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By JOHN STUART MILL. London: Longmans. 1865.</p> + + <p>The work bearing the above title is an octavo volume, + consisting of twenty-eight chapters, and five hundred and sixty + pages. This is no great amount of print; but the amount of matter + contained in it is prodigious, and the quality of that matter + such as to require a full stretch of attention. Mr Mill gives his + readers no superfluous sentences, scarcely even a superfluous + word, above what is necessary to express his meaning briefly and + clearly. Of such a book no complete abstract can be given in the + space to which we are confined.</p> + + <p>To students of philosophy—doubtless but a minority among + the general circle of English readers—this work comes + recommended by the strongest claims both of interest and + instruction. It presents in direct antithesis two most + conspicuous representatives of the modern speculative mind of + England—Sir W. Hamilton and Mr John Stuart Mill.</p> + + <p>Sir W. Hamilton has exercised powerful influence over the + stream of thought during the present generation. The lectures on + Logic and Metaphysics delivered by him at Edinburgh, for twenty + years, determined the view taken of those subjects by a large + number of aspiring young students, and determined that view for + many of them permanently and irrevocably.<a name= + "FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> + Several eminent teachers and writers of the present day are proud + of considering themselves his disciples, enunciate his doctrines + in greater or less proportion, and seldom contradict him without + letting it be seen that they depart unwillingly from such a + leader. Various new phrases and psychological illustrations have + obtained footing in treatises of philosophy, chiefly from his + authority. We do not number ourselves among his followers; but we + think his influence on philosophy was in many ways beneficial. He + kept up the idea of philosophy as a subject to be studied from + its own points of view: a dignity which in earlier times it + enjoyed, perhaps, to mischievous excess, but from which in recent + times it has far too much receded—especially in England. He + performed the great service of labouring strenuously to piece + together the past traditions of philosophy, to re-discover those + which had been allowed to drop into oblivion, and to make out the + genealogy of opinions as far as negligent predecessors had still + left the possibility of doing so.</p> + + <p>The forty-six lectures on Metaphysics, and the thirty-five + lectures on Logic, published by Messrs Mansel and Veitch, + constitute the biennial course actually delivered by Sir W. + Hamilton in the Professorial Chair. They ought therefore to be + looked at chiefly with reference to the minds of youthful + hearers, as preservatives against that mischief forcibly + described by Rousseau—'L'inhabitude de penser dans la + jeunesse en ôte la capacité pendant le reste de la + vie.'</p> + + <p>Now, in a subject so abstract, obscure, and generally + unpalatable, as Logic and Metaphysics, the difficulty which the + teacher finds in inspiring interest is extreme. That Sir W. + Hamilton overcame such difficulty with remarkable success, is the + affirmation of his two editors; and our impression, as readers of + his lectures, disposes us to credit them. That Sir W. Hamilton + should have done this effectively is in itself sufficient to + stamp him as a meritorious professor—as a worthy successor + to the chair of Dugald Stewart, whose unrivalled perfection in + that department is attested by every one. Many a man who + ultimately adopted speculative opinions opposed to Dugald + Stewart, received his first impulse and guidance in the path of + speculation from the lasting impression made by Stewart's + lectures.</p> + + <p>But though we look at these lectures, as they ought to be + looked at, chiefly with a view to the special purpose for which + they were destined, we are far from insinuating that they have no + other merits, or that they are useless for readers who have + already a metaphysical creed of their own. We have found them + both instructive and interesting: they go over a large proportion + of the field of speculative philosophy, partly from the point of + view (not always the same) belonging to the author, partly from + that of numerous predecessors whom he cites. We recognize also in + Sir W. Hamilton an amount of intellectual independence which + seldom accompanies such vast erudition. He recites many different + opinions, but he judges them all for himself; and, what is of + still greater moment, he constantly gives the reasons for his + judgments. To us these reasons are always of more or less value, + whether we admit them to be valid or not. Many philosophers + present their own doctrine as if it were so much ascertained and + acknowledged truth, either intimating, or leading you to suppose, + that though erroneous beliefs to the contrary formerly prevailed, + these have now become discredited with every one. We do not + censure this way of proceeding, but we prefer the manner of Sir + W. Hamilton. He always keeps before us divergence and discrepancy + of view as the normal condition of reasoned truth or philosophy; + the characteristic postulate of which is, that every affirmative + and every negative shall have its appropriate reasons clearly and + fully enunciated.</p> + + <p>In this point of view the appendix annexed to the lectures is + also valuable; and the four copious appendixes or dissertations + following the edition of Reid's works, are more valuable still. + How far Sir W. Hamilton has there furnished good proof of his own + doctrines on External Perception, and on the Primary Qualities of + Matter, we shall not now determine; but to those who dissent from + him, as well as to those who agree with him, his reasonings on + these subjects are highly instructive: while the full citations + from so many other writers contribute materially not only to + elucidate the points directly approached, but also to enlarge our + knowledge of philosophy generally. We set particular value upon + this preservation of the traditions of philosophy, and upon this + maintenance of a known perpetual succession among the speculative + minds of humanity, with proper comparisons and contrasts. We have + found among the names quoted by Sir W. Hamilton, and, thanks to + his care, several authors hardly at all known to us, and opinions + cited from them not less instructive than curious. He deserves + the more gratitude, because he departs herein from received usage + since Bacon and Descartes. The example set by these great men was + admirable, so far as it went to throw off the authority of + predecessors; but pernicious so far as it banished those + predecessors out of knowledge, like mere magazines of immaturity + and error. Throughout the eighteenth century, all study of the + earlier modes of philosophizing was, for the most part, + neglected. Of such neglect, remarkable instances are pointed out + by Sir W. Hamilton.</p> + + <p>While speaking about the general merits and philosophical + position of Sir William Hamilton, we have hitherto said nothing + about those of Mr Mill. But before we proceed to analyze the + separate chapters of his volume, we must devote a few words to + the fulfilment of another obligation.</p> + + <p>Mr John Stuart Mill has not been the first to bestow honour on + the surname which he bears. His father, Mr James Mill, had + already ennobled the name. An ampler title to distinction in + history and philosophy can seldom be produced than that which Mr + James Mill left behind him. We know no work which surpasses his + 'History of British India' in the main excellencies attainable by + historical writers: industrious accumulation, continued for many + years, of original authorities—careful and conscientious + criticism of their statements—and a large command of + psychological analysis, enabling the author to interpret + phenomena of society, both extremely complicated, and far removed + from his own personal experience. Again, Mr James Mill's + 'Elements of Political Economy' were, at the time when they + appeared, the most logical and condensed exposition of the entire + science then existing. Lastly, his latest avowed production, the + 'Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind,' is a model of + perspicuous exposition of complex states of consciousness, + carried farther than by any other author before him; and + illustrating the fulness which such exposition may be made to + attain, by one who has faith in the comprehensive principle of + association, and has learnt the secret of tracing out its + innumerable windings. It is, moreover, the first work in which + the great fact of Indissoluble Association is brought into its + due theoretical prominence. These are high merits, of which + lasting evidence is before the public; but there were other + merits in Mr James Mill, less publicly authenticated, yet not + less real. His unpremeditated oral exposition was hardly less + effective than his prepared work with the pen; his colloquial + fertility on philosophical subjects, his power of discussing + himself, and of stimulating others to discuss, his ready + responsive inspirations through all the shifts and windings of a + sort of Platonic dialogue—all these accomplishments were, + to those who knew him, even more impressive than what he composed + for the press. Conversation with him was not merely instructive, + but provocative to the dormant intelligence. Of all persons whom + we have known, Mr James Mill was one who stood least remote from + the lofty Platonic ideal of Dialectic—[Greek: <i>Tou + didhonai kahi dhechesthai lhogon</i>]—(the giving and + receiving of reasons) competent alike to examine others, or to be + examined by them, on philosophy. When to this we add a strenuous + character, earnest convictions, and single-minded devotion to + truth, with an utter disdain of mere paradox—it may be + conceived that such a man exercised powerful intellectual + ascendancy over younger minds. Several of those who enjoyed his + society—men now at, or past, the maturity of life, and some + of them in distinguished positions—remember and attest with + gratitude such ascendancy in their own cases: among them the + writer of the present article, who owes to the historian of + British India an amount of intellectual stimulus and guidance + such as he can never forget.</p> + + <p>When a father, such as we have described, declining to send + his son either to school or college, constituted himself + schoolmaster from the beginning, and performed that duty with + laborious solicitude—when, besides full infusion of modern + knowledge, the forcing process applied by the Platonic Socrates + to the youth-Theætêtus, was administered by Mr James + Mill, continuously and from an earlier age, to a youthful mind + not less pregnant than that of Theætêtus—it + would be surprising if the son thus trained had not reached even + a higher eminence than his father. The fruit borne by Mr John + Stuart Mill has been worthy of the culture bestowed, and the + volume before us is at once his latest and his ripest + product.</p> + + <p>The 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy' is + intended by Mr Mill (so he tells us in the preface to the sixth + published edition of his 'System of Logic, Ratiocinative and + Inductive') as a sequel and complement to that system. We are + happy to welcome so valuable an addition; but with or without + that addition, the 'System of Logic' appears to us to present the + most important advance in speculative theory which the present + century has witnessed. Either half of it, the Ratiocinative or + the Inductive, would have surpassed any previous work on the same + subject. The Inductive half discriminates and brings into clear + view, for the first time, those virtues of method which have + insensibly grown into habits among consummate scientific + inquirers of the post-Baconian age, as well as the fallacies by + which some of these authors have been misled. The Ratiocinative + half, dealing with matters which had already been well handled by + Dutrieu and other scholastic logicians, invests their dead though + precise formalism with a real life and application to the actual + process of finding and proving truth. But besides thus working + each half up to perfection, Mr Mill has performed the still more + difficult task of overcoming the repugnance, apparently an + inveterate repugnance, between them, so as chemically to combine + the two into one homogeneous compound; thus presenting the + problem of Reasoned Truth, Inference, Proof, and Disproof, as one + connected whole. For ourselves, we still recollect the mist which + was cleared from our minds when we first read the 'System of + Logic,' very soon after it was published. We were familiar with + the Syllogistic Logic in Burgersdicius and Dutrieu; we were also + familiar with examples of the best procedure in modern inductive + science; but the two streams flowed altogether apart in our + minds, like two parallel lines never joining nor approaching. The + irreconcilability of the two was at once removed, when we had + read and mastered the second and third chapters of the Second + Book of the 'System of Logic;' in which Mr Mill explains the + functions and value of the Syllogism, and the real import of its + major premiss. This explanation struck us at the time as one of + the most profound and original efforts of metaphysical thought + that we had ever perused, and we see no reason to retract that + opinion now.<a name="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href= + "#Footnote_2_2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> It appears all the more + valuable when we contrast it with what is said by Mr Mill's two + contemporaries—Hamilton and Whately: the first of whom + retains the ancient theory of reasoning, as being only a + methodized transition from a whole to its parts, and from the + parts up to the whole—Induction being only this ascending + part of the process, whereby, after having given a complete + enumeration of all the compound parts, you conclude to the sum + total described in one word as a whole;<a name= + "FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> + while the second (Whately) agrees in subordinating Induction to + Syllogism, but does so in a different way—by representing + inductive reasoning as a syllogism, with its major premiss + suppressed, from which major premiss it derived its authority. + The explanation of Mr Mill attacks the problem from the opposite + side. It subordinates syllogism to induction, the technical to + the real; it divests the major premiss of its illusory pretence + to be itself the proving authority, or even any real and + essential part of the proof—and acknowledges it merely as a + valuable precautionary test and security for avoiding mistake in + the process of proving. Taking Mr Mill's 'System of Logic' as a + whole, it is one of the books by which we believe ourselves to + have most profited. The principles of it are constantly present + to our mind when engaged in investigations of evidence, whether + scientific or historical.</p> + + <p>Concerned as we are here with Mr Mill only as a logician and + philosopher, we feel precluded from adverting to his works on + other topics—even to his 'Elements of Political Economy,' + by which he is probably more widely known than by anything else. + Of the many obligations which Political Economy owes to him, one + only can be noticed consistent with the scope of the present + article: the care which he has taken—he alone, or at least, + he more explicitly and formally than any other expositor—to + set forth the general position of that science in the aggregate + field of scientific research; its relation to sociology as a + whole, or to other fractions thereof, how far derivative or + co-ordinate; what are its fundamental postulates or hypotheses, + with what limits the logical methods of induction and deduction + are applicable to it, and how far its conclusions may be relied + on as approximations to truth. All these points will be found + instructively handled in the Sixth Book of Mr Mill's 'System of + Logic,' as well as in his smaller and less known work, 'Essays on + Some Unsettled Questions in Political Economy.' We find him, + while methodizing and illustrating the data of the special + science, uniformly keeping in view its relation to philosophy as + a whole.</p> + + <p>But there is yet another work in which the interests of + philosophy, as a whole, come into the foreground and become the + special object of vindication in their largest compass and most + vital requirements. We mean Mr Mill's 'Essay on Liberty,' one + half of which takes for its thesis the <i>libertus + philosophandi</i>. He maintains, emphatically, in this book, the + full dignity of reasoned truth against all the jealous exigencies + of traditional dogma and self-justifying sentiment. He claims the + most unreserved liberty of utterance for negative and affirmative + on all questions—not merely for the purpose of + discriminating truth from falsehood, but also to keep up in + individual minds the full sense and understanding of the matters + controverted, in place of a mere partial and one-sided adhesion. + At first sight, indeed, it might seem as if Mr Mill was fighting + with a shadow; for liberty of philosophizing is a postulate + which, in general terms, every one concedes. But when you come to + fathom the real feelings which underlie this concession, you + discover that almost every man makes it under reserves which, + though acting in silence, are not the less efficacious. Every one + has some dogmas which he cannot bear to hear advocated, and + others which he will not allow to be controverted in his + presence. A writer has to consider not merely by what reasons any + novelty of belief or disbelief may be justified, but also how + much it will be safe for him to publish, having regard to the + irritable sore places of the public judgment. In July, 1864, we + were present at the annual meeting of the French Academy at + Paris, where the prizes for essays sent in, pursuant to subjects + announced for study beforehand, are awarded. We heard the titles + of various compositions announced by the President (M. + Villemain), with a brief critical estimate of each. Their + comparative merits were appreciated, and the prize awarded to one + of the competitors. Among the compositions sent to compete for + the prize, one was a work by M. Taine, upon which the President + bestowed the most remarkable encomiums, in every different point + of view: extent of knowledge, force of thought, style, + arrangement, all were praised in a manner which we have rarely + heard exceeded. Nevertheless, the prize was not awarded to this + work, but to another which the President praised in a manner + decidedly less marked and emphatic. What was here the <i>ratio + decidendi</i>? The reason was, and the President declared it in + the most explicit language, that the work of M. Taine <i>was + deeply tainted with materialism</i>. 'Sans doute,' said the + esteemed veteran of French literature in pronouncing his award, + 'sans doute les opinions sont libres, <i>mais</i>'—It is + precisely against this <i>mais</i>—ushering in the special + anathematized or consecrated conclusion which it is intended to + except from the general liberty of enforcing or + impugning—in matters of philosophical discussion, that Mr + Mill, in the 'Essay on Liberty,' declares war as champion of + Reasoned Truth.</p> + + <p>He handles this grand theme—<i>eleythheroys + eleythherôs philosophein</i>—involving as it does the + best interests of philosophy, as an instructress to men's + judgments, and a stimulus to their intelligence—with great + depth of psychological analysis sustained by abundant historical + illustration. And he in the same volume discusses most profitably + another question akin to it—To what extent, and by what + principles, the interference of others is justifiable, in + restraining the liberty of taste and action for each individual? + A question at once grave and neglected, but the discussion of + which does not belong to our present article.</p> + + <p>A new work from one who has already manifested such mastery of + philosophy, both in principle and in detail, and a work + exhibiting the analysis and appreciation of the philosophical + views of an eminent contemporary, must raise the highest + expectation. We think no reader will be disappointed who peruses + Mr Mill's 'Examination,' and we shall now endeavour to give some + account of the manner in which he performs it. Upon topics so + abstract and subtle as the contents of this volume, the + antithesis between two rival theories is the best way, and often + the only way, for bringing truth into clear view; and the + 'Examination' here before us is professedly controversy. But of + controversy in its objectionable sense—of captious or + acrimonious personality—not a trace will here be found. A + dignified, judicial equanimity of tone is preserved from first to + last. Moreover, though the title and direct purpose of the volume + is negative and critical, yet the destructive criticism is + pervaded by many copious veins of constructive exposition, + embodying Mr Mill's own views upon some of the most intricate + problems of metaphysics.</p> + + <p>Mr Mill begins his work by analyzing and explaining the + doctrine called the Relativity of Human Knowledge:</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'The doctrine (chap. ii. p. 5) which is thought to belong in + the most especial manner to Sir W. Hamilton, and which was the + ground of his opposition to the transcendentalism of the later + French and German metaphysicians, is that which he and others + have called the Relativity of Human Knowledge. It is the + subject of the most generally known and impressive of all his + writings—the one which first revealed to the English + metaphysical reader that a new power had arisen in philosophy. + Together with its developments, it composes the Philosophy of + the Conditioned, which he opposed to the French and German + philosophies of the Absolute, and which is regarded by most of + his admirers as the greatest of his titles to a permanent place + in the history of metaphysical thought. But, "the relativity of + human knowledge," like most other phrases into which the words + <i>relative</i> or <i>relation</i> enter, is vague, and admits + of a great variety of meanings,' &c.</p> + </div> + + <p>Mr Mill then proceeds to distinguish these various meanings, + and to determine in which of them the phrase is understood by Sir + W. Hamilton.</p> + + <p>One meaning is, that we only know anything by knowing it as + distinguished from something else—that all consciousness is + of difference. It is not, however, in this sense that the + expression is ordinarily or intentionally used by Sir W. + Hamilton, though he fully recognizes the truth which, when thus + used, it serves to express. In general, when he says that all our + knowledge is relative, the relation he has in view is not between + the thing known and other objects compared with it, but between + the thing known and the mind knowing—(p. 6).</p> + + <p>The doctrine in this last meaning is held by different + philosophers in two different forms. Some (e.g. Berkeley, Hume, + Ferrier, &c.), usually called Idealists, maintain not merely + that all we can possibly know of anything is the manner in which + it affects the human faculties, but that there is nothing else to + be known; that affections of human or of other minds are all that + we can know to exist—that the difference between the ego + and the non-ego is only a formal distinction between two aspects + of the same reality. Other philosophers (Brown, Mr Herbert + Spencer, Auguste Comte, with many others) believe that the ego + and the non-ego denote two realities, each self-existent, and + neither dependent on the other; that the Noumenon, or 'thing + <i>per se</i>,' is in itself a different thing from the + Phenomenon, and equally or more real, but that, though we know + its existence, we have no means of knowing what it is. All that + we can know is, relatively to ourselves, the modes in which it + affects us, or the phenomena which it produces—(pp. + 9—11).</p> + + <p>The doctrine of Relativity, as held by Kant and his many + followers, is next distinguished from the same doctrine as held + by Hartley, James Mill, Professor Bain, &c., compatible with + either acceptance or rejection of the Berkeleian theory. Kant + maintains that the attributes which we ascribe to outward things, + or which are inseparable from them in thought, contain additional + elements over and above sensations <i>plus</i> an unknowable + cause—additional elements added by the mind itself, and + therefore still only relative, but constituting the original + furniture of the mind itself—inherent laws, partly of our + sensitive, partly of our intellectual faculty. It is on this + latter point that Hartley and those going along with him diverge. + Admitting the same additional elements, these philosophers do not + ascribe to the mind any innate forms to account for them, but + hold that place, extension, substance, cause, and the rest, + &c., are conceptions put together out of ideas of sensation, + by the known laws of Association—(pp. 12—14).</p> + + <p>Partial Relativity is the opinion professed by most + philosophers (and by most persons who do not philosophize). They + hold that we know things partly as they are in themselves, partly + as they are merely in relation to us.</p> + + <p>This discrimination of the various schools of philosophers is + highly instructive, and is given with the full perspicuity + belonging to Mr Mill's style. He proceeds to examine in what + sense Sir W. Hamilton maintained the Relativity of Human + Knowledge. He cites passages both from the 'Discussions on + Philosophy' and from the Lectures, in which that doctrine is both + affirmed in its greatest amplitude, and enunciated in the most + emphatic language—(pp. 17, 18, 22, 23). But he also + produces extracts from the most elaborate of Sir W. Hamilton's + 'Dissertations on Reid,' in which a doctrine quite different and + inconsistent is proclaimed—that our knowledge is only + partially, not wholly, relative; that the secondary qualities of + matter, indeed, are known to us only relatively, but that the + primary qualities are known to us as they are in themselves, or + as they exist objectively, and that they may be even evolved by + demonstration <i>à priori</i>—(pp. 19-26, 30). The + inconsistency between the two doctrines, professed at different + times, and in different works, by Sir W. Hamilton, is certainly + manifest. Mr Mill is of opinion that one of the two must be taken + 'in a non-natural sense,' and that Sir W. Hamilton either did not + hold, or had ceased to hold, the doctrine of the full relativity + of knowledge (pp. 20-28)—the hypothesis of a flat + contradiction being in his view inadmissible. But we think it at + least equally possible that Sir W. Hamilton held both the two + opinions in their natural sense, and enforced both of them <i>at + different times</i> by argument; his attention never having been + called to the contradiction between them. That such forgetfulness + was quite possible, will appear clearly in many parts of the + present article. His argument in support of both is equally + characterized by that peculiar energy of style which is frequent + with him, and which no way resembles the qualifying refinements + of one struggling to keep clear of a perceived contradiction.</p> + + <p>From hence Mr Mill (chap. iv.) proceeds to criticise at + considerable length what he justly denominates the celebrated and + striking review of Cousin's philosophy, which forms the first + paper in Sir W. Hamilton's 'Discussions on Philosophy.' According + to Mr Mill—</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'The question really at issue is this: Have we or have we + not an immediate intuition of God? The name of God is veiled + under two extremely abstract phrases, "The Infinite and the + Absolute," perhaps from a reverential feeling; such, at least, + is the reason given by Sir W. Hamilton's disciple, Mr Mansel, + for preferring the more vague expressions; but it is one of the + most unquestionable of all logical maxims, that the meaning of + the abstract must be sought for in the concrete, and not + conversely; and we shall see, both in the case of Sir William + Hamilton, and of Mr Mansel, that the process cannot be reversed + with impunity.'—p. 32.</p> + </div> + + <p>Upon this we must remark, that though the 'logical maxim' here + laid down by Mr Mill may be generally sound, we think the + application of it inconvenient in the present case. Discussions + on points of philosophy are best conducted without either + invoking or offending religious feeling. M. Cousin maintains that + we have a direct intuition of the Infinite and the Absolute: Sir + W. Hamilton denies that we have. Upon this point Mr Mill sides + entirely with Sir W. Hamilton, and considers 'that the latter has + rendered good service to philosophy by refuting M. Cousin,' + though much of the reasoning employed in such refutation seems to + Mr Mill unsound. But Sir W. Hamilton goes further, and affirms + that we have no faculties capable of apprehending the Infinite + and the Absolute—that both of them are inconceivable to us, + and by consequence unknowable. Herein Mr Mill is opposed to him, + and controverts his doctrine in an elaborate argument.</p> + + <p>Of this argument, able and ingenious, like all those in the + present volume, our limits only enable us to give a brief + appreciation. In so far as Mr Mill controverts Sir W. Hamilton, + we think him perfectly successful, though there are some points + in his reasoning in which we do not fully concur.</p> + + <p>In our opinion, as in his, the Absolute alone (in its sense as + opposed to relative) can be necessarily unknowable, + inconceivable, incogitable. Nothing which falls under the + condition of relativity can be declared to be so. The structure + of our minds renders us capable of knowing everything which is + relative, though there are many such things which we have no + evidence, nor shall ever get evidence, to enable us to know. Now + the Infinite falls within the conditions of relativity, as indeed + Sir W. Hamilton himself admits, when he intimates (p. 58) that + though it cannot be known, it is, must be, and ought to be, + <i>believed</i> by us, according to the marked distinction which + he draws between belief and knowledge. We agree with Mr Mill in + the opinion that it is thinkable, conceivable, knowable. + Doubtless we do not conceive it adequately, but we conceive it + sufficiently to discuss and reason upon it intelligibly to + ourselves and others. That we conceive the Infinite inadequately, + is not to be held as proof that we do not conceive it at all; for + in regard to finite things also, we conceive the greater number + of them only inadequately.</p> + + <p>We cannot construe to the imagination a polygon with an + infinite number of sides (i.e. with a number of sides greater + than any given number), but neither can we construe to the + imagination a polygon with a million of sides; nevertheless, we + understand what is meant by the first description as well as by + the second, and can reason upon both. There is, indeed, this + difference between the two: That the terms used in describing the + first, proclaim at once in their direct meaning that we should in + vain attempt to construe it to the imagination; whereas the terms + used in describing the second do not intimate that fact. We know + the fact only by trial, or by an estimate of our own mental force + which is the result of many past trials. If the difference here + noted were all which Sir W. Hamilton has in view when he declares + the Infinite to be unknowable and incogitable, we should accede + to his opinion; but we apprehend that he means much more, and he + certainly requires more to justify the marked antithesis in which + he places himself against M. Cousin and Hegel. Indeed, the + facility with which he declares matters to be incogitable, which + these two and other philosophers not only cogitate but maintain + as truth, is to us truly surprising. The only question which + appears to us important is, whether we can understand and reason + upon the meaning of the terms and propositions addressed to us. + If we can, the subjects propounded must be cogitable and + conceivable, whether we admit the propositions affirmed + concerning them or not; if we cannot, then these subjects are + indeed incogitable by ourselves in the present state of our + knowledge, but they may not be so to our opponent who employs the + terms.</p> + + <p>In criticising the arguments of Sir W. Hamilton against M. + Cousin, Mr Mill insists much on a distinction between (1) the + Infinite, and (2) the Infinite in any one or more positive + attributes, such as infinite wisdom, goodness, redness, hardness, + &c.<a name="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href= + "#Footnote_4_4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> He thinks that Sir W. Hamilton + has made out his case against the first, but not against the + last; that the first is really 'an unmeaning and senseless + abstraction,' a fasciculus of negations, unknowable and + inconceivable, but not the last. We think that Mr Mill makes more + of this distinction than the case warrants; that the first is not + unmeaning, but an intelligible abstraction, only a higher reach + of abstraction than the last; that it is knowable inadequately, + in the same way as the last—though more inadequately, + because of its higher abstraction.</p> + + <p>As the finite is intelligible, so also is its + negation—the Infinite: we do not say (with M. Cousin) that + the two are conjointly given in consciousness—but the two + are understood and partially apprehended by the mind conjointly + and in contrast. Though the Infinite is doubtless negative as to + a degree, it is not wholly or exclusively negative, since it + includes a necessary reference to some positive attribute, to + which the degree belongs; the positive element is not eliminated, + but merely left undetermined. The Infinite (like the Finite, + [Greek: to peperasmhenon—to hapeiron]) is a genus; it + comprehends under it the Infinitely Hard and the Infinitely Soft, + the Infinitely Swift and the Infinitely Slow—the infinite, + in short, of any or all positive attributes. It includes, + doubtless, 'a farrago of contradictions;' but so, also, does the + Finite—and so, also, do the actual manifestations of the + real, concrete universe, which manifestations constitute a + portion of the Finite. Whoever attempts to give any philosophical + account of the generation of the universe, tracing its phenomena, + as an aggregate, to some ultra-phenomenal origin, must include in + his scheme a <i>fundamentum</i> for all those opposite and + contradictory manifestations which experience discloses in the + universe. There always have been, and still are, many + philosophers who consider the Abstract and General to be prior + both in nature and time to the Concrete and Particular; and who + hold further that these two last are explained, when presented as + determinate and successive manifestations of the two first, which + they conceive as indeterminate and sempiternal. Now the Infinite + (Ens Infinitum or Entia Infinita, according to the point of view + in which we look at it) is a generic word, including all these + supposed indeterminate antecedents; and including therefore, of + course, many contradictory agencies. But this does not make it + senseless or unmeaning; nor can we distinguish it from 'the + Infinite in some one or more given attributes,' by any other + character than by greater reach of abstraction. We cannot admit + the marked distinction which Mr Mill contends for—that the + one is unknowable and the other knowable.</p> + + <p>It may be proper to add that the mode of philosophizing which + we have just described is not ours. We do not agree in this way + either of conceiving, or of solving, the problem of philosophy. + But it is a mode so prevalent that Trendelenberg speaks of it, + justly enough, as 'the ancient Hysteron-Proteron of Abstraction.' + The doctrine of these philosophers appears to us unfounded, but + we cannot call it unmeaning.</p> + + <p>In another point, also, we differ from Mr Mill respecting that + inferior abstraction which he calls 'the Infinite in some + particular attribute.' He speaks as if this could be known not + only as an abstraction, a conceivable, an ideal—but also as + a concrete reality; as if 'we could know a concrete reality as + infinite or as absolute' (p. 45); as if there really existed in + actual nature 'concrete persons or things possessing infinitely + or absolutely certain specific attributes'—(pp. + 55—93). To this doctrine we cannot subscribe. As we + understand concrete reality, we find no evidence to believe that + there exist in nature any real concrete persons or things, + possessing to an infinite degree such attributes as they do + possess: <i>e.g.</i> any men infinitely wise or infinitely + strong, any horses infinitely swift, any stones infinitely hard. + Such concrete real objects appear to us not admissible, because + experience not only has not certified their existence in any + single case, but goes as far to disprove their existence as it + can do to disprove anything. All the real objects in nature known + to us by observation are finite, and possess only in a finite + measure their respective attributes. Upon this is founded the + process of Science, so comprehensively laid out by Mr Mill in his + 'System of Logic '—Induction, Deduction from general facts + attested by Induction, Verification by experience of the results + obtained by Deduction. The attributes, whiteness or hardness, in + the abstract, are doubtless infinite; that is, the term will + designate, alike and equally, any degree of whiteness or hardness + which you may think of, and any unknown degree even whiter and + harder than what you think of. But when perceived as invested in + a given mass of snow or granite before us, they are divested of + that indeterminateness, and become restricted to a determinate + measure and degree.</p> + + <p>Having thus indicated the points on which we are compelled to + dissent from Mr Mill's refutation of Sir W. Hamilton in the + pleading against M. Cousin, we shall pass to the seventh chapter, + in which occurs his first controversy with Mr Mansel. This + passage has excited more interest, and will probably be + remembered by a larger number of readers, than any portion of the + book. We shall give it in his own words (pp. 99—103), since + the energetic phraseology is quite as remarkable as the + thought:—</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'There is but one way for Mr Mansel out of this difficulty, + and he adopts it. He must maintain, not merely that an Absolute + Being is unknowable in himself, but that the Relative + attributes of an Absolute Being are unknowable also.<a name= + "FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> + He must say that we do not know what Wisdom, Justice, + Benevolence, Mercy, &c., are, as they exist in God. + Accordingly, he does say so. "It is a fact" (says Mr Mansel) + "which experience forces upon us, and which it is useless, were + it possible, to disguise, that the representation of God after + the model of the highest human morality which we are capable of + conceiving, is not sufficient to account for all the phenomena + exhibited by the course of his natural Providence. The + infliction of physical suffering, the permission of moral evil, + the adversity of the good, the prosperity of the wicked, the + crimes of the guilty involving the misery of the innocent, the + tardy appearance and partial distribution of moral and + religious knowledge in the world—these are facts, which + no doubt are reconcilable, we know not how, with the Infinite + Goodness of God, but which certainly are not to be explained on + the supposition that its sole and sufficient type is to be + found in the finite goodness of man."</p> + + <p>'In other words' (continues Mr Mill commenting) 'it is + necessary to suppose that the infinite goodness ascribed to God + is not the goodness which we know and love in our + fellow-creatures, distinguished only as infinite in degree; but + is different in kind, and another quality altogether. + Accordingly Mr Mansel combats as a heresy of his opponents, the + opinion that infinite goodness differs only in degree from + finite goodness.—Here, then, I take my stand upon the + acknowledged principle of logic and of morality; that when we + mean different things we have no right to call them by the same + name, and to apply to them, the same predicates, moral and + intellectual. If, instead of the glad tidings that there exists + a Being in whom all the excellences which the highest human + form can conceive, exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am + informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes + are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, except that + the highest human morality does not sanction + them—convince me of this and I will hear my fate as I + may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the + same time call this being by the names which express and affirm + the highest human morality, I say, in plain terms, that I will + not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one + thing he shall not do; he shall not compel me to worship him. I + will call no being good who is not what I mean when I apply + that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can + sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will + go.'</p> + </div> + + <p>This concluding declaration is memorable in many ways. Mr Mill + announces his resolution to determine for himself, and according + to his own reason and conscience, what God he will worship, and + what God he will not worship. For ourselves, we cordially + sympathize with his resolution. But Mr Mill must be aware that + this is a point on which society is equally resolved that no + individual shall determine for himself, if they can help + it.<a name="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href= + "#Footnote_6_6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> Each new-born child finds his + religious creed ready prepared for him. In his earliest days of + unconscious infancy, the stamp of the national, gentile, + phratric, God, or Gods, is imprinted upon him by his elders; and + if the future man, in the exercise of his own independent reason, + acquires such convictions as compel him to renounce those Gods, + proclaiming openly that he does so—he must count upon such + treatment as will go far to spoil the value of the present life + to him, even before he passes to those ulterior liabilities which + Mr Mill indicates in the distance. We are not surprised that a + declaration so unusual and so impressive should have been often + cited in critical notices of this volume; that during the month + preceding the last Westminster election, it was studiously + brought forward by some opponents of Mr Mill, and more or less + regretted by his friends, as likely to offend many electors, and + damage his chance of success; and that a conspicuous and + noble-minded ecclesiastic, the Dean of Westminster, thought the + occasion so grave as to come forward with his characteristic + generosity, for the purpose of shielding a distinguished man + suspected of heresy.</p> + + <p>The sublime self-assertion, addressed by Prometheus to Zeus, + under whose sentence he was groaning, has never before been put + into such plain English.<a name="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href= + "#Footnote_7_7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> Mr Mill's declaration reminds + us also of Hippolytus, the chaste and pure youth, whose tragic + fate is so beautifully described by Euripides. Hippolytus is + exemplary in his devotions to the Goddess Artemis; but he + dissents from all his countrymen, and determines for himself, in + refusing to bestow the smallest mark of honour or worship upon + Aphroditê, because he considers her to be a very bad + Goddess.<a name="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href= + "#Footnote_8_8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> In this refusal he persists + with inflexible principle (even after having received, from an + anxious attendant, warning of the certain ruin which it will + bring upon him), until the insulted Aphroditê involves him, + along with the unhappy Phædra and Theseus himself, in one + common abyss of misery. In like manner Mr Mill's declaration + stands in marked contrast with the more cautious proceeding of + men like Herodotus. That historian, alike pious and prudent, is + quite aware that all the Gods are envious and mischief-making, + and expressly declares them to be so.<a name= + "FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> + Yet, far from refusing to worship them on that account, he is + assiduous in prayer and sacrifice—perhaps, indeed, all the + more assiduous in consequence of what he believes about their + attributes;<a name="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href= + "#Footnote_10_10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> being persuaded (like the + attendant who warned Hippolytus) that his only chance of + mollifying their ungentle dispositions in regard to himself is, + by honorific tribute in words and offerings.</p> + + <p>When, however, after appreciating as we are bound to do Mr + Mill's declaration of subjective sentiment, we pass to its + logical bearing on the controversy between him and Mr Mansel, we + are obliged to confess that in this point of view it has little + objective relevancy. The problem was, how to reconcile the actual + evil and suffering in the universe (which is recited as a fact by + Mr Mansel, though in terms conveying a most inadequate idea of + its real magnitude) with the goodness of God. Mr Mill repudiates + the explanatory hypothesis tendered by Mr Mansel, as a solution, + but without suggesting any better hypothesis of his own. For + ourselves, we are far from endorsing Mr Mansel's solution as + satisfactory; yet we can hardly be surprised if he considers it + less unsatisfactory than no solution at all. And when we reflect + how frequently and familiarly predicates applicable to man are + applied to the Supreme Being, when they cannot possibly be + understood about Him in the same sense—we see no ground for + treating the proceeding as disingenuous, which Mr Mill is + disposed to do. Indeed, it cannot easily be avoided: and Mr Mill + himself furnishes us with some examples in the present volume. At + page 491, he says:—</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'It would be difficult to find a stronger argument in favour + of Theism, than that the eye must have been made by one who + sees, and the ear by one who hears.'</p> + </div> + + <p>In the words here employed, <i>seeing</i> and <i>hearing</i> + are predicted of God.</p> + + <p>Now when we predicate of men, that they <i>see</i> or + <i>hear</i>, we affirm facts of extreme complexity, especially in + the case of <i>seeing</i>; facts partly physical, partly mental, + involving multifarious movements and agencies of nerves, muscles, + and other parts of the organism, together with direct sensational + impressions, and mental reconstruction of the past, inseparably + associated therewith; all which, so far as they are known, are + perspicuously enumerated in the work of Professor Bain<a name= + "FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href= + "#Footnote_11_11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> on the 'Senses and the + Intellect,' Again, Mr Mill speaks (in p. 102 and elsewhere) of + 'the veracity of God.' When we say of our neighbour that he is a + veracious man, we ascribe to him a habit of speaking the truth; + that is, of employing his physical apparatus of speech, and his + mental power of recalling and recombining words lodged in the + memory, for the purpose of asserting no other propositions except + such as declare facts which he knows, or beliefs which he really + entertains. But how either <i>seeing</i>, or <i>hearing</i>, or + <i>veracity</i>, in these senses, can be predicated of God, we + are at a loss to understand. And if they are to be predicated of + God in a different sense, this admits the same license as Mr + Mansel contends for in respect to Goodness, when he feels that + undeniable facts preclude him from predicating that epithet + univocally respecting God and respecting man.<a name= + "FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href= + "#Footnote_12_12"><sup>[12]</sup></a></p> + + <p>On the whole, it seems to us, that though Mr Mill will consent + to worship only a God of perfect goodness, he has thrown no new + light on the grave problem—frankly stated though + imperfectly solved, by Mr Mansel—how such a conception of + God is to be reconciled with the extent of evil and suffering + actually pervading human life and animal life throughout the + earth. We are compelled to say, respecting Mr Mill's treatment of + this subject—what we should not say respecting his + treatment of any other—that he has left an old perplexing + problem not less perplexing than he found it.</p> + + <p>Reverting, not unwillingly, from theology to philosophy, we + now pass on to Mr Mill's ninth chapter (p. 128 seq.), of the + Interpretation of Consciousness. There is assuredly no lesson + more requiring to be taught than the proper mode of conducting + such interpretation; for the number of different modes in which + Consciousness has been interpreted is astonishing. Mr Mill begins + by citing from Sir W. Hamilton's lectures a passage of some + length, upon which he bestows considerable praise, regarding it + as—</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'One of the proofs that, whatever may be the positive value + of his (Sir W. Hamilton's) achievements in metaphysics, he had + a greater capacity for the subject than many metaphysicians of + high reputation; and particularly than his two distinguished + predecessors in the same school of thought—"Reid and + Stewart."'—p. 131.</p> + </div> + + <p>This is one of the greatest compliments to Sir W. Hamilton + that the book contains, and as such we are glad to cite it.</p> + + <p>On the subject of Consciousness, Mr Mill has cited from Sir W. + Hamilton other good observations besides the one last alluded to; + but, unfortunately, these are often neutralized by opposite or + inconsistent opinions also cited from other parts of his works. + The number of such inconsistencies produced is indeed one + remarkable feature in Sir W. Hamilton's philosophical character. + He seems to follow out energetically (as Plato in his various + dialogues) the vein of thought pervading his mind at each + particular moment, without troubling himself to look back upon + his own prior speculations. Even compared with the best views of + Sir W. Hamilton, however, Mr Mill's mode of handling the subject + of Consciousness exhibits signal improvement. To some of his + observations we shall call particular attention.</p> + + <p>All philosophers agree that what Consciousness testifies is to + be believed; but they differ much on the question—To what + points Consciousness does testify? and even on the still deeper + question—How shall we proceed to ascertain what <i>are</i> + these attested points? What is the proper method of studying or + interrogating Consciousness? Upon this Mr Mill remarks (pp. + 145—147):—</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'Here emerges the distinction between two different methods + of studying the problems of metaphysics; forming the radical + difference between the two great schools into which + metaphysicians are divided. One of these I shall call for + distinction, the <i>introspective</i> method; the other, the + <i>psychological</i>. M. Cousin observes that Locke went wrong + from the beginning, by placing before himself, as the question + to be first resolved, the origin of our ideas. This (he says) + was commencing at the wrong end. The proper course would have + been to begin by determining what the ideas now are; to + ascertain what it is that Consciousness now tells us; + postponing till afterwards the attempt to frame a theory + concerning the origin of any of the mental phenomena.</p> + + <p>'I accept the question as M. Cousin states it; and I contend + that no attempt to determine what are the direct revelations of + Consciousness can be successful, or entitled to any regard, + unless preceded by what M. Cousin says ought only to follow + it—an inquiry into the origin of our acquired ideas. For + we have it not in our power to ascertain, by any direct + process, what Consciousness told us at the time when its + revelations were in their pristine purity. It only offers + itself to our inspection, as it exists now, when those original + revelations are overlaid and buried under a mountainous heap of + acquired notions and perceptions.</p> + + <p>'It seems to M. Cousin, that if we examine with care and + minuteness our present states of Consciousness, distinguishing + and defining every ingredient which we find to enter into + them—every element that we seem to recognize as real, and + cannot "by merely concentrating our attention upon it analyze + into anything simpler—we reach the ultimate and primary + truths, which are the sources of all our knowledge, and which + cannot be denied or doubted without denying or doubting the + evidence of Consciousness itself—that is, the only + evidence that there is for anything. I maintain this to be a + misconception of the condition imposed on inquirers by the + difficulties of psychological investigation. To begin the + inquiry at the point where M. Cousin takes it up is, in fact, + to beg the question. For he must be aware, if not of the fact, + at least of the belief of his opponents, that the laws of the + mind—the Laws of Association, according to one class of + thinkers, the Categories of the Understanding, according to + another—are capable of creating, out of those data of + Consciousness which are uncontested, purely mental conceptions, + which become so identified in thought with all our states of + Consciousness, that <i>we seem, and cannot but seem, to receive + them by direct intuition</i>. For example, the belief in matter + in the opinion of these thinkers is, or at least may be, thus + produced:—</p> + + <p>'"The proof that any of the alleged Universal Beliefs, or + Principles of Common Sense, are affirmations of + Consciousness—supposes two things: that the beliefs + exist, and that they cannot possibly have been acquired. The + first is, in most cases, undisputed; but the second is a + subject of inquiry which often taxes the utmost resources of + psychologists. Locke was therefore right in believing that 'the + origin of our ideas' is the main stress of the problem of + mental science, and the subject which must be first considered + in forming the theory of the Mind."'</p> + </div> + + <p>This citation from Mr Mill's book is already almost too long, + yet we could have wished to prolong it still more, from the + importance of some of the succeeding paragraphs. It presents, in + clear discrimination and contrast, two opposite points of view + according to which the phenomena of mind are regarded by + different philosophers, and the method of studying them + determined: the <i>introspective</i> method, adopted by M. Cousin + and others—the <i>psychological</i> or analytical method, + pursued by Locke and by many other eminent men since + Locke—'the known and approved method of physical science, + adapted to the necessities of psychology'—(p. 148).</p> + + <p>There are passages of Sir W. Hamilton's writings in which he + appears to feel that the <i>introspective</i> method alone is + insufficient for the interpretation of Consciousness, and that + the analytical method must be employed to reinforce it. But on + this as on other points he is not always consistent with himself. + For in laying down the principle upon which the primary truths of + Consciousness, the original data of intelligence, are to be + ascertained and distinguished from generalizations out of + experience and custom, he declares that the one single and + certain mark is Necessity—they must be beliefs which we are + under the necessity of believing—of which we cannot get rid + by any mental effort. He decides this, of course, for himself, by + the <i>introspective</i> method alone. He (with M. Cousin and + other philosophers who take the same view) does not apply the + analytical method to inquire whether his necessity of belief may + not be a purely acquired necessity and nowise congenital. It is, + indeed, remarkable that these philosophers do not even seek to + apply the introspective method as far as that method will really + go. They are satisfied with introspection of their own present + minds; without collecting results of the like process as applied + to other minds, in different times and places. They declare + various beliefs to be necessary to the human mind universally, + merely because such is the actual fact with their own minds and + with those immediately around them; sometimes even in defiance of + proof that there are (or have been) persons not sharing such + beliefs, and occasionally even believing the contrary; therefore, + when even the introspective method really disallows their + affirmative instead of sustaining it. This is, in truth, an abuse + of the introspective method; yet even if that method were + employed in its fullest extent—if the same incapability of + believing otherwise could be shown as common to all + mankind—it might still be only the effect of a strong + association. The analytical method must still be called in to + ascertain whether we are forced to suppose such incapability to + be an original fact of consciousness, or whether it may not have + been generated in the mind by circumstances under the natural + working of the laws of association. It is certain that these laws + not only may, but must, give birth to artificial + inconceivabilities in the mind—and that some of these may + be equal in strength to such, if any, as are natural.</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'The History of Science' (says Mr Mill, following out the + same train of reasoning which we read in the third Book of his + 'System of Logic') 'teems with inconceivabilities which have + been conquered; and with supposed necessary truths, which have + first ceased to be thought necessary, then to be thought true, + and have finally come to be deemed impossible.'—p. + 150.</p> + </div> + + <p>After various observations, chiefly exhibiting the rashness of + many censures bestowed by Sir W. Hamilton on Brown, Mr Mill gives + us three valuable chapters (xi., xii., xiii.), wherein he + analyzes the belief in an External World, the Belief in Mind as a + separate substance or Noumenon, and the Primary Qualities of + Matter. To each of these topics he applies what he calls the + <i>psychological</i> method, as contrasted with the simply + <i>introspective</i> method of Sir W. Hamilton (the Ego and + Non-Ego affirmed to be given together in the primary deliverance + of Consciousness) and so many other philosophers. He proves that + these beliefs are no way intuitive, but acquired products; and + that the known laws of Association are sufficient to explain how + they are acquired; especially the Law of Inseparable Association, + together with that of <i>Obliviscence</i>—a very useful, + discriminating phrase, which we first find employed in this + volume—(p. 259 et passim). He defines Matter to be a + <i>permanent possibility of Sensation</i>; he maintains that this + is really all which (apart from philosophical theories) mankind + in general mean by it; he shows that mere possibilities of + sensation not only may, but must, according to the known Laws of + Association, come to present 'to our artificialized + Consciousness' a character of objectivity—(pp. 198, 199). + The correlative subject, though present in fact and + indispensable, is eliminated out of conscious notice, according + to the Law of Obliviscence.</p> + + <p>These chapters will well repay the most careful perusal. We + can only find room for one passage (pp. 214, 215):—</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'Throughout the whole of our sensitive life, except its + first beginnings, we unquestionably refer our sensations to a + <i>me</i> and <i>not-me</i>. As soon as I have formed, on the + one hand, the notion of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation, + and on the other, of that continued series of feelings which I + call my life—both these notions are, by an irresistible + association, recalled by every sensation I have. They represent + two things, with both of which the sensation of the moment, be + it what it may, stands in relation; and I cannot be conscious + of the sensation without being conscious of it as related to + these two things. They have accordingly received relative + names, expressive of the double relation in question. The + thread of consciousness which I apprehend the relation as a + part of, is called the <i>Subject</i>; the group of Permanent + Possibilities of Sensation to which I refer it, and which is + partially realized and actualized in it, is called the + <i>Object</i> of the sensation. The sensation itself ought to + have a correlative name, or rather ought to have two such + names—one denoting the sensation as opposed to its + Subject, the other denoting it as opposed to its Object; but it + is a remarkable fact that this necessity has not been felt, and + that the need of a correlative name to every relative one has + been considered to be satisfied by the terms Object and Subject + themselves. It is true that these two are related to one + another, but only through the sensation. We have no conception + of either Subject or Object, either Mind or Matter, except as + something to which we refer our sensations, and whatever other + feelings we are conscious of. <i>The very existence of them + both, so far as cognizable by us, consists only in the relation + they respectively bear to our states of feeling.</i> Their + relation to each other is only the relation between those two + relations. The immediate correlatives are, not the pair, + <i>Object, Subject,</i> but the two pairs, Object, <i>Sensation + objectively considered</i>—Subject, <i>Sensation + subjectively considered</i>. The reason why this is overlooked + might easily be shown, and would furnish a good illustration of + that important part of the Laws of Association, which may be + termed the Laws of Obliviscence.'</p> + </div> + + <p>This chapter, on the Primary Qualities of Matter, controverts + the opinion of Sir W. Hamilton, that extension, as consisting of + co-existent <i>partes extra partes</i>, is immediately and + necessarily apprehended by our consciousness. It cites, as well + as confirms, the copious proof given by Professor Bain (in his + work on the Senses and the Intellect) that our conception of + extension is derived from our muscular sensibility: that our + sensation of <i>muscular motion impeded</i> constitutes that of + filled space: that our conception of extension, as an aggregate + of co-existent parts, arises from the sense of sight, which + comprehends a great number of parts in a succession so rapid as + to be confounded with simultaneity—and which not only + becomes the symbol of muscular and tactile succession, but even + acquires such ascendancy as to supersede both of them in our + consciousness. Confirmation is here given to this important + doctrine, not merely by observations from Mr Mill himself, but + also from the very curious narrative, discovered and produced by + Sir W. Hamilton, out of a work of the German philosopher, + Platner. Platner instituted a careful examination of a man born + blind, and ascertained that this man did not conceive extension + as an aggregate of simultaneous parts, but as a series of + sensations experienced or to be experienced in + succession—(pp. 232, 233). The case reported from Platner + both corroborates the theory of Professor Bain, and receives its + proper interpretation from that theory; while it is altogether + adverse to the doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton—as is also + another case, which he cites from Maine de Biran:—</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'It gives a very favourable idea of Sir W. Hamilton's + sincerity and devotion to truth (remarks Mr Mill, p. 247), that + he should have drawn from obscurity, and made generally known, + two cases so unfavourable to his own opinions.'</p> + </div> + + <p>We think this remark perfectly just; and we would point out + besides, in appreciating Sir W. Hamilton's merits, that his + appetite for facts was useful to philosophy, as well as his + appetite for speculation. But the person whose usefulness to + philosophy we prefer to bring into the foreground, is Platner + himself. He spent three weeks in patient examination of this + blind man, and the tenor of his report proves that his sagacity + in interpreting facts was equal to his patience in collecting + them. The rarity of all such careful and premeditated observation + of the facts of mind, appears to us one main reason why (what Mr + Mill calls) the <i>psychological</i> theory finds so little + acceptance; and why those who maintain that what now seems a + mental integer was once a multiplicity of separate mental + fragments, can describe the antecedent steps of the change only + as a <i>latens processus</i>, which the reader never fully + understands, and often will not admit. Every man's mind is + gradually built up from infancy to maturity; the process is + always going on before our eyes, yet the stages of + it—especially the earliest stages, the most pregnant with + instruction—are never studied and put on record by + observers trained in inductive logic, knowing beforehand what + they ought to look for as the <i>sine quâ non</i> for + proving or disproving any proposed theory. Such cases as that + cited by Platner—cases of one marked congenital defect of + sense, enabling us to apply the Method of Difference—are + always within reach; but few Platners are found to scrutinize and + record them. Historians of science describe to us the laborious + and multiplied observations, and the elaborate precaution for + ensuring accuracy of observation, which recent chemical and + physical inquirers have found indispensable for the establishment + of their results. We cannot, therefore, be surprised that mental + philosophers, dealing with facts even more obscure, and careless + about enlarging, varying, authenticating their records of + particular facts, should have had little success in establishing + any results at all.</p> + + <p>But if even those, who adopt the psychological theory, have + been remiss in the observation of particular mental + facts,—those who deny the theory have been far more than + remiss; they have been blind to obvious facts contradicting the + principles which they lay down. Mr Mill, in chap, xiv., deals + with this denial, common to Mr Mansel with Sir W. Hamilton. That + philosophers so eminent as both of them should declare + confidently—'what I cannot but think must be <i>à + priori</i>, or original to thought; it cannot be engendered by + experience upon custom' (p. 264)—appears to us as + extraordinary as it does to Mr Mill. Though no one ever surpassed + Sir W. Hamilton in large acquaintance with the actual diversities + of human belief, and human incapacities of believing—yet he + never seems to have thought of bringing this acquaintance into + account, when he assured the students in his lecture-room, that + custom, experience, indissoluble association, were altogether + insufficient to engender a felt necessity of believing. Such + forgetfulness of well-known mental facts cannot be reproached to + the advocates of the psychological theory.</p> + + <p>In chap. xv. Mr Mill examines Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine on + unconscious mental modifications. He points out the confused + manner in which Sir W. Hamilton has conceived <i>mental + latency</i>, as well as the inconclusive character of the + reasoning whereby he refutes the following doctrine of Dugald + Stewart—That in the most rapid trains of association, each + separate item must have been successively present to + consciousness, though for a time too short to leave any memory. + Sir W. Hamilton thinks that the separate items may pass, and + often do pass, unconsciously; which opinion Mr Mill also, though + not approving his reasons, is inclined to adopt.</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'I am myself inclined (p. 285) to admit unconscious mental + modifications, in the only sense in which I can attach any very + distinct meaning to them—namely, unconscious + modifications of the nerves. It may well be believed that the + apparently suppressed links in a chain of association, those + which Sir W. Hamilton considers as latent, really are so: that + they are not even momentarily felt, the chain of causation + being continued only physically—by one organic state of + the nerves succeeding another so rapidly, that the state of + mental consciousness appropriate to each is not produced.'</p> + </div> + + <p>Mr Mill gives various illustrations in support of this + doctrine. He at the same time calls attention to a valuable + lecture of Sir W. Hamilton's, the thirty-second lecture on + Metaphysics; especially to the instructive citation from + Cardaillac contained therein, noting the important fact, which + descriptions of the Law of Association often keep out of + sight—that the suggestive agency of Association is carried + on, not by single antecedents raising up single consequents, but + by a mass of antecedents raising up simultaneously a mass of + consequents, among which attention is very unequally + distributed.</p> + + <p>We shall say little upon Mr Mill's remarks on Sir W. + Hamilton's Theory of Causation—(chap. xvi.). This theory + appears to Mr Mill absurd; while the theory of Mr Mill (continued + from Hume, Brown, and James Mill) on the same subject, appears to + Sir W. Hamilton insufficient and unsatisfactory—'professing + to explain the phenomenon of causality, but, previously to + explanation, evacuating the phenomenon of all that desiderates + explanation'—(p. 295). For ourselves we embrace the theory + of Mr Mill:<a name="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href= + "#Footnote_13_13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> yet we are aware that the + remark just cited from Sir W. Hamilton represents the + dissatisfaction entertained towards it by many objectors. The + unscientific and antiscientific yearnings, prevalent among + mankind, lead them to put questions which no sound theory of + Causation will answer; and they are ready to visit and trust any + oracle which professes to deliver a confident affirmative + solution of such questions. Among all the terms employed by + metaphysicians, none is used in a greater variety of meanings + than the term Cause.</p> + + <p>In Mr Mill's next chapter (xvi.) he comments on Sir W. + Hamilton's doctrine of Concepts or General Notions. There are + portions of this chapter with which we agree less than with most + other parts of the volume; especially with his marked hostility + to the term <i>Concept</i>, and the reasons given for it, which + reasons appear to us not very consistent with what he has himself + said in the 'System of Logic,' Book IV. chap. ii. § + 1—3. The term <i>Concept</i> has no necessary connection + with the theory called Conceptualism. It is equally available to + designate the idea called up by a general name, as understood + either by Mr Bailey or by James Mill. We think it useful as an + equivalent to the German word <i>Begriff</i>, which sense Sir W. + Hamilton has in view when he introduces it, though he does not + always adhere to his profession. And when Mr Mill says (p. + 331)—</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'I consider it nothing less than a misfortune, that the + words Concept, General Notion, or any other phrase to express + the supposed mental modification corresponding to a general + name, should ever have been invented.'</p> + </div> + + <p>we dissent from his opinion. To talk of 'the Concept of an + individual,' however, as Mr Mansel does (pp. 338, 339), is + improper and inconsistent with the purpose for which the name is + given.</p> + + <p>We are more fully in harmony with Mr Mill in his two next + chapters (xviii. et seq.) on Judgment and Reasoning; which are + among the best chapters in this volume. He there combats and + overthrows the theory of Reasoning laid down by Sir W. Hamilton; + but we doubt the propriety of his calling this 'the Conceptualist + theory' (pp. 367, 368); since it has nothing to do with + Conceptualism, in the special sense of antithesis to Realism and + Nominalism,—but is, in fact, the theory of the Syllogism as + given in the Analytics of Aristotle, and generally admitted + since. Not merely Conceptualists, but (to use Mr Mill's own + language, p. 366) 'nearly all the writers on logic, taught a + theory of the science too small and narrow to contain their own + facts.' Such, indeed, was the theory constantly taught until the + publication of Mr Mill's 'System of Logic;' the first two books + of which corrected it, by arguments which are reinforced and + amplified in these two chapters on Judgment and Reasoning, as + well as in the two chapters next following—chaps, xx. and + xxi.—('Is Logic the Science of the Forms of + Thought—On the Fundamental Laws of Thought.') The contrast + which is there presented, in many different ways, between the + limited theory of logic taught by Sir W. Hamilton and Mr Mansel, + and the enlarged theory of Mr Mill, is instructive in a high + degree. We consider Mr Mill as the real preserver of all that is + valuable in Formal Logic, from the unfortunate consequences of an + erroneous estimate, brought upon it through the exaggerated + pretensions of logicians. When Sir W. Hamilton contrasts it + pointedly with physical science (of which he talks with a sort of + supercilious condescension, in one of the worst passages of his + writings, p. 401)—when all its apparent fruits were + produced in the shape of ingenious but barren verbal + technicalities—what hope could be entertained that Formal + Logic could hold its ground in the estimation of the recent + generation of scientific men? Mr Mill has divested it of that + assumed demonstrative authority which Bacon called 'regere res + per syllogismum;' but he has at the same time given to it a firm + root amidst the generalities of objective science. He has shown + that in the great problem of Evidence or Proof, the Laws of + Formal Logic, though bearing only on one part of the entire + procedure, yet bear upon one essential part, proper to be studied + separately: and that the maintenance of consistency between our + affirmations (which is the only special province of Formal + Logic), has great importance and value as a part of the process + necessary for ascertaining and vindicating their truth, or + exposing their character when false or uncertified—but no + importance or value except as a part of that larger exigency.</p> + + <p>While Mr Mill was amending the Syllogistic theory so as to + ensure for Formal Logic its legitimate place among the essentials + of scientific procedure, Sir W. Hamilton was at the same time + enlarging it on its technical side, in two modes which are highly + esteemed both by himself and by others: 1. The recognition of two + kinds of Syllogisms; one in Extension, the other in + Comprehension: 2. The doctrine of the Quantification of the + Predicate.—Both these novelties are here criticised by Mr + Mill in chapter xxii., which we recommend the reader to peruse + conjointly with Lectures 15 and 16 of Sir W. Hamilton on + Logic.</p> + + <p>Now whereas the main objection, by which the study of the + syllogistic logic has been weighed down and discredited in modern + times, is this, that it encumbers the memory with formal + distinctions, having no useful application to the real process + and purposes of reasoning—the procedure of Sir W. Hamilton + might almost lead us to imagine that he himself was trying to + aggravate that objection to the uttermost. He introduces a + variety of new canons (classifying Syllogisms as Extensive and + Intensive, by a distinction founded on the double quantity of + notions, in Extension and in Comprehension) which he intimates + that all former logicians have neglected—while it plainly + appears, even on his own showing, that the difference between + syllogisms, in respect to these two sorts of quantity, is of no + practical value; and that 'we can always change a categorical + syllogism of the one quantity into a categorical syllogism of the + other, by reversing the order of the two premises, and by + reversing the meaning of the copula' (Lect. xvi. p. 296); nay, + that every syllogism is already a syllogism in both quantities + (Mill, p. 431). Against these useless ceremonial reforms of Sir + W. Hamilton, we may set the truly philosophical explanation here + given by Mr Mill of the meaning of propositions.</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'All judgments' (he says—p. 423), 'except where both + the terms are proper names, are really judgments in + Comprehension; though it is customary, and the natural tendency + of the mind, to express most of them in terms of Extension. In + other words, we never really predicate anything but attributes; + though, in the usage of language, we commonly predicate them by + means of words which are names of concrete + objects—because' (p. 426)—'we have no other + convenient and compact mode of speaking. Most attributes, and + nearly all large bundles of attributes, have no names of their + own. We can only name them by a circumlocution. We are + accustomed to speak of attributes, not by names given to + themselves, but by means of the names which they give to the + objects they are attributes of.' 'All our ordinary judgments' + (p. 428) 'are in Comprehension only; Extension not being + thought of. But we may, if we please, make the Extension of our + general terms an express object of thought. When I judge that + all oxen ruminate, I have nothing in my thoughts but the + attributes and their co-existence. But when by reflection I + perceive what the proposition implies, I remark that other + things may ruminate besides oxen, and that the unknown + multitude of things which ruminate form a mass, with which the + unknown multitude of things having the attributes of oxen is + either identical or is wholly comprised in it. Which of these + two is the truth I may not know, and if I did, took no notice + of it when I assented to the proposition, all oxen ruminate; + but I perceive, on consideration, that one or other of them + must be true. Though I had not this in my mind when I affirmed + that all oxen ruminate, I can have it now; I can make the + concrete objects denoted by each of the two names an object of + thought, as a collective though indefinite aggregate; in other + words, I can make the Extension of the names (or notions) an + object of direct consciousness. When I do this, I perceive that + this operation introduces no new fact, but is only a different + mode of contemplating the very fact which I had previously + expressed by the words, all oxen ruminate. The fact is the + same, but the mode of contemplating it is different. There is + thus in all Propositions a judgment concerning attributes + (called by Sir W. Hamilton a Judgment in Comprehension) which + we make as a matter of course; and a possible judgment in or + concerning Extension, which we <i>may</i> make, and which will + be true if the former is true.'</p> + </div> + + <p>From the lucid explanation here cited (and from a following + paragraph too long to describe p. 433), we see that there is no + real distinction between Judgments in Comprehension and Judgments + in Extension; that the <i>appearance</i> of distinction between + them arises from the customary mode of enunciation, which custom + is here accounted for; that the addition to the theory of the + Syllogism, for which Sir W. Hamilton takes credit, is alike + troublesome and unprofitable.</p> + + <p>The like may also be said about his other innovation, the + Quantification of the Predicate. Still more extensive are the + changes (as stated by himself) which this innovation would + introduce in the canons of Syllogism. Indeed, when we read his + language (Appendix to 'Lectures on Logic,' pp. 291—297) + censuring generally the prior logicians from Aristotle downwards, + and contending that 'more than half the value of logic had been + lost' by their manner of handling it—we may appreciate the + magnitude of the reform which he believed himself to be + introducing. The larger the reform, the more it behoved him to be + sure of the ground on which he was proceeding. But on this point + we remark a serious deficiency. After laying down, with + appropriate emphasis, the valuable logical postulate, <i>to state + explicitly what is thought implicitly</i>, on which, Sir W. + Hamilton says,</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'Logic ever insists, but which logicians have never fairly + obeyed—it follows that logically we ought to take into + account the quantity, <i>always understood in thought</i>, but + usually, and for manifest reasons, elided in expression, not + only of the <i>subject</i>, but also of the <i>predicate</i>, + of a judgment.'—('Discussions on Philos.,' p. 614.)</p> + </div> + + <p>Here Sir W. Hamilton assumes that the quantity of the + predicate is always understood in thought; and the same + assumption is often repeated, in the Appendix to his 'Lectures on + Logic,' p. 291 and elsewhere, as if it was alike obvious and + incontestable. Now it is precisely on this point that issue is + here taken with Sir W. Hamilton. Mr Mill denies altogether (p. + 437) that the quantity of the predicate is always understood or + present in thought, and appeals to every reader's consciousness + for an answer:—</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'Does he, when he judges that all oxen ruminate, advert even + in the minutest degree to the question, whether there is + anything else that ruminates? Is this consideration at all in + his thoughts, any more than any other consideration foreign to + the immediate subject? One person may know that there are other + ruminating animals, another may think that there are none, a + third may be without any opinion on the subject; but if they + all know what is meant by ruminating, they all, when they judge + that every ox ruminates, mean precisely the same thing. The + mental process they go through, <i>as far as that one judgment + is concerned</i>, is precisely identical; though some of them + may go on farther, and <i>add other judgments</i> to it.'</p> + </div> + + <p>The last sentence cited from Mr Mill indicates the vice of Sir + W. Hamilton's proceeding in quantifying the predicate, and + explains why it was that logicians before him declined to do so. + Sir W. Hamilton, in this proceeding, insists on stating + explicitly, not merely all that is thought implicitly, but a + great deal more;<a name="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href= + "#Footnote_14_14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> adding to it something + else, which <i>may</i>, indeed, be thought conjointly, but which + more frequently <i>is not</i> thought at all. He requires us to + pack two distinct judgments into one and the same proposition: he + interpolates the meaning of the Propositio Conversa + <i>simpliciter</i> into the form of the Propositio Convertenda + (when an universal Affirmative), and then claims it as a great + advantage, that the proposition thus interpolated admits of being + converted <i>simpliciter</i>, and not merely <i>per accidens</i>. + Mr Mill is, nevertheless, of opinion (pp. 439-443) that though + 'the quantified syllogism is not a true expression of what is in + thought, yet writing the predicate with a quantification may be + sometimes a real help to the Art of Logic.' We see little + advantage in providing a new complicated form, for the purpose of + expressing in one proposition what naturally throws itself into + two, and may easily be expressed in two. If a man is prepared to + give us information on one Quaesitum, why should he be + constrained to use a mode of speech which forces on his attention + at the same time a second and distinct Quaesitum—so that he + must either give us information about the two at once, or confess + himself ignorant respecting the second?</p> + + <p>The two next chapters of Mr Mill, noticing some other minor + peculiarities (all of them unfortunate, and one, p. 447, really + unaccountable) of Sir W. Hamilton's Formal Logic; and some + Fallacious Modes of Thought countenanced by Sir W. Hamilton (chs. + xxiii., xxiv.—pp. 446, 478), we are compelled to pass over. + We must find space, however, for a few words on the Freedom of + the Will (ch. xxv.), which (in Mr Mill's language, pp. + 488—549), 'was so fundamental with Sir W. Hamilton, that it + may be regarded as the central idea of his system—the + determining cause of most of his philosophical opinions.' Prior + to Sir W. Hamilton, we find some writers who maintain the + doctrine of Free-will, others who maintain that of Necessity: + each supporting their respective conclusions by reasons which + they deem sufficient. Sir W. Hamilton declares that both the one + doctrine and the other are inconceivable and incomprehensible; + yet that, by the law of Excluded Middle, one or other of them + must be true: and he decides in favour of Free-will, of which he + believes himself to be distinctly conscious; moreover, Free-will + is essential (he thinks) to moral responsibility, of which also + he feels himself conscious. He confesses himself, however, unable + to explain the possibility of Free-will; but he maintains that + the same may be said about Necessity also. 'The champions of both + the two opposite doctrines are at once resistless in attack, and + impotent in defence'—(Hamilton's 'Footnotes on Reid,' p. + 602.) Mr Mansel also asserts, even more confidently than Sir W. + Hamilton, that we are directly conscious of Free-will—(p. + 503).</p> + + <p>Sir W. Hamilton has himself given some of the best arguments + against the doctrine of Free-will, in refutation of Reid: + arguments, some of which are here cited by Mr Mill with praise + which they well deserve—(pp. 497, 498). But Mr Mill's own + reasoning on the same side is of a still higher order, enlarging + the grounds previously urged in the last book of his 'System of + Logic,' He protests against the term <i>Necessity</i>; and + discards the idea of Necessity, if it be understood to imply + anything more than invariability of antecedence and consequence. + If it mean <i>that</i>, experience proves thus much about + antecedents in the world of mind, as in the world of matter: if + it mean more, experience does not prove more, either in the world + of matter or in the world of mind: nor have we any grounds for + affirming it in either—(p. 501.) If it were true, + therefore, that consciousness attested Free-will, we should find + the testimony of consciousness opposed to a full proof from + experience and induction. But does consciousness really attest + what is called Free-will? Mr Mill analyzes the case, and declares + in the negative.</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'To be conscious of Free-will, must mean to be conscious, + before I have decided, that I am able to decide either way; + exception may be taken <i>in limine</i> to the use of the word + <i>consciousness</i> in such an application. Consciousness + tells me what I do or feel. But what I am <i>able</i> to do, is + not a subject of consciousness. Consciousness is not prophetic; + we are conscious of what is, not of what will or can be. We + never know that we are able to do a thing, except from having + done it, or something similar to it. Having acted, we know, as + far as that experience reaches, how we are able to act; <i>and + this knowledge, when it has become familiar, is often + confounded with, and called by, the name of consciousness.</i> + But it does not derive any increase of authority from being + misnamed: its truth is not supreme over, but depends upon, + experience. If our so-called consciousness is not borne out by + experience, it is a delusion. It has no title to credence, but + as an interpretation of experience; and if it is a false + interpretation, it must give way.'—pp. 503, 504</p> + </div> + + <p>After this salutary and much-needed warning against the + confusion between consciousness as an infallible authority, and + belief upon experience, of which we are conscious as a + belief—Mr Mill proceeds to sift the alleged self-evident + connection between Free-will and Accountability. He shows, not + merely that there is no connection, but that there is a positive + repugnance, between the two. By Free-will is meant that a + volition is not determined by motives, but is a spontaneous + mental fact, neither having a cause, nor admitting of being + predicted. Now, the very reason for giving notice that we intend + to punish certain acts, and for inflicting punishment if the acts + be committed, is, that we trust in the efficacy of the threat and + the punishment as deterring motives. If the volition of agents be + not influenced by motives, the whole machinery of law becomes + unavailing, and punishment a purposeless infliction of pain. In + fact, it is on that very ground that the madman is exempted from + punishment; his volition being presumed to be not capable of + being acted upon by the deterring motive of legal sanction. The + <i>free</i> agent, thus understood, is one who can neither feel + himself accountable, nor be rendered accountable, to or by + others. It is only the <i>necessary</i> agent (the person whose + volitions are determined by motives, and, in case of conflict, by + the strongest desire or the strongest apprehension) that can be + held really accountable, or can feel himself to be so.</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'The true doctrine of the Causation of human actions (says + Mr Mill, p. 516) maintains, in opposition both to pure and to + modified Fatalism, that not only our conduct, but our + character, is in part amenable to our will: that we can, by + employing the proper means, improve our character: and that if + our character is such that, while it remains what it is, it + necessitates us to do wrong—it will be just to apply + motives which will necessitate us to strive for its + improvement. We shall not indeed do so unless we desire our + improvement, and desire it more than we dislike the means which + must he employed for the purpose.'</p> + </div> + + <p>It thus appears that of the two propositions, 1, volitions are + necessary, or depend on causes; 2, volitions are free, or do not + depend on causes—neither the one nor the other is + inconceivable or incomprehensible, as Sir W. Hamilton supposed + them to be. That the first is true, and the second false, we + learn by experience, and by that alone; just as we learn the like + in regard to the phenomena of the material world. Indeed, the + fact that human volitions are both predictable and modifiable, + quite as much as all those physical phenomena that depend upon a + complication of causes—which is only a corollary from what + has just been said—is so universally recognized and acted + upon by all men, that there would probably be little difference + of opinion about this question, if the antithesis were not + obscured and mystified by the familiar, but equivocal, phrases of + Free-will and Necessity.</p> + + <p>Passing over chapter xxvii., in which Mr Mill refutes Sir W. + Hamilton's opinion that the study of mathematics is worthless, or + nearly so, as an intellectual discipline—we shall now call + attention to the concluding remarks which sum up the results of + the volume. After saying that he 'differs from almost everything + in Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy, on which he particularly valued + himself, or which is specially his own,' Mr Mill describes Sir W. + Hamilton's general merits as follows:—</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'They chiefly consist in his clear and distinct mode of + bringing before the reader many of the fundamental questions of + metaphysics: some good specimens of psychological analysis on a + small scale: and the many detached logical and psychological + truths which he has separately seized, and which are scattered + through his writings, mostly applied to resolve some special + difficulty, and again lost sight of. I can hardly point to + anything he has done towards helping the more thorough + understanding of the greater mental phenomena, unless it be his + theory of Attention (including Abstraction), which seems to me + the most perfect we have; but the subject, though a highly + important, is comparatively a simple one.'—p. 547.</p> + </div> + + <p>Agreeing in this general view of Sir W. Hamilton's merits, we + should be disposed to describe them in language stronger and more + emphatic as to degree, than that which has just been cited. But + what is stated in the pages immediately following (pp. 550, + 551)—That Sir W. Hamilton's doctrines appear to be usually + taken up under the stimulus of some special dispute, and often + afterwards forgotten; That he did not think out subjects until + they were thoroughly mastered, or until consistency was attained + between the different views which the author took from different + points of observation; That accordingly, his philosophy seems + made up of scraps from several conflicting metaphysical + systems—All this is literally and amply borne out by the + many inconsistencies and contradictions which Mr Mill has brought + to view in the preceding chapters. It would appear that the + controversial disposition was powerful with Sir W. Hamilton, and + that a present impulse of that sort (as has been said respecting + Bayle, Burke, and others) not only served to provoke new + intellectual combinations in his mind, but also exercised a + Lethæan influence in causing obliviscence of the old. But + we can hardly follow Mr Mill in ascribing the defect to + 'excessive absorption of time and energy by the study of old + writers' (p. 551). If this study did no other good, it at least + kept the memory in exercise. Now, what surprises us most in Sir + W. Hamilton's inconsistencies, is the amount of + self-forgetfulness which they imply.</p> + + <p>While the laborious erudition of Sir W. Hamilton cannot be + fairly regarded as having produced any of his intellectual + defects, it undoubtedly stamped upon him his special title of + excellence as a philosopher. This is fully recognized by Mr Mill; + though he treats it as belonging not so much to a philosopher as + to an historian of philosophy. He concludes (pp. + 552—554):—</p> + + <div class="blkquot"> + <p>'It is much to be regretted that Sir W. Hamilton did not + write the history of philosophy, instead of choosing, as the + direct object of his intellectual exertions, philosophy itself. + He possessed a knowledge of the materials such as no one, + probably for many generations, will take the trouble of + acquiring again. Independently of the great interest and value + attaching to a knowledge of the historical development of + speculation, there is much in the old writers on philosophy, + even those of the middle ages, really worth preserving for its + scientific value. But this should be extracted, and rendered + into the phraseology of modern thought, by persons as familiar + with that as with the ancient, and possessing a command of its + language: a combination never yet so perfectly realized as in + Sir W. Hamilton. This, which no one but himself could have + done, he has left undone, and has given us, instead, a + contribution to mental philosophy, which has been more than + equalled by many not superior to him in powers, and wholly + destitute of erudition. Of all persons in modern times entitled + to the name of philosophers, the two, probably, whose reading + on the subject was the scantiest, in proportion to their + intellectual capacity, were Archbishop Whately and Dr Brown. + Accordingly they are the only two of whom Sir W. Hamilton, + though acknowledging their abilities, speaks with some tinge of + superciliousness. It cannot be denied that both Dr Brown and + Whately would have thought and written better than they did, if + they had been better read in the writings of previous thinkers; + but I am not afraid that posterity will contradict me when I + say, that either of them has done far greater service to the + world in the origination and diffusion of important thought, + than Sir W. Hamilton with all his learning; because, though + indolent readers, they were both of them active and fertile + thinkers.</p> + + <p>'It is not that Sir W. Hamilton's erudition is not + frequently of real use to him on particular questions of + philosophy. It does him one valuable service: it enables him to + know all the various opinions which can be held on the + questions he discusses, and to conceive and express them + clearly, leaving none of them out. This it does, though even + this not always; but it does little else, even of what might be + expected from erudition when enlightened by philosophy. He + knew, with extraordinary accuracy, the [Greek: hoti] of each + philosopher's opinions, but gave himself little trouble about + the [Greek: dihoti]. With one exception, I find no remark + bearing upon that point in any part of his writings. I imagine + he would have been much at a loss if he had been required to + draw up a philosophical estimate of the mind of any great + thinker. He never seems to look at any opinion of a philosopher + in connection with the same philosopher's other opinions. + Accordingly he is weak as to the mutual relations of + philosophical doctrines. One of the most striking examples of + this inability is in the case of Leibnitz,' &c.</p> + </div> + + <p>Here we find in a few sentences the conclusion which Mr Mill + conceives to be established by his book. We shall state how far + we are able to concur with it. He has brought the matter to a + direct issue, by weighing Sir W. Hamilton in the balance against + two other actual cotemporaries; instead of comparing him with + some unrealized ideal found only in the fancy of critics and + reviewers.</p> + + <p>Comparing Sir W. Hamilton with Dr Brown, we cordially + subscribe to the opinion of Mr Mill. We think that Dr Brown has + 'done far greater service to the world than Sir W. Hamilton, in + the origination and diffusion of important thought.' To speak + only of two chief subjects in the field of important + thought—Causality and the Freedom of the Will—we not + only adopt the conclusions of Dr Brown, but we admire both his + acuteness and his originality in vindicating and illustrating the + first of the two, while we dissent entirely from the views of Sir + W. Hamilton. This alone would be sufficient to make us approve + the superiority assigned by Mr Mill to Dr Brown. We discover no + compensating item to be placed to the credit of Sir W. Hamilton: + for the great doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, which is + our chief point of philosophical brotherhood with him, was + maintained by Brown also.</p> + + <p>But in regard to Dr Whately, our judgment is altogether + different. We cannot consent to admit him as a superior, or even + as an equal, to Sir W. Hamilton, 'in the origination and + diffusion of important thought.' He did much service by reviving + an inclination and respect for Logic, and by clearing up a part + of the technical obscurity which surrounded it: but we look upon + him as an acute and liberal-minded English theologian, enlarging + usefully, though timidly, the intellectual prison in which many + orthodox minds are confined—rather than as a fit aspirant + to the cosmopolitan honours of philosophy. 'An active and fertile + thinker,' Mr Mill calls Whately; and such he undoubtedly was. But + such also we consider Sir W. Hamilton to have been in a degree, + at least equal. If the sentence which we have quoted above be + intended to deny the predicate, 'active and fertile thinker,' of + Sir W. Hamilton, we cannot acquiesce in it. His intellect appears + to us thoroughly active and fertile, even when we dissent from + his reasonings—nay, even in the midst of his + inconsistencies, when a new growth of opinions is unexpectedly + pushed up on ground which we supposed to be already pre-occupied + by another both older and different. And we find this same + judgment implied in the discriminating remarks upon his + philosophical procedure made by Mr Mill himself—(pp. 271, + 272). For example, respecting Causality and the Freedom of the + Will, we detect no want of activity and fertility, though marked + evidence of other defects—especially the unconditional + surrender of a powerful mind to certain privileged inspirations, + worshipped as 'necessities of thought.'</p> + + <p>While thus declaring how far we concur in the parallel here + drawn of Sir W. Hamilton with Brown and Whately, we must at the + same time add that the comparison is taken under circumstances + unduly favourable to these two last. There has been no exposure + of <i>their</i> errors and inconsistencies, equal in penetration + and completeness to the crushing volume which Mr Mill has devoted + to Sir W. Hamilton. To make the odds fair, he ought to furnish a + similar systematic examination to Brown and Whately; enabling us + to read their works (as we now do those of Sir W. Hamilton) with + the advantage of his unrivalled microscope, which detects the + minutest breach or incoherence in the tissue of + reasoning—and of his large command of philosophical + premisses, which brings into full notice what the author had + overlooked. Thus alone could the competition between the three be + rendered perfectly fair.</p> + + <p>We regret, as Mr Mill does, that Sir W. Hamilton did not + undertake the composition of a history of philosophy. + Nevertheless we must confess that we should hardly feel such + regret, if we could see evidence to warrant Mr Mill's judgment + (p. 554) that Sir W. Hamilton was 'indifferent to the [Greek: + dihoti] of a man's opinions, and that he was incompetent to draw + up an estimate of the opinions of any great thinker,' &c. + Such incompetence, if proved to be frequent and considerable, + would deprive an author of all chance of success in writing a + history of philosophy. But the study of Sir William Hamilton's + works does not prove it to us, though Mr Mill has convicted him + of an erroneous estimate of Leibnitz. We say <i>frequent</i> and + <i>considerable</i>, because no historian of philosophy is exempt + from the defect more or less; or rather (to pass out of the + self-confidence of the Absolute into the modesty of the Relative) + we seldom find any historian whose estimate of great + philosophical thinkers does not often differ from our own. Hence + we are glad when ample original extracts are produced, enabling + us to test the historian, and judge for ourselves—a + practice which Sir W. Hamilton would have required no stimulus to + enforce upon him. There ought, indeed, to be various histories of + philosophy, composed from different points of view; for the + ablest historian cannot get clear of a certain exclusiveness + belonging to himself. But, so far as we can conjecture what Sir + W. Hamilton <i>would</i> or <i>could</i> have done, we think that + a history of philosophy composed by him would have surpassed any + work of the kind in our language.</p> + + <p>We trust that Sir W. Hamilton's works will long continue to be + read, along with Mr Mill's examination of them; and we should be + glad if the works of other philosophers could be read along with + a comment of equal acuteness and impartiality. Any point of view + which could command the adherence of such a mind as Sir W. + Hamilton's, deserves to be fully considered. Moreover, the living + force of philosophy, as directress of human intelligence, depends + upon keeping up in each of her devotees a full mastery of many + divergent and opposite veins of reasoning—a knowledge, + negative and affirmative, of the full case of opponents as well + as of his own.</p> + + <p>It is to Philosophy alone that <i>our</i> allegiance is sworn; + and while we concur mostly with Mr Mill's opinions, we number + both him and Sir W. Hamilton as a noble pair of brethren, serving + alike in her train.</p> + + <p><i>Amicus Hamilton; magis amicus Mill; amica ante omnes + Philosophia.</i> FOOTNOTES:</p><a name= + "Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1">[1]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>Mr Mansel and Mr Veitch, the editors of Sir W. Hamilton's + Lectures on Metaphysics, posthumously published, say in their + preface (p. xiii.)—</p> + + <p>'For twenty years—from 1836 to 1856—the courses + of logic and metaphysics were the means through which Sir + William Hamilton sought to discipline and imbue with his + philosophical opinions the numerous youth who gathered from + Scotland and other countries to his classroom; and while, by + these prelections, the author supplemented, developed, and + moulded the national philosophy, leaving thereon the + ineffaceable impress of his genius and learning, he, at the + same time and by the same means, exercised over the intellects + and feelings of his pupils an influence which, for depth, + feeling, and elevation, was certainly never surpassed by that + of any philosophical instructor. Among his pupils there are not + a few who, having lived for a season under the constraining + power of his intellect, and been led to reflect on those great + questions regarding the character, origin, and bounds of human + knowledge, which his teaching stirred and quickened, bear the + memory of their beloved and revered instructor inseparably + blended with what is highest in their present intellectual + life, as well as in their practical aims and aspirations.'</p> + </div><a name="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2">[2]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>We are happy to find such high authorities as Dr Whewell, Mr + Samuel Bailey, and Sir John Herschel concurring in this + estimation of the new logical point of view thus opened by Mr + Mill. We will not call it a <i>discovery</i>, since Sir John + Herschel thinks the expression unsuitable.—See the recent + sixth edition of the 'System of Logic,' vol. i. p. 229.</p> + </div><a name="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3">[3]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>See Sir William. Hamilton's 'Lectures on Logic' (Lect. xvii. + p. 320, 321; also Appendix to those Lectures, p. 361). He here + distinguishes also formal induction from, material induction, + which latter he brings under the grasp of syllogism, by an + hypothesis in substance similar to that of Whately. There is, + however, in Lecture xix. (p. 380), a passage in a very + different spirit, which one might almost imagine to have been + written by Mr Mill: 'In regard to simple syllogisms, it was an + original dogma of the Platonic school, and an early dogma of + the Peripatetic, that science, strictly so called, was only + conversant with, and was exclusively contained in, universals; + and the doctrine of Aristotle, which taught that all our + general knowledge is only an induction from an observation of + particulars, was too easily forgotten or perverted by his + followers. It thus obtained almost the force of an acknowledged + principle that everything to be known must be known under some + general form or notion. Hence the exaggerated importance + attributed to definition and deduction; it not being considered + that we only take out of a general notion what we had + previously placed therein, and that the amplification of our + knowledge is not to be sought for from above but from + below—not from speculation about abstract generalities, + but from the observation of concrete particulars. Bat however + erroneous and irrational, the persuasion had its day and + influence, and it perhaps determined, as one of its effects, + the total neglect of one half, and that not the least important + half of the reasoning process.'</p> + + <p>These very just observations are suggested to Sir William + Hamilton by a train of thought which has little natural + tendency to suggest them, viz., by the distinction upon which + he so much insists, between the logic of comprehension and the + logic of extension, and by his anxiety to explain why the + former had been exclusively cultivated and the latter + neglected.</p> + + <p>That which Sir William Hamilton calls here truly the + doctrine of Aristotle (enunciated especially at the close of + the Analyt. Post.), and which he states to have been forgotten + by Aristotle's followers, was not always remembered by + Aristotle himself.</p> + </div><a name="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4">[4]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>The distinction is given by Stier and other logicians. 1. + Infinitum simpliciter. 2. Infinitum secundum quid, sive in + certo genere.</p> + </div><a name="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5">[5]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>This doctrine has been affirmed (so far as reason is + concerned, apart from revelation) not merely by Mr Mansel, but + also by Pascal, one of the most religious philosophers of the + seventeenth century, in the 'Pensées':—</p> + + <p>'Parlons selon les lumieres naturelles. S'il y a un Dieu, il + est infiniment incompréhensible; puisque, n'ayant ni + principes ni bornes, il n'a nul rapport à nous; nous + sommes done incapables de connâitre ni ce qn'il est, ni + s'il est.'—(See Arago, Biographie de Condorcet, p. + lxxxiv., prefixed to his edition of Condorcet's works.)</p> + </div><a name="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6">[6]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>The indictment under which Socrates was condemned at Athens, + as reported by Xenophon at the commencement of the Memorabilia, + ran thus—'Socrates is guilty of crime, inasmuch as he + does not believe in those Gods in whom the City believes, but + introduces other novelties in regard to the Gods; he is guilty + also, inasmuch as he corrupts the youth.'</p> + + <p>These words express clearly a sentiment entertained not + merely by the Athenian people, but generally by other societies + also. They all agree in antipathy to free, individual, + dissenting reason; though that antipathy manifests itself by + acts, more harsh in one place, less harsh in another. The + Hindoo who declares himself a convert to Christianity, becomes + at the same time an outcast ([Greek: <i>aphrhêtôr, + athhemistos, anhestios</i>]) among those whose Gods he has + deserted. As a general fact, the man who dissents from his + fellows upon fundamentals of religion, purchases an undisturbed + life only by being content with that 'semi-liberty under + silence and concealment,' for which Cicero was thankful under + the dictatorship of Julius Cæsar. + 'Obsecro—abiiciamus ista et semi-liberi saltern, simus; + quod assequemur <i>et tacendo et latendo'</i> (Epist. ad Attic, + xiii. 31). Contrast with this the memorable declaration of + Socrates, in the Platonic Apology, that silence and abstinence + from cross-examination were intolerable to him; that life would + not be worth having under such conditions.</p> + </div><a name="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7">[7]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>Aeschyl. Prometh., 996-1006—</p> + + <p><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">pros tauta, rhipthesthô + men aithaloussa phlox,</span><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">leykoptherps de niphadi kai + bronthêmasin</span><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">chthonhiois kykhatô + phanta kahi tarasshetô</span><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">gnhampsei gar ouden + tôndhe m'——</span><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">eiselthetô se + mhêpot, hôs egô, Dios</span><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">gnhômên + phobêtheis, thêlhynoys genhêsomai,</span><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">kai liparhêsô ton + mhega stygohymenon</span><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">gynaikomhimois hyptihysmasin + cherhôn,</span><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">lyshai me dhesmôn + tônde toy pantos oheô.</span></p> + + <p>Also v. 1047, et seq. The memorable ode of Goethe, entitled + <i>Prometheus</i>, embodies a similar vein of sentiment in the + finest poetry.</p> + </div><a name="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8">[8]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>Euripid Hippol., 10—</p> + + <p><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">(Aph) oh gar me thaeseos pais, + 'Amazonos tokos</span><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">monos politon taesde gaes + Troizaenias</span><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">legei kakistaen daimonon + pephukenai</span><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">Phoibou d' adelphaen + Artemin,—</span><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">tima, megiotaen daimonon + aegoumenos—</span></p> + + <p><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">(Hipp.) taen saen dhe Khyprin + pholl' hegô Chairein lhego—</span><br> + <span style="margin-left: 1em;">(112.)</span></p> + + <p>See also v. 1328—1402.</p> + </div><a name="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9">[9]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>Herodot. t. 32. O Kroise, epistumenon me to theion pan eohn + phthonerohn te kai taraxodes, epeirotas ahnthropaeion + pragmhaton pheri; also iii. 40</p> + </div><a name="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href= + "#FNanchor_10_10">[10]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>See Eurip. Hipp., 6-96-149. The language of the attendant, + after his affectionate remonstrance to Hippolytus had been + disregarded, supplicating Aphroditê to pardon the + recalcitrancy of that virtuous but obstinate youth, is + characteristic and touching (114-120.)</p> + </div><a name="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href= + "#FNanchor_11_11">[11]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>See especially his chapter ii. on the Sensations of Sight, + pp. 222, 241—247, in the second edition of this work.</p> + </div><a name="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href= + "#FNanchor_12_12">[12]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>Descartes says, in his 'Principia Philosophiæ,' i + 51—'Et quidem substantia quæ nullâ + planè re indigeat, unica tantum potest + intelligi—nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nisi ope + concursûs Dei existere posse perspicimus. Atque ideo + nomen substantiæ non convenit Deo et illis + <i>univocè</i>, ut dici solet in scholis, hoc est, nulla + ejus nominis significatio potest distinctè intelligi, + quæ Deo et creaturis sit communis.'</p> + </div><a name="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href= + "#FNanchor_13_13">[13]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>At the same time, we cannot go along with Mr Mill in the + following affirmation (p. 201):—</p> + + <p>'This natural probability is converted into certainty when + we take into consideration that universal law of our experience + which is termed the Law of Causation, and which makes us + <i>unable to conceive the beginning of anything without</i> an + antecedent condition, <i>or cause.'</i> Such 'inability to + conceive' appears to us not in correspondence with facts. + First, it cannot be properly either affirmed or denied, until + agreement is obtained what the word <i>cause</i> means. If + three persons, A, B, and C, agree in affirming it—A + adopting the meaning of Aristotle, B that of Sir William + Hamilton, and C that of Mr Mill—the agreement is purely + verbal; or rather, all three concur in having a mental exigency + pressing for satisfaction, but differ as to the hypothesis + which satisfies it.</p> + + <p>Next, if we reason upon Mr Mill's theory as to Cause, + certainly those who deny his theory can have no difficulty in + conceiving events without any cause (in that sense): nor have + those who adopt this theory any greater difficulty. These + latter <i>believe</i> that there are, throughout, constant and + uniform conditions on which the occurrence of every event + depends; but they can perfectly <i>conceive</i> events as + occurring without any such uniform sequence. In truth, the + belief in such causation, as pervading <i>all nature</i>, is an + acquired result of scientific training. The greater part of + mankind believe that some events occur in regular, others in + irregular succession. Moreover, a full half of the metaphysical + world espouse the doctrine of free-will, and consider that all + volitions occur without any cause at all.</p> + </div><a name="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href= + "#FNanchor_14_14">[14]</a> + + <div class="note"> + <p>Among the various authorities (upon this question of + quantifying the predicate) collected by Sir W. Hamilton in the + valuable Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' we find one (p. + 311) which takes the same ground of objection as Mr Mill, in + these words:—'The cause why the quantitative note is not + usually joined with the predicate, is, that there would thus be + two <i>quæsita</i> at once; to wit, whether the predicate + were affirmed of the subject, and whether it were denied of + everything beside. For when we say, <i>all man is all + rational</i>, we judge that <i>all man is rational</i>, and + judge likewise <i>that rational is denied of everything but + man</i>. But these are, in reality, two different + <i>quæsita</i>; and therefore it has become usual to + state them, not in one, but in two several propositions. And + this is self-evident, seeing that a <i>quæsitum</i>, in + itself, asks only—<i>Does or does not this inhere in + that?</i> and <i>not</i> Does or does not this inhere in that, + <i>and at the same time inhere in nothing else?</i>'</p> + + <p>The author of this just and sagacious remark—much + surpassing what the other writers quoted in the Appendix + say—was a Jew who died at Perpignan in or near 1370, + named Levi Ben Gerson or Gersonides. An interesting account of + this man, eminent as a writer and thinker in his age, will be + found in a biography by Dr Joel, published at Breslau in 1862, + 'Levi Ben Gerson als Religions—philosoph.' He + distinguished himself as a writer on theology, philosophy, and + astronomy; he was one of the successors to the free speculative + vein of Maimonides, and one of the continuators of the Arabic + Aristotelian philosophy. He both commented on and combated the + doctrines of Averroes. Dr Joel thinks that he died earlier than + 1370.</p> + </div> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 12002 ***</div> +</body> +</html> |