than their adversaries.[1] But, except in these respects, +everything was against them. In mettle and in discipline the troops +were fairly matched. On both sides the higher commands, with few +exceptions, were held by regular officers, who had received the same +training. On both sides the staff was inexperienced. If the Confederate +infantry were better marksmen than the majority of the Federals, they +were not so well armed; and the Federal artillery, both in materiel and +in handling, was the more efficient. + +The odds against the South were great; and to those who believed that +Providence sides with the big battalions, +that numbers, armament, discipline, and tactical efficiency, are all +that is required to ensure success, the fall of Richmond must have +seemed inevitable. + +But within three months of the day that McClellan started for the +Peninsula the odds had been much reduced. The Confederates had won no +startling victories. Except in the Valley, and there only small +detachments were concerned, the fighting had been indecisive. The North +had no reason to believe that her soldiers, save only the cavalry, were +in any way inferior to their adversaries. And yet, on June 26, where +were the “big battalions?” 105,000 men were intrenched within sight of +the spires of Richmond; but where were the rest? Where were the +70,000[2] that should have aided McClellan, have encircled the rebel +capital on every side, cut the communications, closed the sources of +supply, and have overwhelmed the starving garrison? How came it that +Frémont and Banks were no further south than they were in March? that +the Shenandoah Valley still poured its produce into Richmond? that +McDowell had not yet crossed the Rappahannock? What mysterious power +had compelled Lincoln to retain a force larger than the whole +Confederate army “to protect the national capital from danger and +insult?” + +It was not hard fighting. The Valley campaign, from Kernstown to Port +Republic, had not cost the Federals more than 7,000 men; and, with the +exception of Cross Keys, the battles had been well contested. It was +not the difficulties of supply or movement. It was not absence of +information; for until Jackson vanished from the sight of both friend +and foe on June 17, spies and “contrabands“[3] (_i.e._ fugitive slaves) +had done good work. Nor was it want of will on the part of the Northern +Government. None +were more anxious than Lincoln and Stanton to capture Richmond, to +disperse the rebels, and to restore the Union. They had made stupendous +efforts to organise a sufficient army. To equip that army as no army +had ever been equipped before they had spared neither expense nor +labour; and it can hardly be denied that they had created a vast +machine, perhaps in part imperfect, but, considering the weakness of +the enemy, not ill-adapted for the work before it. + +There was but one thing they had overlooked, and that was that their +host would require intelligent control. So complete was the mechanism, +so simple a matter it appeared to set the machine in motion, and to +keep it in the right course, that they believed that their untutored +hands, guided by common-sense and sound abilities, were perfectly +capable of guiding it, without mishap, to the appointed goal. Men who, +aware of their ignorance, would probably have shrunk from assuming +charge of a squad of infantry in action, had no hesitation whatever in +attempting to direct a mighty army, a task which Napoleon has assured +us requires profound study, incessant application, and wide +experience.[4] + +They were in fact ignorant—and how many statesmen, and even soldiers, +are in like case?—that strategy, the art of manœuvring armies, is an +art in itself, an art which none may master by the light of nature, but +to which, if he is to attain success, a man must serve a long +apprenticeship. + +The rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be learned in a +week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. +But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like +Napoleon +than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon. +Lincoln, when the army he had so zealously toiled to organise, reeled +back in confusion from Virginia, set himself to learn the art of war. +He collected, says his biographer, a great library of military books; +and, if it were not pathetic, it would be almost ludicrous, to read of +the great President, in the midst of his absorbing labours and his +ever-growing anxieties, poring night after night, when his capital was +asleep, over the pages of Jomini and Clausewitz. And what was the +result? In 1864, when Grant was appointed to the command of the Union +armies, he said: “I neither ask nor desire to know anything of your +plans. Take the responsibility and act, and call on me for assistance.” +He had learned at last that no man is a born strategist. + +The mistakes of Lincoln and Stanton are not to be condoned by pointing +to McClellan. + +McClellan designed the plan for the invasion of Virginia, and the plan +failed. But this is not to say that the plan was in itself a bad one. +Nine times out of ten it would have succeeded. In many respects it was +admirable. It did away with a long line of land communications, passing +through a hostile country. It brought the naval power of the Federals +into combination with the military. It secured two great waterways, the +York and the James, by which the army could be easily supplied, which +required no guards, and by which heavy ordnance could be brought up to +bombard the fortifications of Richmond. But it had one flaw. It left +Washington, in the opinion of the President and of the nation, +insecure; and this flaw, which would have escaped the notice of an +ordinary enemy, was at once detected by Lee and Jackson. Moreover, had +McClellan been left in control of the whole theatre of war, Jackson’s +manœuvres would probably have failed to produce so decisive an effect. +The fight at Kernstown would not have induced McClellan to strike +40,000 men off the strength of the invading army. He had not been +deceived when Jackson threatened Harper’s Ferry at the end of May. The +reinforcements sent from Richmond after Port Republic +had not blinded him, nor did he for a moment believe that Washington +was in actual danger. There is this, however, to be said: had McClellan +been in sole command, public opinion, alarmed for Washington, would +have possibly compelled him to do exactly what Lincoln did, and to +retain nearly half the army on the Potomac. + +So much for the leading of civilians. On the other hand, the failure of +the Federals to concentrate more than 105,000 men at the decisive +point, and even to establish those 105,000 in a favourable position, +was mainly due to the superior strategy of the Confederates. Those were +indeed skilful manœuvres which prevented McDowell from marching to the +Chickahominy; and, at the critical moment, when Lee was on the point of +attacking McClellan, which drew McDowell, Banks, and Frémont on a +wild-goose chase towards Charlottesville. The weak joint in the enemy’s +armour, the national anxiety for Washington, was early recognised. +Kernstown induced Lincoln, departing from the original scheme of +operations, to form four independent armies, each acting on a different +line. Two months later, when McClellan was near Richmond it was of +essential importance that the move of these armies should be combined, +Jackson once more intervened; Banks was driven across the Potomac, and +again the Federal concentration was postponed. Lastly, the battles of +Cross Keys and Port Republic, followed by the dispatch of Whiting and +Lawton to the Valley, led the Northern President to commit his worst +mistake. For the second time the plan of campaign was changed, and +McClellan was left isolated at the moment he most needed help. + +The brains of two great leaders had done more for the Confederacy than +200,000 soldiers had done for the Union. Without quitting his desk, and +leaving the execution of his plans to Jackson, Lee had relieved +Richmond of the pressure of 70,000 Federals, and had lured the +remainder into the position he most wished to find them. The +Confederacy, notwithstanding the enormous disparity of force, had once +more gained the upper hand; and from this +instance, as from a score of others, it may be deduced that Providence +is more inclined to side with the big brains than with the big +battalions. + +It was not mere natural ability that had triumphed. Lee, in this +respect, was assuredly not more highly gifted than Lincoln, or Jackson +than McClellan. But, whether by accident or design, Davis had selected +for command of the Confederate army, and had retained in the Valley, +two past masters in the art of strategy. If it was accident he was +singularly favoured by fortune. He might have selected many soldiers of +high rank and long service, who would have been as innocent of +strategical skill as Lincoln himself. His choice might have fallen on +the most dashing leader, the strictest disciplinarian, the best drill, +in the Confederate army; and yet the man who united all these qualities +might have been altogether ignorant of the higher art of war. Mr. Davis +himself had been a soldier. He was a graduate of West Point, and in the +Mexican campaign he had commanded a volunteer regiment with much +distinction. But as a director of military operations he was a greater +marplot than even Stanton. It by no means follows that because a man +has lived his life in camp and barrack, has long experience of command, +and even long experience of war, that he can apply the rules of +strategy before the enemy. In the first place he may lack the +character, the inflexible resolution, the broad grasp, the vivid +imagination, the power of patient thought, the cool head, and, above +all, the moral courage. In the second place, there are few schools +where strategy may be learned, and, in any case, a long and laborious +course of study is the only means of acquiring the capacity to handle +armies and outwit an equal adversary. The light of common-sense alone +is insufficient; nor will a few months’ reading give more than a +smattering of knowledge. + +“Read and _re-read,_” said Napoleon, “the eighty-eight campaigns of +Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus, Turenne, Eugène, and Frederick. +Take them as your models, for it is the only means of becoming a great +leader, and of mastering the secrets of the art of war. Your +intelligence, enlightened by such study, will then reject methods +contrary to those adopted by these great men.” + +In America, as elsewhere, it had not been recognised before the Civil +War, even by the military authorities, that if armies are to be handled +with success they must be directed by trained strategists. No +_Kriegsakademie_ or its equivalent existed in the United States, and +the officers whom common-sense induced to follow the advice of Napoleon +had to pursue their studies by themselves. To these the campaigns of +the great Emperor offered an epitome of all that had gone before; the +campaigns of Washington explained how the principles of the art might +be best applied to their own country, and Mexico had supplied them with +practical experience. Of the West Point graduates there were many who +had acquired from these sources a wide knowledge of the art of +generalship, and among them were no more earnest students than the +three Virginians, Lee, Jackson, and Johnston. + +When Jackson accepted an appointment for the Military Institute, it was +with the avowed intention of training his intellect for war. In his +retirement at Lexington he had kept before his eyes the possibility +that he might some day be recalled to the Army. He had already acquired +such practical knowledge of his profession as the United States service +could afford. He had become familiar with the characteristics of the +regular soldier. He knew how to command, to maintain discipline, and +the regulations were at his fingers’ ends. A few years had been +sufficient to teach him all that could be learned from the routine of a +regiment, as they had been sufficient to teach Napoleon, Frederick, and +Lee. But there remained over and above the intellectual part of war, +and with characteristic thoroughness he had set himself to master it. +His reward came quickly. The Valley campaign practically saved +Richmond. In a few short months the quiet gentleman of Lexington +became, in the estimation of both friend and foe, a very thunderbolt of +war; and his name, which a year previous had hardly been known beyond +the Valley, was already famous. + +It is, perhaps, true that Johnston and Lee had a larger share in +Jackson’s success than has been generally recognised. It was due to +Johnston that Jackson was retained in the Valley when McClellan moved +to the Peninsula; and his, too, was the fundamental idea of the +campaign, that the Federals in the Valley were to be prevented from +reinforcing the army which threatened Richmond. To Lee belongs still +further credit. From the moment he assumed command we find the +Confederate operations directed on a definite and well-considered plan; +a defensive attitude round Richmond, a vigorous offensive in the +Valley, leading to the dispersion of the enemy, and a Confederate +concentration on the Chickahominy. His operations were very bold. When +McClellan, with far superior numbers, was already within twenty miles +of Richmond, he had permitted Jackson to retain Ewell’s 8,000 in the +Valley, and he would have given him the brigades of Branch and Mahone. +From Lee, too, came the suggestion that a blow should be struck at +Banks, that he should be driven back to the Potomac, and that the North +should be threatened with invasion. From him, too, at a moment when +McClellan’s breastworks could be actually seen from Richmond, came the +7,000 men under Whiting and Lawton, the news of whose arrival in the +Valley had spread such consternation amongst the Federals. But it is to +be remembered that Jackson viewed the situation in exactly the same +light as his superiors. The instructions he received were exactly the +instructions he would have given had he been in command at Richmond; +and it may be questioned whether even he would have carried them out +with such whole-hearted vigour if he had not thoroughly agreed with +every detail. + +Lee’s strategy was indeed remarkable. He knew McClellan and he knew +Lincoln. He knew that the former was over-cautious; he knew that the +latter was over-anxious. No sudden assault on the Richmond lines, weak +as they were, was to be apprehended, and a threat against Washington +was certain to have great results. Hence the audacity which, at a +moment apparently most critical, sent 17,000 of the best troops in the +Confederacy as +far northward as Harper’s Ferry, and, a fortnight later, weakened the +garrison of Richmond by 7,000 infantry. He was surely a great leader +who, in the face of an overwhelming enemy, dared assume so vast a +responsibility. But it is to be remembered that Lee made no suggestion +whatever as to the manner in which his ideas were to be worked out. +Everything was left to Jackson. The swift manœuvres which surprised in +succession his various enemies emanated from himself alone. It was his +brain that conceived the march by Mechum’s Station to M’Dowell, the +march that surprised Frémont and bewildered Banks. It was his brain +that conceived the rapid transfer of the Valley army from the one side +of the Massanuttons to the other, the march that surprised Kenly and +drove Banks in panic to the Potomac. It was his brain that conceived +the double victory of Cross Keys and Port Republic; and if Lee’s +strategy was brilliant, that displayed by Jackson on the minor theatre +of war was no less masterly. The instructions he received at the end of +April, before he moved against Milroy, were simply to the effect that a +successful blow at Banks might have the happiest results. But such a +blow was not easy. Banks was strongly posted and numerically superior +to Jackson, while Frémont, in equal strength, was threatening Staunton. +Taking instant advantage of the separation of the hostile columns, +Jackson struck at Milroy, and having checked Frémont, returned to the +Valley to find Banks retreating. At this moment he received orders from +Lee to threaten Washington. Without an instant’s hesitation he marched +northward. By May 28, had the Federals received warning of his advance, +they might have concentrated 80,000 men at Strasburg and Front Royal; +or, while Banks was reinforced, McDowell might have moved on +Gordonsville, cutting Jackson’s line of retreat on Richmond. + +But Jackson took as little count of numbers as did Cromwell. Concealing +his march with his usual skill he dashed with his 16,000 men into the +midst of his enemies. Driving Banks before him, and well aware that +Frémont and McDowell were converging in his rear, he advanced +boldly on Harper’s Ferry, routed Saxton’s outposts, and remained for +two days on the Potomac, with 62,000 Federals within a few days’ march. +Then, retreating rapidly up the Valley, beneath the southern peaks of +the Massanuttons he turned fiercely at bay; and the pursuing columns, +mustering together nearly twice his numbers, were thrust back with +heavy loss at the very moment they were combining to crush him.[5] A +week later he had vanished, and when he appeared on the Chickahominy, +Banks, Frémont, and McDowell were still guarding the roads to +Washington, and McClellan was waiting for McDowell. 175,000 men +absolutely paralysed by 16,000! Only Napoleon’s campaign of 1814 +affords a parallel to this extraordinary spectacle.[6] + +Jackson’s task was undoubtedly facilitated by the ignorance of Lincoln +and the incapacity of his political generals. But in estimating his +achievements, this ignorance and incapacity are only of secondary +importance. The historians do not dwell upon the mistakes of Colli, +Beaulieu, and Wurmser in 1796, but on the brilliant resolution with +which Napoleon took advantage of them; and the salient features, both +of the Valley Campaign and of that of 1796, are the untiring vigilance +with which opportunities were looked for, the skill with which they +were detected, and the daring rapidity with which they were seized. + +History often unconsciously injures the reputation of great soldiers. +The more detailed the narrative, the less brilliant seems success, the +less excusable defeat. When we are made fully acquainted with the +dispositions of both sides, the correct solution of the problem, +strategical or tactical, is generally so plain that we may easily be +led to believe that it must needs have spontaneously suggested itself +to the victorious leader; and, as a natural corollary, that success is +due rather to force of will than to force of intellect; to vigilance, +energy, and audacity, rather than +to insight and calculation. It is asserted, for instance, by +superficial critics that both Wellington and Napoleon, in the campaign +of 1815, committed unpardonable errors. Undoubtedly, at first sight, it +is inconceivable that the one should have disregarded the probability +of the French invading Belgium by the Charleroi road, or that the +other, on the morning of the great battle, should never have suspected +that Blücher was close at hand. But the critic’s knowledge of the +situation is far more ample and accurate than that of either commander. +Had either Wellington before Quatre Bras, or Napoleon on the fateful +June 18 known what we know now, matters would have turned out very +differently. “If,” said Frederick the Great, “we had exact information +of our enemy’s dispositions, we should beat him every time;” but exact +information is never forthcoming. A general in the field literally +walks in darkness, and his success will be in proportion to the +facility with which his mental vision can pierce the veil. His +manœuvres, to a greater or less degree, must always be based on +probabilities, for his most recent reports almost invariably relate to +events which, at best, are several hours old; and, meanwhile, what has +the enemy been doing? This it is the most essential part of his +business to discover, and it is a matter of hard thinking and sound +judgment. From the indications furnished by his reports, and from the +consideration of many circumstances, with some of which he is only +imperfectly acquainted, he must divine the intentions of his opponent. +It is not pretended that even the widest experience and the finest +intellect confer infallibility. But clearness of perception and the +power of deduction, together with the strength of purpose which they +create, are the fount and origin of great achievements; and when we +find a campaign in which they played a predominant part, we may fairly +rate it as a masterpiece of war. It can hardly be disputed that these +qualities played such a part on the Shenandoah. For instance; when +Jackson left the Valley to march against Milroy, many things might have +happened which would have brought about disaster:— + +1. Banks, who was reported to have 21,000 men at Harrisonburg, might +have moved on Staunton, joined hands with Milroy, and crushed Edward +Johnson. + +2. Banks might have attacked Ewell’s 8,000 with superior numbers. + +3. Frémont, if he got warning of Jackson’s purpose, might have +reinforced Milroy, occupied a strong position, and requested Banks to +threaten or attack the Confederates in rear. + +4. Frémont might have withdrawn his advanced brigade, and have +reinforced Banks from Moorefield. + +5. Banks might have been reinforced by Blenker, of whose whereabouts +Jackson was uncertain. + +6. Banks might have marched to join McDowell at Fredericksburg. + +7. McClellan might have pressed Johnston so closely that a decisive +battle could not have been long delayed. + +8. McDowell might have marched on Richmond, intervening between the +Valley army and the capital. + +Such an array of possibilities would have justified a passive attitude +on Elk Run. A calculation of the chances, however, showed Jackson that +the dangers of action were illusory. “Never take counsel of your +fears,” was a maxim often on his lips. Unlike many others, he first +made up his mind what he wanted to do, and then, and not till then, did +he consider what his opponents might do to thwart him. To seize the +initiative was his chief preoccupation, and in this case it did not +seem difficult to do so. He knew that Banks was unenterprising. It was +improbable that McDowell would advance until McClellan was near +Richmond, and McClellan was very slow. To prevent Frémont getting an +inkling of his design in time to cross it was not impossible, and +Lincoln’s anxiety for Washington might be relied on to keep Banks in +the Valley. + +It is true that Jackson’s force was very small. But the manifestation +of military genius is not affected by numbers. The handling of masses +is a mechanical art, of which knowledge and experience are the key; but +it is the manner in which the grand principles of +war are applied which marks the great leader, and these principles may +be applied as resolutely and effectively with 10,000 men as with +100,000. + +“In meditation,” says Bacon, “all dangers should be seen; in execution +none, unless they are very formidable.” It was on this precept that +Jackson acted. Not a single one of his manœuvres but was based on a +close and judicial survey of the situation. Every risk was weighed. +Nothing was left to chance. “There was never a commander,” says his +chief of the staff, “whose foresight was more complete. Nothing emerged +which had not been considered before in his mind; no possibility was +overlooked; he was never surprised.”[7] The character of his opponent, +the _moral_ of the hostile troops, the nature of the ground, and the +manner in which physical features could be turned to account, were all +matters of the most careful consideration. He was a constant student of +the map, and his topographical engineer was one of the most important +officers on his staff. “It could readily be seen,” writes Major +Hotchkiss, “that in the preparations he made for securing success he +had fully in mind what Napoleon had done under similar circumstances; +resembling Napoleon especially in this, that he was very particular in +securing maps, and in acquiring topographical information. He furnished +me with every facility that I desired for securing topographical +information and for making maps, allowing me a complete transportation +outfit for my exclusive use and sending men into the enemy’s country to +procure copies of local maps when I expressed a desire to have them. I +do not think he had an accurate knowledge of the Valley previous to the +war. When I first reported to him for duty, at the beginning of March +1862, he told me that he wanted “a complete map of the entire +Shenandoah Valley from Harper’s Ferry to Lexington, one showing every +point of offence and defence,” and to that task I immediately addressed +myself. As a rule he did not refer to maps in the field, making his +study of them in advance. He undoubtedly had the power of retaining the +topography +of the country in his imagination. He had spent his youth among the +mountains, where there were but few waggon roads but many bridle and +foot paths. His early occupation made it necessary for him to become +familiar with such intricate ways; and I think this had a very +important bearing on his ability to promptly recognise the +topographical features of the country, and to recall them whenever it +became necessary to make use of them. He was quick in comprehending +topographical features. I made it a point, nevertheless, to be always +ready to give him a graphic representation of any particular point of +the region where operations were going on, making a rapid sketch of the +topography in his presence, and using different coloured pencils for +greater clearness in the definition of surface features. The carefully +prepared map generally had too many points of detail, and did not +sufficiently emphasise features apparently insignificant, but from a +military standpoint most important. I may add that Jackson not only +studied the general maps of the country, but made a particular study of +those of any district where he expected to march or fight, constantly +using sketch maps made upon the ground to inform him as to portions of +the field of operations that did not immediately come under his own +observation. I often made rough sketches for him when on the march, or +during engagements, in answer to his requests for information.”[8] + +It is little wonder that it should have been said by his soldiers that +“he knew every hole and corner of the Valley as if he had made it +himself.” + +But to give attention to topography was not all that Jackson had +learned from Napoleon. “As a strategist,” says Dabney, “the first +Napoleon was undoubtedly his model. He had studied his campaigns +diligently, and he was accustomed to remark with enthusiasm upon the +evidences of his genius. “Napoleon,” he said, “was the first to show +what an army could be made to accomplish. He had shown what was the +value of time as an element +of strategic combination, and that good troops, if well cared for, +could be made to march twenty-five miles daily, and win battles +besides.” And he had learned more than this. “We must make this +campaign,” he said at the beginning of 1868, “an exceedingly active +one. Only thus can a weaker country cope with a stronger; it must make +up in activity what it lacks in strength. A defensive campaign can only +be made successful by taking the aggressive at the proper time. +Napoleon never waited for his adversary to become fully prepared, but +struck him the first blow.” + +It would perhaps be difficult, in the writings of Napoleon, to find a +passage which embodies his conception of war in terms as definite as +these; but no words could convey it more clearly. It is sometimes +forgotten that Napoleon was often outnumbered at the outset of a +campaign. It was not only in the campaigns of Italy, of Leipsic, of +1814, and of Waterloo, that the hostile armies were larger than his +own. In those of Ulm, Austerlitz, Eckmühl, and Dresden, he was +numerically inferior on the whole theatre of war; but while the French +troops were concentrated under a single chief, the armies of the Allies +were scattered over a wide area, and unable to support each other. +Before they could come together, Napoleon, moving with the utmost +rapidity, struck the first blow, and they were defeated in succession. +The first principle of war is to concentrate superior force at the +decisive point, that is, upon the field of battle. But it is +exceedingly seldom that by standing still, and leaving the initiative +to the enemy, that this principle can be observed, for a numerically +inferior force, if it once permits its enemy to concentrate, can hardly +hope for success. True generalship is, therefore, “to make up in +activity for lack of strength; to strike the enemy in detail, and +overthrow his columns in succession. And the highest art of all is to +compel him to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force +against each fraction in turn. + +It is such strategy as this that “gains the ends of States and makes +men heroes.” Napoleon did not discover it. Every single general who +deserves to be entitled great +has used it. Frederick, threatened by Austria, France, Russia, Saxony, +and Sweden, used it in self-defence, and from the Seven Years’ War the +little kingdom of Prussia emerged as a first-class Power. It was such +strategy which won back the Peninsula; not the lines of Torres Vedras, +but the bold march northwards to Vittoria.[9] It was on the same lines +that Lee and Jackson acted. Lee, in compelling the Federals to keep +their columns separated, manœuvred with a skill which has seldom been +surpassed; Jackson, falling as it were from the skies into the midst of +his astonished foes, struck right and left before they could combine, +and defeated in detail every detachment which crossed his path. + +It is when regarded in connection with the operations of the main +armies that the Valley campaign stands out in its true colours; but, at +the same time, even as an isolated incident, it is in the highest +degree interesting. It has been compared, and not inaptly, with the +Italian campaign of 1796. And it may even be questioned whether, in +some respects, it was not more brilliant. The odds against the +Confederates were far greater than against the French. Jackson had to +deal with a homogeneous enemy, with generals anxious to render each +other loyal support, and not with the contingents of different States. +His marches were far longer than Napoleon’s. The theatre of war was not +less difficult. His troops were not veterans, but, in great part, the +very rawest of recruits. The enemy’s officers and soldiers were not +inferior to his own; their leaders were at least equal in capacity to +Colli, Beaulieu, and Alvinzi, and the statesmen who directed them were +not more purblind than the Aulic Council. Moreover, Jackson was merely +the commander of a detached force, which might at any moment be +required at Richmond. The risks which Napoleon freely accepted he could +not afford. He dared not deliver battle unless he were certain of +success, +and his one preoccupation was to lose as few men as possible. But be +this as it may, in the secrecy of the Confederate movements, the +rapidity of the marches, and the skilful use of topographical features, +the Valley campaign bears strong traces of the Napoleonic methods. +Seldom has the value of these methods been more forcibly illustrated. +Three times was McDowell to have marched to join McClellan: first, at +the beginning of April, when he was held back by Kernstown; second, on +May 26, when he was held back by Front Royal and Winchester; third, on +June 25, when he was held back by Jackson’s disappearance after Port +Republic. Above all, the campaign reveals a most perfect appreciation +of the surest means of dealing with superior numbers. “In my personal +intercourse with Jackson,” writes General Imboden, “in the early part +of the war, he often said that there were two things never to be lost +sight of by a military commander. ‘Always mystify, mislead, and +surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, +never give up the pursuit as long as your men have strength to follow; +for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can +then be destroyed by half their number. The other rule is, never fight +against heavy odds, if by any possible manœuvering you can hurl your +own force on only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy and +crush it. Such tactics will win every time, and a small army may thus +destroy a large one in detail, and repeated victory will make it +invincible.’[10] And again: ‘To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and +secure all the fruits of victory, is the secret of successful war.’ ” + +These maxims were the outcome of his studies, “drawn absolutely and +merely,” says Lord Wolseley, “from his knowledge of war, as learned +from the great leaders of former days;”[11] and if he made war by rule, +as he had regulated his conduct as a cadet, it can hardly be denied +that his rules were of the soundest. They are a complete summary of the +tactics which wrought such havoc in the +Valley. The order in which they are placed is interesting. “To mystify, +mislead, and surprise,” is the first precept. How thoroughly it was +applied! The measures by which his adversaries were to be deceived were +as carefully thought out as the maps had been closely studied. The +troops moved almost as often by country roads and farm tracks as by the +turnpikes. The longer route, even when time was of importance, was +often preferred, if it was well concealed, to the shorter. No +precaution, however trivial, that might prevent information reaching +the enemy was neglected. In order that he might give his final +instructions to Colonel Munford before marching to Richmond, he told +that officer to meet him at ten o’clock at night in Mount Sidney. “I +will be on my horse,” he wrote, “at the north end of the town, so you +need not inquire after me.”[12] “_Le bon général ordinaire_” would have +scoffed at the atmosphere of mystery which enveloped the Confederate +camp. The march from Elk Run Valley to Port Republic, with its +accompaniments of continuous quagmire and dreary bivouacs, he would +have ridiculed as a most useless stratagem. The infinite pains with +which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most trusted staff +officers, his movements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a commander +less thorough would have pronounced useless. The long night ride to +Richmond, on June 22, with its untoward delays and provoking +_contretemps,_ sounds like an excess of precaution which was absolutely +pedantic.[13] But war, according to Napoleon, is made up of accidents. +The country was full of spies; the Southern newspapers were sometimes +indiscreet; and the simple fact that Jackson had been seen near +Richmond would have warned McClellan that his right wing was in +jeopardy. Few men would have taken such infinite trouble to hide the +departure from the Valley and the march across Virginia to attack +McClellan. But soldiers of experience, alive to the full bearing of +seemingly petty details, appreciate his skill.[14] According to the +dictum of Napoleon, “there are no such things as trifles in war.” + +It was not, however, on such expedients that Jackson principally relied +to keep his enemy in the dark. The use he made of his cavalry is +perhaps the most brilliant tactical feature of the campaign. Ashby’s +squadrons were the means whereby the Federals were mystified. Not only +was a screen established which perfectly concealed the movements of the +Valley army, but constant demonstrations, at far distant points, +alarmed and bewildered the Federal commanders. In his employment of +cavalry Jackson was in advance of his age. His patrols were kept out +two or three marches to front and flank; neither by day nor by night +were they permitted to lose touch of the enemy; and thus no movement +could take place without their knowledge. Such tactics had not been +seen since the days of Napoleon. The Confederate horsemen in the Valley +were far better handled than those of France or Austria in 1859, of +Prussia or Austria in 1866, of France in 1870, of England, France, or +Russia in the Crimea. + +In the flank march on Sebastopol the hostile armies passed within a few +miles, in an open country, without either of them being aware of the +proximity of the other, and the English headquarter staff almost rode +into a Russian baggage-train. At Solferino and at Sadowa, armies which +were counted by hundreds of thousands encamped almost within sight of +each other’s watch-fires, without the slightest suspicion that the +enemy lay over the next ridge. The practice of Napoleon had been +forgotten. The great cloud of horsemen which, riding sometimes a +hundred miles to the front, veiled the march of the Grand Army had +vanished from memory. The vast importance ascribed by the Emperor to +procuring early information of his enemy and hiding his own movements +had been overlooked; and it was left to an American soldier to revive +his methods. + +The application of Jackson’s second precept, “to hurl +your own force on the weakest part of the enemy’s,” was made possible +by his vigorous application of the first. The Federals, mystified and +misled by demonstrations of the cavalry, and unable to procure +information, never knew at what point they should concentrate, and +support invariably came too late. Jackson’s tactical successes were +achieved over comparatively small forces. Except at Cross Keys, and +there he only intended to check Frémont for the moment, he never +encountered more than 10,000 men on any single field. No great victory, +like Austerlitz or Salamanca, was won over equal numbers. No +Chancellorsville, where a huge army was overthrown by one scarce half +the size, is reckoned amongst the triumphs of the Valley campaign. But +it is to be remembered that Jackson was always outnumbered, and +outnumbered heavily, on the theatre of war; and if he defeated his +enemies in detail, their overthrow was not less decisive than if it had +been brought about at one time and at one place. The fact that they +were unable to combine their superior numbers before the blow fell is +in itself the strongest testimony to his ability. “How often,” says +Napier, “have we not heard the genius of Buonaparte slighted, and his +victories talked of as destitute of merit, because, at the point of +attack, he was superior in numbers to his enemies! This very fact, +which has been so often converted into a sort of reproach, constitutes +his greatest and truest praise. He so directed his attack as at once to +divide his enemy, and to fall with the mass of his own forces upon a +point where their division, or the distribution of their army, left +them unable to resist him. It is not in man to defeat armies by the +breath of his mouth; nor was Buonaparte commissioned, like Gideon, to +confound and destroy a host with three hundred men. He knew that +everything depended ultimately upon physical superiority; and his +genius was shown in this, that, though outnumbered on the whole, he was +always superior to his enemies at the decisive point.”[15] + +The material results of the Valley campaign were by no means +inconsiderable. 8,500 prisoners were either paroled or sent to +Richmond. 3,500 Federals were killed or wounded. An immense quantity of +stores was captured, and probably as much destroyed. 9 guns were taken +and over 10,000 rifles, while the loss of the Confederates was no more +than 2,500 killed and wounded, 600 prisoners, and 3 guns. It may be +added that the constant surprises, together with the successive +conflict with superior numbers, had the worst effect on the _moral_ of +the Federal soldiers. The troops commanded by Frémont, Shields, Banks, +Saxton, and Geary were all infected. Officers resigned and men +deserted. On the least alarm there was a decided tendency to +“stampede.” The generals thought only of retreat. Frémont, after Cross +Keys, did not think that his men would stand, and many of his men +declared that it was “only murder” to fight without reinforcements.[16] + +When to those results is added the strategical effect of the campaign, +it can hardly be denied that the success he achieved was out of all +proportion to Jackson’s strength. Few generals have done so much with +means so small. Not only were the Valley troops comparatively few in +numbers, but they were volunteers, and volunteers of a type that was +altogether novel. Even in the War of the Revolution many of the +regimental officers, and indeed many of the soldiers, were men who had +served in the Indian and French wars under the English flag. But there +were not more than half a dozen regular officers in the whole Army of +the Valley. Except Jackson himself, and his chief of artillery, not one +of the staff had more than a year’s service. Twelve months previous +several of the brigadiers had been civilians. The regimental officers +were as green as the men; and although military offences were few, the +bonds of discipline were slight. When the march to M’Dowell was begun, +which was to end five weeks later at Port Republic, a considerable +number of the so-called “effectives” had only been drilled for a few +hours. The cavalry on parade was little better than a mob; on the line +of march they kept or left the ranks as the humour took them. It is +true that the Federals were hardly more efficient. But Jackson’s +operations were essentially offensive, and offensive operations, as was +shown at Bull Run, are ill-suited to raw troops. Attack cannot be +carried to a triumphant issue unless every fraction of the force +co-operates with those on either hand; and co-operation is hardly to be +expected from inexperienced officers. Moreover, offensive operations, +especially when a small force is manœuvring against the fraction of a +larger, depend for success on order, rapidity, and endurance; and it is +in these qualities, as a rule, that raw troops are particularly +deficient. Yet Jackson, like Napoleon at Ulm, might have boasted with +truth that he had “destroyed the enemy merely by marches,” and his men +accomplished feats of which the hardiest veterans might well be proud. + +From April 29 to June 5, that is, in thirty-eight days, they marched +four hundred miles, fought three battles and numerous combats, and were +victorious in all. Several of the marches exceeded twenty-five miles a +day; and in retreat, from the Potomac to Port Republic, the army made +one hundred and four miles between the morning of May 30 and the night +of June 5, that is, fifteen miles daily +without a rest day intervening. This record, if we take into +consideration the infamous roads, is remarkable; and it well may be +asked by what means these half-trained troops were enabled to +accomplish such a feat?[17] + +Jackson’s rules for marching have been preserved. “He never broke down +his men by long-continued movement. He rested the whole column very +often, but only for a few minutes at a time. He liked to see the men +lie flat on the ground to rest, and would say, ‘A man rests all over +when he lies down.’ ’[18] Nor did he often call upon his troops for +extraordinary exertions. In the period between his departure from Elk +Run Mountain to the battle of Port Republic there were only four series +of forced marches.[19] “The hardships of forced marches,” he said, “are +often more painful than the dangers of battle.” It was only, in short, +when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, +that he sacrificed everything to speed. The troops marched light, +carrying only rifles, blankets, haversacks, and ammunition. When long +distances were to be covered, those men who still retained their +knapsacks were ordered to leave them behind. No heavy trains +accompanied the army. The ambulances and ammunition waggons were always +present; but the supply waggons were often far in rear. In their +haversacks the men carried several days’ rations; and when these were +consumed they lived either on the farmers, or on the stores they had +captured from the enemy. + +It is not to be supposed, however, that the ranks +remained full. “I had rather,” said Jackson, “lose one man in marching +than five in fighting,” and to this rule he rigorously adhered. He +never gave the enemy warning by a deliberate approach along the main +roads; and if there was a chance of effecting a surprise, or if the +enemy was already flying, it mattered little how many men fell out. And +fall out they did, in large numbers. Between May 17 and the battle of +Cross Keys the army was reduced from 16,500 men to 18,000. Not more +than 500 had been killed or wounded, so there were no less than 3,000 +absentees. Many were footsore and found no place in the ambulances. +Many were sick; others on detachment; but a large proportion had +absented themselves without asking leave. Two days after Winchester, in +a letter to Ewell, Jackson writes that “the evil of straggling has +become enormous.” + +Such severe exertion as the march against Kenly, the pursuit of Banks, +and the retreat from the Potomac, would have told their tale upon the +hardiest veterans. When the German armies, suddenly changing direction +from west to north, pushed on to Sedan by forced marches, large numbers +of the infantry succumbed to pure exhaustion. When the Light Division, +in 1818, pressing forward after Sauroren to intercept the French +retreat, marched nineteen consecutive hours in very sultry weather, and +over forty miles of mountain roads, “many men fell and died convulsed +and frothing at the mouth, while others, whose spirit and strength had +never before been quelled, leant on their muskets and muttered in +sullen tones that they yielded for the first time.”[20] + +But the men that fell out on the march to Sedan and in the passes of +the Pyrenees were physically incapable of further effort. They were not +stragglers in the true sense of the term; and in an army broken to +discipline straggling on the line of march is practically unknown. The +sickly and feeble may fall away, but every sound man may confidently be +relied upon to keep his place. The secret of full ranks is good +officers and strict discipline; and the most marked difference between +regular troops and those hastily +organised is this—with the former the waste of men will be small, with +the latter very great. In all armies, however constituted, there is a +large proportion of men whose hearts are not in the business.[21] + +When hard marching and heavy fighting are in prospect the inclination +of such men is to make themselves scarce, and when discipline is +relaxed they will soon find the opportunity. But when their instincts +of obedience are strong, when the only home they know is with the +colours, when the credit of their regiment is at stake—and even the +most worthless have some feeling for their own corps—engrained habit +and familiar associations overcome their natural weakness. The +troop-horse bereft of his rider at once seeks his comrades, and pushes +his way, with empty saddle, into his place in the ranks. And so the +soldier by profession, faint-hearted as he may be, marches shoulder to +shoulder with his comrades, and acquires a fictitious, but not +unuseful, courage from his contact with braver men. + +It is true that the want of good boots told heavily on the +Confederates. A pair already half-worn, such as many of the men started +with, was hardly calculated to last out a march of several hundred +miles over rocky tracks, and fresh supplies were seldom forthcoming. +There was a dearth both of shoe-leather and shoe-factories in the +South; and if Mr. Davis, before the blockade was established, had +indented on the shoemakers of Europe, he would have added very largely +to the efficiency of his armies. A few cargoes of good boots would have +been more useful than a shipload of rifled guns. + +Nevertheless, the absentees from the ranks were not all footsore. The +vice of straggling was by no means confined to Jackson’s command. It +was the curse of both armies, Federal and Confederate. The Official +Records, as well as the memoirs of participants, teem with references +to it. It was an evil which the severest punishments seemed incapable +of checking. It was in vain that it was +denounced in orders, that the men were appealed to, warned, and +threatened. Nor were the faint-hearted alone at fault. The day after +Jackson’s victory at M’Dowell, Johnston, falling back before McClellan, +addressed General Lee as follows:— + +“Stragglers cover the country, and Richmond is no doubt filled with the +absent without leave. . . . The men are full of spirit when near the +enemy, but at other times to avoid restraint leave their regiments in +crowds.”[22] A letter from a divisional general followed:— + +“It is with deep mortification that I report that several thousand +soldiers and many individuals with commissions have fled to Richmond +under pretext of sickness. They have even thrown away their arms that +their flight might not be impeded. Cannot these miserable wretches be +arrested and returned to their regiments, where they can have their +heads shaved and be drummed out of the service?’[23] + +Jackson, then, had to contend with difficulties which a general in +command of regular troops would not have been called on to provide +against; and in other respects also he suffered from the constitution +of his army. The one thing lacking in the Valley campaign was a +decisive victory over a considerable detachment of the Federal army, +the annihilation of one of the converging forces, and large capture of +guns and prisoners. A victory as complete as Rivoli would have +completed its dramatic interest. But for this Jackson himself was +hardly to blame. The misconduct of the Confederate cavalry on May 24 +and 25 permitted Banks to escape destruction; and the delay at the +temporary bridge near Port Republic, due, mainly, to the disinclination +of the troops to face the ford, and the want of resolute obedience on +the part of their commanders, saved Frémont from the same fate. Had +Shields’ advanced brigades been driven back, as Jackson designed, while +the day was still young, the operations of the Valley army would in all +probability have been crowned by a brilliant triumph over nearly +equal forces. Frémont, already fearful and irresolute, was hardly the +man to withstand the vigour of Jackson’s onset; and that onset would +assuredly have been made if more careful arrangements had been made to +secure the bridge. This was not the only mistake committed by the +staff. The needlessly long march of the main body when approaching +Front Royal on May 28 might well have been obviated. But for this delay +the troops might have pushed on before nightfall to within easy reach +of the Valley turnpike, and Banks have been cut off from Winchester. + +It is hardly necessary to say that, even with regular troops, the same +mistakes might have occurred. They are by no means without parallel, +and even those committed by the Federals have their exact counterpart +in European warfare. At the beginning of August, 1870, the French army, +like Banks’ division on May 28, 1862, was in two portions, divided by a +range of mountains. The staff was aware that the Germans were in +superior strength, but their dispositions were unknown. Like Banks, +they neglected to reconnoitre; and when a weak detachment beyond the +mountains was suddenly overwhelmed, they still refused to believe that +attack was imminent. The crushing defeats of Wörth and Spicheren were +the result. + +The staff of a regular army is not always infallible. It would be hard +to match the extraordinary series of blunders made by the staffs of the +three armies—English, French, and Prussian—in the campaign of Waterloo, +and yet there was probably no senior officer present in Belgium who had +not seen several campaigns. But the art of war has made vast strides +since Waterloo, and even since 1870. Under Moltke’s system, which has +been applied in a greater or less degree to nearly all professional +armies, the chance of mistakes has been much reduced. The staff is no +longer casually educated and selected haphazard; the peace training of +both officers and men is far more thorough; and those essential details +on which the most brilliant conceptions, tactical and strategical, +depend for success stand much less chance of being overlooked than in +1815. It is by the standard of a modern army, and not of those +whose only school in peace was the parade-ground, that the American +armies must be judged. + +That Jackson’s tactical skill, and his quick eye for ground, had much +to do with his victories can hardly be questioned. At Kernstown and +Port Republic he seized the key of the position without a moment’s +hesitation. At Winchester, when Ewell was checked upon the right, three +strong brigades, suddenly thrown forward on the opposite flank, +completely rolled up the Federal line. At Cross Keys the position +selected for Ewell proved too formidable for Frémont, despite his +superiority in guns. At Port Republic, Taylor’s unexpected approach +through the tangled forest was at once decisive of the engagement. The +cavalry charge at Front Royal was admirably timed; and the manner in +which Ashby was employed throughout the campaign, not only to screen +the advance but to check pursuit, was a proof of the highest tactical +ability. Nor should the quick insight into the direction of Shields’ +march on June 1, and the destruction of the bridges by which he could +communicate with Frémont, be omitted. It is true that the operations in +the Valley were not absolutely faultless. When Jackson was bent on an +effective blow his impatience to bring the enemy to bay robbed him more +than once of complete success. On the march to M’Dowell Johnson’s +brigade, the advanced guard, had been permitted to precede the main +body by seven miles, and, consequently, when Milroy attacked there was +not sufficient force at hand for a decisive counterstroke. Moreover, +with an ill-trained staff a careful supervision was most essential, and +the waggon bridge at Port Republic should have been inspected by a +trustworthy staff officer before Winder rushed across to fall on Tyler. + +Errors of this nature, however instructive they may be to the student +of war, are but spots upon the sun; and in finding in his subordinate +such breadth of view and such vigour of execution, Lee was fortunate +indeed. Jackson was no less fortunate when Ashby came under his +command. That dashing captain of free-lances was undoubtedly a most +valuable colleague. It was something to have a +cavalry leader who could not only fight and reconnoitre, but who had +sagacity enough to divine the enemy’s intentions. But the ideas that +governed the employment of the cavalry were Jackson’s alone. He it was +who placed the squadrons across Frémont’s road from Wardensville, who +ordered the demonstrations against Banks, before both M’Dowell and +Front Royal, and those which caused Frémont to retreat after Port +Republic. More admirable still was the quickness with which he +recognised the use that might be made of mounted riflemen. From the +Potomac to Port Republic his horsemen covered his retreat, dismounting +behind every stream and along the borders of every wood, checking the +pursuers with their fire, compelling them to deploy their infantry, and +then retreating rapidly to the next position. Day after day were the +Federal advanced guards held in check, their columns delayed, and the +generals irritated by their slippery foe. Meanwhile, the Confederate +infantry, falling back at their leisure, were relieved of all +annoyance. And if the cavalry was suddenly driven in, support was +invariably at hand, and a compact brigade of infantry, supported by +artillery, sent the pursuing horsemen to the right-about. The retreat +of the Valley army was managed with the same skill as its advance, and +the rear-guard tactics of the campaign are no less remarkable than +those of the attack. + +To judge from the Valley campaign, Jackson handled his horsemen with +more skill than any other commander, Confederate or Federal. A cavalry +that could defend itself on foot as well as charge in the saddle was +practically a new arm, of far greater efficiency than cavalry of the +old type, and Jackson at once recognised, not only its value; but the +manner in which it could be most effectively employed. He was not led +away by the specious advantages, so eagerly urged by young and +ambitious soldiers, of the so-called raids. Even Lee himself, +cool-headed as he was, appears to have been fascinated by the idea of +throwing a great body of horsemen across his enemy’s communications, +spreading terror amongst his supply trains, cutting his +telegraphs, and destroying his magazines. In hardly a single instance +did such expeditions inflict more than temporary discomfort on the +enemy; and the armies were led more than once into false manœuvres, for +want of the information which only the cavalry could supply. Lee at +Malvern Hill and Gettysburg, Hooker at Chancellorsville, Grant at +Spotsylvania, owed defeat, in great measure, to the absence of their +mounted troops. In the Valley, on the contrary, success was made +possible because the cavalry was kept to its legitimate duty—that is, +to procure information, to screen all movements, to take part in battle +at the decisive moment, and to carry out the pursuit. + +With all his regard for Napoleon’s maxims, Jackson was no slave to +rule. In war, circumstances vary to such an extent that a manœuvre, +which at one time is manifestly unsound, may at another be the most +judicious. The so-called rules are never binding; they merely point out +the risks which are generally entailed by some particular course of +action. There is no principle on which Napoleon lays more stress than +that a general should never divide his force, either on the field of +battle or the theatre of war. But when he marched to M’Dowell and left +Ewell at Swift Run Gap, Jackson deliberately divided his forces and +left Banks between them, knowing that the apparent risk, with an +opponent like Banks, was no risk at all. At the battle of Winchester, +too, there was a gap of a mile between the brigades on the left of the +Kernstown road and Ewell on the right; and owing to the intervening +hills, one wing was invisible to the other. Here again, like Moltke at +Königgrätz, Jackson realised that the principle might be disregarded +not only with impunity but with effect. He was not like Lord Galway, “a +man who was in war what Molière’s doctors were in medicine, who thought +it much more honourable to fail according to rule than to succeed by +innovation.”[24] + +But the triumphs of the Valley campaign were not due alone to the +orders issued by Lee and Jackson. The Confederate troops displayed +extraordinary endurance. When +the stragglers were eliminated their stauncher comrades proved +themselves true as steel. In every engagement the regiments fought with +stubborn courage. They sometimes failed to break the enemy’s line at +the first rush; but, except at Kernstown, the Federals never drove them +from their position, and Taylor’s advance at Winchester, Trimble’s +counterstroke at Cross Keys, the storming of the battery at Port +Republic, and the charge of the cavalry at Cedarville, were the deeds +of brave and resolute men. + +A retreat is the most exhausting of military movements. It is costly in +men, “more so,” says Napoleon, “than two battles,” and it shakes the +faith of the soldiers in their general and in themselves. Jackson’s +army retreated for seven days before Frémont, dwindling in numbers at +every step, and yet it never fought better than when it turned at bay. +From first to last it believed itself superior to its enemies; from +first to last it was equal to the tasks which its exacting commander +imposed upon it, and its spirit was indomitable throughout. “One male a +week and three foights a day,” according to one of Jackson’s Irishmen, +was the rule in the campaigns of 1862. The forced marches were not made +in luxury. Not seldom only half-rations were issued, and more often +none at all. The weather, for many days in succession, was abominable, +and the forest bivouacs were comfortless in the extreme. On May 25 +twenty per cent of Trimble’s brigade went into action barefoot; and had +it not been for the stores captured in Winchester, the march to the +Potomac, and the subsequent unmolested retreat to Woodstock, would have +been hardly possible. + +If the troops were volunteers, weak in discipline and prone to +straggling, they none the less bore themselves with conspicuous +gallantry. Their native characteristics came prominently to the front. +Patient under hardships, vigorous in attack, and stubborn in defence, +they showed themselves worthy of their commander. Their enthusiastic +patriotism was not without effect on their bearing before the enemy. +Every private in the ranks believed that he was fighting in the sacred +cause of liberty, and the spirit +which nerved the resolution of the Confederate soldier was the same +which inspired the resistance of their revolutionary forefathers. His +hatred of the Yankee, as he contemptuously styled the Northerner, was +even more bitter than the wrath which Washington’s soldiers felt +towards England; and it was intensified by the fact that his detested +foeman had not only dared to invade the South, but had proclaimed his +intention, in no uncertain tones, of dealing with the Sovereign States +exactly as he pleased. + +But it was something more than native courage and enthusiastic +patriotism which inspired the barefooted heroes of Winchester. It would +be difficult to prove that in other parts of the theatre of war the +Confederate troops were inferior to those that held the Valley. Yet +they were certainly less successful, and in very many instances they +had failed to put forth the same resolute energy as the men who +followed Jackson. + +But it is hardly possible to discuss the spirit of an army apart from +that of its commander. If, in strategy wholly, and in tactics in great +part, success emanates from a single brain, the _moral_ of the troops +is not less dependent on the influence of one man. “Better an army of +stags,” runs the old proverb, “led by a lion, than an army of lions led +by a stag.” + +Their leader’s character had already made a sensible impression on the +Valley soldiers. Jackson was as untheatrical as Wellington. He was +hardly to be distinguished, even by his dress, from the private in the +ranks. Soon after his arrival at Richmond he called on Mrs. Pendleton, +the wife of the reverend captain of the Rockbridge battery. The negro +servant left him standing in the hall, thinking that this quiet +soldier, clad in a faded and sunburnt uniform, need not be treated with +further ceremony.[25] Headquarters in camp were an ordinary bell-tent, +or a room in the nearest cottage, and they were often without guard or +sentry. In bivouac the general rolled himself in his blankets, and lay +down under a tree or in a fence corner. He could sleep +anywhere, in the saddle, under fire, or in church; and he could compel +sleep to come to him when and where he pleased. He cared as little for +good quarters as a mountain hunter, and he was as abstemious as a Red +Indian on the war-path. He lived as plainly as the men, and often +shared their rations. The majority of the cavalry were better mounted, +and many of his officers were better dressed. He was not given to +addressing his troops, either in mass or as individuals. His praises he +reserved for his official reports, and then he was generous. In camp he +was as silent as the Sphinx, and he never posed, except in action, as +the commander of an army. Off duty he was the gentlest and most +unpretentious of men, and the most approachable of generals. He was +always scrupulously polite; and the private soldier who asked him a +question might be sure of a most courteous reply. But there was no man +with whom it was less safe to take liberties; and where duty was +concerned he became a different being. The gentle tones grew curt and +peremptory, and the absent demeanour gave place to a most purposeful +energy. His vigilance was marvellous: his eye was everywhere; he let +nothing pass without his personal scrutiny. The unfortunate officer +accused of indolence or neglect found the shy and quiet professor +transformed into the most implacable of masters. No matter how high the +rank of the offender, the crime met with the punishment it deserved. +The scouts compared him with Lee. The latter was so genial that it was +a pleasure to report to him. Jackson cross-questioned them on every +detail, treating them as a lawyer does a hostile witness, and his keen +blue eyes seemed to search their very souls. + +Nor did the men escape when they misbehaved. Ashby’s cavalry were +reprimanded in general orders for their indiscipline at Middletown, and +again at Port Republic; and if either officer or regiment displeased +the general, it was duly mentioned in his published reports.[26] +But the troops knew that their grave leader, so uncommunicative in +camp, and so unrelenting to misconduct, was constantly occupied with +their well-being. They knew that he spared them, when opportunity +offered, as he never spared himself. His _camaraderie_ was expressed in +something more than words. The hospitals constructed in the Valley +excited the admiration even of the Federals, and Jackson’s wounded were +his first care. Whatever it might cost the army, the ambulances must be +got safely away, and the sick and disabled soldiers transferred to +their own people. But, at the same time, the troops had long since +learned that, as administered by Jackson, the military code was a stern +reality. They had seen men shot for striking their officers, and they +knew that for insubordination or disobedience it was idle to plead +excuse. They had thought their general harsh, and even cruel; but as +their experience increased they recognised the wisdom of his severity, +and when they looked upon that kindly face, grave and determined as it +was, they realised how closely his firmness was allied to tenderness. +They had learned how highly he esteemed them. Once, in his twelve +months of command, he had spoken from his heart. When, on the heights +near Centreville, he bade farewell to his old brigade, his pride in +their achievements had broken through the barriers of his reserve, and +his ringing words had not yet been forgotten. If he was swift to blame, +his general orders and official dispatches gave full credit to every +gallant action, and each man felt himself a hero because his general so +regarded him. + +They had learned, too, that Jackson’s commendation was worth having. +They had seen him in action, the coolest of them all, riding along the +line of battle with as much composure as if the hail of bullets was no +more than summer rain. They had seen him far in advance of the charging +lines, cheering them to the pursuit; and they knew the tremendous +vigour of his flank attacks. + +But it was not only confidence in the skill of their +commander that inspired the troops. It was impossible not to admire the +man who, after a sleepless night, a long march, and hard fighting, +would say to his officers, “We must push on—we must push on!” as +unconcernedly as if his muscles were of steel and hunger an unknown +sensation. Such fortitude was contagious. The men caught something of +his resolution, of his untiring energy, and his unhesitating audacity. +The regiments which drove Banks to the Potomac were very different from +those that crawled to Romney through the blinding sleet, or that fell +back with the loss of one-sixth their number from the Kernstown Ridge. +It has been related of Jackson that when he had once made up his mind, +“he seemed to discard all idea of defeat, and to regard the issue as +assured. A man less open to the conviction that he was beaten could not +be imagined.” To this frame of mind he brought his soldiers. Jackson’s +brigade at Bull Run, Jackson’s division in the Valley, Jackson’s army +corps later in the war, were all imbued with the characteristics of +their leader. The exertions that he demanded of them seemed beyond the +powers of mortal men, but with Jackson leading them the troops felt +themselves able to accomplish impossibilities. “I never saw one of +Jackson’s couriers approach,” said Ewell, “without expecting an order +to assault the North Pole!” But had the order been given neither Ewell +nor the Valley troops would have questioned it. + +With the senior officers of his little army Jackson’s relations were in +some instances less cordial than with the men. His staff was devoted to +him, for they had learned to know him. At the beginning of the Valley +campaign some of them thought him mad; before it was over they believed +him to be a genius. He lived with his military family on the most +intimate terms, and his unfailing courtesy, his utter absence of +self-assertion, his sweet temper, and his tactful consideration for +others, no matter how humble their rank, were irresistible. On duty, +indeed, his staff officers fared badly. Tireless himself, regardless of +all personal comforts, he seemed to think that others were fashioned in +the same mould. After +a weary day’s marching or fighting, it was no unusual thing for him to +send them for a ride of thirty or forty miles through the night. And he +gave the order with no more thought than if he were sending them with a +message to the next tent. But off duty he was simply a personal friend, +bent on making all things pleasant. “Never,” says Dr. Hunter McGuire, +“can I forget his kindness and gentleness to me when I was in great +sorrow and trouble. He came to my tent and spent hours with me, +comforting me in his simple, kindly, Christian way, showing a depth of +friendship and affection which can never be forgotten. There is no +measuring the intensity with which the very soul of Jackson burned in +battle. Out of it he was very gentle. Indeed, as I look back on the two +years that I was daily, indeed hourly, with him, his gentleness as a +man, his tenderness to those in trouble or affliction—the tenderness +indeed of a woman—impress me more than his wonderful prowess as a +warrior.” + +It was with his generals and colonels that there was sometimes a lack +of sympathy. Many of these were older than himself. Ewell and Whiting +were his seniors in point of service, and there can be little doubt +that it was sometimes a little hard to receive peremptory orders from a +younger man. Jackson’s secrecy was often irritating. Men who were +over-sensitive thought it implied a want of confidence. Those +overburdened with dignity objected to being treated like the private +soldiers; and those over-conscious of superior wisdom were injured +because their advice was not asked. Before the march to Richmond there +was much discontent. General Whiting, on reaching Staunton with his +division, rode at once to Port Republic to report. “The distance,” says +General Imboden, “was twenty miles, and Whiting returned after +midnight. He was in a towering passion, and declared that Jackson had +treated him outrageously. I asked, ‘How is that possible, General?—he +is very polite to everyone.’ + +“‘Oh, hang him! he was polite enough. But he didn’t say one word about +his plans. I finally asked him for orders, telling him what troops I +had. He +simply told me to go back to Staunton, and he would send me orders +to-morrow. I haven’t the slightest idea what they will be. I believe he +has no more sense than my horse.’”[27] + +The orders, when they came, simply directed him to take his troops by +railway to Gordonsville, through which they had passed two days before, +and gave no reason whatever for the movement. + +General Whiting was not the only Confederate officer who was mystified. +When the troops left the Valley not a single soul in the army, save +Jackson alone, knew the object of their march. He had even gone out of +his way to blind his most trusted subordinates. + +“During the preceding afternoon,” says Major Hotchkiss, “he sent for me +to his tent, and asked me to bring maps of the country from Port +Republic to Lexington (at the head of the Valley), as he wished to +examine them. I took the map to his tent, and for about half an hour we +talked concerning the roads and streams, and points of offence and +defence of that region, just as though he had in mind a march in that +direction. After this interval had passed he thanked me and said that +that would do. About half an hour later he sent for me again, and +remarked that there had been some fighting down about Richmond, +referring, of course, to the battle of Seven Pines, and that he would +like to see the map of the field of the operations. I brought the maps +of the district round Richmond, and we spent nearly twice as much time +over those, talking about the streams, the roads, the condition of the +country, and so forth. On retiring to my tent I said to myself, “Old +Jack” is going to Richmond.”[28] + +Even the faithful Dabney was left in the dark till the troops had +reached Mechum’s Station. There, calling him into a room in the hotel, +the general locked the door and explained the object of his march. But +it was under seal of secrecy; and Ewell, the second in command, +complained to the chief of the staff that Jackson had gone off by +train, leaving him without orders, or even a hint of what was in +the wind. In fact, a few days after the battle of Port Republic, Ewell +had sent some of his staff on leave of absence, telling them that large +reinforcements were coming up, and that the next move would be “to beat +up Banks’ quarters about Strasburg.” + +When Jackson was informed of the irritation of his generals he merely +smiled, and said, “If I can deceive my own friends I can make certain +of deceiving the enemy.” Nothing shook his faith in Frederick the +Great’s maxim, which he was fond of quoting: “If I thought my coat knew +my plans, I would take it off and burn it.” An anecdote told by one of +his brigadiers illustrates his reluctance to say more than necessary. +Previous to the march to Richmond this officer met Jackson riding +through Staunton. “Colonel,” said the general, “have you received the +order?” “No, sir.” “Want you to march.” “When, sir?” “Now.” “Which +way?” “Get in the cars—go with Lawton.” “How must I send my train and +the battery?” “By the road.” “Well, General, I hate to ask questions, +but it is impossible to send my waggons off without knowing which road +to send them.” “Oh!”—laughing—“send them by the road the others go.” + +At last, when they saw how constant fortune was to their reticent +leader, his subordinates ceased to complain; but unfortunately there +was another source of trouble. Jackson had no regard whatever for +persons. Reversing the usual procedure, he held that the choleric word +of the soldier was rank blasphemy in the captain; the higher the rank +of the offender the more severe, in his opinion, should be the +punishment. Not only did he hold that he who would rule others must +himself set the example of punctiliousness, but that to whom much is +given, from him much is to be expected. Honour and promotion fall to +the lot of the officer. His name is associated in dispatches with the +valorous deeds of he command, while the private soldier fights on +unnoticed in the crowd. To his colonels, therefore, Jackson was a +strict master, and stricter to his generals. If he had reason to +believe that his subordinates were indolent or disobedient, he visited +their shortcomings with +a heavy hand. No excuse availed. Arrest and report followed immediately +on detection, and if the cure was rude, the plague of incompetency was +radically dealt with. Spirited young soldiers, proud of their high +rank, and in no way underrating their own capacity, rebelled against +such discipline; and the knowledge that they were closely watched, that +their omissions would be visited on their heads with unfaltering +severity, sometimes created a barrier between them and their commander. + +But it was only wilful disobedience or actual insubordination that +roused Jackson’s wrath. “If he found in an officer,” says Dabney, “a +hearty and zealous purpose to do all his duty, he was the most tolerant +and gracious of superiors, overlooking blunders and mistakes with +unbounded patience, and repairing them through his own exertions, +without even a sign of vexation.” The delay at the bridge on the +morning of Port Republic, so fatal to his design of crushing Frémont, +caused no outburst of wrath. He received his adjutant-general’s report +with equanimity, regarding the accident as due to the will of +Providence, and therefore to be accepted without complaint.[29] + +Whether the nobler side of Jackson’s character had a share in creating +the confidence which his soldiers already placed in him must be matter +of conjecture. It was well known in the ranks that he was superior to +the frailties of human nature; that he was as thorough a Christian as +he was a soldier; that he feared the world as little as he did the +enemy.[30] In all things he was consistent; his sincerity was as clear +as the noonday sun, and his faith as firmly rooted as the Massanuttons. +Publicly and privately, in official dispatches and in ordinary +conversation, the success of his army was ascribed to the Almighty. +Every victory, as +soon as opportunity offered, was followed by the order: “The chaplains +will hold divine service in their respective regiments.” “The General +Commanding,” ran the order after Winchester, “would warmly express to +the officers and men under his command his joy in their achievements, +and his thanks for their brilliant gallantry in action, and their +patient obedience under the hardships of forced marches, often more +painful to the brave soldier than the danger of battle. The explanation +of the severe exertions to which the commanding general called the +army, which were endured by them with such cheerful confidence in him, +is now given in the victory of yesterday. He receives this proof of +their confidence in the past with pride and gratitude, and asks only a +similar confidence in the future. + +“But his chief duty of to-day and that of the army is to recognise +devoutly the hand of a protecting Providence in the brilliant successes +of the last three days (which have given us the results of a great +victory without great losses), and to make the oblation of our thanks +to God for His service to us and our country in heartfelt acts of +religious worship. For this purpose the troops will remain in camp +to-day, suspending, as far as possible, all military exercises; and the +chaplains of regiments will hold divine service in their several +charges at 4 o’clock p.m.”[31] + +Whenever it was possible Sunday was always set apart for a day of rest; +and the claims of the day were seldom altogether disregarded.[32] On +the morning of Cross Keys it is related that a large portion of Elzey’s +brigade were at service, and that the crash of the enemy’s artillery +interrupted the “thirdly” of the chaplain’s sermon. + +It has been sometimes asserted that Jackson was of the same type as the +saints militant who followed Cromwell, who, when they were not +slaughtering their enemies, would expound the harsh tenets of their +unlovely creed to the grim circle of belted Ironsides. He has been +described +as taking the lead at religious meetings, as distributing tracts from +tent to tent, as acting as aide-de-camp to his chaplains, and as +consigning to perdition all those “whose doxy was not his doxy.” + +Nothing is further from the truth. “His views of each denomination,” +says his wife, “had been obtained from itself, not from its opponents. +Hence he could see excellences in all. Even of the Roman Catholic +Church he had a much more favourable impression than most Protestants, +and he fraternised with all Evangelical denominations. During a visit +to New York, one Sabbath morning, we chanced to find ourselves at the +door of an Episcopal Church at the hour of worship. He proposed that we +should enter; and as it was a day for the celebration of the Communion, +he remained for that service, and it was with the utmost reverence and +solemnity that he walked up the chancel and knelt to receive the +elements.” + +Jackson, then, was by no means imbued with the belief that the +Presbyterian was the one true Church, and that all others were in +error. Nor did he attempt, in the very slightest degree, to usurp the +functions of his chaplains. Although he invariably went to sleep during +their sermons, he was deeply interested in their endeavours, and gave +them all the assistance in his power. But he no more thought of taking +their duties on himself than of interfering with the treatment of the +men in hospital. He spoke no “words in season,” even to his intimates. +He had no “message” for them. Where religion was concerned, so long as +duly qualified instructors were available, he conceived it his business +to listen and not to teach. Morning and evening prayers were the rule +at his headquarters, but if any of his staff chose to remain absent, +the general made no remark. Yet all suspicion of indifference to vice +was effectually removed. Nothing ungenerous or unclean was said in his +presence without incurring his displeasure, always unmistakably +expressed, and although he made no parade of his piety he was far too +manly to hide it. + +Yet he was never a prominent figure at the camp services. Rather than +occupy a conspicuous place he +would seat himself amongst the privates; and the only share he took in +directing the proceedings was to beckon men to the seats that respect +had left empty beside him. Those who picture him as an enthusiastic +fanatic, invading, like the Puritan dragoons, the pulpits of the +chaplains, and leading the devotions of his troops with the same +fervour that he displayed in battle, have utterly misread his +character. The humblest soldier in the Confederate army was not more +modest and unassuming than Stonewall Jackson. + +NOTE + +_The Federal strength at M’Dowell._ + +Frémont’s return of April 30 is as follows:— + +Milroy’s Brigade Schenck’s Brigade 4,307 3,335 + +of May 10:— + +Milroy Schenck 3,694 3,335 + +of May 31:— + +Milroy Schenck 2,914 3,335 + +Schenck reports that the total force _engaged_ at M’Dowell was 1,768 of +Milroy’s brigade, and about 500 of his own, total 2,268; and that he +himself brought to M’Dowell 1,300 infantry, a battery, and 250 +cavalry—say, 1,600 men. + +Milroy’s command may fairly be estimated at 3,500; Schenck brought +1,600 men; there were therefore available for action at M’Dowell 5,100 +Federals. + +_Frémont’s strength at Cross Keys._ + +The return of May 31 gives:—13,520 officers and men. + +Frémont, in his report of the battle, says that on May 29 he had over +11,000 men, which, deducting guards, garrisons, working parties and +stragglers, were reduced to 10,500 combatants at Cross Keys. + +But he does not include in this last estimate Bayard’s cavalry, which +joined him at Strasburg. + +On May 31 Bayard had 1,844 officers and men; he had suffered some loss +in fighting Ashby, and his strength at the battle may be put down as +1,750. + +All garrisons, guards and working parties are included in the +Confederate numbers, so they should be added to the Federal estimate. +We may fairly say, then, that at Cross Keys the following troops were +available:— + +Frémont Bayard 11,000 1,750 ——— Total 12,750 + +NOTE + +_Strength of the Federals, May 17–25._ + +On April 30 Banks’ “effective” numbers were as follows:— + +Donnelly’s Brigade +Gordon’s Brigade +Artillery (26 guns) +Cavalry (General Hatch) +Body-guard 2,747 3,005 492 2,834 70 ——— 9,148 ——— + +On May 23 he had:— + +At Strasburg: Infantry Cavalry Artillery (18 guns) 4,476 2,600 350 At +Front Royal, Buckton, &c. At Front Royal, Body-guard 1,300 70 + +From the Harper’s Ferry Garrison:— + +At Strasburg: Cavalry At Winchester: Infantry + Cavalry 300 856 600 ——— 10,552 ——— + +On May 31, after losing 2,019 men at Front Royal and Winchester, he +had, the Harper’s Ferry troops having been added to his command:— + +Infantry Cavalry Artillery (16 guns) Miscellaneous 5,124 3,230 286 82 +——— 8,722 Add 2,019 ——— 10,741 ——— + +10,500 effectives on May 23 is therefore a fair estimate. + +Geary’s 2,000 at Rectortown, as they were acting under Mr. Stanton’s +orders, have not been included. + + [1] “If I were mindful only of my own glory, I would choose always to + make war in my own country, for there every man is a spy, and the + enemy can make no movement of which I am not informed.”—Frederick the + Great’s _Instructions to his Generals._ + + [2] At the date of the action at Front Royal, May 23, the following + was the strength of the detached forces: Banks, 10,000; Frémont, + 25,000; McDowell (including Shields, but excluding McCall), 35,000. + + [3] The blacks, however, appear to have been as unreliable as regards + numbers as McClellan’s detectives. “If a negro were asked how many + Confederates he had seen at a certain point, his answer was very + likely to be: ‘I dunno, Massa, but I guess about a + million.’”—_McClellan’s Own Story,_ p. 254. + + [4] “In consequence of the excessive growth of armies tactics have + lost in weight, and the strategical design, rather than the detail of + the movements, has become the decisive factor in the issue at a + campaign. The strategical design depends, as a rule, upon the decision + of cabinets, and upon the resources placed at the disposal of the + commander. Consequently, either the leading statesmen should have + correct views of the science of war, or should make up for their + ignorance by giving their entire confidence to the man to whom the + supreme command of the army is entrusted. Otherwise, the germs of + defeat and national ruin may be contained in the first preparations + for war.”—_The Archduke Charles of Austria._ + + [5] “An operation which stamps him as a military genius of the highest + order.”—Lord Wolseley, _North American Review,_ vol. 149, No. 2, p. + 166. + + [6] “These brilliant successes appear to me models of their kind, both + in conception and execution. They should be closely studied by all + officers who wish to learn the art and science of war.”—_Ibid._ + + [7] Dabney, vol. i, p. 76. + + [8] Letter to the author. + + [9] “In six weeks, Wellington marched with 100,000 men six hundred + miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested + two fortresses, and drove 120,000 veteran troops from Spain.”—_The War + in the Peninsula,_ Napier, vol. v, p. 132. + + [10] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 297. + + [11] _North American Review,_ vol. 149, p. 168. + + [12] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 914. + + [13] He instructed the orderly that accompanied him, and who knew the + roads, to call him “Colonel’ + + [14] “The manner,” says Lord Wolseley, “in which he thus mystified his + enemy regarding this most important movement is a masterpiece.”—_North + American Review,_ vol. 149, pp. 166, 167. + + [15] The following table, of which the idea is borrowed from _The + Principles of Strategy,_ by Captain Bigelow, U.S.A., may be found + interesting. Under the heading “Strategic” appear the numbers + available on the theatre of operations; under the heading “Tactical” + the numbers present on the field of battle. See also note at the end + of the volume. + + STRATEGIC TACTICAL _M’Dowell_ Federal Confederate 30,000 + 17,000 2,500 6,000 _Winchester_ Federal Confederate 60,000 + 16,000 7,500 16,000 _Cross Keys_ Federal Confederate 23,000 + 13,000 12,750 8,000 _Port Republic_ Federal + Confederate 22,000 12,700 4,500 6,000 + + [16] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 402. + + [17] “Campaigning in France,” says General Sheridan, who was with the + Prussian Headquarter Staff in 1870, “that is, the marching, camping, + and subsisting of an army, is an easy matter, very unlike anything we + had in the War of the Rebellion. To repeat: the country is rich, + beautiful, and densely populated, subsistence abundant, and the roads + all macadamised highways; thus the conditions are altogether different + from those existing with us. . . . I can but leave to conjecture how + the Germans would have got along on bottomless roads—often none at + all—through the swamps and quicksands of Northern + Virginia.”—_Memoirs,_ vol. ii, p. 450. + + [18] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 297, 298. + + [19] From April 17 to April 19, when he moved to Elk Run Valley; May 6 + to May 8, when he moved against Milroy; May 18 to May 25, when he + moved against Banks; and May 29 to June 1, when he passed south + between Frémont and Shields. + + [20] _The War in the Peninsula,_ Napier, vol. v, p. 244. + + [21] General Sheridan is said to have declared that 25 per cent of the + Federal soldiers lacked the military spirit. + + [22] O.R., vol. xi, part iii,p. 503. + + [23] _Ibid,_ p. 506. + + [24] Macaulay. + + [25] _Memoirs of W. N. Pendleton, D.D., Brigadier-General, C.S.A.,_ p. + 201. + + [26] It is worth remark that Jackson’s methods of punishment showed + his deep knowledge of his soldiers. The sentence on the men who were + tempted from their duty, during Banks’ retreat, by the plunder on the + Winchester road was that they should not be allowed to serve with the + advanced guard until further orders. It was considered terribly + severe. O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 902. + + [27] _Battles and Leaders,_ p. 297. + + [28] Letter to the author. + + [29] Dabney, _Southern Historical Society Papers,_ vol. xi, p. 152. + + [30] His devout habits were no secret in the camp. Jim, most faithful + of servants, declared that he could always tell when there was going + to be a battle. “The general,” he said, “is a great man for prayin’. + He pray night and morning—all times. But when I see him git up several + times in the night, an’ go off an’ pray, _den I know there is goin’ to + be somethin’ to pay,”_ an’ I go right away and pack his haversack!” + + [31] Dabney, vol. ii, pp. 114–5. + + [32] “Sometimes,” says Major Hotchkiss, “Jackson would keep two or + three Sundays running, so as to make up arrears, and balance the + account!’ + + + + +Chapter XIII +THE SEVEN DAYS. GAINES’ MILL + + +1862 The region whither the interest now shifts is very different from +the Valley. From the terraced banks of the Rappahannock, sixty miles +north of Richmond, to the shining reaches of the James, where the +capital of the Confederacy stands high on her seven hills, the lowlands +of Virginia are clad with luxuriant vegetation. The roads and railways +run through endless avenues of stately trees; the shadows of the giant +oaks lie far across the rivers, and ridge and ravine are mantled with +the unbroken foliage of the primeval forest. In this green wilderness +the main armies were involved. But despite the beauty of broad rivers +and sylvan solitudes, gay with gorgeous blossoms and fragrant with +aromatic shrubs, the eastern, or tidewater, counties of Virginia had +little to recommend them as a theatre of war. They were sparsely +settled. The wooden churches, standing lonely in the groves where the +congregations hitched their horses; the solitary taverns, half inns and +half stores; the court-houses of the county justices, with a few wooden +cottages clustered round them, were poor substitutes for the +market-towns of the Shenandoah. Here and there on the higher levels, +surrounded by coppice and lawn, by broad acres of corn and clover, the +manors of the planters gave life and brightness to the landscape. But +the men were fighting in Lee’s ranks, their families +had fled to Richmond, and these hospitable homes showed signs of +poverty and neglect. Neither food nor forage was to be drawn from the +country, and the difficulties of supply and shelter were not the worst +obstacles to military operations. At this season of the year the +climate and the soil were persistent foes. The roads were mere tracks, +channels which served as drains for the interminable forest. The deep +meadows, fresh and green to the eye, were damp and unwholesome +camping-grounds. Turgid streams, like the Chickahominy and its +affluents, winding sluggishly through rank jungles, spread in swamp and +morass across the valleys, and the languid atmosphere, surcharged with +vapour, was redolent of decay. + +June Through this malarious region the Federal army had been pushing +its slow way forward for more than six weeks, and 105,000 men, +accompanied by a large siege train, lay intrenched within sight of the +spires of Richmond. 30,000 were north of the Chickahominy, covering the +York River Railway and waiting the coming of McDowell. The remainder, +from Woodbury’s Bridge to the Charles City road, occupied the line of +breastworks which stood directly east of the beleaguered city. So +nearly was the prize within their grasp that the church bells, and even +the clocks striking the hour, were heard in the camps; and at +Mechanicsville Bridge, watched by a picket, stood a sign-post which +bore the legend: “To Richmond, 4½ miles.” The sentries who paced that +beat were fortunate. For the next two years they could boast that no +Federal soldier, except as a prisoner, had stood so close as they had +to the rebel stronghold. But during these weeks in June not a single +soul in McClellan’s army, and few in the Confederacy, suspected that +the flood of invasion had reached high-water mark. Richmond, gazing +night after night at the red glow which throbbed on the eastern vault, +the reflection of countless camp-fires, and, listening with strained +ears to the far-off call of hostile bugles, seemed in perilous case. No +formidable position protected the approaches. Earthworks, indeed, were +in process of construction; but, although the left flank at New Bridge +was covered by the +Chickahominy, the right was protected by no natural obstacle, as had +been the case at Yorktown; and the lines occupied no commanding site. +Nor had the Government been able to assemble an army of a strength +sufficient to man the whole front. Lee, until Jackson joined him, +commanded no more than 72,500 men. Of these a large portion were new +troops, and their numbers had been reduced by the 7,000 dispatched +under Whiting to the Valley. + +June 11 But if the Federal army was far superior in numbers, it was not +animated by an energy in proportion to its strength. The march from the +White House was more sluggish than the current of the Chickahominy. +From May 17 to June 26 the Army of the Valley had covered four hundred +miles. Within the same period the Army of the Potomac had covered +twenty. It is true that the circumstances were widely different. +McClellan had in front of him the lines of Richmond, and his advance +had been delayed by the rising of the Chickahominy. He had fought a +hard fight at Seven Pines; and the constant interference of Jackson had +kept him waiting for McDowell. But, at the same time, he had displayed +an excess of caution which was perfectly apparent to his astute +opponent. He had made no attempt to use his superior numbers; and Lee +had come to the conclusion that the attack on Richmond would take the +same form as the attack on Yorktown,—the establishment of great +batteries, the massing of heavy ordnance, and all the tedious processes +of a siege. He read McClellan like an open book. He had personal +knowledge both of his capacity and character, for they had served +together on the same staff in the Mexican war. He knew that his young +adversary was a man of undoubted ability, of fascinating address, and +of courage that was never higher than when things were at their worst. +But these useful qualities were accompanied by marked defects. His will +was less powerful than his imagination. Bold in conception, he was +terribly slow in execution. When his good sense showed him the +opportunity, his imagination whispered, “Suppose the enemy has reserves +of which I know nothing! Is it not more prudent to wait until I receive +more accurate information?” And so “I dare not,” +inevitably waited on “I would.” He forgot that in war it is impossible +for a general to be absolutely certain. It is sufficient, according to +Napoleon, if the odds in his favour are three to two; and if he cannot +discover from the attitude of his enemy what the odds are, he is +unfitted for supreme command. + +Before Yorktown McClellan’s five army corps had been held in check, +first by 15,000 men, then by 58,000, protected by earthworks of feeble +profile.[1] The fort at Gloucester Point was the key of the Confederate +lines.[2] McClellan, however, although a division was actually under +orders to move against it, appears to have been unwilling to risk a +failure.[3] The channel of the York was thus closed both to his +transports and the gunboats, and he did nothing whatever to interfere +with Johnston’s long line of communications, which passed at several +points within easy reach of the river bank. Nor had he been more active +since he had reached West Point. Except for a single expedition, which +had dispersed a Confederate division near Hanover Court House, north of +the Chickahominy, he had made no aggressive movement. He had never +attempted to test the strength of the fortifications of Richmond, to +hinder their construction, or to discover their weak points. His urgent +demands for reinforcements had appeared in the Northern newspapers, and +those newspapers had found their way to Richmond. From the same source +the Confederates were made aware that he believed himself confronted by +an army far larger than his own; and when, on the departure of +Whiting’s division for the Valley, he refused to take advantage of the +opportunity to attack Lee’s diminished force, it became abundantly +clear, if further proof were wanting, that much might be ventured +against so timid a commander. + +From his knowledge of his adversary’s character, and +still more from his attitude, Lee had little difficulty in discovering +his intentions. McClellan, on the other hand, failed to draw a single +correct inference. And yet the information at his disposal was +sufficient to enable him to form a fair estimate of how things stood in +the Confederate camp. He had been attacked at Seven Pines, but not by +superior numbers; and it was hardly likely that the enemy had not +employed their whole available strength in this battle; otherwise their +enterprise was insensate. Furthermore, it was clearly to the interests +of the Confederates to strike at his army before McDowell could join +him. They had not done so, and it was therefore probable that they did +not feel themselves strong enough to do so. It is true that he was +altogether misled by the intelligence supplied as to the garrison of +Richmond by his famous detective staff. 200,000 was the smallest number +which the chief agent would admit. But that McClellan should have +relied on the estimate of these untrained observers rather than on the +evidence furnished by the conduct of the enemy is but a further proof +that he lacked all power of deduction.[4] + +It may well be questioned whether he was anxious at heart to measure +swords with Lee. His knowledge of his adversary, whose reputation for +daring, for ability, for strength of purpose, had been higher than any +other in the old army, must needs have had a disturbing influence on +his judgment. Against an enemy he did not know McClellan might have +acted with resolution. Face to face with Lee, it can hardly be doubted +that the weaker will was dominated by the stronger. Vastly different +were their methods of war. McClellan made no effort whatever either to +supplement or to corroborate the information supplied by his +detectives. Since he had reached West Point his cavalry had done +little.[5] Lee, on the other hand, had found +means to ascertain the disposition of his adversary’s troops, and had +acquired ample information of the measures which had been taken to +protect the right wing, north of the Chickahominy, the point he had +determined to attack. + +June 12 Early on June 12, with 1,200 horsemen and a section of +artillery, Stuart rode out on an enterprise of a kind which at that +time was absolutely unique, and which will keep his memory green so +long as cavalry is used in war. Carefully concealing his march, be +encamped that night near Taylorsville, twenty-two miles north of +Richmond, and far beyond the flank of the Federal intrenchments. + +June 13 The next morning he turned eastward towards Hanover Court +House. Here he drove back a picket, and his advanced guard, with the +loss of one officer, soon afterwards charged down a squadron of +regulars. A few miles to the south-east, near Old Church, the enemy’s +outposts were finally dispersed; and then, instead of halting, the +column pushed on into the very heart of the district occupied by the +Federals, and soon found itself in rear of their encampments. Stuart +had already gained important information. He had learned that +McClellan’s right flank extended but a short way north of the +Chickahominy, that it was not fortified, and that it rested on neither +swamp nor stream, and this was what Lee had instructed him to discover. +But it was one thing to obtain the information, another to bring it +back. If he returned by the road he had come, it was probable he would +be cut off, for the enemy was thoroughly roused, and the South Anna +River, unfordable from recent rains, rendered a _détour_ to the north +impracticable. To the mouth and west of him lay the Federal army, some +of the infantry camps not five miles distant. It was about +four o’clock in the afternoon. He could hardly reach Hanover Court +House before dark, and he might find it held by the enemy. To escape +from the dilemma he determined on a plan of extraordinary daring, which +involved nothing less than the passage of the Chickahominy in rear of +the enemy, and a circuit of the entire Federal army. + +The audacity of the design proved the salvation of his command. The +enemy had assembled a strong force of both cavalry and infantry at +Hanover Court House, under Stuart’s father-in-law, General Cooke; but, +misled by the reports brought in, and doubtless perplexed by the +situation, the latter pursued but slowly and halted for the night at +Old Church. Stuart, meanwhile, had reached Tunstall’s Station on the +York River Railway, picking up prisoners at every step. Here, routing +the guard, he tore up the rails, destroyed a vast amount of stores and +many waggons, broke down the telegraph and burnt the railway bridge, +his men regaling themselves on the luxuries which were found in the +well-stored establishments of the sutlers. Two squadrons, dispatched to +Garlick’s Landing on the Pamunkey, set fire to two transports, and +rejoined with a large number of prisoners, horses, and mules. Then, led +by troopers who were natives of the country, the column marched +south-east by the Williamsburg road, moving further and still further +away from Richmond. The moon was full, and as the troops passed by the +forest farms, the women, running to the wayside, wept with delight at +the unexpected apparition of the grey jackets, and old men showered +blessings on the heads of their gallant countrymen. At Talleysville, +eight miles east, Stuart halted for three hours; and shortly after +midnight, just as a Federal infantry brigade reached Tunstall’s Station +in hot pursuit, he turned off by a country road to the Chickahominy. + +June 14 At Forge Bridge, where he arrived at daylight, he should have +found a ford; but the river had overflowed its banks, and was full of +floating timber. Colonel Fitzhugh Lee, not the least famous member of a +famous family, accompanied by a few men, swam his horse at imminent +peril over to the +other bank; but, although he re-crossed the swollen waters in the same +manner, the daring young officer had to report that the passage was +impracticable. It was already light. The enemy would soon be up, and +the capture of the whole column seemed absolutely certain. Hitherto the +men, exhilarated by the complete success of the adventure, had borne +themselves as gaily as if they were riding through the streets of +Richmond. But the danger of their situation was now forcibly impressed +upon them, and the whole command became grave and anxious. Stuart alone +was unmoved, and at this juncture one of his scouts informed him that +the skeleton of an old bridge spanned the stream about a mile below. An +abandoned warehouse furnished the materials for a footway, over which +the troopers passed, holding the bridles of their horses as they swam +alongside. Half the column thus crossed, while the remainder +strengthened the bridge so as to permit the passage of the artillery. +By one o’clock the whole force was over the Chickahominy, unmolested by +the enemy, of whom only small parties, easily driven back by the +rear-guard, had made their appearance. + +Thirty-five miles now to Richmond, in rear of the left wing of the +Northern army, and within range, for some portion of the march, of the +gunboats on the James River! Burning the bridge, with a wave of the +hand to the Federal horsemen who covered the heights above Stuart +plunged into the woods, and without further misadventure brought his +troops at sunset to the neighbourhood of Charles City Court House. +Leaving his men sleeping, after thirty-six hours in the saddle, he rode +to Richmond to report to Lee. + +June 15 Before dawn on the 15th, after covering another thirty miles, +over a road which was patrolled by the enemy, he reached head-quarters. +His squadrons followed, marching at midnight, and bringing with them +165 prisoners and 260 captured horses and mules. + +This extraordinary expedition, which not only effected the destruction +of a large amount of Federal property, and broke up, for the time +being, their line of supplies, but acquired information of the utmost +value, and shook the +confidence of the North in McClellan’s generalship, was accomplished +with the loss of one man. These young Virginia soldiers marched one +hundred and ten miles in less than two days. “There was something +sublime,” says Stuart, “in the implicit confidence and unquestioning +trust of the rank and file in a leader guiding them straight, +apparently, into the very jaws of the enemy, every step appearing to +them to diminish the hope of extrication.”[6] Nor was the influence of +their achievement on the _moral_ of the whole Confederate army the +least important result attained. A host of over 100,000 men, which had +allowed a few squadrons to ride completely round it, by roads which +were within hearing of its bugles, was no longer considered a +formidable foe. + +On receiving Stuart’s information, Lee drew up the plan of operations +which had been imparted to Jackson on the 22nd. + +It was a design which to all appearance was almost foolhardy. The +Confederate army was organised as follows:— + +Longstreet +A. P. Hill +Magruder +Huger +Holmes +D. H. Hill +Jackson +Cavalry +Reserve Artillery 9,000 +14,000 +13,000 +9,000 +6,500 +10,000 +18,500 +3,000 +3,000 +——— +86,500[7] + +June 24 On the night of June 24 the whole of these troops, with the +exception of the Valley army, were south of the Chickahominy, holding +the earthworks which protected Richmond. Less than two miles eastward, +strongly intrenched, lay four of McClellan’s army corps, in round +numbers 75,000 officers and men.[8] + +To attack this force, even after Jackson’s arrival, +was to court disaster. The right was protected by the Chickahominy, the +left rested on White Oak Swamp, a network of sluggish streams and +impassable swamps, screened everywhere by tangled thickets. It needed +not the presence of the siege ordnance, placed on the most commanding +points within the lines, to make such a position absolutely +impregnable. + +North of the Chickahominy, however, the Federals were less favourably +situated. The Fifth Army Corps, 25,000 strong,[9] under General +FitzJohn Porter, had been pushed forward, stretching a hand to McDowell +and protecting the railway, in the direction of Mechanicsville; and +although the tributaries of the Chickahominy, running in from the +north, afforded a series of positions, the right flank of these +positions, resting, as Stuart had ascertained, on no natural obstacle, +was open to a turning movement. Furthermore, in rear of the Fifth +Corps, and at an oblique angle to the front, ran the line of supply, +the railway to West Point. If Porter’s right were turned, the +Confederates, threatening the railway, would compel McClellan to detach +largely to the north bank of the Chickahominy in order to recover or +protect the line. + +On the north bank of the Chickahominy, therefore, Lee’s attention had +been for some time fixed. Here was his adversary’s weak point, and a +sudden assault on Porter, followed up, if necessary, by an advance +against the railway, would bring McClellan out of his intrenchments, +and force him to fight at a disadvantage. To ensure success, however, +in the attack on Porter it was necessary to concentrate an overwhelming +force on the north bank; and this could hardly be done without so +weakening the force which held the Richmond lines that it would be +unable to resist the attack of the 75,000 men who faced it. If +McClellan, while Lee was fighting Porter, boldly threw forward the +great army he had on the south bank, the rebel capital might be the +reward of his resolution. The danger +was apparent to all, but Lee resolved to risk it, and his audacity has +not escaped criticism. It has been said that he deliberately +disregarded the contingency of McClellan either advancing on Richmond, +or reinforcing Porter. The truth is, however, that neither Lee, nor +those generals about him who knew McClellan, were in the least +apprehensive that their over-cautious adversary, if the attack were +sudden and well sustained, would either see or utilise his opportunity. + +From Hannibal to Moltke there has been no great captain who has +neglected to study the character of his opponent, and who did not trade +on the knowledge thus acquired, and it was this knowledge which +justified Lee’s audacity. + +The real daring of the enterprise lay in the inferiority of the +Confederate armament. Muskets and shot-guns, still carried by a large +part of the army, were ill-matched against rifles of the most modern +manufacture; while the smooth-bore field-pieces, with which at least +half the artillery was equipped, possessed neither the range nor the +accuracy of the rifled ordnance of the Federals. + +That Lee’s study of the chances had not been patient and exhaustive it +is impossible to doubt. He was no hare-brained leader, but a profound +thinker, following the highest principles of the military art. That he +had weighed the disconcerting effect which the sudden appearance of the +victorious Jackson, with an army of unknown strength, would produce +upon McClellan, goes without saying. He had omitted no precaution to +render the surprise complete, and although the defences of Richmond +were still too weak to resist a resolute attack, Magruder, the same +officer who had so successfully imposed upon McClellan at Yorktown, was +such a master of artifice that, with 28,000 men and the reserve +artillery,[10] he might be relied upon to hold Richmond until Porter +had been +disposed of. The remainder of the army, 2,000 of Stuart’s cavalry, the +divisions of Longstreet and the two Hills, 35,000 men all told, +crossing to the north bank of the Chickahominy and combining with the +18,500 under Jackson, would be sufficient to crush the Federal right. + +The initial operations, however, were of a somewhat complicated nature. +Four bridges[11] crossed the river on Lee’s left. A little more than a +mile and a half from Mechanicsville Bridge, up stream, is Meadow +Bridge, and five and a half miles further up is another passage at the +Half Sink, afterwards called Winston’s Bridge. Three and a half miles +below Mechanicsville Bridge is New Bridge. The northern approaches to +Mechanicsville, Meadow, and New Bridge, were in possession of the +Federals; and it was consequently no simple operation to transfer the +troops before Richmond from one bank of the Chickahominy to the other. +Only Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridges could be used. Winston’s Bridge +was too far from Richmond, for, if Longstreet and the two Hills were to +cross at that point, not only would Magruder be left without support +during their march, but McClellan, warned by his scouts, would receive +long notice of the intended blow and have ample time for preparation. +To surprise Porter, to give McClellan no time for reflection, and at +the same time to gain a position which would bring the Confederates +operating on the north bank into close and speedy communication with +Magruder on the south, another point of passage must be chosen. The +position would be the one commanding New Bridge, for the Confederate +earthworks, held by Magruder, ran due south from that point. But Porter +was already in possession of the coveted ground, with strong outposts +at Mechanicsville. To secure, then, the two centre bridges was the +first object. This, it was expected, would be achieved by the advance +of the Valley army, aided by a brigade from the Half Sink, against the +flank and rear of the Federals at Mechanicsville. Then, as soon +as the enemy fell back, Longstreet and the two Hills would cross the +river by the Meadow and Mechanicsville Bridges, and strike Porter in +front, while Jackson attacked his right. A victory would place the +Confederates in possession of New Bridge, and the troops north of the +Chickahominy would be then in close communication with Magruder. + +Lee’s orders were as follows:—’Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia, +June 24, 1862. General Orders, No. 75. + +“I.—General Jackson’s command will proceed to-morrow (June 25) from +Ashland towards the Slash (Merry Oaks) Church, and encamp at some +convenient point west of the Central Railroad. Branch’s brigade of A. +P. Hill’s division will also, to-morrow evening, take position on the +Chickahominy, near Half Sink. At three o’clock Thursday morning, 26th +instant, General Jackson will advance on the road leading to Pole Green +Church, communicating his march to General Branch, who will immediately +cross the Chickahominy, and take the road leading to Mechanicsville. As +soon as the movements of these columns are discovered, General A. P. +Hill, with the rest of his division, will cross the Chickahominy at +Meadow Bridge, and move direct upon Mechanicsville. To aid his advance +the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy will at the proper time open +upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. The enemy being driven from +Mechanicsville and the passage of the bridge being opened, General +Longstreet, with his division and that of General D. H. Hill, will +cross the Chickahominy at or near that point; General D. H. Hill moving +to the support of General Jackson, and General Longstreet supporting +General A. P. Hill; the four divisions keeping in communication with +each other, and moving _en échelon_ on separate roads if practicable; +the left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharp-shooters +extending in their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy, and +endeavour to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge, +General Jackson bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, and +taking the direction towards +Cold Harbour. They will then press forward towards the York River +Railroad, closing upon the enemy’s rear, and forcing him down the +Chickahominy. An advance of the enemy towards Richmond will be +prevented by vigorously following his rear, and crippling and arresting +his progress. + +“II.—The divisions under Generals Huger and Magruder will hold their +position in front of the enemy against attack, and make such +demonstrations, Thursday, as to discover his operations. Should +opportunity offer, the feint will be converted into a real attack. . . +. + +“III.—General Stuart, with the 1st, 4th, and 9th Virginia Cavalry, the +cavalry of Cobb’s Legion, and the Jeff Davis Legion, will cross the +Chickahominy to-morrow (Wednesday, June 25), and take position to the +left of General Jackson’s line of march. The main body will be held in +reserve, with scouts well extended to the front and left. General +Stuart will keep General Jackson informed of the movements of the enemy +on his left, and will cooperate with him in his advance. . . .” + +June 25 On the 25th Longstreet and the two Hills moved towards the +bridges; and although during the movement McClellan drove back +Magruder’s pickets to their trenches, and pushed his own outposts +nearer Richmond, Lee held firmly to his purpose. As a matter of fact, +there was little to be feared from McClellan. With a profound belief in +the advantages of defensive and in the strength of a fortified +position, he expected nothing less than that the Confederates would +leave the earthworks they had so laboriously constructed, and +deliberately risk the perils of an attack. He seems to have had little +idea that in the hands of a skilful general intrenchments may form a +“pivot of operations,’[12] the means whereby he covers his most +vulnerable point, holds the enemy in front, and sets his main body free +for offensive action. Yet +McClellan was by no means easy in his mind. He knew Jackson was +approaching. He knew his communications were threatened. Fugitive +negroes, who, as usual, either exaggerated or lied, had informed him +that the Confederates had been largely reinforced, and that Beauregard, +with a portion of the Western army, had arrived in Richmond. But that +his right wing was in danger he had not the faintest suspicion. He +judged Lee by himself. Such a plan as leaving a small force to defend +Richmond, and transferring the bulk of the army to join Jackson, he +would have at once rejected as over-daring. If attack came at all, he +expected that it would come by the south bank; and he was so far from +anticipating that an opportunity for offensive action might be offered +to himself that, on the night of the 25th, he sent word to his corps +commanders that they were to regard their intrenchments as “the true +field of battle.”[13] + +June 26. 3 a.m. Lee’s orders left much to Jackson. The whole operation +which Lee had planned hinged upon his movements. On the morning of the +24th he was at Beaver Dam Station. The same night he was to reach +Ashland, eighteen miles distant as the crow flies. On the night of the +25th he was to halt near the Slash Church, just west of the Virginia +Central Railway, and six miles east of Ashland. At three o’clock, +however, on the morning of the 26th, the Army of the Valley was still +at Ashland, and it was not till nine that it crossed the railroad. + +10.30 a.m. Branch, on hearing that Jackson was at last advancing, +passed the Chickahominy by Winston’s Bridge, and driving Federal +pickets before him, moved on Mechanicsville. General A. P. Hill was +meanwhile near Meadow Bridge, waiting until the advance of Jackson and +Branch should turn the flank of the Federal force which blocked his +passage. + +3 p.m. At 3 p.m., hearing nothing from his colleagues, and apprehensive +that longer delay might hazard the failure of the whole plan, he +ordered his advanced guard to seize the bridge. The enemy, already +threatened in rear by Branch, at once fell back. Hill followed +the retiring pickets towards Beaver Dam Creek, and after a short march +of three miles found himself under fire of the Federal artillery. +Porter had occupied a position about two miles above New Bridge. + +The rest of the Confederate army was already crossing the Chickahominy; +and although there was no sign of Jackson, and the enemy’s front was +strong, protected by a long line of batteries, Hill thought it +necessary to order an attack. A message from Lee, ordering him to +postpone all further movement, arrived too late.[14] There was no +artillery preparation, and the troops, checked unexpectedly by a wide +abattis, were repulsed with terrible slaughter, the casualties +amounting to nearly 2,000 men.[15] The Union loss was 360.[16] + +4.30 p.m. Jackson, about 4.30 p.m., before this engagement had begun, +had reached Hundley’s Corner, three miles north of the Federal +position, but separated from it by dense forest and the windings of the +creek. On the opposite bank was a detachment of Federal infantry, +supported by artillery. + +6 p.m. Two guns, accompanied by the advanced guard, sufficed to drive +this force to the shelter of the woods; and then, establishing his +outposts, Jackson ordered his troops to bivouac. + +It has been asserted by more than one Southern general that the +disaster at Beaver Dam Creek was due to Jackson’s indifferent tactics; +and, at first sight, the bare facts would seem to justify the verdict. +He had not reached his appointed station on the night of the 25th, and +on the 26th he was five hours behind time. He should have crossed the +Virginia Central Railway at sunrise, but at nine o’clock he was still +three miles distant. His advance against the Federal right flank and +rear should have been made in co-operation with the remainder of the +army. But his whereabouts was unknown when Hill attacked; and although +the cannonade was distinctly heard at Hundley’s Corner, he made no +effort to lend assistance, and his troops were encamping when their +comrades, not three miles +away, were rushing forward to the assault. There would seem to be some +grounds, then, for the accusation that his delay thwarted General Lee’s +design; some reason for the belief that the victor of the Valley +campaign, on his first appearance in combination with the main army, +had proved a failure, and that his failure was in those very qualities +of swiftness and energy to which he owed his fame. + +General D. H. Hill has written that “Jackson’s genius never shone when +he was under the command of another. It seemed then to be shrouded or +paralysed. . . . MacGregor on his native heath was not more different +from MacGregor in prison than was Jackson his own master from Jackson +in a subordinate position. This was the keynote to his whole character. +The hooded falcon cannot strike the quarry.”[17] + +The reader who has the heart to follow this chronicle to the end will +assuredly find reason to doubt the acumen, however he may admire the +eloquence, of Jackson’s brother-in-law. When he reads of the Second +Manassas, of Harper’s Ferry, of Sharpsburg and of Chancellorsville, he +will recall this statement with astonishment; and it will not be +difficult to show that Jackson conformed as closely to the plans of his +commander at Mechanicsville as elsewhere. + +The machinery of war seldom runs with the smoothness of clockwork. The +course of circumstances can never be exactly predicted. Unforeseen +obstacles may render the highest skill and the most untiring energy of +no avail; and it may be well to point out that the task which was +assigned to Jackson was one of exceeding difficulty. In the first +place, his march of eight-and-twenty miles, from Frederickshall to +Ashland, on June 23, 24, and 25, was made over an unmapped country, +unknown either to himself or to his staff, which had lately been in +occupation of the Federals. Bridges had been destroyed and roads +obstructed. The Valley army had already marched far and fast; and +although Dabney hints that inexperienced and sluggish subordinates were +the chief cause of delay, +there is hardly need to look so far for excuse.[18] The march from +Ashland to Hundley’s Corner, sixteen miles, was little less difficult. +It was made in two columns, Whiting and the Stonewall division, now +under Winder, crossing the railway near Merry Oaks Church, Ewell moving +by Shady Grove Church, but this distribution did not accelerate the +march. The midsummer sun blazed fiercely down on the dusty roads; the +dense woods on either hand shut out the air, and interruptions were +frequent. The Federal cavalry held a line from Atlee’s Station to near +Hanover Court House. The 8th Illinois, over 700 strong, picketed all +the woods between the Chickahominy and the Totopotomoy Creek. Two other +regiments prolonged the front to the Pamunkey, and near Hundley’s +Corner and Old Church were posted detachments of infantry. Skirmishing +was constant. The Federal outposts contested every favourable position. +Here and there the roads were obstructed by felled trees; a burned +bridge over the Totopotomoy delayed the advance for a full hour, and it +was some time before the enemy’s force at Hundley’s Corner was driven +behind Beaver Dam Creek. + +At the council of war, held on the 23rd, Lee had left it to Jackson to +fix the date on which the operation against the Federal right should +begin, and on the latter deciding on the 26th, Longstreet had suggested +that he should make more ample allowance for the difficulties that +might be presented by the country and by the enemy, and give himself +more time.[19] Jackson had not seen fit to alter his decision, and it +is hard to say that he was wrong. + +Had McClellan received notice that the Valley army was approaching, a +day’s delay would have given him a fine opportunity. More than one +course would have been open to him. He might have constructed +formidable intrenchments on the north bank of the Chickahominy and +have brought over large reinforcements of men and guns; or he might +have turned the tables by a bold advance on Richmond. It was by no +means inconceivable that if he detected Lee’s intention and was given +time to prepare, he might permit the Confederates to cross the +Chickahominy, amuse them there with a small force, and hurl the rest of +his army on the works which covered the Southern capital. It is true +that his caution was extreme, and to a mind which was more occupied +with counting the enemy’s strength than with watching for an +opportunity, the possibility of assuming the offensive was not likely +to occur. But, timid as he might be when no enemy was in sight, +McClellan was constitutionally brave; and when the chimeras raised by +an over-active imagination proved to be substantial dangers, he was +quite capable of daring resolution. Time, therefore, was of the utmost +importance to the Confederates. It was essential that Porter should be +overwhelmed before McClellan realised the danger; and if Jackson, in +fixing a date for the attack which would put a heavy tax on the +marching powers of his men, already strained to the utmost, ran some +risks, from a strategical point of view those risks were fully +justified. + +In the second place, an operation such as that which Lee had devised is +one of the most difficult manœuvres which an army can be called upon to +execute. According to Moltke, to unite two forces on the battle-field, +starting at some distance apart, at the right moment, is the most +brilliant feat of generalship. The slightest hesitation may ruin the +combination. Haste is even more to be dreaded. There is always the +danger that one wing may attack, or be attacked, while the other is +still far distant, and either contingency may be fatal. The Valley +campaign furnishes more than one illustration. In their pursuit of +Jackson, Shields and Fremont failed to co-operate at Strasburg, at +Cross Keys, and at Port Republic. And greater generals than either +Shields or Fremont have met with little better success in attempting +the same manœuvre. At both Eylau and Bautzen Napoleon was deprived of +decisive victory by his failure to ensure the co-operation of his +widely separated columns. + +Jackson and A. P. Hill, on the morning of the 26th, were nearly fifteen +miles apart. Intercommunication at the outset was ensured by the +brigade under Branch; but as the advance progressed, and the enemy was +met with, it became more difficult. The messengers riding from one +force to the other were either stopped by the Federals, or were +compelled to make long _détours_; and as they approached the enemy’s +position, neither Hill nor Jackson was informed of the whereabouts of +the other. + +The truth is, that the arrangements made by the Confederate headquarter +staff were most inadequate. In the first place, the order of the 24th, +instructing Jackson to start from Slash Church at 3 a.m. on the 26th, +and thus leading the other generals to believe that he would certainly +be there at that hour, should never have been issued. When it was +written Jackson’s advanced guard was at Beaver Dam Station, the rear +brigades fifteen miles behind; and to reach Slash Church his force had +to march forty miles through an intricate country, in possession of the +enemy, and so little known that it was impossible to designate the +route to be followed. To fix an hour of arrival so long in advance was +worse than useless, and Jackson cannot be blamed if he failed to comply +with the exact letter of a foolish order. As it was, so many of the +bridges were broken, and so difficult was it to pass the fords, that if +Dr. Dabney had not found in his brother, a planter of the +neighbourhood, an efficient substitute for the guide headquarters +should have provided, the Valley army would have been not hours but +days too late. In the second place, the duty of keeping up +communications should not have been left to Jackson, but have been seen +to at headquarters. Jackson had with him only a few cavalry, and these +few had not only to supply the necessary orderlies for the subordinate +generals, and the escorts for the artillery and trains, but to form his +advanced guard, for Stuart’s squadrons were on his left flank, and not +in his front. Moreover, his cavalry were complete strangers to the +country, and there were no +maps. In such circumstances the only means of ensuring constant +communication was to have detached two of Stuart’s squadrons, who knew +the ground, to establish a series of posts between Jackson’s line of +march and the Chickahominy; and to have detailed a staff officer, whose +sole duty would have been to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with hourly +reports of the progress made, to join the Valley army.[20] It may be +remarked, too, that Generals Branch and Ewell, following converging +roads, met near Shady Grove Church about 3 p.m. No report appears to +have been sent by the latter to General A. P. Hill; and although Branch +a little later received a message to the effect that Hill had crossed +the Chickahominy and was moving on Mechanicsville,[21] the information +was not passed on to Jackson. + +Neglect of these precautions made it impracticable to arrange a +simultaneous attack, and co-operation depended solely on the judgment +of Hill and Jackson. In the action which ensued on Beaver Dam Creek +there was no co-operation whatever. Hill attacked and was repulsed. +Jackson had halted at Hundley’s Corner, three miles distant from the +battle-field. Had the latter come down on the Federal rear while Hill +moved against their front an easy success would in all probability have +been the result. + +Nevertheless, the responsibility for Hill’s defeat cannot be held to +rest on Jackson’s shoulders. On August 18, 1870, the Prussian Guards +and the Saxon Army Corps +were ordered to make a combined attack on the village of St. Privat, +the Guards moving against the front, the Saxons against the flank. When +the order was issued the two corps were not more than two miles apart. +The tract of country which lay between them was perfectly open, the +roads were free, and inter-communication seemed easy in the extreme. +Yet, despite their orders, despite the facilities of communication, the +Guards advanced to the attack an hour and a half too soon; and from six +o’clock to nearly seven their shattered lines lay in front of the +position, at the mercy of a vigorous counterstroke, without a single +Saxon regiment coming to their aid. But the Saxons were not to blame. +Their march had been unchecked; they had moved at speed. On their part +there had been no hesitation; but on the part of the commander of the +Guards there had been the same precipitation which led to the premature +attack on the Federal position at Beaver Dam Creek. It was the +impatience of General Hill, not the tardiness of Jackson, which was the +cause of the Confederate repulse. + +We may now turn to the question whether Jackson was justified in not +marching to the sound of the cannon. Referring to General Lee’s orders, +it will be seen that as soon as Longstreet and D. H. Hill had crossed +the Chickahominy the four divisions of the army were to move forward +_in communication with each other_ and drive the enemy from his +position, Jackson, in advance upon the left, “turning Beaver Dam Creek, +and taking the direction of Cold Harbour.” + +When Jackson reached Hundley’s Corner, and drove the Federal infantry +behind the Creek, the first thing to do, as his orders indicated, was +to get touch with the rest of the army. It was already near sunset; +between Hundley’s Corner and Mechanicsville lay a dense forest, with no +roads in the desired direction; and it was manifestly impossible, under +ordinary conditions, to do more that evening than to establish +connection; the combined movement against the enemy’s position must be +deferred till the morning. But the sound of battle to the south-west +introduced a complication. “We distinctly heard,” says Jackson, +“the rapid and continued discharges of cannon.”[22] What did this fire +portend? It might proceed, as was to be inferred from Lee’s orders, +from the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy covering Hill’s passage. +It might mean a Federal counterstroke on Hill’s advanced guard; or, +possibly, a premature attack on the part of the Confederates. General +Whiting, according to his report, thought it “indicated a severe +battle.”[23] General Trimble, marching with Ewell, heard both musketry +and artillery; and in his opinion the command should have moved +forward;[24] and whatever may have been Jackson’s orders, it was +undoubtedly his duty, if he believed a hot engagement was in progress, +to have marched to the assistance of his colleagues. He could not help +them by standing still. He might have rendered them invaluable aid by +pressing the enemy in flank. But the question is, What inference did +the cannonade convey to Jackson’s mind? Was it of such a character as +to leave no doubt that Hill was in close action, or might it be +interpreted as the natural accompaniment of the passage of the +Chickahominy? The evidence is conflicting. On the one hand we have the +evidence of Whiting and Trimble, both experienced soldiers; on the +other, in addition to the indirect evidence of Jackson’s inaction, we +have the statement of Major Dabney. “We heard no signs,” says the chief +of the staff, “of combat on Beaver Dam Creek until a little while +before sunset. The whole catastrophe took place in a few minutes about +that time; and in any case our regiments, who had gone into bivouac, +could not have been reassembled, formed up, and moved forward in time +to be of any service. A night attack through the dense, pathless, and +unknown forest was quite impracticable.”[25] It seems probable, +then—and the Federal reports are to the same effect[26]—that the firing +was only really heavy for a very short period, and that Jackson +believed it +to be occasioned by Hill’s passage of the Chickahominy, and the rout of +the Federals from Mechanicsville. Neither Trimble nor Whiting were +aware that Lee’s orders directed that the operation was to be covered +by a heavy cannonade. + +Obeying orders very literally himself, Jackson found it difficult to +believe that others did not do the same. He knew that the position he +had taken up rendered the line of Beaver Dam Creek untenable by the +Federals. They would never stand to fight on that line with a strong +force established in their rear and menacing their communications, nor +would they dare to deliver a counterstroke through the trackless woods. +It might confidently be assumed, therefore, that they would fall back +during the night, and that the Confederate advance would then be +carried out in that concentrated formation which Lee’s orders had +dictated. Such, in all probability, was Jackson’s view of the +situation; and that Hill, in direct contravention of those orders, +would venture on an isolated attack before that formation had been +assumed never for a moment crossed his mind.[27] + +Illustration: Map of The Environs of Richmond For larger view click on +image. + +Hill, on the other hand, seems to have believed that if the Federals +were not defeated on the evening of the 26th they would make use of the +respite, either to bring up reinforcements, or to advance on Richmond +by the opposite bank of the Chickahominy. It is not impossible that he +thought the sound of his cannon would bring Jackson to his aid. That it +would have been wiser to establish communication, and to make certain +of that aid before attacking, there can be no question. It was too late +to defeat Porter the same evening. Nothing was to be gained by +immediate attack, and much would be risked. The last assault, in which +the heaviest losses were incurred, was made just as night fell. It was +a sacrifice of life as unnecessary as that of the Prussian Guard before +St. Privat. At the same time, that General Hill did wrong in crossing +the Chickahominy before he heard of his colleague’s approach is not a +fair +accusation. To have lingered on the south bank would have been to leave +Jackson to the tender mercies of the Federals should they turn against +him in the forest. Moreover, it was Hill’s task to open a passage for +the remaining divisions, and if that passage had been deferred to a +later hour, it is improbable that the Confederate army would have been +concentrated on the north bank of the Chickahominy until the next +morning. It must be admitted, too, that the situation in which Hill +found himself, after crossing the river, was an exceedingly severe test +of his self-control. His troops had driven in the Federal outposts; +infantry, cavalry, and artillery were retiring before his skirmishers. +The noise of battle filled the air. From across the Chickahominy +thundered the heavy guns, and his regiments were pressing forward with +the impetuous ardour of young soldiers. If he yielded to the excitement +of the moment, if eagerness for battle overpowered his judgment, if his +brain refused to work calmly in the wild tumult of the conflict, he is +hardly to be blamed. The patience which is capable of resisting the +eagerness of the troops, the imperturbable judgment which, in the heat +of action, weighs with deliberation the necessities of the moment, the +clear vision which forecasts the result of every movement—these are +rare qualities indeed. + +During the night Porter fell back on Gaines’ Mill. While the engagement +at Beaver Dam Creek was still in progress vast clouds of dust, rising +above the forests to the north-west and north, had betrayed the +approach of Jackson, and the reports of the cavalry left no doubt that +he was threatening the Federal rear. + +The retreat was conducted in good order, a strong rear-guard, +reinforced by two batteries of horse-artillery, holding the +Confederates in check, and before morning a second position, east of +Powhite Creek, and covering two bridges over the Chickahominy, +Alexander’s and Grapevine, was occupied by the Fifth Army Corps. + +June 27, 5 a.m. New Bridge was now uncovered, and Lee’s army was in +motion shortly after sunrise, Jackson crossing Beaver Dam Creek and +moving due south in the direction of Walnut +Grove Church.[28] The enemy, however, had already passed eastward; and +the Confederates, well concentrated and in hand, pushed forward in +pursuit; A. P. Hill, with Longstreet on his right, moving on Gaines’ +Mill, while Jackson, supported by D. H. Hill, and with Stuart covering +his left, marched by a more circuitous route to Old Cold Harbour. Near +Walnut Grove Church Jackson met the Commander-in-Chief, and it is +recorded that the staff officers of the Valley army, noting the +eagerness displayed by General Lee’s suite to get a glimpse of +“Stonewall,” then for the first time realised the true character and +magnitude of the Valley campaign. + +12 noon About noon, after a march of seven miles, A. P. Hill’s scouts +reported that the Federals had halted behind Powhite Creek. The leading +brigade was sent across the stream, which runs past Gaines’ Mill, and +pressing through the thick woods found the enemy in great strength on a +ridge beyond. Hill formed his division for attack, and opened fire with +his four batteries. The enemy’s guns, superior in number, at once +responded, and the skirmish lines became actively engaged. The +Confederate general, despite urgent messages from his subordinates, +requesting permission to attack, held his troops in hand, waiting till +he should be supported, and for two and a half hours the battle was no +more than an affair of “long bowls.” + +The position held by the defence was emphatically one to impose caution +on the assailants. To reach it the Confederates were confined to three +roads, two from Mechanicsville, and one from Old Cold Harbour. These +roads led each of them through a broad belt of forest, and then, +passing through open fields, descended into a +winding valley, from five hundred to a thousand yards in breadth. +Rising near McGehee’s House, due south of Old Cold Harbour, a sluggish +creek, bordered by swamps and thick timber, and cutting in places a +deep channel, filtered through the valley to the Chickahominy. Beyond +this stream rose an open and undulating plateau, admirably adapted to +the movement of all arms, and with a slight command of the opposite +ridge. On the plateau, facing west and north, the Federals were formed +up. A fringe of trees and bushes along the crest gave cover and +concealment to the troops. 60 feet below, winding darkly through the +trees, the creek covered the whole front; and in the centre of the +position, east of New Cold Harbour, the valley was completely filled +with tangled wood. + +Towards Old Cold Harbour the timber on the Confederate side of the +ravine was denser than elsewhere. On the Federal left flank the valley +of the Chickahominy was open ground, but it was swept by heavy guns +from the right bank of the river, and at this point the creek became an +almost impassable swamp. + +Porter, who had been reinforced by 9,000 men under General Slocum, now +commanded three divisions of infantry, four regiments of cavalry, and +twenty-two batteries, a total of 36,000 officers and men. The _moral_ +of the troops had been strengthened by their easy victory of the +previous day. Their commander had gained their confidence; their +position had been partially intrenched, and they could be readily +supported by way of Alexander’s and Grapevine Bridges from the south +bank of the Chickahominy. + +The task before the Confederates, even with their superior numbers, was +formidable in the extreme. The wooded ridge which encircled the +position afforded scant room for artillery, and it was thus +impracticable to prepare the attack by a preliminary bombardment. The +ground over which the infantry must advance was completely swept by +fire, and the centre and left were defended by three tiers of riflemen, +the first sheltered by the steep banks of the creek, the second halfway +up the bluff, +covered by a breastwork, the third on the crest, occupying a line of +shelter-trenches; and the riflemen were supported by a dozen batteries +of rifled guns.[29] + +But Lee had few misgivings. In one respect the Federal position seemed +radically defective. The line of retreat on White House was exposed to +attack from Old Cold Harbour. In fact, with Old Cold Harbour in +possession of the Confederates, retreat could only be effected by one +road north of the Chickahominy, that by Parker’s Mill and Dispatch +Station; and if this road were threatened, Porter, in order to cover +it, would be compelled to bring over troops from his left and centre, +or to prolong his line until it was weak everywhere. There was no great +reason to fear that McClellan would send Porter heavy reinforcements. +To do so he would have to draw troops from his intrenchments on the +south bank of the Chickahominy, and Magruder had been instructed to +maintain a brisk demonstration against this portion of the line. It was +probable that the Federal commander, with his exaggerated estimate of +the numbers opposed to him, would be induced by this means to +anticipate a general attack against his whole front, and would postpone +moving his reserves until it was too late. + +While Hill was skirmishing with the Federals, Lee was anxiously +awaiting intelligence of Jackson’s arrival at Old Cold Harbour. + +2.30 p.m. Longstreet was already forming up for battle, and at 2.30 +Hill’s regiments were slipped to the attack. A fierce and sanguinary +conflict now ensued. Emerging in well-ordered lines from the cover of +the woods, the Confederates swept down the open slopes. Floundering in +the swamps, and struggling through the abattis which had been placed on +the banks of the stream, they drove in the advanced line of hostile +riflemen, and strove gallantly to ascend the slope which lay beyond. +“But brigade after brigade,” says General Porter, “seemed almost to +melt away before the concentrated fire of our artillery and infantry; +yet others pressed on, followed by supports daring and brave as their +predecessors, despite their heavy losses and the disheartening +effect of having to clamber over many of their disabled and dead, and +to meet their surviving comrades rushing back in great disorder from +the deadly contest.”[30] For over an hour Hill fought on without +support. There were no signs of Jackson, and Longstreet, whom it was +not intended to employ until Jackson’s appearance should have caused +the Federals to denude their left, was then sent in to save the day. + +As on the previous day, the Confederate attack had failed in +combination. Jackson’s march had been again delayed. The direct road +from Walnut Grove Church to Old Cold Harbour, leading through the +forest, was found to be obstructed by felled timber and defended by +sharpshooters, and to save time Jackson’s division struck off into the +road by Bethesda Church. This threw it in rear of D. H. Hill, and it +was near 2 p.m. when the latter’s advanced guard reached the tavern at +the Old Cold Harbour cross roads. No harm, however, had been done. A. +P. Hill did not attack till half an hour later. But when he advanced +there came no response from the left. A battery of D. H. Hill’s +division was brought into action, but was soon silenced, and beyond +this insignificant demonstration the Army of the Valley made no +endeavour to join the battle. The brigades were halted by the roadside. +Away to the right, above the intervening forest, rolled the roar of +battle, the crash of shells and the din of musketry, but no orders were +given for the advance. + +Nor had Jackson’s arrival produced the slightest consternation in the +Federal ranks. Although from his position at Cold Harbour he seriously +threatened their line of retreat to the White House, they had neither +denuded their left nor brought up their reserves. Where he was now +established he was actually nearer White House than any portion of +Porter’s army corps, and yet that general apparently accepted the +situation with equanimity. + +Lee had anticipated that Jackson’s approach would cause the enemy to +prolong their front in order to cover their line of retreat to the +White House, and so weaken +that part of the position which was to be attacked by Longstreet; and +Jackson had been ordered[31] to draw up his troops so as to meet such a +contingency. “Hoping,” he says in his report, “that Generals A. P. Hill +and Longstreet would soon drive the Federals towards me, I directed +General D. H. Hill to move his division to the left of the wood, so as +to leave between him and the wood on the right an open space, across +which I hoped that the enemy would be driven.” But Lee was deceived. +The Federal line of retreat ran not to the White House, but over +Grapevine Bridge. McClellan had for some time foreseen that he might be +compelled to abandon the York River Railway, and directly he suspected +that Jackson was marching to Richmond had begun to transfer his line of +operations from the York to the James, and his base of supply from the +White House to Harrison’s Landing. + +So vast is the amount of stores necessary for the subsistence, health, +and armament of a host like McClellan’s that a change of base is an +operation which can only be effected under the most favourable +circumstances.[32] It is evident, then, that the possibility of the +enemy shifting his line of operations to the James, abandoning the York +River Railroad, might easily have +escaped the penetration of either Lee or Jackson. They were not behind +the scenes of the Federal administrative system. They were not aware of +the money, labour, and ingenuity which had been lavished on the +business of supply. They had not seen with their own eyes the fleet of +four hundred transports which covered the reaches of the York. They had +not yet realised the enormous advantage which an army derives from the +command of the sea. + +Nor were they enlightened by the calmness with which their immediate +adversaries on the field of battle regarded Jackson’s possession of Old +Cold Harbour. Still, one fact was manifest: the Federals showed no +disposition whatever to weaken or change their position, and it was +clear that the success was not to be attained by mere manœuvre. Lee, +seeing Hill’s division roughly handled, ordered Longstreet forward, +while Jackson, judging from the sound and direction of the firing that +the original plan had failed, struck in with vigour. Opposed to him was +Sykes’ division of regulars, supported by eighteen guns, afterwards +increased to twenty-four; and in the men of the United States Army the +Valley soldiers met a stubborn foe. The position, moreover, occupied by +Sykes possessed every advantage which a defender could desire. Manned +even by troops of inferior mettle it might well have proved +impregnable. The valley was wider than further west, and a thousand +yards intervened between the opposing ridges. From either crest the +cornfields sloped gently to the marshy sources of the creek, hidden by +tall timber and dense undergrowth. The right and rear of the position +were protected by a second stream, running south to the Chickahominy, +and winding through a swamp which Stuart, posted on Jackson’s left, +pronounced impassable for horsemen. Between the head waters of these +two streams rose the spur on which stands McGehee’s house, facing the +road from Old Cold Harbour, and completely commanding the country to +the north and north-east. The flank, therefore, was well secured; the +front was strong, with a wide field of fire; the Confederate artillery, +even if it could +make its way through the thick woods on the opposite crest, would have +to unlimber under fire at effective range, and the marsh below, with +its tangled undergrowth and abattis, could hardly fail to throw the +attacking infantry into disorder. Along the whole of Sykes’ line only +two weak points were apparent. On his left, as already described, a +broad tract of woodland, covering nearly the whole valley, and climbing +far up the slope on the Federal side, afforded a covered approach from +one crest to the other; on his right, a plantation of young pines +skirted the crest of McGehee’s Hill, and ran for some distance down the +slope. Under shelter of the timber it was possible that the Confederate +infantry might mass for the assault; but once in the open, unaided by +artillery, their further progress would be difficult. Under ordinary +circumstances a thorough reconnaissance, followed by a carefully +planned attack, would have been the natural course of the assailant. +The very strength of the position was in favour of the Confederates. +The creek which covered the whole front rendered a counterstroke +impracticable, and facilitated a flank attack. Holding the right bank +of the creek with a portion of his force, Jackson might have thrown the +remainder against McGehee’s Hill, and, working round the flank, have +repeated the tactics of Kernstown, Winchester, and Port Republic. + +But the situation permitted no delay. A. P. Hill was hard pressed. The +sun was already sinking. McClellan’s reserves might be coming up, and +if the battle was to be won, it must be won by direct attack. There was +no time for further reconnaissance, no time for manœuvre. + +Jackson’s dispositions were soon made. D. H. Hill, eastward of the Old +Cold Harbour road, was to advance against McGehee’s Hill, overlapping, +if possible, the enemy’s line. Ewell was to strike in on Hill’s right, +moving through the tract of woodland; Lawton, Whiting, and Winder, in +the order named, were to fill the gap between Ewell’s right and the +left of A. P. Hill’s division, and the artillery was ordered into +position opposite McGehee’s Hill. + +4 p.m. D. H. Hill, already in advance, was the first to move. Pressing +forward from the woods, under a heavy fire of +artillery, his five brigades, the greater part in first line, descended +to the creek, already occupied by his skirmishers. In passing through +the marshy thickets, where the Federal shells were bursting on every +hand, the confusion became great. The brigades crossed each other’s +march. Regiments lost their brigades, and companies their regiments. At +one point the line was so densely crowded that whole regiments were +forced to the rear; at others there were wide intervals, and effective +supervision became impossible. Along the edge of the timber the fire +was fierce, for the Union regulars were distant no more than four +hundred yards; the smoke rolled heavily through the thickets, and on +the right and centre, where the fight was hottest, the impetuosity of +both officers and men carried them forward up the slope. An attempt to +deliver a charge with the whole line failed in combination, and such +portion of the division as advanced, scourged by both musketry and +artillery, fell back before the fire of the unshaken Federals. + +In the wood to the right Ewell met with even fiercer opposition. So +hastily had the Confederate line been formed, and so difficult was it +for the brigades to maintain touch and direction in the thick covert, +that gaps soon opened along the front; and of these gaps, directly the +Southerners gained the edge of the timber, the Northern brigadiers took +quick advantage. Not content with merely holding their ground, the +regular regiments, changing front so as to strike the flanks of the +attack, came forward with the bayonet, and a vigorous counterstroke, +delivered by five battalions, drove Ewell across the swamp. Part of +Trimble’s brigade still held on in the wood, fighting fiercely; but the +Louisiana regiments were demoralised, and there were no supports on +which they might have rallied. + +Jackson, when he ordered Hill to the front, had sent verbal +instructions-always dangerous-for the remainder of his troops to move +forward inline of battle.”[33] +The young staff officer to whom these instructions were entrusted, +misunderstanding the intentions of his chief, communicated the message +to the brigadiers with the addition that “they were to await further +orders before engaging the enemy.” Partly for this reason, and partly +because the rear regiments of his division had lost touch with the +leading brigades, Ewell was left without assistance. For some time the +error was undiscovered. Jackson grew anxious. From his station near Old +Cold Harbour little could be seen of the Confederate troops. On the +ridge beyond the valley the dark lines of the enemy’s infantry were +visible amongst the trees, with their well-served batteries on the +crests above. But in the valley immediately beneath, and as well as in +the forest to the right front, the dense smoke and the denser timber +hid the progress of the fight. Yet the sustained fire was a sure token +that the enemy still held his own; and for the first time and the last +his staff beheld their leader riding restlessly to and fro, and heard +his orders given in a tone which betrayed the storm within.[34] +“Unconscious,” says Dabney, “that his veteran brigades were but now +reaching the ridge of battle, he supposed that all his strength had +been put forth, and (what had never happened before) the enemy was not +crushed.”[35] Fortunately, the error of the aide-de-camp had already +been corrected by the vigilance of the chief of the staff, and the +remainder of the Valley army was coming up. + +Their entry into battle was not in accordance with the +intentions of their chief. Whiting should have come in on Ewell’s +right, Lawton on the right of Whiting, and Jackson’s division on the +right of Lawton. Whiting led the way; but he had advanced only a short +distance through the woods when he was met by Lee, who directed him to +support General A. P. Hill.[36] The brigades of Law and of Hood were +therefore diverted to the right, and, deploying on either side of the +Gaines’ Mill road, were ordered to assault the commanding bluff which +marked the angle of the Federal position. Lawton’s Georgians, 3,500 +strong, moved to the support of Ewell; Cunningham and Fulkerson, of +Winder’s division, losing direction in the thickets, eventually +sustained the attack of Longstreet, and the Stonewall Brigade +reinforced the shattered ranks of D. H. Hill. Yet the attack was +strong, and in front of Old Cold Harbour six batteries had forced their +way through the forest. + +As this long line of guns covered McGehee’s Hill with a storm of +shells, and the louder crash of musketry told him that his lagging +brigades were coming into line, Jackson sent his last orders to his +divisional commanders: “Tell them,” he said, “this affair must hang in +suspense no longer; let them sweep the field with the bayonet.” But +there was no need for further urging. Before the messengers arrived the +Confederate infantry, in every quarter of the battlefield, swept +forward from the woods, and a vast wave of men converged upon the +plateau. Lee, almost at the same moment as Jackson, had given the word +for a general advance. As the supports came thronging up the shout was +carried down the line, “The Valley men are here!” and with the cry of +“Stonewall Jackson!” for their slogan, the Southern army dashed across +the deep ravine. Whiting, with the eight regiments of Hood and Law, +none of which had been yet engaged, charged impetuously against the +centre. The brigades of A. P. Hill, spent with fighting but clinging +stubbornly to their ground, found strength for a final effort. +Longstreet threw in his last reserve against the triple line which had +already decimated his division. Lawton’s Georgians bore back the +regulars. D. H. Hill, despite the +fire of the batteries on McGehee’s Hill, which, disregarding the shells +of Jackson’s massed artillery, turned with canister on the advancing +infantry, made good his footing on the ridge; and as the sun, low on +the horizon, loomed blood-red through the murky atmosphere, the +Confederate colours waved along the line of abandoned breastworks. + +As the Federals retreated, knots of brave men, hastily collected by +officers of all ranks, still offered a fierce resistance, and, +supported by the batteries, inflicted terrible losses on the crowded +masses which swarmed up from the ravine; but the majority of the +infantry, without ammunition and with few officers, streamed in +disorder to the rear. For a time the Federal gunners stood manfully to +their work. Porter’s reserve artillery, drawn up midway across the +upland, offered a rallying point to the retreating infantry. Three +small squadrons of the 5th United States Cavalry made a gallant but +useless charge, in which out of seven officers six fell; and on the +extreme right the division of regulars, supported by a brigade of +volunteers, fell back fighting to a second line. As at Bull Run, the +disciplined soldiers alone showed a solid front amid the throng of +fugitives. Not a foot of ground had they yielded till their left was +exposed by the rout of the remainder. Of the four batteries which +supported them only two guns were lost, and on their second position +they made a determined effort to restore the fight. But their stubborn +valour availed nothing against the superior numbers which Lee’s fine +strategy had concentrated on the field of battle. + +Where the first breach was made in the Federal line is a matter of +dispute. Longstreet’s men made a magnificent charge on the right, and +D. H. Hill claimed to have turned the flank of the regulars; but it is +abundantly evident that the advent of Jackson’s fresh troops, and the +vigour of their assault, broke down the resistance of the Federals.[37] +When the final attack developed, and along the whole front masses of +determined men, in overwhelming +numbers, dashed against the breastworks, Porter’s troops were well-nigh +exhausted, and not a single regiment remained in reserve. Against the +very centre of his line the attack was pushed home by Whiting’s men +with extraordinary resolution. His two brigades, marching abreast, were +formed in two lines, each about 2,000 strong. Riding along the front, +before they left the wood, the general had enjoined his men to charge +without a halt, in double time, and without firing. “Had these orders,” +says General Law, “not been strictly obeyed the assault would have been +a failure. No troops could have stood long under the withering storm of +lead and iron that beat in their faces as they became fully exposed to +view from the Federal line.”[38] The assault was met with a courage +that was equally admirable.[39] But the Confederate second line +reinforced the first at exactly the right moment, driving it +irresistibly forward; and the Federal regiments, which had been hard +pressed through a long summer afternoon, and had become scattered in +the thickets, were ill-matched with the solid and ordered ranks of +brigades which had not yet fired a shot. It was apparently at this +point that the Southerners first set foot on the plateau, and sweeping +over the intrenchments, outflanked the brigades which still held out to +right and left, and compelled them to fall back. Inspired by his +soldierly enthusiasm for a gallant deed, Jackson himself has left us a +vivid description of the successful charge. “On my extreme right,” he +says in his report, “General Whiting advanced his division through the +dense forest and swamp, emerging from the wood into the field near the +public road and at the head of the deep ravine which covered the +enemy’s left. Advancing thence through a number of retreating and +disordered regiments he came within range of the enemy’s fire, who, +concealed in an open wood and protected by breastworks, poured a +destructive fire for a quarter of a mile into his advancing +line, under which many brave officers and men fell. Dashing on with +unfaltering step in the face of these murderous discharges of canister +and musketry, General Hood and Colonel Law, at the heads of their +respective brigades, rushed to the charge with a yell. Moving down a +precipitous ravine, leaping ditch and stream, clambering up a difficult +ascent, and exposed to an incessant and deadly fire from the +intrenchments, those brave and determined men pressed forward, driving +the enemy from his well-selected and fortified position. In this +charge, in which upwards of 1,000 men fell killed and wounded before +the fire of the enemy, and in which 14 pieces of artillery and nearly a +whole regiment were captured, the 4th Texas, under the lead of General +Hood, was the first to pierce these strongholds and seize the +guns.”[40] + +How fiercely the Northern troops had battled is told in the outspoken +reports of the Confederate generals. Before Jackson’s reserves were +thrown in the first line of the Confederate attack had been exceedingly +roughly handled. A. P. Hill’s division had done good work in preparing +the way for Whiting’s assault, but a portion of his troops had become +demoralised. Ewell’s regiments met the same fate; and we read of them +“skulking from the front in a shameful manner; the woods on our left +and rear full of troops in safe cover, from which they never stirred;” +of “regiment after regiment rushing back in utter disorder;” of others +which it was impossible to rally; and of troops retiring in confusion, +who cried out to the reinforcements, “You need not go in; we are +whipped, we can’t do anything!” It is only fair to say that the +reinforcements replied, “Get out of our way, we will show you how to do +it;“[41] but it is not to be disguised that the Confederates at one +time came near defeat. With another division in reserve at the critical +moment, Porter might have maintained his line unbroken. His troops, had +they been supported, were still capable of resistance. + +McClellan, however, up to the time the battle was lost, had sent but +one division (Slocum’s) and two batteries to Porter’s support. 66,000 +Federals, on the south bank of the Chickahominy, had been held in their +intrenchments, throughout the day, by the demonstrations of 28,000 +Confederates. Intent on saving his trains, on securing his retreat to +the river James, and utterly regardless of the chances which fortune +offered, the “Young Napoleon” had allowed his rearguard to be +overwhelmed. He was not seen on the plateau which his devoted troops so +well defended, nor even at the advanced posts on the further bank of +the Chickahominy. So convinced was he of the accuracy of the +information furnished by his detective staff that he never dreamt of +testing the enemy’s numbers by his own eyesight. Had he watched the +development of Lee’s attack, noted the small number of his batteries, +the long delay in the advance of the supports, the narrow front of his +line of battle, he would have discovered that the Confederate strength +had been greatly exaggerated. There were moments, too, during the fight +when a strong counterstroke, made by fresh troops, would have placed +Lee’s army in the greatest peril. But a general who thinks only of +holding his lines and not of annihilating the enemy is a poor +tactician, and McClellan’s lack of enterprise, which Lee had so +accurately gauged, may be inferred from his telegram to Lincoln: “I +have lost this battle because my force is too small.”[42] + +Porter was perhaps a more than sufficient substitute for the +Commander-in-Chief. His tactics, as fighting a waiting battle, had been +admirable; and, when his front was broken, strongly and with cool +judgment he sought to hold back the enemy and cover the bridges. The +line of batteries he established across the plateau—80 guns in +all—proved at first an effective barrier. But the retreat of the +infantry, the waning light, and the general dissolution of all order, +had its effect upon the gunners. When the remnant of the 5th Cavalry +was borne back in flight, the greater part of the batteries had already +limbered up, and over the bare surface of the upland the Confederate +infantry, shooting down +the terrified teams, rushed forward in hot pursuit. 22 guns, with a +large number of ammunition waggons, were captured on the field, +prisoners surrendered at every step, and the fight surged onward +towards the bridges. But between the bridges and the battlefield, on +the slopes falling to the Chickahominy, the dark forest covered the +retreat of the routed army. Night had already fallen. The confusion in +the ranks of the Confederates was extreme, and it was impossible to +distinguish friend from foe. All direction had been lost. None knew the +bearings of the bridges, or whether the Federals were retreating east +or south. Regiments had already been exposed to the fire of their +comrades, and in front of the forest a perceptible hesitation seized on +both officers and men. At this moment, in front of D. H. Hill’s +division, which was advancing by the road leading directly to the +bridges, loud cheers were heard. It was clear that Federal +reinforcements had arrived; the general ordered his troops to halt, and +along the whole line the forward movement came quickly to a standstill. +Two brigades, French’s and Meagher’s, tardily sent over by McClellan, +had arrived in time to stave off a terrible disaster. Pushing through +the mass of fugitives with the bayonet, these fine troops had crossed +the bridge, passed through the woods, and formed line on the southern +crest of the plateau. Joining the regulars, who still presented a +stubborn front, they opened a heavy fire, and under cover of their +steadfast lines Porter’s troops withdrew across the river. + +Notwithstanding this strong reinforcement of 5,000 or 6,000 fresh +troops, it is by no means impossible, had the Confederates pushed +resolutely forward, that the victory would have been far more complete. +“Winder,” says General D. H. Hill, “thought that we ought to pursue +into the woods, on the right of the Grapevine Bridge road; but not +knowing the position of our friends, nor what Federal reserves might be +awaiting us in the woods, I thought it advisable not to move on. +General Lawton concurred with me. I had no artillery to shell the woods +in front, as mine had not got through the swamp. Winder,” +he adds, “was right; even a show of pressure must have been attended +with great result.”[43] Had Jackson been at hand the pressure would in +all probability have been applied. The contagion of defeat soon +spreads; and whatever reserves a flying enemy may possess, if they are +vigorously attacked whilst the fugitives are still passing through +their ranks, history tells us, however bold their front, that, unless +they are intrenched, their resistance is seldom long protracted. More +than all, when night has fallen on the field, and prevents all estimate +of the strength of the attack, a resolute advance has peculiar chances +of success. But when his advanced line halted Jackson was not yet up; +and before he arrived the impetus of victory had died away; the Federal +reserves were deployed in a strong position, and the opportunity had +already passed. + +It is no time, when the tide of victory bears him forward, for a +general “to take counsel of his fears.” It is no time to count numbers, +or to conjure up the phantoms of possible reserves; the sea itself is +not more irresistible than an army which has stormed a strong position, +and which has attained, in so doing, the exhilarating consciousness of +superior courage. Had Stuart, with his 2,000 horsemen, followed up the +pursuit towards the bridges, the Federal reserves might have been swept +away in panic. But Stuart, in common with Lee and Jackson, expected +that the enemy would endeavour to reach the White House, and when he +saw that their lines were breaking he had dashed down a lane which led +to the river road, about three miles distant. When he reached that +point, darkness had already fallen, and finding no traces of the enemy, +he had returned to Old Cold Harbour. + +On the night of the battle the Confederates remained where the issue of +the fight had found them. Across the Grapevine road the pickets of the +hostile forces were in close proximity, and men of both sides, in +search of water, or carrying messages, strayed within the enemy’s +lines. Jackson himself, it is said, came near capture. Riding forward +in the darkness, attended by only a few staff +officers, he suddenly found himself in presence of a Federal picket. +Judging rightly of the enemy’s _moral,_ he set spurs to his horse, and +charging into the midst, ordered them to lay down their arms; and +fifteen or twenty prisoners, marching to the rear, amused the troops +they met on the march by loudly proclaiming that they had the honour of +being captured by Stonewall Jackson. These men were not without +companions. 2,830 Federals were reported either captured or missing; +and while some of those were probably among the dead, a large +proportion found their way to Richmond; 4,000, moreover, had fallen on +the field of battle.[44] + +The Confederate casualties were even a clearer proof of the severity of +the fighting. So far as can be ascertained, 8,000 officers and men were +killed or wounded. + +Longstreet +A.P. Hill +Jackson 1,850 2,450 3,700 + +Jackson’s losses were distributed as follows:— + +Jackson’s own Division +Ewell +Whiting +D.H. Hill 600 650 1,020 1,430 + +The regimental losses, in several instances, were exceptionally severe. +Of the 4th Texas, of Hood’s brigade, the first to pierce the Federal +line, there fell 20 officers and 230 men. The 20th North Carolina, of +D.H. Hill’s division, which charged the batteries on McGehee’s Hill, +lost 70 killed and 200 wounded; of the same division the 3rd Alabama +lost 200, and the 12th North Carolina 212; while two of Lawton’s +regiments, the 31st and the 38th Georgia, had each a casualty list of +170. Almost every single regiment north of the Chickahominy took part +in the action. The cavalry did nothing, but at least 48,000 infantry +were engaged, and seventeen batteries are mentioned in the reports as +having participated in the battle. + +[Illustration: Map of the Battle of Gaines’ Mill] + + [1] “No one but McClellan would have hesitated to attack.” Johnston to + Lee, April 22, 1862. O.R., vol. xi, part3, p. 456. + + [2] _Narrative of Military Operations,_ General J. B. Johnston, pp. + 112, 113. + + [3] The garrison consisted only of a few companies of heavy artillery, + and the principal work was still unfinished when Yorktown fell. + Reports of Dr. Comstock, and Colonel Cabell, C.S.A. O.R., vol. xi, + part i. + + [4] In one sense McClellan was not far wrong in his estimate of the + Confederate numbers. In assuming control of the Union armies Lincoln + and Stanton made their enemies a present of at least 50,000 men. + + [5] It must be admitted that his cavalry was very weak in proportion + to the other arms. On June 20 he had just over 5,000 sabres (O.R., + vol. xi, part iii, p. 238), of which 3,000 were distributed among the + army corps. The Confederates appear to have had about 3,000, but of + superior quality, familiar, more or less, with the country, and united + under one command. It is instructive to notice how the necessity for a + numerous cavalry grew on the Federal commanders. In 1864 the Army of + the Potomac was accompanied by a cavalry corps over 13,000 strong, + with 32 guns. It is generally the case in war, even in a close + country, that if the cavalry is allowed to fall below the usual + proportion of one trooper to every six men of the other arms the army + suffers. + + [6] Stuart’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i. + + [7] This estimate is rather larger than that of the Confederate + historians (Allan, W. H. Taylor, &c., &c.), but it has been arrived at + after a careful examination of the strength at different dates and the + losses in the various engagements. + + [8] Return of June 20, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 238. + + [9] The Fifth Army Corps included McCall’s division, which had but + recently arrived by water from Fredericksburg. Report of June 20, + O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 238. + + [10] Magruder’s division, 13,000; Huger’s division, 9,000; reserve + artillery, 3,000; 5 regiments of cavalry, 2,000. Holmes’ division, + 6,500, was still retained on the south bank of the James. + + [11] Lee’s bridge, shown on the map, had either been destroyed or was + not yet built. + + [12] The meaning of this term is clearly defined in Lee’s report. “It + was therefore determined to construct defensive lines, so as to enable + a part of the army to defend the city, and leave the other part free + to operate on the north bank.” O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 490. + + [13] O.R., vol. xi, part iii, p. 252. + + [14] Letter from Captain T. W. Sydnor, 4th Virginia Cavalry, who + carried the message. + + [15] So General Porter. _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 331. + + [16] O.R., vol. xi, part i, pp. 38, 39. + + [17] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 389, 390. + + [18] Dr. White, in his excellent _Life of Lee,_ states that the + tardiness of the arrival of the provisions sent him from Richmond had + much to do with the delay of Jackson’s march. + + [19] “Lee’s Attacks North of the Chickahominy.” By General D. H. Hill. + _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 347. General Longstreet, however, + _From Manassas to Appomattox,_ says Jackson appointed the morning of + the 25th, but, on Longstreet’s suggestion, changed the date to the + 26th. + + [20] Of the events of June 26 Dr. Dabney, in a letter to the author, + writes as follows:—“Here we had a disastrous illustration of the lack + of an organised and intelligent general staff. Let my predicament + serve as a specimen. As chief of Jackson’s staff, I had two assistant + adjutant-generals, two men of the engineer department, and two clerks. + What did I have for orderlies and couriers? A detail from some cavalry + company which happened to bivouac near. The men were sent to me + without any reference to their local knowledge, their intelligence, or + their courage; most probably they were selected for me by their + captain on account of their lack of these qualities. Next to the + Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the General Staff should be the best + man in the country. The brains of an army should be in the General + Staff. The lowest orderlies attached to it should be the very best + soldiers in the service, for education, intelligence, and courage. + Jackson had to find his own guide for his march from Beaver Dam + Station. He had not been furnished with a map, and not a single + orderly or message reached him during the whole day.” + + [21] Branch’s Report, O.R., vol. ii, part ii, p. 882. + + [22] Jackson’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 553. + + [23] Whiting’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 562. + + [24] Trimble’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 614. + + [25] Letter to the author. + + [26] Porter’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 222. _Battles and + Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 330. + + [27] Longstreet, on page 124 of his _From Manassas to Appomattox,_ + declares that “Jackson marched by the fight without giving attention, + and went into camp at Hundley’s Corner, _half a mile in rear_ of the + enemy’s position. A reference to the map is sufficient to expose the + inaccuracy of this statement. + + [28] Jackson’s division—so-called in Lee’s order—really consisted of + three divisions:— + +Whiting’s Division Hood’s Brigade Law’s Brigade Jackson’s [Winder] +Division Stonewall Brigade Cunningham’s Brigade Fulkerson’s Brigade +Lawton’s Brigade Ewell’s Division B. T. Johnson’s Elzey’s Brigade +Trimble’s Brigade Taylor’s Brigade + + [29] The remainder of the guns were in reserve. + + [30] _Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,_ vol. ii, p. 337. + + [31] This order was verbal; no record of it is to be found, and + Jackson never mentioned, either at the time or afterwards, what its + purport was. His surviving staff officers, however, are unanimous in + declaring that he must have received direct instructions from General + Lee. “Is it possible,” writes Dr. McGuire, “that Jackson, who knew + nothing of the country, and little of the exact situation of affairs, + would have taken the responsibility of stopping at Old Cold Harbour + for an hour or more, unless he had had the authority of General Lee to + do so? I saw him that morning talking to General Lee. General Lee was + sitting on a log, and Jackson standing up. General Lee was evidently + giving him instructions for the day.” In his report (O.R., vol. ii, + part i, p. 492) Lee says: “The arrival of Jackson on our left was + momentarily expected; it was supposed that his approach would cause + the enemy’s extension in that direction.” + + [32] The Army of the Potomac numbered 105,000 men, and 25,000 animals. + 600 tons of ammunition, food, forage, medical and other supplies had + to be forwarded each day from White House to the front; and at one + time during the operations from fifty to sixty days’ rations for the + entire army, amounting probably to 25,000 tons, were accumulated at + the depot. 5 tons daily per 1,000 men is a fair estimate for an army + operating in a barren country. + + [33] The instructions, according to Dr. Dabney, ran as follows:— + “The troops are standing at ease along our line of march. Ride back + rapidly along the line and tell the commanders to advance instantly + _en échelon_ from the left. Each brigade is to follow as a guide + the right regiment of the brigade on the left, and to keep within + supporting distance. Tell the commanders that if this formation + fails at any point, to form line of battle and move to the front, + pressing to the sound of the heaviest firing and attack the enemy + vigorously wherever found. As to artillery, each commander must use + his discretion. If the ground will at all permit tell them to take + in their field batteries and use them. If not, post them in the + rear.” Letter to the author. + + [34] It may be noted that Jackson’s command had now been increased by + two divisions, Whiting’s and D. H. Hill’s, but there had been no + increase in the very small staff which had sufficed for the Valley + army. The mistakes which occurred at Gaines’ Mill, and Jackson’s + ignorance of the movements and progress of his troops, were in great + part due to his lack of staff officers. A most important message, + writes Dr. Dabney, involving tactical knowledge, was carried by a + non-combatant. + + [35] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 194. + + [36] Whiting’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 563. + + [37] Porter himself thought that the first break in his line was made + by Hood, at a point where he least expected it.” _Battles and + Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 335, 340. + + [38] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 363. + + [39] “The Confederates were within ten paces when the Federals broke + cover, and leaving their log breastworks, swarmed up the hill in rear, + carrying the second line with them in their rout.”—General Law, + _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 363. + + [40] Jackson’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part 1, pp. 555, 556. + + [41] Reports of Whiting, Trimble, Bodes, Bradley T. Johnson, O.R., + vol. xi, part i. + + [42] Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War. + + [43] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 357. + + [44] O.R., vol. xi, part i, pp. 40–42. + + + + +Chapter XIV +THE SEVEN DAYS. FRAYSER’S FARM AND MALVERN HILL + + +June 28, 1862 The battle of Gaines’ Mill, although the assailants +suffered heavier losses than they inflicted, was a long step towards +accomplishing the deliverance of Richmond. One of McClellan’s five army +corps had been disposed of, a heavy blow had been struck at the _moral_ +of his whole army, and his communications with the White House and the +Pamunkey were at the mercy of his enemies. Still the Confederate +outlook was not altogether clear. It is one thing to win a victory, but +another to make such use of it as to annihilate the enemy. Porter’s +defeat was but a beginning of operations; and although Lee was +convinced that McClellan would retreat, he was by no means so certain +that his escape could be prevented. Yet this was essential. If the +Federal army were suffered to fall back without incurring further loss, +it would be rapidly reinforced from Washington, and resuming the +advance, this time with still larger numbers, might render Gaines’ Mill +a barren victory. How to compass the destruction of McClellan’s host +was the problem that now confronted the Confederate leader; and before +a plan could be devised it was necessary to ascertain the direction of +the retreat. + +On the morning of June 28 it was found that no formed body of Federal +troops remained north of the Chickahominy. French, Meagher, and Sykes, +the regulars forming the rear-guard, had fallen back during the night +and destroyed the bridges. Hundreds of stragglers were picked up, and +one of the most gallant of the Northern +brigadiers[1] was found asleep in the woods, unaware that his troops +had crossed the stream. No further fighting was to be expected on the +plateau. But it was possible that the enemy might still endeavour to +preserve his communications, marching by the south bank of the river +and recrossing by the railway and Bottom’s Bridges. Stuart, supported +by Ewell, was at once ordered to seize the former; but when the cavalry +reached Dispatch Station, a small Federal detachment retreated to the +south bank of the Chickahominy and fired the timbers. + +Meanwhile, from the field of Gaines’ Mill, long columns of dust, rising +above the forests to the south, had been descried, showing that the +enemy was in motion; and when the news came in that the railway bridge +had been destroyed, and that the line itself was unprotected, it was at +once evident that McClellan had abandoned his communications with White +House. + +This was valuable information, but still the line of retreat had not +yet been ascertained. The Federals might retreat to some point on the +James River, due south, there meeting their transports, or they might +march down the Peninsula to Yorktown and Fortress Monroe. “In the +latter event,” says Lee, “it was necessary that our troops should +continue on the north bank of the river, and until the intention of +General McClellan was discovered it was deemed injudicious to change +their disposition. Ewell was therefore ordered to proceed to Bottom’s +Bridge, and the cavalry to watch the bridges below. No certain +indications of a retreat to the James River were discovered by our +forces (Magruder) on the south side of the Chickahominy, and late in +the afternoon the enemy’s works were reported to be fully manned. Below +(south of) the enemy’s works the country was densely wooded and +intersected by impassable swamps, at once concealing his movements and +precluding reconnaissances except by the regular roads, all of which +were strongly guarded. The bridges over the Chickahominy in rear of the +enemy were destroyed, and their reconstruction impracticable in the +presence of +his whole army and powerful batteries. We were therefore compelled to +wait until his purpose should be developed.”[2] + +During the day, therefore, the Confederate army remained on the +battle-field, waiting for the game to bolt. In the evening, however, +signs of a general movement were reported in rear of the intrenchments +at Seven Pines; and as nothing had been observed by the cavalry on the +Chickahominy, Lee, rightly concluding that McClellan was retreating to +the James, issued orders for the pursuit to be taken up the next +morning. + +But to intercept the enemy before he could fortify a position, covered +by the fire of his gunboats, on the banks of the James, was a difficult +operation. The situation demanded rapid marching, close concert, and +delicate manœuvres. The Confederate army was in rear of the Federals, +and separated from them by the Chickahominy, and, to reach the James, +McClellan had only fourteen miles to cover. But the country over which +he had to pass was still more intricate, and traversed by even fewer +roads, than the district which had hitherto been the theatre of +operations. Across his line of march ran the White Oak Swamp, bordered +by thick woods and a wide morass, and crossed by only one bridge. If he +could transfer his whole army south of this stream, without +molestation, he would find himself within six miles of his gunboats; +and as his left flank was already resting on the Swamp, it was not easy +for Lee’s army to prevent his passage. + +But 28,000 Confederates were already south of the Chickahominy, on the +flank of McClellan’s line of march, and it was certainly possible that +this force might detain the Federals until A. P. Hill, Longstreet, and +Jackson should come up. Magruder and Huger were therefore ordered to +advance early on the 29th, and moving, the one by the Williamsburg, the +other by the Charles City road, to strike the enemy in flank. + +A. P. Hill and Longstreet, recrossing the Chickahominy at New Bridge, +were to march by the Darbytown road in the +direction of Charles City cross roads, thus turning the head waters of +the White Oak Swamp, and threatening the Federal rear. + +Jackson, crossing Grapevine Bridge, was to move down the south bank of +the Chickahominy, cross the Swamp by the bridge, and force his way to +the Long Bridge road. + +The Confederate army was thus divided into four columns, moving by four +different roads; each column at starting was several miles distant from +the others, and a junction was to be made upon the field of battle. The +cavalry, moreover, with the exception of a few squadrons, was far away +upon the left, pursuing a large detachment which had been observed on +the road to the White House.[3] + +McClellan had undoubtedly resolved on a most hazardous manœuvre. His +supply and ammunition train consisted of over five thousand waggons. He +was encumbered with the heavy guns of the siege artillery. He had with +him more than fifty field batteries; his army was still 95,000 strong; +and this unwieldy multitude of men, horses, and vehicles, had to be +passed over White Oak Swamp, and then to continue its march across the +front of a powerful and determined enemy. + +But Lee also was embarrassed by the nature of the country.[4] If +McClellan’s movements were retarded by the woods, swamps, and +indifferent roads, the same obstacles would interfere with the +combination of the Confederate columns; and the pursuit depended for +success on their close co-operation. + +June 29 The first day’s work was hardly promising. The risks of +unconnected manœuvres received abundant illustration. Magruder, late in +the afternoon, struck the enemy’s rearguard near Savage’s Station, but +was heavily repulsed by two Federal army corps. Huger, called by +Magruder to his assistance, turned aside from the road which had been +assigned to him, and when he was recalled by an urgent message from +Lee, advanced with the timidity which almost invariably besets the +commander of an isolated force in the neighbourhood of a large army. +Jackson, whose line of march led him directly on Savage’s Station, was +delayed until after nightfall by the necessity of rebuilding the +Grapevine Bridge.[5] Stuart had gone off to the White House, bent on +the destruction of the enemy’s supply depot. Longstreet and Hill +encamped south-west of Charles City cross roads, but saw nothing of the +enemy. Holmes, with 6,500 men, crossed the James during the afternoon +and encamped on the north bank, near Laurel Hill Church. During the +night the Federal rearguard fell back, destroying the bridge over White +Oak Swamp; and although a large quantity of stores were either +destroyed or abandoned, together with a hospital containing 2,500 +wounded, the whole of McClellan’s army, men, guns, and trains, effected +the passage of this dangerous obstacle. + +June 30 The next morning Longstreet, with Hill in support, moved +forward, and found a Federal division in position near Glendale. +Bringing his artillery into action, he held his infantry in hand until +Huger should come up on his left, and Jackson’s guns be heard at White +Oak Bridge. Holmes, followed by Magruder, was marching up the Newmarket +road to Malvern House; and when the sound of Jackson’s artillery became +audible to the northwards, Lee sent Longstreet forward to the attack. A +sanguinary conflict, on ground covered with heavy timber, and cut up by +deep ravines, resulted in the Federals holding +their ground till nightfall; and although many prisoners and several +batteries were captured by the Confederates, McClellan, under cover of +the darkness, made good his escape. + +[Illustration: Map of troop positions for the Seven Days - June 26th to +July 2nd, 1862.] + +The battle of Glendale or Frayser’s Farm was the crisis of the “Seven +Days.” Had Lee been able to concentrate his whole strength against the +Federals it is probable that McClellan would never have reached the +James. But Longstreet and Hill fought unsupported. As the former very +justly complained, 50,000 men were within hearing of the guns but none +came to co-operate, and against the two Confederate divisions fought +the Third Federal Army Corps, reinforced by three divisions from the +Second, Fifth, and Sixth. Huger’s march on the Charles City road was +obstructed by felled trees. When he at last arrived in front of the +enemy, he was held in check by two batteries, and he does not appear to +have opened communication with either Lee or Longstreet. Magruder had +been ordered to march down from Savage Station to the Darbytown road, +and there to await orders. At 4.30 p.m. he was ordered to move to +Newmarket in support of Holmes. This order was soon countermanded, but +he was unable to join Longstreet until the fight was over. Holmes was +held in check by Porter’s Army Corps, minus McCall’s division, on +Malvern Hill; and the cavalry, which might have been employed +effectively against the enemy’s left flank and rear, was still north of +the Chickahominy, returning from a destructive but useless raid on the +depôt at the White House. Nor had the conduct of the battle been +unaffected by the complicated nature of the general plan. Longstreet +attacked alone, Hill being held back, in order to be fresh for the +pursuit when Jackson and Huger should strike in. The attack was +successful, and McCall’s division, which had shared the defeat at +Gaines’ Mill, was driven from its position. But McCall was reinforced +by other divisions; Longstreet was thrown on to the defensive by +superior numbers, and when Hill was at length put in, it was with +difficulty that the fierce counterblows of the Federals were beaten +off. + +Jackson had been unable to participate in the conflict. When night fell +he was still north of the White Oak Swamp, seven miles distant from his +morning bivouac, and hardly a single infantry man in his command had +pulled a trigger. According to his own report his troops reached White +Oak Bridge about noon. “Here the enemy made a determined effort to +retard our advance and thereby to prevent an immediate junction between +General Longstreet and myself. We found the bridge destroyed, the +ordinary place of crossing commanded by their batteries on the other +side, and all approach to it barred by detachments of sharp-shooters +concealed in a dense wood close by. . . . A heavy cannonading in front +announced the engagement of General Longstreet at Frayser’s Farm +(Glendale) and made me eager to press forward; but the marshy character +of the soil, the destruction of the bridge over the marsh and creek, +and the strong position of the enemy for defending the passage, +prevented my advancing until the following morning.”[6] + +Such are Jackson’s reasons for his failure to co-operate with +Longstreet. It is clear that he was perfectly aware of the importance +of the part he was expected to play; and he used every means which +suggested itself as practicable to force a crossing. The 2nd Virginia +Cavalry, under Colonel Munford, had now joined him from the Valley, and +their commanding officer bears witness that Jackson showed no lack of +energy. + +“When I left the general on the preceding evening, he ordered me to be +at the cross-roads (five miles from White Oak Bridge) at sunrise the +next morning, ready to move in advance of his troops. The worst +thunderstorm came up about night I ever was in, and in that thickly +wooded country one could not see his horse’s ears. My command scattered +in the storm, and I do not suppose that any officer had a rougher time +in any one night than I had to endure. When the first grey dawn +appeared I started off my adjutant and officers to bring up the +scattered regiment; but at sunrise I had not more than fifty men, +and I was half a mile from the cross-roads. When I arrived, to my +horror there sat Jackson waiting for me. He was in a bad humour, and +said, ‘Colonel, my orders to you were to be here at sunrise.’ I +explained my situation, telling him that we had no provisions, and that +the storm and the dark night had conspired against me. When I got +through he replied, ‘Yes, sir. But, Colonel, I ordered you to be here +at sunrise. Move on with your regiment. If you meet the enemy drive in +his pickets, and if you want artillery, Colonel Crutchfield will +furnish you.’ + +“I started on with my little handful of men. As others came straggling +on to join me, Jackson noticed it, and sent two couriers to inform me +that ‘my men were straggling badly.’ I rode back and went over the same +story, hoping that he would be impressed with my difficulties. He +listened to me, but replied as before, ‘Yes, sir. But I ordered you to +be here at sunrise, and I have been waiting for you for a quarter of an +hour.’ + +“Seeing that he was in a peculiar mood, I determined to make the best +of my trouble, sent my adjutant back, and made him halt the stragglers +and form my men as they came up; and with what I had, determined to +give him no cause for complaint. When we came upon the enemy’s picket +we charged, and pushed the picket every step of the way into their +camp, where there were a large number of wounded and many stores. It +was done so rapidly that the enemy’s battery on the other side of White +Oak Swamp could not fire on us without endangering their own friends. + +“When Jackson came up he was smiling, and he at once (shortly after +noon) ordered Colonel Crutchfield to bring up the artillery, and very +soon the batteries were at work. After the lapse of about an hour my +regiment had assembled, and while our batteries were shelling those of +the enemy, Jackson sent for me and said, ‘Colonel, move your regiment +over the creek, and secure those guns. I will ride with you to the +Swamp.’ When we reached the crossing we found that the enemy had torn +up the bridge, and had thrown the timbers into the stream, forming a +tangled mass which seemed to prohibit a crossing. I said to General +Jackson that I did not think that we could cross. He looked at me, +waved his hand, and replied, ‘Yes, Colonel, try it.’ In we went and +floundered over, and before I formed the men, Jackson cried out to me +to move on at the guns. Colonel Breckenridge started out with what we +had over, and I soon got over the second squadron, and moved up the +hill. We reached the guns, but they had an infantry support which gave +us a volley; at the same time a battery on our right, which we had not +seen, opened on us, and back we had to come. I moved down the Swamp +about a quarter of a mile, and re-crossed with great difficulty by a +cow-path.”[7] + +The artillery did little better than the cavalry. The ground on the +north bank of the Swamp by no means favoured the action of the guns. To +the right of the road the slopes were clear and unobstructed, hut the +crest was within the forest; while to the left a thick pine wood +covered both ridge and valley. On the bank held by the Federals the +ground was open, ascending gently to the ridge; but the edge of the +stream, immediately opposite the cleared ground on the Confederate +right, was covered by a belt of tall trees, in full leaf, which made +observation, by either side, a matter of much difficulty. This belt was +full of infantry, while to the right rear, commanding the ruined +bridge, stood the batteries which had driven back the cavalry. + +After some time spent in reconnaissance, it was determined to cut a +track through the wood to the right of the road. This was done, and +thirty-one guns, moving forward simultaneously ready-shotted, opened +fire on the position. The surprise was complete. One of the Federal +batteries dispersed in confusion; the other disappeared, and the +infantry supports fell back. Jackson immediately ordered two guns to +advance down the road, and shell the belt of trees which harboured the +enemy’s skirmishers. These were driven back; the divisions of D. H. +Hill and Whiting were formed up in the pine wood on the left, and a +working party was sent forward to repair the bridge. Suddenly, from the +high ground behind the belt of trees, by which they were completely +screened, two fresh Federal batteries—afterwards increased to +three—opened on the line of Confederate guns. Under cover of this fire +their skirmishers returned to the Swamp, and their main line came +forward to a position whence it commanded the crossing at effective +range. The two guns on the road were sent to the right-about. The +shells of the Federal batteries fell into the stream, and the men who +had been labouring at the bridge ran back and refused to work. The +artillery duel, in which neither side could see the other, but in which +both suffered some loss, continued throughout the afternoon. + +Meantime a Confederate regiment, fording the stream, drove in the +hostile skirmishers, and seized the belt of trees; Wright’s brigade, of +Huger’s division, which had joined Jackson as the guns came into +action, was sent back to force a passage at Brackett’s Ford, a mile up +stream; and reconnaissances were pushed out to find some way of turning +the enemy’s position. Every road and track, however, was obstructed by +felled trees and abattis, and it was found that a passage was +impracticable at Brackett’s Ford. Two companies were pushed over the +creek, and drove back the enemy’s pickets. “I discovered,” says Wright, +“that the enemy had destroyed the bridge, and had completely blockaded +the road through the Swamp by felling trees in and across it. . . . I +ascertained that the road debouched from the Swamp into an open field +(meadow), commanded by a line of high hills, all in cultivation and +free from timber. Upon this ridge of hills the enemy had posted heavy +batteries of field-artillery, strongly supported by infantry, which +swept the meadow by a direct and cross fire, and which could be used +with terrible effect upon my column while struggling through the fallen +timber in the wood through the Swamp.”[8] +Having ascertained that the enemy was present in great strength on the +further bank, that every road was obstructed, and that there was no +means of carrying his artillery over the creek, or favourable ground on +which his infantry could act, Jackson gave up all hope of aiding +Longstreet. + +That the obstacles which confronted him were serious there can be no +question. His smooth-bore guns, although superior in number, were +unable to beat down the fire of the rifled batteries. The enemy’s +masses were well hidden. The roads were blocked, the stream was +swollen, the banks marshy, and although infantry could cross them, the +fords which had proved difficult for the cavalry would have stopped the +artillery, the ammunition waggons, and the ambulances; while the +Federal position, on the crest of a long open slope, was exceedingly +strong. Jackson, as his report shows, maturely weighed these +difficulties, and came to the conclusion that he could do no good by +sending over his infantry alone. It was essential, it is true, to +detain as many as possible of the enemy on the banks of the Swamp, +while Longstreet, Hill, Huger, and Magruder dealt with the remainder; +and this he fully realised, but it is by no means improbable that he +considered the heavy fire of his guns and the threatening position of +his infantry would have this effect. + +It is interesting to note how far this hope, supposing that he +entertained it, was fulfilled. Two divisions of Federal infantry and +three batteries—a total of 22,000 men—defended the passage at White Oak +Bridge against 27,000 Confederates, including Wright; and a detached +force of infantry and guns was posted at Brackett’s Ford.[9] On the +Confederate artillery opening fire, two +brigades were sent up from near Glendale, but when it was found that +this fire was not followed up by an infantry attack, these brigades, +with two others in addition, were sent over to reinforce the troops +which were engaged with Longstreet. When these facts became known; when +it was clear that had Jackson attacked vigorously, the Federals would +hardly have dared to weaken their line along White Oak Swamp, and that, +in these circumstances, Longstreet and A. P. Hill would probably have +seized the Quaker road, his failure to cross the creek exposed him to +criticism. Not only did his brother-generals complain of his inaction, +but Franklin, the Federal commander immediately opposed to him, writing +long afterwards, made the following comments:— + +“Jackson seems to have been ignorant of what General Lee expected of +him, and badly informed about Brackett’s Ford. When he found how +strenuous was our defence at the bridge, he should have turned his +attention to Brackett’s Ford also. A force could have been as quietly +gathered there as at the bridge; a strong infantry movement at the ford +would have easily overrun our small force there, placing our right at +Glendale, held by Slocum’s division, in great jeopardy, and turning our +force at the bridge by getting between it and Glendale. In fact, it is +likely that we should have been defeated that day had General Jackson +done what his great reputation seems to make it imperative he should +have done.”[10] But General Franklin’s opinion as to the ease with +which Brackett’s Ford might have been passed is not justified by the +facts. In the first place, General Slocum, who was facing Huger, and +had little to do throughout the day, had two brigades within easy +distance of the crossing; in the second place, General Wright reported +the ford impassable; and in the third place, General Franklin himself +admits that directly Wright’s scouts were seen near the ford two +brigades of Sedgwick’s division were sent to oppose their passage. + +General Long, in his life of Lee, finds excuse for Jackson in a story +that he was utterly exhausted, and that +his staff let him sleep until the sun was high. Apart from the +unlikelihood that a man who seems to have done without sleep whenever +the enemy was in front should have permitted himself to be overpowered +at such a crisis, we have Colonel Munford’s evidence that the general +was well in advance of his columns at sunrise, and the regimental +reports show that the troops were roused at 2.30 a.m. + +Jackson may well have been exhausted. He had certainly not spared +himself during the operations. On the night of the 27th, after the +battle of Gaines’ Mill, he went over to Stuart’s camp at midnight, and +a long conference took place. At 8.30 on the morning of the 29th he +visited Magruder, riding across Grapevine Bridge from McGehee’s House, +and his start must have been an early one. In a letter to his wife, +dated near the White Oak Bridge, he says that in consequence of the +heavy rain he rose “about midnight” on the 30th. Yet his medical +director, although he noticed that the general fell asleep while he was +eating his supper the same evening, says that he never saw him more +active and energetic than during the engagement;[11] and Jackson +himself, neither in his report nor elsewhere, ever admitted that he was +in any way to blame. + +It is difficult to conceive that his scrupulous regard for truth, +displayed in every action of his life, should have yielded in this one +instance to his pride. He was perfectly aware of the necessity of +aiding Longstreet; and if, owing to the obstacles enumerated in his +report, he thought the task impossible, his opinion, as that of a man +who as difficulties accumulated became the more determined to overcome +them, must be regarded with respect. The critics, it is possible, have +forgotten for the moment that the condition of the troops is a factor +of supreme importance in military operations. General D. H. Hill has +told us that “Jackson’s own corps was worn out by long and exhausting +marches, and reduced in numbers by numerous sanguinary battles;”[12] +and he records his conviction that pity for his +troops had much to do with the general’s inaction. Hill would have +probably come nearer the truth if he had said that the tired regiments +were hardly to be trusted in a desperate assault, unsupported by +artillery, on a position which was even stronger than that which they +had stormed with such loss at Gaines’ Mill. + +Had Jackson thrown two columns across the fords—which the cavalry, +according to Munford, had not found easy,—and attempted to deploy on +the further bank, it was exceedingly probable that they would have been +driven back with tremendous slaughter. The refusal of the troops to +work at the bridge under fire was in itself a sign that they had little +stomach for hard fighting. + +It may be argued that it was Jackson’s duty to sacrifice his command in +order to draw off troops from Glendale. But on such unfavourable ground +the sacrifice would have been worse than useless. The attack +repulsed—and it could hardly have gone otherwise—Franklin, leaving a +small rear-guard to watch the fords, would have been free to turn +nearly his whole strength against Longstreet. It is quite true, as a +tactical principle, that demonstrations, such as Jackson made with his +artillery, are seldom to be relied upon to hold an enemy in position. +When the first alarm has passed off, and the defending general becomes +aware that nothing more than a feint is intended, he will act as did +the Federals, and employ his reserves elsewhere. A vigorous attack is, +almost invariably, the only means of keeping him to his ground. But an +attack which is certain to be repulsed, and to be repulsed in quick +time, is even less effective than a demonstration. It may be the +precursor of a decisive defeat. + +But it is not so much for his failure to force the passage at White Oak +Swamp that Jackson has been criticised, as for his failure to march to +Frayser’s Farm on finding that the Federal position was impregnable. +“When, on the forenoon of the 30th,” writes Longstreet, “Jackson found +his way blocked by Franklin, he had time to march to the head of it +(White Oak Swamp), and across to the Charles City road, in season for +the engagement at +Frayser’s Farm [Glendale], the distance being about four miles.”[13] + +Without doubt this would have been a judicious course to pursue, but it +was not for Jackson to initiate such a movement. He had been ordered by +General Lee to move along the road to White Oak Swamp, to endeavour to +force his way to the Long Bridge road, to guard Lee’s left flank from +any attack across the fords or bridges of the lower Chickahominy, and +to keep on that road until he received further orders. These further +orders he never received; and it was certainly not his place to march +to the Charles City road until Lee, who was with Longstreet, sent him +instructions to do so. “General Jackson,” says Dr. McGuire, “demanded +of his subordinates implicit, blind obedience. He gave orders in his +own peculiar, terse, rapid way, and he did not permit them to be +questioned. He obeyed his own superiors in the same fashion. At White +Oak Swamp he was looking for some message from General Lee, but he +received none, and therefore, as a soldier, he had no right to leave +the road which had been assigned to him. About July 18, 1862, the night +before we started to Gordonsville, Crutchfield, Pendleton (assistant +adjutant-general), and myself were discussing the campaign just +finished. We were talking about the affair at Frayser’s Farm, and +wondering if it would have been better for Jackson with part of his +force to have moved to Longstreet’s aid. The general came in while the +discussion was going on, and curtly said: ‘If General Lee had wanted me +he could have sent for me.’ It looked the day after the battle, and it +looks to me now, that if General Lee had sent a staff officer, who +could have ridden the distance in forty minutes, to order Jackson with +three divisions to the cross roads, while D. H. Hill and the artillery +watched Franklin, we should certainly have crushed McClellan’s army. If +Lee had wanted Jackson to give direct support to Longstreet, he could +have had him there in under three hours. The staff officer was not +sent, and the evidence is that General Lee believed Longstreet strong +enough to defeat the Federals without +direct aid from Jackson.”[14] Such reasoning appears incontrovertible. +Jackson, be it remembered, had been directed to guard the left flank of +the army “until further orders.” Had these words been omitted, and he +had been left free to follow his own judgment, it is possible that he +would have joined Huger on the Charles City road with three divisions. +But in all probability he felt himself tied down by the phrase which +Moltke so strongly reprobates. Despite Dr. McGuire’s statement Jackson +knew well that disobedience to orders may sometimes be condoned. It may +be questioned whether he invariably demanded “blind” obedience. +“General,” said an officer, “you blame me for disobedience of orders, +but in Mexico you did the same yourself.” “But I was successful,” was +Jackson’s reply; as much as to say that an officer, when he takes upon +himself the responsibility of ignoring the explicit instructions of his +superior, must be morally certain that he is doing what that superior, +were he present, would approve. Apply this rule to the situation at +White Oak Swamp. For anything Jackson knew it was possible that +Longstreet and Hill might defeat the Federals opposed to them without +his aid. In such case, Lee, believing Jackson to be still on the left +flank, would have ordered him to prevent the enemy’s escape by the Long +Bridge. What would Lee have said had his “further orders” found Jackson +marching to the Charles City road, with the Long Bridge some miles in +rear? The truth is that the principle of marching to the sound of the +cannon, though always to be borne in mind, cannot be invariably +followed. The only fair criticism on Jackson’s conduct is that he +should have informed Lee of his inability to force the passage across +the Swamp, and have held three divisions in readiness to march to +Glendale. This, so far as can be ascertained, was left undone, but the +evidence is merely negative. + +Except for this apparent omission, it cannot be fairly said that +Jackson was in the slightest degree responsible for the failure of the +Confederate operations. If the truth be told, Lee’s design was by no +means +perfect. It had two serious defects. In the first place, it depended +for success on the co-operation of several converging columns, moving +over an intricate country, of which the Confederates had neither +accurate maps nor reliable information. The march of the columns was +through thick woods, which not only impeded intercommunication, but +provided the enemy with ample material for obstructing the roads, and +Jackson’s line of march was barred by a formidable obstacle in White +Oak Swamp, an admirable position for a rear-guard. In the second place, +concentration at the decisive point was not provided for. The staff +proved incapable of keeping the divisions in hand. Magruder was +permitted to wander to and fro after the fashion of D’Erlon between +Quatre Bras and Ligny. Holmes was as useless as Grouchy at Waterloo. +Huger did nothing, although some of his brigades, when the roads to the +front were found to be obstructed, might easily have been drawn off to +reinforce Longstreet. The cavalry had gone off on a raid to the White +House, instead of crossing the Chickahominy and harassing the enemy’s +eastward flank; and at the decisive point only two divisions were +assembled, 20,000 men all told, and these two divisions attacked in +succession instead of simultaneously. Had Magruder and Holmes, neither +of whom would have been called upon to march more than thirteen miles, +moved on Frayser’s Farm, and had part of Huger’s division been brought +over to the same point, the Federals would in all probability have been +irretrievably defeated. It is easy to be wise after the event. The +circumstances were extraordinary. An army of 75,000 men was pursuing an +army of 95,000, of which 65,000, when the pursuit began, were perfectly +fresh troops. The problem was, indeed, one of exceeding difficulty; +but, in justice to the reputation of his lieutenants, it is only fair +to say that Lee’s solution was not a masterpiece. + +During the night which followed the battle of Frayser’s Farm the whole +Federal army fell back on Malvern Hill—a strong position, commanding +the country for many miles, and very difficult of access, on which the +reserve artillery, +supported by the Fourth and Fifth Corps, was already posted. + +July 1 The Confederates, marching at daybreak, passed over roads which +were strewn with arms, blankets, and equipments. Stragglers from the +retreating army were picked up at every step. Scores of wounded men lay +untended by the roadside. Waggons and ambulances had been abandoned; +and with such evidence before their eyes it was difficult to resist the +conviction that the enemy was utterly demoralised. That McClellan had +seized Malvern Hill, and that it was strongly occupied by heavy guns, +Lee was well aware. But, still holding to his purpose of annihilating +his enemy before McDowell could intervene from Fredericksburg, he +pushed forward, determined to attack; and with his whole force now well +in hand the result seemed assured. Three or four miles south of White +Oak Swamp Jackson’s column, which was leading the Confederate advance, +came under the fire of the Federal batteries. The advanced guard +deployed in the woods on either side of the road, and Lee, accompanied +by Jackson, rode forward to reconnoitre. + +Malvern Hill, a plateau rising to the height of 150 feet above the +surrounding forests, possessed nearly every requirement of a strong +defensive position. The open ground on the top, undulating and +unobstructed, was a mile and a half in length by half a mile in +breadth. To the north, north-west, and north-east it fell gradually, +the slopes covered with wheat, standing or in shock, to the edge of the +woods, which are from eight to sixteen hundred yards distant from the +commanding crest. The base of the hill, except to the east and +south-east, was covered with dense forest; and within the forest, at +the foot of the declivity, ran a tortuous and marshy stream. The right +flank was partially protected by a long mill-dam. The left, more open, +afforded an excellent artillery position overlooking a broad stretch of +meadows, drained by a narrow stream and deep ditches, and flanked by +the fire of several gunboats. Only three approaches, the Quaker and the +river roads, and a track from the north-west, gave access to the +heights. + +The reconnaissance showed that General Porter, commanding the defence, +had utilised the ground to the best advantage. A powerful artillery, +posted just in rear of the crest, swept the entire length of the +slopes, and under cover in rear were dense masses of infantry, with a +strong line of skirmishers pushed down the hill in front. + +Nevertheless, despite the formidable nature of the Federal +preparations, orders were immediately issued for attack. General Lee, +who was indisposed, had instructed Longstreet to reconnoitre the +enemy’s left, and to report whether attack was feasible. Jackson was +opposed to a frontal attack, preferring to turn the enemy’s right. +Longstreet, however, was of a different opinion. “The spacious open,” +he says, “along Jackson’s front appeared to offer a field for play of a +hundred or more guns. . . . I thought it probable that Porter’s +batteries, under the cross-fire of the Confederates’ guns posted on his +left and front, could be thrown into disorder, and thus make way for +the combined assaults of the infantry. I so reported, and General Lee +ordered disposition accordingly, sending the pioneer corps to cut a +road for the right batteries.”[15] + +4 p.m. It was not till four o’clock that the line of battle was formed. +Jackson was on the left, with Whiting to the left of the Quaker road, +and D. H. Hill to the right; Ewell’s and Jackson’s own divisions were +in reserve. Nearly half a mile beyond Jackson’s right came two of +Huger’s brigades, Armistead and Wright, and to Huger’s left rear was +Magruder. Holmes, still on the river road, was to assail the enemy’s +left. Longstreet and A. P. Hill were in reserve behind Magruder, on the +Long Bridge road. + +The deployment of the leading divisions was not effected without loss, +for the Federal artillery swept all the roads and poured a heavy fire +into the woods; but at length D. H. Hill’s infantry came into line +along the edge of the timber. + +The intervening time had been employed in bringing the artillery to the +front; and now were seen the tremendous difficulties which confronted +the attack. The swamps +and thickets through which the batteries had to force their way were +grievous impediments to rapid or orderly movement, and when they at +last emerged from the cover, and unlimbered for action, the +concentrated fire of the Federal guns overpowered them from the outset. +In front of Huger four batteries were disabled in quick succession, the +enemy concentrating fifty or sixty guns on each of them in turn; four +or five others which Jackson had ordered to take post on the left of +his line, although, with two exceptions, they managed to hold their +ground, were powerless to subdue the hostile fire. “The obstacles,” +says Lee in his report, “presented by the woods and swamp made it +impracticable to bring up a sufficient amount of artillery to oppose +successfully the extraordinary force of that arm employed by the enemy, +while the field itself afforded us few positions favourable for its use +and none for its proper concentration.” + +According to Longstreet, when the inability of the batteries to prepare +the way for the infantry was demonstrated by their defeat, Lee +abandoned the original plan of attack. “He proposed to me to move +“round to the left with my own and A. P. Hill’s division, and turn the +Federal right.” I issued my orders accordingly for the two divisions to +go around and turn the Federal right, when in some way unknown to me +the battle was drawn on.”[16] + +Unfortunately, through some mistake on the part of Lee’s staff, the +order of attack which had been already issued was not rescinded. It was +certainly an extraordinary production. “Batteries,” it ran, “have been +established to rake the enemy’s line. If it is broken, as is probable, +Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to +charge with a yell. Do the same.”[17] This was to D. H. Hill and to +Magruder, who had under his command Huger’s and McLaws’ divisions as +well as his own. + +5.30 p.m. So, between five and six o’clock, General D. H. Hill, +believing that he heard the appointed signal, broke forward from the +timber, and five brigades, in one irregular line, charged full against +the enemy’s front. The +Federals, disposed in several lines, were in overwhelming strength. +Their batteries were free to concentrate on the advancing infantry. +Their riflemen, posted in the interval between the artillery masses, +swept the long slopes with a grazing fire, while fence, bank, and +ravine, gave shelter from the Confederate bullets. Nor were the +enormous difficulties which confronted the attack in any way mitigated +by careful arrangement on the part of the Confederate staff. The only +hope of success, if success were possible, lay in one strong +concentrated effort; in employing the whole army; in supporting the +infantry with artillery, regardless of loss, at close range; and in +hurling a mass of men, in several successive lines, against one point +of the enemy’s position. It is possible that the Federal army, already +demoralised by retreat, might have yielded to such vigorous pressure. +But in the Confederate attack there was not the slightest attempt at +concentration. The order which dictated it gave an opening to +misunderstanding; and, as is almost invariably the case when orders are +defective, misunderstanding occurred. The movement was premature. +Magruder had only two brigades of his three divisions, Armistead’s and +Wright’s, in position. Armistead, who was well in advance of the +Confederate right, was attacked by a strong body of skirmishers. D. H. +Hill took the noise of this conflict for the appointed signal, and +moved forward. The divisions which should have supported him had not +yet crossed the swamp in rear; and thus 10,500 men, absolutely unaided, +advanced against the whole Federal army. The blunder met with terrible +retribution. On that midsummer evening death reaped a fearful harvest. +The gallant Confederate infantry, nerved by their success at Gaines’ +Mill, swept up the field with splendid determination. “It was the onset +of battle,” said a Federal officer present, “with the good order of a +review.” But the iron hail of grape and canister, laying the ripe wheat +low as if it had been cut with a sickle, and tossing the shocks in air, +rent the advancing lines from end to end. Hundreds fell, hundreds +swarmed back to the woods, but still the brigades pressed on, and +through the smoke of battle +the waving colours led the charge. But the Federal infantry had yet to +be encountered. Lying behind their shelter they had not yet fired a +shot; but as the Confederates reached close range, regiment after +regiment, springing to their feet, poured a devastating fire into the +charging ranks. The rush was checked. Here and there small bodies of +desperate men, following the colours, still pressed onward, but the +majority lay down, and the whole front of battle rang with the roar of +musketry. But so thin was the Confederate line that it was impossible +to overcome the sustained fire of the enemy. The brigade reserves had +already been thrown in; there was no further support at hand; the +Federal gunners, staunch and resolute, held fast to their position, and +on every part of the line Porter’s reserves were coming up. As one +regiment emptied its cartridge-boxes it was relieved by another. The +volume of fire never for a moment slackened; and fresh batteries, +amongst which were the 32-pounders of the siege train, unlimbering on +the flanks, gave further strength to a front which was already +impregnable. + +[Illustration: Map of the Battle of Malvern Hill.] + +Jackson, meanwhile, on receiving a request for reinforcements, had sent +forward three brigades of his own division and a brigade of Hill’s. But +a mistake had been committed in the disposition of these troops. The +order for attack had undoubtedly named only D. H. Hill’s division. But +there was no good reason that it should have been so literally +construed as to leave the division unsupported. Whiting was guarding +the left flank, and was not available; but Ewell and Winder were doing +nothing, and there can be no question but that they should have +advanced to the edge of the woods directly D. H. Hill moved forward, +and have followed his brigades across the open, ready to lend aid +directly his line was checked. As it was, they had been halted within +the woods and beyond the swamp, and the greater part, in order to avoid +the random shells, had moved even further to the rear. It thus happened +that before the reinforcements arrived Hill’s division had been beaten +back, and under the tremendous fire of the Federal artillery it was +with difficulty that the border of the forest was maintained. + +While Hill was retiring, Huger, and then Magruder, came into action on +the right. It had been reported to Lee that the enemy was beginning to +fall back. This report originated, there can be little doubt, in the +withdrawal of the Federal regiments and batteries which had exhausted +their ammunition and were relieved by others; but, in any case, it was +imperative that D. H. Hill should be supported, and the other divisions +were ordered forward with all speed. Huger’s and Magruder’s men +attacked with the same determination as had been displayed by Hill’s, +but no better success attended their endeavours. The brigades were not +properly formed when the order arrived, but scattered over a wide +front, and they went in piecemeal. Magruder’s losses were even greater +than Hill’s; and with his defeat the battle ceased. + +Had the Federals followed up the repulse with a strong counter-attack +the victory of Malvern Hill might have been more decisive than that of +Gaines’ Mill. It is true that neither Longstreet nor A. P. Hill had +been engaged, and that three of Jackson’s divisions, his own, Whiting’s +and Ewell’s, had suffered little. But Magruder and D. H. Hill, whose +commands included at least 30,000 muskets, one half of Lee’s infantry, +had been completely crushed, and Holmes on the river road was too far +off to lend assistance. The fatal influence of a continued retreat had +paralysed, however, the initiative of the Federal generals. Intent only +on getting away unscathed, they neglected, like McClellan at Gaines’ +Mill, to look for opportunities, forgetting that when an enemy is +pursuing in hot haste he is very apt to expose himself. Jackson had +acted otherwise at Port Republic. + +The loss of over 5,000 men was not the worst which had befallen the +Confederates. “The next morning by dawn,” says one of Ewell’s +brigadiers, “I went off to ask for orders, when I found the whole army +in the utmost disorder—thousands of straggling men were asking every +passer-by for their regiments; ambulances, waggons, and artillery +obstructing every road, and altogether, in a drenching rain, presenting +a scene of the most woeful and disheartening +confusion.”[18] The reports of other officers corroborate General +Trimble’s statement, and there can be no question that demoralisation +had set in. Whether, if the Federals had used their large reserves with +resolution, and, as the Confederates fell back down the slopes, had +followed with the bayonet, the demoralisation would not have increased +and spread, must remain in doubt. Not one of the Southern generals +engaged has made public his opinion. There is but one thing certain, +that with an opponent so blind to opportunity as McClellan a strong +counterstroke was the last thing to be feared. After witnessing the +opening of the attack, the Federal commander, leaving the control of +the field to Porter, had ridden off to Harrison’s Landing, eight miles +down the James, whither his trains, escorted by the Fourth Army Corps, +had been directed, and where he had determined to await reinforcements. +The Federal troops, moreover, although they had withstood the charge of +the Confederate infantry with unbroken ranks, had not fought with the +same spirit as they had displayed at Gaines’ Mill. General Hunt, +McClellan’s chief of artillery, to whose admirable disposition of the +batteries the victory was largely due, wrote that “the battle was +desperately contested, and frequently trembled in the balance. The last +attack . . . was nearly successful; but we won from the fact that we +had kept our reserves in hand.”[19] Nor had McClellan much confidence +in his army. “My men,” he wrote to Washington on the morning of the +battle, “are completely exhausted, and I dread the result if we are +attacked to-day by fresh troops. If possible, I shall retire to-night +to Harrison’s Landing, where the gunboats can render more aid in +covering our position. Permit me to urge that not an hour should be +lost in sending me fresh troops. More gunboats are much needed. . . . I +now pray for time. My +men have proved themselves the equals of any troops in the world, but +they are worn out. Our losses have been very great, we have failed to +win only because overpowered by superior numbers.”[20] + +Surely a more despairing appeal was never uttered. The general, whose +only thought was “more gunboats and fresh troops,” whatever may have +been the condition of his men, had reached the last stage of +demoralisation. + +The condition to which McClellan was reduced seems to have been +realised by Jackson. The crushing defeat of his own troops failed to +disturb his judgment. Whilst the night still covered the battle-field, +his divisional generals came to report the condition of their men and +to receive instructions. “Every representation,” says Dabney, “which +they made was gloomy.” At length, after many details of losses and +disasters, they concurred in declaring that McClellan would probably +take the aggressive in the morning, and that the Confederate army was +in no condition to resist him. Jackson had listened silently, save when +he interposed a few brief questions, to all their statements; but now +he replied: “No; he will clear out in the morning.” + +July 2 The forecast was more than fulfilled. When morning dawned, grey, +damp, and cheerless, and the Confederate sentinels, through the cold +mist which rose from the sodden woods, looked out upon the +battle-field, they saw that Malvern Hill had been abandoned. Only a few +cavalry patrols rode to and fro on the ground which had been held by +the Federal artillery, and on the slopes below, covered with hundreds +of dead and dying men, the surgeons were quietly at work. During the +night the enemy had fallen back to Harrison’s Landing, and +justification for Lee’s assault at Malvern Hill may be found in the +story of the Federal retreat. The confusion of the night march, +following on a long series of fierce engagements, told with terrible +effect on the _moral_ of the men, and stragglers increased at every +step. “It was like the retreat,” said one of McClellan’s generals, “of +a whipped army. We retreated like a parcel of sheep, and a +few shots from the rebels would have panic-stricken the whole +command.”[21] At length, through blinding rain, the flotilla of +gunboats was discovered, and on the long peninsula between Herring Run +and the James the exhausted army reached a resting-place. But so great +was the disorder, that during the whole of that day nothing was done to +prepare a defensive position; a ridge to the north, which commanded the +whole camp, was unoccupied; and, according to the Committee of Congress +which took evidence on the conduct of the war, “nothing but a heavy +rain, thereby preventing the enemy from bringing up their artillery, +saved the army from destruction.”[22] McClellan’s own testimony is even +more convincing. “The army,” he wrote on July 8, the second day after +the battle, “is thoroughly worn out and requires rest and very heavy +reinforcements. . . . I am in hopes that the enemy is as completely +worn out as we are. . . . The roads are now very bad; for these reasons +I hope we shall have enough breathing space to reorganise and rest the +men, and get them into position before the enemy can attack again. . . +. It is of course impossible to estimate as yet our losses, but I doubt +whether there are to-day more than 50,000 men with the colours.”[23] + +As his army of 105,000 men, during the whole of the Seven Days, lost +only 16,000, the last admission, if accurate, is most significant. +Nearly half the men must either have been sick or straggling. + +It was not because the Confederates were also worn out that the +Federals were given time to reorganise and to establish themselves in a +strong position. Jackson, the moment it was light, rode through the +rain to the front. Learning that the enemy had evacuated their +position, he ordered his chief of staff to get the troops under arms, +to form the infantry in three lines of battle, and then to allow the +men to build fires, cook their rations, and dry their clothes. By 11 +o’clock the ammunition had been +replenished, and his four divisions were formed up. Longstreet’s +brigades had pushed forward a couple of miles, but no orders had +reached the Valley troops, and Major Dabney rode off to find his +general. “I was told,” he writes, “that he was in the Poindexter House, +a large mansion near Willis’ Church. Lee, Jackson, Dr. McGuire, and +Major Taylor of Lee’s staff, and perhaps others, were in the +dining-room. Asking leave to report to General Jackson that his orders +had been fulfilled, I was introduced to General Lee, who, with his +usual kindness, begged me to sit by the fire and dry myself. Here I +stayed much of the day, and witnessed some strange things. Longstreet, +wet and muddy, was the first to enter. He had ridden round most of the +battle-field, and his report was not particularly cheerful. Jackson was +very quiet, never volunteering any counsel or suggestion, but answering +when questioned in a brief, deferential tone. His countenance was very +serious, and soon became very troubled. After a time the clatter of +horses’ hoofs was heard, and two gentlemen came in, dripping. They were +the President and his nephew. Davis and Lee then drew to the table, and +entered into an animated military discussion. Lee told the President +the news which the scouts were bringing in, of horrible mud, and of +abandoned arms and baggage waggons. They then debated at length what +was to be done next. McClellan was certainly retiring, but whether as +beaten or as only manœuvring was not apparent, nor was the direction of +his retreat at all clear. Was he aiming for some point on the lower +James where he might embark and get away? or at some point on the upper +James—say Shirley, or Bermuda Hundred—where he could cross the river +(he had pontoons and gunboats) and advance on Richmond from the south? +Such were the questions which came up, and at length it was decided +that the army should make no movement until further information had +been received. The enemy was not to be pursued until Stuart’s cavalry, +which had arrived the previous evening at Nance’s Shop, should obtain +reliable information. + +“Jackson, meanwhile, sat silent in his corner. I +watched his face. The expression, changing from surprise to dissent, +and lastly to intense mortification, showed clearly the tenor of his +thoughts. He knew that McClellan was defeated, that he was retreating +and not manœuvring. He knew that his troops were disorganised, that +sleeplessness, fasting, bad weather, and disaster must have weakened +their _moral_. He heard it said by General Lee that the scouts reported +the roads so deep in mud that the artillery could not move, that our +men were wet and wearied. But Jackson’s mind reasoned that where the +Federals could march the Confederates could follow, and that a decisive +victory was well worth a great effort.”[24] + +July 3 The decision of the council of war was that the army should move +the next morning in the direction of Harrison’s Landing. Longstreet, +whose troops had not been engaged at Malvern Hill, was to lead the way. +But the operations of this day were without result. The line of march +was by Carter’s Mill and the river road. But after the troops had been +set in motion, it was found that the river road had been obstructed by +the enemy, and Lee directed Longstreet to countermarch to the Charles +City cross roads and move on Evelington Heights.[25] But ignorance of +the country and inefficient guides once more played into the enemy’s +hands, and when night closed the troops were still some distance from +the Federal outposts. + +The delay had been exceedingly unfortunate. At 9 a.m. Stuart’s cavalry +had occupied the Evelington Heights, and, believing that Longstreet was +close at hand, had opened fire with a single howitzer on the camps +below. The consternation caused by this unlooked-for attack was great. +But the Federals soon recovered from their surprise, and, warned as to +the danger of their situation, sent out infantry and artillery to drive +back the enemy and secure the heights. Stuart, dismounting his +troopers, held on for some time; but at two o’clock, finding that the +Confederate infantry was still six or seven miles distant, +and that his ammunition was failing, he gave up the Heights, which were +immediately fortified by the enemy. Had the cavalry commander resisted +the temptation of spreading panic in the enemy’s ranks, and kept his +troops under cover, infantry and artillery might possibly have been +brought up to the Heights before they were occupied by the Federals. In +any case, it was utterly useless to engage a whole army with one gun +and a few regiments of cavalry, and in war, especially in advanced +guard operations, silence is often golden.[26] It was not till they +were warned by the fire of Stuart’s howitzer that the Federals realised +the necessity of securing and intrenching the Evelington Heights, and +it is within the bounds of possibility, had they been left undisturbed, +that they might have neglected them altogether. McClellan, according to +his letters already quoted, believed that the condition of the roads +would retard the advance of the enemy; and, as is evident from a letter +he wrote the same morning, before the incident took place, he was of +opinion that there was no immediate need for the occupation of a +defensive position.[27] + +During this day the Valley divisions, crawling in rear of Longstreet, +had marched only three miles; and such sluggish progress, at so +critical a moment, put the climax to Jackson’s discontent. His wrath +blazed forth with unwonted vehemence. “That night,” says Dabney,[28] +“he was quartered in a farmhouse a mile or two east of Willis’ Church. +The soldier assigned to him as a guide made a most stupid report, and +admitted that he knew nothing of the road. Jackson turned on him in +fierce anger, and ordered him from his presence with threats of the +severest punishment. On retiring, he said to his staff, ‘Now, +gentlemen, Jim will have breakfast for you punctually at dawn. I expect +you to be up, to eat immediately, and be in the saddle without delay. +We must burn no more daylight.’ About daybreak I heard him tramping +down the stairs. I alone went out to meet him. All the rest were +asleep. He addressed me in +stern tones: ‘Major, how is it that this staff never will be punctual?’ +I replied: ‘I am in time; I cannot control the others.’ Jackson turned +in a rage to the servant: ‘Put back that food into the chest, have that +chest in the waggon, and that waggon moving in two minutes.’ I +suggested, very humbly, that he had better at least take some food +himself. But he was too angry to eat, and repeating his orders, flung +himself into the saddle, and galloped off. Jim gave a low whistle, +saying: ‘My stars, but de general is just mad dis time; most like +lightnin’ strike him!’” + +July 4 With the engagement on the Evelington Heights the fighting round +Richmond came to an end. When Lee came up with his advanced divisions +on the morning of the 4th, he found the pickets already engaged, and +the troops formed up in readiness for action. He immediately rode +forward with Jackson, and the two, dismounting, proceeded without staff +or escort to make a careful reconnaissance of the enemy’s position. +Their inspection showed them that it was practically impregnable. The +front, facing westward, was flanked from end to end by the fire of the +gunboats, and the Evelington Heights, already fortified, and approached +by a single road, were stronger ground than even Malvern Hill. The +troops were therefore withdrawn to the forest, and for the next three +days, with the exception of those employed in collecting the arms and +stores which the Federals had abandoned, they remained inactive. + +July 8 On July 8, directing Stuart to watch McClellan, General Lee fell +back to Richmond. + +The battles of the Seven Days cost the Confederates 20,000 men. The +Federals, although defeated, lost no more than 16,000, of whom 10,000, +nearly half of them wounded, were prisoners. In addition, however, 52 +guns and 35,000 rifles became the prize of the Southerners; and vast as +was the quantity of captured stores, far greater was the amount +destroyed. + +But the defeat of McClellan’s army is not to be measured by a mere +estimate of the loss in men and in materiel. The discomfited general +sought to cover his failure by a lavish employment of strategic +phrases. The +retreat to the James, he declared, had been planned before the battle +of Mechanicsville. He had merely manœuvred to get quit of an +inconvenient line of supply, and to place his army in a more favourable +position for attacking Richmond. He congratulated his troops on their +success in changing the line of operations, always regarded as the most +hazardous of military expedients. Their conduct, he said, ranked them +among the most celebrated armies of history. Under every disadvantage +of numbers, and necessarily of position also, they had in every +conflict beaten back their foes with enormous slaughter. They had +reached the new base complete in organisation and unimpaired in +spirit.[29] + +It is possible that this address soothed the pride of his troops. It +certainly deluded neither his own people nor the South. The immediate +effect of his strategic manœuvre was startling. + +5,000 men, the effective remnant of Shields’ division, besides several +new regiments, were sent to the Peninsula from the army protecting +Washington. General Burnside, who had mastered a portion of the North +Carolina coast, was ordered to suspend operations, to leave a garrison +in New Berne, and to bring the remainder of his army to Fortress +Monroe. Troops were demanded from General Hunter, who had taken the +last fort which defended Savannah, the port of Georgia.[30] The Western +army of the Union was asked to reinforce McClellan, and Lincoln called +on the Northern States for a fresh levy. But although 300,000 men were +promised him, the discouragement of the Northern people was so great +that recruits showed no alacrity in coming forward. The South, on the +other hand, ringing with the brilliant deeds of Lee and Jackson, turned +with renewed vigour to the task of resisting the invader. Richmond, the +beleaguered capital, although the enemy was in position not more than +twenty miles away, knew that her agony was over. The city was one vast +hospital. Many of the best and bravest of the Confederacy had fallen in +the Seven Days, and the voice of mourning hushed all sound +of triumph. But the long columns of prisoners, the captured cannon, the +great trains of waggons, piled high with spoil, were irrefragable proof +of the complete defeat of the invader. + +When the army once more encamped within sight of the city it was +received as it deserved. Lee and Jackson were the special objects of +admiration. All recognised the strategic skill which had wrought the +overthrow of McClellan’s host; and the hard marches and sudden blows of +the campaign on the Shenandoah, crowned by the swift transfer of the +Valley army from the Blue Ridge to the Chickahominy, took fast hold of +the popular imagination. The mystery in which Jackson’s operations were +involved, the dread he inspired in the enemy, his reticence, his piety, +his contempt of comfort, his fiery energy, his fearlessness, and his +simplicity aroused the interest and enthusiasm of the whole community. +Whether Lee or his lieutenant was the more averse to posing before the +crowd it is difficult to say. Both succeeded in escaping all public +manifestation of popular favour; both went about their business with an +absolute absence of ostentation, and if the handsome features of the +Commander-in-Chief were familiar to the majority of the citizens, few +recognised in the plainly dressed soldier, riding alone through +Richmond, the great leader of the Valley, with whose praises not the +South only, but the whole civilised world, was already ringing. + + [1] General Reynolds. + + [2] Lee’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i, pp. 493, 494. + + [3] This detachment, about 3,500 strong, consisted of the outposts + that had been established north and north-east of Beaver Dam Creek on + June 27, of the garrison of the White House, and of troops recently + disembarked. + + [4] Strange to say, while the Confederates possessed no maps whatever, + McClellan was well supplied in this respect. “Two or three weeks + before this,” says General Averell (_Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. + 431), “three officers of the 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry, and others, + penetrated the region between the Chickahominy and the James, taking + bearings and making notes. Their fragmentary sketches, when put + together, made a map which exhibited all the roadways, fields, + forests, bridges, the streams, and houses, so that our commander knew + the country to be traversed far better than any Confederate + commander.” + + [5] Jackson had with him a gang of negroes who, under the + superintendence of Captain Mason, a railroad contractor of long + experience, performed the duties which in regular armies appertain to + the corps of engineers. They had already done useful service in the + Valley. + + [6] O.R., vol. xi, part i, pp. 556, 557. + + [7] “Jackson himself,” writes Dr. McGuire, “accompanied by three or + four members of his staff, of whom I was one, followed the cavalry + across the Swamp. The ford was miry and deep, and impracticable for + either artillery or infantry.” + + [8] O.R., vol. xi, part i, pp. 810, 811. + + [9] General Heintzleman, commanding the Federal 3rd Corps, reports + that he had placed a force at Brackett’s Ford (O.R., vol. xi, part ii, + p. 100). General Slocum (6th Corps) sent infantry and a 12-pounder + howitzer (O.R., volume xi, part ii, p. 435) to the same point; and + Seeley’s battery of the 3rd Corps was also engaged here (O.R., vol. + xi, part ii, p. 106). The force at White Oak Bridge was constituted as + follows:— + +Smith’s Division +Richardson’s Division +Sedgwick’s Division (Dana’s and Sully’s Brigades) +Peck’s Division (Naglee’s Brigade) of the 6th Corps. +of the 2nd Corps. +of the 2nd Corps. +of the 4th Corps. + + [10] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 381. + + [11] Letter from Dr. Hunter McGuire to the author. + + [12] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 389. + + [13] _From Manassas to Appomattox,_ p. 150. + + [14] Letter to the author. + + [15] _From Manassas to Appomattox,_ p. 143. + + [16] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 403. + + [17] O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 677. + + [18] Trimble’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 619. + + [19] Three horse-batteries and eight 32-pr. howitzers were “brought up + to the decisive point at the close of the day, thus bringing every gun + of this large artillery force (the artillery reserve) into the most + active and decisive use. Not a gun remained unemployed: not one could + have been safely spared.—Hunt’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part ii, p. + 239. + + [20] O.R., vol. xi, part iii, p. 282. + + [21] Report on the Conduct of the War, p. 580. General Hooker’s + evidence. + + [22] Report on the Conduct of the War, p. 27. + + [23] O.R., vol. xi, part i, pp. 291, 292. + + [24] Letter to the author. Dr. McGuire writes to the same effect. + + [25] Evelington Heights are between Rawling’s Mill Pond and Westover. + + [26] The military student will compare the battles of Weissembourg, + Vionville, and Gravelotte in 1870, all of which began with a useless + surprise. + + [27] O.R., vol. xi, part iii, pp. 291–2. + + [28] Letter to the author. + + [29] O.R., vol. xi, part iii, p. 299. + + [30] The forces under Burnside and Hunter amounted to some 35,000 men. + + + + +Chapter XV +CEDAR RUN + + +The victories in the Valley, the retreat of Banks, Shields, and +Frémont, followed by the victory of Gaines’ Mill, had raised the hopes +of the South to the highest pitch. + +When McClellan fell back to the James the capture or destruction of his +army seemed a mere matter of time, and it was confidently expected that +a disaster of such magnitude would assuredly bring the North to terms. +But the slaughter of the Confederates at Malvern Hill, the unmolested +retreat of the enemy to Harrison’s Landing, the fortification of that +strong position, induced a more sober mood. The Northern soldiers had +displayed a courage for which the South had not yet given them credit. +On the last of the Seven Days they had fought almost as stubbornly as +on the first. Their losses had been heavy, but they had taught their +adversaries that they were no longer the unmanageable levies of Bull +Run, scattered by the first touch of disaster to the four winds. It was +no frail barrier which stood now between the South and her +independence, but a great army of trained soldiers, seasoned by +experience, bound together by discipline, and capable of withstanding a +long series of reverses. And when it became clear that McClellan, +backed by the fleet, had no intention of losing his grip on Richmond; +when the news came that Lincoln had asked for 300,000 fresh troops; and +that the Federal Army of the West, undisturbed by Lee’s victories, was +still advancing through Tennessee,[1] the power and persistency of the +North were revealed in all their huge proportions. +But the disappointment of the Southern people in no way abated their +gratitude. The troops drank their fill of praise. The deeds of the +Valley regiments were on every tongue. The Stonewall Brigade was the +most famous organisation in the Confederacy. To have marched with +Jackson was a sure passport to the good graces of every citizen. Envied +by their comrades, regarded as heroes by the admiring crowds that +thronged the camps, the ragged soldiers of the Shenandoah found ample +compensation for their labour. They had indeed earned the rest which +was now given them. For more than two months they had been marching and +fighting without cessation. Since they left Elk Run, on April 29, until +they fell back to the capital on July 8, their camps had never stood in +the same spot for more than four days in succession. + +But neither they nor their general looked forward to a long sojourn +within the works round Richmond. The men pined for the fresh breezes of +their native highlands. The tainted atmosphere of a district which was +one vast battle-ground told upon their health, and the people of +Richmond, despite their kindness, were strangers after all. Nor was +Jackson less anxious to leave the capital. The heavy rain which had +deluged the bivouac on the Chickahominy had chilled him to the bone. +During the whole of the pursuit, from White Oak Swamp to Westover, he +had suffered from fever. But his longing for a move westward was +dictated by other motives than the restoration of his health. No sooner +had it become evident that McClellan’s position was impregnable than he +turned his thoughts to some more vulnerable point. He would allow the +enemy no respite. In his opinion there should be no “letting up” in the +attack. The North should be given no leisure to reorganise the armies +or to train recruits. A swift succession of fierce blows, delivered at +a vital point, was the only means of bringing the colossus to its +knees, and that vital point was far from Richmond. + +Before the Confederate troops marched back to Richmond +he laid his views before the member of Congress for the Winchester +district, and begged Mr. Boteler to impress them on the Government. +“McClellan’s army,” he said, “was manifestly thoroughly beaten, +incapable of moving until it had been reorganised and reinforced. There +was danger,” he foresaw, “that the fruits of victory would be lost, as +they had been lost after Bull Run. The Confederate army should at once +leave the malarious district round Richmond, and moving northwards, +carry the horrors of invasion across the border. This,” he said, “was +the only way to bring the North to its senses, and to end the war. And +it was within the power of the Confederates, if they were to +concentrate their resources, to make a successful bid for victory. +60,000 men might march into Maryland and threaten Washington. But while +he was anxious that these views should be laid before the President, he +would earnestly disclaim the charge of self-seeking. He wished to +follow, and not to lead. He was willing to follow anyone—Lee, or Ewell, +or anyone who would fight.” “Why do you not urge your views,” asked Mr. +Boteler, “on General Lee?” “I have done so,” replied Jackson. “And what +does he say to them?” “He says nothing,” was the answer; “but do not +understand that I complain of this silence; it is proper that General +Lee should observe it. He is wise and prudent. He feels that he bears a +fearful responsibility, and he is right in declining a hasty expression +of his purpose to a subordinate like me.”[2] + +Jackson was perfectly right in his estimate of the Federal army. +McClellan had 90,000 men, but 16,000 were sick, and he was still under +the delusion that he had been defeated by more than twice his numbers. +His letters to the President, it is true, betrayed no misgiving. He was +far from admitting that he had been defeated. His army, he wrote, was +now so favourably placed that an advance on Richmond was easy. He was +full of confidence. He was watching carefully for any fault committed +by the enemy, and would take advantage of it. The spirit of his +army, he declared, was such that he felt unable to restrain it from +speedily assuming the offensive. He had determined not to fall back +unless he was absolutely forced to do so. He was ready for a rapid and +heavy blow at Richmond. But to strike that blow he required heavy +reinforcements, and while waiting their arrival he was unwilling to +leave his strong position.[3] + +Jackson’s views were considered by Mr. Davis. For the present, however, +they were disregarded. The situation, in the opinion of the Government, +was still critical. McClellan might be reinforced by sea. He might be +superseded by a more energetic commander, and the Federals might then +cross to the right bank of the James, cut the railways which connected +Richmond with the South, and turn the line of fortifications. The +losses of the Seven Days had reduced the Confederate strength to +60,000. Under such circumstances it was not considered safe to remove +the army from the capital. Jackson, however, was entrusted with a more +congenial duty than watching an enemy who, he was absolutely convinced, +had no intention of leaving his intrenchments. + +July 13 His longing for active work was gratified by an order to march +westward. Lee, finding McClellan immovable, had recourse to his former +strategy. He determined to play once more on Lincoln’s fears. The Army +of Virginia, under the command of Pope, defended Washington. Would the +Northern Government, when the news came that Stonewall Jackson was +returning to the Shenandoah, deem this force sufficient to protect the +capital? Would they not rather think it necessary to recall McClellan? +The experiment was worth trying. After some delay in recovering from +the disorganisation caused by the disasters in the Valley, Pope had +assembled his army east of the Blue Ridge, near the sources of the +Rappahannock. Sperryvile, his advanced post, was no more than forty +miles north of the Virginia Central Railway, and his cavalry was +already advancing. It was essential that +the railway, the chief line of supply of the Confederate army, should +be protected; and Jackson was instructed to halt near Gordonsville. + +July 16 On the 16th his leading brigades reached their destination. +Their arrival was opportune. The Federal cavalry, with a strong +infantry support, was already threatening Gordonsville. On learning, +however, that the town was occupied they at once fell back. + +Jackson, as soon as his command was up, and he had had time to +ascertain the Federal strength, applied for reinforcements. His own +numbers were very small. The divisions of D. H. Hill and Whiting had +remained at Richmond. The Army of the Valley, reduced to its original +elements, was no more than 11,000 strong. Pope’s army consisted of +47,000 men.[4] But the Federals were scattered over a wide front. +Sigel, a German who had succeeded Frémont, was near Sperryville, and +Banks lay close to Sigel. Each of these officers commanded an army +corps of two divisions. Of McDowell’s army corps, Ricketts’ division +held Warrenton, twenty-five miles east of Banks; while King’s division +was retained at Fredericksburg, forty miles south-east of Ricketts’. +Such dispersion seemed to invite attack. Lee, however, found it +impossible to comply with his lieutenant’s request for such aid as +would enable him to assume the offensive. The army covering Richmond +was much smaller than McClellan’s, and the Confederates were aware that +a large reinforcement for the latter, under General Burnside, had +landed in the Peninsula. But assistance was promised in case Pope +advanced so far south that troops could be detached without risk to +Richmond. Pope, in fact, was too far off, and Jackson was to entice him +forward. + +A week, however, passed away without any movement on the part of +McClellan. He knew that Lee’s army was diminished; and it was believed +at his headquarters that “Jackson had started towards the Valley with +60,000 to 80,000 troops.”[5] He knew that there was no large force +within ten miles of his outposts, and if the President would send him +20,000 or 30,000 more men he said that he was ready to march on +Richmond. But, as yet, he had not observed the opportunity for which, +according to his own account, he was so carefully watching. Pope was +far more enterprising. His cavalry had burned the railway depôt at +Beaver Dam, destroyed some Confederate stores, cut the line at several +points, and threatened Hanover Junction. Stuart, with his cavalry +division, was immediately sent northwards, and Lee ordered A. P. Hill +to Gordonsville. + +Jackson’s letters to headquarters at this period are missing. But Lee’s +answers indicate the tenor of the views therein expressed. On July 27 +the Commander-in-Chief wrote:— + +“I have received your dispatch of the 26th instant. I will send A. P. +Hill’s division and the Second Brigade of Louisiana volunteers to you. +. . . I want Pope to be suppressed. . . . A. P. Hill you will, I think, +find a good officer, with whom you can consult, and by advising with +your division commanders as to your movements, much trouble will be +saved you in arranging details, and they can act more intelligently. I +wish to save you trouble from my increasing your command. Cache your +troops as much as possible till you can strike your blow, and be +prepared to return to me when done, if necessary. I will endeavour to +keep General McClellan quiet till it is over, if rapidly executed.” + +Illustration: Map of the Environs of Warrenton, Virginia. For larger +view click on image. + +This letter, besides containing a delicate hint that extreme reticence +is undesirable, evidently refers to some plan proposed by Jackson. +Whatever this may have been, it is certain that both he and Lee were in +close accord. They believed that the best method of protecting the +railway was, in Lee’s words, “to find the main body of the enemy and +drive it,” and they were agreed that there should be no more Malvern +Hills. “You are right,” says Lee on August 4, “in not attacking them in +their strong and chosen positions. They ought always to be turned as +you propose, and thus force them on to more favourable ground.” + +At the end of July, about the same time that Hill +joined Jackson, Pope, under instructions from Washington, moved +forward. His cavalry occupied the line of Robertson River, within +twenty miles of the Confederate lines, and it became clear that he +intended advancing on Gordonsville. His infantry, however, had not yet +crossed Hazel Run, and Jackson, carefully concealing his troops, +remained on the watch for a few days longer. His anxiety, however, to +bring his enemy to battle was even greater than usual. Pope had already +gained an unenviable notoriety. On taking over command he had issued an +extraordinary address. His bombast was only equalled by his want of +tact. Not content with extolling the prowess of the Western troops, +with whom he had hitherto served, he was bitterly satirical at the +expense of McClellan and of McClellan’s army. “I have come to you,” he +said to his soldiers, “from the West, where we have always seen the +backs of our enemies—from an army whose business it has been to seek +the adversary, and beat him when found, whose policy has been attack +and not defence. . . . I presume that I have been called here to pursue +the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to +do so, and that speedily. . . . Meantime, I desire you to dismiss from +your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find much in vogue +amongst you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding +them—of lines of retreat and of bases of supplies. Let us discard such +ideas. . . . Let us study the probable line of retreat of our +opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look +before and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster +and shame lurk in the rear.”[6] + +Even the Northern press made sport of Pope’s “’Ercles vein,” and the +Confederates contrasted his noisy declamation with the modesty of Lee +and Jackson. To the South the new commander was peculiarly obnoxious. +He was the first of the Federal generals to order that the troops +should subsist upon the country, and that the people should be held +responsible for all damage done to roads, railways, and +telegraphs by guerillas. His orders, it is true, were warranted by the +practice of war. But “forced requisitions,” unless conducted on a +well-understood system, must inevitably degenerate into plunder and +oppression; and Pope, in punishing civilians, was not careful to +distinguish between the acts of guerillas and those of the regular +Confederate cavalry. “These orders,” says a Northern historian, “were +followed by the pillaging of private property, and by insults to +females to a degree unknown heretofore during the war.” But in +comparison with a third edict they were mild and humane. On July 23 +Pope’s generals were instructed to arrest every Virginian within the +limits of their commands, to administer the oath of allegiance to the +Union, and to expel from their homes all those who refused to take it. +This order was preceded by one from General von Steinwehr, a German +brigadier, directing the arrest of five prominent citizens, to be held +as hostages, and to suffer death in the event of any soldiers being +shot by bushwhackers. The Confederate Government retaliated by +declaring that Pope and his officers were not entitled to be considered +as soldiers. If captured they were to be imprisoned so long as their +orders remained unrepealed; and in the event of any unarmed Confederate +citizens being tried and shot, an equal number of Federal prisoners +were to be hanged. It need hardly be added that the operations north of +Gordonsville were watched with peculiar interest by the South. “This +new general,” it was said to Jackson, “claims your attention.” “And, +please God, he shall have it,” was the reply. + +Nevertheless, with all his peculiar characteristics, Pope was no +despicable foe. The Federal cavalry were employed with a boldness which +had not hitherto been seen. Their outposts were maintained twenty miles +in advance of the army. Frequent reconnaissances were made. A regiment +of Jackson’s cavalry was defeated at Orange Court House, with a loss of +60 or 70 men, and scouting parties penetrated to within a few miles of +Gordonsville. Even Banks was spurred to activity, and learned at last +that information is generally to be obtained +if it is resolutely sought.[7] Very little that occurred within the +Confederate lines escaped the vigilance of the enemy; and although +Jackson’s numbers were somewhat overestimated, Pope’s cavalry, +energetically led by two able young officers, Generals Buford and +Bayard, did far better service than McClellan’s detectives. Jackson had +need of all his prudence. Including the Light Division, his force +amounted to no more than 24,000 men; and if Pope handled his whole army +with as much skill as he used his cavalry, it would go hard with +Gordonsville. 24,000 men could hardly be expected to arrest the march +of 47,000 unless the larger force should blunder. + +During the first week in August events began to thicken. Stuart made a +strong reconnaissance towards Fredericksburg, and administered a check +to the Federal scouting parties in that quarter. But McClellan threw +forward a division and occupied Malvern Hill, and it became evident +that Pope also was meditating a further advance. + +Jackson, for the purpose of luring him forward, and also of concealing +Hill’s arrival, had drawn back his cavalry, and moved his infantry +south of Gordonsville. Pope was warned from Washington that this was +probably a ruse. His confidence, however, was not to be shaken. “Within +ten days,” he reported, “unless the enemy is heavily reinforced from +Richmond, I shall be in possession of Gordonsville and +Charlottesville.” + +Although such an operation would carry Pope far from Washington there +was no remonstrance from headquarters. Lincoln and Stanton, mistrustful +at last of their ability as strategists, had called to their councils +General Halleck, who had shown some evidence of capacity while in +command of the Western armies. The new Commander-in-Chief had a +difficult problem to work out. It is impossible to determine how far +Jackson’s movement to Gordonsville influenced the Federal authorities, +but immediately on Halleck’s arrival +at Washington, about the same date that the movement was reported, he +was urged, according to his own account, to withdraw McClellan from the +Peninsula. “I delayed my decision,” he says, “as long as I dared delay +it;” but on August 3 his mind was made up, and McClellan, just after +Hill joined Jackson, was ordered to embark his army at Fortress Monroe, +sail to Aquia Creek, near Fredericksburg, and join Pope on the +Rappahannock. The proposed combination, involving the transfer by sea +of 90,000 men, with all their artillery and trains, was a manœuvre full +of danger.[8] The retreat and embarkation of McClellan’s troops would +take time, and the Confederates, possessing the interior lines, had two +courses open to them:— + +1. Leaving Jackson to check Pope, they might attack McClellan as soon +as he evacuated his intrenched position at Harrison’s Landing. + +2. They might neglect McClellan and concentrate against Pope before he +could be reinforced. + +Halleck considered that attack on McClellan was the more likely, and +Pope was accordingly instructed to threaten Gordonsville, so as to +force Lee to detach heavily from Richmond, and leave him too weak to +strike the Army of the Potomac. + +August 6 On August 6 Pope commenced his advance. Banks had pushed a +brigade of infantry from Sperryville to Culpeper Court House, and +Ricketts’ division (of McDowell’s corps) was ordered to cross the +Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge and march to the same spot. Jackson, +whose spies had informed him of the enemy’s dispositions, received +early intelligence of Banks’ movement, and the next afternoon his three +divisions were ordered forward, marching by roads where there was no +chance of their being seen. “He hoped,” so he wrote to Lee, “through +the blessing of Providence, to defeat the advanced Federal detachment +before reinforcements should arrive.” This detachment was +his first objective; but he had long since recognised the strategic +importance of Culpeper Court House. At this point four roads meet, and +it was probable, from their previous dispositions, that the Federal +army corps would use three of these in their advance. Pope’s right wing +at Sperryville would march by Woodville and Griffinsburg. His centre +had already moved forward from Warrenton. His left wing at Falmouth, +north of Fredericksburg, would march by Bealeton and Brandy Station, or +by Richardsville and Georgetown. As all these roads were several miles +apart, and the lateral communications were indifferent, the three +columns, during the movement on Culpeper Court House, would be more or +less isolated; and if the Confederates could seize the point at which +the roads met, it might be possible to keep them apart, to prevent them +combining for action, and to deal with them in detail. Pope, in fact, +had embarked on a manœuvre which is always dangerous in face of a +vigilant and energetic enemy. Deceived by the passive attitude which +Jackson had hitherto maintained, and confident in the strength of his +cavalry, which held Robertson River, a stream some ten miles south of +Culpeper Court House, he had pushed a small force far in advance, and +was preparing to cross Hazel Run in several widely separated columns. +He had no apprehension that he might be attacked during the process. +Most generals in Jackson’s situation, confronted by far superior +numbers, would have been content with occupying a defensive position in +front of Gordonsville, and neither Pope nor Halleck had gauged as yet +the full measure of their opponent’s enterprise. So confident was the +Federal Commander-in-Chief that General Cox, with 11,000 men, was +ordered to march from Lewisburg, ninety miles south-west of Staunton, +to join Pope at Charlottesville.[9] + +Jackson’s force was composed as follows:— + +Jackson’s Own Division (commanded by Winder) +Ewell +A. P. Hill (The Light Division) +Cavalry 3,000 7,550 12,000 1,200 ——— 23,750 ——— + +Jackson was by no means displeased when he learned who was in command +of the Federal advance. “Banks is in front of me,” he said to Dr. +McGuire, “he is always ready to fight;” and then, laughing, he added as +if to himself, “and he generally gets whipped.” + +The Confederate regiments, as a rule, were very weak. The losses of the +Seven Days, of Winchester, of Cross Keys, and of Port Republic had not +yet been replaced. Companies had dwindled down to sections. Brigades +were no stronger than full battalions, and the colonel was happy who +could muster 200 muskets. But the waste of the campaign was not +altogether an evil. The weak and sickly had been weeded out. The +faint-hearted had disappeared, and if many of the bravest had fallen +before Richmond, those who remained were hardy and experienced +soldiers. The army that lay round Gordonsville was the best that +Jackson had yet commanded. The horses, which had become almost useless +in the Peninsula, had soon regained condition on the rich pastures at +the foot of the South-west Mountains. Nearly every man had seen +service. The officers were no longer novices. The troops had implicit +confidence in their leaders, and their _moral_ was high. They had not +yet tasted defeat. Whenever they had met the enemy he had abandoned the +field of battle. With such troops much might be risked, and if the +staff was not yet thoroughly trained, the district in which they were +now operating was far less intricate than the Peninsula. As the troops +marched westward from Richmond, with their faces towards their own +mountains, the country grew more open, the horizon larger, and the +breezes purer. The dark forests disappeared. The clear streams, running +swiftly over rocky beds, were a welcome change from the swamps of the +Chickahominy. North of Gordonsville the spurs of the Blue Ridge, +breaking up into long chains of isolated hills, towered high above the +sunlit plains. The rude tracks of the Peninsula, winding through the +woods, gave place to broad and well-trodden highways. Nor did the +marches now depend upon the guidance of some casual rustic or terrified +negro. There were many in +the Confederate ranks who were familiar with the country; and the quick +pencil of Captain Hotchkiss, Jackson’s trusted engineer, who had +rejoined from the Valley, was once more at his disposal. Information, +moreover, was not hard to come by. The country was far more thickly +populated than the region about Richmond, and, notwithstanding Pope’s +harsh measures, he was unable to prevent the people communicating with +their own army. If the men had been unwilling to take the risk, the +women were quite ready to emulate the heroines of the Valley, and the +conduct of the Federal marauders had served only to inflame their +patriotism. Under such circumstances Jackson’s task was relieved of +half its difficulties. He was almost as much at home as on the +Shenandoah, and although there were no Massanuttons to screen his +movements, the hills to the north, insignificant as they might be when +compared with the great mountains which divide the Valley, might still +be turned to useful purpose. + +August 7 On August 7, starting late in the afternoon, the Confederates +marched eight miles by a country track, and halted at Orange Court +House. Culpeper was still twenty miles distant, and two rivers, the +Rapidan and Robertson, barred the road. The Robertson was held by 5,000 +or 6,000 Federal cavalry; five regiments, under General Buford, were +near Madison Court House; four, under General Bayard, near Rapidan +Station. East of the railway two more regiments held Raccoon Ford; +others watched the Rappahannock as far as Fredericksburg, and on +Thoroughfare Mountain, ten miles south-west of Culpeper, and commanding +a view of the surrounding country as far as Orange Court House, was a +signal station. + +August 8 Early on the 8th, Ewell’s division crossed the Rapidan at +Liberty Mills, while the other divisions were ordered to make the +passage at Barnett’s Ford, six miles below. A forced march should have +carried the Confederates to within striking distance of Culpeper, and a +forced march was almost imperative. The cavalry had been in contact; +the advance must already have been reported to Pope, and within +twenty-four hours +the whole of the Federal army, with the exception of the division at +Fredericksburg, might easily be concentrated in a strong position. + +Still there were no grounds for uneasiness. If the troops made sixteen +miles before nightfall, they would be before Culpeper soon after dawn, +and sixteen miles was no extraordinary march for the Valley regiments. +But to accomplish a long march in the face of the enemy, something is +demanded more than goodwill and endurance on the part of the men. If +the staff arrangements are faulty, or the subordinate commanders +careless, the best troops in the world will turn sluggards. It was so +on August 8. Jackson’s soldiers never did a worse day’s work during the +whole course of his campaigns. Even his energy was powerless to push +them forward. The heat, indeed, was excessive. Several men dropped dead +in the ranks; the long columns dragged wearily through the dust, and +the Federal cavalry was not easily pushed back. Guns and infantry had +to be brought up before Bayard’s dismounted squadrons were dislodged. +But the real cause of delay is to be found elsewhere. Not only did +General Hill misunderstand his orders, but, apparently offended by +Jackson’s reticence, he showed but little zeal. The orders were +certainly incomplete. Nothing had been said about the supply trains, +and they were permitted to follow their divisions, instead of moving in +rear of the whole force. Ewell’s route, moreover, was changed without +Hill being informed. The lines of march crossed each other, and Hill +was delayed for many hours by a long column of ambulances and waggons. +So tedious was the march that when the troops halted for the night, +Ewell had made eight miles, Hill only two, and the latter was still +eighteen miles from Culpeper. Chagrined by the delay, Jackson reported +to Lee that “he had made but little progress, and that the expedition,” +he feared, “in consequence of his tardy movements, would be productive +of little good.” + +How the blame should be apportioned it is difficult to say. Jackson +laid it upon Hill. And that officer’s conduct +was undoubtedly reprehensible. The absence of Major Dabney, struck down +by sickness, is a possible explanation of the faulty orders. But that +Jackson would have done better to have accepted Lee’s hint, to have +confided his intentions to his divisional commanders, and to have +trusted something to their discretion, seems more than clear. In war, +silence is not invariably a wise policy. It was not a case in which +secrecy was all-important. The movement had already been discovered by +the Federal cavalry, and in such circumstances the more officers that +understood the intention of the general-in-chief the better. Men who +have been honoured with their leader’s confidence, and who grasp the +purpose of the efforts they are called upon to make, will co-operate, +if not more cordially, at least more intelligently, than those who are +impelled by the sense of duty alone. + +As it was, so much time had been wasted that Jackson would have been +fully warranted in suspending the movement, and halting on the Rapidan. +The Federals were aware he was advancing. Their divisions were not so +far apart that they could not be concentrated within a few hours at +Culpeper, and, in approaching so close, he was entering the region of +uncertainty. Time was too pressing to admit of waiting for the reports +of spies. The enemy’s cavalry was far more numerous than his own, and +screened the troops in rear from observation. The information brought +in by the country people was not to be implicitly relied on; their +estimate of numbers was always vague, and it would be exceedingly +difficult to make sure that the force at Culpeper had not been strongly +reinforced. It was quite on the cards that the whole of Pope’s army +might reach that point in the course of the next day, and in that case +the Confederates would be compelled to retreat, followed by a superior +army, across two bridgeless rivers. + +Nevertheless, the consideration of these contingencies had no effect on +Jackson’s purpose. The odds, he decided, were in his favour; and the +defeat of Pope’s army in detail, with all the consequences that might +follow, was worth risking much to bring about. It was still possible +that Pope might delay his concentration; it was still possible that an +opportunity might present itself; and, as he had done at Winchester in +March, when threatened by a force sevenfold stronger than his own, he +resolved to look for that opportunity before he renounced his +enterprise. + +August 9 In speed and caution lay the only chance of success. The start +on the 9th was early. Hill, anxious to redeem his shortcomings, marched +long before daylight, and soon caught up with Ewell and Winder. Half of +the cavalry covered the advance; the remainder, screening the left +flank, scouted west and in the direction of Madison Court House. Two +brigades of infantry, Gregg’s and Lawton’s, were left in rear to guard +the trains, for the Federal horsemen threatened danger, and the army, +disembarrassed of the supply waggons, pressed forward across the +Rapidan. Pushing the Federal cavalry before them, the troops reached +Robertson River. The enemy’s squadrons, already worn out by incessant +reconnaissance and picket duty, were unable to dispute the passage, and +forming a single column, the three divisions crossed the Locustdale +Ford. Climbing the northern bank, the high-road to Culpeper, white with +dust, lay before them, and to their right front, little more than two +miles distant, a long wooded ridge, bearing the ominous name of +Slaughter Mountain, rose boldly from the plain. + +Ewell’s division led the march, and shortly before noon, as the troops +swept past the western base of Slaughter Mountain, it was reported that +the Federal cavalry, massed in some strength, had come to a halt a mile +or two north, on the bank of a small stream called Cedar Run. + +The Confederate guns opened, and the hostile cavalry fell back; but +from a distant undulation a Federal battery came into action, and the +squadrons, supported by this fire, returned to their old position. +Although Cedar Run was distant seven miles from Culpeper, it was +evident, from the attitude of the cavalry, that the enemy was inclined +to make a stand, and that in all probability Banks’ army corps was in +support.[10] Early’s brigade, forming the advanced +guard which had halted in a wood by the roadside, was now ordered +forward. Deploying to the right of the highway, it drove in the enemy’s +vedettes, and came out on the open ground which overlooks the stream. +Across the shallow valley, covered with the high stalks and broad +leaves of Indian corn, rose a loftier ridge, twelve hundred yards +distant, and from more than one point batteries opened on the +Confederate scouts. The regiments of the advanced guard were +immediately withdrawn to the reverse slope of the ridge, and Jackson +galloped forward to the mound of the guns. His dispositions had been +quickly made. A large force of artillery was ordered to come into +action on either flank of the advanced guard. Ewell’s division was +ordered to the right, taking post on the northern face of Slaughter +Mountain; Winder was ordered to the left, and Hill, as soon as he came +up, was to form the reserve, in rear of Winder. These movements took +time. The Confederate column, 20,000 infantry and fifteen batteries, +must have occupied more than seven miles of road; it would consequently +take over two hours for the whole force to deploy for battle. + +2.45 p.m. Before three o’clock, however, the first line was formed. On +the right of the advanced guard, near a clump of cedars, were eight +guns, and on Slaughter Mountain eight more. Along the high-road to the +left six guns of Winder’s division were soon afterwards deployed, +reinforced by four of Hill’s. These twenty-six pieces, nearly the whole +of the long-range ordnance which the Confederates possessed, were +turned on the opposing batteries, and for nearly two hours the +artillery thundered across the valley. The infantry, meanwhile, +awaiting Hill’s arrival, had come into line. Ewell’s brigades, +Trimble’s, and the Louisianians (commanded by Colonel Forno) had halted +in the woods on the extreme right, at the base of the mountain, +threatening the enemy’s flank. Winder had come up on the left, and had +posted the Stonewall Brigade in rear of his guns; Campbell’s +brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Garnett, was stationed in front, +west, and Taliaferro’s brigade east, of the road. The 10,000 men of the +Light Division, however, were still some distance to the rear, and the +position was hardly secure against a counterstroke. The left of the +line extended along a skirt of woodland, which ran at right angles to +the road, overlooking a wheat-field but lately reaped, on the further +side of which, and three hundred yards distant, was dense wood. This +point was the most vulnerable, for there was no support at hand, and a +great tract of forest stretched away westward, where cavalry was +useless, but through which it was quite possible that infantry might +force its way. Jackson ordered Colonel Garnett, commanding the brigade +on this flank, “to look well to his left, and to ask his divisional +commander for reinforcements.” The brigadier sent a staff officer and +an orderly to reconnoitre the forest to the left, and two officers were +dispatched to secure the much-needed support. + +But at this juncture General Winder was mortally wounded by a shell; +there was some delay in issuing orders, and before the weak place in +the line could be strengthened the storm broke. The enemy’s batteries, +five in number, although the concentrated fire of the Confederates had +compelled them to change position, had not yet been silenced. No large +force of Federal infantry had as yet appeared; skirmishers only had +pushed forward through the corn; but the presence of so many guns was a +clear indication that a strong force was not far off, and Jackson had +no intention of attacking a position which had not yet been +reconnoitred until his rear division had closed up, and the hostile +artillery had lost its sting. + +5 p.m. About five o’clock, however, General Banks, although his whole +force, including Bayard’s cavalry, did not exceed 9,000 officers and +men,[11] and Ricketts’ division, in support, was four miles distant, +gave orders for a general attack.[12] Two brigades, crossing the rise +which formed the Federal position, +bore down on the Confederate centre, and strove to cross the stream. +Early was hard pressed, but, Taliaferro’s brigade advancing on his +left, he held his own; and on the highroad, raked by a Confederate gun, +the enemy was unable to push forward. But within the wood to the left, +at the very point where Jackson had advised precaution, the line of +defence was broken through. On the edge of the timber commanding the +wheatfield only two Confederate regiments were posted, some 500 men all +told, and the 1st Virginia, on the extreme left, was completely +isolated. The Stonewall Brigade, which should have been placed in +second line behind them, had not yet received its orders; it was more +than a half-mile distant, in rear of Winder’s artillery, and hidden +from the first line by the trees and undergrowth. Beyond the +wheat-field 1,500 Federals, covered by a line of skirmishers, had +formed up in the wood. Emerging from the covert with fixed bayonets and +colours flying, their long line, overlapping the Confederate left, +moved steadily across the three hundred yards of open ground. The +shocks of corn, and some ragged patches of scrub timber, gave cover to +the skirmishers, but in the closed ranks behind the accurate fire of +the Southern riflemen made fearful ravages. Still the enemy pressed +forward; the skirmishers darted from bush to bush; the regiments on the +right swung round, enveloping the Confederate line; and the 1st +Virginia, despite the entreaties of its officers, broke and +scattered.[13] Assailed in front from the field and in flank from the +forest, the men would stand no longer, and flying back through the +woodland, left the way open to the very rear of the position. The 42nd +Virginia, outflanked in turn, was compelled to give ground; and the +Federals, without waiting to reform, swept rapidly through the wood, +and bore down upon the flank of Taliaferro’s brigade and Winder’s +batteries. + +And now occurred a scene of terrible confusion. So swift was the +onslaught that the first warning received by the Confederates on the +highroad was a sudden storm +of musketry, the loud cheers of the enemy, and the rush of fugitives +from the forest. Attacked simultaneously in front, flank and rear, with +the guns and limbers entangled among the infantry, Winder’s division +was subjected to an ordeal of which it was without experience. The +batteries, by Jackson’s order, were at once withdrawn, and not a gun +was lost. The infantry, however, did not escape so lightly. The +Federals, emboldened by the flight of the artillery, charged forward +with reckless courage. Every regimental commander in Garnett’s brigade +was either killed or wounded. Taliaferro’s brigade was driven back, and +Early’s left was broken. Some regiments attempted to change front, +others retreated in disorder. Scattered groups, plying butt and +bayonet, endeavoured to stay the rout. Officers rushed into the +_mêlée,_ and called upon those at hand to follow. Men were captured and +recaptured, and, for a few moments, the blue and grey were mingled in +close conflict amid the smoke. But the isolated efforts of the +Confederates were of no avail. The first line was irretrievably broken; +the troops were mingled in a tumultuous mass, through which the shells +tore shrieking; the enemy’s bayonets were surging forward on every +side, and his well-served batteries, firing over the heads of their own +infantry, played heavily on the road. But fortunately for the +Virginians the Federal right wing was unsupported; and although the +Light Division was still at some distance from the field, the Stonewall +Brigade was already advancing. Breaking through the rout to the left of +the highroad, these five staunch regiments, undismayed by the disaster, +opened a heavy fire. The Federals, although still superior in numbers +at the decisive point, had lost all order in their successful charge; +to meet this fresh onset they halted and drew together, and then +Jackson, with wonderful energy, restored the battle. + +Sending orders for Ewell and A. P. Hill to attack at once, he galloped +forward, unattended by either staff officer or orderly, and found +himself in the midst of his own men, his soldiers of the Valley, no +longer presenting the stubborn front of Bull Run or Kernstown, but an +ungovernable mob, breaking rapidly to the rear, and on the very +verge of panic. Drawing his sword, for the first time in the war, his +voice pealed high above the din; the troops caught the familiar +accents, instinct with resolution, and the presence of their own +general acted like a spell. “Rally, men,” he shouted, “and follow me!” +Taliaferro, riding up to him, emphatically insisted that the midst of +the _mêlée_ was no place for the leader of an army. He looked a little +surprised, but with his invariable ejaculation of “Good, good,” turned +slowly to the rear. The impulse, however, had already been given to the +Confederate troops. With a wild yell the remnant of the 21st Virginia +rushed forward to the front, and received the pursuers with a sudden +volley. The officers of other regiments, inspired by the example of +their commander, bore the colours forward, and the men, catching the +enthusiasm of the moment, followed in the path of the 21st. The +Federals recoiled. Taliaferro and Early, reforming their brigades, +again advanced upon the right; and Jackson, his front once more +established, turned his attention to the counterstroke he had already +initiated. + +Ewell was ordered to attack the Federal left. Branch, leading the Light +Division, was sent forward to support the Stonewall Brigade, and Lane +to charge down the highroad. Thomas was to give aid to Early. Archer +and Pender, following Branch, were to outflank the enemy’s right, and +Field and Stafford were to follow as third line. + +Ewell was unable to advance at once, for the Confederate batteries on +Slaughter Mountain swept the whole field, and it was some time before +they could be induced to cease fire. But on the left the mass of fresh +troops, directed on the critical point, exerted a decisive influence. +The Federal regiments, broken and exhausted, were driven back into the +wood and across the wheat-field by the charge of the Stonewall Brigade. +Still they were not yet done with. Before Hill’s troops could come into +action, Jackson’s old regiments, as they advanced into the open, were +attacked in front and threatened on the flank. The 4th and 27th +Virginia were immediately thrown back to meet the more pressing danger, +forming to the left within +the wood; but assailed in the confusion of rapid movement, they gave +way and scattered through the thickets. But the rift in the line was +rapidly closed up. Jackson, riding in front of the Light Division, and +urging the men to hold their fire and use their bayonets, rallied the +27th and led them to the front; while Branch’s regiments, opening their +ranks for the fugitives to pass through, and pressing forward with +unbroken line, drove back the Northern skirmishers, and moving into the +wheatfield engaged their main body in the opposite wood. + +[Illustration: Map of the Battle of Cedar Run, Virginia, Saturday, +August 9th, 1862.] + +Lane, meanwhile, was advancing astride the road; Archer and Pender, in +accordance with Jackson’s orders, were sweeping round through the +forest, and Field and Stafford were in rear of Branch. A fresh brigade +had come up to sustain the defeated Federals; but gallantly as they +fought, the Northerners could make no head against overwhelming +numbers. Outflanked to both right and left, for Early and Ewell were +now moving forward, they began to yield. Jackson rode forward to the +wheat-field, and just at this moment Banks made a despairing effort to +extricate his infantry. Two squadrons, hitherto concealed by the woods, +appeared suddenly on the road, and, deploying into two lines, charged +full against the Confederate centre. The skirmishers were ridden down; +but the troops in rear stood firm, and several companies, running to a +fence along the highway, poured a devastating fire into the mass of +horsemen. Out of 174 officers and men only 71 rode back.[14] + +6.30 p.m. This brilliant but useless exploit brought no respite to the +Federals. Archer and Pender had turned their right; Ewell was pressing +forward against their left, scaling the ridge on which their batteries +had been posted; Early and Lane were pressing back their centre, and +their guns had already limbered up. Jackson, galloping to the front, +was received with the cheers of his victorious troops. In every quarter +of the field the enemy was in full retreat, and as darkness began to +fall the whole Confederate line crossed Cedar Run and swept up the +slopes beyond. Every yard of ground bore witness to the severity of the +fighting. The slaughter had been very heavy. Within ninety minutes +3,000 men had fallen. The woods were a shambles, and among the corn the +dead lay thick. Scores of prisoners surrendered themselves, and +hundreds of discarded muskets bore witness to the demoralisation of the +Northerners. Nevertheless, the pursuit was slow. The impetuosity of the +Confederates, eager to complete their triumph, was checked with a firm +hand. The infantry were ordered to reform before they entered the dense +forest which lay between them and Culpeper. The guns, unable to cross +Cedar Run except by the road, were brought over in a single column, and +two fresh brigades, Field’s and Stafford’s, which had not yet fired a +shot, were brought forward as advanced guard. Although Jackson had been +careful to bring guides who knew the woodland tracks, there was need +for prudence. The light was failing; the cavalry could find no space to +act; and, above all, the whereabouts of Pope’s main body was still +uncertain. The Federals had fought with fine courage. Their resolute +attack, pressed home with extraordinary dash, had rolled up the +choicest of the Valley regiments. And yet it was evident that only a +small portion of the Northern army had been engaged. The stirring +incidents of the battle had been crowded into a short space of time. It +was five o’clock when the Federals left their covert. An hour and a +half later they had abandoned the field. Their precipitate retreat, the +absence of a strong rear-guard, were sure tokens that every regiment +had been employed in the attack, and it was soon discovered by the +Confederate soldiers that these regiments were old opponents of the +Valley army. The men who had surprised and outflanked Jackson’s old +division were the same men that had been surprised at Front Royal and +outflanked at Winchester. But Banks’ army corps formed only a third +part of Pope’s army. Sigel and McDowell were still to be accounted for. + +It was possible, however, that no more formidable enemies than the +troops already defeated would be found between Cedar Run and Culpeper, +and Jackson, intent +upon securing that strategic point before morning,[15] pushed steadily +forward. Of the seven miles that intervened between the battle-field +and the Court House only one-and-a-half had been passed, when the +scouts brought information that the enemy was in position a few hundred +yards to the front. A battery was immediately sent forward to develop +the situation. The moon was full, and on the far side of the glade +where the advanced guard, acting under Jackson’s orders, had halted and +deployed, a strong line of fire marked the hostile front. Once more the +woodland avenues reverberated to the crash of musketry, and when the +guns opened a portion of the Federal line was seen flying in disorder. +Pope himself had arrived upon the scene, but surprised by the sudden +salvo of Jackson’s guns, he was constrained to do what he had never +done in the West—to turn his back upon the enemy, and seek a safer +position. Yet despite the disappearance of the staff the Union +artillery made a vigorous reply. Two batteries, hidden by the timber, +concentrated on the four guns of the advanced guard, and about the same +moment the Confederate cavalry on the extreme right reported that they +had captured prisoners belonging to Sigel’s army corps. “Believing it +imprudent,” says Jackson, “to continue to move forward during the +darkness, I ordered a halt for the night.” + +August 10 Further information appears to have come to hand after +midnight; and early the next morning General Stuart, who had arrived on +a tour of inspection, having been placed in charge of the cavalry, +ascertained beyond all question that the greater part of Pope’s army +had come up. The Confederates were ordered to withdraw, and before noon +nearly the whole force had regained their old position on Cedar Run. +They were not followed, save by the Federal cavalry; and for two days +they remained in position, ready to receive attack. The enemy, however, +gave no sign of aggressive intentions. + +August 11 On the morning of the 11th a flag of truce was received, and +Pope was permitted to bury the dead which had not already been +interred. The same +night, his wounded, his prisoners, and the captured arms having already +been removed, Jackson returned to his old camps near Gordonsville. + +August 12 His position on Cedar Run, tactically strong, was +strategically unsound. The intelligence he had obtained was +substantially correct. With the exception of five regiments of +McDowell’s cavalry, only Banks’ army corps had been engaged at Cedar +Run. But during the evening both Sigel and McDowell had reached the +field, and it was their troops which had checked the Confederate +pursuit. In fact, on the morning of the 10th, Pope, besides 5,000 +cavalry, had 22,000 fresh troops in addition to those which had been +defeated, and which he estimated at 5,000 effectives, wherewith to bar +the way to Culpeper. McDowell’s second division, 10,000 strong, on the +march from Fredericksburg, was not more than twenty mites east of +Slaughter Mountain. + +In front, therefore, Jackson was confronted by superior numbers. At the +least estimate, 32,000 men were posted beyond Cedar Run, and 10,000 +under King were coming up from Fredericksburg. Nor was a preponderance +of numbers the only obstacle with which Jackson had to deal. A direct +attack on Pope was impossible, but a turning movement, by way of James +City, might have found him unprepared, or a swift advance might have +crushed King. But for the execution of either manœuvre a large force of +cavalry was absolutely essential. By this means alone could the march +be concealed and a surprise effected. In view, however, of the superior +strength of the Federal horsemen such a project was unfeasible, and +retreat was manifestly the only alternative. Nevertheless, it was not +till he was assured that no further opportunity would be given him that +Jackson evacuated his position. For two days he remained on Cedar Run, +within two miles of the Federal outposts, defying his enemy to battle. +If an attack on the Federals promised nothing but defeat, it was not so +sure that Pope with 27,000 infantry, of whom a considerable number had +just tasted defeat, would be able to oust Jackson with 22,000 from a +position +which the latter had selected; and it was not till King’s approach gave +the Federals an overwhelming superiority that the Confederates withdrew +behind the Rapidan. + +With sublime audacity, as soon as his enemy had disappeared, Pope +claimed the battle of Cedar Run as a Federal success. Carried away by +enthusiasm he ventured to forecast the future. “It is safe to predict,” +he declared in a general order, “that this is only the first of a +series of victories which shall make the Army of Virginia famous in the +land.” That such language, however, was the natural result of intense +relief at Jackson’s retreat may be inferred from his telegrams, which, +unfortunately for his reputation, have been preserved in the archives +of Washington. Nor was his attitude on the 10th and 11th that of a +victorious commander. For two days he never stirred from his position. +He informed Halleck that the enemy was in very superior force, that +Stuart and Longstreet had joined Jackson, and while the Confederates +were withdrawing he was telegraphing that he would certainly be +attacked the next morning. + +Halleck’s reply to Pope’s final dispatch, which congratulated the +defeated army corps on a “hard-earned but brilliant success,” must have +astonished Banks and his hapless troops. They might indeed be fairly +considered to have “covered themselves with glory.”[16] 9,000 men, of +which only 7,000 were infantry, had given an enemy of more than double +their strength a hard fight. They had broken some of the best troops in +the Confederate army, under their most famous leader; and if they had +been overwhelmed by numbers, they had at least fought to the last man. +Jackson himself bore witness to the vigour of their onslaught, to their +“temporary triumph,” and to the “impetuous valour” of their cavalry. +The Federal defeat was more honourable than many victories. But that it +was a crushing defeat can hardly be disputed. The two divisions which +had been engaged were completely shattered, and Pope reported that they +were no longer fit for service. The casualties amongst the infantry +amounted to a third +of the total strength. Of the brigade that had driven in the +Confederate left the 28th New York lost the whole of its company +officers; the 5th Connecticut 17 officers out of 20, and the 10th Maine +had 170 killed or wounded. In two brigades nearly every field-officer +and every adjutant was struck down. The 2nd Massachusetts, employed in +the last effort to hold back Jackson’s counterstroke, lost 16 officers +out of 28, and 147 men out of 451. The Ohio regiments, which had been +with Shields at Kernstown and Port Republic, and had crossed Cedar Run +opposite the Confederate centre, were handled even more roughly. The +5th lost 118 men out of 275, the 7th 10 officers out of 14, and 170 men +out of 293. Two generals were wounded and one captured. 400 prisoners, +three stand of colours, 5,000 rifles and one gun were taken by the +Southerners, and, including those suffered by Sigel and McDowell in the +night action, the sum of losses reached 2,380. The Confederates by no +means came off scatheless. General Winder died upon the field; and the +two brigades that stood the brunt of the attack, together with Early’s, +suffered heavily. But the number of killed and wounded amounted to no +more than 1,314, and many of the brigades had few losses to report. The +spirit of the Valley troops was hardly to be tamed by such punishment +as this. Nevertheless, Northern historians have not hesitated to rank +Cedar Run as a battle unfavourable to the Confederates. Swinton +declares that Jackson undertook the pursuit of Banks, “_under the +impression_ that he had gained a victory.“[17] Southern writers, on the +other hand, have classed Cedar Run amongst the most brilliant +achievements of the war, and an unbiassed investigation goes far to +support their view. + +During the first week in August Jackson, protecting the Virginia +Central Railroad, was confronted by a much superior force. He could +expect no further reinforcements, +for McClellan was still near Richmond, and according to the latest +information was actually advancing. On the 7th he heard that Pope also +was moving forward from Hazel Run, and had pushed a portion of his army +as far as Culpeper. In face of the overwhelming strength of the Federal +cavalry it was impossible, if he occupied a defensive position, that he +could protect the railroad; for while their infantry and artillery held +him in front, their swarming squadrons would operate at their leisure +on either flank. Nor could a defensive position have been long +maintained. There were no natural obstacles, neither river nor +mountains, to protect Jackson’s flanks; and the railroad—his line of +supply—would have been parallel to his front. In a vigorous offensive, +then, should opportunity offer, lay his best chance of success. That +opportunity was offered by the unsupported advance of the Federal +detachment under Banks. It is true that Jackson hoped to achieve more +than the defeat of this comparatively small force. If he could have +seized Culpeper he might have been able to deal with Pope’s army in +detail; he saw before him another Valley campaign, and he was fully +justified in believing that victory on the Rapidan would bring +McClellan back to Washington. + +His anticipations were not altogether realised. He crushed the +detachment immediately opposed to him, but he failed to seize Culpeper, +and McClellan had already been ordered, although this was unknown to +the Confederates, to evacuate the Peninsula. But it cannot be fairly +said that his enterprise was therefore useless. Strategically it was a +fine conception. The audacity of his manœuvre was not the least of its +merits. For an army of 24,000 men, weak in cavalry, to advance against +an army of 47,000, including 5,000 horsemen, was the very height of +daring. But it was the daring of profound calculation. As it was, +Jackson ran little risk. He succeeded in his immediate object. He +crushed Pope’s advanced guard, and he retreated unmolested, bearing +with him the prisoners, the colours, and the arms which he had +captured. If he did not succeed in occupying Culpeper, it was not his +fault. Fortune was against +him. On the very day that he had moved forward Pope had done the same. +Banks and McDowell were at Culpeper on the 8th, and Sigel received +orders to move the same day. + +Nevertheless the expedition was far from barren in result. If Jackson +failed to defeat Pope altogether, he at least singed his beard. It was +well worth the loss of 1,300 men to have destroyed two whole divisions +under the very eyes of the general commanding a superior army. A few +days later Pope was to feel the want of these gallant regiments,[18] +and the confidence of his troops in their commander was much shaken. +Moreover, the blow was felt at Washington. There was no more talk of +occupying Gordonsville. Pope was still full of ardour. But Halleck +forbade him to advance further than the Rapidan, where Burnside would +reinforce him; and McClellan was ordered to hasten the departure of his +troops from the Peninsula. + +Jackson’s tactics have been criticised as severely as his strategy. +Because his first line was broken it is asserted that he narrowly +escaped a serious defeat, and that had the two forces been equally +matched Banks would have won a decisive victory. This is hardly sound +criticism. In the first place, Jackson was perfectly well aware that +the two forces were not equally matched. If he had had no more men than +Banks, would he have disposed his forces as he did? He would scarcely +have occupied the same extent of ground with 9,000 men that he did with +20,000. His actual front, when Banks attacked, was two miles long. With +smaller numbers he would have occupied a smaller front, and would have +retained a sufficient force in reserve. In the second place, it is +generally possible for an inferior force, if it puts every man into the +fighting-line, to win some measure of success. But such success, as was +shown at Kernstown, can seldom be more than temporary; and if the enemy +makes good use of his reserves must end in defeat. + +So far from Jackson’s tactics being indifferent, it is very easy to +show that they were exactly the contrary. Immediately he came upon the +field he sent Ewell to occupy Slaughter Mountain, a mile distant from +his line of march; and the huge hill, with batteries planted on its +commanding terraces, not only secured his flank, but formed a strong +pivot for his attack on the Federal right. The preliminary operations +were conducted with due deliberation. There was no rushing forward to +the attack while the enemy’s strength was still uncertain. The ridge +occupied by the enemy, so far as possible, was thoroughly reconnoitred, +and every rifled gun was at once brought up. The artillery positions +were well selected, for, notwithstanding their superiority of ordnance, +the Federal batteries suffered far more heavily than the Confederates. +The one weak point was the extreme left, and to this point Jackson in +person directed the attention of his subordinates. “Had +reinforcements,” says Colonel Garnett, who commanded the troops that +first gave way, “momentarily expected, arrived ten minutes sooner no +disaster would have happened.”[19] That the point was not strengthened, +that the Stonewall Brigade was not posted in second line behind the 1st +Virginia, and that only a staff officer and an orderly were sent to +patrol the forest to the westward, instead of several companies of +infantry, was in no way due to the general-in-chief. + +Nor was the position of A. P. Hill’s division, which, in conjunction +with the Stonewall Brigade, averted the disaster and won the victory, a +fortuitous circumstance. Before the attack began it had been directed +to this point, and the strong counterstroke which was made by these +fresh troops was exactly the manœuvre which the situation demanded. At +the time it was ordered the Confederate left and centre were hard +pressed. The Stonewall Brigade had checked the troops which had issued +from the forest, but the whole Confederate line was shaken. The normal, +though less brilliant, course would have been to have re-established +the front, and not +till that had been done to have ventured on the counter-stroke. +Jackson, with that quick intuition which is possessed by few, saw and +seized his opportunity while the Federals were still pressing the +attack. One of Hill’s brigades was sent to support the centre, and, +almost in the same breath, six others, a mass of 7,000 or 8,000 men, +were ordered to attack the enemy’s right, to outflank it, and to roll +back his whole line upon Ewell, who was instructed at the same moment +to outflank the left. Notwithstanding some delay in execution, Ewell’s +inability to advance, and the charge of the Federal cavalry, this +vigorous blow changed the whole aspect of the battle within a short +half-hour. Conceived in a moment, in the midst of wild excitement and +fierce tumult, delivered with all the strength available, it cannot be +judged otherwise than as the mark of a great captain. Few battles, +indeed, bear the impress of a single personality more clearly than +Cedar Run. From the first cannon-shot of the advanced guard until the +last volley in the midnight forest, one will directed every movement. +The field was no small one. The fight was full of startling changes. It +was no methodical conflict, but a fierce struggle at close quarters, +the lines swaying to and fro, and the ground covered with confused +masses of men and guns, with flying batteries and broken regiments. But +the turmoil of battle found a master. The strong brain was never +clearer than when the storm raged most fiercely. Wherever his presence +was most needed there Jackson was seen, rallying the fugitives, +reinforcing the centre, directing the counterstroke, and leading the +pursuit. And he was well supported. His subordinate generals carried +out their orders to the letter. But every order which bore upon the +issue of the battle came from the lips of one man. + +If Northern writers have overlooked the skill with which Jackson +controlled the fight, they have at the same time misunderstood his +action two days later. His retreat to Gordonsville has been represented +as a flight. He is said to have abandoned many wounded and stragglers, +and to have barely saved his baggage. In all this there is not one word +of truth. We have, indeed, the report of the Federal officer who +conducted the pursuit. “The flight of the enemy after Saturday’s fight +was most precipitate and in great confusion. His old camp was strewn +with dead men, horses, and arms. . . . A good many (Federal) prisoners, +wounded in Saturday’s fight, were found almost abandoned. Major +Andrews, chief of artillery to General Jackson, was found, badly +wounded, at Crooked Run, in charge of an assistant surgeon.” It is +hardly necessary to say that General Buford, the officer thus +reporting, had not been present at the battle. He had been out off with +his four regiments by the advance of the Confederate cavalry, and had +retired on Sperryville. He may accordingly be excused for imagining +that a retreat which had been postponed for two days was precipitate. +But dead men, dead horses, and old arms which the Confederates had +probably exchanged for those which were captured, several wounded +Federals, who had been prisoners in the enemy’s hands, and one wounded +Confederate, a major of horse-artillery and not a staff officer at all, +are hardly evidences of undue haste or great confusion. Moreover, in +the list of Confederate casualties only thirty-one men were put down as +missing. + +It is true that Jackson need not have retreated so far as Gordonsville. +He might have halted behind the Rapidan, where the bluffs on the south +bank overlook the level country to the north. But Jackson’s manœuvres, +whether in advance or retreat, were invariably actuated by some +definite purpose, and what that purpose was he explains in his +dispatches.[20] “I remained in position until the night of the 11th, +when I returned to the vicinity of Gordonsville, in order to avoid +being attacked by the vastly superior force in front of me, _and with +the hope that by thus falling back, General Pope would be induced to +follow me until I should be reinforced._” That Pope, had he been left +to his own judgment, would have crossed the Rapidan is certain. “The +enemy,” he reported, “has retreated to Gordonsville. . . . I shall move +forward on Louisa Court House as soon as Burnside arrives.” He was +restrained, however, +by the more wary Halleck. “Beware of a snare,” wrote the +Commander-in-Chief. “Feigned retreats are ‘Secesh’ tactics.” How wise +was this warning, and what would have been the fate of Pope had he +recklessly crossed the Rapidan, the next chapter will reveal. + + [1] After the repulse of the Confederates at Malvern Hill, and the + unmolested retreat of the Army of the Potomac to Harrison’s Landing, + Lincoln cancelled his demand for troops from the West. + + [2] Dabney, vol. ii, pp. 230, 231. + + [3] O.R., vol. xi, part ii, p. 306. + + [4] Sigel, 13,000; Banks, 11,000; McDowell, 18,000; Bayard’s and + Bulord’s cavalry, 5,000. + + [5] O.R., vol. xi, part iii, p. 334. + + [6] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 474. + + [7] “We must constantly feel the enemy, know where he is, and what he + is doing. Vigilance, activity, and a precaution that has a + considerable mixture of audacity in it will carry you through many + difficulties.” Such were his instructions to an officer of the regular + army! It was unfortunate he had not acted on those sound principles in + the Valley. + + [8] McClellan had received no further reinforcements than those sent + from Washington. Burnside, with 14,000 men, remained at Fortress + Monroe until the beginning of August, when he embarked for Aquia + Creek, concentrating on August 5. Hunter’s troops were withheld. + + [9] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 281. + + [10] This was the case. Banks had reached Culpeper on the 8th. On the + same day his advanced brigade was sent forward to Cedar Run, and was + followed by the rest of the army corps on the 9th. + + [11] 3,500 of Banks’ army corps had been left at Winchester, and his + sick were numerous. + + [12] Banks had received an order from Pope which might certainly be + understood to mean that he should take the offensive if the enemy + approached.—_Report of Committee of Congress,_ vol. iii, p. 45. + + [13] O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 201. + + [14] O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 141. + + [15] nReport. O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 184.ote + + [16] O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 135. + + [17] I may here express my regret that in the first edition I should + have classed Mr. Ropes amongst the adverse critics of Jackson’s + operations at this period. How I came to fall into the error I cannot + explain. I should certainly have remembered that Mr. Ropes’ writings + are distinguished as much by impartiality as by ability. + + [18] So late as August 28, Pope reported that Banks’ troops were much + demoralised. O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 653. + + [19] O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 201. + + [20] O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 185. + + + + +Chapter XVI +GROVETON AND THE SECOND MANASSAS + + +During the summer of 1862 the stirring events in the Western hemisphere +attracted universal attention. All eyes were fixed on Richmond. The +fierce fighting on the Chickahominy, and the defeat of the invaders, +excited Europe hardly less than it did the North. The weekly mails were +eagerly awaited. The newspapers devoted many columns to narrative, +criticism, and prediction. The strategy and tactics of the rival armies +were everywhere discussed, and the fact that almost every single item +of intelligence came from a Northern source served only as a whet to +curiosity. The vast territory controlled by the Confederacy was so +completely cut off from the outer world that an atmosphere of mystery +enveloped the efforts of the defence. “The Southern States,” it has +been said, “stood in the attitude of a beleaguered fortress. The war +was in truth a great siege; the fortress covered an area of more than +700,000 square miles, and the lines of investment around it extended +over more than 10,000 miles.” Within the circle of Federal cannon and +Federal cruisers only the imagination could penetrate. At rare +intervals some daring blockade-runner brought a budget of Southern +newspapers, or an enterprising correspondent succeeded in transmitting +a dispatch from Richmond. But such glimpses of the situation within the +cordon did little more than tantalise. The news was generally belated, +and had often been long discounted by more recent events. Still, from +Northern sources alone, it was abundantly clear that the weaker of the +two belligerents was making a splendid struggle. Great names and great +achievements loomed large through +the darkness. The war at the outset, waged by ill-trained and +ill-disciplined volunteers, commanded by officers unknown to fame, had +attracted small notice from professional soldiers. After the Seven +Days’ battles it assumed a new aspect. The men, despite their +shortcomings, had displayed undeniable courage, and the strategy which +had relieved Richmond recalled the master-strokes of Napoleon. It was +evident that the Southern army was led by men of brilliant ability, and +the names of Lee’s lieutenants were on every tongue. Foremost amongst +these was Stonewall Jackson. Even the Northern newspapers made no +scruple of expressing their admiration, and the dispatches of their own +generals gave them constant opportunities of expatiating on his skill. +During the first weeks of August, the reports from the front, whether +from Winchester, from Fredericksburg, or from the Peninsula, betrayed +the fear and uneasiness he inspired. The overthrow of Pope’s advanced +guard at Cedar Run, followed by the unaccountable disappearance of the +victorious army, was of a piece with the manœuvres in the Valley. What +did this disappearance portend? Whither had the man of mystery betaken +himself? Where would the next blow fall? “I don’t like Jackson’s +movements,” wrote McClellan to Halleck; “he will suddenly appear when +least expected.” This misgiving found many echoes. While Jackson was +operating against Pope, McClellan had successfully completed the +evacuation of Harrison’s Landing. Embarking his sick, he marched his +five army corps to Fortress Monroe, observed by Lee’s patrols, but +otherwise unmolested. The quiescence of the Confederates, however, +brought no relief to the North. Stocks fell fast, and the premium on +gold rose to sixteen per cent. For some days not a shot had been fired +along the Rapidan. Pope’s army rested in its camps. Jackson had +completely vanished. But the silence at the front was not considered a +reassuring symptom. + +If the Confederates had allowed McClellan to escape, it was very +generally felt that they had done so only because they were preparing +to crush Pope before he could be +reinforced. “It is the fear of this operation,” wrote the _Times_ +Special Correspondent in the Northern States, “conducted by the +redoubtable Stonewall Jackson, that has filled New York with uneasy +forebodings. Wall Street does not ardently believe in the present good +fortune or the future prospects of the Republic.”[1] + +Neither the knowledge which McClellan possessed of his old West Point +comrade, nor the instinct of the financiers, proved misleading. Jackson +had already made his plans. Even before he had lured Pope forward to +the Rapidan he had begun to plot his downfall. “When we were marching +back from Cedar Run,” writes Major Hotchkiss, “and had passed Orange +Court House on our way to Gordonsville, the general, who was riding in +front of the staff, beckoned me to his aide. He at once entered into +conversation, and said that as soon as we got back to camp he wished me +to prepare maps of the whole country between Gordonsville and +Washington, adding that he required several copies—I think five. + +August 13 “This was about noon on Sunday, and as we were near camp I +asked him if the map was to be begun immediately, knowing his great +antipathy to doing anything on Sunday which was not a work of +necessity. He replied that it was important to have it done at +once.”[2] + +August 14 The next day, August 14, the exact position of the Federal +army was ascertained. The camps were north and east of Slaughter +Mountain, and Jackson instructed Captain Boswell, his chief engineer, +who had lived in the neighbourhood, to report on the best means of +turning the enemy’s left flank and reaching Warrenton, thus intervening +between Pope and Washington, or between Pope and Aquia Creek. The line +of march recommended by Boswell led through Orange Court House to +Pisgah Church, and crossing the Rapidan at Somerville Ford, ran by Lime +Church and Stevensburg to Brandy Station. + +August 15 On the night of the 15th, after two days’ rest, the three +divisions moved from Gordonsville to Pisgah Church, and there halted to +await reinforcements. +These were already on their way. On the 13th General Lee had learned +that Burnside, who had already left the Peninsula for Aquia Creek on +the Potomac, was preparing to join Pope, and it was reported by a +deserter that part of McClellan’s army had embarked on the transports +at Harrison’s Landing. Inferring that the enemy had relinquished all +active operations in the Peninsula, and that Pope would soon be +reinforced by the Army of the Potomac, Lee resolved to take the +offensive without delay. The campaign which Jackson had suggested more +than a month before, when McClellan was still reeling under the effects +of his defeat, and Pope’s army was not yet organised, was now to be +begun. The same evening the railway conveyed Longstreet’s advanced +brigade to Gordonsville, and with the exception of D. H. Hill’s and +McLaws’ divisions, which remained to watch McClellan, the whole army +fled. + +On the 15th Lee met his generals in council. The map drawn by Captain +Hotchkiss was produced, and the manœuvre which had suggested itself to +Jackson was definitely ordered by the Commander-in-Chief. The Valley +army, at dawn on the 18th, was to cross the Rapidan at Somerville Ford. +Longstreet, preceded by Stuart, who was to cut the Federal +communications in rear of Culpeper Court House, was to make the passage +at Raccoon Ford. Jackson’s cavalry was to cover the left and front, and +Anderson’s division was to form a general reserve. The movement was +intended to be speedy. Only ambulances and ammunition waggons were to +follow the troops. Baggage and supply trains were to be parked on the +south side of the Rapidan, and the men were to carry three days’ cooked +rations in their haversacks. + +On Clark’s Mountain, a high hill near Pisgah Church, Jackson had +established a signal station. The view from the summit embraced an +extensive landscape. The ravages of war had not yet effaced its +tranquil beauty, nor had the names of its bright rivers and thriving +villages become household words. It was still unknown to history, a +peaceful and pastoral district, remote from the beaten +tracks of trade and travel, and inhabited by a quiet and industrious +people. To-day there are few regions which boast sterner or more heroic +memories. To the right, rolling away in light and shadow for a score of +miles, is the great forest of Spotsylvania, within whose gloomy depths +lie the fields of Chancellorsville; where the breastworks of the +Wilderness can still be traced; and on the eastern verge of which stand +the grass-grown batteries of Fredericksburg. Northward, beyond the +woods which hide the Rapidan, the eye ranges over the wide and fertile +plains of Culpeper, with the green crest of Slaughter Mountain +overlooking Cedar Run, and the dim levels of Brandy Station, the scene +of the great cavalry battle,[3] just visible beyond. Far away to the +north-east the faint outline of a range of hills marks the source of +Bull Run and the Manassas plateau, and to the west, the long rampart of +the Blue Ridge, softened by distance, stands high above the Virginia +plains. + +August 17 On the afternoon of August 17, Pope’s forces seemed doomed to +inevitable destruction. The Confederate army, ready to advance the next +morning, was concentrated behind Clark’s Mountain, and Lee and Jackson, +looking toward Culpeper, saw the promise of victory in the careless +attitude of the enemy. The day was hot and still. Round the base of +Slaughter Mountain, fifteen miles northward, clustered many thousands +of tents, and the blue smoke of the camp-fires rose straight and thin +in the sultry air. Regiments of infantry, just discernible through the +glare, were marching and countermarching in various directions, and +long waggon-trains were creeping slowly along the dusty roads. Near at +hand, rising above the tree-tops, the Union colours showed that the +outposts still held the river, and the flash of steel at the end of +some woodland vista betrayed the presence of scouting party or vedette. +But there were no symptoms of unusual excitement, no sign of working +parties, of reinforcements for the advanced posts, of the construction +of earthworks or abattis. Pope’s camps were scattered over a wide tract +of +country, his cavalry was idle, and it seemed absolutely certain that he +was unconscious of the near neighbourhood of the Confederate army. + +The inference was correct. The march to Pisgah Church had escaped +notice. The Federals were unaware that Lee had arrived at Gordonsville, +and they had as yet no reason to believe that there was the smallest +danger of attack. + +Between Raccoon and Locustdale fords, and stretching back to Culpeper +Court House, 52,500 men—for Reno, with two divisions of Burnside’s +army, 8,000 strong, had arrived from Fredericksburg—were in camp and +bivouac. The front was protected by a river nearly a hundred yards +wide, of which every crossing was held by a detachment, and Pope had +reported that his position was so strong that it would be difficult to +drive him from it. But he had not made sufficient allowance for the +energy and ability of the Confederate leaders. His situation, in +reality, was one of extreme danger. In ordering Pope to the Rapidan, +and bidding him “fight like the devil’[4] until McClellan should come +up, Halleck made the same fatal error as Stanton, when he sent Shields +up the Luray Valley in pursuit of Jackson. He had put an inferior force +within reach of an enemy who held the interior lines, and had ordered +two armies, separated by several marches, to effect their concentration +under the fire of the enemy’s guns. And if Pope’s strategical position +was bad, his tactical position was even worse. His left, covering +Raccoon and Somerville Fords, was very weak. The main body of his army +was massed on the opposite flank, several miles distant, astride the +direct road from Gordonsville to Culpeper Court House, and he remained +without the least idea, so late as the morning of the 18th, that the +whole Confederate army was concentrated behind Clark’s Mountain, within +six miles of his most vulnerable point. Aware that Jackson was based on +Gordonsville, he seems to have been convinced that if he advanced at +all, he would advance directly on Culpeper +Court House; and the move to Pisgah Church, which left Gordonsville +unprotected, never entered into his calculations. A sudden attack +against his left was the last contingency that he anticipated; and had +the Confederates moved as Lee intended, there can be no question but +that the Federal army, deprived of all supplies, cut off from +Washington, and forced to fight on ground where it was unprepared, +would have been disastrously defeated. + +But it was not to be. The design was thwarted by one of those petty +accidents which play so large a part in war. Stuart had been instructed +to lead the advance. The only brigade at his disposal had not yet come +up into line, but a message had been sent to appoint a rendezvous, and +it was expected to reach Verdiersville, five miles from Raccoon Ford, +on the night of the 17th. Stuart’s message, however, was not +sufficiently explicit. Nothing was said of the exigencies of the +situation; and the brigadier, General Fitzhugh Lee, not realising the +importance of reaching Verdiersville on the 17th, marched by a +circuitous route in order to replenish his supplies. At nightfall he +was still absent, and the omission of a few words in a simple order +cost the Confederates dear. Moreover, Stuart himself, who had ridden to +Verdiersville with a small escort, narrowly escaped capture. His plumed +hat, with which the whole army was familiar, as well as his +adjutant-general and his dispatch-box, fell into the hands of a Federal +reconnoitring party; and among the papers brought to Pope was found a +letter from General Lee, disclosing the fact that Jackson had been +strongly reinforced. + +In consequence of the absence of Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade, the movement +was postponed until the morning of the 20th. The Commander-in-Chief was +of opinion that the horses, exhausted by their long march, would +require some rest before they were fit for the hard work he proposed +for them. Jackson, for once in opposition, urged that the movement +should go forward. His signal officer on Clark’s Mountain reported that +the enemy was quiet, and even extending his right up stream. The +location of the Federal divisions had been already ascertained. The +cavalry was not required to get information. There was no need, +therefore, to wait till Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade was fit for movement. +Jackson had, with his own command, a sufficient number of squadrons to +protect the front and flanks of the whole army; and the main object was +not to cut the enemy’s communications, but to turn his left and +annihilate him. Pope was still isolated, still unconscious of his +danger, and the opportunity might never return. + +The suggestion, however, was overruled, and “it was fortunate,” says +one of Pope’s generals, “that Jackson was not in command of the +Confederates on the night of August 17; for the superior force of the +enemy must have overwhelmed us, if we could not have escaped, and +escape on that night was impossible.”[5] + +It is probable, however, that other causes induced General Lee to hold +his hand. There is good reason to believe that it was not only the +cavalry that was unprepared. The movement from Richmond had been rapid, +and both vehicles and supplies had been delayed. Nor were all the +generals so avaricious of time as Jackson. It was impossible, it was +urged, to move without some food in the waggons. Jackson replied that +the enemy had a large magazine at Brandy Station, which might easily be +captured, and that the intervening district promised an abundance of +ripening corn and green apples. It was decided, however, that such +fare, on which, it may be said, the Confederates learned afterwards to +subsist for many days in succession, was too meagre for the work in +hand. Jackson, runs the story, groaned so audibly when Lee pronounced +in favour of postponement, that Longstreet called the attention of the +Commander-in-Chief to his apparent disrespect. + +August 18 Be this as it may, had it been possible to adopt Jackson’s +advice, the Federal army would have been caught in the execution of a +difficult manœuvre. On the morning of the 18th, about the very hour +that the advance should have begun, Pope was informed by a spy that the +Confederate army was assembled behind Clark’s +Mountain and the neighbouring hills; that the artillery horses were +harnessed, and that the troops were momentarily expecting orders to +cross the river and strike his rear. He at once made preparations for +retreat. The trains moved off to seek shelter behind the Rappahannock, +and the army followed, leaving the cavalry in position, and marching as +follows:— + +Reno by Stevensburg to Kelly’s Ford. +Banks and McDowell by Culpeper Court House and + Brandy Station to the Rappahannock railway bridge. +Sigel by Rixeyville to Sulphur Springs. + +August 19 The march was slow and halts were frequent. The long lines of +waggons blocked every road, and on the morning of August 19 the troops +were still at some distance from the Rappahannock, in neither condition +nor formation to resist a resolute attack. + +August 20 The movement, however, was not discovered by the Confederates +until it had been more than four-and-twenty hours in progress. General +Lee, on August 19, had taken his stand on Clark’s Mountain, but the +weather was unfavourable for observation. Late in the afternoon the +haze lifted, and almost at the same moment the remaining tents of the +Federal army, fifteen miles away to the north-west, suddenly vanished +from the landscape, and great clouds of dust, rising high above the +woods, left it no longer doubtful that Pope had taken the alarm. It was +too late to interfere, and the sun set on an army baffled of its prey. +In the Confederate councils there was some dismay, among the troops +much heart-burning. Every hour that was wasted brought nearer the +junction of Pope and McClellan, and the soldiers were well aware that a +most promising opportunity, which it was worth while living on green +corn and apples to secure, had been allowed to slip. Nevertheless, the +pursuit was prompt. By the light of the rising moon the advanced guards +plunged thigh-deep into the clear waters of the Rapidan, and the whole +army crossed by Raccoon and Somerville Fords. Stuart, with Robertson’s +and Fitzhugh Lee’s brigades, pressed forward on the traces +of the retreating foe. Near Brandy Station the Federal cavalry made a +stubborn stand. The Confederates, covering a wide front, had become +separated. Robertson had marched through Stevensburg, Fitzhugh Lee on +Kelly’s Ford, an interval of six miles dividing the two brigades; and +when Robertson was met by Bayard’s squadrons, holding a skirt of woods +with dismounted men, it was several hours before a sufficient force +could be assembled to force the road. Towards evening two of Fitzhugh +Lee’s regiments came up, and the Confederates were now concentrated in +superior numbers. A series of vigorous charges, delivered by successive +regiments on a front of fours, for the horsemen were confined to the +road, hurried the retreating Federals across the Rappahannock; but the +presence of infantry and guns near the railway bridge placed an +effective barrier in the way of further pursuit. Before nightfall +Jackson’s advanced guard reached Brandy Station, after a march of +twenty miles, and Longstreet bivouacked near Kelly’s Ford. + +The Rappahannock, a broad and rapid stream, with banks high and +well-timbered, now rolled between the hostile armies. Pope, by his +timely retreat, had gained a position where he could be readily +reinforced, and although the river, in consequence of the long drought, +had much dwindled from its usual volume, his front was perfectly +secure. + +The situation with which the Confederate commander had now to deal was +beset by difficulties. The delay from August 18 to August 20 had been +most unfortunate. The Federals were actually nearer Richmond than the +Army of Northern Virginia, and if McClellan, landing as Burnside had +done at Aquia Creek, were to move due south through Fredericksburg, he +would find the capital but feebly garrisoned. It was more probable, +however, that he would reinforce Pope, and Lee held fast to his idea of +crushing his enemies in detail. Aquia Creek was only thirty-five miles’ +march from the Rappahannock, but the disembarkation with horses, +trains, and artillery must needs be a lengthy process, and it might +still be possible, by skilful and swift +manœuvres, to redeem the time which had been already lost. But the +Federal position was very strong. + +August 21 Early on the 21st it was ascertained that Pope’s whole army +was massed on the left bank of the Rappahannock, extending from Kelly’s +Ford to Hazel Run, and that a powerful artillery crowned the commanding +bluffs. To turn the line of the river from the south was hardly +practicable. The Federal cavalry was vigilant, and Pope would have +quietly fallen back on Washington. A turning movement from the north +was more promising, and during the day Stuart, supported by Jackson, +made vigorous efforts to find a passage across the river. Covered by a +heavy fire of artillery, the squadrons drove in a regiment and a +battery holding Beverley Ford, and spread their patrols over the +country on the left bank. It was soon evident, however, that the ground +was unsuitable for attack, and Stuart, menaced by a strong force of +infantry, withdrew his troopers across the stream. Nothing further was +attempted. Jackson went into bivouac near St. James’s Church, and +Longstreet closed in upon his right. + +August 22 The next morning, in accordance with Lee’s orders to “seek a +more favourable place to cross higher up the river, and thus gain the +enemy’s right,” Jackson, still preceded by Stuart, and concealing his +march as far as possible in the woods, moved towards the fords near +Warrenton Springs. Longstreet, meanwhile, marched towards the bridge at +Rappahannock Station, where the enemy had established a _tête-de-pont,_ +and bringing his guns into action at every opportunity, made brisk +demonstrations along the river. + +Late in the afternoon, after an attack on his rear-guard at Welford’s +Mill had been repulsed by Trimble, reinforced by Hood, Jackson, under a +lowering sky, reached the ruined bridge at the Sulphur Springs. Only a +few of the enemy’s cavalry had been descried, and he at once made +preparations to effect the passage of the Rappahannock. The 13th +Georgia dashed through the ford, and occupied the cottages of the +little watering-place. Early’s brigade and two batteries crossed by an +old mill-dam, a mile below, and +took post on the ridge beyond. But heavy rain had begun to fall; the +night was closing in; and the river, swollen by the storms in the +mountains, was already rising. The difficulties of the passage +increased every moment, and the main body of the Valley army was +ordered into bivouac on the western bank. It was not, however, the +darkness of the ford or the precarious footing of the mill-dam that +held Jackson back from reinforcing his advanced guard, but the +knowledge that these dangerous roadways would soon be submerged by a +raging torrent. Early was, indeed, in peril, but it was better that one +brigade should take its chance of escape than that one half the column +should be cut off from the remainder. + +August 23 Next morning the pioneers were ordered to repair the bridge, +while Longstreet, feinting strongly against the _tête-de-pont,_ gave +Pope occupation. Early’s troops, under cover of the woods, moved +northward to the protection of a creek named Great Run, and although +the Federal cavalry kept close watch upon him, no attack was made till +nightfall. This was easily beaten back; and Jackson, anxious to keep +the attention of the enemy fixed on this point, sent over another +brigade. + +August 24 At dawn on the 24th, however, as the Federals were reported +to be advancing in force, the detachment was brought back to the +Confederate bank. The men had been for two days and a night without +food or shelter. It was in vain that Early, after the bridge had been +restored, had requested to be withdrawn. Jackson sent Lawton to +reinforce him with the curt message: “Tell General Early to hold his +position;” and although the generals grumbled at their isolation, Pope +was effectually deluded into the conviction that a serious attack had +been repulsed, and that no further attempt to turn his right was to be +immediately apprehended. The significance of Jackson’s action will be +seen hereafter. + +While Jackson was thus mystifying the enemy, both Longstreet and Stuart +had been hard at work. The former, after an artillery contest of +several hours’ duration, had driven the enemy from his _tête-de-pont_ +on the railway, and had burnt the bridge. The latter, on the morning of +the +22nd, had moved northward with the whole of the cavalry, except two +regiments, and had ridden round the Federal right. Crossing the +Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge and Hart’s Mills, he marched eastward +without meeting a single hostile scout, and as evening fell the column +of 1,500 men and two pieces of artillery clattered into Warrenton. The +troopers dismounted in the streets. The horses were fed and watered, +and while the officers amused themselves by registering their names, +embellished with fantastic titles, at the hotel, Stuart’s staff, +questioning the throng of women and old men, elicited important +information. None of the enemy’s cavalry had been seen in the vicinity +for some days, and Pope’s supply trains were parked at Catlett’s +Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railway, ten miles south-east. +After an hour’s rest the force moved on, and passing through Auburn +village was caught by the same storm that had cut off Early. The narrow +roads became running streams, and the creeks which crossed the line of +march soon rose to the horses’ withers. But this was the very condition +of the elements most favourable for the enterprise. The enemy’s +vedettes and patrols, sheltering from the fury of the storm, were +captured, one after another, by the advanced guard, and the two +brigades arrived at Catlett’s Station without the Federals receiving +the least notice of their approach. + +A moment’s halt, a short consultation, a silent movement forward, and +the astonished sentinels were overpowered. Beyond were the encampments +and the trains, guarded by 1,500 infantry and 500 horsemen. The night +was dark—the darkest, said Stuart, that he had ever known. Without a +guide concerted action seemed impossible. The rain still fell in +torrents, and the raiders, soaked to the skin, could only grope +aimlessly in the gloom. But just at this moment a negro was captured +who recognised Stuart, and who knew where Pope’s baggage and horses +were to be found. He was told to lead the way, and Colonel W. H. F. +Lee, a son of the Commander-in-Chief, was ordered to follow with his +regiment. The guide +led the column towards the headquarter tents. “Then there mingled with +the noise of the rain upon the canvas and the roar of the wind in the +forest the rushing sound of many horsemen, of loud voices, and clashing +sabres.” One of Pope’s staff officers, together with the uniform and +horses of the Federal commander, his treasure chest, and his personal +effects, fell into the hands of the Confederates, and the greater part +of the enemy’s troops, suddenly alarmed in the deep darkness, dispersed +into the woods. Another camp was quickly looted, and the 1st and 5th +Virginia Cavalry were sent across the railway, riding without accident, +notwithstanding the darkness, over a high embankment with deep ditches +on either side. But the Federal guards had now rallied under cover, and +the attack on the railway waggons had to be abandoned. Another party +had taken in hand the main object of the expedition, the destruction of +the railway bridge over Cedar Run. The force which should have defended +it was surprised and scattered. The timbers, however, were by this time +thoroughly saturated, and only a few axes had been discovered. Some +Federal skirmishers maintained a heavy fire from the opposite bank, and +it was impossible to complete the work. The telegraph was more easily +dealt with; and shortly before daylight on the 23rd, carrying with him +300 prisoners, including many officers, Stuart withdrew by the light of +the blazing camp, and after a march of sixty miles in six-and-twenty +hours, reached the Sulphur Springs before evening. + +The most important result of this raid was the capture of Pope’s +dispatch book, containing most detailed information as to his strength, +dispositions, and designs; referring to the reinforcements he expected, +and disclosing his belief that the line of the Rappahannock was no +longer tenable. But the enterprise had an indirect effect upon the +enemy’s calculations, which was not without bearing on the campaign. +Pope believed that Stuart’s advance on Catlett’s Station had been made +in connection with Jackson’s attempt to cross at Sulphur Springs; and +the retreat of the cavalry, combined with that of Early, seemed +to indicate that the movement to turn his right had been definitely +abandoned. + +The Federal commander was soon to be undeceived. Thrice had General Lee +been baulked. The enemy, who should have been annihilated on August 19, +had gained six days’ respite. On the 20th he had placed himself behind +the Rappahannock. On the 22nd the rising waters forbade Jackson’s +passage at the Sulphur Springs; and now, on the afternoon of the 24th, +the situation was still unchanged. Disregarding Longstreet’s +demonstrations, Pope had marched northward, keeping pace with Jackson, +and his whole force was concentrated on the great road which runs from +the Sulphur Springs through Warrenton and Gainesville to Washington and +Alexandria. He had answered move by countermove. Hitherto, except in +permitting Early to recross the river, he had made no mistake, and he +had gained time. He had marched over thirty miles, and executed +complicated manœuvres, without offering the Confederates an opening. +His position near the Sulphur Springs was as strong as that which he +had left on the lower reaches near the railway bridge. Moreover, the +correspondence in his dispatch book disclosed the fact that a portion +at least of McClellan’s army had landed at Aquia Creek, and was +marching to Bealtown;[6] that a strong force, drawn from the Kanawha +Valley and elsewhere, was assembling at Washington; and that 150,000 +men might be concentrated within a few days on the Rappahannock. Lee, +on learning McClellan’s destination, immediately asked that the troops +which had been retained at Richmond should be sent to join him. Mr. +Davis assented, but it was not till the request had been repeated and +time lost that the divisions of D. H. Hill and McLaws’, two brigades of +infantry, under J. G. Walker, and Hampton’s cavalry +brigade were ordered up. Yet these reinforcements only raised Lee’s +numbers to 75,000 men, and they were from eighty to a hundred miles +distant by an indifferent railroad. + +Nor was it possible to await their arrival. Instant action was +imperative. But what action was possible? A defensive attitude could +only result in the Confederate army being forced back by superior +strength; and retreat on Richmond would be difficult, for the Federals +held the interior lines. The offensive seemed out of the question. +Pope’s position was more favourable than before. His army was massed, +and reinforcements were close at hand. His right flank was well +secured. The ford at Sulphur Springs and the Waterloo Bridge were both +in his possession; north of the Springs rose the Bull Run Mountains, a +range covered with thick forest, and crossed by few roads; and his left +was protected by the march of McClellan’s army corps from Aquia Creek. +Even the genius of a Napoleon might well have been baffled by the +difficulties in the way of attack. But there were men in the +Confederate army to whom overwhelming numbers and strong positions were +merely obstacles to be overcome. + +On August 24 Lee removed his headquarters to Jefferson, where Jackson +was already encamped, and on the same evening, with Pope’s captured +correspondence before them, the two generals discussed the problem. +What occurred at this council of war was never made public. To use +Lee’s words: “A plan of operations was determined on;” but by whom it +was suggested there is none to tell us. “Jackson was so reticent,” +writes Dr. McGuire, “that it was only by accident that we ever found +out what he proposed to do, and there is no staff officer living (1897) +who could throw any light on this matter. The day before we started to +march round Pope’s army I saw Lee and Jackson conferring together. +Jackson—for him—was very much excited, drawing with the toe of his boot +a map in the sand, and gesticulating in a much more earnest way than he +was in the habit of doing. General Lee was simply listening, and after +Jackson had got through, he nodded his head, as if +acceding to some proposal. I believe, from what occurred afterwards, +that Jackson suggested the movement as it was made, but I have no +further proof than the incident I have just mentioned.”[7] It is only +certain that we have record of few enterprises of greater daring than +that which was then decided on; and no matter from whose brain it +emanated, on Lee fell the burden of the responsibility; on his +shoulders, and on his alone, rested the honour of the Confederate arms, +the fate of Richmond, the independence of the South; and if we may +suppose, so consonant was the design proposed with the strategy which +Jackson had already practised, that it was to him its inception was +due, it is still to Lee that we must assign the higher merit. It is +easy to conceive. It is less easy to execute. But to risk cause and +country, name and reputation, on a single throw, and to abide the issue +with unflinching heart, is the supreme exhibition of the soldier’s +fortitude. + +Lee’s decision was to divide his army. Jackson, marching northwards, +was to cross the Bull Run Mountains at Thoroughfare Gap, ten miles as +the crow flies from the enemy’s right, and strike the railway which +formed Pope’s line of supply. The Federal commander, who would +meanwhile be held in play by Longstreet, would be compelled to fall +back in a north-easterly direction to save his communications, and thus +be drawn away from McClellan. Longstreet would then follow Jackson, and +it was hoped that the Federals, disconcerted by these movements, might +be attacked in detail or forced to fight at a disadvantage. The risk, +however, was very great. + +An army of 55,000 men was about to march into a region occupied by +100,000,[8] who might easily be reinforced to 150,000; and it was to +march in two wings, +separated from each other by two days’ march. If Pope were to receive +early warning of Jackson’s march, he might hurl his whole force on one +or the other. Moreover, defeat, with both Pope and McClellan between +the Confederates and Richmond, spelt ruin and nothing less. But as Lee +said after the war, referring to the criticism evoked by manœuvres, in +this as in other of his campaigns, which were daring even to rashness, +“Such criticism is obvious, but the disparity of force between the +contending forces rendered the risks unavoidable.”[9] In the present +case the only alternative was an immediate retreat; and retreat, so +long as the enemy was not fully concentrated, and there was a chance of +dealing with him in detail, was a measure which neither Lee nor Jackson +was ever willing to advise. + +On the evening of the 24th Jackson began his preparations for the most +famous of his marches. His troops were quietly withdrawn from before +the Sulphur Springs, and Longstreet’s division, unobserved by the +Federals, took their place. Captain Boswell was ordered to report on +the most direct and hidden route to Manassas Junction, and the three +divisions—Ewell’s, Hill’s, and the Stonewall, now commanded by +Taliaferro—assembled near Jefferson. Three days’ cooked rations were to +be carried in the haversacks, and a herd of cattle, together with the +green corn standing in the fields, was relied upon for subsistence +until requisition could be made on the Federal magazines. The troops +marched light. Knapsacks were left behind. Tin cans and a few +frying-pans formed the only camp equipment, and many an officer’s +outfit consisted of a few badly baked biscuits and a handful of salt. + +August 25 Long before dawn the divisions were afoot. The men were +hungry, and their rest had been short; but they were old acquaintances +of the morning star, and to march while the east was still grey had +become a matter of routine. But as their guides led northward, and the +sound of the guns, opening along the Rappahannock, grew fainter and +fainter, a certain excitement began to pervade the column. Something +mysterious was in the air. +What their movement portended not the shrewdest of the soldiers could +divine; but they recalled their marches in the Valley and their +inevitable results, and they knew instinctively that a surprise on a +still larger scale was in contemplation. The thought was enough. Asking +no questions, and full of enthusiasm, they followed with quick step the +leader in whom their confidence had become so absolute. The flood had +subsided on the Upper Rappahannock, and the divisions forded it at +Hinson’s Mill, unmolested and apparently unobserved. Without halting it +pressed on, Boswell with a small escort of cavalry leading the way. The +march led first by Amissville, thence north to Orleans, beyond +Hedgeman’s River, and thence to Salem, a village on the Manassas Gap +Railroad. Where the roads diverged from the shortest line the troops +took to the fields. Guides were stationed by the advanced guard at each +gap and gate which marked the route. Every precaution was taken to +conceal the movement. The roads in the direction of the enemy were +watched by cavalry, and so far as possible the column was directed +through woods and valleys. The men, although they knew nothing of their +destination, whether Winchester, or Harper’s Ferry, or even Washington +itself, strode on mile after mile, through field and ford, in the +fierce heat of the August noon, without question or complaint. “Old +Jack” had asked them to do their best, and that was enough to command +their most strenuous efforts. + +Near the end of the day Jackson rode to the head of the leading +brigade, and complimented the officers on the fine condition of the +troops and the regularity of the march. They had made more than twenty +miles, and were still moving briskly, well closed up, and without +stragglers. Then, standing by the wayside, he watched his army pass. +The sun was setting, and the rays struck full on his familiar face, +brown with exposure, and his dusty uniform. Ewell’s division led the +way, and when the men saw their general, they prepared to salute him +with their usual greeting. But as they began to cheer he raised his +hand to stop them, and the word passed down the column, “Don’t shout, +boys, the +Yankees will hear us;” and the soldiers contented themselves with +swinging their caps in mute acclamation. When the next division passed +a deeper flush spread over Jackson’s face. Here were the men he had so +often led to triumph, the men he had trained himself, the men of the +Valley, of the First Manassas, of Kernstown, and McDowell. The +Stonewall regiments were before him, and he was unable to restrain +them; devotion such as theirs was not to be silenced at such a moment, +and the wild battle-yell of his own brigade set his pulses tingling. +For once a breach of discipline was condoned. “It is of no use,” said +Jackson, turning to his staff, “you see I can’t stop them;” and then, +with a sudden access of intense pride in his gallant veterans, he +added, half to himself, “Who could fail to win battles with such men as +these?” + +It was midnight before the column halted near Salem village, and the +men, wearied outright with their march of six-and-twenty miles, threw +themselves on the ground by the piles of muskets, without even +troubling to unroll their blankets. So far the movement had been +entirely successful. Not a Federal had been seen, and none appeared +during the warm midsummer night. Yet the soldiers were permitted scant +time for rest. Once more they were aroused while the stars were bright; +and, half awake, snatching what food they could, they stumbled forward +through the darkness. + +August 26 As the cool breath of the morning rose about them, the dark +forests of the Bull Run Mountains became gradually visible in the faint +light of the eastern sky, and the men at last discovered whither their +general was leading them. With the knowledge, which spread quickly +through the ranks, that they were making for the communications of the +boaster Pope, the regiments stepped out with renewed energy. “There was +no need for speech, no breath to spare if there had been—only the +shuffling tramp of marching feet, the rumbling of wheels, the creak and +clank of harness and accoutrements, with an occasional order, uttered +under the breath, and always the same: ‘Close up, men! Close up!’”[10] +Through Thoroughfare Gap, a narrow gorge in the Bull Run range, with +high cliffs, covered with creepers and crowned with pines on either +hand, the column wound steadily upwards; and, gaining the higher level, +the troops looked down on the open country to the eastward. Over a vast +area of alternate field and forest, bounded by distant uplands, the +shadows of the clouds were slowly sailing. Issuing from the mouth of +the pass, and trending a little to the south-east, ran the broad +high-road, passing through two tiny hamlets, Haymarket and Gainesville, +and climbing by gentle gradients to a great bare plateau, familiar to +the soldiers of Bull Run under the name of Manassas Plains. At +Gainesville this road was crossed by another, which, lost in dense +woods, appeared once more on the open heights to the far north-east, +where the white buildings of Centreville glistened in the sunshine. The +second road was the Warrenton and Alexandria highway, the direct line +of communication between Pope’s army and Washington, and it is not +difficult to divine the anxiety with which it was scrutinised by +Jackson. If his march had been detected, a far superior force might +already be moving to intercept him. At any moment the news might come +in that the Federal army was rapidly approaching; and even were that +not the case, it seemed hardly possible that the Confederate column, +betrayed by the dust, could escape the observation of passing patrols +or orderlies. But not a solitary scout was visible; no movement was +reported from the direction of Warrenton; and the troops pressed on, +further and further round the Federal rear, further and further from +Lee and Longstreet. The cooked rations which they carried had been +consumed or thrown away; there was no time for the slaughter and +distribution of the cattle; but the men took tribute from the fields +and orchards, and green corn and green apples were all the morning meal +that many of them enjoyed. At Gainesville the column was joined by +Stuart, who had maintained a fierce artillery fight at Waterloo Bridge +the previous day; and then, slipping quietly away under cover of the +darkness, had marched at two in the morning to cover +Jackson’s flank. The sun was high in the heavens, and still the enemy +made no sign. Munford’s horsemen, forming the advanced guard, had long +since reached the Alexandria turnpike, sweeping up all before them, and +neither patrols nor orderlies had escaped to carry the news to +Warrenton. + +So the point of danger was safely passed, and thirteen miles in rear of +Pope’s headquarters, right across the communications he had told his +troops to disregard, the long column swung swiftly forward in the +noonday heat. Not a sound, save the muffled roll of many wheels, broke +the stillness of the tranquil valley; only the great dust cloud, +rolling always eastward up the slopes of the Manassas plateau, betrayed +the presence of war. + +Beyond Gainesville Jackson took the road which led to Bristoe Station, +some seven miles south of Manassas Junction. Neither the success which +had hitherto accompanied his movement, nor the excitement incident on +his situation, had overbalanced his judgment. From Gainesville the +Junction might have been reached in little more than an hour’s march; +and prudence would have recommended a swift dash at the supply depôt, +swift destruction, and swift escape. But it was always possible that +Pope might have been alarmed, and the railroad from Warrenton Junction +supplied him with the means of throwing a strong force of infantry +rapidly to his rear. In order to obstruct such a movement Jackson had +determined to seize Bristoe Station. Here, breaking down the railway +bridge over Broad Run, and establishing his main body in an almost +impregnable position behind the stream, he could proceed at his leisure +with the destruction of the stores at Manassas Junction. The advantages +promised by this manœuvre more than compensated for the increased +length of the march. + +The sun had not yet set when the advanced guard arrived within striking +distance of Bristoe Station. Munford’s squadrons, still leading the +way, dashed upon the village. Ewell followed in hot haste, and a large +portion of the guard, consisting of two companies, one of cavalry and +one of infantry, was immediately captured. +A train returning empty from Warrenton Junction to Alexandria darted +through the station under a heavy fire.[11] The line was then torn up, +and two trains which followed in the same direction as the first were +thrown down a high embankment. A fourth, scenting danger ahead, moved +back before it reached the break in the road. The column had now closed +up, and it was already dark. The escape of the two trains was most +unfortunate. It would soon be known, both at Alexandria and Warrenton, +that Manassas Junction was in danger. The troops had marched nearly +five-and-twenty miles, but if the object of the expedition was to be +accomplished, further exertions were absolutely necessary. Trimble, +energetic as ever, volunteered with two regiments, the 21st Georgia and +21st North Carolina, to move on Manassas Junction. Stuart was placed in +command, and without a moment’s delay the detachment moved northward +through the woods. The night was hot and moonless. The infantry moved +in order of battle, the skirmishers in advance; and pushing slowly +forward over a broken country, it was nearly midnight before they +reached the Junction. Half a mile from the depôt their advance was +greeted by a salvo of shells. The Federal garrison, warned by the +fugitives from Bristoe Station, were on the alert; but so harmless was +their fire that Trimble’s men swept on without a check. The two +regiments, one on either side of the railroad, halted within a hundred +yards of the Federal guns. The countersign was passed down the ranks, +and the bugles sounded the charge. The Northern gunners, without +waiting for the onset, fled through the darkness, and two batteries, +each with its full complement of guns and waggons, became the prize of +the Confederate infantry. Stuart, coming up on the flank, rode down the +fugitives. Over 300 prisoners were taken, and the remainder of the +garrison streamed northward through the deserted camps. The results of +this attack more than compensated for the exertions the troops had +undergone. Only 15 Confederates had been wounded, and the supplies on +which Pope’s army, whether it was intended to move against Longstreet +or merely to hold the line of the Rappahannock, depended both for food +and ammunition were in Jackson’s hands. + +August 27 The next morning Hill’s and Taliaferro’s divisions joined +Trimble. Ewell remained at Bristoe; cavalry patrols were sent out in +every direction, and Jackson, riding to Manassas, saw before him the +reward of his splendid march. Streets of warehouses, stored to +overflowing, had sprung up round the Junction. A line of freight cars, +two miles in length, stood upon the railway. Thousands of barrels, +containing flour, pork, and biscuit, covered the neighbouring fields. +Brand-new ambulances were packed in regular rows. Field-ovens, with the +fires still smouldering, and all the paraphernalia of a large bakery, +attracted the wondering gaze of the Confederate soldiery; while great +pyramids of shot and shell, piled with the symmetry of an arsenal, +testified to the profusion with which the enemy’s artillery was +supplied. + +It was a strange commentary on war. Washington was but a long day’s +march to the north; Warrenton, Pope’s headquarters, but twelve miles +distant to the south-west; and along the Rappahannock, between Jackson +and Lee, stood the tents of a host which outnumbered the whole +Confederate army. No thought of danger had entered the minds of those +who selected Manassas Junction as the depôt of the Federal forces. Pope +had been content to leave a small guard as a protection against raiding +cavalry. Halleck, concerned only with massing the whole army on the +Rappahannock, had used every effort to fill the storehouses. If, he +thought, there was one place in Virginia where the Stars and Stripes +might be displayed in full security, that place was Manassas Junction; +and here, as nowhere else, the wealth of the North had been poured out +with a prodigality such as had never been seen in war. To feed, clothe, +and equip the Union armies no expenditure was +deemed extravagant. For the comfort and well-being of the individual +soldier the purse-strings of the nation were freely loosed. No demand, +however preposterous, was disregarded. The markets of Europe were +called upon to supply the deficiencies of the States; and if money +could have effected the re-establishment of the Union, the war would +have already reached a triumphant issue. But the Northern Government +had yet to learn that the accumulation of men, materiel, and supplies +is not in itself sufficient for success. Money alone cannot provide +good generals, a trained staff, or an efficient cavalry; and so on this +August morning 20,000 ragged Confederates, the soldiers of a country +which ranked as the poorest of nations, had marched right round the +rear of the Federal army, and were now halted in undisturbed possession +of all that made that army an effective force. + +Few generals have occupied a position so commanding as did Jackson on +the morning of August 27. His enemies would henceforward have to dance +while he piped. It was Jackson, and not Pope, who was to dictate the +movements of the Federal army. It was impossible that the latter could +now maintain its position on the Rappahannock, and Lee’s strategy had +achieved its end. The capture of Manassas Junction, however, was only +the first step in the campaign. Pope, to restore his communications +with Alexandria, would be compelled to fall back; but before he could +be defeated the two Confederate wings must be united, and the harder +part of the work would devolve on Jackson. The Federals, at Warrenton, +were nearer by five miles to Thoroughfare Gap, his shortest line of +communication with Lee and Longstreet, than he was himself. Washington +held a large garrison, and the railway was available for the transit of +the troops. The fugitives from Manassas must already have given the +alarm, and at any moment the enemy might appear. + +If there were those in the Confederate ranks who considered the +manœuvres of their leader overbold, their misgivings were soon +justified. + +A train full of soldiers from Warrenton Junction put back on finding +Ewell in possession of Bristoe Station; but a more determined effort +was made from the direction of Alexandria. So early as seven o’clock a +brigade of infantry, accompanied by a battery, detrained on the north +bank of Bull Run, and advanced in battle order against the +Junction.[12] The Federals, unaware that the depôt was held in +strength, expected to drive before them a few squadrons of cavalry. But +when several batteries opened a heavy fire, and heavy columns advanced +against their flanks, the men broke in flight towards the bridge. The +Confederate infantry followed rapidly, and two Ohio regiments, which +had just arrived from the Kanawha Valley, were defeated with heavy +loss. Fitzhugh Lee, who had fallen back before the enemy’s advance, was +then ordered in pursuit. The cars and railway bridge were destroyed; +and during the day the brigade followed the fugitives as far as Burke’s +Station, only twelve miles from Alexandria. + +This feeble attack appears to have convinced Jackson that his danger +was not pressing. It was evident that the enemy had as yet no idea of +his strength. Stuart’s cavalry watched every road; Ewell held a strong +position on Broad Run, barring the direct approach from Warrenton +Junction, and it was determined to give the wearied soldiers the +remainder of the day for rest and pillage. It was impossible to carry +away even a tithe of the stores, and when an issue of rations had been +made, the bakery set working, and the liquor placed under guard, the +regiments were let loose on the magazines. Such an opportunity occurs +but seldom in the soldiers’ service, and the hungry Confederates were +not the men to let it pass. “Weak and haggard from their diet of green +corn and apples, one can well imagine,” says Gordon, “with what +surprise their eyes opened upon the contents of the sutlers’ stores, +containing an amount and +variety of property such as they had never conceived. Then came a +storming charge of men rushing in a tumultuous mob over each other’s +heads, under each other’s feet, anywhere, everywhere, to satisfy a +craving stronger than a yearning for fame. There were no laggards in +that charge, and there was abundant evidence of the fruits of victory. +Men ragged and famished clutched tenaciously at whatever came in their +way, whether of clothing or food, of luxury or necessity. Here a long +yellow-haired, barefooted son of the South claimed as prizes a +toothbrush, a box of candles, a barrel of coffee; while another, whose +butternut homespun hung round him in tatters, crammed himself with +lobster salad, sardines, potted game and sweetmeats, and washed them +down with Rhenish wine. Nor was the outer man neglected. From piles of +new clothing the Southerners arrayed themselves in the blue uniforms of +the Federals. The naked were clad, the barefooted were shod, and the +sick provided with luxuries to which they had long been strangers.”[13] + +The history of war records many extraordinary scenes, but there are few +more ludicrous than this wild revel at Manassas. Even the chagrin of +Northern writers gives way before the spectacle; and Jackson must have +smiled grimly when he thought of the maxim which Pope had promulgated +with such splendid confidence: “Let us study the probable lines of +retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of +themselves!” + +It was no time, however, to indulge in reflections on the irony of +fortune. All through the afternoon, while the sharp-set Confederates +were sweeping away the profits which the Northern sutlers had wrung +from Northern soldiers, Stuart’s vigilant patrols sent in report on +report of the Federal movements. From Warrenton heavy columns were +hurrying over the great highroad to Gainesville, and from Warrenton +Junction a large force of all arms was marching direct on Bristoe. +There was news, too, from Lee. Despite the distance to be covered, and +the +proximity of the enemy, a trooper of the Black Horse, a regiment of +young planters which now formed Jackson’s Escort, disguised as a +countryman, made his way back from headquarters, and Jackson learned +that Longstreet, who had started the previous evening, was following +his own track by Orleans, Salem, and Thoroughfare Gap.[14] It was +evident, then, that the whole Federal army was in motion northwards, +and that Longstreet had crossed the Rappahannock. But Longstreet had +many miles to march and Thoroughfare Gap to pass before he could lend +assistance; and the movement of the enemy on Gainesville threatened to +intervene between the widely separated wings of the Confederate army. + +It was no difficult matter for Jackson to decide on the course to be +adopted. There was but one thing to do, to retreat at once; and only +one line of escape still open, the roads leading north and north-west +from Manassas Junction. To remain at Manassas and await Lee’s arrival +would have been to sacrifice his command. 20,000 men, even with the +protection of intrenchments, could hardly hope to hold the whole +Federal army at bay for two days; and it was always possible that Pope, +blocking Thoroughfare Gap with a portion of his force, might delay Lee +for even longer than two days. Nor did it recommend itself to Jackson +as sound strategy to move south, attack the Federal column approaching +Bristoe, and driving it from his path to escape past the rear of the +column moving to Gainesville. The exact position of the Federal troops +was far from clear. Large forces might be encountered near the +Rappahannock, and part of McClellan’s army was known to be marching +westward from Aquia Creek. Moreover, such a movement would have +accentuated the separation of the Confederate wings, and a local +success over a portion of the hostile army would have been but a poor +substitute for the decisive victory which Lee hoped to win when his +whole force was once more concentrated. + +About three in the afternoon the thunder of artillery was heard from +the direction of Bristoe. Ewell had sent a brigade along the railroad +to support some cavalry on reconnaissance, and to destroy a bridge over +Kettle Run. Hardly had the latter task been accomplished when a strong +column of Federal infantry emerged from the forest and deployed for +action. Hooker’s division of 5,500 men, belonging to McClellan’s army, +had joined Pope on the same day that Jackson had crossed the +Rappahannock, and had been dispatched northwards from Warrenton +Junction as soon as the news came in that Manassas Junction had been +captured. Hooker had been instructed to ascertain the strength of the +enemy at Manassas, for Pope was still under the impression that the +attack on his rear was nothing more than a repetition of the raid on +Catlett’s Station. Striking the Confederate outposts at Kettle Run, he +deployed his troops in three lines and pushed briskly forward. The +batteries on both sides opened, and after a hot skirmish of an hour’s +duration Ewell, who had orders not to risk an engagement with superior +forces, found that his flanks were threatened. In accordance with his +instructions he directed his three brigades to retire in succession +across Broad Run. This difficult manœuvre was accomplished with +trifling loss, and Hooker, ascertaining that Jackson’s whole corps, +estimated at 30,000 men, was near at hand, advanced no further than the +stream. Ewell fell back slowly to the Junction; and shortly after +midnight the three Confederate divisions had disappeared into the +darkness. The torch had already been set to the captured stores; +warehouses, trains, camps, and hospitals were burning fiercely, and the +dark figures of Stuart’s troopers, still urging on the work, passed to +and fro amid the flames. Of the value of property destroyed it is +difficult to arrive at an estimate. Jackson, in his official report, +enumerates the various items with an unction which he must have +inherited from some moss-trooping ancestor. Yet the actual quantity +mattered little, for the stores could be readily replaced. But the +effect of their destruction on the Federal operations was for the time +being overwhelming. And of this +destruction Pope himself was a witness. The fight with Ewell had just +ceased, and the troops were going into bivouac, when the +Commander-in-Chief, anxious to ascertain with his own eyes the extent +of the danger to which he was exposed, reached Bristoe Station. There, +while the explosion of the piles of shells resembled the noise of a +great battle, from the ridge above Broad Run he saw the sky to the +north-east lurid with the blaze of a vast conflagration; and there he +learned for the first time that it was no mere raid of cavalry, but +Stonewall Jackson, with his whole army corps, who stood between himself +and Washington. + +For the best part of three days the Union general had been completely +mystified. Jackson had left Jefferson on the 25th. But although his +march had been seen by the Federal signaller on the hills near Waterloo +Bridge,[15] and the exact strength of his force had been reported, his +destination had been unsuspected. When the column was last seen it was +moving northward from Orleans, but the darkness had covered it, and the +measure of prolonging the march to midnight bore good fruit. For the +best part of two days Jackson had vanished from his enemy’s view, to be +found by Pope himself at Manassas Junction.[16] Nevertheless, although +working in the dark, the Federal commander, up to the moment he reached +Bristoe Station, had acted with sound judgment. He had inferred from +the reports of his signalmen that Jackson was marching to Front Royal +on the Shenandoah; but in order to clear up the situation, on the 26th +Sigel and McDowell were ordered to force the passage of the +Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge and the Sulphur Springs, and obtain +information of the enemy’s movements. Reno, at the same time, was to +cross below the railway bridge and make for Culpeper. The manœuvres, +however, were not carried out as contemplated. Only McDowell advanced; +and as Lee had replaced Longstreet, who marched to Orleans the same +afternoon, by Anderson, but little was discovered. + +[Illustration: Situation at Sunset, August 27th, 1862.] + +It was evident, however, that the Confederates were trending steadily +northwards, and on the night of the 26th Pope ordered his 80,000 +Federals to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Warrenton. Reports had +come in that hostile troops had passed through Salem, White Plains, and +Thoroughfare Gap.[17] But it seemed improbable, both to Pope and +McDowell, the second in command, that more was meant by this than a +flank attack on Warrenton. McDowell expressed his opinion that a +movement round the right wing in the direction of Alexandria was far +too hazardous for the enemy to attempt. Pope appears to have +acquiesced, and a line of battle near Warrenton, with a strong reserve +at Greenwich, to the right rear, was then decided on. Franklin’s army +corps from the Peninsula, instead of proceeding to Aquia Creek, was +disembarking at Alexandria, and Halleck had been requested to push +these 10,000 men forward with all speed to Gainesville. The Kanawha +regiments had also reached Washington, and Pope was under the +impression that these too would be sent to join him. He had therefore +but little apprehension for his rear. The one error of judgment into +which both Pope and McDowell had been betrayed was in not giving Lee +due credit for audacity or Jackson for energy. That Lee would dare to +divide his army they had never conceived; that Jackson would march +fifty miles in two days and place his single corps astride their +communications was an idea which had they thought of they would have +instantly dismissed. Like the Austrian generals when they first +confronted Napoleon, they might well have complained that their enemy +broke every rule of the military art; and like all generals who believe +that war is a mere matter of precedent, they found themselves +egregiously deceived. + +The capture of Manassas, to use Pope’s own words, rendered his position +at Warrenton no longer tenable, and early on the 27th, the army, +instead of concentrating on Warrenton, was ordered to move to +Gainesville (from Gainesville it was easy to block Thoroughfare Gap); +Buford’s cavalry brigade was thrown out towards White Plains to observe +Longstreet, and Hooker was dispatched to clear up the situation at +Manassas. This move, which was completed before nightfall, could hardly +have been improved upon. The whole Federal army was now established on +the direct line of communication between Jackson and Lee, and although +Jackson might still escape, the Confederates had as yet gained no +advantage beyond the destruction of Pope’s supplies. It seemed +impossible that the two wings could combine east of the Bull Run +Mountains. But on the evening of the 27th, after the conclusion of the +engagement at Bristoe Station, Pope lost his head. The view he now took +of the situation was absolutely erroneous. Ewell’s retreat before +Hooker he interpreted as an easy victory, which fully compensated for +the loss of his magazines. He imagined that Jackson had been surprised, +and that no other course was open to him than to take refuge in the +intrenchments of Manassas Junction and await Lee’s arrival. Orders were +at once issued for a manœuvre which should ensure the defeat of the +presumptuous foe. The Federal army corps, marching in three columns, +were called up to Manassas, a movement which would leave Thoroughfare +Gap unguarded save by Buford’s cavalry. Some were to move at midnight, +others “at the very earliest blush of dawn.” “We shall bag the whole +crowd, if they are prompt and expeditious,”[18] said Pope, with a sad +lapse from the poetical phraseology he had just employed. + +August 28 And so, on the morning of the 28th, a Federal army once more +set out with the expectation of surrounding Jackson, to find once more +that the task was beyond their powers. + +The march was slow. Pope made no movement from +Bristoe Station until Hooker had been reinforced by Kearney and Reno; +McDowell, before he turned east from Gainesville, was delayed by +Sigel’s trains, which crossed his line of march, and it was not till +noon that Hooker’s advanced guard halted amid the still smouldering +ruins on the Manassas plateau. The march had been undisturbed. The +redoubts were untenanted. The woods to the north were silent. A few +grey-coated vedettes watched the operations from far-distant ridges; a +few stragglers, overcome perhaps by their Gargantuan meal of the +previous evening, were picked up in the copses, but Jackson’s divisions +had vanished from the earth. + +Then came order and counter-order. Pope was completely bewildered. By +four o’clock, however, the news arrived that the railway at Burke’s +Station, within twelve miles of Alexandria, had been cut, and that the +enemy was in force between that point and Centreville. On Centreville, +therefore, the whole army was now directed; Hooker, Kearney, and Reno, +forming the right wing, marched by Blackburn’s Ford, and were to be +followed by Porter and Banks; Sigel and Reynolds, forming the centre, +took the road by New Market and the Stone Bridge; McDowell (King’s and +Ricketts’ divisions), forming the left, was to pass through Gainesville +and Groveton. But when the right wing reached Centreville, Pope was +still at fault. There were traces of a marching column, but some small +patrols of cavalry, who retreated leisurely before the Federal advance, +were the sole evidence of the enemy’s existence. Night was at hand, and +as the divisions he accompanied were directed to their bivouacs, Pope +sought in vain for the enemy he had believed so easy a prey. + +Before his troops halted the knowledge came to him. Far away to the +south-west, where the great Groveton valley, backed by the wooded +mountains, lay green and beautiful, rose the dull booming of cannon, +swelling to a continuous roar; and as the weary soldiers, climbing the +slopes near Centreville, looked eagerly in the direction of the sound, +the rolling smoke of a fierce battle was distinctly visible above the +woods which bordered the Warrenton-Alexandria highway. +Across Bull Run, in the neighbourhood of Groveton, and still further +westward, where the cleft in the blue hills marked Thoroughfare Gap, +was seen the flash of distant guns. McDowell, marching northwards +through Gainesville, had evidently come into collision with the enemy. +Jackson was run to earth at last; and it was now clear that while Pope +had been moving northwards on Centreville, the Confederates had been +moving westward, and that they were once more within reach of Lee. But +by what means, Pope might well have asked, had a whole army corps, with +its batteries and waggons, passed through the cordon which he had +planned to throw around it, and passed through as if gifted with the +secret of invisibility? + +The explanation was simple. While his enemies were watching the +midnight glare above Manassas, Jackson was moving north by three roads; +and before morning broke A. P. Hill was near Centreville, Ewell had +crossed Bull Run by Blackburn’s Ford, and Taliaferro was north of Bald +Hill, with a brigade at Groveton, while Stuart’s squadrons formed a +screen to front and flank. Then, as the Federals slowly converged on +Manassas, Hill and Ewell, marching unobserved along the north bank of +Bull Run, crossed the Stone Bridge; Taliaferro joined them, and before +Pope had found that his enemy had left the Junction, the Confederates +were in bivouac north of Groveton, hidden in the woods, and recovering +from the fatigue of their long night march.[19] + +Jackson’s arrangements for deceiving his enemy, for concealing his line +of retreat, and for drawing Pope northward on Centreville, had been +carefully thought out. The march from Manassas was no hasty movement to +the rear. Taliaferro, as soon as darkness fell, had moved by New Market +on Bald Hill. At 1 a.m. Ewell followed Hill to Blackburn’s Ford; but +instead of continuing the march on Centrevile, had crossed Bull Run, +and moving up stream, had joined Taliaferro by way of the Stone Bridge. +Hill, leaving Centreville at 10 a.m., +marched to the same rendezvous. Thus, while the attention of the enemy +was attracted to Centreville, Jackson’s divisions were concentrated in +the woods beyond Bull Bun, some five or six miles west. The position in +which his troops were resting had been skilfully selected. South of +Sudley Springs, and north of the Warrenton turnpike, it was within +twelve miles of Thoroughfare Gap, and a line of retreat, in case of +emergency, as well as a line by which Lee could join him, should +Thoroughfare Gap be blocked, ran to Aldie Gap, the northern pass of the +Bull Run Mountains. Established on his enemy’s flank, he could avoid +the full shock of his force should Lee be delayed, or he could strike +effectively himself; and it was to retain the power of striking that he +had not moved further northward, and secured his front by camping +beyond Catharpen Run. It was essential that he should be prepared for +offensive action. The object with which he had marched upon Manassas +had only been half accomplished. Pope had been compelled to abandon the +strong line of the Rappahannock, but he had not yet been defeated; and +if he were not defeated, he would combine with McClellan, and advance +in a few days in overwhelming force. Lee looked for a battle with Pope +before he could be reinforced, and to achieve this end it was necessary +that the Federal commander should be prevented from retreating further; +that Jackson should hold him by the throat until Lee should come up to +administer the _coup de grâce._ + +It was with this purpose in his mind that Jackson had taken post near +Groveton, and he was now awaiting the information that should tell him +the time had come to strike. But, as already related, the march of the +Federals on Manassas was slow and toilsome. It was not till the morning +was well on that the brigade of Taliaferro’s division near Groveton, +commanded by Colonel Bradley Johnson, was warned by the cavalry that +the enemy was moving through Gainesville in great strength. A skirmish +took place a mile or two north of that village, and Johnson, finding +himself menaced by far superior numbers, fell back +to the wood near the Douglass House. He was not followed. The Union +generals, Sigel and Reynolds, who had been ordered to Manassas to “bag” +Jackson, had received no word of his departure from the Junction; and +believing that Johnson’s small force was composed only of cavalry, they +resumed the march which had been temporarily interrupted. + +The situation, however, was no clearer to the Confederates. The enemy +had disappeared in the great woods south-west of Groveton, and heavy +columns were still reported coming up from Gainesville. During the +afternoon, however, the cavalry captured a Federal courier, carrying +McDowell’s orders for the movement of the left and centre, which had +been placed under his command, to Manassas Junction,[20] and this +important document was immediately forwarded to Jackson. + +“Johnson’s messenger,” says General Taliaferro, “found the Confederate +headquarters established on the shady side of an old-fashioned +worm-fence, in the corner of which General Jackson and his division +commanders were profoundly sleeping after the fatigues of the preceding +night, notwithstanding the intense heat of the August day. There was +not so much as an ambulance at headquarters. The headquarters’ train +was back beyond the Rappahannock, at Jefferson, with remounts, camp +equipage, and all the arrangements for cooking and serving food. All +the property of the general, the staff, and the headquarters’ bureau +was strapped to the pommels and cantels of the saddles, and these +formed the pillows of their weary owners. The captured dispatch roused +Jackson like an electric shock. He was essentially a man of action. He +rarely, if ever, hesitated. He never asked advice. He called no council +to discuss the situation disclosed by this +communication, although his ranking officers were almost at his side. +He asked no conference of opinion. He made no suggestion, but simply, +without a word, except to repeat the language of the message, turned to +me and said: ‘Move your division and attack the enemy;’ and to Ewell, +‘Support the attack.’ The slumbering soldiers sprang from the earth at +the first murmur. They were sleeping almost in ranks; and by the time +the horses of their officers were saddled, the long lines of infantry +were moving to the anticipated battle-field. + +“The two divisions, after marching some distance to the north of the +turnpike, were halted and rested, and the prospect of an engagement on +that afternoon seemed to disappear with the lengthening shadows. The +enemy did not come. The Warrenton turnpike, along which it was supposed +he would march, was in view, but it was as free from Federal soldiery +as it had been two days before, when Jackson’s men had streamed along +its highway.”[21] + +[Illustration: Situation Sunset, August 28th, 1862.] + +Jackson, however, was better informed than his subordinate. Troops were +still moving through Gainesville, and, instead of turning off to +Manassas, were marching up the turnpike on which so many eyes were +turned from the neighbouring woods. King’s division, while on the march +to Manassas, had been instructed to countermarch and make for +Centrevile, by Groveton and the Stone Bridge. Ricketts, who had been +ordered by McDowell to hold Thoroughfare Gap, was already engaged with +Longstreet’s advanced guard, and of this Jackson was aware; for Stuart, +in position at Haymarket, three miles north of Gainesville, had been +skirmishing all day with the enemy’s cavalry, and had been in full view +of the conflict at the Gap.[22] + +Jackson, however, knew not that one division was all that was before +him. The Federal movements had covered +so wide an extent of country, and had been so well concealed by the +forests, that it was hardly possible for Stuart’s patrols, enterprising +as they were, to obtain accurate information. Unaccustomed to such +disjointed marches as were now in progress across his front, Jackson +believed that King’s column was the flank-guard of McDowell’s army +corps. But, although he had been compelled to leave Hill near the Stone +Bridge, in order to protect his line of retreat on Aldie, he had still +determined to attack. The main idea which absorbed his thoughts is +clear enough. The Federal army, instead of moving direct from Warrenton +on Alexandria, as he had anticipated, had apparently taken the more +circuitous route by Manassas, and if Pope was to be fought in the open +field before he could be reinforced by McClellan, he must be induced to +retrace his steps. To do this, the surest means was a resolute attack +on King’s division, despite the probability that it might be strongly +reinforced; and it is by no means unlikely that Jackson deferred his +attack until near sunset in order that, if confronted by superior +numbers, he might still be able to hold on till nightfall, and obtain +time for Longstreet to come up. + +Within the wood due north of the Dogan House, through which ran an +unfinished railroad, Ewell’s and Taliaferro’s divisions, awaiting the +propitious moment for attack, were drawn up in order of battle. Eight +brigades, and three small batteries, which had been brought across +country with great difficulty, were present, and the remainder of the +artillery was not far distant.[23] Taliaferro, on the right, had two +brigades (A. G. Taliaferro’s and the Stonewall) in first line; Starke +was in second line, and Bradley Johnson near Groveton village. Ewell, +on the left, had placed Lawton and Trimble in front, while Early and +Forno formed a general reserve. This force numbered in all about 8,000 +men, and even the skirmishers, thrown out well to the front, were +concealed by the undulations of the ground. + +The Federal division commanded by General King, although unprovided +with cavalry and quite unsupported, was no unworthy enemy. It was +composed of four brigades of infantry, led by excellent officers, and +accompanied by four batteries. The total strength was 10,000 men. The +absence of horsemen, however, placed the Northerners at a disadvantage +from the outset. + +The leading brigade was within a mile of Groveton, a hamlet of a few +houses at the foot of a long descent, and the advanced guard, deployed +as skirmishers, was searching the woods in front. On the road in rear, +with the batteries between the columns, came the three remaining +brigades—Gibbon’s, Doubleday’s, and Patrick’s—in the order named. + +The wood in which the Confederates were drawn up was near a mile from +the highway, on a commanding ridge, overlooking a broad expanse of open +ground, which fell gently in successive undulations to the road. The +Federals were marching in absolute unconsciousness that the enemy, whom +the last reports had placed at Manassas, far away to the right, was +close at hand. No flank-guards had been thrown out. General King was at +Gainesville, sick, and a regimental band had just struck up a merry +quickstep. On the open fields to the left, bathed in sunshine, there +was not a sign of life. The whitewashed cottages, surrounded by green +orchards, which stood upon the slopes, were lonely and untenanted, and +on the edge of the distant wood, still and drooping in the heat, was +neither stir nor motion. The troops trudged steadily forward through +the dust; regiment after regiment disappeared in the deep copse which +stands west of Groveton, and far to the rear the road was still crowded +with men and guns. Jackson’s time had come. + +Two Confederate batteries, trotting forward from the wood, deployed +upon the ridge. The range was soon found, and the effect was +instantaneous. But the confusion in the Northern ranks was soon +checked; the troops found cover inside the bank which lined the road, +and two batteries, one with the advanced guard and one from the centre +of the column, wheeling into the fields to the +left, came quickly into action. About the same moment Bradley Johnson +became engaged with the skirmishers near Groveton. + +The Confederate infantry, still hidden by the rolling ground, was +forming for attack, when a Federal brigade, led by General Gibbon, +rapidly deploying on the slopes, moved forward against the guns. It was +Stuart’s horse-artillery, so the Northerners believed, which had fired +on the column, and a bold attack would soon drive back the cavalry. But +as Gibbon’s regiments came forward the Southern skirmishers, lying in +front of the batteries, sprang to their feet and opened with rapid +volleys; and then the grey line of battle, rising suddenly into view, +bore down upon the astonished foe. Taliaferro, on the right, seized a +small farmhouse near Gainesville, and occupied the orchard; the +Stonewall Brigade advanced upon his left, and Lawton and Trimble +prolonged the front towards the Douglass House. But the Western farmers +of Gibbon’s brigade were made of stubborn stuff. The Wisconsin +regiments held their ground with unflinching courage. Both flanks were +protected by artillery, and strong reinforcements were coming up. The +advanced guard was gradually falling back from Groveton; the rear +brigades were hurrying forward up the road. The two Confederate +batteries, overpowered by superior metal, had been compelled to shift +position; only a section of Stuart’s horse-artillery under Captain +Pelham had come to their assistance, and the battle was confined to a +frontal attack at the closest range. In many places the lines +approached within a hundred yards, the men standing in the open and +blazing fiercely in each other’s faces. Here and there, as fresh +regiments came up on either side, the grey or the blue gave way for a +few short paces; but the gaps were quickly filled, and the wave once +more surged forward over the piles of dead. Men fell like leaves in +autumn. Ewell was struck down and Taliaferro, and many of their field +officers, and still the Federals held their ground. Night was settling +on the field, and although the gallant Pelham, the boy soldier, brought +a gun into action within seventy paces of Gibbon’s line, yet +the front of fire, flashing redly through the gloom, neither receded +nor advanced. A flank attack on either side would have turned the +scale, but the fight was destined to end as it had begun. The Federal +commander, ignorant of the enemy’s strength, and reaching the field +when the fight was hottest, was reluctant to engage his last reserves. +Jackson had ordered Early and Forno, moving through the wood west of +the Douglass House, to turn the enemy’s right; but within the thickets +ran the deep cuttings and high embankments of the unfinished railroad; +and the regiments, bewildered in the darkness, were unable to advance. +Meanwhile the fight to the front had gradually died away. The Federals, +outflanked upon the left, and far outnumbered, had slowly retreated to +the road. The Confederates had been too roughly handled to pursue. + +The reports of the engagement at Groveton are singularly meagre. +Preceded and followed by events of still greater moment, it never +attracted the attention it deserved. On the side of the Union 2,800 men +were engaged, on the side of the Southerners 4,500, and for more than +an hour and a half the lines of infantry were engaged at the very +closest quarters. The rifled guns of the Federals undoubtedly gave them +a marked advantage. But the men who faced each other that August +evening fought with a gallantry that has seldom been surpassed. The +Federals, surprised and unsupported, bore away the honours. The Western +brigade, commanded by General Gibbon, displayed a coolness and a +steadfastness worthy of the soldiers of Albuera. Out of 2,000 men the +four Wisconsin and Indiana regiments lost 750, and were still +unconquered. The three regiments which supported them, although it was +their first battle, lost nearly half their number, and the casualties +must have reached a total of 1,100. The Confederate losses were even +greater. Ewell, who was shot down in the first line, and lay long on +the field, lost 725 out of 3,000. The Stonewall Brigade, which had by +this time dwindled to 600 muskets, lost over 200, including five field +officers; the 21st Georgia, of Trimble’s brigade, 178 men out of 242; +and it is probable that the Valley army on +this day was diminished by more than 1,200 stout soldiers. The fall of +Ewell was a terrible disaster. Zealous and indefatigable, a stern +fighter and beloved by his men, he was the most able and the most loyal +of Jackson’s generals. Taliaferro, peculiarly acceptable to his +Virginia regiments as a Virginian himself, had risen from the rank of +colonel to the command of a division, and his spurs had been well won. +The battle of Groveton left gaps in Jackson’s ranks which it was hard +to fill, and although the men might well feel proud of their stubborn +fight, they could hardly boast of a brilliant victory. + +Strategically, however, the engagement was decisive. Jackson had +brought on the fight with the view of drawing the whole Federal army on +himself, and he was completely successful. The centre, marching on the +Stone Bridge from Manassas Junction, heard the thunder of the cannon +and turned westward; and before nightfall A. P. Hill’s artillery became +engaged with Sigel’s advanced guard. Pope himself, who received the +intelligence of the engagement at 9.20 p.m., immediately issued orders +for an attack on Jackson the next morning, in which the troops who had +already reached Centreville were to take part. “McDowell,” ran the +order, “has intercepted the retreat of the enemy, Sigel is immediately +in his front, and I see no possibility of his escape.” + +But Pope, full of the idea that Jackson had been stopped in attempting +to retreat through Thoroughfare Gap, altogether misunderstood the +situation. He was badly informed. He did not know even the position of +his own troops. His divisions, scattered over a wide extent of country, +harassed by Stuart’s cavalry, and ignorant of the topography, had lost +all touch with the Commander-in-Chief. Important dispatches had been +captured. Messages and orders were slow in arriving, if they arrived at +all. Even the generals were at a loss to find either the +Commander-in-Chief or the right road. McDowell had ridden from +Gainesville to Manassas in order to consult with Pope, but Pope had +gone to Centreville. McDowell thereupon set out to rejoin his troops, +but lost his way in the forest and went +back to Manassas. From Ricketts Pope received no information +whatever.[24] He was not aware that after a long skirmish at +Thoroughfare Gap, Longstreet had opened the pass by sending his +brigades over the mountains on either hand, threatening both flanks of +the Federals, and compelling them to retire. He was not aware that +King’s division, so far from intercepting Jackson’s retreat, had +abandoned the field of Groveton at 1 a.m., and, finding its position +untenable in face of superior numbers, had fallen back on Manassas; or +that Ricketts, who had by this time reached Gainesville, had in +consequence continued his retreat in the same direction. + +Seldom have the baneful effects of dispersion been more strikingly +illustrated, and the difficulty, under such circumstances, of keeping +the troops in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. On the morning of the +28th Pope had ordered his army to march in three columns on Manassas, +one column starting from Warrenton Junction, one from Greenwich, and +one from Buckland Mills, the roads which they were to follow being at +their furthest point no more than seven miles apart. And yet at dawn on +the 29th he was absolutely ignorant of the whereabouts of McDowell’s +army corps; he was but vaguely informed of what had happened during the +day; and while part of his army was at Bald Hill, another part was at +Centreville, seven miles north-east, and a third at Manassas and at +Bristoe, from seven to twelve miles south-east. Nor could the staff be +held to blame for the absence of communication between the columns. In +peace it is an easy matter to assume that a message sent to a +destination seven miles distant by a highroad or even country lanes +arrives in good time. Seven miles in peace are very short. In war, in +the neighbourhood of the enemy, they are very long. In peace, roads are +easy to find. In war, it is the exception that they are found, even +when messengers are provided with good maps +and the country is thickly populated; and it is from war that the +soldier’s trade is to be learned. + +Jackson’s army corps bivouacked in the position they had held when the +fierce musketry of Groveton died away. It was not till long after +daybreak on the 29th that his cavalry patrols discovered that King’s +troops had disappeared, and that Longstreet’s advanced guard was +already through Thoroughfare Gap. Nor was it till the sun was high that +Lee learned the events of the previous evening, and these threw only a +faint light on the general situation. But had either the +Commander-in-Chief or his lieutenant, on the night of the 28th, known +the true state of affairs, they would have had reason to congratulate +themselves on the success of the plan which had been hatched on the +Rappahannock. They had anticipated that should Jackson’s movement on +Manassas prove successful, Pope would not only fall back, but that he +would fall back in all the confusion which arises from a hastily +conceived plan and hastily executed manœuvres. They had expected that +in his hurried retreat his army corps would lose touch and cohesion; +that divisions would become isolated; that the care of his impedimenta, +suddenly turned in a new direction, would embarrass every movement; and +that the general himself would become demoralised. + +The orders and counter-orders, the marches and counter-marches of +August 28, and the consequent dispersion of the Federal army, are +sufficient in themselves to prove the deep insight into war possessed +by the Confederate leaders. + +Nevertheless, the risk bred of separation which, in order to achieve +great results, they had deliberately accepted had not yet passed away. +Longstreet had indeed cleared the pass, and the Federals who guarded it +had retreated; but the main body of the Confederate army had still +twelve miles to march before it could reach Jackson, and Jackson was +confronted by superior numbers. On the plateau of Bull Run, little more +than two miles from the field of Groveton, were encamped over 20,000 +Federals, with the main number at Manassas. At Centreville, a seven +miles’ march, were 18,000; and at Bristoe Station, about the same +distance, 11,000. + +It was thus possible for Pope to hurl a superior force against Jackson +before Lee could intervene; and although it would have been sounder +strategy, on the part of the Federal commander, to have concentrated +towards Centreville, and have there awaited reinforcements, now fast +coming up, he had some reason for believing that he might still, +unaided, deal with the enemy in detail. The high virtue of patience was +not his. Ambition, anxiety to retrieve his reputation, already +blemished by his enforced retreat, the thought that he might be +superseded by McClellan, whose operations in the Peninsula he had +contemptuously criticised, all urged him forward. An unsuccessful +general who feels instinctively that his command is slipping from him, +and who sees in victory the only hope of retaining it, seldom listens +to the voice of prudence. + +August 29 So on the morning of the 29th Jackson had to do with an enemy +who had resolved to overwhelm him by weight of numbers. Nor could he +expect immediate help. The Federal cavalry still stood between Stuart +and Thoroughfare Gap, and not only was Jackson unaware that Longstreet +had broken through, but he was unaware whether he could break through. +In any case, it would be several hours before he could receive support, +and for that space of time his three divisions, worn with long marching +and the fierce fight of the previous evening, would have to hold their +own unaided. The outlook, to all appearance, was anything but bright. +But on the opposite hills, where the Federals were now forming in line +of battle, the Valley soldiers had already given proof of their +stubborn qualities on the defensive. The sight of their baptismal +battle-field and the memories of Bull Run must have gone far to nerve +the hearts of the Stonewall regiments, and in preparing once more to +justify their proud title the troops were aided by their leader’s quick +eye for a position. While it was still dark the divisions which had +been engaged at Groveton took ground to their left, and passing north +of the hamlet, deployed on the right of A. P. Hill. The long, +flat-topped ridge, covered with scattered copses and rough undergrowth, +which stands north of the +Warrenton–Centreville road, commands the approaches from the south and +east, and some five hundred yards below the crest ran the unfinished +railroad. + +Behind the deep cuttings and high embankments the Confederate +fighting-line was strongly placed. The left, lightly thrown back, +rested on a rocky spur near Bull Run, commanding Sudley Springs Ford +and the road to Aldie Gap. The front extended for a mile and +three-quarters south-west. Early, with two brigades and a battery, +occupied a wooded knoll where the unfinished railroad crosses the +highroad, protecting the right rear, and stretching a hand to +Longstreet. + +The infantry and artillery were thus disposed:— + +_Infantry_ + + Left.—A. P. Hill’s Division. First and Second line: Three brigades. + (Field, Thomas, Gregg.) Third line: Three brigades. (Branch, + Pender, Archer.) + Centre.—Two brigades of Ewell’s Division (now commanded by + Lawton). (Trimble’s and Lawton’s.) + Right.—Taliaferro’s Division (now commanded by Stark). First + and Second line: Two brigades. Third line: Two brigades. + Force detached on the right: Two brigades of Ewell’s Division + (Early and Forno), and one battery. + +_Artillery_ + + 16 guns behind the left, 24 guns behind the right centre: On the + ridge, five hundred yards in rear of the fighting-line. + +The flanks were secured by Stuart. A portion of the cavalry was placed +at Haymarket to communicate as soon as possible with Longstreet. A +regiment was pushed out towards Manassas, and on the left bank of Bull +Run Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade watched the approaches from Centreville and +the north. Jackson’s strength, deducting the losses of the previous +day, and the numerous stragglers left behind during his forced marches, +can hardly have exceeded 18,000 muskets, supported by 40 guns, all that +there was room for, and some 2,500 cavalry. These numbers, however, +were ample for the defence of the position which had been selected. +Excluding the detached force on the extreme +right, the line occupied was three thousand yards in length, and to +every yard of this line there were more than five muskets, so that half +the force could be retained in third line or reserve. The position was +thus strongly held and strong by nature. The embankments formed stout +parapets, the cuttings deep ditches. + +Before the right and the right centre the green pastures, shorn for +thirteen hundred yards of all obstacles save a few solitary cottages, +sloped almost imperceptibly to the brook which is called Young’s +Branch. The left centre and left, however, were shut in by a belt of +timber, from four hundred to six hundred yards in width, which we may +call the Groveton wood. This belt closed in upon, and at one point +crossed, the railroad, and, as regards the field of fire, it was the +weakest point. In another respect, however, it was the strongest, for +the defenders were screened by the trees from the enemy’s artillery. +The rocky hill on the left, facing north-east, was a point of vantage, +for an open corn-field lay between it and Bull Run. Within the +position, behind the copses and undulations, there was ample cover for +all troops not employed on the fighting-line; and from the ridge in +rear the general could view the field from commanding ground. + +5.15 a.m. Shortly after 5 a.m., while the Confederates were still +taking up their positions, the Federal columns were seen moving down +the heights near the Henry House. Jackson had ridden round his lines, +and ordering Early to throw forward two regiments east of the turnpike, +had then moved to the great battery forming in rear of his right +centre. His orders had already been issued. The troops were merely to +hold their ground, no general counterstroke was intended, and the +divisional commanders were to confine themselves to repulsing the +attack. The time for a strong offensive return had not yet come. + +The enemy advanced slowly in imposing masses. Shortly after seven +o’clock, hidden to some extent by the woods, four divisions of infantry +deployed in several lines at the foot of the Henry Hill, and their +skirmishers became +engaged with the Confederate pickets. At the same moment three +batteries came into action on a rise north-east of Groveton, opposite +the Confederate centre, and Sigel, supported by Reynolds, prepared to +carry out his instructions, and hold Jackson until the remainder of +Pope’s army should arrive upon the field. At the end of July, Sigel’s +army corps had numbered 13,000 men. Allowing for stragglers and for +casualties on the Rappahannock, where it had been several times +engaged, it must still have mustered 11,000. It was accompanied by ten +batteries, and Reynolds’ division was composed of 8,000 infantry and +four batteries. The attack was thus no stronger than the defence, and +as the Federal artillery positions were restricted by the woods, there +could be little doubt of the result. In other respects, moreover, the +combatants were not evenly matched. Reynolds’ Pennsylvanians were fine +troops, already seasoned in the battles on the Peninsula, and commanded +by such officers as Meade and Seymour. But Sigel, who had been an +officer in the Baden army, had succeeded Frémont, and his corps was +composed of those same Germans whom Ewell had used so hardly at Cross +Keys. Many of them were old soldiers, who had borne arms in Europe; but +the stern discipline and trained officers of conscript armies were +lacking in America, and the Confederate volunteers had little respect +for these foreign levies. Nor were Sigel’s dispositions a brilliant +example of offensive tactics. His three divisions, Schurz’, Schenck’s, +and Steinwehr’s, supported by Milroy’s independent brigade, advanced to +the attack along a wide front. Schurz, with two brigades, moving into +the Groveton wood, assailed the Confederate left, while Milroy and +Schenck advanced over the open meadows which lay in front of the right. +Steinwehr was in reserve, and Reynolds, somewhat to the rear, moved +forward on the extreme left. The line was more than two miles long; the +artillery, hampered by the ground, could render but small assistance; +and at no single point were the troops disposed in sufficient depth to +break through the front of the defence. The attack, too, was piecemeal. +Advancing +through the wood, Schurz’ division was at once met by a sharp +counterstroke, delivered by the left brigade (Gregg’s South Carolina) +of A. P. Hill’s division, which drove the two Federal brigades apart. +Reinforcements were sent in by Milroy, who had been checked on the open +ground by the heavy fire of Jackson’s guns, and the Germans rallied; +but, after some hard fighting, a fresh counterstroke, in which Thomas’ +brigade took part, drove them in disorder from the wood; and the South +Carolinians, following to the edge, poured heavy volleys into their +retreating masses. Schenck, meanwhile, deterred by the batteries on +Jackson’s right, had remained inactive; the Federal artillery, such as +had been brought into action, had produced no effect; Reynolds, who had +a difficult march, had not yet come into action; and in order to +support the broken troops Schenck was now ordered to close in upon the +right. But the opportunity had already passed. + +10.15 a.m. It was now 10.30 a.m., and Jackson had long since learned +that Lee was near at hand. Longstreet’s advanced guard had passed +through Gainesville, and the main body was closing up. Not only had +time been gained, but two brigades alone had proved sufficient to hold +the enemy at arm’s length, and the rough counterstrokes had +disconcerted the order of attack. A fresh Federal force, however, was +already approaching. The troops from Centreville, comprising the +divisions of Hooker, Kearney, and Reno, 17,000 or 18,000 men, were +hurrying over the Stone Bridge; and a second and more vigorous attack +was now to be withstood. Sigel, too, was still capable of further +effort. Bringing up Steinwehr’s division, and demanding reinforcements +from Reno, he threw his whole force against the Confederate front. +Schenck, however, still exposed to the fire of the massed artillery, +was unable to advance, and Milroy in the centre was hurled back. But +through the wood the attack was vigorously pressed, and the fight raged +fiercely at close quarters along the railway. Between Gregg’s and +Thomas’ brigades a gap of over a hundred yards, as the men closed in +upon the +centre, had gradually opened. Opposite the gap was a deep cutting, and +the Federals, covered by the wood, massed here unobserved in heavy +force. Attack from this quarter was unexpected, and for a moment Hill’s +first line was in jeopardy. Gregg, however, had still a regiment in +second line, and throwing it quickly forward he drove the enemy across +the railroad. Then Hill, bringing up Branch from the third line, sent +this fresh brigade to Gregg’s support, and cleared the front. + +The Germans had now been finally disposed of. But although Longstreet +had arrived upon the ground, and was deploying in the woods on +Jackson’s right, thus relieving Early, who at once marched to support +the centre, Jackson’s men had not yet finished with the enemy. Pope had +now taken over command; and besides the troops from Centreville, who +had already reached the field, McDowell and Porter, with 27,000 men, +were coming up from Manassas, and Reynolds had not yet been engaged. +But it is one thing to assemble large numbers on the battle-field, +another to give them the right direction. + +In the direction of Gainesville high woods and rolling ridges had +concealed Longstreet’s approach, and the Federal patrols had been +everywhere held in check by Stuart’s squadrons. In ignorance, +therefore, that the whole Confederate army was concentrated before him, +Pope, anticipating an easy victory, determined to sweep Jackson from +the field. But it was first necessary to relieve Sigel. Kearney’s +division had already deployed on the extreme right of the Federal line, +resting on Bull Run. Hooker was on the left of Kearney and a brigade of +Reno’s on the left of Hooker. While Sigel assembled his shattered +forces, these 10,000 fresh troops, led by some of the best officers of +the Army of the Potomac, were ordered to advance against A. P. Hill. +Reynolds, under the impression that he was fighting Jackson, was +already in collision with Longstreet’s advanced-guard; and McDowell and +Porter, marching along the railway from Manassas, might be expected to +strike the Confederate right rear at any moment. It was then with good +hope of victory that Pope rode along his line and explained the +situation to his generals. + +But the fresh attack was made with no better concert than those which +preceded it. Kearney, on the right, near Bull Run, was held at bay by +Jackson’s guns, and Hooker and Reno advanced alone. + +[Illustration: Positions on August 29th, 1862.] + +1 p.m. As the Federals moved forward the grey skirmishers fell back +through the Groveton wood, and scarcely had they reached the railroad +before the long blue lines came crashing through the undergrowth. +Hill’s riflemen, lying down to load, and rising only to fire, poured in +their deadly volleys at point-blank range. The storm of bullets, +shredding leaves and twigs, stripped the trees of their verdure, and +the long dry grass, ignited by the powder sparks, burst into flames +between the opposing lines. But neither flames nor musketry availed to +stop Hooker’s onset. Bayonets flashed through the smoke, and a gallant +rush placed the stormers on the embankment. The Confederates reeled +back in confusion, and men crowded round the colours to protect them. +But assistance was at hand. A fierce yell and a heavy volley, and the +regiments of the second line surged forward, driving back the +intruders, and closing the breach. Yet the Federal ranks reformed; the +wood rang with cheers, and a fresh brigade advanced to the assault. +Again the parapet was carried; again the Southern bayonets cleared the +front. Hooker’s leading brigade, abandoning the edge of the wood, had +already given ground. Reno’s regiments, suffering fearful slaughter, +with difficulty maintained their place; and Hill, calling once more +upon his reserves, sent in Pender to the counterstroke. Passing by the +right of Thomas, who, with Field, had borne the brunt of the last +attack, Pender crossed the railroad, and charged into the wood. Many of +the men in the fighting-line joined in the onward movement. The +Federals were borne back; the brigades in rear were swept away by the +tide of fugitives; the wood was cleared, and a battery near by was +deserted by the gunners. + +Then Pender, received with a heavy artillery fire from the opposite +heights, moved boldly forward across the open. But the counterstroke +had been pushed too far. The line +faltered; hostile infantry appeared on either flank, and as the +Confederates fell back to the railroad, the enemy came forward in +pursuit. Grover’s brigade of Hooker’s division had hitherto been held +in reserve, sheltered by a roll of the land opposite that portion of +the front which was held by Thomas. + +3 p.m. It was now directed to attack. “Move slowly forward,” were the +orders which Grover gave to his command, “until the enemy opens fire. +Then advance rapidly, give them one volley, and then the bayonet.” The +five regiments moved steadily through the wood in a single line. When +they reached the edge they saw immediately before them the red earth of +the embankment, at this point ten feet high and lined with riflemen. +There was a crash of fire, a swift rush through the rolling smoke, and +the Federals, crossing the parapet, swept all before them. Hill’s +second line received them with a scattered fire, turned in confusion, +and fled back upon the guns. Then beckoned victory to him who had held +his reserves in hand. Jackson had seen the charge, and Forno’s +Louisianians, with a regiment of Lawton’s, had already been sent +forward with the bayonet. + +In close order the counterstroke came on. The thinned ranks of the +Federals could oppose no resolute resistance. Fighting they fell back, +first to the embankment, where for a few moments they held their own, +and then to the wood. But without supports it was impossible to rally. +Johnson’s and Starke’s brigades swept down upon their flank, the +Louisianians, supported by Field and Archer, against their front, and +in twenty minutes, with a loss of one-fourth his numbers, Grover in his +turn was driven beyond the Warrenton turnpike. + +Four divisions, Schurz’, Steinwehr’s, Hooker’s, and Reno’s, had been +hurled in succession against Jackson’s front. Their losses had been +enormous. Grover’s brigade had lost 461 out of 2,000, of which one +regiment, 288 strong, accounted for 6 officers and 106 men; three +regiments of Reno’s lost 530; and it is probable that more than 4,000 +men had fallen in the wood which lay in front of Hill’s brigades. + +The fighting, however, had not been without effect on +the Confederates. The charges to which they had been exposed, impetuous +as they were, were doubtless less trying than a sustained attack, +pressed on by continuous waves of fresh troops, and allowing the +defence no breathing space. Such steady pressure, always increasing in +strength, saps the morale more rapidly than a series of fierce +assaults, delivered at wide intervals of time. But such pressure +implies on the part of the assailant an accumulation of superior force, +and this accumulation the enemy’s generals had not attempted to +provide. In none of the four attacks which had shivered against Hill’s +front had the strength of the assailants been greater than that of his +own division; and to the tremendous weight of such a stroke as had won +the battles of Gaines’ Mill or Cedar Run, to the closely combined +advance of overwhelming numbers, Jackson’s men had not yet been +subjected. + +The battle, nevertheless, had been fiercely contested, and the strain +of constant vigilance and close-range fighting had told on the Light +Division. The Federal skirmishers, boldly advancing as Pender’s men +fell back, had once more filled the wood, and their venomous fire +allowed the defenders no leisure for repose.[25] Ammunition had already +given out; many of the men had but two or three cartridges remaining, +and the volunteers who ran the gauntlet to procure fresh supplies were +many of them shot down. Moreover, nine hours’ fighting, much of it at +close range, had piled the corpses thick upon the railroad, and the +ranks of Hill’s brigades were terribly attenuated. The second line had +already been brought up to fill the gaps, and every brigade had been +heavily engaged. + +4 p.m. It was about four o’clock, and for a short space the pressure on +the Confederate lines relaxed. The continuous +roar of the artillery dwindled to a fitful cannonade; and along the +edge of the wood, drooping under the heat, where the foliage was white +with the dust of battle, the skirmishers let their rifles cool. But the +Valley soldiers knew that their respite would be short. The Federal +masses were still marching and counter-marching on the opposite hills; +from the forest beyond long columns streamed steadily to the front, and +near the Warrenton turnpike fresh batteries were coming into action. + +Pope had ordered Kearney and Reno to make a fresh attack. The former, +one of the most dashing officers in the Federal army, disposed his +division in two lines. Reno, in the same formation, deployed upon +Kearney’s right, and with their flank resting on Bull Run the five +brigades went forward to the charge. The Confederate batteries, posted +on the ridge in rear, swept the open ground along the stream; but, +regardless of their fire, the Federals came rapidly to close quarters, +and seized the railroad. + +4.30 p.m. When Hill saw this formidable storm bursting on his lines he +felt that the supreme moment had arrived. Would Gregg, on whose front +the division of Reno was bearing down, be able to hold his own? That +gallant soldier, although more than one half of his command lay dead or +wounded, replied, in answer to his chief’s enquiry, that his ammunition +was almost expended, but that he had still the bayonet. Nevertheless, +the pressure was too heavy for his wearied troops. Foot by foot they +were forced back, and, at the same moment, Thomas, Field, and Branch, +still fighting desperately, were compelled to yield their ground. Hill, +anxiously looking for succour, had already called on Early. The enemy, +swarming across the railroad, had penetrated to a point three hundred +yards within the Confederate position. But the grey line was not yet +shattered. The men of the Light Division, though borne backwards by the +rush, still faced towards the foe; and Early’s brigade, supported by +two regiments of Lawton’s division, advanced with levelled bayonets, +drove through the tumult, and opposed a solid line to the crowd of +Federals. + +Once more the fresh reserve, thrown in at the propitious +moment, swept back numbers far superior to itself. Once more order +prevailed over disorder, and the cold steel asserted its supremacy. The +strength of the assailants was already spent. The wave receded more +swiftly than it had risen, and through the copses and across the +railroad the Confederates drove their exhausted foe. General Hill had +instructed Early that he was not to pass beyond the original front; but +it was impossible to restrain the troops, and not till they had +advanced several hundred yards was the brigade halted and brought back. + +5.15 p.m. The counterstroke was as completely successful as those that +had preceded it. Early’s losses were comparatively slight, those +inflicted on the enemy very heavy, and Hill’s brigades were finally +relieved. Pope abandoned all further efforts to crush Jackson. Five +assaults had failed. 30,000 infantry had charged in vain through the +fatal wood; and of the 8,000 Federal casualties reported on this day, +by far the larger proportion was due to the deadly fire and dashing +counterstrokes of Jackson’s infantry. + +While Pope was hurling division after division against the Confederate +left, Lee, with Longstreet at his side, observed the conflict from +Stuart’s Hill, the wooded eminence which stands south-west of Groveton. +On this wing, though a mile distant from Jackson’s battle, both +Federals and Confederates were in force. At least one half of Pope’s +army had gradually assembled on this flank. Here were Reynolds and +McDowell, and on the Manassas road stood two divisions under Porter. + +Within the woods on Stuart’s Hill, with the cavalry on his flank, +Longstreet had deployed his whole force, with the exception of +Anderson, who had not yet passed Thoroughfare Gap. But although both +Pope and Lee were anxious to engage, neither could bring their +subordinates to the point. Pope had sent vague instructions to Porter +and McDowell, and when at Length he had substituted a definite order it +was not only late in arriving, but the generals found that it was based +on an absolutely incorrect view of the situation. The Federal commander +had no knowledge that Longstreet, +with 25,000 men, was already in position beyond his left. So close lay +the Confederates that under the impression that Stuart’s Hill was still +untenanted, he desired Porter to move across it and envelop Jackson’s +right. Porter, suspecting that the main body of the Southern army was +before him, declined to risk his 10,000 men until he had reported the +true state of affairs. A peremptory reply to attack at once was +received at 6.30, but it was then too late to intervene. + +Nor had Lee been more successful in developing a counterstroke. +Longstreet, with a complacency it is difficult to understand, has +related how he opposed the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief. Three +times Lee urged him forward. The first time he rode to the front to +reconnoitre, and found that the position, in his own words, was not +inviting. Again Lee insisted that the enemy’s left might be turned. +While the question was under discussion, a heavy force (Porter and +McDowell) was reported advancing from Manassas Junction. No attack +followed, however, and Lee repeated his instructions. Longstreet was +still unwilling. A large portion of the Federal force on the Manassas +road now marched northward to join Pope, and Lee, for the last time, +bade Longstreet attack towards Groveton. “I suggested,” says the +latter, “that the day being far spent, it might be as well to advance +before night on a forced reconnaissance, get our troops into the most +favourable positions, and have all things ready for battle the next +morning. To this General Lee reluctantly gave consent, and orders were +given for an advance to be pursued under cover of night, until the main +position could be carefully examined. It so happened that an order to +advance was issued on the other side at the same time, so that the +encounter was something of a surprise on both sides.[26] Hood, with his +two Texan brigades, led the Confederates, and King’s division, now +commanded by Hatch, met him on the slopes of Stuart’s Hill. Although +the Federals, since 1 a.m. the same morning, had marched to Manassas +and back again, the fight was spirited. Hood, however, was strongly +supported, and the Texans pushed forward +a mile and a half in front of the position they had held since noon. +Longstreet had now full leisure to make his reconnaissance. The ground +to which the enemy had retreated was very strong. He believed it +strongly manned, and an hour after midnight Hood’s brigades were +ordered to withdraw. + +The firing, even of the skirmishers, had long since died away on the +opposite flank. The battle was over, and the Valley army had been once +more victorious. But when Jackson’s staff gathered round him in the +bivouac, “their triumph,” says Dabney, “bore a solemn hue.” Their great +task had been accomplished, and Pope’s army, harassed, starving, and +bewildered, had been brought to bay. But their energies were worn down. +The incessant marching, by day and night, the suspense of the past +week, the fierce strife of the day that had just closed, pressed +heavily on the whole force. Many of the bravest were gone. Trimble, +that stout soldier, was severely wounded, Field and Forno had fallen, +and in Gregg’s brigade alone 40 officers were dead or wounded. Doctor +McGuire, fresh from the ghastly spectacle of the silent battle-field, +said, “General, this day has been won by nothing but stark and stern +fighting.” “No,” replied Jackson, very quietly, “it has been won by +nothing but the blessing and protection of Providence.” And in this +attitude of acknowledgment general and soldiers were as one. When the +pickets had been posted, and night had fallen on the forest, officers +and men, gathered together round their chaplains, made such +preparations for the morrow’s battle as did the host of King Harry on +the eve of Agincourt. + +NOTE + +Students of war will note with interest the tactical details of the +passage of the Rappahannock by the Army of Northern Virginia. + +_August 21._—FEDERALS. + +In position behind the river from Kelly’s Ford to Freeman’s Ford. + +_Tête de pont_ covering the railway bridge, occupied by a brigade. + +CONFEDERATES. + +Longstreet to Kelly’s Ford. + +Jackson to Beverley Ford. + +Stuart to above Beverley Ford. + +Constant skirmishing and artillery fire. + +_August 22._—FEDERALS. + +In position from Kelly’s Ford to Freeman’s Ford. + +Bayard’s cavalry brigade on right flank. + +Buford’s cavalry brigade at Rappahannock Station. + +CONFEDERATES. + +Jackson to Sulphur Springs. Early crosses the river. + +Longstreet to Beverley Ford and railway. + +Constant skirmishing and artillery fire. + +_August 23._—FEDERALS. + +Pope abandons _tête de pont_ and burns railway bridge. + +Sigel moves against Early, but his advance is repulsed. + +Army to a position about Warrenton, with detachments along the river, +and a strong force at Kelly’s Ford. + +CONFEDERATES. + +Early moves north to Great Run, and is reinforced by Lawton. + +Stuart to Catlett’s Station. + +Longstreet demonstrates against railway bridge. + +_August 24._—FEDERAL. + +Buford’s and Bayard’s cavalry to Waterloo. + +Army to Waterloo and Sulphur Springs. + +CONFEDERATES. + +Jackson in the evening retires to Jefferson, and is relieved after dark +opposite Sulphur Springs and Waterloo by Longstreet. + +Anderson relieves Longstreet on the railway. + +Constant skirmishing and artillery fire all along the line. + +_August 25._—FEDERALS. + +Pope extends his left down the river to Kelly’s Ford, determining to +receive attack at Warrenton should the Confederates cross. + +CONFEDERATES. + +Jackson moves north and crosses the river at Hinson’s Mills. + +Longstreet demonstrates at Waterloo, and Anderson at the Sulphur +Springs. + +_August 26._—FEDERALS. + +A reconnaissance in force, owing to bad staff arrangements, comes to +nothing. At nightfall the whole army is ordered to concentrate at +Warrenton. + +CONFEDERATES. + +2 a.m. Stuart follows Jackson. + +Late in the afternoon, Longstreet, having been relieved by Anderson, +marches to Hinson’s Mills. + +Jackson captures Manassas Junction. + +Skirmishing all day along the Rappahannock. + +_August 27._—FEDERALS. + +7 a.m. Hooker’s division from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe Station. + +8.30 a.m. Army ordered to concentrate at Gainesville, Buckland Mills, +and Greenwich. Porter and Banks at Warrenton Junction. + +3 p.m. Action at Bristoe Station. + +6.30 p.m. Pope arrives at Bristoe Station. + +Army ordered to march to Manassaa Junction at dawn. + +CONFEDERATES. + +Jackson at Manassas Junction. + +Longstreet to White Plains. + + [1] The _Times,_ September 4, 1862. + + [2] Letter to the author. + + [3] June 9, 1863. + + [4] O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 67. “It may have been fortunate for + the Confederates,” says Longstreet, “that he was not instructed to + fight like Jackson.” + + [5] General George H. Gordon. _The Army of Virginia,_ p. 9. + + [6] Between August 21 and 25 Pope received the following + reinforcements for the Army of the Potomac, raising his strength to + over 80,000 men: + +Third Corps Heintzleman Hooker’s Division Kearney’s +Division 10,000 Fifth Corps Porter Morell’s Division Sykes’ +Division 10,000 Pennsylvania Reserves. Reynolds 8,000 + + [7] Letter to the author. + + [8] Pope, 80,000; Washington and Aquia Creek, 20,000. Lee was well + aware, from the correspondence which Stuart had captured, if indeed he + had not already inferred it, that Pope had been strictly enjoined to + cover Washington, and that he was dependent on the railway for + supplies. There was not the slightest fear of his falling back towards + Aquia Creek to join McClellan. + + [9] _The Army of Northern Virginia,_ Colonel Allan, p. 200. + + [10] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 533. + + [11] The report received at Alexandria from Manassas Junction ran as + follows: “No. 6 train, engine Secretary, was fired into at Bristoe by + a party of cavalry, some 500 strong. They had piled ties on the track, + but the engine threw them off. Secretary is completely riddled by + bullets.” + + [12] These troops were sent forward, without cavalry, by order of + General Halleck. O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 680. The Federal + Commander-in-Chief expected that the opposition would be slight. He + had evidently no suspicion of the length to which the daring of Lee + and Jackson might have carried them. + + [13] _The Army of Virginia._ General George H. Gordon. + + [14] “Up to the night of August 28 we received,” says Longstreet, + “reports from General Jackson at regular intervals, assuring us of his + successful operation, and of confidence in his ability to baffle all + efforts of the enemy, till we should reach him.” _Battles and + Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 517. + + [15] Five messages were sent in between 8.45 a.m. and 11 a.m., but + evidently reached headquarters much later. O.R., vol. xii, part iii, + pp. 654–5. + + [16] There is a curious undated report on page 671, O.R., vol. xii, + part iii, from Colonel Duffie, a French officer in the Federal + service, which speaks of a column passing through Thoroughfare Gap; + but, although the compilers of the Records have placed it under the + date August 26, it seems evident, as this officer (_see_ page 670) was + at Rappahannock Station on the 26th and 27th (O.R., vol. xii, part + iii, p. 688), that the report refers to Longstreet’s and not Jackson’s + troops, and was written on August 28. + + [17] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 672. Pope to Porter, p. 675. Pope to + Halleck, p. 684. + + [18] O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 72. + + [19] A. P. Hill had marched fourteen miles, Ewell fifteen, and + Taliaferro, with whom were the trains, from eight to ten. + + [20] The order, dated 2 a.m., August 25, was to the following effect:— + “1. Sigel’s Corps to march from Gainesville to Manassas Junction, + the right resting on the Manassas railroad. + “2. Reynolds to follow Sigel. + “3. King to follow Reynolds. + “4. Ricketts to follow King; but to halt at Thoroughfare Gap if the + enemy threatened the pass. + King was afterwards, while on the march, directed to Centreville by + the Warrenton–Alexandria road.” + + [21] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 507, 508. + + [22] Longstreet had been unable to march with the same speed as + Jackson. Leaving Jefferson on the afternoon of August 26, he did not + reach Thoroughfare Gap until “just before night” on August 28. He had + been delayed for an hour at White Plains by the Federal cavalry, and + the trains of the army, such as they were, may also have retarded him. + In two days he covered only thirty miles. + + [23] Twenty pieces had been ordered to the front soon after the + infantry moved forward. The dense woods, however, proved impenetrable + to all but three horse-artillery guns, and one of these was unable to + keep up. + + [24] Ricketts’ report would have been transmitted through McDowell, + under whose command he was, and as McDowell was not to be found, it + naturally went astray. + + [25] “The Federal sharpshooters at this time,” says Colonel McCrady, + of the Light Division, “held possession of the wood, and kept up a + deadly fire of single shots whenever any one of us was exposed. Every + lieutenant who had to change position did so at the risk of his life. + What was my horror, during an interval in the attack, to see General + Jackson himself walking quickly down the railroad cut, examining our + position, and calmly looking into the wood that concealed the enemy! + Strange to say, he was not molested.”—_Southern Historical Society + Papers,_ vol. xiii, p. 27. + + [26] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 519. + + + + +Chapter XVII +THE SECOND MANASSAS _(continued)_ + + +During the night of August 30 the long line of camp-fires on the +heights above Bull Run, and the frequent skirmishes along the picket +line, told General Lee that his enemy had no intention of falling back +behind the stream. And when morning broke the Federal troops were +observed upon every ridge. + +August 30 The Confederate leader, eager as he had been to force the +battle to an issue on the previous afternoon, had now abandoned all +idea of attack. The respite which the enemy had gained might have +altogether changed the situation. It was possible that the Federals had +been largely reinforced. Pope and McClellan had been given time, and +the hours of the night might have been utilised to bring up the +remainder of the Army of the Potomac. Lee resolved, therefore, to await +events. The Federal position was strong; their masses were well +concentrated; there was ample space, on the ridges beyond Young’s +Branch, for the deployment of their numerous artillery, and it would be +difficult to outflank them. Moreover, a contingent of fresh troops from +Richmond, the divisions of D. H. Hill, McLaws, and Walker, together +with Hampton’s brigade of cavalry, and part of the reserve artillery, +20,350 men in all, had crossed the Rappahannock.[1] Until this force +should join him he determined +to postpone further manœuvres, and to rest his army. But he was not +without hope that Pope might assume the initiative and move down from +the heights on which his columns were already forming. Aware of the +sanguine and impatient temper of his adversary, confident in the +_moral_ of his troops, and in the strength of his position, he foresaw +that an opportunity might offer for an overwhelming counterstroke. + +Meanwhile, the Confederate divisions, still hidden in the woods, lay +quietly on their arms. Few changes were made in the dispositions of the +previous day. Jackson, despite his losses, had made no demand for +reinforcements; and the only direct support afforded him was a battery +of eighteen guns, drawn from the battalion of Colonel S. D. Lee, and +established on the high ground west of the Douglass House, at right +angles to his line of battle. These guns, pointing north-east, +overlooked the wide tract of undulating meadow which lay in front of +the Stonewall and Lawton’s divisions, and they commanded a field of +fire over a mile long. The left of the battery was not far distant from +the guns on Jackson’s right, and the whole of the open space was thus +exposed to the cross-fire of a formidable artillery. + +[Illustration: Map of Groveton and Second Manassas] + +To the right of the batteries, Stuart’s Hill was strongly occupied by +Longstreet, with Anderson’s division as general reserve; and this wing +of the Confederate army was gradually wheeled up, but always under +cover, until it was almost perpendicular to the line of the unfinished +railroad. The strength of Lee’s army at the battle of Manassas was +hardly more than 50,000 of all arms. Jackson’s command had been reduced +by battle and forced marches to 17,000 men. Longstreet mustered 30,000, +and the cavalry 2,500. + +But numbers are of less importance than the confidence of the men in +their ability to conquer,[2] and the spirit of the Confederates had +been raised to the highest pitch. The keen +critics in Longstreet’s ranks, although they had taken no part in the +Manassas raid, or in the battles of August 28 and 29, fully appreciated +the daring strategy which had brought them within two short marches of +Washington. The junction of the two wings, in the very presence of the +enemy, after many days of separation, was a manœuvre after their own +hearts. The passage of Thoroughfare Gap revealed the difficulties which +had attended the operations, and the manner in which the enemy had been +outwitted appealed with peculiar force to their quick intelligence. +Their trust in Lee was higher than ever; and the story of Jackson’s +march, of the capture of Manassas, of the repulse of Pope’s army, if it +increased their contempt for the enemy, inspired them with an +enthusiastic determination to emulate the achievements of their +comrades. The soldiers of the Valley army, who, unaided by a single +bayonet, had withstood the five successive assaults which had been +launched against their position, were supremely indifferent, now +Longstreet was in line, to whatever the enemy might attempt. It was +noticed that notwithstanding the heavy losses they had experienced +Jackson’s troops were never more light-hearted than on the morning of +August 30. Cartridge-boxes had been replenished, rations had been +issued, and for several hours the men had been called on neither to +march nor fight. As they lay in the woods, and the pickets, firing on +the enemy’s patrols, kept up a constant skirmish to the front, the +laugh and jest ran down the ranks, and the unfortunate Pope, who had +only seen “the backs of his enemies,” served as whetstone for their +wit. + +By the troops who had revelled in the spoils of Winchester Banks had +been dubbed “Old Jack’s Commissary General.” By universal acclamation, +after the Manassas foray, Pope was promoted to the same distinction; +and had it been possible to penetrate to the Federal headquarters, the +mirth of those ragged privates would hardly have diminished. Pope was +in an excellent humour, conversing affably with his staff, and viewing +with pride the martial aspect of his massed divisions. Nearly his whole +force +was concentrated on the hills around him, and Porter, who had been +called up from the Manassas road, was already marching northwards +through the woods. + +10.15 p.m. Banks still was absent at Bristoe Station, in charge of the +trains and stores which had been removed from Warrenton; but, shortly +after ten o’clock, 65,000 men, with eight-and-twenty batteries, were at +Pope’s disposal. He had determined to give battle, although Franklin +and Sumner, who had already reached Alexandria, had not yet joined him; +and he anticipated an easy triumph. He was labouring, however, under an +extraordinary delusion. The retreat of Hood’s brigades the preceding +night, after their reconnaissance, had induced him to believe that +Jackson had been defeated, and he had reported to Halleck at daybreak; +“We fought a terrific battle here yesterday with the combined forces of +the enemy, which lasted with continuous fury from daylight until dark, +by which time the enemy was driven from the field, which we now occupy. +The enemy is still in our front, but badly used up. We lost not less +than 8,000 men killed and wounded, but from the appearance of the field +the enemy lost at least two to one. The news has just reached me from +the front that the enemy is retreating towards the mountains.” + +If, in these days of long-range weapons, Napoleon’s dictum still stands +good, that the general who is ignorant of his enemy’s strength and +dispositions is ignorant of his trade, then of all generals Pope was +surely the most incompetent. At ten o’clock on the morning of August +30, and for many months afterwards, despite his statement that he had +fought “the combined forces of the enemy” on the previous day, he was +still under the impression, so skilfully were the Confederate troops +concealed, that Longstreet had not yet joined Jackson, and that the +latter was gradually falling back on Thoroughfare Gap. His patrols had +reported that the enemy’s cavalry had been withdrawn from the left bank +of Bull Run. A small reconnaissance in force, sent to test Jackson’s +strength, had ascertained that the extreme left was not so far forward +as it had been yesterday; while two of the Federal generals, +reconnoitring beyond the +turnpike, observed only a few skirmishers. On these negative reports +Pope based his decision to seize the ridge which was held by Jackson. +Yet the woods along the unfinished railroad had not been examined, and +the information from other sources was of a different colour and more +positive. Buford’s cavalry had reported on the evening of the 29th that +a large force had passed through Thoroughfare Gap. Porter declared that +the enemy was in great strength on the Manassas road. Reynolds, who had +been in close contact with Longstreet since the previous afternoon, +reported that Stuart’s Hill was strongly occupied. Ricketts, moreover, +who had fought Longstreet for many hours at Thoroughfare Gap, was +actually present on the field. But Pope, who had made up his mind that +the enemy ought to retreat, and that therefore he must retreat, refused +credence to any report whatever which ran counter to these preconceived +ideas. + +12 noon Without making the slightest attempt to verify, by personal +observation, the conclusions at which his subordinates had arrived, at +midday, to the dismay of his best officers, his army being now in +position, he issued orders for his troops to be “immediately thrown +forward in pursuit of the enemy, and to press him vigorously.” + +Porter and Reynolds formed the left of the Federal army. These +generals, alive to the necessity of examining the woods, deployed a +strong skirmish line before them as they formed for action. Further +evidence of Pope’s hallucination was at once forthcoming. The moment +Reynolds moved forward against Stuart’s Hill he found his front +overlapped by long lines of infantry, and, riding back, he informed +Pope that in so doing he had had to run the gauntlet of skirmishers who +threatened his rear. Porter, too, pushing his reconnaissance across the +meadows west of Groveton, drew the fire of several batteries. But at +this juncture, unfortunately for the Federals, a Union prisoner, +recaptured from Jackson, declared that he had “heard the rebel officers +say that their army was retiring to unite with Longstreet.” So +positively did the indications before him contradict this statement, +that Porter, on sending the man +to Pope, wrote: “In duty bound I send him, but I regard him as either a +fool or designedly released to give a wrong impression. No faith should +be put in what he says.” If Jackson employed this man to delude his +enemy, the ruse was eminently successful. Porter received the reply: +“General Pope believes that soldier, and directs you to attack;” +Reynolds was dismissed with a message that cavalry would be sent to +verify his report; and McDowell was ordered to put in the divisions of +Hatch and Ricketts on Porter’s right. + +During the whole morning the attention of the Confederates had been +directed to the Groveton wood. Beyond the timber rose the hill +north-east, and on this hill three or four Federal batteries had come +into action at an early hour, firing at intervals across the meadows. +The Confederate guns, save when the enemy’s skirmishers approached too +close, hardly deigned to reply, reserving their ammunition for warmer +work. That such work was to come was hardly doubtful. Troops had been +constantly in motion near the hostile batteries, and the thickets below +were evidently full of men. + +12.15 p.m. Shortly after noon the enemy’s skirmishers became +aggressive, swarming over the meadows, and into the wood which had seen +such heavy slaughter in the fight of yesterday. As Jackson’s pickets, +extended over a wide front, gave slowly back, his guns opened in +earnest, and shell and shrapnel flew fast over the open space. The +strong force of skirmishers betrayed the presence of a line of battle +not far in rear, and ignoring the fire of the artillery, the +Confederate batteries concentrated on the covert behind which they knew +the enemy’s masses were forming for attack. But, except the pickets, +not a single man of either the Stonewall or Lawton’s division was +permitted to expose himself. A few companies held the railroad, the +remainder were carefully concealed. The storm was not long in breaking. +Jackson had just ridden along his lines, examining with his own eyes +the stir in the Groveton wood, when, in rear of the skirmishers, +advancing over the highroad, appeared the serried ranks of the line +of battle. 20,000 bayonets, on a front which extended from Groveton to +near Bull Run, swept forward against his front; 40,000, formed in dense +masses on the slopes in rear, stood in readiness to support them; and +numerous batteries, coming into action on every rising ground, covered +the advance with a heavy fire. + +Pope, standing on a knoll near the Stone House, saw victory within his +grasp. The Confederate guns had been pointed out to his troops as the +objective of the attack. Unsupported, as he believed, save by the +scattered groups of skirmishers who were already retreating to the +railroad, and assailed in front and flank, these batteries, he +expected, would soon be flying to the rear, and the Federal army, in +possession of the high ground, would then sweep down in heavy columns +towards Thoroughfare Gap. Suddenly his hopes fell. Porter’s masses, +stretching far to right and left, had already passed the Dogan House; +Hatch was entering the Groveton wood; Ricketts was moving forward along +Bull Run, and the way seemed clear before them; when loud and clear +above the roar of the artillery rang out the Confederate bugles, and +along the whole length of the ridge beyond the railroad long lines of +infantry, streaming forward from the woods, ran down to the embankment. +“The effect,” said an officer who witnessed this unexpected apparition, +“was not unlike flushing a covey of quails.” + +Instead of the small rear-guard which Pope had thought to crush by +sheer force of overwhelming numbers, the whole of the Stonewall +division, with Lawton on the left, stood across Porter’s path. + +Reynolds, south of the turnpike, and confronting Longstreet, was +immediately ordered to fall back and support the attack, and two small +brigades, Warren’s and Alexander’s, were left alone on the Federal +left. Pope had committed his last and his worst blunder. Sigel with two +divisions was in rear of Porter, and for Sigel’s assistance Porter had +already asked. But Pope, still under the delusion that Longstreet was +not yet up, preferred rather to weaken his left than grant the request +of a subordinate. + +Under such a leader the courage of the troops, however vehement, was of +no avail, and in Porter’s attack the soldiers displayed a courage to +which the Confederates paid a willing tribute. Morell’s division, with +the two brigades abreast, arrayed in three lines, advanced across the +meadows. Hatch’s division, in still deeper formation, pushed through +the wood on Morell’s right. Nearer Bull Run were two brigades of +Ricketts; and to Morell’s left rear the division of regulars moved +forward under Sykes. + +[Illustration: Map of the approximate positions in the attack on +Jackson, August 30th, 1862.] + +Morell’s attack was directed against Jackson’s right. In the centre of +the Federal line a mounted officer, whose gallant bearing lived long in +the memories of the Stonewall division, rode out in front of the +column, and, drawing his sabre, led the advance over the rolling +grass-land. The Confederate batteries, with a terrible cross-fire, +swept the Northern ranks from end to end. The volley of the infantry, +lying behind their parapet, struck them full in face. But the horse and +his rider lived through it all. The men followed close, charging +swiftly up the slope, and then the leader, putting his horse straight +at the embankment, stood for a moment on the top. The daring feat was +seen by the whole Confederate line, and a yell went up from the men +along the railroad, “Don’t kill him! don’t kill him!” But while the cry +went up horse and rider fell in one limp mass across the earthwork, and +the gallant Northerner was dragged under shelter by his generous foes. + +With such men as this to show the way what soldiers would be backward? +As the Russians followed Skobeleff’s grey up the bloody slopes of +Plevna, so the Federals followed the bright chestnut of this unknown +hero, and not till the colours waved within thirty paces of the parapet +did the charge falter. But, despite the supports that came thronging +up, Jackson’s soldiers, covered by the earthwork, opposed a resistance +which no mere frontal attack could break. Three times, as the lines in +rear merged with the first, the Federal officers brought their men +forward to the assault, and three times were they hurled back, leaving +hundreds of their number dead and wounded on the +blood-soaked turf. One regiment of the Stonewall division, posted in a +copse beyond the railroad, was driven in; but others, when cartridges +failed them, had recourse, like the Guards at Inkermann, to the stones +which lay along the railway-bed; and with these strange weapons, backed +up by the bayonet, more than one desperate effort was repulsed. In +arresting Garnett after Kernstown, because when his ammunition was +exhausted he had abandoned his position, Jackson had lost a good +general, but he had taught his soldiers a useful lesson. So long as the +cold steel was left to them, and their flanks were safe, they knew that +their indomitable leader expected them to hold their ground, and right +gallantly they responded. For over thirty minutes the battle raged +along the front at the closest range. Opposite a deep cutting the +colours of a Federal regiment, for nearly half an hour, rose and fell, +as bearer after bearer was shot down, within ten yards of the muzzles +of the Confederate rifles, and after the fight a hundred dead +Northerners were found where the flag had been so gallantly upheld. + +Hill, meanwhile, was heavily engaged with Hatch. Every brigade, with +the exception of Gregg’s, had been thrown into the fighting-line; and +so hardly were they pressed, that Jackson, turning to his signallers, +demanded reinforcements from his colleague. Longstreet, in response to +the call, ordered two more batteries to join Colonel Stephen Lee; and +Morell’s division, penned in that deadly cockpit between Stuart’s Hill +and the Groveton wood, shattered by musketry in front and by artillery +at short range in flank, fell back across the meadows. Hatch soon +followed suit, and Jackson’s artillery, which during the fight at close +quarters had turned its fire on the supports, launched a storm of shell +on the defeated Federals. Some batteries were ordered to change +position so as to rake their lines; and the Stonewall Division, +reinforced by a brigade of Hill’s, was sent forward to the +counter-attack. At every step the losses of the Federals increased, and +the shattered divisions, passing through two regiments of regulars, +which had been sent forward to support them, sought shelter in the +woods. Then Porter and Hatch, under cover of their artillery, withdrew +their +infantry. Ricketts had fallen back before his troops arrived within +decisive range. Under the impression that he was about to pursue a +retreating enemy, he had found on advancing, instead of a thin screen +of skirmishers, a line of battle, strongly established, and backed by +batteries to which he was unable to reply. Against such odds attack +would only have increased the slaughter. + +[Illustration: Map of positions on August 30th, 1862.] + +It was after four o’clock. Three hours of daylight yet remained, time +enough still to secure a victory. But the Federal army was in no +condition to renew the attack. Worn with long marches, deprived of +their supplies, and oppressed by the consciousness that they were +ill-led, both officers and men had lost all confidence. Every single +division on the field had been engaged, and every single division had +been beaten back. For four days, according to General Pope, they had +been following a flying foe. “We were sent forward,” reported a +regimental commander with quiet sarcasm, “to pursue the enemy, who was +said to be retreating; we found the enemy, but did not see them +retreat.” + +Nor, had there been a larger reserve in hand, would a further advance +have been permitted. The Stonewall division, although Porter’s +regiments were breaking up before its onset, had been ordered to fall +back before it became exposed to the full sweep of the Federal guns. +But the woods to the south, where Longstreet’s divisions had been lying +for so many hours, were already alive with bayonets. The grey +skirmishers, extending far beyond Pope’s left, were moving rapidly down +the slopes of Stuart’s Hill, and the fire of the artillery, massed on +the ridge in rear, was increasing every moment in intensity. The +Federals, just now advancing in pursuit, were suddenly thrown on the +defensive; and the hand of a great captain snatched control of the +battle from the grasp of Pope. + +As Porter reeled back from Jackson’s front, Lee had seen his +opportunity. The whole army was ordered to advance to the attack. +Longstreet, prepared since dawn for the counterstroke, had moved before +the message +reached him, and the exulting yells of his soldiers were now resounding +through the forest. Jackson was desired to cover Longstreet’s left; and +sending Starke and Lawton across the meadows, strewn with the bloody +_débris_ of Porter’s onslaught, he instructed Hill to advance _en +échelon_ with his left “refused.” Anticipating the order, the commander +of the Light Division was already sweeping through the Groveton wood. + +The Federal gunners, striving valiantly to cover the retreat of their +shattered infantry, met the advance of the Southerners with a rapid +fire. Pope and McDowell exerted themselves to throw a strong force on +to the heights above Bull Run; and the two brigades upon the left, +Warren’s and Alexander’s, already overlapped, made a gallant effort to +gain time for the occupation of the new position. + +But the counterstroke of Lee was not to be withstood by a few regiments +of infantry. The field of Bull Run had seen many examples of the attack +as executed by indifferent tacticians. At the first battle isolated +brigades had advanced at wide intervals of time. At the second battle +the Federals had assaulted by successive divisions. Out of 50,000 +infantry, no more than 20,000 had been simultaneously engaged, and when +a partial success had been achieved there were no supports at hand to +complete the victory. When the Confederates came forward it was in +other fashion; and those who had the wit to understand were now to +learn the difference between mediocrity and genius, between the +half-measures of the one and the resolution of the other. Lee’s order +for the advance embraced his whole army. Every regiment, every battery, +and every squadron was employed. No reserves save the artillery were +retained upon the ridge, but wave after wave of bayonets followed +closely on the fighting-line. To drive the attack forward by a quick +succession of reinforcements, to push it home by weight of numbers, to +pile blow on blow, to keep the defender occupied along his whole front, +and to provide for retreat, should retreat be necessary, not by +throwing in fresh troops, but by leaving the enemy so crippled that he +would be powerless +to pursue—such were the tactics of the Confederate leader. + +The field was still covered with Porter’s and Hatch’s disordered masses +when Lee’s strong array advanced, and the sight was magnificent. As far +as the eye could reach the long grey lines of infantry, with the +crimson of the colours gleaming like blood in the evening sun, swept +with ordered ranks across the Groveton valley. Batteries galloped +furiously to the front; far away to the right fluttered the guidons of +Stuart’s squadrons, and over all the massed artillery maintained a +tremendous fire. The men drew fresh vigour from this powerful +combination. The enthusiasm of the troops was as intense as their +excitement. With great difficulty, it is related, were the gunners +restrained from joining in the charge, and the officers of the staff +could scarcely resist the impulse to throw themselves with their +victorious comrades upon the retreating foe. + +The advance was made in the following order: + +Wilcox’ division, north of the turnpike, connected with Jackson’s +right. Then came Evans, facing the two brigades which formed the +Federal left, and extending across the turnpike. Behind Evans came +Anderson on the left and Kemper on the right. Then, in prolongation of +Kemper’s line, but at some interval, marched the division of D. R. +Jones, flanked by Stuart’s cavalry, and on the further wing, extending +towards Bull Run, were Starke, Lawton, and A. P. Hill. 50,000 men, +including the cavalry, were thus deployed over a front of four miles; +each division was formed in at least two lines; and in the centre, +where Anderson and Kemper supported Evans, were no less than eight +brigades one in rear of the other. + +The Federal advanced line, behind which the troops which had been +engaged in the last attack were slowly rallying, extended from the +Groveton wood to a low hill, south of the turnpike and east of the +village. This hill was quickly carried by Hood’s brigade of Evans’s +division. The two regiments which defended it, rapidly outflanked, and +assailed by overwhelming numbers, were routed with the loss of nearly +half their muster. Jackson’s attack +through the Groveton wood was equally successful, but on the ridge in +rear were posted the regulars under Sykes; and, further east, on Buck +Hill, had assembled the remnants of four divisions. + +Outflanked by the capture of the hill upon their left, and fiercely +assailed in front, Sykes’s well-disciplined regiments, formed in lines +of columns and covered by a rear-guard of skirmishers, retired steadily +under the tremendous fire, preserving their formation, and falling back +slowly across Young’s Branch. Then Jackson, reforming his troops along +the Sudley road, and swinging round to the left, moved swiftly against +Buck Hill. Here, in addition to the infantry, were posted three Union +batteries, and the artillery made a desperate endeavour to stay the +counterstroke. + +But nothing could withstand the vehement charge of the Valley soldiers. +“They came on,” says the correspondent of a Northern journal, “like +demons emerging from the earth.” The crests of the ridges blazed with +musketry, and Hill’s infantry, advancing in the very teeth of the +canister, captured six guns at the bayonet’s point. Once more Jackson +reformed his lines; and, as twilight came down upon the battle-field, +from position after position, in the direction of the Stone Bridge, the +division of Stevens, Ricketts, Kearney, and Hooker, were gradually +pushed back. + +On the Henry Hill, the key of the Federal position, a fierce conflict +was meanwhile raging. From the high ground to the south Longstreet had +driven back several brigades which, in support of the artillery, Sigel +and McDowell had massed upon Bald Hill. But this position had not been +occupied without a protracted struggle. Longstreet’s first line, +advancing with over-impetuosity, had outstripped the second; and before +it could be supported was compelled to give ground under the enemy’s +fire, one of the brigades losing 62 officers and 560 men. Anderson and +Kemper were then brought up; the flank of the defenders was turned; a +counterstroke was beaten back, ridge after ridge was mastered, the edge +of every wood was stormed; and as the sun set +behind the mountains Bald Hill was carried. During this fierce action +the division of D. R. Jones, leaving the Chinn House to the left, had +advanced against the Henry Hill. + +6 p.m. On the very ground which Jackson had held in his first battle +the best troops of the Federal army were rapidly assembling. Here were +Sykes’ regulars and Reynolds’ Pennsylvanians; where the woods permitted +batteries had been established; and Porter’s Fifth Army Corps, who at +Gaines’ Mill and Malvern Hill had proved such stubborn fighters, +opposed a strong front once more to their persistent foes. + +Despite the rapid fire of the artillery the Southerners swept forward +with unabated vigour. But as the attack was pressed the resistance of +the Federals grew more stubborn, and before long the Confederate +formation lost its strength. The lines in rear had been called up. The +assistance of the strong centre had been required to rout the defenders +of Bald Hill; and although Anderson and Wilcox pressed forward on his +left, Jones had not sufficient strength to storm the enemy’s last +position. Moreover, the Confederate artillery had been unable to follow +the infantry over the broken ground; the cavalry, confronted by +Buford’s squadrons and embarrassed by the woods, could lend no active +aid, and the Federals, defeated as they were, had not yet lost all +heart. Whatever their guns could do, in so close a country, to relieve +the infantry had been accomplished; and the infantry, though +continually outflanked, held together with unflinching courage. +Stragglers there were, and stragglers in such large numbers that +Bayard’s cavalry brigade had been ordered to the rear to drive them +back; but the majority of the men, hardened by months of discipline and +constant battle, remained staunch to the colours. The conviction that +the battle was lost was no longer a signal for “the thinking bayonets” +to make certain of their individual safety; and the regulars, for the +second time on the same field, provided a strong nucleus of resistance. + +Thrown into the woods along the Sudley–Manassas road, five battalions +of the United States army held the extreme left, the most critical +point of the Federal line, until +the second brigade relieved them. To their right Meade and his +Pennsylvanians held fast against Anderson and Wilcox; and although six +guns fell into the hands of the Confederate infantry, and four of +Longstreet’s batteries, which had accompanied the cavalry, were now +raking their left, Pope’s soldiers, as twilight descended upon the +field, redeemed as far as soldiers could the errors of their general. +Stuart, on the right flank of the Confederate line, charged down the +opposing cavalry[3] and crossed Bull Run at Lewis’ Ford; but the dark +masses on the Henry Hill, increased every moment by troops ascending +from the valley, still held fast, with no hope indeed of victory, but +with a stern determination to maintain their ground. Had the hill been +lost, nothing could have saved Pope’s army. The crest commanded the +crossings of Bull Run. The Stone Bridge, the main point of passage, was +not more than a mile northward, within the range of artillery, and +Jackson was already in possession of the Matthew Hill, not fourteen +hundred yards from the road by which the troops must pass in their +retreat. + +7.30 p.m. The night, however, put an end to the battle. Even the Valley +soldiers were constrained to halt. It was impossible in the obscurity +to distinguish friend from foe. The Confederate lines presented a +broken front, here pushed forward, and here drawn back; divisions, +brigades, and regiments had intermingled; and the thick woods, +intervening at frequent intervals, rendered combination impracticable. +During the darkness, which was accompanied by heavy rain, the Federals +quietly withdrew, leaving thousands of +wounded on the field, and morning found them in position on the heights +of Centreville, four miles beyond Bull Run. + +Pope, with an audacity which disaster was powerless to tame, reported +to Halleck that, on the whole, the results of the battle were +favourable to the Federal army. “The enemy,” he wrote, “largely +reinforced, assailed our position early to-day. We held our ground +firmly until 6 o’clock p.m., when the enemy, massing very heavy forces +on our left, forced that wing back about half a mile. At dark we held +that position. Under all the circumstances, with horses and men having +been two days without food, and the enemy greatly outnumbering us, I +thought it best to move back to this place at dark. The movement has +been made in perfect order and without loss. The battle was most +furious for hours without cessation, and the losses on both sides very +heavy. The enemy is badly whipped, and we shall do well enough. Do not +be uneasy. We will hold our own here.” + +Pope’s actions, however, were invariably at variance with Pope’s words. +At 6 p.m. he had ordered Franklin, who was approaching Bull Run from +Alexandria with 10,000 fresh troops, to occupy with his own command and +whatever other troops he could collect, the fortifications round +Centreville, and hold them “to the last extremity.” Banks, still at +Bristoe Station, was told to destroy all the supplies of which he was +in charge, as well as the railway, and to march on Centreville; while +30 guns and more than 2,000 wounded were left upon the field. Nor were +Pope’s anticipations as to the future to be fulfilled. The position at +Centrevile was strong. The intrenchments constructed by the +Confederates during the winter of 1861 were still standing. Halleck had +forwarded supplies; there was ammunition in abundance, and 20,000 +infantry under Franklin and Sumner—for the latter also had come up from +Washington—more than compensated for the casualties of the battle. But +formidable earthworks, against generals who dare manœuvre, are often a +mere trap for the unwary. + +August 31 Before daylight Stuart and his troopers were in the saddle; +and, picking up many stragglers as they marched, came within range of +the guns at Centreville. Lee, accompanied by Jackson, having +reconnoitred the position, determined to move once more upon the +Federal rear. Longstreet remained on the battle-field to engage the +attention of the enemy and cover the removal of the wounded; while +Jackson, crossing not by the Stone Bridge, but by Sudley Ford, was +entrusted with the work of forcing Pope from his strong position. + +The weather was inclement, the roads were quagmires, and the men were +in no condition to make forced marches. Yet before nightfall Jackson +had pushed ten miles through the mud, halting near Pleasant Valley, on +the Little River turnpike, five miles north-west of Centreville. During +the afternoon Longstreet, throwing a brigade across Bull Run to keep +the enemy on the _qui vive,_ followed the same route. Of these +movements Pope received no warning, and Jackson’s proclivity for flank +manœuvres had evidently made no impression on him, for, in blissful +unconsciousness that his line of retreat was already threatened, he +ordered all waggons to be unloaded at Centreville, and to return to +Fairfax Station for forage and rations. + +Sept. 1 But on the morning of September 1, although his whole army, +including Banks, was closely concentrated behind strong intrenchments, +Pope had conceived a suspicion that he would find it difficult to +fulfil his promise to Halleck that “he would hold on.” The previous +night Stuart had been active towards his right and rear, capturing his +reconnoitring parties, and shelling his trains. Before noon suspicion +became certainty. Either stragglers or the country people reported that +Jackson was moving down the Little River turnpike, and Centreville was +at once evacuated, the troops marching to a new position round Fairfax +Court House. + +Jackson, meanwhile, covered by the cavalry, was advancing to +Chantilly—a fine old mansion which the Federals had gutted—with the +intention of seizing a position whence he could command the road. The +day was sombre, and a tempest was gathering in the mountains. Late in +the +afternoon, Stuart’s patrols near Ox Hill were driven in by hostile +infantry, the thick woods preventing the scouts from ascertaining the +strength or dispositions of the Federal force. Jackson at once ordered +two brigades of Hill’s to feel the enemy. The remainder of the Light +Division took ground to the right, followed by Lawton; Starke’s +division held the turnpike, and Stuart was sent towards Fairfax Court +House to ascertain whether the Federal main body was retreating or +advancing. + +Reno, who had been ordered to protect Pope’s flank, came briskly +forward, and Hill’s advanced guard was soon brought to a standstill. +Three fresh brigades were rapidly deployed; as the enemy pressed the +attack a fourth was sent in, and the Northerners fell back with the +loss of a general and many men. Lawton’s first line became engaged at +the same time, and Reno, now reinforced by Kearney, made a vigorous +effort to hold the Confederates in check. Hays’ brigade of Lawton’s +division, commanded by an inexperienced officer, was caught while +“clubbed” during a change of formation, and driven back in disorder; +and Trimble’s brigade, now reduced to a handful, became involved in the +confusion. But a vigorous charge of the second line restored the +battle. The Federals were beginning to give way. General Kearney, +riding through the murky twilight into the Confederate lines, was shot +by a skirmisher. The hostile lines were within short range, and the +advent of a reserve on either side would have probably ended the +engagement. But the rain was now falling in torrents; heavy peals of +thunder, crashing through the forest, drowned the discharges of the two +guns which Jackson had brought up through the woods, and the red flash +of musketry paled before the vivid lightning. Much of the ammunition +was rendered useless, the men were unable to discharge their pieces, +and the fierce wind lashed the rain in the faces of the Confederates. +The night grew darker and the tempest fiercer; and as if by mutual +consent the opposing lines drew gradually apart.[4] + +On the side of the Confederates only half the force had been engaged. +Starke’s division never came into action, and of Hill’s and Lawton’s +there were still brigades in reserve. 500 men were killed or wounded; +but although the three Federal divisions are reported to have lost +1,000, they had held their ground, and Jackson was thwarted in his +design. Pope’s trains and his whole army reached Fairfax Court House +without further disaster. But the persistent attacks of his +indefatigable foe had broken down his resolution. He had intended, he +told Halleck, when Jackson’s march down the Little River turnpike was +first announced, to attack the Confederates the next day, or “certainly +the day after.” + +Sept. 2 The action at Chantilly, however, induced a more prudent mood; +and, on the morning of the 2nd, he reported that “there was an intense +idea among the troops that they must get behind the intrenchments [of +Alexandria]; that there was an undoubted purpose, on the part of the +enemy, to keep on slowly turning his position so as to come in on the +right, and that the forces under his command were unable to prevent him +doing so in the open field. Halleck must decide what was to be done.” +The reply was prompt, Pope was to bring his forces, “as best he could,” +under the shelter of the heavy guns. + +Whatever might be the truth as regards the troops, there could be no +question but that the general was demoralised; and, preceded by +thousands of stragglers, the army fell back without further delay to +the Potomac. It was not followed except by Stuart. “It was found,” says +Lee, in his official dispatch, ”that the enemy had conducted his +retreat so rapidly that the attempt to interfere with him was +abandoned. The proximity of the fortifications around Alexandria and +Washington rendered further pursuit useless.” + +On the same day General McClellan was entrusted with the defence of +Washington, and Pope, permitted to resign, was soon afterwards +relegated to an obscure +command against the Indians of the North-west. His errors had been +flagrant. He can hardly be charged with want of energy, but his energy +was spasmodic; on the field of battle he was strangely indolent, and +yet he distrusted the reports of others. But more fatal than his +neglect of personal reconnaissance was his power of self-deception. He +was absolutely incapable of putting himself in his enemy’s place, and +time after time he acted on the supposition that Lee and Jackson would +do exactly what he most wished them to do. When his supplies were +destroyed, he concentrated at Manassas Junction, convinced that Jackson +would remain to be overwhelmed. When he found Jackson near Sudley +Springs, and Thoroughfare Gap open, he rushed forward to attack him, +convinced that Longstreet could not be up for eight-and-forty hours. +When he sought shelter at Centreville, he told Halleck not to be +uneasy, convinced that Lee would knock his head against his fortified +position. Before the engagement at Chantilly he had made up his mind to +attack the enemy the next morning. A few hours later he reported that +his troops were utterly untrustworthy, although 20,000 of them, under +Franklin and Sumner, had not yet seen the enemy. In other respects his +want of prudence had thwarted his best endeavours. His cavalry at the +beginning of the campaign was effectively employed. But so extravagant +were his demands on the mounted arm, that before the battle of Manassas +half his regiments were dismounted. It is true that the troopers were +still indifferent horsemen and bad horse-masters, but it was the fault +of the commander that the unfortunate animals had no rest, that +brigades were sent to do the work of patrols, and that little heed was +paid to the physical wants of man and beast. As a tactician Pope was +incapable. As a strategist he lacked imagination, except in his +dispatches. His horizon was limited, and he measured the capacity of +his adversaries by his own. He was familiar with the campaign in the +Valley, with the operations in the Peninsula, and Cedar Run should have +enlightened him as to Jackson’s daring. But he had no conception that +his adversaries would cheerfully accept +great risks to achieve great ends; he had never dreamt of a general who +would deliberately divide his army, or of one who would make fifty-six +miles in two marches. + +Lee, with his extraordinary insight into character, had played on Pope +as he had played on McClellan, and his strategy was justified by +success. In the space of three weeks he had carried the war from the +James to the Potomac. With an army that at no time exceeded 55,000 men +he had driven 80,000 into the fortifications of Washington.[5] He had +captured 30 guns, 7,000 prisoners, 20,000 rifles, and many stand of +colours; he had killed or wounded 13,500 Federals, destroyed supplies +and material of enormous value; and all this with a loss to the +Confederates of 10,000 officers and men. + +So much had he done for the South; for his own reputation he had done +more. If, as Moltke avers, the junction of two armies on the field of +battle is the highest achievement of military genius,[6] the campaign +against Pope has seldom been surpassed; and the great counterstroke at +Manassas is sufficient in itself to make Lee’s reputation as a +tactician. Salamanca was perhaps a more brilliant example of the same +manœuvre, for at Salamanca Wellington had no reason to anticipate that +Marmont would blunder, and the mighty stroke which beat 40,000 French +in forty minutes was conceived in a few moments. Nor does Manassas +equal Austerlitz. No such subtle manœuvres were employed as those by +which Napoleon induced the Allies to lay bare their centre, and drew +them blindly to their doom. It was not due to the skill of Lee that +Pope weakened his left at the crisis of the battle.[7] +But in the rapidity with which the opportunity was seized, in the +combination of the three arms, and in the vigour of the blow, Manassas +is in no way inferior to Austerlitz or Salamanca. That the result was +less decisive was due to the greater difficulties of the battle-field, +to the stubborn resistance of the enemy, to the obstacles in the way of +rapid and connected movement, and to the inexperience of the troops. +Manassas was not, like Austerlitz and Salamanca, won by veteran +soldiers, commanded by trained officers, perfect in drill and inured to +discipline. + +Lee’s strategic manœuvres were undoubtedly hazardous. But that an +antagonist of different calibre would have met them with condign +punishment is short-sighted criticism. Against an antagonist of +different calibre, against such generals as he was afterwards to +encounter, they would never have been attempted. “He studied his +adversary,” says his Military Secretary, “knew his peculiarities, and +adapted himself to them. His own methods no one could foresee-he varied +them with every change in the commanders opposed to him. He had one +method with McClellan, another with Pope, another with Hooker, another +with Meade, and yet another with Grant.” Nor was the dangerous period +of the Manassas campaign so protracted as might be thought. Jackson +marched north from Jefferson on August 25. On the 26th he reached +Bristoe Station. Pope, during these two days, might have thrown himself +either on Longstreet or on Jackson. He did neither, and on the morning +of the 27th, when Jackson reached Sudley Springs, the crisis had +passed. Had the Federals blocked Thoroughfare Gap that day, and +prevented Longstreet’s passage, Lee was still able to concentrate +without incurring defeat. Jackson, retreating by Aldie Gap, would have +joined Longstreet west of the mountains; Pope would have escaped +defeat, but the Confederates would have lost nothing. + +Moreover, it is well to remember that the Confederate cavalry was in +every single respect, in leading, horsemanship, training, and knowledge +of the country, superior to the Federal. The whole population, too, was +staunchly +Southern. It was always probable, therefore, that information would be +scarce in the Federal camps, and that if some items did get through the +cavalry screen, they would be so late in reaching Pope’s headquarters +as to be practically useless. There can be no question that Lee, in +these operations, relied much on the skill of Stuart. Stuart was given +a free hand. Unlike Pope, Lee issued few orders as to the disposition +of his horsemen. He merely explained the manœuvres he was about to +undertake, pointed out where he wished the main body of the cavalry +should be found, and left all else to their commander. He had no need +to tell Stuart that he required information of the enemy, or to lay +down the method by which it was to be obtained. That was Stuart’s +normal duty, and right well was it performed. How admirably the young +cavalry general co-operated with Jackson has already been described. +The latter suggested, the former executed, and the combination of the +three arms, during the whole of Jackson’s operations against Pope, was +as close as when Ashby led his squadrons in the Valley. + +Yet it was not on Stuart that fell, next to Lee, the honours of the +campaign. Brilliant as was the handling of the cavalry, impenetrable +the screen it formed, and ample the information it procured, the +breakdown of the Federal horse made the task comparatively simple. +Against adversaries whose chargers were so leg-weary that they could +hardly raise a trot it was easy to be bold. One of Stuart’s brigadiers +would have probably done the work as well as Stuart himself. But the +handling of the Valley army, from the time it left Jefferson on the +25th until Longstreet reached Gainesville on the 29th, demanded higher +qualities than vigilance and activity. Throughout the operations +Jackson’s endurance was the wonder of his staff. He hardly slept. He +was untiring in reconnaissance, in examination of the country and in +observation of the enemy, and no detail of the march escaped his +personal scrutiny. Yet his muscles were much less hardly used than his +brain. The intellectual problem was more difficult than the physical. +To march his +army fifty-six miles in two days was far simpler than to maintain it on +Pope’s flank until Longstreet came into line. The direction of his +marches, the position of his bivouacs, the distribution of his three +divisions, were the outcome of long premeditation. On the night of the +25th he disappeared into the darkness on the road to Salem leaving the +Federals under the conviction that he was making for the Valley. On the +26th he moved on Bristoe Station, rather than on Manassas Junction, +foreseeing that he might be interrupted from the south-west in his +destruction of the stores. On the 27th he postponed his departure till +night had fallen, moving in three columns, of which the column marching +on Centreville, whither he desired that the enemy should follow, was +the last to move. Concentrating at Sudley Springs on the 28th, he +placed himself in the best position to hold Pope fast, to combine with +Longstreet, or to escape by Aldie Gap; and on the 29th the ground he +had selected for battle enabled him to hold out against superior +numbers. + +Neither strategically nor tactically did he make a single mistake. His +attack on King’s division at Groveton, on the evening of the 28th, was +purely frontal, and his troops lost heavily. But he believed King to be +the flank-guard of a larger force, and under such circumstances turning +movements were over-hazardous. The woods, too, prevented the deployment +of his artillery; and the attack, in its wider aspect, was eminently +successful, for the aim was not to defeat King, but to bring Pope back +to a position where Lee could crush him. On the 29th his dispositions +were admirable. The battle is a fine example of defensive tactics. The +position, to use a familiar illustration, “fitted the troops like a +glove.” It was of such strength that, while the front was adequately +manned, ample reserves remained in rear. The left, the most dangerous +flank, was secured by Bull Run, and massed batteries gave protection to +the right. The distribution of the troops, the orders, and the amount +of latitude accorded to subordinate leaders, followed the best models. +The front was so apportioned that each brigadier on the fighting-line +had his own reserve, +and each divisional general half his force in third line. The orders +indicated that counterstrokes were not to be pushed so far as to +involve the troops in an engagement with the enemy’s reserves, and the +subordinate generals were encouraged, without waiting for orders, and +thus losing the occasion, to seize all favourable opportunities for +counterstroke. The methods employed by Jackson were singularly like +those of Wellington. A position was selected which gave cover and +concealment to the troops, and against which the powerful artillery of +a more numerous enemy was practically useless. These were the +characteristics of Vimiera, Busaco, Talavera, and Waterloo. Nor did +Jackson’s orders differ from those of the great Englishman. + +The Duke’s subordinates, when placed in position, acted on a +well-established rule. Within that position they had unlimited power. +They could defend the first line, or they could meet the enemy with a +counter-attack from a position in rear, and in both cases they could +pursue. But the pursuit was never to be carried beyond certain defined +limits. Moreover, Wellington’s views as to the efficacy of the +counterstroke were identical with those of Jackson, and he had the same +predilection for cold steel. “If they attempt this point again, Hill,” +were his orders to that general at Busaco, “give them a volley and +charge bayonets; but don’t let your people follow them too far.” + +But it was neither wise strategy nor sound tactics which was the main +element in Pope’s defeat; neither the strong effort of a powerful +brain, nor the judicious devolution of responsibility. A brilliant +military historian, more conversant perhaps with the War of Secession +than the wars of France, concludes his review of this campaign with a +reference to Jackson as “the Ney of the Confederate army.”[8] The +allusion is obvious. So long as the victories of Napoleon are +remembered, the name of his lieutenant will always be a synonym for +heroic valour. But the valour of Ney was of a different type from that +of Jackson. Ney’s valour was animal, Jackson’s was moral, and between +the two there is a vast distinction. Before the +enemy, when his danger was tangible, Ney had few rivals. But when the +enemy was unseen and his designs were doubtful, his resolution +vanished. He was without confidence in his own resources. He could not +act without direct orders, and he dreaded responsibility. At Bautzen +his timidity ruined Napoleon’s combinations; in the campaign of Leipsic +he showed himself incapable of independent command; and he cannot be +acquitted of hesitation at Quatre Bras. + +It was in the same circumstances that Ney’s courage invariably gave way +that Jackson’s courage shone with the brightest lustre. It might appear +that he had little cause for fear in the campaign of the Second +Manassas, that he had only to follow his instructions, and that if he +had failed his failure would have been visited upon Lee. The +instructions which he received, however, were not positive, but +contingent on events. If possible, he was to cut the railway, in order +to delay the reinforcements which Pope was expecting from Alexandria; +and then, should the enemy permit, he was to hold fast east of the Bull +Run Mountains until Lee came up. But he was to be guided in everything +by his own discretion. He was free to accept battle or refuse it, to +attack or to defend, to select his own line of retreat, to move to any +quarter of the compass that he pleased. For three days, from the +morning of August 26 to the morning of August 29, he had complete +control of the strategic situation; on his movements were dependent the +movements of the main army; the bringing the enemy to bay and the +choice of the field of battle were both in his hands. And during those +three days he was cut off from Lee and Longstreet. The mountains, with +their narrow passes, lay between; and, surrounded by three times his +number, he was abandoned entirely to his own resources. + +Throughout the operations he had been in unusually high spirits. The +peril and responsibility seemed to act as an elixir, and he threw off +much of his constraint. But as the day broke on August 29 he looked +long and earnestly in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, and +when a messenger from Stuart brought the intelligence that Longstreet +was through the pass, he drew a long breath and uttered a sigh of +relief.[9] The period of suspense was over, but even on that unyielding +heart the weight of anxiety had pressed with fearful force. For three +days he had only received news of the main army at long and uncertain +intervals. For two of these days his information of the enemy’s +movements was very small. While he was marching to Bristoe Station, +Pope, for all he knew, might have been marching against Longstreet with +his whole force. When he attacked King on the 28th the Federals, in +what strength he knew not, still held Thoroughfare Gap; when he formed +for action on the 29th he was still ignorant of what had happened to +the main body, and it was on the bare chance that Longstreet would +force the passage that he accepted battle with far superior numbers. + +It is not difficult to imagine how a general like Ney, placed in +Jackson’s situation, would have trimmed and hesitated: how in his march +to Manassas, when he had crossed the mountains and left the Gap behind +him, he would have sent out reconnaissances in all directions, halting +his troops until he learned the coast was clear; how he would have +dashed at the Junction by the shortest route; how he would have forced +his weary troops northward when the enemy’s approach was reported; how, +had he reached Sudley Springs, he would have hugged the shelter of the +woods and let King’s division pass unmolested; and, finally, when +Pope’s columns converged on his position, have fallen back on +Thoroughfare or Aldie. Nor would he have been greatly to blame. Unless +gifted with that moral fortitude which Napoleon ranks higher than +genius or experience, no general would have succeeded in carrying Lee’s +design to a successful issue. In his unhesitating march to Manassas +Junction, in his deliberate sojourn for four-and-twenty hours astride +his enemy’s communications, in his daring challenge to Pope’s whole +army at Groveton, Jackson displayed the indomitable courage +characteristic of the greatest soldiers. + +As suggested in the first volume, it is too often overlooked, by those +who study the history of campaign, that war is the province of +uncertainty. The reader has the whole theatre of war displayed before +him. He notes the exact disposition of the opposing forces at each hour +of the campaign, and with this in his mind’s eye he condemns or +approves the action of the commanders. In the action of the defeated +general he usually often sees much to blame; in the action of the +successful general but little to admire. But his judgment is not based +on a true foundation. He has ignored the fact that the information at +his disposal was not at the disposal of those he criticises; and until +he realises that both generals, to a greater or less degree, must have +been groping in the dark, he will neither make just allowance for the +errors of the one, nor appreciate the genius of the other. + +It is true that it is difficult in the extreme to ascertain how much or +how little those generals whose campaigns have become historical knew +of their enemy at any particular moment. For instance, in the campaign +before us, we are nowhere told whether Lee, when he sent Jackson to +Manassas Junction, was aware that a portion of McClellan’s army had +been shipped to Alexandria in place of Aquia; or whether he knew, on +the second day of the battle of Manassas, that Pope had been reinforced +by two army corps from the Peninsula. He had certainly captured Pope’s +dispatch book, and no doubt it threw much light on the Federal plans, +but we are not aware how far into the future this light projected. We +do know, however, that, in addition to this correspondence, such +knowledge as he had was derived from reports. But reports are never +entirely to be relied on; they are seldom full, they are often false, +and they are generally exaggerated. However active the cavalry, however +patriotic the inhabitants, no general is ever possessed of accurate +information of his enemy’s dispositions, unless the forces are very +small, or the precautions to elude observation very feeble. On August +28 Stuart’s patrols covered the whole country round Jackson’s army, and +during the +whole day the Federal columns were converging on Manassas. Sigel and +Reynolds’ four divisions passed through Gainesville, not five miles +from Sudley Springs, and for a time were actually in contact with +Jackson’s outposts; and yet Sigel and Reynolds mistook Jackson’s +outposts for reconnoitring cavalry. Again, when King’s single division, +the rear-guard of Pope’s army, appeared upon the turnpike, Jackson +attacked it with the idea that it was the flank-guard of a much larger +force. Nor was this want of accurate intelligence due to lack of +vigilance or to the dense woods. As a matter of fact the Confederates +were more amply provided with information than is usually the case in +war, even in an open country and with experienced armies. + +But if, in the most favourable circumstances, a general is surrounded +by an atmosphere which has been most aptly named the fog of war, his +embarrassments are intensified tenfold when he commands a portion of a +divided army. Under ordinary conditions a general is at least fully +informed of the dispositions of his own forces. But when between two +widely separated columns a powerful enemy, capable of crushing each in +turn, intervenes; when the movements of that enemy are veiled in +obscurity; when anxiety has taken possession of the troops, and the +soldiers of either column, striving hopelessly to penetrate the gloom, +reflect on the fate that may have overtaken their comrades, on the +obstacles that may delay them, on the misunderstandings that may have +occurred—it is at such a crisis that the courage of their leader is put +to the severest test. + +His situation has been compared to a man entering a dark room full of +assailants, never knowing when or whence a blow may be struck against +him. The illustration is inadequate. Not only has he to contend with +the promptings of his own instincts, but he has to contend with the +instincts and to sustain the resolution of his whole army. It is not +from the enemy he has most to fear. A time comes in all protracted +operations when the nervous energy of the best troops becomes +exhausted, when the most daring shrink from further sacrifice, when +the desire of self-preservation infects the stoutest veterans, and the +will of the mass opposes a tacit resistance to all further effort. +“Then,” says Clausewitz, “the spark in the breast of the commander must +rekindle hope in the hearts of his men, and so long as he is equal to +this he remains their master. When his influence ceases, and his own +spirit is no longer strong enough to revive the spirit of others, the +masses, drawing him with them, sink into that lower region of animal +nature which recoils from danger and knows not shame. Such are the +obstacles which the brain and courage of the military commander must +overcome if he is to make his name illustrious.” And the obstacles are +never more formidable than when his troops see no sign of the support +they have expected. Then, if he still moves forward, although his peril +increase at every step, to the point of junction; if he declines the +temptation, although overwhelming numbers threaten him, of a safe line +of retreat; if, as did Jackson, he deliberately confronts and +challenges the hostile masses, then indeed does the soldier rise to the +highest level of moral energy. + +Strongly does Napoleon inveigh against operations which entail the +division of an army into two columns unable to communicate; and +especially does he reprobate the strategy which places the point of +junction under the very beard of a concentrated enemy. Both of these +maxims Lee violated. The last because he knew Pope, the first because +he knew Jackson. It is rare indeed that such strategy succeeds. When +all has depended on a swift and unhesitating advance, generals renowned +for their ardent courage have wavered and turned aside. Hasdrubal, +divided from Hannibal by many miles and a Consular army, fell back to +the Metaurus, and Rome was saved. Two thousand years later, Prince +Frederick Charles, divided by a few marches and two Austrian army corps +from the Crown Prince, lingered so long upon the leer that the +supremacy of Prussia trembled in the balance. But the character of the +Virginian soldier was of loftier type. It has been remarked that after +Jackson’s death Lee never again attempted those great turning movements +which had +achieved his most brilliant victories. Never again did he divide his +army to unite it again on the field of battle. The reason is not far to +seek. There was now no general in the Confederate army to whom he dared +confide the charge of the detached wing, and in possessing one such +general he had been more fortunate than Napoleon.[10] + + [1] + +D. H. Hill +McLaws +Walker +Hampton +Artillery 7,000 +6,850 +4,000 +1,500 +1,000 +——— +20,350 + + [2] Hood’s Texans had a hymn which graphically expressed this truism:— + +“The race is not to him that’s got + The longest legs to run, +Nor the battle to those people + That shoot the biggest gun.” + + [3] This was one of the most brilliant cavalry fights of the war. + Colonel Munford, of the 2nd Virginia, finding the enemy advancing, + formed line and charged, the impetuosity of the attack carrying his + regiment through the enemy’s first line, with whom his men were + thoroughly intermingled in hand-to-hand conflict. The Federals, + however, who had advanced at a trot, in four successive lines, were + far superior in numbers; but the 7th and 12th Virginia rapidly came + up, and the charge of the 12th, constituting as it were a last + reserve, drove the enemy from the field. The Confederates lost 5 + killed and 40 wounded. Munford himself, and the commander of the First + Michigan (Union) cavalry were both wounded by sabre-cuts, the latter + mortally. 300 Federals were taken prisoners, 19 killed, and 80 + wounded. Sabre, carbine, and revolver were freely used. + + [4] It was at this time, probably, that Jackson received a message + from a brigade commander, reporting that his cartridges were so wet + that he feared he could not maintain his position. “Tell him,” was the + quick reply, “to hold his ground; if his guns will not go off, neither + will the enemy’s.” + + [5] Sumner and Franklin had become involved in Pope’s retreat. + + [6] Tried by this test alone Lee stands out as one of the greatest + soldiers of all times. Not only against Pope, but against McClellan at + Gaines’ Mill, against Burnside at Fredericksburg, and against Hooker + at Chancellorsville, he succeeded in carrying out the operations of + which Moltke speaks; and in each case with the same result of + surprising his adversary. None knew better how to apply that great + principle of strategy, “to march divided but to fight concentrated.” + + [7] It may be noticed, however, that the care with which Longstreet’s + troops were kept concealed for more than four-and-twenty hours had + much to do with Pope’s false manœuvres. + + [8] Swinton. _Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac._ + + [9] Letter from Dr. Hunter McGuire. + + [10] It is noteworthy that Moltke once, at Königgrätz, carried out the + operation referred to; Wellington twice, at Vittoria and Toulouse; + Napoleon, although he several times attempted it, and, against + inferior numbers, never, except at Ulm, with complete success. + + + + +Chapter XVIII +HARPER’S FERRY + + +Sept. 1862 The Confederate operations in Virginia during the spring and +summer of 1862 had been successful beyond expectation and almost beyond +precedent. Within six months two great armies had been defeated; +McClellan had been driven from the Peninsula, and Pope from the +Rappahannock. The villages of Virginia no longer swarmed with foreign +bayonets. The hostile camps had vanished from her inland counties. +Richmond was free from menace; and in the Valley of the Shenandoah the +harvest was gathered in without let or hindrance. Except at Winchester +and Martinsburg, where the garrisons, alarmed by the news of Pope’s +defeat, were already preparing to withdraw; in the vicinity of Norfolk, +and at Fortress Monroe, the invaders had no foothold within the +boundaries of the State they had just now overrun; and their +demoralised masses, lying exhausted behind the fortifications of +Washington and Alexandria, were in no condition to resume the +offensive. The North had opened the campaign in the early spring with +the confident hope of capturing the rebel capital; before the summer +was over it was questionable whether it would be able to save its own. +Had the rival armies been equally matched in numbers and equipment this +result would have hardly been remarkable. The Federals had had great +difficulties to contend with—an unknown country, bad roads, a hostile +population, natural obstacles of formidable character, statesmen +ignorant of war, and generals at loggerheads with the Administration. +Yet so superior were their numbers, so ample their resources, that even +these +disadvantages might have been overcome had the strategy of the Southern +leaders been less admirable. Lee, Jackson, and Johnston had played the +_rôle_ of the defender to perfection. No attempt had been made to hold +the frontier. Mobility and not earthwork was the weapon on which they +had relied. Richmond, the only fortress, had been used as a pivot of +operations, and not merely as a shelter for the army. The specious +expedient of pushing forward advanced guards to harass or delay the +enemy had been avoided; and thus no opportunity had been offered to the +invaders of dealing with the defence in detail, or of raising their own +_moral_ by victory over isolated detachments. The generals had declined +battle until their forces were concentrated and the enemy was divided. +Nor had they fought except on ground of their own choice. Johnston had +refused to be drawn into decisive action until McClellan became +involved in the swamps of the Chickahominy. Jackson, imitating like his +superior the defensive strategy of Wellington and Napoleon, had fallen +back to a zone of manœuvre south of the Massanuttons. By retreating to +the inaccessible fastness of Elk Run Valley he had drawn Banks and +Frémont up the Shenandoah, their lines of communication growing longer +and more vulnerable at every march, and requiring daily more men to +guard them. Then, rushing from his stronghold, he had dealt his blows, +clearing the Valley from end to end, destroying the Federal magazines, +and threatening Washington itself; and when the overwhelming masses he +had drawn on himself sought to cut him off, he had selected his own +battle-field, and crushed the converging columns which his skill had +kept apart. The hapless Pope, too, had been handled in the same fashion +as McClellan, Banks, Shields, and Frémont. Jackson had lured him +forward to the Rapidan; and although his retreat had been speedy, Lee +had completed his defeat before he could be efficiently supported. But, +notwithstanding all that had been done, much yet remained to do. + +It was doubtless within the bounds of probability that a second attempt +to invade Virginia would succeed no +better than the first. But it was by no means certain that the +resolution of the North was not sufficient to withstand a long series +of disasters so long as the war was confined to Southern territory; +and, at the same time, it might well be questioned whether the South +could sustain, without foreign aid, the protracted and exhausting +process of a purely defensive warfare. If her tactics, as well as her +strategy, could be confined to the defensive; that is, if her generals +could await the invaders in selected and prepared positions, and if no +task more difficult should devolve upon her troops than shooting down +their foes as they moved across the open to the assault of strong +intrenchments, then the hope might reasonably be entertained that she +might tire out the North. But the campaign, so far as it had +progressed, had shown, if indeed history had not already made it +sufficiently clear, that opportunities for such tactics were not likely +to occur. The Federal generals had consistently refused to run their +heads against earthworks. Their overwhelming numbers would enable them +to turn any position, however formidable; and the only chance of +success lay in keeping these numbers apart and in preventing them from +combining. + +It was by strategic and tactical counterstrokes that the recent +victories had been won. Although it had awaited attack within its own +frontier, the Army of Northern Virginia had but small experience of +defensive warfare. With the exception of the actions round Yorktown, of +Cross Keys, and of the Second Manassas, the battles had been entirely +aggressive. The idea that a small army, opposed to one vastly superior, +cannot afford to attack because the attack is costly, and that it must +trust for success to favourable ground, had been effectually dispelled. +Lee and Jackson had taught the Southerners that the secret of success +lies not in strong positions, but in the concentration, by means of +skilful strategy, of superior numbers on the field of battle. Their +tactics had been essentially offensive, and it is noteworthy that their +victories had not been dearly purchased. If we compare them with those +of the British in the Peninsula, we shall +find that with no greater loss than Wellington incurred in the +defensive engagements of three years, 1810, 1811, 1812, the +Confederates had attacked and routed armies far larger in proportion +than those which Wellington had merely repulsed.[1] + +But if they had shown that the best defence lies in a vigorous +offensive, their offensive had not yet been applied at the decisive +point. To make victory complete it is the sounder policy to carry the +war into hostile territory. A nation endures with comparative +equanimity defeat beyond its own borders. Pride and prestige may +suffer, but a high-spirited people will seldom be brought to the point +of making terms unless its army is annihilated in the heart of its own +country, unless the capital is occupied and the hideous sufferings of +war are brought directly home to the mass of the population. A single +victory on Northern soil, within easy reach of Washington, was far more +likely to bring about the independence of the South than even a +succession of victories in Virginia. It was time, then, for a strategic +counterstroke on a larger scale than had hitherto been attempted. The +opportunity was ripe. No great risk would be incurred by crossing the +Potomac. There was no question of meeting a more powerful enemy. “The +Federals, recruited by fresh levies; would undoubtedly be numerically +the stronger; and the Confederate equipment, despite the large captures +of guns and rifles, was still deficient. But for deficiencies in +numbers and in materiel the higher _moral_ and the more skilful leading +would make ample compensation. It might safely be inferred that the +Northern soldiers would no longer display the cool confidence of +Gaines’ Mill or even of Malvern Hill. The places of the brave and +seasoned soldiers who had fallen would +be filled by recruits; and generals who had been out-manœuvred on so +many battle-fields might fairly be expected, when confronted once more +with their dreaded opponents, to commit even more egregious errors than +those into which they had already fallen. + +Sept. 2 Such were the ideas entertained by Lee and accepted by the +President, and on the morning of September 2, as soon as it was found +that the Federals had sought shelter under the forts of Alexandria, +Jackson was instructed to cross the Potomac, and form the advanced +guard of the army of invasion. It may be imagined with what feelings he +issued his orders for the march on Leesburg, above which lay an easy +ford. For more than twelve months, since the very morrow of Bull Run, +he had persistently advocated an aggressive policy.[2] The fierce +battles round Richmond and Manassas he had looked upon as merely the +prelude to more resolute efforts. After he had defeated Banks at +Winchester he had urged his friend Colonel Boteler to inform the +authorities that, if they would reinforce him, he would undertake to +capture Washington. The message had been conveyed to Lee. “Tell General +Jackson,” was the reply of the Commander-in-Chief, “that he must first +help me to drive these people away from Richmond.” This object had been +now thoroughly accomplished, and General Lee’s decision to redeem his +promise was by none more heartily approved than by the leader of the +Valley army. And yet, though the risks of the venture were small, the +prospects of complete success were dubious. The opportunity had come, +but the means of seizing it were feeble. Lee himself was buoyed up by +no certain expectation of great results. In +advocating invasion he confessed to the President that his troops were +hardly fit for service beyond the frontier. “The army,” he wrote, “is +not properly equipped for an invasion of the enemy’s territory. It +lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the +animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with +clothes. And in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. . . . +What concerns me most is the fear of getting out of ammunition.”[3] + +This description was by no means over-coloured. As a record of military +activity the campaign of the spring and summer of 1862 has few +parallels. Jackson’s division, since the evacuation of Winchester at +the end of February, that is, in six months, had taken part in no less +than eight battles and innumerable minor engagements; it had marched +nearly a thousand miles, and it had long ago discarded tents. The +remainder of the army had been hardly less severely tasked. The demands +of the outpost service in front of Richmond had been almost as trying +as the forced marches in the Valley, and the climate of the Peninsula +had told heavily on the troops. From the very first the army had been +indifferently equipped; the ill effects of hasty organisation were +still glaring; the regimental officers had not yet learned to study the +wants and comfort of their men; the troops were harassed by the +ignorance of a staff that was still half-trained, and the commissariat +officials were not abreast of their important duties. More than all, +the operations against Pope, just brought to a successful issue, had +been most arduous; and the strain on the endurance of the troops, not +yet recovered from their exertions in the Peninsula, had been so great +that a period of repose seemed absolutely necessary. It was not only +that battle and sickness had thinned the ranks, but that those whose +health had been proof against continued hardships, and whose strength +and spirit were still equal to further efforts, were so badly shod that +a few long marches over indifferent roads were certain to be more +productive of casualties than a pitched battle. The want of +boots had already been severely felt.[4] It has been said that the +route of the Confederate army from the Rappahannock to Chantilly might +have been traced by the stains of bloody feet along the highways; and +if the statement is more graphic than exact, yet it does not fall far +short of the truth. Many a stout soldier, who had hobbled along on his +bare feet until Pope was encountered and defeated, found himself +utterly incapable of marching into Maryland. In rear of the army the +roads were covered with stragglers. Squads of infantry, banding +together for protection, toiled along painfully by easy stages, unable +to keep pace with the colours, but hoping to be up in time for the next +fight; and amongst these were not a few officers. But this was not the +worst. Lax discipline and the absence of soldierly habits asserted +themselves with the same pernicious effect as in the Valley. Not all +the stragglers had their faces turned towards the enemy, not all were +incapacitated by physical suffering. Many, without going through the +formality of asking leave, were making for their homes, and had no idea +that their conduct was in any way peculiar. They had done their duty in +more than one battle, they had been long absent from their farms, their +equipment was worn out, the enemy had been driven from Virginia, and +they considered that they were fully entitled to some short repose. And +amongst these, whose only fault was an imperfect sense of their +military obligations, was the residue of cowards and malingerers shed +by every great army engaged in protracted operations. + +Lee had been joined by the divisions of D. H. Hill, McLaws, Walker, and +by Hampton’s cavalry, and the strength of his force should have been +65,000 effectives.[5] But it was evident that these numbers could not +be long +maintained. The men were already accustomed to half-rations of green +corn, and they would be no worse off in Maryland and Pennsylvania, +untouched as yet by the ravages of war, than in the wasted fields of +Virginia. The most ample commissariat, however, would not compensate +for the want of boots and the want of rest, and a campaign of invasion +was certain to entail an amount of hard marching to which the strength +of the troops was hardly equal. Not only had the South to provide from +her seven millions of white population an army larger than that of +Imperial France, but from a nation of agriculturists she had to provide +another army of craftsmen and mechanics to enable the soldiers to keep +the field. For guns and gun-carriages, powder and ammunition, clothing +and harness, gunboats and torpedoes, locomotives and railway plant, she +was now dependent on the hands of her own people and the resources of +her own soil; the organisation of those resources, scattered over a +vast extent of territory, was not to be accomplished in the course of a +few months, nor was the supply of skilled labour sufficient to fill the +ranks of her industrial army. By the autumn of 1862, although the +strenuous efforts of every Government department gave the lie to the +idea, not uncommon in the North, that the Southern character was +shiftless and the Southern intellect slow, so little real progress had +been made that if the troops had not been supplied from other sources +they could hardly have marched at all. The captures made in the Valley, +in the Peninsula, and in the Second Manassas campaign proved of +inestimable value. Old muskets were exchanged for new, smooth-bore +cannon for rifled guns, tattered blankets for good overcoats. “Mr. +Commissary Banks,” his successor Pope, and McClellan himself, had +furnished their enemies with the material of war, with tents, +medicines, ambulances, and ammunition waggons. Even the vehicles at +Confederate headquarters bore on their tilts the initials U.S.A.; many +of Lee’s soldiers were partially clothed in Federal uniforms, and the +bad quality of the boots supplied by the Northern contractors was a +very general subject of complaint in the +Southern ranks. Nor while the men were fighting were the women idle. +The output of the Government factories was supplemented by private +enterprise. Thousands of spinning-wheels, long silent in dusty +lumber-rooms, hummed busily in mansion and in farm; matrons and maids, +from the wife and daughters of the Commander-in-Chief to the mother of +the drummer-boy, became weavers and seamstresses; and in every +household of the Confederacy, although many of the necessities of +life—salt, coffee and sugar—had become expensive luxuries, the needs of +the army came before all else. + +But notwithstanding the energy of the Government and the patriotism of +the women, the troops lacked everything but spirit. Nor, even with more +ample resources, could their wants have been readily supplied. In any +case this would have involved a long halt in a secure position, and in +a few weeks the Federal strength would be increased by fresh levies, +and the _moral_ of their defeated troops restored. But even had time +been given the Government would have been powerless to render +substantial aid. Contingents of recruits were being drilled into +discipline at Richmond; yet they hardly exceeded 20,000 muskets; and it +was not on the Virginia frontier alone that the South was hard pressed. +The Valley of the Mississippi was beset by great armies; Alabama was +threatened, and Western Tennessee was strongly occupied; it was already +difficult to find a safe passage across the river for the supplies +furnished by the prairies of Texas and Louisiana, and communication +with Arkansas had become uncertain. If the Mississippi were lost, not +only would three of the most fertile States, as prolific of hardy +soldiers as of fat oxen, be cut off from the remainder, but the enemy, +using the river as a base, would push his operations into the very +heart of the Confederacy. To regain possession of the great waterway +seemed of more vital importance than the defence of the Potomac or the +secession of Maryland, and now that Richmond had been relieved, the +whole energy of the Government was expended on the operations in +Kentucky and +Tennessee. It may well be questioned whether a vigorous endeavour, +supported by all the means available, and even by troops drawn from the +West, to defeat the Army of the Potomac and to capture Washington, +would not have been a more efficacious means to the same end; but Davis +and his Cabinet consistently preferred dispersion to concentration, +and, indeed, the situation of the South was such as might well have +disturbed the strongest brains. The sea-power of the Union was telling +with deadly effect. Although the most important strategic points on the +Mississippi were still held by Confederate garrisons, nearly every mile +of the great river, from Cairo to New Orleans, was patrolled by the +Federal gunboats; and in deep water, from the ports of the Atlantic to +the roadsteads of the Gulf, the frigates maintained their vigilant +blockade. + +Even on the northern border there was hardly a gleam of light across +the sky. The Federal forces were still formidable in numbers, and a +portion of the Army of the Potomac had not been involved in Pope’s +defeat. It was possible, therefore, that more skilful generalship than +had yet been displayed by the Northern commanders might deprive the +Confederates of all chance of winning a decisive victory. Yet, although +the opportunity of meeting the enemy with a prospect of success might +never offer, an inroad into Northern territory promised good results. + +1. Maryland, still strong in sympathy with the South, might be induced +by the presence of a Southern army to rise against the Union. + +2. The Federal army would be drawn off westward from its present +position; and so long as it was detained on the northern frontier of +Virginia nothing could be attempted against Richmond, while time would +be secured for improving the defences of the Confederate capital. + +3. The Shenandoah Valley would be most effectively protected, and its +produce transported without risk of interruption both to Lee’s army and +to Richmond. + +To obtain such advantages as these was worth an effort, and Lee, after +careful consideration, determined to cross the +Potomac. The movement was made with the same speed which had +characterised the operations against Pope. It was of the utmost +importance that the passage of the river should be accomplished before +the enemy had time to discover the design and to bar the way. Stuart’s +cavalry formed the screen. On the morning after the battle of +Chantilly, Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade followed the retreating Federals in +the direction of Alexandria. Hampton’s brigade was pushed forward to +Dranesville by way of Hunter’s Mill. Robertson’s brigade made a strong +demonstration towards Washington, and Munford, with the 2nd Virginia, +cleared out a Federal detachment which occupied Leesburg. Behind the +cavalry the army marched unmolested and unobserved.[6] + +Sept. 6 D. H. Hill’s division was pushed forward as advanced guard; +Jackson’s troops, who had been granted a day’s rest, brought up the +rear, and on the morning of the 6th reached White’s Ford on the +Potomac. Through the silver reaches of the great river the long columns +of men and waggons, preceded by Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade, splashed and +stumbled, and passing through the groves of oaks which overhung the +water, wound steadily northward over the green fields of Maryland. + +Sept. 7 The next day Frederick was occupied by Jackson, who was once +more in advance; the cavalry at Urbanna watched the roads to +Washington, and every city in the North was roused by the tidings that +the grey jackets had crossed the border. But although the army had +entered Maryland without the slightest difficulty, the troops were not +received with the enthusiasm they had anticipated. The women, indeed, +emulating their Virginia sisters, gave a warm welcome to the heroes of +so many victories. But the men, whether terrorised by the stern rule of +the Federal Government, or mistrusting the power of the Confederates to +secure them from further punishment, showed little disposition to join +the ranks. It is possible that the appearance of the Southern soldiery +was not without effect. Lee’s troops, after five months’ hard marching +and hard fighting, were no delectable objects. With torn and brimless +hats, strands of rope for belts, and raw-hide moccasins of their own +manufacture in lieu of boots; covered with vermin, and carrying their +whole kit in Federal haversacks, the ragged scarecrows who swarmed +through the streets of Frederick presented a pitiful contrast to the +trim battalions which had hitherto held the Potomac. Their conduct +indeed was exemplary. They had been warned that pillage and +depredations would be severely dealt with, and all requisitions, even +of fence-rails, were paid for on the spot. Still recruits were few. The +warworn aspect and indifferent equipment of the “dirty darlings,” as +more than one fair Marylander spoke of Jackson’s finest soldiers, +failed to inspire confidence, and it was soon evident that the western +counties of Maryland had small sympathy with the South. + +There were certainly exceptions to the general absence of cordiality. +The troops fared well during their sojourn in Frederick. Supplies were +plentiful; food and clothing were gratuitously distributed, and Jackson +was presented with a fine but unbroken charger. The gift was timely, +for “Little Sorrel,” the companion of so many marches, was lost for +some days after the passage of the Potomac; but the Confederacy was +near paying a heavy price for +the “good grey mare.” When Jackson first mounted her a band struck up +close by, and as she reared the girth broke, throwing her rider to the +ground. Fortunately, though stunned and severely bruised, the general +was only temporarily disabled, and, if he appeared but little in public +during his stay in Frederick, his inaccessibility was not due to broken +bones. “Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson, and for a time Jeb Stuart,” +writes a staff officer, “had their headquarters near one another in +Best’s Grove. Hither in crowds came the good people of Frederick, +especially the ladies, as to a fair. General Jackson, still suffering +from his hurt, kept to his tent, busying himself with maps and official +papers, and declined to see visitors. Once, however, when he had been +called to General Lee’s tent, two young girls waylaid him, paralysed +him with smiles and questions, and then jumped into their carriage and +drove off rapidly, leaving him there, cap in hand, bowing, blushing, +speechless. But once safe in his tent, he was seen no more that +day.”[7] The next evening (Sunday) he went with his staff to service in +the town, and slept soundly, as he admitted to his wife, through the +sermon of a minister of the German Reformed Church.[8] + +But it was not for long that the Confederates were permitted to repose +in Frederick. The enemy had made no further reply to the passage of the +Potomac beyond concentrating to the west of Washington. McClellan, who +had superseded Pope, was powerless, owing to the inefficiency of his +cavalry, to penetrate the cordon of Stuart’s pickets, and to ascertain, +even approximately, the dispositions of the invading force. He was +still in doubt if the whole or only part of Lee’s army had crossed +into Maryland; and whether his adversary intended to attack Washington +by the left bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltimore, or to invade +Pennsylvania, were questions which he had no means of determining. This +uncertainty compelled him to move cautiously, and on September 9 his +advanced guard was still twenty miles east of Frederick. + +Nevertheless, the situation of the Confederates had become suddenly +complicated. When the march into Maryland was begun, three towns in the +Valley were held by the Federals. 3,000 infantry and artillery occupied +Winchester. 3,000 cavalry were at Martinsburg; and Harper’s Ferry, in +process of conversion into an intrenched camp, had a garrison of 8,000 +men. Lee was well aware of the presence of these forces when he +resolved to cross the Potomac, but he believed that immediately his +advance threatened to separate them from the main army, and to leave +them isolated, they would be ordered to insure their safety by a timely +retreat. Had it depended upon McClellan this would have been done. +Halleck, however, thought otherwise; and the officer commanding at +Harper’s Ferry was ordered to hold his works until McClellan should +open communication with him. + +On arrival at Frederick, therefore, the Confederates, contrary to +anticipation, found 14,000 Federals still established in their rear, +and although Winchester had been evacuated,[9] it was clear that +Harper’s Ferry was to be defended. The existence of the intrenched camp +was a serious obstacle to the full development of Lee’s designs. His +line of communication had hitherto run from Rapidan Station to Manassas +Junction, and thence by Leesburg and Point of Rocks to Frederick. This +line was within easy reach of Washington, and liable to be cut at any +moment by the enemy’s cavalry. Arrangements had therefore been already +made to transfer the line to the Valley. There, sheltered by the Blue +Ridge, the convoys of +sick and wounded, of arms, clothing, and ammunition, could move in +security from Staunton to Shepherdstown, and the recruits which were +accumulating at Richmond be sent to join the army in Northern +territory. But so long as Harper’s Ferry was strongly garrisoned this +new line would be liable to constant disturbance, and it was necessary +that the post should either be masked by a superior force, or carried +by a _coup de main._ The first of these alternatives was at once +rejected, for the Confederate numbers were too small to permit any +permanent detachment of a considerable force, and without hesitation +Lee determined to adopt the bolder course. 25,000 men, he considered, +would be no more than sufficient to effect his object. But 25,000 men +were practically half the army, and the plan, when laid before the +generals, was not accepted without remonstrance. Longstreet, indeed, +went so far as to refuse command of the detachment. “I objected,” he +writes, “and urged that our troops were worn with marching and were on +short rations, and that it would be a bad idea to divide our forces +while we were in the enemy’s country, where he could get information, +in six or eight hours, of any movement we might make. The Federal army, +though beaten at the Second Manassas, was not disorganised, and it +would certainly come out to look for us, and we should guard against +being caught in such a condition. Our army consisted of a superior +quality of soldiers, but it was in no condition to divide in the +enemy’s country. I urged that we should keep it in hand, recruit our +strength, and get up supplies, and then we could do anything we +pleased. General Lee made no reply to this, and I supposed the Harper’s +Ferry scheme was abandoned.”[10] + +Jackson, too, would have preferred to fight McClellan first, and +consider the question of communicating afterwards;[11] but he accepted +with alacrity the duty which his colleague had declined. His own +divisions, reinforced by +those of McLaws, R. H. Anderson,[12] and Walker, were detailed for the +expedition; Harper’s Ferry was to be invested on three sides, and the +march was to begin at daybreak on September 10. Meanwhile, the +remainder of the army was to move north-west to Hagerstown, +five-and-twenty miles from Frederick, where it would alarm Lincoln for +the safety of Pennsylvania, and be protected from McClellan by the +parallel ranges of the Catoctin and South Mountains. + +Undoubtedly, in ordinary circumstances, General Longstreet would have +been fully justified in protesting against the dispersion of the army +in the presence of the enemy. Hagerstown and Harper’s Ferry are +five-and-twenty miles apart, and the Potomac was between them. +McClellan’s advanced guard, on the other hand, was thirty miles from +Harper’s Ferry, and forty-five from Hagerstown. The Federals were +advancing, slowly and cautiously it is true, but still pushing +westward, and it was certainly possible, should they receive early +intelligence of the Confederate movements, that before Harper’s Ferry +fell a rapid march might enable them to interpose between Lee and +Jackson. But both Lee and Jackson calculated the chances with a surer +grasp of the several factors. Had the general in command of the Federal +army been bold and enterprising, had the Federal cavalry been more +efficient, or Stuart less skilful, they would certainly have hesitated +before running the risk of defeat in detail. But so long as McClellan +controlled the movements of the enemy, rapid and decisive action was +not to be apprehended; and it was exceedingly improbable that the +scanty and unreliable information which he might obtain from civilian +sources would induce him to throw off his customary caution. Moreover, +only a fortnight previously the Federal army had been heavily +defeated.[13] + +Sept. 10 Lee had resolved to woo fortune while she was in the +mood. The movement against Harper’s Ferry once determined, it was +essential that it should be carried out with the utmost speed, and +Jackson marched with even more than ordinary haste, but without +omitting his usual precautions. Before starting he asked for a map of +the Pennsylvania frontier, and made many inquiries as to roads and +localities to the north of Frederick, whereas his route lay in the +opposite direction. “The cavalry, which preceded the column,” says +Colonel Douglas, “had instructions to let no civilian go to the front, +and we entered each village we passed before the inhabitants knew of +our coming. In Middletown two very pretty girls, with ribbons of red, +white, and blue floating from their hair, and small Union flags in +their hands, rushed out of a house as we passed, came to the kerbstone, +and with much laughter waved their flags defiantly in the face of the +general. He bowed, raised his hat, and turning with his quiet smile to +the staff, said, ‘We evidently have no friends in this town.’ + +Sept. 11 “Having crossed South Mountain at Turner’s Gap, the command +encamped for the night within a mile of Boonsboro’ (fourteen miles from +Frederick). Here General Jackson must determine whether he would go to +Williamsport or turn towards Shepherdstown. I at once rode into the +village with a cavalryman to make some inquiries, but we ran into a +Federal squadron, who without ceremony proceeded to make war upon us. +We retraced our steps, and although we did not stand upon the order of +our going, a squad of them escorted us out of the town with great +rapidity. Reaching the top of the hill, we discovered, just over it, +General Jackson, walking slowly towards us, leading his horse. There +was but one thing to do. Fortunately the chase had become less +vigorous, and with a cry of command to unseen troops, we turned and +charged the enemy. They, suspecting trouble, turned and fled, while the +general quickly galloped to the rear. As I returned to camp I picked up +the gloves which he had dropped in mounting, and took them to him. +Although he had sent a regiment of infantry to the front as soon as he +went back, the only +allusion he made to the incident was to express the opinion that I had +a very fast horse. + +“The next morning, having learned that the Federal troops still +occupied Martinsburg, General Jackson took the direct road to +Williamsport. He then forded the Potomac, the troops singing, the bands +playing ‘Carry me back to ole Virginny!’ We marched on Martinsburg. + +Sept. 12 “General A. P. Hill took the direct turnpike, while Jackson, +with the rest of his command, followed a side road, so as to approach +Martinsburg from the west, and encamped four miles from the town. His +object was to drive General White, who occupied Martinsburg, towards +Harper’s Ferry, and thus ‘corral’ all the Federal troops in that +military pen. As the Comte de Paris puts it, he ‘organised a grand +hunting match through the lower Valley, driving all the Federal +detachments before him and forcing them to crowd into the blind alley +of Harper’s Ferry.’ + +“The next morning the Confederates entered Martinsburg. Here the +general was welcomed with enthusiasm, and a great crowd hastened to the +hotel to greet him. At first he shut himself up in a room to write +dispatches, but the demonstration became so persistent that he ordered +the door to be opened. The crowd, chiefly ladies, rushed in and +embarrassed the general with every possible outburst of affection, to +which he could only reply, ‘Thank you, you are very kind.’ He gave them +his autograph in books and on scraps of paper, cut a button from his +coat for a little girl, and then submitted patiently to an attack by +the others, who soon stripped the coat of nearly all the remaining +buttons. But when they looked beseechingly at his hair, which was thin, +he drew the line, and managed to close the interview. These +blandishments did not delay his movements, however, for in the +afternoon he was off again, and his troops bivouacked on the banks of +the Opequon.”[14] + +Sept. 13 On the 13th Jackson passed through Halltown and halted a mile +north of that village,[15] throwing out pickets to hold the roads which +lead south and west from Harper’s Ferry. Meanwhile, McLaws and Walker +had taken possession of the heights to the north and east, and the +intrenched camp of the Federals, which, in addition to the garrison, +now held the troops who had fled from Martinsburg, was surrounded on +every side. The Federal officer in command had left but one brigade and +two batteries to hold the Maryland Heights, the long ridge, 1,000 feet +high, on the north shore of the Potomac, which looks down on the +streets of the little town. This detachment, although strongly posted, +and covered by breastworks and abattis, was driven off by General +McLaws; while the Loudoun Heights, a portion of the Blue Ridge, east of +the Shenandoah, and almost equally commanding, were occupied without +opposition by General Walker. Harper’s Ferry was now completely +surrounded. Lee’s plans had been admirably laid and precisely executed, +and the surrender of the place was merely a question of hours. + +Nor had matters progressed less favourably elsewhere. In exact +accordance with the anticipations of Lee and Jackson, McClellan, up +till noon on the 13th, had received no inkling whatever of the +dangerous manœuvres which Stuart so effectively concealed, and his +march was very slow. On the 12th, after a brisk skirmish with the +Confederate cavalry, his advanced guard had occupied Frederick, and +discovered that the enemy had marched off in two columns, one towards +Hagerstown, the other towards Harper’s Ferry, but he was uncertain +whether Lee intended to recross the Potomac or to move northwards into +Pennsylvania. On the morning of the 13th, although General Hooker, +commanding the First Army Corps, took the liberty of reporting that, in +his opinion, “the rebels had no more intention of going to Pennsylvania +than they had +of going to heaven,” the Federal Commander-in-Chief was still +undecided, and on the Boonsboro’ road only his cavalry was pushed +forward. In four days McClellan had marched no more than +five-and-twenty miles; he had been unable to open communication with +Harper’s Ferry, and he had moved with even more than his usual caution. +But at noon on the 13th he was suddenly put into possession of the most +ample information. A copy of Lee’s order for the investment of Harper’s +Ferry, in which the exact position of each separate division of the +Confederate army was laid down, was picked up in the streets of +Frederick, and chance had presented McClellan with an opportunity +unique in history.[16] He was within twenty miles of Harper’s Ferry. +The Confederates were more than that distance apart. The intrenched +camp still held out, for the sound of McLaws’ battle on the Maryland +Heights was distinctly heard during the afternoon, and a resolute +advance would have either compelled the Confederates to raise the +siege, or have placed the Federal army between their widely separated +wings. + +But, happily for the South, McClellan was not the man for the +opportunity. He still hesitated, and during the afternoon of the 13th +only one division was pushed forward. In front of him was the South +Mountain, the name given to the continuation of the Blue Ridge north of +the Potomac, and the two passes, Turner’s and Crampton’s Gaps, were +held by Stuart. No Confederate infantry, as Lee’s order indicated, with +the exception, perhaps, of a rear-guard, were nearer the passes than +the Maryland Heights and Boonsboro’.[17] The roads were good and the +weather fine, and a night march of twelve miles would have placed the +Federal advanced guards at the foot of the mountains, ready to force +the Gaps at earliest dawn. McClellan, however, although his men had +made no unusual exertions during the past few days, preferred to wait +till daylight. + +Nevertheless, on the night of the 13th disaster threatened the +Confederates. Harper’s Ferry had not yet fallen, and, in addition to +the cavalry, D. H. Hill’s division was alone available to defend the +passes. Lee, however, still relying on McClellan’s irresolution, +determined to hold South Mountain, thus gaining time for the reduction +of Harper’s Ferry, and Longstreet was ordered back from Hagerstown, +thirteen miles west of Boonsboro’, to Hill’s assistance. + +Sept. 14 On the same night Jackson, at Halltown, opened communications +with McLaws and Walker, and on the next morning (Sunday) he made the +necessary arrangements to ensure combination in the attack. The Federal +lines, although commanded by the Maryland and Loudoun Heights to the +north and east, opposed a strong front to the south and west. The +Bolivar Heights, an open plateau, a mile and a quarter in length, which +has the Potomac on the one flank and the Shenandoah on the other, was +defended by several batteries and partially intrenched. Moreover, it +was so far from the summits occupied by McLaws and Walker that their +guns, although directed against the enemy’s rear, could hardly render +effective aid; only the extremities of the plateau were thoroughly +exposed to fire from the heights. + +In order to facilitate communication across the two great rivers +Jackson ordered a series of signal stations to be established, and +while his own batteries were taking up their ground to assail the +Bolivar Heights he issued his instructions to his colleagues. At ten +o’clock the flags on the Loudoun Heights signalled that Walker had six +rifled guns in position. He was ordered to wait until McLaws, +who was employed in cutting roads through the woods, should have done +the same, and the following message explained the method of attack:— + +“General McLaws,—If you can, establish batteries to drive the enemy +from the hill west of Bolivar and on which Barbour’s House is, and from +any other position where he may be damaged by your artillery. Let me +know when you are ready to open your batteries, and give me any +suggestions by which you can operate against the enemy. Cut the +telegraph line down the Potomac if it is not already done. Keep a good +look-out against a Federal advance from below. Similar instructions +will be sent to General Walker. I do not desire any of the batteries to +open until all are ready on both sides of the river, except you should +find it necessary, of which you must judge for yourself. I will let you +know when to open all the batteries. + +“T. J. JACKSON, +_“Major-General Commanding.”_[18] + +About half-past two in the afternoon McLaws reported that his guns were +up, and a message “to fire at such positions of the enemy as will be +most effective,” followed the formal orders for the co-operation of the +whole force. + +“Headquarters, Valley District, +Sept. 14, 1862. + +“1. To-day Major-General McLaws will attack so as to sweep with his +artillery the ground occupied by the enemy, take his batteries in +reverse, and otherwise operate against him as circumstances may +justify. + +“2. Brigadier-General Walker will take in reverse the battery on the +turnpike, and sweep with his artillery the ground occupied by the +enemy, and silence the batteries on the island of the Shenandoah should +he find a battery (_sic_) there. + +“3. Major-General A. P. Hill will move along the left bank of the +Shenandoah, and thus turn the enemy’s left flank and enter Harper’s +Ferry. + +“4. Brigadier-General Lawton will move along the turnpike for the +purpose of supporting General Hill, and otherwise operating against the +enemy to the left of General Hill. + +“5. Brigadier-General Jones will, with one of his brigades and a +battery of artillery, make a demonstration against the enemy’s right; +the remaining part of his division will constitute the reserve and move +along the turnpike. + +“By order of Major-General Jackson, + +“WM. L. JACKSON, +_“Acting Assistant Adjutant-General’_[19] + +Jackson, it appears, was at first inclined to send a flag of truce, for +the purpose of giving the civilian population time to get away, should +the garrison refuse to surrender; but during the morning heavy firing +was heard to the northward, and McLaws reported that he had been +obliged to detach troops to guard his rear against McClellan. The +batteries were therefore ordered to open fire on the Federal works +without further delay. + +According to General Walker, Jackson, although he was aware that +McClellan had occupied Frederick, not over twenty miles distant, could +not bring himself to believe that his old classmate had overcome his +prudential instincts, and attributed the sounds of battle to a cavalry +engagement. It is certain that he never for a single moment anticipated +a resolute attempt to force the passages of the South Mountain, for, in +reply to McLaws, he merely instructed him to ask General P. H. Hill to +protect his rear, and to communicate with Lee at Hagerstown. Had he +entertained the slightest suspicion that McClellan was advancing with +his whole force against the passages of the South Mountain, he would +hardly have suggested that Hill would be asked to defend Crampton’s as +well as Turner’s Gap. + +Illustration: Harper’s Ferry, Virginia. For larger view click on image. + +With full confidence, therefore, that he would have time to enforce the +surrender of Harper’s Ferry and to join Lee on the further bank of the +Potomac, the progress of +his attack was cautious and methodical. “The position in front of me,” +he wrote to McLaws, “is a strong one, and I desire to remain quiet, and +let you and Walker draw attention from Furnace Hill (west of Bolivar +Heights), so that I may have an opportunity of getting possession of +the hill without much loss.” It was not, then, till the artillery had +been long in action, and the fire of the enemy’s guns had been in some +degree subdued, that the infantry was permitted to advance. Although +the Federal batteries opened vigorously on the lines of skirmishers, +the casualties were exceedingly few. The troops found cover in woods +and broken ground, and before nightfall Hill had driven in the enemy’s +pickets, and had secured a knoll on their left flank which afforded an +admirable position for artillery. Lawton, in the centre, occupied a +ridge over which ran the Charlestown turnpike, brought his guns into +action, and formed his regiments for battle in the woods. Jones’ +division held the Shepherdstown road on Lawton’s left, seized Furnace +Hill, and pushed two batteries forward. + +No attempt was made during this Sunday evening to storm the Bolivar +Heights; and yet, although the Confederate infantry had been hardly +engaged, the enemy had been terribly shaken. From every point of the +compass, from the lofty crests which looked down upon the town, from +the woods towards Charlestown, from the hill to westward, a ceaseless +hail of shells had swept the narrow neck to which the garrison was +confined. Several guns had been dismounted. More than one regiment of +raw troops had dispersed in panic, and had been with difficulty +rallied. The roads were furrowed with iron splinters. Many buildings +had been demolished, and although the losses among the infantry, +covered by their parapets, had been insignificant, the batteries had +come almost to their last round. + +During the night Jackson made preparations for an early assault. Two of +A. P. Hill’s brigades, working their way along the bank of the +Shenandoah, over ground which the Federal commander had considered +impassable, established themselves to the left rear of the Bolivar +Heights. Guns were brought up to the knoll which Hill +had seized during the afternoon; and ten pieces, which Jackson had +ordered to be taken across the Shenandoah by Keyes’ Ford, were placed +in a position whence they could enfilade the enemy’s works at effective +range. Lawton and Jones pushed forward their lines until they could +hear voices in the intrenchments; and a girdle of bayonets, closely +supported by many batteries, encircled the hapless Federals. The +assault was to be preceded by a heavy bombardment, and the advance was +to be made as soon as Hill’s guns ceased fire. + +Sept. 15 All night long the Confederates slept upon their arms, waiting +for the dawn. When day broke, a soft silver mist, rising from the broad +Potomac, threw its protecting folds over Harper’s Ferry. But the +Southern gunners knew the direction of their targets; the clouds were +rent by the passage of screaming shells, and as the sun, rising over +the Loudoun Heights, dispersed the vapour, the whole of Jackson’s +artillery became engaged. The Federal batteries, worked with stubborn +courage, and showing a bold front to every fresh opponent, maintained +the contest for an hour; but, even if ammunition had not failed them, +they could not have long withstood the terrible fire which took them in +front, in flank, and in reverse.[20] Then, perceiving that the enemy’s +guns were silenced, Hill ordered his batteries to cease fire, and threw +forward his brigades against the ridge. Staunch to the last, the +Federal artillerymen ran their pieces forward, and opened on the +Confederate infantry. Once more the long line of Jackson’s guns crashed +out in answer, and two batteries, galloping up to within four hundred +yards of the ridge, poured in a destructive fire over the heads of +their own troops. Hill’s brigades, when the artillery duel recommenced, +had halted at the foot of the slope. Beyond, over the bare fields, the +way was obstructed by felled timber, the lopped branches of which were +closely interlaced, and above the abattis rose the line of breastworks. +But before the charge was sounded +the Confederate gunners completed the work they had so well begun. At +7.30 a.m. the white flag was hoisted, and with the loss of no more than +100 men Jackson had captured Harper’s Ferry with his artillery alone. + +The general was near the church in the wood on the Charlestown road, +and Colonel Douglas was sent forward to ascertain the enemy’s purpose. +“Near the top of the hill,” he writes, “I met General White (commanding +the Federals), and told him my mission. Just then General Hill came up +from the direction of his line, and on his request I conducted them to +General Jackson, whom I found sitting on his horse where I had left +him. He was not, as the Comte de Paris says, leaning against a tree +asleep, but exceedingly wide-awake. . . . The surrender was +unconditional, and then General Jackson turned the matter over to +General A. P. Hill, who allowed General White the same liberal terms +that Grant afterwards gave Lee at Appomattox. The fruits of the +surrender were 12,520 prisoners, 13,000 small arms, 73 pieces of +artillery, and several hundred waggons. + +“General Jackson, after a brief dispatch to General Lee announcing the +capitulation, rode up to Bolivar and down into Harper’s Ferry. The +curiosity in the Union army to see him was so great that the soldiers +lined the sides of the road. Many of them uncovered as he passed, and +he invariably returned the salute. One man had an echo of response all +about him when he said aloud: ‘Boys, he’s not much for looks, but if +we’d had him we wouldn’t have been caught in this trap.’”[21] + +The completeness of the victory was marred by the escape of the Federal +cavalry. Under cover of the night 1,200 horsemen, crossing the pontoon +bridge, and passing swiftly up the towpath under the Maryland Heights, +had ridden boldly beneath the muzzles of McLaws’ batteries, and, moving +north-west, had struck out for Pennsylvania. Yet the capture of +Harper’s Ferry was a notable exploit, although Jackson seems to have +looked upon it as a mere matter of course. + +“Through God’s blessing,” he reported to Lee at eight o’clock, +“Harper’s Ferry and its garrison are to be surrendered. As Hill’s +troops have borne the heaviest part of the engagement, he will be left +in command until the prisoners and public property shall be disposed +of, unless you direct otherwise. The other forces can move off this +evening so soon as they get their rations. To what point shall they +move? I write at this time in order that you may be apprised of the +condition of things. You may expect to hear from me again to-day, after +I get more information respecting the number of prisoners, etc.”[22] + +Lee, with D. H. Hill, Longstreet, and Stuart, was already falling back +from the South Mountain to Sharpsburg, a little village on the right +bank of the Antietam Creek; and late in the afternoon Jackson, Walker, +and McLaws were ordered to rejoin without delay.[23] September 14 had +been an anxious day for the Confederate Commander-in-Chief. During the +morning D. H. Hill, with no more than 5,000 men in his command, had +seen the greater part of McClellan’s army deploy for action in the wide +valley below and to the eastward of Turner’s Gap. Stuart held the woods +below Crampton’s Gap, six miles south, with Robertson’s brigade, now +commanded by the gallant Munford; and on the heights above McLaws had +posted three brigades, for against this important pass, the shortest +route by which the Federals could interpose between Lee and Jackson, +McClellan’s left wing, consisting of 20,000 men under General Franklin, +was steadily advancing. + +The positions at both Turner’s and Crampton’s Gaps were very strong. +The passes, at their highest points, are at least 600 feet above the +valley, and the slopes steep, rugged, and thickly wooded. The enemy’s +artillery had +little chance. Stone walls, running parallel to the crest, gave much +protection to the Southern infantry, and loose boulders and rocky +scarps increased the difficulties of the ascent. But the numbers +available for defence were very small; and had McClellan marched during +the night he would probably have been master of the passes before +midday. As it was, Crampton’s Gap was not attacked by Franklin until +noon; and although at the same hour the advanced guard of the Federal +right wing had gained much ground, it was not till four in the evening +that a general attack was made on Turner’s Gap. By this time +Longstreet, after a march of thirteen miles, had reached the +battle-field;[24] and despite the determination with which the attack +was pressed, Turner’s Gap was still held when darkness fell. + +The defence of Crampton’s Gap had been less successful. Franklin had +forced the pass before five o’clock, and driving McLaws’ three brigades +before him, had firmly established himself astride the summit. The +Confederate losses were larger than those which they had inflicted. +McClellan reports 1,791 casualties on the right, Franklin 533 on the +left. McLaws’ and Munford’s loss was over 800, of whom 400 were +captured. The number of killed and wounded in Hill’s and Longstreet’s +commands is unknown; it probably reached a total of 1,500, and 1,100 of +their men were marched to Frederick as prisoners. Thus the day’s +fighting had cost the South 3,400 men. Moreover, Longstreet’s +ammunition column, together with an escort of 600 men, had been cut up +by the cavalry which had escaped from Harper’s Ferry, and which had +struck the Hagerstown road as it marched northward into Pennsylvania. +Yet, on the whole, Lee had no reason to be chagrined with the result of +his operations. McClellan had acted with unexpected vigour. But neither +in strategy nor in tactics had he displayed improvement on his +Peninsular methods. He should have thrown the bulk of his army against +Crampton’s Gap, thus intervening between Lee and Jackson; but instead +of doing so he had directed 70,000 men against Turner’s Gap. Nor had +the attack on Hill and Longstreet been characterised by resolution. The +advanced guard was left unsupported until 2 p.m., and not more than +30,000 men were employed throughout the day. Against this number 8,000 +Confederates had held the pass. Cobb, one of McLaws’ brigadiers, who +commanded the defence at Crampton’s Gap, though driven down the +mountain, had offered a stout resistance to superior forces; and +twenty-four hours had been gained for Jackson. On the other hand, in +face of superior numbers, the position at Turner’s Gap had become +untenable; and during the night Hill and Longstreet marched to +Sharpsburg. + +Sept. 15 This enforced retreat was not without effect on the _moral_ of +either army. McClellan was as exultant as he was credulous. “I have +just learned,” he reported to Halleck at 8 a.m. on the 15th, “from +General Hooker, in advance, that the enemy is making for Shepherdstown +in a perfect panic; and that General Lee last night stated publicly +that he must admit they had been shockingly whipped. I am hurrying +forward to endeavour to press their retreat to the utmost.” Then, two +hours later: “Information this moment received completely confirms the +rout and demoralisation of the rebel army. It is stated that Lee gives +his losses as 15,000. We are following as rapidly as the men can +move.”[25] Nor can it be doubted that McClellan’s whole army, +unaccustomed to see their antagonists give ground before them, shared +the general’s mood.[26] Amongst the Confederates, on the other hand, +there was some depression. It could not be disguised that +a portion of the troops had shown symptoms of demoralisation. The +retreat to the Antietam, although effectively screened by Fitzhugh +Lee’s brigade of cavalry, was not effected in the best of order. Many +of the regiments had been broken by the hard fighting on the mountain; +men had become lost in the forest, or had sought safety to the rear; +and the number of stragglers was very large. It was not, then, with its +usual confidence that the army moved into position on the ridge above +the Antietam Creek. General Longstreet, indeed, was of opinion that the +army should have recrossed the Potomac at once. “The moral effect of +our move into Maryland had been lost by our discomfiture at South +Mountain, and it was evident we could not hope to concentrate in time +to do more than make a respectable retreat, whereas by retiring before +the battle [of Sharpsburg] we could have claimed a very successful +campaign.”[27] So spake the voice of prudence. Lee, however, so soon as +he was informed of the fall of Harper’s Ferry, had ordered Jackson to +join him, resolving to hold his ground, and to bring McClellan to a +decisive battle on the north bank of the Potomac. + +Although 45,000 men—for Lee at most could count on no more than this +number, so great had been the straggling—were about to receive the +attack of over 90,000, Jackson, when he reached Sharpsburg on the +morning of the 16th, heartily approved the Commander-in-Chief’s +decision, and it is worth while to consider the reasons which led them +to disagree with Longstreet. + +1. Under ordinary conditions, to expect an army of 45,000 to wrest +decisive victory from one of 90,000 well-armed enemies would be to +demand an impossibility. The defence, when two armies are equally +matched, is physically stronger than the attack, although we have +Napoleon’s word for it that the defence has the harder task. But that +the inherent strength of the defence is so great as to enable the +smaller force to annihilate its enemy is contrary to all the teaching +of history. By making good use of favourable ground, or by constructing +substantial works, +the smaller force may indeed stave off defeat and gain time. But it can +hope for nothing more. The records of warfare contain no instance, when +two armies were of much the same quality, of the smaller army bringing +the campaign to a decisive issue by defensive tactics. Wellington and +Lee both fought many defensive battles with inferior forces. But +neither of them, under such conditions, ever achieved the destruction +of their enemy. They fought such battles to gain time, and their hopes +soared no higher. At Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes d’Onor, where the French +were superior to the allies, Wellington repulsed the attack, but he did +not prevent the defeated armies taking the field again in a few days. +At the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, the North Anna, and Cold Harbour, the +great battles of 1864, Lee maintained his ground, but he did not +prevent Grant moving round his flank in the direction of Richmond. At +the Second Manassas, Jackson stood fast for the greater part of two +days, but he would never have driven Pope across Bull Run without the +aid of Longstreet. Porter at Gaines’ Mill held 55,000 men with 35,000 +for more than seven hours, but even if he had maintained his position, +the Confederate army would not have become a mob of fugitives. No; +except on peculiarly favourable ground, or when defending an intrenched +camp, an army matched with one of equal efficiency and numerically +superior, can never hope for decisive success. So circumstanced, a wise +general will rather retreat than fight, and thus save his men for a +more favourable opportunity.[28] + +But Lee and Jackson had not to deal with ordinary conditions. Whatever +may have been the case in the Peninsula and in the Valley, there can be +no question but that the armies in Maryland were by no means equal in +quality. The Federals were far more accustomed to retreat than advance. +For several months, whether they were engaged on the Shenandoah, on the +Chickahominy, on the Rappahannock, or on Bull Run, they had been +invariably outmanœuvered. Their losses had been exceedingly severe, not +only in battle, but from sickness and straggling. Many of their bravest +officers and men had fallen. With the exception of the Second and Sixth +Army Corps, commanded by Sumner and by Franklin, by far the greater +part of the troops had been involved in Pope’s defeat, and they had not +that trust in their leaders which promises a strong offensive. While at +Washington the army had been reinforced by twenty-four regiments of +infantry, but the majority of these troops had been but lately raised; +they knew little of drill; they were commanded by officers as ignorant +as themselves, and they had never fired a musket. Nor were the generals +equal in capacity to those opposing them. “If a student of history,” +says a Northern officer, “familiar with the characters who figured in +the War of Secession, but happening to be ignorant of the battle of +Antietam, should be told the names of the men who held high commands +there, he would say that with anything like equality of forces the +Confederates must have won, for their leaders were men who made great +names in the war, while the Federal leaders were, with few exceptions, +men who never became conspicuous, or became conspicuous only through +failure.”[29] And the difference in military capacity extended to the +rank and file. When the two armies met on the Antietam, events had been +such as to confer a marked superiority on the Southerners. They were +the children of victory, and every man in the army had participated in +the successes of Lee and Jackson. They had much experience of battle. +They were supremely confident in their own prowess, for the fall of +Harper’s Ferry had made more than amends for the retreat from South +Mountain, and they were supremely confident in their leaders. No new +regiments weakened +the stability of their array. Every brigade and every regiment could be +depended on. The artillery, which had been but lately reorganised in +battalions, had, under the fostering care of General Pendleton, become +peculiarly efficient, although the materiel was still indifferent; and +against Stuart’s horsemen the Federal cavalry was practically useless. + +In every military attribute, then, the Army of Northern Virginia was so +superior to the Army of the Potomac that Lee and Jackson believed that +they might fight a defensive battle, outnumbered as they were, with the +hope of annihilating their enemy. They were not especially favoured by +the ground, and time and means for intrenching were both wanting; but +they were assured that not only were their veterans capable of holding +the position, but, if favoured by fortune, of delivering a +counterstroke which should shiver the Army of the Potomac into a +thousand fragments. + +2. By retreating across the Potomac, in accordance with General +Longstreet’s suggestion, Lee would certainly have avoided all chances +of disaster. But, at the same time, he would have abandoned a good hope +of ending the war. The enemy would have been fully justified in +assuming that the retrograde movement had been made under the +compulsion of his advance, and the balance of _moral_ have been +sensibly affected in favour of the Federals. If the Potomac had once +been placed between the opposing forces, McClellan would have had it in +his power to postpone an encounter until his army was strongly +reinforced, his raw regiments trained, and his troops rested. The +passage of the river, it is true, had been successfully forced by the +Confederates on September 5. But it by no means followed that it could +be forced for the second time in face of a concentrated enemy, who +would have had time to recover his _moral_ and supply his losses. +McClellan, so long as the Confederates remained in Maryland, had +evidently made up his mind to attack. But if Maryland was evacuated he +would probably content himself with holding the line of the Potomac; +and, in view of the relative strength of the two armies, it would be an +extraordinary stroke of fortune which should lay him open to assault. +Lee and Jackson were firmly convinced that it was the wiser policy to +give the enemy no time to reorganise and recruit, but to coerce him to +battle before he had recovered from the defeat which he had sustained +on the heights above Bull Run. To recross the Potomac would be to +slight the favours of fortune, to abandon the initiative, and to +submit, in face of the vast numbers of fresh troops which the North was +already raising, to a defensive warfare, a warfare which might protract +the struggle, but which must end in the exhaustion of the Confederacy. +McClellan’s own words are the strongest justification of the views held +by the Southern leaders:— + +“The Army of the Potomac was thoroughly exhausted and depleted by the +desperate fighting and severe marching in the unhealthy regions of the +Chickahominy and afterwards, during the second Bull Run campaign; its +trains, administrative services and supplies were disorganised or +lacking in consequence of the rapidity and manner of its removal from +the Peninsula, as well as from the nature of its operations during the +second Bull Run campaign. + +“Had General Lee remained in front of Washington (south of the Potomac) +it would have been the part of wisdom to hold our own army quiet until +its pressing wants were fully supplied, its organisation was restored, +and its ranks were filled with recruits—in brief, until it was prepared +for a campaign. But as the enemy maintained the offensive, and crossed +the Upper Potomac to threaten or invade Pennsylvania, it became +necessary to meet him at any cost, notwithstanding the condition of the +troops, to put a stop to the invasion, to save Baltimore and +Washington, and throw him back across the Potomac. Nothing but sheer +necessity justified the advance of the Army of the Potomac to South +Mountain and Antietam in its then condition. The purpose of advancing +from Washington was simply to meet the necessities of the moment by +frustrating Lee’s invasion of the Northern States, and when that was +accomplished, to push with +the utmost rapidity the work of reorganisation and supply, so that a +new campaign might be promptly inaugurated with the army in condition +to prosecute it to a successful termination without intermission.”[30] + +And in his official report, showing what the result of a Confederate +success might well have been, he says: “One battle lost and almost all +would have been lost. Lee’s army might have marched as it pleased on +Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New York. It could have levied +its supplies from a fertile and undevastated country, extorted tribute +from wealthy and populous cities, and nowhere east of the Alleghenies +was there another organised force to avert its march.”[31] + +3. The situation in the West was such that even a victory in Maryland +was exceedingly desirable. Confederate movements in Tennessee and +Kentucky had won a measure of success which bade fair to open up a +brilliant opportunity. Should the Federals be defeated in both the +theatres of war, the blow would be felt throughout the length and +breadth of the Northern States; and, in any case, it was of the utmost +importance that all McClellan’s troops should be retained in the East. + +So, when the tidings came of Jackson’s victory at Harper’s Ferry, both +armies braced themselves for the coming battle, the Confederates in the +hope that it would be decisive of the war, the Federals that it would +save the capital. But the Confederates had still a most critical time +before them, and Lee’s daring was never more amply illustrated than +when he made up his mind to fight on the Antietam. McClellan’s great +army was streaming through the passes of the South Mountain. At +Rohrersville, six miles east of the Confederate bivouacs, where he had +halted as soon as the cannonade at Harper’s Ferry ceased, Franklin was +still posted with 20,000 men. From their battle-field at Turner’s Gap, +ten miles from Sharpsburg, came the 70,000 which composed the right and +centre; and on the banks of the Antietam but 15,000 Southerners were in +position. +Jackson had to get rid of his prisoners, to march seventeen miles, and +to ford the Potomac before he could reach the ground. Walker was twenty +miles distant, beyond the Shenandoah; and McLaws, who would be +compelled by Franklin’s presence near Rohrersville to cross at Harper’s +Ferry and follow Jackson, over five-and-twenty. Would they be up before +McClellan attacked? Lee, relying on McClellan’s caution and Jackson’s +energy, answered the question in the affirmative. + +The September day wore on. The country between the South Mountain and +Sharpsburg, resembling in every characteristic the Valley of the +Shenandoah, is open and gently undulating. No leagues of woodland, as +in Eastern Virginia, block the view. The roads run through wide +cornfields and rolling pastures, and scattered copses are the only +relics of the forest. It was not yet noon when the Federal scouts +appeared among the trees which crown the left bank of the Antietam +Creek. “The number increased, and larger and larger grew the field of +blue until it seemed to stretch as far as the eye could see. It was an +awe-inspiring spectacle,” adds Longstreet, “as this grand force settled +down in sight of the Confederates, shattered by battles and scattered +by long and tedious marches.”[32] But when night fell upon the field +the only interchange of hostilities had been a brief engagement of +artillery. McClellan’s advance, owing to the difficulty of passing his +great army through the mountains, and to the scarcity of roads, had +been slow and tedious; in some of the divisions there had been +unnecessary delay; and Lee had so disposed his force that the Federal +commander, unenlightened as to the real strength of his adversary, +believed that he was opposed by 50,000 men. + +Sept. 16 Nor was the next morning marked by any increase of activity. +McClellan, although he should have been well aware that a great part of +the Confederate army was still west of the Potomac, made no attack. “It +was discovered,” he reports, “that the enemy had changed the position +of some of his batteries. The masses of +his troops, however, were still concealed behind the opposite heights. +It was afternoon before I could move the troops to their positions for +attack, being compelled to spend the morning in reconnoitring the new +position taken up by the enemy, examining the ground, and finding +fords, clearing the approaches, and hurrying up the ammunition and +supply trains.”[33] + +Considering that McClellan had been in possession of the left bank of +the Antietam since the forenoon of the previous day, all these +preliminaries might well have been completed before daylight on the +16th. That a change in the dispositions of a few batteries, a change so +unimportant as to pass unnoticed in the Confederate reports, should +have imposed a delay, when every moment was precious, of many hours, +proves that Lee’s and Jackson’s estimate of their opponent’s character +was absolutely correct. While McClellan was reconnoitring, and the guns +were thundering across the Antietam, Jackson and Walker crossed the +Potomac, and reported to Lee in Sharpsburg.[34] Walker had expected to +find the Commander-in-Chief anxious and careworn. “Anxious no doubt he +was; but there was nothing in his look or manner to indicate it. On the +contrary, he was calm, dignified, and even cheerful. If he had had a +well-equipped army of a hundred thousand veterans at his back, he could +not have appeared more composed and confident. On shaking hands with +us, he simply expressed his satisfaction with the result of our +operations at Harper’s Ferry, and with our timely arrival at +Sharpsburg; adding that with our reinforcements he felt confident of +being able to hold his ground until the arrival of the divisions of R. +H. Anderson, McLaws, and A. P. Hill, which were still behind, and which +did not arrive till next day.”[35] + +Yet the reinforcements which Jackson and Walker had brought up were no +considerable addition to Lee’s +strength. Jones’ division consisted of no more than 1,600 muskets, +Lawton’s of less than 3,500. Including officers and artillery, +therefore, the effectives of these divisions numbered about 5,500. A. +P. Hill’s division appears to have mustered 5,000 officers and men, and +we may add 1,000 for men sick or on detached duties. The total should +undoubtedly have been larger. After the battle of Cedar Run, Jackson +had 22,450 effectives in his ranks. His losses in the operations +against Pope, and the transfer of Robertson’s cavalry to Stuart, had +brought his numbers down by 5,787; but on September 16, including 70 +killed or wounded at Harper’s Ferry, they should have been not less +than 16,800. In reality they were only 11,500. We have not far to look +for the cause of this reduction. Many of the men had absented +themselves before the army crossed into Maryland; and if those who +remained with the colours had seen little fighting since Pope’s defeat, +they had had no reason to complain of inactivity. The operations which +resulted in the capture of Harper’s Ferry had been arduous in the +extreme. Men who had taken part in the forced marches of the Valley +campaign declared that the march from Frederick to Harper’s Ferry +surpassed all their former experiences. In three-and-a-half days they +had covered over sixty miles, crossing two mountain ranges, and fording +the Potomac. The weather had been intensely hot, and the dust was +terrible. Nor had the investment of Harper’s Ferry been a period of +repose. They had been under arms during the night which preceded the +surrender, awaiting the signal to assault within a few hundred yards of +the enemy’s sentries. As soon as the terms of capitulation were +arranged they had been hurried back to the bivouac, had cooked two +days’ rations, and shortly after midnight had marched to the Potomac, +seventeen miles away. This night march, coming on the top of their +previous exertions, had taxed the strength of many beyond endurance. +The majority were badly shod. Many were not shod at all. They were +ill-fed, and men ill-fed are on the highroad to hospital. There were +stragglers, then, from every company in the command. Even the Stonewall +Brigade, though it had still preserved its five regiments, was reduced +to 300 muskets; and the other brigades of Jackson’s division were but +little stronger. Walker’s division, too, although less hardly used in +the campaign than the Valley troops, had diminished under the strain of +the night march, and mustered no more than 3,500 officers and men at +Sharpsburg. Thus the masses of troops which McClellan conceived were +hidden in rear of D. H. Hill and Longstreet amounted in reality to some +10,000 effective soldiers. + +It was fortunate, indeed, that in their exhausted condition there was +no immediate occasion for their services on September 16. The shadows +grew longer, but yet the Federals made no move; even the fire of the +artillery died away, and the men slept quietly in the woods to north +and west of the little town. Meanwhile, in an old house, one of the few +which had any pretensions to comfort in Sharpsburg, the generals met in +council. Staff officers strolled to and fro over the broad brick +pavement; the horses stood lazily under the trees which shaded the +dusty road; and within, Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet pored long and +earnestly over the map of Maryland during the bright September +afternoon. But before the glow of a lovely sunset had faded from the +sky the artillery once more opened on the ridge above, and reports came +in that the Federals were crossing the Antietam near Pry’s Mill. Lee at +once ordered Longstreet to meet this threat with Hood’s division, and +Jackson was ordered into line on the left of Hood. No serious +collision, however, took place during the evening. The Confederates +made no attempt to oppose the passage of the Creek. Hood’s pickets were +driven in, but a speedy reinforcement restored the line, and except +that the batteries on both sides took part the fighting was little more +than an affair of outposts. At eleven o’clock Hood’s brigades were +withdrawn to cook and eat. Jackson’s division filled their place; and +the night, although broken by constant alarms, passed away without +further conflict. The Federal movements had clearly exposed their +intention of attacking, and had even revealed the point which they +would first assail. +McClellan had thrown two army corps, the First under Hooker, and the +Twelfth under Mansfield, across the Antietam; and they were now posted, +facing southward, a mile and a half north of Sharpsburg, concealed by +the wood beyond Jackson’s left. + +NOTE + +The essential paragraphs of the lost order ran as follows:— + +“The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. +General Jackson’s command will form the advance, and after passing +Middletown, with such portions as he may select, take the route towards +Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by +Friday night (September 12) take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio +Railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and +intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper’s Ferry. + +“General Longstreet’s command will pursue the same road as far as +Boonsboro’, where it will halt with the reserve, supply, and baggage +trains of the army. + +“General McLaws, with his own division and that of General Anderson, +will follow General Longstreet; on reaching Middletown he will take the +route to Harper’s Ferry, and by Friday morning (September 12) possess +himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavour to capture the enemy at +Harper’s Ferry and vicinity. + +“General Walker with his division . . . will take possession of the +Loudoun Heights, if practicable by Friday morning (September 12), . . . +He will as far as practicable co-operate with General McLaws and +General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy. + +“General D. H. Hill’s division will form the rear-guard of the army, +pursuing the road taken by the main body. + +“General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the +commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the +main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army and bring up +all stragglers. + +“The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after +accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join +the main body at Boonsboro’ or Hagerstown.” + +The second paragraph was afterwards modified by General Lee so as to +place Longstreet at Hagerstown. + + [1] Wellington’s losses in the battles of these three years were + 33,000. The Confederates lost 23,000 in the Valley and the Seven Days + and 10,000 in the campaign against Pope. It is not to be understood, + however, that the Duke’s strategy was less skilful or less audacious + than Lee’s and Jackson’s. During these three years his army, largely + composed of Portuguese and Spaniards, was incapable of offensive + tactics against his veteran enemies, and he was biding his time. It + was the inefficiency of his allies and the miserable support he + received from the English Government that prevented him, until 1813, + from adopting a bolder policy. + + [2] In Mrs. Jackson’s Memoirs of her husband a letter is quoted from + her brother-in-law, giving the substance of a conversation with + General Jackson on the conduct of the war. This letter I have not felt + justified in quoting. In the first place, it lacks corroboration; in + the second place, it contains a very incomplete statement of a large + strategical question; in the third place, the opinions put in + Jackson’s mouth are not only contradictory, but altogether at variance + with his practice; and lastly, it attributes certain ideas to the + general—raising “the black flag.” &c.—which his confidential aid + officers declare that he never for a moment entertained. + + [3] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, pp. 590, 591. + + [4] “1,000 pairs of shoes were obtained in Fredericktown, 250 pairs in + Williamsport, and about 400 pairs in this city (Hagerstown). They will + not be sufficient to cover the bare feet of the army.” Lee to Davis, + September 12, 1862. O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 605. + + [5] Calculated on the basis of the Field Returns dated July 20, 1862, + with the addition of Jackson’s and Ewell’s divisions, and subtracting + the losses (10,000) of the campaign against Pope. + + [6] The Army of Northern Virginia was thus organised during the + Maryland campaign:— + +Longstreet’s McLaws’ Division +R. H. Anderson’s Division +D. R. Jones’ Division +J. G. Walker’s Division +Evans’ Brigade +Washington Artillery +S. D. Lee’s Artillery battalion = 35,600 Jackson’s Ewell’s (Lawton) +Division +The Light (A. P. Hill) Division +Jackson’s own (J. R. Jones) Division = 16,800 +D. H. Hill’s Division = 7,000 +Pendleton’s Reserve Artillery, 4 battalions = 1,000 +Stuart Hampton’s Brigade +Fitzhugh Lee’s Brigade +Robertson’s Brigade +3 H.A. Batteries, Captain Pelham = 4,000 +Total ——— 64,400 + +No allowance has been made for straggling. It is doubtful if more than +55,000 men entered Maryland. + + [7] “Stonewall Jackson in Maryland.” Colonel H. K. Douglas. _Battles + and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 621. + + [8] “The minister,” says Colonel Douglas, “was credited with much + loyalty and courage, because he had prayed for the President of the + United States in the very presence of Stonewall Jackson. Well, the + general didn’t hear the prayer, and if he had he would doubtless have + felt like replying as General Ewell did, when asked at Carlisle, + Pennsylvania, if he would permit the usual prayer for President + Lincoln—‘Certainly; I’m sure he needs it.’” + + [9] On the night of September 2. Lee’s Report, O.R., vol. xix, part i, + p. 139. + + [10] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 662. + + [11] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 302. + + [12] Anderson was placed under McLaws’ command. + + [13] “Are you acquainted with McClellan?” said Lee to General Walker + on September 8, 1862. “He is an able general but a very cautious one. + His enemies among his own people think him too much so. His army is in + a very demoralised and chaotic condition, and will not be prepared for + offensive operations—or he will not think it so—for three or four + weeks.”—_Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 605 and 606. + + [14] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 622, 623. Major Hotchkiss + relates that the ladies of Martinsburg made such desperate assaults on + the mane and tail of the general’s charger that he had at last to post + a sentry over the stable. + + [15] On September 10 he marched fourteen miles, on September 11 + twenty, on September 12 sixteen, and on September 13 twelve, arriving + at Halltown at 11 a.m. + + [16] General Longstreet, in his _From Manassas to Appomattox,_ + declares that the lost order was sent by General Jackson to General D. + H. Hill, “but was not delivered. The order,” he adds, “that was sent + to General Hill from general headquarters was carefully preserved.” + General Hill, however, in _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 570 + (note), says: “It was proper that I should receive that order through + Jackson, and not through me. I have now before me (1888) the order + received from Jackson. My adjutant-general swore affidavit, twenty + years ago, that no order was received at our office from General Lee.” + Jackson was so careful that no one should learn the contents of the + order that the copy he furnished to Hill was written by his own hand. + The copy found by the Federals was wrapped round three cigars, and was + signed by Lee’s adjutant-general. + + [17] For the lost order, see Note at end of chapter. + + [18] Report of Signal Officer, O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. 958. + + [19] Report of Signal Officer, O.R., vol xix, part i, p. 659. + + [20] The ten guns which had been carried across the Shenandoah were + specially effective. Report of Colonel Crutchfield, Jackson’s chief of + artillery. O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. 962. + + [21] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 625–7. + + [22] O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. 951. General Longstreet (_From + Manassas to Appomattox,_ p. 233) suggests that Jackson, after the + capitulation of Harper’s Ferry, should have moved east of South + Mountain against McClellan’s rear. Jackson, however, was acquainted + neither with McClellan’s position nor with Lee’s intentions, and + nothing could have justified such a movement except the direct order + of the Commander-in-Chief. + + [23] “The Invasion of Maryland,” General Longstreet, _Battles and + Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 666. + + [24] The order for the march had been given the night before (“The + Invasion of Maryland,” General Longstreet, _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. + ii, p. 666), and there seems to have been no good reason, even + admitting the heat and dust, that Longstreet’s command should not have + joined him at noon. The troops marched “at daylight” (5 a.m.), and + took ten hours to march thirteen miles. As it was, only four of the + brigades took part in the action, and did so, owing to their late + arrival, in very disjointed fashion. Not all the Confederate generals + appear to have possessed the same “driving power” as Jackson. + + [25] O.R., vol. xix, pp. 294, 295. + + [26] “The _moral_ of our men is now restored.” McClellan to Halleck + after South Mountain. O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 294. + + [27] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 666, 667. + + [28] Before Salamanca, for instance, because Marmont, whose strength + was equal to his own, was about to be reinforced by 4,000 cavalry, + Wellington had determined to retreat. It is true, however, that when + weaker than Masséna, whom he had already worsted, by 8,000 infantry + and 3,800 sabres, but somewhat stronger in artillery, he stood to + receive attack at Fuentes d’Onor. Yet Napier declares that it was a + very audacious resolution. The knowledge and experience of the great + historian told him that to pit 32,000 Infantry against 40,000 was to + trust too much to fortune. + + [29] _The Antietam and Fredericksburg._ General Palfrey p. 53. + + [30] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 554. + + [31] O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. 65. + + [32] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 667. + + [33] O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. 55. + + [34] According to Jackson’s staff officers he himself reported shortly + after daylight. + + [35] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 675. + + + + +Chapter XIX +SHARPSBURG + + +1862. Sept. 17 It is a curious coincidence that not only were the +number, of the opposing armies at the battle of Sharpsburg almost +identical with those of the French and Germans at the battle of Wörth, +but that there is no small resemblance between the natural features and +surrounding scenery of the two fields. Full in front of the Confederate +position rises the Red Hill, a spur of the South Mountain, wooded, like +the Vosges, to the very crest, and towering high above the fields of +Maryland, as the Hochwald towers above the Rhineland. The Antietam, +however, is a more difficult obstacle than the Sauerbach, the brook +which meanders through the open meadows of the Alsatian valley. A deep +channel of more than sixty feet in width is overshadowed by forest +trees; and the ground on either bank ascends at a sharp gradient to the +crests above. Along the ridge to the west, which parts the Antietam +from the Potomac, and about a mile distant from the former stream, runs +the Hagerstown turnpike, and in front of this road there was a strong +position. Sharpsburg, a village of a few hundred inhabitants, lies on +the reverse slope of the ridge, extending in the direction of the +Potomac, and only the church steeples were visible to the Federals. +Above the hamlet was the Confederate centre. Here, near a limestone +boulder, which stood in a plot which is now included in the soldiers’ +cemetery, was Lee’s station during the long hours of September 17, and +from this point he overlooked the whole extent of his line of battle. A +mile northward, on the Hagerstown pike, his loft centre was marked by a +square white building, famous +under the name of the Dunkard Church, and backed by a long dark wood. +To the right, a mile southward, a bold spur, covered with scattered +trees, forces the Antietam westward, and on this spur, overlooking the +stream, he had placed his right. + +Illustration: Map of Sharpsburg, Maryland. For larger view click on +image. + +Between the Hagerstown pike and the Antietam the open slopes, although +not always uniform, but broken, like those on the French side of the +Sauerbach, by long ravines, afforded an admirable field of fire. The +lanes which cross them are sunk in many places below the surface: in +front of Sharpsburg the fields were divided by low stone walls; and +these natural intrenchments added much to the strength of the position. +Nor were they the only advantages. The belt of oaks beyond the Dunkard +Church, the West Wood, was peculiarly adapted for defence. Parallel +ledges of outcropping limestone, both within the thickets and along the +Hagerstown road, rising as high as a man’s waist, gave good coyer from +shot and shell; the trees were of old growth, and there was little +underwood. To the north-east, however, and about five hundred yards +distant across the fields, lay the East Wood, covering the slopes to +the Antietam, with Poffenberger’s Wood beyond; while further to the +left, the North Wood, extending across the Hagerstown pike, approached +the Confederate flank. The enemy, if he advanced to the attack in this +quarter of the field, would thus find ample protection during his march +and deployment; and in case of reverse he would find a rallying-point +in the North and Poffenberger’s Woods, of which Hooker was already in +possession. In the space between the woods were several small farms, +surrounded by orchards and stone fences; and on the slope east of the +Dunkard Church stood a few cottages and barns. + +Access to the position was not easy. Only a single ford, near +Snaveley’s house, exists across the Antietam, and this was commanded by +the bluff on the Confederate right. The stone bridges, however, for +want of time and means to destroy them, had been left standing. That +nearest the confluence of the Antietam and the Potomac, +at the Antietam Iron-works, by which A. P Hill was expected, was +defended by rifle-pits and enfiladed by artillery. The next, known as +the Burnside Bridge, was completely overlooked by the heights above. +That opposite Lee’s centre could be raked throughout its length; but +the fourth, at Pry’s Mill, by which Hooker and Mansfield had already +crossed, was covered both from view and fire. Roads within the position +were numerous. The Hagerstown turnpike, concealed for some distance on +either side of Sharpsburg by the crest of the ridge, was admirably +adapted for the movement of reserves, and another broad highway ran +through Sharpsburg to the Potomac. + +The position, then, in many respects, was well adapted to Lee’s +purpose. The flanks were reasonably secure. The right rested on the +Antietam. The left was more open; but the West Wood formed a strong +_point d’appui,_ and beyond the wood a low ridge, rising above +Nicodemus Run, gave room for several batteries; while the Potomac was +so close that the space available for attack on this flank was much +restricted. The ground could thus be held by a comparatively small +number of men, and a large reserve set free for the counterstroke. The +great drawback was that the ridge east of the Antietam, although +commanded by the crest which the Confederates occupied, would permit +McClellan to deploy the whole of his powerful artillery, and in no +place did the range exceed two thousand yards. In case of retreat, +moreover, the Potomac, two hundred yards from shore to shore, would +have to be crossed by a few deep fords,[1] of which only one was +practicable for waggons. These disadvantages, however, it was +impossible to avoid; and if the counterstroke were decisive, they would +not be felt. + +The left of the position was assigned to Jackson, with Hood in third +line. Next in order came D. H. Hill. Longstreet held the centre and the +right, with Walker in reserve behind the flank. Stuart, with Fitzhugh +Lee’s +brigade and his four guns, was between the West Wood and the Potomac. +Munford’s two regiments of cavalry, reinforced by a battery, held the +bridge at the Antietam Iron-works, and kept open the communication with +Harper’s Ferry; and twenty-six rifled pieces of the reserve artillery +were with D. H. Hill. From the Nicodemus Run to the bluff overhanging +the Burnside Bridge is just three miles, and for the occupation of this +front the following troops were at Lee’s disposal:— + + Men Guns Jackson: + Jones’ Division + Ewell’s Division (General Lawton) 5,500 16[2] Longstreet: + D. R. Jones’ Division + Hood’s Division (detached to Jackson) + Evan’s Brigade 8,000 50 + D. H. Hill’s Division 5,000 26 + Walker’s Division 3,500 12 +Stuart: + Fitzhugh Lee’s Brigade + Munford’s Brigade 2,500 4 Reserve Artillery 1,000 ——— + 25,000 26 —— 134 + +On the far side of the Potomac the Shepherdstown Ford was protected by +the remainder of the reserve artillery, with an infantry escort; but so +small was the force whose retreat was thus secured that nearly every +man was required in the fighting-line. Except the divisions of Hood and +Walker, 5,500 men all told, there was no immediate reserve. + +But at daybreak on the 17th the troops which had been left at Harper’s +Ferry were rapidly coming up. McLaws and Anderson, who had started +before midnight, were already nearing the Potomac; Hampton’s cavalry +brigade was not far behind, and orders had been dispatched to A. P. +Hill. But could these 13,000 bayonets be up in time—before Hooker and +Mansfield received strong support, or before the Burnside Bridge was +heavily attacked? The question was indeed momentous. If the Federals +were to put forth their whole strength without +delay, bring their numerous artillery into action, and press the battle +at every point, it seemed hardly possible that defeat could be averted. +McClellan, however, who had never yet ventured on a resolute offensive, +was not likely, in Lee’s judgment, to assault so strong a position as +that held by the Confederates with whole-hearted energy, and it was +safe to calculate that his troops would be feebly handled. Yet the odds +were great. Even after the arrival of the absent divisions[3] no more +than 35,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 194 guns would be in line, and +the enemy’s numbers were far superior. McClellan had called in Franklin +from Rohrersville, and his muster roll was imposing. + + Men Guns + +First Corps—Hooker +Second Corps—Sumner +Fifth Corps—Porter +Sixth Corps—Franklin +Ninth Corps—Burnside +Twelfth Corps—Mansfield +Cavalry—Pleasanton 14,856 +18,813 +12,930 +12,300 +13,819 +10,126 +4,320 +——— +87,164 40 42 70 36 35 36 16 —— 275 + +In comparison with the masses arrayed between the Red Hill and the +Antietam, the Confederate army was but a handful. + +5 a.m. Notwithstanding McClellan’s caution, the opening of the battle +was not long delayed. Before sunrise the desultory firing of the +pickets had deepened to the roar of battle. Hooker, who had been +ordered to begin the attack, forming his troops behind the North Wood, +directed them on the Dunkard Church, which, standing on rising ground, +appeared the key of the position. Jackson had already thrown back his +two divisions at nearly a right angle to the Confederate front. His +right, which connected with the left of D. H. Hill, and resting on the +western edge of the East Wood extended as far as the Miller House, was +held by Lawton, with two brigades in front and one in second line. West +of the Hagerstown turnpike, and covering the ground as far as the +Nicodemus Farm, was Jones’ division; the Stonewall and Jones’ brigades +in front, Taliaferro’s and Starke’s along the edge of the wood in rear. +Three guns stood upon the turnpike; the remainder of the artillery +(thirteen) guns was with Stuart on the high ground north of Nicodemus +Run. Hood, in third line, stood near the Dunkard Church; and on Hood’s +right were three of Longstreet’s batteries under Colonel Stephen Lee. + +The ground which Jackson had been ordered to occupy was not +unfavourable for defence, although the troops had practically no cover +except the rail-fences and the rocky ledges. There was a wide and open +field of fire, and when the Federal skirmishers appeared north of the +Miller House the Confederate batteries, opening with vigour at a range +of eight hundred yards, struck down sixteen men at the first salvo. +This fire, and the stubborn resistance of the pickets, held the enemy +for some time in check; but Hooker deployed six batteries in reply, and +after a cannonade of nearly an hour his infantry advanced. From the +cover of the woods, still veiled by the morning mist, the Federals came +forward in strong force. Across the dry ploughed land in Lawton’s front +the fight grew hot, and on the far side of the turnpike the meadows +round the Nicodemus Farm became the scene of a desperate struggle. +Hooker had sent in two divisions, Meade on the left and Doubleday on +the right, while a third under Ricketts acted in close support of +Meade.[4] The attack was waged with the dash and energy which had +earned for Hooker the sobriquet of Fighting Joe, and the troops he +commanded had already proved their mettle on many murderous fields. +Meade’s Pennsylvanians, together with the Indiana and Wisconsin +regiments, which had wrought such havoc in Jackson’s ranks at +Grovetown, were once more bearing down upon his line. Nor were the +tactics of the leaders ill-calculated to second the valour of the +troops. Hooker’s whole army corps of 12,500 men was manœuvred in close +combination. The second line was so posted as to render quick support. +No portion of the front was without an adequate reserve in rear. The +artillery was used in mass, and the flanks were adequately guarded. + +The conflict between soldiers so well matched was not less fierce than +when they had met on other fields. Hooker’s troops had won a large +measure of success at South Mountain three days previously, and their +blood was up. Meade, Gibbon, and Ricketts were there to lead them, and +the battle opened with a resolution which, if it had infected +McClellan, would have carried the Sharpsburg ridge ere set of sun. +Stubborn was the resistance of Jackson’s regiments, unerring the aim of +his seasoned riflemen; but the opposing infantry, constantly +reinforced, pressed irresistibly forward, and the heavy guns beyond the +Antietam, finding an opening between the woods, swept the thin grey +line from end to end. Jones’ division, after fighting for +three-quarters of an hour on the meadows, fell back to the West Wood; +General Jones was carried wounded from the field, and the guns on the +turnpike were abandoned. + +6.30 a.m. So tremendous was the fire, that the corn, said Hooker, over +thirty acres was cut as close by the bullets as if it had been reaped +with the sickle, and the dead lay piled in regular ranks along the +whole Confederate front. Never, he added, had been seen a more bloody +or dismal battle-field. To the east of the turnpike Lawton’s division, +strengthened at the critical moment by the brigade in second line, held +Meade in check, and with a sharp counterstroke drove the Pennsylvanians +back upon their guns. But Gibbon, fighting fiercely in the centre by +the Miller House, brought up a battery in close support of his first +line, and pressed heavily on the West Wood until the Confederate +skirmishers, creeping through the maize, shot +down the gunners and the teams;[5] and Starke, who had succeeded Jones, +led the Valley regiments once more into the open field. The battle +swayed backwards and forwards under the clouds of smoke; the crash of +musketry, reverberating in the woods, drowned the roar of the +artillery; and though hundreds were shot down at the shortest range +neither Federal nor Confederate flinched from the dreadful fray. Hooker +sent in a fresh brigade, and Patrick, reinforcing Gibbon with four +regiments, passed swiftly to the front, captured two colours, and made +some headway. But again the Virginians rallied, and Starke, observing +that the enemy’s right had become exposed, led his regiments forward to +the charge. Doubleday’s division, struck fiercely in front and flank, +reeled back in confusion past the Miller House, and although the +gallant Starke fell dead, the Confederates recovered the ground which +they had lost. Jackson’s men had not been left unaided. Colonel Lee’s +guns had themselves to look to, for along the whole course of the +Antietam McClellan’s batteries were now in action, sweeping the +Sharpsburg ridge with a tremendous fire; but Stuart, west of the +Nicodemus Farm, had done much to embarrass Hooker’s operations. +Bringing his artillery into action, for the ground was unsuited to +cavalry, he had distracted the aim of the Federal gunners, and, +assailing their infantry in flank, had compelled Doubleday to detach a +portion of his force against him. Jackson, with supreme confidence in +the ability of his men to hold their ground, had not hesitated to +reinforce Stuart with Early’s brigade, the strongest in his command; +but before Doubleday was beaten back, Early had been recalled. + +7.30 a.m. It was now half-past seven. The battle had been in progress +nearly three hours, and Hooker’s attack had been repulsed. But fresh +troops were coming into action from the north and north-east, and +Lawton’s and Jones’ divisions were in no condition to withstand a +renewed assault. No less than three officers in succession had led the +latter. Not one single brigade in either +division was still commanded by the officer who brought it into action, +and but few regiments. Of 4,200 infantry,[6] 1,700 had already fallen. +Never had Jackson’s soldiers displayed a spirit more akin to that of +their intrepid leader, and their fierce courage was not to be wasted. +Reinforcements were close at hand. Early’s brigade, 1,100 strong,[7] +was moving across from Nicodemus Run into the West Wood. Hood brought +his Texans, 1,800 muskets, to the relief of Lawton; and on Hood’s +right, but facing eastward, for Ricketts was working round Jackson’s +right, three of D. H. Hill’s brigades, hitherto hidden under cover, +came rapidly into line. Lawton’s division, nearly half the command +being killed or wounded, was withdrawn to the Dunkard Church; but on +the skirt of the West Wood the heroic remnant of the Valley regiments +still held fast among the limestone ledges. + +The 8,500 infantry which McClellan had sent to Hooker’s assistance +formed the Twelfth Army Corps, commanded by Mansfield; and with those +men, too, Jackson’s soldiers were well acquainted.[8] They were the men +who had followed Banks and Shields from Kernstown to Winchester, from +Port Republic to Cedar Run; and the Valley army had not yet encountered +more determined foes. Their attack was delivered with their wonted +vigour. Several regiments, moving west of the turnpike, bore down on +the West Wood. But coming into action at considerable intervals, they +were roughly handled by Jones’ division, now commanded by Colonel +Grigsby, and protected by the rocks; and Stuart’s artillery taking them +in flank they were rapidly dispersed. East of the highroad the battle +raged with still greater violence. Hood and his Texans, as Lawton’s +brigades passed to the rear, dashed across the corn-field against Meade +and Ricketts, driving back the infantry on the batteries, and shooting +down the +gunners. But the Federal line remained unbroken, and Mansfield’s troops +were already moving forward. Crawford’s brigade, and then Gordon’s, +struck the Texans in front, while Greene, working round the East Wood, +made a resolute onslaught on D. H. Hill. The struggle was long and +bloody. The men stood like duelists, firing and receiving the fire at +fifty or a hundred paces. Crawford lost 1,000 men without gaining a +foot of ground; but Gordon turned the scale, and Hood’s brigades were +gradually forced back through the corn-field to the Dunkard Church. A +great gap had now opened in Jackson’s line. Jones’ division, its flank +uncovered by Hood’s retreat, found itself compelled to seek a new +position. D. H. Hill’s brigades, in the same plight, gave ground +towards Sharpsburg; and Greene, following in pursuit, actually crossed +the turnpike, and penetrated the West Wood; but neither Hooker nor +Mansfield were able to support him, and unassisted he could make no +progress. + +[Illustration: Map of the Approximate Positions of the Troops during +the attacks of Hooker and Mansfield on the Confederate left, at the +Battle of Sharpsburg.] + +9 a.m. At this moment, as if by common consent, the firing ceased on +this flank of the battle; and as McClellan’s Second Army Corps, led by +Sumner, advanced to sustain the First and Twelfth, we may stand by +Jackson near the Dunkard Church, and survey the field after four hours’ +fighting. + +Assailed in front by superior numbers, and enfiladed by the batteries +beyond the Antietam, the Confederate left had everywhere given back. +The East Wood was in possession of the enemy. Their right occupied the +Miller House; their centre, supported by many batteries, stood across +the corn-field; while the left, thrust forward, was actually +established on the edge of the West Wood, some five hundred yards to +northward of the church. But if Jackson had yielded ground, he had +exacted a fearful price. The space between the woods was a veritable +slaughter-pen, reeking under the hot September sun, where the blue +uniforms lay thicker than the grey. The First Army Corps had been cut +to pieces. It had been beaten in fair fight by Jackson’s two divisions, +counting at the outset less than half its numbers, and aided only by +the cavalry. It had lost in killed and wounded over 100 officers and +2,400 men. Hooker himself had been struck down, and as far as the +Antietam the field was covered with his stragglers. The Twelfth Corps +had suffered hardly less severely; and Mansfield himself, an old man +and a gallant soldier, was dying of his wounds. His batteries indeed +remained in action, pouring shot and shell on the West Wood and the +Dunkard Church; but his infantry, reduced by more than 1,500 rifles, +could do no more than hold their ground. + +Nor was the exhaustion of the enemy the only advantage which the +Confederates had gained by the slaughter of 4,000 men. The position to +which Jackson had retired was more favourable than that from which he +had been driven. The line, no longer presenting a weak angle, was +almost straight, and no part of the front was open to enfilade. Stuart +and his artillery, withdrawn to a more favourable position, secured the +left. D. H. Hill on the right, though part of his force had given way, +still held the Roulette House and the sunken road, and the troops in +the West Wood were well protected from the Northern batteries. The one +weak point was the gap occupied by Greene’s Federals, which lay between +Grigsby’s regiments in the northern angle of the West Wood and Hood’s +division at the Dunkard Church. The enemy, however, showed no signs of +making good his opportunity; Early’s brigade was close at hand, and Lee +had promised further reinforcements. + +A glance southward showed that there was no reason for despair. Over +all the field lay the heavy smoke of a great artillery battle. From +near the Dunkard Church to the bluff overhanging the Antietam, a +distance of two miles, battery on battery was in line. Here were +Longstreet’s artillery under Stephen Lee, together with the +six-and-twenty guns of Cutts’ reserve battalion, forty-eight guns in +all; the divisional batteries of D. H. Hill, and the Washington +artillery of New Orleans,[9] and in addition to these eighty guns +others were in action above the Burnside Bridge. An array even more +formidable crowned the opposite +crest; but although the Confederate batteries, opposed by larger +numbers and heavier metal, had suffered terribly, both in men and in +_matériel,_ yet the infantry, the main strength of the defence, was +still intact.[10] The cliffs of the Red Hill, replying to the rolling +thunder of near 800 guns, gave back no echo to the sharper crack of +musketry. Save a few skirmishers, who had crossed the Sharpsburg +Bridge, not one company of McClellan’s infantry had been sent into +action south of the Dunkard Church. Beyond the Antietam, covering the +whole space between the river and the hills, the blue masses were +plainly to be seen through the drifting smoke; some so far in the +distance that only the flash of steel in the bright sunshine +distinguished them from the surrounding woods; others moving in dense +columns towards the battle: + +Standards on standards, men on men; +In slow succession still. + +But neither by the Sharpsburg nor yet by the Burnside Bridge had a +single Federal regiment crossed the stream; Lee’s centre and right were +not even threatened, and it was evident his reserves might be +concentrated without risk at whatever point he pleased. + +Walker’s division was therefore withdrawn from the right, and McLaws, +who had reached Sharpsburg shortly after sunrise, was ordered to the +front. G. T. Anderson’s brigade was detached from D. H. Hill; and the +whole force was placed at Jackson’s disposal. These fresh troops, +together with Early’s regiments, not yet engaged, gave 10,000 muskets +for the counterstroke, and had Hooker and Mansfield been alone upon the +field the Federal right wing would have been annihilated. But as the +Confederate reserves approached the Dunkard Church, Sumner, whom +McClellan +had ordered to cross Pry’s Bridge with the Second Army Corps, threw +three divisions against the West Wood and the Roulette House. In three +lines, up the slope from the Antietam, at sixty yards distance and +covering a wide front, came Sedgwick on the right, French on the left, +and Richardson to the left rear. So orderly was the advance of those +18,000 Northerners, and so imposing their array, that even the +Confederate officers watched their march with admiration, and terrible +was the shock with which they renewed the conflict. + +Sedgwick, emerging from the East Wood, moved directly over the +corn-field, crossed the turnpike, and entering the West Wood to +northward of the point still held by Greene, swept through the timber, +and with a portion of his advanced brigade reached the further edge. +Greene, at the same moment, moved upon the Dunkard Church, and Early, +who with the fragments of Jones’ division was alone within the wood, +marched rapidly in the same direction. Attacked suddenly in flank from +behind a ridge of rock Greene’s regiments were driven back; and then +Early, observing Sedgwick’s third line pushing across the turnpike, +reformed his troops for further action. Greene, for the moment, had +been disposed of, but a more formidable attack was threatening. +Sedgwick’s 6,000 muskets, confronted only by some 600[11] of the Valley +soldiers under Grigsby, were thronging through the wood, and a change +of front southward would have sent them sweeping down the Confederate +line. Early could hardly have withstood their onset; Hood was incapable +of further effort, and D. H. Hill was heavily pressed by French. But +Jackson’s hand still held the reins of battle. During the fierce +struggle of the morning he had remained on the edge of the West Wood, +leaving, as was his wont, the conduct of the divisions to his +subordinates, but watching his enemy with a glance that saw beyond the +numbers arrayed against him. He had already demanded reinforcements +from General Lee; and in anticipation of their speedy arrival +their orders had been already framed. They had not been called for to +sustain his front, or to occupy a new position. Despite the thronging +masses of the Federals, despite the fact that his line was already +broken, attack, and attack only, was in Jackson’s mind, and the +reserves and the opportunity arrived together. A staff officer was +dispatched to direct Walker, on the left, to sustain the Texans, to +clear the West Wood, and to place a detachment in the gap between the +Dunkard Church and the batteries of Colonel Lee;[12] while Jackson +himself, riding to meet McLaws, ordered him “to drive the enemy back +and turn his right.” Anderson’s brigade was sent to support McLaws, and +Semmes’ brigade of McLaws’ division was detached to strengthen Stuart. + +Forming into line as they advanced, McLaws and Walker, leaving the +Dunkard Church on their right, and moving swiftly through the wood, +fell suddenly on Sedgwick’s flank. Early joined in the _mêlée,_ and +“the result,” says Palfrey, a Northern general who was present on the +field, “was not long doubtful. Sedgwick’s fine division was at the +mercy of their enemy. Change of front was impossible. In less time than +it takes to tell it the ground was strewn with the bodies of the dead +and wounded, while the unwounded were moving off rapidly to the north. +Nearly 2,000 men were disabled in a moment.”[13] And the impetus of the +counterstroke was not yet spent. Gordon’s brigade of the Twelfth Corps +had been dispatched to Sedgwick’s help, but McLaws had reformed his +troops, and after a short struggle the Confederates drove all before +them. + +Confusion reigned supreme in the Federal ranks. In vain their powerful +artillery, firing case and canister with desperate energy, strove to +arrest the rush of the pursuing infantry. Out from the West Wood and +across the cornfield the grey lines of battle, preceded by clouds of +skirmishers, pressed forward without a check, and the light batteries, +plying whip and spur, galloped to the front in +close support. Hope rose high. The Southern yell, pealing from ten +thousand throats, rang with a wild note of anticipated triumph, and +Jackson, riding with McLaws, followed with kindling gaze the progress +of his counterstroke attack. “God,” he said to his companion, as the +shells fell round them and the masses of the enemy melted away like the +morning mist, “has been very kind to us this day.” + +But the end was not yet. Sedgwick’s brigades, flying to the north-east, +rallied under the fire of their batteries, and as the Confederates +advanced upon the East Wood, they found it already occupied by a fresh +brigade. Smith’s division of the Sixth Corps had been sent forward by +McClellan to sustain the battle, and its arrival saved his army from +defeat. Once more the corn-field became the scene of a furious +struggle, the Southerners fighting for decisive victory, the Federals +for existence. So impetuous was McLaws’ attack that the regiments on +his left, although checked by the fences, drove in a battery and dashed +back the enemy’s first line; but the weight of the artillery in front +of the North Wood, supported by a portion of Smith’s division, +prevented further advance, and a Federal brigade, handled with rare +judgment, rushed forward to meet the assailants in the open. Sharp was +the conflict, for McLaws, a fine soldier, as daring as he was skilful, +strove fiercely to complete the victory; but the fight within the woods +and the swift pursuit had broken the order of his division. Brigade had +mingled with brigade, regiment with regiment. There were no supports; +and the broken ranks, scourged by the terrible cross-fire of many +batteries, were unable to withstand the solid impact of the Federal +reserve. Slowly and sullenly the troops fell back from the deadly +strife. The enemy, no less exhausted, halted and lay down beyond the +turnpike; and while the musketry once more died away to northward of +the Dunkard Church, Jackson, rallying his brigades, re-established his +line along the edge of the West Wood. + +Near the church was a portion of Walker’s division. Further north were +two of McLaws’ brigades; then Armistead, who had been sent forward from +Sharpsburg, and +then Early. A brigade of McLaws’ division formed the second line, and +Anderson was sent back to D. H. Hill. Hood also was withdrawn, and the +survivors of Jones’ division, many of whom had shared in the +counterattack, were permitted to leave the front. + +10.30 a.m. Their rifles were no longer needed, for from half-past ten +onwards, so far as the defence of the Confederate left was concerned, +the work was done. For many hours the West Wood was exposed to the +concentrated fire of the Federal artillery; but this fire, although the +range was close, varying from six to fifteen hundred yards, had little +effect. The shattered branches fell incessantly among the recumbent +ranks, and the shells, exploding in the foliage, sent their hissing +fragments far and wide; yet the losses, so more than one general +reported, were surprisingly small. + +But although the enemy’s infantry had been repulsed, no immediate +endeavour was made by the Confederates to initiate a fresh +counterstroke. When Lee sent McLaws and Walker to Jackson’s aid, he +sent in his last reserve, for A. P. Hill had not yet reached the field, +and R. H. Anderson’s division had already been taken to support the +centre. Thus no fresh troops were available, and the Federal right was +strong. At least fifteen batteries of artillery were in position along +the edge of the North Wood, and they were powerfully supported by the +heavy guns beyond the stream. + +Yet the infantry so effectively protected was only formidable by reason +of its numbers. The First Corps and the Twelfth no longer existed as +organised bodies.[14] Sedgwick’s division of the Second Corps was still +more shattered. Only Smith’s division was effective, and General +McClellan, acting on the advice of Sumner, forbade all further attack. +Slocum’s division of the Sixth Corps, which reached the East Wood at +twelve o’clock, was ordered to remain in rear as support to Smith. The +Confederate left wing, then, had offered such strenuous resistance that +eight divisions of infantry, more than half of McClellan’s army, lay +paralysed before them for the remainder of +the day. 30,500 infantry, at the lowest calculation,[15] and probably +100 guns, besides those across the Antietam, had been massed by the +Federals in this quarter of the field. Jackson’s numbers, even after he +had been reinforced by McLaws and Walker, at no time approached those +arrayed against him, and 19,400 men, including Stuart and three +brigades of Hill, and 40 guns, is a liberal estimate of his +strength.[16] The losses on both sides had been exceedingly heavy. +Nearly 13,000 men,[17] including no less than fifteen generals and +brigadiers, had fallen within six hours. But although the Confederate +casualties were not greatly exceeded by those of the enemy, and were +much larger in proportion to their strength, the Federals had lost more +than mere numbers. The _moral_ of the troops had suffered, and still +more the _moral_ of the leaders. Even +Sumner, bravest of men, had been staggered by the fierce assault which +had driven Sedgwick’s troops like sheep across the corn-field, nor was +McClellan disposed to push matters to extremity. + +Over in the West Wood, on the other hand, discouragement had no place. +Jackson had not yet abandoned hope of sweeping the enemy from the +field. He was disappointed with the partial success of McLaws’ +counterstroke. It had come too late. The fortuitous advance of Smith’s +division, at the very crisis of the struggle, had, in all human +probability, rescued the Federal right from a terrible defeat. Had +McLaws been able to reach the East Wood he would have compelled the +hostile batteries to retreat; the Federal infantry, already shattered +and disorganised, could hardly have held on, and the line would have +been broken through. But although one opportunity had been lost, and he +was once more thrown on the defensive, Jackson’s determination to make +the battle decisive of the war was still unshaken. His judgment was +never clearer. Shortly before eleven o’clock his medical director, +appalled by the number of wounded men sent back from the front, and +assured that the day was going badly, rode to the West Wood in order to +discuss the advisability of transferring the field hospitals across the +Potomac. Dr. McGuire found Jackson sitting quietly on “Little Sorrel” +behind the line of battle, and some peaches he had brought with him +were gratefully accepted. He then made his report, and his +apprehensions were not made less by the weakness of the line which held +the wood. The men, in many places, were lying at intervals of several +yards; for support there was but one small brigade, and over in the +corn-fields the overwhelming strength of the Federal masses was +terribly apparent. Yet his imperturbable commander, apparently paying +more attention to the peaches than to his subordinate’s suggestions, +replied by pointing to the enemy and saying quietly, “Dr. McGuire, they +have done their worst.” + +Meanwhile, the tide of battle, leaving Jackson’s front and setting +strongly southwards, threatened to submerge the Confederate centre. +French’s division of Sumner’s +corps, two brigades of Franklin’s, and afterwards Richardson’s +division, made repeated efforts to seize the Dunkard Church, the +Roulette Farm, and the Piper House. + +1 p.m. From before ten until one o’clock the battle raged fiercely +about the sunken road which was held by D. H. Hill, and which witnessed +on this day such pre-eminence of slaughter that it has since been known +by the name of the “Bloody Lane.” Here, inspired by the unyielding +courage of their leaders, fought the five brigades of D. H. Hill, with +B. H. Anderson’s division and two of Walker’s regiments; and here +Longstreet, confident as always, controlled the battle with his +accustomed skill. The Confederate artillery was by this time +overpowered, for on each battery in turn the enemy’s heavy ordnance had +concentrated an overwhelming fire, and the infantry were supported by +no more than a dozen guns. The attack was strong, but the sunken road, +fortified by piles of fence-rails, remained inviolable. Still the +Confederate losses were enormous, and defeat appeared a mere question +of time; at one moment, the enemy under French had actually seized the +wood near the Dunkard Church, and was only dispossessed by a desperate +counterstroke. Richardson, who advanced on French’s right, and at an +appreciable interval of time, was even more successful than his +colleague. The “Bloody Lane,” already piled with dead, and enfiladed +from a height to the north-west, was carried by a brilliant charge; and +when the Roulette Farm, a strong defensive post, was stormed, +Longstreet fell back to the turnpike through the wreck of the +artillery. But at this critical juncture the Federals halted. They had +not been supported by their batteries. Richardson had received a mortal +wound, and a succession of rough counterstrokes had thinned their +ranks. Here, too, the musketry dwindled to a spattering fire, and the +opposing forces, both reduced to the defensive, lay watching each other +through the long hours of the afternoon. A threat of a Federal advance +from the Sharpsburg Bridge came to nothing. Four batteries of regulars, +preceded by a force of infantry, pushed across the stream and came into +action on either side of +the Boonsboro’ road; but on the slopes above, strongly protected by the +walls, Evans’ brigade stood fast; Lee sent up a small support, and the +enemy confined his movements to a demonstration. + +Still further to the south, however, the battle blazed out at one +o’clock with unexpected fury. The Federal attack, recoiling first from +Jackson and then from Longstreet, swung round to the Confederate right; +and it seemed as if McClellan’s plan was to attempt each section of +Lee’s line in succession. Burnside had been ordered to force the +passage of the bridge at nine o’clock, but either the difficulty of the +task, or his inexperience in handling troops on the offensive, delayed +his movements; and when the attack was made, it was fiercely met by +four Confederate brigades. At length, well on in the afternoon, three +Federal divisions crowned the spur, and, driving Longstreet’s right +before them, made good their footing on the ridge. Sharpsburg was below +them; the Southern infantry, outflanked and roughly handled, was +falling back in confusion upon the town; and although Lee had assembled +a group of batteries in the centre, and regiments were hurrying from +the left, disaster seemed imminent. But strong assistance was at hand. +A. P. Hill, who had forded the Potomac and crossed the Antietam by the +lower bridge, after a forced march of seventeen miles in eight hours +from Harper’s Ferry,[18] attacked without waiting for orders, and +struck the Federals in flank with 3,000 bayonets. By this brilliant +counterstroke Burnside was repulsed and the position saved. + +Northern writers have laid much stress on this attack. Had Burnside +displayed more, or A. P. Hill less, energy, the Confederates, they +assert, could hardly have escaped defeat. It is certainly true that +Longstreet’s four brigades had been left to bear the brunt of +Burnside’s assault without further support than could be rendered by +the artillery. They were not so left, however, because it was +impossible to aid them. Jackson’s and Longstreet’s +troops, despite the fiery ordeal through which they had passed, were +not yet powerless, and the Confederate leaders were prepared for +offensive tactics. A sufficient force to sustain the right might have +been withdrawn from the left and centre; but Hill’s approach was known, +and it was considered inadvisable to abandon all hold of the means for +a decisive counterstroke on the opposite flank. Early in the afternoon +Longstreet had given orders for an advance. Hood’s division, with full +cartridge-boxes, had reappeared upon the field. Jones’ and Lawton’s +divisions were close behind; the batteries had replenished their +ammunition, and if Longstreet was hardly warranted in arranging a +general counter-attack on his own responsibility, he had at least full +confidence in the ability of the troops to execute it. “It seemed +probable,” he says, “that by concealing our movements under cover of +the (West) wood, we could draw our columns so near to the enemy to the +front that we would have but a few rods to march to mingle our ranks +with his; that our columns, massed in goodly numbers, and pressing +heavily upon a single point, would give the enemy much trouble and +might cut him in two, breaking up his battle arrangements at Burnside +Bridge.”[19] + +The stroke against the centre was not, however, to be tried. Lee had +other views, and Jackson had been already ordered to turn the Federal +right. Stuart, reinforced by a regiment of infantry and several light +batteries, was instructed to reconnoitre the enemy’s position, and if +favourable ground were found, he was to be supported by all the +infantry available. “About half-past twelve,” says General Walker, “I +sought Jackson to report that from the front of my position in the wood +I thought I had observed a movement of the enemy, as if to pass through +the gap where I had posted Colonel Cooke’s two regiments. I found +Jackson in rear of Barksdale’s brigade, under an apple tree, sitting on +his horse, with one leg thrown carelessly over the pommel of his +saddle, plucking and eating the fruit. Without making any reply to my +report, he asked me abruptly: ‘Can you spare me a +regiment and a battery?’ . . . Adding that he wished to make up, from +the different commands on our left, a force of four or five thousand +men, and give them to Stuart, with orders to turn the enemy’s right and +attack him in the rear; that I must give orders to my division to +advance to the front, and attack the enemy as soon as I should hear +Stuart’s guns, and that our whole left wing would move to the attack at +the same time. Then, replacing his foot in the stirrup, he said with +great emphasis, ‘We’ll drive McClellan into the Potomac.’ + +“Returning to my command, I repeated General Jackson’s order to my +brigade commanders and directed them to listen to the sound of Stuart’s +guns. We all confidently expected to hear the welcome sound by two +o’clock at least, and as that hour approached every ear was on the +alert. Napoleon at Waterloo did not listen more intently for the sound +of Grouchy’s fire than did we for Stuart’s. Two o’clock came, but +nothing was heard of Stuart. Half-past two, and then three, and still +Stuart made no sign. + +“About half-past three a staff officer of General Longstreet’s brought +me an order to advance and attack the enemy in my front. As the +execution of this order would have materially interfered with Jackson’s +plans, I thought it my duty before beginning the movement to +communicate with General Longstreet personally. I found him in rear of +the position in which I had posted Cooke in the morning, and upon +informing him of Jackson’s intentions, he withdrew his order. + +“While we were discussing this subject, Jackson himself joined us with +the information of Stuart’s failure to turn the Federal right, for the +reason that he found it securely posted on the Potomac. Upon my +expressing surprise at this statement, Jackson replied that he also had +been surprised, as he had supposed the Potomac much further away; but +he remarked that Stuart had an excellent eye for topography, and it +must be as he represented. ‘It is a great pity,’ he added; ‘we should +have driven McClellan into the Potomac.’”[20] + +That a counterstroke which would have combined a frontal and flank +attack would have been the best chance of destroying the Federal army +can hardly be questioned. The front so bristled with field artillery, +and the ridge beyond the Antietam was so strong in heavier ordnance, +that a purely frontal attack, such as Longstreet suggested, was hardly +promising; but the dispositions which baffled Stuart were the work of a +sound tactician. Thirty rifled guns had been assembled in a single +battery a mile north of the West Wood, where the Hagerstown turnpike +ascends a commanding ridge, and the broad channel of the Potomac is +within nine hundred yards. Here had rallied such portions of Hooker’s +army corps as had not dispersed, and here Mansfield’s two divisions had +reformed; and although the infantry could hardly have opposed a +resolute resistance the guns were ready to repeat the lesson of Malvern +Hill. Against the rifled pieces the light Confederate smooth-bores were +practically useless. Stuart’s caution was fully justified, and the sun +sank on an indecisive battle. + +“The blessed night came, and brought with it sleep and forgetfulness +and refreshment to many; but the murmur of the night wind, breathing +over fields of wheat and clover, was mingled with the groans of the +countless sufferers of both armies. Who can tell, who can even imagine, +the horrors of such a night, while the unconscious stars shone above, +and the unconscious river went rippling by?”[21] Out of 130,000 men +upon the ground, 21,000 had been killed or wounded, more than sixteen +per cent.; and 25,000 of the Federals can hardly be said to have been +engaged. + +The losses of the Confederate left have already been enumerated. Those +of the centre and the right, although A. P. Hill reported only 350 +casualties, had hardly been less severe. In all 9,500 officers and men, +one-fourth of the total strength, had fallen, and many of the regiments +had almost disappeared.[22] The 17th Virginia, for +instance, of Longstreet’s command, took into battle 9 officers and 46 +men; of these 7 officers and 24 men were killed or wounded, and 10 +taken prisoners, leaving 2 officers and 12 men to represent a regiment +which was over 1,000 strong at Bull Run. Yet as the men sank down to +rest on the line of battle, so exhausted that they could not be +awakened to eat their rations; as the blood cooled and the tension on +the nerves relaxed, and even the officers, faint with hunger and +sickened with the awful slaughter, looked forward with apprehension to +the morrow, from one indomitable heart the hope of victory had not yet +vanished. In the deep silence of the night, more oppressive than the +stunning roar of battle, Lee, still mounted, stood on the highroad to +the Potomac, and as general after general rode in wearily from the +front, he asked quietly of each, “How is it on your part of the line?” +Each told the same tale: their men were worn out; the enemy’s numbers +were overwhelming; there was nothing left but to retreat across the +Potomac before daylight. Even Jackson had no other counsel to offer. +His report was not the less impressive for his quiet and respectful +tone. He had had to contend, he said, against the heaviest odds he had +ever met. Many of his divisional and brigade commanders were dead or +wounded, and his loss had been severe. Hood, who came next, was quite +unmanned. He exclaimed that he had no men left. “Great God!” cried Lee, +with an excitement he had not yet displayed, “where is the splendid +division you had this morning?” “They are lying on the field, where you +sent them,” was the reply, “for few have straggled. My division has +been almost wiped out.” + +After all had given their opinion, there was an appalling silence, +which seemed to last for several minutes, and then General Lee, rising +erect in his stirrups, said, “Gentlemen, we will not cross the Potomac +to-night. You will go to your respective commands, strengthen your +lines; send +two officers from each brigade towards the ford to collect your +stragglers and get them up. Many have come in. I have had the proper +steps taken to collect all the men who are in the rear. If McClellan +wants to fight in the morning, I will give him battle again. Go!” +Without a word of remonstrance the group broke up, leaving their great +commander alone with his responsibility, and, says an eyewitness, “if I +read their faces aright, there was not one but considered that General +Lee was taking a fearful risk.”[23] So the soldiers’ sleep was +undisturbed. Through the September night they lay beside their arms, +and from the dark spaces beyond came the groans of the wounded and the +nameless odours of the battle-field. Not often has the night looked +down upon a scene more terrible. The moon, rising above the mountains, +revealed the long lines of men and guns, stretching far across hill and +valley, waiting for the dawn to shoot each other down, and between the +armies their dead lay in such numbers as civilised war has seldom seen. +So fearful had been the carnage, and comprised within such narrow +limits, that a Federal patrol, it is related, passing into the +corn-field, where the fighting had been fiercest, believed that they +had surprised a whole Confederate brigade. There, in the shadow of the +woods, lay the skirmishers, their muskets beside them, and there, in +regular ranks, lay the line of battle, sleeping, as it seemed, the +profound sleep of utter exhaustion. But the first man that was touched +was cold and lifeless, and the next, and the next; it was the bivouac +of the dead. + +Sept. 18 When the day dawned the Confederate divisions, reinforced by +some 5,000 or 6,000 stragglers, held the same position as the previous +evening, and over against them, seen dimly through the mist, lay the +Federal lines. The skirmishers, crouching behind the shattered fences, +confronted each other at short range; the guns of both armies were +unlimbered, and the masses of infantry, further to the rear, lay ready +for instant conflict. But not a shot was fired. The sun rose higher in +the +heavens; the warm breath of the autumn morning rustled in the woods, +but still the same strange silence prevailed. The men spoke in +undertones, watching intently the movements of staff officers and +orderlies; but the ranks lay as still as the inanimate forms, half +hidden by the trodden corn, which lay so thickly between the lines; and +as the hours passed on without stir or shot, the Southern generals +acknowledged that Lee’s daring in offering battle was fully justified. +The enemy’s aggressive strength was evidently exhausted; and then arose +the question, Could the Confederates attack? It would seem that the +possibility of a great counterstroke had already been the subject of +debate, and that Lee, despite the failure of the previous evening, and +Jackson’s adverse report, believed that the Federal right might be +outflanked and overwhelmed. “During the morning,” writes General +Stephen D. Lee, “a courier from headquarters came to my battalion of +artillery with a message that the Commander-in-Chief wished to see me. +I followed the courier, and on meeting General Lee, he said, ‘Colonel +Lee, I wish you to go with this courier to General Jackson, and say +that I sent you to report to him.’ I replied, ‘General, shall I take my +batteries with me?’ He said, ‘No, just say that I told you to report to +him, and he will tell you what he wants.’ I soon reached General +Jackson. He was dismounted, with but few persons round him. He said to +me, ‘Colonel Lee, I wish you to take a ride with me,’ and we rode to +the left of our lines with but one courier, I think. We soon reached a +considerable hill and dismounted. General Jackson then said, ‘Let us go +up this hill, and be careful not to expose yourself, for the Federal +sharpshooters are not far off.’ The hill bore evidence of fierce fight +the day before.[24] A battery of artillery had been on it, and there +were wrecked caissons, broken wheels, dead bodies, and dead horses +around. General Jackson said: ‘Colonel, I wish you to take your glasses +and carefully examine the Federal line of battle.’ I did so, and saw a +remarkably strong line of battle, with more troops than I knew General +Lee had. After locating the +different batteries, unlimbered and ready for action, and noting the +strong skirmish line, in front of the dense masses of infantry, I said +to him, ‘General, that is a very strong position, and there is a large +force there.’ He said, ‘Yes. I wish you to take fifty pieces of +artillery and crush that force, which is the Federal right. Can you do +it?’ I can scarcely describe my feelings as I again took my glasses, +and made an even more careful examination. I at once saw such an +attempt must fail. More than fifty guns were unlimbered and ready for +action, strongly supported by dense lines of infantry and strong +skirmish lines, advantageously posted. The ground was unfavourable for +the location of artillery on the Confederate side, for, to be +effective, the guns would have to move up close to the Federal lines, +and that, too, under fire of both infantry and artillery. I could not +bring myself to say all that I felt and knew. I said, ‘Yes, General; +where will I get the fifty guns?’ He said, ‘How many have you?’ I +replied, ‘About twelve out of the thirty I carried into the action the +day before.’ (My losses had been very great in men, horses, and +carriages.) He said, ‘I can furnish you some, and General Lee says he +can furnish some.’ I replied, ‘Shall I go for the guns?’ ‘No, not yet,’ +he replied. ‘Colonel Lee, can you crush the Federal right with fifty +guns?’ I said, ‘General, I can try. I can do it if anyone can.’ He +replied, ‘That is not what I asked you, sir. If I give you fifty guns, +can you crush the Federal right?’ I evaded the question again and +again, but he pressed it home. Finally I said, ‘General, you seem to be +more intent upon my giving you my technical opinion as an artillery +officer, than upon my going after the guns and making the attempt.’ +‘Yes, sir,’ he replied, ‘and I want your positive opinion, yes or no.’ +I felt that a great crisis was upon me, and I could not evade it. I +again took my glasses and made another examination. I waited a good +while, with Jackson watching me intently. + +“I said, ‘General, it cannot be done with fifty guns and the troops you +have near here.’ In an instant he said, ‘Let us ride back, Colonel.’ I +felt that I had +positively shown a lack of nerve, and with considerable emotion begged +that I might be allowed to make the attempt, saying, ‘General, you +forced me to say what I did unwillingly. If you give the fifty guns to +any other artillery officer, I am ruined for life. I promise you I will +fight the guns to the last extremity, if you will only let me command +them.’ Jackson was quiet, seemed sorry for me, and said, ‘It is all +right, Colonel. Everybody knows you are a brave officer and would fight +the guns well,’ or words to that effect. We soon reached the spot from +which we started. He said, ‘Colonel, go to General Lee, and tell him +what has occurred since you reported to me. Describe our ride to the +hill, your examination of the Federal position, and my conversation +about your crushing the Federal right with fifty guns, and my forcing +you to give your opinion.’ + +“With feelings such as I never had before, nor ever expect to have +again, I returned to General Lee, and gave a detailed account of my +visit to General Jackson, closing with the account of my being forced +to give my opinion as to the possibility of success. I saw a shade come +over General Lee’s face, and he said, ‘Colonel, go and join your +command.’ + +“For many years I never fully understood my mission that day, or why I +was sent to General Jackson. When Jackson’s report was published of the +battle, I saw that he stated, that on the afternoon of September 17, +General Lee had ordered him to move to the left with a view of turning +the Federal right, but that he found the enemy’s numerous artillery so +judiciously posted in their front, and so near the river, as to render +such an attempt too hazardous to undertake. I afterwards saw General J. +E. B. Stuart’s report, in which he says that it was determined, the +enemy not attacking, to turn the enemy’s right on the 18th. It appears +General Lee ordered General Jackson, on the evening of the 17th, to +turn the enemy’s right, and Jackson said that it could not be done. It +also appears from Stuart’s report, and from the incident I relate, that +General Lee reiterated the order on the 18th, +and told Jackson to take fifty guns, and crush the Federal right. +Jackson having reported against such attempt on the 17th, no doubt said +that if an artillerist, in whom General Lee had confidence, would say +the Federal right could be crushed with fifty guns, he would make the +attempt. + +“I now have the satisfaction of knowing that the opinion which I was +forced to give on September 18 had already been given by Jackson on the +evening of September 17, and that the same opinion was reiterated by +him on September 18, and confirmed by General J. E. B. Stuart on the +same day. I still believe that Jackson, Stuart, and myself were right, +and that the attempt to turn the Federal right either on the 17th or on +the 18th would have been unwise. + +“The incident shows General Lee’s decision and boldness in battle, and +General Jackson’s delicate loyalty to his commanding general, in +convincing him of the inadvisability of a proposed movement, which he +felt it would be hazardous to undertake.”[25] + +The Federal left, protected by the Antietam, was practically +inaccessible; and on receiving from the artillery officers’ lips the +confirmation of Jackson’s report, Lee was fain to relinquish all hope +of breaking McClellan’s line. The troops, however, remained in line of +battle; but during the day information came in which made retreat +imperative. The Federals were being reinforced. Humphrey’s division, +hitherto held back at Frederick by orders from Washington, had marched +over South Mountain; Couch’s division, which McClellan had left to +observe Harper’s Ferry, had been called in; and a large force of +militia was assembling on the Pennsylvania border. Before evening, +therefore, Lee determined to evacuate his position, and during the +night the Army of Northern Virginia, with all its trains and artillery, +recrossed the Potomac at Boteler’s Ford. + +Such was the respect which the hard fighting of the Confederates had +imposed upon the enemy, that although the rumbling of heavy vehicles, +and the tramp of the long columns, were so distinctly audible in the +Federal lines that they seemed to wakeful ears like the steady flow of +a river, not the slightest attempt was made to interfere. It was not +till the morning of the 19th that a Federal battalion, reconnoitring +towards Sharpsburg, found the ridge and the town deserted; and although +Jackson, who was one of the last, except the cavalry scouts, to cross +the river, did not reach the Virginia shore till eight o’clock, not a +shot was fired at him. + +Nor were the trophies gathered by the Federals considerable. Several +hundred badly wounded men were found in Sharpsburg, and a number of +stragglers were picked up, but neither gun nor waggon had been left +upon the field. The retreat, despite many obstacles, was as +successfully as skilfully executed. The night was very dark, and a fine +rain, which had set in towards evening, soon turned the heavy soil into +tenacious mud; the ford was wide and beset with boulders, and the only +approach was a narrow lane. But the energetic quartermaster of the +Valley army, Major Harman, made light of all difficulties, and under +the immediate supervision of Lee and Jackson, the crossing was effected +without loss or misadventure. + +Sept. 19 Just before nightfall, however, under cover of a heavy +artillery fire, the Federals pushed a force of infantry across the +ford, drove back the two brigades, which, with thirty pieces of +artillery, formed the Confederate rear-guard, and captured four guns. +Emboldened by this partial success, McClellan ordered Porter to put +three brigades of the Fifth Army Corps across the river the next +morning, and reconnoitre towards Winchester. + +The news of the disaster to his rear-guard was long in reaching Lee’s +headquarters. His army had not yet recovered from the confusion and +fatigue of the retreat. The bivouacs of the divisions were several +miles from the river, and were widely scattered. The generals were +ignorant of each other’s dispositions. No arrangements had been +made to support the rear-guard in case of emergency. The greater part +of the cavalry had been sent off to Williamsport, fifteen miles up +stream, with instructions to cross the Potomac and delay the enemy’s +advance by demonstration. The brigadiers had no orders; many of the +superior generals had not told their subordinates where they would be +found; and the commander of the rear-guard, General Pendleton, had not +been informed of the strength of the infantry placed at his disposal. +On the part of the staff, worn out by the toils and anxieties of the +past few days, there appears to have been a general failure; and had +McClellan, calculating on the chances invariably offered by an enforced +retreat, pushed resolutely forward in strong force, success might +possibly have followed. + +Sept. 20 Lee, on receiving Pendleton’s report, long after midnight, +sent off orders for Jackson to drive the enemy back. When the messenger +arrived, Jackson had already ridden to the front. He, too, had received +news of the capture of the guns; and ordering A. P. Hill and Early,[26] +who were in camp near Martinsburg, to march at once to Shepherdstown, +he had gone forward to reconnoitre the enemy’s movements. When Lee’s +courier found him he was on the Shepherdstown road, awaiting the +arrival of his divisions, and watching, unattended by a single +aide-de-camp, the advance of Porter’s infantry. He had at once grasped +the situation. The Confederates were in no condition to resist an +attack in force. The army was not concentrated. The cavalry was absent. +No reconnaissance had been made either of lines of march or of +positions. The roads were still blocked by the trains. The men were +exhausted by their late exertions, and depressed by their retreat, and +the straggling was terrible. The only chance of safety lay in driving +back the enemy’s advanced guard across the river before it could be +reinforced; and the chance was seized without an instant’s hesitation. + +The Federals advanced leisurely, for the cavalry which +should have led the way had received its orders too late to reach the +rendezvous at the appointed hour, and the infantry, compelled to +reconnoitre for itself, made slow progress. Porter’s leading brigade +was consequently not more than a mile and a half from the river when +the Light Division reported to Jackson. Hill was ordered to form his +troops in two lines, and with Early in close support to move at once to +the attack. The Federals, confronted by a large force, and with no +further object than to ascertain the whereabouts of the Confederate +army, made no attempt to hold their ground. Their left and centre, +composed mainly of regulars, withdrew in good order. The right, +hampered by broken country, was slow to move; and Hill’s soldiers, who +had done much at Sharpsburg with but little loss, were confident of +victory. The Federal artillery beyond the river included many of their +heavy batteries, and when the long lines of the Southerners appeared in +the open, they were met by a storm of shells. But without a check, even +to close the gaps in the ranks, or to give time to the batteries to +reply to the enemy’s fire, the Light Division pressed forward to the +charge. The conflict was short. The Northern regulars had already +passed the ford, and only a brigade of volunteers was left on the +southern bank. Bringing up his reserve regiment, the Federal general +made a vain effort to prolong his front. Hill answered by calling up a +brigade from his second line; and then, outnumbered and outflanked, the +enemy was driven down the bluffs and across the river. The losses in +this affair were comparatively small. The Federals reported 340 killed +and wounded, and of these a raw regiment, armed with condemned Enfield +rifles, accounted for no less than 240. Hill’s casualties were 271. Yet +the engagement was not without importance. Jackson’s quick action and +resolute advance convinced the enemy that the Confederates were still +dangerous; and McClellan, disturbed by Stuart’s threat against his +rear, abandoned all idea of crossing the Potomac in pursuit of Lee. + +The losses at Sharpsburg may be here recorded. + +JONES’ DIVISION—1,800 +The Stonewall Brigade, 250 strong +Taliaferro’s Brigade +Starke’s Brigade +Jones’ Brigade 88 173 287 152 —— 700 (38 p.c.) +EWELL’S (LAWTON) DIVISION—8,600 Lawton’s Brigade, 1,150 strong +Early’s Brigade, 1,200 strong +Trimble’s Brigade, 700 strong +Hays’ Brigade, 650 strong 567 194 237 336 ——— 1,334 (47 p.c.) +THE LIGHT DIVISION—3,000 +Branch’s Brigade +Gregg’s Brigade +Archer’s Brigade +Pender’s Brigade +Field’s Brigade (not engaged) +Thomas’ Brigade (at Harper’s Ferry) + +Artillery (estimated) + Total (209 officers) 104 165 105 30 — — —— 404 50 2,488 D. + H. HILL’S DIVISION—3,500 +Rodes’ Brigade +Garland’s Brigade (estimated) +Anderson’s Brigade +Ripley’s Brigade (estimated) +Colquitt’s Brigade (estimated) 203 300 302 300 300 ——— 1,405 MCLAWS’ +DIVISION—4,500 +Kershaw’s Brigade +Cobb’s Brigade +Semmes’ Brigade +Barksdale’s Brigade 355 156 314 294 ——— 1,119 +[27] + + +D. R. JONES’ DIVISION—3,500 +Toombs’ Brigade (estimated) +Drayton’s Brigade (estimated) +Anderson’s Brigade +Garnett’s Brigade +Jenkins’ Brigade +Kemper’s Brigade (estimated) 125 400 87 99 210 120 ——— 1,041 +WALKER’S DIVISION—3,500 +Walker’s Brigade +Ransom’s Brigade +825 187 ——— 1,012 +HOOD’S DIVISION—2,000 +Laws’ Brigade +Hood’s Brigade 454 548 ——— 1,022 +Evans’ Brigade, 260 strong 200 +R. H. ANDERSON’S DIVISION—3,500 +Featherston’s Brigade +Mahone’s Brigade +Pryor’s Brigade +Armistead’s Brigade +Wright’s Brigade +Wilcox’ Brigade 304 76 182 35 203 221 ——— 1,021 +ARTILLERY +Colonel S. D. Lee’s Battalion +Washington Artillery +Cavalry, etc. etc. (estimated) 85 34 143 —— 262 Grand total 9,550 +ARMY OF THE POTOMAC +First Corps—Hooker +Second Corps—Sumner +Fifth Corps—Porter +Sixth Corps—Franklin +Ninth Corps—Burnside +Twelfth Corps—Mansfield +Cavalry Division, etc. + (2,108 killed) 2,590 5,188 109 439 2,349 1,746 + 39 ——— 12,410 [28] + +With Porter’s repulse the summer campaign of 1862 was closed. Begun on +the Chickahominy, within thirty miles of Richmond, it ended on the +Potomac, within seventy miles of Washington; and six months of +continuous fighting had brought both belligerents to the last stage of +exhaustion. Falling apart like two great battleships of the older wars, + +The smoke of battle drifting slow a-lee. + +hulls rent by roundshot, and scuppers awash with blood, but with the +colours still flying over shattered spars and tangled shrouds, the +armies drew off from the tremendous struggle. Neither Confederates nor +Federals were capable of further effort. Lee, gathering in his +stragglers, left Stuart to cover his front, and fell back towards +Winchester. McClellan was content with seizing the Maryland Heights at +Harper’s Ferry, and except the cavalry patrols, not a single Federal +soldier was sent across the river. + +The organisation was absolutely imperative. The Army of the Potomac was +in no condition to undertake the invasion of Virginia. Not only had the +losses in battle been very large, but the supply train, hurriedly got +together after Pope’s defeat, had broken down; in every arm there was +great deficiency of horses; the troops, especially those who had been +engaged in the Peninsula, were half-clad and badly shod; and, above +all, the army was very far from sharing McClellan’s conviction that +Sharpsburg was a brilliant victory. The men in the ranks were not so +easily deceived as their commander. McClellan, relying on a return +drawn up by General Banks, now in command at Washington, estimated the +Confederate army at 97,000 men, and his official reports made frequent +mention of Lee’s overwhelming strength.[29] +The soldiers knew better. They had been close enough to the enemy’s +lines to learn for themselves how thin was the force which manned them. +They were perfectly well aware that they had been held in check by +inferior numbers, and that the battle on the Antietam, tactically +speaking, was no more of a victory for the North than Malvern Hill had +been for the South. From dawn to dark on September 18 they had seen the +tattered colours and bright bayonets of the Confederates still covering +the Sharpsburg ridge; they had seen the grey line, immovable and +defiant, in undisputed possession of the battle-ground, while their own +guns were silent and their own generals reluctant to renew the fight. +Both the Government and the people expected McClellan to complete his +success by attacking Lee in Virginia. The Confederates, it was said—and +men based their opinions on McClellan’s reports—had been heavily +defeated, not only at Antietam, but also at South Mountain; and +although the Army of the Potomac might be unfit for protracted +operations, the condition of the enemy must necessarily be far worse. + +Such arguments, however, were entirely inapplicable to the situation. +The Confederates had not been defeated at all, either at South Mountain +or Sharpsburg; and although they had eventually abandoned their +positions they had suffered less than their opponents. The retreat, +however, across the Potomac had undoubtedly shaken their _moral_. “In a +military point of view,” wrote Lee to Davis on September 25, “the best +move, in my opinion, the army could make would be to advance upon +Hagerstown and endeavour to defeat the enemy at that point. I would not +hesitate to make it even with our diminished numbers did the army +exhibit its former temper and condition, but, as far as I am able to +judge, the hazard would be great and reverse disastrous.”[30] But +McClellan was not more cheerful. “The army,” he said on the 27th, “is +not now in a +condition to undertake another campaign nor to bring on another battle, +unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy, or +pressing military exigencies render it necessary.” So far from thinking +of pursuit, he thought only of the defence of the Potomac, apprehending +a renewed attempt to enter Maryland, and by no means over-confident +that the two army corps which he had at last sent to Harper’s Ferry +would be able to maintain their position if attacked.[31] Nor were the +soldiers more eager than their commander to cross swords with their +formidable enemy. “It would be useless,” says General G. H. Gordon, who +now commanded a Federal division, “to deny that at this period there +was a despondent feeling in the army,” and the Special Correspondents +of the New York newspapers, the “World” and “Tribune,” confirm the +truth of this statement. But the clearest evidence as to the condition +of the troops is furnished in the numerous reports which deal with +straggling. The vice had reached a pitch which is almost inconceivable. +Thousands and tens of thousands, Federals as well as Confederates, were +absent from their commands. + +“The States of the North,” wrote McClellan, “are flooded with deserters +and absentees. One corps of this army has 13,000 men present and 15,000 +absent; of this 15,000, 8,000 probably are at work at home.”[32] On +September 28, General Meade, who had succeeded to the command of +Hooker’s corps, reported that over 8,000 men, including 250 officers, +had quitted the ranks either before or during the battle of Antietam; +adding that “this terrible and serious evil seems to pervade the whole +body.”[33] The Confederates, although the privations of the troops +during the forced marches, their indifferent equipment, and the +deficiencies of the commissariat were contributory causes, had almost +as much reason to complain. It is said that in the vicinity of Leesburg +alone over 10,000 men were living on the citizens. Jackson’s own +division, which took into action 1,600 effectives on September 17 and +lost 700, had 3,900 present for duty on September 30; Lawton’s +division rose from 2,500 to 4,450 during the same period; and the +returns show that the strength of Longstreet’s and Jackson’s corps was +only 37,992 on September 22, but 52,019 on October 1.[34] It is thus +evident that in eight days the army was increased by more than 14,000 +men, yet only a few conscripts had been enrolled. Lee’s official +reports and correspondence allude in the strongest terms to the +indiscipline of his army. “The absent,” he wrote on September 23, “are +scattered broadcast over the land;” and in the dispatches of his +subordinates are to be found many references to the vagrant tendencies +of their commands.[35] A strong provost guard was established at +Winchester for the purpose of collecting stragglers. Parties of cavalry +were sent out to protect the farms from pillage, and to bring in the +marauders as prisoners. The most stringent regulations were issued as +to the preservation of order on the march, the security of private +property, and the proper performance of their duties by regimental and +commissariat officers. On September 23, General Jones reported from +Winchester that the country was full of stragglers, that be had already +sent back 5,000 or 6,000, and that the numbers of officers amongst them +was astonishing.[36] The most earnest representations were made to the +President, suggesting trial of the offenders by drumhead court-martial, +and ordinary police duties became the engrossing occupation of every +general officer. + +It can hardly be said, then, that the Confederates had drawn much +profit from the invasion of Maryland. The capture of Harper’s Ferry +made but small amends for +the retreat into Virginia; and the stubborn endurance of Sharpsburg, +however remarkable in the annals of war, had served no useful purpose +beyond crippling for the time being the Federal army. The battle must +be classed with Aspern and Talavera; Lee’s soldiers saved their honour, +but no more. The facts were not to be disguised. The Confederates had +missed their mark. Only a few hundred recruits had been raised in +Maryland, and there had been no popular outbreak against the Union +Government. The Union army had escaped defeat; Lincoln had been able to +announce to the Northern people that Lee’s victorious career had at +length been checked; and 12,000 veteran soldiers, the flower of the +Southern army, had fallen in battle. Had General Longstreet’s advice +been taken, and the troops withdrawn across the Potomac after the fall +of Harper’s Ferry, this enormous loss, which the Confederacy could so +ill afford, would certainly have been avoided. Yet Lee was not +ill-satisfied with the results of the campaign, nor did Jackson doubt +the wisdom of accepting battle on the Antietam. + +The hazard was great, but the stake was greater. To achieve decisive +success in war some risk must be run. “It is impossible,” says Moltke, +“to forecast the result of a pitched battle;” but this is no reason +that pitched battles, if there is a fair prospect of success, should be +shirked. And in the Sharpsburg campaign the Confederates had +undoubtedly fair prospects of success. If the lost order had not fallen +into McClellan’s hands, Lee in all probability would have had ample +time to select his battlefield and concentrate his army; there would +have been no need of forced marches, and consequently much less +straggling. Both Lee and Jackson counted on the caution of their +opponent. Both were surprised by the unwonted vigour be displayed, +especially at South Mountain and in the march to Sharpsburg. Such +resolution in action, they were aware, was foreign to his nature. “I +cannot understand this move of McClellan’s,” was Jackson’s remark, when +it was reported that the Federal general had boldly advanced against +the strong position on South Mountain. But neither Lee +nor Jackson was aware that McClellan had exact information of their +dispositions, and that the carelessness of a Confederate staff officer +had done more for the Union than all the Northern scouts and spies in +Maryland. Jackson had been disposed to leave a larger margin for +accidents than his commander. He would have left Harper’s Ferry alone, +and have fought the Federals in the mountains;[37] and he was probably +right, for in the Gettysburg campaign of the following year, when Lee +again crossed the Potomac, Harper’s Ferry was ignored, although +occupied by a strong garrison, and neither in advance nor retreat were +the Confederate communications troubled. But as to the wisdom of giving +battle on the Antietam, after the fall of Harper’s Ferry, there was no +divergence of opinion between Lee and his lieutenant. They had no +reason to respect the Union army as a weapon of offence, and very great +reason to believe that McClellan was incapable of wielding it. Their +anticipations were well founded. The Federal attack was badly designed +and badly executed. If it be compared with the German attack at Worth, +the defects of McClellan, the defects of his subordinates, the want of +sound training throughout the whole army, become at once apparent. On +August 6, 1870, there was certainly, early in the day, much disjointed +fighting, due in great part to the difficulties of the country, the +absence of the Crown Prince, and the anxiety of the generals to render +each other loyal support. But when once the Commander-in-Chief appeared +upon the field, and, assuming direction of the battle, infused harmony +into the operations, the strength and unity of the attack could hardly +have been surpassed. Almost at the same moment 30,000 men were launched +against McMahon’s front, 25,000 against his right, and 10,000 against +his left. Every battalion within sound of the cannon participated in +the forward movement; and numerous batteries, crossing the stream which +corresponds with the Antietam, supported the infantry at the closest +range. No general hesitated to act on his own responsibility. +Everywhere there was +co-operation, between infantry and artillery, between division and +division, between army corps and army corps; and such co-operation, due +to a sound system of command, is the characteristic mark of a +well-trained army and a wise leader. At Sharpsburg, on the other hand, +there was no combination whatever, and even the army corps commanders +dared not act without specific orders. There was nothing like the close +concert and the aggressive energy which had carried the Southerners to +victory at Gaines’ Mill and the Second Manassas. The principle of +mutual support was utterly ignored. The army corps attacked in +succession and not simultaneously, and in succession they were +defeated. McClellan fought three separate battles, from dawn to 10 a.m. +against Lee’s left; from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. against his centre; from 1 +to 4 p.m. against his right. The subordinate generals, although, with a +few exceptions, they handled their commands skilfully, showed no +initiative, and waited for orders instead of improving the opportunity. +Only two-thirds of the army was engaged; 25,000 men hardly fired a +shot, and from first to last there was not the slightest attempt at +co-operation. McClellan was made aware by his signallers on the Red +Hill of every movement that took place in his opponent’s lines, and yet +he was unable to take advantage of Lee’s weakness. He had still to +grasp the elementary rule that the combination of superior numbers and +of all arms against a single point is necessary to win battles. + +The Northern infantry, indeed, had not fought like troops who own their +opponents as the better men. Rather had they displayed an elasticity of +spirit unsuspected by their enemies; and the Confederate soldiers, who +knew with what fierce courage the attack had been sustained, looked on +the battle of Sharpsburg as the most splendid of their achievements. No +small share of the glory fell to Jackson. Since the victory of Cedar +Run, his fame, somewhat obscured by Frayser’s Farm and Malvern Hill, +had increased by leaps and bounds, and the defence of the West Wood was +classed with the march to Manassas Junction, the three days’ battle +about Groveton, +and the swift seizure of Harper’s Ferry. On October 2, Lee proposed to +the President that the Army of Northern Virginia should be organised in +two army corps, for the command of which he recommended Longstreet and +Jackson. “My opinion,” wrote Lee, “of General Jackson has been greatly +enhanced during this expedition. He is true, honest, and brave; has a +single eye to the good of the service, and spares no exertion to +accomplish his object.”[38] On October 11, Jackson received his +promotion as Lieutenant-General, and was appointed to the Second Army +Corps, consisting at that date of his own division, the Light Division, +Ewell’s, and D. H. Hill’s, together with Colonel Brown’s battalion of +artillery; a force of 1,917 officers, 25,000 men, and 126 guns. + +Jackson does not appear to have been unduly elated by his promotion, +for two days after his appointment he wrote to his wife that there was +no position in the world equal to that of a minister of the Gospel, and +his letter was principally concerned with the lessons he had learned +from the sermon of the previous Sunday.[39]The soldiers of +the Second Army Corps, however, did not allow him to forget his +greatness. In their bivouacs by the clear waters of the Opequon, with +abundance of supplies and with ample leisure for recuperation, the +troops rapidly regained their strength and spirit. The reaction found +vent in the most extravagant gaiety. No circumstance that promised +entertainment was permitted to pass without attention, and the jest +started at the expense of some unfortunate wight, conspicuous for +peculiarity of dress or demeanour, was taken up by a hundred voices. +None were spared. A trim staff officer was horrified at the irreverent +reception of his nicely twisted moustache, as he heard from behind +innumerable trees: “Take them mice out o’ your mouth! take ’em out—no +use to say they ain’t there, see their tails hanging out! Another, +sporting immense whiskers, was urged “to come out o’ that bunch of +hair! I know you’re in there! I see your ears a-working!” So the +soldiers chaffed the dandies, and the camp rang with laughter; fun and +frolic were always in the air, and the fierce fighters of Sharpsburg +behaved like schoolboys on a holiday. But when the general rode by the +men remembered the victories they had won and to whom they owed them, +the hardships they had endured, and who had shared them; and the +appearance of “Little Sorrel” was the sure precursor of a scene of the +wildest enthusiasm. The horse soon learned what the cheers implied, and +directly they began he would break into a gallop, as if to carry his +rider as quickly as possible through the embarrassing ordeal. But the +soldiers were not to be deterred by their commander’s modesty, and +whenever he was compelled to pass through the bivouacs the same tribute +was so invariably offered that the sound of a distant cheer, rolling +down the lines of the Second Army Corps, always evoked the exclamation: +“Boys, look out! here comes old Stonewall or an old hare!” “These being +the only individuals,” writes one of Jackson’s soldiers, “who never +failed to bring down the whole house.” + +Nothing could express more clearly the loyalty of the soldiers to their +general than this quaint estimate of his +popularity. The Anglo-Saxon is averse to the unrestrained display of +personal affection; and when his natural reluctance is overborne by +irrepressible emotion, he attempts to hide it by a jest. So Jackson’s +veterans laughed at his peculiarities, at his dingy uniform, his +battered cap, his respect for clergymen, his punctilious courtesy, and +his blushes. They delighted in the phrase, when a distant yell was +heard, “Here’s ‘Old Jack’ or a rabbit!” They delighted more in his +confusion when he galloped through the shouting camp. “Here he comes,” +they said, “we’ll make him take his hat off.” They invented strange +fables of which he was the hero. “Stonewall died,” ran one of the most +popular, “and two angels came down from heaven to take him back with +them. They went to his tent. He was not there. They went to the +hospital. He was not there. They went to the outposts. He was not +there. They went to the prayer-meeting. He was not there. So they had +to return without him; but when they reported that he had disappeared, +they found that he had made a flank march and reached heaven before +them.” Another was to the effect that whereas Moses took forty years to +get the children of Israel through the wilderness, “‘Old Jack’ would +have double-quicked them through in three days on half rations!” + +But, nevertheless, beneath this affectation of hilarity lay a deep and +passionate devotion; and two incidents which occurred at this time show +the extent of this feeling, and at least one reason for its existence. +“On October 8th,” writes Major Heros von Borcke, adjutant-general of +the cavalry division, “I was honoured with the pleasing mission of +presenting to Stonewall, as a slight token of Stuart’s high regard, a +new uniform coat, which had just arrived from the hands of a Richmond +tailor. Starting at once, I reached the simple tent of our great +general just in time for dinner. I found him in his old weather-stained +coat, from which all the buttons had been clipped by the fair hands of +patriotic ladies, and which, from exposure to sun, rain, and +powder-smoke, and by reason of many rents and patches, was in a very +unseemly +condition. When I had dispatched more important matters, I produced +General Stuart’s present in all its magnificence of gilt buttons and +sheeny facings and gold lace, and I was heartily amused at the modest +confusion with which the hero of many battles regarded the fine +uniform, scarcely daring to touch it, and at the quiet way in which at +last he folded it up carefully and deposited it in his portmanteau, +saying to me, “Give Stuart my best thanks, Major; the coat is much too +handsome for me, but I shall take the best care of it, and shall prize +it highly as a souvenir. And now let us have some dinner.” But I +protested emphatically against the summary disposition of the matter of +the coat, deeming my mission indeed but half executed, and remarked +that Stuart would certainly ask how the coat fitted, and that I should +take it as a personal favour if he would put it on. To this with a +smile he readily assented, and having donned the garment, he escorted +me outside the tent to the table where dinner had been served in the +open air. The whole of the staff were in a perfect ecstasy at their +chief’s brilliant appearance, and the old negro servant, who was +bearing the roast turkey to the board, stopped in mid career with a +most bewildered expression, and gazed in such wonderment at his master +as if he had been transfigured before him. Meanwhile, the rumour of the +change ran like electricity through the neighbouring camps, the +soldiers came running by hundreds to the spot, desirous of seeing their +beloved Stonewall in his new attire; and the first wearing of a new +robe by Louis XIV, at whose morning toilette all the world was +accustomed to assemble, never created half the excitement at Versailles +that was roused in the woods of Virginia by the investment of Jackson +in the new regulation uniform.”[40] + +The second incident is less amusing, but was not less appreciated by +the rank and file. Riding one morning near Front Royal, accompanied by +his staff, Jackson was stopped by a countrywoman, with a chubby child +on either side, who inquired anxiously for her son Johnnie, serving, +she said, “in Captain Jackson’s company.” The +general, with the deferential courtesy he never laid aside, introduced +himself as her son’s commanding officer, but begged for further +information as to his regiment. The good dame, however, whose interest +in the war centred on one individual, appeared astonished that Captain +Jackson “did not know her particular Johnnie,” and repeated her +inquiries with such tearful emphasis that the young staff officers +began to smile. Unfortunately for themselves, Jackson heard a titter, +and turning on them with a scathing rebuke for their want of manners, +he sent them off in different directions to discover Johnnie, giving +them no rest until mother and son were brought together. + +But if the soldiers loved Jackson for his simplicity, and respected him +for his honesty, beyond and above was the sense of his strength and +power, of his indomitable will, of the inflexibility of his justice, +and of the unmeasured resources of his vigorous intellect. It is +curious even after the long lapse of years to hear his veterans speak +of their commander. Laughter mingles with tears; each has some droll +anecdote to relate, each some instance of thoughtful sympathy or kindly +deed; but it is still plain to be seen how they feared his displeasure, +how hard they found his discipline, how conscious they were of their +own mental inferiority. The mighty phantom of their lost leader still +dominates their thoughts; just as in the battles of the Confederacy his +earthly presentment dominated the will of the Second Army Corps. In the +campaign which had driven the invaders from Virginia, and carried the +Confederate colours to within sight of Washington, his men had found +their master. They had forgotten how to criticise. His generals had +learned to trust him. Success and adulation had not indeed made him +more expansive. He was as reticent as ever, and his troops—the +foot-cavalry as they were now called—were still marched to and fro +without knowing why or whither. But men and officers, instead of +grumbling when they were roused at untimely hours, or when their +marches were prolonged, without apparent necessity, obeyed with +alacrity, and amused themselves by wondering what new surprise the +general was preparing. “Where are you going?” they were asked as they +were turned out for an unexpected march: “We don’t know, but Old Jack +does,” was the laughing reply. And they had learned something of his +methods. They had discovered the value of time, of activity, of +mystery, of resolution. They discussed his stratagems, gradually +evolving, for they were by no means apparent at the time, the object +and aim of his manœuvres; and the stirring verses, sung round every +camp-fire, show that the soldiers not only grasped his principles of +warfare, but that they knew right well to whom their victories were to +be attributed. + + STONEWALL JACKSON’S WAY + +Come, stack arms, men, pile on the rails; + Stir up the camp-fires bright; +No matter if the canteen fails, + We’ll make a roaring night. +Here Shenandoah brawls along, +There lofty Blue Ridge echoes strong, +To swell the Brigade’s roaring song + Of Stonewall Jackson’s way. + +We see him now—the old slouched hat, + Cocked o’er his eye askew; +The shrewd dry smile—the speech so pat, + So calm, so blunt, so true. +The “Blue-Light Elder” knows them well: +Says he, “That’s Banks—he’s fond of shell; +Lord save his soul! we’ll give him——” well, + That’s Stonewall Jackson’s way. + +Silence! ground arms! kneel all! caps off! + Old Blue-Light’s going to pray; +Strangle the fool that dares to scoff! + Attention! it’s his way! +Appealing from his native sod, +_In formá pauperis_ to God, +“Lay bare thine arm—stretch forth thy rod, + Amen!” That’s Stonewall’s way. + +He’s in the saddle now! Fall in, + Steady, the whole Brigade! +Hill’s at the Ford, cut off!—we’ll win + His way out, ball and blade. +What matter if our shoes are worn? +What matter if our feet are torn? +Quick step! we’re with him before morn! + That’s Stonewall Jackson’s way. + +The sun’s bright lances rout the mists + Of morning—and, by George! +There’s Longstreet struggling in the lists, + Hemmed in an ugly gorge. +Pope and his columns whipped before— +“Bayonets and grape!” hear Stonewall roar, +“Charge, Stuart! pay off Ashby’s score!” + That’s Stonewall Jackson’s way. + +Ah! maiden, wait and watch and yearn + For news of Stonewall’s band; +Ah! widow, read with eyes that burn + The ring upon thy hand. +Ah! wife, sew on, pray on, hope on +Thy life shall not be all forlorn; +The foe had better ne’er been born + That gets in Stonewall’s way. + +NOTE +_Jackson’s Strength and Losses, August–September 1882_ + +Strength at Cedar Run, August 9: + Winder’s (Jackson’s own) Division (estimate) + Ewell’s Division[41] + Lawton’s Brigage[42] + A. P. Hill’s (the Light) Division[43] + Robertson’s Cavalry Brigade[44] (estimate) 3,000 5,350 2,200 12,000 + 1,200 ——— 23,750 +Losses at Cedar Run: + Winder’s Division + Ewell’s Division + The Light Division + Cavalry, etc. 718 195 381 20 —— + +4,000 ——— 22,436 + +Losses on the Rappahannock, August 20–24 +Losses at Bristoe Station and Manassas + Junction, August 26, 27 100 +300 Losses at Groveton, August 28: + Stonewall Division (estimate) + Ewell’s Division 441 759 —— 1,200 Stragglers and sick + (estimate) Cavalry transferred to Stuart 1,200 1,200 ——— +4,000 +Strength at Second Manassas, August 20 and 30 ——— 18,436 +Losses: + Taliaferro’s Division + Ewell’s Division + The Light Division 416 364 1,507 ——— 2,387 Loss at Chantilly, + September 1 +Should have marched into Maryland 500 ——— 15,549 + +Strength at Sharpsburg: + Jones’ Division + Ewell’s Division + The Light Division + (1 Brigade left at Harper’s Ferry) 2,000 4,000 5,000 800 ——— + +11,800[45] Loss at Harper’s Ferry 62 Losses at Sharpsburg: + Jones’ Division + Ewell’s Division + The Light Division 700 1,334 404 ——— + +2,438 ——— Strength on September 19 9,300 + +The Report of September 22, O.R., vol. xiv, part ii, p. 621, gives: + +Jackson’s own Division +Ewell’s Division +The Light Division 2,553 3,290 4,777 ——— 10,620[46] + + [1] Two fords, behind the left and centre, were examined by Major + Hotchkiss during the battle by Jackson’s order, and were reported + practicable for infantry. + + [2] The majority of Jackson’s guns appear to have been left behind the + team. Having broken down, at Harper’s Ferry. + + [3] + + Men Guns A. P. Hill’s Division McLaws’ Division + R. H. Anderson’s Division + Hampton’s Cavalry Brigade 5,000 4,500 3,500 1,500 ——— + 14,500 18 24 18 — — 60 + + [4] Doubleday’s Division consisted of Phelps’, Wainwright’s, + Patrick’s, and Gibbon’s brigades; Rickett’s Division of Duryea’s, + Lyle’s, and Hartsuff’s; and Meade’s Pennsylvania Division of + Seymour’s, Magilton’s, and Anderson’s. + + [5] This battery of regulars, “B” 4th U.S. Artillery, lost 40 officers + and men killed and wounded, besides 33 horses. O.R., vol. xix, part i, + p. 229. + + [6] Early’s brigade had not yet been engaged. + + [7] One small regiment was left with Stuart. + + [8] Mansfield’s corps consisted of two divisions, commanded by + Crawford (two brigades) and Greene (three brigades). The brigadiers + were Knipe, Gordon, Tynedale, Stainbrook, Goodrich. + + [9] Both D. H. Hill and the Washington artillery had sixteen guns + each. + + [10] “Our artillery,” says General D. H. Hill, “could not cope with + the superior weight, calibre, range, and number of the Yankee guns; + hence it ought only to have been used against masses of infantry. On + the contrary, our guns were made to reply to the Yankee guns, and were + smashed up or withdrawn before they could be effectually turned + against massive columns of attack.” After Sharpsburg Lee gave orders + that there were to be no more “artillery duels” so long as the + Confederates fought defensive battles. + + [11] Letter of Jackson’s Adjutant-General. _Memoirs of W. N. + Pendleton, D.D.,_ p. 216. + + [12] Sharpsburg. By Major-General J. G. Walker, C.S.A. _Battles and + Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 677, 678. + + [13] _Memoirs,_ p. 572. _The Antietam and Fredericksburg,_ p. 87. + + [14] It was not until two o’clock that even Meade’s Pennsylvanians + were reformed. + + [15] + + Hooker Mansfield Sedwick Smith 11,000 8,500 6,000 5,000 ——— + 30,500 [16] Lawton Jones Hood Stuart G. T. Anderson Walker + McLaws D. H. Hill (3 brigades) 3,600 1,800 2,000 1,500 1,000 + 3,500 4,500 1,500 ——— 19,400 + + [17] The Federals engaged against Jackson lost in five and a half + hours 7,000 officers and men. During the seven hours they were engaged + at Gravelotte the Prussian Guard and the Saxon Army Corps lost 10,349; + but 50,000 infantry were in action. The percentage of loss (20) was + about the same in both cases. The Confederate losses up to 10.30 a.m. + were as follows: + +Jones Lawton Hood McLaws Walker Anderson D.H. Hill (estimate) 700 +1,334 1,002 1,119 1,012 87 500 ——— 5,754 (29 p.c.) + + [18] Hill received his orders at 6.30 a.m. and marched an hour later, + reaching the battle-field about 3.30 p.m. + + [19] _From Manassas to Appomattox,_ pp 256, 257. + + [20] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 679, 680. + + [21] General Palfrey. _The Antietam and Fredericksburg._ + + [22] “One does not look for humour in a stern story like this, but the + _Charleston Courier_ account of the battle contains the following + statement: ‘They [the Confederates] fought until they were cut to + pieces, and then retreated only because they had fired their last + round!’” General Palfrey, _The Antietam and Fredericksburg._ + + [23] Communicated by General Stephen P. Lee, who was present at the + conference. + + [24] Evidently the ridge which had been held by Stuart on the 17th. + + [25] Communicated to the author. The difficulties in the way of the + attack, of which Jackson was aware on the night of the 17th, probably + led to his advising retreat when Lee asked his opinion at the + conference (_ante,_ pp. 259, 260). + + [26] Commanding Ewell’s division, _vice_ Lawton, wounded at + Sharpsburg. + + [27] Semmes’ four regiments, engaged in Jackson’s counterstroke, + reported the following percentage of loss. 53rd Georgia, 30 p.c.; 32nd + Virginia, 45 p.c.; 10th Georgia, 57 p.c.; 15th Virginia, 58 p.c. + + [28] For the losses in various great battles, see Note at end of + volume. + + [29] Mr. Lincoln had long before this recognised the tendency of + McClellan and others to exaggerate the enemy’s strength. As a + deputation from New England was one day leaving the White House, a + delegate turned round and said: “Mr. President, I should much like to + know what you reckon to be the number the rebels have in arms against + us.” Without a moment’s hesitation Mr. Lincoln replied: “Sir, I have + the best possible reason for knowing the number to be one million of + men, for whenever one of our generals engages a rebel army he reports + that he has encountered a force twice his strength. Now I know we have + half a million soldiers, so I am bound to believe that the rebels have + twice that number.” + + [30] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 627. + + [31] O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. 70. + + [32] _Ibid.,_ part ii, p. 365. + + [33] _Ibid.,_ p. 348. + + [34] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, pp. 621, 639. + + [35] General orders, Sept. 4; Lee to Davis, Sept. 7; Lee to Davis, + Sept. 13; special orders, Sept. 21; circular order, Sept. 22; Lee to + Davis, Sept. 23; Lee to Secretary of War, Sept. 23; Lee to Pendleton, + Sept. 24; Lee to Davis, Sept. 24; Lee to Davis, Sept. 28; Lee to + Davis, Oct. 2; O.R., vol. xix, part ii. _See also_ Report of D. H. + Hill, O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. l026. Stuart to Secretary of War, + Oct. 13. On Sept. 21, Jackson’s adjutant-general wrote, “We should + have gained a victory and routed them, had it not been for the + straggling. We were twenty-five thousand short by this cause.” + _Memoirs of W. N. Pendleton, D.D.,_ p. 217. It is but fair to say that + on September 13 there was a camp of 900 barefooted men at Winchester, + and “a great many more with the army.” Lee to Quarter-Master-General, + O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 614. + + [36] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 629. + + [37] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 302. + + [38] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 643. + + [39] About this time he made a successful appearance in a new role. In + September, General Bradley T. Johnson was told off to accompany + Colonel Garnet Wolseley, the Hon. Francis Lawley, Special + Correspondent to the _Times,_ and Mr. Vizetelly, Special Correspondent + of the _Illustrated London News,_ round the Confederate camps. By + order of General Lee,” he says, “I introduced the party to General + Jackson. We were all seated in front of General Jackson’s tent, and he + took up the conversation. He had been to England, and had been greatly + impressed with the architecture of Durham Cathedral and with the + history of the bishopric. The Bishops had been Palatines from the date + of the Conquest, and exercised semi-royal authority over their + bishopric. + ”There is a fair history of the Palatinate of Durham in Blackstone + and Coke, but I can hardly think that General Jackson derived his + information from those two fountains of the law. Anyhow, he + cross-examined the Englishmen in detail about the cathedral and the + close and the rights of the bishops, etc. etc. He gave them no + chance to talk, and kept them busy answering questions, for he knew + more about Durham than they did. + ”As we rode away, I said: ‘Gentlemen, you have disclosed Jackson in + a new character to me, and I’ve been carefully observing him for a + year and a half. You have made him exhibit _finesse,_ for he did + all the talking to keep you from asking too curious or embarrassing + questions. I never saw anything like it in him before.’ We all + laughed, and agreed that the General had been too much for the + interviewers.” _Memoirs,_ pp. 53–1. + + [40] _Memoirs of the Confederate War,_ vol. i + + [41] Report of July 31, O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 965. + + [42] Report of August 20, O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 966. (Not + engaged at Cedar Run.) + + [43] Report of July 20, O.R., vol. xi, part iii, p. 645. (3½ regiments + had been added.) + + [44] Four regiments. + + [45] 3,866 sick and straggling since August 28 = 21 p.c. + + [46] Over 1,300 stragglers had rejoined. + + + + +Chapter XX +FREDERICKSBURG + + +1862. October While the Army of Northern Virginia was resting in the +Valley, McClellan was preparing for a winter campaign. He was unable, +however, to keep pace with the impatience of the Northern people. Not +only was he determined to postpone all movement until his army was +properly equipped, his ranks recruited, his cavalry remounted, and his +administrative services reorganised, but the military authorities at +Washington were very slow in meeting his demands. Notwithstanding, +then, the orders of the President, the remonstrances of Halleck, and +the clamour of the press, for more than five weeks after the battle of +Sharpsburg he remained inactive on the Potomac. It may be that in the +interests of the army he was perfectly right in resisting the pressure +brought to bear upon him. He was certainly the best judge of the temper +of his troops, and could estimate more exactly than either Lincoln or +Halleck the chances of success if he were to encounter Lee’s veterans +on their native soil. However this may be, his inaction was not in +accordance with the demands of the political situation. The President, +immediately the Confederates retired from Maryland, had taken a step +which changed the character of the war. Hitherto the Northerners had +fought for the restoration of the Union on the basis of the +Constitution, as interpreted by themselves. Now, after eighteen months +of conflict, the Constitution was deliberately violated. For the clause +which forbade all interference with the domestic institutions of the +several States, a declaration that slavery should no longer exist +within the boundaries +of the Republic was substituted, and the armies of the Union were +called upon to fight for the freedom of the negro. + +In the condition of political parties this measure was daring. It was +not approved by the Democrats, and many of the soldiers were Democrats; +or by those—and they were not a few—who believed that compromise was +the surest means of restoring peace; or by those—and they were +numerous—who thought the dissolution of the Union a smaller evil than +the continuance of the war. The opposition was very strong, and there +was but one means of reconciling it—vigorous action on the part of the +army, the immediate invasion of Virginia, and a decisive victory. Delay +would expose the framers of the measure to the imputation of having +promised more than they could perform, of wantonly tampering with the +Constitution, and of widening the breach between North and South beyond +all hope of healing. + +In consequence, therefore, of McClellan’s refusal to move forward, the +friction between the Federal Government and their general-in-chief, +which, so long as Lee remained in Maryland, had been allayed, once more +asserted its baneful influence; and the aggressive attitude of the +Confederates did not serve to make matters smoother. Although the +greater part of October was for the Army of Northern Virginia a period +of unusual leisure, the troops were not altogether idle. As soon as the +stragglers had been brought in, and the ranks of the divisions once +more presented a respectable appearance, various enterprises were +undertaken. The Second Army Corps was entrusted with the destruction of +the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, a duty carried out by Jackson with +characteristic thoroughness. The line from Harper’s Ferry to +Winchester, as well as that from Manassas Junction to Strasburg, were +also torn up; and the spoils of the late campaign were sent south to +Richmond and Staunton. These preparations for defensive warfare were +not, however, so immediately embarrassing to the enemy as the action of +the cavalry. Stuart’s three brigades, after the affair at +Boteler’s Ford, picketed the line of the Potomac from the North +Mountain to the Shenandoah, a distance of forty miles: Hampton’s +brigade at Hedgesville, Fitzhugh Lee’s at Shepherdstown, Munford’s at +Charlestown, and headquarters near Leetown. + +On October 8 General Lee, suspecting that McClellan was meditating some +movement, ordered the cavalry to cross the Potomac and reconnoitre. + +Oct. 9 Selecting 600 men from each of his brigades, with General +Hampton, Colonels W. H. F. Lee and W. E. Jones in command, and +accompanied by four horse-artillery guns, Stuart rendezvoused on the +night of the 9th at Darkesville. As the day dawned he crossed the +Potomac at McCoy’s Ford, drove in the Federal pickets, and broke up a +signal station near Fairview. + +Oct. 10 Marching due north, he reached Mercersburg at noon, and +Chambersburg, forty-six miles from Darkesville, at 7 p.m. on October +10. Chambersburg, although a Federal supply depôt of some importance, +was without a garrison, and here 275 sick and wounded were paroled, 500 +horses requisitioned, the wires cut, and the railroad obstructed; while +the machine shops, several trains of loaded cars, and a large quantity +of small arms, ammunition, and clothing was destroyed. + +Oct. 11 At nine the next morning the force marched in the direction of +Gettysburg, moving round the Federal rear. Then, crossing the +mountains, it turned south through Emmittsburg, passed the Monocacy +near Frederick, and after a march of ninety miles since leaving +Chambersburg reached Hyattstown at daylight on the 12th. + +Oct.12 Here, on the road which formed McClellan’s line of communication +with Washington, a few waggons were captured, and information came to +hand that 4,000 or 5,000 Federal troops were near Poolesville, guarding +the fords across the Potomac. Moving at a trot through the woods, the +column, leaving Poolesville two or three miles to the left, made for +the mouth of the Monocacy. About a mile and a half from that river an +advanced guard of hostile cavalry, moving eastward, was encountered and +driven in. Colonel Lee’s men were +dismounted, a gun was brought into action, and under cover of this +screen, posted on a high crest, the main body made a dash for White’s +Ford. The point of passage, although guarded by about 100 Federal +riflemen, was quickly seized, and Stuart’s whole force, together with +the captured horses, had completed the crossing before the enemy, +advancing in large force from the Monocacy, was in a position to +interfere. + +This brilliantly conducted expedition was as fruitful of results as the +ride round McClellan’s army in the previous June. The information +obtained was most important. Lee, besides being furnished with a +sufficiently full report of the Federal dispositions, learned that no +part of McClellan’s army had been detached to Washington, but that it +was being reinforced from that quarter, and that therefore no over-sea +expedition against Richmond was to be apprehended. Several hundred fine +horses from the farms of Pennsylvania furnished excellent remounts for +the Confederate troopers. Prominent officials were brought in as +hostages for the safety of the Virginia citizens who had been thrown +into Northern prisons. Only a few scouts were captured by the enemy, +and not a man was killed. The distance marched by Stuart, from +Darkesville to White’s Ford, was one hundred and twenty-six miles, of +which the last eighty were covered without a halt. Crossing the Potomac +at McCoy’s Ford about 6 a.m. on October 10, he had recrossed it at +White’s Ford, between 1 and 2 p.m. on October 12; he was thus for +fifty-six hours inside the enemy’s lines, and during the greater part +of his march within thirty miles of McClellan’s headquarters near +Harper’s Ferry. + +It is often the case in war that a well-planned and boldly executed +enterprise has a far greater effect than could possibly have been +anticipated. Neither Lee nor Stuart looked for larger results from this +raid than a certain amount of plunder and a good deal of intelligence. +But skill and daring were crowned with a more ample reward than the +attainment of the immediate object. + +In the first place, the expedition, although there was little fighting, +was most destructive to the Federal cavalry. +McClellan had done all in his power to arrest the raiders. Directly the +news came in that they had crossed the Potomac, troops were sent in +every direction to cut off their retreat. Yet so eminently judicious +were Stuart’s precautions, so intelligent the Maryland soldiers who +acted as his guides, and so rapid his movements, that although constant +reports were received by the Federal generals as to the progress and +direction of his column, the information came always too late to serve +any practical purpose, and his pursuers were never in time to bar his +march. General Pleasanton, with such cavalry as could be spared from +the picket line, marched seventy-eight miles in four-and-twenty hours, +and General Averell’s brigade, quartered on the Upper Potomac, two +hundred miles in four days. The severity of the marches told heavily on +these commands, already worn out by hard work on the outposts; and so +many of the horses broke down that a period of repose was absolutely +necessary to refit them for the field. Until his cavalry should have +recovered it was impossible for McClellan to invade Virginia. + +In the second place, neither the Northern Government nor the Northern +people could forget that this was the second time that McClellan had +allowed Stuart to ride at will round the Army of the Potomac. Public +confidence in the general-in-chief was greatly shaken; and a handle was +given to his opponents in the ranks of the abolitionists, who, because +he was a Democrat, and had much influence with the army, were already +clamouring for his removal. + +Oct. 26 The respite which Stuart had gained for Virginia was not, +however, of long duration. On October 26, McClellan, having ascertained +by means of a strong reconnaissance in force that the Confederate army +was still in the vicinity of Winchester, commenced the passage of the +Potomac. The principal point of crossing was near Berlin, and so soon +as it became evident that the Federal line of operations lay east of +the Blue Ridge, Lee ordered Longstreet to Culpeper Court House. +Jackson, taking post on the road between Berryville and Charlestown, +was to remain in the Valley. + +On November 7 the situation was as follows:— + +ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. + +First Corps +Second Corps +Third Corps +Fifth Corps +Ninth Corps +Eleventh Corps +Cavalry Division +Line of Supply +Twelfth Corps Warrenton. +Rectortown. +Between Manassas Junction and Warrenton. +White Plains. +Waterloo. +New Baltimore. +Rappahannock Station and Sperryville. +Orange and Alexandria and Manassas Railways. +Harper’s Ferry and Sharpsburg. + +ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. + +First Corps +Second Corps +Cavalry Division + +Lines of Supply Culpeper Court House. +Headquarters, Millwood. +Hampton’s and Fitzhugh Lee’s Brigades + on the Rappahannock. +Munford’s Brigade with Jackson. +Staunton—Strasburg. +Staunton—Culpeper Court House. +Richmond—Gordonsville. + +Nov. 7 On this date the six corps of the Army of the Potomac which were +assembled between the Bull Run Mountains and the Blue Ridge numbered +125,000 officers and men present for duty, together with 320 guns. + +The returns of the Army of Northern Virginia give the following +strength:— + + Guns First Army Corps +Second Army Corps +Cavalry Division +Reserve Artillery 31,939 +31,794 +7,176 +900 +——— +71,809 112 +123 +4 +36 +—— +275 (54 short-range smooth-bores) +(53 short-range smooth-bores) + +(20 short-range smooth-bores) + +The Confederates were not only heavily outnumbered by the force +immediately before them, but along the Potomac, from Washington +westward, was a second hostile army, not indeed so large as that +commanded by +McClellan, but larger by several thousands than that commanded by Lee. +The Northern capital held a garrison of 80,000; at Harper’s Ferry were +10,000; in the neighbourhood of Sharpsburg over 4,000; along the +Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 8,000. Thus the total strength of the +Federals exceeded 225,000 men. Yet in face of this enormous host, and +with Richmond only weakly garrisoned behind him, Lee had actually +separated his two wings by an interval of sixty miles. He was evidently +playing his old game, dividing his army with a view to a junction on +the field of battle. + +Lincoln, in a letter of advice with which he had favoured McClellan a +few days previously, had urged the importance of making Lee’s line of +supply the first objective of the invading army. “An advance east of +the Blue Ridge,” he said, “would at once menace the enemy’s line of +communications, and compel him to keep his forces together; and if Lee, +disregarding this menace, were to cut in between the Army of the +Potomac and Washington, McClellan would have nothing to do but to +attack him in rear.” He suggested, moreover, that by hard marching it +might be possible for McClellan to reach Richmond first. + +The Confederate line of communications, so the President believed, ran +from Richmond to Culpeper Court House, and McClellan’s advanced guards, +on November 7, were within twenty miles of that point. Lee, however, +had altogether failed to respond to Mr. Lincoln’s strategical +pronouncements. Instead of concentrating his forces he had dispersed +them; and instead of fearing for his own communications, he had placed +Jackson in a position to interfere very seriously with those of his +enemy. + +Mr. Lincoln’s letter to McClellan shows that the lessons of the war had +not been altogether lost upon him. Generals Banks and Pope, with some +stimulus from Stonewall Jackson, had taught him what an important part +is played by lines of supply. He had mastered the strategical truism +that an enemy’s communications are his weakest point. But there were +other considerations which had not come home to him. He had overlooked +the possibility +that Lee might threaten McClellan’s communications before McClellan +could threaten his; and he had yet to learn that an army operating in +its own country, if proper forethought be exercised, can establish an +alternative line of supply, and provide itself with a double base, thus +gaining a freedom of action of which an invader, bound, unless he has +command of the sea, to a single line, is generally deprived. + +The President appears to have thought that, if Lee were cut off from +Richmond, the Army of Northern Virginia would be reduced to starvation, +and become absolutely powerless. It never entered his head that the +astute commander of that army had already, in anticipation of the very +movement which McClellan was now making, established a second base at +Staunton, and that his line of supply, in case of necessity, would not +run over the open country between Richmond and Gordonsville, but from +Staunton to Culpeper, behind the ramparts of the Blue Ridge. + +Lee, in fact, accepted with equanimity the possibility of the Federals +intervening between himself and Richmond. He had already, in the +campaign against Pope, extricated himself from such a situation by a +bold stroke against his enemy’s communications; and the natural +fastness of the Valley, amply provided with food and forage, afforded +facilities for such a manœuvre which had been altogether absent before +the Second Manassas. Nor was he of Mr. Lincoln’s opinion, that if the +Army of Northern Virginia cut in between Washington and McClellan it +would be a simple operation for the latter to about face and attack the +Confederates in rear. He knew, and Mr. Lincoln, if he had studied +Pope’s campaign, should have known it too, that the operation of +countermarching, if the line of communication has been cut, is not only +apt to produce great confusion and great suffering, but has the very +worst effect on the _moral_ of the troops. But Lee had that practical +experience which Mr. Lincoln lacked, and without which it is but waste +of words to dogmatise on strategy. He was well aware that a large army +is a cumbrous machine, not readily deflected from the original +direction of the line of march;[1] and, more than all, he had that +intimate acquaintance with the soldier in the ranks, that knowledge of +the human factor, without which no military problem, whether of +strategy, tactics, or organisation, can be satisfactorily solved. +McClellan’s task, therefore, so long as he had to depend for his +supplies on a single line of railway, was not quite so simple as Mr. +Lincoln imagined. + +Nevertheless, on November 7 Lee decided to unite his army. As soon as +the enemy advanced from Warrenton, Jackson was to ascend the Valley, +and crossing the Blue Ridge at Fisher’s Gap, join hands with +Longstreet, who would retire from Madison Court House to the vicinity +of Gordonsville. The Confederates would then be concentrated on +McClellan’s right flank should he march on Richmond, ready to take +advantage of any opportunity for attack; or, if attack were considered +too hazardous, to threaten his communications, and compel him to fall +back to the Potomac. + +The proposed concentration, however, was not immediately carried out. +In the first place, the Federal advance came to a sudden standstill; +and, in the second place, Jackson was unwilling to abandon his post of +vantage behind the Blue Ridge. It need hardly be said that the policy +of manœuvring instead of intrenching, of aiming at the enemy’s flank +and rear instead of barring his advance directly, was in full agreement +with his views of war; and it appears that about this date he had +submitted proposals for a movement against the Federal communications. +It would be interesting indeed to have the details of his design, but +Jackson’s letter-book for this period has unfortunately disappeared, +nor did he communicate his ideas to any of his staff. Letters from +General Lee, however, indicate that the manœuvre proposed was of the +same character as +that which brought Pope in such hot haste from the Rappahannock to Bull +Run, and that it was Jackson’s suggestion which caused the +Commander-in-Chief to reconsider his determination of uniting his army. + +“As long as General Jackson,” wrote Lee to the Secretary of War on +November 10, “can operate with safety, and secure his retirement west +of the Massanutton Mountains, I think it advantageous that he should be +in a position to threaten the enemy’s flank and rear, and thus prevent +his advance southward on the east side of the Blue Ridge. General +Jackson has been directed accordingly, and should the enemy descend +into the Valley, General Longstreet will attack his rear, and cut off +his communications. The enemy apparently is so strong in numbers that I +think it preferable to baffle his designs by manœuvring, rather than +resist his advance by main force, To accomplish the latter without too +great a risk and loss would require more than double our present +numbers.”[2] + +His letter to Jackson, dated November 9, ran as follows: “The enemy +seems to be massing his troops along the Manassas Railroad in the +vicinity of Piedmont, which gives him great facilities for bringing up +supplies from Alexandria. It has occurred to me that his object may be +to seize upon Strasburg with his main force, to intercept your ascent +of the Valley. . . . This would oblige you to cross into the Lost River +Valley, or west of it, unless you could force a passage through the +Blue Ridge; hence my anxiety for your safety. If you can prevent such a +movement of the enemy, and operate strongly on his flank and rear +through the gaps of the Blue Ridge, you would certainly in my opinion +effect the object you propose. A demonstration of crossing into +Maryland would serve the same purpose, and might call him back to the +Potomac. As my object is to retard and baffle his designs, if it can be +accomplished by manœuvring your corps as you propose, it will serve my +purpose as well as if effected in any other way. With this +understanding, you can use your discretion, which I know I can rely +upon, in remaining or advancing up the +Valley. Keep me advised of your movements and intentions; and you must +keep always in view the probability of an attack upon Richmond from +either north or south, when a concentration of force will become +necessary.”[3] + +Jackson’s plan, however, was not destined to be tried. McClellan had +issued orders for the concentration of his army at Warrenton. His +troops had never been in better condition. They were in good spirits, +well supplied and admirably equipped. Owing to the activity of his +cavalry, coupled with the fact that the Confederate horses were at this +time attacked by a disease which affected both tongue and hoof, his +information was more accurate than usual. He knew that Longstreet was +at Culpeper, and Jackson in the Valley. He saw the possibility of +separating the two wings of the enemy’s forces, and of either defeating +Longstreet or forcing him to fall back to Gordonsville, and he had +determined to make the attempt. + +On the night of November 7, however, at the very moment when his army +was concentrating for an advance against Longstreet, McClellan was +ordered to hand over his command to General Burnside. Lincoln had +yielded to the insistence of McClellan’s political opponents, to the +rancour of Stanton, and the jealousy of Halleck. But in sacrificing the +general who had saved the Union at Sharpsburg he sacrificed the lives +of many thousands of his soldiers. A darker day than even the Second +Manassas was in store for the Army of the Potomac. McClellan was not a +general of the first order. But he was the only officer in the United +States who had experience of handling large masses of troops, and he +was improving every day. Stuart had taught him the use of cavalry, and +Lee the value of the initiative. He was by no means deficient in +resolution, as his march with an army of recently defeated men against +Lee in Maryland conclusively proves; and although he had never won a +decisive victory, he possessed, to a degree which was never attained by +any of his successors, the confidence and affection of his troops. But +deplorable +as was the weakness which sanctioned his removal on the eve of a +decisive manœuvre, the blunder which put Burnside in his place was even +more so. The latter appears to have been the _protégé_ of a small +political faction. He had many good qualities. He was a firm friend, +modest, generous, and energetic. But he was so far from being +distinguished for military ability that in the Army of the Potomac it +was very strongly questioned whether he was fit to command an army +corps. His conduct at Sharpsburg, where he had been entrusted with the +attack on the Confederate right, had been the subject of the severest +criticism, and by not a few of his colleagues he was considered +directly responsible for the want of combination which had marred +McClellan’s plan of attack. More than once Mr. Lincoln infringed his +own famous aphorism, “Never swap horses when crossing a stream,” but +when he transferred the destinies of the Army of the Potomac from +McClellan to Burnside he did more—he selected the weakest of his team +of generals to bear the burden. + +At the same time that McClellan was superseded, General FitzJohn +Porter, the gallant soldier of Gaines’ Mill and Malvern Hill, probably +the best officer in the Army of the Potomac, was ordered to resign +command of the Fifth Army Corps, and to appear before a court-martial +on charges of incompetency and neglect of duty at the Second Manassas. +The fact that those charges were preferred by Pope, and that Porter had +been allowed to retain his command through the campaign in Maryland, +were hardly calculated to inspire the army with confidence in either +the wisdom or the justice of its rulers; and it was the general opinion +that his intimate friendship with McClellan had more to say to his +trial than his alleged incompetency. + +Burnside commenced his career by renouncing the enterprise which +McClellan had contemplated. Longstreet was left unmolested at Culpeper; +and, in order to free the communications from Jackson, the Federal army +was marched eastward along the Rappahannock to Falmouth, a new line of +supply being established between that village +and Aquia Creek, the port on the Potomac, six hours’ sail from +Washington. + +Lee had already foreseen that Jackson’s presence in the Valley might +induce the Federals to change their line of operations. Fredericksburg, +on the south side of the Rappahannock, and the terminus of the Richmond +and Potomac Railroad, had consequently been garrisoned by an infantry +regiment and a battery, while three regiments of cavalry patrolled the +river. This force, however, was not posted on the Rappahannock with a +view of retarding the enemy’s advance, but merely for observation. Lee, +at this date, had no intention of concentrating at Fredericksburg. The +Federals, if they acted with resolution, could readily forestall him, +and the line of the North Anna, a small but difficult stream, +thirty-six miles south, offered peculiar advantages to the defence. + +Nov. 17 The Federal march was rapid. On November 15 the Army of the +Potomac left Warrenton, and the advanced guard reached Falmouth on the +afternoon of the 17th. General Sumner, in command, observing the +weakness of the Confederate garrison, requested permission from +Burnside to cross the Rappahannock and establish himself on the further +bank. Although two army corps were at hand, and the remainder were +rapidly closing up, Burnside refused, for the bridges had been broken, +and he was unwilling to expose part of his forces on the right bank +with no means of retreat except a difficult and uncertain ford. The +same day, part of Longstreet’s corps and a brigade of cavalry were sent +to Fredericksburg; and on the 19th, Lee, finding that the Federals had +left Warrenton, ordered Longstreet to concentrate his whole force at +Fredericksburg, and summoned Jackson from the Valley to Orange Court +House. + +Jackson, meanwhile, had moved to Winchester, probably with the design +of threatening the enemy’s garrisons on the Potomac, and this +unexpected movement had caused much perturbation in the North. +Pennsylvania and Maryland expected nothing less than instant invasion. +The merchant feared for his strong-box, the farmer for +his herds; plate was once more packed up; railway presidents demanded +further protection for their lines; generals begged for reinforcements, +and, according to the “Times” Correspondent, it was “the universal +belief that Stonewall Jackson was ready to pounce upon Washington from +the Shenandoah, and to capture President, Secretaries, and all.” But +before apprehension increased to panic, before Mr. Lincoln had become +infected by the prevailing uneasiness, the departure of the +Confederates from the Valley brought relief to the affrighted citizens. + +On November 22 Jackson bade farewell to Winchester. His headquarters +were not more than a hundred yards from Dr. Graham’s manse, and he +spent his last evening with his old friends. “He was in fine health and +fine spirits,” wrote the minister’s wife to Mrs. Jackson. “The children +begged to be permitted to sit up to see “General Jackson,” and he +really seemed overjoyed to see them, played with them and fondled them, +and they were equally pleased. I have no doubt it was a great +recreation to him. He seemed to be living over last winter again, and +talked a great deal about the hope of getting back to spend this winter +with us, in the old room, which I told him I was keeping for you and +him. He certainly has had adulation enough to spoil him, but it seems +not to affect or harm him at all. He is the same humble, dependent +Christian, desiring to give God all the glory, looking to Him alone for +a blessing, and not thinking of himself.” + +So it was with no presage that this was the last time he would look +upon the scenes he loved that Jackson moved southward by the Valley +turnpike. Past Kernstown his columns swept, past Middletown and +Strasburg, and all the well-remembered fields of former triumphs; until +the peaks of the Massanuttons threw their shadows across the highway, +and the mighty bulk of the noble mountains, draped in the gold and +crimson of the autumn, once more re-echoed to the tramp of his +swift-footed veterans. Turning east at New Market, he struck upwards by +the familiar road; and then, descending the narrow pass, he forded the +Shenandoah, and crossing the Luray valley vanished in the forests of +the Blue Ridge. Through the dark pines of Fisher’s Gap he led his +soldiers down to the Virginia plains, and the rivers and the mountains +knew him no more until their dead returned to them. + +On the 26th the Second Army Corps was at Madison Court House. + +Nov. 27 The next day it was concentrated at Orange Court House, +six-and-thirty miles from Fredericksburg. In eight days, two being +given to rest, the troops had marched one hundred and twenty miles, and +with scarce a straggler, for the stern measures which had been taken to +put discipline on a firmer basis, and to make the regimental officers +do their duty, had already produced a salutary effect. + +On Jackson’s arrival at Orange Court House he found the situation +unchanged. Burnside, notwithstanding that heavy snow-storms and sharp +frosts betokened the approach of winter, the season of impassable roads +and swollen rivers, was still encamped near Falmouth. The difficulty of +establishing a new base of supplies at Aquia Creek, and some delay on +the part of the Washington authorities in furnishing him with a pontoon +train, had kept him idle; but he had not relinquished his design of +marching upon Richmond. His quiescence, however, together with the +wishes of the President, had induced General Lee to change his plans. +The Army of Northern Virginia, 78,500 strong, although, in order to +induce the Federals to attack, it was not yet closely concentrated, was +ready to oppose in full force the passage of the Rappahannock, and all +thought of retiring to the North Anna had been abandoned. + +Nov. 29 On November 29, therefore, Jackson was ordered forward, and +while the First Army Corps occupied a strong position in rear of +Fredericksburg, with an advanced detachment in the town, the Second was +told off to protect the lower reaches of the Rappahannock. Ewell’s +division, still commanded by Early, was posted at Skinker’s Neck, +twelve miles south-east of Fredericksburg, a spot which afforded many +facilities for crossing; D. H. Hill’s at Port Royal, already menaced by +Federal gunboats, six +miles further down stream; A. P. Hill’s and Taliaferro’s (Jackson’s +own) at Yerby’s House and Guiney’s Station, five and nine miles +respectively from Longstreet’s right; and Stuart, whose division was +now increased to four brigades, watched both front and flanks. + +The Rappahannock was undoubtedly a formidable obstacle. Navigable for +small vessels as far as Fredericksburg, the head of the tide water, it +is two hundred yards wide in the neighbourhood of the city, and it +increases in width and depth as it flows seaward. But above Falmouth +there are several easy fords; the river banks, except near +Fredericksburg, are clad with forest, hiding the movements of troops; +and from Falmouth downward, the left bank, under the name of the +Stafford Heights, so completely commands the right that it was +manifestly impossible for the Confederates to prevent the enemy, +furnished with a far superior artillery, from making good the passage +of the stream. A mile west of Fredericksburg, however, extending from +Beck’s Island to the heights beyond the Massaponax Creek, runs a long +low ridge, broken by ravines and partially covered with timber, which +with some slight aid from axe and spade could be rendered an +exceedingly strong position. Longstreet, who occupied this ridge, had +been ordered to intrench himself; gun-pits had been dug on the bare +crest, named Marye’s Hill, which immediately faces Fredericksburg; a +few shelter-trenches had been thrown up, natural defences improved, and +some slight breastworks and abattis constructed along the outskirts of +the woods. These works were at extreme range from the Stafford Heights; +and the field of fire, extending as far as the river, a distance +varying from fifteen hundred to three thousand yards, needed no +clearing. Over such ground a frontal attack, even if made by superior +numbers, had little chance of success. + +But notwithstanding its manifest advantages the position found no +favour in the eyes of Jackson. It could be easily turned by the fords +above Falmouth—Banks’, United States, Ely’s, and Germanna. This, +however, was a minor disqualification compared with the restrictions in +the way of offensive action. If the enemy should cross at +Fredericksburg, both his flanks would be protected by the river, while +his numerous batteries, arrayed on the Stafford Heights, and commanding +the length and the breadth of the battle-field, would make +counterstroke difficult and pursuit impossible. To await attack, +moreover, was to allow the enemy to choose his own time and place, and +to surrender the advantages of the initiative. Burnside’s +communications were protected by the Rappahannock, and it was thus +impracticable to manœuvre against his most vulnerable point, to inflict +on him a surprise, to compel him to change front, and, in case he were +defeated, to cut him off from his base and deprive him of his supplies. +The line of the North Anna, in Jackson’s opinion, promised far greater +results. The Federals, advancing from Fredericksburg, would expose +their right flank and their communications for a distance of +six-and-thirty miles; and if they were compelled to retreat, the +destruction of their whole army was within the bounds of possibility. +“I am opposed,” he said to General D. H. Hill, “to fighting on the +Rappahannock. We will whip the enemy, but gain no fruits of victory. I +have advised the line of the North Anna, but have been overruled.”[4] + +So the days passed on. The country was white with snow. The temperature +was near zero, and the troops, their blankets as threadbare as their +uniforms, without greatcoats, and in many instances without boots, +shivered beneath the rude shelters of their forest bivouacs. +Fortunately there was plenty of work. Roads were cut through the woods, +and existing tracks improved. The river banks were incessantly +patrolled. Fortifications were constructed at Port Royal and Skinker’s +Neck, and the movements of the Federals, demonstrating now here and now +there, kept the whole army on the alert. Nor were Jackson’s men +deprived of all excitement. He had the satisfaction of reporting to +General Lee that D. H. Hill, with the aid of Stuart’s horse-artillery, +had frustrated two attempts of the Federal gunboats to pass up the +river at Port Royal; +and that the vigilance of Early at Skinker’s Neck had caused the enemy +to abandon the design which he had apparently conceived of crossing at +that point. + +Dec. 11 But more vigorous operations were not long postponed. On +December 10, General Burnside, urged by the impatience of the Northern +press, determined to advance, and the next morning, at 3 a.m., the +signal guns of the Confederates gave notice that the enemy was in +motion. One hundred and forty Federal guns, many of large calibre, +placed in epaulments on the Stafford Heights, frowned down upon +Fredericksburg, and before the sun rose the Federal bridge builders +were at work on the opposite shore. The little city, which had been +deserted by the inhabitants, was held by Barksdale’s Mississippi +brigade of McLaws’ division, about 1,600 strong, and the conduct of +this advanced detachment must have done much to inspirit the troops who +watched their prowess from the ridge in rear. A heavy fog hung upon the +water, and not until the bridge was two-thirds completed, and shadowy +figures became visible in the mist, did the Mississippians open fire. +At such close quarters the effect was immediate, and the builders fled. +Twice, at intervals of half an hour, they ventured again upon the +deserted bridge, and twice were they driven back. Strong detachments +were now moved forward by the Federals to cover the working parties, +and artillery began to play upon the town. The Southerners, however, +securely posted in rifle-pits and cellars, were not to be dislodged; +and at ten o’clock Burnside ordered the heavy batteries into action. +Every gun which could be brought to bear on Fredericksburg discharged +fifty rounds of shot and shell. To this bombardment, which lasted +upwards of an hour, Longstreet’s artillery could make no reply. Yet +though the effect on the buildings was appalling, and flames broke out +in many places, the defenders not only suffered little loss, but at the +very height of the cannonade repelled another attempt to complete the +bridge. + +After a delay of several hours General Hooker, commanding the advance, +called for volunteers to cross the river in boats. Four regiments came +forward. The pontoons +were manned, and though many lives were lost during the transit, the +gallant Federals pushed quickly across; others followed, and Barksdale, +who had no orders to hold the place against superior strength, withdrew +his men from the river bank. About 4.30 p.m., three bridges being at +last established, the enemy pushed forward, and the Mississippians, +retiring in good order, evacuated Fredericksburg. A mile below, near +the mouth of Hazel Run, the Confederate outposts had been driven in, +and three more bridges had been thrown across. Thus on the night of the +11th the Federals, who were now organised in three Grand Divisions, +each of two army corps, had established their advanced guards on the +right bank of the Rappahannock, and, under cover of the batteries on +the Stafford Heights, could rapidly and safely pass over their great +host of 120,000 men.[5] + +Burnside had framed his plan of attack on the assumption that Lee’s +army was dispersed along the Rappahannock. His balloon had reported +large Confederate bivouacs below Skinker’s Neck, and he appears to have +believed that Lee, alarmed by his demonstrations near Port Royal, had +posted half his army in that neighbourhood. Utterly unsuspicious that a +trap had been laid for him, he had resolved to take advantage of this +apparently vicious distribution, and, crossing rapidly at +Fredericksburg, to defeat the Confederate left before the right could +lend support. Port Royal is but eighteen miles from Fredericksburg, and +in prompt action, therefore, lay his only hope of success. Burnside, +however, after the successful establishment, of his six bridges, +evinced the same want of resolution which had won him so unenviable a +reputation at Sharpsburg. The long hours of darkness slipped peacefully +away; no unusual sound broke the silence of the night, and all was +still along the Rappahannock. + +Dec. 12 It was not till the next morning, December 12, that the army +began to cross, and the movement, made difficult by a dense fog, was by +no means energetic. Four of the six army corps were transferred during +the +day to the southern bank; but beyond a cavalry reconnaissance, which +was checked by Stuart, there was no fighting, and to every man in the +Federal ranks it was perfectly plain that the delay was fatal. + +Lee, meanwhile, with ample time at his disposal and full confidence in +the wisdom of his dispositions, calmly awaited the development of his +adversary’s plans. Jackson brought up A. P. Hill and Taliaferro at +noon, and posted them on Longstreet’s right; but it was not till that +hour, when it had at last become certain that the whole Federal army +was crossing, that couriers were dispatched to call in Early and D. H. +Hill. Once more the Army of Northern Virginia was concentrated at +exactly the right moment on the field of battle.[6] + +Dec. 13 Like its predecessor, December 13 broke dull and calm, and the +mist which shrouded river and plain hid from each other the rival +hosts. Long before daybreak the Federal divisions still beyond the +stream began to cross; and as the morning wore on, and the troops near +Hazel Run moved forward from their bivouacs, the rumbling of artillery +on the frozen roads, the loud words of command, and the sound of +martial music came, muffled by the fog, to the ears of the Confederates +lying expectant on the ridge. Now and again the curtain lifted for a +moment, and the Southern guns assailed the long dark columns of the +foe. Very early had the Confederates taken up their position. The +ravine of Deep Run, covered with tangled brushwood, was the line of +demarcation between Jackson and Longstreet. On the extreme right of the +Second Corps, and half a mile north of the marshy valley of the +Massaponax, where a spur called Prospect Hill juts down from the wooded +ridge, were fourteen guns under Colonel Walker. Supported by two +regiments of Field’s brigade, these pieces were held back for the +present within the forest which here clothed the ridge. Below Prospect +Hill, and running thence along the front of the position, the +embankment of the Richmond and Potomac Railroad formed a tempting +breastwork. It was utilised, however, +only by the skirmishers of the defence. The edge of the forest, One +hundred and fifty to two hundred yards in rear, looked down upon an +open and gentle slope, and along the brow of this natural glacis, +covered by the thick timber, Jackson posted his fighting-line. To this +position it was easy to move up his supports and reserves without +exposing them to the fire of artillery; and if the assailants should +seize the embankment, he relied upon the deadly rifles of his infantry +to bar their further advance up the ascent beyond. + +The Light Division supplied both the first and second lines of +Jackson’s army corps. To the left of Walker’s guns, posted in a +shelter-trench within the skirts of the wood, was Archer’s brigade of +seven regiments, including two of Field’s, the left resting on a +coppice that projected beyond the general line of forest. On the +further side of this coppice, but nearer the embankment, lay Lane’s +brigade, an unoccupied space of six hundred yards intervening between +his right and Archer’s left. Between Lane’s right and the edge of the +coppice was an open tract two hundred yards in breadth. Both of these +brigades had a strong skirmish line pushed forward along and beyond the +railroad. Five hundred yards in rear, along a road through the woods +which had been cut by Longstreet’s troops, Gregg’s South Carolina +brigade, in second line, covered the interval between Archer and Lane. +To Lane’s left rear lay Pender’s brigade, supporting twelve guns posted +in the open, on the far side of the embankment, and twenty-one massed +in a field to the north of a small house named Bernard’s Cabin. Four +hundred yards in rear of Lane’s left and Pender’s right was stationed +Thomas’s brigade of four regiments.[7] + +It is necessary to notice particularly the shape, size, and position of +the projecting tongue of woodland which +broke the continuity of Hill’s line. A German officer on Stuart’s staff +had the day previous, while riding along the position, remarked its +existence, and suggested the propriety of razing it; but, although +Jackson himself predicted that there would be the scene of the severest +fighting, the ground was so marshy within its depths, and the +undergrowth so dense and tangled, that it was judged impenetrable and +left unoccupied—an error of judgment which cost many lives. General +Lane had also recognised the danger of leaving so wide a gap between +Archer and himself, and had so reported, but without effect, to his +divisional commander. + +The coppice was triangular in shape, and extended nearly six hundred +yards beyond the embankment. The base, which faced the Federals, was +five hundred yards long. Beyond the apex the ground was swampy and +covered with scrub, and the ridge, depressed at this point to a level +with the plain, afforded no position from which artillery could command +the approach to or issue from this patch of jungle. A space of seven +hundred yards along the front was thus left undefended by direct fire. + +[Illustration: The Field of Fredericksburg] + +Early, who with D. H. Hill had marched in shortly after daybreak, +formed the right of the third line, Taliaferro the left. The division +of D. H. Hill, with several batteries, formed the general reserve, and +a portion of Early’s artillery was posted about half a mile in rear of +his division, in readiness, if necessary, to relieve the guns on +Prospect Hill. + +Jackson’s line was two thousand six hundred yards in length, and his +infantry 30,000 strong, giving eleven rifles to the yard; but nearly +three-fourths of the army corps, the divisions of Early, Taliaferro, +and D. H. Hill, were in third line and reserve. Of his one hundred and +twenty-three guns only forty-seven were in position, but the wooded and +broken character of the ground forbade a further deployment of his +favourite arm. His left, near Deep Run, was in close touch with Hood’s +division of Longstreet’s army corps; and in advance of his right, +already protected by the Massaponax, was Stuart with two brigades and +his +horse-artillery. One Whitworth gun, a piece of great range and large +calibre, was posted on the wooded heights beyond the Massaponax, +north-east of Yerby’s House. + +Jackson’s dispositions were almost identical with those which he had +adopted at the Second Manassas. His whole force was hidden in the +woods; every gun that could find room was ready for action, and the +batteries were deployed in two masses. Instead, however, of giving each +division a definite section of the line, he had handed over the whole +front to A. P. Hill. This arrangement, however, had been made before D. +H. Hill and Early came up, and with the battle imminent a change was +hazardous. In many respects, moreover, the ground he now occupied +resembled that which he had so successfully defended on August 29 and +30. There was the wood opposite the centre, affording the enemy a +covered line of approach; the open fields, pasture and stubble, on +either hand; the stream, hidden by timber and difficult of passage, on +the one flank, and Longstreet on the other. But the position at +Fredericksburg was less strong for defence than that at the Second +Manassas, for not only was Jackson’s line within three thousand yards—a +long range but not ineffective—of the heavy guns on the Stafford +Heights, but on the bare plain between the railway and the river there +was ample room for the deployment of the Federal field-batteries. At +the Second Manassas, on the other hand, the advantages of the artillery +position had been on the side of the Confederates. + +Nevertheless, with the soldiers of Sharpsburg, ragged indeed and +under-fed, but eager for battle and strong in numbers, there was no +reason to dread the powerful artillery of the foe; and Jackson’s +confidence was never higher than when, accompanied by his staff, he +rode along his line of battle. He was not, however, received by his +soldiers with their usual demonstrations of enthusiastic devotion. In +honour of the day he had put on the uniform with which Stuart had +presented him; the old cadet cap, which had so often waved his men to +victory, was replaced by a head-dress resplendent with gold lace; +“Little Sorrel” had been deposed in favour of a more imposing charger; +and +the veterans failed to recognise their commander until he had galloped +past them. A Confederate artillery-man has given a graphic picture of +his appearance when the fight was at its hottest:— + +“A general officer, mounted upon a superb bay horse and followed by a +single courier, rode up through our guns. Looking neither to the right +nor the left, he rode straight to the front, halted, and seemed gazing +intently on the enemy’s line of battle. The outfit before me, from top +to toe, cap, coat, top-boots, horse and furniture, were all of the new +order of things. But there was something about the man that did not +look so new after all. He appeared to be an old-time friend of all the +turmoil around him. As he had done us the honour to make an afternoon +call on the artillery, I thought it becoming in someone to say +something on the occasion. No one did, however, so, although a somewhat +bashful and weak-kneed youngster, I plucked up courage enough to +venture to remark that those big guns over the river had been knocking +us about pretty considerably during the day. He quickly turned his +head, and I knew in an instant who it was before me. The clear-cut, +chiselled features; the thin, compressed and determined lips; the calm, +steadfast eye; the countenance to command respect, and in time of war +to give the soldier that confidence he so much craves from a superior +officer, were all there. He turned his head quickly, and looking me all +over, rode up the line and away as quickly and silently as he came, his +little courier hard upon his heels; and this was my first sight of +Stonewall Jackson.” + +From his own lines Jackson passed along the front, drawing the fire of +the Federal skirmishers, who were creeping forward, and proceeded to +the centre of the position, where, on the eminence which has since +borne the name of Lee’s Hill, the Commander-in-Chief, surrounded by his +generals, was giving his last instructions. It was past nine o’clock. +The sun, shining out with almost September warmth, was drawing up the +mist which hid the opposing armies; and as the dense white folds +dissolved and rolled sway, the Confederates saw the broad +plain beneath them dark with more than 80,000 foes. Of these the left +wing, commanded by Franklin, and composed of 55,000 men and 116 guns, +were moving against the Second Corps; 30,000, under Sumner, were +forming for attack on Longstreet, and from the heights of Stafford, +where the reserves were posted in dense masses, a great storm of shot +and shell burst upon the Confederate lines. “For once,” says Dabney, +“war unmasked its terrible proportions with a distinctness hitherto +unknown in the forest-clad landscapes of America, and the plain of +Fredericksburg presented a panorama that was dreadful in its grandeur.” +It was then that Longstreet, to whose sturdy heart the approach of +battle seemed always welcome, said to Jackson, “General, do not all +those multitudes of Federals frighten you?” “We shall very soon see +whether I shall not frighten them;” and with this grim reply the +commander of the Second Corps rode back to meet Franklin’s onset. + +9 a.m. The Federals were already advancing. From Deep Run southward, +for more than a mile and a half, three great lines of battle, +accompanied by numerous batteries, moved steadily forward, powerful +enough, to all appearance, to bear down all opposition by sheer weight +of numbers. “On they came,” says an eye-witness, “in beautiful order, +as if on parade, their bayonets glistening in the bright sunlight; on +they came, waving their hundreds of regimental flags, which relieved +with warm bits of colouring the dull blue of the columns and the russet +tinge of the wintry landscape, while their artillery beyond the river +continued the cannonade with unabated fury over their heads, and gave a +background of white fleecy smoke, like midsummer clouds, to the +animated picture.” + +And yet that vast array, so formidable of aspect, lacked that moral +force without which physical power, even in its most terrible form, is +but an idle show. Not only were the strength of the Confederate +position, the want of energy in the preliminary movements, the +insecurity of their own situation, but too apparent to the intelligence +of the regimental officers and men, but they mistrusted their +commander. Northern writers have recorded that the Army of the Potomac +never went down to battle with less alacrity than on this day at +Fredericksburg. + +Nor was the order of attack of such a character as to revive the +confidence of the troops. Burnside, deluded by the skill with which +Jackson had hidden his troops into the belief that the Second Army +Corps was still at Port Royal, had instructed Franklin to seize the +ridge with a single division, and Meade’s 4,500 Pennsylvanians were +sent forward alone, while the remainder of the Grand Division, over +50,000 strong, stood halted on the plain, awaiting the result of this +hopeless manœuvre.[8] Meade advanced in three lines, each of a brigade, +with skirmishers in front and on the flank, and his progress was soon +checked. No sooner had his first line crossed the Richmond road than +the left was assailed by a well-directed and raking artillery fire. + +Captain Pelham, commanding Stuart’s horse-artillery, had galloped +forward by Jackson’s orders with his two rifled guns, and, escorted by +a dismounted squadron, had come into action beyond a marshy stream +which ran through a tangled ravine on the Federal flank. So telling was +his fire that the leading brigade wavered and gave ground; and though +Meade quickly brought up his guns and placed his third brigade _en +potence_ in support, he was unable to continue his forward movement +until he had brushed away his audacious antagonist. The four +Pennsylvania batteries were reinforced by two others; but rapidly +changing his position as often as the Federal gunners found his range, +for more than half an hour Pelham defied their efforts, and for that +space of time arrested the advance of Meade’s 4,500 infantry. One of +his pieces was soon disabled; but with the remaining gun, captured from +the enemy six months before, he maintained the unequal fight until his +limbers were empty, and he received peremptory orders from Stuart to +withdraw. + +On Pelham’s retirement, Franklin, bringing several batteries forward to +the Richmond road, for more than +half an hour subjected the woods before him to a heavy cannonade, in +which the guns on the Stafford Heights played a conspicuous part. +Hidden, however, by the thick timber, Jackson’s regiments lay secure, +unharmed by the tempest that crashed above them through the leafless +branches; and, reserving their fire for the hostile infantry, his guns +were silent. The general, meanwhile, according to his custom, had +walked far out into the fields to reconnoitre for himself, and luck +favoured the Confederacy on this day of battle. Lieutenant Smith was +his only companion, and a Federal sharpshooter, suddenly rising from +some tall weeds two hundred paces distant, levelled his rifle and +fired. The bullet whistled between their heads, and Jackson, turning +with a smile to his aide-de-camp, said cheerfully: “Mr. Smith, had you +not better go to the rear? They may shoot you.” Then, having +deliberately noted the enemy’s arrangements, he returned to his station +on Prospect Hill. + +11.15 a.m. It was past eleven before Meade resumed his advance. Covered +by the fire of the artillery, his first line was within eight hundred +yards of Jackson’s centre, when suddenly the silent woods awoke to +life. The Confederate batteries, pushing forward from the covert, came +rapidly into action, and the flash and thunder of more than fifty guns +revealed to the astonished Federals the magnitude of the task they had +undertaken. From front and flank came the scathing fire; the +skirmishers were quickly driven in, and on the closed ranks behind +burst the full fury of the storm. Dismayed and decimated by this fierce +and unexpected onslaught, Meade’s brigades broke in disorder and fell +back to the Richmond road. + +For the next hour and a half an artillery duel, in which over 400 guns +took part, raged over the whole field, and the Confederate batteries, +their position at last revealed, engaged with spirit the more numerous +and powerful ordnance of the enemy. Then Franklin brought up three +divisions to Meade’s support; and from the smouldering ruins of +Fredericksburg, three miles to the northward, beyond the high trees of +Hazel Run, the deep columns of Sumner’s +Grand Division deployed under the fire of Longstreet’s guns. Sumner’s +attack had been for some time in progress before Franklin was in +readiness to co-operate. The battle was now fully developed, and the +morning mists had been succeeded by dense clouds of smoke, shrouding +bill and plain, through which the cannon flashed redly, and the defiant +yells of Longstreet’s riflemen, mingled with their rattling volleys, +stirred the pulses of Jackson’s veterans. As the familiar sounds were +borne to their ears, it was seen that the dark lines beyond the +Richmond road were moving forward, and the turn of the Second Corps had +come. + +1 p.m. It was one o’clock, and Jackson’s guns had for the moment ceased +their fire. Meade’s Pennsylvanians had rallied. Gibbon’s division had +taken post on their right; Biney and Newton were in support; and +Doubleday, facing south, was engaged with Stuart’s dismounted troopers. +Twenty-one guns on the right, and thirty on the left, stationed on the +Richmond road, a thousand yards from the Confederate position, formed a +second tier to the heavier pieces on the heights, and fired briskly on +the woods. Preceded by clouds of skirmishers, Meade and Gibbon advanced +in column of brigades at three hundred paces distance, the whole +covering a front of a thousand yards; and the supporting divisions +moved up to the Richmond road. + +When the Federals reached the scene of their former repulse, Jackson’s +guns again opened; but without the same effect, for they were now +exposed to the fire of the enemy’s batteries at close range. Even +Pelham could do but little; and the artillery beyond the railroad on +Hill’s left was quickly driven in. + +Meade’s rear brigade was now brought up and deployed on the left of the +first, in the direction of the Massaponax, thus further extending the +front. + +The leading brigade made straight for the tongue of woodland which +interposed between Lane and Archer. As they neared the Confederate +line, the Pennsylvanians, masked by the trees, found that they were no +longer exposed to fire, and that the coppice was unoccupied. +Quickly crossing the border, through swamp and undergrowth they pushed +their way, and, bursting from the covert to the right, fell on the +exposed flank of Lane’s brigade. The fight was fierce, but the +Southerners were compelled to give ground, for neither Archer nor Gregg +was able to lend assistance. + +Meade’s second brigade, though following close upon the first, had, +instead of conforming to the change of direction against Lane’s flank, +rushed forward through the wood. Two hundred paces from the embankment +it came in contact with Archer’s left, which was resting on the very +edge of the coppice. The Confederates were taken by surprise. Their +front was secured by a strong skirmish line; but on the flank, as the +thickets appeared impenetrable, neither scouts nor pickets had been +thrown out, and the men were lying with arms piled. Two regiments, +leaping to their feet and attempting to form line to the left, were +broken by a determined charge, and gave way in disorder. The remainder, +however, stood firm, for the Federals, instead of following up their +success in this direction, left Archer to be dealt with by the third +brigade of the division, which had now reached the railroad, and swept +on towards the military road, where Gregg’s brigade was drawn up within +the forest. So thick was the cover, and so limited the view, that +General Gregg, taking the advancing mass for part of Archer’s line +retiring, restrained the fire of his men. The Federals broke upon his +right. He himself fell mortally wounded. His flank regiment, a +battalion of conscripts, fled, except one company, without firing a +shot. The two regiments on the opposite flank, however, were with great +readiness turned about, and changing front inwards, arrested the +movement of the enemy along the rear. + +The Federals had now been joined by a portion of the first brigade, +inspirited by their victory over Lane, and the moment, to all +appearance, seemed critical in the extreme for the Confederates. To the +left rear of the attacking column, Meade’s third brigade was held in +check by Walker’s batteries and the sturdy Archer, who, +notwithstanding that a strong force had passed beyond his flank, and +had routed two of his regiments, still resolutely held his ground, and +prevented his immediate opponents from joining the intruding column. To +the right rear, opposite Pender, Gibbon’s division had been checked by +the fire of the great battery near Bernard’s Cabin; two of his brigades +had been driven back, and the third had with difficulty gained the +shelter of the embankment. So from neither left nor right was immediate +support to be expected by Meade’s victorious regiments. But on the +Richmond road were the divisions of Birney and Newton, with Doubleday’s +and Sickles’ not far in rear, and 20,000 bayonets might have been +thrown rapidly into the gap which the Pennsylvanians had so vigorously +forced. Yet Jackson’s equanimity was undisturbed. The clouds of smoke +and the thick timber hid the fighting in the centre from his post of +observation on Prospect Hill, and the first intimation of the enemy’s +success was brought by an aide-de-camp, galloping wildly up the slope. +“General,” he exclaimed in breathless haste, “the enemy have broken +through Archer’s left, and General Gregg says he must have help, or he +and General Archer will both lose their position.” Jackson turned round +quietly, and without the least trace of excitement in either voice or +manner, sent orders to Early and Taliaferro, in third line, to advance +with the bayonet and clear the front. Then, with rare self-restraint, +for the fighting instinct was strong within him, and the danger was so +threatening as to have justified his personal interference, he raised +his field-glasses and resumed his scrutiny of the enemy’s reserves on +the Richmond road. + +1.45 p.m. His confidence in his lieutenants was not misplaced. Early’s +division, already deployed in line, came forward with a rush, and the +Stonewall Brigade, responding with alacrity to Jackson’s summons, led +the advance of Taliaferro. + +The counterstroke was vigorous. Meade’s brigades had penetrated to the +heart of the Confederate position, but their numbers were reduced to +less than 2,000 bayonets; in the fierce fighting and dense thickets +they had lost all semblance of cohesion, and not a single regiment had +supported them. The men looked round in vain for help, and the forest +around them resounded with the yells of the Confederate reinforcements. +Assailed in front and flank by a destructive fire, the Pennsylvanians +were rapidly borne back. Hill’s second line joined in Early’s advance. +Gibbon was strongly attacked. Six brigades, sweeping forward from the +forest, dashed down the slopes, and in a few moments the broken +remnants of the Federal divisions were dispersing in panic across the +plain. As the enemy fled the Confederate gunners, disregarding the +shells of Franklin’s batteries, poured a heavy fire into the receding +mass; and although instructions had been given that the counterstroke +was not to pass the railroad, Hoke’s and Atkinson’s brigades,[9] +carried away by success and deaf to all orders, followed in swift +pursuit. Some of Birney’s regiments, tardily coming forward to Meade’s +support, were swept away, and the yelling line of grey infantry, +shooting down the fugitives and taking many prisoners, pressed on +towards the Richmond road. There the remainder of Birney’s division was +drawn up, protected by the breast-high bank, and flanked by artillery; +yet it seemed for a moment as if the two Confederate brigades would +carry all before them. + +The troops of Meade and Gibbon were streaming in confusion to the rear. +Two batteries had been abandoned, and before Hake’s onset the left of +Birney’s infantry gave ground for fifty yards. But the rash advance had +reached its climax. Unsupported, and with empty cartridge-boxes, the +Southerners were unable to face the fire from the road; sixteen guns +had opened on them with canister; and after suffering heavy losses in +killed, wounded, and prisoners, they withdrew in disorder but +unpursued. + +The success of the Second Army Corps was greater than even Jackson +realised. Meade and Gibbon had lost 4,000 officers and men; and it was +not till late in the afternoon that they were rallied on the river +bank. The casualties in Birney’s division swelled the total to 5,000, +and the Confederate counterstroke had inflicted a +heavier blow than the tale of losses indicates. Not only the troops +which had been engaged, but those who had witnessed their defeat, who +had seen them enter the enemy’s position, and who knew they should have +been supported, were much disheartened. + +2.30 p.m. At 2.30 p.m., soon after the repulse of Hake and Atkinson, +Burnside, having just witnessed the signal failure of a fourth assault +on Longstreet, sent an urgent order to Franklin to renew his attack. +Franklin made no response. He had lost all confidence both in his +superior and his men, and he took upon himself to disobey. + +On the Confederate side Taliaferro and Early, with part of the Light +Division, now held the railway embankment and the skirt of the woods. +D. H. Hill was brought up into third line, and the shattered brigades +of A. P. Hill were withdrawn to the rear. During the rest of the +afternoon the skirmishers were actively engaged, but although Jackson’s +victorious soldiery long and eagerly expected a renewal of the assault, +the enemy refused to be again tempted to close quarters. + +On the left, meanwhile, where the battle still raged, the Confederates +were equally successful. Against an impregnable position 40,000 +Northerners were madly hurled by the general of Mr. Lincoln’s choice. +By those hapless and stout-hearted soldiers, sacrificed to +incompetency, a heroism was displayed which won the praise and the pity +of their opponents. The attack was insufficiently prepared, and feebly +supported, by the artillery. The troops were formed on a narrow front. +Marye’s Hill, the strongest portion of the position, where the +Confederate infantry found shelter behind a stout stone wall, and +numerous batteries occupied the commanding ground in rear, was selected +for assault. Neither feint nor demonstration, the ordinary expedients +by which the attacker seeks to distract the attention and confuse the +efforts of the defence, was made use of; and yet division after +division, with no abatement of courage, marched in good order over the +naked plain, dashed forward with ever-thinning ranks, and then, +receding sullenly before the +storm of fire, left, within a hundred yards of the stone wall, a long +line of writhing forms to mark the limit of their advance. + +3 p.m. Two army corps had been repulsed by Longstreet with fearful +slaughter when Meade and Gibbon gave way before Jackson’s +counterstroke, and by three o’clock nearly one-half of the Federal army +was broken and demoralised. The time appeared to have come for a +general advance of the Confederates. Before Fredericksburg, the wreck +of Sumner’s Grand Division was still clinging to such cover as the +ground afforded. On the Richmond road, in front of Jackson, Franklin +had abandoned all idea of the offensive, and was bringing up his last +reserves to defend his line. The Confederates, on the other hand, were +in the highest spirits, and had lost but few. + +General Lee’s arrangements, however, had not included preparation for a +great counterstroke, and such a movement is not easily improvised. The +position had been occupied for defensive purposes alone. There was no +general reserve, no large and intact force which could have moved to +the attack immediately the opportunity offered. “No skill,” says +Longstreet, “could have marshalled our troops for offensive operations +in time to meet the emergency. My line was long and over broken +country, so much so that the troops could not be promptly handled in +offensive operations. Jackson’s corps was in mass, and could he have +anticipated the result of my battle, he would have been justified in +pressing Franklin to the river when the battle of the latter was lost. +Otherwise, pursuit would have been as unwise as the attack he had just +driven off. It is well known that after driving off attacking forces, +if immediate pursuit can be made, so that the victors can go along with +the retreating forces pell-mell, it is well enough to do so; but the +attack should be immediate. To follow a success by counter-attack +against the enemy in position is problematical.”[10] + +Moreover, so large was the battle-field, so limited the view by reason +of the woods, and with such ease had the +Federal attacks been repulsed, that General Lee was unaware of the +extent of his success. Ignorant, too, as he necessarily was, of the +mistrust and want of confidence in its leaders with which the Federal +army was infected, he was far from suspecting what a strong ally he had +in the hearts of his enemies; while, on the other hand, the +inaccessible batteries on the Stafford Heights were an outward and +visible token of unabated strength. + +Jackson, however, although the short winter day was already closing in, +considered that the attempt was worth making. About 3 p.m. he had seen +a feeble attack on the Confederate centre repulsed by Hood and Pender, +and about the same time he received information of Longstreet’s +success. + +Franklin, meanwhile, was reforming his lines behind the high banks of +the Richmond road, and the approach of his reserves, plainly visible +from the Confederate position, seemed to presage a renewed attack. “I +waited some time,” says Jackson, “to receive it, but he making no +forward movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself. The +artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make an advance +of our troops across the plain very hazardous; yet it was so promising +of good results, if successfully executed, as to induce me to make +preparations for the attempt. In order to guard against disaster, the +infantry was to be preceded by artillery, and the movement postponed +until late in the afternoon, so that if compelled to retire, it would +be under cover of the night.”[11] + +Jackson’s decision was not a little influenced by Stuart, or rather by +the reports which Stuart, who had sent out staff officers to keep the +closest watch on the enemy’s movements, had been able to furnish of the +demoralised condition of a great part of Franklin’s force. The cavalry +general, as soon as he verified the truth of these reports in person, +galloped off to confer with Jackson on Prospect Hill, and a message was +at once sent to Lee, requesting permission for an advance. A single +cannon shot was to be the signal for a general attack, which Stuart, +striking the +enemy in flank, was to initiate with his two brigades and the lighter +guns. + +“Returning to our position,” to quote Stuart’s chief of staff, “we +awaited in anxious silence the desired signal; but minute after minute +passed by, and the dark veil of the winter night began to envelop the +valley, when Stuart, believing that the summons agreed upon had been +given, issued the order to advance. Off we went into the gathering +darkness, our sharpshooters driving their opponents easily before them, +and Pelham with his guns, pushing ahead at a trot, giving them a few +shots whenever the position seemed favourable, and then again pressing +forward. This lasted about twenty minutes, when the fire of the enemy’s +infantry began to be more and more destructive, and other fresh +batteries opened upon us. Still all remained silent upon our main line. +Our situation had become, indeed, a critical one, when a courier from +General Jackson galloped up at full speed, bringing the order for +Stuart to retreat as quickly as he could to his original position.” + +Under cover of the night this retrograde movement was effected without +loss; and the cavalry, as they marched back, saw the camp-fires +kindling on the skirts of the forest, and the infantry digging +intrenchments by the fitful glare. + +The Second Corps had not come into action. Jackson had issued orders +that every gun, of whatever calibre or range, which was not disabled +should be brought to the front and open fire at sunset; and that as +soon as the enemy showed signs of wavering, the infantry should charge +with fixed bayonets, and sweep the invaders into the river. Hood’s +division, which had been temporarily placed at his disposal, was +instructed to co-operate.[12] It appears, however, that it had not been +easy, in the short space of daylight still available, to remedy the +confusion into which the Confederates had been thrown by Meade’s attack +and their own counterstroke. The divisions were to some extent mixed +up. Several regiments had been broken, and the ammunition of both +infantry and artillery needed replenishment. +Moreover, it was difficult in the extreme to bring the batteries +forward through the forest; and, when they eventually arrived, the +strength of the Federal position was at once revealed. Franklin’s line +was defended by a hundred and sixteen field pieces, generally of +superior metal to those of the Confederates, and the guns on the +Stafford Heights, of which at least thirty bore upon Jackson’s front, +were still in action. As the first Confederate battery advanced, this +great array of artillery, which had been for some time comparatively +quiet, reopened with vigour, and, to use Jackson’s words, “so +completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed movement +should be abandoned.” + +But he was not yet at the end of his resources. A strong position, +which cannot be turned, is not always impregnable. If the ground be +favourable, and few obstacles exist, a night attack with the bayonet, +especially if the enemy be exhausted or half-beaten, has many chances +of success; and during the evening Jackson made arrangements for such a +movement. “He asked me,” says Dr. McGuire, “how many yards of bandaging +I had, and when I replied that I did not know the exact number, but +that I had enough for another fight, he seemed a little worried at my +lack of information and showed his annoyance. I repeated rather +shortly, ‘I have enough for another battle,’ meaning to imply that this +was all that it was necessary for him to know. I then asked him: ‘Why +do you want to know how much bandaging I have?’ He said: ‘I want a yard +of bandaging to put on the arm of every soldier in this night’s attack, +so that the men may know each other from the enemy.’ I told him I had +not enough cotton cloth for any such purpose, and that he would have to +take a piece of the shirt tail of each soldier to supply the cloth, +but, unfortunately, half of them had no shirts! The expedient was never +tried. General Lee decided that the attack would be too hazardous.”[13] + +That night both armies lay on their arms. Burnside, +notwithstanding that he spent several hours amongst the troops before +Fredericksburg, and found that both officers and men were opposed to +further attack, decided to renew the battle the next day. His +arrangements became known to Lee, an officer or orderly carrying +dispatches having strayed within the Confederate outposts,[14] and the +Southern generals looked forward, on the morning of the 14th, to a +fresh attack, a more crushing repulse, and a general counterstroke. + +Such cheerful anticipations, however, so often entertained by generals +holding a strong defensive position, are but seldom realised, and +Fredericksburg was no exception. The Confederates spent the night in +diligent preparation. Supplies of ammunition were brought up and +distributed, the existing defences were repaired, abattis cut and laid, +and fresh earthworks thrown up. Jackson, as usual on the eve of battle, +was still working while others rested. Until near midnight he sat up +writing and dispatching orders; then, throwing himself, booted and +spurred, on his camp bed, he slept for two or three hours, when he +again arose, lighted his candle, and resumed his writing. Before four +o’clock he sent to his medical director to inquire as to the condition +of General Gregg. Dr. McGuire reported that his case was hopeless, and +Jackson requested that he would go over and see that he had everything +he wished. Somewhat against his will, for there were many wounded who +required attention, the medical officer rode off, but scarcely had he +entered the farmhouse where Gregg was lying, than he heard the tramp of +horses, and Jackson himself dismounted on the threshold. The brigadier, +it appears, had lately fallen under the ban of his displeasure; but +from the moment his condition was reported, Jackson forgot everything +but the splendid services he had rendered on so many hard-fought +fields; and in his anxiety that every memory should be effaced which +might embitter his last moments, he had followed Dr. McGuire to his +bedside. + +The interview was brief, and the dying soldier was +the happier for it; but the scene in that lonely Virginian homestead, +where, in the dark hours of the chill December morning, the life of a +strong man, of a gallant comrade, of an accomplished gentleman, and of +an unselfish patriot—for Gregg was all these—was slowly ebbing, made a +deeper impression on those who witnessed it than the accumulated +horrors of the battle-field. Sadly and silently the general and his +staff officer rode back through the forest, where the troops were +already stirring round the smouldering camp-fires. Their thoughts were +sombre. The Confederacy, with a relatively slender population, could +ill spare such men as Gregg. And yet Jackson, though yielding to the +depression of the moment, and deploring the awful sacrifices which the +defence of her liberties imposed upon the South, was in no melting +mood. Dr. McGuire, when they reached headquarters, put a question as to +the best means of coping with the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. +“Kill them, sir! kill every man!” was the reply of the stern soldier +who but just now, with words of tender sympathy and Christian hope, had +bade farewell to his dying comrade. + +Dec. 14 But on December 14, as on the morrow of Sharpsburg, the +Confederates were doomed to disappointment. “Darkness still prevailed,” +writes Stuart’s chief of the staff, “when we mounted our horses and +again hastened to Prospect Hill, the summit of which we reached just in +time to see the sun rising, and unveiling, as it dispersed the haze, +the long lines of the Federal army, which once more stood in full line +of battle between our own position and the river. I could not withhold +my admiration as I looked down upon the well-disciplined ranks of our +antagonists, astonished that these troops now offering so bold a front +should be the same whom not many hours since I had seen in complete +flight and disorder. The skirmishers of the two armies were not much +more than a hundred yards apart, concealed from each other’s view by +the high grass in which they were lying, and above which, from time to +time, rose a small cloud of blue smoke, telling that a shot had been +fired. As the boom of artillery began +to sound from different parts of the line, and the attack might be +expected every minute, each hastened to his post.” + +But though the skirmishing at times grew hotter, and the fire of the +artillery more rapid, long intervals of silence succeeded, until it at +length became apparent to the Confederates that the enemy, though well +prepared to resist attack, was determined not to fight outside his +breastworks. Burnside, indeed, giving way to the remonstrances of his +subordinates, had abandoned all idea of further aggressive action, and +unless Lee should move forward, had determined to recross the Potomac. + +Dec. 15 The next morning saw the armies in the same positions, and the +Federal wounded, many of whom had been struck down nearly forty-eight +hours before, still lying untended between the hostile lines. It was +not till now that Burnside admitted his defeat by sending a flag of +truce with a request that he might be allowed to bury his dead.[15] + +The same night a fierce storm swept the valley of the Rappahannock, and +the Army of the Potomac repassed the bridges, evading, under cover of +the elements, the observation of the Confederate patrols. + +The retreat was effected with a skill which did much credit to the +Federal staff. Within fourteen hours 100,000 troops, with the whole of +their guns, ambulances, and ammunition waggons, were conveyed across +the Rappahannock; +but there remained on the south bank sufficient evidence to show that +the Army of the Potomac had not escaped unscathed. When the morning +broke the dead lay thick upon the field; arms and accoutrements, the +_débris_ of defeat, were strewed in profusion on every hand, and the +ruined houses of Fredericksburg were filled with wounded. Burnside lost +in the battle 12,647 men. + +LEFT ATTACK—FRANKLIN + +First Corps Meade’s Division +Gibbon’s Division +Doubleday’s Division 1,853 +1,267 +214 Third Corps Birney’s Division +Sickles’ Division 950 +100 Sixth Corps Newton’s Division 63 Total ——— +4,447 + +CENTRE + + Brook’s Division +Howe’s Division 197 +186 Total ——— +383 + +RIGHT ATTACK—SUMNER AND HOOKER + +Second Corps Hancock’s Division +Howard’s Division +French’s Division 2,032 +914 +1,160 Ninth Corps Burns’ Division +Sturgis’ Division +Getty’s Division 27 +1,007 +296 Third Corps Whipple’s Division 129 Fifth Corps Griffin’ +Division +Sykes’ Division +Humphrey’s Division 926 +228 +1,019 Engineers and Reserve Artillery, etc. 79 Total ——— +7,817 + +Grand Total (including 877 officers) 12,647 +(589 prisoners) + +The Confederates showed 5,309 casualties out of less than 30,000 +actually engaged. + +LEFT WING—LONGSTREET + +First Corps Ransom’s Division +McLaws’ Division +Anderson’s Division 535 +858 +159 Artillery 37 Total ——— +1,589 + +(1,224 on December 12.) + +CENTRE + +First Corps Pickett’s Division +Hood’s Division 54 +251 Total ——— +305 + +RIGHT WING—JACKSON + + Light Division +Early’s Division +D. H. Hill’s Division +Taliaferro’s Division 2,120 +932 +173 +190 Total (including 500 captured) ——— +3,415 + +No attempt was made by the Confederates to follow the enemy across the +Rappahannock. The upper fords were open; but the river was rising fast, +and the Army of the Potomac, closely concentrated and within a few +miles of Aquia Creek, was too large to be attacked, and too close to +its base to permit effective manœuvres, which might induce it to +divide, against its line of communications. The exultation of the +Southern soldiers in their easy victory was dashed by disappointment. +Burnside’s escape had demonstrated the fallacy of one of the so-called +rules of war. The great river which lay behind him during the battle of +Fredericksburg had proved his salvation instead of—as it theoretically +should—his ruin. Over the six bridges his troops had more lines of +retreat than is usually the case when roads only are available; and +these lines of retreat were secure, protected from the Confederate +cavalry by the river, and from the infantry and artillery by the +batteries on the Stafford Heights. Had the battle been fought on the +North Anna, thirty-six miles from Fredericksburg, the result might have +been very different. A direct counterstroke would possibly have been no +more practicable +than on the Rappahannock, for the superior numbers of the enemy, and +his powerful artillery, could not have been disregarded. Nor would a +direct pursuit have been a certain means of making success decisive; +the rear of a retreating army, as the Confederates had found to their +cost at Malvern Hill, is usually its strongest part. But a pursuit +directed against the flanks, striking the line of retreat, cutting off +the supply and ammunition trains, and blocking the roads, a pursuit +such as Jackson had organised when he drove Banks from the Valley, if +conducted with vigour, seldom fails in its effect. And who would have +conducted such an operation with greater skill and energy than Stuart, +at the head of his 9,000 horsemen? Who would have supported Stuart more +expeditiously than the “foot-cavalry” of the Second Army Corps? + +Lee’s position at Fredericksburg, strong as it might appear, was +exceedingly disadvantageous. A position which an army occupies with a +view to decisive battle should fulfil four requirements:— + +1. It should not be too strong, or the enemy will not attack it. + +2. It should give cover to the troops both from view and fire from +artillery, and have a good field of fire. + +3. It should afford facilities for counterstroke. + +4. It should afford facilities for pursuit. + +Of these Lee’s battle-field fulfilled but the first and second. It +would have been an admirable selection if the sole object of the +Confederates had been to gain time, or to prevent the enemy +establishing himself south of the Rappahannock; but to encompass the +destruction of the enemy’s whole army it was as ill adapted as +Wellington’s position at Torres Vedras, at Busaco, or at Fuentes +d’Onor. But while Wellington in taking up these positions had no +further end in view than holding the French in check, the situation of +the Confederacy was such that a decisive victory was eminently +desirable. Nothing was to be gained by gaining time. The South could +furnish Lee with no further reinforcements. Every able-bodied man was +in the service of his country; and it was perfectly certain that the +Western +armies, although they had been generally successful during the past +year, would never be permitted by Mr. Davis to leave the valley of the +Mississippi. + +The Army of Northern Virginia was not likely to be stronger or more +efficient. Equipped with the spoils of many victories, it was more on a +level with the enemy than had hitherto been the case. The ranks were +full. The men were inured to hardships and swift marches; their health +was proof against inclement weather, and they knew their work on the +field of battle. The artillery had recently been reorganised. During +the Peninsular campaign the batteries had been attached to the infantry +brigades, and the indifferent service they had often rendered had been +attributed to the difficulty of collecting the scattered units, and in +handling them in combination. Formed into battalions of four or six +batteries a large number of guns was now attached to each of the +divisions, and each army corps had a strong reserve; so that the +concentration of a heavy force of artillery on any part of a position +became a feasible operation. The cavalry, so admirably commanded by +Stuart, Hampton, and the younger Lees, was not less hardy or efficient +than the infantry, and the _moral_ of the soldiers of every arm, +founded on confidence in themselves not less than on confidence in +their leaders, was never higher. + +“After the truce had been agreed upon,” says Captain Smith, +“litter-bearers to bring away the dead and wounded were selected from +the command of General Bodes. When they had fallen in, General Bodes +said to them: ‘Now, boys, those Yankees are going to ask you questions, +and you must not tell them anything. Be very careful about this.’ At +this juncture one of the men spoke up, and said, ‘General, can’t we +tell them that we whipped them yesterday?’ Bodes replied, laughing: +‘Yes, yes! you can tell them that.’ Immediately another man spoke up: +‘General, can’t we tell them that we can whip them tomorrow and the day +after?’ Bodes again laughed, and sent those incorrigible jokers off +with: ‘Yes, yes! go on, go on! Tell them what you please.’” + +The Army of the Potomac, on the other hand, was not +likely to become weaker or less formidable if time were allowed it to +recuperate. It had behind it enormous reserves. 60,000 men had been +killed, wounded, or captured since the battle of Kernstown, and yet the +ranks were as full as when McClellan first marched on Richmond. Many +generals had disappeared; but those who remained were learning their +trade; and the soldiers, although more familiar with defeat than +victory, showed little diminution of martial ardour. Nor had the strain +of the war sapped the resources of the North. Her trade, instead of +dwindling, had actually increased; and the gaps made in the population +by the Confederate bullets were more than made good by a constant +influx of immigrants from Europe. + +It was not by partial triumphs, not by the slaughter of a few brigades, +by defence without counterstroke, by victories without pursuit, that a +Power of such strength and vitality could be compelled to confess her +impotence. Whether some overwhelming disaster, a Jena or a Waterloo, +followed by instant invasion, would have subdued her stubborn spirit is +problematical. Rome survived Cannæ, Scotland Flodden, and France Sedan. +But in some such crowning mercy lay the only hope of the Confederacy, +and had the Army of the Potomac, ill-commanded as it was, been drawn +forward to the North Anna, it might have been utterly destroyed. +Half-hearted strategy, which aims only at repulsing the enemy’s attack, +is not the path to king-making victory; it is not by such feeble means +that States secure or protect their independence. To occupy a position +where Stuart’s cavalry was powerless, where the qualities which made +Lee’s infantry so formidable—the impetuosity of their attack, the +swiftness of their marches—had no field for display, and where the +enemy had free scope for the employment of his artillery, his strongest +arm, was but to postpone the evil day. It had been well for the +Confederacy if Stonewall Jackson, whose resolute strategy had but one +aim, and that aim the annihilation of the enemy, had been the supreme +director of her councils. To paraphrase Mahan: “The strategic mistake +(in occupying a position for which pursuit was impracticable) +neutralised the tactical advantage +gained, thus confirming the military maxim that a strategic mistake is +more serious and far-reaching in its effects than an error in tactics.” + +Lee, however, was fettered by the orders of the Cabinet; and Mr. Davis +and his advisers, more concerned with the importance of retaining an +area of country which still furnished supplies than of annihilating the +Army of the Potomac, and relying on European intervention rather than +on the valour of the Southern soldier, were responsible for the +occupation of the Fredericksburg position. In extenuation of their +mistake it may, however, be admitted that the advantages of +concentration on the North Anna were not such as would impress +themselves on the civilian mind, while the surrender of territory would +undoubtedly have embarrassed both the Government and the supply +department. Moreover, at the end of November, it might have been urged +that if Burnside were permitted to possess himself of Fredericksburg, +it was by no means certain that he would advance on Richmond; +establishing himself in winter quarters, he might wait until the +weather improved, controlling, in the meantime, the resources and +population of that portion of Virginia which lay within his reach. + +Nevertheless, as events went far to prove, Mr. Davis would have done +wisely had he accepted the advice of the soldiers on the spot. His +strategical glance was less comprehensive than that of Lee and Jackson. +In the first place, they knew that if Burnside proposed going into +winter quarters, he would not deliberately place the Rappahannock +between himself and his base, nor halt with the great forest of +Spotsylvania on his flank. In the second place, there could be no +question but that the Northern Government and the Northern people would +impel him forward. The tone of the press was unmistakable; and the very +reason that Burnside had been appointed to command was because +McClellan was so slow to move. In the third place, both Lee and Jackson +saw the need of decisive victory. With them questions of strategic +dispositions, offering chances of such victory, were of more importance +than questions +of supply or internal politics. They knew with what rapidity the +Federal soldiers recovered their _moral_; and they realised but too +keenly the stern determination which inspired the North. They had seen +the hosts of invasion retire in swift succession, stricken and +exhausted, before their victorious bayonets. Thousands of prisoners had +been marched to Richmond; thousands of wounded, abandoned on the +battle-field, had been paroled; guns, waggons and small arms, enough to +equip a great army, had been captured; and general after general had +been reduced to the ignominy that awaits a defeated leader. Frémont and +Shields had disappeared; Banks was no longer in the field; Porter was +waiting trial; McDowell had gone; Pope had gone, and McClellan; and yet +the Army of the Potomac still held its ground, the great fleets still +kept their stations, the capture of Richmond was still the objective of +the Union Government, and not for a single moment had Lincoln wavered +from his purpose. + +It will not be asserted that either Lee or Jackson fathomed the source +of this unconquerable tenacity, They had played with effect on the +fears of Lincoln; they had recognised in him the motive power of the +Federal hosts; but they had not yet learned, for the Northern people +themselves had not yet learned it, that they were opposed by an +adversary whose resolution was as unyielding as their own, who loved +the Union even as they loved Virginia, and who ruled the nation with +the same tact and skill that they ruled their soldiers. + +In these pages Mr. Lincoln has not been spared. He made mistakes, and +he himself would have been the last to claim infallibility. He had +entered the White House with a rich endowment of common-sense, a high +sense of duty, and an extraordinary knowledge of the American +character; but his ignorance of statesmanship directing arms was great, +and his military errors were numerous. Putting these aside, his tenure +of office during the dark days of ’61 and ’62 had been marked by the +very highest political sagacity; his courage and his patriotism had +sustained the nation in its distress; and in spite of every obstacle he +was gradually +bringing into being a unity of sympathy and of purpose, which in the +early days of the war had seemed an impossible ideal. Not the least +politic of his measures was the edict of emancipation, published after +the battle of Sharpsburg. It was not a measure without flaw. It +contained paragraphs which might fairly be interpreted, and were so +interpreted by the Confederates, as inciting the negroes to rise +against their masters, thus exposing to all the horrors of a servile +insurrection, with its accompaniments of murder and outrage, the farms +and plantations where the women and children of the South lived lonely +and unprotected. But if the edict served only to embitter the +Southerners, to bind the whole country together in a still closer +league of resistance, and to make peace except by conquest impossible, +it was worth the price. The party in the North which fought for the +re-establishment of the Union had carried on the war with but small +success. The tale of reverses had told at last upon recruiting. Men +were unwilling to come forward; and those who were bribed by large +bounties to join the armies were of a different character to the +original volunteer. Enthusiasm in the cause was fast diminishing when +Lincoln, purely on his own initiative, proclaimed emancipation, and, +investing the war with the dignity of a crusade, inspired the soldier +with a new incentive, and appealed to a feeling which had not yet been +stirred. Many Northerners had not thought it worth while to fight for +the re-establishment of the Union on the basis of the Constitution. If +slavery was to be permitted to continue they preferred separation; and +these men were farmers and agriculturists, the class which furnished +the best soldiers, men of American birth, for the most part +abolitionists, and ready to fight for the principle they had so much at +heart. It is true that the effect of the edict was not at once +apparent. It was not received everywhere with acclamation. The army had +small sympathy with the coloured race, and the political opponents of +the President accused him vehemently of unconstitutional action. Their +denunciations, however, missed the mark. The letter of the +Constitution, as Mr. Lincoln clearly saw, had ceased to be +regarded, at least by the great bulk of the people, with superstitious +reverence. + +They had learned to think more of great principles than of political +expedients; and if the defence of their hereditary rights had welded +the South into a nation, the assertion of a still nobler principle, the +liberty of man, placed the North on a higher plane, enlisted the +sympathy of Europe, and completed the isolation of the Confederacy. + +But although Lee and Jackson had not yet penetrated the political +genius of their great antagonist, they rated at its true value the +vigour displayed by his Administration, and they saw that something +more was wanting to wrest their freedom from the North than a mere +passive resistance to the invader’s progress. Soon after the battle of +Fredericksburg, Lee went to Richmond and laid proposals for an +aggressive campaign before the President. “He was assured, however,” +says General Longstreet, “that the war was virtually over, and that we +need not harass our troops by marches and other hardships. Gold had +advanced in New York to two hundred premium, and we were told by those +in the Confederate capital that in thirty or forty days we would be +recognised (by the European Powers) and peace proclaimed. General Lee +did not share this belief.”[16] + +Dec. 18 So Jackson, who had hoped to return to Winchester, was doomed +to the inaction of winter quarters on the Rappahannock, for with +Burnside’s repulse operations practically ceased. The Confederate +cavalry, however, did not at once abandon hostilities. On December 18, +Hampton marched his brigade as far as the village of Occoquan, bringing +off 150 prisoners and capturing a convoy. + +Dec. 26 And on December 26 Stuart closed his record for 1862 by leading +1,800 troopers far to the Federal rear. After doing much damage in the +district about Occoquan and Dumfries, twenty miles from Burnside’s +headquarters, he marched northward in the direction of Washington, and +penetrated as far as Burke’s Station, fifteen miles from Alexandria. +Sending a telegraphic +message to General Meigs, Quartermaster-General at Washington, to the +effect that the mules furnished to Burnside’s army were of such bad +quality that he was embarrassed in taking the waggons he had captured +into the Confederate lines, and requesting that a better class of +animal might be supplied in future, he returned by long marches through +Warrenton to Culpeper Court House, escaping pursuit, and bringing with +him a large amount of plunder and many prisoners. From the afternoon of +December 26 to nightfall on December 31 he rode one hundred and fifty +miles, losing 28 officers and men in skirmishes with detachments of the +Federal cavalry. He had contrived to throw a great part of the troops +sent to meet him into utter confusion by intercepting their telegrams, +and answering them himself in a manner that scattered his pursuers and +broke down their horses. + +Near the end of January, Burnside made a futile attempt to march his +army round Lee’s flank by way of Ely’s and Germanna Fords. The weather, +however, was inclement; the roads were in a fearful condition, and the +troops experienced such difficulty in movement, that the operation, +which goes by the name of the Mud Campaign, was soon abandoned. + +1863. Jan. 26 On January 26, Burnside, in consequence of the strong +representations made by his lieutenants to the President, was +superseded. General Hooker, the dashing fighter of the Antietam, +replaced him in command of the Army of the Potomac, and the Federal +troops went into winter quarters about Falmouth, where, on the opposite +shore of the Rappahannock, within full view of the sentries, stood a +row of finger-posts, on which the Confederate soldiers had painted the +taunting legend, “This way to Richmond!” + + [1] On November 1 the Army of the Potomac (not including the Third + Corps) was accompanied by 4,818 waggons and ambulances, 8,500 + transport horses, and 12,000 mules. O.R., vol. xix, part i, pp. 97–8. + The train of each army corps and of the cavalry covered eight miles of + road, or fifty miles for the whole. + + [2] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 711. + + [3] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 705. + + [4] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 355. From _Manassas to Appomattox,_ p. 299. + + [5] The three Grand Divisions were commanded by Sumner, Hooker, and + Franklin. + + [6] Lord Wolseley. _North American Review,_ vol. 149, p. 282. + + [7] The dispositions were as follows:— + + 12 guns Lane Archer ------- ---- ------ + 14 guns 21 guns + ------- ------- ----- Thomas Pender ------ + ------ Gregg + + [8] Franklin’s Grand Division consisted of the 42,800 men, and 12,000 + of Hooker’s Grand Division had reinforced him. + + [9] Of Early’s Division. + + [10] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. iii, pp. 82–3. + + [11] _Jackson’s Reports,_ O.R., vol. xxi, p. 634. + + [12] _Advance and Retreat,_ Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood, p. 50. + + [13] Letter to the author. + + [14] _From Manassas to Appomattox,_ p. 316. + + [15] “When the flag of truce,” says Major Hotchkiss, “was received by + General Jackson, he asked me for paper and pencil, and began a letter + to be sent in reply; but after writing a few lines he handed the paper + back, and sent a personal message by Captain Smith.” + Captain Smith writes: “The general said to me, before I went out to + meet Colonel Sumner, representing the Federals: ‘If you are asked + who is in command of your right, do not tell them I am, and be + guarded in your remarks.’ It so happened that Colonel Sumner was + the brother-in-law of Colonel Long, an officer on General Lee’s + staff. While we were together, another Federal officer named Junkin + rode up. He was the brother or cousin of Jackson’s first wife, and + I had known him before the war. After some conversation, Junkin + asked me to give his regards to General Jackson, and to deliver a + message from the Reverend Dr. Junkin, the father of his first wife. + I replied, ‘I will do so with pleasure when I meet General + Jackson.’ Junkin smiled and said: ‘It is not worth while for you to + try to deceive us. We know that General Jackson is in front of + us.’” + + [16] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. iii, p. 84. + + + + +Chapter XXI +THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA + + +“In war men are nothing; it is the man who is everything. The general +is the head, the whole of an army. It was not the Roman army that +conquered Gaul, but Cæsar; it was not the Carthaginian army that made +Rome tremble in her gates, but Hannibal; it was not the Macedonian army +that reached the Indus, but Alexander; it was not the French army that +carried the war to the Weser and the Inn, but Turenne; it was not the +Prussian army which, for seven years, defended Prussia against the +three greatest Powers of Europe, but Frederick the Great.” So spoke +Napoleon, reiterating a truth confirmed by the experience of successive +ages, that a wise direction is of more avail than overwhelming numbers, +sound strategy than the most perfect armament; a powerful will, +invigorating all who come within its sphere, than the spasmodic efforts +of ill-regulated valour. + +Even a professional army of long standing and old traditions is what +its commander makes it; its character sooner or later becomes the +reflex of his own; from him the officers take their tone; his energy or +his inactivity, his firmness or vacillation, are rapidly communicated +even to the lower ranks; and so far-reaching is the influence of the +leader, that those who record his campaigns concern themselves but +little as a rule with the men who followed him. The history of famous +armies is the history of great generals, for no army has ever achieved +great things unless it has been well commanded. If the general be +second-rate the army also will be second-rate. Mutual confidence is the +basis of +success in war, and unless the troops have implicit trust in the +resolution and resources of their chief, hesitation and +half-heartedness are sure to mark their actions. They may fight with +their accustomed courage; but the eagerness for the conflict, the +alacrity to support, the determination to conquer, will not be there. +The indefinable quality which is expressed by the word _moral_ will to +some degree be affected. The history of the Army of the Potomac is a +case in point. + +Between the soldiers of the North and South there was little +difference. Neither could claim a superiority of martial qualities. The +Confederates, indeed, at the beginning of the war possessed a larger +measure of technical skill; they were the better shots and the finer +riders. But they were neither braver nor more enduring, and while they +probably derived some advantage from the fact that they were defending +their homes, the Federals, defending the integrity of their native +land, were fighting in the noblest of all causes. But Northerner and +Southerner were of the same race, a race proud, resolute, independent; +both were inspired by the same sentiments of self-respect; _noblesse +oblige_—the _noblesse_ of a free people—was the motto of the one as of +the other. It has been asserted that the Federal armies were very +largely composed of foreigners, whose motives for enlisting were purely +mercenary. At no period of the war, however, did the proportion of +native Americans sink below seventy per cent.,[1] and at the beginning +of 1863 it was much greater. As a matter of fact, the Union army was +composed of thoroughly staunch soldiers.[2] +Nor was the alien element at this time a source of weakness. Ireland +and Germany supplied the greater number of those who have been called +“Lincoln’s hirelings;” and, judging from the official records, the +Irish regiments at least were not a whit less trustworthy than those +purely American. Moreover, even if the admixture of foreigners had been +greater, the Army of the Potomac, for the reason that it was always +superior in numbers, contained in its ranks many more men bred in the +United States than the Army of Northern Virginia.[3] For the consistent +ill-success of the Federals the superior marksmanship and finer +horsemanship of the Confederates cannot, therefore, be accepted as +sufficient explanation. + +In defence the balance of endurance inclined neither to one side nor +the other. Both Southerner and Northerner displayed that stubborn +resolve to maintain their ground which is the peculiar attribute of the +Anglo-Saxon. To claim for any one race a pre-eminence of valour is +repugnant alike to good taste and to sound sense. Courage and endurance +are widely distributed over the world’s surface, and political +institutions, the national conception of duty, the efficiency of the +corps of officers, and love of country, are the foundation of vigour +and staunchness in the field. Yet it is a fact which can hardly be +ignored, that from Creçy to Inkermann there have been exceedingly few +instances where an English army, large or small, has been driven from a +position. In the great struggle with France, neither Napoleon nor his +marshals, although the armies of every other European nation had fled +before them, could boast of having broken the English infantry; and no +soldiers have ever received a prouder tribute than the admission of a +generous enemy, “They never know when they are beaten.” In America, the +characteristics of the parent race were as prominent in the Civil War +as they had been in the Revolution. In 1861–65, the side that stood on +the defensive, unless hopelessly outnumbered, was almost +invariably successful, just as it had been in 1776–82. “My men,” said +Jackson, “sometimes fail to drive the enemy from his position, but to +hold one, never!” The Federal generals might have made the same +assertion with almost equal truth. Porter had indeed been defeated at +Gaines’ Mill, but he could only set 35,000 in line against 55,000; +Banks had been overwhelmed at Winchester, but 6,500 men could hardly +have hoped to resist more than twice their strength; and Shields’ +advanced guard at Port Republic was much inferior to the force which +Jackson brought against it; yet these were the only offensive victories +of the ’62 campaign. But if in defence the armies were well matched, it +must be conceded that the Northern attack was not pressed with the same +concentrated vigour as the Southern. McClellan at Sharpsburg had more +than twice as many men as Lee; Pope, on the first day of the Second +Manassas, twice as many as Jackson; yet on both occasions the smaller +force was victorious. But, in the first place, the Federal tactics in +attack were always feeble. Lincoln, in appointing Hooker to command the +Army of the Potomac, warned him “to put in all his men.” His sharp eye +had detected the great fault which had characterised the operations of +his generals. Their assaults had been piecemeal, like those of the +Confederates at Malvern Hill, and they had been defeated in detail by +the inferior numbers. The Northern soldiers were strangers to those +general and combined attacks, pressed with unyielding resolution, which +had won Winchester, Gaines’ Mill, and the Second Manassas, and which +had nearly won Kernstown. The Northern generals invariably kept large +masses in reserve, and these masses were never used. They had not yet +learned, as had Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet, that superior numbers are +of no avail unless they are brought into action, impelling the attack +forward by sheer weight, at the decisive point. In the second place, +none of the Federal leaders possessed the entire confidence either of +their generals or their troops. With all its affection for McClellan, +it may strongly be questioned whether his army gave him credit for dash +or resolution. Pope was +defeated in his first action at Cedar Run. Banks at Winchester, Frémont +west of Staunton, had both been out-manœuvred. Burnside had against him +his feeble conduct at Sharpsburg. Hence the Federal soldiers fought +most of their offensive battles under a terrible disadvantage. They +were led by men who had known defeat, and who owed their defeat, in +great measure, to the same fault—neglect to employ their whole force in +combination. Brave and unyielding as they were, the troops went into +battle mistrustful of their leader’s skill, and fearful, from the very +outset, that their efforts would be unsupported; and when men begin to +look over their shoulders for reinforcements, demoralisation is not far +off. It would be untrue to say that a defeated general can never regain +the confidence of his soldiers; but unless he has previous successes to +set off against his failure, to permit him to retain his position is +dangerous in the extreme. Such was the opinion of Jackson, always +solicitous of the _moral_ of his command. “To his mind nothing ever +fully excused failure, and it was rarely that he gave an officer the +opportunity of failing twice. ‘The service,’ he said, ‘cannot afford to +keep a man who does not succeed.’ Nor was he ever restrained from a +change by the fear of making matters worse. His motto was, get rid of +the unsuccessful man at once, and trust to Providence for finding a +better.” + +Nor was the presence of discredited generals the only evil which went +to neutralise the valour of the Federal soldiers. The system of command +was as rotten in the Army of the Potomac as in the Armies of Northern +Virginia and of the Valley it was sound; and the system of command +plays a most important part in war. The natural initiative of the +American, the general fearlessness of responsibility, were as +conspicuous among the soldiers as in the nation at large. To those +familiar with the Official Records, where the doings of regiments and +even companies are preserved, it is perfectly apparent that, so soon as +the officers gained experience, the smaller units were as boldly and +efficiently handled as in the army of Germany under Moltke. But while +Lee and Jackson, by every means in +their power, fostered the capacity for independent action, following +therein the example of Napoleon,[4] of Washington, of Nelson, and of +Wellington, and aware that their strength would thus be doubled, +McClellan and Pope did their best to stifle it; and in the higher ranks +they succeeded. In the one case the generals were taught to wait for +orders, in the other to anticipate them. In the one case, whether +troops were supported or not depended on the word of the commanding +general; in the other, every officer was taught that to sustain his +colleagues was his first duty. It thus resulted that while the +Confederate leaders were served by scores of zealous assistants, +actively engaged in furthering the aim of their superiors, McClellan, +Pope, and Frémont, jealous of power reduced their subordinates, with +few exceptions, to the position of machines, content to obey the letter +of their orders, oblivious of opportunity, and incapable of +co-operation. Lee and Jackson appear to have realised the requirements +of battle far more fully than their opponents. They knew that the scope +of the commander is limited; that once his troops are committed to +close action it is impossible for him to exert further control, for his +orders can no longer reach them; that he cannot keep the whole field +under observation, much less observe every fleeting opportunity. Yet it +is by utilising opportunities that the enemy’s strength is sapped. For +these reasons the Confederate generals were exceedingly careful not to +chill the spirit of enterprise. Errors of judgment were never +considered in the light of crimes; while the officer who, in default of +orders, remained inactive, or who, when his orders were manifestly +inapplicable to a suddenly changed situation, and there was no time to +have them altered, dared not act for himself, was not long retained in +responsible command. In the Army of the Potomac, on the other hand, +centralisation was the rule. McClellan +expected blind obedience from his corps commanders, and nothing more, +and Pope brought Porter to trial for using his own judgment, on +occasions when Pope himself was absent, during the campaign of the +Second Manassas. Thus the Federal soldiers, through no fault of their +own, laboured for the first two years of the war under a disadvantage +from which the wisdom of Lee and Jackson had relieved the Confederates. +The Army of the Potomac was an inert mass, the Army of Northern +Virginia a living organism, endowed with irresistible vigour. + +It is to be noted, too, as tending to prove the equal courage of North +and South, that on the Western theatre of war the Federals were the +more successful. And yet the Western armies of the Confederacy were +neither less brave, less hardy, nor less disciplined than those in +Virginia. They were led, however, by inferior men, while, on the other +hand, many of the Northern generals opposed to them possessed +unquestionable ability, and understood the value of a good system of +command. + +We may say, then, without detracting an iota from the high reputation +of the Confederate soldiers, that it was not the Army of Northern +Virginia that saved Richmond in 1862, but Lee; not the Army of the +Valley which won the Valley campaign, but Jackson. + +It is related that a good priest, once a chaplain in Taylor’s Louisiana +brigade, concluded his prayer at the unveiling of the Jackson monument +in New Orleans with these remarkable words: “When in Thine inscrutable +decree it was ordained that the Confederacy should fail, it became +necessary for Thee to remove Thy servant Stonewall Jackson.”[5] It is +unnecessary, perhaps, to lay much forcible emphasis on the personal +factor, but, at the same time, it is exceedingly essential that it +should never be overlooked. + +The Government which, either in peace or war, commits the charge of its +armed forces to any other than the ablest and most experienced soldier +the country can produce is but laying the foundation of national +disaster. Had the +importance of a careful selection for the higher commands been +understood in the North as it was understood in the South, Lee and +Jackson would have been opposed by foes more formidable than Pope and +Burnside, or Banks and Frémont. The Federal Administration, confident +in the courage and intelligence of their great armies, considered that +any ordinary general, trained to command, and supported by an efficient +staff, should be able to win victories. Mr. Davis, on the other hand, +himself a soldier, who, as United States Secretary of War, had enjoyed +peculiar opportunities of estimating the character of the officers of +the old army, made no such mistake. He was not always, indeed, either +wise or consistent; but, with few exceptions, his appointments were the +best that could be made, and he was ready to accept the advice, as +regarded selections for command, of his most experienced generals. + +But however far-reaching may be the influence of a great leader, in +estimating his capacity the temper of the weapon that he wielded can +hardly be overlooked. In the first place, that temper, to a greater or +less degree, must have been of his own forging, it is part of his fame. +“No man,” says Napier, “can be justly called a great captain who does +not know how to organise and form the character of an army, as well as +to lead it when formed.” In the second place, to do much with feeble +means is greater than to do more with large resources. Difficulties are +inherent in all military operations, and not the least may be the +constitution of the army. Nor would the story of Stonewall Jackson be +more than half told without large reference to those tried soldiers, +subalterns and private soldiers as they were, whom he looked upon as +his comrades, whose patriotism and endurance he extolled so highly, and +whose devotion to himself, next to the approval of his own conscience, +was the reward that most he valued. + +He is blind indeed who fails to recognise the unselfish patriotism +displayed by the citizen-soldiers of America, the stern resolution with +which the war was waged; the tenacity of the Northerner, ill-commanded +and +constantly defeated, fighting in a most difficult country and foiled on +every line of invasion; the tenacity of the Southerner, confronting +enormous odds, ill-fed, ill-armed, and ill-provided, knowing that if +wounded his sufferings would be great—for drugs had been declared +contraband of war, the hospitals contained no anæsthetics to relieve +the pain of amputation, and the surgical instruments, which were only +replaced when others were captured, were worn out with constant usage; +knowing too that his women-folk and children were in want, and yet +never yielding to despair nor abandoning hope of ultimate victory. +Neither Federal nor Confederate deemed his life the most precious of +his earthly possessions. Neither New Englander nor Virginian ever for +one moment dreamt of surrendering, no matter what the struggle might +cost, a single acre of the territory, a single item of the civil +rights, which had been handed down to him. “I do not profess,” said +Jackson, “any romantic sentiments as to the vanity of life. Certainly +no man has more that should make life dear to him than I have, in the +affection of my home; but I do not desire to survive the independence +of my country.” And Jackson’s attitude was that of his +fellow-countrymen. The words of Naboth, “Jehovah forbid that I should +give to thee the inheritance of my forefathers,” were graven on the +heart of both North and South; and the unknown and forgotten heroes who +fought in the ranks of either army, and who fought for a principle, not +on compulsion or for glory, are worthy of the highest honours that +history can bestow. + +Nor can a soldier withhold his tribute of praise to the capacity for +making war which distinguished the American citizen. The intelligence +of the rank and file played an important _rôle_ in every phase of a +campaign. As skirmishers,—and modern battles, to a very great extent, +are fought out by lines of skirmishers—their work was admirable; and +when the officers were struck down, or when command, by reason of the +din and excitement, became impossible, the self-dependence of the +individual asserted itself with the best effect.[6] The same quality +which the German +training had sought to foster, and which, according to Moltke,[7] had +much to do with the victories of 1870, was born in both Northerner and +Southerner. On outpost and on patrol, in seeking information and in +counteracting the ruses of the enemy, the keen intelligence of the +educated volunteer was of the utmost value. History has hitherto +overlooked the achievements of the scouts, whose names so seldom occur +in the Official Records, but whose daring was unsurpassed, and whose +services were of vast importance. In the Army of Northern Virginia +every commanding general had his own party of scouts, whose business it +was to penetrate the enemy’s lines, to see everything and to hear +everything, to visit the base of operations, to inspect the line of +communications, and to note the condition and the temper of the hostile +troops. Attracted by a pure love of adventure, these private soldiers +did exactly the same work as did the English Intelligence officers in +the Peninsula, and did it with the same thoroughness and acuteness. +Wellington, deploring the capture of Captain Colquhoun Grant, declared +that the gallant Highlander was worth as much to the army as a brigade +of cavalry; Jackson had scouts who were more useful to him than many of +his brigadiers. Again, in constructing hasty intrenchments, the +soldiers needed neither assistance nor impulsion. The rough cover +thrown up by the men when circumstances demanded it, on their own +volition, was always adapted to the ground, and generally fulfilled the +main principles of fortification. For bridge-building, for road-making, +for the destruction, the repair, and even the making, of railroads, +skilled labour was always forthcoming from the ranks; and the soldiers +stamped the impress of their individuality on the tactics of the +infantry. Modern formations, to a very large extent, had their origin +on American battle-fields. The men realised very quickly the advantages +of shelter; the advance by rushes from one cover to another, and the +gradually working up, by this method, of the firing-line to effective +range—the method which all experience shows to be the true one—became +the general rule. + +That the troops had faults, however, due in great part to the fact that +their intelligence was not thoroughly trained, and to the inexperience +of their officers, it is impossible to deny. + +“I agree with you,” wrote Lee in 1868, “in believing that our army +would be invincible if it could be properly organised and officered. +There were never such men in an army before. They will go anywhere and +do anything if properly led. But there is the difficulty—proper +commanders. Where can they be obtained? But they are +improving—constantly improving. Rome was not built in a day, nor can we +expect miracles in our favour.”[8] Yet, taking them all in all, the +American rank and file of 1863, with their native characteristics, +supplemented by a great knowledge of war, were in advance of any +soldiers of their time. + +In the actual composition of the Confederate forces no marked change +had taken place since the beginning of the war. But the character of +the army, in many essential respects, had become sensibly modified. The +men encamped on the Rappahannock were no longer the raw recruits who +had blundered into victory at the First Manassas; nor were they the +unmanageable divisions of the Peninsula. They were still, for the most +part, volunteers, for conscripts in the Army of Northern Virginia were +not numerous, but they were volunteers of a very different type from +those who had fought at Kernstown or at Gaines’ Mill. Despite their +protracted absence from their homes, the wealthy and well-born privates +still shouldered the musket. Though many had been promoted to +commissions, the majority were content to set an example of +self-sacrifice and sterling patriotism, and the regiments were thus +still leavened with a large admixture of educated and intelligent men. +It is a significant fact that during those months of 1863 which were +spent in winter quarters Latin, Greek, mathematical, and even Hebrew +classes were instituted by the soldiers. But all trace of social +distinction had long since vanished. Between the rich planter +and the small farmer or mechanic there was no difference either in +aspect or habiliments. Tanned by the hot Virginia sun, thin-visaged and +bright-eyed, gaunt of frame and spare of flesh, they were neither more +nor less than the rank and file of the Confederate army; the product of +discipline and hard service, moulded after the same pattern, with the +same hopes and fears, the same needs, the same sympathies. They looked +at life from a common standpoint, and that standpoint was not always +elevated. Human nature claimed its rights. When his hunger was +satisfied and, to use his own expression, he was full of hog and +hominy, the Confederate soldier found time to discuss the operations in +which he was engaged. Pipe in mouth, he could pass in review the +strategy and tactics of both armies, the capacity of his generals, and +the bearing of his enemies, and on each one of these questions, for he +was the shrewdest of observers, his comments were always to the point. +He had studied his profession in a practical school. The more delicate +moves of the great game were topics of absorbing interest. He cast a +comprehensive glance over the whole theatre; he would puzzle out the +reasons for forced marches and sudden changes of direction; his +curiosity was great, but intelligent, and the groups round the +camp-fires often forecast with surprising accuracy the manœuvres that +the generals were planning. But far more often the subjects of +conversation were of a more immediate and personal character. The +capacity of the company cook, the quality of the last consignment of +boots, the merits of different bivouacs, the prospect of the supply +train coming up to time, the temper of the captain and subaltern—such +were the topics which the Confederate privates spent their leisure in +discussing. They had long since discovered that war is never romantic +and seldom exciting, but a monotonous round of tiresome duties, +enlivened at rare intervals by dangerous episodes. They had become +familiar with its constant accompaniment of privations—bad weather, wet +bivouacs, and wretched roads, wood that would not kindle, and rations +that did not satisfy. They had learned that a soldier’s worst enemy +may be his native soil, in the form of dust or mud; that it is possible +to march for months without firing a shot or seeing a foe; that a +battle is an interlude which breaks in at rare intervals on the long +round of digging, marching, bridge-building, and road-making; and that +the time of the fiercest fire-eater is generally occupied in escorting +mule-trains, in mounting guard, in dragging waggons through the mud, +and in loading or unloading stores. Volunteering for perilous and +onerous duties, for which hundreds had eagerly offered themselves in +the early days, ere the glamour of the soldier’s life had vanished, had +ceased to be popular. The men were now content to wait for orders; and +as discipline crystallised into habit, they became resigned to the fact +that they were no longer volunteers, masters of their own actions, but +the paid servants of the State, compelled to obey and powerless to +protest. + +To all outward appearance, then, in the spring of 1863 the Army of +Northern Virginia bore an exceedingly close resemblance to an army of +professional soldiers. It is true that military etiquette was not +insisted on; that more license, both in quarters and on the march, was +permitted than would be the case in a regular army; that officers were +not treated with the same respect; and that tact, rather than the +strict enforcement of the regulations, was the key-note of command. +Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the Confederate soldiers were +exceedingly well-conducted. The good elements in the ranks were too +strong for those who were inclined to resist authority, and the amount +of misbehaviour was wonderfully small. There was little neglect of +duty. Whatever the intelligence of the men told them was necessary for +success, for safety, or for efficiency, was done without reluctance. +The outposts were seldom caught napping. Digging and tree-felling—for +the men had learned the value of making fortifications and good +roads—were taken as a matter of course. Nor was the Southern soldier a +grumbler. He accepted half-rations and muddy camping-grounds without +remonstrance; if his boots wore out he made shift to march without +them; and when his uniform fell to pieces he waited for the next +victory to supply himself with a new outfit. He was enough of a +philosopher to know that it is better to meet misery with a smile than +with a scowl. Mark Tapley had many prototypes in the Confederate ranks, +and the men were never more facetious than when things were at their +worst. “The very intensity of their sufferings became a source of +merriment. Instead of growling and deserting, they laughed at their own +bare feet, ragged clothes, and pinched faces; and weak, hungry, cold, +wet and dirty, with no hope of reward or rest, they marched cheerfully +to meet the warmly clad and well-fed hosts of the enemy.”[9] +Indomitable indeed were the hearts that beat beneath the grey jackets, +and a spirit rising superior to all misfortune, + +That ever with a frolic welcome took +The thunder and the sunshine, + +was a marked characteristic of the Confederate soldier. Nor was it only +in camp or on the march that the temper of the troops betrayed itself +in reckless gaiety.[10] The stress of battle might thin their ranks, +but it was powerless to check their laughter. The dry humour of the +American found a fine field in the incidents of a fierce engagement. +Nothing escaped without remark: the excitement of a general, the +accelerated movements of the non-combatants, the vagaries of the army +mule, the bad practice of the artillery—all afforded entertainment. And +when the fight became hotter and the Federals pressed +resolutely to the attack, the flow of badinage took a grim and peculiar +turn. It has already been related that the Confederate armies depended, +to a large degree, for their clothing and equipments on what they +captured. So abundant was this source of supply, that the soldier had +come to look upon his enemy as a movable magazine of creature comforts; +and if he marched cheerfully to battle, it was not so much because he +loved fighting, but that he hoped to renew his wardrobe. A victory was +much, but the spoils of victory were more. No sooner, then, did the +Federals arrive within close range, than the wild yells of the Southern +infantry became mingled with fierce laughter and derisive shouts. “Take +off them boots, Yank!” “Come out of them clothes; we’re gwine to have +them!” “Come on, blue-bellies, we want them blankets!” “Bring them +rations along! You’ve got to leave them!”—such were the cries, like the +howls of half-famished wolves, that were heard along Jackson’s lines at +Fredericksburg.[11] And they were not raised in mockery. The +battle-field was the soldier’s harvest, and as the sheaves of writhing +forms, under the muzzles of their deadly rifles, increased in length +and depth, the men listened with straining ears for the word to charge. +The counterstroke was their opportunity. The rush with the bayonet was +never so speedy but that deft fingers found time to rifle the +haversacks of the fallen, and such was the eagerness for booty that it +was with the greatest difficulty that the troops were dragged off from +the pursuit. It is said that at Fredericksburg, some North Carolina +regiments, which had +repulsed and followed up a Federal brigade, were hardly to be +restrained from dashing into the midst of the enemy’s reserves, and +when at length they were turned back their complaints were bitter. The +order to halt and retire seemed to them nothing less than rank +injustice. Half-crying with disappointment, they accused their generals +of favouritism! “They don’t want the North Car’linians to git +anything,” they whined. “They wouldn’t hev’ stopped Hood’s +Texicans—they’d hev’ let _them_ go on!” + +But if they relieved their own pressing wants at the expense of their +enemies, if they stripped the dead, and exchanged boots and clothing +with their prisoners, seldom getting the worst of the bargain, no +armies—to their lasting honour be it spoken, for no armies were so +destitute—were ever less formidable to peaceful citizens, within the +border or beyond it, than those of the Confederacy. It was exceedingly +seldom that wanton damage was laid to the soldier’s charge. The rights +of non-combatants were religiously respected, and the farmers of +Pennsylvania were treated with the same courtesy and consideration as +the planters of Virginia. A village was none the worse for the vicinity +of a Confederate bivouac, and neither man nor woman had reason to dread +the half-starved tatterdemalions who followed Lee and Jackson. As the +grey columns, in the march through Maryland, swung through the streets +of those towns where the Unionist sentiment was strong, the women, +standing in the porches, waved the Stars and Stripes defiantly in their +faces. But the only retort of “the dust brown ranks” was a volley of +jests, not always unmixed with impudence. The personal attributes of +their fair enemies did not escape observation. The damsel whose locks +were of conspicuous hue was addressed as “bricktop” until she screamed +with rage, and threatened to fire into the ranks; while the maiden of +sour visage and uncertain years was saluted as “Ole Miss Vinegar” by a +whole division of infantry. But this was the limit of the soldier’s +resentment. At the same time, when in the midst of plenty he was not +impeccable. For highway robbery and housebreaking he had no +inclination, but he was by +no means above petty larceny. Pigs and poultry, fruit, corn, vegetables +and fence-rails, he looked upon as his lawful perquisites. + +He was the most cunning of foragers, and neither stringent orders nor +armed guards availed to protect a field of maize or a patch of +potatoes; the traditional negro was not more skilful in looting a +fowl-house;[12] he had an unerring scent for whisky or “apple-jack;” +and the address he displayed in compassing the destruction of the +unsuspecting porker was only equalled, when he was caught _flagrante +delicto,_ by the ingenuity of his excuses. According to the Confederate +private, the most inoffensive animals, in the districts through which +the armies marched, developed a strange pugnacity, and if bullet and +bayonet were used against them, it was solely in self-defence. + +But such venial faults, common to every army, and almost justified by +the deficiencies of the Southern commissariat, were more than atoned +for when the enemy was met. Of the prowess of Lee’s veterans sufficient +has been said. Their deeds speak for themselves. But it was not the +battle-field alone that bore witness to their fortitude. German +soldiers have told us that in the war of 1870, when their armies, +marching on Paris, found, to their astonishment, the great city +strongly garrisoned, and hosts gathering in every quarter for its +relief, a singular apathy took possession of the troops. The +explanation offered by a great military writer is that “after a certain +period even the victor becomes tired of war;” and “the more civilised,” +he adds, “a people is, the more quickly will this weakness become +apparent.”[13] Whether this explanation be adequate is not easy to +decide. The fact remains, however, that the Confederate volunteer was +able to overcome that longing for home which chilled the enthusiasm of +the German conscript. And this is the more remarkable, inasmuch as his +career was not one of unchequered victory. In the spring of 1863, the +Army of the Potomac, more numerous than ever, was still before +him, firmly established on Virginian soil; hope of foreign +intervention, despite the assurances of the politicians, was gradually +fading, and it was but too evident that the war was far from over. Yet +at no time during their two years of service had the soldiers shown the +slightest sign of that discouragement which seized the Germans after +two months. And who shall dare to say that the Southerner was less +highly civilised than the Prussian or the Bavarian? Political liberty, +freedom of speech and action, are the real elements of civilisation, +and not merely education. But let the difference in the constitution of +the two armies be borne in mind. The Confederates, with few exceptions, +were volunteers, who had become soldiers of their own choice, who had +assumed arms deliberately and without compulsion, and who by their own +votes were responsible that war had been declared. The Germans were +conscripts, a dumb, powerless, irresponsible multitude, animated, no +doubt, by hereditary hatred of the enemy, but without that sense of +moral obligation which exists in the volunteer. We may be permitted, +then, to believe that this sense of moral obligation was one reason why +the spirit of the Southerners rose superior to human weakness, and that +the old adage, which declares that one volunteer is better than three +pressed men, is not yet out of date. Nor is it an unfair inference that +the armies of the Confederacy, allied by the “crimson thread of +kinship” to those of Wellington, of Raglan, and of Clyde, owed much of +their enduring fortitude to “the rock whence they were hewn.” + +And yet, with all their admirable qualities, the Southern soldiers had +not yet got rid of their original defects. Temperate, obedient, and +well-conducted, small as was the percentage of bad characters and +habitual misdoers, their discipline was still capable of improvement. +The assertion, at first sight, seems a contradiction in terms. How +could troops, it may be asked, who so seldom infringed the regulations +be other than well-disciplined? For the simple reason that discipline +in quarters is an absolutely different quality from discipline in +battle. No large body of +intelligent men, assembled in a just cause and of good character, is +likely to break out into excesses, or, if obedience is manifestly +necessary, to rebel against authority. Subordination to the law is the +distinguishing mark of all civilised society. But such subordination, +however praiseworthy, is not the discipline of the soldier, though it +is often confounded with it. A regiment of volunteers, billeted in some +country town, would probably show a smaller list of misdemeanours than +a regiment of regulars. Yet the latter might be exceedingly +well-disciplined, and the former have no real discipline whatever. +Self-respect—for that is the discipline of the volunteer—is not battle +discipline, the discipline of the cloth, of habit, of tradition, of +constant association and of mutual confidence. Self-respect, excellent +in itself, and by no means unknown amongst regular soldiers, does not +carry with it a mechanical obedience to command, nor does it merge the +individual in the mass, and give the tremendous power of unity to the +efforts of large numbers. + +It will not be pretended that the discipline of regular troops always +rises superior to privation and defeat. It is a notorious fact that the +number of deserters from Wellington’s army in Spain and Portugal, men +who wilfully absented themselves from the colours and wandered over the +country, was by no means inconsiderable; while the behaviour of the +French regulars in 1870, and even of the Germans, when they rushed back +in panic through the village of Gravelotte, deaf to the threats and +entreaties of their aged sovereign, was hardly in accordance with +military tradition. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to show that the +Southerners fell somewhat short of the highest standard. They were +certainly not incapable of keeping their ranks under a hot fire, or of +holding their ground to the last extremity. Pickett’s charge at +Gettysburg is one of the most splendid examples of disciplined valour +in the annals of war, and the endurance of Lee’s army at Sharpsburg has +seldom been surpassed. Nor was the disorder into which the attacking +lines were sooner or later thrown a proof of inferior training. Even in +the +days of flint-lock muskets, the admixture of not only companies and +battalions, but even of brigades and divisions, was a constant feature +of fierce assaults over broken ground. If, under such conditions, the +troops still press forward, and if, when success has been achieved, +order is rapidly restored, then discipline is good; and in neither +respect did the Confederates fail. But to be proof against disorder is +not everything in battle. It is not sufficient that the men should be +capable of fighting fiercely; to reap the full benefit of their weapons +and their training they must be obedient to command. The rifle is a far +less formidable weapon when every man uses it at his own discretion +than when the fire of a large body of troops is directed by a single +will. Precision of movement, too, is necessary for the quick +concentration of superior forces at the decisive point, for rapid +support, and for effective combination. But neither was the fire of the +Confederate infantry under the complete control of their officers, nor +were their movements always characterised by order and regularity. It +was seldom that the men could be induced to refrain from answering shot +with shot; there was an extraordinary waste of ammunition, there was +much unnecessary noise, and the regiments were very apt to get out of +hand. It is needless to bring forward specific proof; the admissions of +superior officers are quite sufficient. General D. H. Hill, in an +interesting description of the Southern soldier, speaks very frankly of +his shortcomings. “Self-reliant always, obedient when he chose to be, +impatient of drill and discipline. He was unsurpassed as a scout or on +the skirmish line. Of the shoulder-to-shoulder courage, bred of drill +and discipline, he knew nothing and cared less. Hence, on the +battle-field, he was more of a free lance than a machine. Who ever saw +a Confederate line advancing that was not crooked as a ram’s horn? Each +ragged rebel yelling on his own hook and aligning on himself! But there +is as much need of the machine-made soldier as of the self-reliant +soldier, and the concentrated blow is always the most effective blow. +The erratic effort of the Confederate, heroic though it was, yet failed +to +achieve the maximum result just because it was erratic. Moreover, two +serious evils attended that excessive egotism and individuality which +came to the Confederate through his training, association, and habits. +He knew when a movement was false and a position untenable, and he was +too little of a machine to give in such cases the wholehearted service +which might have redeemed the blunder. The other evil was an +ever-growing one. His disregard of discipline and independence of +character made him often a straggler, and by straggling the fruit of +many a victory was lost.[14] + +General Lee was not less outspoken. A circular issued to his troops +during the last months of the war is virtually a criticism on their +conduct. “Many opportunities,” he wrote, “have been lost and hundreds +of valuable lives uselessly sacrificed for want of a strict observance +of discipline. Its object is to enable an army to bring promptly into +action the largest possible number of men in good order, and under the +control of their officers. Its effects are visible in all military +history, which records the triumph of discipline and courage far more +frequently than that of numbers and resources. The importance and +utility of thorough discipline should be impressed on officers and men +on all occasions by illustrations taken from the experience of the +instructor or from other sources of information. They should be made to +understand that discipline contributes no less to their safety than to +their efficiency. Disastrous surprises and those sudden panics which +lead to defeat and the greatest loss of life are of rare occurrence +among disciplined troops. It is well known that the greatest number of +casualties occur when men become scattered, and especially when they +retreat in confusion, as the fire of the enemy is then more deliberate +and fatal. The experience of every officer shows that those troops +suffer least who attack most vigorously, and that a few men, retaining +their organisation and acting in concert, accomplish far more with +smaller loss than a larger number scattered and disorganised. + +“The appearance of a steady, unbroken line is more formidable to the +enemy, and renders his aim less accurate and his fire less effective. +Orders can be readily transmitted, advantage can be promptly taken of +every opportunity, and all efforts being directed to a common end, the +combat will be briefer and success more certain. + +“Let officers and men be made to feel that they will most effectually +secure their safety by remaining steadily at their posts, preserving +order, and fighting with coolness and vigour. . . . Impress upon the +officers that discipline cannot be attained without constant +watchfulness on their part. They must attend to the smallest +particulars of detail. Men must be habituated to obey or they cannot be +controlled in battle, and the neglect of the least important order +impairs the proper influence of the officer.”[15] + +That such a circular was considered necessary after the troops had been +nearly four years under arms establishes beyond all question that the +discipline of the Confederate army was not that of the regular troops +with whom General Lee had served under the Stars and Stripes; but it is +not to be understood that he attributed the deficiencies of his +soldiers to any spirit of resistance on their part to the demands of +subordination. Elsewhere he says: “The greatest difficulty I find is in +causing orders and regulations to be obeyed. This arises not from a +spirit of disobedience, but from ignorance.”[16] And here, with his +usual perspicacity, he goes straight to the root of the evil. When the +men in the ranks understand all that discipline involves, safety, +health, efficiency, victory, it is easily maintained; and it is because +experience and tradition have taught them this that veteran armies are +so amenable to control. “Soldiers,” says Sir Charles Napier, “must obey +in all things. They may and do laugh at foolish orders, but they +nevertheless obey, not because they are blindly obedient, but because +they know that to disobey is to break the backbone of their +profession.” + +Such knowledge, however, is long in coming, even to the regular, and it +may be questioned whether it ever really came home to the Confederates. + +In fact, the Southern soldier, ignorant, at the outset, of what may be +accomplished by discipline, never quite got rid of the belief that the +enthusiasm of the individual, his goodwill and his native courage, was +a more than sufficient substitute. “The spirit which animates our +soldiers,” wrote Lee, “and the natural courage with which they are so +liberally endowed, have led to a reliance upon those good qualities, to +the neglect of measures which would increase their efficiency and +contribute to their safety.”[17] Yet the soldier was hardly to blame. +Neither he nor his regimental officers had any previous knowledge of +war when they were suddenly launched against the enemy, and there was +no time to instil into them the habits of discipline. There was no +regular army to set them an example; no historic force whose traditions +they would unconsciously have adopted; the exigencies of the service +forbade the retention of the men in camps of instruction, and trained +instructors could not be spared from more important duties. + +Such ignorance, however, as that which prevailed in the Southern ranks +is not always excusable. It would be well if those who pose as the +friends of the private soldier, as his protectors from injustice, +realised the mischief they may do by injudicious sympathy. The process +of being broken to discipline is undoubtedly gaffing to the instincts +of free men, and it is beyond question that among a multitude of +superiors, some will be found who are neither just nor considerate. +Instances of hardship must inevitably occur. But men and officers—for +discipline presses as hardly on the officers as on the men—must obey, +no matter at what cost to their feelings, for obedience to orders, +instant and unhesitating, is not only the life-blood of armies but the +security of States; and the doctrine that under any conditions whatever +deliberate disobedience can be justified is treason to the +commonwealth. It is to be remembered that the +end of the soldier’s existence is not merely to conduct himself as a +respectable citizen and earn his wages, but to face peril and +privations, not of his own free will, but at the bidding of others; +and, in circumstances where his natural instincts assert themselves +most strongly, to make a complete surrender of mind and body. If he has +been in the habit of weighing the justice or the wisdom of orders +before obeying them, if he has been taught that disobedience may be a +pardonable crime, he will probably question the justice of the order +that apparently sends him to certain death; if he once begins to think; +if he once contemplates the possibility of disobedience; if he permits +a single idea to enter his head beyond the necessity of instant +compliance, it is unlikely that he will rise superior to the promptings +of his weaker nature. _“Men must be habituated to obey or they cannot +be controlled in battle;”_ and the slightest interference with the +habit of subordination is fraught, therefore, with the very greatest +danger to the efficiency of an army. + +It has been asserted, and it would appear that the idea is widespread, +that patriotism and intelligence are of vastly more importance than the +habit of obedience, and it was certainly a very general opinion in +America before the war. This idea should have been effectually +dissipated, at all events in the North, by the battle of Bull Run. +Nevertheless, throughout the conflict a predilection existed in favour +of what was called the “thinking bayonet;” and the very term +“machine-made soldier,” employed by General D. H. Hill, proves that the +strict discipline of regular armies was not held in high esteem. + +It is certainly true that the “thinking bayonet” is by no means to be +decried. A man can no more be a good soldier without intelligence and +aptitude for his profession than he can be a successful poacher or a +skilful jockey. But it is possible, in considering the value of an +armed force, to rate too highly the natural qualities of the individual +in the ranks. In certain circumstances, especially in irregular +warfare, where each man fights for his own hand, they doubtless play a +conspicuous part. A thousand skilled riflemen, familiar with the +“moving accidents by flood and field,” even if they have no regular +training and are incapable of precise manœuvres, may prove more than a +match for the same number of professional soldiers. But when large +numbers are in question, when the concentration of superior force at a +single point, and the close co-operation of the three arms, infantry, +artillery, and cavalry, decide the issue, then the force that can +manœuvre, that moves like a machine at the mandate of a single will, +has a marked advantage; and the power of manœuvring and of combination +is conferred by discipline alone. “Two Mamelukes,” said Napoleon, “can +defeat three French horsemen, because they are better armed, better +mounted, and more skilful. A hundred French horse have nothing to fear +from a hundred Mamelukes, three hundred would defeat a similar number, +and a thousand French would defeat fifteen hundred Mamelukes. So great +is the influence of tactics, order, and the power of manœuvring.” + +It may be said, moreover, that whatever may have been the case in past +times, the training of the regular soldier to-day neither aims at +producing mere machines nor has it that effect. As much attention is +given to the development of self-reliance in the rank and file as to +making them subordinate. It has long been recognised that there are +many occasions in war when even the private must use his wits; on +outpost, or patrol, as a scout, an orderly, or when his immediate +superiors have fallen, momentous issues may hang on his judgment and +initiative; and in a good army these qualities are sedulously fostered +by constant instruction in field duties. Nor is the fear justified that +the strict enforcement of exact obedience, whenever a superior is +present, impairs, under this system of training, the capacity for +independent action when such action becomes necessary. In the old days, +to drill and discipline the soldier into a machine was undoubtedly the +end of all his training. To-day his officers have the more difficult +task of stimulating his intelligence, while, at the same time, they +instil the habits of subordination; and that such task +may be successfully accomplished we have practical proof. The regiments +of the Light Brigade, trained by Sir John Moore nearly a century ago on +the system of to-day, proved their superiority in the field over all +others. As skirmishers, on the outpost, and in independent fighting, +they were exceedingly efficient; and yet, when they marched shoulder to +shoulder, no troops in Wellington’s army showed a more solid front, +manœuvred with greater precision, or were more completely under the +control of their officers. + +Mechanical obedience, then, is perfectly compatible with the freest +exercise of the intelligence, provided that the men are so trained that +they know instinctively when to give the one and to use the other; and +the Confederates, had their officers and non-commissioned officers been +trained soldiers, might easily have acquired this highest form of +discipline. As it was, and as it always will be with improvised troops, +the discipline of battle was to a great degree purely personal. The men +followed those officers whom they knew, and in whom they had +confidence; but they did not always obey simply because the officer had +the right to command; and they were not easily handled when the wisdom +of an order or the necessity of a movement was not apparent. The only +way, it was said by an Englishman in the Confederacy, in which an +officer could acquire influence over the Southern soldiers was by his +personal conduct under fire. “Every ounce of authority,” was his +expression, “had to be purchased by a drop of my blood.”[18] Such being +the case, it is manifest that Jackson’s methods of discipline were well +adapted to the peculiar constitution of the army in which he served. +With the officers he was exceedingly strict. He looked to them to set +an example of unhesitating obedience and the precise performance of +duty. He demanded, too—and in this respect his own conduct was a +model—that the rank and file should be treated with tact and +consideration. He remembered that his citizen soldiers were utterly +unfamiliar with the forms and customs of military life, that what to +the regular would +be a mere matter of course, might seem a gross outrage to the man who +had never acknowledged a superior. In his selection of officers, +therefore, for posts upon his staff, and in his recommendations for +promotion, he considered personal characteristics rather than +professional ability. He preferred men who would win the confidence of +others—men not only strong, but possessing warm sympathies and broad +minds—to mere martinets, ruling by regulation, and treating the soldier +as a machine. But, at the same time, he was by no means disposed to +condone misconduct in the volunteers. Never was there a more striking +contrast than between Jackson the general and Jackson off duty. During +his sojourn at Moss Neck, Mr. Corbin’s little daughter, a child of six +years old, became a special favourite. “Her pretty face and winsome +ways were so charming that he requested her mother that she might visit +him every afternoon, when the day’s labours were over. He had always +some little treat in store for her—an orange or an apple—but one +afternoon he found that his supply of good things was exhausted. +Glancing round the room he eye fell on a new uniform cap, ornamented +with a gold band. Taking his knife, he ripped off the braid, and +fastened it among the curls of his little playfellow.” A little later +the child was taken ill, and after his removal from Moss Neck he heard +that she had died. “The general,” writes his aide-de-camp, “wept freely +when I brought him the sad news.” Yet in the administration of +discipline Jackson was far sterner than General Lee, or indeed than any +other of the generals in Virginia. “Once on the march, fearing lest his +men might stray from the ranks and commit acts of pillage, he had +issued an order that the soldiers should not enter private dwellings. +Disregarding the order, a soldier entered a house, and even used +insulting language to the women of the family. This was reported to +Jackson, who had the man arrested, tried by drum-head court-martial, +and shot in twenty minutes.”[19] He never failed to confirm the +sentences of death passed by courts-martial on deserters. It was in +vain that his oldest +friends, or even the chaplains, appealed for a mitigation of the +extreme penalty. “While he was in command at Winchester, in December +1861, a soldier who was charged with striking his captain was tried by +court-martial and sentenced to be shot. Knowing that the breach of +discipline had been attended with many extenuating circumstances, some +of us endeavoured to secure his pardon. Possessing ourselves of all the +facts, we waited upon the general, who evinced the deepest interest in +the object of our visit, and listened with evident sympathy to our +plea. There was moisture in his eyes when we repeated the poor fellow’s +pitiful appeal that he be allowed to die for his country as a soldier +on the field of battle, and not as a dog by the muskets of his own +comrades. Such solicitude for the success of our efforts did he +manifest that he even suggested some things to be done which we had not +thought of. At the same time he warned us not to be too hopeful. He +said: ‘It is unquestionably a case of great hardship, but a pardon at +this juncture might work greater hardship. Resistance to lawful +authority is a grave offence in a soldier. To pardon this man would be +to encourage insubordination throughout the army, and so ruin our +cause. Still,’ he added, ‘I will review the whole case, and no man will +be happier than myself if I can reach the same conclusions as you have +done.’ The soldier was shot.”[20] + +On another occasion four men were to be executed for desertion to the +enemy. The firing party had been ordered to parade at four o’clock in +the afternoon, and shortly before the hour a chaplain, not noted for +his tact, made his way to the general’s tent, and petitioned earnestly +that the prisoners might even now be released. Jackson, whom he found +pacing backwards and forwards, in evident agitation, watch in hand, +listened courteously to his arguments, but made no reply, until at +length the worthy minister, in his most impressive manner, said, +“General, consider your responsibility before the Lord. You are sending +these men’s souls to hell!” With a look of intense +disgust at such empty cant, Jackson made one stride forward, took the +astonished divine by his shoulders, and saying, in his severest tones, +“That, sir, is my business—do you do yours!” thrust him forcibly from +the tent. + +His severity as regards the more serious offences did not, however, +alienate in the smallest degree the confidence and affection of his +soldiers. They had full faith in his justice. They were well aware that +to order the execution of some unfortunate wretch gave him intense +pain. But they recognised, as clearly as he did himself, that it was +sometimes expedient that individuals should suffer. They knew that not +all men, nor even the greater part, are heroes, and that if the +worthless element had once reason to believe that they might escape the +legitimate consequences of their crimes, desertion and insubordination +would destroy the army. By some of the senior officers, however, his +rigorous ideas of discipline were less favourably considered. They were +by no means disposed to quarrel with the fact that the sentences of +courts-martial in the Second Army Corps were almost invariably +confirmed; but they objected strongly to the same measure which they +meted out to the men being consistently applied to themselves. They +could not be brought to see that neglect of duty, however trivial, on +the part of a colonel or brigadier was just as serious a fault as +desertion or insubordination on the part of the men; and the conflict +of opinion, in certain cases, had unfortunate results. + +To those whose conduct he approved he was more than considerate. +General Lane, who was under him as a cadet at Lexington, writes as +follows:— + +“When in camp at Bunker Hill, after the battle of Sharpsburg, where the +gallant Branch was killed, I, as colonel commanding the brigade, was +directed by General A. P. Hill to hold my command in readiness, with +three days’ rations, for detached service, and to report to General +Jackson for further orders. That was all the information that Hill +could give me. I had been in Jackson’s corps since the battles round +Richmond, and had been very derelict in not paying my respects to my +old professor. +As I rode to his headquarters I wondered if he would recognise me. I +certainly expected to receive his orders in a few terse sentences, and +to be promptly dismissed with a military salute. He knew me as soon as +I entered his tent, though we had not met for years. He rose quickly, +with a smile on his face, took my hand in both of his in the warmest +manner, expressed his pleasure at seeing me, chided me for not having +been to see him, and bade me be seated. His kind words, the tones of +his voice, his familiarly calling me Lane, whereas it had always been +Mr. Lane at the Institute, put me completely at my ease. Then, for the +first time, I began to love that reserved man whom I had always +honoured and respected as my professor, and whom I greatly admired as +my general. + +“After a very pleasant and somewhat protracted conversation, he ordered +me to move at once, and as rapidly as possible, to North Mountain +Depôt, tear up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and put myself in +communication with General Hampton (commanding cavalry brigade), who +would cover my operations. While we were there General Jackson sent a +member of his staff to see how we were progressing. That night I +received orders to move at once and quickly to Martinsburg, as there +had been heavy skirmishing near Kerneysville. Next morning, when I +reported to General Jackson, he received me in the same cordial, +warm-hearted manner, complimented me on the thoroughness of my work, +told me that he had recommended me for promotion to take permanent +charge of Branch’s brigade, and that as I was the only person +recommended through military channels, I would be appointed in spite of +the two aspirants who were trying to bring political influence to bear +in Richmond in their behalf. When I rose to go he took my hand in both +of his, looked me steadily in the face, and in the words and tones of +friendly warmth, which can never be forgotten, again expressed his +confidence in my promotion, and bade me good-bye, with a ‘God bless +you, Lane!’”[21] + +On the other hand, Jackson’s treatment of those who +failed to obey his orders was very different. No matter how high the +rank of the offender, Jackson never sought to screen the crime.[22] No +thought that the public rebuke of his principal subordinates might +impair their authority or destroy their cordial relations with himself +ever stayed his hand; and it may well be questioned whether his +disregard of consequences was not too absolutely uncompromising. Men +who live in constant dread of their chief’s anger are not likely to +render loyal and efficient service, and the least friction in the +higher ranks is felt throughout the whole command. When the troops +begin taking sides and unanimity disappears, the power of energetic +combination at once deteriorates. That Jackson was perfectly just is +not denied; the misconduct of his subordinates was sometimes flagrant; +but it may well be questioned whether to keep officers under arrest for +weeks, or even months, marching without their swords in rear of the +column, was wholly wise. There is but one public punishment for a +senior officer who is guilty of serious misbehaviour, and that is +instant dismissal. If he is suffered to remain in the army his presence +will always be a source of weakness. But the question will arise, Is it +possible to replace him? If he is trusted by his men they will resent +his removal, and give but halfhearted support to his successor; so in +dealing with those in high places tact and consideration are essential. +Even Dr. Dabney admits that in this respect Jackson’s conduct is open +to criticism. + +As already related, he looked on the blunders of his officers, if those +blunders were honest, and due simply to misconception of the situation, +with a tolerant eye. He knew too much of war and its difficulties to +expect that their judgment would be unerring. He never made the mistake +of reprehending the man who had done his best to succeed, and contented +himself with pointing out, quietly and courteously, how failure might +have been avoided. “But if he believed,” says his chief of the +staff, “that his subordinates were self-indulgent or contumacious, he +became a stern and exacting master; . . . and during his career a +causeless friction was produced in the working of his government over +several gallant and meritorious officers who served under him. This was +almost the sole fault of his military character: that by this jealousy +of intentional inefficiency he diminished the sympathy between himself +and the general officers next his person by whom his orders were to be +executed. Had he been able to exercise the same energetic authority, +through the medium of a zealous personal affection, he would have been +a more perfect leader of armies.”[23] + +This system of command was in all probability the outcome of deliberate +calculation. No officer, placed in permanent charge of a considerable +force, least of all a man who never acted except upon reflection, and +who had a wise regard for human nature, could fail to lay down for +himself certain principles of conduct towards both officers and men. It +may be, then, that Jackson considered the course he pursued the best +adapted to maintain discipline amongst a number of ambitious young +generals, some of whom had been senior to himself in the old service, +and all of whom had been raised suddenly, with probably some +disturbance to their self-possession, to high rank. It is to be +remembered, too, that during the campaigns of 1862 his pre-eminent +ability was only by degrees made clear. It was not everyone who, like +General Lee, discerned the great qualities of the silent and unassuming +instructor of cadets, and other leaders, of more dashing exterior, with +a well-deserved reputation for brilliant courage, may well have doubted +whether his capacity was superior to their own. + +Such soaring spirits possibly needed a tight hand; and, in any case, +Jackson had much cause for irritation. With Wolfe and Sherman he shared +the distinguished honour of being considered crazy by hundreds of +self-sufficient mediocrities. It was impossible that he should have +been ignorant, although not one word of complaint ever passed +his lips, how grossly he was misrepresented, how he was caricatured in +the press, and credited with the most extravagant and foolhardy ideas +of war. Nor did his subordinates, in very many instances, give him that +loyal and ungrudging support which he conceived was the due of the +commanding general. More than one of his enterprises fell short of the +full measure of success owing to the shortcomings of others; and these +shortcomings, such as Loring’s insubordination at Romney, Steuart’s +refusal to pursue Banks after Winchester, Garnett’s retreat at +Kernstown, A. P. Hill’s tardiness at Cedar Run, might all be traced to +the same cause—disdain of his capacity, and a misconception of their +own position. In such circumstances it is hardly to be wondered at if +his wrath blazed to a white heat. He was not of a forgiving nature. +Once roused, resentment took possession of his whole being, and it may +be questioned whether it was ever really appeased. At the same time, +the fact that Jackson lacked the fascination which, allied to lofty +intellect, wins the hearts of men most readily, and is pre-eminently +the characteristic of the very greatest warriors, can hardly be denied. +His influence with men was a plant of slow growth. Yet the glamour of +his great deeds, the gradual recognition of his unfailing sympathy, his +modesty and his truth, produced in the end the same result as the +personal charm of Napoleon, of Nelson, and of Lee. His hold on the +devotion of his troops was very sure: “God knows,” said his +adjutant-general, weeping the tears of a brave man, “I would have died +for him!” and few commanders have been followed with more implicit +confidence or have inspired a deeper and more abiding affection. Long +years after the war a bronze statue, in his habit as he lived, was +erected on his grave at Lexington. Thither, when the figure was +unveiled, came the survivors of the Second Army Corps, the men of +Manassas and of Sharpsburg, of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and +of many another hard-fought field; and the younger generation looked on +the relics of an army whose peer the world has seldom seen. When the +guns had fired a salute, the wild rebel yell, the music which the great +Virginian had +loved so well, rang loud above his grave, and as the last +reverberations died away across the hill, the grey-haired ranks stood +still and silent. “See how they loved him!” said one, and it was spoken +with deepest reverence. Two well-known officers, who had served under +Jackson, were sitting near each other on their horses. Each remarked +the silence of the other, and each saw that the other was in tears. +“I’m not ashamed of it, Snowden!” “Nor I, old boy,” replied the other, +as he tried to smile. + +When, after the unveiling, the columns marched past the monument, the +old fellows looked up, and then bowed their uncovered heads and passed +on. But one tall, gaunt soldier of the Stonewall Brigade, as he passed +out of the cemetery, looked back for a moment at the life-like figure +of his general, and waving his old grey hat towards it, cried out, +“Good-bye, old man, good-bye; we’ve done all we could for you; +good-bye!” + +It is not always easy to discern why one general is worshipped, even by +men who have never seen him, while another, of equal or even superior +capacity, fails to awaken the least spark of affection, except in his +chosen friends. Grant was undoubtedly a greater soldier than McClellan, +and the genius of Wellington was not less than that of Nelson. And yet, +while Nelson and McClellan won all hearts, not one single private had +either for Wellington or Grant any warmer sentiment than respect. It +would be as unfair, however, to attribute selfishness or want of +sympathy to either Wellington or Grant, as to insinuate that Nelson and +McClellan were deliberate bidders for popularity. It may be that in the +two former the very strength of their patriotism was at fault. To them +the State was everything, the individual nothing. To fight for their +country was merely a question of duty, into which the idea of glory or +recompense hardly entered, and, indifferent themselves either to praise +or blame, they considered that the victory of the national arms was a +sufficient reward for the soldier’s toils. Both were generous and +open-handed, exerting themselves incessantly to provide for the comfort +and well-being of their troops. +Neither was insensible to suffering, and both were just as capable of +self-sacrifice as either Nelson or McClellan. But the standpoint from +which they looked at war was too exalted. Nelson and McClellan, on the +other hand, recognised that they commanded men, not stoics. Sharing +with Napoleon the rare quality of captivating others, a quality which +comes by nature or comes not at all, they made allowance for human +nature, and identified themselves with those beneath them in the +closest _camaraderie._ And herein, to a great extent, lay the secret of +the enthusiastic devotion which they inspired. + +If the pitiless dissectors of character are right we ought to see in +Napoleon the most selfish of tyrants, the coldest end most crafty of +charlatans. It is difficult, however, to believe that the hearts of a +generation of hardy warriors were conquered merely by ringing phrases +and skilful flattery. It should be remembered that from a mercenary +force, degraded and despised, he transformed the Grand Army into the +terror of Europe and the pride of France. During the years of his +glory, when the legions controlled the destinies of their country, none +was more honoured than the soldier. His interests were always the first +to be considered. The highest ranks in the peerage, the highest offices +of State, were held by men who had carried the knapsack, and when +thrones were going begging their claims were preferred before all +others. The Emperor, with all his greatness, was always “the Little +Corporal” to his grenadiers. His career was their own. As they shared +his glory, so they shared his reward. Every upward step he made towards +supreme power he took them with him, and their relations were always of +the most cordial and familiar character. He was never happier than +when, on the eve of some great battle, he made his bivouac within a +square of the Guard; never more at ease than when exchanging rough +compliments with the veterans of Rivoli or Jena. He was the +representative of the army rather than of the nation. The men knew that +no civilian would be preferred before them; that their gallant deeds +were certain of his recognition; that their claims to the cross, to +pension, and to promotion, would be as carefully considered as the +claims of their generals. They loved Napoleon and they trusted him; and +whatever may have been his faults, he was “the Little Corporal,” the +friend and comrade of his soldiers, to the end. + +It was by the same hooks of steel that Stonewall Jackson grappled the +hearts of the Second Army Corps to his own. His men loved him, not +merely because he was the bravest man they had ever known, the +strongest, and the most resolute, not because he had given them glory, +and had made them heroes whose fame was known beyond the confines of +the South, but because he was one of themselves, with no interests +apart from their interests; because he raised them to his own level, +respecting them not merely as soldiers, but as comrades, the tried +comrades of many a hard fight and weary march. Although he ruled them +with a rod of iron, he made no secret, either officially or privately, +of his deep and abiding admiration for their self-sacrificing valour. +His very dispatches showed that he regarded his own skill and courage +as small indeed when compared with theirs. Like Napoleon’s, his +congratulatory orders were conspicuous for the absence of all reference +to himself; it was always “we, ” not “I, ” and he was among the first +to recognise the worth of the rank and file. “One day, ” says Dr. +McGuire, “early in the war, when the Second Virginia Regiment marched +by, I said to General Johnston, “If these men will not fight, you have +no troops that will. ” He expressed the prevalent opinion of the day in +his reply, saying, “I would not give one company of regulars for the +whole regiment. ” When I returned to Jackson I had occasion to quote +General Johnston’s opinion. “Did he say that? ” he asked, “and of those +splendid men?” And then he added: “The patriot volunteer, fighting for +his country and his rights, makes the most reliable soldier upon earth. +” And his veterans knew more than that their general believed them to +be heroes. They knew that thia great, valiant man, beside whom all +others, save Lee himself, seemed small and feeble, this mighty captain, +who held the hosts of the enemy in the hollow of his hand, was the +kindest and the most considerate of human beings. To them he was “Old +Jack” in the same affectionate sense as he had been “Old Jack” to his +class-mates at West Point. They followed him willingly, for they knew +that the path he trod was the way to victory; but they loved him as +children do their parents, because they were his first thought and his +last. + +In season and out of season he laboured for their welfare. To his +transport and commissariat officers he was a hard master. The +unfortunate wight who had neglected to bring up supplies, or who +ventured to make difficulties, discovered, to his cost, that his quiet +commander could be very terrible; but those officers who did their +duty, in whatever branch of the service they might be serving, found +that their zeal was more than appreciated. For himself he asked +nothing; on behalf of his subordinates he was a constant and persistent +suitor. He was not only ready to support the claims to promotion of +those who deserved it, but in the case of those who displayed special +merit he took the initiative himself: and he was not content with one +refusal. His only difference with General Lee, if difference it can be +called, was on a question of this nature. The Commander-in-Chief, it +appears, soon after the battle of Fredericksburg, had proposed to +appoint officers to the Second Army Corps who had served elsewhere. +After some correspondence Jackson wrote as follows:—“My rule has been +to recommend such as were, in my opinion, best qualified for filling +vacancies. The application of this rule has prevented me from even +recommending for the command of my old brigade one of its officers, +because I did not regard any of them as competent as another of whose +qualifications I had a higher opinion. This rule has led me to +recommend Colonel Bradley T. Johnson for the command of Taliaferro’s +brigade. . . . I desire the interest of the service, and no other +interest, to determine who shall be selected to fill the vacancies. +Guided by this principle, I cannot go outside of my command for persons +to fill vacancies in it, unless by so doing a more competent officer is +secured. This same principle leads me to oppose +having officers who have never served with me, and of whose +qualifications I have no knowledge, forced upon me by promoting them to +fill vacancies in my command, and advancing them over meritorious +officers well qualified for the positions, and of whose qualifications +I have had ample opportunities of judging from their having served with +me. + +“In my opinion, the interest of the service would be injured if I +should quietly consent to see officers with whose qualifications I am +not acquainted promoted into my command to fill vacancies, regardless +of the merits of my own officers who are well qualified for the +positions. The same principle leads me, when selections have to be made +outside of my command, to recommend those (if there be such) whose +former service with me proved them well qualified for filling the +vacancies. This induced me to recommend Captain Chew, who does not +belong to this army corps, but whose well-earned reputation when with +me has not been forgotten.” + +And as he studied the wishes of his officers, working quietly and +persistently for their advancement, so he studied the wishes of the +private soldiers. It is well known that artillerymen come, after a +time, to feel a personal affection for their guns, especially those +which they have used in battle. When in camp near Fredericksburg +Jackson was asked to transfer certain field-pieces, which had belonged +to his old division, to another portion of the command. The men were +exasperated, and the demand elicited the following letter:— + +“December 3, 1862. + +“General R. E. LEE, +“Commanding Army of Northern Virginia. + +“General,—Your letter of this date, recommending that I distribute the +rifle and Napoleon guns ‘so as to give General D. H. Hill a fair +proportion’ has been received. I respectfully request, if any such +distribution is to be made, that you will direct your chief of +artillery or some other officer to do it; but I hope that none of the +guns which belonged to the Army of the Valley before it became part of +the Army of Northern Virginia, after the battle of Cedar Run, +will be taken from it. If since that time any artillery has improperly +come into my command, I trust that it will be taken away, and the +person in whose possession it may be found punished, if his conduct +requires it. So careful was I to prevent an improper distribution of +the artillery and other public property captured at Harper’s Ferry, +that I issued a written order directing my staff officers to turn over +to the proper chiefs of staff of the Army of Northern Virginia all +captured stores. A copy of the order is herewith enclosed. + +“General D. H. Hill’s artillery wants existed at the time he was +assigned to my command, and it is hoped that the artillery which +belonged to the Army of the Valley will not be taken to supply his +wants. + +“I am, General, your obedient servant, + +“T. J. JACKSON, _Lieutenant-General._” + +No further correspondence is to be found on the subject, so it may be +presumed that the protest was successful. + +Jackson’s relations with the rank and file have already been referred +to, and although he was now commander of an army corps, and universally +acknowledged as one of the foremost generals of the Confederacy, his +rise in rank and reputation had brought no increase of dignity. He +still treated the humblest privates with the same courtesy that he +treated the Commander-in-Chief. He never repelled their advances, nor +refused, if he could, to satisfy their curiosity; and although he +seldom went out of his way to speak to them, if any soldier addressed +him, especially if he belonged to a regiment recruited from the Valley, +he seldom omitted to make some inquiry after those he had left at home. +Never, it was said, was his tone more gentle or his smile more winning +than when he was speaking to some ragged representative of his old +brigade. How his heart went out to them may be inferred from the +following. Writing to a friend at Richmond he said: “Though I have been +relieved from command in the Valley, and may never again be assigned to +that important trust, yet I feel deeply when I see the patriotic people +of that region under the heel of a +hateful military despotism. There are all the hopes of those who have +been with me from the commencement of the war in Virginia, who have +repeatedly left their homes and families in the hands of the enemy, to +brave the dangers of battle and disease; and there are those who have +so devotedly laboured for the relief of our suffering sick and +wounded.” + +NOTE + +_Table showing the Nationality and Average Measurements of 346,744 +Federal Soldiers examined for Military Service after March 6, 1863._ + + Number Height ft. in. Chest at Inspiration in. +United States + (69 per cent.) Germany Ireland Candada England France Scotland + Other nationalities including Wales and five British + Colonies 237, 391 +35,935 32,473 15,507 11,479 2,630 2,127 +9,202 ———— 5 7.40 +5 5.54 5 5.54 5 5.51 5 6.02 5 5.81 5 6.13 +— 35.61 +35.88 35.24 35.42 35.41 35.29 35.97 +— 346,744 + +Report of the Provost Marshal General, 1866, p. 698. + +The Roll of the 35th Massachusetts, which may be taken as a typical +Northern regiment, shows clearly enough at what period the great influx +of foreigners took place. Of 104 officers the names of all but four—and +these four joined in 1864—are pure English. Of the 964 rank and file of +which the regiment was originally composed, only 50 bore foreign names. +In 1864, however, 495 recruits were received, and of these over 400 +were German immigrants.—_History of the 35th Regiment, Massachusetts +Volunteers,_ 1862–65. + + [1] See Note at end of chapter. + + [2] “Throughout New England,” wrote the Special Correspondent of an + English newspaper, “you can scarcely enter a door without being aware + that you are in a house of mourning. Whatever may be said of Irish and + German mercenaries, I must bear witness that the best classes of + Americans have bravely come forth for their country. I know of + scarcely a family more than one member of which has not been or is not + in the ranks of the army. The maimed and crippled youths I meet on the + highroad certainly do not for the most part belong to the immigrant + rabble of which the Northern regiments are said to consist; and even + the present conscription is now in many splendid instances most + promptly and cheerfully complied with by the wealthy people who could + easily purchase exemption, but who prefer to set a good example.” + Letter from Rhode Island, the _Times,_ August 8, 1863. + + [3] John Mitchell, the Irish Nationalist, said in a letter to the + Dublin Nation that there were 40,000 Irishmen in the Southern armies. + The _Times,_ February 7, 1863. + + [4] In the opinion of the author, the charge of centralisation + preferred against Napoleon can only be applied to his leading in his + later campaigns. In his earlier operations he gave his generals every + latitude, and be maintamed that loose but effective system of tactics, + in which much was left to the individual, adopted by the French army + just previous to the wars of the Revolution. + + [5] _Bright Skies and Dark Shadows,_ p. 294. H. M. Field, D.D. + + [6] The historical student may profitably compare with the American + soldier the Armies of Revolutionary France, in which education and + intelligence were also conspicuous. + + [7] _Official Account of the Franco-German War,_ vol. ii, p. 168. + + [8] Lee to Hood, May 21, 1863; _Advance and Retreat,_ p. 58. + + [9] _Soldier Life in the Army of Northern Virginia._ + + [10] General Longstreet relates an amusing story: “One of the + soldiers, during the investment of Suffolk (April 1863), carefully + constructed and equipped a full-sized man, dressed in a new suit of + improved ‘butternut’ clothing; and christening him Julius Cæsar took + him to a signal platform which overlooked the works, adjusted him to a + graceful position, and made him secure to the framework by strong + cords. A little after sunrise ‘Julius Cæsar’ was discovered by some of + the Federal battery officers, who prepared for the target so inviting + to skilful practice. The new soldier sat under the hot fire with + irritating indifference until the Confederates, unable to restrain + their hilarity, exposed the joke by calling for ‘Three cheers for + Julius Cæsar!’ The other side quickly recognised the situation, and + good-naturedly added to ours their cheers for the old hero.” _From + Manassas to Apomattox._ + + [11] “During the truce on the second day of Fredericksburg,” says + Captain Smith, “a tall, fine-looking Alabama soldier, who was one of + the litter-bearers, picked up a new Enfield rifle on the neutral + ground, examined it, tested the sights, shouldered it, and was walking + back to the Confederate lines, when a young Federal officer, very + handsomely dressed and mounted, peremptorily ordered him to throw it + down, telling him he had no right to take it. The soldier, with the + rifle on his shoulder, walked very deliberately round the officer, + scanning him from head to foot, and then started again towards our + lines. On this the Federal Lieutenant, drawing his little sword, + galloped after him, and ordered him with an oath to throw down the + rifle. The soldier halted, then walked round the officer once again, + very slowly, looking him up and down, and at last said, pointing to + his fine boots: ‘I shall shoot you tomorrow, and get them boots;’ then + strode away to his command. The Lieutenant made no attempt to follow.” + + [12] Despite Lee’s proclamations against indiscriminate foraging, “the + hens,” he said, “had to roost mighty high when the Texans were about.” + + [13] _The Conduct of War._ Von der Goltz. + + [14] _Southern Historical Society Papers,_ vol. xiii, p. 261. + + [15] _Memoirs of General Robert E. Lee._ By A. L. Long, Military + Secretary and Brigadier-General, pp. 685–6. + + [16] _Memoirs, etc.,_ p. 619. Letter dated March 21, 1863. + + [17] _Memoirs, etc.,_ p. 684. By A. L. Long. + + [18] _Three Months in the Southern States._ General Sir Arthur + Fremantle, G.C.B. + + [19] _Bright Skies and Dark Shadows._ Rev. H. M. Field, D.D., p. 286. + + [20] Communicated by the Rev. Dr. Graham. + + [21] _Memoirs,_ pp. 536–7. + + [22] The five regimental commanders of the Stonewall Brigade were once + placed under arrest at the same time for permitting their men to burn + fence-rails; they were not released until they had compensated the + farmer. + + [23] Dabney, vol. II, pp. 519–520. + + + + +Chapter XXII +WINTER QUARTERS + + +1863 During the long interval which intervened between the battle of +Fredericksburg and the next campaign, Jackson employed himself in +preparing the reports of his battles, which had been called for by the +Commander-in-Chief. They were not compiled in their entirety by his own +hand. He was no novice at literary composition, and his pen, as his +letter-book shows, was not that of an unready writer. He had a good +command of language, and that power of clear and concise expression +which every officer in command of a large force, a position naturally +entailing a large amount of confidential correspondence, must +necessarily possess. But the task now set him was one of no ordinary +magnitude. Since the battle of Kernstown, the report of which had been +furnished in April 1862, the time had been too fully occupied to admit +of the crowded events being placed on record, and more than one-half of +the division, brigade, and regimental commanders who had been engaged +in the operations of the period had been killed. Nor, even now, did his +duties permit him the necessary leisure to complete the work without +assistance. On his requisition, therefore, Colonel Charles Faulkner, +who had been United States Minister to France before the war, was +attached to his staff for the purpose of collecting the reports of the +subordinate commanders, and combining them in the proper form. The +rough drafts were carefully gone over by the general. Every sentence +was weighed; and everything that might possibly convey a wrong +impression was at once rejected; evidence was called to clear up +disputed points; +no inferences or suppositions were allowed to stand; truth was never +permitted to be sacrificed to effect; superlatives were rigorously +excluded,[1] and the narratives may be unquestionably accepted as an +accurate relation of the facts. Many stirring passages were added by +the general’s own pen; and the praise bestowed upon the troops, both +officers and men, is couched in the warmest terms. Yet much was +omitted. Jackson had a rooted objection to represent the motives of his +actions, or to set forth the object of his movements. In reply to a +remonstrance that those who came after him would be embarrassed by the +absence of these explanations, and that his fame would suffer, he said: +“The men who come after me must act for themselves; and as to the +historians who speak of the movements of my command, I do not concern +myself greatly as to what they may say.” To judge, then, from the +reports, Jackson himself had very little to do with his success; +indeed, were they the only evidence available, it would be difficult to +ascertain whether the more brilliant manœuvres were ordered by himself +or executed on the initiative of others. But in this he was perfectly +consistent. When the publisher of an illustrated periodical wrote to +him, asking him for his portrait and some notes of his battles as the +basis of a sketch, he replied that he had no likeness of himself, and +had done nothing worthy of mention. It is not without interest, in this +connection, to note that the Old Testament supplied him with a pattern +for his reports, just as it supplied him, as he often declared, with +precepts and principles applicable to every military emergency. After +he was wounded, enlarging one morning on his favourite topic of +practical religion, he turned to the staff officer in attendance, +Lieutenant Smith, and asked him with a smile: “Can you tell me where +the Bible gives generals a model for their official reports of +battles?” The aide-de-camp answered, laughing, that it never entered +his mind to think of looking for such a thing +in the Scriptures. “Nevertheless,” said the general, “there are such; +and excellent models, too. Look, for instance, at the narrative of +Joshua’s battles with the Amalekites; there you have one. It has +clearness, brevity, modesty; and it traces the victory to its right +source, the blessing of God.” + +The early spring of 1863 was undoubtedly one of the happiest seasons of +a singularly happy life. Jackson’s ambition, if the desire for such +rank that would enable him to put the powers within him to the best use +may be so termed, was fully gratified. The country lad who, +one-and-twenty years ago, on his way to West Point, had looked on the +green hills of Virginia from the Capitol at Washington, could hardly +have anticipated a higher destiny than that which had befallen him. +Over the hearts and wills of thirty thousand magnificent soldiers, the +very flower of Southern manhood, his empire was absolute; and such +dominion is neither the heritage of princes nor within the reach of +wealth. The most trusted lieutenant of his great commander, the strong +right arm with which he had executed his most brilliant enterprises, he +shared with him the esteem and admiration not only of the army but of +the whole people of the South. The name he had determined, in his +lonely boyhood, to bring back to honour already ranked with those of +the Revolutionary heroes. Even his enemies, for the brave men at the +front left rancour to the politicians, were not proof against the +attraction of his great achievements. A friendly intercourse, not +always confined to a trade of coffee for tobacco, existed between the +outposts; “Johnnies” and “Yanks” often exchanged greetings across the +Rappahannock; and it is related that one day when Jackson rode along +the river, and the Confederate troops ran together, as was their +custom, to greet him with a yell, the Federal pickets, roused by the +sudden clamour, crowded to the bank, and shouted across to ask the +cause. “General Stonewall Jackson,” was the proud reply of the +grey-coated sentry. Immediately, to his astonishment, the cry, “Hurrah +for Stonewall Jackson!” rang out from the Federal ranks, and the voices +of North +and South, prophetic of a time to come, mingled in acclamation of a +great American. + +The situation of the army, although the winter was unusually severe, +was not without its compensations. The country was covered with snow, +and storms were frequent; rations were still scarce,[2] for the single +line of badly laid rails, subjected to the strain of an abnormal +traffic, formed a precarious means of transport; every spring and pond +was frozen; and the soldiers shivered beneath their scanty +coverings.[3] Huts, however, were in process of erection, and the +goodwill of the people did something to supply the deficiencies of the +commissariat.[4] The homes of Virginia were stripped, and many—like +Jackson himself, whose blankets had already been sent from Lexington to +his old brigade—ordered their carpets to be cut up into rugs and +distributed amongst the men. But neither cold nor hunger could crush +the spirit of the troops. The bivouacs were never merrier than on the +bare hills and in the dark pine-woods which looked down on the ruins +and the graves of Fredericksburg. Picket duty was +light, for the black waters of the great river formed a secure barrier +against attack; and if the men’s stomachs were empty, they could still +feast their eyes on a charming landscape. “To the right and left the +wooded range extended towards Fredericksburg on the one hand, and Port +Royal on the other; in front, the far-stretching level gave full sweep +to the eye; and at the foot of its forest-clad bluffs, or by the margin +of undulating fields, the Rappahannock flowed calmly to the sea. Old +mansions dotted this beautiful land—for beautiful it was in spite of +the chill influences of winter, with its fertile meadows, its +picturesque woodlands, and its old roads skirted by long lines of +shadowy cedars.”[5] + +The headquarters of the Second Army Corps were established at Moss +Neck, on the terrace above the Rappahannock, eleven miles below +Fredericksburg. After the retreat of the Federals to Falmouth, the +Confederate troops had reoccupied their former positions, and every +point of passage between Fredericksburg and Port Royal was strongly +intrenched and closely watched. At Moss Neck Jackson was not only +within easy reach of his divisions, but was more comfortably housed +than had usually been the case. A hunting-lodge which stood on the lawn +of an old and picturesque mansion-house, the property of a gentleman +named Corbin, was placed at his disposal—he had declined the offer of +rooms in the house itself lest he should trespass on the convenience of +its inmates; and to show the peculiar constitution of the Confederate +army, an anecdote recorded by his biographers is worth quoting. After +his first interview with Mrs. Corbin, he passed out to the gate, where +a cavalry orderly who had accompanied him was holding his horse. “Do +you approve of your accommodation, General?” asked the courier. “Yes, +sir, I have decided to make my quarters here.” “I am Mr. Corbin, sir,” +said the soldier, “and I am very pleased.” + +The lower room of the lodge, hung with trophies of the chase, was both +his bedroom and his office; while a large tent, pitched on the grass +outside, served as a messroom +for his military family; and here for three long months, until near the +end of March, he rested from the labour of his campaigns. The Federal +troops, on the snow-clad heights across the river, remained idle in +their camps, slowly recovering from the effects of their defeat on the +fields of Fredericksburg; the pickets had ceased to bicker; the +gunboats had disappeared, and “all was quiet on the Rappahannock.” Many +of the senior officers in the Confederate army took advantage of the +lull in operations to visit their homes; but, although his wife urged +him to do the same, Jackson steadfastly refused to absent himself even +for a few days from the front. In November, to his unbounded delight, a +daughter had been born to him. “To a man of his extreme domesticity, +and love for children,” says his wife, “this was a crowning happiness; +and yet, with his great modesty and shrinking from publicity, he +requested that he should not receive the announcement by telegraph, and +when it came to him by letter he kept the glad tidings to +himself—leaving his staff and those around him in the camp to hear of +it from others. This was to him ‘a joy with which a stranger could not +intermeddle,’ and from which even his own hand could not lift the veil +of sanctity. His letters were full of longing to see his little Julia; +for by this name, which had been his mother’s, he had desired her to be +christened, saying, ‘My mother was mindful of me when I was a helpless, +fatherless child, and I wish to commemorate her now.’” + +“How thankful I am,” he wrote, “to our kind Heavenly Father for having +spared my precious wife and given us a little daughter! I cannot tell +how gratified I am, nor how much I wish I could be with you and see my +two darlings. But while this pleasure is denied me, I am thankful it is +accorded to you to have the little pet, and I hope it may be a great +deal of company and comfort to its mother. Now, don’t exert yourself to +write to me, for to know that you were exerting yourself to write would +give me more pain than the letter would pleasure, _so you must not do +it._ But you must love your _esposo_ in the mean time. . . . I expect +you are just now made up with that baby. Don’t you wish +your husband wouldn’t claim any part of it, but let you have the sole +ownership? Don’t you regard it as the most precious little creature in +the world? Do not spoil it, and don’t let anybody tease it. Don’t +permit it to have a bad temper. How I would love to see the darling +little thing! Give her many kisses from her father. “At present I am +fifty miles from Richmond, and eight miles from Guiney’s Station, on +the railroad from Richmond to Fredericksburg. Should I remain here, I +do hope you and baby can come to see me before spring, as you can come +on the railway. Wherever I go, God gives me kind friends. The people +here show me great kindness. I receive invitation after invitation to +dine out and spend the night, and a great many provisions are sent me, +including cakes, tea, loaf-sugar, etc., and the socks and gloves and +handkerchiefs still come! + +“I am so thankful to our ever-kind Heavenly Father for having so +improved my eyes as to enable me to write at night. He continually +showers blessings upon me; and that _you_ should have been spared, and +our darling little daughter given us, fills my heart with overflowing +gratitude. If I know my unworthy self, my desire is to live entirely +and unreservedly to God’s glory. Pray, my darling, that I may so live.” + +Again to his sister-in-law: “I trust God will answer the prayers +offered for peace. Not much comfort is to be expected until this cruel +war terminates. I haven’t seen my wife since last March, and never +having seen my child, you can imagine with what interest I look to +North Carolina.” + +But the tender promptings of his deep natural affection were stilled by +his profound faith that “duty is ours, consequences are God’s.” The +Confederate army, at this time as at all others, suffered terribly from +desertion; and one of his own brigades reported 1,200 officers and men +absent without leave. + +“Last evening,” he wrote to his wife on Christmas Day, “I received a +letter from Dr. Dabney, saying, ‘one of the highest gratifications both +Mrs. Dabney and I could enjoy would be another visit from Mrs. +Jackson,’ and he +invites me to meet you there. He and Mrs. Dabney are very kind, but it +appears to me that it is better for me to remain with my command so +long as the war continues. . . . If all our troops, officers and men, +were at their posts, we might, through God’s blessing, expect a more +speedy termination of the war. The temporal affairs of some are so +deranged as to make a strong plea for their returning home for a short +time; but our God has greatly blessed me and mine during my absence, +and whilst it would be a great comfort to see you and our darling +little daughter, and others in whom I take a special interest, yet duty +appears to require me to remain with my command. It is important that +those at headquarters set an example by remaining at the post of duty.” + +So business at headquarters went on in its accustomed course. There +were inspections to be made, the deficiencies of equipment to be made +good, correspondence to be conducted—and the control of 30,000 men +demanded much office-work—the enemy to be watched, information to be +sifted, topographical data to be collected, and the reports of the +battles to be written. Every morning, as was his invariable habit +during a campaign, the general had an interview with the chiefs of the +commissariat, transport, ordnance, and medical departments, and he +spent many hours in consultation with his topographical engineer. The +great purpose for which Virginia stood in arms was ever present to his +mind, and despite his reticence, his staff knew that he was occupied, +day and night, with the problems that the future might unfold. +Existence at headquarters to the young and high-spirited officers who +formed the military family was not altogether lively. Outside there was +abundance of gaiety. The Confederate army, even on those lonely hills, +managed to extract enjoyment from its surroundings. The hospitality of +the plantations was open to the officers, and wherever Stuart and his +brigadiers pitched their tents, dances and music were the order of the +day. Nor were the men behindhand. Even the heavy snow afforded them +entertainment. Whenever a thaw took place they set themselves to making +snowballs; and great battles, in which one division was arrayed against +another, and which were carried through with the pomp and circumstance +of war, colours flying, bugles sounding, and long lines charging +elaborately planned intrenchments, were a constant source of amusement, +except to unpopular officers. Theatrical and musical performances +enlivened the tedium of the long evenings; and when, by the glare of +the camp-fires, the band of the 5th Virginia broke into the rattling +quick-step of “Dixie’s Land,” not the least stirring of national +anthems, and the great concourse of grey-jackets took up the chorus, +closing it with a yell + +That shivered to the tingling stars, + +the Confederate soldier would not have changed places with the +President himself. + +There was much social intercourse, too, between the different +headquarters. General Lee was no unfrequent visitor to Moss Neck, and +on Christmas Day Jackson’s aides-de-camp provided a sumptuous +entertainment, at which turkeys and oysters figured, for the +Commander-in-Chief and the senior generals. Stuart, too, often invaded +the quarters of his old comrade, and Jackson looked forward to the +merriment that was certain to result just as much as the youngest of +his staff. “Stuart’s exuberant cheerfulness and humour,” says Dabney, +“seemed to be the happy relief, as they were the opposites, to +Jackson’s serious and diffident temper. While Stuart poured out his +‘quips and cranks,’ not seldom at Jackson’s expense, the latter sat by, +sometimes unprepared with any repartee, sometimes blushing, but always +enjoying the jest with a quiet and merry laugh. The ornaments on the +wall of the general’s quarters gave Stuart many a topic of badinage. +Affecting to believe that they were of General Jackson’s selection, he +pointed now to the portrait of some famous race-horse, and now to the +print of some celebrated rat-terrier, as queer revelations of his +private tastes, indicating a great decline in his moral character, +which would be a grief and disappointment to the pious old ladies of +the South. Jackson, with a quiet smile, replied that perhaps he had had +more to do with +race-horses than his friends suspected. It was in the midst of such a +scene as this that dinner was announced, and the two generals passed to +the mess-table. It so happened that Jackson had just received, as a +present from a patriotic lady, some butter, upon the adornment of which +the fair donor had exhausted her housewife’s skill. The servants, in +honour of General Stuart’s presence, had chosen this to grace the +centre of the board. As his eye fell upon it, he paused, and with mock +gravity pointed to it, saying, ‘There, gentlemen! If that is not the +crowning evidence of our host’s sporting tastes. He even has his +favourite game-cock stamped on his butter!’ The dinner, of course, +began with great laughter, in which Jackson joined, with as much +enjoyment as any.” + +Visitors, too, from Europe, attracted by the fame of the army and its +leaders, had made their way into the Confederate lines, and were +received with all the hospitality that the camps afforded. An English +officer has recorded his experiences at Moss Neck:— + +“I brought from Nassau a box of goods (a present from England) for +General Stonewall Jackson, and he asked me when I was at Richmond to +come to his camp and see him. He left the city one morning about seven +o’clock, and about ten landed at a station distant some eight or nine +miles from Jackson’s (or, as his men called him, Old Jack’s) camp. A +heavy fall of snow had covered the country for some time before to the +depth of a foot, and formed a crust over the Virginian mud, which is +quite as villainous as that of Balaclava. The day before had been mild +and wet, and my journey was made in a drenching shower, which soon +cleared away the white mantle of snow. You cannot imagine the slough of +despond I had to pass through. Wet to the skin, I stumbled through mud, +I waded through creeks, I passed through pine-woods, and at last got +into camp about two o’clock. I then made my way to a small house +occupied by the general as his headquarters. I wrote down my name, and +gave it to the orderly, and I was immediately told to walk in. + +“The general rose and greeted me warmly. I expected +to see an old, untidy man, and was most agreeably surprised and pleased +with his appearance. He is tall, handsome, and powerfully built, but +thin. He has brown hair and a brown beard. His mouth expresses great +determination. The lips are thin and compressed firmly together; his +eyes are blue and dark, with keen and searching expression. I was told +that his age was thirty-eight, and he looks forty. The general, who is +indescribably simple and unaffected in all his ways, took off my wet +overcoat with his own hands, made up the fire, brought wood for me to +put my feet on to keep them warm while my boots were drying, and then +began to ask me questions on various subjects. At the dinner hour we +went out and joined the members of his staff. At this meal the general +said grace in a fervent, quiet manner, which struck me very much. After +dinner I returned to his room, and he again talked for a long time. The +servant came in and took his mattress out of a cupboard and laid it on +the floor. + +“As I rose to retire, the general said, ‘Captain, there is plenty of +room on my bed, I hope you will share it with me?’ I thanked him very +much for his courtesy, but said ‘Good-night,’ and slept in a tent, +sharing the blankets of one of his aides-de-camp. In the morning at +breakfast-time I noticed that the general said grace before the meal +with the same fervour I had remarked before. An hour or two afterwards +it was time for me to return to the station; on this occasion, however, +I had a horse, and I returned to the general’s headquarters to bid him +adieu. His little room was vacant, so I slipped in and stood before the +fire. I then noticed my greatcoat stretched before it on a chair. +Shortly afterwards the general entered the room. He said: ‘Captain, I +have been trying to dry your greatcoat, but I am afraid I have not +succeeded very well.’ That little act illustrates the man’s character. +With the care and responsibilities of a vast army on his shoulders he +finds time to do little acts of kindness and thoughtfulness.” + +With each of his staff officers he was on most friendly +terms; and the visitors to his camp, such as the English officer quoted +above, found him a most delightful host, discussing with the ease of an +educated gentleman all manner of topics, and displaying not the +slightest trace of that awkwardness and extreme diffidence which have +been attributed to him. The range and accuracy of his information +surprised them. “Of military history,” said another English soldier, +“he knew more than any other man I met in America; and he was so far +from displaying the somewhat grim characteristics that have been +associated with his name, that one would have thought his tastes lay in +the direction of art and literature.” “His chief delight,” wrote the +Hon. Francis Lawley, who knew him well, “was in the cathedrals of +England, notably in York Minster and Westminster Abbey. He was never +tired of talking about them, or listening to details about the chapels +and cloisters of Oxford.”[6] + +“General Jackson,” writes Lord Wolseley, “had certainly very little to +say about military operations, although he was intensely proud of his +soldiers, and enthusiastic in his devotion to General Lee; and it was +impossible to make him talk of his own achievements. Nor can I say that +his speech betrayed his intellectual powers. But his manner, which was +modesty itself, was most attractive. He put you at your ease at once, +listening with marked courtesy and attention to whatever you might say; +and when the subject of conversation was congenial, he was a most +interesting companion. I quite endorse the statement as to his love for +beautiful things. He told me that in all his travels he had seen +nothing so beautiful as the lancet windows in York Minster.” + +In his daily intercourse with his staff, however, in his office or in +the mess-room, he showed to less advantage than in the society of +strangers. His gravity of demeanour seldom wholly disappeared, his +intense earnestness was in itself oppressive, and he was often absent +and preoccupied. “Life at headquarters,” says one of his staff +officers, “was decidedly dull. Our meals were often very +dreary. The general had no time for light or trivial conversation, and +he sometimes felt it his duty to rebuke our thoughtless and perhaps +foolish remarks. Nor was it always quite safe to approach him. +Sometimes he had a tired look in his eyes, and although he never +breathed a word to one or another, we knew that he was dissatisfied +with what was being done with the army.”[7] + +Intense concentration of thought and purpose, in itself an indication +of a powerful will, had distinguished Jackson from his very boyhood. +During his campaigns he would pace for hours outside his tent, his +hands clasped behind his back, absorbed in meditation; and when the +army was on the march, he would ride for hours without raising his eyes +or opening his lips. It was unquestionably at such moments that he was +working out his plans, step by step, forecasting the counter-movements +of the enemy, and providing for every emergency that might occur. And +here the habit of keeping his whole faculties fixed on a single object, +and of imprinting on his memory the successive processes of complicated +problems, fostered by the methods of study which, both at West Point +and Lexington, the weakness of his eyes had made compulsory, must have +been an inestimable advantage. Brilliant strategical manœuvres, it +cannot be too often repeated, are not a matter of inspiration and of +decision on the spur of the moment. The problems presented by a theatre +of war, with their many factors, are not to be solved except by a +vigorous and sustained intellectual effort. “If,” said Napoleon, “I +always appear prepared, it is because, before entering on an +undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may +occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what +I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and +meditation.” + +The proper objective, speaking in general terms, of all military +operations is the main army of the enemy, for a campaign can never be +brought to a successful conclusion until the hostile forces in the +field have become demoralised +by defeat; but, to ensure success, preponderance of numbers is usually +essential, and it may be said, therefore, that the proper objective is +the enemy’s main army when it is in inferior strength. + +Under ordinary conditions, the first step, then, towards victory must +be a movement, or a series of movements, which will compel the enemy to +divide his forces, and put it out of his power to assemble even equal +strength on the battle-field. + +This entails a consideration of the strategic points upon the theatre +of war, for it is by occupying or threatening some point which the +enemy cannot afford to lose that he will be induced to disperse his +army, or to place himself in a position where he can be attacked at a +disadvantage. While his main army, therefore, is the ultimate +objective, certain strategic points become the initial objectives, to +be occupied or threatened either by the main body or detached forces. +It is seldom, however, that these initial objectives are readily +discovered; and it is very often the case that even the ultimate +objective may be obscured. + +These principles are well illustrated by the operations in the Valley +of Virginia during the month of May and the first fortnight of June, +1862. After the event it is easy to see that Banks’ army was Jackson’s +proper objective—being the principal force in the secondary theatre of +war. But at the time, before the event, Lee and Jackson alone realised +the importance of overwhelming Banks and thus threatening Washington. +It was not realised by Johnston, a most able soldier, for the whole of +his correspondence goes to show that he thought a purely defensive +attitude the best policy for the Valley Army. It was not realised by +Jackson’s subordinates, for it was not till long after the battle of +Winchester that the real purport of the operations in which they had +been engaged began to dawn on them. It was not realised by Lincoln, by +Stanton, or even by McClellan, for to each of them the sudden attack on +Front Royal was as much of a surprise as to Banks himself; and we may +be perfectly confident that none but a trained strategist, after +a prolonged study of the map and the situation, would realise it now. + +It is to be noted, too, that Jackson’s initial objectives—the +strategical points in the Valley—were invariably well selected. The +Luray Gap, the single road which gives access across the Massanuttons +from one side of the Valley to the other, was the most important. The +flank position on Elk Run, the occupation of which so suddenly brought +up Banks, prevented him interposing between Jackson and Edward Johnson, +and saved Staunton from capture, was a second; Front Royal, by seizing +which he threatened Banks at Strasburg in flank and rear, compelling +him to a hasty retreat, and bringing him to battle on ground which he +had not prepared, a third; and the position at Port Republic, +controlling the only bridge across the Shenandoah, and separating +Shields from Frémont, a fourth. The bearing of all these localities was +overlooked by the Federals, and throughout the campaign we cannot fail +to notice a great confusion on their part as regards objectives. They +neither recognised what the aim of their enemy would be, nor at what +they should aim themselves. It was long before they discovered that +Lee’s army, and not Richmond, was the vital point of the Confederacy. +Not a single attempt was made to seize strategic points, and if we may +judge from the orders and dispatches in the Official Records, their +existence was never recognised. To this oversight the successive +defeats of the Northern forces were in great part due. From McClellan +to Banks, each one of their generals appears to have been blind to the +advantages that may be derived from a study of the theatre of war. Not +one of them hit upon a line of operations which embarrassed the +Confederates, and all possessed the unhappy knack of joining battle on +the most unfavourable terms. Moreover, when it at last became clear +that the surest means of conquering a country is to defeat its armies, +the true objective was but vaguely realised. The annihilation of the +enemy’s troops seems to have been the last thing dreamt of. +Opportunities of crushing him in detail were neither sought for nor +created. As General +Sheridan said afterwards: “The trouble with the commanders of the Army +of the Potomac was that they never marched out to ‘lick’ anybody; all +they thought of was to escape being ‘licked’ themselves.” + +But it is not sufficient, in planning strategical combinations, to +arrive at a correct conclusion as regards the objective. Success +demands a most careful calculation of ways and means: of the numbers at +disposal; of food, forage, and ammunition; and of the forces to he +detached for secondary purposes. The different factors of the +problem—the strength and dispositions of the enemy, the roads, +railways, fortresses, weather, natural features, the _moral_ of the +opposing armies, the character of the opposing general, the facilities +for supply have each and all of them to be considered, their relative +prominence assigned to them, and their conflicting claims to be brought +into adjustment. + +For such mental exertion Jackson was well equipped. He had made his own +the experience of others. His knowledge of history made him familiar +with the principles which had guided Washington and Napoleon in the +selection of objectives, and with the means by which they attained +them. It is not always easy to determine the benefit, beyond a +theoretical acquaintance with the phenomena of the battle-field, to be +derived from studying the campaigns of the great masters of war. It is +true that no successful general, whatever may have been his practical +knowledge, has neglected such study; but while many have borne witness +to its efficacy, none have left a record of the manner in which their +knowledge of former campaigns influenced their own conduct. + +In the case of Stonewall Jackson, however, we have much evidence, +indirect, but unimpeachable, as to the value to a commander of the +knowledge thus acquired. The Maxims of Napoleon, carried in his +haversack, were constantly consulted throughout his campaigns, and this +little volume contains a fairly complete exposition, in Napoleon’s own +words, of the grand principles of war. Moreover, Jackson often quoted +principles which are not to be found in the Maxims, but on which +Napoleon +consistently acted. It is clear, therefore, that he had studied the +campaigns of the great Corsican in order to discover the principles on +which military success is based; that having studied and reflected on +those principles, and the effect their application produced, in +numerous concrete cases, they became so firmly imbedded in his mind as +to be ever present, guiding him into the right path, or warning him +against the wrong, whenever he had to deal with a strategic or tactical +situation. + +It may be noted, moreover, that these principles, especially those +which he was accustomed to quote, were concerned far more with the +moral aspect of war than with the material. It is a fair inference, +therefore, that it was to the study of human nature as affected by the +conditions of war, by discipline, by fear, by the want of food, by want +of information, by want of confidence, by the weight of responsibility, +by political interests, and, above all, by surprise, that his attention +was principally directed. He found in the campaigns of Jena and of +Austerlitz not merely a record of marches and manœuvres, of the use of +intrenchments, or of the general rules for attack and defence; this is +the mechanical and elementary part of the science of command. What +Jackson learned was the truth of the famous maxim that the moral is to +the physical—that is, to armament and numbers—as three to one. He +learned, too, to put himself into his adversary’s place and to realise +his weakness. He learned, in a word, that war is a struggle between two +intellects rather than the conflict of masses; and it was by reason of +this knowledge that he played on the hearts of his enemies with such +extraordinary skill. + +It is not to be asserted, however, that the study of military history +is an infallible means of becoming a great or even a good general. The +first qualification necessary for a leader of men is a strong +character, the second, a strong intellect. With both Providence had +endowed Jackson, and the strong intellect illuminates and explains the +page that to others is obscure and meaningless. With its innate faculty +for discerning what is essential and for discarding unimportant +details, it discovers most valuable lessons +where ordinary men see neither light nor leading. Endowed with the +power of analysis and assimilation, and accustomed to observe and to +reflect upon the relations between cause and effect, it will +undoubtedly penetrate far deeper into the actual significance and +practical bearing of historical facts than the mental vision which is +less acute. + +Jackson, by reason of his antecedent training, was eminently capable of +the sustained intellectual efforts which strategical conceptions +involve. Such was his self-command that under the most adverse +conditions, the fatigues and anxieties of a campaign, the fierce +excitement of battle, his brain, to use the words of a great +Confederate general, “worked with the precision of the most perfect +machinery.”[8] But it was not only in the field, when the necessity for +action was pressing, that he was accustomed to seclude himself with his +own thoughts. Nor was he content with considering his immediate +responsibilities. His interest in the general conduct of the war was of +a very thorough-going character. While in camp on the Rappahannock, he +followed with the closest attention the movements of the armies +operating in the Valley of the Mississippi, and made himself +acquainted, so far as was possible, not only with the local conditions +of the war, but also with the character of the Federal leaders. It was +said that, in the late spring of 1862, it was the intention of Mr. +Davis to transfer him to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and +it is possible that some inkling of this determination induced him to +study the Western theatre.[9] Be this as it may, the general situation, +military and political, was always in his mind, and despite the victory +of Fredericksburg, the future was dark and the indications ominous. + +According to the Official Records, the North, at the beginning of +April, had more than 900,000 soldiers under +arms; the South, so far as can be ascertained, not more than 600,000. +The Army of the Potomac was receiving constant reinforcements, and at +the beginning of April, 130,000 men were encamped on the Stafford +Heights. In the West, the whole extent of the Mississippi, with the +exception of the hundred miles between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, was +held by the Federals, and those important fortresses were both +threatened by large armies, acting in concert with a formidable fleet +of gunboats. A third army, over 50,000 strong, was posted at +Murfreesboro’, in the heart of Tennessee, and large detached forces +were operating in Louisiana and Arkansas. The inroads of the enemy in +the West, greatly aided by the waterways, were in fact far more serious +than in the East; but even in Virginia, although the Army of the +Potomac had spent nearly two years in advancing fifty miles, the +Federals had a strong foothold. Winchester had been reoccupied. +Fortress Monroe was still garrisoned. Suffolk, on the south bank of the +James, seventy miles from Richmond, was held by a force of 20,000 men; +while another small army, of about the same strength, occupied New +Berne, on the North Carolina coast. + +Slowly but surely, before the pressure of vastly superior numbers, the +frontiers of the Confederacy were contracting; and although in no +single direction had a Federal army moved more than a few miles from +the river which supplied it, yet the hostile occupation of these +rivers, so essential to internal traffic, was making the question of +subsistence more difficult every day. Louisiana, Texas and Arkansas, +the cattle-raising States, were practically cut off from the remainder; +and in a country where railways were few, distances long, and roads +indifferent, it was impossible, in default of communication by water, +to accumulate and distribute the produce of the farms. Moreover, the +dark menace of the blockade had assumed more formidable proportions. +The Federal navy, gradually increasing in numbers and activity, held +the highway of the ocean in an iron grip; and proudly though the +Confederacy bore her isolation, men looked across the waters with dread +foreboding, for the shadow of their doom was already rising from the +pitiless sea. + +If, then, his staff officers had some reason to complain of their +chief’s silence and abstraction, it was by no means unfortunate for the +South, so imminent was the danger, that the strong brain was +incessantly occupied in forecasting the emergencies that might occur. + +But not for a single moment did Jackson despair of ultimate success. +His faith in the justice of the Southern cause was as profound as his +trust in God’s good providence. He had long since realised that the +overwhelming strength of the Federals was more apparent than real. He +recognised their difficulties; he knew that the size of an army is +limited to the number that can be subsisted, and he relied much on the +superior _moral_ and the superior leading of the Confederate troops. +After long and mature deliberation he had come to a conclusion as to +the policy to be pursued. “We must make this campaign,” he said, in a +moment of unusual expansion, “an exceedingly active one. Only thus can +a weaker country cope with a stronger; it must make up in activity what +it lacks in strength. A defensive campaign can only be made successful +by taking the aggressive at the proper time. Napoleon never waited for +his adversary to become fully prepared, but struck him the first blow.” + +On these principles Jackson had good reason to believe General Lee had +determined to act;[10] of their efficacy he was convinced, and when his +wife came to visit him at the end of April, she found him in good heart +and the highest spirits. He not only anticipated a decisive result from +the forthcoming operations, but he had seen with peculiar satisfaction +that a more manly tone was pervading the Confederate army. Taught by +their leaders, by Lee, Jackson, Stuart, and many others, of whose worth +and valour they had received convincing proof, the Southern soldiers +had begun to practise the clean and wholesome virtue of self-control. +They had discovered that purity +and temperance are by no means incompatible with military prowess, and +that a practical piety, faithful in small things as in great, detracts +in no degree from skill and resolution in the field. The Stonewall +Brigade set the example. As soon as their own huts were finished, the +men, of their own volition, built a log church, where both officers and +men, without distinction of rank, were accustomed to assemble during +the winter evenings; and those rude walls, illuminated by pine torches +cut from the neighbouring forest, witnessed such scenes as filled +Jackson’s cup of content to overflowing. A chaplain writes: “The devout +listener, dressed in simple grey, ornamented only with three stars, +which any Confederate colonel was entitled to wear, is our great +commander, Robert Edward Lee. That dashing-looking cavalry-man, with +‘fighting jacket,’ plumed hat, jingling spurs, and gay decorations, but +solemn, devout aspect during the service, is ‘Jeb’ Stuart, the flower +of cavaliers—and all through the vast crowd wreaths and stars of rank +mingle with the bars of the subordinate officers and the rough garb of +the private soldier. But perhaps the most supremely happy of the +gathered thousands is Stonewall Jackson.” “One could not,” says +another, “sit in that pulpit and meet the concentrated gaze of those +men without deep emotion. I remembered that they were the veterans of +many a bloody field. The eyes which looked into mine, waiting for the +Gospel of peace, had looked steadfastly upon whatever is terrible in +war. Their earnestness of aspect constantly impressed me. . . . They +looked as if they had come on business, and very important business, +and the preacher could scarcely do otherwise than feel that he, too, +had business of moment there! + +At this time, largely owing to Jackson’s exertions, chaplains were +appointed to regiments and brigades, and ministers from all parts of +the country were invited to visit the camps. The Chaplains’ +Association, which did a good work in the army, was established at his +suggestion, and although he steadfastly declined to attend its +meetings, +deeming them outside his functions, nothing was neglected, so far as +lay within his power, that might forward the moral welfare of the +troops. + +But at the same time their military efficiency and material comforts +received his constant attention. Discipline was made stricter, indolent +and careless officers were summarily dismissed, and the divisions were +drilled at every favourable opportunity. Headquarters had been +transferred to a tent near to Hamilton’s Crossing, the general +remarking, “It is rather a relief to get where there will be less +comfort than in a room, as I hope thereby persons will be prevented +from encroaching so much upon my time.” On his wife’s arrival he moved +to Mr. Yerby’s plantation, near Hamilton’s Crossing, but “he did not +permit,” she writes, “the presence of his family to interfere in any +way with his military duties. The greater part of each day he spent at +his headquarters, but returned as early as he could get off from his +labours, and devoted all his leisure time to ha visitors—little Julia +having his chief attention and his care. His devotion to his child was +remarked upon by all who beheld the happy pair together, for she soon +learned to delight in his caresses as much as he loved to play with +her. An officer’s wife, who saw him often during this time, wrote to a +friend in Richmond that ‘the general spent all his leisure time in +playing with the baby.’” + +April 29 But these quiet and happy days were soon ended. On April 29 +the roar of cannon was heard once more at Gurney’s Station, salvo after +salvo following in quick succession, until the house shook and the +windows rattled with the reverberations. The crash of musketry +succeeded, rapid and continuous, and before the sun was high wounded +men were brought in to the shelter of Mr. Yerby’s outhouses. Very early +in the morning a message from the pickets had come in, and after making +arrangements for his wife and child to leave at once for Richmond, the +general, without waiting for breakfast, had hastened to the front. The +Federals were crossing the +Rappahannock, and Stonewall Jackson had gone to his last field.[11] + +NOTE + +Headquarters, Second Corps, Army of N. Va.: +April 13, 1863. + +General Orders, No. 26. + +I. . . . . . . . . + +II. Each division will move precisely at the time indicated in the +order of march, and if a division or brigade is not ready to move at +that time, the next will proceed and take its place, even if a division +should be separated thereby. + +III. On the march the troops are to have a rest of ten minutes each +hour. The rate of march is not to exceed one mile in twenty-five +minutes, unless otherwise specially ordered. The time of each division +commander will be taken from that of the corps commander. When the +troops are halted for the purpose of resting, arms will be stacked, +ranks broken, and in no case during the march will the troops be +allowed to break ranks without previously stacking arms. + +IV. When any part of a battery or train is disabled on a march, the +officer in charge must have it removed immediately from the road, so +that no part of the command be impeded upon its march. + +Batteries or trains must not stop in the line of march to water; when +any part of a battery or train, from any cause, loses its place in the +column, it must not pass any part of the column in regaining its place. + +Company commanders will march at the rear of their respective +companies; officers must be habitually occupied in seeing that orders +are strictly enforced; a day’s march should be with them a day of +labour; as much vigilance is required on the march as in camp. + +Each division commander will, as soon as he arrive at his +camping-ground, have the company rolls called, and guard details +marched to the front of the regiment before breaking ranks; and +immediately afterwards establish his chain of sentinels, and post his +pickets so as to secure the safety of his command, and will soon +thereafter report to their headquarters the disposition made for the +security of his camp. + +Division commanders will see that all orders respecting their divisions +are carried out strictly; each division commander before leaving an +encampment will have all damages occasioned by his command settled for +by payment or covered by proper certificates. + +V. All ambulances in the same brigade will be receipted for by the +brigade quartermaster, they will be parked together, and habitually +kept together, not being separated unless the exigencies of the service +require, and on marches follow in rear of their respective brigades. + +Ample details will be made for taking care of the wounded; +those selected will wear the prescribed badge; and no other person +belonging to the army will be permitted to take part in this important +trust. + +Any one leaving his appropriate duty, under pretext of taking care of +the wounded, will be promptly arrested, and as soon as charges can be +made out, they will be forwarded. + +By command of Lieutenant-General Jackson, + +A. S. PENDLETON, +_Assistant Adjutant-General._ + + [1] The report of Sharpsburg, which Jackson had not yet revised at the + time of his death, is not altogether free from exaggeration. + + [2] On January 23 the daily ration was a quarter of a pound of beef, + and one-fifth of a pound of sugar was ordered to be issued in + addition, but there was no sugar! Lee to Davis, O.R., vol. xxi, p. + 1110. In the Valley, during the autumn, the ration had been one and + one-eighth pound of flour, and one and a quarter pounds of beef. On + March 27 the ration was eighteen ounces of flour, and four ounces of + indifferent bacon, with occasional issues of rice, sugar, or molasses. + Symptoms of scurvy were appearing, and to supply the place of + vegetables each regiment was directed to send men daily to gather + sassafras buds, wild onions, garlic, etc., etc. Still “the men are + cheerful,” writes Lee, “and I receive no complaints.” O.R., vol. xxv, + part ii, p. 687. On April 17 the ration had been increased by ten + pounds of rice to every 100 men about every third day, with a few peas + and dried fruits occasionally. O.R., vol. xxv, part ii, p. 730. + + [3] On January 19, 1,200 pairs of shoes and 400 or 500 pairs of + blankets were forwarded for issue to men without either in D. H. + Hill’s division, O.R., vol. xxi, p. 1097. In the Louisiana brigade on + the same date, out of 1,500 men, 400 had no covering for their feet + whatever. A large number had not a particle of underclothing, shirts, + socks, or drawers; overcoats were so rare as to be a curiosity; the + 5th Regiment could not drill for want of shoes; the 8th was almost + unfit for duty from the same cause; the condition of the men’s feet, + from long exposure, was horrible, and the troops were almost totally + unprovided with cooking utensils. O.R., vol. xxi, p. 1098. + + [4] O.R., vol. xxi, p. 1098. + + [5] Cooke, p. 389. + + [6] _The Times,_ June 11, 1863. + + [7] Letter from Dr. Hunter McGuire. + + [8] General G. B. Gordon. _Introduction to Memoirs of Stonewall + Jackson,_ p. 14. + + [9] In April he wrote to his wife: “There is increasing probability + that I may be elsewhere as the season advances.” That he said no more + is characteristic. + + [10] “There is no better way of defending a long line than by moving + into the enemy’s country.” Lee to General Jones, March 21, 1863; O.R., + vol. xxv, part ii, p. 680. + + [11] The Army of the Potomac was now constituted as follows:— + +Engineer Brigade +First Corps +Second Corps +Third Corps Reynolds +Couch +Sickles Divisions Birney +Berry +Whipple Fifth Corps +Sixth Corps +Eleventh Corps Meade +Sedgwick +Howard Divisions McLean +Von Steinwehr +Schurz Twelfth Corps Slocum Divisions Williams +Geary Cavalry Corps Stoneman Divisions Pleasanton +Averell +Gregg. + + + + +Chapter XXIII +CHANCELLORSVILLE + + +It has already been said that while the Army of Northern Virginia lay +in winter quarters the omens did not point to decisive success in the +forthcoming campaign. During the same period that Lincoln and Stanton, +taught by successive disasters, had ceased to interfere with their +generals, Jefferson Davis and Mr. Seddon, his new Secretary of War, had +taken into their own hands the complete control of military operations. +The results appeared in the usual form: on the Northern side, unity of +purpose and concentration; on the Southern, uncertainty of aim and +dispersion. In the West the Confederate generals were fatally hampered +by the orders of the President. In the East the Army of Northern +Virginia, confronted by a mass of more than 130,000 foes, was deprived +of three of Longstreet’s divisions; and when, at the end of April, it +was reported that Hooker was advancing, it was absolutely impossible +that this important detachment could rejoin in time to assist in the +defence of the Rappahannock. + +[Illustration: Hooker’s Plan of Campaign.] + +A full discussion of the Chancellorsville campaign does not fall within +the scope of this biography, but in justice to the Southern generals—to +Lee who resolved to stand his ground, and to Jackson who approved the +resolution—it must be explained that they were in no way responsible +for the absence of 20,000 veterans. Undoubtedly the situation on the +Atlantic littoral was sufficiently embarrassing to the Confederate +authorities. The presence of a Federal force at New Berne, in North +Carolina, threatened the main line of railway by which Wilmington and +Charleston communicated with Richmond, and these two ports were of the +utmost +importance to the Confederacy. So enormous were the profits arising +from the exchange of munitions of war and medicines[1] for cotton and +tobacco that English ship-owners embarked eagerly on a lucrative if +precarious traffic. Blockade-running became a recognised business. +Companies were organised which possessed large fleets of swift +steamers. The Bahamas and Bermuda became vast entrepôts of trade. +English seamen were not to be deterred from a perilous enterprise by +fear of Northern broadsides or Northern prisons, and despite the number +and activity of the blockading squadrons the cordon of cruisers and +gunboats was constantly broken. Many vessels were sunk, many captured, +many wrecked on a treacherous coast, and yet enormous quantities of +supplies found their way to the arsenals and magazines of Richmond and +Atlanta. The railways, then, leading from Wilmington and Charleston, +the ports most accessible to the blockade-runners, were almost +essential to the existence of the Confederacy. Soon after the battle of +Fredericksburg, General D. H. Hill was placed in command of the forces +which protected them, and, at the beginning of the New Year, Ransom’s +division[2] was drawn from the Rappahannock to reinforce the local +levies. A few weeks later[3] General Lee was induced by Mr. Seddon to +send Longstreet, with the divisions of Hood and Pickett,[4] to cover +Richmond, which was menaced both from Fortress Monroe and Suffolk.[5] + +The Commander-in-Chief, however, while submitting to this detachment as +a necessary evil, had warned General Longstreet so to dispose his +troops that they could return to the Rappahannock at the first alarm. +“The enemy’s position,” he wrote, “on the sea-coast had been probably +occupied merely for purposes of defence, it was likely that they were +strongly intrenched, and nothing would be gained by attacking them.” + +The warning, however, was disregarded; and that Mr. Seddon should have +yielded, in the first instance, to the influence of the sea-power, +exciting apprehensions of sudden attack along the whole seaboard of the +Confederacy, may be forgiven him. Important lines of communication were +certainly exposed. But when, in defiance of Lee’s advice that the +divisions should be retained within easy reach of Fredericksburg, he +suggested to Longstreet the feasibility of an attack on Suffolk, one +hundred and twenty miles distant from the Rappahannock, he committed an +unpardonable blunder. + +Had Jackson been in Longstreet’s place, the Secretary’s proposal, +however promising of personal renown, would unquestionably have been +rejected. The leader who had kept the main object so steadfastly in +view throughout the Valley campaign would never have overlooked the +expressed wishes of the Commander-in-Chief. Longstreet, however, +brilliant fighting soldier as he was, appears to have misconceived the +duties of a detached force. He was already prejudiced in favour of a +movement against Suffolk. Before he left for his new command, he had +suggested to Lee that one army corps only should remain on the +Rappahannock, while the other operated south of Richmond; and soon +after his arrival he urged upon his superior that, in case Hooker +moved, the Army of Northern Virginia should retire to the North Anna. +In short, to his mind the operations of the main body should be made +subservient to those of the detached force; Lee, with 30,000 men, +holding Hooker’s 130,000 in check until Longstreet had won his victory +and could march north to join him. Such strategy was not likely to find +favour at headquarters. It was abundantly evident, in the first place, +that the Army of Northern Virginia must be the principal objective of +the Federals; and, in the second place, that the defeat of the force of +Suffolk, if it were practicable, would have no effect whatever upon +Hooker’s action, except insomuch that his knowledge of Longstreet’s +absence might quicken his resolution to advance. Had Suffolk been a +point vital to the North the question would have assumed a different +shape. As it was, the town merely covered a tract of conquered +territory, the Norfolk dockyard, and the mouth of the James River. The +Confederates would gain little by its capture; the Federals would +hardly feel its loss. It was most improbable that a single man of +Hooker’s army would be detached to defend a point of such comparative +insignificance, and it was quite possible that Longstreet would be +unable to get back in time to meet him, even on the North Anna. General +Lee, however, anxious as ever to defer to the opinions of the man on +the spot, as well as to meet the wishes of the Government, yielded to +Longstreet’s insistence that a fine opportunity for an effective blow +presented itself, and in the first week of April the latter marched +against Suffolk. + +April 17 His movement was swift and sudden. But, as Lee had +anticipated, the Federal position was strongly fortified, with the +flanks secure, and Longstreet had no mind to bring matters to a speedy +conclusion. “He could reduce the place,” he wrote on April 17, “in two +or three days, but the expenditure of ammunition would be very large; +or he could take it by assault, but at a cost of 3,000 men.” + +The Secretary of War agreed with him that the sacrifice would be too +great, and so, at a time when Hooker was becoming active on the +Rappahannock, Lee’s lieutenant was quietly investing Suffolk, one +hundred and twenty miles away. + +From that moment the Commander-in-Chief abandoned all hope that his +missing divisions would be with him when Hooker moved. Bitterly indeed +was he to suffer for his selection of a commander for his detached +force. The loss of 3,000 men at Suffolk, had the works been stormed, +and Hood and Pickett marched instantly to the Rappahannock, would have +been more than repaid. The addition of 12,000 fine soldiers, flushed +with success, and led by two of the most brilliant fighting generals in +the Confederate armies, would have made the victory of Chancellorsville +a decisive triumph. Better still had Longstreet adhered to his original +orders. But both he and Mr. Seddon forgot, as +Jackson never did, the value of time, and the grand principle of +concentration at the decisive point. + +Happily for the South, Hooker, although less flagrantly, was also +oblivious of the first axiom of war. As soon as the weather improved he +determined to move against Richmond. His task, however, was no simple +one. On the opposite bank of the Rappahannock, from Banks’ Ford to Port +Royal, a distance of twenty miles, frowned line upon line of +fortifications, protected by abattis, manned by a numerous artillery, +against which it was difficult to find position for the Federal guns, +and occupied by the victors of Fredericksburg. A frontal attack gave +even less promise of success than in Burnside’s disastrous battle. But +behind Lee’s earthworks were his lines of supply; the Richmond Railway, +running due south, with the road to Bowling Green alongside; and +second, the plank road, which, running at first due west, led past +Chancellorsville, a large brick mansion, standing in a dense forest, to +Orange Court House and the depôts on the Virginia Central Railroad. + +At these roads and railways Hooker determined to strike, expecting that +Lee would at once fall back, and give the Army of the Potomac the +opportunity of delivering a heavy blow.[6] To effect his object he +divided his 130,000 men into three distinct bodies. The cavalry, which, +with the exception of one small brigade, had moved under General +Stoneman to Warrenton Junction, was to march by way of Rappahannock +Station, and either capturing or passing Culpeper and Gordonsville, to +cut the Confederate communications, and should Lee retreat, to hold him +fast.[7] General Sedgwick, with two army corps, the First and Sixth, +forming the left wing of the army, was to cross the river below +Fredericksburg, make a brisk demonstration of attack, and if the enemy +fell back follow him rapidly down the Bowling Green and Telegraph +roads. Then, while Lee’s attention was thus attracted, the right wing, +composed of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps, with Pleasonton’s +brigade of cavalry, under Hooker’s own command, would move up the +Rappahannock to Kelly’s Ford, push forward to the Rapidan, cross at +Ely’s and Germanna fords, and march upon Chancellorsville. The Third +Corps was to remain concentrated on the Stafford Heights, ready to +reinforce either wing as circumstances might require. The Second Corps +was to leave one division on outpost at Falmouth, and to post two +divisions on the north bank of the Rappahannock opposite Banks’ Ford. + +It will be observed that this design would place a wide interval +between the two wings of the Federal army, thus giving the +Confederates, although much inferior in numbers, the advantage of the +interior lines.[8] Hooker, however, who knew the Confederate strength +to a man, was confident that Lee, directly he found his position +turned, and Stoneman in his rear, would at once retreat on Richmond. +Yet he was not blind to the possibility that his great adversary, +always daring, might assume the offensive, and attempt to crush the +Federal wings in detail. Still the danger appeared small. Either wing +was practically equal to the whole Confederate force. Sedgwick had +40,000, with the Third Corps, 19,000, and a division of the Second, +5,500, close at hand; Hooker 42,000, with two divisions of the Second +Corps, 11,000, at Banks’ Ford; the Third Corps could reinforce him in +less than four-and-twenty hours; and Stoneman’s 10,000 sabres, riding +at will amongst Lee’s supply depôts, would surely prevent him from +attacking. Still precaution was taken in case the attempt were made. +Sedgwick, if the enemy detached any considerable part of his force +towards Chancellorsville, was “to carry the works at all hazards, and +establish his force on the Telegraph road.”[9] The right wing, “if not +strongly resisted, was to advance at all hazards, and secure a position +uncovering +Banks’ Ford.”[10] Were the Confederates found in force near +Chancellorsville, it was to select a strong position and await attack +on its own ground, while Sedgwick, coming up from Fredericksburg, would +assail the enemy in flank and rear. + +Such was the plan which, if resolutely carried out, bade fair to crush +Lee’s army between the upper and the nether millstones, and it seems +that the size and condition of his forces led Hooker to anticipate an +easy victory. If the Army of the Potomac was not “the finest on the +planet,” as in an order of the day he boastfully proclaimed it, it +possessed many elements of strength. Hooker was a strict disciplinarian +with a talent for organisation. He had not only done much to improve +the efficiency of his troops, but his vigorous measures had gone far to +restore their confidence. When he succeeded Burnside a large proportion +of the soldiers had lost heart and hope. The generals who had hitherto +commanded them, when compared with Lee and Jackson, were mere pigmies, +and the consciousness that this was the case had affected the entire +army. The Official Records contain much justification of Jackson’s +anxiety that Burnside should be fought on the North Anna, where, if +defeated, he might have been pursued. Although there had been no +pursuit after the battle of Fredericksburg, no harassing marches, no +continued retreat, with lack of supplies, abandoning of wounded, and +constant alarms, the Federal regiments had suffered terribly in +_moral._ + +“The winter rains set in,” said Hooker, “and all operations were for a +while suspended, the army literally finding itself buried in mud, from +which there was no hope of extrication before spring. + +“With this prospect before it, taken in connection with the gloom and +despondency which followed the disaster of Fredericksburg, the army was +in a forlorn, deplorable condition. Reference to the letters from the +army at this time, public and private, affords abundant evidence of its +demoralisation; and these, in their turn, had their effect upon the +friends and relatives of the soldiers at +home. At the time the army was turned over to me desertions were at the +rate of about two hundred a day. So anxious were parents, wives, +brothers and sisters, to relieve their kindred, that they filled the +express trains with packages of citizens’ clothing to assist them in +escaping from service. At that time, perhaps, a majority of the +officers, especially those high in rank, were hostile to the policy of +the Government in the conduct of the war. The emancipation proclamation +had been published a short time before, and a large element of the army +had taken sides antagonistic to it, declaring that they would never +have embarked in the war had they anticipated the action of the +Government. When rest came to the army, the disaffected, from whatever +cause, began to show themselves, and make their influence felt in and +out of the camps. I may also state that at the moment I was placed in +command I caused a return to be made of the absentees of the army, and +found the number to be 2,922 commissioned officers and 81,964 +non-commissioned officers and privates. They were scattered all over, +the country, and the majority were absent from causes unknown.”[11] + +In the face of this remarkable report it is curious to read, in the +pages of a brilliant military historian, that “armies composed of the +citizens of a free country, who have taken up arms from patriotic +motives . . . have constantly exhibited an astonishing endurance, and +possessing a bond of cohesion superior to discipline, have shown their +power to withstand shocks that would dislocate the structure of other +military organisations.”[12] A force which had lost twenty-five per +cent of its strength by desertion, although it had never been pursued +after defeat, would not generally be suspected of peculiar solidity. +Nevertheless, the Northern soldiers must receive their due. Want of +discipline made fearful ravages in the ranks, but, notwithstanding the +defection of so many of their comrades, those that remained faithful +displayed the best characteristics of their +race. The heart of the army was still sound, and only the influence of +a strong and energetic commander was required to restore its vitality. +This influence was supplied by Hooker. The cumbrous organisation of +Grand Divisions was abolished. Disloyal and unsuccessful generals were +removed. Salutary changes were introduced into the various departments +of the staff. The cavalry, hitherto formed in independent brigades, was +consolidated into a corps of three divisions and a brigade of regulars, +and under a system of careful and uniform inspection made rapid +improvement. Strong measures were taken to reduce the number of +deserters. The ranks were filled by the return of absentees. New +regiments were added to the army corps. The troops were constantly +practised in field exercises, and generals of well-deserved reputation +were selected for the different commands. “All were actuated,” wrote +Hooker, “by feelings of confidence and devotion to the cause, and I +felt that it was a living army, and one well worthy of the Republic.” + +On April 27, after several demonstrations, undertaken with a view of +confusing the enemy, had been made at various points, the grand +movement began. + +The Confederate army still held the lines it had occupied for the past +four months. Jackson’s army corps extended from Hamilton’s Crossing to +Port Royal. McLaws’ and Anderson’s divisions occupied Lee’s Hill and +the ridge northward, and a brigade watched Banks’ Ford. Stuart was with +his main body, some 2,400 strong, at Culpeper, observing the great mass +of Federal horsemen at Warrenton Junction, and the line of the +Rappahannock was held by cavalry pickets. + +The strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, so far as can be +ascertained, did not exceed 62,000 officers and men. + +_Second Corps_ + +A. P. Hill’s Division +Bodes’ Division +Colston’s (Jackson’s own) Division +Early’s Division +Artillery 11,500 9,500 6,600 7,500 2,100 + +_First Corps_ + +Anderson’s Division +McLaws’ Division +Artillery 8,100 +8,600 +1,000 + +_Cavalry_ + +Fitzhugh Lee’s Brigade +W. H. F. Lee’s Brigade (two regiments) +Reserve Artillery +Add for reinforcements received since March 1, date of last return +1,500 +900 +700 + +4,000 ——— +Total 62,000 +and 170 guns. + +Thus the road to Richmond, threatened by a host of 130,000 men and 428 +guns, was to be defended by a force of less than half the size. +Ninety-nine generals out of a hundred would have considered the +situation hopeless. The Confederate lines at Fredericksburg were +certainly very strong, but it was clearly impossible to prevent the +Federals outflanking them. The disparity in strength was far greater +than at Sharpsburg, and it seemed that by sheer weight of numbers the +Southern army must inevitably be driven back. Nor did it appear, so +overwhelming were the Federal numbers, that counter-attack was +feasible. The usual resource of the defender, if his adversary marches +round his flank, is to strike boldly at his communications. Here, +however, Hooker’s communications with Aquia Creek were securely covered +by the Rappahannock, and so great was his preponderance of strength, +that he could easily detach a sufficient force to check the +Confederates should they move against them. + +Yet now, as on the Antietam, Lee and Jackson declined to take numbers +into consideration. They knew that Hooker was a brave and experienced +soldier, but they had no reason to anticipate that he would handle his +vast masses with more skill than McClellan. That the Northern soldiers +had suffered in _moral_ they were well aware, and while they divined +that the position they themselves had fortified might readily be made +untenable, the fact that such was the case gave them small concern. +They were agreed +that the best measures of defence, if an opening offered, lay in a +resolute offensive, and with Hooker in command it was not likely that +the opportunity would be long delayed. + +No thought of a strategic retreat, from one position to another, was +entertained. Manœuvre was to be met by manœuvre, blow by +counterblow.[13] If Hooker had not moved Lee would have forestalled +him. On April 16 he had written to Mr. Davis: “My only anxiety arises +from the condition of our horses, and the scarcity of forage and +provisions. I think it is all important that we should assume the +aggressive by the 1st of May. . . . If we could be placed in a +condition to make a vigorous advance at that time, I think the Valley +could be swept of Milroy (commanding the Federal forces at Winchester), +and the army opposite [Hooker’s] be thrown north of the Potomac.”[14] +Jackson, too, even after Hooker’s plan was developed, indignantly +repudiated the suggestion that the forthcoming campaign must be purely +defensive. When some officer on his staff expressed his fear that the +army would be compelled to retreat, he asked sharply, “Who said that? +No, sir, we shall not fall back, we shall attack them.” + +At the end of the month, however, Longstreet with his three divisions +was still absent; sufficient supplies for a forward movement had not +yet been accumulated;[15] two brigades of cavalry, Hampton’s and +Jenkins’, which had been sent respectively to South Carolina and the +Valley, had not rejoined,[16] and Hooker had already seized the +initiative. + +The first news which came to hand was that a strong force of all arms +was moving up the Rappahannock in the +direction of Kelly’s Ford. + +April 28 This was forwarded by Stuart on the evening of April 28. The +next morning the Federal movements, which might have been no more than +a demonstration, became pronounced. + +April 29 Under cover of a thick fog, pontoon bridges were laid at Deep +Run below Fredericksburg; Sedgwick’s troops began to cross, and were +soon engaged with Jackson’s outposts; while, at the same time, the +report came in that a force of unknown strength had made the passage at +Kelly’s Ford. + +Lee displayed no perturbation. Jackson, on receiving information of +Sedgwick’s movement from his outposts, had sent an aide-de-camp to +acquaint the Commander-in-Chief. The latter was still in his tent, and +in reply to the message said: “Well, I heard firing, and I was +beginning to think that it was time some of your lazy young fellows +were coming to tell me what it was about. Tell your good general he +knows what to do with the enemy just as well as I do.”[17] + +The divisions of the Second Army Corps were at once called up to their +old battle-ground, and while they were on the march Jackson occupied +himself with watching Sedgwick’s movements. The Federals were busily +intrenching on the river bank, and on the heights behind frowned the +long line of artillery that had proved at Fredericksburg so formidable +an obstacle to the Confederate attack. The enemy’s position was very +strong, and the time for counterstroke had not yet come. During the day +the cavalry was actively engaged between the Rappahannock and the +Rapidan, testing the strength of the enemy’s columns. The country was +wooded, the Federals active, and as usual in war, accurate information +was difficult to obtain and more difficult to communicate. It was not +till 6.30 p.m. that Lee received notice that troops had crossed at +Ely’s and Germanna Fords at 2 p.m. +Anderson’s division was at once dispatched to Chancellorsvile. + +April 30 The next message, which does not appear to have been received +until the morning of the 30th, threw more light on the situation. +Stuart had made prisoners from the Fifth, the Eleventh, and the Twelfth +Corps, and had ascertained that the corps commanders, Meade, Howard, +and Slocum, were present with the troops. Anderson, moreover, who had +been instructed to select and intrench a strong position, was falling +back from Chancellorsville before the enemy’s advance, and two things +became clear:— + +1. That it was Hooker’s intention to turn the Confederate left. + +2. That he had divided his forces. + +The question now to be decided was which wing should be attacked first. +There was much to be said in favour of crushing Sedgwick. His numbers +were estimated at 35,000 men, and the Confederates had over 60,000. +Moreover, time is a most important consideration in the use of interior +lines. The army was already concentrated in front of Sedgwick, whereas +it would require a day’s march to seek Hooker in the forest round +Chancellorsville. Sedgwick’s, too, was the smaller of the Federal +wings, and his overthrow would certainly ruin Hooker’s combinations. +“Jackson at first,” said Lee, “preferred to attack Sedgwick’s force in +the plain of Fredericksburg, but I told him I feared it was as +impracticable as it was at the first battle of Fredericksburg. It was +hard to get at the enemy, and harder to get away if we drove him into +the river, but if he thought it could be done, I would give orders for +it.” Jackson asked to be allowed to examine the ground, but soon came +to the conclusion that the project was too hazardous and that Lee was +right. Orders were then issued for a concentration against Hooker, +10,000 men, under General Early, remaining to confront Sedgwick on the +heights of Fredericksburg. + +We may now turn to the movements of the Federals. + +Hooker’s right wing had marched at a speed which had +been hitherto unknown in the Army of the Potomac. At nightfall, on +April 30, the three army corps, although they had been delayed by the +Confederate cavalry, were assembled at Chancellorsville. In three days +they had marched forty-six miles over bad roads, had forded breast-high +two difficult rivers, established several bridges, and captured over a +hundred prisoners.[18] Heavy reinforcements were in rear. The two +divisions of the Second Corps had marched from Banks’ Ford to United +States Ford, six miles from Chancellorsville; while the Third Corps, +ordered up from the Stafford Heights, was rapidly approaching the same +point of passage. Thus, 70,000 men, in the highest spirits at the +success of their manœuvres, were massed in rear of Lee’s lines, and +Hooker saw victory within his grasp. + +“It is with heartfelt satisfaction,” ran his general order, “that the +commanding general announces to his army that the operations of the +last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously +fly or come out from behind his defences, and give us battle on our own +ground, where certain destruction awaits him. The operations of the +Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps have been a succession of splendid +achievements.” + +Hooker was skinning the lion while the beast yet lived, but he had +certainly much reason for congratulation. His manœuvres had been +skilfully planned and energetically executed. The two rivers which +protected the Confederate position had been crossed without loss; the +Second and Third Corps had been brought into close touch with the right +wing; Lee’s earthworks were completely turned, and Stoneman’s cavalry +divisions, driving the enemy’s patrols +before them, were already within reach of Orange Court House, and not +more than twenty miles from Gordonsville. Best of all, the interval +between the two wings—twenty-six miles on the night of the 28th—was now +reduced to eleven miles by the plank road. + +Two things only were unsatisfactory:— + +1. The absence of information. + +2. The fact that the whole movement had been observed by the +Confederate cavalry. + +Pleasonton’s brigade of horse had proved too weak for the duty assigned +to it. It had been able to protect the front, but it was too small to +cover the flanks; and at the flanks Stuart had persistently struck. +Hooker appears to have believed that Stoneman’s advance against the +Central Railroad would draw off the whole of the Confederate horse. +Stuart, however, was not to be beguiled from his proper functions. +Never were his squadrons more skilfully handled than in this campaign. +With fine tactical insight, as soon as the great movement on +Chancellorsville became pronounced, he had attacked the right flank of +the Federal columns with Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade, leaving only the two +regiments under W. H. F. Lee to watch Stoneman’s 10,000 sabres. Then, +having obtained the information he required, he moved across the +Federal front, and routing one of Pleasonton’s regiments in a night +affair near Spotsylvania Court House, he had regained touch with his +own army. The results of his manœuvres were of the utmost importance. +Lee was fully informed as to his adversary’s strength; the Confederate +cavalry was in superior strength at the critical point, that is, along +the front of the two armies; and Hooker had no knowledge whatever of +what was going on in the space between Sedgwick and himself. He was +only aware, on the night of April 30, that the Confederate position +before Fredericksburg was still strongly occupied. + +The want, however, of accurate information gave him no uneasiness. The +most careful arrangements had been made to note and report every +movement of the enemy the next day. + +No less than three captive balloons, in charge of skilled +observers, looked down upon the Confederate earthworks.[19] Signal +stations and observatories had been established on each commanding +height; a line of field telegraph had been laid from Falmouth to United +States Ford, and the chief of the staff, General Butterfield, remained +at the former village in communication with General Sedgwick. If the +weather were clear, and the telegraph did not fail, it seemed +impossible that either wing of the Federal army could fail to be fully +and instantly informed of the situation of the other, or that a single +Confederate battalion could change position without both Hooker and +Sedgwick being at once advised. + +Moreover, the Federal Commander-in-Chief was so certain that Lee would +retreat that his deficiency in cavalry troubled him not at all. He had +determined to carry out his original design. + +May 1 The next morning—May 1—the right wing was to move by the plank +road and uncover Banks’ Ford, thus still further shortening the line of +communication between the two wings; and as the chief of the staff +impressed on Sedgwick, it was “expected to be on the heights west of +Fredericksburg at noon or shortly after, or, if opposed strongly, at +night.” Sedgwick, meanwhile, was “to observe the enemy’s movements with +the utmost vigilance; should he expose a weak point, to attack him in +full force and destroy him; should he show any symptom of falling back, +to pursue him with the utmost vigour.”[20] + +But Hooker was to find that mere mechanical precautions are not an +infallible remedy for a dangerous situation. The Confederates had not +only learned long since the importance of concealment, and the +advantage of night marches, but in the early morning of May 1 the river +mists rendered both balloons and observatories useless. Long before the +sun broke through the fog, both McLaws and Jackson had joined Anderson +at Tabernacle +Church, and a strong line of battle had been established at the +junction of the two roads, the pike and the plank, which led east from +Chancellorsville. The position was favourable, running along a low +ridge, partially covered with timber, and with open fields in front. +Beyond those fields, a few hundred paces distant, rose the outskirts of +a great forest, stretching far away over a gently undulating country. +This forest, twenty miles in length from east to west, and fifteen in +breadth from north to south, has given to the region it covers the name +of the Wilderness of Spotsylvania, and in its midst the Federal army +was now involved. Never was ground more unfavourable for the manœuvres +of a large army. The timber was unusually dense. The groves of pines +were immersed in a sea of scrub-oak and luxuriant undergrowth. The soil +was poor. Farms were rare, and the few clearings were seldom more than +a rifle shot in width. The woodland tracks were seldom travelled; +streams with marshy banks and tortuous courses were met at frequent +intervals, and the only _débouchée_ towards Fredericksburg, the pike, +the plank road, an unfinished line of railway a mile south of their +junction, and the river road, about two miles north, were commanded +from the Confederate position. + +8 a.m. When Jackson arrived upon the scene, Anderson, with the help of +Lee’s engineers, had strongly intrenched the whole front. A large force +of artillery had already taken post. The flanks of the line were +covered; the right, which extended to near Duerson’s Mill, by Mott’s +Run and the Rappahannock; the left, which rested on the unfinished +railroad not far from Tabernacle Church, by the Massaponax Creek. For +the defence of this position, three miles in length, there were present +45,000 infantry, over 100 guns, and Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade of cavalry, +a force ample for the purpose, and giving about nine men to the yard. +On the rolling ground eastward there was excellent cover for the +reserves, and from the breastworks to the front the defiles, for such, +owing to the density of the wood, were the four roads by which the +enemy must approach, might be so effectively swept +as to prevent him from deploying either artillery or infantry. + +But Jackson was not disposed to await attack. Only 10,000 men remained +in the Fredericksburg lines to confront Sedgwick, and if that officer +acted vigorously, his guns would soon be heard in rear of the lines at +Tabernacle Church. Work on the intrenchments was at once broken off, +and the whole force was ordered to prepare for an immediate advance on +Chancellorsville. + +10.45 a.m. Before eleven o’clock the rear brigades had closed up; and +marching by the pike and the plank road, with a regiment of cavalry in +advance, and Fitzhugh Lee upon the left, the Confederate army plunged +resolutely into the gloomy depths of the great forest. Anderson’s +division led the way, one brigade on the pike, and two on the plank +road; a strong line of skirmishers covered his whole front, and his +five batteries brought up the rear. Next in order came McLaws, together +with the two remaining brigades of Anderson, moving by the pike, while +Jackson’s three divisions were on the plank road. The artillery +followed the infantry. + +About a mile towards Chancellorsville the Federal cavalry was found in +some force, and as the patrols gave way, a heavy force of infantry was +discovered in movement along the pike. General McLaws, who had been +placed in charge of the Confederate right, immediately deployed his +four leading brigades, and after the Federal artillery, unlimbering in +an open field, had fired a few rounds, their infantry advanced to the +attack. The fight was spirited but short. The Northern regulars of +Sykes’ division drove in the Confederate skirmishers, but were unable +to make ground against the line of battle. Jackson, meanwhile, who had +been at once informed of the encounter, had ordered the troops on the +plank road to push briskly forward, and the Federals, finding their +right in danger of being enveloped, retired on Chancellorsvile. Another +hostile column was shortly afterwards met on the plank road, also +marching eastward. Again there was a skirmish, and again Jackson, +ordering a brigade to march +rapidly along the unfinished railroad, had recourse to a turning +movement; but before the manœuvre was completed, the Federals began to +yield, and all opposition gradually melted away. The following order +was then sent to McLaws:— + +2.30 p.m. + +Headquarters, Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, +May 1, 1863, 2.30 p.m. (received 4 p.m.). + +“General,—The Lieutenant-General commanding directs me to say that he +is pressing up the plank road; also, that you will press on up the +turnpike towards Chancellorsville, as the enemy is falling back. + +“Keep your skirmishers and flanking parties well out, to guard against +ambuscade. + +“Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + +“J. G. MORRISON, +_Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.”_[21] + +There was something mysterious in so easy a victory. The enemy was +evidently in great strength, for, on both roads, heavy columns had been +observed behind the lines of skirmishers. Several batteries had been in +action; cavalry was present; and the Confederate scouts reported that a +third column, of all arms, had marched by the river road toward Banks’ +Ford, and had then, like the others, unaccountably withdrawn. The +pursuit, therefore, was slow and circumspect. Wilcox’ brigade, on the +extreme right, moved up the Mine road, in the direction of Duerson’s +Mill; Wright’s brigade, on the extreme left, followed Fitzhugh Lee’s +cavalry on the unfinished railroad; while the main body, well closed +up, still kept to the main highways. + +5 p.m. At length, late in the afternoon, Hooker’s tactics became clear. +As Jackson’s advanced guards approached Chancellorsville, the +resistance of the Federal skirmishers, covering the retreat, became +more stubborn. From the low ridge, fringed by heavy timber, on which +the mansion stands, the fire of artillery, raking every avenue of +approach, grew more intense, and it was evident that the foe was +standing fast on the defensive. + +The Confederate infantry, pushing forward through the undergrowth, made +but tardy progress; the cavalry patrols found that every road and +bridle-path was strongly held, and it was difficult in the extreme to +discover Hooker’s exact position. Jackson himself, riding to the front +to reconnoitre, nearly fell a victim to the recklessness he almost +invariably displayed when in quest of information. The cavalry had been +checked at Catherine Furnace, and were waiting the approach of the +infantry. Wright’s brigade was close at hand, and swinging round +northwards, drove back the enemy’s skirmishers, until, in its turn, it +was brought up by the fire of artillery. Just at this moment Jackson +galloped up, and begged Stuart to ride forward with him in order to +find a point from which the enemy’s guns might be enfiladed. A +bridle-path, branching off from the main road to the right, led to a +hillock about half a mile distant, and the two generals, accompanied by +their staffs, and followed by a battery of horse-artillery, made for +this point of vantage. “On reaching the spot,” says Stuart’s +adjutant-general, “so dense was the undergrowth, it was found +impossible to find enough clear space to bring more than one gun at a +time into position; the others closed up immediately behind, and the +whole body of us completely blocked up the narrow road. Scarcely had +the smoke of our first shot cleared away, when a couple of masked +batteries suddenly opened on us at short range, and enveloped us in a +storm of shell and canister, which, concentrated on so narrow a space, +did fearful execution among our party, men and horses falling right and +left, the animals kicking and plunging wildly, and everybody eager to +disentangle himself from the confusion, and get out of harm’s way. +Jackson, as soon as he found out his mistake, ordered the guns to +retire; but the confined space so protracted the operation of turning, +that the enemy’s cannon had full time to continue their havoc, covering +the road with dead and wounded. That Jackson and Stuart with their +staff officers escaped was nothing short of miraculous.”[22] + +Other attempts at reconnaissance were more successful. Before nightfall +it was ascertained that Hooker was in strong force on the +Chancellorsville ridge, along the plank road, and on a bare plateau to +the southward called Hazel Grove. “Here,” in the words of General Lee, +“he had assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all +sides by a dense forest, filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the +midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed, with trees +felled in front, so as to form an almost impenetrable abattis. His +artillery swept the few narrow roads, by which the position could be +approached from the front, and commanded the adjacent woods. The left +of his line extended from Chancellorsville towards the Rappahannock, +covering the Bark Mill (United States) Ford, which communicated with +the north bank of the river by a pontoon bridge. His right stretched +westward along the Germanna Ford road (the pike) more than two miles. . +. . As the nature of the country rendered it hazardous to attack by +night, our troops were halted and formed in line of battle in front of +Chancellorsville at right angles to the plank road, extending on the +right to the Mine road, and to the left in the direction of the +Catherine Furnace.” + +As darkness falls upon the Wilderness, and the fire of the outposts, +provoked by every movement of the patrols, gradually dies away, we may +seek the explanation of the Federal movements. On finding that his +enemy, instead of “ingloriously flying,” was advancing to meet him, and +advancing with confident and aggressive vigour, Hooker’s resolution had +failed him. Waiting till his force was concentrated, until the Second +and Third Corps had crossed at United States Ford, and were close to +Chancellorsville, it was not till eleven o’clock on the morning of May +1 that he had marched in three great columns towards Fredericksburg. +His intention was to pass rapidly through the Wilderness, secure the +open ground about Tabernacle Church, and there, with ample space for +deployment, to form for battle, and move against the rear of Marye’s +Hill.[23] +But before his advanced guards got clear of the forest defiles they +found the Confederates across their path, displaying an unmistakable +purpose of pressing the attack. Hooker at once concluded that Lee was +marching against him with nearly his whole force, and of the strength +of that force, owing to the weakness of his cavalry, he was not aware. +The news from the Stafford Heights was disquieting. As soon as the fog +had lifted, about nine o’clock in the morning, the signal officers and +balloonists had descried long columns of troops and trains marching +rapidly towards Chancellorsville.[24] This was duly reported by the +telegraph,[25] and it was correctly inferred to signify that Lee was +concentrating against the Federal right. But at the same time various +movements were observed about Hamilton’s Crossing; columns appeared +marching from the direction of Gurney’s Station; there was much traffic +on the railway, and several deserters from Lee’s army declared, on +being examined, that Hood’s and Pickett’s divisions had arrived from +Richmond.[26] The statements of these men—who we may suspect were not +such traitors as they appeared—were confirmed by the fact that +Sedgwick, who was without cavalry, had noticed no diminution in the +force which held the ridge before him. + +It is easy, then, to understand Hooker’s decision to stand on the +defensive. With a prudent foresight which does him much credit, before +he marched in the morning he had ordered the position about +Chancellorsville, covering his lines of retreat to United States and +Ely’s Fords, to be reconnoitred and intrenched, and his front, as Lee +said, was undoubtedly very strong. He would assuredly have done better +had he attacked vigorously when he found the Confederates advancing. +His sudden retrograde movement, especially as following the swift and +successful manœuvres which had turned Lee’s position, could not fail to +have a discouraging effect upon the troops; and +if Sedgwick had been ordered to storm the Fredericksburg lines, the +whole Federal force could have been employed, and the Confederates, +assailed in front and rear simultaneously, must, to say the least, have +been embarrassed. But in abandoning his design of crushing Lee between +his two wings, and in retiring to the stronghold he had prepared, +Hooker did what most ordinary generals would have done, especially one +who had served on the losing side at Fredericksburg. He had there +learned the value of intrenchments. He had seen division after division +shatter itself in vain against a stone wall and a few gun-pits, and it +is little wonder that he had imbibed a profound respect for defensive +tactics. He omitted, however, to take into consideration two simple +facts. First, that few districts contain two such positions as those of +the Confederates at Fredericksburg; and, secondly, that the strength of +a position is measured not by the impregnability of the front, but by +the security of the flanks. The Fredericksburg lines, resting on the +Rappahannock and the Massaponax, had apparently safe flanks, and yet he +himself had completely turned them, rendering the whole series of works +useless without firing a shot. Were Lee and Jackson the men to knock +their heads, like Burnside, against stout breastworks strongly manned? +Would they not rather make a wide sweep, exactly as he himself had +done, and force him to come out of his works? Hooker, however, may have +said that if they marched across his front, he would attack them _en +route,_ as did Napoleon at Austerlitz and Wellington at Salamanca, and +cut their army in two. But here he came face to face with the fatal +defect of the lines he had selected, and also of the disposition he had +made of his cavalry. The country near Chancellorsville was very unlike +the rolling plains of Austerlitz or the bare downs of Salamanca. From +no part of the Federal position did the view extend for more than a few +hundred yards. Wherever the eye turned rose the dark and impenetrable +screen of close-growing trees, interlaced with wild vines and matted +undergrowth, and seamed with rough roads, perfectly passable for +troops, with which his +enemies were far better acquainted than himself. Had Stoneman’s cavalry +been present, the squadrons, posted far out upon the flanks, and +watching every track, might have given ample warning of any turning +movement, exactly as Stuart’s cavalry had given Lee warning of Hooker’s +own movement upon Chancellorsville. As it was, Pleasonton’s brigade was +too weak to make head against Stuart’s regiments; and Hooker could +expect no early information of his enemy’s movements. + +He thus found himself in the dilemma which a general on the defensive, +if he be weak in cavalry, has almost invariably to face, especially in +a close country. He was ignorant, and must necessarily remain ignorant, +of where the main attack would be made. Lee, on the other hand, by +means of his superior cavalry, could reconnoitre the position at his +leisure, and if he discovered a weak point could suddenly throw the +greater portion of his force against it. Hooker could only hope that no +weak point existed. Remembering that the Confederates were on the pike +and the plank road, there certainly appeared no cause for apprehension. +The Fifth Corps, with its flank on the Rappahannock, held the left, +covering the river and the old Mine roads. Next in succession came the +Second Corps, blocking the pike. In the centre the Twelfth Corps, under +General Slocum, covered Chancellorsville. The Third Corps, under +Sickles, held Hazel Grove, with Berry’s division as general reserve; +and on the extreme right, his breastworks running along the plank road +as far as Talley’s Clearing, was Howard with the Eleventh Corps, +composed principally of German regiments. Strong outposts of infantry +had been thrown out into the woods; the men were still working in the +intrenchments; batteries were disposed so as to sweep every approach +from the south, the south-east, or the south-west, and there were at +least five men to every yard of parapet. The line, however, six miles +from flank to flank, was somewhat extensive, and to make certain, so +far as possible, that sufficient numbers should be forthcoming to +defend the position, at 1.55 on the morning of May 2, Sedgwick was +instructed to send the First Army Corps to Chancellorsville. Before +midnight, moreover, thirty-four guns, principally horse. Artillery, +together with a brigade of infantry, were sent from Falmouth to Banks’ +Ford. + +Sedgwick, meantime, below Fredericksburg, had contented himself with +engaging the outposts on the opposite ridge. An order to make a brisk +demonstration, which Hooker had dispatched at 11.30 a.m., did not +arrive, the telegraph having broken down, until 5.45 p.m., six hours +later; and it was then too late to effect any diversion in favour of +the main army. + +Yet it can hardly be said that Sedgwick had risen to the height of his +responsibilities. He knew that a portion at least of the Confederates +had marched against Hooker, and the balloonists had early reported that +a battle was in progress near Tabernacle Church. But instead of obeying +Napoleon’s maxim and marching to the sound of the cannon, he had made +no effort to send support to his commander. Both he and General +Reynolds[27] considered “that to have attacked before Hooker had +accomplished some success, in view of the strong position and numbers +in their front, might have failed to dislodge the enemy, and have +rendered them unserviceable at the proper time.”[28] That is, they were +not inclined to risk their own commands in order to assist Hooker, of +whose movements they were uncertain. Yet even if they had been +defeated, Hooker would still have had more men than Lee. + + [1] Quinine sold in the South for one hundred dollars (Confederate) + the ounce. O.R., vol. xxv, part ii, p. 79. + + [2] 3,594 officers and men. Report of December 1. O.R., vol. xxi, p. + 1082. + + [3] Middle of February. + + [4] Pickett, 7,165; Hood, 7,956—15,121 officers and men. + + [5] Lee thought Pickett was sufficient. O.R., vol. xxi, p. 623. + + [6] Hooker to Lincoln, April 12, O.R., vol.xxv, part ii, p. 199. + + [7] The cavalry was to take supplies for six days, food and forage, + depending on the country and on captures for any further quantity that + might be required. + + [8] From Franklin’s Crossing below Fredericksburg, where Sedgwick’s + bridges were thrown, to Kelly’s Ford is 27 miles; to Ely’s Ford 19 + miles, and to Chancellorsville 11 miles. + + [9] O.R., vol. xxv, p. 268. + + [10] O.R., vol. xxv, p. 274. + + [11] _Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War._ + + [12] _Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac._ By William Swinton, p. + 267. + + [13] “The idea of securing the provisions, waggons, guns, of the enemy + is truly tempting, and the idea has haunted me since December.” Lee to + Trimble, March 8, 1862. O.R., vol.xxv, part ii, p. 658. + + [14] O.R., vol. xxv, p. 725. + + [15] “From the condition of our horses and the amount of our supplies + I am unable even to act on the defensive as vigorously as + circumstances might reguire.” Lee to Davis, April 27, O.R., vol.xxv, + p. 752. + + [16] On April 20 Lee had asked that the cavalry regiments not needed + in other districts might be sent to the Army of Northern Virginia. The + request was not compiled with until too late. O.R., vol. xxv, pp. 740, + 741. + + [17] On March 12, before Hooker had even framed his plan of + operations, Lee had received information that the Federals, as soon as + the state of the roads permitted, would cross at United States, + Falmouth, and some point below; the attempt at Falmouth to be a feint. + O.R., vol. xxv, part ii, p. 664. + + [18] The troops carried eight days’ supplies: three days’ cooked + rations with bread and groceries in the haversacks; five days’ bread + and groceries in the knapsacks; five days’ “beef on the hoof.” The + total weight carried by each man, including sixty rounds of + ammunition, was 45 pounds. The reserve ammunition was carried + principally by pack mules, and only a small number of waggons crossed + the Rappahannock. Four pontoon bridges were laid by the engineers. One + bridge took three-quarters of an hour to lay; the other three, one and + a half hour to lay, and an hour to take up. Each bridge was from 100 + to 140 yards long. O.R., vol. xxv, pp. 215, 216. + + [19] Balloons, which had been first used in the Peninsular campaign, + were not much dreaded by the Confederates. “The experience of twenty + months’ warfare has taught them how little formidable such engines of + war are.” Special Correspondent of the _Times_ at Fredericksburg, + January 1, 1863. + + [20] O.R., vol. xxv, p. 306. + + [21] O.R., vol. xxv, p. 764. + + [22] _Memoirs of the Confederate War._ Heros von Boreke. + + [23] O.R., vol. xxv, p. 324. + + [24] O.R., vol. xxv, pp. 323, 336. + + [25] _Ibid.,_ p. 326. The telegraph, however, appears to have worked + badly, and dispatches took several hours to pass from Falmouth to + Chancellorsville. + + [26] _Ibid.,_ p. 327. + + [27] The following letter (O.R., vol. xxv, p. 337) is interesting as + showing the state of mind into which the commanders of detached forces + are liable to be thrown by the absence of information:— + +“Headquarters, First Corps, May 1, 1863. + +“Major-General Sedgwick,—I think the proper view to take of affairs is +this: If they have not detached more than A. P. Hill’s division from +our front, they have been keeping up appearances, showing weakness, +with a view of delaying Hooker, and tempting us to make an attack on +their fortified position, and hoping to destroy us and strike for our +depôt over our bridges. We ought therefore, in my judgment, _to know +something of what has transpired on our right._ + +“JOHN F. REYNOLDS, _Major-General._” + + [28] Dispatch of Chief of the Staff to Hooker, dated 4 p.m., May 1. + O.R., vol. xxv, p. 326. + + + + +Chapter XXIV +CHANCELLORSVILLE_ (continued)_ + + +At a council of war held during the night at Chancellorville House, the +Federal generals were by no means unanimous as to the operations of the +morrow. Some of the generals advised an early assault. Others favoured +a strictly defensive attitude. Hooker himself wished to contract his +lines so as to strengthen them; but as the officers commanding on the +right were confident of the strength of their intrenchments, it was at +length determined that the army should await attack in its present +position. + +Three miles down the plank road, under a grove of oak and pine, Lee and +Jackson, while their wearied soldiers slept around them, planned for +the fourth and the last time the overthrow of the great army with which +Lincoln still hoped to capture Richmond. At this council there was no +difference of opinion. If Hooker had not retreated before the +morning—and Jackson thought it possible he was already demoralised—he +was to be attacked. The situation admitted of no other course. It was +undoubtedly a hazardous operation for an inferior force to assault an +intrenched position; but the Federal army was divided, the right wing +involved in a difficult and unexplored country, with which the +Confederate generals and staff were more or less familiar, and an +opportunity so favourable might never recur. “Fortune,” says Napoleon, +“is a woman, who must be wooed while she is in the mood. If her favours +are rejected, she does not offer them again.” The only question was +where the attack should be delivered. Lee himself had reconnoitred the +enemy’s left. It was very utrong, resting on the Rappahannock, and +covered by a +stream called Mineral Spring Run. Two of Jackson’s staff officers had +reconnoitred the front, and had pronounced it impregnable, except at a +fearful sacrifice of life. But while the generals were debating, Stuart +rode in with the reports of his cavalry officers, and the weak point of +the position was at once revealed. General Fitzhugh Lee, to whose skill +and activity the victory of Chancellorsville was in great part due, had +discovered that the Federal right, on the plank road, was completely in +the air; that is, it was protected by no natural obstacle, and the +breastworks faced south, and south only. It was evident that attack +from the west or north-west was not anticipated, and Lee at once seized +upon the chance of effecting a surprise. + +Yet the difficulties of the proposed operation were very great. To +transfer a turning column to a point from which the Federal right might +be effectively outflanked necessitated a long march by the narrow and +intricate roadways of the Wilderness, and a division of the Confederate +army into two parts, between which communication would be most +precarious. To take advantage of the opportunity the first rule of war +must be violated. But as it has already been said, the rules of war +only point out the dangers which are incurred by breaking them; and, in +this case, before an enemy on the defensive from whom the separation +might be concealed until it is too late for him to intervene, the risks +of dispersion were much reduced. The chief danger lay in this, that the +two wings, each left to its own resources, might fail to act in +combination, just as within the past twenty-four hours Hooker and +Sedgwick had failed. But Lee knew that in Jackson he possessed a +lieutenant whose resolution was invincible, and that the turning +column, if entrusted to his charge, would be pushed forward without +stop or stay until it had either joined hands with the main body, or +had been annihilated. + +Moreover, the battle of Fredericksburg had taught both armies that the +elaborate constructions of the engineer are not the only or the most +useful resources of fortification. Hooker had ordered his position to +be intrenched in the hope +that Lee and Jackson, following Burnside’s example, would dash their +divisions into fragments against them and thus become an easy prey. +Lee, with a broader appreciation of the true tactical bearing of ditch +and parapet, determined to employ them as a shelter for his own force +until Jackson’s movement was completed, and the time had come for a +general advance. Orders were at once sent to General McLaws to cover +his front, extending across the pike and the plank roads, with a line +of breastworks; and long before daylight the soldiers of his division, +with the scanty means at their disposal, were busy as beavers amongst +the timber. + +It only remained, then, to determine the route and the strength of the +outflanking force; and here it may be observed that the headquarters +staff appears to have neglected certain precautions for which there had +been ample leisure. So long ago as March 19 a council of war had +decided that if Hooker attacked he would do so by the upper fords, and +yet the Wilderness, lying immediately south of the points of passage, +had not been adequately examined. Had Jackson been on the left wing +above Fredericksburg, instead of on the right, near Hamilton’s +Crossing, we may be certain that accurate surveys would have been +forthcoming. As it was, the charts furnished to the Commander-in-Chief +were untrustworthy, and information had to be sought from the +country-people. + +May 2. 2.30 a.m. “About daylight on May 2,” says Major Hotchkiss, +“General Jackson awakened me, and requested that I would at once go +down to Catherine Furnace, which is quite near, and where a Colonel +Welford lived, and ascertain if there was any road by which we could +secretly pass round Chancellorsville to the vicinity of Old Wilderness +Tavern. I had a map, which our engineers had prepared from actual +surveys, of the surrounding country, showing all the public roads, but +with few details of the intermediate topography. Reaching Mr. +Welford’s, I aroused him from his bed, and soon learned that he himself +had recently opened a road through the woods in that direction for the +purpose of hauling cord-wood and iron ore to his furnace. This I +located on the map, and having +asked Mr. Welford if he would act as a guide if it became necessary to +march over that road, I returned to head-quarters. + +3.30 a.m. “When I reached those I found Generals Lee and Jackson in +conference, each seated on a cracker box, from a pile which had been +left there by the Federals the day before. In response to General +Jackson’s request for my report, I put another cracker box between the +two generals, on which I spread the map, showed them the road I had +ascertained, and indicated, so far as I knew it, the position of the +Federal army. General Lee then said, ‘General Jackson, what do you +propose to do?’ He replied, ‘Go around here,’ moving his finger over +the road which I had located upon the map. General Lee said, ‘What do +you propose to make this movement with?’ ‘With my whole corps,’ was the +answer. General Lee then asked, ‘What will you leave me?’ ‘The +divisions of Anderson and McLaws,’ said Jackson. General Lee, after a +moment’s reflection, remarked, ‘Well, go on,’ and then, pencil in hand, +gave his last instructions. Jackson, with an eager smile upon his face, +from time to time nodded assent, and when the Commander-in-Chief ended +with the words, ‘General Stuart will cover your movement with his +cavalry,’ he rose and saluted, saying, ‘My troops will move at once, +sir.’”[1] The necessary orders were forthwith dispatched. The trains, +parked in open fields to the rear, were to move to Todd’s Tavern, and +thence westward by interior roads; the Second Army Corps was to march +in one column, Rodes’ division in front, and A. P. Hill’s in rear; the +First Virginia Cavalry, with whom was Fitzhugh Lee, covered the front; +squadrons of the 2nd, the 3rd, and the 5th were on the right; +Hotchkiss, accompanied by a squad of couriers, was to send back +constant reports to General Lee; the commanding officers were impressed +with the importance of celerity and secrecy; the ranks were to be kept +well closed up, and all stragglers were to be bayoneted. + +4.5 a.m. The day had broken without a cloud, and as the troops began +their march in the fresh May morning, the green vistas of the +Wilderness, grass under foot, and thick foliage overhead, were dappled +with sunshine. The men, comprehending intuitively that a daring and +decisive movement was in progress, pressed rapidly forward, and General +Lee, standing by the roadside to watch them pass, saw in their +confident bearing the presage of success. Soon after the first +regiments had gone by Jackson himself appeared at the head of his +staff. Opposite to the Commander-in-Chief he drew rein, and the two +conversed for a few moments. Then Jackson rode on, pointing in the +direction in which his troops were moving. “His face,” says an +eyewitness, “was a little flushed, as it was turned to General Lee, who +nodded approval of what he said.” Such was the last interview between +Lee and Jackson. + +Then, during four long hours, for the column covered at least ten +miles, the flood of bright rifles and tattered uniforms swept with +steady flow down the forest track. The artillery followed, the guns +drawn by lean and wiry horses, and the ammunition waggons and +ambulances brought up the rear. In front was a regiment of cavalry, the +5th Virginia, accompanied by General Fitzhugh Lee; on the flanks were +some ten squadrons, moving by the tracks nearest the enemy’s outposts; +a regiment of infantry, the 23rd Georgia, was posted at the cross-roads +near Catherine Furnace; and the plank road was well guarded until +Anderson’s troops came up to relieve the rear brigades of the Second +Army Corps. + +Meanwhile, acting under the immediate orders of General Lee, and most +skilfully handled by McLaws and Anderson, the 10,000 Confederates who +had been left in position opposite the Federal masses kept up a brisk +demonstration. Artillery was brought up to every point along the front +which offered space for action; skirmishers, covered by the timber, +engaged the enemy’s pickets, and maintained a constant fire, and both +on the pike and the river road the lines of battle, disposed so as to +give an impression of great strength, threatened instant assault. +Despite all precautions, however, Jackson’s movement did +not escape the notice of the Federals. + +8 a.m. A mile north of Catherine Furnace the eminence called Hazel +Grove, clear of timber, looked down the valley of the Lewis Creek, and +as early as 8 a.m. General Birney, commanding the Federal division at +this point, reported the passage of a long column across his front. + +The indications, however, were deceptive. At first, it is probable, the +movement seemed merely a prolongation of the Confederate front; but it +soon received a different interpretation. The road at the point where +Jackson’s column was observed turned due south; it was noticed that the +troops were followed by their waggons, and that they were turning their +backs on the Federal lines. Hooker, when he received Birney’s report, +jumped to the conclusion that Lee, finding the direct road to Richmond, +through Bowling Green, threatened by Sedgwick, was retreating on +Gordonsville. + +11 a.m. About 11 a.m. a battery was ordered into action on the Hazel +Grove heights. + +12.15 p.m. The fire caused some confusion in the Confederate ranks; the +trains were forced on to another road; and shortly after noon, General +Sickles, commanding the Third Army Corps, was permitted by Hooker to +advance upon Catherine Furnace and to develop the situation. Birney’s +division moved forward, and Whipple’s soon followed. This attack, which +threatened to cut the Confederate army in two, was so vigorously +opposed by Anderson’s division astride the plank road and by the 23rd +Georgia at the Furnace, that General Sickles was constrained to call +for reinforcements. Barlow’s brigade, which had hitherto formed the +reserve of the Eleventh Corps, holding the extreme right of the Federal +line, the flank at which Jackson was aiming, was sent to his +assistance. Pleasonton’s cavalry brigade followed. Sickles’ movement, +even before the fresh troops arrived, had met with some success. The +23rd Georgia, driven back to the unfinished railroad and surrounded, +lost 300 officers and men. But word had been sent to Jackson’s column, +and Colonel Brown’s artillery battalion, together with the brigades of +Archer and Thomas, rapidly retracing their steps, checked the advance +in front, while Anderson, +manœuvring his troops with vigour, struck heavily against the flank. +Jackson’s train, thus effectively protected, passed the dangerous point +in safety, and then Archer and Thomas, leaving Anderson to deal with +Sickles, drew off and pursued their march. + +These operations, conducted for the most part in blind thickets, +consumed much time, and Jackson was already far in advance. Moving in a +south-westerly direction, he had struck the Brook road, a narrow track +which runs nearly due north, and crosses both the plank road and the +pike at a point about two miles west of the Federal right flank. The +Brock road, which, had Stoneman’s three divisions of cavalry been +present with the Federal army, would have been strongly held, was +absolutely free and unobstructed. Since the previous evening Fitzhugh +Lee’s patrols had remained in close touch with the enemy’s outposts, +and no attempt had been made to drive them in. So with no further +obstacle than the heat the Second Army Corps pressed on. Away to the +right, echoing faintly through the Wilderness, came the sound of cannon +and the roll of musketry; couriers from the rear, galloping at top +speed, reported that the trains had been attacked, that the rear +brigades had turned back to save them, and that the enemy, in heavy +strength, had already filled the gap which divided the Confederate +wings. But, though the army was cut in two, Jackson cast no look behind +him. The battle at the Furnace made no more impression on him than if +it was being waged on the Mississippi. He had his orders to execute; +and above all, he was moving at his best speed towards the enemy’s weak +point. He knew—and none better—that Hooker would not long retain the +initiative; that every man detached from the Federal centre made his +own chances of success the more certain; and trusting implicitly in +Lee’s ability to stave off defeat, he rode northwards with redoubled +assurance of decisive victory. Forward was the cry, and though the heat +was stifling, and the dust, rising from the deep ruts on the unmetalled +road, rose in dense clouds beneath the trees, and men dropped fainting +in the ranks, the great column pushed on without a check.[2] + +2 p.m. About 2 p.m., as the rear brigades, Archer and Thomas, after +checking Sickles, were just leaving Welford’s House, some six miles +distant, Jackson himself had reached the plank road, the point where he +intended to turn eastward against the Federal flank. Here he was met by +Fitzhugh Lee, conveying most important and surprising information. + +The cavalry regiment had halted when it arrived on the plank road; all +was reported quiet at the front; the patrols were moving northward, +and, attended by a staff officer, the young brigadier had ridden +towards the turnpike. The path they followed led to a wide clearing at +the summit of a hill, from which there was a view eastward as far as +Dowdall’s Tavern. Below, and but a few hundred yards distant, ran the +Federal breastworks, with abattis in front and long lines of stacked +arms in rear; but untenanted by a single company. Two cannon were seen +upon the highroad, the horses grazing quietly near at hand. The +soldiers were scattered in small groups, laughing, cooking, smoking, +sleeping, and playing cards, while others were butchering cattle and +drawing rations. What followed is best told in General Fitzhugh Lee’s +own words. + +“I rode back and met Jackson. ‘General,’ said I, ‘if you will ride with +me, halting your columns here, out of sight, I will show you the great +advantage of attacking down the old turnpike instead of the plank road, +the enemy’s lines being taken in reverse. Bring only one courier, as +you will be in view from the top of the hill.’ Jackson assented. When +we reached the eminence the picture below was still unchanged, and I +watched him closely as he gazed on Howard’s troops. His expression was +one of intense interest. His eyes burnt with a brilliant glow, and his +face was slightly flushed, radiant at the success of his flank +movement. To the remarks made to him while the unconscious line of blue +was pointed out +he made no reply, and yet during the five minutes he was on the hill +his lips were moving. ‘Tell General Rodes,’ he said, suddenly turning +his horse towards the courier, ‘to move across the plank road, and halt +when he gets to the old turnpike. I will join him there.’ One more look +at the Federal lines, and he rode rapidly down the hill.” + +4 p.m. The cavalry, supported by the Stonewall Brigade, was immediately +placed a short distance down the plank road, in order to mask the march +of the column. At 4 p.m. Rodes was on the turnpike. Passing down it for +about a mile, in the direction of the enemy’s position, the troops were +ordered to halt and form for battle. Not a shot had been fired. A few +hostile patrols had been observed, but along the line of breastworks, +watched closely by the cavalry, the Federal troops, still in the most +careless security, were preparing their evening meal. Jackson, +meanwhile, seated on a stump near the Brock road, had penned his last +dispatch to General Lee. + +“Near 3 p.m. May 2, 1863. + +“General,—The enemy has made a stand at Chancellor’s,[3] which is about +two miles from Chancellorsville. I hope as soon as practicable to +attack. I trust that an ever-kind Providence will bless us with great +success. + +“Respectfully, + +T. J. JACKSON, _Lieutenant-General._ + +“The leading division is up, and the next two appear to be well closed. + +“T.J.J. + +“General B. E. Lee.” + +25,000 men were now deploying in the forest within a mile of the +Federal works, overlapping them both to north and south, and not a +single general in the Northern army appears to have suspected their +presence. The day had passed quietly at Chancellorsville. At a very +early hour in +the morning Hooker, anticipating a vigorous attack, had ordered the +First Army Corps, which had hitherto been acting with Sedgwick below +Fredericksburg, to recross the Rappahannock and march to +Chancellorsville. Averell’s division of cavalry, also, which had been +engaged near Orange Court House with W. H. F. Lee’s two regiments, was +instructed about the same time to rejoin the army as soon as possible, +and was now marching by the left bank of the Rapidan to Ely’s Ford. +Anticipating, therefore, that he would soon be strongly reinforced, +Hooker betrayed no uneasiness. Shortly after dawn he had ridden round +his lines. Expecting at that time to be attacked in front only, he had +no fault to find with their location or construction. “As he looked +over the barricades,” says General Howard, “while receiving the cheers +and salutes of the men, he said to me, ‘How strong! how strong!’ When +the news came that a Confederate column was marching westward past +Catherine Furnace, his attention, for the moment, was attracted to his +right. At 10 a.m. he was still uncertain as to the meaning of Jackson’s +movement. As the hours went by, however, and Jackson’s column +disappeared in the forest, he again grew confident; the generals were +informed that Lee was in full retreat towards Gordonsville, and a +little later Sedgwick received the following: + +“Chancellorsville, May 2, 1863, 4.10 p.m. + +“General Butterfield,—The Major-General Commanding directs that General +Sedgwick cross the river (_sic_) as soon as indications will permit,[4] +capture Fredericksburg with everything in it, and vigorously pursue the +enemy. We know that the enemy is fleeing, trying to save his trains. +Two of Sickles’ divisions are among them. + + “J. H. VAN ALEN, + +_“Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.”_ + +“(Copy from Butterfield, at Falmouth, to Sedgwick, 5.50 p.m.).” + +At 4 o’clock, therefore, the moment Jackson’s vanguard reached the old +turnpike near Luckett’s Farm, Hooker believed that all danger of a +flank attack had passed away. His left wing was under orders to +advance, as soon as a swamp to the front could be “corduroyed,” and +strike Lee in flank; while to reinforce Sickles, “among the enemy’s +trains,” Williams’ division of the Twelfth Corps was sent forward from +the centre, Howard’s reserve brigade (Barlow’s) from the right, and +Pleasonton’s cavalry brigade from Hazel Grove. + +The officers in charge of the Federal right appear to have been as +unsuspicious as their commander. During the morning some slight +preparations were made to defend the turnpike from the westward; a +shallow line of rifle-pits, with a few epaulements for artillery, had +been constructed on a low ridge, commanding open fields, which runs +north from Dowdall’s Tavern, and the wood beyond had been partially +entangled. But this was all, and even when the only reserve of the +Eleventh Army Corps, Barlow’s brigade, was sent to Sickles, it was not +considered necessary to make any change in the disposition of the +troops. The belief that Lee and Jackson were retreating had taken firm +hold of every mind. The pickets on the flank had indeed reported, from +time to time, that infantry was massing in the thickets; and the +Confederate cavalry, keeping just outside effective range, occupied +every road and every clearing. Yet no attempt was made, by a strong +reconnaissance in force, to ascertain what was actually going on within +the forest; and the reports of the scouts were held to be exaggerated. + +The neglect was the more marked in that the position of the Eleventh +Army Corps was very weak. Howard had with him twenty regiments of +infantry and six batteries; but his force was completely isolated. His +extreme right, consisting of four German regiments, was posted in the +forest, with two guns facing westward on the pike, and a line of +intrenchments facing south. On the low hill eastward, where Talley’s +Farm, a small wooden cottage, stood in the midst of a wide clearing, +were two more German regiments +and two American. Then, near the junction of the roads, intervened a +patch of forest, which was occupied by four regiments, with a brigade +upon their left; and beyond, nearly a mile wide from north to south, +and five or six hundred yards in breadth, were the open fields round +the little Wilderness Church, dipping at first to a shallow brook, and +then rising gradually to a house called Dowdall’s Tavern. In these +fields, south of the turnpike, were the breastworks held by the second +division of the Eleventh Army Corps; and here were six regiments, with +several batteries in close support. The 60th New York and 26th +Wisconsin, near the Hawkins House at the north end of the fields, faced +to the west; the remainder all faced south. Beyond Dowdall’s Tavern +rose the forest, dark and impenetrable to the view; but to the +south-east, nearly two miles from Talley’s, the clearings of Hazel +Grove were plainly visible. This part of the line, originally entrusted +to General Sickles, was now unguarded, for two divisions of the Third +Corps were moving on the Furnace; and the nearest force which could +render support to Howard’s was Berry’s division, retained in reserve +north-east of Chancellorsville, three miles distant from Talley’s Farm +and nearly two from Howard’s left. + +The Confederates, meanwhile, were rapidly forming for attack. +Notwithstanding their fatigue, for many of the brigades had marched +over fifteen miles, the men were in the highest spirits. A young +staff-officer, who passed along the column, relates that he was +everywhere recognised with the usual greetings. “Say, here’s one of old +Jack’s little boys; let him by, boys!” “Have a good breakfast this +morning, sonny?” “Better hurry up, or you’ll catch it for gettin’ +behind.” “Tell old Jack we’re all a-comin’. Don’t let him begin the +fuss till we get there!” But on reaching the turnpike orders were given +that all noise should cease, and the troops, deploying for a mile or +more on either side of the road, took up their formation for attack. In +front were the skirmishers of Rodes’ division, under Major Blackford; +four hundred yards in rear came the lines of battle, Rodes forming the +first line;[5] Colston, at two hundred yards distance, the second line; +A. P. Hill, part in line and part in column, the third. In little more +than an hour-and-a-half, notwithstanding the dense woods, the formation +was completed, and the lines dressed at the proper angle to the road. + +5.45 p.m. Notwithstanding that the enemy might at any moment awake to +their danger, not a single precaution was neglected. Jackson was +determined that the troops should move forward in good order, and that +every officer and man should know what was expected from him. +Staff-officers had been stationed at various points to maintain +communication between the divisions, and the divisional and brigade +commanders had received their instructions. The whole force was to push +resolutely forward through the forest. The open hill, about a thousand +yards eastward, on which stood Talley’s Farm, was to be carried at all +hazard, for, so far as could be ascertained, it commanded, over an +intervening patch of forest, the ridge which ran north from Dowdall’s +Tavern. After the capture of the heights at Talley’s, if the Federals +showed a determined front on their second line, Rodes was to halt under +cover until the artillery could come up and dislodge them. Under no +other circumstances was there to be any pause in the advance. A brigade +of the first line was detailed to guard the right flank, a regiment the +left; and the second and third lines were ordered to support the first, +whenever it might be necessary, without waiting for further +instructions. The field hospital was established at the Old Wilderness +Tavern. + +The men were in position, eagerly awaiting the signal; their quick +intelligence had already realised the situation, and all was life and +animation. Across the narrow clearing stretched the long grey lines, +penetrating far into the forest on either flank; in the centre, on the +road, were four +Napoleon guns, the horses fretting with excitement; far to the rear, +their rifles glistening under the long shafts of the setting sun, the +heavy columns of A. P. Hill’s division were rapidly advancing, and the +rumble of the artillery, closing to the front, grew louder and louder. +Jackson, watch in hand, sat silent on “Little Sorrel,” his slouched hat +drawn low over his eyes, and his lips tightly compressed. On his right +was General Rodes, tall, lithe, and soldierly, and on Rodes’ right was +Major Blackford. + +“Are you ready, General Rodes?” said Jackson. + +“Yes, sir,” said Rodes, impatient as his men. + +“You can go forward, sir,” said Jackson. + +6 p.m. A nod from Rodes was a sufficient order to Blackford, and the +woods rang with the notes of a single bugle. Back came the responses +from bugles to right and left, and the skirmishers, dashing through the +wild undergrowth, sprang eagerly to their work, followed by the quick +rush of the lines of battle. For a moment the troops seemed buried in +the thickets; then, as the enemy’s sentries, completely taken by +surprise, fired a few scattered shots, and the guns on the turnpike +came quickly into action, the echoes waked; through the still air of +the summer evening rang the rebel yell, filling the forest far to north +and south, and the hearts of the astonished Federals, lying idly behind +their breastworks, stood still within them. + +So rapid was the advance, so utterly unexpected the attack, that the +pickets were at once over-run; and, crashing through the timber, +driving before it the wild creatures of the forest, deer, and hares, +and foxes, the broad front of the mighty torrent bore down upon +Howard’s flank. For a few moments the four regiments which formed his +right, supported by two guns, held staunchly together, and even checked +for a brief space the advance of O’Neal’s brigade. But from the right +and from the left the grey infantry swarmed round them; the second line +came surging forward to O’Neal’s assistance; the gunners were shot down +and their pieces captured; and in ten minutes the right brigade of the +Federal army, +submerged by numbers, was flying in panic across the clearing, Here, +near Talley’s Farm, on the fields south of the turnpike and in the +forest to the north, another brigade, hastily changing front, essayed +to stay the rout. But Jackson’s horse-artillery, moving forward at a +gallop, poured in canister at short range; and three brigades, +O’Neal’s, Iverson’s, and Doles’, attacked the Northerners fiercely in +front and flank. No troops, however brave, could have long withstood +that overwhelming rush. The slaughter was very great; every mounted +officer was shot down, and in ten or fifteen minutes the fragments of +these hapless regiments were retreating rapidly and tumultuously +towards the Wilderness Church. + +The first position had been captured, but there was no pause in the +attack. As Jackson, following the artillery, rode past Talley’s Farm, +and gazed across the clearing to the east, he saw a sight which raised +high his hopes of a decisive victory. Already, in the green cornfields, +the spoils of battle lay thick around him. Squads of prisoners were +being hurried to the rear. Abandoned guns, and waggons overturned, the +wounded horses still struggling in the traces, were surrounded by the +dead and dying of Howard’s brigades. Knapsacks, piled in regular order, +arms, blankets, accoutrements, lay in profusion near the breastworks; +and beyond, under a rolling cloud of smoke and dust, the bare fields, +sloping down to the brook, were covered with fugitives. Still further +eastward, along the plank road, speeding in wild confusion towards +Chancellorsville, was a dense mass of men and waggons; cattle, maddened +with fright, were rushing to and fro, and on the ridge beyond the +little church, pushing their way through the terror-stricken throng +like ships through a heavy sea, or breaking into fragments before the +pressure, the irregular lines of a few small regiments were moving +hastily to the front. At more than one point on the edge of the distant +woods guns were coming into action; the hill near Talley’s Farm was +covered with projectiles; men were falling, and the Confederate first +line was already in some confusion. + +Galloping up the turnpike, and urging the artillery +forward with voice and gesture, Jackson passed through the ranks of his +eager infantry; and then Rodes’s division, rushing down the wooded +slopes, burst from the covert, and, driving their flying foes before +them, advanced against the trenches on the opposite ridge. Here and +there the rush of the first line was checked by the bold resistance of +the German regiments. On the right, especially, progress was slow, for +Colquitt’s brigade, drawn off by the pressure of Federal outposts in +the woods to the south, had lost touch with the remainder of the +division; Ramseur’s brigade in rear had been compelled to follow suit, +and on this flank the Federals were most effectively supported by their +artillery. But Iverson, O’Neal, and Doles, hardly halting to reform as +they Left the woods, and followed closely by the second line, swept +rapidly across the fields, dashed back the regiments which sought to +check them, and under a hot fire of grape and canister pressed +resolutely forward. + +The rifle-pits on the ridge were occupied by the last brigade of +Howard’s Army Corps. A battery was in rear, three more were on the +left, near Dowdall’s Tavern, and many of the fugitives from Talley’s +Farm had rallied behind the breastwork. But a few guns and four or five +thousand rifles, although the ground to the front was clear and open, +were powerless to arrest the rush of Jackson’s veterans. The long lines +of colours, tossing redly above the swiftly moving ranks, never for a +moment faltered; the men, running alternately to the front, delivered +their fire, stopped for a moment to load, and then again ran on. Nearer +and nearer they came, until the defenders of the trenches, already half +demoralised, could mark through the smoke-drift the tanned faces, the +fierce eyes, and the gleaming bayonets of their terrible foes. The guns +were already flying, and the position was outflanked; yet along the +whole length of the ridge the parapets still blazed with fire; and +while men fell headlong in the Confederate ranks, for a moment there +was a check. But it was the check of a mighty wave, mounting slowly to +full volume, ere it falls in thunder on the shrinking sands. Running to +the front with uplifted swords, the officers gave the signal for the +charge. +The men answered with a yell of triumph; the second line, closing +rapidly on the first, could no longer be restrained; and as the grey +masses, crowding together in their excitement, breasted the last slope, +the Federal infantry, in every quarter of the field, gave way before +them; the ridge was abandoned, and through the dark pines beyond rolled +the rout of the Eleventh Army Corps. + +7 p.m. It was seven o’clock. Twilight was falling on the woods; and +Rodes’ and Colston’s divisions had become so inextricably mingled that +officers could not find their men nor men their officers. But Jackson, +galloping into the disordered ranks, directed them to press the +pursuit. His face was aglow with the blaze of battle. His swift +gestures and curt orders, admitting of no question, betrayed the fierce +intensity of his resolution. Although the great tract of forest, +covering Chancellorsville on the west, had swallowed up the fugitives, +he had no need of vision to reveal to him the extent of his success. +10,000 men had been utterly defeated. The enemy’s right wing was +scattered to the winds. The Southerners were within a mile-and-a-half +of the Federals’ centre and completely in rear of their intrenchments; +and the White House or Bullock road, only half-a-mile to the front, led +directly to Hooker’s line of retreat by the United States Ford. Until +that road was in his possession Jackson was determined to call no halt. +The dense woods, the gathering darkness, the fatigue and disorder of +his troops, he regarded no more than he did the enemy’s overwhelming +numbers. In spirit he was standing at Hooker’s side, and he saw, as +clearly as though the intervening woods had been swept away, the +condition to which his adversary had been reduced. + +To the Federal headquarters confusion and dismay had come, indeed, with +appalling suddenness. Late in the afternoon Hooker was sitting with two +aides-de-camp in the verandah of the Chancellor House. There were few +troops in sight. The Third Corps and Pleasonton’s cavalry had long +since disappeared in the forest. The Twelfth Army Corps, with the +exception of two brigades, was already advancing against Anderson; and +only the trains and some artillery remained +within the intrenchments at Hazel Grove. All was going well. A +desultory firing broke out at intervals to the eastward, but it was not +sustained; and three miles to the south, where, as Hooker believed, in +pursuit of Jackson, Sickles and Pleasonton were, the reports of their +cannon, growing fainter and fainter as they pushed further south, +betokened no more than a lively skirmish. The quiet of the Wilderness, +save for those distant sounds, was undisturbed, and men and animals, +free from every care, were enjoying the calm of the summer evening. It +was about half-past six. Suddenly the cannonade swelled to a heavier +roar, and the sound came from a new direction. All were listening +intently, speculating on what this might mean, when a staff-officer, +who had stepped out to the front of the house and was looking down the +plank road with his glass, exclaimed: “My God, here they come!” Hooker +sprang upon his horse; and riding rapidly down the road, met the +stragglers of the Eleventh Corps—men, waggons, and ambulances, an +ever-increasing crowd—rushing in blind terror from the forest, flying +they knew not whither. The whole of the right wing, they said, +overwhelmed by superior numbers, was falling back on Chancellorsville, +and Stonewall Jackson was in hot pursuit. + +The situation had changed in the twinkling of an eye. Just now +congratulating himself on the complete success of his manœuvres, on the +retreat of his enemies, on the flight of Jackson and the helplessness +of Lee, Hooker saw his strong intrenchments taken in reverse, his army +scattered, his reserves far distant, and the most dreaded of his +opponents, followed by his victorious veterans, within a few hundred +yards of his headquarters. His weak point had been found, and there +were no troops at hand wherewith to restore the fight. The centre was +held only by the two brigades of the Twelfth Corps at the Fairview +Cemetery. The works at Hazel Grove were untenanted, save by a few +batteries and a handful of infantry. The Second and Fifth Corps on the +left were fully occupied by McLaws, for Lee, at the first sound of +Jackson’s guns, had ordered a vigorous attack up the pike and the plank +road. Sickles, with +20,000 men, was far away, isolated and perhaps surrounded, and the line +of retreat, the road to United States Ford, was absolutely unprotected. + +Messengers were dispatched in hot haste to recall Sickles and +Pleasonton to Hazel Grove. Berry’s division, forming the reserve +north-east of the Chancellor House, was summoned to Fairview, and Hays’ +brigade of the Second Corps ordered to support it. But what could three +small brigades, hurried into position and unprotected by intrenchments, +avail against 25,000 Southerners, led by Stonewall Jackson, and +animated by their easy victory? If Berry and Hays could stand fast +against the rush of fugitives, it was all that could be expected; and +as the uproar in the dark woods swelled to a deeper volume, and the +yells of the Confederates, mingled with the crash of the musketry, were +borne to his ears, Hooker must have felt that all was lost. To make +matters worse, as Pleasonton, hurrying back with his cavalry, arrived +at Hazel Grove, the trains of the Third Army Corps, fired on by the +Confederate skirmishers, dashed wildly across the clearing, swept +through the parked artillery, and, breaking through the forest, +increased the fearful tumult which reigned round Chancellorsville. + +The gunners, however, with a courage beyond all praise, stood staunchly +to their pieces; and soon a long line of artillery, for which two +regiments of the Third Army Corps, coming up rapidly from the south, +formed a sufficient escort, was established on this commanding hill. +Other batteries, hitherto held in reserve, took post on the high ground +at Fairview, a mile to the north-east, and, although Berry’s infantry +were not yet in position, and the stream of broken troops was still +pouring past, a strong front of fifty guns opposed the Confederate +advance. + +But it was not the artillery that saved Hooker from irretrievable +disaster.[6] As they followed the remnants of the Eleventh Army Corps, +the progress of Rodes and Colston had been far less rapid than when +they stormed forward +past the Wilderness Church. A regiment of Federal cavalry, riding to +Howard’s aid by a track from Hazel Grove to the plank road, was quickly +swept aside; but the deep darkness of the forest, the efforts of the +officers to re-form the ranks, the barriers opposed by the tangled +undergrowth, the difficulty of keeping the direction, brought a large +portion of the troops to a standstill. At the junction of the White +House road the order to halt was given, and although a number of men, +pushing impetuously forward, seized a line of log breastworks which ran +north-west through the timber below the Fairview heights, the pursuit +was stayed in the midst of the dense thickets. + +8.15 p.m. At this moment, shortly after eight o’clock, Jackson was at +Dowdall’s Tavern. The reports from the front informed him that his +first and second lines had halted; General Rodes, who had galloped up +the plank road to reconnoitre, sent in word that there were no Federal +troops to be seen between his line and the Fairview heights; and +Colonel Cobb, of the 44th Virginia, brought the news that the strong +intrenchments, less than a mile from Chancellorsville, had been +occupied without resistance. + +There was a lull in the battle; the firing had died away, and the +excited troops, with a clamour that was heard in the Federal lines, +sought their companies and regiments by the dim light of the rising +moon. But deeming that nothing was done while aught remained to do, +Jackson was already planning a further movement. Sending instructions +to A. P. Hill to relieve Rodes and Colston, and to prepare for a night +attack, he rode forward, almost unattended, amongst his rallying +troops, and lent his aid to the efforts of the regimental officers. +Intent on bringing up the two divisions in close support of Hill, he +passed from one regiment to another. Turning to Colonel Cobb, he said +to him; “Find General Rodes, and tell him to occupy the barricade[7] at +once,” and then added: “I need your help for a time; this disorder must +be corrected. As you go along the right, tell the troops from me to get +into line and preserve their order.” + +It was long, however, before the men could be assembled, and the delay +was increased by an unfortunate incident. Jackson’s chief of artillery, +pressing forward up the plank road to within a thousand yards of +Chancellorsville, opened fire with three guns upon the enemy’s +position. This audacious proceeding evoked a quick reply. Such Federal +guns as could be brought to bear were at once turned upon the road, and +although the damage done was small, A. P. Hill’s brigades, just coming +up into line, were for the moment checked; under the hail of shell and +canister the artillery horses became unmanageable, the drivers lost +their nerve, and as they rushed to the rear some of the infantry joined +them, and a stampede was only prevented by the personal efforts of +Jackson, Colston, and their staff-officers. Colonel Crutchfield was +then ordered to cease firing; the Federals did the same; and A. P. +Hill’s brigades, that of General Lane leading, advanced to the deserted +breastworks, while two brigades, one from Rodes’ division and one from +Colston’s, were ordered to guard the roads from Hazel Grove. + +8.45 p.m. These arrangements made, Jackson proceeded to join his +advanced line. At the point where the track to the White House and +United States ford strikes the plank road he met General Lane, seeking +his instructions for the attack. They were sufficiently brief: “Push +right ahead, Lane; right ahead!” As Lane galloped off to his command, +General Hill and some of his staff came up, and Jackson gave Hill his +orders. “Press them; cut them off from the United States Ford, Hill; +press them.” General Hill replied that he was entirely unacquainted +with the topography of the country, and asked for an officer to act as +guide. Jackson directed Captain Boswell, his chief engineer, to +accompany General Hill, and then, turning to the front, rode up the +plank road, passing quickly through the ranks of the 18th North +Carolina of Lane’s brigade. Two or three hundred yards eastward the +general halted, for the ringing of axes and the words of command were +distinctly audible in the enemy’s lines. + +While the Confederates were re-forming, Hooker’s +reserves had reached the front, and Berry’s regiments, on the Fairview +heights, using their bayonets and tin-plates for intrenching tools, +piling up the earth with their hands, and hacking down the brushwood +with their knives, were endeavouring in desperate haste to provide some +shelter, however slight, against the rush that they knew was about to +come. + +After a few minutes, becoming impatient for the advance of Hill’s +division, Jackson turned and retraced his steps towards his own lines. +“General,” said an officer who was with him, “you should not expose +yourself so much.” “There is no danger, sir, the enemy is routed. Go +back and tell General Hill to press on.” + +Once more, when he was only sixty or eighty yards from where the 18th +North Carolina were standing in the trees, he drew rein and +listened—the whole party, generals, staff-officers, and couriers, +hidden in the deep shadows of the silent woods. At this moment a single +rifle-shot rang out with startling suddenness. + +A detachment of Federal infantry, groping their way through the +thickets, had approached the Southern lines. + +The skirmishers on both sides were now engaged, and the lines of battle +in rear became keenly on the alert. Some mounted officers galloped +hastily back to their commands. The sound startled the Confederate +soldiers, and an officer of the 18th North Carolina, seeing a group of +strange horsemen riding towards him through the darkness—for Jackson, +hearing the firing, had turned back to his own lines—gave the order to +fire. + +The volley was fearfully effective. Men and horses fell dead and dying +on the narrow track. Jackson himself received three bullets, one in the +right hand, and two in the left arm, cutting the main artery, and +crushing the bone below the shoulder, and as the reins dropped upon his +neck, “Little Sorrel,” frantic with terror, plunged into the wood and +rushed towards the Federal lines. An overhanging bough struck his rider +violently in the face, tore off his cap and nearly unhorsed him; but +recovering his seat, he managed to seize the bridle with his bleeding +hand, and turned +into the road. Here Captain Wilbourn, one of his staff-officers, +succeeded in catching the reins; and, as the horse stopped, Jackson +leaned forward and fell into his arms. Captain Hotchkiss, who had just +returned from a reconnaissance, rode off to find Dr. McGuire, while +Captain Wilbourn, with a small penknife, ripped up the sleeve of the +wounded arm. As he was doing so, General Hill, who had himself been +exposed to the fire of the North Carolinians, reached the scene, and, +throwing himself from his horse, pulled off Jackson’s gauntlets, which +were full of blood, and bandaged the shattered arm with a handkerchief. +“General,” he said, “are you much hurt?” “I think I am,” was the reply, +“and all my wounds are from my own men. I believe my right arm is +broken.” + +To all questions put to him he answered in a perfectly calm and +self-possessed tone, and, although he spoke no word of complaint, he +was manifestly growing weaker. It seemed impossible to move him, and +yet it was absolutely necessary that he should be carried to the rear. +He was still in front of his own lines, and, even as Hill was speaking, +two of the enemy’s skirmishers, emerging from the thicket, halted +within a few paces of the little group. Hill, turning quietly to his +escort, said, “Take charge of those men,” and two orderlies, springing +forward, seized the rifles of the astonished Federals. Lieutenant +Morrison, Jackson’s aide-de-camp, who had gone down the road to +reconnoitre, now reported that he had seen a section of artillery +unlimbering close at hand. Hill gave orders that the general should be +at once removed, and that no one should tell the men that he was +wounded. Jackson, lying on Hill’s breast, opened his eyes, and said, +“Tell them simply that you have a wounded Confederate officer.” +Lieutenants Smith and Morrison, and Captain Leigh of Hill’s staff, now +lifted him to his feet, and with their aid he walked a few steps +through the trees. But hardly had they gained the road when the Federal +batteries, along their whole front, opened a terrible fire of grape and +canister. The storm of bullets, tearing through the foliage, was +fortunately directed too high, and the three young officers, +laying the general down by the roadside, endeavoured to shield him by +lying between him and the deadly hail. The earth round them was torn up +by the shot, covering them with dust; boughs fell from the trees, and +fire flashed from the flints and gravel of the roadway. Once Jackson +attempted to rise; but Smith threw his arm over him, holding him down, +and saying, “General, you must be still—it will cost you your life to +rise.” + +After a few minutes, however, the enemy’s gunners, changing from +canister to shell, mercifully increased their range; and again, as the +Confederate infantry came hurrying to the front, their wounded leader, +supported by strong arms, was lifted to his feet. Anxious that the men +should not recognise him, Jackson turned aside into the wood, and +slowly and painfully dragged himself through the undergrowth. As he +passed along, General Fender, whose brigade was then pushing forward, +asked Smith who it was that was wounded. “A Confederate officer” was +the reply; but as they came nearer Fender, despite the darkness, saw +that it was Jackson. Springing from his horse, he hurriedly expressed +his regret, and added that his lines were so much disorganised by the +enemy’s artillery that he feared it would be necessary to fall back. +“At this moment,” says an eye-witness, “the scene was a fearful one. +The air seemed to be alive with the shriek of shells and the whistling +of bullets; horses riderless and mad with fright dashed in every +direction; hundreds left the ranks and hurried to the rear, and the +groans of the wounded and dying mingled with the wild shouts of others +to be led again to the assault. Almost fainting as he was from loss of +blood, desperately wounded, and in the midst of this awful uproar, +Jackson’s heart was unshaken. The words of Fender seemed to rouse him +to life. Pushing aside those who supported him, he raised himself to +his full height, and answered feebly, but distinctly enough to be heard +above the din, ‘You must hold your ground, General Fender; you must +hold out to the last, sir.’” + +His strength was now completely gone, and he asked to be allowed to lie +down. His staff-officers, however, +refused assent. The shells were still crashing through the forest, and +a litter having been brought up by Captain Leigh, he was carried slowly +towards Dowdall’s Tavern. But before they were free of the tangled +wood, one of the stretcher-bearers, struck by a shot in the arm, let go +the handle. Jackson fell violently to the ground on his wounded side. +His agony must have been intense, and for the first time he was heard +to groan. + +Smith sprang to his side, and as he raised his head a bright beam of +moonlight made its way through the thick foliage, and rested upon his +white and lacerated face. The aide-de-camp was startled by its great +pallor and stillness, and cried out, “General, are you seriously hurt?” +“No, Mr. Smith, don’t trouble yourself about me,” he replied quietly, +and added some words about winning the battle first, and attending to +the wounded afterwards. He was again placed upon the litter, and +carried a few hundred yards, still followed by the Federal shells, to +where his medical director was waiting with an ambulance. + +Dr. McGuire knelt down beside him and said, “I hope you are not badly +hurt, General?” He replied very calmly but feebly, “I am badly injured, +doctor, I fear I am dying.” After a pause he went on, “I am glad you +have come. I think the wound in my shoulder is still bleeding.” The +bandages were readjusted and he was lifted into the ambulance, where +Colonel Crutchfield, who had also been seriously wounded, was already +lying. Whisky and morphia were administered, and by the light of pine +torches, carried by a few soldiers, he was slowly driven through the +fields where Hooker’s right had so lately fled before his impetuous +onset. All was done that could ease his sufferings, but some jolting of +the ambulance over the rough road was unavoidable; “and yet,” writes +Dr. McGuire, “his uniform politeness did not forsake him even in these +most trying circumstances. His complete control, too, over his mind, +enfeebled as it was by loss of blood and pain, was wonderful. His +suffering was intense; his hands were cold, his skin clammy. But not a +groan escaped him—not a sign of suffering, except the +light corrugation of the brow, the fixed, rigid face, the thin lips, so +tightly compressed that the impression of the teeth could be seen +through them. Except these, he controlled by his iron will all evidence +of emotion, and, more difficult than this even, he controlled that +disposition to restlessness which many of us have observed upon the +battle-field as attending great loss of blood. Nor was he forgetful of +others. He expressed very feelingly his sympathy for Crutchfield, and +once, when the latter groaned aloud, he directed the ambulance to stop, +and requested me to see if something could not be done for his relief. + +“After reaching the hospital, he was carried to a tent, and placed in +bed, covered with blankets, and another drink of whisky and water given +him. Two hours and a half elapsed before sufficient reaction took place +to warrant an examination, and at two o’clock on Sunday morning I +informed him that chloroform would be given him; I told him also that +amputation would probably be required, and asked, if it was found +necessary, whether it should be done at once. He replied promptly, +‘Yes, certainly, Dr. McGuire, do for me whatever you think best.’ + +“Chloroform was then administered, and the left arm amputated about two +inches below the shoulder. Throughout the whole of the operation, and +until all the dressings were applied, he continued insensible. About +half-past three, Colonel (then Major) Pendleton arrived at the +hospital. He stated that General Hill had been wounded, and that the +troops were in great disorder. General Stuart was in command, and had +sent him to see the general. At first I declined to permit an +interview, but Pendleton urged that the safety of the army and success +of the cause depended upon his seeing him. When he entered the tent the +general said, ‘Well, Major, I am glad to see you; I thought you were +killed.’ Pendleton briefly explained the position of affairs, gave +Stuart’s message, and asked what should be done. Jackson was at once +interested, and asked in his quick way several questions. When they +were answered, he remained silent, evidently trying to think; he +contracted his brow, set his mouth, +and for some moments lay obviously endeavouring to concentrate his +thoughts. For a moment we believed he had succeeded, for his nostrils +dilated, and his eye flashed with its old fire, but it was only for a +moment: his face relaxed again, and presently he answered, very feebly +and sadly: ‘I don’t know—I can’t tell; say to General Stuart he must do +what he thinks best.’ Soon after this he slept.” + +So, leaving behind him, struggling vainly against the oppression of his +mortal hurt, the one man who could have completed the Confederate +victory, Pendleton rode wearily through the night. Jackson’s fall, at +so critical a moment, just as the final blow was to be delivered, had +proved a terrible disaster. Hill, who alone knew his intention of +moving to the White House, had been wounded by a fragment of shell as +he rode back to lead his troops. Boswell, who had been ordered to point +out the road, had been killed by the same volley which struck down his +chief, and the subordinate generals, without instructions and without +guides, with their men in disorder, and the enemy’s artillery playing +fiercely on the forest, had hesitated to advance. Hill, remaining in a +litter near the line of battle, had sent for Stuart. The cavalry +commander, however, was at some distance from the field. Late in the +evening, finding it impossible to employ his command at the front, he +had been detached by Jackson, a regiment of infantry supporting him, to +take and hold Ely’s Ford. He had already arrived within view of a +Federal camp established at that point, and was preparing to charge the +enemy, under cover of the night, when Hill’s messenger recalled him. + +When Stuart reached the front he found the troops still halted, Rodes +and Colston reforming on the open fields near Dowdall’s Tavern, the +Light Division deployed within the forest, and the generals anxious for +their own security. + +So far the attack had been completely successful, but Lee’s lack of +strength prevented the full accomplishment of his design. Had +Longstreet been present, with Pickett and Hood to lead his splendid +infantry, the +Third Corps and the Twelfth would have been so hardly pressed that +Chancellorsville, Hazel Grove, and the White House would have fallen an +easy prize to Jackson’s bayonets. Anderson, with four small brigades, +was powerless to hold the force confronting him, and marching rapidly +northwards, Sickles had reached Hazel Grove before Jackson fell. Here +Pleasonton, with his batteries, was still in position, and Hooker had +not yet lost his head. As soon as Birney’s and Whipple’s divisions had +come up, forming in columns of brigades behind the guns, Sickles was +ordered to assail the enemy’s right flank and check his advance. Just +before midnight the attack was made, in two lines of battle, supported +by strong columns. The night was very clear and still; the moon, nearly +full, threw enough light into the woods to facilitate the advance, and +the tracks leading north-west served as lines of direction. + +The attack, however, although gallantly made, gained no material +advantage. The preliminary movements were plainly audible to the +Confederates, and Lane’s brigade, most of which was now south of the +plank road, had made every preparation to receive it. Against troops +lying down in the woods the Federal artillery, although fifty or sixty +guns were in action, made but small impression; and the dangers of a +night attack, made upon troops who are expecting it, and whose _moral_ +is unaffected, were forcibly illustrated. The confusion in the forest +was very great; a portion of the assailing force, losing direction, +fell foul of Berry’s division at the foot of the Fairview heights, +which had not been informed of the movement, and at least two +regiments, fired into from front and rear, broke up in panic. Some part +of the log breastworks which Jackson’s advanced line had occupied were +recaptured; but not a single one of the assailants, except as +prisoners, reached the plank road. And yet the attack was an +exceedingly well-timed stroke, and as such, although the losses were +heavy, had a very considerable effect on the issue of the day’s +fighting. It showed, or seemed to show, that the Federals were still in +good heart, that they were rapidly concentrating, and that the +Confederates might be met by +vigorous counter-strokes. “The fact,” said Stuart in his official +dispatch, “that the attack was made, and at night, made me apprehensive +of a repetition of it.” + +So, while Jackson slept through the hours of darkness that should have +seen the consummation of his enterprise, his soldiers lay beside their +arms; and the Federals, digging, felling, and building, constructed a +new line of parapet, protected by abattis, and strengthened by a long +array of guns, on the slopes of Fairview and Hazel Grove. The respite +which the fall of the Confederate leader had brought them was not +neglected; the fast-spreading panic was stayed; the First Army Corps, +rapidly crossing the Rappahannock, secured the road to the White House, +and Averell’s division of cavalry reached Ely’s Ford. + +May 3 On the left, between Chancellorsville and the river, where a +young Federal colonel, named Miles,[8] handled his troops with +conspicuous skill, Lee’s continuous attacks had been successfully +repulsed, and at dawn on the morning of May 3 the situation of the +Union army was far from unpromising. A gap of nearly two miles +intervened between the Confederate wings, and within this gap, on the +commanding heights of Hazel Grove and Fairview, the Federals were +strongly intrenched. An opportunity for dealing a crushing +counterblow—for holding one portion of Lee’s army in check while the +other was overwhelmed—appeared to present itself. The only question was +whether the _moral_ of the general and the men could be depended upon. + +In Stuart, however, Hooker had to deal with a soldier who was no +unworthy successor of Stonewall Jackson. Reluctantly abandoning the +idea of a night attack, the cavalry general, fully alive to the +exigencies of the situation, had determined to reduce the interval +between himself and Lee; and during the night the artillery was brought +up to the front, and the batteries deployed wherever they could find +room. Just before the darkness began to lift, orders were received from +Lee that the assault was to be made as early as possible; and the right +wing, swinging round in order to come abreast of the centre, +became hotly engaged. Away to the south-east, across the hills held by +the Federals, came the responding thunder of Lee’s guns; and 40,000 +infantry, advancing through the woods against front and flank, +enveloped in a circle of fire a stronghold which was held by over +60,000 muskets. + +It is unnecessary to describe minutely the events of the morning. The +Federal troops, such as were brought into action, fought well; but +Jackson’s tremendous attack had already defeated Hooker. Before Sickles +made his night attack from Hazel Grove he had sent orders for Sedgwick +to move at once, occupy Fredericksburg, seize the heights, and march +westward by the plank road; and, at the same time, he had instructed +his engineers to select and fortify a position about a mile in rear of +Chancellorsville. So, when Stuart pressed forward, not only had this +new position been occupied by the First and Fifth Army Corps, but the +troops hitherto in possession of Hazel Grove were already evacuating +their intrenchments. + +These dispositions sufficiently attest the demoralisation of the +Federal commander. As the historian of the Army of the Potomac puts it: +“The movement to be executed by Sedgwick was precisely one of those +movements which, according as they are wrought out, may be either the +height of wisdom or the height of folly. Its successful accomplishment +certainly promised very brilliant results. It is easy to see how +seriously Lee’s safety would be compromised if, while engaged with +Hooker in front, he should suddenly find a powerful force assailing his +rear, and grasping already his direct line of communication with +Richmond. But if, on the other hand, Lee should be able by any +slackness on the part of his opponent to engage him in front with a +part of his force, while he should turn swiftly round to assail the +isolated moving column, it is obvious that he would be able to repulse +or destroy that column, and then by a vigorous return, meet or attack +his antagonist’s main body. In the successful execution of this plan +not only was Sedgwick bound to the most energetic action, but Hooker +also was engaged by every +consideration of honour and duty to so act as to make the dangerous +task he had assigned to Sedgwick possible.”[9] + +But so far from aiding his subordinate by a heavy counter-attack on +Lee’s front, Hooker deliberately abandoned the Hazel Grove salient, +which, keeping asunder the Confederate wings, strongly facilitated such +a manœuvre; and more than this, he divided his own army into two +portions, of which the rear, occupying the new position, was actually +forbidden to reinforce the front. + +It is possible that Hooker contemplated an early retreat of his whole +force to the second position. If so, Lee and Stuart were too quick for +him. The cavalry commander, as soon as it became light, and the hills +and undulations of the Wilderness emerged from the shadows, immediately +recognised the importance of Hazel Grove. The hill was quickly seized; +thirty pieces of artillery, established on the crest, enfiladed the +Federal batteries, facing west, on the heights of Fairview; and the +brigade on Stuart’s extreme right was soon in touch with the troops +directed by General Lee. Then against the three sides of the Federal +position the battle raged. From the south and south-east came Anderson +and McLaws, the batteries unlimbering on every eminence, and the +infantry, hitherto held back, attacking with the vigour which their +gallant commanders knew so well how to inspire. And from the west, +formed in three lines, Hill’s division to the front, came the Second +Army Corps. The men knew by this time that the leader whom they trusted +beyond all others had been struck down, that he was lying wounded, +helpless, far away in rear. Yet his spirit was still with them. Stuart, +galloping along the ranks, recalled him with ringing words to their +memories, and as the bugles sounded the onset, it was with a cry of +“Remember Jackson!” that his soldiers rushed fiercely upon the Federal +breastworks. + +The advanced line, within the forest, was taken at the first rush; the +second, at the foot of the Fairview heights, protected by a swampy +stream, a broad belt of abattis, and +with thirty guns on the hill behind, proved far more formidable, and +Hill’s division was forced back. But Rodes and Colston were in close +support. The fight was speedily renewed; and then came charge and +counter-charge; the storm of the parapets; the rally of the defenders; +the rush with the bayonet; and, mowing down men like grass, the fearful +sweep of case and canister. Twice the Confederates were repulsed. Twice +they reformed, brigade mingled with brigade, regiment with regiment, +and charged again in the teeth of the thirty guns. + +On both sides ammunition began to fail; the brushwood took fire, the +ground became hot beneath the foot, and many wounded perished miserably +in the flames. Yet still, with the tangled abattis dividing the +opposing lines, the fight went on; both sides struggling fiercely, the +Federals with the advantage of position, the Confederates of numbers, +for Hooker refused to reinforce his gallant troops. At length the guns +which Stuart had established on Hazel Grove, crossing their fire with +those of McLaws and Anderson, gained the upper hand over the Union +batteries. The storm of shell, sweeping the Fairview plateau, took the +breastworks in reverse; the Northern infantry, after five hours of such +hot battle as few fields have witnessed, began sullenly to yield, and +as Stuart, leading the last charge, leapt his horse over the parapet, +the works were evacuated, and the tattered colours of the Confederates +waved in triumph on the hill. + +“The scene,” says a staff-officer, “can never be effaced from the minds +of those that witnessed it. The troops were pressing forward with all +the ardour and enthusiasm of combat. The white smoke of musketry +fringed the front of battle, while the artillery on the hills in rear +shook the earth with its thunder and filled the air with the wild +shrieking of the shells that plunged into the masses of the retreating +foe. To add greater horror and sublimity to the scene, the +Chancellorsville House and the woods surrounding it were wrapped in +flames. It was then that General Lee rode to the front of his advancing +battalions. His presence was the signal for one of those uncontrollable +outbursts of enthusiasm which none can appreciate who have not +witnessed them. + +“The fierce soldiers, with their faces blackened with the smoke of +battle, the wounded, crawling with feeble limbs from the fury of the +devouring flames, all seemed possessed of a common impulse. One long, +unbroken cheer, in which the feeble cry of those who lay helpless on +the earth blended with the strong voices of those who still fought, +hailed the presence of the victorious chief. + +“His first care was for the wounded of both armies, and he was among +the foremost at the burning mansion, where some of them lay. But at +that moment, when the transports of his troops were drowning the roar +of battle with acclamations, a note was brought to him from General +Jackson. It was handed to him as he sat on his horse near the +Chancellorsville House, and unable to open it with his gauntleted +hands, he passed it to me with directions to read it to him. I shall +never forget the look of pain and anguish that passed over his face as +he listened. In a voice broken with emotion he bade me say to General +Jackson that the victory was his. I do not know how others may regard +this incident, but for myself, as I gave expression to the thoughts of +his exalted mind, I forgot the genius that won the day in my reverence +for the generosity that refused its glory.” + +Lee’s reply ran:— + +“General,—I have just received your note, informing me that you were +wounded. I cannot express my regret at the occurrence. Could I have +directed events, I should have chosen for the good of the country to be +disabled in your stead. + +“I congratulate you upon the victory, which is due to your skill and +energy. + +“Very respectfully, your obedient servant, +R. E. LEE, _General._” + +Such was the tribute, not the less valued that it was couched in no +exaggerated terms, which was brought to the bedside in the quiet +hospital. Jackson was almost alone. As the sound of cannon and +musketry, borne across +the forest, grew gradually louder, he had ordered all those who had +remained with him, except Mr. Smith, to return to the battle-field and +attend to their different duties. + +His side, injured by his fall from the litter, gave him much pain, but +his thoughts were still clear, and his speech coherent. “General Lee,” +he said, when his aide-de-camp read to him the Commander-in-Chief’s +brief words, “is very kind, but he should give the praise to God.” + +During the day the pain gradually ceased; the general grew brighter, +and from those who visited the hospital he inquired minutely about the +battle and the troops engaged. When conspicuous instances of courage +were related his face lit up with enthusiasm, and he uttered his usual +“Good, good,” with unwonted energy when the gallant behaviour of his +old command was alluded to. “Some day,” he said, “the men of that +brigade will be proud to say to their children, ‘I was one of the +Stonewall Brigade.’ He disclaimed all right of his own to the name +Stonewall: ‘It belongs to the brigade and not to me.’ That night he +slept well, and was free from pain. + +Meanwhile the Confederate army, resting on the heights of +Chancellorsville, preparatory to an attack upon Hooker’s second +stronghold, had received untoward news. Sedgwick, at eleven o’clock in +the morning, had carried Marye’s Hill, and, driving Early before him, +was moving up the plank road. Wilcox’ brigade of Anderson’s division, +then at Banks’ Ford, was ordered to retard the advance of the hostile +column. McLaws was detached to Salem Church. The Second Army Corps and +the rest of Anderson’s division remained to hold Hooker in check, and +for the moment operations at Chancellorsville were suspended. + +McLaws, deploying his troops in the forest, two hundred and fifty yards +from a wide expanse of cleared ground, pushed his skirmishers forward +to the edge, and awaited the attack of a superior force. Reserving his +fire to close quarters, its effect was fearful. But the Federals pushed +forward; a school-house occupied as an advanced post was captured, and +at this point Sedgwick was within an ace of breaking through. His +second line, however, had not yet +deployed, and a vigorous counterstroke, delivered by two brigades, +drove back the whole of his leading division in great disorder. As +night fell the Confederates, careful not to expose themselves to the +Union reserves, retired to the forest, and Sedgwick, like Hooker, +abandoned all further idea of offensive action. + +May 4 The next morning Lee himself, with the three remaining brigades +of Anderson, arrived upon the scene. Sedgwick, who had lost 5,000 men +the preceding day, May had fortified a position covering Banks’ Ford, +and occupied it with over 20,000 muskets. Lee, with the divisions of +McLaws, Anderson, and Early, was slightly stronger. The attack was +delayed, for the Federals held strong ground, difficult to reconnoitre; +but once begun the issue was soon decided. Assailed in front and +flanks, with no help coming from Hooker, and only a single bridge at +Banks’ Ford in rear, the Federals rapidly gave ground. + +Darkness, however, intensified by a thick fog, made pursuit difficult, +and Sedgwick re-crossed the river with many casualties but in good +order. During these operations, that is, from four o’clock on Sunday +afternoon until after midnight on Monday, Hooker had not moved a single +man to his subordinate’s assistance.[10] So extraordinary a situation +has seldom been seen in war: an army of 60,000 men, strongly fortified, +was held in check for six-and-thirty hours by 20,000; while not seven +miles away raged a battle on which the whole fate of the campaign +depended. + +Lee and Jackson had made no false estimate of Hooker’s incapacity. +Sedgwick’s army corps had suffered so severely in men and in _moral_ +that it was not available for immediate service, even had it been +transferred to Chancellorsville; and Lee was now free to concentrate +his whole force against the main body of the Federal army. His men, +notwithstanding their extraordinary exertions, were confident of +victory. + +May 5 “As I sheltered myself,” says an eye-witness, “in a little +farmhouse on the plank road the brigades of Anderson’s division came +splashing through the mud, in wild tumultuous spirits, singing, +shouting, jesting, heedless of soaking rags, drenched to the skin, and +burning again to mingle in the mad revelry of battle.”[11] But it was +impossible to push forward, for a violent rain-storm burst upon the +Wilderness, and the spongy soil, saturated with the deluge, absolutely +precluded all movement across country. Hooker, who had already made +preparations for retreat, took advantage of the weather, and as soon as +darkness set in put his army in motion for the bridges. + +May 6 By eight o’clock on the morning of the 6th the whole force had +crossed; and when the Confederate patrols pushed forward, Lee found +that his victim had escaped. + +The Army of the Potomac returned to its old camp on the hills above +Fredericksburg, and Lee reoccupied his position on the opposite ridge. +Stoneman, who had scoured the whole country to within a few miles of +Richmond, returned to Kelly’s Ford on May 8. The raid had effected +nothing. The damage done to the railroads and canals was repaired by +the time the raiders had regained the Rappahannock. Lee’s operations at +Chancellorsville had not been affected in the very slightest degree by +their presence in his rear, while Stoneman’s absence had proved the +ruin of the Federal army. Jackson, who had been removed by the +Commander-in-Chief’s order to Mr. Chandler’s house, near Gurney’s +Station, on the morning of May 5, was asked what he thought of Hooker’s +plan of campaign. His reply was: “It was in the main a good conception, +an excellent plan. But he should not have sent away his cavalry; that +was his great blunder. It was that which enabled me to turn him without +his being aware of it, and to take him in the rear. Had he kept his +cavalry with him, his plan would have been a very good one.” This was +not his only comment on the great battle. Among other things, he said +that he intended to cut the Federals off from the United States Ford, +and, taking a position between them and the +river, oblige them to attack him, adding, with a smile, “My men +sometimes fail to drive the enemy from a position, but they always fail +to drive us away.” He spoke of General Rodes, and alluded in high terms +to his splendid behaviour in the attack on Howard. He hoped he would be +promoted, and he said that promotion should be made at once, upon the +field, so as to act as an incentive to gallantry in others. He spoke of +Colonel Willis, who had commanded the skirmishers, and praised him very +highly, and referred most feelingly to the death of Paxton, the +commander of the Stonewall Brigade, and of Captain Boswell, his chief +engineer. In speaking of his own share in the victory he said: “Our +movement was a great success; I think the most successful military +movement of my life. But I expect to receive far more credit for it +than I deserve. Most men will think I planned it all from the first; +but it was not so. I simply took advantage of circumstances as they +were presented to me in the providence of God. I feel that His hand led +me—let us give Him the glory.” + +It must always be an interesting matter of speculation what the result +would have been had Jackson accomplished his design, on the night he +fell, of moving a large part of his command up the White House road, +and barring the only line of retreat left open to the Federals. + +Hooker, it is argued, had two corps in position which had been hardly +engaged, the Second and the Fifth; and another, the First, under +Reynolds, was coming up. Of these, 25,000 men might possibly, could +they have been manœuvred in the forest, have been sent to drive Jackson +back. And, undoubtedly, to those who think more of numbers than of +human nature, of the momentum of the mass rather than the mental +equilibrium of the general, the fact that a superior force of +comparatively fresh troops was at Hooker’s disposal will be sufficient +to put the success of the Confederates out of court. Yet the question +will always suggest itself, would not the report that a victorious +enemy, of unknown strength, was pressing forward, in the darkness of +the night, towards the only line of retreat, +have so demoralised the Federal commander and the Federal soldiers, +already shaken by the overthrow of the Eleventh Army Corps, that they +would have thought only of securing their own safety? Would Hooker, +whose tactics the next day, after he had had the night given him in +which to recover his senses, were so inadequate, have done better if he +had received no respite? Would the soldiers of the three army corps not +yet engaged, who had been witnesses of the rout of Howard’s divisions, +have fared better, when they heard the triumphant yells of the +advancing Confederates, than the hapless Germans? “The wounding of +Jackson,” says a most careful historian of the battle, himself a +participator in the Union disaster, was a most fortunate circumstance +for the Army of the Potomac. At nine o’clock the capture or destruction +of a large part of the army seemed inevitable. There was, at the time, +great uncertainty and a feeling akin to panic prevailing among the +Union forces round Chancellorsville; and when we consider the position +of the troops at this moment, and how many important battles have been +won by trivial flank attacks—how Richepanse (attacking through the +forest) with a single brigade ruined the Austrians at Hohenlinden—we +must admit that the Northern army was in great peril when Jackson +arrived within one thousand yards of its vital point (the White House) +with 20,000 men and 50 cannon.”[12] He must be a great leader indeed +who, when his flank is suddenly rolled up and his line of retreat +threatened, preserves sufficient coolness to devise a general +counterstroke. Jackson had proved himself equal to such a situation at +Cedar Run, but it is seldom in these circumstances that Providence +sides with the “big battalions.” + +The Federal losses in the six days’ battles were heavy: over 12,000 at +Chancellorsville, and 4,700 at Fredericksburg, Salem Church, and Banks’ +Ford; a total of 17,287. The army lost 13 guns, and nearly 6,000 +officers and men were reported either captured or missing. + +The casualties were distributed as follows:— + +First Army Corps +Second Army Corps +Third Army Corps +Fifth Army Corps +Sixth Army Corps +Eleventh Army Corps +Twelfth Army Corps +Pleasonton’s Cavalry Brigade 135 1,925 4,119 700 4,590 2,412 2,822 141 +——— 16,844 + +The Confederate losses were hardly less severe. The killed and wounded +were as under:— + +SECOND ARMY CORPS + +A. P. Hill’s Division +Rodes” Division +Colston’s Division +Early’s Division +Anderson’s Division +McLaws” Division +Artillery +Cavalry +Prisoners (estimated) 2,583 2,178 1,868 851 1,180 1,379 227 11 2,000 +——— 12,227 + +But a mere statement of the casualties by no means represents the +comparative loss of the opposing forces. Victory does not consist in +merely killing and maiming a few thousand men. This is the visible +result; it is the invisible that tells. The Army of the Potomac, when +it retreated across the Rappahannock, was far stronger in mere numbers +than the Army of Northern Virginia; but in reality it was far weaker, +for the moral of the survivors, and of the general who led them, was +terribly affected. That of the Confederates, on the other hand, had +been sensibly elevated, and it is moral, not numbers, which is the +strength of armies. What, after all, was the loss of 12,200 soldiers to +the Confederacy? In that first week of May there were probably 20,000 +conscripts in different camps of instruction, more than enough to +recruit the depleted regiments to full strength. Nor did the slaughter +of Chancellorsville diminish to any appreciable degree the vast hosts +of the Union. + +And yet the Army of the Potomac had lost more than all the efforts of +the Government could replace. The Army of Virginia, on the other hand, +had acquired a superiority of spirit which was ample compensation for +the sacrifice which had been made. It is hardly too much to say that +Lee’s force had gained from the victory an increase of strength +equivalent to a whole army corps of 80,000 men, while that of his +opponent had been proportionately diminished. Why, then, was there no +pursuit? + +It has been asserted that Lee was so crippled by his losses at +Chancellorsville that he was unable to resume operations against Hooker +for a whole month. This explanation of his inactivity can hardly be +accepted. + +Illustration: The Battlefields of Chancellorsville, Salem Church and +Fredericksburg, May 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 1862. For larger view +click on image. + +On June 16 and 18, 1815, at Quatre-Bras and Waterloo, the Anglo-Dutch +army, little larger than that of Northern Virginia, lost 17,000 men; +and yet on the 19th Wellington was marching in pursuit of the French; +nor did he halt until he arrived within sight of Paris. And on August +28, 29, and 30, 1862, at Groveton and the Second Manassas, Stonewall +Jackson lost 4,000 officers and men, one-fifth of his force, but he was +not left in rear when Lee invaded Maryland. Moreover, after he had +defeated Sedgwick, on the same night that Hooker was recrossing the +Rappahannock, Lee was planning a final attack on the Federal +intrenchments, and his disappointment was bitter when he learned that +his enemy had escaped. If his men were capable of further efforts on +the night of May 5, they were capable of them the next day; and it was +neither the ravages of battle nor the disorganisation of the army that +held the Confederates fast, but the deficiency of supplies, the damage +done to the railways by Stoneman’s horsemen, the weakness of the +cavalry, and, principally, the hesitation of the Government. After the +victory of Chancellorsville, strong hopes of peace were entertained in +the South. Before Hooker advanced, a large section of the Northern +Democrats, despairing of ultimate success, had once more raised the cry +that immediate separation was better, than a hopeless contest, +involving such awful sacrifices, and it needed all Lincoln’s strength +to stem the tide of disaffection. +The existence of this despondent feeling was well known to the Southern +statesmen; and to such an extent did they count upon its growth and +increase that they had overlooked altogether the importance of +improving a victory, should the army be successful; so now, when the +chance had come, they were neither ready to forward such an enterprise, +nor could they make up their minds to depart from their passive +attitude. But to postpone all idea of counterstroke until some +indefinite period is as fatal in strategy as in tactics. By no means an +uncommon policy, it has been responsible for the loss of a thousand +opportunities. + +Had not politics intervened, a vigorous pursuit—not necessarily +involving an immediate attack, but drawing Hooker, as Pope had been +drawn in the preceding August, into an unfavourable situation, before +his army had had time to recover—would have probably been initiated. It +may be questioned, however, whether General Lee, even when Longstreet +and his divisions joined him, would have been so strong as he had been +at the end of April. None felt more deeply than the Commander-in-Chief +that the absence of Jackson was an irreparable misfortune. “Give him my +affectionate regards,” he said to an aide-de-camp who was riding to the +hospital; “tell him to make haste and get well, and come back to me as +soon as he can. He has lost his left arm, but I have lost my right.” +“Any victory,” he wrote privately, “would be dear at such a price. I +know not how to replace him.” + +His words were prophetic. Exactly two months after Chancellorsville the +armies met once more in the clash of battle. During the first two days, +on the rolling plain round Gettysburg, a village of Pennsylvania, four +Federal army corps were beaten in succession, but ere the sun set on +the third Lee had to admit defeat. + +And yet his soldiers had displayed the same fiery courage and stubborn +persistence which had carried them victorious through the Wilderness. +But his “right arm” had not yet been replaced. “If,” he said after the +war, with unaccustomed emphasis, “I had had Jackson at +Gettysburg I should have won the battle, and a complete victory there +would have resulted in the establishment of Southern independence.” + +It was not to be. Chancellorsville, where 130,000 men were defeated by +60,000, is up to a certain point as much the tactical masterpiece of +the nineteenth century as was Leuthen of the eighteenth. But, splendid +triumph as it was, the battle bore no abiding fruits, and the reason +seems very clear. The voice that would have urged pursuit was silent. +Jackson’s fall left Lee alone, bereft of his alter ego; with none, save +Stuart, to whom he could entrust the execution of those daring and +delicate manœuvres his inferior numbers rendered necessary; with none +on whose resource and energy he could implicitly rely. Who shall say +how far his own resolution had been animated and confirmed at other +crises by the prompting and presence of the kindred spirit? “They +supplemented each other,” said Davis, “and together, with any fair +opportunity, they were absolutely invincible.” + +Many a fierce battle still lay before the Army of Northern Virginia; +marvellous was the skill and audacity with which Lee manœuvred his +ragged regiments in the face of overwhelming odds; fierce and +unyielding were the soldiers, but with Stonewall Jackson’s death the +impulse of victory died away. + +May 7 It is needless to linger over the closing scene at Gurney’s +Station. For some days there was hope that the patient would recover; +pneumonia, attributed to his fall from the litter as he was borne from +the field, supervened, and he gradually began to sink. On the Thursday +his wife and child arrived from Richmond; but he was then almost too +weak for conversation, and on Sunday morning it was evident that the +end was near. + +May 10 As yet he had scarcely realised his condition. If, he said, it +was God’s will, he was ready to go, but he believed that there was +still work for him to do, and that his life would be preserved to do +it. At eleven o’clock Mrs. Jackson knelt by his side, and told him that +he could not live beyond the evening. “You are frightened, my +child,” he replied, “death is not so near; I may yet get well.” She +fell upon the bed, weeping bitterly, and told him again that there was +no hope. After a moment’s pause, he asked her to call Dr. McGuire. +“Doctor,” he said, “Anna tells me I am to die to-day; is it so?” When +he was answered, he remained silent for a moment or two, as if in +intense thought, and then quietly replied, “Very good, very good; it is +all right.” + +About noon, when Major Pendleton came into the room, he asked, “Who is +preaching at headquarters to-day?” He was told that Mr. Lacy was, and +that the whole army was praying for him. “Thank God,” he said; “they +are very kind to me.” Already his strength was fast ebbing, and +although his face brightened when his baby was brought to him, his mind +had begun to wander. Now he was on the battle-field, giving orders to +his men; now at home in Lexington; now at prayers in the camp, +Occasionally his senses came back to him, and about half-past one he +was told that he had but two hours to live. Again he answered, feebly +but firmly, “Very good; it is all right. These were almost his last +coherent words. For some time he lay unconscious, and then suddenly he +cried out: “Order A.P. Hill to prepare for action! Pass the infantry to +the front! Tell Major Hawks “then stopped, leaving the sentence +unfinished. Once more he was silent; but a little while after he said +very quietly and clearly, “Let us cross over the river, and rest under +the shade of the trees,” and the soul of the great captain passed into +the peace of God. + +NOTE I + +[From General Lee’s letter-book.] + +Lexington, Virginia, 25th January, 1866. + +MRS. T. J. JACKSON:— + +MY DEAR MRS. JACKSON,—Dr. Brown handed me your note of the 9th, when in +Richmond on business connected with Washington College. I have delayed +replying since my return, hoping to have sufficient time to comply with +your request. Last night I received a note from Mrs. Brown, enclosing +one from Dr. Dabney, stating that the immediate return of his +manuscript was necessary. I have not been able to open it; and when I +read it when you were here, it was for the pleasure of the narrative, +with no view of remark or correction; and I took no memoranda of what +seemed to be errors. I have not thought of them since, and do not know +that I can now recall them; and certainly have no desire that my +opinions should be adopted in preference to Dr. Dabney’s. . . . I am, +however, unable at this time to specify the battles to which my remark +particularly refers. The opinion of General Jackson, in reference to +the propriety of attacking the Federal army under General McClellan at +Harrison’s Landing, is not, I think, correctly stated. Upon my arrival +there, the day after General Longstreet and himself, I was disappointed +that no opportunity for striking General McClellan, on the retreat, or +in his then position, had occurred, and went forward with General +Jackson alone, on foot; and after a careful reconnaissance of the whole +line and position, he certainly stated to me, at that time, the +impropriety of attacking. I am misrepresented at the battle of +Chancellorsville in proposing an attack in front, the first evening of +our arrival. On the contrary, I decided against it, and stated to +General Jackson, we must attack on our left as soon as practicable; and +the necessary movement of the troops began immediately. In consequence +of a report received about that time, from General Fitzhugh Lee, +describing the position of the Federal army, and the roads which he +held with his cavalry leading to its rear, General Jackson, after some +inquiry concerning the roads leading to the Furnace, undertook to throw +his command entirely in Hooker’s rear, which he accomplished with equal +skill and boldness; the rest of the army being moved to the left flank +to connect with him as he advanced. I think there is some mistake, too, +of a regiment of infantry being sent by him to the ford on the Rapidan, +as described by Dr. Dabney. The cavalry was ordered to make such a +demonstration. General Stuart had proceeded to that part of the field +to co-operate in General Jackson’s movement, and I always supposed it +was his dismounted cavalry. As well as I now recollect, something is +said by +Dr. Dabney as to General Jackson’s opinion as to the propriety of +delivering battle at Sharpsburg. When he came upon the field, having +preceded his troops, and learned my reasons for offering battle, he +emphatically concurred with me. When I determined to withdraw across +the Potomac, he also concurred; but said then, in view of all the +circumstances, it was better to have fought the battle in Maryland than +to have left it without a struggle. After crossing the Potomac, General +Jackson was charged with the command of the rear, and he designated the +brigades of infantry to support Pendleton’s batteries. I believed +General McClellan had been so crippled at Sharpsburg that he could not +follow the Confederate army into Virginia immediately; but General +Stuart was ordered, after crossing the Potomac, to recross at once at +Williamsport, threaten his right flank, and observe his movements. Near +daylight the next, morning, General Pendleton reported to me the +occurrence at Shepherdstown the previous evening, and stated that he +had made a similar report to General Jackson, who was lying near me on +the same field. From his statement, I thought it possible that the +Federal army might be attempting to follow us; and I sent at once to +General Jackson to say that, in that event, I would attack it; that he +must return with his whole command if necessary; that I had sent to +Longstreet to countermarch the rest of the army; and that upon his +joining me, unless I heard from him to the contrary, I should move with +it to his support. General Jackson went back with Hill’s division, +General Pendleton accompanying him, and soon drove the Federals into +Maryland with loss. His report, which I received on my way towards the +river, relieved my anxiety, and the order of the march of the troops +was again resumed. I have endeavoured to be as brief as possible in my +statement, and with the single object of calling Dr. Dabney’s attention +to the points referred to, that he may satisfy himself as to the +correctness of his own statements; and this has been done solely in +compliance with your request. Other points may have attracted my +attention in the perusal of the narrative; but I cannot now recall +them, and do not know that those which have occurred to me are of +importance. I wish I could do anything to give real assistance, for I +am very anxious that his work should be perfect. + +With feelings of great esteem and regard, I am, + +Very truly yours, +(Signed) R. E. LEE. + +The production of this letter is due to the kindness of Dr. Henry A. +White, and of R. E. Lee, Esquire, of Washington, youngest son of +General Lee. + +NOTE II + +The following details, communicated to the author by one of Lee’s +generals, as to the formations of the Confederate infantry, will be +found interesting:— + +“Our brigades were usually formed of four or five regiments, each +regiment composed of ten companies. Troops furnished by the same State +were, as far as possible, brigaded together, in order to stimulate +State pride, and a spirit of healthy emulation. + +“The regiment was formed for attack in line two-deep, covered by +skirmishers. + +“The number of skirmishers, and the intervals between the men on the +skirmish line, depended altogether on the situation. Sometimes two +companies were extended as skirmishers; sometimes one company; +sometimes a certain number of men from several companies. In rear of +the skirmishers, at a distance ranging from three hundred to one +hundred and fifty paces, came the remainder of the regiment. + +“When a regiment or a brigade advanced through a heavily wooded +country, such as the Wilderness, the point of direction was +established, and the officers instructed to conform to the movements of +the ‘guide company’ or ‘guide regiment’ as the case might be, the +‘guide’ company or regiment governing both direction and alignment. + +“The maintenance of direction under such circumstances was a very +difficult matter. Our officers, however, were greatly assisted by the +rank and file, as many of the latter were accomplished woodsmen, and +accustomed to hunt and shoot in the dense forests of the South. Each +regiment, moreover, was provided with a right and a left ‘general +guide,’ men selected for their special aptitudes, being good judges of +distance, and noted for their steadiness and skill in maintaining the +direction. + +“Then, again, the line of battle was greatly aided in maintaining the +direction by the fire of the skirmishers, and frequently the line would +be formed with a flank resting on a trail or woods-road, a ravine or +watercourse, the flank regiment in such cases acting as the guide: (at +Chancellorsville, Jackson’s divisions kept direction by the turnpike, +both wings looking to the centre.) In advancing through thick woods the +skirmish line was almost invariably strengthened, and while the ‘line +of battle,’ covered by the skirmishers, advanced in two-deep line, +bodies in rear usually marched in columns of fours, prepared to come, +by a ‘forward into line,’ to the point where their assistance might be +desired. I never saw the compass used in wood-fighting. In all +movements to attack it was the universal custom for the brigade +commander to assemble both field and company officers to the ‘front and +centre,’ and instruct them particularly as to the purpose of the +movement, the method in which it was to be carried out, the point of +direction, the guide regiment, the position of other brigades, etc., +etc. Like action was also taken by the regimental commander when a +regiment was alone. + +“This precaution, I venture to think, is absolutely indispensable to an +orderly and combined advance over any ground whatever, and, so far as +my knowledge goes, was seldom omitted, except when haste was +imperative, in the Army of Northern Virginia. Practical experience +taught us that no movement should be permitted until every +officer was acquainted with the object in view, and had received his +instructions. I may add that brigade and regimental commanders were +most particular to secure their flanks and to keep contact with other +troops by means of patrols; and, also, that in thick woods it was found +to be of very great advantage if a few trustworthy men were detailed as +orderlies to the regimental commander, for by this means he could most +easily control the advance of his skirmishers and of his line of +battle. + + “N. H. HARRIS, + +_General, late Army of Northern Virginia.”_ + +NOTE III + +Before the campaign of 1864, the theatre of which embraced the region +between the Rappahannock and Petersburg, including the Wilderness, +corps of sharp-shooters, each 180 strong, were organised in many of the +brigades of Lee’s army. These “light” troops undertook the outpost, +advanced, flank, and rear guard duties. The men were carefully +selected; they were trained judges of distance, skilful and +enterprising on patrol, and first-rate marksmen, and their rifles were +often fitted with telescopic sights. In order to increase their +confidence in each other they were subdivided into groups of fours, +which messed and slept together, and were never separated in action. +These corps did excellent service during the campaign of 1864. + + [1] Letter to the author. A letter of General Lee to Mrs. Jackson, + which contains a reference to this council of war, appears as a Note + at the end of the chapter. + + [2] There were three halts during the march of fourteen miles. Letter + from Major Hotchkiss. + + [3] Melzi Chancellor’s house; otherwise Dowdall’s Tavern. + + [4] Sedgwick had crossed the river on April 29 and 30. + + [5] Rodes’ brigades were formed in the following order: + + ...................................... + || _______ ______ _____ _______ .......... + Iverson O’Neal Doles Colquitt _______ Ramseur || + + [6] Lieutenant-Colonel Hamlin, the latest historian of + Chancellorsville, has completely disposed of the legend that these + fifty guns repulsed a desperate attack on Hazel Grove. + + [7] In the woods west of the Fairview Heights. + + [8] Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, 1898. + + [9] _Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,_ pp. 241–242. + + [10] It is but fair, however, to state that Hooker, during the + cannonade which preceded the final assault at Chancellorsville, had + been severely bruised by a fall of masonry. + + [11] Hon. Francis Lawley, the _Times,_ June 16, 1863. + + [12] Chancellorsville, Lt.-Colonel A. C. Hamlin. + + + + +Chapter XXV +THE SOLDIER AND THE MAN[1] + + +To the mourning of a sore-stricken nation Stonewall Jackson was carried +to his rest. As the hearse passed to the Capitol, and the guns which +had so lately proclaimed the victory of Chancellorsville thundered +forth their requiem to the hero of the fight, the streets of Richmond +were thronged with a silent and weeping multitude. In the Hall of +Representatives, surrounded by a guard of infantry, the body lay in +state; and thither, in their thousands, from the President to the +maimed soldier, from the generals of the Valley army to wondering +children, borne in their mothers’ arms, the people came to look their +last upon the illustrious dead. The open coffin, placed before the +Speaker’s chair, was draped in the Confederate standard; the State +colours were furled along, the galleries; and the expression on the +face, firm and resolute, as if the spirit of battle still lingered in +the lifeless clay, was that of a great conqueror, wise in council, +mighty in the strife. But as the evening drew on the darkened chamber, +hung with deep mourning, and resounding to the clash of arms, lost its +sombre and martial aspect. Garlands of soft spring flowers, the tribute +of the women of Virginia, rose high above the bier, and white pyramids +of lilies, the emblems of purity and meekness, recalled the blameless +life of the Christian soldier. + +From Richmond the remains were conveyed to Lexington, and, under the +charge of the cadets, lay for the night in the lecture-room of the +Institute, which Jackson had quitted just two years before. The next +morning he was buried, as he himself had wished, in the little cemetery +above the town. + +Many were the mourners that stood around the grave, but they were few +in number compared with those whose hearts were present on those silent +hills. From the cities of the Atlantic coast to the far-off settlements +of Texas the news that Stonewall Jackson had fallen came as a stunning +blow. The people sorrowed for him with no ordinary grief, not as a +great man and a good, who had done his duty and had gone to his reward, +but as the pillar of their hopes and the sheet-anchor of the +Confederate cause. Nor will those familiar with the further history of +the Civil War, from the disaster of Gettysburg to the surrender at +Appomattox, question the truth of this mournful presage. The Army of +Northern Virginia became a different and less manageable instrument +after Chancellorsville. Over and over again it failed to respond to the +conceptions of its leader, and the failure was not due to the soldiers, +but to the generals. Loyal and valiant as they were, of not one of his +lieutenants could Lee say, as he had said of Jackson, “Such an +executive officer the sun never shone on. I have but to show him my +design, and I know that if it can be done it will be done. No need for +me to send or watch him. Straight as the needle to the pole he advances +to the execution of my purpose.”[2] + +These words have been quoted as an epitome of Jackson’s military +character. “He was essentially,” says Swinton, “an executive officer, +and in that sphere he was incomparable; but he was devoid of high +mental parts, and destitute of that power of planning a combination, +and of that calm, broad, military intelligence which distinguished +General Lee.”[3] And this verdict, except in the South, has been +generally accepted. Yet it rests on a most unsubstantial basis. Because +Jackson knew so well how to obey it is asserted that he was not well +fitted for independent command. Because he could carry out orders to +the letter it is assumed that he was no master of strategy. Because his +will was of iron, and his purpose, once fixed, never for a moment +wavered, we are asked to believe that +his mental scope was narrow. Because he was silent in council, not +eager in expressing his ideas, and averse to argument, it is implied +that his opinions on matters of great moment were not worth the +hearing. Because he was shy and unassuming; because he betrayed neither +in face nor bearing, save in the heat of battle, any unusual power or +consciousness of power, it is hastily concluded that he was deficient +in the initiative, the breadth, and the penetration which are the +distinguishing characteristics of great generals. + +In these pages, however, it has been made clear that Jackson’s quiet +demeanour concealed a vivid imagination, a fertile brain, and an +extraordinary capacity for far-reaching combinations. After he had once +made up his mind when and where to strike, it is true that his methods +of war were very simple, and his blows those of a sledgehammer. But +simplicity of design and vigour of execution are often marks of the +very highest military ability. “Genius,” says Napier, “is not +extravagant; it is ardent, and it conceives great projects; but it +knows beforehand how to attain the result, and it uses the simplest +means, because its faculties are essentially calculating, industrious, +and patient. It is creative, because its knowledge is vast; it is quick +and peremptory, not because it is presumptuous, but because it is +well-prepared.” And Swinton’s verdict would have been approved by few +of the soldiers of the Civil War. It was not the verdict of Lee. +Significant indeed was the cry of the great Confederate, the soul of +truth as of generosity, when Jackson was wounded: “Could I have +directed events, I should have chosen, for the good of the country, to +have been disabled in your stead.” It was not the verdict of the +Southern people. “No man,” it was said by one who knew them well, “had +so magnificent prospect before him as General Jackson. Whether he +desired it or not, he could not have escaped being Governor of +Virginia, and also, in the opinion of competent judges, sooner or later +President of the Confederacy.”[4] Nor was it the verdict of the foe. +“Stonewall Jackson,” wrote General Howard, commanding the Eleventh +Corps +at Chancellorsville, “was victorious. Even his enemies praise him; but, +providentially for us, it was the last battle he waged against the +American Union. For, in bold planning, in energy of execution, which he +had the power to diffuse, in indefatigable activity and moral +ascendency, he stood head and shoulders above his _confrères,_ and +after his death General Lee could not replace him.”[5] + +It can hardly be questioned that, at the time of his death, Jackson was +the leader most trusted by the Confederates and most dreaded by the +Federals. His own soldiers, and with them the whole population of the +South, believed him capable of any task, invincible except by fate. It +never, indeed, fell to Jackson’s lot to lead a great army or to plan a +great campaign. The operations in the Valley, although decisive in +their results, were comparatively insignificant, in respect both of the +numbers employed and of the extent of the theatre. Jackson was not +wholly independent. His was but a secondary role, and he had to weigh +at every turn the orders and instructions of his superiors. His hand +was never absolutely free. His authority did not reach beyond certain +limits, and his operations were confined to one locality. He was never +permitted to cross the border, and “carry the war into Africa.” Nor +when he joined Lee before Richmond was the restraint removed. In the +campaign against Pope, and in the reduction of Harper’s Ferry, he was +certainly entrusted with tasks which led to a complete severance from +the main body, but the severance was merely temporary. He was the most +trusted of Lee’s lieutenants, but he was only a lieutenant. He had +never the same liberty of action as those of his contemporaries who +rose to historic fame—as Lee himself, as Johnston or Beauregard, as +Grant, or Sherman, or as Sheridan—and consequently he had never a real +opportunity for revealing the height and breadth of his military +genius. + +The Civil War was prolific of great leaders. The young American +generals, inexperienced as they were in dealing with large armies, and +compelled to improvise their tactics as they improvised their staff, +displayed a talent for +command such as soldiers more regularly trained could hardly have +surpassed. Neither the deficiencies of their material nor the +difficulties of the theatre of war were to be lightly overcome; and yet +their methods displayed a refreshing originality. Not only in +mechanical auxiliaries did the inventive genius of their race find +scope. The principles which govern civilised warfare, the rules which +control the employment of each arm, the technical and mechanical arts, +were rapidly modified to the exigencies of the troops and of the +country. Cavalry, intrenchments, the railway, the telegraph, balloons, +signalling, were all used in a manner which had been hitherto unknown. +Monitors and torpedoes were for the first time seen, and even the +formations of infantry were made sufficiently elastic to meet the +requirements of a modern battle-field. Nor was the conduct of the +operations fettered by an adherence to conventional practice. From +first to last the campaigns were characterised by daring and often +skilful manœuvres; and if the tactics of the battle-field were often +less brilliant than the preceding movements, not only are parallels to +these tactics to be found in almost every campaign of history, but they +would probably have escaped criticism had the opponent been less +skilful. But among the galaxy of leaders, Confederate and Federal, in +none had the soldiers such implicit confidence as in Stonewall Jackson, +and than the Southern soldiers, highly educated as many of them were, +no better judges of military capacity were ever known. + +Nevertheless, the opinion of the soldiers is no convincing proof that +Jackson was equal to the command of a large army, or that he could have +carried through a great campaign. Had Lee been disabled, it might be +asked, would Jackson have proved a sufficient substitute? + +It has already been explained that military genius shows itself first +in character, and, second, in the application of the grand principles +of warfare, not in the mere manipulation of armed masses. It cannot +well be denied that Jackson possessed every single attribute which +makes for success in war. Morally and physically he was absolutely +fearless. He accepted responsibility with the same equanimity that +he faced the bullets of the enemy. He permitted no obstacle to turn him +aside from his appointed path, and in seizing an opportunity or in +following up a victory he was the very incarnation of untiring energy. +He had no moments of weakness. He was not robust, and his extraordinary +exertions told upon his constitution. “My health,” he wrote to his wife +in January 1863, “is essentially good, but I do not think I shall be +able in future to stand what I have already stood;” and yet his will +invariably rose superior to bodily exhaustion. A supreme activity, both +of brain and body, was a prominent characteristic of his military life. +His idea of strategy was to secure the initiative, however inferior his +force; to create opportunities and to utilise them; to waste no time, +and to give the enemy no rest. “War,” he said, “means fighting. The +business of the soldier is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig +trenches, to throw up breastworks, to live in camps, but to find the +enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible +damage in the shortest possible time. This will involve great +destruction of life and property while it lasts; but such a war will of +necessity be of brief continuance, and so would be an economy of life +and property in the end. To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure +all the fruits of victory is the secret of successful war.” + +That he felt to the full the fascination of war’s tremendous game we +can hardly doubt. Not only did he derive, as all true soldiers must, an +intense intellectual pleasure from handling his troops in battle so as +to outwit and defeat his adversary, but from the day he first smelt +powder in Mexico until he led that astonishing charge through the dark +depths of the Wilderness his spirits never rose higher than when danger +and death were rife about him. With all his gentleness there was much +of the old Berserker about Stonewall Jackson, not indeed the lust for +blood, but the longing to do doughtily and die bravely, as best becomes +a man. His nature was essentially aggressive. He was never more to be +feared than when he was retreating, and where others thought only of +strong defensive positions he looked persistently for the opportunity +to attack. He was +endowed, like Masséna, “with that rare fortitude which seems to +increase as perils thicken. When conquered he was as ready to fight +again as if he had been conqueror.” “L’audace, l’audace, et toujours +l’audace” was the mainspring of all his actions, and the very sights +and sounds of a stricken field were dear to his soul. Nothing had such +power to stir his pulses as the rebel yell. “I remember,” says a +staff-officer, “one night, at tattoo, that this cry broke forth in the +camp of the Stonewall Brigade, and was taken up by brigades and +divisions until it rang out far over field and woods. The general came +hastily and bareheaded from his tent, and leaning on a fence near by, +listened in silence to the rise, the climax, and the fall of that +strange serenade, raising his head to catch the sound, as it grew +fainter and fainter and died away at last like an echo among the +mountains. Then, turning towards his tent, he muttered in half +soliloquy, ‘That was the sweetest music I ever heard.’” + +Yet least of all was Jackson a mere fighting soldier, trusting to his +lucky star and resolute blows to pull him through. He was not, indeed, +one of those generals who seek to win victories without shedding blood. +He never spared his men, either in marching or fighting, when a great +result was to be achieved, and he was content with nothing less than +the complete annihilation of the enemy. “Had we taken ten sail,” said +Nelson, “and allowed the eleventh to escape, when it had been possible +to have got at her, I could never have called it well done.” Jackson +was of the same mind. “With God’s blessing,” he said before the Valley +campaign, “let us make thorough work of it.” When once he had joined +battle, no loss, no suffering was permitted to stay his hand. He never +dreamed of retreat until he had put in his last reserve. Yet his +victories were won rather by sweat than blood, by skilful manœuvring +rather than sheer hard fighting. Solicitous as he was of the comfort of +his men, he had no hesitation, when his opportunity was ripe, of taxing +their powers of endurance to the uttermost. But the marches which +strewed the wayside with the footsore and the weaklings won his +battles. The enemy, surprised and outnumbered, was practically beaten +before +a shot was fired, and success was attained at a trifling cost. + +Yet, despite his energy, Jackson was eminently patient. He knew when to +refuse battle, just as well as he knew when to deliver it. He was never +induced to fight except on his own terms, that is, on his own ground, +and at his own time, save at Kernstown only, and there the strategical +situation forced his hand. And he was eminently cautious. Before he +committed himself to movement he deliberated long, and he never +attacked until he had ample information. He ran risks, and great ones, +but in war the nettle danger must be boldly grasped, and in Jackson’s +case the dangers were generally more apparent than real. Under his +orders the cavalry became an admirable instrument of reconnaissance. He +showed a marked sagacity for selecting scouts, both officers and +privates, and his system for obtaining intelligence was well-nigh +perfect. He had the rare faculty, which would appear instinctive, but +which is the fruit of concentrated thought allied to a wide knowledge +of war, of divining the intention of his adversary and the state of his +moral. His power of drawing inferences, often from seemingly +unimportant trifles, was akin to that of the hunter of his native +backwoods, to whom the rustle of a twig, the note of a bird, a track +upon the sand, speak more clearly than written characters. His estimate +of the demoralisation of the Federal army after Bull Run, and of the +ease with which Washington might have been captured, was absolutely +correct. In the middle of May, 1862, both Lee and Johnston, +notwithstanding Jackson’s victory over Milroy, anticipated that Banks +would leave the Valley. Jackson thought otherwise, and Jackson was +right. After the bloody repulse at Malvern Hill, when his generals +reported the terrible confusion in the Confederate ranks, he simply +stated his opinion that the enemy was retreating, and went to sleep +again. A week later he suggested that the whole army should move +against Pope, for McClellan, he said, would never dare to march on +Richmond. At Sharpsburg, as the shells cut the trees to pieces in the +West Wood, and the heavy +masses of Federal infantry filled the fields in front, he told his +medical director that McClellan had done his worst. At Fredericksburg, +after the first day’s battle, he believed that the enemy was already +defeated, and, anticipating their escape under cover of the darkness, +he advised a night attack with the bayonet. His knowledge of his +adversary’s character, derived, in great degree, from his close +observation of every movement, enabled him to predict with astonishing +accuracy exactly how he would act under given circumstances. + +Nor can he be charged in any single instance with neglect of +precautions by which the risks of war are diminished. He appears to +have thought out and to have foreseen—and here his imaginative power +aided him—every combination that could be made against him, and to have +provided for every possible emergency. He was never surprised, never +disconcerted, never betrayed into a false manœuvre. Although on some +occasions his success fell short of his expectations, the fault was not +his; his strategy was always admirable, but fortune, in one guise or +another—the indiscipline of the cavalry, the inefficiency of +subordinates, the difficulties of the country—interfered with the full +accomplishment of his designs. But whatever could be done to render +fortune powerless that Jackson did. By means of his cavalry, by forced +marches, by the careful selection of his line of march, of his camps, +of his positions, of his magazines, and lastly, by his consistent +reticence, he effectually concealed from the Federals both his troops +and his designs. Never surprised himself, he seldom failed to surprise +his enemies, if not tactically—that is, while they were resting in +their camps—at least strategically. Kernstown came as a surprise to +Banks, McDowell to Frémont. Banks believed Jackson to be at +Harrisonburg when he had already defeated the detachment at Front +Royal. At Cross Keys and Port Republic neither Frémont nor Shields +expected that their flying foe would suddenly turn at bay. Pope was +unable to support Banks at Cedar Run till the battle had been decided. +When McClellan on the Chickahominy was informed that the Valley army +had joined Lee +it was too late to alter his dispositions, and no surprise was ever +more complete than Chancellorsville. + +And the mystery that always involved Jackson’s movements was +undoubtedly the result of calculation, He knew the effect his sudden +appearances and disappearances would have on the _moral_ of the Federal +generals, and he relied as much on upsetting the mental equilibrium of +his opponents as on concentrating against them superior numbers. Nor +was his view confined to the field of battle and his immediate +adversary. It embraced the whole theatre of war. The motive power which +ruled the enemy’s politics as well as his armies was always his real +objective. From the very first he recognised the weakness of the +Federal position—the anxiety with which the President and the people +regarded Washington—and on this anxiety he traded. Every blow struck in +the Valley campaign, from Kernstown to Cross Keys, was struck at +Lincoln and his Cabinet; every movement, including the advance against +Pope on Cedar Run, was calculated with reference to the effect it would +produce in the Federal councils; and if he consistently advocated +invasion, it was not because Virginia would be relieved of the enemy’s +presence, but because treaties of peace are only signed within sight of +the hostile capital. + +It has been urged that the generals whom Jackson defeated were men of +inferior stamp, and that his capacity for command was consequently +never fairly tested. Had Grant or Sheridan, it is said, been pitted +against him in the Valley, or Sherman or Thomas on the Rappahannock, +his laurels would never have been won. The contention is fair. Generals +of such calibre as Banks and Frémont, Shields and Pope, committed +blunders which the more skilful leaders would undoubtedly have avoided; +and again, had he been pitted against a worthy antagonist, Jackson +would probably have acted with less audacity and greater caution. It is +difficult to conceive, however, that the fact would either have +disturbed his brain or weakened his resolution. Few generals, +apparently, have been caught in worse predicaments than he was; first, +when his army was near Harper’s Ferry, and Frémont and Shields were +converging on his +rear; second, when he lay in the woods near Groveton, with no news from +Longstreet, and Pope’s army all around him; third, when he was marching +by the Brock road to strike Hooker’s right, and Sickles’ column struck +in between himself and Lee. But it was at such junctures as these that +his self-possession was most complete and his skill most marked. The +greater the peril, the more fixed became his purpose. The capacity of +the opponent, moreover, cannot be accepted as the true touchstone of +generalship. “The greatest general,” said Napoleon, “is he who makes +the fewest mistakes,” _i.e._ he who neither neglects an opportunity nor +offers one. + +Thus tested Jackson has few superiors. During the whole of the two +years he held command he never committed a single error. At +Mechanicsville, and again at Frayser’s Farm, the failure to establish +some method of intercommunication left his column isolated; this, +however, was a failure in staff duties, for which the Confederate +headquarters was more to blame than himself. And further, how sure and +swift was the retribution which followed a mistake committed within his +sphere of action! What opportunity did Jackson miss? His penetration +was unerring; and when, after he had marked his prey, did he ever +hesitate to swoop? “What seemed reckless audacity,” it has been well +said by one of the greatest of Southern soldiers, “was the essence of +prudence. His eye had caught at a glance the entire situation, and his +genius, with marvellous celerity and accuracy, had weighed all the +chances of success or failure. While, therefore, others were slowly +feeling their way, or employing in detail insufficient forces, Jackson, +without for one moment doubting his success, hurled his army like a +thunderbolt against the opposing lines, and thus ended the battle at a +single blow.”[6] + +But if Jackson never failed to take advantage of his +opponent’s blunders, it might be said that he sometimes laid himself +open to defeat. Grant and Sheridan, had they been in place of Shields +and Frémont, would hardly have suffered him to escape from Harper’s +Ferry; Sherman would probably have crushed him at the Second Manassas; +Thomas would not have been surprised at Chancellorsville. But Jackson +only pushed daring to its limits when it was safe to do so. He knew the +men he had to deal with. And in whatever situation he might find +himself he invariably reserved more than one means of escape. + +On the field of battle his manœuvres were always sound and often +brilliant. He never failed to detect the key-point of a position, or to +make the best use of the ground. On the defensive his flanks were +always strong and his troops concealed both from view and fire; on the +offensive he invariably attacked where he was least expected. He +handled the three arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in the +closest combination and with the maximum of effect. Except at +Kernstown, where Garnett interfered, his reserve was invariably put in +at exactly the right moment, and he so manipulated his command that he +was always strongest at the decisive point. Nor did he forget that a +battle is only half won where there is no pursuit, and whenever he held +command upon the field, his troops, especially the cavalry, were so +disposed that from the very outset the enemy’s retreat was menaced. The +soldiers, sharers in his achievements, compared his tactical leading +with that of others, and gave the palm to Jackson. An officer of his +staff, who served continuously with the Army of Northern Virginia, +says: “I was engaged in no great battle subsequent to Jackson’s death +in which I did not see the opportunity which, in my opinion, he would +have seized, and have routed our opponents;”[7] and General Lane writes +that on many a hard-fought field, subsequent to Chancellorsville, he +heard his veterans exclaim: “Oh for another Jackson!” + +Until Jackson fell the Army of Northern Virginia, except when his +advice was overruled, had never missed an opening. Afterwards it missed +many. Gettysburg, which +should have been decisive of the war, was pre-eminently a battle of +lost opportunities, and there are others which fall into the same +category. It is a perfectly fair assumption, then, that Jackson, so +unerring was his insight, would not only have proved an efficient +substitute for Lee, but that he would have won such fame as would have +placed him, as it placed his great commander, among the most +illustrious soldiers of all ages. With any of his contemporaries, not +even excepting Lee, he compares more than favourably. Most obedient of +subordinates as he was, his strategical views were not always in +accordance with those of his Commander-in-Chief. If Jackson had been in +charge of the operations, the disastrous battle of Malvern Hill would +never have been fought; Pope would have been cut off from the +Rappahannock; McClellan would have found the whole Confederate army +arrayed against him at South Mountain, or would have been attacked near +Frederick; and Burnside would have been encountered on the North Anna, +where defeat would probably have proved his ruin. It is difficult to +compare him with Lee. A true estimate of Lee’s genius is impossible, +for it can never be known to what extent his designs were thwarted by +the Confederate Government. Lee served Mr. Davis; Jackson served Lee, +wisest and most helpful of masters. It would seem, however, that +Jackson in one respect was Lee’s superior. His courage, physical and +moral, was not more brilliant or more steadfast; his tactical skill no +greater; but he was made of sterner stuff. His self-confidence was +supreme. He never doubted his ability, with God’s help, to carry out +any task his judgment approved. Lee, on the other hand, was oppressed +by a consciousness of his own shortcomings. Jackson never held but one +council of war. Lee seldom made an important movement without +consulting his corps commanders. Jackson kept his subordinates in their +place, exacting from his generals the same implicit obedience he +exacted from his corporals. Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg because +he allowed his second in command to argue instead of marching. Nor was +that political courage, which Nelson declared is as necessary for a +commander as +military courage, a component part of Lee’s character.[8] On assuming +command of the Army of Northern Virginia, in spite of Mr. Davis’ +protestations, he resigned the control of the whole forces of the +Confederacy, and he submitted without complaint to interference. +Jackson’s action when Loring’s regiments were ordered back by the +Secretary of War is sufficient proof that he would have brooked no +meddling with his designs when once they had received the sanction of +the Cabinet. At the same time, it must remain undetermined whether +Jackson was equal to the vast responsibilities which Lee bore with such +steadfast courage; whether he could have administered a great army, +under the most untoward circumstances, with the same success; whether +he could have assuaged the jealousies of the different States, and have +dealt so tactfully with both officers and men that there should have +been no friction between Virginians and Georgians, Texans and +Carolinians. + +It is probable that Jackson’s temper was more akin to Grant’s than +Lee’s. Grant had the same whole-hearted regard for the cause; the same +disregard for the individual. He was just as ready as Jackson to place +a recalcitrant subordinate, no matter how high his rank, under instant +arrest, and towards the incompetent and unsuccessful he was just as +pitiless. Jackson, however, had the finer intellect. The Federal +Commander-in-Chief was unquestionably a great soldier, greater than +those who overlook his difficulties in the ’64 campaign are disposed to +admit. As a strategist he ranks high. But Grant was no master of +stratagem. There was no mystery about his operations. His manœuvres +were strong and straightforward, but he had no skill in deceiving his +adversary, and his tactics were not always of a high order. It may be +questioned whether on the field of battle his ability was equal to that +of Sherman, or of Sherman’s great antagonist, Johnston. Elsewhere he +was their superior. Both Sherman and Johnston were methodical rather +than brilliant; patient, confident, and far-seeing as they were, +strictly observant of the established principles of war, they were +without a +touch of that aggressive genius which distinguished Lee, Grant, and +Jackson. + +Nevertheless, to put Jackson above Grant is to place him high on the +list of illustrious captains. Yet the claim is not extravagant. If his +military characteristics are compared with those of so great a soldier +as Wellington, it will be seen that in many respects they run on +parallel lines. Both had perfect confidence in their own capacity. “I +can do,” said Jackson, “whatever I will to do;” while the Duke, when a +young general in India, congratulated himself that he had learned not +to be deterred by apparent impossibilities. Both were patient, fighting +on their own terms, or fighting not at all. Both were prudent, and yet, +when audacity was justified by the character of their opponent and the +condition of his troops, they took no counsel of their fears. They were +not enamoured of the defensive, for they knew the value of the +initiative, and that offensive strategy is the strategy which +annihilates. Yet, when their enemy remained concentrated, they were +content to wait till they could induce him to disperse. Both were +masters of ruse and stratagem, and the Virginian was as industrious as +the Englishman. And in yet another respect they were alike. “In issuing +orders or giving verbal instruction, Jackson’s words were few and +simple; but they were so clear, so comprehensive and direct, that no +officer could possibly misunderstand, and none dared disobey.”[9] +Exactly the same terms might be applied to Wellington. Again, although +naturally impetuous, glorying in war, they had no belief in a lucky +star; their imagination was always controlled by common-sense, and, +unlike Napoleon, their ambition to succeed was always subordinate to +their judgment. Yet both, when circumstances were imperative, were +greatly daring. The attacks at Groveton and at Chancellorsville were +enterprises instinct with the same intensity of resolution as the storm +of Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, the passage of the Douro, the great +counterstroke of Salamanca. On the field of battle the one was not more +vigilant nor imperturbable than the other, and both possessed a due +sense of proportion. They knew exactly how much they could effect +themselves, and how much must be left to others. Recognising that when +once the action had opened the sphere in which their authority could be +exercised was very limited, they gave their subordinates a free hand, +issuing few orders, and encouraging their men rather by example than by +words. Both, too, had that “most rare faculty of coming to prompt and +sure conclusions in sudden exigencies—the certain mark of a +master-spirit in war.”[10] At Bull Run, Jackson was ordered to support +Evans at the Stone Bridge. Learning that the left was compromised, +without a moment’s hesitation he turned aside, and placed his brigade +in the only position where it could have held its ground. At Groveton, +when he received the news that the Federal left wing was retreating on +Centreville across his front, the order for attack was issued almost +before he had read the dispatch. At Chancellorsville, when General +Fitzhugh Lee showed him the enemy’s right wing dispersed and +unsuspecting, he simply turned to his courier and said, “Let the column +cross the road,” and his plan of battle was designed with the same +rapidity as Wellington’s at Salamanca or Assaye. + +It has been already pointed out that Jackson’s dispositions for defence +differed in no degree from those of the great Duke. His visit to +Waterloo, perhaps, taught the American soldier the value and importance +of concealing his troops on the defensive. It was not, however, from +Wellington that he learned to keep his plans to himself and to use +every effort to mislead his adversary. Yet no general, not even +Napoleon himself, brought about so many startling surprises as +Wellington. The passage of the Douro, the storm of the frontier +fortresses, the flank attack at Vittoria, the passage of the Adour, the +passage of the Bidassoa—were each and all of them utterly unexpected by +the French marshals; and those were by no means the only, or the most +conspicuous, instances. Was ever general more surprised than Masséna, +when pursuing his retreating foe through Portugal, in full anticipation +of “driving the leopards +into the sea,” he suddenly saw before him the frowning lines of Torres +Vedras, the great fortress which had sprung from earth, as it were, at +the touch of a magician’s wand? + +The dispatches and correspondence of the generals who were opposed to +Wellington are the clearest evidence of his extraordinary skill. +Despite their long experience, their system of spies, their excellent +cavalry, superior, during the first years of the Peninsular War, both +in numbers and training, to the English, it was seldom indeed that the +French had more than the vaguest knowledge of his movements, his +intentions, or his strength. On no other theatre of war—and they were +familiar with many—had they encountered so mysterious an enemy. And +what was the result? Constantly surprised themselves, they at length +hesitated to attack even isolated detachments. At Guinaldo, in 1812, +Marmont, with 30,000 soldiers, refused to assault a ridge occupied by +no more than 13,000. The morning of Quatre-Bras, when that important +position was but thinly held, even Ney was reluctant to engage. In the +judgment of himself and his subordinates, who had met Wellington +before, the fact that there were but few red jackets to be seen was no +proof whatever that the whole allied army was not close at hand, and +the opportunity was suffered to escape. Other generals have been +content with surprising the enemy when they advanced against him; +Wellington and Jackson sought to do so even when they were confined to +the defensive. + +And in still another respect may a likeness be found. Jackson’s regard +for truth was not more scrupulous than Wellington’s. Neither declined +to employ every legitimate means of deceiving their enemies, but both +were absolutely incapable of self-deception. And this characteristic +was not without effect on their military conduct. Although never +deterred by difficulties, they distinguished clearly between the +possible and the impossible. To gain great ends they were willing to +run risks, but if their plans are carefully considered, it will be seen +that the margin left to chance was small. The odds were invariably in +their favour. In conception as in execution obstacles were +resolutely faced, and they were constitutionally unable to close their +eyes to contingencies that might prove ruinous. The promise of great +results was never suffered to cajole them into ignoring the perils that +might beset their path. Imagination might display in vivid colours the +success that might accrue from some audacious venture, but if one step +was obscure the idea was unhesitatingly rejected. Undazzled by the +prospect of personal glory, they formed “a true, not an untrue, picture +of the business to be done,” and their plans, consequently, were +without a flaw. Brilliant, indeed, were the campaigns of Napoleon, and +astonishing his successes, but he who had so often deceived others in +the end deceived himself. Accustomed to the dark dealings of intrigue +and chicanery, his judgment, once so penetrating, became blunted. He +believed what he wished to believe, and not that which was fact. More +than once in his later campaigns he persuaded himself that the chances +were with him when in reality they were terribly against him. He +trusted to the star that had befriended him at Marengo and at Aspern; +that is, he would not admit the truth, even to himself, that he had +been overdaring, that it was fortune, and fortune alone, that had saved +him from destruction, and Moscow and Vittoria, Leipsic and Waterloo, +were the result. + +But although there was a signal resemblance, both in their military +characters as in their methods of war, between Wellington and Jackson, +the parallel cannot be pushed beyond certain well-defined limits. It is +impossible to compare their intellectual capacity. Wellington was +called to an ampler field and far heavier responsibilities. Not as a +soldier alone, but as financier, diplomatist, statesman, he had his +part to play. While Napoleon languished on his lonely island, his great +conqueror, the plenipotentiary of his own Government, the most trusted +counsellor of many sovereigns, the adviser of foreign Administrations, +was universally acknowledged as the mastermind of Europe. Nor was the +mark which Wellington left on history insignificant. The results of his +victories were lasting. The freedom of the nations was restored to +them, +and land and sea became the thoroughfares of peace. America, on the +other hand, owes no single material benefit to Stonewall Jackson. In +the cause of progress or of peace he accomplished nothing. The +principle he fought for, the right of secession, lives no longer, even +in the South. He won battles. He enhanced the reputation of American +soldiers. He proved in his own person that the manhood of Virginia had +suffered no decay. And this was all. But the fruits of a man’s work are +not to be measured by a mere utilitarian standard. In the minds of his +own countrymen the memory of Wellington is hallowed not so much by his +victories, as by his unfaltering honesty and his steadfast regard for +duty, and the life of Stonewall Jackson is fraught with lessons of +still deeper import. + +Not only with the army, but with the people of the South, his influence +while he lived was very great. From him thousands and ten thousands of +Confederate soldiers learned the self-denial which is the root of all +religion, the self-control which is the root of all manliness.[11] +Beyond the confines of the camps he was personally unknown. In the +social and political circles of Richmond his figure was unfamiliar. +When his body lay in state the majority of those who passed through the +Hall of Representatives looked upon his features for the first time. He +had never been called to council by the President, and the members of +the Legislature, with but few exceptions, had no acquaintance with the +man who acted while they deliberated. But his fame had spread far and +wide, and not merely the fame of his victories, but of his Christian +character. The rare union of strength and simplicity, of child-like +faith and the most fiery energy, had attracted the sympathy of the +whole country, of the North as well as of the South; and beyond the +Atlantic, where with breathless interest the parent islands were +watching the issue of the mighty conflict, it seemed that another +Cromwell without Cromwell’s ambition, or that another Wolfe with more +than Wolfe’s ability, had arisen among the soldiers of the youngest of +nations. And this interest was intensified by his untimely end. +When it was reported that Jackson had fallen, men murmured in their +dismay against the fiat of the Almighty. “Why,” they asked, “had one so +pure and so upright been suddenly cut down?” Yet a sufficient answer +was not far to seek. To the English race, in whatever quarter of the +globe it holds dominion, to the race of Alfred and De Montfort, of +Bruce and Hampden, of Washington and Gordon, the ideal of manhood has +ever been a high one. Self-sacrifice and the single heart are the +attributes which it most delights to honour; and chief amongst its +accepted heroes are those soldier-saints who, sealing their devotion +with their lives, have won + +Death’s royal purple in the foeman’s lines. + +So, from his narrow grave on the green hillside at Lexington, Jackson +speaks with voice more powerful than if, passing peacefully away, in +the fulness of years and honours, he had found a resting-place in some +proud sepulchre, erected by a victorious and grateful commonwealth. And +who is there who can refuse to listen? His creed may not be ours; but +in whom shall we find a firmer faith, a mind more humble, a sincerity +more absolute? He had his temptations like the rest of us. His passions +were strong; his temper was hot; forgiveness never came easily to him, +and he loved power. He dreaded strong liquor because he liked it; and +if in his nature there were great capacities for good, there were none +the less, had it been once perverted, great capacities for evil. +Fearless and strong, self-dependent and ambitious, he had within him +the making of a Napoleon, and yet his name is without spot or blemish. +From his boyhood onward, until he died on the Rappahannock, he was the +very model of a Christian gentleman:— + +E’en as he trod that day to God, so walked he from his birth, +In simpleness, and gentleness, and honour, and clean mirth. + +Paradox as it may sound, the great rebel was the most loyal of men. His +devotion to Virginia was hardly surpassed by his devotion to his wife. +And he made no secret +of his absolute dependence on a higher power. Every action was a +prayer, for every action was begun and ended in the name of the +Almighty. Consciously and unconsciously, in deed as in word, in the +quiet of his home and in the tumult of battle, he fastened to his soul +those golden chains “that bind the whole round earth about the feet of +God.” Nor was their burden heavy. “He was the happiest man,” says one +of his friends, “I ever knew,” and he was wont to express his surprise +that others were less happy than himself. + +But there are few with Jackson’s power of concentration. He fought evil +with the same untiring energy that he fought the North. His relations +to his moral duties were governed by the same strong purpose, the same +clear perception of the aim to be achieved, and of the means whereby it +was to be achieved, as his manœuvres on the field of battle. He was +always thorough. And it was because he was thorough—true, steadfast, +and consistent, that he reached the heroic standard. His attainments +were not varied. His interests, so far as his life’s work was +concerned, were few and narrow. Beyond his religion and the army he +seldom permitted his thoughts to stray. His acquaintance with art was +small. He meddled little with politics. His scholarship was not +profound, and he was neither sportsman nor naturalist. Compared with +many of the prominent figures of history the range of his capacity was +limited. + +And yet Jackson’s success in his own sphere was phenomenal, while +others, perhaps of more pronounced ability, seeking success in many +different directions, have failed to find it in a single one. Even when +we contrast his recorded words with the sayings of those whom the world +calls great—statesmen, orators, authors—his inferiority is hardly +apparent. He saw into the heart of things, both human and divine, far +deeper than most men. He had an extraordinary facility for grasping the +essential and discarding the extraneous. His language was simple and +direct, without elegance or embellishment, and yet no one has excelled +him in crystallising great principles in a single phrase. The few +maxims which fell from his lips are +almost a complete summary of the art of war. Neither Frederick, nor +Wellington, nor Napoleon realised more deeply the simple truths which +ever since men first took up arms have been the elements of success; +and not Hampden himself beheld with clearer insight the duties and +obligations which devolve on those who love their country well, but +freedom more. + +It is possible that the conflicts of the South are not yet ended. In +America men pray for peace, but dark and mysterious forces, threatening +the very foundations of civic liberty, are stirring even now beneath +their feet. The War of Secession may be the precursor of a fiercer and +a mightier struggle, and the volunteers of the Confederacy, enduring +all things and sacrificing all things, the prototype and model of a new +army, in which North and South shall march to battle side by side. +_Absit omen!_ But in whatever fashion his own countrymen may deal with +the problems of the future, the story of Stonewall Jackson will tell +them in what spirit they should be faced. Nor has that story a message +for America alone. The hero who lies buried at Lexington, in the Valley +of Virginia, belongs to a race that is not confined to a single +continent; and to those who speak the same tongue, and in whose veins +the same blood flows, his words come home like an echo of all that is +noblest in their history: “What is life without honour? Degradation is +worse than death. We must think of the living and of those who are to +come after us, and see that by God’s blessing we transmit to them the +freedom we have ourselves inherited.” + +NOTE I + +Mr. W. P. St. John, President of the Mercantile Bank of New York, +relates the following incident:—A year or two ago he was in the +Shenandoah Valley with General Thomas Jordan, C.S.A., and at the close +of the day they found themselves at the foot of the mountains in a wild +and lonely place; there was no village, and no house, save a rough +shanty for the use of the “track-walker” on the railroad. It was not an +attractive place for rest, yet here they were forced to pass the night, +and to sit down to such supper as might be provided in so desolate a +spot. The unprepossessing look of everything was completed when the +host came in and took his seat at the head of the table. A bear out of +the woods could hardly have been rougher, with his unshaven hair and +unkempt beard. He answered to the type of border ruffian, and his +appearance suggested the dark deeds that might be done here in secret, +and hidden in the forest gloom. Imagine the astonishment of the +travellers when this rough backwoodsman rapped on the table and bowed +his head. And such a prayer! “Never,” says Mr. St. John, “did I hear a +petition that more evidently came from the heart. It was so simple, so +reverent, so tender, so full of humility and penitence, as well as of +thankfulness. We sat in silence, and as soon as we recovered ourselves +I whispered to General Jordan, ‘Who can he be?’ To which he answered, +‘I don’t know, but he must be one of Stonewall Jackson’s old soldiers.’ +And he was. As we walked out in the open air, I accosted our new +acquaintance, and after a few questions about the country, asked, ‘Were +you in the war?’ ‘Oh, yes,’ he said with a smile, ‘I was out with Old +Stonewall.’”—_Southern Historical Society Papers,_ vol. xix, p. 871. + +NOTE II + +LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED (EXCLUDING PRISONERS) IN +GREAT BATTLES + +_(The victorious side is given first)_ + +Name of battle Number of troops Killed and +wounded Total Total +% % of +victor Blenheim, 1704 Allies, 56,000 French, 60,000 11,000 +20,000 31,000 26 19 Ramilies, 1706 Allies, 60,000 French, +62,000 3,600 8,000 11,600 9 6 Oudenarde, 1708 Allies, +85,000 French, 85,000 10,000 10,000 20,000 11 11 +Malplaquet, 1709 Allies, 100,000 French, 100,000 14,000 +20,000 34,000 17 14 Dettingen, 1743 Allies, 37,000 French, +60,000 2,350 7,000 9,350 9 6 Fontenoy, 1745 French, +50,000 Allies, 40,000 6,000 7,300 13,300 14 12 Prague, +1757 Prussians, 64,000 Austrians, 60,000 12,000 +10,000 22,000 17 18 Kollin, 1757 Austrians, 53,000 +Prussians, 34,000 8,000 11,000 19,000 21 15 Rosbach, +1757 Prussians, 22,000 Allies, 46,000 541 +4,000 4,541 6 2 Leuthen, 1757 Prussians, 30,000 Austrians, +80,000 6,000 10,000 16,000 14 20 Breslau, +1757 Austrians, 80,000 Prussians, 30,000 5,700 +6,000 11,700 10 7 Zorndorf, 1758 Prussians, 32,760 +Russians, 52,000 12,000 20,000 32,000 38 37 Hochkirch, +1758 Austrians, 90,000 Prussians, 42,000 6,000 +8,000 14,000 10 8 Créfeld, 1758 Allies, 33,000 French, +47,000 1,700 4,000 5,700 7 5 Zullichau, 1759 Russians, +72,000 Prussians, 27,500 4,800 6,000 10,800 10 6 +Kunnersdorf, 1759 Allies, 70,000 Prussians, 43,000 14,000 +17,000 31,000 27 20 Minden, 1759 Allies, 37,000 French and +Saxons, 52,000 2,800 +7,000 9,800 11 7 Torgau, 1760 Prussians, 46,000 Austrians, +60,000 12,000 12,000 24,000 22 26 Leignitz, +1760 Prussians, 30,000 Austrians, 35,000 3,000 +5,000 8,000 12 10 Lonato and Castiglione, 1796 French, +44,000 Austrians, 46,000 7,000 10,000 17,000 18 15 Rivoli, +1797 French, 18,000 Austrians, 28,000 4,500 +10,000 14,500 30 25 Marengo, 1800 French, 28,000 Austrians, +30,000 5,000 8,000 13,000 22 17 Hohenlinden, +1800 French, 56,000 Austrians, 50,000 2,500 +12,000 14,500 13 4 Austerlitz, 1805 French, 65,000 Allies, +83,000 9,000 16,000 25,000 16 13 Jena, 1806 French, +58,000 Prussians, 40,000 5,000 12,000 17,000 17 8 +Auerstadt, 1806 French, 28,000 Prussians, 45,000 9,500 +6,000 15,500 22 33 Eylau, 1807 French, 70,000 Russians, +63,500 20,000 22,000 42,000 33 28 Heilsberg, +1807 Russians, 84,000 French, 85,000 10,000 +12,000 22,000 13 11 Friedland, 1807 French, 75,000 +Russians, 67,000 10,000 24,000 34,000 23 13 Vimiero, +1808 English, 18,000 French, 14,000 720 2,000 2,720 8 4 +Eckmühl, 1809 French, 65,000 Austrians, 80,000 7,000 +8,000 15,000 10 10 Aspern, 1809 Austrians, 75,000 French, +95,000 20,000 25,000 45,000 26 26 Wagram, 1809 French, +220,000 Austrians, 150,000 22,000 22,000 44,000 11 10 +Talavera, 1809 English and Spanish, 53,000 French, 56,000 7,200 +8,300 15,500 14 13 Albuera, 1811 Allies, 32,000 French, +22,500 6,750 7,000 13,750 25 20 Salamanca, 1812 Allies, +44,000 French, 47,000 5,000 10,000 15,000 16 11 Borodino, +1812 French, 125,000 Russians, 138,000 30,000 +45,000 75,000 28 24 Bautzen, 1813 French, 190,000 Allies, +110,000 12,000 12,000 10,000 8 6 Vittoria, 1813 Allies, +83,000 French, 60,000 5,000 5,000 10,000 7 6 Leipsic, +1813 Allies, 290,000 French, 150,000 42,000 +50,000 92,000 20 14 Orthez, 1814 Allies, 37,000 French, +40,000 2,250 3,800 6,050 7 6 Toulouse, 1814 Allies, +52,000 French, 38,000 4,650 5,900 10,550 11 9 La Rothière, +1814 Allies, 80,000 French, 40,000 6,500 +6,000 12,500 10 8 Montmirail, 1814 French, 25,000 Allies, +39,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 7 8 Laon, 1814 Allies, 60,000 +French, 52,000 2,000 7,000 9,000 8 3 Ligny, 1815 French, +73,000 Prussians, 86,000 12,000 12,000 24,000 15 16 +Quatre-Bras, 1815 Allies, 31,000 French, 21,500 4,500 +4,200 8,700 16 14 Waterloo, 1815 Allies, 100,000 French, +70,000 20,000 22,000 42,000 24 20 Alma, 1854 Allies, +51,000 Russians, 35,000 3,400 5,700 9,100 10 6 Inkermann, +1854 Allies, 15,700 French, 68,000 3,287 +10,500 13,787 15 21 Magenta, 1859 Allies, 48,000 Austrians, +60,000 4,500 6,500 11,000 10 9 Solferino, 1859 Allies, +135,000 Austrians, 160,000 16,500 15,000 31,500 10 11 Bull +Run, 1861 Confederates, 18,000 Federals, 18,000 1,969 +1,584 3,553 9 10 Perryville, 1862 Federals, 27,000 +Confederates, 16,000 3,700 3,200 6,900 16 — Shiloh, +1862 Federals, 58,000 Confederates, 40,000 12,000 +9,000 21,000 20 20 Seven Pines, 1862 Federals, 51,000 +Confederates, 39,000 5,031 6,134 11,165 12 9 Gaines’ Mill, +1862 Confederates, 54,000 Federals, 36,000 8,000 +5,000 13,000 14 14 Malvern Hill, 1862 Federals, 80,000 +Confederates, 70,000 2,800 5,500 8,300 5 3 Cedar Run, +1862 Confederates, 21,000 Federals, 12,000 1,314 +2,380 3,694 11 6 Second Manassas, 1862 Confederates, 54,000 +Federals, 73,000 9,000 13,000 22,000 17 16 Sharpsburg, +1862 Confederates, 41,000 Federals, 87,000 9,500 +12,410 21,910 17 23 Fredericksburg, 1862 Confederates, +70,000 Federals, 120,000 4,224 12,747 16,971 8 6 +Chickamauga, 1863 Confederates, 71,000 Federals, 57,000 18,000 +17,100 35,100 27 25 Chancellorsville, 1863 Confederates, +62,000 Federals, 130,000 10,000 14,000 24,000 12 17 +Gettysburg, 1863 Federals, 93,000 Confederates, 70,000 19,000 +18,000 37,000 24 20 Chattanooga, 1863 Federals, 60,000 +Confederates, 33,000 5,500 3,000 8,500 8 9 Stone’s River, +1863 Federals, 43,000 Confederates, 37,712 9,000 +9,500 18,500 24 20 The Wilderness, 1864 Confederates, +61,000 Federals, 118,000 11,000 15,000 26,000 14 18 +Spotsylvania Court House, 1864 Confederates, 50,000 Federals, +100,000 8,000 17,000 25,000 16 16 Cold Harbour, +1864 Confederates, 58,000 Federals, 110,000 1,700 +10,000 11,700 6 3 Nashville, 1864 Federals, 55,000 +Confederates, 39,000 3,000 3,500 6,500 6 5 Königgrätz, +1866 Prussians, 211,000 Austrians, 206,000 8,894 +18,000 26,894 6 4 Wörth, 1870 Germans, 90,000 French, +45,000 10,642 8,000 18,642 13 11 Spicheren, +1870 Germans, 37,000 French, 29,000 4,871 +4,000 8,871 13 13 Colombey, 1870 Germans, 34,000 French, +54,000 5,000 3,700 8,700 9 14 Vionville, 1870 Germans, +70,000 French, 98,000 15,800 17,000 32,800 19 22 +Gravelotte, 1870 Germans, 200,000 French, 120,000 20,000 +10,000 30,000 9 10 Noisseville, 1870 Germans, 52,000 +French, 100,000 3,078 3,542 6,620 4 5 Plevna, July 20, +1877 Turks, 20,000 Russians, 7,000 1,000 +2,850 3,850 13 5 Plevna, July 30, 1877 Turks, 20,000 +Russians, 30,000 4,000 7,300 11,300 22 20 Pelishat, Aug. +31, 1877 Russians, 20,000 Turks, 15,000 1,350 +1,000 2,350 7 6 Lovtcha, 1877 Russians, 20,000 Turks, +5,000 1,500 2,000 3,500 14 7 Plevna, Sep. 11, +1877 Turks, 35,000 Russians, 80,000 3,000 +16,000 19,000 16 8 Plevna, Dec. 10, 1877 Russians, 24,000 +Turks, 20,000 2,000 6,000 8,000 17 8 Aladja Dagh, +1877 Russians, 60,000 Turks, 35,000 1,450 +4,500 5,950 6 2 Shipka, 1878 Russians, 25,000 Turks, +30,000 5,500 — 5,500 — — — 22 — Tel-el-Kebir, +1882 English, 17,000 Egyptians, 25,000 439 +3,000 3,439 9 2 + +Although this return has been compiled from the most trustworthy +sources, it can only be taken as approximately accurate. + +BRITISH LOSSES + + Strength Killed and wounded Per- centage *Dettingen, 1743 + *Fontenoy, 1745 + Alexandria, 1801 +*†Assaye, 1803 + Coruña, 1809 + *Talavera, 1809 + *Albuera, 1811 + Barossa, 1811 + *Salamanca, 1812 + *Quatre-Bras, 1815 + *Waterloo, 1815 + †Maharajpore, 1843 + †Moodkee, 1845 + †Ferozeshah, 1845 + †Aliwal, 1846 + †Sobrao, 1846 + †Chillianwalla, 1849 + *Alma, 1854 + *Inkerman, 1854 12,000 +16,600 +12,000 + 4,500 +14,500 +20,500 + 8,200 + 4,400 +26,000 +12,000 +23,991 + 6,000 + 9,000 +16,000 +10,500 +15,500 +15,000 +21,500 + 7,464 821 +4,002 +1,521 +1,566 +1,000 +6,250 +3,990 +1,210 +3,386 +2,504 +6,932 + 790 + 874 +2,415 + 580 +2,063 +2,388 +2,002 +2,357 6 +24 +12 +34 + 6 +30 +48 +27 +13 +20 +29 +13 + 9 +15 + 5 +13 +15 + 9 +31 + +* In those marked by an asterisk the force formed part of an allied +army. +† In these battles Indian troops took part. + + [1] Copyright 1898 by Longmans, Green, & Co. + + [2] Hon. Francis Lawley, the _Times,_ June 16, 1863. + + [3] _Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,_ p. 289. + + [4] Hon. Francis Lawley, the _Times,_ June 11, 1863. + + [5] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. iii, p. 202. + + [6] General J. B. Gordon, Commanding 2nd Army Corps, Army of Northern + Virginia. “Jackson,” says one of his staff, “never changed an order on + the battlefield when he had once given it. I have seen Ewell, Early, + A. P. Hill, and even Lee send an aide with an order, and in a few + minutes send another messenger to recall or alter it.” Letter to the + author. + + [7] Major Hotchkiss, C.S.A. + + [8] Lord Wolseley, _Macmillan’s Magazine,_ March, 1887. + + [9] General J. B. Gordon. + + [10] Napier. + + [11] See Note at end of volume. + + + + +INDEX + + +A + + Abolitionists, i 80, 81–2, 84–6, 88–9, 93, 98, 102. + Abolitionists, Southern, i 82, 85, 88 + Adour, passage of river, ii 491 + Agincourt, battle of, ii 164 + Albuera, battle of, ii 148 + Alexander, General, U.S.A., ii 177 + Allan, Colonel W., C.S.A., i 274, 309, 352; ii 9, 125 + Alvinzi, General, i 419 + American soldier (see also _Northern_ and _Southern soldier_), i 106; + ii 342, 345–8, 381 + American volunteer, i 33, 48–9; ii 109, 169, 354, 373 + Anderson, Colonel G. T., C.S.A., ii 250, 252, 254, 255, 271 + Anderson, General R. H., C.S.A., ii 138, 162, 166, 208, 213, 234, 238, + 242–3, 254, 257, 272, 329, 412–3, 416, 419–21, 432–5, 445, 459–60, + 462–4, 467 + Anglo-Saxon race, i 93; ii 339–40, 355 + Antietam. (See _Sharpsburg_) + Archduke Charles of Austria, quoted, i 406 + Archer, General, C.S.A., ii 95–6, 153, 159, 271, 309–10, 316–8, 434, + 436 + Armament. (See under _Tactics, Arms_) + Armies and soldiers, regular, i 48–9, 114, 133, 137, 147, 169, 220–2, + 227, 427, 429–30; 32–3, 180–1, 360, 362–3, 373 + Armies, Northern, i 105, 110–11, 120, 124, 157, 172, 208, 222; ii 339, + 345–6, 378, 396–7 + Armies, Southern, i 115, 208; 339, 397, 494 + Armies, Western. (See _Western_). Armistead, General, C.S.A., ii 61–3, + 253, 272 + Army, Austrian, i 110; ii 466 + Army, English, i 208, 427; ii 340, 355–6, 468 + Army, French, i 110, 221, 419; ii 338, 356, 362, 372–3, 491 + Army, German, i 256, 426, 427; ii 21–2, 24, 278, 342, 355, 356 + Army, Mexican, i 26, 30, 34, 35, 44–5 + Army of Mexico (U.S.), i 48–9 + Army of Northern Virginia (strength, etc.), i 172, 174, 232, 271, 389; + ii 13, 72, 74, 111–2, 118, 123–4, 165–6, 168, 196, 208, 225, 228–30, + 235–6, 242, 267, 271–2, 274–5, 280, 289, 294, 296, 303, 308, 331, 338, + 341–4, 347–60, 370–1, 382, 386–7, 398–9, 406, 412–3, 440, 467–8, 487 + Army of Prussia, i 110; 338 + Army of the Potomac (strength, etc.), i 202, 213, 216, 218, 231, 235, + 250, 252, 265, 389; ii 2, 3, 9, 30, 43, 46, 72, 75, 84, 122, 124, 167, + 198, 213, 228–31, 243, 267, 272–5, 278–9, 294–5, 299, 300, 314, 327, + 329, 331–2, 337, 339, 341–4, 381, 401, 410–2, 466–8 + Army of the Rappahannook, Federal, under McDowell (strength, etc.) i + 292, 293–4, 304, 355–6, 386 + Army of the Shenandoah, Confederate, i 123, 167 + Army of the Shenandoah, Federal, under Banks (strength, etc.), i + 213–4, 224–6, 269, 293–4, 316–7, 355–6, 447 + Army of the Valley (strength, etc.), i 219–25, 228, 235, 253–5, 260, + 274, 284, 304, 309–13, 333, 349, 355–6, 371, 373–4, 385, 419, 424–5, + 434, 437–8; ii 3, 9, 17–18, 20, 26, 29–30, 34, 68, 79, 83, 85–6, 97, + 102, 109, 111, 119, 126–7, 152–3, 160, 164, 169, 178, 247, 268 + Army of Virginia, Federal, under Pope, (strength, etc.), i 401; ii 78, + 97, 100, 103, 113, 116, 122–3, 124, 132, 135, 151, 165–6, 171, 176 + Army of Western Virginia, Federal, under Rosecrans and Frémont, + (strength, etc.), i 186, 188, 205, 213, 217, 269, 275, 293–4, 295, + 303, 355–6, 446 + Army, United States (strength, etc.), (see also _Officers_), i 24–5, + 33, 58, 104–5, 111, 120; ii 30, 33, 36–7, 59, 180 + Ashby, General Turner, C.S.A., i 178, 220, 222–5, 227–8, 230, 236–9, + 241–2, 246, 259, 264, 265–6, 268–70, 273–4, 284, 288, 291, 303, 309, + 320–2, 328–9, 331–4, 342, 345, 350–2, 354, 355–6, 359, 360–3, 368, + 431, 436, 446; ii 189, 286 + Aspern, battle of, ii 277, 493 + Assaye, battle of, ii 491 + Atkinson, General, C.S.A., ii 319–20 + Aulic Council, i 419 + Austerlitz, battle of, i 59, 418, 423; ii 187–8, 395, 426 + Averell, General, U.S.A., ii 46, 293, 438, 457 + +B + + Badajos, siege of, ii 490 + Balloons, ii 307, 418–9, 425, 480 + Banks, General N. P., U.S.A. (see also _Army of the Shenandoah_), i + 184, 189, 196, 202, 2113, 216, 218–9, 224–8, 230–2, 235, 247–8, 251–2, + 259–60, 263–72, 274–8, 280–4, 287–94, 297, 301–3, 311, 314–7, 321, + 323–30, 333–4, 336, 342–4, 347–50, 355–6, 372, 392, 398, 400–1, 405, + 408, 411–3, 415, 426, 427, 429–30, 432–3, 441, 447; ii 75, 79, 82, 84, + 86, 90, 92, 97, 100–3, 116, 140, 169–70, 182–3, 199, 205, 247, 273, + 285, 295, 334, 341, 345, 370, 392–3, 485 + “Barbara Fritchie,” i 65 + Barksdale, General, C.S.A., ii 259, 271, 306–7 + Barlow, General, U.S.A., ii 434, 439 + Barossa, battle of, i 254 + Bartow, General, C.S.A., i 135, 141–3, 145–6, 150, 160 + Bath, skirmish near, i 190 + Bautzen, battle of, ii 19, 192 + Bayard, General, U.S.A., i 344, 352, 354, 355–6, 359, 446; ii 79, 83, + 87–8, 92, 165–6, 180 + Beaulieu, General, i 413, 419 + Beauregard, General, C.S.A., i 38, 50, 124, 131–3, 136, 141, 147, + 151–2, 156, 159–60, 165, 175–6, 201; ii 15 + Beaver Dam Creek, Virginia, engagement at, ii 16 + Bee, General, C.S.A., i 135, 141–7, 150, 151, 160 + Belle Boyd, i 327 + Benjamin, Hon. J. P., i 178, 184, 187, 199, 200–201, 203–6, 209–10, + 273 + Berry, General, U.S.A., ii 427, 440, 447, 450, 456 + Bidassoa, passage of river, ii 491 + Bigelow, Captain, U.S.A., i 423 + Birney, General, U.S.A., ii 316, 318–9, 328 + “Black Republicans,” i 81, 86, 96, 102 + Blenker, General, U.S.A., i 248, 260, 266, 277, 295, 302, 364, 373–4, + 379, 415 + Blockade, i 112–3, 124, 213; ii 108, 207, 334, 405 + Blücher, Field-Marshal, i 75–6, 259 + Bonham, General, C.S.A., i 142, 150 + Boots, i 222, 312, 428; ii 203, 205, 209, 235, 349, 350, 353, 382 + Borcke, Major Eeros von, C.S.A., ii 282–3 + Boswell, Captain J. K., C.S.A., ii 125–6, 449, 455, 465 + Boteler, Hon. R., Colonel, C.S.A., i 272, 348, ii 77, 202 + Boteler’s Ford, engagement at, 239, ii 472–3 + Braddock, General, i 227 + Branch, General, C.S.A., i 311, 411, ii 13, 15, 20, 21, 95–6, 153, + 157, 161, 271, 366–7 + Brandy Station, battle of, ii 112 + Bridges, i 266, 359, 361, 364, 378, 381, 387; ii 7–8, 12, 17, 20, 27, + 44, 49, 50, 52, 119, 121, 136, 240, 301, 306–7, 409, 415, 417, 424 + Bristoe Station, Virginia, engagement at, ii 133, 136 + Brown, Colonel, C.S.A., ii 280, 434 + Brown, John, i 76 + Buchanan, President, i 97, 226 + Buena Vista, battle of, i 30 + Buford, General, U.S.A., ii 79, 83, 87, 106, 139, 165–6, 171, 180 + Bull Run, battle of. (See _Manassas_) + Bunker’s Hill, battle of, 1776, i 106 + Burks, Colonel, C.S.A., i 220, 240, 262, 264 + Burns, General, U.S.A., ii 328 + Burnside, General A. E., U.S.A., ii 73, 79, 84, 103, 106, 111, 113, + 117, 187, 243, 258, 299–301, 303, 306–7, 320, 324–5, 329, 333, 336–7, + 342, 405, 410, 488 + Busaco, battle of, ii 191, 228, 330 + Butterfield, General, U.S.A., ii 419, 428, 438 + +C + + Cadets, Military Institute, i 56, 58–60, 62–3, 98–9, 104, 295 + Cadets, West Point, i 12–20, 22, 55 + Cæsar, i 75, 409; ii 338 + Campbell, Colonel, U.S.A., i 309, 332; ii 91–2 + Camp Lee, Virginia, i 104 + Cannæ battle of, ii 332 + Carrington, Captain, C.S.A., i 369–70 + Carroll, General, U.S.A., 371 + Catholic Church, i 53 + Cavaliers, the English, i 2, 83 + Cedar Run, Virginia, battle of, ii Chap. XV, 109, 186, 235, 247, 279, + 287, 342, 370, 375, 484–5 + Cedarviile, Virginia, cavalry engagement near, i 319–20 + Cerro Gordo, battle of, i 30–2, 35, 38, 45 + Chancellorsville, battle of, i 423, 433; ii Chap. XXIII, Chap. XXIV, + 187, 370, 485, 487, 490, 491 + Chantilly or Ox Hill, engagement at, ii 183–5, 287 + Chaplains, i ; ii 399 + Chapultepec, battle of, i 40–3, 45–6, 50, 64 + Chew, Captain, C.S.A., i 220; ii 375 + Churubusco, battle of, i 38–9, 50 + Ciudad Rodrigo, siege of, ii 490 + Clausewitz, General, i 407; ii 196 + Clyde, Field-Marshal Lord, ii 355 + Cobb, General, C.S.A., ii 226, 271, 448 + Coercion, i 93–7, 101–2 + Cold Harbour, battle of. (See _Gaines’ Mill_) + Cold Harbour, second battle of, 1864, ii 228 + Colli, General, i 413, 418, Colquitt, General, C.S.A., ii 271, 441, + 444 + Colston, General, C.S.A., ii 412, 441, 447–9, 455, 460, 467 + Columbia, district of, i 108–9 + Command, selections for, i 226; ii 300, 344–5 + Command, system of, ii 342–4 + Comte de Paris, ii 215, 223 + Confederacy, the resources of, i 111–2; ii 205 + Confederate territory, i 108–9 + Conscription Act, Southern, i 273, 303 + Conscripts, ii 348 + Contreras, battle of, i 36–7, 39, 64 + Cooke, Colonel, C.S.A., i 348 + Cooking, i 222; ii 349 + Corbin, ii 364, 383 + Cornwallis, Lord, i 278 + Cortez, i 26, 28, 35, 43 + Couch, General, U.S.A., ii 267 + Council of War, i 37 + Cox, General, U.S.A., i 314; ii 85 + Crampton’s Gap, engagement at, ii 224–6 + Crawford, General, U.S.A., ii 247–8 + Creçy, battle of, ii 340 + Crimean campaign, i 171, 208, 226, 422 + Cromwell, i 64, 73, 83, 101, 108, 412, 443; ii 494 + Cross Keys, battle of, i Chap. XI, 405, 408, 412, 423, 424, 427, 443, + 446; ii 200, 484–5 + Crown Prince of Prussia, ii 278 + Crutchfield, Cal. S., C.S.A., i 369; ii 50, 57, 222, 449, 453–4 + Cunningham, Cal., C.S.A., ii 26, 35 + Cutts, Colonel, C.S.A., ii 249 + +D + + Dabney, Reverend Dr., Major, C.S.A., i 181, 206, 253, 255, 274, 276, + 286, 295, 298, 300, 303, 309, 322, 333, 379, 381, 385, 395, 417, 429, + 440, 442; ii 17, 21, 23, 33–4, 67, 69, 71, 77, 89, 164, 212, 313, + 368–9, 385–7, 472–3 + Davis, President, i 79, 131, 172–6, 186, 201, 203, 207–8, 210, 215, + 218–9, 226, 280, 289, 294, 302, 305, 310, 388, 409, 428; ii 69, 77–8, + 122, 207, 274–6, 280, 303, 331, 333, 336, 345, 382, 396, 404, 488–9 + D’Erlon, Count, ii 59 + Desaix, General, i 111 + Deserters, i 290; ii 111, 275–6, 356, 364, 366, 385, 411, 425 + Discipline (see also _Straggling_), i 16–8, 45, 48–9, 64, 104, 106, + 111, 117–8, 152–3, 161–2, 169, 179, 193–5, 197, 208–9, 212, 214, 221, + 223, 252–4, 273, 362; ii 36, 75, 188, 204, 209, 276, 350, 353, 355, + 357–63, 411 + Doles, General, C.S.A., ii 441, 443 + Donnelly, General, U.S.A., i 338, 341, 447 + Doubleday, General, U.S.A., ii 146, 245, 246, 316, 318, 328 + Douglas, Cal. H. K., C.S.A., ii 210, 214, 223 + Douro, passage of river, ii 490 + Drayton, General, C.S.A., ii 272 + Dresden, campaign of, i 418 + Dress, i 63, 105, 115, 129, 221–2; ii 205, 209, 282, 351, 353 + +E + + Early, General Jubal A., C.S.A., i 152, ii 93–6, 101, 118–22, 145, + 148, 153–4, 157, 161–2, 165, 249, 251, 254, 269–71, 303, 306, 308, + 310, 318–20, 329, 412, 416, 462–3, 467 + Earthworks and intrenchments (see also under _Tactics_), i 30–1, + 35–40, 106, 158, 170, 232, 233, 278, 307, 308, 388, 391; ii 9, 14–6, + 18–9, 112, 182–3, 200, 305, 325, 327, 347 + Eckmühl, campaign of, i 418 + Edict of Emancipation, ii 289–90, 335, 411 + Elk Run Valley, position in, ii 199 + Elzey, General, C.S.A., i 151, 309, 337, 339–40, 443 + Episcopal Church, i 55 + Eugène, Prince, i 409 + Evans, General N. G., C.S.A., i 142–4, 146–7, 151, 160, 172; ii 178, + 208, 242, 258, 491 + Ewell, General R. S., C.S.A., i 25, 50, 274, 276–7, 280–4, 288, 290, + 294, 302–3, 314–5, 327–30, 332, 334, 337–9, 341, 343, 345, 351, 355, + 359, 365, 367–8, 372, 374–7, 380–3, 391, 393, 400, 415, 427, 431, 433, + 438–41; ii 18, 21, 26, 32–5, 38, 42, 44, 61, 64–5, 85, 87–8, 90–1, + 94–6, 104–5, 125–6, 129, 131, 133, 136–7, 139, 141, 144–5, 147, 149, + 155, 204, 208, 210, 242, 271, 280, 287–8, 303 + Eylau, battle of, i 259; ii 19 + +F + + Fair Oaks, Virginia, battle of. (See _Seven Pines_) + Falling Waters, Va., engagement at, i 128–30, 165 + Field exercises, ii 412 + Field, General, U.S.A., i 280, 282; ii 95, 97, 153, 158–9, 161, 164, + 271, 309 + Flodden, battle of, ii 332 + Flournoy, Colonel, U.S.A., i 310, 320, 342 + “Fog of War, the”, ii 194–5 + Forno, Colonel, C.S.A., ii 145, 148, 153, 159, 164 + Forrest, General, U.S.A., i 333 + Fortifications, i 16, 30, 35, 39, 40, 125, 158, 213, 233, 250, 389; ii + 185, 198–9, 305, 347, 350, 383, 408, 430–1, 480 + Fortresses, i 28–9, 40, 109, 125; ii 199 + Fox-hunting, i 9, 161 + Franklin, General, W. B., U.S.A., ii 54, 56–7, 138, 170, 182, 186, + 224–5, 229, 233, 243, 272, 313–6, 320–2, 324, 328 + Frayser’s Farm, Virginia, battle of, i chapter xiv; ii 279, 486 + Frederick the Great, i 75, 173, 227, 404, 409, 410, 414, 419, 441; ii + 338, 497 + Fredericksburg, battle of, ii chapter xx, 109, 370, 484 + Frémont, General John C., U.S.A., i 213, 248, 250, 269, 271–2, 275, + 277, 280, 293–5, 301–3, 314, 344–6, 348–54, 355–6, 359–61, 363, 365, + 367–8, 372–3, 375–6, 379, 381, 384, 386, 391–3, 398–401, 404–5, 408, + 412–3, 415, 423–4, 426, 429, 431–2, 434, 442, 446; ii 19, 75, 155, + 199, 342–3, 345, 393, 484–5 + French, General, U.S.A., ii 40, 43, 251, 257, 328 + Front Royal, engagement at, i chapter x, 337–8, 405, 412, 447; ii + 392–3 + Fuentes d’Onor, battle of, ii 228, 330 + Fulkerson, Colonel, C.S.A., i 220, 240–1, 243, 262; ii 26, 35 + Funsten, Colonel, U.S.A., i 237 + +G + + Gaines’ Mill, Virginia, battle of, ii chapter xiii, 201, 228, 279, + 341, 348 + Garland, General, C.S.A., ii 271 + Garnett, General, C.S.A., i 190, 194, 220, 229, 243–5, 253, 255, 257; + ii 175, 272, 370, 487 + Garnett, Lieut.-Colonel, C.S.A., ii 92, 94, 104 + Geary, General, U.S.A., i 316, 321, 350, 355–6, 424, 447 + German soldiers in America, i 352, 373, 375; ii 155, 339, 466 + Getty, General, U.S.A., ii 328 + Gettysburg, battle of, i 169, 254, 433; ii 278, 469, 487–8 + Gibbon, General John, U.S.A., ii 146–8, 244–6, 316–9, 325, 328 + Gneisenau, i 75 + Gordon, General G. H., U.S.A., i 264, 266, 270, 323–5, 329, 334, + 338–9, 447; ii 115, 134, 247–8, 252, 275 + Gordon, General J. B., C.S.A., ii 396, 486 + Graham, Rev. Dr., i 199, 212, 229–30, 258 + Grant, General Ulysses S., U.S.A., i 26, 44–5, 48–50, 58, 87, 208, + 255, 276, 433; ii 188, 223, 228, 371, 479, 485, 487, 489, 490 + Gravelotte, battle of, i 259; ii 21–2, 24, 71, 356 + Green, General, C.S.A., i 333 + Greene, General, U.S.A., ii 247–9, 251 + Gregg, General, C.S.A., ii 90, 153, 156–7, 161, 164, 271, 309, 317–8, + 325–6 + Griffin, General, U.S.A., ii 328 + Grigsby, Colonel, C.S.A., i 303; ii 247, 249, 251 + Grouchy, Marshal, ii 59, 260 + Grover, General, U.S.A., ii 159 + Groveton, battle of, ii chapter xvi, 279, 287, 468, 490, 491 + Guerillas, i 44, 45–6; ii 82 + Guinaldo, 1812, ii 492 + Gustavus Adolphus, i 409 + +H + + Halleck, General, U.S.A., ii 83–5, 100, 103, 107, 113, 131, 133, + 182–3, 185, 211, 226, 289, 299 + Hampden, ii 495, 498 + Hampton, General Wade, C.S.A., i 143–4, 150–1, 160, 333; ii 122, 167, + 205, 208, 242–3, 291, 294, 331, 336, 337, 414 + Hancock, General W. S., U.S.A., ii 328 + Hancock, skirmish near, i 191 + Hannibal, i 75, 409; ii 11, 196, 338 + Hanover Court House, Virginia, engagement at, ii 4 + Harman, Colonel W. A., C.S.A., i 253; ii 268 Harman, Major, C.S.A., i + 182, 228 + Harper’s Ferry, investment of, ii chapter xviii, 280, 288, 376, 479 + Harris, General N., C.S.A., ii 475 + Hartsuff, Colonel, U.S.A., i 294 + Hasdrubal, ii 196 + Hatch, General, U.S.A., i 288, 332, 334, 447; ii 163, 173, 175, 178 + Hawks, Major, C.S.A., i 182; ii 471 + Hayes, General, U.S.A., ii 447 + Hays, General, C.S.A., ii 184, 271 + Heintzleman, General S. P., U.S.A., i 142–3, ii 53, 122 + Hill, General A. P., C.S.A., i 50, 395, 397; ii 9, 12–4, 15–6, 21–6, + 28–32, 35, 38, 42, 45, 47–8, 54, 61–2, 65, 80, 83–5, 88, 90–1, 94, + 104–5, 125, 131, 141, 145, 149, 152–3, 156–62, 208, 215, 219, 221–4, + 235–6, 241–3, 254, 258–9, 261, 269–70, 304, 308, 310–1, 316, 319, 320, + 366, 370, 412, 432, 441, 442, 448–51, 455, 459–60, 467, 473 + Hill, General D. H., C.S.A., i 27, 50, 55, 176, 200, 202, 216–8, 397; + ii 9, 12–4, 17–8, 29, 30, 32–6, 40, 42, 52, 55–8, 61–5, 79, 111, 122, + 167, 205, 208, 220, 224–6, 236, 238, 241–2, 244, 247–51, 254–5, 257, + 271, 276, 280, 303, 305, 308, 310–1, 320, 329, 357, 361, 375, 382, 405 + Hitchcock, General, U.S.A., i 294 + Hoche, General, i 111 + Hohenlinden, battle of, ii 466 + Hoke, General, C.S.A., ii 319 + Holmes, General, C.S.A., ii 9, 11, 47–8, 59, 61, 65 + Hood, General J. B., C.S.A., i 394; ii 26, 35–6, 38, 42, 119, 163, + 236, 241–2, 244, 247–9, 251, 254–5, 262, 272, 310, 322–3, 329, 348, + 353, 407, 425, 455 + Hooker, General Joseph, U.S.A., i 50; ii 68, 122, 136, 139–40, 156–9, + 166, 179, 187–8, 216, 226, 237, 240–50, 255, 261, 272, 275, 306, 314, + 328, 337, 341, 404, 406–10, 412–19, 422–8, 430–1, 434, 438–9, 445, + 449, 453, 457–60, 462–6, 468–9, 472, 486 + Horsemanship, i 70, 161, 198, 224, 362; ii 339–40 + Horse-masters, i 225 + Horse-racing, i 9 + Horses, i 9, 111, 161, 224; ii 115, 186, 189, 273, 292–3, 299, 414 + Hotchkiss, Major J., C.S.A., i 181, 303, 349, 381, 416, 440; ii 87, + 110, 215, 241, 327, 431–2, 436, 451, 487 + Howard, General O. O., U.S.A., i 152, ii 328, 416, 427, 436, 438–40, + 442, 444, 465–6 + Huger, General, C.S.A., i 50; ii 9, 11, 14, 45, 47–8, 52–4, 58–9, + 61–2, 65 + Humphreys, General, U.S.A., ii 267, 328 + Hundley’s Corner, Virginia, engagement at, ii 16, 22 + Hunt, General, U.S.A., ii 66 + Hunter, General, U.S.A., i 142–3, ii 73, 84 + +I + + Imboden, General, C.S.A., i 121, 144–5, 149, 163, 378, 420, 439 + “Immortals,” the, i 15–6 + India, i 58 + Indians, i 5–6, 24–5 + Information in war. (See _Intelligence,_ etc.) + Inkermann, battle of, ii 175, 340 + Intelligence Department and Information, i 224, 232, 258–9, 287, + 326–7, 412–4, 422–3; ii 39, 82–3, 89, 120, 145, 170–1, 188–9, 193–5, + 213, 415, 418–9, 427 + Interior lines. (See _Strategy_) + Irish soldiers in America, i 242, 311; ii 340 + Ironsides, the, i 225, 443 + Italy, campaign of, i 418, 419 + Iverson, Col., C.S.A., ii 441, 443 + +J + + Jackson, Cummins, uncle of General T. J. Jackson, i 7, 8, 10, 11 + Jackson, Elizabeth, i 5 + Jackson family, characteristics of, i 3, 5–6 + Jackson family, origin of, i 3–4 + Jackson, General, President of the United States, i 4, 15, 106 + Jackson, John, i 4–6 + Jackson, John, father of General T. J. Jackson, i 5–6 + Jackson, Julia, mother of General T. J. Jackson, i 6–7, 11, 52; ii 384 + Jackson, Julia, daughter of General T. J. Jackson, ii 384–5, 400, 470 + Jackson, Mary Anna, wife of General T. J. Jackson, i 59, 61, 67–73, + 76, 103–4, 116, 156, 161, 176–8, 257–8, 272; ii 55, 280, 384–5, 396, + 400, 470–1, 495 + Jackson, Thomas Jonathan, “Stonewall”, Lieut.-General, C.S.A.: + +Advice overruled, ii 61, 78, 109, 114, 489 + Anecdotes of, i 10, 19, 20, 27, 46–7, 68, 100, 114, 130, 134, 145, + 154, 163, 165–6, 177, 190, 212, 230, 247, 300, 303, 312–3, 336, 347–8, + 370, 394, 396, 439–41; ii 50–1, 57–8, 67, 69, 70, 71–2, 82, 95, 115, + 126–7, 143–4, 160, 164, 202, 210, 214–5, 223, 253, 256, 259–60, 264–7, + 282–4, 302, 312–3, 315, 318, 326, 364–7, 381, 387–8, 389, 399, 400, + 482, 499 + +Appointments: + +To Cadetship, i 13 + First Regiment of artillery U.S.A., i 24 + Magruder’s Field Battery, i 33 +Professorship at Military Institute, i 56 +Topographical Department, C.S.A., i 114 + Virginia Volunteers, i 114 +Command at Harper’s Ferry, 1861, i 115 +First Brigade of Army of Shenandoah, i 123, + Command of District of Shenandoah Valley, i 164, + Command of Second Army Corps, ii 280 + +Birth, i 5 + Birthplace, i 5, 131, 163 + Boyhood, i 8–10, 410 +Brother, i 6, 9 + Caricatures of, i 65; ii 370, 390 + Childhood, i 7–9 + Compared with: + +Cromwell, ii 494 + Grant, ii 489 + Hasdrubal, ii 196 + Johnston, ii 489 + Lee, ii 488 + Napoleon, i 22–3; ii 493 + Ney, ii 191, 193 + Prince Frederick Charles, ii 196 + Sherman, ii 489 + Wellington, ii 191, 490–3 + Wolfe, ii 494 + +Criticism of his manœuvres refuted, i 258; ii 16–24, 54, 57–8, 100–5 +Death, ii 470–1 +Devotion of his men, i 77, 165, 286, 434; ii 281–2, 366, 370–1, 373–4 +Dispatches, ii 373 +Dissatisfaction with conduct of war, i 154, 175–6, 203–4; ii 70, 71, +391 +Estimate of: + +Banks’, i 315 +Lee’s, ii 469–70, 477–8 +Letcher’s, i 205 +Lexington’s, i 63–5, 76 +McClellan’s, ii 109 +Northern generals’, i 232–3, 314, 325, 399; ii 54, 109, 479 +Northern press’, ii 109 +Northern soldiers’, ii 223, 381 +President Davis’, ii 470 +President of Baltimore and Ohio Railway, i 314 +Southern people’s, ii 74, 109, 477, 479 +Southern soldiers’, i 129, 165, 177–8, 437–8; ii 279, 284–5, 373–4, +381, 480 +Swinton’s, ii 477 + +First estimate of: + +His friends’, i 114 +His officers’, i 196–7, 283, 438–40; ii 370–1 +His troops’, i 197–8 + +Funeral, ii 476–7 +Guards the camp, i 134 +Horsemanship, i 9, 18, 70, 115 +Influence on his soldiers, i 117, 429, 432, 436; ii 398, 494, 499 +Influence on the Southern people, ii 494 +Letters of: + +On faith, i 71, 72, 272–3 +On his travels, i 70–1 +On state of country, i 76 +On promotion, i 114, 130; ii 280 +On necessity of secrecy, i 116, 258 +After First Manassas, i 155 +On defence of Harper’s Ferry, i 125 +On battle of First Manassas, i 156–7 +On leave of absence, i 161; ii 385–6 +On parting with Stonewall Brigade, i 164 +On selection of staff-officer, i 179–80 +On appointment of staff-officer, i 183 +On discipline, i 195 +On resignation of command, i 204–5 +On defence of Valley, i 217–8 +On threatening Washington, i 252 +On fighting on Sunday, i 257 +On making “thorough work” of campaign, i 272 +On attacking Banks, i 276, 281–4 +On Banks’ character, i 278 +On obedience of orders, i 281, 308 +On qualities of West Virginia troops, i 298 +On straggling, i 427 +On surrender of Harper’s Ferry, ii 224 +On promotion of officers, ii 374 +On giving over guns of Army Corps, ii 375 +On the people of the Valley, ii 376 +On birth of his daughter, ii 384–5 +On peace, ii 385 + +Library, i 69 +Losses: + +At Falling Waters, i 129 +At First Manassas, i 157 +On Romney expedition, i 195 +At Kernstown, i 253, 260 +At M’Dowell, i 299 +At Cedarville, i 320 +At Front Royal, i 353 +At Winchester, i 353 +At Cross Keys, i 376 +At Port Republic, i 385 +At Valley Campaign, i 424 +At Gaines’ Mill, ii 42 +At Cedar Run, ii 105, 287 +At Groveton, ii 146, 287 +At Second Manassas, ii 164, 287 +At Chantily, ii 185, 287 +At Harper’s Ferry, ii 223, 288 +At Sharpsburg, ii 255, 271–2, 288 +At Boteler’s Ford, ii 270 +On the Rappahannock, ii 287 +At Bristoe Station, ii 287 +At Fredericksburg, ii 329 +At Chancellorsville, ii 467 + +Marriage, i 59 +Military Maxims of, ii 496 + +Attack, i 162–3 +Infantry fire, i 162 +Use of bayonet, i 163, 229 +Cavalry in touch with the enemy, i 342 +Strategy of weaker army, i 412, 415, 420; ii 398 +Defensive strategy, i 418 +Value of time, i 417–8, 481 +Mystifying and misleading, i 420 +Pursuit, i 420; ii 76–7, 481 +A routed army, i 420 +Battle against odds, i 420 +Point of attack, i 420 +Vigour in attack, i 420; ii 31, 76–7, 179, 481 +Rapidity, i 420; ii 481 +Rest on the march, i 426 +Forced marches, i 426–7 +Invasion, i 174–5; ii 77, 481 +Concentration of force, i 175; ii 77 +Councils of War, i 230 +Reaping fruits of victory, ii 322, 481 +Defensive positions, ii 305 +Meeting superior numbers, ii 326 +Unsuccessful officers, ii 342 +Promotion of officers, ii 374, 465 +Example to be set by superior officers, ii 386 +Activity, i 412, 419–20; ii 398 +Secret of success in war, ii 480 +Earthworks, ii 481 +Loss in forced marches, ii 482 +Patriotism, ii 497 + +Narrow escapes of, i 369; ii 41–2, 160 +Personal characteristics of: + +Ability, i 47–8 +Absence of show and assumption, i 115, 117, 164–5, 435–6, 444–5; ii 71, +478 +Absent-minded, i 63, 77; ii 390, 398 +Abstemiousness, i 60, 336, 436; ii 495 +Abstraction, power of, i 21, 69, 74; ii 391 +Accuracy of statement, i 62–3 +Admiration of Lee, i 307, 397–8; ii 77 +Admiration of Napoleon’s genius, i 58, 416 +Admiration of Confederate soldier, i 437; ii 373–4, 462 +Affection, i 8, 22; ii 495–6 +Ambition, i 11, 21, 23, 46, 71, 157, 196; ii 381, 495 +Anger, i 19, 436, 441–2; ii 71, 370 +Appearance: + +On the battlefield, i 147, 149, 165, 243–4, 340; ii 34, 50, 94, 311–2, +432, 436 +As a cadet, i 14, 18, 22 +In camp, ii 388–9 +In childhood, i 9 +At councils of war, i 229–30, 397; ii 69, 123 +At Lexington, i 61, 63 +At reviews, i 164–5 +On service, i 115, 312–3; ii 478 + +Application, i 10, 15–17, 20–1, 33, 46; ii 490 +Audacity, i 411; ii 487, 491 +Bible: + +His guide, i 61, 73 +Literal interpretation of the, i 61, 257 +Study of the, i 61, 69 + +Camaraderie, i 436–7, 439; ii 373 +Carelessness of comfort, i 161, 187, 192, 196, 246, 435–6, 438 +Careless of popular opinion, i 155–6; ii 376 +Catholicity, i 438–9 +Cheerfulness, i 8, 66–7; ii 315, 377–8 +Choice of companions, i 21 +Clanship, i 11 +Concentration, power of, i 20, 66, 74; ii 391, 396, 496 +Consideration for others, i 19–20, 438; ii 374, 376 +Conversation, i 165; ii 389–90 +Coolness under fire, i 41–2, 47, 130, 147, 149, 163, 165, 437; ii 318, +396 +Courage, moral, i 12, 21, 77, 437; ii 480 +Courage, physical, i 10, 39, 41–2, 77, 130, 163, 165, 244; ii 480–2 +Courtesy, i 9, 66, 116, 436, 438; ii 376, 389–90, 453 +Decision, i 10, 12 +Decision in emergencies, ii 490–1 +Devotion to duty, i 19, 21, 33, 78, 116, 161 +Devotion to Virginia, i 99, 103, 204, 209–10; ii 346, 495 +Devotion to his wife, i 116 +Dislike of profanity, i 145 +Distaste of show, i 115, 129–30, 221 +Early rising, ii 50, 55, 68, 284–5 +Earnestness, i 12, 20, 66, 77, 117, 237; 390 +Economical habits, i 70 +Endurance, i 438; ii 189, 481 +Energy, i 10, 43, 60, 191, 192, 377–9, 412, 436; ii 189, 233, 478, 481, +494 +Enthusiasm, i 66 +Estimate of time, i 13, 187–8 +Faith, i 71–3, 77, 163, 211; ii 462, 465, 488, 495 +Family pride, i 11 +Fearlessness of responsibility, i 77; ii 480 +Finesse, i 116; ii 280 +Freedom from cant, i 73 +Gentleness, i 20, 71, 436, 439 + Gravity, i 8, 66; ii 390 +Health, i 9, 11, 21, 60, 69, 78, 160–1, 214; ii 55, 76, 385, 481 +Horror of war, i 103, 257; ii 385 +Hospitality, i 70; ii 388–9 +Humility, i 445; ii 495 +Imagination, i 66, 74, 417; ii 478, 484 +Industry. (See _Application_) +Inflexibility, i 19, 63 +Information, range of, ii 390 +Intellectual development, i 21, 23 +Intellectual training for war, i 74–6, 78; ii 394–6 +Kindness, i 8, 20, 67, 76; ii 364, 389 +Knowledge of military history, i 58, 420; ii 390, 394–5 +Language, i 73 +Love of art, i 71; ii 390 +Love of children, i 68, 212; ii 302, 364, 400 +Love of fighting, i 27, 33, 43, 149, 209, 439; ii 481 +Love of history, i 69–70; ii 390 +Love of home, i 9, 71, 199, 210; ii 346 +Love of Nature, i 66, 70, 71, 366 +Love of peace, i 103, 257; ii 385 +Love of theological discussion, i 165, 212 +Love of truth, i 62 +Manners. (See _Courtesy_) +Modesty, i 47, 198, 210; ii 370, 380, 390, 462, 465 +Neatness, i 63 +Never knew when he was beaten, i 150, 244, 252, 438 +Peculiar gestures, i 149, 166 +Perseverance, i 10, 15–16, 22 +Personal magnetism, i 197, 437 +Playfulness, i 65, 177, 212 +Power of drawing inferences, ii 483, 486 +Prayer, i 61, 68, 73, 103, 165, 210, 443–4; ii 496 +Pride in his soldiers, i 156–7, 166–7, 195, 443; ii 341 +Purity, i 10, 23, 74; ii 399 +Recreations, i 18, 60, 69, 70 +Reflective habits, ii 391, 396 +Religion on service, i 443–4; ii 399 +Religious views, i 72, 163 +Reserve, i 18, 66, 74 +Resolution, ii 435, 445, 481, 491 +Reticence, i 115–6; ii 89, 284–5, 483 +Reticence as regards his achievements, i 155, 157; ii 374 +Self-control, i 210; ii 494 +Self-possession, ii 478 +Self-reliance, i 21, 23, 48; ii 488, 490, 495 +Self-sacrifice, i 204, 209; ii 494 +Sense of honour, i 20 +Shrewdness, i 14 +Shyness, i 18, 27, 60; ii 478 +Silence, i 22, 63, 64, 115, 197, 436; ii 390, 391, 398, 478 +Simplicity, i 23, 115, 435–6; ii 494 +Studious habits, i 18, 22, 68–9, 74, 410 +Study, method of, i 20, 69; ii 391 +Study of, and training for, war, i 48, 57–9, 69, 745–5, 78, 250, 410, +416; ii 394–5 +Sunday, observance of, i 61, 257, 273, 287, 302, 443 +Tact, i 19, 117–8, 165, 438 +Taste for strong liquor, ii 495 +Temper, i 14, 71, 210, 436; ii 370, 495 +Temperance, i 60; ii 399 +Thankfulness, i 71, 130, 156 +Thoroughness, i 421; ii 496 +Truthfulness and sincerity, i 8, 20, 23, 62, 74; ii 370, 380, 492, 496 +Vindictiveness, i 19; ii 370, 495 + +Practice and principles of, military: + +_Administration:_ + +Care for comfort of men, i 165, 192, 443; ii 374 +Care of private rights, i 166, 197–8 +Care of wounded, i 260, 300, 437; ii 402–3 +Examination of officers, i 182 +Hospitals, i 437 +Medical service, i 118, 437, 444; ii 386 +Supply, i 118; ii 374, 386, 417 +Transport, i 118; ii 374, 386 + +_Command:_ + +Application of military code to volunteers, ii 355 +Councils of War, i 229–30; ii 488 +Courtesy to men, i 165; ii 366 +Duties of commanding officers, i 161, 179, 193 +Employment of regular officers with volunteers, i 181 +Employment of unsuccessful officers, ii 342, 489 +Encouragement of initiative, ii 343 +Official reports, i 436; ii +Recommendations for promotion, ii 364, 374 +Relations with his officers, i 436, 438–42; ii 325–6, 363–4, 366–70, +374, 488–9 +Relations with his soldiers, i 436–7; ii 366, 376 +Relations with his staff, i 439–41; ii 389 +Scope on battlefield, ii 343, 491 +Selection of officers for the staff, i 179–83; ii 364 +Supervision, i 376, 436; ii 189 +System of, i 117–8, 179; ii 363–4 +Tact and consideration, i 165; ii 376 +Trusts his subordinates, i 375; ii 318, 491 + +_Discipline:_ i 117, 161, 162, 178–9, 195, 197–8, 208–9, 214, 253, 254, +303, 350, 376, 436, 441–2; ii 175, 363–6, 373 + +Dealing with mutiny, i 303 +Demands exact obedience, i 376; ii 57, 488 +Gives exact obedience, ii 58, 435 +Punishment of officers, ii 366 +Punishment of soldiers, ii 364–5 +Refuses to take furlough, ii 384 +Strict conception of duty, i 197, 204, 376; ii 364–5 + +_Drill,_ i 117, 162, 365; ii 400 +_Instruction,_ i 117–8, 162, 178, 188–9 +_Marches,_ i 133–4, 189–93, 230, 236, 263, 274, 284–6, 290, 295–6, 302, +308, 312–14, 327, 345–6, 349, 351–3, 360–1, 393–5, 401, 412–3, 425–7; +ii 11, 15–23, 25–6, 29, 49, 50, 87–9, 124–9, 138, 183, 189–90, 203, +208–9, 214–6, 233, 235, 302–3 +_Marching,_ i 183, 427; ii 285, 482 + +Early start, i 183; ii 49, 55, 90, 284 +Forced marches, ii 482, 484 +Rules for, i 426 +Standing orders for, ii 402 + +_Orders:_ + +Anticipates orders, ii 269 +Character of, i 115; ii 490 +Method of issue, i 377; ii 57 +For counterstroke, ii 92, 94–5, 154, 190, 252, 260, 323 +For attack, ii 141–2 +For assault, ii 35 +For attack of Second Line, ii 33 +For night march, i 298 +For rear guard action, i 377 +For retreat, i 349 +To Ewell, i 307 +To Ewell at Cross Keys, i 365 +On dress, i 221, For flank attack, i 380 +At Cedar Run, ii 92–5, 98 +At Chancellorsville, ii 421–2, 432, 437, 441–2, 448–9, 491–2 +General orders, i 302, 436, 443 +To Federal gunners at Port Republic, i 370 +For defence of position, ii 154, 190 +For bombardment of Harper’s Ferry, ii 218–20 +At Fredericksburg, ii 318, 323, 325 +Verbal, ii 33 +Incomplete, ii 88 +Interpretation of, i 259–60, 281–2; ii 23 +Miscarriage of, i 322; ii 34 +Orders and instructions received by Feb. 1862, i 219–20, 259–60; April, +1862, i 280, 294, 411; May, 1862, i 345, 411; June, 1862, i 390–3; ii +13, 15, 23, 30, 46, 57; Sept. 1862, ii 212–3, 217, 226, 259; before +Chancellorsville, ii 415, 424 + +_Strategy:_ + +Activity, i 418; ii 189, 398, 479, 481–2 +Breadth of view, i 282, 432; ii 213, 396, 406, 478, 485, 486 +Calculation, i 201–2, 321, 353, 377, 415, 421; ii 105, 140, 141, 189, +391, 484–6 +Compels enemy to blunder, i 272, 423 +Concealment of movements and intentions, i 116, 290, 309, 313–6, 393–6, +398–402, 412, 420–1, 423, 439–40; ii 11, 85–7, 116, 125–6, 132, 135, +137, 139–42, 483 +Concentration of superior force, i 423; ii 200 +Counterstroke, i 365, 374; ii 182 +Deals with enemy in detail, i 189–9, 361–2, 412–3, 419, 423; ii 79, 85, +199 +Defensive, ii 199–201, 297 +Estimate of time, i 174, 187, 237, 257, 259, 302, 334, 412; ii 19, 77, +114, 400, 407 +Induces enemy to divide, i 386 +Intelligence Department, i 118, 202, 327; ii 347, 483 +Keeps enemy’s columns apart, ii 199, 200 +Looks for annihilation of enemy, ii 482 +Looks for opportunity, i 214; ii 481 +Lures enemy into false position, i 267, 272; ii 79, 91, 106, 110, 199, +485 +Mystifying the enemy, i 129, 228, 392–5; ii 119, 121–2, 327, 484–5 +Never fights except on his own terms, ii 199, 490 +Never gives the enemy time, i 175; ii 189, 231, 398 +Never misses an opportunity, i 413; ii 487 +No slave to rule, i 433 +Objectives, i 189, 219, 247; ii 390–1, 485 +Patience, ii 483, 490 +Plays on enemy’s fears, ii 391, 485 +Reaps fruits of victory, ii 470 +Regards enemy’s difficulties, i 347, 351, 354, 415; ii 395 +Regards moral aspect of war, i 342, 424; ii 342, 395, 483 +Secrecy, i 115–6, 181, 183, 187, 197, 257, 286, 378, 439, 440; ii 89 +Spreads false information, i 392, 395, 400 +Stratagems, i 121–2, 270, 309, 389, 391; ii 83, 85, 106, 118, 199, 327, +490 +Strikes at mental equilibrium of opponent, i 307; ii 395, 485 +Strikes at vital point, i 342; ii 76, 416 +Strikes where least expected, i 401 +Surprise, ii 484, 491 +Takes advantage of mistakes, i 270 +Threatens enemy’s communications, i 187, 193, 271, 283, 325–6, 328; ii +24 +Trades on knowledge of enemy’s character, i 49–50, 227–8, 276, 281; ii +220, 234, 396, 483–4 +Vigilance, i 198, 358, 436 + +_Strategical Plans:_ i 174–5, 184–8, 193–4, 201–3, 214, 217, 251–2, +269, 271, 278, 280, 283, 286–7, 299, 301–2, 365; ii 77, 83–5, 99, +101–2, 105–6, 108–9, 135, 140, 143–4, 146, 149, 212–3, 227–32, 334, +336, 398, 413–4, 483, 485, 488 +_Strategical Views:_ + +Advantages of North-west Virginia, i 164 + Counteracting enemy’s superiority of numbers, i 189, 412; ii 76–7, 297 +Criticism of Hooker’s plan in Chancellorsville campaign, ii 464 +Defensive, the, i 413 + Evils of civilian control, i 199–200, 203–10; ii 489 +Importance of recruiting-grounds, i 164 +Importance of Washington, i 219, 247, 405 +Invasion, i 164, 174–6, 185; ii 77–8, 481, 485 +Offensive, the, ii 490 +Proper action for weaker belligerent, i 412, 420; ii 398 + +_Tactics:_ + +Advanced guards, i 426 +Artillery, use of, ii 190 +Attack, formation for, i 239, 296–7, 338–9, 368, 379–80, 431; ii 90, +94, 122, 421–2 +Attack, night, i 133, 229, 335–7 +Attack, vigour of, ii 31, 179, 458, 481, 486 +Attacks where least expected, i 239, 251, 412, ii 483–4, 487 +Caution, ii 96–7, 484, 486, 490 +Cavalry, use of, i 178, 223, 237, 263, 309, 318–21, 392, 394, 422, 432; +ii 188, 483, 487 +Combination of three arms, ii 487 +Concealment of troops on defensive, i 146, 149, 151, 298; ii 172, 191, +315, 487, 491 +Concentration of superior force, i 250, 340; ii 487 + Counter-attack, i 149, 151–2, 239, 244, 365, 373–4; ii 94–6, 104, + 154–9, 161–2, 175–6, 178–9, 252–3, 256, 259–61, 318, 321–3 + Defensive, ii 230, 487, Defensive position, ii 152–4, 158, 304–5 + Earthworks, i 307; ii 481 + Flank attacks, i 239, 298, 338–9, 379–80, 431; ii 90, 94, 121, 421–3, + 432, 472 + Guides, i 136, 240; ii 97, 120, 126 + Insight, i 218, 227, 320, 350, 353, 413, 431; ii 67, 70, 77, 131, 256, + 445, 483, 491 +Intercommunication, i 202; ii 485 + Night marches, i 300; ii 127, 130, 136, 141, 190 +Patience, ii 483, 490 + Plans of attack, i 239, 296, 317–8, 328, 338, 365–7, 379; ii 32, 51–2, + 61, 90–1, 103, 145, 220–2 +Positions, i 140–1, 145–6, 151, 213, 228, 270, 274, 275, 353–4, 363–6; +ii 98, 139, 152–4, 244, 248, 304–5, 309–11 +Pursuit, i 65, 153–5, 299, 330–3, 340–2, 427; ii 69, 70, 96–7, 330, +422, 438–9, 470, 481–6, 487 +Reconnaissance, ii 51, 60–1, 92, 160, 183, 189, 315, 318 +Reliance on the bayonet, i 146, 151, 229, 253; ii 35, 96, 175, 191 +Retreat and rear guards, i 213–4, 218 +Surprise, i 239, 250, 317, 412, 419, 424, 431; ii 483, 491 +Vigilance, i 214, 360, 420; ii 419 + +Professor at Military Institute: + +Duties as, i 58 +Inculcates discipline at, i 64 + Unpopular as, i 63 +Want of success as, i 59 + +Promotion: + +Second Lieutenant, i 29 +First Lieutenant, i 29 + Brevet-captain, i 46 + Brevet-major, i 47 + Colonel, i 114 + Brigadier-general, i 130 + Lieutenant-general, ii 280 + +Resigns his command, i 201 +Resigns his commission, i 57–8 + Staff officers, i 115, 180–1, 404, 425, 438 +“Stonewall,” origin of the name, i 145 +Strength of command: + +First Brigade, July, 1861, i 153 + Romney expedition, i 189 +Army of Valley, February, 1861, i 219–20, 228; March, i 230–1; at +Kernstown, i 250, 263–3; April, i 267, 270, 271; at M’Dowell, i 297–8, +301; before Winchester, i 309–10; at Cross Keys, i 368; at Port +Republic, i 385; in Peninsula, ii 9; at Cedar Run, ii 85, 91, 95–6; at +Groveton, ii 146; at Second Manassas, ii 153–5, 168; at Sharpsburg, ii +235–6, 255, 275–6; at Harper’s Ferry, ii 235; Sept. 30, 1862, ii 275; +Second Army Corps, October, ii 281; at Fredericksburg, ii 310; at +Chancellorsville, ii 412–3 + +Sunday-school, i 61, 64 +Travels, i 59, 70–1; ii 390 +Usefulness of Mexican experiences, i 48–51, 410 +Views: + +On Secession, i 99 +On slavery, i 89 +On special correspondents, i 156, 258 +On States’ rights, i 99 +On war, i 103 +Wounded, i 149, 160–1, 163; ii 450 + +Jena, battle of, i 59, 259; ii 332 +Jenkins, General, C.S.A., ii 272, 414 +“Jim,” i 300, 396, 442; ii 72 +Johnson, General Bradley T., C.S.A., ii 26, 38, 142, 145, 147, 159, +280, 374 +Johnson, General Edward, C.S.A., i 50, 206, 284, 286–8, 291, 295–8, +303, 309, 415; ii 393 +Johnston, General A. S., C.S.A., i 304 +Johnston, General Joseph E., C.S.A., i 50, 122, 125–6, 130, 132–3, 139, +140, 147, 153–4, 156, 157, 159–60, 164, 172, 175–6, 185, 187–9, +199–202, 204–7, 213, 217–9, 232–3, 235, 250, 258, 260, 264–5, 267, +271–2, 274, 278–82, 292, 294, 301, 307–8, 345, 388, 410–1; ii 4, 199, +373, 392, 479, 483, 489 +Jomini, Baron, i 75, 407 +Jones, Colonel W. E., C.S.A., ii 291 +Jones, General D. R., C.S.A., ii 178, 180, 208, 242 +Jones, General J. R., C.S.A., ii 208, 220–2, 244–8, 254, 255, 259, 271 +Jones, Reverend W., D.D., i 359 +Junkin, Miss, i 59 +Junkin, Reverend Dr., i 59; ii 327 + +K + + Kearney, General Philip, U.S.A., ii 122, 140, 156, 157–8, 161, 179, + 184 +Kelley, Colonel, C.S.A., i 383 +Kelly, General, U.S.A., i 184, 190 + Kemper, General, C.S.A., ii 178, 179, 272 +Kenly, Colonel, U.S.A., i 316–9, 321, 323–6, 328, 342, 412 +Kernstown, battle of, chapter viii, i 273, 276, 337, 405, 407; ii 32, +103, 175, 247, 302, 332, 341, 348, 370, 379, 483–5, 487 +Kershaw, General, C.S.A., ii 271 + Kimball, General N., U.S.A., i 238, 242–3, 251, 252 +King, General, U.S.A., i 349, 355–6, 400; ii 79, 99, 140, 143–6, 150–1, +163, 190, 193, 195 + Kirby Smith, General, C.S.A., i 135, 150–1 +Knapsacks, i 222; ii 125 + Königgrätz or Sadowa, battle of, i 422; ii 197 +Kriegsakademie, i 410 + +L + + Lander, General, U.S.A., i 201–2, 213, 227 +Lane, General, C.S.A., ii 95–6, 309–10, 316–7, 366–7, 449, 456, 487 +Law, General, C.S.A., ii 26, 35, 37–8, 272, +Lawley, Hon. F., special correspondent of the “Times,” ii 280, 390, +461, 477, 478 +Lawrences, the, i 4 +Lawton, General, C.S.A., i 391, 393, 408; ii 26, 32, 35, 40, 42, 90, +119, 145, 147, 153, 159, 161, 172–3, 177, 208, 220–2, 235, 242, 244–5, +247, 255, 259, 269, 271, 275, 287 +Lee, General Fitzhugh, C.S.A., i 333; ii 7, 114, 116, 133, 207–8, 227, +241–2, 294, 331, 413, 418, 420–2, 430, 432–3, 435–6, 472, 491 +Lee, General Robert Edward, C.S.A., i 13, 31, 36, 37, 58, 86, 88, 90, +125–6, 130, 131, 141, 173, 204, 207–8, 215, 225, 280–4, 295, 305–8, +352, 388–93, 397–8, 407–12, 419, 429, 431–3, 436; ii 1, 3–6, 8–19, +21–3, 25–6, 28, 29, 30, 35, 39, 41, 43–8, 54, 57–62, 65, 67, 69, 70, +72–4, 75, 77–81, 84, 88, 109, 111–7, 122–5, 128, 131–4, 135, 138, 139, +142, 150–1, 156, 162–3, 167–9, 176–8, 183, 185–90, 192–4, 196, 199, +200, 202, 205–13, 216–7, 220, 223–4, 226–8, 236, 239, 242–3, 250–1, +254, 258–9, 262–9, 273–4, 276–80, 289–93, 295–9, 300, 303, 305, 307–8, +312, 322, 324–5, 330, 332–4, 336, 341–5, 348, 353–4, 358–60, 364, 369, +370, 373–6, 382, 387, 390, 392–3, 398–9, 404–10, 413–9, 424–35, 437–9, +446, 455, 457–64, 468–70, 472–5, 477–80, 483–4, 486, 488–90 +Lee, B. E., Esq., C.S.A., ii 473 +Lee, General Stephen D., C.S.A., ii 168, 175, 208, 244, 246, 249, 252, +263–7, 272 +Lee, General W. H. F., C.S.A., i 333; ii 120, 291, 331, 413, 438 +Leigh, Captain, C.S.A., ii 451, 453 +Leipsic, campaign and battle of, i 418; ii 192, 493 +Letcher, Governor, i 205, 210 +Leuthen, battle of, ii 470 +Ligny, battle of, i 259; ii 59 +Lincoln, Abraham, i 81, 86, 97–8, 101, 105, 120, 158, 171–2, 208, 215, +216, 226, 231, 233–5, 249–50, 252, 260, 265, 277, 279, 289, 293–4, +305–6, 314–5, 344, 349–50, 358, 386, 399, 401, 405–9, 411, 415; ii 5, +73, 75, 77, 80, 83, 210, 213, 273, 276, 289, 295–7, 302, 320, 334–5, +337, 341, 392, 408, 468, 485 +Little Sorrel, i 198; ii 209, 256, 281, 311, 442, 450 +Long, General, C.S.A., ii 54, 188, 327, 359, 360 +Longstreet, General, C.S.A., i 50, 139, 265, 397; ii 9, 12, 14, 18, 24, +26, 28–31, 36, 42, 45, 47–9, 53–7, 59, 61–2, 65, 69–71, 100, 111, 137, +144, 150–3, 156–7, 162–3, 165–6, 168–70, 171, 173, 175–7, 179, 181, +183, 187–90, 193, 208, 210, 212–3, 217–8, 224–7, 230, 233, 236, 238, +241, 244, 249, 257–61, 276–7, 280, 286, 293, 298–301, 304, 308–9, 311, +313, 316, 320–2, 336, 341, 351, 404, 406–7, 414, 455, 469, 486 +Loring, General, C.S.A., i 185, 187–9, 193–7, 199–201, 205, 211; ii +370, 489 +Louis XIV, ii 283 + +M + + McCall, General, U.S.A., i 349, 386; ii 10, 48 +McClellan, General, U.S.A., i 50, 58, 155, 171, 174–5, 184, 187, 196, +202–3, 213, 215, 216, 218–20, 227, 231–2, 235–6, 247–50, 252, 259, +265–7, 269–72, 274, 277–80, 292–3, 304–6, 314, 344–5, 386–91, 393, 398, +400–1, 404–5, 407–9, 411, 413, 415, 420, 429; ii 2, 5, 6, 9, 12, 14, +15, 18–9, 28, 30, 32, 39, 40, 43–8, 57, 60, 65–74, 75–7, 81, 83–4, 102, +109–11, 113, 116–7, 122–5, 135–6, 142, 145, 152, 167, 185, 187, 194, +198–9, 205, 210–3, 216–8, 224–7, 230–4, 236–7, 241, 243, 245–8, 250, +253–4, 256, 258, 260, 263, 267–8, 270, 273–5, 277–9, 289, 291–7, 299, +332–3, 341, 343, 371–2, 392, 413, 485 +McDowell, battle of, chapter ix, i 263, 412, 424–5, 446; ii 484 +McDowell, General, U.S.A., i 50, 131–3, 135–6, 138–9, 144, 147, 150, +152, 154–5, 158–9, 171, 248–50, 279–80, 289, 292–4, 304, 314–5, 325, +344–6, 349–53, 358, 364, 386–91, 395, 398–401, 404, 408, 412–3, 415, +420; ii 3, 5, 10, 60, 79, 84, 97, 99, 101, 103, 116 + McGuire, Dr. Hunter, C.S.A., i 260, 369, 439; ii 30, 51, 55, 57–8, 69, + 86, 123, 164, 193, 257, 324–5, 373, 391, 451, 453–4, 471 +McLaws, General, C.S.A., ii 62, 111, 122, 169, 204, 208, 213, 216–21, +223–5, 233–4, 238, 243, 250, 250–6, 271, 329, 413, 421–2, 431–3, 446, +459, 462–3, 467 +Magruder, General, C.S.A., i 32–3, 36–7, quoted 39, 42, quoted 47, 50, +278–9; ii 9, 11, 12, 14, 44–5, 47, 53, 55, 59, 61–3, 65 +Mahan, Captain, U.S.N., quoted, ii 332 +Mahone, General, C.S.A., i 411; ii 272 +Malvern Hill, battle of, chapter xiv, ii 43, 75, 80, 201, 274, 330, +341, 483, 488 +Manassas, first battle of, chapter vi, i 135, 173–4, 198, 209, 216, +255, 425; ii 274, 348, 483, 491 +Manassas, second battle of, chapters xvi, ii 108 and xvii, 167, 187–8, +192, 202, 212, 228, 231, 253, 311, 341, 344, 370, 468, 487 +Mansfield, General, C.S.A., ii 237, 241–3, 247–8, 250, 255, 261, 272 +Maps, i 136, 183, 416–7, 440; ii 46, 59, 110, 431–2 +Marches. (See under _Jackson_) +Marcus Aurelius, i 21 + Marengo, battle of, i 255; ii 493 + Marlborough, Duke of, i 75, 215 + Marmont, Marshal, ii 187, 492 + Mars-la-Tour, battle of, i 259 + Mason and Dixon’s Line, i 82–4 + Masséna, Marshal, ii 482, 491 + Meade, General, U.S.A., ii 155, 181, 188, 244–5, 247, 275, 314–9, 321, + 323, 328, 416 +Meagher, General, U.S.A., ii 40, 43 + Mechanicsville, Virginia, engagement at, chapter xii, 404; ii 486 + Medicines, i 112; ii 205, 346, 405 +Meigs, General, U.S.A., ii 337 +Merrimac, the, i 278, 301 +Metaurus, battle of, ii 196 + Mexico, city of, i 26, 30, 35 + Mexico, evacuation of, i 53 + Mexico, occupation of city of, i 51–2 + Mexico, Republic of, i 26 + Mexico, surrender of city of, i 45 + Mexico, valley of, i 30, 34 + Middletown, engagement at, chapter x, 304, i 328–30 + Miles, Colonel, U.S.A., ii 457 + Military Academy,(See _West Point_) +Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia, i 55–8, 60, 63–4, 68, 71, 76, +98–100, 104 +Militia, American, i 17, 56, 79, 101, 105 +Milroy, General, U.S.A., i 269, 275, 284, 288, 291–2, 295, 297–8, 300, +315, 375, 412, 414–5, 431, 446; ii 155–6, 414 + Molino del Rey, battle of, i 39, 45 + Moltke, Field-Marshal Count, i 8, 25, 357, 430, 433; ii 11, 19, 58, + 187, 197, 342, 347 + Monitor, the, i 278 + Monterey, battle of, i 27, 28 + Moore, Captain, C.S.A., i 370 + Moore, General Sir John, ii 363 + Morell, General, U.S.A., ii 122, 174, 175 + Morrison, Captain J. G., C.S.A., ii 422, 451 + Morrison, Miss A. M., i 59 + Moscow, i 109; ii 493 + Mule battery, i 378 + Munford, Colonel, C.S.A., i 310, 321, 391–3, 398, 421; ii 49, 55–6, + 129, 181, 208, 224–5, 242, 294 +Murat, Prince, i 259 + +N + + Napier, General Sir Charles, i 4; quoted, ii 359 +Napier, General Sir William, i 4; quoted, i 419, 423, 427; ii 345, 478 +Napiers, the, i 4 +Napoleon, i 22–3, 48, 57, 75, 78, 109, 110, 182, 186, 193, 197, 221, +232, 247, 250–1, 259, 336, 347, 357, 406, 409, 410, 413–4, 416, 417–9, +422–3, 433–4; ii 19, 109, 138, 170, 187, 196, 197, 199, 260, 338, 340, +343, 362, 370, 372, 391, 394–5, 426, 428, 429, 486, 491, 493, 495 +Naval and military expeditions (see also _Transport by Sea_), i 28, +213, 233–6, 249–50, 252, 279 +Navy, U.S., i 27, 106, 112, 124, 305 +Nelson, i 75, 157, 197; ii 370, 371, 482 +Newton, General, U.S.A., ii 316, 318, 328 +Ney, Marshal, i 75–6; ii 191–2, 492 +North Anna, battle of, ii 228 +North Anna, position on, ii 301, 303, 305, 329–30, 332–3, 410, 488 +Northern soldier, i 132, 137, 139, 152–3, 158–60; ii 75, 148, 180, 229, +244–5, 247, 274–5, 279, 331–2, 341–2, 344–8, 381 + +O + + Officers, corps of, ii 348 +Officers, U.S. Army, i 178–8, 25, 50, 104, 136; ii 480–1 +“Old Dominion,” the, i 2, 98 + O’Neal, Colonel, C.S.A., ii 441–3 +Ord, General, U.S.A., i 344, 354, 355–6, 386 +“Order, the lost,” ii 217, 238, 277–8 + Orderlies, i 322; ii 150 +Orders (see also under _Jackson_), ii 20, 24, 30, 33, 57, 63, 87–8, +94–5, 105, 113–4, 140, 144, 149, 189, 191, 217, 219, 359, 432 +Organisation and recruiting, i 17–8, 33, 104–11, 115, 117–8, 120, 123, +136–8, 154–5, 158–9, 161, 169–70, 215, 225–6, 231, 248–9, 254, 273, +312, 322, 333, 405–6, 427–9; ii 30, 203–6, 231, 273, 275–6, 280, 289, +331, 348, 410, 412, 468 +Ox Hill. (See _Chantilly_) + +P + + Palfrey, General, U.S.A., ii 229, 252, 261 + Palo Alto, battle of, i 27, 28, 32 +Patrick, General, U.S.A., ii 146, 246 +Patterson, General, U.S.A., i 126, 128–9, 131–3, 135, 139, 227 +Patton, Colonel, C.S.A., i 377, 384 +Paxton, General, C.S.A., ii 465 +Pelham, Major John, C.S.A., ii 147, 314, 316, 323 +Pender, General, C.S.A., ii 95–6, 153, 158, 160, 271, 309, 318, 322, +452 +Pendleton, Lieutenant Colonel A. S., C.S.A., i 369; ii 57, 403, 454–5, +471 +Pendleton, Reverend Dr., General, C.S.A., i 123, 146; ii 208, 230, 251, +269, 276, 473 +Peninsular campaign, 1862, ii 86, 109, 186, 200, 331, 348 +Peninsular War, 1808–14, i 170, 221, 419; ii 200, 201, 492 +Pickett, General, C.S.A., i 50; ii 329, 356, 405, 407, 425, 455 +Pierce, General, U.S.A., i 33 +Pillow, General, U.S.A., i 33, 36–7, 46 +Pleasonton, General, U.S.A., ii 293, 418, 427, 435, 439, 446–7 +Plevna, battle of, i 232; ii 174 +Plunder, ii 352–4 +Poague, Colonel, C.S.A., i 370 +Pope, General, U.S.A., i 401; ii 78–85, 87, 89, 90, 92, 97–100, 102–3, +106–7, 109–11, 113–25, 127–9, 131–2, 134, 136–42, 145, 149–51, 157, +161–2, 165–6, 167–73, 176–7, 181–3, 185, 187–96, 199, 203, 205, 207, +210, 229, 235, 295–6, 300, 341, 343–5, 469, 479, 483–6, 488 +Population of North and South, i 106–7 +Port Republic, battle of, chapter xi, 357, i 365, 424, 425, 441; ii +247, 341, 484 +Porter, General FitzJohn, U.S.A., i 51; ii 10, 12–3, 16, 19, 25, 27–9, +36, 38–9, 48, 61, 64, 66, 122, 140, 157, 162–3, 170, 171–3, 175–8, 180, +228, 243, 268–70, 272, 341, 344 +Presbyterian Church, i 53, 59, 61 +Prescott, W. F., the historian, i 26 +Preston, Colonel, C.S.A., i 187 +Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, General, ii 196 +Prussia, i 75, 110; ii 196 +Puritans, the, i 73, 83 + +Q + + Quatre-Bras, battle of, i 414; ii 59, 192, 468, 492 + +R + + Raglan, Field-Marshal Lord, ii 355 +Railroads in war, i 107–9, 120–1, 135, 150, 235, 266, 277, 286–7, 391, +393, 395; ii 10, 78–80, 101–2, 111, 121, 124, 129, 133, 140, 182, 192, +291, 297, 397, 404, 480 +Ramseur, General, C.S.A., ii 441, 444 +Ransom, General, C.S.A., ii 272, 329, 405 +Rebel Yell, i 340; ii 482 +Reconnaissance. (See _Tactics_) +Regimental life in 1851, i 57 +Reno, General, U.S.A., i 50; ii 113, 116, 137, 140, 156–9, 161, 184 +Resaca de la Palma, battle of, i 27, 32 +Revolution, American, and War of Independence, i 6, 57, 91–2, 95–6, +106, 113, 221, 425; ii 340 +Reynolds, General, U.S.A., ii 44, 122, 140, 143, 155–7, 162, 171, 173, +180, 195, 428, 465 +Richardson, General, U.S.A., ii 53, 251, 257 +Richepanse, General, ii 466 +Ricketts, General, U.S.A., i 386, 401; ii 79, 84, 92, 140, 143, 150, +171, 173–4, 176, 179, 244, 247 +Ripley, General, C.S.A., ii 271 +Rivoli, battle of, i 429 +Roads, American, i 108 +Roads, Virginian, i 211, 232, 237, 426; ii 198, 203 +Robertson, General, C.S.A., ii 116–7, 208, 224, 235 +Rodes, General, C.S.A., ii 38, 271, 331, 412, 432, 437, 440–2, 444, +447–9, 455, 460 +Romney, expedition to, chapter vii, 171 +Ropes, John C., i 92; ii 101 +Rosecrans, General, U.S.A., i 186, 189, 294 +Rupert, Prince, i 83 +Russia, i 79, 108, 109 + +S + + Sadowa. (See _Königgräts_) +Salamanca, battle of, i 428; ii 187, 188, 426, 490, 491 +Santa Anna, President of Mexico, i 27, 28–31, 39, 45 +Sauroren, battle of, i 427 +Savage’s Station, engagement at, ii 47 +Saxton, General, U.S.A., i 345–6, 355–6, 372, 413, 425 +Schenck, General, U.S.A., i 269, 295, 298, 375, 446; ii 155–6 +Schurz, General, U.S.A., ii 155–6, 401 +Scotland, i 3, 11, 93, 102; ii 332 +Scott, Colonel, C.S.A., i 309, 337, 339, 385 +Scott, General Winfleld, U.S.A., i 27–30, 36–9, 46–50, 52, 111, 132, +136, 171 +Sea, command of. (See _Strategy_) +Sea power, i 112–3. (See _Sea, Command of_) +Sebastopol, i 422 +Secession, i 78–9, 81–2, 86–7, 90–102 +Sedan, campaign and battle of, i 427; ii 332 +Seddon, Hon. Mr., ii 404, 406, 407 +Sedgwick, General, U.S.A., i 235; ii 53, 251–3, 255–6, 408–10, 416, +418–9, 421, 425–8, 430, 434, 438, 458, 462–3 +Semmes, General, U.S.A., ii 252, 271 +Seven Days’ Battles, chapters xiii, xiv, ii 109, 201 +Seven Pines, battle of, i 443; ii 3, 5 +Seymour, General, U.S.A., ii 155 +Sharpsburg, battle of, chapter xix, i 169; ii 288, 289, 335, 341, 356, +370, 380, 483 +Sheridan, General, U.S.A., i 426, 428; ii 394, 479, 485, 487 +Sherman, General, U.S.A., i 58, 144, ii 479, 485, 487, 489 +Shields, General, U.S.A., i 38, 213, 230, 235–6, 238, 242–3, 248, 251, +259–60, 262, 263, 277, 279, 283, 290, 293–4, 298, 314–5, 344, 346, +349–56, 358–60, 363–5, 367–9, 371–2, 375–6, 378, 381, 384, 386, 391, +400, 424, 426, 429, 431; ii 19, 73, 75, 101, 199, 247, 341, 393, 484–5 +Sickles, General, U.S.A., ii 318, 328, 401, 427, 434–5, 438–40, 446–7, +456, 486 +Sigel, General, U.S.A., ii 79, 97–9, 101, 103, 116, 137, 140, 143, 149, +155–6, 173, 179, 195 +Signalling, i 143, 363, 368; ii 87, 111, 137, 218, 279, 418–9, 425, 480 +Skobeleff, General, i 197, 255; ii 174 +Slave owners, i 79–81, 84–8, 90–1, 95, 124 +Slavery, i 79–80, 82, 84–96, 98, 102 +Slaves, i 61, 79, 81, 85–90 +Slocum, General, U.S.A., ii 27, 39, 53–4, 254, 401, 416, 427 +Smith, Captain (Reverend Dr.), C.S.A., ii 315, 327, 331, 352, 380, +451–3, 462 +Smith, General G. W., C.S.A., i 388 +Smith, General, U.S.A., i 174–6, 388 +Smolensko, i 109 +Soldier, American (see also _Northern_ and _Southern Soldier,_ and +_Volunteer_), i 106; ii 345–8, 382 +Solferino, battle of, i 422 +Southern soldier, i 104–5, 115, 117, 123, 161, 166, 174, 178, 193, 200, +254–5, 273, 299, 303, 333, 335, 394–5, 435–8; ii 126–7, 133, 204, 209, +229, 235–6, 263, 273, 279–85, 331, 344, 346–61, 363, 381, 386–7, 398–9, +440–1, 444–5, 469, 477, 480, 487, 497 +South Mountain, battle of, chapter xix xix, ii 488 +South, the, i 76, 79–81, 83–6, 90, 93–9, 100–2 +Spicheren, battle of, i 259, 430 +Spies, i 290, 421; ii 89 +Spotsylvania, battle of, i 433; ii 201 +Staff, i 105–6, 111, 115, 136, 153, 154, 165, 169, 179–83, 212, 215, +227, 229, 237, 388, 392, 421, 425, 430–1, 438, 440–1; ii 20–1, 26, 34, +41–2, 57, 59, 62, 68, 71, 89, 143, 150, 169, 178, 236, 252, 264, 269, +283, 327, 345, 364, 384, 386–7, 389–91, 423, 446, 486 +Stafford, Colonel, C.S.A., ii 95–6, 97 +Starke, General, C.S.A., ii 145, 153, 159, 177, 184–5, 244, 246, 271 +States’ rights, i 79, 86, 92–4, 96, 98–102 +Stanton, Hon. Mr., i 155, 208, 265, 275, 277, 281, 292, 294, 304, +314–6, 325–6, 344, 348, 351, 360, 386, 388–9, 400, 401, 406–7, 409, +447; ii 5, 83, 113, 299, 392, 404 +Steinwehr, General von, U.S.A., ii 82, 155–6, 159, 401 +Steuart, General, C.S.A., i 310, 328, 331–2, 334, 341–2, ; ii 370 +Stevens, General, U.S.A., ii 179 +Stoneman, General, U.S.A., ii 408–9, 417–8, 464, 468 +“Stonewall Brigade,” i 162, 165–7, 178–9, 183, 194–5, 197, 209, 220, +241, 252–4, 262, 295, 299, 309, 334–5, 338, 340, 345, 347, 349, 351, +355, 383; ii 26, 35, 76, 93–5, 104, 145, 148, 173, 235–6, 271, 437, +465, 482 +Stores, ii 30, 129, 131–2, 136 +Straggling, i 138, 150, 152–3, 313, 428–9; ii 50, 180, 185, 204, 227, +235, 249, 262, 273, 275–7, 303, 358, 411, 432 +Strategist, qualities of, i 48, 75–6, 409, 413–4 +Strategy. (See also under _Jackson_) + +Application of principles of, i 409, 415 +Art of, i 25, 75–6, 406, 409, 432–3; ii 391 +Factors of, i 75; ii 391, 393–4 +Importance of, i 401, 406, 409; ii 338 +Problems of, i 75; ii 391 +Rules of, i 406, 409; ii 138, 430 +Study of, i 227; ii 391, 394, 396 +Training in, i 74–6, 409–10; ii 396 +_Practice and Elements of:_ + +Action of weaker belligerent, i 154, 174–5, 418; ii 199 +Activity, i 418–9 +Audacity, ii 11 +Base of operations, i 44, 109; ii 295 +Civilian strategy, i 172–3, 206–8, 252, 406–8 +Command of the sea, i 27, 112–3, 124, 213, 217; ii 31, 207, 406 +Compelling the enemy to make mistakes, i 270 +Concealment of movements, i 412, 421–3; ii 79, 80, 83, 126, 137–42, 190 +Concentration of effort, i 173, 187–8, 418; ii 135, 207, 407, 416 +Concentration of superior force at decisive point, i 418, 420, 423; ii +407–8, 423 +Concentration on the battlefield, i 131, 390, 418, 420, 422–3; ii 10, +37, 90, 127, 187, 196, 277, 297 +Converging columns, i 359, 372, 412, 419; ii 16–7, 19, 22, 46, 48, +58–9, 85, 139, 423 +Counterstroke, i 173, 293; ii 200–1, 414, 469 +Dealing with enemy in detail, i 189–90, 418; ii 84–5, 89, 102, 125, +199, 213, 298, 408–9, 416 +Deceiving the enemy, i 282, 391–3 +Defensive, the, i 172–3, 401, 418; ii 199, 200, 231, 332, 413 +Demonstrations, ii 408–9 +Detached force, duties of, i 75, 281; ii 406–7 +Dispersion, i 131, 219, 231, 277, 314, 358, 418, 433; ii 79, 85, +149–51, 187, 195–7, 207, 212–3, 307, 404–5, 418 +Dividing to unite, i 411, 423; ii 124, 138, 187, 192, 196–7, 295, 307, +416 +Exterior and interior lines, i 293; ii 83–4, 113, 122, 124–5, 135, 151, +195, 213, 217, 226, 408–9 +Finance as a factor, i 234 +Forcing the enemy out of a strong or intrenched position, i 308–9, 391; +ii 10, 124, 183, 408–9, 417 +Holding enemy fast, ii 142, 232, 408 +Human factor, the, ii 297 +Inducing enemy to divide, i 330, 386, 418; ii 392 +Initiative, i 415, 418; ii 231, 305, 435 +Invasion, i 107–10, 175, 185–6, 203, 305–6; ii 78, 199, 200, 202–4, 231 +Knowledge of enemy’s character, i 50, 227, 276, 291, 325–6, 330, 376, +415; ii 4, 11, 28, 187, 188, 202, 220, 233, 243, 277 +Lines of communication, i 34, 107–9, 112, 142, 164, 175, 188, 224, 272, +283, 389; ii 24, 30, 111, 114, 124, 132, 151, 199, 211–2, 305, 329, +404, 408, 413, 458 +Lines of operation, i 27–8, 30; ii 393 +Lines of supply, ii 79, 131, 295–7, 300, 408 +Luring enemy into false position, i 267, 270, 272; ii 79, 83, 106, 110, +199, 307, 415 +Moral factors, i 110, 155, 232, 270, 347, 351–2, 372, 415; ii 47, 201, +346–7, 349, 369–70, 395 +Objectives, ii 391–4, 406 +Obstacles, topographical, i 267–9, 365–7; ii 81–2, 87, 135, 196, 266–7 +Offensive, i 418, 425; ii 102, 111, 123, 142, 231, 336, 413–4 +Politics, i 206, 231, 234, 401; ii 289–90, 292 +Prestige, ii 201 +Pursuit, i 153–4, 420; ii 43, 45–6, 59, 77, 470 +Recruiting-grounds, i 119, 164; ii 207 +Retreat, i 213; ii 106, 125 +Space, i 109 +Stratagems, i 271, 391–4, 420–1 +Strategical points, i 173, 199, 206, 233–4, 249–50, 408; ii 206, 392, +393 +Surprise, i 398–9 +Time, i 415; ii 19, 24, 231, 234, 307–8, 407 +Topographical factors, i 75, 232, 416–7 +Turning movements, i 35 +Uncertainty, i 347, 350–2, 372, 384; ii 47, 193, 428 +Vital points, i 219, 233–4, 408; ii 305, 406 +Zone of manœuvre, ii 199 + +Strother, Colonel, U.S.A., i 325, 340 +Stuart, General J. E. B., C.S.A., i 126–7, 129, 135, 146, 149, 165, +333; ii 6–9, 12, 14, 20–1, 31, 41, 44, 47, 55, 69, 72, 80, 98, 100, +114, 116, 118–21, 130, 133–4, 136, 141, 144–5, 147, 149, 152–3, 157, +165–6, 178, 181–5, 189, 193–4, 210, 213, 217, 224, 230, 235, 238, +241–2, 246, 249, 252, 255, 259–61, 264, 266–7, 270, 273, 282–3, 287, +291–2, 299, 308, 311, 322–3, 330–3, 336, 386–8, 398–9, 412, 414, 416, +418, 423, 427, 430, 454–5, 457–60, 473 +Sturgis, General, U.S.A., ii 328 +Summer, General, U.S.A., ii 170, 182, 186, 248, 250, 254, 256, 321 +Sumter, Fort, i 100 +Supply, i 30, 34, 44, 106–8, 111, 118, 138, 153–4, 173, 187, 203, 216, +265, 275, 288–9, 364; ii 30, 114, 125, 128, 131, 187, 204, 207, 209, +231, 333, 382, 405, 409, 412, 414, 417, 468 +Supply by requisition, ii 81 +Supply depôts and magazines, i 44, 107; ii 80, 125, 129, 199, 291, 408 +Supply trains, ii 88, 90, 111, 140, 183, 231, 234, 297, 330 +Suvoroff, Field-Marshal, i 197 +Swinton, W. H., ii 101, 191, 411, 477–8 +Sydnor, Captain J. W., C.S.A., ii 16 +Sykes, General, U.S.A., ii 31–2, 53, 122, 174, 179, 180, 328, 421 + +T + + Tactics. (See also under _Jackson_) + +Advanced guards, i 240, 277, 317–8, 337, 364, 382; ii 60, 71, 90–1, +109, 119–20, 146, 184, 199, 202, 208, 269, 306–7, 421 +Ambuscade, i 139, 226, 242, 259; ii 106 +Ammunition columns, i 35, 374, 378, 426; ii 234, 330 +Arms, i 105, 112, 140, 215, 220, 225, 292; ii 11, 205, 270, 346 +Artillery, i 144, 146, 159, 220, 222, 225, 404; ii 28, 31–2, 36, 39, +51–3, 60–3, 66, 91–3, 95, 104, 148, 154–6, 172–3, 175–6, 179, 181, 190, +218–24, 230, 241, 245–7, 249–50, 253–5, 261, 264–6, 305–6, 310–1, +314–6, 320, 323–4, 330–1, 434, 446–7, 457, 459 +Assault of second line, ii 36–8, 445 +Attack, i 38, 138, 148, 160, 229, 239, 250, 296, 338–9, 347, 350, +370–1, 373–4, 380–3, 387, 420; ii 15, 56, 59, 62–3, 100, 114, 145, 147, +155, 158–60, 247, 250–3, 270, 277–9, 314–6, 320, 323, 340, 458 +Attack, at dawn, i 345, 360, 379 +Attack, night, ii 456 +Attack, secondary, i 240, 339 +Attack, signal for, ii 62, 441–2 +Audacity, i 251 +Cavalry and Mounted Riflemen, i 31, 36, 38, 49, 105, 127, 149, 161, +178, 215, 222–6, 237, 245–6, 264, 273, 290, 318–21, 329, 332–6, 339, +341–3, 360–3, 385, 394, 425; ii 5–6, 20, 36, 41, 70, 80, 82, 88, 90, +96, 105, 114, 117, 131, 133, 145, 149, 157, 179–81, 186, 188–9, 194, +208, 211, 223, 227, 230, 291, 301, 304, 323, 330–1, 412, 415, 418, 425, +428, 434, 436, 462–3, 468 +Cavalry raids, ii 6–9, 48, 59, 120–2, 291–3, 336–7, 409, 418, 462–3, +468 +Combination, i 311; ii 15–6, 29, 46, 62–3, 180, 187–8, 245, 278, 357, +362, 430, 457–8 +Communication between columns, i 193, 195–6, 280–1, 440; ii 12, 20–3, +132, 134–5, 139, 154, 181 +Concealment of force, ii 161, 168, 171–2, 187, 233, 240–1 +Concentration of superior force, ii 357, 362 +Counter-attack, i 37, 151, 239, 244–5, 255–6, 301, 374, 380; ii 32, 49, +66, 94–5, 104–5, 155–9, 161–2, 168, 176–7, 179, 187–8, 190–1, 200, 230, +241, 247–8, 250, 252–3, 256–61, 264, 267, 269–70, 305, 318–23, 325, +329–30, 332, 413, 427, 457–9, 463, 465 +Counter-attack, time for, ii 168, 176–7, 252, 415, 429, 457, 465, 478 +Counter-attack, unreadiness for, ii 15, 19, 65–6, 190 +Defensive positions, i 145–6, 148, 160, 238–9, 267, 276, 296–7, 334, +345, 367–8, 372, 379; ii 10, 26–7, 52–3, 59–61, 72, 102, 123, 152–4, +200, 224–5, 239–41, 244, 248–9, 264–6, 304, 308–9, 330, 332, 341, 424, +427–8, 429–30, 439–40, 462–3 +Defensive, the, i 106–7, 160; ii 14, 190–1, 199, 227–8, 332, 341, +425–7, 429 +Demonstrations, i 243, 260, 329, 392; ii 53–4, 56, 119, 305, 408–9, +412, 433–4 +Flank guards, i 329; ii 433, 435, 441 +Formations for attack, ii 347–8, 440–1, 473–5 +Front of defence, ii 104, 153–4, 310–1, 427 +Hasty intrenchments, ii 347, 415–6, 420–1, 426, 429, 431, 439, 450, +457–8 +Hour of marching, i 183; ii 87, 90, 116, 125, 182, 284 +Initiative, ii 279, 342–3, 346, 362 +Investment, ii 213, 216, 218–21 +Marching to sound of cannon, ii 22–41, 58, 278 +Mobility, ii 199 +Musketry and marksmanship, i 136–7, 161–3, 220, 298, 373, 375, 404; ii +63–5, 339–40 +Mutual support, ii 278–9 +Offensive, the, i 136–7, 172; ii 229, 243, 340–1 +Outposts, i 139, 161, 223, 265, 316–7, 368–9, 394, 396; ii 18, 203, +291, 347, 350–1, 362–3, 439–40, 442, 475 +Panic, i 47, 153, 256, 340; ii 41, 356, 358, 449 +Passage of rivers, ii 12, 44–6, 49, 116–8, 165–6, 230–1, 293, 304–8, +409, 415, 417 +Patrolling, i 220–1, 223, 226, 394; ii 347, 357, 362 +“Pivot of operation,” ii 14, 199 +Preliminary arrangements for attack, ii 441 +Pursuit, i 65, 153, 193, 251–2, 263, 299, 301–2, 318, 331–5, 340–3, +385, 420; ii 39–41, 59, 69, 106, 176, 182, 226, 293, 305, 330, 332, +422, 468, 470 +Rapidity, i 311, 353, 419 +Rear guards, i 239, 245, 332–4, 343, 360, 394; ii 59, 136, 268 +Reconnaissance, i 116, 139, 223–4, 225; ii 104, 183–4, 186, 189, 234, +347, 423, 429, 439 +Reconnaissance in force, i 128–9, 172, 297–8; ii 137–8, 163, 171, 184, +293, 433–4 +Reserves, i 142, 299, 339; ii 38, 40, 64, 66, 103, 159, 161, 190, 250, +268, 310, 420, 440 +Retreat, i 147, 213, 218, 239–40, 245, 256; ii 59, 60, 67, 69, 70, 106, +116, 170, 226–7, 230, 410 +Skirmishing, i 221, 377; ii 160, 346, 357, 363 +Slopes of positions, i 298; ii 240 +Steadiness and precision of movement, ii 357, 359, 362 +Surprise, i 239, 317, 348, 373; ii 12, 70–1, 113–4, 146, 430, 442 +Turning movements, i 31, 160, 239, 251, 318, 418, 430; ii 99, 183, 185, +196, 200, 228 +Wood fighting, i 329; ii 32–3, 93, 95–8, 148, 155–6, 159, 181–2, 184, +190, 195, 218–9, 227, 309–10, 316–7, 415–6, 423–4, 426–7, 442, 447–8, +466, 474–5 + +Talavera, battle of, ii 191, 228, 271 +Taliaferro, Colonel A. G., C.S.A., ii 145, 244, 271 +Taliaferro, General W. B., C.S.A., i 309, 339; ii 92–3, 95, 125, 131, +141–3, 145, 147, 149, 153, 304, 308, 310, 318, 320, 374 +Tariff, i 83 +Taylor, Colonel Frank, U.S.A., i 52, 55 +Taylor, General R., C.S.A., i 309–11, 313–4, 327–8, 332–3, 336, 339–40, +352, 355, 375, 379–81, 383, 431, 434; ii 26, 69 +Taylor, General, U.S.A., i 28–9, 48–9 +Telegraph, i 108, 194, 202, 351; ii 7, 121, 291, 336–7, 419, 425, 428, +480 +Tents, i 222; ii 203, 205 +Theatres of war, i 107–8, 426 +“Thinking bayonet,” the, ii 361–3 +Thomas, General, C.S.A., ii 95, 153, 156, 158–9, 161, 271, 309, 434, +436 +Thomas, General, U.S.A., ii 485, 487 +Toombs, General, C.S.A., ii 272 +Torres Vedras, i 221, 419; ii 330, 492 +Toulouse, battle of, 1814, ii 197 +Transport, i 30, 106, 108, 138, 154, 173, 190, 192, 213, 236, 266, +346–7; ii 31, 46 +Transport of troops by sea, i 28, 233, 235, 250, 252, 278–9; ii 31, 73, +84, 109–11, 122, 194 +Trimble, General, C.S.A., i 309–11, 328, 337–9, 341, 373–7, 384, 434; +ii 23–4, 26, 33, 38, 66, 91, 118, 145, 147–8, 153, 164, 184, 271, 414 +Turenne, Marshal, i 108; ii 338 +Twiggs, General, U.S.A., i 33 +Tyler, General, U.S.A., i 142, 144, 150–1, 242–3, 251–2, 371, 379, +382–5, 431 + +U + + Ulm, campaign of, i 418, 425; ii 197 + Ulster, i 3, , 6, 93 + Uniform. (See _Dress_) + Unionist feeling in the South, i 91, 95–6, 98, 102 + +V + + Valley campaign, 1862, i 104, 110, 330–1, chapter xii 404; ii 19, + 80–1, 186, 200, 204, 484–6 +Valley of the Shenandoah, the, i 56, 119, 178, 267, 276, 317, 329, +366–7, 425 +Valley of Virginia, the, i 56 +Vera Cruz, siege of, i 27–9 +Vimiera, battle of, ii 191 +Vionville, battle of, ii 71 +Vittoria, battle of, i 419; ii 196, 493 +Volunteer officers, i 48, 104, 117, 254, 333; ii 203, 303, 348 +Volunteers, American. (See also under _Northern_ and _Southern +Soldiers_), i 17–8, 33, 48–9; ii 109, 168, 354, 378 + +W + + Walker, Colonel, C.S.A., ii 308–9, 317 +Walker, General J. G., C.S.A., ii 123, 167, 204, 208, 213, 216, 218–21, +224, 233–4, 236, 238, 241–2, 250, 252–5, 257, 259, 272 +Warren, General, U.S.A., ii 173, 177 +Washington, General, President, U.S.A., i 6, 48, 75, 96, 101, 177, 224, +410; ii 343, 395, 494 +Waterloo, battle of, i 208, 254, 418, 430; ii 59, 468, 491, 493 +Weissembourg, battle of, 1870, ii 71 +Wellington, i 4, 75, 146, 162, 170, 180, 208, 215, 221, 357, 414; ii +187, 191, 199, 201, 228, 330, 343, 347, 355, 371, 426, 468, 490–4 +Western armies and campaigns, i 124, 213, 218, 224–5, 304; ii 15, 73–4, +206–7, 232, 330–1, 344, 397, 404 +West Point, graduates of, i 104 +West Point, Military Academy at, i 12–4, 16–9, 24 +Wheeler, General, C.S.A., i 333 +Whipple, General, U.S.A., ii 328, 434, 456 +White, Dr. H. A., ii 18 +White, General, U.S.A., ii 215, 223, 473 +White Oak Swamp, engagement at, ii 49–57 +White, Reverend Dr., i 155, 161, 164 +Whiting, General, C.S.A., i 391, 393, 408, 439–40; ii 3, 18, 23, 24, +32, 34–5, 37–8, 42, 52, 61, 64–5, 79 +Whittier, i 65 +Wilbourn, Captain, C.S.A., ii 451 +Wilcox, General, C.S.A., ii 178, 180–1, 272, 422, 462 +Williams, General, U.S.A., i 235, 238, 248–9, 259–60, 263 +Willis, Colonel, C.S.A., i 369 +Winchester, battle of, chapter x 304, i 424, 427, 447; ii 202, 247, 341 +Winder, General, C.S.A., i 295, 309, 345–6, 349, 351–2, 354, 380–5, +431; ii 18, 26, 32, 35, 40, 64, 90–3, 101, 287 +Wolfe, General, i 4, 111; ii 494 +Wolseley, Field-Marshal Lord, quoted, i 215, 413, 420; ii 280, 390, 489 +Woodson, Captain, i 6 +Wörth, battle of, i 256, 430; ii 239, 278 +Worth, General, U.S.A., i 28, 33, 36 +Wright, General, C.S.A., ii 52–4, 61, 63, 272, 422 +Würmser, General, i 418 + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Stonewall Jackson And The American Civil War by G. F. R. Henderson + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 12233 *** |