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diff --git a/old/11224-8.txt b/old/11224-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2bf3bd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/11224-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2964 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Utilitarianism, by John Stuart Mill + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Utilitarianism + +Author: John Stuart Mill + +Release Date: February 22, 2004 [EBook #11224] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK UTILITARIANISM *** + + + + +Produced by Julie Barkley, Garrett Alley and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team. + + + + + + + +UTILITARIANISM + + +BY + +JOHN STUART MILL + + + +REPRINTED FROM 'FRASER'S MAGAZINE' + +SEVENTH EDITION + +LONDON + +LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. + +1879 + + + + +CONTENTS. + + + + +CHAPTER I. GENERAL REMARKS + +CHAPTER II. WHAT UTILITARIANISM IS + +CHAPTER III. OF THE ULTIMATE SANCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY + +CHAPTER IV. OF WHAT SORT OF PROOF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY IS +SUSCEPTIBLE + +CHAPTER V. OF THE CONNEXION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND UTILITY + + + + +UTILITARIANISM. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + + +GENERAL REMARKS. + +There are few circumstances among those which make up the present +condition of human knowledge, more unlike what might have been expected, +or more significant of the backward state in which speculation on the +most important subjects still lingers, than the little progress which +has been made in the decision of the controversy respecting the +criterion of right and wrong. From the dawn of philosophy, the question +concerning the _summum bonum_, or, what is the same thing, concerning +the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in +speculative thought, has occupied the most gifted intellects, and +divided them into sects and schools, carrying on a vigorous warfare +against one another. And after more than two thousand years the same +discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged under the same +contending banners, and neither thinkers nor mankind at large seem +nearer to being unanimous on the subject, than when the youth Socrates +listened to the old Protagoras, and asserted (if Plato's dialogue be +grounded on a real conversation) the theory of utilitarianism against +the popular morality of the so-called sophist. + +It is true that similar confusion and uncertainty, and in some cases +similar discordance, exist respecting the first principles of all the +sciences, not excepting that which is deemed the most certain of them, +mathematics; without much impairing, generally indeed without impairing +at all, the trustworthiness of the conclusions of those sciences. An +apparent anomaly, the explanation of which is, that the detailed +doctrines of a science are not usually deduced from, nor depend for +their evidence upon, what are called its first principles. Were it not +so, there would be no science more precarious, or whose conclusions were +more insufficiently made out, than algebra; which derives none of its +certainty from what are commonly taught to learners as its elements, +since these, as laid down by some of its most eminent teachers, are as +full of fictions as English law, and of mysteries as theology. The +truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a +science, are really the last results of metaphysical analysis, practised +on the elementary notions with which the science is conversant; and +their relation to the science is not that of foundations to an edifice, +but of roots to a tree, which may perform their office equally well +though they be never dug down to and exposed to light. But though in +science the particular truths precede the general theory, the contrary +might be expected to be the case with a practical art, such as morals or +legislation. All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of +action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character +and colour from the end to which they are subservient. When we engage in +a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would +seem to be the first thing we need, instead of the last we are to look +forward to. A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would +think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of +having already ascertained it. + +The difficulty is not avoided by having recourse to the popular theory +of a natural faculty, a sense or instinct, informing us of right and +wrong. For--besides that the existence of such a moral instinct is +itself one of the matters in dispute--those believers in it who have any +pretensions to philosophy, have been obliged to abandon the idea that it +discerns what is right or wrong in the particular case in hand, as our +other senses discern the sight or sound actually present. Our moral +faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to +the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of +moral judgments; it is a branch of our reason, not of our sensitive +faculty; and must be looked to for the abstract doctrines of morality, +not for perception of it in the concrete. The intuitive, no less than +what may be termed the inductive, school of ethics, insists on the +necessity of general laws. They both agree that the morality of an +individual action is not a question of direct perception, but of the +application of a law to an individual case. They recognise also, to a +great extent, the same moral laws; but differ as to their evidence, and +the source from which they derive their authority. According to the one +opinion, the principles of morals are evident _à priori_, requiring +nothing to command assent, except that the meaning of the terms be +understood. According to the other doctrine, right and wrong, as well as +truth and falsehood, are questions of observation and experience. But +both hold equally that morality must be deduced from principles; and the +intuitive school affirm as strongly as the inductive, that there is a +science of morals. Yet they seldom attempt to make out a list of the _à +priori_ principles which are to serve as the premises of the science; +still more rarely do they make any effort to reduce those various +principles to one first principle, or common ground of obligation. They +either assume the ordinary precepts of morals as of _à priori_ +authority, or they lay down as the common groundwork of those maxims, +some generality much less obviously authoritative than the maxims +themselves, and which has never succeeded in gaining popular acceptance. +Yet to support their pretensions there ought either to be some one +fundamental principle or law, at the root of all morality, or if there +be several, there should be a determinate order of precedence among +them; and the one principle, or the rule for deciding between the +various principles when they conflict, ought to be self-evident. + +To inquire how far the bad effects of this deficiency have been +mitigated in practice, or to what extent the moral beliefs of mankind +have been vitiated or made uncertain by the absence of any distinct +recognition of an ultimate standard, would imply a complete survey and +criticism of past and present ethical doctrine. It would, however, be +easy to show that whatever steadiness or consistency these moral beliefs +have attained, has been mainly due to the tacit influence of a standard +not recognised. Although the non-existence of an acknowledged first +principle has made ethics not so much a guide as a consecration of men's +actual sentiments, still, as men's sentiments, both of favour and of +aversion, are greatly influenced by what they suppose to be the effects +of things upon their happiness, the principle of utility, or as Bentham +latterly called it, the greatest happiness principle, has had a large +share in forming the moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully +reject its authority. Nor is there any school of thought which refuses +to admit that the influence of actions on happiness is a most material +and even predominant consideration in many of the details of morals, +however unwilling to acknowledge it as the fundamental principle of +morality, and the source of moral obligation. I might go much further, +and say that to all those _à priori_ moralists who deem it necessary to +argue at all, utilitarian arguments are indispensable. It is not my +present purpose to criticise these thinkers; but I cannot help +referring, for illustration, to a systematic treatise by one of the most +illustrious of them, the _Metaphysics of Ethics_, by Kant. This +remarkable man, whose system of thought will long remain one of the +landmarks in the history of philosophical speculation, does, in the +treatise in question, lay down an universal first principle as the +origin and ground of moral obligation; it is this:--'So act, that the +rule on which thou actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all +rational beings.' But when he begins to deduce from this precept any of +the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show +that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say +physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the +most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the +_consequences_ of their universal adoption would be such as no one would +choose to incur. + +On the present occasion, I shall, without further discussion of the +other theories, attempt to contribute something towards the +understanding and appreciation of the Utilitarian or Happiness theory, +and towards such proof as it is susceptible of. It is evident that this +cannot be proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term. +Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever +can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to +something admitted to be good without proof. The medical art is proved +to be good, by its conducing to health; but how is it possible to prove +that health is good? The art of music is good, for the reason, among +others, that it produces pleasure; but what proof is it possible to give +that pleasure is good? If, then, it is asserted that there is a +comprehensive formula, including all things which are in themselves +good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as an end, but as a +mean, the formula may be accepted or rejected, but is not a subject of +what is commonly understood by proof. We are not, however, to infer that +its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary +choice. There is a larger meaning of the word proof, in which this +question is as amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of +philosophy. The subject is within the cognizance of the rational +faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way +of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of determining the +intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and +this is equivalent to proof. + +We shall examine presently of what nature are these considerations; in +what manner they apply to the case, and what rational grounds, +therefore, can be given for accepting or rejecting the utilitarian +formula. But it is a preliminary condition of rational acceptance or +rejection, that the formula should be correctly understood. I believe +that the very imperfect notion ordinarily formed of its meaning, is the +chief obstacle which impedes its reception; and that could it be +cleared, even from only the grosser misconceptions, the question would +be greatly simplified, and a large proportion of its difficulties +removed. Before, therefore, I attempt to enter into the philosophical +grounds which can be given for assenting to the utilitarian standard, I +shall offer some illustrations of the doctrine itself; with the view of +showing more clearly what it is, distinguishing it from what it is not, +and disposing of such of the practical objections to it as either +originate in, or are closely connected with, mistaken interpretations of +its meaning. Having thus prepared the ground, I shall afterwards +endeavour to throw such light as I can upon the question, considered as +one of philosophical theory. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + + +WHAT UTILITARIANISM IS. + +A passing remark is all that needs be given to the ignorant blunder of +supposing that those who stand up for utility as the test of right and +wrong, use the term in that restricted and merely colloquial sense in +which utility is opposed to pleasure. An apology is due to the +philosophical opponents of utilitarianism, for even the momentary +appearance of confounding them with any one capable of so absurd a +misconception; which is the more extraordinary, inasmuch as the contrary +accusation, of referring everything to pleasure, and that too in its +grossest form, is another of the common charges against utilitarianism: +and, as has been pointedly remarked by an able writer, the same sort of +persons, and often the very same persons, denounce the theory "as +impracticably dry when the word utility precedes the word pleasure, and +as too practicably voluptuous when the word pleasure precedes the word +utility." Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every +writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, +meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but +pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain; and instead of +opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always +declared that the useful means these, among other things. Yet the +common herd, including the herd of writers, not only in newspapers and +periodicals, but in books of weight and pretension, are perpetually +falling into this shallow mistake. Having caught up the word +utilitarian, while knowing nothing whatever about it but its sound, they +habitually express by it the rejection, or the neglect, of pleasure in +some of its forms; of beauty, of ornament, or of amusement. Nor is the +term thus ignorantly misapplied solely in disparagement, but +occasionally in compliment; as though it implied superiority to +frivolity and the mere pleasures of the moment. And this perverted use +is the only one in which the word is popularly known, and the one from +which the new generation are acquiring their sole notion of its meaning. +Those who introduced the word, but who had for many years discontinued +it as a distinctive appellation, may well feel themselves called upon to +resume it, if by doing so they can hope to contribute anything towards +rescuing it from this utter degradation.[A] + +The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the +Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion +as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the +reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the +absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To +give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more +requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas +of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. +But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on +which this theory of morality is grounded--namely, that pleasure, and +freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all +desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any +other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in +themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention +of pain. + +Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some +of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To +suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than +pleasure--no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit--they +designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a doctrine worthy only of +swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, +contemptuously likened; and modern holders of the doctrine are +occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its +German, French, and English assailants. + +When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not +they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading +light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no +pleasures except those of which swine are capable. If this supposition +were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no +longer an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the +same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough +for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the +Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because +a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of +happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal +appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything +as happiness which does not include their gratification. I do not, +indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in +drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. +To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian +elements require to be included. But there is no known Epicurean theory +of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect; of the +feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher +value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, +however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority +of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, +safety, uncostliness, &c., of the former--that is, in their +circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on +all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they +might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, +with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of +utility to recognise the fact, that some _kinds_ of pleasure are more +desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, +in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as +quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on +quantity alone. + +If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or +what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a +pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible +answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who +have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any +feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable +pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted +with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even +though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, +and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which +their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the +preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing +quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account. + +Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted +with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a +most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their +higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into +any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a +beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a +fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling +and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be +persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied +with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they +possess more than he, for the most complete satisfaction of all the +desires which they have in common with him. If they ever fancy they +would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme, that to escape +from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however +undesirable in their own eyes. A being of higher faculties requires more +to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and is +certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; +but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into +what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what +explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to +pride, a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to +some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind are capable; we +may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal +to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the +inculcation of it; to the love of power, or to the love of excitement, +both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but its most +appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings +possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, +proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part +of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which +conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of +desire to them. Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a +sacrifice of happiness-that the superior being, in anything like equal +circumstances, is not happier than the inferior-confounds the two very +different ideas, of happiness, and content. It is indisputable that the +being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of +having them fully satisfied; and a highly-endowed being will always feel +that any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constituted, +is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at +all bearable; and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed +unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all +the good which those imperfections qualify. It is better to be a human +being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates +dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a +different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the +question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides. + +It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pleasures, +occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the +lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the +intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of +character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it +to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two +bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue +sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that +health is the greater good. It may be further objected, that many who +begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in +years sink into indolence and selfishness. But I do not believe that +those who undergo this very common change, voluntarily choose the lower +description of pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe that +before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have already +become incapable of the other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in +most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile +influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young +persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position +in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, +are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose +their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because +they have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict +themselves to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer +them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have +access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. +It may be questioned whether any one who has remained equally +susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly +preferred the lower; though many, in all ages, have broken down in an +ineffectual attempt to combine both. + +From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be +no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two +pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to +the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, +the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if +they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final. +And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment +respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to +be referred to even on the question of quantity. What means are there of +determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two +pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are +familiar with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous, and +pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide +whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a +particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? +When, therefore, those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures +derived from the higher faculties to be preferable _in kind_, apart from +the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, +disjoined from the higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled +on this subject to the same regard. + +I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly +just conception of Utility or Happiness, considered as the directive +rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition +to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not +the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness +altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character +is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it +makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a +gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by +the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each +individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, +so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the +benefit. But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, +renders refutation superfluous. + +According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above explained, the +ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other +things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of +other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and +as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and +quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against +quantity, being the preference felt by those who, in their opportunities +of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness +and self-observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison. +This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human +action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may +accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the +observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to +the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to them +only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient +creation. + +Against this doctrine, however, arises another class of objectors, who +say that happiness, in any form, cannot be the rational purpose of human +life and action; because, in the first place, it is unattainable: and +they contemptuously ask, What right hast thou to be happy? a question +which Mr. Carlyle clenches by the addition, What right, a short time +ago, hadst thou even _to be_? Next, they say, that men can do _without_ +happiness; that all noble human beings have felt this, and could not +have become noble but by learning the lesson of Entsagen, or +renunciation; which lesson, thoroughly learnt and submitted to, they +affirm to be the beginning and necessary condition of all virtue. + +The first of these objections would go to the root of the matter were it +well founded; for if no happiness is to be had at all by human beings, +the attainment of it cannot be the end of morality, or of any rational +conduct. Though, even in that case, something might still be said for +the utilitarian theory; since utility includes not solely the pursuit of +happiness, but the prevention or mitigation of unhappiness; and if the +former aim be chimerical, there will be all the greater scope and more +imperative need for the latter, so long at least as mankind think fit to +live, and do not take refuge in the simultaneous act of suicide +recommended under certain conditions by Novalis. When, however, it is +thus positively asserted to be impossible that human life should be +happy, the assertion, if not something like a verbal quibble, is at +least an exaggeration. If by happiness be meant a continuity of highly +pleasurable excitement, it is evident enough that this is impossible. A +state of exalted pleasure lasts only moments, or in some cases, and with +some intermissions, hours or days, and is the occasional brilliant flash +of enjoyment, not its permanent and steady flame. Of this the +philosophers who have taught that happiness is the end of life were as +fully aware as those who taunt them. The happiness which they meant was +not a life of rapture, but moments of such, in an existence made up of +few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided +predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the +foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life than it is capable +of bestowing. A life thus composed, to those who have been fortunate +enough to obtain it, has always appeared worthy of the name of +happiness. And such an existence is even now the lot of many, during +some considerable portion of their lives. The present wretched +education, and wretched social arrangements, are the only real hindrance +to its being attainable by almost all. + +The objectors perhaps may doubt whether human beings, if taught to +consider happiness as the end of life, would be satisfied with such a +moderate share of it. But great numbers of mankind have been satisfied +with much less. The main constituents of a satisfied life appear to be +two, either of which by itself is often found sufficient for the +purpose: tranquillity, and excitement. With much tranquillity, many find +that they can be content with very little pleasure: with much +excitement, many can reconcile themselves to a considerable quantity of +pain. There is assuredly no inherent impossibility in enabling even the +mass of mankind to unite both; since the two are so far from being +incompatible that they are in natural alliance, the prolongation of +either being a preparation for, and exciting a wish for, the other. It +is only those in whom indolence amounts to a vice, that do not desire +excitement after an interval of repose; it is only those in whom the +need of excitement is a disease, that feel the tranquillity which +follows excitement dull and insipid, instead of pleasurable in direct +proportion to the excitement which preceded it. When people who are +tolerably fortunate in their outward lot do not find in life sufficient +enjoyment to make it valuable to them, the cause generally is, caring +for nobody but themselves. To those who have neither public nor private +affections, the excitements of life are much curtailed, and in any case +dwindle in value as the time approaches when all selfish interests must +be terminated by death: while those who leave after them objects of +personal affection, and especially those who have also cultivated a +fellow-feeling with the collective interests of mankind, retain as +lively an interest in life on the eve of death as in the vigour of youth +and health. Next to selfishness, the principal cause which makes life +unsatisfactory, is want of mental cultivation. A cultivated mind--I do +not mean that of a philosopher, but any mind to which the fountains of +knowledge have been opened, and which has been taught, in any tolerable +degree, to exercise its faculties--finds sources of inexhaustible +interest in all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the +achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents of +history, the ways of mankind past and present, and their prospects in +the future. It is possible, indeed, to become indifferent to all this, +and that too without having exhausted a thousandth part of it; but only +when one has had from the beginning no moral or human interest in these +things, and has sought in them only the gratification of curiosity. + +Now there is absolutely no reason in the nature of things why an amount +of mental culture sufficient to give an intelligent interest in these +objects of contemplation, should not be the inheritance of every one +born in a civilized country. As little is there an inherent necessity +that any human being should be a selfish egotist, devoid of every +feeling or care but those which centre in his own miserable +individuality. Something far superior to this is sufficiently common +even now, to give ample earnest of what the human species may be made. +Genuine private affections, and a sincere interest in the public good, +are possible, though in unequal degrees, to every rightly brought-up +human being. In a world in which there is so much to interest, so much +to enjoy, and so much also to correct and improve, every one who has +this moderate amount of moral and intellectual requisites is capable of +an existence which may be called enviable; and unless such a person, +through bad laws, or subjection to the will of others, is denied the +liberty to use the sources of happiness within his reach, he will not +fail to find this enviable existence, if he escape the positive evils of +life, the great sources of physical and mental suffering--such as +indigence, disease, and the unkindness, worthlessness, or premature loss +of objects of affection. The main stress of the problem lies, therefore, +in the contest with these calamities, from which it is a rare good +fortune entirely to escape; which, as things now are, cannot be +obviated, and often cannot be in any material degree mitigated. Yet no +one whose opinion deserves a moment's consideration can doubt that most +of the great positive evils of the world are in themselves removable, +and will, if human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced +within narrow limits. Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, may be +completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined with the good +sense and providence of individuals. Even that most intractable of +enemies, disease, may be indefinitely reduced in dimensions by good +physical and moral education, and proper control of noxious influences; +while the progress of science holds out a promise for the future of +still more direct conquests over this detestable foe. And every advance +in that direction relieves us from some, not only of the chances which +cut short our own lives, but, what concerns us still more, which deprive +us of those in whom our happiness is wrapt up. As for vicissitudes of +fortune, and other disappointments connected with worldly circumstances, +these are principally the effect either of gross imprudence, of +ill-regulated desires, or of bad or imperfect social institutions. All +the grand sources, in short, of human suffering are in a great degree, +many of them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and effort; and +though their removal is grievously slow--though a long succession of +generations will perish in the breach before the conquest is completed, +and this world becomes all that, if will and knowledge were not wanting, +it might easily be made--yet every mind sufficiently intelligent and +generous to bear a part, however small and unconspicuous, in the +endeavour, will draw a noble enjoyment from the contest itself, which he +would not for any bribe in the form of selfish indulgence consent to be +without. + +And this leads to the true estimation of what is said by the objectors +concerning the possibility, and the obligation, of learning to do +without happiness. Unquestionably it is possible to do without +happiness; it is done involuntarily by nineteen-twentieths of mankind, +even in those parts of our present world which are least deep in +barbarism; and it often has to be done voluntarily by the hero or the +martyr, for the sake of something which he prizes more than his +individual happiness. But this something, what is it, unless the +happiness of others, or some of the requisites of happiness? It is noble +to be capable of resigning entirely one's own portion of happiness, or +chances of it: but, after all, this self-sacrifice must be for some end; +it is not its own end; and if we are told that its end is not happiness, +but virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice +be made if the hero or martyr did not believe that it would earn for +others immunity from similar sacrifices? Would it be made, if he thought +that his renunciation of happiness for himself would produce no fruit +for any of his fellow creatures, but to make their lot like his, and +place them also in the condition of persons who have renounced +happiness? All honour to those who can abnegate for themselves the +personal enjoyment of life, when by such renunciation they contribute +worthily to increase the amount of happiness in the world; but he who +does it, or professes to do it, for any other purpose, is no more +deserving of admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pillar. He may +be an inspiriting proof of what men _can_ do, but assuredly not an +example of what they _should_. + +Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world's arrangements +that any one can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute +sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect +state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice +is the highest virtue which can be found in man. I will add, that in +this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the +conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of +realizing such happiness as is attainable. For nothing except that +consciousness can raise a person above the chances of life, by making +him feel that, let fate and fortune do their worst, they have not power +to subdue him: which, once felt, frees him from excess of anxiety +concerning the evils of life, and enables him, like many a Stoic in the +worst times of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in tranquillity the +sources of satisfaction accessible to him, without concerning himself +about the uncertainty of their duration, any more than about their +inevitable end. + +Meanwhile, let utilitarians never cease to claim the morality of +self-devotion as a possession which belongs by as good a right to them, +as either to the Stoic or to the Transcendentalist. The utilitarian +morality does recognise in human beings the power of sacrificing their +own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that +the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or +tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted. +The only self-renunciation which it applauds, is devotion to the +happiness, or to some of the means of happiness, of others; either of +mankind collectively, or of individuals within the limits imposed by the +collective interests of mankind. + +I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have +the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the +utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own +happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and +that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial +as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus +of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To +do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, +constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of +making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, +that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as +speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every +individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the +whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a +power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in +the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own +happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own +happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and +positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes: so that not +only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to +himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also +that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every +individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments +connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human +being's sentient existence. If the impugners of the utilitarian morality +represented it to their own minds in this its true character, I know not +what recommendation possessed by any other morality they could possibly +affirm to be wanting to it: what more beautiful or more exalted +developments of human nature any other ethical system can be supposed to +foster, or what springs of action, not accessible to the utilitarian, +such systems rely on for giving effect to their mandates. + +The objectors to utilitarianism cannot always be charged with +representing it in a discreditable light. On the contrary, those among +them who entertain anything like a just idea of its disinterested +character, sometimes find fault with its standard as being too high for +humanity. They say it is exacting too much to require that people shall +always act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of +society. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of +morals, and to confound the rule of action with the motive of it. It is +the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test +we may know them; but no system of ethics requires that the sole motive +of all we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine +hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly +so done, if the rule of duty does not condemn them. It is the more +unjust to utilitarianism that this particular misapprehension should be +made a ground of objection to it, inasmuch as utilitarian moralists have +gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing +to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the +agent. He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally +right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his +trouble: he who betrays the friend that trusts him, is guilty of a +crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under +greater obligations.[B] But to speak only of actions done from the +motive of duty, and in direct obedience to principle: it is a +misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as +implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as +the world, or society at large. The great majority of good actions are +intended, not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, +of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most +virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular +persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that +in benefiting them he is not violating the rights--that is, the +legitimate and authorized expectations--of any one else. The +multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the +object of virtue: the occasions on which any person (except one in a +thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale, in other +words, to be a public benefactor, are but exceptional; and on these +occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every +other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few +persons, is all he has to attend to. Those alone the influence of whose +actions extends to society in general, need concern themselves +habitually about so large an object. In the case of abstinences +indeed--of things which people forbear to do, from moral considerations, +though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial--it +would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware +that the action is of a class which, if practised generally, would be +generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation to +abstain from it. The amount of regard for the public interest implied in +this recognition, is no greater than is demanded by every system of +morals; for they all enjoin to abstain from whatever is manifestly +pernicious to society. + +The same considerations dispose of another reproach against the doctrine +of utility, founded on a still grosser misconception of the purpose of a +standard of morality, and of the very meaning of the words right and +wrong. It is often affirmed that utilitarianism renders men cold and +unsympathizing; that it chills their moral feelings towards +individuals; that it makes them regard only the dry and hard +consideration of the consequences of actions, not taking into their +moral estimate the qualities from which those actions emanate. If the +assertion means that they do not allow their judgment respecting the +rightness or wrongness of an action to be influenced by their opinion of +the qualities of the person who does it, this is a complaint not against +utilitarianism, but against having any standard of morality at all; for +certainly no known ethical standard decides an action to be good or bad +because it is done by a good or a bad man, still less because done by an +amiable, a brave, or a benevolent man or the contrary. These +considerations are relevant, not to the estimation of actions, but of +persons; and there is nothing in the utilitarian theory inconsistent +with the fact that there are other things which interest us in persons +besides the rightness and wrongness of their actions. The Stoics, +indeed, with the paradoxical misuse of language which was part of their +system, and by which they strove to raise themselves above all concern +about anything but virtue, were fond of saying that he who has that has +everything; that he, and only he, is rich, is beautiful, is a king. But +no claim of this description is made for the virtuous man by the +utilitarian doctrine. Utilitarians are quite aware that there are other +desirable possessions and qualities besides virtue, and are perfectly +willing to allow to all of them their full worth. They are also aware +that a right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character, +and that actions which are blameable often proceed from qualities +entitled to praise. When this is apparent in any particular case, it +modifies their estimation, not certainly of the act, but of the agent. +I grant that they are, notwithstanding, of opinion, that in the long run +the best proof of a good character is good actions; and resolutely +refuse to consider any mental disposition as good, of which the +predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct. This makes them +unpopular with many people; but it is an unpopularity which they must +share with every one who regards the distinction between right and wrong +in a serious light; and the reproach is not one which a conscientious +utilitarian need be anxious to repel. + +If no more be meant by the objection than that many utilitarians look on +the morality of actions, as measured by the utilitarian standard, with +too exclusive a regard, and do not lay sufficient stress upon the other +beauties of character which go towards making a human being loveable or +admirable, this may be admitted. Utilitarians who have cultivated their +moral feelings, but not their sympathies nor their artistic perceptions, +do fall into this mistake; and so do all other moralists under the same +conditions. What can be said in excuse for other moralists is equally +available for them, namely, that if there is to be any error, it is +better that it should be on that side. As a matter of fact, we may +affirm that among utilitarians as among adherents of other systems, +there is every imaginable degree of rigidity and of laxity in the +application of their standard: some are even puritanically rigorous, +while others are as indulgent as can possibly be desired by sinner or by +sentimentalist. But on the whole, a doctrine which brings prominently +forward the interest that mankind have in the repression and prevention +of conduct which violates the moral law, is likely to be inferior to no +other in turning the sanctions of opinion against such violations. It is +true, the question, What does violate the moral law? is one on which +those who recognise different standards of morality are likely now and +then to differ. But difference of opinion on moral questions was not +first introduced into the world by utilitarianism, while that doctrine +does supply, if not always an easy, at all events a tangible and +intelligible mode of deciding such differences. + + * * * * * + +It may not be superfluous to notice a few more of the common +misapprehensions of utilitarian ethics, even those which are so obvious +and gross that it might appear impossible for any person of candour and +intelligence to fall into them: since persons, even of considerable +mental endowments, often give themselves so little trouble to understand +the bearings of any opinion against which they entertain a prejudice, +and men are in general so little conscious of this voluntary ignorance +as a defect, that the vulgarest misunderstandings of ethical doctrines +are continually met with in the deliberate writings of persons of the +greatest pretensions both to high principle and to philosophy. We not +uncommonly hear the doctrine of utility inveighed against as a _godless_ +doctrine. If it be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an +assumption, we may say that the question depends upon what idea we have +formed of the moral character of the Deity. If it be a true belief that +God desires, above all things, the happiness of his creatures, and that +this was his purpose in their creation, utility is not only not a +godless doctrine, but more profoundly religious than any other. If it be +meant that utilitarianism does not recognise the revealed will of God as +the supreme law of morals, I answer, that an utilitarian who believes in +the perfect goodness and wisdom of God, necessarily believes that +whatever God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must +fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree. But others +besides utilitarians have been of opinion that the Christian revelation +was intended, and is fitted, to inform the hearts and minds of mankind +with a spirit which should enable them to find for themselves what is +right, and incline them to do it when found, rather than to tell them, +except in a very general way, what it is: and that we need a doctrine of +ethics, carefully followed out, to _interpret_ to us the will of God. +Whether this opinion is correct or not, it is superfluous here to +discuss; since whatever aid religion, either natural or revealed, can +afford to ethical investigation, is as open to the utilitarian moralist +as to any other. He can use it as the testimony of God to the usefulness +or hurtfulness of any given course of action, by as good a right as +others can use it for the indication of a transcendental law, having no +connexion with usefulness or with happiness. + +Again, Utility is often summarily stigmatized as an immoral doctrine by +giving it the name of Expediency, and taking advantage of the popular +use of that term to contrast it with Principle. But the Expedient, in +the sense in which it is opposed to the Right, generally means that +which is expedient for the particular interest of the agent himself: as +when a minister sacrifices the interest of his country to keep himself +in place. When it means anything better than this, it means that which +is expedient for some immediate object, some temporary purpose, but +which violates a rule whose observance is expedient in a much higher +degree. The Expedient, in this sense, instead of being the same thing +with the useful, is a branch of the hurtful. Thus, it would often be +expedient, for the purpose of getting over some momentary embarrassment, +or attaining some object immediately useful to ourselves or others, to +tell a lie. But inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive +feeling on the subject of veracity, is one of the most useful, and the +enfeeblement of that feeling one of the most hurtful, things to which +our conduct can be instrumental; and inasmuch as any, even +unintentional, deviation from truth, does that much towards weakening +the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is not only the principal +support of all present social well-being, but the insufficiency of which +does more than any one thing that can be named to keep back +civilisation, virtue, everything on which human happiness on the largest +scale depends; we feel that the violation, for a present advantage, of a +rule of such transcendent expediency, is not expedient, and that he who, +for the sake of a convenience to himself or to some other individual, +does what depends on him to deprive mankind of the good, and inflict +upon them the evil, involved in the greater or less reliance which they +can place in each other's word, acts the part of one of their worst +enemies. Yet that even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible +exceptions, is acknowledged by all moralists; the chief of which is when +the withholding of some fact (as of information from a male-factor, or +of bad news from a person dangerously ill) would preserve some one +(especially a person other than oneself) from great and unmerited evil, +and when the withholding can only be effected by denial. But in order +that the exception may not extend itself beyond the need, and may have +the least possible effect in weakening reliance on veracity, it ought to +be recognized, and, if possible, its limits defined; and if the +principle of utility is good for anything, it must be good for weighing +these conflicting utilities against one another, and marking out the +region within which one or the other preponderates. + +Again, defenders of utility often find themselves called upon to reply +to such objections as this--that there is not time, previous to action, +for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the +general happiness. This is exactly as if any one were to say that it is +impossible to guide our conduct by Christianity, because there is not +time, on every occasion on which anything has to be done, to read +through the Old and New Testaments. The answer to the objection is, that +there has been ample time, namely, the whole past duration of the human +species. During all that time mankind have been learning by experience +the tendencies of actions; on which experience all the prudence, as well +as all the morality of life, is dependent. People talk as if the +commencement of this course of experience had hitherto been put off, and +as if, at the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle with the +property or life of another, he had to begin considering for the first +time whether murder and theft are injurious to human happiness. Even +then I do not think that he would find the question very puzzling; but, +at all events, the matter is now done to his hand. It is truly a +whimsical supposition, that if mankind were agreed in considering +utility to be the test of morality, they would remain without any +agreement as to what is useful, and would take no measures for having +their notions on the subject taught to the young, and enforced by law +and opinion. There is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard +whatever to work ill, if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined +with it, but on any hypothesis short of that, mankind must by this time +have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some actions on +their happiness; and the beliefs which have thus come down are the rules +of morality for the multitude, and for the philosopher until he has +succeeded in finding better. That philosophers might easily do this, +even now, on many subjects; that the received code of ethics is by no +means of divine right; and that mankind have still much to learn as to +the effects of actions on the general happiness, I admit, or rather, +earnestly maintain. The corollaries from the principle of utility, like +the precepts of every practical art, admit of indefinite improvement, +and, in a progressive state of the human mind, their improvement is +perpetually going on. But to consider the rules of morality as +improvable, is one thing; to pass over the intermediate generalizations +entirely, and endeavour to test each individual action directly by the +first principle, is another. It is a strange notion that the +acknowledgment of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission +of secondary ones. To inform a traveller respecting the place of his +ultimate destination, is not to forbid the use of landmarks and +direction-posts on the way. The proposition that happiness is the end +and aim of morality, does not mean that no road ought to be laid down to +that goal, or that persons going thither should not be advised to take +one direction rather than another. Men really ought to leave off talking +a kind of nonsense on this subject, which they would neither talk nor +listen to on other matters of practical concernment. Nobody argues that +the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy, because sailors +cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack. Being rational +creatures, they go to sea with it ready calculated; and all rational +creatures go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the +common questions of right and wrong, as well as on many of the far more +difficult questions of wise and foolish. And this, as long as foresight +is a human quality, it is to be presumed they will continue to do. +Whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require +subordinate principles to apply it by: the impossibility of doing +without them, being common to all systems, can afford no argument +against any one in particular: but gravely to argue as if no such +secondary principles could be had, and as if mankind had remained till +now, and always must remain, without drawing any general conclusions +from the experience of human life, is as high a pitch, I think, as +absurdity has ever reached in philosophical controversy. + +The remainder of the stock arguments against utilitarianism mostly +consist in laying to its charge the common infirmities of human nature, +and the general difficulties which embarrass conscientious persons in +shaping their course through life. We are told that an utilitarian will +be apt to make his own particular case an exception to moral rules, and, +when under temptation, will see an utility in the breach of a rule, +greater than he will see in its observance. But is utility the only +creed which is able to furnish us with excuses for evil doing, and means +of cheating our own conscience? They are afforded in abundance by all +doctrines which recognise as a fact in morals the existence of +conflicting considerations; which all doctrines do, that have been +believed by sane persons. It is not the fault of any creed, but of the +complicated nature of human affairs, that rules of conduct cannot be so +framed as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any kind of action +can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always +condemnable. There is no ethical creed which does not temper the +rigidity of its laws, by giving a certain latitude, under the moral +responsibility of the agent, for accommodation to peculiarities of +circumstances; and under every creed, at the opening thus made, +self-deception and dishonest casuistry get in. There exists no moral +system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting +obligation. These are the real difficulties, the knotty points both in +the theory of ethics, and in the conscientious guidance of personal +conduct. They are overcome practically with greater or with less success +according to the intellect and virtue of the individual; but it can +hardly be pretended that any one will be the less qualified for dealing +with them, from possessing an ultimate standard to which conflicting +rights and duties can be referred. If utility is the ultimate source of +moral obligations, utility may be invoked to decide between them when +their demands are incompatible. Though the application of the standard +may be difficult, it is better than none at all: while in other systems, +the moral laws all claiming independent authority, there is no common +umpire entitled to interfere between them; their claims to precedence +one over another rest on little better than sophistry, and unless +determined, as they generally are, by the unacknowledged influence of +considerations of utility, afford a free scope for the action of +personal desires and partialities. We must remember that only in these +cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that +first principles should be appealed to. There is no case of moral +obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved; and if +only one, there can seldom be any real doubt which one it is, in the +mind of any person by whom the principle itself is recognized. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote A: The author of this essay has reason for believing himself +to be the first person who brought the word utilitarian into use. He did +not invent it, but adopted it from a passing expression in Mr. Galt's +_Annals of the Parish_. After using it as a designation for several +years, he and others abandoned it from a growing dislike to anything +resembling a badge or watchword of sectarian distinction. But as a name +for one single opinion, not a set of opinions--to denote the recognition +of utility as a standard, not any particular way of applying it--the +term supplies a want in the language, and offers, in many cases, a +convenient mode of avoiding tiresome circumlocution.] + +[Footnote B: An opponent, whose intellectual and moral fairness it is a +pleasure to acknowledge (the Rev. J. Llewellyn Davis), has objected to +this passage, saying, "Surely the rightness or wrongness of saving a man +from drowning does depend very much upon the motive with which it is +done. Suppose that a tyrant, when his enemy jumped into the sea to +escape from him, saved him from drowning simply in order that he might +inflict upon him more exquisite tortures, would it tend to clearness to +speak of that rescue as 'a morally right action?' Or suppose again, +according to one of the stock illustrations of ethical inquiries, that a +man betrayed a trust received from a friend, because the discharge of it +would fatally injure that friend himself or some one belonging to him, +would utilitarianism compel one to call the betrayal 'a crime' as much +as if it had been done from the meanest motive?" + +I submit, that he who saves another from drowning in order to kill him +by torture afterwards, does not differ only in motive from him who does +the same thing from duty or benevolence; the act itself is different. +The rescue of the man is, in the case supposed, only the necessary first +step of an act far more atrocious than leaving him to drown would have +been. Had Mr. Davis said, "The rightness or wrongness of saving a man +from drowning does depend very much"--not upon the motive, but--"upon +the _intention_" no utilitarian would have differed from him. Mr. Davis, +by an oversight too common not to be quite venial, has in this case +confounded the very different ideas of Motive and Intention. There is no +point which utilitarian thinkers (and Bentham pre-eminently) have taken +more pains to illustrate than this. The morality of the action depends +entirely upon the intention--that is, upon what the agent _wills to do_. +But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him will so to do, when +it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality: though it +makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent, +especially if it indicates a good or a bad habitual _disposition_--a +bent of character from which useful, or from which hurtful actions are +likely to arise.] + + + + +CHAPTER III. + + +OF THE ULTIMATE SANCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY. + +The question is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any supposed +moral standard--What is its sanction? what are the motives to obey it? +or more specifically, what is the source of its obligation? whence does +it derive its binding force? It is a necessary part of moral philosophy +to provide the answer to this question; which, though frequently +assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian morality, as if it +had some special applicability to that above others, really arises in +regard to all standards. It arises, in fact, whenever a person is called +on to adopt a standard or refer morality to any basis on which he has +not been accustomed to rest it. For the customary morality, that which +education and opinion have consecrated, is the only one which presents +itself to the mind with the feeling of being _in itself_ obligatory; and +when a person is asked to believe that this morality _derives_ its +obligation from some general principle round which custom has not thrown +the same halo, the assertion is to him a paradox; the supposed +corollaries seem to have a more binding force than the original theorem; +the superstructure seems to stand better without, than with, what is +represented as its foundation. He says to himself, I feel that I am +bound not to rob or murder, betray or deceive; but why am I bound to +promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something +else, why may I not give that the preference? + +If the view adopted by the utilitarian philosophy of the nature of the +moral sense be correct, this difficulty will always present itself, +until the influences which form moral character have taken the same hold +of the principle which they have taken of some of the +consequences--until, by the improvement of education, the feeling of +unity with our fellow creatures shall be (what it cannot be doubted that +Christ intended it to be) as deeply rooted in our character, and to our +own consciousness as completely a part of our nature, as the horror of +crime is in an ordinarily well-brought-up young person. In the mean +time, however, the difficulty has no peculiar application to the +doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every attempt to analyse +morality and reduce it to principles; which, unless the principle is +already in men's minds invested with as much sacredness as any of its +applications, always seems to divest them of a part of their sanctity. + +The principle of utility either has, or there is no reason why it might +not have, all the sanctions which belong to any other system of morals. +Those sanctions are either external or internal. Of the external +sanctions it is not necessary to speak at any length. They are, the hope +of favour and the fear of displeasure from our fellow creatures or from +the Ruler of the Universe, along with whatever we may have of sympathy +or affection for them or of love and awe of Him, inclining us to do His +will independently of selfish consequences. There is evidently no +reason why all these motives for observance should not attach themselves +to the utilitarian morality, as completely and as powerfully as to any +other. Indeed, those of them which refer to our fellow creatures are +sure to do so, in proportion to the amount of general intelligence; for +whether there be any other ground of moral obligation than the general +happiness or not, men do desire happiness; and however imperfect may be +their own practice, they desire and commend all conduct in others +towards themselves, by which they think their happiness is promoted. +With regard to the religious motive, if men believe, as most profess to +do, in the goodness of God, those who think that conduciveness to the +general happiness is the essence, or even only the criterion, of good, +must necessarily believe that it is also that which God approves. The +whole force therefore of external reward and punishment, whether +physical or moral, and whether proceeding from God or from our fellow +men, together with all that the capacities of human nature admit, of +disinterested devotion to either, become available to enforce the +utilitarian morality, in proportion as that morality is recognized; and +the more powerfully, the more the appliances of education and general +cultivation are bent to the purpose. + +So far as to external sanctions. The internal sanction of duty, whatever +our standard of duty may be, is one and the same--a feeling in our own +mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, +which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious +cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility. This feeling, when +disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and +not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory +circumstances, is the essence of Conscience; though in that complex +phenomenon as it actually exists, the simple fact is in general all +encrusted over with collateral associations, derived from sympathy, from +love, and still more from fear; from all the forms of religious feeling; +from the recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from +self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even +self-abasement. This extreme complication is, I apprehend, the origin of +the sort of mystical character which, by a tendency of the human mind of +which there are many other examples, is apt to be attributed to the idea +of moral obligation, and which leads people to believe that the idea +cannot possibly attach itself to any other objects than those which, by +a supposed mysterious law, are found in our present experience to excite +it. Its binding force, however, consists in the existence of a mass of +feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our +standard of right, and which, if we do nevertheless violate that +standard, will probably have to be encountered afterwards in the form of +remorse. Whatever theory we have of the nature or origin of conscience, +this is what essentially constitutes it. + +The ultimate sanction, therefore, of all morality (external motives +apart) being a subjective feeling in our own minds, I see nothing +embarrassing to those whose standard is utility, in the question, what +is the sanction of that particular standard? We may answer, the same as +of all other moral standards--the conscientious feelings of mankind. +Undoubtedly this sanction has no binding efficacy on those who do not +possess the feelings it appeals to; but neither will these persons be +more obedient to any other moral principle than to the utilitarian one. +On them morality of any kind has no hold but through the external +sanctions. Meanwhile the feelings exist, a feet in human nature, the +reality of which, and the great power with which they are capable of +acting on those in whom they have been duly cultivated, are proved by +experience. No reason has ever been shown why they may not be cultivated +to as great intensity in connection with the utilitarian, as with any +other rule of morals. + +There is, I am aware, a disposition to believe that a person who sees in +moral obligation a transcendental fact, an objective reality belonging +to the province of "Things in themselves," is likely to be more obedient +to it than one who believes it to be entirely subjective, having its +seat in human consciousness only. But whatever a person's opinion may be +on this point of Ontology, the force he is really urged by is his own +subjective feeling, and is exactly measured by its strength. No one's +belief that Duty is an objective reality is stronger than the belief +that God is so; yet the belief in God, apart from the expectation of +actual reward and punishment, only operates on conduct through, and in +proportion to, the subjective religious feeling. The sanction, so far as +it is disinterested, is always in the mind itself; and the notion, +therefore, of the transcendental moralists must be, that this sanction +will not exist _in_ the mind unless it is believed to have its root out +of the mind; and that if a person is able to say to himself, That which +is restraining me, and which is called my conscience, is only a feeling +in my own mind, he may possibly draw the conclusion that when the +feeling ceases the obligation ceases, and that if he find the feeling +inconvenient, he may disregard it, and endeavour to get rid of it. But +is this danger confined to the utilitarian morality? Does the belief +that moral obligation has its seat outside the mind make the feeling of +it too strong to be got rid of? The fact is so far otherwise, that all +moralists admit and lament the ease with which, in the generality of +minds, conscience can be silenced or stifled. The question, Need I obey +my conscience? is quite as often put to themselves by persons who never +heard of the principle of utility, as by its adherents. Those whose +conscientious feelings are so weak as to allow of their asking this +question, if they answer it affirmatively, will not do so because they +believe in the transcendental theory, but because of the external +sanctions. + +It is not necessary, for the present purpose, to decide whether the +feeling of duty is innate or implanted. Assuming it to be innate, it is +an open question to what objects it naturally attaches itself; for the +philosophic supporters of that theory are now agreed that the intuitive +perception is of principles of morality, and not of the details. If +there be anything innate in the matter, I see no reason why the feeling +which is innate should not be that of regard to the pleasures and pains +of others. If there is any principle of morals which is intuitively +obligatory, I should say it must be that. If so, the intuitive ethics +would coincide with the utilitarian, and there would be no further +quarrel between them. Even as it is, the intuitive moralists, though +they believe that there are other intuitive moral obligations, do +already believe this to be one; for they unanimously hold that a large +portion of morality turns upon the consideration due to the interests of +our fellow creatures. Therefore, if the belief in the transcendental +origin of moral obligation gives any additional efficacy to the internal +sanction, it appears to me that the utilitarian principle has already +the benefit of it. + +On the other hand, if, as is my own belief, the moral feelings are not +innate, but acquired, they are not for that reason the less natural. It +is natural to man to speak, to reason, to build cities, to cultivate the +ground, though these are acquired faculties. The moral feelings are not +indeed a part of our nature, in the sense of being in any perceptible +degree present in all of us; but this, unhappily, is a fact admitted by +those who believe the most strenuously in their transcendental origin. +Like the other acquired capacities above referred to, the moral faculty, +if not a part of our nature, is a natural outgrowth from it; capable, +like them, in a certain small degree, of springing up spontaneously; and +susceptible of being brought by cultivation to a high degree of +development. Unhappily it is also susceptible, by a sufficient use of +the external sanctions and of the force of early impressions, of being +cultivated in almost any direction: so that there is hardly anything so +absurd or so mischievous that it may not, by means of these influences, +be made to act on the human mind with all the authority of conscience. +To doubt that the same potency might be given by the same means to the +principle of utility, even if it had no foundation in human nature, +would be flying in the face of all experience. + +But moral associations which are wholly of artificial creation, when +intellectual culture goes on, yield by degrees to the dissolving force +of analysis: and if the feeling of duty, when associated with utility, +would appear equally arbitrary; if there were no leading department of +our nature, no powerful class of sentiments, with which that association +would harmonize, which would make us feel it congenial, and incline us +not only to foster it in others (for which we have abundant interested +motives), but also to cherish it in ourselves; if there were not, in +short, a natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality, it might +well happen that this association also, even after it had been implanted +by education, might be analysed away. + +But there is this basis of powerful natural sentiment; and this it is +which, when once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical +standard, will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality. This +firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to +be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful +principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become +stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of +advancing civilization. The social state is at once so natural, so +necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual +circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never +conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body; and this +association is riveted more and more, as mankind are further removed +from the state of savage independence. Any condition, therefore, which +is essential to a state of society, becomes more and more an inseparable +part of every person's conception of the state of things which he is +born into, and which is the destiny of a human being. Now, society +between human beings, except in the relation of master and slave, is +manifestly impossible on any other footing than that the interests of +all are to be consulted. Society between equals can only exist on the +understanding that the interests of all are to be regarded equally. And +since in all states of civilization, every person, except an absolute +monarch, has equals, every one is obliged to live on these terms with +somebody; and in every age some advance is made towards a state in which +it will be impossible to live permanently on other terms with anybody. +In this way people grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a +state of total disregard of other people's interests. They are under a +necessity of conceiving themselves as at least abstaining from all the +grosser injuries, and (if only for their own protection.) living in a +state of constant protest against them. They are also familiar with the +fact of co-operating with others, and proposing to themselves a +collective, not an individual, interest, as the aim (at least for the +time being) of their actions. So long as they are co-operating, their +ends are identified with those of others; there is at least a temporary +feeling that the interests of others are their own interests. Not only +does all strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of +society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in +practically consulting the welfare of others; it also leads him to +identify his feelings more and more with their good, or at least with +an ever greater degree of practical consideration for it. He comes, as +though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being who _of +course_ pays regard to others. The good of others becomes to him a thing +naturally and necessarily to be attended to, like any of the physical +conditions of our existence. Now, whatever amount of this feeling a +person has, he is urged by the strongest motives both of interest and of +sympathy to demonstrate it, and to the utmost of his power encourage it +in others; and even if he has none of it himself, he is as greatly +interested as any one else that others should have it. Consequently, the +smallest germs of the feeling are laid hold of and nourished by the +contagion of sympathy and the influences of education; and a complete +web of corroborative association is woven round it, by the powerful +agency of the external sanctions. This mode of conceiving ourselves and +human life, as civilization goes on, is felt to be more and more +natural. Every step in political improvement renders it more so, by +removing the sources of opposition of interest, and levelling those +inequalities of legal privilege between individuals or classes, owing to +which there are large portions of mankind whose happiness it is still +practicable to disregard. In an improving state of the human mind, the +influences are constantly on the increase, which tend to generate in +each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; which feeling, if +perfect, would make him never think of, or desire, any beneficial +condition for himself, in the benefits of which they are not included. +If we now suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion, and +the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion, +directed, as it once was in the case of religion, to make every person +grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and +by the practice of it, I think that no one, who can realize this +conception, will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the +ultimate sanction for the Happiness morality. To any ethical student who +finds the realization difficult, I recommend, as a means of facilitating +it, the second of M. Comte's two principal works, the _Système de +Politique Positive_. I entertain the strongest objections to the system +of politics and morals set forth in that treatise; but I think it has +superabundantly shown the possibility of giving to the service of +humanity, even without the aid of belief in a Providence, both the +physical power and the social efficacy of a religion; making it take +hold of human life, and colour all thought, feeling, and action, in a +manner of which the greatest ascendency ever exercised by any religion +may be but a type and foretaste; and of which the danger is, not that it +should be insufficient, but that it should be so excessive as to +interfere unduly with human freedom and individuality. + +Neither is it necessary to the feeling which constitutes the binding +force of the utilitarian morality on those who recognize it, to wait for +those social influences which would make its obligation felt by mankind +at large. In the comparatively early state of human advancement in which +we now live, a person cannot indeed feel that entireness of sympathy +with all others, which would make any real discordance in the general +direction of their conduct in life impossible; but already a person in +whom the social feeling is at all developed, cannot bring himself to +think of the rest of his fellow creatures as struggling rivals with him +for the means of happiness, whom he must desire to see defeated in their +object in order that he may succeed in his. The deeply-rooted conception +which every individual even now has of himself as a social being, tends +to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be +harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures. +If differences of opinion and of mental culture make it impossible for +him to share many of their actual feelings-perhaps make him denounce and +defy those feelings-he still needs to be conscious that his real aim and +theirs do not conflict; that he is not opposing himself to what they +really wish for, namely, their own good, but is, on the contrary, +promoting it. This feeling in most individuals is much inferior in +strength to their selfish feelings, and is often wanting altogether. But +to those who have it, it possesses all the characters of a natural +feeling. It does not present itself to their minds as a superstition of +education, or a law despotically imposed by the power of society, but as +an attribute which it would not be well for them to be without. This +conviction is the ultimate sanction of the greatest-happiness morality. +This it is which makes any mind, of well-developed feelings, work with, +and not against, the outward motives to care for others, afforded by +what I have called the external sanctions; and when those sanctions are +wanting, or act in an opposite direction, constitutes in itself a +powerful internal binding force, in proportion to the sensitiveness and +thoughtfulness of the character; since few but those whose mind is a +moral blank, could bear to lay out their course of life on the plan of +paying no regard to others except so far as their own private interest +compels. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + + +OF WHAT SORT OF PROOF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY IS SUSCEPTIBLE. + +It has already been remarked, that questions of ultimate ends do not +admit of proof, in the ordinary acceptation of the term. To be incapable +of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles; to the first +premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct. But the +former, being matters of fact, may be the subject of a direct appeal to +the faculties which judge of fact--namely, our senses, and our internal +consciousness. Can an appeal be made to the same faculties on questions +of practical ends? Or by what other faculty is cognizance taken of them? + +Questions about ends are, in other words, questions what things are +desirable. The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and +the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only +desirable as means to that end. What ought to be required of this +doctrine--what conditions is it requisite that the doctrine should +fulfil--to make good its claim to be believed? + +The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that +people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that +people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like +manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that +anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. If the end +which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory +and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince +any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general +happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes +it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a +fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all +which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each +person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, +therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made +out its title as _one_ of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of +the criteria of morality. + +But it has not, by this alone, proved itself to be the sole criterion. +To do that, it would seem, by the same rule, necessary to show, not only +that people desire happiness, but that they never desire anything else. +Now it is palpable that they do desire things which, in common language, +are decidedly distinguished from happiness. They desire, for example, +virtue, and the absence of vice, no less really than pleasure and the +absence of pain. The desire of virtue is not as universal, but it is as +authentic a fact, as the desire of happiness. And hence the opponents of +the utilitarian standard deem that they have a right to infer that there +are other ends of human action besides happiness, and that happiness is +not the standard of approbation and disapprobation. + +But does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue, or +maintain that virtue is not a thing to be desired? The very reverse. It +maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be +desired disinterestedly, for itself. Whatever may be the opinion of +utilitarian moralists as to the original conditions by which virtue is +made virtue; however they may believe (as they do) that actions and +dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than +virtue; yet this being granted, and it having been decided, from +considerations of this description, what _is_ virtuous, they not only +place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to +the ultimate end, but they also recognise as a psychological fact the +possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in itself, without +looking to any end beyond it; and hold, that the mind is not in a right +state, not in a state conformable to Utility, not in the state most +conducive to the general happiness, unless it does love virtue in this +manner--as a thing desirable in itself, even although, in the individual +instance, it should not produce those other desirable consequences which +it tends to produce, and on account of which it is held to be virtue. +This opinion is not, in the smallest degree, a departure from the +Happiness principle. The ingredients of happiness are very various, and +each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as +swelling an aggregate. The principle of utility does not mean that any +given pleasure, as music, for instance, or any given exemption from +pain, as for example health, are to be looked upon as means to a +collective something termed happiness, and to be desired on that +account. They are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides +being means, they are a part of the end. Virtue, according to the +utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end, +but it is capable of becoming so; and in those who love it +disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired and cherished, not as a +means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness. + +To illustrate this farther, we may remember that virtue is not the only +thing, originally a means, and which if it were not a means to anything +else, would be and remain indifferent, but which by association with +what it is a means to, comes to be desired for itself, and that too with +the utmost intensity. What, for example, shall we say of the love of +money? There is nothing originally more desirable about money than about +any heap of glittering pebbles. Its worth is solely that of the things +which it will buy; the desires for other things than itself, which it is +a means of gratifying. Yet the love of money is not only one of the +strongest moving forces of human life, but money is, in many cases, +desired in and for itself; the desire to possess it is often stronger +than the desire to use it, and goes on increasing when all the desires +which point to ends beyond it, to be compassed by it, are falling off. +It may be then said truly, that money is desired not for the sake of an +end, but as part of the end. From being a means to happiness, it has +come to be itself a principal ingredient of the individual's conception +of happiness. The same may be said of the majority of the great objects +of human life--power, for example, or fame; except that to each of these +there is a certain amount of immediate pleasure annexed, which has at +least the semblance of being naturally inherent in them; a thing which +cannot be said of money. Still, however, the strongest natural +attraction, both of power and of fame, is the immense aid they give to +the attainment of our other wishes; and it is the strong association +thus generated between them and all our objects of desire, which gives +to the direct desire of them the intensity it often assumes, so as in +some characters to surpass in strength all other desires. In these cases +the means have become a part of the end, and a more important part of it +than any of the things which they are means to. What was once desired as +an instrument for the attainment of happiness, has come to be desired +for its own sake. In being desired for its own sake it is, however, +desired as part of happiness. The person is made, or thinks he would be +made, happy by its mere possession; and is made unhappy by failure to +obtain it. The desire of it is not a different thing from the desire of +happiness, any more than the love of music, or the desire of health. +They are included in happiness. They are some of the elements of which +the desire of happiness is made up. Happiness is not an abstract idea, +but a concrete whole; and these are some of its parts. And the +utilitarian standard sanctions and approves their being so. Life would +be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happiness, if there +were not this provision of nature, by which things originally +indifferent, but conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the +satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of +pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures, both in permanency, +in the space of human existence that they are capable of covering, and +even in intensity. Virtue, according to the utilitarian conception, is a +good of this description. There was no original desire of it, or motive +to it, save its conduciveness to pleasure, and especially to protection +from pain. But through the association thus formed, it may be felt a +good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other +good; and with this difference between it and the love of money, of +power, or of fame, that all of these may, and often do, render the +individual noxious to the other members of the society to which he +belongs, whereas there is nothing which makes him so much a blessing to +them as the cultivation of the disinterested, love of virtue. And +consequently, the utilitarian standard, while it tolerates and approves +those other acquired desires, up to the point beyond which they would be +more injurious to the general happiness than promotive of it, enjoins +and requires the cultivation of the love of virtue up to the greatest +strength possible, as being above all things important to the general +happiness. + +It results from the preceding considerations, that there is in reality +nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as +a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is +desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself +until it has become so. Those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire +it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the +consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both reasons united; +as in truth the pleasure and pain seldom exist separately, but almost +always together, the same person feeling pleasure in the degree of +virtue attained, and pain in not having attained more. If one of these +gave him no pleasure, and the other no pain, he would not love or desire +virtue, or would desire it only for the other benefits which it might +produce to himself or to persons whom he cared for. + +We have now, then, an answer to the question, of what sort of proof the +principle of utility is susceptible. If the opinion which I have now +stated is psychologically true--if human nature is so constituted as to +desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of +happiness, we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that +these are the only things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole end of +human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all +human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the +criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole. + +And now to decide whether this is really so; whether mankind do desire +nothing for itself but that which is a pleasure to them, or of which the +absence is a pain; we have evidently arrived at a question of fact and +experience, dependent, like all similar questions, upon evidence. It can +only be determined by practised self-consciousness and self-observation, +assisted by observation of others. I believe that these sources of +evidence, impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a thing and +finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are +phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same +phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the +same psychological fact: that to think of an object as desirable (unless +for the sake of its consequences), and to think of it as pleasant, are +one and the same thing; and that to desire anything, except in +proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical +impossibility. + +So obvious does this appear to me, that I expect it will hardly be +disputed: and the objection made will be, not that desire can possibly +be directed to anything ultimately except pleasure and exemption from +pain, but that the will is a different thing from desire; that a person +of confirmed virtue, or any other person whose purposes are fixed, +carries out his purposes without any thought of the pleasure he has in +contemplating them, or expects to derive from their fulfilment; and +persists in acting on them, even though these pleasures are much +diminished, by changes in his character or decay of his passive +sensibilities, or are outweighed by the pains which the pursuit of the +purposes may bring upon him. All this I fully admit, and have stated it +elsewhere, as positively and emphatically as any one. Will, the active +phenomenon, is a different thing from desire, the state of passive +sensibility, and though originally an offshoot from it, may in time take +root and detach itself from the parent stock; so much so, that in the +case of an habitual purpose, instead of willing the thing because we +desire it, we often desire it only because we will it. This, however, is +but an instance of that familiar fact, the power of habit, and is nowise +confined to the case of virtuous actions. Many indifferent things, which +men originally did from a motive of some sort, they continue to do from +habit. Sometimes this is done unconsciously, the consciousness coming +only after the action: at other times with conscious volition, but +volition which has become habitual, and is put into operation by the +force of habit, in opposition perhaps to the deliberate preference, as +often happens with those who have contracted habits of vicious or +hurtful indulgence. Third and last comes the case in which the habitual +act of will in the individual instance is not in contradiction to the +general intention prevailing at other times, but in fulfilment of it; as +in the case of the person of confirmed virtue, and of all who pursue +deliberately and consistently any determinate end. The distinction +between will and desire thus understood, is an authentic and highly +important psychological fact; but the fact consists solely in this--that +will, like all other parts of our constitution, is amenable to habit, +and that we may will from habit what we no longer desire for itself, or +desire only because we will it. It is not the less true that will, in +the beginning, is entirely produced by desire; including in that term +the repelling influence of pain as well as the attractive one of +pleasure. Let us take into consideration, no longer the person who has a +confirmed will to do right, but him in whom that virtuous will is still +feeble, conquerable by temptation, and not to be fully relied on; by +what means can it be strengthened? How can the will to be virtuous, +where it does not exist in sufficient force, be implanted or awakened? +Only by making the person _desire_ virtue--by making him think of it in +a pleasurable light, or of its absence in a painful one. It is by +associating the doing right with pleasure, or the doing wrong with pain, +or by eliciting and impressing and bringing home to the person's +experience the pleasure naturally involved in the one or the pain in the +other, that it is possible to call forth that will to be virtuous, +which, when confirmed, acts without any thought of either pleasure or +pain. Will is the child of desire, and passes out of the dominion of its +parent only to come under that of habit. That which is the result of +habit affords no presumption of being intrinsically good; and there +would be no reason for wishing that the purpose of virtue should become +independent of pleasure and pain, were it not that the influence of the +pleasurable and painful associations which prompt to virtue is not +sufficiently to be depended on for unerring constancy of action until it +has acquired the support of habit. Both in feeling and in conduct, habit +is the only thing which imparts certainty; and it is because of the +importance to others of being able to rely absolutely on one's feelings +and conduct, and to oneself of being able to rely on one's own, that the +will to do right ought to be cultivated into this habitual independence. +In other words, this state of the will is a means to good, not +intrinsically a good; and does not contradict the doctrine that nothing +is a good to human beings but in so far as it is either itself +pleasurable, or a means of attaining pleasure or averting pain. + +But if this doctrine be true, the principle of utility is proved. +Whether it is so or not, must now be left to the consideration of the +thoughtful reader. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + + +ON THE CONNEXION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND UTILITY. + +In all ages of speculation, one of the strongest obstacles to the +reception of the doctrine that Utility or Happiness is the criterion of +right and wrong, has been drawn from the idea of Justice, The powerful +sentiment, and apparently clear perception, which that word recalls with +a rapidity and certainty resembling an instinct, have seemed to the +majority of thinkers to point to an inherent quality in things; to show +that the Just must have an existence in Nature as something +absolute-generically distinct from every variety of the Expedient, and, +in idea, opposed to it, though (as is commonly acknowledged) never, in +the long run, disjoined from it in fact. + +In the case of this, as of our other moral sentiments, there is no +necessary connexion between the question of its origin, and that of its +binding force. That a feeling is bestowed on us by Nature, does not +necessarily legitimate all its promptings. The feeling of justice might +be a peculiar instinct, and might yet require, like our other instincts, +to be controlled and enlightened by a higher reason. If we have +intellectual instincts, leading us to judge in a particular way, as well +as animal instincts that prompt us to act in a particular way, there is +no necessity that the former should be more infallible in their sphere +than the latter in theirs: it may as well happen that wrong judgments +are occasionally suggested by those, as wrong actions by these. But +though it is one thing to believe that we have natural feelings of +justice, and another to acknowledge them as an ultimate criterion of +conduct, these two opinions are very closely connected in point of fact. +Mankind are always predisposed to believe that any subjective feeling, +not otherwise accounted for, is a revelation of some objective reality. +Our present object is to determine whether the reality, to which the +feeling of justice corresponds, is one which needs any such special +revelation; whether the justice or injustice of an action is a thing +intrinsically peculiar, and distinct from all its other qualities, or +only a combination of certain of those qualities, presented under a +peculiar aspect. For the purpose of this inquiry, it is practically +important to consider whether the feeling itself, of justice and +injustice, is _sui generis_ like our sensations of colour and taste, or +a derivative feeling, formed by a combination of others. And this it is +the more essential to examine, as people are in general willing enough +to allow, that objectively the dictates of justice coincide with a part +of the field of General Expediency; but inasmuch as the subjective +mental feeling of Justice is different from that which commonly attaches +to simple expediency, and, except in extreme cases of the latter, is far +more imperative in its demands, people find it difficult to see, in +Justice, only a particular kind or branch of general utility, and think +that its superior binding force requires a totally different origin. + +To throw light upon this question, it is necessary to attempt to +ascertain what is the distinguishing character of justice, or of +injustice: what is the quality, or whether there is any quality, +attributed in common to all modes of conduct designated as unjust (for +justice, like many other moral attributes, is best defined by its +opposite), and distinguishing them from such modes of conduct as are +disapproved, but without having that particular epithet of +disapprobation applied to them. If, in everything which men are +accustomed to characterize as just or unjust, some one common attribute +or collection of attributes is always present, we may judge whether this +particular attribute or combination of attributes would be capable of +gathering round it a sentiment of that peculiar character and intensity +by virtue of the general laws of our emotional constitution, or whether +the sentiment is inexplicable, and requires to be regarded as a special +provision of Nature. If we find the former to be the case, we shall, in +resolving this question, have resolved also the main problem: if the +latter, we shall have to seek for some other mode of investigating it. + + * * * * * + +To find the common attributes of a variety of objects, it is necessary +to begin, by surveying the objects themselves in the concrete. Let us +therefore advert successively to the various modes of action, and +arrangements of human affairs, which are classed, by universal or widely +spread opinion, as Just or as Unjust. The things well known to excite +the sentiments associated with those names, are of a very multifarious +character. I shall pass them rapidly in review, without studying any +particular arrangement. + +In the first place, it is mostly considered unjust to deprive any one +of his personal liberty, his property, or any other thing which belongs +to him by law. Here, therefore, is one instance of the application of +the terms just and unjust in a perfectly definite sense, namely, that it +is just to respect, unjust to violate, the _legal rights_ of any one. +But this judgment admits of several exceptions, arising from the other +forms in which the notions of justice and injustice present themselves. +For example, the person who suffers the deprivation may (as the phrase +is) have _forfeited_ the rights which he is so deprived of: a case to +which we shall return presently. But also, + +Secondly; the legal rights of which he is deprived, may be rights which +_ought_ not to have belonged to him; in other words, the law which +confers on him these rights, may be a bad law. When it is so, or when +(which is the same thing for our purpose) it is supposed to be so, +opinions will differ as to the justice or injustice of infringing it. +Some maintain that no law, however bad, ought to be disobeyed by an +individual citizen; that his opposition to it, if shown at all, should +only be shown in endeavouring to get it altered by competent authority. +This opinion (which condemns many of the most illustrious benefactors of +mankind, and would often protect pernicious institutions against the +only weapons which, in the state of things existing at the time, have +any chance of succeeding against them) is defended, by those who hold +it, on grounds of expediency; principally on that of the importance, to +the common interest of mankind, of maintaining inviolate the sentiment +of submission to law. Other persons, again, hold the directly contrary +opinion, that any law, judged to be bad, may blamelessly be disobeyed, +even though it be not judged to be unjust, but only inexpedient; while +others would confine the licence of disobedience to the case of unjust +laws: but again, some say, that all laws which are inexpedient are +unjust; since every law imposes some restriction on the natural liberty +of mankind, which restriction is an injustice, unless legitimated by +tending to their good. Among these diversities of opinion, it seems to +be universally admitted that there may be unjust laws, and that law, +consequently, is not the ultimate criterion of justice, but may give to +one person a benefit, or impose on another an evil, which justice +condemns. When, however, a law is thought to be unjust, it seems always +to be regarded as being so in the same way in which a breach of law is +unjust, namely, by infringing somebody's right; which, as it cannot in +this case be a legal right, receives a different appellation, and is +called a moral right. We may say, therefore, that a second case of +injustice consists in taking or withholding from any person that to +which he has a _moral right_. + +Thirdly, it is universally considered just that each person should +obtain that (whether good or evil) which he _deserves_; and unjust that +he should obtain a good, or be made to undergo an evil, which he does +not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest and most emphatic form in +which the idea of justice is conceived by the general mind. As it +involves the notion of desert, the question arises, what constitutes +desert? Speaking in a general way, a person is understood to deserve +good if he does right, evil if he does wrong; and in a more particular +sense, to deserve good from those to whom he does or has done good, and +evil from those to whom he does or has done evil. The precept of +returning good for evil has never been regarded as a case of the +fulfilment of justice, but as one in which the claims of justice are +waived, in obedience to other considerations. + +Fourthly, it is confessedly unjust to _break faith_ with any one: to +violate an engagement, either express or implied, or disappoint +expectations raised by our own conduct, at least if we have raised those +expectations knowingly and voluntarily. Like the other obligations of +justice already spoken of, this one is not regarded as absolute, but as +capable of being overruled by a stronger obligation of justice on the +other side; or by such conduct on the part of the person concerned as is +deemed to absolve us from our obligation to him, and to constitute a +_forfeiture_ of the benefit which he has been led to expect. + +Fifthly, it is, by universal admission, inconsistent with justice to be +_partial_; to show favour or preference to one person over another, in +matters to which favour and preference do not properly apply. +Impartiality, however, does not seem to be regarded as a duty in itself, +but rather as instrumental to some other duty; for it is admitted that +favour and preference are not always censurable, and indeed the cases in +which they are condemned are rather the exception than the rule. A +person would be more likely to be blamed than applauded for giving his +family or friends no superiority in good offices over strangers, when he +could do so without violating any other duty; and no one thinks it +unjust to seek one person in preference to another as a friend, +connexion, or companion. Impartiality where rights are concerned is of +course obligatory, but this is involved in the more general obligation +of giving to every one his right. A tribunal, for example, must be +impartial, because it is bound to award, without regard to any other +consideration, a disputed object to the one of two parties who has the +right to it. There are other cases in which impartiality means, being +solely influenced by desert; as with those who, in the capacity of +judges, preceptors, or parents, administer reward and punishment as +such. There are cases, again, in which it means, being solely influenced +by consideration for the public interest; as in making a selection among +candidates for a Government employment. Impartiality, in short, as an +obligation of justice, may be said to mean, being exclusively influenced +by the considerations which it is supposed ought to influence the +particular case in hand; and resisting the solicitation of any motives +which prompt to conduct different from what those considerations would +dictate. + +Nearly allied to the idea of impartiality, is that of _equality_; which +often enters as a component part both into the conception of justice and +into the practice of it, and, in the eyes of many persons, constitutes +its essence. But in this, still more than in any other case, the notion +of justice varies in different persons, and always conforms in its +variations to their notion of utility. Each person maintains that +equality is the dictate of justice, except where he thinks that +expediency requires inequality. The justice of giving equal protection +to the rights of all, is maintained by those who support the most +outrageous inequality in the rights themselves. Even in slave countries +it is theoretically admitted that the rights of the slave, such as they +are, ought to be as sacred as those of the master; and that a tribunal +which fails to enforce them with equal strictness is wanting in justice; +while, at the same time, institutions which leave to the slave scarcely +any rights to enforce, are not deemed unjust, because they are not +deemed inexpedient. Those who think that utility requires distinctions +of rank, do not consider it unjust that riches and social privileges +should be unequally dispensed; but those who think this inequality +inexpedient, think it unjust also. Whoever thinks that government is +necessary, sees no injustice in as much inequality as is constituted by +giving to the magistrate powers not granted to other people. Even among +those who hold levelling doctrines, there are as many questions of +justice as there are differences of opinion about expediency. Some +Communists consider it unjust that the produce of the labour of the +community should be shared on any other principle than that of exact +equality; others think it just that those should receive most whose +needs are greatest; while others hold that those who work harder, or who +produce more, or whose services are more valuable to the community, may +justly claim a larger quota in the division of the produce. And the +sense of natural justice may be plausibly appealed to in behalf of every +one of these opinions. + +Among so many diverse applications of the term Justice, which yet is not +regarded as ambiguous, it is a matter of some difficulty to seize the +mental link which holds them together, and on which the moral sentiment +adhering to the term essentially depends. Perhaps, in this +embarrassment, some help may be derived from the history of the word, as +indicated by its etymology. + +In most, if not in all languages, the etymology of the word which +corresponds to Just, points to an origin connected either with positive +law, or with that which was in most cases the primitive form of +law-authoritative custom. _Justum_ is a form of _jussum_, that which has +been ordered. _Jus_ is of the same origin. _Dichanou_ comes from +_dichae_, of which the principal meaning, at least in the historical +ages of Greece, was a suit at law. Originally, indeed, it meant only the +mode or _manner_ of doing things, but it early came to mean the +_prescribed_ manner; that which the recognized authorities, patriarchal, +judicial, or political, would enforce. _Recht_, from which came _right_ +and _righteous_, is synonymous with law. The original meaning, indeed, +of _recht_ did not point to law, but to physical straightness; as +_wrong_ and its Latin equivalents meant twisted or tortuous; and from +this it is argued that right did not originally mean law, but on the +contrary law meant right. But however this may be, the fact that _recht_ +and _droit_ became restricted in their meaning to positive law, although +much which is not required by law is equally necessary to moral +straightness or rectitude, is as significant of the original character +of moral ideas as if the derivation had been the reverse way. The courts +of justice, the administration of justice, are the courts and the +administration of law. _La justice_, in French, is the established term +for judicature. There can, I think, be no doubt that the _idée mère_, +the primitive element, in the formation of the notion of justice, was +conformity to law. It constituted the entire idea among the Hebrews, up +to the birth of Christianity; as might be expected in the case of a +people whose laws attempted to embrace all subjects on which precepts +were required, and who believed those laws to be a direct emanation from +the Supreme Being. But other nations, and in particular the Greeks and +Romans, who knew that their laws had been made originally, and still +continued to be made, by men, were not afraid to admit that those men +might make bad laws; might do, by law, the same things, and from the +same motives, which, if done by individuals without the sanction of law, +would be called unjust. And hence the sentiment of injustice came to be +attached, not to all violations of law, but only to violations of such +laws as _ought_ to exist, including such as ought to exist but do not; +and to laws themselves, if supposed to be contrary to what ought to be +law. In this manner the idea of law and of its injunctions was still +predominant in the notion of justice, even when the laws actually in +force ceased to be accepted as the standard of it. + +It is true that mankind consider the idea of justice and its obligations +as applicable to many things which neither are, nor is it desired that +they should be, regulated by law. Nobody desires that laws should +interfere with the whole detail of private life; yet every one allows +that in all daily conduct a person may and does show himself to be +either just or unjust. But even here, the idea of the breach of what +ought to be law, still lingers in a modified shape. It would always give +us pleasure, and chime in with our feelings of fitness, that acts which +we deem unjust should be punished, though we do not always think it +expedient that this should be done by the tribunals. We forego that +gratification on account of incidental inconveniences. We should be glad +to see just conduct enforced and injustice repressed, even in the +minutest details, if we were not, with reason, afraid of trusting the +magistrate with so unlimited an amount of power over individuals. When +we think that a person is bound in justice to do a thing, it is an +ordinary form of language to say, that he ought to be compelled to do +it. We should be gratified to see the obligation enforced by anybody who +had the power. If we see that its enforcement by law would be +inexpedient, we lament the impossibility, we consider the impunity given +to injustice as an evil, and strive to make amends for it by bringing a +strong expression of our own and the public disapprobation to bear upon +the offender. Thus the idea of legal constraint is still the generating +idea of the notion of justice, though undergoing several transformations +before that notion, as it exists in an advanced state of society, +becomes complete. + +The above is, I think, a true account, as far as it goes, of the origin +and progressive growth of the idea of justice. But we must observe, that +it contains, as yet, nothing to distinguish that obligation from moral +obligation in general. For the truth is, that the idea of penal +sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not only into the +conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We do not +call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be +punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the +opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of +his own conscience. This seems the real turning point of the distinction +between morality and simple expediency. It is a part of the notion of +Duty in every one of its forms, that a person may rightfully be +compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may be _exacted_ from a +person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it might be exacted +from him, we do not call it his duty. Reasons of prudence, or the +interest of other people, may militate against actually exacting it; but +the person himself, it is clearly understood, would not be entitled to +complain. There are other things, on the contrary, which we wish that +people should do, which we like or admire them for doing, perhaps +dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that they are not +bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not blame them, +that is, we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment. How +we come by these ideas of deserving and not deserving punishment, will +appear, perhaps, in the sequel; but I think there is no doubt that this +distinction lies at the bottom of the notions of right and wrong; that +we call any conduct wrong, or employ instead, some other term of dislike +or disparagement, according as we think that the person ought, or ought +not, to be punished for it; and we say that it would be right to do so +and so, or merely that it would be desirable or laudable, according as +we would wish to see the person whom it concerns, compelled or only +persuaded and exhorted, to act in that manner.[C] + +This, therefore, being the characteristic difference which marks off, +not justice, but morality in general, from the remaining provinces of +Expediency and Worthiness; the character is still to be sought which +distinguishes justice from other branches of morality. Now it is known +that ethical writers divide moral duties into two classes, denoted by +the ill-chosen expressions, duties of perfect and of imperfect +obligation; the latter being those in which, though the act is +obligatory, the particular occasions of performing it are left to our +choice; as in the case of charity or beneficence, which we are indeed +bound to practise, but not towards any definite person, nor at any +prescribed time. In the more precise language of philosophic jurists, +duties of perfect obligation are those duties in virtue of which a +correlative right resides in some person or persons; duties of imperfect +obligation are those moral obligations which do not give birth to any +right. I think it will be found that this distinction exactly coincides +with that which exists between justice and the other obligations of +morality. In our survey of the various popular acceptations of justice, +the term appeared generally to involve the idea of a personal right--a +claim on the part of one or more individuals, like that which the law +gives when it confers a proprietary or other legal right. Whether the +injustice consists in depriving a person of a possession, or in breaking +faith with him, or in treating him worse than he deserves, or worse than +other people who have no greater claims, in each case the supposition +implies two things--a wrong done, and some assignable person who is +wronged. Injustice may also be done by treating a person better than +others; but the wrong in this case is to his competitors, who are also +assignable persons. It seems to me that this feature in the case--a +right in some person, correlative to the moral obligation--constitutes +the specific difference between justice, and generosity or beneficence. +Justice implies something which it is not only right to do, and wrong +not to do, but which some individual person can claim from us as his +moral right. No one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence, +because we are not morally bound to practise those virtues towards any +given individual. And it will be found, with respect to this as with +respect to every correct definition, that the instances which seem to +conflict with it are those which most confirm it. For if a moralist +attempts, as some have done, to make out that mankind generally, though +not any given individual, have a right to all the good we can do them, +he at once, by that thesis, includes generosity and beneficence within +the category of justice. He is obliged to say, that our utmost exertions +are due to our fellow creatures, thus assimilating them to a debt; or +that nothing less can be a sufficient _return_ for what society does for +us, thus classing the case as one of gratitude; both of which are +acknowledged cases of justice. Wherever there is a right, the case is +one of justice, and not of the virtue of beneficence: and whoever does +not place the distinction between justice and morality in general where +we have now placed it, will be found to make no distinction between them +at all, but to merge all morality in justice. + +Having thus endeavoured to determine the distinctive elements which +enter into the composition of the idea of justice, we are ready to enter +on the inquiry, whether the feeling, which accompanies the idea, is +attached to it by a special dispensation of nature, or whether it could +have grown up, by any known laws, out of the idea itself; and in +particular, whether it can have originated in considerations of general +expediency. + +I conceive that the sentiment itself does not arise from anything which +would commonly, or correctly, be termed an idea of expediency; but that, +though the sentiment does not, whatever is moral in it does. + +We have seen that the two essential ingredients in the sentiment of +justice are, the desire to punish a person who has done harm, and the +knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual or +individuals to whom harm has been done. + +Now it appears to me, that the desire to punish a person who has done +harm to some individual, is a spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments, +both in the highest degree natural, and which either are or resemble +instincts; the impulse of self-defence, and the feeling of sympathy. + +It is natural to resent, and to repel or retaliate, any harm done or +attempted against ourselves, or against those with whom we sympathize. +The origin of this sentiment it is not necessary here to discuss. +Whether it be an instinct or a result of intelligence, it is, we know, +common to all animal nature; for every animal tries to hurt those who +have hurt, or who it thinks are about to hurt, itself or its young. +Human beings, on this point, only differ from other animals in two +particulars. First, in being capable of sympathizing, not solely with +their offspring, or, like some of the more noble animals, with some +superior animal who is kind to them, but with all human, and even with +all sentient beings. Secondly, in having a more developed intelligence, +which gives a wider range to the whole of their sentiments, whether +self-regarding or sympathetic. By virtue of his superior intelligence, +even apart from his superior range of sympathy, a human being is capable +of apprehending a community of interest between himself and the human +society of which he forms a part, such that any conduct which threatens +the security of the society generally, is threatening to his own, and +calls forth his instinct (if instinct it be) of self-defence. The same +superiority of intelligence, joined to the power of sympathizing with +human beings generally, enables him to attach himself to the collective +idea of his tribe, his country, or mankind, in such a manner that any +act hurtful to them rouses his instinct of sympathy, and urges him to +resistance. + +The sentiment of justice, in that one of its elements which consists of +the desire to punish, is thus, I conceive, the natural feeling of +retaliation or vengeance, rendered by intellect and sympathy applicable +to those injuries, that is, to those hurts, which wound us through, or +in common with, society at large. This sentiment, in itself, has nothing +moral in it; what is moral is, the exclusive subordination of it to the +social sympathies, so as to wait on and obey their call. For the natural +feeling tends to make us resent indiscriminately whatever any one does +that is disagreeable to us; but when moralized by the social feeling, it +only acts in the directions conformable to the general good; just +persons resenting a hurt to society, though not otherwise a hurt to +themselves, and not resenting a hurt to themselves, however painful, +unless it be of the kind which society has a common interest with them +in the repression of. + +It is no objection against this doctrine to say, that when we feel our +sentiment of justice outraged, we are not thinking of society at large, +or of any collective interest, but only of the individual case. It is +common enough certainly, though the reverse of commendable, to feel +resentment merely because we have suffered pain; but a person whose +resentment is really a moral feeling, that is, who considers whether an +act is blameable before he allows himself to resent it--such a person, +though he may not say expressly to himself that he is standing up for +the interest of society, certainly does feel that he is asserting a rule +which is for the benefit of others as well as for his own. If he is not +feeling this--if he is regarding the act solely as it affects him +individually--he is not consciously just; he is not concerning himself +about the justice of his actions. This is admitted even by +anti-utilitarian moralists. When Kant (as before remarked) propounds as +the fundamental principle of morals, 'So act, that thy rule of conduct +might be adopted as a law by all rational beings,' he virtually +acknowledges that the interest of mankind collectively, or at least of +mankind indiscriminately, must be in the mind of the agent when +conscientiously deciding on the morality of the act. Otherwise he uses +words without a meaning: for, that a rule even of utter selfishness +could not _possibly_ be adopted by all rational beings--that there is +any insuperable obstacle in the nature of things to its adoption--cannot +be even plausibly maintained. To give any meaning to Kant's principle, +the sense put upon it must be, that we ought to shape our conduct by a +rule which all rational beings might adopt _with benefit to their +collective interest_. + +To recapitulate: the idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of +conduct, and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be +supposed common to all mankind, and intended for their good. The other +(the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who +infringe the rule. There is involved, in addition, the conception of +some definite person who suffers by the infringement; whose rights (to +use the expression appropriated to the case) are violated by it. And the +sentiment of justice appears to me to be, the animal desire to repel or +retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself, or to those with whom one +sympathizes, widened so as to include all persons, by the human capacity +of enlarged sympathy, and the human conception of intelligent +self-interest. From the latter elements, the feeling derives its +morality; from the former, its peculiar impressiveness, and energy of +self-assertion. + +I have, throughout, treated the idea of a _right_ residing in the +injured person, and violated by the injury, not as a separate element in +the composition of the idea and sentiment, but as one of the forms in +which the other two elements clothe themselves. These elements are, a +hurt to some assignable person or persons on the one hand, and a demand +for punishment on the other. An examination of our own minds, I think, +will show, that these two things include all that we mean when we speak +of violation of a right. When we call anything a person's right, we mean +that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession +of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion. +If he has what we consider a sufficient claim, on whatever account, to +have something guaranteed to him by society, we say that he has a right +to it. If we desire to prove that anything does not belong to him by +right, we think this done as soon as it is admitted that society ought +not to take measures for securing it to him, but should leave it to +chance, or to his own exertions. Thus, a person is said to have a right +to what he can earn in fair professional competition; because society +ought not to allow any other person to hinder him from endeavouring to +earn in that manner as much as he can. But he has not a right to three +hundred a-year, though he may happen to be earning it; because society +is not called on to provide that he shall earn that sum. On the +contrary, if he owns ten thousand pounds three per cent. stock, he _has_ +a right to three hundred a-year; because society has come under an +obligation to provide him with an income of that amount. + +To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society +ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask +why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility. If +that expression does not seem to convey a sufficient feeling of the +strength of the obligation, nor to account for the peculiar energy of +the feeling, it is because there goes to the composition of the +sentiment, not a rational only but also an animal element, the thirst +for retaliation; and this thirst derives its intensity, as well as its +moral justification, from the extraordinarily important and impressive +kind of utility which is concerned. The interest involved is that of +security, to every one's feelings the most vital of all interests. +Nearly all other earthly benefits are needed by one person, not needed +by another; and many of them can, if necessary, be cheerfully foregone, +or replaced by something else; but security no human being can possibly +do without; on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the +whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing moment; since +nothing but the gratification of the instant could be of any worth to +us, if we could be deprived of everything the next instant by whoever +was momentarily stronger than ourselves. Now this most indispensable of +all necessaries, after physical nutriment, cannot be had, unless the +machinery for providing it is kept unintermittedly in active play. Our +notion, therefore, of the claim we have on our fellow creatures to join +in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence, gathers +feelings round it so much more intense than those concerned in any of +the more common cases of utility, that the difference in degree (as is +often the case in psychology) becomes a real difference in kind. The +claim assumes that character of absoluteness, that apparent infinity, +and incommensurability with all other considerations, which constitute +the distinction between the feeling of right and wrong and that of +ordinary expediency and inexpediency. The feelings concerned are so +powerful, and we count so positively on finding a responsive feeling in +others (all being alike interested), that _ought_ and _should_ grow into +_must_, and recognized indispensability becomes a moral necessity, +analogous to physical, and often not inferior to it in binding force. + +If the preceding analysis, or something resembling it, be not the +correct account of the notion of justice; if justice be totally +independent of utility, and be a standard _per se_, which the mind can +recognize by simple introspection of itself; it is hard to understand +why that internal oracle is so ambiguous, and why so many things appear +either just or unjust, according to the light in which they are +regarded. We are continually informed that Utility is an uncertain +standard, which every different person interprets differently, and that +there is no safety but in the immutable, ineffaceable, and unmistakeable +dictates of Justice, which carry their evidence in themselves, and are +independent of the fluctuations of opinion. One would suppose from this +that on questions of justice there could be no controversy; that if we +take that for our rule, its application to any given case could leave us +in as little doubt as a mathematical demonstration. So far is this from +being the fact, that there is as much difference of opinion, and as +fierce discussion, about what is just, as about what is useful to +society. Not only have different nations and individuals different +notions of justice, but, in the mind of one and the same individual, +justice is not some one rule, principle, or maxim, but many, which do +not always coincide in their dictates, and in choosing between which, he +is guided either by some extraneous standard, or by his own personal +predilections. + +For instance, there are some who say, that it is unjust to punish any +one for the sake of example to others; that punishment is just, only +when intended for the good of the sufferer himself. Others maintain the +extreme reverse, contending that to punish persons who have attained +years of discretion, for their own benefit, is despotism and injustice, +since if the matter at issue is solely their own good, no one has a +right to control their own judgment of it; but that they may justly be +punished to prevent evil to others, this being an exercise of the +legitimate right of self-defence. Mr. Owen, again, affirms that it is +unjust to punish at all; for the criminal did not make his own +character; his education, and the circumstances which surround him, have +made him a criminal, and for these he is not responsible. All these +opinions are extremely plausible; and so long as the question is argued +as one of justice simply, without going down to the principles which lie +under justice and are the source of its authority, I am unable to see +how any of these reasoners can be refuted. For, in truth, every one of +the three builds upon rules of justice confessedly true. The first +appeals to the acknowledged injustice of singling out an individual, and +making him a sacrifice, without his consent, for other people's benefit. +The second relies on the acknowledged justice of self-defence, and the +admitted injustice of forcing one person to conform to another's notions +of what constitutes his good. The Owenite invokes the admitted +principle, that it is unjust to punish any one for what he cannot help. +Each is triumphant so long as he is not compelled to take into +consideration any other maxims of justice than the one he has selected; +but as soon as their several maxims are brought face to face, each +disputant seems to have exactly as much to say for himself as the +others. No one of them can carry out his own notion of justice without +trampling upon another equally binding. These are difficulties; they +have always been felt to be such; and many devices have been invented to +turn rather than to overcome them. As a refuge from the last of the +three, men imagined what they called the freedom of the will; fancying +that they could not justify punishing a man whose will is in a +thoroughly hateful state, unless it be supposed to have come into that +state through no influence of anterior circumstances. To escape from the +other difficulties, a favourite contrivance has been the fiction of a +contract, whereby at some unknown period all the members of society +engaged to obey the laws, and consented to be punished for any +disobedience to them; thereby giving to their legislators the right, +which it is assumed they would not otherwise have had, of punishing +them, either for their own good or for that of society. This happy +thought was considered to get rid of the whole difficulty, and to +legitimate the infliction of punishment, in virtue of another received +maxim of justice, _volenti non fit injuria_; that is not unjust which is +done with the consent of the person who is supposed to be hurt by it. I +need hardly remark, that even if the consent were not a mere fiction, +this maxim is not superior in authority to the others which it is +brought in to supersede. It is, on the contrary, an instructive specimen +of the loose and irregular manner in which supposed principles of +justice grow up. This particular one evidently came into use as a help +to the coarse exigencies of courts of law, which are sometimes obliged +to be content with very uncertain presumptions, on account of the +greater evils which would often arise from any attempt on their part to +cut finer. But even courts of law are not able to adhere consistently to +the maxim, for they allow voluntary engagements to be set aside on the +ground of fraud, and sometimes on that of mere mistake or +misinformation. + +Again, when the legitimacy of inflicting punishment is admitted, how +many conflicting conceptions of justice come to light in discussing the +proper apportionment of punishment to offences. No rule on this subject +recommends itself so strongly to the primitive and spontaneous sentiment +of justice, as the _lex talionis_, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a +tooth. Though this principle of the Jewish and of the Mahomedan law has +been generally abandoned in Europe as a practical maxim, there is, I +suspect, in most minds, a secret hankering after it; and when +retribution accidentally falls on an offender in that precise shape, the +general feeling of satisfaction evinced, bears witness how natural is +the sentiment to which this repayment in kind is acceptable. With many +the test of justice in penal infliction is that the punishment should be +proportioned to the offence; meaning that it should be exactly measured +by the moral guilt of the culprit (whatever be their standard for +measuring moral guilt): the consideration, what amount of punishment is +necessary to deter from the offence, having nothing to do with the +question of justice, in their estimation: while there are others to whom +that consideration is all in all; who maintain that it is not just, at +least for man, to inflict on a fellow creature, whatever may be his +offences, any amount of suffering beyond the least that will suffice to +prevent him from repeating, and others from imitating, his misconduct. + +To take another example from a subject already once referred to. In a +co-operative industrial association, is it just or not that talent or +skill should give a title to superior remuneration? On the negative side +of the question it is argued, that whoever does the best he can, +deserves equally well, and ought not in justice to be put in a position +of inferiority for no fault of his own; that superior abilities have +already advantages more than enough, in the admiration they excite, the +personal influence they command, and the internal sources of +satisfaction attending them, without adding to these a superior share of +the world's goods; and that society is bound in justice rather to make +compensation to the less favoured, for this unmerited inequality of +advantages, than to aggravate it. On the contrary side it is contended, +that society receives more from the more efficient labourer; that his +services being more useful, society owes him a larger return for them; +that a greater share of the joint result is actually his work, and not +to allow his claim to it is a kind of robbery; that if he is only to +receive as much as others, he can only be justly required to produce as +much, and to give a smaller amount of time and exertion, proportioned to +his superior efficiency. Who shall decide between these appeals to +conflicting principles of justice? Justice has in this case two sides to +it, which it is impossible to bring into harmony, and the two disputants +have chosen opposite sides; the one looks to what it is just that the +individual should receive, the other to what it is just that the +community should give. Each, from his own point of view, is +unanswerable; and any choice between them, on grounds of justice, must +be perfectly arbitrary. Social utility alone can decide the preference. + +How many, again, and how irreconcileable, are the standards of justice +to which reference is made in discussing the repartition of taxation. +One opinion is, that payment to the State should be in numerical +proportion to pecuniary means. Others think that justice dictates what +they term graduated taxation; taking a higher percentage from those who +have more to spare. In point of natural justice a strong case might be +made for disregarding means altogether, and taking the same absolute sum +(whenever it could be got) from every one: as the subscribers to a mess, +or to a club, all pay the same sum for the same privileges, whether they +can all equally afford it or not. Since the protection (it might be +said) of law and government is afforded to, and is equally required by, +all, there is no injustice in making all buy it at the same price. It is +reckoned justice, not injustice, that a dealer should charge to all +customers the same price for the same article, not a price varying +according to their means of payment. This doctrine, as applied to +taxation, finds no advocates, because it conflicts strongly with men's +feelings of humanity and perceptions of social expediency; but the +principle of justice which it invokes is as true and as binding as those +which can be appealed to against it. Accordingly, it exerts a tacit +influence on the line of defence employed for other modes of assessing +taxation. People feel obliged to argue that the State does more for the +rich than for the poor, as a justification for its taking more from +them: though this is in reality not true, for the rich would be far +better able to protect themselves, in the absence of law or government, +than the poor, and indeed would probably be successful in converting the +poor into their slaves. Others, again, so far defer to the same +conception of justice, as to maintain that all should pay an equal +capitation tax for the protection of their persons (these being of equal +value to all), and an unequal tax for the protection of their property, +which is unequal. To this others reply, that the all of one man is as +valuable to him as the all of another. From these confusions there is no +other mode of extrication than the utilitarian. + + * * * * * + +Is, then, the difference between the Just and the Expedient a merely +imaginary distinction? Have mankind been under a delusion in thinking +that justice is a more sacred thing than policy, and that the latter +ought only to be listened to after the former has been satisfied? By no +means. The exposition we have given of the nature and origin of the +sentiment, recognises a real distinction; and no one of those who +profess the most sublime contempt for the consequences of actions as an +element in their morality, attaches more importance to the distinction +than I do. While I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up +an imaginary standard of justice not grounded on utility, I account the +justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and +incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality. Justice +is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the +essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more +absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life; and +the notion which we have found to be of the essence of the idea of +justice, that of a right residing in an individual, implies and +testifies to this more binding obligation. + +The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which we +must never forget to include wrongful interference with each other's +freedom) are more vital to human well-being than any maxims, however +important, which only point out the best mode of managing some +department of human affairs. They have also the peculiarity, that they +are the main element in determining the whole of the social feelings of +mankind. It is their observance which alone preserves peace among human +beings: if obedience to them were not the rule, and disobedience the +exception, every one would see in every one else a probable enemy, +against whom he must be perpetually guarding himself. What is hardly +less important, these are the precepts which mankind have the strongest +and the most direct inducements for impressing upon one another. By +merely giving to each other prudential instruction or exhortation, they +may gain, or think they gain, nothing: in inculcating on each other the +duty of positive beneficence they have an unmistakeable interest, but +far less in degree: a person may possibly not need the benefits of +others; but he always needs that they should not do him hurt. Thus the +moralities which protect every individual from being harmed by others, +either directly or by being hindered in his freedom of pursuing his own +good, are at once those which he himself has most at heart, and those +which he has the strongest interest in publishing and enforcing by word +and deed. It is by a person's observance of these, that his fitness to +exist as one of the fellowship of human beings, is tested and decided; +for on that depends his being a nuisance or not to those with whom he is +in contact. Now it is these moralities primarily, which compose the +obligations of justice. The most marked cases of injustice, and those +which give the tone to the feeling of repugnance which characterizes the +sentiment, are acts of wrongful aggression, or wrongful exercise of +power over some one; the next are those which consist in wrongfully +withholding from him something which is his due; in both cases, +inflicting on him a positive hurt, either in the form of direct +suffering, or of the privation of some good which he had reasonable +ground, either of a physical or of a social kind, for counting upon. + +The same powerful motives which command the observance of these primary +moralities, enjoin the punishment of those who violate them; and as the +impulses of self-defence, of defence of others, and of vengeance, are +all called forth against such persons, retribution, or evil for evil, +becomes closely connected with the sentiment of justice, and is +universally included in the idea. Good for good is also one of the +dictates of justice; and this, though its social utility is evident, and +though it carries with it a natural human feeling, has not at first +sight that obvious connexion with hurt or injury, which, existing in the +most elementary cases of just and unjust, is the source of the +characteristic intensity of the sentiment. But the connexion, though +less obvious, is not less real. He who accepts benefits, and denies a +return of them when needed, inflicts a real hurt, by disappointing one +of the most natural and reasonable of expectations, and one which he +must at least tacitly have encouraged, otherwise the benefits would +seldom have been conferred. The important rank, among human evils and +wrongs, of the disappointment of expectation, is shown in the fact that +it constitutes the principal criminality of two such highly immoral acts +as a breach of friendship and a breach of promise. Few hurts which human +beings can sustain are greater, and none wound more, than when that on +which they habitually and with full assurance relied, fails them in the +hour of need; and few wrongs are greater than this mere withholding of +good; none excite more resentment, either in the person suffering, or in +a sympathizing spectator. The principle, therefore, of giving to each +what they deserve, that is, good for good as well as evil for evil, is +not only included within the idea of Justice as we have defined it, but +is a proper object of that intensity of sentiment, which places the +Just, in human estimation, above the simply Expedient. + +Most of the maxims of justice current in the world, and commonly +appealed to in its transactions, are simply instrumental to carrying +into effect the principles of justice which we have now spoken of. That +a person is only responsible for what he has done voluntarily, or could +voluntarily have avoided; that it is unjust to condemn any person +unheard; that the punishment ought to be proportioned to the offence, +and the like, are maxims intended to prevent the just principle of evil +for evil from being perverted to the infliction of evil without that +justification. The greater part of these common maxims have come into +use from the practice of courts of justice, which have been naturally +led to a more complete recognition and elaboration than was likely to +suggest itself to others, of the rules necessary to enable them to +fulfil their double function, of inflicting punishment when due, and of +awarding to each person his right. + +That first of judicial virtues, impartiality, is an obligation of +justice, partly for the reason last mentioned; as being a necessary +condition of the fulfilment of the other obligations of justice. But +this is not the only source of the exalted rank, among human +obligations, of those maxims of equality and impartiality, which, both +in popular estimation and in that of the most enlightened, are included +among the precepts of justice. In one point of view, they may be +considered as corollaries from the principles already laid down. If it +is a duty to do to each according to his deserts, returning good for +good as well as repressing evil by evil, it necessarily follows that we +should treat all equally well (when no higher duty forbids) who have +deserved equally well of us, and that society should treat all equally +well who have deserved equally well of it, that is, who have deserved +equally well absolutely. This is the highest abstract standard of social +and distributive justice; towards which all institutions, and the +efforts of all virtuous citizens, should be made in the utmost possible +degree to converge. But this great moral duty rests upon a still deeper +foundation, being a direct emanation from the first principle of morals, +and not a mere logical corollary from secondary or derivative doctrines. +It is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the +Greatest-Happiness Principle. That principle is a mere form of words +without rational signification, unless one person's happiness, supposed +equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted +for exactly as much as another's. Those conditions being supplied, +Bentham's dictum, 'everybody to count for one, nobody for more than +one,' might be written under the principle of utility as an explanatory +commentary.[D] The equal claim of everybody to happiness in the +estimation of the moralist and the legislator, involves an equal claim +to all the means of happiness, except in so far as the inevitable +conditions of human life, and the general interest, in which that of +every individual is included, set limits to the maxim; and those limits +ought to be strictly construed. As every other maxim of justice, so +this, is by no means applied or held applicable universally; on the +contrary, as I have already remarked, it bends to every person's ideas +of social expediency. But in whatever case it is deemed applicable at +all, it is held to be the dictate of justice. All persons are deemed to +have a _right_ to equality of treatment, except when some recognised +social expediency requires the reverse. And hence all social +inequalities which have ceased to be considered expedient, assume the +character not of simple inexpediency, but of injustice, and appear so +tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how they ever could have been +tolerated; forgetful that they themselves perhaps tolerate other +inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of expediency, the +correction of which would make that which they approve seem quite as +monstrous as what they have at last learnt to condemn. The entire +history of social improvement has been a series of transitions, by which +one custom or institution after another, from being a supposed primary +necessity of social existence, has passed into the rank of an +universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the +distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and +plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the +aristocracies of colour, race, and sex. + +It appears from what has been said, that justice is a name for certain +moral requirements, which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the +scale of social utility, and are therefore of more paramount obligation, +than any others; though particular cases may occur in which some other +social duty is so important, as to overrule any one of the general +maxims of justice. Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, +but a duty, to steal, or take by force, the necessary food or medicine, +or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified medical +practitioner. In such cases, as we do not call anything justice which is +not a virtue, we usually say, not that justice must give way to some +other moral principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by +reason of that other principle, not just in the particular case. By this +useful accommodation of language, the character of indefeasibility +attributed to justice is kept up, and we are saved from the necessity of +maintaining that there can be laudable injustice. + +The considerations which have now been adduced resolve, I conceive, the +only real difficulty in the utilitarian theory of morals. It has always +been evident that all cases of justice are also cases of expediency: the +difference is in the peculiar sentiment which attaches to the former, as +contradistinguished from the latter. If this characteristic sentiment +has been sufficiently accounted for; if there is no necessity to assume +for it any peculiarity of origin; if it is simply the natural feeling of +resentment, moralized by being made coextensive with the demands of +social good; and if this feeling not only does but ought to exist in all +the classes of cases to which the idea of justice corresponds; that idea +no longer presents itself as a stumbling-block to the utilitarian +ethics. Justice remains the appropriate name for certain social +utilities which are vastly more important, and therefore more absolute +and imperative, than any others are as a class (though not more so than +others may be in particular cases); and which, therefore, ought to be, +as well as naturally are, guarded by a sentiment not only different in +degree, but also in kind; distinguished from the milder feeling which +attaches to the mere idea of promoting human pleasure or convenience, at +once by the more definite nature of its commands, and by the sterner +character of its sanctions. + + +THE END. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote C: See this point enforced and illustrated by Professor Bain, +in an admirable chapter (entitled "The Ethical Emotions, or the Moral +Sense") of the second of the two treatises composing his elaborate and +profound work on the Mind.] + +[Footnote D: This implication, in the first principle of the utilitarian +scheme, of perfect impartiality between persons, is regarded by Mr. +Herbert Spencer (in his _Social Statics_) as a disproof of the +pretentions of utility to be a sufficient guide to right; since (he +says) the principle of utility presupposes the anterior principle, that +everybody has an equal right to happiness. It may be more correctly +described as supposing that equal amounts of happiness are equally +desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons. This, +however, is not a pre-supposition; not a premise needful to support the +principle of utility, but the very principle itself; for what is the +principle of utility, if it be not that 'happiness' and 'desirable' are +synonymous terms? If there is any anterior principle implied, it can be +no other than this, that the truths of arithmetic are applicable to the +valuation of happiness, as of all other measurable quantities. + +[Mr. Herbert Spencer, in a private communication on the subject of the +preceding Note, objects to being considered an opponent of +Utilitarianism; and states that he regards happiness as the ultimate end +of morality; but deems that end only partially attainable by empirical +generalizations from the observed results of conduct, and completely +attainable only by deducing, from the laws of life and the conditions of +existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, +and what kinds to produce unhappiness. With the exception of the word +"necessarily," I have no dissent to express from this doctrine; and +(omitting that word) I am not aware that any modern advocate of +utilitarianism is of a different opinion. Bentham, certainly, to whom in +the _Social Statics_ Mr. Spencer particularly referred, is, least of all +writers, chargeable with unwillingness to deduce the effect of actions +on happiness from the laws of human nature and the universal conditions +of human life. The common charge against him is of relying too +exclusively upon such deductions, and declining altogether to be bound +by the generalizations from specific experience which Mr. Spencer thinks +that utilitarians generally confine themselves to. My own opinion (and, +as I collect, Mr. Spencer's) is, that in ethics, as in all other +branches of scientific study, the consilience of the results of both +these processes, each corroborating and verifying the other, is +requisite to give to any general proposition the kind and degree of +evidence which constitutes scientific proof.]] + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Utilitarianism, by John Stuart Mill + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK UTILITARIANISM *** + +***** This file should be named 11224-8.txt or 11224-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/1/2/2/11224/ + +Produced by Julie Barkley, Garrett Alley and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team. + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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