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+Project Gutenberg's History Of Modern Philosophy, by Richard Falckenberg
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: History Of Modern Philosophy
+       From Nicolas of Cusa to the Present Time
+
+Author: Richard Falckenberg
+
+Release Date: February 17, 2004 [EBook #11100]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: UTF-8
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Juliet Sutherland, Lazar Liveanu and PG Distributed
+Proofreaders
+
+
+
+
+
+HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY
+
+From Nicolas of Cusa to the Present Time
+
+
+by
+
+RICHARD FALCKENBERG
+
+_Professor of Philosophy in the University of Erlangen_
+
+
+
+
+_THIRD AMERICAN FROM THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION_
+
+
+TRANSLATED WITH THE AUTHOR'S SANCTION BY
+A.C. ARMSTRONG, JR.
+_Professor of Philosophy in Wesleyan University_
+
+
+
+1893
+
+
+
+
+TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
+
+The aim of this translation is the same as that of the original work. Each
+is the outcome of experience in university instruction in philosophy, and
+is intended to furnish a manual which shall be at once scientific and
+popular, one to stand midway between the exhaustive expositions of the
+larger histories and the meager sketches of the compendiums. A pupil of
+Kuno Fischer, Fortlage, J.E. Erdmann, Lotze, and Eucken among others,
+Professor Falckenberg began his career as _Docent_ in the university of
+Jena. In the year following the first edition of this work he became
+_Extraordinarius_ in the same university, and in 1888 _Ordinarius_ at
+Erlangen, choosing the latter call in preference to an invitation to Dorpat
+as successor to Teichmüller. The chair at Erlangen he still holds. His work
+as teacher and author has been chiefly in the history of modern philosophy.
+Besides the present work and numerous minor articles, he has published the
+following: _Ueber den intelligiblen Charakter, zur Kritik der Kantischen
+Freiheitslehre_ 1879; _Grundzüge der Philosophie des Nicolaus Cusanus_,
+1880-81; and _Ueber die gegenwärtige Lage der deutschen Philosophie_, 1890
+(inaugural address at Erlangen). Since 1884-5 Professor Falckenberg has
+also been an editor of the _Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische
+Kritik_, until 1888 in association with Krohn, and after the latter's
+death, alone. At present he has in hand a treatise on Lotze for a German
+series analogous to Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, which is to be
+issued under his direction. Professor Falckenberg's general philosophical
+position may be described as that of moderate idealism. His historical
+method is strictly objective, the aim being a free reproduction of the
+systems discussed, as far as possible in their original terminology and
+historical connection, and without the intrusion of personal criticism.
+
+The translation has been made from the second German edition (1892),
+with still later additions and corrections communicated by the author in
+manuscript. The translator has followed the original faithfully but
+not slavishly. He has not felt free to modify Professor Falckenberg's
+expositions, even in the rare cases where his own opinions would have led
+him to dissent, but minor changes have been made wherever needed to fit the
+book for the use of English-speaking students. Thus a few alterations have
+been made in dates and titles, chiefly under the English systems and from
+the latest authorities; and a few notes added in elucidation of portions
+of the text. Thus again the balance of the bibliography has been somewhat
+changed, including transfers from text to notes and _vice versa_ and a few
+omissions, besides the introduction of a number of titles from our English
+philosophical literature chosen on the plan referred to in the preface
+to the first German edition. The glossary of terms foreign to the German
+reader has been replaced by a revision and expansion of the index, with the
+analyses of the glossary as a basis. Wherever possible, and this has been
+true in all important cases, the changes have been indicated by the usual
+signs.
+
+The translator has further rewritten Chapter XV., Section 3, on recent
+British and American Philosophy. In this so much of the author's
+(historical) standpoint and treatment as proved compatible with the aim of
+a manual in English has been retained, but the section as a whole has been
+rearranged and much enlarged.
+
+The labor of translation has been lightened by the example of previous
+writers, especially of the translators of the standard treatises of
+Ueberweg and Erdmann. The thanks of the translator are also due to several
+friends who have kindly aided him by advice or assistance: in particular to
+his friend and former pupil, Mr. C.M. Child, M.S., who participated in the
+preparation of a portion of the translation; and above all to Professor
+Falckenberg himself, who, by his willing sanction of the work and his
+co-operation throughout its progress, has given a striking example of
+scholarly courtesy.
+
+A.C.A., Jr.
+
+Wesleyan University, June, 1893.
+
+
+
+PREFACE TO THE FIRST GERMAN EDITION.
+
+Since the appearance of Eduard Zeller's _Grundriss der Geschichte der
+griechischen Philosophie_ (1883; 3d ed. 1889) the need has become even more
+apparent than before for a presentation of the history of modern philosophy
+which should be correspondingly compact and correspondingly available for
+purposes of instruction. It would have been an ambitious undertaking to
+attempt to supply a counterpart to the compendium of this honored scholar,
+with its clear and simple summation of the results of his much admired five
+volumes on Greek philosophy; and it has been only in regard to practical
+utility and careful consideration of the needs of students--concerning
+which we have enjoyed opportunity for gaining accurate information in the
+review exercises regularly held in this university--that we have ventured
+to hope that we might not fall too far short of his example.
+
+The predominantly practical aim of this _History_--it is intended to serve
+as an aid in introductory work, in reviewing, and as a substitute for
+dictations in academical lectures, as well as to be a guide for the
+wider circle of cultivated readers--has enjoined self-restraint in the
+development of personal views and the limitation of critical reflections
+in favor of objective presentation. It is only now and then that critical
+hints have been given. In the discussion of phenomena of minor importance
+it has been impossible to avoid the _oratio obliqua_ of exposition; but,
+wherever practicable, we have let the philosophers themselves develop their
+doctrines and reasons, not so much by literal quotations from their
+works, as by free, condensed reproductions of their leading ideas. If the
+principiant view of the forces which control the history of philosophy, and
+of the progress of modern philosophy, expressed in the Introduction and in
+the Retrospect at the end of the book, have not been everywhere verified
+in detail from the historical facts, this is due in part to the limits, in
+part to the pedagogical aim, of the work. Thus, in particular, more space
+has for pedagogical reasons been devoted to the "psychological" explanation
+of systems, as being more popular, than in our opinion its intrinsic
+importance would entitle it to demand. To satisfy every one in the choice
+of subjects and in the extent of the discussion is impossible; but our hope
+is that those who would have preferred a guide of this sort to be entirely
+different will not prove too numerous. In the classification of movements
+and schools, and in the arrangement of the contents of the various systems,
+it has not been our aim to deviate at all hazards from previous accounts;
+and as little to leave unutilized the benefits accruing to later comers
+from the distinguished achievements of earlier workers in the field. In
+particular we acknowledge with gratitude the assistance derived from the
+renewed study of the works on the subject by Kuno Fischer, J.E. Erdmann,
+Zeller, Windelband, Ueberweg-Heinze, Harms, Lange, Vorlãnder, and Pünjer.
+
+The motive which induced us to take up the present work was the perception
+that there was lacking a text-book in the history of modern philosophy,
+which, more comprehensive, thorough, and precise than the sketches of
+Schwegler and his successors, should stand between the fine but detailed
+exposition of Windelband, and the substantial but--because of the division
+of the text into paragraphs and notes and the interpolation of pages of
+bibliographical references--rather dry outline of Ueberweg. While the
+former refrains from all references to the literature of the subject and
+the latter includes far too many, at least for purposes of instruction, and
+J.B. Meyer's _Leitfaden_ (1882) is in general confined to biographical and
+bibliographical notices; we have mentioned, in the text or the notes and
+with the greatest possible regard for the progress of the exposition, both
+the chief works of the philosophers themselves and some of the
+treatises concerning them. The principles which have guided us in these
+selections--to include only the more valuable works and those best adapted
+for students' reading, and further to refer as far as possible to the most
+recent works--will hardly be in danger of criticism. But we shall not
+dispute the probability that many a book worthy of mention may have been
+overlooked.
+
+The explanation of a number of philosophical terms, which has been added as
+an appendix at the suggestion of the publishers, deals almost entirely
+with foreign expressions and gives the preference to the designations of
+fundamental movements. It is arranged, as far as possible, so that it may
+be used as a subject-index.
+
+JENA, December 23, 1885.
+
+
+
+PREFACE TO THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION.
+
+The majority of the alterations and additions in this new edition are in
+the first chapter and the last two; no departure from the general character
+of the exposition has seemed to me necessary. I desire to return my
+sincere thanks for the suggestions which have come to me alike from public
+critiques and private communications. In some cases contradictory requests
+have conflicted--thus, on the one hand, I have been urged to expand, on the
+other, to cut down the sections on German idealism, especially those on
+Hegel--and here I confess my inability to meet both demands. Among the
+reviews, that by B. Erdmann in the first volume of the _Archiv für
+Geschichte der Philosophie_, and, among the suggestions made by letter,
+those of H. Heussler, have been of especial value. Since others commonly
+see defects more clearly than one's self, it will be very welcome if I can
+have my desire continually to make this _History_ more useful supported by
+farther suggestions from the circle of its readers. In case it continues to
+enjoy the favor of teachers and students, these will receive conscientious
+consideration.
+
+For the sake of those who may complain of too much matter, I may remark
+that the difficulty can easily be avoided by passing over Chapters I., V.
+(§§ 1-3), VI., VIII., XII., XV., and XVI.
+
+Professor A.C. Armstrong, Jr., is preparing an English translation. My
+earnest thanks are due to Mr. Karl Niemann of Charlottenburg for his kind
+participation in the labor of proof-reading.
+
+R.F.
+
+ERLANGEN, June 11, 1892.
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+%CONTENTS.%
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION: FROM NICOLAS OF CUSA TO DESCARTES
+
+1. Nicolas of Cusa
+2. The Revival of Ancient Philosophy and the Opposition to it
+3. The Italian Philosophy of Nature
+4. Philosophy of the State and of Law
+5. Skepticism in France
+6. German Mysticism
+7. The Foundation of Modern Physics
+8. Philosophy in England to the Middle of the Seventeenth Century
+  (_a_) Bacon's Predecessors
+  (_b_) Bacon
+  (_c_) Hobbes
+  (_d_) Lord Herbert of Cherbury
+9. Preliminary Survey
+
+
+
+
+PART I.
+
+%From Descartes to Kant.%
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+DESCARTES
+
+1. The Principles
+2. Nature
+3. Man
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF CARTESIANISM IN THE NETHERLANDS AND
+IN FRANCE
+
+1. Occasionalism: Geulincx
+2. Spinoza
+  _(a)_ Substance, Attributes, and Modes
+  _(b)_ Anthropology; Cognition and the Passions
+  _(c)_ Practical Philosophy
+3. Pascal, Malebranche, Bayle
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+LOCKE
+
+  _(a)_ Theory of Knowledge
+  _(b)_ Practical Philosophy
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
+
+1. Natural Philosophy and Psychology
+2. Deism
+3. Moral Philosophy
+4. Theory of Knowledge
+ _(a)_ Berkeley
+ _(b)_ Hume
+ _(c)_ The Scottish School
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+THE FRENCH ILLUMINATION
+
+1. The Entrance of English Doctrines
+2. Theoretical and Practical Sensationalism
+3. Skepticism and Materialism
+4. Rousseau's Conflict with the Illumination
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+LEIBNITZ
+
+1. Metaphysics: the Monads, Representation, the Pre-established Harmony;
+the Laws of Thought and of the World
+2. The Organic World
+3. Man: Cognition and Volition
+4. Theology and Theodicy
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.
+
+THE GERMAN ILLUMINATION
+
+1. The Contemporaries of Leibnitz
+2. Christian Wolff
+3. The Illumination as Scientific and as Popular Philosophy
+4. The Faith Philosophy
+
+
+
+
+PART II.
+
+%From Kant to the Present Time.%
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.
+
+KANT
+
+1. Theory of Knowledge
+  _(a)_ The Pure Intuitions (Transcendental Aesthetic)
+  _(b)_ The Concepts and Principles of the Pure Understanding
+  (Transcendental Analytic)
+  _(c)_ The Reason's Ideas of the Unconditioned (Transcendental
+  Dialectic)
+2. Theory of Ethics
+3. Theory of the Beautiful and of Ends in Nature
+  _(a)_ Aesthetic Judgment
+  _(b)_ Teleological Judgment
+4. From Kant to Fichte
+
+
+CHAPTER X.
+
+FICHTE
+
+1. The Science of Knowledge
+  _(a)_ The Problem
+  _(b)_ The Three Principles
+  _(c)_ The Theoretical Ego
+  _(d)_ The Practical Ego
+2. The Science of Ethics and of Right
+3. Fichte's Second Period: his View of History and his Theory
+of Religion
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.
+
+SCHELLING
+
+1_a_. Philosophy of Nature
+1_b_. Transcendental Philosophy
+2. System of Identity
+3_a_. Doctrine of Freedom
+3_b_. Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.
+
+SCHELLING'S CO-WORKERS
+
+1. The Philosophers of Nature
+2. The Philosophers of Identity (F. Krause)
+3. The Philosophers of Religion (Baader and Schleiermacher)
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII.
+
+HEGEL
+
+1. Hegel's View of the World and his Method
+2. The System
+  (_a_) Logic
+  (_b_) The Philosophy of Nature
+  (_c_) The Doctrine of Subjective Spirit
+  (_d_) The Doctrine of Objective Spirit
+  (_e_) Absolute Spirit
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV.
+
+THE OPPOSITION TO CONSTRUCTIVE IDEALISM: FRIES, HERBART, SCHOPENHAUER
+
+1. The Psychologists: Fries and Beneke
+2. Realism: Herbart
+3. Pessimism: Schopenhauer
+
+
+CHAPTER XV.
+
+PHILOSOPHY OUT OF GERMANY
+
+1. Italy
+2. France
+3. Great Britain and America
+4. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Holland
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI.
+
+GERMAN PHILOSOPHY SINCE THE DEATH OF HEGEL
+
+1. From the Division of the Hegelian School to the Materialistic
+Controversy
+2. New Systems: Trendelenburg, Fechner, Lotze, and Hartmann
+3. From the Revival of the Kantian Philosophy to the Present Time
+  (_a_) Neo-Kantianism, Positivism, and Kindred Phenomena
+  (_b_) Idealistic Reaction against the Scientific Spirit
+  (_c_) The Special Philosophical Sciences
+4. Retrospect
+
+
+INDEX
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+In no other department is a thorough knowledge of history so important as
+in philosophy. Like historical science in general, philosophy is, on the
+one hand, in touch with exact inquiry, while, on the other, it has a
+certain relationship with art. With the former it has in common its
+methodical procedure and its cognitive aim; with the latter, its intuitive
+character and the endeavor to compass the whole of reality with a glance.
+Metaphysical principles are less easily verified from experience than
+physical hypotheses, but also less easily refuted. Systems of philosophy,
+therefore, are not so dependent on our progressive knowledge of facts as
+the theories of natural science, and change less quickly; notwithstanding
+their mutual conflicts, and in spite of the talk about discarded
+standpoints, they possess in a measure the permanence of classical works of
+art, they retain for all time a certain relative validity. The thought of
+Plato, of Aristotle, and of the heroes of modern philosophy is ever proving
+anew its fructifying power. Nowhere do we find such instructive errors as
+in the sphere of philosophy; nowhere is the new so essentially a completion
+and development of the old, even though it deem itself the whole and assume
+a hostile attitude toward its predecessors; nowhere is the inquiry so much
+more important than the final result; nowhere the categories "true and
+false" so inadequate. The spirit of the time and the spirit of the people,
+the individuality of the thinker, disposition, will, fancy--all these exert
+a far stronger influence on the development of philosophy, both by way of
+promotion and by way of hindrance, than in any other department of thought.
+If a system gives classical expression to the thought of an epoch, a
+nation, or a great personality; if it seeks to attack the world-riddle from
+a new direction, or brings us nearer its solution by important original
+conceptions, by a subtler or a simpler comprehension of the problem, by a
+wider outlook or a deeper insight; it has accomplished more than it could
+have done by bringing forward a number of indisputably correct principles.
+The variations in philosophy, which, on the assumption of the unity of
+truth, are a rock of offense to many minds, may be explained, on the one
+hand, by the combination of complex variety and limitation in the motives
+which govern philosophical thought,--for it is the whole man that
+philosophizes, not his understanding merely,--and, on the other, by the
+inexhaustible extent of the field of philosophy. Back of the logical labor
+of proof and inference stand, as inciting, guiding, and hindering agents,
+psychical and historical forces, which are themselves in large measure
+alogical, though stronger than all logic; while just before stretches
+away the immeasurable domain of reality, at once inviting and resisting
+conquest. The grave contradictions, so numerous in both the subjective
+and the objective fields, make unanimity impossible concerning ultimate
+problems; in fact, they render it difficult for the individual thinker to
+combine his convictions into a self-consistent system. Each philosopher
+sees limited sections of the world only, and these through his own eyes;
+every system is one-sided. Yet it is this multiplicity and variety of
+systems alone which makes the aim of philosophy practicable as it endeavors
+to give a complete picture of the soul and of the universe. The history of
+philosophy is the philosophy of humanity, that great individual, which,
+with more extended vision than the instruments through which it works,
+is able to entertain opposing principles, and which, reconciling old
+contradictions as it discovers new ones, approaches by a necessary and
+certain growth the knowledge of the one all-embracing truth, which is
+rich and varied beyond our conception. In order to energetic labor in the
+further progress of philosophy, it is necessary to imagine that the goddess
+of truth is about to lift the veil which has for centuries concealed her.
+The historian of philosophy, on the contrary, looks on each new system as
+a stone, which, when shaped and fitted into its place, will help to raise
+higher the pyramid of knowledge. Hegel's doctrine of the necessity
+and motive force of contradictories, of the relative justification of
+standpoints, and the systematic development of speculation, has great and
+permanent value as a general point of view. It needs only to be guarded
+from narrow scholastic application to become a safe canon for the
+historical treatment of philosophy.
+
+In speaking above of the worth of the philosophical doctrines of the past
+as defying time, and as comparable to the standard character of finished
+works of art, the special reference was to those elements in speculation
+which proceed less from abstract thinking than from the fancy, the heart,
+and the character of the individual, and even more directly from the
+disposition of the people; and which to a certain degree may be divorced
+from logical reasoning and the scientific treatment of particular
+questions. These may be summed up under the phrase, views of the world. The
+necessity for constant reconsideration of them is from this standpoint at
+once evident. The Greek view of the world is as classic as the plastic art
+of Phidias and the epic of Homer; the Christian, as eternally valid as the
+architecture of the Middle Ages; the modern, as irrefutable as Goethe's
+poetry and the music of Beethoven. The views of the world which proceed
+from the spirits of different ages, as products of the general development
+of culture, are not so much thoughts as rhythms in thinking, not theories
+but modes of intuition saturated with feelings of worth. We may dispute
+about them, it is true; we may argue against them or in their defense; but
+they can neither be established nor overthrown by cogent proofs. It is not
+only optimism and pessimism, determinism and indeterminism, that have their
+ultimate roots in the affective side of our nature, but pantheism and
+individualism, also idealism and materialism, even rationalism and
+sensationalism. Even though they operate with the instruments of thought,
+they remain in the last analysis matters of faith, of feeling, and of
+resolution. The aesthetic view of the world held by the Greeks, the
+transcendental-religious view of Christianity, the intellectual view of
+Leibnitz and Hegel, the panthelistic views of Fichte I and Schopenhauer are
+vital forces, not doctrines, postulates, not results of thought. One view
+of the world is forced to yield its pre-eminence to another, which it has
+itself helped to produce by its own one-sidedness; only to reconquer its
+opponent later, when it has learned from her, when it has been purified,
+corrected, and deepened by the struggle. But the elder contestant is no
+more confuted by the younger than the drama of Sophocles by the drama of
+Shakespeare, than youth by age or spring by autumn.
+
+If it is thus indubitable that the views of the world held in earlier times
+deserve to live on in the memory of man, and to live as something better
+than mere reminders of the past--the history of philosophy is not a cabinet
+of antiquities, but a museum of typical products of the mind--the value
+and interest of the historical study of the past in relation to the exact
+scientific side of philosophical inquiry is not less evident. In every
+science it is useful to trace the origin and growth of problems and
+theories, and doubly so in philosophy. With her it is by no means the
+universal rule that progress shows itself by the result; the statement of
+the question is often more important than the answer. The problem is more
+sharply defined in a given direction; or it becomes more comprehensive,
+is analyzed and refined; or if now it threatens to break up into subtle
+details, some genius appears to simplify it and force our thoughts back
+to the fundamental question. This advance in problems, which happily is
+everywhere manifested by unmistakable signs, is, in the case of many of the
+questions which irresistibly force themselves upon the human heart, the
+only certain gain from centuries of endeavor. The labor here is of more
+value than the result.
+
+In treating the history of philosophy, two extremes must be avoided,
+lawless individualism and abstract logical formalism. The history
+of philosophy is neither a disconnected succession of arbitrary
+individual opinions and clever guesses, nor a mechanically developed series
+of typical standpoints and problems, which imply one another in just the
+form and order historically assumed. The former supposition does violence
+to the regularity of philosophical development, the latter to its vitality.
+In the one case, the connection is conceived too loosely, in the other, too
+rigidly and simply. One view underestimates the power of the logical Idea,
+the other overestimates it. It is not easy to support the principle that
+chance rules the destiny of philosophy, but it is more difficult to avoid
+the opposite conviction of the one-sidedness of formalistic construction,
+and to define the nature and limits of philosophical necessity. The
+development of philosophy is, perhaps, one chief aim of the world-process,
+but it is certainly not the only one; it is a part of the universal aim,
+and it is not surprising that the instruments of its realization do not
+work exclusively in its behalf, that their activity brings about results,
+which seem unessential for philosophical ends or obstacles in their way.
+Philosophical ideas do not think themselves, but are thought by living
+spirits, which are something other and better than mere thought
+machines--by spirits who live these thoughts, who fill them with personal
+warmth and passionately defend them. There is often reason, no doubt, for
+the complaint that the personality which has undertaken to develop some
+great idea is inadequate to the task, that it carries its subjective
+defects into the matter in hand, that it does too much or too little, or
+the right thing in the wrong way, so that the spirit of philosophy seems
+to have erred in the choice and the preparation of its instrument. But the
+reverse side of the picture must also be taken into account. The thinking
+spirit is more limited, it is true, than were desirable for the perfect
+execution of a definite logical task; but, on the other hand, it is far
+too rich as well. A soulless play of concepts would certainly not help
+the cause, and there is no disadvantage in the failure of the history of
+philosophy to proceed so directly and so scholastically, as, for instance,
+in the system of Hegel. A graded series of interconnected general forces
+mediate between the logical Idea and the individual thinker--the spirit of
+the people, of the age, of the thinker's vocation, of his time of life,
+which are felt by the individual as part of himself and whose impulses
+he unconsciously obeys. In this way the modifying, furthering, hindering
+correlation of higher and lower, of the ruler with his commands and the
+servant with his more or less willing obedience, is twice repeated, the
+situation being complicated further by the fact that the subject affected
+by these historical forces himself helps to make history. The most
+important factor in philosophical progress is, of course, the state of
+inquiry at the time, the achievements of the thinkers of the immediately
+preceding age; and in this relation of a philosopher to his predecessors,
+again, a distinction must be made between a logical and a psychological
+element. The successor often commences his support, his development, or his
+refutation at a point quite unwelcome to the constructive historian. At all
+events, if we may judge from the experience of the past, too much caution
+cannot be exercised in setting up formal laws for the development of
+thought. According to the law of contradiction and reconciliation, a
+Schopenhauer must have followed directly after Leibnitz, to oppose his
+pessimistic ethelism to the optimistic intellectualism of the latter; when,
+in turn, a Schleiermacher, to give an harmonic resolution of the antithesis
+into a concrete doctrine of feeling, would have made a fine third. But it
+turned out otherwise, and we must be content.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+The estimate of the value of the history of philosophy in general, given at
+the start, is the more true of the history of modern philosophy, since the
+movement introduced by the latter still goes on unfinished. We are still at
+work on the problems which were brought forward by Descartes, Locke, and
+Leibnitz, and which Kant gathered up into the critical or transcendental
+question. The present continues to be governed by the ideal of culture
+which Bacon proposed and Fichte exalted to a higher level; we all live
+under the unweakened spell of that view of the world which was developed in
+hostile opposition to Scholasticism, and through the enduring influence of
+those mighty geographical and scientific discoveries and religious reforms
+which marked the entrance of the modern period. It is true, indeed, that
+the transition brought about by Kant's noëtical and ethical revolution was
+of great significance,--more significant even than the Socratic period,
+with which we are fond of comparing it; much that was new was woven on,
+much of the old, weakened, broken, destroyed. And yet, if we take into
+account the historical after-influence of Cartesianism, we shall find that
+the thread was only knotted and twisted by Kantianism, not cut through. The
+continued power of the pre-Kantian modes of thought is shown by the fact
+that Spinoza has been revived in Fichte and Schelling, Leibnitz in Herbart
+and Hegel, the sensationalism of the French Illuminati in Feuerbach; and
+that even materialism, which had been struck down by the criticism of the
+reason (one would have thought forever), has again raised its head. Even
+that most narrow tendency of the early philosophy of the modern period, the
+apotheosis of cognition is,--in spite of the moralistic counter-movement
+of Kant and Fichte,--the controlling motive in the last of the great
+idealistic systems, while it also continues to exercise a marvelously
+powerful influence on the convictions of our Hegel-weary age, alike within
+the sphere of philosophy and (still more) without it. In view of the
+intimate relations between contemporary inquiry and the progress of thought
+since the beginning of the modern period, acquaintance with the latter,
+which it is the aim of this _History_ to facilitate, becomes a pressing
+duty. To study the history of philosophy since Descartes is to study the
+pre-conditions of contemporary philosophy.
+
+We begin with an outline sketch of the general characteristics of modern
+philosophy. These may be most conveniently described by comparing them with
+the characteristics of ancient and of mediaeval philosophy. The character
+of ancient philosophy or Greek philosophy,--for they are practically the
+same,--is predominantly aesthetic. The Greek holds beauty and truth closely
+akin and inseparable; "cosmos" is his common expression for the world and
+for ornament. The universe is for him a harmony, an organism, a work of
+art, before which he stands in admiration and reverential awe. In quiet
+contemplation, as with the eye of a connoisseur, he looks upon the world or
+the individual object as a well-ordered whole, more disposed to enjoy the
+congruity of its parts than to study out its ultimate elements. He prefers
+contemplation to analysis, his thought is plastic, not anatomical. He finds
+the nature of the object in its form; and ends give him the key to the
+comprehension of events. Discovering human elements everywhere, he is
+always ready with judgments of worth--the stars move in circles because
+circular motion is the most perfect; the right is better than left, upper
+finer than lower, that which precedes more beautiful than that which
+follows. Thinkers in whom this aesthetic reverence is weaker than the
+analytic impulse--especially Democritus--seem half modern rather than
+Greek. By the side of the Greek philosophy, in its sacred festal garb,
+stands the modern in secular workday dress, in the laborer's blouse, with
+the merciless chisel of analysis in its hand. This does not seek beauty,
+but only the naked truth, no matter what it be. It holds it impossible to
+satisfy at once the understanding and taste; nay, nakedness, ugliness,
+and offensiveness seem to it to testify for, rather than against, the
+genuineness of truth. In its anxiety not to read human elements into
+nature, it goes so far as completely to read spirit out of nature. The
+world is not a living whole, but a machine; not a work of art which is to
+be viewed in its totality and enjoyed with reverence, but a clock-movement
+to be taken apart in order to be understood. Nowhere are there ends in the
+world, but everywhere mechanical causes. The character of modern thought
+would appear to a Greek returned to earth very sober, unsplendid, undevout,
+and intrusive. And, in fact, modern philosophy has a considerable amount
+of prose about it, is not easily impressed, accepts no limitations from
+feeling, and holds nothing too sacred to be attacked with the weapon of
+analytic thought. And yet it combines penetration with intrusiveness;
+acuteness, coolness, and logical courage with its soberness. Never before
+has the demand for unprejudiced thought and certain knowledge been made
+with equal earnestness. This interest in knowledge for its own sake
+developed so suddenly and with such strength that, in presumptuous
+gladness, men believed that no previous age had rightly understood what
+truth and love for truth are. The natural consequence was a general
+overestimation of cognition at the expense of all other mental activities.
+Even among the Greek thinkers, thought was held by the majority to be the
+noblest and most divine function. But their intellectualism was checked
+by the aesthetic and eudaemonistic element, and preserved from the
+one-sidedness which it manifests in the modern period, because of the
+lack of an effective counterpoise. However eloquently Bacon commends the
+advantages to be derived from the conquest of nature, he still understands
+inquiry for inquiry's sake, and honors it as supreme; even the ethelistic
+philosophers, Fichte and Schopenhauer, pay their tribute to the prejudice
+in favor of intellectualism. The fact that the modern period can show
+no one philosophic writer of the literary rank of Plato, even though it
+includes such masters of style as Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and
+Lotze, not to speak of lesser names, is an external proof of how noticeably
+the aesthetic impulse has given way to one purely intellectual.
+
+When we turn to the character of mediaeval thinking; we find, instead of
+the aesthetic views of antiquity and the purely scientific tendency of the
+modern era, a distinctively religious spirit. Faith prescribes the objects
+and the limitations of knowledge; everything is referred to the hereafter,
+thought becomes prayer. Men speculate concerning the attributes of God, on
+the number and rank of the angels, on the immortality of man--all purely
+transcendental subjects. Side by side with these, it is true, the world
+receives loving attention, but always as the lower story merely,[1] above
+which, with its own laws, rises the true fatherland, the kingdom of grace.
+The most subtle acuteness is employed in the service of dogma, with the
+task of fathoming the how and why of things whose existence is certified
+elsewhere. The result is a formalism in thought side by side with profound
+and fervent mysticism. Doubt and trust are strangely intermingled, and a
+feeling of expectation stirs all hearts. On the one side stands sinful,
+erring man, who, try as hard as he may, only half unravels the mysteries of
+revealed truth; on the other, the God of grace, who, after our death, will
+reveal himself to us as clearly as Adam knew him before the fall. God
+alone, however, can comprehend himself--for the finite spirit, even
+truth unveiled is mystery, and ecstasy, unresisting devotion to the
+incomprehensible, the culmination of knowledge. In mediaeval philosophy
+the subject looks longingly upward to the infinite object of his thought,
+expecting that the latter will bend down toward him or lift him upward
+toward itself; in Greek philosophy the spirit confronts its object, the
+world, on a footing of equality; in modern philosophy the speculative
+subject feels himself higher than the object, superior to nature. In
+the conception of the Middle Ages, truth and mystery are identical; to
+antiquity they appear reconcilable; modern thought holds them as mutually
+exclusively as light and darkness. The unknown is the enemy of knowledge,
+which must be chased out of its last hiding-place. It is, therefore, easy
+to understand that the modern period stands in far sharper antithesis to
+the mediaeval era than to the ancient, for the latter has furnished it many
+principles which can be used as weapons against the former. Grandparents
+and grandchildren make good friends.
+
+[Footnote 1: On the separation and union of the three worlds, _natura,
+gratia, gloria_, in Thomas Aquinas, cf. Rudolph Eucken, _Die Philosophie
+des Thomas von Aquino und die Kultur der Neuzeit_, Halle. 1886.]
+
+When a new movement is in preparation, but there is a lack of creative
+force to give it form, a period of tumultuous disaffection with existing
+principles ensues. What is wanted is not clearly perceived, but there is a
+lively sense of that which is not wanted. Dissatisfaction prepares a place
+for that which is to come by undermining the existent and making it
+ripe for its fall. The old, the outgrown, the doctrine which had become
+inadequate, was in this case Scholasticism; modern philosophy shows
+throughout--and most clearly at the start--an anti-Scholastic character. If
+up to this time Church dogma had ruled unchallenged in spiritual affairs,
+and the Aristotelian philosophy in things temporal, war is now declared
+against authority of every sort and freedom of thought is inscribed on
+the banner.[1] "Modern philosophy is Protestantism in the sphere of the
+thinking spirit" (Erdmann). Not that which has been considered true for
+centuries, not that which another says, though he be Aristotle or Thomas
+Aquinas, not that which flatters the desires of the heart, is true, but
+that only which is demonstrated to my own understanding with convincing
+force. Philosophy is no longer willing to be the handmaid of theology,
+but must set up a house of her own. The watchword now becomes freedom and
+independent thought, deliverance from every form of constraint, alike from
+the bondage of ecclesiastical decrees and the inner servitude of prejudice
+and cherished inclinations. But the adoption of a purpose leads to the
+consideration of the means for attaining it. Thus the thirst for knowledge
+raises questions concerning the method, the instruments, and the limits of
+knowledge; the interest in noëtics and methodology vigorously develops,
+remains a constant factor in modern inquiry, and culminates in Kant, not
+again to die away.
+
+[Footnote 1: The doctrine of twofold truth, under whose protecting cloak
+the new liberal movements had hitherto taken refuge, was now disdainfully
+repudiated. Cf. Freudenthal, _Zur Beurtheilung der Scholastik_, in vol.
+iii. of the _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, 1890. Also, H. Reuter,
+_Geschichte der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter_ 1875-77; and Dilthey,
+_Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften_, 1883.]
+
+This negative aspect of modern tendencies needs, however, a positive
+supplement. The mediaeval mode of thought is discarded and the new one is
+not yet found. What can more fittingly furnish a support, a preliminary
+substitute, than antiquity? Thus philosophy, also, joins in that great
+stream of culture, the Renaissance and humanism, which, starting from
+Italy, poured forth over the whole civilized world. Plato and Neoplatonism,
+Epicurus and the Stoa are opposed to Scholasticism, the real Aristotle to
+the transformed Aristotle of the Church and the distorted Aristotle of the
+schools. Back to the sources, is the cry. With the revival of the ancient
+languages and ancient books, the spirit of antiquity is also revived. The
+dust of the schools and the tyranny of the Church are thrown off, and the
+classical ideal of a free and noble humanity gains enthusiastic adherents.
+The man is not to be forgotten in the Christian, nor art and science, the
+rights and the riches of individuality in the interest of piety; work for
+the future must not blind us to the demands of the present nor lead us to
+neglect the comprehensive cultivation of the natural capacities of the
+spirit. The world and man are no longer viewed through Christian eyes, the
+one as a realm of darkness and the other as a vessel of weakness and wrath,
+but nature and life gleam before the new generation in joyous, hopeful
+light. Humanism and optimism have always been allied.
+
+This change in the spirit of thought is accompanied by a corresponding
+change in the object of thought: theology must yield its supremacy to the
+knowledge of nature. Weary of Christological and soteriological questions,
+weary of disputes concerning the angels, the thinking spirit longs to
+make himself at home in the world it has learned to love, demands real
+knowledge,--knowledge which is of practical utility,--and no longer seeks
+God outside the world, but in it and above it. Nature becomes the home, the
+body of God. Transcendence gives place to immanence, not only in theology,
+but elsewhere. Modern philosophy is naturalistic in spirit, not only
+because it takes nature for its favorite object, but also because it
+carries into other branches of knowledge the mathematical method so
+successful in natural science, because it considers everything _sub ratione
+naturae_ and insists on the "natural" explanation of all phenomena, even
+those of ethics and politics.
+
+In a word, the tendency of modern philosophy is anti-Scholastic,
+humanistic, and naturalistic. This summary must suffice for preliminary
+orientation, while the detailed division, particularization, modification,
+and limitation of these general points must be left for later treatment.
+
+Two further facts, however, may receive preliminary notice. The
+indifference and hostility to the Church which have been cited among the
+prominent characteristics of modern philosophy, do not necessarily mean
+enmity to the Christian religion, much less to religion in general. In
+part, it is merely a change in the object of religious feeling, which
+blazes up especially strong and enthusiastic in the philosophy of the
+sixteenth century, as it transfers its worship from a transcendent deity to
+a universe indued with a soul; in part, the opposition is directed against
+the mediaeval, ecclesiastical form of Christianity, with its monastic
+abandonment of the world. It was often nothing but a very deep and strong
+religious feeling that led thinkers into the conflict with the hierarchy.
+Since the elements of permanent worth in the tendencies, doctrines, and
+institutions of the Middle Ages are thus culled out from that which is
+corrupt and effete, and preserved by incorporation into the new view of the
+world and the new science, and as fruitful elements from antiquity enter
+with them, the progress of philosophy shows a continuous enrichment in
+its ideas, intuitions, and spirit. The old is not simply discarded and
+destroyed, but purified, transformed, and assimilated. The same fact
+forces itself into notice if we consider the relations of nationality and
+philosophy in the three great eras. The Greek philosophy was entirely
+national in its origin and its public, it was rooted in the character of
+the people and addressed itself to fellow-countrymen; not until toward its
+decline, and not until influenced by Christianity, were its cosmopolitan
+inclinations aroused. The Middle Ages were indifferent to national
+distinctions, as to everything earthly, and naught was of value in
+comparison with man's transcendent destiny. Mediaeval philosophy is in its
+aims un-national, cosmopolitan, catholic; it uses the Latin of the schools,
+it seeks adherents in every land, it finds everywhere productive
+spirits whose labors in its service remain unaffected by their national
+peculiarities. The modern period returns to the nationalism of antiquity,
+but does not relinquish the advantage gained by the extension of mediaeval
+thought to the whole civilized world. The roots of modern philosophy are
+sunk deep in the fruitful soil of nationality, while the top of the
+tree spreads itself far beyond national limitations. It is national and
+cosmopolitan together; it is international as the common property of the
+various peoples, which exchange their philosophical gifts through an active
+commerce of ideas. Latin is often retained for use abroad, as the
+universal language of savants, but many a work is first published in the
+mother-tongue--and thought in it. Thus it becomes possible for the ideas
+of the wise to gain an entrance into the consciousness of the people, from
+whose spirit they have really sprung, and to become a power beyond the
+circle of the learned public. Philosophy as illumination, as a factor in
+general culture, is an exclusively modern phenomenon. In this speculative
+intercourse of nations, however, the French, the English, and the Germans
+are most involved, both as producers and consumers. France gives the
+initiative (in Descartes), then England assumes the leadership (in Locke),
+with Leibnitz and Kant the hegemony passes over to Germany. Besides these
+powers, Italy takes an eager part in the production of philosophical
+ideas in the period of ferment before Descartes. Each of these nations
+contributes elements to the total result which it alone is in a position
+to furnish, and each is rewarded by gifts in return which it would be
+incapable of producing out of its own store. This international exchange of
+ideas, in which each gives and each receives, and the fact that the chief
+modern thinkers, especially in the earlier half of the era, prior to Kant,
+are in great part not philosophers by profession but soldiers, statesmen,
+physicians, as well as natural scientists, historians, and priests, give
+modern philosophy an unprofessional, worldly appearance, in striking
+contrast to the clerical character of mediaeval, and the prophetic
+character of ancient thinking.
+
+Germany, England, and France claim the honor of having produced the first
+_modern_ philosopher, presenting Nicolas of Cusa, Bacon of Verulam, and
+René Descartes as their candidates, while Hobbes, Bruno, and Montaigne have
+received only scattered votes. The claim of England is the weakest of all,
+for, without intending to diminish Bacon's importance, it may be said that
+the programme which he develops--and in essence his philosophy is nothing
+more--was, in its leading principles, not first announced by him, and
+not carried out with sufficient consistency. The dispute between the two
+remaining contestants may be easily and equitably settled by making the
+simple distinction between forerunner and beginner, between path-breaker
+and founder. The entrance of a new historical era is not accompanied by an
+audible click, like the beginning of a new piece on a music-box, but is
+gradually effected. A considerable period may intervene between the point
+when the new movement flashes up, not understood and half unconscious of
+itself, and the time when it appears on the stage in full strength and
+maturity, recognizing itself as new and so acknowledged by others: the
+period of ferment between the Middle Ages and modern times lasted almost
+two centuries. It is in the end little more than logomachy to discuss
+whether this time of anticipation and desire, of endeavor and partial
+success, in which the new struggles with the old without conquering it, and
+the opposite tendencies in the conflicting views of the world interplay in
+a way at once obscure and wayward, is to be classed as the epilogue of the
+old era or the prologue of the new. The simple solution to take it as a
+_transition period_, no longer mediaeval but not yet modern, has met with
+fairly general acceptance. Nicolas of Cusa (1401-64) was the first to
+announce _fundamental principles_ of modern philosophy--he is the leader in
+this intermediate preparatory period. Descartes (1596-1650) brought forward
+the first _system_--he is the father of modern philosophy.
+
+A brief survey of the literature may be added in conclusion:
+
+Heinrich Ritter's _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_ (vols. ix.-xii. of
+his _Geschichte der Philosophie_), 1850-53, to Wolff and Rousseau, has
+been superseded by more recent works, J.E. Erdmann's able _Versuch einer
+wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der neueren Philosophie_ (6 vols., 1834-53)
+gives in appendices literal excerpts from non-German writers; the same
+author's _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ (2 vols., 1869; 3d ed.,
+1878) contains at the end the first exposition of German Philosophy since
+the Death of Hegel [English translation in 3 vols., edited by W. S. Hough,
+1890.--TR.]. Ueberweg's _Grundriss_ (7th ed. by M. Heinze, 1888) is
+indispensable for reference on account of the completeness of its
+bibliographical notes, which, however, are confusing to the beginner
+[English translation by G.S. Morris, with additions by the translator, Noah
+Porter, and Vincenzo Botta, New York, 1872-74.--TR.]. The most detailed and
+brilliant exposition has been given by Kuno Fischer (1854 seq.; 3d
+ed., 1878 seq.; the same author's _Baco und seine Nachfolger_, 2d ed.,
+1875,--English translation, 1857, by Oxenford,--supplements the first two
+volumes of the _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_). This work, which is
+important also as a literary achievement, is better fitted than any other
+to make the reader at home in the ideal world of the great philosophers,
+which it reconstructs from its central point, and to prepare him for the
+study (which, of course, even the best exposition cannot replace) of the
+works of the thinkers themselves. Its excessive simplification of problems
+is not of great moment in the first introduction to a system [English
+translation of vol. iii. book 2 (1st ed.), _A Commentary on Kant's Critick
+of the Pure Reason_, by J.P. Mahaffy, London, 1866; vol. i. part 1 and part
+2, book 1, _Descartes and his School_, by J, P. Gordy, New York, 1887;
+of vol. v. chaps, i.-v., _A Critique of Kant_, by W.S. Hough, London,
+1888.--TR.]. Wilhelm Windelband _(Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_,
+2 vols., 1878 and 1880, to Hegel and Herbart inclusive) accentuates the
+connection of philosophy with general culture and the particular sciences,
+and emphasizes philosophical method. This work is pleasant reading, yet, in
+the interest of clearness, we could wish that the author had given more
+of positive information concerning the content of the doctrines treated,
+instead of merely advancing reflections on them. A projected third volume
+is to trace the development of philosophy down to the present time.
+Windelband's compendium, _Geschichte der Philosophie_, 1890-91, is
+distinguished from other expositions by the fact that, for the most part,
+it confines itself to a history of _problems_. Baumann's _Geschichte der
+Philosophie_, 1890, aims to give a detailed account of those thinkers only
+who have advanced views individual either in their content or in their
+proof. Eduard Zeller has given his _Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie
+seit Leibniz_ (1873; 2d ed., 1875) the benefit of the same thorough
+and comprehensive knowledge and mature judgment which have made his
+_Philosophie der Griechen_ a classic. [Bowen's _Modern Philosophy_,
+New York, 1857 (6th ed., 1891); Royce's _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_,
+1892.--TR.]
+
+Eugen Dühring's hypercritical _Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie_
+(1869; 3d ed., 1878) can hardly be recommended to students. Lewes (German
+translation, 1876) assumes a positivistic standpoint; Thilo (1874), a
+position exclusively Herbartian; A. Stoeckl (3d ed., 1889) writes from the
+standpoint of confessional Catholicism; Vincenz Knauer (2d ed., 1882) is
+a Güntherian. With the philosophico-historical work of Chr. W. Sigwart
+(1854), and one of the same date by Oischinger, we are not intimately
+acquainted.
+
+Expositions of philosophy since Kant have been given by the Hegelian, C.L.
+Michelet (a larger one in 2 vols., 1837-38, and a smaller one, 1843); by
+Chalybaeus (1837; 5th ed., 1860, formerly very popular and worthy of it,
+English, 1854); by Fr. K. Biedermann (1842-43); by Carl Fortlage (1852,
+Kantio-Fichtean standpoint); and by Friedrich Harms (1876). The last of
+these writers unfortunately did not succeed in giving a sufficiently clear
+and precise, not to say tasteful, form to the valuable ideas and original
+conceptions in which his work is rich. The very popular exposition by an
+anonymous author of Hegelian tendencies, _Deutschlands Denker seit Kant_
+(Dessau, 1851), hardly deserves mention.
+
+Further, we may mention some of the works which treat the historical
+development of particular subjects: On the history of the _philosophy of
+religion_, the first volume of Otto Pfleiderer's _Religionsphilosophie auf
+geschichtlicher Grundlage_ (2d ed., 1883;--English translation by Alexander
+Stewart and Allan Menzies, 1886-88.--TR.), and the very trustworthy
+exposition by Bernhard Pünjer (2 vols., 1880, 1883; English translation by
+W. Hastie, vol. i., 1887.--TR.). On the history of _practical philosophy_,
+besides the first volume of I.H. Fichte's _Ethik_ (1850), Franz Vorländer's
+_Geschichte der philosophischen Moral, Rechts- und Staatslehre der
+Engländer und Franzosen_ (1855); Fr. Jodl, _Geschichte der Ethik in der
+neueren Philosophie_ (2 vols., 1882, 1889), and Bluntschli, _Geschichte der
+neueren Staatswissenschaft_ (3d ed., 1881); [Sidgwick's _Outlines of
+the History of Ethics_, 3d ed., 1892, and Martineau's _Types of Ethical
+Theory_, 3d ed., 1891.--TR.]. On the history of the _philosophy of
+history_: Rocholl, _Die Philosophie der Geschichte_, 1878; Richard Fester,
+_Rousseau und die deutsche Geschichtsphilosophie_, 1890 [Flint, _The
+Philosophy of History in Europe_, vol. i., 1874, complete in 3 vols., 1893
+_seq_.]. On the history of _aesthetics_, R. Zimmermann, 1858; H. Lotze,
+1868; Max Schasler, 1871; Ed. von Hartmann (since Kant), 1886; Heinrich
+von Stein, _Die Entstehung der neueren Aesthetik_ (1886); [Bosanquet, _A
+History of Aesthetic_, 1892.--TR.]. Further, Fr. Alb. Lange, _Geschichte
+des Materialismus_, 1866; 4th ed., 1882; [English translation by E.C.
+Thomas, 3 vols., 1878-81.--TR.]; Jul. Baumann, _Die Lehren von Raum, Zeit
+und Mathematik in der neueren Philosophie_, 1868-69; Edm. König, _Die
+Entwickelung des Causalproblems von Cartesius bis Kant_, 1888, _seit
+Kant_, 1890; Kurd Lasswitz, _Geschichte der Atomistik vom Mittelalter bis
+Newton_, 2 vols., 1890; Ed. Grimm, _Zur Geschichte des Erkenntnissproblems,
+von Bacon zu Hume_, 1890. The following works are to be recommended on the
+period of transition: Moritz Carrière, _Die philosophische Weltanschauung
+der Reformationszeit_, 1847; 2d ed., 1887; and Jacob Burckhardt, _Kultur
+der Renaissance in Italien_, 4th ed., 1886. Reference may also be made to
+A. Trendelenburg, _Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie_, 3 vols., 1846-67;
+Rudolph Eucken, _Geschichte und Kritik der Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart_,
+1878; [English translation by M. Stuart Phelps, 1880.--TR.]; the same,
+_Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie_, 1879; the same, _Beiträge
+zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, 1886 (including a valuable
+paper on parties and party names in philosophy); the same, _Die
+Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker_, 1890; Ludwig Noack,
+_Philosophiegeschichtliches Lexicon_, 1879; Ed. Zeller, _Vorträge und
+Abhandlungen_, three series, 1865-84; Chr. von Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften_,
+2 vols., 1881; 2d ed., 1889. R. Seydel's _Religion und Philosophie_, 1887,
+contains papers on Luther, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Weisse, Fechner,
+Lotze, Hartmann, Darwinism, etc., which are well worth reading.
+
+Among the smaller compends Schwegler's (1848; recent editions revised
+and supplemented by R. Koeber) remains still the least bad [English
+translations by Seelye and Smith, revised edition with additions, New York,
+1880; and J.H. Stirling, with annotations, 7th ed., 1879.--TR.]. The meager
+sketches by Deter, Koeber, Kirchner, Kuhn, Rabus, Vogel, and others are
+useful for review at least. Fritz Schultze's _Stammbaum der Philosophie_,
+1890, gives skillfully constructed tabular outlines, but, unfortunately, in
+a badly chosen form.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION: FROM NICOLAS OF CUSA TO DESCARTES.
+
+
+The essays at philosophy which made their appearance between the middle of
+the fifteenth century and the middle of the seventeenth, exhibit mediaeval
+and modern characteristics in such remarkable intermixture that they can
+be assigned exclusively to neither of these two periods. There are eager
+longings, lofty demands, magnificent plans, and promising outlooks in
+abundance, but a lack of power to endure, a lack of calmness and maturity;
+while the shackles against which the leading minds revolt still bind too
+firmly both the leaders and those to whom they speak. Only here and there
+are the fetters loosened and thrown off; if the hands are successfully
+freed, the clanking chains still hamper the feet. It is a time just suited
+for original thinkers, a remarkable number of whom in fact make their
+appearance, side by side or in close succession. Further, however little
+these are able to satisfy the demand for permanent results, they ever
+arouse our interest anew by the boldness and depth of their brilliant
+ideas, which alternate with quaint fancies or are pervaded by them; by the
+youthful courage with which they attacked great questions; and not least
+by the hard fate which rewarded their efforts with misinterpretation,
+persecution, and death at the stake. We must quickly pass over the broad
+threshold between modern philosophy and Scholastic philosophy, which is
+bounded by the year 1450, in which Nicolas of Cusa wrote his chief
+work, the _Idiota_, and 1644, when Descartes began the new era with
+his _Principia Philosophiae_; and can touch, in passing, only the most
+important factors. We shall begin our account of this transition period
+with Nicolas, and end it with the Englishmen, Bacon, Hobbes, and Lord
+Herbert of Cherbury. Between these we shall arrange the various figures
+of the Philosophical Renaissance (in the broad sense) in six groups:
+the Restorers of the Ancient Systems and their Opponents; the Italian
+Philosophers of Nature; the Political and Legal Philosophers; the Skeptics;
+the Mystics; the Founders of the Exact Investigation of Nature. In Italy
+the new spiritual birth shows an aesthetic, scientific, and humanistic
+tendency; in Germany it is pre-eminently religious emancipation--in the
+Reformation.
+
+
+%1. Nicolas of Cusa.%
+
+Nicolas[1] was born in 1401, at Cues (Cusa) on the Moselle near Treves.
+He early ran away from his stern father, a boatman and vine-dresser named
+Chrypps (or Krebs), and was brought up by the Brothers of the Common Life
+at Deventer. In Padua he studied law, mathematics, and philosophy, but the
+loss of his first case at Mayence so disgusted him with his profession that
+he turned to theology, and became a distinguished preacher. He took part
+in the Council of Basle, was sent by Pope Eugen IV. as an ambassador to
+Constantinople and to the Reichstag at Frankfort; was made Cardinal in
+1448, and Bishop of Brixen in 1450. His feudal lord, the Count of Tyrol,
+Archduke Sigismund, refused him recognition on account of certain quarrels
+in which they had become engaged, and for a time held him prisoner.
+Previous to this he had undertaken journeys to Germany and the Netherlands
+on missionary business. During a second sojourn in Italy death overtook
+him, in the year 1464, at Todi in Umbria. The first volume of the Paris
+edition of his collected works (1514) contains the most important of his
+philosophical writings; the second, among others, mathematical essays and
+ten books of selections from his sermons; the third, the extended work, _De
+Concordantia Catholica_, which he had completed at Basle. In 1440 (having
+already written on the Reform of the Calendar) he began his imposing series
+of philosophical writings with the _De Docta Ignorantia_, to which the
+_De Conjecturis_ was added in the following year. These were succeeded by
+smaller treatises entitled _De Quaerendo Deum, De Dato Patris Luminum, De
+Filiatione Dei, De Genesi_, and a defense of the _De Docta Ignorantia_. His
+most important work is the third of the four dialogues of the _Idiota_ ("On
+the Mind"), 1450. He clothes in continually changing forms the one supreme
+truth on which all depends, and which cannot be expressed in intelligible
+language but only comprehended by living intuition. In many different ways
+he endeavors to lead the reader on to a vision of the inexpressible, or
+to draw him up to it, and to develop fruitfully the principle of the
+coincidence of opposites, which had dawned upon him on his return journey
+from Constantinople (_De Visione Dei, Dialogus de Possest, De Beryllo,
+De Ludo Globi, De Venatione Sapientiae, De Apice Theoriae, Compendium_).
+Sometimes he uses dialectical reasoning; sometimes he soars in mystical
+exaltation; sometimes he writes with a simplicity level to the common mind,
+and in connection with that which lies at hand; sometimes, with the most
+comprehensive brevity. Besides these his philosophico-religious works
+are of great value, _De Pace Fidei, De Cribratione Alchorani_. Liberal
+Catholics reverence him as one of the deepest thinkers of the Church; but
+the fame of Giordano Bruno, a more brilliant but much less original figure,
+has hitherto stood in the way of the general recognition of his great
+importance for modern philosophy.
+
+[Footnote 1: R. Zimmermann, _Nikolaus Cusanus als Vorläufer Leibnizens_, in
+vol. viii. of the _Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-historischen Klasse
+der Akademie der Wissenschaften_, Vienna, 1852, p. 306 seq. R. Falckenberg,
+_Grundzüge der Philosophie des Nikolaus Cusanus mit besonderer
+Berücksichtigung der Lehre vom Erkennen_, Breslau, 1880. R. Eucken,
+_Beiträge zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, Heidelberg, 1886, p. 6
+seq.; Joh. Uebinger, _Die Gotteslehre des Nikolaus Cusanus_, Münster,
+1888. Scharpff, _Des Nikolaus von Cusa wichtigste Schriften in deutscher
+Uebersetzung, Freiburg i. Br_., 1862.]
+
+Human knowledge and the relation of God to the world are the two poles of
+the Cusan's system. He distinguishes four stages of knowledge. Lowest of
+all stands sense (together with imagination), which yields only confused
+images; next above, the understanding (_ratio_), whose functions comprise
+analysis, the positing of time and space, numerical operations, and
+denomination, and which keeps the opposites distinct under the law of
+contradiction; third, the speculative reason (_intellectus_), which finds
+the opposites reconcilable; and highest of all the mystical, supra-rational
+intuition (_visio sine comprehensione, intuitio, unio, filiatio_),
+for which the opposites coincide in the infinite unity. The intuitive
+culmination of knowledge, in which the soul is united with God,--since
+here even the antithesis of subject and object disappears,--is but seldom
+attained; and it is difficult to keep out the disturbing symbols and images
+of sense, which mingle themselves in the intuition. But it is just this
+insight into the incomprehensibility of the infinite which gives us a true
+knowledge of God; this is the meaning of the "learned ignorance," the
+_docta ignorantia_. The distinctions between these several stages of
+cognition are not, however, to be understood in any rigid sense, for
+each higher function comprehends the lower, and is active therein. The
+understanding can discriminate only when it is furnished by sensation with
+images of that which is to be discriminated, the reason can combine only
+when the understanding has supplied the results of analysis as material for
+combination; while, on the other hand, it is the understanding which is
+present in sense as consciousness, and the reason whose unity guides
+the understanding in its work of separation. Thus the several modes of
+cognition do not stand for independent fundamental faculties, but for
+connected modifications of one fundamental power which work together and
+mutually imply one another. The position that an intellectual function of
+attention and discrimination is active in sensuous perception, is a view
+entirely foreign to mediaeval modes of thought; for the Scholastics were
+accustomed to make sharp divisions between the cognitive faculties, on the
+principle that particulars are felt through sense and universals thought
+through the understanding. The idea on which Nicolas bases his argument for
+immortality has also an entirely modern sound: viz., that space and time
+are products of the understanding, and, therefore, can have no power over
+the spirit which produces them; for the author is higher and mightier than
+the product.
+
+The confession that all our knowledge is conjecture does not simply mean
+that absolute and exact truth remains concealed from us; but is intended at
+the same time to encourage us to draw as near as possible to the eternal
+verity by ever truer conjectures. There are degrees of truth, and our
+surmises are neither absolutely true nor entirely false. Conjecture becomes
+error only when, forgetting the inadequacy of human knowledge, we rest
+content with it as a final solution; the Socratic maxim, "I know that I
+am ignorant," should not lead to despairing resignation but to courageous
+further inquiry. The duty of speculation is to penetrate deeper and deeper
+into the secrets of the divine, even though the ultimate revelation will
+not be given us until the hereafter. The fittest instrument of speculation
+is furnished by mathematics, in its conception of the infinite and the
+wonders of numerical relations: as on the infinite sphere center and
+circumference coincide, so God's essence is exalted above all opposites;
+and as the other numbers are unfolded from the unit, so the finite proceeds
+by explication from the infinite. A controlling significance in the serial
+construction of the world is ascribed to the ten, as the sum of the first
+four numbers--as reason, understanding, imagination, and sensibility are
+related in human cognition, so God, spirit, soul, and body, or infinity,
+thought, life, and being are related in the objective sphere; so, further,
+the absolute necessity of God, the concrete necessity of the universe,
+the actuality of individuals, and the possibility of matter. Beside the
+quaternary the tern also exercises its power--the world divides into the
+stages of eternity, imperishability, and the temporal world of sense,
+or truth, probability, and confusion. The divine trinity is reflected
+everywhere: in the world as creator, created, and love; in the mind as
+creative force, concept, and will. The triunity of God is very variously
+explained--as the subject, object, and act of cognition; as creative
+spirit, wisdom, and goodness; as being, power, and deed; and, preferably,
+as unity, equality, and the combination of the two.
+
+God is related to the world as unity, identity, _complicatio_, to
+otherness, diversity, _explicatio_, as necessity to contingency, as
+completed actuality to mere possibility; yet, in such a way that the
+otherness participates in the unity, and receives its reality from this,
+and the unity does not have the otherness confronting it, outside it. God
+is triune only as the Creator of the world, and in relation to it; in
+himself he is absolute unity and infinity, to which nothing disparate
+stands opposed, which is just as much all things as not all things, and
+which, as the Areopagite had taught of old, is better comprehended by
+negations than by affirmations. To deny that he is light, truth, spirit,
+is more true than to affirm it, for he is infinitely greater than anything
+which can be expressed in words; he is the Unutterable, the Unknowable,
+the supremely one and the supremely absolute. In the world, each thing has
+things greater and smaller by its side, but God is the absolutely greatest
+and smallest; in accordance with the principle of the _coincidentia
+oppositorum_, the absolute _maximum_ and the absolute _minimum_ coincide.
+That which in the world exists as concretely determinate and particular,
+is in God in a simple and universal way; and that which here is present
+as incompleted striving, and as possibility realizing itself by gradual
+development, is in God completed activity. He is the realization of all
+possibility, the Can-be or Can-is (_possest_); and since this absolute
+actuality is the presupposition and cause of all finite ability and action,
+it may be unconditionally designated ability (_posse ipsum_), in antithesis
+to all determinate manifestations of force; namely, to all ability to be,
+live, feel, think, and will.
+
+However much these definitions, conceived in harmony with the dualistic
+view of Christianity, accentuate the antithesis between God and the world,
+this is elsewhere much softened, nay directly denied, in favor of a
+pantheistic view which points forward to the modern period. Side by side
+with the assertion that there is no proportion whatever between the
+infinite and the finite, the following naïvely presents itself, in open
+contradiction to the former: God excels the reason just as much as
+the latter is superior to the understanding, and the understanding to
+sensibility, or he is related to thought as thought to life, and life to
+being. Nay, Nicolas makes even bolder statements than these, when he calls
+the universe a sensuous and mutable God, man a human God or a humanly
+contracted infinity, the creation a created God or a limited infinity; thus
+hinting that God and the world are at bottom essentially alike, differing
+only in the form of their existence, that it is one and the same being
+and action which manifests itself absolutely in God, relatively and in a
+limited way in the system of creation. It was chiefly three modern ideas
+which led the Cusan on from dualism to pantheism--the boundlessness of the
+universe, the connection of all being, and the all-comprehensive richness
+of individuality. Endlessness belongs to the universe as well as to God,
+only its endlessness is not an absolute one, beyond space and time, but
+weakened and concrete, namely unlimited extension in space and unending
+duration in time. Similarly, the universe is unity, yet not a unity
+absolutely above multiplicity and diversity, but one which is divided into
+many members and obscured thereby. Even the individual is infinite in a
+certain sense; for, in its own way, it bears in itself all that is, it
+mirrors the whole world from its limited point of view, is an abridged,
+compressed representation of the universe. As the members of the body, the
+eye, the arm, the foot, interact in the closest possible way, and no one
+of them can dispense with the rest, so each thing is connected with each,
+different from it and yet in harmony with it, so each contains all the
+others and is contained by them. All is in all, for all is in the universe
+and in God, as the universe and God in all. In a still higher degree man is
+a microcosm (_parvus mundus_), a mirror of the All, since he not merely,
+like other beings, actually has in himself all that exists, but also has
+a knowledge of this richness, is capable of developing it into conscious
+images of things. And it is just this which constitutes the perfection of
+the whole and of the parts, that the higher is in the lower, the cause in
+the effect, the genus in the individual, the soul in the body, reason
+in the senses, and conversely. To perfect, is simply to make active a
+potential possession, to unfold capacities and to elevate the unconscious
+into consciousness. Here we have the germ of the philosophy of Bruno and of
+Leibnitz.
+
+As we have noticed a struggle between two opposite tendencies, one
+dualistic and Christian, one pantheistic and modern, in the theology of
+Nicolas, so at many other points a conflict between the mediaeval and the
+modern view of the world, of which our philosopher is himself unconscious,
+becomes evident to the student. It is impossible to follow out the details
+of this interesting opposition, so we shall only attempt to distinguish in
+a rough way the beginnings of the new from the remnants of the old. Modern
+is his interest in the ancient philosophers, of whom Pythagoras, Plato, and
+the Neoplatonists especially attract him; modern, again, his interest in
+natural science[1] (he teaches not only the boundlessness of the world, but
+also the motion of the earth); his high estimation of mathematics, although
+he often utilizes this merely in a fanciful symbolism of numbers; his
+optimism (the world an image of the divine, everything perfect of its kind,
+the bad simply a halt on the way to the good); his intellectualism (knowing
+the primal function and chief mission of the spirit; faith an undeveloped
+knowledge; volition and emotion, as is self-evident, incidental results of
+thought; knowledge a leading back of the creature to God as its source,
+hence the counterpart of creation); modern, finally, the form and
+application given to the Stoic-Neoplatonic concept of individuality, and
+the idealistic view which resolves the objects of thought into products
+thereof.[2] This last position, indeed, is limited by the lingering
+influence of nominalism, which holds the concepts of the mind to be merely
+abstract copies, and not archetypes of things. Moreover, _explicatio,
+evolutio_, unfolding, as yet does not always have the meaning of
+development to-day, of progressive advance. It denotes, quite neutrally,
+the production of a multiplicity from a unity, in which the former has lain
+confined, no matter whether this multiplicity and its procession signify
+enhancement or attenuation. For the most part, in fact, involution,
+_complicatio_ (which, moreover, always means merely a primal, germinal
+condition, never, as in Leibnitz, the return thereto) represents the more
+perfect condition. The chief examples of the relation of involution and
+evolution are the principles in which science is involved and out of which
+it is unfolded; the unit, which is related to numbers in a similar way;
+the spirit and the cognitive operations; God and his creatures. However
+obscure and unskillful this application of the idea of development may
+appear, yet it is indisputable that a discovery of great promise has been
+made, accompanied by a joyful consciousness of its fruitfulness. Of the
+numberless features which point backward to the Middle Ages, only one need
+be mentioned, the large space taken up by speculations concerning the
+God-man (the whole third book of the _De Docta Ignorantia_), and by those
+concerning the angels. Yet even here a change is noticeable, for the
+earthly and the divine are brought into most intimate relation, while in
+Thomas Aquinas, for instance, they form two entirely separate worlds. In
+short, the new view of the world appears in Nicolas still bound on every
+hand by mediaeval conceptions. A century and a half passed before the
+fetters, grown rusty in the meanwhile, broke under the bolder touch of
+Giordano Bruno.
+
+[Footnote 1: The attention of our philosopher was called to the natural
+sciences, and thus also to geography, which at this time was springing into
+new life, by his friend Paul Toscanelli, the Florentine. Nicolas was the
+first to have the map of Germany engraved (cf. S. Ruge in _Globus_, vol.
+lx., No. I, 1891), which, however, was not completed until long after his
+death, and issued in 1491.]
+
+[Footnote 2: On the modern elements in his theory of the state and of
+right, cf. Gierke, _Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht_, vol. iii. § II,
+1881.]
+
+
+%2. The Revival of Ancient Philosophy and the Opposition to it%.
+
+Italy is the home of the Renaissance and the birthplace of important
+new ideas which give the intellectual life of the sixteenth century its
+character of brave endeavor after high and distant ends. The enthusiasm
+for ancient literature already aroused by the native poets, Dante (1300),
+Petrarch (1341), and Boccaccio (1350), was nourished by the influx of Greek
+scholars, part of whom came in pursuance of an invitation to the Council of
+Ferrara and Florence (1438) called in behalf of the union of the Churches
+(among these were Pletho and his pupil Bessarion; Nicolas Cusanus was one
+of the legates invited), while part were fugitives from Constantinople
+after its capture by the Turks in 1453. The Platonic Academy, whose
+most celebrated member, Marsilius Ficinus, translated Plato and the
+Neoplatonists into Latin, was founded in 1440 on the suggestion of Georgius
+Gemistus Pletho[1] under the patronage of Cosimo dei Medici. The writings
+of Pletho ("On the Distinction between Plato and Aristotle"), of Bessarion
+(_Adversus Calumniatorem Platonis_, 1469, in answer to the _Comparatio
+Aristotelis et Platonis_, 1464, an attack by the Aristotelian, George of
+Trebizond, on Pletho's work), and of Ficinus (_Theologia Platonica_, 1482),
+show that the Platonism which they favored was colored by religious,
+mystical, and Neoplatonic elements. If for Bessarion and Ficinus, just as
+for the Eclectics of the later Academy, there was scarcely any essential
+distinction between the teachings of Plato, of Aristotle, and of
+Christianity; this confusion of heterogeneous elements was soon carried
+much farther, when the two Picos (John Pico of Mirandola, died 1494, and
+his nephew Francis, died 1533) and Johann Reuchlin (_De Verbo Mirifico_,
+1494; _De Arte Cabbalistica_, 1517), who had been influenced by the former,
+introduced the secret doctrines of the Jewish Cabala into the Platonic
+philosophy, and Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim of Cologne (_De Occulta
+Philosophia_, 1510; cf. Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften_, vol. i. p. 1 seq.)
+made the mixture still worse by the addition of the magic art. The impulse
+of the modern spirit to subdue nature is here already apparent, only that
+it shows inexperience in the selection of its instruments; before long,
+however, nature will willingly unveil to observation and calm reflection
+the secrets which she does not yield to the compulsion of magic.
+
+[Footnote 1: Pletho died at an advanced age in 1450. His chief work, the
+[Greek: Nomoi], was given to the flames by his Aristotelian opponent,
+Georgius Scholarius, surnamed Gennadius, Patriarch of Constantinople.
+Portions of it only, which had previously become known, have been
+preserved. On Pletho's life and teachings, cf. Fritz Schultze, _G.G.
+Plethon_, Jena, 1874.]
+
+A similar romantic figure was Phillipus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombast
+Paracelsus[1] von Hohenheim (1493-1541), a traveled Swiss, who endeavored
+to reform medicine from the standpoint of chemistry. Philosophy for
+Paracelsus is knowledge of nature, in which observation and thought
+must co-operate; speculation apart from experience and worship of the
+paper-wisdom of the ancients lead to no result. The world is a living
+whole, which, like man, the microcosm, in whom the whole content of
+the macrocosm is concentrated as in an extract, runs its life course.
+Originally all things were promiscuously intermingled in a unity, the
+God-created _prima materia_, as though inclosed in a germ, whence the
+manifold, with its various forms and colors, proceeded by separation.
+The development then proceeds in such a way that in each genus that is
+perfected which is posited therein, and does not cease until, at the last
+day, all that is possible in nature and history shall have fulfilled
+itself. But the one indwelling life of nature lives in all the manifold
+forms; the same laws rule in the human body as in the universe; that which
+works secretly in the former lies open to the view in the latter, and the
+world gives the clew to the knowledge of man. Natural becoming is brought
+about by the chemical separation and coming together of substances; the
+ultimate constituents revealed by analysis are the three fundamental
+substances or primitive essences, quicksilver, sulphur, and salt, by which,
+however, something more principiant is understood than the empirical
+substances bearing these names: _mercurius_ means that which makes bodies
+liquid, _sulfur_, that which makes them combustible, _sal_, that which
+makes them fixed and rigid. From these are compounded the four elements,
+each of which is ruled by elemental spirits--earth by gnomes or pygmies,
+water by undines or nymphs, air by sylphs, fire by salamanders (cf. with
+this, and with Paracelsus's theory of the world as a whole, Faust's two
+monologues in Goethe's drama); which are to be understood as forces
+or sublimated substances, not as personal, demoniacal beings. To each
+individual being there is ascribed a vital principle, the _Archeus_, an
+individualization of the general force of nature, _Vulcanus_; so also to
+men. Disease is a checking of this vital principle by contrary powers,
+which are partly of a terrestrial and partly of a sidereal nature; and the
+choice of medicines is to be determined by their ability to support the
+Archeus against its enemies. Man is, however, superior to nature--he is not
+merely the universal animal, inasmuch as he is completely that which other
+beings are only in a fragmentary way; but, as the image of God, he has also
+an eternal element in him, and is capable of attaining perfection through
+the exercise of his rational judgment. Paracelsus distinguishes three
+worlds: the elemental or terrestrial, the astral or celestial, and the
+spiritual or divine. To the three worlds, which stand in relations of
+sympathetic interaction, there correspond in man the body, which nourishes
+itself on the elements, the spirit, whose imagination receives its food,
+sense and thoughts, from the spirits of the stars, and, finally, the
+immortal soul, which finds its nourishment in faith in Christ. Hence
+natural philosophy, astronomy, and theology are the pillars of
+anthropology, and ultimately of medicine. This fantastic physic of
+Paracelsus found many adherents both in theory and in practice.[2] Among
+those who accepted and developed it may be named R. Fludd (died 1637), and
+the two Van Helmonts, father and son (died 1644 and 1699).
+
+[Footnote 1: On Paracelsus cf. Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften_, vol. i. p. 25
+seq.; Eucken, _Beiträge zur Geschichteder neueren Philosophie_, p. 32 seq.;
+Lasswitz, _Geschichte der Atomistik_, vol. i. p. 294 seq.]
+
+[Footnote 2: The influence of Paracelsus, as of Vives and Campanella, is
+evident in the great educator, Amos Comenius (Komensky, 1592-1670), whose
+pansophical treatises appeared in 1637-68. On Comenius cf. Pappenheim,
+Berlin, 1871; Kvacsala, Doctor's Dissertation, Leipsic, 1886; Walter
+Mueller, Dresden, 1887.]
+
+Beside the Platonic philosophy, others of the ancient systems were also
+revived. Stoicism was commended by Justus Lipsius (died 1606) and Caspar
+Schoppe (Scioppius, born 1562); Epicureanism was revived by Gassendi
+(1647), and rhetorizing logicians went back to Cicero and Quintilian. Among
+the latter were Laurentius Valla (died 1457); R. Agricola (died 1485); the
+Spaniard, Ludovicus Vives (1531), who referred inquiry from the authority
+of Aristotle to the methodical utilization of experience; and Marius
+Nizolius (1553), whose _Antibarbarus_ was reissued by Leibnitz in 1670.
+
+The adherents of Aristotle were divided into two parties, one of which
+relied on the naturalistic interpretation of the Greek exegete,
+Alexander of Aphrodisias (about 200 A.D.), the other on the pantheistic
+interpretation of the Arabian commentator, Averroës (died 1198). The
+conflict over the question of immortality, carried on especially in Padua,
+was the culmination of the battle. The Alexandrist asserted that, according
+to Aristotle, the soul was mortal, the Averroists, that the rational part
+which is common to all men was immortal; while to this were added the
+further questions, if and how the Aristotelian view could be reconciled
+with the Church doctrine, which demanded a continued personal existence.
+The most eminent Aristotelian of the Renaissance, Petrus Pomponatius (_De
+Immortalite Animae_, 1516; _De Fato, Libero Arbitrio, Providentia et
+Praedestinatione_), was on the side of the Alexandrists. Achillini and
+Niphus fought on the other side. Caesalpin (died 1603), Zabarella, and
+Cremonini assumed an intermediate, or, at least, a less decided position.
+Still others, as Faber Stapulensis in Paris (1500), and Desiderius Erasmus
+(1520), were more interested in securing a correct text of Aristotle's
+works than in his philosophical principles.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Among the Anti-Aristotelians only two famous names need be mentioned, that
+of the influential Frenchman, Petrus Ramus, and the German, Taurellus.
+Pierre de la Ramée (assassinated in the massacre of St. Bartholomew,
+1572), attacked the (unnatural and useless) Aristotelian logic in his
+_Aristotelicae Animadversiones_, 1543, objecting, with the Ciceronians
+mentioned above, to the separation of logic and rhetoric; and attempted a
+new logic of his own, in his _Institutiones Dialecticae_, which, in spite
+of its formalism, gained acceptance, especially in Germany.[1] Nicolaus
+Oechslein, Latinized Taurellus (born in 1547 at Mömpelgard; at his death,
+in 1606, professor of medicine in the University of Altdorf), stood quite
+alone because of his independent position in reference to all philosophical
+and religious parties. His most important works were his _Philosophiae
+Triumphus_, 1573; _Synopsis Aristotelis Metaphysicae_, 1596; _Alpes Caesae_
+(against Caesalpin, and the title punning on his name), 1597; and _De Rerum
+Aeternitate_, 1604.[2] The thought of Taurellus inclines toward the ideal of
+a Christian philosophy; which, however, Scholasticism, in his view, did
+not attain, inasmuch as its thought was heathen in its blind reverence
+for Aristotle, even though its faith was Christian. In order to heal this
+breach between the head and the heart, it is necessary in religion to
+return from confessional distinctions to Christianity itself, and in
+philosophy, to abandon authority for the reason. We should not seek to be
+Lutherans or Calvinists, but simply Christians, and we should judge on
+rational grounds, instead of following Aristotle, Averroës, or Thomas
+Aquinas. Anyone who does not aim at the harmony of theology and philosophy,
+is neither a Christian nor a philosopher. One and the same God is the
+primal source of both rational and revealed truth. Philosophy is the basis
+of theology, theology the criterion and complement of philosophy. The one
+starts with effects evident to the senses and leads to the suprasensible,
+to the First Cause; the other follows the reverse course. To philosophy
+belongs all that Adam knew or could know before the fall; had there been no
+sin, there would have been no other than philosophical knowledge. But after
+the fall, the reason, which informs us, it is true, of the moral law, but
+not of the divine purpose of salvation, would have led us to despair, since
+neither punishment nor virtue could justify us, if revelation did not teach
+us the wonders of grace and redemption. Although Taurellus thus softens the
+opposition between theology and philosophy, which had been most sharply
+expressed in the doctrine of "twofold truth" (that which is true in
+philosophy may be false in theology, and conversely), and endeavors to
+bring the two into harmony, the antithesis between God and the world still
+remains for him immovably fixed. God is not things, though he is all. He
+is pure affirmation; all without him is composed, as it were, of being and
+nothing, and can neither be nor be known independently: _negatio non nihil
+est, alias nec esset nec intelligeretur, sed limitatio est affirmationis_.
+Simple being or simple affirmation is equivalent to infinity, eternity,
+unity, uniqueness,--properties which do not belong to the world. He who
+posits things as eternal, sublates God. God and the world are opposed to
+each other as infinite cause and finite effect. Moreover, as it is our
+spirit which philosophizes and not God's spirit in us, so the faith through
+which man appropriates Christ's merit is a free action of the human spirit,
+the capacity for which is inborn, not infused from above; in it, God acts
+merely as an auxiliary or remote cause, by removing the obstacles which
+hinder the operation of the power of faith. With this anti-pantheistic
+tendency he combines an anti-intellectualistic one--being and production
+precedes and stands higher than contemplation; God's activity does not
+consist in thought but in production, and human blessedness, not in the
+knowledge but the love of God, even though the latter presupposes the
+former. While man, as an end in himself, is immortal--and the whole man,
+not his soul merely--the world of sense, which has been created only for
+the conservation of man (his procreation and probation), must disappear;
+above this world, however, a higher rears its walls to subserve man's
+eternal happiness.
+
+[Footnote 1: On Ramus cf. Waddington's treatises, one in Latin, Paris,
+1849, the other in French, Paris, 1855.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Schmid Schwarzenburg has written on Taurellus, 1860, 2d ed.,
+1864.]
+
+The high regard which Leibnitz expressed for Taurellus may be in part
+explained by the many anticipations of his own thoughts to be found in
+the earlier writer. The intimate relation into which sensibility and
+understanding are brought is an instance of this from the theory of
+knowledge. Receptivity is not passivity, but activity arrested (through the
+body). All knowledge is inborn; all men are potential philosophers (and, so
+far as they are loyal to conscience, Christians); the spirit is a thinking
+and a thinkable universe. Taurellus's philosophy of nature, recognizing
+the relative truth of atomism, makes the world consist of manifold simple
+substances combined into formal unity: he calls it a well constructed
+system of wholes. A discussion of the origin of evil is also given, with a
+solution based on the existence and misuse of freedom. Finally, it is to
+be mentioned to the great credit of Taurellus, that, like his younger
+contemporaries, Galileo and Kepler, he vigorously opposed the Aristotelian
+and Scholastic animation of the material world and the anthropomorphic
+conception of its forces, thus preparing the way for the modern view of
+nature to be perfected by Newton.
+
+
+%3. The Italian Philosophy of Nature%.
+
+We turn now from the restorers of ancient doctrines and their opponents to
+the men who, continuing the opposition to the authority of Aristotle, point
+out new paths for the study of nature. The physician, Hieronymus Cardanus
+of Milan (1501-76), whose inclinations toward the fanciful were restrained,
+though not suppressed, by his mathematical training, may be considered the
+forerunner of the school. While the people should accept the dogmas of the
+Church with submissive faith, the thinker may and should subordinate all
+things to the truth. The wise man belongs to that rare class who neither
+deceive nor are deceived; others are either deceivers or deceived, or both.
+In his theory of nature, Cardanus advances two principles: one passive,
+matter (the three cold and moist elements), and an active, formative one,
+the world-soul, which, pervading the All and bringing it into unity,
+appears as warmth and light. The causes of motion are attraction and
+repulsion, which in higher beings become love and hate. Even superhuman
+spirits, the demons, are subject to the mechanical laws of nature.
+
+The standard bearer of the Italian philosophy of nature was Bernardinus
+Telesius[1] of Cosenza (1508-88; _De Rerum Natura juxta Propria Principia_,
+1565, enlarged 1586), the founder of a scientific society in Naples called
+the Telesian, or after the name of his birthplace, the Cosentian Academy.
+Telesius maintained that the Aristotelian doctrine must be replaced by an
+unprejudiced empiricism; that nature must be explained from itself, and by
+as few principles as possible. Beside inert matter, this requires only two
+active forces, on whose interaction all becoming and all life depend. These
+are warmth, which expands, and cold, which contracts; the former resides in
+the sun and thence proceeds, the latter is situated in the earth. Although
+Telesius acknowledges an immaterial, immortal soul, he puts the emphasis
+on sensuous experience, without which the understanding is incapable of
+attaining certain knowledge. He is a sensationalist both in the theory of
+knowledge and in ethics, holding the functions of judgment and thought
+deducible from the fundamental power of perception, and considering the
+virtues different manifestations of the instinct of self-preservation
+(which he ascribes to matter as well).
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. on Telesius, Florentine, 2 vols., Naples, 1872-74; K.
+Heiland, _Erkenntnisslehre und Ethik des Telesius_, Doctor's Dissertation
+at Leipsic, 1891. Further, Rixner and Siber, _Leben und Lehrmeinungen
+berühmter Physiker am Ende des XVI. und am Anfang des XVII. Jahrhunderts_,
+Sulzbach (1819-26), 7 Hefte, 2d ed., 1829. Hefte 2-6 discuss Cardanus,
+Telesius, Patritius, Bruno, and Campanella; the first is devoted to
+Paracelsus, and the seventh to the older Van Helmont (Joh. Bapt.).]
+
+With the name of Telesius we usually associate that of Franciscus Patritius
+(1529-97), professor of the Platonic philosophy in Ferrara and Rome
+_(Discussiones Peripateticae,_ 1581; _Nova de Universis Philosophia_,
+1591), who, combining Neoplatonic and Telesian principles, holds that the
+incorporeal or spiritual light emanates from the divine original light, in
+which all reality is seminally contained; the heavenly or ethereal
+light from the incorporeal; and the earthly or corporeal, from the
+heavenly--while the original light divides into three persons, the One and
+All _(Unomnia)_, unity or life, and spirit.
+
+The Italian philosophy of nature culminates in Bruno and Campanella, of
+whom the former, although he is the earlier, appears the more advanced
+because of his freer attitude toward the Church. Giordano Bruno was born
+in 1548 at Nola, and educated at Naples; abandoning his membership in the
+Dominican Order, he lived, with various changes of residence, in France,
+England, and Germany. Returning to his native land, he was arrested in
+Venice and imprisoned for seven years at Rome, where, on February 17, 1600,
+he suffered death at the stake, refusing to recant. (The same fate overtook
+his fellow-countryman, Vanini, in 1619, at Toulouse.) Besides three
+didactic poems in Latin (Frankfort, 1591), the Italian dialogues, _Della
+Causa, Principio ed Uno_, Venice, 1584 (German translation by Lasson,
+1872), are of chief importance. The Italian treatises have been edited by
+Wagner, Leipsic, 1829, and by De Lagarde, 2 vols., Göttingen, 1888; the
+Latin appeared at Naples, in 3 vols., 1880, 1886, and 1891. Of a passionate
+and imaginative nature, Bruno was not an essentially creative thinker, but
+borrowed the ideas which he proclaimed with burning enthusiasm and lofty
+eloquence, and through which he has exercised great influence on later
+philosophy, from Telesius and Nicolas, complaining the while that the
+priestly garb of the latter sometimes hindered the free movement of his
+thought. Beside these thinkers he has a high regard for Pythagoras, Plato,
+Lucretius, Raymundus Lullus, and Copernicus (died 1543).[1] He forms the
+transition link between Nicolas of Cusa and Leibnitz, as also the link
+between Cardanus and Spinoza. To Spinoza Bruno offered the naturalistic
+conception of God (God is the "first cause" immanent in the universe, to
+which self-manifestation or self-revelation is essential; He is _natura
+naturans_, the numberless worlds are _natura naturata_); Leibnitz he
+anticipated by his doctrine of the "monads," the individual, imperishable
+elements of the existent, in which matter and form, incorrectly divorced by
+Aristotle as though two antithetical principles, constitute one unity.
+The characteristic traits of the philosophy of Bruno are the lack of
+differentiation between pantheistic and individualistic elements, the
+mediaeval animation and endlessness of the world, and, finally, the
+religious relation to the universe or the extravagant deification of nature
+(nature and the world are entirely synonymous, the All, the world-soul,
+and God nearly so, while even matter is called a divine being).[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: Nicolaus Copernicus (Koppernik; 1473-1543) was born at Thorn;
+studied astronomy, law, and medicine at Cracow, Bologna, and Padua; and
+died a Canon of Frauenberg. His treatise, _De Revolutionibus Orbium
+Caelestium_, which was dedicated to Pope Paul III., appeared at Nuremberg
+in 1543, with a preface added to it by the preacher, Andreas Osiander,
+which calls the heliocentric system merely an hypothesis advanced as a
+basis for astronomical calculations. Copernicus reached his theory rather
+by speculation than by observation; its first suggestion came from the
+Pythagorean doctrine of the motion of the earth. On Copernicus cf. Leop.
+Prowe, vol. i. _Copernicus Leben_, vol. ii. (_Urkunden_), Berlin, 1883-84;
+and K. Lohmeyer in Sybel's _Historische Zeitschrift_, vol. lvii., 1887.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Cf. on Bruno, H. Brunnhofer (somewhat too enthusiastic),
+Leipsic, 1882; also Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften_, vol. i. p. 49 _seq_.]
+
+Bruno completes the Copernican picture of the world by doing away with the
+motionless circle of fixed stars with which Copernicus, and even Kepler,
+had thought our solar system surrounded, and by opening up the view into
+the immeasurability of the world. With this the Aristotelian antithesis of
+the terrestrial and the celestial is destroyed. The infinite space (filled
+with the aether) is traversed by numberless bodies, no one of which
+constitutes the center of the world. The fixed stars are suns, and, like
+our own, surrounded by planets. The stars are formed of the same materials
+as the earth, and are moved by their own souls or forms, each a living
+being, each also the residence of infinitely numerous living beings of
+various degrees of perfection, in whose ranks man by no means takes the
+first place. All organisms are composed of minute elements, called _minima_
+or monads; each monad is a mirror of the All; each at once corporeal and
+soul-like, matter and form, each eternal; their combinations alone being
+in constant change. The universe is boundless in time, as in space;
+development never ceases, for the fullness of forms which slumber in the
+womb of matter is inexhaustible. The Absolute is the primal unity, exalted
+above all antitheses, from which all created being is unfolded and in which
+it remains included. All is one, all is out of God and in God. In
+the living unity of the universe, also, the two sides, the spiritual
+(world-soul), and the corporeal (universal matter), are distinguishable,
+but not separate. The world-reason pervades in its omnipresence the
+greatest and the smallest, but in varying degrees. It weaves all into
+one great system, so that if we consider the whole, the conflicts and
+contradictions which rule in particulars disappear, resolved into the
+most perfect harmony. Whoever thus regards the world, becomes filled with
+reverence for the Infinite and bends his will to the divine law--from true
+science proceed true religion and true morality, those of the spiritual
+hero, of the heroic sage.
+
+Thomas Campanella[1] (1568-1639) was no less dependent on Nicolas and
+Telesius than Bruno. A Calabrian by birth like Telesius, whose writings
+filled him with aversion to Aristotle, a Dominican like Bruno, he was
+deprived of his freedom on an unfounded suspicion of conspiracy against the
+Spanish rule, spent twenty-seven years in prison, and died in Paris after a
+short period of quiet. Renewing an old idea, Campanella directed attention
+from the written volume of Scripture to the living book of nature as being
+also a divine revelation. Theology rests on faith (in theology, Campanella,
+in accordance with the traditions of his order, follows Thomas Aquinas);
+philosophy is based on perception, which in its instrumental part comprises
+mathematics and logic, and in its real part, the doctrine of nature and of
+morals, while metaphysics treats of the highest presuppositions and the
+ultimate grounds,--the "pro-principles," Campanella starts, as Augustine
+before him and Descartes in later times, from the indisputable certitude of
+the spirit's own existence, from which he rises to the certitude of God's
+existence. On this first certain truth of my own existence there follow
+three others: my nature consists in the three functions of power,
+knowledge, and volition; I am finite and limited, might, wisdom, and
+love are in man constantly intermingled with their opposites, weakness,
+foolishness, and hate; my power, knowledge, and volition do not extend
+beyond the present. The being of God follows from the idea of God in us,
+which can have been derived from no other than an infinite source. It would
+be impossible for so small a part of the universe as man to produce from
+himself the idea of a being incomparably greater than the whole universe.
+I attain a knowledge of God's nature from my own by thinking away from
+the latter, in which, as in everything finite, being and non-being are
+intermingled, every limitation and negation, by raising to infinity
+my positive fundamental powers, _posse, cognoscere_, and _velle_, or
+_potentia, sapientia_, and _amor_, and by transferring them to him, who is
+pure affirmation, _ens_ entirely without _non-ens_. Thus I reach as the
+three pro-principles or primalities of the existent or the Godhead,
+omnipotence, omniscience, and infinite love. But the infrahuman world may
+also be judged after the analogy of our fundamental faculties. The
+universe and all its parts possess souls; there is naught without
+sensation; consciousness, it is true, is lacking in the lower creatures,
+but they do not lack life, feeling, and desire, for it is impossible
+for the animate to come from the inanimate. Everything loves and hates,
+desires and avoids. Plants are motionless animals, and their roots,
+mouths. Corporeal motion springs from an obscure, unconscious impulse of
+self-preservation; the heavenly bodies circle about the sun as the center
+of sympathy; space itself seeks a content _(horror vacui_).
+
+[Footnote 1: Campanella's works have been edited by Al. d'Ancona, Turin,
+1854, Cf. Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften_, vol. i. p. 125 _seq_.]
+
+The more imperfect a thing is, the more weakened is the divine being in it
+by non-being and contingency. The entrance of the naught into the divine
+reality takes place by degrees. First God projects from himself the ideal
+or archetypal world (_mundus archetypus_), _i.e._, the totality of the
+possible. From this ideal world proceeds the metaphysical world of eternal
+intelligences _(mundus mentalis)_, including the angels, the world-soul,
+and human spirits. The third product is the mathematical world of space
+_(mundus sempiternus_), the object of geometry; the fourth, the temporal
+or corporeal world; the fifth, and last, the empirical world _(mundus
+situalis_), in which everything appears at a definite point in space and
+time. All things not only love themselves and seek the conservation of
+their own being, but strive back toward the original source of their being,
+to God; _i.e._, they possess religion. In man, natural and animal religion
+are completed by rational religion, the limitations of which render a
+revelation necessary. A religion can be considered divine only when it is
+adapted to all, when it gains acceptance through miracles and virtue, and
+when it contradicts neither natural ethics nor the reason. Religion is
+union with God through knowledge, purity of will, and love. It is inborn,
+a law of nature, not, as Machiavelli teaches, a political invention.
+
+Campanella desired to see the unity in the divine government of the world
+embodied in a pyramid of states with the papacy at the apex: above the
+individual states was to come the province, then the kingdom, the empire,
+the (Spanish) world-monarchy, and, finally, the universal dominion of the
+Pope. The Church should be superior to the State, the vicegerent of God to
+temporal rulers and to councils.
+
+
+%4. Philosophy of the State and of Law%.
+
+The originality of the modern doctrines of natural law was formerly
+overestimated, as it was not known to how considerable an extent the way
+had been prepared for them by the mediaeval philosophy of the state and of
+law. It is evident from the equally rich and careful investigations of Otto
+Gierke[1] that in the political and legal theories of a Bodin, a Grotius,
+a Hobbes, a Rousseau, we have systematic developments of principles long
+extant, rather than new principles produced with entire spontaneity. Their
+merit consists in the principiant expression and accentuation and the
+systematic development of ideas which the Middle Ages had produced, and
+which in part belong to the common stock of Scholastic science, in part
+constitute the weapons of attack for bold innovators. Marsilius of Padua
+(_Defensor Pacis_, 1325), Occam (died 1347), Gerson (about 1400), and the
+Cusan[2] _(Concordantia Catholica_, 1433) especially, are now seen in a
+different light. "Under the husk of the mediaeval system there is revealed
+a continuously growing antique-modern kernel, which draws all the living
+constituents out of the husk, and finally bursts it" (Gierke, _Deutsches
+Genossenschaftsrecht_, vol. iii. p. 312). Without going beyond the
+boundaries of the theocratico-organic view of the state prevalent in
+the Middle Ages, most of the conceptions whose full development was
+accomplished by the natural law of modern times were already employed in
+the Scholastic period. Here we already find the idea of a transition on the
+part of man from a pre-political natural state of freedom and equality into
+the state of citizenship; the idea of the origin of the state by a contract
+(social and of submission); of the sovereignty of the ruler (_rex major
+populo; plenitudo potestatis_), and of popular sovereignty[3] (_populus
+major principe_); of the original and inalienable prerogatives of the
+generality, and the innate and indestructible right of the individual to
+freedom; the thought that the sovereign power is superior to positive
+law _(princeps legibus solutus_), but subordinate to natural law; even
+tendencies toward the division of powers (legislative and executive),
+and the representative system. These are germs which, at the fall of
+Scholasticism and the ecclesiastical reformation, gain light and air for
+free development.
+
+[Footnote 1: Gierke, _Johannes Althusius und die Entwickelung der
+naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien_, Breslau, 1880; the same, _Deutsches
+Genossenschaftsrecht_, vol. iii. § II, Berlin, 1881. Cf. further, Sigm.
+Riezler, _Die literarischen Widersacher der Päpste_, Leipsic, 1874; A.
+Franck, _Réformateurs et Publicistes de L'Europe_, Paris, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Nicolas' political ideas are discussed by T. Stumpf, Cologne,
+1865.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Cf. F. von Bezold, _Die Lehre von der Volkssouveränität im
+Mittelalter_, (Sybel's _Historische Zeitschrift_, vol. xxxvi., 1876).]
+
+The modern theory of natural law, of which Grotius was the most influential
+representative, began with Bodin and Althusius. The former conceives
+the contract by which the state is founded as an act of unconditional
+submission on the part of the community to the ruler, the latter conceives
+it merely as the issue of a (revocable) commission: in the view of the one,
+the sovereignty of the people is entirely alienated, "transferred," in that
+of the other, administrative authority alone is granted, "conceded," while
+the sovereign prerogatives remain with the people. Bodin is the founder
+of the theory of absolutism, to which Grotius and the school of Pufendorf
+adhere, though in a more moderate form, and which Hobbes develops to the
+last extreme. Althusius, on the other hand, by his systematic development
+of the doctrine of social contract and the inalienable sovereignty of the
+people, became the forerunner of Locke[1] and Rousseau.
+
+[Footnote 1: Ulrich Huber (1674) may be called the first representative
+of constitutionalism, and so the intermediate link between Althusius and
+Locke. Cf. Gierke, _Althusius_, p. 290.]
+
+The first independent political philosopher of the modern period was
+Nicolo Machiavelli of Florence (1469-1527). Patriotism was the soul of his
+thinking, questions of practical politics its subject, and historical fact
+its basis.[1] He is entirely unscholastic and unecclesiastical. The power
+and independence of the nation are for him of supreme importance, and the
+greatness and unity of Italy, the goal of his political system. He
+opposes the Church, the ecclesiastical state, and the papacy as the chief
+hindrances to the attainment of these ends, and considers the means by
+which help may be given to the Fatherland. In normal circumstances a
+republican constitution, under which Sparta, Rome, and Venice have achieved
+greatness, would be the best. But amid the corruption of the times, the
+only hope of deliverance is from the absolute rule of a strong prince,
+one not to be frightened back from severity and force. Should the ruler
+endeavor to keep within the bounds of morality, he would inevitably be
+ruined amid the general wickedness. Let him make himself liked, especially
+make himself feared, by the people; let him be fox and lion together; let
+him take care, when he must have recourse to bad means for the sake of the
+Fatherland, that they are justified by the result, and still to preserve
+the appearance of loyalty and honor when he is forced to act in their
+despite--for the populace always judges by appearance and by results. The
+worst thing of all is half-way measures, courses intermediate between good
+and evil and vacillating between reason and force. Even Moses had to kill
+the envious refractories, while Savonarola, the unarmed prophet, was
+destroyed. God is the friend of the strong, energy the chief virtue; and
+it is well when, as was the case with the ancient Romans, religion is
+associated with it without paralyzing it. The current view of Christianity
+as a religion of humility and sloth, which preaches only the courage
+of endurance and makes its followers indifferent to worldly honor,
+is unfavorable to the development of political vigor. The Italians have
+been made irreligious by the Church and the priesthood; the nearer Rome,
+the less pious the people. When Machiavelli, in his proposals looking
+toward Lorenzo (II.) dei Medici (died 1519), approves any means for
+restoring order, it must be remembered that he has an exceptional case
+in mind, that he does not consider deceit and severity just, but only
+unavoidable amid the anarchy and corruption of the time. But neither the
+loftiness of the end by which he is inspired, nor the low condition of
+moral views in his time, justifies his treatment of the laws as mere means
+to political ends, and his unscrupulous subordination of morality to
+calculating prudence. Machiavelli's general view of the world and of life
+is by no means a comforting one. Men are simple, governed by their passions
+and by insatiable desires, dissatisfied with what they have, and inclined
+to evil. They do good only of necessity; it is hunger which makes them
+industrious and laws that render them good. Everything rapidly degenerates:
+power produces quiet, quiet, idleness, then disorder, and, finally, ruin,
+until men learn by misfortune, and so order and power again arise. History
+is a continual rising and falling, a circle of order and disorder.
+Governmental forms, even, enjoy no stability; monarchy, when it has run out
+into tyranny, is followed by aristocracy, which gradually passes over into
+oligarchy; this in turn is replaced by democracy, until, finally, anarchy
+becomes unendurable, and a prince again attains power. No state, however,
+is so powerful as to escape succumbing to a rival before it completes the
+circuit. Protection against the corruption of the state is possible only
+through the maintenance of its principles, and its restoration only by a
+return to the healthy source whence it originated. This is secured either
+by some external peril compelling to reflection, or internally, by wise
+thought, by good laws (framed in accordance with the general welfare, and
+not according to the ambition of a minority), and by the example of good
+men.
+
+[Footnote 1: In his _Essays on the First Decade of Livy (Discorsi)_,
+Machiavelli investigates the conditions and the laws of the maintenance of
+states; while in _The Prince (II Principe_, 1515), he gives the principles
+for the restoration of a ruined state. Besides these he wrote a history
+of Florence, and a work on the art of war, in which he recommended the
+establishment of national armies.]
+
+In the interval between Machiavelli and the system of natural law of
+Grotius, the Netherlander (1625: _De Jure Belli et Pacis_), belong the
+socialistic ideal state of the Englishman, Thomas More (_De Optimo
+Reipublicae Statu deque Nova Insula Utopia_, 1516), the political theory of
+the Frenchman, Jean Bodin (_Six Livres de la République_, 1577, Latin 1584;
+also a philosophico-historical treatise, _Methodus ad Facilem Historiarum
+Cognitionem_, and the _Colloquium Heptaplomeres_, edited by Noack, 1857),
+and the law of war of the Italian, Albericus Gentilis, at his death
+professor in Oxford (_De Jure Belli_, 1588). Common to these three was
+the advocacy of religious tolerance, from which atheists alone were to
+be excepted; common, also, their ethical standpoint in opposition to
+Machiavelli, while they are at one with him in regard to the liberation of
+political and legal science from theology and the Church. With Gentilis
+(1551-1611) this separation assigns the first five commandments to divine,
+and the remainder to human law, the latter being based on the laws of human
+nature (especially the social impulse). In place of this derivation of law
+and the state from the nature of man, Jean Bodin (1530-96) insists on an
+historical interpretation; endeavors, though not always with success, to
+give sharp definitions of political concepts;[1] rejects composite
+state forms, and among the three pure forms, monarchy, aristocracy, and
+democracy, rates (hereditary) monarchy the highest, in which the subjects
+obey the laws of the monarch, and the latter the laws of God or of nature
+by respecting the freedom and the property of the citizens. So far, no
+one has correctly distinguished between forms of the state and modes of
+administration. Even a democratic state may be governed in a monarchical
+or aristocratic way. So far, also, there has been a failure to take into
+account national peculiarities and differences of situation, conditions to
+which legislation must be adjusted. The people of the temperate zone are
+inferior to those of the North in physical power and inferior to those of
+the South in speculative ability, but superior to both in political gifts
+and in the sense of justice. The nations of the North are guided by
+force, those of the South by religion, those between the two by reason.
+Mountaineers love freedom. A fruitful soil enervates men, when less
+fertile, it renders them temperate and industrious.
+
+[Footnote 1: What is the state? What is sovereignty? The former is defined
+as the rational and supremely empowered control over a number of families
+and of whatever is common to them; the latter is absolute and continuous
+authority over the state, with the right of imposing laws without being
+bound by them. The prince, to whom the sovereignty has been unconditionally
+relinquished by the people in the contract of submission, is accountable to
+God alone.]
+
+Attention has only recently been called (by O. Gierke, in the work already
+mentioned, Heft vii. of his _Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats- und
+Rechtsgeschichte_, Breslau, 1880) to the Westphalian, Johannes Althusius
+(Althusen or Althaus) as a legal philosopher worthy of notice. He was born,
+1557, in the Grafschaft Witgenstein; was a teacher of law in Herborn and
+Siegen from 1586, and Syndic in Emden from 1604 to his death in 1638. His
+chief legal work was the _Dicaeologica_, 1617 (a recasting of a treatise
+on Roman law which appeared in 1586), and his chief political work the
+_Politica_, 1603 (altered and enlarged 1610, and reprinted, in addition,
+three times before his death and thrice subsequently). Down to the
+beginning of the eighteenth century he was esteemed or opposed as chief
+among the _Monarchomachi_, so called by the Scotchman, Barclay (_De Regno
+et Regali Potestate_, 1600); since that time he has fallen into undeserved
+oblivion. The sovereign power (_majestas_) of the people is untransferable
+and indivisible, the authority vested in the chosen wielder of the
+administrative power is revocable, and the king is merely the chief
+functionary; individuals are subjects, it is true, but the community
+retains its sovereignty and has its rights represented over against the
+chief magistrate by a college of ephors. If the prince violates the
+compact, the ephors are authorized and bound to depose the tyrant, and to
+banish or execute him. There is but one normal state-form; monarchy and
+polyarchy are mere differences in administrative forms. Mention should
+finally be made of his valuation of the social groups which mediate between
+the individual and the state: the body politic is based on the narrower
+associations of the family, the corporation, the commune, and the province.
+
+While with Bodin the historical, and with Gentilis the _a priori_ method of
+treatment predominates, Hugo Grotius[1] combines both standpoints. He bases
+his system on the traditional distinction of two kinds of law. The origin
+of positive law is historical, by voluntary enactment; natural law is
+rooted in the nature of man, is eternal, unchangeable, and everywhere the
+same. He begins by distinguishing with Gentilis the _jus humanum_ from the
+_jus divinum_ given in the Scriptures. The former determines, on the one
+hand, the legal relations of individuals, and, on the other, those of whole
+nations; it is _jus personale_ and _jus gentium_.[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: Hugo de Groot lived 1583-1645. He was born in Delft, became
+Fiscal of Holland in 1607, and Syndic of Rotterdam and member of the States
+General in 1613. A leader of the aristocratic party with Oldenbarneveld, he
+adhered to the Arminians or Remonstrants, was thrown into prison, freed in
+1621 through the address of his wife, and fled to Paris, where he lived
+till 1631 as a private scholar, and, from 1635, as Swedish ambassador. Here
+he composed his epoch-making work, _De Jure Belli et Pacis_, 1625. Previous
+to this had appeared his treatise, _De Veritate Religionis Christianae_,
+1619, and the _Mare Liberum_, 1609, the latter a chapter from his maiden
+work, _De Jure Praedae_, which was not printed until 1868.]
+
+[Footnote 2: The meaning which Grotius here gives to _jus gentium_
+(=international law), departs from the customary usage of the Scholastics,
+with whom it denotes the law uniformly acknowledged among all nations.
+Thomas Aquinas understands by it, in distinction to _jus naturale_ proper,
+the sum of the conclusions deduced from this as a result of the development
+of human culture and its departure from primitive purity. Cf. Gierke,
+_Althusius_, p. 273; _Deutsches Genossenschaftsrecht_, vol. iii. p. 612.
+On the meaning of natural law cf. Gierke's Inaugural Address as Rector at
+Breslau, _Naturrecht und Deutsches Recht_, Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1883.]
+
+The distinction between natural and conventional law which has been already
+mentioned, finds place within both: the positive law of persons is called
+_jus civile_, and the positive law of nations, _jus gentium voluntarium_.
+Positive law has its origin in regard for utility, while unwritten law
+finds its source neither in this nor (directly) in the will of God,[1] but
+in the rational nature of man. Man is by nature social, and, as a rational
+being, possesses the impulse toward ordered association. Unlawful means
+whatever renders such association of rational beings impossible, as the
+violation of promises or the taking away and retention of the property
+of others. In the (pre-social) state of nature, all belonged to all, but
+through the act of taking possession _(occupatio)_ property arises (sea and
+air are excluded from appropriation). In the state of nature everyone has
+the right to defend himself against attack and to revenge himself on the
+evil-doer; but in the political community, founded by contract, personal
+revenge is replaced by punishment decreed by the civil power. The aim of
+punishment is not retribution, but reformation and deterrence. It belongs
+to God alone to punish because of sin committed, the state can punish only
+to prevent it. (The antithesis _quia peccatum est_--_ne peccetur_ comes
+from Seneca.)
+
+[Footnote 1: Natural law would be valid even if there were no God. With
+these words the alliance between the modern and the mediaeval philosophy of
+law is severed.]
+
+This energetic revival of the distinction already common in the Middle Ages
+between "positive and natural," which Lord Herbert of Cherbury brought
+forward at the same period (1624) in the philosophy of religion, gave the
+catchword for a movement in practical philosophy whose developments extend
+into the nineteenth century. Not only the illumination period, but all
+modern philosophy down to Kant and Fichte, is under the ban of the
+antithesis, natural and artificial. In all fields, in ethics as well as in
+noëtics, men return to the primitive or storm back to it, in the hope of
+finding there the source of all truth and the cure for all evils. Sometimes
+it is called nature, sometimes reason (natural law and rational law are
+synonymous, as also natural religion and the religion of the reason), by
+which is understood that which is permanent and everywhere the same in
+contrast to the temporary and the changeable, that which is innate in
+contrast to that which has been developed, in contrast, further, to that
+which has been revealed. Whatever passes as law in all places and at all
+times is natural law, says Grotius; that which all men believe forms the
+content of natural religion, says Lord Herbert. Before long it comes to
+be said: that _alone_ is genuine, true, healthy, and valuable which has
+eternal and universal validity; all else is not only superfluous and
+valueless but of evil, for it must be unnatural and corrupt. This step is
+taken by Deism, with the principle that whatever is not natural or rational
+in the sense indicated is unnatural and irrational. Parallel phenomena are
+not wanting, further, in the philosophy of law (Gierke, _Althusius_). But
+these errors must not be too harshly judged. The confidence with which they
+were made sprang from the real and the historical force of their underlying
+idea.
+
+As already stated, the "natural" forms the antithesis to the supernatural,
+on the one hand, and to the historical, on the other. This combination of
+the revealed and the historical will not appear strange, if we remember
+that the mediaeval view of the world under criticism was, as Christian,
+historico-religious, and, moreover, that for the philosophy of religion the
+two in fact coincide, inasmuch as revelation is conceived as an historical
+event, and the historical religions assume the character of revealed. The
+term arbitrary, applied to both in common, was questionable, however: as
+revelation is a divine decree, so historical institutions are the products
+of human enactment, the state, the result of a contract, dogmas, inventions
+of the priesthood, _the results of development, artificial constructions_!
+It took long ages for man to free himself from the idea of the artificial
+and conventional in his view of history. Hegel was the first to gather
+the fruit whose seeds had been sown by Leibnitz, Lessing, Herder, and the
+historical school of law. As often, however, as an attempt was made from
+this standpoint of origins to show laws in the course of history, only one
+could be reached, a law of necessary degeneration, interrupted at times
+by sudden restorations--thus the Deists, thus Machiavelli and Rousseau.
+Everything degenerates, science itself only contributes to the
+fall--therefore, back to the happy beginnings of things!
+
+If, finally, we inquire into the position of the Church in regard to the
+questions of legal philosophy, we may say that, among the Protestants,
+Luther, appealing to the Scripture text, declares rulers ordained by God
+and sacred, though at the same time he considers law and politics but
+remotely related to the inner man; that Melancthon, in his _Elements of
+Ethics_ (1538), as in all his philosophical text-books,[1] went back to
+Aristotle, but found the source of natural law in the Decalogue, being
+followed in this by Oldendorp (1539), Hemming (1562), and B. Winkler
+(1615).[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: The edition of Melancthon's works by Bretschneider and
+Bindseil gives the ethical treatises in vol. xvi. and the other
+philosophical treatises in vol. xiii. (in part also in vols. xi. and xx.).]
+
+[Footnote 2: Cf. C.v. Kaltenborn, _Die Vorläufer des Hugo Grotius_,
+Leipsic, 1848.]
+
+On the Catholic side, the Jesuits (the Order was founded in 1534, and
+confirmed in 1540), on the one hand, revived the Pelagian theory of freedom
+in opposition to the Luthero-Augustinian doctrine of the servitude of the
+will, and, on the other, defended the natural origin of the state in a
+(revocable) contract in opposition to its divine origin asserted by the
+Reformers, and the sovereignty of the people even to the sanctioning of
+tyrannicide. Bellarmin (1542-1621) taught that the prince derives his
+authority from the people, and as the latter have given him power, so they
+retain the natural right to take it back and bestow it elsewhere. The view
+of Juan Mariana (1537-1624; _De Rege_, 1599) is that, as the people in
+transferring rights to the prince retain still greater power themselves,
+they are entitled in given cases to call the king to account. If he
+corrupts the state by evil manners, and, degenerating into the tyrant,
+despises religion and the laws, he may, as a public enemy, be deprived by
+anyone of his authority and his life. It is lawful to arrest tyranny in any
+way, and those have always been highly esteemed who, from devotion to the
+public welfare, have sought to kill the tyrant.
+
+
+%5. Skepticism in France.%
+
+Toward the end of the sixteenth century, and in the very country which was
+to become the cradle of modern philosophy, there appeared, as a forerunner
+of the new thinking, a skepticism in which that was taken for complete
+and ultimate truth which with Descartes constitutes merely a moment or
+transition point in the inquiry. The earliest and the most ingenious among
+the representatives of this philosophy of doubt was Michel de Montaigne
+(1533-92), who in his _Essays_--which were the first of their kind and soon
+found an imitator in Bacon; they appeared in 1580 in two volumes, with an
+additional volume in 1588--combined delicate observation and keen thinking,
+boldness and prudence, elegance and solidity. The French honor him as one
+of their foremost writers. The most important among these treatises or
+essays is considered to be the "Apology for Raymond of Sabunde" (ii. 12)
+with valuable excursuses on faith and knowledge. Montaigne bases his doubt
+on the diversity of individual views, each man's opinion differing from his
+fellow's, while truth must be one. There exists no certain, no universally
+admitted knowledge. The human reason is feeble and blind in all things,
+knowledge is deceptive, especially the philosophy of the day, which clings
+to tradition, which fills the memory with learned note-stuff, but leaves
+the understanding void and, instead of things, interprets interpretations
+only. Both sensuous and rational knowledge are untrustworthy: the former,
+because it cannot be ascertained whether its deliverances conform to
+reality, and the latter, because its premises, in order to be valid, need
+others in turn for their own establishment, etc., _ad infinitum_. Every
+advance in inquiry makes our ignorance the more evident; the doubter alone
+is free. But though certainty is denied us in regard to truth, it is not
+withheld in regard to duty. In fact, a twofold rule of practical life is
+set up for us: nature, or life in accordance with nature and founded on
+self-knowledge, and supernatural revelation, the Gospel (to be understood
+only by the aid of divine grace). Submission to the divine ruler and
+benefactor is the first duty of the rational soul. From obedience proceeds
+every virtue, from over-subtlety and conceit, which is the product of
+fancied knowledge, comes every sin. Montaigne, like all who know men, has
+a sharp eye for human frailty. He depicts the universal weakness of human
+nature and the corruption of his time with great vivacity and not without a
+certain pleasure in the obscene; and besides folly and passion, complains
+above all of the fact that so few understand the art of enjoyment, of which
+he, a true man of the world, was master.
+
+The skeptico-practical standpoint of Montaigne was developed into a system
+by the Paris preacher, Pierre Charron (1541-1603), in his three books _On
+Wisdom_ (1601). Doubt has a double object: to keep alive the spirit
+of inquiry and to lead us on to faith. From the fact that reason and
+experience are liable to deception and that the mind has at its disposal no
+means of distinguishing truth from falsehood, it follows that we are born
+not to possess truth but to seek it. Truth dwells alone in the bosom of
+God; for us doubt and investigation are the only good amid all the error
+and tribulation which surround us. Life is all misery. Man is capable of
+mediocrity alone; he can neither be entirely good nor entirely evil; he is
+weak in virtue, weak in vice, and the best degenerates in his hands. Even
+religion suffers from the universal imperfection. It is dependent on
+nationality and country, and each religion is based on its predecessor;
+the supernatural origin of which all religions boast belongs in fact
+to Christianity alone, which is to be accepted with humility and with
+submission of the reason. Charron lays chief emphasis, however, on the
+practical side of Christianity, the fulfillment of duty; and the "wisdom"
+which forms the subject of his book is synonymous with uprightness
+(_probité_), the way to which is opened up by self-knowledge and whose
+reward is repose of spirit. And yet we are not to practice it for the
+sake of the reward, but because nature and reason, i.e., God, absolutely
+(entirely apart from the pleasurable results of virtue) require us to be
+good. True uprightness is more than mere legality, for even when outward
+action is blameless, the motives may be mixed. "I desire men to be upright
+without paradise and hell." Religion seeks to crown morality, not to
+generate it; virtue is earlier and more natural than piety. In his
+definition of the relation between religion and ethics, his delimitation
+of morality from legality, and his insistence on the purity of motives (do
+right, because the inner rational law commands it), an anticipation of
+Kantian principles may be recognized.
+
+Under Francis Sanchez (died 1632; his chief work is entitled _Quod Nihil
+Scitur_), a Portuguese by birth, and professor of medicine in Montpellier
+and Toulouse, skepticism was transformed from melancholy contemplation into
+a fresh, vigorous search after new problems. In the place of book-learning,
+which disgusts him by its smell of the closet, its continued prating of
+Aristotle, and its self-exhaustion in useless verbalism, Sanchez desires
+to substitute a knowledge of things. Perfect knowledge, it is true, can be
+hoped for only when subject and object correspond to each other. But how
+is finite man to grasp the infinite universe? Experience, the basis of
+all knowledge, gropes about the outer surface of things and illumines
+particulars only, without the ability either to penetrate to their inner
+nature or to comprehend the whole. We know only what we produce. Thus
+God knows the world which he has made, but to us is vouchsafed merely an
+insight into mediate or second causes, _causae secundae_. Here, however,
+a rich field still lies open before philosophy--only let her attack her
+problem with observation and experiment rather than with words.
+
+The French nation, predisposed to skepticism by its prevailing acuteness,
+has never lacked representatives of skeptical philosophy. The transition
+from the philosophers of doubt whom we have described to the great Bayle
+was formed by La Mothe le Vayer (died 1672; _Five Dialogues_, 1671), the
+tutor of Louis XIV., and P.D. Huet(ius), Bishop of Avranches (died 1721),
+who agreed in holding that a recognition of the weakness of the reason is
+the best preparation for faith.
+
+
+6. %German Mysticism%.
+
+In a period which has given birth to a skeptical philosophy, one never
+looks in vain for the complementary phenomenon of mysticism. The stone
+offered by doubt in place of bread is incapable of satisfying the impulse
+after knowledge, and when the intellect grows weary and despairing, the
+heart starts out in the quest after truth. Then its path leads inward, the
+mind turns in upon itself, seeks to learn the truth by inner experience and
+life, by inward feeling and possession, and waits in quietude for divine
+illumination. The German mysticism of Eckhart[1] (about 1300), which had
+been continued in Suso and Tauler and had received a practical direction
+in the Netherlands,--Ruysbroek (about 1350) to Thomas à Kempis (about
+1450),--now puts forth new branches and blossoms at the turning point of
+the centuries.
+
+[Footnote 1: Master Eckhart's _Works_ have been edited by F. Pfeiffer,
+Leipsic, 1857. The following have written on him: Jos. Bach, Vienna, 1864;
+Ad. Lasson, Berlin, 1868; the same, in the second part of Ueberweg's
+_Grundriss_, last section; Denifle, in the _Archiv für Litteratur und
+Kulturgeschichte des Mittelalters_. ii. 417 _seq_.; H. Siebeck,
+_Der Begriff des Gemuts in der deutschen Mystik (Beiträge zur
+Entstehungsgeschichte der neueren Psychologie_, i), Giessen Programme,
+1891.]
+
+Luther himself was originally a mystic, with a high appreciation of Tauler
+and Thomas à Kempis, and published in 1518 that attractive little book by
+an anonymous Frankfort author, the _German Theology_. When, later, he fell
+into literalism, it was the mysticism of German Protestantism which, in
+opposition to the new orthodoxy, held fast to the original principle of
+the Reformation, _i.e._, to the principle that faith is not assent to
+historical facts, not the acceptance of dogmas, but an inner experience,
+a renewal of the whole man. Religion and theology must not be confounded.
+Religion is not doctrine, but a new birth. With Schwenckfeld, and also with
+Franck, mysticism is still essentially pietism; with Weigel, and by the
+addition of ideas from Paracelsus, it is transformed into theosophy, and as
+such reaches its culmination in Böhme.
+
+Caspar Schwenckfeld sought to spiritualize the Lutheran movement and
+protested against its being made into a pastors' religion. Though he had
+been aroused by Luther's pioneer feat, he soon saw that the latter had not
+gone far enough; and in his _Letter on the Eucharist_, 1527, he defined the
+points of difference between Luther's view of the Sacrament and his own.
+Luther, he maintained, had fallen back to an historical view of faith,
+whereas the faith which saves can never consist in the outward acceptance
+of an historical fact. He who makes salvation dependent on preaching and
+the Sacrament, confuses the invisible and the visible Church, _Ecclesia
+interna_ and _externa_. The layman is his own priest.
+
+According to Sebastian Franck (1500-45), there are in man, as in everything
+else, two principles, one divine and one selfish, Christ and Adam, an
+inner and an outer man; if he submits himself to the former (by a timeless
+choice), he is spiritual, if to the latter, carnal. God is not the cause
+of sin, but man, who turns the divine power to good or evil. He who denies
+himself to live God is a Christian, whether he knows and confesses
+the Gospel or not. Faith does not consist in assent, but in inner
+transformation. The historical element in Christianity and its ceremonial
+observances are only the external form and garb (its "figure"), have merely
+a symbolic significance as media of communication, as forms of revelation
+for the eternal truth, proclaimed but not founded by Christ; the Bible is
+merely the shadow of the living Word of God.
+
+Valentin Weigel (born in 1533, pastor in Zschopau from 1567), whose works
+were not printed until after his death, combines his predecessors' doctrine
+of inner and eternal Christianity with the microcosmos-idea of Paracelsus.
+God, who lacks nothing, has not created the world in order to gain, but in
+order to give. Man not only bears the earthly world in his body, and the
+heavenly world of the angels in his reason (his spirit), but by virtue of
+his intellect (his immortal soul) participates in the divine world also. As
+he is thus a microcosm and, moreover, an image of God, all his knowledge
+becomes self-knowledge, both sensuous perception (which is not caused by
+the object, but only occasioned by it), and the knowledge of God. The
+literalist knows not God, but he alone who bears God in himself. Man
+is favored above other beings with the freedom to dwell in himself or
+in God. When man came out from God, he was his own tempter and made himself
+proud and selfish. Thus evil, which had before remained hidden, was
+revealed, and became sin. As the separation from God is an eternal act, so
+also redemption and resurrection form an inner event. Christ is born in
+everyone who gives up the I-ness (_Ichheit_); each regenerate man is a son
+of God. But no vicarious suffering can save him who does not put off the
+old Adam, no matter how much an atheology sunk in literalism may comfort
+itself with the hope that man can "drink at another's cost" (that the merit
+of another is imputed to him).[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Weigel is discussed by J.O. Opel, Leipsic, 1864.]
+
+German mysticism reaches its culmination in the Görlitz cobbler, Jacob
+Böhme (1575-1624; _Aurora, or the Rising Dawn_; _Mysterium Magnum, or
+on the First Book of Moses_, etc. The works of Böhme, collected by his
+apostle, Gichtel, appeared in 1682 in ten volumes, and in 1730 in six
+volumes; a new edition was prepared by Schiebler in 1831-47, with a second
+edition in 1861 _seq_.). Böhme's doctrine[1] centers about the problem of
+the origin of evil. He transfers this to God himself and joins therewith
+the leading thought of Eckhart, that God goes through a process, that he
+proceeds from an unrevealed to a revealed condition. At the sight of a tin
+vessel glistening in the sun, he conceived, as by inspiration, the idea
+that as the sunlight reveals itself on the dark vessel so all light needs
+darkness and all good evil in order to appear and to become knowable.
+Everything becomes perceptible through its opposite alone: gentleness
+through sternness, love through anger, affirmation through negation.
+Without evil there would be no life, no movement, no distinctions, no
+revelation; all would be unqualified, uniform nothingness. And as in nature
+nothing exists in which good and evil do not reside, so in God, besides
+power or the good, a contrary exists, without which he would remain unknown
+to himself. The theogonic process is twofold: self-knowledge on the part of
+God, and his revelation outward, as eternal nature, in seven moments.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Windelband's fine exposition, _Geschichte der neueren
+Philosophie_, vol. i. §19. The following have written on Böhme: Fr. Baader
+(in vols. iii. and xiii. of his _Werke_); Hamberger, Munich, 1844: H. A.
+Fechner, Görlitz, 1857; A. v. Harless, Berlin, 1870, new edition, Leipsic,
+1882.]
+
+At the beginning of the first development God is will without object,
+eternal quietude and rest, unqualified groundlessness without determinate
+volition. But in this divine nothingness there soon awakes the hunger after
+the aught (somewhat, existence), the impulse to apprehend and manifest
+self, and as God looks into and forms an image of himself, he divides into
+Father and Son. The Son is the eye with which the Father intuits himself,
+and the procession of this vision from the groundless is the Holy Ghost.
+Thus far God, who is one in three, is only understanding or wisdom, wherein
+the images of all the possible are contained; to the intuition of self must
+be added divisibility; it is only through the antithesis of the revealed
+God and the unrevealed groundless that the former becomes an actual
+trinity (in which the persons stand related as essence, power, and
+activity), and the latter becomes desire or nature in God.
+
+At the creation of the world seven equally eternal qualities,
+source-spirits or nature-forms, are distinguished in the divine nature.
+First comes desire as the contractile, tart quality or pain, from which
+proceed hardness and heat; next comes mobility as the expansive, sweet
+quality, as this shows itself in water. As the nature of the first was to
+bind and the second was fluid, so they both are combined in the bitter
+quality or the pain of anxiety, the principle of sensibility. (Contraction
+and expansion are the conditions of perceptibility.) From these three forms
+fright or lightning suddenly springs forth. This fourth quality is the
+turning-point at which light flames up from darkness and the love of
+God breaks forth from out his anger; as the first three, or four, forms
+constitute the kingdom of wrath, so the latter three constitute the kingdom
+of joy. The fifth quality is called light or the warm fire of love, and has
+for its functions external animation and communication; the sixth, report
+and sound, is the principle of inner animation and intelligence; the
+seventh, the formative quality, corporeality, comprehends all the preceding
+in itself as their dwelling.
+
+The dark fire of anger (the hard, sweet, and bitter qualities) and the
+light fire of love (light, report, and corporeality), separated by the
+lightning-fire, in which God's wrath is transformed into mercy, stand
+related as evil and good. The evil in God is not sin, but simply the
+inciting sting, the principle of movement; which, moreover, is restrained,
+overcome, transfigured by gentleness. Sin arises only when the creature
+refuses to take part in the advance from darkness to light, and obstinately
+remains in the fire of anger instead of forcing his way through to the
+fire of love. Thus that which was one in God is divided. Lucifer becomes
+enamored of the tart quality (the _centrum naturae_ or the matrix) and will
+not grow into the heart of God; and it is only after such lingering behind
+that the kingdom of wrath become a real hell. Heaven and hell are not
+future conditions, but are experienced here on earth; he who instead of
+subduing animality becomes enamored of it, stands under the wrath of God;
+whereas he who abjures self dwells in the joyous kingdom of mercy. He alone
+truly believes who himself becomes Christ, who repeats in himself what
+Christ suffered and attained.
+
+The creation of the material world is a result of Lucifer's fall. Böhme's
+description of it, based on the Mosaic account of creation, may be passed
+without notice; similarly his view of cognition, familiar from the earlier
+mystics, that all knowledge is derived from self-knowledge, that our
+destination is to comprehend God from ourselves, and the world from God.
+Man, whose body, spirit, and soul hold in them the earthly, the sidereal,
+and the heavenly, is at once a microcosm and a "little God."
+
+Under the intractable form of Böhme's speculations and amid their riotous
+fancy, no one will fail to recognize their true-hearted sensibility and an
+unusual depth and vigor of thought. They found acceptance in England and
+France, and have been revived in later times in the systems of Baader and
+Schelling.
+
+
+%7. The Foundation of Modern Physics%.
+
+In no field has the modern period so completely broken with tradition as
+in physics. The correctness of the Copernican theory is proved by Kepler's
+laws of planetary movement, and Galileo's telescopical observations; the
+scientific theory of motion is created by Galileo's laws of projectiles,
+falling bodies, and the pendulum; astronomy and mechanics form the entrance
+to exact physics--Descartes ventures an attempt at a comprehensive
+mechanical explanation of nature. And thus an entirely new movement is at
+hand. Forerunners, it is true, had not been lacking. Roger Bacon (1214-94)
+had already sought to obtain an empirical knowledge of nature based upon
+mathematics; and the great painter Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) had
+discovered the principles of mechanics, though without gaining much
+influence over the work of his contemporaries. It was reserved for the
+triple star which has been mentioned to overthrow Scholasticism. The
+conceptions with which the Scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy of nature
+sought to get at phenomena--substantial forms, properties, qualitative
+change--are thrown aside; their place is taken by matter, forces working
+under law, rearrangement of parts. The inquiry into final causes is
+rejected as an anthropomorphosis of natural events, and deduction from
+efficient causes is alone accepted as scientific explanation. Size, shape,
+number, motion, and law are the only and the sufficient principles of
+explanation. For magnitudes alone are knowable; wherever it is impossible
+to measure and count, to determine force mathematically, there rigorous,
+exact science ceases. Nature a system of regularly moved particles of
+mass; all that takes place mechanical movement, viz., the combination,
+separation, dislocation, oscillation of bodies and corpuscles; mathematics
+the organon of natural science! Into this circle of modern scientific
+categories are articulated, further, Galileo's new conception of motion
+and the conception of atoms, which, previously employed by physicists, as
+Daniel Sennert (1619) and others, is now brought into general acceptance
+by Gassendi, while the four elements are definitively discarded (Lasswitz,
+_Geschichte der Atomistik_, 1890). Still another doctrine of Democritus
+is now revived; an evident symptom of the quantification and mechanical
+interpretation of natural phenomena being furnished by the doctrine of the
+subjectivity of sense qualities, in which, although on varying grounds,
+Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Gassendi, and Hobbes agree.[1] Descartes and
+Hobbes will be discussed later. Here we may give a few notes on their
+fellow laborers in the service of the mechanical science of nature.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. chapter vi. in Natorp's work on _Descartes'
+Erkenntnisstheorie_, Marburg, 1882, and the same author's _Analekten zur
+Geschichte der Philosophie_, in the _Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol.
+xviii. 1882, p. 572 _seq_.]
+
+We begin with John Kepler[1] (1571-1630; chief work, _The New Astronomy or
+Celestial Physics, in Commentaries on the Motions of Mars_, 1609). Kepler's
+merit as an astronomer has long obscured his philosophical importance,
+although his discovery of the laws of planetary motion was the outcome of
+endeavors to secure an exact foundation for his theory of the world. The
+latter is aesthetic in character, centers about the idea of a universal
+world-harmony, and employs mathematics as an instrument of confirmation.
+For the fact that this theory satisfies the mind, and, on the whole,
+corresponds to our empirical impression of the order of nature, is not
+enough in Kepler's view to guarantee its truth; by exact methods, by means
+of induction and experiment, a detailed proof from empirical facts must be
+found for the existence not only of a general harmony, but of definitely
+fixed proportions. Herewith the philosophical application of mathematics
+loses that obscure mystical character which had clung to it since the time
+of Pythagoras, and had strongly manifested itself as late as in Nicolas of
+Cusa. Mathematical relations constitute the deepest essence of the real and
+the object of science. Where matter is, there is geometry; the latter is
+older than the world and as eternal as the divine Spirit; magnitudes are
+the source of things. True knowledge exists only where quanta are known;
+the presupposition of the capacity for knowledge is the capacity to count;
+the spirit cognizes sensuous relations by means of the pure, archetypal,
+intellectual relations born in it, which, before the advent of
+sense-impressions, have lain concealed behind the veil of possibility;
+inclination and aversion between men, their delight in beauty, the pleasant
+impression of a view, depend upon an unconscious and instinctive perception
+of proportions. This quantitative view of the world, which, with a
+consciousness of its novelty as well as of its scope, is opposed to the
+qualitative view of Aristotle;[2] the opinion that the essence of the human
+spirit, as well as of the divine, nay, the essence of all things, consists
+in activity; that, consequently, the soul is always active, being conscious
+of its own harmony at least in a confused way, even when not conscious of
+external proportions; further, the doctrine that nature loves simplicity,
+avoids the superfluous, and is accustomed to accomplish large results with
+a few principles--these remind one of Leibnitz. At the same time, the law
+of parsimony and the methodological conclusions concerning true hypotheses
+and real causes (an hypothesis must not be an artificially constructed set
+of fictions, forcibly adjusted to reality, but is to trace back phenomena
+to their real grounds), obedience to which enabled him to deduce _a priori_
+from causes the conclusions which Copernicus by fortunate conjecture had
+gathered inductively from effects--these made our thinker a forerunner of
+Newton. The physical method of explanation must not be corrupted either
+by theological conceptions (comets are entirely natural phenomena!) or by
+anthropomorphic views, which endow nature with spiritual powers.
+
+[Footnote 1: See Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften_, vol. i. p. 182 _seq_.; R.
+Eucken, _Beiträge zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, p. 54 _seq_.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Aristotle erred when he considered qualitative distinctions
+(_idem_ and _aliud_) ultimate. These are to be traced back to quantitative
+differences, and the _aliud_ or _diversum_ is to be replaced by _plus et
+minus_. There is nothing absolutely light, but only relatively. Since
+all things are distinguished only by "more or less," the possibility of
+mediating members or proportions between them is given.]
+
+Intermediate between Bacon and Descartes, both in the order of time and in
+the order of fact, and a co-founder of modern philosophy, stands Galileo
+Galilei (1564-1641).[1] Galileo exhibits all the traits characteristic
+of modern thinking: the reference from words to things, from memory to
+perception and thought, from authority to self-ascertained principles, from
+chance opinion, arbitrary opinion, and the traditional doctrines of the
+schools, to "knowledge," that is, to one's own, well grounded, indisputable
+insight, from the study of human affairs to the study of nature. Study
+Aristotle, but do not become his slave; instead of yielding yourselves
+captive to his views, use your own eyes; do not believe that the mind
+remains unproductive unless it allies itself with the understanding of
+another; copy nature, not copies merely! He equals Bacon in his high
+estimation of sensuous experience in contrast to the often illusory
+conclusions of the reason, and of the value of induction; but he does not
+conceal from himself the fact that observation is merely the first step in
+the process of cognition, leaving the chief rôle for the understanding.
+This, supplementing the defect of experience--the impossibility of
+observing all cases--by its _a priori_ concept of law and with its
+inferences overstepping the bounds of experience, first makes induction
+possible, brings the facts established into connection (their combination
+under laws is thought, not experience), reduces them to their primary,
+simple, unchangeable, and necessary causes by abstraction from contingent
+circumstances, regulates perception, corrects sense-illusions, _i. e_.,
+the false judgments originating in experience, and decides concerning the
+reality or fallaciousness of phenomena. Demonstration based on experience,
+a close union of observation and thought, of fact and Idea (law)--these
+are the requirements made by Galileo and brilliantly fulfilled in his
+discoveries; this, the "inductive speculation," as Dühring terms it, which
+derives laws of far-reaching importance from inconspicuous facts; this,
+as Galileo himself recognizes, the distinctive gift of the investigator.
+Galileo anticipates Descartes in regard to the subjective character of
+sense qualities and their reduction to quantitative distinctions,[2] while
+he shares with him the belief in the typical character of mathematics and
+the mechanical theory of the world. The truth of geometrical propositions
+and demonstrations is as unconditionally certain for man as for God, only
+that man learns them by a discursive process, whereas God's intuitive
+understanding comprehends them with a glance and knows more of them than
+man. The book of the universe is written in mathematical characters; motion
+is the fundamental phenomenon in the world of matter; our knowledge reaches
+as far as phenomena are measurable; the qualitative nature of force, back
+of its quantitative determinations, remains unknown to us. When Galileo
+maintains that the Copernican theory is philosophically true and not merely
+astronomically useful, thus interpreting it as more than a hypothesis,
+he is guided by the conviction that the simplest explanation is the most
+probable one, that truth and beauty are one, as in general he concedes
+a guiding though not a controlling influence in scientific work to the
+aesthetic demand of the mind for order, harmony, and unity in nature, to
+correspond to the wisdom of the Creator.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Natorp's essay on Galileo, in vol. xviii. of the
+_Philosophische Monatshefte_, 1882.]
+
+[Footnote 1: This doctrine is developed by Galileo in the controversial
+treatise against Padre Grassi, _The Scales (Il Saggiatore_, 1623, in the
+Florence edition of his collected works, 1842 _seq_., vol. iv. pp.
+149-369; cf. Natorp, _Descartes' Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1882, chap. vi.). In
+substance, moreover, this doctrine is found, as Heussler remarks, _Baco_,
+p. 94, in Bacon himself, in _Valerius Terminus (Works_, Spedding, vol. iii.
+pp. 217-252.)]
+
+One of the most noted and influential among the contemporaries, countrymen,
+and opponents of Descartes, was the priest and natural scientist, Petrus
+Gassendi,[1] from 1633 Provost of Digne, later for a short period professor
+of mathematics at Paris. His renewal of Epicureanism, to which he was
+impelled by temperament, by his reverence for Lucretius, and by the
+anti-Aristotelian tendency of his thinking, was of far more importance for
+modern thought than the attempts to revive the ancient systems which have
+been mentioned above (p. 29). Its superior influence depends on the fact
+that, in the conception of atoms, it offered exact inquiry a most useful
+point of attachment. The conflict between the Gassendists and the
+Cartesians, which at first was a bitter one, centered, as far as physics
+was concerned, around the value of the atomic hypothesis as contrasted with
+the corpuscular and vortex theory which Descartes had opposed to it. It
+soon became apparent, however, that these two thinkers followed along
+essentially the same lines in the philosophy of nature, sharply as they
+were opposed in their noëtical principles. Descartes' doctrine of body is
+conceived from an entirely materialistic standpoint, his anthropology,
+indeed, going further than the principles of his system would allow.
+Gassendi, on the other hand, recognizes an immaterial, immortal reason,
+traces the origin of the world, its marvelous arrangement, and the
+beginning of motion back to God, and, since the Bible so teaches, believes
+the earth to be at rest,--holding that, for this reason, the decision must
+be given in favor of Tycho Brahé and against Copernicus, although the
+hypothesis of the latter affords the simpler and, scientifically, the more
+probable explanation. Both thinkers rejoice in their agreement with the
+dogmas of the Church, only that with Descartes it came unsought in the
+natural progress of his thought, while Gassendi held to it in contradiction
+to his system. It is the more surprising that Gassendi's works escaped
+being put upon the Index, a fate which overtook those of Descartes in 1663.
+
+[Footnote 2: Pierre Gassendi, 1592-1655: _On the Life and Character of
+Epicurus_, 1647; _Notes on the Tenth Book of Diogenes Laërtius, with a
+Survey of the Doctrine of Epicurus_, 1649. _Works_, Lyons, 1658, Florence,
+1727. Cf. Lange, _History of Materialism_, book i. § 3, chap, 1; Natorp,
+_Analekten, Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xviii. 1882, p. 572 _seq_.]
+
+As modern thought derives its mechanical temper equally from both these
+sources, and the natural science of the day has appropriated the corpuscles
+of Descartes under the name of molecules, as well as the atoms of Gassendi,
+though not without considerable modification in both conceptions (Lange,
+vol. i. p. 269), so we find attempts at mediation at an early period.
+While Père Mersenne (1588-1648), who was well versed in physics, sought
+an indecisive middle course between these two philosophers, the English
+chemist, Robert Boyle, effected a successful synthesis of both. The son
+of Richard Boyle, Earl of Cork, he was born at Lismore in 1626, lived in
+literary retirement at Oxford from 1654, and later in Cambridge, and died,
+1692, in London, president of the Royal Society. His principal work, _The
+Sceptical Chemist (Works_, vol. i. p. 290 _seq_.), appeared in 1661, the
+tract, _De Ipsa Natura_, in 1682.[1] By his introduction of the atomic
+conception he founded an epoch in chemistry, which, now for the first, was
+freed from bondage to the ideas of Aristotle and the alchemists.
+Atomism, however, was for Boyle merely an instrument of method and not a
+philosophical theory of the world. A sincerely religious man,[2] he regards
+with disfavor both the atheism of Epicurus and his complete rejection of
+teleology--the world-machine points to an intelligent Creator and a purpose
+in creation; motion, to a divine impulse. He defends, on the other hand,
+the right of free inquiry against the priesthood and the pedantry of the
+schools, holding that the supernatural must be sharply distinguished from
+the natural, and mere conjectures concerning insoluble problems from
+positions susceptible of experimental proof; while, in opposition to
+submission to authority, he remarks that the current coin of opinion must
+be estimated, not by the date when and the person by whom it was minted but
+by the value of the metal alone. Cartesian elements in Boyle are the start
+from doubt, the derivation of all motion from pressure and impact, and the
+extension of the mechanical explanation to the organic world. His inquiries
+relate exclusively to the world of matter so far as it was "completed on
+the last day but one of creation." He defends empty space against Descartes
+and Hobbes. He is the first to apply the mediaeval terms, primary and
+secondary qualities, to the antithesis between objective properties which
+really belong to things, and sensuous or subjective qualities present only
+in the feeling subject.[3]
+
+[Footnote 1: Boyle's _Works_ were published in Latin at Geneva, in 1660, in
+six volumes, and in 1714 in five; an edition by Birch appeared at London,
+1744, in five volumes, second edition, 1772, in six. Cf. Buckle, _History
+of Civilization in England_, vol. i. chap. vii. pp. 265-268; Lange,
+_History of Materialism_, vol. i. pp. 298-306; vol. ii. p. 351 _seq_.;
+Georg Baku, _Der Streit über den Naturbegriff, Zeitschrift für
+Philosophie_, vol. xcviii., 1891, p. 162 _seq_.]
+
+[Footnote 2: The foundation named after him had for its object to promote
+by means of lectures the investigation of nature on the basis of atomism,
+and, at the same time, to free it from the reproach of leading to atheism
+and to show its harmony with natural religion. Samuel Clarke's work on _The
+Being and Attributes of God_, 1705, originated in lectures delivered on
+this foundation.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Eucken, _Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie_,
+pp. 94, 196.]
+
+
+%8. Philosophy in England to the Middle of the Seventeenth Century.%
+
+%(a) Bacon's Predecessors.%--The darkness which lay over the beginnings
+of modern English philosophy has been but incompletely dispelled by
+the meritorious work of Ch. de Rémusat _(Histoire de la Philosophie en
+Angleterre depuis Bacon jusqu'a Locke_, 2 vols., 1878). The most recent
+investigations of J. Freudenthal _(Beiträge zur Geschichte der Englischen
+Philosophie_, in the _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, vols. iv. and
+v., 1891) have brought assistance in a way deserving of thanks, since they
+lift at important points the veil which concealed Bacon's relations to his
+predecessors and contemporaries, by describing the scientific tendencies
+and achievements of Digby and Temple. The following may be taken from his
+results.
+
+Everard Digby (died 1592; chief work, _Theoria Analytica,_ 1579),
+instructor in logic in Cambridge from 1573, who was strongly influenced
+by Reuchlin and who favored an Aristotelian-Alexandrian-Cabalistic
+eclecticism, was the first to disseminate Neoplatonic ideas in England;
+and, in spite of the lack of originality in his systematic presentation of
+theoretical philosophy, aroused the study of this branch in England into
+new life. His opponent, Sir William Temple [1] (1553-1626), by his defense
+and exposition of the doctrine of Ramus (introduced into Great Britain by
+George Buchanan and his pupil, Andrew Melville), made Cambridge the chief
+center of Ramism. He was the first who openly opposed Aristotle.
+
+[Footnote 1: Temple was secretary to Philip Sidney, William Davison, and
+the Earl of Essex, and, from 1619, Provost of Trinity College, Dublin.
+His maiden work, _De Unica P. Rami Methodo_, which he published under the
+pseudonym, Mildapettus 1580, was aimed at Digby's _De Duplici Methodo_. His
+chief work, _P. Rami Dialectics Libri Dua Scholiis, Illustrati_, appeared
+in 1584.]
+
+Bacon was undoubtedly acquainted with both these writers and took ideas
+from both. Digby represented the scholastic tendency, which Bacon
+vehemently opposed, yet without being able completely to break away
+from it. Temple was one of those who supplied him with weapons for this
+conflict. Finally, it must be mentioned that many of the English scientists
+of the time, especially William Gilbert (1540-1603; _De Magnete_, 1600),
+physician to Queen Elizabeth, used induction in their work before Bacon
+advanced his theory of method.
+
+%(b) Bacon%.--The founder of the empirical philosophy of modern times was
+Francis Bacon (1561-1626), a contemporary of Shakespeare. Bacon began
+his political career by sitting in Parliament for many years under Queen
+Elizabeth, as whose counsel he was charged with the duty of engaging in
+the prosecution of his patron, the Earl of Essex, and at whose command he
+prepared a justification of the process. Under James I, he attained the
+highest offices and honors, being made Keeper of the Great Seal in 1617,
+Lord Chancellor and Baron Verulam in 1618, and Viscount St. Albans in
+1621. In this last year came his fall. He was charged with bribery, and
+condemned; the king remitted the imprisonment and fine, and for the
+remainder of his life Bacon devoted himself to science, rejecting every
+suggestion toward a renewal of his political activity. The moral laxity
+of the times throws a mitigating light over his fault; but he cannot be
+aquitted of self-seeking, love of money and of display, and excessive
+ambition. As Macaulay says in his famous essay, he was neither malignant
+nor tyrannical, but he lacked warmth of affection and elevation of
+sentiment; there were many things which he loved more than virtue, and many
+which he feared more than guilt. He first gained renown as an author by his
+ethical, economic, and political _Essays_, after the manner of Montaigne;
+of these the first ten appeared in 1597, in the third edition (1625)
+increased to fifty-eight; the Latin translation bears the title _Sermones
+Fideles_. His great plan for a "restoration of the sciences" was intended
+to be carried out in four, or rather, in six parts. But only the first two
+parts of the _Instauratio Magna_ were developed: the _encyclopaedia_, or
+division of all sciences[1], a chart of the _globus intellectualis_, on
+which was depicted what each science had accomplished and what still
+remained for each to do; and the development of the _new method_. Bacon
+published his survey of the circle of the sciences in the English work, the
+_Advancement of Learning_, 1605, a much enlarged revision of which, _De
+Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum_, appeared in Latin in 1623. In 1612
+he printed as a contribution to methodology the draft, _Cogitata et Visa_
+(written 1607), later recast into the [first book of the] _Novum Organum_,
+1620. This title, _Novum Organum_, of itself indicates opposition to
+Aristotle, whose logical treatises had for ages been collected under the
+title _Organon_. If in this work Bacon had given no connected exposition
+of his reforming principles, but merely a series of aphorisms, and this
+an incomplete one, the remaining parts are still more fragmentary, only
+prefaces and scattered contributions having been reduced to writing. The
+third part was to have been formed by a description of the world or natural
+_history, Historia Naturalis_, and the last,--introduced by a _Scala
+Intellectus_ (ladder of knowledge, illustrations of the method
+by examples), and by _Prodromi_ (preliminary results of his own
+inquiries),--by natural _science, Philosophia Secunda_. The best edition of
+Bacon's works is the London one of Spedding, Ellis & Heath, 1857 _seq_., 7
+vols., 2d ed., 1870; with 7 volumes additional of _The Letters and Life of
+Francis Bacon, including His Occasional Works_, and a Commentary, by J.
+Spedding, 1862-74. Spedding followed this further with a briefer _Account
+of the Life and Times of Francis Bacon_, 2 vols., 1878[2].
+
+[Footnote 1: According to the faculties of the soul, memory, imagination,
+and understanding, three principal sciences are distinguished; history,
+poesy, and philosophy. Of the three objects of the latter, "nature strikes
+the mind with a direct ray, God with a refracted ray, and man himself
+with a reflected ray." Theology is natural or revealed. Speculative
+(theoretical) natural philosophy divides into physics, concerned with
+material and efficient causes, and metaphysics, whose mission, according to
+the traditional view, is to inquire into final causes, but in Bacon's own
+opinion, into formal causes; operative (technical) natural philosophy
+is mechanics and natural magic. The doctrine concerning man comprises
+anthropology (including logic and ethics) and politics. This division of
+Bacon was still retained by D'Alembert in his preliminary discourse to the
+_Encyclopédie_.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Cf. on Bacon, K. Fischer, 2d ed., 1875; Chr. Sigwart, in the
+_Preussische Jahrbücher_, 1863 and 1864, and in vol. ii. of his _Logik_;
+H. Heussler, _Baco und seine geschichtliche Stellung_, Breslau, 1889.
+[Adamson, _Encyclopedia Britannica_, 9th. ed., vol. iii. pp. 200-222;
+Fowler, English Philosophers Series, 1881; Nichol, Blackwood's
+Philosophical Classics, 2 vols., 1888-89.--TR.]] Bacon's merit was
+threefold: he felt more forcibly and more clearly than previous
+thinkers the need of a reform in science; he set up a new and grand
+ideal--unbiased and methodical investigation of nature in order to
+mastery over nature; and he gave information and directions as to
+the way in which this goal was to be attained, which, in spite of their
+incompleteness in detail, went deep into the heart of the subject and laid
+the foundation for the work of centuries.[1] His faith in the omnipotence
+of the new method was so strong, that he thought that science for the
+future could almost dispense with talent. He compares his method to a
+compass or a ruler, with which the unpractised man is able to draw circles
+and straight lines better than an expert without these instruments.
+
+[Footnote 1: His detractors are unjust when they apply the criterion of the
+present method of investigation and find only imperfection in an imperfect
+beginning.]
+
+All science hitherto, Bacon declares, has been uncertain and unfruitful,
+and does not advance a step, while the mechanic arts grow daily more
+perfect; without a firm basis, garrulous, contentious, and lacking in
+content, it is of no practical value. The seeker after certain knowledge
+must abandon words for things, and learn the art of forcing nature to
+answer his questions. The seeker after fruitful knowledge must increase
+the number of discoveries, and transform them from matters of chance into
+matters of design. For discovery conditions the power, greatness, and
+progress of mankind. Man's power is measured by his knowledge, knowledge is
+power, and nature is conquered by obedience--_scientia est potentia; natura
+parendo vincitur_.
+
+Bacon declares three things indispensable for the attainment of this
+power-giving knowledge: the mind must understand the instruments of
+knowledge; it must turn to experience, deriving the materials of knowledge
+from perception; and it must not rise from particular principles to the
+higher axioms too rapidly, but steadily and gradually through middle
+axioms. The mind can accomplish nothing when left to itself; but undirected
+experience alone is also insufficient (experimentation without a plan is
+groping in the dark), and the senses, moreover, are deceptive and not acute
+enough for the subtlety of nature--therefore, methodical experimentation
+alone, not chance observation, is worthy of confidence. Instead of the
+customary divorce of experience and understanding, a firm alliance, a
+"lawful marriage," must be effected between them. The empiricists merely
+collect, like the ants; the dogmatic metaphysicians spin the web of their
+ideas out of themselves, like the spiders; but the true philosopher must be
+like the bee, which by its own power transforms and digests the gathered
+material.
+
+As the mind, like a dull and uneven mirror, by its own nature distorts the
+rays of objects, it must first of all be cleaned and polished, that is, it
+must be freed from all prejudices and false notions, which, deep-rooted by
+habit, prevent the formation of a true picture of the world. It must root
+out its prejudices, or, where this is impossible, at least understand them.
+Doubt is the first step on the way to truth. Of these Phantoms or Idols to
+be discarded, Bacon distinguishes four classes: Idols of the Theater, of
+the Market Place, of the Den, and of the Tribe. The most dangerous are
+the _idola theatri_, which consist in the tendency to put more trust in
+authority and tradition than in independent reflection, to adopt current
+ideas simply because they find general acceptance. Bacon's injunction
+concerning these is not to be deceived by stage-plays (_i.e._, by the
+teachings of earlier thinkers which represent things other than they are);
+instead of believing others, observe for thyself! The _idola fori_, which
+arise from the use of language in public intercourse, depend upon the
+confusion of words, which are mere symbols with a conventional value and
+which are based on the carelessly constructed concepts of the vulgar, with
+things themselves. Here Bacon warns us to keep close to things. The _idola
+specus_ are individual prepossessions which interfere with the apprehension
+of the true state of affairs, such as the excessive tendency of thought
+toward the resemblances or the differences of things, or the investigator's
+habit of transferring ideas current in his own department to subjects of a
+different kind. Such individual weaknesses are numberless, yet they may in
+part be corrected by comparison with the perceptions of others. The _idola
+tribus_, finally, are grounded in the nature of the human species. To this
+class belong, among others, illusions of the senses, which may in part be
+corrected by the use of instruments, with which we arm our organs; further,
+the tendency to hold fast to opinions acceptable to us in spite of contrary
+instances; similarly, the tendency to anthropomorphic views, including,
+as its most important special instance, the mistake of thinking that we
+perceive purposive relations everywhere and the working of final causes,
+after the analogy of human action, when in reality efficient causes alone
+are concerned. Here Bacon's injunction runs, not to interpret natural
+phenomena teleologically, but to explain them from mechanical causes; not
+to narrow the world down to the limits of the mind, but to extend the mind
+to the boundaries of the world, so that it shall understand it as it
+really is.
+
+To these warnings there are added positive rules. When the investigator,
+after the removal of prejudices and habitual modes of thought, approaches
+experience with his senses unperverted and a purified mind, he is to
+advance from the phenomena given to their conditions. First of all, the
+facts must be established by observation and experiment, and systematically
+arranged,[1] then let him go on to causes and laws.[2] The true or
+scientific induction[3] thus inculcated is quite different from the
+credulous induction of common life or the unmethodical induction of
+Aristotle. Bacon emphasizes the fact that hitherto the importance of
+negative instances, which are to be employed as a kind of counter-proof,
+has been completely overlooked, and that a substitute for complete
+induction, which is never attainable, may be found, on the one hand, in the
+collection of as many cases as possible, and, on the other, by considering
+the more important or decisive cases, the "prerogative instances." Then the
+inductive ascent from experiment to axiom is to be followed by a deductive
+descent from axioms to new experiments and discoveries. Bacon rejects
+the syllogism on the ground that it fits one to overcome his opponent in
+disputation, but not to gain an active conquest over nature. In his own
+application of these principles of method, his procedure was that of a
+dilettante; the patient, assiduous labor demanded for the successful
+promotion of the mission of natural investigation was not his forte. His
+strength lay in the postulation of problems, the stimulation and direction
+of inquiry, the discovery of lacunae and the throwing out of suggestions;
+and many ideas incidentally thrown off by him surprise us by their
+ingenious anticipations of later discoveries. The greatest defect in his
+theory was his complete failure to recognize the services promised by
+mathematics to natural science. The charge of utilitarianism, which has
+been so broadly made, is, on the contrary, unjust. For no matter how
+strongly he emphasizes the practical value of knowledge, he is still in
+agreement with those who esteem the godlike condition of calm and cheerful
+acquaintance with truth more highly than the advantages to be expected from
+it; he desires science to be used, not as "a courtezan for pleasure," but
+"as a spouse for generation, fruit and comfort," and--leaving entirely out
+of view his isolated acknowledgments of the inherent value of knowledge--he
+conceives its utility wholly in the comprehensive and noble sense that the
+pursuit of science, from which as such all narrow-minded regard for direct
+practical application must keep aloof, is the most important lever for the
+advancement of human culture.
+
+[Footnote 1: Bacon illustrates the method by the explanation of heat. The
+results of experimental observation are to be arranged in three tables. The
+table of presence contains many different cases in which heat occurs; the
+table of absence, those in which, under circumstances otherwise the same,
+it is wanting; the table of degrees or comparison enumerates phenomena
+whose increase and decrease accompany similar variations in the degree of
+heat. That which remains after the _exclusion_ now to be undertaken (of
+that which cannot be the nature or cause of heat), yields as a preliminary
+result or commencement of interpretation (as a "first vintage"), the
+definition of heat: "a motion, expansive, restrained, and acting in its
+strife upon the smaller particles of bodies."]
+
+[Footnote 2: This goal of Baconian inquiry is by no means coincident with
+that of exact natural science. Law does not mean to him, as to the physical
+scientist of to-day, a mathematically formulated statement of the course of
+events, but the nature of the phenomenon, to be expressed in a definition
+(E. König, _Entwickelung des Causalproblems bis Kant_, 1883, pp. 154-156).
+Bacon combines in a peculiar manner ancient and modern, Platonic and
+corpuscular fundamental ideas. Rejecting final causes with the atomists,
+yet handing over material and efficient causes (the latter of which sink
+with him to the level of mere changing occasional causes) to empirical
+physics, he assigns to metaphysics, as the true _science_ of nature, the
+search for the "forms" and properties of things. In this he is guided by
+the following metaphysical presupposition: Phenomena, however manifold
+they may be, are at bottom composed of a few elements, namely, permanent
+properties, the so-called "simple natures," which form, as it were, the
+alphabet of nature or the colors on her palette, by the combination of
+which she produces her varied pictures; _e. g_., the nature of heat and
+cold, of a red color, of gravity, and also of age, of death. Now the
+question to be investigated becomes, What, then, is heat, redness, etc.?
+The ground essence and law of the natures consist in certain forms,
+which Bacon conceives in a Platonic way as concepts and substances, but
+phenomenal ones, and, at the same time, with Democritus, as the grouping or
+motion of minute material particles. Thus the form of heat is a particular
+kind of motion, the form of whiteness a determinate arrangement of material
+particles. Cf. Natge, _Ueber F. Bacons Formenlehre_, Leipsic, 1891, in
+which Heussler's view is developed in more detail. [Cf. further, Fowler's
+_Bacon_, English Philosophers Series, 1881, chap. iv.--TR.]]
+
+[Footnote 3: The Baconian method is to be called induction, it is true,
+only in the broad sense. Even before Sigwart, Apelt, _Theorie der
+Induction_, 1854, pp. 151, 153, declared that the question it discussed was
+essentially a method of abstraction. This, however, does not detract from
+the fame of Bacon as the founder, of the theory of inductive investigation
+(in later times carefully elaborated by Mill).]
+
+Bacon intended that his reforming principles should accrue to the benefit
+of practical philosophy also, but gave only aphoristic hints to this
+end. Everything is impelled by two appetites, of which the one aims at
+individual welfare, the other at the welfare of the whole of which the
+thing is a part (_bonum suitatis_--_bonum communionis_). The second is not
+only the nobler but also the stronger; this holds of the lower creatures as
+well as of man, who, when not degenerate, prefers the general welfare to
+his individual interests. Love is the highest of the virtues, and is never,
+as other human endowments, exposed to the danger of excess; therefore the
+life of action is of more worth than the life of contemplation. By this
+principle of morals Bacon marked out the way for the English ethics of
+later times.[1] He notes the lack of a science of character, for which more
+material is given in ordinary discourse, in the poets and the historians,
+than in the works of the philosophers; he explains the power of the
+affections over the reason by the fact that the idea of present good fills
+the imagination more forcibly than the idea of good to come, and summons
+persuasion, habit, and morals to the aid of the latter. We must endeavor
+so to govern the passions (each of which combines in itself a masculine
+impetuosity with a feminine weakness) that they shall take the part of
+the reason instead of attacking it. Elsewhere Bacon gives (not entirely
+unquestionable) directions concerning the art of making one's way. Acute
+observations and ingenious remarks everywhere abound. In order to inform
+one's self of a man's intentions and ends, it is necessary to "keep a good
+mediocrity in liberty of speech, which invites a similar liberty, and in
+secrecy, which induces trust." "In order to get on one must have a little
+of the fool and not too much of the honest." "As the baggage is to an
+army, so is riches to virtue. It cannot be spared nor left behind, but it
+hindereth the march; yea, and the care of it sometimes loseth or disturbeth
+the victory" (impedimenta--baggage and hindrance). On envy and malevolence
+he says: "For men's minds will either feed upon their own good or upon
+others' evil; ... and whoso is out of hope to attain another's virtue will
+seek to come at even hand by depressing another's fortune."
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Vorlaender, p. 267 _seq_.]
+
+In ethics, as in theoretical philosophy, Bacon demands the completion of
+natural knowledge by revelation. The light of nature (the reason and the
+conscience) is able only to convince us of sin and not to give us complete
+information concerning our duty,--_e.g._, the lofty moral principle, Love
+your enemies. Similarly, natural theology is quite sufficient to place
+the existence of God beyond doubt, by reasoning from the order in nature
+("slight tastes of philosophy may perchance move one to atheism but fuller
+draughts lead back to religion"); but the doctrines of Christianity are
+matters of faith. Religion and science are separate fields, any confusion
+of which involves the danger of an heretical religion or a fabulous
+philosophy. The more a principle of faith contradicts the reason, the
+greater the obedience and the honor to God in accepting it.
+
+%(c) Hobbes%.--Hobbes stands in sharp contrast to Bacon both in disposition
+and in doctrine. Bacon was a man of a wide outlook, a rich, stimulating,
+impulsive nature, filled with great plans, but too mobile and desultory to
+allow them to ripen to perfection; Hobbes is slow, tenacious, persistent,
+unyielding, his thought strenuous and narrow. To this corresponds a
+profound difference in their systems, which is by no means adequately
+characterized by saying that Hobbes brings into the foreground the
+mathematical element neglected by his predecessor, and turns his attention
+chiefly to politics. The dependence of Hobbes on Bacon is, in spite of
+their personal acquaintance, not so great as formerly was universally
+assumed. His guiding stars are rather the great mathematicians of the
+Continent, Kepler and Galileo, while Cartesian influences also are not
+to be denied. He finds his mission in the construction of a strictly
+mechanical view of the world. Mechanism applied to the world gives
+materialism; applied to knowledge, sensationalism of a mathematical type;
+applied to the will, determinism; to morality and the state, ethical and
+political naturalism. Nevertheless, the empirical tendency of his nation
+has a certain power over him; he holds fast to the position that all ideas
+ultimately spring from experience. With his energetic but short-breathed
+thinking, he did not succeed in fusing the rationalistic elements received
+from foreign sources with these native tendencies, so as to produce
+a unified system. As Grimm has correctly shown (_Zur Geschichte des
+Erkenntnissproblems_), there is an unreconciled contradiction between the
+dependence of thought on experience, which he does not give up, and the
+universal validity of the truths derived from pure reason, which he asserts
+on the basis of the mathematico-philosophical doctrines of the Continent. A
+similar unmediated dualism will meet us in Locke also.
+
+Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was repelled while a student at Oxford by
+Scholastic methods in thought, with which he agreed only in their
+nominalistic results (there are no universals except names). During
+repeated sojourns in Paris, where he made the acquaintance of Gassendi,
+Mersenne, and Descartes, he devoted himself to the study of mathematics,
+and was greatly influenced by the doctrines of Galileo; while the disorders
+of the English revolution led him to embrace an absolutist theory of the
+state. His chief works were his politics, under the title _Leviathan_,
+1651, and his _Elementa Philosophiae_, in three parts (_De Corpore, De
+Homine, De Cive_), of which the third, _De Cive_, appeared first (in Latin;
+in briefer form and anonymously, 1642, enlarged 1647), the first, _De
+Corpore_, in 1655, and the second, _De Homine_, in 1658. These had
+been preceded by two books [1] written, like the two last parts of the
+_Elements_, in English: _On Human Nature_ and _De Corpore Politico_,
+composed 1640, printed without the author's consent in 1650. Besides these
+he wrote two treatises _Of Liberty and Necessity_, 1646 and 1654,
+and prepared, 1668, a collected edition of his works (in Latin). In
+Molesworth's edition, 1839-45, the Latin works occupy five volumes and the
+English eleven.[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: Or rather one; the treatise _On Human Nature_ consists of
+the first thirteen chapters of the work, _Elements of Law, Natural and
+Politic_, and the _De Corpore Politico_ of the remainder.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Cf. on Hobbes, G.C. Robertson (Blackwood's Philosophical
+Classics, vol. x.), 1886; Tönnies in the _Vierteljahrsschrift für
+wissenschaftliche Philosophie_, Jahrg. 3-5, 1879-81.]
+
+Philosophy is formally defined by Hobbes as knowledge of effects from
+causes and causes from effects by means of legitimate rational inference.
+This implies the equal validity of the deductive and inductive
+methods,--while Bacon had proclaimed the latter the most important
+instrument of knowledge,--as well as the exclusion of theology based on
+revelation from the domain of science. Philosophy is objectively defined as
+the theory of body and motion: _all that exists is body; all that occurs,
+motion_. Everything real is corporeal; this holds of points, lines, and
+surfaces, which as the limits of body cannot be incorporeal, as well as
+of the mind and of God. The mind is merely a (for the senses too) refined
+body, or, as it is stated in another place, a movement in certain parts
+of the organic body. All events, even internal events, the feelings and
+passions, are movements of material parts. "Endeavor" is a diminutive
+motion, as the atom is the smallest of bodies; sensation and representation
+are changes in the perceiving body. Space is the idea of an existing thing
+as such, _i. e_., merely as existing outside the perceiving subject; time,
+the idea of motion. All phenomena are corporeal motions, which take place
+with mechanical necessity. Neither formal nor final causes exist, but only
+efficient causes. All that happens takes its origin in the activity of an
+external cause, and not in itself; a body at rest (or in motion) remains
+at rest (or in motion) forever, unless affected by another in a contrary
+sense. And as bodies and their changes constitute the only objects of
+philosophy, so the mathematical method is the only correct method.
+
+There are two kinds of bodies: natural bodies, which man finds in nature,
+and artificial bodies, which he himself produces. By the latter Hobbes
+refers especially to the state as a human artefact. Man stands between the
+two as the most perfect natural body and an element in the political body.
+Philosophy, therefore, besides the introductory _philosophia prima_, which
+discusses the underlying concepts, consists of three parts: physics,
+anthropology, and politics. Even the theory of the state is capable of
+demonstrative treatment; moral phenomena are as subject to the law of
+mechanical causation as physical phenomena.
+
+The first factor in the cognitive process is an impression on a
+sense-organ, which, occasioned by external motion, continues onward to the
+heart and from this center gives rise to a reaction. The perception or
+sensation which thus arises is entirely subjective, a function of the
+knower merely, and in no way a copy of the external movement. The
+properties light, color, and sound, which we believe to be without us, are
+merely internal phenomena dependent on outer and inner motions, but with no
+resemblance to them. Memory consists in the lingering effects or residuary
+traces of perception; it is a sense or consciousness of having felt before
+_(sentire se sensisse meminisse est_), and ideas are distinguished from
+sensations as the perfect from the present tense. Experience is the
+totality of perceptions retained in memory, together with a certain
+foresight of the future after the analogy of the past. These stages of
+cognition, which can yield prudence but not necessary and universal
+knowledge, are present in animals as well as men. The human capacity for
+science is dependent on the faculty of speech; words are conventional
+signs to facilitate the retention and communication of ideas. As the
+memory-images denoted by words are weaker, fainter, and less clearly
+discriminated than the original sensations, it comes to pass that a number
+of similar ideas of memory receive a common name. Thus abstract general
+ideas and generic concepts arise, to which nothing real corresponds, for
+in reality particulars alone exist. The universal is a human artefact. The
+combination of words into propositions, being an addition or subtraction
+of arbitrary symbols or marks, is called judgment; the combination of
+propositions into syllogisms, inference; the united body of true or
+demonstrated principles, science--hence mathematics is the type of all
+knowledge. In short, thought is nothing but calculation and the words with
+which we operate are mere counters; he who takes counters for coin is a
+fool. Animals lack reason, _i.e._, this power of combining artificial
+symbols.
+
+Hobbes's theory of the will is characterized by the same! sensationalism
+and mechanism as his theory of knowledge. All spiritual events originate
+in impressions of sense. Man responds to the action of objects by a double
+reaction, adding to the theoretical reaction of sensation a practical one
+in the feeling of pleasure or pain (according as the impression furthers or
+hinders the vital function), whence desire and aversion follow in respect
+to future experience. Further developments from the feelings experienced at
+the signs of honor (the acknowledgment of superior power) and the contrary,
+are the affections of pride, courage, anger, of shame and repentance, of
+hope and love, of pity, etc. Deliberation is the alternation of different
+appetites; the final, victorious one which immediately precedes action is
+called will. Freedom cannot be predicated of the will, but only of the
+action, and even in this case it means simply the absence of external
+restraints, the procedure of the action from the will of the agent; while
+the action is necessary nevertheless. Every motion is the inevitable result
+of the sum of the preceding (including cerebral) motions.
+
+Things which we desire are termed good, and those which we shun, evil.
+Nothing is good _per se_ or absolutely, but only relatively, for a given
+person, place, time, or set of circumstances. Different things are good to
+different men, and there is no objective, universal rule of good and
+evil, so long as men are considered as individuals, apart from society. A
+definite criterion of the good is first reached in the state: that is right
+which the law permits, that wrong which it forbids; good means that which
+is conducive to the general welfare. In the state of nature nothing is
+forbidden; nature gives every man a right to everything, and right is
+coextensive with might. What, then, induces man to abandon the state of
+nature and enter the state of citizenship? The opinion of Aristotle and
+Grotius that the state originates in the social impulse is false; for man
+is essentially not social, but selfish, and nothing but regard for his own
+interests bids him seek the protection of the state; the civil commonwealth
+is an artificial product of fear and prudence. The highest good is
+self-preservation; all other goods, as friendship, riches, wisdom,
+knowledge, and, above all, power, are valuable only as instruments of the
+former. The precondition of well-being, for which each man strives by
+nature, is security for life and health. This is wanting in the state of
+nature, in which the passions govern; for the state of nature is a state
+of war of everyone against everyone _(bellum omnium contra omnes_). Each
+man strives for success and power, and, since he cannot trust his fellow,
+seeks to subdue, nay, to kill him; each looks upon his fellow as a wolf
+which he prefers to devour rather than submit himself to the like
+operation. Now, as no one is so weak as to be incapable of inflicting on
+his fellows that worst of evils, death, and thus the strongest is unsafe,
+reason, in the interest of everyone, enjoins a search after peace and the
+establishment of an ordered community. The conditions of peace are the
+"laws of nature," which relate both to politics and to morals but which do
+not attain their full binding authority until they become positive laws,
+injunctions of the sovereign power. Peace is attainable only when each man,
+in return for the protection vouchsafed to him, gives up his natural right
+to all. The compact by which each renounces his natural liberty to do what
+he pleases, provided all others are ready for the same renunciation,--to
+which are added, further, the laws of justice (sanctity of covenants),
+equity, gratitude, modesty, sociability, mercifulness, etc., whose
+opposites would bring back the state of nature,--this compact is secured
+against violation by the transfer of the general power and freedom to a
+single will (the will of an assembly or of an individual person), which
+then represents the general will. The civil contract includes, then, two
+moments: first, renunciation; second, irrevocable transference and
+(absolute) submission. The second unites the multitude into a civil
+personality, the most perfect unity being vouchsafed by absolute monarchy.
+The sovereign is the soul of the political body; the officials, its limbs;
+reward and punishment, its nerves; law and equity, its reason.
+
+The social contract theory has often experienced democratic interpretation
+and application, both before and since Hobbes's time; and, in fact, it does
+not include _per se_ the irrevocability of the transfer, the absoluteness
+of the sovereign power, and the monarchical head, which Hobbes considered
+indispensable in order to guard against the danger of anarchy. In every
+abridgment of the supreme power, whether by division or limitation, he sees
+a step toward the renewal of the state of nature; and he defends with iron
+rigor the omnipotence of the state and the complete lack of legal status on
+the part of all individuals in contrast with it. The citizen is not to obey
+his own conscience, which has simply the value of a private opinion,
+but the laws, as the public conscience; while the supreme ruler, on the
+contrary, is superior to the civil laws, for it is he that decrees,
+interprets, alters, and abrogates them. He is lord over the property, the
+life, and the death of the citizens, and can do no one wrong. For he
+alone has retained his original natural right to all, which the rest have
+entirely and forever renounced. He must have regard, indeed, to the welfare
+of the people, but he is accountable to God alone. The obligation of the
+subject to obey is extinguished in one case only,--when the civil power is
+incapable of providing him further with external and internal protection.
+For the rest, Hobbes declares the existing public order the lawful one, the
+evils of arbitrary rule much more tolerable than the universal hostility of
+the state of nature, and aversion to tyrants a disease inherited from the
+republicans of antiquity.
+
+The sovereign, by the laws and by instruction, determines what is good and
+evil; he determines also what is to be believed. Religion unsanctioned by
+the state is superstition. The temporal ruler is also the spiritual ruler,
+the king, the chief pastor, and the clergy his servants. One and the same
+community is termed state in so far as it consists of men, and church in so
+far as it consists of Christian men (the ecclesiastical commonwealth). The
+dogmas which the law prescribes are to be received without investigation,
+to be swallowed like pills, without mastication.
+
+The principle that every passion and every action is in its nature
+indifferent, that right and wrong exist only in the state, that the will
+of a despot is to determine what is moral and what immoral, has given just
+offense. Moreover, this was not, in fact, Hobbes's deepest conviction. Even
+without ascribing great importance to isolated statements,[1] it must
+be admitted that his doctrine was interpreted more narrowly than it was
+intended. He does not say that no moral distinctions whatever exist before
+the foundation of the state, but only that the state first supplies a fixed
+criterion of the good. Moral ideas have a certain currency before this, but
+they lack power to enforce themselves. Further, when he ascribes the origin
+of the state to self-interest, this does not mean that reason, conscience,
+generosity, and love for our fellows are entirely wanting in the state of
+nature, but only that they are not general enough, and, as against the
+passions, not strong enough to furnish a foundation for the edifice of the
+state. Not only exaggeration in statement but also uncouthness of thought
+may be forgiven the representative of a movement which is at once new and
+strengthened by the consciousness of agreement with a naturalistic theory
+of knowledge and physics; and the vigor of execution compels admiration,
+even though many obscurities remain to be deplored _(e. g_., the relation
+of the two moral standards, the standard of the reason or natural law and
+the standard of positive law). And recognition must be accorded to the
+significant kernel of doctrine formed, on the one hand, by the endeavor to
+separate ethics from theology, and on the other, by the thoughts--which, it
+is true, were not perfectly brought out--that the moral is not founded on
+a natural social impulse, but on a law of the reason, and first gains a
+definite criterion in society, and that the interests of the individual are
+inseparably connected with those of the community. In any case, the
+attempt to form a naturalistic theory of the state would be an undertaking
+deserving of thanks, even if the promulgation of this theory had done no
+further service than to challenge refutation.
+
+[Footnote 1: God inscribed the divine or natural law (Do not that to
+another, etc.) on the heart of man, when he gave him the reason to rule his
+actions. The laws of nature are, it is true, not always legally binding
+(_in foro externo_), but always and everywhere binding on the conscience
+(_in foro interno_). Justice is the virtue which we can measure by civil
+laws; love, that which we measure by the law of nature merely. The ruler
+_ought_ to govern in accordance with the law of nature.]
+
+%(d) Lord Herbert of Cherbury.%--Between Bacon (1605, 1620) and Hobbes
+(1642, 1651) stands Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1581-1648), who, by his
+work _De Veritate_ (1624),[1] became the founder of deism, that theory of
+"natural religion," which, in opposition to the historical dogmatic faith
+of the Church theology, takes the reason, which is the same in all men,
+as its basis and morality for its content. Lord Herbert introduces his
+philosophy of religion by a theory of knowledge which makes universal
+consent the highest criterion of truth (_summa veritatis norma consensus
+universalis_), and bases knowledge on certain self-evident principles
+(_principia_), common to all men in virtue of a natural instinct, which
+gives safe guidance. These common notions (_notitiae communes_) precede all
+reflective inquiry, as well as all observation and experience, which would
+be impossible without them. The most important among them are the religious
+and ethical maxims of conscience.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Tractatus de Veritate prout distinguitur a Revelatione, a
+Verisimili, a Possibile, et a False_. Also, _De Religione Gentilium_, 1645,
+complete 1663.]
+
+This natural instinct is both an impulse toward truth and a capacity for
+good or impulse to self-preservation. The latter extends not only to the
+individual but to all things with which the individual is connected, to the
+species, nay, to all the rest of the world, and its final goal is eternal
+happiness: all natural capacities are directed toward the highest good or
+toward God. The sense for the divine may indeed be lulled to sleep or led
+astray by our free will, but not eradicated. To be rational and to be
+religious are inseparable; it is religion that distinguishes man from the
+brute, and no people can be found in which it is lacking. If atheists
+really exist, they are to be classed with the irrational and the insane.
+
+The content of natural religion may be summed up in the following five
+articles, which all nations confess: 1. That there is a Supreme Being
+(_numen supremum_). 2. That he ought to be worshiped. 3. That virtue and
+piety are the chief elements of worship. 4. That man ought to repent of his
+sins. 5. That there are rewards and punishments in a future life. Besides
+these general principles, on the discovery of which Lord Herbert greatly
+prides himself, the positive religions contain arbitrary additions, which
+distinguish them from one another and which owe their origin, for the most
+part, to priestly deception, although the rhapsodies of the poets and the
+inventions of the philosophers have contributed their share. The essential
+principles of natural religion (God, virtue, faith, hope, love, and
+repentance) come more clearly to light in Christianity than in the
+religions of heathendom, where they are overgrown with myths and
+ceremonies.
+
+The _Religio Medici_ (1642) of Sir Thomas Browne shows similar tendencies.
+
+
+%9. Preliminary Survey.%
+
+In the line of development from the speculations of Nicolas of Cusa to the
+establishment of the English philosophy of nature, of religion, and of the
+state by Bacon, Herbert, and Hobbes, and to the physics of Galileo, modern
+ideas have manifested themselves with increasing clearness and freedom.
+Hobbes himself shows thus early the influence of Descartes's decisive step,
+with which the twilight gives place to the brightness of the morning. In
+Descartes the empiricism and sensationalism of the English is confronted by
+rationalism, to which the great thinkers of the Continent continue loyal.
+In Britain, experience, on the Continent the reason is declared to be the
+source of cognition; in the former, the point of departure is found in
+particular impressions of sense, on the latter, in general concepts and
+principles of the understanding; there the method of observation is
+inculcated and followed, here, the method of deduction. This antithesis
+remained decisive in the development of philosophy down to Kant, so that it
+has long been customary to distinguish two lines or schools, the Empirical
+and the Rationalistic, whose parallelism may be exhibited in the following
+table (when only one date is given it indicates the appearance of the
+philosopher's chief work):
+
+  _Empiricism.                         Rationalism_.
+  Bacon, 1620.                       (Nicolas, 1450; Bruno, 1584).
+  Hobbes, 1651.                      _Descartes_, died 1650.
+ _Locke_, 1690 (1632-1704).           Spinoza, (1632-) 1677.
+  Berkeley, 1710.                    _Leibnitz_, 1710.
+  Hume, 1748.                         Wolff, died 1754.
+
+We must not forget, indeed, the lively interchange of ideas between the
+schools (especially the influence of Descartes on Hobbes, and of the latter
+on Spinoza; further, of Descartes on Locke, and of the latter on Leibnitz)
+which led to reciprocal approximation and enrichment. Berkeley and
+Leibnitz, from opposite presuppositions, arrive at the same idealistic
+conclusion--there is no real world of matter, but only spirits and ideas
+exist. Hume and Wolff conclude the two lines of development: under the
+former, empiricism disintegrates into skepticism; under the latter,
+rationalism stiffens into a scholastic dogmatism, soon to run out into a
+popular eclecticism of common sense.
+
+If we compare the mental characteristics of the three great nations which,
+in the period between Descartes and Kant, participated most productively in
+the work of philosophy,--the Italians, with their receptive temperament and
+so active in many fields, exerted a decisive influence on its development
+and progress in the transition period alone,--it will be seen that the
+Frenchman tends chiefly to acuteness, the Englishman to clearness and
+simplicity, the German to profundity of thought. France is the land of
+mathematical, England of practical, Germany of speculative thinkers; the
+first is the home of the skeptics, though of the enthusiasts as well; the
+second, of the realists; the third, of the idealists.
+
+The English philosopher resembles a geographer who, with conscientious
+care, outlines a map of the region through which he journeys; the
+Frenchman, an anatomist who, with steady stroke, lays bare the nerves and
+muscles of the organism; the German, a mountaineer who loses in clear
+vision of particular objects as much as he gains in loftiness of position
+and extent of view. The Englishman describes the given reality, the
+Frenchman analyses it, the German transfigures it.
+
+The English thinker keeps as close as possible to phenomena, and the
+principles which he uses in the explanation of phenomena themselves lie in
+the realm of concrete experience. He explains one phenomenon by another; he
+classifies and arranges the given material without analyzing it; he keeps
+constantly in touch with the popular consciousness. His reverence for
+reality, as this presents itself to him, and his distrust of far-reaching
+abstraction, are so strong that it is enough for him to take his bearings
+from the real, and to give a true reproduction of it, while he willingly
+renounces the ambition to form it anew in concepts. With this respect for
+concrete reality he combines a similar reverence for ethical postulates.
+When the development of a given line of thought threatens to bring him into
+conflict with practical life, he is honest enough to draw the conclusions
+which follow from his premises and to give them expression, but he avoids
+the collision by a simple compromise, shutting up the refinements of
+philosophy in the study and yielding in practice to the guidance of
+natural instinct and conscience. His support, therefore, of theories which
+contradict current views in morals is free from the levity in which the
+Frenchman indulges. Life and thought are separate fields, contradictions
+between them are borne in patience, and if science draws its material from
+life it shows itself grateful for the favor by giving life the benefit of
+the useful outcome of its labors, and, at the same time, shielding it from
+the revolutionary or disintegrating effect of its doubtful paradoxes.
+
+While the deliberate craft of English philosophy does not willingly lose
+sight of the shores of the concrete world, French thought sails boldly and
+confidently out into the open sea of abstraction. It is not strange that
+it finds the way to the principles more rapidly than the way back to
+phenomena. A free road, a fresh start, a straight course--such is the
+motto of French thinking. Whatever is inconsistent with rectilinearity is
+ignored, or opposed as unfitting. The line drawn by Descartes through the
+world between matter and spirit, and that by Rousseau between nature
+and culture, are distinctive of the philosophical character of their
+countrymen. Dualism is to them entirely congenial; it satisfies their
+need for clearness, and with this they are content. Antithesis is in the
+Frenchman's blood; he thinks in it and speaks in it, in the salon or on the
+platform, in witty jest or in scientific earnestness of thought. Either A
+or not-A, and there is no middle ground. This habit of precision and
+sharp analysis facilitates the formation of closed parties, whereas each
+individual German, in philosophy as in politics, forms a party of his own.
+The demand for the removal of the rubbish of existing systems and the
+sanguine return to the sources, give French philosophy an unhistorical,
+radical, and revolutionary character. Minds of the second order, who are
+incapable of taking by themselves the step from that which is given to the
+sources, prove their radicalism by following down to the roots that which
+others have begun (so Condillac and the sensationalism of Locke). Moreover,
+philosophical principles are to be translated into action; the thinker has
+shown himself the doctrinaire in his destructive analysis of that which
+is given, so, also, he hopes to play the dictator by overturning existing
+institutions and establishing a new order of things,--only his courageous
+endeavor flags as soon in the region of practice as in that of theory.
+
+The German lacks the happy faculty, which distinguishes the two nations
+just discussed, of isolating a problem near at hand, and he is accustomed
+to begin his system with Leda's egg; but, by way of compensation, he
+combines the lofty flight of the French with the phlegmatic endurance of
+the English, _i.e._, he seeks his principles far above experience, but,
+instead of stopping with the establishment of points of view or when he
+has set the note, he carries his principles through in detail with loving
+industry and comprehensive architectonic skill. While common sense turns
+the scale with the English and analytical thought with the French, the
+German allows the fancy and the heart to take an important part in the
+discussion, though in such a way that the several faculties work together
+and in harmony. While in France rationalism, mysticism, and the philosophy
+of the heart were divided among different thinkers (Descartes, Malebranche
+and Pascal, Rousseau), there is in every German philosopher something of
+all three. The skeptical Kant provides a refuge for the postulates of
+thought in the sanctuary of faith; the earnest, energetic Fichte, toward
+the end of his life, takes his place among the mystics; Schelling thinks
+with the fancy and dreams with the understanding; and under the broad cloak
+of the Hegelian dialectic method, beside the reflection of the Critique of
+Reason and of the Science of Knowledge, the fancies of the Philosophy of
+Nature, the deep inwardness of Böhme, even the whole wealth of empirical
+fact, found a place. As synthesis is predominant in his view of things, so
+a harmonizing, conciliatory tendency asserts itself in his relations to his
+predecessors: the results of previous philosophers are neither discarded
+out of hand nor accepted in the mass, but all that appears in any way
+useful or akin to the new system is wrought in at its proper place, though
+often with considerable transformation. In this work of mediation there is
+considerable loss in definiteness, the just and comprehensive consideration
+of the most diverse interests not always making good the loss. And since
+such a philosophy, as we have already shown, engages the whole man, its
+disciple has neither impulse nor strength left for reforming labors; while,
+on the other hand, he perceives no external call to undertake them, since
+he views the world through the glasses of his system. Thus philosophy in
+Germany, pursued chiefly by specialists, remains a professional affair, and
+has not exercised a direct transforming influence on life (for Fichte, who
+helped to philosophize the French out of Germany, was an exception); but
+its influence has been the greater in the special sciences, which in
+Germany more than any other land are handled in a philosophic spirit.
+
+The mental characteristics of these nations are reflected also in their
+methods of presentation. The style of the English philosopher is sober,
+comprehensible, diffuse, and slightly wearisome. The French use a fluent,
+elegant, lucid style which entertains and dazzles by its epigrammatic
+phrases, in which not infrequently the epigram rules the thought. The
+German expresses his solid, thoughtful positions in a form which is at
+once ponderous and not easily understood; each writer constructs his own
+terminology, with a liberal admixture of foreign expressions, and the
+length of his paragraphs is exceeded only by the thickness of his books.
+These national distinctions may be traced even in externals. The Englishman
+makes his divisions as they present themselves at first thought, and rather
+from a practical than from a logical point of view. The analytic Frenchman
+prefers dichotomy, while trichotomy corresponds to the synthetic,
+systematic character of German thinking; and Kant's naïve delight, because
+in each class the third category unites its two predecessors, has been
+often experienced by many of his countrymen at the sight of their own
+trichotomies.
+
+The division of labor in the pre-Kantian philosophy among these three
+nationalities entirely agrees with the account given of the peculiarities
+of their philosophical endowment. The beginning falls to the share of
+France; Locke receives that tangled skein, the problem of knowledge,
+from the hand of Descartes, and passes it on to Leibnitz; and while the
+Illumination in all three countries is converting the gold inherited from
+Locke and Leibnitz into small coin, the solution of the riddle rings out
+from Königsberg.
+
+
+
+
+PART I.
+
+FROM DESCARTES TO KANT.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+DESCARTES.
+
+The long conflict with Scholasticism, which had been carried on with ever
+increasing energy and ever sharper weapons, was brought by Descartes to a
+victorious close. The new movement, long desired, long sought, and prepared
+for from many directions, at length appears, ready and well-established.
+Descartes accomplishes everything needful with the sure simplicity of
+genius. He furnishes philosophy with a settled point of departure in
+self-consciousness, offers her a method sure to succeed in deduction from
+clear and distinct conceptions, and assigns her the mechanical explanation
+of nature as her most imperative and fruitful mission.
+
+René Descartes was born at La Haye in Touraine, in 1596, and died at
+Stockholm in 1650. Of the studies taught in the Jesuit school at La Flèche,
+mathematics alone was able to satisfy his craving for clear and certain
+knowledge. The years 1613-17 he spent in Paris; then he enlisted in the
+military service of the Netherlands, and, in 1619, in that of Bavaria.
+While in winter quarters at Neuburg, he vowed a pilgrimage to Loretto if
+the Virgin would show him a way of escape from his tormenting doubts; and
+made the saving discovery of the "foundations of a wonderful science."
+At the end of four years this vow was fulfilled. On his return to Paris
+(1625), he was besought by his learned friends to give to the world his
+epoch-making ideas. Though, to escape the distractions of society, he kept
+his residence secret, as he had done during his first stay in Paris, and
+frequently changed it, he was still unable to secure the complete privacy
+and leisure for scientific work which he desired. Therefore he went to
+Holland in 1629, and spent twenty years of quiet productivity in Amsterdam,
+Franecker, Utrecht, Leeuwarden, Egmond, Harderwijk, Leyden, the palace of
+Endegeest, and five other places. His work here was interrupted only by
+a few journeys, but much disturbed in its later years by annoying
+controversies with the theologian Gisbert Voëtius of Utrecht, with Regius,
+a pupil who had deserted him, and with professors from Leyden. His
+correspondence with his French friends was conducted through Père Mersenne.
+In 1649 he yielded to pressing invitations from Queen Christina of Sweden
+and removed to Stockholm. There his weak constitution was not adequate to
+the severity of the climate, and death overtook him within a few months.
+
+The two decades of retirement in the Netherlands were Descartes's
+productive period. His motive in developing and writing out his thoughts
+was, essentially, the desire not to disappoint the widely spread belief
+that he was in possession of a philosophy more certain than the common one.
+The work entitled _Le Monde_, begun in 1630 and almost completed, remained
+unprinted, as the condemnation of Galileo (1632) frightened our philosopher
+from publication; fragments of it only, and a brief summary, appeared
+after the author's death. The chief works, the _Discourse on Method_, the
+_Meditations on the First Philosophy_, and the _Principles of Philosophy_
+appeared between 1637 and 1644,--the _Discours de la Méthode_ in 1637,
+together with three dissertations (the "Dioptrics," the "Meteors," and the
+"Geometry"), under the common title, _Essais Philosophiques_. To the (six)
+_Meditationes de Prima Philosophia_, published in 1641, and dedicated to
+the Paris Sorbonne, are appended the objections of various savants to whom
+the work had been communicated in manuscript, together with Descartes's
+rejoinders. He himself considered the criticisms of Arnauld, printed fourth
+in order, as the most important. The Third Objections are from Hobbes, the
+Fifth from Gassendi, the First, which were also the first received, from
+the theologian Caterus of Antwerp, while the Second and Sixth, collected by
+Mersenne, are from various theologians and mathematicians. In the second
+edition there were added, further, the Seventh Objections, by the Jesuit
+Bourdin, and the Replies of the author thereto. The four books of the
+_Principia Philosophiae_, published in 1644 and dedicated to Elizabeth,
+Countess Palatine, give a systematic presentation of the new philosophy.
+The _Discourse on Method_ appeared, 1644, in a Latin translation, the
+_Meditations_ and the _Principles_ in French, in 1647. The _Treatise on the
+Passions_ was published in 1650; the _Letters_, 1657-67, in French, 1668,
+in Latin. The _Opera Postuma_, 1701, beside the _Compendium of Music_
+(written in 1618) and other portions of his posthumous writings, contain
+the "Rules for the Direction of the Mind," supposed to have been written in
+1629, and the "Search for Truth by the Light of Nature." The complete works
+have been often published, both in Latin and in French. The eleven volume
+edition of Cousin appeared in 1824-26.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Of the many treatises on the philosophy of Descartes those of
+C. Schaarschmidt (_Descartes und Spinoza_, 1850) and J.H. Löwe, 1855, may
+be mentioned. Further, M. Heinze has discussed _Die Sittenlehre des
+Descartes_, 1872; Ed. Grimm, _Descartes' Lehre von den angeborenen
+Ideen_, 1873; G. Glogau, _Darlegung und Kritik des Grundgedankens der
+Cartesianisch. Metaphysik (Zeitschrift für Philosophie_, vol. lxxiii. p.
+209 _seq_.), 1878; Paul Natorp, _Descartes' Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1882;
+and Kas. Twardowski, _Idee und Perception_ in Descartes, 1892. In French,
+Francisque Bouillier (_Histoire de la Philosophie Cartésienne_, 1854) and
+E. Saisset (_Précurseurs et Disciples de Descartes_, 1862) have written
+on Cartesianism. [The _Method, Meditations, and Selections from the
+Principles_ have been translated into English by John Veitch, 5th ed.,
+1879, and others since; and H.A.P. Torrey has published _The Philosophy
+of Descartes in Extracts from his Writings_, 1892 (Sneath's Modern
+Philosophers). The English reader may be referred, also, to Mahaffy's
+_Descartes_, 1880, in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics; to the article
+"Cartesianism," _Encyclopedia Britannica_, 9th ed., vol. v., by Edward
+Caird; and, for a complete discussion, to the English translation of
+Fischer's _Descartes and his School_' by J.P. Gordy, 1887.--TR.]]
+
+We begin our discussion with Descartes's noëtical and metaphysical
+principles, and then take up in order his doctrine of nature and of man.
+
+
+%1. The Principles%.
+
+That which passes nowadays for science, and is taught as such in the
+schools, is nothing but a mass of disconnected, uncertain, and often
+contradictory opinions. A principle of unity and certainty is entirely
+lacking. If anything permanent and irrefutable is to be accomplished in
+science, everything hitherto considered true must be thoroughly demolished
+and built up anew. For we come into the world as children and we form
+judgments of things, or repeat them after others, before we have come into
+the full possession of our intellectual powers; so that it is no wonder
+that we are filled with a multitude of prejudices, from which we can
+thoroughly escape only by considering everything doubtful which shows the
+least sign of uncertainty. Let us renounce, therefore, all our old views,
+in order later to accept better ones in their stead; or, perchance, to
+take the former up again after they shall have stood the test of rational
+criticism. The recognized precaution, never to put complete confidence in
+that which has once deceived us, holds of our relation to the senses as
+elsewhere. It is certain that they sometimes deceive us--perhaps they do so
+always. Again, we dream every day of things which nowhere exist, and there
+is no certain criterion by which to distinguish our dreams from our waking
+moments,--what guarantee have we, then, that we are not always dreaming?
+Therefore, our doubt must first of all be directed to the existence of
+sense-objects. Nay, even mathematics must be suspected in spite of the
+apparent certainty of its axioms and demonstrations, since controversy
+and error are found in it also.
+
+I doubt or deny, then, that the world is what it appears to be, that there
+is a God, that external objects exist, that I have a body, that twice
+two are four. One thing, however, it is impossible for me to bring into
+question, namely, that I myself, who exercise this doubting function,
+exist. There is one single point at which doubt is forced to halt--at the
+doubter, at the self-existence of the thinker. I can doubt everything
+except that I doubt, and that, in doubting, I am. Even if a superior being
+sought to deceive me in all my thinking, he could not succeed unless I
+existed, he could not cause me not to exist so long as I thought. To be
+deceived means to think falsely; but that something is thought, no matter
+what it be, is no deception. It might be true, indeed, that nothing at all
+existed; but then there would be no one to conceive this non-existence.
+Granted that everything may be a mistake; yet the being mistaken, the
+thinking is not a mistake. Everything is denied, but the denier remains.
+The whole content of consciousness is destroyed; consciousness itself, the
+doubting activity, the being of the thinker, is indestructible. _Cogitatio
+sola a me divelli nequit_. Thus the settled point of departure required for
+knowledge is found in the _self-certitude of the thinking ego_. From the
+fact that I doubt, _i.e._, think, it follows that I, the doubter, the
+thinker, am. _Cogito, ergo sum_ is the first and most certain of all
+truths.
+
+The principle, "I think, therefore I am," is not to be considered a
+deduction from the major premise, "Whatever thinks exists." It is rather
+true that this general proposition is derived from the particular and
+earlier one. I must first realize in my own experience that, as thinking, I
+exist, before I can reach the general conclusion that thought and existence
+are inseparable. This fundamental truth is thus not a syllogism, but a
+not further deducible, self-evident, immediate cognition, a pure
+intuition--_sum cogitans_. Now, if my existence is revealed by my activity
+of thought, if my thought is my being, and the converse, if in me thought
+and existence are identical, then I am a being whose essence consists in
+thinking. I am a spirit, an ego, a rational soul. My existence follows only
+from my thinking, not from any chance action. _Ambulo ergo sum_ would not
+be valid, but _mihi videor_ or _puto me ambulare, ergo sum_. If I believe
+I am walking, I may undoubtedly be deceived concerning the outward action
+(as, for instance, in dreams), but never concerning my inward belief.
+_Cogitatio_ includes all the conscious activities of the mind, volition,
+emotion, and sensation, as well as representation and cognition; they are
+all _modi cogitandi_. The existence of the mind is therefore the most
+certain of all things. We know the soul better than the body. It is for
+the present the only certainty, and every other is dependent on this, the
+highest of all.
+
+What, then, is the peculiarity of this first and most certain knowledge
+which renders it self-evident and independent of all proof, which makes
+us absolutely unable to doubt it? Its entire clearness and distinctness.
+Accordingly, I may conclude that everything which I perceive as clearly and
+distinctly as the _cogito ergo sum_ is also true, and I reach this general
+rule, _omne est verum, quod clare et distincte percipio_. So far, then, we
+have gained three things: a challenge; to be inscribed over the portals
+of certified knowledge, _de omnibus dubitandum_; a basal truth, _sum
+cogitans_; a criterion of truth, _clara et distinct a perceptio_.
+
+The doubt of Descartes is not the expression of a resigned spirit which
+renounces the unattainable; it is precept, not doctrine, the starting point
+of philosophy, not its conclusion, a methodological instrument in the hand
+of a strong and confident longing for truth, which makes use of doubt to
+find the indubitable. It is not aimed at the possibility of attaining
+knowledge, but at the opinion that it has already been attained, at the
+credulity of the age, at its excessive tendency toward historical and
+poly-historical study, which confuses the acquisition and handing down of
+information with knowledge of the truth. That knowledge alone is certain
+which is self-attained and self-tested--and this cannot be learned
+or handed down; it can only be rediscovered through examination and
+experience. Instead of taking one's own unsupported conjectures or the
+opinions of others as a guide, the secret of the search for truth is to
+become independent and of age, to think for one's self; and the only remedy
+against the dangers of self-deception and the ease of repetition is to be
+found in doubting everything hitherto considered true. This is the meaning
+of the Cartesian doubt, which is more comprehensive and more thorough
+than the Baconian. Descartes disputed only the certitude of the knowledge
+previously attained, not the possibility of knowledge--for of the latter no
+man is more firmly convinced than he. He is a rationalist, not a skeptic.
+The intellect is assured against error just as soon as, freed from
+hindrances, it remains true to itself, as it puts forth all its powers and
+lets nothing pass for truth which is not clearly and distinctly known.
+Descartes demands the same thing for the human understanding as Rousseau at
+a later period for the heart: a return to uncorrupted nature. This faith in
+the unartificial, the original, the natural, this radical and naturalistic
+tendency is characteristically French. The purification of the mind, its
+deliverance from the rubbish of scholastic learning, from the pressure of
+authority, and from inert acceptance of the thinking of others--this is
+all. Descartes finds the clearest proof of the mind's capacity for truth in
+mathematics, whose trustworthiness he never seriously questioned, but only
+hypothetically, in order to exhibit the still higher certainty of the "I
+think, therefore I am." He wants to give philosophy the stable character
+which had so impressed him in mathematics when he was a boy, and recommends
+her, therefore, not merely the evidence of mathematics as a general
+example, but the mathematical method for definite imitation. Metaphysics,
+like mathematics, must derive its conclusions by deduction from
+self-evident principles. Thus the geometrical method begins its rule in
+philosophy, a rule not always attended with beneficial results.
+
+With this criterion of truth Descartes advances to the consideration of
+ideas. He distinguishes volition and judgment from ideas in the narrow
+sense (_imagines_), and divides the latter, according to their origin, into
+three classes: _ideae innatae, adventitiae, a me ipso factae_, considering
+the second class, the "adventitious" ideas, the most numerous, but the
+first, the "innate" ideas, the most important. No idea is higher or clearer
+than the idea of God or the most perfect being. Whence comes this idea?
+That every idea must have a cause, follows from the "clear and distinct"
+principle that nothing produces nothing. It follows from this same
+principle, _ex nihilo nihil fit_, however, that the cause must contain as
+much reality or perfection--_realitas_ and _perfectio_ are synonymous--as
+the effect, for otherwise the overplus would have come from nothing. So
+much ("objective," representative) reality contained in an idea, so much or
+more ("formal," actual) reality must be contained in its cause. The idea
+of God as infinite, independent, omnipotent, omniscient, and creative
+substance, has not come to me through the senses, nor have I formed it
+myself. The power to conceive a being more perfect than myself, can have
+only come from someone who is more perfect in reality than I. Since I know
+that the infinite contains more reality than the finite, I may conclude
+that the idea of the infinite has not been derived from the idea of the
+finite by abstraction and negation; it precedes the latter, and I become
+conscious of my defects and my finitude only by comparison with the
+absolute perfection of God. This idea, then, must have been implanted in me
+by God himself. The idea of God is an original endowment; it is as innate
+as the idea of myself. However incomplete it may be, it is still
+sufficient to give a knowledge of God's existence, although not a perfect
+comprehension of his being, just as a man may skirt a mountain without
+encircling it.
+
+Descartes brings in the idea of God in order to escape solipsism. So long
+as the self-consciousness of the ego remained the only certainty, there was
+no conclusive basis for the assumption that anything exists beyond self,
+that the ideas which apparently come from without are really occasioned by
+external things and do not spring from the mind itself. For our natural
+instinct to refer them to objects without us might well be deceptive. It is
+only through the idea of God, and by help of the principle that the cause
+must contain at least as much reality as the effect, that I am taken beyond
+myself and assured that I am not the only thing in the world. For as this
+idea contains more of representative, than I of actual reality, I cannot
+have been its cause.
+
+To this empirical argument, which derives God's existence from our idea
+of God (from the fact that we have an idea of him), Descartes joins the
+(modified) ontological argument of Anselm, which deduces the existence of
+God from the concept of God. While the ideas of all other things include
+only the possibility of existence, necessary existence is inseparable from
+the concept of the most perfect being. God cannot be thought apart from
+existence; he has the ground of his existence in himself; he is _a se_
+or _causa sui_. Finally, Descartes adds a third argument. The idea of
+perfections which I do not possess can only have been imparted to me by a
+more perfect being than I, which has bestowed on me all that I am and
+all that I am capable of becoming. If I had created myself, I would have
+bestowed upon myself these absent perfections also. And the existence of a
+plurality of causes is negatived by the supreme perfection which I conceive
+in the idea of God, the indivisible unity of his attributes. Among the
+attributes of God his veracity is of special importance. It is impossible
+that he should will to deceive us; that he should be the cause of our
+errors. God would be a deceiver, if he had endowed us with a reason to
+which error should appear true, even when it uses all its foresight in
+avoiding it and assents only to that which it clearly and distinctly
+perceives. Error is man's own fault; he falls into it only when he misuses
+the divine gift of knowledge, which includes its own standard. Thus
+Descartes finds new confirmation for his test of truth in the _veracitas
+dei_. Erdmann has given a better defense of Descartes than the philosopher
+himself against the charge that this is arguing in a circle, inasmuch as
+the existence of God is proved by the criterion of truth, and then the
+latter by the former: The criterion of certitude is the _ratio cognoscendi_
+of God's existence; God is the _ratio essendi_ of the criterion of
+certitude. In the order of existence God is first, he creates the reason
+together with its criterion; in the order of knowledge the criterion
+precedes, and God's existence follows from it. Descartes himself endeavors
+to avoid the circle by making _intuitive_ knowledge self-evident, and by
+not bringing in the appeal to God's veracity in _demonstrative_ knowledge
+until, in reflective thought, we no longer have each separate link in the
+chain of proof present to our minds with full intuitive certainty, but only
+remember that we have previously understood the matter with clearness and
+distinctness.
+
+Our ideas represent in part things, in part qualities. Substance is defined
+by the concept of independence as _res quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re
+indigeat ad existendum_; a pregnant definition with which the concept of
+substance gains the leadership in metaphysics, which it held till the time
+of Hume and Kant, sharing it then with the conception of cause or, rather,
+relinquishing it to the latter. The Spinozistic conclusion that, according
+to the strict meaning of this definition, there is but one substance, God,
+who, as _causa sui_, has absolutely no need of any other thing in order to
+his existence, was announced by Descartes himself. If created substances
+are under discussion, the term does not apply to them in the same sense
+(not _univoce_) as when we speak of the infinite substance; created beings
+require a different explanation, they are things which need for their
+existence only the co-operation of God, and have no need of one another.
+Substance is cognized through its qualities, among which one is pre-eminent
+from the fact that it expresses the essence or nature of the thing, and
+that it is conceived through itself, without the aid of the others, while
+they presuppose it and cannot be thought without it. The former fundamental
+properties are termed attributes, and these secondary ones, modes or
+accidents. Position, figure, motion, are contingent properties of
+body; they presuppose that it is extended or spatial; they are _modi
+extensionis_, as feeling, volition, desire, representation, and judgment
+are possible only in a conscious being, and hence are merely modifications
+of thought. Extension is the essential or constitutive attribute of body,
+and thought of mind. Body is never without extension, and mind never
+without thought--_mens semper cogitat_. Guided by the self-evident
+principle that the non-existent has no properties, we argue from a
+perceived quality to a substance as its possessor or support. Substances
+are distinct from one another when we can clearly and distinctly cognize
+one without the other. Now, we can adequately conceive mind without a
+corporeal attribute and body without a spiritual one; the former has
+nothing of extension in it, the latter nothing of thought: hence thinking
+substance and extended substance are entirely distinct and have nothing
+in common. Matter and mind are distinct _realiter_, matter and extension
+_idealiter_ merely. Thus we attain three clear and distinct ideas, three
+eternal verities: _substantia infinita sive deus, substantia finita
+cogitans sive mens, substantia extensa sive corpus_.
+
+By this abrupt contraposition of body and mind as reciprocally independent
+substances, Descartes founded that dualism, as whose typical representative
+he is still honored or opposed. This dualism between the material and
+spiritual worlds belongs to those standpoints which are valid without being
+ultimate truth; on the pyramid of metaphysical knowledge it takes a high,
+but not the highest, place. We may not rest in it, yet it retains a
+permanent value in opposition to subordinate theories. It is in the
+right against a materialism which still lacks insight into the essential
+distinction between mind and matter, thought and extension, consciousness
+and motion; it loses its validity when, with a full consideration and
+conservation of the distinction between these two spheres, we succeed in
+bridging over the gulf between them, whether this is accomplished through
+a philosophy of identity, like that of Spinoza and Schelling, or by an
+idealism, like that of Leibnitz or Fichte. In any case philosophy retains
+as an inalienable possession the negative conclusion, that, in view of the
+heterogeneity of consciousness and motion, the inner life is not reducible
+to material phenomena. This clear and simple distinction, which sets bounds
+to every confusion of spiritual and material existence, was an act of
+emancipation; it worked on the sultry intellectual atmosphere of the time
+with the purifying and illuminating power of a lightning flash. We shall
+find the later development of philosophy starting from the Cartesian
+dualism.
+
+Descartes himself looked upon the fundamental principles which have now
+been discussed as merely the foundation for his life work, as the entrance
+portal to his cosmology. Posterity has judged otherwise; it finds his chief
+work in that which he considered a mere preparation for it. The start from
+doubt, the self-certitude of the thinking ego, the rational criterion of
+certitude, the question of the origin of ideas, the concept of substance,
+the essential distinction between conscious activity and corporeal being,
+and, also, the principle of thoroughgoing mechanism in the material world
+(from his philosophy of nature)--these are the thoughts which assure his
+immortality. The vestibule has brought the builder more fame, and has
+proved more enduring, than the temple: of the latter only the ruins remain;
+the former has remained undestroyed through the centuries.
+
+
+%2. Nature.%
+
+What guarantee have we for the existence of material objects affecting our
+senses? That the ideas of sense do not come from ourselves, is shown by
+the fact that it is not in our power to determine the objects which we
+perceive, or the character of our perception of them. The supposition that
+God has caused our perceptions directly, or by means of something which has
+no resemblance whatever to an external object extended in three dimensions
+and movable, is excluded by the fact that God is not a deceiver. In
+reliance on God's veracity we may accept as true whatever the reason
+declares concerning body, though not all the reports of the senses,
+which so often deceive us. At the instance of the senses we clearly and
+distinctly perceive matter distinct from our mind and from God, extended
+in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth, with variously formed and
+variously moving parts, which occasion in us sensations of many kinds. The
+belief that perception makes known things as they really are is a prejudice
+of sense to be discarded; on the contrary, it merely informs us concerning
+the utility or harmfulness of objects, concerning their relation to man as
+a being composed of soul and body. (The body is that material thing which
+is very intimately joined with the mind, and occasions in the latter
+certain feelings, _e.g._, pain, which as merely cogitative it would not
+have.) Sense qualities, as color, sound, odor, cannot constitute the
+essence of matter, for their variation or loss changes nothing in it; I can
+abstract from them without the material thing disappearing.[1] There is one
+property, however, extensive magnitude (_quantitas_), whose removal would
+imply the destruction of matter itself. Thus I perceive by pure thought
+that the essence of matter consists in extension, in that which constitutes
+the object of geometry, in that magnitude which is divisible, figurable,
+and movable. This thesis (_corpus = extensio sive spatium_) is next
+defended by Descartes against several objections. In reply to the objection
+drawn from the condensation and rarefaction of bodies, he urges that the
+apparent increase or decrease in extension is, in fact, a mere change of
+figure; that the rarefaction of a body depends on the increase in size of
+the intervals between its parts, and the entrance into them of foreign
+bodies, just as a sponge swells up when its pores become filled with water
+and, therefore, enlarged. The demand that the pores, and the bodies which
+force their way into them, should always be perceptible to the senses, is
+groundless. He meets the second point, that we call extension by itself
+_space_, and not body, by maintaining that the distinction between
+extension and corporeal substance is a distinction in thought, and not in
+reality; that attribute and substance, mathematical and physical bodies,
+are not distinct in fact but only in our thought of them. We apply the
+term space to extension in general, as an abstraction, and body to a given
+individual, determinate, limited extension. In reality, wherever extension
+is, there substance is also,--the non-existent has no extension,--and
+wherever space is, there matter is also. Empty space does not exist.
+When we say a vessel is empty, we mean that the bodies which fill it are
+imperceptible; if it were absolutely empty its sides would touch. Descartes
+argues against the atomic theory and against the finitude of the world, as
+he argues against empty space: matter, as well as space, has no smallest,
+indivisible parts, and the extension of the world has no end. In the
+identification of space and matter the former receives fullness from
+the latter, and the latter unlimitedness from the former, both internal
+unlimitedness (endless divisibility) and external (boundlessness). Hence
+there are not several matters but only one (homogeneous) matter, and only
+one (illimitable) world.
+
+[Footnote 1: They are merely subjective states in the perceiver, and
+entirely unlike the motions which give rise to them, although there is
+a certain agreement, as the differences and variations in sensation are
+paralleled by those in the object.]
+
+Matter is divisible, figurable, movable quantity. Natural science needs no
+other principles than these indisputably true conceptions, by which all
+natural phenomena may be explained, and must employ no others. The most
+important is motion, on which all the diversity of forms depends. Corporeal
+being has been shown to be extension; corporeal becoming is motion. Motion
+is defined as "the transporting of one part of matter, or of one body, from
+the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it,
+or which we regard as at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies." This
+separation of bodies is reciprocal, hence it is a matter of choice which
+shall be considered at rest. Besides its own proper motion in reference to
+the bodies in its immediate vicinity, a body can participate in very many
+other motions: the traveler walking back and forth on the deck of a ship,
+for instance, in the motion of the vessel, of the waves, and of the earth.
+The common view of motion as an activity is erroneous; since it requires
+force not only to set in motion bodies which are at rest, but also to stop
+those which are in motion, it is clear that motion implies no more activity
+than rest. Both are simply different states of matter. Since there is no
+empty space, each motion spreads to a whole circle of bodies: A forces B
+out of its place, B drives out C, and so on, until Z takes up the position
+which A has left.
+
+The ultimate cause of motion is God. He has created bodies with an
+original measure of motion and rest, and, in accordance with his immutable
+character, he preserves this quantity of motion unchanged: it remains
+constant in the world as a whole, though it varies in individual bodies.
+For with the power to create or destroy motion bodies lack, further, the
+power to alter their quantity of motion. By the side of God, the primary
+cause of motion, the laws of motion appear as secondary causes. The first
+of these is the one become familiar under the name, law of inertia:
+Everything continues of itself in the state (of motion or rest) in which it
+is, and changes its state only as a result of some extraneous cause. The
+second of these laws, which are so valuable in mechanics, runs: Every
+portion of matter tends to continue a motion which has been begun in the
+same direction, hence in a straight line, and changes its direction only
+under the influence of another body, as in the case of the circle above
+described. Descartes bases these laws on the unchangeableness of God and
+the simplicity of his world-conserving (_i.e._, constantly creative)
+activity. The third law relates to the communication of motion; but
+Descartes does not recognize the equality of action and reaction as
+universally as the fact demands. If a body in motion meets another body,
+and its power (to continue its motion in a straight line) is less than the
+resistance of the other on which it has impinged, it retains its motion,
+but in a different direction: it rebounds in the opposite direction. If, on
+the contrary, its force is greater, it carries the other body along with
+it, and loses so much of its own motion as it imparts to the latter. The
+seven further rules added to these contain much that is erroneous. As
+_actio in distans_ is rejected, all the phenomena of motion are traced back
+to pressure and impulse. The distinction between fluid and solid bodies is
+based on the greater or less mobility of their parts.
+
+The leading principle in the special part of the Cartesian physics,--we
+can only briefly sketch it,--which embraces, first, celestial, and, then,
+terrestial phenomena, is the axiom that we cannot estimate God's power and
+goodness too highly, nor ourselves too meanly. It is presumptuous to seek
+to comprehend the purposes of God in creation, to consider ourselves
+participants in his plans, to imagine that things exist simply for our
+sake--there are many things which no man sees and which are of advantage
+to none. Nothing is to be interpreted teleologically, but all must be
+interpreted from clearly known attributes, hence purely mechanically.
+After treating of the distances of the various heavenly bodies, of the
+independent light of the sun and the fixed stars and the reflected light of
+the planets, among which the earth belongs, Descartes discusses the motion
+of the heavenly bodies. In reference to the motion of the earth he seeks a
+middle course between the theories of Copernicus and Tycho Brahé. He agrees
+with Copernicus in the main point, but, in reliance on his definition
+of motion, maintains that the earth is at rest, viz., in respect to its
+immediate surroundings. It is clear that the harmony of his views with
+those of the Church (though it was only a verbal agreement) was not
+unwelcome to him. According to his hypothesis,--as he suggests, perhaps an
+erroneous hypothesis,--the fluid matter which fills the heavenly spaces,
+and which may be compared to a vortex or whirlpool, circles about the sun
+and carries the planets along with it. Thus the planets move in relation to
+the sun, but are at rest in relation to the adjacent portions of the matter
+of the heavens. In view of the biblical doctrine, according to which the
+world and all that therein is was created at a stroke, he apologetically
+describes his attempt to explain the origin of the world from chaos under
+the laws of motion as a scientific fiction, intended merely to make the
+process more comprehensible. It is more easily conceivable, if we think
+of the things in the world as though they had been gradually formed from
+elements, as the plant develops from the seed. We now pass to the Cartesian
+anthropology, with its three chief objects: the body, the soul, and the
+union of the two.
+
+
+3. %Man.%
+
+The human body, like all organic bodies, is a machine. Artificial automata
+and natural bodies are distinguished only in degree. Machines fashioned by
+the hand of man perform their functions by means of visible and tangible
+instruments, while natural bodies employ organs which, for the most part,
+are too minute to be perceived. As the clock-maker constructs a clock from
+wheels and weights so that it is able to go of itself, so God has made
+man's body out of dust, only, being a far superior artist, he produces a
+work of art which is better constructed and capable of far more wonderful
+movements. The cause of death is the destruction of some important part of
+the machine, which prevents it from running longer; a corpse is a broken
+clock, and the departure of the soul comes only as a result of death. The
+common opinion that the soul generates life in the body is erroneous. It
+is rather true that life must be present before the soul enters into union
+with the body, as it is also true that life must have ended before it
+dissolves the bond.
+
+The sole principles of physiology are motion and heat. The heat (vital
+warmth, a fire without light), which God has put in the heart as the
+central organ of life, has for its function the promotion of the
+circulation of the blood, in the description of which Descartes mentions
+with praise the discoveries of Harvey _(De Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in
+Animalibus_, 1628). From the blood are separated its finest, most fiery,
+and most mobile parts, called by Descartes "animal spirits" _(spiritus
+animales sive corporales_), and described as a "very subtle wind" or "pure
+and vivid flame," which ascend into the cavities of the brain, reach
+the pineal gland suspended in its center _(conarion, glans pinealis,
+glandula_), pass into the nerves, and, by their action on the muscles
+connected with the nerves, effect the motions of the limbs. These views
+refer to the body alone, and so are as true of animals as of men. If
+automata existed similar to animals in all respects, both external and
+internal, it would be absolutely impossible to distinguish them from real
+animals. If, however, they were made to resemble human bodies, two signs
+would indicate their unreality--we would find no communication of ideas by
+means of language, and also an absence of those bodily movements which
+take their origin in the reason (and not merely in the constitution of the
+body). The only thing which raises man above the brute is his rational
+soul, which we are on no account to consider a product of matter, but which
+is an express creation of God, superadded. The union of the soul or the
+mind _(anima sive mens_) with the body is, it is true, not so loose that
+the mind merely dwells in the body, like a pilot in a ship, nor, on the
+other hand, in view of the essential contrariety of the two substances, is
+it so intimate as to be more than a _unio compositionis_. Although the soul
+is united to the whole body, an especially active intercourse between them
+is developed at a single point, the pineal gland, which is distinguished by
+its central, protected position, above all, by the fact that it is the only
+cerebral organ that is not double. This gland, together with the animal
+spirits passing to and from it, mediates between mind and body; and as the
+point of union for the twofold impressions from the (right and left) eyes
+and ears, without which objects would be perceived double instead of
+single, is the seat of the soul. Here the soul exercises a direct influence
+on the body and is directly affected by it; here it dwells, and at will
+produces a slight, peculiar movement of the gland, through this a change
+in the course of the animal spirits (for it is not capable of generating
+motion, but only of changing its direction), and, finally, movements of the
+members; just as, on the other hand, it remarks the slightest change in the
+course of the _spiritus_ through a corresponding movement of the gland,
+whose motions vary according to the sensuous properties of the object to be
+perceived, and responds by sensations. Although Descartes thus limits the
+direct interaction of soul and body to a small part of the organism, he
+makes an exception in the case of _memoria_, which appears to him to be
+more of a physical than a psychical function, and which he conjectures to
+be diffused through the whole brain.
+
+In spite of the comprehensive meaning which Descartes gives to the notion
+_cogitatio_, it is yet too narrow to leave room for an _anima vegetativa_
+and an _anima sensitiva_. Whoever makes mind and soul equivalent, holds
+that their essence consists in conscious activity alone, and interprets
+sensation as a mode of thought, cannot escape the paradox of denying to
+animals the possession of a soul. Descartes does not shrink from such
+a conclusion. Animals are mere machines; they are bodies animated, but
+soulless; they lack conscious perception and appetition, though not the
+appearance of them. When a clock strikes seven it knows nothing of the
+fact; it does not regret that it is so late nor long soon to be able to
+strike eight; it wills nothing, feels nothing, perceives nothing. The lot
+of the brute is the same. It sees and hears nothing, it does not hunger or
+thirst, it does not rejoice or fear, if by these anything more than mere
+corporeal phenomena is to be meant; of all these it possesses merely the
+unconscious material basis; it moves and motion goes on in it--that is all.
+The psychology of Descartes, which has had important results,[1] divides
+_cogitationes_ into two classes: _actiones_ and _passiones_. Action denotes
+everything which takes its origin in, and is in the power of, the soul;
+passion, everything which the soul receives from without, in which it can
+make no change, which is impressed upon it. The further development of this
+distinction is marred by the crossing of the most diverse lines of thought,
+resulting in obscurities and contradictions. Descartes's simple, naïve
+habits of thought and speech, which were those of a man of the world rather
+than of a scholar, were quite incompatible with the adoption and consistent
+use of a finely discriminated terminology; he is very free with _sive_, and
+not very careful with the expressions _actio, passio, perceptio, affectio,
+volitio_. First he equates activity and willing, for the will springs
+exclusively from the soul--it is only in willing that the latter is
+entirely independent; while, on the other hand, passivity is made
+equivalent to representation and cognition, for the soul does not create
+its ideas, but receives them,--sensuous impressions coming to her quite
+evidently from the body. These equations, "_actio_--the practical, _passio_
+= the theoretical function," are soon limited and modified, however. The
+natural appetites and affections are forms of volition, it is true, but not
+free products of the mind, for they take their origin in its connection
+with the body. Further, not all perceptions have a sensuous origin; when
+the soul makes free use of its ideas in imagination, especially when in
+pure thought it dwells on itself, when without the interference of the
+imagination it gazes on its rational nature, it is by no means passive
+merely. Every act of the will, again, is accompanied by the consciousness
+of volition. The _volitio_ is an activity, the _cogitatio volitionis_ a
+passivity; the soul affects itself, is passively affected through its own
+activity, is at the same instant both active and passive.
+
+[Footnote 1: For details cf. the able monograph of Dr. Anton Koch, 1881.]
+
+Thus not every volition, _e.g._ sensuous desire, is action nor all
+perception, _e.g._ that of the pure intellect, passion. Finally, certain
+psychical phenomena fall indifferently under the head of perception or of
+volition, _e.g._, pain, which is both an indistinct idea of something and
+an impulse to shun it. In accordance with these emendations, and omitting
+certain disturbing points of secondary importance, the matter may be thus
+represented:
+
+                             COGITATIO.
+                                 ¦
+                                 ¦
+                           ACTIO ¦ PASSIO
+                                 ¦
+                                 ¦
+                                 ¦
+(Mens sola; clarae et distinctae ¦ (Mens unita cum corpore;
+ideae.)                          ¦ confusae ideae.)
+                                 ¦
+VOLITIO:                         ¦
+    6. Voluntas. 3b. Commotiones ¦ 3a. Affectus. 2. Appetitus naturales.
+           ¦       intellectuales¦        ¦                  ¦
+           ¦                     ¦         \                /
+           ¦                     ¦          --------v-------
+       Judicium.                 ¦           Sensus interni
+---------------------------------+-----------------------------------
+                                 ¦
+                                 ¦
+PERCEPTIO:                4. Imaginatio
+                           ------^------
+                          /             \
+   5. Intellectus 4b. Phantasia. ¦ 4a. Memoria. 1. Sensus externi.
+
+
+Accordingly six grades of mental function are to be distinguished: (1)
+The external senses. (2) The natural appetites. (3) The passions (which,
+together with the natural appetites, constitute the internal senses,
+and from which the mental emotions produced by the intellect are quite
+distinct). (4) The imagination with its two divisions, passive memory and
+active phantasy. (5) The intellect or reason. (6) The will. These various
+stages or faculties are, however, not distinct parts of the soul, as in the
+old psychology, in opposition to which Descartes emphatically defends the
+_unity of the soul_. It is one and the same psychical power that exercises
+the higher and the lower, the rational and the sensuous, the practical and
+the theoretical activities.
+
+Of the mental functions, whether representative images, perceptions, or
+volitions, a part are referred to body (to parts of our own body, often
+also to external objects), and produced by the body (by the animal spirits
+and, generally, by the nerves as well), while the rest find both object and
+cause in the soul. Intermediate between the two classes stand those acts
+of the will which are caused by the soul, but which relate to the body,
+_e.g._, when I resolve to walk or leap; and, what is more important, the
+_passions_, which relate to the soul itself, but which are called forth,
+sustained, and intensified by certain motions of the animal spirits. Since
+only those beings which consist of a body as well as a soul are capable of
+the passions, these are specifically human phenomena. These affections,
+though very numerous, may be reduced to a few simple or primary ones,
+of which the rest are mere specializations or combinations. Descartes
+enumerates six primitive passions (which number Spinoza afterward reduced
+one-half)--_admiratio, amor et odium, cupiditas (désir), gaudium et
+tristitia_. The first and the fourth have no opposites, the former being
+neither positive nor negative, and the latter both at once. Wonder, which
+includes under it esteem and contempt, signifies interest in an object
+which neither attracts us by its utility nor repels us by its hurtfulness,
+and yet does not leave us indifferent. It is aroused by the powerful or
+surprising impression made by the extraordinary, the rare, the unexpected.
+Love seeks to appropriate that which is profitable; hate, to ward off that
+which is harmful, to destroy that which is hostile. Desire or longing looks
+with hope or fear to the future. When that which is feared or hoped for
+has come to pass, joy and grief come in, which relate to existing good and
+evil, as desire relates to those to come.
+
+The Cartesian theory of the passions forms the bridge over which its author
+passes from psychology to ethics. No soul is so weak as to be incapable of
+completely mastering its passions, and of so directing them that from them
+all there will result that joyous temper advantageous to the reason. The
+freedom of the will is unlimited. Although a direct influence on the
+passions is denied it,--it can neither annul them merely at its bidding,
+nor at once reduce them to silence, at least, not the more violent
+ones,--it still has an indirect power over them in two ways. During the
+continuance of the affection (e.g., fear) it is able to arrest the bodily
+movements to which the affection tends (flight), though not the emotion
+itself, and, in the intervals of quiet, it can take measures to render a
+new attack of the passion less dangerous. Instead of enlisting one passion
+against another, a plan which would mean only an appearance of freedom,
+but in fact a continuance in bondage, the soul should fight with its own
+weapons, with fixed maxims _(judicia)_, based on certain knowledge of good
+and evil. The will conquers the emotions by means of principles, by clear
+and distinct knowledge, which sees through and corrects the false values
+ascribed to things by the excitement of the passions. Besides this negative
+requirement, "subjection of the passions," Descartes' contributions to
+ethics--in the letters to Princess Elizabeth on human happiness, and to
+Queen Christina on love and the highest good--were inconsiderable. Wisdom
+is the carrying out of that which has been seen to be best, virtue is
+steadfastness, sin inconstancy therein. The goal of human endeavor is peace
+of conscience, which is attained only through the determination to be
+virtuous, i.e., to live in harmony with self.
+
+Besides its ethical mission, the will has allotted to it the theoretical
+function of affirmation and negation, i.e., of judgment. If God in his
+veracity and goodness has bestowed on man the power to know truth, how is
+misuse of this power, how is error possible? Single sensations and ideas
+cannot be false, but only judgments--the reference of ideas to objects.
+Judgment or assent is a matter of the will; so that when it makes erroneous
+affirmations or negations, when it prefers the false judgment to the true,
+it alone is guilty. Our understanding is limited, our will unlimited; the
+latter reaches further than the former, and can assent to a judgment
+even before its constituent parts have attained the requisite degree of
+clearness. False judgment is prejudgment, for which we can hold neither God
+nor our own nature responsible. The possibility of error, as well as the
+possibility of avoiding error, resides in the will. This has the power to
+postpone its assent or dissent, to hold back its decision until the ideas
+have become entirely clear and distinct. The supreme perfection is the
+_libertas non errandi_. Thus knowledge itself becomes a moral function; the
+true and the good are in the last analysis identical. The contradiction
+with which Descartes has been charged, that he makes volition and cognition
+reciprocally determinative, that he bases moral goodness on the clearness
+of ideas and _vice versa_, does not exist. We must distinguish between a
+theoretical and a practical stadium in the will; it is true of the latter
+that it depends on knowledge of the right, of the former that the knowledge
+of the right is dependent on it. In order to the possibility of moral
+_action_ the will must conform to clear judgment; in order to the
+production of the latter the will must _be_ moral. It is the unit-soul,
+which first, by freely avoiding overhasty judgment, cognizes the truth, to
+exemplify it later in moral conduct.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF CARTESIANISM IN THE NETHERLANDS AND
+IN FRANCE.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. G. Monchamp, _Histoire du Cartésianisme en Belgique_,
+Brussels, 1886.]
+
+%1. Occasionalism: Geulincx.%
+
+The propagation and defense of a system of thought soon give occasion
+to its adherents to purify, complete, and transform it. Obscurities and
+contradictions are discovered, which the master has overlooked or allowed
+to remain, and the disciple exerts himself to remove them, while retaining
+the fundamental doctrines. In the system of Descartes there were two
+closely connected points which demanded clarification and correction, viz.,
+his double dualism (1) between extended substance and thinking substance,
+(2) between created substance and the divine substance. In contrast with
+each other matter and mind are substances or independent beings, for
+the clear conception of body contains naught of consciousness, thought,
+representation, and that of mind nothing of extension, matter, motion.
+In comparison with God they are not so; apart from the creator they can
+neither exist nor be conceived. In every case where the attempt is made to
+distinguish between intrinsic and general (as here, between substance in
+the stricter and wider senses), an indecision betrays itself which is not
+permanently endured.
+
+The substantiality of the material and spiritual worlds maintained by
+Descartes finds an excellent counterpart in his (entirely modern) tendency
+to push the _concursus dei_ as far as possible into the background, to
+limit it to the production of the original condition of things, to give
+over motion, once created, to its own laws, and ideas implanted in the mind
+to its own independent activity; but it is hard to reconcile with it the
+view, popular in the Middle Ages, that the preservation of the world is a
+perpetual creation. In the former case the relation of God to the world is
+made an external relation; in the latter, an internal one. In the one the
+world is thought of as a clock, which once wound up runs on mechanically,
+in the second it is likened to a piece of music which the composer himself
+recites. If God preserves created things by continually recreating them
+they are not substances at all; if they are substances, preservation
+becomes an empty word, which we repeat after the theologians without giving
+it any real meaning.
+
+Matter and spirit stand related in our thought only by way of exclusion;
+is the same true of them in reality? They can be conceived and can exist
+without each other; can they, further, without each other effect all that
+we perceive them to accomplish? There are some motions in the material
+world which we refer to a voluntary decision of the soul, and some among
+our ideas (_e.g._, perceptions of the senses) which we refer to corporeal
+phenomena as their causes. If body and soul are substances, how can they
+be dependent on each other in certain of their activities, if they are of
+opposite natures, how can they affect each other? How can the incorporeal,
+unmoved spirit move the animal spirits and receive impulses from them?
+The substantiality (reciprocal independence) of body and mind, and their
+interaction (partial reciprocal dependence), are incompatible, one or
+the other is illusory and must be abandoned. The materialists (Hobbes)
+sacrifice the independence of mind, the idealists (Berkeley, Leibnitz), the
+independence of matter, the occasionalists, the interaction of the two.
+This forms the advance of the last beyond Descartes, who either naïvely
+maintains that, in spite of the contrariety of material and mental
+substances, an exchange of effects takes place between them as an
+empirical fact, or, when he realizes the difficulty of the anthropological
+problem,--how is the union of the two substances in man possible,--ascribes
+the interaction of body and mind, together with the union of the two, to
+the power of God, and by this abandonment of the attempt at a natural
+explanation, opens up the occasionalistic way of escape. Further, in
+his more detailed description of the intercourse between body and mind
+Descartes had been guilty of direct violations of his laws of natural
+philosophy. If the quantity of motion is declared to be invariable and a
+change in its direction is attributed to mechanical causes alone, we must
+not ascribe to the soul the power to move the pineal gland, even in the
+gentlest way, nor to control the direction of the animal spirits. These
+inconsistencies also are removed by the occasionalistic thesis.
+
+The question concerning the substantiality of mind and matter in relation
+to God, is involved from the very beginning in this latter problem, "How
+is the appearance of interaction between the two to be explained without
+detriment to their substantiality in relation to each other?" The denial
+of the reciprocal dependence of matter and spirit leads to sharper
+accentuation of their common dependence upon God. Thus occasionalism forms
+the transition to the pantheism of Spinoza, Geulincx emphasizing the
+non-substantiality of spirits, and Malebranche the non-substantiality of
+bodies, while Spinoza combines and intensifies both. And yet history was
+not obliging enough to carry out this convenient and agreeable scheme of
+development with chronological accuracy, for she had Spinoza complete his
+pantheism _before_ Malebranche had prepared the way. The relation which was
+noted in the case of Bruno and Campanella is here repeated: the earlier
+thinker assumes the more advanced position, while the later one seems
+backward in comparison; and that which, viewed from the standpoint of the
+question itself, may be considered a transition link, is historically to be
+taken as a reaction against the excessive prosecution of a line of thought
+which, up to a certain point, had been followed by the one who now shrinks
+back from its extreme consequences. The course of philosophy takes first a
+theological direction in the earlier occasionalists, then a metaphysical
+(naturalistic) trend in Spinoza, to renew finally, in Malebranche, the
+first of these movements in opposition to the second. The Cartesian school,
+as a whole, however, exhibits a tendency toward mysticism, which was
+concealed to a greater or less extent by the rationalistic need for clear
+concepts, but never entirely suppressed.
+
+Although the real interaction of body and mind be denied, some explanation
+must, at least, be given for the appearance of interaction, _i.e._ for the
+actual correspondence of bodily and mental phenomena. Occasionalism denotes
+the theory of occasional causes. It is not the body that gives rise to
+perception, nor the mind that causes the motion of the limbs which it has
+determined upon--neither the one nor the other can receive influence from
+its fellow or exercise influence upon it; but it is God who, "on the
+occasion" of the physical motion (of the air and nerves); produces the
+sensation (of sound), and, "at the instance" of the determination of the
+will, produces the movement of the arms. The systematic development and
+marked influence of this theory, which had already been more or less
+clearly announced by the Cartesians Cordemoy and De la Forge,[1] was due to
+the talented Arnold Geulincx (1624-69), who was born at Antwerp, taught
+in Lyons (1646-58) and Leyden, and became a convert to Calvinism. It
+ultimately gained over the majority of the numerous adherents of the
+Cartesian philosophy in the Dutch universities,--Renery (died 1639) and
+Regius (van Roy; _Fundamenta Physicae_, 1646; _Philosophia Naturalis_,
+1661) in Utrecht; further, Balthasar Bekker (1634-98; _The World
+Bewitched_, 1690), the brave opponent of the belief in angels and devils,
+of magic, and of prosecution for witchcraft,--in the clerical orders in
+France and, finally, in Germany.
+
+[Footnote 1: Gerauld de Cordemoy, a Parisian advocate (died 1684,
+_Dissertations Philosophiques_, 1666), communicated his occasionalistic
+views orally to his friends as early as 1658 (cf. L. Stein in the _Archiv
+für Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. i., 1888, p. 56). Louis de la Forge,
+a physician of Saumur, _Tractatus de Mente Humana_, 1666, previously
+published in French; cf. Seyfarth, Gotha, 1887. But the logician, Johann
+Clauberg, professor in Duisburg (1622-65; _Opera_, edited by Schalbruch,
+1691), is, according to the investigations of Herm. Müller _(J. Clauberg
+und seine Stellung im Cartesianismus_, Jena, 1891), to be stricken from
+the list of thinkers who prepared the way for occasionalism, since in his
+discussion of the anthropological problem (_corporis et animae conjunctio_)
+he merely develops the Cartesian position, and does not go beyond it. He
+employs the expression _occasio_, it is true, but not in the sense of the
+occasionalists. According to Clauberg the bodily phenomenon becomes the
+stimulus or "occasion" (not for God, but) for the soul to produce from
+itself the corresponding mental phenomenon.]
+
+Geulincx himself, besides two inaugural addresses at Leyden (as Lector in
+1662, Professor Extraordinary in 1665), published the following treatises:
+_Quaestiones Quodlibeticae_ (in the second edition, 1665, entitled
+_Saturnalia_) with an important introductory discourse; _Logica Fundamentis
+Suis Restituta_, 1662; _Methodus Inveniendi Argumenta_ (new edition by
+Bontekoe, 1675); and the first part of his Ethics--_De Virtute et Primis
+ejus Proprietatibus, quae vulgo Virtutes Cardinales Vocantur, Tractatus
+Ethicus Primus_, 1665. This chief work was issued complete in all six parts
+with the title, _[Greek: Gnothi seauton] sive Ethica_, 1675, by Bontekoe,
+under the pseudonym Philaretus. The _Physics_, 1688, the _Metaphysics_,
+1691, and the _Annotata Majora in Cartesii Principia Philosophiae_, 1691,
+were also posthumous publications, from the notes of his pupils. In view of
+the rarity of these volumes, and the importance of the philosopher, it is
+welcome news that J.P.N. Land has undertaken an edition of the collected
+works, in three volumes, of which the first two have already appeared.[1]
+The Hague, 1891-92.[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: On vol. i. cf. Eucken, _Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol.
+xxviii., 1892, p,200 _seq_.]
+
+[Footnote 2: On Geulincx see V. van der Haeghen, _Geulincx, Étude sur sa
+Vie, sa Philosophie, et ses Ouvrages_, Ghent, 1886, including a complete
+bibliography; and Land in vol. iv. of the _Archiv für Geschichte der
+Philosophie_, 1890. [English translation, _Mind_, vol. xvi. p. 223 _seq_.]]
+
+Geulincx bases the _occasionalistic_ position on the principle, _quod
+nescis, quomodo fiat, id non facis_. Unless I know how an event happens, I
+am not its cause. Since I have no consciousness how my decision to speak or
+to walk is followed by the movement of my tongue or limbs, I am not the one
+who effects these. Since I am just as ignorant how the sensation in my mind
+comes to pass as a sequel to the motion in the sense-organ; since, further,
+the body as an unconscious and non-rational being can effect nothing, it is
+neither I nor the body that causes the sensation. Both the bodily movement
+and the sense-impression are, rather, the effects of a higher power, of the
+infinite spirit. The act of my will and the sense-stimulus are only _causae
+occasionales_ for the divine will, in an incomprehensible way, to effect,
+in the one case, the execution of the movement of the limbs resolved upon,
+and, in the other, the origin of the perception; they are (unsuitable)
+instruments, effective only in the hand of God; he brings it to pass that
+my will goes out beyond my soul, and that corporeal motion has results in
+it. The meaning of this doctrine is misapprehended when it is assumed,--an
+assumption to which the Leibnitzian account of occasionalism may mislead
+one,--that in it the continuity of events, alike in the material and the
+psychical world, is interrupted by frequent scattered interferences from
+without, and all becoming transformed into a series of disconnected
+miracles. An order of nature such as would be destroyed by God's action
+does not exist; God brings everything to pass; even the passage of motion
+from one body to another is his work. Further, Geulincx expressly says that
+God has imposed such _laws_ on motion that it harmonizes with the soul's
+free volition, of which, however, it is entirely independent (similar
+statements occur also in De la Forge). And with this our thinker
+appears--as Pfleiderer[1] emphasizes--closely to approach the
+pre-established harmony of Leibnitz. The occasionalistic theory certainly
+constitutes the preliminary step to the Leibnitzian; but an essential
+difference separates the two. The advance does not consist in the
+substitution by Leibnitz of one single miracle at creation for a number of
+isolated and continually recurring ones, but (as Leibnitz himself remarks,
+in reply to the objection expressed by Father Lami, that a perpetual
+miracle is no miracle) in the exchange of the immediate causality of God
+for natural causation. With Geulincx mind and body act on each other, but
+not by their own power; with Leibnitz the monads do not act on one another,
+but they act by their own power.[2]--When Geulincx in the same connection
+advances to the statements that, in view of the limitedness and passivity
+of finite things, God is the only truly active, because the only
+independent, being in the world, that all activity is his activity, that
+the human (finite) spirit is related to the divine (infinite) spirit as
+the individual body to space in general, viz., as a section of it, so that,
+by thinking away all limitations from our mind, we find God in us and
+ourselves in him, it shows how nearly he verges on pantheism.
+
+[Footnote 1: Edm. Pfleiderer, _Geulincx, als Hauptvertreter der
+occasionalistischen Metaphysik und Ethik_, Tübingen, 1882; the same,
+_Leibniz und Geulincx mit besonderer Beziehung auf ihr Uhrengleichnis_,
+Tübingen, 1884.]
+
+[Footnote 2: See Ed. Zeller, _Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie der
+Wissenschaften_, 1884, p. 673 _seq_.; Eucken, _Philosophische Monatshefte_,
+vol. xix., 1893, p. 525 _seq_; vol. xxiii., 1887, p. 587 _seq_.]
+
+Geulincx's services to noëtics have been duly recognized by Ed. Grimm
+(Jena, 1875), although with an excessive approximation to Kant. In this
+field he advances many acute and suggestive thoughts, as the deduction
+which reappears in Lotze, that the actually existent world of figure and
+motion cognized by thought, though the real world, is poorer than the
+wonderful world of motley sensuous appearance conjured forth in our minds
+on the occasion of the former, that the latter is the more beautiful and
+more worthy of a divine author. Further, the conviction, also held by
+Lotze, that the fundamental activities of the mind cannot be defined, but
+only known through inner experience or immediate consciousness (he
+who loves, knows what love is; it is a _per conscientiam et intimam
+experientiam notissima res_); the praiseworthy attempt to give a systematic
+arrangement, according to their derivation from one another, to the innate
+mathematical concepts, which Descartes had simply co-ordinated (the concept
+of surface is gained from the concept of body by abstracting from the third
+dimension, thickness--the act of thus abstracting from certain parts of
+the content of thought, Geulincx terms _consideratio_ in contrast to
+_cogitatio_, which includes the whole content); and, finally, the still
+more important inquiry, whether it is possible for us to reach a knowledge
+of things independently of the forms of the understanding, as in pure
+thought we strip off the fetters of sense. The possibility of this is
+denied; there is no higher faculty of knowledge to act as judge over the
+understanding, as the latter over the sensibility, and even the wisest
+man cannot free himself from the forms of thought (categories, _modi
+cogitandi_). And yet the discussion of the question is not useless: the
+reason should examine into the unknowable as well as the knowable; it is
+only in this way that we learn that it is unknowable. As the highest forms
+of thought Geulincx names subject (the empty concept of an existent, _ens_
+or _quod est_) and predicate _(modus entis_), and derives them from two
+fundamental activities of the mind, a combining function _(simulsumtio,
+totatio_) and an abstracting function (one which removes the _nota
+subjecti_). Substance and accident, substantive and adjective, are
+expressions for subjective processes of thought and hence do not hold
+of things in themselves. With reference to the importance, nay, to the
+indispensability, of linguistic signs in the use of the understanding, the
+science of the forms of thought is briefly termed grammar.
+
+The principle _ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis_, forms the connection
+between the occasionalistic metaphysics and ethics, the latter deducing the
+practical consequences of the former. Where thou canst do nothing, there
+will nothing. Since we can effect nothing in the material world, to which
+we are related merely as spectators, we ought also not to seek in it the
+motives and objects of our actions. God, does not require works, but
+dispositions only, for the result of our volition is beyond our power. Our
+moral vocation, then, consists in renunciation of the world and retirement
+into ourselves, and in patient faithfulness at the post assigned to us.
+Virtue is _amor dei ac rationis_, self-renouncing, active, obedient love
+to God and to the reason as the image and law of God in us. The cardinal
+virtues are _diligentia_, sedulous listening for the commands of the
+reason; _obedientia_, the execution of these _justitia_, the conforming of
+the whole life to what is perceived to be right; finally, _humilitas_,
+the recognition of our impotency and self-renunciation (_inspectio_ and
+_despectio_, or _derelictio, neglectus, contemptus, incuria sui_). The
+highest of these is humility, pious submission to the divine order of
+things; its condition, the self-knowledge commended in the title of the
+Ethics; the primal evil, self-love (_Philautia_--_ipsissimum peccatum_).
+Man is unhappy because he seeks happiness. Happiness is like our shadows;
+it shuns us when we pursue it, it follows us when we flee from it. The joys
+which spring from virtue are an adornment of it, not an enticement to it;
+they are its result, not its aim. The ethics of Geulincx, which we cannot
+further trace out here, surprises one by its approximation to the views of
+Spinoza and of Kant. With the former it has in common the principle of love
+toward God, as well as numerous details; with the latter, the absoluteness
+of the moral law (_in rebus moralibus absolute praecipit ratio aut vetat,
+nulla interposita conditione_); with both the depreciation of sympathy, on
+the ground that it is a concealed egoistic motive.
+
+The denial of substantiality to individual things, brought in by the
+occasionalists, is completed by Spinoza, who boldly and logically proclaims
+pantheism on the basis of Cartesianism and gives to the divine All-one a
+naturalistic instead of a theological character.
+
+
+%2. Spinoza.%
+
+Benedictus (originally Baruch) de Spinoza sprang from a Jewish family of
+Portugal or Spain, which had fled to Holland to escape persecution at home.
+He was born in Amsterdam in 1632; taught by the Rabbin Morteira, and,
+in Latin, by Van den Ende, a free-thinking physician who had enjoyed a
+philological training; and expelled by anathema from the Jewish communion,
+1656, on account of heretical views. During the next four years he found
+refuge at a friend's house in the country near Amsterdam, after which he
+lived in Rhynsburg, and from 1664 in Voorburg, moving thence, in 1669, to
+The Hague, where he died in 1677. Spinoza lived in retirement and had few
+wants; he supported himself by grinding optical glasses; and, in 1673,
+declined the professorship at Heidelberg offered him by Karl Ludwig, the
+Elector Palatine, because of his love of quiet, and on account of the
+uncertainty of the freedom of thought which the Elector had assured him.
+Spinoza himself made but two treatises public: his dictations on the first
+and second parts of Descartes's _Principia Philosophiae_, which had been
+composed for a private pupil, with an appendix, _Cogitata Metaphysica_,
+1663, and the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_, published anonymously
+in 1670, in defense of liberty of thought and the right to unprejudiced
+criticism of the biblical writings. The principles expressed in the latter
+work were condemned by all parties as sacrilegious and atheistic, and
+awakened concern even in the minds of his friends. When, in 1675, Spinoza
+journeyed to Amsterdam with the intention of giving his chief work, the
+_Ethics_, to the press, the clergy and the followers of Descartes applied
+to the government to forbid its issue. Soon after Spinoza's death it was
+published in the _Opera Posthuma_, 1677, which were issued under the care
+of Hermann Schuller,[1] with a preface by Spinoza's friend, the physician
+Ludwig Meyer, and which contained, besides the chief work, three incomplete
+treatises (_Tractatus Politicus, Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione,
+Compendium Grammatices Linguae Hebraeae_) and a collection of Letters by
+and to Spinoza. The _Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata_, in five parts,
+treats (1) of God, (2) of the nature and origin of the mind, (3) of the
+nature and origin of the emotions, (4) of human bondage or the strength
+of the passions, (5) of the power of the reason or human freedom. It has
+become known within recent times that Spinoza made a very early sketch
+of the system developed in the _Ethics_, the _Tractatus Brevis de Deo et
+Homine ejusque Felicitate_, of which a Dutch translation in two copies was
+discovered, though not the original Latin text. This treatise was published
+by Böhmer, 1852, in excerpts, and complete by Van Vloten, 1862, and by
+Schaarschmidt, 1869. It was not until our own century, and after Jacobi's
+_Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an Moses Mendelssohn_ (1785)
+had aroused the long slumbering interest in this much misunderstood
+philosopher, who has been oftener despised than studied, that complete
+editions of his works were prepared, by Paulus 1802-03; Gfrörer, 1830;
+Bruder, 1843-46; Ginsberg (in Kirchmann's _Philosophische Bibliothek_,
+4 vols.), 1875-82; and Van Vloten and Land,[2] 2 vols., 1882-83. B.
+Auerbach has worked Spinoza's life into a romantic novel, _Spinoza, ein
+Denkerleben_, 1837; 2d ed., 1855 [English translation by C.T. Brooks,
+1882.]
+
+[Footnote 1: See L. Stein in the _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_,
+vol. i., 1888, p. 554 _seq_.]
+
+[Footnote 2: For the literature on Spinoza the reader is referred to
+Ueberweg and to Van der Linde's _B. Spinoza, Bibliografie_, 1871; while
+among recent works we shall mention only Camerer's _Die Lehre Spinozas_,
+Stuttgart, 1877. An English translation of _The Chief Works of Spinoza_ has
+been given by Elwes, 1883-84; a translation of the _Ethics_ by White,
+1883; and one of selections from the _Ethics_, with notes, by Fullerton in
+Sneath's Modern Philosophers, 1892. Among the various works on Spinoza, the
+reader may be referred to Pollock's _Spinoza, His Life and Times_, 1880
+(with bibliography to same year); Martineau's _Study of Spinoza_, 1883; and
+J. Caird's _Spinoza_, Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1888.--TR.]
+
+We shall consider Spinoza's system as a completed whole as it is given in
+the _Ethics_; for although it is interesting for the investigator to trace
+out the development of his thinking by comparing this chief work with its
+forerunner (that _Tractatus Brevis_ "concerning God, man, and the happiness
+of the latter," whose dialogistical portions we may surmise to have been
+the earliest sketch of the Spinozistic position, and which was followed by
+the _Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione_) such a procedure is not equally
+valuable for the student. In regard to Spinoza's relations to other
+thinkers it cannot be doubted, since Freudenthal's[1] proof, that he was
+dependent to a large degree on the predominant philosophy of the schools,
+_i.e._ on the later Scholasticism (Suarez[2]), especially on its Protestant
+side (Jacob Martini, Combachius, Scheibler, Burgersdijck, Heereboord);
+Descartes, it is true, felt the same influence. Joël,[3]: Schaarschmidt,
+Sigwart,[4] R. Avenarius,[5] and Böhmer[6] = have advanced the view that
+the sources of Spinoza's philosophy are not to be sought exclusively in
+Cartesianism, but rather that essential elements were taken from the
+Cabala, from the Jewish Scholasticism (Maimonides, 1190; Gersonides, died
+1344; Chasdai Crescas, 1410), and from Giordano Bruno. In opposition
+to this Kuno Fischer has defended, and in the main successfully, the
+proposition that Spinoza reached, and must have reached, his fundamental
+pantheism by his own reflection as a development of Descartes's principles.
+The traces of his early Talmudic education, which have been noticed in
+Spinoza's works, prove no dependence of his leading ideas on Jewish
+theology. His pantheism is distinguished from that of the Cabalists by
+its rejection of the doctrine of emanation, and from Bruno's, which
+nevertheless may have influenced him, by its anti-teleological character.
+When with Greek philosophers, Jewish theologians, and the Apostle Paul
+he teaches the immanence of God (_Epist. 21_), when with Maimonides and
+Crescas he teaches love to God as the principal of morality, and with the
+latter of these, determinism also, it is not a necessary consequence that
+he derived these theories from them. That which most of all separates him
+from the mediaeval scholastics of his own people, is his rationalistic
+conviction that God can be known. His agreement with them comes out most
+clearly in the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_. But even here it holds
+only in regard to undertaking a general criticism of the Scriptures and to
+their figurative interpretation, while, on the other hand, the demand for
+a special historical criticism, and the object which with Spinoza was
+the basis of the investigation as a whole, were foreign to mediaeval
+Judaism--in fact, entirely modern and original. This object was to make
+science independent of religion, whose records and doctrines are to edify
+the mind and to improve the character, not to instruct the understanding.
+"Spinoza could not have learned the complete separation of religion and
+science from Jewish literature; this was a tendency which sprang from the
+spirit of his own time" (Windelband, _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_,
+vol. i. p. 194).
+
+[Footnote 1: J. Freudenthal, _Spinoza und die Scholastik_ in the
+_Philosophische Aufsätze, Zeller zum 50-Jährigen Doktorjubiläum gewidmet_,
+Leipsic, 1887, p. 85 _seq_. Freudenthal's proof covers the _Cogitata
+Metaphysica_ and many of the principal propositions of the _Ethics_.]
+
+[Footnote 2: The Spanish Jesuit, Francis Suarez, lived 1548-1617. _Works_,
+Venice, 1714 Cf. Karl Werner, _Suarez und die Scholastik der letzten
+Jahrhunderte_, Regensburg, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 3: M. Joël, _Don Chasdai Crescas' religions-philosophische Lehren
+in ihrem geschichtlichen Einfluss_, 1866; _Spinozas Theo.-pel. Traktat
+auf seine Quellen geprüft_, 1870; _Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinozas mit
+besonderer Berücksichtigung des kurzen Traktats_, 1871.]
+
+[Footnote 4: _Spinozas neu entdeckter Traktat eläutert u. s. w_., 1866;
+_Spinozas kurzer Traktat übersetzt mit Einleitungen und Erläuterungen_,
+1870.]
+
+[Footnote 5: _Ueber die beiden ersten Phasen des Spinozistischen
+Pantheismus und das Verhältniss der zweiten zur dritten Phase_, 1868.]
+
+[Footnote 6: _Spinozana_ in Fichte's _Zeitschrift für Philosophie_ vols.
+xxxvi., xlii., lvii., 1860-70.]
+
+The logical presuppositions of Spinoza's philosophy lie in the fundamental
+ideas of Descartes, which Spinoza accentuates, transforms, and adopts.
+Three pairs of thoughts captivate him and incite him to think them through:
+first, the rationalistic belief in the power of the human spirit to possess
+itself of the truth by pure thought, together with confidence in the
+omnipotence of the mathematical method; second, the concept of substance,
+together with the dualism of extension and thought; finally, the
+fundamental mechanical position, together with the impossibility
+of interaction between matter and spirit, held in common with the
+occasionalists, but reached independently of them. Whatever new elements
+are added (_e. g_., the transformation of the Deity from a mere aid to
+knowledge into its most important, nay, its only object; as, also, the
+enthusiastic, directly mystical devotion to the all-embracing world-ground)
+are of an essentially emotional nature, and to be referred less to
+historical influences than to the individuality of the thinker. The
+divergences from his predecessors, however, especially the extension of
+mechanism to mental phenomena and the denial of the freedom of the will,
+inseparable from this, result simply from the more consistent application
+of Cartesian principles. Spinoza is not an inventive, impulsive spirit,
+like Descartes and Leibnitz, but a systematic one; his strength does not
+lie in brilliant inspirations, but in the power of resolutely thinking a
+thing through; not in flashes of thought, but in strictly closed circles of
+thought. He develops, but with genius, and to the end. Nevertheless this
+consecutiveness of Spinoza, the praises of which have been unceasingly sung
+by generations since his day, has its limits. It holds for the unwavering
+development of certain principles derived from Descartes, but not with
+equal strictness for the inter-connection of the several lines of thought
+followed out separately. His very custom of developing a principle straight
+on to its ultimate consequences, without regard to the needs of the heart
+or to logical demands from other directions, make it impossible for the
+results of the various lines of thought to be themselves in harmony; his
+vertical consistency prevents horizontal consistency. If the original
+tendencies come into conflict (the consciously held theoretical principles
+into conflict with one another, or with hidden aesthetic or moral
+principles), either one gains the victory over the other or both insist
+on their claims; thus we have inconsistencies in the one case, and
+contradictions in the other (examples of which have been shown by Volkelt
+in his maiden work, _Pantheismus und Individualismus im Systeme Spinozas_,
+1872). Science demands unified comprehension of the given, and seeks the
+smallest number of principles possible; but her concepts prove too narrow
+vessels for the rich plenitude of reality. He who asks from philosophy more
+than mere special inquiries finds himself confronted by two possibilities:
+first, starting from one standpoint, or a few such, he may follow a direct
+course without looking to right or left, at the risk that in his
+thought-calculus great spheres of life will be wholly left out of view, or,
+at least, will not receive due consideration; or, second, beginning from
+many points of departure and ascending along converging lines, he may seek
+a unifying conclusion. In Spinoza we possess the most brilliant example of
+the former one-sided, logically consecutive power of (also, no doubt,
+violence in) thought, while Leibnitz furnishes the type of the many-sided,
+harmonistic thinking. The fact that even the rigorous Spinoza is not
+infrequently forced out of the strict line of consistency, proves that the
+man was more many-sided than the thinker would have allowed himself to be.
+
+To begin with the formal side of Spinozism: the rationalism of Descartes
+is heightened by Spinoza into the imposing confidence that absolutely
+everything is cognizable by the reason, that the intellect is able by its
+pure concepts and intuitions entirely to exhaust the multiform world of
+reality, to follow it with its light into its last refuge.[1] Spinoza is
+just as much in earnest in regard to the typical character of mathematics.
+Descartes (with the exception of an example asked for in the second of the
+Objections, and given as an appendix to the _Meditations_, in which he
+endeavors to demonstrate the existence of God and the distinction of body
+and spirit on the synthetic Euclidean method), had availed himself of the
+analytic form of presentation, on the ground that, though less cogent, it
+is more suited for instruction since it shows the way by which the matter
+has been discovered. Spinoza, on the other hand, rigorously carried out the
+geometrical method, even in externals. He begins with definitions, adds to
+these axioms (or postulates), follows with propositions or theorems as the
+chief thing, finally with demonstrations or proofs, which derive the later
+propositions from the earlier, and these in turn from the self-evident
+axioms. To these four principal parts are further added as less essential,
+deductions or corollaries immediately resulting from the theorems, and the
+more detailed expositions of the demonstrations or scholia. Besides these,
+some longer discussions are given in the form of remarks, introductions,
+and appendices.
+
+[Footnote 1: Heussler's objections (_Der Rationalismus des_ 17
+_Jahrhunderts_, 1885, pp. 82-85) to this characterization of Kuno Fischer's
+are not convincing. The question is not so much about a principle
+demonstrable by definite citations as about an unconscious motive in
+Spinoza's thinking. Fischer's views on this point seem to us correct.
+Spinoza's mode of thinking is, in fact, saturated with this strong
+confidence in the omnipotence of the reason and the rational constitution
+of true reality.]
+
+If everything is to be cognizable through mathematics, then everything must
+take place necessarily; even the thoughts, resolutions, and actions of man
+cannot be free in the sense that they might have happened otherwise. Thus
+there is an evident methodological motive at work for the extension
+of mechanism to all becoming, even spiritual becoming. But there are
+metaphysical reasons also. Descartes had naïvely solved the anthropological
+problem by the answer that the interaction of mind and body is
+incomprehensible but actual. The occasionalists had hesitatingly questioned
+these conclusions a little, the incomprehensibility as well as the
+actuality, only at last to leave them intact. For the explanation that
+there is a real influence of body on mind and _vice versa_, though not
+an immediate but an occasional one, one mediated by the divine will, is
+scarcely more than a confession that the matter is inexplicable. Spinoza,
+who admits neither the incognizability of anything real, nor any
+supernatural interferences, roundly denies both. There is no intercourse
+between body and soul; yet that which is erroneously considered such
+is both actually present and explicable. The assumed interaction is as
+unnecessary as it is impossible. Body and soul do not need to act on one
+another, because they are not two in kind at all, but constitute one being
+which may be looked at from two different sides. This is called body when
+considered under its attribute of extension, and spirit when considered
+under its attribute of thought. It is quite impossible for two substances
+to affect each other, because by their reciprocal influence, nay, by their
+very duality, they would lose their independence, and, with this, their
+substantiality. There is no plurality of substances, but only one, the
+infinite, the divine substance. Here we reach the center of the system.
+There is but one becoming and but one independent, substantial being.
+Material and spiritual becoming form merely the two sides of one and the
+same necessary world-process; particular extended beings and particular
+thinking beings are nothing but the changeable and transitory states
+_(modi)_ of the enduring, eternal, unified world-ground. "Necessity in
+becoming and unity of being," mechanism and pantheism--these are the
+controlling conceptions in Spinoza's doctrine. Multiplicity, the
+self-dependence of particular things, free choice, ends, development, all
+this is illusion and error.
+
+%(a) Substance, Attributes, and Modes%.--There is but one substance, and
+this is infinite (I. _prop_. 10, _schol; prop_. 14, _cor_. 1). Why, then,
+only one and why infinite? With Spinoza as with Descartes independence is
+the essence of substantiality. This is expressed in the third definition:
+"By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived by
+means of itself, _i.e._, that the conception of which can be formed without
+the aid of the conception of any other thing." _Per substantiam intelligo
+id, quod in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id, cujus conceptus
+non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat_. An absolutely
+self-dependent being can neither be limited (since, in respect to its
+limits, it would be dependent on the limiting being), nor occur more than
+once in the world. Infinity follows from its self-dependence, and its
+uniqueness from its infinity.
+
+Substance is the being which is dependent on nothing and on which
+everything depends; which, itself uncaused, effects all else; which
+presupposes nothing, but itself constitutes the presupposition of all that
+is: it is pure being, primal being, the cause of itself and of all. Thus in
+Spinoza the being which is without presuppositions is brought into the most
+intimate relation with the fullness of multiform existence, not coldly and
+abstractly exalted above it, as by the ancient Eleatics. Substance is the
+being in (not above) things, that in them which constitutes their reality,
+which supports and produces them. As the cause of all things Spinoza calls
+it God, although he is conscious that he understands by the term something
+quite different from the Christians. God does not mean for him a
+transcendent, personal spirit, but only the _ens absolute infinitum (def.
+sexta)_, the essential heart of things: _Deus sive substantia_.
+
+How do things proceed from God? Neither by creation nor by emanation. He
+does not put them forth from himself, they do not tear themselves free from
+him, but they follow out of the necessary nature of God, as it follows from
+the nature of the triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to two right
+angles (I. _prop_. 17, _schol_.). They do not come out from him, but remain
+in him; just this fact that they are in another, in God, constitutes their
+lack of self-dependence (I. _prop_. 18, _dem.: nulla res, quae extra Deum
+in se sit_). God is their inner, indwelling cause (_causa immanens, non
+vero transiens_.--I. _prop_. 18), is not a transcendent creator, but
+_natura naturans_, over against the sum of finite beings, _natura naturata_
+(I. _prop_. 29, _schol_.): _Deus sive natura_.
+
+Since nothing exists out of God, his actions do not follow from external
+necessity, are not constrained, but he is free cause, free in the sense
+that he does nothing except that toward which his own nature impels him,
+that he acts in accordance with the laws of his being (_def. septima: ea
+res libera dicitur, quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit et a se
+sola ad agendum determinatur; Epist_. 26). This inner necessitation is
+so little a defect that its direct opposite, undetermined choice and
+inconstancy, must rather be excluded from God as an imperfection. Freedom
+and (inner) necessity are identical; and antithetical, on the one side, to
+undetermined choice and, on the other, to (external) compulsion. Action in
+view of ends must also be denied of the infinite; to think of God as acting
+in order to the good is to make him dependent on something external to him
+(an aim) and lacking in that which is to be attained by the action. With
+God the ground of his action is the same as the ground of his existence;
+God's power and his essence coincide (I. _prop_. 34: _Dei potentia est ipsa
+ipsius essentia_). He is the cause of himself (_def. prima: per causam sui
+intelligo id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cujus natura
+non potest concipi nisi existens_); it would be a contradiction to hold
+that being was not, that God, or substance, did not exist; he cannot be
+thought otherwise than as existing; his concept includes his existence. To
+be self-caused means to exist necessarily (I. _prop_. 7). The same thing
+is denoted by the predicate eternal, which, according to the eighth
+definition, denotes "existence itself, in so far as it is conceived to
+follow necessarily from the mere definition of the eternal thing."
+
+The infinite substance stands related to finite, individual things, not
+only as the independent to the dependent, as the cause to the caused, as
+the one to the many, and the whole to the parts, but also as the universal
+to the particular, the indeterminate to the determinate. From infinite
+being as pure affirmation (I. _prop_. 8, _schol_. I: _absoluta affirmatio_)
+everything which contains a limitation or negation, and this includes every
+particular determination, must be kept at a distance: _determinatio negatio
+est (Epist_. 50 and 41: a determination denotes nothing positive, but a
+deprivation, a lack of existence; relates not to the being but to the
+non-being of the thing). A determination states that which distinguishes
+one thing from another, hence what it is _not_, expresses a limitation of
+it. Consequently God, who is free from every negation and limitation, is to
+be conceived as the absolutely indeterminate. The results thus far reached
+run: _Substantia una infinita--Deus sive natura--causa sui (aeterna) et
+rerum (immanens)--libera necessitas--non determinata_. Or more briefly:
+Substance = God = nature. The equation of God and substance had been
+announced by Descartes, but not adhered to, while Bruno had approached the
+equation of God and nature--Spinoza decisively completes both and combines
+them.
+
+A further remark may be added concerning the relation of God and the world.
+In calling the infinite at once the permanent essence of things and their
+producing cause, Spinoza raises a demand which it is not easy to fulfill,
+the demand to think the existence of things in substance as a following
+from substance, and their procession from God as a remaining in him. He
+refers us to mathematics: the things which make up the world are related to
+God as the properties of a geometrical figure to its concepts, as theorems
+to the axiom, as the deduction to the principle, which from eternity
+contains all that follows from it and retains this even while putting
+it forth. It cannot be doubted that such a view of causality contains
+error,--it has been characterized as a confusion of _ratio_ and _causa_,
+of logical ground and real cause,--but it is just as certain that Spinoza
+committed it. He not only compares the dependence of the effect on its
+cause to the dependence of a derivative principle on that from which it is
+derived, but fully equates the two; he thinks that in logico-mathematical
+"consequences" he has grasped the essence of real "effects": for him the
+type of all legality, as also of real becoming, was the necessity which
+governs the sequence of mathematical truths, and which, on the one hand, is
+even and still, needing no special exertion of volitional energy, while, on
+the other, it is rigid and unyielding, exalted above all choice. Philosophy
+had sought the assistance of mathematics because of the clearness and
+certainty which distinguish the conclusions of the latter, and which she
+wished to obtain for her own. In excess of zeal she was not content with
+striving after this ideal of indefectible certitude, but, forgetting the
+diversity of the two fields, strove to imitate other qualities which
+are not transferable; instead of learning from mathematics she became
+subservient to it.
+
+Substance does not affect us by its mere existence, but through an
+_Attribute_. By attribute is meant, according to the fourth definition,
+"that which the understanding perceives of substance as constituting the
+essence of it" _(quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem
+essentiam constituens)_. The more reality a substance contains, the more
+attributes it has; consequently infinite substance possesses an infinite
+number, each of which gives expression to its essence, but of which two
+only fall within our knowledge. Among the innumerable divine attributes
+the human mind knows those only which it finds in itself, thought and
+extension. Although man beholds God only as thinking and extended
+substance, he yet has a clear and complete; an adequate--idea of God. Since
+each of the two attributes is conceived without the other, hence in itself
+(_per se_), they are distinct from each other _realiter_, and independent.
+God is absolutely infinite, the attributes only in their kind (_in suo
+genere_).
+
+How can the indeterminate possess properties? Are the attributes merely
+ascribed to substance by the understanding, or do they possess reality
+apart from the knowing subject? This question has given rise to much
+debate. According to Hegel and Ed. Erdmann the attributes are something
+external to substance, something brought into it by the understanding,
+forms of knowledge present in the beholder alone; substance itself is
+neither extended nor cogitative, but merely appears to the understanding
+under these determinations, without which the latter would be unable to
+cognize it. This "formalistic" interpretation, which, relying on a passage
+in a letter to De Vries (_Epist_. 27), explains the attributes as mere
+modes of intellectual apprehension, numbers Kuno Fischer among its
+opponents. As the one party holds to the first half of the definition, the
+other places the emphasis on the second half ("that which the
+_understanding_ perceives--as constituting the _essence_ of substance").
+The attributes are more than mere modes of representation--they are real
+properties, which substance possesses even apart from an observer, nay, in
+which it consists; in Spinoza, moreover, "must be conceived" is the
+equivalent of "to be." Although this latter "realistic" party undoubtedly
+has the advantage over the former, which reads into Spinoza a subjectivism
+foreign to his system, they ought not to forget that the difference in
+interpretation has for its basis a conflict among the motives which control
+Spinoza's thinking. The reference of the attributes to the understanding,
+given in the definition, is not without significance. It sprang from the
+wish not to mar the indeterminateness of the absolute by the opposition of
+the attributes, while, on the other hand, an equally pressing need for the
+conservation of the immanence of substance forbade a bold transfer of the
+attributes to the observer. The real opinion of Spinoza is neither so
+clear and free from contradictions, nor so one-sided, as that which his
+interpreters ascribe to him. Fischer's further interpretation of the
+attributes of God as his "powers" is tenable, so long as by _causa_ and
+_potentia_ we understand nothing more than the irresistible, but
+non-kinetic, force with which an original truth establishes or effects
+those which follow from it.
+
+As the dualism of extension and thought is reduced from a substantial to
+an attributive distinction, so individual bodies and minds, motions and
+thoughts, are degraded a stage further. Individual things lack independence
+of every sort. The individual is, as a determinate finite thing, burdened
+with negation and limitation, for every determination includes a negation;
+that which is truly real in the individual is God. Finite things are
+_modi_ of the infinite substance, mere states, variable states, of God. By
+themselves they are nothing, since out of God nothing exists. They possess
+existence only in so far as they are conceived in their connection with the
+infinite, that is, as transitory forms of the unchangeable substance. They
+are not in themselves, but in another, in God, and are conceived only
+in God. They are mere affections of the divine attributes, and must be
+considered as such.
+
+To the two attributes correspond two classes of modes. The most important
+modifications of extension are rest and motion. Among the modes of thought
+are understanding and will. These belong in the sphere of determinate and
+transitory being and do not hold of the _natura naturans_: God is exalted
+above all modality, above will and understanding, as above motion and rest.
+We must not assert of the _natura naturata_ (the world as the sum of all
+modes), as of the _natura naturans_, that its essence involves existence
+(I. _prop_. 24): we can conceive finite things as non-existent, as well as
+existent (_Epist_. 29). This constitutes their "contingency," which must
+by no means be interpreted as lawlessness. On the contrary, all that takes
+place in the world is most rigorously determined; every individual, finite,
+determinate thing and event is determined to its existence and action by
+another similarly finite and determinate thing or event, and this cause is,
+in turn, determined in its existence and action by a further finite mode,
+and so on to infinity (I. _prop_. 28). Because of this endlessness in the
+series there is no first or ultimate cause in the phenomenal world; all
+finite causes are second causes; the primary cause lies within the sphere
+of the infinite and is God himself. The modes are all subject to the
+constraint of an unbroken and endless nexus of efficient causes, which
+leaves room neither for chance, nor choice, nor ends. Nothing can be or
+happen otherwise than as it is and happens (I. _prop_. 29, 33).
+
+The causal chain appears in two forms: a mode of extension has its
+producing ground in a second mode of extension; a mode of thought can be
+caused only by another mode of thought--each individual thing is determined
+by one of its own kind. The two series proceed side by side, without a
+member of either ever being able to interfere in the other or to effect
+anything in it--a motion can never produce anything but other motions, an
+idea can result only in other ideas; the body can never determine the mind
+to an idea, nor the soul the body to a movement. Since, however, extension
+and thought are not two substances, but attributes of one substance,
+this apparently double causal nexus of two series proceeding in exact
+correspondence is, in reality, but a single one. (III. _prop_. 2, _schol_.)
+viewed from different sides. That which represents a chain of motions when
+seen from the side of extension, bears the aspect of a series of ideas from
+the side of thought. _Modus extensionis et idea illius modi una cademque
+est res, sed duobus modis expressa_ (II. _prop_. 7, _schol_.; cf. III.
+_prop_. 2, _schol_.). The soul is nothing but the idea of an actual body,
+body or motion nothing but the object or event in the sphere of extended
+actuality corresponding to an idea. No idea exists without something
+corporeal corresponding to it, no body, without at the same time existing
+as idea, or being conceived; in other words, everything is both body and
+spirit, all things are animated (II. _prop_. 13, _schol_.). Thus the famous
+proposition results; _Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio
+rerum (sive corporum; II. prop_. 7), and in application to man, "the order
+of the actions and passions of our body is simultaneous in nature with the
+order of the actions and passions of the mind" (III. _prop. 2, schol_.).
+
+The attempt to solve the problem of the relation between the material and
+the mental worlds by asserting their thoroughgoing correspondence and
+substantial identity, was philosophically justifiable and important,
+though many evident objections obtrude themselves upon us. The required
+assumption, that there is a mental event corresponding to _every_ bodily
+one, and _vice versa_, meets with involuntary and easily supported
+opposition, which Spinoza did nothing to remove. Similarly he omitted
+to explain how body is related to motion, mind to ideas, and both to
+actuality. The ascription of a materialistic tendency to Spinoza is not
+without foundation. Corporeality and reality appear well-nigh identical for
+him,--the expressions _corpora_ and _res_ are used synonymously,--so that
+there remains for minds and ideas only an existence as reflections of
+the real in the sphere of [an] ideality (whose degree of actuality it is
+difficult to determine). Moreover, individualistic impulses have been
+pointed out, which, in part, conflict with the monism which he consciously
+follows, and, in part, subserve its interests. An example of this is given
+in the relation of mind and idea: Spinoza treats the soul as a sum of
+ideas, as consisting in them. An (at least apparently substantial) bond
+among ideas, an ego, which possesses them, does not exist for him: the
+Cartesian _cogito_ has become an impersonal _cogitatur_ or a _Deus
+cogitat_. In order to the unique substantiality of the infinite, the
+substantiality of individual spirits must disappear. That which argues for
+the latter is their I-ness (_Ichheit_), the unity of self-consciousness;
+it is destroyed, if the mind is a congeries of ideas, a composite of them.
+Thus in order to relieve itself from the self-dependence of the individual
+mind, monism allies itself with a spiritual atomism, the most extreme which
+can be conceived. The mind is resolved into a mass of individual ideas.
+
+Mention may be made in passing, also, of a strange conception, which
+is somewhat out of harmony with the rest of the system, and of which,
+moreover, little use is made. This is the conception of _infinite modes_.
+As such are cited, _facies totius mundi, motus et quies, intellectus
+absolute infinitus_. Kuno Fischer's interpretation of this difficult
+conception may be accepted. It denotes, according to him, the connected sum
+of the modes, the itself non-finite sum total of the finite--the universe
+meaning the totality of individual things in general (without reference to
+their nature as extended or cogitative); rest and motion, the totality of
+material being; the absolutely infinite understanding, the totality of
+spiritual being or the ideas. Individual spirits together constitute, as
+it were, the infinite intellect; our mind is a part of the divine
+understanding, yet not in such a sense that the whole consists of the
+parts, but that the part exists only through the whole. When we say, the
+human mind perceives this or that, it is equivalent to saying that God--not
+in so far as he is infinite, but as he expresses himself in this human
+mind and constitutes its essence--has this or that idea (II. _prop_. II,
+_coroll_).
+
+The discussion of these three fundamental concepts exhausts all the chief
+points in Spinoza's doctrine of God. Passing over his doctrine of body (II.
+between _prop_. 13 and _prop_. 14) we turn at once to his discussion of
+mind and man.
+
+%(b) Anthropology: Cognition and the Passions.%--Each thing is at once mind
+and body, representation and that which is represented, idea and ideate
+(object). Body and soul are the same being, only considered under different
+attributes. The human mind is the idea of the human body; it cognizes
+itself in perceiving the affections of its body; it represents all that
+takes place in the body, though not all adequately. As man's body is
+composed of very many bodies, so his soul is composed of very many ideas.
+To judge of the relation of the human mind to the mind of lower beings, we
+must consider the superiority of man's body to other bodies; the more
+complex a body is, and the greater the variety of the affections of
+which it is capable, the better and more adapted for adequate cognition,
+the accompanying mind.--A result of the identity of soul and body is
+that the acts of our will are not free (_Epist_. 62): they are, in fact,
+determinations of our body, only considered under the attribute of thought,
+and no more free than this from the constraint of the causal law (III.
+_prop_. 2, _schol_.).--Since the mind does nothing without at the same time
+knowing that it does it--since, in other words, its activity is a conscious
+activity, it is not merely _idea corporis humani_, but also _idea ideae
+corporis_ or _idea mentis_.
+
+All adherents of the Eleatic separation of the one pure being from the
+manifold and changing world of appearance are compelled to make a
+like distinction between two kinds and two organs of _knowledge_. The
+representation of the empirical manifold of separately existing individual
+things, together with the organ thereof, Spinoza terms _imaginatio_; the
+faculty of cognizing the true reality, the one, all-embracing substance, he
+calls _intellectus. Imaginatio_ (imagination, sensuous representation)
+is the faculty of inadequate, confused ideas, among which are included
+abstract conceptions, as well as sensations and memory-images. The objects
+of perception are the affections of our body; and our perceptions,
+therefore, are not clear and distinct, because we are not completely
+acquainted with their causes. In the merely perceptual stage, the mind
+gains only a confused and mutilated idea of external objects, of the body,
+and of itself; it is unable to separate that in the perception (_e.g._,
+heat) which is due to the external body from that which is due to its own
+body. An inadequate idea, however, is not in itself an error; it becomes
+such only when, unconscious of its defectiveness, we take it for complete
+and true. Prominent examples of erroneous ideas are furnished by general
+concepts, by the idea of ends, and the idea of the freedom of the will. The
+more general and abstract an idea, the more inadequate and indistinct it
+becomes; and this shows the lack of value in generic concepts, which are
+formed by the omission of differences. All cognition which is carried on by
+universals and their symbols, words, yields opinion and imagination merely
+instead of truth. Quite as valueless and harmful is the idea of ends, with
+its accompaniments. We think that nature has typical forms hovering before
+it, which it is seeking to actualize in things; when this intention is
+apparently fulfilled we speak of things as perfect and beautiful; when it
+fails, of imperfect and ugly things. Such concepts of value belong in the
+sphere of fictions. The same is true of the idea of the freedom of the
+will, which depends on our ignorance of that which constrains us. Apart
+from the consideration that "the will," the general conception of which
+comes under the rubric of unreal abstractions, is in fact merely the sum of
+the particular volitions, the illusion of freedom, _e.g._, that we will
+and act without a cause, arises from the fact that we are conscious of
+our action (and also of its proximate motives), but not of its (remoter)
+determining causes. Thus the thirsty child believes it desires its milk of
+its own free will, and the timid one, that it freely chooses to run away
+(_Ethica, III. prop_. 2, _schol_.; I. _app_.) If the falling stone were
+conscious, it would, likewise, consider itself free, and its fall the
+result of an undetermined decision.
+
+Two degrees are to be distinguished in the true or adequate knowledge
+of the intellect: rational knowledge attained through inference, and
+intuitive, self-evident knowledge; the latter has principles for its
+object, the former that which follows from them. Instead of operating with
+abstract concepts the reason uses common notions, _notiones communes_.
+Genera do not exist, but, no doubt, something common to all things. All
+bodies agree in being extended; all minds and ideas in being modes of
+thought; all beings whatever in the fact that they are modes of the divine
+substance and its attributes; "that which is common to all things, and
+which is equally in the part and in the whole, cannot but be adequately
+conceived." The ideas of extension, of thought, and of the eternal and
+infinite essence of God are adequate ideas. The adequate idea of each
+individual actual object involves the idea of God, since it can neither
+exist nor be conceived apart from God, and "all ideas, in so far as
+they are referred to God, are true." The ideas of substance and of the
+attributes are conceived through themselves, or immediately (intuitively)
+cognized; they are underivative, original, self-evident ideas.
+
+There are thus three kinds, degrees, or faculties of cognition--sensuous or
+imaginative representation, reason, and immediate intuition. Knowledge of
+the second and third degrees is necessarily true, and our only means
+of distinguishing the true from the false. As light reveals itself and
+darkness, so the truth is the criterion of itself and of error. Every
+truth is accompanied by certainty, and is its own witness (II. _prop_. 43,
+_schol_.).--Adequate knowledge does not consider things as individuals,
+but in their necessary connection and as eternal sequences from the
+world-ground. The reason perceives things under the form of eternity: _sub
+specie aeternitatis_ (II. _prop_. 44, _cor_. 2).
+
+In his theory of the _emotions_, Spinoza is more dependent on Descartes
+than anywhere else; but even here he is guided by a successful endeavor
+after greater rigor and simplicity. He holds his predecessor's false
+concept of freedom responsible for the failure of his very acute inquiry.
+All previous writers on the passions have either derided, or bewailed, or
+condemned them, instead of investigating their nature. Spinoza will
+neither denounce nor ridicule human actions and appetites, but endeavor
+to comprehend them on the basis of natural laws, and to consider them as
+though the question concerned lines, surfaces, and bodies. He aims not
+to look on hate, anger, and the rest as flaws, but as necessary, though
+troublesome, properties of human nature, for which, as really as for heat
+and cold, thunder and lightning, a causal explanation is requisite.--As a
+determinate, finite being the mind is dependent in its existence and its
+activity on other finite things, and is incomprehensible without them;
+from its involution in the general course of nature the inadequate ideas
+inevitably follow, and from these the passive states or emotions; the
+passions thus belong to human nature, as one subject to limitation and
+negation.--The destruction of contingent and perishable things is effected
+by external causes; no one is destroyed by itself; so far as in it lies
+everything strives to persist in its being (III. _prop_. 4 and 6). The
+fundamental endeavor after self-preservation constitutes the essence of
+each thing (III. _prop_. 7). This endeavor _(conatus)_ is termed will
+_(voluntas)_ or desire _(cupiditas)_ when it is referred to the mind alone,
+and appetite _(appetitus)_ when referred to the mind and body together;
+desire or volition is conscious appetite (III. _prop_. 9, _schol_.). We
+call a thing good because we desire it, not desire a thing because we hold
+it good (cf. Hobbes, p. 75). To desire two further fundamental forms of the
+emotions are added, pleasure and pain. If a thing increases the power of
+our body to act, the idea of it increases the power of our soul to think,
+and is gladly imagined by it. Pleasure (_laetitia_) is the transition of
+a man to a greater, and pain (_tristitia_) his transition to a lesser
+perfection.
+
+All other emotions are modifications or combinations of the three original
+ones, to which Spinoza reduces the six of Descartes (cf. p. 105). In
+the deduction and description of them his procedure is sometimes aridly
+systematic, sometimes even forced and artificial, but for the most part
+ingenious, appropriate, and psychologically acute. Whatever gives us
+pleasure augments our being, and whatever pains us diminishes it; hence we
+seek to preserve the causes of pleasurable emotions, and love them, to do
+away with the causes of painful ones, and hate them. "Love is pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause; hate is pain accompanied by
+the idea of an external cause." Since all that furthers or diminishes the
+being of (the cause of our pleasure) the object of our love, exercises
+at the same time a like influence on us, we love that which rejoices the
+object of our love and hate that which disturbs it; its happiness and
+suffering become ours also. The converse is true of the object of our hate:
+its good fortune provokes us and its ill fortune pleases us. If we are
+filled with no emotion toward things like ourselves, we sympathize in their
+sad or joyous feelings by involuntary imitation. Pity, from which we
+strive to free ourselves as from every painful affection, inclines us to
+benevolence or to assistance in the removal of the cause of the misery of
+others. Envy of those who are fortunate, and commiseration of those who are
+in trouble, are alike rooted in emulation. Man is by nature inclined
+to envy and malevolence. Hate easily leads to underestimation, love to
+overestimation, of the object, and self-love to pride or self-satisfaction,
+which are much more frequently met with than unfeigned humility. Immoderate
+desire for honor is termed ambition; if the desire to please others is kept
+within due bounds it is praised as unpretentiousness, courtesy, modesty
+(_modestia_). Ambition, luxury, drunkenness, avarice, and lust have no
+contraries, for temperance, sobriety, and chastity are not emotions
+(passive states), but denote the power of the soul by which the former
+are moderated, and which is discussed later under the name _fortitudo_.
+Self-abasement or humility is a feeling of pain arising from the
+consideration of our weakness and impotency; its opposite is
+self-complacency. Either of these may be accompanied by the (erroneous)
+belief that we have done the saddening or gladdening act of our own free
+will; in this case the former affection is termed repentance. Hope and fear
+are inconstant pleasure and pain, arising from the idea of something past
+or to come, concerning whose coming and whose issue we are still in doubt.
+There is no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear without hope; for he who
+still doubts imagines something which excludes the existence of that which
+is expected. If the cause of doubt is removed, hope is transformed into a
+feeling of confidence and fear into despair. There are as many kinds of
+emotions as there are classes among their objects or causes.
+
+Besides the emotions to be termed "passions" in the strict sense, states
+of passivity, Spinoza recognizes others which relate to us as active. Only
+those which are of the nature of pleasure or desire belong to this class
+of _active_ emotions; the painful affections are entirely excluded, since
+without exception they diminish or arrest the mind's power to think. The
+totality of these nobler impulses is called _fortitudo_ (fortitude), and
+a distinction is made among them between _animositas_ (vigor of soul) and
+_generositas_ (magnanimity, noble-mindedness), according as rational
+desire is directed to the preservation of our own being or to aiding our
+fellow-men. Presence of mind and temperance are examples of the former,
+modesty and clemency of the latter. By this bridge, the idea of the active
+emotions, we may follow Spinoza into the field of ethics.
+
+%(c) Practical Philosophy.%--Spinoza's theory of ethics is based on the
+equation of the three concepts, perfection, reality, activity (V. _prop_.
+40, _dem_.). The more active a thing is, the more perfect it is and the
+more reality it possesses. It is active, however, when it is the complete
+or adequate cause of that which takes place within it or without it;
+passive when it is not at all the cause of this, or the cause only in part.
+A cause is termed adequate, when its effect can be clearly and distinctly
+perceived from it alone. The human mind, as a _modus_ of thought, is active
+when it has adequate ideas; all its passion consists in confused ideas,
+among which belong the affections produced by external objects. The essence
+of the mind is thought; volition is not only dependent on cognition, but at
+bottom identical with it.
+
+Descartes had already made the will the power of affirmation and negation.
+Spinoza advances a step further: the affirmation cannot be separated from
+the idea affirmed, it is impossible to conceive a truth without in the
+same act affirming it, the idea involves its own affirmation. "Will and
+understanding are one and the same" (II. _prop_. 49, _cor_.). For Spinoza
+moral activity is entirely resolved into cognitive activity. To the two
+stages of knowing, _imaginatio_ and _intellectus_, correspond two stages
+of willing--desire, which is ruled by imagination, and volition, which is
+guided by reason. The passive emotions of sensuous desire are directed to
+perishable objects, the active, which spring from reason, have an eternal
+object--the knowledge of the truth, the intuition of God. For reason there
+are no distinctions of persons,--she brings men into concord and gives them
+a common end (IV. _prop_. 35-37,40),--and no distinctions of time (IV.
+_prop_. 62, 66), and in the active emotions, which are always good, no
+excess (IV. _prop_. 61). The passive emotions arise from confused ideas.
+They cease to be passions, when the confused ideas of the modifications of
+the body are transformed into clear ones; as soon as we have clear ideas,
+we become active and cease to be slaves of desire. We master the emotions
+by gaining a clear knowledge of them. Now, an idea is clear when we cognize
+its object not as an individual thing, but in its connection, as a link in
+the causal chain, as necessary, and as a mode of God. The more the mind
+conceives things in their necessity, and the emotions in their reference to
+God, the less it is passively subject to the emotions, the more power it
+attains over them: "Virtue is power" (IV. _def_. 8; _prop_. 20, _dem_.). It
+is true, indeed, that one emotion can be conquered only by another stronger
+one, a passive emotion only by an active one. The active emotion by which
+knowledge gains this victory over the passions is the joyous consciousness
+of our power (III. _prop_. 58, 59). Adequate ideas conceive their objects
+in union with God; thus the pleasure which proceeds from knowledge of,
+and victory over, the passions is accompanied by the idea of God, and,
+consequently (according to the definition of love), by _love toward God_
+(V. _prop_. 15, 32). The knowledge and love of God, together, "intellectual
+love toward God,"[1] is the highest good and the highest virtue (IV.
+_prop_. 28). Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself.
+The intellectual love of man toward God, in which the highest peace of the
+soul, blessedness, and freedom consist, and in virtue of which (since it,
+like its object and cause, true knowledge, is eternal), the soul is not
+included in the destruction of the body (V. _prop_. 23, 33), is a part of
+the infinite love with which God loves himself, and is one and the same
+with the love of God to man. The eternal part of the soul is reason,
+through which it is active; the perishable part is imagination or sensuous
+representation, through which it is passively affected. We are immortal
+only in adequate cognition and in love to God; more of the wise man's soul
+is immortal than of the fool's.
+
+[Footnote 1: The conception _amor Dei intellectualis_ in Spinoza is
+discussed in a dissertation by C. Lülmann, Jena, 1884.]
+
+Spinoza's ethics is intellectualistic--virtue is based on knowledge.[1] It
+is, moreover, naturalistic--morality is a necessary sequence from human
+nature; it is a physical product, not a product of freedom; for the acts of
+the will are determined by ideas, which in their turn are the effects
+of earlier causes. The foundation of virtue is the effort after
+self-preservation: How can a man desire to act rightly unless he desires to
+be (IV. _prop_. 21, 22)? Since reason never enjoins that which is contrary
+to nature, it of necessity requires every man to love himself, to seek
+that which is truly useful to him, and to desire all that makes him more
+perfect. According to the law of nature all that is useful is allowable.
+The useful is that which increases our power, activity, or perfection, or
+that which furthers knowledge, for the life of the soul consists in thought
+(IV. _prop. 26; app. cap_. 5). That alone is an evil which restrains man
+from perfecting the reason and leading a rational life. Virtuous action is
+equivalent to following the guidance of the reason in self-preservation
+(IV. _prop_. 24).--Nowhere in Spinoza are fallacies more frequent than
+in his moral philosophy; nowhere is there a clearer revelation of the
+insufficiency of his artificially constructed concepts, which, in their
+undeviating abstractness, are at no point congruent with reality. He is
+as little true to his purpose to exclude the imperative element, and to
+confine himself entirely to the explanation of human actions considered as
+facts, as any philosopher who has adopted a similar aim. He relieves the
+inconsistency by clothing his injunctions under the ancient ideal of the
+free wise man. This, in fact, is not the only thing in Spinoza which
+reminds one of the customs of the Greek moralists. He renews the Platonic
+idea of a philosophical virtue, and the opinion of Socrates, that right
+action will result of itself from true insight. Arguing from himself, from
+his own pure and strong desire for knowledge, to mankind in general, he
+makes reason the essence of the soul, thought the essence of reason, and
+holds the direction of the impulse of self-preservation to the perfection
+of knowledge, which is "the better part of us," to be the natural one.
+
+[Footnote 1: That virtue which springs from knowledge is alone genuine.
+The painful, hence unactive, emotions of pity and repentance may impel to
+actions whose accomplishment is better than their omission. Emotion caused
+by sympathy for others and contrition for one's own guilt, both of which
+increase present evil by new ones, have only the value of evils of a lesser
+kind. They are salutary for the irrational man, in so far as the one spurs
+him on to acts of assistance and the other diminishes his pride. They
+are harmful to the wise man, or, at least, useless; he is in no need of
+irrational motives to rational action. Action from insight is alone true
+morality.]
+
+All men endeavor after continuance of existence (III. _prop_. 6); why not
+all after virtue? If all endeavor after it, why do so few reach the goal?
+Whence the sadly large number of the irrational, the selfish, the vicious?
+Whence the evil in the world? Vice is as truly an outcome of "nature" as
+virtue. Virtue is power, vice is weakness; the former is knowledge, the
+latter ignorance. Whence the powerless natures? Whence defective knowledge?
+Whence imperfection in general?
+
+The concept of imperfection expresses nothing positive, nothing actual, but
+merely a defect, an absence of reality. It is nothing but an idea in us,
+a fiction which arises through the comparison of one thing with another
+possessing greater reality, or with an abstract generic concept, a pattern,
+which it seems unable to attain. That concepts of value are not properties
+of things themselves, but denote only their pleasurable or painful effects
+on us, is evident from the fact that one and the same thing may be at the
+same time good, bad, and indifferent: the music which is good for the
+melancholy man may be bad for the mourner, and neither good nor bad for the
+deaf. Knowledge of the bad is an abstract, inadequate idea; in God there is
+no idea of evil. If imperfection and error were something real, it would
+have to be conceded that God is the author of evil and sin. In reality
+everything is that which it can be, hence without defect: everything actual
+is, in itself considered, perfect. Even the fool and the sinner cannot be
+otherwise than he is; he appears imperfect only when placed beside the wise
+and the virtuous. Sin is thus only a lesser reality than virtue, evil a
+lesser good; good and bad, activity and passivity, power and weakness
+are merely distinctions in degree. But why is not everything absolutely
+perfect? Why are there lesser degrees of reality? Two answers are given.
+The first is found only between the lines: the imperfections in the
+being and action of individual things are grounded in their finitude,
+particularly in their involution in the chain of causality, in virtue of
+which they are acted on from without, and are determined in their action
+not by their own nature only, but also by external causes. Man sins because
+he is open to impressions from external things, and only superior natures
+are strong enough to preserve their rational self-determination in spite
+of this. The other answer is expressly given at the end of the first part
+(with an appeal to the sixteenth proposition, that everything which
+the divine understanding conceives as creatable has actually come into
+existence). "To those who ask why God did not so create all men that they
+should be governed only by reason, I reply only: because matter was not
+lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest
+to lowest; or, more strictly, because the laws of his nature were so ample
+as so suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite
+intellect." All possible degrees of perfection have come into being,
+including sin and error, which represent the lowest grade. The universe
+forms a chain of degrees of perfection, of which none must be wanting:
+particular cases of defect are justified by the perfection of the whole,
+which would be incomplete without the lowest degree of perfection, vice
+and wickedness. Here we see Spinoza following a path which Leibnitz was to
+broaden out into a highway in his _Theodicy_. Both favor the quantitative
+view of the world, which softens the antitheses, and reduces distinctions
+of kind to distinctions of degree. Not till Kant was the qualitative view
+of the world, which had been first brought into ethics by Christianity,
+restored to its rights. An ethics which denies freedom and evil is nothing
+but a physics of morals.
+
+In his _theory of the state_ Spinoza follows Hobbes pretty closely, but
+rejects absolutism, and declares democracy, in which each is obedient to
+self-imposed law, to be the form of government most in accordance with
+reason. (So in the _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_, while in the later
+_Tractatus Politicus_ he gives the preference to aristocracy.) In
+accordance with the supreme right of nature each man deems good, and seeks
+to gain, that which seems to him useful; all things belong to all, each may
+destroy the objects of his hate. Conflict and insecurity prevail in the
+state of nature as a result of the sensuous desires and emotions (_homines
+ex natura hostes_); and they can be done away with only through the
+establishment of a society, which by punitive laws compels everyone to do,
+and leave undone, that which the general welfare demands. Strife and breach
+of faith become sin only in the state; before its formation that alone was
+wrong which no one had the desire and power to do. Besides this mission,
+however, of protecting selfish interests by the prevention of aggression,
+the civil community has a higher one, to subserve the development of
+reason; it is only in the state that true morality and true freedom are
+possible, and the wise man will prefer to live in the state, because
+he finds more freedom there than in isolation. Thus the dislocation of
+concepts, which is perceptible in Spinoza's ethics, repeats itself in his
+politics. First, virtue is based on the impulse of self-preservation and
+the good is equated with that which is useful to the individual; then, with
+a transformation of mere utility into "true" utility, the rational moment
+is brought in (first as practical prudence, next as the impulse after
+knowledge, and then, with a gradual change of meaning, as moral wisdom),
+until, finally, in strange contrast to the naturalistic beginning, the
+Christian idea of virtue as purity, self-denial, love to our neighbors and
+love to God, is reached. In a similar way "Spinoza conceives the starting
+point of the state naturalistically, its culmination idealistically."[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: C. Schindler in his dissertation _Ueber den Begriff des
+Guten und Nützlichen bei Spinoza_, Jena, 1885, p. 42, a work, however,
+which does not penetrate to the full depth of the matter. Cf. Eucken,
+_Lebensanschauungen_, p. 406.]
+
+The fundamental ideas of the Spinozistic system, and those which render
+it important, are rationalism, pantheism, the essential identity of the
+material and spiritual worlds, and the uninterrupted mechanism of becoming.
+Besides the twisting of ethical concepts just mentioned, we may briefly
+note the most striking of the other difficulties and contradictions which
+Spinoza left unexplained. There is a break between his endeavor to exalt
+the absolute high above the phenomenal world of individual existence, and,
+at the same time, to bring the former into the closest possible conjunction
+with the latter, to make it dwell therein--a break between the transcendent
+and immanent conceptions of the idea of God. No light is vouchsafed on the
+relation between primary and secondary causes, between the immediate divine
+causality and the divine causality mediated through finite causes. The
+infinity of God is in conflict with his complete cognizability on the
+part of man; for how is a finite, transitory spirit able to conceive
+the Infinite and Eternal? How does the human intellect rise above modal
+limitations to become capable and worthy of the mystical union with God?
+Reference has been already made to the twofold nature of the attributes (as
+forms of intellectual apprehension and as real properties of substance)
+which invites contradictory interpretations.
+
+
+3. %Pascal, Malebranche, Bayle.%
+
+Returning from Holland to France, we find a combination of Cartesianism
+and mysticism similar to that which we have noticed in the former country.
+Under Geulincx these two forces had lived peacefully together; in Spinoza
+they had entered into the closest alliance; with Blaise Pascal (1623-62),
+the first to adopt a religious tendency, they came into a certain
+antithesis. Spinoza had taught: through the knowledge of God to the love
+of God; in Pascal the watchword becomes, God is not conceived through
+the reason, but felt with the heart. After attacking the Jesuits in his
+_Provincial Letters_, and unveiling the worthlessness of their casuistical
+morality, Pascal, constrained by a genuine piety, undertook to construct a
+philosophy of Christianity; but the attempt was ended by the early death of
+the author, who had always suffered under a weak constitution. Fragments of
+this work were published by his friends, the Jansenists, under the title,
+_Thoughts on Religion_, 1669, though not without mediating alterations.
+The Port-Royal _Logic (The Art of Thinking_, 1662), edited by Arnauld and
+Nicole, was based on a treatise of Pascal. His thought, which was not
+distinguished by clearness, but by depth and movement, and which, after
+the French fashion, delighted in antitheses, was influenced by Descartes,
+Montaigne, and Epictetus. He, too, finds in mathematics the example for
+all science, and holds that whatever transcends mathematics transcends the
+reason. By the application of mathematics to the study of nature we attain
+a mundane science, which is certain, no doubt, and which makes constant
+progress,[1] but which does not satisfy, since it reveals nothing of the
+infinite, of the whole, without which the parts remain unintelligible.
+Hence all natural philosophy together is not worth an hour's toil. Pascal
+consoles himself for our ignorance concerning external things by the
+stability of ethics.
+
+[Footnote 1: It is this uninterrupted progress which raises the reason
+above the operations of nature and the instincts of animals. While the bees
+build their cells to-day just as they did a thousand years ago, science is
+continually developing. This guarantees to us our immortal destiny.]
+
+The leading principles of his ethics are as follows: In sin the love to God
+created in us has left us and self-love has transgressed its limits; pride
+has delivered us over to selfishness and misery. Our nature is corrupted,
+but not beyond redemption. In his actions worthless and depraved, man is
+seen to be exalted and incomprehensible in his ends; in reality he is
+worthy of abhorrence, but great in his destination. No philosophy or
+religion has so taught us at once to know the greatness and the misery of
+man as Christianity: this bids him recognize his low condition, but at the
+same time to endeavor to become like God. We must humbly despise the world
+and renounce ourselves; in order to love God, we must hate ourselves. Moral
+reformation is an act of divine grace, and the merit of human volition
+consists only in not resisting this. God transforms the heart by a heavenly
+sweetness, grants it to know that spiritual pleasure is greater than bodily
+pleasure, and infuses into it a disgust at the allurements of sin. Virtue
+is finding one's greatest happiness in God or in the eternal good. As
+morality is a matter of feeling, not of thought, so God, so even the first
+principles on which the certitude of demonstration depends, are the object,
+not of reason, but of the heart. That which certifies to the highest
+indemonstrable principles is a feeling, a belief, an instinct of nature:
+_les principes se sentent_. As a defender of the needs and rights of the
+heart, Pascal is a forerunner of the great Rousseau. His depreciation of
+the reason to exalt faith establishes a certain relationship with the
+skeptics of his native land, among whom Cousin has unjustly classed him
+(_Études sur Pascal_, 5th ed., 1857).[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Of the works on Pascal we may mention that of H. Reuchlin,
+1840: Havet's edition of the _Pensées_, with notes, Paris, 1866; and the
+_Étude_ by Ed. Droz, Paris, 1886.]
+
+Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), a member of the Oratory of Jesus, in
+Paris, which was opposed by the Jesuits, completed the development of
+Cartesianism in the religious direction adopted by Pascal. His thought
+is controlled by the endeavor to combine Cartesian metaphysics and
+Augustinian Christianity, those two great forces which constituted the
+double citadel of his order. His collected works appeared three years
+before his death; and a new edition in four volumes, prepared by
+J. Simon, in 1871. His chief work, _On the Search for Truth_ (new edition
+by F. Bouillier, 1880), appeared in 1675, and was followed by the
+_Treatise on Ethics_ (new edition by H. Joly, 1882) and the _Christian
+and Metaphysical Meditations_ in 1684, the _Discussions on Metaphysics and
+on Religion_ in 1688, and various polemic treatises. The best known among
+the doctrines of Malebranche is the principle that _we see all things in
+God (que nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu_.--_Recherche_, iii. 2, 6). What
+does this mean, and how is it established? It is intended as an answer to
+the question, How is it possible for the mind to cognize the body if, as
+Descartes has shown, mind and body are two fundamentally distinct and
+reciprocally independent substances?
+
+The seeker after truth must first understand the sources of error. Of these
+there are two, or, more exactly, five--as many as there are faculties of
+the soul. Error may spring from either the cognitive or the appetitive
+faculty; in the first case, either from sense-perception, the imagination,
+or the pure understanding, and, in the latter, from the inclinations or the
+passions. The inclinations and the passions do not reveal the nature of
+things, but only express how they affect us, of what value they are to
+us. Further still, the senses and the imagination only reproduce the
+impressions which things make on us as feeling subjects, express only what
+they are for us, not what they are in themselves. The senses have been
+given us simply for the preservation of our body, and so long as we expect
+nothing further from them than practical information concerning the
+(useful or hurtful) relation of things to our body, there is no reason for
+mistrusting them,--here we are not deceived by sensation, but at most by
+the overhasty judgment of the will. "Consider the senses as false witnesses
+in regard to the truth, but as trustworthy counselors in relation to the
+interests of life!"--Sensation and imagination belong to the soul in virtue
+of its union with the body; apart from this it is pure spirit. The essence
+of the soul is thought, for this function is the only one which cannot be
+abstracted from it without destroying it. Hence there can be no moment in
+the life of the soul when it ceases to think; it thinks always (_l'âme
+pense toujours_), only it does not always remember the fact.
+
+The kinds of knowledge differ with the classes of things cognized. God is
+known immediately and intuitively. He is necessary and unlimited being,
+the universal, infinite being, being absolutely; he only is known through
+himself. The concept of the infinite is the presupposition of the concept
+of the finite, and the former is earlier in us; we gain the conception of
+a particular thing only when we omit something from the idea of "being in
+general," or limit it. God is cogitative, like spirits, and extended, like
+bodies, but in an entirely different manner from created things. We know
+our own soul through consciousness or inner perception. We know its
+existence more certainly than that of bodies, but understand its nature
+less perfectly than theirs. To know that it is capable of sensations of
+pain, of heat, of light, we must have experienced them. For knowledge
+of the minds of others we are dependent upon conjecture, on analogical
+inferences from ourselves.
+
+But how is the unextended soul capable of cognizing extended body? Only
+through the medium of _ideas_. The ideas occupy an intermediate position
+between objects, whose archetypes they are, and representations in the
+soul, whose causes they are. The ideas, after the pattern of which God
+has created things, and the relations among them (necessary truths), are
+eternal, hence uncaused; they constitute the wisdom of God and are not
+dependent on his will. Things are in God in archetypal form, and are
+cognized through these their archetypes in God. Ideas are not produced by
+bodies, by the emission of sensuous images,[1] nor are they originated by
+the soul, or possessed by it as an innate possession. But God is the cause
+of knowledge, although he neither imparts ideas to the soul in creation nor
+produces them in it on every separate occasion. The ideas or perfections of
+things are in God and are beheld by spirits, who likewise dwell in God as
+the universal reason. As space is the place of bodies, so God is the
+place of spirits. As bodies are modes of extension, so their ideas are
+modifications of the idea of extension or of "intelligible extension." The
+principle stated at the beginning, that things are perceived in God, is,
+therefore, supported in the following way: we perceive bodies (through
+ideas, which ideas, and we ourselves, are) in God.
+
+[Footnote 1: Malebranche's refutation of the emanation hypothesis of the
+Peripatetics is acute and still worthy of attention. If bodies transmitted
+to the sense-organs forms like themselves, these copies, which would
+evidently be corporeal, must, by their departure, diminish the mass of the
+body from which they came away, and also, because of their impenetrability,
+obstruct and interfere with one another, thus destroying the possibility of
+clear impressions. A further point against the image theory is furnished by
+the increase in the size of an object, when approached. And, above all, it
+can never be made conceivable how motion can be transformed into sensations
+or ideas.]
+
+As the knowledge of truth has been found to consist in seeing things as God
+sees them, so morality consists in man's loving things as God loves them,
+or, what amounts to the same thing, in loving them to that degree which
+is their due in view of their greater or less perfection. If, in the last
+analysis, all cognition is knowledge of God, so all volition is loving God;
+there is implanted in every creature a direction toward the Creator. God is
+not only the primordial, unlimited being, he is also the highest good,
+the final end of all striving. As the ideas of things are imperfect
+participations in, or determinations of universal being, the absolute
+perfection of God, so the particular desires, directed toward individual
+objects, are limitations of the universal will toward the good. How does
+it happen that the human will, so variously mistaking its fundamental
+direction toward God, attaches itself to perishable goods, and prefers
+worthless objects to those which have value, and earthly to heavenly
+pleasure? The soul is, on the one hand, united to God, on the other, united
+to the body. The possibility of error and sin rests on its union with the
+body, since with the ideas (as representations of the pure understanding)
+are associated sensuous images, which mingle with and becloud them, and
+passions with the inclinations (or the will of the soul, in so far as it is
+pure spirit). This gives, however, merely the possibility of the immoral,
+sensuous, God-estranged disposition, which becomes actual only through
+man's free act, when he fails to stand the test. For sin does not consist
+in having passions, but in consenting to them. The passion is not caused by
+the corporeal movement of which it is the sequel, but only occasioned by
+it; and the same is true of the movement of the limbs and the decision
+of the will. The one true cause of all that happens is God. It is he who
+produces affections in the soul, and motion in the material world. For the
+body possesses only the capacity of being moved; and the soul cannot be the
+cause of the movement, since it would then have to know how it produces
+the latter. In fact those who lack a medical training have no idea of the
+muscular and nervous processes involved. Without God we cannot even move
+the tongue. It is he who raises our arm, even when we use it contrary to
+his law.
+
+Anxious to guard his pantheism from being identified with that of Spinoza,
+Malebranche points out that, according to his views, the universe is in
+God, not, as with Spinoza, that God is in the universe; that he teaches
+creation, which Spinoza denies; that he distinguishes, which Spinoza had
+not done, between the world in God (the ideas of things) and the world of
+created things, and between intelligible and corporeal extension. It may
+be added that he maintains the freedom of God and of man, which Spinoza
+rejects, and that he conceives God, who brings everything to pass, not as
+nature, but as omnipotent will. Nevertheless, as Kuno Fischer has shown,
+he approaches the naturalism of Spinoza more nearly than he is himself
+conscious, when he explains finite things as limitations (hence as modes)
+of the divine existence, posits the will of God in dependence on his wisdom
+(the uncreated world of ideas), thus limiting it in its omnipotence, and,
+which is decisive, makes God the sole author of motion, _i.e._, a natural
+cause. His attempt at a Christian pantheism was consequently unsuccessful.
+But its failure has not shattered the well-grounded fame of its thoughtful
+author as the second greatest metaphysician of France.
+
+Pierre Poiret[1] (1646-1719; for some years a preacher in Hamburg; lived
+later in Rhynsburg near Leyden) was rendered hostile to Cartesianism
+through the influence of mystical writings (among others those of
+Antoinette Bourignon, which he published), and through the perception of
+the results to which it had led in Spinoza. All cognition is taking up the
+form of the object. The perfection of man is based more on his passive
+capacities than on his active reason, which is concerned with mere ideas,
+unreal shadows; the mathematical spirit leads to fatalism, to the denial of
+freedom. The passive faculties, on the contrary, are in direct intercourse
+with reality, the senses with external material objects, and the arcanum of
+the mind, the basis of the soul, the intellect, with spiritual truths
+and with God, whose existence is more certain than our own. Man is not
+unconcerned in the development of the highest power of the mind, he must
+offer himself to God in sincere humility. In subordination to the passive
+intellect, the external faculty, the active reason, is also to be
+cultivated; it deserves care, like the skin. Evil consists in the absurdity
+that the creature, who apart from God is nothing, ascribes to himself an
+independent existence.
+
+[Footnote 1: Poiret: _Cogitationes Rationates de Deo, Anima, et Malo_,
+1677, the later editions including a vehement attack on the atheism of
+Spinoza: _L'Économie Divine_, 1682; _De Eruditione Solida, Superficiaria,
+et Falsa_, 1692; _Fides et Ratio Collatae_, against Locke, 1707.]
+
+Le Vayer and Huet, who have been already mentioned (pp. 50-51),
+mediate between the founders of skepticism and Bayle, its most gifted
+representative. The latter of these two wrote a _Criticism of the Cartesian
+Philosophy_, 1689, besides a _Treatise on the Impotence of the Human Mind_,
+which did not appear until after his death. He opposes, among other things,
+the criterion of truth based on evidence, since there is an evidence of
+the false not to be distinguished from that of the true, as well as the
+position that God becomes a deceiver in the bestowal of a weak and blind
+reason--for he gives us, at the same time, the power to know its deceptive
+character.
+
+As the last among those influenced by Descartes but who advanced beyond
+him, may be mentioned the acute Pierre Bayle (1647-1706; professor in Sedan
+and Rotterdam; _Works_, 1725-31[1]), who greatly excited the world of
+letters by his occasional and polemic treatises, and still more by the
+journal, _Nouvelles de la République des Lettres_ from 1684, and his
+_Historical and Critical Dictionary_, in two volumes, 1695 and 1697.
+Nowhere do the most opposite antitheses dwell in such close proximity as
+in the mind of Bayle. Along with an ever watchful doubt he harbors a most
+active zeal for knowledge, with a sincere spirit of belief (which has been
+wrongly disputed by Lange, Zeller, and Pünjer) a demoniacal pleasure in
+bringing to light absurdities in the doctrines of faith, with absolute
+confidence in the infallibility of conscience an entirely pessimistic view
+of human morality. His strength lies in criticism and polemics, his work in
+the latter (aside from his hostility to fanaticism and the persecution of
+those differing in faith) being directed chiefly against optimism and the
+deistic religion of reason, which holds the Christian dogmas capable of
+proof, or, at least, faith and knowledge capable of reconciliation. The
+doctrines of faith are not only above reason, incomprehensible, but
+contrary to reason; and it is just on this that our merit in accepting
+them depends. The mysteries of the Gospel do not seek success before the
+judgment seat of thought, they demand the blind submission of the reason;
+nay, if they were objects of knowledge they would cease to be mysteries.
+Thus we must choose between religion and philosophy, for they cannot be
+combined. For one who is convinced of the untrustworthiness of the reason
+and her lack of competence in things supernatural, it is in no wise
+contradictory or impossible to receive as true things which she declares
+to be false; he will thank God for the gift of a faith which is entirely
+independent of the clearness of its objects and of its agreement with the
+axioms of philosophy. Even, when in purely scientific questions he calls
+attention to difficulties and shows contradictions on every hand, Bayle by
+no means intends to hold up principles with contradictory implications as
+false, but only as uncertain.[2] The reason, he says, generalizing from his
+own case, is capable only of destruction, not of construction; of
+discovering error, not of finding truth; of finding reasons and
+counter-reasons, of exciting doubt and controversy, not of vouchsafing
+certitude. So long as it contents itself with controverting that which is
+false, it is potent and salutary; but when, despising divine assistance, it
+advances beyond this, it becomes dangerous, like a caustic drug which
+attacks the healthy flesh after it has consumed that which was diseased.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. on Bayle, L. Feuerbach. 1838, 2d ed., 1844; Eucken in the
+_Allgemeine Zeitung_, supplement to Nos. 251, 252, October 27, 28, 1891.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Thus, in regard to the problem of freedom, he finds it hard
+to comprehend how the creatures, who are not the authors of their own
+existence, can be the authors of their own actions, but, at the same time,
+inadmissible to think of God as the cause of evil. He seeks only to show
+the indemonstrability and incomprehensibility of freedom, not to reject it.
+For he sees in it the condition of morality, and calls attention to
+the fact that the difficulties in which those who deny freedom involve
+themselves are far greater than those of their opponents. He shows himself
+entirely averse to the determinism and pantheism of Spinoza.]
+
+He who seeks to refute skepticism must produce a criterion of truth. If
+such exists, it is certainly that advanced by Descartes, the evidence, the
+evident clearness of a principle. Well, then, the following principles pass
+for evident: That one, who does not exist, can have no responsibility for
+an evil action; that two things, which are identical with the same thing,
+are identical with each other; that I am the same man to-day that I was
+yesterday. Now, the revealed doctrines of original sin and of the Trinity
+show that the first and second of these axioms are false, and the Church
+doctrine of the preservation of the world as a continuous creation, that
+the last principle is uncertain. Thus if not even self-evidence furnishes
+us a criterion of truth, we must conclude that none whatever exists.
+Further, in regard to the origin of the world from a single principle, its
+creation by God, we find this supported, no doubt, both by the conclusions
+of the pure reason and by the consideration of nature, but controvened by
+the fact of evil, by the misery and wickedness of man. Is it conceivable
+that a holy and benevolent God has created so unhappy and wicked a being?
+
+Bayle's motives in defending faith against reason were, on the one hand,
+his personal piety, on the other, his conviction of the unassailable purity
+of Christian ethics. All the sects agree in regard to moral principles, and
+it is this which assures us of the divinity of the Christian revelation.
+Nevertheless, he does not conceal from himself the fact that possession of
+the theoretical side of religion is far from being a guarantee of practice
+in conformity with her precepts. It is neither true that faith alone leads
+to morality nor that unbelief is the cause of immorality. A state composed
+of atheists would be not at all impossible, if only strict punishments and
+strict notions of honor were insisted upon.
+
+The judgments of the natural reason in moral questions are as certain
+and free from error as its capacity is shown to be weak and limited in
+theoretical science. The idea of morality never deceives anyone; the moral
+law is innate in every man. Although Christianity has given the best
+development of our duties, yet the moral law can be understood and followed
+by all men, even by heathen and atheists. We do not need to be Christians
+in order to act virtuously; the knowledge given by conscience is not
+dependent upon revelation. From the knowledge of the good to the practice
+of it is, it is true, a long step; we may be convinced of moral truth
+without loving it, and God's grace alone is able to strengthen us against
+the power of the passions, by adding to the illumination of the mind an
+inclination of the heart toward the good. Temperament, custom, self-love
+move the soul more strongly than general truths. As in life pleasure is far
+outbalanced by pain and vexation, so far more evil acts are done than good
+ones: history is a collection of misdeeds, with scarcely one virtuous act
+for a thousand crimes. It is not the external action that constitutes the
+ethical character of a deed, but the motive or disposition; almsgiving from
+motives of pride is a vice, and only when practiced out of love to one's
+neighbors, a virtue. God looks only at the act of the will; our highest
+duty, and one which admits of no exceptions, is never to act contrary to
+conscience.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+LOCKE.
+
+After the Cartesian philosophy had given decisive expression to the
+tendencies of modern thought, and had been developed through occasionalism
+to its completion in the system of Spinoza, the line of further progress
+consisted in two factors: Descartes's principles--one-sidedly rationalistic
+and abstractly scientific, as they were--were, on the one hand, to be
+supplemented by the addition of the empirical element which Descartes had
+neglected, and, on the other, to be made available for general culture by
+approximation to the interests of practical life. England, with its freer
+and happier political conditions, was the best place for the accomplishment
+of both ends, and Locke, a typically healthy and sober English thinker,
+with a distaste for extreme views, the best adapted mind. Descartes, the
+rationalist, had despised experience, and Bacon, the empiricist, had
+despised mathematics; but Locke aims to show that while the reason is the
+instrument of science, demonstration its form, and the realm of knowledge
+wider than experience, yet this instrument and this form are dependent for
+their content on a supply of material from the senses. The emphasis, it is
+true, falls chiefly on the latter half of this programme, and posterity,
+especially, has almost exclusively attended to the empirical side of
+Locke's theory of knowledge in giving judgment concerning it.
+
+John Locke was born at Wrington, not far from Bristol, in 1632. At Oxford
+he busied himself with philosophy, natural science, and medicine, being
+repelled by the Scholastic thinkers, but strongly attracted by the writings
+of Descartes. In 1665 he became secretary to the English ambassador to the
+Court of Brandenburg. Returning thence to Oxford he made the acquaintance
+of Lord Anthony Ashley (from 1672 Earl of Shaftesbury; died in Holland
+1683), who received him into his own household as a friend, physician, and
+tutor to his son (the father of Shaftesbury, the moral philosopher), and
+with whose varying fortunes Locke's own were henceforth to be intimately
+connected. Twice he became secretary to his patron (once in 1667--with
+an official secretaryship in 1672, when Shaftesbury became Lord
+Chancellor--and again in 1679, when he became President of the Council),
+but both times he lost his post on his friend's fall. The years 1675-79
+were spent in Montpellier and Paris. In 1683 he went into voluntary exile
+in Holland (where Shaftesbury had died in January of the same year), and
+remained there until 1689, when the ascension of the throne by William of
+Orange made it possible for him to return to England. Here he was made
+Commissioner of Appeals, and, subsequently, one of the Commissioners of
+Trade and Plantations (till 1700). He died in 1704 at Gates, in Essex, at
+the house of Sir Francis Masham, whose wife was the daughter of Cudworth,
+the philosopher.
+
+Locke's chief work, _An Essay concerning Human Understanding_, which had
+been planned as early as 1670, was published in 1689-90, a short abstract
+of it having previously appeared in French in Le Clerc's _Bibliothèque
+Universelle_, 1688. His theoretical works include, further, the two
+posthumous treatises, _On the Conduct of the Understanding_ (originally
+intended for incorporation in the fourth edition of the _Essay_, which,
+however, appeared in 1700 without this chapter, which probably had proved
+too extended) and the _Elements of Natural Philosophy_. To political
+and politico-economic questions Locke contributed the two _Treatises on
+Government_, 1690, and three essays on money and the coinage. In the year
+1689 appeared the first of three _Letters on Tolerance_, followed, in 1693,
+by _Some Thoughts on Education_, and, in 1695, by _The Reasonableness of
+Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures_. The collected works appeared
+for the first time in 1714, and in nine volumes in 1853; the philosophical
+works (edited by St. John) are given in Bonn's Standard Library
+(1867-68).[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Lord King and Fox Bourne have written on Locke's life, 1829
+and 1876. A comparison of Locke's theory of knowledge with Leibnitz's
+critique was published by Hartenstein in 1865, and one by Von Benoit (prize
+dissertation) in 1869, and an exposition of his theory of substance by De
+Fries in 1879. Victor Cousin's _Philosophie de Locke_ has passed through
+six editions. [Among more recent English discussions reference may be made
+to Green's Introduction to Hume's _Treatise on Human Nature_, 1874 (new ed.
+1890), which is a valuable critique of the line of development, Locke,
+Berkeley, Hume; Fowler's _Locke_, in the English Men of Letters, 1880; and
+Fraser's _Locke_, in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1890.--TR.]]
+
+%(a) Theory of Knowledge.%--Locke's theory of knowledge is controlled by
+two tendencies, one native, furnished by the Baconian empiricism, and the
+other Continental, supplied by the Cartesian question concerning the origin
+of ideas. Bacon had demanded the closest connection with experience as
+the condition of fruitful inquiry. Locke supports this commendation of
+experience by a detailed description of the services which it renders to
+cognition, namely, by showing that, in simple ideas, perception supplies
+the material for complex ideas, and for all the cognitive work of the
+understanding. Descartes had divided ideas, according to their origin, into
+three classes: those which are self-formed, those which come from without,
+and those which are innate (p. 79), and had called this third class the
+most valuable. Locke disputes the existence of ideas in the understanding
+from birth, and makes it receive the elements of knowledge from the senses,
+that is, from without. He is a representative of sensationalism,--not in
+the stricter sense, first put into the term by those who subsequently
+continued his endeavors, that thought arises from perception, that it is
+transformed sensation--but in the wider sense, that thought is (free)
+operation with ideas, which are neither created by it nor present in it
+from the first, but given to it by perception, that, consequently, the
+cognitive process begins with sensation and so its first attitude is a
+passive one. From the standpoint of the Cartesian problem, which he solves
+in a sense opposite to Descartes, Locke supplements the empiricism of Bacon
+by basing it on a psychologically developed theory of knowledge. That in
+the course of the inquiry he introduces a new principle, which causes him
+to diverge from the true empirical path, will appear in the sequel.
+
+The question "How our ideas come into the mind" receives a negative answer
+(in the first book of the _Essay_): "There are no innate principles in the
+mind"[1] The doctrine of the innate character of certain principles is
+based on their universal acceptance. The asserted agreement of mankind in
+regard to the laws of thought, the principles of morality, the existence
+of God, etc., is neither cogent as an argument nor correct in fact. In the
+first place, even if there were any principles which everyone assented to,
+this would not prove that they had been created in the soul; the fact of
+general consent would admit of a different explanation. Granted that no
+atheists existed, yet it would not necessarily follow that the universal
+conviction of the existence of God is innate, for it might have been
+gradually reached in each case through the use of the reason--might have
+been inferred, for instance, from the perception of the purposive character
+of the world. Second, the fact to which this theory of innate ideas appeals
+is not true. No moral rule can be cited which is respected by all nations.
+The idea of identity is entirely unknown to idiots and to children. If
+the laws of identity and contradiction were innate they must appear in
+consciousness prior to all other truths; but long before a child is
+conscious of the proposition "It is impossible for the same thing to be and
+not to be," it knows that sweet is not bitter, and that black is not white.
+The ideas first known are not general axioms and abstract concepts, but
+particular impressions of the senses. Would nature write so illegible a
+hand that the mind must wait a long time before becoming able to read what
+had been inscribed upon it? It is often said, however, that innate ideas
+and principles may be obscured and, finally, completely extinguished
+by habit, education, and other extrinsic circumstances. Then, if
+they gradually become corrupted and disappear, they must at least be
+discoverable in full purity where these disturbing influences have not
+yet acted; but it is especially vain to look for them in children and the
+ignorant. Perhaps, however, these possess such principles unconsciously;
+perhaps they are imprinted on the understanding, without being attended
+to? This would be a contradiction in terms. To be in the mind or the
+understanding simply means "to be understood" or to be known; no one can
+have an idea without being conscious of it. Finally, if the attempt be
+made to explain "originally in the mind" in so wide a sense that it would
+include all truths which man can ever attain or is capable of discovering
+by the right use of reason, this would make not only all mathematical
+principles, but all knowledge in general, all sciences, and all arts
+innate; there would be no ground even for the exclusion of wisdom and
+virtue. Therefore, either all ideas are innate or none are. This is an
+important alternative. While Locke decides for the second half of the
+proposition, Leibnitz defends the first by a delicate application of the
+concept of unconscious representation and of implicit knowledge, which his
+predecessor rejects out of hand.
+
+[Footnote 1: According to Fox Bourne this first book was written after the
+others. Geil _(Ueber die Abhängigkeit Lockes von Descartes_, Strassburg,
+1887, chap, iii.) has endeavored to prove that, since the arguments
+controverted are wanting in Descartes, the attack was not aimed at
+Descartes and his school, but at native defenders of innate ideas, as Lord
+Herbert of Cherbury and the English Platonists (Cudworth, More, Parker,
+Gale). That along with these the Cartesian doctrine was a second and
+chief object of attack is shown by Benno Erdmann in his discussion of the
+treatises by G. Geil and R. Sommer _(Lockes Verhältnis zu Descartes_,
+Berlin, 1887) in the _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, ii, pp.
+99-121.]
+
+Locke's positive answer to the question concerning the origin of ideas is
+given in his second book. Ideas are not present in the understanding from
+the beginning, nor are they originated by the understanding, but received
+through sensation. The understanding is like a piece of white paper
+on which perception inscribes its characters. All knowledge arises in
+experience. This is of two kinds, derived either from the external senses
+or the internal sense. The perception of external objects is termed
+Sensation, that of internal phenomena (of the states of the mind itself)
+Reflection. External and internal perception are the only windows
+through which the light of ideas penetrates into the dark chamber of the
+understanding. The two are not opened simultaneously, however, but one
+after the other; since the perceptions of the sensible qualities of bodies,
+unlike that of the operations of the mind itself, do not require an effort
+of attention, they are the earlier. The child receives ideas of sensation
+before those of reflection; internal perception presupposes external
+perception.
+
+In this distinction between sensation and reflection, we may recognize
+an after-effect of the Cartesian dualism between matter and spirit.
+The antithesis of substances has become a duality in the faculties of
+perception. But while Descartes had so far forth ascribed precedence to the
+mind in that he held the self-certitude of the ego to be the highest and
+clearest of all truths and the soul to be better known than the body, in
+Locke the relation of the two was reversed, since he made the perception
+of self dependent on the precedent perception of external objects. This
+antithesis was made still sharper in later thinking, when Condillac made
+full use of the priority of sensation, which in Locke had remained without
+much effect; while Berkeley, on the other hand, reduced external perception
+to internal perception.
+
+All original ideas are representations either of the external senses or
+of the internal sense, or of both. And since, in the case of ideas of
+sensation, there is a distinction between those which are perceived by a
+single one of the external senses and those which come from more than one,
+four classes of simple ideas result: (1) Those which come from one external
+sense, as colors, sounds, tastes, odors, heat, solidity, and the like.
+(2) Those which come from more than one external sense (sight and touch),
+as extension, figure, and motion. (3) Reflection on the operations of our
+minds yields ideas of perception or thinking (with its various modes,
+remembrance, judging, knowledge, faith, etc.), and of volition or willing.
+(4) From both external and internal perception there come into the mind the
+ideas of pleasure and pain, existence, power, unity, and succession. These
+are approximately our original ideas, which are related to knowledge as
+the letters to written discourse; as all Homer is composed out of only
+twenty-four letters, so these few simple ideas constitute all the material
+of knowledge. The mind can neither have more nor other simple ideas than
+those which are furnished to it by these two sources of experience.
+
+Locke differs from Descartes again in regard to extension and thought.
+Extension does not constitute the essence of matter, nor thought the
+essence of mind. Extension and body are not the same; the former is
+presupposed by the latter as its necessary condition, but it is the former
+alone which yields mathematical matter. The essence of physical matter
+consists rather in solidity: where impenetrability is found there is body,
+and the converse; the two are absolutely inseparable. With space the case
+is different. I cannot conceive unextended matter, indeed, but I can easily
+conceive immaterial extension, an unfilled space Further, if the essence
+of the soul consisted in thought, it must be always thinking. As the
+Cartesians maintained, it must have ideas as soon as it begins to be, which
+is manifestly contrary to experience. Thinking is merely an activity of
+the mind, as motion is an activity of the body, and not its essential
+characteristic. The mind does not receive ideas until external objects
+occasion perception in it through impressions, which it is not able to
+avert. The understanding may be compared to a mirror, which, without
+independent activity and without being consulted, takes up the images of
+things. Some of the simple ideas which have been mentioned above represent
+the properties of things as they really are, others not. The former class
+includes all ideas of reflection (for we are ourselves the immediate object
+of the inner sense); but among the ideas of sensation those only which come
+from different senses, hence extension, motion and rest, number, figure,
+and, further, solidity, are to be accounted _primary_ qualities, _i. e_.,
+such as are actual copies of the properties of bodies. All other ideas, on
+the contrary, have no resemblance to properties of bodies; they represent
+merely the ways in which things act, and are not copies of things. The
+ideas of _secondary_ or derivative qualities (hard and soft, warm and cold,
+colors and sounds, tastes and odors) are in the last analysis caused--as
+are the primary--by motion, but not perceived as such. Yellow and warm are
+merely sensations in us, which we erroneously ascribe to objects; with
+equal right we might ascribe to fire, as qualities inherent in it, the
+changes in form and color which it produces in wax and the pain which it
+causes in the finger brought into proximity with it. The warmth and the
+brightness of the blaze, the redness, the pleasant taste, and the aromatic
+odor of the strawberry, exist in these bodies merely as the power to
+produce such sensations in us by stimulation of the skin, the eye, the
+palate, and the nose. If we remove the perceptions of them, they disappear
+as such, and their causes alone remain--the bulk, figure, number, texture,
+and motion of the insensible particles. The ground of the illusion lies in
+the fact that such qualities as color, etc., bear no resemblance to their
+causes, in no wise point to these, and in themselves contain naught of
+bulk, density, figure, and motion, and that our senses are too weak
+to discover the material particles and their primary qualities.--The
+distinction between qualities of the first and second order--first advanced
+by the ancient atomists, revived by Galileo and Descartes on the threshold
+of the modern period, retained by Locke, and still customary in the natural
+science of the day--forms an important link in the transition from the
+popular view of all sense-qualities as properties of things in themselves
+to Kant's position, that spatial and temporal qualities also belong
+to phenomena alone, and are based merely on man's subjective mode of
+apprehension, while the real properties of things in themselves are
+unknowable.
+
+Thus far the procedure of the understanding has been purely passive. But
+besides the capacity for passively receiving simple ideas, it possesses the
+further power of variously combining and extending these original ideas
+which have come into it from without, of working over the material given
+in sensation by the combination, relation, and separation of its various
+elements. In this it is active, but not creative. It is not able to form
+new simple ideas (and just as little to destroy such as already exist), but
+only freely to combine the elements furnished without its assistance by
+perception (or, following the figure mentioned above, to combine into
+syllables and words the separate letters of sensation). Complex ideas arise
+from simple ideas through voluntary combination of the latter.
+
+Perception is the first step toward knowledge. After perception the most
+indispensable faculty is retention, the prolonged consciousness of present
+ideas and the revival of those which have disappeared, or, as it were, have
+been put aside. For an idea to be "in the memory" means that the mind
+has the capacity to reproduce it at will, whereupon it recognizes it as
+previously experienced. If our ideas are not freshened up from time to time
+by new impressions of the same sort they gradually fade out, until finally
+(as the idea of color in one become blind in early life) they completely
+disappear. Ideas impressed upon the mind by frequent repetition are rarely
+entirely lost. Memory is the basis for the intellectual functions of
+discernment and comparison, of composition, abstraction, and naming. Since,
+amid the innumerable multitude of ideas, it is not possible to assign to
+each one a definite sign, the indispensable condition of language is found
+in the power of abstraction, that is, in the power of generalizing ideas,
+of compounding many ideas into one, and of indicating by the names of the
+general ideas, or of the classes and species, the particular ideas also
+which are contained under these. Here is the great distinction between
+man and the brute. The brute lacks language because he lacks (not all
+understanding whatever, _e.g._, not a capacity, though an imperfect one, of
+comparison and composition, but) the faculty of abstraction and of forming
+general ideas. The object of language is simply the quick and easy
+communication of our thoughts to others, not to give expression to the real
+essence of objects. Words are not names for particular things, but signs
+of general ideas; and _abstracta_ nothing more than an artifice for
+facilitating intellectual intercourse. This abbreviation, which aids in
+the exchange of ideas, involves the danger that the creations of the mind
+denoted by words will be taken for images of real general essences, of
+which, in fact, there are none in existence, but only particular things. In
+order to prevent anyone to whom I am speaking from understanding my words
+in a different sense from the one intended, it is necessary for me to
+define the complex ideas by analyzing them into their elements, and, on the
+other hand, to give examples in experience of the simple ideas, which do
+not admit of definition, or to explain them by synonyms. Thus much from
+Locke's philosophy of language, to which he devotes the third book of the
+_Essay_.
+
+Complex ideas, which are very numerous, may be divided into three classes:
+Modes, Substances, and Relations.
+
+_Modes_ (states, conditions) are such combinations of simple ideas which do
+not "contain in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are
+considered as dependencies on, or affections of substances." They fall into
+two classes according as they are composed of the same simple ideas, or
+simple ideas of various kinds; the former are called simple, the latter
+mixed, modes. Under the former class belong, for example, a dozen or a
+score, the idea of which is composed of simple units; under the latter,
+running, fighting, obstinacy, printing, theft, parricide. The formation of
+_mixed_ modes is greatly influenced by national customs. Very complicated
+transactions (sacrilege, triumph, ostracism), if often considered and
+discussed, receive for the sake of brevity comprehensive names, which
+cannot be rendered by a single expression in the language of other
+nations among whom the custom in question is not found. The elements most
+frequently employed in the formation of mixed modes are ideas of the two
+fundamental activities, thinking and motion, together with power, which is
+their source. Locke discusses _simple_ modes in more detail, especially
+those derived from the ideas of space, time, unity, and power.
+Modifications of space are distance, figure, place, length; since any
+length or measure of space can be repeated to infinity, we reach the idea
+of immensity. As modes of time are enumerated succession (which we perceive
+and measure only by the flow of our ideas), duration, and lengths or
+measures of duration, the endless repetition of which yields the idea of
+eternity. From unity are developed the modes of numbers, and from the
+unlimitedness of these the idea of infinity. No idea, however, is richer
+in modes than the idea of power. A distinction must be made between active
+power and passive power, or mere receptivity. While bodies are not capable
+of originating motion, but only of communicating motion received, we notice
+in ourselves, as spiritual beings, the capacity of originating actions and
+motions. The body possesses only the passive power of being moved, the mind
+the active power of producing motion. This latter is termed "will." Here
+Locke discusses at length the freedom of the will, but not with entire
+clearness and freedom from contradictions (cf. below).
+
+Modes are conditions which do not subsist of themselves, but have need of
+a basis or support; they are not conceivable apart from a thing whose
+properties or states they are. We notice that certain qualities always
+appear together, and habitually refer them to a substratum as the ground of
+their unity; in which they subsist or from which they proceed. _Substance_
+denotes this self-existent "we know not what," which has or bears the
+attributes in itself, and which arouses the ideas of them in us. It is the
+combination of a number of simple ideas which are presumed to belong to one
+thing. From the ideas of sensation the understanding composes the idea of
+body, and from the ideas of reflection that of mind. Each of these is just
+as clear and just as obscure as the other; of each we know only its effects
+and its sensuous properties; its essence is for us entirely unknowable.
+Instead of the customary names, material and immaterial substances,
+Locke recommends cogitative and incogitative substances, since it is not
+inconceivable that the Creator may have endowed some material beings with
+the capacity of thought. God,--the idea of whom is attained by uniting the
+ideas of existence, power, might, knowledge, and happiness with that of
+infinity,--is absolutely immaterial, because not passive, while finite
+spirits (which are both active and passive) are perhaps only bodies which
+possess the power of thinking.
+
+While the ideas of substances are referred to a reality without the mind as
+their archetype, to which they are to conform and which they should image
+and represent, _Relations_ (_e.g._, husband, greater) are free and immanent
+products of the understanding. They are not copies of real things, but
+represent themselves alone, are their own archetypes. We do not ask whether
+they agree with things, but, conversely, whether things agree with them
+(Book iv. 4.5). The mind reaches an idea of relation by placing two things
+side by side and comparing them. If it perceives that a thing, or a
+quality, or an idea begins to exist through the operation of some other
+thing, it derives from this the idea of the causal relation, which is the
+most comprehensive of all relations, since all that is actual or possible
+can be brought under it. _Cause_ is that which makes another thing to begin
+to be; _effect_, that which had its beginning from some other thing. The
+production of a new quality is termed alteration; of artificial things,
+making; of a living being, generation; of a new particle of matter,
+creation. Next in importance is the relation of _identity and diversity_.
+Since it is impossible for a thing to be in two different places at the
+same time and for two things to be at the same time in the same place,
+everything that at a given instant is in a given place is identical with
+itself, and, on the other hand, distinct from everything else (no matter
+how great the resemblance between them) that at the same moment exists in
+another place. Space and time therefore form the _principium
+individuationis_. By what marks, however, may we recognize the identity of
+an individual at different times and in different places? The identity of
+inorganic matter depends on the continuity of the mass of atoms which
+compose it; that of living beings upon the permanent organization of
+their parts (different bodies are united into _one_ animal by a common
+life); personal identity consists in the unity of self-consciousness, not
+in the continuity of bodily existence (which is at once excluded by the
+change of matter). The identity of the person or the ego must be carefully
+distinguished from that of substance and of man. It would not be impossible
+for the person to remain the same in a change of substances, in so far as
+the different beings (for instance, the souls of Epicurus and Gassendi)
+participated in the same self-consciousness; and, conversely, for a spirit
+to appear in two persons by losing the consciousness of its previous
+existence. Consciousness is the sole condition of the self, or personal
+identity.--The determinations of space and time are for the most part
+relations. Our answers to the questions "When?" "How long?" "How large?"
+denote the distance of one point of time from another (_e.g._, the birth of
+Christ), the relation of one duration to another (of a revolution of the
+sun), the relation of one extension to another well-known one taken as a
+standard. Many apparently positive ideas and words, as young and old, large
+and small, weak and strong, are in fact relative. They imply merely the
+relation of a given duration of life, of a given size and strength, to that
+which has been adopted as a standard for the class of things in question. A
+man of twenty is called young, but a horse of like age, old; and neither of
+these measures of time applies to stars or diamonds. Moral relations, which
+are based on a comparison of man's voluntary actions with one of the three
+moral laws, will be discussed below.
+
+The inquiry now turns from the origin of ideas to their _cognitive value_
+or their _validity_, beginning (in the concluding chapters of the second
+book) with the accuracy of single ideas, and advancing (in Book iv., which
+is the most important in the whole work) to the truth of judgments. An idea
+is real when it conforms to its archetype, whether this is a thing, real
+or possible, or an idea of some other thing; it is adequate when the
+conformity is complete. The idea of a four-sided triangle or of brave
+cowardice is unreal or fantastical, since it is composed of incompatible
+elements, and the idea of a centaur, since it unites simple ideas in a
+way in which they do not occur in nature. The layman's ideas of law or of
+chemical substances are real, but inadequate, since they have a general
+resemblance to those of experts, and a basis in reality, but yet only
+imperfectly represent their archetypes. Nay, further, our ideas of
+substances are all inadequate, not only when they are taken for
+representations of the inner essences of things (since we do not know these
+essences), but also when they are considered merely as collections of
+qualities. The copy never includes all the qualities of the thing, the less
+so since the majority of these are powers, _i.e._, consist in relations to
+other objects, and since it is impossible, even in the case of a single
+body, to discover all the changes which it is fitted to impart to, or
+to receive from, other substances. Ideas of modes and relations are all
+adequate, for they are their own archetypes, are not intended to represent
+anything other than themselves, are images without originals. An idea of
+this kind, however, though perfect when originally formed, may become
+imperfect through the use of language, when it is unsuccessfully intended
+to agree with the idea of some other person and denominated by a current
+term. In the case of mixed modes and their names, therefore, the
+compatibility of their elements and the possible existence of their objects
+are not enough to secure their reality and their complete adequacy; in
+order to be adequate they must, further, exactly conform to the meaning
+connected with their names by their author, or in common use. Simple
+ideas are best off, according to Locke, in regard both to reality and to
+adequacy. For the most part, it is true, they are not accurate copies of
+the real qualities, of things, but only the regular effects of the powers
+of things. But although real qualities are thus only the causes and not
+the patterns of sensations, still simple ideas, by their constant
+correspondence with real qualities, sufficiently fulfill their divinely
+ordained end, to serve us as instruments of knowledge, _i.e._, in the
+discrimination of things.--An unreal and inadequate idea becomes false only
+when it is referred to an object, whether this be the existence of a thing,
+or its true essence, or an idea of other things. Truth and error belong
+always to affirmations or negations, that is, to (it may be, tacit)
+propositions. Ideas uncombined, unrelated, apart from judgments, ideas,
+that is, as mere phenomena in the mind, are neither true nor false.
+
+Knowledge is defined as the "perception of the connexion and agreement, or
+disagreement and repugnancy" of two ideas; truth, as "the right joining or
+separating of signs, _i.e._, ideas or words." The object of knowledge
+is neither single ideas nor the relations of ideas to things, but the
+_relations of ideas among themselves_. This view was at once paradoxical
+and pregnant. If all cognition, as Locke suggests in objection to his own
+theory, consists in perceiving the agreement or disagreement of our ideas,
+are not the visions of the enthusiast and the reasonings of sober thinkers
+alike certain? are not the propositions, A fairy is not a centaur, and a
+centaur is a living being, just as true as that a circle is not a triangle,
+and that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles?
+The mind directly perceives nothing but its own ideas, but it seeks a
+knowledge of things! If this is possible it can only be indirect
+knowledge--the mind knows things through its ideas, and possesses criteria
+which show that its ideas agree with things.
+
+Two cases must be clearly distinguished, for a considerable number of our
+ideas, viz., all complex ideas except those of substances, make no claim
+to represent things, and consequently cannot represent them falsely. For
+mathematical and moral ideas and principles, and the truth thereof, it is
+entirely immaterial whether things and conditions correspondent to them
+exist in nature or not. They are valid, even if nowhere actualized; they
+are "eternal truths," not in the sense that they are known from childhood,
+but in the sense that, as soon as known, they are immediately assented
+to.[1] The case is different, however, with simple ideas and the ideas of
+substances, which have their originals without the mind and which are to
+correspond with these. In regard to the former we may always be certain
+that they agree with real things, for since the mind can neither
+voluntarily originate them (_e.g._, cannot produce sensations of color
+in the dark) nor avoid having them at will, but only receive them from
+without, they are not creatures of the fancy, but the natural and regular
+productions of external things affecting us. In regard to the latter, the
+ideas of substances, we may be certain at least when the simple ideas which
+compose them have been found so connected in experience. Perception has
+an external cause, whose influence the mind is not able to withstand. The
+mutual corroboration furnished by the reports of the different senses, the
+painfulness of certain sensations, the clear distinction between ideas from
+actual perception and those from memory, the possibility of producing and
+predicting new sensations of an entirely definite nature in ourselves and
+in others, by means of changes which we effect in the external world (e.g.
+by writing down a word)--these give further justification for the trust
+which we put in the senses. No one will be so skeptical as to doubt in
+earnest the existence of the things which he sees and touches, and to
+declare his whole life to be a deceptive dream. The certitude which
+perception affords concerning the existence of external objects is indeed
+not an absolute one, but it is sufficient for the needs of life and the
+government of our actions; it is "as certain as our happiness or misery,
+beyond which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being." In regard
+to the past the testimony of the senses is supplemented by memory, in
+which certainty [in regard to the continued existence of things previously
+perceived] is transformed into high probability; while in regard to the
+existence of other finite spirits, numberless kinds of which may be
+conjectured to exist, though their existence is quite beyond our powers of
+perception, certitude sinks into mere (though well-grounded) faith.
+
+[Footnote 1: Thus it results that knowledge, although dependent on
+experience for all its materials, extends beyond experience. The
+understanding is completely bound in the reception of simple ideas; less so
+in the combination of these into complex ideas; absolutely free in the act
+of comparison, which it can omit at will; finally, again, completely bound
+in its recognition of the relation in which the ideas it has chosen
+to compare stand to one another. There is room for choice only in the
+intermediate stage of the cognitive process; at the beginning (in the
+reception of the simple ideas of perception, a, b, c, d), and at the end
+(in judging how the concepts a b c and a b d stand related to each other),
+the understanding is completely determined.]
+
+More certain than our _sensitive_ knowledge of the existence of external
+objects, are our immediate or _intuitive_ knowledge of our own existence
+and our mediate or _demonstrative_ knowledge of the existence of God.
+Every idea that we have, every pain, every thought assures us of our own
+existence. The existence of God, however, as the infinite cause of all
+reality, endowed with intelligence, will, and supreme power, is inferred
+from the existence and constitution of the world and of ourselves. Reality
+exists; the real world is composed of matter in motion and thinking beings,
+and is harmoniously ordered. Since it is impossible for any real being to
+be produced by nothing, and since we obtain no satisfactory answer to the
+question of origin until we rise to something existent from all eternity,
+we must assume as the cause of that which exists an Eternal Being, which
+possesses in a higher degree all the perfections which it has bestowed upon
+the creatures. As the cause of matter and motion, and as the source of all
+power, this Being must be omnipotent; as the cause of beauty and order in
+the world, and, above all, as the creator of thinking beings, it must be
+omniscient. But these perfections are those which we combine in the idea
+of God.
+
+Intuitive knowledge is the highest of the three degrees of knowledge. It is
+gained when the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas
+at first sight, without hesitation, and without the intervention of any
+third idea. This immediate knowledge is self-evident, irresistible, and
+exposed to no doubt. Knowledge is demonstrative when the mind perceives the
+agreement (or disagreement) of two ideas, not by placing them side by side
+and comparing them, but through the aid of other ideas. The intermediate
+links are called proofs; their discovery is the work of the reason, and
+quickness in finding them out is termed sagacity. The greater the number
+of the intermediate steps, the more the clearness and distinctness of the
+knowledge decreases, and the more the possibility of error increases.
+In order for an argument (_e. g_., that a = d) to be conclusive, every
+particular step in it (a = b, b = c, c = d) must possess intuitive
+certainty. Mathematics is not the only example of demonstrative knowledge,
+but the most perfect one, since in mathematics, by the aid of visible
+symbols, the full equality and the least differences among ideas may be
+exactly measured and sharply determined.
+
+Besides real existence Locke, unsystematically enough, enumerates three
+other sorts of agreement between ideas,--in the perception of which he
+makes knowledge consist,--viz., identity or diversity (blue is not yellow),
+relation (when equals are added to equals the results are equal), and
+coexistence or necessary connexion (gold is fixed). We are best off in
+regard to the knowledge of the first of these, "identity or diversity," for
+here our intuition extends as far as our ideas, since we recognize every
+idea, as soon as it arises, as identical with itself and different from
+others. We are worst off in regard to "necessary connexion." We know
+something, indeed, concerning the incompatibility or coexistence of certain
+properties (_e. g_., that the same object cannot have two different sizes
+or colors at the same time; that figure cannot exist apart from extension):
+but it is only in regard to a few qualities and powers of bodies that we
+are able to discover dependence and necessary connexion by intuitive or
+demonstrative thought, while in most cases we are dependent on experience,
+which gives us information concerning particular cases only, and affords no
+guarantee that things are the same beyond the sphere of our observation and
+experiment. Since empirical inquiry furnishes no certain and universal
+knowledge, and since the assumption that like bodies will in the same
+circumstances have like effects is only a conjecture from analogy, natural
+science in the strict sense does not exist. Both mathematics and ethics,
+however, belong in the sphere of the demonstrative knowledge of relations.
+The principles of ethics are as capable of exact demonstration as those of
+arithmetic and geometry, although their underlying ideas are more complex,
+more involved, hence more exposed to misunderstanding, and lacking in
+visible symbols; though these defects can, and should, in part be made good
+by careful and strictly consistent definitions. Such moral principles as
+"where there is no property there is no injustice," or "no government
+allows absolute liberty," are as certain as any proposition in Euclid.
+
+The advantage of the mathematical and moral sciences over the physical
+sciences consists in the fact that, in the former, the real and nominal
+essences of their objects coincide, while in the latter they do not; and,
+further, that the real essences of substances are beyond our knowledge. The
+true inner constitution of bodies, the root whence all their qualities, and
+the coexistence of these, necessarily proceed, is completely unknown to us;
+so that we are unable to deduce them from it. Mathematical and moral ideas,
+on the other hand, and their relations, are entirely accessible, for they
+are the products of our own voluntary operations. They are not copied from
+things, but are archetypal for reality and need no confirmation from
+experience. The connexion constituted by our understanding between the
+ideas crime and punishment _(e. g_., the proposition: crime deserves
+punishment) is valid, even though no crime had ever been committed, and
+none ever punished. Existence is not at all involved in universal
+propositions; "general knowledge lies only in our own thoughts, and
+consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract ideas" and their
+relations. The truths of mathematics and ethics are both universal and
+certain, while in natural science single observations and experiments are
+certain, but not general, and general propositions are only more or less
+probable. Both the particular experiments and the general conclusions are
+of great value under certain circumstances, but they do not meet the
+requirements of comprehensive and certain knowledge.
+
+The _extent_ of our knowledge is very limited--much less, in fact, than
+that of our ignorance. For our knowledge reaches no further than our ideas,
+and the possibility of perceiving their agreements. Many things exist of
+which we have no ideas--chiefly because of the fewness of our senses and
+their lack of acuteness--and just as many of which our ideas are only
+imperfect. Moreover, we are often able neither to command the ideas
+which we really possess, or at least might attain, nor to perceive their
+connexions. The ideas which are lacking, those which are undiscoverable,
+those which are not combined, are the causes of the narrow limits of human
+knowledge.
+
+There are two ways by which knowledge may be extended: by experience, on
+the one hand, and, on the other, by the elevation of our ideas to a state
+of clearness and distinctness, together with the discovery and systematic
+arrangement of those intermediate ideas which exhibit the relation of other
+ideas, in themselves not immediately comparable. The syllogism, as an
+artificial form, is of little value in the perception of the agreements
+between these intermediate and final terms, and of none whatever in the
+discovery of the former. Analytical and identical propositions which merely
+explicate the conception of the subject, but express nothing not already
+known, are, in spite of their indefeasible certitude, valueless for the
+extension of knowledge, and when taken for more than verbal explanations,
+mere absurdities. Even those most general propositions, those "principles"
+which are so much talked of in the schools, lack the utility which is so
+commonly ascribed to them. Maxims are, it is true, fit instruments for the
+communication of knowledge already acquired, and in learned disputations
+may perform indispensable service in silencing opponents, or in bringing
+the dispute to a conclusion; but they are of little or no use in the
+discovery of new truth. It is a mistake to believe that special cases (as
+5 = 2 + 3, or 5 = 1 + 4) are dependent on the truth of the abstract rule
+(the whole is equal to the sum of its parts), that they are confirmed by
+it and must be derived from it. The particular and concrete is not only
+as clear and certain as the general maxim, but better known than this,
+as well as earlier and more easily perceived. Nay, further, in cases
+where ideas are confused and the meanings of words doubtful, the use of
+axioms is dangerous, since they may easily lend the appearance of proved
+truth to assertions which are really contradictory.
+
+Between the clear daylight of certain knowledge and the dark night of
+absolute ignorance comes the twilight of probability. We find ourselves
+dependent on _opinion_ and presumption, or judgment based upon probability,
+when experience and demonstration leave us in the lurch and we are,
+nevertheless, challenged to a decision by vital needs which brook no delay.
+The judge and the historian must convince themselves from the reports of
+witnesses concerning events which they have not themselves observed; and
+everyone is compelled by the interests of life, of duty, and of eternal
+salvation to form conclusions concerning things which lie beyond the limits
+of his own perception and reflective thought, nay, which transcend all
+human experience and rigorous demonstration whatever. To delay decision and
+action until absolute certainty had been attained, would scarcely allow
+us to lift a single finger. In cases concerning events in the past, the
+future, or at a distance, we rely on the testimony of others (testing their
+reports by considering their credibility as witnesses and the conformity of
+the evidence to general experience in like cases); in regard to questions
+concerning that which is absolutely beyond experience, _e.g._, higher
+orders of spirits, or the ultimate causes of natural phenomena, analogy is
+the only help we have. If the witnesses conflict among themselves, or with
+the usual course of nature, the grounds _pro_ and _con_ must be carefully
+balanced; frequently, however, the degree of probability attained is so
+great that our assent is almost equivalent to complete certainty. No
+one doubts,--although it is impossible for him to "know,"--that Caesar
+conquered Pompey, that gold is ductile in Australia as elsewhere, that iron
+will sink to-morrow as well as to-day. Thus opinion supplements the lack of
+certain knowledge, and serves as a guide for belief and action, wherever
+the general lot of mankind or individual circumstances prevent absolute
+certitude.
+
+Although in this twilight region of opinion demonstrative proofs are
+replaced merely by an "occasion" for "taking" a given fact or idea "as true
+rather than false," yet assent is by no means an act of choice, as the
+Cartesians had erroneously maintained, for in knowledge it is determined by
+clearly discerned reasons, and in the sphere of opinion, by the balance of
+probability. The understanding is free only in combining ideas, not in its
+judgment concerning the agreement or the repugnancy of the ideas compared;
+it lies within its own power to decide whether it will judge at all, and
+what ideas it will compare, but it has no control over the result of the
+comparison; it is impossible for it to refuse its assent to a demonstrated
+truth or a preponderant probability.
+
+In this recognition of objective and universally valid relations existing
+among ideas, which the thinking subject, through comparisons voluntarily
+instituted, discovers valid or finds given, but which it can neither alter
+nor demur to, Locke abandons empirical ground (cf. p. 155) and approaches
+the idealists of the Platonizing type. His inquiry divides into two very
+dissimilar parts (a psychological description of the origin of ideas and a
+logical determination of the possibility and the extent of knowledge), the
+latter of which is, in Locke's opinion, compatible with the former, but
+which could never have been developed from it. The rationalistic edifice
+contradicts the sensationalistic foundation. Locke had hoped to show the
+value and the limits of knowledge by an inquiry into the origin of ideas,
+but his estimate of this value and these limits cannot be proved from the
+_a posteriori_ origin of ideas--it can only be maintained in despite of
+this, and stands in need of support from some (rationalistic) principle
+elsewhere obtained. Thinkers who trace back all simple ideas to outer and
+inner perception we expect to reject every attempt to extend knowledge
+beyond the sphere of experience, to declare the combinations of ideas
+which have their origin in sensation trustworthy, and those which are
+formed without regard to perception, illusory; or else, with Protagoras,
+to limit knowledge to the individual perceiving subject, with a consequent
+complete denial of its general validity. But exactly the opposite of all
+these is found in Locke. The remarkable spectacle is presented of a
+philosopher who admits no other sources of ideas than perception and the
+voluntary combination of perceptions, transcending the limits of experience
+with proofs of the divine existence, viewing with suspicion the ideas of
+substance formed at the instance of experience, and reducing natural
+science to the sphere of mere opinion; while, on the other hand, he
+ascribes reality and eternal validity to the combinations of ideas formed
+independently of perception, which are employed by mathematics and ethics,
+and completely abandons the individualistic position in his naïve faith in
+the impregnable validity of the relations of ideas, which is evident to all
+who turn their attention to them. The ground for the universal validity of
+the relations among ideas as well as of our knowledge of them, naturally
+lies not in their empirical origin (for my experience gives information to
+me alone, and that only concerning the particular case in question), but in
+the uniformity of man's rational constitution. If two men really have the
+same ideas--not merely think they have because they use similar
+language--it is impossible, according to Locke, that they should hold
+different opinions concerning the relation of their ideas. With this
+conviction, that the universal validity of knowledge is rooted in the
+uniformity of man's rational constitution, and the further one, that we
+attain certain knowledge only when things conform to our ideas, Locke
+closely approaches Kant; while his assumption of a fixed order of relations
+among ideas, which the individual understanding cannot refuse to recognize,
+and the typical character assigned to mathematics, associate him with
+Malebranche and Spinoza. In view of these points of contact with the
+rationalistic school and his manifold dependence on its founder, we may
+venture the paradox, that Locke may not only be termed a Baconian with
+Cartesian leanings, but (almost) a Cartesian influenced by Bacon. The
+possibility must not be forgotten, however, that rationalistic suggestions
+came to him also from Galileo, Hobbes, and Newton.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. the article by Benno Erdmann cited p. 156, note.]
+
+Intermediate between knowledge and opinion stands faith as a form of assent
+which is based on testimony rather than on deductions of the reason,
+but whose certitude is not inferior to that of knowledge, since it is a
+communication from God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. Faith
+and the certainty thereof depend on reason, in so far as reason alone can
+determine whether a divine revelation has really been made and the meaning
+of the words in which the revelation has come down to us. In determining
+the boundaries of faith and reason Locke makes use of the
+distinction--which has become famous--between things above reason,
+according to reason, and contrary to reason. Our conviction that God exists
+is according to reason; the belief that there are more gods than one, or
+that a body can be in two different places at the same time, contrary
+to reason; the former is a truth which can be demonstrated on rational
+grounds, the latter an assumption incompatible with our clear and distinct
+ideas. In the one case revelation confirms a proposition of which we
+were already certain; in the other an alleged revelation is incapable
+of depriving our certain knowledge of its force. Above reason are those
+principles whose probability and truth cannot be shown by the natural use
+of our faculties, as that the dead shall rise again and the account of the
+fall of part of the angels. Among the things which are not contrary to
+reason belong miracles, for they contradict opinion based on the usual
+course of nature, it is true, but not our certain knowledge; in spite of
+their supernatural character they deserve willing acceptance, and receive
+it, when they are well attested, whereas principles contrary to reason must
+be unconditionally rejected as a revelation from God. Locke's demand for
+the subjection of faith to rational criticism assures him an honorable
+place in the history of English deism. He enriched the philosophy of
+religion by two treatises of his own: _The Reasonableness of Christianity_,
+1695, and three _Letters on Tolerance_, 1689-1692. The former transfers the
+center of gravity of the Christian religion from history to the doctrine of
+redemption; the _Letters_ demand religious freedom, mutual tolerance among
+the different sects, and the separation of Church and State. Those sects
+alone are to receive no tolerance which themselves exercise none, and which
+endanger the well-being of society; together with atheists, who are
+incapable of taking oaths. In other respects it is the duty of the state to
+protect all confessions and to favor none.
+
+%(b) Practical Philosophy.%--Locke contributed to practical philosophy
+important suggestions concerning freedom, morality, politics, and
+education. Freedom is the "power to begin or forbear, continue or put an
+end to" actions (thoughts and motions). It is not destroyed by the fact
+that the will is always moved by desire, more exactly, by uneasiness under
+present circumstances, and that the decision is determined by the judgment
+of the understanding. Although the result of examination is itself
+dependent on the unalterable relations of ideas, it is still in our power
+to decide whether we will consider at all, and what ideas we will take into
+consideration. Not the thought, not the determination of the will, is free,
+but the person, the mind; this has the power to suspend the prosecution of
+desire, and by its judgment to determine the will, even in opposition
+to inclination. Four stages must, consequently, be distinguished in the
+volitional process: desire or uneasiness; the deliberative combination of
+ideas; the judgment of the understanding; determination. Freedom has its
+place at the beginning of the second stage: it is open to me to decide
+whether to proceed at all to consideration and final judgment concerning a
+proposed action; thus to prevent desire from directly issuing in movements;
+and, according to the result of my examination, perhaps, to substitute for
+the act originally desired an opposite one. Without freedom, moral judgment
+and responsibility would be impossible. The above appears to us to
+represent the essence of Locke's often vacillating discussion of freedom
+(II. 21). Desire is directed to pleasure; the will obeys the understanding,
+which is exalted above motives of pleasure and the passions. Everything is
+physically good which occasions and increases pleasure in us, which removes
+or diminishes pain, or contributes to the attainment of some other good and
+the avoidance of some other evil. Actions, on the contrary, are morally
+good when they conform to a rule by which they are judged. Whoever
+earnestly meditates on his welfare will prefer moral or rational good to
+sensuous good, since the former alone vouchsafes true happiness. God has
+most intimately united virtue and general happiness, since he has made the
+preservation of human society dependent on the exercise of virtue.
+
+The mark of a law for free beings is the fact that it apportions reward for
+obedience and punishment for disobedience. The laws to which an action must
+conform in order to deserve the predicate "good" are three in number
+(II. 28): by the divine law "men judge whether their actions are sins
+or duties"; by the civil law, "whether they be criminal or innocent"
+(deserving of punishment or not); by the law of opinion or reputation,
+"whether they be virtues or vices." The first of these laws threatens
+immorality with future misery; the second, with legal punishments; the
+third, with the disapproval of our fellow-men.
+
+The third law, the law of opinion or reputation, called also philosophical,
+coincides on the whole, though not throughout, with the first, the divine
+law of nature, which is best expressed in Christianity, and which is the
+true touchstone of the moral character of actions. While Locke, in his
+polemic against innate ideas, had emphasized the diversity of moral
+judgments among individuals and nations (as a result of which an action is
+condemned in one place and praised as virtuous in another), he here gives
+prominence to the fact of general agreement in essentials, since it is only
+natural that each should encourage by praise and esteem that which is to
+his advantage, while virtue evidently conduces to the good of all who
+come into contact with the virtuous. Amid the greatest diversity of moral
+judgments virtue and praise, vice and blame, go together, while in general
+that is praised which is really praiseworthy--even the vicious man approves
+the right and condemns that which is faulty, at least in others. Locke was
+the first to call attention to general approval as an external mark of
+moral action, a hint which the Scottish moralists subsequently exploited.
+The objection that he reduced morality to the level of the conventional is
+unjust, for the law of opinion and reputation did not mean for him the
+true principle of morality, but only that which controls the majority of
+mankind--If anyone is inclined to doubt that commendation and disgrace are
+sufficient motives to action, he does not understand mankind; there is
+hardly one in ten thousand insensible enough to endure in quiet the
+constant disapproval of society. Even if the lawbreaker hopes to escape
+punishment at the hands of the state, and puts out of mind the thought of
+future retribution, he can never escape the disapproval of his misdeeds
+on the part of his fellows. In entire harmony with these views is Locke's
+advice to educators, that they should early cultivate the love of esteem in
+their pupils.
+
+Of the four principles of morals which Locke employs side by side, and in
+alternation, without determining their exact relations--the reason, the
+will of God, the general good (and, deduced from this, the approval of
+our fellow-men), self-love--the latter two possess only an accessory
+significance, while the former two co-operate in such a way that the one
+determines the content of the good and the other confirms it and gives
+it binding authority. The Christian religion does the reason a threefold
+service--it gives her information concerning our duty, which she could have
+reached herself, indeed, without the help of revelation, but not with
+the same certitude and rapidity; it invests the good with the majesty of
+absolute obligation by proclaiming it as the command of God; it increases
+the motives to morality by its doctrines of immortality and future
+retribution. Although Locke thus intimately joins virtue with earthly joy
+and eternal happiness, and although he finds in the expectation of heaven
+or hell a welcome support for the will in its conflict with the passions,
+we must remember that he values this regard for the results and rewards of
+virtue only as a subsidiary motive, and does not esteem it as in itself
+ethical: eternal happiness forms, as it were, the "dowry" of virtue,
+which adds to its true value in the eyes of fools and the weak, though it
+constitutes neither its essence nor its basis. Virtue seems to the wise man
+beautiful and valuable enough even without this, and yet the commendations
+of philosophers gain for her but few wooers. The crowd is attracted to her
+only when it is made clear to it that virtue is the "best policy."
+
+In politics Locke is an opponent of both forms of absolutism, the despotic
+absolutism of Hobbes and the patriarchal absolutism of Filmer (died 1647;
+his _Patriarcha_ declared hereditary monarchy a divine institution), and
+a moderate exponent of the liberal tendencies of Milton (1608-74) and
+Algernon Sidney (died 1683; _Discourses concerning Government_). The two
+_Treatises on Civil Government_, 1690, develop, the first negatively, the
+second positively, the constitutional theory with direct reference to the
+political condition of England at the time. All men are born free and with
+like capacities and rights. Each is to preserve his own interests, without
+injuring those of others. The right to be treated by every man as a
+rational being holds even prior to the founding of the state; but then
+there is no authoritative power to decide conflicts. The state of nature is
+not in itself a state of war, but it would lead to this, if each man should
+himself attempt to exercise the right of self-protection against injury. In
+order to prevent acts of violence there is needed a civil community, based
+on a free contract, to which each individual member shall transfer his
+freedom and power. Submission to the authority of the state is a free act,
+and, by the contract made, natural rights are guarded, not destroyed;
+political freedom is obedience to self-imposed law, subordination to the
+common will expressing itself in the majority. The political power is
+neither tyrannical, for arbitrary rule is no better than the state of
+nature, nor paternal, for rulers and subjects are on an equality in the use
+of the reason, which is not the case with parents and children. The
+supreme power is the legislative, intrusted by the community to its chosen
+representatives--the laws should aim at the general good. Subordinate
+to the legislative power, and to be kept separate from it, come the two
+executing powers, which are best united in a single hand (the king), viz.,
+the executive power (administrative and judicial), which carries the laws
+into effect, and the federative power, which defends the community against
+external foes. The ruler is subject to the law. If the government, through
+violation of the law, has become unworthy of the power intrusted to it, and
+has forfeited it, sovereign authority reverts to the source whence it
+was derived, that is, to the people. The people decides whether its
+representatives and the monarch have deserved the confidence placed in
+them, and has the right to depose them, if they exceed their authority. As
+the sworn obedience (of the subjects) is to the law alone, the ruler who
+acts contrary to law has lost the right to govern, has put himself in a
+state of hostility to the people, and revolution becomes merely necessary
+defense against aggression.
+
+Montesquieu made these political ideas of Locke the common property of
+Europe.[1] Rousseau did a like service for Locke's pedagogical views, given
+in the modest but important _Thoughts concerning Education_, 1693. The
+aim of education should not be to instill anything into the pupil, but to
+develop everything from him; it should guide and not master him, should
+develop his capacities in a natural way, should rouse him to independence,
+not drill him into a scholar. In order to these ends thorough and
+affectionate consideration of his individuality is requisite, and private
+instruction is, therefore, to be preferred to public instruction. Since it
+is the business of education to make men useful members of society, it must
+not neglect their physical development. Learning through play and object
+teaching make the child's task a delight; modern languages are to be
+learned more by practice than by systematic study. The chief difference
+between Locke and Rousseau is that the former sets great value on arousing
+the sense of esteem, while the latter entirely rejects this as an
+educational instrument.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Theod. Pietsch, _Ueber das Verhältniss der politischen
+Theorien Lockes zu Montesquieus Lehre von der Teilung der Gewalten_ Berlin
+dissertation, Breslau, 1887.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.
+
+Besides the theory of knowledge, which forms the central doctrine in his
+system, Locke had discussed the remaining branches of philosophy, though in
+less detail, and, by his many-sided stimulation, had posited problems
+for the Illumination movement in England and in France. Now the several
+disciplines take different courses, but the after-influence of his powerful
+mind is felt on every hand. The development of deism from Toland on is
+under the direct influence of his "rational Christianity"; the ethics of
+Shaftesbury stands in polemic relation to his denial of everything innate;
+and while Berkeley and Hume are deducing the consequences of his theory of
+knowledge, Hartley derives the impulse to a new form of psychology from his
+chapter on the association of ideas.
+
+
+%1. Natural Philosophy and Psychology.%
+
+In Locke's famous countryman, Isaac Newton (1642-1727),[1] the modern
+investigation of nature attains the level toward which it had striven, at
+first by wishes and demands, gradually, also, in knowledge and achievement,
+since the end of the mediaeval period. Mankind was not able to discard at
+a stroke its accustomed Aristotelian view of nature, which animated things
+with inner, spirit-like forces. A full century intervened between Telesius
+and Newton, the concept of natural law requiring so long a time to break
+out of its shell. A tremendous revolution in opinion had to be effected
+before Newton could calmly promulgate his great principle, "Abandon
+substantial forms and occult qualities and reduce natural phenomena to
+mathematical laws," before he could crown the discoveries of Galileo and
+Kepler with his own. For this successful union of Bacon's experimental
+induction with the mathematical deduction of Descartes, this combination of
+the analytic and the synthetic methods, which was shown in the demand
+for, and the establishment of, mathematically formulated natural laws,
+presupposes that nature is deprived of all inner life [2] and all
+qualitative distinctions, that all that exists is compounded of uniformly
+acting parts, and that all that takes place is conceived as motion. With
+this Hobbes's programme of a mechanical science of nature is fulfilled. The
+heavens and the earth are made subject to the same law of gravitation. How
+far Newton himself adhered to the narrow meaning of mechanism (motion from
+pressure and impulse), is evident from the fact that, though he is often
+honored as the creator of the dynamical view of nature, he rejected _actio
+in distans_ as absurd, and deemed it indispensable to assume some "cause"
+of gravity (consisting, probably, in the impact of imponderable material
+particles). It was his disciples who first ventured to proclaim gravity as
+the universal force of matter, as the "primary quality of all bodies" (so
+Roger Cotes in the preface to the second edition of the _Principia_, 1713).
+
+[Footnote 1: 1669-95 professor of mathematics in Cambridge, later resident
+in London; 1672, member, and, 1703, president of the Royal Society. Chief
+work, _Philosophic Naturalis Principia Mathematica_, 1687. _Works_, 1779
+_seq_. On Newton cf. K. Snell, 1843; Durdik, _Leibniz und Newton_, 1869;
+Lange, _History of Materialism_, vol. i. p. 306 _seq_.]
+
+[Footnote 2: That the mathematical view of nature, since it leaves room for
+quantitative distinctions alone, is equivalent to an examination of nature
+had been clearly recognized by Poiret. As he significantly remarked: The
+principles of the Cartesian physics relate merely to the "cadaver" of
+nature _(Erud_., p. 260).]
+
+Newton resembles Boyle in uniting profound piety with the rigor of
+scientific thought. He finds the most certain proof for the existence of
+an intelligent creator in the wonderful arrangement of the world-machine,
+which does not need after-adjustment at the hands of its creator, and whose
+adaptation he praises as enthusiastically as he unconditionally rejects
+the mingling of teleological considerations in the explanation of physical
+phenomena. By this "physico-theological" argument he furnishes a welcome
+support to deism. While the finite mind perceives in the sensorium of the
+brain the images of objects which come to it from the senses, God has all
+things in himself, is immediately present in all, and cognizes them without
+sense-organs, the expanse of the universe forming his sensorium.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The transfer of mechanical views to psychical phenomena was also
+accompanied by the conviction that no danger to faith in God would
+result therefrom, but rather that it would aid in its support. The chief
+representatives of this movement, which followed the example of Gay,
+were the physician, David Hartley[1] (1704-57), and his pupil, Joseph
+Priestley,[2] a dissenting minister and natural scientist (born 1733, died
+in Philadelphia 1804; the discoverer of oxygen gas, 1774).
+
+The fundamental position of these psychologists is expressed in two
+principles: (1) all cognitive and motive life is based on the mechanism of
+psychical elements, the highest and most complex inner phenomena (thoughts,
+feelings, volitions) are produced by the combination of simple ideas,
+that is, they arise through the "association of ideas "; (2) all inner
+phenomena, the complex as well as the simple, are accompanied by, or rather
+depend on, more or less complicated physical phenomena, viz., nervous
+processes and brain vibrations. Although Hartley and Priestley are agreed
+in their demand for an associational and physiological treatment of
+psychology, and in the attempt to give one, they differ in this, that
+Hartley cautiously speaks only of a parallelism, a correspondence between
+mental and cerebral processes, and rejects the materialistic interpretation
+of inner phenomena, pointing out that the heterogeneity of motion and ideas
+forbids the reduction of the latter to the former, and that psychological
+analysis never reaches corporeal but only psychical elements. Moreover, it
+is only with reluctance that, conscious of the critical character of the
+conclusion, he admits the dependence of brain vibrations on the mechanical
+laws of the material world and the thoroughgoing determinateness of the
+human will, consoling himself with the belief that moral responsibility
+nevertheless remains intact. Priestley, on the contrary, boldly avows the
+materialistic and deterministic consequences of his position, holds that
+psychical phenomena are not merely accompanied by material motions but
+consist in them (thought is a function of the brain), and makes psychology,
+as the physics of the nerves, a part of physiology. The denial of
+immortality and the divine origin of the world is, however, by no means
+to follow from materialism. Priestley not only combated the atheism of
+Holbach, but also entered the deistic ranks with works of his own on
+Natural Religion and the Corruptions of Christianity.
+
+[Footnote 1: Hartley, _Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duties, his
+Expectations_. 1749.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Priestley, _Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind on the
+Principles of the Association of Ideas_, 1775; _Disquisitions relating to
+Matter and Spirit_, 1777; _The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity_, 1777;
+_Free Discussions of the Doctrines of Materialism_, 1778 (against Richard
+Price's _Letters on Materialism and Philosophical Necessity_). Cf. on
+both Schoenlank's dissertation, _Hartley und Priestley, die Begründer des
+Assoziationismus in England_, 1882.]
+
+As early as in Hartley[1] the principle, which is so important for ethics,
+appears that things and actions (_e.g._, promotion of the good of others)
+which at first are sought and done because they are means to our own
+enjoyment, in time come to have a direct worth of their own, apart from the
+original egoistic end. James Mill (1829) has repeated this thought in later
+times. As fame becomes an immediate object of desire to the ambitious man,
+and gold to the miser, so, through association, the impulse toward that
+which will secure approval may be transformed into the endeavor after that
+which deserves approval.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Jodl, _Geschichte der Ethik_, vol. i. p. 197 _seq_.]
+
+Among later representatives of the Associational school we may mention
+Erasmus Darwin _(Zoönomia, or the Laws of Organic Life_, 1794-96).
+
+
+
+%2. Deism%.
+
+As Bacon and Descartes had freed natural science, Hobbes, the state, and
+Grotius, law from the authority of the Church and had placed them on an
+independent basis, _i.e._, the basis of nature and reason, so deism[1]
+seeks to free religion from Church dogma and blind historical faith, and to
+deduce it from natural knowledge. In so far as deism finds both the source
+and the test of true religion in reason, it is rationalism; in so far as it
+appeals from the supernatural light of revelation and inspiration to the
+natural light of reason, it is naturalism; in so far as revelation and its
+records are not only not allowed to restrict rational criticism, but are
+made the chief object of criticism, its adherents are freethinkers.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Lechler's _Geschichte des Englischen Deismus_, 1841, which
+is rigorously drawn from the sources. [Hunt, _History of Religious Thought
+in England_, 1871-73 [1884]; Leslie Stephen, _History of English Thought in
+the Eighteenth Century_, 1876 [1880]; Cairns, _Unbelief in the Eighteenth
+Century_, 1881.]]
+
+The general principles of deism may be compressed into a few theses. There
+is a natural religion, whose essential content is morality; this comprises
+not much more than the two maxims, Believe in God and Do your duty.
+
+Positive religions are to be judged by this standard. The elements in them
+which are added to natural religion, or conflict with it, are superfluous
+and harmful additions, arbitrary decrees of men, the work of cunning rulers
+and deceitful priests. Christianity, which in its original form was the
+perfect expression of the true religion of reason, has experienced great
+corruptions in its ecclesiastical development, from which it must now be
+purified.
+
+These principles are supported by the following arguments: Truth is one
+and there is but one true religion. If the happiness of men depends on the
+fulfilment of her commands, these must be comprehensible to every man and
+must have been communicated to him; and since a special revelation and
+legislation could not come to the knowledge of all, they can be no other
+than the laws of duty inscribed on the human heart. In order to salvation,
+then, we need only to know God as creator and judge, and to fulfill his
+commands, _i.e._. to live a moral life. The one true religion has been
+communicated to man in two forms, through the inner natural revelation of
+reason, and the outer historical revelation of the Gospel. Since both have
+come from God they cannot be contradictory. Accordingly natural religion
+and the true one among the positive religions do not differ in their
+content, but only in the manner of their promulgation. Reason tries
+historical religion by the standard furnished by natural religion, and
+distinguishes actual from asserted revelation by the harmony of its
+contents with reason: the deist believes in the Bible because of the
+reasonableness of its teachings; he does not hold these teachings true
+because they are found in the Bible. If a positive religion contains
+less than natural religion it is incomplete; if it contains more it is
+tyrannical, since it imposes unnecessary requirements. The authority of
+reason to exercise the office of a judge in regard to the credibility of
+revelation is beyond doubt; indeed, apart from it there is no means of
+attaining truth, and the acceptance of an external revelation as genuine,
+and not merely as alleged to be such, is possible only for those who have
+already been convinced of God's existence by the inner light of reason.
+
+To these logical considerations is added an historical position, which,
+though only cursorily indicated at the beginning, is evidenced in
+increasing detail as the deistic movement continues on its course. Natural
+religion is always and everywhere the same, is universal and necessary, is
+perfect, eternal, and original. As original, it is the earliest religion,
+and as old as the world; as perfect, it is not capable of improvement, but
+only of corruption and restoration. Twice it has existed in perfect purity,
+as the religion of the first men and as the religion of Christ. Twice
+it has been corrupted, in the pre-Christian period by idolatry, which
+proceeded from the Egyptian worship of the dead, in the period after Christ
+by the love of miracle and blind reverence for authority. In both cases the
+corruption has come from power-loving priests, who have sought to frighten
+and control the people by incomprehensible dogmas and ostentations,
+mysterious ceremonies, and found their advantage in the superstition of the
+multitude,--each new divinity, each new mystery meaning a gain for them. As
+they had corrupted the primitive religion into polytheism, so Christianity
+was corrupted by conforming it to the prejudices of those to be converted,
+in whose eyes the simplicity of the new doctrine would have been no
+recommendation for it. The Jew sought in it an echo of the Law, the heathen
+longed for his festivals and his occult philosophy; so it was burdened
+with unprofitable ceremonial observances and needless profundity, it was
+Judaized and heathenized. It was inevitable that the doctrines of original
+sin, of satisfaction and atonement should prove especially objectionable to
+the purely rational temper of the deists. Neither the guilt of others (the
+sin of our ancestors) nor the atonement of others (Christ's death on the
+cross) can be imputed to us; Christ can be called the Savior only by way of
+metaphor, only in so far as the example of his death leads us on to faith
+and obedience for ourselves. The name atheism, which, it is true, orthodoxy
+held ready for every belief incorrect according to its standard, was on the
+contrary undeserved. The deists did not attack Christian revelation, still
+less belief in God. They considered the atheist bereft of reason, and they
+by no means esteemed historical revelation superfluous. The end of the
+latter was to stir the mind to move men to reflection and conversion, to
+transform morals, and if anyone declared it unnecessary because it contains
+nothing but natural truths, he was referred to the works of Euclid, which
+certainly contain nothing which is not founded in the reason, but which no
+one but a fool will consider unnecessary in the study of mathematics.
+
+That which we have here summarized as the general position of deism, gained
+gradual expression through the regular development and specialization of
+deistic ideas in individual representatives of the movement. The chief
+points and epochs were marked by Toland's _Christianity not Mysterious_,
+1696; Collins's _Discourse of Freethinking_, 1713; Tindal's _Christianity
+as Old as the Creation_, 1730; and Chubb's _True Gospel of Jesus Christ_,
+1738. The first of these demands a critique of revelation, the second
+defends the right of free investigation, the third declares the religion
+of Christ, which is merely a revived natural religion, to be the oldest
+religion, the fourth reduces it entirely to moral life.
+
+The deistic movement was called into life by Lord Herbert of Cherbury (pp.
+79-80) and continued by Locke, in so far as the latter had intrusted to
+reason the discrimination of true from false revelation, and had admitted
+in Christianity elements above reason, though not things contrary to
+reason. Following Locke, John Toland (1670-1722) goes a step further with
+the proof that the Gospel not only contains nothing contrary to reason, but
+also nothing above reason, and that no Christian doctrine is to be called
+mysterious. To the demand that we should worship what we do not comprehend,
+he answers that reason is the only basis of certitude, and alone decides on
+the divinity of the Scriptures, by a consideration of their contents. The
+motive which impels us to assent to a truth must lie in reason, not in
+revelation, which, like all authority and experience, is merely the way by
+which we attain the knowledge of the truth; it is a means of instruction,
+not a ground of conviction. All faith has knowledge and understanding for
+its conditions, and is rational conviction. Before we can put our trust in
+the Scriptures, we must be convinced that they were in fact written by the
+authors to whom they are ascribed, and must consider whether these men,
+their deeds, and their works, were worthy of God. The fact that God's
+inmost being is for us inscrutable does not make him a mystery, for even
+the common things of nature are known to us only by their properties.
+Miracles are also in themselves nothing incomprehensible; they are
+simply enhancements of natural laws beyond their ordinary operations, by
+supernatural assistance, which God vouchsafes but rarely and only for
+extraordinary ends. Toland explains the mysteries smuggled into the ethical
+religion of Christianity as due to the toleration of Jewish and heathen
+customs, to the entrance of learned speculation, and to the selfish
+inventions of the clergy and the rulers. The Reformation itself had not
+entirely restored the original purity and simplicity.
+
+Thus far Toland the deist. In his later writings, the five _Letters to
+Serena_, 1704, addressed to the Prussian queen, Sophia Charlotte, and
+the _Pantheisticon_ (Cosmopoli, 1720), he advances toward a hylozoistic
+pantheism.
+
+The first of the Letters discusses the prejudices of mankind; the second,
+the heathen doctrine of immortality; the third, the origin of idolatry;
+while the fourth and fifth are devoted to Spinoza, the chief defect in
+whose philosophy is declared to be the absence of an explanation of motion.
+Motion belongs to the notion of matter as necessarily as extension and
+impenetrability. Matter is always in motion; rest is only the reciprocal
+interference of two moving forces. The differences of things depend on the
+various movements of the particles of matter, so that it is motion which
+individualizes matter in general into particular things. As the Letters
+ascribe the purposive construction of organic beings to a divine reason, so
+the _Pantheisticon_ also stops short before it reaches the extreme of naked
+materialism. Everything is from the whole; the whole is infinite, one,
+eternal, all-rational. God is the force of the whole, the soul of
+the world, the law of nature. The treatise includes a liturgy of the
+pantheistic society with many quotations from the ancient poets.
+
+Anthony Collins (1676-1729), in his _Discourse of Free-thinking_, shows
+the right of free thought _(i. e_., of judgment on rational grounds) in
+general, from the principle that no truth is forbidden to us, and that
+there is no other way by which we can attain truth and free ourselves from
+superstition, and the right to apply it to God and the Bible in particular,
+from the fact that the clergy differ concerning the most important matters.
+The fear that the differences of opinion which spring from freethinking may
+endanger the peace of society lacks foundation; on the contrary, it is
+only restriction of the freedom of thought which leads to disorders, by
+weakening moral zeal. The clergy are the only ones who condemn liberty of
+thought. It is sacrilege to hold that error can be beneficial and truth
+harmful. As a proof that freethinking by no means corrupts character,
+Collins gives in conclusion a list of noble freethinkers from Socrates down
+to Locke and Tillotson. Among the replies to the views of Collins we may
+mention the calmly objective Boyle Lectures by Ibbot, and the sharp and
+witty letter of Richard Bentley, the philologist. Neither of these attacks
+Collins's leading principle, both fully admitting the right to employ the
+reason, even in religious questions; but they dispute the implication that
+freethinking is equivalent to contentious opposition. On the one hand, they
+maintain that Collins's thinking is too free, that is, unbridled, hasty,
+presumptuous, and paradoxical; on the other, that it is not free enough
+(from prejudice).
+
+After Shaftesbury had based morality on a natural instinct for the
+beautiful and had made it independent of religion, as well as served the
+cause of free thought by a keenly ironical campaign against enthusiasm and
+orthodoxy, and Clarke had furnished the representatives of natural religion
+a useful principle of morals in the objective rationality of things, the
+debate concerning prophecy and miracles[1] threatened to dissipate the
+deistic movement into scattered theological skirmishes. At this juncture
+Matthew Tindal (1657-1733) led it back to the main question. His
+_Christianity as Old as the Creation_ is the doomsday book of deism.
+It contains all that has been given above as the core of this view of
+religion. Christ came not to bring in a new doctrine, but to exhort to
+repentance and atonement, and to restore the law of nature, which is as old
+as the creation, as universal as reason, and as unchangeable as God,
+human nature, and the relations of things, which we should respect in our
+actions. Religion is morality; more exactly, it is the free, constant
+disposition to do as much good as possible, and thereby to promote the
+glory of God and our own welfare. For the harmony of our conduct with
+the rules of reason constitutes our perfection, and on this depends our
+happiness. Since God is infinitely blessed and self-sufficient his purpose
+in the moral law is man's happiness alone. Whatever a positive religion
+contains beyond the moral law is superstition, which puts emphasis on
+worthless trivialities. The true religion occupies the happy mean between
+miserable unfaith, on the one hand, and timorous superstition, wild
+fanaticism, and pietistical zeal on the other. In proclaiming the
+sovereignty of reason in the sphere of religion as well as elsewhere, we
+are only openly demanding what our opponents have tacitly acknowledged in
+practice _(e. g_.> in allegorical interpretation) from time immemorial. God
+has endowed us with reason in order that we should by it distinguish truth
+from falsehood.
+
+[Footnote 1: The chief combatant in the conflict over the argument from
+prophecy, which was called forth by Whiston's corruption hypothesis,
+was Collins _(A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian
+Religion_, 1724). Christianity is based on Judaism; its fundamental article
+is that Jesus is the prophesied Messiah of the Jews, its chief proof the
+argument from Old Testament prophecy, which, it is true, depends on the
+typical or allegorical interpretation of the passages in question. Whoever
+rejects this cuts away the ground from under the Christian revelation,
+which is only the allegorical import of the revelation of the Jews.--The
+second proof of revelation, the argument from miracles, was shaken by
+Thomas Woolston _(Six Discourses on the Miracles of our Saviour_, 1727-30),
+by his extension of the allegorical interpretation to these also. He
+supported himself in this by the authority of the Church Fathers, and,
+above all, by the argument that the accounts of the miracles, if taken
+literally, contradict all sense and understanding. The unavoidable doubts
+which arise concerning the literal interpretation of the resurrection of
+the dead, the healing of the sick, the driving out of devils, and the other
+miracles, prove that these were intended only as symbolic representations
+of the mysterious and wonderful effects which Jesus was to accomplish. Thus
+Jairus's daughter means the Jewish Church, which is to be revived at the
+second coming of Christ; Lazarus typifies humanity, which will be raised
+again at the last day; the account of the bodily resurrection of Jesus is
+a symbol of his spiritual resurrection from his grave in the letter of
+Scripture. Sherlock, whose _Trial of the Witnesses of the Resurrection of
+Jesus_ was long considered a cogent answer to the attacks of Woolston,
+was opposed by Peter Annet, who, without leaving the refuge of figurative
+interpretation open, proceeded still more regardlessly in the discovery of
+contradictory and incredible elements in the Gospel reports, and declared
+all the scriptural writers together to be liars and falsifiers. If a man
+believes in miracles as supernatural interferences with the regular course
+of nature (and they must be so taken if they are to certify to the divine
+origin of the Scriptures), he makes God mutable, and natural laws imperfect
+arrangements which stand in need of correction. The truth of religion is
+independent of all history.]
+
+Thomas Chubb (1679-1747), a man of the people (he was a glove maker and
+tallow-chandler), and from 1715 on a participant in deistic literature and
+concerned to adapt the new ideas to the men of his class, preached in _The
+True Gospel of Jesus Christ_ an honorable working-man's Christianity.,
+Faith means obedience to the law of reason inculcated by Christ, not the
+acceptance of the facts reported about him. The gospel of Christ was
+preached to the poor before his death and his asserted resurrection and
+ascension. It is probable that Christ really lived, because of the great
+effect of his message; but he was a man like other men. His gospel is his
+teaching, not his history, his own teaching, not that of his followers--the
+reflections of the apostles are private opinions. Christ's teaching
+amounts, in effect, to these three fundamental principles: (1) Conform
+to the rational law of love to God and one's neighbor; this is the only
+ground of divine acceptance. (2) After transgression of the law, repentance
+and reformation are the only grounds of divine grace and forgiveness. (3)
+At the last day every one will be rewarded according to his works. By
+proclaiming these doctrines, by carrying them out in his own pure life
+and typical death, and by founding religio-ethical associations on the
+principle of brotherly equality, Christ selected the means best fitted for
+the attainment of his purpose, the salvation of human souls. His aim was
+to assure men of future happiness (and of the earthly happiness connected
+therewith), and to make them worthy of it; and this happiness can only be
+attained when from free conviction we submit ourselves to the natural moral
+law, which is grounded on the moral fitness of things. Everything which
+leads to the illusion that the favor of God is attainable by any other
+means than by righteousness and repentance, is pernicious; as, also, the
+confusion of Christian societies with legal and civil societies, which
+pursue entirely different aims.
+
+Thomas Morgan _(The Moral Philosopher, a Dialogue between the Christian
+Deist, Philalethes, and the Christian Jew, Theophanes, 1737 seq_.) stands
+on the same ground as his predecessors, by holding that the moral truth of
+things is the criterion of the divinity of a doctrine, that the Christian
+religion is merely a restoration of natural religion, and that the apostles
+were not infallible. Peculiar to him are the application of the first of
+these principles to the Mosaic law, with the conclusion that this was not a
+revelation; the complete separation of the New Testament from the Old (the
+Church of Christ and the expected kingdom of the Jewish Messiah are as
+opposed to each other as heaven and earth); and the endeavor to give a
+more exact explanation of the origin of superstition, the pre-Christian
+manifestations of which he traces back to the fall of the angels, and those
+since Christ to the intermixture of Jewish elements. He seeks to solve his
+problem by a detailed critique of Israelitish history, which is lacking in
+sympathy but not in spirit, and in which, introducing modern relations
+into the earliest times, he explains the Old Testament miracles in part as
+myths, in part as natural phenomena, and deprives the heroes of the Jews of
+their moral renown. The Jewish historians are ranked among the poets; the
+God of Israel is reduced to a subordinate, local tutelary divinity; the
+moral law of Moses is characterized as a civil code limited to external
+conduct, to national and mundane affairs, with merely temporal sanctions,
+and the ceremonial law as an act of worldly statecraft; David is declared
+a gifted poet, musician, hypocrite, and coward; the prophets are made
+professors of theology and moral philosophy; and Paul is praised as the
+greatest freethinker of his time, who defended reason against authority
+and rejected the Jewish ritual law as indifferent. Whatever is spurious in
+Christianity is a remnant of Judaism, all its mysteries are misunderstood
+and falsely (_i.e._ literally) applied allegories. Out of regard for Jewish
+prejudices Christ's death was figuratively described as sacrificial, as in
+earlier times Moses had been forced to yield to the Egyptian superstitions
+of his people. Morgan looks for the final victory of the rational morality
+of the pure, Pauline, or deistic Christianity over the Jewish Christianity
+of orthodoxy. Among the works of his opponents the following deserve
+mention: William Warburton's _Divine Legation of Moses, and_ Samuel
+Chandler's _Vindication of the History of the Old Testament_.
+
+It maybe doubted whether Bolingbroke (died 1751; cf. p. 203) is to be
+classed among the deists or among their opponents. On the one hand, he
+finds in monotheism the original true religion, which has degenerated
+into superstition through priestly cunning and fantastical philosophy; in
+primitive Christianity, the system of natural religion, which has been
+transformed into a complicated and contentious science by its weak,
+foolish, or deceitful adherents; in theology, the corruption of religion;
+in Bacon, Descartes, and Locke, types of untrammeled investigation. On
+the other hand, he seeks to protect revelation from the reason whose
+cultivation he has just commended, and to keep faith and knowledge
+distinct, while he demands that the Bible, with all the undemonstrable
+and absurd elements which it contains, be accepted on its own authority.
+Religion is an instrument indispensable to the government for keeping the
+people in subjection. Only the fear of a higher power, not the reason,
+holds the masses in check; and the freethinkers do wrong in taking a bit
+out of the mouth of the sensual multitude, when it were better to add to
+those already there.
+
+As Hume, the skeptic, leads empiricism to its fall, so Hume, the
+philosopher of religion (see below), leads deism toward dissolution. Among
+those who defended revealed Christianity against the deistical attacks we
+may mention the names of Conybeare (1732) and Joseph Butler (1736). The
+former argues from the imperfection and mutability of our reason to like
+characteristics in natural religion. Butler (cf. p. 206) does not admit
+that natural and revealed religion are mutually exclusive. Christian
+revelation lends a higher authority to natural religion, in which she finds
+her foundation, and adapts it to the given relations and needs of mankind,
+adding, however, to the rational law of virtue new duties toward God the
+Son and God the Holy Ghost. It is evident that in order to be able to deal
+with their opponents, the apologetes are forced to accommodate themselves
+to the deistic principle of a rational criticism of revelation.
+
+Notwithstanding the fear which this principle inspired in the men of the
+time, it soon penetrated the thought even of its opponents, and found
+its way into the popular mind through the channels of the Illumination.
+
+Although it was often defended and applied with violence and with a
+superfluous hatred of the clergy, it forms the justifiable element in the
+endeavors of the deists. It is a commonplace to-day that everything which
+claims to be true and valid must justify itself before the criticism of
+reason; but then this principle, together with the distinction between
+natural and positive religion based upon it, exerted an enlightening and
+liberating influence. The real flaw in the deistical theory, which was
+scarcely felt as such, even by its opponents, was its lack of religious
+feeling and all historical sense, a lack which rendered the idea acceptable
+that religions could be "made," and priestly falsehoods become world-moving
+forces. Hume was the first to seek to rise above this unspeakable
+shallowness. There was a remarkable conflict between the ascription to
+man, on the one hand, of an assured treasure of religious knowledge in
+the reason, and the abandonment of him, on the other, to the juggling of
+cunning priests and despots. Thus the deists had no sense either for the
+peculiarities of an inward religious feeling, which, in happy prescience,
+rises above the earthly circle of moral duties to the world beyond, or for
+the involuntary, historically necessary origin and growth of the particular
+forms of religion. Here, again, we find that turning away from will and
+feeling to thought, from history to nature, from the oppressive complexity
+of that which has been developed to the simplicity of that which is
+original, which we have noted as one of the most prominent characteristics
+of the modern period.
+
+
+%3. Moral Philosophy.%
+
+The watchword of deism was "independence in religion"; that of modern
+ethical philosophy is "independence in morals." Hobbes had given this out
+in opposition to the mediaeval dependence of ethics on theology; now it was
+turned against himself, for he had delivered morality from ecclesiastical
+bondage only to subject it to the no less oppressive and unworthy yoke of
+the civil power. Selfish consideration, so he had taught, leads men to
+transfer by contract all power to the ruler. Right is that which the
+sovereign enjoins, wrong that which he forbids. Thus morality was conceived
+in a purely negative way as justice, and based on interest and agreement.
+Cumberland, recognizing the one-sidedness of the first of these positions,
+announces the principle of universal benevolence, at which Bacon had hinted
+before him, and in which he is followed by the school of Shaftesbury.
+Opposition to the foundation of ethics on self-love and convention, again,
+springs up in three forms, one idealistic, one logical, and one aesthetic.
+Ethical ideas have not arisen artificially through shrewd calculation and
+agreement, but have a natural origin. Cudworth, returning to Plato and
+Descartes, assumes an innate idea of the good. Clarke and Woolston base
+moral distinctions on the rational order of things, and characterize
+the ethically good action as a logical truth translated into practice.
+Shaftesbury derives ethical ideas and actions from a natural instinct for
+judging the good and the beautiful. Moreover, Hobbes's ethics of interest
+experiences, first, correction at the hands of Locke (who, along with a
+complete recognition of the "legal" character of the good, distinguishes
+the sphere of morality from that of mere law, and brings it under the
+law of "reputation," hence of a "tacit" agreement), and then a frivolous
+intensification under Mandeville and Bolingbroke. A preliminary conclusion
+is reached in the ethical labors of Hume and Smith.
+
+Richard Cumberland _(De Legibus Naturae_, 1672) turns to experience with
+the questions, In what does morality consist? Whence does it arise? and
+What is the nature of moral obligation? and finds these answers: Those
+actions are good, or in conformity to the moral law of nature, which
+promote the common good _(commune bonum summa lex)_. Individual welfare
+must be subordinated to the good of all, of which it forms only a part. The
+psychological roots of virtuous action are the social and disinterested
+affections, which nature has implanted in all beings, especially in those
+endowed with reason. There is nothing in man more pleasing to God than
+love. We recognize our obligation to the virtue of benevolence, or that God
+commands it, from the rewards and punishments which we perceive to follow
+the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the law,--the subordination of
+individual to universal good is the only means of attaining true happiness
+and contentment. Men are dependent on mutual benevolence. He who labors
+for the good of the whole system of rational beings furthers thereby the
+welfare of the individual parts, among whom he himself is one; individual
+happiness cannot be separated from general happiness. All duties are
+implied in the supreme one: Give to others, and preserve thyself. This
+principle of benevolence, advanced by Cumberland with homely simplicity,
+received in the later development of English ethics, for which it pointed
+out the way, a more careful foundation.
+
+The series of emancipations of morality begins with the Intellectual System
+of Ralph Cud worth _(The Intellectual System of the Universe_, 1678; _A
+Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality_, 1731). Ethical ideas
+come neither from experience nor from civil legislation nor from the will
+of God, but are necessary ideas in the divine and the human reason. Because
+of their simplicity, universality, and immutability, it is impossible for
+them to arise from experience, which never yields anything but that which
+is particular and mutable. It is just as impossible that they should spring
+from political constitutions, which have a temporal origin, which are
+transitory, and which differ from one another. For if obedience to positive
+law is right and disobedience wrong, then moral distinctions must have
+existed before the law; if, on the other hand, obedience to the civil law
+is morally indifferent, then more than ever is it impossible that this
+should be the basis of the moral distinctions in question. A law can bind
+us only in virtue of that which is necessarily, absolutely, or _per se_
+right; therefore the good is independent, also, of the will of God. The
+absolutely good is an eternal truth which God does not create by an act of
+his will, but which he finds present in his reason, and which, like the
+other ideas, he impresses on created spirits. On the _a priori_ ideas
+depends the possibility of science, for knowledge is the perception of
+necessary truth.
+
+In agreement with Cudworth that the moral law is dependent neither on human
+compact nor on the divine will, Samuel Clarke (died 1729) finds the eternal
+principles of justice, goodness, and truth, which God observes in his
+government of the universe, and which should also be the guide of human
+action, embodied in the nature of things or in their properties, powers,
+and relations, in virtue of which certain things, relations, and modes
+of action are suited to one another, and others not. Morality is the
+subjective conformity of conduct to this objective fitness of things; the
+good is the fitting. Moral rules, to which we are bound by conscience and
+by rational insight, are valid independently of the command of God and of
+all hope or fear in reference to the life to come, although the principles
+of religion furnish them an effective support, and one which is almost
+indispensable in view of the weakness of human nature. They are not
+universally observed, indeed, but universally acknowledged; even the
+vicious man cannot refrain from praising virtue in others. He who is
+induced by the voice of passion to act contrary to the eternal relations
+or harmony of things, contradicts his own reason in thus undertaking to
+disturb the order of the universe; he commits the absurdity of willing that
+things should be that which they are not. Injustice is in practice that
+which falsity and contradiction are in theoretical affairs. In his
+well-known controversy with Leibnitz, Clarke defends the freedom of the
+will against the determinism of the German philosopher.
+
+In William Wollaston (died 1724), with whom the logical point of view
+becomes still more apparent, Clarke found a thinker who shared his
+convictions that the subjective moral principle of interest was
+insufficient, and, hence, an objective principle to be sought; that
+morality consists in the suitableness of the action to the nature and
+destination of the object, and that, in the last analysis, it is coincident
+with truth. The highest destination of man is, on the one hand, to know the
+truth, and, on the other, to express it in actions. That act is good whose
+execution includes the affirmation (and its omission the negation) of a
+truth. According to the law of nature, a rational being ought so to conduct
+himself that he shall never contradict a truth by his actions, _i. e_., to
+treat each thing for what it is. Every immoral action is a false judgment;
+the violation of a contract is a practical denial of it. The man who is
+cruel to animals declares by his act that the creature maltreated is
+something which in fact it is not, a being devoid of feeling. The murderer
+acts as though he were able to restore life to his victim. He who, in
+disobedience toward God, deals with things in a way contrary to their
+nature, behaves as though he were mightier than the author of nature. To
+this equation of truth and morality happiness is added as a third identical
+member. The truer the pleasures of a being the happier it is; and a
+pleasure is untrue whenever more (of pain) is given for it than it is
+worth. A rational being contradicts itself when it pursues an irrational
+pleasure.--The course of moral philosophy has passed over the logical
+ethics of Clarke and Wollaston as an abstract and unfruitful idiosyncrasy,
+and it is certain that with both of these thinkers their plans were greater
+than their performances. But the search for an ethical norm which should
+be universally valid and superior to the individual will, did not lack
+justification in contrast to the subjectivism of the other two schools of
+the time--the school of interest and the school of benevolence, which made
+virtue a matter of calculation or of feeling.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The English ethics of the period culminates in Shaftesbury (1671-1713),
+who, reared on the principles of his grandfather's friend Locke, formed
+his artistic sense on the models of classical antiquity, to recall to the
+memory of his age the Greek ideal of a beautiful humanity. Philosophy,
+as the knowledge of ourselves and that which is truly good, a guide to
+morality and happiness; the world and virtue, a harmony; the good, the
+beautiful as well; the whole, a controlling force in the particular--these
+views, and his tasteful style of exposition, make Shaftesbury a modern
+Greek; it is only his bitterness against Christianity which betrays the
+son of the new era. Among the studies collected under the title
+_Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times_, 1711, the most
+important are those on Enthusiasm, on Wit and Humor, on Virtue and Merit,
+and the Moralists.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Georg v. Gizycki has written on Shaftesbury's philosophy,
+1876. [Cf. Fowler's _Shaftesbury and Hutchison_, English Philosophers
+Series, 1882.--TR.]]
+
+Shaftesbury's fundamental metaphysical concept is aesthetic: unity in
+variety is for him the all-pervasive law of the world. In every case where
+parts work in mutual dependence toward a common result, there rules a
+central unity, uniting and animating the members. The lowest of these
+substantial unities is the ego, the common source of our thoughts and
+feelings. But as the parts of the organism are governed and held together
+by the soul, so individuals are joined with one another into species and
+genera by higher unities. Each individual being is a member in a system of
+creatures, which a common nature binds together. Moreover, since order and
+harmony are spread throughout the world, and no one thing exists out of
+relation to all others and to the whole, the universe must be conceived
+as animated by a formative power which works purposively; this all-ruling
+unity is the soul of the world, the universal mind, the Deity. The finality
+and beauty of those parts of the world which we can know justifies the
+inference to a like constitution of those which are unapproachable, so that
+we may be certain that the numerous evils which we find in the details,
+work for the good of a system superior to them, and that all apparent
+imperfections contribute to the perfection of the whole. As our philosopher
+makes use of the idea of the world-harmony to support theism and the
+theodicy, so, further, he derives the content of morality from it, thus
+giving ethics a natural basis independent of self-interest and conventional
+fancies.
+
+A being is good when its impulses toward the preservation and welfare of
+the species is strong, and those directed to its own good not too strong.
+The virtue of a rational being is distinguished from the goodness of
+a merely "sensible creature" by the fact that man not only possesses
+impulses, but reflects upon them, that he approves or disapproves his own
+conduct and that of others, and thus makes his affections the object of a
+higher, reflective, judging affection. This faculty of moral distinctions,
+the sense for right and wrong, or, which amounts to the same thing, for
+beauty and ugliness, is innate; we approve virtue and condemn vice by
+nature, not as the result of a compact, and from this natural feeling for
+good and evil exercise develops a cultivated moral taste or tact. And when,
+further, the reason, by means of this faculty of judgment, gains control
+over the passions, man becomes an ethical artist, a moral virtuoso.
+
+Virtue pleases by its own worth and beauty, not because of any external
+advantage. We must not corrupt the love of the good for its own sake by
+mixing with it the hope of future reward, which at the best is admissible
+only as a counter-weight against evil passions. When Shaftesbury speaks of
+future bliss, his highest conception of the heavenly life is uninterrupted
+friendship, magnanimity, and nobility, as a continual rewarding of virtue
+by new virtue.
+
+The good is the beautiful, and the beautiful is the harmonious, the
+symmetrical; hence the essence of virtue consists in the balance of the
+affections and passions. Of the three classes into which Shaftesbury
+divides the passions, one, including the "unnatural" or unsocial
+affections, as malevolence, envy, and cruelty, which aim neither at the
+good of the individual nor that of others, is always and entirely evil.
+
+The two other classes, the social (or "natural") affections and the
+"self-affections," may be virtuous or vicious, according to their degree,
+_i. e_., according to the relation of their strength to that of the other
+affections. In itself a benevolent impulse is never too strong; it
+can become so only in comparison with self-love, or in respect to the
+constitution of the individual in question, and conversely. Commonly the
+social impulses do not attain the normal standard, while the selfish exceed
+it; but the opposite case also occurs. Excessive parental tenderness, the
+pity which enervates and makes useless for aid, religious zeal for making
+converts, passionate partisanship, are examples of too violent social
+affections which interfere with the activity of the other inclinations.
+Just as erroneous, on the other side, is the neglect of one's own good.
+For although the possession of selfish inclinations does not make a
+man virtuous, yet the lack of them is a moral defect, since they are
+indispensable to the general good. No one can be useful to others who
+does not keep himself in a condition for service. The impulse to care for
+private welfare is good and necessary in so far as it comports with the
+general welfare or contributes to this. The due proportion between the
+social passions, which constitute the direct source of good, and those of
+self-love, consists in subordinating the latter to the former. The kinship
+of this ethics of harmony with the ethical views of antiquity is evident.
+It is completed by the eudemonistic conclusion of the system.
+
+As the harmony of impulses constitutes the essence of virtue, so also it is
+the way to true happiness. Experience shows that unsocial, unsympathetic,
+vicious men are miserable; that love to society is the richest source
+of happiness; that even pity for the suffering of others occasions more
+pleasure than pain. Virtue secures us the love and respect of others,
+secures us, above all, the approval of our own conscience, and true
+happiness consists in satisfaction with ourselves. The search after this
+pure, constant, spiritual pleasure in the good, which is never accompanied
+by satiety and disgust, should not be called self-seeking; he alone takes
+pleasure in the good who is already good himself.
+
+Shaftesbury is not well disposed toward positive Christianity, holding that
+it has made virtue mercenary by its promises of heavenly rewards, removed
+moral questions entirely out of this world into the world to come, and
+taught men most piously to torment one another out of pure supernatural
+brotherly love. In opposition to such transcendental positions Shaftesbury,
+a priest of the modern view of the world, gives virtue a home on earth,
+seeks the hand of Providence in the present world, and teaches men to reach
+faith in God by inspiring contemplation of the well-ordered universe.
+Virtue without piety is possible, indeed, though not complete. But morality
+is first and fixed, hence it is the condition and the criterion of genuine
+religion. Revelation does not need to fear free rational criticism, for the
+Scriptures are accredited by their contents. Besides reason, banter is
+with Shaftesbury a second means for distinguishing the genuine from the
+spurious: ridicule is the test of truth, and wit and humor the only
+cure for enthusiasm. With these he scourges the over-pious as religious
+parasites, who for safety's sake prefer to believe too much rather than too
+little.
+
+Before Shaftesbury's theory of the moral sense and the disinterested
+affections had gained adherents and developers, the danger, which indeed
+had not always been escaped, that man might content himself with the
+satisfaction of possessing noble impulses, without taking much care
+to realize them in useful actions, called forth by way of reaction, a
+paradoxical attempt at an apology for vice. Mandeville, a London physician
+of French extraction, and born in Holland, had aroused attention by his
+poem, _The Grumbling Hive; or Knaves Turned Honest_, 1706, and in response
+to vehement attacks upon his work, had added a commentary to the second
+edition, _The Fable of the Bees; or Private Vices Public Benefits_, 1714.
+The moral of the fable is that the welfare of a society depends on the
+industry of its members, and this, in turn, on their passions and vices.
+Greed, extravagance, envy, ambition, and rivalry are the roots of
+the acquisitive impulse, and contribute more to the public good than
+benevolence and the control of desire. Virtue is good for the individual,
+it is true, since it makes him contented with himself and acceptable to God
+and man, but great states require stronger motives to labor and industry
+in order to be prosperous. A people among whom frugality, self-denial, and
+quietness of spirit were the rule would remain poor and ignorant. Besides
+holding that virtue furthers the happiness of society, Shaftesbury makes a
+second mistake in assuming that human nature includes unselfish
+inclinations. It is not innate love and goodness that make us social, but
+our passions and weaknesses (above all, fear); man is by nature
+self-seeking. All actions, including the so-called virtues, spring from
+vanity and egoism; thus it has always been, thus it is in every grade of
+society. In social life, indeed, we dare not display all these desires
+openly, nor satisfy them at will. Shrewd lawgivers have taught men to
+conceal their natural passions and to limit them by artificial ones,
+persuading them that renunciation is true happiness, on the ground that
+through it we attain the supreme good--reputation among, and the esteem of
+our fellows. Since then honor and shame have become the strongest motives
+and have incited men to that which is called virtue, _i.e._, to actions
+which apparently imply the sacrifice of selfish inclinations for the good
+of society, while they are really done out of pride and self-love. By
+constantly feigning noble sentiments before others man comes, finally, to
+deceive himself, believing himself a being whose happiness consists in the
+renunciation of self and all that is earthly, and in the thought of his
+moral excellence.--The crass assumptions in Mandeville's reasoning are
+evident at a glance. After analyzing virtue into the suppression of desire,
+after labeling the impulse after moral approbation vanity, lawful self-love
+egoism, and rational acquisitiveness avarice, it was easy for him to prove
+that it is vice which makes the individual industrious and the state
+prosperous, that virtue is seldom found, and that if it were universal it
+would become injurious to society.
+
+With different shading and with less one-sidedness, Bolingbroke (cf.
+p. 193) defended the standpoint of naturalism. God has created us for
+happiness in common; we are destined to assist one another. Happiness is
+attainable in society alone, and society cannot exist without justice and
+benevolence. He who exercises virtue, _i.e._, promotes the good of the
+species, promotes at the same time his own good. All actions spring from
+self-love, which, guided at first by an immediate instinct, and later, by
+reason developed through experience, extends itself over ever widening
+spheres. We love ourselves in our relatives, in our friends, further still,
+in our country, finally, in humanity, so that self-love and social love
+coincide, and we are impelled to virtue by the combined motives of interest
+and duty. This is an ethic of common sense from the standpoint of the
+cultured man of the world--which at the proper time has the right, no
+doubt, to gain itself a hearing.
+
+Meanwhile Shaftesbury's ideas had impressed Hutcheson and Butler, according
+to the peculiarities of each. Both of these writers deem it necessary to
+explain and correct the distinction between the selfish and the benevolent
+affections by additions, which were of influence on the ethics of Hume;
+both devote their zeal to the new doctrine of feelings of reflection or
+moral taste, in which the former gives more prominence to the aesthetic,
+merely judging factor, the latter to the active or mandatory one.
+
+Francis Hutcheson[1] (died 1747), professor at Glasgow, in his posthumous
+_System of Moral Philosophy_, 1755, which had been preceded by an _Inquiry
+concerning the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue_, 1725, pursues
+the double aim of showing against Hobbes and Locke the originality and
+disinterestedness both of benevolence and of moral approval. Virtue is not
+exercised because it brings advantage to the agent, nor approved on account
+of advantage to the observer.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Fowler's treatise, cited above--TR.]
+
+(1) The benevolent affections are entirely independent of self-love and
+regard for the rewards of God and of man, nay, independent even of the
+lofty satisfaction afforded by self-approbation. This last, indeed, is
+vouchsafed to us only when we seek the good of others without personal
+aims: the joy of inward approval is the result of virtue, not the motive to
+it. If love were in reality a concealed egoism, it would yield to control
+in cases where it promises advantage, which, as experience shows, is not
+the fact. Benevolence is entirely natural and as universal in the moral
+world as gravitation in the corporeal; and like gravitation further in
+that its intensity increases with propinquity--the nearer the persons, the
+greater the love. Benevolence is more widespread than malevolence; even
+the criminal does more innocent and kind acts in his life than criminal
+ones--the rarity of the latter is the reason why so much is said about
+them.
+
+(2) Moral judgment is also entirely uninfluenced by consideration of the
+advantageous or disadvantageous results for the agent or the spectator. The
+beauty of a good deed arouses immediate satisfaction. Through the moral
+sense we feel pleasure at observing a virtuous action, and aversion when we
+perceive an ignoble one, feelings which are independent of all thought of
+the rewards and punishments promised by God, as well as of the utility or
+harm for ourselves. Hutcheson argues a complete distinction between moral
+approval and the perception of the agreeable and the useful, from the facts
+that we judge a benevolent action which is forced, or done from motives of
+personal advantage, quite differently from one inspired by love; that we
+pay esteem to high-minded characters whether their fortunes be good or
+ill; and that we are moved with equal force by fictitious actions, as, for
+instance, on the stage, and by those which really take place.
+
+(3) A few further particulars may be emphasized from the comprehensive
+systematization which Hutcheson industriously and thoughtfully gave to
+Shaftesbury's ideas. Two points reveal the forerunner of Hume. First, the
+rôle assigned to the reason in moral affairs is merely subsidiary. Our
+motive to action is never the knowledge of a true proposition, but always
+simply a wish, affection, or impulse. Ultimate ends are given by the
+feelings alone; the reason can only discover the means thereto. Secondly,
+the turbulent, blind, rapidly passing passions are distinguished from the
+calm, permanent affections, which are mediated by cognition. The latter are
+the nobler; among them, in turn, the highest place is occupied by those
+conducive to the general good, whose worth is still further determined
+by the extent of their objects. From this is derived the law that a kind
+affection receives the more lively approval, the more calm and deliberate
+it is, the higher the degree of happiness experienced by the object of the
+action, and the greater the number of persons affected by it. Patriotism
+and love of mankind in general are higher virtues than affection for
+friends and children. As the goal of the self-regarding affections,
+perfection makes its appearance--for the first time in English ethics--by
+the side of happiness.
+
+Joseph Butler[1] (1692-1752; _Sermons on Human Nature_, 1726; cf. p. 194)
+maintains still more strictly than Hutcheson the immediateness both of the
+affections and the moral estimation of them. He declares that even the
+self-regarding impulses as such are un-egoistic, and makes moral judgment
+leave out of view all consequences, either foreseen or present, whereas his
+predecessor had resolved the goodness of the action into its advantageous
+effects (not for the agent and the spectator, but for its object and) for
+society. The conscience--so Butler terms the moral sense--directly approves
+or disapproves characters and actions in themselves, no matter what good or
+ill they occasion in the world. We judge a mode of action good, not because
+it is useful to society, but because it corresponds to the demands of the
+conscience. This must be unconditionally obeyed, whatever be the issue. We
+must not act contrary to truth and justice, even if it should seem to bring
+about more happiness than misery.--Butler, too, furnishes material for the
+ethics of Hume, by his revival of the separation, previously defended by
+the Stoics, of desire and passion from self-love or interest. Self-love
+desires a thing because it expects pleasure from it, but the natural
+impulses impel us toward their objects immediately, _i. e_., without a
+representation of the pleasure to be gained; and repetition is necessary
+before the artificial motive of egoistic pleasure-seeking can be added to
+the natural motive of inborn desire. Self-love always presupposes original,
+immediate affections.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Collins's _Butler_, Blackwood's Philosophical Classics.
+1881.--TR.]
+
+The English moral science of the century is brought to a conclusion by Adam
+Smith[1] (1723-90), the celebrated founder of political economy.[2] Smith
+not only takes into consideration--like his greater friend, Hume--all the
+problems proposed by his predecessors, but, further (in his _Theory of
+Moral Sentiments_, 1759, published while he was professor at Glasgow),
+combines the various attempts at their solution, not by eclectic
+co-ordination but by working them over for himself, and arranges them on a
+uniform principle, thus accomplishing a work which has not yet received
+due recognition beyond the limits of his native land. He reached this
+comprehensive moral principle by recognizing the full bearing of a thought
+which Hume had incidentally expressed, that moral judgment depends on
+participation in the feelings of the agent, and by following out with fine
+psychological observation this sympathy of men into its first and last
+manifestations. In this way a twofold kind of morality was revealed to him:
+mere propriety of behavior and real merit in action. On the one hand, that
+is, the sympathy of the spectator--as Hume has one-sidedly emphasized--is
+directed to the utility of the consequences (or to the "merit") of the
+action, and, on the other, to the fitness of the motives (or their
+"propriety"). An action is proper when the impartial spectator is able to
+sympathize with its motive, and meritorious if he can sympathize also with
+its end or effect; _i.e._, if, in the first case, the feelings are suitable
+to their objects (neither too strong nor too weak), and, in the second
+case, the consequences of the act are advantageous to others. Merit =
+propriety + utility. The main conclusion is this: Sympathy is that by
+means of which virtue is recognized and approved, as well as that which is
+approved as virtue; it is _ratio cognoscendi_ as well as _ratio essendi_,
+the criterion as well as the source of morality. Thus Smith endeavors to
+solve the two principal problems of English ethics--the criterion and the
+origin of virtue--with a common answer.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Farrer's _Adam Smith_, English Philosophers Series,
+1880.--TR.]
+
+[Footnote 2: The epoch-making work, with which he called economic science
+into existence, _The Wealth of Nations_\ appeared in 1776. Cf. Wilhelm
+Hassbach, _Untersuchungen über Adam Smith_, Leipsic, 1891.]
+
+"Sympathy" denotes primarily nothing more than the innate and purely formal
+power of imitating to a certain degree the feelings of others. From this
+modest germ is developed by a progressive growth the wide-spreading tree of
+morality: moral judgment, the moral imperative with its religious sanction,
+and ethical character. Accordingly we may distinguish different stages
+in the development of sympathy--the psychological stage of mere
+fellow-feeling, the aesthetic stage of moral appreciation, the imperative
+stage of moral precepts, which further on are construed as commands of
+God (the famous Kantian definition of religion was announced in Glasgow
+a generation earlier than in Königsberg), finally, the concluding stage
+wherein these laws of duty are taken up into the disposition. Besides
+these, there results from the mechanism of the sympathetic feelings a
+series of phenomena, which, although they do not entirely conform to the
+ethical standard, yet exercise a salutary effect on the permanence of
+society; _e.g._, our exceptional judgment of the deeds of the great, the
+rich, and the fortunate, as also the higher worth ascribed to good (and,
+conversely, the greater guilt to bad) intentions when successfully carried
+out into action, in comparison with those which fall short of their result.
+
+The first, the purely psychological stage, includes three cases. The
+spectator sympathizes (1) with the feelings of the agent; (2) with the
+gratitude or anger of the person affected by the action; (3) the person
+observed sympathizes in return with the imitative and judging feelings of
+the spectator.
+
+The fundamental laws of sympathy are as follows: We are roused to imitate
+the feeling of another by the perception either of its signs (its natural
+consequences or its natural expression in visible and audible motions), or
+of its causes (the circumstances and experiences which occasion it), the
+latter exercising a more potent influence than the former. The wooden leg
+of the beggar is more effective in exciting our pity than his anxious air;
+the sight of dental instruments is more eloquent than the plaints of
+the sufferer from toothache. In order to be able to imitate vividly the
+feelings of a person, we must know the causes of them.--The feeling of
+the spectator is, on the average, less intense than that of the person
+observed, so long as the latter does not control and repress his emotions
+in view of the calmness of the former. The difference of intensity between
+the original and the sympathetic feelings differs widely with the various
+classes of emotions. It is difficult to take part in feelings which arise
+from bodily conditions, but easy to share those in the production of which
+the imagination is concerned--hence easier to share in hope and fear than
+in pleasure and pain.--We sympathize more readily with feelings which are
+agreeable to the observer, the observed, and other participants than with
+such as are not so; more willingly, therefore, with cheerfulness, love,
+benevolence than with grief, hatred, malevolence. This is not only true of
+temporary affections, but especially of those general dispositions which
+depend on a more or less happy situation in life; we sympathize more
+vividly with the fortunes of the rich and noble, because we consider them
+happier than the poor and lowly. Wealth and high rank are objects of
+general desire chiefly because their possessor enjoys the advantage of
+knowing that whatever gives him joy or sorrow always arouses similar
+feelings in countless other men. The root of all ambition is the wish to
+rule over the hearts of our fellows by compelling them to make our feelings
+their own; the central nerve of all happiness consists in seeing our own
+sensations shared by those about us and reflected back, as it were, from
+manifold mirrors. Small annoyances often have a diverting effect on the
+spectator; great success easily excites his envy; great sorrows and minor
+joys, on the contrary, are always sure of our sympathy. Hence the morose
+man, to whom everything is an occasion of ill-humor, is nowhere welcome,
+and the man of cheerful disposition, who rejoices in each little event and
+whose good spirits are contagious, everywhere.
+
+Not less admirable than the fine gift of observation which guides Smith in
+his discovery of the primary manifestations and the laws of sympathy is the
+skill with which he deduces moral phenomena, from the simplest to the
+most complex--moral judgment, the moral law, its application to one's own
+conduct, the conscience--from the interchange of sympathetic feelings. From
+involuntary comparison of the representative feeling of the spectator with
+its original in the person observed arises an agreeable or disagreeable
+feeling of judgment, a judgment of value, approbating or rejecting the
+latter. This is approving when the intensity of the original harmonizes
+with that of the copy, disapproving when the former exceeds or fails to
+attain the latter. In the one case the emotion is judged suitable to the
+object which causes it; in the other, too violent or too weak. It is always
+a certain mean of passion which, as "proper," receives approval (esteem,
+love, or admiration). In the case of the social passions excess is more
+readily condoned, in the case of the unsocial and selfish ones, defect;
+hence we judge the over-sensitive more leniently than the over-vengeful.
+Anger must be well-grounded and must express itself with great moderation
+to arouse in the spectator a like degree of sympathetic resentment. For
+here the sympathy of the spectator is divided between two parties, and
+fellow-feeling with the angry one is weakened by fear for the person
+menaced by him, whereas, in the case of kind affections, sympathy is
+increased by doubling. While our judgment of propriety or decorum rests on
+simple participation in the sentiments of the agent, our judgment of
+merit and demerit is based, in addition, on sympathy with the feelings
+of gratitude or resentment experienced by the person on whom the action
+terminates. An act is meritorious if it appears to us to deserve thanks
+and reward, ill-deserving if it seems to merit resentment and punishment.
+Nature has inscribed on the heart, apart from all reflection on the utility
+of punishment, an independent, immediate, and instinctive approbation of
+the sacred law of retribution. This is the point at which a hitherto purely
+contemplative sympathy passes over into an active impulse, which prepares
+us to support the victim of attack and insult in his defense and revenge.
+
+This participation in the circumstances and feelings of others is a
+reciprocal phenomenon. The spectator takes pains to share the sentiments of
+the person observed; and the latter, on his part, endeavors to reduce the
+emotions which move him to a degree which will render participation in them
+possible for the former. In these reciprocal efforts we have the beginnings
+of the two classes of virtues--the gentle, amiable virtues of sympathy
+and sensibility, and the exalted, estimable virtues of self-denial and
+self-command. Both of these conditions of mind, however, are considered
+virtues only when they are manifested in unusual intensity: humanity is
+a remarkably delicate fellow-feeling, greatness of soul a rare degree of
+self-command. (The consideration for those about one which is ethically
+demanded is given, moreover, to a certain extent involuntarily. The man
+in trouble and the merry man alike restrain themselves in the company of
+persons who are indifferent, or in an opposite mood, while they give rein
+to their emotions when with those similarly affected. Joy is enhanced by
+sympathy, and grief mitigated.) Thus the perfection of human nature and the
+divinely willed harmony among the feelings of men are dependent on every
+man feeling little for himself and much for others; on his holding his
+selfish inclinations in check and giving free course to his benevolent
+ones. This is the injunction of Christianity as well as of nature. And
+as, on the one hand, the content of the moral law is thus deduced from
+sympathy, so, on the other, this yields the formal criterion of good:
+Look upon thy sentiments and actions in the light in which the impartial
+spectator would see them. Conscience is the spectator taken up into our own
+breast. It remains to consider the origin of this third, imperative stage.
+
+From daily experience of the fact that we judge the conduct of others, and
+they ours, and from the wish to gain their approval, arises the habit of
+subjecting our own actions to criticism. We learn to look at ourselves
+through the eyes of others, we assign the spectator and judge a place in
+our own heart, we make his calm objective judgment our own, and hear the
+man within calling to us: Thou art responsible for thy acts and intentions.
+In this way we are placed in a position to overcome two great delusions,
+one of passion, which overestimates the present at the expense of the
+future, and one of self-love, which overestimates the individual at the
+expense of other men; delusions from which the impartial spectator is free,
+for the pleasure of the moment seems to him no more desirable than pleasure
+to come, and one person is just the same to him as another. Through
+comparison of like cases in the exercise of self-examination certain rules
+or principles are formed concerning what is right and good. Reverence for
+these general rules of living is called the sense of duty. The last step in
+the process consists in our enhancement of the binding authority of moral
+rules by looking on them as commands of God. Here Smith adds subtle
+discussions of the question, in what cases actions ought to be done simply
+out of regard for these abstract maxims, and in what others we welcome the
+co-operation of a natural impulse or passion. We ought to be angry and to
+punish with reluctance, merely because reason enjoins it, but, on the other
+hand, we should be benevolent and grateful from affection; she is not a
+model wife who performs her duties merely from a sense of duty, and not
+from inclination also. Further, in all cases where the rules cannot be
+formulated with perfect exactness and definiteness (as they can in the case
+of justice), and are not absolutely valid without exception, reverence for
+them must be assisted by a natural taste for modifying and supplementing
+the general maxims to suit particular instances.
+
+In this sketch of the course of Smith's moral philosophy much that is fine
+and much that is of importance has of necessity been passed over--his
+excellent analysis of the relations of benevolence and justice, and
+numerous descriptions of traits of character, _e. g_., his ingenious
+parallel between pride and vanity. We may briefly mention, in conclusion,
+his observations on the irregularities of moral judgment. Prosperity and
+success exert an influence on this, which, though hurtful to its purity,
+must, on the whole, be considered advantageous to mankind. Our lenience
+toward the defects of princes, the great, and the rich, and our over-praise
+for their excellent qualities are, from the moral standpoint, an injustice,
+but one which has this advantage, that it encourages ambition and industry,
+and maintains social distinctions intact, which without loyalty and respect
+toward superiors would be broken down. For most men the road to fortune
+coincides with the path to virtue. Again, it is a beneficent provision of
+nature that we put a higher estimate on a successfully executed act of
+benevolence, and reward it more, than a kind intention which fails of
+execution; that we judge and punish the purposed crime which is not carried
+out more leniently than the one which is completed; that we even ascribe
+a certain degree of accountability to an unintentional act of good or
+evil--although in these cases the moralist is compelled to see an ethically
+unjustifiable corruption of the judgment by external success or failure
+beyond the control of the agent. The first of these irregularities does
+not allow the man of good intentions to content himself with noble desires
+merely, but spurs him on to greater endeavors to carry them out--man
+is created for action; the second protects us from the inquisitorial
+questioning of motives, for it is easy for the most innocent to fall under
+grave suspicion. To this inconsistency of feeling we owe the necessary
+legal principle that deeds only, not intentions, are punishable. God
+has reserved for himself judgment concerning dispositions. The third
+irregularity, that he who inflicts unintentional injury is not guilty, even
+in his own eyes, but yet seems bound to make atonement and reparation,
+is useful in so far as it warns everyone to be prudent, while the
+corresponding illusion, in virtue of which we are grateful to an
+involuntary benefactor--for instance, the bearer of good tidings--and
+reward him, is at least not harmful, for any reason appears sufficient for
+the bestowal of kind intentions and actions.
+
+It is impossible to explain in brief the relation of Smith's ethical
+theory to his political economy. His merit in the former consists in his
+comprehensive and characteristic combination of the results reached by his
+predecessors, and in his preparation for Kantian views, so far as this
+was possible from the empirical standpoint of the English. His impartial
+spectator was the forerunner of the categorical imperative.
+
+English ethics after Smith may, almost without exception, be termed
+eclecticism. This is true of Ferguson _(Institutes of Moral Philosophy_,
+1769); of Paley (1785); of the Scottish School (Dugald Stewart, 1793).
+Bentham's utilitarianism was the first to bring in a new phase.
+
+
+%4. Theory of Knowledge.%
+
+(a) %Berkeley%.--George Berkeley, a native of Ireland, Bishop of Cloyne
+(1685-1753; _An Essay toward a New Theory of Vision_, 1709; _A Treatise
+concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge_, 1710; _Three Dialogues
+between Hylas and Philonous_, 1713; _Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher_,
+1732, against the freethinkers; _Works_, 1784. Fraser's edition of the
+Collected Works appeared in 1871, in four volumes),[1] is related to Locke
+as Spinoza to Descartes. He notices blemishes and contradictions allowed by
+his predecessor to remain, and, recognizing that the difficulty is not to
+be remedied by minor corrections and artificial hypotheses, goes back to
+the fundamental principles, takes these more earnestly than their author,
+and, by carrying them out more strictly, arrives at a new view of the
+world. The points in Locke's doctrines which invited a further advance were
+the following: Locke proclaims that our knowledge extends no further
+than our ideas, and that truth consists in the agreement of ideas among
+themselves, not in the agreement of ideas with things. But this principle
+had scarcely been announced before it was violated. In spite of his
+limitation of knowledge to ideas, Locke maintains that we know (if not the
+inner constitution, yet) the qualities and powers of things without us, and
+have a "sensitive" certainty of their existence. Against this, it is to be
+said that there are no primary qualities, that is, qualities which exist
+without as well as within us. Extension, motion, solidity, which are cited
+as such, are just as purely subjective states in us as color, heat, and
+sweetness. Impenetrability is nothing more than the feeling of resistance,
+an idea, therefore, which self-evidently can be nowhere else than in the
+mind experiencing it. Extension, size, distance, and motion are not even
+sensations (we see colors only, not quantitative determinations), but
+relations which we in thinking add to the sense-qualities (secondary
+qualities), and which we are not able to represent apart from them; their
+relativity alone would forbid us to consider them objective. And material
+substances, the "support" of qualities invented by the philosophers, are
+not only unknown, but entirely non-existent. Abstract matter is a phrase
+without meaning, and individual things are collections of ideas in us,
+nothing more. If we take away all sense-qualities from a thing, absolutely
+nothing remains. Our ideas are not merely the only; objects of knowledge,
+but also the only existing things--_nothing exists except minds and
+their ideas_. Spirits alone are active beings, they only are indivisible
+substances, and have real existence, while the being of bodies (as
+dependent, inert, variable beings, which are in a constant process of
+becoming) consists alone in their appearance to spirits and their being
+perceived by them. Incogitative, hence passive, beings are neither
+substances, nor capable of producing ideas in us. Those ideas which we do
+not ourselves produce are the effects of a spirit which is mightier than
+we. With this a second inconsistency was removed which had been overlooked
+by Locke, who had ascribed active power to spirits alone and denied it to
+matter, but at the same time had made the former affected by the latter. If
+external sense is to mean the capacity for having ideas occasioned by the
+action of external material things, then there is no external sense. A
+third point wherein Locke had not gone far enough for his successor,
+concerned the favorite English doctrine of nominalism. Locke, with his
+predecessors, had maintained that all reality is individual, and that
+universals exist only in the abstracting understanding. From this point
+Berkeley advances a step further, the last, indeed, which was possible in
+this direction, by bringing into question the possibility even of abstract
+ideas. As all beings are particular things, so all ideas are particular
+ideas.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. also Fraser's _Berkeley_ (Blackwood's Philosophical
+Classics) 1881; Eraser's _Selections from Berkeley_, 4th ed., 1891; and
+Krauth's edition of the _Principles_, 1874, with notes from several
+sources, especially those translated from Ueberweg.--TR.]
+
+Berkeley looks on the refutation of these two fundamental mistakes--the
+assumption of general ideas in the mind, and the belief in the existence
+of a material world outside it--as his life work, holding them the chief
+sources of atheism, doubt, and philosophical discord. The first of these
+errors arises from the use of language. Because we employ words which
+denote more than one object, we have believed ourselves warranted in
+concluding that we have ideas which correspond to the extension of the
+words in question, and which contain only those characteristics which are
+uniformly found in all objects so named. This, however, is not the case.[1]
+We speak of many things which we cannot represent: names do not always
+stand for ideas. The definition of the word triangle as a three-sided
+figure bounded by straight lines, makes demands upon us which our faculties
+of imagination are never fully able to meet; for the triangle that we
+represent to ourselves is always either right-angled or oblique-angled, and
+not--as we must demand from the abstract conception of the figure--both and
+neither at once. The name "man" includes men and women, children and the
+aged, but we are never able to represent a man except as an individual of a
+definite age and sex. Nevertheless we are in a position to make a safe
+use of these non-presentative but useful abbreviations, and by means of a
+particular idea to develop truths of wider application. This takes place
+when, in the demonstration, those qualities are not considered which
+distinguish the idea from others with a like name. In this case the
+given idea stands for all others which are known by the same name; the
+representative idea is not universal, but serves as such. Thus when I have
+demonstrated the proposition, the sum of all the angles of a triangle is
+equal to two right angles, for a given triangle, I do not need to prove
+it for every triangle thereafter. For not only the color and size of the
+triangle are indifferent, but its other peculiarities as well; the question
+whether it is right-angled or obtuse-angled, whether it has equal
+sides, whether it has equal or unequal angles, is not mentioned in the
+demonstration, and has no influence upon it. _Abstracta_ exist only in this
+sense. In considering the individual Paul I can attend exclusively to those
+characteristics which he has in common with all men or with all living
+beings, but it is impossible for me to represent this complex of common
+qualities apart from his individual peculiarities. Self-observation shows
+that we have no general concepts; reason, that we can have none, for the
+combination of opposite elements in one idea would be a contradiction in
+terms. Motion in general, neither swift nor slow, extension in general,
+at once great and small, abstract matter without sensuous
+determinations--these can neither exist nor be perceived.
+
+[Footnote 1: Against the Berkeleyan denial of abstract notions the popular
+philosopher, Joh. Jak. Engel, directed an essay, _Ueber die Realität
+allgemeiner Begriffe_ (Engel's _Schriften_, vol. x.), to which attention
+has been called by O. Liebmann, _Analysis tier Wirklichkeit_, 2d ed., p.
+473.]
+
+The "materialistic" hypothesis--so Berkeley terms the assumption that a
+material world exists apart from perceiving mind, and independently of
+being perceived--is, first, unnecessary, for the facts which it is to
+explain can be explained as well, or even better, without it; and, second,
+false, since it is a contradiction to suppose that an object can exist
+unperceived, and that a sensation or idea is the copy of anything itself
+not a sensation or idea. Ideas are the only objects of the understanding.
+Sensible qualities (white, sweet) are subjective states of the soul; sense
+objects (sugar), sensation-complexes. If sensations need a substantial
+support, this is the soul which perceives them, not an external thing which
+can neither perceive nor be perceived. Single ideas, and those combined
+into objects, can exist nowhere else than in the mind; the being of sense
+objects consists in their being perceived (_esse est percipi_). I see light
+and feel heat, and combine these sensations of sight and touch into the
+substance fire, because I know from experience that they constantly
+accompany and suggest each other.[1] The assumption of an "object" apart
+from the idea is as useless as its existence would be. Why should God
+create a world of real things without the mind, when these can neither
+enter into the mind, nor (because unperceived) be copied by its ideas, nor
+(because they themselves lack perception and power) produce ideas in it?
+Ideas signify nothing but themselves, _i. e_., affections of the subject.
+
+[Footnote 1: The fire that I see is not the cause of the pain which I
+experience in approaching it, but the visual image of the flame is only a
+sign which warns me not to go too near. If I look through a microscope
+I see a different object from the one perceived with the naked eye. Two
+persons never see the same object, they merely have like sensations.]
+
+The further question arises, What is the origin of ideas? Men have been led
+into this erroneous belief in the reality of the material world by the
+fact that certain ideas are not subject to our will, while others are.
+Sensations are distinguished from the ideas of imagination, which we can
+excite and alter at pleasure, by their greater strength, liveliness, and
+distinctness, by their steadiness, regular order, and coherence, and by
+the fact that they arise without our aid and whether we will or no. Unless
+these ideas are self-originated they must have an external cause. This,
+however, can be nothing else than a willing, thinking Being; for without
+will it could not be active and act upon me, and without ideas of its own
+it could not communicate ideas to me. Because of the manifoldness and
+regularity of our sensations the Being which produces them must, further,
+possess infinite power and intelligence. The ideas of imagination are
+produced by ourselves, real perceptions are produced by God. The connected
+whole of divinely produced ideas we call nature, and the constant
+regularity in their succession, the laws of nature. The invariableness of
+the divine working and the purposive harmony of creation reveal the wisdom
+and goodness of the Almighty more clearly than "astonishing and exceptional
+events." When we hear a man speak we reason from this activity to his
+existence. How much less are we entitled to doubt the existence of God, who
+speaks to us in the thousandfold works of nature.
+
+The natural or created ideas which God impresses on us are copies of
+the eternal ideas which he himself perceives, not, indeed, by passive
+sensation, but through his creative reason. Accordingly when it was
+maintained that things do not exist independently of perception, the
+reference was not to the individual spirit, but to all spirits. When I
+turn my eyes away from an object it continues to exist, indeed, after
+my perception has ended--in the minds of other men and in that of the
+Omnipresent One. The pantheistic conclusion of these principles, in the
+sense of Geulincx and Malebranche,[1] which one expects, was really
+suggested by Berkeley. Everything exists only in virtue of its
+participation in the one, permanent, all-comprehensive spirit; individual
+spirits are of the same nature with the universal reason, only they are
+less perfect, limited, and not pure activity, while God is passionless
+intelligence. But if, in the last analysis, God is the cause of all, this
+does not hold of the free actions of men, least of all of wicked ones. The
+freedom of the will must not be rejected because of the contradictions
+which its acceptance involves; motion, also, and mathematical infinity
+imply incomprehensible elements. In the philosophy of nature Berkeley
+prefers the teleological to the mechanical view, since the latter is able
+to discover the laws of phenomena only, but not their efficient and
+final causes. Sense and experience acquaint us merely with the course
+of phenomenal effects; the reason, which opens up to us the realm of
+causation, of the spiritual, is the only sure guide to science and truth.
+The understanding does not feel, the senses do not know. We have no
+(sensuous) idea of other spirits, but only a notion of them; instead of
+themselves we perceive their activities merely, from which we argue
+to souls like ourselves, while we know our own mind by immediate
+self-consciousness.[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: The example of Arthur Collier shows that the same results
+which Berkeley reaches empirically can be obtained from the standpoint of
+rationalism. Following Malebranche, and developing further the idealistic
+tendencies of the latter, Collier had, independently of Berkeley, conceived
+the doctrine of the "non-existence or impossibility of an external world ";
+but had not worked it out in his _Clavis Universalis_, 1713, until after
+the appearance of Berkeley's chief work, and not without consideration of
+this. The general point of view and the arguments are the same: Existence
+is equivalent to being perceived by God; the creation of a real world of
+matter apart from the ideal world in God and from sensuous perceptions in
+us would have been a superfluous device, etc.]
+
+
+[Footnote 2: It should be remembered, however, that this immediate
+knowledge of ourselves is also "not after the manner of an idea or
+sensation." Our knowledge of spirits is always mediated by "notions" not by
+"ideas" in the strict sense, that is, not by "images." Cf. _Principles_,
+§§ 27, 135 _seq_., especially in the second edition.--TR.]
+
+In contrast to the fearlessness with which Berkeley propounds his
+spiritualism, his anxious endeavors to take away the appearance of paradox
+from his immaterialistic doctrine, and to show its complete agreement with
+common sense, excite surprise. Even the common man, he argues, desires
+nothing more than that his perceptions be real; the distinction between
+idea and object is an invention of philosophers. Here Berkeley cannot be
+acquitted of a certain sophistical play upon the term "idea," which, in
+fact, is ambiguous. He understands by it _that which_ the soul perceives
+(its immediate, inner object), but the popular mind, _that through which_
+the soul perceives an object. The reality of an idea in us is different
+from the idea of a real thing, or from the reality of that which is
+perceived without us by means of the idea, and it is just this last meaning
+which common sense affirms and Berkeley denies. In any case it was a work
+of great merit to have transferred the existence of objects beyond our
+ideas, of things-in-themselves, out of the region of the self-evident into
+the region of the problematical. We never get beyond the circle of our
+ideas, and if we posit a thing-in-itself as the ground and object of the
+idea, this also is simply a thought, an idea. For us there is no being
+except that of the perceiver and the perceived. Later we shall meet two
+other forms of idealism, in Leibnitz and Fichte. Both of these agree with
+Berkeley that spiritual beings alone are active, and active beings alone
+real, and that the being of the inactive consists in their being perceived.
+But while in Berkeley the objective ideas are impressed upon finite spirits
+by the Infinite Spirit from without and singly, with Leibnitz they appear
+as a fullness of germs, which God implanted together in the monads at the
+beginning, and which the individual develops into consciousness, and with
+Fichte they become the unconscious productions of the Absolute Ego acting
+in the individual egos. For the two former as many worlds exist as there
+are individual spirits, their harmony being guaranteed, in the one case, by
+the consistency of God's working, and, in the other, by his foresight. For
+Fichte, on the other hand, there is but one world, for the absolute is not
+outside the individual spirits, but the uniformly working force within
+them.
+
+(b) Hume.--David Hume was born in Edinburgh in 1711, and died in the same
+city, 1776. His position as librarian, which he held in the place of
+his birth, 1752-57, gave the opportunity for his _History of England_(
+1754-62). His chief work, the _Treatise on Human Nature_, which, however,
+found few readers, was composed during his first residence in France in
+1734-37. Later he worked over the first book of this work into his
+_Enquiry concerning Human Understanding_ (1748); the second book into _A
+Dissertation on the Passions_; and the third _into An Enquiry concerning
+the Principles of Morals_. These, and others of his essays, found so much
+favor that, during his second sojourn in France, as secretary to Lord
+Hertford, in 1763-66, he was already honored as a philosopher of world-wide
+renown. Then, after serving for some time as Under-Secretary of State, he
+retired to private life at home (1769).
+
+The three books of the _Treatise on Human Nature_, which appeared in
+1739-40, are entitled _Of the Understanding, Of the Passions, Of Morals_.
+Of the five volumes of the Essays, the first contains the _Essays Moral,
+Political, and Literary_, 1741-42; the second, the _Enquiry concerning
+Human Understanding_, 1748; the third, the _Enquiry concerning the
+Principles of Morals_, 1751; the fourth, the _Political Discourses_, 1752;
+the fifth, 1757, the _Four Dissertations_, including that _On the Passions_
+and the _Natural History of Religion_. After Hume's death appeared the
+_Autobiography_, 1777; the _Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_, 1779;
+and the two small essays on _Suicide_ and the _Immortality of the Soul_,
+1783.[1] The _Philosophical Works_ were published in 1827, and frequently
+afterward.[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: Or 1777, cf. Green and Grose's edition, vol. iii. p. 67
+_seq_.--Tr.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Among the works on Hume we may mention Jodl's prize treatise,
+1872, and Huxley's _Hume_ (English Men of Letters), 1879. [The reader may
+be referred also to Knight's _Hume_ (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics),
+1886; to T.H. Green's "Introductions" in Green and Grose's edition of the
+collected works in four volumes, 1874 (new ed. 1889-90), which is now
+standard; and to Selby-Bigge's reprint of the original edition of the
+_Treatise_, I vol., 1888, with a valuable Analytical Index.]]
+
+Hume's object, like that of Berkeley, is the improvement of Locke's
+doctrine of knowledge. In several respects he does not go so far as
+Berkeley, in others very much farther. In agreement with Berkeley's
+ultra-nominalism, which combats even the possibility of abstract ideas, he
+yet does not follow him to the extent of denying external reality. On the
+other hand, he carries out more consistently Berkeley's hint that immediate
+sensation includes less than is ascribed to it (_e.g._, that by vision
+we perceive colors only, and not distance, etc.), as well as his
+principle--destructive to the certainty of our knowledge of nature--that
+there is no causality among phenomena; and brings the question of substance
+to, the negative conclusion, that there is no need whatever for a support
+for groups of qualities, and, therefore, that substantiality is to be
+denied to immaterial as well as to material beings. The points in Locke's
+philosophy which seemed to Hume to need completion were different from
+those at which Berkeley had struck in. The antithesis of rational and
+empirical knowledge is more sharply conceived; the combination of ideas is
+not left to the choice of the understanding but placed under the dominion
+of psychological laws; and to the distinction between outer and inner
+experience (to the former of which priority is conceded, on the ground that
+we must have had an external sensation before we can, through reflection,
+be conscious of it as an internal phenomenon), there is added a second, as
+important as the other and crossing it, between impressions and ideas, of
+which the former are likewise made prior to the latter.
+
+Everyone will acknowledge the considerable difference between a sensation
+actually present (of heat, for instance) and the mere idea of one
+previously experienced, or shortly to come. This consists in the greater
+force, liveliness, and vividness of the former. Although these two classes
+of states (the idea of a landscape described by a poet and the perception
+of a real one, anger and the thought of anger) are only quantitatively
+distinct, they are scarcely ever in danger of being confused--the most
+lively idea is always less so than the weakest perception. The actual,
+outer or inner, sensations may be termed impressions; the weaker images of
+memory or imagination, which they leave behind them, ideas. Since nothing
+can gain entrance to the soul except through the two portals of outer and
+inner experience, there is no idea which has not arisen from an impression
+or several such; every idea is the image and copy of an impression. But
+as the understanding and imagination variously combine, separate, and
+transpose the elements furnished by the senses and lingering in memory, the
+possibility of error arises. A hidden, and, therefore more dangerous source
+of error consists in the reference of an idea to a different impression
+than the one of which it is the copy. The concepts substance and causality
+are examples of such false reference.
+
+The combination of ideas takes place without freedom, in a purely
+mechanical, way according to fixed rules, which in the last analysis
+reduce to three fundamental laws of association: Ideas are associated
+(1) according to their resemblance and contrast; (2) according to their
+contiguity in space and time; (3) according to their causal connection.
+Mathematics is based on the operation of the first of these laws, on
+the immediate or mediate knowledge of the resemblance, contrariety, and
+quantitative relations of ideas; the descriptive and experimental part of
+the sciences of nature and of man on the second; religion, metaphysics, and
+that part of physical and moral science which goes beyond mere observation
+on the third. The theory of knowledge has to determine the boundaries of
+human understanding and the degree of credibility to which these sciences
+are entitled.
+
+The objects of human thought and inquiry are either relations of ideas or
+matters of fact. To the former class belong the objects of mathematics, the
+truths of which, since they are analytic (_i. e_., merely explicate in the
+predicate the characteristics already contained in the subject, and add
+nothing new to this), and since they concern possible relations only,
+not reality, possess intuitive or demonstrative certainty. It is only
+propositions concerning quantity and number that are discoverable _a
+priori_ by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on real
+existence, and that can be proved from the impossibility of their
+opposites--mathematics is the only demonstrative science.
+
+We reach certainty in matters of fact by direct perception, or by
+inferences from other facts, when they transcend the testimony of our
+senses and memory. These arguments from experience are of an entirely
+different sort from the rational demonstrations of mathematics; as the
+contrary of a fact is always thinkable (the proposition that the sun will
+not rise to-morrow implies no logical contradiction), they yield, strictly
+speaking, probability only, no matter how strong our conviction of their
+accuracy may be. Nevertheless it is advisable to separate this species of
+inferences from experience--whose certainty is not doubted except by the
+philosophers--from uncertain probabilities, as a class intermediate between
+the latter and demonstrative truth (demonstrations--proofs--probabilities).
+All reasonings concerning matters of fact are based on the relation of
+cause and effect. Whence, then, do we obtain the knowledge of cause and
+effect? Not by _a priori_ thought. Pure reason is able only to analyze
+concepts into their elements, not to connect new predicates with them. All
+its judgments are analytic, while synthetic judgments rest on experience.
+Judgments concerning causation belong in this latter class, for effects are
+entirely distinct from causes; the effect is not contained in the cause,
+nor the latter in the former. In the case of a phenomenon previously
+unknown we cannot tell from what causes it has proceeded, nor what
+its effect will be. We argue that fire will warm us, and bread afford
+nourishment, because we have often perceived these causal pairs closely
+connected in space and time. But even experience does not vouchsafe all
+that we desire. It shows nothing more than the coexistence and succession
+of phenomena and events; while the judgment itself, _e. g_., that the
+motion of one body stands in causal connection with that of another,
+asserts more than mere contiguity in space and time, it affirms not merely
+that the one precedes the other, but that it produces it--not merely that
+the second follows the first, but that it results from it. The bond which
+connects the two events, the force that puts forth the second from the
+first, the necessary connection between the two is not perceived, but added
+to perception by thought, construed into it.[1] What, then, is the occasion
+and what the warrant for transforming perceived succession in time into
+causal succession, for substituting _must_ for _is_, for interpreting the
+observed connection of fact into a necessary connection which always eludes
+observation?
+
+[Footnote 1: The weakness of the concept of cause had been recognized
+before Hume by the skeptic, J. Glanvil (1636-80). Causality itself cannot
+be perceived; we infer it from the constant succession of two phenomena,
+without being able to show warrant for the transformation of _thereafter_
+into _thereby_.]
+
+We do not causally connect every chance pair of successive events, but
+those only which have been repeatedly observed together. The wonder is,
+then, that through oft-repeated observation of certain objects we come to
+believe that we know something about the behavior of other like objects,
+and the further behavior of these same ones. From the fact that I have seen
+a given apple fall ten times to the ground, I infer that all the apples in
+the world do the same when loosened, instead of flying upward, which, in
+itself, is quite as thinkable; I infer further that this has always
+been the case, and will continue to be so to all eternity. Where is the
+intermediate link between the proposition, "I have found that such an
+object has always been attended with such an effect," and this other, "I
+foresee that other objects which are, in appearance, similar, will be
+attended with similar effects"? This postulate, that the future will be
+like the past, and that like causes will have like effects, rests on a
+purely psychological basis. In virtue of the laws of association the sight
+of an object or event vividly recalls the image of a second, often observed
+in connection with the former, and leads us involuntarily to expect its
+appearance anew. The idea of causal connection is based on feeling (the
+feeling of inner determination to pass from one idea to a second), not upon
+insight; it is a product of the imagination, not of the understanding. From
+the habitual perception of two events in connection (sunshine and heat)
+arises the mental determination to think of the second when we perceive the
+first, and, anticipating the senses, to count on its appearance. It is now
+possible to state of what impression the idea of the causal nexus is the
+copy: the impression on which it is based is the habitual transition from
+the idea of a thing to its customary attendant. Hence the idea of causality
+has a purely subjective significance, not the objective one which we
+ascribe to it. It is impossible to determine whether there is a real
+necessity of becoming corresponding to the felt necessity of thought.
+In life we never doubt the fact, but for science our conviction of the
+uniformity of nature remains a merely probable (though a very highly
+probable) conviction. Complete certainty is vouchsafed only by rational
+demonstration and immediate experience. The necessary bond which we
+postulate between cause and effect can neither be demonstrated nor felt.
+
+If all experiential reasonings depend on the idea of causality, and this
+has no other support than subjective mental habit, it follows that all
+knowledge of nature which goes beyond mere observed fact is not knowledge
+(neither demonstrative knowledge nor knowledge of fact), but belief.[1] The
+probability of our belief in the regularity of natural phenomena increases,
+indeed, with every new verification of the assumptions based thereon; but,
+as has been shown, it never rises to absolute certainty. Nevertheless
+inferences from experience are trustworthy and entirely sufficient for
+practical life, and the aim of the above skeptical deliverances was not
+to shake belief--only a fool or a lunatic can doubt in earnest the
+immutability of nature--but only to make it clear that it is mere belief,
+and not, as hitherto held, demonstrative or factual knowledge. Our doubt
+is intended to define the boundary between knowledge and belief, and to
+destroy that absolute confidence which is a hindrance rather than a help to
+investigation. We should recognize it as a wise provision of nature that
+the regulation of our thoughts and the belief in the objective validity
+of our anticipation of future events have not been confided to the weak,
+inconstant, inert, and fallacious reason, but to a powerful instinct. In
+life and action we are governed by this natural impulse, in spite of all
+the scruples of the skeptical reason.
+
+[Footnote 1: Hume distinguishes belief as a form of knowledge from
+religious faith, both in fact and in name. In the _Treatise_--the passage
+is wanting in the _Enquiry_--our conviction of the external existence of
+the objects of perception is also ascribed to the former, which later
+formed Jacobi's point of departure. Religious faith is referred to
+revelation.]
+
+In Hume's earlier work his destructive critique of the idea of cause
+is accompanied by a deliverance in a similar strain on the concept of
+substance, which is not included in the shorter revision. Substances are
+not perceived through impressions, but only qualities and powers. The
+unknown something which is supposed to have qualities, or in which these
+are supposed to inhere, is an unnecessary fiction of the imagination. A
+permanent similarity of attributes by no means requires a self-identical
+support for these. A thing is nothing more than a collection of qualities,
+to which we give a special name because they are always found together. The
+idea of substance, like the idea of cause, is founded in a subjective habit
+which we erroneously objectify. The impression from which it has arisen
+is our inner perception that our thought remains constant in the repeated
+experience of the same group of qualities (whenever I see sugar, _I do the
+same thing_, that is, I combine the qualities white color, sweet taste,
+hardness, etc., with one another), or the impression of a uniform
+combination of ideas. The idea of substance becomes erroneous through the
+fact that we refer it not to the inner activity of representation, to which
+it rightly belongs, but to the external group of qualities, and make it
+a real, permanent substratum for the latter. Mental substances disappear
+along with material substances. The soul or mind is, in reality, nothing
+more than the sum of our inner states, a collection of ideas which flow
+on in a continuous and regular stream; it is like a stage, across which
+feelings, perceptions, thoughts, and volitions are passing while it does
+not itself come into sight. A permanent self or ego, as a substratum of
+ideas, is not perceived; there is no invariable, permanent impression. That
+which leads to the assumption of personal identity is only the frequent
+repetition of similar trains of ideas, and the gradual succession of
+our ideas, which is easily confused with constancy. Thus robbed of its
+substantiality, the soul has no further claims to immateriality and
+immortality, and suicide ceases to be a crime.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. the essays on _Suicide_ and the _Immortality of the Soul_,
+1783, whose authorship by Hume, however, is not absolutely established [of.
+Green and Grose, as above, p. 221, note first.--TR.]]
+
+Is Hume roundly to be called a skeptic? [1] He never impugned the validity
+of mathematical reasonings, nor experimental truths concerning matters of
+fact; in regard to the former his thought is rationalistic, in regard to
+the latter it is empirical or, more accurately, sensationalistic. His
+attitude toward the empirical sciences of nature and of mind is that of a
+semi-skeptic or probabilist, in so far as they go beyond the establishment
+of facts to the proof of connections under law and to inferences concerning
+the future. Habit is for him a safe guide for life, although it does not go
+beyond probabilities; absolute knowledge is unattainable for us, but
+not indispensable. Toward metaphysics, as an alleged science of the
+suprasensible, he takes up an entirely negative attitude. If an argument
+from experience is to be assured of merely that degree of probability which
+is sufficient for belief, it must not only have a well-established fact (an
+impression or memory-image) for its starting point, but, together with its
+conclusion, it must keep within the limits of possible experience. The
+limits of possible experience are also the limits of the knowable;
+inferences to the continued existence of the soul after death and to the
+being of God are vain sophistry and illusion. According to the famous
+conclusion of the _Essay_, all volumes which contain anything other than
+"abstract reasonings concerning quantity or number" or "experimental
+reasonings concerning matter of fact and existence" deserve to be committed
+to the flames. In view of this limitation of knowledge to that which is
+capable of exact measurement and that which is present in experience, as
+well of the principle that the elements added by thought are to be
+sharply distinguished from the positively given (the immediate facts of
+perception), we must agree with those who call Hume the father of modern
+positivism.[2]
+
+[Footnote 1: In the _Essay_, Hume describes his own standpoint as mitigated
+or academical skepticism in antithesis to the Cartesian, which from doubt
+and through doubt hopes to reach the indubitable, and to the excessive
+skepticism of Pyrrhonism, which cripples the impulse to inquiry. This
+moderate skepticism asks us only, after resisting the tendency to
+unreflecting conclusions, to make a duty of deliberation and caution in
+judging, and to restrain inquiry within those fields which are accessible
+to our knowledge, _i.e._, the fields of mathematics and empirical fact. In
+the _Treatise_ Hume had favored a sharper skepticism and extended his doubt
+more widely, _e.g._, even to the trustworthiness of geometry. Cf. on this
+point Ed. Grimm, _Zur Geschichte des Erkenntnissproblems_, 1890, p, 559
+_seq_.]
+
+[Footnote 2: So Volkelt, _Erfahrung und Denken_, 1886, p. 105.]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+As a philosopher of religion Hume is the finisher and destroyer of deism.
+Of the three principles of the deists--religion, its origin and its truth
+are objects of scientific investigation; religion has its origin in the
+reason and the consciousness of duty; natural religion is the oldest, the
+positive religions are degenerate or revived forms of natural religion--he
+accepts the first, while rejecting the other two. Religion may correspond
+to reason or contradict it, but not proceed from it. Religion has its basis
+in human nature, yet not in its rational but its sensuous side; not in
+the speculative desire for knowledge, but in practical needs; not in the
+contemplation of nature, but in looking forward with fear or joy to the
+changing events of human life. Anxiety and hope concerning future events
+lead us to posit unseen powers as directing our destiny, and to seek their
+favor. The capriciousness of fortune points to a plurality of gods;
+the tendency to conceive all things like ourselves gives them human
+characteristics; the powerful impression made by all that comes within the
+sphere of the senses incites us to connect the divine power with visible
+objects; the allegorical laudation and deification of eminent men leads to
+a completed polytheism. That this and not (mono-) theism was the original
+form of religion, Hume assumes to be a fact for historical times, and a
+well-founded conjecture for prehistoric ages. Those who hold that humanity
+began with a perfect religion find it difficult to explain the obscuration
+of the truth, endow immature ages with a developed use of the reason which
+they can scarcely have possessed, make error grow worse with increasing
+culture, and contradict the historical progress upward which is everywhere
+else observed. The philosophical knowledge of God is a very late product of
+mature reflection; even monotheism, as a popular religion, did not arise
+from rational reflection, although its chief principle is in agreement
+with the results of philosophy, but from the same irrational motives
+as polytheism. Its origin from polytheism is accomplished by the
+transformation of the leading god (the king of the gods or the tutelary
+deity of the nation) through the fear and emulous flattery of his votaries
+into the one, infinite, spiritual ruler of the world. Amid the folly of the
+superstitious herd, however, this refined idea is not long preserved in its
+purity; the more exalted the conception entertained of the supreme deity,
+the more imperatively the need makes itself felt for the interpolation
+between this being and mankind of mediators and demi-gods, partaking more
+of the human nature of the worshipers and more familiar to them. Later
+a new purification takes place, so that the history of religion shows a
+continuous alternation of the lower and higher forms.
+
+After depriving theism of its prerogative of originality, Hume further
+takes away from it its fame as in every respect the best religion. It is
+disadvantageously distinguished from polytheism by the fact that it is more
+intolerant, makes its followers pusillanimous, and, by its incomprehensible
+dogmas, puts their faith to severer tests; while it is on a level with
+polytheism in that most of its adherents exalt belief in foolish mysteries,
+fanaticism, and the observance of useless customs above the practice of
+virtue.
+
+The _Natural History of Religion_, which far outbids the conclusions of
+the deists by its endeavors to explain religion, not on rational, but on
+historical and psychological grounds, and to separate it entirely
+from knowledge by relegating it to the sphere of practice, leaves the
+possibility of a philosophical knowledge of God an open question. The
+_Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_ greatly diminish this hope.
+The most cogent argument for the intelligence of the world-ground, the
+teleological argument, is a hypothesis which has grave weaknesses, and one
+to which many other equally probable hypotheses may be opposed. The finite
+world, with its defects and abounding misery amid all its order and
+adaptation, can never yield an inference to an infinite, perfect
+unit-cause, to an all-powerful, all-wise, and benevolent deity. To this
+the eleventh section of the _Enquiry_ adds the argument, that it is
+inadmissible to ascribe to the inferred cause other properties than those
+which are necessary to explain the observed effect. The tenth section of
+the same _Essay_ argues that there is no miracle supported by a sufficient
+number of witnesses credible because of their intelligence and honesty, and
+free from a preponderance of contradictory experiences and testimony of
+greater probability. In short, the reason is neither capable of reaching
+the existence of God by well-grounded inference nor of comprehending the
+truth of the Christian religion with its accompanying miracles. That which
+transcends experience cannot be proven and known, but only believed in.
+Whoever is moved by faith to give assent to things which contradict all
+custom and experience, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own
+person.
+
+Hume never denied the existence of God, never directly impugned revelation.
+His final word is doubt and uncertainty. It is certain that his counsel not
+to follow the leadership of the reason in religious matters, but to submit
+ourselves to the power of instinct and common opinion, was less earnest and
+less in harmony with the nature of the philosopher than his other advice,
+to take refuge from the strife of the various forms of superstition in the
+more quiet, though dimmer regions of--naturally, the skeptical--philosophy.
+Hume's originality and greatness in this field consist in his genetic view
+of the historical religions. They are for him errors, but natural ones,
+grounded in the nature of man, "sick men's dreams," whose origin and course
+he searches out with frightful cold-bloodedness, with the dispassionate
+interest of the dissector.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In his moral philosophy[1] Hume shows himself the empiricist only, not the
+skeptic. The laws of human nature are capable of just as exact empirical
+investigation as those of external nature; observation and analysis promise
+even more brilliant success in this most important, and yet hitherto so
+badly neglected, branch of science than in physics. As knowledge and
+opinion have been found reducible to the associative play of ideas, and the
+store of ideas, again, to original impressions and shown derivable from
+these; so man's volition and action present themselves as results of the
+mechanical working of the passions, which, in turn, point further back to
+more primitive principles. The ultimate motives of all action are pleasure
+and pain, to which we owe our ideas of good and evil. The direct passions,
+desire and aversion, joy and sorrow, hope and fear, are the immediate
+effects of these original elements. From the direct arise in certain
+circumstances the indirect passions, pride and humility, love and hatred
+(together with respect and contempt); the first two, if the objects which
+excite feeling are immediately connected with ourselves, the latter, when
+pleasure and pain are aroused by the accomplishments or the defects of
+others. While love and hate are always conjoined with a readiness
+for action, with benevolence or anger, pride and humility are pure,
+self-centered, inactive emotions.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. G. von Gizycki, _Die Ethik David Humes_, 1878.]
+
+All moral phenomena, will, moral judgment, conscience, virtue, are not
+simple and original data, but of a composite or derivative nature. They are
+without exception products of the regular interaction of the passions. With
+such views there can be, of course, no question of a freedom of the will.
+If anyone objects to determinism, that virtues and vices, if they are
+involuntary and necessary, are not praise-or blame-worthy, he is to be
+referred to the applause paid to beauty and talent, which are considered
+meritorious, although they are not dependent upon our choice. The legal
+attitude of theology and law first caused all desert to be based upon
+freedom, whereas the ancient philosophers spoke unhesitatingly of
+intellectual virtues.
+
+Hume does not, like nearly all his predecessors and contemporaries, find
+the determining grounds of volition in ideas, but in the feelings. After
+curtailing the rights of the reason in the theoretical field in favor of
+custom and instinct, he dispossesses her also in the sphere of practice.
+Impassive reason, judging only of truth and falsehood, is an inactive
+faculty, which of itself can never inspire us with inclination and desire
+toward an object, can never itself become a motive. It is only capable
+of influencing the will indirectly, through the aid of some affection.
+Abstract relations of ideas, and facts as well, leave us entirely
+indifferent so long as they fail to acquire an emotional value through
+their relation to our state of mind. When we speak of a victory of reason
+over passion it is nothing but a conquest of one passion by another, _i.
+e_., of a violent passion by a calm one. That which is commonly called
+reason here is nothing but one of those general and calm affections _(e.
+g_., the love of life) which direct the will to a distant good, without
+exciting any sensible emotion in the mind; by passion we commonly
+understand the violent passions only, which engender a marked disturbance
+in the soul and the production of which requires a certain propinquity of
+the object. A man is said to be industrious "from reason," when a calm
+desire for money makes him laborious. It is a mistake to consider all
+violent passions powerful, and all calm ones weak. The prevalence of calm
+affections constitutes the essence of strength of mind.
+
+As reason is thus degraded from a governor of the will to a "slave of the
+passions," so, further, judgment concerning right and wrong is taken away
+from her. Moral distinctions are determined by our sense of the agreeable
+and the disagreeable. We pass an immediate judgment of taste on the actions
+of our fellow-men; the good pleases, evil displeases. The sight of virtue
+gives us satisfaction; that of vice repels us. Accordingly an action or
+trait of mind is virtuous when it calls forth in the observer an agreeable,
+disinterested sentiment of approbation.
+
+What, then, are the actions which receive such general approval, and how is
+the praise to be explained which the spectator bestows on them? We approve
+such traits of character as are immediately agreeable or useful, either to
+the person himself or to others. This yields four classes of praiseworthy
+qualities. The first class, those which are agreeable to the possessor
+(quite apart from any utility to himself or to others), includes
+cheerfulness, greatness of mind, courage, tranquillity, and benevolence;
+the second, those immediately agreeable to others, modesty, good manners,
+politeness, and wit; the third, those useful to ourselves, strength of
+will, industry, frugality, strength of body, intelligence and other mental
+gifts. The fourth class comprises the highest virtues, the qualities useful
+to others, benevolence and justice. Pleasure and utility are in all cases
+the criterion of merit. The monkish virtues of humility and mortification
+of the flesh, which bring no pleasure or advantage either to their
+possessor or to society, are considered meritorious by no one who
+understands the subject.
+
+If the moral value of actions is thus made to depend on their effects, we
+cannot dispense with the assistance of reason in judging moral questions,
+since it alone can inform us concerning these results of action. Reason,
+however, is not sufficient to determine us to praise or blame. Nothing but
+a sentiment can induce us to give the preference to beneficial and useful
+tendencies over pernicious ones. This feeling is evidently no other than
+satisfaction in the happiness of men and uneasiness in view of their
+misery--in short, it is sympathy. By means of the imagination we enter into
+the experiences of others and participate in their joy and sorrow. Whatever
+depresses or rejoices them, whatever inspires them with pride, fills us
+with similar emotions. From the habit of sympathetically passing moral
+judgment on the actions of others, and of seeing our own judged by them,
+is developed the further one of keeping a constant watch over ourselves and
+of considering our dispositions and deeds from the standpoint of the good
+of others. This custom is called conscience. Allied to this is the love of
+reputation, which continually leads us to ask, How will our behavior appear
+in the eyes of those with whom we associate?
+
+Within the fourth and most important class, the social virtues, Hume
+distinguishes between the natural virtues of humanity and benevolence and
+the artificial virtues of justice and fidelity. The former proceed from our
+inborn sympathy with the good of others, while the latter, on the other
+hand, are not to be derived from a natural passion, an instinctive love of
+humanity, but are the product of reflection and art, and take their origin
+in a social convention.
+
+In order that an action may gain the approval of the spectator two other
+things are required besides its salutary effects: it must be a mark
+of character, of a permanent disposition, and it must proceed from
+disinterested motives. Hume is obliged by this latter position to show that
+disinterested benevolence actually exists, that the unselfish affections
+do not secretly spring from self-love. To cite only one of the thousand
+examples of benevolence in which no discernible interest is concerned,
+we desire happiness for our friends even when we have no expectation
+of participating in it. The accounts of human selfishness are greatly
+overdrawn, and those who deduce all actions from it make the mistake of
+taking the inevitable consequences of virtue--the pleasure of self-approval
+and of being esteemed by others--for the only motives to virtue. Because
+virtue, in the outcome, produces inner satisfaction and is praised by
+others, it does not follow that it is practiced merely for the sake of
+these agreeable consequences. Self-love is a secondary impulse, whose
+appearance at all presupposes primary impulses. Only after we have
+experienced the pleasure which comes from the satisfaction of such an
+original impulse (_e. g_., ambition), can this become the object of a
+conscious reflective search after pleasure, or of egoism. Power brings no
+enjoyment to the man by nature devoid of ambition, and he who is naturally
+ambitious does not desire fame because it affords him pleasure, but
+conversely, fame affords him pleasure because he desires it. The natural
+propensity which terminates directly on the object, without knowledge or
+foresight of the pleasurable results, comes first, and egoistic reflection
+directed toward the hoped-for enjoyment can develop only after this has
+been satisfied. The case is the same with benevolence as with the love
+of fame. It is implanted in the constitution of our minds as an original
+impulse immediately directed toward the happiness of other men. After
+it has been exercised and its exercise rewarded by self-satisfaction,
+admiration, thanks, and reciprocation, it is indeed possible for the
+expectation of such agreeable consequences to lead us to the repetition of
+beneficent acts. But the original motive is not an egoistic, regard for
+useful consequences. If, from the force of the passion alone, vengeance
+may be so eagerly pursued that every consideration of personal quiet and
+security is silenced, it may also be conceded that humanity causes us
+to forget our own interests. Nay, further, the social affections, as
+Shaftesbury has proven, are the strongest of all, and the man will rarely
+be found in whom the sum of the benevolent impulses will not outweigh that
+of the selfish ones.
+
+In the section on justice Hume attacks the contract theory. Law, property,
+and the sacredness of contracts exist first in society, but not first in
+the state. The obligation to observe contracts is, indeed, made stronger by
+the civil law and civil authority, but not created by them. Law arises from
+convention, _i. e_., not from a formal contract, but a tacit agreement, a
+sense of common interest, and this agreement, in turn, proceeds from an
+original propensity to enter into social relations. The unsocial and
+lawless state of nature is a philosophical fiction which has never existed;
+men have always been social. They have all at least been born into the
+society of the family, and they know no-more terrible punishment than
+isolation. States are not created, however, by a voluntary act, but have
+their roots in history. The question at issue between Hobbes and Hume was
+thus adjusted at a later period by Kant: the state, it is true, has not
+historically arisen from a contract, yet it is allowable and useful to
+consider it under the aspect of a contract as a regulative idea.
+
+
+Only once since David Hume, in Herbert Spencer, has the English nation
+produced a mind of like comprehensive power. Hume and Locke form the
+culminating points of English thought. They are national types, in that
+in them the two fundamental tendencies of English thinking, clearness of
+understanding and practical sense, were manifested in equal force. In Locke
+these worked together in harmonious co-operation. In Hume the friendly
+alliance is broken, the common labor ceases; each of the two demands its
+full rights; a painful breach opens up between science and life. Reason
+leads inevitably to doubt, to insight into its own weakness, while life
+demands conviction. The doubter cannot act, the agent cannot know. It is
+true that a substitute is found for defective knowledge in belief based
+upon instinct and custom; but this is a makeshift, not a solution of the
+problem, an acknowledgment of the evil, not a cure for it. Further, Hume's
+greatness does not consist in the fact that he preached modesty to the
+contending parties, that he banished the doubting reason into the study
+and restricted life to belief in probabilities, but in the mental strength
+which enabled him to endure sharp contradictions, and, instead of an
+overhasty and easy reconciliation, to suspend the one impulse until the
+other had made its demands thoroughly, completely, and regardlessly heard.
+Though he is distinguished from other skeptics by the fact that he not
+only shows the fundamental conceptions of our knowledge of nature and the
+principles of religion uncertain and erroneous, but finds _necessary_
+errors in them and acutely uncovers their origin in the lawful workings
+of our inner life, yet his historical influence essentially rests on his
+skepticism. In his own country it roused in the "Scottish School" the
+reaction of common sense, while in Germany it helped to wake a kindred but
+greater spirit from the bonds of his dogmatic slumbers, and to fortify him
+for his critical achievements.
+
+(c) %The Scottish School%.--Priestley's associational psychology,
+Berkeley's idealism, and Hume's skepticism are legitimate deductions from
+Locke's assumption that the immediate objects of thought are not things but
+ideas, and that judgment or knowledge arises from the combination of ideas
+originally separate. The absurdity of the consequences shows the falsity of
+the premises. The true philosophy must not contradict common sense. It
+is not correct to look upon the mind as a sheet of white paper on which
+experience inscribes single characters, and then to make the understanding
+combine these originally disconnected elements into judgments by means of
+comparison, and the belief in the existence of the object come in as a
+later result added to the ideas by reflection. It is rather true that the
+elements discovered by the analysis of the cognitive processes are far from
+being the originals from which these arise. It is not isolated ideas that
+come first, but judgments, self-evident axioms of the understanding, which
+form part of the mental constitution with which God has endowed us; and
+sensation is accompanied by an immediate belief in the reality of the
+object. Sensation guarantees the presence of an external thing possessing a
+certain character, although it is not an image of this property, but merely
+a sign for something in no wise resembling itself.
+
+This is the standpoint of the founder[1] of the Scottish School, Thomas
+Reid (1710-96, professor in Aberdeen and Glasgow; _An Inquiry into the
+Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense_, 1764; _Essays on the
+Intellectual Powers of Man_, 1785, _Essays on the Active Powers_, 1788,
+together under the title, _Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind.
+Collected Works_, 1804, and often since, especially the edition by
+Hamilton, with valuable notes and dissertations, 7th ed., 2 vols., 1872).
+We may recognize in it a revival of the common notions of Herbert, as well
+as a transfer of the innate faculty of judgment inculcated by the ethical
+and aesthetic writers from the practical to the theoretical field; the
+"common sense" of Reid is an original sense for truth, as the "taste"
+of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson was a natural sense for the good and the
+beautiful. Like Jacobi at a later period, Reid points out that mediate,
+reasoned knowledge presupposes a knowledge which is immediate, and all
+inference and demonstration, fixed, undemonstrable, immediately certain
+fundamental truths. The fundamental judgments or principles of common
+sense, which are true for us, even if [possibly] not true in themselves,
+are discoverable by observation (empirical rationalism). In the enumeration
+of them two dangers are to be avoided: we must neither raise contingent
+principles to the position of axioms, nor, from an exaggerated endeavor
+after unity, underestimate the number of these self-evident principles.
+Reid himself is always more sparing with them than his disciples. He
+distinguishes two classes: first principles of necessary truth, and first
+principles of contingent truth or truth of fact. As first principles of
+necessary truth he cites, besides the axioms of logic and mathematics,
+grammatical, aesthetic, moral, and metaphysical principles (among the last
+belong the principles: "That the qualities which we perceive by our senses
+must have a subject, which we call body, and that the thoughts we are
+conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind"; "that whatever
+begins to exist, must have a cause which produced it"). He lays down twelve
+principles as the basis of our knowledge of matters of fact, in which his
+reference to the doubt of Berkeley and Hume is evident. The most important
+of these are: "The existence of everything of which I am conscious"; "that
+the thoughts of which I am conscious, are the thoughts of a being which I
+call myself, my mind, my person"; "our own personal identity and continued
+existence, as far back as we remember anything distinctly"; "that those
+things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are
+what we perceive them to be"; "that we have some degree of power over our
+actions, and the determinations of our will"; "that there is life and
+intelligence in our fellow-men"; "that there is a certain regard due... to
+human authority in matters of opinion"; "that, in the phenomena of
+nature, what is to be, will probably be like what has been in similar
+circumstances."
+
+[Footnote 1: In the sense of "chief founder"; cf. McCosh's _Scottish
+Philosophy_, 1875, pp. 36, 68 _seq_., which is the standard authority on
+the school as a whole.--TR.]
+
+The widespread and lasting favor experienced by this theory, with its
+invitation to forget all earnest work in the problems of philosophy
+by taking refuge in common sense, shows that a general relaxation had
+succeeded the energetic endeavors which Hume had demanded of himself and
+of his readers. With this declaration of the infallibility of common
+consciousness, the theory of knowledge, which had been so successfully
+begun, was incontinently thrust aside, although, indeed, empirical
+psychology gained by the industrious investigation of the inner life by
+means of self-observation. James Beattie continued the attack on Hume
+in his _Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to
+Sophistry and Skepticism_, 1770, on the principle that wisdom must never
+contradict nature, and that whatever our nature compels us to believe,
+hence whatever all agree in, is true. In his briefer dissertations Beattie
+discussed Memory and Imagination, Fable and Romance, the Effects of
+
+Poetry and Music, Laughter, the Sublime, etc. While Beattie had given the
+preference to psychological and aesthetic questions, James Oswald (1772)
+appealed to common sense in matters of religion, describing it as an
+instinctive faculty of judgment concerning truth and falsehood. The most
+eminent among the followers of Reid was Dugald Stewart (professor in
+Edinburgh; _Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind_, 1792-1827;
+_Collected Works_, edited by Hamilton, 1854-58), who developed the
+doctrines of the master and in some points modified them. Thomas
+Brown (1778-1820), who is highly esteemed by Mill, Spencer, and Bain,
+approximated the teachings of Reid and Stewart to those of Hume. The
+philosophy of the Scottish School was long in favor both in England and in
+France, where it was employed as a weapon against materialism.
+
+By way of appendix we may mention the beginnings of a psychological
+aesthetics in Henry Home (Lord Kames, 1696-1782), and Edmund Burke
+(1728-97).[1] Home, in ethics a follower of Hutcheson, is fond of
+supporting his aesthetic views by examples from Shakespeare. Beauty (chap.
+iii.) appears to belong to the object itself, but in reality it is only an
+effect, a "secondary quality," of the object; like color, it is nothing but
+an idea in the mind, "for an object is said to be beautiful for no other
+reason but that it appears so to the spectator." It arises from regularity,
+proportion, order, simplicity--properties which belong to sublimity as well
+(chap, iv.), but to which they are by no means so essential, since it is
+satisfied with a less degree of them. While the beautiful excites emotions
+of sweetness and gayety, the sublime rouses feelings which are agreeable,
+it is true, but which are not sweet and gay, but strong and more serious.
+Burke's explanation goes deeper. He derives the antithesis of the sublime
+and the beautiful from the two fundamental impulses of human nature, the
+instinct of self-preservation and the social impulse. Whatever is contrary
+to the former makes a strong and terrible impression on the soul; whatever
+favors the latter makes a weak but agreeable one. The terrible delights us
+(first depressing and then exalting us), when we merely contemplate it,
+without being ourselves affected by the danger or the pain--this is the
+sublime. On the other hand, that is beautiful which inspires us with
+tenderness and affection without our desiring to possess it. Sublimity
+implies a certain greatness, beauty, a certain smallness. Delight in both
+is based on bodily phenomena. Terror moderated exercises a beneficent
+influence on the nerves by stimulating them and giving them tension;
+the gentle impression of beauty exerts a quieting effect upon them. The
+disturbances caused by the former, and the recovery induced by the latter,
+are both conducive to health, and hence, experienced as pleasures.
+
+[Footnote 1: Home, _Elements of Criticism_, 1762. Burke, _A Philosophical
+Inquiry info the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful_,
+1756.]
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+THE FRENCH ILLUMINATION.
+
+In the last decade of the seventeenth century France had yielded the
+leadership in philosophy to England. Whereas Hobbes had in Paris imbibed
+the spirit of the Galilean and Cartesian inquiry, while Bacon, Locke, and
+even Hume had also visited France with advantage, now French thinkers take
+the watchword from the English. Montesquieu and Voltaire, returning from
+England in the same year (1729), acquaint their countrymen with the ideas
+of Locke and his contemporaries. These are eagerly caught up; are, step
+by step, and with the logical courage characteristic of the French mind,
+developed to their extreme conclusions; and, at the same time, spread
+abroad in this heightened form among the people beyond the circles of the
+learned, nay, even beyond the educated classes. The English temperament is
+favorable neither to this advance to extreme revolutionary inferences nor
+to this propagandist tendency. Locke combines a rationalistic ethics with
+his semi-sensational theory of knowledge; Newton is far from finding in his
+mechanical physics a danger for religious beliefs; the deists treat the
+additions of positive religion rather as superfluous ballast than as
+hateful unreason; Bolingbroke wishes at least to conceal from the people
+the illuminating principles which he offers to the higher classes. Such
+halting where farther progress threatens to become dangerous to moral
+interests does more honor to the moral, than to the logical, character of
+the philosopher. But with the transfer of these ideas to France, the wall
+of separation is broken down between the theory of knowledge and the theory
+of ethics, between natural philosophy and the philosophy of religion;
+sensationalism forces its way from the region of theory into the sphere
+of practice, and the mechanical theory is transformed from a principal
+of physical interpretation into a metaphysical view of the world of an
+atheistical character. Naturalism is everywhere determined to have its
+own: if knowledge comes from the senses, then morality must be rooted
+in self-interest; whoever confines natural science to the search for
+mechanical causes must not postulate an intelligent Power working from
+design, even to explain the origin of things and the beginning of
+motion--has no right to speak of a free will, an immortal soul, and a deity
+who has created the world. Further, as Bayle's proof that the dogmas of
+the Church were in all points contradictory to reason had, contrary to its
+author's own wishes, exerted an influence hostile to religion, and as,
+moreover, the political and social conditions of the time incited to revolt
+and to a break with all existing institutions, the philosophical ideas from
+over the Channel and the condition of things at home alike pressed toward
+a revolutionary intensification of modern principles, which found
+comprehensive expression in the atheists' Bible, the _System of Nature_ of
+Baron Holbach, 1770. The movement begins in the middle of the thirties,
+when Montesquieu commences to naturalize Locke's political views in France,
+and Voltaire does the same service for Locke's theory of knowledge,
+and Newton's natural philosophy, which had already been commended by
+Maupertuis. The year 1748, the year also of Hume's _Essay_, brings
+Montesquieu's chief work and La Mettrie's _Man a Machine_. While the
+_Encyclopedia_, the herald of the Illumination, begun in 1751, is advancing
+to its completion (1772, or rather 1780), Condillac (1754) and Bonnet
+(1755) develop theoretical sensationalism, and Helvetius (_On Mind_,
+1758; in the same year, D'Alembert's _Elements of Philosophy_) practical
+sensationalism. Rousseau, engaged in authorship from 1751 and a contributor
+to the _Encyclopedia_ until 1757 comes into prominence, 1762, with his two
+chief works, _Emile_ and the _Social Contract_. Parallel with these we
+find interesting phenomena in the field of political economy: Morelly's
+communistic _Code of Nature_ (1755), the works of Quesnay (1758), the
+leader of the physiocrats, and those of Turgot, 1774.
+
+Our discussion takes up, first, the introduction and popularization of
+English ideas; then, the further development of these into a consistent
+sensationalism, into the morality of interest, and into materialism;
+finally, the reaction against the illumination of the understanding in
+Rousseau's philosophy of feeling.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: On the whole chapter cf. Damiron, _Mémoires pour Servir à
+l'Histoire de la Philosophie au XVIII. Siécle_, 3 vols., 1858-64; and
+John Morley's _Voltaire_, 1872 [1886], _Rousseau_, 1873 [1886], and
+_Diderot and the Encyclopedists_, 1878 [new ed., 1886].]
+
+
+1. %The Entrance of English Doctrines%.
+
+Montesquieu[1] (1689-1755) made Locke's doctrine of constitutional
+monarchy and the division of powers (pp. 179-180), with which he joins the
+historical point of view of Bodin and the naturalistic positions of the
+time, the common property of the cultivated world. Laws must be adapted to
+the character and spirit of the nation; the spirit of the people, again,
+is the result of nature, of the past, of manners, of religion, and of
+political institutions. Nature has bestowed many gifts on the Southern
+peoples, but few on those of the North; hence the latter need freedom,
+while the former readily dispense with it. Warm climates produce greater
+sensibility and passionateness, cold ones, muscular vigor and industry; in
+the temperate zones nations are less constant in their habits, their vices,
+and their virtues. The laws of religion concern man as man, those of the
+state concern him as a citizen; the former have for their object the moral
+good of the individual, the latter, the welfare of society; the first aim
+at immutable, the second at mutable good. Laws and manners are closely
+interrelated. Right is older than the state, and the law of justice holds
+even in the state of nature; but in order to assure peace positive right is
+required in three forms, international, political, and civil.
+
+[Footnote 1: Montesquieu, _Persian Letters_, 1721; _Considerations on
+the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and of their Decadence_, 1734;
+_Spirit of Laws_, 1748.]
+
+Each of the four political forms has a passion for its underlying
+principle: despotism has fear; monarchy, honor (personal and class
+prejudice); aristocracy, the moderation of the nobility; democracy,
+political virtue, which subordinates personal to general welfare, and
+especially the inclination to equality and frugality. While republics are
+destroyed by extravagance, lust, and self-seeking, a monarchy can dispense
+with civil virtue, patriotism, and moral disinterestedness, since in it
+false honor, luxury, and wantonness subserve the public good. Great states
+tend toward despotism; smaller ones toward aristocracy, or a democratic
+republicanism; for those of medium size monarchy, which is intermediate
+between the two former, is the best form of constitution. Although
+Montesquieu, in his _Lettres Persanes_, shows himself enthusiastic for the
+federal republics of Switzerland and the Netherlands, his opinions are
+different after his return from England, and in his _Esprit des Lois_ he
+praises the English form of government as the ideal of civil liberty.
+
+Political freedom consists in liberty to do (not what we wish, but) what
+we ought, or in doing that which the laws allow. Such lawful freedom is
+possible only where the constitution of the state and criminal legislation
+inspire the citizen with a sense of security. In order to prevent misuse of
+the supreme power, the different authorities in the state must be divided
+so that they shall hold one another in check. In particular Montesquieu
+demands for the judicial power absolute independence of the executive power
+(which Locke had termed the federative) as well as of the legislative
+power. The last belongs to parliament, which includes in its two houses an
+aristocratic and a democratic element.
+
+Voltaire[1] (1694-1778)--he himself had made this anagram from his name,
+Arouet l(e) j(eune)--seemed by his many-sided receptivity almost made to be
+the interpreter of English ideas; in the words of Windelband, he "combines
+Newton's mechanical philosophy of nature, Locke's noëtical empiricism, and
+Shaftesbury's moral philosophy under the deistic point of view." The
+same qualities which made him the first journalist, enabled him to free
+philosophy from its scholastic garb, and, by concentrating it on the
+problems which press most upon the lay mind (God, freedom, immortality),
+to make it a living force among the people. His superficiality, as Erdmann
+acutely remarks, was his strength. True religion, so reason teaches us,
+consists in loving God and in being just and forbearing to our fellow-men
+as to our brothers; morality is so natural and necessary that it is no
+wonder that all philosophers since Zoroaster have inculcated the same
+principles. The less of dogma the better the religion; atheism is not
+so bad as superstition, which teaches men to commit crimes with an easy
+conscience. He considered it the chief mission of his life to destroy these
+two miserable errors. He endeavored to controvert atheism by rational
+arguments, while with passionate hatred and contemptuous wit he attacked
+positive Christianity and his persecutors, the priesthood. The existence
+of God is for him not merely a moral postulate, but a result of scientific
+reasoning. One of his famous sayings was: "If God did not exist it would be
+necessary to invent him; but all nature cries out to us that he exists." He
+defends immortality in spite of theoretical difficulties, because of its
+practical necessity; his attitude toward the freedom of the will, which
+he had energetically defended in the beginning, grows constantly more
+skeptical with increasing age. His position in regard to the question
+of evil experiences a similar change--the Lisbon earthquake made him an
+opponent of optimism, though he had previously favored it.
+
+[Footnote 1: David Friedrich Strauss, _Voltaire, sechs Vorträge_, 1870.]
+
+
+%2. Theoretical and Practical Sensationalism.%
+
+We turn next from the popular introduction and dissemination of Locke's
+doctrines, which left their contents unchanged, to their principiant
+development by the French sensationalists. Condillac (1715-80) always
+thinks of his work as a completion of Locke's, whose _Essay_ he held not to
+have gone down to the final root of the cognitive process. Locke did not
+go far enough, Condillac thinks, in his rejection of innate elements; he
+failed to trace out the origin of perception, reflection, cognition, and
+volition, as also the relation between the external senses, the internal
+sense, and the combining intellect, which he discussed as separate sources,
+the two former of particular, and the last of complex, ideas; in short,
+he omitted to inquire into the origin of the first function of the soul.
+Berkeley was right in feeling that a simplification was needed here; but by
+erroneously reducing outer perception to inner perception, he reached the
+absurd conclusion of denying the external world. The true course is just
+the opposite of this--the one already taken by the Bishop of Cork, Peter
+Browne (died 1735; _The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human
+Understanding_, 1728): understanding and reflection must be reduced to
+sensation. All psychical functions are transformed sensations. The soul has
+only one original faculty, that of sensation; all the others, theoretical
+and practical alike, are acquired, _i.e._, they have gradually developed
+from the former. Condillac is related to Locke as Fichte to Kant; in
+the former case the transition is mediated by Browne, in the latter
+by Reinhold. Each crowns the work of his predecessor with a unifying
+conclusion; each demands and offers a genetic psychology which finds the
+origin of all the spiritual functions--from sensation and feelings of
+pleasure and pain up to rational cognition and moral will--in a single
+fundamental power of the soul. But there is a great difference, materially
+as well as formally, between these kindred undertakings, a difference
+corresponding to that between Locke's empiricism and Kant's idealism.
+The idea of ends, which controls the course of thought in Fichte as in
+Leibnitz, is entirely lacking in Condillac; that which is first in time,
+sensation, is for the Science of Knowledge and the Monadology only the
+beginning, not the essence, of psychical activity, while Condillac makes
+no distinction between beginning and ground, but expressly identifies
+_principe_ and _commencement_. With Fichte and Leibnitz sensation is
+immature thought, with Condillac thought is refined sensation. The former
+teach a teleological, the latter a mechanical mono-dynamism. The Science
+of Knowledge, moreover, makes a very serious task of the deduction of the
+particular psychical functions from the original power, while Condillac
+takes it extraordinarily easy. Good illustrations of his way of effacing
+distinctions instead of explaining them are given by such monotonously
+recurring phrases as memory is "nothing but" modified sensation; comparison
+and simultaneous attention to two ideas "are the same thing"; sensation
+"gradually becomes" comparison and judgment; reflection is "in its origin"
+attention itself; speech, thought, and the formation of general notions
+are "at bottom the same"; the passions are "only" various kinds of desire;
+understanding and will spring "from one root," etc.
+
+The demand for a single fundamental psychical power comes from Descartes,
+and Condillac does not hesitate to retain the word _penser_ itself as a
+general designation for all mental functions. Similarly he holds fast to
+the dualism between extension and sensation as reciprocally incompatible
+properties, opposes the soul as the "simple" subject of thought to
+"divisible" matter, and sees in the affections of the bodily organs merely
+the "occasions" on which the soul of itself alone exercises its sensitive
+activity. Even freedom--the supremacy of thought over the passions--is
+maintained, in striking contrast to the whole tendency of his doctrine and
+to the openly announced principle, that pleasure controls the attention and
+governs all our actions. He has just as little intention of doubting the
+existence of God. All is dependent on God. He is our lawgiver; it is in
+virtue of his wisdom that from small beginnings--perception and need--the
+most splendid results, science and morality, are developed under the hands
+of man. Whoever undertakes to complain that He has concealed from us the
+nature of things and granted us to know relations alone, forgets that we
+need no more than this. We do not exist in order to know; to live is to
+enjoy.
+
+The theme of the _Treatise on the Sensations_, 1754, is: Memory,
+comparison, judgment, abstraction, and reflection (in a word, cognition)
+are nothing but different forms of attention; similarly the emotions, the
+appetites, and the will, nothing but modifications of desire; while both
+alike take their origin in sensation. Sensation is the sole source and the
+sole content of the life of the mind as a whole. To prove these positions
+Condillac makes use of the fiction of a statue, in which one sense awakes
+after another, first the lowest of the senses, smell, and last the most
+valuable, the sense of touch, which compels us (by its perception of
+density or resistance) to project our sensations, and thus wakes in us the
+idea of an external world. In themselves sensations are merely subjective
+states, modes of our own being; without the sense of touch we would ascribe
+odor, sound, and color to ourselves. Condillac distinguishes between
+sensation and _ideas_ in a twofold sense, as mere ideas (the memory or
+imagination of something not present), and as ideas of objective things
+(the image, representative of a body); this latter sense is meant when he
+says, touch sensations only are also ideas.
+
+For the details of the deduction, which often makes very happy use of a
+rich store of psychological material, the reader must be referred to the
+more extended expositions. Here we can only cite as examples the chief
+among the genetic definitions. Perceptions (impressions) and consciousness
+are the same thing under different names. A lively sensation, in which the
+mind is entirely occupied, becomes attention, without the necessity of
+assuming an additional special faculty in the mind. Attention, by its
+retentive effect on the sensation, becomes memory. Double attention--to
+a new sensation, and to the lingering trace of the previous one--is
+comparison; the recognition of a relation (resemblance or difference)
+between two ideas is judgment; the separation of an idea from another
+naturally connected with it, by the aid of voluntary linguistic symbols,
+is abstraction; a series of judgments is reflection; and the sum total of
+inner phenomena, that wherein ideas succeed one another, the ego or person.
+All truths concern relations among ideas. The tactual idea of solidity
+accustoms us to project the sensations of the other senses also, to
+transfer them thither where they are not; hence arise the ideas of our
+body, of external objects, and of space. If we perceive several such
+projected qualities together, we refer them to a substratum--substance,
+which we know to exist, although not what it is. By force we mean the
+unknown, but indubitably existent, cause of motion.
+
+There are no indifferent mental states; every sensation is accompanied by
+pleasure or pain. Joy and pain give the determining law for the operation
+of our faculties. The soul dwells longer on agreeable sensations; without
+interest, ideas would pass away like shadows. The remembrance of past
+impressions more agreeable than the present ones is need; from this
+springs desire (_désir_) then the emotions of love, hate, hope, fear, and
+astonishment; finally, the will as an unconditional desire accompanied by
+the thought of its possible fulfillment. All inclinations, good and bad
+alike, spring from self-love. The predicates "good" and "beautiful"
+denote the pleasure-giving qualities of things, the former, that which is
+agreeable to smell and taste (and the passions), the latter, that which
+pleases sight, hearing, feeling (and the intellect). Morality is the
+conformity of our actions to laws, which men have established by convention
+with mutual obligations. In this way the good, which at first was the
+servant of the passions, becomes their lord.
+
+Man's superiority to the brute depends on the greater perfection of his
+sense of touch; on the greater variety of his wants and his associations
+of ideas; on the idea of death, which leads him to seek not merely the
+avoidance of pain but also self-preservation; and the possession of
+language. Without denomination no abstractions, no thought, no handing
+down of knowledge. Although all that is mental has its origin, in the last
+analysis, in simple sensations, its development requires emancipation from
+the sensuous, and language is the means for freeing ourselves from the
+pressure of sensations by the generalization and combination of ideas.
+
+A more moderate representative of sensationalism was Charles Bonnet, who
+later exercised a considerable influence in Germany, especially until
+Tetens (1720-93; _Essay in Psychology, or Considerations on the Operations
+of the Soul_, 1755; _Analytical Essay on the Faculties of the Soul_, 1760;
+_Philosophical Palingenesis, or Ideas on the Past and the Future of Living
+Beings_, 1769, including a defense of Christianity; _Collected Works_,
+1779). Sensations, to which he, too, reduces all mental life, are, in his
+view, reactions of the immaterial soul to sense stimuli, which operate
+merely as occasional causes. On the other hand, he emphasizes more strongly
+than Condillac the dependence of psychical phenomena on physiological
+conditions, and endeavors to show definite brain vibrations as the basis
+not only of habit, memory, and the association of ideas, but also of
+the higher mental operations. In harmony with these views he adheres to
+determinism, and finds the motive of all endeavor: in self-love, and
+its ultimate aim in happiness. To the latter the hope of immortality is
+indispensable. The link between Bonnet's theory of the thoroughgoing
+dependence of the soul on the body and his orthodox convictions, is formed
+by his idea of an imperishable ethereal body, which enables the soul in the
+life to come to remember its life on earth and, after the dissolution of
+the present material body, to acquire a new one. Animals as well as men
+share in the continuance of existence and the transition to a higher stage.
+
+The material earnestness of these thinkers is in sharp contrast to the
+superficial and frivolous manner in which Helvetius (1715-71) carries out
+sensationalism in the sphere of ethics. His chief work, _On Mind_, came out
+in 1758; and a year after his death, the work _On Man, his Intellectual
+Faculties and his Education_. The search for pleasure or self-love is, as
+Helvetius thinks he has discovered for the first time,[1] the only motive
+of action; the laws of interest reign in the moral world as the laws of
+motion in the physical world; justice and love for our neighbors are
+based on utility; we seek friends in order to be amused, aided, and, in
+misfortune, compassionated by them; the philanthropist and the monster both
+seek only their own pleasure.
+
+[Footnote 1: In reality not only English moralists, but also some among his
+countrymen, had anticipated him in the position that all actions proceed
+from selfishness, and that virtue is merely a refined egoism. Thus La
+Rochefoucauld in his _Maxims (Réflexions, ou Sentences et Maximes Morales_,
+1665), La Bruyère _(Les Charactères et les Moeurs de ce Siécle_, 1687), and
+La Mettrie (of. pp, 251-253).]
+
+Helvetius draws the proof for these positions from Condillac. Recollection
+and judgment are sensation. The soul is originally nothing more than the
+capacity for sensation; it receives the stimulus to its development from
+self-love, _i.e._, from powerful passions such as the love of fame, on the
+one hand, and, on the other, from hatred of _ennui_, which induces man to
+overcome the indolence natural to him and to submit himself to the irksome
+effort of attention--without passion he would remain stupid. The sum of
+ideas collected in him is called intellect. All distinctions among men
+are acquired, and concern the intellect only, not the soul: that which is
+innate--sensibility and self-love--is the same in all; differences arise
+only through external circumstances, through education. Man is the pupil of
+all that environs him, of his situation and his chance experience. The most
+important instrument in education is the law; the function of the lawgiver
+is to connect public and personal welfare by means of rewards and
+punishments, and thus to elevate morality. A man is called virtuous when
+his stronger passions harmonize with the general interest. Unfortunately
+the virtues of prejudice, which do not contribute to the public good, are
+more honored among most nations than the political virtues, to which alone
+real merit belongs. And self-interest is always the one motive to just and
+generous action; we serve only our own interests in furthering the welfare
+of the community. As the promulgator of these doctrines was himself a kind
+and generous man, Rousseau could make to him the apt reply: You endeavor in
+vain to degrade yourself below your own level; your spirit gives evidence
+against your principles; your benevolent heart discredits your doctrines.
+
+The morality of enlightened self-love or "intelligent self-interest"
+appears in a milder form in Maupertuis (_Works_, 1752), and Frederick the
+Great,[1] to the latter of whom D'Alembert objected by letter that interest
+could never generate the sense of duty and reverence for the law.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Essay on Self-love as a Principle of Morals_, 1770, printed
+in the proceedings of the Academy of Sciences. Cf. on Frederick, Ed.
+Zeller, 1886.]
+
+
+%3. Skepticism and Materialism.%
+
+The ideas thus far developed move in a direction whose further pursuit
+inevitably issues in materialism. Diderot, the editor of the _Encyclopedia
+of the Sciences, Arts, and Trades_ (1751-72), which gathered all the
+currents of the Illumination into one great stream and carried them to the
+open sea of popular culture, reflects in his intellectual development
+the dialectical movement from deism through skepticism to atheism and
+materialism, and was a co-laborer in the work which brought the whole
+movement to a conclusion, Holbach's _System of Nature_. Two decades,
+however, before the latter work, the outcome of a long development of
+thought, appeared, the physician La Mettrie[1] (1709-51) had promulgated
+materialism, though rather in an anthropological form than as a
+world-system, and with cynical satisfaction in the violation of traditional
+beliefs--in his _Natural History of the Soul_, 1745, in a disguised form,
+and, undisguised, in his _Man a Machine_, 1748--and at the same time
+(_Anti-Seneca, or Discourse on Happiness_, 1748) had sketched out for
+Helvetius the outlines of the sensationalistic morality of interest. While
+ill with a violent fever he observed the influence of the heightened
+circulation of the blood on his mental tone, and inferred that thought is
+the result of the bodily organization. The soul can only be known from the
+body. The senses, the best philosophers, teach us that matter is never
+without form and motion; and whether all matter is sentient or not,
+certainly all that is sentient is material, and every part of the organism
+contains a vital principle (the heart of a frog beats for an hour after
+its removal from the body; the parts of cut-up polyps grow into perfect
+animals). All ideas come from without, from the senses; without
+sense-impressions no ideas, without education, few ideas, the mind of a man
+grown up in isolation remains entirely undeveloped; and since the soul is
+entirely dependent on the bodily organs, along with which it originates,
+grows, and declines, it is subject to mortality. Not only animals, as
+Descartes has shown, but men, who differ from the brutes only in degree,
+are mere machines; by the soul we mean that part of the body which thinks,
+and the brain has fine muscles for thinking as the leg its coarse ones for
+walking.
+
+[Footnote 1: La Mettrie was born at St. Malo, and educated in Paris, and in
+Leyden under Boerhave; he died in Berlin, whither Frederick the Great
+had called him after he had been driven out of his native land and from
+Holland. On La Mettrie cf. Lange, _History of Materialism_, vol. ii. pp.
+49-91; and DuBois-Reymond's Address, 1875.]
+
+If man is nothing but body, there is no other pleasure than that of the
+body. There is a difference, however, between sensuous pleasure, which is
+intense and brief, and intellectual pleasure, which is calm and lasting.
+The educated man will prefer the latter, and find in it a higher and more
+noble happiness; but nature has been just enough to grant the common
+multitude, in the coarser pleasures, a more easily attainable happiness.
+Enjoy the moment, till the farce of life is ended! Virtue exists only in
+society, which restrains from evil by its laws, and incites to good by
+rousing the love of honor. The good man, who subordinates his own welfare
+to that of society, acts under the same necessity as the evil-doer; hence
+repentance and pangs of conscience, which increase the amount of pain
+in the world, but are incapable of effecting amendment, are useless and
+reprehensible: the criminal is an ill man, and must not be more harshly
+punished than the safety of society requires. Materialism humanizes and
+exercises a tranquilizing influence on the mind, as the religious view of
+the world, with its incitement to hatred, disturbs it; materialism frees
+us from the sense of guilt and responsibility, and from the fear of future
+suffering. A state composed of atheists, is not only possible, as Bayle
+argued, but it would be the happiest of all states.
+
+Among the editors of the _Encyclopedia_, the mathematician D'Alembert
+_(Elements of Philosophy_, 1758) remained loyal to skeptical views. Neither
+matter nor spirit is in its essence knowable; the world is probably quite
+different from our sensuous conception of it. As Diderot (1713-84), and
+the _Encyclopedia_ with him, advanced from skepticism to materialism,
+D'Alembert retired from the editorial board (1757), after Rousseau, also,
+had separated himself from the Encyclopedists. Diderot[1] was the leading
+spirit in the second half of the eighteenth century, as Voltaire in the
+first half. His lively and many-sided receptivity, active industry, clever
+and combative eloquence, and enthusiastic disposition qualified him for
+this rôle beyond all his contemporaries, who testify that they owe even
+more to his stimulating conversation than to his writings. He commenced by
+bringing Shaftesbury's _Inquiry into Virtue and Merit_ to the notice of
+his countrymen; and then turned his sword, on the one hand, against the
+atheists, to refute whom, he thought, a single glance into the microscope
+was sufficient, and, on the other, against the traditional belief in a
+God of anger and revenge, who takes pleasure in bathing in the tears of
+mankind. Then followed a period of skepticism, which is well illustrated by
+the prayer in the _Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature_, 1754: O God!
+I do not know whether thou art, but I will guide my thoughts and actions
+as though thou didst see me think and act, etc. Under the influence
+of Holbach's circle he finally reached (in the _Conversation between
+D'Alembert and Diderot_, and _D'Alembert's Dream_, written in 1769, but not
+published until 1830, in vol. iv. of the _Mémoires, Correspondance, et
+Ouvrages Inédits de Diderot_) the position of naturalistic monism--there
+exists but one great individual, the All. Though he had formerly
+distinguished thinking substance from material substance, and had based the
+immortality of the soul on the unity of sensation and the unity of the ego,
+he now makes sensation a universal and essential property of matter
+(_la pierre sent_), declares the talk about the simplicity of the
+soul metaphysico-theological nonsense, calls the brain a self-playing
+instrument, ridicules self-esteem, shame, and repentance as the absurd
+folly of a being that imputes to itself merit or demerit for necessary
+actions, and recognizes no other immortality than that of posthumous fame.
+But even amid these extreme conclusions, his enthusiasm for virtue remains
+too intense to allow him to assent to the audacious theories of La Mettrie
+and Helvetius.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Works_ in twenty-two vols., Paris, Brière, 1821; latest
+edition, 1875 _seq_. Cf. on Diderot the fine work by Karl Rosenkranz,
+_Diderots Leben und Werke_, 1866.]
+
+French natural science also tended toward materialism. Buffon _(Natural
+History_, 1749 _seq_) endeavors to facilitate the mechanical explanation
+of the phenomena of life by the assumption of living molecules, from
+which visible organisms are built up. Robinet (_On Nature_, 1761 _seq_.),
+availing himself of Spinozistic and Leibnitzian conceptions, goes still
+further, in that he endows every particle of matter with sensation, looks
+on the whole world as a succession of living beings with increasing
+mentality, and subjects the interaction of the material and psychical sides
+of the individual, as well as the relation of pleasure and pain in the
+universe, to a law of harmonious compensation.
+
+The _System of Nature_, 1770, which bore on its title page the name of
+Mirabaud, who had died 1760, proceeded from the company of freethinkers
+accustomed to meet in the hospitable house of Baron von Holbach (died
+1789), a native of the Palatinate. Its real author was Holbach himself,
+although his friends Diderot, Naigeon, Lagrange, the mathematician, and the
+clever Grimm (died 1807) seem to have co-operated in the preparation
+of certain sections. The cumbrous seriousness and the dry tone of this
+systematic combination of the radical ideas which the century had produced,
+were no doubt the chief causes of its unsympathetic reception by the
+public. Similarly unsuccessful was the popular account of materialism with
+which Holbach followed it, in 1772, and Helvetius's excerpts from the
+_System of Nature_, 1774.
+
+Holbach applies himself to the despiritualization of nature and the
+destruction of religious prejudices with sincere faith in the sacred
+mission of unbelief--the happiness of humanity depends on atheism. "O
+Nature, sovereign of all beings, and ye her daughters, Virtue, Reason, and
+Truth, be forever our only divinities." What has made virtue so difficult
+and so rare? Religion, which divides men instead of uniting them. What has
+so long delayed the illumination of the reason, and the discovery of truth?
+Religion with its mischievous errors, God, spirit, freedom, immortality.
+Immortality exists only in the memory of later generations; man is the
+creature of a day; nothing is permanent but the great whole of nature and
+the eternal law of universal change. Can a clock broken into a thousand
+pieces continue to mark the hours? The senseless doctrine of freedom was
+invented only to solve the senseless problem of the justification of God in
+view of the existence of evil. Man is at every moment of his life a passive
+instrument in the hands of necessity; the universe is an immeasurable
+and uninterrupted chain of actions and reactions, an eternal round of
+interchanging motions, ruled by laws, a change in which would at once alter
+the nature of all things. The most fatal error is the idea of human and
+divine spirits, which has been advanced by philosophers and adopted with
+applause by fools. The opinion that man is divided into two substances is
+based on the fact that, of the changes in our body, we directly perceive
+only the external molar movements, while, on the other hand, the inner
+motions of the invisible molecules are known only by their effects. These
+latter have been ascribed to the mind, which, moreover, we have adorned
+with properties whose emptiness is manifested by the fact that they are all
+mere negations of that which we know. Experience reveals to us only the
+extended, the corporeal, the divisible--but the mind is to be the opposite
+of all three, yet at the same time to possess the power (how, no man can
+tell) of acting on that which is material and of being acted upon by it.
+In thus dividing himself into body and soul, man has in reality only
+distinguished between his brain and himself. Man is a purely physical
+being. All so-called spiritual phenomena are functions of the brain,
+special cases of the operation of the universal forces of nature. Thought
+and volition are sensation, sensation is motion. The moving forces in the
+moral world are the same as those in the physical world; in the latter they
+are called attraction and repulsion, in the former, love and hate;
+that which the moralist terms self-love is the same instinct of
+self-preservation which is familiar in physics as the force of inertia.
+
+As man has doubled himself, so also he has doubled nature. Evil gave the
+first impulse to the formation of the idea of God, pain and ignorance have
+been the parents of superstition; our sufferings were ascribed to unknown
+powers, of which we were in fear, but which, at the same time, we hoped to
+propitiate by prayer and sacrifice. The wise turned with their worship and
+reverence toward a more worthy object, to the great All; and, in fact, if
+we seek to give the word God a tenable meaning, it signifies active nature.
+The error lay in the dualistic view, in the distinction between nature and
+itself, _i.e._ its activity, and in the belief that the explanation of
+motion required a separate immaterial Mover. This assumption is, in the
+first place, false, for since the All is the complex of all that exists
+there can be nothing outside it; motion follows from the existence of the
+universe as necessarily as its other properties; the world does not receive
+it from without, but imparts it to itself by its own power. In the second
+place the assumption is useless; it explains nothing, but confuses the
+problems of natural science to the point of insolubility. In the third
+place it is self-contradictory, for after theology has removed the Deity
+as far away from man as possible, by means of the negative metaphysical
+predicates, it finds itself necessitated to bring the two together again
+through the moral attributes--which are neither compatible with one another
+nor with the meta-physical--and crowns the absurdity by the assurance that
+we can please God by believing that which is incomprehensible. Finally, the
+assumption is dangerous; it draws men away from the present, disturbs their
+peace and enjoyment, stirs up hatred, and thus makes happiness and morality
+impossible. If, then, utility is the criterion of truth, theism--even in
+the mild form of deism--is proven erroneous by its disastrous consequences.
+All error is bane.
+
+
+Matter and motion are alike eternal. Nature is an active, self-moving,
+living whole, an endless chain of causes and effects. All is in unceasing
+motion, all is cause (nothing is dead, nothing rests), all is effect (there
+is no spontaneous motion, none directed to an end). Order and disorder are
+not in nature, but only in our understanding; they are abstract ideas to
+denote that which is conformable to our nature and that which is contrary
+to it. The end of the All is itself alone, is life, activity; the universal
+goal of particular beings, like that of the universe, is the conservation
+of being.
+
+Anthropology is for Holbach essentially reduced to two problems, the
+deduction of thought from motion, and of morality from the physical
+tendency to self-preservation. The forces of the soul are no other than
+those of the body. All mental faculties develop from sensation; sensations
+are motions in the brain which reveal to us motions without the brain. All
+the passions may be reduced to love and hate, desire and aversion, and
+depend upon temperament, on the individual mixture of the fluid parts.
+Virtue is the equilibrium of the fluids. All human actions proceed from
+interest. Good and bad men are distinguished only by their organizations,
+and by the ideas they form concerning happiness. With the same necessity
+as that of the act itself, follow the love or contempt of fellow-men,
+the pleasure of self-esteem and the pain of repentance (regret for evil
+consequences, hence no evidence of freedom). Neither responsibility nor
+punishment is done away with by this necessity--have we not the right to
+protect ourselves against the stream which damages our fields, by building
+dikes and altering its course? The end of endeavor is permanent happiness,
+and this can be attained through virtue alone. The passions which are
+useful to society compel the affection and approval of our fellows. In
+order to interest others in our welfare we must interest ourselves in
+theirs--nothing is more indispensable to man than man. The clever man acts
+morally, interest binds us to the good; love for others means love for the
+means to our own happiness. Virtue is the art of making ourselves happy
+through the happiness of others. Nature itself chastises immorality, since
+she makes the intemperate unhappy. Religion has hindered the recognition of
+these rules, has misunderstood the diseases of the soul, and applied false
+and ineffective remedies; the renunciation which she requires is opposed to
+human nature. The true moralist recognizes in medicine the key to the human
+heart; he will cure the mind through the body, control the passions and
+hold them in check by other passions instead of by sermons, and will teach
+men that the surest road to personal ends is to labor for the public good.
+Illumination is the way to virtue and to happiness.
+
+Volney (Chasseboeuf, died 1820; _Catechism of the French Citizen_, 1793,
+later under the title _Natural Law or Physical Principles of Morals deduced
+front the Organization of Man and of the Universe_; further, _The Ruins;
+Complete Works_, 1821) belongs among the moralists of self-love, although,
+besides the egoistic interests, he takes account of the natural sympathetic
+impulses also. This is still more the case with Condorcet (_Sketch of
+an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind_, 1794), who was
+influenced alike by Condillac and by Turgot, and who defends a tendency
+toward universal perfection both in the individual and in the race. Besides
+the selfish affections, which are directed as much to the injury as to the
+support of others, there lies in the organization of man a force which
+steadily tends toward the good, in the form of underived feelings of
+sympathy and benevolence, from which moral self-judgment is developed by
+the aid of reflection. The aim of true ethics and social art is not to make
+the "great" virtues universal, but to make them needless; the nearer the
+nations approximate to mental and moral perfection, the less they stand in
+need of these--happy the people in which good deeds are so customary that
+scarcely an opportunity is left for heroism. The chief instrument for the
+moral cultivation of the people is the development of the reason, the
+conscience, and the benevolent affections. Habituation to deeds of kindness
+is a source of pure and inexhaustible happiness. Sympathy with the good of
+others must be so cultivated that the sacrifice of personal enjoyment will
+be a sweeter joy than the pleasure itself. Let the child early learn to
+enjoy the delight of loving and of being loved. We must, finally, strive
+toward the gradual diminution of the inequalities of capacity, of property,
+and between ruler and ruled, for to abolish them is impossible.
+
+Of the remaining philosophers of the revolutionary period mention may be
+made of the physician Cabanis _(Relations of the Physical and the Moral in
+Man, 1799)_, and Destutt de Tracy _(Elements of Ideology, 1801 seq.)_. The
+former is a materialist in psychology (the nerves are the man, ideas are
+secretions of the brain), considers consciousness a property of organic
+matter (the soul is not a being, but a faculty), and makes moral sympathy
+develop out of the animal instincts of preservation and nourishment.
+De Tracy, also, derives all psychical activity from organization and
+sensation. His doctrine of the will, though but briefly sketched, is
+interesting. The desires have a passive and an active side (corresponding
+to the twofold action of the nerves, on themselves and on the muscles); on
+the one hand, they are feelings of pleasure or pain, and on the other, they
+lead us to action--will is need, and, at the same time, the source of
+the means for satisfying this need. Both these feelings and the external
+movements are probably based upon unconscious organic motions. The will is
+rightly identified with the personality, it is the ego itself, the totality
+of the physico-psychical life of man attaining to self-consciousness. The
+inner or organic life consists in the self-preserving functions of the
+individual, the outer or animal life, in the functions of relation (of
+sense, of motion, of speech, of reproduction); individual interests are
+rooted in the former, sympathy in the latter. The primal good is freedom,
+or the power to do what we will; the highest thing in life is love. In
+order to be happy we must avoid punishment, blame, and pangs of conscience.
+
+
+%4. Rousseau's Conflict with the Illumination.%
+
+The Genevese, Jean Jacques Rousseau[1] (1712-78), stands in a similar
+relation of opposition to the French Illumination as the Scottish School to
+the English, and Herder and Jacobi to the German. He points us away from
+the cold sophistical inferences of the understanding to the immediate
+conviction of feeling; from the imaginations of science to the unerring
+voice of the heart and the conscience; from the artificial conditions of
+culture to healthy nature. The vaunted Illumination is not the lever of
+progress, but the source of all degeneration; morality does not rest on the
+shrewd calculation of self-interest, but on original social and sympathetic
+instincts (love for the good is just as natural to the human heart as
+self-love; enthusiasm for virtue has nothing to do with our interest; what
+would it mean to give up one's life for the sake of advantage?); the truths
+of religion are not objects of thought, but of pious feeling.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Brockerhoff, Leipsic, 1863-74; L. Moreau, Paris, 1870.]
+
+Rousseau commenced his career as an author with the _Discourse on the
+Sciences and the Arts_, 1750 (the discussion of a prize question, crowned
+by the Academy of Dijon), which he describes as entirely pernicious, and
+the _Discourse on the Origin and the Bases of the Inequality among Men_,
+1753. By nature man is innocent and good, becoming evil only in society.
+Reflection, civilization, and egoism are unnatural. In the happy state of
+nature pity and innocent self-love (_amour de soi_) ruled, and the
+latter was first corrupted by the reason into the artificial feeling of
+selfishness (_amour propre_) in the course of social development--thinking
+man is a degenerate animal. Property has divided men into rich and poor;
+the magistracy, into strong and weak; arbitrary power, into masters and
+slaves. Wealth generated luxury with its artificial delights of science and
+the theater, which make us more unhappy and evil than we otherwise are;
+science, the child of vice, becomes in turn the mother of new vices. All
+nature, all that is characteristic, all that is good, has disappeared with
+advancing culture; the only relief from the universal degeneracy is to be
+hoped for from a return to nature on the part of the individual and society
+alike--from education and a state conformed to nature. The novel _Emile_ is
+devoted to the pedagogical, and the _Social Contract, or the Principles of
+Political Law_, to the political problem. Both appeared in 1762, followed
+two years later by the _Letters from the Mountain_, a defense against the
+attacks of the clergy. In these later writings Rousseau's naturalistic
+hatred of reason appears essentially softened.
+
+Social order is a sacred right, which forms the basis of all others. It
+does not proceed, however, from nature--no man has natural power over his
+fellows, and might confers no right--consequently it rests on a contract.
+Not, however, on a contract between ruler and people. The act by which the
+people chooses a king is preceded by the act in virtue of which it is a
+people. In the social contract each devotes himself with his powers and his
+goods to the community, in order to gain the protection of the latter.
+With this act the spiritual body politic comes into being, and attains its
+unity, its ego, its will. The sum of the members is called the people; each
+member, as a participant in the sovereignty, citizen, and, as bound to
+obedience to the law, subject. The individual loses his natural freedom,
+receiving in exchange the liberty of a citizen, which is limited by the
+general will, and, in addition, property rights in all that he possesses,
+equality before the law, and moral freedom, which first really makes him
+master of himself. The impulse of mere desire is slavery, obedience to
+self-imposed law, freedom. The sovereign is the people, law the general
+popular will directed to the common good, the supreme goods, "freedom and
+equality," the chief objects of legislation. The lawgiving power is the
+moral will of the body politic, the government (magistracy, prince) its
+executive physical power; the former is its heart, the latter its brain.
+Rousseau calls the government the middle term between the head of the state
+and the individual, or between the citizen as lawgiver and as subject--the
+sovereign (the people) commands, the government executes, the subject
+obeys. The act by which the people submits itself to its head is not a
+contract, but merely a mandate; whenever it chooses it can limit, alter, or
+entirely recall the delegated power. In order to security against illegal
+encroachments on the part of the government, Rousseau recommends regular
+assemblies of the people, in which, under suspension of governmental
+authority, the confirmation, abrogation, or alteration of the constitution
+shall be determined upon. Even the establishment of the articles of social
+belief falls to the sovereign people. The essential difference between
+Rousseau's theory of the state and that of Locke and Montesquieu consists
+in his rejection of the division of powers and of representation by
+delegates, hence in its unlimited democratic character. A generation after
+it was given to the world, the French Revolution made the attempt to
+translate it into practice. "The masses carried out what Rousseau himself
+had thought, it is true, but never willed" (Windelband).
+
+Rousseau's theory of education is closely allied to Locke's (cf. above),
+whose leading idea--the development of individuality--was entirely in
+harmony with the subjectivism of the philosopher of feeling. Posterity has
+not found it a difficult task to free the sound kernel therein from the
+husks of exaggeration and idiosyncrasy which surrounded it. Among the
+latter belong the preference of bodily over intellectual development, and
+the unlimited faith in the goodness of human nature. Exercise the body, the
+organs, the senses of the pupil, and keep his soul unemployed as long as
+possible; for the first, take care only that his mind be kept free from
+error and his heart from vice. In order to secure complete freedom from
+disturbance in this development, it is advisable to isolate the child from
+society, nay, even from the family, and to bring him up in retirement under
+the guidance of a private tutor.
+
+As the Swiss republican spoke in Rousseau's politics, so his religious
+theories[1] betray the Genevan Calvinist. "The Savoyard Vicar's Profession
+of Faith" (in _Emile_) proclaims deism as a religion of feeling. The
+rational proofs brought forward for the existence of God--from the motion
+of matter in itself at rest, and from the finality of the world--are only
+designed, as he declares by letter, to confute the materialists, and derive
+their impregnability entirely from the inner evidence of feeling, which
+amid the vacillation of the reason _pro_ and _con_ gives the final
+decision.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Ch. Borgeaud, _Rousseaus Religionsphilosophie_, Geneva and
+Leipsic, 1883.]
+
+If we limit our inquiry to that which is alone of importance for us, and
+rely on the evidence of feeling, it cannot be doubted that I myself exist
+and feel; that there exists an external world which affects me; that
+thought, comparison or judgment concerning relations is different from
+sensation or the perception of objects--for the latter is a passive,
+but the former an active process; that I myself produce the activity of
+attention or consideration; that, consequently, I am not merely a sensitive
+or passive, but also an active or intelligent being. The freedom of my
+thought and action guarantees to me the immateriality of my soul, and is
+that which distinguishes me from the brute. The life of the soul after
+the decay of the body is assured to me by the fact that in this world the
+wicked triumphs, while the good are oppressed. The favored position which
+man occupies in the scale of beings--he is able to look over the universe
+and to reverence its author, to recognize order and beauty, to love the
+good and to do it; and shall he, then, compare himself to the brute?--fills
+me with emotion and gratitude to the benevolent Creator, who existed before
+all things, and who will exist when they all shall have vanished away,
+to whom all truths are one single idea, all places a point, all times a
+moment. The _how_ of freedom, of eternity, of creation, of the action of
+my will upon matter, etc., is, indeed, incomprehensible to me, but _that_
+these are so, my feeling makes me certain. The worthiest employment of
+my reason is to annihilate itself before God. "The more I strive to
+contemplate his infinite essence the less do I conceive it. But it is, and
+that suffices me. The less I conceive it, the more I adore."
+
+In the depths of my heart I find the rules for my conduct engraved by
+nature in ineffaceable characters. Everything is good that I feel to be so.
+The conscience is the most enlightened of all philosophers, and as safe
+a guide for the soul as instinct for the body. The infallibility of its
+judgment is evidenced by the agreement of different peoples; amid the
+surprising differences of manners you will everywhere find the same ideas
+of justice, the same notions of good and evil. Show me a land where it is
+a crime to keep one's word, to be merciful, benevolent, magnanimous, where
+the upright man is despised and the faithless honored! Conscience enjoins
+the limitation of our desires to the degree to which we are capable of
+satisfying them, but not their complete suppression--all passions are good
+when we control them, all evil when they control us.
+
+In the second part of the "Profession du Foi du Vicaire Savoyard" Rousseau
+turns from his attacks on sensationalism, materialism, atheism, and the
+morality of interest, to the criticism of revelation. Why, in addition to
+natural religion, with its three fundamental doctrines, God, freedom, and
+immortality, should other special doctrines be necessary, which rather
+confuse than clear up our ideas of the Great Being, which exact from us
+the acceptance of absurdities, and make men proud, intolerant, and
+cruel--whereas God requires from us no other service than that of the
+heart? Every religion is good in which men serve God in a befitting manner.
+If God had prescribed one single religion for us, he would have provided
+it with infallible marks of its unique authenticity. The authority of the
+fathers and the priesthood is not decisive, for every religion claims to be
+revealed and alone true; the Mohammedan has the same right as the Christian
+to adhere to the religion of his fathers. Since all revelation comes down
+to us by human tradition, reason alone can be the judge of its divinity.
+The careful examination of the documents, which are written in ancient
+languages, would require an amount of learning which could not possibly be
+a condition of salvation and acceptance with God. Miracles and prophecy are
+not conclusive, for how are we to distinguish the true among them from
+the false? If we turn from the external to the internal criteria of the
+doctrines themselves, even here no decision can be reached between the
+reasons _pro_ and _con_ (the author puts the former into the mouth of a
+believer, and the latter into that of a rationalist); even if the former
+outweighed the latter, the difficulty would still remain of reconciling it
+with God's goodness and justice that the gospel has not reached so many of
+mankind, and of explaining how those to whom the divinity of Christ is
+now proclaimed can convince themselves of it, while his contemporaries
+misjudged and crucified him. In my opinion, I am incapable of fathoming the
+truth of the Christian religion and its value to those who confess it. The
+investigation of the reason ends in "reverential doubt": I neither accept
+revelation nor reject it, but I reject the obligation to accept it. My
+heart, however, judges otherwise than the reflection of my intellect; for
+this the sacred majesty and exalted simplicity of the Scriptures are a most
+cogent proof that they are more than human, and that He whose history they
+contain is more than man. The touching grace and profound wisdom of his
+words, the gentleness of his conduct, the loftiness of his maxims, his
+mastery over his passions, abundantly prove that he was neither an
+enthusiast nor an ambitious sectary. Socrates lived and died like a
+philosopher, Jesus like a God. The virtues of justice, patriotism, and
+moderation taught by Socrates, had been exercised by the great men of
+Greece before he inculcated them. But whence could Jesus derive in his time
+and country that lofty morality which he alone taught and exemplified?
+Things of this sort are not invented. The inventor of such deeds would
+be more wonderful than the doer of them. Thus again, in the question of
+revealed religion, the voice of the heart triumphs over the doubts of the
+reason, as, in the question of natural religion, it had done over the
+objections of opponents. It is true, however, that this enthusiasm is
+paid not to the current Christianity of the priests, but to I the real
+Christianity of the gospel.
+
+Rousseau was the conscience of France, which rebelled against the negations
+and the bald emptiness of the materialistic and atheistic doctrines. By
+vindicating with fervid eloquence the participation of the whole man in
+the highest questions, in opposition to the one-sided illumination of the
+understanding, he became a pre-Kantian defender of the faith of practical
+reason. His emphatic summons aroused a loud and lasting echo, especially in
+Germany, in the hearts of Goethe, Kant, and Fichte.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+LEIBNITZ.
+
+In the contemporaries Spinoza and Locke, the two schools of modern
+philosophy, the Continental, starting from Descartes, and the English,
+which followed Bacon, had reached the extreme of divergence and opposition,
+Spinoza was a rationalistic pantheist, Locke, an empirical individualist.
+With Leibnitz a twofold approximation begins. As a rationalist he sides
+with Spinoza against Locke, as an individualist with Locke against Spinoza.
+But he not only separated rationalism from pantheism, but also qualified
+it by the recognition (which his historical tendencies had of themselves
+suggested to him) of a relative justification for empiricism, since he
+distinguished the factual truths of experience from the necessary truths of
+reason, gave to the former a noëtical principle of their own, the principle
+of sufficient reason, and made sensation an indispensable step to thought.
+
+To the tendencies thus manifested toward a just estimation and peaceful
+reconciliation of opposing standpoints, Leibnitz remained true in all the
+fields to which he devoted his activity. Thus, in the sphere of religion,
+he took an active part in the negotiations looking toward the reunion of
+the Protestant and Catholic Churches, as well as in those concerning the
+union of the Lutheran and the Reformed. Himself a stimulating man, he yet
+needed stimulation from without. He was an astonishingly wide reader, and
+declared that he had never found a book that did not contain something
+of value. With a ready adaptability to the ideas of others he combined a
+remarkable power of transformative appropriation; he read into books more
+than stood written in them. The versatility of his genius was unlimited:
+jurist, historian, diplomat, mathematician, physical scientist, and
+philosopher, and in addition almost a theologian and a philologist--he is
+not only at home in all these departments, because versed in them, but
+everywhere contributes to their advancement by original ideas and plans. In
+such a combination of productive genius and wealth of knowledge Aristotle
+and Leibnitz are unapproached.
+
+Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz was born in 1646 at Leipsic, where his father
+(Friederich Leibnitz, died 1652) was professor of moral philosophy; in his
+fifteenth year he entered the university of his native city, with law as
+his principal subject. Besides law, he devoted himself with quite as much
+of ardor to philosophy under Jacob Thomasius (died 1684, the father of
+Christian Thomasius), and to mathematics under E. Weigel in Jena. In 1663
+(with a dissertation entitled _De Principio Individui_) he became Bachelor,
+in 1664 Master of Philosophy, and in 1666, at Altdorf, Doctor of Laws, and
+then declined the professorship extraordinary offered him in the latter
+place. Having made the acquaintance of the former minister of the Elector
+of Mayence, Freiherr von Boineburg, in Nuremberg, he went, after a short
+stay at Frankfort-on-the-Main, to the court of the Elector at Mayence, at
+whose request he devoted himself to the reform of legal procedure, besides
+writing, while there, on the most diverse subjects. In 1672 he went to
+Paris, where he remained during four years with the exception of a short
+stay in London. The special purpose of the journey to Paris--to persuade
+Louis XIV to undertake a campaign in Egypt, in order to divert him from his
+designs upon Germany--was not successful; but Leibnitz was captivated
+by the society of the Parisian scholars, among them the mathematician,
+Huygens. From the end of 1676 until his death in 1716 Leibnitz lived
+in Hanover, whither he had been called by Johann Friedrich, as court
+councillor and librarian. The successor of this prince, Ernst August, who,
+with his wife Sophie, and his daughter Sophie Charlotte, showed great
+kindness to the philosopher, wished him to write a history of the princely
+house of Brunswick; and a journey which he made in order to study for this
+purpose was extended as far as Vienna and Rome. Upon his return he took
+charge of the Wolfenbüttel library in addition to his other engagements.
+
+The marriage of the Princess Sophie Charlotte with Frederick of
+Brandenburg, the first king of Prussia, brought Leibnitz into close
+relations with Berlin. At his suggestion the Academy (Society) of Sciences
+was founded there in 1700, and he himself became its first president. In
+Charlottenburg he worked on his principal work, the _New Essays concerning
+the Human Understanding_, which was aimed at Locke, but the publication of
+which was deferred on account of the death of the latter in the interim
+(1704), and did not take place until 1765, in Raspe's collective edition.
+The death of the Prussian queen in 1705 interrupted for several years the
+_Theodicy_, which had been undertaken at her request, and which did not
+appear until 1710. In Vienna, where he resided in 1713-14, Leibnitz
+composed a short statement of his system for Prince Eugen; this, according
+to Gerhardt, was not the sketch in ninety paragraphs, familiar under the
+title _Monadology_, which was first published in the original by J.E.
+Erdmann in his excellent _Complete Edition of the Philosophical Works
+of Leibnitz_, 1840, but the _Principles of Nature and of Grace_, which
+appeared two years after the author's death in _L'Europe Savante_.
+While Ernst August, as well as the German emperor and Peter the Great,
+distinguished the philosopher, who was not indifferent to such honors, by
+the bestowal of titles and preferments, his relations with the Hanoverian
+court, which until then had been so cordial, grew cold after the Elector
+Georg Ludwig ascended the English throne as George I. The letters
+which Leibnitz interchanged with his daughter-in-law, gave rise to the
+correspondence, continued to his death, with Clarke, who defended the
+theology of Newton against him. The contest for priority between Leibnitz
+and Newton concerning the invention of the differential calculus was later
+settled by the decision that Newton invented his method of fluxions first,
+but that Leibnitz published his differential calculus earlier and in a more
+perfect form. The variety of pursuits in which Leibnitz was engaged was
+unfavorable to the development and influence of his philosophy, in that it
+hindered him from working out his original ideas in systematic form, and
+left him leisure only for the composition of shorter essays. Besides the
+two larger works mentioned above, the _New Essays_ and the _Theodicy_, we
+have of philosophical works by Leibnitz only a series of private letters,
+and articles for the scientific journals (the _Journal des Savants_ in
+Paris, and the _Acta Eruditorum_ in Leipsic, etc.), among which may be
+mentioned as specially important the _New System of Nature, and of the
+Interaction of Substances as well as of the Union which exists between the
+Soul and the Body_, 1695, which was followed during the next year by three
+explanations of it, and the paper _De Ipsa Natura_, 1698. Previous to
+Erdmann (1840) the following had deserved credit for their editions of
+Leibnitz: Feller, Kortholt, Gruber, Raspe, Dutens, Feder, Guhrauer (the
+German works), and since Erdmann, Pertz, Foucher de Careil, Onno Klopp, and
+especially J.C. Gerhardt. The last named published the mathematical
+works in seven volumes in 1849-63, and recently, Berlin, 1875-90, the
+philosophical treatises, also in seven volumes.[1] In our account of the
+philosophy of Leibnitz we begin with the fundamental metaphysical concepts,
+pass next to his theory of living beings and of man (theory of knowledge
+and ethics), and close with his inquiries into the philosophy of religion.
+
+[Footnote 1: We have a life of Leibnitz by G.E. Guhrauer, jubilee edition,
+Breslau, 1846 [Mackie's _Life_, Boston, 1845 is based on Guhrauer]. Among
+recent works on Leibnitz, we note the little work by Merz, Blackwood's
+Philosophical Classics, 1884, and Ludwig Stein's _Leibniz und Spinoza_,
+Berlin, 1890, in which with the aid of previously unedited material the
+relations of Leibnitz to Spinoza (whom he visited at The Hague on his
+return journey from Paris) are discussed, and the attempt is made to trace
+the development of the theory of monads, down to 1697. The new exposition
+of the Leibnitzian monadology by Ed. Dillman, which has just appeared,
+we have not yet been able to examine [The English reader may be referred
+further to Dewey's _Leibniz_ in Griggs's Philosophical Classics, 1888, and
+Duncan's _Philosophical Works of Leibnitz_ (selections translated,
+with notes), New Haven, 1890, as well as to the work of Merz already
+mentioned.--TR.]]
+
+
+%1. Metaphysics: the Monads, Representation, the Pre-established Harmony;
+the Laws of Thought and of the World.%
+
+Leibnitz develops his new concept of substance, the monad,[1] in
+conjunction with, yet in opposition to, the Cartesian and the atomistic
+conceptions. The Cartesians are right when they make the concept of
+substance the cardinal point in metaphysics and explain it by the concept
+of independence. But they are wrong in their further definition of this
+second concept. If we take independence in the sense of unlimitedness and
+aseity, we can speak, as the example of Spinoza shows, of only one, the
+divine substance. If the Spinozistic result is to be avoided, we must
+substitute independent action for independent existence, self-activity
+for self-existence. Substance is not that which exists through itself
+(otherwise there would be no finite substances), but that which acts
+through itself, or that which contains in itself the ground of its changing
+states. Substance is to be defined by active force,[2] by which we mean
+something different from and better than the bare possibility or capacity
+of the Scholastics. The _potentia sive facultas_, in order to issue into
+action, requires positive stimulation from without, while the _vis activa_
+(like an elastic body) sets itself in motion whenever no external hindrance
+opposes. Substance is a being capable of action (_la substance est un être
+capable d'action_). With the equation of activity and existence (_quod non
+agit, non existit_) the substantiality which Spinoza had taken away from
+individual things is restored to them: they are active, consequently, in
+spite of their limitedness, substantial beings (_quod agit, est substantia
+singularis_). Because of its inner activity every existing thing is a
+determinate individual, and different from every other being. Substance is
+an individual being endowed with force.
+
+[Footnote 1: According to L. Stein's conjecture, Leibnitz took the
+expression Monad, which he employs after 1696, from the younger (Franc.
+Mercurius) van Helmont.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Francis Glisson (1596-1677, professor of medicine in Cambridge
+and London) had as early as 1671, conceived substances as forces in his
+treatise _De Natura Substantiae Energetica_. That Glisson influenced
+Leibnitz, as maintained by H. Marion (Paris, 1880), has not been proven;
+cf. L. Stein, p. 184.]
+
+The atomists are right when they postulate for the explanation of
+phenomenal bodies simple, indivisible, eternal units, for every composite
+consists of simple parts. But they are wrong when they regard these
+invisible, minute corpuscles, which are intended to subserve this purpose
+as indivisible: everything that is material, however small it be, is
+divisible to infinity, nay, is in fact endlessly divided. If we are to find
+indivisible units, we must pass over into the realm of the immaterial and
+come to the conclusion that bodies are composed of immaterial constituents.
+Physical points, the atoms, are physical, but not points; mathematical
+points are indivisible, but not real; metaphysical or substantial
+points, the incorporeal, soul-like units, alone combine in themselves
+indivisibility and reality--the monads are the true atoms. Together with
+indivisibility they possess immortality; as it is impossible for them to
+arise and perish through the combination and separation of parts, they
+cannot come into being or pass out of it in any natural way whatever, but
+only by creation or annihilation. Their non-spatial or punctual character
+implies the impossibility of all external influence, the monad develops its
+states from its own inner nature, has need of no other thing, is sufficient
+unto itself, and therefore deserves the Aristotelian name, entelechy.
+
+Thus two lines of thought combine in the concept of the monad. Gratefully
+recognizing the suggestions from both sides, Leibnitz called Cartesianism
+the antechamber of the true philosophy, and atomism the preparation for
+the theory of monads. From the first it followed that the substances were
+self-acting forces; from the second, that they were immaterial units.
+Through the combination of both determinations we gain information
+concerning the kind of force or activity which constitutes the being of the
+monad: the monads are representative forces. There is nothing truly real in
+the world save the monads and their representations [ideas, perceptions].
+
+In discussing the representation in which the being and activity of the
+monads consist, we must not think directly of the conscious activity of
+the human soul. Representation has in Leibnitz a wider meaning than that
+usually associated with the word. The distinction, which has become of the
+first importance for psychology, between mere representation and conscious
+representation, or between perception and apperception, may be best
+explained by the example of the sound of the waves. The roar which we
+perceive in the vicinity of the sea-beach is composed of the numerous
+sounds of the single waves. Each single sound is of itself too small to be
+heard; nevertheless it must make an impression on us, if only a small one,
+since otherwise their total--as a sum of mere nothings--could not be
+heard. The sensation which the motion of the single wave causes is a weak,
+confused, unconscious, infinitesimal perception (_petite, insensible
+perception_), which must be combined with many similar minute sensations
+in order to become strong and distinct, or to rise above the threshold of
+consciousness. The sound of the single wave is felt, but not distinguished,
+is perceived, but not apperceived. These obscure states of unconscious
+representation, which are present in the mind of man along with states of
+clear consciousness, make up, in the lowest grade of existence, the whole
+life of the monad. There are beings which never rise above the condition of
+deep sleep or stupor.
+
+In conformity with this more inclusive meaning, perception is defined as
+the representation of the external in the internal, of multiplicity in
+unity _(representatio multitudinis in unitate_). The representing being,
+without prejudice to its simplicity, bears in itself a multitude of
+relations to external things. What now is the manifold, which is expressed,
+perceived, or represented, in the unit, the monad? It is the whole world.
+Every monad represents all others in itself, is a concentrated all, the
+universe in miniature. Each individual contains an infinity in itself
+_(substantia infinitas actiones simul exercet_) and a supreme intelligence,
+for which every obscure idea would at once become distinct, would be able
+to read in a single monad the whole universe and its history--all that is,
+has been, or will be; for the past has left its traces behind it, and
+the future will bring nothing not founded in the present: the monad is
+freighted with the past and bears the future in its bosom. Every monad is
+thus a mirror of the universe,[1] but a living mirror (_miror vivant de
+l'univers_), which generates the images of things by its own activity
+or develops them from inner germs, without experiencing influences from
+without. The monad has no windows through which anything could pass in or
+out, but in its action is dependent only on God and on itself.
+
+[Footnote 1: The objection has been made against Leibnitz, and not without
+reason, that strictly speaking there is no content for the representation
+of the monads, although he appears to offer them the richest of all
+contents, the whole world. The "All" which he makes them represent is
+itself nothing but a sum of beings, also representative. The objects of
+representation are merely representing subjects; the monad A represents the
+monads from B to Z, while these in turn do nothing more than represent one
+another. The monad mirrors mirrors--where is the thing that is mirrored?
+The essence of substance consists in being related to others, which
+themselves are only points of relation; amid mere relativities we never
+reach a real. That which prevented Leibnitz himself from recognizing this
+empty formalism was, no doubt, the fact that for him the mere form of
+representation was at once filled with a manifold experiential content,
+with the whole wealth of spiritual life, and that the quantitative
+differences in representation, which for him meant also degrees of feeling,
+desire, action, and progress, imperceptibly took on the qualitative
+vividness of individual characteristics. Moreover, it must not be
+overlooked that the spiritual beings represent not merely the universe but
+the Deity as well, hence a very rich object.]
+
+All monads represent the same universe, but each one represents it
+differently, that is, from its particular point of view--represents that
+which is near at hand distinctly, and that which is distant confusedly.
+Since they all reflect the same content or object, their difference
+consists only in the energy or degree of clearness in their
+representations. So far then, as their action consists in representation,
+distinct representation evidently coincides with complete, unhindered
+activity, confused representation with arrested activity, or passivity.
+The clearer the representations of a monad the more active it is. To have
+clear and distinct perceptions only is the prerogative of God; to the
+Omnipresent everything is alike near. He alone is pure activity; all
+finite beings are passive as well, that is, so far as their perceptions are
+not clear and distinct. Retaining the Aristotelian-Scholastic terminology,
+Leibnitz calls the active principle form, the passive matter, and makes the
+monad, since it is not, like God, _purus actus_ and pure form, consist of
+form (entelechy, soul) and matter. This matter, as a constituent of the
+monad, does not mean corporeality, but only the ground for the arrest of
+its activity. The _materia prima_ (the principle of passivity in the monad)
+is the ground, the _materia secunda_ (the phenomenon of corporeal mass) the
+result of the indistinctness of the representations. For a group of monads
+appears as a body when it is indistinctly perceived. Whoever deprives the
+monad of activity falls into the error of Spinoza; whoever takes away
+its passivity or matter falls into the opposite error, for he deifies
+individual beings.
+
+No monad represents the common universe and its individual parts just as
+well as the others, but either better or worse. There are as many
+different degrees of clearness and distinctness as there are monads.
+
+Nevertheless certain classes may be distinguished. By distinguishing
+between clear and obscure perceptions, and in the former class between
+distinct and confused ones--a perception is clear when it is sufficiently
+distinguished from others, distinct when its component parts are thus
+distinguished--Leibnitz reaches three principal grades. Lowest stand the
+simple or naked monads, which never rise above obscure and unconscious
+perception and, so to speak, pass their lives in a swoon or sleep. If
+perception rises into conscious feeling, accompanied by memory, then
+the monad deserves the name of soul. And if the soul rises to
+self-consciousness and to reason or the knowledge of universal truth, it
+is called spirit. Each higher stage comprehends the lower, since even in
+spirits many perceptions remain obscure and confused. Hence it was an error
+when the Cartesians made thought or conscious activity--by which, it is
+true, the spirit is differentiated from the lower beings--to such a degree
+the essence of spirit that they believed it necessary to deny to it all
+unconscious perceptions.
+
+From perception arises appetition, not as independent activity, but as a
+modification of perception; it is nothing but the tendency to pass from one
+perception to another (_l'appetit est la tendance d'une perception à
+une autre_); impulse is perception in process of becoming. Where the
+perceptions are conscious and rational appetition rises into will. All
+monads are self-active or act spontaneously, but only the thinking ones are
+free. Freedom is the spontaneity of spirits. Freedom does not consist in
+undetermined choice, but in action without external compulsion according to
+the laws of one's own being. The monad develops its representations out of
+itself, from the germs which form its nature. The correspondence of
+the different pictures of the world, however, is grounded in a divine
+arrangement, through which the natures of the monads have from the
+beginning been so adapted to one another that the changes in their states,
+although they take place in each according to immanent laws and without
+external influence, follow an exactly parallel course, and the result is
+the same as though there were a constant mutual interaction. This general
+idea of a _pre-established harmony_ finds special application in the
+problem of the interaction between body and soul. Body and soul are like
+two clocks so excellently constructed that, without needing to be regulated
+by each other, they show exactly the same time. Over the numberless lesser
+miracles with which occasionalism burdened the Deity, the one great miracle
+of the pre-established harmony has an undeniable advantage. As one great
+miracle it is more worthy of the divine wisdom than the many lesser ones,
+nay, it is really no miracle at all, since the harmony does not interfere
+with natural laws, but yields them. This idea may even be freed from its
+theological investiture and reduced to the purely metaphysical expression,
+that the natures of the monads, by which the succession of their
+representations is determined in conformity with law, consist in nothing
+else than the sum of relations in which this individual thing stands to all
+other parts of the world, wherein each member takes account of all others
+and at the same time is considered by them, and thus exerts influence
+as well as suffers it. In this way the external idea of an artificial
+adaptation is avoided. The essence of each thing is simply the position
+which it occupies in the organic whole of the universe; each member is
+related to every other and shares actively and passively in the life of
+all the rest. The history of the universe is a single great process in
+numberless reflections.
+
+The metaphysics of Leibnitz begins with the concept of representation
+and ends with the harmony of the universe. The representations were
+multiplicity (the endless plurality of the represented) in unity (the unity
+of the representing monad); the harmony is unity (order, congruity of the
+world-image) in multiplicity (the infinitely manifold degrees of clearness
+in the representations). All monads represent the same universe; each one
+mirrors it differently. The unity, as well as the difference, could not be
+greater than it is; every possible degree of distinctness of representation
+is present in each single monad, and yet there is a single harmonic accord
+in which the unnumbered tones unite. Now order amid diversity, unity in
+variety make up the concept of beauty and perfection. If, then, this world
+shows, as it does, the greatest unity in the greatest multiplicity, so that
+there is nothing wanting and nothing superfluous, it is the most perfect,
+the best of all possible worlds. Even the lowest grades contribute to the
+perfection of the whole; their disappearance would mean a hiatus; and if
+the unclear and confused representations appear imperfect when considered
+in themselves, yet they are not so in reference to the whole; for just on
+this fact, that the monad is arrested in its representation or is passive,
+_i.e._, conforms itself to the others and subordinates itself to them, rest
+the order and connection of the world. Thus the idea of harmony forms the
+bridge between the Monadology and optimism.
+
+As in regard to the harmony of the universe we found it possible to
+distinguish between a half-mythical, narrative form of presentation and a
+purely abstract conception, so we may make a similar distinction in the
+doctrine of creation. This actual world has been chosen by God as the best
+among many other conceivable worlds. Through the will of God the monads of
+which the world consists attained their reality; as possibilities or
+ideas they were present in the mind of God (as it were, prior to their
+actualization), present, too, with all the distinctive properties and
+perfections that they now exhibit in a state of realization, so that their
+merely possible or conceivable being had the same content as their actual
+being, and their essence is not altered or increased by their existence.
+Now, since the impulse toward actualization dwells in every possible
+essence, and is the more justifiable the more perfect the essence, a
+competition goes on before God, in which, first, those monod-possibilities
+unite which are mutually compatible or compossible, and, then, among the
+different conceivable combinations of monads or worlds that one is ordained
+for entrance into existence which shows the greatest possible sum of
+perfection. It was, therefore, not the perfection of the single monad, but
+the perfection of the system of which it forms a necessary part, that was
+decisive as to its admission into existence. The best world was known
+through God's wisdom, chosen through his goodness, and realized through his
+power.[1] The choice was by no means arbitrary, but wholly determined by
+the law of fitness or of the best (_principe du meilleur_); God's will must
+realize that which his understanding recognizes as most perfect. It is at
+once evident that in the competition of the possible worlds the victory of
+the best was assured by the _lex melioris_, apart from the divine decision.
+
+[Footnote 1: In regard to the dependence of the world on God, there is a
+certain conflict noticeable in Leibnitz between the metaphysical interests
+involved in the substantiality of individual beings, together with the
+moral interests involved in guarding against fatalism, and the opposing
+interests of religion. On the one side, creation is for him only an
+actualization of finished, unchangeable possibilities, on the other, he
+teaches with the mediaeval philosophers that this was not accomplished by a
+single act of realization, that the world has need of conservation, _i.e._,
+of continuous creation.]
+
+This law is the special expression of a more general one, the principle
+of sufficient reason, which Leibnitz added, as of equal authority, to the
+Aristotelian laws of thought. Things or events are real (and assertions
+true) when there is a sufficient reason for their existence, and for their
+determinate existence. The _principium rationis sufficientis_ governs our
+empirical knowledge of contingent truths or truths of fact, while, on
+the other hand, the pure rational knowledge of necessary or eternal
+(mathematical and metaphysical) truths rests on the _principium
+contradictionis_. The principle of contradiction asserts, that is, whatever
+contains a contradiction is false or impossible; whatever contains no
+contradiction is possible; that whose opposite contains a contradiction
+is necessary. Or positively formulated as the principle of identity,
+everything and every representative content is identical with itself.[2]
+Upon this antithesis between the rational laws of contradiction and
+sufficient reason--which, however, is such only for us men, while the
+divine spirit, which cognizes all things _a priori_, is able to reduce even
+the truths of fact to the eternal truths--Leibnitz bases his distinction
+between two kinds of necessity. That is metaphysically necessary whose
+opposite involves a contradiction; that is morally necessary or contingent
+which, on account of its fitness, is preferred by God to its (equally
+conceivable) opposite. To the latter class belongs, further, the physically
+necessary: the necessity of the laws of nature is only a conditional
+necessity (conditioned by the choice of the best); they are contingent
+truths or truths of fact. The principle of sufficient reason holds for
+efficient as well as for final causes, and between the two realms there is,
+according to Leibnitz, the most complete correspondence. In the material
+world every particular must be explained in a purely mechanical way, but
+the totality of the laws of nature, the universal mechanism itself, cannot
+in turn be mechanically explained, but only on the basis of finality, so
+that the mechanical point of view is comprehended in, and subordinated
+to, the teleological. Thus it becomes clear how Leibnitz in the _ratio
+sufficiens_ has final causes chiefly in mind.
+
+[Footnote 2: Within the knowledge of reason, as well as in experiential
+knowledge, a further distinction is made between primary truths (which
+need no proof) and derived truths. The highest truths of reason are the
+identical principles, which are self-evident; from these intuitive truths
+all others are to be derived by demonstration--proof is analysis and, as
+free from contradictions, demonstration. The primitive truths of experience
+are the immediate facts of consciousness; whatever is inferred from them is
+less certain than demonstrative knowledge. Nevertheless experience is not
+to be estimated at a low value; it is through it alone that we can assure
+ourselves of the reality of the objects of thought, while necessary truths
+guarantee only that a predicate must be ascribed to a subject (_e.g._, a
+circle), but make no deliverance as to whether this subject exists or not.]
+
+To the broad and comprehensive tendency which is characteristic of
+Leibnitz's thinking, philosophy owes a further series of general laws,
+which all stand in the closest relation to one another and to his
+monadological and harmonistic principles, viz., the law of continuity, the
+law of analogy, the law of the universal dissimilarity of things or of the
+identity of indiscernibles, and, finally, the law of the conservation of
+force.
+
+The most fundamental of these laws is the _lex continui_. On the one hand,
+it forbids every leap, on the other, all repetition in the series of beings
+and the series of events. Member must follow member without a break and
+without superfluous duplication; in the scale of creatures, as in the
+course of events, absolute continuity is the rule. Just as in the monad one
+state continually develops from another, the present one giving birth
+to the future, as it has itself grown out of the past, just as nothing
+persists, as nothing makes its entrance suddenly or without the way being
+prepared for it, and as all extremes are bound together by connecting
+links and gradual transitions,--so the monad itself stands in a continuous
+gradation of beings, each of which is related to and different from each.
+Since the beings and events form a single uninterrupted series, there are
+no distinctions of kind in the world, but only distinctions in degree. Rest
+and motion are not opposites, for rest may be considered as infinitely
+minute motion; the ellipse and the parabola are not qualitatively
+different, for the laws which hold for the one may be applied to the other.
+Likeness is vanishing unlikeness, passivity arrested activity, evil a
+lesser good, confused ideas simply less distinct ones, animals men with
+infinitely little reason, plants animals with vanishing consciousness,
+fluidity a lower degree of solidity, etc. In the whole world similarity
+and correspondence rule, and it is everywhere the same as here--between
+apparent opposites there is a distinction in degree merely, and hence,
+analogy. In the macrocosm of the universe things go on as in the microcosm
+of the monad; every later state of the world is prefigured in the earlier,
+etc. If, on the one side, the law of analogy follows as a consequence from
+the law of continuity, on the other, we have the _principium (identitatis)
+indiscernibilium_. As nature abhors gaps, so also it avoids the
+superfluous. Every grade in the series must be represented, but none more
+than once. There are no two things, no two events which are entirely alike.
+If they were exactly alike they would not be two, but one. The distinction
+between them is never merely numerical, nor merely local and temporal, but
+always an intrinsic difference: each thing is distinguished from every
+other by its peculiar nature. This law holds both for the truly real (the
+monads) and for the phenomenal world--you will never find two leaves
+exactly alike. By the law of the conservation of force, Leibnitz corrects
+the Cartesian doctrine of the conservation of motion, and approaches the
+point of view of the present day. According to Descartes it is the sum of
+actual motions, which remains constant; according to Leibnitz, the sum of
+the active forces; while, according to the modern theory, it is the sum of
+the active and the latent or potential forces--a distinction, moreover, of
+which Leibnitz himself made use.
+
+We now turn from the formal framework of general laws, to the actual, to
+that which, obeying these laws, constitutes the living content of the
+world.
+
+
+%2. The Organic World.%
+
+A living being is a machine composed of an infinite number of organs. The
+natural machines formed by God differ from the artificial machines made by
+the hand of man, in that, down to their smallest parts, they consist of
+machines. Organisms are complexes of monads, of which one, the soul, is
+supreme, while the rest, which serve it, form its body. The dominant monad
+is distinguished from those which surround it as its body by the greater
+distinctness of its ideas. The supremacy of the soul-monad consists in this
+one superior quality, that it is more active and more perfect, and clearly
+reflects that which the body-monads represent but obscurely. A direct
+interaction between soul and body does not take place; there is only a
+complete correspondence, instituted by God. He foresaw that the soul at
+such and such a moment would have the sensation of warmth, or would wish an
+arm-motion executed, and has so ordered the development of the body-monads
+that, at the same instant, they appear to cause this sensation and to
+obey this impulse to move. Now, since God in this foreknowledge and
+accommodation naturally paid more regard to the perfect beings, to the more
+active and more distinctly perceiving monads than to the less perfect ones,
+and subordinated the latter, as means and conditions, to the former
+as ends, the soul, prior to creation, actually exercised an ideal
+influence--through the mind of God--upon its body. Its activity is the
+reason why in less perfect monads a definite change, a passion takes place,
+since the action was attainable only in this way, "compossible" with this
+alone.[1] The monads which constitute the body are the first and direct
+object of the soul; it perceives them more distinctly than it perceives,
+through them, the rest of the external world. In view of the close
+connection of the elements of the organism thus postulated, Leibnitz, in
+the discussions with Father Des Bosses concerning the compatibility of
+the Monadology with the doctrine of the Church, especially with the real
+presence of the body of Christ in the Supper, consented, in favor of
+the dogma, to depart from the assumption that the simple alone could be
+substantial and to admit the possibility of composite substances, and of a
+"substantial bond" connecting the parts of living beings. It appears least
+in contradiction with the other principles of the philosopher to assign the
+rôle of this _vinculum substantiate_ to the soul or central monad itself.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Gustav Class, _Die metaphysischen Voraussetzungen des
+Leibnizischen Determinismus_, Tübingen, 1874.]
+
+Everything in nature is organized; there are no soulless bodies, no dead
+matter. The smallest particle of dust is peopled with a multitude of living
+beings and the tiniest drop of water swarms with organisms: every portion
+of matter may be compared to a pond filled with fish or a garden full of
+plants. This denial of the inorganic does not release our philosopher from
+the duty of explaining its apparent existence. If we thoughtfully consider
+bodies, we perceive that there is nothing lifeless and non-representative.
+But the phenomenon of extended mass arises for our confused sensuous
+perception, which perceives the monads composing a body together and
+regards them as a continuous unity. Body exists only as a confused idea
+in the feeling subject; since, nevertheless, a reality without the mind,
+namely, an immaterial monad-aggregate, corresponds to it, the phenomenon
+of body is a well-founded one _(phenomenon bene fundatum)_. As matter is
+merely something present in sensation or confused representation, so space
+and time are also nothing real, neither substances nor properties, but only
+ideal things--the former the order of coexistences, the latter the order of
+successions.
+
+If there are no soulless bodies, there are also no bodiless souls; the soul
+is always joined with an aggregate of subordinate monads, though not always
+with the same ones. Single monads are constantly passing into its body,
+or into its service, while others are passing out; it is involved in a
+continuous process of bodily transformation. Usually the change goes on
+slowly and with a constant replacement of the parts thrown off. If it takes
+place quickly men call it birth or death. Actual death there is as little
+as there is an actual genesis; not the soul only, but every living thing
+is imperishable. Death is decrease and involution, birth increase and
+evolution. The dying creature loses only a portion of its bodily machine
+and so returns to the slumberous or germinal condition of "involution",
+in which it existed before birth, and from which it was aroused through
+conception to development. Pre-existence as well as post-existence must
+be conceded both to animals and to men. Leuwenhoek's discovery of the
+spermatozoa furnished a welcome confirmation for this doctrine, that all
+individuals have existed since the beginning of the world, at least as
+preformed germs. The immortality of man, conformably to his superior
+dignity, differs from the continued existence of all monads, in that after
+his death he retains memory and the consciousness of his moral personality.
+
+
+%3. Man: Cognition and Volition.%
+
+In reason man possesses reflection or self-consciousness as well as the
+knowledge of God, of the universal, and of the eternal truths or _a priori_
+knowledge, while the animal is limited in its perception to experience,
+and in its reasoning to the connection of perceptions in accordance with
+memory. Man differs from higher beings in that the majority of his
+ideas are confused. Under confused ideas Leibnitz includes both
+sense-perceptions--anyone who has distinct ideas alone, as God, has no
+sense-perceptions--and the feelings which mediate between the former and
+the perfectly distinct ideas of rational thought. The delight of music
+depends, in his opinion, on an unconscious numbering and measuring of
+the harmonic and rhythmic relations of tones, aesthetic enjoyment of
+the beautiful in general, and even sensuous pleasure, on the confused
+perception of a perfection, order, or harmony.
+
+The application of the _lex continui_ to the inner life has a very wide
+range. The principal results are: (1) the mind always thinks; (2) every
+present idea postulates a previous one from which it has arisen; (3)
+sensation and thought differ only in degree; (4) in the order of time, the
+ideas of sense precede those of reason. We are never wholly without ideas,
+only we are often not conscious of them. If thought ceased in deep sleep,
+we could have no ideas on awakening, since every representation proceeds
+from a preceding one, even though it be unconscious.
+
+In the thoughtful _New Essays concerning the Human Understanding_ Leibnitz
+develops his theory of knowledge in the form of a polemical commentary
+to Locke's chief work.[1] According to Descartes some ideas (the pure
+concepts) are innate, according to Locke none, according to Leibnitz all.
+Or: according to Descartes some ideas (sensuous perceptions) come from
+without, according to Locke all do so, according to Leibnitz none.
+Leibnitz agrees with Descartes against Locke in the position that the mind
+originally possesses ideas; he agrees with Locke against Descartes, that
+thought is later than sensation and the knowledge of universals later
+than that of particulars. The originality which Leibnitz attributes to
+intellectual ideas is different from that which Descartes had ascribed and
+Locke denied to them. They are original in that they do not come into the
+soul and are not impressed upon it from without; they are not original in
+that they can develop only from previously given sense-ideas; again, they
+are original in that they can be developed from confused ideas only because
+they are contained in them _implicite_ or as pre-dispositions.
+Thus Leibnitz is able to agree with both his predecessors up to a certain
+point: with the one, that the pure concepts have their origin within the
+mind; with the other, that they are not the earliest knowledge, but are
+conditioned by sensations. This synthesis, however, was possible only
+because Leibnitz looked on sensation differently from both the others. If
+sensation is to be the mother of thought, and the latter at the same time
+to preserve its character as original, _i.e._, as something not obtained
+from without, sensation must, first, include an unconscious thinking in
+itself, and, secondly, must itself receive a title to originality and
+spontaneity. As the Catholic dogma added the immaculate conception of the
+mother to that of the Son, so Leibnitz transfers the (virginal) origin of
+rational concepts, independent of external influence, to sensations. The
+monad has no windows. It bears germinally in itself all that it is to
+experience, and nothing is impressed on it from without. The intellect
+should not be compared to a blank tablet, but to a block of marble in whose
+veins the outlines of the statue are prefigured. Ideas can only arise from
+ideas, never from external impressions or movements of corporeal parts.
+Thus _all_ ideas are innate in the sense that they grow from inner germs;
+we possess them from the beginning, not developed (_explicite_), but
+potentially, that is, we have the capacity to produce them. The old
+Scholastic principle that "there is nothing in the understanding which was
+not previously in sense" is entirely correct, only one must add, except the
+understanding itself, that is, the faculty of developing our knowledge
+out of ourselves. Thought lies already dormant in perception. With the
+mechanical position (sensuous representation precedes and conditions
+rational thought) is joined the teleological position (sensuous
+representations exist, in order to render the origin of thoughts possible),
+and with this purposive determination, sensation attains a higher dignity:
+it is more than has been seen in it before, for it includes in itself the
+future concept of the understanding in an unconscious form, nay, it is
+itself an imperfect thought, a thought in process of becoming. Sensation
+and thought are not different in kind, and if the former is called a
+passive state, still passivity is nothing other than diminished activity.
+Both are spontaneous; thought is merely spontaneous in a higher degree.
+
+[Footnote 1: A careful comparison of Locke's theory of knowledge with
+that of Leibnitz is given by G. Hartenstein, _Abhandlungen der k. sächs.
+Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften_, Leipsic, 1865, included in Hartenstein's
+_Historisch-philosophische Abhandlungen_, 1870.]
+
+By making sensation and feeling the preliminary step to thought, Leibnitz
+became the founder of that intellectualism which, in the system of Hegel,
+extended itself far beyond the psychological into the cosmical field, and
+endeavored to conceive not only all psychical phenomena but all reality
+whatsoever as a development of the Idea toward itself. This conception,
+which may be characterized as intellectualistic in its content, presents
+itself on its formal side as a quantitative way of looking at the world,
+which sacrifices all qualitative antitheses in order to arrange the
+totality of being and becoming in a single series with no distinctions but
+those of degree. If Leibnitz here appears as the representative of a view
+of the world which found in Kant a powerful and victorious opponent, yet,
+on the other hand, he prepared the way by his conception of innate ideas
+for the Critique of Reason. By his theory of knowledge he forms the
+transition link between Descartes and Kant, since he interprets necessary
+truths not as dwelling in the mind complete and explicit from the start,
+but as produced or raised into consciousness only on the occasion of
+sensuous experience. It must be admitted, moreover, that this in reality
+was only a restoration of Descartes's original position, _i.e._, a
+deliverance of it from the misinterpretations and perversions which it
+had suffered at the hands of adherents and opponents alike, but which
+Descartes, it is true, had failed to render impossible from the start by
+conclusive explanations. The author of the theory of innate ideas certainly
+did not mean what Locke foists upon him, that the child in the cradle
+already possesses the ideas of God, of thought, and of extension in full
+clearness. But whether Leibnitz improved or only restored Descartes, it was
+in any case an important advance when experience and thought were brought
+into more definite relation, and the productive force in rational concepts
+was secured to the latter and the occasion of their production to the
+former.
+
+The unconscious or minute ideas, which in noëtics had served to break the
+force of Locke's objections against the innateness of the principles of
+reason, are in ethics brought into the field against indeterminism. They
+are involved whenever we believe ourselves to act without cause, from pure
+choice, or contrary to the motives present. In this last case, a motive
+which is very strong in itself is overcome by the united power of many in
+themselves weaken The will is always determined, and that by an idea (of
+ends), which generally is of a very complex nature, and in which the
+stronger side decides the issue. An absolute equilibrium of motives is
+impossible: the world cannot be divided into two entirely similar parts
+(this in opposition to "Buridan's ass"). A spirit capable of looking us
+through and through would be able to calculate all our volitions and
+actions beforehand.
+
+In spite of this admitted inevitableness of our resolutions and actions,
+the predicate of freedom really belongs to them, and this on two grounds.
+First, they are only physically or morally, not metaphysically, necessary;
+as a matter of fact, it is true, they cannot happen otherwise, but their
+opposite involves no logical contradiction and remains conceivable. To
+express this thought the formula, often repeated since, that our
+motives only impel, incite, or stimulate the will, but do not compel it
+(_inclinant, non necessitant_), was chosen, but not very happily. Secondly,
+the determination of the will is an inner necessitation, grounded in the
+being's own nature, not an external compulsion. The agent determines
+himself in accordance with his own nature, and for this each bears the
+responsibility himself, for God, when he brought the monads out of
+possibility into actuality, left their natures as they had existed before
+the creation in the form of eternal ideas in His understanding. Though
+Leibnitz thus draws a distinction between his deterministic doctrine and
+the "fatalism" of Spinoza, he recognizes a second concept of freedom, which
+completely corresponds to Spinoza's. A decision is the more free the more
+distinct the ideas which determine it, and a man the more free the more he
+withdraws his will from the influence of the passions, _i.e._, confused
+ideas, and subordinates it to that of reason. God alone is absolutely free,
+because he has no ideas which are not distinct. The bridge between the
+two conceptions of freedom is established by the principle that reason
+constitutes the peculiar nature of man in a higher degree than the sum of
+his ideas; for it is reason which distinguishes him from the lower beings.
+According to the first meaning of freedom man is free, according to the
+second, which coincides with activity, perfection, and morality, he should
+become free.
+
+Morality is the result of the natural development of the individual. Every
+being strives after perfection or increased activity, _i.e._, after more
+distinct ideas. Parallel to this theoretical advance runs a practical
+advance in a twofold form: the increasing distinctness of ideas, or
+enlightenment, or wisdom, raises the impulse to transitory, sensuous
+pleasure into an impulse to permanent delight in our spiritual perfection,
+or toward happiness, while, further, it opens up an insight into the
+connection of all beings and the harmony of the world, in virtue of which
+the virtuous man will seek to promote the perfection and happiness of
+others as well as his own, _i.e._, will _love_ them, for to love is to find
+pleasure in the happiness of others. To promote the good of all, again,
+is the same as to contribute one's share to the world-harmony and to
+co-operate in the fulfillment of God's purposes. Probity and piety are the
+same. They form the highest of the three grades of natural right, which
+Leibnitz distinguishes as _jus strictum_ (mere right, with the principle:
+Injure no one), _aequitas_ (equity or charity, with the maxim: To each
+his due), and _probitas sive pietas_ (honorableness joined with religion,
+according to the command: Lead an upright and morally pure life). They may
+also be designated as commutative, distributive, and universal justice.
+Belief in God and immortality is a condition of the last.
+
+
+%4. Theology and Theodicy.%
+
+God is the ground and the end of the world. All beings strive toward him,
+as all came out from him. In man the general striving toward the most
+perfect Being rises into conscious love to God, which is conditioned by the
+knowledge of God and produces virtuous action as its effect. Enlightenment
+and virtue are the essential constituents of religion; all else, as cultus
+and dogma, have only a derivative value. Religious ceremonies are an
+imperfect expression of the practical element in piety, as the doctrines of
+faith are a weak imitation of the theoretical. It is a direct contradiction
+of the intention of the Divine Teacher when occult formulas and ceremonies,
+which have no connection with virtue, are made the chief thing. The points
+in which the creeds agree are more important than those by which they are
+differentiated. Natural religion has found its most perfect expression in
+Christianity, although paganism and Judaism had also grasped portions of
+the truth. Salvation is not denied to the heathen, for moral purity is
+sufficient to make one a partaker of the grace of God. The religion of the
+Jews elevated monotheism, which, it is true, made its appearance among the
+heathen in isolated philosophers, but was never the popular religion, into
+a law; but it lacked the belief in immortality. Christianity made the
+religion of the sage the religion of the people.
+
+Whatever of positive doctrine revelation has added to natural religion
+transcends the reason, it is true, but does not contradict it. It contains
+no principles contrary to reason (whose opposite can be proved), but, no
+doubt, principles above reason, _i.e._, such as the reason could not have
+found without help from without, and which it cannot fully comprehend,
+though it is able approximately to understand them and to defend them
+against objections. Hence Leibnitz defended the Trinity, which he
+interpreted as God's power, understanding, and will, the eternity of the
+torments of hell (which brought him the commendation of Lessing), and other
+dogmas. Miracles also belong among the things the how and why of which we
+are not in a position to comprehend, but only the that and what. Since the
+laws of nature are only physically or conditionally necessary, _i.e._ have
+been enacted only because of their fitness for the purposes of God, they
+may be suspended in special cases when a higher end requires it.
+
+While the positive doctrines of faith cannot be proved--as, on the other
+hand, they cannot be refuted--the principles of natural religion admit of
+strict demonstration. The usual arguments for the existence of God are
+useful, but need amendment. The ontological argument of Descartes, that
+from the concept of a most perfect Being his existence follows, is
+correct so soon as the idea of God is shown to be possible or free from
+contradiction. The cosmological proof runs: Contingent beings point to a
+necessary, self-existent Being, the eternal truths especially presuppose an
+eternal intelligence in which they exist. If we ask why anything whatever,
+or why just this world exists, this ultimate ground of things cannot be
+found within the world. Every contingent thing or event has its cause in
+another. However far we follow out the series of conditions, we never reach
+an ultimate, unconditioned cause. Consequently the sufficient reason for
+the series must be situated without the world, and, as is evident from the
+harmony of things, can only be an infinitely wise and good Being. Here the
+teleological proof comes in: From the finality of the world we reason to
+the existence of a Being, as the author of the world, who works in view
+of ends and who wills and carries out that which is best,--to the supreme
+intelligence, goodness, and power of the Creator. A special inferential
+value accrues to this position from the system of pre-established
+harmony--it is manifest that the complete correspondence of the manifold
+substances in the world, which are not connected with one another by any
+direct interaction, can proceed only from a common cause endowed with
+infinite intelligence and power.
+
+The possibility of proving the existence of one omnipotent and
+all-beneficent God, and the impossibility of refuting the positive
+dogmas, save the harmony of faith and reason, which Bayle had denied.
+The conclusion of the _New Essays_ and the opening of the _Theodicy_ are
+devoted to this theme. The second part gives, also against Bayle, the
+justification of God in view of the evil in the world. _Si Deus est, unde
+malum_? Optimism has to reckon with the facts of experience, and to show
+that this world, in spite of its undeniable imperfections, is still the
+best world. God could certainly have brought into actuality a world in
+which there would have been less imperfection than in ours, but it would at
+the same time have contained fewer perfections. No world whatever can exist
+entirely free from evil, entirely without limitation--whoever forbids God
+to create imperfect beings forbids him to create a world at all. Certain
+evils--in general terms, the evil of finitude--are entirely inseparable
+from the concept of created beings; imperfection attaches to every created
+thing as such. Other evils God has permitted because it was only through
+them that certain higher goods, which ought not to be renounced, could be
+brought to pass. Think of the lofty feelings, noble resolves, and great
+deeds which war occasions, think of national enthusiasm, readiness for
+sacrifice, and defiance of death--all these would be given over, if war
+should be taken out of the world on account of the suffering which it also
+brings in its train.
+
+If we turn from the general principles to their application in detail, we
+find a separate proof for the inevitableness or salutary nature of each of
+the three kinds of evil--the metaphysical evil of created existence, the
+physical evil of suffering (and punishment), and the moral evil of sin.
+Metaphysical evil is absolutely unavoidable, if a world is to exist at all;
+created beings without imperfection, finiteness, limitation, are entirely
+inconceivable--something besides gods must exist. The physical evil of
+misery finds its justification in that it makes for good. First of all, the
+amount of suffering is not so great as it appears to discontented spirits
+to be. Life is usually quite tolerable, and vouchsafes more joy and
+pleasure than grief and hardship; in balancing the good and the evil we
+must especially remember to reckon on the positive side the goods of
+activity, of health, and all that which affords us, perchance, no
+perceptible pleasure, but the removal of which would be felt as an evil
+(_Theodicy_, ii. § 251). Most evils serve to secure us a much greater good,
+or to ward off a still greater evil. Would a brave general, if given the
+choice of leaving the battle unwounded, but also without the victory, or of
+winning the victory at the cost of a wound, hesitate an instant to choose
+the latter? Other troubles, again, must be regarded as punishment for sins
+and as means of reformation; the man who is resigned to God's will may be
+certain that the sufferings which come to him will turn out for his good.
+
+Especially if we consider the world as a whole, it is evident that the
+sum of evil vanishes before the sum of good. It is wrong to look upon the
+happiness of man as the end of the world. Certainly God had the happiness
+of rational beings in mind, but not this exclusively, for they form only
+a part of the world, even if it be the highest part. God's purpose has
+reference rather to the perfection of the whole system of the universe. Now
+the harmony of the universe requires that all possible grades of reality
+be represented, that there should be indistinct ideas, sense, and
+corporeality, not merely a realm of spirits, and with these, conditions
+of imperfection, feelings of pain, and theoretical and moral errors are
+inevitably given. The connection and the order of the world demands a
+material element in the monad, but happiness without alloy can never be the
+lot of a spirit joined to a body. Thirdly, in regard to moral evil also we
+receive the assurance that the sum of the bad is much less than that of the
+good. Then, moral evil is connected with metaphysical evil: created beings
+cannot be absolutely perfect, hence, also, not morally perfect or sinless.
+But, in return for this, there is no being that is absolutely imperfect,
+none only and entirely evil. With this is joined the well-known principle
+of the earlier thinkers, that evil is nothing actual, but merely
+deprivation, absence of good, lack of clear reason and force of will. That
+which is real in the evil action, the power to act, is perfect and good,
+and, as force, comes from God--the negative or evil element in it comes
+from the agent himself; just as in the case of two ships of the same size,
+but unequally laden, which drift with the current, the speed comes from the
+stream and the retardation from the load of the vessels themselves. God
+is not responsible for sin, for he has only permitted it, not willed it
+directly, and man was already evil before he was created. The fact that God
+foresaw that man would sin does not constrain the latter to commit the
+evil deed, but this follows from his own (eternal) being, which God left
+unaltered when he granted him existence. The guilt and the responsibility
+fall wholly on the sinner himself. The permission of evil is explained by
+the predominantly good results which follow from it (not, as in physical
+evil, for the sufferer himself, but for others)--from the crime of Sextus
+Tarquinius sprang a great kingdom with great men (of. the beautiful myth in
+connection with a dialogue of Laurentius Valla, _Theodicy,_ iii. 413-416).
+Finally, reference is made again to the contribution which evil makes to
+the perfection of the whole. Evil has the same function in the world as the
+discords in a piece of music, or the shadows in a painting--the beauty is
+heightened by the contrast. The good needs a foil in order to come out
+distinctly and to be felt in all its excellence.
+
+In the Leibnitzian theodicy the least satisfactory part is the
+justification of moral evil. We miss the view defended in such grand
+outlines by Hegel, and so ingeniously by Fechner, that the good is not
+the flower of a quiet, unmolested development, but the fruit of energetic
+labor; that it has need of its opposite; that it not merely must approve
+itself in the battle against evil without and within the acting subject,
+but that it is only through this conflict that it is attainable at all.
+Virtue implies force of will as well as purity, and force develops only
+by resistance. Although he does not appreciate the full depth of the
+significance of pain, Leibnitz's view of suffering deserves more approval
+than his questionable application to the ethical sphere of the quantitative
+view of the world, with its interpretation of evil as merely undeveloped
+good. But, in any case, the compassionate contempt of the pessimism of the
+day for the "shallow" Leibnitz is most unjustifiable.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.
+
+THE GERMAN ILLUMINATION.
+
+
+%1. The Contemporaries of Leibnitz.%
+
+The period between Kepler and Leibnitz in Germany was very poor in
+noteworthy philosophical phenomena. The physicist, Christoph Sturm[1] of
+Altdorf (died 1703), was a follower of Descartes, Joachim Jungius[2] (died
+1657) a follower of Bacon, though not denying with the latter the value of
+the mathematical method in natural science. Hieronymus Hirnhaym, Abbot at
+Prague (_The Plague of the Human Race, or the Vanity of Human Learning_,
+1676), declared the thirst for knowledge of his age a dangerous disease,
+knowledge uncertain, since no reliance can be placed on sense-perception
+and the principles of thought contradict the doctrines of faith, and
+harmful, since it contributes nothing to salvation, but makes its
+possessors proud and draws them away from piety. He maintained, further,
+that divine authority is the only refuge for man, and moral life the true
+science. Side by side with such skepticism Hirnhaym's contemporary, the
+poet Angelus Silesius (Joh. Scheffler, died 1667), defended mysticism.
+The teacher of natural law, Samuel Pufendorf[3] (1632-94, professor in
+Heidelberg and Lund, died in Berlin), aimed to mediate between Grotius and
+Hobbes. Natural law is demonstrable, its real ground is the will of God,
+its noëtical ground (not revelation, but) reason and observation of the
+(social) nature of man, and the fundamental law the promotion of universal
+good. The individual must not violate the interests of society in
+satisfying his impulse to self-preservation, because his own interests
+require social existence, and, consequently, respect for its conditions.
+
+[Footnote 1: Chr. Sturm: _Physica Conciliatrix_, 1687; _Physica Electiva_,
+vol. i. 1697, vol. ii. with preface by Chr. Wolff, 1722; _Compendium
+Universalium seu Metaphysica Euclidea_.]
+
+[Footnote 2: J. Jung _Logica Hamburgiensis_, 1638; cf. Guhrauer, 1859.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Pufendorf: _Elementa Juris Universalis_, 1660; _De Statu
+Imperii Germanici_, 1667, under the pseudonym Monzambano; _De Jure Natures
+et Gentium_ 1672, and an abstract of this, _De Officio Hominis et Civis_,
+1673.]
+
+Pufendorf was followed by Christian Thomasius[1] (1655-1728; professor of
+law at the University of Halle from its foundation in 1694). He was
+the first instructor who ventured to deliver lectures in the German
+language--in Leipsic from 1687--and at the same time was the editor of the
+first learned journal in German (_Teutsche Monate, Geschichte der Weisheit
+und Thorheit_). In Thomasius the characteristic features of the German
+Illumination first came out in full distinctness, namely, the avoidance of
+scholasticism in expression and argument, the direct relation of knowledge
+to life, sober rationality in thinking, heedless eclecticism, and the
+demand for religious tolerance. Philosophy must be generally intelligible,
+and practically useful, knowledge of the world (not of God); its form, free
+and tasteful ratiocination; its object, man and morals; its first duty,
+culture, not learning; its highest aim, happiness; its organ and the
+criterion of every truth, common sense. He alone gains true knowledge who
+frees his understanding from prejudice and judges only after examining for
+himself; the joy of mental peace is given to no one who does not free his
+heart from foolish desires and vehement passions, and devote it to virtue,
+to "rational love." The positive doctrines of Thomasius have less interest
+than this general standpoint, which prefigured the succeeding period. He
+divides practical philosophy into natural law which treats of the _justum_,
+politics which treats of the _decorum_, and ethics which treats of the
+_honestum_. Justice bids us, Do not to others what you would not that
+others should do to you; decorum, Do to others as you would that they
+should do to you; and morality, Do to yourself as you would that others
+should do to themselves. The first two laws relate to external, the third
+to internal, peace; legal duties may be enforced by compulsion, moral
+duties not.
+
+[Footnote 1: Thomasius: _Institutionum Jurisprudentiae Divinae Libri Tres_,
+1688; _Fundamenta Juris Naturae et Gentium_, 1705, both in Latin; in
+German, appeared in 1691-96 the _Introduction and Application of Rational
+and Moral Philosophy_.]
+
+If Thomasius was the leader of those popular philosophers who, unconcerned
+about systematic continuity, discussed every question separately before
+the tribunal of common sense, and found in their lack of allegiance to
+any philosophical sect a sufficient guarantee of the unprejudicedness
+and impartiality of their reflections, Count Walter von Tschirnhausen
+(1651-1708; _Medecina Mentis sive Artis Inveniendi Praecepta Generalia_,
+1687), a friend of Spinoza and Leibnitz, became the prototype of another
+group of the philosophers of the Illumination. This group favored
+eclecticism of a more scientific kind, by starting from considerations
+of method and seeking to overcome the antithesis between rationalism and
+empiricism. While fully persuaded of the validity and necessity of the
+mathematical method in philosophical investigations, as well as elsewhere,
+Tschirnhausen still holds it indispensable that the deductions, on the one
+hand, start from empirical facts, and, on the other, that they be confirmed
+by experiments. Inner experience gives us four primal facts, of which the
+chief is the certainty of self-consciousness. The second, that many things
+affect us agreeably and many disagreeably, is the basis of morals; the
+third, that some things are comprehensible to us and others not, the
+basis of logic; the fourth, that through the senses we passively receive
+impressions from without, the basis of the empirical sciences, in
+particular, of physics. Consequently consciousness, will, understanding,
+and sensuous representation _(imaginatio)_, together with corporeality,
+are our fundamental concepts. Not perception _(perceptio)_, but conception
+_(conceptio)_ alone gives science; that which we can "conceive" is true;
+the understanding as such cannot err, but undoubtedly the imagination can
+lead us to confuse the merely perceived with that which is conceived. The
+method of science is geometrical demonstration, which starts from
+(genetic) definitions, and from their analysis obtains axioms, from their
+combination, theorems. That which is thus proved _a priori_ must, as
+already remarked, be confirmed _a posteriori_. The highest of all sciences
+is natural philosophy, since it considers not sense-objects only, not (like
+mathematics) the objects of reason only, but the actual itself in its true
+character. Hence it is the divine science, while the human sciences busy
+themselves only with our ideas or the relations of things to us.
+
+
+%2. Christian Wolff.%
+
+Christian Wolff was born at Breslau in 1679, studied theology at Jena, and
+in addition mathematics and philosophy, habilitated at Leipsic in 1703,
+and obtained, through the instrumentality of Leibnitz, a professorship of
+mathematics at Halle, in 1706. His lectures, which soon extended themselves
+over all philosophical disciplines, met with great success. This
+popularity, as well as the rationalistic tendency of his thinking, aroused
+the disfavor of the pietists, Francke and Lange, who succeeded, in 1723, in
+securing from King Frederick William I. his removal from his chair and his
+expulsion from the kingdom. Finding a refuge in Marburg, he was called back
+to Halle by Frederick the Great a short time after the latter's ascension
+of the throne. Here he taught and wrote zealously until his death in 1754.
+In his lectures, as well as in half of his writings,[1] he followed the
+example of Thomasius in using the German language, which he prepared in
+a most praiseworthy manner for the expression of philosophical ideas and
+furnished with a large part of the technical terms current to-day. Thus
+the terms _Verhältniss_ (relation), _Vorstellung_ (representation, idea),
+_Bewusstsein_ (consciousness), _stetig (continuus)_, come from Wolff, as
+well as the distinction between _Kraft_ (power) and _Vermögen_ (faculty),
+and between _Grund_ (ground) and _Ursache_ (cause),[2] Another great
+service consisted in the reduction of the philosophy of Leibnitz to a
+systematic form, by which he secured a dissemination for it which otherwise
+it would scarcely have obtained. But he did not possess sufficient
+originality to contribute anything remarkable of his own, and it showed
+little self-knowledge when he became indignant at the designation
+Leibnitzio-Wolffian philosophy, which was first used by his pupil,
+Bilfinger. The alterations which he made in the doctrines of Leibnitz are
+far from being improvements, and the parts which he rejected are just the
+most characteristic and thoughtful of all. Such at least is the opinion
+of thinkers to-day, though this mutilation and leveling down of the most
+daring of Leibnitz's hypotheses was perhaps entirely advantageous for
+Wolff's impression on his contemporaries; what appeared questionable to him
+would no doubt have repelled them also. Leibnitz's two leading ideas, the
+theory of monads and the pre-established harmony, were most of all affected
+by this process of toning down. Wolff weakens the former by attributing
+a representative power only to actual souls, which are capable of
+consciousness, although he holds that bodies are compounded of simple
+beings and that the latter are endowed with (a not further defined) force.
+He limits the application of the pre-established harmony to the relation of
+body and soul, which to Leibnitz was only a case especially favorable for
+the illustration of the hypothesis. By such trifling the real meaning of
+both these ideas is sacrificed and their bloom rubbed off.--While depth
+is lacking in Wolff's thinking, he is remarkable for his power of
+systematization, his persevering diligence, and his logical earnestness,
+so that the praise bestowed on him by Kant, that he was the author of the
+spirit of thoroughness in Germany, was well deserved. He, too, finds
+the end of philosophy in the enlightenment of the understanding, the
+improvement of the heart, and, ultimately, in the promotion of the
+happiness of mankind. But while Thomasius demanded as a condition of such
+universal intelligibility and usefulness that, discarding the scholastic
+garb, philosophy should appear in the form of easy ratiocination, Wolff, on
+the other hand, regards methodical procedure and certainty in results as
+indispensable to its usefulness, and, in order to this certainty,
+insists on distinctness of conception and cogency of proof. He demands
+a _philosophia et certa et utilis_. If, finally, his methodical
+deliberateness, especially in his later works, leads him into wearisome
+diffuseness, this pedantry is made good by his genuinely German, honest
+spirit, which manifests itself agreeably in his judgment on practical
+questions.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Reasonable Thoughts on the Powers of the Human
+Understanding_, 1712; _Reasonable Thoughts on God, the World, and the
+Soul of Man, also on All Things in General_, 1719 (_Notes_ to this 1724);
+_Reasonable Thoughts on the Conduct of Man_, 1720; _Reasonable Thoughts on
+the Social Life of Man_, 1721; _Reasonable Thoughts on the Operations of
+Nature_, 1723; _Reasonable Thoughts on the Purposes of Natural Things_,
+1724; _Reasonable Thoughts on the Parts of Man, Animals, and Plants_, 1725,
+all in German. Besides these there are extensive Latin treatises (1728-53)
+on Logic, Ontology, Cosmology, Empirical and Rational Psychology, Natural
+Theology, and all branches of Practical Philosophy. Detailed extracts may
+be found in Erdmann's _Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung_, ii.
+2. The best account of the Wolffian philosophy has been given by Zeller
+(pp. 211-273).]
+
+[Footnote 2: Eucken, _Geschichte der Terminologie_^ pp. 133-134.]
+
+Wolff reaches his division of the sciences by combining the two
+psychological antitheses--the higher (rational) and lower (sensuous)
+faculties of cognition and appetition. On the first is based the
+distinction between the rational and the empirical or historical method of
+treatment. The latter concerns itself with the actual, the former with the
+possible and necessary, or the grounds of the actual; the one observes and
+describes, the other deduces. The antithesis of cognition and appetition
+gives the basis for the division into theoretical and practical philosophy.
+The former, called metaphysics, is divided into a general part, which
+treats of being in general whether it be of a corporeal or a spiritual
+nature, and three special parts, according to their principal subjects, the
+world, the soul, and God,--hence into ontology, cosmology, psychology, and
+theology. The science which establishes rules for action and regards man as
+an individual being, as a citizen, and as the head or member of a family,
+is divided (after Aristotle) into ethics, politics, and economics, which
+are preceded by practical philosophy in general, and by natural law. The
+introduction to the two principal parts is furnished by formal logic.
+
+Philosophy is the science of the possible, _i.e._, of that which contains
+no contradiction; it is science from concepts, its principle, the law of
+identity, its form, demonstration, and its instrument, analysis, which in
+the predicate explicates the determinations contained in the concept of the
+subject. In order to confirm that which has been deduced from pure concepts
+by the facts of experience, _psychologia rationalis_ is supplemented by
+_psychologia empirica_, rational cosmology by empirical physics, and
+speculative theology by an experimental doctrine of God (teleology). Wolff
+gives no explanation how it comes about that the deliverances of the
+reason agree so beautifully with the facts of experience; in his naïve,
+unquestioning belief in the infallibility of the reason he is a typical
+dogmatist.
+
+A closer examination of the Wolffian philosophy seems unnecessary, since
+its most essential portions have already been discussed under Leibnitz and
+since it will be necessary to recur to certain points in our chapter on
+Kant. Therefore, referring the reader to the detailed accounts in Erdmann
+and Zeller, we shall only note that Wolff's ethics opposes the principle
+of perfection to the English principle of happiness (that is good which
+perfects man's condition, and this is life in conformity with nature or
+reason, with which happiness is necessarily connected); that he makes the
+will determined by the understanding, and assigns ignorance as the cause of
+sin; that his philosophy of religion, which argues for a natural religion
+in addition to revealed religion (experiential and rational proofs for the
+existence of God, and a deduction of his attributes), and sets up certain
+tests for the genuineness of revelation, favors a rationalism which was
+flexible enough to allow his pupils either to take part in orthodox
+movements or to advance to a deism hostile to the Church.
+
+Among the followers of Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten (1714-62) deserves
+the first place, as the founder of German aesthetics _(Aesthetica_, 1750
+_seq_.). He perceives a gap in the system of the philosophical sciences.
+This contains in ethics a guide to right volition, and in logic a guide
+to correct thinking, but there are no directions for correct feeling, no
+aesthetic. The beautiful would form the subject of this discipline. For the
+perfection (the harmonious unity of a manifold, which is pleasant to the
+spectator), which manifests itself to the will as the good and to the
+clear thinking of the understanding as the true, appears--according to
+Leibnitz--to confused sensuous perception as beauty. From this on the name
+aesthetics was established for the theory of the beautiful, though in
+Kant's great work it is used in its literal meaning as the doctrine of
+sense, of the faculty of sensations or intuitions. Baumgarten's pupils
+and followers, the aesthetic writer G.F. Meier at Halle, Baumeister, and
+others, contributed like himself to the dissemination of the Wolffian
+system by their manuals on different branches of philosophy. To this school
+belong also the following: Thümmig (_Institutiones Philosophia Wolfianae_,
+1725-26); the theologian Siegmund Baumgarten at Halle, the elder brother
+of the aesthete; the mathematician Martin Knutzen, Kant's teacher;[1] the
+literary historian Gottsched [2] at Leipsic; and G. Ploucquet, who in
+his _Methodus Calculandi in Logicis_, with a _Commentatio de Arte
+Characteristica Universali_ appended to his _Principia de Substantiis et
+Phaenomenis_, 1753, took up again Leibnitz's cherished plan for a logical
+calculus and a universal symbolic language. The psychologist Kasimir von
+Creuz (_Essay on the Soul_, in two parts, 1753-54), and J.H. Lambert,[3]
+whom Kant deemed worthy of a detailed correspondence, take up a more
+independent position, both demanding that the Wolffian rationalism be
+supplemented by the empiricism of Locke, and the latter, moreover, in
+anticipation of the Critique of Reason, pointing very definitely to the
+distinction between content and form as the salient point in the theory of
+knowledge.
+
+[Footnote 1: Benno Erdmann, _M. Knutzen und seine Zeit_, 1876.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Th. W. Danzel, _Gottsched und seine Zeit_, 1848.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Lambert: _Cosmological Letters_, 1761; _New Organon_, 1764;
+_Groundwork of Architectonics_, 1771. Bernoulli edited some of Lambert's
+papers and his correspondence.]
+
+Among the opponents of the Wolffian philosophy, all of whom favor
+eclecticism, A. Rüdiger[1] and Chr. Aug. Crusius,[2] who was influenced by
+Rüdiger, and, like him, a professor at Leipsic, are the most important.
+Rüdiger divides philosophy according to its objects, "wisdom, justice,
+prudence," into three parts--the science of nature (which must avoid
+one-sided mechanical views, and employ ether, air, and spirit as principles
+of explanation); the science of duty (which, as metaphysics, treats of
+duties toward God, as natural law, of duties to our neighbor, and deduces
+both from the primary duty of obedience to the will of God); and the
+science of the good (in which Rüdiger follows the treatise of the Spaniard,
+Gracian, on practical wisdom). Crusius agrees with Rüdiger that mathematics
+is the science of the possible, and philosophy the science of the actual,
+and that the latter, instead of imitating to its own disadvantage the
+deductive-analytical method of geometry, must, with the aid of experience
+and with attention to the probability of its conclusions, rise to the
+highest principles synthetically. Besides its deduction the determinism
+of the Wolffian philosophy gave offense, for it was believed to endanger
+morals, justice, and religion. The will, the special fundamental power of
+the soul (consisting of the impulses to perfection, love, and knowledge),
+is far from being determined by ideas; it is rather they which depend on
+the will. The application of the principle of sufficient reason, which is
+wrongly held to admit of no exception, must be restricted in favor of
+freedom. For the rest, we may note concerning Crusius that he derives the
+principle of sufficient reason (everything which is now, and before was
+not, has a cause) and the principle of contingency from the principles of
+contradiction, inseparability, and incompatibility, and these latter from
+the principle of conceivability; that he rejects the ontological argument,
+and makes the ground of obligation in morality consist in obedience toward
+God, and its content in perfection. Among the other opponents of the
+Wolffian philosophy, we may mention the theologian Budde(us)[3]
+_(Institutiones Philosophiae Eclecticae_, 1705); Darjes (who taught in Jena
+and Frankfort-on-the-Oder; _The Way to Truth_, 1755); and Crousaz (1744).
+
+[Footnote 1: Rüdiger: _Disputatio de eo quod Omnes Idea Oriantur a
+Sensione_, 1704; _Philosophia Synthetica_, 1707; _Physica Divina_, 1716;
+_Philosophia Pragmatica_, 1723.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Crusius: _De Usu et Limitibus Principii Rationis_, 1743;
+_Directions how to Live a Rational Life_ (theory of the will and of
+ethics), 1744; _A Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason_, 1745; _Way to
+the Certainty and Trustworthiness of Human Knowledge_, 1747.]
+
+[Footnote 3: J.J. Brucker _(Historia Critica Philosophiae_, 5 vols.,
+1742-44; 2d ed., 6 vols., 1766-67) was a pupil of Budde.]
+
+
+%3. The Illumination as Scientific and as Popular Philosophy.%
+
+After a demand for the union of Leibnitz and Locke, of rationalism and
+empiricism, had been raised within the Wolffian school itself, and still
+more directly in the camp of its opponents, under the increasing influence
+of the empirical philosophy of England,[1] eclecticism in the spirit of
+Thomasius took full possession of the stage in the Illumination period.
+There was the less hesitation in combining principles derived from entirely
+different postulates without regard to their systematic connection, as
+the interest in scholastic investigation gave place more and more to the
+interest in practical and reassuring results. Metaphysics, noëtics, and
+natural philosophy were laid aside as useless subtleties, and, as in the
+period succeeding Aristotle, man as an individual and whatever directly
+relates to his welfare--the constitution of his inner nature, his duties,
+the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God--became the exclusive
+subjects of reflection. The fact that, besides ethics and religion,
+psychology was chosen as a favorite field, is in complete harmony with the
+general temper of an age for which self-observation and the enjoyment of
+tender and elevated feelings in long, delightfully friendly letters and
+sentimental diaries had become a favorite habit. Hand in hand with this
+narrowing of the content of philosophy went a change in the form of
+presentation. As thinkers now addressed themselves to all cultivated
+people, intelligibility and agreeableness were made the prime requisites;
+the style became light and flowing, the method of treatment facile and
+often superficial. This is true not only of the popular philosophers
+proper--who, as Windelband pertinently remarks (vol. i. p. 563), did not
+seek after the truth, but believed that they already possessed it, and
+desired only to disseminate it; who did not aim at the promotion of
+investigation, but the instruction of the public--but to a certain extent,
+also, of those who were conscious of laboring in the service of science.
+Among the representatives of the more polite tendency belong, Moses
+Mendelssohn[2] (1729-86); Thomas Abbt (_On Death for the Fatherland_, 1761;
+_On Merit_, 1765); J.J. Engel (_The philosopher for the World_, 1775); G.S.
+Steinbart (_The Christian Doctrine of Happiness_, 1778); Ernst Platner
+(_Philosophical Aphorisms_, 1776, 1782; on Platner cf. M. Heinze, 1880);
+G.C. Lichtenberg (died 1799; _Miscellaneous Writings_, 1800 _seq_.; a
+selection is given in _Reclam's Bibliothek_); Christian Garve (died 1798;
+_Essays_, 1792 _seq.; Translations from the Ethical Works of Aristotle,
+Cicero, and Ferguson_); and Friedrich Nicolai[3] (died 1811). Eberhard,
+Feder, and Meiners will be mentioned later among the opponents of the
+Kantian philosophy.
+
+[Footnote 1: The influence of the English philosophers on the German
+philosophy of the eighteenth century is discussed by Gustav Zart, 1881.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Mendelssohn: _Letters on the Sensations_, 1755; _On Evidence
+in the Metaphysical Sciences_, a prize essay crowned by the Academy, 1764;
+_Phaedo, or on Immortality_, 1767; _Jerusalem_, 1783; _Morning Hours, or on
+the Existence of God_, 1785; _To the Friends of Lessing_ (against Jacobi),
+1786; _Works_, 1843-44. Cf. on Mendelssohn, Kayserling, 1856, 1862, 1883.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Nicolai: _Library of Belles Lettres_, from 1757; _Letters on
+the Most Recent German Literature_, from 1759; _Universal German Library_,
+from 1765; _New Universal German Library_, 1793-1805.]
+
+Among the psychologists J.N. Tetens, whose _Philosophical Essays on Human
+Nature_, 1776-77, show a remarkable similarity to the views of Kant,[1]
+takes the first rank. The two thinkers evidently influenced each other. The
+three fold division of the activities of the soul, "knowing, feeling,
+and willing," which has now become popular and which appears to us
+self-evident, is to be referred to Tetens, from whom Kant took it; in
+opposition to the twofold division of Aristotle and Wolff into "cognition
+and appetition," he established the equal rights of the faculty of
+feeling--which had previously been defended by Sulzer (1751), the aesthetic
+writer, and by Mendelssohn (1755, 1763, 1785). Besides Tetens, the
+following should be mentioned among the psychologists: Tetens's opponent,
+Johann Lossius (1775), an adherent of Bonnet; D. Tiedemann (_Inquiries
+concerning Man_, from 1777), who was estimable also as a historian of
+philosophy (_Spirit of Speculative Philosophy_, 1791-97); Von Irwing
+(1772 _seq_.; 2d ed., 1777); and K. Ph. Moriz (_Magazin zur
+Erfahrungsseelenlehre_, from 1785). Basedow (died 1790), Campe (died 1818),
+and J.H. Pestalozzi (1745-1827) did valuable work in pedagogics.
+
+[Footnote 1: Sensation gives the content, and the understanding
+spontaneously produces the form, of knowledge. The only objectivity of
+knowledge which we can attain consists in the subjective necessity of the
+forms of thought or the ideas of relation. Perception enables us to cognize
+phenomena only, not the true essence of things and of ourselves, etc.]
+
+One of the clearest and most acute minds among the philosophers of the
+Illumination was the deist Hermann Samuel Reimarus[1] (1694-1768), from
+1728 professor in Hamburg. He attacks atheism, in whatever form it may
+present itself, with as much zeal and conviction as he shows in breaking
+down the belief in revelation by his inexorable criticism (in his
+_Defense_, communicated in manuscript to a few friends only). He obtains
+his weapons for this double battle from the Wolffian philosophy. The
+existence of an extramundane deity is proved by the purposive arrangement
+of the world, especially of organisms, which aims at the good--not merely
+of man, as the majority of the physico-theologists have believed, but--of
+all living creatures. To believe in a special revelation, _i.e._, a
+miracle, in addition to such a revelation of God as this, which is granted
+to all men, and is alone necessary to salvation, is to deny the perfection
+of God, and to do violence to the immutability of his providence. To these
+general considerations against the credibility of positive revelation
+are to be added, as special arguments against the Jewish and Christian
+revelations, the untrustworthiness of human testimony in general, the
+contradictions in the biblical writings, the uncertainty of their meaning,
+and the moral character of the persons regarded as messengers of God, whose
+teachings, precepts, and deeds in no wise correspond to their high mission.
+Jewish history is a "tissue of sheer follies, shameful deeds, deceptions,
+and cruelties, the chief motives of which were self-interest and lust for
+power." The New Testament is also the work of man; all talk of divine
+inspiration, an idle delusion, the resurrection of Christ, a fabrication of
+the disciples; and the Protestant system, with its dogmas of the Trinity,
+the fall of man, original sin, the incarnation, vicarious atonement, and
+eternal punishment, contrary to reason. The advance of Reimarus beyond
+Wolff consists in the consistent application of the criteria for the divine
+character of revelation, which Wolff had set up without making a positive,
+not to speak of a negative, use of them. His weakness[2] consists in the
+fact that, on the one hand, he contented himself with a rationalistic
+interpretation of the biblical narratives, instead of pushing on--as Semler
+did after him at Halle (1725-91)--to a historical criticism of the sources,
+and, on the other, held fast to the alternative common to all the deists,
+"Either divine or human, either an actual event or a fabrication," without
+any suspicion of that great intermediate region of religious myth, of the
+involuntary and pregnant inventions of the popular fancy.
+
+[Footnote 1: H.S. Reimarus: _Discussions on the Chief Truths of Natural
+Religion_, 1754; _General Consideration of the Instincts of Animals_, 1762;
+_Apology or Defense for the Rational Worshipers of God_. Fragments of the
+last of these works, which was kept secret during its author's life, were
+published by Lessing (the well-known "Wolffenbüttel Fragments," from
+1774). A detailed table of contents is to be found in _Reimarus und seine
+Schutzschrift_, 1862, by D. Fr. Strauss, included in the fifth volume of
+his _Gesammelte Schriften_.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Cf. O. Pfleiderer, _Philosophy of Religion_, vol. i. p. 102,
+p. 106 _seq_.]
+
+The philosophico-religious standpoint of G.E. Lessing (1729-81), in whom
+the Illumination reached its best fruitage, was less one-sided. Apart from
+the important aesthetic impulses which flowed from the _Laocoon_ (1766) and
+the _Hamburg Dramaturgy_ (1767-69), his philosophical significance rests
+on two ideas, which have had important consequences for the religious
+conceptions of the nineteenth century: the speculative interpretation of
+certain dogmas (the Trinity, etc.), and the application of the Leibnitzian
+idea of development to the history of the positive religions. By both of
+these he prepared the way for Hegel. In regard to his relation to his
+predecessors, Lessing sought to mediate between the pantheism of Spinoza
+and the individualism of Leibnitz; and in his comprehension of the latter
+showed himself far superior to the Wolffians. He can be called a Spinozist
+only by those who, like Jacobi, have this title ready for everyone
+who expresses himself against a transcendent, personal God, and the
+unconditional freedom of the will. Moreover, in view of his critical and
+dialectical, rather than systematic, method of thinking, we must guard
+against laying too great stress on isolated statements by him.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: A caution which Gideon Spicker (_Lessings Weltanschauung_,
+1883) counsels us not to forget, even in view of the oft cited avowal of
+determinism, "I thank God that I must, and that I must the best." Among the
+numerous treatises on Lessing we may note those by G.E. Schwarz (1854), and
+Zeller (in Sybel's _Historische Zeitschrift_, 1870, incorporated in the
+second collection of Zeller's _Vorträge und Abhandlungen_, 1877); and on
+his theological position, that of K. Fischer on Lessing's _Nathan der
+Weise_, 1864, as well as J.H. Witte's _Philosophie unserer Dichterheroen_,
+vol. i. _(Lessing and Herder_), 1880. [Cf. in English, Sime, 2 vols., 1877,
+and _Encyclopedia Britannica_, vol. xiv. pp, 478-482.--TR.]]
+
+Lessing conceives the Deity as the supreme, all-comprehensive, living
+unity, which excludes neither a certain kind of plurality nor even a
+certain kind of change; without life and action, without the experience of
+changing states, the life of God would be miserably wearisome. Things are
+not out of, but in him; nevertheless (as "contingent") they are distinct
+from him. The Trinity must be understood in the sense of immanent
+distinctions. God has conceived himself, or his perfections, in a twofold
+manner: he conceived them as united and himself as their sum, and he
+conceived them as single. Now God's thinking is creation, his ideas
+actualities. By conceiving his perfections united he created his eternal
+image, the Son of God; the bond between God representing and God
+represented, between Father and Son, is the Holy Spirit. But when he
+conceived his perfections singly he created the world, in which these
+manifest themselves divided among a continuous series of particular beings.
+Every individual is an isolated divine perfection; the things in the world
+are limited gods, all living, all with souls, and of a spiritual nature,
+though in different degrees. Development is everywhere; at present the soul
+has five senses, but very probably it once had less than five, and in
+the future it will have more. At first the actions of men were guided by
+obscure instinct; gradually the reason obtained influence over the will,
+and one day will govern it completely through its clear and distinct
+cognitions. Thus freedom is attained in the course of history--the rational
+and virtuous man consciously obeys the divine order of the world, while he
+who is unfree obeys unconsciously.
+
+Lessing shares with the deistic Illumination the belief in a religion of
+reason, whose basis and essential content are formed by morality; but he
+rises far above this level in that he regards the religion of reason not
+as the beginning but as the goal of the development, and the positive
+religions as necessary transition stages in its attainment. As natural
+religion differs in each individual according to his feelings and powers,
+without positive enactments there would be no unity and community in
+religious matters. Nevertheless the statutory and historical element is
+not a graft from without, but a shell organically grown around natural
+religion, indispensable for its development, and to be removed but
+gradually and by layers--when the inclosed kernel has become ripe and firm.
+The history of religions is an _education of the human race through divine
+revelation_; so teaches his small but thoughtful treatise of 1780.[1] As
+the education of the individual man puts nothing extraneous into him, but
+only gives him more quickly and easily that which he could have reached of
+himself, so human reason is illuminated by revelation concerning things
+to which it could have itself attained, only that without God's help the
+process would have been longer and more difficult--perhaps it would have
+wandered about for many millions of years in the errors of polytheism, if
+God had not been pleased by a single stroke (his revelation to Moses) to
+give it a better direction. And as the teacher does not impart everything
+to the pupil at once, but considers the state of development reached by him
+at each given period, so God in his revelation observes a certain order and
+measure. To the rude Jewish people he revealed himself first as a national
+God, as the God of their fathers; they had to wait for the Persians to
+teach them that the God whom they had hitherto worshiped as the most
+powerful among other gods was the only one. Although this lowest stage in
+the development of religion lacked the belief in immortality, yet it must
+not be lightly valued; let us acknowledge that it was an heroic obedience
+for men to observe the laws of God simply because they are the laws of God,
+and not because of temporal or future rewards! The first practical teacher
+of immortality was Christ; with him the second age of religion begins: the
+first good book of elementary instruction, the Old Testament, from which
+man had hitherto learned, was followed by the second, better one, the New
+Testament. As we now can dispense with the first primer in regard to the
+doctrine of the unity of God, and as we gradually begin to be able to
+dispense with the second in regard to the doctrine of the immortality of
+the soul, so this New Testament may easily contain still further truths,
+which for the present we wonder at as revelations, until the reason shall
+learn to derive them from other truths already established. Lessing himself
+makes an attempt at a philosophical interpretation of the dogmas of the
+Trinity (see above), of original sin, and of atonement. Such an advance
+from faith to knowledge, such a development of revealed truths into proved
+truths of reason, is absolutely necessary. We cannot dispense with the
+truths of revelation, but we must not remain content with simply believing
+them, but must endeavor to comprehend them; for they have been revealed in
+order that they may become rational. They are, as it were, the sum which
+the teacher of arithmetic tells his pupils beforehand so that they
+may guide themselves by it; but if they content themselves with this
+solution--which was given merely as a guide--they would never learn to
+calculate. Hand in hand with the advance of the understanding goes the
+progress of the will. Future recompenses, which the New Testament promises
+as rewards of virtue, are means of education, and will gradually fall into
+disuse: in the highest stage, the stage of purity of heart, virtue will
+be loved and practiced for its own sake, and no longer for the sake of
+heavenly rewards. Slowly but surely, along devious paths which are yet
+salutary, we are being led toward that great goal. It will surely come, the
+time of consummation, when man will do the good because it is good, this
+time of the new, eternal Gospel, this third age, this "Christianity of
+reason." Continue, Eternal Providence, thine imperceptible march; let me
+not despair of thee because it is imperceptible, not even when to me thy
+steps seem to lead backward. It is not true that the straight line is
+always the shortest.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlects_.]
+
+With the thought that every individual must traverse the same course as
+that by which the race attains its perfection, Lessing connects the idea
+of the transmigration of souls. Why may not the individual man have been
+present in this world more than once? Is this hypothesis so ridiculous
+because it is the oldest?
+
+If Lessing abandoned the ranks of the deists by his recognition of the
+fact that the positive religions contain truth in a gradual process of
+purification, by his free criticism, on the other hand, he broke with
+the orthodox, whose idolatrous reverence for the Bible was to him an
+abomination. The letter is not the spirit, the Bible is not religion, nor
+yet its foundation, but only its records. Contingent historical truths can
+never serve as a proof of the necessary truths of reason. Christianity is
+older than the New Testament.
+
+Already, in the case of Lessing, we may doubt, in view of his historical
+temper and of certain speculative tendencies, whether he is to be included
+among the Illuminati. In the case of Kant a decided protest must be
+raised against such a classification. When Hegel numbers him among the
+philosophers of the Illumination, on account of his lack of rational
+intuition, and some theologians on account of his religious rationalism,
+the answer to the former is that Kant did not lack the speculative gift,
+but only that it was surpassed by his gift of reflection, and, to the
+latter, that in regard to the positive element in religion he judged very
+differently from the deists and appreciated the historical element more
+justly than they--if not to the same extent as Lessing and Herder. We
+do not need to lay great stress on the fact that Kant had a lively
+consciousness that he was making a contribution to thought, and that the
+Illumination contemplated this new doctrine without comprehending it, in
+order to recognize that the difference between his efforts and achievements
+and those of the Illumination is far greater than their kinship. For
+although Kant is upon common ground with it, in so far as he adheres to its
+motto, "Have courage to use thine own understanding, become a man, cease
+to trust thyself to the guidance of others, and free thyself in all fields
+from the yoke of authority," and, although besides such formal injunctions
+to freedom of thought, he also shares in certain material tendencies and
+convictions (the turning from the world to man, the attempt at a synthesis
+of reason and experience, and the belief in a religion of reason); yet in
+method and results, he stands like a giant among a race of dwarfs, like one
+instructed, who judges from principles, among men of opinion, who merely
+stick results together, a methodical systematizer among well-meaning but
+impotent eclectics. The philosophy of the Illumination is related to
+that of Kant as argument to science, as halting mediation to principiant
+resolution, as patchwork to creation out of full resources, yet at the same
+time as wish to deed and as negative preparation to positive achievement.
+It was undeniably of great value to the Kantian criticism that the
+Illumination had created a point of intersection for the various tendencies
+of thought, and had brought about the approximation and mutual contact of
+the opposing systems which then existed, while, at the same time, it had
+crumbled them to pieces, and thus awakened the need for a new, more firmly
+and more deeply founded system.
+
+
+%4. The Faith Philosophy.%
+
+The philosophers of feeling or faith stand in the same relation to the
+German Illumination as Rousseau to the French. Here also the rights of
+feeling are vindicated against those of the knowing reason. Among the
+distinguished representatives of this anti-rationalistic tendency Hamann
+led the way, Herder was the most prolific, and Jacobi the clearest. That
+the fountain of certitude is to be sought not in discriminating thought,
+but in intuition, experience, revelation, and tradition; that the highest
+truths can be felt only and not proved; that all existing things are
+incomprehensible, because individual--these are convictions which, before
+Jacobi defended them as based on scientific principles, had been vehemently
+proclaimed by that singular man, J.G. Hamann (died 1788) of Königsberg.
+From an unprinted review by Hamann, Herder drew the objections which his
+"Metacritique" raises against Kant's Critique of Reason--that the division
+of matter and form, of sensibility and understanding, is inadmissible;
+that Kant misunderstood the significance of language, which is just where
+sensibility and understanding unite, etc.
+
+In Herder[1] (1744-1803: after 1776 Superintendent-General in Weimar) the
+philosophy of feeling gained a finer, more perspicuous and harmonious
+nature, who shared Lessing's interest in history and his tendency to
+hold fast equally to pantheism and to individualism. God is the all-one,
+infinite, spiritual (non-personal) primal force, which wholly reveals
+itself in each thing _(God: Dialogues on the System of Spinoza_, 1787).
+To the life, power, wisdom, and goodness of God correspond the life and
+perfection of the universe and of individual creatures, each of which
+possesses its own irreplaceable value and bears in itself its future in
+germ. Everywhere, one and the same life in an ascending series of powers
+and forms with imperceptible transitions. Always, an inner and an outer
+together; no power without organ, no spirit without a body. As thought is
+only a higher stage of sensation, which develops from the lower by means of
+language--reason, like sense, is not a productive but a receptive faculty
+of knowing, perceiving ("_Vernehmen_")--so the free process of history is
+only the continuation and completion of the nature-process (_Ideas for the
+Philosophy of the History of Mankind_, 1784 _seq_.). Man, the last child of
+nature and her first freedman, is the nodal point where the physical series
+of events changes into the ethical; the last member of the organisms of
+earth is at the same time the first in the spiritual development. The
+mission of history is the unfolding of all the powers which nature
+has concentrated in man as the compendium of the world; its law, that
+everywhere on our earth everything be realized that can be realized there;
+its end, humanity and the harmonious development of all our capacities. As
+nature forms a single great organism, and from the stone to man describes
+a connected development, so humanity is a one great individual which passes
+through its several ages, from infancy (the Orient), through boyhood
+(Eygpt and Phoenicia), youth (Greece), and manhood (Rome), to old age (the
+Christian world). The spirit stands in the closest dependence upon nature,
+and nature is concerned in history throughout. The finer organization of
+his brain, the possession of hands, above all, his erect position, make
+man, man and endow him with reason. Similarly it is natural conditions,
+climate, the character of the soil, the surrounding animal and vegetable
+life, etc., that play an essential part in determining the manners, the
+characters, and the destinies of nations. The connection of nature with
+history by means of the concept of development and through the idea that
+the two merely represent different stages of the same fundamental process,
+made Herder the forerunner of Schelling.
+
+[Footnote 1: On Herder cf. the biography by R. Haym, 2 vols., 1877, 1885;
+and the work by Witte which has been referred to above (p. 306, note).]
+
+His polemic against Kant in the _Metacritique_, 1799 (against the _Critique
+of Pure Reason_), and the dialogue _Calligone_, 1800 (against the _Critique
+of Judgment_), is less pleasing. These are neither dignified in tone nor
+essentially of much importance. In the former the distinction between
+sensibility and reason is censured, and in the latter the separation of the
+beautiful from the true and the good, but Kant's theory of aesthetics is
+for the most part grossly misunderstood. The "disinterested" satisfaction
+Herder makes a cold satisfaction; the harmonious activity of the cognitive
+powers, a tedious, apish sport; the satisfaction "without a concept,"
+judgment without ground or cause. The positive elements in his own views
+are more valuable. Pleasure in mere form, without a concept, and without
+the idea of an end, is impossible. All beauty must mean or express
+something, must be a symbol of inner life; its ground is perfection or
+adaptation. Beauty is that symmetrical union of the parts of a being, in
+virtue of which it feels well itself and gives pleasure to the observer,
+who sympathetically shares in this well-being. The charm and value of the
+_Calligone_ lie more in the warmth and clearness with which the expressive
+beauty of single natural phenomena is described than in the abstract
+discussion.
+
+Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) gave the most detailed statement of
+the position of the philosophy of feeling, and the most careful proof of
+it. He was born in Düsseldorf, the son of a manufacturer; until 1794 he
+lived in his native place and at his country residence in Pempelfort; later
+he resided in Holstein, and, from 1805, in Munich, where, in 1807-13, he
+was president of the Academy of Sciences. Of his works, collected in five
+volumes, 1812-25, we are here chiefly concerned with the letters _On the
+Doctrine of Spinoza_, 1785; _David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism_,
+1787; and the treatise _On Divine Things_, 1811, which called out
+Schelling's merciless response, _Memorial of Jacobi_. Besides Hume and
+Spinoza, the sensationalism of Bonnet and the criticism of Kant had made
+the most lasting impression on Jacobi. His relation to Kant is neither that
+of an opponent nor of a supporter and popularizer. He declares himself in
+accord with Kant's critique of the understanding (the understanding is
+merely a formal function, one which forms and combines concepts only, but
+does not guarantee reality, one to which the material of thought must be
+given from elsewhere and for which the suprasensible remains unattainable);
+in regard to the critique of reason he raises the objection that it; makes
+the Ideas mere postulates, which possess no guarantee for their reality.
+The critique of sensibility appears to him still more unsatisfactory, as
+it does not explain the origin of sensations. Without the concept of the
+"thing-in-itself" one cannot enter the Kantian philosophy, and with it
+one cannot remain there. Fichte has drawn the correct conclusion from the
+Kantian premises; idealism is the unavoidable result of the Critique of
+Reason and foretold by; it as the Messiah was foretold by John the Baptist.
+And by the evil fruit we know the evil root: the idealistic theory is
+philosophical nihilism, for it denies the reality of the external world, as
+the materialism of Spinoza denies a transcendent God and the freedom of
+the will. Reality slips away from both these systems--they are the only
+consistent ones there are--material reality escaping from the former
+and suprasensible reality from the latter; and this must be so, because
+reality, of whatever kind it be, cannot be known, but only believed and
+felt. The actual, the existence of the noumenal as well as of the external
+world, even the existence of our own body, makes itself known to us through
+revelation alone; the understanding comprehends relations only; the
+certainty that a thing exists is attained only through experience and
+faith. Sense and reason are the organs of faith, and hence the true
+sources of knowledge; the former apprehends the natural, the latter, the
+supernatural, while for the understanding is left only the analysis and
+combination of given intuitions.
+
+Philosophy as a science from concepts must necessarily prove atheistic and
+fatalistic. Conception and proof mean deduction from conditions. How shall
+that which has no cause from which to explain it, the unconditioned, God,
+and freedom, be comprehended and proved? Demonstration rises along the
+chain of causes to the universe alone, not to a transcendent Creator;
+mediate knowledge is confined to the sphere of conditioned being and
+mechanical becoming. The intuitive knowledge of feeling alone leads us
+beyond this, and along with the wonderful, the inconceivable power of
+freedom in ourselves, which is above all nature, shows us the primal source
+of all wonders, the transcendent God above us. The inference from our
+own spiritual, self-conscious, free personality to that of God is no
+unauthorized anthropomorphism--in the knowledge of God we may fearlessly
+deify our human existence, because God, when he created man, gave his
+divine nature human form. Reason and freedom are the same: the former
+is theoretical, the latter practical elevation to the suprasensible.
+Nevertheless virtue is not based upon an inflexible, despotic, abstractly,
+formal law, but upon an instinct, which, however, does not aim at
+happiness. Thus Jacobi attempts to mediate between the ethics of the
+Illumination and the ethics of Kant, by agreeing with the former in regard
+to the origin of virtue (it arises from a natural impulse), and with the
+latter in regard to its nature (it consists in disinterestedness). Hence
+with the Illumination he rejects the imperative form, and with Kant the
+eudemonistic end. At the same time he endeavors to introduce Herder's idea
+of individuality into ethics, by demanding that morality assume a special
+form in each man. Schiller and the romantic school take from Jacobi their
+ideal of the "beautiful soul," which from natural impulse realizes in its
+action, and still more in its being, the good in an individual way.
+
+
+
+
+
+%PART II. FROM KANT TO THE PRESENT TIME.%
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.
+
+KANT.
+
+The suit between empiricism and rationalism had continued for centuries,
+but still awaited final decision. Are all our ideas the result of
+experience, or are they (wholly or in part) an original possession of the
+mind? Are they received from without (by perception), or produced from
+within (by self-activity)? Is knowledge a product of sensation or of pure
+thought? All who had thus far taken part in this discussion had resembled
+partisans or advocates rather than disinterested judges. They had given
+less attention to investigation than to the defense of the traditional
+theses of their schools; they had not endeavored to obtain results, but
+to establish results already determined; and, along with real arguments,
+popular appeals had not been despised. Each of the opposing schools had
+given variations on a definite theme, and whenever timid attempts had been
+made to bring the two melodies into harmony they had met with no approval.
+The proceedings thus far had at least made it evident to the unbiased
+hearer that each of the two parties made extravagant claims, and, in the
+end, fell into self-contradiction. If the claim of empiricism is true, that
+all our concepts arise from perception, then not only the science of the
+suprasensible, which it denies, but also the science of the objects of
+experience, about which it concerns itself, is impossible. For perception
+informs us concerning single cases merely, it can never comprehend all
+cases, it yields no necessary and universal truth; but knowledge which is
+not apodictically valid for every reasoning being and for all cases is
+not worthy the name. The very reasons which were intended to prove the
+possibility of knowledge give a direct inference to its impossibility. The
+empirical philosophy destroys itself, ending with Hume in skepticism and
+probabilism. Rationalism is overtaken by a different, and yet an analogous
+fate--it breaks up into a popular eclecticism. It believes that it
+has discovered an infallible criterion of truth in the clearness and
+distinctness of ideas, and a sure example for philosophical method in the
+method of mathematics. In both points it is wrong. The criterion of
+truth is insufficient, for Spinoza and Leibnitz built up their opposing
+theories--the pantheism of the one and the monadology of the other--from
+equally clear and distinct conceptions; tried by this standard
+individualism is just as true as pantheism. Mathematics, again, does not
+owe its unquestioned acceptance and cogent force to the clearness and
+distinctness of its conceptions, but to the fact that these are capable
+of construction in intuition. The distinction between mathematics and
+metaphysics was overlooked, namely, that mathematical thought can transform
+its conceptions into intuitions, can generate its objects or sensuously
+present them, which philosophical thought is not in a position to do. The
+objects of the latter must be given to it, and to the human mind they are
+given in no other way than through sensuous intuition. Metaphysics seeks
+to be a science of the real, but it is impossible to conjure being out of
+thought; reality cannot be proved from concepts, it can only be felt. In
+making the unperceivable and suprasensible (the real nature of things, the
+totality of the world, the Deity, and immortality) the special object
+of philosophy, rationalism looked on the understanding as a faculty of
+knowledge by which objects are given. In reality objects can never be given
+through concepts; these only render it possible to think objects given
+in some other way (by intuition). It is true that concepts of the
+suprasensible exist, but nothing can be known through them, there is
+nothing intuitively given to be subsumed under them.
+
+With this failure to perceive the intuitive element in mathematics was
+joined the mistake of overlooking its synthetic character. The syllogistic
+method of presentation employed in the Euclidean geometry led to the belief
+that the more special theorems had been derived from the simpler ones, and
+these from the axioms, by a process of conceptual analysis; while the fact
+is that in mathematics all progress is by intuition alone, the syllogism
+serving merely to formulate and explain truths already attained, but not to
+supply new ones. Following the example of mathematics thus misunderstood,
+the mission of philosophy was made to consist in the development of
+the truths slumbering in pregnant first principles by means of logical
+analysis. If only there were metaphysical axioms! If we only did not
+demand, and were not compelled to demand, of true science that it increase
+our knowledge, and not merely give an analytical explanation of knowledge.
+When once the clearness and distinctness of conceptions had been taken
+in so purely formal a sense, it was inevitable that in the end, as
+productivity became less, the principle should be weakened down to a mere
+demand for the explanation and elucidation of the metaphysical ideas
+present in popular consciousness. Thus the rationalistic current lost
+itself in the shallow waters of the Illumination, which soon gave as
+ready a welcome to the empirical theories--since these also were able to
+legitimate themselves by clear and distinct conceptions--as it had given
+to the results of the rationalistic systems.
+
+It was thus easy to see that each of the contending parties had been guilty
+of one-sidedness, and that in order to escape this a certain mean must be
+assumed between the two extremes; but it was a much more difficult matter
+to discover the due middle ground. Neither of the opposing standpoints is
+so correct as its defenders believe, and neither so false as its opponents
+maintain. Where, then, on either side, does the mistaken narrowness begin,
+and how far does the justification of each extend?
+
+The conflict centers, first, about the question concerning the origin of
+human knowledge and the sphere of its validity. Rationalism is justified
+when it asserts that some ideas do not come from the senses. If knowledge
+is to be possible, some concepts cannot originate in perception, those,
+namely, by which knowledge is constituted, for if they should, it would
+lack universality and necessity. The sole organ of universally valid
+knowledge is reason. Empiricism, on the other hand, is justified when it
+asserts that the experiential alone is knowable. Whatever is to be knowable
+must be given as a real in sensuous intuition. The only organ of reality is
+sensibility. Rationalism judges correctly concerning the origin of the
+most important classes of ideas; empiricism concerning the sphere of their
+validity. The two may be thus combined: some concepts (those which produce
+knowledge) take their origin in reason or are _a priori_, but they are
+valid for objects of experience alone. The conflict concerns, secondly, the
+use of the deductive (syllogistic) or the inductive method. Empiricism,
+through its founder Bacon, had recommended induction in place of the barren
+syllogistic method, as the only method which would lead to new discoveries.
+It demands, above all things, the extension of knowledge. Rationalism, on
+the contrary, held fast to the deductive method, because the syllogism
+alone, in its view, furnishes knowledge valid for all rational beings. It
+demands, first of all, universality and necessity in knowledge. Induction
+has the advantage of increasing knowledge, but it leads only to empirical
+and comparative, not to strict universality. The syllogism has the
+advantage of yielding universal and necessary truth, but it can only
+explicate and establish knowledge, not increase it. May it not be possible
+so to do justice to the demands of both that the advantages which they seek
+shall be combined, and the disadvantages which have been feared, avoided?
+Are there not cognitions which increase our knowledge (are _synthetic_)
+without being empirical, which are universally and necessarily valid
+(_a priori_) without being analytic? From these considerations arises the
+main question of the _Critique of Pure Reason_: How are synthetic judgments
+_a priori_ possible?
+
+The philosophy of experience had overestimated sense and underestimated the
+understanding, when it found the source of all knowledge in the faculty of
+perception and degraded the faculty of thought to an almost wholly inactive
+recipient of messages coming to it from without. From the standpoint of
+empiricism concepts (Ideas) deserve confidence only in so far as they can
+legitimate themselves by their origin in sensations (impressions). It
+overlooks the _active_ character of all knowing. Among the rationalists,
+on the other hand, we find an underestimation of the senses and an
+overestimation of the understanding. They believe that sense reveals
+only the deceptive exterior of things, while reason gives their true
+non-sensuous essence. That which the mind perceives of things is deceptive,
+but that which it thinks concerning them is true. The former power is the
+faculty of confused, the latter the faculty of distinct knowledge. Sense is
+the enemy rather than the servant of true knowledge, which consists in the
+development and explication of pregnant innate conceptions and principles.
+These philosophers forget that we can never reach reality by conceptual
+analysis; and that the senses have a far greater importance for knowledge
+than merely to give it an impulse; that it is they which supply the
+understanding with real objects, and so with the content of knowledge.
+Beside the (formal) activity (of the understanding), cognition implies a
+passive factor, a reception of impressions. Neither sense alone nor the
+understanding alone produces knowledge, but both cognitive powers are
+necessary, the active and the passive, the conceptual and the intuitive.
+Here the question arises, How do concept and intuition, sensuous and
+rational knowledge, differ, and what is the basis of their congruence?
+Notwithstanding their different points of departure and their variant
+results, the two main tendencies of modern philosophy agree in certain
+points. If the conflict between the two schools and their one-sidedness
+suggested the idea of supplementing the conclusions of the one by those of
+the other, the recognition of the incorrectness of their common
+convictions furnished the occasion to go beyond them and to establish a
+new, a higher point of view above them both, as also above the eclecticism
+which sought to unite the opposing principles. The errors common to both
+concern, in the first place, the nature of judgment and the difference
+between sensibility and understanding. Neither side had recognized that
+the peculiar character of judgment consists in _active connection_. The
+rationalists made judgment an active function, it is true, but a mere
+activity of conscious development, of elucidation and analytical inference,
+which does not advance knowledge a single step. The empiricists described
+it as a process of comparison and discrimination, as the mere perception
+and recognition of the relations and connections already existing between
+ideas; while in reality judgment does not discover the relations and
+connections of representations, but itself establishes them. In the former
+case the synthetic moment is ignored, in the latter the active moment. The
+imperfect view of judgment was one of the reasons for the appearance of
+extreme theories concerning the origin of ideas in reason or in perception.
+Rationalism regards even those concepts which have a content as innate,
+whereas it is only formal concepts which are so. Empiricism regards all,
+even the highest formal concepts (the categories), as abstracted from
+experience, whereas experience furnishes only the content of knowledge,
+and not the synthesis which is necessary to it. On the one hand too much,
+and on the other too little, is regarded as the original possession of the
+understanding. The question "What concepts are innate?" can be decided only
+by answering the further question, What are the concepts through which the
+faculty of judgment connects the representations obtained from experience?
+These connective concepts, these formal instruments of synthesis are
+_a priori_. The agreement of the two schools is still greater in regard to
+the relation of sense and understanding, notwithstanding the apparently
+sharp contrast between them. The empiricist considers thought transformed,
+sublimated perception, while the rationalist sees in perception only
+confused and less distinct thought. For the former concepts are faded
+images of sensations, for the latter sensations are concepts which have not
+yet become clear; the difference is scarcely greater than if the one should
+call ice frozen water, and the other should prefer to call water melted
+ice. Both arrange intuition and thought in a single series, and derive the
+one from the other by enhancement or attenuation. Both make the mistake of
+recognizing only a difference in degree where a difference in kind exists.
+In such a case only an energetic dualism can afford help. Sense and
+understanding are not one and the same cognitive power at different stages,
+but two heterogeneous faculties. Sensation and thought are not different in
+degree, but in kind. As Descartes began with the metaphysical dualism of
+extension and thought, so Kant begins with the noëtical dualism of
+intuition and thought.
+
+Much more serious, however, than any of the mistakes yet mentioned was
+a sin of omission of which the two schools were alike guilty, and the
+recognition and avoidance of which constituted in Kant's own eyes the
+distinctive character of his philosophy and its principiant-advance beyond
+preceding systems. The pre-Kantian thinker had proceeded to the discussion
+of knowledge without raising _the question of the possibility of
+knowledge_. He had approached things in the full confidence that the human
+mind was capable of cognizing them, and with a naïve trust in the power of
+reason to possess itself of the truth. His trust was naïve and ingenuous,
+because the idea that it could deceive him had never entered his mind. Now
+no matter whether this belief in man's capacity for knowledge and in the
+possibility of knowing things is justifiable or not, and no matter how
+far it may be justifiable, it was in any case untested; so that when the
+skeptic approached with his objections the dogmatist was defenseless.
+All previous philosophy, so far as it had not been skeptical, had been,
+according to Kant's expression, dogmatic; that is, it had held as an
+article of faith, and without precedent inquiry, that we possess the power
+of cognizing objects. It had not asked _how_ this is possible; it had not
+even asked what knowledge is, what may and must be demanded of it, and by
+what means our reason is in a position to satisfy such demands. It had left
+human intelligence and its extent uninvestigated. The skeptic, on the other
+hand, had been no more thorough. He had doubted and denied man's capacity
+for knowledge just as uncritically as the dogmatist had believed and
+presupposed it. He had directed his ingenuity against the theories of
+dogmatic philosophy, instead of toward the fundamental question of the
+possibility of knowledge. Human intelligence, which the dogmatist had
+approached with unreasoned trust and the skeptic with just as unreasoned
+distrust, is subjected, according to the plan of the critical philosopher,
+to a searching examination. For this reason Kant termed his standpoint
+"criticism," and his undertaking a "Critique of Reason." Instead of
+asserting and denying, he investigates how knowledge arises, of what
+factors it is composed, and how far it extends. He inquires into the origin
+and extent of knowledge, into its sources and its limits, into the grounds
+of its existence and of its legitimacy. The Critique of Reason finds itself
+confronted by two problems, the second of which cannot be solved until
+after the solution of the first. The investigation of the sources of
+knowledge must precede the inquiry into the extent of knowledge. Only after
+the conditions of knowledge have been established can it be ascertained
+what objects are attainable by it. Its sphere cannot be determined except
+from its origin.
+
+Whether the critical philosopher stands nearer to the skeptic or to the
+dogmatist is rather an idle question. He is specifically distinct from
+both, in that he summons and guides the reason to self-contemplation, to
+a methodical examination of its capacity for knowledge. Where the one had
+blindly trusted and the other suspected and denied, he investigates; they
+overlook, he raises the question of the possibility of knowledge. The
+critical problem does not mean, Does a faculty of knowledge exist? but, Of
+what powers is it composed? are all objects knowable which have been so
+regarded? Kant does not ask whether, but how and by what means, knowledge
+is possible. Everyone who gives himself to scientific reflection must
+postulate that knowledge is possible, and the demand of the noëtical
+theorists of the day for a philosophy absolutely without assumptions is
+quite incapable of fulfillment. Nay, in order to be able to begin his
+inquiry at all, it was necessary for Kant to assume still more special
+postulates; for that a cognition of cognition is possible, that there is a
+critical, self-investigating reason could, at first, be only a matter of
+belief. This would not have excluded a supplementary detailed statement
+concerning the _how_ of this self-knowledge, concerning the organ of the
+critical philosophy. But Kant never gave one, and the omission subsequently
+led to a sharp debate concerning the character and method of the Critique
+of Reason. On this point, if we may so express it, Kant remained a
+dogmatist.
+
+Kant felt himself to be the finisher of skepticism; but this was chiefly
+because he had received the strongest impulse to the development of his
+critique of knowledge from Hume's inquiries concerning causation. Brought
+up in the dogmatic rationalism of the Wolffian school, to which he
+remained true for a considerable period as a teacher and writer (till about
+1760), although at the same time he was inquiring with an independent
+spirit, Kant was gradually won over through the influence of the English
+philosophy to the side of empirical skepticism. Then--as the result, no
+doubt, of reading the _Nouveaux Essais_ of Leibnitz, published in
+1765--he returned to rationalistic principles, until finally, after a
+renewal of empirical influences,[1] he took the position crystallized in
+the _Critique of Pure Reason_, 1781, which, however, experienced still
+other, though less considerable, changes in the sequel, just as in itself
+it shows the traces of previous transformations.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. H. Vaihinger's _Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen
+Vernunft_, vol. i., 1881, pp. 48-49. This is a work marked by acuteness,
+great industry, and an objective point of view which merits respect. The
+second volume, which treats of the Transcendental Aesthetic, appeared in
+1892.]
+
+It would be a most interesting task to trace in the writings which belong
+to Kant's pre-critical period the growth and development of the fundamental
+critical positions. Here, however, we can only mention in passing the
+subjects of his reflection and some of the most striking anticipations and
+beginnings of his epoch-making position. Even his maiden work, _Thoughts on
+the True Estimation of Vis Viva_, 1747, betokens the mediating nature of
+its author. In this it is argued that when men of profound and penetrating
+minds maintain exactly opposite opinions, attention must be chiefly
+directed to some intermediate principle to a certain degree compatible with
+the correctness of both parties. The question under discussion was whether
+the measure of _vis viva_ is equal, as the Cartesians thought, to the
+product of the mass into the velocity, or, according to the Leibnitzians,
+to the product of the mass into the square of the velocity. Kant's
+unsatisfactory solution of the problem--the law of Descartes holds for
+dead, and that of Leibnitz for living forces--drew upon him the derision
+of Lessing, who said that he had endeavored to estimate living forces
+without having tested his own. A similar tendency toward compromise--this
+time it is a synthesis of Leibnitz and Newton--is seen in his
+_Habilitationsschrift, Principiorum Primorum Cognitionis Metaphysicae Nova
+Dilucidatio_, 1755, and in the dissertation _Monadologia Physica_, 1756.
+The former distinguishes between _ratio essendi_ and _ratio cognoscendi_,
+rejects the ontological argument, and defends determinism against Crusius
+on Leibnitzian grounds. In the _Physical Monadology_ Kant gives his
+adherence to dynamism (matter the product of attraction and repulsion), and
+makes the monads or elements of body fill space without prejudice to
+their simplicity. A series of treatises is devoted to subjects in natural
+science: The Effect of the Tides in retarding the Earth's Rotation; The
+Obsolescence of the Earth; Fire (Inaugural Dissertation), Earthquakes, and
+the Theory of the Winds. The most important of these, the _General Natural
+History and Theory of the Heavens_, 1755, which for a long time remained
+unnoticed, and which was dedicated to Frederick II., developed the
+hypothesis (carried out forty years later by Laplace in ignorance of Kant's
+work) of the mechanical origin of the universe and of the motion of the
+planets. It presupposes merely the two forces of matter, attraction and
+repulsion, and its primitive chaotic condition, a world-mist with elements
+of different density. It is noticeable that Kant acknowledges the failure
+of the mechanical theory at two points: it is brought to a halt at the
+origin of the organic world and at the origin of matter. The mechanical
+cosmogony is far from denying creation; on the contrary, the proof that
+this well-ordered and purposive world necessarily arose from the regular
+action of material forces under law and without divine intervention, can
+only serve to support our assumption of a Supreme Intelligence as the
+author of matter and its laws; the belief is necessary, just because
+nature, even in its chaotic condition, can act only in an orderly and
+regular way.
+
+The empirical phase of Kant's development is represented by the writings
+of the 60's. _The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures_, 1762,
+asserts that the first figure is the only natural one, and that the others
+are superfluous and need reduction to the first. In the _Only Possible
+Foundation for a Demonstration of the Existence of God_, 1763, which, in
+the seventh Reflection of the Second Division, recapitulates the cosmogony
+advanced in the _Natural History of the Heavens_, the discussions
+concerning being ("existence" is absolute position, not a predicate which
+increases the sum of the qualities but is posited in a merely relative
+way), and the conclusion, prophetical of his later point of view, "It is
+altogether necessary that we should be _convinced_ of the existence of God,
+but not so necessary that his existence should be _demonstrated_" are more
+noteworthy than the argument itself. This runs: All possibility presupposes
+something actual wherein and whereby all that is conceivable is given as
+a determination or a consequence. That actuality the destruction of which
+would destroy all possibility is absolutely necessary. Therefore there
+exists an absolutely necessary Being as the ultimate real ground of all
+possibility; this Being is one, simple, unchangeable, eternal, the _ens
+realissimum_ and a spirit. The _Attempt to introduce the Notion of
+Negative Quantities into Philosophy_, 1763, distinguishes--contrary to
+Crusius--between logical opposition, contradiction or mere negation (_a_
+and _not-a_, pleasure and the absence of pleasure, power and lack of
+power), and real opposition, which cannot be explained by logic (+_a_ and
+-_a_, pleasure and pain, capital and debts, attraction and repulsion;
+in real opposition both determinations are positive, but in opposite
+directions). Parallel with this it distinguishes, also, between logical
+ground and real ground. The prize essay, _Inquiry concerning the Clearness_
+(Evidence) _of the Principles of Natural Theology and Ethics_, 1764, draws
+a sharp distinction between mathematical and metaphysical knowledge, and
+warns philosophy against the hurtful imitation of the geometrical method,
+in place of which it should rather take as an example the method which
+Newton introduced into natural science. Quantity constitutes the object of
+mathematics, qualities, the object of philosophy; the former is easy and
+simple, the latter difficult and complicated--how much more comprehensible
+the conception of a trillion is than the philosophical idea of freedom,
+which the philosophers thus far have been unable to make intelligible.
+In mathematics the general is considered under symbols _in concrete_, in
+philosophy, by means of symbols _in abstracto_; the former constructs its
+object in sensuous intuition, while the object of the latter is given
+to it, and that as a confused concept to be decomposed. Mathematics,
+therefore, may well begin with definitions, since the conception which is
+to be explained is first brought into being through the definition, while
+philosophy must begin by seeking her conceptions. In the former the
+definition is first in order, and in the latter almost always last; in the
+one case the method is synthetic, in the other it is analytic. It is the
+function of mathematics to connect and compare clear and certain concepts
+of quantity in order to draw conclusions from them; the function of
+philosophy is to analyze concepts given in a confused state, and to make
+them detailed and definite. Philosophy has also this disadvantage, that
+it possesses very many undecomposable concepts and undemonstrable
+propositions, while mathematics has only a few such. "Philosophical truths
+are like meteors, whose brightness gives no assurance of their permanence.
+They vanish, but mathematics remains. Metaphysics is without doubt the most
+difficult of all human sciences _(Einsichten)_, but a metaphysic has
+never yet been written"; for one cannot be so kind as to "apply the term
+philosophy to all that is contained in the books which bear this title." In
+the closing paragraphs, on the ultimate bases of ethics, the stern features
+of the categorical imperative are already seen, veiled by the English
+theory of moral sense, while the attractive _Observations on the Feeling
+of the Beautiful and the Sublime_, which appeared in the same year, still
+naïvely follow the empirical road.
+
+The empirical phase reaches its skeptical termination in the satire _Dreams
+of a Ghost-seer explained by the Dreams of Metaphysics_, 1766, which pours
+out its ingenious sarcasm impartially on spiritualism and on the assumed
+knowledge of the suprasensible. Here Kant is already clearly conscious of
+his new problem, a theory of the limits of human reason, conscious also
+that the attack on this problem is to be begun by a discussion of the
+question of space. This second question had been for many years a frequent
+subject of his reflections;[1] and it was this part of the general critical
+problem that first received definitive solution. In the Latin dissertation
+_On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World_, 1770,
+which concludes the pre-critical period, and which was written on the
+occasion of his assumption of his chair as ordinary professor, the
+critique of sensibility, the new theory of space and time, is set forth in
+approximately the same form as in the _Critique of Pure Reason_, while the
+critique of the understanding and of reason, the theory of the categories
+and the Ideas and of the sphere of their validity, required for its
+completion the intellectual labor of several more years. For this essay,
+_De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis_, leaves
+unchallenged the possibility of a knowledge of things in themselves and of
+God, thus showing that its author has abandoned the skepticism maintained
+in the _Dreams of a Ghost-seer_, and has turned anew to dogmatic
+rationalism, whose final overthrow required another swing in the direction
+of skeptical empiricism. In regard to the progress of this latter phase
+of opinion, the letters to M. Herz are almost the only, though not very
+valuable, source of information.
+
+[Footnote 1: _New Theory of Motion and Rest_, 1758; _On the First Ground of
+the Distinction of Positions in Space_, 1768; besides several of the works
+mentioned above.]
+
+The _Critique of Pure Reason_ appeared in 1781, much later than Kant had
+hoped when he began a work on "The Limits of Sensibility and Reason," and a
+second, altered edition in 1787.[1] After the _Prolegomena to every Future
+Metaphysic which may present itself as Science_, 1783, had given a popular
+form to the critical doctrine of knowledge, it was followed by the critical
+philosophy of ethics in the _Foundation of the Metaphysics of Ethics_,
+1785, and the _Critique of Practical Reason_, 1788; by the critical
+aesthetics and teleology in the _Critique of Judgment_, 1790; and by the
+critical philosophy of religion in _Religion within the Limits of Reason
+Only_, 1793[2] (consisting of four essays, of which the first, "Of Radical
+Evil," had already appeared in the _Berliner Monatsschrift_ in 1792). The
+_Metaphysical Elements of Natural Science_, 1786, and the _Metaphysics
+of Ethics_, 1797 (in two parts, "Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of
+Right," and "Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Virtue "), are devoted
+to the development of the system. The year 1798 brought two more larger
+works, the _Conflict of the Faculties_ and the _Anthropology_. Of the
+reviews, that on Herder's _Ideen_ maybe mentioned, and among the minor
+essays, the following: _Idea for a Universal History in a Cosmopolitan
+Sense, Answer to the Question: What is Illumination f_ both in 1784;
+_What does it mean to Orient oneself in Thought_? 1786; _On the Use of
+Teleological Principles in Philosophy_, 1788; _On a Discovery according to
+which all Recent Criticism of Pure Reason is to be superseded by a Previous
+One_, 1790; _On the Progress of Metaphysics since the Time of Wolff; On
+Philosophy in General, The End of all Things_, 1794; _On Everlasting
+Peace_, 1795. Kant's _Logic_ was published by Jäsche in 1800; his _Physical
+Geography_ and his _Observations on Pedagogics_ by F.T. Rink in 1803; his
+lectures on the _Philosophical Theory of Religion_ (1817; 2d. ed., 1830)
+and on _Metaphysics_ (1821; cf. Benno Erdmann in the _Philosophische
+Monatshefte_, vol. xix. 1883, p. 129 _seq_., and vol. xx. 1884, p. 65
+_seq_.) by Pölitz. If we may judge by the specimens given by Reicke in the
+_Altpreussische Monatsschrift_, 1882-84, and by Krause himself,[3]
+the promised publication of a manuscript of Kant's last years, now in
+possession of the Hamburg pastor, Albrecht Krause, and which discusses the
+transition from the metaphysical elements of natural science to physics,
+will hardly meet the expectations which some have cherished concerning it.
+Benno Erdmann has issued _Nachträge zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft aus
+Kants Nachlass_, 1881, and _Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie
+aus handschriftlichen Aufzeichnungen_--the first volume first _Heft
+(Reflexionen zur Anthropologie_) appearing in 1882, the second volume
+_(Reflexionen zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft, aus Kants Handexemplar
+von Baumgartens Metaphysica)_ in 1884. Max Müller has made an English
+translation of the _Critique of Pure Reason_, 2 vols., 1881.[4]
+
+[Footnote 1: There has been much discussion and much has been written
+concerning the relation of the two editions. In opposition to Schopenhauer
+and Kuno Fischer it must be maintained that the alterations in the second
+edition consist in giving greater prominence to realistic elements, which
+in the first edition remained in the background, though present even
+there.]
+
+[Footnote 2: This publication was the occasion of a conflict between Kant
+and the censorship concerning the right of free religious inquiry; cf.
+Dilthey in the _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. in. 1890, pp.
+418-450.]
+
+[Footnote 3: A. Krause: _I. Kant wider K. Fischer, zum ersten Male mit
+Hülfe des verloren gewesenen Kantischen Hauptwerkes vertheidigt_, 1884 (in
+reply, K. Fischer, _Das Streber- und Gründerthum in der Litteratur_,
+1884); also, _Das nachgelassene Werk I. Kants, mit Belegen
+populär-wissenschaftlich dargestellt_, 1888.]
+
+[Footnote 4: Besides this (centenary) translation the English reader may
+be referred to the earlier version of Meiklejohn in Bonn's Library; to the
+versions of the _Prolegomena_ by Bax (also in Bonn's Library, and including
+the _Metaphysical Elements of Natural Science_), and Mahaffy and Bernard,
+new ed., 1889; to Abbot's _Kant's Theory of Ethics_, 4th ed., 1889,
+containing the _Foundation of the Metaphysics of Ethics_ and the _Critique
+of Practical Reason_ entire, with portions of the _Metaphysics of Ethics_
+and _Religion within the Limits of Reason Only_; to Bernard's translation
+of the _Kritik of Judgment_, 1892; and to Watson's _Selections from Kant_,
+2d ed., 1888 (in Sneath's Modern Philosophers, 1892).--TR.]
+
+The best complete edition of the works of Kant is the second edition of
+Hartenstein, in eight volumes, 1867-68, which is chronologically arranged
+and excellently gotten up. Simultaneously with the first edition of
+Hartenstein in ten volumes, in 1838 _seq_., appeared the edition in twelve
+volumes by K. Rosenkranz and F.W. Schubert (containing in the last volumes
+a biography of Kant by Schubert, and a history of the Kantian philosophy by
+Rosenkranz, 1842). Kehrbach's edition of the principal works in Reclam's
+_Universal-Bibliothek_, with the pagination of the original and collective
+editions (1877 _seq_.), is more valuable than Von Kirchmann's edition of
+the complete works in his _Philosophische Bibliothek_.
+
+Among the works on Kant those of Kuno Fischer (vols. iii.-iv. of the
+_Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, 3d ed., 1882; also Kant's _Leben und
+die Grundlagen seiner Lehre_, 1860) take the first place. The writings of
+Liebmann, Cohen, Stadler, Riehl, Volkelt, and others will be mentioned
+later, in connection with the neo-Kantian movement; here we may give some
+of the more important monographs and essays, selected from the enormously
+developed Kantian literature:
+
+Ad. Böhringer, _Kants erkenntnisstheoretischer Idealismus_, 1888;
+K. Dieterich, _Die Kantische Philosophie in ihrer inneren
+Entwickelungsgeschichte_, 2 parts, 1885 (first published separately,
+_Kant und Newton_, 1877; _Kant und Rousseau_, 1878); W. Dilthey, _Aus
+den Rostocker Kanthandschriften_ in the _Archiv für Geschichte der
+Philosophie_, vols. ii.-iii. 1889-90; M.W. Drobisch, _Kants Ding an sich
+und sein Erfahrungsbegriff_, 1885; B. Erdmann, _Kants Kritizismus in der
+I. und II. Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, 1878; the same, _Kants
+Prolegomena herausgegeben und erläutert_, 1878, Introduction (in reply Emil
+Arnoldt, _Kants Prolegomena nicht doppelt redigiert_, 1879; cf. also H.
+Vaihinger, _Die Erdmann-Arnoldtsche Kontroverse_ in the _Philosophische
+Monatshefte_, vol. xvi. 1880); Franz Erhardt, _Kritik der Kantischen
+Antinomienlehre_, 1888; R. Eucken, _Ueber Bilder und Gleichnisse bei
+Kant, Zeitschrift für Philosophie_, vol. lxxxiii, 1883, reprinted in his
+_Beiträge zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, 1886; F. Frederichs,
+_Der phänomenale Idealismus Berkeleys und Kants_, 1871; the same, _Kants
+Prinzip der Ethik_, 1879; Ed. von Hartmann, _Das Ding an sich und seine
+Beschaffenheit_, 1871, in the 2d ed., 1875, and the 3d, 1885, entitled
+_Kritische Grundlegung des transzendentalen Realismus_; C. Hebler,
+_Kantiana_, in his _Philosophische Aufsätze_, 1869; Alfred Hegler, _Die
+Psychologie in Kants Ethik_, 1891; A. Hölder, _Darstellung der Kantischen
+Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1873 J. Jacobson, _Die Auffindung des Apriori_, 1876;
+the same, _Ueber die Beziehungen zwischen Kategorien und Urtheilsformen_,
+1877; Wilhelm Koppelmann, _Kants Lehre vom analytischen Urtheil, Philosoph.
+Monatshefte_, vol. xxi, 1885; the same, _Lotzes Stellung zu Kants
+Kritizismus, Zeitschrift für Philosophie_, vol. lxxxviii, 1886; the same,
+_Kants Lehre vom kategorischen Imperativ_, 1888; the same, _Kant und die
+Grundlagen der Christlichen Religion_, 1890; E. Laas, _Kants Analogien
+der Erfahrung_, 1876; the same, _Einige Bemerkungen zur
+Transzendentalphilosophie_, Strassburg _Abhandlungen_, 1884; J. Mainzer,
+_Die kritische Epoche in der Lehre von der Einbildungskraft_, 1881; J.B.
+Meyer, _Kants Psychologie_, 1870; F. Paulsen, _Was Kant uns sein kann,
+Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie_, 1881; B. Pünjer,
+_Die Religionslehre Kants_, 1874; R. Quaebicker, _Kants und Herbarts
+metaphysische Grundansichten über das Wesen der Seele_, 1870; J. Rehmke,
+_Physiologie und Kantianismus_, address in Eisenach, 1883; Rud. Reicke,
+_Lose Blätter aus Kants Nachlass_, 1889 (on this H. Vaihinger in the
+_Zeitschrift für Philosophie_, vol. xcvi. 1889); O. Riedel, _Die
+monadologischen Bestimmungen in Kants Lehre vom Ding an sich_, dissertation
+at Kiel, 1884; O. Schneider, _Die psychologische Entwickelung des Apriori_,
+1883; the same, _Transzendentalpsychologie_, 1891; F. Staudinger,
+_Noumena_, 1884; M. Steckelmacher, _Die formale Logik Kants_, Breslau
+Prize Essay, 1879; A. Stern, _Die Beziehung Garves zu Kant,
+nebst ungedruckten Briefen_, 1884; C. Stumpf, _Psychologie und
+Erkenntnisstheorie, Abhandlungen der bayerischen Akademie der
+Wissenschaften_, 1891; G. Thiele, _Kants intellectuelle Anschauung als
+Grundbegriff seines Kritizismus_, 1876; the same, _Die Philosophie Kants
+nach ihrem systematischen Zusammenhange und ihrer logischhistorischen
+Entiwickelung_, I. (1) _Kants vorkritische Naturphilosophie_, 1882; (2)
+_Kants vorkritische Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1887; Ad. Trendelenburg, _Ueber
+eine Lücke in Kants Beweis von der ausschliessenden Subjectivität des
+Raumes and der Zeit_ in vol. iii. of his _Historische Beiträge zur
+Philosophie_, 1867; Ueberhorst, _Kants Lehre von dem Verhältnisse der
+Kategorien zu der Erfahrung_, 1878; H. Vaihinger, _Eine Blattversetzung in
+Kants Prolegomena, Philosoph. Monatshefte_, vol. xv. 1879; the same, _Zu
+Kants Widerlegung des Idealismus_, Strassburg _Abhandlungen_, 1884; J.
+Walter, _Zum Gedächtniss Kants, Festrede_, 1881; Th. Weber, _Zur Kritik der
+Kantischen Erkenntnisstheorie_ (from the _Zeitschrift für Philosophie_),
+1882; W. Windelband, _Ueber die verschiedenen Phasen der Kantischen Lehre
+vom Ding an sich, Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie_,
+1877 (cf. the same author's _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, § 58);
+J. Witte, _Beiträge zum Verständniss Kants_, 1874; the same, _Kantischer
+Kritizismus gegenüber unkritischem Dilettantismus_ (against A. Stöhr),
+1885; Wohlrabe, _Kants Lehre vom Gewissen_, 1889; E. Zeller, _Ueber das
+Kantische Moralprinzip_, 1880; R. Zimmermann, _Ueber Kants Widerlegung des
+Idealismus von Berkeley_, 1871; the same, _Ueber Kants mathematisches
+Vorurtheil und dessen Folgen_, 1871.
+
+Popular expositions have been given by the following: K. Fortlage (in his
+_Philos. Vorträge_, 1869); E. Last, _Mehr Licht! Die Haupsätze Kants und
+Schopenhauers_, 1879; the same, _Die realistiche und die idealistische
+Anschauung entwickelt an Kants Idealität von Raum und Zeit_, 1884; H.
+Romundt, _Antaeus, neuer Aufbau der Lehre Kants über Seele, Freiheit,
+und Gott_, 1882; the same, _Grundlegung zur Reform der Philosophie,
+vereinfachte und erweiterte Darstellung von Kants Kritik der reinen
+Vernunft_, 1885; the same, _Die Vollendung des Socrates, Kants Grundlegung
+zur Reform der Sittenlehre_; the same, _Ein neuer Paulus, Kants Grundlegung
+zu einer sicheren Lehre von der Religion_, 1886; the same, _Die drei Fragen
+Kants_, 1887; A. Krause, _Populäre Darstellung von Kants Kritik der reinen
+Vernunft_, 1881; K. Lasswitz, _Die Lehre Kants von der Idealität des
+Raumes und der Zeit_, 1883; Wilhelm Münz, _Die Grundlagen der Kantischen
+Erkenntnisstheorie_, 2d ed., 1885.
+
+Among foreigners Villers, Cousin, Nolen, Desdouits, Cantoni, E. Caird [_\A
+Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant_, 1877; _The Critical Philosophy
+of Immanuel Kant_, 2 vols., 1889], Adamson _[On the Philosophy of Kant_,
+1879, and a valuable article in the _Encyclopedia Britannica_, 9th ed.,
+vol. xiii.], Stirling [_Text-book to Kant_, 1881], [Watson, _Kant and his
+English Critics_, 1881], Morris _Kant's Critique of Pure Reason_, Griggs's
+Philosophical Classics, 1882, [Wallace, _Kant_, Blackwood's Philosophical
+Classics, 1882; Porter, _Kant's Ethics_, Griggs's Philosophical Classics,
+1886; Green, _Lectures_, Works, vol. ii., 1886.--Tr.], have among others
+made contributions to Kantian literature. Of the older works we may mention
+the dictionaries of E. Schmid, 1788, and Mellin (in six volumes), 1797
+_seq_., the critique of the Kantian philosophy in the first volume of
+Schopenhauer's chief work, 1819, and the essay of C.H. Weisse, _In
+welchem Sinne hat sich die deutsche Philosophie jetzt wieder an Kant zu
+orientieren_, 1847.
+
+Kant's outward life was less eventful and less changeful than his
+philosophical development.[1] Born in Königsberg in 1724, the son of J.G.
+Cant, a saddler of Scottish descent, his home and school training were both
+strict and of a markedly religious type. He was educated at the university
+of his native city, and for nine years, from 1746 on, filled the place of
+a private tutor. In 1755 he became _Docent_, in 1770 ordinary professor in
+Königsberg, serving also for six years of this time as under-librarian. He
+seldom left his native city and never the province. The clearness
+which marked his extremely popular lectures on physical geography and
+anthropology was due to his diligent study of works of travel, and to an
+unusually acute gift of observation, which enabled him to draw from his
+surroundings a comprehensive knowledge of the world and of man. He ceased
+lecturing in 1797, and in 1804 old age ended a life which had always, even
+in minute detail, been governed by rule. A man of extreme devotion to
+duty, particularity, and love of truth, and an amiable, bright, and witty
+companion, Kant belongs to the acute rather than to the profound thinkers.
+Among his manifold endowments the tendency to combination and the faculty
+of intuition (as the _Critique of Judgment_ especially shows) are present
+to a noticeable degree, yet not so markedly as the power of strict analysis
+and subtle discrimination. So that, although a mediating tendency is
+rightly regarded as the distinguishing characteristic of the Kantian
+thinking, it must also be remembered that synthesis is everywhere preceded
+by a mighty work of analysis, and that this still exerts its power even
+after the adjustment is complete. Thus Kant became the energetic defender
+of a qualitative view of the world in opposition to the quantitative view
+of Leibnitz, for which antitheses (_e.g._, sensation and thought, feeling
+and cognition, good and evil, duty and inclination) fade into mere
+differences of degree.
+
+[Footnote 1: The following have done especially valuable service in the
+investigation of the development of Kant's doctrine: Paulsen (_Versuch
+einer Entwickelungsgeschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1875),
+B. Erdmann, Vaihinger, and Windelband. Besides Hume and Leibnitz, Newton,
+Locke, Shaftesbury, Rousseau, and Wolff exercised an important influence
+on Kant.]
+
+In the beginning of this chapter we have indicated how the new ideal of
+knowledge, under whose banner Kant brought about a reform of philosophy,
+grew out of the conflict between the rationalistic (dogmatic) and the
+empirical (skeptical) systems. This combines the Baconian ideal of the
+extension of knowledge with the Cartesian ideal of certainty in knowledge.
+It is synthetic judgments alone which extend knowledge, while analytic
+judgments are explicative merely.[1] _A priori_ judgments alone are
+perfectly certain, absolutely universal, and necessarily valid; while _a
+posteriori_ judgments are subjectively valid merely, lack necessity, and,
+at best, yield only relative universality.[2] All analytic judgments are _a
+priori_, all empirical or _a posteriori_ judgments are synthetic. Between
+the two lies the object of Kant's search. Do _synthetic judgments a priori_
+exist, and how are they possible?
+
+[Footnote 1: "All bodies are extended" is an analytic judgment; "all bodies
+possess weight," a synthetic judgment. The former explicates the concept
+of the subject by bringing into notice an idea already contained in it and
+belonging to the definition as a part thereof; it is based on the law of
+contradiction: an unextended body is a self-contradictory concept. The
+latter, on the contrary, goes beyond the concept of the subject and adds
+a predicate which had not been thought therein. It is experience which
+teaches us that weight is joined to matter, a fact which cannot be derived
+from the concept of matter. Almost all mathematical principles are
+synthetic, and here, as will be shown, it is not experience but "pure
+intuition" which permits us to go beyond the concept and add a new mark
+to it.]
+
+[Footnote 2: The Scholastics applied the term _a priori_ to knowledge from
+causes (from that which precedes), and _a posteriori_ to knowledge from
+effects. Kant, following Leibnitz and Lambert, uses the terms to designate
+the antithesis, knowledge from reason and knowledge from experience. An _a
+priori_ judgment is a judgment obtained without the aid of experience. When
+the principle from which it is derived is also independent of experience it
+is absolutely _a priori_, otherwise it is relatively _a priori_.]
+
+Two sciences discuss the _how_, and a third the _if_ of such judgments,
+which, at the same time, are ampliative and absolutely universal and
+necessary. The first two sciences are pure mathematics and pure natural
+science, of which the former is protected against doubt concerning its
+legitimacy by its evident character, and the latter, by the constant
+possibility of verification in experience; each, moreover, can point to
+the continuous course of its development. All this is absent in the third
+science, metaphysics, as science of the suprasensible, and to its great
+disadvantage. Experiential verification is in the nature of things denied
+to a presumptive knowledge of that which is beyond experience; it lacks
+evidence to such an extent that there is scarcely a principle to be found
+to which all metaphysicians assent, much less a metaphysical text-book
+to compare with Euclid; there is so little continuous advance that it is
+rather true that the later comers are likely to overthrow all that their
+predecessors have taught. In metaphysics, therefore, which, it must be
+confessed, is actual as a natural tendency, the question is not, as in
+the other two sciences, concerning the grounds of its legitimacy, but
+concerning this legitimacy itself. Mathematics and pure physics form
+synthetic judgments _a priori_, and metaphysics does the same. But the
+principles of the two former are unchallenged, while those of the third
+are not. In the former case the subject for investigation is, Whence this
+authority? in the latter case, Is she thus authorized?
+
+Thus the main question, How are synthetic judgments _a priori_ possible?
+divides into the subordinate questions, How is pure mathematics possible?
+How is pure natural science possible, and, How is metaphysics (in two
+senses: metaphysics in general, and metaphysics as science) possible? The
+Transcendental _Aesthetic_ (the critique of sensibility or the faculty
+of intuition) answers the first of these questions; the Transcendental
+_Analytic_ (the critique of the understanding), the second; and the
+Transcendental _Dialectic_ (the critique of "reason" in the narrower sense)
+and the Transcendental _Doctrine of Method (Methodenlehre)_, the third. The
+Analytic and the Dialectic are the two parts of the Transcendental "Logic"
+(critique of the faculty of thought), which, together with the Aesthetic,
+forms the Transcendental "Doctrine of Elements" _(Elementarlehre)_, in
+contrast to the Doctrine of Method. The _Critique of Pure Reason_ follows
+this scheme of subordinate division, while the _Prolegomena_ co-ordinates
+all four parts in the manner first mentioned.
+
+Let us anticipate the answers. Pure mathematics is possible, because there
+are pure or _a priori intuitions_ (space and time), and pure natural
+science or the metaphysics of phenomena, because there are _a priori
+concepts_ (categories) _and principles_ of the pure understanding.
+Metaphysics as a presumptive science of the suprasensible has been possible
+in the form of unsuccessful attempts, because there are _Ideas_ or concepts
+of reason which point beyond experience and look as though knowable objects
+were given through them; but as real science it is not possible, because
+the application of the categories is restricted to the limits of
+experience, while the objects thought through the Ideas cannot be
+sensuously given, and all assumed knowledge of them becomes involved in
+irresolvable contradictions (antinomies). On the other hand, a science is
+possible and necessary to teach the correct use of the categories, which
+may be applied to phenomena alone, and of the Ideas, which may be applied
+only to our knowledge of things (and our volition), and to determine the
+origin and the limits of our knowledge--that is to say, a transcendental
+philosophy. In regard to metaphysics (knowledge from pure reason), then,
+this is the conclusion reached: Rejection of transcendent metaphysics (that
+which goes beyond experience), recognition and development of immanent
+metaphysics (that which remains within the limits of possible experience).
+It is not possible as a metaphysic of things in themselves; it is possible
+as a metaphysic of nature (of the totality of phenomena), and as a
+metaphysic of knowledge (critique of reason).
+
+The interests of the reason are not exhausted, however, by the question,
+What can we know? but include two further questions, What ought we to do?
+and, What may we hope? Thus to the metaphysics of nature there is added
+a metaphysics of morals, and to the critique of theoretical reason, a
+critique of practical reason or of the will, together with a critique of
+religious belief. For even if a "knowledge" of the suprasensible is denied
+to us, yet "practical" grounds are not wanting for a sufficiently certain
+"conviction" concerning God, freedom, and immortality.
+
+After carrying the question of the possibility of synthetic judgments _a
+priori_ from the knowledge of nature over to the knowledge of our duty,
+Kant raises it, in the third place, in regard to our judgment concerning
+the subjective and objective purposiveness of things, or concerning their
+beauty and their perfection, and adds to his critique of the intellect
+and the will a critique of the faculty of aesthetic and teleological
+_judgment_.
+
+The Kantian philosophy accordingly falls into three parts, one theoretical,
+one practical (and religious), one aesthetic and teleological.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Before advancing to our account of the first of these parts, a few
+preliminary remarks are indispensable concerning the presuppositions
+involved in Kant's critical work and on the method which he pursues. The
+presuppositions are partly psychological, partly (as the classification of
+the forms of judgment and inference, and the twofold division of judgments)
+logical, either in the formal or the transcendental sense, and partly
+metaphysical (as the thing in itself). Kant takes the first of these from
+the psychology of his time, by combining the Wolffian classification of the
+faculties with that of Tetens, and thus obtains six different faculties:
+lower (sensuous) and higher (intellectual) faculties of cognition, of
+feeling, and of appetition; or sensibility (the capacity for receiving
+representations through the way in which we are affected by objects),
+understanding (the faculty of producing representations spontaneously and
+of connecting them); the sensuous feelings of pleasure and pain, taste;
+desire, and will. The understanding in the wide sense is equivalent to the
+higher faculty of cognition, and divides further into understanding in the
+stricter sense (faculty of concepts), judgment (faculty of judging), and
+reason (faculty of inference). Of these the first gives laws to the faculty
+of cognition or to nature, the second laws to taste, and the third laws to
+the will.
+
+The most important of the fundamental assumptions concerns the relation,
+the nature, and the mission of the two faculties of cognition. These do
+not differ in degree, through the possession of greater or less
+distinctness--for there are sensuous representations which are distinct and
+intellectual ones which are not so--but specifically: Sensibility is the
+faculty of intuitions, understanding the faculty of concepts. Intuitions
+are particular, concepts general representations. The former relate to
+objects directly, the latter only indirectly (through the mediation of
+other representations). In intuition the mind is receptive, in conception
+it acts spontaneously. "Through intuitions objects are _given_ to us;
+through concepts they are _thought_." It results from this that neither of
+the two faculties is of itself sufficient for the attainment of knowledge,
+for cognition is objective thinking, the determination of objects, the
+unifying combination or elaboration of a given manifold, the forming of a
+material content. Rationalists and empiricists alike have been deceived
+in regard to the necessity for co-operation between the senses and the
+understanding. Sensibility furnishes the material manifold, which of itself
+it is not able to form, while the understanding gives the unifying form, to
+which of itself it cannot furnish a content. "Intuitions without concepts
+are _blind_" (formless, unintelligible), "concepts without intuitions are
+_empty_" (without content). In the one case, form and order are wanting; in
+the other, the material to be formed. The two faculties are thrown back on
+each other, and knowledge can arise only from their union.
+
+A certain degree of form is attained in sense, it is true, since the chaos
+of sensations is ordered under the "forms of intuition," space and time,
+which are an original possession of the intuiting subject, but this is
+not sufficient, without the aid of the understanding, for the genesis of
+knowledge. In view of the _a priori_ nature of space and time, though
+without detraction from their intuitive character (they are immediate
+particular representations), we may assign pure sensibility to the higher
+faculty of cognition and speak of an intuiting reason.
+
+The forms of intuition and of thought come from within, they lie ready in
+the mind _a priori_, though not as completed representations. They are
+functions, necessary actions of the soul, for the execution of which a
+stimulus from without, through sensations, is necessary, but which, when
+once this is given, the soul brings forth spontaneously. The external
+impulse merely gives the soul the occasion for such productive acts, while
+their grounds and laws are found in its own nature. In this sense Kant
+terms them "originally acquired," and in the Introduction to the _Critique
+of Pure Reason_ declares that although it is indubitable that "all our
+knowledge begins _with_ experience (impressions of sense), yet it does not
+all arise _from_ experience." That a representation or cognition is _a
+priori_[1] does not mean that it precedes experience in time, but that
+(apart from the merely exciting, non-productive stimulation through
+impressions already mentioned) it is independent of all experience, that it
+is not derived or borrowed from experience.
+
+[Footnote 1: The terms _a priori_ representation and pure representation
+(concept, intuition) are equivalent; but in judgments, on the other hand,
+there is a distinction. A judgment is _a priori_ when the connection takes
+place independently of experience, no matter whether the concepts connected
+are _a priori_ or not. If the former is the case the _a priori_ judgment is
+pure (mixed with nothing empirical); if the latter, it is mixed.]
+
+The material of intuition and thought is given to the soul, received by
+it; it arises through the action of objects upon the senses, and is always
+empirical. Intuition is the only organ of reality; in sensation the
+presence of a real object as the cause of the sensation is directly
+revealed. When Kant's transcendental idealism was placed by a reviewer on a
+level with the empirical idealism of Berkeley, which denies the existence
+of the external world, he distinctly asserted that it had never entered
+his mind to question the reality of external things. Further, after the
+existence of real things affecting the senses had been transformed in
+his mind from a basis of the investigation into an object of inquiry,
+he endeavored to defend this assumption (which at first he had naïvely
+borrowed from the realism of pre-scientific thought) by arguments, but
+without any satisfactory result.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: The task of confirming the existence of things in themselves
+changes under his hands into another, that of proving the existence of
+external phenomena. "That external objects are real as representations"
+Berkeley had never disputed.]
+
+On the basis of the inseparability of sensibility and understanding the
+ideal of knowledge--an extension of knowledge to be attained by _a priori_
+means (p. 333)--experiences a remarkable addition in the position that the
+rational synthesis thus obtained must be a knowledge of reality, must be
+applied to matter given in intuition. To the question, "How are synthetic
+judgments _a priori possible_?" is joined a second equally legitimate
+inquiry, "How do they become _objectively valid_, or applicable to objects
+of experience?" The principle from which their validity is proved--they are
+applicable to objects of experience because _without them experience would
+not be possible_, because they are _conditions of experience_--like the
+criterion of apriority (strict universality and necessity), is one of the
+noëtic assumptions of the critical theory.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Vaihinger, _Kommentar_, i. pp. 425-430.]
+
+Inasmuch as its investigation relates to the conditions of experience the
+Kantian criticism follows a method which it itself terms _transcendental_.
+Heretofore, when the metaphysical method had been adopted, the object had
+been the suprasensible; and when knowledge had been made the object of
+investigation, the method followed had been empirical, psychological. Kant
+had the right to consider himself the creator of noëtics, for he showed it
+the transcendental point of view. Knowledge is an object of experience, but
+its conditions are not. The object is to explain knowledge, not merely to
+describe it psychologically,--to establish a new science of knowledge from
+principles, from pure reason. That which lies beyond experience is
+sealed from our thought; that which lies on this side of it is still
+uninvestigated, though capable and worthy of investigation, and in
+extreme need thereof. Criticism forbids the _transcendent_ use of reason
+(transcending experience); it permits, demands, and itself exercises the
+_transcendental_[1] use of it, which explains an experiential object,
+knowledge, from its conditions, which are not empirically given.
+
+[Footnote A: Kant applies the term _transcendental_ to the knowledge (the
+discovery, the proof) of the _a priori_ factor and its relation to objects
+of experience. Unfortunately he often uses the same word not only to
+designate the _a priori_ element itself, but also as a synonym for
+transcendent. In all three cases its opposite is _empirical_, namely,
+empirico-psychological investigation by observation in distinction from
+noëtical investigation from principles; empirical origin in distinction
+from an origin in pure reason, and empirical use in distinction from
+application beyond the limits of experience.]
+
+There is, apparently, a contradiction between the empiristic result of the
+Critique of Reason (the limitation of knowledge to objects of experience)
+and its rationalistic proofs (which proceed metaphysically, not
+empirically), and, in fact, a considerable degree of opposition really
+exists. Kant argues in a metaphysical way that there can be no metaphysics.
+This contradiction is solved by the distinction which has been mentioned
+between that which is beyond, and that which lies within, the boundary of
+experience. That metaphysic is forbidden which on the objective side soars
+beyond experience, but that pure rational knowledge is permissible and
+necessary which develops from principles the grounds of experiential
+knowledge existing in the subject. In the Kantian school, however, these
+complementary elements,--empirical result, transcendental or metaphysical,
+properly speaking, pro-physical method,--were divorced, and the one
+emphasized, favored, and further developed at the expense of the other.
+The empiricists hold to the result, while they either weaken or completely
+misunderstand the rationalism of the method: the _a priori_ factor, says
+Fries, was not reached by _a priori_, but by _a posteriori_, means, and
+there is no other way by which it could have been reached. The constructive
+thinkers, Fichte and his successors, adopt and continue the metaphysical
+method, but reject the empirical result. Fichte's aim is directed to
+a system of necessary, unconscious processes of reason, among which,
+rejecting the thing in itself, he includes sensation. According to
+Schelling nature itself is _a priori_, a condition of consciousness. This
+discrepancy between foundation and result continues in an altered form even
+among contemporary thinkers--as a discussion whether the "main purpose"
+of Criticism is to be found in the limitation of knowledge to possible
+experience, or the establishment of _a priori_ elements--though many, in
+adherence to Kant's own view, maintain that the metaphysics of knowledge
+and of phenomena (immanent rationalism) is the only legitimate metaphysics.
+
+
+%1. Theory of Knowledge.
+
+(a) The Pure Intuitions (Transcendental Aesthetic).%--The first part of the
+Critique of Reason, the Transcendental Aesthetic, lays down the position
+that _space and time_ are not independent existences, not real beings, and
+not properties or relations which would belong to things in themselves
+though they were not intuited, but _forms of our intuition_, which have
+their basis in the subjective constitution of our, the human, mind. If we
+separate from sensuous intuition all that the understanding thinks in it
+through its concepts, and all that belongs to sensation, these two forms of
+intuition remain, which may be termed pure intuitions, since they can be
+considered apart from all sensation. As subjective _conditions_ (lying in
+the nature of the subject) through which alone a thing can become an object
+of intuition for us, they precede all empirical intuitions or are
+_a priori_.
+
+Space and time are neither substantial receptacles which contain all
+that is real nor orders inhering in things in themselves, but forms of
+intuition. Now all our representations are either pure or empirical in
+their origin, and either intuitive or conceptual in character. Kant
+advances four proofs for the position that space and time are not empirical
+and not concepts, but pure intuitions: (1) Time is not an empirical
+concept which has been abstracted from experience. For the coexistence or
+succession of phenomena, _i.e._, their existence at the same time or at
+different times (from which, as many believe, the representation of time
+is abstracted), itself presupposes time--a coexistence or succession is
+possible only in time. It is no less false that space is abstracted from
+the empirical space relations of external phenomena, their existence
+outside and beside one another, or in different places, for it is
+impossible to represent relative situation except in space. Therefore
+experience does not make space and time possible; but space and time first
+of all make experience possible, the one outer, the other inner experience.
+They are postulates of perception, not abstractions from it. (2) Time is a
+necessary representation _a priori_. We can easily think all phenomena away
+from it, but we cannot remove time itself in view of phenomena in general;
+we can think time without phenomena, but not phenomena without time. The
+same is true of space in reference to external objects. Both are conditions
+of the possibility of phenomena. (3) Time is not a discursive or general
+concept. For there is but one time. And different times do not precede the
+one time as the constituent parts of which it is made up, but are mere
+limitations of it; the part is possible only through the whole. In the same
+way the various spaces are only parts of one and the same space, and can
+be thought in it alone. But a representation which can be given only by
+a single object is a particular representation or an intuition. Because,
+therefore, of the oneness of space and time, the representation of each
+is an intuition. The _a priori_, immediate intuition of the one space is
+entirely different from the empirical, general conception of space, which
+is abstracted from the various spaces. (4) Determinate periods of time
+arise by limitation of the one, fundamental time. Consequently this
+original time must be unlimited or infinite, and the representation of it
+must be an intuition, not a concept. Time contains in itself an endless
+number of representations (its parts, times), but this is never the
+case with a generic concept, which, indeed, is contained as a partial
+representation in an endless number of representations (those of the
+individuals having the same name), and, consequently, comprehends them all
+under itself, but which never contains them in itself. The general concept
+horse is contained in each particular representation of a horse as a
+general characteristic, and that of justice in each representation of a
+definite just act; time, however, is not contained in the different times,
+but they are contained in it. Similarly the relation of infinite space to
+the finite spaces is not the logical relation of a concept to examples of
+it, but the intuitive relation of an unlimited whole to its limited parts.
+
+The _Prolegomena_ employs as a fifth proof for the intuitive character of
+space, an argument which had already appeared in the essay _On the Ultimate
+Ground of the Distinction of Positions in Space_. There are certain spatial
+distinctions which can be grasped by intuition alone, and which are
+absolutely incapable of comprehension through the understanding--for
+example, those of right and left, above and below, before and behind. No
+logical marks can be given for the distinction between the object and its
+image in the mirror, or between the right ear and the left. The complete
+description of a right hand must, in all respects (quality, proportionate
+position of parts, size of the whole), hold for the left as well;
+but, despite the complete similarity, the one hand cannot be exactly
+super-imposed on the other; the glove of the one cannot be worn on the
+other. This difference in direction, which has significance only when
+viewed from a definite point, and the impossibility mentioned of a
+congruence between an object (right hand) and its reflected image (left
+hand) can be understood only by intuition; they must be seen and felt, and
+cannot be made clear through concepts, and, consequently, can never be
+explained to a being which lacks the intuition of space.
+
+In the "transcendental" exposition of space and time Kant follows this
+"metaphysical" exposition, which had to prove their non-empirical, and
+non-discursive, hence their _a priori_ and intuitive, character, with
+the proof that only such an explanation of space and time could make it
+conceivable how synthetic cognitions _a priori_ can arise from them. The
+principles of mathematics are of this kind. The synthetic character of
+geometrical truths is explained by the intuitive nature of space, their
+apodictic character by its apriority, and their objective reality or
+applicability to empirical objects by the fact that space is the condition
+of (external) perception. The like is true of arithmetic and time.
+
+If space were a mere concept, no proposition could be derived from it which
+should go beyond the concept and extend our knowledge of its properties.
+The possibility of such extension or synthesis in mathematics depends on
+the fact that spatial concepts can always be presented or "constructed" in
+intuition. The geometrical axiom that in the triangle the sum of two sides
+is greater than the third is derived from intuition, by describing the
+triangle in imagination or, actually, on the board. Here the object is
+given through the cognition and not before it.--If space and time were
+empirical representations the knowledge obtained from them would lack
+necessity, which, as a matter of fact, it possesses in a marked degree.
+While experience teaches us only that something is thus or so, and not that
+it could not be otherwise, the axioms, (space has only three dimensions,
+time only one; only one straight line is possible between two points),
+nay, all the propositions of mathematics are strictly universal and
+apodictically certain: we are entirely relieved from the necessity of
+measuring all triangles in the world in order to find out whether the sum
+of their angles is equal to two right angles, and we do not need, as in the
+case of judgments of experience, to add the limitation, so far as it is yet
+known there are no exceptions to this rule. The apriority is the _ratio
+essendi_ of the strict necessity involved in the "it must be so" _(des
+Soseinmüssens_), while the latter is the _ratio cognoscendi_ of the former.
+Now since the necessity of mathematical judgments can only be explained
+through the ideality of space, this doctrine is perfectly certain, not
+merely a probable hypothesis.--The validity of mathematical principles for
+all objects of perception, finally, is based on the fact that they are
+rules under which alone experience is possible for us. It should be
+mentioned, further, that the conceptions of change and motion (change of
+place) are possible only through and in the representation of time. No
+concept could make intelligible the possibility of change, that is, of the
+connection of contradictory predicates in one and the same thing, but the
+intuition of succession easily succeeds in accomplishing it.
+
+The argument is followed by conclusions and explanations based upon it;
+(1) Space is the form of the outer, time of the inner, sense. Through the
+outer sense external objects are given to us, and through the inner sense
+our own inner states. But since all representations, whether they have
+external things for their objects or not, belong in themselves, as mental
+determinations, to our inner state, time is the formal condition of all
+phenomena in general, directly of internal (psychical) phenomena, and,
+thereby, indirectly of external phenomena also. (2) The validity of the
+relations of space and time cognizable _a priori_ is established for all
+objects of possible experience, but is limited to these. They are valid
+for _all phenomena_ (for all things which at any time may be given to our
+senses), but only for these, not for things as they are _in themselves_.
+They have "empirical reality, but, at the same time, transcendental
+ideality." As external phenomena all things are beside one another in
+space, and all phenomena whatever are in time and of necessity under
+temporal relations; in regard to all things which can occur in our
+experience, and in so far as they can occur, space and time are
+objectively, therefore empirically, real. But they do not possess absolute
+reality (neither subsistent reality nor the reality of inherence); for if
+we abstract from our sensuous intuition both vanish, and, apart from the
+subject (_N.B._, the transcendental subject, concerning which more below),
+they are naught. It is only from man's point of view that we can speak
+of space, and of extended, moveable, changeable things; for we can know
+nothing concerning the intuitions of other thinking beings, we have no
+means of discovering whether they are bound by the same conditions which
+limit our intuitions, and which for us are universally valid. (3) Nothing
+which is intuited in space is a thing in itself. What we call external
+objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility, whose
+true correlative, the _thing in itself_, cannot be known by ever so deep
+penetration into the phenomenon; such properties as belong to things in
+themselves can never be given to us through the senses. Similarly nothing
+that is intuited in time is a thing in itself, so that we intuit ourselves
+only as we appear to ourselves, and not as we are.
+
+The merely empirical reality of space and time, the limitation of their
+validity to phenomena, leaves the certainty of knowledge within the limits
+of experience intact; for we are equally certain of it, whether these forms
+necessarily belong to things in themselves, or only to our intuitions
+of things. The assertion of their absolute reality, on the other hand,
+involves us in sheer absurdities (that is, it necessitates the assumption
+of two infinite nonentities which exist, but without being anything real,
+merely in order to comprehend all reality, and on one of which even our own
+existence would be dependent), in view of which the origin of so peculiar
+a theory as the idealism of Berkeley appears intelligible. The critical
+theory of space and time is so far from being identical with, or akin to,
+the theory of Berkeley, that it furnishes the best and only defense against
+the latter. If anyone assumes the absolute or transcendental reality of
+these forms, it is impossible for him to prevent everything, including even
+our own existence, from being changed thereby into mere illusion. But
+the critical philosopher is far from degrading bodies to mere illusion;
+external phenomena are just as real for him as internal phenomena, though
+only as phenomena, it is true, as (possible) representations.
+
+Phenomenon and illusion are not the same. The transcendental distinction
+between phenomena and things in themselves must not be confused with the
+distinction common to ordinary life and to physics, in accordance with
+which we call the rainbow a mere appearance (better, illusion), but the
+combination of sun and rain which gives rise to this illusion the thing
+in itself, as that which in universal experience and in all different
+positions with respect to the senses, is thus and not otherwise determined
+in intuition, or that which essentially belongs to the intuition of the
+object, and is valid for every human sensibility (in antithesis to that
+which only contingently belongs to it, and is valid only for a special
+position or organization of this or that sense). Similarly an object always
+appears to grow smaller as its distance increases, while in itself it is
+and remains of some fixed size. And this use of words is perfectly
+correct, in the _physical or empirical_ sense of "in itself"; but in the
+_transcendental_ sense the raindrops, also, together with their form and
+size, are themselves mere phenomena, the "in itself" of which remains
+entirely unknown to us. Kant, moreover, does not wish to see the
+subjectivity of the forms of intuition placed on a level with the
+subjectivity of sensations or explained by this, though he accepts it as
+a fact long established. The sensations of color, of tone, of temperature
+are, no doubt, like the representation of space in that they belong only to
+the subjective constitution of the sensibility, and can be attributed to
+objects only in relation to our senses. But the great difference between
+the two is that these sense qualities may be different in different persons
+(the color of the rose may seem different to each eye), or may fail to
+harmonize with any human sense; that they are not _a priori_ in the same
+strict sense as space and time, and consequently afford no knowledge of the
+objects of possible experience independently of perception; and that they
+are connected with the phenomenon only as the contingently added effects of
+a particular organization, while space, as the condition of external
+objects, necessarily belongs to the phenomenon or intuition of them. _It is
+through space alone that it is possible for things to be external objects
+for us_. The subjectivity of sensation is individual, while that of space
+and time is general or universal to mankind; the former is empirical,
+individually different, and contingent, the latter _a priori_ and
+necessary. Space alone, not sensation, is a _conditio sine qua non_ of
+external perception. Space and time are the sole _a priori_ elements of
+the sensibility; all other sensuous concepts, even motion and change,
+presuppose perception; the movable in space and the succession of
+properties in an existing thing are empirical data.
+
+In confirmation of the theory that all objects of the senses are mere
+phenomena, the fact is adduced that (with the exception of the will and the
+feelings, which are not cognitions) nothing is given us through the senses
+but representations of relations, while a thing in itself cannot be known
+by mere relations. The phenomenon is a sum total of mere relations. In
+regard to matter we know only extension, motion, and the laws of this
+motion or forces (attraction, repulsion, impenetrability), but all these
+are merely relations of the thing to something, else, that is, external
+relations. Where is the inner side which underlies this exterior, and
+which belongs to the object in itself? This is never to be found in the
+phenomenon, and no matter how far the observation and analysis of nature
+may advance (a work with unlimited horizons!) they reach nothing but
+portions of space occupied by matter and effects which matter exercises,
+that is, nothing beyond that which is comparatively internal, and which,
+in its turn, consists of external relations. The absolutely inner side
+of matter is a mere fancy; and if the complaint that the "inner side" of
+things is concealed from us is to mean that we do not comprehend what
+the things which appear to us may be in themselves, it is unjust and
+irrational, for it demands that we should be able to intuit without
+senses, in other words, that we should be other than men. The transcendent
+questions concerning the noumenon of things are unanswerable; we know
+ourselves, even, only as phenomena! A phenomenon consists in nothing but
+the relation of something in general to the senses.
+
+It is indubitable _that_ something corresponds to phenomena, which,
+by affecting our sensibility, occasions sensations in us, and thereby
+phenomena. The very word, the very concept, "phenomenon", indicates a
+relation to something which is not phenomenon, to an object not dependent
+on the sensibility. _What_ this may be continues hidden from us, for
+knowledge is impossible without intuition. Things in themselves are
+unknowable. Nevertheless the idea (it must be confessed, the entirely empty
+idea) of this "transcendental object", as an indeterminate somewhat = _x_
+which underlies phenomena, is not only allowable, but, as a limiting
+concept, unavoidable in order to confine the pretensions of sense to the
+only field which is accessible to it, that is, to the field of phenomena.
+
+The inference "space and time are nothing but representations and
+representations are in us, therefore space and time as well as all
+phenomena in them, bodies with their forces and motions, are in us," does
+not accurately express Kant's position, for he might justly reply that,
+according to him, bodies as phenomena are in different parts in space from
+that which we assign to ourselves, and thus without us; that space is the
+form of external intuition, and through it external objects arise for us
+from sensations; but that, in regard to the things in themselves which
+affect us, we are entirely ignorant whether they are within or without us.
+
+It can easily be shown by literal quotations that there were distinct
+tendencies in Kant, especially in the first edition of his principal
+work, toward a radical idealism which doubts or denies not merely the
+cognizability, but also the existence of objects external to the subject
+and its representations, and which degrades the thing in itself to a mere
+thought in us, or completely does away with it (_e.g._, "The representation
+of an object as a thing in general is not only insufficient, but, ...
+independently of empirical conditions, in itself contradictory "). But
+these expressions indicate only a momentary inclination toward such a view,
+not a binding avowal of it, and they are outweighed by those in which
+idealism is more or less energetically rejected. That which according to
+Kant _exists outside the representation of the individual_ is twofold: (1)
+the unknown things in themselves with their problematical characteristics,
+as the ground of phenomena; (2) the phenomena "themselves" with their
+knowable immanent laws, and their relations in space and time, as possible
+representations. When I turn my glance away from the rose its redness
+vanishes, since this predicate belongs to it only in so far and so long
+as it acts in the light on my visual apparatus. What, then, is left? That
+thing in itself, of course, which, when it appears to me, calls forth in me
+the intuition of the rose. But there is still something else remaining--the
+phenomenon of the rose, with its size, its form, and its motion in the
+wind. For these are predicates which must be attributed to the phenomenon
+itself as the object of my representation. If the rose, as determined in
+space and time, vanished when I turned my head away, it could not, unless
+intuited by a subject, experience or exert effects in space and time, could
+not lose its leaves in the wind and strew the ground with its petals.
+Perception and thought inform me not merely concerning events of which I am
+a witness, but also of others which have occurred, or which will occur, in
+my absence. The process of stripping the leaves from the rose has actually
+taken place as a phenomenon and does not first become real by my subsequent
+representation of it or inference to it. The things and events of the
+phenomenal world exist both before and after my perception, and are
+something distinct from my subjective and momentary representations of
+them. The space and time, however, in which they exist and happen are
+not furnished by the intuiting individual, but by the supra-individual,
+_transcendental consciousness_ or generic reason of the race. The
+phenomenon thus stands midway between its objective ground (the absolute
+thing in itself) and the subject, whose common product it is, as a relative
+thing in itself, as a reality which is independent of the contingent and
+changing representation of the individual, empirical subject, which is
+dependent for its form on the transcendental subject, and which is the only
+reality accessible to us, yet entirely valid for us. The phenomenal world
+is not a contingent and individual phenomenon, but one necessary for all
+beings organized as we are, a phenomenon for humanity. My representations
+are not the phenomena themselves, but images and signs through which I
+cognize phenomena, _i.e._, real things as they are for me and for every man
+(not as they are in themselves). The reality of phenomena consists in the
+fact that they can be perceived by men, and the objective validity of my
+knowledge of them in the fact that every man must agree in it. The laws
+which the understanding (not the individual understanding!) imposes upon
+nature hold for phenomena, because they hold for every man. Objectivity is
+universal validity. If the world of phenomena which is intuited and known
+by us wears a different appearance from the world of things in themselves,
+this does not justify us in declaring it to be mere seeming and dreaming; a
+dream which all dream together, and which all must dream, is not a dream,
+but reality. As we must represent the world> so it is, though for us, of
+course, and not in itself.
+
+Many places in Kant's works seem to argue against the intermediate position
+here ascribed to the world of phenomena--according to which it is less than
+things in themselves and more than subjective representation--which, since
+they explain the phenomenon as a mere representation, leave room for only
+two factors (on the one hand, the thing in itself = that in the thing which
+cannot be represented; on the other, the thing for me = my representation
+of the thing). In fact, the distinction between the phenomenon "itself"
+and the representation which the individual now has of it and now does not
+have, is far from being everywhere adhered to with desirable clearness; and
+wherever it is impossible to substitute that which has been represented
+and that which may be represented or possible intuitions for "mere
+representations in me," we must acknowledge that there is a departure
+from the standpoint which is assumed in some places with the greatest
+distinctness. The latter finds unequivocal expression, among other places,
+in the "Analogies of Experience" and the "Deduction of the Pure Concepts
+of the Understanding," § 2, No. 4 (first edition). The second of these
+passages speaks of one and the same universal experience, in which all
+perceptions are represented in thoroughgoing and regular connection, and of
+the thoroughgoing affinity of phenomena as the basis of the possibility
+of the association of representations. This affinity is ascribed to the
+objects of the senses, not to the representations, whose association is
+rather the result of the affinity, and not to the things in themselves, in
+regard to which the understanding has no legislative power.
+
+The relation between the thing in itself and the phenomenon is also
+variable. Now they are regarded as entirely heterogeneous (that which can
+never be intuited exists in a mode opposed to that of the intuited and
+intuitable), and now as analogous to each other (non-intuitable properties
+of the thing in itself correspond to the intuitable characteristics of the
+phenomenon). The former is the case when it is said that phenomena are in
+space and time, while things in themselves are not; that in the first of
+these classes natural causation rules, and in the second freedom; that
+in the one-conditioned existence alone is found, in the other
+unconditioned.[1] But just as often things in themselves and phenomena are
+conceived as similar to one another, as two sides of the same object,[2]
+of which one, like the counter-earth of the Pythagoreans, always remains
+turned away from us, while the other is turned toward us, but does not
+reveal the true being of the object. According to this each particular
+thing, state, relation, and event in the world of phenomena would have its
+real counterpart in the noumenal sphere: un-extended roses in themselves
+would lie back of extended roses, certain non-temporal processes back of
+their growth and decay, intelligible relations back of their relations in
+space. This is approximately the relation of the two conceptions as in part
+taught by Lotze himself, in part represented by him as taught by Kant.
+Herbart's principle, "So much seeming, so much indication of being" (_wie
+viel Schein so viel Hindeutung aufs Sein_), might also be cited in
+this connection. That which continually impelled Kant, in spite of his
+proclamation of the unknowableness of things in themselves, to form ideas
+about their character, was the moral interest, but this sometimes threw its
+influence in favor of their commensurability with phenomena and sometimes
+in the opposite scale. For in his ethics Kant needs the intelligible
+character or man as noumenon, and must assume as many men in themselves (to
+be consistent, then, in general, as many beings in themselves) as there are
+in the world of phenomena. But for practical reasons, again, the causality
+of the man in himself must be thought of as entirely different from, and
+opposed to, the mechanical causality of the sense world. Kant's judgment
+is, also, no more stable concerning the value of the knowledge of the
+suprasensible, which is denied to us. "I do not _need_ to know what
+things in themselves may be, because a thing can never be presented to me
+otherwise than as a phenomenon." And yet a natural and ineradicable need of
+the reason to obtain some conviction in regard to the other world is said
+to underlie the abortive attempts of metaphysics; and Kant himself uses
+all his efforts to secure to the practical reason the satisfaction of this
+need, though he has denied it to the speculative reason, and to make good
+the gap in knowledge by faith. From the theoretical standpoint an extension
+of knowledge beyond the limits of phenomena appears impossible, but
+unnecessary; from the practical standpoint it is, to a certain extent,
+possible and indispensable.
+
+[Footnote 1: Kant's conjectures concerning a common ground of material and
+mental phenomena, and those concerning the common root of sensibility and
+understanding, show the same tendency. On the one hand, duality, on the
+other, unity.]
+
+[Footnote 2: "Phenomenon, which always has _two sides_, the one when the
+object in itself is considered (apart from the way in which it is intuited,
+and just because of which fact its character always remains problematical),
+the other when we regard the form of the intuition of this object, which
+must be sought not in the object in itself, but in the subject to whom the
+object appears, while it nevertheless actually and necessarily belongs
+to the phenomenon of _this object_." "This predicate "--_sc_., spatial
+quality, extension--"is attributed to things only in so far as _they_
+appear to us."]
+
+There is, then, a threefold distinction to be made: (1) _Things in
+themselves_, which can never be the object of our knowledge, because our
+forms of intuition are not valid for them. (2) _Phenomena_, things for us,
+nature or the totality of that which either is or, at least, may be the
+object of our knowledge (here belong the possible inhabitants of the moon,
+the magnetic matter which pervades all bodies, and the forces of attraction
+and repulsion, though the first have never been observed, and the second is
+not perceptible on account of the coarseness of our senses, and the
+last, because forces in general are not perceptible; nature comprehends
+everything whose existence "is connected with our perceptions in a possible
+experience"[1]). (3) _Our representations_ of phenomena, _i.e._, that of
+the latter which actually enters into the consciousness of the empirical
+individual. In the realm of things in themselves there is no motion
+whatever, but at most an intelligible correlate of this relation; in the
+world of phenomena, the world of physics, the earth moves around the sun;
+in the sphere of representation the sun moves around the earth. It is true,
+as has been said, that Kant sometimes ignores the distinction between
+phenomena as related to noumena and phenomena as related to
+representations; and, as a result of this, that the phenomenon is either
+completely volatilized into the representation[2] or split up into an
+objective half independent of us and a representative half dependent on us,
+of which the former falls into the thing in itself,[3] while the latter is
+resolved into subjective states of the ego.
+
+[Footnote 1: "Nothing is actually given to us but the perception and the
+empirical progress from this to other possible perceptions." "To call a
+phenomenon a real thing antecedent to perception, means ... that in the
+_progress of experience_ we must meet with such a perception."]
+
+[Footnote 2: Phenomena "are altogether in me," "exist only in our
+sensibility as a modification of it." "There is nothing in space but that
+which is actually represented in it." Phenomena are "mere representations,
+which, if they are not given in us (in perception) nowhere exist."]
+
+[Footnote 3: Here Kant is guilty of the fault which he himself has
+censured, of confusing the physical and transcendental meanings of "in
+itself." He forgets that the thing, if it is momentarily not intuited or
+represented by me, and therefore is not immediately given for me as an
+individual, is nevertheless still present for me as man, is mediately
+given, that is, is discoverable by future search. That which is without
+my present consciousness is not for this reason without all human
+consciousness. In fact, Kant often overlooks the distinction between actual
+and possible intuition, so that for him the "objects" of the latter slip
+out of space and time and into the thing in itself. To the "transcendental
+object we may ascribe the extent and connection of our possible
+perceptions, and say that it is given in itself before all experience." In
+it "the real things of the past are given."]
+
+After the possibility and the legitimacy of synthetic judgments _a
+priori_ have been proved for pure mathematics upon the basis of the
+pure intuitions, there emerges, in the second place, the problem of the
+possibility of _a priori_ syntheses in pure natural science, or the
+question, Do pure concepts exist? And after this has been answered in the
+affirmative, the further questions come up, Is the application of these,
+first, to phenomena, and second, to things in themselves, possible and
+legitimate, and how far?
+
+%(b) The Concepts and Principles of the Pure Understanding (Transcendental
+Analytic).%--Sensations, in order to become "intuition" or the perception
+of a phenomenon, needed to be ordered in space and time; in order to become
+"experience" or a unified knowledge of objects, intuitions need a synthesis
+through concepts. In order to objective knowledge the manifold of intuition
+(already ordered by its arrangement in space and time) must be connected in
+the unity of the concept. Sensibility gives the manifold to be connected,
+the understanding the connecting unity. The former is able to intuit only,
+the latter only to think; knowledge can arise only as the result of their
+union. Intuitions depend on affections, concepts on functions, that is, on
+unifying acts of the understanding.
+
+To discover the pure forms of thought it is necessary to isolate the
+understanding, just as an isolation of the sensibility was necessary above
+in order to the discovery of the pure forms of intuition. We obtain the
+elements of the pure knowledge of the understanding by rejecting all that
+is intuitive and empirical. These elements must be pure, must be concepts,
+further, not derivative or composite, but fundamental concepts, and their
+number must be complete. This completeness is guaranteed only when the pure
+concepts or _categories_ are sought according to some common principle,
+which assigns to each its position in the connection of the whole, and
+not (as with Aristotle) collected by occasional, unsystematic inquiries
+undertaken at random. The table of the forms of judgment will serve as a
+guide for the discovery of the categories. Thought is knowledge through
+concepts; the understanding can make no other use of concepts than to judge
+by means of them. Hence, since the understanding is the faculty of judging,
+the various kinds of connection in judgment must yield the various pure
+"connective-concepts" (_Verknüpfungsbegriffe_.--K. Fischer) or categories.
+
+In regard to quantity, every judgment is universal, particular, or
+singular; in regard to quality, affirmative, negative, or infinite; in
+regard to relation, categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive; and in
+regard to modality, problematical, assertory, or apodictic. To these
+twelve forms of judgment correspond as many categories, viz., I., Unity,
+Plurality, Totality; II., Reality, Negation, Limitation; III., Subsistence
+and Inherence (Substance and Accident), Causality and Dependence (Cause and
+Effect), Community (Reciprocity between the Active and the Passive);
+IV., Possibility--Impossibility, Existence--Non-existence,
+Necessity--Contingency.
+
+The first six of these fundamental concepts, which have no correlatives,
+constitute the mathematical, the second six, which appear in pairs,
+the dynamical categories. The former relate to objects of (pure or of
+empirical) intuition, the latter to the existence of these objects (in
+relation to one another or to the understanding). Although all other _a
+priori_ division though concepts must be dichotomous, each of the four
+heads includes three categories, the third of which in each case arises
+from the combination of the second and first,[1] but, nevertheless, is an
+original (not a derivative) concept, since this combination requires a
+special _actus_ of the understanding. Universality or totality is plurality
+regarded as unity, limitation is reality combined with negation, community
+is the reciprocal causality of substances, and necessity is the actuality
+given by possibility itself. Kant omits, as unnecessary here, the useful,
+easy, and not unpleasant task of noting the great number of derivative
+concepts _a priori_ (predicables) which spring from the combination of
+these twelve original concepts (predicaments = categories) with one
+another, or with the modes of pure sensibility,--the concepts force,
+action, passion, would belong as subsumptions under causality, presence
+and resistance under community, origin, extinction, and change under
+modality,--since his object is not a system, but only the principles of
+one. His liking or even love for this division according to quantity,
+quality, relation, and modality, which he always has ready as though it
+were a universal key for philosophical problems, reveals a very strong
+architectonic impulse, against which even his ever active skeptical
+tendency is not able to keep up the battle.
+
+[Footnote 1: Concerning this "neat observation," Kant remarked that it
+might "perhaps have important consequences in regard to the scientific form
+of all knowledge of reason." This prophecy was fulfilled, although in a
+different sense from that which floated before his mind. Fichte and Hegel
+composed their "thought-symphonies" in the three-four time given by Kant.]
+
+In view of the derivation of the forms of thought from the forms of
+judgment Kant does not stop to give a detailed proof that the categories
+are concepts, and that they are pure. Their discursive (not intuitive)
+character is evident from the fact that their reference to the object is
+mediate only (and not, as in the case of intuition, immediate), and their
+_a priori_ origin, from the necessity which they carry with them, and which
+would be impossible if their origin were empirical. Here Kant starts from
+Hume's criticism of the idea of cause. The Scottish skeptic had said that
+the necessary bond between cause and effect can neither be perceived nor
+logically demonstrated; that, therefore, the relation of causality is an
+idea which we--with what right?--add to perceived succession in time. This
+doubt (without the hasty conclusions), says Kant, must be generalized, must
+be extended to the category of substance (which had been already done by
+Hume, pp. 226-7, though the author of the Critique of Reason was not aware
+of the fact), and to all other pure concepts of the understanding. Then we
+may hope to kindle a torch at the spark which Hume struck out. The problem
+"It is impossible to see why, because something exists, something else must
+necessarily exist," is the starting point alike of Hume's skepticism and
+Kant's criticism. The former recognized that the principle of causality
+is neither empirical nor analytic, and therefore concluded that it is an
+invention of reason, which confuses subjective with objective necessity.
+The latter shows that in spite of its subjective origin it has an objective
+value; that it is a truth which is independent of all experience, and yet
+valid for all who have experience, and for all that can be experienced.
+
+Of the two questions, "How can the concepts which spring from our
+understanding possess objective validity?" and, "How (through what means
+or media) does their application to objects of experience take place?"
+the first is answered in the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
+Understanding, and the second in the chapter on their Schematism.
+
+The _Deduction_, the most difficult portion of the Critique, shows that the
+objective validity of the categories, as concepts of objects in general,
+depends on the fact that _through them alone experience_ as far as regards
+the form of thought _is possible, _i.e._, it is only through them that any
+object whatever can be thought. All knowledge consists in judgments; all
+judgments contain a connection of representations; all connection--whether
+it be conscious or not, whether it relates to concepts or to pure or
+empirical intuitions--is an _act of the understanding_; it cannot be given
+by objects, but only spontaneously performed by the subject itself. We
+cannot represent anything as connected in the object unless we have
+ourselves first connected it. The connection includes three conceptions:
+that of the manifold to be connected (which is given by intuition), that
+of the act of synthesis, and that of the unity; this last is two-fold,
+an objective unity (the conception of an object in general in which the
+manifold is united), and a subjective unity (the unity of consciousness
+under which or, rather, through which the connection is effected). The
+categories represent the different kinds of combination, each one of these,
+again, being completed in three stages, which are termed the Synthesis of
+Apprehension in Intuition, the Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination,
+and the Synthesis of Recognition in Concepts. If I wish to think the time
+from one noon to the next, I must (1) grasp (apprehend) the manifold
+representations (portions of time) in succession; (2) retain or renew
+(reproduce) in thought those which have preceded in passing to those which
+follow; (3) be conscious that that which is now thought is the same
+with that thought before, or know again (recognize) the reproduced
+representation as the one previously experienced. If the mind did not
+exercise such synthetic activity the manifold of representation would not
+constitute a whole, would lack the unity which consciousness alone can
+impart to it. Without this _one_ consciousness, concepts and knowledge of
+objects would be wholly impossible. The unity of pure self-consciousness
+or of "transcendental apperception" is the postulate of all use of the
+understanding. In the flux of internal phenomena there is no constant
+or abiding self, but the unchangeable consciousness here demanded is a
+precedent condition of all experience, and gives to phenomena a connection
+according to laws which determine an object for intuition, _i.e._, the
+conception of something in which they are necessarily connected.[1]
+Reference to an object is nothing other than the necessary unity of
+consciousness. The connective activity of the understanding, and with
+it experience, is possible only through "the synthetic unity of pure
+apperception," the "I think," which must be able to accompany all my
+representations, and through which they first become _mine_.
+
+[Footnote 1: Object is "that which opposes the random or arbitrary
+determination of our cognitions," and which causes "them to be determined
+in a certain way _a priori_."]
+
+Experience (in the strict sense) is distinguished from perception
+(experience in the wide sense) by its objectivity or universal validity. A
+judgment of perception (the sun shines upon the stone and the stone becomes
+warm) is only subjectively valid; while, on the other hand, a judgment of
+experience (the sun warms the stone) aims to be valid not only for me and
+my present condition, but always, for me and for everyone else. If the
+former is to become the latter, an _a priori_ concept must be added to
+the perception (in the above case, the concept of cause), under which the
+perception is subsumed. The category determines the perceptions in view of
+the form of the judgment, gives to the judgment its reference to an object,
+and thus gives to the percepts, or rather, concepts (sunshine and warmth),
+necessary and universally valid connection. The "reason why the judgments
+of others" must "agree with mine" is "the unity of the object to which they
+all relate, with which they agree, and hence must also all agree with one
+another."
+
+Though the categories take their origin in the nature of the subject, they
+are objective and valid for objects of experience, because experience is
+possible alone through them. They are not the product, but the ground
+of experience. The second difficulty concerns their applicability to
+phenomena, which are wholly disparate. By what means is the gulf between
+the categories, which are concepts and _a priori_, and perceptions, which
+are intuitous and empirical, bridged over? The connecting link is supplied
+by the imagination, as the faculty which mediates between sensibility and
+understanding to provide a concept with its image, and consists in the
+intuition of time, which, in common with the categories, has an _a priori_
+character, and, in common with perceptions, an intuitive character, so that
+it is at once pure and sensuous. The subsumption of phenomena or empirical
+intuitions under the category is effected through the _Schemata_[1] of the
+concepts of the understanding, _i.e._, through _a priori_ determinations
+of time according to rules, which relate to time-_series_, time-_content_,
+time-_order_, and time-_comprehension_, and indicate whether I have to
+apply this or that category to a given object.
+
+[Footnote 1: The schema is not an empirical image, but stands midway
+between this (the particular intuition of a definite triangle or dog) and
+the unintuitable concept, as a general intuition (of a triangle or a dog
+in general, which holds alike for right- and oblique-angled triangles, for
+poodles and pugs), or as a rule for determining our intuition in accordance
+with a concept.]
+
+Each category has its own schema. The schema of quantity is number, as
+comprehending the successive addition of homogeneous parts. Filled time
+(being in time) is the schema of reality, empty time (not-being in time)
+the schema of negation, and more or less filled time (the intensity of
+sensation, indicating the degree of reality) the schema of limitation.
+Permanence in time is the sign for the application of the category of
+substance;[1] regular succession, for the application of the concept of
+cause; the coexistence of the determinations of one substance with those of
+another, the signal for their subsumption under the concept of reciprocity.
+The schemata of possibility, actuality, and necessity, finally, are
+existence at any time whatever (whensoever), existence at a definite time,
+and existence at all times. By such schematic syntheses the pure concept
+is brought near to the empirical intuition, and the way is prepared for an
+application of the former to the latter, or, what is the same thing, for
+the subsumption of the latter under the former.
+
+[Footnote 1: This determination is important for psychology. Since
+the inner sense shows nothing constant, but everything in a continual
+flux,--for the permanent subject of our thoughts is an identical activity
+of the understanding, not an intuitable object,--the concept of substance
+is not applicable to psychical phenomena. Representations of a permanent
+(material substances) exist, indeed, but not permanent representations. The
+abiding self (ego, soul) which we posit back of internal phenomena is, as
+the Dialectic will show, a mere Idea, which, or, rather, the object of
+which, maybe "thought" as substance, it is true, but cannot be "given" in
+intuition, hence cannot be "known."]
+
+As a result of the fact that the schematism permits a presentation of the
+categories in time intuition antecedent to all experience, the possibility
+is given of synthetic judgments _a priori_ concerning objects of possible
+experience. Such judgments, in so far as they are not based on higher
+and more general cognitions, are termed "principles," and the system of
+them--to be given, with the table of the categories as a guide, in
+the _Analytic of Principles_ or the Doctrine of the Faculty of
+Judgment--furnishes the outlines of "pure natural science." When thus
+the rules of the subsumption to be effected have been found in the pure
+concepts, and the conditions and criteria of the subsumption in the
+schemata, it remains to indicate the principles which the understanding,
+through the aid of the schemata, actually produces _a priori_ from its
+concepts.
+
+The principle of quantity is the _Axiom of Intuition_, the principle of
+quality the _Anticipation of Perception_; the principles of relation
+are termed _Analogies of Experience_, those of modality _Postulates
+of Empirical Thought in General_. The first runs, "All intuitions are
+extensive quantities"; the second, "In all phenomena sensation, and the
+real which corresponds to it in the object, has an intensive quantity,
+i.e., a degree." The principle of the "Analogies" is, "All phenomena, as
+far as their existence is concerned, are subject _a priori_ to rules,
+determining their mutual relation in time" (in the second edition this is
+stated as follows: "Experience is possible only through the representation
+of a necessary connection of perceptions"). As there are three modes of
+time, there result three "Analogies," the principles of permanence, of
+succession (production), and of coexistence. These are: (1) "In all changes
+of phenomena the substance is permanent, and its quantum is neither
+increased nor diminished in nature." (2) "All changes take place according
+to the law of connection between cause and effect"; or, "Everything that
+happens (begins to be) presupposes something on which it follows according
+to a rule." (3) "All substances, in so far as they are coexistent, stand in
+complete community, that is, reciprocity, one to another." And, finally,
+the three "Postulates": "That which agrees with the formal conditions of
+experience (in intuition and in concepts) is possible," "That which is
+connected with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is actual"
+(perception is the only criterion of actuality). "That which, in its
+connection with the actual, is determined by universal conditions of
+experience, is (exists as) necessary."
+
+As the categories of substance and causality are specially preferred to the
+others by Kant and the Kantians, and are even proclaimed by some as the
+only fundamental concepts, so also the principles of relation have an
+established reputation for special importance. The leading ideas in the
+proofs of the "Analogies of Experience"--for in spite of their underivative
+character the principles require, and are capable of, proof--may next be
+noted.
+
+The time determinations of phenomena, the knowledge of their duration,
+their succession, and their coexistence, form an indispensable part of our
+experience, not only of scientific experience, but of everyday experience
+as well. How is the objective time-determination of things and events
+possible? If the matter in hand is the determination of the particulars of
+a fight with a bloody ending, the witnesses are questioned and testify:
+We heard and saw how A began the quarrel by insulting B, and the latter
+answered the insult with a blow, whereupon A drew his knife and wounded his
+opponent. Here the succession of perceptions on the part of the persons
+present is accepted as a true reproduction of the succession of the actual
+events. But the succession of perceptions is not always the sure indication
+of an actual succession: the trees along an avenue are perceived one after
+the other, while they are in reality coexistent. We might now propose the
+following statement: The representation of the manifold of phenomena is
+always successive, I apprehend one part after another. I can decide whether
+these parts succeed one another in the object also, or whether they
+are coexistent, by the fact that, in the second case, the series of
+my perceptions is reversible, while in the first it is not. I can, if I
+choose, direct my glance along the avenue in such a way that I shall begin
+the second time with the tree at which I left off the first time; if I wish
+to assure myself that the parts of a house are coexistent, I cause my eye
+to wander from the upper to the lower portions, from the right side to the
+left, and then to perform the same motions in the opposite direction. On
+the other hand, it is not left to my choice to hear the thunder either
+before or after I see the lightning, or to see a passing wagon now here,
+now there, but in these cases I am bound in the succession of my sensuous
+representations. The possibility of interchange in the series of
+perceptions proves an objective coexistence, the impossibility of this,
+an objective succession. But this criterion is limited to the immediate
+present, and fails us when a time relation between unobserved phenomena is
+to be established. If I go at evening into the dining room and see a vessel
+of bubbling water, which is to be used in making tea, over a burning spirit
+lamp, whence do I derive the knowledge that the water began, and could
+begin, to boil only after the alcohol had been lighted, and not before?
+Because I have often seen the flame precede the boiling of the water, and
+in this the irreversibility of the two perceptions has guaranteed to me the
+succession of the events perceived? Then I may only assume that it is very
+probable, not that it is certain, that in this case also the order of the
+two events has been the same as I have observed several times before. As a
+matter of fact, however, we all assert that the water could not have come
+into a boiling condition unless the generation of heat had preceded; that
+in every case the fire must be there before the boiling of the water can
+commence. Whence do we derive this _must_? Simply and alone from the
+thought of a causal connection between the two events. Every phenomenon
+_must_ follow in time that phenomenon of which it is the effect, and must
+precede that of which it is the cause. It is through the relation of
+causality, and through this alone, that the objective time relation of
+phenomena is determined. If nothing preceded an event on which it must
+follow according to a rule,[1] then all succession in perception would be
+subjective merely, and nothing whatever would be objectively determined by
+it as to what was the antecedent and what the consequent in the phenomenon
+itself. We should then have a mere play of representations without
+significance for the real succession of events. Only the thought of a rule,
+according to which the antecedent state contains the necessary condition of
+the consequent state, justifies us in transferring the time order of our
+representations to phenomena.[2] Nay, even the distinction between
+the phenomenon itself, as the object of our representations, and our
+representations of it, is effected only by subjecting the phenomenon to
+this rule, which assigns to it its definite position in time after another
+phenomenon by which it is caused, and thus forbids the inversion of the
+perceptions. We can derive the rule of the understanding which produces the
+objective time order of the manifold from experience, only because we have
+put it into experience, and have first brought experience into being by
+means of the rule. We recapitulate in Kant's own words: The objective
+(time) relation of phenomena remains undetermined by mere perception (the
+mere succession in my apprehension, if it is not determined by means of a
+rule in relation to an antecedent, does not guarantee any succession in
+the object). In order that this may be known as determined, the relation
+between the two states must be so conceived (through the understanding's
+concept of causality) that it is thereby determined with necessity which of
+them must be taken as coming first, and which second, and not conversely.
+Thus it is only by subjecting the succession of phenomena to the law of
+causality that empirical knowledge of them is possible. Without the concept
+of cause no objective time determination, and hence, without it, no
+experience.
+
+[Footnote 1: "A reality following on an empty time, that is, a beginning of
+existence preceded by no state of things, can as little be apprehended as
+empty time itself."]
+
+[Footnote 2: "If phenomena were things in themselves no one would be able,
+from the succession of the representations of their manifold, to tell how
+this is connected in the object."]
+
+That which the relation of cause and effect does for the succession[1] of
+phenomena, the relation of reciprocity does for their coexistence, and that
+of substance and accident for their duration. Since absolute time is not an
+object of perception, the position of phenomena in time cannot be directly
+determined, but only through a concept of the understanding. When I
+conclude that two objects (the earth and the moon) must be coexistent,
+because perceptions of them can follow upon one another in both ways, I
+do this on the presupposition that the objects themselves reciprocally
+determine their position in time, hence are not isolated, but stand in
+causal community or a relation of reciprocal influence. It is only on the
+condition of reciprocity between phenomena, through which they form a
+whole, that I can represent them as coexistent.
+
+[Footnote 1: Against the objection that cause and effect are frequently,
+indeed in most cases, simultaneous (_e.g._ the heated stove and the warmth
+of the room), Kant remarks that the question concerns the order of time
+merely, and not the lapse of time. The ball lying on a soft cushion is
+simultaneous, it is true, with its effect, the depression in the cushion.
+"But I, nevertheless, distinguish the two by the time relation of dynamical
+connection. For if I place the ball on the cushion, its previously smooth
+surface is followed by a depression, but if there is a depression in the
+cushion (I know not whence) a leaden ball does not follow from it."]
+
+Coexistence and succession can be represented only in a permanent
+substratum; they are merely the modes in which the permanent exists. Since
+time (in which all change takes place, but which itself abides and does not
+change) in itself cannot be perceived, the substratum of simultaneity and
+succession must exist in phenomena themselves: the permanent in relation
+to which alone all the time relations of phenomena can be determined, is
+substance; that which alters is its determinations, accidents, or special
+modes of existing. Alteration, _i.e._, origin and extinction, is true of
+states only, which can begin and cease to be, and not of substances, which
+change (_sich verändern_), i.e., pass from one mode of existence into
+another, but do not alter (_wechseln_), i.e., pass from non-existence into
+existence, or the reverse. It is the permanent alone that changes, and
+its states alone that begin and cease to be. The origin and extinction of
+substances, or the increase and diminution of their quantum, would remove
+the sole condition of the empirical unity of time; for the time relations
+of the coexistent and the successive can be perceived only in an identical
+substratum, in a permanent, which exists always. The law "From nothing
+nothing comes, and nothing can return to nothing," is everywhere assumed
+and has been frequently advanced, but never yet proved, for, indeed, it is
+impossible to prove it dogmatically. Here the only possible proof for it,
+the critical proof, is given: the principle of permanence is a necessary
+condition of experience. The same argument establishes the principle of
+sufficient reason, and the principle of the community of substances,
+together with the unity of the world to be inferred from this. The three
+Analogies together assert: "All phenomena exist in one nature and must so
+exist, because without such a unity _a priori_ no unity of experience,
+and therefore no determination of objects in experience, would be
+possible."--In connection with the Postulates the same transcendental proof
+is given for a series of other laws of nature _a priori_, viz., that in the
+course of the changes in the world--for the causal principle holds only for
+effects in nature, not for the existence of things as substances--there
+can be neither blind chance nor a blind necessity (but only a conditional,
+hence an intelligible, necessity); and, further, that in the series of
+phenomena, there can be neither leap, nor gap, nor break, and hence no
+void--_in mundo non datur casus, non datur fatum, non datur saltus, non
+datur hiatus_.
+
+While the dynamical principles have to do with the relation of phenomena,
+whether it be to one another (Analogies), or to our faculty of cognition
+(Postulates), the mathematical relate to the quantity of intuitions and
+sensations, and furnish the basis for the application of mathematics
+to natural science.[1] An extensive quantity is one in which the
+representation of the parts makes the representation of the whole possible,
+and so precedes it. I cannot represent a line without drawing it in
+thought, i.e., without producing all parts of it one after the other,
+starting from a point. All phenomena are intuited as aggregates or as
+collections of previously given parts. That which geometry asserts of
+pure intuition (i.e., the infinite divisibility of lines) holds also of
+empirical intuition. An intensive quantity is one which is apprehended only
+as unity, and in which plurality can be represented only by approximation
+to negation = 0. Every sensation, consequently every reality in phenomena,
+has a degree, which, however small it may be, is never the smallest, but
+can always be still more diminished; and between reality and negation there
+exists a continuous connection of possible smaller intermediate sensations,
+or an infinite series of ever decreasing degrees. The property of
+quantities, according to which no part in them is the smallest possible
+part, and no part is simple, is termed their continuity. All phenomena
+are continuous quantities, i.e., all their parts are in turn (further
+divisible) quantities. Hence it follows, first, that a proof for an empty
+space or empty time can never be drawn from experience, and secondly, that
+all change is also continuous. "It is remarkable," so Kant ends his proof
+of the Anticipation, "that of quantities in general we can know one
+_quality_ only _a priori_, namely, their continuity, while with regard to
+quality (the real of phenomena) nothing is known to us _a priori_ but their
+intensive _quantity_, that is, that they must have a degree. Everything
+else is left to experience."
+
+[Footnote 1: In each particular science of nature, science proper (i.e.,
+apodictically certain science) is found only to the extent in which
+mathematics can be applied therein. For this reason chemistry can never
+be anything more than a systematic art or experimental doctrine; and
+psychology not even this, but only a natural history of the inner sense or
+natural description of the soul. That which Kant's _Metaphysical Elements
+of Natural Science_, 1786--in four chapters, Phoronomy, Dynamics,
+Mechanics, and Phenomenology--advances as pure physics or the metaphysics
+of corporeal nature, is a doctrine of motion. The fundamental determination
+of matter (of a somewhat which is to be the object of the external senses)
+is motion, for it is only through motion that these senses can be affected,
+and the understanding itself reduces all other predicates of matter to
+this. The second and most valuable part of the work defines matter as the
+movable, that which fills space by its moving force, and recognizes two
+original forces, repulsive, expansive superficial force or force of
+contact, by which a body resists the entrance of other bodies into its own
+space, and attractive, penetrative force or the force which works at a
+distance, in virtue of which all particles of matter attract one another.
+In order to a determinate filling of space the co-operation of both
+fundamental forces is required. In opposition to the mechanical theory of
+the atomists, which explains forces from matter and makes them inhere in
+it, Kant holds fast to the dynamical view which he had early adopted (cf.
+p. 324), according to which forces are the primary factor and matter is
+constituted by them.]
+
+The outcome of the Analytic of Principles sounds bold enough. _The
+understanding is the lawgiver of nature_: "It does not draw its laws _a
+priori_ from nature, but prescribes them to it"; the principles of the pure
+understanding are the most universal laws of nature, the empirical laws of
+nature only particular determinations of these. All order and regularity
+take their origin in the spirit, and are put into objects by this.
+Universal and necessary knowledge remained inexplicable so long as it was
+assumed that the understanding must conform itself to objects; it is at
+once explained if, conversely, we make objects conform themselves to the
+understanding. This is a reversal of philosophical opinion which may justly
+be compared to the Copernican revolution in astronomy; it is just as
+paradoxical as the latter, but just as incontestably true, and just as rich
+in results. The sequel will show that this strangely sounding principle,
+that things conform themselves to our representations and the laws of
+nature are dependent on the understanding, is calculated to make us humble
+rather than proud. Our understanding is lawgiver within the limits of its
+knowledge, no doubt, but it knows only within the limits of its legislative
+authority; nature, to which it dictates laws, is nothing but a totality of
+phenomena; beyond the limits of the phenomenal, where its commands become
+of no effect, its wishes also find no hearing.
+
+In the second edition the Analytic of Principles contains as a supplement a
+"Refutation of Idealism," which, in opposition to Descartes's position that
+the only immediate experience is inner experience, from which we reach
+outer experience by inference alone, argues that, conversely, it is only
+through outer experience, which is immediate experience proper, that inner
+experience--as the consciousness of my own existence in time--is possible.
+For all time determination presupposes something permanent in perception,
+and this permanent something cannot be in me (the mere representation of an
+external thing), but only actually existing things which I perceive without
+me. There is, further, a chapter on the "Ground of the Distinction of all
+Objects in general into Phenomena and Noumena," with an appendix on the
+Amphiboly (ambiguity) of the Concepts of Reflection. The latter shows
+that the concepts of comparison: identity and difference, agreement and
+opposition, the internal and the external, matter and form, acquire
+entirely different meanings when they relate to phenomena and to things in
+themselves (in other words, to things in their relation to the sensibility,
+and in relation to the understanding merely); and further, in a criticism
+of the philosophy of Leibnitz, reproaches him with having intellectualized
+phenomena, while Locke is said to have sensationalized the concepts of the
+understanding.
+
+The chapter on the distinction between phenomena and noumena very much
+lessens the hopes, aroused, perchance, by the establishment of the
+non-empirical origin of the categories, for an application of these not
+confined to any experience. Although the categories, that is, are in their
+origin entirely independent of all experience (so much so that they first
+make experience possible), they are yet confined in their application
+within the bounds of possible experience. They "serve only to spell
+phenomena, that we may be able to read them as experience," and when
+applied to things in themselves lose all significance.[1] Similarly the
+principles which spring from them are "nothing more than principles of
+possible experience," and can be referred to phenomena alone, beyond which
+they are arbitrary combinations without objective reality. Things in
+themselves may be thought, but they can never be known; for knowledge,
+besides the empty thought of an object, implies intuitions which must be
+subsumed under it or by which the object must be determined. In themselves
+the pure concepts relate to all that is thinkable, not merely to that which
+can be experienced, but the schemata, which assures their applicability in
+the field of experience, at the same time limit them to this sphere. The
+schematism makes the immanent use of the categories, and thus a metaphysics
+of phenomena, possible, but the transcendent use of them, and consequently
+the metaphysics of the suprasensible, impossible. The case would be
+different if our intuition were intellectual instead of sensuous, or,
+which is the same thing, if our understanding were intuitive instead of
+discursive; then the objects which we think would not need to be given us
+from another source (through sensuous intuition), but would be themselves
+produced in the act by which we thought them. The divine spirit may be such
+an archetypal, creative understanding (_intellectus archetypus_), which
+generates objects by its thought; the human spirit is not such, and
+therefore is confined, with its knowledge, within the circle of possible
+perception.--The conception of "intellectual intuition" leads to a
+distinction in regard to things in themselves: in its negative meaning
+noumenon denotes a thing in so far as it is _not_ the object of our
+_sensuous_ intuition, in its positive meaning a thing which is the
+object of a _non-sensuous_ intuition. The positive thing in itself is a
+problematical concept; its possibility depends on the existence of an
+intuitive understanding, something about which we are ignorant. The
+negative thing in itself cannot be known, indeed, but it can be thought;
+and the representation of it is a possible concept, one which is not
+self-contradictory[2] (a principle which is of great importance for
+practical philosophy). Still further, it is an indispensable concept, which
+shows that the boundary where our intuition ends is not the boundary of
+the thinkable as well; and even if it affords no positive extension of
+knowledge[3] it is, nevertheless, very useful, since it sets bounds to the
+use of the understanding, and thus, as it were, negatively extends our
+knowledge. That which lies beyond the boundary, the "how are they possible"
+_(Wiemöglichkeit)_ of things in themselves is shrouded in darkness, but the
+boundary itself, _i.e._, the "that they are possible" _(Dassmöglichkeit)_,
+of things in themselves, and the unknowableness of their nature, belongs to
+that which is within the boundary and lies in the light. In this way Kant
+believed that the categories of causality and substance might be applied to
+the relation of things in themselves to phenomena without offending against
+the prohibition of their transcendent use, since here the boundary appeared
+only to be touched, and not overstepped.
+
+[Footnote 1: "A pure use of the categories is no doubt possible, that is,
+not self-contradictory, but it has no kind of objective validity, because
+it refers to no intuition to which it is meant to impart the unity of an
+object. The categories remain forever mere functions of thought by which no
+object can be given to me, but by which I can only think whatever may
+be given to me in intuition" (_Critique of Pure Reason_, Max Müller's
+translation, vol. ii. p. 220). Without the condition of sensuous intuition,
+for which they supply the synthesis, the categories have no relation to any
+definite object; for without this condition they contain nothing but the
+logical function, or the form of the concept, by means of which alone
+nothing can be known and distinguished as to any object belonging to it
+(_Ibid_., pp. 213, 214).]
+
+[Footnote 2: The thing in itself denotes the object in so far as it can
+be thought by us, but not intuited, and consequently not determined by
+intuitions, _i.e._, cannot be known. It is only through the schematism
+that the categories are limited to phenomena. O. Liebmann (_Kant und die
+Epigonen_, p. 27, and _passim_) overlooks or ignores this when he says:
+Kant here allows himself to "recognize an object emancipated from the
+forms of knowledge, therefore an irrational object, _i.e._, to represent
+something which is not representable--wooden iron." The thing in itself is
+insensible, but not irrational, and the forms of intuition and forms of
+thought joined by Liebmann under the title forms of knowledge have in Kant
+a by no means equal rank.]
+
+[Footnote 3: A category by itself, freed from all conditions of intuition
+(_e.g._, the representation of a substance which is thought without
+permanence in time, or of a cause which should not act in time), can yield
+no definite concept of an object.]
+
+Though the concepts of the understanding possess a cognitive value in the
+sphere of phenomena alone, the hope still remains of gaining an entrance
+into the suprasensible sphere through the concepts of reason. It is
+indubitable that our spirit is conscious of a far higher need than that for
+the mere connection of phenomena into experience; it is that which cannot
+be experienced, the Ideas God, freedom, and immortality, which form the
+real end of its inquiry. Can this need be satisfied, and how? Can this end
+be attained, and reality be given to the Ideas? This is the third question
+of the Critique of Reason.
+
+%(c) The Reason's Ideas of the Unconditioned (Transcendental
+Dialectic).%--"All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds thence to
+the understanding, and ends with reason." The understanding is the
+faculty of rules, reason the faculty of principles. The categories of the
+understanding are necessary concepts which make experience possible, and
+which, therefore, can always be given in experience; the Ideas of reason
+are necessary concepts to which no corresponding object can be given. Each
+of the Ideas gives expression to an unconditioned. How does the concept of
+the unconditioned arise, and what service does it perform for knowledge?
+
+As perceptions are connected by the categories in the unity of the
+understanding, and thus are elevated into experience, so the manifold
+knowledge of experience needs a higher unity, the unity of reason, in order
+to form a connected system. This is supplied to it by the Ideas--which,
+consequently, do not relate directly to the objects of intuition, but only
+to the understanding and its judgments--in order, through the concept
+of the unconditioned, to give completion to the knowledge of the
+understanding, which always moves in the sphere of the conditioned, _i.e._,
+to give it the greatest possible unity together with the greatest possible
+extension. The concept of the absolute grows out of the logical task which
+is incumbent on reason, _i.e._, inference, and it may be best explained
+from this as a starting point. In the syllogism the judgment asserted in
+the conclusion is derived from a general rule, the major premise. The
+validity of this general proposition is, however, itself conditional,
+dependent on higher conditions. Then, as reason seeks the condition for
+each conditioned moment, and always commands a further advance in
+the series of conditions, it acts under the Idea of _the totality
+of conditions_, which, nevertheless, since it can never be given in
+experience, does not denote an object, but only an heuristic maxim for
+knowledge, the maxim, namely, never to stop with any one condition as
+ultimate, but always to continue the search further. The Idea of the
+unconditioned or of the completeness of conditions is a goal which we never
+attain, but which we are continually to approach. The categories and the
+principles of the understanding were _constitutive_ principles, the Ideas
+are _regulative_ merely; their function is to guide the understanding, to
+give it a direction helpful for the connection of knowledge, not to inform
+it concerning the actual character of things.
+
+Since reason is the faculty of inference (as the understanding was found to
+be the faculty of judgment), the forms of the syllogism perform the same
+service for us in our search for the Ideas as the forms of judgment in
+the discovery of the categories. To the categorical, hypothetical, and
+disjunctive syllogisms correspond the three concepts of reason, the soul or
+the thinking subject, the world or the totality of phenomena, and God, the
+original being or the supreme condition of the possibility of all that can
+be thought. By means of these we refer all inner phenomena to the ego as
+their (unknown) common subject, think all beings and events in nature as
+ordered under the comprehensive system of the (never to be experienced)
+universe, and regard all things as the work of a supreme (unknowable)
+intelligence. These Ideas are necessary concepts; not accidental products
+nor mere fancies, but concepts sprung from the nature of reason; their
+use is legitimate so long as we remember that we can have a problematical
+concept of objects corresponding to them, but no knowledge of these; that
+they are problems and rules for knowledge, never objects and instruments of
+it. Nevertheless the temptation to regard these regulative principles as
+constitutive and these problems as knowable objects is almost irresistible;
+for the ground of the involuntary confusion of the required with the given
+absolute lies not so much in the carelessness of the individual as in the
+nature of our cognitive faculty. The Ideas carry with them an unavoidable
+illusion of objective reality, and the sophistical inferences which spring
+from them are not sophistications of men, but of pure reason itself, are
+natural misunderstandings from which even the wisest cannot free himself.
+At best we can succeed in avoiding the error, not in doing away with the
+transcendental illusion from which it proceeds. We can see through the
+illusion and avoid the erroneous conclusions built upon it, not shake off
+the illusion itself.
+
+On this erroneous objective use of the Ideas three so-called sciences are
+based: speculative psychology, speculative cosmology, and speculative
+theology, which, together with ontology, constitute the stately structure
+of the (Wolffian) metaphysics. The Critique of Reason completes its work
+of destruction when, as Dialectic (Logic cf. Illusion), it follows the
+refutation of dogmatic ontology--developed in the Analytic--which
+believed that it knew things in themselves through the concepts of
+the understanding, with a refutation of rational psychology, rational
+cosmology, and rational theology. It shows that the first is founded on
+paralogisms, and the second entangled in irreconcilable contradictions,
+while the third makes vain efforts to prove the existence of the Supreme
+Being.
+
+(i) _The Paralogisms of Rational Psychology_. The transcendental
+self-consciousness or pure ego which accompanies and connects all my
+representations, the subject of all judgments which I form, is, as the
+Analytic recognized, the presupposition of all knowing (pp. 358-359), but
+as such it can never become an object of knowledge. We must not make
+a given object out of the subject which never can be a predicate, nor
+substitute a real thinking substance for the logical subject of thought,
+nor revamp the unity of self-consciousness into the simplicity and
+identical personality of the soul. The rational psychology of the Wolffian
+school is guilty of this error, and whatever of proof it advances for the
+substantiality, simplicity, and personality of the soul, and, by way
+of deduction, for its immateriality and immortality as well as for its
+relation to the body, is based upon this substitution, this ambiguity of
+the middle term, and therefore upon a _quaternio terminorum_,--all its
+conclusions are fallacious. It is allowable and unavoidable to add in
+thought an absolute subject, the unity of the ego, to inner phenomena;[1]
+it is inadmissible to treat the Idea of the soul as a knowable thing. In
+order to be able to apply the category of substance to it, we would have to
+lay hold of a permanent in intuition such as cannot be found in the inner
+sense. Empirical psychology, then, alone remains for the extension of our
+knowledge of mental life, while rational psychology shrivels up from
+a doctrine into a mere discipline, which watches that the limits of
+experience are not overstepped. But even as a mere limiting determination
+it has great value. For, along with the hope of proving the immateriality
+and immortality of the soul, the fear of seeing them _disproved_ is also
+dissipated; materialism is just as unfounded as spiritualism, and if the
+conclusions of the latter concerning the soul as a simple, immaterial
+substance which survives the death of the body, cannot be proved, yet we
+need not, for that reason, regard them as erroneous, for the opposite is as
+little susceptible of demonstration. The whole question belongs not in the
+forum of knowledge, but in the forum of faith, and that which we gain by
+the proof that nothing can be determined concerning it by theoretical
+reasoning (viz., assurance against materialistic objections) is far more
+valuable than what we lose.
+
+[Footnote 1: The rational concept of the soul as a simple, independent
+intelligence does not signify an actual being, but only expresses certain
+principles of systematic unity in the explanation of psychical phenomena,
+viz., "To regard all determinations as existing in one subject, all powers,
+as far as possible, as derived from, one fundamental power, all change
+as belonging to the states of one and the same permanent being, and
+to represent all phenomena in space as totally distinct from acts of
+thought."]
+
+(2) _The Antinomies of Rational Cosmology_. If in its endeavor to spin
+metaphysical knowledge concerning the nature of the spirit and the
+existence of the soul after death out of the concept of the thinking ego
+the reason falls into the snare of an ambiguous _terminus medius_, the
+difficulties which frustrate its attempts to use the Idea of the world
+in the extension of its knowledge _a priori_ are of quite a different
+character. Here the formal correctness of the method of inference is not
+open to attack. It may be proved with absolute strictness (and in the
+apagogical or indirect form, from the impossibility of the contrary) that
+the world has a beginning in time, and also that it is _limited_ in space;
+that every compound substance consists of _simple_ parts; that, besides the
+causality according to the laws of nature, there is a causality through
+_freedom_, and that an _absolutely necessary Being_ exists, either as a
+part of the world or as the cause of it. But the contrary may be proved
+with equal stringency (and indirectly, as before): The world is infinite in
+space and time; there is nothing simple in the world; there is no freedom,
+but everything in the world takes place entirely according to the laws of
+nature; and there exists no absolutely necessary Being either within the
+world or without it. This is the famous doctrine of the conflict of the
+four cosmological theses and antitheses or of the Antinomy of Pure Reason,
+the discovery of which indubitably exercised a determining influence upon
+the whole course of the Kantian Critique of Reason, and which forms one of
+its poles. The transcendental idealism, the distinction between phenomena
+and noumena, and the limitation of knowledge to phenomena, all receive
+significant confirmation from the Antithetic. Without the critical
+idealism (that which is intuited in space and time, and known through
+the categories, is merely the phenomenon of things, whose "in itself" is
+unknowable), the antinomies would be insoluble. How is reason to act in
+view of the conflict? The grounds for the antitheses are just as conclusive
+as those for the theses; on neither side is there a preponderance which
+could decide the result. Ought reason to agree with both parties or with
+neither?
+
+The solution distinguishes the first two antinomies, as the mathematical,
+from the second two, as the dynamical antinomies; in the former, since it
+is a question of the composition and division of quanta, the conditions may
+be homogeneous with the conditioned, in the latter, heterogeneous. In the
+former, thesis and antithesis are alike _false_, since both start from
+the inadmissible assumption that the universe (the complete series of
+phenomena) is given, while in fact it is only required of us (is an Idea).
+The world does not exist in itself, but only in the empirical regress of
+phenomenal conditions, in which we never can reach infinity and never the
+limitation of the world by an empty space or an antecedent empty time, for
+infinite space, like empty space (and the same holds in regard to time), is
+not perceivable. Consequently the quantity of the world is neither finite
+nor infinite. The question of the quantity of the world is unanswerable,
+because the concept of a sense-world existing by itself _(before_ the
+regress) is self-contradictory. Similarly the problem whether the composite
+consists of simple elements is insoluble, because the assumption that
+the phenomenon of body is a thing in itself, which, antecedent to all
+experience, contains all the parts that can be reached in experience--in
+other words, that representations exist outside of the representative
+faculty--is absurd. Matter is infinitely divisible, no doubt, yet it does
+not consist of infinitely numerous parts, and just as little of a definite
+number of simple parts, but the parts exist merely in the representation
+of them, in the division (decomposition), and this goes as far as possible
+experience extends. The case is different with the dynamical antinomies,
+where thesis and antithesis can both be _true_, in so far as the former
+is referred to things in themselves and the latter to phenomena. The
+contradiction vanishes if we take that which the thesis asserts and the
+antithesis denies in different senses. The fact that in the world of
+phenomena the causal nexus proceeds without interruption and without end,
+so that there is no room in it either for an absolutely necessary Being or
+for freedom, does not conflict with this other, that beyond the world of
+sense there may exist an omnipotent, omniscient cause of the world, and an
+intelligible freedom as the ground of our empirically necessary actions.
+"May exist," since for the critical philosopher, who has learned that every
+extension of knowledge beyond the limits of experience is impossible, the
+question can concern only the conceivability of the world-ground and of
+freedom. This possibility is amply sufficient to give a support for faith,
+as, on the other hand, it is indispensable in order to satisfy at once the
+demands of the understanding and of reason, especially to satisfy their
+practical interests. For if it were not possible to resolve the apparent
+contradiction, and to show its members capable of reconciliation, it would
+be all over either with the possibility of experiential knowledge or with
+the basis of ethics and religion. Without unbroken causal connection, no
+nature; without freedom, no morality; and without a Deity, no religion.
+Of special interest is the solution of the third antinomy, which is
+accomplished by means of the valuable (though in the form in which it is
+given by Kant, untenable) conception of the _intelligible character_.[1]
+Man is a citizen of two worlds. As a being of the senses (phenomenon) he
+is subject in his volition and action to the control of natural necessity,
+while as a being of reason (thing in itself) he is free. For science his
+acts are the inevitable results of precedent phenomena, which, in turn,
+are themselves empirically caused; nevertheless moral judgment holds
+him responsible for his acts. In the one case, they are referred to his
+empirical character, in the other, to his intelligible character. Man
+cannot act otherwise than he does act, if he be what he is, but he need not
+be as he is; the moral constitution of the intelligible character, which
+reflects itself in the empirical character, is his own work, and its
+radical transformation (moral regeneration) his duty, the fulfillment of
+which is demanded, and, hence, of necessity possible.
+
+[Footnote 1: On the difficulties in the way of this theory and the
+possibility of their removal cf. R. Falckenberg, _Ueber den intelligiblen
+Character, zur Kritik der Kantischen Freiheitslehre_ (from the _Zeitschrift
+für Philosophie_, vol. lxxv.), Halle, 1879.]
+
+(3) _Speculative Theology_. The principle of complete determination,
+according to which of all the possible predicates of things, as compared
+with their opposites, one must belong to each thing, relates the thing to
+be determined to the sum of all possible predicates or the _Idea of an ens
+realissimum_, which, since it is the representation of a single being, may
+be called the _Ideal_ of pure reason. From this prototype things, as its
+imperfect copies, derive the material of their possibility; all their
+manifold determinations are simply so many modes of limiting the concept of
+the highest reality, which is their common substratum, just as all figures
+are possible only as different ways of limiting infinite space. Or better:
+the derivative beings are not related to the ideal of the original Being as
+limitations to the sum of the highest reality (on which view the Supreme
+Being would be conceived as an aggregate consisting of the derivative
+beings, whereas these presuppose it, and hence cannot constitute it), but
+as consequences to a ground. But reason does not remain content with this
+entirely legitimate thought of the dependence of finite things on the ideal
+of the Being of all beings, as a relation of concepts to the Idea, but,
+dazzled by an irresistible illusion, proceeds to realize, to hypostatize,
+and to personify this ideal, and, since she herself is dimly conscious of
+the illegitimacy of such a transformation of the mere Idea into a given
+object, devises _arguments for the existence of God_. Reason, moreover,
+would scarcely be induced to regard a mere creation of its thought as a
+real being, if it were not compelled from another direction to seek a
+resting place somewhere in the regress of conditions, and to think the
+empirical reality of the contingent world as founded upon the rock of
+something absolutely necessary. There is no being, however, which appears
+more fit for the prerogative of absolute necessity than that one the
+concept of which contains the therefore to every wherefore, and is in no
+respect defective; in other words, rational theology joins the rational
+ideal of the most perfect Being with the fourth cosmological Idea of the
+absolutely necessary Being.
+
+The proof of the existence of God may be attempted in three ways: we may
+argue the existence of a supreme cause either by starting from a definite
+experience (the special constitution and order of the sense-world, that
+is, its purposiveness), or from an indefinite experience (any existence
+whatever), or, finally, abstracting from all experience, from mere concepts
+_a priori_. But neither the empirical nor the transcendent nor the
+intermediate line of thought leads to the goal. The most impressive and
+popular of the proofs is the _physico-theological_ argument. But even if we
+gratuitously admit the analogy of natural products with the works of human
+art (for the argument is not able to prove that the purposive arrangement
+of the things in the world, which we observe with admiration, is
+contingent, and could only have been produced by an ordering, rational
+principle, not self-produced by their own nature according to general
+mechanical laws), this can yield an inference only to an intelligent author
+of the purposive form of the world, and not to an author of its matter,
+only, therefore, to a world-architect, not to a world-creator. Further,
+since the cause must be proportionate to the effect, this argument can
+prove only a very wise and wonderfully powerful, but not an omniscient
+and omnipotent, designer, and so cannot give any definite concept of
+the supreme cause of the world. In leaping from the contingency of the
+purposive order of the world to the existence of something absolutely
+necessary and thence to an all-comprehensive reality, the teleological
+argument abandons the ground of experience and passes over into the
+_cosmological argument_, which in its turn is merely a concealed
+ontological argument (these two differ only in the fact that the
+cosmological proof argues from the antecedently given absolute necessity
+of a being to its unlimited reality, and the ontological, conversely, from
+supreme reality to necessary existence). The weaknesses of the cosmological
+argument in its first half consist in the fact that, in the inference
+from the contingent to a cause for it, it oversteps the boundary of the
+sense-world, and, in the inference from the impossibility of an infinite
+series of conditions to a first cause, it employs the subjective principle
+of investigation--to assume hypothetically a necessary ultimate ground in
+behalf of the systematic unity of knowledge--as an objective principle
+applying to things in themselves. The _ontological argument_, finally,
+which the two nominally empirical arguments hoped to avoid, but in which in
+the end they were forced to take refuge, goes to wreck on the impossibility
+of dragging out of an idea the existence of the object corresponding to it.
+Existence denotes nothing further than the position of the subject with all
+the marks which are thought in its concept--that is, its relation to our
+knowledge, but does not itself belong to the predicates of the concept, and
+hence cannot be analytically derived from the latter. The content of the
+concept is not enriched by the addition of being; a hundred real dollars do
+not contain a penny more than a hundred conceived dollars. All existential
+propositions are synthetic; hence the existence of God cannot be
+demonstrated from the concept of God. It is a contradiction, to be sure, to
+say that God is not almighty, just as it is a contradiction to deny that
+a triangle has three angles: _if_ posit the concept I must not remove
+the predicate which necessarily belongs to it. If I remove the subject,
+however, together with its predicate (the almighty God is not), no
+contradiction arises, for in that case nothing remains to be contradicted.
+
+Thus all the proofs for the existence of a necessary being are shown to be
+illusory, and the basis of speculative theology uncertain. Nevertheless the
+idea of God retains its validity, and the perception of the inability of
+reason to demonstrate its objective reality on theoretical grounds has
+great value. For though the existence of God cannot be proved, it is true,
+by way of recompense, that it cannot be disproved; the same grounds which
+show us that the assertion of his existence is based on a weak foundation
+suffice also to prove every contrary assertion unfounded. And should
+practical motives present themselves to turn the scale in favor of the
+assumption of a supreme and all-sufficient Being, reason would be obliged
+to take sides and to follow these grounds, which, it is true, are not
+objectively sufficient,[1] but still preponderant, and than which we know
+none better. After, however, the objective reality of the idea of God is
+guaranteed from the standpoint of ethics, there remains for transcendental
+theology the important negative duty ("censorship," _Censor_) of exactly
+determining the concept of the most perfect Being (as a being which through
+understanding and freedom contains the first ground of all other things),
+of removing from it all impure elements, and of putting an end to all
+opposite assertions, whether atheistic, deistic (deism maintains the
+possibility of knowing the existence of an original being, but declares all
+further determination of this being impossible), or (in the dogmatic
+sense) anthropomorphic. Theism is entirely possible apart from a mistaken
+anthropomorphism, in so far as through the predicates which we take from
+inner experience (understanding and will) we do not determine the concept
+of God as he is in himself, but only _analogically_[2] in his relation to
+the world. That concept serves only to aid us in our contemplation of
+the world,[3] not as a means of knowing the Supreme Being himself. For
+speculative purposes it remains a mere ideal, yet a perfectly faultless
+one, which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge.
+
+[Footnote 1: "They need favor to supply their lack of legitimate claims."
+Of themselves alone, therefore, they are unable to yield any theological
+knowledge, but they are fitted to prepare the understanding for it, and to
+give emphasis to other possible (moral) proofs.]
+
+[Footnote 2: We halt _at_ the boundary of the legitimate use of reason,
+without overstepping it, when we limit our judgment to the relation of
+the world to the Supreme Being, and in this allow ourselves a symbolical
+anthropomorphism only, which in reality has reference to our language alone
+and not to the object.]
+
+[Footnote 3: We are compelled to _look on_ the world _as if_ it were the
+work of a supreme intelligence and will. "We may confidently derive the
+phenomena of the world and their existence from other (phenomena), as if no
+necessary being existed, and yet unceasingly strive after completeness
+in the derivation, as though such a being were presupposed as a supreme
+ground." In short, physical (mechanical) _explanation_, and a theistic
+point of view or teleological _judgment_.]
+
+Thus the value of the Ideas is twofold. By showing the untenable ness of
+atheism, fatalism, and naturalism, they I clear the way for the objects of
+faith. By providing natural science with the standpoint of a systematical
+unity through teleological connection, they make an extension of the use of
+the understanding possible within the realm of experience,[1] though not
+beyond it. The systematic development of the Kantian teleology, which is
+here indicated in general outlines only, is found in the second part of the
+_Critique of Judgment_; while the practical philosophy, which furnishes the
+only possible proof, the moral proof, for the reality of the Ideas, erects
+on the site left free by the removal of the airy summer-houses of dogmatic
+metaphysics the solid mansion of critical metaphysics, that is, the
+metaphysics of duties and of hopes. "I was obliged to destroy knowledge
+in order to make room for faith." The transition from the impossible
+theoretical or speculative knowledge of things in themselves to the
+possible "practical knowledge" of them (the belief that there is a God and
+a future world) is given in the _Doctrine of Method_, which is divided into
+four parts (the Discipline, the Canon, the Architectonic, and the History
+of Pure Reason), in its second chapter. There, in the ideal of the _Summum
+Bonum_, the proof is brought forward for the validity of the Ideas God,
+freedom, and immortality, as postulates inseparable from moral obligation;
+and by a cautious investigation of the three stages of assent (opinion,
+knowledge, and belief) both doctrinal and moral belief are assigned their
+places in the system of the kinds of knowledge.
+
+[Footnote 1: The principle to regard all order in the world (_e.g._, the
+shape of the earth, mountains, and seas, the members of animal bodies) as
+if it proceeded from the design of a supreme reason leads the investigator
+on to various discoveries.]
+
+We may now sum up the results of the three parts of Kant's theoretical
+philosophy. The pure intuitions, the categories, and the Ideas are
+functions of the spirit, and afford non-empirical _(erfahrungsfreie)_
+knowledge concerning the objects of possible experience (and concerning the
+possibility of knowledge). The first make universal and necessary knowledge
+possible in relation to the forms under which objects can be given to us;
+the second make a similarly apodictic knowledge possible in relation to
+the forms under which phenomena must be thought; the third make possible a
+judgment of phenomena differing from this knowledge, yet not in conflict
+with it. The categories and the Ideas, moreover, yield problematical
+concepts of objects which are not given to us in intuition, but which may
+exist outside of space and time: things in themselves cannot be known, it
+is true, but they can be thought, a fact of importance in case we should be
+assured of their existence in some other way than by sensuous intuition.
+
+The determination of the limits of speculative reason is finished.
+All knowing and all demonstration is limited to phenomena or possible
+experience. But the boundary of that which can be experienced is not the
+boundary of that which is, still less of that which ought to be; the
+boundary of theoretical reason is not the boundary of practical reason. We
+_ought_ to act morally; in order to be able to do this we must ascribe to
+ourselves the power to initiate a series of events; and, in general, we are
+warranted in assuming everything the non-assumption of which makes moral
+action impossible. If we were merely theoretical, merely experiential
+beings, we should lack all occasion to suppose a second, intelligible world
+behind and above the world of phenomena; but we are volitional and active
+beings under laws of reason, and though we are unable to know things in
+themselves, yet we may and must _postulate_ them--our freedom, God, and
+immortality. For not only that which is a condition of experience is true
+and necessary, but that, also, which is a condition of morality. The
+discovery of the laws and conditions of morality is the mission of
+practical philosophy.
+
+
+%2. Theory of Ethics.%
+
+The investigation now turns from the laws of nature, which express a
+"must," to the laws of will, in which an "ought" is expressed, and by which
+certain actions are not compelled, but prescribed. (If we were merely
+rational, and not at the same time sensuous beings, the moral law would
+determine the will in the form of a natural law; since, however, the
+constant possibility of deviation is given in the sensibility, or, rather,
+the moral standpoint can only be attained by conquering the sensuous
+impulses, therefore the moral law speaks to us in the form of an "ought,"
+of an imperative.) Among the laws of the will or imperatives, also,
+there are some which possess the character of absolute necessity and
+universality, and which, consequently, are _a priori_. As the understanding
+dictates laws to the phenomenal world, so practical reason gives a law to
+itself, is _autonomous_; and as the _a priori_ laws of nature relate only
+to the form of the objects of experience, so the moral law determines not
+the content, but only the form of volition: "Act only on that maxim whereby
+thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law."
+The law of practical reason is a "categorical imperative." What does this
+designation mean, and what is the basis of the formula of the moral law
+which has just been given?
+
+Practical principles are either subjectively valid, in which case they are
+termed maxims (volitional principles of the individual), or objectively
+valid, when they are called imperatives or precepts. The latter are either
+valid under certain conditions (If you wish to become a clergyman you must
+study theology; he who would prosper as a merchant must not cheat his
+customers), or unconditionally valid (Thou shalt not lie). All prudential
+or technical rules are hypothetical imperatives, the moral law is a
+categorical imperative. The injunction to be truthful is not connected with
+the condition that we intend to act morally, but this general purpose,
+together with all the special purposes belonging to it, to avoid lying,
+etc., is demanded unconditionally and of everyone--as surely as we are
+rational beings we are under moral obligation, not in order to reputation
+here below and happiness above, but without all "ifs" and "in order to's."
+Thou shalt unconditionally, whatever be the outcome. And as the moral law
+is independent of every end to be attained, so it suffers neither increase
+nor diminution in its binding force, whether men obey it or not. It has
+absolute authority, no matter whether it is fulfilled frequently or seldom,
+nay, whether it is fulfilled anywhere or at any time whatsoever in the
+world!
+
+There is an important difference between the good which we are under
+obligation to do and the evil which we are under obligation not to do, and
+the goods and ills which we seek and avoid. The goods are always relatively
+good only, _good for something_--as means to ends--and a bad use can be
+made of all that nature and fortune give us as well as a good one. That
+which duty commands is an end in itself, in itself good, absolutely
+worthful, and no misuse of it is possible. It might be supposed that
+pleasure, that happiness is an ultimate end. But men have very different
+opinions in regard to what is pleasant, one holding one thing pleasurable
+and another another. It is impossible to discover by empirical methods what
+duty demands of all men alike and under all circumstances; the appeal is to
+our reason, not to our sensibility. If happiness were the end of rational
+beings, then nature had endowed us but poorly for it, since instead of an
+unfailing instinct she has given us the weak and deceitful reason as a
+guide, which, with its train, culture, science, art, and luxury, has
+brought more trouble than satisfaction to mankind. Man has a destiny other
+than well-being, and a higher one--the formation of good dispositions: here
+we have the only thing in the whole world that can never be used for evil,
+the only thing that does not borrow its value from a higher end, but itself
+originally and inalienably contains it, and that gives value to all else
+that merits esteem. "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or
+even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a
+_good will_." Understanding, courage, moderation, and whatever other mental
+gifts or praiseworthy qualities of temperament may be cited, as also the
+gifts of fortune, "are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects, but
+they may also become extremely evil and mischievous, if the will which is
+to make use of them is not good." These are the classic words with which
+Kant commences the _Foundation of the Metaphysics of Ethics_.
+
+When does the will deserve the predicate "good"? Let us listen to the
+popular moral consciousness, which distinguishes three grades of moral
+recognition. He who refrains from that which is contrary to duty, no matter
+from what motives--as, for example, the shopkeeper who does not cheat
+because he knows that honesty is the best policy--receives moderate
+praise for irreproachable outward behavior. We bestow warmer praise and
+encouragement on him whom ambition impels to industry, kind feeling to
+beneficence, and pity to render assistance. But he alone earns our esteem
+who does his duty for duty's sake. Only in this third case, where not
+merely the external action, nor merely the impulse of a happy disposition,
+but the will itself, the maxim, is in harmony with the moral law, where
+the good is done for the sake of the good, do we find true morality, that
+unconditioned, self-grounded worth. The man who does that which is in
+accordance with duty out of reflection on its advantages, and he who does
+it from immediate--always unreliable--inclination, acts _legally_; he alone
+acts _morally_ who, without listening to advantage and inclination, takes
+up the law into his disposition, and does his duty because it is duty. The
+sole moral motive is the consciousness of duty, _respect for the moral
+lazy_[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: The respect or reverence which the law, and, derivatively, the
+person in whom it is realized, compel from us, is, as self-produced through
+a concept of reason and as the only feeling which can be known _a priori_,
+specifically different from all feelings of inclination or fear awakened by
+sensuous influences. As it strengthens and raises our rational nature, the
+consciousness of our freedom and of our high destination, but, at the same
+time, humbles our sensibility, there is mingled with the joy of exaltation
+a certain pain, which permits no intimate affection for the stern and
+sublime law. It is not quite willingly that we pay our respect--just
+because of the depressing effect which this feeling exerts on our
+self-love.]
+
+Here Kant is threatened by a danger which he does not succeed in escaping.
+The moral law demands perfect purity in our maxims; only the idea of duty,
+not an inclination, is to determine the will. Quite right. Further, the one
+judging is himself never absolutely certain, even when his own volition is
+concerned, that no motives of pleasure have mingled with the feeling of
+duty in contributing to the right action, unless that which was morally
+demanded has been contrary to all his inclinations. When a person who is
+not in need and who is free from cupidity leaves the money-box intrusted
+to his care untouched, or when a man who loves life overcomes thoughts of
+suicide, I may assume that the former was sufficiently protected
+against the temptation by his moderation, and the other by his cheerful
+disposition, and I rate their behavior as merely legal. When, on the other
+hand, an official inclined to extravagance faithfully manages the funds
+intrusted to him, or one who is oppressed by hopeless misery preserves his
+life, although he does not love it, then I may ascribe the abstinence from
+wrongdoing to moral principles. This, too, may be admitted. We are
+certain of the morality of a resolution only when it can be shown that no
+inclination was involved along with the maxim. The cases where the right
+action is performed in opposition to inclination are the only ones in which
+we may be certain that the moral quality of the action is unmixed--are
+they, then, the only ones in which a moral disposition is present? Kant
+rightly maintains that the admixture of egoistic motives beclouds the
+purity of the disposition, and consequently diminishes its moral worth.
+With equal correctness he draws attention to the possibility that, even
+when we believe that we are acting from pure principles, a hidden sensuous
+impulse may be involved. But he leaves unconsidered the possibility that,
+even when the inclinations are favorable to right action, the action may be
+performed, not from inclination, but because of the consciousness of duty.
+Given that a man is naturally industrious, does this happy predisposition
+protect him from fits of idleness? And if he resists them, must it always
+be his inclination to activity and never moral principle which overcomes
+the temptation? In yielding to the danger of confounding the limits of our
+certain knowledge of the purity of motives with the limits of moral action,
+and in admitting true morality only where action proceeds from principle
+in opposition to the inclinations, Kant really deserves the reproach of
+rigorism or exaggerated purism--sometimes groundlessly extended to the
+justifiable strictness of his views--and the ridicule of the well-known
+lines of Schiller ("Scruples of Conscience" and "Decision" at the
+conclusion of his distich-group "The Philosophers"):
+
+"The friends whom I love I gladly would serve, but to this inclination
+        incites me;
+ And so I am forced from virtue to swerve since my act, through affection,
+        delights me.
+ The friends whom thou lovest thou must first seek to scorn, for to no
+        other way can I guide thee;
+ 'Tis alone with disgust thou canst rightly perform the acts to which
+        duty would lead thee."
+
+If we return from this necessary limitation of a groundless inference
+(that true morality is present only when duty is performed against our
+inclinations, when it is difficult for us, when a conflict with sensuous
+motives has preceded), to the development of the fundamental ethical
+conceptions, we find that important conclusions concerning the origin and
+content of the moral law result from the principle obtained by the analysis
+of moral judgment: this law commands with _unconditional authority_--for
+every rational being and under all circumstances--what has _unconditioned
+worth_--the disposition which corresponds to it. The universality and
+necessity (_unconditionalness_) of the categorical imperative proves that
+it springs from no other source than reason itself. Those who derive
+the moral law from the will of God subject it to a condition, viz., the
+immutability of the divine will. Those who find the source of moral
+legislation in the pursuit of happiness make rational will dependent on a
+natural law of the sensibility; it would be folly to enjoin by a moral law
+that which everyone does of himself, and does superabundantly. Moreover,
+the theories of the social inclinations and of moral sense fail of their
+purpose, since they base morality on the uncertain ground of feeling. Even
+the principle of perfection proves insufficient, inasmuch as it limits the
+individual to himself, and, in the end, like those which have preceded,
+amounts to a refined self-love. Theonomic ethics, egoistic ethics, the
+ethics of sympathy, and the ethics of perfection are all eudemonistic, and
+hence heteronomic. The practical reason[1] receives the law neither from
+the will of God nor from natural impulse, but draws it out of its own
+depths; it binds itself.
+
+[Footnote 1: Will and practical reason are identical. The definition runs:
+Will is the faculty of acting in accordance with the representation of
+laws.]
+
+The grounds which establish the derivation of the moral law from the will
+or reason itself exclude at the same time every material determination of
+it. If the categorical imperative posited definite ends for the will, if it
+prescribed a direction to definite objects, it could neither be known _a
+priori_ nor be valid for all rational beings: its apodictic character
+forbids the admission of empirical elements of every sort.[1] If we think
+away all content from the law we retain the form of universal legality,[2]
+and gain the formula: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at
+the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." The
+possibility of conceiving the principle of volition as a universal law of
+nature is the criterion of morality. If you are in doubt concerning the
+moral character of an action or motive simply ask yourself the question,
+What would become of humanity if everyone were to act according to the same
+principle? If no one could trust the word of another, or count on aid from
+others, or be sure of his property and his life, then no social life would
+be possible. Even a band of robbers cannot exist unless certain laws are
+respected as inviolable duties.
+
+[Footnote 1: The moral law, therefore, is independent of all experience in
+three respects, as to its origin, its content, and its validity. It springs
+from reason, it contains a formal precept only, and its validity is not
+concerned, whether it meets with obedience or not. It declares what ought
+to be done, even though this never should be done.]
+
+[Footnote 2: The "formal principle" of the Kantian ethics has met very
+varied criticism. Among others Edmund Pfleiderer (_Kantischer Kritizismus
+und Englische Philosophie_, 1881) and Zeller express themselves
+unfavorably, Fortlage and Liebmann (_Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit_, 2d
+ed., 1880, p. 671) favorably.]
+
+It was indispensable to free the supreme formula of the moral law from all
+material determinations, _i.e._, limitations. This does not prevent us,
+however, from afterward giving the abstract outline a more concrete
+coloring. First of all, the concept of the dignity of persons in contrast
+to the utility of things offers itself as an aid to explanation and
+specialization. Things are means whose worth is always relative, consisting
+in the useful or pleasant effects which they exercise, in the satisfaction
+of a need or of the taste, they can be replaced by other means, which
+fulfill the same purpose, and they have a (market or fancy) _value_; while
+that which is above all value and admits of no equivalent has an ultimate
+worth or _dignity_, and is an object of respect. The legislation which
+determines all worth, and with this the disposition which corresponds to
+it, has a dignity, an unconditioned, incomparable worth, and lends its
+subjects, rational beings framed for morality, the advantage of being ends
+in themselves. "Therefore morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of
+morality, is that which alone possesses dignity." Accordingly the following
+formulation of the moral law may be held equivalent to the first: "So act
+as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other,
+in every case as an end, never as a means only."
+
+A further addition to the abstract formula of the categorical imperative
+results from the discussion of the question, What universal ends admit of
+subsumption under it, _i.e._, stand the test of fitness to be principles of
+a universal legislation? Here again Kant stands forth as an arbiter between
+the contending parties, and, with a firm grasp, combines the useful
+elements from both sides after winnowing them out from the worthless
+principles. The majority of the eudemonistic systems, along with the
+promotion of private welfare, prescribe the furtherance of universal good
+without being able to indicate at what point the pursuit of personal
+welfare should give way to regard for the good of others, while in the
+perfectionist systems the social element is wanting or retreats unduly into
+the background. The principle of happiness represents moral empiricism, the
+principle of perfection moral rationalism. Kant resolves the antithesis
+by restricting the theses of the respective parties within their proper
+limits: "Make _thine own perfection_ and _the happiness of others_ the end
+of thy actions;" these are the only ends which are at the same time duties.
+The perfection of others is excluded by the fact that I cannot impart
+to anyone a good disposition, for everyone must acquire it for himself;
+personal happiness by the fact that everyone seeks it naturally.
+
+This antithesis (which is crossed by the further distinction between
+perfect, _i.e._, indispensable, and imperfect duties) serves as a basis for
+the division of moral duties into duties toward ourselves and duties toward
+other men.[1] The former enjoin the preservation and development of our
+natural and moral powers, the latter are duties of obligation (of respect)
+or of merit (of love). Since no one can obligate me to feel, we are to
+understand by love not the pathological love of complacency, but only the
+active love of benevolence or practical sympathy. Since it is just as
+impossible that the increase of the evils in the world should be a duty,
+the enervating and useless excitation of pity, which adds to the pain of
+the sufferer the sympathetic pain of the spectator, is to be struck off
+the list of virtues, and active readiness to aid put in its place. In
+friendship love and respect unite in exact equipoise. Veracity is one of
+the duties toward self; lying is an abandonment of human dignity and under
+no conditions allowable, not even if life depends on it.
+
+[Footnote 1: All duties are toward men, not toward supra-human or
+infra-human beings. That which we commonly term duties toward animals,
+likewise the so-called duties toward God, are in reality duties toward
+ourselves. Cruelty to animals is immoral, because our sympathies are
+blunted by it. To have religion is a duty to ourselves, because the view of
+moral laws as laws of God is an aid to morality.]
+
+After it has been settled what the categorical imperative enjoins, the
+further problem awaits us of explaining how it is possible. The categorical
+imperative is possible only on I the presupposition of our _freedom_. Only
+a free being gives laws to itself, just as an autonomous being alone is
+free. In theoretical philosophy the pure self-consciousness, the "I think,"
+denoted a point where the thing in itself manifests to us not its nature,
+indeed, but its existence. The same holds true in practical philosophy of
+the moral law. The incontestable fact of the moral law empowers me to rank
+myself in a higher order of things than the merely phenomenal order, and
+in another causal relation than that of the merely necessary (mechanical)
+causation of nature, to regard myself as a legislative member of an
+intelligible world, and one independent of sensuous impulses--in short, to
+regard myself as free. Freedom is the _ratio essendi_ of the self-given
+moral law, the latter the _ratio cognoscendi_ of freedom. The law would
+have no meaning if we did not possess the power to obey it: I can _because_
+I ought. It is true that freedom is a mere Idea, whose object can never be
+given to me in an experience, and whose reality, consequently, cannot
+be objectively known and proved, but nevertheless, is required with
+satisfactory subjective necessity as the condition of the moral law and of
+the possibility of its fulfillment. I may not say it is certain, but, with
+safety, I am certain that I am free. Freedom is not a dogmatic proposition
+of theoretical reason, but a _postulate_ of practical reason; and the
+latter holds the _primacy_ over the former to this extent, that it can
+require the former to show that certain transcendent Ideas of the
+suprasensible, which are most intimately connected with moral obligation,
+are compatible with the principles of the understanding. It was just in
+view of the practical interests involved in the rational concepts God,
+freedom, immortality, that it was so important to establish, at least,
+their possibility (their conceivability without contradiction). That,
+therefore, which the Dialectic recognized as possible is in the Ethics
+shown to be real: Whoever seeks to fulfill his moral destiny--and this is
+the duty of every man--must not doubt concerning the conditions of its
+possible fulfillment, must, in spite of their incomprehensibility,
+_believe_ in freedom and a suprasensible world. They are both postulates
+of practical reason, _i.e._, assumptions concerning that which is in behalf
+of that which ought to be. Naturally the interests of the understanding
+must not be infringed upon by those of the will. The principle of the
+complete causal determination of events retains its validity unimpeached
+for the sphere of the knowledge of the understanding, that is, for the
+realm of phenomena; while, on the other hand, it remains permissible for
+us to postulate another kind of causality for the realm of things in
+themselves, although we can have no idea of its _how_, and to ascribe to
+ourselves a free intelligible character.
+
+While the Idea of freedom can be derived directly from the moral law as
+a postulate thereof, the proof of the reality of the two other Ideas is
+effected indirectly by means of the concept of the "highest good," in which
+reason conceives a union of perfect virtue and perfect happiness. The
+moral law requires absolute correspondence between the disposition and the
+commands of reason, or holiness of will. But besides this supreme good
+(_bonum supremum_) of completed morality, the highest good (_bonum
+consummatum_) further contains a degree of happiness corresponding to the
+degree of virtue. Everyone agrees in the judgment that, by rights, things
+should go well with the virtuous and ill with the wicked, though this must
+not imply any deduction from the principle previously announced that the
+least impulse of self-interest causes the maxim to forfeit its worth: the
+motive of the will must never be happiness, but always the being worthy of
+happiness. The first element in the highest good yields the argument for
+_immortality_, and the second the argument for the _existence of God_. (1)
+Perfect correspondence between the will and the law never occurs in this
+life, because the sensibility never allows us to attain a permanently good
+disposition, armed against every temptation; our will can never be
+holy, but at best virtuous, and our lawful disposition never escape the
+consciousness of a constant tendency to transgression, or at least of
+impurity. Since, nevertheless, the demands of the (Christian) moral law
+continue in their unrelenting stringency to be the standard, we are
+justified in the hope of an unlimited continuation of our existence,
+in order that by constant progress in goodness we may draw nearer _in
+infinitum_ to the ideal of holiness. (2) The establishment of a rational
+proportion between happiness and virtue is also not to be expected until
+the future life, for too often on earth it is the evil man who prospers,
+while the good man suffers. A justly proportioned distribution of rewards
+and punishment can only be expected from an infinite power, wisdom, and
+goodness, which rules the moral world even as it has created the natural
+world. Deity alone is able to bring the physical and moral realms into
+harmony, and to establish the due relation between well-being and right
+action. This, the moral argument, is the only possible proof for the
+existence of God. Theology is not possible as speculative, but only as
+moral theology. The certitude of faith, moreover, is only different from,
+not less than, the certainty of knowledge, in so far as it brings with it
+not an objective, but a subjective, although universally valid, necessity.
+Hence it is better to speak of belief in God as a need of the reason than
+as a duty; while a logical error, not a moral one, should be charged
+against the atheist. The atheist is blind to the intimate connection which
+exists between the highest good and the Ideas of the reason; he does not
+see that God, freedom, and immortality are the indispensable conditions of
+the realization of this ideal.
+
+Thus faith is based upon duty without being itself duty: ethics is the
+_basis of religion_, which consists in our regarding moral laws as
+(_instar_, as if they were) divine commands. They are not valid or
+obligatory because God has given them (this would be heteronomy), but they
+should be regarded as divine because they are necessary laws of reason.
+Religion differs from ethics only in its form, not in its content, in that
+it adds to the conception of duty the idea of God as a moral lawgiver, and
+thus increases the influence of this conception on the will; it is simply
+a means for the promotion of morality. Since, however, besides natural
+religion or the pure faith of reason (the moral law and the moral
+postulates), the historical religions contain statutory determinations or a
+doctrinal faith, it becomes the duty of the critical philosopher to inquire
+how much of this positive admixture can be justified at the bar of reason.
+In this investigation the question of the divine revelation of dogma
+and ceremonial laws is neither supra-rationalistically affirmed nor
+naturalistically derived, but rationalistically treated as an open
+question.
+
+The four essays combined under the title _Religion within the Limits of
+Reason Only_ treat of the Radical Evil in Human Nature, the Conflict of the
+Good Principle with the Evil for the Mastery over Man, the Victory of the
+Good Principle over the Evil and the Founding of a Kingdom of God upon
+Earth, and, finally, Service and False Service under the Dominion of the
+Good Principle, or Religion and Priestcraft; or more briefly, the fall, the
+atonement (the Christ-idea), the Church, and true and false service of God.
+
+(1) The individual evil deeds of the empirical character point to an
+original fault of the intelligible character, a _propensity to evil_
+dwelling in man and not further deducible. This, although it is
+self-incurred, may be called natural and innate, and consists (not in the
+sensibility merely, but) in a freely chosen reversal of the moral order
+of our maxims, in virtue of which the maxim of duty or morality is
+subordinated to that of well-being or self-love instead of being
+placed above it, and that which should be the supreme condition of all
+satisfaction is degraded into a mere means thereto. Morality is therefore a
+_conversion_ from the evil to the good, and requires a complete revolution
+in the disposition, the putting on of a new man, a "new birth,"
+which, an act out of time, can manifest itself in the temporal world of
+phenomena only as a gradual transformation in conduct, as a continuous
+advance, but which, we may hope, is judged by him who knows the heart,
+who regards the disposition instead of particular imperfect actions, as a
+completed unity.
+
+(2) By the eternal Son of God, for whose sake God created all things, we
+are to understand the ideal of the perfect man, which in truth forms the
+end of creation, and is come down from heaven, etc. To believe in Christ
+means to resolve to realize in one's self the ideal of human nature which
+is well pleasing to God, or to make the divine disposition of the Son of
+God our own, not to believe that this ideal has appeared on earth as an
+actual man, in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. The only saving faith is
+the belief of reason in the ideal which Christ represents, and not the
+historical belief in his person. The vicarious atonement of the ideal
+man for those who believe on him is to be interpreted to mean that the
+sufferings and sacrifices (crucifixion of the flesh) imposed by moral
+conversion, which are due to the sinful man as punishment, are assumed by
+the regenerate man: the new Adam bears the sufferings of the old. In the
+same way as that in which Kant handles the history of Christ and the
+doctrine of justification, all biblical narratives and ecclesiastical
+doctrines are in public instruction (from the pulpit) to be interpreted
+morally, even where the authors themselves had no such meaning in mind.
+
+(3) The Church is a society based upon the laws of virtue, an ethical
+community or a people of God, whose members confirm each other in the
+performance of duty by example and by the profession of a common moral
+conviction; we are all brothers, the children of one father. Ideally there
+is only one (the universal, invisible) Church, and its foundation the pure
+faith of reason; but in consequence of a weakness peculiar to human nature
+the foundation of an actual church required the addition of a statutory
+historical faith, with claims to a divine origin, from which a multitude of
+visible churches and the antithesis of orthodox and heretics have sprung.
+The history of the Church since the establishment of Christianity
+represents the conflict between the historical faith and the faith of
+reason; its goal is the submission of the former to the latter, as, indeed,
+we have already begun to perceive that God does not require a special
+service beyond the practice of virtue.
+
+(4) The true service of God consists in a moral disposition and its
+manifestation: "All that man supposes himself able to do in order to please
+God, beyond living a good life, is _false service_" False service is the
+false subordination of the pure faith of reason to the statutory faith, by
+which the attainment of the goal of religious development is hindered
+and the laity are brought into dangerous dependence upon the clergy.
+Priestcraft, hypocrisy, and fanaticism enter in the train of fetich
+service. The church-faith is destined little by little to make itself
+superfluous. It has been necessary as a vehicle, as a means for the
+introduction and extension of the pure religion of morality, and it still
+remains useful for a time, until humanity shall become of age; with man's
+entrance on the period of youth and manhood, however, the leading-string of
+holy traditions, which in its time did good service, becomes unnecessary,
+nay, finally, a fetter. (This relative appreciation of the positive element
+in religion, in antithesis to the unthinking rejection of it by the
+Illumination, resembles the view of Lessing; cf. pp. 306-309.) Moreover,
+since it is a duty to be a co-worker in the transition from the historical
+to the pure religious faith, the clergy must be free as scientific
+theologians, as scholars and authors to examine the doctrines of faith
+and to give expression to dissenting opinions, while, as preachers in the
+pulpit, speaking under commission, they are bound to the creeds. To decide
+the articles of belief unalterable would be a crime against human
+nature, whose primal destination is just this--to progress. To renounce
+illumination means to trample upon the divine rights of reason.
+
+The "General Observations" appended to each division add to the four
+principle discussions as many collateral inquiries concerning Operations
+of Grace, Miracles, Mysteries, and Means of Grace, objects of transcendent
+ideas, which do not properly belong in the sphere of religion within pure
+reason itself, but which yet border on it. (1) We are entirely incapable of
+calling forth works of grace, nay, even of indicating the marks by which
+actual divine illuminations are distinguished from imaginary ones; the
+supposed experience of heavenly influences belongs in the region of
+superstitious religious illusion. But their impossibility is just as little
+susceptible of proof as their reality. Nothing further can be said on the
+question, save that works of grace may exist, and perhaps must exist in
+order to supplement our imperfect efforts after virtue; and that everyone,
+instead of waiting for divine assistance, should do for his own amendment
+all that is in his power. (2) Kant judges more sharply in regard to the
+belief in miracles, which contradict the laws of experience without in the
+least furthering the performance of our duties. In practical life no one
+regards miracles as possible; and their limitation to the past and to rare
+instances does not make them more credible. (3) In so far as the Christian
+mysteries actually represent impenetrable secrets they have no bearing on
+moral conduct; so far as they are morally valuable they admit of rational
+interpretation and thus cease to be mysteries. The Trinity signifies the
+three moral qualities or powers united in the head of the moral state: the
+one God as holy lawgiver, gracious governor, and just judge. (4) The
+services of the Church have worth as ethical ceremonies, as emblems of the
+moral disposition (prayer) and of moral fellowship (church attendance,
+baptism, and the Lord's Supper); but to find in these symbolic ceremonies
+means of grace and to seek to purchase the favor of God by them, is an
+error of the same kind as sorcery and fetichism. The right way leads from
+virtue to grace, not in the opposite direction; piety without morality is
+worthless.
+
+The Kantian theory of religion is rationalistic and moralistic. The fact
+that religion is based on morality should never be assailed. But the
+foundation is not the building, the origin not the content and essence
+of the thing itself. As far as the nature of religion is concerned,
+the Kantian view does not exclude completion in the direction of
+Schleiermacher's theory of feeling, just as by its speculative
+interpretation of the Christian dogmas and its appreciation of the history
+of religion as a gradual transformation of historical faith into a faith of
+reason, it points out the path afterward followed by Hegel. The philosophy
+of religion of the future must be, as some recent attempts aim to be (O.
+Pfleiderer, Biedermann, Lipsius), a synthesis of Kant, Schleiermacher, and
+Hegel.
+
+While the moral law requires rightness not only of the action, but also of
+the disposition, the law of right is satisfied when the act enjoined is
+performed, no matter from what motives. Legal right, as the sum of the
+conditions under which the will of the one can consist with the will of
+others according to a universal law, relates only to enforceable actions,
+without concerning itself about motives. Private right includes right in
+things or property, personal right or right of contract, and real-personal
+right (marriage right); public right is divided into the right of states,
+of nations, and of citizens of the world. Kant's theory of punishment is
+original and important. He bases it not upon prudential regard for the
+protection of society, or the deterrence or reformation of the criminal,
+but upon the exalted idea of retaliation (_jus talionis_), which demands
+that everyone should meet with what his deeds deserve: Eye for eye, life
+for life. In _politics_ Kant favors democratic theories, though less
+decidedly than Rousseau and Fichte. As he followed with interest the
+efforts after freedom manifested in the American and French Revolutions, so
+he opposed an hereditary nobility as a hindrance to the natural equality of
+rights, and demanded freedom for the public expression of opinion as the
+surest means of guarding against revolutions. The only legitimate form of
+the state is the republican, _i.e._, that in which the executive power is
+separated from the legislative power, in contrast to despotism, where they
+are united in one hand. The best guaranty for just government and civil
+liberty is offered by constitutional monarchy, in which the people through
+its representatives exercises the legislative power, the sovereign the
+executive power, and judges chosen by the people the judicial power. The
+contract from which we may conceive the state to have arisen is not to be
+regarded as an historical fact, but as a rational idea or rule, by which
+we may judge whether the laws are just or not: that which the people as a
+whole cannot prescribe for itself, this cannot be prescribed for it by
+the ruler (cf. p. 235). That there is a constant progress--not only of
+individuals, but--of the race, not merely in technical and intellectual,
+but also in moral respects, is supported both by rational grounds (without
+faith in such progress we could not fulfill our duty as co-laborers in it)
+and by experiential grounds (above all, the unselfish sympathy which all
+the world gave to the French Revolution); and the never-ending complaint
+that the times are growing worse proves only that mankind is continually
+setting up stricter standards for itself. The beginning of _history_ is to
+be placed at the point where man passes out of the condition of innocence,
+in which instinct rules, and begins to subdue nature, which hitherto he has
+obeyed. The goal of history, again, is the establishment of the perfect
+form of the state. Nature itself co-operates with freedom in the gradual
+transformation of the state based on necessity _(Notstaat)_ into a rational
+state, inasmuch as selfish competition and the commercial spirit require
+peace, order, and justice for their own security and help to bring them
+about. And so, further, we need not doubt that humanity will constantly
+draw nearer to the ideal condition of everlasting peace among the nations
+(guaranteed by a league of states which shall as a mediator settle disputes
+between individual states), however impracticable the idea may at present
+appear.
+
+If the bold declaration of Fortlage, that in Kant the system of absolute
+truth appeared, is true of any one part of his philosophy, it is true of
+the practical part, in which Christian morality has found its scientific
+expression. If we may justly complain that on the basis of his sharp
+distinction between legality and morality, between legal duty and
+virtue-duty, Kant took into account only the legal side of the institutions
+of marriage and of the state, overlooking the fact that besides these they
+have a moral importance and purpose, if we may demand a social ethic as a
+supplement to his ethics, which is directed to the duties of the individual
+alone, yet these and other well-founded desiderata may be attained by
+slight corrections and by the addition of another story to the Kantian
+edifice, while the foundations are still retained. The bases are immovable.
+Autonomy, absolute oughtness, the formal character of the law of reason,
+and the incomparable worth of the pure, disinterested disposition--these
+are the corner stones of the Kantian, nay, of all morals.
+
+
+%3. Theory of the Beautiful and of Ends in Nature.%
+
+We now know the laws which the understanding imposes upon nature and those
+which reason imposes upon the will. If there is a field in which to be
+(_Sein_) and ought to be (_Sollen_), nature and freedom, which we have thus
+far been forced to consider antithetical, are reconciled--and that there
+is such a field is already deducible from the doctrine of the religious
+postulates (as practical truths or assumptions concerning what is, in
+behalf of what ought to be), and from the hints concerning a progress in
+history (in which both powers co-operate toward a common goal)--then the
+source of its laws is evidently to be sought in that faculty which mediates
+alike between understanding and reason and between knowing and feeling:
+in _Judgment_, as the higher faculty of feeling. Judgment, in the general
+sense, is the faculty of thinking a particular as contained in a universal,
+and exercises a twofold function: as "determinant" judgment it subsumes the
+particular under a given universal (a law), as "reflective" it seeks the
+universal for a given particular. Since the former coincides with the
+understanding, we are here concerned only with the reflective judgment,
+judgment in the narrower sense, which does not cognize objects, but judges
+them, and this according to the principle of purposiveness.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: The universal laws springing from the understanding, to
+which every nature must conform to become an object of experience for us,
+determine nothing concerning the particular form of the given reality;
+we cannot deduce the special laws of nature from them. Nevertheless the
+nature of our cognitive faculty does not allow us to accept the empirical
+manifoldness of our world as contingent, but impels us to regard it as
+purposive or adapted to our knowledge, and to look upon these special
+laws as if an intelligence had given them in order to make a system of
+experience possible.]
+
+This, in turn, is of two kinds. An object is really or _objectively_
+purposive (perfect) when it corresponds to its nature or its determination,
+formally or _subjectively_ purposive (beautiful) when it is conformed to
+the nature of our cognitive faculty. The perception of purpose is always
+accompanied by a feeling of pleasure; in the first case, where the pleasure
+is based on a concept of the object, it is a logical satisfaction, in the
+second, where it springs only from the harmony of the object with our
+cognitive powers, aesthetic satisfaction. The objects of the teleological
+and the aesthetic judgment, the purposive and the beautiful products of
+nature and art, constitute the desired intermediate field between nature
+and freedom; and here again the critical question comes up, How, in
+relation to these, synthetic judgments _a priori_ are possible?
+
+%(a) Esthetic Judgment.%--The formula holds of Kant's aesthetics as well as
+of his theoretical and practical philosophy, that his aim is to overcome
+the opposition between the empirical and the rationalistic theories, and to
+find a middle course of his own between the two extremes. Neither Burke
+nor Baumgarten satisfied him. The English aesthetics was sensational, the
+German, _i.e._, that of the Wolffian school, rationalistic. The former
+identified the beautiful with the agreeable, the latter identified it with
+the perfect or with the conformity of the object to its concept; in the one
+case, aesthetic appreciation is treated as sensuous pleasure, in the other,
+it is treated as a lower, confused kind of knowledge, its peculiar nature
+being in both cases overlooked. In opposition to the sensualization of
+aesthetic appreciation, its character as judgment must be maintained;
+and in opposition to its rationalization, its character as feeling. This
+relation of the Kantian aesthetics to that of his predecessors explains
+both its fundamental tendency and the elements in it which appear defective
+and erroneous. In any case, Kant shows himself in this field also an
+unapproachable master of careful analysis.
+
+The first task of aesthetics is the careful distinction of its object from
+related phenomena. The beautiful has points of contact with the agreeable,
+the good, the perfect, the useful, and the true. It is distinguished
+from the true by the fact that it is not an object of knowledge, but
+of satisfaction. If we inquire further into the difference between the
+satisfaction in the beautiful and the satisfaction in the agreeable, in the
+good (in itself), and in the (good for something, as a means, or in the)
+useful, which latter three have this in common, that they are objects of
+appetition--of sensuous want, of moral will, of prudential desire--it
+becomes evident that the beautiful pleases through its mere representation
+(that is, independently of the real existence of the object), and that
+the delight in the beautiful is a contemplative pleasure. It is for
+contemplation only, not to be sensuously enjoyed nor put to practical use;
+and, further, its production is not a universal duty. Sensuous, prudential,
+or moral appetition has always an "interest" in the actual existence of
+the object; the beautiful, on the other hand, calls forth a disinterested
+satisfaction.
+
+According to quality the beautiful is the object of a disinterested, free
+(bound by no interest), and sportive satisfaction. According to quantity
+and modality the judgment of taste claims universal and necessary validity,
+without this being based upon concepts. This posits further differences
+between the beautiful and the agreeable and the good. The good also pleases
+universally, but it pleases through concepts; the agreeable as well as the
+beautiful pleases without a concept, but it does not please universally.
+
+That which pleases the reason through the concept is good; that which
+pleases the senses in sensation is agreeable. That which pleases
+_universally and necessarily without a concept_ is beautiful. Moral
+judgment demands the assent of all, and its universal validity is
+demonstrable. The judgment concerning the agreeable is not capable of
+demonstration, but neither does it pretend to possess universal validity;
+we readily acknowledge that what is pleasant to one need not be so to every
+other man. In regard to the beautiful, on the contrary, we do not content
+ourselves with saying that tastes differ, but we expect it to please all.
+We expect everyone to assent to our judgment of taste, although it is able
+to support itself by no proofs.
+
+Here there is a difficulty: since the judgment of taste does not express
+a characteristic of the object, but a state of mind in the observer, a
+feeling, a satisfaction, it is purely subjective; and yet it puts forth a
+claim to be universally communicable. The difficulty can be removed only on
+the assumption of a common aesthetic sense, of a corresponding organization
+of the powers of representation in all men, which yields the common
+standard for the pleasurableness of the impression. The agreeable appeals
+to that in man which is different in different individuals, the beautiful
+to that which functions alike in all; the former addresses itself to
+the passive sensibility, the latter to the active judgment. The
+agreeable--because of the non-calculable differences in our sensuous
+inclinations, which are in part conditioned by bodily states--possesses no
+universality whatever, the good possesses an objective, and the beautiful
+a subjective universality. The judgment concerning the agreeable has an
+empirical, that concerning the beautiful an _a priori_, determining ground:
+in the former case, the judgment follows the feeling, in the latter, it
+precedes it.
+
+An object is considered beautiful (for, strictly speaking, we may say only
+this, not that it is beautiful) when its form puts the powers of the human
+mind in a state of harmony, brings the intuitive and rational faculties
+into concordant activity, and produces an agreeable proportion between the
+imagination and the understanding. In giving the occasion for an harmonious
+play of the cognitive activities (that is, for an easy combination of the
+manifold into unity) the beautiful object is purposive for us, for our
+function of apprehension; it is--here we obtain a determination of the
+judgment of taste from the standpoint of relation--_purposive without a
+definite purpose_. We know perfectly well that a landscape which attracts
+us has not been specially arranged for the purpose of delighting us, and we
+do not wish to find in a work of art anything of an intention to please.
+An object is perfect when it is purposive for itself (corresponds to its
+concept); useful when it is purposive for our desire (corresponds to a
+practical intention of man); beautiful when the arrangement of its parts
+is purposive for the relation between the fancy and understanding of
+the beholder (corresponds in an unusual degree to the conditions of our
+apprehension). Perfection is internal (real, objective) purposiveness, and
+utility is external purposiveness, both for a definite purpose; beauty,
+on the other hand, is purposiveness without a purpose, formal, subjective
+purposiveness. The beautiful pleases by its mere form. The satisfaction in
+the perfect is of a conceptual or intellectual kind, the satisfaction in
+the beautiful, emotional or aesthetic in character.
+
+The combination of these four determinations yields an exhaustive
+definition of the beautiful: The beautiful is that which universally and
+necessarily arouses disinterested satisfaction by its mere form
+(purposiveness without the representation of a purpose).
+
+Since the pleasurableness of the beautiful rests on the fact that
+it establishes a pleasing harmony between the imagination and the
+understanding, hence between sensuous and intellectual apprehension, the
+aesthetic attitude is possible only in sensuous-rational beings. The
+agreeable exists for the animal as well, and the good is an object of
+approval for pure spirits; but the beautiful exists for humanity alone.
+Kant succeeded in giving very delicate and felicitous verbal expression
+to these distinctions: the agreeable gratifies _(vergnügt)_ and excites
+inclination _(Neigung)_; the good is approved _(gebilligt)_ and arouses
+respect _(Achtung)_; the beautiful "pleases" _(gefällt)_ and finds "favor"
+_(Gunst)_.
+
+
+In the progress of the investigation the principle that beauty depends on
+the form alone, and that the concept, the purpose, the nature of the
+object is not taken into account at all in aesthetic judgment, experiences
+limitation. In its full strictness this applies only to a definite and, in
+fact, a subordinate division of the beautiful, which Kant marks off under
+the name of pure or _free_ beauty. With this he contrasts _adherent_
+beauty, as that which presupposes a generic concept to which its form must
+correspond and which it must adequately present. Too much a purist not
+to mark the coming in of an intellectual pleasure as a beclouding of the
+"purity" of the aesthetic satisfaction, he is still just enough to admit
+the higher worth of adherent beauty. For almost the whole of artificial
+beauty and a considerable part of natural beauty belong to this latter
+division, which we to-day term ideal and characteristic beauty. Examples of
+free or purely formal beauty are tapestry patterns, arabesques, fountains,
+flowers, and landscapes, the pleasurableness of which rests simply on the
+proportion of their form and relations, and not upon their conformity to a
+presupposed significance and determination of the thing. A building, on the
+contrary--a dwelling, a summer-house, a temple--is considered beautiful
+only when we perceive in it not merely harmonious relations of the parts
+one to another, but also an agreement between the form and the purpose or
+generic concept: a church must not look like a chalet. Here the external
+form is compared with an inner nature, and harmony is required between form
+and content. Adherent beauty is significant and expressive beauty, which,
+although the satisfaction in it is not "purely" aesthetic, nevertheless
+stands higher than pure beauty, because it gives to the understanding also
+something to think, and hence busies the whole spirit.
+
+The analytical investigations concerning the nature of the beautiful
+receive a valuable supplement in the classical definition of genius. Kant
+gives two definitions of productive talent, one formal and one genetic.
+
+Natural beauty is a beautiful thing; artificial beauty, a beautiful
+representation of a thing. The gift of agreeably presenting a thing which
+in itself, perhaps, is ugly, is called taste. To judge of the beautiful
+it is sufficient to possess taste, but for its production there is still
+another talent needed, spirit or genius. For an art product can fulfill
+the demands of taste and yet not aesthetically satisfy; while formally
+faultless, it may be spiritless.
+
+While beautiful nature looks as though it were art (as though it were
+calculated for our enjoyment), beautiful art should resemble nature, must
+not appear to be intentional though, no doubt, it is so, must show a
+careful but not an overnice adherence to rules (_i.e._, not one which
+fetters the powers of the artist). This is the case when the artist bears
+the rule in himself, that is, when he is gifted. Genius is the
+innate disposition (through) which (nature) gives rules to art; its
+characteristics are originality, exemplariness, and unreflectiveness. It
+does not produce according to definite rules which can be learned, but
+it is a law in itself, it is original. It creates instinctively without
+consciousness of the rule, and cannot describe how it produces its results.
+It creates typical works which impel others to follow, not to imitate. It
+is only in art that there are geniuses, _i.e._, spirits who produce that
+which absolutely cannot be learned, while the great men of science differ
+only in degree, not in kind, from their imitators and pupils, and that
+which they discover can be learned by rule.
+
+This establishes the criteria by which genius may be recognized. If we ask
+by what psychological factors it is produced the answer is as follows:
+Genius presupposes a certain favorable relation between imagination and
+reason. Genius is the faculty of aesthetic Ideas, but an aesthetic Idea is
+a representation of the imagination which animates the mind, which adds to
+a concept of the understanding much of ineffable thought, much that belongs
+to the concept but which cannot be comprehended in a definite concept. With
+the aid of this idea Kant solves the antinomy of the aesthetic judgment.
+The thesis is: The judgment of taste is not based upon concepts; for
+otherwise it would admit of controversy (would be determinable by proofs).
+The antithesis is: It is based upon concepts; for otherwise we could not
+contend about it (endeavor to obtain assent). The two principles are
+reconcilable, for "concept" is understood differently in the two cases.
+That which the thesis rightly seeks to exclude from the judgment of beauty
+is the determinate concept of the understanding; that which the antithesis
+with equal justice pronounces indispensable is the indeterminate concept,
+the aesthetic Idea.
+
+The freest play is afforded the imagination by poetry, the highest of
+all arts, which, with rhetoric ("insidious," on account of its earnest
+intention to deceive), forms the group termed arts of speech. To the class
+of formative arts belong architecture, sculpture, and painting as the art
+of design. A third group, the art of the beautiful play of sensations,
+includes painting as the art of color, and music, which as a "fine" art is
+placed immediately after poetry, as an "agreeable" art at the very foot of
+the list, and as the play of tone in the vicinity of the entertaining play
+of fortune [games of chance] and the witty play of thought. The explanation
+of the comic (the ludicrous is based, according to Kant, on a sudden
+transformation of strained expectation into nothing) lays great (indeed
+exaggerated) weight on the resulting physiological phenomena, the
+bodily shock which heightens vital feeling and favors health, and which
+accompanies the alternating tension and relaxation of the mind.
+
+Besides free and adherent beauty, there is still a third kind of aesthetic
+effect, the Sublime. The beautiful pleases by its bounded form. But also
+the boundless and formless can exert aesthetic effect: that which is great
+beyond all comparison we judge sublime. Now this magnitude is either
+extensive in space and time or intensive greatness of force or power;
+accordingly there are two forms of the sublime. That phenomenon which mocks
+the power of comprehension possessed by the human imagination or surpasses
+every measure of our intuition, as the ocean and the starry heavens, is
+mathematically sublime. That which overcomes all conceivable resistance,
+as the terrible forces of nature, conflagrations, floods, earthquakes,
+hurricanes, thunderstorms, is dynamically sublime or mighty. The former
+is relative to the cognitive, the latter to the appetitive faculty. The
+beautiful brings the imagination and the understanding into accord; by
+the sublime the fancy is brought into a certain favorable relation, not
+directly to be termed harmony, with reason. In the one case there arose a
+restful, positively pleasurable mood; here a shock is produced, an indirect
+and negative pleasure proceeding from pain. Since the sublime exceeds the
+functional capability of our sensuous representations and does violence to
+the imagination, we first feel small at the sight of the absolutely great,
+and incapable of compassing it with our sensuous glance. The sensibility is
+not equal to the impression; this at first seems contrary to purpose and
+violent. This humiliating impression, however, is quickly followed by a
+reaction, and the vital forces, which were at first checked, are stimulated
+to the more lively activity. Moreover, it is the sensuous part of man
+which is humbled and the spiritual part that is exalted: the overthrow of
+sensibility becomes a triumph for reason. The sight of the sublime, that
+is, awakens the _Idea of the unconditioned, of the infinite_. This Idea can
+never be adequately presented by an intuition, but can be aroused only
+by the inadequacy of all that is sensuous to present it; the infinite is
+presented through the impossibility of presenting it. We cannot intuit the
+infinite, but we can think it. In comparison with reason (as the faculty of
+Ideas, the faculty of thinking the infinite) even the greatest thing that
+can be given in the sense-world appears small; reason is the absolutely
+great. "That is sublime the mere ability to think which proves a faculty
+of the mind surpassing every standard of sense." "That is sublime which
+pleases immediately through its opposition to the interest of the senses."
+The conflict between phantasy and reason, the insufficiency of the former
+for the attainment of the rational Idea, makes us conscious of the
+superiority of reason. Just because we feel small as sensuous beings we
+feel great as rational beings. The pleasure (related to the moral feeling
+of respect and, like this, mingled with a certain pain) which accompanies
+this consciousness of inner greatness is explained by the fact that the
+imagination, in acknowledging reason superior, places itself in the
+appropriate and purposive relation of subordination. It is evident from the
+foregoing that the truly sublime is reason, the moral nature of man, his
+predisposition and destination, which point beyond the present world.
+Schiller declares that "in space the sublime does not dwell," and
+Kant says, "Sublimity is contained in none of the things of nature, but
+only in our mind, in so far as we are conscious of being superior to nature
+within us and without us." Nevertheless, since in this contemplation we fix
+our thoughts entirely on the object without reflecting on ourselves, we
+transfer the admiration of right due to the reason and its Idea of the
+infinite by subreption to the object by which the Idea is occasioned, and
+call the object itself sublime, instead of the mood which it wakes in us.
+
+If the sublime marks the point where the aesthetic touches on the boundary
+of the moral, the beautiful is also not without some relation to the good.
+By showing the agreement of sensibility and reason, which is demanded by
+the moral law, realized in aesthetic intuition (as a voluntary yielding of
+the imagination to the legitimacy of the understanding), it gives us the
+inspiring consciousness that the antithesis is reconcilable, that the
+rational can be presented in the sensuous, and so becomes a "symbol of the
+good."
+
+%(b) Teleological Judgment.%--Teleological judgment is not knowledge, but
+a way of looking at things which comes into play where the causal or
+mechanical explanation fails us. This is not the case if the purposiveness
+is external, relative to its utility for something else. The fact that the
+sand of the sea-shore furnishes a good soil for the pine neither furthers
+nor prevents a causal knowledge of it. Only inner purposiveness, as it
+is manifested in the products of organic nature, brings the mechanical
+explanation to a halt. Organisms are distinguished above inorganic forms by
+the fact that of themselves they are at once cause and effect, that they
+are self-productive and this both as a species (the oak springs from the
+acorn, and in its turn bears acorns) and as individuals (self-preservation,
+growth, and the replacement of dying parts by new ones), and also by the
+fact that the reciprocally productive parts are in their form and their
+existence all conditioned by the whole. This latter fact, that the whole is
+the determining ground for the parts, is perfectly obvious in the products
+of human art. For here it is the representation of the whole (the idea of
+the work desired) which as the ground precedes the existence and the form
+of the parts (of the machine). But where is the subject to construct
+organisms according to its representations of ends? We may neither conceive
+nature itself as endowed with forces acting in view of ends, nor a
+praetermundane intelligence interfering in the course of nature. Either of
+these suppositions would be the death of natural philosophy: the hylozoist
+endows matter with a property which conflicts with its nature, and the
+theist oversteps the boundary of possible experience. Above all, the
+analogy of the products of organic nature with the products of human
+technique is destroyed by the fact that machines do not reproduce
+themselves and their parts cannot produce one another, while the organism
+organizes itself.
+
+For our discursive understanding an interaction between the whole and the
+parts is completely incomprehensible. We understand when the parts precede
+the whole (mechanically) or the representation of the whole precedes
+the parts (teleologically); but to think the whole itself (not the Idea
+thereof) as the ground of the parts, which is demanded by organic life,
+is impossible for us. It would have been otherwise if an intuitive
+understanding had been bestowed upon us. For a being possessing
+intellectual intuition the antithesis between possibility and actuality,
+between necessity and contingency, between mechanism and teleology, would
+disappear along with that between thought and intuition. For such a being
+everything possible (all that it thinks) would be at the same time
+actual (present for intuition), and all that appears to us
+contingent--intentionally selected from several possibilities and in order
+to an end--would be necessary as well; with the whole would be given
+the parts corresponding thereto, and consequently natural mechanism
+and purposive connection would be identical, while for us, to whom the
+intuitive understanding is denied, the two divide. Hence the teleological
+view is a mere form of human representation, a subjective principle. We may
+not say that a mechanical origin of living beings is impossible, but only
+that we are unable to understand it. If we knew how a blade of grass or
+a frog sprang from mechanical forces, we would also be in a position to
+produce them.
+
+The antinomy of the teleological judgment--thesis: all production of
+material things and their forms must be judged to be possible according to
+merely mechanical laws; antithesis: some products of material nature cannot
+be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws, but to judge
+them requires the causality of final causes--is insoluble so long as both
+propositions are taken for constitutive principles; but it is soluble when
+they are taken as regulative principles or standpoints for judgment. For it
+is in no wise contradictory, on the one hand, to continue the search for
+mechanical causes as far as this is in any way possible, and, on the other,
+clearly to recognize that, at last, this will still leave a remainder which
+we cannot make intelligible without calling to our aid the concept of ends.
+Assuming that it were possible to carry the explanation of life from life,
+from ancestral organisms (for the _generatio aequivoca_ is an absurd
+theory) so far that the whole organic world should represent one great
+family descended from one primitive form as the common mother, even
+then the concept of final causes would only be pushed further back, not
+eliminated: the origin of the first organization will always resist
+mechanical explanation. Besides this mission of putting limits to causal
+derivation and of filling the gap in knowledge by a necessary, although
+subjective, way of looking at things, the Idea of ends has still another,
+the direct promotion of knowledge from efficient causes through the
+discovery of new causal problems. Thus, for example, physiology owes the
+impulse to the discovery of previously unnoticed mechanical connections
+(cf. also p. 382 note) to the question concerning the purpose of organs.
+As doctrines mechanism and teleology are irreconcilable and impossible;
+as rules or maxims of inquiry they are compatible, and the one as
+indispensable as the other.
+
+After the problem of life, which is insoluble by means of the mechanical
+explanation, has necessitated the application of the concept of ends, the
+teleological principle must, at least by way of experiment, be extended to
+the whole of nature. This consideration culminates in the position that
+man, as the subject of morality, must be held to be the final aim of the
+world, for it is only in regard to a moral being that no further inquiry
+can be raised as to the purpose of its existence. It also repeats the
+moral argument for the existence of a supreme reason, thus supplementing
+physico-theology, which is inadequate to the demonstration of one
+absolutely perfect Deity; so that the third _Critique_, like the two
+preceding, concludes with the Idea of God as an object of practical faith.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+There are three original and pregnant pairs of thoughts which cause Kant's
+name to shine in the philosophical sky as a star of the first magnitude:
+the demand for a critique of knowledge and the proof of _a priori_ forms
+of knowledge; the moral autonomy and the categorical imperative; the
+regulative validity of the Ideas of reason and the practical knowledge of
+the transcendent world. No philosophical theory, no scientific hypothesis
+can henceforth avoid the duty of examining the value and legitimacy of its
+conclusions, as to whether they keep within the limits of the competency of
+human reason; whether Kant's determination of the origin and the limits of
+knowledge may count on continued favor or not, the fundamental critical
+idea, that reflection upon the nature and range of our cognitive faculty is
+indispensable, retains its validity for all cases and makes an end of all
+philosophizing at random.[1] No ethical system will with impunity pass by
+the autonomous legislation of reason and the unconditional imperative (the
+admonition of conscience translated into conceptual language): the nature
+and worth of moral will will be everywhere sought in vain if they are not
+recognized where Kant has found them--in the unselfish disposition, in that
+maxim which is fitted to become a general law for all rational beings.
+The doctrine of the Ideas, finally, reveals to us, beyond the daylight of
+phenomenal knowledge, the starlit landscape of another mode of looking at
+things,[2] in which satisfaction is afforded for the hitherto unmet wishes
+of the heart and demands of the reason.
+
+[Footnote 1: "_Reason_ consists just in this, that we are able to give
+account of all our concepts, opinions, and assertions, either on objective
+or subjective grounds."]
+
+[Footnote 2: Those who regard all future metaphysics as refuted by the
+Critique of Reason are to be referred to the positive side of the Kantian
+doctrine of Ideas. Kant admits that the mechanical explanation does not
+satisfy reason, and that, besides it, a judgment according to Ideas is
+legitimate. When, therefore, the speculation of the constructive school
+gives an ideal interpretation of the world, it may be regarded as an
+extended application of "regulative principles," which exceeds its
+authority only when it professes to be "objective knowledge."]
+
+The effect of the three _Critiques_ upon the public was very varied. The
+first great work excited alarm by the sharpness of its negations and its
+destruction of dogmatic metaphysics, which to its earliest readers appeared
+to be the core of the matter; Kant was for them the universal destroyer.
+Then the Science of Knowledge brought into prominence the positive,
+boldly conquering side, the investigation of the conditions of empirical
+knowledge. In later times the endeavor has been made to do justice to both
+sides, but, in opposition to the overbold procedure of the constructive
+thinkers, who had fallen into a revived dogmatism, more in the spirit of
+caution and resignation. The second great work aroused glowing enthusiasm:
+"Kant is no mundane luminary," writes Jean Paul in regard to the _Critique
+of Practical Reason_, "but a whole solar system shining at once."
+The third, because of its subject and by its purpose of synthetic
+reconciliation between fields heretofore sharply separated, gained the
+sympathy of our poet-heroes Schiller and Goethe, and awakened in a young,
+speculative spirit Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature. Schelling reclaimed
+the intuitive understanding, which Kant had problematically attributed to
+the primal spirit, as the property of the philosopher, after Fichte had
+drawn attention to the fact that the consciousness of the categorical
+imperative, which Kant had not thoroughly investigated, could be nothing
+else than intellectual intuition, because in it knowing and doing coincide.
+Fichte, however, does not derive the material for his system from the
+_Critique of Judgment_, though he also had a high appreciation of it, but
+from the two earlier _Critiques_, the fundamental conceptions of which
+he--following the hint that practical and theoretical reason are only
+different applications of one and the same reason--brings into the closest
+connection. He unites the central idea of the practical philosophy, the
+freedom and autonomous legislation of the will, with the leading principle
+of the theoretical philosophy, the spontaneity of the understanding, under
+the original synthesis of the pure ego, in order to deduce from the
+activity of the ego not only the _a priori_ forms of knowledge, but also,
+rejecting the thing in itself, the whole content of empirical
+consciousness. The thought which intervenes between the Kantian Critique
+of Reason and the development of thoroughgoing idealism by Fichte, with
+its criticisms of and additions to the former and its preparation for the
+latter, may be glanced at in a few supplementary pages.
+
+
+%4. From Kant to Fichte.%
+
+To begin with the works which aided in the extension and recognition of the
+Kantian philosophy, besides Kant's _Prolegomena_, the following stand
+in the front rank: _Exposition of the Critique of Pure Reason_, by the
+Königsberg court preacher, Johannes Schulz, 1784; the flowing _Letters
+concerning the Kantian Philosophy_, by K.L. Reinhold in Wieland's
+_Deutscher Merkur_, 1786-87; and the _Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung_, in
+Jena, founded in 1785, and edited by the philologist Schütz and the jurist
+Hufeland, which offered itself as the organ of the new doctrine. Jena
+became the home and principal stronghold of Kantianism; while by the
+beginning of the nineteenth century almost all German chairs belonged to
+it, and the non-philosophical sciences as well received from it stimulation
+and guiding ideas.
+
+In the camp of the enemy there was no less of activity. The Wolffian,
+Eberhard of Halle, founded a special journal for the purpose of opposing
+the Kantian philosophy: the _Philosophisches Magazin_, 1789, continued from
+1792 as the _Philosophisches Archiv_. The Illumination collected its forces
+in the _Philosophische Bibliothek_, edited by Feder and Meiners. Nicolai
+waved the banner of common sense in the _Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek_,
+and in satirical romances, and was handled as he deserved by the heroes
+of poetry and philosophy (cf. the _Xenien_ of Goethe and Schiller, Kant's
+_Letter on Bookmaking_, and Fichte's cutting disposal of him, _Nicolai's
+Life and Peculiar Opinions_). The attacks of the faith-philosophers have
+been already noticed (pp. 310-314).
+
+The advance from Kant to Fichte was preparing alike among friends and
+enemies, and this in two points. The demand was in part for a formal
+complement (a first principle from which the Kantian results could be
+deduced, and by which the dualism of sense and understanding could be
+overcome), in part for material correction (the removal of the thing in
+itself) and development (to radical idealism). Karl Leonhard Reinhold (born
+at Vienna in 1758; fled from a college of the St. Barnabite order, 1783;
+in 1787-94 professor in Jena, and then as the successor of Tetens in Kiel,
+where he died in 1823) undertook the former task in his _Attempt at a New
+Theory of the Human Faculty of Representation_, 1789. Kant's classical
+theory of the faculty of cognition requires for its foundation a theory of
+the faculty of representation, or an elementary philosophy, which shall
+take for its object the deduction of the several functions of reason
+(intuition, concept, Idea) from the original activity of representation.
+The Kantian philosophy lacks a first principle, which, as first, cannot be
+demonstrable, but only a fact immediately evident and admitted by everyone.
+The primal fact, which we seek, is consciousness. No one can dispute that
+every representation contains three things: the subject, the object, and,
+between the two, the activity of representation. Accordingly the principle
+of consciousness runs: "The representation is distinguished in
+consciousness from the represented [object] and the representing [subject],
+and is referred to both." From this first principle Reinhold endeavors to
+deduce the well-known principles of the material manifold given by the
+action of objects, and the forms of representation spontaneously produced
+by the subject, which combine this manifold into unity. When, a few years
+later, Fichte's Science of Knowledge brilliantly succeeded in bridging the
+gap between sense and understanding by means of a first principle, thus
+accomplishing what Reinhold had attempted, the latter became one of his
+adherents, only to attach himself subsequently to Jacobi, and then to
+Bardili (_Outlines of Logic_, 1800), and to end with a verbal philosophy
+lacking both in influence and permanence.
+
+In Reinhold's elementary philosophy the thing in itself was changed from a
+problematical, negative, merely limiting concept into a positive element of
+doctrine. Objections were raised against Kantianism, as thus dogmatically
+modified in the direction of realism, by Schulze, Maimon, and Beck--by
+the first for purposes of attack, by the second in order to further
+development, and by the third with an exegetical purpose. Gottlob Ernst
+Schulze, professor in Helmstädt, and from 1810 in Göttingen, in his
+_Aenesidemus_ (1792, published anonymously), which was followed later by
+psychological works, defended the skeptical position in opposition to
+the Critique of Reason. Hume's skepticism remains unrefuted by Kant
+and Reinhold. The thing in itself, which is to produce the material of
+representation by affecting the senses, is a self-contradictory idea. The
+application of the category of cause to things in themselves violates
+the doctrine that the latter are unknowable and that the use of the pure
+concepts of the understanding beyond the sphere of experience is
+inadmissible. The transcendental philosophy has never proved that the
+ground of the material of representation cannot, just as the form thereof,
+reside in the subject itself.
+
+Side by side with the anti-critical skepticism of Aenesidemus-Schulze,
+Salomon Maimon (died 1800; cf. Witte, 1876), who was highly esteemed by the
+greatest philosophers of his time, represents critical skepticism. With
+Reinhold he holds consciousness (as the combination of a manifold into
+objective unity) to be the common root of sensibility and understanding,
+and with Schulze, the concept of the thing in itself to be an imaginary or
+irrational quantity, a thought that cannot be carried out; it is not only
+unknowable, but unthinkable. That alone is knowable which we ourselves
+produce, hence only the form of representation. The matter of
+representation is "given," but this does not mean that it arises from the
+action of the thing in itself, but only that we do not know its origin.
+Understanding and sense, or spontaneity and receptivity, do not differ
+generically, but only in degree, viz., as complete and incomplete
+consciousness. Sensation is an incomplete consciousness, because we do not
+know how its object arises.
+
+By the removal of the thing in itself Aenesidemus-Schulze sought to refute
+the Kantian theory and Maimon to improve it. Sigismund Beck (1761-1840), in
+his _Only Possible Standpoint from which the Critical Philosophy must be
+Judged_, 1796,[1] seeks by it to elucidate the Kantian theory, holding up
+idealism as its true meaning. In opposition to the usual opinion that a
+representation is true when it agrees with its object, he points to the
+impossibility of comparing the one with the other. Of objects out of
+consciousness we can know nothing; after the removal of all that is
+subjective there is nothing positive left of the representation. Everything
+in it is produced by us; the matter arises together with the form through
+the "original synthesis."
+
+[Footnote 1: This book forms the third volume of his _Expository Abridgment
+of the Critical Writings of Professor Kant_; in the same year appeared the
+_Outlines of the Critical Philosophy_. Cf. on Beck, Dilthey in the _Archiv
+für Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. ii., 1889, pp. 592-650.]
+
+The last mentioned attempts to develop the Kantian philosophy were so far
+surpassed by Fichte's great achievement that they have received from their
+own age and from posterity a less grateful appreciation and remembrance
+than was essentially their due. A phenomenon of a different sort, which is
+also to be placed at the threshold between Kant and Fichte, but which forms
+rather a supplement to the noëtics and ethics of the latter than a link in
+the transition to them, has, on the contrary, gained an honorable position
+in the memory of the German people, viz., Schiller's aesthetics.[1] In
+its center stand the Kantian antithesis of sensibility and reason and
+the reconciliation of the two sides of human nature brought about by its
+occupation with the beautiful. Artistic activity or the play-impulse
+mediates between the lower, sensuous matter-impulse and the higher,
+rational form-impulse, and unites the, two in harmonious co-operation.
+Where appetite seeks after satisfaction, and where the strict idea of duty
+rules, there only half the man is occupied; neither lust nor moral worth is
+beautiful. In order that beauty and grace may arise, the matter-impulse
+and the form-impulse, or sensibility and reason, must manifest themselves
+uniformly and in harmony. Only when he "plays" is man wholly and entirely
+man; only through art is the development of humanity possible. The
+discernment of the fact that the beautiful brings into equilibrium the two
+fundamental impulses, one or the other of which preponderates in sensuous
+desire and in moral volition, does not of itself decide the relative rank
+of artistic and moral activity. The recognition of this mediating position
+of art may be connected with the view that it forms a transitional stage
+toward and a means of education for morality, as well as with the other,
+that in it human nature attains its completion. Evidence of both views can
+be found in Schiller's writings. At first he favors the Kantian moralism,
+which admits nothing higher than the good will, and sets art the task
+of educating men up to morality by ennobling their natural impulses.
+Gradually, however, aesthetic activity changes in his view from a
+preparation for morality into the ultimate goal of human endeavor. Peaceful
+reconciliation is of more worth than the spirit's hardly gained victory
+in the conflict with the sensibility; fine feeling is more than rational
+volition; the highest ideal is the beautiful soul, in which inclination not
+merely obeys the command of duty, but anticipates it.
+
+[Footnote 1: The most important of Schiller's aesthetic essays are those
+_On Grace and Dignity_, 1793; _On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry_, 1795-96;
+and the _Letters on Aesthetic Education_, intermediate between them. Cf.
+Kuno Fischer, _Schiller als Philosoph_, 1858, 2d ed. (_Schillerschriften_,
+iii., iv.) 1891-92.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X.
+
+FICHTE.
+
+Fichte is a Kantian in about the same sense that Plato was a Socratic.
+Instead of taking up and developing particular critical problems he
+makes the vivifying kernel, the soul of criticism, his own. With the
+self-activity of reason (as a real force and as a problem) for his
+fundamental idea, he outlines with magnificent boldness a new view of the
+world, in which the idealism concealed in Kant's philosophy under the
+shell of cautious limitations was roused into vigorous life, and the great
+Königsberger's noble words on the freedom, the position, and the power of
+the spirit translated from the language of sober foresight into that of
+vigorous enthusiasm. The world can be understood only from the standpoint
+of spirit, the spirit only from the will. The ego is pure activity, and all
+reality its product. Fichte's system is all life and action: its aim is not
+to mediate knowledge, but to summon the hearer and reader to the production
+of a new and pregnant fundamental view, in which the will is as much
+a participant as the understanding; it begins not with a concept or a
+proposition, but with a demand for action (posit thyself; do consciously
+what thou hast done unconsciously so often as thou hast called thyself I;
+analyze, then, the act of self-consciousness, and cognize in their elements
+the forces from which all reality proceeds); its God is not a completed
+absolute substance, but a self-realizing world-order. This inner vivacity
+of the Fichtean principle, which recalls the pure actuality of Aristotle's
+[Greek: nous] and the ceaseless becoming of Heraclitus, finds its complete
+parallel in the fact that, although he was wanting neither in logical
+consecutiveness nor in the talent for luminous and popular exposition,
+Fichte felt continually driven to express his ideas in new forms, and, just
+when he seemed to have succeeded in saying what he meant with the greatest
+clearness, again unsatisfied, to seek still more exact and evident
+renderings for his fundamental position, which proved so difficult to
+formulate.
+
+The author of the _Wissenschaftslehre_ was the son of a poor ribbon maker,
+and was born at Rammenau in Lusatia in 1762. The talents of the boy induced
+the Freiherr von Miltiz to give him the advantage of a good education.
+Fichte attended school in Meissen and in Pforta, and was a student of
+theology at the universities of Jena and Leipsic. While a tutor in Zurich
+he made the acquaintance of Lavater and Pestalozzi, as well as of his
+future wife, Johanna Rahn, a niece of Klopstock. Returning to Leipsic, his
+whole mode of thought was revolutionized by the Kantian philosophy, in
+which it was his duty to instruct a pupil. This gives to the mind, as his
+letters confess, an inconceivable elevation above all earthly things. "I
+have adopted a nobler morality, and, instead of occupying myself with
+things without me, have been occupied more with myself." "I now believe
+with all my heart in human freedom, and am convinced that only on this
+supposition duty and virtue of any kind are possible." "I live in a new
+world since I have read the _Critique of Practical Reason_. Things which
+I believed never could be proved to me, _e.g._, the idea of an absolute
+freedom and duty, have been proved, and I feel the happier for it. It is
+inconceivable what reverence for humanity, what power this philosophy gives
+us, what a blessing it is for an age in which the citadels of morality
+had been destroyed, and the idea of duty blotted out from all the
+dictionaries!" A journey to Warsaw, whither he had been attracted by the
+expectation of securing a position as a private tutor, soon afforded him
+the opportunity of visiting at Königsberg the author of the system which
+had effected so radical a transformation in his convictions. His rapidly
+written treatise, _Essay toward a Critique of All Revelation_, attained the
+end to which its inception was due by gaining for its author a favorable
+reception from the honored master. Kant secured for Fichte a tutor's
+position in Dantzic, and a publisher for his maiden work. When this
+appeared, at Easter, 1792, the name of its author was by oversight omitted
+from the title page, together with the preface, which had been furnished
+after the rest of the book; and as the anonymous work was universally
+ascribed to Kant (whose religious philosophy was at this time eagerly
+looked for), the young writer became famous at a stroke as soon as the
+error was explained. A second edition was issued as early as the following
+year.
+
+After his marriage in Zurich, where he had completed several political
+treatises (the address, _Reclamation of the Freedom of Thought from the
+Princes of Europe, who have hitherto suppressed it, Heliopolis in the Last
+Year of the Old Darkness_, and the two _Hefte, Contributions toward the
+Correction of the Public Judgment on the French Revolution_, 1793), Fichte
+accepted, in 1794, a call to Jena, in place of Reinhold, who had gone to
+Kiel, and whose popularity was soon exceeded by his own. The same year saw
+the birth of the _Wissenschaftslehre_. His stay in Jena was embittered by
+conflicts with the clergy, who took offense at his ethical lectures (_On
+the Vocation of the Scholar_) held on Sunday mornings (though not at an
+hour which interfered with church service), and with the students, who,
+after they had been untrue to their decision--which they had formed as a
+result of these lectures--to dissolve their societies or orders, gave vent
+to their spite by repeatedly smashing the windows of Fichte's residence.
+Accordingly he took leave of absence, and spent the summer of 1795 in
+Osmannstädt. The years 1796-98, in which, besides the two _Introductions to
+the Science of Knowledge_, the _Natural Right_ and the _Science of Ethics_
+(one of the most all important works in German philosophical literature)
+appeared, mark the culmination of Fichte's famous labors. The so-called
+atheistic controversy[1] resulted in Fichte's departure from Jena. The
+_Philosophisches Journal_, which since 1797 had been edited by Fichte in
+association with Niethammer, had published an article by Magister Forberg,
+rector at Saalfeld, entitled "The Development of the Concept of Religion,"
+and as a conciliating introduction to this a short essay by Fichte, "On the
+Ground of our Belief in a Divine Government of the World."[2] For this
+it was confiscated by the Dresden government on the charge of containing
+atheistical matter, while other courts were summoned to take like action.
+In Weimar hopes were entertained of an amicable adjustment of the matter.
+But when Fichte, after publishing two vindications[3] couched in vehement
+language, had in a private letter uttered the threat that he would answer
+with his resignation any censure proceeding from the University Senate, not
+only was censure for indiscretion actually imposed, but his (threatened)
+resignation accepted.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Karl August Hase, _Jenaisches Fichtebüchlein_, 1856.]
+
+[Footnote 2: It is a mistake, Fichte writes here, referring to the
+conclusion of Forberg's article ("Is there a God? It is and remains
+uncertain," etc.), to say that it is doubtful whether there is a God or
+not. That there is a moral order of the world, which assigns to each
+rational individual his determined place and counts on his work, is most
+certain, nay, it is the ground of all other certitude. The living and
+operative moral order _(ordo ordinans)_ is itself God; we need no other
+God, and can conceive no other. There is no ground in reason for going
+beyond this world order to postulate a particular being as its cause.
+Whoever ascribes personality and consciousness to this particular being
+makes it finite; consciousness belongs only to the individual, limited ego.
+And it is allowable to state this frankly and to beat down the prattle of
+the schools, in order that the true religion of joyous well-doing may lift
+up its head.]
+
+[Footnote 3: _Appeal to the Public_, and _Formal Defense against the Charge
+of Atheism_, 1799. The first of these maintains that Fichte's standpoint
+and that of his opponents are related as duty and advantage, sensible and
+suprasensible, and that the substantial God of his accusers, to be derived
+from the sensibility, is, as personified fate, as the distributer of all
+happiness and unhappiness to finite beings, a miserable fetich.]
+
+Going to Berlin, Fichte found a friendly government, a numerous public for
+his lectures, and a stimulating circle of friends in the romanticists, the
+brothers Schlegel, Tieck, Schleiermacher, etc. In the first years of
+his Berlin residence there appeared _The Vocation of Man. The Exclusive
+Commercial State_, 1800; _The Sun-clear Report to the Larger Public on the
+Essential Nature of the New Philosophy_, and the _Answer to Reinhold_,
+1801. Three works, which were the outcome of his lectures and were
+published in the year 1806 _(Characteristics of the Present Age, The Nature
+of the Scholar, Way to the Blessed Life or Doctrine of Religion)_, form a
+connected whole. In the summer of 1805 Fichte filled a professorship at
+Erlangen, and later, after the outbreak of the war, he occupied for a short
+time a chair at Königsberg, finding a permanent university position at the
+foundation of the University of Berlin in 1810. His glowing _Addresses to
+the German Nation_, 1808, which essentially aided in arousing the national
+spirit, have caused his name to live as one of the greatest of orators
+and most ardent of patriots in circles of the German people where his
+philosophical importance cannot be understood. His death in 1814 was also a
+result of unselfish labor in the service of the Fatherland. He succumbed to
+a nervous fever contracted from his wife, who, with self-sacrifice equal
+to his own, had shared in the care of the wounded, and who had brought the
+contagion back with her from the hospital. On his monument is inscribed
+the beautiful text, "The teachers shall shine as the brightness of the
+firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars that
+shine forever and ever." Forberg in his journal records this estimate: The
+leading trait in Fichte's character is his absolute integrity. All his
+words are weighty and important. His principles are stern and little
+modified by affability. The spirit of his philosophy is proud and
+courageous, one which does not so much lead as possess us and carry us
+along. His philosophemes are inquiries in which we see the truth arise
+before our eyes, and which just for this reason lay the foundations of
+science and conviction.
+
+The philosopher's son, Immanuel Hermann Fichte (his own name was Johann
+Gottlieb), wrote a biography of his father (1830; 2d ed., 1862), and
+supervised the publication of both the _Posthumous Works_ (1834-35, 3
+vols.) and the _Collected Works_ (1845-46, 8 vols.). The simple and
+luminous _Facts of Consciousness_ of 1811, or 1817 (not the lecture of 1813
+with the same title), is especially valuable as an introduction to the
+system. Among the many redactions of the _Wissenschaftslehre_, the
+epoch-making _Foundation of the whole Science of Knowledge_, 1794, with
+the two _Introductions to the Science of Knowledge_, 1797, takes the first
+rank, while of the practical works the most important are the _Foundation
+of Natural Right according to the Principles of the Science of Knowledge_,
+1796, and the _System of the Science of Ethics according to the Principles
+of the_ _Science of Knowledge_, 1798, and next to these the _Lectures on
+the Theory of the State_, 1820 (delivered in 1813).[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: At the same time as J.H. Löwe's book _Die Philosophie
+Fichtes_, 1862, there appeared in celebration of the centenary of Fichte's
+birthyear, or birthday, a large number of minor essays and addresses by
+Friedrich Harms, A.L. Kym, Trendelenburg, Franz Hoffman, Karl Heyder, F.C.
+Lott, Karl Köstlin, J.B. Meyer, and others (cf. Reichlin-Meldegg in vol.
+xlii. of the _Zeitschrift für Philosophie_). Lasson has written, 1863, on
+Fichte's relation to Church and state, Zeller on Fichte as a political
+thinker (_Vorträge und Abhandlungen_, 1865), and F. Zimmer on his
+philosophy of religion. Among foreign works we may note Adamson's _Fichte_,
+1881, and the English translations of several of Fichte's works by Kroeger
+[_Science of Knowledge_, 1868; _Science of Rights_, 1869--both also, 1889]
+and William Smith [_Popular Writings_, 4th ed., 1889; also Everett's
+_Fichte's Science of Knowledge_ (Griggs's Philosophical Classics, 1884),
+and several translations in the _Journal of Speculative Philosophy_,
+including one of _The Facts of Consciousness_.--TR.]]
+
+
+%1. The Science of Knowledge.%
+
+%(a) The Problem.%--In Fichte's judgment Kant did not succeed in carrying
+through the transformation in thought which it was his aim to effect,
+because the age did not understand the spirit of his philosophy. This
+spirit, and with it the great service of Kant, consists in _transcendental
+idealism_, which by the doctrine that objects conform themselves to
+representations, not representations to objects, draws philosophy away from
+external objects and leads it back into ourselves. We have followed the
+letter, he thinks, instead of the spirit of Kant, and because of a few
+passages with a dogmatic ring, whose references to a given matter, the
+thing in itself, and the like, were intended only as preliminary, have
+overlooked the numberless others in which the contrary is distinctly
+maintained. Thus the interpreters of Kant, using their own prejudices as a
+criterion, have read into him exactly that which he sought to refute, and
+have made the destroyer of all dogmatism himself a dogmatist; thus in the
+Kantianism of the Kantians there has sprung up a marvelous combination of
+crude dogmatism and uncompromising idealism. Though such an absurd
+mingling of entirely heterogeneous elements may be excused in the case of
+interpreters and successors, who have had to construct for themselves the
+guiding principle of the whole from their study of the critical writings,
+yet we cannot assume it in the author of the system, unless we believe the
+_Critique of Pure Reason_ the result of the strangest chance, and not the
+work of intellect. Two men only, Beck, the teacher of the Standpoint, and
+Jacobi, the clearest mind of the century, are to be mentioned with respect
+as having risen above the confusion of the time to the perception that Kant
+teaches idealism, that, according to him, the object is not given, but
+made.
+
+Besides the perspicuity which would have prevented these misunderstandings,
+Fichte misses something further in Kant's work. Considered as a system
+Kant's expositions were incomplete; and, on his own confession, his aim
+was not to furnish the science itself, but only the foundation and the
+materials for it. Therefore, although the Kantian philosophy is established
+as far as its inner content is concerned, there is still need of earnest
+work to systematize the fragments and results which he gives into a firmly
+connected and impregnable whole. The _Wissenschaftslehre_ takes this
+completion of idealism for its mission. It cannot solve the problem by a
+commentary on the Kantian writings, nor by the correction and addition of
+particulars, but only by restoring the whole at a stroke. He alone finds
+the truth who new creates it in himself, independently and in his own way.
+Thus Fichte's system contains the same view of the matter as the critical
+system--the author is aware, runs the preface to the programme, _On the
+Concept of the Science of Knowledge_, 1794, "that he never will be able to
+say anything at which Kant has not hinted, immediately or mediately,
+more or less clearly, before him,"--but in his procedure he is entirely
+independent of the Kantian exposition. We shall first raise the question,
+What in the Kantian philosophy is in need of completion? and, secondly,
+What method must be adopted in completing it?
+
+Kant discusses the laws of intelligence when they are already applied to
+objects, without enlightening us concerning the ground of these laws. He
+derived the pure concepts (the laws of substantiality, of causality, etc.)
+from (logic, and thus mediately from) experience instead of deducing
+them from the nature of intelligence; similarly he never furnished
+this deduction for the forms of intuition, space and time. In order to
+understand that intelligence, and why intelligence, must act in just this
+way (must think just by means of these categories), we must prove, and not
+merely, with Kant, assert, that these functions or forms are really laws of
+thought--or, what amounts to the same thing, that they are conditions of
+self-consciousness. Again, even if it be granted that Kant has explained
+the properties and relations of things (that they appear in space and time,
+and that their accidents must be referred to substances), the question
+still remains unanswered, Whence comes the matter which is taken up into
+these forms? So long as the whole object is not made to arise before the
+eyes of the thinker, dogmatism is not driven out of its last corner. The
+thing in itself is, like the rest, only a thought in the ego. If thus
+the antithesis between the form and the matter of cognition undergoes
+modification, so, further, the allied distinction between understanding and
+sensibility must, as Reinhold accurately recognized, be reduced to a common
+principle and receptivity be conceived as self-limiting spontaneity. In
+his practical philosophy also Kant left much unfinished. The categorical
+imperative is susceptible of further deduction, it is not the principle
+itself, but a conclusion from the true principle, from the injunction to
+absolute _self-dependence on the part of reason_; moreover, the nature of
+our consciousness of the moral law must be more thoroughly discussed, and
+in order to gain a real, instead of a merely formal, ethics the relation of
+this law to natural impulse. Finally, Kant never discussed the foundation
+of philosophy as a whole, but always separated its theoretical from its
+practical side, and Reinhold also did nothing to remove this dualism. In
+short, some things that Kant only asserted or presupposed can and must be
+proved, some that he kept distinct must be united. In what way are both to
+be accomplished?
+
+Since correct inferences from correct premises yield correct results, and
+correct inference is easy to secure, everything depends on the correct
+point of departure. If we neglect this and consider only the process and
+the results of inference, there are two consistent systems: the dogmatic
+or realistic course of thought, which seeks to derive representations from
+things; and the idealistic, which, conversely, seeks to derive being from
+thought. Now, no matter how consistently dogmatism may proceed (and when it
+does so it becomes, like the system of Spinoza, materialism and fatalism or
+determinism, maintaining that all is nature, and all goes on mechanically;
+treats the spirit as a thing among others, and denies its metaphysical and
+moral independence, its immateriality and freedom), it may be shown to
+be false, because it starts from a false principle. Thought can never be
+derived from being, because it is not contained therein; from being only
+being can proceed, and never representation. Being, however, can be derived
+from thought, for consciousness is also being; nay, it is more than this,
+it is conscious being. And as consciousness contains both being and a
+knowledge of this being, idealism is superior to realism, because idealism
+includes the latter as a moment in itself, and hence can explain it, though
+it is not explicable by it. Dogmatism makes the mistake of going beyond
+consciousness or the ego, and working with empty, merely formal concepts. A
+concept is empty when nothing actual corresponds to it, or no intuition
+can be subsumed under it (here it is to be noted that, besides sensuous
+intuition, there is an intellectual intuition also; an example is found in
+the ego as a self-intuiting being). Philosophy, indeed, may abstract and
+must abstract, must rise above that which is given--for how could she
+explain life and particular knowledge if she assumed no higher standpoint
+than her object?--but true abstraction is nothing other than the separation
+of factors which in experience always present themselves together; it
+analyzes empirical consciousness in order to reconstruct it from its
+elements, it causes empirical consciousness to arise before our eyes, it
+is a pragmatic _history of consciousness_. Such abstraction, undertaken in
+order to a genetic consideration of the ego, does not go beyond experience,
+but penetrates into the depths of experience, is not transcendent, but
+transcendental, and, since it remains in close touch with that which is
+intuitable, yields a real philosophy in contrast to all merely formal
+philosophy.
+
+These theoretical advantages of idealism are supplemented by momentous
+reasons of a practical kind, which determine the choice between the two
+systems, besides which none other is possible. The moral law says: Thou
+shalt be self-dependent. If I ought to be so I must be able to be so; but
+if I were matter I would not be able. Thus idealism proves itself to be the
+ethical mode of thought, while the opposite mode shows that those who favor
+it have not raised themselves to that independence of all that is external
+which is morally enjoined, for in order to be able to know ourselves free
+we must have made ourselves free.[1] Thus the philosophy which a man
+chooses depends on what sort of a man he is. If, on the other hand, the
+categorical imperative calls for belief in the reality of the external
+world and of other minds, this is nothing against idealism. For idealism
+does not deny the realism of life, but explains it as a necessary, though
+not a final, mode of intuition. The dogmatic mode of thought is merely an
+explanation from the standpoint of common consciousness, and for idealism,
+as the only view which is both scientifically and practically satisfactory,
+this explanation itself needs explaining. Realism and idealism, like
+natural impulse and moral will in the sphere of action, are both grounded
+in reason. But idealism is the true standpoint, because it is able to
+comprehend and explain the opposing theory, while the converse is not the
+case.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. O. Liebmann (_Ueber den individuellen Beweis für die
+Freiheit des Willens p, 131. 1866)_ "Here we discover the noteworthy point
+where theoretical and practical philosophy actually pass over into each
+other. For this principle results: In order to carry out the individual
+proof for the freedom of the will, I must do my duty."]
+
+The nature, the goal, and the methods of the Science of Knowledge have now
+been determined. It is genuine, thoroughgoing idealism, which raises the
+Kantian philosophy to the rank of an evident science by deducing its
+premises from a first principle which is immediately certain, and by
+removing the twofold dualism of intuition and thought, of knowledge and
+volition, viz., by proving both contraries acts of one and the same ego.
+While Reinhold had sought a supreme truth as a fundamental principle of
+unity, without which the doctrine of knowledge would lack the systematic
+form essential to science, while Beck had interpreted the spirit of the
+Kantian philosophy in an idealistic sense, and Jacobi had demanded the
+elimination of the thing in itself, all these desires combined are
+fulfilled in Fichte's doctrine, and at the same time the results of the
+Critique of Reason are given that evidence which Aenesidemus-Schulze had
+missed in them. As an answer to the question, "How is knowledge brought
+about?" (as well the knowledge of common sense as that given in the
+particular sciences), "how is experience possible?", and as a construction
+of common consciousness as this manifests itself in life and in the
+particular sciences, Fichteanism adopts the name _Science of Knowledge_,
+being distinguished from the particular sciences by the fact that they
+discuss the voluntary, and it the necessary, representations or actions of
+the spirit. (The representation of a triangle or a circle is a free one, it
+may be omitted; the representation of space in general is a necessary one,
+from which it is impossible for us to abstract.) How does intelligence
+come to have sensations, to intuit space and time, and to form just such
+categories (thing and property, cause and effect, and not others quite
+different)? While Kant correctly described these functions of the intuiting
+and thinking spirit, and showed them actual, they must further be proven,
+be shown necessary or deduced. Deduced whence? From the "deed-acts"
+(_Thathandlungen_) of the ego which lie at the basis of all consciousness,
+and the highest of which are formulated in three principles.
+
+%(b) The Three Principles.%--At the portal of the Science of Knowledge we
+are met not by an assertion, but by a summons--a summons to
+self-contemplation. Think anything whatever and observe what thou dost,
+and of necessity must do, in thinking. Thou wilt discover that thou dost
+never think an object without thinking thyself therewith, that it is
+absolutely impossible for thee to abstract from thine ego. And second,
+consider what thou dost when thou dost think thine "ego." This means
+to affirm or posit one's self, to be a subject-object. The nature of
+self-consciousness is the identity of the representing [subject] and
+the represented [object]. The pure ego is not a fact, but an original
+doing, the act of being for self (_Fürsichsein_), and the (philosophical,
+or--as seems to be the case according to some passages--even the common)
+consciousness of this doing an intellectual intuition; through this we
+become conscious of the deed-act which is ever (though unconsciously)
+performing. This is the meaning of the first of the principles: "The _ego_
+posits originally and absolutely its own being," or, more briefly: The ego
+posits itself; more briefly still: I am. The nature of the ego consists in
+positing itself as existing.[1] Since, besides this self-cogitation of
+the ego, an op-position is found among the facts of empirical
+consciousness (think only of the principle of contradiction), and yet,
+besides the ego, there is nothing which could be opposed, we must assume
+as a second principle: To the ego there is absolutely opposited
+a _non-ego_. These two principles must be united, and this can be
+accomplished only by positing the contraries (ego and non-ego), since they
+are both in the ego, as reciprocally limiting or partially sublating
+one another, that is, each as _divisible_ (capable of quantitative
+determination). Accordingly the third principle runs: "The ego opposes in
+the ego a divisible non-ego to the divisible ego." From these principles
+Fichte deduces the three laws of thought, identity, contradiction, and
+sufficient reason, and the three categories of quality--reality, negation,
+and limitation or determination. Instead of following him in these labors,
+we may emphasize the significance of his view of the ego as pure activity
+without an underlying substratum, with which he carries dynamism over from
+the Kantian philosophy of nature to metaphysics. We must not conceive the
+ego as something which must exist before it can put forth its activities.
+Doing is not a property or consequence of being, but being is an accident
+and effect of doing. All substantiality is derivative, activity is primal;
+_being arises from doing_. The ego is nothing more than self-position; it
+exists not only for itself (_für sich_), but also through itself (_durch
+sich_).
+
+[Footnote 1: The ego spoken of in the first of the principles, the ego as
+the object of intellectual intuition and as the ground and creator of all
+being, is, as the second _Introduction to the Science of Knowledge_ clearly
+announces, not the individual, but the I-ness _(Ichheit)_ (which is to be
+presupposed as the prius of the manifold of representation, and which is
+exalted above the opposition of subject and object), mentality in general,
+eternal reason, which is common to all and the same in all, which is
+present in all thinking and at the basis thereof, and to which particular
+persons stand related merely as accidents, as instruments, as special
+expressions, destined more and more to lose themselves in the universal
+form of reason. But, further still, a distinction must be made between the
+absolute ego as intuition (as the form of I-ness), from which the Science
+of Knowledge starts, and the ego as Idea (as the supreme goal of practical
+endeavor) with which it ends. In neither is the ego conceived as
+individual; in the former the I-ness is not yet determined to the point of
+individuality, in the latter individuality has disappeared, Fichte is right
+when he thinks it remarkable that "a system whose beginning and end and
+whole nature is aimed at forgetfulness of individuality in the theoretical
+sphere and denial of it in the practical sphere" should be "called egoism."
+And yet not only opponents, but even adherents of Fichte, as is shown by
+_Friedrich Schlegel's_ philosophy of genius, have, by confusing the pure
+and the empirical ego, been guilty of the mistake thus censured. On the
+philosophy of the romanticists cf. Erdmann's _History_, vol. ii. §§ 314,
+315; Zeller, p. 562 _seq_.; and R. Haym, _Die Romantische Schule_, 1870.]
+
+The actions expressed in the three principles are never found pure in
+experience, nor do they represent isolated acts of the ego. Intelligence
+can think nothing without thinking itself therewith; it is equally
+impossible for it to think "I am" without at the same time thinking
+something else which is not itself; subject and object are inseparable.
+It is rather true that the acts of position described are one single,
+all-inclusive act, which forms only the first member in a connected system
+of pre-conscious actions, through which consciousness is produced, and the
+complete investigation of whose members constitutes the further business of
+the Science of Knowledge as a theory of the nature of reason. In this the
+Science of Knowledge employs a method which, by its rhythm of analysis and
+synthesis, development and reconciliation of opposites, became the model of
+Hegel's dialectic method. The synthesis described in the third principle,
+although it balances thesis and antithesis and unites them in itself, still
+contains contrary elements, in order to whose combination a new synthesis
+must be sought. In this, in turn, the analytic discovery and the synthetic
+adjustment of a contrariety is repeated, etc., etc. The original synthesis,
+moreover, prescribes a division of the inquiry into two parts, one
+theoretical and the other practical. For it contains the following
+principles: The ego posits itself as limited by the non-ego--it functions
+cognitively; and: The ego posits itself as determining the non-ego--it
+functions volitionally and actively.
+
+%(c) The Theoretical Ego.%--In positing itself as determined by the
+non-ego, the ego is at once passive (affected by something other than
+itself) and active (it posits its own limitation). This is possible only as
+it posits reality in itself only in part, and transfers to the non-ego so
+much as it does not posit in itself. Passivity is diminished activity,
+negation of the totality of reality. From reflection on this relation
+between ego and non-ego spring the categories of reciprocal determination,
+of causality (the non-ego as the cause of the passion of the ego), and
+substantiality (this passion merely the self-limitation of the ego).
+The conflict between the causality of the non-ego (by which the ego is
+affected) and the substantiality of the ego (in which and the activity of
+which all reality is contained) is resolved only by the assumption of two
+activities (or, rather, of two opposite directions of one activity) in the
+ego, one of which (centrifugal, expansive) strives infinitely outward while
+the other (centripetal or contractile) sets a bound to the former, and
+drives the ego back into itself, whereupon another excursus follows, and a
+new limitation and return, etc. With every repetition of this double act
+of production and reflection a special class of representations arises.
+Through the first limitation of the in itself unlimited activity
+"sensation" arises (as a product of the "productive imagination"). Because
+the ego produces this unconsciously, it appears to be given, brought about
+by influence from without. The second stage, "intuition," is reached when
+the ego reflects on sensation, when it opposes to itself something foreign
+which limits it. Thirdly, by reflection on intuition an "image" of that
+which is intuited is constructed, and, as such, distinguished from a real
+thing to which the image corresponds; at this point the categories and the
+forms of intuition, space and time, appear, which thus arise along with
+the object.[1] The fourth stadium is "understanding," which steadies the
+fluctuating intuition into a concept, realizes the object, and looks upon
+it as the cause of the intuition. Fifthly, "judgment" makes its appearance
+as the faculty of free reflection and abstraction, or the power to consider
+a definite content or to abstract from it. As judgment is itself the
+condition of the bound reflection of the understanding, so it points in
+turn to its condition, to the sixth and highest stage of intelligence,
+"reason," by means of which we are able to abstract from all objects
+whatever, while reason itself, pure self-consciousness, is that from
+which abstraction is never possible. It is only in the highest stage that
+consciousness or a representation of representation takes place. And at the
+culmination of the theoretical ego the point of transition to the practical
+ego appears. Here the ego becomes aware that in positing itself as
+determined by the non-ego it has only limited itself, and therefore is
+itself the ground of the whole content of consciousness; here it apprehends
+itself as determining the non-ego or as acting, and recognizes as its chief
+mission to impress the form of the ego as far as possible on the non-ego,
+and ever to extend the boundary further.
+
+[Footnote 1: The object is a product of the ego only for the observer, not
+for the observed ego itself, to which, from this standpoint of imagination,
+it appears rather as a thing in itself independent of the ego and affecting
+it. Further, it must so appear, because the ego, in its after reflection
+on its productive activity, and just by this reflection, transforms the
+productive action considered into a fixed and independent product found
+existing.]
+
+The "deduction of representation" whose outline has just been given was the
+first example (often imitated in the school of Schelling and Hegel) of a
+_constructive psychology_, which, from the mission or the concept of the
+soul--in this case from the nature of self-consciousness--deduces the
+various psychical functions as a system of actions, each of which is in
+its place implied by the rest, as it in turn presupposes them. This is
+distinguished from the sensationalistic psychology, which is also genetic
+(cf. pp. 245-250), as well as from the mechanical or associational
+psychology, which likewise excludes the idea of an isolated coexistence of
+mental faculties, by the fact that it demands a new manifestation of the
+soul-ground in order to the ascent from one member of the series to
+the next higher. It is also distinguished from sensationalism by its
+teleological point of view. For no matter how much Fichte, too, may speak
+of the mechanism of consciousness, it is plain to the reader of the
+theoretical part of his system not only that he makes this mechanism work
+in the service of an end, but also that he finds its origin in purposive
+activity of the ego; while the practical part gives further and decisive
+confirmation of the fact. The danger and the defect of such a constructive
+treatment of psychology--as we may at once remark for all later
+attempts--lies in imagining that the task of mental science has been
+accomplished and all its problems solved when each particular activity of
+the ego has been assigned its mission and work for the whole, and its place
+in the system, without any indication of the means through which this
+destination can be fulfilled.
+
+%(d) The Practical Ego.%--The deduction of representation has shown
+how (through what unconscious acts of the ego) the different stages of
+cognition, the three sensuous and the three intellectual functions of
+representation, come into being. It has proved incapable, however, of
+giving any account of the way in which the ego comes at one point to arrest
+its activity, which tends infinitely outward, and to turn it back upon
+itself. We know, indeed, that this first limitation, through which
+sensation arises, and on which as a basis the understanding, by continued
+reflection constructs the objective world, was necessary in order that
+consciousness and knowledge might arise. If the ego did not limit its
+infinite activity neither representation nor an objective world
+would exist. But why, then, are there such things as consciousness,
+representation, and a world? From the standpoint of the theoretical ego
+this problem, "Whence the original non-ego or opposition (_Anstoss_),
+which impels the ego back upon itself?" cannot be solved, since it is
+only through the opposition that it itself arises. The "deduction of the
+opposition," which the theoretical part of the Science of Knowledge did
+not furnish, is to be looked for from the practical part. The primacy of
+practical reason, already emphasized by Kant, gives us the answer: _The
+ego_ limits itself and _is theoretical, in order to be practical_. The
+whole machinery of representation and the represented world exists only to
+furnish us the possibility of fulfilling our duty. We are intelligence in
+order that we may be able to be will.
+
+Action, action--that is the end of our existence. Action is giving form to
+matter, it is the alteration or elaboration of an object, the conquest of
+an impediment, of a limitation. We cannot act unless we have something
+in, on, and against which to act. The world of sensation and intuition is
+nothing but a means for attaining our ethical destiny, it is "the material
+of our duty under the form of sense." The theoretical ego posits an
+object (_Gegenstand_) that the practical ego may experience resistance
+(_Widerstand_). No action is possible without a world as the object of
+action; no world is possible without a consciousness which represents it;
+no consciousness possible without reflection of the ego on itself; no
+reflection without limitation, without an opposition or non-ego. The
+_Anstoss_ is deduced. The ego posits a limit (is theoretical) in order (as
+practical) to overcome it. Our duty is the only _per se (Ansich)_ of
+the phenomenal world, the only truly real element in it: "Things are in
+themselves that which we ought to make of them." Objectivity exists only to
+be more and more sublated, that is, to be so worked up that the activity
+of the ego may in it become evident.--The same ground of explanation which
+reveals the necessity of an external nature enables us to understand why
+the one infinite ego (the universal life or the Deity, as Fichte puts it in
+his later works) divides into the many empirical egos or individuals, why
+it does not carry out its plan immediately, but through finite spirits as
+its organs. Action is possible only under the form of the individual, only
+in individuals are consciousness and morality possible. Without resistance,
+no action; without conflict, no morality. Individuality, it is true, is to
+be overcome and destroyed in moral endeavor; but in order to this it must
+have existed. Virtue is a conquest over external _and internal_ nature.
+
+A gradation of practical functions corresponding to the series of
+theoretical activities leads from feeling and striving (longing and
+desire) through the system of impulses (the impulse to representation or
+reflection, to production, to satisfaction) up to moral will or the impulse
+to harmony with self, which stands opposed to the natural impulses as the
+categorical imperative. The practical ego mediates between the theoretical
+and the absolute ego. The ego ought to be infinite and self-dependent, but
+finds itself finite and dependent on a non-ego--a contradiction which is
+resolved by the ego becoming practical, by the fact that in ever increasing
+measure it subdues nature to itself, and by such increasing extension
+of the boundary draws nearer and ever nearer to the realization of its
+destination, to become absolute ego.
+
+
+%2. The Science of Ethics and of Right.%
+
+The moral law demands the control of the sensuous impulse by the pure
+impulse. If the former aims at comfortable ease and enjoyment, the
+latter is directed toward satisfaction with one's self, to endeavor and
+self-dependence. (Enjoyment is inevitable, it is true, as satisfaction
+where any impulse whatever is carried out; only it must not form the end
+of action.) Morality is activity for its own sake, the radical evil--from
+which only a miracle can deliver us, but a miracle which we must ourselves
+perform--is inertness, lack of will to rise above the natural
+determinateness of the impulse of self-preservation to the clear
+consciousness of duty and of freedom. For the moral man there is no
+resting; each end attained becomes for him the impulse to renewed endeavor,
+each task fulfilled leads him to a fresh one. Become self-dependent, act
+autonomously, make thyself free; let every action have a place in a series,
+in the continuation of which the ego must become independent. To this
+formal and universal norm, again, there is added a special injunction for
+each individual. Each individual spirit has its definite mission assigned
+to it by the world-order: each ought to do that which it alone should and
+can do. Always fulfill thy moral vocation, thy special destination.[1] Or
+both in popular combination: Never act contrary to conscience.
+
+[Footnote 1: Although Fichte was justly charged with surpassing even the
+abstractness of the Kantian ethics with his bald moral principle, the
+self-dependence of the ego, he deserves praise for having given ethics a
+concrete content of indisputable soundness and utility by his introduction
+of Jacobi's idea of purified individuality.]
+
+The elevation to freedom is accomplished gradually. At first freedom
+consists only in the consciousness of the natural impulse, then follows
+a breaking away from this by means of maxims, which in the beginning
+are maxims of individual happiness. Later on a blind enthusiasm for
+self-dependence arises and produces an heroic spirit, which would rather be
+generous than just, which bestows sympathy more readily than respect; true
+morality, however, does not arise until, with constant attention to the law
+and continued watchfulness of self, duty is done for its own sake. No man
+is for a moment secure of his morality without continued endeavor. In order
+to deliverance from the original sin of inertness and its train, cowardice
+and falsity, men stand in need of examples, such as have been given them in
+the founders of religions, to construe for them the riddle of freedom. The
+necessary enlightenment concerning moral conviction is given by the Church,
+whose symbols are not to be looked upon as dogmatic propositions, but only
+as means for the proclamation of the eternal verities, and which, like the
+state (for both are institutions based on necessity), has for its object to
+make itself unnecessary as time goes on.
+
+The system of duties distinguishes four classes of duties on the basis
+of the twofold opposition of universal (non-transferable) and particular
+(transferable) duties, and of unconditional duties (directed to the whole)
+and conditional duties (directed toward self). These four classes are the
+duties of self-preservation, of class, of non-interference with others,
+and of vocation. The lower calling includes the producers, artisans, and
+tradesmen, whose action terminates directly on nature; and the higher,
+the scholars, teachers of the people or clergy, artists, and government
+officials, who work directly on the community of rational beings. Fichte's
+thoughtful and sympathetically written discussion of marriage is in
+pleasant contrast to the bald, purely legal view of this relation adopted
+by Kant.
+
+_Natural right_ is for Fichte, as for Kant, whose theory of right,
+moreover, appeared later than Fichte's, entirely independent of ethics,
+and distinguished from the latter by its exclusive reference to external
+conduct instead of to the disposition and the will. The rule of right gains
+from the moral law, it is true, new sanction for conscience, but cannot be
+derived from the law.--The concept of right is to be deduced as a necessary
+act of the ego, _i.e._, to be shown a condition of self-consciousness. The
+ego must posit itself as an individual, and can accomplish this only by
+positing itself in a relation of right to other finite rational beings;
+without a thou, no I. A finite rational being cannot posit itself without
+ascribing to itself a free activity in an external sense-world; and it
+cannot effect this latter unless (1) it ascribes free activity to other
+beings as well, hence not without assuming other finite rational beings
+outside itself, and positing itself as standing in _the relation of right_
+to them; and unless (2) it ascribes to itself a material body and posits
+this as standing under the influence of a person outside it. But, further,
+Fichte considers it possible to deduce the particular constitution both of
+the external world and of the human body (as the sphere of all free actions
+possible to the person). In the former there must be present a tough,
+durable matter capable of resistance, and light and air in order to the
+possibility of intercourse between spirits; while the latter must be an
+organized, articulated nature-product, furnished with senses, capable of
+infinite determination, and adapted to all conceivable motions.
+
+If a community of free beings, such as has been shown the condition of
+individual self-consciousness, is to be possible, the following must hold
+as the law of right: So limit thy freedom that others may be free along
+with thee. This law is conditioned on the lawful behavior of others. Where
+this is lacking, where my fellow does not recognize and treat me as a free,
+rational being, the right of coercion comes in; coercion, however, is not
+to be exercised by the individual himself--since then there would be no
+guaranty either for its successful exercise or for the non-violation of the
+legal limit--but devolves upon the state. The state takes its origin in
+the common will of all to unite for the safeguarding of their rights, and
+determines by positive laws (intermediate between the law of right and
+legal judgments) what shall be considered rights. Thus there result three
+subjects for natural right: original rights or the sum of that which
+pertains to freedom or personality (inviolability of the body and of
+property), the right of coercion, and political right. The aim of
+punishment is the reform of the evil doer and the deterrence of others.
+Fichte is in agreement with Kant concerning the principle of popular
+sovereignty (Rousseau) and the exercise of the political power through
+representatives; but not so concerning the guaranties against the violation
+of the fundamental law of the state. Instead of the division of powers
+recommended by Kant he demands supervision of the rulers of the state by
+ephors, who, themselves without any legislative or executive authority,
+shall suspend the rulers in case they violate the law, and call them to
+account before the community. Every constitution in which the rulers
+are not responsible is despotic. Fichte did not continue loyal to this
+principle, that the state is merely a legal institution. He not only
+demands a state organization of labor by which everyone shall be placed in
+a position to live from his work, in the _Natural Right_ and the _Exclusive
+Commercial State_, but, in his posthumous _Theory of Right_, 1812, he makes
+it the chief duty of the state to lead men, by the moral and intellectual
+training of the people, to do from insight what they have hitherto done
+from traditional belief. Through the education of the people the empirical
+state is gradually to transform itself into the rational state.
+
+
+%3. Fichte's Second Period: his View of History and his Theory of
+Religion.%
+
+Fichte's transfer to Berlin brought him into more intimate contact with
+the world, and along with new experiences and new emotions gave him new
+problems. While a vigorously developing religious sentiment turned his
+speculation to the relation of the individual ego to the primal source of
+spiritual life, empirical reality also acquired greater significance for
+him, and the intellectual, moral, and political situation of the time
+especially attracted his attention. The last required philosophical
+interpretation, demanded at once inquiry into its historical conditions and
+a consideration of the means by which the glaring contradiction between
+the condition of the nation at the time and the ideals of reason could be
+diminished. The _Addresses to the German Nation_ outlined a plan for a
+moral reformation of the world, to start with the education of the German
+people;[1] while the _Characteristics of the Present Age_, which had
+preceded the _Addresses_, defined the place of the age in the general
+development of humanity. The scheme of historical periods given in
+the _Characteristics_ and similarly in the _Theory of the State_
+(innocence--sin--supremacy of reason, with intermediate stages between each
+two) is interesting as a forerunner of Hegel's undertaking.
+
+[Footnote 1: "Among all nations you are the one in whom the germ of human
+perfection is most decidedly present." The spiritual regeneration of
+mankind must proceed from the German people, for they are the one original
+or primitive people of the new age, the only one which has preserved its
+living language--French is a dead tongue--and has raised itself to true
+creative poetry and free science. The ground of distinction between
+Germanism and the foreign spirit lies in the question, whether we believe
+in an original element in man, in the freedom, infinite perfectibility, and
+eternal progress of our race, or put no faith in all these.]
+
+History is produced through the interaction of the two principles, faith
+and understanding, which are related to each other as law and freedom, and
+strives toward a condition in which these two shall be so reconciled that
+faith shall have entirely passed over into the form of understanding, shall
+have been transformed into insight, and understanding shall have taken up
+the content of faith into itself. History begins with the coming together
+of two original and primitive races, one of order or faith, and one of
+freedom or understanding, neither of which would attain to an historical
+development apart from the other. From the legal race the free race learns
+respect for the law, as in turn it arouses in the former the impulse toward
+freedom. The course of history divides into five periods. In the state
+of "innocence" or of rational instinct that which is rational is done
+unconsciously, out of natural impulse; in the state of "commencing sin" the
+instinct for the good changes into an external compulsory authority,
+the law of reason appears as a ruling power from without, which can be
+disobeyed as well as obeyed. We ourselves live in the period of "completed
+sinfulness," of absolute license and indifference to all truth, of
+unlimited caprice and selfishness. But however far removed from the moral
+ideal this age appears, in which the individual, freed from all restraints,
+heeds naught except his egoistic desire, and in his care for his own
+welfare forgets to labor for the universal, yet this ultimate goal, this
+doing from free insight that which in the beginning was done out of blind
+faith, cannot be attained unless authority shall have first been shaken off
+and the individual become self-dependent. A few signs already betoken
+the dawn of the fourth era, that of rational science or of "commencing
+justification," in which truth shall be acknowledged supreme, and the
+individual ego, at least as cognitive, shall submit itself to the generic
+reason. Finally, with the era of rational art, or the state of "completed
+justification and sanctification," wherein the will of the individual shall
+entirely merge in life for the race, the end of the life of humanity
+on earth--the free determination of all its relations according to
+reason--will be fulfilled.
+
+In the Jena period the religious life of the ego simply coincided for
+Fichte with its practical life; piety coincided with moral conduct; the
+Deity with the absolute ego, with the moral law, with the moral order of
+the world. A change subsequently took place in his views on this point.
+He experienced feelings which, at least in quality, were distinct from
+readiness for moral action, no matter how intimately they are intertwined
+with this, and no matter how little they can actually be separated from
+it; _religion_ is possible neither without a metaphysical belief in a
+suprasensible world, nor without obedience to the moral law, yet in itself
+it is not that belief nor this action, but the inner spirit which pervades
+and animates all our thought and action--it is life, love, blessedness. And
+as quiet blessedness is here distinguished from ceaseless action, so for
+our thinker the inactive Deity, the self-identical life of the absolute,
+separates from the active universal reason, which in its individual organs
+advances from task to task. The earlier undivided and unique principle, the
+absolute ego, divides into the _Ichheit_ (moral law, world-order), and an
+absolute as the ground thereof. "The spirit (the ego, or, as Fichte now
+prefers to say, knowledge) an image of God, the world an image of the
+spirit." The active order of the world (the moral law which realizes
+itself in individuals) the immediate, and objective reality the mediate,
+revelation of the absolute!
+
+Does this view of religion, which Fichte incorporates also in the later
+expositions of the Science of Knowledge, indicate an abandonment and denial
+of the earlier standpoint? The philosophy of Fichte's second period is a
+new system--so judge the majority of the historians of philosophy. It is
+not a transformation, but a completion of the earlier system; the doctrine
+promulgated in Berlin continues to be idealistic, as that advanced in Jena
+had itself been pantheistic--this is the opinion of Fortlage and Harms,
+in agreement with the philosopher himself and with his son. Kuno Fischer,
+also, who shows a constant advance in the development of Fichteanism, a
+gradual transition "without a break," may be counted among the minority who
+hold that throughout his life Fichte taught but one system. We believe it
+our duty to adhere to this latter view. The Science of Knowledge (the world
+a product of the ego) enters as it is into the later form of the Fichtean
+philosophy; the latter gives up none of the fundamental positions of the
+former, but only adds to it a culmination, by which the appearance of
+the building is altered, it is true, but not the edifice itself. In the
+discussion of the question the following three have been emphasized as
+the most important points of distinction between the two periods: In the
+earlier system God is made equivalent to the absolute ego and the moral
+order of the world, in the later he is separated from these and removed
+beyond them; in the former the nature of God is described as activity,
+in the latter, as being; in the one, action is designated as the highest
+mission of man, in the other, blessed devotion to God. All three variations
+of the later doctrine from the earlier may be admitted without giving up
+the position that the former is only an extension of the latter and not
+an essential modification of it (_i.e._, in its teachings concerning the
+relation of the ego and the world). Fichte experienced religious feelings
+the philosophical outcome of which he worked into his system. He now knows
+a first thing (the Deity as distinct from the absolute ego) and a last
+thing (the inwardness of religious devotion to the world-ground), which he
+had before not overlooked, much less denied, but combined in one with the
+second (the absolute ego or the moral order of the world) and the one
+before the last (moral action). It is incorrect to say that, in his later
+doctrine, Fichte substituted the inactive absolute in place of the active
+absolute ego, and the quiet blessedness of contemplation in place of
+ceaseless action. Not in place of these, but beyond them, while all
+else remains as it was. The categorical imperative, the absolute ego or
+knowledge is no longer God himself, but the first manifestation of God,
+though a necessary revelation of him. Religion had previously been included
+for Fichte in moral action; now fellowship with God goes beyond this,
+though morality remains its indispensable condition and inseparable
+companion. Finally, how to construe the previously avoided predicate,
+being, in relation to the Deity, is shown by the no less frequent
+designation of the absolute as the "Universal Life." The expression being,
+which it must be confessed is ambiguous, here signifies in our opinion only
+the quiet, self-identical activity of the absolute, in opposition to the
+unresting, changeful activity of the world-order and its finite organs, not
+that inert and dead being posited by the ego, the ascription of which to
+the Deity Fichte had forbidden in his essay which had been charged with
+atheism, not to speak of the existence-mode of a particular self-conscious
+and personal being. Instead of speaking of a conversion of Fichte to
+the position of his opponents, we might rather venture the paradoxical
+assertion, that, when he characterizes the absolute as the only true being,
+he intends to produce the same view in the mind of the reader as in his
+earlier years, when he expressed himself against the application of the
+concepts existence, substance, and conscious personality to God, on the
+ground that they are categories of sense. The chief thing, at least,
+remains unaltered: the opposition to a view of religion which transforms
+the sublime and sacred teaching of Christianity "into an enervating
+doctrine of happiness."
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.
+
+SCHELLING.
+
+Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph (von) Schelling was born January 27, 1775, at
+Leonberg (in Würtemberg), and died August 20, 1854, at the baths of Ragatz
+(in Switzerland). In 1790-95 he attended the seminary at Tübingen, in
+company with Hölderlin and Hegel, who were five years older than himself;
+at seventeen he published a dissertation on the Fall of Man, and a
+year later an essay on Religious Myths; and was called in 1798 from
+Leipsic--where, after several treatises[1] in explanation of the Science
+of Knowledge, he had issued, in 1797, the _Ideas for a Philosophy of
+Nature_--to Jena. In the latter place he became acquainted with his future
+wife, Caroline,[2] _née_ Michaëlis (1763-1809), widow of Böhmer and at this
+time the brilliant wife of August Wilhelm Schlegel. From 1803 to 1806 he
+served as professor in Würzburg; then followed two residences of fourteen
+years each in Munich, separated by seven years in Erlangen: 1806-20 as
+Member of the Academy of Sciences and General Secretary of the Academy of
+the Plastic Arts (he received this latter position after delivering on the
+king's birthday his celebrated address on "The Relation of the Plastic
+Arts to Nature," 1807); and 1827-41 as professor in the newly established
+university, and President of the Academy of Sciences. In 1812 Schelling
+married his second wife, Pauline Gotter. Besides various journals[3] and
+the works to be noticed later, two polemic treatises should be mentioned,
+the _Exposition of the True Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the
+Improved Doctrine of Fichte_, 1806, in which his former friend is charged
+with plagiarism, and the _Memorial of the Treatise on Divine Things by Herr
+Jacobi_, 1812, which answers a bitter attack of Jacobi still more bitterly.
+From this on our philosopher, once so fond of writing, becomes silent.[4]
+The often promised issue of the positive philosophy, which had already been
+twice commenced in print (_The Ages of the World_, 1815; _Mythological
+Lectures_, 1830), was both times suspended. Being called to the Berlin
+Academy by Frederick William IV., in order to counterbalance the prevailing
+Hegelianism, Schelling delivered lectures in the university also (on
+Mythology and Revelation), which he ceased, however, when notes taken by
+his hearers were printed without his consent.[5] His collected works were
+published in fourteen volumes (1856-61) under the care of his son, K.E.A.
+Schelling.[6]
+
+[Footnote 1: _On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy in General_, _On
+the Ego as Principle of Philosophy_, both in 1795; _Letters on Dogmatism
+and Criticism_, 1796; _Essays in Explanation of the Science of Knowledge_,
+1797.]
+
+[Footnote 2: _Karoline_, Letters, edited by G. Waitz, 1871.]
+
+[Footnote 3: _Kritisches Journal der Philosophie_ (with Hegel), 1802;
+_Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik_, 1800 (continued as _Neue Zeitschrift
+für spekulative Physik_); _Jahrbücher der Medizin als Wissenschaft_ (with
+Marcus), 1806-08; _Allgemeine Zeitschrift von Deutschen für Deutsche_,
+1813.]
+
+[Footnote 4: Besides a supplement to _Die Weltalter_ and his inaugural
+lecture at Berlin, he published only two prefaces, one to _Viktor Cousin
+über französische und deutsche Philosophie_, done into German by Hubert
+Beckers, 1834, and one to Steffens's _Nachgelassene Schriften_, 1846.]
+
+[Footnote 5: Paulus, _Die endüch offenbar gewordene positive Philosophie
+der Offenbarung_, 1843. Frauenstädt had previously published a sketch from
+this later doctrine, 1842.]
+
+[Footnote 6: On Schelling cf. the Lectures by K. Rosenkranz, 1843; the
+articles by Heyder in vol. xiii. of Herzog's _Realencyclopädie für
+protestantische Theologie_, 1860, and Jodl in the _Allgemeine deutsche
+Biographie_; R. Haym, _Die romantische Schule_, 1870; _Aus Schellings
+Leben, in Briefen_, edited by Plitt, 3 vols., 1869-70. [Cf. also Watson's
+_Schelling's Transcendental Idealism_ (Griggs's Philosophical Classics,
+1882); and several translations from Schelling in the _Journal of
+Speculative Philosophy_.--TR.]]
+
+The leading motive in Schelling's thinking is an unusually powerful fancy,
+which gives to his philosophy a lively, stimulating, and attractive
+character, without making it to a like degree logically satisfactory. If
+the systems of Fichte and Hegel, which in their content are closely related
+to Schelling's, impress us by their logical severity, Schelling chains us
+by his lively intuition and his suggestive power of feeling his way into
+the inner nature of things. With him analogies outweigh reasons; he is
+more concerned about the rich content of concepts than about their sharp
+definition; and in the endeavor to show the unity of the universe, both in
+the great and in the little, especially to show the unity of nature and
+spirit, he dwells longer on the relationship of objects than on their
+antitheses, which he is glad to reduce to mere quantitative and temporary
+differences. He adds to this an astonishing mobility of thought, in virtue
+of which every offered suggestion is at once seized and worked into his own
+system, though in this the previous standpoint is unconsciously exchanged
+for a somewhat altered one. Schelling's philosophy is, therefore, in a
+continual state of flux, nearly every work shows it in a new form, and it
+is always ideas from without whose incorporation has caused the transition.
+Besides Leibnitz, Kant, and Fichte, who were already familiar to Schelling
+as a pupil at Tübingen, it was first Herder, then Spinoza and Bruno, who
+exerted a transforming influence on his system, to be followed later by
+Neoplatonism and Böhme's mysticism, and, finally, by Aristotle and
+the Gnostics, not to speak of his intercourse with his contemporaries
+Kielmeyer, Steffens, Baader, Eschenmayer, and others. Omitting his early
+adherence to Fichte, at least three periods must be distinguished
+in Schelling's thinking. The first period (1797-1800) includes the
+epoch-making feat of his youth, the _philosophy of nature_, and, as an
+equally legitimate second part of his system, the philosophy of spirit or
+_transcendental philosophy_. The latter is a supplementary recasting of
+Fichte's Science of Knowledge, while in the former Schelling follows Kant
+and Herder. The second period, from 1801, adds to these two co-ordinate
+parts, the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit, and as a
+fundamental discipline, a science of the absolute, the _philosophy of
+identity_, which may be characterized as Spinozism revived on a Fichtean
+basis. Besides the example of Spinoza, Giordano Bruno had most influence on
+this form of Schelling's philosophy. With the year 1809, after the signs of
+a new phase had become perceptible from 1804 on, his system enters on its
+third, the theosophical, period, the period of the _positive philosophy_,
+in which we shall distinguish a mystical and a scholastic stage. The former
+is represented by the doctrine of freedom inspired by Jacob Böhme; the
+latter, by the philosophy of mythology and revelation, which goes back to
+Aristotle and the Gnostics. In the first period the absolute for Schelling
+is creative nature; in the second, the identity of opposites; in the third
+it is an antemundane process which advances from the not-yet-present of
+the contraries to their overcoming. In neither of these advances is it
+Schelling's intention to break with his previous teachings, but in each
+case only to add a supplement. That which has hitherto been the whole is
+retained as a part. The philosophy of nature takes its place beside the
+completed Fichtean transcendental philosophy, with equal rights, though
+with a reversed procedure; then the theory of identity assumes a place
+above both; finally, a positive (existential) philosophy is added to the
+previous negative (rational) philosophy.
+
+
+%1a. Philosophy of Nature.%
+
+Schelling agrees with Fichte that philosophy is transcendental science,
+the doctrine of the conditions of consciousness, and has to answer the
+question, What must take place in order that knowledge may arise? They
+agree, further, that these conditions of knowledge are necessary acts,
+outgoings of an active original ground which is not yet conscious self, but
+seeks to become such, and that the material world is the product of these
+actions. Nature exists in order that the ego may develop. But while Fichte
+correctly understood the purpose of nature, to help intelligence into
+being, he failed to recognize the dignity of nature, for he deprived it of
+all self-dependence, all life of its own, all generative power, and treated
+it merely as a dead tool, as a passive, merely posited non-ego. Nature
+is not a board which the original ego nails up before itself in order,
+striking against it, to be driven back upon itself, to be compelled to
+reflection, and thereby to become theoretical ego; in order, further,
+working over the non-ego, and transforming it, to exercise its practical
+activity: but it is a ladder on which spirit rises to itself. Spirit
+develops out of nature; nature itself has a spiritual element in it; it
+is undeveloped, slumbering, unconscious, benumbed intelligence. By
+transferring to nature the power of self-position or of being subject,
+Schelling exalts the drudge of the Science of Knowledge to the throne.
+The threefold division, "infinite original activity--nature or
+object--individual ego or subject," remains as in Fichte, only that the
+first member is not termed pure ego, but nature, yet creative nature,
+_natura naturans_. Schelling's aim is to show how from the object a subject
+arises, from the existent something represented, from the representable a
+representer, from nature an ego. He could only hope to solve this problem
+if he conceived natural objects--in the highest of which, man, he makes
+conscious spirit break forth or nature intuit itself--as themselves the
+products of an original subject, of a creative ground striving toward
+consciousness. For him also doing is more original than being. It would not
+be exact, therefore, to define the difference between Fichte and Schelling
+by saying that, with the former, nature proceeds from the ego, and with the
+latter the ego, from nature. It is rather true that with them both nature
+and spirit are alike the products of a third and higher term, which seeks
+to become spirit, and can accomplish this only by positing nature. In the
+Science of Knowledge, it is true, this higher ground is conceived as an
+ethical, in the Philosophy of Nature as a physical, power, although one
+framed for intelligence; in the former, moreover, the _natura naturata_
+appears as the position once for all of a non-spiritual, in the latter as
+a progressive articulated construction, with gradually increasing
+intelligence. In the unconscious products of nature, nature's aim to
+reflect upon itself, to become intelligence, fails, in man it succeeds.
+Nature is the embryonic life of spirit. Nature and spirit are essentially
+identical: "That which is posited _out of_ consciousness is in its essence
+the same as that which is posited _in_ consciousness also." Therefore
+"the knowable must itself bear the impress of the knower." Nature the
+preliminary stage, not the antithesis, of spirit; history, a continuation
+of physical becoming; the parallelism between the ideal and the real
+development-series--these are ideas from Herder which Schelling introduces
+into the transcendental philosophy. The Kantio-Fichtean moralism, with
+its sharp contraposition of nature and spirit, is limited in the
+_Naturphilosophie_ by Herder's physicism.
+
+"Nature _is a priori_" (everything individual in it is pre-determined by
+the whole, by the Idea of a nature in general); hence the forms of nature
+can be deduced from the concept of nature. The philosopher creates nature
+anew, he constructs it. Speculative physics considers nature as _subject_,
+becoming, productivity (not, like empirical science, as object, being,
+product), and for this purpose it needs, instead of individualizing
+reflection, an intuition directed to the whole. To this productive nature,
+as to the absolute ego of Fichte, are ascribed two opposite activities,
+one expansive or repulsive, and one attractive, and on these is based the
+universal law of _polarity_. The absolute productivity strives toward an
+infinite product, which it never attains, because apart from arrest no
+product exists. At definite points a check must be given it in order that
+something knowable may arise. Thus every product in nature is the result
+of a positive, centrifugal, accelerating, universalizing force, and a
+negative, limiting, retarding, individualizing one. The endlessness of the
+creative activity manifests itself in various ways: in the striving for
+development on the part of every product, in the preservation of the genus
+amid the disappearance of individuals, in the endlessness of the series of
+products. Nature's creative impulse is inexhaustible, it transcends every
+product. Qualities are points of arrest in the one universal force of
+nature; all nature is a connected development. Because of the opposition in
+the nature-ground between the stimulating and the retarding activity, the
+law of duality everywhere rules. To these two forces, however, still a
+third factor must be added as their copula, which determines the relation
+or measure of their connection. This is the source of the threefold
+division of the Philosophy of Nature. The magnet with its union of opposite
+polar forces is the type of all configuration in nature.
+
+With Fichte's synthetic method and Herder's naturalistic principles
+Schelling combines Kantian ideas, especially Kant's dynamism (matter is
+a force-product),[1] and his view of the organic (organisms are
+self-productive beings, and are regarded by us as ends in themselves,
+because of the interaction between their members and the whole). The three
+organic functions sensibility, irritability, and reproduction, on the other
+hand, Schelling took from Kielmeyer, whose address _On the Relations of
+the Organic Forces_, 1793, excited great attention. The concept of life is
+dominant in Schelling's theory of nature. The organic is more original than
+the inorganic; the latter must be explained from the former; that which is
+dead must be considered as a product of departing life. No less erroneous
+than the theory of a magic vital force is the mechanical interpretation,
+which looks on life merely as a chemical phenomenon. The dead, mechanical
+and chemical, forces are merely the negative conditions of life; to them
+there must be added as a positive force a vital stimulus external to the
+individual, which continually rekindles the conflict between the opposing
+activities on which the vital process depends. Life consists, that is, in
+the perpetual prevention of the equilibrium which is the object of the
+chemical process. This constant disturbance proceeds from "universal
+nature," which, as the common principle of organic and inorganic nature, as
+that which determines them for each other, which founds a pre-established
+harmony between them, deserves the name of the world-soul. Schelling
+thus recognizes a threefold nature: organized, inorganic, and universal
+organizing (according to Harms, cosmical) nature, of which the two former
+arise from the third and are brought by it into connection and harmony. (As
+Schelling here takes an independent middle course between the mechanical
+explanation of life and the assumption of a specific vital force, so in
+all the burning physical questions of the time he seeks to rise above the
+contending parties by means of mediating solutions. Thus, in the question
+of "single or double electricity," he ranges himself neither on the side of
+Franklin nor on that of his opponents; in regard to the problem of light,
+endeavors to overcome the antithesis between Newton's emanation theory and
+the undulation theory of Euler; and, in his chapter on combustion, attacks
+the defenders of phlogiston as well as those who deny it).
+
+[Footnote 1: Schelling terms his philosophy of nature dynamic atomism,
+since it posits pure intensities as the simple (atoms), from which
+qualities are to be explained.]
+
+Schelling's philosophy of nature[1] proposes to itself three chief
+problems: the construction of general, indeterminate, homogeneous
+matter, with differences in density alone, of determinate, qualitatively
+differentiated matter and its phenomena of motion or the dynamical process,
+and of the organic process. For each of these departments of nature an
+original force in universal nature is assumed--gravity, light, and their
+copula, universal life. Gravity--this does not mean that which as the force
+of attraction falls within the view of sensation, for it is the union of
+attraction and repulsion--is the principle of corporeality, and produces
+in the visible world the different conditions of aggregation in solids,
+fluids, and gases. Light--this, too, is not to be confounded with actual
+light, of which it is the cause--is the principle of the soul (from it
+proceeds all intelligence, it is a spiritual potency, the "first subject"
+in nature), and produces in the visible world the dynamical processes
+magnetism, electricity, and chemism. The higher unity of gravity and
+light is the copula or life, the principle of the organic, of animated
+corporeality or the processes of growth and reproduction, irritability,
+and sensibility.
+
+[Footnote 1: This is contained in the following treatises: _Ideas for a
+Philosophy of Nature, 1797; On the World-soul, 1798; First Sketch of a
+System of the Philosophy of Nature, 1799; Universal Deduction of the
+Dynamical Process or the Categories of Physics_ (in the _Zeitschrift für
+spekulative Physik_) 1800. In the above exposition, however, the modified
+philosophy of nature of the second period has also been taken into
+account.]
+
+General _matter_ or the filling of space, arises from the co-operation of
+three forces: the centrifugal, which manifests itself as repulsion (first
+dimension), the centripetal, manifested as attraction (second dimension),
+and the synthesis of the two, manifested as gravity (third dimension).
+These forces are raised by light to a higher potency, and then make their
+appearance as the causes of the _dynamical_ process or of the specific
+differences of matter. The linear function of magnetism is the condition
+of coherence; the surface force of electricity, the basis of the qualities
+perceivable by sense; the tri-dimensional force of the chemical process, in
+which the two former are united, produces the chemical qualities. Galvanism
+forms the transition to living nature, in which through the operation of
+the "copula" these three dynamical categories are raised to _organic_
+categories. To magnetism as the most general, and hence the lowest force,
+corresponds reproduction (the formative impulse, as nutrition, growth, and
+production, including the artistic impulse); electricity develops into
+irritability or excitability; the higher analogue to the chemical process
+as the most individual and highest stage is sensibility or the capacity
+of feeling. (Such at least is Schelling's doctrine after Steffens had
+convinced him of the higher dignity of that which is individual, whereas
+at first he had made sensibility parallel with magnetism, and reproduction
+with chemism, because the former two appear most seldom, and the latter
+most frequently. Electricity and irritability always maintained their
+intermediate position.) With the awakening of feeling nature has attained
+its goal--intelligence. As inorganic substances are distinguished only by
+relative degrees of repulsion and attraction, so the differentiation of
+organisms is conditioned by the relation of the three vital functions: in
+the lower forms reproduction predominates, then irritability gradually
+increases, while in the highest forms both of these are subordinated to
+sensibility. All species, however, are connected by a common life, all the
+stages are but arrests of the same fundamental force. This accentuation
+of the unity of nature, which establishes a certain kinship between
+Schelling's philosophy of nature and Darwinism, was a great idea, which
+deserves the thanks of posterity in spite of such defects as its often
+sportive, often heedlessly bold reasoning in details.
+
+The parallelism of the potencies of nature, as we have developed it by
+leaving out of account the numerous differences between the various
+expositions of the _Naturphilosophie_, may be shown by a table:
+
+
+
+I. UNIVERSAL NATURE.    II. INORGANIC NATURE       III. ORGANIC NATURE.
+   (ORGANIZING)
+    3. Copula                                    3. Organization
+     or Life.                                        |
+     ___^___                    /Chemical   \ G      | /Sensi-     Man.
+    /       \                   |Process (3d| a      | |bility.   __^__
+    2. Light       2._Dynamical_|Dimen-     | l      | |         /     \
+      (Soul).       _Process_. < sion)      | v      | |Irritabi-  Male
+
+b. At-   \           (Determi-  |Electri-   | a      |_|lity.    (=Light)
+traction.|           nate       |city (2d Di->n        |Animal.
+          >1. Gra-   matter.)   | mension.) | i        |
+         |    vity 1. Indeter-  |Magnetism  | s        |Repro-    Female
+a. Re-   |   (Body)  minate     |(1st Di-   | m        |duction (-Gravity)
+pulsion  /          _matter_.   \ mension.) /          \ Plant.
+
+
+%1b. Transcendental Philosophy.%
+
+The philosophy of nature explained the products of nature teleologically,
+deduced them from the concept or the mission of nature, by ignoring the
+mechanical origin of physical phenomena and inquiring into the significance
+of each stage in nature in view of this ideal meaning of the whole. It asks
+what is the outcome of the chemical process for the whole of nature, what
+is given by electricity, by magnetism, etc.--what part of the general aim
+of nature is attained, is realized through this or that group of phenomena.
+The philosophy of spirit given in the _System of Transcendental Idealism_,
+1800, finds itself confronted by corresponding questions concerning the
+phenomena of intelligence, of morals, and of art. Here again Schelling does
+not trace out the mechanics of the soul-life, but is interested only in the
+meaning, in the teleological significance of the psychical functions.
+His aim is a constructive psychology in the Fichtean sense, a history of
+consciousness, and the execution of his design as well closely follows the
+example of the _Wissenschaftslehre_.
+
+Since truth is the agreement of thought and its object, every cognition
+necessarily implies the coming together of a subjective and an objective
+factor. The problem of this coming together may be treated in two ways.
+With the philosophy of nature we may start from the object and observe how
+intelligence is added to nature. The transcendental philosophy takes the
+opposite course, it takes its position with the subject, and asks, How
+is there added to intelligence an object corresponding to it? The
+transcendental philosopher has need of intellectual intuition in order to
+recognize the original object-positing actions of the ego, which remain
+concealed from common consciousness, sunk in the outcome of these acts. The
+_theoretical_ part of the system explains the representation of objective
+reality (the feeling connected with certain representations that we are
+compelled to have them), from pure self-consciousness, whose opposing
+moments, a real and an ideal force, limit each other by degrees,--and
+follows the development of spirit in three periods ("epochs"). The first
+of these extends from sensation, in which the ego finds itself limited, to
+productive intuition, in which a thing in itself is posited over against
+the ego and the phenomenon between the two; the second, from this point to
+reflection (feeling of self, outer and inner intuition together with space
+and time, the categories of relation as the original categories); the
+third, finally, through judgment, wherein intuition and concept are
+separated as well as united, up to the absolute act of will. Willing is
+the continuation and completion of intuition;[1] intuition was unconscious
+production, willing is conscious production. It is only through action that
+the world becomes objective for us, only through interaction with other
+active intelligences that the ego attains to the consciousness of a real
+external world, and to the consciousness of its freedom. The _practical_
+part follows the will from impulse (the feeling of contradiction between
+the ideal and the object) through the division into moral law and resistant
+natural impulse up to arbitrary will. Observations on legal order, on the
+state, and on history are added as "supplements." The law of right, by
+which unlawful action is directed against itself, is not a moral, but a
+natural order, which operates with blind necessity. The state, like law, is
+a product of the genus, and not of individuals. The ideal of a cosmopolitan
+legal condition is the goal of _history_, in which caprice and conformity
+to law are one, in so far as the conscious free action of individuals
+subserves an unconscious end prescribed by the world-spirit. History is the
+never completed revelation of the absolute (of the unity of the conscious
+and the unconscious) through human freedom. We are co-authors in the
+historical world-drama, and invent our own parts. Not until the third (the
+religious) period, in which he reveals himself as "providence," will God
+_be_; in the past (the tragical) period, in which the divine power was felt
+as "fate," and in the present (the mechanical) period, in which he appears
+as the "plan of nature," God is not, but is only _becoming_.
+
+[Footnote 1: With this transformation of the antithesis between knowledge
+and volition into a mere difference in degree, Schelling sinks back to the
+standpoint of Leibnitz. In all the idealistic thinkers who start from Kant
+we find the endeavor to overcome the Critical dualism of understanding and
+will, as also that between intellect and sensibility. Schiller brings the
+contrary impulses of the ego into ultimate harmonious union in artistic
+activity. Fichte traces them back to a common ground; Schelling combines
+both these methods by extolling art as a restoration of the original
+identity. Hegel reduces volition to thought, Schopenhauer makes intellect
+proceed from will.]
+
+An interesting supplement to the Fichtean philosophy is furnished by the
+third, the _aesthetic_, part of the transcendental idealism, which makes
+use of Kant's theory of the beautiful in a way similar to that in which the
+philosophy of nature had availed itself of his theory of the organic.
+Art is the higher third in which the opposition between theoretical and
+practical action, the antithesis of subject and object, is removed; in
+which cognition and action, conscious and unconscious activity, freedom and
+necessity, the impulse of genius and reflective deliberation are united.
+The beautiful, as the manifestation of the infinite in the finite, shows
+the problem of philosophy, the identity of the real and the ideal, solved
+in sensuous appearance. Art is the true organon and warrant of philosophy;
+she opens up to philosophy the holy of holies, is for philosophy the
+supreme thing, the revelation of all mysteries. Poesy and philosophy (the
+aesthetic intuition of the artist and the intellectual intuition of
+the thinker) are most intimately related; they were united in the old
+mythology--why should not this repeat itself in the future?
+
+
+%2. System of Identity.%
+
+The assertion which had already been made in the first period that "nature
+and spirit are fundamentally the same," is intensified in the second into
+the proposition, "The ground of nature and spirit, the absolute, is the
+identity of the real and the ideal," and in this form is elevated into
+a principle. As the absolute is no longer employed as a mere ground of
+explanation, but is itself made the object of philosophy, the doctrine of
+identity is added to the two co-ordinate disciplines, the philosophy of
+nature and the philosophy of spirit, as a higher third, which serves as a
+basis for them, and in Schelling's exposition of which several phases must
+be distinguished.[1]
+
+
+[Footnote 1: The philosophy of identity is given in the following
+treatises: _Exposition of my System of Philosophy, 1801; Further
+Expositions of the System of Philosophy, 1802; Bruno, or on the Divine and
+Natural Principle of Things, 1803; Lectures on the Method of Academical
+Study, 1803; Aphorisms by way of Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature,
+Aphorisms on the Philosophy of Nature_ (both in the _Jahrbücher für
+Medizin), 1806_. Besides these the following also bear on this doctrine:
+the additions to the second edition of the _Ideas_, 1803, and the
+_Exposition_, against Fichte, 1806.]
+
+Following Spinoza, whom he at first imitated even in the geometrical method
+of proof, Schelling teaches that there are two kinds of knowledge, the
+philosophical knowledge of the reason and the confused knowledge of
+the imagination, and, as objects of these, two forms of existence, the
+infinite, undivided existence of the absolute, and the finite existence of
+individual things, split up into multiplicity and becoming. The manifold
+and self-developing things of the phenomenal world owe their existence
+to isolating thought alone; they possess as such no true reality, and
+speculation proves them void. While things appear particular to inadequate
+representation, the philosopher views them _sub specie aeterni_, in their
+_per se_, in their totality, in the identity, as Ideas. To construe things
+is to present them as they are in God. But in God all things are one;
+in the absolute all is absolute, eternal, infinitude itself. (Accord-to
+Hegel's parody, the absolute is the night, in which all cows are black.)
+
+The world-ground appears as nature and spirit; yet in itself it is neither
+the one nor the other, but the unity of both which is raised above all
+contrariety, the indifference of objective and subjective. Although amid
+the finitude of the things of the world the self-identity of the absolute
+breaks up into a plurality of self-developing individual existences, yet
+even in the phenomenal world of individuals the unity of the ground is not
+entirely lost: each particular existence is a definite expression of the
+absolute, and to it as such the character of identity belongs, though in
+a diminished degree and mingled with difference (Bruno's "monads"). The
+world-ground is absolute, the individual thing is relative, identity and
+totality; nothing exists which is merely objective or merely subjective;
+everything is both, only that one or other of these two factors always
+predominates. This Schelling terms quantitative difference: the phenomena
+of nature, like the phenomena of spirit, are a unity of the real and the
+ideal, only that in the former there is a preponderance of the real, in the
+latter a preponderance of the ideal.
+
+At first Schelling, in Neoplatonic fashion, maintained the existence of
+another intermediate region between the spheres of the infinite and the
+finite: absolute knowing or the self-knowledge of the identity. In this,
+as the "form" of the absolute, the objective and the subjective are not
+absolutely one, as they are in the being or "essence" of the absolute, but
+ideally (potentially) opposed, though one _realiter_. Later he does away
+with this distinction also, as existing for reflection alone, not for
+rational intuition, and outbids his earlier determinations concerning the
+simplicity of the absolute with the principle, that it is not only the
+unity of opposites, but also the unity of the unity and the opposition or
+the identity of the identity, in which fanciful description the dialogue
+_Bruno_ pours itself forth. A further alteration is brought in by
+characterizing the absolute as the identity of the finite and the infinite,
+and by equating the finite with the real or being, the infinite with the
+ideal or knowing. With this there is joined a philosophical interpretation
+of the Trinity akin to Lessing's. In the absolute or eternal the finite
+and the infinite are alike absolute. God the Father is the eternal, or the
+unity of the finite and the infinite; the Son is the finite in God (before
+the falling away); the Spirit is the infinite or the return of the finite
+into the eternal.
+
+In the construction of the real series Schelling proceeds still more
+schematically and analogically than in the _Naturphilosophie_ of the first
+period, the contents of which are here essentially reproduced. With this is
+closely connected his endeavor, in correspondence with the principles of
+the theory of identity, to show in every phenomenon the operation of
+all three moments of the absolute. In each natural product all three
+"potencies" or stages, gravity A(^1), light A(^2), and organization A(^3),
+are present, only in subordination to one of their number. Since the third
+potency is never lacking, all is organic; that which appears to us as
+inorganic matter is only the residuum left over from organization,
+that which could become neither plant nor animal. New here is the
+cohesion-series of Steffens (the phenomenon of magnetism), in which
+nitrogen forms the south pole, carbon the north pole, and iron the point of
+indifference, while oxygen, hydrogen, and water represent the east pole,
+west pole, and indifference point in electrical polarity. In the organic
+world plants represent the carbon pole, animals the nitrogen pole; the
+former is the north pole, the latter the south. Moreover, the points of
+indifference reappear: the plant corresponds to water, the animal to iron.
+Schelling was far outdone in fantastic analogies of this kind by his
+pupils, especially by Oken, who in his _Sketch of the Philosophy of
+Nature_, 1805, compares the sense of hearing, for example, to the parabola,
+to a metal, to a bone, to the bird, to the mouse, and to the horse. As
+nature was the imaging of the infinite (unity or essence) into the finite
+(plurality or form), so spirit is the taking up of the finite into the
+infinite. In the spiritual realm also all three divine original potencies
+are every, where active, though in such a way that one is dominant. In
+intuition (sensation, consciousness, intuition, each in turn thrice
+divided) the infinite and the eternal are subordinated to the finite; in
+thought or understanding (concept, judgment, inference, each in three
+kinds) the finite and the eternal are subordinated to the infinite; in
+reason (which comprehends all under the form of the absolute) the finite
+and the infinite are subordinated to the eternal. Intuition is finite
+cognition, thought infinite cognition, reason eternal cognition. The forms
+of the understanding do not suffice for the knowledge of reason; common
+logic with its law of contradiction has no binding authority for
+speculation, which starts with the equalization of opposites. In the
+_Aphorisms by way of Introduction_ science, religion, and art figure as
+stages of the ideal all, in correspondence with the potencies of the real
+all--matter, motion, and organization. Nature culminates in man, history
+in the state. Reason, philosophy, is the re-establishment of identity, the
+return of the absolute to itself.
+
+Unconditioned knowledge, as Schelling maintains in his encyclopedia,
+_i.e._, his _Lectures on the Method of Academical Study_, is the
+presupposition of all particular knowledge. The function of universities is
+to maintain intact the connection between particular knowledge and absolute
+knowledge. The three higher faculties correspond to the three potencies in
+the absolute: Natural Science and Medicine to the real or finite; History
+and Law to the ideal or infinite; Theology to the eternal or the copula.
+There is further a faculty of arts, the so-called Philosophical Faculty,
+which imparts whatever in philosophy is teachable. The two lectures on
+theology (viii. and ix.) are especially important. There are two forms of
+religion, one of which discovers God in nature, while the other finds him
+in history; the former culminates in the Greek religion, the latter in the
+Christian, and with the founding of this the third period of history (which
+Schelling had previously postponed into the future), the period of
+providence begins. In Christianity mythology is based on religion, not
+religion on mythology, as was the case in heathenism. The speculative
+kernel of Christianity is the incarnation of God, already taught by the
+Indian sages; this, however, is not to be understood as a single event in
+time, but as eternal. It has been a hindrance to the development of
+Christianity that the Bible, whose value is far below that of the sacred
+books of India, has been more highly prized than that which the patristic
+thinking succeeded in making out of its meager contents.
+
+If, finally, we compare Schelling's system of identity with its model, the
+system of Spinoza, two essential differences become apparent. Although both
+thinkers start from a principiant equal valuation of the two phenomenal
+manifestations of the absolute, nature and spirit, Spinoza tends to posit
+thought in dependence on extension (the soul represents what the body is),
+while in Schelling, conversely, the Fichtean preference of spirit is still
+potent (the state and art stand nearer to the absolute identity
+than the organism, although, principiantly considered, the greatest
+possible approximation to the equilibrium of the real and the ideal is as
+much attained in the one as in the other). The second difference lies in
+the fact that the idea of development is entirely lacking in Spinoza, while
+in Schelling it is everywhere dominant. It reminds one of Lessing and
+Herder, who also attempted to combine Spinozistic and Leibnitzian elements.
+
+
+
+%3a. Doctrine of Freedom.%
+
+The system of identity had, with Spinoza, distinguished two worlds, the
+real world of absolute identity and the imagined world of differentiated
+and changeable individual things; it had traced back the latter to the
+former as its ground, but had not deduced it from the former. Whence, then,
+the imagination which, instead of the unchangeable unity, shows us the
+changing manifold? Whence the imperfections of the finite, whence evil?
+The pantheism of Spinoza is inseparably connected with determinism, which
+denies evil without explaining it. Evil and finitude demand explanation,
+not denial, and this without the abandonment of pantheism. But explanation
+by what? By the absolute, for besides the absolute there is naught. How,
+then, must the pantheistic doctrine of the absolute be transformed in order
+that the fact of evil and the separate existence of the finite may become
+comprehensible? To this task are devoted the _Inquiries into the Nature of
+Human Freedom (Philosophical Works_, vol. i., 1809, with which should be
+compared the _Memorial of Jacobi_, 1812, and the _Answer to Eschenmayer_,
+1813).
+
+As early as in the _Bruno_, the problem occasionally emerges why matters do
+not rest with the original infinite unity of the absolute, why the finite
+breaks away from the identical primal ground. The possibility of the
+separation, it is answered, lies in the fact that the finite is like the
+infinite _realiter_, and yet, ideally, is different from it; the actuality
+of the coming forth, however, lies in the non-deducible self-will of
+the finite. Then after Eschenmayer[1] _(Philosophy in its Transition to
+Not-philosophy_, 1803) had characterized the procession of the Ideas out of
+the Godhead as an impenetrable mystery for thought, before which philosophy
+must yield to faith, Schelling, in the essay _Religion and Philosophy_,
+1804, goes more deeply into the problem. The origin of the sense-world is
+conceivable only as a breaking away, a spring, a _falling away_,
+which consists in the soul's grasping itself in its selfhood, in its
+subordination of the infinite in itself to the finite, and in its thus
+ceasing to be in God. The procession of the world from the infinite is a
+free act, a fact which can only be described, not deduced as necessary. The
+counterpart of this attainment of independence on the part of things or
+creation is history as the return of the world to its source. They are
+related to each other as the fall to redemption. Both the dismission of the
+world and its reception back, together with the intervening development,
+are, however, events needed by God himself in order to become actual God:
+He develops through the world. (A similar thought was not unknown in the
+Middle Ages: if God is to give a complete revelation of himself he must
+make known his grace; and this presupposes sin. As the occasion of divine
+grace, the fall is a happy, saving fault; without it God could not have
+revealed himself as gracious, as forgiving, hence not completely.)
+Schelling's study of Jacob Böhme, to which he was led by Baader,
+essentially contributed to the concentration of his thought on this point.
+_The Exposition of the True Relation_, etc., already distinctly betrays the
+influence of this mystic. In correspondence with Böhme's doctrine that God
+is living God only through his inclusion of negation in himself, it is here
+maintained: A being can manifest itself only when it is not merely one, but
+has another, an opposition (the many), in itself, whereby it is revealed to
+itself as unity. With the addition of certain Kantian ideas, in particular
+the idea of transcendental freedom and the intelligible character,
+Schelling's theosophy now assumes the following form:
+
+The only way to guard against the determinism and the lifeless God of
+Spinoza is to assume something in God which is not God himself, to
+distinguish between God as existent and that which is merely the ground of
+his existence or "nature in God." In God also the perfect proceeds from the
+imperfect, he too develops and realizes himself. The actual, perfect God,
+who is intelligence, wisdom, goodness, is preceded by something which is
+merely the possibility of all this, an obscure, unconscious impulse toward
+self-representation. For in the last analysis there is no being but
+willing; to willing alone belong the predicates of the primal being,
+groundlessness, eternity, independence of time, self-affirmation. This
+"ground of existence" is an obscure "longing" to give birth to self, an
+unconscious impulse to become conscious; the goal of this longing is the
+"understanding," the Logos, the Word, wherein God becomes revealed to self.
+By the self-subordination of this longing to the understanding as its
+matter and instrument, God becomes actual God, becomes spirit and love. The
+operation of the light understanding on the dark nature-will consists in a
+separation of forces, whence the visible world proceeds. Whatever in the
+latter is perfect, rational, harmonious, and purposive is the work of the
+understanding; the irrational remainder, on the other hand, conflict and
+lawlessness, abortion, sickness and death, originates in the dark ground.
+Each thing has two principles in it: its self-will it receives from nature
+in God, yet, at the same time, as coming from the divine understanding,
+it is the instrument of the universal will. In God the light and dark
+principles stand in indissoluble unity, in man they are separable. The
+freedom of man's will makes him independent of both principles; going over
+from truth to falsehood, he may strive to make his selfhood supreme and
+to reduce the spiritual in him to the level of a means, or--with divine
+assistance--continuing in the center, he may endeavor to subordinate
+the particular will to the will of love. Good consists in overcoming
+resistance, for in every case a thing can be revealed only through its
+opposite. If man yields to temptation it is his own guilty choice. Evil is
+not merely defect, privation, but something positive, selfhood breaking
+away, the reversal of the rightful order between the particular and the
+universal will. The possibility of a separation of the two wills lies in
+the divine ground (it is "permitted" in order that by overmastering the
+self-will the will of love may approve itself), the actuality of evil is
+the free act of the creature. Freedom is to be conceived, in the Kantian
+sense, as equally far removed from chance or caprice and from compulsion:
+Man chooses his own non-temporal, intelligible nature; he predestinates
+himself in the first creation, _i.e._, from eternity, and is responsible
+for his actions in the sense-world, which are the necessary results of that
+free primal act.
+
+[Footnote 1: K. Ad. Eschenmayer was originally a physician, then, 1811-36,
+professor of philosophy in Tübingen, and died in 1852 at Kirchheim unter
+Teck.]
+
+As in nature and in the individual, so also in the history of mankind, the
+two original grounds of things do battle with one another. The golden age
+of innocence, of happy indecision and unconsciousness concerning sin, when
+neither good nor evil yet was, was followed by a period of the omnipotence
+of nature, in which the dark ground of existence ruled alone, although
+it did not make itself felt as actual evil until, in Christianity, the
+spiritual light was born in personal form. The subsequent conflict of good
+against evil, in which God reveals himself as spirit, leads toward a state
+wherein evil will be reduced to the position of a potency and everything
+subordinated to spirit, and thus the complete identity of the ground of
+existence and the existing God be brought about.
+
+Besides this after-reconciliation of the two divine moments, Schelling
+recognizes another, original unity of the two. The not yet unfolded unity
+of the beginning (God as Alpha) he terms _indifference_ or groundlessness;
+the more valuable unity of the end, attained by unfolding (God as Omega)
+is called _identity_ or spirit. In the former the contraries are not yet
+present; in the latter they are present no longer. The groundless divides
+into two equally eternal beginnings, nature and light, or longing and
+understanding, in order that the two may become one in love, and thereby
+the absolute develop into the personal God. In this way Schelling endeavors
+to overcome the antithesis between naturalism and theism, between dualism
+and pantheism, and to remove the difficulties which arise for pantheism
+from the fact of evil, as well as from the concepts of personality and of
+freedom.
+
+In the two moments of the absolute (nature in God--personal spirit) we
+recognize at once the antithesis of the real and ideal which was given
+in the philosophy of identity. The chief difference between the mystical
+period and the preceding one consists in the fact that the absolute itself
+is now made to develop (from indifference to identity, from the neither-nor
+to the as-well-as of the antithesis), and that there is conceded to the
+sense-world a reality which is more than apparent, more than merely present
+for imagination. That which facilitated this rapid, almost unceasing change
+of position for Schelling, and which at the same time concealed the fact
+from him, was, above all, the ambiguous and variable meaning of his leading
+concepts. The "objective," for example, now signifies unconscious being,
+becoming, and production, now represented reality, now the real, in so far
+as it is not represented, but only _is_. "God" sometimes means the whole
+absolute, sometimes only the infinite, spiritual moment in the absolute.
+Scarcely a single term is sharply defined, much less consistently used in a
+single meaning.
+
+
+%3b. Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation.%
+
+Once again Schelling is ready with a new statement of the problem.
+Philosophy is the science of the existent. In this, however, a distinction
+is to be made between the _what (quid sit)_ and the _that (quod sit)_, or
+between essence and existence. The apprehension of the essence, of the
+concept, is the work of reason, but this does not go as far as actual
+being. Rational philosophy cognizes only the universal, the possible,
+the necessary truths (whose contradictory is unthinkable), but not the
+particular and factual. This philosophy can only assert: If anything exists
+it must conform to these laws; existence is not given with the _what_.
+Hegel has ignored this distinction between the logical and the actual, has
+confused the rational and the real. Even the system of identity was merely
+rational, _i.e., negative_, philosophy, to which there must be added, as a
+second part, a positive or existential philosophy, which does not, like the
+former, rise to the highest principle, to God, but starts from this supreme
+Idea and shows its actuality.
+
+The content of this phase of Schelling's thought[1] was so unfruitful, and
+its influence so small, that brief hints concerning it must here suffice.
+First of all, the doctrine of the divine potencies and of creation is
+repeated in altered form, and then there is given a philosophy of the
+history of religion as a reflection of the theogonic process in human
+consciousness.
+
+[Footnote 1: On Schelling's negative and positive philosophy, published in
+the four volumes of the second division of the _Works_, cf. Karl Groos,
+_Die reine Vernunftwissenschaft, systematische Darstellung von Schellings
+negativer Philosophie_, 1889; Konstantin Frantz, _Schellings positive
+Philosophie_, in three parts, 1879-80; Ed. von Hartmann, _Gesammelte
+Studien und Aufsätze_, 1876, p. 650 _seq_.; Ad. Planck, _Schellings
+nachgelassene Werke_, 1858; also the essay by Heyder, referred to above].
+
+The potencies are now called the infinite ability to be (inactive will,
+subject), pure being (being without potentiality, object), and spirit,
+which is free from the one-sidednesses of mere potentiality and of
+mere being, and master of itself (subject-object); to these is added,
+further--not as a fourth, but as that which has the three predicates and
+is wholly in each--the absolute proper, as the cause and support of these
+attributes. The original unity of the three forms is dissolved, as the
+first raises itself out of the condition of a mere potency and withdraws
+itself from pure being in order to exist for itself; the tension extends
+itself to the two others--the second now comes out from its selflessness,
+subdues the first, and so leads the third back to unity. In creation
+the three potencies stand related as the unlimited Can-be, the limiting
+Must-be, and the Ought-to-be, or operate as material, formal, and final
+causes, all held in undivided combination by the soul. It was not until the
+end of creation that they became personalities. Man, in whom the potencies
+come to rest, can divide their unity again; his fall calls forth a new
+tension, and thereby the world becomes a world outside of God. History, the
+process o progressive reconciliation between the God-estranged world and
+God, passes through two periods--heathenism, in which the second person
+works as a natural potency, and Christianity, in which it works with
+freedom. In the discussion of these positive philosophy becomes a
+_philosophy of mythology and revelation_. The irresistible force of
+mythological ideas is explained by the fact that the gods are not creations
+of the fancy, but real powers, namely, these potencies, which form the
+substance of human conciousness.
+
+The history of religion has for its starting-point the relative monotheism
+of humanity in its original unity, and for its goal the absolute monotheism
+of Christianity. With the separation into nations polytheism arises. This
+is partly simultaneous polytheism (a plurality of gods under a chief god),
+partly successive polytheism (an actual plurality of divinities, changing
+dynasties of several chief gods), and develops from star worship or Sabeism
+up to the religion of the Greeks. The Greek mysteries form the transition
+from mythology to revelation. While in the mythological process one or
+other of the divine potencies (Ground, Son, Spirit) was always predominant,
+in Christianity they return into unity. The true monotheism of revelation
+shows God as an articulated unity, in which the opposites are contained,
+as being overcome. The person of Christ constitutes the content of
+Christianity, who, in his incarnation and sacrificial death, yields up the
+independence out of God which had come to him through the fall of man.
+The three periods in the development of the Church (real, substantial
+unity--ideality or freedom--the reconciliation of the two) were
+foreshadowed in the chief apostles: Peter, with his leaning toward the
+past, represents the Papal Church; Paul the thinker the Protestant Church;
+and the gentle John the Church of the future.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.
+
+SCHELLING'S CO-WORKERS.
+
+In his period of vigorous creation Schelling was the center of an animated
+philosophical activity. Each phase of his philosophy found a circle of
+enthusiastic fellow-laborers, whom we must hesitate to term disciples
+because of their independence and of their reaction on Schelling himself.
+Only G.M. Klein (1776-1820, professor in Würzburg), Stutzmann (died 1816
+in Erlangen; _Philosophy of the Universe_, 1806; _Philosophy of History_,
+1808), and the historians of philosophy Ast and Rixner can be called
+disciples of Schelling. Prominent among his co-workers in the philosophy
+of nature were Steffens, Oken, Schubert, and Carus; besides these the
+physiologist Burdach, the pathologist Kieser, the plant physiologist Nees
+von Esenbeck, and the medical thinker Schelver (_Philosophy of Medicine_,
+1809) deserve mention. Besides Hegel, J.J. Wagner and Friedrich Krause
+distinguished themselves as independent founders of systems of identity;
+Troxler, Suabedissen, and Berger are also to be assigned to this group.
+Baader and Schleiermacher were competitors of Schelling in the philosophy
+of religion, and Solger in aesthetics. Finally Fr. J. Stahl (died 1861;
+_Philosophy of Right_, 1830 _seq_..), was also influenced by Schelling.
+There is a wide divergence in Schelling's school, as J.E. Erdmann
+accurately remarks, between the naturalistic pantheist Oken and the
+mystical theosophist Baader, in whom elements which had been united in
+Schelling appear divided.
+
+
+%1. The Philosophers of Nature.%
+
+Henrik Steffens[1] (a Norwegian, 1773-1845; professor in Halle, Breslau,
+and Berlin) makes individual development the goal of nature--which is first
+completely attained in man and in his peculiarity or talent--and holds that
+the catastrophes of the spirit are reflected in the history of the earth.
+Lorenz Oken[2] (1779-1851; professor in Jena 1807-27, then in Munich and
+Zurich) identifies God and the universe, which comes to self-consciousness
+in man, the most perfect animal; teaches the development of organisms from
+an original slime (a mass of organic elements, infusoria, or cells); and
+looks on the animal kingdom as man anatomized, in that the animal world
+contains in isolated development that which man possesses collected in
+minute organs--the worm is the feeling animal, the insect the light animal,
+the snail the touch animal, the bird the hearing animal, the fish the
+smelling animal, the amphibian the taste animal, the mammal the animal of
+all senses.
+
+[Footnote 1: Steffens, _Contributions to the Inner Natural History of the
+Earth_, 1801; _Caricatures of the Holiest_, 1819-21; _Anthropology_, 1822.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Oken: _On the Significance of the Bones of the Skull_, 1807;
+_Text-book of the Philosophy of Nature_, 1809-11, 2d ed. 1831, 3d ed. 1843;
+the journal _Isis_, from 1817. On Oken cf. C. Güttler, 1885.]
+
+While in Steffens geological interests predominate, and in Oken biological
+interests, Schubert, Carus, and Ennemoser are the psychologists of the
+school. Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert[1] (1780-1860; professor in Erlangen and
+Munich) brings the human soul into intimate relation with the world-soul,
+whose phantasy gives form to all that is corporeal, and delights to dwell
+on the abnormal and mysterious phenomena of the inner life, the border-land
+between the physical and the psychical, on the unconscious and the
+half-conscious, on presentiments and clairvoyance, as from another
+direction also Schelling's philosophy was brought into perilous connection
+with somnambulism. A second predominantly contemplative thinker was Karl
+Gustav Carus[2] (1789-1869; at his death in Dresden physician to the king;
+_Lectures on Psychology_, 1831; _Psyche_, 1846; _Physis_, 1851), greatly
+distinguished for his services to comparative anatomy. Carus endows the
+cell with unconscious psychical life,--a memory for the past shows itself
+in the inheritance of dispositions and talents, just as the formation of
+milk in the breasts of the pregnant and the formation of lungs in the
+embryo betray a prevision of the future,--and points out that with the
+higher development of organic and spiritual life the antitheses constantly
+become more articulate: individual differences are greater among men than
+among women, among adults than among children, among Europeans than among
+negroes.
+
+[Footnote 1: G.H. Schubert: _Views of the Dark Side of Natural Science_,
+1808; _The Primeval World and the Fixed Stars_, 1822; _History of the
+Soul_, 1830 (in briefer form, _Text-book of the Science of Man and of the
+Soul_, 1838).]
+
+[Footnote 2: Not to be confused with Friedrich August Carus (1770-1807;
+professor in Leipsic), whose _History of Psychology_, 1808, forms the third
+part of his posthumous works.]
+
+
+%2. The Philosophers of Identity.%
+
+It has been said of the Dane Johann Erich von Berger (1772-1833; from
+1814 professor in Kiel; _Universal Outlines of Science_, 1817-27) that
+he adopted a middle course between Fichte and Schelling. The same may be
+asserted of Karl Ferdinand Solger (1780-1819; at his death professor in
+Berlin; _Erwin, Four Dialogues on Beauty and Art_, 1815; _Lectures on
+Aesthetics_, edited by Heyse, 1829), who points out the womb of the
+beautiful in the fancy, and introduces into aesthetics the concept of
+irony, that spirit of sadness at the vanity of the finite, though this is
+needed by the Idea in order to its manifestation.
+
+In Johann Jacob Wagner[1] (1775-1841; professor in Würzburg) and in J.P.V.
+Troxler[2] (1780-1866) we find, as in Steffens, a fourfold division instead
+of Schelling's triads. Both Wagner and Troxler find an exact correspondence
+between the laws of the universe and those of the human mind. Wagner
+(in conformity to the categories essence and form, opposition and
+reconciliation) makes all becoming and cognition advance from unity to
+quadruplicity, and finds the four stages of knowledge in representation,
+perception, judgment, and Idea. Troxler shares with Fries the
+anthropological standpoint, (philosophy is anthropology, knowledge of the
+world is self-knowledge), and distinguishes, besides the emotional nature
+or the unity of human nature, four constituents thereof, spirit,
+higher soul, lower soul (body, _Leib_), and body _(Körper)_, and four
+corresponding kinds of knowledge, in reverse order, sensuous perception,
+experience, reason, and spiritual intuition, of which the middle two are
+mediate or reflective in character, while the first and last are intuitive.
+For D. Th. A. Suabedissen also (1773-1835; professor in Marburg;
+_Examination of Man_, 1815-18) philosophy is the science of man, and
+self-knowledge its starting point.
+
+[Footnote 1: J.J. Wagner: _Ideal Philosophy_, 1804; _Mathematical
+Philosophy_, 1811; _Organon of Human Knowledge_, 1830, in three parts,
+System of the World, of Knowledge, and of Language. On Wagner cf. L. Rabus,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Troxler: _Glances into the Nature of Man_, 1812;
+_Metaphysics_, 1828; _Logic_, 1830.]
+
+The relatively limited reputation enjoyed in his own time and to-day by
+Friedrich Krause[1] (born in Eisenberg 1781; habilitated in Jena 1802;
+lived privately in Dresden; became a _Privatdocent_ in Göttingen from 1824;
+and died at Munich 1832; _Prototype of Humanity_, 1812, and numerous other
+works) has been due, on the one hand, to the appearance of his more gifted
+contemporary Hegel, and, on the other, to his peculiar terminology. He not
+only Germanized all foreign words in a spirit of exaggerated purism, but
+also coined new verbal roots, _(Mäl, Ant, Or, Om)_ and from these formed
+the most extraordinary combinations (_Vereinselbganzweseninnesein,
+Oromlebselbstschauen_). His most important pupil, Ahrens (professor in
+Leipsic, died 1874; _Course of Philosophy_, 1836-38; _Natural Right_,
+1852), helped Krause's doctrine to gain recognition in France and Belgium
+by his fine translations into French; while it was introduced into Spain by
+J.S. del Rio of Madrid (died 1869).--Since the finite is a negative, the
+infinite a positive concept, and hence the knowledge of the infinite
+primal, the principle of philosophy is the absolute, and philosophy itself
+knowledge of God or the theory of essence. The Subjective Analytic Course
+leads from the self-viewing of the ego up to the vision of God; the
+Synthetic Course starts from the fundamental Idea, God, and deduces from
+this the partial Ideas, or presents the world as the revelation of God. For
+his attempted reconciliation of theism and pantheism Krause invented the
+name panentheism, meaning thereby that God neither is the world nor stands
+outside the world, but has the world in himself and extends beyond it. He
+is absolute identity, nature and reason are relative identity, viz., the
+identity of the real and ideal, the former with the character of reality,
+the latter with the character of ideality. Or, the absolute considered from
+the side of its wholeness (infinity) is nature, considered from the side of
+its selfhood (unconditionality) is reason; God is the common root of both.
+Above nature and reason is humanity, which combines in itself the highest
+products of both, the most perfect animal body and self-consciousness. The
+humanity of earth, the humanity known to us, is but a very small portion of
+the humanity of the universe, which in the multitude of its members, which
+cannot be increased, constitutes the divine state. Krause's most important
+work is his philosophy of right and of history, with its marks of a highly
+keyed idealism. He treats human right as an effluence of divine right;
+besides the state or legal union, he recognizes many other
+associations--the science and the art union, the religious society, the
+league of virtue or ethical union. His philosophy of history
+(_General Theory of Life_, edited by Von Leonhardi, 1843) follows the
+Fichteo-Hegelian rhythm, unity, division, and reunion, and correlates the
+several ages with these. The first stage is germinal life; the second,
+youth; the third, maturity. The culmination is followed by a
+reverse movement from counter-maturity, through counter-youth, to
+counter-childhood, whereupon the development recommences--without
+cessation. It is to be regretted that this noble-minded man joined to his
+warm-hearted disposition, broad outlook, and rigorous method a heated
+fancy, which, crippling the operation of these advantageous qualities,
+led his thought quite too far away from reality. Ahrens, Von Leonhardi,
+Lindemann, and Roeder may be mentioned as followers of Krause.
+
+[Footnote 1: On Krause cf. P. Hohlfeld, _Die Krausesche Philosophic_, 1879;
+B. Martin, 1881; R. Eucken, _Zur Erinnerung an Krause, Festrede_, 1881.
+From his posthumous works Hohlfeld and Wünsche have published the _Lectures
+on Aesthetics_, the _System of Aesthetics_ (both 1882), and numerous other
+treatises.]
+
+
+%3. The Philosophers of Religion.%
+
+Franz (von) Baader, the son of a physician, was born in Munich in 1765,
+resided there as superintendent of mines, and, from 1826, as professor
+of speculative dogmatics, and died there also in 1841. His works, which
+consisted only of a series of brief treatises, were collected (16 vols.,
+1851-60) by his most important adherent, Franz Hoffman[1] (at his death in
+1881 professor in Würzburg). Baader may be characterized as a mediaeval
+thinker who has worked through the critical philosophy, and who, a
+believing, yet liberal Catholic, endeavors to solve with the instruments
+of modern speculation the old Scholastic problem of the reconciliation of
+faith and knowledge. His themes are, on the one hand, the development
+of God, and, on the other, the fall and redemption, which mean for him,
+however, not merely inner phenomena, but world-events. He is in sympathy
+with the Neoplatonists, with Augustine, with Thomas Aquinas, with Eckhart,
+with Paracelsus, above all, with Jacob Böhme, and Böhme's follower Louis
+Claude St. Martin (1743-1804), but does not overlook the value of the
+modern German philosophy. With Kant he begins the inquiry with the problem
+of knowledge; with Fichte he finds in self-consciousness the essence,
+and not merely a property, of spirit; with Hegel he looks on God or
+the absolute spirit not only as the object, but also as the subject
+of knowledge. He rejects, however, the autonomy of the will and the
+spontaneity of thought; and though he criticises the Cartesian separation
+between the thought of the creator and that of the creature, he as little
+approves the pantheistic identification of the two--human cognition
+participates in the divine, without constituting a part of it.
+
+[Footnote 1: Besides Hoffman, Lutterbeck and Hamberger have described and
+expounded Baader's system. See also Baumann's paper in the _Philosophische
+Monatshefte_, vol. xiv., 1878, p. 321 _seq_.]
+
+In accordance with its three principal objects, "God, Nature, and Man,"
+philosophy divides into fundamental science (logic or the theory of
+knowledge and theology), the philosophy of nature (cosmology or the
+theory of creation and physics), and the philosophy of spirit (ethics and
+sociology). In all its parts it must receive religious treatment. Without
+God we cannot know God. In our cognition of God he is at once knower
+and known; our being and all being is a being known by him; our
+self-consciousness is a consciousness of being known by God: _cogitor, ergo
+cogito et sum_; my being and thinking are based on my being thought by
+God. Conscience is a joint knowing with God's knowing (_conscientia_).
+The relation between the known and the knower is threefold. Cognition is
+incomplete and lacks the free co-operation of the knower when God merely
+pervades (_durchwohnt_) the creature, as is the case with the devil's
+timorous and reluctant knowledge of God. A higher stage is reached when the
+known is present to the knower and dwells with him (_beiwohnt_). Cognition
+becomes really free and perfect when God dwells in (_inwohnt_) the
+creature, in which case the finite reason yields itself freely and in
+admiration to the divine reason, lets the latter speak in itself, and
+feels its rule, not as foreign, but as its own. (Baader maintains a like
+threefoldness in the practical sphere: the creature is either the object
+or, rather, the passive recipient, or the organ, or the representative of
+the divine action, i.e., in the first case, God alone works; in the second,
+he co-operates with the creature; in the third, the creature works with the
+forces and in the name of God. Joyful obedience, conscious of its grounds,
+is the highest freedom). Knowing and loving, thought and volition,
+knowledge and faith, philosophy and dogma are as little to be abstractly
+divided as thing and self, being and thought, object and subject. True
+freedom and genuine speculation are neither blind traditional belief nor
+doubting, God-estranged thinking, but the free recognition of authority,
+and self-attained conviction of the truth of the Church doctrine.
+
+Baader distinguishes a twofold creation of the world and a double process
+of development (an esoteric and an exoteric revelation) of God himself.
+The creation of the ideal world, as a free act of love, is a non-deducible
+fact; the theogonic process, on the contrary, is a necessary event by which
+God becomes a unity returning from division to itself, and so a living God.
+The eternal self-generation of God is a twofold birth: in the immanent
+or logical process the unsearchable will (Father) gives birth to the
+comprehensible will (Son) to unite with it as Spirit; the place of this
+self-revelation is wisdom or the Idea. In the emanent or real process,
+since desire or nature is added to the Idea and is overcome by it, these
+three moments become actual persons. In the creation of the--at first
+immaterial--world, in which God unites, not with his essence, but with
+his image only, the same two powers, desire and wisdom, operate as the
+principles of matter and form. The materialization of the world is a
+consequence of the fall. Evil consists in the elevation of selfhood, which
+springs from desire, into self-seeking. Lucifer fell because of pride, and
+man, yielding to Lucifer's temptation, from baseness, by falling in love
+with nature beneath him. By the creation of matter God has out of pity
+preserved the world, which was corrupted by the fall, from the descent into
+hell, and at the same time has given man occasion for moral endeavor.
+The appearance of Christ, the personification of the moral law, is the
+beginning of reconciliation, which man appropriates through the sacrament.
+Nature participates in the redemption, as in the corruption.
+
+Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher was born in 1768 at Breslau, and died
+in 1834 in Berlin, where he had become preacher at Trinity church in 1809,
+professor of theology in 1810, member of the philosophical section of the
+Academy in 1811, and its secretary in 1814. Reared in the Moravian schools
+at Niesky and Barby, he studied at Halle; and, between 1794 and 1804, was a
+preacher in Landsberg on the Warthe, in Berlin (at the Charité Hospital),
+and in Stolpe, then professor in Halle. He first attracted attention by the
+often republished _Discourses on Religion addressed to the Educated among
+those who despise it_, 1799 (critical edition by Pünjer, 1879), which was
+followed in the succeeding year by the _Monologues_, and the anonymous
+_Confidential Letters on Lucinde (Lucinde_ was the work of his friend Fr.
+Schlegel). Besides several collections of sermons, mention must further
+be made of his _Outlines of a Critique of Previous Ethics_, 1803; _The
+Celebration of Christmas_, 1806; and his chief theological work, _The
+Christian Faith_, 1822, new edition 1830. In the third (the philosophical)
+division of his _Collected Works_ (1835-64) the second and third volumes
+contain the essays on the history of philosophy, on ethical, and on
+academic subjects; vols. vi. to ix., the Lectures on Psychology, Esthetics,
+the Theory of the State, and Education, edited by George, Lommatsch,
+Brandis, and Platz; and the first part of vol. iv., the _History of
+Philosophy_ (to Spinoza), edited by Ritter. The _Monologues_ and _The
+Celebration of Christmas_ have appeared in _Reclam's Bibliothek_.
+
+Schleiermacher's philosophy is a rendezvous for the most diverse systems.
+Side by side with ideas from Kant, Fichte, and Schelling we meet Platonic,
+Spinozistic, and Leibnitzian elements; even Jacobi and the Romanticists
+have contributed their mite. Schleiermacher is an eclectic, but one who,
+amid the fusion of the most diverse ideas, knows how to make his own
+individuality felt. In spite of manifold echoes of the philosophemes of
+earlier and of contemporary thinkers, his system is not a conglomeration
+of unrelated lines of thought, but resembles a plant, which in its own way
+works over and assimilates the nutritive elements taken up from the
+soil. Schleiermacher is attractive rather than impressive; he is less a
+discoverer than a critic and systematizer. His fine critical sense works in
+the service of a positive aim, subserves a harmonizing tendency; he
+takes no pleasure in breaking to pieces, but in adjusting, limiting, and
+combining. There is no one of the given views which entirely satisfies him,
+none which simply repels him; each contains elements which seem to him
+worthy of transformation and adoption. When he finds himself confronted by
+a sharp conflict of opinion, he seeks by careful mediation to construct
+a whole out of the two "half truths," though this, it is true, does not
+always give a result more satisfactory than the partial views which he
+wishes to reconcile. A single example may be given of this conciliatory
+tendency: space, time, and the categories are not only subjective forms of
+knowledge, but at the same time objective forms of reality. "Not only"
+is the watchword of his philosophy, which became the prototype of the
+numberless "ideal realisms" with which Germany was flooded after Hegel's
+death. If the skeptical and eclectic movements, which constantly make their
+appearance together, are elsewhere divided among different thinkers, they
+here come together in one mind in the form of a mediating criticism, which,
+although it argues logically, is yet in the end always guided by the
+invisible cords of a _feeling_ of justice in matters scientific. In its
+weaker portions Schleiermacher's philosophy is marked by lack of grasp,
+pettiness, and sportiveness. It lacks courage and force, and the rare
+delicacy of the thought is not entirely able to compensate for this defect.
+In its fear of one-sidedness it takes refuge in the arms of an often
+faint-hearted policy of reconciliation.
+
+We shall not discuss the specifically theological achievements of this
+many-sided man, nor his great services in behalf of the philological
+knowledge of the history of philosophy--through his translation of Plato,
+1804-28, and a series of valuable essays on Greek thinkers--but shall
+confine our attention to the leading principles of his theory of knowledge,
+of religion, and of ethics.
+
+The _Dialectic_[1] (edited by Jonas, 1839), treats in a transcendental part
+and a technical or formal part of the concept and the forms of knowledge.
+_Knowledge_ is thought. What distinguishes that thought which we call
+knowledge from that other thought which does not deserve this honorable
+title, from mere opinion? Two criteria: its agreement with the thought of
+other thinkers (its universality and necessity), and its agreement with
+the being which is thought in it. That thought alone is knowledge which is
+represented as necessarily valid for all who are capable of thought, and
+as corresponding to a being or reproducing it. These two agreements (among
+thinkers, and of thought with the being which is thought) are the criteria
+of knowledge--let us turn now to its factors. These are essentially the
+two brought forward by Kant, sensibility and understanding; Schleiermacher
+calls them the organic function and the intellectual function. The organic
+activity of the senses furnishes us, in sensations, the unordered, manifold
+material of knowledge, which is formed and unified by the activity of
+reason. If we except two concepts which limit our knowledge, chaos and
+God--absolute formlessness or chaos is an idea just as incapable of
+realization as absolute unity or deity--every actual cognition is a product
+of both factors, of the sensuous organization and of reason. But these two
+do not play equal parts in every cognitive act. When the organic function
+is predominant we have perception; when the intellectual function
+predominates we have thought in the strict sense. A perfect balance of the
+two would be intuition, which, however, constitutes the goal of knowledge,
+never fully to be realized. These two kinds of knowledge, therefore, are
+not specifically, but only relatively, different: in all perception reason
+is also active, and in all thought sensibility, only to a less degree than
+the opposite function. Moreover, perception and thought, or sensibility and
+reason, are by no means to relate to different objects. They have the same
+object, only that the organic activity represents it as an indefinite,
+chaotic manifold, while the activity of reason (whose work consists
+in discrimination and combination), represents it as a well-ordered
+multiplicity and unity. It is the same being which is represented by
+perception in the form of an "image," and by thought in the form of a
+"concept." In the former case we have the world as chaos; in the latter, we
+have it as cosmos. Inasmuch as the two factors in knowledge represent the
+same object in relatively different ways, it may be said of them that they
+are opposed to each other, and yet identical. The same is true of the two
+modes of being which Schleiermacher posits as real and ideal over against
+the two factors in thought. The real is that which corresponds to the
+organic function, the ideal that which corresponds to the activity of
+reason. These forms of being also are opposed, and yet identical. Our
+self-consciousness gives clear proof of the fact that _thought and being_
+can be _identical_; in it, as thinking being, we have the identity of the
+real and the ideal, of being and thought immediately given. As the ego,
+in which the subject of thought and the object of thought are one, is the
+undivided ground of its several activities, so God is the primal unity,
+which lies at the basis of the totality of the world. As in Schelling, the
+absolute is described as self-identical, absolute unity, exalted above
+the antithesis of real and ideal, nay, above all antitheses. God is the
+negation of opposites, the world the totality of them. If there were
+an adequate knowledge of the absolute identity it would be an absolute
+knowledge. This is denied, however, to us men, who are never able to rise
+above the opposition of sensuous and intellectual cognition. The unity of
+thought and being is presupposed in all thinking, but can never actually
+be thought. As an Idea this identity is indispensable, but to think it
+definitely, either by conception or judgment, is impossible. The concepts
+supreme power (God or creative nature) and supreme cause (fate or
+providence) do not attain to that which we seek to think in them: that
+which has in it no opposition is an idea incapable of realization by man,
+but, nevertheless, a necessary ideal, the presupposition of all cognition
+(and volition), and the ground of all certitude. All knowledge must be
+related to the absolute unity and be accompanied by it. Since, then, the
+absolute identity cannot be presented, but ever sought for only, and
+absolute knowledge exists only as an ideal, dialectic is not so much a
+science as a technique of thought and proof, an introduction to philosophic
+thinking or (since knowledge is thought in common) to discussion in
+conformity with the rules of the art. With this the name dialectic returns
+to its original Platonic meaning.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Quaebicker, _Ueber Schleiermachers erkeuntnisstheoretische
+Grundansicht_, 1871, and the _Inquiries_ by Bruno Weiss in the _Zeitschrift
+für Philosophie_, vols. lxxiii.-lxxv., 1878-79.]
+
+The popular ideas of God ill stand examination by the standard furnished
+by the principle of identity. The plurality of attributes which we are
+accustomed to ascribe to God agree but poorly with his unity free from all
+contrariety. In reality God does not possess these manifold attributes;
+they first arise in the religious consciousness, in which his unconditioned
+and undivided working is variously reflected and, as it were, divided. They
+are only the various reflections of his undivided nature in the mind of
+the observer. In God ability and performance, intelligence and will, his
+thought of self and his thought of the world coincide in one. Even
+the concept of personality must not be ascribed to God, since it is a
+limitation of the infinite and belongs to mythology; while the idea of
+life, on the contrary, is allowable as a protection against atheism and
+fatalism. When Schleiermacher, further, equates the activity of God and the
+causality of nature he ranges himself on the pantheistic side in regard
+to the question of the "immanence or transcendence of God," without being
+willing to acknowledge it. It sounds Spinozistic enough when he says: God
+never was without the world, he exists neither before nor outside it, we
+know him only _in_ us and in things. Besides that which he actually brings
+forth, God could not produce anything further, and just as little does he
+miraculously interfere in the course of the world as regulated by natural
+law. Everything takes place necessarily, and man is distinguished above
+other beings neither by freedom (if by freedom we understand anything more
+than inner necessitation) nor by eternal existence. Like all individual
+beings, so we are but changing states in the life of the universe, which,
+as they have arisen, will disappear again. The common representations of
+immortality, with their hope of future compensation, are far from pious.
+The true immortality of religion is this--amid finitude to become one with
+the infinite, and in one moment to be eternal.
+
+Schleiermacher's optimism well harmonizes with this view of the relation
+between God and the world. If the universe is the phenomenon of the
+divine activity, then considered as a whole it is perfect; whatever of
+imperfection we find in it, is merely the inevitable result of finitude.
+The bad is merely the less perfect; everything is as good as it can be;
+the world is the best possible; everything is in its right place; even the
+meanest thing is indispensable; even the mistakes of men are to be treated
+with consideration. All is good and divine. In this way Schleiermacher
+weds ideas from Spinoza to Leibnitzian conceptions. From the former he
+appropriates pantheism, from the latter optimism and the concept of
+individuality; he shares determinism with both: all events, even the
+decisions of the will, are subject to the law of necessity.
+
+In the _philosophy of religion_ Schleiermacher created a new epoch by his
+separation between religion and related departments with which it had often
+been identified before his time, as it has been since. In its origin and
+essence religion is not a matter of knowing, further, not a matter of
+willing, but a matter of the heart. It lies quite outside the sphere of
+speculation and of practice, coincides neither with metaphysics nor with
+ethics, is not knowledge and not volition, but an intermediate third: it
+has its own province in the emotional nature, where it reigns without
+limitation; its essence is intuition and feeling in undivided unity. In
+_feeling_ is revealed the presence of the infinite; in feeling we become
+immediately aware of the Deity. The absolute, which in cognition and
+volition we only presuppose and demand, but never attain, is actually
+given in feeling alone as the relative identity and the common ground
+of cognition and volition. Religion is _piety_, an affective, not an
+objective, consciousness. And if certain religious ideas and actions
+ally themselves with the pious state of mind, these are not essential
+constituents of religion, but derivative elements, which possess a
+religious significance only in so far as they immediately develop from
+piety and exert an influence upon it. That which makes an act religious
+is always feeling as a point of indifference between knowing and doing,
+between receptive and forthgoing activity, as the center and junction
+of all the powers of the soul, as the very focus of personality. And as
+feeling in general is the middle point in the life of the soul, so, again,
+the religious feeling is the root of all genuine feeling. What sort of a
+feeling, then, is piety? Schleiermacher answers: A feeling of _absolute
+dependence_. Dependence on what? On the universe, on God. Religion grows
+out of the longing after the infinite, it is the sense and taste for the
+All, the direction toward the eternal, the impulse toward the absolute
+unity, immediate experience of the world harmony; like art, religion is the
+immediate apprehension of a whole. In and before God all that is individual
+disappears, the religious man sees one and the same thing in all that is
+particular. To represent all events in the world as actions of a God,
+to see God in all and all in God, to feel one's self one with the
+eternal,--this is religion. As we look on all being within us and without
+as proceeding from the world-ground, as determined by an ultimate cause, we
+feel ourselves dependent on the divine causality. Like all that is finite,
+we also are the effect of the absolute Power. While we stand in a relation
+of interaction with the individual parts of the world, and feel ourselves
+partially free in relation to them, we can only receive effects from God
+without answering them; even our self-activity we have from him.
+Nevertheless the feeling of dependence is not to be depressing, not
+humbling merely, but the joyous sense of an exaltation and broadening of
+life. In our devotion to the universe we participate in the life of the
+universe; by leaning on the infinite we supplement our finitude--religion
+makes up for the needy condition of man by bringing him into relation with
+the absolute, and teaching him to know and to feel himself a part of the
+whole.
+
+From this elevating influence of religion, which Schleiermacher eloquently
+depicts, it is at once evident that his definition of it as a feeling of
+absolute dependence is only half correct. It needs to be supplemented by
+the feeling of freedom, which exalts us by the consciousness of the oneness
+of the human reason and the divine. It is only to this side of religion,
+neglected by Schleiermacher, that we can ascribe its inspiring influence,
+which he in vain endeavors to derive from the feeling of dependence. Power
+can never spring from humility as such. This defect, however, does not
+detract from Schleiermacher's merit in assigning to religion a special
+field of spiritual activity. While Kant treats religion as an appendix to
+ethics, and Hegel, with a one-sidedness which is still worse, reduces it to
+an undeveloped form of knowledge, Schleiermacher recognizes that it is
+not a mere concomitant phenomenon--whether an incidental result or a
+preliminary stage--of morality or cognition, but something independent,
+co-ordinate with volition and cognition, and of equal legitimacy. The proof
+that religion has its habitation in feeling is the more deserving of thanks
+since it by no means induced Schleiermacher to overlook the connection of
+the God-consciousness with self-consciousness and the consciousness of
+the world. Schleiermacher's theory, moreover, may be held correct without
+ignoring the relatively legitimate elements in the views of religion which
+he attacked. With the view that religion has its seat in feeling, it is
+quite possible to combine a recognition of the fact that it has its origin
+in the will, and its basis in morals, and that, further, it has the
+significance of being (to use Schopenhauer's words) the "metaphysics of the
+people."
+
+Although religion and piety be made synonymous, it must still be admitted
+that in a being capable of knowing and willing as well as of feeling, this
+devout frame will have results in the spheres of cognition and action. In
+regard to _cultus_ Schleiermacher maintains that a religious observance
+which does not spring from one's own feeling and find an echo therein is
+superstitious, and demands that religious feeling, like a sacred melody,
+accompany all human action, that everything be done with religion, nothing
+from religion. Instead of expressing itself in single specifically
+religious actions, the religious feeling should uniformly pervade the whole
+life. Let a private room be the temple where the voice of the priest is
+raised. Dogmas, again, are descriptions of pious excitation, and take their
+origin in man's reflection on his religious feelings, in his endeavor to
+explain them, in his expression of them in ideas and words. The concepts
+and principles of theology are valid only as descriptions and presentations
+of feelings, not as cognitions; by their unavoidable anthropomorphic
+character alone they are completely unfitted for science. The dogmatic
+system is an envelopment which religion accepts with a smile. He who treats
+religious doctrines as science falls into empty mythology. Principles of
+faith and principles of knowledge are in no way related to one another,
+neither by way of opposition nor by way of agreement; they never come into
+contact. A theology in the sense of an actual science of God is impossible.
+Further, out of its dogmas the Church constructs prescriptive symbols, a
+step which must be deplored. It is to be hoped that some time religion will
+no longer have need of the Church. In view of the present condition of
+affairs it must be said that the more religious a man is the more secular
+he must become, and that the cultured man opposes the Church in order to
+promote religion.
+
+So-called natural religion is nothing more than an abstraction of thought;
+in reality positive religions alone exist. Because of the infinity of God
+and the finitude of man, the one, universal, eternal religion can only
+manifest itself in the form of particular historical religions, which
+are termed revealed because founded by religious heroes, creative
+personalities, in whom an especially lively religious feeling is aroused by
+a new view of the universe, and determines (not, like artistic inspiration,
+single moments, but) their whole existence. Three stages are to be
+distinguished in the development of religion, according as the world is
+represented as an unordered unity (chaos), or as an indeterminate manifold
+of forces and elements (plurality without unity), or, finally, as an
+organized plurality dominated by unity (system)--fetichism with fatalism,
+polytheism, mono- (including pan-) theism. Among the religions of the third
+stadium Islam is physical or aesthetic in spirit; Judaism and Christianity,
+on the other hand, ethical or teleological. The Christian religion is
+the most perfect, because it gives the central place to the concept
+of redemption and reconciliation (hence to that which is essential to
+religion) instead of to the Jewish idea of retribution.
+
+The concept of individuality became of the highest importance for
+Schleiermacher's ethics, as well as for his philosophy of religion; and
+by his high appreciation of it he ranges himself with Leibnitz, Herder,
+Goethe, and Novalis. Now two sides may be distinguished both in regard to
+that which the individual is and to that which he ought to accomplish. Like
+every particular being, man is an abbreviated, concentrated presentation of
+the universe; he contains everything in himself, contains all, that is, in
+a not yet unfolded, germinal manner, awaiting development in life in time,
+but yet in a form peculiar to him, which is never repeated elsewhere. This
+yields a twofold moral task. The individual ought to rouse into actuality
+the infinite fullness of content which he possesses as possibility, as
+slumbering germs, should harmoniously develop his capacities; yet in this
+he must not look upon the unique form which has been bestowed upon him
+as worthless. He is not to feel himself a mere specimen, an unimportant
+repetition of the type, but as a particular, and in this particularity a
+significant, expression of the absolute, whose omission would cause a gap
+in the world. It is surprising that the majority of the thinkers who
+have defended the value of individuality lay far less stress upon the
+micro-cosmical nature of the individual and the development of his
+capacities in all directions than on care for his peculiar qualities.
+So also Schleiermacher. Yet he gradually returned from the extreme
+individualism--the _Monologues_ affect one almost repellently by the
+impulse which they give to vain self-reflection--which he at first
+defended.
+
+In the _Ethics_ (edited by Kirchmann, 1870; earlier editions by Schweizer,
+1835, and Twesten, 1841) Schleiermacher brings the well-nigh forgotten
+concept of goods again into honor. The three points of view from which
+ethics is to be discussed, and each of which presents the whole ethical
+field in its own peculiar way--the good, virtue, duty--are related as
+resultant, force, and law of motion. Every union of reason and nature
+produced by the action of the former on the latter is called a _good_; the
+sum of these unities, the highest good. According as reason uses nature
+as an instrument in formation or as a symbol in cognition her action is
+formative or indicative; it is, further, either common or peculiar. On the
+crossing of these (fluctuating) distinctions of identical and individual
+organization and symbolization is based the division of the theory of
+goods:
+
+                      SPHERES.      RELATIONS.        GOODS.
+  _Ident. Organ.:_    Intercourse.  Right.            The State.
+  _Individ. Organ.:_  Property.     Free Sociability. Class, House,
+                                                        Friendship.
+  _Ident. Symbol.:_   Knowledge.    Faith.            School and
+                                                        University.
+  _Individ. Symbol.:_ Feeling.      Revelation.       The Church
+                                                             (Art).
+
+The four ethical communities, each of which represents the organic union
+of opposites--rulers and subjects, host and guests, teachers and pupils
+or scholars and the public, the clergy and the laity--have for their
+foundation the family and the unity of the nation. Virtue (the personal
+unification of reason and sensibility) is either disposition or skill, and
+in each case either cognitive or presentative; this yields the cardinal
+virtues wisdom, love, discretion, and perseverance. The division of duties
+into duties of right, duties of love, duties of vocation, and duties of
+conscience rests on the distinction between community in production and
+appropriation, each of which may be universal or individual. The most
+general laws of duty (duty is the Idea of the good in an imperative form)
+run: Act at every instant with all thy moral power, and aiming at thy whole
+moral problem; act with all virtues and in view of all goods, further,
+Always do that action which is most advantageous for the whole sphere of
+morality, in which two different factors are included: Always do that
+toward which thou findest thyself inwardly moved, and that to which thou
+findest thyself required from without. Instead of following further the
+wearisome schematism of Schleiermacher's ethics, we may notice, finally,
+a fundamental thought which our philosopher also discussed by itself:
+The sharp contraposition of natural and moral law, advocated by Kant, is
+unjustifiable; the moral law is itself a law of nature, viz., of rational
+will. It is true neither that the moral law is a mere "ought" nor that the
+law of nature is a mere "being," a universally followed "must." For, on the
+one hand, ethics has to do with the law which human action really follows,
+and, on the other, there are violations of rule in nature also. Immorality,
+the imperfect mastery of the sensuous impulses by rational will, has an
+analogue in the abnormalities--deformities and diseases--in nature, which
+show that here also the higher (organic) principles are not completely
+successful in controlling the lower processes. The higher law everywhere
+suffers disturbances, from the resistance of the lower forces, which cannot
+be entirely conquered. It is Schleiermacher's determinism which leads him,
+in view of the parallelism of the two legislations, to overlook their
+essential distinction.
+
+Adherents of Schleiermacher are Vorländer (died 1867), George (died 1874),
+the theologian, Richard Rothe (died 1867; cf. Nippold, 1873 _seq_.), and
+the historians of philosophy, Brandis (died 1867) and H. Ritter (died
+1869).[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: W. Dilthey (born 1834), the successor of Lotze in Berlin, is
+publishing a life of Schleiermacher (vol. i. 1867-70). Cf. also Dilthey's
+briefer account in the _Allgemeine deutsche Biographie_, and Haym's
+_Romantische Schule_, 1870. Further, _Aus Schleiermachers Leben, in
+Briefen_, 4 vols., 1858-63.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII.
+
+HEGEL.
+
+Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born at Stuttgart on August 27, 1770. He
+attended the gymnasium of his native city, and, from 1788, the Tübingen
+seminary as a student of theology; while in 1793-1800 he resided as a
+private tutor in Berne and Frankfort-on-the-Main. In the latter city the
+plan of his future system was already maturing. A manuscript outline
+divides philosophy, following the ancient division, logic, physics, and
+ethics, into three parts, the first of which (the fundamental science, the
+doctrine of the categories and of method, combining logic and metaphysics)
+considers the absolute as pure Idea, while the second considers it as
+nature, and the third as real (ethical) spirit. Hegel habilitated in 1801
+at Jena, with a Latin dissertation _On the Orbits of the Planets_, in
+which, ignorant of the discovery of Ceres, he maintained that on rational
+grounds--assuming that the number-series given in Plato's _Timaeus_ is the
+true order of nature--no additional planet could exist between Mars and
+Jupiter. This dissertation gives, further, a deduction of Kepler's laws.
+The essay on the _Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling_
+had appeared even previous to this. In company with Schelling he edited in
+1802-03 the _Kritisches Journal der Philosophie_. The article on "Faith and
+Knowledge" published in this journal characterizes the standpoint of Kant,
+Jacobi, and Fichte as that of reflection, for which finite and infinite,
+being and thought form an antithesis, while true _speculation_ grasps these
+in their identity. In the night before the battle of Jena Hegel finished
+the revision of his _Phenomenology of Spirit_, which was published in 1807.
+The extraordinary professorship given him in 1805 he was forced to resign
+on account of financial considerations; then he was for a year a newspaper
+editor in Bamberg, and in 1808 went as a gymnasial rector to Nuremberg,
+where he instructed the higher classes in philosophy. His lectures there
+are printed in the eighteenth volume of his works, under the title
+_Propaedeutic_. In the Nuremberg period fell his marriage and the
+publication of the _Logic_ (vol. i. 1812, vol. ii. 1816). In 1816 he was
+called as professor of philosophy to Heidelberg (where the _Encyclopedia_
+appeared, 1817), and two years later to Berlin. The _Outlines of the
+Philosophy of Right_, 1821, is the only major work which was written in
+Berlin. The _Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik_, founded in 1827 as
+an organ of the school, contained a few critiques, but for the rest he
+devoted his whole strength to his lectures. He fell a victim to the cholera
+on November 14, 1831. The collected edition of his works in eighteen
+volumes (1832-45) contains in vols. ii.-viii. the four major works which
+had been published by Hegel himself (the _Encyclopaedia_ with additions
+from the Lectures); in vols. i., xvi., and xvii. the minor treatises; in
+vols. ix.-xv. the Lectures, edited by Cans, Hotho, Marheineke, and
+Michelet. The Letters from and to Hegel have been added as a nineteenth
+volume, under the editorship of Karl Hegel, 1887.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Hegel's Life has been written by Karl Rosenkranz (1844), who
+has also defended the master (_Apologie Hegels_, 1858) against R.
+Haym _(Hegel und seine Zeit,_ 1857), and extolled him as the national
+philosopher of Germany (1870; English by G.S. Hall). Cf., further, the
+neat popular exposition by Karl Köstlin, 1870, and the essays by Ed. von
+Hartmann, _Ueber die dialektische Methode_, 1868, and _Hegels Panlogismus_
+(1870, incorporated in the _Gesammelte Studien und Aufsätze_, 1876). [The
+English reader may consult E. Caird's _Hegel_ in Blackwood's Philosophical
+Classics, 1883; Harris's _Hegel's Logic_, Morris's _Hegel's Philosophy of
+the State and of History_, and Kedney's _Hegel's Aesthetics_ in Griggs's
+Philosophical Classics; and Wallace's translation of the "Logic"--from
+the _Encyclopaedia_--with Prolegomena, 1874, 2d. ed., Translation, 1892,
+Prolegomena to follow. Stirling's _Secret of Hegel, 2_ vols., London, 1865,
+includes a translation of a part of the _Logic_, and numerous translations
+from different works of the master are to be found in the _Journal of
+Speculative Philosophy_. The _Lectures on the Philosophy of History_ have
+been translated by J. Sibree, M.A., in Bohn's Library, 1860, and E.S.
+Haldane is issuing a translation of those on the _History of Philosophy_,
+vol. i., 1892.--TR.]]
+
+We may preface our exposition of the parts of the system by some remarks on
+Hegel's standpoint in general and his scientific method.
+
+
+%1. Hegel's View of the World and his Method.%
+
+In Hegel there revives in full vigor the intellectualism which from the
+first had lain in the blood of German philosophy, and which Kant's moralism
+had only temporarily restrained. The primary of practical reason is
+discarded, and theory is extolled as the ground, center, and aim of human,
+nay, of all existence.
+
+Leibnitz and Hegel are the classical representatives of the
+intellectualistic view of the world. In the former the subjective
+psychological point of view is dominant, in the latter, the objective
+cosmical position: Leibnitz argues from the representative nature of the
+soul to an analogous constitution of all elements of the universe; from the
+general mission of all that is real, to be a manifestation of reason, Hegel
+deduces that of the individual spirit, to realize a determinate series of
+stages of thought. The true reality is reason; all being is the embodiment
+of a pregnant thought, all becoming a movement of the concept, the world a
+development of thought. The absolute or the logical Idea exists first as
+a system of antemundane concepts, then it descends into the unconscious
+sphere of nature, awakens to self-consciousness in man, realizes its
+content in social institutions, in order, finally, in art, religion, and
+science to return to itself enriched and completed, _i.e._, to attain a
+higher absoluteness than that of the beginning. Philosophy is the
+highest product and the goal of the world-process. As will, intuition,
+representation, and feeling are lower forms of thought, so ethics, art, and
+religion are preliminary stages in philosophy; for it first succeeds in
+that which these vainly attempt, in presenting the concept adequately, in
+conceptual form.
+
+If we develop that which is contained as a constituent factor or by
+implication in the intellectualistic thesis, "All being is thought
+realized, all becoming a development of thought," we reach the following
+definitions: (i) The object of philosophy is formed by the Ideas of things.
+Its aim is to search out the concept, the purpose, the significance of
+phenomena, and to assign to these their corresponding positions in
+the world and in the system of knowledge. It is chiefly interested in
+discovering where in the scale of values a thing belongs according to
+its meaning and its destination; the procedure is teleological, valuing,
+aesthetic. Instead of a causal explanation of phenomena we are given an
+ideal interpretation of them. (So Lotze accurately describes the character
+of German idealism.) (2) If all that is real is a manifestation of reason
+and each thing a stage, a modification of thought, then thought and being
+are identical. (3) If the world is thought in becoming, and philosophy has
+to set forth this process, philosophy is a theory of development. If each
+thing realizes a thought, then all that is real is rational; and if the
+world-process attains its highest stadium in philosophy, and this in
+turn its completion in the system of absolute idealism, then all that is
+rational is real. Reason or the Idea is not merely a demand, a longed for
+ideal, but a world-power which accomplishes its own realization. "The
+rational is real and the real is rational" (Preface to the _Philosophy of
+Right_). Or to sum it up--Hegel's philosophy is _idealism, a system
+of identity, and an optimistic doctrine of development_. What, then,
+distinguishes Hegel from other idealists, philosophers of identity, and
+teachers of development? What in particular distinguishes him from his
+predecessor Schelling?
+
+In Schelling nature is the subject and art the conclusion of the
+development; his idealism has a physical and aesthetical character, as
+Fichte's an ethical character. In Hegel, however, the concept is the
+subject and goal of the development, his philosophy is, in the words of
+Haym, a "_Logisierung_" of the world, a _logical idealism_.
+
+The theory of identity is that system which looks upon nature and spirit as
+one in essence and as phenomenal modes of an absolute which is above them
+both. But while Schelling treats the real and the ideal as having equal
+rights, Hegel restores the Fichtean subordination of nature to spirit,
+without, however, sharing Fichte's contempt for nature. Nature is neither
+co-ordinate with spirit nor a mere instrument for spirit, but a transition
+stage in the development of the absolute, viz., the Idea in its other-being
+_(Anderssein)_. It is spirit itself that becomes nature in order to become
+actual, conscious spirit; before the absolute became nature it was already
+spirit, not, indeed, "for itself" _(für sich)_, yet "in itself" _(an
+sich)_, it was Idea or reason. The ideal is not merely the morning which
+follows the night of reality, but also the evening which precedes it.
+The absolute (the concept) develops from in-itself _(Ansich)_ through
+out-of-self _(Aussersich)_ or other-being to for-itself _(Fürsich)_; it
+exists first as reason (system of logical concepts), then as nature,
+finally as living spirit. Thus Hegel's philosophy of identity is
+distinguished from Schelling's by two factors: it subordinates nature to
+spirit, and conceives the absolute of the beginning not as the indifference
+of the real and ideal, but as ideal, as a realm of eternal thoughts.
+
+The assertion that Hegel represents a synthesis of Fichte and Schelling is
+therefore justified. This is true, further, for the character of Hegel's
+thought as a whole, in so far as it follows a middle course between the
+world-estranged, rigid abstractness of Fichte's thinking and Schelling's
+artistico-fanciful intuition, sharing with the former its logical
+stringency as well as its dominant interest in the philosophy of spirit,
+and with the latter its wide outlook and its sense for the worth and the
+richness of that which is individual.
+
+We have characterized Hegel's system, thirdly, as a philosophy of
+development. The point of distinction here is that Hegel carries out with
+logical consecutiveness and up to the point of obstinacy the principle
+of development which Fichte had discovered, and which Schelling also
+had occasionally employed,--the threefold rhythm _thesis, antithesis,
+synthesis_. Here we come to Hegel's _dialectic method_. He reached this as
+the true method of speculation through a comparison of the two forms of
+philosophy which he found dominant at the beginning of his career--the
+Illumination culminating in Kant, on the one hand, and, on the other, the
+doctrine of identity defended by Schelling and his circle--neither of which
+entirely satisfied him.
+
+In regard to the main question he feels himself one with Schelling:
+philosophy is to be metaphysics, the science of the absolute and its
+immanence in the world, the doctrine of the identity of opposites, of the,
+_per se_ of things, not merely of their phenomenon. But the form which
+Schelling had given it seems to him unscientific, unsystematic, for
+Schelling had based philosophical knowledge on the intuition of genius--and
+science from intuition is impossible. The philosophy of the Illumination
+impresses him, on the other hand, by the formal strictness of its inquiry;
+he agrees with it that philosophy must be science from concepts. Only not
+from abstract concepts. Kant and the Illumination stand on the platform
+of reflection, for which the antithesis of thought and being, finite and
+infinite remains insoluble, and, consequently, the absolute transcendent,
+and the true essence of things unknowable. Hegel wishes to combine the
+advantages of both sides, the depth of content of the one, and the
+scientific form of the other.
+
+The intuition with which Schelling works is immediate cognition, directed
+to the concrete and particular. The concept of the philosophy of reflection
+is mediate cognition, moving in the sphere of the abstract and universal.
+Is it not feasible to do away with the (unscientific) immediateness of the
+one, and the (non-intuitive, content-lacking) abstractness of the other,
+to combine the concrete with the mediate or conceptual, and in this way
+to realize the Kantian ideal of an intuitive understanding? _A concrete
+concept_ would be one which sought the universal not without the
+particular, but in it; which should not find the infinite beyond the
+finite, nor the absolute at an unattainable distance above the world, nor
+the essence hidden behind the phenomenon, but manifesting itself therein.
+If the philosophy of reflection, in the abstract lifelessness of its
+concepts, looked on opposites as incapable of sublation, and Schelling
+regarded them as immediately identical, if the former denied the identity
+of opposites, and the latter maintained it primordially given (in the
+absolute indifference which is to be grasped by intuition), the concrete
+concept secures the identity of _opposites through self-mediation_, their
+passing over into it; it teaches us to know the identity as the result of a
+process. First immediate unity, then divergence of opposites, and, finally,
+reconciliation of opposites--this is the universal law of all development.
+
+The conflict between the philosophy of reflection and the philosophy of
+intuition, which Hegel endeavors to terminate by a speculation at once
+conceptual and concrete, concerns (1) the organ of thought, (2) the object
+of thought, (3) the nature and logical dignity of the contradiction.
+
+The organ of the true philosophy is neither the abstract reflective
+understanding, which finds itself shut up within the limits of the
+phenomenal, nor mystical intuition, which expects by a quick leap to gain
+the summit of knowledge concerning the absolute, but reason as the faculty
+of concrete concepts. That concept is concrete which does not assume an
+attitude of cold repulsion toward its contrary, but seeks self-mediation
+with the latter, and moves from thesis through antithesis, and with it, to
+synthesis. Reason neither fixes the opposites nor denies them, but has them
+become identical. The unity of opposites is neither impossible nor present
+from the first, but the result of a development.
+
+The object of philosophy is not the phenomenal world or the relative, but
+the absolute, and this not as passive substance, but as living subject,
+which divides into distinctions, and returns from them to identity, which
+develops through the opposites. The absolute is a process, and all that
+is real the manifestation of this process. If science is to correspond
+to reality, it also must be a process. Philosophy is thought-movement
+(dialectic); it is a system of concepts, each of which passes over into
+its successor, puts its successor forth from itself, just as it has been
+generated by its predecessor.
+
+All reality is development, and the motive force in this development (of
+the world as well as of science) is opposition, _contradiction_. Without
+this there would be no movement and no life. Thus all reality is full of
+contradiction, and yet rational. The contradiction is not that which is
+entirely alogical, but it is a spur to further thinking. It must not
+be annulled, but "sublated" _(aufgehoben), _i.e._, at once negated and
+conserved. This is effected by thinking the contradictory concepts together
+in a third higher, more comprehensive, and richer concept, whose moments
+they then form. As sublated moments they contradict each other no longer;
+the opposition or contradiction is overcome. But the synthesis is still
+not a final one; the play begins anew; again an opposition makes its
+appearance, which in turn seeks to be overcome, etc. Each separate concept
+is one-sided, defective, represents only a part of the truth, needs to be
+supplemented by its contrary, and, by its union with this, its complement,
+yields a higher concept, which comes nearer to the whole truth, but still
+does not quite reach it. Even the last and richest concept--the absolute
+Idea--is by itself alone not the full truth; the result implies the whole
+development through which it has been attained. It is only at the end
+of such a dialectic of concepts that philosophy reaches complete
+correspondence with the living reality, which it has to comprehend; and the
+speculative progress of thought is no capricious sporting with concepts
+on the part of the thinking subject, but the adequate expression of
+the movement of the matter itself. Since the world and its ground is
+development, it can only be known through a development of concepts. The
+law which this follows, in little as in great, is the advance from position
+to opposition, and thence to combination. The most comprehensive example
+of this triad--Idea, Nature, Spirit--gives the division of the system; the
+second--Subjective, Objective, Absolute Spirit--determines the articulation
+of the third part.
+
+
+%2. The System.%
+
+Hegel began with a _Phenomenology_ by way of introduction, in which (not
+to start, like the school of Schelling, with absolute knowledge "as though
+shot from a pistol") he describes the genesis of philosophical cognition
+with an attractive mingling of psychological and philosophico-historical
+points of view. He makes spirit--the universal world-spirit as well as
+the individual consciousness, which repeats in brief the stages in the
+development of humanity--pass through six stadia, of which the first three
+(consciousness, self-consciousness, reason) correspond to the progress
+of the intermediate part of the Doctrine of Subjective Spirit, which is
+entitled _Phänomenologie_, and the others (ethical spirit, religion, and
+absolute knowledge) give an abbreviated presentation of that which the
+Doctrine of Objective and Absolute Spirit develops in richer articulation.
+
+%(a) Logic% considers the Idea in the abstract element of thought, only as
+it is thought, and not yet as it is intuited, nor as it thinks itself; its
+content is the truth as it is without a veil in and for itself, or God in
+his eternal essence before the creation of the world. Unlike common logic,
+which is merely formal, separating form and content, speculative logic,
+which is at the same time ontology or metaphysics, treats the categories as
+real relations, the forms of thought as forms of reality: as thought and
+thing are the same, so logic is the theory of thought and of being in one.
+Its three principal divisions are entitled _Being, Essence, the Concept_.
+The first of these discusses quality, quantity, and measure or qualitative
+quantum. The second considers essence as such, appearance, and (essence
+appearing or) actuality, and this last, in turn, in the moments,
+substantiality, causality, and reciprocity. The third part is divided into
+the sections, subjectivity (concept, judgment, syllogism), objectivity
+(mechanism, chemism, teleology), and the Idea (life, cognition, the
+absolute Idea).
+
+As a specimen of the way in which Hegel makes the concept pass over into
+its opposite and unite with this in a synthesis, it will be sufficient to
+cite the famous beginning of the _Logic_. How must the absolute first be
+thought, how first defined? Evidently as that which is absolutely without
+presupposition. The most general concept which remains after abstracting
+from every determinate content of thought, and from which no further
+abstraction is possible, the most indeterminate and immediate concept, is
+pure _being_. As without quality and content it is equivalent to _nothing_.
+In thinking pure being we have rather cogitated nothing; but this in turn
+cannot be retained as final, but passes back into being, for in being
+thought it exists as a something thought. Pure being and pure nothing are
+the same, although we mean different things by them; both are absolute
+indeterminateness. The transition from being to nothing and from nothing to
+being is _becoming_. Becoming is the unity, and hence the truth of both.
+When the boy is "becoming" a youth he is, and at the same time is not, a
+youth. Being and not-being are so mediated and sublated in becoming that
+they are no longer contradictory. In a similar way it is further shown
+that quality and quantity are reciprocally dependent and united in measure
+(which may be popularly illustrated thus: progressively diminishing heat
+becomes cold, distances cannot be measured in bushels); that essence and
+phenomenon are mutually inseparable, inasmuch as the latter is always the
+appearance of an essence, and the former is essence only as it manifests
+itself in the phenomenon, etc.
+
+The significance of the Hegelian logic depends less on its ingenious and
+valuable explanations of particulars than on the fundamental idea, that the
+categories do not form an unordered heap, but a great organically connected
+whole, in which each member occupies its determinate position, and is
+related to every other by gradations of kinship and subordination. This
+purpose to construct a _globus_ of the pure concepts was itself a
+mighty feat, which is assured of the continued admiration of posterity
+notwithstanding the failure in execution. He who shall one day take it up
+again will draw many a lesson from Hegel's unsuccessful attempt. Before
+all, the connections between the concepts are too manifold and complex
+for the monotonous transitions of this dialectic method (which Chalybaeus
+wittily called articular disease) to be capable of doing them justice.
+Again, the productive force of thought must not be neglected, and to it,
+rather than to the mobility of the categories themselves, the matter of the
+transition from one to the other must be transferred.
+
+%(b) The Philosophy of Nature% shows the Idea in its other-being. Out of
+the realm of logical shades, wherein the souls of all reality dwell,
+we move into the sphere of external, sensuous existence, in which the
+concepts take on material form. Why does the Idea externalize itself? In
+order to become actual. But the actuality of nature is imperfect, unsuited
+to the Idea, and only the precondition of a better actuality, the actuality
+of spirit, which has been the aim from the beginning: reason becomes
+nature in order to become spirit; the Idea goes forth from itself in
+order--enriched--to return to itself again. Only the man who once has been
+in a foreign land knows his home aright.
+
+The relation of natural objects to one another and their action upon one
+another is an external one: they are governed by mechanical necessity,
+and the contingency of influences from without arrests and disturbs their
+development, so that while reason is everywhere discernible in nature,
+it is not reason alone; and much that is illogical, contrary to purpose,
+lawless, painful, and unhealthy, points to the fact that the essence of
+nature consists in externality. This inadequacy in the realization of the
+Idea, however, is gradually removed by development, until, in "life," the
+way is prepared for the birth of spirit.
+
+As Hegel in his philosophy of nature--which falls into three parts,
+mechanics, physics, and organics--follows Schelling pretty closely, and,
+moreover, does not show his power, it does not seem necessary to dwell
+longer upon it. In the next section, also, in view of the fact that its
+models, the constructive psychologies of Fichte and Schelling, have already
+been discussed in detail, a statement of the divisions and connections must
+suffice.
+
+%(c) The Doctrine of Subjective Spirit% makes freedom (being with or in
+self) the essence and destination of spirit, and shows how spirit realizes
+this predisposition in increasing independence of nature. The subject of
+anthropology is spirit as the (natural, sensitive, and actual) "soul" of
+a body; here are discussed the distinctions of race, nation, sex, age,
+sleeping and waking, disposition and temperament, together with talents and
+mental diseases, in short, whatever belongs to spirit in its union with a
+body. Phenomenology is the science of the "ego," i.e., of spirit, in so
+far as it opposes itself to nature as the non-ego, and passes through the
+stages of (mere) consciousness, self-consciousness, and (the synthesis of
+the two) reason. Psychology (better pneumatology) considers "spirit" in its
+reconciliation with objectivity under the following divisions: Theoretical
+Intelligence as intuition (sensation, attention, intuition), as
+representation (passive memory, phantasy, memory), and (as conceiving,
+judging, reasoning) thought; Practical Intelligence as feeling, impulse
+(passion and caprice), and happiness; finally, the unity of the knowing and
+willing spirit, free spirit or rational will, which in turn realizes itself
+in right, ethics, and history.
+
+%(d) The Doctrine of Objective Spirit%, comprehending ethics, the
+philosophy of right, of the state, and of history, is Hegel's most
+brilliant achievement. It divides as follows: (1) Right (property,
+contract, punishment); (2) Morality (purpose, intention and welfare, good
+and evil); (3) Social Morality: (a) the family; (b) civil society; (c) the
+state (internal and external polity, and the history of the world). In
+right the will or freedom attains to outer actuality, in morality it
+attains to inner actuality, in social morality to objective and subjective
+actuality at once, hence to complete actuality.
+
+Right, as it were a second, higher nature, because a necessity posited and
+acknowledged by spirit, is originally a sum of prohibitions; wherever it
+seems to command the negative has only received a positive expression.
+Private right contains two things--the warrant to be a person, and the
+injunction to respect other persons as such. Property is the external
+sphere which the will gives to itself; without property no personality.
+Through punishment (retaliation) right is restored against un-right
+(_Unrecht_), and the latter shown to be a nullity. The criminal is treated
+according to the same maxim as that of his action--that coercion is
+allowable.
+
+In the stadium of morality the good exists in the form of a requirement
+which can never be perfectly fulfilled, as a mere imperative; there remains
+an irrepressible opposition between the moral law and the individual will,
+between intention and execution. Here the judge of good and evil is the
+conscience, which is not secure against error. That which is objectively
+evil may seem good and a duty to subjective conviction. (According to
+Fichte this was impossible).
+
+On account of the conflict between duty and will, which is at this stage
+irrepressible, Hegel is unable to consider morality, the sphere of the
+subjective disposition, supreme. He thinks he knows a higher sphere,
+wherein legality and morality become one: "social morality"
+(_Sittlichkeit_). This sphere takes its name from _Sitte_, that custom
+ruling in the community which is felt by the individual not as a command
+from without, but as his own nature. Here the good appears as the spirit
+of the family and of the people, pervading individuals as its substance.
+Marriage is neither a merely legal nor a merely sentimental relation, but
+an "ethical" (_sittliches_) institution. While love rules in the family, in
+civil society each aims at the satisfaction of his private wants, and yet,
+in working for himself, subserves the good of the whole. Class distinctions
+are based on the division of labor demanded by the variant needs of men
+(the agricultural, industrial, and thinking classes). Class and party honor
+is, in Hegel's view, among the most essential supports of general morality.
+Strange to say, he brings the administration of justice and the police into
+the same sphere.
+
+The state, the unity of the family and civil society, is the completed
+actualization of freedom. Its organs are the political powers (which are
+to be divided, but not to be made independent): the legislative power
+determines the universal, the executive subsumes the particular thereunder,
+the power of the prince combines both into personal unity. In the will of
+the prince the state becomes subject. The perfect form of the state is
+constitutional monarchy, its establishment the goal of history, which
+Hegel, like Kant, considers chiefly from the political standpoint.
+
+History is the development of the rational state; the world-spirit the
+guiding force in this development; its instruments the spirits of the
+nations and great men. A particular people is the expression of but one
+determinate moment of the universal spirit; and when it has fulfilled
+its commission it loses its legal warrant, and yields up its dominion to
+another, now the only authorized one: the history of the world is the
+judgment of the world, which is held over the nations. The world-historical
+characters, also, are only the instruments of a higher power, the purposes
+of which they execute while imagining that they are acting in their own
+interests--their own deed is hidden from them, and is neither their purpose
+nor their object. This should be called the cunning of reason, that it
+makes the passions work in its service.
+
+History is progress in the consciousness of freedom. At first one only
+knows himself free, then several, finally all. This gives three chief
+periods, or rather four world-kingdoms,--Oriental despotism, the Greek
+(democratic) and the Roman (aristocratic) republic, and the Germanic
+monarchy,--in which humanity passes through its several ages. Like the sun,
+history moves from east to west. China and India have not advanced beyond
+the preliminary stages of the state; the Chinese kingdom is a family state,
+India a society of classes stiffened into castes. The Persian despotism is
+the first true state, and this in the form of a conquering military state.
+In the youth and manhood of humanity the sovereignty of the people replaces
+the sovereignty of one; but not all have yet the consciousness of freedom,
+the slaves have no share in the government. The principle of the Greek
+world, with its fresh life and delight in beauty, is individuality; hence
+the plurality of small states, in which Sparta is an anticipation of
+the Roman spirit. The Roman Republic is internally characterized by the
+constitutional struggle between the patricians and the plebeians, and
+externally by the policy of world conquest. Out of the repellent relations
+between the universal and the individual, which oppose one another as
+the abstract state and abstract personality, the unhappy imperial period
+develops. In the Roman Empire and Judaism the conditions were given for the
+appearance of Christianity. This brings with it the idea of humanity: every
+man is free as man, as a rational being. In the beginning this emancipation
+was religious; through the Germans it became political as well. The
+remaining divisions cannot here be detailed. Their captions run: The
+Elements of the Germanic Spirit (the Migrations; Mohammedanism; the
+Frankish Empire of Charlemagne); the Middle Ages (the Feudal System and the
+Hierarchy; the Crusades; the Transition from Feudal Rule to Monarchy,
+or the Cities); Modern Times (the Reformation; its Effect on Political
+Development; Illumination and Revolution).
+
+The philosophy of history[1] is Hegel's most brilliant and most lasting
+achievement. His view of the state as the absolute end, the complete
+realization of the good, is dominated, no doubt, by the antique ideal,
+which cannot take root again in the humanity of modern times. But his
+splendid endeavor to "comprehend" history, to bring to light the laws of
+historical development and the interaction between the different spheres of
+national life, will remain an example for all time. The leading ideas of
+his philosophy of history have so rapidly found their way into the general
+scientific consciousness that the view of history which obtained in
+the period of the Illumination is well nigh incomprehensible to the
+investigator of to-day.
+
+[Footnote 1: A well-chosen collection of aphorisms from the philosophy of
+history is given by M. Schasler under the title _Hegel: Populäre Gedanken
+aus seinen Werken_, 2d. ed., 1873.]
+
+%(e) Absolute Spirit% is the unity of subjective and objective spirit.
+As such, spirit becomes perfectly free (from all contradictions)
+and reconciled with itself. The break between subject and object,
+representation and thing, thought and being, infinite and finite is done
+away with, and the infinite recognized as the essence of the finite. The
+knowledge of the reconciliation of the highest opposites or of the infinite
+_in_ the finite presents itself in three forms: in the form of intuition
+(art), of feeling and representation (religion), of thought (philosophy).
+
+(1) _Aesthetics_.--The beautiful is the absolute (the infinite in the
+finite) in sensuous existence, the Idea in limited manifestation. According
+to the relation of these moments, according as the outer form or the inner
+content predominates, or a balance of the two occurs, we have the symbolic
+form of art, in which the phenomenon predominates and the Idea is merely
+suggested; or the classical form, in which Idea and intuition, or spiritual
+content and sensuous form, completely balance and pervade each other, in
+which the former of them is ceaselessly taken up into the latter; or
+the romantic form, in which the phenomenon retires, and the Idea, the
+inwardness of the spirit predominates. Classical art, in which form and
+content are perfectly conformed to each other, is the most beautiful, but
+romantic art is, nevertheless, higher and more significant.
+
+Oriental, including Egyptian and Hebrew, art was symbolic; Greek art,
+classical; Christian art is romantic, bringing into art entirely new
+sentiments of a knightly and a religious sort--love, loyalty and honor,
+grief and repentance--and understanding how by careful treatment to ennoble
+even the petty and contingent. The sublime belongs to symbolic art; the
+Roman satire is the dissolution of the classical, and humor the dissolution
+of the romantic, ideal.
+
+Architecture is predominantly symbolic; sculpture permits the purest
+expression of the classical ideal; painting, music, and poetry bear a
+romantic character. This does not exclude the recurrence of these three
+stages within each art--in architecture, for example, as monumental
+(the obelisk), useful (house and temple), and Gothic (the cathedral)
+architecture. As the plastic arts reached their culmination among the
+Hellenes, so the romantic arts culminate among the Christian nations. In
+poetry, as the most perfect and universal (or the totality of) art, uniting
+in itself the two contraries, the symbolic and the classical, the lyric
+is a repetition of the architectonic-musical, the epic, of the
+plastic-pictorial, the drama, the union of the lyric and the epic.
+
+(2) _Philosophy of Religion_.--The withdrawal from outer sensibility into
+the inner spirit, begun in romantic art, especially in poetry, is completed
+in religion. In religion the nations have recorded the way in which they
+represent the substance of the world; in it the unity of the infinite and
+the finite is felt, and represented through imagination. Religion is not
+merely a feeling of piety, but a thought of the absolute, only not in the
+form of thinking. Religion and philosophy are materially the same, both
+have God or the truth for their object, they differ only in form--religion
+contains in an empirical, symbolic form the same speculative content which
+philosophy presents in the adequate form of the concept. Religion is
+developing knowledge as it gradually conquers imperfection. It appears
+first as definite religion in two stadia, natural religion and the religion
+of spiritual individuality, and finally attains the complete realization of
+its concept in the absolute religion of Christianity.
+
+Natural religion, in its lowest stage magic, develops in three forms--as
+the religion of measure (Chinese), of phantasy (Indian or Brahmanical), and
+of being in self (Buddhistic). In the Persian (Zoroastrian) religion of
+light, the Syrian religion of pain, and the Egyptian religion of enigma, is
+prepared the way for the transformation into the religion of freedom. The
+Greek solves the riddle of the Sphinx by apprehending himself as subject,
+as man.
+
+The religion of spiritual individuality or free subjectivity passes through
+three stadia: the Jewish religion of sublimity (unity), the Greek religion
+of beauty (necessity), the Roman religion of purposiveness (of the
+understanding). In contrast to the Jewish religion of slavish obedience,
+which by miracle makes known the power of the one God and the nullity of
+nature, which has been "created" by his will, and the prosaic severity of
+the Roman, which, in Jupiter and Fortuna, worships only the world-dominion
+of the Roman people, the more cheerful art-religion of the Hellenes
+reverences in the beautiful forms of the gods, the powers which man is
+aware of in himself--wisdom, bravery, and beauty.
+
+The Christian or revealed religion is the religion of truth, of freedom, of
+spirit. Its content is the unity of the divine nature and the human, God
+as knowing himself in being known of man+; the knowledge of God is God's
+self-knowledge. Its fundamental truths are the Trinity (signifying that God
+differentiates and sublates the difference in love), the incarnation (as a
+figure of the essential unity of the infinite and finite spirit), the fall,
+and Christ's atoning death (this signifies that the realization of the
+unity between man and God presupposes the overcoming of naturality and
+selfishness).
+
+(3) _Philosophy_.--Finally the task remains of clothing the absolute
+content given in religion in the form adequate to it, in the form of the
+concept. In philosophy absolute spirit attains the highest stage, its
+perfect self-knowledge. It is the self-thinking Idea.
+
+Here we must not look for further detailed explanations: philosophy is
+just the course which has been traversed. Its systematic exposition is
+encyclopaedia; the consideration of its own actualization, the history
+of philosophy, which, as a "philosophical" discipline, has to show the
+conformity to law and the rationality of this historical development, to
+show the more than mere succession, the genetic succession, of systems,
+as well as their connection with the history of culture. Each system
+is the product and expression of its time, and as the self-reflection
+of each successive stage in culture cannot appear before this has reached
+its maturity and is about to be overcome. Not until the approach of the
+twilight does the owl of Minerva begin its flight.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV.
+
+THE OPPOSITION TO CONSTRUCTIVE IDEALISM: FRIES, HERBART, SCHOPENHAUER.
+
+In Fries, Herbart, and Schopenhauer a threefold opposition was raised
+against the idealistic school represented by Fichte, Schelling, and
+Hegel. The opposition of Fries is aimed at the method of the constructive
+philosophers, that of Herbart against their ontological positions, and that
+of Schopenhauer against their estimate of the value of existence. Fries
+and Beneke declare that a speculative knowledge of the suprasensible is
+impossible, and seek to base philosophy on empirical psychology; to the
+monism (panlogism) of the idealists Herbart opposes a pluralism, to their
+philosophy of becoming, a philosophy of being; Schopenhauer rejects their
+optimism, denying rationality to the world and the world-ground. Among
+themselves the thinkers of the opposition have little more in common than
+their claim to a better understanding of the Kantian philosophy, and a
+development of it more in harmony with the meaning of its author, than it
+had experienced at the hands of the idealists. Whoever fails to agree
+with them in this, and ascribes to the idealists whom they oppose better
+grounded claims to the honor of being correct interpreters and consistent
+developers of Kantian principles, will be ready to adopt the name
+_Semi-Kantians_, given by Fortlage to the members of the opposition,--a
+title which seems the more fitting since each of them appropriates only a
+definitely determinable part of Kant's views, and mingles a foreign element
+with it. In Fries this non-Kantian element comes from Jacobi's philosophy
+of faith; in Herbart it comes from the monadology of Leibnitz, and the
+ancient Eleatico-atomistic doctrine; in Schopenhauer, from the religion of
+India and (as in Beneke) from the sensationalism of the English and the
+French. We can only hint in passing at the parallelism which exists between
+the chief representatives of the idealistic school and the leaders of
+the opposition. Fries's theory of knowledge and faith is the empirical
+counterpart of Fichte's Science of Knowledge. Schopenhauer, in his doctrine
+of Will and Idea, in his vigorously intuitive and highly fanciful view of
+nature and art, and, in general, in his aesthetical mode of philosophizing,
+with its glad escape from the fetters of method, has so much in common with
+Schelling that many unhesitatingly treat his system as an offshoot of the
+Philosophy of Nature. The contrast between Herbart and Hegel is the more
+pronounced since they are at one in their confidence in the power of the
+concept. The most conspicuous point of comparison between the metaphysics
+of the two thinkers is the significance ascribed by them to the
+contradiction as the operative moment in the movement of philosophical
+thought. The attitude of hostility which Schleiermacher assumed in relation
+to Hegel's intellectualistic conception of religion induced Harms to give
+to Schleiermacher also a place in the ranks of the opposition. Following
+the chronological order, we begin with the campaign opened by Fries under
+the banner of anthropology against the main branch of the Kantian school.
+
+
+%1. The Psychologists: Fries and Beneke.%
+
+Jacob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) was born and reared at Barby, studied
+at Jena, and habilitated at the same university in the year 1801; he was
+professor at Heidelberg in 1806-16, and at Jena from 1816 until his death.
+His chief work was the _New Critique of Reason_, in three volumes, 1807
+(2d ed., 1828 _seq_.), which had been preceded, in 1805, by the treatise
+_Knowledge, Faith, and Presentiment_. Besides these he composed a _Handbook
+of Psychical Anthropology_, 1821 (2d ed., 1837 _seq_.), text-books of
+Logic, Metaphysics, the Mathematical Philosophy of Nature, and Practical
+Philosophy and the Philosophy of Religion, and a philosophical novel,
+_Julius and Evagoras, or the Beauty of the Soul_.
+
+Fries adopts and popularizes Kant's results, while he rejects Kant's
+method. With Reinhold and Fichte, he thinks "transcendental prejudice" has
+forced its way into philosophy, a phase of thought for which Kant himself
+was responsible by his anxiety to demonstrate everything. That _a priori_
+forms of knowledge exist cannot be proved by speculation, but only by
+empirical methods, and discovered by inner observation; they are
+given facts of reason, of which we become conscious by reflection or
+psychological analysis. The _a priori_ element cannot be demonstrated nor
+deduced, but only shown actually present. The question at issue[1] between
+Fries and the idealistic school therefore becomes, Is the discovery of the
+_a priori_ element itself a cognition _a priori_ or _a posteriori_? Is
+the criticism of reason a metaphysical or an empirical, that is, an
+anthropological inquiry? Herbart decides with the idealists: "All concepts
+through which we think our faculty of knowledge are themselves metaphysical
+concepts" (_Lehrbuch zur Einleitung_, p. 231). Fries decides: The criticism
+of reason is an empirico-psychological inquiry, as in general empirical
+psychology forms the basis of all philosophy.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Kuno Fischer's Pro-Rectoral Address, _Die beiden
+Kantischen Schulen in Jena_, 1862.]
+
+With the exception of this divergence in method Fries accepts Kant's
+results almost unchanged, unless we must call the leveling down which they
+suffer at his hands a considerable alteration. Only the doctrine of the
+Ideas and of the knowledge of reason is transformed by the introduction and
+systematization of Jacobi's principle of the immediate evidence of faith.
+Reason, the faculty of Ideas, _i.e._, of the indemonstrable yet indubitable
+principles, is fully the peer of the sensibility and the understanding. The
+same subjective necessity which guarantees to us the objective reality of
+the intuitions and the categories accompanies the Ideas as well; the faith
+which reveals to us the _per se_ of things is no less certain than the
+knowledge of phenomena. The ideal view of the world is just as necessary as
+the natural view; through the former we cognize the same world as through
+the latter, only after a higher order; both spring from reason or the
+unity of transcendental apperception, only that in the natural view we are
+conscious of the fact, from which we abstract in the ideal view, that this
+is the condition of experience. That which necessitates us to rise from
+knowledge to faith is the circumstance that the empty unity-form of reason
+is never completely filled by sensuous cognition. The Ideas are of two
+kinds: the aesthetic Ideas are intuitions, which lack clear concepts
+corresponding to them; the logical Ideas are concepts under which no
+correspondent definite intuitions can be subsumed. The former are reached
+through combination; the latter by negation, by thinking away the
+limitations of empirical cognition, by removing the limits from the
+concepts of the understanding. By way of the negation of all limitations we
+reach as many Ideas as there are categories, that is, twelve, among which
+the Ideas of relation are the most important. These are the three axioms of
+faith--the eternity of the soul (its elevation above space and time, to be
+carefully distinguished from immortality, or its permanence in time),
+the freedom of the will, and the Deity. Every Idea expresses something
+absolute, unconditioned, perfect, and eternal.--The dualism of knowledge
+and faith, of nature and freedom, or of phenomenal reality and true, higher
+reality, is bridged over by a third and intermediate mode of apprehension,
+feeling or presentiment, which teaches us the reconciliation of the two
+realities, the union of the Idea and the phenomenon, the interpenetration
+of the eternal and the temporal. The beautiful is the Idea as it manifests
+itself in the phenomenon, or the phenomenon as it symbolizes the eternal.
+The aesthetico-religious judgment looks on the finite as the revelation and
+symbol of the infinite. In brief, "Of phenomena we have knowledge; in the
+true nature of things we believe; presentiment enables us to cognize the
+latter in the former."
+
+Theoretical philosophy is divided into the philosophy of nature, which
+is to use the mathematical method, hence to give a purely mechanical
+explanation of all external phenomena, including those of organic life,
+and to leave the consideration of the world as a teleological realm to
+religious presentiment--and psychology. The object of the former is
+external nature, that of the latter internal nature. I know myself only as
+phenomenon, my body through outer, my ego through inner, experience. It
+is only a variant mode of appearing on the part of one and the same
+reality--so Fries remarks in opposition to the _influxus physicus_ and
+the _harmonia praestabilata_--which now shows me my person inwardly as
+my spirit, and now outwardly as the life-process of my body. Practical
+philosophy includes ethics, the philosophy of religion, and aesthetics. In
+accordance with the threefold interest of our animal, sensuo-rational, and
+purely rational impulses, there result three ideals for the legislation of
+values. These are the ideal of happiness, the ideal of perfection, and the
+ideal of morality, or of the agreeable, the useful, and the good, the third
+of which alone possesses an unconditioned worth and validity as a universal
+and necessary law. The moral laws are deduced from faith in the equal
+personal dignity of men, and the ennobling of humanity set up as the
+highest mission of morality. The three fundamental aesthetical tempers are
+the idyllic and epic of enthusiasm, the dramatic of resignation, the lyric
+of devotion.
+
+Fries's system is thus a union of Kantian positions with elements from
+Jacobi, in which the former experience deterioration, and the latter
+improvement, namely, more exact formulation. Among his adherents, and he
+has them still, the following appear deserving of mention: the botanists
+Schleiden and Hallier; the theologian De Wette; the philosophers Calker (of
+Bonn, died 1870) and Apelt (1812-59). The last made himself favorably known
+by his _Epochs of the History of Humanity_, 1845-46, _Theory of Induction_,
+1854, and _Metaphysics_, 1857; his _Philosophy of Religion_ (1860) did not
+appear until after his death. The Catholic theologian, Georg Hermes of Bonn
+(1775-1831) favored a Kantianism akin to that of Fries.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The psychological view founded by Fries was consistently developed by
+Friedrich Eduard Beneke (1798-1854). With the exception of three years of
+teaching in Göttingen, 1824-27, whither he had gone in consequence of a
+prohibition of his lectures called forth by his _Foundation of the Physics
+of Ethics_, 1822, he was a member of the university of his native city,
+Berlin, first as _Docent_, and, from 1832, after the death of Hegel, who
+was unfavorably disposed toward him, as professor extraordinary.[1] Besides
+Kant, Jacobi, and Fries, Schleiermacher, Herbart (with whom he became
+acquainted in 1821), and the English thinkers exerted a determining
+influence on the formation of his philosophy. Beneke denies the possibility
+of speculative knowledge even more emphatically than Fries. Kant's
+undertaking was aimed at the destruction of a non-experiential science from
+concepts, and if it has not succeeded in preventing the neo-Scholasticism
+of the Fichtean school, with its overdrawn attempts to revive a deductive
+knowledge of the absolute, this has been chiefly due to the false,
+non-empirical method of the great critic of reason. The root and basis of
+all knowledge is experience; metaphysics itself is an empirical science, it
+is the last in the series of philosophical disciplines. Whoever begins with
+metaphysics, instead of ending with it, begins the house at the roof.
+The point of departure for all cognition is inner experience or
+self-observation; hence the fundamental science is psychology, and all
+other branches of philosophy nothing but applied psychology. By the inner
+sense we perceive our ego as it really is, not merely as it appears to us;
+the only object whose _per se_ we immediately know is our own soul; in
+self-consciousness being and representation are one. Thus, in opposition to
+Kant, Beneke stands on the side of Descartes: The soul is better known
+to us than the external world, to which we only transfer the existence
+immediately given in the soul as a result of instinctive analogical
+inference, so that in the descent of our knowledge from men organized
+like ourselves to inorganic matter the inadequacy of our representations
+progressively increases.
+
+[Footnote 1: On Beneke's character cf. the fourth of Fortlage's _Acht
+psychologische Vorträge_, which are well worth reading.]
+
+Psychology--we may mention of Beneke's works in this field the
+_Psychological Sketches_, 1825-27, and the _Text-book of Psychology_, 1833,
+the third and fourth (1877) editions of which, edited by Dressler, contain
+as an appendix a chronological table of all Beneke's works--must, as
+internal natural science, follow the same method, and, starting with
+the immediately given, employ the same instruments in the treatment of
+experience as external natural science, _i.e._ the explanation of facts
+by laws, and, further still, by hypotheses and theories. Gratefully
+recognizing the removal of two obstacles to psychology, the doctrine of
+innate ideas and the traditional theory of the faculties of the soul by
+Locke and Herbart, (the commonly accepted faculties--memory, understanding,
+feeling, will--are in fact not simple powers, but mere abstractions,
+hypostatized class concepts of extremely complex phenomena,) Beneke seeks
+to discover the simple elements from which all mental life is compounded.
+He finds these in the numerous elementary faculties of receiving and
+appropriating external stimuli, which the soul in part possesses, in part
+acquires in the course of its life, and which constitute its substance;
+each separate sense of itself includes many such faculties. Every act
+or product of the soul is the result of two mutually dependent factors:
+_stimulus and receptivity_. Their coming together gives the first of
+the _four fundamental processes_, that of perception. The second is
+the constant addition of new elementary faculties. By the third,
+the equilibration or reciprocal transfer of the movable elements in
+representations, Beneke explains the reproduction of an idea through
+another associated with it, and the widening of the mental horizon by
+emotion, _e.g._, the astounding eloquence of the angry. Since each
+representation which passes out of consciousness continues to exist in the
+soul as an unconscious product (where we cannot tell; the soul is not in
+space), it is not retention, but obliviscence which needs explanation. That
+which persists of the representation which is passing into unconsciousness,
+and which makes its reappearance in consciousness possible, is called
+a "trace" in reference to its departed cause, and a "disposition"
+(_Angelegtheit_) in reference to its future results. Every such trace
+or germ (_Anlage_)--that which lies intermediate between perception and
+recollection--is a force, a striving, a tendency. The fourth of the
+fundamental processes (which may be traced downward into the material
+world, since the corporeal and the psychical differ only in degree and
+pass over into each other) is the combination of mental products according
+to the measure of their similarity, as these come to light in the formation
+of judgments, comparisons, witticisms, of collective images, collective
+feelings, and collective desires. The innate differences among men depend
+on the greater or lesser "powerfulness, vivacity, and receptivity" of their
+elementary faculties; all further differences arise gradually and are due
+to the external stimuli; even the distinction between the human and the
+animal soul, which consists in the spiritual nature of the former, is not
+original.
+
+Of the five constructive forms of the soul, which result from the varying
+relation between stimulus and faculty, four are emotional products or
+products of moods. If the stimulus is too small pain (dissatisfaction,
+longing) arises, while pleasure springs from a marked, but not too great,
+fullness of stimulus. If the stimulus gradually increases to the point of
+excess, blunted appetite and satiety come in; when the excess is sudden
+it results in pain. A clear representation, a sensation arises when the
+stimulus is exactly proportioned to the faculty; it is in this case only
+that the soul assumes a theoretical attitude, that it merely perceives
+without any admixture of agreeable or disagreeable feelings. Desire is
+pleasure remembered, the ego the complex of all the representations which
+have ever arisen in the soul, the totality of the manifold given within me.
+For the immortality of the immaterial soul Beneke advances an original and
+attractive argument based on the principle that, in consequence of the
+constantly increasing traces, through which the substance of the soul is
+continually growing, consciousness turns more and more from the outer
+to the inner, until finally perception dies entirely away. At death the
+connection with the outer world ceases, it is true, but not the inner being
+of the soul, for which that which has hitherto been highest now becomes the
+foundation for new and still higher developments.
+
+Like Herbart, on whom he was in many ways dependent, Beneke discussed
+psychology and pedagogics with greater success than logic, metaphysics,
+practical philosophy, and the philosophy of religion. He combats the
+apriorism of Kant in ethics as elsewhere. The moral law does not arise
+until the end of a long development. First in order are the immediately
+felt values of things, which we estimate according to the degree of
+enhancement or depression in the psychical state which they call forth.
+From the feelings are formed concepts, from concepts judgments; and the
+abstraction of the categorical imperative is a highly derivative phenomenon
+and a very late result, although the feeling of oughtness or of moral
+obligation, which accompanies the correct estimation of values and bids
+us prefer spiritual to sensuous delights and the general good to our own
+welfare, grows necessarily out of the inner nature of the human soul. There
+are two sources of religion: one theoretical, for the idea of God; the
+other practical, for the worship of God. We are impelled to the assumption
+of a suprasensible, an unconditioned, a providence, on the one hand, by the
+desire for a unitary conclusion for our fragmentary knowledge of the world;
+and, on the other, by moral need, by our unsatisfied longing after the
+good. The attributes which we ascribe to God are taken from experience, the
+abstract attributes from being in general, the naturalistic from the world,
+the spiritual from man. As an inevitable outcome of the transformation of
+religious feelings into representations, and one which is harmless because
+of the unmistakableness of their symbolic character, the anthropomorphic
+predicates, through which we think the Deity as personal, themselves
+establish the superiority of theism over pantheism. The object of religion,
+moreover, is accessible only to the subjective certitude of feeling which
+is given by faith, and not to scientific knowledge.
+
+Feuerbach's anthropological standpoint will be discussed below. Like
+Friedrich Ueberweg (1826-71; professor in Königsberg; _System of Logic_,
+1857, 5th ed., edited by J.B. Meyer, 1882--English translation, 1871), Karl
+Fortlage was strongly influenced in his psychological views by Beneke.
+Born in 1806 at Osnabrück, and at his death in 1881 a professor in Jena,
+Fortlage shared with Beneke an impersonality of character, as well as the
+fate of meeting with less esteem from his contemporaries than he merited
+by the seriousness and originality of his thinking. To his _System of
+Psychology_, 1855, in two volumes, he added, as it were, a third volume,
+his _Contributions to Psychology_, 1875, besides psychological lectures of
+a more popular cast (_Eight Lectures_, 1869, 2d ed., 1872; _Four Lectures_,
+1874).[1] Fortlage characterizes his psychological method--in the criticism
+of which F.A. Lange fails to show the justice for which he is elsewhere
+to be commended--as observation by the inner sense. In the first place,
+consciousness, as the active form of representation, must be separated from
+that of which we are conscious, from the "content of representation," which
+is in itself unconscious, but capable of coming into consciousness. Next
+Fortlage seeks to determine the laws of these two factors. In regard to
+the content of representation he distinguishes more sharply than Herbart
+between the fusibility of the homogeneous and the capacity for complex
+combination possessed by the heterogeneous (the fusion of similars goes on
+even without aid from consciousness, while the connection of dissimilars is
+brought about only through the help of the latter), and adds to these two
+general properties of the content of representation two further ones, its
+revivability (its persistence in unconsciousness), and its dissolubility in
+the scale of size, color, etc. Consciousness, on the other hand, which for
+Fortlage coincides with the ego or self, is treated as the presupposition
+of all representations, not as their result--it is underived activity. He
+explains the nature of consciousness by the concept of attention,
+characterizes them both as "questioning activity" (_Fragethätigkeit_), and
+follows them out in their various degrees from expectation through
+observation up to reflection. The listening and watching of the hunter
+when waiting for the game is only a prolongation of the same consciousness
+which accompanies all less exciting representations. The essential element
+in conscious or questioning activity is the oscillation between yes and no.
+
+As soon as the disjunction is decided by a yes, the desire which lies at
+its basis, and which in the condition of consciousness is arrested, passes
+over into activity. All consciousness is based on interest, and in its
+origin is "arrested impulse" (_Triebhemmung_). "The direction of impulse
+to an intuition to be expected only in the future is called
+consciousness." The rank of a being depends on its capacity for
+reflection: the greater the extent of its attention and the smaller
+the stimuli which suffice to rouse this to action, the higher it stands.
+Impulse--this is the fundamental idea of Fortlage's psychology, like will
+with Fichte, and representation with Herbart--consists of an element of
+representation and an element of feeling.
+
+Pleasure + effort-image = impulse.
+
+[Footnote 1: Among Fortlage's other works we may mention his valuable
+_History of Poetry_, 1839; the _Genetic History of Philosophy since Kant_,
+1852; and the attractive _Six Philosophical Lectures_, 1869, 2d ed., 1872.]
+
+
+In his metaphysical convictions, to which he gave expression in his
+_Exposition and Criticism of the Arguments for the Existence of God_,
+1840, among other works, Fortlage belongs to the philosophers of identity.
+Originally sailing in Hegel's wake, he soon recognizes that the roots of
+the theory of identity go back to the Kantio-Fichtean philosophy, with
+which the system of absolute truth, as he holds, has come into being. He
+thus becomes an adherent of the Science of Knowledge, whose deductive
+results he finds inductively confirmed by psychological experience.
+Psychology is the empirical test for the metaphysical calculus of the
+Science of Knowledge. In regard to the absolute Fortlage is in agreement
+with Krause, the younger Fichte, Ulrici, etc., and calls his standpoint
+_transcendent pantheism_. According to this all that is good, exalted, and
+valuable in the world is divine in its nature; the human reason is of
+the same essence as the divine reason (there can be nothing higher than
+reason); the Godhead is the absolute ego of Fichte, which employs the
+empirical egos as organs, which thinks and wills in individuals, in so
+far as they think the truth and will the good, but at the same time as
+universal subject goes beyond them. If, after the example of Hegel, we give
+up transcendent pantheism in favor of immanence, two unphilosophical modes
+of representing the absolute at once result--on the one hand, materialism;
+on the other, popular, unphilosophical theism. If the Fichtean Science
+of Knowledge could be separated from its difficult method, which it is
+impossible ever to make comprehensible to the unphilosophical mind, it
+would be called to take the place of religion.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: Among Fortlage's posthumous manuscripts was one on the
+Philosophy of Religion, on which Eucken published an essay in the
+_Zeitschrift für Philosophie_, vol. lxxxii. 1883, p. 180 _seq_. after
+Lipsius had given a single chapter from it--"The Ideal of Morality
+according to Christianity"--in his _Jahrbücher für protestantische
+Theologie_ (vol. ix. pp. 1-45). The journals _Im Neuen Reich_, 1881, No.
+24, and _Die Gegenwart_, 1882, No. 34, contained warmly written notices of
+Fortlage by J. Volkelt. Leopold Schmid (in Giessen, died 1869) gives a
+favorable and skillfully composed outline of Fortlage's system in his
+_Grundzüge der Einleitung in die Philosophie mit einer Beleuchtung der
+von K. Ph. Fischer, Sengler, und Fortlage ermöglichten Philosophie der
+That_, 1860, pp. 226-357. Cf. also Moritz Brasch, _K. Fortlage, Ein
+philosophisches Charakterbild_, in _Unsere Zeit_, 1883, Heft II,
+pp. 730-756, incorporated in the same author's _Philosophie der
+Gegenwart_, 1888.]
+
+
+%2. Realism: Herbart.%
+
+Johann Friedrich Herbart was scientifically the most important among the
+philosophers of the opposition. Herbart was born at Oldenburg in 1776, the
+son of a councilor of justice, and had already become acquainted with the
+systems of Wolff and Kant before he entered the University of Jena in
+1794. In 1796 he handed in to his instructor Fichte a critique of two of
+Schelling's treatises, in which the youthful thinker already broke
+away from idealism. While a private tutor in Switzerland he made the
+acquaintance of Pestalozzi. In 1802 he habilitated in Göttingen, where, in
+1805, he was promoted to a professorship extraordinary; while in 1809 he
+received the professorship in Königsberg once held by Kant, and later by
+W. Tr. Krug (died 1842). He died in 1841 at Göttingen, whither he had been
+recalled in 1833. His _Collected Works_ were published in twelve volumes,
+1850-52 (reprinted 1883 _seq_.), by his pupil Hartenstein, who has also
+given an excellent exposition of his master's system in his _Probleme und
+Grundlehren der allgemeinen Metaphysik_, 1836, and his _Grundbegriffe der
+ethischen Wissenschaften_, 1844; a new edition, in chronological order, and
+under the editorship of K. Kehrbach, began to appear in 1882, or rather
+1887, and has now advanced to the fourth volume, 1891. Herbart's chief
+works were written during his Königsberg residence: the _Text-book of
+Introduction to Philosophy_, 1813, 4th ed., 1837 (very valuable as an
+introduction to Herbartian modes of thought); _General Metaphysics_, 1829
+(preceded in 1806 and 1808 by _The Principal Points in Metaphysics_, with a
+supplement, _The Principal Points in Logic); Text-book of Psychology_,[1]
+1816, 2d ed., 1834; _On the Possibility and Necessity of applying
+Mathematics to Psychology_, 1822; _Psychology as a Science_, 1824-25. The
+two works on ethics, which were widely separated in time, were, on the
+other hand, written in Göttingen: _General Practical Philosophy_, 1808;
+_Analytical Examination of Natural Right and of Morals_, 1836. To these
+may be added a _Discourse on Evil_, 1817; _Letters on the Doctrine of
+the Freedom of the Human Will_, 1836; and the _Brief Encyclopaedia of
+Philosophy_, 1831, 2d ed., 1841. His works on education and instruction,
+whose influence and value perhaps exceed those of his philosophical
+achievements (collected editions of the pedagogical works have been
+prepared by O. Willmann, 1873-75, 2d ed., 1880; and by Bartholomaei),
+extended through his whole life. Besides pedagogics, psychology was the
+chief sphere of his services.
+
+[Footnote 1: English translation by M.K. Smith, 1891.]
+
+In antithesis to the philosophy of intuition with its imagined superiority
+to the standpoint of reflection, Herbart makes philosophy begin with
+attention to concepts, defining it as the elaboration of concepts.
+Philosophy, therefore, is not distinguished from other sciences by its
+object, but by its method, which again must adapt itself to the
+peculiarity of the object, to the starting point of the investigation in
+question--there is no universal philosophical method. There are as many
+divisions of philosophy as there are modes of elaborating concepts. The
+first requisite is the discrimination of concepts, both the discrimination
+of concepts from others and of the marks within each concept. This work
+of making concepts clear and distinct is the business of logic. With this
+discipline, in which Herbart essentially follows Kant, are associated two
+other forms of the elaboration of concepts, that of physical and that
+of aesthetic concepts. Both of these classes require more than a merely
+logical elucidation. The physical concepts, through which we apprehend the
+world and ourselves, contain contradictions and must be freed from them;
+their correction is the business of meta-physics. Metaphysics is the
+science of the comprehensibility of experience. The aesthetic (including
+the ethical) concepts are distinguished from the nature-concepts by a
+peculiar increment which they occasion in our representation, and which
+consists in a judgment of approval or disapproval. To clear up these
+concepts and to free them from false allied ideas is the task of aesthetics
+in its widest sense. This includes all concepts which are accompanied by a
+judgment of praise or blame; the most important among them are the ethical
+concepts. Thus, aside from logic, we reach two principal divisions of
+philosophy, which are elsewhere contrasted as theoretical and practical,
+but here in Herbart as metaphysics and aesthetics. Herbart maintains that
+these are entirely independent of each other, so that aesthetics, since it
+presupposes nothing of metaphysics, may be discussed before metaphysics,
+while the philosophy of nature and psychology depend throughout on
+ontological principles. Together with natural theology the two latter
+sciences constitute "applied" metaphysics. This in turn presupposes
+"general" metaphysics, which subdivides into four parts: Methodology,
+Ontology, Synechology, _i.e._, the theory of the continuous ([Greek:
+_suneches_]), which treats of the continua, space, time, and motion, and
+Eidolology, _i.e._, the theory of images or representations. The last forms
+the transition to psychology, while synechology forms the preparation
+for the philosophy of nature, whose most general problems it solves. Our
+exposition will not need to observe these divisions closely.
+
+Metaphysics starts with the given, but cannot rest content with it, for it
+contains contradictions. In resolving these we rise above the given. What
+_is given_? Kant has not answered this question with entire correctness.
+We may, indeed, term the totality of the given "phenomena," but this
+presupposes something which appears. If nothing existed there would also
+nothing appear. As smoke points to fire, so appearance to being. So much
+seeming, so much indication of being. Things in themselves may be known
+mediately, though not immediately, by following out the indications of
+being contained by the given appearance. Further, not merely the unformed
+matter of cognition is given to us, but it is rather true that everything
+comes under this concept which experience so presses on us that we cannot
+resist it; hence not merely single sensations, but entire sensation-groups,
+not merely the matter, but also the forms of experience. If the latter were
+really subjective products, as Kant holds, it would necessarily be possible
+for us at will to think each perceptive-content either under the category
+of substance, or property, or cause--possible for us, if we chose, to see
+a round table quadrilateral. In reality we are bound in the application of
+these forms; they are given for each object in a definite way. The given
+forms--Herbart calls them experience-concepts--contain contradictions.
+How can these contradictions be removed? We may neither simply reject the
+concepts which are burdened with contradictions, for they are given, nor
+leave them as they are, for the logical _principium contradictionis_
+requires that the contradiction as such be rooted out. The
+experience-concepts are valid (they find application in experience), but
+they are not thinkable. Therefore we must so transform and supplement them
+that they shall become free from contradictions and thinkable. The method
+which Herbart employs to remove the contradictions is as follows: The
+contradiction always consists in the fact that an _a_ should be the same as
+a _b_, but is not so. The desiderated likeness of the two is impossible so
+long as we think _a_ as _one_ thing. That which is unsuccessful in this
+case will succeed, perhaps, if in thought we break up the _a_ into several
+things--[Greek: _a b g_]. Then we shall be able to explain through the
+"together" (_Zusammen_) of this plurality what we were unable to explain
+from the undecomposed _a_, or from the single constituents of it. The
+"together" is a "relation" established by thought among the elements of the
+real. For this reason Herbart terms his method of finding out necessary
+supplements to the given "the method of relations." Another name for the
+same thing is "the method of contingent aspects." Mechanics operates with
+contingent aspects when, for the sake of explanation, it resolves a given
+motion into several components. Such fictions and substitutions--auxiliary
+concepts, which are not real, but which serve only as paths for
+thought--may be successfully employed by metaphysics also. The abstract
+expression of this method runs: The contradiction is to be removed by
+thinking one of its members as manifold rather than as one. In order to
+observe the workings of this Herbartian machine we shall go over the four
+principal contradictions by which his acuteness is put to the test--the
+problems of inherence, of change, of the continuous, of the ego.
+
+We call the given sensation-complexes "things," and ascribe "properties" to
+them. How can one and the same thing have different properties--how can
+the one be at the same time many? To say that the thing "possesses" the
+properties does not help the matter. The possession of the different
+properties is itself just as manifold and various as the properties which
+are possessed. Hence the concept of the thing and its properties must be
+so transformed that the plurality which seems to be in the thing shall be
+transferred without it. Instead of one thing let us assume several, each
+with a single definite property, from whose "together" the appearance
+of many qualities in one thing now arises. The appearance of manifold
+properties in the one thing has its ground in the "together" of many
+things, each of which has one simple quality. Again, it is just as
+impossible for a thing to have different qualities in succession, or to
+change, as it is for it to have them at the same time. The popular view
+of change, which holds that a thing takes on different forms (ice, water,
+steam) and yet remains the same substance, is untenable. How is it possible
+to become another, and yet to remain the same? The universal feeling that
+the concept needs correction betrays itself in the fact that everyone
+involuntarily adds a cause to the change in thought, and seeks a cause for
+it, and thus of himself undertakes a transformation of the concept, though,
+it is true, an inadequate one. If we think this concept through we come
+upon a trilemma, a threefold impossibility. Whether we endeavor to deduce
+the change from external or from internal causes, or (with Hegel) to think
+it as causeless, in each case we involve ourselves in inconceivabilities.
+All three ideas--change as mechanism, as self-determination or freedom,
+as absolute becoming--are alike absurd. We can escape these contradictions
+only by the bold decision to conceive the quality of the existent as
+unchangeable. For the truly existent there is no change whatever. It
+remains, however, to explain the appearance of change, in which the wand of
+decomposition and the "together" again proves its magic power. Supported by
+the motley manifoldness of phenomena, we posit real beings as qualitatively
+different, and view this diversity as partial contraposition; we resolve,
+_e.g._, the simple quality _a_ into the elements _x_ + _z_, and a second
+quality _b_ into _y - z_. So long as the individual things remain by
+themselves, the opposition of the qualities will not make itself evident.
+But as soon as they come together, something takes place--now the opposites
+(+_z_ and -_z_) seek to destroy or at least to disturb each other. The
+reals defend themselves against the disturbance which would follow if the
+opposites could destroy each other, by each conserving its simple,
+unchangeable quality, _i.e._, by simply remaining self-identical.
+_Self-conservation against_ threatened _disturbances_ from without (it may
+be compared to resistance against pressure) is the only real change, and
+apparent change, the empirical changes of things, to be explained from
+this. That which changes is only the relations between the beings, as a
+thing maintains itself now against this and now against that other thing;
+the relations, however, and their change are something entirely contingent
+and indifferent to the existent. In itself the self-conservation of a real
+is as uniform as the quality which is conserved, but in virtue of the
+changing relations (the variety of the disturbing things) it can express
+itself for the observer in manifold ways as force. The real itself changes
+as little as a painting changes, for instance, when, seen near at hand, the
+figures in it are clearly distinguished, while for the distant
+observer, on the contrary, they run together into an indistinguishable
+chaos. Change has no meaning in the sphere of the existent.
+
+Anyone who speaks thus has denied change, not deduced it. Among the many
+objections experienced by Herbart's endeavor to explain the empirical
+fact of change by his theory of self-conservation against threatened
+disturbances Lotze's is the most cogent: The unsuccessful attempt to
+solve the difficulties in the concept of becoming and action is still
+instructive, for it shows that they cannot be solved in this way--from the
+concept of inflexible being. If the "together," the threatened disturbance,
+and the reaction against the latter be taken as realities, then, in the
+affection by the disturber, the concept of change remains uneliminated and
+uncorrected; if they be taken as unreal concepts auxiliary to thought,
+change is relegated from the realm of being to the realm of seeming.
+Herbart gives to them a kind of semi-reality, less true than the unmoving
+ground of things (their unchangeable, permanent qualities), and more true
+than their contradictory exterior (the empirical appearance of change).
+Between being and seeming he thrusts in, as though between day and night,
+the twilight region of his "contingent aspects," with their relations,
+which are nothing to the real, their disturbances, which do not come to
+pass, and their self-conservations, which are nothing but undisturbed
+continuance in existence on the part of the real.
+
+Besides the contradictions in the concepts of inherence, of change,
+and action and passion, it is the concept of being which prevents our
+philosopher from ascribing a living character to reality. Being, as Kant
+correctly perceived, contains nothing qualitative; it is absolute position.
+Whoever affirms that an object _is_, expresses thereby that the matter is
+to rest with the simple position; in which is included that it is nothing
+dependent, relative, or negative. (Every negation is something relative,
+relates to a precedent position, which is to be annulled by it.) Besides
+being, the existent contains something more--a quality; it consists of this
+absolute position and a _what_. If this _what_ is separated from being we
+reach an "image"; united with being it yields an essence or a real. This
+_what_ of things is not their sensuous qualities; the latter belong rather
+to the mere phenomenon. No one of them indicates what the object is by
+itself, when left alone. They depend on contingent circumstances, and apart
+from these they would not exist--what is color in the dark? what sound
+in airless space? what weight in empty space? what fusibility without
+fire?--they are each and all relative. Since being excludes negation of
+every kind, the quality of the existent must be absolutely _simple and
+unchangeable_; it brooks no manifoldness, no quantity, no distinctions in
+degree, no becoming; all this were a corruption of the purely affirmative
+or positive character of being. The existent is unextended and eternal.
+The Eleatics are to be praised because the need of escaping from the
+contradictions in the world of experience led them to make themselves
+masters of the concept of being without relation and without negation, and
+of the simple, homogeneous quality of the existent in its full purity. But
+while the Eleatics conceived the existent as one, the atomists made an
+advance by assuming a _plurality_ of reals. The truly one never becomes
+a plurality; plurality is given, hence an original plurality must be
+postulated. Herbart characterizes his own standpoint as qualitative
+atomism, since his reals are differentiated by their properties, not by
+quantitative relations (size and figure). The idealists and the pantheists
+make a false use of the tendency toward unity which, no doubt, is present
+in our reason, when they maintain that true being must be one. There is
+absolutely nothing in the concept of being to forbid us to think the
+existent as many; while the world of phenomena, with its many things and
+their many properties, gives irrefragable grounds which compel us to this
+conclusion. Hence, according to Herbart, the true reality is a (very
+large, though not, it is true, an infinite[1]) plurality of supra-sensible
+(non-spatial and non-temporal) reals, or, according to the Leibnitzian
+expression, monads, which all their life have nothing further to do than
+to preserve intact against disturbances the simple quality in which they
+consist (for the existent is not distinct from its quality; it does not
+have the quality, but is the quality). Each thing has but one response for
+the most varied influences: it answers all suggestions from without by
+affirming its _what_, by continually repeating, as it were, the same note,
+which gains a varying meaning only in so far as, in accordance with the
+character of the disturber, it appears now as a third, now as a fifth or
+seventh. This picture of the world is certainly not attractive; in it all
+change and becoming, all life and all activity is offered up on the altar
+of monotonous being. Happily Herbart is inconsistent enough to enliven this
+comfortless waste of changeless being by the relatively real or semi-real
+manifoldness of the self-conservations.
+
+The infinite divisibility of space and of matter forms the chief difficulty
+in the problem of the continuous. Herbart endeavors to solve it by the
+assumption of an intelligible space with "fixed" lines (lines formed by a
+definite number of points, hence finitely divisible, and not continuous).
+Metaphysics demands the fixed or discrete line, although common thought
+is incapable of conceiving it. Space is a mere form of combination in
+representation or for the observer, and yet it is objective, _i.e._, it is
+valid for all intelligences, and not merely for human intelligence.
+From his complex and unproductive endeavors to derive the appearance of
+continuity from discontinuous reality we hurry on to the fourth, the
+psychological problem, which Herbart discusses with great acuteness. He
+considers it the chief merit of Fichte's Science of Knowledge that it
+called attention to this problem.
+
+The concept of the ego, of whose reality we have so strong and immediate a
+conviction that, in the formula of asseveration, "as true as I exist,"
+it is made the criterion of all other certitude, labors under various
+contradictions. Besides the familiar difficulty, here especially sensible,
+of one thing with many marks, it contains other absurdities of its own. In
+the ego or self-consciousness subject and object are to be identical.
+The identity of the representing and the represented ego is a
+self-contradictory idea, for the law of contradiction forbids the equation
+of opposites, while a subject is subject only through the fact that it is
+not object. But, again, self-consciousness can never be realized, because
+it involves a _regressus in infinitum_. The ego is defined as that which
+represents itself. What is this "self"? It is, in turn, the self-knower.
+This new explanation contains still a further self; which once more
+signifies the self-knower and so on to infinity. The ego represents the
+representation (_Vorstellen_) of its representation (_Vorstellen)_, etc.
+The representation (_Vorstellung_) of the ego, therefore, can never be
+actually brought to completion. (The assumption of the freedom of the will
+leads to an analogous _regressus in infinitum_, in which the question,
+"Willst thou thy volition?" "Willst thou the willing of this volition"? is
+repeated to infinity.) The only escape from this tissue of absurdities
+is to think the ego otherwise than is done by popular consciousness. The
+knowing and the known ego are by no means the same, but the observing
+subject in self-consciousness is one group of representations, the observed
+subject another. Thus, for example, newly formed representations are
+apperceived by the existing older ones, but the highest apperceiver is not,
+in turn, itself apperceived. The ego is not a unit being, which represents
+itself in the literal meaning of the phrase, but that which is represented
+is a plurality. The ego is the junction of numberless series of
+representations, and is constantly changing its place; it dwells now in
+this representation, now in that. But as we distinguish the point of
+meeting from the series which meet there, and imagine that it is possible
+simultaneously to abstract from all the represented series (whereas in fact
+we can only abstract from each one separately), there arises the appearance
+of a permanent ego as the unit subject of all our representations. In
+reality the ego is not the source of our representations, but the final
+result of their combination. The representation, not the ego, is the
+fundamental concept of psychology, the ego constituting rather its most
+difficult problem.[1] It is a "result of other representations, which,
+however, in order to yield this result, must be together in a single
+substance, and must interpenetrate one another" (_Text-book of
+Introduction_, p. 243). In this way Herbart defends the substantiality
+of the soul against Kant and Fries. The soul's immortality (as also its
+pre-existence) goes without saying, because of the non-temporal character
+of the real.
+
+[Footnote 1: On the Herbartian psychology, cf. Ribot, _German Psychology of
+To-day_, English Translation by Baldwin, 1886, pp. 24-67; and G.F. Stout,
+_Mind_, vols. xiii.-xiv.--TR.]
+
+The soul is one of these reals which, unchangeable in themselves, enter
+into various relations with others, and conserve themselves against the
+latter. In its simple _what_ as unknowable as the rest, it is yet familiar
+to us in its self-conservations. In the absence of a more fitting
+expression for the totality of psychical phenomena we call these
+_representations_, the phenomenal manifoldness of which is due to the
+variety of the disturbances and exists for the observer alone. In itself,
+without a plurality of dispositions and impulses, the soul is originally
+not a representative force, but first becomes such under certain
+circumstances, viz., when it is stimulated to self-conservation by other
+beings. The sum of the reals which stand in immediate relation to the soul
+is called its body; this, an aggregate of simple beings, furnishes the
+intermediate link of causal relation between the soul and the external
+world. The soul has its (movable) seat in the brain. In opposition to the
+physiological treatment of psychology, Herbart remarks that psychology
+throws much more light on physiology than she can ever receive from it.
+
+The simplest representations are the sensations, which, amid all their
+variety, still group themselves into definite classes (odors, sounds,
+colors). They serve us as symbols of the disturbing reals, but they are not
+images of things, nor effects of these, but products of the soul itself:
+the generation of sensations is the soul's peculiar way of guarding itself
+against threatened disturbances. Every representation once come into being
+disappears again from consciousness, it is true, but not from the soul.
+It persists, unites with others, and stands with them in a relation of
+interaction--in both cases according to definite laws. These original
+representations are the only ones which the soul produces by its own
+activity; all other psychical phenomena, feeling, desire, will, attention,
+memory, judgment, the whole wealth of inner events, result of themselves
+from the interplay of the primary representations under law. Representation
+(more exactly sensation) is alone original; space, time, the categories,
+which Kant makes _a priori_, are all acquired, _i.e._, like all the higher
+mental life, they are the results of a psychical _mechanism_, results whose
+production needs no renewed exertion on the part of the soul itself. It has
+been a very harmful error in psychology hitherto to ascribe each particular
+mental activity to a special _faculty of the soul_ having a similar name,
+instead of deriving it from combinations of simple representations.
+Abstract, empty class ideas have been treated as real forces, in the belief
+that thus the single concrete acts had been "explained."
+
+There is no bitterer foe of the faculty theory than Herbart. His campaign
+against it, if not victorious, was yet salutary, and the motives of his
+hostility, up to a certain point, entirely justified. Nothing is more
+useless than the assurance that what the soul actually does, that it must
+also have the power to do. Who disputes this? A faculty explains nothing
+so long as the laws under which its functions and its relations to other
+faculties remain unexplained. But although the faculty idea serves no
+positive end, it cannot be entirely discarded. It marks the boundary where
+our ability to reduce one class of psychical phenomena to another ceases.
+Herbart's polemic has no force against the moderate and necessary use of
+this idea, no matter how much it was in place in view of the impropriety of
+a superfluous multiplication of the faculties of the soul. The realization
+of the ideal of psychology, the reduction of the complex phenomena of
+mental life to the smallest possible number of simple elements, is limited
+by the heterogeneity of the original phenomena, knowing, feeling, willing,
+which wholly resists derivation from the combination of sensations. That
+which blinded Herbart to these limitations was that tendency toward unity,
+which, as a metaphysician and moral philosopher, he had all too willfully
+suppressed, and which now took revenge for this infringement of its rights
+by misleading the psychologist to an exaggeration which had important
+consequences. Nevertheless his unsuccessful attempt remains interesting and
+worthy of gratitude.
+
+
+
+The discovery of the laws which govern the interaction of the psychical
+elements is the task of a _statics and a mechanics_ of representations. The
+former investigates the equilibrium or the settled final state; the latter,
+the change, _i.e._ the movements of representations. These names of
+themselves betray Herbart's conviction that mathematics can and must be
+applied to psychology. The bright hopes, however, which Herbart formed for
+the attempt at a mathematical psychology, were fulfilled neither in his own
+endeavors nor in those of his pupils, although, as Lotze remarks, it would
+be asserting too much to say that the most general formulas which he set up
+contradict experience.--The unity of the soul forces representations to act
+on one another. Disparate representations, those, that is, which belong
+to different representative series, as the visual image of a rose and the
+auditory image of the word rose, or as the sensations yellow, hard, round,
+ringing, connected in the concept gold piece, enter into complications
+[complexes]. Homogeneous representations (the memory image and the
+perceptual image of a black poodle) fuse into a single representation.
+Opposed representations (red and blue) arrest one another when they are in
+consciousness together. The connection and graded fusion of representations
+is the basis of their retention and reproduction, as well as of the
+formation of continuous series of representations. The reproduction is in
+part immediate, a free rising of the representation by its own power as
+soon as the hindrances give way; in part mediate, a coming up through
+the help of others. On the _arrest_ of partially or totally opposed
+representations Herbart bases his psychological calculus. Let there be
+given simultaneously in consciousness three opposed representations of
+different intensities, the strongest to be called _a_, the weakest _c_, the
+intermediate one _b_. What happens? They arrest one another, _i.e._ a part
+of each is forced to sink below the threshold of consciousness.[1]
+
+What is the amount of the arrest? As much as all the weaker representations
+together come to--the sum of arrest or the sum of that which becomes
+unconscious (as it were the burden to be divided) is equal to the sum of
+all the representations with the exception of the strongest (hence = _b_ +
+_c_), and is divided among the individual representations in the inverse
+ratio of their strength, consequently in such a way that the strongest (the
+one which most actively and successfully resists arrest) has the least,
+and the weakest the most, of it to bear. It may thus come to pass that a
+representation is entirely driven out of consciousness by two stronger
+ones, while it is impossible for this to happen to it from a single one,
+no matter how superior it be. The simplest case of all is when two equally
+strong representations are present, in which case each is reduced to
+the half of its original intensity. The sum of that which remains in
+consciousness is always equal to the greatest representation.
+
+[Footnote 1: By their mutual pressure representations are transformed into
+a mere _tendency_ to represent, which again becomes actual representation
+when the arrest ceases. The parts of a representation transformed into a
+tendency, and the residua remaining unobscured, are not pieces cut off,
+but the quantity denotes merely a degree of obscuration in the whole
+representation, or rather in the representation which actually takes
+place.]
+
+As soon as a representation reaches the zero point of consciousness, or as
+soon as a new representation (sensation) comes in, the others begin at
+once to rise or sink. The Mechanics seeks to investigate the laws of these
+movements of representations; but we may the more readily pass over its
+complicated calculations since their precise formulas can never more than
+very roughly represent the true state of the case, which simply rebels
+against precision. The rock on which every immanent use of mathematics
+in psychology must strike, is the impossibility of exactly measuring one
+representation by another. We may, indeed, declare one stronger than
+another on the basis of the immediate impression of feeling, but we cannot
+say how much stronger it is, nor with reason assert that it is twice or
+half as intense. Herbart's mathematical psychology was wrecked by this
+insurmountable difficulty. The demand for exactness which it raised, but
+which it was unable to satisfy with the means at its disposal, has recently
+been renewed, and has led to assured results in psycho-physics, which works
+on a different basis and with ingenious methods of measurement.
+
+Herbart endeavors, as we have seen, to deduce the various mental activities
+from the play of representations, Feeling and desire are not something
+beside representations, are not special faculties of the soul, but results
+of the relations of representations, changing states of representations
+arrested and working upward against hindrances. A representation which has
+been forced out of consciousness persists as a _tendency or effort_ to
+represent, and as such exerts a pressure on the conscious representations.
+If a representation is suspended between counteracting forces a feeling
+results; desire is the rise of a representation in the face of hindrances,
+aversion is hesitation in sinking. If the effort is accompanied by the idea
+that its goal is attainable, it is termed will. The character of a man
+depends on the fact that definite masses of representations have
+become dominant, and by their strength and persistence hold opposing
+representations in check or suppress them. The longer the dominant mass of
+representations exercises its power, the firmer becomes the habit of acting
+in a certain way, the more fixed the will. Herbart's intellectualistic
+denial of self-dependence to the practical capacities of the soul leads him
+logically to determinism. Volition depends on insight, is determined by
+representations; freedom signifies nothing but the fact that the will
+can be determined by motives. If the individual decisions of man were
+undetermined he would have no character; if the character were free in the
+choice between two actions, then, along with the noblest resolve, there
+would remain the possibility of an opposite decision; freedom of choice
+would make pure chance the doer of our deeds. Pedagogics, above all,
+must reject the idea of an undetermined freedom; education, along with
+imputation, correction, and punishment, would be a meaningless word, if no
+determining influence on the will of the pupil were possible.--This last
+objection overlooks the fact that the pedagogical influence is always
+mediate, and can do no more than, by disciplining the impulses of the pupil
+and by supplying him with aids against immoral inclinations, to lighten his
+moral task. We can work on the motives only, never directly on the will
+itself. Otherwise it would be inexplicable that even the best pedagogical
+skill proves powerless in the case of many individuals.
+
+Herbart's psychology was preceded by a philosophy of nature, which
+construes matter from attraction and repulsion, and declares an _actio in
+distans_ impossible. The intermediate link between physics and psychology
+is formed by the science of organic life (physiology or biology); and
+with this natural theology is connected by the following principles: The
+purposiveness which we notice with admiration in men and the higher animals
+compels us, since it can neither come from chance nor be explained on
+natural grounds alone, to assume as its author a supreme artificer,
+an intelligence which works by ends. It is true, indeed, that the existence
+of the Deity is not demonstrated by the teleological argument; this is only
+an hypothesis, but one as highly probable as the assumption that the human
+bodies by which we are surrounded are inhabited by human souls--a fact
+which we can only assume, not perceive nor prove. The assurance of faith
+is different from that of logic and experience, but not inferior to it.
+Religion is based on humility and grateful reverence, which is favored, not
+injured, by the immeasurable sublimity of its object, the incompleteness of
+our idea of the Supreme Being, and the knowledge of our ignorance. If faith
+rests, on the one hand, on the teleological view of nature, it is, on the
+other, connected with moral need, and exercises, in addition, aesthetic
+influences. By comforting the suffering, setting right the erring,
+reclaiming and pacifying the sinner, warning, strengthening, and
+encouraging the morally sound, religion brings the spirit into a new and
+better land, shows it a higher order of things, the order of providence,
+which, amid all the mistakes of men, still furthers the good. The religious
+spirit always includes an ethical element, and the bond of the Church holds
+men together even where the state is destroyed. Indispensable theoretically
+as a supplement to our knowledge, and practically because of the moral
+imperfection of men, who need it to humble, warn, comfort, and lift them
+up, religion is, nevertheless, in its origin independent of knowledge
+and moral will. Faith is older than science and morals: the doctrine of
+religion did not wait for astronomy and cosmology, nor the erection of
+temples for ethics. Before the development of the moral concepts religion
+already existed in the form of wonder without a special object, of a gloomy
+awe which ascribed every sudden inner excitement to the impulse of an
+invisible power. Since a speculative knowledge of the nature of God is
+impossible, the only task which remains for metaphysics is the removal of
+improper determinations from that which tradition and phantasy have to
+say on the subject. We are to conceive God as personal, extramundane, and
+omnipotent, as the creator, not of the reals themselves, but of their
+purposive coexistence (_Zusammen_). In order, however, to rise from the
+idea of the original, most real, and most powerful being to that of the
+most excellent being we need the practical Ideas, without which the former
+would remain an indifferent theoretical concept. Man can pray only to a
+wise, holy, perfect, just, and good God.
+
+This, in essential outline, is the content of the scattered observations
+on the philosophy of religion given by Herbart. Drobisch (_Fundamental
+Doctrines of the Philosophy of Religion_, 1840), from the standpoint of
+religious criticism and with a renewal of the moral argument, and Taute
+(1840-52) and Flügel (_Miracles and the Possibility of a Knowledge of God_,
+1869) with an apologetic tendency and one toward a belief in miracles,
+have, among others, endeavored to make up for the lack of a detailed
+treatment of this discipline by Herbart--from which, moreover, much of
+value could hardly have been expected in view of the jejuneness of his
+metaphysical conceptions and the insufficiency of his appreciation of evil.
+
+It remains only to glance at Herbart's Aesthetics. The beautiful is
+distinguished from the agreeable and the desirable, which, like it, are the
+objects of preference and rejection, by the facts, first, that it arouses
+an involuntary and disinterested judgment of approval; and second, that it
+is a predicate which is ascribed to the object or is objective. To these is
+added, thirdly, that while desire seeks for that which is to come, taste
+possesses in the present that which it judges.
+
+That which pleases or displeases is always the form, never the matter;
+and further, is always a relation, for that which is entirely simple is
+indifferent. As in music we have succeeded in discovering the simplest
+relations, which please immediately and absolutely--we know not why--so
+this must be attempted in all branches of the theory of art. The most
+important among them, that which treats of moral beauty, moral philosophy,
+has therefore to inquire concerning the simplest relations of will, which
+call forth moral approval or disapproval (independently of the interest
+of the spectator), to inquire concerning the practical Ideas or
+pattern-concepts, in accordance with which moral taste, involuntarily and
+with unconditional evidence, judges concerning the worth or unworth of
+(actually happening or merely represented) volitions. Herbart enumerates
+five such primary Ideas or fundamental judgments of conscience.
+
+(1) The Idea of inner freedom compares the will with the judgment, the
+conviction, the conscience of the agent himself. The agreement of his
+desire with his own judgment, with the precept of his taste, pleases, lack
+of agreement displeases. Since the power to determine the will according
+to one's own insight of itself establishes only an empty consistency and
+loyalty to conviction, and may also subserve immoral craft, the first Idea
+waits for its content from the four following.
+
+(2) The Idea of perfection has reference to the quantitative relations
+of the manifold strivings of a subject, in intensity, extension, and
+concentration. The strong is pleasing in contrast with the weak, the
+greater (more extended, richer) in contrast with the smaller, the collected
+in contrast with the scattered; in other words, in the individual
+desires it is energy which pleases, in their sum variety, in the system
+co-operation. While the first two Ideas have compared the will of the
+individual man with itself, the remaining ones consider its relation to the
+will of other rational beings, the third to a merely represented will, and
+the last two to an actual one.
+
+(3) According to the Idea of benevolence or goodness, which gives the most
+immediate and definite criterion of the worth of the disposition, the will
+pleases if it is in harmony with the (represented) will of another, _i.e._,
+makes the satisfaction of the latter its aim.
+
+(4) The Idea of right is based on the fact that strife displeases. If
+several wills come together at one point without ill-will (in claiming a
+thing), the parties ought to submit themselves to right as a rule for the
+avoidance of strife.
+
+(5) In retribution and equity, also, the original element is displeasure,
+displeasure in an unrequited act as a disturbance of equilibrium. This
+last Idea demands that no deed of good or evil remain unanswered; that in
+reward, thanks, and punishment, a quantum of good and evil equal to that of
+which he has been the cause return upon the agent. The one-sided deed of
+good or ill is a disturbance, the removal of which demands a corresponding
+requital.
+
+Herbart warns us against the attempt to derive the five original Ideas
+(which scientific analysis alone separates, for in life we always judge
+according to all of them together) from a single higher Idea, maintaining
+that the demand for a common principle of morals is a prejudice. From
+the union of several beings into one person proceed five other
+pattern-concepts, the derived or social Ideas of the ethical institutions
+in which the primary Ideas are realized. These correspond to the primary
+Ideas in the reverse order: The system of rewards, which regulates
+punishment; the legal society, which hinders strife; the system of
+administration, aimed at the greatest possible good of all; the system
+of culture, aimed at the development of the greatest possible power and
+virtuosity; finally, as the highest, and that which unites the others in
+itself, society as a person, which, when it is provided with the necessary
+power, is termed the state.
+
+If we combine the totality of the original Ideas into the unity of the
+person the concept of virtue arises. If we reflect on the limitations which
+oppose the full realization of the ideal of virtue, we gain the concepts of
+law and duty. An ethics, like that of Kant, which exclusively emphasizes
+the imperative or obligatory character of the good, is one-sided; it
+considers morality only in arrest, a mistake which goes with its false
+doctrine of freedom. On the other hand, it was a great merit in Kant
+that he first made clear the unconditional validity of moral judgment,
+independent of all eudemonism. Politics and pedagogics are branches of the
+theory of virtue. The end of education is development in virtue, and, as
+a means to this, the arousing of varied interests and the production of a
+stable character.
+
+In conclusion, we may sum up the points in which Herbart shows himself
+a follower of Kant--he calls himself a "Kantian of the year 1828." His
+practical philosophy takes from Kant its independence of theoretical
+philosophy, the disinterested character of aesthetic judgment, the
+absoluteness of ethical values, the non-empirical origin of the moral
+concepts: "The fundamental ethical relations are not drawn from
+experience." His metaphysics owes to Kant the critical treatment of the
+experience-concepts (its task is to make experience comprehensible), in
+which the leading idea in the Kantian doctrine of the antinomies, the
+inevitableness of contradictions, is generalized, extended to all the
+fundamental concepts of experience, and, as it were, transferred from the
+Dialectic to the Analytic; it owes to him, further, the conception of being
+as absolute position, and, finally, the dualism of phenomena and things
+in themselves. Herbart (with Schopenhauer) considers the renewal of the
+Platonic distinction between seeming and being the chief service of the
+great critical philosopher, and finds his greatest mistake in the _a
+priori_ character ascribed to the forms of cognition. In the doctrine of
+the pure intuitions and the categories, and the Critique of Judgment, he
+rejects, and with full consciousness, just those parts of Kant on which the
+Fichtean school had built further. Finally, Herbart's method of thought,
+his impersonality, the at times anxious caution of his inquiry, and the
+neatness of his conceptions, are somewhat akin to Kant's, only that he
+lacked the gift of combination to a much greater degree than his great
+predecessor on the Königsberg rostrum. His remarkable acuteness is busier
+in loosening than in binding; it is more happy in the discovery of
+contradictions than in their resolution. Therefore he does not belong to
+the kings who have decided the fate of philosophy for long periods of time;
+he stands to one side, though it is true he is the most important figure
+among these who occupy such a position.
+
+The first to give his adherence to Herbart in essential positions, and so
+to furnish occasion for the formation of an Herbartian school, was Drobisch
+(born 1802), in two critiques which appeared in 1828 and 1830. Besides
+Drobisch, from whom we have valuable discussions of Logic (1836, 5th ed.,
+1887) and Empirical Psychology (1842), and an interesting essay on _Moral
+Statistics and the Freedom of the Will_ (1867), L. Strümpell (born 1812;
+_The Principal Points in Herbart's Metaphysics Critically Examined_, 1840),
+is a professor in Leipsic. The organ of the school, the _Zeitschrift
+für exakte Philosophie_, now edited by Flügel (the first volume, 1860,
+contained a survey of the literature of the school), was at first issued
+by T. Ziller, the pedagogical thinker, and Allihn. The _Zeitschrift für
+Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft_, from 1859, edited by M. Lazarus
+(born 1824; _The Life of the Soul_, 3 vols., 1856 _seq_., 3d ed., 1883
+_seq_.) and H. Steinthal (born 1823; _The Origin of Language_, 4th ed.,
+1888; _Sketch of the Science of Language_, part i. 2d ed., 1881; _General
+Ethics_, 1885) of Berlin, also belongs to the Herbartian movement.
+Distinguished service has been done in psychology by Nahlowsky (_The Life
+of Feeling_, 1862, 2d. ed., 1884), Theodor Waitz in Marburg (1821-84;
+_Foundation of Psychology_, 1846; _Text-book of Psychology_, 1849), and
+Volkmann in Prague (1822-77; _Text-book of Psychology_, 3d. ed., by
+Cornelius, 1884 and 1885); while Friedrich Exner (died 1853) was formerly
+much spoken of as an opponent of the Hegelian psychology (1843-44). Robert
+Zimmermann in Vienna (born 1824) represents an extreme formalistic tendency
+in aesthetics (_History of Aesthetics_, 1858; _General Esthetics as Science
+of Form_, 1865; further, a series of thorough essays on subjects in the
+history of philosophy). Among historians of philosophy Thilo has given a
+rather one-sided representation of the Herbartian standpoint. The school's
+philosophers of religion have been mentioned above (p. 532). Beneke, whom
+we have joined with Fries on account of his anthropological standpoint,
+stands about midway between Herbart and Schopenhauer. He shares in the
+former's interest in psychology, in the latter's foundation of metaphysical
+knowledge on inner experience, and in the dislike felt by both for Hegel;
+while, on the other hand, he differs from Herbart in his empirical method,
+and from Schopenhauer in the priority ascribed to representation over
+effort.
+
+
+%3. Pessimism: Schopenhauer.%
+
+Schopenhauer is in all respects the antipodes of Herbart. If in Herbart
+philosophy breaks up into a number of distinct special inquiries,
+Schopenhauer has but one fundamental thought to communicate, in the
+carrying out of which, as he is convinced, each part implies the whole and
+is implied by the whole. The former operates with sober concepts where the
+latter follows the lead of gifted intuition. The one is cool, thorough,
+cautious, methodical to the point of pedantry; the other is passionate,
+ingenious, unmethodical to the point of capricious dilettantism. In the one
+case, philosophy is as far as possible exact science, in which the person
+of the thinker entirely retires behind the substance of the inquiry; in the
+other, philosophy consists in a sum of artistic conceptions, which derive
+their content and value chiefly from the individuality of the author. The
+history of philosophy has no other system to show which to the same
+degree expresses and reflects the personality of the philosopher as
+Schopenhauer's. This personality, notwithstanding its limitations and its
+whims, was important enough to give interest to Schopenhauer's views, even
+apart from the relative truth which they contain.
+
+Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was the son of a merchant in Dantzic and
+his wife Johanna, _née_ Trosiener, who subsequently became known as a
+novelist. His early training was gained from foreign travel, but after the
+death of his father he exchanged the mercantile career, which he had begun
+at his father's request, for that of a scholar, studying under G.E. Schulze
+in Göttingen, and under Fichte at Berlin. In 1813 he gained his doctor's
+degree in Jena with a dissertation _On the Fourfold Root of the Principle
+of Sufficient Reason_. Then he moved from Weimar, the residence of his
+mother, where he had associated considerably with Goethe and had been
+introduced to Indian philosophy by Fr. Mayer, to Dresden (1814-18). In the
+latter place he wrote the essay _On Sight and Colors_ (1816; subsequently
+published by the author in Latin), and his chief work, _The World as Will
+and Idea_ (1819; new edition, with a second volume, 1844). After the
+completion of the latter he began his first Italian journey, while his
+second tour fell in the interval between his two quite unsuccessful
+attempts (in Berlin 1820 and 1825) to propagate his philosophy from the
+professor's desk. From 1831 until his death he lived in learned retirement
+in Frankfort-on-the-Main. Here he composed the opuscule _On Will in
+Nature_, 1836, the prize treatises _On the Freedom of the Human Will_ and
+_On the Foundation of Ethics_ (together, _The Two Fundamental Problems
+of Ethics_, 1841), and the collection of minor treatises _Parerga and
+Paralipomena_, 2 vols., 1851 (including an essay "On Religion").
+J. Frauenstädt has published a considerable amount of posthumous material
+(among other things the translation, _B. Gracians Handorakel der
+Weltklugheit_); the _Collected Works_ (6 vols., 1873-74, 2d ed., 1877, with
+a biographical notice); _Lichtstrahlen aus Schopenhauers Werken_, 1861, 5th
+ed. 1885; and a _Schopenhauer Lexicon_, 2 vols., 1871.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: From the remaining Schopenhauer literature (F. Laban has
+published a chronological survey of it, 1880) we may call attention to the
+critiques of the first edition of the chief work by Herbart and Beneke, and
+that of the second edition by Fortlage (_Jenaische Litteratur Zeitung_,
+1845, Nos. 146-151); J.E. Erdmann _Herbart und Schopenhauer, eine Antithese
+(Zeitschrift für Philosophie_, 1851); Wilh. Gwinner, _Schopenhauers
+Leben_, 1878 (the second edition of _Schopenhauer aus persönlichem
+Umgang dargestellt_, 1862); Fr. Nietzsche, _Schopenhauer als Erzieher
+(Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen, Stück iii_., 1874); O. Busch, _A.
+Schopenhauer_, 2d. ed., 1878; K. Peters, _Schopenhauer als Philosoph und
+Schriftsteller_, 1880; R. Koeber, _Die Philosophie A. Schopenhauers_, 1888.
+[The English reader may be referred to Haldane and Kemp's translation of
+_The World as Will and Idea_, 3 vols., 1883-86; the translation of _The
+Fourfold Root_ and the _Will in Nature_ in Bohn's Philosophical Library,
+1889; Saunders's translations from the _Parerga and Paralipomena_, 1889
+_seq_.; Helen Zimmern's _Arthur Schopenhauer, his Life and his Philosophy_,
+1876; W. Wallace's _Schopenhauer_, Great Writers Series, 1890 (with a
+bibliography by Anderson, including references to numerous magazine
+articles, etc.); Sully's _Pessimism_, 2d ed., 1882, chap. iv.; and Royce's
+_Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, chap, viii., 1892.--TR.]]
+
+In regard to subjective idealism Schopenhauer confesses himself a
+thoroughgoing Kantian. That sensations are merely states in us has long
+been known; Kant opened the eyes of the world to the fact that the forms of
+knowledge are also the property of the subject. I know things only as they
+appear to me, as I represent them in virtue of the constitution of my
+intellect; the world is my idea. The Kantian theory, however, is capable of
+simplification, the various forms of cognition may be reduced to a single
+one, to the category of causality or principle of sufficient reason--which
+was preferred by Kant himself--as the general expression of the regular
+connection of our representations. This principle, in correspondence with
+the several classes of objects, or rather of representations--viz., pure
+(merely formal) intuitions, empirical (complete) intuitions, acts of will,
+abstract concepts--has four forms: it is the _principium rationis essendi,
+rationis fiendi, rationis agendi, rationis cognoscendi_. The _ratio
+essendi_ is the law which regulates the coexistence of the parts of space
+and the succession of the divisions of time. The _ratio fiendi_ demands for
+every change of state another from which it regularly follows as from its
+cause, and a substance as its unchangeable substratum--matter. All changes
+take place necessarily, all that is real is material; the law of causality
+is valid for phenomena alone, not beyond them, and holds only for the
+states of substances, not for substances themselves. In inorganic nature
+causes work mechanically, in organic nature as stimuli (in which the
+reaction is not equal to the action), and in animated nature as motives.
+A motive is a conscious (but not therefore a free) cause; the law of
+motivation is the _ratio agendi_. This serial order, "mechanical cause,
+stimulus, and motive," denotes only distinctions in the mode of action, not
+in the necessity of action. Man's actions follow as inevitably from his
+character and the motives which influence him as a clock strikes the hours;
+the freedom of the will is a chimera. Finally, the _ratio cognoscendi_
+determines that a judgment must have a sufficient ground in order to be
+true. Judgment or the connection of concepts is the chief activity of the
+reason, which, as the faculty of abstract thought and the organ of science,
+constitutes the difference between man and the brute, while the possession
+of the understanding with its intuition of objects is common to both. In
+opposition to the customary overestimation of this gift of mediate
+representations, of language, and of reflection, Schopenhauer gives
+prominence to the fact that the reason is not a creative faculty like the
+understanding, but only a receptive power, that it clarifies and transforms
+the content furnished by intuition without increasing it by new
+representations.
+
+Objective cognition is confined within the circle of our representations;
+all that is knowable is phenomenon. Space, time, and causality spread out
+like a triple veil between us and the _per se_ of things, and prevent a
+vision of the true nature of the world. There is one point, however, at
+which we know more than mere phenomena, where of these three disturbing
+media only one, time-form, separates us from the thing in itself. This
+point is the consciousness of ourselves.
+
+On the one hand, I appear to myself as body. My body is a temporal,
+spatial, material object, an object like all others, and with them subject
+to the laws of objectivity. But besides this objective cognition, I have,
+further, an immediate consciousness of myself, through which I apprehend
+my true being--I know myself as willing. My will is more than a mere
+representation, it is the original element in me, the truly real which
+appears to me as body. The will is related to the intellect as the primary
+to the secondary, as substance to accident; it is related to the body
+as the inner to the outer, as reality to phenomenon. The act of will is
+followed at once and inevitably by the movement of the body willed, nay,
+the two are one and the same, only given in different ways: will is the
+body seen from within, body the will seen from without, the will become
+visible, objectified. After the analogy of ourselves, again, who appear to
+ourselves as material objects but in truth are will, all existence is to
+be judged. The universe is the _mac-anthropos_; the knowledge of our own
+essence, the key to the knowledge of the essence of the world. Like our
+body, the whole world is the visibility of will. The human will is the
+highest stage in the development of the same principle which manifests its
+activity in the various forces of nature, and which properly takes its name
+from the highest species. To penetrate further into the inner nature of
+things than this is impossible. What that which presents itself as will
+and which still remains after the negation of the latter (see below) is in
+itself, is for us absolutely unknowable.
+
+The world is _per se_ will. None of the predicates are to be attributed to
+the primal will which we ascribe to things in consequence of our subjective
+forms of thought--neither determination by causes or ends, nor plurality:
+it stands outside the law of causality, as also outside space and time,
+which form the _principium individuationis_. The primal will is groundless,
+blind stress, unconscious impulse toward existence; it is one, the one
+and all, [Greek: en nai pan]. That which manifests itself as gravity, as
+magnetic force, as the impulse to growth, as the _vis medicatrix naturae_,
+is only this one world-will, whose unity (not conscious character!) shows
+itself in the purposiveness of its embodiments. The essence of each thing,
+its hidden quality, at which empirical explanation finds its limit, is its
+will: the essence of the stone is its will to fall; that of the lungs is
+the will to breathe; teeth, throat, and bowels are hunger objectified.
+Those qualities in which the universal will gives itself material
+manifestation form a series with grades of increasing perfection, a realm
+of unchangeable specific forms or eternal Ideas, which (with a real value
+difficult to determine) stand midway between the one primal will and
+the numberless individual beings. That the organic individual does not
+perfectly correspond to the ideal of its species, but only approximates
+this more or less closely, is grounded in the fact that the stadia in the
+objectification of the will, or the Ideas, contend, as it were, for matter;
+and whatever of force is used up in the victory of the higher Ideas over
+the lower is lost for the development of the examples of the former. The
+higher the level on which a being stands the clearer the expression of its
+individuality. The most general forces of nature, which constitute the raw
+mass, play the fundamental bass in the world-symphony, the higher stages
+of inorganic nature, with the vegetable and animal worlds, the harmonious
+middle parts, and man the guiding treble, the significant melody. With the
+human brain the world as idea is given at a stroke; in this organ the will
+has kindled a torch in order to throw light upon itself and to carry out
+its designs with careful deliberation; it has brought forth the intellect
+as its instrument, which, with the great majority of men, remains in a
+position of subservience to the will. Brain and thought are the same; the
+former is nothing other than the will to know, as the stomach is will
+to digest. Those only talk of an immaterial soul who import into
+philosophy--where such ideas do not belong--concepts taught them when they
+were confirmed.
+
+Schopenhauer's philosophy is as rich in inconsistencies as his personality
+was self-willed and unharmonious. "He carries into his system all the
+contradictions and whims of his capricious nature," says Zeller. From the
+most radical idealism (the objective world a product of representation) he
+makes a sharp transition to the crassest materialism (thought a function of
+the brain); first matter is to be a mere idea, now thought is to be merely
+a material phenomenon! The third and fourth books of _The World as Will and
+Idea_, which develop the aesthetic and ethical standpoint of their author,
+stand in as sharp a contradiction to the first (poëtical) and the second
+(metaphysical) books as these to each other. While at first it was
+maintained that all representation is subject to the principle of
+sufficient reason, we are now told that, besides causal cognition, there is
+a higher knowledge, one which is free from the control of this principle,
+viz., aesthetic and philosophical intuition. If, before, it was said that
+the intellect is the creature and servant of the will, we now learn that in
+favored individuals it gains the power to throw off the yoke of slavery,
+and not only to raise itself to the blessedness of contemplation free from
+all desire, but even to enter on a victorious conflict with the tyrant,
+to slay the will. The source of this power--is not revealed. R. Haym _(A.
+Schopenhauer_, 1864, reprinted from the _Preussische Jahrbücher_) was not
+far wrong in characterizing Schopenhauer's philosophy as a clever novel,
+which entertains the reader by its rapid vicissitudes.
+
+The contemplation which is free from causality and will is the essence of
+aesthetic life; the partial and total sublation, the quieting and negation
+of the will, that of ethical life. It is but seldom, and only in the
+artistic and philosophical genius, that the intellect succeeds in freeing
+itself from the supremacy of the will, and, laying aside the question of
+the _why_ and _wherefore_, _where_ and _when_, in sinking itself completely
+in the pure _what_ of things. While with the majority of mankind, as with
+animals, the intellect always remains a prisoner in the service of the will
+to live, of self-preservation, of personal interests, in gifted men,
+in artists and thinkers, it strips off all that is individual, and, in
+disinterested vision of the Ideas, becomes pure, timeless subject, freed
+from the will. Art removes individuality from the subject as well as from
+the object; its comforting and cheering influence depends on the fact that
+it elevates those enjoying it to the stand-point--raised above all pain
+of desire--of a fixed, calm, completely objective contemplation of the
+unchangeable essence, of the eternal types of things. For aesthetic
+intuition the object is not a thing under relations of space, time, and
+cause, but only an expression, an exemplification, a representative of
+the Idea. Poetry, which presents--most perfectly in tragedy--the Idea of
+humanity, stands higher than the plastic arts. The highest rank, however,
+belongs to music, since it does not, like the other arts, represent single
+Ideas, but--as an unconscious metaphysic, nay, a second, ideal world above
+the material world--the will itself. In view of this high appreciation
+of their art, it is not surprising that musicians have contributed a
+considerable contingent to the band of Schopenhauer worshipers. A different
+source of attraction for the wider circle of readers was supplied by the
+piquant spice of pessimism.
+
+If the purposiveness of the phenomena of nature points to the unity of the
+primal will, the unspeakable misery of life, which Schopenhauer sets forth
+with no less of eloquence, proves the blindness and irrationality of the
+world-ground. To live is to suffer; the world contains incomparably more
+pain than pleasure; it is the worst possible world. In the world of
+sub-animal nature aimless striving; in the animal world an insatiable
+impulse after enjoyment--while the will, deceiving itself with fancied
+happiness to come, which always remains denied it, and continually
+tossed to and fro between necessity and _ennui_, never attains complete
+satisfaction. The pleasure which it pursues is nothing but the removal of
+a dissatisfaction, and vanishes at once when the longing is stilled, to
+be replaced by fresh wants, that is, by new pains. In view of the
+indescribable misery in the world, to favor optimism is evidence not so
+much of folly and blindness as of a wanton disposition. The old saying is
+true: Non-existence is better than existence. The misery, however, is the
+just punishment for the original sin of the individual, which gave itself
+its particular existence by an act of intelligible freedom. Redemption from
+the sin and misery of existence is possible only through a second act
+of transcendental freedom, which, since it consists in the complete
+transformation of our being, and since it is supernatural in its origin,
+the Church is right in describing as a new birth and work of grace.
+
+Morality presupposes pessimistic insight into the badness of the world and
+the fruitlessness of all desire, and pantheistic discernment of the untruth
+of individual existence and the identity in essence of all individuals
+from a metaphysical standpoint. Man is able to free himself from egoistic
+self-affirmation only when he perceives the two truths, that all striving
+is vain and the longed-for pleasure unattainable, and that all individuals
+are at bottom one, viz. manifestations of the same primal will. This is
+temporarily effected in sympathy, which, as the only counterpoise to
+natural selfishness, is the true moral motive and the source of all love
+and justice. The sympathizer sees himself in others and feels their
+suffering as his own. The entire negation of the will, however, inspiring
+examples of which have been furnished by the Christian ascetics and
+Oriental penitents, stands higher than the vulgar virtue of sympathy with
+the sufferings of others. Here knowledge, turned away from the individual
+and vain to the whole and genuine, ceases to be a motive for the will and
+becomes a means of stilling it; the intellect is transformed from a motive
+into a quietive, and brings him who gives himself up to the All safely
+out from the storm of the passions into the peace of deliverance from
+existence. Absence of will, resignation, is holiness and blessedness in
+one. For him who has slain the will in himself the motley deceptive dream
+of phenomena has vanished, he lives in the ether of true reality, which for
+our knowledge is an empty nothingness ("Nirvana"), yet (as the ultimate,
+incomprehensible _per se_, which remains after the annulling of the will)
+only a relative nothingness--relative to the phenomenon.
+
+Schopenhauer disposes of the sense of responsibility and the reproofs of
+conscience, which are inconvenient facts for his determinism, by making
+them both refer, not to single deeds and the empirical character, but to
+the indivisible act of the intelligible character. Conscience does not
+blame me because I have acted as I must act with my character and the
+motives given, but for being what in these actions I reveal myself to be.
+_Operari sequitur esse_. My action follows from my being, my being was my
+own free choice, and a new act of freedom is alone capable of transforming
+it.
+
+If Schopenhauer is fond of referring to the agreement of his views with the
+oldest and most perfect religions, the idea lies in the background that
+religion,--which springs from the same metaphysical needs as philosophy,
+and, for the great multitude, who lack the leisure and the capacity for
+philosophical thought, takes the place of the former,--as the metaphysics
+of the people, clothes the same fundamental truths which the philosopher
+offers in conceptual form and supports by rational grounds in the garb of
+myth and allegory, and places them under the protection of an external
+authority. When this character of religion is overlooked, and that which
+is intended to be symbolical is taken for literal truth (it is not
+the supernaturalists alone who start with this unjust demand, but the
+rationalists also, with their minimizing interpretations), it becomes the
+worst enemy of true philosophy. In Christianity the doctrines of original
+sin and of redemption are especially congenial to our philosopher, as well
+as mysticism and asceticism. He declares Mohammedanism the worst religion
+on account of its optimism and abstract theism, and Buddhism the best,
+because it is idealistic, pessimistic, and--atheistic.
+
+It was not until after the appearance of the second edition of his
+chief work that Schopenhauer experienced in increasing measure the
+satisfaction--which his impatient ambition had expected much earlier--of
+seeing his philosophy seriously considered. A zealous apostle arose for
+him in Julius Frauenstädt (died 1878; _Letters on the Philosophy of
+Schopenhauer_, 1854; _New Letters on the Philosophy of Schopenhauer_,
+1876), who, originally an Hegelian, endeavored to remove pessimism from the
+master's system. Like Eduard von Hartmann, who will be discussed below,
+Julius Bahnsen (died 1882; _The Contradiction in the Knowledge and Being
+of the World, the Principle and Particular Verification of Real-Dialectic_,
+1880-81; also, interesting characterological studies) seeks to combine
+elements from Schopenhauer and Hegel, while K. Peters (_Will-world and
+World-will_, 1883) shows in another direction points of contact with the
+first named thinker. Of the younger members of the school we may name P.
+Deussen in Kiel (_The Elements of Metaphysics_, 2d ed., 1890), and Philipp
+Mainländer (_Philosophy of Redemption_, 2d ed., 1879). As we have mentioned
+above, Schopenhauer's doctrines have exercised an attractive force in
+artistic circles also. Richard Wagner (1813-83; _Collected Writings_, 9
+vols., 1871-73, vol. x. 1883; 2d ed., 1887-88), whose earlier aesthetic
+writings (_The Art-work of the Future_, 1850; _Opera and Drama_, 1851) had
+shown the influence of Feuerbach, in his later works (_Beethoven_, 1870;
+_Religion and Art_, in the third volume of the _Bayreuther Blätter_, 1880)
+became an adherent of Schopenhauer, after, in the _Ring of the Nibelung_,
+he had given poetical expression to a view of the world nearly allied to
+Schopenhauer's, though this was previous to his acquaintance with the works
+of the latter.[1] One of the most thoughtful disciples of the Frankfort
+philosopher and the Bayreuth dramatist is Fried rich Nietzsche (born 1844).
+His _Unseasonable Reflections_, 1873-76,[2] is a summons to return from the
+errors of modern culture, which, corrupted by the seekers for gain, by the
+state, by the polite writers and savants, especially by the professors
+of philosophy, has made men cowardly and false instead of simple and
+honorable, mere self-satisfied "philistines of culture." In his writings
+since 1878[3] Nietzsche has exchanged the rôle of a German Rousseau for
+that of a follower of Voltaire, to arrive finally at the ideal of the man
+above men.[4]
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. on Wagner, Fr. v. Hausegger, _Wagner und Schopenhauer_,
+1878. [English translation of Wagner's _Prose Works_ by Ellis, vol. i.,
+1892.--TR.]]
+
+[Footnote 2: "D. Strauss, the Confessor and the Author"; "On the Advantage
+and Disadvantage of History for Life"; "Schopenhauer as an Educator"; "R.
+Wagner in Bayreuth."]
+
+[Footnote 3: _Human, All-too-human_, new ed., 1886; _The Dawn, Thoughts on
+Human Prejudices_, 1881; _The Merry Science_, 1882; _So spake Zarathustra_,
+1883-84; _Beyond Good and Evil_, 1886; _On the Genealogy of Morals_, 1887,
+2d ed., 1887; _The Wagner Affair_, 1888, 2d ed., 1892; _Götzendämmerung, or
+How to Philosophize with the Hammer_, 1889.]
+
+[Footnote 4: Cf. H. Kaatz, _Die Weltanschauung Fr. Nietzsches, I. Kultur
+und Moral_, 1892.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV.
+
+PHILOSOPHY OUT OF GERMANY.
+
+
+%1. Italy.%
+
+The Cartesian philosophy, which had been widely accepted in Italy, and had
+still been advocated, in the sense of Malebranche, by Sigismond Gerdil
+(1718-1802), was opposed as an unhistorical view of the world by
+Giambattista Vico,[1] the bold and profound creator of the philosophy of
+history (1668-1744; from 1697 professor of rhetoric in the University
+of Naples). Vico's leading ideas are as follows: Man makes himself the
+criterion of the universe, judges that which is unknown and remote by the
+known and present. The free will of the individual rests on the judgments,
+manners, and habits of the people, which have arisen without reflection
+from a universal human instinct. Uniform ideas among nations unacquainted
+with one another are motived in a common truth. History is the development
+of human nature; in it neither chance nor fate rules, but the legislative
+power of providence, in virtue of which men through their own freedom
+progressively realize the idea of human nature. The universal course of
+civilization is that culture transfers its abode from the forests and huts
+into villages, cities, and, finally, into academies; the nature of the
+nations is at first rude, then stern, gradually it becomes mild, nay,
+effeminate, and finally wanton; at first men feel only that which is
+necessary, later they regard the useful, the convenient, the agreeable
+and attractive, until the luxury sprung from the sense for the beautiful
+degenerates into a foolish misuse of things. Vico divides antiquity into
+three periods: the divine (theocracy), the heroic (aristocracy), and the
+human (democracy and monarchy). The same course of things repeats itself in
+the nations of later times: to the patriarchal dominion of the fanciful,
+myth-making Orient correspond the spiritual states of the migrations; to
+the old Greek aristocracy, the chivalry and robbery of the period of the
+Crusades; to the republicanism and the monarchy of later antiquity, the
+modern period, which gives even the citizens and peasants a share in the
+universal equality. If European culture had not been transplanted to
+America, the same three-act drama of human development would there be
+playing. Vico carries this threefold division into his consideration of
+manners, laws, languages, character, etc.
+
+[Footnote 1: Vico: _Principles of a New Science of the Common Nature of
+Nations_, 1725; _Works_, in six volumes, edited by G. Ferrari, 1835-37,
+new ed.. 1853 _seq_. On Vico cf. K. Werner, 1877 and 1879. [Also Flint's
+_Vico_, Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1884.--TR.]]
+
+If Vico anticipates the Hegelian view of history, Antonio Genovesi
+(1712-69), who also taught at the University of Naples, and while the
+former was still living, shows himself animated by a presentiment of the
+Kantian criticism.[1] Appreciating Leibnitz and Locke, and appropriating
+the idea of the monads from the one and the unknowableness of substance
+from the other, he reaches the conviction--according to statements in his
+letters--that sense-bodies are nothing but the appearances of intelligible
+unities; that each being for us is an activity, whose substratum and
+ground remains unknown to us; that self-consciousness and the knowledge
+of external impressions yield phenomena alone, through the elaboration of
+which we produce the intellectual worlds of the sciences. For the rest,
+Genovesi thus advises his friends: Study the world, devote yourselves to
+languages and to mathematics, think more about men than about the things
+above us, and leave metaphysical vagaries to the monks! His countrymen
+honor in him the man who first included ethics and politics in
+philosophical instruction, and who used the Italian language both from the
+desk and in his writings, holding that a nation whose scientific works are
+not composed in its own tongue is barbarian.
+
+[Footnote 1: In the following account we have made use of a translation of
+the concluding section of Francesco Florentine's _Handbook of the History
+of Philosophy_, 1879-81, which was most kindly placed at our disposal by
+Dr. J. Mainzer. Cf. _La Filosofia Contemporanea in Italia_, 1876, by the
+same author; further, Bonatelli, _Die Philosophic in Italien seit_, 1815;
+_Zeitschrift für Philosophic und philosophische Kritik_, vol. liv. 1869, p.
+134 _seq._; and especially, K. Werner, _Die Italienische Philosophic des
+XIX. Jahrhunderts_, 5 vols., 1884-86. [The English reader may be referred to
+the appendix on Italian philosophy in vol. ii. of the English translation
+of Ueberweg, by Vincenzo Botta; and to Barzellotti's "Philosophy in Italy,"
+_Mind_, vol. in. 1878.--TR.]]
+
+The sensationalism of Condillac, starting from Parma, gained influence over
+Melchiore Gioja (1767-1828; _Statistical Logic_, 1803; _Ideology_, 1822)
+and Giandomenico Romagnosi (1761-1835; _What is the Sound Mind?_ 1827), but
+not without experiencing essential modification from both. The importance
+of these men, moreover, lies more in the sphere of social philosophy than
+in the sphere of noëtics.
+
+Of the three greatest Italian philosophers of this century, Galluppi,
+Rosmini, and Gioberti, the first named is more in sympathy with the Kantian
+position than he himself will confess. Pasquale Galluppi[1] (1770-1846;
+from 1831 professor at Naples) adheres to the principle of experience, but
+does not conceive experience as that which is sensuously given, but as
+the elaboration of this through the synthetic relations _(rapporti)_ of
+identity and difference, which proceed from the activity of the mind.
+Vincenzo de Grazia (_Essay on the Reality of Human Knowledge_, 1839-42),
+who holds all relations to be objective, and Ottavio Colecchi (died 1847;
+_Philosophical Investigations_, 1843), who holds them all subjective,
+oppose the view of Galluppi that some are objective and others subjective.
+According to De Grazia judgment is observation, not connection; it finds
+out the relations contained in the data of sensation; it discovers, but
+does not produce them. Colecchi reduces the Kantian categories to two,
+substance and cause. Testa, Borelli (1824), and, among the younger men,
+Cantoni, are Kantians; Labriola is an Herbartian.
+
+[Footnote 1: Galluppi: _Philosophical Essay on the Critique of Knowledge_,
+1819 _seq.; Lectures on Logic and Metaphysics_, 1832 _seq.; Philosophy
+of the Will_, 1832 _seq.; On the System of Fichte, or Considerations on
+Transcendental Idealism and Absolute Rationalism_, 1841. By the _Letters
+on the History of Philosophy from Descartes to Kant_, 1827, in the later
+editions to Cousin, he became the founder of this discipline in his native
+land.]
+
+Antonio Rosmini-Serbati[1] (born 1797 at Rovereto, died 1855 at Stresa)
+regards knowledge as the common product of sensibility and understanding,
+the former furnishing the matter, the latter the form. The form is one: the
+Idea of being which precedes all judgment, which does not come from myself,
+which is innate, and apprehensible by immediate inner perception _(essere
+ideale, ente universale)_. The pure concepts (substance, cause, unity,
+necessity) arise when the reflecting reason analyzes this general Idea
+of being; the mixed Ideas (space, time, motion; body, spirit), when the
+understanding applies it to sensuous experience. The universal Idea of
+being and the particular existences are in their being identical, but in
+their mode of existence different. In his posthumous _Theosophy_,
+1859 _seq_., Rosmini no longer makes the universal being receive its
+determinations from without, but produce them from its own inner nature
+by means of an _a priori_ development. Vincenzo Gioberti[1] (born 1801 in
+Turin, died 1852 at Paris) has been compared as a patriot with Fichte, and
+in his cast of thought with Spinoza. In place of Rosmini's "psychologism,"
+which was advanced by Descartes and which leads to skepticism, he seeks to
+substitute "ontologism," which is alone held capable of reconciling science
+and the Catholic religion. By immediate intuition (the content of which
+Gioberti comprehends in the formula "Being creates the existences") we
+cognize the absolute as the creative ground of two series, the series of
+thought and the series of reality. The endeavors of Rosmini and Gioberti to
+bring the reason into harmony with the faith of the Church were fiercely
+attacked by Giussepe Ferrari (1811-76) and Ausonio Franchi (1853), while
+Francesco Bonatelli _(Thought and Cognition_, 1864) and Terenzio Mamiani
+(1800-85; _Confessions of a Metaphysician_, 1865), follow a line of thought
+akin to the Platonizing views of the first named thinkers. The review
+_Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane_, called into life by Mamiani in 1870, has
+been continued since 1886 under the direction of L. Ferri as the _Rivista
+Italiana di Filosofia_.
+
+[Footnote 1: Rosmini: _New Essay on the Origin of Ideas_, 1830 (English
+translation, 1883-84); _Principles of Moral Science_, 1831; _Philosophy
+of Right_, 1841.] [Footnote B: Gioberti: _Introduction to the Study of
+Philosophy_, 1840; _Philosophical Errors of A. Rosmini_, 1842; _On the
+Beautiful_, 1841; _On the Good_, 1842; _Protology_ edited by Massari, 1857.
+On both cf. R. Seydel, _Zeitschrift für Philosophie_, 1859.]
+
+The Thomistic doctrine has many adherents in Italy, among whom the Jesuit
+M. Liberatore (1865) may be mentioned. The Hegelian philosophy has also
+found favor there (especially in Naples), as well as positivism. The former
+is favored by Vera, Mariano, Ragnisco, and Spaventa (died 1885); the
+_Rivista di Filosofia Scientifica_, 1881 _seq_., founded by Morselli,
+supports the latter, and E. Caporali's _La Nuova Scienza_, 1884, moves in
+a similar direction. Pietro Siciliani _(On the Revival of the Positive
+Philosophy in Italy_, 1871) makes the third, the critical, period of
+philosophy by which scholasticism is overthrown and the reason made
+authoritative, commence with Vico, and bases his doctrine on Vico's
+formula: The conversion (transposition) of the _verum_ and the _factum_,
+and _vice versa_. Subsequently he inclined to positivism, which he had
+previously opposed, and among the representatives of which we may mention,
+further, R. Ardigò of Pavia _(Psychology as Positive Science_, 1870; _The
+Ethics of Positivism_, 1885; _Philosophical Works_, 1883 _seq_.), and
+Andrea Angiulli of Naples (died 1890; _Philosophy and the Schools_, 1889),
+who explain matter and spirit as two phenomena of the same essence;
+further, Giuseppe Sergi, Giovanni Cesca, and the psychiatrist, C. Lombroso,
+the head of the positivistic school of penal law.
+
+
+%2. France.%
+
+Among the French philosophers of this century[1] none can compare in
+far-reaching influence, both at home and abroad, with Auguste Comte,[2] the
+creator of positivism (born at Montpellier in 1798, died at Paris in 1857),
+whose chief work, the _Course of Positive Philosophy_, 6 vols., appeared in
+1830 42. [English version, "freely translated and condensed," by Harriet
+Martineau, 1853.]
+
+[Footnote 1: Accounts of French philosophy in the nineteenth century have
+been given by Taine (1857, 3d ed., 1867); Janet _(La Philosophie Française
+Contemporaine_, 2d ed., 1879); A. Franck; Ferraz (3 vols., 1880-89); Felix
+Ravaisson (2d ed., 1884); the Swede, J. Borelius _(Glances at the Present
+Position of Philosophy in Germany and France_, German translation by Jonas,
+1887); [and Ribot, _Mind_, vol. ii., 1877].]
+
+[Footnote 2: On Comte cf. B. Pünjer, _Jahrbücher für protestantische
+Theologie_, 1878; R. Eucken, _Zur Würdigung Comtes und des Positivismus_,
+in the _Aufsätze zum Zellerjubiläum_, 1887; Maxim. Brütt, _Der
+Positivismus_, Programme of the _Realgymnasium des Johanneums_, Hamburg,
+1889; [also, besides Mill, p. 560, John Morley, _Encyclopedia Britannica_,
+vol. vi. pp. 229-238, and E. Caird, _The Social Philosophy and Religion of
+Comte_, 1885.--Tr.]]
+
+The positive philosophy seeks to put an end to the hoary error that
+anything more is open to our knowledge than given facts--phenomena and
+their relations. We do not know the essence of phenomena, and just
+as little their first causes and ultimate ends; we know--by means of
+observation, experiment, and comparison--only the constant relations
+between phenomena, the relations of succession and of similarity among
+facts, the uniformities of which we call their laws. All knowledge is,
+therefore, relative; there is no absolute knowledge, for the inmost essence
+of facts, and likewise their origin, the way in which they are produced,
+is for us impenetrable. We know only, and this by experience, that the
+phenomenon A is invariably connected with the phenomenon B, that the
+second always follows on the first, and call the constant antecedent of a
+phenomenon its cause. We know such causes only as are themselves phenomena.
+The fact that our knowledge is limited to the succession and coexistence of
+phenomena is not to be lamented as a defect: the only knowledge which is
+attainable by us is at the same time the only useful knowledge, that which
+lends us practical power over phenomena. When we inquire into causes we
+desire to hasten or hinder the effect, or to change it as we wish, or at
+least to anticipate it in order to make our preparations accordingly. Such
+foresight and control of events can be attained only through a knowledge
+of their laws, their order of succession, their phenomenal causes. _Savoir
+pour prévoir_. But, although the prevision of facts is the only knowledge
+which we need, men have always sought after another, an "absolute"
+knowledge, or have even believed that they were in possession of it; the
+forerunners of the positive philosophy themselves, Bacon and Descartes,
+have been entangled in this prejudice. A long intellectual development was
+required to reach the truth, that our knowledge does not extend beyond
+the cognition of the succession and coexistence of facts; that the same
+procedure must be extended to abstract speculation which the common mind
+itself makes use of in its single actions. On the other hand, the positive
+philosophy, notwithstanding its rejection of metaphysics, is far from
+giving its sanction to empiricism. Every isolated, empirical observation
+is useless and uncertain; it obtains value and usefulness only when it is
+defined and explained by a theory, and combined with other observations
+into a law--this makes the difference between the observations of the
+scholar and the layman.
+
+The positive stage of a science, which begins when we learn to explain
+phenomena by their laws, is preceded by two others: a theological stage,
+which ascribes phenomena to supposed personal powers, and a metaphysical
+stage, which ascribes them to abstract natural forces. These three periods
+denote the childhood, the youth, and the manhood of science.
+
+The earliest view of the world is the theological view, which derives the
+events of the world from the voluntary acts of supernatural intelligent
+beings. The crude view of nature sees in each individual thing a being
+animated like man; later man accustoms himself to think of a whole class
+of objects as governed by one invisible being, by a divinity; finally
+the multitude of divinities gives place to a single God, who creates,
+maintains, and rules the universe, and by extraordinary acts, by miracles,
+interferes in the course of events. Thus fetichism (in its highest form,
+astrolatry), polytheism, and monotheism are the stages in the development
+of the theological mode of thought. In the second, the metaphysical,
+period, the acts of divine volition are replaced by entities, by abstract
+concepts, which are regarded as realities, as the true reality back of
+phenomena. A force, a power, an occult property or essence is made to dwell
+in things; the mysterious being which directs events is no longer called
+God, but "Nature," and invested with certain inclinations, with a horror
+of a vacuum, an aversion to breaks, a tendency toward the best, a _vis
+medicatrix_, etc. Here belong, also, the vegetative soul of Aristotle, the
+vital force and the plastic impulse of modern investigators. Finally the
+positive stage is reached, when all such abstractions, which are even yet
+conceived as half personal and acting voluntarily, are abandoned, and
+the unalterable and universally valid laws of phenomena established by
+observation and experiment alone. But to explain the laws of nature
+themselves transcends, according to Comte, the fixed limits of human
+knowledge. The beginning of the world lies outside the region of the
+knowable, atheism is no better grounded than the theistic hypothesis, and
+if Comte asserts that a blindly acting mechanism is less probable than a
+world-plan, he is conscious that he is expressing a mere conjecture which
+can never be raised to the rank of a scientific theory. The origin and the
+end of things are insoluble problems, in answering which no progress has
+yet been made in spite of man's long thought about them. Only that which
+lies intermediate between the two inscrutable termini of the world is an
+object of knowledge.
+
+It is not only the human mind in general that exhibits this advance from
+the theological, through the metaphysical, to the positive mode of thought,
+but each separate science goes through the same three periods--only that
+the various disciplines have developed with unequal rapidity. While some
+have already culminated in the positive method of treatment, others yet
+remain caught in the theological period of beginnings, and others still are
+in the metaphysical transition stage. Up to the present all three phases
+of development exist side by side, and even among the objects of the most
+highly developed sciences there are some which we continue to regard
+theologically; these are the ones which we do not yet understand how to
+calculate, as the changes of the weather or the spread of epidemics. Which
+science first attained the positive state, and in what order have the
+others followed? With this criterion Comte constructs his _classification
+of the sciences_, in which, however, he takes account only of those
+sciences which he calls abstract, that is, those which treat of "events" in
+distinction from "objects." The abstract sciences (as biology) investigate
+the most general laws of nature, valid for all phenomena, from which the
+particular phenomena which experience presents to us cannot be deduced, but
+on the basis of which an entirely different world were also possible. The
+concrete sciences, on the other hand (_e.g._, botany and zoölogy), have to
+do with the actually given combinations of phenomena. The former follow out
+each separate one of the general laws through all its possible modes of
+operation, the latter consider only the combination of laws given in an
+object. Thus oaks and squirrels are the result of very many laws, inasmuch
+as organisms are dependent not only on biological, but also on physical,
+chemical, and mathematical laws.
+
+Comte enumerates six of these abstract sciences, and arranges them in such
+a way that each depends on the truths of the preceding, and adds to these
+its own special truths, while the first (the most general and simplest)
+presupposes no earlier laws whatever, but is presupposed by all the
+later ones. According to this principle of increasing particularity and
+complexity the following scale results: (i) Mathematics, in which the
+science of number, as being absolutely without presuppositions, precedes
+geometry and mechanics; (2) Astronomy; (3) Physics (with five subordinate
+divisions, in which the first place belongs to the theory of weight, and
+the last to electrology, while the theory of heat, acoustics, and optics
+are intermediate); (4) Chemistry; (5) Biology or physiology; (6) Sociology
+or the science of society. This sequence, which is determined by the
+increasing complexity and increasing dependence of the objects of the
+sciences, is the order in which they have historically developed--before
+the special laws of the more complicated sciences can be ascertained, the
+general laws of the more simple ones must be accurately known. It is also
+advisable to follow this same order of increasing complexity and difficulty
+in the study of the sciences, for acquaintance with the methods of those
+which are elementary is the best preparation for the pursuit of the higher
+ones. In arithmetic and geometry we study positivity at its source; in the
+sociological spirit it finds its completion.
+
+Mathematics entered on its positive stage at quite an early period,
+chemistry and biology only in recent times, while, in the highest and most
+complicated science, the metaphysical (negative, liberal, democratic,
+revolutionary) mode of thought is still battling with the feudalism of the
+theological mode. To make sociology positive is the mission of the second
+half of Comte's work, and to this goal his philosophical activity had been
+directed from the beginning. Comte rates the efforts of political economy
+very low, with the exception of the work of Adam Smith, and will not let
+them pass as a preparation for scientific sociology, holding that they are
+based on false abstractions. Psychology, which is absent from the above
+enumeration, is to form a branch of biology, and exclusively to use the
+objective method, especially phrenology (to the three faculties of the
+soul, "heart, character, and intellect," correspond three regions of the
+brain). Self-observation, so Comte, making an impossibility out of a
+difficulty, teaches, can at most inform us concerning our feelings and
+passions, and not at all concerning our own thinking, since reflection
+brings to a stop the process to which it attends, and thus destroys its
+object. The sole source of knowledge is external sense-perception. In his
+_Positive Polity_ Comte subsequently added a seventh fundamental science,
+ethics or anthropology.
+
+Sociology,[1] the elevation of which to the rank of a positive science is
+the principal aim of our philosopher, uses the same method as the natural
+sciences, namely, the interrogation and interpretation of experience by
+means of induction and deduction, only that here the usual relation of
+these two instruments of knowledge is reversed. Between inorganic and
+organic philosophy, both of which proceed from the known to the unknown,
+there is this difference, that in the former the advance is from the
+elements, as that which alone is directly accessible, to the whole which is
+composed of them, while in the latter the opposite is the case, since here
+the whole is better known than the individual parts of which it consists.
+Hence, in inorganic science the laws of the composite phenomena are
+obtained by deduction (from the laws of the simple facts inductively
+discovered) and confirmed by observation; in sociology, on the other
+hand, the laws are found through (historical) experience, and deductively
+verified (from the nature of man as established by biology) only in the
+sequel. Since the phenomena of society are determined not merely by the
+general laws of human nature, but, above all, by the growing influence of
+the past, historical studies must form the basis of sociological inquiry.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Krohn: _Beiträge zur Kenntniss und Würdigung der
+Soziologie, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik_, New Series,
+vols. i. and iii., 1880 and 1881.]
+
+Of the two parts of sociology, the Statics, which investigates the
+equilibrium (the conditions of the existence, the permanence, and the
+coexistence of social states), and Dynamics, which investigates the
+movement (the laws of the progress) of social phenomena, the first was in
+essence established by Aristotle. The fundamental concept of the Statics
+is the _consensus_, the harmony, solidarity, or mutual dependence of the
+members of the social organism. All its parts, science, art, religion,
+politics, industry, must be considered together; they stand in such
+intimate harmony and correlation that, for every important change of
+condition in one of these parts, we may be certain of finding
+corresponding changes in all the others, as its causes and effects.
+Besides the selfish propensities, there dwell in man an equally original,
+but intrinsically weaker, impulse toward association, which instinctively
+leads him to seek the society of his fellows without reflection on the
+advantages to be expected therefrom, and a moderate degree of
+benevolence. As altruism conflicts with egoism, so the reason, together
+with the impulse to get ahead, which can only be satisfied through
+labor, is in continual conflict with the inborn disinclination to regulated
+activity (especially to mental effort). The character of society depends on
+the strength of the nobler incentives, that is, the social inclinations and
+intellectual vivacity in opposition to the egoistic impulses and natural
+inertness. The former nourish the progressive, the latter the conservative
+spirit. Women are as much superior to men in the stronger development of
+their sympathy and sociability as they are inferior in insight and reason.
+Society is a group of families, not of individuals, and domestic life is
+the foundation, preparation, and pattern for social life, Comte praises the
+family, the connecting link between the individual and the species, as a
+school of unselfishness, and approves the strictness of the Catholic Church
+in regard to the indissolubility of the marriage relation. He remarks the
+evil consequences of the constantly increasing division of labor, which
+makes man egoistic and narrow-minded, since it hides rather than reveals
+the social significance of the employment of the individual and its
+connection with the welfare of the community, and seeks for a means of
+checking them. Besides the universal education of youth, he demands
+the establishment of a spiritual power to bring the general interest
+continually to the minds of the members of all classes and avocations, to
+direct education, and to enjoy the same authority in moral and intellectual
+matters as is conceded to the astronomer in the affairs of his department.
+The function of this power would be to occupy the position heretofore held
+by the clergy. Comte conceives it as composed of positive philosophers,
+entirely independent of the secular authorities, but in return cut off from
+political influence and from wealth. Secular authority, on the other hand,
+he wishes put into the hands of an aristocracy of capitalists, with the
+bankers at the head of these governing leaders of industry.
+
+The Dynamics, the science of the temporal succession of social phenomena,
+makes use of the principle of development. The progress of society,
+which is to be regarded as a great individual, consists in the growing
+predominance of the higher, human activities over the lower and animal. The
+humanity in us, it is true, will never attain complete ascendency over the
+animality, but we can approach nearer and nearer to the ideal, and it is
+our duty to aid in this march of civilization. Although the law of progress
+holds good for all sides of mental life, for art, politics, and morals,
+as well as for science, nevertheless the most important factor in the
+evolution of the human race is the development of the intellect as the
+guiding power in us (though not in itself the strongest). Awakened first by
+the lower wants, the intellect assumes in increasing measure the guidance
+of human operations, and gives a determinate direction to the feelings. The
+passions divide men, and, without the guidance of the speculative faculty,
+would mutually cripple one another; that which alone unites them into
+a collection force is a common belief, an idea. Ideas are related to
+feeling--to quote a comparison from John Stuart Mill's valuable treatise
+_Auguste Comte and Positivism_, 3d ed., 1882, a work of which we have made
+considerable use--as the steersman who directs the ship is to the steam
+which drives it forward. Thus the history of humanity has been determined
+by the history of man's intellectual convictions, and this in turn by the
+three familiar stages in the theory of the universe. With the development
+from the theological to the positive mode of thought is most intimately
+connected, further, the transition from the military to the industrial
+mode of life. As the religious spirit prepares the way for the scientific
+spirit, so without the dominion of the military spirit industry could not
+have been developed. It was only in the school of war that the earliest
+societies could learn order; slavery was beneficial in that through it
+labor was imposed upon the greater part of mankind in spite of their
+aversion to it. The political preponderance of the legists corresponds to
+the intermediate, metaphysical stage. The sociological law (discovered by
+Comte in the year 1822) harmonizes also with the customary division which
+separates the ancient from the modern world by the Middle Ages.
+
+In his philosophy of history Comte gives the further application of these
+principles. Here he has won commendation even from his opponents for a
+sense of justice which merits respect and for his comprehensive view. The
+outlooks and proposals for the future here interspersed were in later
+writings[1] worked out into a comprehensive theory of the regeneration
+of society; the extravagant character of which has given occasion to his
+critics to make a complete division between the second, "subjective or
+sentimental," period of his thinking, in which the philosopher is said to
+be transformed into the high priest of a new religion, and the first, the
+positivistic period, although the major part of the qualities pointed out
+as characteristic of the former are only intensifications of some which may
+be shown to have been present in the latter. Beneath the surface of the
+most sober inquiry mystical and dictatorial tendencies pulsate in Comte
+from the beginning, and science was for him simply a means to human
+happiness. But now he no longer demands the independent pursuit of science
+in order to the attainment of this end, but only the believing acceptance
+of its results. The intellect is to be placed under the dominion of the
+heart, and only such use made of it as promises a direct advantage for
+humanity; the determination of what problems are most important at a given
+time belongs to the priesthood. The systematic unity or harmony of the
+mind demands this dominion of the feelings over thought. The religion of
+positivism, which has "love for its principle, order for its basis, and
+progress for its end," is a religion without God, and without any other
+immortality than a continuance of existence in the grateful memory of
+posterity. The dogmas of the positivist religion are scientific principles.
+Its public _cultus_ with nine sacraments and a large number of annual
+festivals, is paid to the _Grand Être_ "Humanity" (which is not omnipotent,
+but, on account of its composite character, most dependent, yet infinitely
+superior to any of its parts); and, besides this, space, the earth, the
+universe, and great men of the past are objects of reverence. Private
+devotion consists in the adoration of living or dead women as our guardian
+angels. The _ethics_ of the future declares the good of others to be the
+sole moral motive to action (altruism). Comte's last work, the _Philosophy
+of Mathematics_, 1856, indulges in a most remarkable numerical mysticism.
+The historical influence exercised by Comte through his later writings is
+extremely small in comparison with that of his chief work. Besides
+Blignières and Robinet, E. Littré, the well-known author of the
+_Dictionnaire de la Langue Française_ (1863 _seq_.) who was the most
+eminent of Comte's disciples and the editor of his _Collected Works_ (1867
+_seq_.), has written on the life and work of the master. Comte's school
+divided into two groups--the apostates, with Littré (1801-81) at their
+head, who reject the subjective phase and hold fast to the earlier
+doctrine, and the faithful, who until 1877, when a new division between
+strict and liberal Comteans took place within this group, gathered about P.
+Laffitte (born 1823).[2] The leader of the English positivists is Frederic
+Harrison (born 1831). Positivistic societies exist also in Sweden, Brazil,
+Chili, and elsewhere. Positivism has been developed in an independent
+spirit by J.S. Mill and Herbert Spencer.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Positivist Catechism_, 1852 [English translation by Congreve,
+1858, 2d ed., 1883]; _System of Positive Polity_, 4 vols., 1851-54 [English
+translation, 1875-77]. Cf. Pünjer, _A. Comtes "Religion der Menschheit_" in
+the _Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie_, 1882.]
+
+[Footnote 2: On this division cf. E. Caro, _M. Littré et le Positivisme_,
+1883, and Herm. Gruber (S.J.), _Der Positivismus vom Tode Comtes bis auf
+unsere Tage_, 1891.]
+
+The following brief remarks on the course of French philosophy may also be
+added. Against the sensationalism of Condillac as continued by Cabanis,
+Destutt de Tracy (see above, pp. 259-260), and various physiologists, a
+twofold reaction asserted itself. One manifestation of this proceeded from
+the _theological school_, represented by the "traditionalists" Victor de
+Bonald (1818), Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821; _St. Petersburg Soirées_,
+1821), and F. de Lamennais (1782-1854), who, however, after his break with
+the Church (_Words of a Believer_, 1834) developed in his _Sketch of a
+Philosophy_, 1841 _seq_., an ontological system after Italian and German
+models. The other came from the _spiritualistic school_, at whose head
+stood Maine de Biran[1] (1766-1824; _On the Foundations of Psychology_; his
+_Works_ have been edited by Cousin, 1841, Naville, 1859, and Bertrand) and
+Royer Collard (1763-1845). Their pupil Victor Cousin (1792-1867; _Works_,
+1846-50), who admired Hegel also, became the head of the _eclectic school_.
+Cousin will neither deny metaphysics with the Scotch, nor construe
+metaphysics _a priori_ with the Germans, but with Descartes bases it on
+psychology. For a time an idealist of the Hegelian type (infinite and
+finite, God and the world, are mutually inseparable; the Ideas reveal
+themselves in history, in the nations, in great men), he gradually sank
+back to the position of common sense. His adherents, among whom Théodore
+Jouffroy (died 1842) was the most eminent, have done special service in the
+history of philosophy. From Cousin's school, which was opposed by P. Leroux
+and J. Reynaud, have come Ravaisson, Saisset, Jules Simon, P. Janet (born
+1823),[2] and E. Caro (born 1826; _The Philosophy of Goethe_, 1866). Kant
+has influenced Charles Renouvier (born 1817; _Essays in General Criticism_,
+4 vols., 1854-64) and E. Vacherot (born 1809; _Metaphysics and Science_,
+1858, 2d ed., 1863; _Science and Consciousness_, 1872).
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. E. König in _Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xxv. 1889,
+p.160 _seq_.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Janet: _History of Political Science in its Relations to
+Morals_, 1858, 3d ed., 1887; _German Materialism of the Present Day_, 1864,
+English translation by Masson, 1866: _The Family_, 1855; _The Philosophy of
+Happiness_, 1862; _The Brain and Thought_, 1867; _Elements of Morals_,
+1869 [English translation by Corson, 1884]; _The Theory of Morals_, 1874
+[English translation by Mary Chapman, 1883]; _Final Causes_, 1876 [English
+translation by Affleck, with a preface by Flint, new ed., 1883].]
+
+Among other thinkers of reputation we may mention the socialist Henri de
+Saint-Simon (1760-1825; _Selected Works_, 1859), the physiologist Claude
+Bernard (1813-78), the positivist H. Taine (1828-93; _The Philosophy of
+Art_, English translation by Durand, 2d ed., 1873; _On Intelligence_, 1872,
+English translation by Haye, 1871), E. Renan (1823-92; _The Life of
+Jesus_, 1863, English translation by Wilbour, _Philosophical Dialogues and
+Fragments_--English, 1883), the writer on aesthetics and ethics J.M. Guyau
+(_The Problems of Contemporary Aesthetics_, 1884; _Sketch of an Ethic
+without Obligation or Sanction_, 1885; _The Irreligion of the Future_,
+1887), Alfred Fouillée _(The Future of Metaphysics founded on Experience_,
+1889; _Morals, Art, and Religion according to Guyau_, 1889; _The
+Evolutionism of the Idea-Forces_, 1890), and the psychologist Th. Ribot,[1]
+editor of the _Revue Philosophique_ (from 1876).
+
+[Footnote 1: Ribot: _Heredity_, 2d ed., 1882 [English translation, 1875];
+_The Diseases of Memory_, 1881 [English translation, 1882]; _The Diseases
+of the Will_, 1883 [English. 1884]; _The Diseases of Personality_, 1885
+[English, 1887]; _The Psychology of Attention_, 1889 [English, 1890];
+_German Psychology of To-day_, 2d ed., 1885 [English translation by
+Baldwin, 1886].]
+
+
+%3. Great Britain and America.%
+
+Prominent among the British philosophers of the nineteenth century[1]
+are Hamilton, Bentham, J.S. Mill, and Spencer. Hamilton is the leading
+representative of the Scottish School; Bentham is known as the advocate of
+utilitarianism; Mill, an exponent of the traditional empiricism of English
+thinking, develops the theory of induction and the principle of utility;
+Spencer combines an agnostic doctrine of the absolute and thoroughgoing
+evolution in the phenomenal world into a comprehensive philosophical
+system.[2] In recent years there has been a reaction against empirical
+doctrines on the basis of neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian principles. Foremost
+among the leaders of this movement we may mention T.H. Green.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Harald Höffding, _Einleitung in die englische Philosophie
+unserer Zeit_ (Danish, 1874), German (with alterations and additions by the
+author) by H. Kurella, 1889; David Masson, _Recent British Philosophy_,
+1865, 3d ed., 1877; Ribot, _La Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine_, 1870,
+2d ed., 1875 [English, 1874] Guyau, _La Morale Anglaise Contemporaine_,
+1879 [Morris, _British Thought and Thinkers_, 1880; Porter, "On English and
+American Philosophy," Ueberweg's _History_, English translation, vol.
+ii. pp. 348-460; O. Pfleiderer, _Development of Theology_, 1890, book
+iv.--TR.]]
+
+[Footnote 2: Cf. on Mill and Spencer, Bernh. Pünjer, _Jahrbücher für
+protestantische Theologie_, 1878.]
+
+The Scottish philosophy has been continued in the nineteenth century by
+James Mackintosh (_Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy_,
+1830, 3d ed., 1863), and William Whewell (_History of the Inductive
+Sciences_, 3d ed., 1857; _Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences_, 1840, 3d
+ed., 1858-60). Its most important representative is Sir William Hamilton[1]
+of Edinburgh (1788-1856), who, like Whewell, is influenced by Kant.
+Hamilton bases philosophy on the facts of consciousness, but, in antithesis
+to the associational psychology, emphasizes the mental activity of
+discrimination and judgment. Our knowledge is relative, and relations its
+only object. Consciousness can never transcend itself, it is bound to
+the antithesis of subject and object, and conceives the existent under
+relations of space and time. Hence the unconditioned is inaccessible to
+knowledge and attainable by faith alone. Among Hamilton's followers belong
+Mansel (_Metaphysics_, 3d. ed., 1875; _Limits of Religions Thought_, 5th
+ed., 1870) and Veitch. The Scottish doctrine was vigorously opposed by J.F.
+Ferrier (1808-64; _Institutes of Metaphysics_, 2d ed., 1856), who himself
+developed an idealistic standpoint.
+
+[Footnote 1: Hamilton: _Discussions on Philosophy and Literature_, 1852, 3d
+ed., 1866; _Lectures on Metaphysics_, 2d ed., 1860, and on _Logic_, 2d ed.,
+1866, edited by his pupils, Mansel and Veitch; _Reid's Works_, with notes
+and dissertations, 1846, 7th ed., 1872. On Hamilton cf. Veitch, 1882, 1883
+[Monck, 1881].]
+
+In the United States the Scottish philosophy has exercised a wide
+influence. In recent times it has been strenuously advocated, chiefly in
+the spirit of Reid, by James McCosh (a native of Scotland, but since 1868
+in America; _The Intuitions of the Mind_, 3d ed., 1872; _The Laws of
+Discursive Thought_, new ed., 1891; _First and Fundamental Truths_, 1889);
+while in Noah Porter (died 1892; _The Human Intellect_, new ed., 1876; _The
+Elements of Moral Science_, 1885) it appears modified by elements from
+German thinking.
+
+Jeremy Bentham[1] (1748-1832) is noteworthy for his attempt to revive
+Epicureanism in modern form. Virtue is the surest means to pleasure, and
+pleasure the only self-evident good. Every man strives after happiness, but
+not every one in the right way. The honest man calculates correctly, the
+criminal falsely; hence a careful calculation of the value of the various
+pleasures, and a prudent use of the means to happiness, is the first
+condition of virtue; in this the easily attainable minor joys, whose
+summation amounts to a considerable quantum, must not be neglected. The
+value of a pleasure is measured by its intensity, duration, certainty,
+propinquity, fecundity in the production of further pleasure, purity or
+freedom from admixture of consequent pain, and extent to the greatest
+possible number of persons. Every virtuous action results in a balance of
+pleasure. Inflict no evil on thyself or others from which a balance of good
+will not result. The end of morality is the "greatest happiness of the
+greatest number," in the production of which each has first to care for
+his own welfare: whoever injures himself more than he serves others acts
+immorally, for he diminishes the sum of happiness in the world; the
+interest of the individual coincides with the interest of society. The two
+classes of virtues are prudence and benevolence. The latter is a natural,
+though not a disinterested affection: happiness enjoyed with others is
+greater than happiness enjoyed alone. Love is a pleasure-giving extension
+of the individual; we serve others to be served by them.
+
+[Footnote 1: Bentham: _Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
+Legislation_, 1789; new ed., 1823, reprinted 1876; _Deontology_, 1834,
+edited by Bowring, who also edited the _Works_, 1838-43. _The Principles
+of Civil and Criminal Legislation_, edited in French from Bentham's
+manuscripts by his pupil Etienne Dumont (1801, 2d ed., 1820; English by
+Hildreth, 5th ed., 1887), was translated into German with notes by F.E.
+Beneke, 1830.]
+
+Associationalism has been reasserted by James Mill (1773-1836; _Analysis of
+the Phenomena of the Human Mind_, 1829), whose influence lives on in the
+work of his greater son. The latter, John Stuart Mill,[1] was born in
+London 1806, and was from 1823 to 1858 a secretary in the India House;
+after the death of his wife he lived (with the exception of two years of
+service as a Member of Parliament) at Avignon; his death occurred in
+1873. Mill's _System of Logic_ appeared in 1843, 9th ed., 1875; his
+_Utilitarianism_, 1863, new ed., 1871; _An Examination of Sir William
+Hamilton's Philosophy_, 1865, 5th ed., 1878; his notes to the new edition
+of his father's work, _Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind_, 2d
+ed., 1878, also deserve notice. With the phenomenalism of Hume and the
+(somewhat corrected) associational psychology of his father as a basis,
+Mill makes experience the sole source of knowledge, rejecting _a priori_
+and intuitive elements of every sort. Matter he defines as a "permanent
+possibility of sensation"; mind is resolved into "a series of feelings with
+a background of possibilities of feeling," even though the author is not
+unaware of the difficulty involved in the question how a series of feelings
+can be aware of itself as a series. Mathematical principles, like all
+others, have an experiential origin--the peculiar certitude ascribed to
+them by the Kantians is a fiction--and induction is the only fruitful
+method of scientific inquiry (even in mental science). The syllogism is
+itself a concealed induction.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. on Mill. Taine, _Le Positivisme Anglais_, 1864 [English,
+by Haye]; the objections of Jevons _(Contemporary Review_, December, 1877
+_seq_., reprinted in _Pure Logic and other Minor Works_, 1890; cf. _Mind_,
+vol. xvi. pp. 106-110) to Mill's doctrine of the inductive character of
+geometry, his treatment of the relation of resemblance, and his exposition
+of the four methods of experimental inquiry in their relation to the law of
+causation; and the finely conceived essay on utilitarianism, by C.
+Hebler, _Philosophische Aufsãtze_, 1869, pp. 35-66. [Also Mill's own
+_Autobiography_, 1873: Bain's _John Stuart Mill, a Criticism_, 1882; and
+T.H. Green, Lectures on the _Logic, Works_, vol. ii.--TR.]]
+
+When I assert the major premise the inference proper is already made, and
+in the conclusion the comprehensive formula for a number of particular
+truths which was given in the premise is merely explicated, interpreted.
+Because universal judgments are for him merely brief expressions for
+aggregates of particular truths, Mill is able to say that all knowledge is
+generalization, and at the same time to argue that all inference is from
+particulars to particulars. Inference through a general proposition is not
+necessary, yet useful as a collateral security, inasmuch as the syllogistic
+forms enable us more easily to discover errors committed. The ground of
+induction, the uniformity of nature in reference both to the coexistence
+and the succession of phenomena, since it wholly depends on induction,
+is not unconditionally certain; but it may be accepted as very highly
+probable, until some instance of lawless action (in itself conceivable)
+shall have been actually proved. Like the law of causation, the principles
+of logic are also not _a priori_, but only the highest generalizations from
+all previous experience.
+
+Mill's most brilliant achievement is his theory of experimental inquiry,
+for which he advances four methods: (1) The Method of Agreement: "If two
+or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one
+circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances
+agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon." (2) The Method of
+Difference: "If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation
+occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance
+in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance
+in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an
+indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon," These two methods (the
+method of observation, and the method of artificial experiment) may also be
+employed in combination, and the Canon of the Joint Method of Agreement and
+Difference runs: "If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs
+have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in
+which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that
+circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances
+differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the
+cause, of the phenomenon." (3) The Method of Residues: "Subduct from any
+phenomenon such part as is known by previous inductions to be the effect of
+certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the
+remaining antecedents." (4) The Method of Concomitant Variations: "Whatever
+phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some
+particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is
+connected with it through some fact of causation." When the phenomena are
+complex the deductive method must be called in to aid: from the inductively
+ascertained laws of the action of single causes this deduces the laws
+of their combined action; and, as a final step, the results of such
+ratiocination are verified by the proof of their agreement with empirical
+facts. To explain a phenomenon means to point out its cause; the
+explanation of a law is its reduction to other, more general laws. In all
+this, however, we remain within the sphere of phenomena; the essence of
+nature always eludes our knowledge.
+
+In the chapter "Of Liberty and Necessity" (book vi. chap, ii.) Mill
+emphasizes the position that the necessity to which human actions are
+subject must not be conceived, as is commonly done, as irresistible
+compulsion, for it denotes nothing more than the uniform order of our
+actions and the possibility of predicting them. This does not destroy
+the element in the idea of freedom which is legitimate and practically
+valuable: we have the power to alter our character; it is formed _by_ us
+as well as _for_ us; the desire to mould it is one of the most influential
+circumstances in its formation. The principle of morality is the promotion
+of the happiness of all sentient beings. Mill differs from Bentham,
+however, from whom he derives the principle of utility, in several
+important particulars--by his recognition of qualitative as well as of
+quantitative differences in pleasures, of the value of the ordinary rules
+of morality as intermediate principles, of the social feelings, and of the
+disinterested love of virtue. Opponents of the utilitarian theory have
+not been slow in availing themselves of the opportunities for attack thus
+afforded.[1] A third distinguished representative of the same general
+movement is Alexander Bain, the psychologist (born 1818; _The Senses and
+the Intellect_, 3d ed., 1868; _The Emotions and the Will_, 3d ed., 1875;
+_Mental and Moral Science_, 1868, 3d ed., 1872, part ii., 1872; _Mind and
+Body_, 3d ed., 1874).
+
+[Footnote 1: On the relation of Bentham and Mill cf. Höffding, p. 68:
+Sidgwick's _Outlines_, chap. iv. § 16; and John Grote's _Examination of the
+Utilitarian Philosophy_, 1870, chap. i.]
+
+The system projected by Herbert Spencer (born 1820), the major part of
+which has already appeared, falls into five parts: _First Principles_,
+1862, 7th ed., 1889; _Principles of Biology_, 1864-67, 4th ed., 1888;
+_Principles of Psychology_, 1855, 5th ed., 1890; _Principles of Sociology_
+(vol. i. 1876, 3d ed., 1885; part iv. _Ceremonial Institutions_, 1879, 3d
+ed., 1888, part v. _Political Institutions_, 1882, 2d ed., 1885, part vi.
+_Ecclesiastical Institutions_, 1885, 2d ed., 1886, together constituting
+vol. ii.); _Principles of Ethics_ (part i. _The Data of Ethics_, 1879, 5th
+ed., 1888; parts ii. and iii. _The Inductions of Ethics_ and _The Ethics of
+Individual Life_, constituting with part i. the first volume, 1892; part
+iv. _Justice_, 1891). A comprehensive exposition of the system has been
+given, with the authority of the author, by F.H. Collins in his _Epitome of
+the Synthetic Philosophy_, 1889.[1] The treatise on _Education_, 1861, 23d
+ed., 1890, his sociological writings, and his various essays have also
+contributed essentially to Mr. Spencer's fame, both at home and abroad. The
+_First Principles_ begin with the "Unknowable." Since human opinions, no
+matter how false they may seem, have sprung from actual experiences, and,
+when they find wide acceptance and are tenaciously adhered to, must have
+something in them which appeals to the minds of men, we must assume that
+every error contains a kernel of truth, however small it be. No one of
+opposing views is to be accepted as wholly true, and none rejected as
+entirely false. To discover the incontrovertible fact which lies at their
+basis, we must reject the various concrete elements in which they disagree,
+and find for the remainder the abstract expression which holds true
+throughout its divergent manifestations. No antagonism is older, wider,
+more profound, and more important than that between religion and science.
+Here too some most general truth, some ultimate fact must lie at the basis.
+The ultimate religious ideas are self-contradictory and untenable. No
+one of the possible hypotheses concerning the nature and origin of
+things--every religion may be defined as an _a priori_ theory of the
+universe, the accompanying ethical code being a later growth--is logically
+defensible: whether the world is conceived atheistically as self-existent,
+or pantheistically as self-created, or theistically (fetichism, polytheism,
+or monotheism), as created by an external agency, we are everywhere
+confronted by unthinkable conclusions. The idea of a First Cause or of
+the absolute (as Mansel, following Hamilton, has proved in his _Limits
+of Religious Thought_) is full of contradictions. But however widely the
+creeds diverge, they show entire unanimity, from the grossest superstition
+up to the most developed theism, in the belief that the existence of the
+world is a mystery which ever presses for interpretation, though it can
+never be entirely explained. And in the progress of religion from crude
+fetichism to the developed theology of our time, the truth, at first but
+vaguely perceived, that there is an omnipresent Inscrutable which manifests
+itself in all phenomena, ever comes more clearly into view.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. also Fiske's _Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy_, 2 vols.,
+1874. Numerous critiques and discussions of Spencer's views have been given
+in various journals and reviews; among more extended works reference may be
+made to Bowne, _The Philösophy of Herbert Spencer_, 1874; Malcolm Guthrie,
+_On Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution_, 1879, and the same author, _On Mr.
+Spencer's Unification of Knowledge_, 1882; and T.H. Green, on Spencer and
+Lewes, _Works_, vol. i.--TR.]
+
+Science meets this ultimate religious truth with the conviction, grasped
+with increasing clearness as the development proceeds from Protagoras to
+Kant, that the reality hidden behind all phenomena must always remain
+unknown, that our knowledge can never be absolute. This principle maybe
+established inductively from the incomprehensibility of the ultimate
+scientific ideas, as well as deductively from the nature of intelligence,
+through an analysis of the product and the process of thought. (1) The
+ideas space, time, matter, motion, and force, as also the first states of
+consciousness, and the thinking substance, the ego as the unity of subject
+and object, all represent realities whose nature and origin are entirely
+incomprehensible. (2) The subsumption of particular facts under more
+general facts leads ultimately to a most general, highest fact, which
+cannot be reduced to a more general one, and hence cannot be explained or
+comprehended. (3) All thought (as has been shown by Hamilton in his essay
+"On the Philosophy of the Unconditioned," and by his follower Mansel)
+is the establishment of relations, every thought involving relation,
+difference, and (as Spencer adds) likeness. Hence the absolute, the idea
+of which excludes every relation, is entirely beyond the reach of an
+intelligence which is concerned with relations alone, and which always
+consists in discrimination, limitation, and assimilation--it is trebly
+unthinkable. Therefore: Religion and Science agree in the supreme truth
+that the human understanding is capable of relative knowledge only or of a
+knowledge of the relative (Relativity). Nevertheless, according to Spencer,
+it is too much to conclude with the thinkers just mentioned, that the
+idea of the absolute is a mere expression for inconceivability, and its
+existence problematical. The nature of the absolute is unknowable, but
+not the existence of a basis for the relative and phenomenal. The
+considerations which speak in favor of the relativity of knowledge and its
+limitation to phenomena, argue also the existence of a non-relative, whose
+phenomenon the relative is; the idea of the relative and the phenomenal
+posits _eo ipso_ the existence of the absolute as its correlative, which
+manifests itself in phenomena. We have at least an indefinite, though not
+a definite, consciousness of the Unknowable as the Unknown Cause, the
+Universal Power, and on this is founded our ineradicable belief in
+objective reality.
+
+All knowledge is limited to the relative, and consists in increasing
+generalization: the apex of this pyramid is formed by philosophy. Common
+knowledge is un-unified knowledge; science is partially unified knowledge;
+philosophy, which combines the highest generalizations of the sciences into
+a supreme one, is completely unified knowledge. The data of philosophy
+are--besides an Unknowable Power--the existence of knowable likenesses and
+differences among its manifestations, and a resulting segregation of the
+manifestations into those of subject and object. Further, derivative data
+are space (relations of coexistence), time (relations of irreversible
+sequence), matter (coexistent positions that offer resistance), motion
+(which involves space, time, and matter), and force, the ultimate of
+ultimates, on which all others depend, and from our primordial experiences
+of which all the other modes of consciousness are derivable. Similarly the
+ultimate primary truth is the _persistence of force_, from which, besides
+the indestructibility of matter and the continuity of (actual or potential)
+motion, still further truths may be deduced: the persistence of relations
+among forces or the uniformity of law, the transformation and equivalence
+of (mental and social as well as of physical) forces, the law of the
+direction of motion (along the line of least resistance, or the line of
+greatest traction, or their resultant), and the unceasing rhythm of
+motion. Beyond these analytic truths, however, philosophy demands a law of
+universal synthesis. This must be the law of _the continuous redistribution
+of matter and motion_, for each single thing, and the whole universe
+as well, is involved in a (continuously repeated) double process of
+_evolution_ and _dissolution_, the former consisting in the integration of
+matter[1] and the dissipation of motion, the latter in the absorption of
+motion and the disintegration of matter. The law of evolution, in its
+complete development, then runs: "Evolution is an integration of matter and
+concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an
+indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity;
+and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."
+This is inductively supported by illustrations from every region of nature
+and all departments of mental and social life; and, further, shown
+deducible from the ultimate principle of the persistence of force, through
+the mediation of several corollaries to it, viz., the instability of the
+homogeneous under the varied incidence of surrounding forces, the
+multiplication of effects by action and reaction, and segregation. Finally
+the principle of equilibration indicates the impassable limit at which
+evolution passes over into dissolution, until the eternal round is again
+begun. If it may be said of Hegel himself, that he vainly endeavored to
+master the concrete fullness of reality with formal concepts, the criticism
+is applicable to Spencer in still greater measure. The barren schemata of
+concentration, passage into heterogeneity, adaptation, etc., which are
+taken from natural science, and which are insufficient even in their own
+field, prove entirely impotent for the mastery of the complex and peculiar
+phenomena of spiritual life.
+
+[Footnote 1: Organic growth is the concentration of elements before
+diffused; cf. the union of nomadic families into settled tribes.]
+
+Armed with these principles, however, Mr. Spencer advances to the
+discussion of the several divisions of "Special Philosophy." Passing over
+inorganic nature, he finds his task in the interpretation of the phenomena
+of life, mind, and society in terms of matter, motion, and force under the
+general evolution formula. This procedure, however, must not be understood
+as in any wise materialistic. Such an interpretation would be a
+misrepresentation, it is urged, for the strict relativity of the standpoint
+limits all conclusions to phenomena, and permits no inference concerning
+the nature of the "Unknowable." The _Principles of Biology_ take up the
+phenomena of life. Life is defined as the "continuous adjustment of
+internal relations to external relations." No attempt is made to explain
+its origin, yet (in the words of Mr. Sully) it is clear that the lowest
+forms of life are regarded as continuous in their essential nature with
+sub-vital processes. The evolution of living organisms, from the lowest to
+the highest, with the development of all their parts and functions, results
+from the co-operation of various factors, external and internal, whose
+action is ultimately reducible to the universal law.
+
+The field of _psychology_ is intimately allied with biology, and yet
+istinguished from it. Mental life is a subdivision of life in general, and
+may be subsumed under the general definition; but while biological truths
+concern the connection between internal phenomena, with but tacit or
+occasional recognition of the environment, psychology has to do neither
+with the internal connection nor the external connection, but "the
+connection between these two connections." Psychology in its subjective
+aspect, again, is a field entirely _sui generis_. The substance of mind,
+conceived as the underlying substratum of mental states, is unknowable; but
+the character of those states of which mind, as we know it, is composed,
+is a legitimate subject of inquiry. If this be carefully investigated, it
+seems highly probable that the ultimate unit of consciousness is something
+"of the same order as that which we call a nervous shock." Mind is
+proximately composed of feelings and the relations between feelings;
+from these, revived, associated, and integrated, the whole fabric of
+consciousness is built up. There is, then, no sharp distinction between the
+several phases of mind. If we trace its development objectively, in terms
+of the correspondence between inner and outer phenomena, we find a gradual
+progress from the less to the more complex, from the lower to the higher,
+without a break. Reflex action, instinct, memory, reason, are simply
+stages in the process. All is dependent on experience. Even the forms of
+knowledge, which are _a priori_ to the individual, are the product
+of experience in the race, integrated and transmitted by heredity, and
+become organic in the nervous structure. In general the correspondence of
+inner and outer in which mental life consists is mediated by the nervous
+organism. The structure and functions of this condition consciousness and
+furnish the basis for the interpretation of mental evolution in terms of
+"evolution at large, regarded as a process of physical transformation."
+Nevertheless mental phenomena and bodily phenomena are not identical,
+consciousness is not motion. They are both phenomenal modes of the
+unknowable, disparate in themselves, and giving no indication of the
+ultimate nature of the absolute. Subjective analysis of human consciousness
+yields further proof of the unity of mental composition. All mental action
+is ultimately reducible to "the continuous differentiation and integration
+of states of consciousness." The criterion of truth is the inconceivability
+of the negation. Tried by this test, as by all others, realism is superior
+to idealism, though in that "transfigured" form which implies objective
+existence without implying the possibility of any further knowledge
+concerning it,--hence in a form entirely congruous with the conclusion
+reached by many other routes.
+
+_Sociology_ deals with super-organic evolution, which involves the
+co-ordinated actions of many individuals. To understand the social unit, we
+must study primitive man, especially the ideas which he forms of himself,
+of other beings, and of the surrounding world. The conception of a mind or
+other-self is gradually evolved through observation of natural phenomena
+which favor the notion of duality, especially the phenomena of sleep,
+dreams, swoons, and death. Belief in the influence of these doubles of the
+dead on the fortunes of the living leads to sorcery, prayer, and praise.
+Ancestor-worship is the ultimate source of all forms of religion; to it
+can be traced even such aberrant developments as fetichism and idolatry,
+animal-, plant-, and nature-worship. Thus the primitive man feels himself
+related not only to his living fellows, but to multitudes of supernatural
+beings about him. The fear of the living becomes the root of the political,
+and the fear of the dead the root of the religious, control. A society is
+an organic entity. Though differing from an individual organism in many
+ways, it yet resembles it in the permanent relations among its component
+parts. The Domestic Relations, by which the maintenance of the species is
+now secured, have come from various earlier and less developed forms; the
+militant type of society is accompanied by a lower, the industrial type
+by a higher stage of this development. Ceremonial observance is the most
+primitive kind of government, and the kind from which the political and
+religious governments have differentiated. Political organization is
+necessary in order to co-operation for ends which benefit the society
+directly, and the individual only indirectly. The ultimate political force
+is the feeling of the community, including as its largest part ancestral
+feeling. Many facts combine to obscure this truth, but however much it may
+be obscured, public feeling remains the primal source of authority. The
+various forms and instruments of government have grown up through processes
+in harmony with the general law. The two antithetical types of society are
+the militant and the industrial--the former implies compulsory co-operation
+under more or less despotic rule, with governmental assumption of functions
+belonging to the individual and a minimizing of individual initiative;
+in the latter, government is reduced to a minimum and best conducted by
+representative agencies, public organizations are largely replaced by
+private organizations, the individual is freer and looks less to the state
+for protection and for aid. The fundamental conditions of the highest
+social development is the cessation of war. The ideas and sentiments at the
+basis of Ecclesiastical Institutions have been naturally derived from the
+ghost-theory already described. The goal of religious development is the
+final rejection of all anthropomorphic conceptions of the First Cause,
+until the harmony of religion and science shall be reached in the
+veneration of the Unknowable. The remaining parts of Mr. Spencer's
+Sociology will treat of Professional Institutions, Industrial Institutions,
+Linguistic Progress, Intellectual, Moral, and Aesthetic Progress.
+
+The subject matter of _ethics_ is the conduct termed good or bad. Conduct
+is the adjustment of acts to ends. The evolution of conduct is marked by
+increasing perfection in the adjustment of acts to the furtherance of
+individual life, the life of offspring, and social life. The ascription of
+ethical character to the highly evolved conduct of man in relation to
+these ends implies the fundamental assumption, that "life is good or bad
+according as it does, or does not, bring a surplus of agreeable feeling."
+The ideal of moral science is rational deduction: a rational utilitarianism
+can be attained only by the recognition of the necessary laws--physical,
+biological, psychological, and sociological--which condition the results of
+actions; among these the biological laws have been largely neglected in
+the past, though they are of the utmost importance as furnishing the link
+between life and happiness. The "psychological view," again, explains the
+origin of conscience. In the course of development man comes to recognize
+the superiority of the higher and more representative feelings as guides
+to action; this form of self-restraint, however, is characteristic of the
+non-moral restraints as well, of the political, social, and religious
+controls. From these the moral control proper has emerged--differing from
+them in that it refers to intrinsic instead of extrinsic effects--and the
+element of coerciveness in them, transferred, has generated the feeling of
+moral compulsion (which, however, "will diminish as fast as moralization
+increases").
+
+Such a rational ethics, based on the laws which condition welfare rather
+than on a direct estimation of happiness, and premising the relativity of
+all pains and pleasures, escapes fundamental objections to the earlier
+hedonism (_e.g._, those to the hedonic calculus); and, combining the
+valuable elements in the divergent ethical theories, yields satisfactory
+principles for the decision of ethical problems. Egoism takes precedence
+of altruism; yet it is in turn dependent on this, and the two, on due
+consideration, are seen to be co-essential. Entirely divorced from the
+other, neither is legitimate, and a compromise is the only possibility;
+while in the future advancing evolution will bring the two into complete
+harmony. The goal of the whole process will be the ideal man in the ideal
+society, the scientific anticipation of which, absolute ethics, promises
+guidance for the relative and imperfect ethics of the transition period.
+
+Examination of the actual, not the professed, ideas and sentiments of men
+reveals wide variation in moral judgments. This is especially true of the
+"pro-ethical" consciousnesses of external authorities, coercions, and
+opinions--religious, political, and social--by which the mass of mankind
+are governed; and is broadly due to variation in social conditions. Where
+the need of external co-operation predominates the ethics of enmity
+develops; where internal, peaceful co-operation is the chief social need
+the ethics of amity results: and the evolution principle enables us to
+infer that, as among certain small tribes in the past, so in the great
+cultivated nations of the future, the life of amity will unqualifiedly
+prevail. The Ethics of Individual Life shows the application of moral
+judgments to all actions which affect individual welfare. The very fact
+that some deviations from normal life are now morally disapproved, implies
+the existence of both egoistic and altruistic sanctions for the moral
+approval of all acts which conduce to normal living and the disapproval of
+all minor deviations, though for the most part these have hitherto remained
+unconsidered. Doubtless, however, moral control must here be somewhat
+indefinite; and even scientific observation and analysis must leave the
+production of a perfectly regulated conduct to "the organic adjustment of
+constitution to [social] conditions."
+
+The Ethics of Social Life includes justice and beneficence. Human justice
+emerges from sub-human or animal justice, whose law (passing over gratis
+benefits to offspring) is "that each individual shall receive the benefits
+and evils of its own nature and its consequent conduct." This is the law
+of human justice, also, but here it is more limited than before by the
+non-interference which gregariousness requires, and by the increasing need
+for the sacrifice of individuals for the good of the species. The egoistic
+sentiment of justice arises from resistance to interference with free
+action; the altruistic develops through sympathy under social conditions,
+these being maintained meanwhile by a "pro-altruistic" sentiment, into
+which dread of retaliation, of social reprobation, of legal punishment, and
+of divine vengeance enter as component parts. The idea of justice emerges
+gradually from the sentiment of justice: it has two elements, one brute or
+positive, with inequality as its ideal, one human or negative, the ideal
+of which is equality. In early times the former of these was unduly
+appreciated, as in later times the latter, the true conception includes
+both, the idea of equality being applied to the limits and the idea of
+inequality to the benefits of action. Thus the formula of justice becomes:
+"Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the
+equal freedom of any other man "--a law which finds its authority in the
+facts, that it is an _a priori_ dictum of "consciousness after it has been
+subject to the discipline of prolonged social life," and that it is also
+deducible from the conditions of the maintenance of life at large and of
+social life. From this law follow various particular corollaries or rights,
+all of which coincide with ordinary ethical concepts and have legal
+enactments corresponding to them. Political rights so-called do not exist;
+government is simply a system of appliances for the maintenance of private
+rights. Both the nature of the state and its constitution are variable:
+the militant type requires centralization and a coercive constitution;
+the industrial type implies a wider distribution of political power, but
+requires a representation of interests rather than a representation of
+individuals. Government develops as a result of war, and its function of
+protection against internal aggression arises by differentiation from its
+primary function of external defense. These two, then, constitute the
+essential duties of the state; when war ceases the first falls away, and
+its sole function becomes the maintenance of the conditions under which
+each individual may "gain the fullest life compatible with the fullest life
+of fellow-citizens." All beyond this, all interference with this life of
+the individual, whether by way of assistance, restraint, or education,
+proves in the end both unjust and impolitic. The remaining parts of the
+_Ethics_ will treat of Negative and Positive Beneficence.
+
+If J.S. Mill and Spencer (the latter of whom, moreover, had announced
+evolution as a world-law before the appearance of Darwin), move in a
+direction akin to positivism, the same is true, further, of G.H. Lewes
+(1817-78; _History of Philosophy_, 5th ed., 1880; _Problems of Life and
+Mind_, 1874 _seq_).
+
+Turning to the discussion of particular disciplines, we may mention as
+prominent among English logicians,[1] besides Hamilton, Whewell, and Mill,
+Whately, Mansel, Thomson, De Morgan, Boole (_An Investigation of the Laws
+of Thought_, 1854); W.S. Jevons (_The Principles of Science_, 2d ed.,
+1877); Venn (_Symbolic Logic_, 1881; _Empirical Logic_, 1889), Bradley, and
+Bosanquet. Among more recent investigators in the field of psychology we
+may name Carpenter, Ferrier, Maudsley, Galton, Ward, and Sully (_The Human
+Mind_, 1892), and in the field of comparative psychology, Lubbock, Romanes
+(_Mental Evolution in Animals_, 1883; _Mental Evolution in Man_, 1889), and
+Morgan (_Animal Life and Intelligence_, 1891). Among ethical writers the
+following, besides Spencer and Green, hold a foremost place: H. Sidgwick
+_(The Methods of Ethics_, 4th ed., 1890), Leslie Stephen _(The Science of
+Ethics_, 1882), and James Martineau _(Types of Ethical Theory_, 3d ed.,
+1891). The quarterly review _Mind_ (vols. i.-xvi. 1876-91, edited by G.
+Croom Robertson; new series from 1892, edited by G.F. Stout) has since its
+foundation played an important part in the development of English thought.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Nedich, _Die Lehre von der Quantifikation des Prädikats_
+in vol. iii. of Wundt's _Philosophische Studien_; L. Liard, _Les
+Logiciens Anglais Contemporains_, 1878; Al. Riehl in vol. i. of the
+_Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie_, 1877 [cf. also
+appendix A to the English translation of Ueberweg's _Logic_.--TR.].]
+
+German idealism, for which S.T. Coleridge (died 1834) and Thomas Carlyle
+(died 1881) endeavored to secure an entrance into England, for a long
+time gained ground there but slowly. Later years, however, have brought
+increasing interest in German speculation, and much of recent thinking
+shows the influence of Kantian and Hegelian principles. As pioneer of this
+movement we may name J.H. Stirling _(The Secret of Hegel_, 1865); and as
+its most prominent representatives John Caird _(An Introduction to the
+Philosophy of Religion_, 1880), Edward Caird _(The Critical Philosophy of
+Immanuel Kant_, 1889; _The Evolution of Religion_, 1893), both in Glasgow,
+and T.H. Green (1836-82; professor at Oxford; _Prolegomena to Ethics_,
+3d ed., 1887; _Works_, edited by Nettleship, 3 vols., 1885-88).[1] In
+opposition to the hereditary empiricism of English philosophy--which
+appears in Spencer and Lewes, as it did in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume,
+though in somewhat altered form--Green maintains that all experience is
+constituted by intelligible relations. Knowledge, therefore, is possible
+only for a correlating self-consciousness; while nature, as a system of
+relations, is likewise dependent on a spiritual principle, of which it is
+the expression. Thus the central conception of Green's philosophy becomes,
+"that the universe is a single eternal activity or energy, of which it is
+the essence to be self-conscious, that is, to be itself and not itself
+in one" (Nettleship). To this universal consciousness we are related as
+manifestations or "communications" under the limitations of our physical
+organization. As such we are free, that is, self-determined, determined by
+nothing from without. The moral ideal is self-realization or perfection,
+the progressive reproduction of the divine self-consciousness. This is
+possible only in terms of a development of persons, for as a self-conscious
+personality the divine spirit can reproduce itself in persons alone; and,
+since "social life is to personality what language is to thought,"
+the realization of the moral ideal implies life in common. The nearer
+determination of the ideal is to be sought in the manifestations of the
+eternal spirit as they have been given in the moral history of individuals
+and nations. This shows what has already been implied in the relation of
+morality to personality and society, that moral good must first of all be
+a common good, one in which the permanent well-being of self includes the
+well-being of others also. This is the germ of morality, the development of
+which yields, first, a gradual extension of the area of common good, and
+secondly, a fuller and more concrete determination of its content. Further
+representatives of this movement are W. Wallace, Adamson, Bradley; A. Seth
+is an ex-member.
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. on Green the Memoir by Nettleship in vol. iii. of the
+_Works_.]
+
+The first and greatest of American philosophical thinkers was the
+Calvinistic theologian Jonathan Edwards (1703-58; treatise on the _Freedom
+of Will_, 1754; _Works_, 10 vols., edited by Dwight, 1830). Edwards's
+deterministic doctrine found numerous adherents (among them his son, who
+bore his father's name, died 1801) as well as strenuous opponents (Tappan,
+Whedon, Hazard among later names), and essentially contributed to
+the development of philosophical thought in the United States. For a
+considerable period this crystallized for the most part around elements
+derived from British thinkers, especially from Locke and the Scottish
+School. In 1829 James Marsh called attention to German speculation [1] by
+his American edition of Coleridge's _Aids to Reflection_, with an important
+introduction from his own hand. Later W.E. Channing (1780-1842), the head
+of the Unitarian movement, attracted many young and brilliant minds, the
+most noted of whom, Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-82), became a leader among
+the New England transcendentalists. Metaphysical idealism has, perhaps, met
+with less resistance in America than in England. Kant and Hegel have been
+eagerly studied (G.S. Morris, died 1889; C.C. Everett; J. Watson in Canada;
+Josiah Royce, _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, 1892; and others); and
+_The Journal of Speculative Philosophy_, edited by W.T. Harris, has since
+1867 furnished a rallying point for idealistic interests. The influence
+of Lotze has also been considerable (B.P. Bowne in Boston). Sympathy
+with German speculation, however, has not destroyed the naturally close
+connection with the work of writers who use the English tongue. Thus
+Spencer's writings have had a wide currency, and his system numbers many
+disciples, though these are less numerous among students of philosophy by
+profession (John Fiske, _Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy_, 1874).
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Porter, _op. cit._]
+
+In the latest decades the broadening of the national life, the increasing
+acquaintance with foreign thought, and the rapid development of university
+work have greatly enlarged and deepened the interest in philosophical
+pursuits. This is manifested most clearly in the field of psychology,
+including especially the "new" or "physiological" psychology, and the
+history of philosophy, though indications of pregnant thought in other
+departments, as ethics and the philosophy of religion, and even of
+independent construction, are not wanting. Among psychologists of the day
+we may mention G.S. Hall, editor of _The American Journal of Psychology_
+(1887 seq.), G.T. Ladd (_Elements of Physiological Psychology_, 1887),
+and William James (_Principles of Psychology_, 1890). _The International
+Journal of Ethics_ (Philadelphia, 1890 seq.), edited by S. Burns Weston, is
+"devoted to the advancement of ethical knowledge and practice"; among the
+foreign members of its editorial committee are Jodl and Von Gizycki. The
+weekly journal of popular philosophy, _The Open Court_, published in
+Chicago, has for its object the reconciliation of religion and science; the
+quarterly, _The Monist_ (1890 seq.), published by the same company under
+the direction of Paul Carus (_The Soul of Man_, 1891), the establishment of
+a monistic view of the world. Several journals, among them the _Educational
+Review_ (1891 seq., edited by N.M. Butler), point to a growing interest in
+pedagogical inquiry. _The American Philosophical Review_ (1892 seq.,
+edited by J.G. Schurman, _The Ethical Import of Darwinism_, 1887) is a
+comprehensive exponent of American philosophic thought.
+
+
+%4. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Holland.%
+
+In _Sweden_ an empirical period represented by Leopold (died 1829) and Th.
+Thorild (died 1808), and based upon Locke and Rousseau, was followed, after
+the introduction of Kant by D. Boëthius, 1794, by a drift toward idealism.
+This was represented in an extreme form by B. Höijer (died 1812), a
+contemporary and admirer of Fichte, who defended the right of philosophical
+construction, and more moderately by Christofer Jacob Böstrom (1797-1866),
+the most important systematic thinker of his country. As predecessors of
+Böstrom we may mention Biberg (died 1827), E.G. Geijer (died 1846), and S.
+Grubbe (died 1853), like him professors in Upsala, and of his pupils,
+S. Ribbing, known in Germany by his peculiar conception of the Platonic
+doctrine of ideas (German translation, 1863-64), the moralist Sahlin
+(1877), the historian, of Swedish philosophy[1] (1873 seq.) A. Nyblaeus of
+Lund, and H. Edfeldt of Upsala, the editor of Böstrom's works (1883).
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Höffding, _Die Philosophie in Schweden_ in the
+_Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xv. 1879, p. 193 seq.]
+
+Böstrom's philosophy is a system of self-activity and personalism which
+recalls Leibnitz and Krause. The absolute or being is characterized as a
+concrete, systematically articulated, self-conscious unity, which dwells
+with its entire content in each of its moments, and whose members both bear
+the character of the whole and are immanent in one another, standing in
+relations of organic inter-determination. The antithesis between unity and
+plurality is only apparent, present only for the divisive view of finite
+consciousness. God is infinite, fully determinate personality (for
+determination is not limitation), a system of self-dependent living beings,
+differing in degree, in which we, as to our true being, are eternally and
+unchangeably contained. Every being is a definite, eternal, and living
+thought of God; thinking beings with their states and activities alone
+exist; all that is real is spiritual, personal. Besides this true,
+suprasensible world of Ideas, which is elevated above space, time, motion,
+change, and development, and which has not arisen by creation or a process
+of production, there exists for man, but only for him--man is formally
+perfect, it is true, but materially imperfect (since he represents the real
+from a limited standpoint)--a sensuous world of phenomena as the sphere of
+his activity. To this he himself belongs, and in it he is spontaneously to
+develop the suprasensible content which is eternally given him (i.e., his
+true nature), namely, to raise it from the merely potential condition of
+obscure presentiment to clear, conscious actuality. Freedom is the power
+to overcome our imperfection by means of our true nature, to realize our
+suprasensible capacities, to become for ourselves what we are in ourselves
+(in God). The ethics of Böstrom is distinguished from the Kantian ethics,
+to which it is related, chiefly by the fact that it seeks to bring
+sensibility into a more than merely negative relation to reason. Society
+is an eternal, and also a personal, Idea in God. The most perfect form
+of government is constitutional monarchy; the ideal goal of history, the
+establishment of a system of states embracing all mankind.
+
+J. Borelius of Lund is an Hegelian, but differs from the master in regard
+to the doctrine of the contradiction. The Hegelian philosophy has adherents
+in _Norway_ also, as G.V. Lyng (died 1884; _System of Fundamental Ideas_),
+M.J. Monrad (_Tendencies of Modern Thought_, 1874, German translation,
+1879), both professors in Christiania, and Monrad's pupil G. Kent (_Hegel's
+Doctrine of the Nature of Experience_, 1891).
+
+The _Danish_ philosophy of the nineteenth century has been described
+by Höffding in the second volume of the _Archiv für Geschichte der
+Philosophie_, 1888. He begins with the representatives of the speculative
+movement: Steffens (see above), Niels Treschow (1751-1833), Hans Christian
+Oersted (1777-1851; _Spirit in Nature_, German translation, Munich,
+1850-51), and Frederik Christian Sibbern (1785-1872). A change was brought
+about by the philosophers of religion Sören Kierkegaard (1813-55) and
+Rasmus Nielsen (1809-84; _Philosophy of Religion_, 1869), who opposed
+speculative idealism with a strict dualism of knowledge and faith, and were
+in turn opposed by Georg Brandes (born 1842) and Hans Bröchner (1820-75).
+Among younger investigators the Copenhagen professors, Harald Höffding[1]
+(born 1843) and Kristian Kroman[2] (born 1846) stand in the first rank.
+
+[Footnote 1: Höffding: _The Foundations of Human Ethics_, 1876, German
+translation, 1880; _Outlines of Psychology_, 1882, English translation by
+Lowndes, 1891, from the German translation, 1887; _Ethics_, 1887, German
+translation by Bendixen, 1888.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Kroman: _Our Knowledge of Nature_, German translation, 1883;
+_A Brief Logic and Psychology_, German translation by Bendixen, 1890.]
+
+Land (_Mind_, vol. iii. 1878) and G. von Antal (1888) have written on
+philosophy in _Holland_. Down to the middle of the nineteenth century the
+field was occupied by an idealism based upon the ancients, in particular
+upon Plato: Franz Hemsterhuis (1721-90; _Works_, new ed., 1846-50), and the
+philologists Wyttenbach and Van Heusde. Then Cornelius Wilhelm Opzoomer[3]
+(1821-92; professor in Utrecht) brought in a new movement. Opzoomer
+favors empiricism. He starts from Mill and Comte, but goes beyond them in
+important points, and assigns faith a field of its own beside knowledge.
+In opposition to apriorism he seeks to show that experience is capable of
+yielding universal and necessary truths; that space, time, and causality
+are received along with the content of thought; that mathematics itself is
+based upon experience; and that the method of natural science, especially
+deduction, must be applied to the mental sciences. The philosophy of mind
+considers man as an individual being, in his connection with others, in
+relation to a higher being, and in his development; accordingly it
+divides into psychology (which includes logic, aesthetics, and ethology),
+sociology, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of history.
+Central to Opzoomer's system is his doctrine of the five sources of
+knowledge: Sensation, the feeling of pleasure and pain, aesthetic, moral,
+and religious feeling. If we build on the foundation of the first three
+alone, we end in materialism; if we leave the last unused, we reach
+positivism; if we make religious feeling the sole judge of truth, mysticism
+is the outcome. The criteria of science are utility and progress. These are
+still wanting in the mental sciences, in which the often answered but never
+decided questions continually recur, because we have neither derived the
+principles chosen as the basis of the deduction from an exact knowledge
+of the phenomena nor tested the results by experience. The causes of this
+defective condition can only be removed by imitating the study of nature:
+we must learn that no conclusions can be reached except from facts, and
+that we are to strive after knowledge of phenomena and their laws alone. We
+have no right to assume an "essence" of things beside and in addition to
+phenomena, which reveals itself in them or hides behind them. Pupils of
+Opzoomer are his successor in his Utrecht chair, Van der Wyck, and Pierson.
+We may also mention J.P.N. Land, who has done good service in editing
+the works of Spinoza and of Geulincx, and the philosopher of religion
+Rauwenhoff (1888).
+
+[Footnote 1: Opzoomer: _The Method of Science_, a Handbook of Logic, German
+translation by Schwindt, 1852; _Religion_, German translation by Mook,
+1869.]
+
+On the system of the Hungarian philosopher Cyrill Horváth (died 1884 at
+Pesth) see the essay by E. Nemes in the _Zeitschrift für Philosophie_,
+vol. lxxxviii, 1886. Since 1889 a review, _Problems of Philosophy and
+Psychology_, has appeared at Moscow in Russian, under the direction of
+Professor N. von Grot.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI.
+
+GERMAN PHILOSOPHY SINCE THE DEATH OF HEGEL.
+
+With Hegel the glorious dynasty which, with a strong hand, had guided the
+fate of German philosophy since the conclusion of the preceding century
+disappears. From his death (1831) we may date the second period of
+post-Kantian philosophy,[1] which is markedly and unfavorably distinguished
+from the first by a decline in the power of speculative creation and by
+a division of effort. If previous to this the philosophical public,
+comprising all the cultured, had been eagerly occupied with problems in
+common, and had followed with unanimous interest the work of those who were
+laboring at them, during the last fifty years the interest of wider circles
+in philosophical questions has grown much less active; almost every
+thinker goes his own way, giving heed only to congenial voices; the inner
+connection of the schools has been broken down; the touch with thinkers of
+different views has been lost. The latest decades have been the first
+to bring a change for the better, in so far as new rallying points of
+philosophical interest have been created by the neo-Kantian movement, by
+the systems of Lotze and Von Hartmann, by the impulse toward the philosophy
+of nature proceeding from Darwinism, by energetic labors in the field of
+practical philosophy, and by new methods of investigation in psychology.
+
+[Footnote 1: On philosophy since 1831 cf. vol. iii. of J.E. Erdmann's
+_History_; Ueberweg, _Grundriss_, part iii. §§ 37-49 (English translation,
+vol. ii. pp. 292-516); Lange, _History of Materialism_; B. Erdmann, _Die
+Philosophie der Gegenwart_ in the _Deutsche Rundschau_, vols. xix., xx.,
+1879, June and July numbers; (A. Krohn,) _Streifzüge durch die Philosophie
+der Gegenwart_ in the _Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische
+Kritik_, vols. lxxxvii., lxxxix., 1885-86; (Burt, _History of Modern
+Philosophy_, 1892), also the third volume of Windelband's _Geschichte der
+neueren Philosophie_, when it appears.]
+
+
+%1. From the Division of the Hegelian School to the Materialistic
+Controversy.%
+
+A decade after the philosophy of Hegel had entered on its supremacy a
+division in the school was called forth by Strauss's _Life of Jesus_(1835).
+The differences were brought to light by the discussion of religious
+problems, in regard to which Hegel had not expressed himself with
+sufficient distinctness. The relation of knowledge and faith, as he had
+defined it, admitted of variant interpretations and deductions, and this in
+favor of Church doctrine as well as in opposition to it. Philosophy has the
+same content as religion, but in a different form, _i.e._, not in the form
+of representation, but in the form of the concept--it transforms dogma into
+speculative truth. The conservative Hegelians hold fast to the identity of
+content in the two modes of cognition; the liberals, to the alteration
+in form, which, they assert, brings an alteration in content with it.
+According to Hegel the lower stage is "sublated" in the higher, _i.e._,
+conserved as well as negated. The orthodox members of the school emphasize
+the conservation of religious doctrines, their justification from the side
+of the philosopher; the progressists, their negation, their overcoming by
+the speculative concept. The general question, whether the ecclesiastical
+meaning of a dogma is retained or to be abandoned in its transformation
+into a philosopheme, divides into three special questions, the
+anthropological, the soteriogical, and the theological. These are: whether
+on Hegelian principles immortality is to be conceived as a continuance
+of individual existence on the art of particular spirits, or only as the
+eternity of the universal reason; whether by the God-man the person of
+Christ is to be understood, or, on the other hand, the human species, the
+Idea of Humanity; whether personality belongs to the Godhead before the
+creation of the world, or whether it first attains to self-consciousness
+in human spirits, whether Hegel was a theist or a pantheist, whether he
+teaches the transcendence or the immanence of God. The Old Hegelians defend
+the orthodox interpretation; the Young Hegelians oppose it. The former,
+Göschel, Gabler, Hinrichs, Schaller (died 1868; _History of the Philosophy
+of Nature since Bacon_, 1841 _seq_.), J.E. Erdmann in Halle (1805-92; _Body
+and Soul_, 1837; _Psychological Letters_, 1851, 6th ed., 1882; _Earnest
+Sport_, 1871, 4th ed., 1890), form, according to Strauss's parliamentary
+comparison carried out by Michelet, the "right"; the latter, Strauss,
+Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, and A. Ruge, who, with Echtermeyer, edited the
+_Hallesche_, afterward _Deutsche, Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Kunst_,
+1838-42, the "left." Between them, and forming the "center," stand Karl
+Rosenkranz[1] in Königsberg (1805-79), C.L. Michelet in Berlin (p. 16;
+_Hegel, the Unrefuted World-philosopher_, 1870; _System of Philosophy_,
+1876 _seq_.), and the theologians Marheineke (a pupil of Daub at
+Heidelberg) and W. Vatke (_Philosophy of Religion_, edited by Preiss,
+1888). Contrasted with these is the group of semi- or pseudo-Hegelians (p.
+596), who declare themselves in accord with the theistic doctrines of the
+right, but admit that the left represents Hegel's own opinion, or at least
+the correct deductions from his position.
+
+[Footnote 1: K. Rosenkranz: _Psychology_, 1837, 3d ed., 1863; _Science
+of the Logical Idea_, 1858; _Studies_, 1839 _seq_., _New Studies_, 1875
+_seq_.; _Aesthetics of the Ugly_, 1853; several works on the history of
+poetry.]
+
+The following should also be mentioned as Hegelians: the philosopher of
+history, Von Cieszkowski, the pedagogical writer, Thaulow (at Kiel, died
+1883), the philosopher of religion and of law, A. Lasson at Berlin, the
+aesthetic writers Hotho, Friedrich Theodor Vischer[1] (1807-87), and Max
+Schasler (_Critical History of Aesthetics_, 1872; _Aesthetics_, 1886),
+the historians of philosophy, Schwegler (died 1857; _History of Greek
+Philosophy_, 1859, 4th ed., 1886, edited by Karl Köstlin, whose
+_Aesthetics_ appeared 1869), Eduard Zeller[2] of Berlin (born 1814),
+and Kuno Fischer (born 1824; 1856-72 professor at Jena, since then at
+Heidelberg; _Logic and Metaphysics_, 2d ed., 1865). While Weissenborn (died
+1874) is influenced by Schleiermacher also, and Zeller and Fischer strive
+back toward Kant, Johannes Volkelt[3] in Würzburg (born 1848), who started
+from Hegel and advanced through Schopenhauer and Hartmann, has of late
+years established an independent noëtical position and has done good
+service by his energetic opposition to positivism _(Das Denken als
+Hülfvorstellungs--Thätigkeit und als Aupassungsvorgang_ in the _Zeitschrift
+für Philosophic_, vols. xcvi., xcvii., 1889-90).
+
+[Footnote 1: Vischer: _Aesthetics_, 1846-58; _Critical Excursions_, 1844
+_seq_.; several _Hefte "Altes and Neues_". The diary in the second part of
+the novel _Auch Einer_ develops an original pantheistic view of the world.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Zeller: _The Philosophy of the Greeks in its Historical
+Development_, 5 vols., 3d ed., vol. i. 5th ed. (English translation, 1868
+_seq_.); three collections of _Addresses and Essays_, 1865, 1877, 1884.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Volkelt: _The Phantasy in Dreams_, 1875; _Kant's Theory of
+Knowledge_, 1879; _On the Possibility of Metaphysics_, inaugural address at
+Basle, 1884; _Experience and Thought, Critical Foundation of the Theory of
+Knowledge_, 1886; _Lectures Introductory to the Philosophy of the Present
+Time_ (delivered in Frankfort on the Main), 1892.]
+
+The leaders of the Hegelian left require more detailed consideration. In
+David Friedrich Strauss[1] (1808-74, born and died at Ludwigsburg) the
+philosophy of religion becomes a historical criticism of the Bible and of
+dogmatics. The biblical narratives are, in great part, not history (this
+has been the common error alike of the super-naturalistic and of the
+rationalistic interpreters), but myths, that is, suprasensible facts
+presented in the form of history and in symbolic language. It is evident
+from the contradictions in the narratives and the impossibility of miracles
+that we are not here concerned with actual events. The myths possess
+(speculative, absolute) truth, but no (historical) reality. They are
+unintentional creations of the popular imagination; the spirit of the
+community speaks in the authors of the Gospels, using the historical factor
+(the life-history of Jesus) with mythical embellishments as an investiture
+for a supra-historical, eternal truth (the speculative Idea of
+incarnation). The God become man, in which the infinite and the finite, the
+divine nature and the human, are united, is the human race. The Idea of
+incarnation manifests itself in a multitude of examples which supplement
+one another, instead of pouring forth its whole fullness in a single one.
+The (real) Idea of the race is to be substituted for a single individual
+as the subject of the predicates (resurrection, ascension, etc.) which the
+Church ascribes to Christ. The Son of God is _Humanity_.
+
+[Footnote 1: Strauss: _The Life of Jesus_, 1835-36, 4th ed., 1840 [English
+translation by George Eliot, 2d. ed., 1893]; the same "for the German
+People," 1864 [English translation, 1865]; _Christian Dogmatics_, 1840-41;
+_Voltaire_, 1870; _Collected Writings_, 12 vols., edited by Zeller,
+1876-78. On Strauss cf. Zeller, 1874 [English, 1874], and Hausrath,
+1876-78.]
+
+In his second principal work Strauss criticises the dogmas of Christianity
+as sharply as he had criticised the Gospel narrative in the first one. The
+historical development of these has of itself effected their destruction:
+the history of dogma is the objective criticism of dogma. Christianity and
+philosophy, theism and pantheism, dualism and immanence, are irreconcilable
+opposites. To be able to know we must cease to believe. Dogma is the
+product of the unphilosophical, uncultured consciousness; belief in
+revelation, only for those who have not yet risen to reason. In the
+transformation of religious representations into philosophical Ideas
+nothing specifically representative is left; the form of representation
+must be actually overcome. The Christian contraposition of the present
+world and that which is beyond is explained by the fact that the
+sensuo-rational spirit of man, so long as it does not philosophically know
+itself as the unity of the infinite and the finite, but only feels itself
+as finite, sensuo-empirical consciousness, projects the infinite, which
+it has in itself, as though this were something foreign, looks on it
+as something beyond the world. This separation of faith is entirely
+unphilosophical; it is the mission of the philosopher to reduce all that is
+beyond the world to the present. Thus for him immortality is not something
+to come, but the spirit's own power to rise above the finite to the Idea.
+And like future existence, so the transcendent God also disappears. The
+absolute is the universal unity of the world, which posits and sublates the
+individual as its modes. God is the being in all existence, the life in
+all that lives, the thought in all that think: he does not stand as an
+individual person beside and above other persons, but is the infinite which
+personifies itself and attains to consciousness in human spirits, and this
+from eternity; before there was a humanity of earth there were spirits on
+other stars, in whom God reflected himself.
+
+Three decades later Strauss again created a sensation by his confession
+of materialism and atheism, _The Old Faith and the New_, 1872 (since the
+second edition, "With a Postscript as Preface"),[1] in which he continues
+the conflict against religious dualism. The question "Are we"--the
+cultured men of the day--"still Christians?" is answered in the negative.
+Christianity is a cult of poverty, despising the world, and antagonistic to
+labor and culture; but we have learned to esteem science and art, riches
+and acquisition, as the chief levers of culture and of human progress.
+Christianity dualistically tears apart body and soul, time and eternity,
+the world and God; we need no Creator, for the life-process has neither
+beginning nor end. The world is framed for the highest reason, it is true,
+but it has not been framed by a highest reason. Our highest Idea is the
+All, which is conformed to law, and instinct with life and reason, and
+our feeling toward the universe--the consciousness of dependence on its
+laws--exercises no less of ethical influence, is no less full of reverence,
+and no less exposed to injury from an irreverent pessimism, than the
+feeling of the devout of the old type toward their God. Hence the answer
+to the second question "Have we still a religion?" maybe couched in the
+affirmative. The new faith does not need a _cultus_ and a Church. Since the
+dry services of the free congregations offer nothing for the fancy and the
+spirit, the edification of the heart must be accomplished in other ways--by
+participation in the interests of humanity, in the national life, and,
+not last, by aesthetic enjoyment. Thus in his last work, which in two
+appendices reaches a discussion of the great German poets and musicians,
+the old man returns to a thought to which he had given earlier expression,
+that the religious _cultus_ should be replaced by the _cultus_ of genius.
+
+[Footnote 1: English translation by Mathilde Blind, 1873.]
+
+As Strauss went over from Hegelianism to pantheism, so Ludwig Feuerbach[1]
+(1804-72), a son of the great jurist, Anselm Feuerbach, after he had for
+a short time moved in the same direction, took the opposite, the
+individualistic course, only, like Strauss, to end at last in materialism.
+"My first thought," as he himself describes the course of his development,
+"was God; my second, reason; my third and last, man." As theology has been
+overcome by Hegel's philosophy of reason, so this in turn must give place
+to the philosophy of man. "The new philosophy makes man, including nature
+as his basis, the highest and sole subject of philosophy, and,
+consequently, anthropology the universal science." Only that which is
+immediately self-evident is true and divine. But only that which is
+sensible is evident (_sonnenklar)_; it is only where sensibility begins
+that all doubt and conflict cease. Sensible beings alone are true, real
+beings; existence in space and time is alone existence; truth, reality,
+and sensibility are identical. While the old philosophy took for its
+starting point the principle, "I am an abstract, a merely thinking being;
+the body does not belong to my essence," the new philosophy, on the other
+hand, begins with the principle, "I am a real, a sensible being; the body
+in its totality is my ego, my essence itself." Feuerbach, however, uses
+the concept of sensibility in so wide and vague a sense that,
+supported--or deceived--by the ambiguity of the word sensation, he
+includes under it even the most elevated and sacred feelings. Even the
+objects of art are seen, heard, and felt; even the souls of other men are
+sensed. In the sensations the deepest and highest truths are concealed. Not
+only the external, but the internal also, not only flesh, but spirit, not
+only the thing, but the ego, not only the finite, the phenomenal, but also
+the true divine essence is an object of the senses. Sensation proves the
+existence of objects outside our head--there is no other proof of being
+than love, than sensation in general. Everything is perceivable by the
+senses, if not directly, yet indirectly, if not with the vulgar, untrained
+senses, yet with the "cultivated senses," if not with the eye of the
+anatomist or chemist, yet with that of the philosopher. All our ideas
+spring from the senses, but their production requires communication and
+converse between man and man. The higher concepts cannot be derived from
+the individual Ego without a sensuously given Thou; the highest object of
+sense is man; man does not reach concepts and reason in general by himself,
+but only as one of two. The nature of man is contained in community alone;
+only in life with others and for others does he attain his destiny and
+happiness. The conscience is the ego putting itself in the place of another
+who has been injured. Man with man, the unity of I and Thou, is God, and
+God is love.
+
+[Footnote 1: Feuerbach was born at Landshut, studied at Heidelberg and
+Berlin, habilitated, 1828, at Erlangen, and lived, 1836-60, in the village
+of Bruckberg, not far from Bayreuth, and from 1860 until his death in
+Rechenberg, a suburb of Nuremberg. _Collected Works_ in 10 vols., 1846-66.
+The chief works are entitled: _P. Bayle_, 1838, 2d ed., 1844; _Philosophy
+and Christianity_, 1839; _The Essence of Christianity_, 1841, 4th ed., 1883
+[English translation by George Eliot, 1854]; _Principles of the Philosophy
+of the Future_, 1843; _The Essence of Religion_, 1845; _Theogony_, 1857;
+_God, Freedom, and Immortality_, 1866. Karl Grün, 1874, C.N. Starcke, 1885,
+and W. Bolin, 1891, treat of Feuerbach.]
+
+To the philosophy of religion Feuerbach assigns the task of giving a
+psychological explanation of the genesis of religion, instead of showing
+reason in religion. In bidding us believe in miracles dogma is a
+prohibition to think. Hence the philosopher is not to justify it, but to
+uncover the illusion to which it owes its origin. Speculative theology is
+an intoxicated philosophy; it is time to become sober, and to recognize
+that philosophy and religion are diametrically opposed to each other,
+that they are related to each other as health to disease, as thought to
+phantasy. Religion arises from the fact that man objectifies his own true
+essence, and opposes it to himself as a personal being, without coming to a
+consciousness of this divestment of self, of the identity of the divine
+and human nature. Hence the Hegelian principles, that the absolute is
+self-consciousness, that in man God knows himself, must be reversed:
+self-consciousness is the absolute; in his God man knows himself only. The
+Godhead is our own universal nature, freed from its individual limitations,
+intuited and worshiped as another, independent being, distinct from us.
+God is self objectified, the inner nature of man expressed; man is
+the beginning, the middle, and the end of religion. All theology is
+anthropology, for all religion is a self-deification of man. In religion
+man makes a division in his own nature, posits himself as double, first as
+limited (as a human individual), then as unlimited, raised to infinity (as
+God); and this deified self he worships in order to obtain from it the
+satisfaction of his needs, which the course of the world leaves unmet. Thus
+religion grows out of egoism: its basis is the difference between our will
+and our power; its aim, to set us free from the dependence which we feel
+before nature. (Like culture, religion seeks to make nature an intelligible
+and compliant being, only that in this it makes use of the supernatural
+instruments faith, prayer, and magic; it is only gradually that men learn
+to attack the evils by natural means.) That which man himself is not, but
+wishes to be, that he represents to himself in his gods as existing; they
+are the wishes of man's heart transformed into real beings, his longing
+after happiness satisfied by the fancy. The same holds true of all dogmas:
+as God is the affirmation of our wishes, so the world beyond is the present
+embellished and idealized by the fancy. Instead of "God is merciful, is
+love, is omnipotent, he performs miracles and hears prayers," the statement
+must be reversed: mercy, love, omnipotence, to perform miracles, and to
+hear prayers, is divine. In the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper
+Feuerbach sees the truth that water and food are indispensable and divine.
+As Feuerbach, following out this naturalistic tendency, reached the extreme
+of materialism, the influence of his philosophy--whose different phases
+there is no occasion to trace out in detail--had already passed its
+culmination. From his later writings little more has found its way into
+public notice than the pun, that man is (_ist_) what he eats (_isst_).
+
+The remaining members of the Hegelian left may be treated more briefly.
+Bruno Bauer[1] (died in 1882; his principal work is the _Critique of the
+Synoptics_, in three volumes, 1841-42, which had been preceded, in 1840, by
+a _Critique of the Evangelical History of John_) at first belonged on the
+right of the school, but soon went over to the extreme left. He explains
+the Gospel narratives as creations with a purpose (_Tendenzdichtungen_),
+as intentional, but not deceitful, inventions, from which, despite their
+unreality, history may well be learned, inasmuch as they reflect the spirit
+of the time in which they were constructed. His own publications and those
+of his brother Edgar are much more radical after the year 1844. In these
+the brothers advocate the standpoint of "pure or absolute criticism," which
+extends itself to all things and events for or against which sides are
+taken from any quarter, and calmly watches how everything destroys
+itself. As soon as anything is admitted, it is no longer true. Nothing is
+absolutely valid, all is vain; it is only the criticising, all-destroying
+ego, free from all ethical ties, that possesses truth.
+
+[Footnote 1: Not to be confused with the head of the Tübingen School,
+Ferdinand Christian Baur (died 1860).]
+
+One further step was possible beyond Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer, that from
+the community to the particular, selfish individual, from the criticising,
+therefore thinking, ego, to the ego of sensuous enjoyment. This step was
+taken in that curious book _The Individual and his Property_, which Kaspar
+Schmidt, who died in 1856 at Berlin, published in 1845 (2d ed., 1882),
+under the pseudonym of Max Stirner. The Individual of whom the title speaks
+is the egoist. For me nothing is higher than myself; I use men and use up
+the world for my own pleasure. I seek to be and have all that I can be
+and have; I have a right to all that is within my power. Morality is a
+delusion, justice, like all Ideas, a phantom. Those who believe in ideals,
+and worship such generalities as self-consciousness, man, society, are
+still deep in the mire of prejudice and superstition, and have banished the
+old orthodox phantom of the Deity only to replace it by a new one. Nothing
+whatever is to be respected.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Among the opponents of the Hegelian philosophy the members of the "theistic
+school," who have above been designated as semi-Hegelians, approximate it
+most closely. These endeavor, in part retaining the dialectic method, to
+blend the immanence of the absolute, which philosophy cannot give up and
+concerning which Hegel had erred only by way of over-emphasis, with the
+transcendence of God demanded by Christian consciousness, to establish a
+theism which shall contain pantheism as a moment in itself. God is present
+in all creatures, yet distinct from them; he is intramundane as well as
+extramundane; he is self-conscious personality, free creative spirit,
+is this from all eternity, and does not first become such through the
+world-development. He does not need the world for his perfection, but out
+of his goodness creates it. Philosophy must begin with the living Godhead
+instead of beginning, like Hegel's Logic, with the empty concept of being.
+For the categories--as Schelling had already objected--express necessary
+forms or general laws only, to which all reality must conform, but which
+are never capable of generating reality; the content which appears in them
+and which obeys them, can only be created by a Deity, and only empirically
+cognized. This is the standpoint of Christian Hermann Weisse[1] in Leipsic
+(1801-66), Karl Philipp Fischer[2] in Erlangen (1807-85), Immanuel Hermann
+Fichte[3] (1797-1879; 1842-65 professor in Tübingen), and the follower of
+Schleiermacher, Julius Braniss in Breslau (1792-1873). The following hold
+similar views, influenced, like Weisse and K. Ph. Fischer, by Schelling:
+Jacob Sengler of Freiburg (1799-1878; _The Idea of God_, 1845 _seq_.),
+Leopold Schmid of Giessen (1808-69; cf. p. 516, note), Johannes Huber
+(died 1879), Moritz Carrière[4] (born 1817), both in Munich, K. Steffensen
+of Basle (1816-88; _Collected Essays_, 1890), and Karl Heyder in Erlangen
+(1812-86; _The Doctrine of Ideas_, vol. i. 1874). Chalybaeus at Kiel (died
+1862), and Friedrich Harms at Berlin (died 1880; _Metaphysics_,
+posthumously edited by H. Wiese, 1885), who, like Fortlage and I.H. Fichte,
+start from the system of the elder Fichte, should also be mentioned as
+sympathizing with the opinions of those who have been named.
+
+[Footnote 1: Weisse: _System of Aesthetics_, 1830; _The Idea of the
+Godhead_, 1833; _Philosophical Dogmatics_, 1855. His pupil Rudolf Seydel
+has published several of his posthumous works; H. Lotze also acknowledges
+that he owes much to Weisse. Rud. Seydel in Leipsic (born 1835), _Logic_,
+1866; _Ethics_, 1874; cf. p. 17.]
+
+[Footnote 2: K. Ph. Fischer: _The Idea of the Godhead_, 1839; _Outlines of
+the System of Philosophy_, 1848 _seq_.; _The Untruth of Sensationalism and
+Materialism_, 1853.]
+
+[Footnote 3: I.H. Fichte: _System of Ethics_, 1850-53, the first volume of
+which gives a history of moral philosophy since 1750; _Anthropology_, 1856,
+3d ed., 1876; _Psychology_, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 4: Carrière: _Aesthetics_, 1859, 3d ed., 1885; _The Moral Order
+of the World_, 1877, 2d ed., 1891; _Art in connection with the Development
+of Culture_, 5 vols., 1863-73.]
+
+The same may be said, further, of Hermann Ulrici[1] of Halle (1806-84),
+for many years the editor of the _Zeitschrift für Philosophie und
+philosophische Kritik_, founded in 1837 by the younger Fichte and now
+edited by the author of this _History_, which, as the organ of the theistic
+school, opposed, first, the pantheism of the Young Hegelians, and then the
+revived materialism so loudly proclaimed after the middle of the
+century. This _Zeitschrift_ of Fichte and Ulrici, following the altered
+circumstances of the time, has experienced a change of aim, so that it now
+seeks to serve idealistic efforts of every shade; while the _Philosophische
+Monatshefte_ (founded by Bergmann in 1868, edited subsequently by
+Schaarschmidt, and now) edited by P. Natorp of Marburg, favors
+neo-Kantianism, and the _Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche
+Philosophie_ (begun in 1877, and) edited by R. Avenarius of Zurich,
+especially cultivates those parts of philosophy which are open to exact
+treatment.
+
+[Footnote 1: Ulrici: _On Shakespeare's Dramatic Art_, 1839, 3d ed., 1868
+[English, 1876]; _Faith and Knowledge_, 1858; _God and Nature_, 1861, 2d
+ed., 1866; _God and Man_, in two volumes, _Body and Soul_, 1866, 2d ed.,
+1874, and _Natural Law_, 1872; various treatises on Logic--in which
+consciousness is based on the distinguishing activity, and the categories
+conceived as functional modes of this--on Spiritualism, etc.]
+
+The appearance of _materialism_ was the consequence of the flagging of
+the philosophic spirit, on the one hand, and, on the other, of the
+dissatisfaction of the representatives of natural science with the
+constructions of the Schelling-Hegelian school. If the German naturalist is
+especially exposed to the danger of judging all reality from the section
+of it with which he is familiar, from the world of material substances and
+mechanical motions, the reason lies in the fact that he does not find it
+easy, like the Englishman for example, to let the scientific and the
+philosophico-religious views of the world go on side by side as two
+entirely heterogeneous modes of looking at things. The metaphysical impulse
+to generalization and unification spurs him on to break down the boundary
+between the two spheres, and, since the physical view of things has become
+part of his flesh and blood, psychical phenomena are for him nothing but
+brain-vibrations, and the freedom of the will and all religious ideas,
+nothing but illusions. The materialistic controversy broke out most
+actively at the convention of naturalists at Göttingen in 1854, when
+Rudolph Wagner in his address "On the Creation of Man and the Substance
+of the Soul" declared, in opposition to Karl Vogt, that there is no
+physiological reason for denying the descent of man from one pair and an
+immaterial immortal soul. Vogt's answer was entitled "Collier Faith and
+Science." Among others Schaller (_Body and Soul_, 1855), J.B. Meyer in a
+treatise with the same title, 1856, and the Jena physicist, Karl Snell,[1]
+took part in the controversy by way of criticism and mediation. A much
+finer nature than the famous leaders of materialism--Moleschott (_The
+Circle of Life_, 1852, in answer to Liebig's _Chemical Letters_), and Louis
+Büchner, with whose _Force and Matter_ (1855, 16th ed., 1888; English
+translation by Collingwood, 4th ed., 1884) the gymnasiast of to-day still
+satisfies his freethinking needs--is H. Czolbe (1819-73; _New Exposition of
+Sensationalism_, 1855; _The Limits and Origin of Human Knowledge_, 1865),
+who, on ethical grounds, demands the exclusion of everything suprasensible
+and contentment with the given world of phenomena, but holds that, besides
+matter and motion, eternal, purposive forms and original sensations in a
+world-soul are necessary to explain organic and psychical phenomena.
+
+[Footnote 1: Snell (1806-86): _The Materialistic Question_, 1858; _The
+Creation of Man_, 1863. R. Seydel has edited _Lectures on the Descent of
+Man_, 1888, from Snell's posthumous writings.]
+
+
+%2. New Systems: Trendelenburg, Fechner, Lotze, and Hartmann%.
+
+The speculative impulse, especially in the soul of the German people,
+is ineradicable. It has neither allowed itself to be discouraged by the
+collapse of the Hegelian edifice, nor to be led astray by the clamor of the
+apostles of empiricism, nor to be intimidated by the papal proclamation of
+the infallibility of Thomas Aquinas.[1] Manifold attempts have been made
+at a new conception of the world, and with varying success. Of the earlier
+theories[2] only two have been able to gather a circle of adherents--the
+dualistic theism of Günther (1783-1863), and the organic view of the world
+of Trendelenburg (1802-72).
+
+[Footnote 2: In 1879 a summons was sent forth from Rome for the revival and
+dissemination of the Thomistic system as the only true philosophy (cf. R.
+Eucken, _Die Philosophic des Thomas von Aquino und die Kultur der
+Neuzeit_, 1886). This movement is supported by the journals, _Jahrbuch für
+Philosophie und spekulative Theologie_, edited by Professor E. Commer
+of Münster, 1886 _seq_., and _Philosophisches Jahrbuch_, edited, at the
+instance and with the support of the Görres Society, by Professor Const.
+Gutberlet of Fulda, 1888 _seq_. While the text-books of Hagemann, Stoeckl,
+Gutberlet, Pesch, Commer, C.M. Schneider, and others also follow Scholastic
+lines, B. Bolzano (died 1848), M. Deutinger (died 1864) and his pupil
+Neudecker, Oischinger, Michelis, and W. Rosenkrantz (1821-74; _Science of
+Knowledge_, 1866-68), who was influenced by Schelling, have taken a freer
+course.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Trahndorff, gymnasial professor in Berlin (1782-1863),
+_Aesthetics_, 1827 (cf. E. von Hartmann in the _Philosophische
+Monatshefte_, vol. xxii. 1886, p. 59 _seq_., and J. von Billewicz, in the
+same, vol. xxi. 1885, p. 561 _seq_.); J.F. Reiff in Tübingen: _System of
+the Determinations of the Will_, 1842; K. Chr. Planck (died 1880): _The
+Ages of the World_, 1850 _seq_.; _Testament of a German_, edited by Karl
+Köstlin, 1881; F. Röse (1815-59), _On the Method of the Knowledge of
+the Absolute_, 1841; _Psychology as Introduction to the Philosophy of
+Individuality_, 1856. Emanuel Sharer follows Röse. Friedrich Rohmer
+(died 1856): _Science of God, Science of Man_, in _Friedrich Rohmer's
+Wissenschaft und Leben_, edited by Bluntschli and Rud. Seele, 6 vols.,
+1871-92.]
+
+Anton Günther (engaged in authorship from 1827; _Collected Writings_, 1881;
+_Anti-Savarese_, edited with an appendix by P. Knoodt), who in 1857
+was compelled to retract his views, invokes the spirit of Descartes in
+opposition to the Hegelian pantheism. In agreement with Descartes,
+Günther starts from self-consciousness (in the ego being and thought are
+identical), and brings not only the Creator and the created world, but also
+nature (to which the soul is to be regarded as belonging) and spirit into
+a relation of exclusive opposition, yet holds that in man nature (body and
+soul) and spirit are united, and that they interact without prejudice to
+their qualitative difference. J.H. Pabst (died in 1838 in Vienna), Theodor
+Weber of Breslau, Knoodt of Bonn (died 1889), V. Knauer of Vienna and
+others are Güntherians.
+
+Adolf Trendelenburg[1] of Berlin, the acute critic of Hegel and Herbart,
+in his own thinking goes back to the philosophy of the past, especially to
+that of Aristotle. Motion and purpose are for him fundamental facts, which
+are common to both being and thinking, which mediate between the two, and
+make the agreement of knowledge and reality possible. The ethical is a
+higher stage of the organic. Space, time, and the categories are forms of
+thought as well as of being; the logical form must not be separated from
+the content, nor the concept from intuition. We must not fail to mention
+that Trendelenburg introduced a peculiar and fruitful method of treating
+the history of philosophy, viz., the historical investigation of particular
+concepts, in which Teichmüller of Dorpat (1832-88; _Studies in the History
+of Concepts_, 1874; _New Studies in the History of Concepts_, 1876-79;
+_The Immortality of the Soul_, 2d ed., 1879; _The Nature of Love_, 1880;
+_Literary Quarrels in the Fourth Century before Christ_, 1881 and 1884),
+and Eucken of Jena (cf. pp. 17 and 623) have followed his example. Kym in
+Zurich (born 1822; _Metaphysical Investigations_, 1875; _The Problem of
+Evil_, 1878) is a pupil of Trendelenburg.
+
+[Footnote 1: Trendelenburg: _Logical Investigations_, 1840, 3d ed., 1870;
+_Historical Contributions to Philosophy_, 3 vols., 1846, 1855, 1867;
+_Natural Law on the Basis of Ethics_, 1860, 2d ed., 1868. On Trendelenburg
+cf. Eucken in the _Philosophische Monatshefte_, 1884.]
+
+Of more recent systematic attempts the following appear worthy of
+mention: Von Kirchmann (1802-84; from 1868 editor of the _Philosophische
+Bibliothek_), _The Philosophy of Knowledge_, 1865; _Aesthetics_, 1868; _On
+the Principles of Realism_, 1875; _Catechism of Philosophy_ 2d ed., 1881;
+E. Dühring (born 1833), _Natural Dialectic_, 1865; _The Value of Life_,
+1865, 3d ed, 1881; _Critical History of the Principles of Mechanics_,
+1873, 2d ed., 1877; _Course of Philosophy_, 1875 (cf. on Dühring, Helene
+Druskowitz, 1889); J. Baumann of Göttingen (born 1837), _Philosophy as
+Orientation concerning the World_, 1872; _Handbook of Ethics_, 1879;
+_Elements of Philosophy_, 1891; L. Noiré, _The Monistic Idea_, 1875, and
+many other works; Frohschammer of Munich (born 1821), _The Phantasy as
+the Fundamental Principle of the World-process_, 1877; _On the Genesis
+of Humanity, and its Spiritual Development in Religion, Morality and
+Language_, 1883; _On the Organization and Culture of Human Society_, 1885.
+
+In the first rank of the thinkers who have made their appearance since
+Hegel and Herbart stand Fechner and Lotze, both masters in the use of exact
+methods, yet at the same time with their whole souls devoted to the highest
+questions, and superior to their contemporaries in breadth of view as in
+the importance and range of their leading ideas--Fechner a dreamer and
+sober investigator by turns, Lotze with gentle hand reconciling the
+antitheses in life and science.
+
+Gustav Theodor Fechner[1] (1801-87; professor at Leipsic) opposes the
+abstract separation of God and the world, which has found a place in
+natural inquiry and in theology alike, and brings the two into the same
+relation of correspondence and reciprocal reference as the soul and the
+body. The spirit gives cohesion to the manifold of material parts, and
+needs them as a basis and material for its unifying activity. As our
+ego connects the manifold of our activities and states in the unity of
+consciousness, so the divine spirit is the supreme unity of consciousness
+for all being and becoming. In the spirit of God everything is as in ours,
+only expanded and enhanced. Our sensations and feelings, our thoughts and
+resolutions are His also, only that He, whose body all nature is, and to
+whom not only that which takes place in spirits is open, but also that
+which goes on between them, perceives more, feels deeper, thinks higher,
+and wills better things than we. According to the analogy of the human
+organism, both the heavenly bodies and plants are to be conceived as beings
+endowed with souls, although they lack nerves, a brain, and voluntary
+motion. How could the earth bring forth living beings, if it were itself
+dead? Shall not the flower itself rejoice in the color and fragrance which
+it produces, and with which it refreshes us? Though its psychical life may
+not exceed that of an infant, its sensations, at all events, since they do
+not form the basis of a higher activity, are superior in force and richness
+to those of the animal. Thus the human soul stands intermediate in the
+scale of psychical life: beneath and about us are the souls of plants and
+animals, above us the spirits of the earth and stars, which, sharing in and
+encompassing the deeds and destinies of their inhabitants, are in
+their turn embraced by the consciousness of the universal spirit. The
+omnipresence of the divine spirit affords at the same time the means of
+escaping from the desolate "night view" of modern science, which looks upon
+the world outside the perceiving individual as dark and silent. No, light
+and sound are not merely subjective phenomena within us, but extend around
+us with objective reality--as sensations of the divine spirit, to which
+everything that vibrates resounds and shines.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Nanna, or on the Psychical Life of Plants_, 1848;
+_Zend-Avesta, or on the Things of Heaven and the World Beyond_, 1851;
+_Physical and Philosophical Atomism_, 1855; _The Three Motives and Grounds
+of Belief_, 1863; _The Day View_, 1879; _Elements of Aesthetics_, 1876;
+_Elements of Psycho-physics_, 1860; _In the Cause of Psycho-physics_, 1877;
+_Review of the Chief Points in Psycho-physics_, 1882; _Book of the Life
+after Death_, 1836, 3d ed., 1887; _On the Highest Good_, 1846; _Four
+Paradoxes_, 1846; _On the Question of the. Soul_, 1861; _Minor Works by Dr.
+Mises_ (Fechner's pseudonym), 1875. On Fechner cf. J. E. Kuntze, Leipsic,
+1892.]
+
+The door of the world beyond also opens to the key of analogy. Similar
+laws unite the here with the hereafter. As intuition prepares the way for
+memory, and lives on in it, so the life of earth merges in the future life,
+and continues active in it, elevated to a higher plane. Fechner treats the
+problem of evil in a way peculiar to himself. We must not consider the
+fact of evil apart from the effort to remove it. It is the spur to all
+activity--without evil, no labor and no progress.
+
+Fechner's "psycho-physics," a science which was founded by him in
+continuation of the investigations of Bernoulli, Euler, and especially
+of E.H. Weber, wears an entirely different aspect from that of his
+metaphysics (the "day view," moreover does not claim to be knowledge,
+but belief--though a belief which is historically, practically, and
+theoretically well-grounded). This aims to be an exact science of the
+relations between body and mind, and to reach indirectly what Herbart
+failed to reach by direct methods, that is, a measurement of psychical
+magnitudes, using in this attempt the least observable differences in
+sensations as the unit of measure. Weber's law of the dependence of the
+intensity of the sensation on the strength of the stimulus--the increase
+in the intensity of the sensation remains the same when the relative
+increase of the stimulus (or the relation of the stimuli) remains
+constant;[1] so that, _e.g._, in the case of light, an increase from a
+stimulus of intensity 1 to one of intensity 100, gives just the same
+increase in the intensity of the sensation as an increase from a stimulus
+of intensity 2 (or 3) to a stimulus of 200 (or 300)--is much more generally
+valid than its discoverer supposed; it holds good for all the senses. In
+the case of the pressure sense of the skin, with an original weight of 15
+grams (laid upon the hand when at rest and supported), in order to produce
+a sensation perceptibly greater we must add not 1 gram, but 5, and with an
+original weight of 30 grams, not 5, but 10. Equal additions to the weights
+are not enough to produce a sensation of pressure whose intensity shall
+render it capable of being distinguished with certainty, but the greater
+the original weights the larger the increments must be; while the
+intensities of the sensations form an arithmetical, those of the stimuli
+form a geometrical, series; the change in sensation is proportional to the
+relative change of the stimulus. Sensations of tone show the same
+proportion (3:4) as those of pressure; the sensibility of the muscle sense
+is finer (when weights are raised the proportion is 15:16), as also that
+of vision (the relative brightness of two lights whose difference of
+intensity is just perceptible is 100:101). In addition to the
+investigations on the threshold of difference there are others on the
+threshold of stimulation (the point at which a sensation becomes just
+perceptible), on attention, on methods of measurement, on errors, etc.
+Moreover, Fechner does not fail to connect his psycho-physics, the
+presuppositions and results of which have recently been questioned in
+several quarters,[2] with his metaphysical conclusions. Both are pervaded
+by the fundamental view that body and spirit belong together (consequently
+that everything is endowed with a soul, and that nothing is without a
+material basis), nay, that they are the same essence, only seen from
+different sides. Body is the (manifold) phenomenon for others, while spirit
+is the (unitary) self-phenomenon, in which, however, the inner aspect is
+the truer one. That which appears to us as the external world of matter,
+is nothing but a universal consciousness which overlaps and influences our
+individual consciousness. This is Spinozism idealistically interpreted. In
+aesthetics Fechner shows himself an extreme representative of the principle
+of association.
+
+[Footnote 1: Fechner teaches: The sensation increases and diminishes in
+proportion to the logarithm of the stimulus and of the psycho-physical
+nervous activity, the latter being directly proportional to the external
+stimulus. Others, on the contrary, find a direct dependence between nervous
+activity and sensation, and a logarithmic proportion between the external
+stimulus and the nervous activity.]
+
+[Footnote 2: So by Helmholtz; Hering _(Fechners psychophysisches Gesetz_,
+1875); P. Langer _(Grundlagen der Psychophysik_, 1876); G.E. Müller in
+Göttingen _(Zur Grundlegung der Psychophysik_, 1878); F.A. Müller _(Das
+Axiom der Psychophysik_, 1882); A. Elsas _(Ueber die Psychophysik_, 1886);
+O. Liebmann _(Aphorismen zur Psychologie, Zeitschrift für Philosophie_,
+vol. ci.--Wundt has published a number of papers from his psycho-physical
+laboratory in his _Philosophische Studien_, 1881 _seq_. Cf. also Hugo
+Münsterberg, _Neue Grundlegung der Psychophysik_ in _Heft_ iii. of his
+_Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie_, 1889 _seq_). [Further,
+Delboeuf, in French, and a growing literature in English as A. Seth,
+_Encyclopedia Britannica_, vol. xxiv. 469-471; Ladd, _Elements of
+Physiological Psychology_, part ii. chap, v.; James, _Principles of
+Psychology_, vol. i. p. 533 _seq_.; and numerous articles as Ward,
+_Mind_, vol. i.; Jastrow, _American Journal of Psychology_, vols. i. and
+iii.--TR.]]
+
+The most important of the thinkers mentioned in the title of this section
+is Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817-81: born at Bautzen; a student of medicine,
+and of philosophy under Weisse, in Leipsic; 1844-81 professor in Göttingen;
+died in Berlin). Like Fechner, gifted rather with a talent for the fine and
+the suggestive than for the large and the rigorous, with a greater reserve
+than the former before the mystical and peculiar, as acute, cautious, and
+thorough as he was full of taste and loftiness of spirit, Lotze has proved
+that the classic philosophers did not die out with Hegel and Herbart. His
+_Microcosmus_ (3 vols., 1856-64, 4th ed., 1884 _seq_; English translation
+by Hamilton and Jones, 3d ed., 1888), which is more than an anthropology,
+as it is modestly entitled, and _History of Aesthetics in Germany_, 1868,
+which also gives more than the title betrays, enjoy a deserved popularity.
+These works were preceded by the _Medical Psychology_, 1852, and a polemic
+treatise against I.H. Fichte, 1857, as well as by a _Pathology_ and a
+_Physiology_, and followed by the _System of Philosophy_, which remained
+incomplete (part i. _Logic_, 1874, 2d ed., 1881, English translation
+edited by Bosanquet, 2d ed., 1888; part ii. _Metaphysics_, 1879, English
+translation edited by Bosanquet, 2d ed., 1887). Lotze's _Minor Treatises_
+have been published by Peipers in three volumes (1885-91); and Rehnisch has
+edited eight sets of dictata from his lectures, 1871-84.[1] Since these
+"Outlines," all of which we now have in new editions, make a convenient
+introduction to the Lotzean system, and are, or should be, in the
+possession of all, a brief survey may here suffice.
+
+[Footnote 1: _Outlines of Psychology, Practical Philosophy, Philosophy of
+Religion, Philosophy of Nature, Logic and the Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
+Metaphysics, Aesthetics_, and the _History of Philosophy since Kant_, all
+of which may be emphatically commended to students, especially the one
+first mentioned, and, in spite of its subjective position, the last.
+[English translations of these _Outlines_ except the fourth and the
+last, by Ladd, 1884 _seq_.] On Lotze cf. the obituaries by J. Baumann
+(_Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xvii.), H. Sommer (_Im Neuen Reich_),
+A. Krohn (_Zeitschrift für Philosophie_, vol. lxxxi. pp. 56-93), R.
+Falckenberg (Augsburg _Allgemeine Zeitung_, 1881, No. 233), and Rehnisch
+(_National Zeitung_ and the _Revue Philosophique_, vol. xii.). The last of
+these was reprinted in the appendix to the _Grundzüge der Aesthetik_, 1884,
+which contains, further, a chronological table of Lotze's works, essays,
+and critiques, as well as of his lectures. Hugo Sommer has zealously
+devoted himself to the popularization of the Lotzean system. Cf., further,
+Fritz Koegel, _Lotzes Aesthetik_, Göttingen, 1886, and the article by
+Koppelmann referred to above, p. 330.]
+
+The subject of metaphysics is reality. Things which are, events which
+happen, relations which exist, representative contents and truths which
+are valid, are real. Events happening and relations existing presuppose
+existing things as the subjects in and between which they happen and exist.
+The being of things is neither their being perceived (for when we say that
+a thing is we mean that it continues to be, even when we do not perceive
+it), nor a pure, unrelated position, its position in general, but _to be is
+to stand in relations_. Further, the _what_ or essence of the things which
+enter into these relations cannot be conceived as passive quality, but
+only abstractly, as a rule or a law which determines the connection and
+succession of a series of qualities. The nature of water, for example, is
+the unintuitable somewhat which contains the ground of the change of ice,
+first into the liquid condition, and then into steam, when the temperature
+increases, and conversely, of the possibility of changing steam back
+into water and ice under opposite conditions. And when we speak of an
+unchangeable identity of the thing with itself, as a result of which it
+remains the same essence amid the change of its phenomena, we mean only the
+consistency with which it keeps within the closed series of forms a1, a2,
+a3, without ever going over into the series b1, b2. The relations, however,
+in which things stand, cannot pass to and fro between things like threads
+or little spirits, but are states in things themselves, and the change
+of the former always implies a change in these inner states. To stand in
+relations means to _exchange actions_. In order to experience such effects
+from others and to exercise them upon others, things must neither be wholly
+incomparable (as red, hard, sweet) and mutually indifferent, nor yet
+absolutely independent; if the independence of individual beings were
+complete the process of action would be entirely inconceivable. The
+difficulty in the concept of causality--how does being _a_ come to produce
+in itself a different state _a_ because another being _b_ enters into the
+state [Greek: _b_]?--is removed only when we look on the things as
+modes, states, parts of a single comprehensive being, of an infinite,
+unconditioned substance, in so far as there is then only an action of
+the absolute on itself. Nevertheless the assumption that, in virtue of
+the unity and consistency of the absolute or of its impulse to
+self-preservation, state [Greek: _b_] in being _b_ follows state
+[Greek: _a_] in being _a_ as an accommodation or compensation follows a
+disturbance, is not a full explanation of the process of action, does
+not remove the difficulty as to how one state can give rise to another.
+Metaphysics is, in general, unable to show how reality is made, but only to
+remove certain contradictions which stand in the way of the conceivability
+of these notions. The so far empty concept of an absolute looks to the
+philosophy of religion for its content; the conception of the Godhead as
+infinite personality (it is a person in a far higher sense than we) is
+first produced when we add to the ontological postulate of a comprehensive
+substance the ethical postulate of a supreme good or a universal
+world-Idea.
+
+By "thing" we understand the permanent unit-subject of changing states. But
+the fact of consciousness furnishes the only guaranty that the different
+states _a, [Greek: b], y_, are in reality states of one being, and not so
+many different things alternating with one another. Only a conscious
+being, which itself effects the distinction between itself and the states
+occurring in it, and in memory and recollection feels and knows itself as
+their identical subject, is actually a subject which has states. Hence,
+if things are to be real, we must attribute to them a nature in essence
+related to that of our soul. Reality is existence for self. All beings
+are spiritual, and only spiritual beings possess true reality. Thus Lotze
+combines the monadology of Leibnitz with the pantheism of Spinoza, just
+as he understands how to reconcile the mechanical view of natural science
+(which is valid also for the explanation of organic life) with the
+teleology and the ethical idealism of Fichte. The sole mission of the
+world of forms is to aid in the realization of the ideal purposes of the
+absolute, of the world of values.
+
+The ideality of space, which Kant had based on insufficient grounds, is
+maintained by Lotze also, only that he makes things stand in "intellectual"
+relations, which the knowing subject translates into spatial language. The
+same character of subjectivity belongs not only to our sensations, but
+also to our ideas concerning the connection of things. Representations are
+results, not copies, of the external stimuli; cognition comes under the
+general concept of the interaction of real elements, and depends, like
+every effect, as much upon the nature of the being that experiences the
+effect as upon the nature of the one which exerts it, or rather, more upon
+the former than upon the latter. If, nevertheless, it claims objective
+reality, truth must not be interpreted as the correspondence of thought and
+its object (the cognitive image can never be like the thing itself), nor
+the mission of cognition, made to consist in copying a world already
+finished and closed apart from the realm of spirits, to which mental
+representation is added as something accessory. Light and sound are not
+therefore illusions because they are not true copies of the waves of ether
+and of air from which they spring, but they are the end which nature has
+sought to attain through these motions, an end, however, which it cannot
+attain alone, but only by acting upon spiritual subjects; the beauty and
+splendor of colors and tones are that which of right ought to be in the
+world; without the new world of representations awakened in spirits by the
+action of external stimuli, the world would lack its essential culmination.
+The purpose of things is to be known, experienced, and enjoyed by spirits.
+The truth of cognition consists in the fact that it opens up the meaning
+and destination of the world. That which ought to be is the ground of that
+which is; that which is exists in order to the realization of values in
+it; the good is the only real. It is true that we are not permitted to
+penetrate farther than to the general conviction that the Idea of the good
+is the ground and end of the world; the question, how the world has arisen
+from this supreme Idea as from the absolute and why just this world with
+its determinate forms and laws has arisen, is unanswerable. We understand
+the meaning of the play, but we do not see the machinery by which it is
+produced at work behind the stage. In ethics Lotze emphasizes with Fechner
+the inseparability of the good and pleasure: it is impossible to state in
+what the worth or goodness of a good is to consist, if it be conceived out
+of all relation to a spirit capable of finding enjoyment in it.
+
+If Lotze's philosophy harmoniously combines Herbartian and Fichteo-Hegelian
+elements, Eduard von Hartmann (born 1842; until 1864 a soldier, now a man
+of letters in Berlin) aims at a synthesis of Schopenhauer and Hegel; with
+the pessimism of the former he unites the evolutionism of the latter, and
+while the one conceives the nature of the world-ground as irrational will,
+and the other as the logical Idea, he follows the example of Schelling
+in his later days by making will and representation equally legitimate
+attributes of his absolute, the Unconscious. His principal theoretical
+work, _The Philosophy of the Unconscious_, 1869 (10th ed., 1891; English
+translation by Coupland, 1884), was followed in 1879 by his chief ethical
+one, _The Moral Consciousness_ (2d ed., 1886, in the _Selected Works_); the
+two works on the philosophy of religion, _The Religious Consciousness of
+Humanity in the Stages of its Development_, 1881, and _The Religion of
+Spirit_, 1882, together form the third chief work (_The Self-Disintegration
+of Christianity and the Religion of the Future_, 1874, and _The Crisis of
+Christianity in Modern Theology_, 1880, are to be regarded as forerunners
+of this); the fourth is the _Aesthetics_ (part i. _German Aesthetics since
+Kant_, 1886; part ii. _Philosophy of the Beautiful_, 1887). The _Collected
+Studies and Essays_, 1876, were preceded by two treatises on the philosophy
+of nature, _Truth and Error in Darwinism_, 1875, and _The Unconscious
+from the Standpoint of Physiology and the Theory of Descent_, published
+anonymously in 1872, in the latter of which, disguised as a Darwinian,
+he criticises his own philosophy. Of his more recent publications we may
+mention the _Philosophical Questions of the Day_, 1885; _Modern Problems_,
+1886; and the controversial treatise _Lotzes Philosophy_, 1888.[1]
+
+[Footnote 1: On Hartmann cf. Volkelt in _Nord und Süd_, July, 1881; the
+same, _Das Unbewusste und der Pessimismus_, 1873; Vaihinger, _Hartmann_,
+_Dühring und Lange_, 1876; R. Koeber, _Das philosophische System Ed.
+v, Hartmann_, 1884; O. Pfleiderer, critique of the _Phänomenologie des
+sittlichen Bewusstseins (Im neuen Reich)_, 1879; L. von Golther, _Der
+moderne Pessimismus_, 1878; J. Huber, _Der Pessimismus_, 1876; Weygoldt,
+_Kritik des philosophischen Pessimismus der neuesten Zeit_, 1875; M.
+Venetianer, _Der Allgeist_, 1874; A Taubert (Hartmann's first wife),
+_Der Pessimismus und seine Gegner_, 1873; O. Plümacher, _Der Kampf ums
+Unbewusste_ (with a chronological table of Hartmann literature appended),
+1881; the same, _Der Pessimismus in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart_, 1884;
+Krohn, _Streifzüge_ (see above); Seydel (see above). During the year
+1882 four publications appeared under the title _Der Pessimismus und die
+Sittenlehre_, by Bacmeister, Christ, Rehmke, and H. Sommer (2d ed., 1883).
+[English translation of _Truth and Error in Darwinism_ in the _Journal
+of Speculative Philosophy_, vols. xi.-xiii., and of _The Religion of the
+Future_, by Dare, 1886; cf. also Sully's _Pessimism_, chap. v.--TR.]]
+
+In polemical relation, on the one hand, to the naïve realism of life,
+and, on the other, to the subjective idealism of Kant, or rather of
+the neo-Kantians, the logical conclusion of which would be absolute
+illusionism, Hartmann founds his "transcendental realism," which mediates
+between these two points of view (the existence and true nature of the
+world outside our representations is knowable, if only indirectly; the
+forms of knowledge, in spite of their subjective origin, have a more
+than subjective, a transcendental, significance) by pointing out that
+sense-impressions, which are accompanied by the feeling of compulsion and
+are different from one another, cannot be explained from the ego, but only
+by the action of things in themselves external to us, _i.e._, independent
+of consciousness, and themselves distinct from one another. The causality
+of things in themselves is the bridge which enables us to cross the gulf
+between the immanent world of representations and the transcendent world of
+being. The causality of things in themselves proves their reality, their
+difference at different times, their changeability and their temporal
+character; change, however, demands something permanent, existence, an
+existing, unchangeable, supra-temporal, and non-spatial substance (whether
+a special substance for each thing in itself or a common one for all, is
+left for the present undetermined). My action upon the thing in itself
+assures me of its causal conditionality or necessity; the various
+affections of the same sense, that there are many things in themselves; the
+peculiar form of change shown by some bodies, that these, like my body, are
+united with a soul. Thus it is evident that, besides the concept of cause,
+a series of other categories must be applied to the thing in itself, hence
+applied transcendentally.
+
+The "speculative results" obtained by Hartmann on an "inductive" basis
+are as follows: The _per se (Ansich)_ of the empirical world is the
+Unconscious. The two attributes of this absolute are the active,
+groundless, alogical, infinite will, and the passive, finite representation
+(Idea); the former is the ground of the _that_ of the world, the latter
+the ground of its purposive _what_ and _how_. Without the will the
+representation, which in itself is without energy, could not become real,
+and without the representation (of an end) the will, which in itself is
+without reason, could not become a definite willing (relative or immanent
+dualism of the attributes, a necessary moment in absolute monism). The
+empirical preponderance of pain over pleasure, which can be shown by
+calculation,[1] proves that the world is evil, that its non-existence were
+better than its existence; the purposiveness everywhere perceptible in
+nature and the progress of history toward a final goal (it is true, a
+negative one) proves, nevertheless, that it is the best world that was
+possible (reconciliation of eudemonistic pessimism with evolutionistic
+optimism). The creation of the world begins when the blind will to live
+groundlessly and fortuitously passes over from essence to phenomenon, from
+potency to act, from supra-existence to existence, and, in irrational
+striving after existence, draws to itself the only content which is capable
+of realization, the logical Idea. This latter seeks to make good the
+error committed by the will by bringing consciousness into the field as
+a combatant against the insatiable, ever yearning, never satisfied will,
+which one day will force the will back into latency, into the (antemundane)
+blessed state of not-willing. The goal of the world-development is
+deliverance from the misery of existence, the peace of non-existence, the
+return from the will and representation, become spatial and temporal, to
+the original, harmonious equilibrium of the two functions, which has been
+disturbed by the origin of the world or to the antemundane identity of the
+absolute. The task of the logical element is to teach consciousness more
+and more to penetrate the illusion of the will--in its three stages of
+childlike (Greek) expectation of happiness to be attained here, youthful
+(Christian) expectation of happiness to be attained hereafter, and
+adult expectation of happiness to be attained in the future of the
+world-development--and, finally, to teach it to know, in senile longing
+after rest, that only the doing away with this miserable willing, and,
+consequently, with earthly existence (through the resolve of the majority
+of mankind) can give the sole attainable blessedness, freedom from pain.
+The world-process is the incarnation, the suffering, and the redemption
+of the absolute; the moral task of man is not personal renunciation and
+cowardly retirement, but to make the purposes of the Unconscious his own,
+with complete resignation to life and its sufferings to labor energetically
+in the world-process, and, by the vigorous promotion of consciousness, to
+hasten the fulfillment of the redemptive purpose; the condition of morality
+is insight into the fruitlessness of all striving after pleasure and into
+the essential unity of all individual beings with one another and with the
+universal spirit, which exists in the individuals, but at the same time
+subsists above them. "To know one's self as of divine nature, this does
+away with all divergence between selfwill and universal will, with all
+estrangement between man and God, with all undivine, that is, merely
+natural, conduct."
+
+[Footnote 1: Cf. Volkelt, _Ueber die Lust als höchsten Werthmassstab_
+(in the _Zeitschrift für Philosophie_, vol. lxxxviii.), 1886, and O.
+Pfleiderer, _Philosophy of Religion_, vol. ii. p. 249 _seq_.]
+
+Religion, which, in common with philosophy, has for its basis the
+metaphysical need for, or the mystical feeling of, the unity of the human
+individual and the world-ground, needs transformation, since in its
+traditional forms it is opposed to modern culture, and the merging of
+religion (as a need of the heart) in metaphysics is impossible. The
+religion of the future, for which the way has already been prepared by the
+speculative Protestantism of the present, is _concrete monism_ (the divine
+unity is transcendent as well as immanent in the plurality of the beings of
+earth, every moral man a God-man), which includes in itself the abstract
+monism (pantheism) of the Indian religions and the Judeo-Christian (mono-)
+theism as subordinate moments. (The original henotheism and its decline
+into polytheism, demonism, and fetichism was followed by--Egyptian and
+Persian, as well as Greek, Roman, and German--naturalism, and then by
+supernaturalism in its monistic and its theistic form. The chief defect of
+the Christian religion is the transcendental-eudemonistic heteronomy of its
+ethics.) The _Religion of Spirit_ divides into three parts. The psychology
+of religion considers the religious function in its subjective aspect,
+faith as a combined act of representation, feeling, and will, in which one
+of these three elements may predominate--though feeling forms the inmost
+kernel of the theoretical and practical activities as well--and, as
+the objective correlate of faith, grace (revealing, redeeming, and
+sanctifying), which elevates man above peripheral and phenomenal dependence
+on the world, and frees him from it, through his becoming conscious of his
+central and metaphysical dependence upon God. The metaphysics of religion
+(in theological, anthropological, and cosmological sections) proves
+by induction from the facts of religion the existence, omnipotence,
+spirituality, omniscience, righteousness, and holiness of the All-one,
+which coincides with the moral order of the world. Further, it proves the
+need and the capacity of man for redemption from guilt and evil--here three
+spheres of the individual will are distinguished, one beneath God, one
+contrary to God, and one conformable to God, or a natural, an evil, and a
+moral sphere--and, preserving alike the absoluteness of God and the reality
+of the world, shows that it is not so much man as God himself, who, as the
+bearer of all the suffering of the world, is the subject of redemption.
+The ethics of religion discusses the subjective and objective processes of
+redemption, namely, repentance and amendment on the part of the individual
+and the ecclesiastical _cultus_ of the future, which is to despise symbols
+and art.
+
+It is to Hartmann's credit, though the fact has not been sufficiently
+appreciated by professional thinkers, that in a time averse to speculation
+he has devoted his energies to the highest problems of metaphysics, and in
+their elaboration has approached his task with scientific earnestness and
+a comprehensive and thorough consideration of previous results. Thus
+the critique of ethical standpoints in the historical part of the
+_Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness_, especially, contains much that
+is worthy of consideration; and his fundamental metaphysical idea, that the
+absolute is to be conceived as the unity of will and reason, also deserves
+in general a more lively assent than has been accorded to it, while his
+rejection of an infinite consciousness has justly met with contradiction.
+It has been impossible here to go into his discussions in the philosophy of
+nature--they cannot be described in brief--on matter (atomic forces), on
+the mechanical and teleological views of life and its development, on
+instinct, on sexual love, etc., which he very skillfully uses in support of
+his metaphysical principle.
+
+
+%3. From the Revival of the Kantian Philosophy to the Present Time.%
+
+%(a) Neo-Kantianism, Positivism, and Kindred Phenomena.%--The Kantian
+philosophy has created two epochs: one at the time of its appearance, and
+a second two generations after the death of its author. The new Kantian
+movement, which is one of the most prominent characteristics of the
+philosophy of the present time, took its beginning a quarter of a century
+ago. It is true that even before 1865 individual thinkers like Ernst
+Reinhold of Jena (died 1855), the admirer of Fries, J.B. Meyer of Bonn,
+K.A. von Reichlin-Meldegg, and others had sought a point of departure for
+their views in Kant; that K. Fischer's work on Kant (1860) had given a
+lively impulse to the renewed study of the critical philosophy; nay, that
+the cry "Back to Kant" had been expressly raised by Fortlage (as early as
+1832 in his treatise _The Gaps in the Hegelian System_), and by Zeller
+(p. 589). But the movement first became general after F.A. Lange in his
+_History of Materialism_ had energetically advocated the Kantian doctrine
+according to his special conception of it, after Helmholtz[1] (born 1821)
+had called attention to the agreement of the results of physiology with
+those of the Critique of Reason, and at the same time Liebmann's youthful
+work, _Kant and the Epigones_, in which every chapter ended with the
+inexorable refrain, "therefore we must go back to Kant," had given the
+strongest expression to the longing of the time.
+
+[Footnote 1: Helmholtz: _On Human Vision_, 1855; _Physiological Optics_,
+1867; _Sensations of Tone_, 1863, 4th ed., 1877 [English translation by
+Ellis, 2d ed., 1885].]
+
+Otto Liebmann (cf. also the chapter on "The Metamorphoses of the A Priori"
+in his _Analysis of Reality_) sees the fundamental truth of criticism in
+the irrefutable proof that, space, time, and the categories are functions
+of the intellect, and that subject and object are necessary correlates,
+inseparable factors of the empirical world, and finds Kant's fundamental
+error, which the Epigones have not corrected, but made still worse, in the
+non-concept of the thing in itself, which must be expelled from the Kantian
+philosophy as a remnant of dogmatism, as a drop of alien blood, and as an
+illegitimate invader which has debased it.
+
+According to Friedrich Albert Lange[1] (1828-75; during the last years
+of his life professor at Marburg), materialism, which is unfruitful and
+untenable as a principle, a system, and a view of the world, but useful
+and indispensable as a method and a maxim of investigation, must be
+supplemented by formal idealism, which, rejecting all science from mere
+reason limits knowledge to the sensuous, to that which can be experienced,
+yet at the same time conceives the formal element in the sense world as the
+product of the organization of man, and hence makes objects conform to our
+representations. Above the sensuous world of experience and of mechanical
+becoming, however, the speculative impulse to construction, rounding off
+the fragmentary truth of the sciences into a unified picture of the whole
+truth, rears the ideal world of that which ought to be. Notwithstanding
+their indefeasible certitude, the Ideas possess no scientific truth, though
+they have a moral value which makes them more than mere fabrics of the
+brain: man is framed not merely for the knowledge of truth, but also for
+the realization of values. But since the significance of the Ideas is
+only practical, and since determinations of value are not grounds
+of explanation, science and metaphysics or "concept poetry"
+(_Begriffsdichtung_) must be kept strictly separate.
+
+[Footnote 1: F.A. Lange: _Logical Studies_, 1877. Cf. M. Heinze in the
+_Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophic_, 1877, and
+Vaihinger in the work cited above, p. 610 note.]
+
+Friedrich Paulsen of Berlin (born in 1846; cf. pp. 330, 332, note) sees in
+the Kantian philosophy the foundation for the philosophy of the future. A
+profounder Wolff (the self-dominion of the reason), a Prussian Hume (the
+categories of the understanding are not world-categories; rejection of
+anthropomorphic metaphysics), and a German Rousseau (the primacy of the
+will, consideration of the demands of the heart; the good will alone, not
+deeds nor culture, constitutes the worth of man; freedom, the rights of
+man) in one person, Kant has withdrawn from scientific discussion the
+question concerning the dependence of reality on values or the good,
+which is theoretically insoluble but practically to be answered in the
+affirmative, and given it over to faith. Kant is in so far a positivist
+that he limits the mission of knowledge to the reduction of the
+temporo-spatial relations of phenomena to rules, and declares the
+teleological power of values to be undemonstrable. But science is able
+to prove this much, that the belief in a suprasensible world, in the
+indestructibility of that which alone has worth, and in the freedom of
+the intelligible character, which the will demands, is not scientifically
+impossible. Since, according to formal rationalism, the whole order of
+nature is a creation of the understanding, and hence atomism and mechanism
+are only forms of representation, valid, no doubt, for our peripheral point
+of view, but not absolutely valid, since, further, the empirical view of
+the world apart from the Idea of the divine unity of the world (which, it
+is true, is incapable of theoretical realization) would lack completion,
+the immediate conviction of the heart in regard to the power of the good is
+in no danger of attack from the side of science, although this can do no
+further service for faith than to remove the obstacles which oppose it. The
+will, not the intellect, determines the view of the world; but this is only
+a belief, and in the world of representation, the intelligible world, with
+which the will brings us into relation, can come before us only in the form
+of symbols.--While Albrecht Krause (_The Laws of the Human Heart, a Formal
+Logic of Pure Feeling_, 1876) and A. Classen (_Physiology of the Sense of
+Sight_, 1877) are strict followers of Kant, J. Volkelt (_Analysis of the
+Fundamental Principles of Kant's Theory of Knowledge_, 1879) has traced the
+often deplored inconsistencies and contradictions in Kant down to their
+roots, and has shown that in Kant's thinking, which has hitherto been
+conceived as too simple and transparent, but which, in fact, is extremely
+complicated and struggling in the dark, a number of entirely heterogeneous
+principles of thought (skeptical, subjectivistic, metaphysico-work,
+rationalistic, _a priori_, and practical motives) are at which, conflicting
+with and crippling one another, make the attainment of harmonious results
+impossible. Benno Erdmann (p. 330) and Hans Vaihinger (pp. 323 note, 331)
+have given Kant's principal works careful philological interpretation.
+
+Among the various differences of opinion which exist within the neo-Kantian
+ranks, the most important relates to the question, whether the individual
+ego or a transcendental consciousness is to be looked upon as the executor
+of the _a priori_ functions. In agreement with Schopenhauer and with Lotze,
+who makes the subjectivity of space, time, and the pure concepts parallel
+with that of the sense qualities, Lange teaches that the human individual
+is so organized that he must apprehend that which is sensuously given under
+these forms. Others, on the contrary, urge that the individual soul with
+its organization is itself a phenomenon, and consequently cannot be the
+bearer of that which precedes phenomena--space, time, and the categories
+as "conditions" of experience are functions of a pure consciousness to be
+presupposed. The antithesis of subject and object, the soul and the world,
+first arises in the sphere of phenomena. The empirical subject, like the
+world of objects, is itself a product of the _a priori_ forms, hence not
+that which produces them. To the transcendental group belong Hermann
+Cohen[1] in Marburg, A. Stadler[2], Natorp, Lasswitz (p.17), E. König (p.
+17), Koppelmann (p. 330), Staudinger (p. 331). Fritz Schultze of Dresden is
+also to be counted among the neo-Kantians (_Philosophy of Natural Science_,
+1882; _Kant and Darwin_, 1875; _The Fundamental Thoughts of Materialism_,
+1881; _The Fundamental Thoughts of Spiritualism_, 1883; _Comparative
+Psychology_, i. 1, 1892).
+
+[Footnote 1: Cohen: _Kant's Theory of Experience_, 1871, 2d ed., 1886;
+_Kant's Foundation of Ethics_, 1877; _Kant's Foundation of Aesthetics_,
+1889.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Stadler: _Kant's Teleology_, 1874; _The Principles of the Pure
+Theory of Knowledge in the Kantian Philosophy_, 1876; _Kant's Theory of
+Matter_, 1883.]
+
+The German positivists[1]:--E. Laas of Strasburg (1837-85), A. Riehl
+of Freiburg in Baden (born 1844), and R. Avenarius of Zurich (born
+1843)--develop their sensationalistic theory of knowledge in critical
+connection with Kant. Ernst Laas defines positivism (founded by Protagoras,
+advocated in modern times by Hume and J.S. Mill, and hostile to Platonic
+idealism) as that philosophy which recognizes no other foundations than
+positive facts (_i.e._, perceptions), and requires every opinion to exhibit
+the experiences on which it rests. Its basis is constituted by three
+articles of belief: (1) The correlative facts, subject and object, exist
+and arise only in connection (objects are directly known only as the
+contents of a consciousness, _cui objecta sunt_, subjects only as centers
+of relation, as the scene or foundation of a representative content, _cui
+subjecta sunt_: outside my thoughts body does not exist as body, nor I
+myself as soul). (2) The variability of the objects of perception. (3)
+Sensationalism--all specific differences in consciousness must be conceived
+as differences in degree, all higher mental processes and states, including
+thought, as the perceptions and experiences, transformed according to
+law, of beings which feel, have wants, possess memory, and are capable of
+spontaneous motion. The subject coincides with its feeling of pleasure and
+pain, from which sensation is distinguished by its objective content. The
+illusions of metaphysics are scientifically untenable and practically
+unnecessary. Various yearnings, wants, presentiments, hopes, and fancies,
+it is true, lead beyond the sphere of that which can be checked by sense
+and experience, but for none of their positions can any sufficient proof be
+adduced. As physics has discarded transcendent causes and learned how to
+get along with immanent causes, so ethics also must endeavor to establish
+the worth of moral good without excursions into the suprasensible. The
+ethical obligations arise naturally from human relations, from earthly
+needs. The third volume of Laas's work differs from the earlier ones by
+conceding the rank of facts to the principles of logic as well as to
+perception. Aloys Riehl opposes the theory of knowledge (which starts from
+the fundamental fact of sensation) as scientific philosophy to metaphysics
+as unscientific, and banishes the doctrine of the practical ideals from the
+realm of science into the region of religion and art. Richard Avenarius
+defends the principle of "pure experience." Sensation, which is all that is
+left as objectively given after the removal of the subjective additions,
+constitutes the content, and motion the form of being.
+
+[Footnote 1: Laas: _Idealism and Positivism_, 1879-84. Riehl:
+_Philosophical Criticism_, 1876-87; Address _On Scientific and Unscientific
+Philosophy_, 1883. Avenarius (p. 598): _Philosophy as Thought concerning
+the World according to the Principle of Least Work_, 1876; _Critique of
+Pure Experience_, vol. i. 1888, vol. ii. 1890; _Man's Concept of the
+World_, 1891. C. Göring (died 1879; _System of Critical Philosophy_, 1875)
+may also be placed here.]
+
+With the neo-Kantians and the positivists there is associated, thirdly, a
+coherent group of noëtical thinkers, who, rejecting extramental elements of
+every kind, look on all conceivable being as merely a conscious content.
+This monism of consciousness is advocated by W. Schuppe of Greifswald (born
+1836; _Noëtical Logic_, 1878), J. Rehmke, also of Greifswald (_The World as
+Percept and Concept_, 1880; "The Question of the Soul" in vol. ii. of the
+_Zeitschrift für Psychologie_, 1891), A. von Leclair (_Contributions to
+a_ _Monistic Theory of Knowledge_, 1882), and R. von Schubert-Soldern
+(_Foundations of a Theory of Knowledge_, 1884; _On the Transcendence
+of Object and Subject_, 1882; _Foundations for an Ethics_, 1887). J.
+Bergmann[1] in Marburg (born 1840) occupies a kindred position.
+
+[Footnote 1: Bergmann: _Outlines of a Theory of Consciousness_, 1870; _Pure
+Logic_, 1879; _Being and Knowing_, 1880; _The Fundamental Problems of
+Logic_, 1882; _On the Right_, 1883; _Lectures on Metaphysics_, 1886; _On
+the Beautiful_, 1887; _History of Philosophy_, vol. i., _Pre-Kantian
+Philosophy_, 1892.]
+
+It is the same scientific spirit of the time, which in the fifties led many
+who were weary of the idealistic speculations over to materialism, that now
+secures such wide dissemination and so widespread favor for the endeavors
+of the neo-Kantians and the positivists or neo-Baconians, who desire to see
+metaphysics stricken from the list of the sciences and replaced by noëtics,
+and the theory of the world relegated to faith. The philosophy of the
+present, like the pre-Socratic philosophy and the philosophy of the early
+modern period, wears the badge of physics. The world is conceived from the
+standpoint of nature, psychical phenomena are in part neglected, in part
+see their inconvenient claims reduced to a minimum, while it is but rarely
+that we find an appreciation of their independence and co-ordinate value,
+not to speak of their superior position. The power which natural science
+has gained over philosophy dates essentially from a series of famous
+discoveries and theories, by which science has opened up entirely new and
+wide outlooks, and whose title to be considered in the formation of a
+general view of reality is incontestable. To mention only the most
+prominent, the following have all posited important and far-reaching
+problems for philosophy as well as for science: Johannes Müller's (Müller
+died 1858) theory of the specific energies of the senses, which Helmholtz
+made use of as an empirical confirmation of the Kantian apriorism; the law
+of the conservation of energy discovered by Robert Mayer (1842, 1850;
+Helmholtz, 1847, 1862), and, in particular, the law of the transformation
+of heat into motion, which invited an examination of all the forces active
+in the world to test their mutual convertibility; the extension of
+mechanism to the vital processes, favored even by Lotze; the renewed
+conflict between atomism and dynamism; further, the Darwinian theory[1]
+(1859), which makes organic species develop from one another by natural
+selection in the struggle for existence (through inheritance and
+adaptation); finally, the meta-geometrical speculations[2] of Gauss (1828),
+Riemann (_On the Hypotheses which lie at the Basis of Geometry_, 1854,
+published in 1867), Helmholtz (1868), B. Erdmann (_The Axioms of Geometry_,
+1877). G. Cantor, and others, which look on our Euclidean space of three
+dimensions as a special case of the unintuitable yet thinkable analytic
+concept of a space of _n_ dimensions. The circumstance that these theories
+are still largely hypothetical in their own field appears to have stirred
+up rather than moderated the zeal for carrying them over into other
+departments and for applying them to the world as a whole. Thus,
+especially, the Darwinians[3] have undauntedly attempted to utilize the
+biological hypothesis of the master as a philosophical principle of the
+world, and to bring the mental sciences under the point of view of the
+mechanical theory of development, though thus far with more daring and
+noise than success. The finely conceived ethics of Höffding (p. 585) is an
+exception to the rule which is the object of this remark.
+
+[Footnote 1: A critical exposition of the modern doctrine of development
+and of the causes used to explain it is given by Otto Hamann,
+_Entwickelungslehre und Darwinismus_, Jena, 1892. Cf. also, O. Liebmann,
+_Analysis der Wirklichkeit_; and Ed. von Hartmann (above, p. 610). [Among
+the numerous works in English the reader may be referred to the article
+"Evolution," by Huxley and Sully, _Encyclopedia Britannica_, 9th ed., vol.
+viii.; Wallace's _Darwinism_, 1889; Romanes, _Darwin and after Darwin_,
+i. _The Darwinian Theory_, 1892; and Conn's _Evolution of To-day_,
+1886.--TR.]]
+
+[Footnote 2: Cf. Liebmann, _Analysis der Wirklichkeit_, 2d ed., pp. 53-59.
+G. Frege (_Begriffsschrift_, 1879; _The Foundations of Arithmetic_, 1884;
+_Function and Concept_, 1891; "On Sense and Meaning" in the _Zeitschrift
+für Philosophie,_ vol. c. 1892) has also chosen the region intermediate
+between mathematics and philosophy for his field of work. We note, further,
+E.G. Husserl, _Philosophy of Arithmetic_, vol. i., 1891.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Ernst Haeckel of Jena (born 1834; _General Morphology_, 1866;
+_Natural History of Creation_, 1868 [English, 1875] I _Anthropogeny_, 1874;
+_Aims and Methods of the Development History of To-day_, 1875; _Popular
+Lectures_, 1878 _seq_.--English, 1883), G. Jäger, A. Schleicher _(The
+Darwinian Theory and the Science of Language_, 1865), Ernst Krause
+(Carus Sterne, the editor of _Kosmos_) O. Caspari, Carneri (_Morals and
+Darwinism_, 1871), O. Schmidt, Du Prel, Paul Rée (_The Origin of the Moral
+Feelings_, 1877; _The Genesis of Conscience_, 1885; _The Illusion of Free
+Will_, 1885); G.H. Schneider (_The Animal Will_, 1880; _The Human Will_,
+1882; _The Good and III of the Human Race_, 1883).]
+
+Besides the theory of knowledge, in the elaboration of which the most
+eminent naturalists[1] participate with acuteness and success, psychology
+and the practical disciplines also betray the influence of the scientific
+spirit. While sociology and ethics, following the English model, seek an
+empirical basis and begin to make philosophical use of statistical results
+(E.F. Schäffle, _Frame and Life of the Social Body_, new ed., 1885; A. von
+Oettingen, _Moral Statistic in its Significance for a Social Ethics_, 3d
+ed., 1882), psychology endeavors to attain exact results in regard to
+psychical life and its relation to its physical basis--besides Fechner and
+the Herbartians, W. Wundt and A. Horwicz should be mentioned here. Wundt
+and, of late, Haeckel go back to the Spinozistic parallelism of material
+and psychical existence, only that the latter emphasizes merely the
+inseparability _(Nichtohneeinander)_ of the two sides (the cell-body and
+the cell-soul) with a real difference between them and a metaphysical
+preponderance of the material side, while the former emphasizes the
+essential unity of body and soul, and the higher reality of the spiritual
+side.
+
+[Footnote 1: Helmholtz, Virchow (born 1821), Zöllner (1834-82; _On the
+Nature of Comets_, 1872), and Du Bois-Reymond (born 1818), who, in his
+lectures _On the Limits of the Knowledge of Nature_, 1872, and _The Seven
+World-riddles_, 1880 (both together in 1882, and reprinted in the first
+series of his _Addresses_, 1886), looks on the origin of life, the
+purposive order of nature, and thought as problems soluble in the future,
+but declares, on the other hand, that the nature of matter (atoms)
+and force _(actio in distant)_, the origin of motion, the genesis of
+consciousness (of sensation, together with pleasure and pain) from the
+knowable conditions of psychical life, and the freedom of the will, are
+absolute limits to our knowledge of nature.]
+
+%(b) Idealistic Reaction against the Scientific Spirit.%--In opposition to
+the preponderance of natural science and the empirico-skeptical tendency of
+the philosophy of the day conditioned by it, an idealistic counter-movement
+is making itself increasingly felt as the years go on. Wilhelm Dilthey[1]
+abandons metaphysics as a basis, it is true, but (with the assent of
+Gierke, _Preussische Jahrbücher_, vol. liii. 1884) declares against the
+transfer of the method of natural science to the mental sciences, which
+require a special foundation. In spite of his critical rejection of
+metaphysics, Wilhelm Windelband in Strasburg (born 1848; _Preludes_, 1884)
+is, like Dilthey, to be counted among the idealists. In opposition to the
+individualism of the positivists, the folk-psychologists--at their head
+Steinthal and Lazarus (p. 536); Gustav Glogau[2] in Kiel (born 1844) is
+an adherent of the same movement--defend the power of the universal over
+individual spirits. The spirit of the people is not a phrase, an empty
+name, but a real force, not the sum of the individuals belonging to the
+people, but an encompassing and controlling power, which brings forth
+in the whole body processes (_e.g._, language) which could not occur in
+individuals as such. It is only as a member of society that anyone becomes
+truly man; the community is the subject of the higher life of spirit.
+
+[Footnote 1: Dilthey: _Introduction to the Mental Sciences_, part i.,
+1883; _Poetic Creation_ in the Zeller _Aufsätze_, 1887; "Contributions to
+the Solution of the Question of the Origin of our Belief in the Reality of
+the External World, and its Validity," _Sitzungsberichte_ of the Berlin
+Academy of Sciences, 1890; "Conception and Analysis of Man in the
+Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries" in the _Archiv für Geschichte der
+Philosophie_, vols. iv., v., 1891-92.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Glogau: _Sketch of the Fundamental Philosophical Sciences_
+(part i., _The Form and the Laws of Motion of the Spirit_, 1880; part
+ii., _The Nature and the Fundamental Forms of Conscious Spirit_, 1888);
+_Outlines of Psychology_; 1884.]
+
+If folk-psychology, whose title but imperfectly expresses the comprehensive
+endeavor to construct a psychology of society or of the universal spirit,
+is, as it were, an empirical confirmation of Hegel's theory of Objective
+Spirit, Rudolf Eucken[1] (born 1846), pressing on in the Fichtean manner
+from the secondary facts of consciousness to an original real-life,
+endeavors to solve the question of a universal becoming, of an
+all-pervasive force, of a supporting unity ("totality") in the life of
+spirit (neither in a purely noëtical nor a purely metaphysical, but) in a
+noölogical way, and demands that the fundamental science or doctrine of
+principles direct its attention not to cognition by itself, but to the
+activity of psychical life as a whole.
+
+[Footnote 1: Eucken: _The Unity of Spiritual Life in the Consciousness and
+Deeds of Humanity_, 1888; _Prolegomena_ to this, 1885. A detailed analysis
+of the latter by Falckenberg is given in the _Zeitschrift für Philosophie_,
+vol. xc, 1887; cf. above, pp. 17 and 610.]
+
+We have elsewhere discussed the more recent attempts to establish a
+metaphysic which shall be empirically well grounded and shall cautiously
+rise from facts.[1] In regard to the possibility of metaphysics three
+parties are to be distinguished: On the left, the positivists, the
+neo-Kantians, and the monists of consciousness, who deny it out of hand. On
+the right, a series of philosophers--e.g., adherents of Hegel, Herbart, and
+Schopenhauer--who, without making any concessions to the modern theory of
+knowledge, hold fast to the possibility of a speculative metaphysics of the
+old type. In the center, a group of thinkers who are willing to renounce
+neither a solid noëtical foundation nor the attainment of metaphysical
+conclusions--so Eduard von Hartmann, Wundt,[2] Eucken, Volkelt (pp. 590,
+617). Otto Liebmann (born 1840; _On the Analysis of Reality_, 1876, 2d
+ed., 1880; _Thoughts and Facts_, Heft i. 1882) demands a sharp separation
+between the certain and the uncertain and an exact estimation of the degree
+of probability which theories possess; puts the principles of metaphysics
+under the rubric of logical hypothesis; and, in his _Climax of the
+Theories_, 1884, calls attention to the fact that experiential science, in
+addition to axioms necessarily or apodictically certain and empeiremes
+possessing actual or assertory certainty, needs, further, a number of
+"interpolation maxims," which form an attribute of our type of intellectual
+organization _(i.e._, principles, according to the standard of which we
+supplement the fragmentary and discrete series of single perceptions and
+isolated observations by the interpolation of the needed intermediate
+links, so that they form a connected experience). The most important of
+these maxims are the principles of real identity, of the continuity of
+existence, of causality, and of the continuity of becoming. Experience is
+a gift of the understanding; the premises, as a rule, latent in ordinary
+consciousness, on whose anticipatory application our experience is based
+throughout, assert something absolutely incapable of being experienced.
+If, in order to the production of a "pure experience," we eliminate all
+subjective additions of the understanding contained in experiential thought
+(all that cannot be present at the moment or locally at hand, in short, all
+that cannot be the direct object and content of actual observation),
+this breaks up into an unordered, unconnected aggregate of discontinuous
+perceptual fragments; in order that a complete and articulated condition
+of experience may result, these fragments (the purely factual content of
+observation, the incoherent matter of perception) must be supplemented and
+connected by very much that is not observed.
+
+[Footnote 1: R. Falckenberg, _Ueber die gegenwärtige Lage der deutschen
+Philosophie_, inaugural address at Erlangen, Leipsic, 1890.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Wundt: _Essays_, 1885, including "Philosophy and Science";
+_System of Philosophy_, 1889. On the latter cf. Volkelt's paper in the
+_Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xxvii. 1891; and on the _Essays_ a
+notice by the same author in the same review, vol. xxiii. 1887.]
+
+Further, a reaction against crude naturalism is observable in the practical
+field, though political economists (Roscher) and jurists take a more active
+part in it than the philosophers. Personally R. von Jhering (1818-92;
+_Purpose in Law_, 2 vols., 1877-83, 2d ed., 1884-86) stands on idealistic
+ground, although, rejecting the nativistic and formalistic theory, he is in
+principle an adherent of "realism," of the principle of interest and social
+utility (the moral is that Which is permanently useful to society).
+
+Finally, similar motives underlie the growing interest in the history
+of philosophy. The idealistic impulse seeks the nourishment which the
+un-metaphysical present denies to it from the great works of the past, and
+hopes, by keeping alive the classical achievements of previous times, to
+enhance the consciousness of the urgency and irrepressibleness of the
+highest questions, and to awaken courage for renewed attempts at their
+solution. Thus the study of history enters the service of systematic
+philosophy.
+
+%(c) The Special Philosophical Sciences.%--The more the courage to attack
+the central problems of philosophy has been paralyzed by the neo-Kantian
+theory of knowledge and the coming-in of the positivistic spirit, the more
+lively has been the work of the last decades in the special departments:
+the transfer of the center of gravity from metaphysics to the particular
+sciences is the most prominent characteristic of the philosophy of the
+time. Logic sees century-old convictions shattered and new foundations
+arising. Psychology has entered into competition with physiology in regard
+to the discovery of the laws of the psychical functions which depend
+on bodily processes, while metaphysical questions are forced into the
+background and there is a growing distrust of the reliability of inner
+observation. The philosophy of religion is favored with undiminished
+interest and aesthetics, after long neglect, with a renewal of attention;
+the philosophy of history is about to reconquer its former rights.
+There is, moreover, an especially lively interest in ethics; and the
+investigation of the history of philosophy is more widely extended than
+ever before. We will close our sketch with a short survey of the particular
+disciplines.
+
+In the department of _logic_ the following should be mentioned as classical
+achievements: the works of Christoph Sigwart of Tübingen (vol. i. 1873,
+2d ed., 1889; vol. ii. 1878), of Lotze (p. 605), and of Wundt (vol. i.
+_Erkenntnisslehre_, 1880; vol. ii. _Methodenlehre_, 1883). Besides these,
+Bergmann (p. 620), Schuppe (p. 619), and Benno Erdmann (_Logik_, vol. i.
+1892) deserve notice.
+
+In _psychology_ the following writers have made themselves prominent:
+Wilhelm Wundt at Leipsic (born 1832), _Grundzüge der physiologischen
+Psychologie_, 1874, 3d ed., 1887; A. Horwicz, _Psychologische Analysen auf
+physiologischer Grundlage_, 1872 _seq_.; Franz Brentano in Vienna (born
+1838), _Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte_, vol. i. 1874; Carl
+Stumpf of Munich (born 1848), _Ueber den psychologischen Ursprung der
+Raumvorstellung_, 1873, _Tonpsychologie_, vol. i. 1883, vol. ii. 1890;
+Theodor Lipps of Breslau (born 1851), _Grundthatsachen des Seelenlebens_,
+1883. The following may be mentioned in the same connection: J.H. Witte,
+_Das Wesen der Seele_, 1888; H. Münsterberg, _Die Willenshandlung_, 1888,
+_Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie_, 1889 _seq_,; Goswin K. Uphues
+at Halle, _Wahrnehmung und Empfindung_, 1888, _Ueber die Erinnerung_, 1889;
+H. Schmidkunz, _Psychologie der Suggestion_, 1892; H. Ebbinghaus, the
+co-editor of the _Zeitschrift für Psychologie una Physiologie der
+Sinnesorgane_, 1890 _seq_.; H. Spitta; Max Dessoir, _Der Hautsinn_, in
+the _Archiv für Anatomie una Physiologie_, 1892. The following works are
+psychological contributions to the theory of knowledge: E.L. Fischer,
+_Theorie der Gesichtswahrnehmung_, 1891; Hermann Schwarz, _Das
+Wahrnehmungsproblem_, 1892. Finally we may add A. Dorner in Königsberg,
+_Das menschliche Erkennen_, 1887; and E.L. Fischer, _Die Grundfragen der
+Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1887.
+
+The literature of _moral philosophy_ has been substantially enriched by
+Wundt, _Ethik_, 1886, 2d ed., 1892; and Friedrich Paulsen, _System der
+Ethik_, 1889, 2d ed., 1891. We may mention, further, Baumann (p. 601);
+Schuppe, _Grundzüge der Ethik und Rechtsphilosophie_, 1882; Witte,
+_Freiheit des Willens_, 1882; G. Class in Erlangen, _Ideale und Güter_,
+1886; Richard Wallaschek, _Ideen zur praktischen Philosophic_, 1886;
+F. Tönnies in Kiel, _Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft_, 1887; A. Döring,
+_Philosophische Güterlehre_, 1888; Th. Ziegler, _Sittliches Sein und
+Werden_, 2d ed., 1890; G. Simmel, _Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft_,
+vol. i. 1892.
+
+Of the newer works in the field of _aesthetics_, in addition to A.
+Zeising's _Aesthetische Forschungen_, 1855, C. Hermann's _Aesthetik_,
+1875, and Hartmann's _Philosophie des Schönen_, 1887, we may mention the
+_Einleitung in die Aesthetik_ of Karl Groos, 1892, and the following by
+Lipps: _Der Streit über die Tragödie_, 1890; _Aesthetische Faktoren der
+Raumanschauung_, 1891; the essay _Psychologie der Komik (Philosophische
+Monatshefte_, vols. xxiv.-xxv. 1888-89), and _Aesthetische
+Litteraturberichte_, (in the same review, vol. xxvi. 1890 _seq_.).
+
+Among the writers and works on the _philosophy of history_ we may note
+Conrad Hermann in Leipsic (born 1819), _Philosophie der Geschichte_, 1870;
+Bernheim, _Geschichtsforschung und Geschichtsphilosophie_, 1880; Karl
+Fischer, _Ist eine Philosophie der Geschichte wissenschaftlich erforderlich
+bezw. möglich?_ Dillenburg Programme, 1889; Hinneberg, _Die philosophischen
+Grundlagen der Geschichtswissenschaft_ in Sybel's _Historische
+Zeitschrift_, vol. lxiii. 1889; A. Dippe, _Das Geschichtsstudium mit
+seinen Zielen und Fragen_, 1891; Georg Simmel, _Die Probleme der
+Geschichtsphilosophie_, 1892.
+
+In the _philosophy of religion_, which is discussed especially by the
+theologians, a neo-Kantian and a neo-Hegelian tendency confront each other.
+The former, dividing in its turn, is represented, on the one hand, by
+the Ritschlian school--W. Herrmann in Marburg (_Die Metaphysik in der
+Theologie_, 1876, _Die Religion im Verhältniss zum Welterkennen und zur
+Sittlichkeit_, 1889), J. Kaftan in Berlin (_Das Wesen der christlichen
+Religion_, 1881)--and, on the other, by R.A. Lipsius in Jena (born 1830;
+_Dogmatik_, 1876, 2d ed., 1879; _Philosophie und Religion_, 1885). The
+latter is represented by A.E. Biedermann of Zurich (1819-85; _Christliche
+Dogmatik_, 1868; 2d ed., 1884-85), a pupil of W. Vatke, and by Otto
+Pfleiderer of Berlin (born 1839; _Religionsphilosophie_, 1879; 2d ed.,
+1883-4). The neo-Kantians base religion exclusively on the practical side
+of human nature, especially on the moral law, derive it from the contrast
+between external dependence on nature and the inner freedom or supernatural
+destination of the spirit, and wish it preserved from all intermixture
+with metaphysics. According to the neo-Hegelians, on the contrary, the
+theoretical element in religion is no less essential; and is capable of
+being purified, of being elevated from the form of representation, which is
+full of contradictions, into the adequate form of pure thought, capable,
+therefore, of reconciliation with philosophy. Hugo Delff (_Ueber den Weg
+zum Wissen und zur Gewissheit zu gelangen_, 1882; _Die Hauptprobleme der
+Philosophie und Religion_, 1886) follows Jacobi's course.
+
+Among the numerous works on the _history of philosophy_, besides the
+masterpieces of Zeller, J.E. Erdmann, and Kuno Fischer, the following are
+especially worthy of attention:
+
+Cl. Bäumker in Breslau, _Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen
+Philosophie_, 1890; H. Bonitz, _Platonische Studien_, 3d ed., 1886,
+_Aristotelische Studien_, 1862 _seq., Index Aristotelicus_, 1870, _Kleine
+Schriften_; P. Deussen (born 1845), _Das System der Vedanta_, 1883, H.
+Diels in Berlin, _Doxographi Graeci_, 1879; Eucken in Jena (p. 17), _Die
+Methode der aristotelischen Forschung_, 1872, Address _Ueber den Werth der
+Geschichte der Philosophie_, 1874; J. Freudenthal in Breslau (born 1839,
+pp. 63, 118), _Hellenistische Studien, 3 Hefte_, 1879, _Ueber die Theologie
+des Xenophanes_, 1886; M. Heinze in Leipsic, _Die Lehre vom Logos in der
+griechischen Philosophie_, 1872; G. Freiherr von Hertling in Munich (born
+1843), _Materie und Form und die Definition der Seele bei Aristoteles_,
+1871, _Albertus Magnus_, 1880; H. Heussler in Basle (p. 65 note),
+_Der Rationalismus des XVII. Jahrhunderts in seinen Beziehungen zur
+Eniwickelungslehre_, 1885; Fr. Jodl in Prague (born 1849; pp. 16, 221
+note); A. Krohn (1840-89), _Sokrates und Xenophon_, 1874, _Der platonische
+Staat_, 1876, _Die platonische Frage_, 1878--on Krohn, an obituary by
+Falckenberg in the _Biographisches Jahrbuch für Alterthumskunde, Jahrg_.
+12, 1889; P. Natorp (pp. 88 note, 598), _Forschungen zur Geschichte des
+Erkenntnissproblems im Alterthum_, 1884; Edmund Pfleiderer in Tübingen
+(born 1842; p. 113 note[1]), _Empirismus und Skepsis im D. Humes
+Philosophie_, 1874, _Die Philosophie des Heraklit im Lichte der
+Mysterienidee_, 1886; K. von Prantl (1820-88), _Geschichte der Logik im
+Abendlande_, 4 vols., 1855-70; Carl Schaarschmidt (pp. 88 note, 117-118);
+_Johannes Sarisberiensis_, 1862, _Die Sammlung der platonischen Schriften_,
+1866; L. Schmidt in Marburg (born 1824), _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_,
+1881; Gustav Schneider, _Die platonische Metaphysik_, 1884; H. Siebeck in
+Giessen, _Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen_, 1873, 2d ed., 1888,
+_Geschichte der Psychologie_, part i. 1880-84; Chr. von Sigwart (born 1830;
+pp. 17, 118); Heinrich von Stein in Rostock (born 1833), _Sieben Bücher zur
+Geschichte des Platonismus_, 1862-75; Ludwig Stein in Berne, editor of the
+_Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, founded in 1877, _Die Psychologie
+der Stoa_, I. _Metaphysisch-Anthropologischer Theil_, 1886, II.
+_Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1888, _Leibniz und Spinoza_, 1890; L. Strümpell,
+_Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie_, 1854, 1861; Susemihl in
+Greifswald, _Die Politik des Aristoteles_, Greek and German with notes,
+1879, further, a series of essays on Plato and Aristotle; Teichmüller (p.
+601); Trendelenburg (pp. 600-601), _Aristotelis de Anima_, 2d ed., by
+Belger. 1887; Th. Waitz, _Aristotelis Organon_, 1844-46; J. Walter in
+Königsberg, _Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft in der griechischen
+Philosophie_, 1874, _Geschichte der Aesthetik im Alterthum_, 1892; Tob.
+Wildauer in Innsbruck, _Die Psychologie des Willens bei Sokrates, Platon,
+und Aristoteles_, 1877, 1879; W. Windelbund in Strasburg (pp. 15-16),
+_Geschichte der alten Philosophie_, 1888; Theob. Ziegler in Strasburg,
+_Geschichte der christlichen Ethik_, 1886, 2d ed., with index, 1892; Rob.
+Zimmermann (pp. 19 note, 331, 536), _Studien und Kritiken_, 1870.
+
+
+%4. Retrospect.%
+
+In order to avoid the appearance of arbitrary construction we have been
+sparing with references of a philosophico-historical character. In
+conclusion, looking back at the period passed over, we may give expression
+to some convictions concerning the guiding threads in the development of
+modern philosophy, though these here claim only the rights of subjective
+opinion.
+
+A mirror of modern culture, and conscious of its sharp antithesis to
+Scholasticism, modern philosophy in its pre-Kantian period is pre-eminently
+characterized by naturalism. Nature, as a system of masses moved according
+to law, forms not only the favorite object of investigation, but also
+the standard by which psychical reality is judged and explained. The two
+directions in which this naturalism expresses itself, the mechanical
+view of the world, which endeavors to understand the universe from the
+standpoint of nature and all becoming from the standpoint of motion,[1] and
+the intellectualistic view, which seeks to understand the mind from the
+standpoint of knowledge, are most intimately connected. Where the general
+view of the All takes form and color from nature, a content and a mission
+can come to the mind from no other source than the external world; whether
+we (empirically) make it take up the material of representation from
+without or (rationalistically) make it create an ideal reproduction of
+the content of external reality from within, it is always the function of
+knowledge, conceived as the reproduction of a completed reality, which,
+since it brings us into contact with nature, advances into the foreground
+and determines the nature of psychical activity. As is conceivable, along
+with dogmatic faith in the power of the reason to possess itself of the
+reality before it and to reconstrue it in the system of science, and with
+triumphant references to the mathematical method as a guaranty for the
+absolute certainty of philosophical knowledge, the noëtical question
+emerges as to the means by which, and the limits within which, human
+knowledge is able to do justice to this great problem. Descartes gave out
+the programme for all these various tendencies--the mechanical explanation
+of nature, the absolute separation of body and soul (despiritualization of
+matter), thought the essence of the mind, the demand for certain knowledge,
+armed against every doubt, and the question as to the origin of ideas. Its
+execution by his successors shows not only a lateral extension in the
+most various directions (the dualistic view of the world held by the
+occasionalists, the monistic or pantheistic view of Spinoza, the
+pluralistic or individualistic view of Leibnitz; similarly the antithesis
+between the sensationalism of Locke and Condillac and the rationalism
+of Spinoza and Leibnitz), but also a progressive deepening of problems,
+mediated by party strife which puts every energy to the strain. What a
+tremendous step from the empiricism of Bacon to the skepticism of Hume,
+from the innate ideas of Descartes to the potential _a priori_ of Leibnitz!
+From the moment when the negative and positive culminations of the
+pre-Kantian movement in thought--Hume and Leibnitz--came together in
+one mind, the conditions of the Kantian reform were given, just as the
+preparation for the Socratic reform had been given in the skepticism of the
+Sophists and the [Greek: nous] principle of Anaxagoras.
+
+[Footnote 1: Even for Leibnitz the mind is a machine (_automaton
+spirituale_), and psychical action a movement of ideas.]
+
+Kant, who dominates the second period of modern philosophy down to the
+present time, is related to his predecessors in a twofold way. In his
+criticism he completes the noëtical tendency, and at the same time
+overcomes naturalism, by limiting the mechanical explanation (and with
+it certain knowledge, it is true) to phenomena and opposing moralism to
+intellectualism. Nature must be conceived from the standpoint of the spirit
+(as its product, for all conformity to law takes its origin in the spirit),
+the spirit from the standpoint of the will. Metaphysics, as the theory of
+the _a priori_ conditions of experience, is raised to the rank of a
+science, while the suprasensible is removed from the region of proof and
+refutation and based upon the rock of moral will. In the positive side of
+the Kantian philosophy--the spirit the law-giver of nature, the will the
+essence of spirit and the key to true reality--we find its kernel, that
+in it which is forever valid. The conclusions on the absolute worth of
+the moral disposition, on the ultimate moral aim of the world, on the
+intelligible character, and on radical evil, reveal the energy with which
+Kant took up the mission of furnishing the life-forces opened up by
+Christianity--which the Middle Ages had hidden rather than conserved under
+the crust of Aristotelian conceptions entirely alien to them, and the
+pre-Kantian period of modern times had almost wholly ignored--an entrance
+into philosophy, and of transforming and enriching the modern view of the
+world from this standpoint. Kant's position is as opposite and superior to
+the specifically modern, to the naturalistic temper of the new period, as
+Plato stands out, a stranger and a prophet of the future, above the level
+of Greek modes of thought. More fortunate, however, than Plato, he found
+disciples who followed further in the direction pointed out by that face of
+the Janus-head of his philosophy which looked toward the future: the
+ethelism of Fichte and the historicism of Hegel have their roots in Kant's
+doctrine of the practical reason. These are acquisitions which must never
+be given up, which must ever be reconquered in face of attack from forces
+hostile to spirit and to morals. In life, as in science, we must ever anew
+"win" ethical idealism "in order to possess it." As yet the reconciliation
+of the historical and the scientific, the Christian and the modern spirit
+is not effected. For the inbred naturalism of the modern period has not
+only asserted itself, amalgamated with Kantian elements, in the realistic
+metaphysics and mechanical psychology of Herbart and in the system of
+Schopenhauer, as a lateral current by the side of Fichte, Schelling, and
+Hegel, but, under the influence of the new and powerful development of the
+natural sciences, has once more confidently risen against the traditions of
+the idealistic school, although now it is tempered by criticism and
+concedes to the practical ideals at least a refuge in faith. The conviction
+that the rule of neo-Kantianism is provisional does not rest merely on the
+mutability of human affairs. The widespread active study of the philosophy
+of the great Königsberger gives ground for the hope that also those
+elements in it from which the systems of the idealists have proceeded as
+necessary consequences will again find attention and appreciation. The
+perception of the fact that the naturalistico-mechanical view represents
+only a part, a subordinate part, of the truth will lead to the further
+truth, that the lower can only be explained by the higher. We shall also
+learn more and more to distinguish between the permanent import of the
+position of fundamental idealism and the particular form which the
+constructive thinkers have given it; the latter may fall before legitimate
+assaults, but the former will not be affected by them. _The revival of the
+Fichteo-Hegelian idealism by means of a method which shall do justice to
+the demands of the time by a closer adherence to experience, by making
+general use of both the natural and the mental sciences, and by an exact
+and cautious mode of argument--this seems to us to be the task of the
+future_. The most important of the post-Hegelian systems, the system of
+Lotze, shows that the scientific spirit does not resist reconciliation with
+idealistic convictions in regard to the highest questions, and the
+consideration which it on all sides enjoys, that there exists a strong
+yearning in this direction. But when a deeply founded need of the time
+becomes active, it also rouses forces which dedicate themselves to its
+service and which are equal to the work.
+
+
+THE END.
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+INDEX.
+
+Abbt
+Absolute, the
+ Fichte on
+ Schelling on
+ F. Krause on
+ Schleiermacher on
+ Hegel on
+ Fortlage on
+ Spencer on
+ Böstrom on
+ Strauss on
+ Feuerbach on
+ the theistic school on
+ Lotze on
+ Hartmann on
+ See also
+ God
+ the Unconditioned
+Achillini
+Adamson, R.
+Aesthetics
+ of Home (Lord Kames)
+ of Burke
+ of Baumgarten
+ of Herder
+ of Kant
+ of Schiller
+ of Schelling
+ of Hegel
+ of J.F. Fries
+ of Herbart
+ of Schopenhauer
+Agnosticism, of Spencer
+Agricola, R.
+Agrippa of Nettesheim
+Ahrens, H.
+Alexandrists
+Allihn
+Althusius
+Anderson
+Angiulli, A.
+Annet, P.
+Antal, G. von
+Antinomies, the
+ of Kant
+ his antinomy of aesthetic judgment
+ and of teleological judgment
+Apelt, E.F.
+_A priori_, the
+ in Kant
+ in Kant and the post-Kantians
+ nature, in Schelling
+ in J.F. Fries
+ Beneke on
+ Herbart on
+ J.S. Mill on
+ Spencer's doctrine of the racial origin of
+ Opzoomer on
+ _Cf_. Ideas
+Aquinas, Thomas
+Ardigò, R.
+Aristotelians, the
+ opponents of
+Arnauld
+Arnoldt, E.
+Associationalism
+ of Hartley and Priestley
+ of Hume
+ of the Mills
+ of Bain
+Ast, G.A.F.
+Atomism
+ in modern physics
+ in Gassendi and Descartes
+ in Boyle
+ Leibnitz on
+Attributes
+ in Descartes
+ Spinoza's doctrine of
+Auerbach
+Augustine
+Avenarius, R.
+Averroists
+
+Baader, F. (von),
+ and Schelling
+ system of
+Bach, J.
+Bacmeister
+Bacon, Francis
+ a beginner of modern philosophy,
+ doctrine of,
+ in relation to Locke
+
+Bacon, Roger
+Bahnsen, J.
+Bain, Alexander
+Baku
+Barclay
+Bardili
+Bartholomaei
+Barzellotti, G.
+Basedow
+Bauer, Bruno
+Bauer, Edgar
+Baumann, J.
+Baumeister
+Baumgarten, Alex.
+Baumgarten, Siegmund
+Bäumker, Cl.
+Baur, F.C.
+Bayle, P.,
+ doctrine of,
+ and Leibnitz
+Beattie, J.
+Beck, Sigismund
+Beckers, H.,
+Bekker, Balthasar, III
+Belger
+Bellarmin
+Beneke, F.E.
+Benoit, G. von
+Bentham, J.
+Bentley, Richard
+Berger, J.E. von
+Bergmann, J.
+Berkeley, George,
+ position in modern philosophy,
+ view of mind and matter,
+ relation to Locke on perception,
+ on knowledge,
+ his system,
+ relation to Hume,
+ relation to Scottish School,
+ relation to Condillac,
+ his idealism criticised by Kant,
+ referred to
+Bernard, Claude
+Bernheim
+Bessarion
+Bezold, F. von,
+Biberg
+Biedermann, A.E.
+Biedermann, Fr. K.
+Bilfinger
+Billewicz, J. von,
+Biran, Maine de
+Blignières
+Bluntschli
+Bodin(us)
+Body and Mind, _see_ Mind and Body
+Boëthius, D.
+Böhme, Jacob,
+ system of,
+ and Schelling
+Böhmer
+Böhringer, A.
+Bolin, W.
+Bolingbroke
+Bolzano, B.
+Bonald, Victor de
+Bonatelli, F.
+Bonitz, H.
+Bonnet
+Bontekoe
+Boole, G.
+Borelius, J.
+Borelli
+Borgeaud
+Bosanquet, B.
+Böstrom, C.J.
+Botta, V.
+Bouillier
+Bourdin
+Bourignon, Antoinette
+Bowen, F.
+Bowne, B.P.
+Boyle, R.
+Bradley, F.H.
+Brahé, Tycho
+Brandes, G.
+Brandis, C.A.
+Braniss, J.
+Brasch, M.
+Brentano, F.
+Bröchner, H.
+Brockerhoff
+Brown, Thomas
+Browne, Peter
+Browne, Sir Thomas
+Brucker
+Bruder
+Brunnhofer
+Bruno, Giordano
+ system of
+ and Spinoza,
+ and Schelling
+Brütt, M.
+Buchanan, George
+Büchner, L.
+Buckle
+Budde
+Buffon
+Burckhardt
+Burdach, K.F.
+Burgersdijck
+Burke, Edmund
+Burt, B.C.
+Busch, O.
+Butler, Joseph
+Butler, N.M.
+
+Cabanis
+Caesalpin
+Caird, Edward
+Caird, John
+Cairns
+Calker, F.V.
+Camerer
+Campanella, Thomas
+ system of
+Campe
+Cantoni
+Cantor, G.
+Caporali, E.
+Cardanus, Hieronymus
+Carlyle, Thomas
+Carneri
+Caro, E.
+Carpenter, W.B.
+Carrière, M.
+Cartesians, the
+ Locke's relation to
+ Leibnitz's relation to
+Carus, F.A.
+Carus, K.G.
+Carus, P.
+Caspari, O.
+Categories, the, Kant on
+ Hegel's doctrine of
+Caterus
+Causation
+ Spinoza's view of
+ Locke on
+ Hume's skeptical analysis of
+ Kant on
+ Schopenhauer on
+ Lotze on
+ Hartmann on
+ _See also_ Sufficient Reason, Teleology
+Cesca, Giovanni
+Chalybaeus
+Chandler, Samuel
+Channing, W.E.
+Character, the Intelligible
+ in Kant
+ in Schelling
+ in Schopenhauer
+Charron, Pierre
+Christ, P.
+Chubb, Thomas
+Cieszkowski, A. von
+Clarke, Samuel
+ ethics of
+Class, G.
+Classen, A.
+Clauberg
+_Cogito ergo sum_
+ the Cartesian
+Cohen, H.
+Colecchi, A.
+Coleridge, S.T.
+Collard, Royer
+Collier, Arthur
+Collins, Anthony
+Collins, F.H.
+Collins, W.L.
+Combachius
+Comenius
+Commer, E.
+Common Sense, Scottish doctrine of
+Comte, Auguste
+Condillac
+ doctrine of
+Condorcet
+Conn, H.W.
+Conybeare, J.
+Copernicus, N.
+Cordemoy
+Cosmological Argument, the
+ in Locke
+ in Rousseau
+ in Leibnitz
+ in Kant
+Cotes, Roger
+Cousin, Victor
+Cremonini
+Crescas, Chasdai
+Creuz, K. von
+Critique of Reason, the
+ meaning of
+ the neo-Kantians on
+ its central position in modern thought
+Crousaz
+Crusius, C.A.
+Cudworth, Ralph
+ ethics of
+Cumberland, Richard
+Czolbe, H.
+
+D'Alembert
+Damiron
+Danzel
+Darjes
+Darwin, Charles
+Darwin, Erasmus
+Daub, K.
+Da Vinci, Leonardo
+Deism
+ naturalism of
+ in Herbert
+ in English thinkers of XVIII. century
+ in Hume
+ in Rousseau
+ of Reimarus
+ in Lessing
+ Kant's relation to
+ _See also_ Faith, Faith and Reason, Religion, Theology
+Delboeuf
+Delff, H.
+De Morgan, A.
+
+Denifle
+Des Bosses
+Descartes, René
+ system of
+ and occasionalism
+ and Spinoza
+ and Locke
+ and Leibnitz
+ _See also_ Spinoza
+Desdouits
+Dessoir, M.
+Deter
+Determinism
+ in Hobbes
+ in Spinoza
+ of the early associationalists
+ of Hume
+ in Leibnitz
+ of Schleiermacher
+ of Herbart
+ of Schopenhauer
+ of J.S. Mill
+ of Jonathan Edwards
+ _See also_ Character, the Intelligible; Freedom of the Will
+Deussen, P.
+Deutinger, M.
+De Wette
+Dewey, J.
+Diderot, Denis
+Diels, H.
+Dieterich, K.
+Digby, Everard
+Dillman
+Dilthey, W.
+ doctrine of,
+Dippe, A.
+Döring, A.
+Dorner, A.
+Doubt
+ the Cartesian
+ in Bayle
+ Rousseau's reverential
+Drobisch, M.W.
+Droz
+Druskowitz, Helene
+Du Bois-Reymond, E
+Dühring, E.
+Dumont, E.
+Duncan, G.M.
+Durdik
+
+Ebbinghaus, H.
+Eberhard, J.A.
+Echtermeyer
+Eckhart
+Eclecticism, of the German Illumination
+ of Schleiermacher
+ of Cousin and his School
+Edfeldt, H.
+Education
+ Locke on
+ Rousseau on
+Edwards, Jonathan
+Ego, the
+ certain knowledge of, in Campanella, and Descartes
+ the individual, and the transcendental consciousness in Kant
+ Fichte's doctrine of
+ a complex of representations in Beneke
+ Fortlage on
+ Herbart's doctrine of
+ the neo-Kantians on the individual, and the transcendental consciousness
+ _See also_ Soul
+Ellis
+Emerson, R.W.
+Empiricism
+ founded by Bacon
+ in Hobbes
+ and rationalism
+ of Locke
+ of J.S. Mill
+ of Opzoomer
+ Liebmann on
+ _See also_ Experience, Sensationalism
+Encyclopedists, the
+Engel, J.J.
+Ennemoser
+Erasmus, Desiderius
+Erdmann, Benno
+ works by
+Erdmann, J.E.
+ works by
+ philosophy of
+Erhardt, F.
+Eschenmayer, K.A.
+Ethelism
+ in Crusius
+ of Fichte
+ of Schopenhauer
+ in Hartmann
+ _See also_ Panthelism.
+Ethics
+ Bacon on
+ Hobbes's political theory of
+ Descartes on
+ Geulincx on
+ Spinoza on
+ Pascal on
+ Malebranche on
+ Locke on
+ English, of XVIII. century
+ Hume's empirical and mechanical
+ of French sensationalists
+ of French materialists
+ of Rousseau
+ of Leibnitz
+ of Herder
+ of Kant
+ of Fichte
+ of Schleiermacher
+ of Hegel
+ of J.F. Fries
+ of Beneke
+ of Herbart
+ of Schopenhauer
+ of Comte
+ of Bentham
+ of J.S. Mill,
+ of Spencer
+ of T.H. Green
+ of Lotze
+ of Hartmann
+ recent German interest in
+Eucken, R.
+ works by
+ philosophy of
+Everett, C.C.
+Evil
+ Weigel on the origin of
+ Böhme on the origin of
+ Spinoza's doctrine of
+ Leibnitz's doctrine of
+ Schelling's theory of
+ Baader's theory of
+ Fechner's view of
+ _See also_ Optimism, Pessimism
+Evolution
+ in the sense of explication in Nicolas of Cusa
+ and involution in Leibnitz
+ cosmical, of Spencer
+ biological, of Darwin
+ _Cf_. also the systems of Schelling, Hegel, Hartmann
+Exner, F.
+Experience
+ the basis of science in Bacon
+ Kant on
+ Green on
+ Liebmann's view of
+ _See also_ Empiricism, Sensationalism
+External World, the
+ reality of, in Descartes
+ knowledge and reality of, in Locke
+ Berkeley on
+ Kant on the reality of
+ the "material of duty in the form of sense" in Fichte
+
+Faber Stapulensis (Lefèvre of Etaples)
+Faith
+ the reformers' view of
+ Deistic view of
+ Kant on
+ Kant on moral or practical
+ Paulsen on practical
+ _See also_ Deism
+Faith and Reason,
+ the relation of, in modern philosophy
+ Bayle on
+ Locke on
+ Deistic view of
+ in Rousseau
+ Leibnitz on
+ Lessing on
+ Baader on
+ Schleiermacher on
+ _See also_ Deism
+Faith Philosophy, the
+ of Hamann
+ of Herder
+ of Jacobi
+ elements of, in J.F. Fries
+Falckenberg, R.
+ works by
+Farrer, J.A.
+Fechner, G.T.
+ system of
+Fechner, H.A.
+Feder, J.G.H.
+Feeling
+ the basis of knowledge in Pascal
+ the central doctrine of Rousseau
+ central to religion in Schleiermacher
+ _See also_ The Faith Philosophy
+Ferguson, Adam
+Ferrari, Giuseppe
+Ferraz
+Ferri, L.
+Ferrier, D.
+Ferrier, J.F.
+Fester, R.
+Feuerbach, L.
+ philosophy of
+Fichte, I.H.
+Fichte, J.G.
+ and Kant
+ system of
+ and Schelling
+ and Hegel
+ and Herbart
+ and Lotze
+ _See also_ Idealism, Jacobi, Kant
+Ficinus
+Filmer
+Final Causes, _see_ Teleology
+Fiorentino, F.
+Fischer, E.L.
+Fischer, K. Ph.
+Fischer, Karl
+Fischer, Kuno
+ works by
+ on Spinoza
+ on Kant
+ his philosophy
+ and neo-Kantianism
+Fiske, John
+Flint, K.
+Fludd, R.
+Flügel
+Forberg
+Forge, L. de la
+Fortlage, Karl
+ works by
+ system of
+Fouillèe, A.
+Fowler, Thos.
+Fox Bourne
+Franchi, A.
+Franck, A.
+Franck, Sebastian
+Francke
+Frantz, K.
+Eraser, A.C.
+Frauenstädt, J.
+Frederichs, F.
+Frederick the Great
+Freedom of the Will, Hobbes's denial of
+ Descartes's unlimited affirmation of
+ denied by Spinoza
+ Locke on
+ denied by Hume
+ in Rousseau
+ Leibnitz on
+ Herder on
+ Kant on
+ Fichte on
+ Schelling on
+ Herbart on
+ Schopenhauer on
+ J-S. Mill on
+ _See also_ Character, the Intelligible; Determinism
+Frege, G.
+Freudenthal, J.
+Fries, A. de
+Fries, J.F., and Kant
+ an opponent of constructive idealism
+ his system
+ and Herbart
+Froschammer
+Fullerton, G.S.
+
+Gabler
+Gale
+Galileo (Galileo Galilei)
+ his work as a foundation for modern physics
+ his system
+Galluppi, P.
+Galton, Francis
+Garve, C.
+Gassendi, P.
+Gauss
+Gay
+Geijer, E.G.
+Geil
+Genovesi, A.
+Gentilis, Albericus
+George, L.
+George of Trebizond
+Georgius Scholarius (Gennadius)
+Gerdil, S.
+Gerhardt
+Gerson
+Gersonides
+Geulincx, Arnold
+Gichtel
+Gierke, O.
+Gilbert, William
+Gioberti, V.
+Gioja, M.
+Gizycki, G. von
+Glanvil
+Glisson, Francis
+Glogau, G.
+God, doctrine of, in Nicolas of Cusa
+ in Taurellus
+ in Bruno
+ Campanella's argument for the existence of
+ Weigel's doctrine of
+ Böhme's doctrine of
+ Descartes's arguments for the existence of
+ Spinoza's doctrine of
+ Malebranche's view of
+ Locke's doctrine of
+ Berkeley ascribes ideas of sense-world to
+ Hume's doctrine of
+ Voltaire's doctrine of
+ Holbach's discussion of
+ Leibnitz's doctrine of
+ Reimarus's doctrine of
+ Lessing's doctrine of
+ Herder's doctrine of
+ Jacobi's doctrine of
+ Kant on the arguments for the existence of
+ Fichte's doctrine of
+ Schelling's doctrine of
+ F. Krause's doctrine of
+ Baader's doctrine of
+ Schleiermacher's doctrine of
+ Beneke's doctrine of
+ Herbart's doctrine of
+ Böstrom's doctrine of
+ the doctrine of, in Hegel's School
+ Strauss's doctrine of
+ Feuerbach's doctrine of
+ the doctrine of, in the Theistic School
+ Fechner on the relation of God and the world
+ Lotze's doctrine of
+ Hartmann's doctrine of
+ See also:
+ Cosmological Argument
+ Deism
+ Ontological Argument
+ Religion
+ Teleological Argument
+ Theology
+Göhring, C.
+Golther, L. von
+Göschel
+Goethe
+Gottsched
+Gracian, B.
+Grazia, V. de
+Green, T.H., works by
+ doctrine of
+Grimm, E.
+Grimm, F.M., Baron von
+Groos, K.
+Grot, N. von
+Grote, John
+Grotius, Hugo
+Grubbe, S.
+Gruber, H.
+Grün, K.
+Guhrauer
+Günther, A.
+Gutberlet, C.
+Guthrie, M.
+Güttler, C.
+Guyau, J.M.
+Gwinner, W.
+
+Haeckel, E.
+Haeghen, V. van der
+Hagemann
+Hall, G.S.
+Hallier
+Hamann, J.G.
+Hamann, O.
+Hamberger
+Hamilton, Sir William
+Harless, A. von
+Harmony
+ Leibnitz's pre-established
+ Wolff's development of Leibnitz's, pre-established
+Harms, F.
+Harris, W.T.
+Harrison, Frederic
+Hartenstein, G.
+Hartley, David
+Hartmann, E. von
+ works by
+ system of
+Harvey
+Hase, K.A.
+Hassbach
+Hausegger
+Hausrath
+Havet
+Haym, R.
+Hazard, R.G.
+Heath
+Hebler, C.
+Heereboord
+Hegel, G.W.F.
+ and Schelling
+ system of
+ opponents of
+ influence and followers of
+ _See also_ J.G. Fichte, Kant, Schelling
+Hegelians, the Old
+ the Young
+ _See also_ Semi-Hegelians
+Hegler, A.
+Heiland, K.
+Heinze, M.
+Helmholtz, H.
+Helmont, F.M. van
+Helmont, J.B. van
+Helvetius, C.A.
+Hemming
+Hemsterhuis, F.
+Herbart, J.F.
+ system of
+ _See also_ J.G. Fichte
+Herbert, Lord, of Cherbury
+Herder, J.G.
+ system of
+ Schelling and
+Hering
+Hermann, C.
+Hermann, W.
+Hermes, G.
+Herz, M.
+Heusde, P.W. van
+Heussler, H.
+Heyder, Karl
+Hinneberg
+Hinrichs
+Hirnhaym
+History
+ Machiavelli on
+ Herder's philosophy of
+ Kant's view of
+ Fichte's view of
+ Schelling's view of
+ F. Krause's philosophy of
+ Hegel's philosophy of
+ Vico's philosophy of
+History of Philosophy, the
+ importance of
+ method in
+ Hegel's view of
+ recent development of
+Hobbes, Thomas
+ his system
+ and Descartes
+ and Spinoza
+ and Locke
+ and Hume
+ and Pufendorf
+Höffding, H.
+Hoffmann, Franz
+Höijer, B.
+Holbach, Baron von
+Hölder, A.
+
+Hölderlin
+Home, Henry, (Lord Kames)
+Horváth
+Horwicz, A.
+Hotho
+Huber, J.
+Huber, U.
+Huet(ius), P.D.
+Hufeland
+Hume, David
+ system of
+ and Scottish School
+ and Kant
+ _See also_ Berkeley, Locke
+Hunt, J.
+Husserl, E.G.
+Hutcheson, Francis
+Huxley, T.H.
+
+Ibbot
+Idealism
+ phenomenal or individual of Berkeley
+ in Leibnitz
+ critical or transcendental, of Kant
+ post-Kantian, of Beck
+ subjective, of Fichte
+ objective, of Schelling
+ absolute or logical, of Hegel
+ the opposition to constructive
+ in Schopenhauer
+ German, in Great Britain
+ of Green
+ in America
+ ethical or ideological, of Lotze
+ idealistic reaction in Germany against the scientific spirit
+ Falckenberg on (ethical) idealism and the future
+Ideas,
+ innate, in Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, the rationalists and the empiricists
+ origin of, in Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, the rationalists and
+ empiricists, and Herbart
+ impressions and, in Hume
+ unconscious ideas or representations in Leibnitz
+ Ideas of reason in Kant
+ the logical Idea the subject of the world-process in Hegel
+Identity, Locke on
+ Spinozism a system of
+ Schelling's philosophy or system of
+ the philosophy of, among Schelling's followers
+ Hegel's doctrine a system of
+ Fortlage's system of
+ philosophy of, in Schopenhauer
+Immortality
+ Hume on
+ Voltaire on
+ Rousseau on
+ Leibnitz on
+ Kant on
+ Schleiermacher on
+ Beneke on
+ Herbart on
+ Hegel's followers on
+ Strauss on
+ Fechner on
+Imperative, the Categorical
+ in Kant
+ in Fichte
+ in Beneke
+Induction
+ Kepler on
+ Galileo on
+ used before Bacon
+ Bacon's theory of
+ in Hobbes
+ J.S. Mill's theory of
+Irwing, Von
+
+Jacobi, F.H.
+ system of
+ and Fichte
+ and the anti-idealists
+Jacobson, J.
+Jäger, G.
+James, William
+Janet, Paul
+Jansenists
+Jastrow, J.
+Jesuits
+Jevons, W.S.
+Jhering, R. von
+Jodl, F.
+Joël, M.
+Jouffroy, T.
+Judgment
+ Descartes on
+ rationalists and empiricists both mistake nature of
+ Kant on synthetic judgments _a priori_
+ the categories and, in Kant
+ judgments of perception and of experience in Kant
+ Kant on aesthetic and teleological
+Jungius
+
+Kaatz, H.
+Kaftan, J.
+Kaltenborn, C. von
+Kant, I.
+
+ position in modern philosophy
+ and Locke
+ and the Illumination
+ system of
+ the development to Fichte
+ and Fichte
+ and Schelling
+ and Hegel
+ and Schopenhauer
+ his influence, followers, and opponents
+ _See also_ Berkeley, Critique of Reason, J.G. Fichte, Hume, Leibnitz,
+ Locke,
+ Schopenhauer, Wolff
+Kayserling
+Kedney, J.S.
+Kent, G.
+Kepler, J.
+ philosophy of
+Kielmeyer
+Kierkegaard, S.
+Kieser
+King, Lord
+Kirchmann, J.H. von
+Kirchner
+Klein, G.M.
+Knauer, V.
+Knight, W.
+Knoodt, P.
+Knowledge
+ theory of, in modern thought
+ doctrine of, in Nicolas of Cusa
+ declared deceptive by Montaigne
+ mathematical basis of, in Kepler and Galileo
+ in Bacon
+ in Hobbes
+ in Herbart
+ the two views of
+ Geulincx on
+ Descartes on
+ Spinoza on
+ Malebranche on ("we see all things in God")
+ Locke's doctrine of
+ Berkeley on
+ Hume's skeptical doctrine of
+ Scottish doctrine of
+ sensationalistic doctrine of, in France
+ Leibnitz's theory of
+ Kant on
+ Fichte's Science of
+ Schelling's philosophy of
+ Baader on
+ Schleiermacher's doctrine of
+ Hegel on philosophical
+ J.F. Fries's doctrine of
+ Beneke on speculative
+ Schopenhauer's doctrine of
+ Comte's doctrine of
+ Sir Wm. Hamilton's doctrine of
+ J.S. Mill's doctrine of
+ Spencer's doctrine of
+ T.H. Green's doctrine of
+ Feuerbach's doctrine of
+ Lotze's doctrine of
+ Hartmann's doctrine of
+ the neo-Kantians on
+ the German positivists on
+ influence of recent science on the theory of
+ Liebmann's doctrine of
+ _See also_ Agnosticism, Critique of Reason, Empiricism, Faith,
+ Faith and Reason, Nominalism, Positivism, Rationalism and Empiricism,
+ Relativity, Sensationalism, Skepticism
+Knutzen, M.
+Koch, A.
+Koeber, R. von
+Koegel, F.
+König, E.
+Koppelmann
+Köstlin, Karl
+Krause, A.
+Krause, E.
+Krause, F.
+Krauth, C.P.
+Krohn, A.
+Kroman, K.
+Krug, W.T.
+Kuhn
+Kuntze, J.E.
+Kvacsala
+Kym, A.L.
+
+Laas, E.
+Laban, F.
+Labriola,
+La Bruyère
+Ladd, G.T.
+Laffitte, P.
+Lagrange
+Lambert, J.H.
+Lamennais, F. de
+La Mettrie, J.O. de
+La Mothe la Vayer
+Land, J.P.N.
+Lange, F.A.
+Lange, J.J.
+La Rochefoucauld
+Lasson, A.
+Lasswitz, K.
+Last, E.
+Lavater
+Law (or Right)
+ early philosophy of
+ Montesquieu on
+ Pufendorf on
+ C. Thomasius on
+ Kant's theory of legal right
+ Fichte's theory of right
+ Schelling's view of
+ F. Krause's philosophy of right
+ Hegel's philosophy of right
+Lazarus, M.
+Lechler
+Leclair, A. von
+Leibnitz, Friedrich (the father)
+Leibnitz, G.W.
+ position in modern thought
+ and occasionalism
+ system of
+ and the Illumination (Wolff, Lessing)
+ and Kant
+ _See also_ Descartes, Locke, Spinoza
+Leonhardi, H.K. von
+Leopold
+Lessing, G.E.
+ system of
+Lewes, G.H.
+Liard, L.
+Liberatore, M.
+Lichtenberg
+Liebig
+Liebmann, O.
+Linde, A. van der
+Lindemann
+Lipps, T.
+Lipsius, Justus
+Lipsius, R.A.
+Littré, E.
+Locke, J.
+ position in modern philosophy
+ system of
+ and Berkeley
+ and Hume
+ and the French Illumination (and Rousseau)
+ and Leibnitz
+ and Kant
+ _See also_ Bacon, Berkeley, Descartes, Empiricism, Kant
+Lohmeyer
+Lombroso, C.
+Lossius
+Lott, F.C.
+Lotze, R.H.
+ system of
+Löwe, J.H.
+Lubbock, J.
+Lülmann, C.
+Luther
+Lutterbeck
+Lyng, G.V.
+
+Macaulay, T.B.
+Machiavelli, N.
+Mackie
+Mackintosh, J.
+Mahaffy, J.P.
+Maimon, S.
+Maimonides
+Mainländer, P.
+Mainzer, J.
+Maistre, J, de
+Malebranche, Nicolas
+ system of
+Mamiani, T.
+Mandeville, Bernard de
+Mansel, H.L.
+Marcus
+Marheineke
+Mariana, Juan
+Mariano
+Marion, H.
+Marsh, James
+Marsilius of Padua
+Martin, B.
+Martineau, Harriet
+Martineau, James
+Martini, Jacob
+Masson, David
+Materialism
+ in Hobbes
+ Spinoza's tendency toward
+ in the early associationalists
+ in France in XVIII. century
+ Kant on
+ in Schopenhauer
+ and Spencer's philosophy
+ in Strauss
+ of Feuerbach
+ the controversy over, in Germany
+ Lange on
+Mathematics
+ the philosophical use of, advocated by Nicolas of Cusa
+ by Kepler
+ scientific use of, ignored by Bacon
+ Hobbes's recognition of
+ method of, adopted by Spinoza
+ Kant on philosophy and
+ Kant on science and
+ applied to psychology by Herbart
+ and by Fechner
+ recent, and philosophy
+Maudsley, Henry
+Maupertuis
+Mayer, F.
+Mayer, R.
+McCosh, J.
+Mechanism
+ in modern thought
+ in modern physical science
+ the central doctrine of Hobbes
+ fundamental in Spinoza
+ applied to mind by the associationalists
+ of J.F. Fries
+ of ideas in Herbart
+ in Lotze
+ in recent physical science
+ _See also_ Naturalism, Physical Science, Teleology
+Meier, G.F.
+Meiners
+Melancthon
+Mellin
+Melville, Andrew
+Mendelssohn
+Mersenne
+Merz, J.T.
+Metaphysics
+ Bacon on
+ of Descartes
+ of Spinoza
+ of Leibnitz
+ the Wolffian division of
+ Kant on
+ Hegel on
+ of Fortlage
+ of Herbart
+ Comte on
+ of Fechner
+ of Lotze
+ of Hartmann
+ recent German views on
+Meyer, J.B.
+Meyer, Ludwig
+Michelet, C.L.
+Michelis,
+Mill, James
+Mill, J.S.
+Milton, John
+Mind and Body
+ Descartes on
+ occasionalistic view of, in Geulincx
+ Spinoza on
+ Hartley and Priestley on
+ Leibnitz on
+ J.F. Fries on
+Modern Philosophy
+ value of history of
+ characteristics of
+ relation to the church
+ relation to nationality
+ beginnings of
+ bibliography of
+ two main schools of
+ future of
+Modes (of Substance)
+ in Descartes
+ in Spinoza
+ in Locke
+Moleschott
+Monads
+ Giordano Bruno's doctrine of
+ Leibnitz's doctrine of
+ Wolff's development of Leibnitz's doctrine of
+Monchamp, G.
+Monck, W.H.S.
+Monrad, M.J.
+Montaigne, M. de
+Montesquieu
+More, H.
+More, Thomas
+Moreau
+Morelly
+Morgan, C.L.
+Morgan, Thomas
+Moriz
+Morley, J.
+Morris, G.S.
+Morselli
+Mueller, W.
+Müller, F.A.
+Müller, G.E.
+Müller, H.
+Müller, Johannes
+Müller, Max
+Münsterberg, H.
+Münz, W.
+
+Nahlowsky
+Naigeon
+Natge
+Natorp, P.
+Naturalism
+ characteristic of modern philosophy
+ _See also_ Mechanism, Physical Science, Teleology
+Nature, Philosophy of
+ early Italian
+ Schelling's
+ among Schelling's followers
+ Hegel's
+ J.F. Fries's
+ Herbart's
+ _See also_ Physical Science
+Nedich
+Nees von Esenbeck
+Nemes, E.
+Neo-Kantians
+Nettleship, R.L.
+Neudecker
+Newton, Isaac
+Nichol
+Nicolai, F.
+Nicolas of Cusa
+Nicole
+Nielsen, R.
+Niethammer
+Nietzsche, F.
+Niphus
+Nippold
+Nizolius, Marius
+Noack, L.
+Noiré, L.
+Nolen
+Nominalism
+ in Hobbes
+ in Locke
+ of Berkeley
+ of Hume
+Noumena
+ _See also_ Phenomena, Things in themselves
+Novalis
+Nyblaeus, A.
+
+Occam
+Occasionalists
+Oischinger
+Oken, L.
+Oldendorp
+Ontological argument, the
+ in Descartes
+ in Spinoza
+ in Leibnitz
+ in Kant
+Opel, J.O.
+Opposites
+ the unity of, in Nicolas of Cusa
+ in Schelling
+ the reconciliation and identity of, in Hegel
+Optimism
+ in Voltaire
+ of Leibnitz
+ of Schleiermacher
+Opzoomer, C.W.
+Oratorians
+Oersted, H.C.
+Oswald, James
+Oettingen, A. von
+
+Pabst, J.H.
+Paley, W.
+Pantheism
+ of Nicolas of Cusa
+ of Spinoza
+ Malebranche's "Christian"
+ in Toland
+ Berkeley's tendency to
+ of Holbach
+ in Fichte
+ in Schelling
+ in Schleiermacher
+ Fortlage's transcendent
+ of Strauss
+ the theistic school on
+ _See also_ Hegel, Panthelism
+Panthelism
+ of Fichte
+ in Schelling
+ of Schopenhauer
+ _See also_ Ethelism
+Pappenheim
+Paracelsus
+Parker
+Pascal, Blaise
+Patritius, Franciscus
+Paulsen, F.
+Paulus
+Pertz
+Pessimism
+ of Schopenhauer
+ of Hartmann
+Pesch
+Pestalozzi, J.H.
+Peters, K.
+Pfleiderer, E.
+Pfleiderer, O.
+Phenomena
+ and things in themselves in Kant
+ and representation in Kant
+ and things in themselves in Herbart
+ in Schopenhauer
+ in Lotze
+ _See also_ Noumena, Things in themselves
+Physical Science
+ concepts of modern
+ Newton's development of
+ its influence on philosophy in XIX century
+Pico, Francis, of Mirandola
+Pico, John, of Mirandola
+Pierson
+Pietsch, T.
+Planck, A.
+Planck, K.C.
+Platner
+Platonists
+Pletho, G.G.
+Plitt
+Ploucquet
+Plümacher, O.
+Poiret, P.
+Pollock, F.
+Pomponatius, Petrus
+Porter, N.
+Positivism
+ in Italy
+ of Comte
+ of Comte's followers
+ in England
+ in Sweden, Brazil, and Chili
+ in Germany
+Prantl
+Prel, K. du
+Price, Richard
+Priestley, J.
+Prowe, L.
+Psychology
+ the associational
+ the sensationalistic
+ of Leibnitz
+ of Wolff
+ of Tetens
+ Kant on rational
+ constructive
+ the basis of philosophy in J.F. Fries
+ and Beneke
+ of Beneke
+ of Fortlage
+ of Herbart
+ of Comte
+ physiological
+ folk-psychology
+
+ of Spencer
+ _See also_ Ego, Mind and Body, Soul
+Pufendorf, Samuel
+Pünjer, B., works by
+
+Quaebicker, R.
+Qualities
+ Primary and Secondary, so termed by Boyle
+ Locke's doctrine of
+ Kant's relation to
+ Berkeley's co-ordination of
+Quesnay
+
+Rabus, L.
+Ragnisco
+Ramus (Pierre de la Ramée)
+Rationalism and Empiricism
+ in Locke
+ in Leibnitz
+ in Tschirnhausen
+ in others of the German Illuminati
+ in relation to Kant
+Rauwenhoff
+Ravaisson, F.
+Realism
+ of Herbart
+ the "transfigured," of Spencer
+ the "transcendental realism" of Hartmann
+Rée, P.
+Regius
+Regulative and constitutive principles, in Kant
+Rehmke, J.
+Rehnisch
+Reichlin-Meldegg, K.A. von
+Reicke, R
+Reid, Thomas
+Reiff, J.F.
+Reimarus
+Reinhold, E.
+Reinhold, K.L.
+Relativity of Knowledge
+ in Comte
+ of Sir Wm. Hamilton
+ of Mansel
+ of Spencer
+Religion
+ Bacon's view of
+ Hobbes on
+ Lord Herbert's doctrine of natural
+ Pascal on
+ deistic view of
+ Hume on
+ Voltaire on
+ Holbach on
+ Rousseau's view of
+ Leibnitz on
+ Reimarus on
+ Lessing's developmental theory of
+ Kant on
+ Fichte on
+ Schelling on
+ Schleiermacher's philosophy of
+ Hegel's philosophy of
+ Beneke on
+ Herbart's doctrine of
+ Schopenhauer's doctrine of
+ Comte's religion of humanity
+ Spencer's view of
+ Hegel's followers on
+ Strauss on
+ Feuerbach's doctrine of
+ Hartmann's philosophy of
+ _See also_ Deism, Faith, Faith and Reason, God, Theology
+Rémusat, C. de
+Renan, E.
+Renery
+Renouvier, C.
+Reuchlin, H.
+Reuchlin, J.
+Reuter, H.
+Reynaud, J.
+Ribbing, S.
+Ribot, Th.
+Riedel, O.
+Riehl, A.
+Riemann
+Riezler, S.
+Right, _see_ Law
+Rio, J.S. del
+Ritschl, A.
+Ritter, H.
+Rixner
+Robertson, G.C.
+Robinet
+Robinet, J.B.
+Rocholl
+Roeder
+Rohmer, F.
+Romagnosi, G.
+Romanes, G.J.
+Romanticists, the
+Romundt, H.
+Roscher
+Röse, F.
+Rosenkrantz, W.
+Rosenkranz, K.
+Rosmini, A.
+Rothe, R.
+Rousseau, J.J.
+ system of
+Royce, J.
+Rüdiger
+Ruge, A.
+Ruge, S.
+Ruysbroek
+
+Sahlin
+St. Martin, L.C.
+Saint Simon, H. de
+Saisset, E.
+Sanchez, Francis
+Schaarschmidt, C.
+Schäffle, E.F.
+Schaller
+Schärer, E.
+Schasler, M.
+Scheffler
+Scheibler
+Schelling, F.W.J. (von)
+ system of
+ immediate followers of
+ and Hegel
+ _See also_ J.G. Fichte, Hegel, Kant, Spinoza
+Schelver
+Schematism, Kant's
+Schiller
+Schindler, C.
+Schlegel, F.
+Schleicher, A.
+Schleiden
+Schleiermacher, F.D.E.
+ system of
+Schmid, E.
+Schmid, Leopold
+Schmidkunz, H.
+Schmid-Schwarzenberg
+Schmidt, K.
+Schmidt, L.
+Schmidt, O.
+Schneider, C.M.
+Schneider, G.
+Schneider, G.H.
+Schneider, O.
+Schoenlank
+Schopenhauer, A.
+ and Kant
+ system of
+ followers of
+Schoppe (Scioppius)
+Schubert, F.W.
+Schubert, G.H.
+Schubert-Soldern, R. von
+Schuller, H.
+Schultze, Fritz
+Schulz, J.
+Schulze, G.E. (Aenesidemus-Schulze)
+Schuppe, W.
+Schurman, J.G.
+Schütz
+Schwarz, H.
+Schwarz, G.E.
+Schwegler, A.
+Schwenckfeld
+Scottish School, the
+Selby-Bigge
+Semi-Hegelians, the
+Semi-Kantians, the
+Semler
+Sengler, J.
+Sennert, D.
+Sensation
+ a source of knowledge in Locke
+ and in Hume
+ the sole source of knowledge in Condillac
+ Leibnitz's view of
+ _See also_ Rationalism and Empiricism, Sensationalism
+Sensationalism
+ in Hobbes
+ in modern thought in general
+ of Locke
+ of Condillac
+ of Bonnet
+ of Helvetius
+ of La Mettrie
+ of Holbach
+ in Italy
+ of Feuerbach
+ of the German positivists
+ _See also_ Empiricism, Experience, Sensation
+Sergi, G.
+Seth, A.
+Seydel, R.
+Seyfarth
+Shaftesbury
+Sherlock, T.
+Sibbern, F.C.
+Siber
+Siciliani, P.
+Sidgwick, H.
+Sidney, Algernon
+Siebeck
+Sigwart, Chr. von
+Sigwart, Chr. W.
+Silesius
+Sime, J.
+Simmel, G.
+Simon, J.
+Skepticism, in Montaigne
+ in Charron
+ in F. Sanchez
+ in Bayle
+ of Hume
+ of Diderot,
+ of D'Alembert
+ the anti-Critical, of Schulze
+ the Critical, of Maimon
+Smith, Adam
+Snell, K.
+Social Contract, the theory of, in Hobbes
+ Hume on
+ in Rousseau
+ Kant on
+Solger, K.F.
+Sommer, H.
+Sommer, R.
+Soul, the, thought the essence of, in Descartes
+ a congeries of ideas in Spinoza
+ thought the essence of, in Malebranche,
+ thought merely an activity of, in Locke
+ a sum of inner states in Hume
+ Leibnitz's monadological view of
+ Kant on
+ Herbart on
+ _See also_ Ego, Immortality, Mind and Body
+Space (and Time), Hobbes on
+ in Leibnitz
+ in Kant
+ in Herbart
+ in Schopenhauer
+ in Spencer
+ in Lotze
+Spaventa
+Spedding
+Spencer, H.
+ system of
+Spicker, G.
+Spinoza, B. de
+ position in modern philosophy
+ and Descartes
+ system of
+ and Leibnitz
+ and Schelling
+ _See also_ Descartes
+Spirit, Schilling's philosophy of
+ Hegel's phenomenology of
+ his doctrine of subjective
+ of objective
+ of absolute
+ recent German philosophy of
+Spitta, H.
+Stadler, A.
+Stahl, F.J.
+Starcke, C.N.
+State, the, early theories of
+ Hobbes on
+ Spinoza on
+ Locke on
+ Montesquieu on
+ Rousseau's theory of
+ Kant's view of
+ Fichte on
+ Schelling on
+ Hegel on
+ Spencer on
+ _See also_ Social Contract
+Staudinger, F.
+Steckelmacher, M.
+Steffens, H.
+Steffensen, K.
+Steinbart
+Stein, H. von
+Stein, L.
+Steinthal
+Stephen, Leslie
+Stern, A.
+Stewart, Dugald
+Stirling, J.H.
+Stirner, Max (pseudonym, cf. K. Schmidt)
+Stoeckl, A.
+Stöhr, A.
+Stout, G.F.
+Strauss, D.F.
+Strümpell, L.
+Stumpf, C.
+Stumpf, T.
+Sturm, Christoph
+Stutzmann
+Suabedissen
+Suarez, Francis
+Substance
+ Descartes on
+ Spinoza on
+ Locke on
+ Berkeley on (material)
+ Hume's skeptical analysis of
+ Leibnitz's doctrine of
+ Kant on
+ Schopenhauer on
+ Hartmann on
+Sufficient Reason, the Principle of
+ in Leibnitz
+ in Schopenhauer
+Sully, James
+Sulzer
+Susemihl
+Suso
+
+Taine, H.
+Tappan, H.P.
+Taubert, A.
+Tauler
+Taurellus
+Taute
+Teichmüller
+Teleological Argument, the
+ in Boyle
+ Hume on
+ Reimarus on
+ Leibnitz on
+ Kant on
+ Herbart on
+Teleology
+ minimized by modern thought
+ rejected by modern physics
+ in Boyle
+ Bacon on
+ Hobbes's denial of
+ Descartes on
+ Spinoza's denial of
+ Newton on
+ Leibnitz on
+ Kant on
+ in Fichte
+ Schelling on
+ in Hegel
+ in Trendelenburg
+ in Hartmann
+ _See also_ Mechanism, Naturalism, Sufficient Reason, Teleological
+ Argument
+Telesius
+Temple, Sir William
+Testa
+Tetens, J.N.
+Thaulow
+Theology
+ relation of, to philosophy in Taurellus
+ in Campanella
+ and science in Bacon
+ in Leibnitz
+ Lessing's speculative
+
+ Kant's view of
+ Schelling on
+ Schleiermacher's view of
+ Comte on the theological stage of thought
+ Strauss on
+ Feuerbach on
+ _See also_ Deism, Faith, Faith and Reason, God, Religion
+Thiele, G.
+Things in themselves
+ in Kant's critics and immediate successors
+ in Fichte
+ Liebmann on
+ _See also_ Phenomena, Noumena
+Thomas à Kempis
+Thilo
+Thomasius, Christian
+Thomasius, Jacob (Father of Christian)
+Thomson, W.
+Thorild, T.
+Thümmig
+Tieck
+Tiedemann
+Tillotson, J.
+Time, Kant on objective determinations of
+ _See also_ Space and Time
+Tindal, Matthew
+Toland, John
+Tönnies, F.
+Torrey, H.A.P.
+Toscanelli
+Tracy, Destutt de
+Trahndorff
+Transcendental and Transcendent, meaning of, in Kant
+Trendelenburg, A.
+Treschow, N.
+Tschirnhausen
+Turgot
+Twardowski, K.
+
+Ueberhorst
+Ueberweg, F.
+Uebinger, J.
+Ulrici, H.
+Unconditioned, the
+ in Kant
+ in Sir Wm. Hamilton
+ in Mansel
+ in Spencer
+ _See also_ the Absolute
+Unconscious, the, Hartmann's philosophy of
+Uphues, G.K.
+
+Vacherot, E.
+Vaihinger, H.
+Valla, L.
+Vanini
+Vatke, W.
+Veitch, J.
+Venetianer, M.
+Venn, J.
+Vera
+Vico
+Villers
+Virchow, R.
+Vischer, F.T.
+Vives
+Vloten, J. van
+Voëtius
+Vogel
+Vogt, Karl
+Volkelt, J.
+ works by
+ position of
+Volkmann von Volkmar
+Volney (Chasseboeuf)
+Voltaire
+Vorländer, F.
+
+Waddington
+Wagner, J.J.
+Wagner, Richard
+Wagner, Rudolph
+Waitz, Theodor
+Wallace, A.R.
+Wallace, William
+Wallaschek, R.
+Walter, J.
+Warburton, W.
+Ward, J.
+Watson, John
+Weber, E.H.
+Weber, Theodor
+Weigel, E.
+Weigel, Valentin
+Weiss, Bruno
+Weisse, C.H.
+Weissenborn
+Werner, K.
+Weston, S. Burns
+Weygoldt
+Whately, Richard
+Whedon, D.D.
+Whewell, W.
+Whiston, W.
+Wildauer, T.
+Willmann, O.
+Windelband, W.
+Winkler, B.
+Witte, J.H.
+Wohlrabe
+Wolff, Christian
+ system of
+ and Kant
+Wollaston, William
+Woolston, T.
+Wundt, W.
+Wyck, Van der
+Wyttenbach, D.
+
+Zabarella
+Zart, G.
+Zeising, A.
+Zeller, E.
+ works of
+ position of
+Ziegler, T.
+Ziller, T.
+Zimmer, F.
+Zimmermann, R.
+Zimmern, Helen
+Zöllner
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of History Of Modern Philosophy
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