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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Memorabilia, by Xenophon
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Memorabilia
+ Recollections of Socrates
+
+Author: Xenophon
+
+Translator: H. G. Dakyns
+
+Posting Date: August 24, 2008 [EBook #1177]
+Release Date: January, 1998
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MEMORABILIA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by John Bickers
+
+
+
+
+
+THE MEMORABILIA
+
+Recollections of Socrates
+
+By Xenophon
+
+
+
+
+Translated by H. G. Dakyns
+
+
+
+
+
+ Xenophon the Athenian was born 431 B.C. He was a
+ pupil of Socrates. He marched with the Spartans,
+ and was exiled from Athens. Sparta gave him land
+ and property in Scillus, where he lived for many
+ years before having to move once more, to settle
+ in Corinth. He died in 354 B.C.
+
+ The Memorabilia is a recollection of Socrates in
+ word and deed, to show his character as the best
+ and happiest of men.
+
+
+
+
+
+ PREPARER'S NOTE
+
+ First Published 1897 by Macmillan and Co.
+ This was typed from Dakyns' series, "The Works of Xenophon," a
+ four-volume set. The complete list of Xenophon's works (though
+ there is doubt about some of these) is:
+
+ Work Number of books
+
+ The Anabasis 7
+ The Hellenica 7
+ The Cyropaedia 8
+ The Memorabilia 4
+ The Symposium 1
+ The Economist 1
+ On Horsemanship 1
+ The Sportsman 1
+ The Cavalry General 1
+ The Apology 1
+ On Revenues 1
+ The Hiero 1
+ The Agesilaus 1
+ The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians 2
+
+ Text in brackets "{}" is my transliteration of Greek text into
+ English using an Oxford English Dictionary alphabet table. The
+ diacritical marks have been lost.
+
+
+
+
+
+THE MEMORABILIA
+
+or
+
+Recollections of Socrates
+
+
+
+
+BOOK I
+
+
+I
+
+I have often wondered by what arguments those who indicted (1) Socrates
+could have persuaded the Athenians that his life was justly forfeit to
+the state. The indictment was to this effect: "Socrates is guilty of
+crime in refusing to recognise the gods acknowledged by the state,
+and importing strange divinities of his own; he is further guilty of
+corrupting the young."
+
+ (1) {oi grapsamenoi} = Meletus (below, IV. iv. 4, viii. 4; "Apol." 11,
+ 19), Anytus ("Apol." 29), and Lycon. See Plat. "Apol." II. v. 18;
+ Diog. Laert. II. v. (Socr.); M. Schanz, "Plat. Apol. mit deutschen
+ Kemmentar, Einleitung," S. 5 foll.
+
+In the first place, what evidence did they produce that Socrates refused
+to recognise the gods acknowledged by the state? Was it that he did not
+sacrifice? or that he dispensed with divination? On the contrary, he was
+often to be seen engaged in sacrifice, at home or at the common altars
+of the state. Nor was his dependence on divination less manifest. Indeed
+that saying of his, "A divinity (2) gives me a sign," was on everybody's
+lips. So much so that, if I am not mistaken, it lay at the root of
+the imputation that he imported novel divinities; though there was no
+greater novelty in his case than in that of other believers in oracular
+help, who commonly rely on omens of all sorts: the flight or cry
+of birds, the utterances of man, chance meetings, (3) or a victim's
+entrails. Even according to the popular conception, it is not the mere
+fowl, it is not the chance individual one meets, who knows what things
+are profitable for a man, but it is the gods who vouchsafe by such
+instruments to signify the same. This was also the tenet of Socrates.
+Only, whereas men ordinarily speak of being turned aside, or urged
+onwards by birds, or other creatures encountered on the path, Socrates
+suited his language to his conviction. "The divinity," said he, "gives
+me a sign." Further, he would constantly advise his associates to do
+this, or beware of doing that, upon the authority of this same divine
+voice; and, as a matter of fact, those who listened to his warnings
+prospered, whilst he who turned a deaf ear to them repented afterwards.
+(4) Yet, it will be readily conceded, he would hardly desire to present
+himself to his everyday companions in the character of either knave
+or fool. Whereas he would have appeared to be both, supposing (5) the
+God-given revelations had but revealed his own proneness to deception.
+It is plain he would not have ventured on forecast at all, but for his
+belief that the words he spoke would in fact be verified. Then on whom,
+or what, was the assurance rooted, if not upon God? And if he had faith
+in the gods, how could he fail to recognise them?
+
+ (2) Or, "A divine something." See "Encyc. Brit." "Socrates." Dr. H.
+ Jackason; "The Daemon of Socrates," F. W. H. Myers; K. Joel, "Der
+ echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates," i. p. 70 foll.; cf.
+ Aristot. "M. M." 1182 a 10.
+
+ (3) See Aesch. "P. V." 487, {enodious te sombolous}, "and pathway
+ tokens," L. Campbell; Arist. "Birds," 721, {sombolon ornin}:
+ "Frogs," 196, {to sometukhon exion}; "Eccl." 792; Hor. "Od." iii.
+ 27, 1-7.
+
+ (4) See "Anab." III. i. 4; "Symp." iv. 48.
+
+ (5) Or, "if his vaunted manifestations from heaven had but manifested
+ the falsity of his judgment."
+
+But his mode of dealing with his intimates has another aspect. As
+regards the ordinary necessities of life, (6) his advice was, "Act as
+you believe (7) these things may best be done." But in the case of those
+darker problems, the issues of which are incalculable, he directed his
+friends to consult the oracle, whether the business should be undertaken
+or not. "No one," he would say, "who wishes to manage a house or city
+with success: no one aspiring to guide the helm of state aright, can
+afford to dipense with aid from above. Doubtless, skill in carpentering,
+building, smithying, farming, of the art of governing men, together with
+the theory of these processes, and the sciences of arithmetic,
+economy, strategy, are affairs of study, and within the grasp of human
+intelligence. Yet there is a side even of these, and that not the least
+important, which the gods reserve to themselves, the bearing of which is
+hidden from mortal vision. Thus, let a man sow a field or plant a farm
+never so well, yet he cannot foretell who will gather in the fruits:
+another may build him a house of fairest proportion, yet he knows not
+who will inhabit it. Neither can a general foresee whether it will
+profit him to conduct a campaign, nor a politician be certain whether
+his leadership will turn to evil or good. Nor can the man who weds a
+fair wife, looking forward to joy, know whether through her he shall not
+reap sorrow. Neither can he who has built up a powerful connection in
+the state know whether he shall not by means of it be cast out of his
+city. To suppose that all these matters lay within the scope of human
+judgment, to the exclusion of the preternatural, was preternatural
+folly. Nor was it less extravagant to go and consult the will of Heaven
+on any questions which it is given to us to decide by dint of learning.
+As though a man should inquire, "Am I to choose an expert driver as my
+coachman, or one who has never handled the reins?" "Shall I appoint a
+mariner to be skipper of my vessel, or a landsman?" And so with respect
+to all we may know by numbering, weighing, and measuring. To seek advice
+from Heaven on such points was a sort of profanity. "Our duty is plain,"
+he would observe; "where we are permitted to work through our natural
+faculties, there let us by all means apply them. But in things which are
+hidden, let us seek to gain knowledge from above, by divination; for the
+gods," he added, "grant signs to those to whom they will be gracious."
+
+ (6) Or, "in the sphere of the determined," {ta anagkaia} = certa,
+ quorum eventus est necessarius; "things positive, the law-ordained
+ department of life," as we might say. See Grote, "H. G." i. ch.
+ xvi. 500 and passim.
+
+ (7) Reading {os nomizoien}, or if {os enomizen}, translate "As to
+ things with certain results, he advised them to do them in the way
+ in which he believed they would be done best"; i.e. he did not
+ say, "follow your conscience," but, "this course seems best to me
+ under the circumstances."
+
+Again, Socrates ever lived in the public eye; at early morning he was to
+be seen betaking himself to one of the promenades, or wrestling-grounds;
+at noon he would appear with the gathering crowds in the market-place;
+and as day declined, wherever the largest throng might be encountered,
+there was he to be found, talking for the most part, while any one who
+chose might stop and listen. Yet no one ever heard him say, or saw him
+do anything impious or irreverent. Indeed, in contrast to others he set
+his face against all discussion of such high matters as the nature of
+the Universe; how the "kosmos," as the savants (8) phrase it, came into
+being; (9) or by what forces the celestial phenomena arise. To trouble
+one's brain about such matters was, he argued, to play the fool. He
+would ask first: Did these investigators feel their knowledge of
+things human so complete that they betook themselves to these lofty
+speculations? Or did they maintain that they were playing their proper
+parts in thus neglecting the affairs of man to speculate on the concerns
+of God? He was astonished they did not see how far these problems lay
+beyond mortal ken; since even those who pride themselves most on their
+discussion of these points differ from each other, as madmen do. For
+just as some madmen, he said, have no apprehension of what is truly
+terrible, others fear where no fear is; some are ready to say and do
+anything in public without the slightest symptom of shame; (10) others
+think they ought not so much as to set foot among their fellow-men; some
+honour neither temple, nor altar, nor aught else sacred to the name
+of God; others bow down to stocks and stones and worship the very
+beasts:--so is it with those thinkers whose minds are cumbered with
+cares (11) concerning the Universal Nature. One sect (12) has discovered
+that Being is one and indivisible. Another (13) that it is infinite in
+number. If one (14) proclaims that all things are in a continual flux,
+another (15) replies that nothing can possibly be moved at any time.
+The theory of the universe as a process of birth and death is met by the
+counter theory, that nothing ever could be born or ever will die.
+
+ (8) Lit. "the sophists." See H. Sidgwick, "J. of Philol." iv. 1872; v.
+ 1874.
+
+ (9) Reading {ephu}. Cf. Lucian, "Icaromenip." xlvi. 4, in imitation of
+ this passage apparently; or if {ekhei}, translate "is arranged."
+ See Grote, "H. G." viii. 573.
+
+ (10) See "Anab." V. iv. 30.
+
+ (11) See Arist. "Clouds," 101, {merimnophrontistai kaloi te kagathoi}.
+
+ (12) e.g. Xenophanes and Parmenides, see Grote, "Plato," I. i. 16
+ foll.
+
+ (13) e.g. Leucippus and Democritus, ib. 63 foll.
+
+ (14) e.g. Heraclitus, ib. 27 foll.
+
+ (15) e.g. Zeno, ib. ii. 96.
+
+But the questioning of Socrates on the merits of these speculators
+sometimes took another form. The student of human learning expects, he
+said, to make something of his studies for the benefit of himself or
+others, as he likes. Do these explorers into the divine operations hope
+that when they have discovered by what forces the various phenomena
+occur, they will create winds and waters at will and fruitful seasons?
+Will they manipulate these and the like to suit their needs? or has no
+such notion perhaps ever entered their heads, and will they be content
+simply to know how such things come into existence? But if this was
+his mode of describing those who meddle with such matters as these, he
+himself never wearied of discussing human topics. What is piety? what is
+impiety? What is the beautiful? what the ugly? What the noble? what the
+base? What are meant by just and unjust? what by sobriety and madness?
+what by courage and cowardice? What is a state? what is a statesman?
+what is a ruler over men? what is a ruling character? and other like
+problems, the knowledge of which, as he put it, conferred a patent of
+nobility on the possessor, (16) whereas those who lacked the knowledge
+might deservedly be stigmatised as slaves.
+
+ (16) Or, "was distinctive of the 'beautiful and good.'" For the phrase
+ see below, ii. 2 et passim.
+
+Now, in so far as the opinions of Socrates were unknown to the world at
+large, it is not surprising that the court should draw false conclusions
+respecting them; but that facts patent to all should have been ignored
+is indeed astonishing.
+
+At one time Socrates was a member of the Council, (17) he had taken
+the senatorial oath, and sworn "as a member of that house to act in
+conformity with the laws." It was thus he chanced to be President of the
+Popular Assembly, (18) when that body was seized with a desire to put
+the nine (19) generals, Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and the rest, to death
+by a single inclusive vote. Whereupon, in spite of the bitter resentment
+of the people, and the menaces of several influential citizens,
+he refused to put the question, esteeming it of greater importance
+faithfully to abide by the oath which he had taken, than to gratify the
+people wrongfully, or to screen himself from the menaces of the mighty.
+The fact being, that with regard to the care bestowed by the gods upon
+men, his belief differed widely from that of the multitude. Whereas most
+people seem to imagine that the gods know in part, and are ignorant in
+part, Socrates believed firmly that the gods know all things--both the
+things that are said and the things that are done, and the things that
+are counselled in the silent chambers of the heart. Moreover, they are
+present everywhere, and bestow signs upon man concerning all the things
+of man.
+
+ (17) Or "Senate." Lit. "the Boule."
+
+ (18) Lit. "Epistates of the Ecclesia." See Grote, "H. G." viii. 271;
+ Plat. "Apol." 32 B.
+
+ (19) {ennea} would seem to be a slip of the pen for {okto}, eight. See
+ "Hell." I. v. 16; vi. 16; vi. 29; vii. 1 foll.
+
+I can, therefore, but repeat my former words. It is a marvel to me
+how the Athenians came to be persuaded that Socrates fell short of
+sober-mindedness as touching the gods. A man who never ventured one
+impious word or deed against the gods we worship, but whose whole
+language concerning them, and his every act, closely coincided, word
+for word, and deed for deed, with all we deem distinctive of devoutest
+piety.
+
+
+II
+
+No less surprising to my mind is the belief that Socrates corrupted
+the young. This man, who, beyond what has been already stated, kept
+his appetites and passions under strict control, who was pre-eminently
+capable of enduring winter's cold and summer's heat and every kind of
+toil, who was so schooled to curtail his needs that with the scantiest
+of means he never lacked sufficiency--is it credible that such a
+man could have made others irreverent or lawless, or licentious, or
+effeminate in face of toil? Was he not rather the saving of many through
+the passion for virtue which he roused in them, and the hope he infused
+that through careful management of themselves they might grow to be
+truly beautiful and good--not indeed that he ever undertook to be a
+teacher of virtue, but being evidently virtuous himself he made those
+who associated with him hope that by imitating they might at last
+resemble him.
+
+But let it not be inferred that he was negligent of his own body
+or approved of those who neglected theirs. If excess of eating,
+counteracted by excess of toil, was a dietary of which he disapproved,
+(1) to gratify the natural claim of appetite in conjunction with
+moderate exercise was a system he favoured, as tending to a healthy
+condition of the body without trammelling the cultivation of the spirit.
+On the other hand, there was nothing dandified or pretentious about
+him; he indulged in no foppery of shawl or shoes, or other effeminacy of
+living.
+
+ (1) See (Plat.) "Erast." 132 C.
+
+Least of all did he tend to make his companions greedy of money. He
+would not, while restraining passion generally, make capital out of the
+one passion which attached others to himself; and by this abstinence,
+he believed, he was best consulting his own freedom; in so much that he
+stigmatised those who condescended to take wages for their society as
+vendors of their own persons, because they were compelled to discuss for
+the benefits of their paymasters. What surprised him was that any one
+possessing virtue should deign to ask money as its price instead of
+simply finding his reward in the acquisition of an honest friend, as if
+the new-fledged soul of honour could forget her debt of gratitude to her
+greatest benefactor.
+
+For himself, without making any such profession, he was content to
+believe that those who accepted his views would play their parts as good
+and true friends to himself and one another their lives long. Once more
+then: how should a man of this character corrupt the young? unless the
+careful cultivation of virtue be corruption.
+
+But, says the accuser, (2) by all that's sacred! did not Socrates cause
+his associates to despise the established laws when he dwelt on the
+folly of appointing state officers by ballot? (3) a principle which, he
+said, no one would care to apply in selecting a pilot or a flute-player
+or in any similar case, where a mistake would be far less disastrous
+than in matters political. Words like these, according to the accuser,
+tended to incite the young to contemn the established constitution,
+rendering them violent and headstrong. But for myself I think that
+those who cultivate wisdom and believe themselves able to instruct
+their fellow-citizens as to their interests are least likely to become
+partisans of violence. They are too well aware that to violence attach
+enmities and dangers, whereas results as good may be obtained by
+persuasion safely and amicably. For the victim of violence hates with
+vindictiveness as one from whom something precious has been stolen,
+while the willing subject of persuasion is ready to kiss the hand which
+has done him a service. Hence compulsion is not the method of him
+who makes wisdom his study, but of him who wields power untempered
+by reflection. Once more: the man who ventures on violence needs the
+support of many to fight his battles, while he whose strength lies in
+persuasiveness triumphs single-handed, for he is conscious of a cunning
+to compel consent unaided. And what has such a one to do with the
+spilling of blood? since how ridiculous it were to do men to death
+rather than turn to account the trusty service of the living.
+
+ (2) {o kategoros} = Polycrates possibly. See M. Schantz, op. cit.,
+ "Einleitun," S. 6: "Die Anklagerede des Polykrates"; Introduction,
+ p. xxxii. foll.
+
+ (3) i.e. staking the election of a magistrate on the colour of a bean.
+ See Aristot. "Ath. Pol." viii. 2, and Dr. Sandys ad loc.
+
+But, the accuser answers, the two men (4) who wrought the greatest evils
+to the state at any time--to wit, Critias and Alcibiades--were both
+companions of Socrates--Critias the oligarch, and Alcibiades the
+democrat. Where would you find a more arrant thief, savage, and murderer
+(5) than the one? where such a portent of insolence, incontinence,
+and high-handedness as the other? For my part, in so far as these two
+wrought evil to the state, I have no desire to appear as the apologist
+of either. I confine myself to explaining what this intimacy of theirs
+with Socrates really was.
+
+ (4) See "Hell." I. and II. passim.
+
+ (5) Reading {kleptistatos te kai biaiotatos kai phonikotatos}, or if
+ {pleonektistatos te kai biaiotatis}, translate "such a manner of
+ greed and violence as the one, of insolence, etc., as the other?"
+ See Grote, "H. G." viii. 337.
+
+Never were two more ambitious citizens seen at Athens. Ambition was in
+their blood. If they were to have their will, all power was to be in
+their hands; their fame was to eclipse all other. Of Socrates they
+knew--first that he lived an absolutely independent life on the
+scantiest means; next that he was self-disciplined to the last degree
+in respect of pleasures; lastly that he was so formidable in debate that
+there was no antagonist he could not twist round his little finger. Such
+being their views, and such the character of the pair, which is the more
+probable: that they sought the society of Socrates because they felt the
+fascination of his life, and were attracted by the bearing of the man?
+or because they thought, if only we are leagued with him we shall become
+adepts in statecraft and unrivalled in the arts of speech and action?
+For my part I believe that if the choice from Heaven had been given them
+to live such a life as they saw Socrates living to its close, or to die,
+they would both have chosen death.
+
+Their acts are a conclusive witness to their characters. They no sooner
+felt themselves to be the masters of those they came in contact with
+than they sprang aside from Socrates and plunged into that whirl of
+politics but for which they might never have sought his society.
+
+It may be objected: before giving his companions lessons in politics
+Socrates had better have taught them sobriety. (6) Without disputing the
+principle, I would point out that a teacher cannot fail to discover to
+his pupils his method of carrying out his own precepts, and this along
+with argumentative encouragement. Now I know that Socrates disclosed
+himself to his companions as a beautiful and noble being, who would
+reason and debate with them concerning virtue and other human interests
+in the noblest manner. And of these two I know that as long as they were
+companions of Socrates even they were temperate, not assuredly from fear
+of being fined or beaten by Socrates, but because they were persuaded
+for the nonce of the excellence of such conduct.
+
+ (6) {sophrosune} = "sound-mindedness," "temperence." See below, IV.
+ iii. 1.
+
+Perhaps some self-styled philosophers (7) may here answer: "Nay, the man
+truly just can never become unjust, the temperate man can never become
+intemperate, the man who has learnt any subject of knowledge can
+never be as though he had learnt it not." That, however, is not my own
+conclusion. It is with the workings of the soul as with those of the
+body; want of exercise of the organ leads to inability of function, here
+bodily, there spiritual, so that we can neither do the things that
+we should nor abstain from the things we should not. And that is why
+fathers keep their sons, however temperate they may be, out of the reach
+of wicked men, considering that if the society of the good is a training
+in virtue so also is the society of the bad its dissolution.
+
+ (7) In reference to some such tenet as that of Antisthenes ap. Diog.
+ Laert. VI. ix. 30, {areskei d' autois kai ten areten didakten
+ einai, katha phesin 'Antisthenes en to 'Rraklei kai anapobleton
+ uparkhein}. Cf. Plat. "Protag." 340 D, 344 D.
+
+To this the poet (8) is a witness, who says:
+
+ "From the noble thou shalt be instructed in nobleness; but, and if
+ thou minglest with the base thou wilt destroy what wisdom thou
+ hast now";
+
+And he (9) who says:
+
+ "But the good man has his hour of baseness as well as his hour of
+ virtue"--
+
+to whose testimony I would add my own. For I see that it is impossible
+to remember a long poem without practice and repetition; so is
+forgetfulness of the words of instruction engendered in the heart
+that has ceased to value them. With the words of warning fades the
+recollection of the very condition of mind in which the soul yearned
+after holiness; and once forgetting this, what wonder that the man
+should let slip also the memory of virtue itself! Again I see that a man
+who falls into habits of drunkenness or plunges headlong into licentious
+love, loses his old power of practising the right and abstaining from
+the wrong. Many a man who has found frugality easy whilst passion was
+cold, no sooner falls in love than he loses the faculty at once, and in
+his prodigal expenditure of riches he will no longer withhold his hand
+from gains which in former days were too base to invite his touch. Where
+then is the difficulty of supposing that a man may be temperate to-day,
+and to-morrow the reverse; or that he who once has had it in his power
+to act virtuously may not quite lose that power? (10) To myself, at all
+events, it seems that all beautiful and noble things are the result
+of constant practice and training; and pre-eminently the virtue of
+temperance, seeing that in one and the same bodily frame pleasures are
+planted and spring up side by side with the soul and keep whispering in
+her ear, "Have done with self-restraint, make haste to gratify us and
+the body." (11)
+
+ (8) Theognis, 35, 36. See "Symp." ii. 4; Plat. "Men." 95 D.
+
+ (9) The author is unknown. See Plat. "Protag." l.c.
+
+ (10) Cf. "Cyrop." V. i. 9 foll.; VI. i. 41.
+
+ (11) See my remarks, "Hellenica Essays," p. 371 foll.
+
+But to return to Critias and Alcibiades, I repeat that as long as they
+lived with Socrates they were able by his support to dominate their
+ignoble appetites; (12) but being separated from him, Critias had to
+fly to Thessaly, (13) where he consorted with fellows better versed in
+lawlessness than justice. And Alcibiades fared no better. His personal
+beauty on the one hand incited bevies of fine ladies (14) to hunt him
+down as fair spoil, while on the other hand his influence in the state
+and among the allies exposed him to the corruption of many an adept in
+the arts of flattery; honoured by the democracy and stepping easily
+to the front rank he behaved like an athlete who in the games of the
+Palaestra is so assured of victory that he neglects his training; thus
+he presently forgot the duty which he owed himself.
+
+ (12) Cf. (Plat.) "Theag." 130 A.
+
+ (13) See "Hell." II. iii. 36.
+
+ (14) Cf. Plut. "Ages.," "Alcib."
+
+Such were the misadventures of these two. Is the sequel extraordinary?
+Inflated with the pride of ancestry, (15) exalted by their wealth,
+puffed up by power, sapped to the soul's core by a host of human
+tempters, separate moreover for many a long day from Socrates--what
+wonder that they reached the full stature of arrogancy! And for the
+offences of these two Socrates is to be held responsible! The accuser
+will have it so. But for the fact that in early days, when they
+were both young and of an age when dereliction from good feeling and
+self-restraint might have been expected, this same Socrates kept them
+modest and well-behaved, not one word of praise is uttered by the
+accuser for all this. That is not the measure of justice elsewhere
+meted. Would a master of the harp or flute, would a teacher of any sort
+who has turned out proficient pupils, be held to account because one of
+them goes away to another teacher and turns out to be a failure? Or what
+father, if he have a son who in the society of a certain friend remains
+an honest lad, but falling into the company of some other becomes
+a good-for-nothing, will that father straightway accuse the earlier
+instructor? Will not he rather, in proportion as the boy deteriorates in
+the company of the latter, bestow more heartfelt praise upon the former?
+What father, himself sharing the society of his own children, is held to
+blame for their transgressions, if only his own goodness be established?
+Here would have been a fair test to apply to Socrates: Was he guilty of
+any base conduct himself? If so let him be set down as a knave, but if,
+on the contrary, he never faltered in sobriety from beginning to end,
+how in the name of justice is he to be held to account for a baseness
+which was not in him?
+
+ (15) Or, "became overweening in arrogance." Cf. "Henry VIII. II. iv.
+ 110": "But your heart is crammed with arrogancy, spleen, and
+ pride."
+
+I go further: if, short of being guilty of any wrong himself, he saw
+the evil doings of others with approval, reason were he should be held
+blameworthy. Listen then: Socrates was well aware that Critias was
+attached to Euthydemus, (16) aware too that he was endeavouring to deal
+by him after the manner of those wantons whose love is carnal of the
+body. From this endeavour he tried to deter him, pointing out how
+illiberal a thing it was, how ill befitting a man of honour to appear
+as a beggar before him whom he loved, in whose eyes he would fain be
+precious, ever petitioning for something base to give and base to get.
+
+ (16) See below, IV. ii. 1 (if the same person).
+
+But when this reasoning fell on deaf ears and Critias refused to be
+turned aside, Socrates, as the story goes, took occasion of the presence
+of a whole company and of Euthydemus to remark that Critias appeared to
+be suffering from a swinish affection, or else why this desire to rub
+himself against Euthydemus like a herd of piglings scraping against
+stones.
+
+The hatred of Critias to Socrates doubtless dates from this incident.
+He treasured it up against him, and afterwards, when he was one of the
+Thirty and associated with Charicles as their official lawgiver, (17)
+he framed the law against teaching the art of words (18) merely from a
+desire to vilify Socrates. He was at a loss to know how else to lay hold
+of him except by levelling against him the vulgar charge (19) against
+philosophers, by which he hoped to prejudice him with the public. It
+was a charge quite unfounded as regards Socrates, if I may judge from
+anything I ever heard fall from his lips myself or have learnt about him
+from others. But the animus of Critias was clear. At the time when the
+Thirty were putting citizens, highly respectable citizens, to death
+wholesale, and when they were egging on one man after another to the
+commission of crime, Socrates let fall an observation: "It would be
+sufficiently extraordinary if the keeper of a herd of cattle (20) who
+was continually thinning and impoverishing his cattle did not admit
+himself to be a sorry sort of herdsman, but that a ruler of the state
+who was continually thinning and impoverishing the citizens should
+neither be ashamed nor admit himself to be a sorry sort of ruler was
+more extraordinary still." The remark being reported to the government,
+Socrates was summoned by Critias and Charicles, who proceeded to point
+out the law and forbade him to converse with the young. "Was it open to
+him," Socrates inquired of the speaker, "in case he failed to understand
+their commands in any point, to ask for an explanation?"
+
+ (17) Lit. "Nomothetes." See "Hell." II. iii. 2; Dem. 706. For
+ Charicles see Lys. "c. Eratosth." S. 56; Aristot. "Pol." v. 6. 6.
+
+ (18) See Diog. Laert. II. v. ("Socr.")
+
+ (19) i.e. {to ton etto logon kreitto poiein}, "of making the worse
+ appear the better cause." Cf. Arist. "Clouds."
+
+ (20) See Dio Chrys. "Or." 43.
+
+"Certainly," the two assented.
+
+Then Socrates: I am prepared to obey the laws, but to avoid
+transgression of the law through ignorance I need instruction: is it on
+the supposition that the art of words tends to correctness of statement
+or to incorrectness that you bid us abstain from it? for if the former,
+it is clear we must abstain from speaking correctly, but if the latter,
+our endeavour should be to amend our speech.
+
+To which Charicles, in a fit of temper, retorted: In consideration of
+your ignorance, (21) Socrates, we will frame the prohibition in
+language better suited to your intelligence: we forbid you to hold any
+conversation whatsoever with the young.
+
+ (21) See Aristot. "de Soph. El." 183 b7.
+
+Then Socrates: To avoid all ambiguity then, or the possibility of my
+doing anything else than what you are pleased to command, may I ask you
+to define up to what age a human being is to be considered young?
+
+For just so long a time (Charicles answered) as he is debarred from
+sitting as a member of the Council, (22) as not having attained to the
+maturity of wisdom; accordingly you will not hold converse with any one
+under the age of thirty.
+
+ (22) The Boule or Senate. See W. L. Newman, "Pol. Aristot." i. 326.
+
+Soc. In making a purchase even, I am not to ask, what is the price of
+this? if the vendor is under the age of thirty?
+
+Cha. Tut, things of that sort: but you know, Socrates, that you have
+a way of asking questions, when all the while you know how the matter
+stands. Let us have no questions of that sort.
+
+Soc. Nor answers either, I suppose, if the inquiry concerns what I know,
+as, for instance, where does Charicles live? or where is Critias to be
+found?
+
+Oh yes, of course, things of that kind (replied Charicles), while
+Critias added: But at the same time you had better have done with your
+shoemakers, carpenters, and coppersmiths. (23) These must be pretty well
+trodden out at heel by this time, considering the circulation you have
+given them.
+
+ (23) Cf. Plat. "Gorg." 491 A; "Symp." 221 E; Dio Chrys. "Or." 55, 560
+ D, 564 A.
+
+Soc. And am I to hold away from their attendant topics also--the just,
+the holy, and the like?
+
+Most assuredly (answered Charicles), and from cowherds in particular; or
+else see that you do not lessen the number of the herd yourself.
+
+Thus the secret was out. The remark of Socrates about the cattle had
+come to their ears, and they could not forgive the author of it.
+
+Perhaps enough has been said to explain the kind of intimacy which
+had subsisted between Critias and Socrates, and their relation to one
+another. But I will venture to maintain that where the teacher is not
+pleasing to the pupil there is no education. Now it cannot be said of
+Critias and Alcibiades that they associated with Socrates because they
+found him pleasing to them. And this is true of the whole period. From
+the first their eyes were fixed on the headship of the state as their
+final goal. During the time of their intimacy with Socrates there were
+no disputants whom they were more eager to encounter than professed
+politicians.
+
+Thus the story is told of Alcibiades--how before the age of twenty he
+engaged his own guardian, Pericles, at that time prime minister of the
+state, in a discussion concerning laws.
+
+Alc. Please, Pericles, can you teach me what a law is?
+
+Per. To be sure I can.
+
+Alc. I should be so much obliged if you would do so. One so often hears
+the epithet "law-abiding" applied in a complimentary sense; yet, it
+strikes me, one hardly deserves the compliment, if one does not know
+what a law is.
+
+Per. Fortunately there is a ready answer to your difficulty. You wish to
+know what a law is? Well, those are laws which the majority, being met
+together in conclave, approve and enact as to what it is right to do,
+and what it is right to abstain from doing.
+
+Alc. Enact on the hypothesis that it is right to do what is good? or to
+do what is bad?
+
+Per. What is good, to be sure, young sir, not what is bad.
+
+Alc. Supposing it is not the majority, but, as in the case of an
+oligarchy, the minority, who meet and enact the rules of conduct, what
+are these?
+
+Per. Whatever the ruling power of the state after deliberation enacts as
+our duty to do, goes by the name of laws.
+
+Alc. Then if a tyrant, holding the chief power in the state, enacts
+rules of conduct for the citizens, are these enactments law?
+
+Per. Yes, anything which a tyrant as head of the state enacts, also goes
+by the name of law.
+
+Alc. But, Pericles, violence and lawlessness--how do we define them?
+Is it not when a stronger man forces a weaker to do what seems right to
+him--not by persuasion but by compulsion?
+
+Per. I should say so.
+
+Alc. It would seem to follow that if a tyrant, without persuading
+the citizens, drives them by enactment to do certain things--that is
+lawlessness?
+
+Per. You are right; and I retract the statement that measures passed by
+a tyrant without persuasion of the citizens are law.
+
+Alc. And what of measures passed by a minority, not by persuasion of the
+majority, but in the exercise of its power only? Are we, or are we not,
+to apply the term violence to these?
+
+Per. I think that anything which any one forces another to do without
+persuasion, whether by enactment or not, is violence rather than law.
+
+Alc. It would seem that everything which the majority, in the exercise
+of its power over the possessors of wealth, and without persuading them,
+chooses to enact, is of the nature of violence rather than of law?
+
+To be sure (answered Pericles), adding: At your age we were clever hands
+at such quibbles ourselves. It was just such subtleties which we used to
+practise our wits upon; as you do now, if I mistake not.
+
+To which Alcibiades replied: Ah, Pericles, I do wish we could have met
+in those days when you were at your cleverest in such matters.
+
+Well, then, as soon as the desired superiority over the politicians of
+the day seemed to be attained, Critias and Alcibiades turned their backs
+on Socrates. They found his society unattractive, not to speak of the
+annoyance of being cross-questioned on their own shortcomings. Forthwith
+they devoted themselves to those affairs of state but for which they
+would never have come near him at all.
+
+No; if one would seek to see true companions of Socrates, one must
+look to Crito, (24) and Chaerephon, and Chaerecrates, to Hermogenes,
+to Simmias and Cebes, to Phaedondes and others, who clung to him not to
+excel in the rhetoric of the Assembly or the law-courts, but with the
+nobler ambition of attaining to such beauty and goodliness of soul as
+would enable them to discharge the various duties of life to house and
+family, to relatives and friends, to fellow-citizens, and to the state
+at large. Of these true followers not one in youth or old age was ever
+guilty, or thought guilty, of committing any evil deed.
+
+ (24) For these true followers, familiar to us in the pages of Plato,
+ ("Crito," "Apol.," "Phaedo," etc) see Cobet, "Pros. Xen."
+
+"But for all that," the accuser insists, "Socrates taught sons to pour
+contumely upon their fathers (25) by persuading his young friends that
+he could make them wiser than their sires, or by pointing out that
+the law allowed a son to sue his father for aberration of mind, and to
+imprison him, which legal ordinance he put in evidence to prove that it
+might be well for the wiser to imprison the more ignorant."
+
+ (25) See "Apol." 20; Arist. "Clouds," 1407, where Pheidippides "drags
+ his father Strepsiades through the mire."
+
+Now what Socrates held was, that if a man may with justice incarcerate
+another for no better cause than a form of folly or ignorance, this same
+person could not justly complain if he in his turn were kept in bonds by
+his superiors in knowledge; and to come to the bottom of such questions,
+to discover the difference between madness and ignorance was a problem
+which he was perpetually working at. His opinion came to this: If a
+madman may, as a matter of expediency to himself and his friends, be
+kept in prison, surely, as a matter of justice, the man who knows not
+what he ought to know should be content to sit at the feet of those who
+know, and be taught.
+
+But it was the rest of their kith and kin, not fathers only (according
+to the accuser), whom Socrates dishonoured in the eyes of his circle
+of followers, when he said that "the sick man or the litigant does not
+derive assistance from his relatives, (26) but from his doctor in the
+one case, and his legal adviser in the other." "Listen further to his
+language about friends," says the accuser: "'What is the good of their
+being kindly disposed, unless they can be of some practical use to you?
+Mere goodness of disposition is nothing; those only are worthy of
+honour who combine with the knowledge of what is right the faculty of
+expounding it;' (27) and so by bringing the young to look upon himself
+as a superlatively wise person gifted with an extraordinary capacity for
+making others wise also, he so worked on the dispositions of those who
+consorted with him that in their esteem the rest of the world counted
+for nothing by comparison with Socrates."
+
+ (26) See Grote, "H. G." v. 535.
+
+ (27) Cf. Thuc. ii. 60. Pericles says, "Yet I with whom you are so
+ angry venture to say of myself, that I am as capable as any one of
+ devising and explaining a sound policy."--Jowett.
+
+Now I admit the language about fathers and the rest of a man's
+relations. I can go further, and add some other sayings of his, that
+"when the soul (which is alone the indwelling centre of intelligence)
+is gone out of a man, be he our nearest and dearest friend, we carry the
+body forth and bury it out of sight." "Even in life," he used to say,
+"each of us is ready to part with any portion of his best possession--to
+wit, his own body--if it be useless and unprofitable. He will remove it
+himself, or suffer another to do so in his stead. Thus men cut off their
+own nails, hair, or corns; they allow surgeons to cut and cauterise
+them, not without pains and aches, and are so grateful to the doctor for
+his services that they further give him a fee. Or again, a man ejects
+the spittle from his mouth as far as possible. (28) Why? Because it is
+of no use while it stays within the system, but is detrimental rather."
+
+ (28) See Aristot. "Eth. Eud." vii. 1.
+
+Now by these instances his object was not to inculcate the duty of
+burying one's father alive or of cutting oneself to bits, but to show
+that lack of intelligence means lack of worth; (29) and so he called
+upon his hearers to be as sensible and useful as they could be, so that,
+be it father or brother or any one else whose esteem he would deserve,
+a man should not hug himself in careless self-interest, trusting to mere
+relationship, but strive to be useful to those whose esteem he coveted.
+
+ (29) i.e. "witless and worthless are synonymous."
+
+But (pursues the accuser) by carefully culling the most immoral
+passages of the famous poets, and using them as evidences, he taught his
+associates to be evildoers and tyrranical: the line of Hesiod (30) for
+instance--
+
+ No work is a disgrace; slackness of work is the disgrace--
+
+"interpreted," says the accuser, "by Socrates as if the poet enjoined us
+to abstain from no work wicked or ignoble; do everything for the sake of
+gain."
+
+ (30) "Works and Days," 309 {'Ergon d' ouden oneidos}. Cf. Plat.
+ "Charm." 163 C.
+
+Now while Socrates would have entirely admitted the propositions that
+"it is a blessing and a benefit to a man to be a worker," and that "a
+lazy do-nothing is a pestilent evil," that "work is good and idleness
+a curse," the question arises, whom did he mean by workers? In his
+vocabulary only those were good workmen (31) who were engaged on good
+work; dicers and gamblers and others engaged on any other base and
+ruinous business he stigmatised as the "idle drones"; and from this
+point of view the quotation from Hesiod is unimpeachable--
+
+ No work is a disgrace; only idlesse is disgrace.
+
+But there was a passage from Homer (32) for ever on his lips, as the
+accuser tells us--the passage which says concerning Odysseus,
+
+ What prince, or man of name,
+ He found flight-giv'n, he would restrain with words of gentlest blame:
+ "Good sir, it fits you not to fly, or fare as one afraid,
+ You should not only stay yourself, but see the people stayed."
+
+ Thus he the best sort us'd; the worst, whose spirits brake out in
+ noise, (33) He cudgell'd with his sceptre, chid, and said, "Stay,
+ wretch, be still, And hear thy betters; thou art base, and both in
+ power and skill Poor and unworthy, without name in counsel or in
+ war." We must not all be kings.
+
+ (31) See below, III. ix. 9.
+
+ (32) "Il." ii. 188 foll., 199 foll. (so Chapman).
+
+ (33) Lit. "But whatever man of the people he saw and found him
+ shouting."--W. Leaf.
+
+The accuser informs us that Socrates interpreted these lines as though
+the poet approved the giving of blows to commoners and poor folk. Now
+no such remark was ever made by Socrates; which indeed would have been
+tantamount to maintaining that he ought to be beaten himself. What he
+did say was, that those who were useful neither in word nor deed, who
+were incapable of rendering assistance in time of need to the army or
+the state or the people itself, be they never so wealthy, ought to be
+restrained, and especially if to incapacity they added effrontery.
+
+As to Socrates, he was the very opposite of all this--he was plainly
+a lover of the people, and indeed of all mankind. Though he had many
+ardent admirers among citizens and strangers alike, he never demanded
+any fee for his society from any one, (34) but bestowed abundantly upon
+all alike of the riches of his soul--good things, indeed, of which
+fragments accepted gratis at his hands were taken and sold at high
+prices to the rest of the community by some, (35) who were not, as he
+was, lovers of the people, since with those who had not money to give in
+return they refused to discourse. But of Socrates be it said that in
+the eyes of the whole world he reflected more honour on the state and a
+richer lustre than ever Lichas, (36) whose fame is proverbial, shed
+on Lacedaemon. Lichas feasted and entertained the foreign residents in
+Lacedaemon at the Gymnopaediae most handsomely. Socrates gave a lifetime
+to the outpouring of his substance in the shape of the greatest benefits
+bestowed on all who cared to receive them. In other words, he made
+those who lived in his society better men, and sent them on their way
+rejoicing.
+
+ (34) See "Symp." iv. 43; Plat. "Hipp. maj." 300 D; "Apol." 19 E.
+
+ (35) See Diog. Laert. II. viii. 1.
+
+ (36) See "Hell." III. ii. 21; Thuc. v. 50; Plut. "Cim." 284 C. For the
+ Gymnopaediae, see Paus. III. xi. 9; Athen. xiv. p. 631.
+
+To no other conclusion, therefore, can I come but that, being so good a
+man, Socrates was worthier to have received honour from the state than
+death. And this I take to be the strictly legal view of the case, for
+what does the law require? (37) "If a man be proved to be a thief, a
+filcher of clothes, a cut-purse, a housebreaker, a man-stealer, a robber
+of temples, the penalty is death." Even so; and of all men Socrates
+stood most aloof from such crimes.
+
+ (37) See "Symp." iv. 36; Plat. "Rep." 575 B; "Gorg." 508 E.
+
+To the state he was never the cause of any evil--neither disaster in
+war, nor faction, nor treason, nor any other mischief whatsoever. And if
+his public life was free from all offence, so was his private. He never
+hurt a single soul either by deprivation of good or infliction of evil,
+nor did he ever lie under the imputation of any of those misdoings.
+where then is his liability to the indictment to be found? Who, so
+far from disbelieving in the gods, as set forth in the indictment, was
+conspicuous beyond all men for service to heaven; so far from corrupting
+the young--a charge alleged with insistence by the prosecutor--was
+notorious for the zeal with which he strove not only to stay his
+associates from evil desires, but to foster in them a passionate desire
+for that loveliest and queenliest of virtues without which states and
+families crumble to decay. (38) Such being his conduct, was he not
+worthy of high honour from the state of Athens?
+
+ (38) Or, "the noblest and proudest virtue by means of which states and
+ families are prosperously directed."
+
+
+III
+
+It may serve to illustrate the assertion that he benefited his
+associates partly by the display of his own virtue and partly by verbal
+discourse and argument, if I set down my various recollections (1)
+on these heads. And first with regard to religion and the concerns of
+heaven. In conduct and language his behaviour conformed to the rule laid
+down by the Pythia (2) in reply to the question, "How shall we act?" as
+touching a sacrifice or the worship of ancestors, or any similar point.
+Her answer is: "Act according to the law and custom of your state, and
+you will act piously." After this pattern Socrates behaved himself, and
+so he exhorted others to behave, holding them to be but busybodies and
+vain fellows who acted on any different principle.
+
+ (1) Hence the title of the work, {'Apomenmoneumata}, "Recollections,
+ Memoirs, Memorabilia." See Diog. Laert. "Xen." II. vi. 48.
+
+ (2) The Pythia at Delphi.
+
+His formula or prayer was simple: "Give me that which is best for me,"
+for, said he, the gods know best what good things are--to pray for gold
+or silver or despotic power were no better than to make some particular
+throw at dice or stake in battle or any such thing the subject of
+prayer, of which the future consequences are manifestly uncertain. (3)
+
+ (3) See (Plat.) "Alcib. II." 142 foll.; Valerius Max. vii. 2;
+ "Spectator," No. 207.
+
+If with scant means he offered but small sacrifices he believed that he
+was in no wise inferior to those who make frequent and large sacrifices
+from an ampler store. It were ill surely for the very gods themselves,
+could they take delight in large sacrifices rather than in small, else
+oftentimes must the offerings of bad men be found acceptable rather
+than of good; nor from the point of view of men themselves would life
+be worth living if the offerings of a villain rather than of a righteous
+man found favour in the sight of Heaven. His belief was that the joy of
+the gods is greater in proportion to the holiness of the giver, and he
+was ever an admirer of that line of Hesiod which says,
+
+ According to thine ability do sacrifice to the immortal gods. (4)
+
+ (4) Hesiod, "Works and Days," 336. See "Anab." III. ii. 9.
+
+"Yes," he would say, "in our dealings with friends and strangers alike,
+and in reference to the demands of life in general, there is no better
+motto for a man than that: 'let a man do according to his ability.'"
+
+Or to take another point. If it appeared to him that a sign from
+heaven had been given him, nothing would have induced him to go against
+heavenly warning: he would as soon have been persuaded to accept the
+guidance of a blind man ignorant of the path to lead him on a journey
+in place of one who knew the road and could see; and so he denounced the
+folly of others who do things contrary to the warnings of God in order
+to avoid some disrepute among men. For himself he despised all human
+aids by comparison with counsel from above.
+
+The habit and style of living to which he subjected his soul and body
+was one which under ordinary circumstances (5) would enable any one
+adopting it to look existence cheerily in the face and to pass his days
+serenely: it would certainly entail no difficulties as regards expense.
+So frugal was it that a man must work little indeed who could not earn
+the quantum which contented Socrates. Of food he took just enough
+to make eating a pleasure--the appetite he brought to it was sauce
+sufficient; while as to drinks, seeing that he only drank when thirsty,
+any draught refreshed. (6) If he accepted an invitation to dinner, he
+had no difficulty in avoiding the common snare of over-indulgence, and
+his advice to people who could not equally control their appetite was to
+avoid taking what would allure them to eat if not hungry or to drink if
+not thirsty. (7) Such things are ruinous to the constitution, he said,
+bad for stomachs, brains, and soul alike; or as he used to put it, with
+a touch of sarcasm, (8) "It must have been by feasting men on so many
+dainty dishes that Circe produced her pigs; only Odysseus through his
+continency and the 'promptings (9) of Hermes' abstained from touching
+them immoderately, and by the same token did not turn into a swine." So
+much for this topic, which he touched thus lightly and yet seriously.
+
+ (5) {ei me ti daimonion eie}, "save under some divinely-ordained
+ calamity." Cf. "Cyrop." I. vi. 18; "Symp." viii. 43.
+
+ (6) See "Ages." ix; Cic. "Tusc." v. 34, 97; "de Fin." ii. 28, 90.
+
+ (7) Cf. Plut. "Mor." 128 D; Clement, "Paedag." 2. 173, 33; "Strom." 2,
+ 492, 24; Aelian, "N. A." 8, 9.
+
+ (8) "Half in gibe and half in jest," in ref. to "Od." x. 233 foll.:
+ "So she let them in..."
+
+ (9) {upothemosune}, "inspiration." Cf. "Il." xv. 412; "Od." xvi. 233.
+
+But as to the concerns of Aphrodite, his advice was to hold strongly
+aloof from the fascination of fair forms: once lay finger on these
+and it is not easy to keep a sound head and a sober mind. To take a
+particular case. It was a mere kiss which, as he had heard, Critobulus
+(10) had some time given to a fair youth, the son of Alcibiades. (11)
+Accordingly Critobulus being present, Socrates propounded the question.
+
+ (10) For Critobulus (the son of Crito) see "Econ." i. 1 foll.; "Symp."
+ i. 3 foll.
+
+ (11) See Isocr. "Or." xvi. Cobet conj. {ton tou 'Axiokhou uion}, i.e.
+ Clinias.
+
+Soc. Tell me, Xenophon, have you not always believed Critobulus to be a
+man of sound sense, not wild and self-willed? Should you not have said
+that he was remarkable for his prudence rather than thoughtless or
+foolhardy?
+
+Xen. Certainly that is what I should have said of him.
+
+Soc. Then you are now to regard him as quite the reverse--a hot-blooded,
+reckless libertine: this is the sort of man to throw somersaults into
+knives, (12) or to leap into the jaws of fire.
+
+ (12) Cf. "Symp." ii. 10, iv. 16. See Schneider ad loc.
+
+Xen. And what have you seen him doing, that you give him so bad a
+character?
+
+Soc. Doing? Why, has not the fellow dared to steal a kiss from the son
+of Alcibiades, most fair of youths and in the golden prime?
+
+Xen. Nay, then, if that is the foolhardy adventure, it is a danger which
+I could well encounter myself.
+
+Soc. Poor soul! and what do you expect your fate to be after that
+kiss? Let me tell you. On the instant you will lose your freedom, the
+indenture of your bondage will be signed; it will be yours on compulsion
+to spend large sums on hurtful pleasures; you will have scarcely a
+moment's leisure left for any noble study; you will be driven to concern
+yourself most zealously with things which no man, not even a madman,
+would choose to make an object of concern.
+
+Xen. O Heracles! how fell a power to reside in a kiss!
+
+Soc. Does it surprise you? Do you not know that the tarantula, which is
+no bigger than a threepenny bit, (13) has only to touch the mouth and it
+will afflict its victim with pains and drive him out of his senses.
+
+ (13) Lit. "a half-obol piece." For the {phalaggion} see Aristot. "H.
+ A." ix. 39, 1.
+
+Xen. Yes, but then the creature injects something with its bite.
+
+Soc. Ah, fool! and do you imagine that these lovely creatures infuse
+nothing with their kiss, simply because you do not see the poison? Do
+you not know that this wild beast which men call beauty in its bloom is
+all the more terrible than the tarantula in that the insect must first
+touch its victim, but this at a mere glance of the beholder, without even
+contact, will inject something into him--yards away--which will make
+him man. And may be that is why the Loves are called "archers," because
+these beauties wound so far off. (14) But my advice to you, Xenophon,
+is, whenever you catch sight of one of these fair forms, to run
+helter-skelter for bare life without a glance behind; and to you,
+Critobulus, I would say, "Go abroad for a year: so long time will it
+take to heal you of this wound."
+
+ (14) L. Dindorf, etc. regard the sentence as a gloss. Cf. "Symp." iv.
+ 26 ({isos de kai... entimoteron estin}).
+
+Such (he said), in the affairs of Aphrodite, as in meats and drinks,
+should be the circumspection of all whose footing is insecure. At least
+they should confine themselves to such diet as the soul would dispense
+with, save for some necessity of the body; and which even so ought
+to set up no disturbance. (15) But for himself, it was clear, he was
+prepared at all points and invulnerable. He found less difficulty in
+abstaining from beauty's fairest and fullest bloom than many others from
+weeds and garbage. To sum up: (16) with regard to eating and drinking
+and these other temptations of the sense, the equipment of his soul made
+him independent; he could boast honestly that in his moderate fashion
+(17) his pleasures were no less than theirs who take such trouble to
+procure them, and his pains far fewer.
+
+ (15) Cf. "Symp." iv. 38.
+
+ (16) L. Dindorf (brackets) this passage as spurious.
+
+ (17) On the principle "enough is as good as a feast," {arkountos}.
+
+
+IV
+
+A belief is current, in accordance with views maintained concerning
+Socrates in speech and writing, and in either case conjecturally, that,
+however powerful he may have been in stimulating men to virtue as a
+theorist, he was incapable of acting as their guide himself. (1) It
+would be well for those who adopt this view to weigh carefully not only
+what Socrates effected "by way of castigation" in cross-questioning
+whose who conceived themselves to be possessed of all knowledge, but
+also his everyday conversation with those who spent their time in close
+intercourse with himself. Having done this, let them decide whether he
+was incapable of making his companions better.
+
+ (1) Al. "If any one believes that Socrates, as represented in certain
+ dialogues (e.g. of Plato, Antisthenes, etc.) of an imaginary
+ character, was an adept ({protrepsasthai}) in the art of
+ stimulating people to virtue negatively but scarcely the man to
+ guide ({proagein}) his hearers on the true path himself." Cf.
+ (Plat.) "Clitophon," 410 B; Cic. "de Or." I. xlvii. 204; Plut.
+ "Mor." 798 B. See Grote, "Plato," iii. 21; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 51
+ foll.; Cf. below, IV. iii. 2.
+
+I will first state what I once heard fall from his lips in a discussion
+with Aristodemus, (2) "the little," as he was called, on the topic of
+divinity. (3) Socrates had observed that Aristodemus neither sacrificed
+nor gave heed to divination, but on the contrary was disposed to
+ridicule those who did.
+
+ (2) See Plat. "Symp." 173 B: "He was a little fellow who never wore
+ any shoes, Aristodemus, of the deme of Cydathenaeum."--Jowett.
+
+ (3) Or, "the divine element."
+
+So tell me, Aristodemus (he began), are there any human beings who have
+won your admiration for their wisdom?
+
+Ar. There are.
+
+Soc. Would you mention to us their names?
+
+Ar. In the writings of epic poetry I have the greatest admiration for
+Homer.... And as a dithyrambic poet for Melanippides. (4) I admire also
+Sophocles as a tragedian, Polycleitus as a sculptor, and Zeuxis as a
+painter.
+
+ (4) Melanippides, 430 B.C. See Cobet, "Pros. Xen." s.n.
+
+Soc. Which would you consider the more worthy of admiration, a fashioner
+of senseless images devoid of motion or one who could fashion living
+creatures endowed with understanding and activity?
+
+Ar. Decidedly the latter, provided his living creatures owed their birth
+to design and were not the offspring of some chance.
+
+Soc. But now if you had two sorts of things, the one of which presents
+no clue as to what it is for, and the other is obviously for some useful
+purpose--which would you judge to be the result of chance, which of
+design?
+
+Ar. Clearly that which is produced for some useful end is the work of
+design.
+
+Soc. Does it not strike you then that he who made man from the beginning
+(5) did for some useful end furnish him with his several senses--giving
+him eyes to behold the visible word, and ears to catch the intonations
+of sound? Or again, what good would there be in odours if nostrils had
+not been bestowed upon us? what perception of sweet things and pungent,
+and of all the pleasures of the palate, had not a tongue been fashioned
+in us as an interpreter of the same? And besides all this, do you
+not think this looks like a matter of foresight, this closing of the
+delicate orbs of sight with eyelids as with folding doors, which, when
+there is need to use them for any purpose, can be thrown wide open and
+firmly closed again in sleep? and, that even the winds of heaven may not
+visit them too roughly, this planting of the eyelashes as a protecting
+screen? (6) this coping of the region above the eyes with cornice-work
+of eyebrow so that no drop of sweat fall from the head and injure them?
+again this readiness of the ear to catch all sounds and yet not to be
+surcharged? this capacity of the front teeth of all animals to cut
+and of the "grinders" to receive the food and reduce it to pulp? the
+position of the mouth again, close to the eyes and nostrils as a portal
+of ingress for all the creature's supplies? and lastly, seeing that
+matter passing out (7) of the body is unpleasant, this hindward
+direction of the passages, and their removal to a distance from the
+avenues of sense? I ask you, when you see all these things constructed
+with such show of foresight can you doubt whether they are products of
+chance or intelligence?
+
+ (5) Cf. Aristot. "de Part. Animal." 1. For the "teleological" views
+ see IV. iii. 2 foll.
+
+ (6) "Like a sieve" or "colander."
+
+ (7) "That which goeth out of a man."
+
+Ar. To be sure not! Viewed in this light they would seem to be the
+handiwork of some wise artificer, (8) full of love for all things
+living. (9)
+
+ (8) "Demiurge."
+
+ (9) Passage referred to by Epictetus ap. Stob. "Flor." 121, 29.
+
+Soc. What shall we say of this passion implanted in man to beget
+offspring, this passion in the mother to rear her babe, and in the
+creature itself, once born, this deep desire of life and fear of death?
+
+Ar. No doubt these do look like the contrivances of some one
+deliberately planning the existence of living creatures.
+
+Soc. Well, and doubtless you feel to have a spark of wisdom yourself?
+
+Ar. Put your questions, and I will answer.
+
+Soc. And yet you imagine that elsewhere no spark of wisdom is to be
+found? And that, too, when you know that you have in your body a tiny
+fragment only of the mighty earth, a little drop of the great waters,
+and of the other elements, vast in their extent, you got, I presume,
+a particle of each towards the compacting of your bodily frame? Mind
+alone, it would seem, which is nowhere to be found, (10) you had the
+lucky chance to snatch up and make off with, you cannot tell how. And
+these things around and about us, enormous in size, infinite in number,
+owe their orderly arrangement, as you suppose, to some vacuity of wit?
+
+ (10) Cf. Plat. "Phileb." 30 B: "Soc. May our body be said to have a
+ soul? Pro. Clearly. Soc. And whence comes that soul, my dear
+ Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains
+ elements similar to our bodies but finer, has also a soul? Can
+ there be any other source?"--Jowett. Cic. "de N. D." ii. 6; iii.
+ 11.
+
+Ar. It may be, for my eyes fail to see the master agents of these, as
+one sees the fabricators of things produced on earth.
+
+Soc. No more do you see your own soul, which is the master agent of your
+body; so that, as far as that goes, you may maintain, if you like, that
+you do nothing with intelligence, (11) but everything by chance.
+
+ (11) Or, "by your wit," {gnome}.
+
+At this point Aristodemus: I assure you, Socrates, that I do not disdain
+the Divine power. On the contrary, my belief is that the Divinity is too
+grand to need any service which I could render.
+
+Soc. But the grander that power is, which deigns to tend and wait upon
+you, the more you are called upon to honour it.
+
+Ar. Be well assured, if I could believe the gods take thought for all
+men, I would not neglect them.
+
+Soc. How can you suppose that they do not so take thought? Who, in the
+first place, gave to man alone of living creatures his erect posture,
+enabling him to see farther in front of him and to contemplate more
+freely the height above, and to be less subject to distress than other
+creatures (endowed like himself with eyes and ears and mouth). (12)
+Consider next how they gave to the beast of the field (13) feet as a
+means of progression only, but to man they gave in addition hands--those
+hands which have achieved so much to raise us in the scale of happiness
+above all animals. Did they not make the tongue also? which belongs
+indeed alike to man and beast, but in man they fashioned it so as to
+play on different parts of the mouth at different times, whereby we can
+produce articulate speech, and have a code of signals to express our
+every want to one another. Or consider the pleasures of the sexual
+appetite; limited in the rest of the animal kingdom to certain seasons,
+but in the case of man a series prolonged unbroken to old age. Nor did
+it content the Godhead merely to watch over the interests of man's body.
+What is of far higher import, he implanted in man the noblest and most
+excellent type of soul. For what other creature, to begin with, has
+a soul to appreciate the existence of the gods who have arranged this
+grand and beauteous universe? What other tribe of animals save man
+can render service to the gods? How apt is the spirit of man to take
+precautions against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, to alleviate
+disease and foster strength! how suited to labour with a view to
+learning! how capable of garnering in the storehouse of his memory all
+that he has heard or seen or understood! Is it not most evident to you
+that by the side of other animals men live and move a race of gods--by
+nature excellent, in beauty of body and of soul supreme? For, mark you,
+had a creature of man's wit been encased in the body of an ox, (14)
+he would have been powerless to carry out his wishes, just as the
+possession of hands divorced from human wit is profitless. And then you
+come, you who have obtained these two most precious attributes, and give
+it as your opinion, that the gods take no thought or care for you. Why,
+what will you have them to do, that you may believe and be persuaded
+that you too are in their thoughts?
+
+ (12) See Kuhner for an attempt to cure the text.
+
+ (13) {erpetois}, a "poetical" word. Cf. "Od." iv. 418; Herod. i. 140.
+
+ (14) See Aristot. "de Part. Animal." iv. 10.
+
+Ar. When they treat me as you tell us they treat you, and send me
+counsellors to warn me what I am to do and what abstain from doing, (15)
+I will believe.
+
+ (15) See IV. iii. 12.
+
+Soc. Send you counsellors! Come now, what when the people of Athens make
+inquiry by oracle, and the gods' answer comes? Are you not an Athenian?
+Think you not that to you also the answer is given? What when they send
+portents to forewarn the states of Hellas? or to all mankind? Are you
+not a man? a Hellene? Are not these intended for you also? Can it be
+that you alone are excepted as a signal instance of Divine neglect?
+Again, do you suppose that the gods could have implanted in the heart
+of man the belief in their capacity to work him weal or woe had they not
+the power? Would not men have discovered the imposture in all this lapse
+of time? Do you not perceive that the wisest and most perdurable of
+human institutions--be they cities or tribes of men--are ever the most
+God-fearing; and in the individual man the riper his age and judgment,
+the deeper his religousness? Ay, my good sir (he broke forth), lay to
+heart and understand that even as your own mind within you can turn and
+dispose of your body as it lists, so ought we to think that the wisdom
+which abides within the universal frame does so dispose of all things as
+it finds agreeable to itself; for hardly may it be that your eye is able
+to range over many a league, but that the eye of God is powerless to
+embrace all things at a glance; or that to your soul it is given to
+dwell in thought on matters here or far away in Egypt or in Sicily,
+but that the wisdom and thought of God is not sufficient to include all
+things at one instant under His care. If only you would copy your
+own behaviour (16) where human beings are concerned. It is by acts of
+service and of kindness that you discover which of your fellows are
+willing to requite you in kind. It is by taking another into your
+counsel that you arrive at the secret of his wisdom. If, on like
+principle, you will but make trial of the gods by acts of service,
+whether they will choose to give you counsel in matters obscure to
+mortal vision, you shall discover the nature and the greatness of
+Godhead to be such that they are able at once to see all things and to
+hear all things and to be present everywhere, nor does the least thing
+escape their watchful care.
+
+ (16) Or, "reason as you are wont to do."
+
+To my mind the effect of words like these was to cause those about him
+to hold aloof from unholiness, baseness, and injustice, not only whilst
+they were seen of men, but even in the solitary place, since they must
+believe that no part of their conduct could escape the eye of Heaven.
+
+
+V
+
+I suppose it may be taken as admitted that self-control is a noble
+acquirement for a man. (1) If so, let us turn and consider whether by
+language like the following he was likely to lead his listeners onwards
+(2) to the attainment of this virtue. "Sirs," he would say, "if a war
+came upon us and we wished to choose a man who would best help us to
+save ourselves and to subdue our enemy, I suppose we should scarcely
+select one whom we knew to be a slave to his belly, to wine, or lust,
+and prone to succumb to toil or sleep. Could we expect such an one to
+save us or to master our foes? Or if one of us were nearing the end of
+his days, and he wished to discover some one to whom he might entrust
+his sons for education, his maiden daughters for protection, and his
+property in general for preservation, would he deem a libertine worthy
+of such offices? Why, no one would dream of entrusting his flocks and
+herds, his storehouses and barns, or the superintendence of his works to
+the tender mercies of an intemperate slave. If a butler or an errand boy
+with such a character were offered to us we would not take him as a free
+gift. And if he would not accept an intemperate slave, what pains should
+the master himself take to avoid that imputation. (3) For with the
+incontinent man it is not as with the self-seeker and the covetous.
+These may at any rate be held to enrich themselves in depriving others.
+But the intemperate man cannot claim in like fashion to be a blessing
+to himself if a curse to his neighbours; nay, the mischief which he
+may cause to others is nothing by comparison with that which redounds
+against himself, since it is the height of mischief to ruin--I do not
+say one's own house and property--but one's own body and one's own soul.
+Or to take an example from social intercourse, no one cares for a guest
+who evidently takes more pleasure in the wine and the viands than in the
+friends beside him--who stints his comrades of the affection due to them
+to dote upon a mistress. Does it not come to this, that every honest man
+is bound to look upon self-restraint as the very corner-stone of virtue:
+(4) which he should seek to lay down as the basis and foundation of his
+soul? Without self-restraint who can lay any good lesson to heart or
+practise it when learnt in any degree worth speaking of? Or, to put it
+conversely, what slave of pleasure will not suffer degeneracy of soul
+and body? By Hera, (5) well may every free man pray to be saved from the
+service of such a slave; and well too may he who is in bondage to such
+pleasures supplicate Heaven to send him good masters, seeing that is the
+one hope of salvation left him."
+
+ (1) Lit. "a beautiful and brave possession."
+
+ (2) {proubibaze}.
+
+ (3) Or, "how should the master himself beware lest he fall into that
+ category."
+
+ (4) {krepida}. See Pind. "Pyth." iv. 138; ib. vii. 3; ib. fr. 93.
+
+ (5) See below, III. x. 9, xi. 5; IV. ii. 9, iv. 8; "Econ." x. 1;
+ "Cyrop." I. iv. 12; Plat. "Phaedr." 230 B. Cf. Shakesp. "by'r
+ Lakin."
+
+Well-tempered words: yet his self-restraint shone forth even more in
+his acts than in his language. Not only was he master over the pleasures
+which flow from the body, but of those also which are fed by riches, his
+belief being that he who receives money from this or that chance donor
+sets up over himself a master, and binds himself to an abominable
+slavery.
+
+
+VI
+
+In this context some discussions with Antiphon the sophist (1) deserve
+record. Antiphon approaches Socrates in hope of drawing away his
+associates, and in their presence thus accosts him.
+
+ (1) {o teratoskopos}, "jealous of Socrates," according to Aristotle
+ ap. Diog. Laert. II. v. 25. See Cobet, "Pros. Xen."
+
+Antiphon. Why, Socrates, I always thought it was expected of students of
+philosophy to grow in happiness daily; but you seem to have reaped other
+fruits from your philosophy. At any rate, you exist, I do not say live,
+in a style such as no slave serving under a master would put up with.
+Your meat and your drink are of the cheapest sort, and as to clothes,
+you cling to one wretched cloak which serves you for summer and winter
+alike; and so you go the whole year round, without shoes to your feet
+or a shirt to your back. Then again, you are not for taking or making
+money, the mere seeking of which is a pleasure, even as the possession
+of it adds to the sweetness and independence of existence. I do not know
+whether you follow the common rule of teachers, who try to fashion
+their pupils in imitation of themselves, (2) and propose to mould the
+characters of your companions; but if you do you ought to dub yourself
+professor of the art of wretchedness. (3)
+
+ (2) Or, "try to turn out their pupils as copies of themselves."
+
+ (3) See Arist. "Clouds," {on o kakodaimon Sokrates kai Khairephon}.
+
+Thus challenged, Socrates replied: One thing to me is certain, Antiphon;
+you have conceived so vivid an idea of my life of misery that for
+yourself you would choose death sooner than live as I do. Suppose now we
+turn and consider what it is you find so hard in my life. Is it that he
+who takes payment must as a matter of contract finish the work for which
+he is paid, whereas I, who do not take it, lie under no constraint to
+discourse except with whom I choose? Do you despise my dietary on the
+ground that the food which I eat is less wholesome and less stengthening
+than yours, or that the articles of my consumption are so scarce and
+so much costlier to procure than yours? Or have the fruits of your
+marketing a flavour denied to mine? Do you not know the sharper the
+appetite the less the need of sauces, the keener the thirst the less the
+desire for out-of-the-way drinks? And as to raiment, clothes, you know,
+are changed on account of cold or else of heat. People only wear boots
+and shoes in order not to gall their feet and be prevented walking.
+Now I ask you, have you ever noticed that I keep more within doors than
+others on account of the cold? Have you ever seen me battling with
+any one for shade on account of the heat? Do you not know that even a
+weakling by nature may, by dint of exercise and practice, come to outdo
+a giant who neglects his body? He will beat him in the particular point
+of training, and bear the strain more easily. But you apparently will
+not have it that I, who am for ever training myself to endure this,
+that, and the other thing which may befall the body, can brave all
+hardships more easily than yourself for instance, who perhaps are not
+so practised. And to escape slavery to the belly or to sleep or lechery,
+can you suggest more effective means than the possession of some
+powerful attraction, some counter-charm which shall gladden not only in
+the using, but by the hope enkindled of its lasting usefulness? And yet
+this you do know; joy is not to him who feels that he is doing well in
+nothing--it belongs to one who is persuaded that things are progressing
+with him, be it tillage or the working of a vessel, (4) or any of the
+thousand and one things on which a man may chance to be employed. To
+him it is given to rejoice as he reflects, "I am doing well." But is
+the pleasured derived from all these put together half as joyous as the
+consciousness of becoming better oneself, of acquiring better and better
+friends? That, for my part, is the belief I continue to cherish.
+
+ (4) "The business of a shipowner or skipper."
+
+Again, if it be a question of helping one's friends or country, which of
+the two will have the larger leisure to devote to these objects--he who
+leads the life which I lead to-day, or he who lives in the style which
+you deem so fortunate? Which of the two will adopt a soldier's life more
+easily--the man who cannot get on without expensive living, or he to
+whom whatever comes to hand suffices? Which will be the readier to
+capitulate and cry "mercy" in a siege--the man of elaborate wants, or
+he who can get along happily with the readiest things to hand? You,
+Antiphon, would seem to suggest that happiness consists of luxury and
+extravagance; I hold a different creed. To have no wants at all is, to
+my mind, an attribute of Godhead; (5) to have as few wants as possible
+the nearest approach to Godhead; and as that which is divine is
+mightiest, so that is next mightiest which comes closest to the divine.
+
+ (5) Cf. Aristot. "Eth. N." x. viii. 1.
+
+Returning to the charge at another time, this same Antiphon engaged
+Socrates in conversation thus.
+
+Ant. Socrates, for my part, I believe you to be a good and upright man;
+but for your wisdom I cannot say much. I fancy you would hardly dispute
+the verdict yourself, since, as I remark, you do not ask a money payment
+for your society; and yet if it were your cloak now, or your house, or
+any other of your possessions, you would set some value upon it, and
+never dream, I will not say of parting with it gratis, but of exchanging
+it for less than its worth. A plain proof, to my mind, that if you
+thought your society worth anything, you would ask for it not less than
+its equivalent in gold. (6) Hence the conclusion to which I have come,
+as already stated: good and upright you may be, since you do not
+cheat people from pure selfishness; but wise you cannot be, since your
+knowledge is not worth a cent.
+
+ (6) Or rather "money," lit. "silver."
+
+To this onslaught Socrates: Antiphon, it is a tenet which we cling to
+that beauty and wisdom have this in common, that there is a fair way and
+a foul way in which to dispose of them. The vendor of beauty purchases
+an evil name, but supposing the same person has discerned a soul of
+beauty in his lover and makes that man his friend, we regard his choice
+as sensible. (7) So is it with wisdom; he who sells it for money to the
+first bidder we name a sophist, (8) as though one should say a man who
+prostitutes his wisdom; but if the same man, discerning the noble nature
+of another, shall teach that other every good thing, and make him his
+friend, of such a one we say he does that which it is the duty of every
+good citizen of gentle soul to do. In accordance with this theory, I
+too, Antiphon, having my tastes, even as another finds pleasure in his
+horse and his hounds, (9) and another in his fighting cocks, so I too
+take my pleasure in good friends; and if I have any good thing myself I
+teach it them, or I commend them to others by whom I think they will be
+helped forwards on the path of virtue. The treasures also of the wise of
+old, written and bequeathed in their books, (10) I unfold and peruse in
+common with my friends. If our eye light upon any good thing we cull it
+eagerly, and regard it as great gain if we may but grow in friendship
+with one another.
+
+ (7) Add "and a sign of modesty," {sophrona nomizomen}.
+
+ (8) {sophistas}. See Grote, "H. G." viii. 482 foll.; "Hunting," xi.
+ foll.
+
+ (9) Cf. Plat. "Lys." 211 E.
+
+ (10) Cf. "Symp." iv. 27.
+
+As I listened to this talk I could not but reflect that he, the master,
+was a person to be envied, and that we, his hearers, were being led by
+him to beauty and nobility of soul.
+
+Again on some occasion the same Antiphon asked Socrates how he expected
+to make politicians of others when, even if he had the knowledge, he did
+not engage in politics himself.
+
+Socrates replied: I will put to you a question, Antiphon: Which were
+the more statesmanlike proceeding, to practise politics myself
+single-handed, or to devote myself to making as many others as possible
+fit to engage in that pursuit?
+
+
+VII
+
+Let us here turn and consider whether by deterring his associates from
+quackery and false seeming he did not directly stimulate them to the
+pursuit of virtue. (1) He used often to say there was no better road
+to renown than the one by which a man became good at that wherein he
+desired to be reputed good. (2) The truth of the concept he enforced as
+follows: "Let us reflect on what a man would be driven to do who wanted
+to be thought a good flute player, without really being so. He would
+be forced to imitate the good flute player in the externals of his art,
+would he not? and first or all, seeing that these artists always have
+a splendid equipment, (3) and travel about with a long train of
+attendants, he must have the same; in the next place, they can command
+the plaudits of a multitude, he therefore must pack a conclave of
+clackers. But one thing is clear: nothing must induce him to give
+a performance, or he will be exposed at once, and find himself a
+laughing-stock not only as a sorry sort of flute player, but as a
+wretched imposter. And now he has a host of expenses to meet; and not
+one advantage to be reaped; and worse than all his evil reputation. What
+is left him but to lead a life stale and unprofitable, the scorn and
+mockery of men? Let us try another case. Suppose a man wished to be
+thought a good general or a good pilot, though he were really nothing of
+the sort, let us picture to our minds how it will fare with him. Of two
+misfortunes one: either with a strong desire to be thought proficient in
+these matters, he will fail to get others to agree with him, which will
+be bad enough; or he will succeed, with worse result; since it stands
+to reason that anyone appointed to work a vessel or lead an army without
+the requisite knowledge will speedily ruin a number of people whom he
+least desires to hurt, and will make but a sorry exit from the
+stage himself." Thus first by one instance and then another would
+he demonstrate the unprofitableness of trying to appear rich, or
+courageous, or strong, without really being the thing pretended. "You
+are sure sooner or later to have commands laid upon you beyond your
+power to execute, and failing just where you are credited with capacity,
+the world will give you no commiseration." "I call that man a cheat, and
+a great cheat too," he would say, "who gets money or goods out of some
+one by persuasion, and defrauds him; but of all imposters he surely is
+the biggest who can delude people into thinking that he is fit to lead
+the state, when all the while he is a worthless creature." (4)
+
+ (1) {apotrepon proutrepen}. See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 450 foll.
+
+ (2) Cf. "Cyrop." I. vi. 22.
+
+ (3) Or, "furniture of the finest," like Arion's in Herod. i. 24.
+ Schneid. cf. Demosth. 565. 6.
+
+ (4) Here follows the sentence ({emoi men oun edokei kai tou
+ alazoneuesthai apotrepein tous sunontas toiade dialegomenos}),
+ which, for the sake of convenience, I have attached to the first
+ sentence of Bk. II. ch. i. ({edokei de moi... ponou.}) I
+ believe that the commentators are right in bracketing both one and
+ the other as editorial interpolations.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK II
+
+
+I
+
+Now, if the effect of such discourses was, as I imagine, to deter his
+hearers from the paths of quackery and false-seeming, (1) so I am
+sure that language like the following was calculated to stimulate his
+followers to practise self-control and endurance: self-control in
+the matters of eating, drinking, sleeping, and the cravings of lust;
+endurance of cold and heat and toil and pain. He had noticed the undue
+licence which one of his acquaintances allowed himself in all such
+matters. (2) Accordingly he thus addressed him:
+
+ (1) This sentence in the Greek concludes Bk. I. There is something
+ wrong or very awkward in the text here.
+
+ (2) Cf. Grote, "Plato," III. xxxviii. p. 530.
+
+Tell me, Aristippus (Socrates said), supposing you had two children
+entrusted to you to educate, one of them must be brought up with an
+aptitude for government, and the other without the faintest propensity
+to rule--how would you educate them? What do you say? Shall we begin our
+inquiry from the beginning, as it were, with the bare elements of food
+and nutriment?
+
+Ar. Yes, food to begin with, by all means, being a first principle, (3)
+without which there is no man living but would perish.
+
+ (3) Aristippus plays upon the word {arkhe}.
+
+Soc. Well, then, we may expect, may we not, that a desire to grasp food
+at certain seasons will exhibit itself in both the children?
+
+Ar. It is to be expected.
+
+Soc. Which, then, of the two must be trained, of his own free will, (4)
+to prosecute a pressing business rather than gratify the belly?
+
+ (4) {proairesis}.
+
+Ar. No doubt the one who is being trained to govern, if we would not
+have affairs of state neglected during (5) his government.
+
+ (5) Lit. "along of."
+
+Soc. And the same pupil must be furnished with a power of holding out
+against thirst also when the craving to quench it comes upon him?
+
+Ar. Certainly he must.
+
+Soc. And on which of the two shall we confer such self-control in regard
+to sleep as shall enable him to rest late and rise early, or keep vigil,
+if the need arise?
+
+Ar. To the same one of the two must be given that endurance also.
+
+Soc. Well, and a continence in regard to matters sexual so great that
+nothing of the sort shall prevent him from doing his duty? Which of them
+claims that?
+
+Ar. The same one of the pair again.
+
+Soc. Well, and on which of the two shall be bestowed, as a further gift,
+the voluntary resolution to face toils rather than turn and flee from
+them?
+
+Ar. This, too, belongs of right to him who is being trained for
+government.
+
+Soc. Well, and to which of them will it better accord to be taught all
+knowledge necessary towards the mastery of antagonists?
+
+Ar. To our future ruler certainly, for without these parts of learning
+all his other capacities will be merely waste.
+
+Soc. (6)Will not a man so educated be less liable to be entrapped by
+rival powers, and so escape a common fate of living creatures, some
+of which (as we all know) are hooked through their own greediness, and
+often even in spite of a native shyness; but through appetite for
+food they are drawn towards the bait, and are caught; while others are
+similarly ensnared by drink?
+
+ (6) (SS. 4, 5, L. Dind. ed Lips.)
+
+Ar. Undoubtedly.
+
+Soc. And others again are victims of amorous heat, as quails, for
+instance, or partridges, which, at the cry of the hen-bird, with
+lust and expectation of such joys grow wild, and lose their power of
+computing dangers: on they rush, and fall into the snare of the hunter?
+
+Aristippus assented.
+
+Soc. And would it not seem to be a base thing for a man to be affected
+like the silliest bird or beast? as when the adulterer invades the
+innermost sanctum (7) of the house, though he is well aware of the risks
+which his crime involves, (8) the formidable penalties of the law,
+the danger of being caught in the toils, and then suffering the direst
+contumely. Considering all the hideous penalties which hang over the
+adulterer's head, considering also the many means at hand to release him
+from the thraldom of his passion, that a man should so drive headlong on
+to the quicksands of perdition (9)--what are we to say of such frenzy?
+The wretch who can so behave must surely be tormented by an evil spirit?
+(10)
+
+ (7) {eis as eirktas}. The penetralia.
+
+ (8) Or, "he knows the risks he runs of suffering those penalties with
+ which the law threatens his crime should he fall into the snare,
+ and being caught, be mutilated."
+
+ (9) Or, "leap headlong into the jaws of danger."
+
+ (10) {kakodaimonontos}.
+
+Ar. So it strikes me.
+
+Soc. And does it not strike you as a sign of strange indifference that,
+whereas the greater number of the indispensable affairs of men, as for
+instance, those of war and agriculture, and more than half the rest,
+need to be conducted under the broad canopy of heaven, (11) yet the
+majority of men are quite untrained to wrestle with cold and heat?
+
+ (11) Or, "in the open air."
+
+Aristippus again assented.
+
+Soc. And do you not agree that he who is destined to rule must train
+himself to bear these things lightly?
+
+Ar. Most certainly.
+
+Soc. And whilst we rank those who are self-disciplined in all these
+matters among persons fit to rule, we are bound to place those incapable
+of such conduct in the category of persons without any pretension
+whatsoever to be rulers?
+
+Ar. I assent.
+
+Soc. Well, then, since you know the rank peculiar to either section of
+mankind, did it ever strike you to consider to which of the two you are
+best entitled to belong?
+
+Yes I have (replied Aristippus). I do not dream for a moment of ranking
+myself in the class of those who wish to rule. In fact, considering how
+serious a business it is to cater for one's own private needs, I look
+upon it as the mark of a fool not to be content with that, but to
+further saddle oneself with the duty of providing the rest of the
+community with whatever they may be pleased to want. That, at the cost
+of much personal enjoyment, a man should put himself at the head of a
+state, and then, if he fail to carry through every jot and tittle of
+that state's desire, be held to criminal account, does seem to me the
+very extravagance of folly. Why, bless me! states claim to treat their
+rulers precisely as I treat my domestic slaves. I expect my attendants
+to furnish me with an abundance of necessaries, but not to lay a finger
+on one of them themselves. So these states regard it as the duty of a
+ruler to provide them with all the good things imaginable, but to keep
+his own hands off them all the while. (12) So then, for my part, if
+anybody desires to have a heap of pother himself, (13) and be a nuisance
+to the rest of the world, I will educate him in the manner suggested,
+and he shall take his place among those who are fit to rule; but for
+myself, I beg to be enrolled amongst those who wish to spend their days
+as easily and pleasantly as possible.
+
+ (12) Or, "but he must have no finger in the pie himself."
+
+ (13) See Kuhner ad loc.
+
+Soc. Shall we then at this point turn and inquire which of the two are
+likely to lead the pleasanter life, the rulers or the ruled?
+
+Ar. By all means let us do so.
+
+Soc. To begin then with the nations and races known to ourselves. (14)
+In Asia the Persians are the rulers, while the Syrians, Phrygians,
+Lydians are ruled; and in Europe we find the Scythians ruling, and the
+Maeotians being ruled. In Africa (15) the Carthaginians are rulers, the
+Libyans ruled. Which of these two sets respectively leads the happier
+life, in your opinion? Or, to come nearer home--you are yourself a
+Hellene--which among Hellenes enjoy the happier existence, think you,
+the dominant or the subject states?
+
+ (14) Or, "the outer world, the non-Hellenic races and nationalities of
+ which we have any knowledge."
+
+ (15) Lit. "Libya."
+
+Nay, (16) I would have you to understand (exclaimed Aristippus) that I
+am just as far from placing myself in the ranks of slavery; there is, I
+take it, a middle path between the two which it is my ambition to tread,
+avoiding rule and slavery alike; it lies through freedom--the high road
+which leads to happiness.
+
+ (16) Or, "Pardon me interrupting you, Socrates; but I have not the
+ slightest intention of placing myself." See W. L. Newman, op. cit.
+ i. 306.
+
+Soc. True, if only your path could avoid human beings, as it avoids rule
+and slavery, there would be something in what you say. But being placed
+as you are amidst human beings, if you purpose neither to rule nor to be
+ruled, and do not mean to dance attendance, if you can help it, on those
+who rule, you must surely see that the stronger have an art to seat the
+weaker on the stool of repentance (17) both in public and in private,
+and to treat them as slaves. I daresay you have not failed to note this
+common case: a set of people has sown and planted, whereupon in comes
+another set and cuts their corn and fells their fruit-trees, and in
+every way lays siege to them because, though weaker, they refuse to pay
+them proper court, till at length they are persuaded to accept slavery
+rather than war against their betters. And in private life also,
+you will bear me out, the brave and powerful are known to reduce the
+helpless and cowardly to bondage, and to make no small profit out of
+their victims.
+
+ (17) See "Symp." iii. 11; "Cyrop." II. ii. 14; Plat. "Ion," 535 E; L.
+ Dindorf ad loc.
+
+Ar. Yes, but I must tell you I have a simple remedy against all such
+misadventures. I do not confine myself to any single civil community. I
+roam the wide world a foreigner.
+
+Soc. Well, now, that is a masterly stroke, upon my word! (18) Of course,
+ever since the decease of Sinis, and Sciron, and Procrustes, (19)
+foreign travellers have had an easy time of it. But still, if I bethink
+me, even in these modern days the members of free communities do
+pass laws in their respective countries for self-protection against
+wrong-doing. Over and above their personal connections, they provide
+themselves with a host of friends; they gird their cities about with
+walls and battlements; they collect armaments to ward off evil-doers;
+and to make security doubly sure, they furnish themselves with allies
+from foreign states. In spite of all which defensive machinery these
+same free citizens do occasionally fall victims to injustice. But you,
+who are without any of these aids; you, who pass half your days on the
+high roads where iniquity is rife; (20) you, who, into whatever city
+you enter, are less than the least of its free members, and moreover are
+just the sort of person whom any one bent on mischief would single out
+for attack--yet you, with your foreigner's passport, are to be
+exempt from injury? So you flatter yourself. And why? Will the state
+authorities cause proclamation to be made on your behalf: "The person
+of this man Aristippus is secure; let his going out and his coming in
+be free from danger"? Is that the ground of your confidence? or do you
+rather rest secure in the consciousness that you would prove such a
+slave as no master would care to keep? For who would care to have in
+his house a fellow with so slight a disposition to work and so strong
+a propensity to extravagance? Suppose we stop and consider that very
+point: how do masters deal with that sort of domestic? If I am not
+mistaken, they chastise his wantonness by starvation; they balk his
+thieving tendencies by bars and bolts where there is anything to steal;
+they hinder him from running away by bonds and imprisonment; they drive
+the sluggishness out of him with the lash. Is it not so? Or how do you
+proceed when you discover the like tendency in one of your domestics?
+
+ (18) Or, "Well foiled!" "A masterly fall! my prince of wrestlers."
+
+ (19) For these mythical highway robbers, see Diod. iv. 59; and for
+ Sciron in particular, Plut. "Theseus," 10.
+
+ (20) Or, "where so many suffer wrong."
+
+Ar. I correct them with all the plagues, till I force them to serve me
+properly. But, Socrates, to return to your pupil educated in the royal
+art, (21) which, if I mistake not, you hold to be happiness: how, may I
+ask, will he be better off than others who lie in evil case, in spite
+of themselves, simply because they suffer perforce, but in his case the
+hunger and the thirst, the cold shivers and the lying awake at nights,
+with all the changes he will ring on pain, are of his own choosing? For
+my part I cannot see what difference it makes, provided it is one and
+the same bare back which receives the stripes, whether the whipping be
+self-appointed or unasked for; nor indeed does it concern my body in
+general, provided it be my body, whether I am beleaguered by a whole
+armament of such evils (22) of my own will or against my will--except
+only for the folly which attaches to self-appointed suffering.
+
+ (21) Cf. below, IV. ii. 11; Plat. "Statesm." 259 B; "Euthyd." 291 C;
+ K. Joel, op. cit. p. 387 foll. "Aristippus anticipates Adeimantus"
+ ("Rep." 419), W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 395.
+
+ (22) Cf. "suffers the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune."
+
+Soc. What, Aristippus, does it not seem to you that, as regards such
+matters, there is all the difference between voluntary and involuntary
+suffering, in that he who starves of his own accord can eat when he
+chooses, and he who thirsts of his own free will can drink, and so for
+the rest; but he who suffers in these ways perforce cannot desist from
+the suffering when the humour takes him? Again, he who suffers hardship
+voluntarily, gaily confronts his troubles, being buoyed on hope
+(23)--just as a hunter in pursuit of wild beasts, through hope of
+capturing his quarry, finds toil a pleasure--and these are but prizes of
+little worth in return for their labours; but what shall we say of their
+reward who toil to obtain to themselves good friends, or to subdue their
+enemies, or that through strength of body and soul they may administer
+their households well, befriend their friends, and benefit the land
+which gave them birth? Must we not suppose that these too will take
+their sorrows lightly, looking to these high ends? Must we not suppose
+that they too will gaily confront existence, who have to support them
+not only their conscious virtue, but the praise and admiration of the
+world? (24) And once more, habits of indolence, along with the fleeting
+pleasures of the moment, are incapable, as gymnastic trainers say, of
+setting up (25) a good habit of body, or of implanting in the soul any
+knowledge worthy of account; whereas by painstaking endeavour in the
+pursuit of high and noble deeds, as good men tell us, through endurance
+we shall in the end attain the goal. So Hesiod somewhere says: (26)
+
+ Wickedness may a man take wholesale with ease, smooth is the way
+ and her dwelling-place is very nigh; but in front of virtue the
+ immortal gods have placed toil and sweat, long is the path and
+ steep that leads to her, and rugged at the first, but when the
+ summit of the pass is reached, then for all its roughness the path
+ grows easy.
+
+ (23) Cf. above, I. vi. 8.
+
+ (24) Or, "in admiration of themselves, the praise and envy of the
+ world at large."
+
+ (25) See Hippocrates, "V. Med." 18.
+
+ (26) Hesiod, "Works and Days," 285. See Plat. "Prot." 340 C; "Rep."
+ ii. 364 D; "Laws," iv. 718 E.
+
+And Ephicharmus (27) bears his testimony when he says:
+
+ The gods sell us all good things in return for our labours.
+
+ (27) Epicharmus of Cos, the chief comic poet among the Dorians, fl.
+ 500 B.C. Cf. Plat. "Theaet." 152 E, "the prince of comedy";
+ "Gorg." 505 D.
+
+And again in another passage he exclaims:
+
+ Set not thine heart on soft things, thou knave, lest thou light
+ upon the hard.
+
+And that wise man Prodicus (28) delivers himself in a like strain
+concerning virtue in that composition of his about Heracles, which
+crowds have listened to. (29) This, as far as I can recollect it, is the
+substance at least of what he says:
+
+ (28) Prodicus of Ceos. See Plat. "Men." 24; "Cratyl." 1; Philostr.
+ "Vit. Soph." i. 12.
+
+ (29) Or, "which he is fond of reciting as a specimen of style." The
+ title of the {epideixis} was {'Orai} according to Suidas,
+ {Prodikos}.
+
+"When Heracles was emerging from boyhood into the bloom of youth, having
+reached that season in which the young man, now standing upon the verge
+of independence, shows plainly whether he will enter upon the path of
+virtue or of vice, he went forth into a quiet place, and sat debating
+with himself which of those two paths he should pursue; and as he there
+sat musing, there appeared to him two women of great stature which drew
+nigh to him. The one was fair to look upon, frank and free by gift
+of nature, (30) her limbs adorned with purity and her eyes with
+bashfulness; sobriety set the rhythm of her gait, and she was clad in
+white apparel. The other was of a different type; the fleshy softness
+of her limbs betrayed her nurture, while the complexion of her skin was
+embellished that she might appear whiter and rosier than she really
+was, and her figure that she might seem taller than nature made her;
+she stared with wide-open eyes, and the raiment wherewith she was clad
+served but to reveal the ripeness of her bloom. With frequent glances
+she surveyed her person, or looked to see if others noticed her; while
+ever and anon she fixed her gaze upon the shadow of herself intently.
+
+ (30) Reading {eleutherion phusei,...} or if {eleutherion,
+ phusei...} translate "nature had adorned her limbs..."
+
+"Now when these two had drawn near to Heracles, she who was first
+named advanced at an even pace (31) towards him, but the other, in her
+eagerness to outstrip her, ran forward to the youth, exclaiming, 'I see
+you, Heracles, in doubt and difficulty what path of life to choose; make
+me your friend, and I will lead you to the pleasantest road and easiest.
+This I promise you: you shall taste all of life's sweets and escape all
+bitters. In the first place, you shall not trouble your brain with
+war or business; other topics shall engage your mind; (32) your only
+speculation, what meat or drink you shall find agreeable to your palate;
+what delight (33) of ear or eye; what pleasure of smell or touch; what
+darling lover's intercourse shall most enrapture you; how you shall
+pillow your limbs in softest slumber; how cull each individual pleasure
+without alloy of pain; and if ever the suspicion steal upon you that the
+stream of joys will one day dwindle, trust me I will not lead you where
+you shall replenish the store by toil of body and trouble of soul. No!
+others shall labour, but you shall reap the fruit of their labours; you
+shall withhold your hand from nought which shall bring you gain. For to
+all my followers I give authority and power to help themselves freely
+from every side.'
+
+ (31) Or, "without change in her demeanour."
+
+ (32) Reading {diese}, or {dioisei}, "you shall continue speculating
+ solely."
+
+ (33) It will be recollected that Prodicus prided himself on {orthotes
+ onomaton}. Possibly Xenophon is imitating (caricaturing?) his
+ style. {terphtheies, estheies, euphrantheies}.
+
+"Heracles hearing these words made answer: 'What, O lady, is the name
+you bear?' To which she: 'Know that my friends call be Happiness,
+but they that hate me have their own nicknames (34) for me, Vice and
+Naughtiness.'
+
+ (34) So the vulg. {upokorizomenoi} is interpreted. Cobet ("Pros. Xen."
+ p. 36) suggests {upoknizomenoi} = "quippe qui desiderio
+ pungantur."
+
+"But just then the other of those fair women approached and spoke:
+'Heracles, I too am come to you, seeing that your parents are well
+known to me, and in your nurture I have gauged your nature; wherefore I
+entertain good hope that if you choose the path which leads to me, you
+shall greatly bestir yourself to be the doer of many a doughty deed of
+noble emprise; and that I too shall be held in even higher honour for
+your sake, lit with the lustre shed by valorous deeds. (35) I will not
+cheat you with preludings of pleasure, (36) but I will relate to you the
+things that are according to the ordinances of God in very truth. Know
+then that among things that are lovely and of good report, not one have
+the gods bestowed upon mortal men apart from toil and pains. Would
+you obtain the favour of the gods, then must you pay these same gods
+service; would you be loved by your friends, you must benefit these
+friends; do you desire to be honoured by the state, you must give the
+state your aid; do you claim admiration for your virtue from all Hellas,
+you must strive to do some good to Hellas; do you wish earth to yield
+her fruits to you abundantly, to earth must you pay your court; do you
+seek to amass riches from your flocks and herds, on them must you bestow
+your labour; or is it your ambition to be potent as a warrior, able to
+save your friends and to subdue your foes, then must you learn the arts
+of war from those who have the knowledge, and practise their application
+in the field when learned; or would you e'en be powerful of limb and
+body, then must you habituate limbs and body to obey the mind, and
+exercise yourself with toil and sweat.'
+
+ (35) Or, "bathed in the splendour of thy virtues."
+
+ (36) Or, "honeyed overtures of pleasure."
+
+"At this point, (as Prodicus relates) Vice broke in exclaiming: 'See
+you, Heracles, how hard and long the road is by which yonder woman would
+escort you to her festal joys. (37) But I will guide you by a short and
+easy road to happiness.'
+
+ (37) Hesiod, "Theog." 909; Milton, "L'Allegro," 12.
+
+"Then spoke Virtue: 'Nay, wretched one, what good thing hast thou? or
+what sweet thing art thou acquainted with--that wilt stir neither hand
+nor foot to gain it? Thou, that mayest not even await the desire of
+pleasure, but, or ever that desire springs up, art already satiated;
+eating before thou hungerest, and drinking before thou thirsteth; who to
+eke out an appetite must invent an army of cooks and confectioners; and
+to whet thy thirst must lay down costliest wines, and run up and down
+in search of ice in summer-time; to help thy slumbers soft coverlets
+suffice not, but couches and feather-beds must be prepared thee and
+rockers to rock thee to rest; since desire for sleep in thy case springs
+not from toil but from vacuity and nothing in the world to do. Even the
+natural appetite of love thou forcest prematurely by every means thou
+mayest devise, confounding the sexes in thy service. Thus thou educatest
+thy friends: with insult in the night season and drowse of slumber
+during the precious hours of the day. Immortal, thou art cast forth
+from the company of gods, and by good men art dishonoured: that sweetest
+sound of all, the voice of praise, has never thrilled thine ears; and
+the fairest of all fair visions is hidden from thine eyes that have
+never beheld one bounteous deed wrought by thine own hand. If thou
+openest thy lips in speech, who will believe thy word? If thou hast need
+of aught, none shall satisfy thee. What sane man will venture to join
+thy rablle rout? Ill indeed are thy revellers to look upon, young men
+impotent of body, and old men witless in mind: in the heyday of life
+they batten in sleek idleness, and wearily do they drag through an age
+of wrinkled wretchedness: and why? they blush with shame at the thought
+of deeds done in the past, and groan for weariness at what is left to
+do. During their youth they ran riot through their sweet things, and
+laid up for themselves large store of bitterness against the time of
+eld. But my companionship is with the gods; and with the good among men
+my conversation; no bounteous deed, divine or human, is wrought without
+my aid. Therefore am I honoured in Heaven pre-eminently, and upon
+earth among men whose right it is to honour me; (38) as a beloved
+fellow-worker of all craftsmen; a faithful guardian of house and lands,
+whom the owners bless; a kindly helpmeet of servants; (39) a brave
+assistant in the labours of peace; an unflinching ally in the deeds of
+war; a sharer in all friendships indispensable. To my friends is given
+an enjoyment of meats and drinks, which is sweet in itself and devoid
+of trouble, in that they can endure until desire ripens, and sleep more
+delicious visits them than those who toil not. Yet they are not pained
+to part with it; nor for the sake of slumber do they let slip the
+performance of their duties. Among my followers the youth delights in
+the praises of his elders, and the old man glories in the honour of the
+young; with joy they call to memory their deeds of old, and in to-day's
+well-doing are well pleased. For my sake they are dear in the sight
+of God, beloved of their friends and honoured by the country of their
+birth. When the appointed goal is reached they lie not down in oblivion
+with dishonour, but bloom afresh--their praise resounded on the lips of
+men for ever. (40) Toils like these, O son of noble parents, Heracles,
+it is yours to meet with, and having endured, to enter into the heritage
+assured you of transcendant happiness.'"
+
+ (38) Reading {ois prosekei}, or if {proseko}, translate "to whom I am
+ attached."
+
+ (39) Cf. "Econ." v. 8.
+
+ (40) Or, "so true is it, a branch is left them; undying honour to
+ their name!"
+
+This, Aristippus, in rough sketch is the theme which Prodicus pursues
+(41) in his "Education of Heracles by Virtue," only he decked out
+his sentiments, I admit, in far more magnificent phrases than I have
+ventured on. Were it not well, Aristippus, to lay to heart these
+sayings, and to strive to bethink you somewhat of that which touches the
+future of our life?
+
+ (41) Reading {diokei}, al. {diokei} = "so Prodicus arranged the parts
+ of his discourse."
+
+
+II
+
+At another time, he had noticed the angry temper shown by Lamprocles,
+the elder of his sons, towards their mother, and thus addressed himself
+to the lad.
+
+Soc. Pray, my son, did you ever hear of certain people being called
+ungrateful?
+
+That I have (replied the young man).
+
+Soc. And have you understood what it is they do to get that bad name?
+
+Lamp. Yes, I have: when any one has been kindly treated, and has it in
+his power to requite the kindness but neglects to do so, men call him
+ungrateful.
+
+Soc. And you admit that people reckon the ungrateful among wrongdoers?
+
+Lamp. I do.
+
+Soc. And has it ever struck you to inquire whether, as regards the right
+or wrong of it, ingratitude may not perhaps resemble some such conduct
+as the enslavement, say, of prisoners, which is accounted wrong towards
+friends but justifiable towards enemies?
+
+Lamp. Yes, I have put that question to myself. In my opinion, no matter
+who confers the kindness, friend or foe, the recipient should endeavour
+to requite it, failing which he is a wrongdoer.
+
+Soc. Then if that is how the matter stands, ingratitude would be an
+instance of pure unadulterate wrongdoing?
+
+Lamprocles assented to the proposition.
+
+Soc. It follows, then, that in proportion to the greatness of the
+benefit conferred, the greater his misdoing who fails to requite the
+kindness?
+
+Lamprocles again assented.
+
+Socrates continued: And where can we hope to find greater benefits than
+those which children derive from their parents--their father and mother
+who brought them out of nothingness into being, who granted them to look
+upon all these fair sights, and to partake of all those blessings which
+the gods bestow on man, things so priceless in our eyes that one and all
+we shudder at the thought of leaving them, and states have made death
+the penalty for the greatest crimes, because there is no greater evil
+through fear of which to stay iniquity.
+
+You do not suppose that human beings produce children for the sake of
+carnal pleasure (1) merely; were this the motive, street and bordell are
+full of means to quit them of that thrall; whereas nothing is plainer
+than the pains we take to seek out wives who shall bear us the finest
+children. (2) With these we wed, and carry on the race. The man has a
+twofold duty to perform: partly in cherishing her who is to raise up
+children along with him, and partly towards the children yet unborn
+in providing them with things that he thinks will contribute to their
+well-being--and of these as large a store as possible. The woman,
+conceiving, bears her precious burthen with travail and pain, and at the
+risk of life itself--sharing with that within her womb the food on which
+she herself is fed. And when with much labour she has borne to the end
+and brought forth her offspring, she feeds it and watches over it with
+tender care--not in return for any good thing previously received, for
+indeed the babe itself is little conscious of its benefactor and cannot
+even signify its wants; only she, the mother, making conjecture of what
+is good for it, and what will please it, essays to satisfy it; (3)
+and for many months she feeds it night and day, enduring the toil nor
+recking what return she shall receive for all her trouble. Nor does the
+care and kindness of parents end with nurture; but when the children
+seem of an age to learn, they teach them themselves whatever cunning
+they possess, as a guide to life, or where they feel that another is
+more competent, to him they send them to be taught at their expense.
+Thus they watch over their children, doing all in their power to enable
+them to grow up to be as good as possible.
+
+ (1) Lit. "the joys of Aphrodite."
+
+ (2) "For the procreation of children." See below, IV. iv. 22; "Pol.
+ Lac." i.
+
+ (3) Lit. "to leave nought lacking."
+
+So be it (the youth answered); but even if she have done all that,
+and twenty times as much, no soul on earth could endure my mother's
+cross-grained temper.
+
+Then Socrates: Which, think you, would be harder to bear--a wild beast's
+savagery or a mother's?
+
+Lamp. To my mind, a mother's--at least if she be such as mine.
+
+Soc. Dear me! And has this mother ever done you any injury--such as
+people frequently receive from beasts, by bite or kick?
+
+Lamp. If she has not done quite that, she uses words which any one would
+sooner sell his life than listen to.
+
+Soc. And how many annoyances have you caused your mother, do you
+suppose, by fretfulness and peevishness in word and deed, night and day,
+since you were a little boy? How much sorrow and pain, when you were
+ill?
+
+Lamp. Well, I never said or did anything to bring a blush to her cheeks.
+
+Soc. No, come now! Do you suppose it is harder for you to listen to your
+mother's speeches than for actor to listen to actor on the tragic stage,
+(4) when the floodgates of abuse are opened?
+
+ (4) See Grote, "H. G." viii. 457; Plut. "Solon," xxix.
+
+Lamp. Yes; for the simple reason that they know it is all talk on their
+parts. The inquisitor may cross-question, but he will not inflict
+a fine; the threatener may hurl his menaces, but he will do no
+mischief--that is why they take it all so easily.
+
+Soc. Then ought you to fly into a passion, who know well enough that,
+whatever your mother says, she is so far from meaning you mischief that
+she is actually wishing blessings to descend upon you beyond all others?
+Or do you believe that your mother is really ill disposed towards you?
+
+Lamp. No, I do not think that.
+
+Soc. Then this mother, who is kindly disposed to you, and takes such
+tender care of you when you are ill to make you well again, and to see
+that you want for nothing which may help you; and, more than all, who is
+perpetually pleading for blessings in your behalf and offering her vows
+to Heaven (5)--can you say of her that she is cross-grained and harsh?
+For my part, I think, if you cannot away with such a mother, you cannot
+away with such blessings either.
+
+ (5) Or, "paying vows."
+
+But tell me (he proceeded), do you owe service to any living being,
+think you? or are you prepared to stand alone? Prepared not to please or
+try to please a single soul? to follow none? To obey neither general nor
+ruler of any sort? Is that your attitude, or do you admit that you owe
+allegiance to somebody?
+
+Lamp. Yes; certainly I owe allegiance.
+
+Soc. May I take it that you are willing to please at any rate your
+neighbour, so that he may kindle a fire for you in your need, may prove
+himself a ready helpmate in good fortune, or if you chance on evil and
+are stumbling, may friendlily stand by your side to aid?
+
+Lamp. I am willing.
+
+Soc. Well, and what of that other chance companion--your
+fellow-traveller by land or sea? what of any others, you may light upon?
+is it indifferent to you whether these be friends or not, or do you
+admit that the goodwill of these is worth securing by some pains on your
+part?
+
+Lamp. I do.
+
+Soc. It stands thus then: you are prepared to pay attention to this,
+that, and the other stranger, but to your mother who loves you more than
+all else, you are bound to render no service, no allegiance? Do you
+not know that whilst the state does not concern itself with ordinary
+ingratitude or pass judicial sentence on it; whilst it overlooks the
+thanklessness of those who fail to make return for kindly treatment, it
+reserves its pains and penalties for the special case? If a man render
+not the service and allegiance due to his parents, on him the finger
+of the law is laid; his name is struck off the roll; he is forbidden to
+hold the archonship--which is as much as to say, "Sacrifices in behalf
+of the state offered by such a man would be no offerings, being tainted
+with impiety; nor could aught else be 'well and justly' performed
+of which he is the doer." Heaven help us! If a man fail to adorn the
+sepulchre of his dead parents the state takes cognisance of the matter,
+and inquisition is made in the scrutiny of the magistrates. (6) And as
+for you, my son, if you are in your sober senses, you will earnestly
+entreat your mother, lest the very gods take you to be an ungrateful
+being, and on their side also refuse to do you good; and you will beware
+of men also, lest they should perceive your neglect of your parents, and
+with one consent hold you in dishonour; (7) and so you find yourself in
+a desert devoid of friends. For if once the notion be entertained that
+here is a man ungrateful to his parents, no one will believe that any
+kindness shown you would be other than thrown away.
+
+ (6) Lit. "the docimasia." See Gow, "Companion," xiv.
+
+ (7) "Visiti with atimia."
+
+
+III
+
+At another time the differences between two brothers named Chaerephon
+and Chaerecrates, both well known to him, had drawn his attention; and
+on seeing the younger of the two he thus addressed him.
+
+Soc. Tell me, Chaerecrates, you are not, I take it, one of those strange
+people who believe that goods are better and more precious than a
+brother; (1) and that too although the former are but senseless chattels
+which need protection, the latter a sensitive and sensible being who
+can afford it; and what is more, he is himself alone, whilst as for them
+their name is legion. And here again is a marvellous thing: that a man
+should count his brother a loss, because the goods of his brother are
+not his; but he does not count his fellow-citizens loss, and yet their
+possessions are not his; only it seems in their case he has wits to see
+that to dwell securely with many and have enough is better than to own
+the whole wealth of a community and to live in dangerous isolation; but
+this same doctrine as applied to brothers they ignore. Again, if a
+man have the means, he will purchase domestic slaves, because he wants
+assistants in his work; he will acquire friends, because he needs their
+support; but this brother of his--who cares about brothers? It seems
+a friend may be discovered in an ordinary citizen, but not in a blood
+relation who is also a brother. And yet it is a great vantage-ground
+towards friendship to have sprung from the same loins and to have been
+suckled at the same breasts, since even among beasts a certain natural
+craving, and sympathy springs up between creatures reared together. (2)
+Added to which, a man who has brothers commands more respect from the
+rest of the world than the man who has none, and who must fight his own
+battles. (3)
+
+ (1) Cf. "Merchant of Venice," II. viii. 17: "Justice! the law! my
+ ducats, and my daughter!"
+
+ (2) Or, "a yearning after their foster-brothers manifests itself in
+ animals." See "Cyrop." VIII. vii. 14 foll. for a parallel to this
+ discussion.
+
+ (3) Lit. "and is less liable to hostility."
+
+Chaer. I daresay, Socrates, where the differences are not profound,
+reason would a man should bear with his brother, and not avoid him for
+some mere trifle's sake, for a brother of the right sort is, as you say,
+a blessing; but if he be the very antithesis of that, why should a man
+lay his hand to achieve the impossible?
+
+Soc. Well now, tell me, is there nobody whom Chaerephon can please any
+more than he can please yourself; or do some people find him agreeable
+enough?
+
+Chaer. Nay, there you hit it. That is just why I have a right to detest
+him. He can be pleasing enough to others, but to me, whenever he appears
+on the scene, he is not a blessing--no! but by every manner of means the
+reverse.
+
+Soc. May it not happen that just as a horse is no gain to the inexpert
+rider who essays to handle him, so in like manner, if a man tries to
+deal with his brother after an ignorant fashion, this same brother will
+kick?
+
+Chaer. But is it likely now? How should I be ignorant of the art of
+dealing with my brother if I know the art of repaying kind words and
+good deeds in kind? But a man who tries all he can to annoy me by word
+and deed, I can neither bless nor benefit, and, what is more, I will not
+try.
+
+Soc. Well now, that is a marvellous statement, Chaerecrates. Your dog,
+the serviceable guardian of your flocks, who will fawn and lick the hand
+of your shepherd, when you come near him can only growl and show his
+teeth. Well; you take no notice of the dog's ill-temper, you try to
+propitiate him by kindness; but your brother? If your brother were what
+he ought to be, he would be a great blessing to you--that you admit;
+and, as you further confess, you know the secret of kind acts and words,
+yet you will not set yourself to apply means to make him your best of
+friends.
+
+Chaer. I am afraid, Socrates, that I have no wisdom or cunning to make
+Chaerephon bear himself towards me as he should.
+
+Soc. Yet there is no need to apply any recondite or novel machinery.
+Only bait your hook in the way best known to yourself, and you will
+capture him; whereupon he will become your devoted friend.
+
+Chaer. If you are aware that I know some love-charm, Socrates, of which
+I am the happy but unconscious possessor, pray make haste and enlighten
+me.
+
+Soc. Answer me then. Suppose you wanted to get some acquaintance to
+invite you to dinner when he next keeps holy day, (4) what steps would
+you take?
+
+ (4) "When he next does sacrifice"; see "Hiero," viii. 3. Cf. Theophr.
+ "Char." xv. 2, and Prof. Jebb's note ad loc.
+
+Chaer. No doubt I should set him a good example by inviting him myself
+on a like occasion.
+
+Soc. And if you wanted to induce some friend to look after your affairs
+during your absence abroad, how would you achieve your purpose?
+
+Chaer. No doubt I should present a precedent in undertaking to look
+after his in like circumstances.
+
+Soc. And if you wished to get some foreign friend to take you under his
+roof while visiting his country, what would you do?
+
+Chaer. No doubt I should begin by offering him the shelter of my own
+roof when he came to Athens, in order to enlist his zeal in furthering
+the objects of my visit; it is plain I should first show my readiness to
+do as much for him in a like case.
+
+Soc. Why, it seems you are an adept after all in all the philtres known
+to man, only you chose to conceal your knowledge all the while; or is
+it that you shrink from taking the first step because of the scandal you
+will cause by kindly advances to your brother? And yet it is commonly
+held to redound to a man's praise to have outstripped an enemy in
+mischief or a friend in kindness. Now if it seemed to me that Chaerephon
+were better fitted to lead the way towards this friendship, (5) I
+should have tried to persuade him to take the first step in winning your
+affection, but now I am persuaded the first move belongs to you, and to
+you the final victory.
+
+ (5) Reading {pros ten philian}, or if {phusin}, transl. "natural
+ disposition."
+
+Chaer. A startling announcement, Socrates, from your lips, and most
+unlike you, to bid me the younger take precedence of my elder brother.
+Why, it is contrary to the universal custom of mankind, who look to the
+elder to take the lead in everything, whether as a speaker or an actor.
+
+Soc. How so? Is it not the custom everywhere for the younger to step
+aside when he meets his elder in the street and to give him place? Is he
+not expected to get up and offer him his seat, to pay him the honour of
+a soft couch, (6) to yield him precedence in argument?
+
+ (6) Lit. "with a soft bed," or, as we say, "the best bedroom."
+
+My good fellow, do not stand shilly-shallying, (7) but put out your hand
+caressingly, and you will see the worthy soul will respond at once with
+alacrity. Do you not note your brother's character, proud and frank and
+sensitive to honour? He is not a mean and sorry rascal to be caught by a
+bribe--no better way indeed for such riff-raff. No! gentle natures need
+a finer treatment. You can best hope to work on them by affection.
+
+ (7) Or, "have no fears, essay a soothing treatment."
+
+Chaer. But suppose I do, and suppose that, for all my attempts, he shows
+no change for the better?
+
+Soc. At the worst you will have shown yourself to be a good, honest,
+brotherly man, and he will appear as a sorry creature on whom kindness
+is wasted. But nothing of the sort is going to happen, as I conjecture.
+My belief is that as soon as he hears your challenge, he will embrace
+the contest; pricked on by emulous pride, he will insist upon getting
+the better of you in kindness of word and deed.
+
+At present you two are in the condition of two hands formed by God to
+help each other, but which have let go their business and have turned to
+hindering one another all they can. You are a pair of feet fashioned on
+the Divine plan to work together, but which have neglected this in order
+to trammel each other's gait. Now is it not insensate stupidity (8) to
+use for injury what was meant for advantage? And yet in fashioning
+two brothers God intends them, methinks, to be of more benefit to one
+another than either two hands, or two feet, or two eyes, or any other
+of those pairs which belong to man from his birth. (9) Consider how
+powerless these hands of ours if called upon to combine their action at
+two points more than a single fathom's length apart; (10) and these feet
+could not stretch asunder (11) even a bare fathom; and these eyes, for
+all the wide-reaching range we claim for them, are incapable of seeing
+simultaneously the back and front of an object at even closer quarters.
+But a pair of brothers, linked in bonds of amity, can work each for the
+other's good, though seas divide them. (12)
+
+ (8) "Boorishness verging upon monomania."
+
+ (9) "With which man is endowed at birth."
+
+ (10) "More than an 'arms'-stretch' asunder."
+
+ (11) Lit. "reach at one stretch two objects, even over that small
+ distance."
+
+ (12) "Though leagues separate them."
+
+
+IV
+
+I have at another time heard him discourse on the kindred theme of
+friendship in language well calculated, as it seemed to me, to help a
+man to choose and also to use his friends aright.
+
+He (Socrates) had often heard the remark made that of all possessions
+there is none equal to that of a good and sincere friend; but, in spite
+of this assertion, the mass of people, as far as he could see, concerned
+themselves about nothing so little as the acquisition of friends.
+Houses, and fields, and slaves, and cattle, and furniture of all sorts
+(he said) they were at pains to acquire, and they strove hard to keep
+what they had got; but to procure for themselves this greatest of all
+blessings, as they admitted a friend to be, or to keep the friends whom
+they already possessed, not one man in a hundred ever gave himself a
+thought. It was noticeable, in the case of a sickness befalling a man's
+friend and one of his own household simultaneously, the promptness with
+which the master would fetch the doctor to his domestic, and take every
+precaution necessary for his recovery, with much expenditure of pains;
+but meanwhile little account would be taken of the friend in like
+condition, and if both should die, he will show signs of deep annoyance
+at the death of his domestic, which, as he reflects, is a positive loss
+to him; but as regards his friend his position is in no wise materially
+affected, and thus, though he would never dream of leaving his other
+possessions disregarded and ill cared for, friendship's mute appeal is
+met with flat indifference. (1)
+
+ (1) Or, "the cry of a friend for careful tending falls on deaf ears."
+
+Or to take (said he) a crowning instance: (2) with regard to ordinary
+possessions, however multifarious these may be, most people are at least
+acquainted with their number, but if you ask a man to enumerate his
+friends, who are not so very many after all perhaps, he cannot; or if,
+to oblige the inquirer, he essays to make a list, he will presently
+retract the names of some whom he had previously included. (3) Such is
+the amount of thought which people bestow upon their friends.
+
+ (2) Or, "Nor had he failed to observe another striking contrast." Cf.
+ Cic. "Lael." 17; Diog. Laert. ii. 30.
+
+ (3) i.e. "like a chess-player recalling a move."
+
+And yet what thing else may a man call his own is comparable to this one
+best possession! what rather will not serve by contrast to enhance the
+value of an honest friend! Think of a horse or a yoke of oxen; they have
+their worth; but who shall gauge the worth of a worthy friend? Kindlier
+and more constant than the faithfullest of slaves--this is that
+possession best named all-serviceable. (4) Consider what the post is
+that he assigns himself! to meet and supplement what is lacking to
+the welfare of his friends, to promote their private and their public
+interests, is his concern. Is there need of kindly action in any
+quarter? he will throw in the full weight of his support. Does some
+terror confound? he is at hand to help and defend by expenditure of
+money and of energy, (5) by appeals to reason or resort to force. His
+the privilege alike to gladden the prosperous in the hour of success and
+to sustain their footing who have well-nigh slipped. All that the hands
+of a man may minister, all that the eyes of each are swift to see, the
+ears to hear, and the feet to compass, he with his helpful arts will not
+fall short of. Nay, not seldom that which a man has failed to accomplish
+for himself, has missed seeing or hearing or attaining, a friend acting
+in behalf of friend will achieve vicariously. And yet, albeit to try and
+tend a tree for the sake of its fruit is not uncommon, this copious mine
+of wealth--this friend--attracts only a lazy and listless attention on
+the part of more than half the world.
+
+ (4) "A vessel fit for all work indeed is this friend." Cf. Ar. "Ach."
+ 936, {pagkhreston aggos estai}, like the "leather bottel."
+
+ (5) Or, "by dint of his diplomacy."
+
+
+V
+
+I remember listening to another argument of his, the effect of which
+would be to promote self-examination. The listener must needs be brought
+to ask himself, "Of what worth am I to my friends?" It happened thus.
+One of those who were with him was neglectful, as he noted, of a friend
+who was at the pinch of poverty (Antisthenes). (1) Accordingly, in the
+presence of the negligent person and of several others, he proceeded to
+question the sufferer.
+
+ (1) Antisthenes, "cynicorum et stoicorum parens." Cic. "de Or." iii.
+ 17; "ad Att." xii. 38. See below, III. iii. 17; "Symp." passim;
+ Diog. Laert. II. v.; VI. i.
+
+Soc. What say you, Antisthenes?--have friends their values like domestic
+slaves? One of these latter may be worth perhaps two minae, (2) another
+only half a mina, a third five, and a fourth as much as ten; while they
+do say that Nicias, (3) the son of Niceratus, paid a whole talent for
+a superintendent of his silver mines. And so I propound the question to
+myself as follows: "Have friends, like slaves, their market values?"
+
+ (2) A mina = L4 circ.
+
+ (3) For Nicias see Thuc. vii. 77 foll.; "Revenues," iv. 14; Plut.
+ "Nic." IV. v.; Lys. "de bon. Aristoph." 648.
+
+Not a doubt of it (replied Antisthenes). At any rate, I know that I
+would rather have such a one as my friend than be paid two minae, and
+there is such another whose worth I would not estimate at half a mina,
+and a third with whom I would not part for ten, and then again a fourth
+whose friendship would be cheap if it cost me all the wealth and pains
+in the world to purchase it.
+
+Well then (continued Socrates), if that be so, would it not be well if
+every one were to examine himself: "What after all may I chance to be
+worth to my friends?" Should he not try to become as dear as possible,
+so that his friends will not care to give him up? How often do I hear
+the complaint: "My friend So-and-so has given me up"; or "Such an one,
+whom I looked upon as a friend, has sacrificed me for a mina." And every
+time I hear these remarks, the question arises in my mind: If the vendor
+of a worthless slave is ready to part with him to a purchaser for what
+he will fetch--is there not at least a strong temptation to part with a
+base friend when you have a chance of making something on the exchange?
+Good slaves, as far as I can see, are not so knocked down to the hammer;
+no, nor good friends so lightly parted with.
+
+
+VI
+
+Again, in reference to the test to be applied, if we would gauge the
+qualifications of a friend worth the winning, the following remarks of
+Socrates could not fail, I think, to prove instructive. (1)
+
+ (1) Or, "Again, as to establishing a test of character, since a friend
+ worth having must be of a particular type, I cannot but think that
+ the following remarks would prove instructive."
+
+Tell me (said Socrates, addressing Critobulus), supposing we stood in
+need of a good friend, how should we set about his discovery? We
+must, in the first place, I suppose, seek out one who is master of his
+appetites, not under the dominion, that is, of his belly, not addicted
+to the wine-cup or to lechery or sleep or idleness, since no one
+enslaved to such tyrants could hope to do his duty either by himself or
+by his friends, could he?
+
+Certainly not (Critobulus answered).
+
+Soc. Do you agree, then, that we must hold aloof from every one so
+dominated?
+
+Cri. Most assuredly.
+
+Well then (proceeded Socrates), what shall we say of the spendthrift who
+has lost his independence and is for ever begging of his neighbours;
+if he gets anything out of them he cannot repay, but if he fails to get
+anything, he hates you for not giving--do you not think that this man
+too would prove but a disagreeable friend?
+
+Cri. Certainly.
+
+Soc. Then we must keep away from him too?
+
+Cri. That we must.
+
+Soc. Well! and what of the man whose strength lies in monetary
+transactions? (2) His one craving is to amass money; and for that reason
+he is an adept at driving a hard bargain (3)--glad enough to take in,
+but loath to pay out.
+
+ (2) Or, "the money-lender? He has a passion for big money-bags."
+
+ (3) Or, "hard in all his dealings."
+
+Cri. In my opinion he will prove even a worse fellow than the last.
+
+Soc. Well! and what of that other whose passion for money-making is so
+absorbing that he has no leisure for anything else, save how he may add
+to his gains?
+
+Cri. Hold aloof from him, say I, since there is no good to be got out of
+him or his society.
+
+Soc. Well! what of the quarrelsome and factious person (4) whose main
+object is to saddle his friends with a host of enemies?
+
+ (4) "The partisan."
+
+Cri. For God's sake let us avoid him also.
+
+Soc. But now we will imagine a man exempt indeed from all the above
+defects--a man who has no objection to receive kindnesses, but it never
+enters into his head to do a kindness in return.
+
+Cri. There will be no good in him either. But, Socrates, what kind of
+man shall we endeavour to make our friend? what is he like?
+
+Soc. I should say he must be just the converse of the above: he has
+control over the pleasures of the body, he is kindly disposed, (5)
+upright in all his dealings, (6) very zealous is he not to be outdone in
+kindness by his benefactors, if only his friends may derive some profit
+from his acquaintance.
+
+ (5) Reading {eunous}, or if {euorkos}, transl. "a man of his word."
+
+ (6) Or, "easy to deal with."
+
+Cri. But how are we to test these qualities, Socrates, before
+acquaintance?
+
+Soc. How do we test the merits of a sculptor?--not by inferences drawn
+from the talk of the artist merely. No, we look to what he has already
+achieved. These former statues of his were nobly executed, and we trust
+he will do equally well with the rest.
+
+Cri. You mean that if we find a man whose kindness to older friends
+is established, we may take it as proved that he will treat his newer
+friends as amiably?
+
+Soc. Why, certainly, if I see a man who has shown skill in the handling
+of horses previously, I argue that he will handle others no less
+skilfully again.
+
+Cri. Good! and when we have discovered a man whose friendship is worth
+having, how ought we to make him our friend?
+
+Soc. First we ought to ascertain the will of Heaven whether it be
+advisable to make him our friend.
+
+Cri. Well! and how are we to effect the capture of this friend of our
+choice, whom the gods approve? will you tell me that?
+
+Not, in good sooth (replied Socrates), by running him down like a hare,
+nor by decoying him like a bird, or by force like a wild boar. (7) To
+capture a friend against his will is a toilsome business, and to bind
+him in fetters like a slave by no means easy. Those who are so treated
+are apt to become foes instead of friends. (8)
+
+ (7) Reading {kaproi}, al. {ekhthroi}, "an enemy."
+
+ (8) Or, "Hate rather than friendship is the outcome of these methods."
+
+Cri. But how convert them into friends?
+
+Soc. There are certain incantations, we are told, which those who know
+them have only to utter, and they can make friends of whom they list;
+and there are certain philtres also which those who have the secret of
+them may administer to whom they like and win their love.
+
+Cri. From what source shall we learn them?
+
+Soc. You need not go farther than Homer to learn that which the Sirens
+sang to Odysseus, (9) the first words of which run, I think, as follows:
+
+ Hither, come hither, thou famous man, Odysseus, great glory of the
+ Achaeans!
+
+ (9) "Od." xii. 184.
+
+Cri. And did the magic words of this spell serve for all men alike? Had
+the Sirens only to utter this one incantation, and was every listener
+constrained to stay?
+
+Soc. No; this was the incantation reserved for souls athirst for fame,
+of virtue emulous.
+
+Cri. Which is as much as to say, we must suit the incantation to the
+listener, so that when he hears the words he shall not think that the
+enchanter is laughing at him in his sleeve. I cannot certainly conceive
+a method better calculated to excite hatred and repulsion than to go
+to some one who knows that he is small and ugly and a weakling, and to
+breathe in his ears the flattering tale that he is beautiful and tall
+and stalwart. But do you know any other love-charms, Socrates?
+
+Soc. I cannot say that I do; but I have heard that Pericles (10) was
+skilled in not a few, which he poured into the ear of our city and won
+her love.
+
+ (10) See above, I. ii. 40; "Symp." viii. 39.
+
+Cri. And how did Themistocles (11) win our city's love?
+
+ (11) See below, III. vi. 2; IV. ii. 2.
+
+Soc. Ah, that was not by incantation at all. What he did was to encircle
+our city with an amulet of saving virtue. (12)
+
+ (12) See Herod. vii. 143, "the wooden wall"; Thuc. i. 93, "'the walls'
+ of Athens."
+
+Cri. You would imply, Socrates, would you not, that if we want to win
+the love of any good man we need to be good ourselves in speech and
+action?
+
+And did you imagine (replied Socrates) that it was possible for a bad
+man to make good friends?
+
+Cri. Why, I could fancy I had seen some sorry speech-monger who was fast
+friends with a great and noble statesman; or again, some born commander
+and general who was boon companion with fellows quite incapable of
+generalship. (13)
+
+ (13) Or, "Why, yes, when I see some base orator fast friends with a
+ great leader of the people; or, again, some fellow incapable of
+ generalship a comrade to the greatest captains of his age."
+
+Soc. But in reference to the point we were discussing, may I ask whether
+you know of any one who can attach a useful friend to himself without
+being of use in return? (14) Can service ally in friendship with
+disservice?
+
+ (14) Add, "Can service ally in friendship with disservice? Must there
+ not be a reciprocity of service to make friendship lasting?"
+
+Cri. In good sooth no. But now, granted it is impossible for a base man
+to be friends with the beautiful and noble, (14) I am concerned at once
+to discover if one who is himself of a beautiful and noble character
+can, with a wave of the hand, as it were, attach himself in friendship
+to every other beautiful and noble nature.
+
+ (14) {kalous kagathous}.
+
+Soc. What perplexes and confounds you, Critobulus, is the fact that
+so often men of noble conduct, with souls aloof from baseness, are not
+friends but rather at strife and discord with one another, and deal more
+harshly by one another than they would by the most good-for-nothing of
+mankind.
+
+Cri. Yes, and this holds true not of private persons only, but states,
+the most eager to pursue a noble policy and to repudiate a base one,
+are frequently in hostile relation to one another. As I reason on
+these things my heart fails me, and the question, how friends are to
+be acquired, fills me with despondency. The bad, as I see, cannot be
+friends with one another. For how can such people, the ungrateful, or
+reckless, or covetous, or faithless, or incontinent, adhere together as
+friends? Without hesitation I set down the bad as born to be foes not
+friends, and as bearing the birthmark of internecine hate. But then
+again, as you suggest, no more can these same people harmonise in
+friendship with the good. For how should they who do evil be friends
+with those who hate all evil-doing? And if, last of all, they that
+cultivate virtue are torn by party strife in their struggle for the
+headship of the states, envying one another, hating one another, who are
+left to be friends? where shall goodwill and faithfulness be found among
+men?
+
+Soc. The fact is there is some subtlety in the texture of these things.
+(15) Seeds of love are implanted in man by nature. Men have need of
+one another, feel pity, help each other by united efforts, and in
+recognition of the fact show mutual gratitude. But there are seeds of
+war implanted also. The same objects being regarded as beautiful or
+agreeable by all alike, they do battle for their possession; a spirit of
+disunion (16) enters, and the parties range themselves in adverse camps.
+Discord and anger sound a note of war: the passion of more-having,
+staunchless avarice, threatens hostility; and envy is a hateful fiend.
+(17)
+
+ (15) i.e. a cunning intertwining of the threads of warp and woof.
+
+ (16) Cf. Shelley, "The devil of disunion in their souls."
+
+ (17) The diction is poetical.
+
+But nevertheless, through all opposing barriers friendship steals her
+way and binds together the beautiful and good among mankind. (18) Such
+is their virtue that they would rather possess scant means painlessly
+than wield an empire won by war. In spite of hunger and thirst they will
+share their meat and drink without a pang. Not bloom of lusty youth, nor
+love's delights can warp their self-control; nor will they be tempted
+to cause pain where pain should be unknown. It is theirs not merely
+to eschew all greed of riches, not merely to make a just and lawful
+distribution of wealth, but to supply what is lacking to the needs of
+one another. Theirs it is to compose strife and discord not in painless
+oblivion simply, but to the general advantage. Theirs also to hinder
+such extravagance of anger as shall entail remorse hereafter. And as to
+envy they will make a clean sweep and clearance of it: the good things
+which a man possesses shall be also the property of his friends, and the
+goods which they possess are to be looked upon as his. Where then is
+the improbability that the beautiful and noble should be sharers in the
+honours (19) of the state not only without injury, but even to their
+mutual advantage?
+
+ (18) Or, as we say, "the elite of human kind."
+
+ (19) "And the offices."
+
+They indeed who covet and desire the honours and offices in a state
+for the sake of the liberty thereby given them to embezzle the public
+moneys, to deal violently by their fellow-creatures, and to batten in
+luxury themselves, may well be regarded as unjust and villainous persons
+incapable of harmony with one another. But if a man desire to obtain
+these selfsame honours in order that, being himself secure against
+wrong-doing, he may be able to assist his friends in what is right, and,
+raised to a high position, (20) may essay to confer some blessing on the
+land of his fathers, what is there to hinder him from working in harmony
+with some other of a like spirit? Will he, with the "beautiful and
+noble" at his side, be less able to aid his friends? or will his
+power to benefit the community be shortened because the flower of that
+community are fellow-workers in that work? Why, even in the contests
+of the games it is obvious that if it were possible for the stoutest
+combatants to combine against the weakest, the chosen band would come
+off victors in every bout, and would carry off all the prizes. This
+indeed is against the rules of the actual arena; but in the field of
+politics, where the beautiful and good hold empery, and there is nought
+to hinder any from combining with whomsoever a man may choose to benefit
+the state, it will be a clear gain, will it not, for any one engaged
+in state affairs to make the best men his friends, whereby he will find
+partners and co-operators in his aims instead of rivals and antagonists?
+And this at least is obvious: in case of foreign war a man will need
+allies, but all the more if in the ranks opposed to him should stand the
+flower of the enemy. (21) Moreover, those who are willing to fight
+your battles must be kindly dealt with, that goodwill may quicken to
+enthusiasm; and one good man (22) is better worth your benefiting that a
+dozen knaves, since a little kindness goes a long way with the good, but
+with the base the more you give them the more they ask for.
+
+ (20) "As archon," or "raised to rule."
+
+ (21) Lit. "the beautiful and good."
+
+ (22) Or, "the best, though few, are better worth your benefiting than
+ the many base."
+
+So keep a good heart, Critobulus; only try to become good yourself, and
+when you have attained, set to your hand to capture the beautiful and
+good. Perhaps I may be able to give you some help in this quest, being
+myself an adept in Love's lore. (23) No matter who it is for whom my
+heart is aflame; in an instant my whole soul is eager to leap forth.
+With vehemence I speed to the mark. I, who love, demand to be loved
+again; this desire in me must be met by counter desire in him; this
+thirst for his society by thirst reciprocal for mine. And these will
+be your needs also, I foresee, whenever you are seized with longing to
+contract a friendship. Do not hide from me, therefore, whom you would
+choose as a friend, since, owing to the pains I take to please him
+who pleases me, I am not altogether unversed, I fancy, in the art of
+catching men. (24)
+
+ (23) "An authority in matters of love." Cf. Plat. "Symp." 177 D; Xen.
+ "Symp." viii. 2.
+
+ (24) See below, III. xi. 7; cf. Plat. "Soph." 222; N. T. Matt. iv. 19,
+ {alieis anthropon}.
+
+Critobulus replied: Why, these are the very lessons of instruction,
+Socrates, for which I have been long athirst, and the more particularly
+if this same love's lore will enable me to capture those who are good of
+soul and those who are beautiful of person.
+
+Soc. Nay, now I warn you, Critobulus, it is not within the province of
+my science to make the beautiful endure him who would lay hands upon
+them. And that is why men fled from Scylla, I am persuaded, because she
+laid hands upon them; but the Sirens were different--they laid hands on
+nobody, but sat afar off and chanted their spells in the ears of all;
+and therefore, it is said, all men endured to listen, and were charmed.
+
+Cri. I promise I will not lay violent hands on any; therefore, if you
+have any good device for winning friends, instruct your pupil.
+
+Soc. And if there is to be no laying on of the hands, there must be no
+application either of the lips; is it agreed?
+
+Cri. No, nor application of the lips to any one--not beautiful.
+
+Soc. See now! you cannot open your mouth without some luckless
+utterance. Beauty suffers no such liberty, however eagerly the ugly may
+invite it, making believe some quality of soul must rank them with the
+beautiful.
+
+Cri. Be of good cheer then; let the compact stand thus: "Kisses for the
+beautiful, and for the good a rain of kisses." So now teach us the art
+of catching friends.
+
+Soc. Well then, when you wish to win some one's affection, you will
+allow me to lodge information against you to the effect that you admire
+him and desire to be his friend?
+
+Cri. Lodge the indictment, with all my heart. I never heard of any one
+who hated his admirers.
+
+Soc. And if I add to the indictment the further charge that through your
+admiration you are kindly disposed towards him, you will not feel I am
+taking away your character?
+
+Cri. Why, no; for myself I know a kindly feeling springs up in my heart
+towards any one whom I conceive to be kindly disposed to me.
+
+Soc. All this I shall feel empowered to say about you to those whose
+friendship you seek, and I can promise further help; only there is a
+comprehensive "if" to be considered: if you will further authorise me to
+say that you are devoted to your friends; that nothing gives you so much
+joy as a good friend; that you pride yourself no less on the fine deeds
+of those you love than on your own; and on their good things equally
+with your own; that you never weary of plotting and planning to procure
+them a rich harvest of the same; and lastly, that you have discovered
+a man's virtue is to excel his friends in kindness and his foes in
+hostility. If I am authorised thus to report of you, I think you will
+find me a serviceable fellow-hunter in the quest of friends, which is
+the conquest of the good.
+
+Cri. Why this appeal to me?--as if you had not free permission to say
+exactly what you like about me.
+
+Soc. No; that I deny, on the authority of Aspasia. (25) I have it from
+her own lips. "Good matchmakers," she said tome, "were clever hands at
+cementing alliances between people, provided the good qualities they
+vouched for were truthfully reported; but when it came to their telling
+lies, for her part she could not compliment them. (26) Their poor
+deluded dupes ended by hating each other and the go-betweens as well."
+Now I myself am so fully persuaded of the truth of this that I feel it
+is not in my power to say aught in your praise which I cannot say with
+truth.
+
+ (25) Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, of Miletus. See "Econ." iii. 14;
+ Plat. "Menex." 235 E; Aesch. Socrat. ap. Cic. "de Invent." I.
+ xxxi. 51. See Grote, "H. G." vi. 132 foll.; Cobet, "Pros. Xen."
+
+ (26) Reading {ouk ethelein epainein}, or if {ouk ophelein epainousas}
+ with Kuhner transl. "Good matchmakers, she told me, have to
+ consult truth when reporting favourably of any one: then indeed
+ they are terribly clever at bringing people together: whereas
+ false flatterers do no good; their dupes," etc.
+
+Cri. Really, Socrates, you are a wonderfully good friend to me--in so
+far as I have any merit which will entitle me to win a friend, you will
+lend me a helping hand, it seems; otherwise you would rather not forge
+any petty fiction for my benefit.
+
+Soc. But tell me, how shall I assist you best, think you? By praising
+you falsely or by persuading you to try to be a good man? Or if it is
+not plain to you thus, look at the matter by the light of some examples.
+I wish to introduce you to a shipowner, or to make him your friend: I
+begin by singing your praises to him falsely thus, "You will find him a
+good pilot"; he catches at the phrase, and entrusts his ship to you,
+who have no notion of guiding a vessel. What can you expect but to make
+shipwreck of the craft and yourself together? or suppose by similar
+false assertions I can persuade the state at large to entrust her
+destinies to you--"a man with a fine genius for command," I say, "a
+practised lawyer," "a politician born," and so forth. The odds are, the
+state and you may come to grief through you. Or to take an instance
+from everyday life. By my falsehoods I persuade some private person to
+entrust his affairs to you as "a really careful and business-like
+person with a head for economy." When put to the test would not your
+administration prove ruinous, and the figure you cut ridiculous? No, my
+dear friend, there is but one road, the shortest, safest, best, and it
+is simply this: In whatsoever you desire to be deemed good, endeavour
+to be good. For of all the virtues namable among men, consider, and
+you will find there is not one but may be increased by learning and
+practice. For my part then, Critobulus, these are the principles on
+which we ought to go a-hunting; but if you take a different view, I am
+all attention, please instruct me.
+
+Then Critobulus: Nay, Socrates, I should be ashamed to gainsay what you
+have said; if I did, it would neither be a noble statement nor a true.
+(27)
+
+ (27) {kala... alethe}.
+
+
+VII
+
+He had two ways of dealing with the difficulties of his friends: where
+ignorance was the cause, he tried to meet the trouble by a dose of
+common sense; or where want and poverty were to blame, by lessoning them
+that they should assist one another according to their ability; and here
+I may mention certain incidents which occurred within my own knowledge.
+How, for instance, he chanced upon Aristarchus wearing the look of one
+who suffered from a fit of the "sullens," and thus accosted him.
+
+Soc. You seem to have some trouble on your mind, Aristarchus; if so, you
+should share it with your friends. Perhaps together we might lighten the
+weight of it a little.
+
+Aristarchus answered: Yes, Socrates, I am in sore straits indeed. Ever
+since the party strife declared itself in the city, (1) what with the
+rush of people to Piraeus, and the wholesale banishments, I have been
+fairly at the mercy of my poor deserted female relatives. Sisters,
+nieces, cousins, they have all come flocking to me for protection. I
+have fourteen free-born souls, I tell you, under my single roof, and how
+are we to live? We can get nothing out of the soil--that is in the hands
+of the enemy; nothing from my house property, for there is scarcely a
+living soul left in the city; my furniture? no one will buy it; money?
+there is none to be borrowed--you would have a better chance to find
+it by looking for it on the road than to borrow it from a banker. Yes,
+Socrates, to stand by and see one's relatives die of hunger is hard
+indeed, and yet to feed so many at such a pinch impossible.
+
+ (1) i.e. circa 404-403 B.C. See "Hell." II. iv.
+
+After he listened to the story, Socrates asked: How comes it that
+Ceramon, (2) with so many mouths to feed, not only contrives to furnish
+himself and them with the necessaries of life, but to realise a handsome
+surplus, whilst you being in like plight (3) are afraid you will one and
+all perish of starvation for want of the necessaries of life?
+
+ (2) An employer of labour, apparently, on a grand scale.
+
+ (3) Lit. "with your large family to feed." L. Dindorf would like to
+ read {su de oligous}, "you with your small family."
+
+Ar. Why, bless your soul, do you not see he has only slaves and I have
+free-born souls to feed?
+
+Soc. And which should you say were the better human beings, the
+free-born members of your household or Ceramon's slaves?
+
+Ar. The free souls under my roof without a doubt.
+
+Soc. Is it not a shame, then, that he with his baser folk to back
+him should be in easy circumstances, while you and your far superior
+household are in difficulties?
+
+Ar. To be sure it is, when he has only a set of handicraftsmen to feed,
+and I my liberally-educated household.
+
+Soc. What is a handicraftsman? Does not the term apply to all who can
+make any sort of useful product or commodity?
+
+Ar. Certainly.
+
+Soc. Barley meal is a useful product, is it not?
+
+Ar. Pre-eminently so.
+
+Soc. And loaves of bread?
+
+Ar. No less.
+
+Soc. Well, and what do you say to cloaks for men and for women--tunics,
+mantles, vests? (4)
+
+ (4) For these articles of dress see Becker's "Charicles," Exc. i. to
+ Sc. xi. "Dress."
+
+Ar. Yes, they are all highly useful commodities.
+
+Soc. Then your household do not know how to make any of these?
+
+Ar. On the contrary, I believe they can make them all.
+
+Soc. Then you are not aware that by means of the manufacture of one of
+these alone--his barley meal store--Nausicydes (5) not only maintains
+himself and his domestics, but many pigs and cattle besides, and
+realises such large profits that he frequently contributes to the state
+benevolences; (6) while there is Cyrebus, again, who, out of a bread
+factory, more than maintains the whole of his establishment, and lives
+in the lap of luxury; and Demeas of Collytus gets a livelihood out of
+a cloak business, and Menon as a mantua-maker, and so, again, more than
+half the Megarians (7) by the making of vests.
+
+ (5) Nausicydes. Cobet, "Pros. Xen." cf. Aristoph. "Eccles." 426.
+
+ (6) Lit. "state liturgies," or "to the burden of the public services."
+ For these see Gow, "Companion," xviii. "Athenian Finance."
+
+ (7) Cf. Arist. "Acharnians," 519, {esukophantei Megareon ta
+ khlaniskia}. See Dr. Merry's note ad loc.
+
+Ar. Bless me, yes! They have got a set of barbarian fellows, whom they
+purchase and keep, to manufacture by forced labour whatever takes their
+fancy. My kinswomen, I need not tell you, are free-born ladies.
+
+Soc. Then, on the ground that they are free-born and your kinswomen,
+you think that they ought to do nothing but eat and sleep? Or is it your
+opinion that people who live in this way--I speak of free-born people
+in general--lead happier lives, and are more to be congratulated, than
+those who give their time and attention to such useful arts of life as
+they are skilled in? Is this what you see in the world, that for the
+purpose of learning what it is well to know, and of recollecting the
+lessons taught, or with a view to health and strength of body, or for
+the sake of acquiring and preserving all that gives life its charm,
+idleness and inattention are found to be helpful, whilst work and study
+are simply a dead loss? Pray, when those relatives of yours were taught
+what you tell me they know, did they learn it as barren information
+which they would never turn to practical account, or, on the contrary,
+as something with which they were to be seriously concerned some day,
+and from which they were to reap advantage? Do human beings in general
+attain to well-tempered manhood by a course of idling, or by carefully
+attending to what will be of use? Which will help a man the more to grow
+in justice and uprightness, to be up and doing, or to sit with folded
+hands revolving the ways and means of existence? As things now stand,
+if I am not mistaken, there is no love lost between you. You cannot help
+feeling that they are costly to you, and they must see that you find
+them a burthen? This is a perilous state of affairs, in which hatred and
+bitterness have every prospect of increasing, whilst the pre-existing
+bond of affection (8) is likely to be snapped.
+
+ (8) Or, "the original stock of kindliness will be used up."
+
+But now, if only you allow them free scope for their energies, when you
+come to see how useful they can be, you will grow quite fond of them,
+and they, when they perceive that they can please you, will cling to
+their benefactor warmly. Thus, with the memory of former kindnesses
+made sweeter, you will increase the grace which flows from kindnesses
+tenfold; you will in consequence be knit in closer bonds of love and
+domesticity. If, indeed, they were called upon to do any shameful work,
+let them choose death rather than that; but now they know, it would
+seem, the very arts and accomplishments which are regarded as the
+loveliest and the most suitable for women; and the things which we know,
+any of us, are just those which we can best perform, that is to say,
+with ease and expedition; it is a joy to do them, and the result is
+beautiful. (9) Do not hesitate, then, to initiate your friends in what
+will bring advantage to them and you alike; probably they will gladly
+respond to your summons.
+
+ (9) Or, "with ease, rapidity, pleasure and effect."
+
+Well, upon my word (Aristarchus answered), I like so well what you
+say, Socrates, that though hitherto I have not been disposed to borrow,
+knowing that when I had spent what I got I should not be in a condition
+to repay, I think I can now bring myself to do so in order to raise a
+fund for these works.
+
+Thereupon a capital was provided; wools were purchased; the good man's
+relatives set to work, and even whilst they breakfasted they worked, and
+on and on till work was ended and they supped. Smiles took the place of
+frowns; they no longer looked askance with suspicion, but full into each
+other's eyes with happiness. They loved their kinsman for his kindness
+to them. He became attached to them as helpmates; and the end of it all
+was, he came to Socrates and told him with delight how matters fared;
+"and now," he added, "they tax me with being the only drone in the
+house, who sit and eat the bread of idleness."
+
+To which Socrates: Why do not you tell them the fable of the dog? (10)
+Once on a time, so goes the story, when beasts could speak, the sheep
+said to her master, "What a marvel is this, master, that to us, your
+own sheep, who provide you with fleeces and lambs and cheese, you give
+nothing, save only what we may nibble off earth's bosom; but with this
+dog of yours, who provides you with nothing of the sort, you share
+the very meat out of your mouth." When the dog heard these words, he
+answered promptly, "Ay, in good sooth, for is it not I who keep you safe
+and sound, you sheep, so that you are not stolen by man nor harried by
+wolves; since, if I did not keep watch over you, you would not be able
+so much as to graze afield, fearing to be destroyed." And so, says
+the tale, the sheep had to admit that the dog was rightly preferred to
+themselves in honour. And so do you tell your flock yonder that like the
+dog in the fable you are their guardian and overseer, and it is thanks
+to you that they are protected from evil and evildoers, so that they
+work their work and live their lives in blissful security.
+
+ (10) See Joseph Jacobs, "The Fables of Aesop," vol. i. p. 26 foll.,
+ for "a complete list of the Fables given in Greek literature up to
+ the fall of Greek independence." Cf. Hesiod, "Works and Days," 202
+ foll.; Archilochus, 89 (60), Bergk; Herod. i. 141; Aesch.
+ "Myrmid." fr. 123; Aristot. "Rhet." II. xx.
+
+
+VIII
+
+At another time chancing upon an old friend whom he had not seen for a
+long while, he greeted him thus.
+
+Soc. What quarter of the world do you hail from, Eutherus?
+
+The other answered: From abroad, just before the close of the war; but
+at present from the city itself. (1) You see, since we have been denuded
+of our possessions across the frontier, (2) and my father left me
+nothing in Attica, I must needs bide at home, and provide myself with
+the necessaries of life by means of bodily toil, which seems preferable
+to begging from another, especially as I have no security on which to
+raise a loan.
+
+ (1) Lit. "from here." The conversation perhaps takes place in Piraeus
+ 404 B.C.
+
+ (2) Or, "colonial possession." Cf. "Symp." iv. 31.
+
+Soc. And how long do you expect your body to be equal to providing the
+necessaries of life for hire?
+
+Euth. Goodness knows, Socrates--not for long.
+
+Soc. And when you find yourself an old man, expenses will not diminish,
+and yet no one will care to pay you for the labour of your hands.
+
+Euth. That is true.
+
+Soc. Would it not be better then to apply yourself at once to such
+work as will stand you in good stead when you are old--that is, address
+yourself to some large proprietor who needs an assistant in managing his
+estate? (3) By superintending his works, helping to get in his crops,
+and guarding his property in general, you will be a benefit to the
+estate and be benefited in return.
+
+ (3) Cf. "Cyrop." VIII. iii. 48.
+
+I could not endure the yoke of slavery, Socrates! (he exclaimed).
+
+Soc. And yet the heads of departments in a state are not regarded as
+adopting the badge of slavery because they manage the public property,
+but as having attained a higher degree of freedom rather.
+
+Euth. In a word, Socrates, the idea of being held to account to another
+is not at all to my taste.
+
+Soc. And yet, Eutherus, it would be hard to find a work which did
+not involve some liability to account; in fact it is difficult to do
+anything without some mistake or other, and no less difficult, if
+you should succeed in doing it immaculately, to escape all unfriendly
+criticism. I wonder now whether you find it easy to get through your
+present occupations entirely without reproach. No? Let me tell you what
+you should do. You should avoid censorious persons and attach yourself
+to the considerate and kind-hearted, and in all your affairs accept
+with a good grace what you can and decline what you feel you cannot do.
+Whatever it be, do it heart and soul, and make it your finest work. (4)
+There lies the method at once to silence fault-finders and to minister
+help to your own difficulties. Life will flow smoothly, risks will be
+diminished, provision against old age secured.
+
+ (4) Or, "study to make it your finest work, the expression of a real
+ enthusiasm."
+
+
+IX
+
+At another time, as I am aware, he had heard a remark made by Crito (1)
+that life at Athens was no easy matter for a man who wished to mind his
+own affairs.
+
+ (1) Crito. See above, I. ii. 48; Cobet, "P. X."; cf. Plat. "Rep."
+ viii. 549 C.
+
+As, for instance, at this moment (Crito proceeded) there are a set
+of fellows threatening me with lawsuits, not because they have any
+misdemeanour to allege against me, but simply under the conviction that
+I will sooner pay a sum of money than be troubled further.
+
+To which Socrates replied: Tell me, Crito, you keep dogs, do you not, to
+ward off wolves from your flocks?
+
+Cr. Certainly; it pays to do so.
+
+Soc. Then why do you not keep a watchman willing and competent to ward
+off this pack of people who seek to injure you?
+
+I should not at all mind (he answered), if I were not afraid he might
+turn again and rend his keeper.
+
+What! (rejoined Socrates), do you not see that to gratify a man like
+yourself is far pleasanter as a matter of self-interest than to quarrel
+with you? You may be sure there are plenty of people here who will take
+the greatest pride in making you their friend.
+
+Accordingly, they sought out Archedemus, (2) a practical man with a
+clever tongue in his head (3) but poor; the fact being, he was not the
+sort to make gain by hook or by crook, but a lover of honesty and of
+too good a nature himself to make his living as a pettifogger. (4) Crito
+would then take the opportunity of times of harvesting and put aside
+small presents for Achedemus of corn and oil, or wine, or wool, or any
+other of the farm produce forming the staple commodities of life, or he
+would invite him to a sacrificial feast, and otherwise pay him marked
+attention. Archedemus, feeling that he had in Crito's house a harbour
+of refuge, could not make too much of his patron, and ere long he
+had hunted up a long list of iniquities which could be lodged against
+Crito's pettifogging persecutors themselves, and not only their numerous
+crimes but their numerous enemies; and presently he prosecuted one of
+them in a public suit, where sentence would be given against him "what
+to suffer or what to pay." (5) The accused, conscious as he was of
+many rascally deeds, did all he could to be quit of Archedemus, but
+Archedemus was not to be got rid of. He held on until he had made the
+informer not only loose his hold of Crito but pay himself a sum of
+money; and now that Archedemus had achieved this and other similar
+victories, it is easy to guess what followed. (6) It was just as when
+some shepherd has got a very good dog, all the other shepherds wish
+to lodge their flocks in his neighbourhood that they too may reap the
+benefit of him. So a number of Crito's friends came begging him to allow
+Archedemus to be their guardian also, and Archedemus was overjoyed to
+do something to gratify Crito, and so it came about that not only Crito
+abode in peace, but his friends likewise. If any of those people with
+whom Archedemus was not on the best of terms were disposed to throw
+it in his teeth that he accepted his patron's benefits and paid in
+flatteries, he had a ready retort: "Answer me this question--which is
+the more scandalous, to accept kindnesses from honest folk and to repay
+them, with the result that I make such people my friends but quarrel
+with knaves, or to make enemies of honourable gentlemen (7) by attempts
+to do them wrong, with the off-chance indeed of winning the friendship
+of some scamps in return for my co-operation, but the certainty of
+losing in the tone of my acquaintances?" (8)
+
+ (2) Archedemus, possibly the demagogue, "Hell." I. vii. 2. So Cobet,
+ "P. X.," but see Grote, "H. G." viii. 245.
+
+ (3) Lit. "very capable of speech and action"--the writer's favourite
+ formula for the well-trained Athenian who can speak fluently and
+ reason clearly, and act energetically and opportunely.
+
+ (4) Reading {kai euphuesteros on} (or {e os})... {apo sukophanton}
+ (or {sukophantion}), after Cobet, "P. X." s.v. Archedemus. The
+ MSS. give {kai ephe raston einai}--"nothing is easier," he said,
+ "than recovering from sycophants."
+
+ (5) For this formula cf. "Econ." vi. 24. Cf. Plat. "Statesm." 299 A.
+
+ (6) {ede tote}. Cf. Plat. "Laws," vi. 778 C.
+
+ (7) Lit. the {kaloi kagathoi}, which like {khrestous} and {ponerous}
+ has a political as well as an ethical meaning.
+
+ (8) Lit. "must associate with these (the {ponerois}) instead of those
+ (the {kalois te kagathois}).
+
+The net result of the whole proceedings was that Archedemus was now
+Crito's right hand, (9) and by the rest of Crito's friends he was held
+in honour.
+
+ (9) He was No. 1--{eis}.
+
+
+X
+
+Again I may cite, as known to myself, (1) the following discussion; the
+arguments were addressed to Diodorus, one of his companions. The master
+said:
+
+ (1) Or, "for which I can personally vouch."
+
+Tell me, Diodorus, if one of your slaves runs away, are you at pains to
+recover him?
+
+More than that (Diodorus answered), I summon others to my aid and I have
+a reward cried for his recovery.
+
+Soc. Well, if one of your domestics is sick, do you tend him and call in
+the doctors to save his life?
+
+Diod. Decidedly I do.
+
+Soc. And if an intimate acquaintance who is far more precious to you
+than any of your household slaves is about to perish of want, you would
+think it incumbent on you to take pains to save his life? Well! now you
+know without my telling you that Hermogenes (2) is not made of wood or
+stone. If you helped him he would be ashamed not to pay you in kind.
+And yet--the opportunity of possessing a willing, kindly, and trusty
+assistant well fitted to do your bidding, and not merely that, but
+capable of originating useful ideas himself, with a certain forecast
+of mind and judgment--I say such a man is worth dozens of slaves. Good
+economists tell us that when a precious article may be got at a low
+price we ought to buy. And nowadays when times are so bad it is possible
+to get good friends exceedingly cheap.
+
+ (2) Hermogenes, presumably the son of Hipponicus. See I. ii. 48.
+
+Diodorus answered: You are quite right, Socrates; bid Hermogenes come to
+me.
+
+Soc. Bid Hermogenes come to you!--not I indeed! since for aught I can
+understand you are no better entitled to summon him that to go to him
+yourself, nor is the advantage more on his side than your own.
+
+Thus Diodorus went off in a trice to seek Hermogenes, and at no great
+outlay won to himself a friend--a friend whose one concern it now was to
+discover how, by word or deed, he might help and gladden Diodorus.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK III
+
+
+I
+
+Aspirants to honour and distinction (1) derived similar help from
+Socrates, who in each case stimulated in them a persevering assiduity
+towards their several aims, as the following narratives tend to show. He
+had heard on one occasion of the arrival in Athens of Dionysodorus, (2)
+who professed to teach the whole duty of a general. (3) Accordingly he
+remarked to one of those who were with him--a young man whose anxiety to
+obtain the office of Strategos (4) was no secret to him:
+
+ (1) {ton kalon} = everything which the {kalos te kagathos} should aim
+ at, but especially the honourable offices of state such as the
+ Archonship, Strategia, Hipparchia, etc. See Plat. "Laches."
+
+ (2) Dionysodorus of Chios, presumably. See Plat. "Euthyd." 271 C foll.
+
+ (3) A professor of the science and art of strategy.
+
+ (4) Lit. "that honour," sc. the Strategia.
+
+Soc. It would be monstrous on the part of any one who sought to become
+a general (5) to throw away the slightest opportunity of learning the
+duties of the office. Such a person, I should say, would deserve to be
+fined and punished by the state far more than the charlatan who without
+having learnt the art of a sculptor undertakes a contract to carve a
+statue. Considering that the whole fortunes of the state are entrusted
+to the general during a war, with all its incidental peril, it is only
+reasonable to anticipate that great blessings or great misfortunes
+will result in proportion to the success or bungling of that officer. I
+appeal to you, young sir, do you not agree that a candidate who, while
+taking pains to be elected neglects to learn the duties of the office,
+would richly deserve to be fined?
+
+ (5) i.e. "head of the war department, and commander-in-chief," etc.
+
+With arguments like these he persuaded the young man to go and take
+lessons. After he had gone through the course he came back, and Socrates
+proceeded playfully to banter him.
+
+Soc. Behold our young friend, sirs, as Homer says of Agamemnon, of mein
+majestical, (6) so he; does he not seem to move more majestically, like
+one who has studied to be a general? Of course, just as a man who
+has learned to play the harp is a harper, even if he never touch the
+instrument, or as one who has studied medicine is a physician, though he
+does not practise, so our friend here from this time forward is now and
+ever shall be a general, even though he does not receive a vote at the
+elections. But the dunce who has not the science is neither general
+nor doctor, no, not even if the whole world appointed him. But (he
+proceeded, turning to the youth), in case any of us should ever find
+ourselves captain or colonel (7) under you, to give us some smattering
+of the science of war, what did the professor take as the starting-point
+of his instruction in generalship? Please inform us.
+
+ (6) "Il." iii. 169, 170.
+
+ (7) Or, "brigadier or captain," lit. taxiarch or lochagos.
+
+Then the young man: He began where he ended; he taught me tactics
+(8)--tactics and nothing else.
+
+ (8) Cf. "Cyrop." I. vi. 12 foll.; VIII. v. 15.
+
+Yet surely (replied Socrates) that is only an infinitesimal part of
+generalship. A general (9) must be ready in furnishing the material of
+war: in providing the commissariat for his troops; quick in devices, he
+must be full of practical resource; nothing must escape his eye or tax
+his endurance; he must be shrewd, and ready of wit, a combination at
+once of clemency and fierceness, of simplicity and of insidious
+craft; he must play the part of watchman, of robber; now prodigal as
+a spendthrift, and again close-fisted as a miser, the bounty of his
+munificence must be equalled by the narrowness of his greed; impregnable
+in defence, a very dare-devil in attack--these and many other qualities
+must he possess who is to make a good general and minister of war; they
+must come to him by gift of nature or through science. No doubt it is a
+grand thing also to be a tactician, since there is all the difference in
+the world between an army properly handled in the field and the same
+in disorder; just as stones and bricks, woodwork and tiles, tumbled
+together in a heap are of no use at all, but arrange them in a certain
+order--at bottom and atop materials which will not crumble or rot,
+such as stones and earthen tiles, and in the middle between the two put
+bricks and woodwork, with an eye to architectural principle, (10) and
+finally you get a valuable possession--to wit, a dwelling-place.
+
+ (9) A strategos. For the duties and spheres of action of this officer,
+ see Gow, op. cit. xiv. 58.
+
+ (10) "As in the building of a house." See Vitrivius, ii. 3; Plin. xxv.
+ 14.
+
+The simile is very apt, Socrates (11) (replied the youth), for in
+battle, too, the rule is to draw up the best men in front and rear,
+with those of inferior quality between, where they may be led on by the
+former and pushed on by the hinder.
+
+ (11) Cf. "Il." iv. 297 foll.; "Cyrop." VI. iii. 25; Polyb. x. 22.
+
+Soc. Very good, no doubt, if the professor taught you to distinguish
+good and bad; but if not, where is the use of your learning? It would
+scarcely help you, would it, to be told to arrange coins in piles, the
+best coins at top and bottom and the worst in the middle, unless you
+were first taught to distinguish real from counterfeit.
+
+The Youth. Well no, upon my word, he did not teach us that, so that the
+task of distinguishing between good and bad must devolve on ourselves.
+
+Soc. Well, shall we see, then, how we may best avoid making blunders
+between them?
+
+I am ready (replied the youth).
+
+Soc. Well then! Let us suppose we are marauders, and the task imposed
+upon us is to carry off some bullion; it will be a right disposition of
+our forces if we place in the vanguard those who are the greediest of
+gain? (12)
+
+ (12) "Whose fingers itch for gold."
+
+The Youth. I should think so.
+
+Soc. Then what if there is danger to be faced? Shall the vanguard
+consist of men who are greediest of honour?
+
+The Youth. It is these, at any rate, who will face danger for the sake
+of praise and glory. (13) Fortunately such people are not hid away in
+a corner; they shine forth conspicuous everywhere, and are easy to be
+discovered.
+
+ (13) Cf. Shakesp. "seeking the bubble reputation even in the cannon's
+ mouth."
+
+Soc. But tell me, did he teach you how to draw up troops in general,
+or specifically where and how to apply each particular kind of tactical
+arrangement?
+
+The Youth. Nothing of the sort.
+
+Soc. And yet there are and must be innumerable circumstances in which
+the same ordering of march or battle will be out of place.
+
+The Youth. I assure you he did not draw any of these fine distinctions.
+
+He did not, did not he? (he answered). Bless me! Go back to him again,
+then, and ply him with questions; if he really has the science, and is
+not lost to all sense of shame, he will blush to have taken your money
+and then to have sent you away empty.
+
+
+II
+
+At another time he fell in with a man who had been chosen general and
+minister of war, and thus accosted him.
+
+Soc. Why did Homer, think you, designate Agamemnon "shepherd of the
+peoples"? (1) Was it possibly to show that, even as a shepherd must care
+for his sheep and see that they are safe and have all things needful,
+and that the objects of their rearing be secured, so also must a general
+take care that his soldiers are safe and have their supplies, and attain
+the objects of their soldiering? Which last is that they may get the
+mastery of their enemies, and so add to their own good fortune and
+happiness; or tell me, what made him praise Agamemnon, saying--
+
+ He is both a good king and a warrior bold? (2)
+
+Did he mean, perhaps, to imply that he would be a 'warrior bold,' not
+merely in standing alone and bravely battling against the foe, but as
+inspiring the whole of his host with like prowess; and by a 'good king,'
+not merely one who should stand forth gallantly to protect his own life,
+but who should be the source of happiness to all over whom he reigns?
+Since a man is not chosen king in order to take heed to himself, albeit
+nobly, but that those who chose him may attain to happiness through him.
+And why do men go soldiering except to ameliorate existence? (3) and to
+this end they choose their generals that they may find in them guides to
+the goal in question. He, then, who undertakes that office is bound to
+procure for those who choose him the thing they seek for. And indeed it
+were not easy to find any nobler ambition than this, or aught ignobler
+than its opposite.
+
+ (1) "Il." ii. 243. "The People's Paster," Chapman.
+
+ (2) "Il." iii. 179; cf. "Symp." iv. 6. A favourite line of Alexander
+ the Great's, it is said.
+
+ (3) Of, "that life may reach some flower of happiness."
+
+After such sort he handled the question, what is the virtue of a good
+leader? and by shredding off all superficial qualities, laid bare as
+the kernel of the matter that it is the function of every leader to make
+those happy whom he may be called upon to lead. (4)
+
+ (4) Cf. Plat. "Rep." 342.
+
+
+III
+
+The following conversation with a youth who had just been elected
+hipparch (1) (or commandant of cavalry), I can also vouch for. (2)
+
+ (1) Cf. "Hipparch."
+
+ (2) Lit. "I know he once held."
+
+Soc. Can you tell us what set you wishing to be a general of cavalry,
+young sir? What was your object? I suppose it was not simply to ride at
+the head of the "knights," an honour not denied to the mounted archers,
+(3) who ride even in front of the generals themselves?
+
+ (3) Lit. "Hippotoxotai." See Boeckh, "P. E. A." II. xxi. p. 264 (Eng.
+ tr.)
+
+Hipp. You are right.
+
+Soc. No more was it for the sake merely of public notoriety, since a
+madman might boast of that fatal distinction. (4)
+
+ (4) Or, "as we all know, 'Tom Fool' can boast," etc.
+
+Hipp. You are right again.
+
+Soc. Is this possibly the explanation? you think to improve the
+cavalry--your aim would be to hand it over to the state in better
+condition than you find it; and, if the cavalry chanced to be called
+out, you at their head would be the cause of some good thing to Athens?
+
+Hipp. Most certainly.
+
+Soc. Well, and a noble ambition too, upon my word--if you can achieve
+your object. The command to which you are appointed concerns horses and
+riders, does it not?
+
+Hipp. It does, no doubt.
+
+Soc. Come then, will you explain to us first how you propose to improve
+the horses.
+
+Hipp. Ah, that will scarcely form part of my business, I fancy. Each
+trooper is personally responsible for the condition of his horse.
+
+Soc. But suppose, when they present themselves and their horses, (5) you
+find that some have brought beasts with bad feet or legs or otherwise
+infirm, and others such ill-fed jades that they cannot keep up on the
+march; others, again, brutes so ill broken and unmanageable that they
+will not keep their place in the ranks, and others such desperate
+plungers that they cannot be got to any place in the ranks at all. What
+becomes of your cavalry force then? How will you charge at the head of
+such a troop, and win glory for the state?
+
+ (5) For this phrase, see Schneider and Kuhner ad loc.
+
+Hipp. You are right. I will try to look after the horses to my utmost.
+
+Soc. Well, and will you not lay your hand to improve the men themselves?
+
+Hipp. I will.
+
+Soc. The first thing will be to make them expert in mounting their
+chargers?
+
+Hipp. That certainly, for if any of them were dismounted he would then
+have a better chance of saving himself.
+
+Soc. Well, but when it comes to the hazard of engagement, what will
+you do then? Give orders to draw the enemy down to the sandy ground (6)
+where you are accustomed to manouvre, or endeavour beforehand to put
+your men through their practice on ground resembling a real battlefield?
+
+ (6) e.g. the hippodrome at Phaleron.
+
+Hipp. That would be better, no doubt.
+
+Soc. Well, shall you regard it as a part of your duty to see that as
+many of your men as possible can take aim and shoot on horseback? (7)
+
+ (7) Cf. "Hipparch," i. 21.
+
+Hipp. It will be better, certainly.
+
+Soc. And have you thought how to whet the courage of your troopers? to
+kindle in them rage to meet the enemy?--which things are but stimulants
+to make stout hearts stouter?
+
+Hipp. If I have not done so hitherto, I will try to make up for lost
+time now.
+
+Soc. And have you troubled your head at all to consider how you are to
+secure the obedience of your men? for without that not one particle
+of good will you get, for all your horses and troopers so brave and so
+stout.
+
+Hipp. That is a true saying; but how, Socrates, should a man best bring
+them to this virtue? (8)
+
+ (8) {protrepsasthai}. See above, I. ii. 64; below, IV. v. 1.
+
+Soc. I presume you know that in any business whatever, people are more
+apt to follow the lead of those whom they look upon as adepts; thus in
+case of sickness they are readiest to obey him whom they regard as
+the cleverest physician; and so on a voyage the most skilful pilot; in
+matters agricultural the best farmer, and so forth.
+
+Hipp. Yes, certainly.
+
+Soc. Then in this matter of cavalry also we may reasonably suppose that
+he who is looked upon as knowing his business best will command the
+readiest obedience.
+
+Hipp. If, then, I can prove to my troopers that I am better than all of
+them, will that suffice to win their obedience?
+
+Soc. Yes, if along with that you can teach them that obedience to you
+brings greater glory and surer safety to themselves.
+
+Hipp. How am I to teach them that?
+
+Soc. Upon my word! How are you to teach them that? Far more easily, I
+take it, than if you had to teach them that bad things are better than
+good, and more advantageous to boot.
+
+Hipp. I suppose you mean that, besides his other qualifications a
+commandant of cavalry must have command of speech and argument? (9)
+
+ (9) Or, "practise the art of oratory"; "express himself clearly and
+ rationally." See Grote, "H. G." VIII. lxvii. p. 463 note;
+ "Hipparch," i. 24; viii. 22.
+
+Soc. Were you under the impression that the commandant was not to open
+his mouth? Did it never occur to you that all the noblest things
+which custom (10) compels us to learn, and to which indeed we owe our
+knowledge of life, have all been learned by means of speech (11) and
+reason; and if there be any other noble learning which a man may learn,
+it is this same reason whereby he learns it; and the best teachers are
+those who have the freest command of thought and language, and those
+that have the best knowledge of the most serious things are the most
+brilliant masters of disputation. Again, have you not observed that
+whenever this city of ours fits out one of her choruses--such as that,
+for instance, which is sent to Delos (12)--there is nothing elsewhere
+from any quarter of the world which can compete with it; nor will you
+find in any other state collected so fair a flower of manhood as in
+Athens? (13)
+
+ (10) Cf Arist. "Rhet." ii. 12, {oi neoi pepaideuntai upo tou nomou
+ monon}.
+
+ (11) {dia logou}.
+
+ (12) See Thuc. iii. 104; and below, IV. viii. 2.
+
+ (13) See references ap. Schneider and Kuhner; "Symp." iv. 17.
+
+Hipp. You say truly.
+
+Soc. But for all that, it is not in sweetness of voice that the
+Athenians differ from the rest of the world so much, nor in stature of
+body or strength of limb, but in ambition and that love of honour (14)
+which most of all gives a keen edge to the spirit in the pursuit of
+things lovely and of high esteem.
+
+ (14) See below, v. 3; Dem. "de Cor." 28 foll.
+
+Hipp. That, too, is a true saying.
+
+Soc. Do you not think, then, that if a man devoted himself to our
+cavalry also, here in Athens, we should far outstrip the rest of the
+world, whether in the furnishing of arms and horses, or in orderliness
+of battle-array, or in eager hazardous encounter with the foe, if only
+we could persuade ourselves that by so doing we should obtain honour and
+distinction?
+
+Hipp. It is reasonable to think so.
+
+Soc. Have no hesitation, therefore, but try to guide your men into this
+path, (15) whence you yourself, and through you your fellow-citizens,
+will reap advantage.
+
+ (15) Or, "to conduct which will not certainly fail of profit to
+ yourself or through you to..."
+
+Yes, in good sooth, I will try (he answered).
+
+
+IV
+
+At another time, seeing Nicomachides on his way back from the
+elections (of magistrates), (1) he asked him: Who are elected generals,
+Nicomachides?
+
+ (1) Cf. "Pol. Ath." i. 3; Aristot. "Ath. Pol." 44. 4; and Dr. Sandys'
+ note ad loc. p. 165 of his edition.
+
+And he: Is it not just like them, these citizens of Athens--just like
+them, I say--to go and elect, not me, who ever since my name first
+appeared on the muster-roll have literally worn myself out with military
+service--now as a captain, now as a colonel--and have received all these
+wounds from the enemy, look you! (at the same time, and suiting the
+action to the word, he bared his arms and proceeded to show the scars
+of ancient wounds)--they elect not me (he went on), but, if you please,
+Antisthenes! who never served as a hoplite (2) in his life nor in the
+cavalry ever made a brilliant stroke, that I ever heard tell of; no! in
+fact, he has got no science at all, I take it, except to amass stores of
+wealth.
+
+ (2) Cf. Lys. xiv. 10.
+
+But still (returned Socrates), surely that is one point in his
+favour--he ought to be able to provide the troops with supplies.
+
+Nic. Well, for the matter of that, merchants are good hands at
+collecting stores; but it does not follow that a merchant or trader will
+be able to command an army.
+
+But (rejoined Socrates) Antisthenes is a man of great pertinacity, who
+insists on winning, and that is a very necessary quality in a general.
+(3) Do not you see how each time he has been choragos (4) he has been
+successful with one chorus after another?
+
+ (3) See Grote, "Plato," i. 465 foll.
+
+ (4) Choir-master, or Director of the Chorus. It was his duty to
+ provide and preside over a chorus to sing, dance, or play at any
+ of the public festivals, defraying the cost as a state service of
+ {leitourgia}. See "Pol. Ath." iii. 4; "Hiero," ix. 4; Aristot.
+ "Pol. Ath." 28. 3.
+
+Nic. Bless me! yes; but there is a wide difference between standing at
+the head of a band of singers and dancers and a troop of soldiers.
+
+Soc. Still, without any practical skill in singing or in the training
+of a chorus, Antisthenes somehow had the art to select the greatest
+proficients in both.
+
+Nic. Yes, and by the same reasoning we are to infer that on a campaign
+he will find proficients, some to marshal the troops for him and others
+to fight his battles?
+
+Soc. Just so. If in matters military he only exhibits the same skill in
+selecting the best hands as he has shown in matters of the chorus, it is
+highly probable he will here also bear away the palm of victory; and we
+may presume that if he expended so much to win a choric victory with a
+single tribe, (5) he will be ready to expend more to secure a victory in
+war with the whole state to back him.
+
+ (5) See Dem. "against Lept." 496. 26. Each tribe nominated such of its
+ members as were qualified to undertake the burden.
+
+Nic. Do you really mean, Socrates, that it is the function of the same
+man to provide efficient choruses and to act as commander-in-chief?
+
+Soc. I mean this, that, given a man knows what he needs to provide,
+and has the skill to do so, no matter what the department of things may
+be--house or city or army--you will find him a good chief and director
+(6) of the same.
+
+ (6) Or, "representative."
+
+Then Nicomachides: Upon my word, Socrates, I should never have expected
+to hear you say that a good housekeeper (7) and steward of an estate
+would make a good general.
+
+ (7) Or, "economist"; cf. "Cyrop." I. vi. 12.
+
+Soc. Come then, suppose we examine their respective duties, and so
+determine (8) whether they are the same or different.
+
+ (8) Lit. "get to know."
+
+Nic. Let us do so.
+
+Soc. Well then, is it not a common duty of both to procure the ready
+obedience of those under them to their orders?
+
+Nic. Certainly.
+
+Soc. And also to assign to those best qualified to perform them their
+distinctive tasks?
+
+That, too, belongs to both alike (he answered).
+
+Soc. Again, to chastise the bad and reward the good belongs to both
+alike, methinks?
+
+Nic. Decidedly.
+
+Soc. And to win the kindly feeling of their subordinates must surely be
+the noble ambition of both?
+
+That too (he answered).
+
+Soc. And do you consider it to the interest of both alike to win the
+adherence of supporters and allies? (9)
+
+ (9) In reference to the necessity of building up a family connection
+ or political alliances cf. Arist. "Pol." iii. 9, 13.
+
+Nic. Without a doubt.
+
+Soc. And does it not closely concern them both to be good guardians of
+their respective charges?
+
+Nic. Very much so.
+
+Soc. Then it equally concerns them both to be painstaking and prodigal
+of toil in all their doings?
+
+Nic. Yes, all these duties belong to both alike, but the parallel ends
+when you come to actual fighting.
+
+Soc. Yet they are both sure to meet with enemies?
+
+Nic. There is no doubt about that.
+
+Soc. Then is it not to the interest of both to get the upper hand of
+these?
+
+Nic. Certainly; but you omit to tell us what service organisation and
+the art of management will render when it comes to actual fighting.
+
+Soc. Why, it is just then, I presume, it will be of most service, for
+the good economist knows that nothing is so advantageous or so lucrative
+as victory in battle, or to put it negatively, nothing so disastrous
+and expensive as defeat. He will enthusiastically seek out and provide
+everything conducive to victory, he will painstakingly discover and
+guard against all that tends to defeat, and when satisfied that all is
+ready and ripe for victory he will deliver battle energetically, and
+what is equally important, until the hour of final preparation has
+arrived, (10) he will be cautious to deliver battle. Do not despise men
+of economic genius, Nicomachides; the difference between the devotion
+requisite to private affairs and to affairs of state is merely one of
+quantity. For the rest the parallel holds strictly, and in this respect
+pre-eminently, that both are concerned with human instruments: which
+human beings, moreover, are of one type and temperament, whether we
+speak of devotion to public affairs or of the administration of private
+property. To fare well in either case is given to those who know the
+secret of dealing with humanity, whereas the absence of that knowledge
+will as certainly imply in either case a fatal note of discord. (11)
+
+ (10) Lit. "as long as he is unprepared."
+
+ (11) L. Dindorf, "Index Graec." Ox. ed.; cf. Hor. "Ep." II. ii. 144,
+ "sed verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae," "the harmony of
+ life," Conington.
+
+
+V
+
+A conversation held with Pericles the son of the great statesman may
+here be introduced. (1) Socrates began:
+
+ (1) Or, "On one occasion Pericles was the person addressed in
+ conversation." For Pericles see "Hell." I. v. 16; vii. 15; Plut.
+ "Pericl." 37 (Clough, i. 368).
+
+I am looking forward, I must tell you, Pericles, to a great improvement
+in our military affairs when you are minister of war. (2) The prestige
+of Athens, I hope, will rise; we shall gain the mastery over our
+enemies.
+
+ (2) "Strategos."
+
+Pericles replied: I devoutly wish your words might be fulfilled, but how
+this happy result is to be obtained, I am at a loss to discover.
+
+Shall we (Socrates continued), shall we balance the arguments for and
+against, and consider to what extent the possibility does exist?
+
+Pray let us do so (he answered).
+
+Soc. Well then, you know that in point of numbers the Athenians are not
+inferior to the Boeotians?
+
+Per. Yes, I am aware of that.
+
+Soc. And do you think the Boeotians could furnish a better pick of fine
+healthy men than the Athenians?
+
+Per. I think we should very well hold our own in that respect.
+
+Soc. And which of the two would you take to be the more united
+people--the friendlier among themselves?
+
+Per. The Athenians, I should say, for so many sections of the Boeotians,
+resenting the selfish policy (3) of Thebes, are ill disposed to that
+power, but at Athens I see nothing of the sort.
+
+ (3) "The self-aggrandisement."
+
+Soc. But perhaps you will say that there is no people more jealous of
+honour or haughtier in spirit. (4) And these feelings are no weak
+spurs to quicken even a dull spirit to hazard all for glory's sake and
+fatherland.
+
+ (4) Reading {megalophronestatoi}, after Cobet. See "Hipparch," vii. 3;
+ or if as vulg. {philophronestatoi}, transl. "more affable."
+
+Per. Nor is there much fault to find with Athenians in these respects.
+
+Soc. And if we turn to consider the fair deeds of ancestry, (5) to
+no people besides ourselves belongs so rich a heritage of stimulating
+memories, whereby so many of us are stirred to pursue virtue with
+devotion and to show ourselves in our turn also men of valour like our
+sires.
+
+ (5) See Wesley's anthem, Eccles. xliv. 1, "Let us now praise famous
+ men and our fathers that begat us."
+
+Per. All that you say, Socrates, is most true, but do you observe that
+ever since the disaster of the thousand under Tolmides at Lebadeia,
+coupled with that under Hippocrates at Delium, (6) the prestige of
+Athens by comparison with the Boeotians has been lowered, whilst the
+spirit of Thebes as against Athens had been correspondingly exalted, so
+that those Boeotians who in old days did not venture to give battle
+to the Athenians even in their own territory unless they had the
+Lacedaemonians and the rest of the Peloponnesians to help them, do
+nowadays threaten to make an incursion into Attica single-handed; and
+the Athenians, who formerly, if they had to deal with the Boeotians (7)
+only, made havoc of their territory, are now afraid the Boeotians may
+some day harry Attica.
+
+ (6) Lebadeia, 447 B.C.; Delium, 424 B.C. For Tolmides and Hippocrates
+ see Thuc. i. 113; iv. 100 foll.; Grote, "H. G." v. 471; vi. 533.
+
+ (7) Reading {ote B. monoi}, al. {ou monoi}, "when the Boeotians were
+ not unaided."
+
+To which Socrates: Yes, I perceive that this is so, but it seems to me
+that the state was never more tractably disposed, never so ripe for
+a really good leader, as to-day. For if boldness be the parent of
+carelessness, laxity, and insubordination, it is the part of fear to
+make people more disposed to application, obedience, and good order.
+A proof of which you may discover in the behaviour of people on
+ship-board. It is in seasons of calm weather when there is nothing
+to fear that disorder may be said to reign, but as soon as there is
+apprehension of a storm, or an enemy in sight, the scene changes; not
+only is each word of command obeyed, but there is a hush of silent
+expectation; the mariners wait to catch the next signal like an
+orchestra with eyes upon the leader.
+
+Per. But indeed, given that now is the opportunity to take obedience
+at the flood, it is high time also to explain by what means we are
+to rekindle in the hearts of our countrymen (8) the old fires--the
+passionate longing for antique valour, for the glory and the wellbeing
+of the days of old.
+
+ (8) Reading {anerasthenai}, Schneider's emendation of the vulg.
+ {aneristhenai}.
+
+Well (proceeded Socrates), supposing we wished them to lay claim
+to certain material wealth now held by others, we could not better
+stimulate them to lay hands on the objects coveted than by showing them
+that these were ancestral possessions (9) to which they had a natural
+right. But since our object is that they should set their hearts on
+virtuous pre-eminence, we must prove to them that such headship combined
+with virtue is an old time-honoured heritage which pertains to them
+beyond all others, and that if they strive earnestly after it they will
+soon out-top the world.
+
+ (9) Cf. Solon in the matter of Salamis, Plut. "Sol." 8; Bergk. "Poet.
+ Lyr. Gr. Solon," SALAMIS, i. 2, 3.
+
+Por. How are we to inculcate this lesson?
+
+Soc. I think by reminding them of a fact already registered in their
+minds, (10) that the oldest of our ancestors whose names are known to us
+were also the bravest of heroes.
+
+ (10) Or, "to which their ears are already opened."
+
+Per. I suppose you refer to that judgment of the gods which, for their
+virtue's sake, Cecrops and his followers were called on to decide? (11)
+
+ (11) See Apollodorus, iii. 14.
+
+Soc. Yes, I refer to that and to the birth and rearing of Erectheus,
+(12) and also to the war (13) which in his days was waged to stay the
+tide of invasion from the whole adjoining continent; and that other war
+in the days of the Heraclidae (14) against the men of Peloponnese; and
+that series of battles fought in the days of Theseus (15)--in all which
+the virtuous pre-eminence of our ancestry above the men of their own
+times was made manifest. Or, if you please, we may come down to things
+of a later date, which their descendants and the heroes of days not so
+long anterior to our own wrought in the struggle with the lords of Asia,
+(16) nay of Europe also, as far as Macedonia: a people possessing a
+power and means of attack far exceeding any who had gone before--who,
+moreover, had accomplished the doughtiest deeds. These things the men of
+Athens wrought partly single-handed, (17) and partly as sharers with
+the Peloponnesians in laurels won by land and sea. Heroes were these men
+also, far outshining, as tradition tells us, the peoples of their time.
+
+ (12) Cf. "Il." ii. 547, {'Erekhtheos megaletoros k.t.l.}
+
+ (13) Cf. Isoc. "Paneg." 19, who handles all the topics.
+
+ (14) Commonly spoken of as "the Return." See Grote, "H. G." II. ch.
+ xviii.
+
+ (15) Against the Amazons and Thracians; cf. Herod. ix. 27; Plut.
+ "Thes." 27.
+
+ (16) The "Persian" wars; cf. Thucyd. I. i.
+
+ (17) He omits the Plataeans.
+
+Per. Yes, so runs the story of their heroism.
+
+Soc. Therefore it is that, amidst the many changes of inhabitants, and
+the migrations which have, wave after wave, swept over Hellas, these
+maintained themselves in their own land, unmoved; so that it was a
+common thing for others to turn to them as to a court of appeal on
+points of right, or to flee to Athens as a harbour of refuge from the
+hand of the oppressor. (18)
+
+ (18) Cf. (Plat.) "Menex."; Isocr. "Paneg."
+
+Then Pericles: And the wonder to me, Socrates, is how our city ever came
+to decline.
+
+Soc. I think we are victims of our own success. Like some athlete, (19)
+whose facile preponderance in the arena has betrayed him into laxity
+until he eventually succumbs to punier antagonists, so we Athenians,
+in the plenitude of our superiority, have neglected ourselves and are
+become degenerate.
+
+ (19) Reading {athletai tines}, or if {alloi tines}, translate "any one
+ else."
+
+Per. What then ought we to do now to recover our former virtue?
+
+Soc. There need be no mystery about that, I think. We can rediscover the
+institutions of our forefathers--applying them to the regulation of our
+lives with something of their precision, and not improbably with like
+success; or we can imitate those who stand at the front of affairs
+to-day, (20) adapting to ourselves their rule of life, in which case, if
+we live up to the standard of our models, we may hope at least to rival
+their excellence, or, by a more conscientious adherence to what they aim
+at, rise superior.
+
+ (20) Sc. the Lacedaemonians. See W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 396.
+
+You would seem to suggest (he answered) that the spirit of beautiful and
+brave manhood has taken wings and left our city; (21) as, for instance,
+when will Athenians, like the Lacedaemonians, reverence old age--the
+Athenian, who takes his own father as a starting-point for the contempt
+he pours upon grey hairs? When will he pay as strict an attention to the
+body, who is not content with neglecting a good habit, (22) but laughs
+to scorn those who are careful in this matter? When shall we Athenians
+so obey our magistrates--we who take a pride, as it were, in despising
+authority? When, once more, shall we be united as a people--we who,
+instead of combining to promote common interests, delight in blackening
+each other's characters, (23) envying one another more than we envy all
+the world besides; and--which is our worst failing--who, in private and
+public intercourse alike, are torn by dissension and are caught in a
+maze of litigation, and prefer to make capital out of our neighbour's
+difficulties rather than to render natural assistance? To make our
+conduct consistent, indeed, we treat our national interests no better
+than if they were the concerns of some foreign state; we make them bones
+of contention to wrangle over, and rejoice in nothing so much as in
+possessing means and ability to indulge these tastes. From this hotbed
+is engendered in the state a spirit of blind folly (24) and cowardice,
+and in the hearts of the citizens spreads a tangle of hatred and mutual
+hostility which, as I often shudder to think, will some day cause some
+disaster to befall the state greater than it can bear. (25)
+
+ (21) Or, "is far enough away from Athens."
+
+ (22) See below, III. xii. 5; "Pol. Ath." i. 13; "Rev." iv. 52.
+
+ (23) Or, "to deal despitefully with one another."
+
+ (24) Reading {ateria}. See L. Dindorf ad loc., Ox. ed. lxii. Al.
+ {apeiria}, a want of skill, or {ataxia}, disorderliness. Cf. "Pol.
+ Ath." i. 5.
+
+ (25) Possibly the author is thinking of the events of 406, 405 B.C.
+ (see "Hell." I. vii. and II.), and history may repeat itself.
+
+Do not (replied Socrates), do not, I pray you, permit yourself to
+believe that Athenians are smitten with so incurable a depravity. Do you
+not observe their discipline in all naval matters? Look at their prompt
+and orderly obedience to the superintendents at the gymnastic contests,
+(26) their quite unrivalled subservience to their teachers in the
+training of our choruses.
+
+ (26) Epistatoi, i.e. stewards and training-masters.
+
+Yes (he answered), there's the wonder of it; to think that all those
+good people should so obey their leaders, but that our hoplites and our
+cavalry, who may be supposed to rank before the rest of the citizens
+in excellence of manhood, (27) should be so entirely unamenable to
+discipline.
+
+ (27) {kalokagathia}.
+
+Then Socrates: Well, but the council which sits on Areopagos is composed
+of citizens of approved (28) character, is it not?
+
+ (28) Technically, they must have passed the {dokimasia}. And for the
+ "Aeropagos" see Grote, "H. G." v. 498; Aristot. "Pol." ii. 12;
+ "Ath. Pol." 4. 4, where see Dr. Sandys' note, p. 18.
+
+Certainly (he answered).
+
+Soc. Then can you name any similar body, judicial or executive, trying
+cases or transacting other business with greater honour, stricter
+legality, higher dignity, or more impartial justice?
+
+No, I have no fault to find on that score (he answered).
+
+Soc. Then we ought not to despair as though all sense of orderliness and
+good discipline had died out of our countrymen.
+
+Still (he answered), if it is not to harp upon one string, I maintain
+that in military service, where, if anywhere, sobreity and temperance,
+orderliness and good discipline are needed, none of these essentials
+receives any attention.
+
+May it not perhaps be (asked Socrates) that in this department they are
+officered by those who have the least knowledge? (29) Do you not notice,
+to take the case of harp-players, choric performers, dancers, and the
+like, that no one would ever dream of leading if he lacked the requisite
+knowledge? and the same holds of wrestlers or pancratiasts.
+
+ (29) {episteme}. See below, III. ix. 10.
+
+Moreover, while in these cases any one in command can tell you where he
+got the elementary knowledge of what he presides over, most generals are
+amateurs and improvisers. (30) I do not at all suppose that you are
+one of that sort. I believe you could give as clear an account of your
+schooling in strategy as you could in the matter of wrestling. No
+doubt you have got at first hand many of your father's "rules for
+generalship," which you carefully preserve, besides having collected
+many others from every quarter whence it was possible to pick up any
+knowledge which would be of use to a future general. Again, I feel
+sure you are deeply concerned to escape even unconscious ignorance of
+anything which will be serviceable to you in so high an office; and
+if you detect in yourself any ignorance, you turn to those who have
+knowledge in these matters (sparing neither gifts nor gratitude) to
+supplement your ignorance by their knowledge and to secure their help.
+
+ (30) Cf. "Pol. Lac." xiii. 5.
+
+To which Pericles: I am not so blind, Socrates, as to imagine you say
+these words under the idea that I am truly so careful in these matters;
+but rather your object is to teach me that the would-be general must
+make such things his care. I admit in any case all you say.
+
+Socrates proceeded: Has it ever caught your observation, Pericles, that
+a high mountain barrier stretches like a bulwark in front of our country
+down towards Boeotia--cleft, moreover, by narrow and precipitous passes,
+the only avenues into the heart of Attica, which lies engirdled by a
+ring of natural fortresses? (31)
+
+ (31) The mountains are Cithaeron and Parnes N., and Cerata N.W.
+
+Per. Certainly I have.
+
+Soc. Well, and have you ever heard tell of the Mysians and Pisidians
+living within the territory of the great king, (32) who, inside their
+mountain fortresses, lightly armed, are able to rush down and inflict
+much injury on the king's territory by their raids, while preserving
+their own freedom?
+
+ (32) For this illustration see "Anab." III. ii. 23; cf. "Econ." iv.
+ 18, where Socrates ({XS}) refers to Cyrus's expedition and death.
+
+Per. Yes, the circumstance is not new to me.
+
+And do you not think (added Socrates) that a corps of young able-bodied
+Athenians, accoutred with lighter arms, (33) and holding our natural
+mountain rampart in possession, would prove at once a thorn in the
+enemy's side offensively, whilst defensively they would form a splendid
+bulwark to protect the country?
+
+ (33) Cf. the reforms of Iphicrates.
+
+To which Pericles: I think, Socrates, these would be all useful
+measures, decidedly.
+
+If, then (replied Socrates), these suggestions meet your approbation,
+try, O best of men, to realise them--if you can carry out a portion
+of them, it will be an honour to yourself and a blessing to the state;
+while, if you fail in any point, there will be no damage done to the
+city nor discredit to yourself.
+
+
+VI
+
+Glaucon, (1) the son of Ariston, had conceived such an ardour to gain
+the headship of the state that nothing could hinder him but he must
+deliver a course of public speeches, (2) though he had not yet reached
+the age of twenty. His friends and relatives tried in vain to stop him
+making himself ridiculous and being dragged down from the bema. (3)
+Socrates, who took a kindly interest in the youth for the sake of
+Charmides (4) the son of Glaucon, and of Plato, alone succeeded in
+restraining him. It happened thus. He fell in with him, and first of
+all, to get him to listen, detained him by some such remarks as the
+following: (5)
+
+ (1) Glaucon, Plato's brother. Grote, "Plato," i. 508.
+
+ (2) "Harangue the People."
+
+ (3) See Plat. "Protag." 319 C: "And if some person offers to give them
+ advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art
+ (sc. of politics), even though he be good-looking, and rich, and
+ noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh at him, and hoot
+ him, until he is either clamoured down and retires of himself; or
+ if he persists, he is dragged away or put out by the constables at
+ the command of the prytanes" (Jowett). Cf. Aristoph. "Knights,"
+ 665, {kath eilkon auton oi prutaneis kai toxotai}.
+
+ (4) For Charmides (maternal uncle of Plato and Glaucon, cousin of
+ Critias) see ch. vii. below; Plato the philosopher, Glaucon's
+ brother, see Cobet, "Pros. Xen." p. 28.
+
+ (5) Or, "and in the first instance addressing him in such terms he
+ could not choose but hear, detained him." See above, II. vi. 11.
+ Socrates applies his own theory.
+
+Ah, Glaucon (he exclaimed), so you have determined to become prime
+minister? (6)
+
+ (6) {prostateuein}.
+
+Glauc. Yes, Socrates, I have.
+
+Soc. And what a noble aim! if aught human ever deserved to be called
+noble; since if you succeed in your design, it follows, as the night the
+day, you will be able not only to gratify your every wish, but you
+will be in a position to benefit your friends, you will raise up your
+father's house, you will exalt your fatherland, you will become a name
+thrice famous in the city first, and next in Hellas, and lastly even
+among barbarians perhaps, like Themistocles; but be it here or be it
+there, wherever you be, you will be the observed of all beholders. (7)
+
+ (7) "The centre of attraction--the cynosure of neighbouring eyes."
+
+The heart of Glaucon swelled with pride as he drank in the words, and
+gladly he stayed to listen.
+
+Presently Socrates proceeded: Then this is clear, Glaucon, is it not?
+that you must needs benefit the city, since you desire to reap her
+honours?
+
+Glauc. Undoubtedly.
+
+Then, by all that is sacred (Socrates continued), do not keep us in the
+dark, but tell us in what way do you propose first to benefit the state?
+what is your starting-point? (8) When Glaucon remained with sealed lips,
+as if he were now for the first time debating what this starting-point
+should be, Socrates continued: I presume, if you wished to improve a
+friend's estate, you would endeavour to do so by adding to its wealth,
+would you not? So here, maybe, you will try to add to the wealth of the
+state?
+
+ (8) Or, "tell us what your starting-point will be in the path of
+ benefaction."
+
+Most decidedly (he answered).
+
+Soc. And we may take it the state will grow wealthier in proportion as
+her revenues increase?
+
+Glauc. That seems probable, at any rate.
+
+Soc. Then would you kindly tell us from what sources the revenues of the
+state are at present derived, and what is their present magnitude? No
+doubt you have gone carefully into the question, so that if any of these
+are failing you may make up the deficit, or if neglected for any reason,
+make some new provision. (9)
+
+ (9) Or, "or if others have dropped out or been negligently overlooked,
+ you may replace them."
+
+Glauc. Nay, to speak the truth, these are matters I have not thoroughly
+gone into.
+
+Never mind (he said) if you have omitted the point; but you might oblige
+us by running through the items or heads of expenditure. Obviously you
+propose to remove all those which are superfluous?
+
+Glauc. Well, no. Upon my word I have not had time to look into that side
+of the matter either as yet.
+
+Soc. Then we will postpone for the present the problem of making
+the state wealthier; obviously without knowing the outgoings and the
+incomings it would be impossible to deal with the matter seriously.
+
+But, Socrates (Glaucon remarked), it is possible to enrich the state out
+of the pockets of her enemies!
+
+Yes, to be sure, considerably (answered Socrates), in the event of
+getting the better of them; but in the event of being worsted, it is
+also possible to lose what we have got.
+
+A true observation (he replied).
+
+And therefore (proceeded Socrates), before he makes up his mind with
+what enemy to go to war, a statesman should know the relative powers of
+his own city and the adversary's, so that, in case the superiority be
+on his own side, he may throw the weight of his advice into the scale
+of undertaking war; but if the opposite he may plead in favour of
+exercising caution.
+
+You are right (he answered).
+
+Soc. Then would you for our benefit enumerate the land and naval forces
+first of Athens and then of our opponents?
+
+Glauc. Pardon me. I could not tell you them off-hand at a moment's
+notice.
+
+Or (added Socrates), if you have got the figures on paper, you might
+produce them. I cannot tell how anxious I am to hear your statement.
+
+Glauc. No, I assure you, I have not got them even on paper yet.
+
+Soc. Well then, we will defer tending advice on the topic of peace or
+war, in a maiden speech at any rate. (10) I can understand that, owing
+to the magnitude of the questions, in these early days of your ministry
+you have not yet fully examined them. But come, I am sure that you have
+studied the defences of the country, at all events, and you know exactly
+how many forts and outposts are serviceable (11) and how many are not;
+you can tell us which garrisons are strong enough and which defective;
+and you are prepared to throw in the weight of your advice in favour
+of increasing the serviceable outposts and sweeping away those that are
+superfluous?
+
+ (10) See "Econ." xi. 1.
+
+ (11) Or, "advantageously situated." See the author's own tract on
+ "Revenues."
+
+Glauc. Yes, sweep them all away, that's my advice; for any good that is
+likely to come of them! Defences indeed! so maintained that the property
+of the rural districts is simply pilfered.
+
+But suppose you sweep away the outposts (he asked), may not something
+worse, think you, be the consequence? will not sheer plundering be free
+to any ruffian who likes?... But may I ask is this judgment the
+result of personal inspection? have you gone yourself and examined the
+defences? or how do you know that they are all maintained as you say?
+
+Glauc. I conjecture that it is so.
+
+Soc. Well then, until we have got beyond the region of conjecture shall
+we defer giving advice on the matter? (It will be time enough when we
+know the facts.)
+
+Possibly it would be better to wait till then (replied Glaucon).
+
+Soc. Then there are the mines, (12) but, of course, I am aware that you
+have not visited them in person, so as to be able to say why they are
+less productive than formerly.
+
+ (12) Again the author's tract on "Revenues" is a comment on the
+ matter.
+
+Well, no; I have never been there myself (he answered).
+
+Soc. No, Heaven help us! an unhealthy district by all accounts; so
+that, when the moment for advice on that topic arrives, you will have an
+excuse ready to hand.
+
+I see you are making fun of me (Glaucon answered).
+
+Soc. Well, but here is a point, I am sure, which you have not neglected.
+No, you will have thoroughly gone into it, and you can tell us. For how
+long a time could the corn supplies from the country districts support
+the city? how much is requisite for a single year, so that the city may
+not run short of this prime necessary, before you are well aware; but on
+the contrary you with your full knowledge will be in a position to give
+advice on so vital a question, to the aid or may be the salvation of
+your country?
+
+It is a colossal business this (Glaucon answered), if I am to be obliged
+to give attention to all these details.
+
+Soc. On the other hand, a man could not even manage his own house or his
+estate well, without, in the first place, knowing what he requires, and,
+in the second place, taking pains, item by item, to supply his wants.
+But since this city consists of more than ten thousand houses, and it is
+not easy to pay minute attention to so many all at once, how is it you
+did not practise yourself by trying to augment the resources of one at
+any rate of these--I mean your own uncle's? The service would not be
+thrown away. Then if your strength suffices in the single case you might
+take in hand a larger number; but if you fail to relieve one, how could
+you possibly hope to succeed with many? How absurd for a man, if he
+cannot carry half a hundredweight, to attempt to carry a whole! (13)
+
+ (13) Lit. "a single talent's weight... to carry two."
+
+Glauc. Nay, for my part, I am willing enough to assist my uncle's house,
+if my uncle would only be persuaded to listen to my advice.
+
+Soc. Then, when you cannot persuade your uncle, do you imagine you will
+be able to make the whole Athenian people, uncle and all, obey you?
+Be careful, Glaucon (he added), lest in your thirst for glory and high
+repute you come to the opposite. Do you not see how dangerous it is for
+a man to speak or act beyond the range (14) of his knowledge? To take
+the cases known to you of people whose conversation or conduct clearly
+transcends these limits: should you say they gain more praise or more
+blame on that account? Are they admired the rather or despised? Or,
+again, consider those who do know what they say and what they do; and
+you will find, I venture to say, that in every sort of undertaking those
+who enjoy repute and admiration belong to the class of those endowed
+with the highest knowledge; whilst conversely the people of sinister
+reputation, the mean and the contemptible, emanate from some depth of
+ignorance and dulness. If therefore what you thirst for is repute and
+admiration as a statesman, try to make sure of one accomplishment: in
+other words, the knowledge as far as in you lies of what you wish to do.
+(15) If, indeed, with this to distinguish you from the rest of the
+world you venture to concern yourself with state affairs, it would not
+surprise me but that you might reach the goal of your ambition easily.
+
+ (14) Or, "to talk of things which he does not know, or to meddle with
+ them."
+
+ (15) Or, "try as far as possible to achieve one thing, and that is to
+ know the business which you propose to carry out."
+
+
+VII
+
+Now Charmides, (1) the son of Glaucon, was, as Socrates observed, a man
+of mark and influence: a much more powerful person in fact than the mass
+of those devoted to politics at that date, but at the same time he was
+a man who shrank from approaching the people or busying himself with the
+concerns of the state. Accordingly Socrates addressed him thus:
+
+ (1) See last chapter for his relationship to Glaucon (the younger) and
+ Plato; for a conception of his character, Plato's dialogue
+ "Charmides"; "Theag." 128 E; "Hell." II. iv. 19; "Symp." iv. 31;
+ Grote, "Plato," i. 480.
+
+Tell me, Charmides, supposing some one competent to win a victory in the
+arena and to receive a crown, (2) whereby he will gain honour himself
+and make the land of his fathers more glorious in Hellas, (3) were to
+refuse to enter the lists--what kind of person should you set him down
+to be?
+
+ (2) In some conquest (e.g. of the Olympic games) where the prize is a
+ mere wreath.
+
+ (3) Cf. Pindar passim.
+
+Clearly an effeminate and cowardly fellow (he answered).
+
+Soc. And what if another man, who had it in him, by devotion to affairs
+of state, to exalt his city and win honour himself thereby, were to
+shrink and hesitate and hang back--would he too not reasonably be
+regarded as a coward?
+
+Possibly (he answered); but why do you address these questions to me?
+
+Because (replied Socrates) I think that you, who have this power, do
+hesitate to devote yourself to matters which, as being a citizen, if for
+no other reason, you are bound to take part in. (4)
+
+ (4) Or add, "and cannot escape from."
+
+Charm. And wherein have you detected in me this power, that you pass so
+severe a sentence upon me?
+
+Soc. I have detected it plainly enough in those gatherings (5) in which
+you meet the politicians of the day, when, as I observe, each time they
+consult you on any point you have always good advice to offer, and when
+they make a blunder you lay your finger on the weak point immediately.
+
+ (5) See above, I. v. 4; here possibly of political club conversation.
+
+Charm. To discuss and reason in private is one thing, Socrates, to
+battle in the throng of the assembly is another.
+
+Soc. And yet a man who can count, counts every bit as well in a crowd as
+when seated alone by himself; and it is the best performer on the harp
+in private who carries off the palm of victory in public.
+
+Charm. But do you not see that modesty and timidity are feelings
+implanted in man's nature? and these are much more powerfully present to
+us in a crowd than within the circle of our intimates.
+
+Soc. Yes, but what I am bent on teaching you is that while you feel no
+such bashfulness and timidity before the wisest and strongest of men,
+you are ashamed of opening your lips in the midst of weaklings and
+dullards. (6) Is it the fullers among them of whom you stand in awe, or
+the cobblers, or the carpenters, or the coppersmiths, or the merchants,
+or the farmers, or the hucksters of the market-place exchanging their
+wares, and bethinking them how they are to buy this thing cheap, and to
+sell the other dear--is it before these you are ashamed, for these are
+the individual atoms out of which the Public Assembly is composed? (7)
+And what is the difference, pray, between your behaviour and that of a
+man who, being the superior of trained athletes, quails before a set of
+amateurs? Is it not the case that you who can argue so readily with the
+foremost statesmen in the city, some of whom affect to look down
+upon you--you, with your vast superiority over practised popular
+debaters--are no sooner confronted with a set of folk who never in their
+lives gave politics a thought, and into whose heads certainly it never
+entered to look down upon you--than you are afraid to open your lips in
+mortal terror of being laughed at?
+
+ (6) Cf. Cic. "Tusc." v. 36, 104; Plat. "Gorg." 452 E, 454 B.
+
+ (7) Cf. Plat. "Protag." 319 C. See W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 103.
+
+Well, but you would admit (he answered) that sound argument does
+frequently bring down the ridicule of the Popular Assembly.
+
+Soc. Which is equally true of the others. (8) And that is just what
+rouses my astonishment, that you who can cope so easily with these
+lordly people (when guilty of ridicule) should persuade yourself that
+you cannot stand up against a set of commoners. (9) My good fellow, do
+not be ignorant of yourself! (10) do not fall into that commonest of
+errors--theirs who rush off to investigate the concerns of the rest of
+the world, and have no time to turn and examine themselves. Yet that is
+a duty which you must not in cowardly sort draw back from: rather must
+you brace ourself to give good heed to your own self; and as to public
+affairs, if by any manner of means they may be improved through you, do
+not neglect them. Success in the sphere of politics means that not only
+the mass of your fellow-citizens, but your personal friends and you
+yourself last but not least, will profit by your action.
+
+ (8) {oi eteroi}, i.e. "the foremost statesmen" mentioned before. Al.
+ "the opposite party," the "Tories," if one may so say, of the
+ political clubs.
+
+ (9) Lit. "those... these."
+
+ (10) Ernesti aptly cf. Cic. "ad Quint." iii. 6. See below, III. ix. 6;
+ IV. ii. 24.
+
+
+VIII
+
+Once when Aristippus (1) set himself to subject Socrates to a
+cross-examination, such as he had himself undergone at the hands of
+Socrates on a former occasion, (2) Socrates, being minded to benefit
+those who were with him, gave his answers less in the style of a debater
+guarding against perversions of his argument, than of a man persuaded of
+the supreme importance of right conduct. (3)
+
+ (1) For Aristippus see above, p. 38; for the connection, {boulomenos
+ tous sunontas ophelein}, between this and the preceeding chapter,
+ see above, Conspectus, p. xxvi.
+
+ (2) Possibly in reference to the conversation above. In reference to
+ the present dialogue see Grote, "Plato," I. xi. p. 380 foll.
+
+ (3) For {prattein ta deonta} cf. below, III. ix. 4, 11; Plat. "Charm."
+ 164 B; but see J. J. Hartman, "An. Xen." p. 141.
+
+Aristippus asked him "if he knew of anything good," (4) intending in
+case he assented and named any particular good thing, like food or
+drink, or wealth, or health, or strength, or courage, to point out
+that the thing named was sometimes bad. But he, knowing that if a thing
+troubles us, we immediately want that which will put an end to our
+trouble, answered precisely as it was best to do. (5)
+
+ (4) See Grote, "Plato," ii. 585, on Philebus.
+
+ (5) Or, "made the happiest answer."
+
+Soc. Do I understand you to ask me whether I know anything good for
+fever?
+
+No (he replied), that is not my question.
+
+Soc. Then for inflammation of the eyes?
+
+Aristip. No, nor yet that.
+
+Soc. Well then, for hunger?
+
+Aristip. No, nor yet for hunger.
+
+Well, but (answered Socrates) if you ask me whether I know of any good
+thing which is good for nothing, I neither know of it nor want to know.
+
+And when Aristippus, returning to the charge, asked him "if he knew of
+any thing beautiful."
+
+He answered: Yes, many things.
+
+Aristip. Are they all like each other?
+
+Soc. On the contrary, they are often as unlike as possible.
+
+How then (he asked) can that be beautiful which is unlike the beautiful?
+
+Soc. Bless me! for the simple reason that it is possible for a man who
+is a beautiful runner to be quite unlike another man who is a beautiful
+boxer, (6) or for a shield, which is a beautiful weapon for the purpose
+of defence, to be absolutely unlike a javelin, which is a beautiful
+weapon of swift and sure discharge.
+
+ (6) See Grote, "H. G." x. 164, in reference to Epaminondas and his
+ gymnastic training; below, III. x. 6.
+
+Aristip. Your answers are no better now than (7) when I asked you
+whether you knew any good thing. They are both of a pattern.
+
+ (7) Or, "You answer precisely as you did when..."
+
+Soc. And so they should be. Do you imagine that one thing is good and
+another beautiful? Do not you know that relatively to the same standard
+all things are at once beautiful and good? (8) In the first place,
+virtue is not a good thing relatively to one standard and a beautiful
+thing relatively to another standard; and in the next place, human
+beings, on the same principle (9) and relatively to the same standard,
+are called "beautiful and good"; and so the bodily frames of men
+relatively to the same standards are seen to be "beautiful and good,"
+and in general all things capable of being used by man are regarded as
+at once beautiful and good relatively to the same standard--the standing
+being in each case what the thing happens to be useful for. (10)
+
+ (8) Or, "good and beautiful are convertible terms: whatever is good is
+ beautiful, or whatever is beautiful is good."
+
+ (9) Or, "in the same breath." Cf. Plat. "Hipp. maj." 295 D; "Gorg."
+ 474 D.
+
+ (10) Or, "and this standard is the serviceableness of the thing in
+ question."
+
+Aristip. Then I presume even a basket for carrying dung (11) is a
+beautiful thing?
+
+ (11) Cf. Plat. "Hipp. maj." 288 D, 290 D; and Grote's note, loc. cit.
+ p. 381: "in regard to the question wherein consists {to kalon}?"
+
+Soc. To be sure, and a spear of gold an ugly thing, if for their
+respective uses--the former is well and the latter ill adapted.
+
+Aristip. Do you mean to assert that the same things may be beautiful and
+ugly?
+
+Soc. Yes, to be sure; and by the same showing things may be good and
+bad: as, for instance, what is good for hunger may be bad for fever, and
+what is good for fever bad for hunger; or again, what is beautiful for
+wrestling is often ugly for running; and in general everything is good
+and beautiful when well adapted for the end in view, bad and ugly when
+ill adapted for the same.
+
+Similarly when he spoke about houses, (12) and argued that "the same
+house must be at once beautiful and useful"--I could not help feeling
+that he was giving a good lesson on the problem: "how a house ought to
+be built." He investigated the matter thus:
+
+ (12) See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 488; "Classical Review," vii. 262.
+
+Soc. "Do you admit that any one purposing to build a perfect house (13)
+will plan to make it at once as pleasant and as useful to live in as
+possible?" and that point being admitted, (14) the next question would
+be:
+
+ (13) Or, "the ideal house"; lit. "a house as it should be."
+
+ (14) See below, IV. vi. 15.
+
+"It is pleasant to have one's house cool in summer and warm in winter,
+is it not?" and this proposition also having obtained assent, "Now,
+supposing a house to have a southern aspect, sunshine during winter will
+steal in under the verandah, (15) but in summer, when the sun traverses
+a path right over our heads, the roof will afford an agreeable shade,
+will it not? If, then, such an arrangement is desirable, the southern
+side of a house should be built higher to catch the rays of the winter
+sun, and the northern side lower to prevent the cold winds finding
+ingress; in a word, it is reasonable to suppose that the pleasantest and
+most beautiful dwelling place will be one in which the owner can at
+all seasons of the year find the pleasantest retreat, and stow away his
+goods with the greatest security."
+
+ (15) Or, "porticoes" or "collonades."
+
+Paintings (16) and ornamental mouldings are apt (he said) to deprive one
+of more joy (17) than they confer.
+
+ (16) See "Econ." ix. 2; Plat. "Hipp. maj." 298 A; "Rep." 529; Becker,
+ "Charicles," 268 (Engl. trans.)
+
+ (17) {euphrosunas}, archaic or "poetical" = "joyance." See "Hiero,"
+ vi. 1.
+
+The fittest place for a temple or an altar (he maintained) was some site
+visible from afar, and untrodden by foot of man: (18) since it was a
+glad thing for the worshipper to lift up his eyes afar off and offer up
+his orison; glad also to wend his way peaceful to prayer unsullied. (19)
+
+ (18) e.g. the summit of Lycabettos, or the height on which stands the
+ temple of Phygaleia. Cf. Eur. "Phoen." 1372, {Pallados
+ khrusaspidos blepsas pros oikon euxato} of Eteocles.
+
+ (19) See Vitruvius, i. 7, iv. 5, ap. Schneid. ad loc.; W. L. Newman,
+ op. cit. i. 338.
+
+
+IX
+
+Being again asked by some one: could courage be taught, (1) or did
+it come by nature? he answered: I imagine that just as one body is by
+nature stronger than another body to encounter toils, so one soul by
+nature grows more robust than another soul in face of dangers. Certainly
+I do note that people brought up under the same condition of laws and
+customs differ greatly in respect of daring. Still my belief is that by
+learning and practice the natural aptitude may always be strengthened
+towards courage. It is clear, for instance, that Scythians or
+Thracians would not venture to take shield and spear and contend with
+Lacedaemonians; and it is equally evident that Lacedaemonians would
+demur to entering the lists of battle against Thracians if limited to
+their light shields and javelins, or against Scythians without some
+weapon more familiar than their bows and arrows. (2) And as far as I can
+see, this principle holds generally: the natural differences of one man
+from another may be compensated by artificial progress, the result of
+care and attention. All which proves clearly that whether nature has
+endowed us with keener or blunter sensibilities, the duty of all alike
+is to learn and practise those things in which we would fain achieve
+distinction.
+
+ (1) Or, "When some one retorted upon him with the question: 'Can
+ courage be taught?'" and for this problem see IV. vi. 10, 11;
+ "Symp." ii. 12; Plat. "Lach."; "Protag." 349; "Phaedr." 269 D; K.
+ Joel, op. cit. p. 325 foll.; Grote, "Plato," i. 468 foll., ii. 60;
+ Jowett, "Plato," i. 77, 119; Newman, op. cit. i. 343.
+
+ (2) Or, "against Thracians with light shields and javelins, or against
+ Scythians with bows and arrows"; and for the national arms of
+ these peoples respectively see Arist. "Lysistr." 563; "Anab." III.
+ iv. 15; VI. VII. passim.
+
+Between wisdom and sobriety of soul (which is temperance) he drew no
+distinction. (3) Was a man able on the one hand to recognise things
+beautiful and good sufficiently to live in them? Had he, on the other
+hand, knowledge of the "base and foul" so as to beware of them? If so,
+Socrates judged him to be wise at once and sound of soul (or temperate).
+(4)
+
+ (3) But cf. IV. vi. 7; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 363.
+
+ (4) Reading {alla to... kai to}, or more lit. "he discovered the
+ wise man and sound of soul in his power not only to recognise
+ things 'beautiful and good,' but to live and move and have his
+ being in them; as also in his gift of avoiding consciously things
+ base." Or if {alla ton... kai ton...} transl. "The man who
+ not only could recognise the beautiful and good, but lived, etc.,
+ in that world, and who moreover consciously avoided things base, in
+ the judgment of Socrates was wise and sound of soul." Cf. Plat.
+ "Charm."
+
+And being further questioned whether "he considered those who have
+the knowledge of right action, but do not apply it, to be wise and
+self-controlled?"--"Not a whit more," he answered, "than I consider them
+to be unwise and intemperate. (5) Every one, I conceive, deliberately
+chooses what, within the limits open to him, he considers most conducive
+to his interest, and acts accordingly. I must hold therefore that
+those who act against rule and crookedly (6) are neither wise nor
+self-controlled.
+
+ (5) For the phrase "not a whit the more" see below, III. xii. 1;
+ "Econ." xii. 18. Al. "I should by no means choose to consider them
+ wise and self-controlled rather than foolish and intemperate."
+
+ (6) "Who cannot draw a straight line, ethically speaking."
+
+He said that justice, moreover, and all other virtue is wisdom. That is
+to say, things just, and all things else that are done with virtue,
+are "beautiful and good"; and neither will those who know these things
+deliberately choose aught else in their stead, nor will he who lacks the
+special knowledge of them be able to do them, but even if he makes the
+attempt he will miss the mark and fail. So the wise alone can perform
+the things which are "beautiful and good"; they that are unwise cannot,
+but even if they try they fail. Therefore, since all things just, and
+generally all things "beautiful and good," are wrought with virtue, it
+is clear that justice and all other virtue is wisdom.
+
+On the other hand, madness (he maintained) was the opposite to wisdom;
+not that he regarded simple ignorance as madness, (7) but he put it
+thus: for a man to be ignorant of himself, to imagine and suppose that
+he knows what he knows not, was (he argued), if not madness itself,
+yet something very like it. The mass of men no doubt hold a different
+language: if a man is all abroad on some matter of which the mass of
+mankind are ignorant, they do not pronounce him "mad"; (8) but a like
+aberration of mind, if only it be about matters within the scope
+of ordinary knowledge, they call madness. For instance, any one who
+imagined himself too tall to pass under a gateway of the Long Wall
+without stooping, or so strong as to try to lift a house, or to attempt
+any other obvious impossibility, is a madman according to them; but in
+the popular sense he is not mad, if his obliquity is confined to small
+matters. In fact, just as strong desire goes by the name of passion
+in popular parlance, so mental obliquity on a grand scale is entitled
+madness.
+
+ (7) See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 346; Grote, "Plato," i. 400.
+
+ (8) Or, "they resent the term 'mad' being applied to people who are
+ all abroad," etc. See Comte, "Pos. Pol." i. 575; ii. 373 (Engl.
+ trans.)
+
+In answer to the question: what is envy? he discovered it to be a
+certain kind of pain; not certainly the sorrow felt at the misfortunes
+of a friend or the good fortune of an enemy--that is not envy; but, as
+he said, "envy is felt by those alone who are annoyed at the successes
+of their friends." And when some one or other expressed astonishment
+that any one friendlily disposed to another should be pained at his
+well-doing, he reminded him of a common tendency in people: when any one
+is faring ill their sympathies are touched, they rush to the aid of the
+unfortunate; but when fortune smiles on others, they are somehow pained.
+"I do not say," he added, "this could happen to a thoughtful person; but
+it is no uncommon condition of a silly mind." (9)
+
+ (9) Or, "a man in his senses... a simpleton"; for the sentiment L.
+ Dind. cf. Isocr. "ad Demonic." 7 D.
+
+In answer to the question: what is leisure? I discover (he said) that
+most men do something: (10) for instance, the dice player, (11) the
+gambler, the buffoon, do something, but these have leisure; they can, if
+they like, turn and do something better; but nobody has leisure to turn
+from the better to the worse, and if he does so turn, when he has no
+leisure, he does but ill in that.
+
+ (10) See above, I. ii. 57; and in ref. to these definitions, K. Joel,
+ op. cit. p. 347 foll.
+
+ (11) For "dice-playing" see Becker, "Charicl." 354 (Engl. trans.); for
+ "buffoonery," ib. 98; "Symp."
+
+(To pass to another definition.) They are not kings or rulers (he said)
+who hold the sceptre merely, or are chosen by fellows out of the street,
+(12) or are appointed by lot, or have stepped into office by violence
+or by fraud; but those who have the special knowledge (13) how to rule.
+Thus having won the admission that it is the function of a ruler to
+enjoin what ought to be done, and of those who are ruled to obey, he
+proceeded to point out by instances that in a ship the ruler or captain
+is the man of special knowledge, to whom, as an expert, the shipowner
+himself and all the others on board obey. So likewise, in the matter
+of husbandry, the proprietor of an estate; in that of sickness, the
+patient; in that of physical training of the body, the youthful athlete
+going through a course; and, in general, every one directly concerned in
+any matter needing attention and care will either attend to this
+matter personally, if he thinks he has the special knowledge; or, if he
+mistrusts his own science, will be eager to obey any expert on the spot,
+or will even send and fetch one from a distance. The guidance of this
+expert he will follow, and do what he has to do at his dictation.
+
+ (12) Tom, Dick, and Harry (as we say).
+
+ (13) The {episteme}. See above, III. v. 21; Newman, op. cit. i. 256.
+
+And thus, in the art of spinning wool, he liked to point out that women
+are the rulers of men--and why? because they have the knowledge of the
+art, and men have not.
+
+And if any one raised the objection that a tyrant has it in his power
+not to obey good and correct advice, he would retort: "Pray, how has
+he the option not to obey, considering the penalty hanging over him who
+disobeys the words of wisdom? for whatever the matter be in which he
+disobeys the word of good advice, he will fall into error, I presume,
+and falling into error, be punished." And to the suggestion that the
+tyrant could, if he liked, cut off the head of the man of wisdom, his
+answer was: "Do you think that he who destroys his best ally will go
+scot free, or suffer a mere slight and passing loss? Is he more likely
+to secure his salvation that way, think you, or to compass his own swift
+destruction?" (14)
+
+ (14) Or, "Is that to choose the path of safety, think you? Is it not
+ rather to sign his own death-warrent?" L. Dind. cf. Hesiod, "Works
+ and Days," 293. See Newman, op. cit. i. 393-397.
+
+When some one asked him: "What he regarded as the best pursuit or
+business (15) for a man?" he answered: "Successful conduct"; (16) and
+to a second question: "Did he then regard good fortune as an end to
+be pursued?"--"On the contrary," he answered, "for myself, I consider
+fortune and conduct to be diametrically opposed. For instance, to
+succeed in some desirable course of action without seeking to do so, I
+hold to be good fortune; but to do a thing well by dint of learning and
+practice, that according to my creed is successful conduct, (17) and
+those who make this the serious business of their life seem to me to do
+well."
+
+ (15) Or, "the noblest study."
+
+ (16) {eupraxia, eu prattein}--to do well, in the sense both of well or
+ right doing, and of welfare, and is accordingly opposed to
+ {eutukhia}, mere good luck or success. Cf. Plat. "Euthyd." 281 B.
+
+ (17) Lit. "well-doing"; and for the Socratic view see Newman, op. cit.
+ i. 305, 401.
+
+They are at once the best and the dearest in the sight of God (18) (he
+went on to say) who for instance in husbandry do well the things of
+farming, or in the art of healing all that belongs to healing, or
+in statecraft the affairs of state; whereas a man who does nothing
+well--nor well in anything--is (he added) neither good for anything nor
+dear to God.
+
+ (18) Or, "most divinely favoured." Cf. Plat. "Euthyphro," 7 A.
+
+
+X
+
+But indeed, (1) if chance brought him into conversation with any one
+possessed of an art, and using it for daily purposes of business, he
+never failed to be useful to this kind of person. For instance, stepping
+one time into the studio of Parrhasius (2) the painter, and getting into
+conversation with him--
+
+ (1) {alla men kai}... "But indeed the sphere of his helpfulness was
+ not circumscribed; if," etc.
+
+ (2) For Parrhasius of Ephesus, the son of Evenor and rival of Zeuxis,
+ see Woltmann and Woermann, "Hist. of Painting," p. 47 foll.;
+ Cobet, "Pros. Xen." p. 50 (cf. in particular Quint. XII. x. 627).
+ At the date of conversation (real or ideal) he may be supposed to
+ have been a young man.
+
+I suppose, Parrhasius (said he), painting may be defined as "a
+representation of visible objects," may it not? (3) That is to say, by
+means of colours and palette you painters represent and reproduce as
+closely as possible the ups and downs, lights and shadows, hard and
+soft, rough and smooth surfaces, the freshness of youth and the wrinkles
+of age, do you not?
+
+ (3) Reading with Schneider, L. Dind., etc., after Stobaeus, {e
+ graphike estin eikasia}, or if the vulg. {graphike estin e
+ eikasia}, trans. "Painting is the term applied to a particular
+ representation," etc.
+
+You are right (he answered), that is so.
+
+Soc. Further, in portraying ideal types of beauty, seeing it is not easy
+to light upon any one human being who is absolutely devoid of blemish,
+you cull from many models the most beautiful traits of each, and so make
+your figures appear completely beautiful? (4)
+
+ (4) Cf. Cic. "de Invent." ii. 1 ad in. of Zeuxis; Max. Tur. "Dissert."
+ 23, 3, ap. Schneider ad loc.
+
+Parrh. Yes, that is how we do. (5)
+
+ (5) Or, "that is the secret of our creations," or "our art of
+ composition."
+
+Well, but stop (Socrates continued); do you also pretend to represent in
+similar perfection the characteristic moods of the soul, its captivating
+charm and sweetness, with its deep wells of love, its intensity of
+yearning, its burning point of passion? or is all this quite incapable
+of being depicted?
+
+Nay (he answered), how should a mood be other than inimitable, Socrates,
+when it possesses neither linear proportion (6) nor colour, nor any of
+those qualities which you named just now; when, in a word, it is not
+even visible?
+
+ (6) Lit. "symmetry." Cf. Plin. xxxv. 10, "primus symmetriam picturae
+ dedit," etc.
+
+Soc. Well, but the kindly look of love, the angry glance of hate at any
+one, do find expression in the human subject, do they not? (7)
+
+ (7) Or, "the glance of love, the scowl of hate, which one directs
+ towards another, are recognised expressions of human feeling." Cf.
+ the description of Parrhasius's own portrait of Demos, ap. Plin.
+ loc. cit.
+
+Parrh. No doubt they do.
+
+Soc. Then this look, this glance, at any rate may be imitated in the
+eyes, may it not?
+
+Undoubtedly (he answered).
+
+Soc. And do anxiety and relief of mind occasioned by the good or evil
+fortune of those we love both wear the same expression?
+
+By no means (he answered); at the thought of good we are radiant, at
+that of evil a cloud hangs on the brow.
+
+Soc. Then here again are looks with it is possible to represent?
+
+Parrh. Decidedly.
+
+Soc. Furthermore, as through some chink or crevice, there pierces
+through the countenance of a man, through the very posture of his body
+as he stands or moves, a glimpse of his nobility and freedom, or again
+of something in him low and grovelling--the calm of self-restraint, and
+wisdom, or the swagger of insolence and vulgarity?
+
+You are right (he answered).
+
+Soc. Then these too may be imitated?
+
+No doubt (he said).
+
+Soc. And which is the pleasanter type of face to look at, do you
+think--one on which is imprinted the characteristics of a beautiful,
+good, and lovable disposition, or one which bears the impress of what is
+ugly, and bad, and hateful? (8)
+
+ (8) For this theory cp. Ruskin, "Mod. P." ii. 94 foll. and indeed
+ passim.
+
+Parrh. Doubtless, Socrates, there is a vast distinction between the two.
+
+At another time he entered the workshop of the sculptor Cleiton, (9) and
+in course of conversation with him said:
+
+ (9) An unknown artist. Coraes conj. {Kleona}. Cf. Plin. xxxiv. 19;
+ Paus. v. 17, vi. 3. He excelled in portrait statues. See Jowett,
+ "Plato," iv.; "Laws," p. 123.
+
+You have a gallery of handsome people here, (10) Cleiton, runners, and
+wrestlers, and boxers, and pancratiasts--that I see and know; but how
+do you give the magic touch of life to your creations, which most of all
+allures the soul of the beholder through his sense of vision?
+
+ (10) Reading after L. Dind. {kaloi ous}, or if vulg. {alloious},
+ translate "You have a variety of types, Cleiton, not all of one
+ mould, but runners," etc.; al. "I see quite well how you give the
+ diversity of form to your runners," etc.
+
+As Cleiton stood perplexed, and did not answer at once, Socrates added:
+Is it by closely imitating the forms of living beings that you succeed
+in giving that touch of life to your statues?
+
+No doubt (he answered).
+
+Soc. It is, is it not, by faithfully copying the various muscular
+contractions of the body in obedience to the play of gesture and poise,
+the wrinklings of flesh and the sprawl of limbs, the tensions and
+the relaxations, that you succeed in making your statues like real
+beings--make them "breathe" as people say?
+
+Cleit. Without a doubt.
+
+Soc. And does not the faithful imitation of the various affections of
+the body when engaged in any action impart a particular pleasure to the
+beholder?
+
+Cleit. I should say so.
+
+Soc. Then the threatenings in the eyes of warriors engaged in battle
+should be carefully copied, or again you should imitate the aspect of a
+conqueror radiant with success?
+
+Cleit. Above all things.
+
+Soc. It would seem then that the sculptor is called upon to incorporate
+in his ideal form the workings and energies also of the soul?
+
+Paying a visit to Pistias, (11) the corselet maker, when that artist
+showed him some exquisite samples of his work, Socrates exclaimed:
+
+ (11) Cf. Athen. iv. 20, where the same artist is referred to
+ apparently as {Piston}, and for the type of person see the
+ "Portrait of a Tailor" by Moroni in the National Gallery--see
+ "Handbook," Edw. T. Cook, p. 152.
+
+By Hera! a pretty invention this, Pistias, by which you contrive that
+the corselet should cover the parts of the person which need protection,
+and at the same time leave free play to the arms and hands.... but
+tell me, Pistias (he added), why do you ask a higher price for these
+corselets of yours if they are not stouter or made of costlier material
+than the others?
+
+Because, Socrates (he answered), mine are of much finer proportion.
+
+Soc. Proportion! Then how do you make this quality apparent to the
+customer so as to justify the higher price--by measure or weight? For
+I presume you cannot make them all exactly equal and of one pattern--if
+you make them fit, as of course you do?
+
+Fit indeed! that I most distinctly do (he answered), take my word for
+it: no use in a corselet without that.
+
+But then are not the wearer's bodies themselves (asked Socrates) some
+well proportioned and others ill?
+
+Decidedly so (he answered).
+
+Soc. Then how do you manage to make the corselet well proportioned if it
+is to fit an ill-proportioned body? (12)
+
+ (12) Or, "how do you make a well-proportioned corselet fit an ill-
+ proportioned body? how well proportioned?"
+
+Pist. To the same degree exactly as I make it fit. What fits is well
+proportioned.
+
+Soc. It seems you use the term "well-proportioned" not in an absolute
+sense, but in reference to the wearer, just as you might describe a
+shield as well proportioned to the individual it suits; and so of a
+military cloak, and so of the rest of things, in your terminology? But
+maybe there is another considerable advantage in this "fitting"?
+
+Pist. Pray instruct me, Socrates, if you have got an idea.
+
+Soc. A corselet which fits is less galling by its weight than one which
+does not fit, for the latter must either drag from the shoulders with a
+dead weight or press upon some other part of the body, and so it becomes
+troublesome and uncomfortable; but that which fits, having its weight
+distributed partly along the collar-bone and shoulder-blade, partly
+over the shoulders and chest, and partly the back and belly, feels like
+another natural integument rather than an extra load to carry. (13)
+
+ (13) Schneider ad loc. cf Eur. "Electr." 192, {prosthemata aglaias},
+ and for the weight cf. Aristoph. "Peace," 1224.
+
+Pist. You have named the very quality which gives my work its
+exceptional value, as I consider; still there are customers, I am bound
+to say, who look for something else in a corselet--they must have them
+ornamental or inlaid with gold.
+
+For all that (replied Socrates), if they end by purchasing
+an ill-fitting article, they only become the proprietors of a
+curiously-wrought and gilded nuisance, as it seems to me. But (he
+added), as the body is never in one fixed position, but is at one time
+curved, at another raised erect how can an exactly-modelled corselet
+fit?
+
+Pist. It cannot fit at all.
+
+You mean (Socrates continued) that it is not the exactly-modelled
+corselet which fits, but that which does not gall the wearer in the
+using?
+
+Pist. There, Socrates, you have hit the very point. I see you understand
+the matter most precisely. (14)
+
+ (14) Or, "There, Socrates, you have hit the very phrase. I could not
+ state the matter more explicitly myself."
+
+
+XI
+
+There was once in the city a fair woman named Theodote. (1) She was
+not only fair, but ready to consort with any suitor who might win her
+favour. Now it chanced that some one of the company mentioned her,
+saying that her beauty beggared description. "So fair is she," he added,
+"that painters flock to draw her portrait, to whom, within the limits of
+decorum, she displays the marvels of her beauty." "Then there is nothing
+for it but to go and see her," answered Socrates, "since to comprehend
+by hearsay what is beyond description is clearly impossible." Then he
+who had introduced the matter replied: "Be quick then to follow me"; and
+on this wise they set off to seek Theodote. They found her "posing" to a
+certain painter; and they took their stand as spectators. Presently the
+painter had ceased his work; whereupon Socrates:
+
+ (1) For Theodote see Athen. v. 200 F, xiii. 574 F; Liban. i. 582. Some
+ say that it was Theodote who stood by Alcibiades to the last,
+ though there are apparently other better claimants to the honour.
+ Plut. "Alc." (Clough, ii. p. 50).
+
+"Do you think, sirs, that we ought to thank Theodote for displaying her
+beauty to us, or she us for coming to gaze at her?... It would
+seem, would it not, that if the exhibition of her charms is the more
+profitable to her, the debt is on her side; but if the spectacle of her
+beauty confers the greater benefit on us, then we are her debtors."
+
+Some one answered that "was an equitable statement of the case."
+
+Well then (he continued), as far as she is concerned, the praise we
+bestow on her is an immediate gain; and presently, when we have spread
+her fame abroad, she will be further benefited; but for ourselves the
+immediate effect on us is a strong desire to touch what we have seen;
+by and by, too, we shall go away with a sting inside us, and when we
+are fairly gone we shall be consumed with longing. Consequently it seems
+that we should do her service and she accept our court.
+
+Whereupon Theodote: Oh dear! if that is how the matter stands, it is I
+who am your debtor for the spectacle. (2)
+
+ (2) In reference to the remark of Socrates above; or, "have to thank
+ you for coming to look at me."
+
+At this point, seeing that the lady herself was expensively attired,
+and that she had with her her mother also, whose dress and style
+of attendance (3) were out of the common, not to speak of the
+waiting-women--many and fair to look upon, who presented anything but
+a forlorn appearance; while in every respect the whole house itself was
+sumptuously furnished--Socrates put a question:
+
+ (3) Or, "her mother there with her in a dress and general get-up
+ ({therapeia}) which was out of the common." See Becker,
+ "Charicles," p. 247 (Eng. tr.)
+
+Pray tell me, Theodote, have you an estate in the country?
+
+Theod. Not I indeed.
+
+Soc. Then perhaps you possess a house and large revenues along with it?
+
+Theod. No, nor yet a house.
+
+Soc. You are not an employer of labour on a large scale? (4)
+
+ (4) Lit. "You have not (in your employ) a body of handicraftsmen of
+ any sort?"
+
+Theod. No, nor yet an employer of labour.
+
+Soc. From what source, then, do you get your means of subsistence? (5)
+
+ (5) Or, Anglice, "derive your income."
+
+Theod. My friends are my life and fortune, when they care to be kind to
+me.
+
+Soc. By heaven, Theodote, a very fine property indeed, and far better
+worth possessing than a multitude of sheep or goats or cattle. A flock
+of friends!... But (he added) do you leave it to fortune whether a
+friend lights like a fly on your hand at random, or do you use any
+artifice (6) yourself to attract him?
+
+ (6) Or, "means and appliances," "machinery."
+
+Theod. And how might I hit upon any artifice to attract him?
+
+Soc. Bless me! far more naturally than any spider. You know how they
+capture the creatures on which they live; (7) by weaving webs of
+gossamer, is it not? and woe betide the fly that tumbles into their
+toils! They eat him up.
+
+ (7) Lit. "the creatures on which they live."
+
+Theod. So then you would counsel me to weave myself some sort of net?
+
+Soc. Why, surely you do not suppose you are going to ensnare that
+noblest of all game--a lover, to wit--in so artless a fashion? Do you
+not see (to speak of a much less noble sort of game) what a number of
+devices are needed to bag a hare? (8) The creatures range for their food
+at night; therefore the hunter must provide himself with night dogs.
+At peep of dawn they are off as fast as they can run. He must therefore
+have another pack of dogs to scent out and discover which way they
+betake them from their grazing ground to their forms; (9) and as they
+are so fleet of foot that they run and are out of sight in no time, he
+must once again be provided with other fleet-footed dogs to follow their
+tracks and overtake them; (10) and as some of them will give even these
+the slip, he must, last of all, set up nets on the paths at the points
+of escape, so that they may fall into the meshes and be caught.
+
+ (8) See the author's own treatise on "Hunting," vi. 6 foll.
+
+ (9) Lit. "from pasture to bed."
+
+ (10) Or, "close at their heels and run them down." See "Hunting"; cf.
+ "Cyrop." I. vi. 40.
+
+Theod. And by what like contrivance would you have me catch my lovers?
+
+Soc. Well now! what if in place of a dog you can get a man who will hunt
+up your wealthy lover of beauty and discover his lair, and having found
+him, will plot and plan to throw him into your meshes?
+
+Theod. Nay, what sort of meshes have I?
+
+Soc. One you have, and a close-folding net it is, (11) I trow; to wit,
+your own person; and inside it sits a soul that teaches you (12) with
+what looks to please and with what words to cheer; how, too, with smiles
+you are to welcome true devotion, but to exclude all wantons from your
+presence. (13) It tells you, you are to visit your beloved in sickness
+with solicitude, and when he has wrought some noble deed you are greatly
+to rejoice with him; and to one who passionately cares for you, you are
+to make surrender of yourself with heart and soul. The secret of true
+love I am sure you know: not to love softly merely, but devotedly. (14)
+And of this too I am sure: you can convince your lovers of your fondness
+for them not by lip phrases, but by acts of love.
+
+ (11) Or, "right well woven."
+
+ (12) Lit. "by which you understand."
+
+ (13) Or, "with what smiles to lie in wait for (cf. 'Cyrop.' II. iv.
+ 20; Herod. vi. 104) the devoted admirer, and how to banish from
+ your presence the voluptary."
+
+ (14) Or, "that it should be simply soft, but full of tender goodwill."
+
+Theod. No, upon my word, I have none of these devices.
+
+Soc. And yet it makes all the difference whether you approach a human
+being in the natural and true way, since it is not by force certainly
+that you can either catch or keep a friend. Kindness and pleasure
+are the only means to capture this fearful wild-fowl man and keep him
+constant.
+
+Theod. You are right.
+
+Soc. In the first place you must make such demands only of your
+well-wisher as he can grant without repentance; and in the next place
+you must make requital, dispensing your favours with a like economy.
+Thus you will best make friends whose love shall last the longest and
+their generosity know no stint. (15) And for your favours you will best
+win your friends if you suit your largess to their penury; for, mark
+you, the sweetest viands presented to a man before he wants them are apt
+to prove insipid, or, to one already sated, even nauseous; but create
+hunger, and even coarser stuff seems honey-sweet.
+
+ (15) Or, "This is the right road to friendship--permanent and open-
+ handed friendship."
+
+Theod. How then shall I create this hunger in the heart of my friends?
+
+Soc. In the first place you must not offer or make suggestion of your
+dainties to jaded appetites until satiety has ceased and starvation
+cries for alms. Even then shall you make but a faint suggestion to their
+want, with modest converse--like one who would fain bestow a kindness...
+and lo! the vision fades and she is gone--until the very pinch of
+hunger; for the same gifts have then a value unknown before the moment
+of supreme desire.
+
+Then Theodote: Oh why, Socrates, why are you not by my side (like the
+huntsman's assistant) to help me catch my friends and lovers?
+
+Soc. That will I be in good sooth if only you can woo and win me.
+
+Theod. How shall I woo and win you?
+
+Soc. Seek and you will find means, if you truly need me.
+
+Theod. Come then in hither and visit me often.
+
+And Socrates, poking sly fun at his own lack of business occupation,
+answered: Nay, Theodote, leisure is not a commodity in which I largely
+deal. I have a hundred affairs of my own too, private or public, to
+occupy me; and then there are my lady-loves, my dear friends, who will
+not suffer me day or night to leave them, for ever studying to learn
+love-charms and incantations at my lips.
+
+Theod. Why, are you really versed in those things, Socrates?
+
+Soc. Of course, or else how is it, do you suppose, that Apollodorus (16)
+here and Antisthenes never leave me; or why have Cebes and Simmias come
+all the way from Thebes to stay with me? Be assured these things cannot
+happen without diverse love-charms and incantations and magic wheels.
+
+ (16) For Apollodorus see "Apol." 28; Plat. "Symp." 172 A; "Phaed." 59
+ A, 117 D. For Antisthenes see above. For Cebes and Simmias see
+ above, I. ii. 48; Plat. "Crit." 45 B; "Phaed." passim.
+
+Theod. I wish you would lend me your magic-wheel, (17) then, and I will
+set it spinning first of all for you.
+
+ (17) Cf. Theocr. ii. 17; Schneider ad loc.
+
+Soc. Ah! but I do not wish to be drawn to you. I wish you to come to me.
+
+Theod. Then I will come. Only, will you be "at home" to me?
+
+Soc. Yes, I will welcome you, unless some one still dearer holds me
+engaged, and I must needs be "not at home."
+
+
+XII
+
+Seeing one of those who were with him, a young man, but feeble of body,
+named Epigenes, (1) he addressed him.
+
+ (1) Epigenes, possibly the son of Antiphon. See Plat. "Apol." 33 E;
+ "Phaed." 59 B.
+
+Soc. You have not the athletic appearance of a youth in training, (2)
+Epigenes.
+
+ (2) {idiotikos}, lit. of the person untrained in gymnastics. See A. R.
+ Cluer ad loc. Cf. Plat. "Laws," 839 E; I. ii. 4; III. v. 15;
+ "Symp." ii. 17.
+
+And he: That may well be, seeing I am an amateur and not in training.
+
+Soc. As little of an amateur, I take it, as any one who ever entered the
+lists of Olympia, unless you are prepared to make light of that contest
+for life and death against the public foe which the Athenians will
+institute when the day comes. (3) And yet they are not a few who, owing
+to a bad habit of body, either perish outright in the perils of war, or
+are ignobly saved. Many are they who for the self-same cause are taken
+prisoners, and being taken must, if it so betide, endure the pains of
+slavery for the rest of their days; or, after falling into dolorous
+straits, (4) when they have paid to the uttermost farthing of all, or
+may be more than the worth of all, that they possess, must drag on
+a miserable existence in want of the barest necessaries until death
+release them. Many also are they who gain an evil repute through
+infirmity of body, being thought to play the coward. Can it be that you
+despise these penalties affixed to an evil habit? Do you think you
+could lightly endure them? Far lighter, I imagine, nay, pleasant even
+by comparison, are the toils which he will undergo who duly cultivates
+a healthy bodily condition. Or do you maintain that the evil habit
+is healthier, and in general more useful than the good? Do you pour
+contempt upon those blessings which flow from the healthy state? And
+yet the very opposite of that which befalls the ill attends the
+sound condition. Does not the very soundness imply at once health and
+strength? (5) Many a man with no other talisman than this has passed
+safely through the ordeal of war; stepping, not without dignity, (6)
+through all its horrors unscathed. Many with no other support than this
+have come to the rescue of friends, or stood forth as benefactors of
+their fatherland; whereby they were thought worthy of gratitude, and
+obtained a great renown and received as a recompense the highest honours
+of the State; to whom is also reserved a happier and brighter passage
+through what is left to them of life, and at their death they leave
+to their children the legacy of a fairer starting-point in the race of
+life.
+
+ (3) Or, "should chance betide." Is the author thinking of a life-and-
+ death struggle with Thebes?
+
+ (4) e.g. the prisoners in the Latomiae. Thuc. vii. 87.
+
+ (5) It is almost a proverb--"Sound of body and limb is hale and
+ strong." "Qui valet praevalebit."
+
+ (6) e.g. Socrates himself, according to Alcibiades, ap. Plat. "Symp."
+ 221 B; and for the word {euskhemonos} see Arist. "Wasps," 1210,
+ "like a gentleman"; L. and S.; "Cyr." I. iii. 8; Aristot. "Eth.
+ N." i. 10, 13, "gracefully."
+
+Because our city does not practise military training in public, (7)
+that is no reason for neglecting it in private, but rather a reason for
+making it a foremost care. For be you assured that there is no contest
+of any sort, nor any transaction, in which you will be the worse off for
+being well prepared in body; and in fact there is nothing which men do
+for which the body is not a help. In every demand, therefore, which can
+be laid upon the body it is much better that it should be in the best
+condition; since, even where you might imagine the claims upon the body
+to be slightest--in the act of reasoning--who does not know the terrible
+stumbles which are made through being out of health? It suffices to say
+that forgetfulness, and despondency, and moroseness, and madness take
+occasion often of ill-health to visit the intellectual faculties so
+severely as to expel all knowledge (8) from the brain. But he who is in
+good bodily plight has large security. He runs no risk of incurring any
+such catastrophe through ill-health at any rate; he has the expectation
+rather that a good habit must procure consequences the opposite to those
+of an evil habit; (9) and surely to this end there is nothing a man in
+his senses would not undergo.... It is a base thing for a man to wax old
+in careless self-neglect before he has lifted up his eyes and seen
+what manner of man he was made to be, in the full perfection of bodily
+strength and beauty. But these glories are withheld from him who is
+guilty of self-neglect, for they are not wont to blaze forth unbidden.
+(10)
+
+ (7) Cf. "Pol. Ath." i. 13; and above, III. v. 15.
+
+ (8) Or, "whole branches of knowledge" ({tas epistemas}).
+
+ (9) Or, "he may well hope to be insured by his good habit against the
+ evils attendant on its opposite."
+
+ (10) Or, "to present themselves spontaneously."
+
+
+XII
+
+Once when some one was in a fury of indignation because he had bidden a
+passer-by good-day and the salutation was not returned, Socrates
+said: "It is enough to make one laugh! If you met a man in a wretched
+condition of body, you would not fall into a rage; but because you
+stumble upon a poor soul somewhat boorishly disposed, you feel annoyed."
+
+To the remark of another who complained that he did not take his food
+with pleasure, he said: "Acumenus (1) has a good prescription for that."
+And when the other asked: "And what may that be?" "To stop eating," he
+said. "On the score of pleasure, economy, and health, total abstinence
+has much in its favour." (2)
+
+ (1) A well-known physician. See Plat. "Phaedr." 227 A, 269 A; "Symp."
+ 176 B. A similar story is told of Dr. Abernethy, I think.
+
+ (2) Lit. "he would live a happier, thriftier, and healthier life, if
+ he stopped eating."
+
+And when some one else lamented that "the drinking-water in his house
+was hot," he replied: "Then when you want a warm bath you will not have
+to wait."
+
+The Other. But for bathing purposes it is cold.
+
+Soc. Do you find that your domestics seem to mind drinking it or washing
+in it?
+
+The Other. Quite the reverse; it is a constant marvel to me how
+contentedly they use it for either purpose.
+
+Soc. Which is hotter to the taste--the water in your house or the hot
+spring in the temple of Asclepius? (3)
+
+ (3) In the Hieron at Epidauros probably. See Baedeker, "Greece," p.
+ 240 foll.
+
+The Other. The water in the temple of Asclepius.
+
+Soc. And which is colder for bathing--yours or the cold spring in the
+cave of Amphiaraus? (4)
+
+ (4) Possibly at Oropos. Cf. Paus. i. 34. 3.
+
+The Other. The water in the cave of Amphiaraus.
+
+Soc. Then please to observe: if you do not take care, they will set you
+down as harder to please than a domestic servant or an invalid. (5)
+
+ (5) i.e. "the least and the most fastidious of men."
+
+A man had administered a severe whipping to the slave in attendance
+on him, and when Socrates asked: "Why he was so wroth with his own
+serving-man?" excused himself on the ground that "the fellow was a lazy,
+gourmandising, good-for-nothing dolt--fonder of money than of work." To
+which Socrates: "Did it ever strike you to consider which of the two in
+that case the more deserves a whipping--the master or the man?"
+
+When some one was apprehending the journey to Olympia, "Why are you
+afraid of the long distance?" he asked. "Here at home you spend nearly
+all your day in taking walks. (6) Well, on your road to Olympia you will
+take a walk and breakfast, and then you will take another walk and dine,
+and go to bed. Do you not see, if you take and tack together five or six
+days' length of walks, and stretch them out in one long line, it will
+soon reach from Athens to Olympia? I would recommend you, however,
+to set off a day too soon rather than a day too late. To be forced to
+lengthen the day's journey beyond a reasonable amount may well be a
+nuisance; but to take one day's journey beyond what is necessary is pure
+relaxation. Make haste to start, I say, and not while on the road." (7)
+
+ (6) {peripateis}, "promenading up and down."
+
+ (7) "Festina lente"--that is your motto.
+
+When some one else remarked "he was utterly prostrated after a long
+journey," Socrates asked him: "Had he had any baggage to carry?"
+
+"Not I," replied the complainer; "only my cloak."
+
+Soc. Were you travelling alone, or was your man-servant with you?
+
+He. Yes, I had my man.
+
+Soc. Empty-handed, or had he something to carry?
+
+He. Of course; carrying my rugs and other baggage.
+
+Soc. And how did he come off on the journey?
+
+He. Better than I did myself, I take it.
+
+Soc. Well, but now suppose you had had to carry his baggage, what would
+your condition have been like?
+
+He. Sorry enough, I can tell you; or rather, I could not have carried it
+at all.
+
+Soc. What a confession! Fancy being capable of so much less toil than
+a poor slave boy! Does that sound like the perfection of athletic
+training?
+
+
+XIV
+
+On the occasion of a common dinner-party (1) where some of the company
+would present themselves with a small, and others with a large supply
+of viands, Socrates would bid the servants (2) throw the small supplies
+into the general stock, or else to help each of the party to a share all
+round. Thus the grand victuallers were ashamed in the one case not
+to share in the common stock, and in the other not to throw in their
+supplies also. (3) Accordingly in went the grand supplies into the
+common stock. And now, being no better off than the small contributors,
+they soon ceased to cater for expensive delicacies.
+
+ (1) For the type of entertainment see Becker, "Charicles," p. 315
+ (Eng. tr.)
+
+ (2) "The boy."
+
+ (3) Or, "were ashamed not to follow suit by sharing in the common
+ stock and contributing their own portion."
+
+At a supper-party one member of the company, as Socrates chanced to
+note, had put aside the plain fare and was devoting himself to certain
+dainties. (4) A discussion was going on about names and definitions,
+and the proper applications of terms to things. (5) Whereupon Socrates,
+appealing to the company: "Can we explain why we call a man a 'dainty
+fellow'? What is the particular action to which the term applies?
+(6)--since every one adds some dainty to his food when he can get it.
+(7) But we have not quite hit the definition yet, I think. Are we to be
+called dainty eaters because we like our bread buttered?" (8)
+
+ (4) For the distinction between {sitos} and {opson} see Plat. "Rep."
+ 372 C.
+
+ (5) Or, "The conversation had fallen upon names: what is the precise
+ thing denoted under such and such a term? Define the meaning of so
+ and so."
+
+ (6) {opsophagos} = {opson} (or relish) eater, and so a "gourmand" or
+ "epicure"; but how to define a gourmand?
+
+ (7) Lit. "takes some {opson} (relish) to his {sitos} (food)."
+
+ (8) Lit. "simply for that" (sc. the taking of some sort of {opson}.
+ For {epi touto} cf. Plat. "Soph." 218 C; "Parmen." 147 D.)
+
+No! hardly! (some member of the company replied).
+
+Soc. Well, but now suppose a man confine himself to eating venison or
+other dainty without any plain food at all, not as a matter of training,
+(9) but for the pleasure of it: has such a man earned the title? "The
+rest of the world would have a poor chance against him," (10) some
+one answered. "Or," interposed another, "what if the dainty dishes he
+devours are out of all proportion to the rest of his meal--what of him?"
+(11)
+
+ (9) Lit. "{opson} (relish) by itself, not for the sake of training,"
+ etc. The English reader wil bear in mind that a raw beefsteak or
+ other meat prescribed by the gymnastic trainer in preference to
+ farinaceous food ({sitos}) would be {opson}.
+
+ (10) Or, more lit. "Hardly any one could deserve the appellation
+ better."
+
+ (11) Lit. "and what of the man who eats much {opson} on the top of a
+ little ({sitos})?" {epesthion} = follows up one course by another,
+ like the man in a fragment of Euripides, "Incert." 98: {kreasi
+ boeiois khlora suk' epesthien}, who "followed up his beefsteak
+ with a garnish of green figs."
+
+Soc. He has established a very fair title at any rate to the
+appellation, and when the rest of the world pray to heaven for a fine
+harvest: "May our corn and oil increase!" he may reasonably ejaculate,
+"May my fleshpots multiply!"
+
+At this last sally the young man, feeling that the conversation set
+somewhat in his direction, did not desist indeed from his savoury
+viands, but helped himself generously to a piece of bread. Socrates was
+all-observant, and added: Keep an eye on our friend yonder, you others
+next him, and see fair play between the sop and the sauce. (12)
+
+ (12) Lit. "see whether he will make a relish of the staple or a staple
+ of the relish" ("butter his bread or bread his butter").
+
+Another time, seeing one of the company using but one sop of bread
+(13) to test several savoury dishes, he remarked: Could there be a more
+extravagant style of cookery, or more murderous to the dainty dishes
+themselves, than this wholesale method of taking so many dishes
+together?--why, bless me, twenty different sorts of seasoning at one
+swoop! (14) First of all he mixes up actually more ingredients than the
+cook himself prescribes, which is extravagant; and secondly, he has the
+audacity to commingle what the chef holds incongruous, whereby if the
+cooks are right in their method he is wrong in his, and consequently the
+destroyer of their art. Now is it not ridiculous first to procure the
+greatest virtuosi to cook for us, and then without any claim to their
+skill to take and alter their procedure? But there is a worse thing in
+store for the bold man who habituates himself to eat a dozen dishes at
+once: when there are but few dishes served, out of pure habit he will
+feel himself half starved, whilst his neighbour, accustomed to send his
+sop down by help of a single relish, will feast merrily, be the dishes
+never so few.
+
+ (13) {psomos}, a sop or morsel of bread (cf. {psomion}, N. T., in mod.
+ Greek = "bread").
+
+ (14) Huckleberry Finn (p. 2 of that young person's "Adventures")
+ propounds the rationale of the system: "In a barrel of odds and
+ ends it is different; things get mixed up, and the juice kind of
+ swaps around, and the things go better."
+
+He had a saying that {euokheisthai}, to "make good cheer," (15) was
+in Attic parlance a synonym for "eating," and the affix {eu} (the
+attributive "good") connoted the eating of such things as would not
+trouble soul or body, and were not far to seek or hard to find. So
+that to "make good cheer" in his vocabulary applied to a modest and
+well-ordered style of living. (16)
+
+ (15) {euokheisthai}, cf. "Cyrop." IV. v. 7; "Pol. Ath." ii. 9; Kuhner
+ cf. Eustah. "ad Il." ii. p. 212, 37, {'Akhaioi ten trophen okhen
+ legousin oxutonos}. Athen. viii. 363 B. See "Hipparch," viii. 4,
+ of horses. Cf. Arist. "H. A." viii. 6.
+
+ (16) See "Symp." vi. 7; and for similar far-fetched etymologies, Plat.
+ "Crat." passim.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK IV
+
+
+I
+
+Such was Socrates; so helpful under all circumstances and in every
+way that no observer, gifted with ordinary sensibility, could fail to
+appreciate the fact, that to be with Socrates, and to spend long time
+in his society (no matter where or what the circumstances), was indeed
+a priceless gain. Even the recollection of him, when he was no longer
+present, was felt as no small benefit by those who had grown accustomed
+to be with him, and who accepted him. Nor indeed was he less helpful to
+his acquaintance in his lighter than in his graver moods.
+
+Let us take as an example that saying of his, so often on his lips:
+"I am in love with so and so"; and all the while it was obvious the
+going-forth of his soul was not towards excellence of body in the bloom
+of beauty, but rather towards faculties of the soul unfolding in virtue.
+(1) And these "good natures" he detected by certain tokens: a readiness
+to learn that to which the attention was directed; a power of retaining
+in the memory the lessons learnt; and a passionate predilection for
+those studies in particular which serve to good administration of a
+house or of a state, (2) and in general to the proper handling of
+man and human affairs. Such beings, he maintained, needed only to
+be educated (3) to become not only happy themselves and happy
+administrators of their private households, but to be capable of
+rendering other human beings as states or individuals happy also.
+
+ (1) Or, "not excellence of body in respect of beauty, but of the soul
+ as regards virtue; and this good natural disposition might be
+ detected by the readiness of its possessor to learn," etc. Cf.
+ Plat. "Rep." 535 B.
+
+ (2) Cf. above, I. i. 7.
+
+ (3) Or, "A person of this type would, if educated, not only prove a
+ fortune-favoured individual himself and," etc. Al. Kuhner, "Eos,
+ qui ita instituti sunt, ut tales sint."
+
+He had indeed a different way of dealing with different kinds of
+people. (4) Those who thought they had good natural ability and despised
+learning he instructed that the most highly-gifted nature stands most
+in need of training and education; (5) and he would point out how in the
+case of horses it is just the spirited and fiery thoroughbred which, if
+properly broken in as a colt, will develop into a serviceable and superb
+animal, but if left unbroken will turn out utterly intractable and good
+for nothing. Or take the case of dogs: a puppy exhibiting that zest for
+toil and eagerness to attack wild creatures which are the marks of high
+breeding, (6) will, if well brought up, prove excellent for the chase or
+for any other useful purpose; but neglect his education and he will turn
+out a stupid, crazy brute, incapable of obeying the simplest command. It
+is just the same with human beings; here also the youth of best natural
+endowments--that is to say, possessing the most robust qualities of
+spirit and a fixed determination to carry out whatever he has laid his
+hand to--will, if trained and taught what it is right to do, prove a
+superlatively good and useful man. He achieves, in fact, what is best
+upon the grandest scale. But leave him in boorish ignorance untrained,
+and he will prove not only very bad but very mischievous, (7) and for
+this reason, that lacking the knowledge to discern what is right to do,
+he will frequently lay his hand to villainous practices; whilst the very
+magnificence and vehemence of his character render it impossible either
+to rein him in or to turn him aside from his evil courses. Hence in his
+case also his achievements are on the grandest scale but of the worst.
+(8)
+
+ (4) Or, "His method of attack was not indeed uniformly the same. It
+ varied with the individual."
+
+ (5) Or, "If any one was disposed to look down upon learning and study
+ in reliance upon his own natural ability, he tried to lesson him
+ that it is just the highly-gifted nature which stands," etc. See
+ Newman, op. cit. i. 397.
+
+ (6) Cf. Aristot. "H. A." ix. 1; and "Hunting," iii. 11.
+
+ (7) Or, "and the same man may easily become a master villain of the
+ most dangerous sort."
+
+ (8) Kuhner ad loc. after Fr. Hermann cf. Plato. "Crito," 44 E; "Hipp.
+ min." 375 E; "Rep." vi. 491 E; "Gorg." 526 A; "Polit." 303 A.
+
+Or to take the type of person so eaten up with the pride of riches that
+he conceives himself dispensed from any further need of education--since
+it is "money makes the man," and his wealth will amply suffice him to
+carry out his desires and to win honours from admiring humanity. (9)
+Socrates would bring such people to their senses by pointing out the
+folly of supposing that without instruction it was possible to draw the
+line of demarcation (10) between what is gainful and what is hurtful
+in conduct; and the further folly of supposing that, apart from such
+discrimination, a man could help himself by means of wealth alone to
+whatever he liked or find the path of expediency plain before him; and
+was it not the veriest simplicity to suppose that, without the power of
+labouring profitably, a man can either be doing well or be in any sort
+of way sufficiently equipped for the battle of life? and again, the
+veriest simplicity to suppose that by mere wealth without true knowledge
+it was possible either to purchase a reputation for some excellence, or
+without such reputation to gain distinction and celebrity?
+
+ (9) Or, "and to be honoured by mankind."
+
+ (10) Or, "that without learning the distinction it was possible to
+ distinguish between," etc.
+
+
+II
+
+Or to come to a third kind--the class of people who are persuaded that
+they have received the best education, and are proud of their wisdom:
+his manner of dealing with these I will now describe.
+
+Euthydemus (1) "the beautiful" had (Socrates was given to understand)
+collected a large library, consisting of the most celebrated poets and
+philosophers, (2) by help of which he already believed himself to be
+more than a match for his fellows in wisdom, and indeed might presently
+expect to out-top them all in capacity of speech and action. (3) At
+first, as Socrates noted, the young man by reason of his youth had not
+as yet set foot in the agora, (4) but if he had anything to transact,
+his habit was to seat himself in a saddler's shop hard by. Accordingly
+to this same saddler's shop Socrates betook himself with some of those
+who were with him. And first the question was started by some one: "Was
+it through consorting with the wise, (5) or by his own unaided talent,
+that Themistocles came so to surpass his fellow-citizens that when the
+services of a capable man were needed the eyes of the whole community
+instinctively turned to him?" Socrates, with a view to stirring (6)
+Euthydemus, answered: There was certainly an ingenuous simplicity in the
+belief that superiority in arts of comparatively little worth could only
+be attained by aid of qualified teachers, but that the leadership of the
+state, the most important concern of all, was destined to drop into the
+lap of anybody, no matter whom, like an accidental windfall. (7)
+
+ (1) Euthydemus, the son of Diocles perhaps. See Plat. "Symp." 222 B,
+ and Jowet ad loc.; Cobet, "Prosop. Xen." s.n.; K. Joel, op. cit.
+ p. 372 foll. For {ton kalon} cf. "Phaedr." 278 E, "Isocrates the
+ fair." For the whole chapter cf. Plat. "Alc." i.; "Lys." 210 E.
+ See above, "Mem." I. ii. 29; Grote, "Plato," i. ch. x. passim.
+
+ (2) Lit. "sophists." See Grote, "H. G." viii. p. 480, note. For
+ private libraries see Becker, "Char." p. 272 foll. (Eng. tr.)
+
+ (3) See "Hipparch," i. 24; "Cyrop." V. v. 46.
+
+ (4) See above, III. vi. 1; Schneid. cf. Isocr. "Areop." 149 C.
+
+ (5) Cf. Soph. fr. 12, {sophoi turannoi ton sophon xunousia}.
+
+ (6) L. and S. cf. Plat. "Lys." 223 A; "Rep." 329 B: "Wishing to draw
+ him out."
+
+ (7) Cf. Plat. "Alc." i. 118 C: "And Pericles is said not to have got
+ his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with
+ several of the philosophers" (Jowett).
+
+On a subsequent occasion, Euthydemus being present, though, as was plain
+to see, somewhat disposed to withdraw from the friendly concourse, (8)
+as if he would choose anything rather than appear to admire Socrates on
+the score of wisdom, the latter made the following remarks.
+
+ (8) {sunedrias}, "the council."
+
+Soc. It is clear from his customary pursuits, is it not, sirs, that when
+our friend Euthydemus here is of full age, and the state propounds some
+question for solution, he will not abstain from offering the benefit
+of his advice? One can imagine the pretty exordium to his parliamentary
+speeches which, in his anxiety not to be thought to have learnt anything
+from anybody, he has ready for the occasion. (9) Clearly at the outset
+he will deliver himself thus: "Men of Athens, I have never at any time
+learnt anything from anybody; nor, if I have ever heard of any one as
+being an able statesman, well versed in speech and capable of action,
+have I sought to come across him individually. I have not so much as
+been at pains to provide myself with a teacher from amongst those who
+have knowledge; (10) on the contrary, I have persistently avoided, I
+will not say learning from others, but the very faintest suspicion of
+so doing. However, anything that occurs to me by the light of nature I
+shall be glad to place at your disposal."... How appropriate (11) would
+such a preface sound on the lips of any one seeking, say, the office of
+state physician, (12) would it not? How advantageously he might begin
+an address on this wise: "Men of Athens, I have never learnt the art of
+healing by help of anybody, nor have I sought to provide myself with any
+teacher among medical men. Indeed, to put it briefly, I have been ever
+on my guard not only against learning anything from the profession, but
+against the very notion of having studied medicine at all. If, however,
+you will be so good as to confer on me this post, I promise I will do
+my best to acquire skill by experimenting on your persons." Every one
+present laughed at the exordium (and there the matter dropped).
+
+ (9) Or, "the pretty exordium... now in course of composition. He
+ must at all hazards avoid the suspicion of having picked up any
+ crumb of learning from anybody; how can he help therefore
+ beginning his speech thus?"
+
+ (10) Or, "scientific experts."
+
+ (11) Al. "Just as if one seeking the office of state physician were to
+ begin with a like exordium." {armoseie} = "it would be consistent
+ (with what has gone before)."
+
+ (12) Schneider cf. Plat. "Laws," iv. 720 A; "Gorg." 456 A; and for
+ "the parish doctor," "Polit." 259 A; Arist. "Acharn." 1030.
+
+Presently, when it became apparent that Euthydemus had got so far that
+he was disposed to pay attention to what was said, though he was still
+at pains not to utter a sound himself, as if he hoped by silence to
+attach to himself some reputation for sagacity, Socrates, wishing to
+cure him of that defect, proceeded.
+
+Soc. Is it not surprising that people anxious to learn to play the
+harp or the flute, or to ride, or to become proficient in any like
+accomplishment, are not content to work unremittingly in private by
+themselves at whatever it is in which they desire to excel, but they
+must sit at the feet of the best-esteemed teachers, doing all things
+and enduring all things for the sake of following the judgment of those
+teachers in everything, as though they themselves could not otherwise
+become famous; whereas, among those who aspire to become eminent
+politically as orators and statesmen, (13) there are some who cannot
+see why they should not be able to do all that politics demand, at a
+moment's notice, by inspiration as it were, without any preliminary
+pains or preparations whatever? And yet it would appear that the latter
+concerns must be more difficult of achievement than the former, in
+proportion as there are more competitors in the field but fewer who
+reach the goal of their ambition, which is as much as to say that a more
+sustained effort of attention is needed on the part of those who embark
+upon the sea of politics than is elsewhere called for.
+
+ (13) Or, more lit. "powerful in speech and action within the sphere of
+ politics."
+
+Such were the topics on which Socrates was wont in the early days of
+their association to dilate in the hearing of Euthydemus; but when the
+philosopher perceived that the youth not only could tolerate the turns
+of the discussion more readily but was now become a somewhat eager
+listener, he went to the saddler's shop alone, (14) and when Euthydemus
+was seated by his side the following conversation took place.
+
+ (14) The question arises: how far is the conversation historical or
+ imaginary?
+
+Soc. Pray tell me, Euthydemus, is it really true what people tell me,
+that you have made a large collection of the writings of "the wise," as
+they are called? (15)
+
+ (15) Or, "have collected several works of our classical authors and
+ philosophers."
+
+Euthydemus answered: Quite true, Socrates, and I mean to go on
+collecting until I possess all the books I can possibly lay hold of.
+
+Soc. By Hera! I admire you for wishing to possess treasures of wisdom
+rather than of gold and silver, which shows that you do not believe gold
+and silver to be the means of making men better, but that the thoughts
+(16) of the wise alone enrich with virtue their possessions.
+
+ (16) Lit. "gnomes," maxims, sententiae. Cf. Aristot. "Rhet." ii. 21.
+
+And Euthydemus was glad when he heard that saying, for, thought he
+to himself, "In the eyes of Socrates I am on the high road to the
+acquisition of wisdom." But the latter, perceiving him to be pleased
+with the praise, continued.
+
+Soc. And what is it in which you desire to excel, Euthydemus, that you
+collect books?
+
+And when Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer he should
+make, Socrates added: Possibly you want to be a great doctor? Why,
+the prescriptions (17) of the Pharmacopoeia would form a pretty large
+library by themselves.
+
+ (17) {suggrammata}, "medical treatises." See Aristot. "Eth." x. 9, 21.
+
+No, indeed, not I! (answered Euthydemus).
+
+Soc. Then do you wish to be an architect? That too implies a man of
+well-stored wit and judgment. (18)
+
+ (18) Or, "To be that implies a considerable store of well-packed
+ wisdom."
+
+I have no such ambition (he replied).
+
+Soc. Well, do you wish to be a mathematician, like Theodorus? (19)
+
+ (19) Of Cyrene (cf. Plat. "Theaet.") taught Plato. Diog. Laert. ii. 8,
+ 19.
+
+Euth. No, nor yet a mathematician.
+
+Soc. Then do you wish to be an astronomer? (20) or (as the youth
+signified dissent) possibly a rhapsodist? (21) (he asked), for I am told
+you have the entire works of Homer in your possession. (22)
+
+ (20) Cf. below, IV. vii. 4.
+
+ (21) See "Symp." iii. 6; Plat. "Ion."
+
+ (22) See Jowett, "Plato," i. 229; Grote, "Plato," i. 455.
+
+Nay, God forbid! not I! (ejaculated the youth). Rhapsodists have a very
+exact acquaintance with epic poetry, I know, of course; but they are
+empty-pated creatures enough themselves. (23)
+
+ (23) Or, "are simply perfect in the art of reciting epic poetry, but
+ are apt to be the veriest simpletons themselves."
+
+At last Socrates said: Can it be, Euthydemus, that you are an aspirant
+to that excellence through which men become statesmen and administrators
+fit to rule and apt to benefit (24) the rest of the world and
+themselves?
+
+ (24) Or, "statesmen, and economists, and rules, and benefactors of
+ the rest of the world and themselves."
+
+Yes (replied he), that is the excellence I desire--beyond measure.
+
+Upon my word (said Socrates), then you have indeed selected as the
+object of your ambition the noblest of virtues and the greatest of the
+arts, for this is the property of kings, and is entitled "royal"; but
+(he continued) have you considered whether it is possible to excel in
+these matters without being just and upright? (25)
+
+ (25) Just, {dikaios} = upright, righteous. Justice, {dikaiosune} =
+ social uprightness = righteousness, N.T. To quote a friend: "The
+ Greek {dikaios} combines the active dealing out of justice with
+ the self-reflective idea of preserving justice in our conduct,
+ which is what we mean by 'upright.'"
+
+Euth. Certainly I have, and I say that without justice and uprightness
+it is impossible to be a good citizen.
+
+No doubt (replied Socrates) you have accomplished that initial step?
+
+Euth. Well, Socrates, I think I could hold my own against all comers as
+an upright man.
+
+And have upright men (continued Socrates) their distinctive and
+appropriate works like those of carpenters or shoe-makers?
+
+Euth. To be sure they have.
+
+Soc. And just as the carpenter is able to exhibit his works and
+products, the righteous man should be able to expound and set forth his,
+should he not?
+
+I see (replied Euthydemus) you are afraid I cannot expound the works
+of righteousness! Why, bless me! of course I can, and the works of
+unrighteousness into the bargain, since there are not a few of that sort
+within reach of eye and ear every day.
+
+Shall we then (proceeded Socrates) write the letter R on this side, (26)
+and on that side the letter W; and then anything that appears to us
+to be the product of righteousness we will place to the R account, and
+anything which appears to be the product of wrong-doing and iniquity to
+the account of W?
+
+ (26) The letter R (to stand for Right, Righteous, Upright, Just). The
+ letter W (to stand for Wrong, Unrighteous, Unjust).
+
+By all means do so (he answered), if you think that it assists matters.
+
+Accordingly Socrates drew the letters, as he had suggested, and
+continued.
+
+Soc. Lying exists among men, does it not?
+
+Euth. Certainly.
+
+To which side of the account then shall we place it? (he asked).
+
+Euth. Clearly on the side of wrong and injustice.
+
+Soc. Deceit too is not uncommon?
+
+Euth. By no means.
+
+Soc. To which side shall we place deceit?
+
+Euth. Deceit clearly on the side of wrong.
+
+Soc. Well, and chicanery (27) or mischief of any sort?
+
+ (27) Reading {to kakourgein} (= furari, Sturz); al. {kleptein}, Stob.
+
+Euth. That too.
+
+Soc. And the enslavement of free-born men? (28)
+
+ (28) Or, "the kidnapping of men into slavery." {to andrapodizesthai} =
+ the reduction of a free-born man to a state of slavery. Slavery
+ itself ({douleia}) being regarded as the normal condition of a
+ certain portion of the human race and not in itself immoral.
+
+Euth. That too.
+
+Soc. And we cannot allow any of these to lie on the R side of the
+account, to the side of right and justice, can we, Euthydemus?
+
+It would be monstrous (he replied).
+
+Soc. Very good. But supposing a man to be elected general, and he
+succeeds in enslaving an unjust, wicked, and hostile state, are we to
+say that he is doing wrong?
+
+Euth. By no means.
+
+Soc. Shall we not admit that he is doing what is right?
+
+Euth. Certainly.
+
+Soc. Again, suppose he deceives the foe while at war with them?
+
+Euth. That would be all fair and right also.
+
+Soc. Or steals and pillages their property? would he not be doing what
+is right?
+
+Euth. Certainly; when you began I thought you were limiting the question
+to the case of friends.
+
+Soc. So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will now
+have to be placed to the credit of Right?
+
+Euth. Apparently.
+
+Soc. Very well then, let us so place them; and please, let us make a
+new definition--that while it is right to do such things to a foe, it is
+wrong to do them to a friend, but in dealing with the latter it behoves
+us to be as straightforward as possible. (29)
+
+ (29) Or, "an absolutely straightforward course is necessary."
+
+I quite assent (replied Euthydemus).
+
+So far so good (remarked Socrates); but if a general, seeing his troops
+demoralised, were to invent a tale to the effect that reinforcements
+were coming, and by means of this false statement should revive the
+courage of his men, to which of the two accounts shall we place that act
+of fraud? (30)
+
+ (30) Cf. "Hell." IV. iii. 10; "Cyrop." I. vi. 31.
+
+On the side of right, to my notion (he replied).
+
+Soc. Or again, if a man chanced to have a son ill and in need of
+medicine, which the child refused to take, and supposing the father by
+an act of deceit to administer it under the guise of something nice to
+eat, and by service of that lie to restore the boy to health, to which
+account shall we set down this fraud?
+
+Euth. In my judgment it too should be placed to the same account.
+
+Soc. Well, supposing you have a friend in deplorably low spirits, and
+you are afraid he will make away with himself--accordingly you rob him
+of his knife or other such instrument: to which side ought we to set the
+theft?
+
+Euth. That too must surely be placed to the score of right behaviour.
+
+Soc. I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in
+every case to be pursued even in dealing with friends?
+
+Heaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed). If you will allow me, I rescind my
+former statement. (31)
+
+ (31) See above, I. ii. 44 ({anatithemai}).
+
+Soc. Allow you! Of course you may--anything rather than make a false
+entry on our lists.... But there is just another point we ought not to
+leave uninvestigated. Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to
+his detriment: which is the more wrongful--to do so voluntarily or
+unintentionally?
+
+Euth. Really, Socrates, I have ceased to believe in my own answers, for
+all my former admissions and conceptions seem to me other than I
+first supposed them. (32) Still, if I may hazard one more opinion, the
+intentional deceiver, I should say, is worse than the involuntary.
+
+ (32) Or, "all my original positions seem to me now other than I first
+ conceived them"; or, "everything I first asserted seems now to be
+ twisted topsy-turvy."
+
+Soc. And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right
+and Justice just as there is of letters and grammar? (33)
+
+ (33) {mathesis kai episteme tou dikaiou}--a doctrine and a knowledge
+ of the Just.
+
+Euth. That is my opinion.
+
+Soc. And which should you say was more a man of letters (34)--he who
+intentionally misspells or misreads, or he who does so unconsciously?
+
+ (34) Or, "more grammatical"; "the better grammarian."
+
+Euth. He who does so intentionally, I should say, because he can spell
+or read correctly whenever he chooses.
+
+Soc. Then the voluntary misspeller may be a lettered person, but the
+involuntary offender is an illiterate? (35)
+
+ (35) Or, "In fact, he who sins against the lore of grammer
+ intentionally may be a good grammarian and a man of letters, but
+ he who does so involuntarily is illiterate and a bad grammarian?"
+
+Euth. True, he must be. I do not see how to escape from that conclusion.
+
+Soc. And which of the two knows what is right--he who intentionally lies
+and deceives, or he who lies and deceives unconsciously? (36)
+
+ (36) Or, Soc. And does he who lies and deceives with intent know what
+ is right rather than he who does either or both unconsciously?
+
+ Euth. Clearly he does.
+
+Euth. The intentional and conscious liar clearly.
+
+Soc. Well then, your statement is this: on the one hand, the man who
+has the knowledge of letters is more lettered than he who has no such
+knowledge? (37)
+
+ (37) Or, Soc. It is a fair inference, is it not, that he who has the
+ {episteme} of grammar is more grammatical than he who has no such
+ {episteme}?
+
+ Euth. Yes.
+
+ Soc. And he who has the {episteme} of things rightful is more
+ righteous than he who lacks the {episteme}? See Plat. "Hipp.
+ min."; Arist. "Eth. Eud." VI. v. 7.
+
+Euth. Yes.
+
+Soc. And, on the other, he who has the knowledge of what is right is
+more righteous than he who lacks that knowledge?
+
+Euth. I suppose it is, but for the life of me I cannot make head or tail
+of my own admission. (38)
+
+ (38) Lit. "Apparently; but I appear to myself to be saying this also,
+ heaven knows how." See Jowett, "Plato," ii. p. 416 (ed. 2).
+
+Soc. Well (look at it like this). Suppose a man to be anxious to speak
+the truth, but he is never able to hold the same language about a thing
+for two minutes together. First he says: "The road is towards the east,"
+and then he says, "No, it's towards the west"; or, running up a column
+of figures, now he makes the product this, and again he makes it that,
+now more, now less--what do you think of such a man?
+
+Euth. Heaven help us! clearly he does not know what he thought he knew.
+
+Soc. And you know the appellation given to certain people--"slavish,"
+(39) or, "little better than a slave?"
+
+ (39) {andropododeis}, which has the connotation of mental dulness, and
+ a low order of intellect, cf. "boorish," "rustic," "loutish,"
+ ("pariah," conceivably). "Slavish," "servile," with us connote
+ moral rather than intellectual deficiency, I suppose. Hence it is
+ impossible to preserve the humour of the Socratic argument. See
+ Newman, op. cit. i. 107.
+
+Euth. I do.
+
+Soc. Is it a term suggestive of the wisdom or the ignorance of those to
+whom it is applied?
+
+Euth. Clearly of their ignorance.
+
+Soc. Ignorance, for instance, of smithying?
+
+Euth. No, certainly not.
+
+Soc. Then possibly ignorance of carpentering?
+
+Euth. No, nor yet ignorance of carpentering.
+
+Soc. Well, ignorance of shoemaking?
+
+Euth. No, nor ignorance of any of these: rather the reverse, for the
+majority of those who do know just these matters are "little better than
+slaves."
+
+Soc. You mean it is a title particularly to those who are ignorant of
+the beautiful, the good, the just? (40)
+
+ (40) Cf. Goethe's "Im Ganzen Guten Schonen resolut zu leben."
+
+It is, in my opinion (he replied).
+
+Soc. Then we must in every way strain every nerve to avoid the
+imputation of being slaves?
+
+Euth. Nay, Socrates, by all that is holy, I did flatter myself that
+at any rate I was a student of philosophy, and on the right road to
+be taught everything essential to one who would fain make beauty and
+goodness his pursuit. (41) So that now you may well imagine my despair
+when, for all my pains expended, I cannot even answer the questions put
+to me about what most of all a man should know; and there is no path of
+progress open to me, no avenue of improvement left.
+
+ (41) {tes kalokagathias}, the virtue of the {kalos te kagathos}--
+ nobility of soul. Cf. above, I. vi. 14.
+
+Thereupon Socrates: Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?
+
+Yes, certainly; twice (said he).
+
+Soc. And did you notice an inscription somewhere on the temple:
+{GNOMI SEAUTON}--KNOW THYSELF?
+
+Euth. I did.
+
+Soc. Did you, possibly, pay no regard to the inscription? or did you
+give it heed and try to discover who and what you were?
+
+I can safely say I did not (he answered). That much I made quite sure
+I knew, at any rate; since if I did not know even myself, what in the
+world did I know?
+
+Soc. Can a man be said, do you think, to know himself who knows his own
+name and nothing more? or must he not rather set to work precisely like
+the would-be purchaser of a horse, who certainly does not think that he
+has got the knowledge he requires until he has discovered whether the
+beast is tractable or stubborn, strong or weak, quick or slow, and
+how it stands with the other points, serviceable or the reverse, in
+reference to the use and purpose of a horse? So, I say, must a man
+in like manner interrogate his own nature in reference to a man's
+requirements, and learn to know his own capacities, must he not?
+
+Euth. Yes, so it strikes me: he who knows not his own ability knows not
+himself.
+
+Soc. And this too is plain, is it not: that through self-knowledge men
+meet with countless blessings, and through ignorance of themselves
+with many evils? Because, the man who knows himself knows what is
+advantageous to himself; he discerns the limits of his powers, and by
+doing what he knows, he provides himself with what he needs and so does
+well; or, conversely, by holding aloof from what he knows not, he avoids
+mistakes and thereby mishaps. And having now a test to gauge other human
+beings he uses their need as a stepping-stone to provide himself with
+good and to avoid evil. Whereas he who does not know himself, but is
+mistaken as to his own capacity, is in like predicament to the rest of
+mankind and all human matters else; he neither knows what he wants,
+nor what he is doing, nor the people whom he deals with; and being all
+abroad in these respects, he misses what is good and becomes involved in
+what is ill.
+
+Again, he that knows what he is doing through the success of his
+performance attains to fame and honour; his peers and co-mates are glad
+to make use of him, whilst his less successful neighbours, failing
+in their affairs, are anxious to secure his advice, his guidance, his
+protection; (42) they place their hopes of happiness in him, and for all
+these causes (43) single him out as the chief object of their affection.
+He, on the contrary, who knows not what he does, who chooses amiss and
+fails in what he puts his hands to, not only incurs loss and suffers
+chastisement through his blunders, but step by step loses reputation
+and becomes a laughing-stock, and in the end is doomed to a life of
+dishonour and contempt.
+
+ (42) Cf. Dante, "Tu duca, tu maestro, tu signore."
+
+ (43) Reading, {dia panta tauta}, or if {dia tauta}, translate "and
+ therefore."
+
+What is true of individuals is true also of communities. (44) That state
+which in ignorance of its power goes to war with a stronger than itself
+ends by being uprooted or else reduced to slavery.
+
+ (44) Or, more lit. "A law which applies, you will observe, to bodies
+ politic."
+
+Thereupon Euthydemus: Be assured I fully concur in your opinion; the
+precept KNOW THYSELF cannot be too highly valued; but what is the
+application? What the starting-point of self-examination? I look to you
+for an explanation, if you would kindly give one. (45)
+
+ (45) Or, "at what point to commence the process of self-inspection?--
+ there is the mystery. I look to you, if you are willing, to
+ interpret it."
+
+Well (replied Socrates), I presume you know quite well the distinction
+between good and bad things: your knowledge may be relied upon so far?
+
+Why, yes, to be sure (replied the youth); for without that much
+discernment I should indeed be worse than any slave. (46)
+
+ (46) Lit. "if I did not know even that."
+
+Come then (said he), do you give me an explanation of the things so
+termed.
+
+That is fortunately not hard (replied the youth). First of all, health
+in itself I hold to be a good, and disease in itself an evil; and in the
+next place the sources of either of those aforenamed, meats and drinks,
+and habits of life, (47) I regard as good or evil according as they
+contribute either to health or to disease.
+
+ (47) Or, "pursuits and occupations"; "manners and customs."
+
+Soc. Then health and disease themselves when they prove to be sources of
+any good are good, but when of any evil, evil?
+
+And when (asked he), can health be a source of evil, or disease a source
+of good?
+
+Why, bless me! often enough (replied Socrates). In the event, for
+instance, of some ill-starred expedition or of some disastrous voyage
+or other incident of the sort, of which veritably there are enough to
+spare--when those who owing to their health and strength take a part
+in the affair are lost; whilst those who were left behind--as hors de
+combat, on account of ill-health of other feebleness--are saved.
+
+Euth. Yes, you are right; but you will admit that there are advantages
+to be got from strength and lost through weakness.
+
+Soc. Even so; but ought we to regard those things which at one moment
+benefit and at another moment injure us in any strict sense good rather
+than evil?
+
+Euth. No, certainly not, according to that line of argument. But wisdom,
+(48) Socrates, you must on your side admit, is irrefragably a good;
+since there is nothing which or in which a wise man would not do better
+than a fool.
+
+ (48) See above, III. ix. 5. Here {sophia} is not = {sophrosune}.
+
+Soc. What say you? Have you never heard of Daedalus, (49) how he was
+seized by Minos on account of his wisdom, and forced to be his slave,
+and robbed of fatherland and freedom at one swoop? and how, while
+endeavouring to make his escape with his son, he caused the boy's
+death without effecting his own salvation, but was carried off among
+barbarians and again enslaved?
+
+ (49) See Ovid. "Met." viii. 159 foll., 261 foll.; Hygin. "Fab." 39,
+ 40; Diod. Sic. iv. 79; Paus. vii. 4. 6.
+
+Yes, I know the old story (he answered). (50)
+
+ (50) Or, "Ah yes, of course; the tale is current."
+
+Soc. Or have you not heard of the "woes of Palamedes," (51) that
+commonest theme of song, how for his wisdom's sake Odysseus envied him
+and slew him?
+
+ (51) See Virg. "Aen." ii. 90; Hygin. 105; Philostr. "Her." x.
+
+Euth. That tale also is current.
+
+Soc. And how many others, pray, do you suppose have been seized on
+account of their wisdom, and despatched to the great king and at his
+court enslaved? (52)
+
+ (52) Cf. Herod. iii. 129.
+
+Well, prosperity, well-being (53) (he exclaimed), must surely be a
+blessing, and that the most indisputable, Socrates?
+
+ (53) {to eudaimonein}, "happiness." Cf. Herod. i. 86.
+
+It might be so (replied the philosopher) if it chanced not to be in
+itself a compound of other questionable blessings.
+
+Euth. And which among the components of happiness and well-being can
+possibly be questionable?
+
+None (he retorted), unless of course we are to include among these
+components beauty, or strength, or wealth, or reputation, or anything
+else of that kind?
+
+Euth. By heaven! of course we are to include these, for what would
+happiness be without these?
+
+Soc. By heaven! yes; only then we shall be including the commonest
+sources of mischief which befall mankind. How many are ruined by their
+fair faces at the hand of admirers driven to distraction (54) by the
+sight of beauty in its bloom! how many, tempted by their strength to
+essay deeds beyond their power, are involved in no small evils! how
+many, rendered effeminate by reason of their wealth, have been plotted
+against and destroyed! (55) how many through fame and political power
+have suffered a world of woe!
+
+ (54) Cf. Plat. "Rep." vii. 517 D; "Phaedr." 249 D.
+
+ (55) e.g. Alcibiades.
+
+Well (the youth replied) if I am not even right in praising happiness,
+I must confess I know not for what one ought to supplicate the gods in
+prayer. (56)
+
+ (56) See above for Socrates' own form of supplication.
+
+Nay, these are matters (proceeded Socrates) which perhaps, through
+excessive confidence in your knowledge of them, you have failed to
+examine into; but since the state, which you are preparing yourself to
+direct, is democratically constituted, (57) of course you know what a
+democracy is.
+
+ (57) Or, "popularly governed."
+
+Euth. I presume I do, decidedly.
+
+Soc. Well, now, is it possible to know what a popular state is without
+knowing who the people are?
+
+Euth. Certainly not.
+
+Soc. And whom do you consider to be the people?
+
+Euth. The poor citizens, I should say.
+
+Soc. Then you know who the poor are, of course?
+
+Euth. Of course I do.
+
+Soc. I presume you also know who the rich are?
+
+Euth. As certainly as I know who are the poor.
+
+Soc. Whom do you understand by poor and rich?
+
+Euth. By poor I mean those who have not enough to pay for their
+necessaries, (58) and by rich those who have more means than sufficient
+for all their needs.
+
+ (58) Al. "who cannot contribute their necessary quota to the taxes
+ (according to the census)."
+
+Soc. Have you noticed that some who possess a mere pittance not only
+find this sufficient, but actually succeed in getting a surplus out of
+it; while others do not find a large fortune large enough?
+
+I have, most certainly; and I thank you for the reminder (replied
+Euthydemus). One has heard of crowned heads and despotic rulers being
+driven by want to commit misdeeds like the veriest paupers.
+
+Then, if that is how matters stand (continued Socrates), we must class
+these same crowned heads with the commonalty; and some possessors of
+scant fortunes, provided they are good economists, with the wealthy?
+
+Then Euthydemus: It is the poverty of my own wit which forces me to this
+admission. I bethink me it is high time to keep silence altogether; a
+little more, and I shall be proved to know absolutely nothing. And so he
+went away crestfallen, in an agony of self-contempt, persuaded that he
+was verily and indeed no better than a slave.
+
+Amongst those who were reduced to a like condition by Socrates, many
+refused to come near him again, whom he for his part looked upon as
+dolts and dullards. (59) But Euthydemus had the wit to understand that,
+in order to become worthy of account, his best plan was to associate
+as much as possible with Socrates; and from that moment, save for some
+necessity, he never left him--in some points even imitating him in his
+habits and pursuits. Socrates, on his side, seeing that this was the
+young man's disposition, disturbed him as little as possible, but in the
+simplest and plainest manner initiated him into everything which he held
+to be needful to know or important to practise.
+
+ (59) Or, "as people of dull intelligence and sluggish temperament."
+ Cf. Plat. "Gorg." 488 A.
+
+
+III
+
+It may be inferred that Socrates was in no hurry for those who were
+with him to discover capacities for speech and action or as
+inventive geniuses, (1) without at any rate a well-laid foundation of
+self-control. (2) For those who possessed such abilities without these
+same saving virtues would, he believed, only become worse men with
+greater power for mischief. His first object was to instil into those
+who were with him a wise spirit in their relation to the gods. (3) That
+such was the tenor of his conversation in dealing with men may be
+seen from the narratives of others who were present on some particular
+occasion. (4) I confine myself to a particular discussion with
+Euthydemus at which I was present.
+
+ (1) Or, "as speakers" (see ch. vi. below), "and men of action" (see
+ ch. v. below), "or as masters of invention" (see ch. vii. below).
+
+ (2) Or, "but as prior to those excellences must be engrafted in them
+ {sophrosune} (the virtues of temperance and sanity of soul)."
+
+ (3) Lit. "His first object and endeavour was to make those who were
+ with him {sophronas} (sound of soul) as regards the gods."
+
+ (4) Reading after Herbst, Cobet, etc., {diegountai}, or if vulg.
+ {diegounto}, translate, "from the current accounts penned during
+ his lifetime by the other witnesses." For {alloi} see K. Joel, op.
+ cit. pp. 15, 23; above, "Mem." I. iv. 1.
+
+Socrates said: (5) Tell me, Euthydemus, has it ever struck you to
+observe what tender pains the gods have taken to furnish man with all
+his needs?
+
+ (5) For the subject matter of this "teleological" chapter, see above,
+ I. iv.; K. Joel, op. cit. Appendix, p. 547 foll. in ref. to
+ Dummler's views.
+
+Euth. No indeed, I cannot say that it has ever struck me.
+
+Well (Socrates continued), you do not need to be reminded that, in the
+first place, we need light, and with light the gods supply us.
+
+Euth. Most true, and if we had not got it we should, as far as our own
+eyes could help us, be like men born blind.
+
+Soc. And then, again, seeing that we stand in need of rest and
+relaxation, they bestow upon us "the blessed balm of silent night." (6)
+
+ (6) {kalliston anapauterion}. The diction throughout is "poetical."
+
+Yes (he answered), we are much beholden for that boon.
+
+Soc. Then, forasmuch as the sun in his splendour makes manifest to us
+the hours of the day and bathes all things in brightness, but anon night
+in her darkness obliterates distinctions, have they not displayed aloft
+the starry orbs, which inform us of the watches of the night, whereby we
+can accomplish many of our needs? (7)
+
+ (7) e.g. for temple orientation see Dr. Penrose quoted by Norman
+ Lockyer, "Nature," August 31. 1893.
+
+It is so (he answered).
+
+Soc. And let us not forget that the moon herself not only makes clear to
+us the quarters of the night, but of the month also?
+
+Certainly (he answered).
+
+Soc. And what of this: that whereas we need nutriment, this too the
+heavenly powers yield us? Out of earth's bosom they cause good to spring
+up (8) for our benefit; and for our benefit provide appropriate seasons
+to furnish us in turn not only with the many and diverse objects of
+need, but with the sources also of our joy and gladness? (9)
+
+ (8) Cf. Plat. "Laws," 747 D.
+
+ (9) Or, "pleasure."
+
+Yes (he answered eagerly), these things bear token truly to a love for
+man. (10)
+
+ (10) Cf. Plat. "Laws," 713 D; "Symp." 189 D. "These things are signs
+ of a beneficient regard for man."
+
+Soc. Well, and what of another priceless gift, that of water, which
+conspires with earth and the seasons to give both birth and increase to
+all things useful to us; nay, which helps to nurture our very selves,
+and commingling with all that feeds us, renders it more digestible, more
+wholesome, and more pleasant to the taste; and mark you in proportion to
+the abundance of our need the superabundance of its supply. What say you
+concerning such a boon?
+
+Euth. In this again I see a sign of providential care.
+
+Soc. And then the fact that the same heavenly power has provided us with
+fire (11)--our assistant against cold, our auxiliary in darkness, our
+fellow-workman in every art and every instrument which for the sake of
+its utility mortal man may invent or furnish himself withal. What of
+this, since, to put it compendiously, there is nothing serviceable to
+the life of man worth speaking of but owes its fabrication to fire? (12)
+
+ (11) Lit. "and then the fact that they made provision for us of even
+ fire"; the credit of this boon, according to Hesiod, being due to
+ Prometheus.
+
+ (12) Or, "no life-aiding appliance worthy of the name."
+
+Euth. Yes, a transcendent instance of benevolent design. (13)
+
+ (13) Or, "Yes, that may be called an extreme instance of the divine
+ 'philanthropy.'" Cf. Cic. "de N. D." ii. 62.
+
+Soc. Again, consider the motions of the Sun, (14) how when he has
+turned him about in winter (15) he again draws nigh to us, ripening some
+fruits, and causing others whose time is past to dry up; how when he has
+fulfilled his work he comes no closer, but turns away as if in fear to
+scorch us to our hurt unduly; and again, when he has reached a point
+where if he should prolong his retreat we should plainly be frozen to
+death with cold, note how he turns him about and resumes his approach,
+traversing that region of the heavens where he may shed his genial
+influence best upon us.
+
+ (14) A single MS. inserts a passage {to de kai era...
+ 'Anekphraston}.
+
+ (15) i.e. as we say, "after the winter solstice."
+
+Yes, upon my word (he answered), these occurrences bear the impress of
+being so ordered for the sake of man.
+
+Soc. And then, again, it being manifest that we could not endure either
+scorching heat or freezing cold if they came suddenly upon us, note how
+gradually the sun approaches, and how gradually recedes, so that we fail
+to notice how we come at last to either extreme. (16)
+
+ (16) Or, "note the gradual approach and gradual recession of the sun-
+ god, so gradual that we reach either extreme in a manner
+ imperceptibly, and before we are aware of its severity."
+
+For my part (he replied), the question forces itself upon my mind,
+whether the gods have any other occupation save only to minister to man;
+and I am only hindered from saying so, because the rest of animals would
+seem to share these benefits along with man.
+
+Soc. Why, to be sure; and is it not plain that these animals themselves
+are born and bred for the sake of man? At any rate, no living creature
+save man derives so many of his enjoyments from sheep and goats, horses
+and cattle and asses, and other animals. He is more dependent, I should
+suppose, on these than even on plants and vegetables. At any rate,
+equally with these latter they serve him as means of subsistence or
+articles of commerce; indeed, a large portion of the human family do not
+use the products of the soil as food at all, but live on the milk and
+cheese and flesh of their flocks and herds, whilst all men everywhere
+tame and domesticate the more useful kinds of animals, and turn them to
+account as fellow-workers in war and for other purposes.
+
+Yes, I cannot but agree with what you say (he answered), when I see that
+animals so much stronger than man become so subservient to his hand that
+he can use them as he lists.
+
+Soc. And as we reflect on the infinite beauty and utility and the
+variety of nature, what are we to say of the fact that man has been
+endowed with sensibilities which correspond with this diversity, whereby
+we take our fill of every blessing; (17) or, again, this implanted
+faculty of reasoning, which enables us to draw inferences concerning the
+things which we perceive, and by aid of memory to understand how
+each set of things may be turned to our good, and to devise countless
+contrivances with a view to enjoying the good and repelling the evil; or
+lastly, when we consider the faculty bestowed upon us of interpretative
+speech, by which we are enabled to instruct one another, and to
+participate in all the blessings fore-named: to form societies, to
+establish laws, and to enter upon a civilised existence (18)--what are
+we to think?
+
+ (17) Or, "Again, when we consider how many beautiful objects there are
+ serviceable to man, and yet how unlike they are to one another,
+ the fact that man has been endowed with senses adapted to each
+ class of things, and so has access to a world of happiness."
+
+ (18) Cf. Aristot. "Pol." III. ix. 5.
+
+Euth. Yes, Socrates, decidedly it would appear that the gods do manifest
+a great regard, nay, a tender care, towards mankind.
+
+Soc. Well, and what do you make of the fact that where we are powerless
+to take advantageous forethought for our future, at this stage they
+themselves lend us their co-operation, imparting to the inquirer through
+divination knowledge of events about to happen, and instructing him by
+what means they may best be turned to good account?
+
+Euth. Ay, and you, Socrates, they would seem to treat in a more friendly
+manner still than the rest of men, if, without waiting even to be
+inquired of by you, they show you by signs beforehand what you must, and
+what you must not do. (19)
+
+ (19) See above, I. iv. 14, for a parallel to the train of thought on
+ the part of Aristodemus "the little," and of Euthydemus; and for
+ Socrates' {daimonion}, see above; Grote, "Plato," i. 400.
+
+Soc. Yes, and you will discover for yourself the truth of what I say, if,
+without waiting to behold the outward and visible forms (20) of the gods
+themselves, you will be content to behold their works; and with these
+before you, to worship and honour the Divine authors of them. (21)
+I would have you reflect that the very gods themselves suggest this
+teaching. (22) Not one of these but gives us freely of his blessings;
+yet they do not step from behind their veil in order to grant one
+single boon. (23) And pre-eminently He who orders and holds together
+the universe, (24) in which are all things beautiful and good; (25) who
+fashions and refashions it to never-ending use unworn, keeping it free
+from sickness or decay, (26) so that swifter than thought it ministers
+to his will unerringly--this God is seen to perform the mightiest
+operations, but in the actual administration of the same abides himself
+invisible to mortal ken. Reflect further, this Sun above our heads, so
+visible to all--as we suppose--will not suffer man to regard him too
+narrowly, but should any essay to watch him with a shameless stare he
+will snatch away their power of vision. And if the gods themselves are
+thus unseen, so too shall you find their ministers to be hidden also;
+from the height of heaven above the thunderbolt is plainly hurled, and
+triumphs over all that it encounters, yet it is all-invisible, no eye
+may detect its coming or its going at the moment of its swoop. The winds
+also are themselves unseen, though their works are manifest, and through
+their approach we are aware of them. And let us not forget, the soul
+of man himself, which if aught else human shares in the divine--however
+manifestly enthroned within our bosom, is as wholly as the rest hidden
+from our gaze. These things you should lay to mind, and not despise
+the invisible ones, but learn to recognise their power, as revealed in
+outward things, and to know the divine influence. (27)
+
+ (20) Cf. Cic. "de N. D." I. xii. 31; Lactantius, "de Ira," xi. 13.
+
+ (21) See L. Dindorf ad loc. (ed. Ox. 1862), {theous}; G. Sauppe, vol.
+ iii. "An. crit." p. xxix; R. Kuhner; C. Schenkl.
+
+ (22) i.e. "that man must walk by faith." For {upodeiknunai} cf.
+ "Econ." xii. 18.
+
+ (23) Schneid. cf. Plat. "Crat." 396.
+
+ (24) Or, "the co-ordinator and container of the universe."
+
+ (25) Or, "in whom all beauty and goodness is."
+
+ (26) Cf. "Cyrop." VIII. vii. 22; above, I. iv. 13.
+
+ (27) {to daimonion}, the divinity.
+
+Nay, Socrates (replied Euthydemus), there is no danger I shall turn a
+deaf ear to the divine influence even a little; of that I am not afraid,
+but I am out of heart to think that no soul of man may ever requite the
+kindness of the gods with fitting gratitude.
+
+Be not out of heart because of that (he said); you know what answer the
+god at Delphi makes to each one who comes asking "how shall I return
+thanks to heaven?"--"According to the law and custom of your city"; and
+this, I presume, is law and custom everywhere that a man should please
+the gods with offerings according to the ability which is in him. (28)
+How then should a man honour the gods with more beautiful or holier
+honour than by doing what they bid him? but he must in no wise slacken
+or fall short of his ability, for when a man so does, it is manifest, I
+presume, that at the moment he is not honouring the gods. You must then
+honour the gods, not with shortcoming but according to your ability;
+and having so done, be of good cheer and hope to receive the greatest
+blessings. For where else should a man of sober sense look to receive
+great blessings if not from those who are able to help him most, and how
+else should he hope to obtain them save by seeking to please his helper,
+and how may he hope to please his helper better than by yielding him the
+amplest obedience?
+
+ (28) Or, "and that law, I presume, is universal which says, Let a
+ man," etc.; and for the maxim see above; "Anab." III. ii. 9.
+
+By such words--and conduct corresponding to his words--did Socrates
+mould and fashion the hearts of his companions, making them at once more
+devout and more virtuous. (29)
+
+ (29) Or, "sounder of soul and more temperate as well as more pious."
+
+
+IV
+
+But indeed (1) with respect to justice and uprightness he not only made
+no secret of the opinion he held, but gave practical demonstration of
+it, both in private by his law-abiding and helpful behaviour to all, (2)
+and in public by obeying the magistrates in all that the laws enjoined,
+whether in the life of the city or in military service, so that he was
+a pattern of loyalty to the rest of the world, and on three several
+occasions in particular: first, when as president (Epistates) of
+the assembly he would not suffer the sovereign people to take an
+unconstitutional vote, (3) but ventured, on the side of the laws, to
+resist a current of popular feeling strong enough, I think, to have
+daunted any other man. Again, when the Thirty tried to lay some
+injunction on him contrary to the laws, he refused to obey, as for
+instance when they forbade his conversing with the young; (4) or again,
+when they ordered him and certain other citizens to arrest a man to
+be put to death, (5) he stood out single-handed on the ground that the
+injunctions laid upon him were contrary to the laws. And lastly, when
+he appeared as defendant in the suit instituted by Meletus, (6)
+notwithstanding that it was customary for litigants in the law courts
+to humour the judges in the conduct of their arguments by flattery
+and supplications contrary to the laws, (7) notwithstanding also that
+defendants owed their acquittal by the court to the employment of such
+methods, he refused to do a single thing however habitual in a court of
+law which was not strictly legal; and though by only a slight deflection
+from the strict path he might easily have been acquitted by his judges,
+(8) he preferred to abide by the laws and die rather than transgress
+them and live.
+
+ (1) L. Dindorf suspects (SS. 1-6, {'Alla men... pollakis}), ed.
+ Lips. 1872. See also Praef. to Ox. ed. p. viii.
+
+ (2) Or, "by his conduct to all, which was not merely innocent in the
+ eye of law and custom but positively helpful."
+
+ (3) See above, I. i. 18; "Hell." I. vii. 14, 15; Grote, "H. G." viii.
+ 272.
+
+ (4) See above, I. ii. 35.
+
+ (5) Leon of Salamis. See "Hell." II. iii. 39; Plat. "Apol." 32 C;
+ Andoc. "de Myst." 46.
+
+ (6) See above, I. i. 1; Plat. "Apol." 19 C.
+
+ (7) Kuhner cf. Quintil. VI. i. 7: "Athenis affectus movere etiam per
+ praeconem prohibatur orator"; "Apol." 4; Plat. "Apol." 38 D, E.
+
+ (8) See Grote, "H. G." viii. p. 663 foll.
+
+These views he frequently maintained in conversation, now with one and
+now with another, and one particular discussion with Hippias of Elis (9)
+on the topic of justice and uprightness has come to my knowledge. (10)
+
+ (9) For this famous person see Cob. "Pros. Xen." s.n.; Plat. "Hipp.
+ maj." 148; Quint. xii. 11, 21; Grote, "H. G." viii. 524.
+
+ (10) Or, "I can personally vouch for."
+
+Hippias had just arrived at Athens after a long absence, and chanced to
+be present when Socrates was telling some listeners how astonishing
+it was that if a man wanted to get another taught to be a shoemaker or
+carpenter or coppersmith or horseman, he would have no doubt where to
+send him for the purpose: "People say," (11) he added, "that if a man
+wants to get his horse or his ox taught in the right way, (12) the world
+is full of instructors; but if he would learn himself, or have his son
+or his slave taught in the way of right, he cannot tell where to find
+such instruction."
+
+ (11) L. Dindorf, after Ruhnken and Valckenar, omits this sentence
+ {phasi de tines... didaxonton}. See Kuhner ad loc. For the
+ sentiment see Plat. "Apol." 20 A.
+
+ (12) Cf. "Cyrop." II. ii. 26; VIII. iii. 38; also "Horsem." iii. 5;
+ "Hunting," vii. 4.
+
+Hippias, catching the words, exclaimed in a bantering tone: What! still
+repeating the same old talk, (13) Socrates, which I used to hear from
+you long ago?
+
+ (13) This tale is repeated by Dio Chrys. "Or." III. i. 109. Cf. Plat.
+ "Gorg." 490 E.
+
+Yes (answered Socrates), and what is still more strange, Hippias, it is
+not only the same old talk but about the same old subjects. Now you, I
+daresay, through versatility of knowledge, (14) never say the same thing
+twice over on the same subject?
+
+ (14) Or, "such is the breadth of your learning," {polumathes}. Cf.
+ Plat. "Hipp. maj."
+
+To be sure (he answered), my endeavour is to say something new on all
+occasions.
+
+What (he asked) about things which you know, as for instance in a case
+of spelling, if any one asks you, "How many letters in Socrates, and
+what is their order?" (15) I suppose you try to run off one string of
+letters to-day and to-morrow another? or to a question of arithmetic,
+"Does twice five make ten?" your answer to-day will differ from that of
+yesterday?
+
+ (15) Cf. "Econ." viii. 14; Plat. "Alc." i. 113 A.
+
+Hipp. No; on these topics, Socrates, I do as you do and repeat myself.
+However, to revert to justice (and uprightness), (16) I flatter myself
+I can at present furnish you with some remarks which neither you nor any
+one else will be able to controvert.
+
+ (16) Or, "on the topic of the just I have something to say at present
+ which," etc.
+
+By Hera! (17) (he exclaimed), what a blessing to have discovered! (18)
+Now we shall have no more divisions of opinion on points of right and
+wrong; judges will vote unanimously; citizens will cease wrangling;
+there will be no more litigation, no more party faction, states will
+reconcile their differences, and wars are ended. For my part I do not
+know how I can tear myself away from you, until I have heard from your
+own lips all about the grand discovery you have made.
+
+ (17) See above, I. v. 5.
+
+ (18) Or, "what a panacea are you the inventor of"; lit. "By Hera, you
+ have indeed discovered a mighty blessing, if juries are to cease
+ recording their verdicts 'aye' and 'no'; if citizens are to cease
+ their wranglings on points of justice, their litigations, and
+ their party strifes; if states are to cease differing on matters
+ of right and wrong and appealing to the arbitrament of war."
+
+You shall hear all in good time (Hippias answered), but not until you
+make a plain statement of your own belief. What is justice? We have had
+enough of your ridiculing all the rest of the world, questioning and
+cross-examining first one and then the other, but never a bit will you
+render an account to any one yourself or state a plain opinion upon a
+single topic. (19)
+
+ (19) See Plat. "Gorg." 465 A.
+
+What, Hippias (Socrates retorted), have you not observed that I am in a
+chronic condition of proclaiming what I regard as just and upright?
+
+Hipp. And pray what is this theory (20) of yours on the subject? Let us
+have it in words.
+
+ (20) {o logos}.
+
+Soc. If I fail to proclaim it in words, at any rate I do so in deed and
+in fact. Or do you not think that a fact is worth more as evidence than
+a word? (21)
+
+ (21) Or, "is of greater evidential value," "ubi res adsunt, quid opus
+ est verbis?"
+
+Worth far more, I should say (Hippias answered), for many a man with
+justice and right on his lips commits injustice and wrong, but no doer
+of right ever was a misdoer or could possibly be.
+
+Soc. I ask then, have you ever heard or seen or otherwise perceived me
+bearing false witness or lodging malicious information, or stirring up
+strife among friends or political dissension in the city, or committing
+any other unjust and wrongful act?
+
+No, I cannot say that I have (he answered).
+
+Soc. And do you not regard it as right and just to abstain from wrong?
+(22)
+
+ (22) Or, "is not abstinence from wrongdoing synonymous with righteous
+ behaviour?"
+
+Hipp. Now you are caught, Socrates, plainly trying to escape from a
+plain statement. When asked what you believe justice to be, you keep
+telling us not what the just man does, but what he does not do.
+
+Why, I thought for my part (answered Socrates) that the refusal to do
+wrong and injustice was a sufficient warrent in itself of righteousness
+and justice, but if you do not agree, see if this pleases you better: I
+assert that what is "lawful" is "just and righteous."
+
+Do you mean to assert (he asked) that lawful and just are synonymous
+terms?
+
+Soc. I do.
+
+I ask (Hippias added), for I do not perceive what you mean by lawful,
+nor what you mean by just. (23)
+
+ (23) Lit. "what sort of lawful or what sort of just is spoken of."
+
+Soc. You understand what is meant by laws of a city or state?
+
+Yes (he answered).
+
+Soc. What do you take them to be?
+
+Hipp. The several enactments drawn up by the citizens or members of a
+state in agreement as to what things should be done or left undone.
+
+Then I presume (Socrates continued) that a member of a state who
+regulates his life in accordance with these enactments will be
+law-abiding, while the transgressor of the same will be law-less?
+
+Certainly (he answered).
+
+Soc. And I presume the law-loving citizen will do what is just and
+right, while the lawless man will do what is unjust and wrong?
+
+Hipp. Certainly.
+
+Soc. And I presume that he who does what is just is just, and he who
+does what is unjust is unjust?
+
+Hipp. Of course.
+
+Soc. It would appear, then, that the law-loving man is just, and the
+lawless unjust?
+
+Then Hippias: Well, but laws, Socrates, how should any one regard as a
+serious matter either the laws themselves, or obedience to them,
+which laws the very people who made them are perpetually rejecting and
+altering?
+
+Which is also true of war (Socrates replied); cities are perpetually
+undertaking war and then making peace again.
+
+Most true (he answered).
+
+Soc. If so, what is the difference between depreciating obedience to law
+because laws will be repealed, and depreciating good discipline in war
+because peace will one day be made? But perhaps you object to enthusiasm
+displayed in defence of one's home and fatherland in war?
+
+No, indeed I do not! I heartily approve of it (he answered).
+
+Soc. Then have you laid to heart the lesson taught by Lycurgus to the
+Lacedaemonians, (24) and do you understand that if he succeeded
+in giving Sparta a distinction above other states, it was only by
+instilling into her, beyond all else, a spirit of obedience to the laws?
+And among magistrates and rulers in the different states, you would
+scarcely refuse the palm of superiority to those who best contribute
+to make their fellow-citizens obedient to the laws? And you would
+admit that any particular state in which obedience to the laws is the
+paramount distinction of the citizens flourishes most in peace time, and
+in time of war is irresistible? But, indeed, of all the blessings which
+a state may enjoy, none stands higher than the blessing of unanimity.
+"Concord among citizens"--that is the constant theme of exhortation
+emphasised by the councils of elders (25) and by the choice spirits of
+the community; (26) at all times and everywhere through the length and
+breadth of all Hellas it is an established law that the citizens be
+bound together by an oath of concord; (27) everywhere they do actually
+swear this oath; not of course as implying that citizens shall all vote
+for the same choruses, or give their plaudits to the same flute-players,
+or choose the same poets, or limit themselves to the same pleasures, but
+simply that they shall pay obedience to the laws, since in the end that
+state will prove most powerful and most prosperous in which the
+citizens abide by these; but without concord neither can a state be well
+administered nor a household well organised.
+
+ (24) Cf. "Pol. Lac." viii. See Newman, op. cit. i. 396.
+
+ (25) Lit. "the Gerousiai." {S} or {X S} uses the Spartan phraseology.
+
+ (26) Lit. "the best men." {S} or {X S} speaks as an "aristocrat."
+
+ (27) Cf. "Hell." II. iv. 43; Lys. xxv. 21 foll.; Schneid. cf. Lycurg.
+ "u Leocr." 189.
+
+And if we turn to private life, what better protection can a man
+have than obedience to the laws? This shall be his safeguard against
+penalties, his guarantee of honours at the hands of the community; it
+shall be a clue to thread his way through the mazes of the law courts
+unbewildered, secure against defeat, assured of victory. (28) It is
+to him, the law-loving citizen, that men will turn in confidence when
+seeking a guardian of the most sacred deposits, be it of money or be it
+their sons or daughters. He, in the eyes of the state collectively, is
+trustworthy--he and no other; who alone may be depended on to render to
+all alike their dues--to parents and kinsmen and servants, to friends
+and fellow-citizens and foreigners. This is he whom the enemy will
+soonest trust to arrange an armistice, or a truce, or a treaty of peace.
+They would like to become the allies of this man, and to fight on
+his side. This is he to whom the allies (29) of his country will most
+confidently entrust the command of their forces, or of a garrison, or
+their states themselves. This, again, is he who may be counted on to
+recompense kindness with gratitude, and who, therefore, is more sure of
+kindly treatment than another whose sense of gratitude is fuller. (30)
+The most desirable among friends, the enemy of all others to be avoided,
+clearly he is not the person whom a foreign state would choose to go
+to war with; encompassed by a host of friends and exempt from foes, his
+very character has a charm to compel friendship and alliance, and before
+him hatred and hostility melt away.
+
+ (28) Or, "ignorant of hostile, assured of favourable verdict."
+
+ (29) Lit. "the Allies," e.g. of Sparta or of Athens, etc.
+
+ (30) Lit. "From whom may the doer of a deed of kindness more
+ confidently expect the recompense of gratitude than from your
+ lover of the law? and whom would one select as the recipient of
+ kindness rather than a man susceptible of gratitude?"
+
+And now, Hippias, I have done my part; that is my proof and
+demonstration that the "lawful" and "law-observant" are synonymous
+with the "upright" and the "just"; do you, if you hold a contrary view,
+instruct us. (31)
+
+ (31) For the style of this enconium (of the {nomimos}) cf. "Ages." i.
+ 36; and for the "Socratic" reverence for law cf. Plat. "Crito."
+
+Then Hippias: Nay, upon my soul, Socrates, I am not aware of holding any
+contrary opinion to what you have uttered on the theme of justice. (32)
+
+ (32) Lit. "the just and upright," {tou dikaiou}.
+
+Soc. But now, are you aware, Hippias, of certain unwritten laws? (33)
+
+ (33) See Soph. "Antig." "Oed. T." 865, and Prof. Jebb ad loc.; Dem.
+ "de Cor." 317, 23; Aristot. "Rhet." I. xiii.
+
+Yes (he answered), those held in every part of the world, and in the
+same sense.
+
+Can you then assert (asked Socrates) of these unwritten laws that men
+made them?
+
+Nay, how (he answered) should that be, for how could they all have come
+together from the ends of the earth? and even if they had so done, men
+are not all of one speech? (34)
+
+ (34) Or, "there would be difficulty of understanding each other, and a
+ babel of tongues."
+
+Soc. Whom then do you believe to have been the makers of these laws.
+
+Hipp. For my part, I think that the gods must have made these laws for
+men, and I take it as proof that first and foremost it is a law and
+custom everywhere to worship and reverence the gods.
+
+Soc. And, I presume, to honour parents is also customary everywhere?
+
+Yes, that too (he answered).
+
+Soc. And, I presume, also the prohibition of intermarriage between
+parents and children?
+
+Hipp. No; at that point I stop, Socrates. That does not seem to me to be
+a law of God.
+
+Now, why? (he asked).
+
+Because I perceive it is not infrequently transgressed (he answered).
+(35)
+
+ (35) Or, "as I perceive, it is not of universal application, some
+ transgress it."
+
+Soc. Well, but there are a good many other things which people
+do contrary to law; only the penalty, I take it, affixed to the
+transgression of the divine code is certain; there is no escape for the
+offender after the manner in which a man may transgress the laws of man
+with impunity, slipping through the fingers of justice by stealth, or
+avoiding it by violence.
+
+Hipp. And what is the inevitable penalty paid by those who, being
+related as parents and children, intermingle in marriage?
+
+Soc. The greatest of all penalties; for what worse calamity can human
+beings suffer in the production of offspring than to misbeget? (36)
+
+ (36) Or, "in the propagation of the species than to produce
+ misbegotten children."
+
+Hipp. But how or why should they breed them ill where nothing hinders
+them, being of a good stock themselves and producing from stock as good?
+
+Soc. Because, forsooth, in order to produce good children, it is not
+simply necessary that the parents should be good and of a good stock,
+but that both should be equally in the prime and vigour of their bodies.
+(37) Do you suppose that the seed of those who are at their prime is
+like theirs who either have not yet reached their prime, or whose prime
+has passed?
+
+ (37) Cf. Plat. "Laws," viii. 839 A; Herbst, etc., cf. Grotius, "de
+ Jure," ii. 5, xii. 4.
+
+Hipp. No, it is reasonable to expect that the seed will differ.
+
+Soc. And for the better--which?
+
+Hipp. Theirs clearly who are at their prime.
+
+Soc. It would seem that the seed of those who are not yet in their prime
+or have passed their prime is not good?
+
+Hipp. It seems most improbable it should be.
+
+Soc. Then the right way to produce children is not that way?
+
+Hipp. No, that is not the right way.
+
+Soc. Then children who are so produced are produced not as they ought to
+be?
+
+Hipp. So it appears to me.
+
+What offspring then (he asked) will be ill produced, ill begotten, and
+ill born, if not these?
+
+I subscribe to that opinion also (replied Hippias).
+
+Soc. Well, it is a custom universally respected, is it not, to return
+good for good, and kindness with kindness?
+
+Hipp. Yes, a custom, but one which again is apt to be transgressed.
+
+Soc. Then he that so transgresses it pays penalty in finding himself
+isolated; bereft of friends who are good, and driven to seek after those
+who love him not. Or is it not so that he who does me kindness in
+my intercourse with him is my good friend, but if I requite not this
+kindness to my benefactor, I am hated by him for my ingratitude, and yet
+I must needs pursue after him and cling to him because of the great gain
+to me of his society?
+
+Hipp. Yes, Socrates. In all these cases, I admit, there is an
+implication of divine authority; (38) that a law should in itself be
+loaded with the penalty of its transgression does suggest to my mind a
+higher than human type of legislator.
+
+ (38) Lit. "Yes, upon my word, Socrates, all these cases look very like
+ (would seem to point to) the gods."
+
+Soc. And in your opinion, Hippias, is the legislation of the gods just
+and righteous, or the reverse of what is just and righteous?
+
+Hipp. Not the reverse of what is just and righteous, Socrates, God
+forbid! for scarcely could any other legislate aright, of not God
+himself.
+
+Soc. It would seem then, Hippias, the gods themselves are well pleased
+that "the lawful" and "the just" should be synonymous? (39)
+
+ (39) Or, "it is well pleasing also to the gods that what is lawful is
+ just and what is just is lawful."
+
+By such language and by such conduct, through example and precept alike,
+he helped to make those who approached him more upright and more just.
+
+
+V
+
+And now I propose to show in what way he made those who were with him
+more vigorous in action. (1) In the first place, as befitted one whose
+creed was that a basis of self-command is indispensable to any noble
+performance, he manifested himself to his companions as one who
+had pre-eminently disciplined himself; (2) and in the next place by
+conversation and discussion he encouraged them to a like self-restraint
+beyond all others. (3) Thus it was that he continued ever mindful
+himself, and was continually reminding all whom he encountered,
+of matters conducive to virtue; as the following discussion with
+Euthydemus, which has come to my knowledge, (4) will serve to
+illustrate--the topic of the discussion being self-command.
+
+ (1) Lit. "more practical," i.e. more energetic and effective.
+
+ (2) "If any one might claim to be a prince of ascetics, it was
+ Socrates; such was the ineffaceable impression left on the minds
+ of his associates."
+
+ (3) Or, "he stimulated in these same companions a spirit of self-
+ restraint beyond all else."
+
+ (4) Or, "which I can vouch for."
+
+Tell me, Euthydemus (he began), do you believe freedom to be a noble and
+magnificent acquisition, whether for a man or for a state?
+
+I cannot conceive a nobler or more magnificent (he answered).
+
+Soc. Then do you believe him to be a free man who is ruled by the
+pleasures of the body, and thereby cannot perform what is best?
+
+Certainly not (he answered).
+
+Soc. No! for possibly to perform what is best appears to you to savour
+of freedom? And, again, to have some one over you who will prevent you
+doing the like seems a loss of freedom?
+
+Most decidedly (he answered).
+
+Soc. It would seem you are decidedly of opinion that the incontinent are
+the reverse of free? (5)
+
+ (5) Or, "incontinency is illiberal."
+
+Euth. Upon my word, I much suspect so.
+
+Soc. And does it appear to you that the incontinent man is merely
+hindered from doing what is noblest, or that further he is impelled to
+do what is most shameful?
+
+Euth. I think he is as much driven to the one as he is hindered from the
+other.
+
+Soc. And what sort of lords and masters are those, think you, who at
+once put a stop to what is best and enforce what is worst?
+
+Euth. Goodness knows, they must be the very worst of masters.
+
+Soc. And what sort of slavery do you take to be the worst?
+
+I should say (he answered) slavery to the worst masters.
+
+It would seem then (pursued Socrates) that the incontinent man is bound
+over to the worst sort of slavery, would it not?
+
+So it appears to be (the other answered).
+
+Soc. And does it not appear to you that this same beldame incontinence
+shuts out wisdom, which is the best of all things, (6) from mankind,
+and plunges them into the opposite? Does it not appear to you that she
+hinders men from attending to things which will be of use and benefit,
+and from learning to understand them; that she does so by dragging them
+away to things which are pleasant; and often though they are well aware
+of the good and of the evil, she amazes and confounds (7) their wits and
+makes them choose the worse in place of the better?
+
+ (6) "Wisdom, the greatest good which men can possess."
+
+ (7) Schneid. cf. Plat. "Protag." 355 A; and "Symp." iv. 23.
+
+Yes, so it comes to pass (he answered).
+
+Soc. And (8) soundness of soul, the spirit of temperate modesty? Who has
+less claim to this than the incontinent man? The works of the temperate
+spirit and the works of incontinency are, I take it, diametrically
+opposed?
+
+ (8) "And if this be so concerning wisdom, {sophia}, what of
+ {sophrasune}, soundness of soul--sobriety?"
+
+That too, I admit (he answered).
+
+Soc. If this then be so concerning these virtues, (9) what with regard
+to carefulness and devotion to all that ought to occupy us? Can anything
+more seriously militate against these than this same incontinence?
+
+ (9) Or add, "If this be so concerning not wisdom only, but concerning
+ temperance and soundness of soul, what," etc.
+
+Nothing that I can think of (he replied).
+
+Soc. And can worse befall a man, think you? Can he be subjected to a
+more baleful influence than that which induces him to choose what is
+hurtful in place of what is helpful; which cajoles him to devote himself
+to the evil and to neglect the good; which forces him, will he nill he,
+to do what every man in his sober senses would shrink from and avoid?
+
+I can imagine nothing worse (he replied).
+
+Soc. Self-control, it is reasonable to suppose, will be the cause of
+opposite effects upon mankind to those of its own opposite, the want of
+self-control?
+
+Euth. It is to be supposed so.
+
+Soc. And this, which is the source of opposite effects to the very
+worst, will be the very best of things?
+
+Euth. That is the natural inference.
+
+Soc. It looks, does it not, Euthydemus, as if self-control were the best
+thing a man could have?
+
+It does indeed, Socrates (he answered).
+
+Soc. But now, Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to note one fact?
+
+What fact? (he asked).
+
+Soc. That, after all, incontinency is powerless to bring us to that
+realm of sweetness which some look upon (10) as her peculiar province;
+it is not incontinency but self-control alone which has the passport to
+highest pleasures.
+
+ (10) Or, "which we are apt to think of as."
+
+In what way? (he asked). How so?
+
+Why, this way (Socrates answered): since incontinency will not suffer us
+to resist hunger and thirst, or to hold out against sexual appetite, or
+want of sleep (which abstinences are the only channels to true pleasure
+in eating and drinking, to the joys of love, to sweet repose and
+blissful slumber won by those who will patiently abide and endure till
+each particular happiness is at the flood) (11)--it comes to this: by
+incontinency we are cut off from the full fruition of the more obvious
+and constantly recurring pleasures. (12) To self-control, which alone
+enables us to endure the pains aforesaid, alone belongs the power to
+give us any pleasure worth remembering in these common cases.
+
+ (11) Or, "at its season." Lit. "is as sweet as possible."
+
+ (12) Or, "from tasting to any extent worth speaking of the most
+ necessary and all-pervading sources of happiness."
+
+You speak the words of truth (13) (he answered).
+
+ (13) Lit. "What you say is absolutely and entirely true" (the "vraie
+ verite" of the matter).
+
+Soc. Furthermore, (14) if there be any joy in learning aught "beautiful
+and good," or in patient application to such rules as may enable a man
+to manage his body aright, or to administer his household well, or to
+prove himself useful to his friends and to the state, or to dominate
+his enemies--which things are the sources not only of advantage but of
+deepest satisfaction (15)--to the continent and self-controlled it
+is given to reap the fruits of them in their performance. It is the
+incontinent who have neither part nor lot in any one of them. Since we
+must be right in asserting that he is least concerned with such things
+who has least ability to do them, being tied down to take an interest in
+the pleasure which is nearest to hand.
+
+ (14) Or, "But indeed, if there be joy in the pursuit of any noble
+ study or of such accomplishments as shall enable," etc.
+
+ (15) Or, "of the highest pleasures."
+
+Euthydemus replied: Socrates, you would say, it seems to me, that a man
+who is mastered by the pleasures of the body has no concern at all with
+virtue.
+
+And what is the distinction, Euthydemus (he asked), between a man devoid
+of self-control and the dullest of brute beasts? A man who foregoes all
+height of aim, who gives up searching for the best and strives only to
+gratify his sense of pleasure, (16) is he better than the silliest of
+cattle? (17)... But to the self-controlled alone is it given to discover
+the hid treasures. These, by word and by deed, they will pick out and
+make selection of them according to their kinds, choosing deliberately
+the good and holding aloof from the evil. (18) Thus (he added) it is
+that a man reaches the zenith, as it were, of goodness and happiness,
+thus it is that he becomes most capable of reasoning and discussion.
+(19) The very name discussion ({dialegesthai}) is got from people coming
+together and deliberating in common by picking out and selecting things
+({dialegein}) according to their kinds. (20) A man then is bound to
+prepare himself as much as possible for this business, and to pursue it
+beyond all else with earnest resolution; for this is the right road to
+excellence, this will make a man fittest to lead his fellows and be a
+master in debate. (21)
+
+ (16) Or, "and seeks by hook and by crook to do what is pleasantest."
+
+ (17) i.e. he becomes an animal "feeding a blind life within the
+ brain."
+
+ (18) Or, "selecting the ore and repudiating the dross." Kuhner cf.
+ Plat. "Laws," v. 735 B.
+
+ (19) Or, "draws nearer to happiness and perfection, and is most
+ capable of truth-disclosing conversation." Cf. Plat. "Apol." 41:
+ "What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the
+ leaders of the great Trojan expedition, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus,
+ or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight
+ would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions!"
+ (Jowett).
+
+ (20) For {dialegein kata gene} = {dialegesthai}, cf. Grote, "H. G."
+ viii. 590.
+
+ (21) Cf. Plat. "Rep." 534 D; "Phaedr." 252 E; "Crat." 390 C;
+ "Statesm." 286 D foll.
+
+
+VI
+
+At this point I will endeavour to explain in what way Socrates fostered
+this greater "dialectic" capacity among his intimates. (1) He held
+firmly to the opinion that if a man knew what each reality was, he would
+be able to explain this knowledge to others; but, failing the possession
+of that knowledge, it did not surprise him that men should stumble
+themselves and cause others to stumble also. (2) It was for this reason
+that he never ceased inquiring with those who were with him into
+the true nature of things that are. (3) It would be a long business
+certainly to go through in detail all the definitions at which he
+arrived; I will therefore content myself with such examples as will
+serve to show his method of procedure. As a first instance I will
+take the question of piety. The mode of investigation may be fairly
+represented as follows.
+
+ (1) Lit. "essayed to make those who were with him more potent in
+ dialectic."
+
+ (2) Or, "Socrates believed that any one who knew the nature of
+ anything would be able to let others into his secret; but, failing
+ that knowledge, he thought the best of men would be but blind
+ leaders of the blind, stumbling themselves and causing others to
+ stumble also."
+
+ (3) Or add, "'What is this among things? and what is its definition?'
+ --such was the ever-recurrent question for which he sought an
+ answer."
+
+Tell me (said he), Euthydemus, what sort of thing you take piety to be?
+
+Something most fair and excellent, no doubt (the other answered). (4)
+
+ (4) Or, "A supreme excellence, no doubt."
+
+Soc. And can you tell me what sort of person the pious man is? (5)
+
+ (5) Or, "can you give me a definition of the pious man?"; "tell me who
+ and what the pious man is."
+
+I should say (he answered) he is a man who honours the gods.
+
+Soc. And is it allowable to honour the gods in any mode or fashion one
+likes?
+
+Euth. No; there are laws in accordance with which one must do that.
+
+Soc. Then he who knows these laws will know how he must honour the gods?
+
+I think so (he answered).
+
+Soc. And he who knows how he must honour the gods conceives that
+he ought not to do so except in the manner which accords with his
+knowledge? (6) Is it not so?
+
+ (6) i.e. "his practice must square with his knowledge and be the
+ outward expression of his belief?"
+
+Euth. That is so. (7)
+
+ (7) "That is so; you rightly describe his frame of mind and
+ persuasion."
+
+Soc. And does any man honour the gods otherwise than he thinks he ought?
+(8)
+
+ (8) "As he should and must." See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 322 foll.
+
+I think not (he answered).
+
+Soc. It comes to this then: he who knows what the law requires in
+reference to the gods will honour the gods in the lawful way? (9)
+
+ (9) Or, "he who knows what is lawful with regard to Heaven pays honour
+ to Heaven lawfully."
+
+Euth. Certainly.
+
+Soc. But now, he who honours lawfully honours as he ought? (10)
+
+ (10) "As he should and must."
+
+Euth. I see no alternative.
+
+Soc. And he who honours as he ought is a pious man?
+
+Euth. Certainly.
+
+Soc. It would appear that he who knows what the law requires with
+respect to the gods will correctly be defined as a pious man, and that
+is our definition?
+
+So it appears to me, at any rate (he replied). (11)
+
+ (11) "I accept it at any rate as mine." N.B.--in reference to this
+ definition of Piety, the question is never raised {poion ti esti
+ nomos}; nor yet {poioi tines eisin oi theoi}; but clearly there is
+ a growth in {ta nomima}. Cf. the conversation recorded in St. John
+ iv. 7 foll., and the words (verse 23) {pneuma o Theos kai tous
+ proskunountas auton en pneumati kai aletheia dei proskunein},
+ which the philosopher Socrates would perhaps readily have assented
+ to.
+
+Soc. But now, with regard to human beings; is it allowable to deal with
+men in any way one pleases? (12)
+
+ (12) Or, "may a man deal with his fellow-men arbitrarily according to
+ his fancy?" See above, II. vii. 8.
+
+Euth. No; with regard to men also, he will be a law-observing man (13)
+who knows what things are lawful as concerning men, in accordance with
+which our dealings with one another must be conducted. (14)
+
+ (13) Or, "he is a man full of the law (lawful) and law-abiding who
+ knows," etc.
+
+ (14) Reading {kath' a dei pros allelous khresthai}, subaud.
+ {allelois}, or if vulg. {kath' a dei pos allelois khresthai},
+ translate "must be specifically conducted."
+
+Soc. Then those who deal with one another in this way, deal with each
+other as they ought? (15)
+
+ (15) "As they should and must."
+
+Obviously (he answered).
+
+Soc. And they who deal with one another as they ought, deal well and
+nobly--is it not so?
+
+Certainly (he answered).
+
+Soc. And they who deal well and nobly by mankind are well-doers in
+respect of human affairs?
+
+That would seem to follow (he replied).
+
+Soc. I presume that those who obey the laws do what is just and right?
+
+Without a doubt, (he answered).
+
+Soc. And by things right and just you know what sort of things are
+meant?
+
+What the laws ordain (he answered).
+
+Soc. It would seem to follow that they who do what the laws ordain both
+do what is right and just and what they ought? (16)
+
+ (16) "What they should and must."
+
+Euth. I see no alternative.
+
+Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?
+(17)
+
+ (17) This proposition, as Kuhner argues (ad loc.), is important as
+ being the middle term of the double syllogism (A and B)--
+
+ A. Those who do what the law demands concerning men do what is
+ just and right.
+
+ Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.
+
+ Ergo--Those who do what the law demands concerning men are
+ righteous and just.
+
+ B. Those who know what is just and right ought (and are bound,
+ cf. above, III. ix. 4) to do also what is just and right.
+
+ Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.
+
+ Ergo--Righteous and Just ({dikaioi}) may be defined as "Those
+ who know what the law demands (aliter things right and just)
+ concerning men."
+
+I should say so myself (he answered).
+
+Soc. And should you say that any one obeys the laws without knowing what
+the laws ordain?
+
+I should not (he answered).
+
+Soc. And do you suppose that any one who knows what things he ought to
+do supposes that he ought not to do them? (18)
+
+ (18) Or, "and no one who knows what he must and should do imagines
+ that he must and should not do it?"
+
+No, I suppose not (he answered).
+
+Soc. And do you know of anybody doing other than what he feels bound to
+do? (19)
+
+ (19) Or, "and nobody that you know of does the contrary of what he
+ thinks he should do?"
+
+No, I do not (he answered).
+
+Soc. It would seem that he who knows what things are lawful (20) as
+concerning men does the things that are just and right?
+
+ (20) Or, "of lawful obligation."
+
+Without a doubt (he answered).
+
+Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?
+(21)
+
+ (21) N.B.--In reference to this definition of justice, see K. Joel,
+ op. cit. p. 323 foll., "Das ist eine Karrikatur des Sokratischen
+ Dialogs."
+
+Who else, if not? (he replied).
+
+Soc. It would seem, then, we shall have got to a right definition if we
+name as just and upright those who know the things which are lawful as
+concerning men?
+
+That is my opinion (he answered).
+
+Soc. And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell me, does it seem to you
+that the wise are wise in what they know, (22) or are there any who are
+wise in what they know not?
+
+ (22) Or, "in that of which they have the knowledge ({episteme})."
+
+Euth. Clearly they are wise in what they know; (23) for how could a man
+have wisdom in that which he does not know?
+
+ (23) Or, "their wisdom is confined to that of which they have the
+ {episteme}. How could a man be wise in what he lacks the knowledge
+ of?"
+
+Soc. In fact, then, the wise are wise in knowledge?
+
+Euth. Why, in what else should a man be wise save only in knowledge?
+
+Soc. And is wisdom anything else than that by which a man is wise, think
+you?
+
+Euth. No; that, and that only, I think.
+
+Soc. It would seem to follow that knowledge and wisdom are the same?
+
+Euth. So it appears to me.
+
+Soc. May I ask, does it seem to you possible for a man to know all the
+things that are?
+
+Euth. No, indeed! not the hundredth part of them, I should say.
+
+Soc. Then it would seem that it is impossible for a man to be all-wise?
+
+Quite impossible (he answered).
+
+Soc. It would seem the wisdom of each is limited to his knowledge; each
+is wise only in what he knows?
+
+Euth. That is my opinion. (24)
+
+ (24) Cf. Plat. "Theaet." 145 D. N.B.--For this definition of wisdom
+ see K. Joel, ib. p. 324 foll.
+
+Soc. Well! come now, Euthydemus, as concerning the good: ought we to
+search for the good in this way?
+
+What way? (he asked).
+
+Soc. Does it seem to you that the same thing is equally advantageous to
+all?
+
+No, I should say not (he answered).
+
+Soc. You would say that a thing which is beneficial to one is sometimes
+hurtful to another?
+
+Decidedly (he replied).
+
+Soc. And is there anything else good except that which is beneficial,
+should you say? (25)
+
+ (25) Or reading (1) {allo d' an ti phaies e agathon einai to
+ ophelimon}; or else (2) {allo d' an ti phaies agathon einai to
+ ophelimon}; (in which case {alloti} = {allo ti e};) translate (1)
+ "and what is beneficial is good (or a good), should you not say?"
+ lit. "could you say that the beneficial is anything else than good
+ (or a good)?" or else (2) "and what is beneficial is good (or a
+ good)? or is it anything else?"
+
+Nothing else (he answered).
+
+Soc. It would seem to follow that the beneficial is good relatively to
+him to whom it is beneficial?
+
+That is how it appears to me (he answered).
+
+Soc. And the beautiful: can we speak of a thing as beautiful in any
+other way than relatively? or can you name any beautiful thing, body,
+vessel, or whatever it be, which you know of as universally beautiful?
+(26)
+
+ (26) i.e. "beautiful in all relations into which it enters." Reading
+ {to de kalon ekhoimen an pos allos eipein e estin onomazein kalon
+ e soma e skeuos e all' otioun, o oistha pros tanta kalon on; Ma
+ Di', ouk egog', ephe}. For other emendations of the vulg., and the
+ many interpretations which have been given to the passage, see R.
+ Kuhner ad loc.
+
+Euth. I confess I do not know of any such myself. (27)
+
+ (27) Or, adopting the reading {ekhois an} in place of {ekhoimen an}
+ above, translate "I certainly cannot, I confess."
+
+Soc. I presume to turn a thing to its proper use is to apply it
+beautifully?
+
+Euth. Undoubtedly it is a beautiful appliance. (28)
+
+ (28) Or, "I presume it is well and good and beautiful to use this,
+ that, and the other thing for the purpose for which the particular
+ thing is useful?"--"That nobody can deny (he answered)." It is
+ impossible to convey simply the verbal play and the quasi-
+ argumentative force of the Greek {kalos ekhei pros ti tini
+ khresthai}. See K. Joel, p. 426.
+
+Soc. And is this, that, and the other thing beautiful for aught else
+except that to which it may be beautifully applied?
+
+Euth. No single thing else.
+
+Soc. It would seem that the useful is beautiful relatively to that for
+which it is of use?
+
+So it appears to me (he answered).
+
+Soc. And what of courage, (29) Euthydemus? I presume you rank courage
+among things beautiful? It is a noble quality? (30)
+
+ (29) Or, perhaps better, "fortitude." See H. Sidgwick, "Hist. of
+ Ethics," p. 43.
+
+ (30) It is one of {ta kala}. See K. Joel, ib. p. 325, and in reference
+ to the definitions of the Good and of the Beautiful, ib. p. 425
+ foll.
+
+Nay, one of the most noble (he answered).
+
+Soc. It seems that you regard courage as useful to no mean end?
+
+Euth. Nay, rather the greatest of all ends, God knows.
+
+Soc. Possibly in face of terrors and dangers you would consider it an
+advantage to be ignorant of them?
+
+Certainly not (he answered).
+
+Soc. It seems that those who have no fear in face of dangers, simply
+because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?
+
+Most true (he answered); or, by the same showing, a large proportion of
+madmen and cowards would be courageous.
+
+Soc. Well, and what of those who are in dread of things which are not
+dreadful, are they--
+
+Euth. Courageous, Socrates?--still less so than the former, goodness
+knows.
+
+Soc. Possibly, then, you would deem those who are good in the face of
+terrors and dangers to be courageous, and those who are bad in the face
+of the same to be cowards?
+
+Certainly I should (he answered).
+
+Soc. And can you suppose any other people to be good in respect of such
+things except those who are able to cope with them and turn them to
+noble account? (31)
+
+ (31) {kalos khresthai}, lit. "make a beautiful use of them."
+
+No; these and these alone (he answered).
+
+Soc. And those people who are of a kind to cope but badly with the same
+occurrences, it would seem, are bad?
+
+Who else, if not they? (he asked).
+
+Soc. May it be that both one and the other class do use these
+circumstances as they think they must and should? (32)
+
+ (32) Or, "feel bound and constrained to do."
+
+Why, how else should they deal with them? (he asked).
+
+Soc. Can it be said that those who are unable to cope well with them or
+to turn them to noble account know how they must and should deal with
+them? (33)
+
+ (33) Or, "Can it be said that those who are unable to cope nobly with
+ their perilous surroundings know how they ought to deal with
+ them?"
+
+I presume not (he answered).
+
+Soc. It would seem to follow that those who have the knowledge how to
+behave are also those who have the power? (34)
+
+ (34) "He who kens can."
+
+Yes; these, and these alone (he said).
+
+Soc. Well, but now, what of those who have made no egregious blunder (in
+the matter); can it be they cope ill with the things and circumstances
+we are discussing?
+
+I think not (he answered).
+
+Soc. It would seem, conversely, that they who cope ill have made some
+egregious blunder?
+
+Euth. Probably; indeed, it would appear to follow.
+
+Soc. It would seem, then, that those who know (35) how to cope with
+terrors and dangers well and nobly are courageous, and those who fail
+utterly of this are cowards?
+
+ (35) "Who have the {episteme}."
+
+So I judge them to be (he answered). (36)
+
+ (36) N.B.--For this definition of courage see Plat. "Laches," 195 A
+ and passim; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 325 foll.
+
+A kingdom and a tyranny (37) were, he opined, both of them forms of
+government, but forms which differed from one another, in his belief; a
+kingdom was a government over willing men in accordance with civil law,
+whereas a tyranny implied the government over unwilling subjects not
+according to law, but so as to suit the whims and wishes of the ruler.
+
+ (37) Or, "despotism."
+
+There were, moreover, three forms of citizenship or polity; in the
+case where the magistrates were appointed from those who discharged the
+obligations prescribed by law, he held the polity to be an aristocracy
+(or rule of the best); (38) where the title to office depended on
+rateable property, it was a plutocracy (or rule of wealth); and lastly,
+where all the citizens without distinction held the reins of office,
+that was a democracy (or rule of the people).
+
+ (38) Or, "in which the due discharge of lawful (law-appointed)
+ obligations gave the title to magisterial office and government,
+ this form of polity he held to be an aristocracy (or rule of the
+ best)." See Newman, op. cit. i. 212, 235.
+
+Let me explain his method of reply where the disputant had no clear
+statement to make, but without attempt at proof chose to contend
+that such or such a person named by himself was wiser, or more of a
+statesman, or more courageous, and so forth, than some other person.
+(39) Socrates had a way of bringing the whole discussion back to the
+underlying proposition, (40) as thus:
+
+ (39) Or, "if any one encountered him in argument about any topic or
+ person without any clear statement, but a mere ipse dixit, devoid
+ of demonstration, that so and so," etc.
+
+ (40) Or, "question at bottom." Cf. Plat. "Laws," 949 B.
+
+Soc. You state that so and so, whom you admire, is a better citizen that
+this other whom I admire?
+
+The Disputant. Yes; I repeat the assertion.
+
+Soc. But would it not have been better to inquire first what is the work
+or function of a good citizen?
+
+The Disputant. Let us do so.
+
+Soc. To begin, then, with the matter of expenditure: his superiority
+will be shown by his increasing the resources and lightening the
+expenditure of the state? (41)
+
+ (41) Or, "In the management of moneys, then, his strength will consist
+ in his rendering the state better provided with ways and means?"
+
+Certainly (the disputant would answer).
+
+Soc. And in the event of war, by rendering his state superior to her
+antagonists?
+
+The Disputant. Clearly.
+
+Soc. Or on an embassy as a diplomatist, I presume, by securing friends
+in place of enemies?
+
+That I should imagine (replies the disputant).
+
+Soc. Well, and in parliamentary debate, by putting a stop to party
+strife and fostering civic concord?
+
+The Disputant. That is my opinion.
+
+By this method of bringing back the argument to its true starting-point,
+even the disputant himself would be affected and the truth become
+manifest to his mind.
+
+His own--that is, the Socratic--method of conducting a rational
+discussion (42) was to proceed step by step from one point of general
+agreement to another: "Herein lay the real security of reasoning," (43)
+he would say; and for this reason he was more successful in winning the
+common assent of his hearers than any one I ever knew. He had a saying
+that Homer had conferred on Odyesseus the title of a safe, unerring
+orator, (44) because he had the gift to lead the discussion from one
+commonly accepted opinion to another.
+
+ (42) Of, "of threading the mazes of an argument."
+
+ (43) Reading {tauton asphaleian}; aliter. {tauten ten asphaleian} =
+ "that this security was part and parcel of reasoning."
+
+ (44) "Od." viii. 171, {o d' asphaleos agoreuei}, "and his speech runs
+ surely on its way" (Butcher and Lang), where Odysseus is
+ describing himself. Cf. Dion. Hal. "de Arte Rhet." xi. 8.
+
+
+VII
+
+The frankness and simplicity with which Socrates endeavoured to declare
+his own opinions, in dealing with those who conversed with him, (1) is,
+I think, conclusively proved by the above instances; at the same time,
+as I hope now to show, he was no less eager to cultivate a spirit of
+independence in others, which would enable them to stand alone in all
+transactions suited to their powers.
+
+ (1) Or, "who frequented his society, is, I hope, clear from what has
+ been said."
+
+Of all the men I have ever known, he was most anxious to ascertain in
+what any of those about him was really versed; and within the range of
+his own knowledge he showed the greatest zeal in teaching everything
+which it befits the true gentleman (2) to know; or where he was
+deficient in knowledge himself, (3) he would introduce his friends to
+those who knew. (4) He did not fail to teach them also up to what point
+it was proper for an educated man to acquire empiric knowledge of any
+particular matter. (5)
+
+ (2) Lit. "a beautiful and good man."
+
+ (3) Or, "where he lacked acquaintance with the matter himself." See,
+ for an instance, "Econ." iii. 14.
+
+ (4) "To those who had the special knowledge"; "a connoisseur in the
+ matter."
+
+ (5) Or, "of any particular branch of learning"; "in each department of
+ things."
+
+To take geometry as an instance: Every one (he would say) ought to be
+taught geometry so far, at any rate, as to be able, if necessary, to
+take over or part with a piece of land, or to divide it up or assign a
+portion of it for cultivation, (6) and in every case by geometric rule.
+(7) That amount of geometry was so simple indeed, and easy to learn,
+that it only needed ordinary application of the mind to the method of
+mensuration, and the student could at once ascertain the size of the
+piece of land, and, with the satisfaction of knowing its measurement,
+depart in peace. But he was unable to approve of the pursuit of geometry
+up to the point at which it became a study of unintelligible diagrams.
+(8) What the use of these might be, he failed, he said, to see; and
+yet he was not unversed in these recondite matters himself. (9) These
+things, he would say, were enough to wear out a man's life, and to
+hinder him from many other more useful studies. (10)
+
+ (6) {e ergon apodeixasthai}, or "and to explain the process." Cf.
+ Plat. "Rep." vii. 528 D. See R. Kuhner ad loc. for other
+ interpretations of the phrase. Cf. Max. Tyr. xxxvii. 7.
+
+ (7) Or, "by correct measurement"; lit. "by measurement of the earth."
+
+ (8) Cf. Aristot. "Pol." v. (viii.) 2; Cic. "Acad. Post." I. iv. 15.
+ For the attitude compare the attitude of a philosopher in other
+ respects most unlike Socrates--August Comte, e.g. as to the
+ futility of sidereal astronomy, "Pos. Pol." i. 412 (Bridges).
+
+ (9) Cf. Isocr. "On the Antidosis," 258-269, as to the true place of
+ "Eristic" in education. See above, IV. ii. 10.
+
+ (10) Cf. A. Comte as to "perte intellectuelle" in the pursuit of
+ barren studies.
+
+Again, a certain practical knowledge of astronomy, a certain skill in
+the study of the stars, he strongly insisted on. Every one should know
+enough of the science to be able to discover the hour of the night or
+the season of the month or year, for the purposes of travel by land or
+sea--the march, the voyage, and the regulations of the watch; (11) and
+in general, with regard to all matters connected with the night season,
+or with the month, or the year, (12) it was well to have such reliable
+data to go upon as would serve to distinguish the various times and
+seasons. But these, again, were pieces of knowledge easily learnt from
+night sportsmen, (13) pilots of vessels, and many others who make it
+their business to know such things. As to pushing the study of astronomy
+so far as to include a knowledge of the movements of bodies outside
+our own orbit, whether planets or stars of eccentric movement, (14) or
+wearing oneself out endeavouring to discover their distances from
+the earth, their periods, and their causes, (15) all this he strongly
+discountenanced; for he saw (he said) no advantage in these any more
+than in the former studies. And yet he was not unversed (16) in the
+subtleties of astronomy any more than in those of geometry; only these,
+again, he insisted, were sufficient to wear out a man's lifetime, and to
+keep him away from many more useful pursuits.
+
+ (11) Schneid. cf. Plat. "Rep." vii. 527 D.
+
+ (12) "Occurrences connected with the night, the month, or year." e.g.
+ the festival of the Karneia, the {tekmerion} (point de repere) of
+ which is the full moon of August. Cf. Eur. "Alc." 449.
+
+ (13) See Plat. "Soph." 220 D; above, III. xi. 8; "Cyrop." I. vi. 40;
+ "Hunting," xii. 6; Hippocr. "Aer." 28.
+
+ (14) See Lewis, "Astron. of the Ancients"; cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 1.
+ 144.
+
+ (15) Or, "the causes of these."
+
+ (16) {oude touton ge anekoos en}. He had "heard," it is said,
+ Archelaus, a pupil of Anaxagoras. Cf. Cic. "Tusc." V. iv. 10.
+
+And to speak generally, in regard of things celestial he set his face
+against attempts to excogitate the machinery by which the divine power
+formed its several operations. (17) Not only were these matters beyond
+man's faculties to discover, as he believed, but the attempt to search
+out what the gods had not chosen to reveal could hardly (he supposed)
+be well pleasing in their sight. Indeed, the man who tortured his brains
+about such subjects stood a fair chance of losing his wits entirely,
+just as Anaxagoras, (18) the headiest speculator of them all, in his
+attempt to explain the divine mechanism, had somewhat lost his head.
+Anaxagoras took on himself to assert that sun and fire are identical,
+(19) ignoring the fact that human beings can easily look at fire, but to
+gaze steadily into the face of the sun is given to no man; or that under
+the influence of his rays the colour of the skin changes, but under the
+rays of fire not. (20) He forgot that no plant or vegetation springs
+from earth's bosom with healthy growth without the help of sunlight,
+whilst the influence of fire is to parch up everything, and to destroy
+life; and when he came to speak of the sun as being a "red-hot stone" he
+ignored another fact, that a stone in fire neither lights up nor lasts,
+whereas the sun-god abides for ever with intensist brilliancy undimmed.
+
+ (17) Or, "he tried to divert one from becoming overly-wise in heavenly
+ matters and the 'mecanique celeste' of the Godhead in His several
+ operations." See above, I. i. 11. See Grote, "Plato," i. 438.
+
+ (18) Of Clazomenae. Cf. Plat. "Apol." 14; Diog. Laert. II. vi; Cic.
+ "Tusc." V. iv. 10; Cobet, "Prosop. Xen." s.n.; Grote, "H. G." i.
+ 501.
+
+ (19) Or, "that the sun was simply a fire, forgetting so simple a fact
+ as that."
+
+ (20) Or, "the complexion darkens, whereas fire has no such effect."
+
+Socrates inculcated the study of reasoning processes, (21) but in these,
+equally with the rest, he bade the student beware of vain and idle
+over-occupation. Up to the limit set by utility, he was ready to join
+in any investigation, and to follow out an argument with those who were
+with him; but there he stopped. He particularly urged those who were
+with him to pay the utmost attention to health. They would learn all
+it was possible to learn from adepts, and not only so, but each one
+individually should take pains to discover, by a lifelong observation of
+his own case, what particular regimen, what meat or drink, or what kind
+of work, best suited him; these he should turn to account with a view to
+leading the healthiest possible life. It would be no easy matter for
+any one who would follow this advice, and study his own idiosyncrasy,
+to find a doctor to improve either on the diagnosis or the treatment
+requisite. (22)
+
+ (21) {logismous} = (1) "arithmetic," (2) "calculation," (3)
+ "syllogistic reasoning." See L. Dind. "Index. Gr." s.v., and
+ Kuhner ad loc.; cf. Plat. "Gorg." 451 C. It is important to decide
+ which form of "logism" is meant here.
+
+ (22) Or, "to find a doctor better able than himself to 'diagnose' and
+ prescribe a treatment congenial to health." Cf. Tac. "Ann." vi.
+ 46; Plut. "de San." 136 E, ap. Schneid. ad loc.
+
+Where any one came seeking for help which no human wisdom could supply,
+he would counsel him to give heed to "divination." He who has the secret
+of the means whereby the gods give signs to men touching their affairs
+can never surely find himself bereft of heavenly guidance.
+
+
+VIII
+
+Now if any one should be disposed to set the statement of Socrates
+touching the divinity (1) which warned him what he ought to do or not
+to do, against the fact that he was sentenced to death by the board of
+judges, and argue that thereby Socrates stood convicted of lying and
+delusion in respect of this "divinity" of his, I would have him to note
+in the first place that, at the date of his trial, Socrates was already
+so far advanced in years that had he not died then his life would have
+reached its natural term soon afterwards; and secondly, as matters went,
+he escaped life's bitterest load (2) in escaping those years which
+bring a diminution of intellectual force to all--instead of which he was
+called upon to exhibit the full robustness of his soul and acquire glory
+in addition, (3) partly by the style of his defence--felicitous alike in
+its truthfulness, its freedom, and its rectitude (4)--and partly by
+the manner in which he bore the sentence of condemnation with infinite
+gentleness and manliness. Since no one within the memory of man, it is
+admitted, ever bowed his head to death more nobly. After the sentence he
+must needs live for thirty days, since it was the month of the "Delia,"
+(5) and the law does not suffer any man to die by the hand of the public
+executioner until the sacred embassy return from Delos. During the whole
+of that period (as his acquaintances without exception can testify)
+his life proceeded as usual. There was nothing to mark the difference
+between now and formerly in the even tenour of its courage; and it was
+a life which at all times had been a marvel of cheerfulness and calm
+content. (6)
+
+ (1) Or, "the words of Socrates with regard to a divine something which
+ warned him," etc.
+
+ (2) The phraseology is poetical.
+
+ (3) Or, "in a manner which redounded to his glory."
+
+ (4) Or, "marvellous alike for the sincerity of its language, the free
+ unbroken spirit of its delivery, and the absolute rectitude of the
+ speaker."
+
+ (5) i.e. the lesser "Delian" solemnities, an annual festival
+ instituted, it was said, by Theseus. See Plut. "Theseus," 23
+ (Clough, i. 19); and for the whole matter see Plat. "Phaed." 58
+ foll.
+
+ (6) Cf. Arist. "Frogs," 82; of Sophocles, {o d' eukolos men enthad',
+ eukolos d' ekei}.
+
+ (Let us pause and ask how could man die more nobly and more
+beautifully than in the way described? or put it thus: dying so,
+then was his death most noble and most beautiful; and being the most
+beautiful, then was it also the most fortunate and heaven-blest; and
+being most blessed of heaven, then was it also most precious in the
+sight of God.) (7)
+
+ (7) This is bracketed as spurious by Sauppe and other commentators.
+ But see "Cyrop." VIII. ii. 7, 8, for similar ineptitude of style.
+ R. Kuhner defends the passage as genuine.
+
+And now I will mention further certain things which I have heard from
+Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, (8) concerning him. He said that even
+after Meletus (9) had drawn up the indictment, he himself used to hear
+Socrates conversing and discussing everything rather than the suit
+impending, and had ventured to suggest that he ought to be considering
+the line of his defence, to which, in the first instance, the master
+answered: "Do I not seem to you to have been practising that my whole
+life long?" And upon his asking "How?" added in explanation that he had
+passed his days in nothing else save in distinguishing between what is
+just and what is unjust (right and wrong), and in doing what is right
+and abstaining from what is wrong; "which conduct" (he added) "I hold
+to be the finest possible practice for my defence"; and when he
+(Hermogenes), returning to the point again, pleaded with Socrates: "Do
+you not see, Socrates, how commonly it happens that an Athenian jury,
+under the influence of argument, condemns innocent people to death and
+acquits real criminals?"--Socrates replied, "I assure you, Hermogenes,
+that each time I have essayed to give my thoughts to the defence which I
+am to make before the court, the divinity (10) has opposed me." And when
+he (Hermogenes) exclaimed, "How strange!"--"Do you find it strange" (he
+continued), "that to the Godhead it should appear better for me to close
+my life at once? Do you not know that up to the present moment there
+is no man whom I can admit to have spent a better or happier life than
+mine. Since theirs I regard as the best of lives who study best to
+become as good as may be, and theirs the happiest who have the liveliest
+sense of growth in goodness; and such, hitherto, is the happy fortune
+which I perceive to have fallen to my lot. To such conclusion I have
+come, not only in accidental intercourse with others, but by a strict
+comparison drawn between myself and others, and in this faith I
+continue to this day; and not I only, but my friends continue in a like
+persuasion with regard to me, not for the lame reason that they are
+my friends and love me (or else would others have been in like case as
+regards their friends), but because they are persuaded that by being
+with me they will attain to their full height of goodness. But, if I am
+destined to prolong my days, maybe I shall be enforced to pay in full
+the penalties of old age--to see and hear less keenly, to fail in
+intellectual force, and to leave school, as it were, more of a dunce
+than when I came, less learned and more forgetful--in a word, I shall
+fall from my high estate, and daily grow worse in that wherein aforetime
+I excelled. But indeed, were it possible to remain unconscious of the
+change, the life left would scarcely be worth living; but given that
+there is a consciousness of the change, then must the existence left to
+live be found by comparison insipid, joyless, a death in life, devoid of
+life's charm. But indeed, if it is reserved for me to die unjustly, then
+on those who unjustly slay me lies the shame (since, given injustice is
+base, how can any unjust action whatsoever fail of baseness?) (11) But
+for me what disgrace is it that others should fail of a just decision
+and right acts concerning me?... I see before me a long line of
+predecessors on this road, and I mark the reputation also among
+posterity which they have left. (12) I note how it varies according as
+they did or suffered wrong, and for myself I know that I too, although I
+die to-day, shall obtain from mankind a consideration far different from
+that which will be accorded to those who put me to death. I know that
+undying witness will be borne me to this effect, that I never at any
+time did wrong to any man, or made him a worse man, but ever tried to
+make those better who were with me."
+
+ (8) See above, II. x. 3; "Symp." i. 3; iii. 14; iv. 47 foll.; vi. 2;
+ "Apol." 2; Plat. "Crat." 384.
+
+ (9) See above, I. i. 1.
+
+ (10) {to daimonion}--"the divine (voice)."
+
+ (11) This passage also may, perhaps, be regarded as spurious.
+
+ (12) Or, "There floats before my eyes a vision of the many who have
+ gone this same gate. I note their legacies of fame among
+ posterity."
+
+Such are the words which he spoke in conversation with Hermogenes and
+the rest. But amongst those who knew Socrates and recognised what manner
+of man he was, all who make virtue and perfection their pursuit still to
+this day cease not to lament his loss with bitterest regret, as for one
+who helped them in the pursuit of virtue as none else could.
+
+To me, personally, he was what I have myself endeavoured to describe: so
+pious and devoutly religious (13) that he would take no step apart
+from the will of heaven; so just and upright that he never did even a
+trifling injury to any living soul; so self-controlled, so temperate,
+that he never at any time chose the sweeter in place of the better; so
+sensible, and wise, and prudent that in distinguishing the better from
+the worse he never erred; nor had he need of any helper, but for the
+knowledge of these matters, his judgment was at once infallible and
+self-sufficing. Capable of reasonably setting forth and defining moral
+questions, (14) he was also able to test others, and where they erred,
+to cross-examine and convict them, and so to impel and guide them in the
+path of virtue and noble manhood. With these characteristics, he seemed
+to be the very impersonation of human perfection and happiness. (15)
+
+ (13) Or, "of such piety and religious devotedness... of such
+ rectitude... of such sobreity and self-control... of such
+ sound sense and wisdom..."
+
+ (14) Or, "gifted with an ability logically to set forth and to define
+ moral subtleties."
+
+ (15) Or, "I look upon him as at once the best and happiest of men."
+
+Such is our estimate. If the verdict fail to satisfy I would ask those
+who disagree with it to place the character of any other side by side
+with this delineation, and then pass sentence.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Memorabilia, by Xenophon
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