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diff --git a/10970-h/10970-h.htm b/10970-h/10970-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c7d64a --- /dev/null +++ b/10970-h/10970-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,1754 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content= + "text/html; charset=UTF-8"> + <title> + The Project Gutenberg eBook of Pragmatism, by D.L. Murray. + </title> + <style type="text/css"> + <!-- + * { font-family: Times;} + P { text-indent: 1em; + margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; } + HR { width: 33%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em;} + BODY{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%;} + .linenum {position: absolute; top: auto; left: 4%;} /* poetry number */ + .note {margin-left: 2em; margin-right: 2em; margin-bottom: 1em;} /* block indent */ + .pagenum {position: absolute; left: 92%; right: 100%; font-size: 8pt; justify: right;} /* page numbers */ + // --> + </style> + </head> +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10970 ***</div> + +<h1>PRAGMATISM</h1> + +<h3>By</h3> + +<h2>D.L. MURRAY</h2> + +<center>WITH A PREFACE BY DR. F.C.S. SCHILLER</center> +<br><br><br> + +<center>PHILOSOPHIES ANCIENT AND MODERN</center> +<br><br><br> +<center>PRAGMATISM</center> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CONTENTS"></a><h2>CONTENTS</h2> + + +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><a href="#CONTENTS">CONTENTS</a></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><a href="#PREFACE">PREFACE</a></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">I. THE GENESIS OF PRAGMATISM</a></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">II. THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY</a></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">III. WILL IN COGNITION</a></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">IV. THE DILEMMAS OF DOGMATISM</a></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">V. THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND ERROR</a></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">VI. THE FAILURE OF FORMAL LOGIC</a></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">VII. THE BANKRUPTCY OF INTELLECTUALISM</a></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">VIII. THOUGHT AND LIFE</a></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><a href="#BIBLIOGRAPHY">BIBLIOGRAPHY</a></span><br> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="PREFACE"></a><h2>PREFACE</h2> +<br> + +<p>Mr. Murray's youthful modesty insists that his study of Pragmatism needs +a sponsor; this is not at all my own opinion, but I may take the +opportunity of pointing out how singularly qualified he is to give a +good account of it.</p> + +<p>In the first place he is young, and youth is an almost indispensable +qualification for the appreciation of novelty; for the mind works more +and more stiffly as it grows older, and becomes less and less capable of +absorbing what is new. Hence, if our 'great authorities' lived for ever, +they would become complete <i>Struldbrugs</i>. This is the justification of +death from the standpoint of social progress. And as there is no subject +in which <i>Struldbruggery</i> is more rampant than in philosophy, a youthful +and nimble mind is here particularly needed. It has given Mr. Murray an +eye also to the varieties of Pragmatism and to their connections.</p> + +<p>Secondly, Mr. Murray has (like myself) enjoyed the advantage of a +severely intellectualistic training in the classical philosophy of +Oxford University, and in its premier college, Balliol. The aim of this +training is to instil into the best minds the country produces an +adamantine conviction that philosophy has made no progress since +Aristotle. It costs about £50,000 a year, but on the whole it is +singularly successful. Its effect upon capable minds possessed of common +sense is to produce that contempt for pure intellect which distinguishes +the British nation from all others, and ensures the practical success of +administrators selected by an examination so gloriously irrelevant to +their future duties that, since the lamentable demise of the Chinese +system, it may boast to be the most antiquated in the world. In minds, +however, which are more prone to theorizing, but at the same time +clear-headed, this training produces a keenness of insight into the +defects of intellectualism and a perception of the <i>intellectual +necessity</i> of Pragmatism which can probably be reached in no other way. +Mr. Murray, therefore, is quite right in emphasizing, above all, the +services of Pragmatism as a rigorously critical theory of knowledge, and +in refuting the amiable delusion of many pedants that Pragmatism is +merely an emotional revolt against the rigors of Logic. It is +essentially a reform of Logic, which protests against a Logic that has +become so formal as to abstract from meaning altogether.</p> + +<p>Thirdly, an elementary introduction to Pragmatism was greatly needed, +less because the subject is inherently difficult than because it has +become so deeply involved in philosophic controversy. Intrinsically it +should be as easy to make philosophy intelligible as any other subject. +The exposition of a truth is difficult only to those who have not +understood it, or do not desire to reveal it. But British philosophy had +long become almost as open as German to the (German) gibe that +'philosophy is nothing but the systematic misuse of a terminology +invented expressly for this purpose,' and Pragmatism, too, could obtain +a hearing only by showing that it could parley with its foes in the +technical language of Kant and Hegel.</p> + +<p>Hence it had no leisure to compose a fitting introduction to itself for +students of philosophy. William James's <i>Pragmatism</i>, great as it is as +a work of genius, brilliant as it is as a contribution to literature, +was intended mainly for the man in the street. It is so lacking in the +familiar philosophic catchwords that it may be doubted whether any +professor has quite understood it. And moreover, it was written some +years ago, and no longer covers tho whole ground. The other writings of +the pragmatists have all been too controversial and technical.</p> + +<p>The critics of Pragmatism have produced only caricatures so gross as to +be unrecognizable, and so obscure as to be unintelligible. Mr. Murray's +little book alone may claim to be (within its limits) a complete survey +of the field, simply worded, and yet not unmindful of due technicality. +It is also up to date, though in dealing with so progressive a subject +it is impossible to say how long it is destined to remain so.</p> + +<p>F.C.S. SCHILLER.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_I"></a><h2>CHAPTER I</h2> +<br> + +<center>THE GENESIS OF PRAGMATISM</center> + +<p>There is a curious impression to-day in the world of thought that +Pragmatism is the most audacious of philosophic novelties, the most +anarchical transvaluation of all respectable traditions. Sometimes it is +pictured as an insurgence of emotion against logic, sometimes as an +assault of theology upon the integrity of Pure Reason. One day it is +described as the reckless theorizing of dilettanti whose knowledge of +philosophy is too superficial to require refutation, the next as a +transatlantic importation of the debasing slang of the Wild West. Abroad +it is frequently denounced as an outbreak of the sordid commercialism of +the Anglo-Saxon mind.</p> + +<p>All these ideas are mistaken. Pragmatism is neither a revolt against +philosophy nor a revolution in philosophy, except in so far as it is an +important evolution of philosophy. It is a collective name for the most +modern solution of puzzles which have impeded philosophical progress +from time immemorial, and it has arisen naturally in the course of +philosophical reflection. It answers the big problems which are as +familiar to the scientist and the theologian as to the metaphysician and +epistemologist, and which are both intelligible and interesting to +common sense.</p> + +<p>The following questions stand out: (1) Can the possibility of knowledge +be maintained against Hume and other sceptics? Certainly, if it can be +shown that 'The New Psychology' has antiquated the analysis of mind +which Hume assumed and 'British Associationism' respectfully continued +to uphold. (2) Seeing that inclination and volition indisputably play a +part in the <i>acceptance</i> of all beliefs, scientific and religious, what +is the logical significance of this fact? This yields the problem 'The +Will to Believe,' and more generally of 'the place of Will in +cognition.' (3) Is there no criterion by which the divergent claims of +rival creeds and philosophies—to be possessed of unconditional +truth—can be scientifically tested? The sceptic's sneer, that the +shifting systems of philosophy illustrate only the changing fashions of +a great illusion about man's capacity for truth, plunges dogmatism into +a 'Dilemma,' from which it can emerge only by finding a way of +discriminating a 'truth' from an 'error,' and so solving the 'problem of +Truth and Error.' The weird verbalism of the traditional Logic suggests +a problem which strikes deeper even than the question, 'What <i>do</i> you +mean by truth?' viz.: 'Do you mean anything?' and so the 'problem of +Meaning' is propounded by the failure of Formal Logic. Is Logic not +concerned at all with <i>meaning</i>, is it only juggling with empty forms of +words? Lastly, if from all this there springs up a conviction of 'The +Bankruptcy of Intellectualism,' the question suggests itself whether the +relation between abstract thinking and concrete experience, between +'Thought' and 'Life,' has been rightly grasped. Is life worth living +only for the sake of philosophic contemplation, or is thinking only +worth doing to aid us in the struggle for life? Are 'theory' and +'practice' two separate kingdoms with rigid frontiers, strictly guarded, +or does it appear that theories which cannot be applied have, in the +end, neither worth, nor truth, nor even meaning?</p> + +<p>It is plain from this catalogue of inquiries that Pragmatism makes no +abrupt breach in tradition. It is not the <i>pétroleuse</i> of philosophy. It +does not wipe out the history of speculation in order to announce a +millennium of new ideas; it claims, on the contrary, to be the +culmination and <i>dénoûment</i> of that history. It cannot rightly be +represented as trying either to sell new lamps for old, or to +jerry-build a new metaphysical system on the ruins of all previous +achievements. Its real task is singularly modest. It aims merely at +instructing system-builders in the elementary laws which condition the +stability of such structures and conduce to their conservation.</p> + +<p>It is therefore a grave mistake to regard it as a parochial +eccentricity, as a specific Americanism. Nor is it the product of the +misplaced ingenuity of individual paradox-mongers. It has come into +being by the <i>convergence</i> of distinct lines of thought pursued in +different countries by different thinkers.</p> + +<p>1. One of the most interesting of these has originated in the scientific +world. The immense growth of scientific knowledge during the last +century was bound to react on human conceptions of scientific procedure. +The enormous number of new facts brought to light by manipulating +hypotheses could not but modify our view of scientific law. Laws no +longer seem to scientists the immutable foundations of an eternal order, +but are inevitably treated as man-made formulae for grouping and +predicting the events which verify them. The labours of physicists like +Mach, Duhem, and Ostwald, point to alternative formulations of new +hypotheses for the best established laws. The physics of Newton are no +longer final, and the notion of 'energy' is a dangerous rival to the +older conception of 'matter.' It is, of course, indifferent to the +philosopher whether the new physics are successful in superseding the +old or not. What it concerns him to note is that dogmatic confidence in +the finality of scientific laws has given place to a belief that our +"laws" are only working formulae for scientific purposes, and that no +science can truly boast of having read off the mind of the Deity. As Sir +J.J. Thomson neatly puts it, a scientific theory, for the enlightened +modern scientist, is a 'policy and not a creed.' Science has become +content to be only 'a conceptual shorthand,' provided that its message +be humanly intelligible. It no longer claims truth because abstractly +and absolutely it 'corresponds with Nature,' but because it yields a +convenient means of mastering the flux of events.</p> + +<p>Even mathematics, long the pattern of absolute knowledge, has not +escaped the stigma of relativity. 'Metageometries' have been invented by +Riemann and Lobatschewski as rivals to the assumptions of Euclid, and +the brilliant writings of Poincaré have explained the human devices on +which mathematical concepts rest. Euclidean geometry is reduced to a +useful interpretation of the data of experience; it is not theoretically +the only one. Its superior validity is dependent upon its use when +applied to the physical world. Even mathematics, therefore, lend +themselves to the philosophic inference drawn by Henri Bergson and +others, that all conceptual systems of the human mind have a merely +conditional truth, depending on the circumstances of their application.</p> + +<p>2. Another fountain-head of Pragmatic philosophy has been Darwinism. +Indeed, the Pragmatic is the only philosophizing which has completely +assimilated Evolution. The insight into the real fluidity of natural +species ought long ago to have toned down the artificial rigidity of +logical classifications. To know reality man can no longer rest in a +'timeless' contemplation of a static system; he must expand his thoughts +so as to cope with a perpetually changing process. Since the world +changes, his 'truths' must change to fit it. He is faced with the +necessity of a continuous reconstruction of beliefs. This influence of +Darwin has inspired the logical theories of Professor Dewey and the +'Chicago School' of Pragmatists. Thought in their writings is +essentially the instrument of this readjustment. Its function is to +effect the necessary changes in beliefs as economically and usefully as +possible. It is an evolving process which keeps pace with the evolution +of reality and the changing situations of mortal life.</p> + +<p>3. It is not, however, entirely the reaction of science upon philosophy +which has given birth to Pragmatism. Philosophy itself has been rent by +internal convulsions. These have been emphasized in the work of Dr. +F.C.S. Schiller, who has shown that already in the days of Plato the +distinction between 'truth' and 'error' was baffling philosophy, that +Plato's <i>Theaetetus</i> has failed to establish it, and that the famous +dictum of Protagoras, 'Man is the measure of all things,' distinctly +foreshadows the 'Pragmatic,' or, as he calls it, the 'Humanist,' +solution of the difficulty.</p> + +<p>Elsewhere Dr. Schiller has commented on the controversies raised by +Hume's criticism of dogmatism. He has shown that Kant failed to answer +Hume because he accepted Hume's psychology, and that no <i>a priori</i> +philosophers have since been able to devise any consistent and tenable +doctrine. The idealistic theories of the 'Absolute' reveal their +futility by their want of application to the genuine problems of life, +and by the theoretic agnosticism from which they cannot escape. Hence +the need for a new Theory of Knowledge and a thorough reform of Logic.</p> + +<p>4. At this point he joins forces with Mr. Alfred Sidgwick, who has long +been urging a radical criticism of the procedures of Formal Logic, and +shown the gulf between them and the processes of concrete thought. +Sidgwick has demonstrated that the belief in formal truth renders Logic +merely verbal, and that the actual <i>meaning</i> of assertions completely +escapes it.</p> + +<p>5. The most sensational approach to Pragmatism, however, is that from +the side of religion. The Pragmatic method of deciding religious +problems, which asserts the legitimacy of a 'Faith' that precedes +knowledge, has always been, more or less consciously, practised by the +religious. It is brilliantly advocated in the <i>Thoughts</i> of Pascal, and +clearly and forcibly defended in that most remarkable essay in +unprofessional philosophy, Cardinal Newman's <i>Grammar of Assent</i>. This +line of reasoning, however, is most familiarly associated with the name +of William James; he first illustrated the Pragmatic Method by a famous +paper (for a theological audience) on <i>The Will to Believe,</i> and founded +the psychological study of religious experience in his Gifford Lectures +on <i>The Varieties of Religious Experience</i>.</p> + +<p>6. This brings us to the last, and historically the most fertile, of the +sources of Pragmatism, Psychology. The publication in 1890 of James's +great <i>Principles of Psychology</i> opened a new era in the history of that +science. More than that, it was destined in the long run to work a +transformation in philosophy as a whole, by introducing into it those +biological and voluntaristic principles to which he afterwards applied +the generic name of Pragmatism, or philosophy of action. We must pass, +then, to consider the New Psychology of William James.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_II"></a><h2>CHAPTER II</h2> +<br> + +<center>THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY</center> + +<p>Until the year 1890, when James's <i>Principles</i> were published, the +psychology of Hume reigned absolutely in philosophy.<a name="FNanchorA"></a><a href="#Footnote_A"><sup>[A]</sup></a> All empiricists +accepted it enthusiastically, as the sum of philosophic wisdom; all +apriorists submitted to it, even in supplementing and modifying it by +'transcendental' and metaphysical additions; in either case it remained +uncontested <i>as psychology</i>, and, by propounding an utterly erroneous +analysis of the mind and its experience, entangled philosophy in +inextricable difficulties.</p> + +<br> + +<p>Hume had, as philosophers commonly do, set out from the practically +sufficient analysis of experience which all find ready-made in language. +He accepted, therefore, from common sense the belief that physical +reality is composed of a multitude of separate existences that act on +one another, and tried to conceive mental life strictly on the same +analogy. His theory of experience, therefore, closely parallels the +atomistic theory of matter. Just as the physicist explains bodies as +collections of discrete particles, so Hume reduced all the contents of +the mind to a number of elementary sensations. Whether the mind was +reflecting on its own internal ideas, or whether it was undergoing +impressions which it supposed to come from an external source, all that +was really happening was a succession of detached sensations. It seemed +to Hume indisputable that every distinct perception (or 'impression') +was a distinct existence, and that all 'ideas' were equally distinct, +though fainter, copies of impressions. Beyond impressions and ideas it +was unnecessary to look. Thus to look at a chessboard was to have a +number of sensations of black and white arranged in a certain order, to +listen to a piece of music was to experience a succession of loud and +soft auditory sensations, to handle a stone was to receive a group of +sensations of touch. To suppose that anything beyond these sensory units +was ever really experienced was futile fiction. Experience was a mosaic, +of which the stones were the detached sensations, and their washed-out +copies, the ideas.</p> + +<p>If this analysis of the mind were correct—and its correctness was not +disputed for more than a hundred years, for were not the sensations +admitted to be the ultimate analysis of all that was perceived?—the +common-sense belief that knowledge revealed a world outside the thinker +was, of course, erroneous. For common sense could hardly treat 'things' +as merely 'sensations' artificially grouped together in space, each +'thing' being a complex of a number of sensations having relation to +similar complexes. It held rather that the successive appearances of +things were related in time, in such a way that they could be supposed +to reveal a single object able to endure in spite of surface changes, +and to manifest the identity of its sensory 'qualities.' Similarly, the +succession of ideas within the mind was for it supported by the inward +unity of the soul within which they arose. Moreover, Hume's analysis +made havoc of all idea, of 'causation.' If every sensation was a +separate being, how was it to be connected with any other in any regular +or necessary connection? Two events related as 'cause' and 'effect' must +be a myth.</p> + +<p>These subversive consequences of his theory Hume did not conceal, though +he did not push his mental 'atomism' to its logical extreme. When he +defined material objects as 'coloured points disposed in a certain +order,' he was in fact admitting space as a relating factor; when he +spoke of the succession of impressions and ideas in experience, he was +tacitly assuming that what was apprehended was not a bare succession of +sensations, but <i>also</i> the fact that they were succeeding one another, +and so allowing a sense of temporal relation. But further than this he +refused to go. The idea of a continuous self was fantastic. There was +nothing beneath the ideas to connect them. The notion of causal +connection was equally chimerical. Each sensation was distinct and +existed in its own right. It could therefore occur alone. There was +nothing to link together the distinct impressions. Hence necessary +connection in events could not be more than a fiction of the mind based +on expectation of customary sequences; how the mind he had described as +non-existent could form an expectation or observe a sequence was calmly +left a mystery.</p> + +<p>Hume, then, seemed to leave to his successors in philosophy a task of +synthesis. He had tumbled the soul off her high watch-tower, but how to +combine her shattered fragments again into a working unity he declined +to say. He saw the sceptical implications of his analysis, but professed +himself unable to suggest a remedy.</p> + +<p>He had, however, made the embarrassments of the theory of knowledge +sufficiently clear for Kant, his most important successor, to hit upon +the most obvious palliative, and in the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> Kant +set himself to patch up Hume's analysis. Experience as it came through +the channels of sense, he admitted Hume had analysed correctly; it was +'a manifold,' a whirl of separate sensations. But these <i>per se</i> could +not yield knowledge. They must be made to cohere, and the way to do this +he had found. The mind on to which they fell was equipped with a +complicated apparatus of faculties which could organize the chaotic +manifold of sense and turn it into the connected world which common +sense and science recognize. First it views the data of sense in the +light of its own 'pure intuitions,' and, lo! they are seen to be in +Space and Time; then it solidifies them with its own 'categories,' which +turn them into 'substances' and 'causes' and endow them with all the +attributes required to sustain that status; finally it refers them all +to a Transcendental Ego, which is not, indeed, a soul, but sufficiently +like one to provide something that can admire the creative synthesis of +'mind as such.'</p> + +<p>Had Hume lived to read Kant's <i>Critique</i>, he would probably have jeered +at the vain complications of Kant's transcendental machinery, and made +it clear that between the primary manifold of sensation and the first +constructions of the intellect there still yawns a gulf which Kant's +laboured explanations nowhere bridge.</p> + +<p>Why does the chaotic 'matter' of sensations submit itself so tamely to +the forming of the mind? How can the <i>a priori</i> necessities of thought, +which are the 'presuppositions' of the complexities Kant loved, operate +upon so alien a stuff as the sensations are assumed to be? And, after +all, was not Kant a bit premature in proclaiming the <i>finality</i> of his +analysis and of his refutation of empiricism for all time? The searching +question, Why should the future resemble the past? had received no +answer, and so might not the mind itself, with all its categories, be +susceptible to change? Was it certain that the miracle whereby the data +presented to our faculties conformed to them would be a standing one? +Had not Kant himself as good as admitted that our faculties might +distort reality instead of making it intelligible?</p> + +<p>The truth is that at this point Kant is open to a charge against which +the assumptions he shared with Hume admit of no defence. Hume had been +the first to discover that we are in the habit of trying to rationalize +our sense-data by putting ideal constructions upon them, though he had +abstained from sanctifying the practice by a hideous jargon of technical +terminology. But this way of eking out the facts only seemed to him to +<i>falsify</i> them. Truth in his view was to be reached by accepting with +docility the sensations given from without. To set to work to 'imagine' +connections between them, and to claim for them a higher truth, had +seemed to him an outrage. What right, then, had Kant to legitimate the +mind's impudence in tampering with sensations? Was not every <i>a priori</i> +form an 'imagination,' and a vain one at that?</p> + +<p>To these objections the Kantian school have never found an answer. They +have simply repeated Kant's phrases about the necessary +'presuppositions' which were to be added to Hume's data. The English +psychologists (the Mills, Bain, etc.) exhibited a similar fidelity. They +never accepted the <i>a priori</i>, but relied on 'the association of ideas' +to build up a mind out of isolated sensations. But was this expedient +really thinkable? For if all 'sensations' or qualities are separate +entities, how can the addition of more 'distinct existences' of the same +sort really bind them together? If in 'the cat is upon the wall,' 'upon' +is a distinct entity which has to relate 'cat' and 'wall,' what is to +connect 'cat' with 'upon' and 'upon' with 'wall'? The atomizing method +carried to its logical extreme demands that not only 'sensations' but +also 'thoughts' should be essentially disconnected, and then, of course, +<i>no</i> thinking can cohere.</p> + +<p>Psychology, then, had worked itself to a breakdown by accepting the +'sensationalistic' analysis offered by Hume, and dragged philosophy with +it. Yet the escape was as easy as the egg of Columbus to the insight of +genius. William James had merely to invert the problem. Instead of +assuming with Hume that because some experiences seemed to attest the +presence of distinct objects, all connections were illusory and all +experience must ultimately consist of psychical atoms, James had merely +to maintain that this separation was secondary and artificial, and that +experience was initially a continuum. Once this is pointed out, the fact +is obvious. The stream of experience no doubt contains what it is +afterwards possible to single out as 'sensations,' but it presents them +also as connected by 'relations.' Moreover, the 'sensations' or +'qualities' and their 'relations' exhibit the immediate indiscerptible +unity of a fluid rather than a succession of flashes. Temporal and +spatial relations with all the connections they sustain are perceived +just as directly as what we come to distinguish as the 'things' in them. +'Consciousness,' James insists, 'does not appear to itself chopped up in +bits,' and 'we ought to say a feeling of <i>and</i>, a feeling of <i>if</i>, a +feeling of <i>but</i>, and a feeling of <i>by</i>, quite as readily as we say a +feeling of <i>blue</i> or a feeling of <i>cold</i>. All things in experience +naturally 'compenetrate,' to use a phrase of Bergson's; they are +distinct and they are united at the same time.</p> + +<p>The great crux in Hume is thus seen to be illusory. Immediate experience +does not require 'synthesis': it calls for 'analysis.' It is not a +jigsaw puzzle, to be pieced together without glue: it is a confused +whole which has to be divided and set in order for clear thinking. +Hume's mistake was to have started from experience <i>as partly analysed</i> +by common sense, and not from the flux <i>as given</i>. His 'sensations' were +the qualities already analysed out of the flux; he took these selections +for the whole and neglected the other less obvious features in it—viz., +the relations which floated them.</p> + +<p>Thus the puzzle 'How do "relations" relate?' received its solution in +this new account of experience. Philosophers are puzzled by this +question because they confuse percepts with concepts. Percepts are +<i>given</i> in relation; but concepts, being ideal dissections of the +perceptual flux, are discontinuous terms which have to be related by an +act of thought, because they were made for this very purpose of +distinction. Thus the eye sees cats sitting upon walls, as parts of a +rural landscape, and without the sharp distinctions which exist between +the concepts 'cat,' 'upon,' 'wall.' These ideas were <i>meant</i> to +disconnect 'the cat' in thought from the site it sat upon. Thought, +then, has <i>made</i> the 'atomism' it professed to find. It has only to +unmake it, and to allow the distinctions it held apart to merge again +into the stream of change.</p> + +<p>All Hume's problems, therefore, are unreal, and those of his apriorist +critics are doubly removed from reality. The whole conception of +philosophy as aiming at uniting disjointed data in a higher synthesis +runs counter to the real movement, which aims at the analysis of a given +whole. The real question about causation is not how events can be +connected causally, but why are certain antecedents preferred and +dissected out and entitled 'causes.' So the 'self' is not one +(undiscoverable) item imagined to keep in order a host of other such +items. Any given moment of a consciousness is just the mass of its +'sensations,' but these are consciously the heirs of its history and +connected with a past which is remembered. No Transcendental Ego could +do more to support the process of experience than is achieved by 'a +stream of consciousness which carries its own past along.' Here, then, +is the straight way James desiderated, a critical philosophy which goes, +not 'through' the complexities of Kantism, but leaves them on one side +as superfluous 'curios.'</p> + +<p>But there remains an even more important deduction from the new +psychology. Hume had been convicted of error in selecting those elements +of the flux which served his purpose and neglecting the rest. But this +mistake might reveal the important fact that all analysis was a choice, +and inspired by volitions. A mind that analyses cannot but be <i>active</i> +in handling its experience. It manipulates it to serve its ends. It +emphasizes only those portions of the flux which seem to it important. +In a better and fairer analysis than Hume's these features will persist. +It, too, would be a product of selection, of a selection depending on +its maker's preferences. As James showed, the distinction between +'dreams' and 'realities,' between 'things' and 'illusions,' results only +from the differential values we attach to the parts of the flux +according as they seem important or interesting to us or not. The +volitional contribution is all-pervasive in our thinking. And once this +volitional interference with 'pure perception' is shown to be +indispensable, it must be allowed to be legitimate. Nor can this +approval of our interference be restricted to selections. It must be +extended to <i>additions</i>. Just as we can select factors from 'the given' +to construct 'reality,' we can add hypotheses to it to make it +'intelligible.' We can claim the right of causal analysis, and assume +that our dissections have laid bare the inner springs of the connection +of events. Moreover, to the 'real world which our choice has built out +of the chaos of 'appearances' we may hypothetically add 'infernal' and +'heavenly' regions.<a name="FNanchorB"></a><a href="#Footnote_B"><sup>[B]</sup></a> Both are transformations of 'the given' by the +will, but, like the postulate of causal series, experience <i>may</i> confirm +them. Kant's <i>a priori</i> activity of the mind may thus in a sense supply +an answer to Hume—but only in a voluntaristic philosophy which would +probably have seemed too bold both to him and to Hume.</p> + +<br> + +<p>There can be no doubt that we do not approach the data of perception in +an attitude of quiescent resignation. Our desires and needs equip us +with assumptions and 'first principles,' which originate from within, +not from without. But how precisely should this mental contribution to +knowledge be conceived? In the last chapter of his <i>Psychology</i> James +suggested that the mind's organization is essentially biological. It has +evolved according to sound Darwinian principles, and in so doing the +fittest of its 'variations' have survived. But were these variations +quite fortuitous? May they not have been purposive responses to the +stimulation of environment? Can logic have been invented like saws and +ships for purposes of human service? These are some of the stimulating +questions which James's work in <i>Psychology</i> has suggested.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><p><a name="Footnote_A"></a><a href="#FNanchorA">[A]</a> Not in Bradley's "Logic."</p></div> + +<div class="note"><p><a name="Footnote_B"></a><a href="#FNanchorB">[B]</a> This is the substance of the doctrine of 'The Will to +Believe.'</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_III"></a><h2>CHAPTER III</h2> +<br> + +<center>WILL IN COGNITION</center> + +<p>The new psychology of James was bound to produce a new theory of +knowledge, and though it did not actually explore this problem, it +contained several valuable suggestions upon the subject. For instance, +in a brief passage discussing 'The Relations of Belief and Will,' James +pointed out that belief is essentially an attitude of the will towards +an idea, adding that in order to acquire a belief 'we need only in cold +blood act as if the thing in question were real, and keep acting as if +it were real, and it will infallibly end by growing into such a +connection with our life that it will become real' (ii., p. 321). This +passage is an outline of the doctrine of 'The Will to Believe,' which he +was afterwards to develop so forcibly.</p> + +<p>Again, in his last chapter, James criticized the doctrine of Spencer +that all the principles of thought, all its general truths and axioms, +were derived from impressions of the external world. He argued, on the +other hand, that such ways of looking at phenomena must originate in the +mind, and be prior to the experience which confirms them. Without +digging further into the character of this mental contribution to +knowledge, James contented himself with the suggestion that the use of +these axiomatic principles might be construed in Darwinian style as a +'variation' surviving by its fitness, thus introducing into his account +of mental process the important idea that thinking might be tested by +its vital value.</p> + +<p>What if knowledge be neither a dull submission to dictation from without +nor an unexplained necessity of thought? What if it be a bold adventure, +an experimental sally of a Will to live, to know and to control reality? +What if its principles were frankly <i>risky</i>, and their truth had to be +<i>desired</i> before it was tested and assured? In a word, what if first +principles were to begin with <i>postulates?</i> Thus the way is paved from +the new psychology to a new theory of knowledge. A third alternative to +the banal dilemma of 'empiricism' or 'apriorism' suggests itself.</p> + +<p>The old <i>empiricist</i> view, as typified by Mill, was that the mind had +been impressed with all its principles, such as the truths of +arithmetic, the axioms of geometry, and the law of causation, by an +uncontradicted course of experience, until it generalized facts into +'laws,' and was enabled to predict a similar future with certainty. But +this theory had really been exploded in advance by Hume. Facts do not +<i>appear</i> as causally connected, nor, if they did, would this guarantee +that they will continue to do so in the future. The continuum of +experience, we may add, is not <i>given</i> as a series of arithmetical units +or geometrical equalities, unless we deliberately measure it out in +accordance with mathematical principles. Empiricism thus gives no real +account of the scientific rational order of the world.</p> + +<p>But does it follow from the failure of empiricism that apriorism is +true? This has always been assumed, and held to dispense rationalist +philosophers from giving any direct and positive proof that these +principles are <i>a priori</i> truths. But manifestly their procedure is +logically far from cogent. If a third explanation can be thought of, it +will <i>not</i> follow that apriorism is true. All that follows is that +<i>something</i> has to be assumed before experience proves it. What that +something is, and whence it comes, remains an open question. Moreover, +apriorism has <i>not</i> escaped from the empirical doubt about the future. +Even granted that facts now conform to the necessities of our thoughts, +why should they so comport themselves for ever?</p> + +<p>Let us, therefore, try a compromise, which ignores neither that which we +bring to experience (like empiricism), nor that which we gain from +experience (like apriorism). This compromise is effected by the doctrine +of postulation. For though a postulate proceeds from us, and is meant to +guide thought in anticipating facts, it yet allows the facts to test and +mould it; so that its working modifies, expands, or restricts its +demands, and fits it to meet the exigencies of experience, and permits, +also, a certain reinterpretation of the previous 'facts' in order to +conform them to the postulate.</p> + +<p>A postulate thus fully meets the demands of apriorism. It is 'universal' +in claim, because it is convenient and economical to make a rule carry +as far as it will go; and it is 'necessary,' because all fresh facts are +on principle subjected to it, in the hope that they will support and +illustrate it. Yet a postulate can never be accused of being a mere +sophistication, or a bar to the progress of knowledge, because it is +always willing to submit to verification in the course of fresh +experience, and can always be reconstructed or abandoned, should it +cease to edify. A long and successful course of service raises a +postulate to the dignity of an 'axiom'—<i>i.e.</i>, a principle which it is +incredible anyone should think worth disputing—whereas repeated failure +in application degrades it to the position of a prejudice—<i>i.e.</i>, an <i>a +priori</i> opinion which is always belied by its consequences.</p> + +<p>A 'postulate' thus differs essentially from the '<i>a priori</i> truth' by +its dependence upon the will, by its being the product of a free choice. +We have always to select the assumptions upon which we mean to act in +our commerce with reality. We select the rules upon which we go, and we +select the 'facts' by which we claim to support our rules, stripping +them of all the 'irrelevant' details involved by their position in the +flux of happenings. Thus we emphasize that side of things which fits in +with our expectations, until the facts are 'faked' sufficiently to +figure as 'cases' of our 'law.' Postulation and the verifying of +postulates is thus a process of reciprocal discrimination and selection. +The postulate once formulated, we seek in the flux for confirmations of +it, and thus construct a system of 'facts' which are relative to it; +that is how the postulate reacts upon experience. If, on the other hand, +this process of selection is unfruitful, and the confirmations of our +rule turn out infinitesimal, we alter the rule; and thus the 'facts' in +the case reject the postulate.</p> + +<p>This continuous process of selection and rejection of 'principles' and +'facts' has, as we have said, a thoroughly <i>biological</i> tinge. The +fitness of a postulate to survive is being continually tested. It +springs in the first place from a human hope that events may be +systematized in a certain way, and it endures so long as it enables men +to deal with them in that way. If it fails, the formation of fresh +ideals and fresh hypotheses is demanded; but that which causes one +postulate to prevail over another is always the satisfaction which, if +successful, it promises to some need or desire. Thus 'thought' is +everywhere inspired by 'will.' It is an <i>instrument</i>, the most potent +man has found, whereby he brings about a harmony with his environment. +This harmony is always something of a compromise. We postulate +conformity between Nature and one of our ideals. We usually desire more +than we can get, but insist on all that Nature can concede.</p> + +<p>Causation serves as a good example. Experience as it first comes to us +is a mere flood of happenings, with no distinction between causal and +casual sequences. Clearly our whole ability to control our life, or even +to continue it, demands that we should <i>predict</i> what happens, and guide +our actions accordingly. We therefore postulate a right to <i>dissect</i> +the flux, to fit together selected series without reference to the +rest. Thus, a systematic network of natural 'laws' is slowly knit +together, and chaos visibly transforms itself into scientific order. The +postulation of 'causes' is verified by its success. Moreover, it is to +be noted that to this postulate there is no alternative. A belief that +all events are casual would be scientifically worthless. So is a +doctrine (still popular among philosophers) that the only true 'cause' +is the total universe at one moment, the only true 'effect,' the whole +of reality at the next. For that is merely to reinstate the given chaos +science tried to analyse, and to forbid us to make selections from it. +It would make prediction wholly vain, and entangle truth in a totality +of things which is unique at every instant, and never can recur.</p> + +<p>The principles of mathematics are as clearly postulates. In Euclidean +geometry we assume definitions of 'points,' 'lines,' 'surfaces,' etc., +which are never found in nature, but form the most convenient +abstractions for measuring things. Both 'space' and 'time,' as defined +for mathematical purposes, are ideal constructions drawn from empirical +'space' (extension) and 'time' (succession) feelings, and purged of the +subjective variations of these experiences. Nevertheless, geometry +forms the handiest system for applying to experience and calculating +shapes and motions. But, ideally, other systems might be used. The +'metageometries' have constructed other ideal 'spaces' out of postulates +differing from Euclid's, though when applied to real space their greater +complexity destroys their value. The postulatory character of the +arithmetical unit is quite as clear; for, in application, we always have +to <i>agree</i> as to what is to count as 'one'; if we agree to count apples, +and count the two halves of an apple as each equalling one, we are said +to be 'wrong,' though, if we were dividing the apple among two +applicants, it would be quite right to treat each half as 'one' share. +Again, though one penny added to another makes two, one drop of water +added to another makes one, or a dozen, according as it is dropped. +Common sense, therefore, admits that we may reckon variously, and that +arithmetic does not <i>apply</i> to <i>all</i> things.</p> + +<p>Again, it is impossible to concede any meaning even to the central 'law +of thought' itself—the Law of Identity ('A is A')—except as a +postulate. Outside of Formal Logic and lunatic asylums no one wishes to +assert that 'A is A.' All significant assertion takes the form 'A is B.' +But A and B are <i>different</i>, and, indeed, no two 'A's' are ever <i>quite</i> +the same. Hence, when we assert either the 'identity' of 'A' in two +contexts, or that of 'A' and 'B,' in 'A is B,' we are clearly <i>ignoring +differences which really exist—i.e.</i>, we postulate that in spite of +these differences A and B will for our purposes behave as if they were +one ('identical'). And we should realize that this postulate is of our +making, and involves a risk. It may be that experience refuses to +confirm it, and convicts us instead of a 'mistaken identity.' In short, +<i>every identity we reason from is made by our postulating an irrelevance +of differences</i>.</p> + +<p>There is thus, perhaps, no fundamental procedure of thought in which we +cannot trace some deliberately adopted attitude. We distinguish between +'ourselves' and the 'external' world, perhaps because we have more +control over our thoughts and limbs, and less, or none, over sticks and +stones and mountains; fundamental as it is, it is a distinction <i>within</i> +experience, and is not given ready-made, but elaborated in the course of +our dealings with it. Similarly, in accordance with its varying degrees +of vividness, continuity, and value, experience itself gets sorted into +'realities,' 'dreams,' and 'hallucinations.' In short, when the +processes of discriminating between 'dreams' and 'reality' are +considered, all these distinctions will ultimately be found to be +judgments of value.</p> + +<p>Nor is it only in the realm of scientific knowing that postulation +reveals itself as a practicable and successful method of anticipating +experience and consolidating fact. The same method has always been +employed by man in reaching out towards the final syntheses which (in +imagination) complete his vision of reality. The 'truths' of all +religions originate in postulates. 'Gods' and 'devils,' 'heavens' and +'hells,' are essentially demands for a moral order in experience which +transcend the given. The value of the actual world is supplemented and +enhanced by being conceived as projected and continued into a greater, +and our postulates are verified by the salutary influence they exercise +on our earthly life. Both postulation and verification, then, are +applicable to the problems of religion as of science. This is the +meaning of the Will to Believe. When James first defined and defended +it, it provoked abundant protest, on the ground that it allowed everyone +to believe whatever he pleased and to call it 'true.' The critics had +simply failed to see that verification by experience is just as integral +a part of voluntaristic procedure as experimental postulation, and that +James himself had from the first asserted this. Indeed, that he had +first given a theological illustration of the function of volition in +knowing was merely an accident. But that the will to believe was capable +of being generalized into a voluntarist theory of all knowledge was soon +shown in Dr. Schiller's <i>Axioms as Postulates</i>.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_IV"></a><h2>CHAPTER IV</h2> +<br> + +<center>THE DILEMMAS OF DOGMATISM</center> + +<p>Every man, probably, is by instinct a dogmatist. He feels perfectly sure +that he knows some things, and is right about them against the world. +Whatever he believes in he does not doubt, but holds to be +self-evidently or indisputably true. His naive dogmatism, moreover, +spontaneously assumes that his truth is universal and shared by all +others.</p> + +<p>If now he could live like a fakir, wholly wrapped in a cloud of his own +imaginings, and nothing ever happened to disappoint his expectations, to +jar upon his prejudices, and to convict him of error; if he never held +converse with anyone who took a different view and controverted him, his +dogmatism would be lifelong and incurable. But as he lives socially, he +has in practice to outgrow it, and this lands him in a serious +theoretical dilemma. He has to learn to live with others who differ from +him in their dogmatizing. Social life plainly would become impossible +if all rigidly insisted on the absolute rightness of their own beliefs +and the absolute wrongness of all others.</p> + +<p>So compromises have to be made to get at a common 'truth.' It must be +recognized that not everything which is believed to be 'knowledge' is +knowledge. In fact, it is safer to assume that none have knowledge, +though all think they have; to say fact, men only have 'opinions,' which +may be nearer to or farther from 'the truth,' but are not of necessity +as unquestionable as they seem to be. Out of this concession to the +social life arise three problems. How are 'opinions' to be compared with +each other, and how is the extent of their 'truth' or 'error' to be +determined? How is the belief in absolute truth to be interpreted and +discounted? How is the penitent dogmatist, once he has allowed doubt to +corrupt his self-confidence, to be stopped from doubting all things and +turning sceptic?</p> + +<p>As regards the first problem, the first question is whether we shall try +to <i>test</i> opinions and to arrive at a standard of value by which to +measure them by comparing the opinions themselves with one another, or +shall presume that there must be some absolute standard which alone is +truly true, whether we are aware of it or not. The former view is +<i>relativism</i>, the latter is <i>absolutism</i>, in the matter of truth.</p> + +<p>Now, there can be no doubt that absolutism is more congenial to our +natural prejudices. Accordingly it is the method tried first; but it +soon conducts dogmatism to an awkward series of dilemmas.</p> + +<p>1. If there is absolute truth, who has it? and who can use the absolute +criterion of opinions it is supposed to form? Not, surely, everyone who +<i>thinks</i> he has. It will never do to let every dogmatist vote for +himself and condemn all others. That way war and madness lie. Until +there is absolute agreement, there cannot be absolute truth.</p> + +<p>2. But absolute truth may still be reverenced as an ideal, to save us +from the scepticism to which a complete relativity of truth would lead. +But would it save us? If it is admitted that no one can arrogate to +himself its possession, what use is it to believe that it is an ideal? +For if no one can assume that he has it, all <i>human</i> truth is, in fact, +such as the relativist asserted, and scepticism is just as inevitable as +before. It makes no difference to the sceptical inference whether there +is no absolute truth, or whether it is unattained by man, and human +unattainable.</p> + +<p>3. It was a mistake, therefore, to admit that opinions cannot be +compared together. Some are much more certain than others, and, indeed, +'self-evident' and 'intuitive.' Let us therefore take these to be +'truer.' If so, the thinker who feels most certain he is right is most +likely to be right.</p> + +<p>4. This suggestion will be welcomed by all dogmatists—until they +discover that it does not help them to agree together, because they are +all as certain as can be. But a critically-minded man will urge against +it that <i>'certainty' is a subjective and psychological criterion</i>, and +that no one has been able to devise a method for distinguishing the +alleged logical from the undeniable psychological certainty. He will +hesitate to say, therefore, that because a belief seems certain it is +true, and to trust the formal claim to infallibility which is made in +every judgment. And when 'intuitions' are appealed to, he will ask how +'true' intuitions are to be discriminated from 'false,' sound from +insane, and inquire to what he is committing himself in admitting the +truth of intuitions. He will demand, therefore, the publication of a +list of the intuitions which are absolutely true. But he will not get +it, and if he did, it may be predicted that he would not find a single +one which has not been disputed by some eminent philosopher.</p> + +<p>5. Intuitions, therefore, are an embarrassment, rather than a help to +Intellectualism. It has to maintain both that intuitions are the +foundations of all truth and certitude, and also that not all are true. +But our natural curiosity as to how these sorts are to be known apart is +left unsatisfied. We must not ask which are true, and which not. No one +can say in advance about what matters intuitive certainty is possible; +what is, or is not, an intuition is revealed only to reflection after +the event. Only if an intuition <i>has</i> played us false, we may be sure it +<i>was</i> not infallible; it must either have been one of the fallible sort, +or else no intuition at all</p> + +<p>6. At this point universal scepticism begins to raise its hydra head, +and to grin at the dogmatist's discomfiture. For in point of fact the +history of thought reveals, not a steady accumulation of indubitable +truth, but a continuous strife of opinions, in which the most widely +accepted beliefs daily succumb to fresh criticism and fall into +disrepute as the 'errors of the past.' Nothing, it seems, can guarantee +a 'truth,' however firmly it may be believed for a time, from the +corrosive force of new speculation and changed opinion; to survey the +field of philosophic dispute, strewn with the remains of 'infallible' +systems and 'absolute' certainties, is to be led irresistibly to a +sceptical doubt as to the competence of human thought. If 'absolute +truth' is our ideal and acquaintance with 'absolute reality' our aim, +then, in view of the persistent illusions on both these points to which +the human mind is liable, it seems necessary to recognize the +hopelessness of our search. Thus the last dilemma of dogmatism is +reached. In view of the diversity of human beliefs and the discredit +which has historically fallen on the most axiomatic articles of faith, +we must either admit scepticism to be the issue of the debate, or else, +condemning our absolute view of truth, find some means of utilizing the +relative truths which are all that humanity seems able to grasp. But to +come to terms with relativism is to renounce the dogmatic attitude +entirely, and to approach the problems of philosophy in a totally +different spirit.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_V"></a><h2>CHAPTER V</h2> +<br> + +<center>THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND ERROR</center> + +<p>It has been shown in the last chapter how urgent has become the problem +of discriminating between the true and false among relative 'truths.' +For absolute truth has become a chimera, self-evidence an illusion, and +intuition untrustworthy. All three are psychologically very real to +those who believe in them, but logically they succumb to the assaults of +a scepticism which infers from the fact that no 'truths' are absolute +that all may reasonably be overthrown.</p> + +<p>The only obstacle to its triumph lies in the existence of 'relative' +truths which are <i>not</i> absolute, and do not claim to be, and in the +unexamined possibility that in a relativist interpretation of all truth +a meaning may be found for the distinction between 'true' and 'false.' +Now, not even a sceptic could deny that the size of an object is better +measured by a yard-measure than by the eye, even though it may be +meaningless to ask what its size may be absolutely; or that it is +probable that bread will be found more nourishing than stone, even +though it may not be a perfect elixir of life. Even if he denied this, +the sceptic's <i>acts</i> would convict his <i>words</i> of insincerity, and +<i>practically</i>, at any rate, no one has been or can be a sceptic, +whatever the extent of his <i>theoretic</i> doubts.</p> + +<p>This fact is construed by the pragmatist as a significant indication of +the way out of the epistemological <i>impasse</i>. The 'relative' truths, +which Intellectualism passed by with contempt, may differ in <i>practical +value</i> and lead to the conceptions of <i>practical truth</i> and certainty +which may be better adapted to the requirements of human life than the +elusive and discredited ideals of absolute truth and certainty, and may +enable us to justify the distinctions we make between the 'true' and the +'false. At any rate, this suggestion seems worth following up.</p> + +<p>To begin with, we must radically disabuse our minds of the idea that +thinking <i>starts from certainty.</i> Even the self-evident and +self-confident 'intuitions' that impress the uncritical so much with +their claim to infallibility are really the results of antecedent doubts +and ponderings, and would never be enunciated unless there were thought +to be a dispute about them. In real life thought starts from +perplexities, from situations in which, as Professor Dewey says, beliefs +have to be 'reconstructed,' and it aims at setting doubts at rest. It is +psychologically impossible for a rational mind to assert what it knows +to be true, and supposes everyone else to admit the truth of. This is +why even a philosopher's conversation does not consist of a rehearsal of +all the unchallenged truisms that he can remember.</p> + +<p>Being thus conditioned by a doubt, every judgment is a challenge. It +claims truth, and backs its claims by the authority of its maker; but it +would be folly to imagine that it thereby becomes <i>ipso facto</i> true, or +is meant to be universally accepted without testing. Its maker must know +this as well as anyone, unless his dogmatism has quite blotted out his +common sense. Indeed, he may himself have given preference to the +judgment he made over the alternatives that occurred to him only after +much debate and hesitation, and may propound it only as a basis for +further discussion and testing.</p> + +<p>Initially, then, every judgment is a <i>truth-claim</i>, and this claim is +merely <i>formal</i>. It does not <i>mean</i> that the claim is absolutely true, +and that it is impious to question it. On the contrary, it has still to +be validated by others, and may work in such a way that its own maker +withdraws it, and corrects it by a better. The intellectualist accounts +of truth have all failed to make this vital distinction between +'truth-claim' and validated truth. They rest on a <i>confusion of formal +with absolute truth</i>, and it is on this account that they cannot +distinguish between 'truth' and error. For false judgments also formally +claim 'truth,' No judgment alleges that it is false.<a name="FNanchorC"></a><a href="#Footnote_C"><sup>[C]</sup></a></p> + +<br> + +<p>On the other hand, if the distinction between truth-claims and validated +truths is made, there ceases to be any <i>theoretic</i> difficulty about the +conception and correction of errors, however difficult it may be to +detect them in practice. 'Truths' will be 'claims' which have worked +well and maintained themselves; 'errors,' such as have been superseded +by better ones. All 'truths' must be <i>tested</i> by something more +objective than their own self-assertiveness, and this testing by their +working and the consequences to which they lead may go on indefinitely. +In other words, however much a 'truth' has been validated, it is always +possible to test it further. <i>I.e.,</i> it is never theoretically +'absolute,' however well it may practically be assured. For a +confirmation of this doctrine Pragmatism appeals to the history of +scientific truth, which has shown a continuous correction of 'truths,' +which were re-valued as 'errors,' as better statements for them became +available.</p> + +<p>It may also be confirmed negatively by the breakdown of the current +definitions of truth, which all seem in the end to mean nothing.</p> + +<p>The oldest and commonest definition of a 'truth' which is given is that +it is 'the correspondence of a thought to reality.' But Intellectualism +never perceived the difficulties lurking in it. At first sight this +seems a brave attempt to get outside the circle of thought in order to +test its value and to control its vagaries. Unluckily, this theory can +only assert, and neither explains nor proves, the connection between the +thought and the reality it desiderates. For, granting that it is the +intent of every thought to correspond with reality, we must yet inquire +how the alleged correspondence is to be made out. Made out it must be; +for as the criterion is quite formal and holds of all assertions, the +claim to 'correspond' may be false. To prove the correspondence, then, +the 'reality' would have somehow to be known apart from the truth-claim +of the thought, in order that the two might be compared and found to +agree. But if the reality were already known directly, what would be +the need of asserting an idea of it and claiming 'truth' for this? How, +moreover, could the claim be tested, if, as is admitted, the reality is +not directly known? To assert the 'correspondence' must become a +groundless postulate about something which is defined to transcend all +knowledge. The correspondence theory, then, does not <i>test</i> the +truth-claim of the assertion; it only gives a fresh definition of it. A +'true' thought, it says, is one which <i>claims to correspond</i> with a +'reality.' <i>But so does a false,</i> and hence the theory leaves us as we +were, puzzled to distinguish them.<a name="FNanchorD"></a><a href="#Footnote_D"><sup>[D]</sup></a></p> + +<br> + +<p>Yet the theory is not wholly wrong. Many of our thoughts do claim to +correspond with reality in ways that can be verified. If the judgment +'There is a green carpet in my hall' is taken to mean 'If I enter my +hall, I shall <i>see</i> a green carpet,' perception tests whether the +judgment 'corresponds' with the reality perceived, and so goes to +validate or disprove the claim. But the limits within which this +correspondence works are very strait. It applies only to such judgments +as are anticipations of perception,<a name="FNanchorE"></a><a href="#Footnote_E"><sup>[E]</sup></a> and will test a truth-claim only +where there is willingness to act on it. It implies an experiment, and +is not a wholly intellectual process.</p> + +<br> + +<p>The superiority of the 'correspondence' theory over the belief in +'intuitions' lies in its insistence that thought is not to audit its own +accounts. Its success or failure depends upon factors external to it, +which establish the truth or falsehood of its claims. No such guarantee +is offered by the next theory, which is known as the 'consistence' or +'coherence' theory. In order to avoid the difficulty which wrecked the +'correspondence' theory, that of making the truth of an assertion reside +in an inexperienceable relation to an unattainable reality, this view +maintains that an idea is true if it is consistent with the rest of our +thoughts, and so can be fitted with them into a coherent system. No +doubt a coherence among our ideas is a convenience and a part of their +'working,' but it is hardly a test of their objective truth. For a +harmonious system of thoughts is conceivable which would either not +apply to reality at all, or, if applied, would completely fail. On this +theory systematic delusions, fictions, and dreams, might properly lay +claim to truth. True, they might not be quite consistent: but neither +are the systems of our sciences. If, then, this <i>absolute</i> coherence be +insisted on, this test condemns our whole knowledge; if not, it remains +formal, and fails to recognize any distinctions of value in the claims +which can be systematized.</p> + +<p>To avoid this <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>, it has been suggested that it is +not the coherence of the idea in human, finite, minds which constitutes +'truth,' but the perfect consistency of the experience of an Absolute +Mind. The test, then, of our limited coherency will lie in its relation +to this Absolute System. But here we have the correspondence doctrine +once again in a fresh disguise; our human systems are now 'true' if they +correspond with the Absolute's, But as there is no way for us of sharing +the Absolute Experience, our test is again illusory, and productive of a +depressing scepticism; and, again, we have only asserted that truth is +what <i>claims</i> to be part of the Absolute System.</p> + +<p>A word may be devoted to the simple refusal of intuitionists to give an +account of Truth on the ground that it is 'indefinable.' Truth is taken +to be an ultimate unanalyzable quality of certain propositions, +intuitively felt, and incapable of description. Error, by the same +token, should be equally indefinable and as immediately apprehended. +How, then, can there be differences of opinion, and mistakes as to what +is true and what false? How is it that a proposition which is felt to be +'true' so often turns out to be erroneous? If all errors are felt to be +true by those they deceive, is it not clear that immediate feeling is +not a good enough test of a validated truth? Thus, once again, we find +that an account of truth-claim is being foisted on us in place of a +description of truth-testing.</p> + +<p>The intellectualist, then, being in every case unable to justify the +vital distinction commonly made between the true and the false, we +return to the pragmatist. He starts with no preconceptions as to what +truth must mean, whether it exists or not; he is content to watch how +<i>de facto</i> claims to truth get themselves validated in experience. He +observes that every question is intimately related to some scheme of +human purposes. For it has to be <i>put</i>, in order to come into being. +Hence every inquiry arises, and every question is asked, because of +obstacles and problems which arise in the carrying out of human +purposes. So soon as uncertainty arises in the course of fulfilling a +purpose, an idea or belief is formulated <i>and acted on</i>, to fill the gap +where immediate certitude has broken down. This engenders the +truth-claim, which is necessarily a 'good' in its maker's eyes, because +it has been selected by him and judged <i>preferable</i> to any alternative +that occurred to him.</p> + +<p>How, then, is it tested? Simply by the consequences which follow from +adopting it and using it as an assumption upon which to work. If these +consequences are satisfactory, if they promote the purpose in hand, +instead of thwarting it, and thus have a valuable effect upon life, then +the truth-claim maintains its 'truth,' and is so far validated. This is +the universal method of testing assertions alike in the formation of +mathematical laws, physical hypotheses, religious beliefs, and ethical +postulates. Hence such pragmatic aphorisms as 'truth is useful' or +'truth is a matter of practical consequences' mean essentially that all +assertions must be <i>tested by being applied to a real problem of +knowing.</i> What is signified by such statements is that no 'truth' must +be accepted merely on account of the insistence of its claim, but that +every idea must be tested by the consequences of its working. Its truth +will then depend upon those consequences being fruitful for life in +general, and in particular for the purpose behind the particular inquiry +in which it arose. Truth is a <i>value</i> and a satisfaction; but +'intellectual satisfaction' is not a morbid delight in dialectical and +verbal juggling: it is the satisfaction which rewards the hard labour of +rationalizing experience and rendering it more conformable with human +desires.</p> + +<p>It should be clear, though it is often misunderstood, that there is +nothing arbitrary or 'subjective' in this method of testing beliefs. It +does not mean that we are free to assert the truth of every idea which +seems to us pretty or pleasant. The very term 'useful' was chosen by +pragmatists as a protest against the common philosophic licence of +alleging 'truths' which could never be applied or tested, and were +supposed to be none the worse for being 'useless.' It is clear both that +such 'truths' must be a monopoly of Intellectualism, and also that they +do allow every man to believe whatever he wishes, provided only that he +boldly claims 'self-evidence' for his idiosyncrasy. In this purely +subjective sense, into which Intellectualism is driven, it is, however, +clear that there can be no useless ideas. For any idea anyone decided to +adopt, because it pleased or amused him, would be <i>ipso facto</i> true. +Pragmatism, therefore, by refuting 'useless' knowledge, shows that it +does <i>not</i> admit such merely subjective 'uses.' It insists that ideas +must be more objectively useful—viz., by showing ability to cope with +the situation they were devised to meet. If they fail to harmonize with +the situation they are untrue, however attractive they may be. For ideas +do not function in a void; they have to work in a world of fact, and to +adapt themselves to all facts, though they may succeed in transforming +them in the end.</p> + +<p>Nor has an idea to reckon only with facts: it has also to cohere with +other ideas. It must be congruous with the mass of other beliefs held +for good reasons by the thinker who accepts it. For no one can afford to +have a stock of beliefs which conflict too violently with those of his +fellows. If his 'intuitions' contrast too seriously with those of +others, and he acts on them, he will be shut up as a lunatic. If, then, +the 'useful' idea has to approve itself both to its maker and his +fellows without developing limitations in its use, it is clear that a +pragmatic truth is really far less arbitrary and subjective than the +'truths' accepted as absolute, on the bare ground that they seem +'self-evident' to a few intellectualists.</p> + +<p>If, however, it be urged that pragmatic truths never grow absolutely +true at all, and that the most prolonged pragmatic tests do not exclude +the possibility of an ultimate error in the idea, there is no difficulty +about admitting this. The pragmatic test yields <i>practical</i>, and not +'absolute,' certainty. The existence of absolute certainty is denied, +and the demand for it, in a world which contains only the practical +sort, merely plays into the hands of scepticism. The uncertainty of all +our verificatory processes, however, is not the creation of the +pragmatist, nor is he a god to abolish it. Abstractly, there is always a +doubt about what transcends our immediate experience, and this is why it +is so healthy to have to repudiate so many theoretic doubts in every act +we do. For beliefs have to be acted on, and the results of the action +rightly react on the beliefs. The pragmatic test is practically +adequate, and is the only one available. That it brings out the risk of +action only brings out its superiority to a theory which cannot get +started at all until it is supplied with absolute certainty, and +meantime can only idly rail at all existing human truths.</p> + +<p>We have in all this consistently referred the truth of ideas to +individual experiences for verification. This evidently makes all truths +in some sense dependent upon the personality of those who assert and +accept them. Intellectualist logic, on the other hand, has always +proclaimed that mental processes, if true, are 'independent' of the +idiosyncrasies of particular minds. Ideas have a <i>fixed</i> meaning, and +cohere in bodies of 'universal' truth, quite irrespective of whether any +particular mind harbours them or not. This is not only a contention +fatal to the pragmatic claims, but also bound up with other assumptions +of Formal Logic. So it becomes necessary to inquire whether this Logic +is a success, and so can coherently abstract from the personality of the +knower and the particular situations that incite him to know.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class="note"><p><a name="Footnote_C"></a><a href="#FNanchorC">[C]</a> Not even 'I lie,' which is meaningless as it stands, <i>Cf.</i> +Dr. Schiller's <i>Formal Logic</i>, p. 373.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><p><a name="Footnote_D"></a><a href="#FNanchorD">[D]</a> This same difficulty reappears in various forms, as <i>e.g.</i>, +in a recent theory which makes the truth of a judgment lie in its +asserting a relation between different objects, and not in the existence +of those objects themselves. This formula also applies as evidently to +false judgments as to true. It, too, brings no independent evidence of +the existence of the objects referred to, and might fall into error +through asserting a relation between objects which did not exist. It is, +moreover, incapable of showing that a relation corresponding to the idea +we have of it really exists when we judge that it does.</p></div> + +<div class="note"><p><a name="Footnote_E"></a><a href="#FNanchorE">[E]</a> Each perception, however, contains much that is supplied by +the mind, not 'given' to it.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_VI"></a><h2>CHAPTER VI</h2> +<br> + +<center>THE FAILURE OF FORMAL LOGIC</center> + +<p>In order to escape the necessity of concerning itself with personality +and particular circumstances in questions of truth and error, +Intellectualism appeals to Logic, which it conceives as a purely formal +science and its impregnable citadel. This appeal, however, rests on a +number of questionable assumptions, and most of these are not avowed.</p> + +<p>1. It assumes that forms of thought can be treated in abstraction from +their matter—in other words, that the general types of thinking are +never affected by the particular context in which they occur. Now, this +means that the question of real truth must not be raised; for, as we +have seen (Chapter V.), real truth is always an affair of particular +consequences. The result is, that as truth-claims are no longer tested, +they <i>all pass as true</i> for Logic, and are even raised to the rank of +'absolute truths,' or are mistaken for them. For the notion of a really +('materially') true judgment which someone has chosen, made, and tested, +there is substituted that of a formally valid proposition, and in the +end Logic gets so involved in the study of 'validity' that it puts aside +altogether all real tests of truth, and becomes a game with verbal +symbols which is entirely irrelevant to scientific thinking.</p> + +<p>2. Formal Logic assumes the right of abstracting from the whole process +of making an assertion. It presumes that the assertion has already been +made somehow. How, it does not inquire. Yet it is clear that in each +case there were concrete reasons why just <i>that</i> assertion was preferred +to any other. These concrete reasons it makes bold to dismiss as +'psychological,' and between 'logic' and 'psychology'<a name="FNanchorF"></a><a href="#Footnote_F"><sup>[F]</sup></a> it decrees an +absolute divorce. Where, when, why, by and to whom, an assertion was +made, is taken to be irrelevant, and put aside as 'extralogical.'</p> + +<br> + +<p>3. This convenient assumption, however, ultimately necessitates an +abstraction from meaning, though Formal Logic does not avow this openly. +Every assertion is meant to convey a certain meaning in a certain +context, and therefore its verbal 'form' has to take on its own +individual <i>nuance</i> of meaning. What any particular form of words does +in fact mean on any particular occasion always depends upon the use of +the words in a particular context. Meaning, therefore, cannot be +depersonalized; if meanings are depersonalized, they cease to be real, +and become verbal.</p> + +<p>Formal Logic has, in fact, mistaken <i>words</i>, which are (within the same +language) identical on all occasions, for the <i>thoughts</i> they are +intended to express, which are varied to suit each occasion. Words alone +are tolerant of the abstract treatment Formal Logic demands. This +'science,' therefore, finally reduces to mere verbalism, distracted by +inconsistent relapses into 'psychology.'</p> + +<p>But will this conception of Logic either work out consistently in itself +or lead to a tenable theory of scientific thinking? Emphatically not. +What is the use of a logic which (1) cannot effect the capital +distinction of all thought, that between the true and the false? (2) is +debarred by its own principles from considering the <i>meaning</i> of any +real assertion? and (3) is thus tossed helplessly from horn to horn of +the dilemma 'either verbalism or psychology'?</p> + +<p>We may select a few examples of this fatal dilemma.</p> + +<p>1. In dealing with what it calls 'the meaning' of terms, propositions, +etc., Formal Logic has always to choose between the meaning of the +<i>words</i> and the meaning of the <i>man</i>. For it is clear that words which +may be used ambiguously may on occasion leave no doubt as to their +meaning, while conversely all may become 'ambiguous' in a context. If, +therefore, the occasion is abstracted from, all forms must be treated +verbally as ambiguous formulae, which may be used in different senses. +If it is, nevertheless, attempted to deal with their actual meaning on +any given occasion, what its maker meant the words to convey must be +discovered, and the inquiry at once becomes 'psychological'—that is to +say, 'extralogical.'</p> + +<p>2. If judgments are not to be verbal ('propositions'), but real +assertions which are actually meant, they must proceed from personal +selections, and must have been chosen from among alternative +formulations because of their superior value for their maker's purpose. +But all this is plainly an affair of psychology. So inevitable is this +that a truly formal Ideal of 'Logic' would exclude ail judgment whatever +from the complete system of 'eternal' Truth. For from such a system no +part could be rightly extracted to stand alone. Such a selection could +be effected and justified only by the exigencies of a human thinker.</p> + +<p>The impotent verbalism of the formal treatment of judgment appears in +another way when the question is raised <i>how</i> a 'true' judgment is to be +distinguished from a 'false.' For the logician, if his public will not +accept either the relegation of this distinction to 'psychology' or the +proper formal answer that <i>all</i> judgments are (formally) 'true' and even +'infallible,' can think of nothing better to say than that if the +'judgment' is not true it was not a 'true judgment,' but a false +'opinion' which may be abandoned to 'psychology.'<a name="FNanchorG"></a><a href="#Footnote_G"><sup>[G]</sup></a> Apparently he is +not concerned to help men to discriminate between 'judgments' and +'opinions,' or even to show that true 'judgments' do in fact occur.</p> + +<br> + +<p>3. Inference involves Formal Logic in a host of difficulties.</p> + +<p><i>(a)</i> If it is not to be a verbal manipulation of phrases whose coming +together is not inquired into, it must be a connected train of thought. +But such a connection of thoughts cannot be conceived or understood +without reference to the purpose of a reasoner, who <i>selects</i> what he +requires from the totality of 'truths.' If, then, 'Logic' has merely to +contemplate this eternal and immutable system of truth in its integrity, +and forbids all selection from it for a merely human purpose, how can it +either justify, or even understand, the drawing of any inference +whatever?</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) Formal Logic clearly will not quail before the charge of +uselessness. But on its own principles it ought to be consistent. But by +this test also, when it is rigorously judged by it, it fails completely. +Its inconsistencies are many and incurable. It cannot even be consistent +in its theory of the simplest fundamentals. It is found upon some +occasions to define judgment as that which may be <i>either</i> true <i>or</i> +false; and upon others as that which is 'true' (formally)—<i>i.e.</i>, it +cannot decide whether or not to ignore the existence of error.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) The Formal view of inference regards it as a 'paradox.' An +inference is required on the one hand to supply fresh information, and +on the other to follow rigorously from its premisses; it must, in a +word, exhibit both <i>novelty</i> and <i>necessity</i>. It would seem, however, +that if our inference genuinely had imparted new knowledge, the event +must be merely psychological; for how can any process or event perturb, +or add to, the completed totality of truth in itself? On the other hand, +if the 'necessity' of the operation be taken seriously, the 'inference' +becomes illusory; for if the conclusion inferred is already contained +in the premisses, what sense is there in the purely verbal process of +drawing it out?</p> + +<p>(<i>d</i>) Most glaringly inadequate of all, however, is the Formal doctrine +of 'Proof' contained in its theory of the Syllogism. A Formal or verbal +syllogism depends essentially on the ability of its Middle Term to +connect the terms in its conclusion. If, however, the Middle Term has +not <i>the same</i> meaning in the two premisses, the syllogism breaks in +two, and no 'valid' conclusion can be reached. Now, whether in fact any +particular Middle Term bears the same meaning in any actual reasoning +Formal Logic has debarred itself from inquiring, by deciding that actual +meaning was 'psychological.' It has to be content, therefore, with an +identity <i>in the word</i> employed for its Middle, But this evidence may +always fail; for when two premisses which are (in general) 'true' are +brought together for the purpose of drawing a particular conclusion, a +glaring falsehood may result. <i>E.g.</i>, it would in general be granted +that 'iron sinks in water,' yet it does not follow that because 'this +ship is iron' it will 'sink in water,' Hence syllogistic 'proof' seems +quite devoid of the 'cogency' it claimed. After a conclusion has been +'demonstrated' <i>it has still to come true in fact</i>. This flaw in the +Syllogism was first pointed out by Mr. Alfred Sidgwick.</p> + +<p>(<i>e</i>) The formal Syllogism, moreover, conceals another formal flaw. An +infinite regress lurks in its bosom. For if its premisses are disputed, +they must in turn be 'proved.' Four fresh premisses are needed, and if +these again are challenged, the number of true premisses needed to prove +the first conclusion goes on doubling at every step <i>ad infinitum</i>. The +only way to stop the process that occurred to logicians was an appeal to +the 'self-evident' truth of 'intuitions'; but this has been shown to be +argumentatively worthless. From this difficulty the pragmatist alone +escapes, by assuming his premisses <i>provisionally</i> and arguing +<i>forwards</i>, in order to test them by their consequences. If the deduced +conclusion can be verified in fact, the premisses grow more assured. +Thus every real inference is an experiment, and 'proof' is an affair of +continuous trial and verification—not an infinite falling back upon an +elusive 'certainty,' but an infinite reaching forwards towards a fuller +consummation.</p> + +<p>(<i>f</i>) So long as the logician regards his premisses not as hypotheses to +be tested, but as established truths, he must condemn the Syllogism as a +formal fallacy. It is inevitably a <i>petitio principii</i>. If the argument +'All men are mortal; Smith is a man, therefore Smith is mortal,' means +that we know, before drawing our inference, that literally all men are +mortal, we must already have discovered that Smith is mortal; if we did +not know beforehand that Smith is mortal, we were not justified in +stating that <i>all</i> men are mortal. Nor is it an escape to interpret 'All +men are mortal' to mean that immortals are excluded from 'man' by +definition. For then the question is merely begged in the minor premiss. +That 'Smith is a man' cannot be asserted without assuming that he is +mortal. If, lastly, 'All men are mortal' be taken to state a law of +nature conjoining inseparably mortality and humanity, the logician +either already knows that Smith is rightly classed under the species +'man,' and so subject to its mortality, or else he <i>assumes</i> this. But +how does he know Smith is not like Elijah or Tithonus, a peculiar case, +to which for some reason the law does not apply? Will he declare it to +be 'intuitively certain' that whatever is called, or looks like, a case +of a 'law' <i>ipso facto</i> becomes one?</p> + +<p>The logician's analysis of reasoning, then, breaks down. In whichever +way he interprets the Syllogism it is revealed as either a superfluity +or a fallacy: it is never a 'formally valid inference' that can compel +assent. But common sense is undismayed by the pragmatist's discovery +that if the Syllogism is to have any sense its premisses <i>must</i> be taken +as disputable; for, unlike Formal Logic, it has perceived that men do +not reason about what they think they know for certain, but about +matters in dispute.</p> + +<p>4. It is not necessary to dwell at length on the futility of the formal +notion of Induction. Formal Induction presupposes that enough particular +instances have been collected to establish a general rule; but in actual +practice inductions always repose, not on indiscriminate observation, +but on a <i>selection of relevant instances</i>, and never claim to be based +upon an <i>exhaustive</i> knowledge of particulars. Hence <i>in form</i> the most +satisfactory induction is always incomplete, and differs in no wise from +a bad one. 'All bodies fall to the ground' is an induction which has +worked. 'All swans are white' broke down when black swans were +discovered in Australia. The validity of an induction, then, is not a +question of form.</p> + +<p>The necessity for such selection no intellectualist theory of Induction +has understood. All have aimed at exhaustiveness, and imagined that if +it could be attained, inductive reasoning would be rendered sound, and +not impossible. Their ideal 'cause' was the totality of reality, +identified with its 'effect,' in a meaningless tautology. Nothing but +voluntarism can enable logicians to see that our actual procedure in +knowing is the reverse of this, that causal explanation is the +<i>analysis</i> of a continuum, and that 'phenomena,' 'events,' 'effects,' +and 'causes' are all creations of our selective attention; that in +selecting them we run a risk of analyzing falsely, and that if we do, +our 'inductions' will be worthless. But whether they are right or wrong, +valuable or not, real reasoning from 'facts' can never be a 'formally +valid' process.</p> + +<p>We are thus brought to see the hollowness of the contention that 'Pure +Reason' can ignore its psychological context and dehumanize itself. A +thought, to be thought at all, must seem <i>worth</i> thinking to someone, it +must convey the meaning he intends, it must be true in his eyes and +relevant to his purposes in the situation in which it arises—<i>i.e.</i>, it +must have a motive, a value, a meaning, a purpose, a context, and be +selected from a greater whole for its relevance to these. None of these +features does intellectualist logic deign to recognize. For if truth is +absolute and not relative, it is all or nothing. Yet no actual thinking +has such transcendent aims. It is content with selections relative to a +concrete situation. If it were permissible to diversify a +debate—<i>e.g.</i>, about the authorship of the <i>Odyssey</i>—by an irruption +of undisputed truths—<i>e.g.</i>, a recitation of the multiplication +table—how would it be possible to distinguish a philosopher from a +lunatic?</p> + +<p>Formal Logic is either a perennial source of errors about real thinking, +or at best an aimless dissection of a <i>caput mortuum—i.e.</i>, of the +verbal husks of dead thoughts, whose value Formal Logic could neither +establish nor apprehend, A real Logic, therefore, would most anxiously +avoid all the initial abstractions which have reduced Formal Logic to +such impotence, and would abandon the insane attempt to eliminate the +thinker from the theory of thought.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<div class=note><p><a name="Footnote_F"></a><a href="#FNanchorF">[F]</a> The descriptive science of thought, in its concrete +actuality in different minds.</p></div> + +<div class=note><p><a name="Footnote_G"></a><a href="#FNanchorG">[G]</a> The most popular contribution which Oxford makes just now +to the theory of Error is, 'A judgment which is erroneous is not really +a judgment.' So when a professor 'judges' he is infallible—by +definition!</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_VII"></a><h2>CHAPTER VII</h2> +<br> + +<center>THE BANKRUPTCY OF INTELLECTUALISM</center> + +<p>We have now struggled through the quagmires of intellectualist +philosophy, and found that neither in its Psychology, which divided the +mind's integrity into a heap of faculties, and comminuted it into a +dust-cloud of sensations; nor in its Epistemology, which ignored the +will to know and the value of knowing; nor in its Logic, which +abstracted thought wholly from the thinking and the thinker, and so +finally from, all meaning, could man find a practicable route of +philosophic progress. But our struggles will not have been in vain if +they have left us with a willingness to try the pragmatist alternative, +and convinced us that it is not a wanton innovation, but the only path +of salvation for the scientific spirit.</p> + +<p>But before we venture on it, it will be well to restore confidence in +the solvency of human thought by analysing the causes of the bankruptcy +of Intellectualism and exposing the extravagance of the assumptions +which conducted to it.</p> + +<p>Was it not, after all, an unwarranted assumption that severed the +intellect from its natural connection with human activity? No doubt it +seemed to simplify the problem to suppose that the functioning of the +intellect could be studied as a thing apart, and unrelated to the +general context of the vital functions. Again, it was to simplify to +assume that thought could be considered apart from the personality of +the human thinker. But it should not have been forgotten that it is +possible to pay too dearly for simplifications and abstractions, and +that they all involve a risk, which the event may show should never have +been taken. So it is in this case. Its rash assumptions confront +Intellectualism with a host of problems it cannot attack. It can do +nothing to assuage the conflict of opinions which all claim truth with +equal confidence. It cannot understand the correction of error which is +continually proceeding. Nor can it understand, either the existence of +error or the meaning of truth, or the means of distinguishing between +them. It has no means of testing and confuting even the wildest and +maddest assertions. It cannot discriminate between the intuitions of the +sage and of the lunatic. It is forced to view energy of will in knowing +as a source merely of corruption, and when it finds that as a psychic +fact willing is ineradicable, it must conclude that we are +constitutionally incapable of that passive reflection of reality which +it regards as the <i>sine qua non</i> of truth. Hence, if disinterestedness +is the condition of knowing, knowledge is impossible. And it is so +entangled in its unintelligible theory of truth as a copying of reality +that, rather than renounce it, when it finds that human knowing is <i>not</i> +copying, it prefers a surrender to Scepticism.</p> + +<p>Yet is not its whole procedure a signal example of human arbitrariness +and perversity? We professed to be impelled by logical necessity at +every step, but were free to escape from all our perplexities by +adopting the pragmatic inferences from them. The Pragmatic Method of +observing the consequences readily suggests the means of discriminating +between truth and error, of sifting values and of testing claims. And, +though not infallible, it is adequate to all our needs. The pragmatic +notion that <i>Truth is practical</i> closes the artificial gulf between the +theoretic and the practical side of life, and assigns to truth a +biological function and vital value. The humanist contention that <i>Truth +is human</i> rescues man from the despondency in which his failure to grasp +absolute truth had left him. The Protagorean dictum that <i>Man is the +measure of all things</i> assures him that <i>his</i> knowledge may become +adequate to <i>his</i> reality, and that the value of truths and the +differences between truth and error also are susceptible of estimation.</p> + +<p>True, this policy averts the bankruptcy of the intellect by scaling down +the intolerable charges on it. True, practical knowledge is not +absolute; but if it is enough to live by, is it not better to live by it +than to be lured on to perish in the deserts of Scepticism by the +<i>mirage</i> of an absolute truth not humanly attainable? True, verification +is not 'proof,' but as its conclusions are not incorrigible, its defects +are not fatal, and its demands are not impracticable. True, no truth and +no reality are wholly 'objective,' in the sense of wholly indifferent to +our action; but to say that the human and 'subjective' factor in all +knowledge must be taken into account does not preclude our apprehending +and measuring an 'objective' world as real as, and more knowable than, +any other theory can offer.</p> + +<p>Thus the proposals of Pragmatism for reconstructing the business of the +intellect, and rescuing it from the bankruptcy of Intellectualism, are +not unreasonable. They open out to it a prospect of recovering its +credit and its usefulness by returning to the service of Life.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_VIII"></a><h2>CHAPTER VIII</h2> +<br> + +<center>THOUGHT AND LIFE</center> + +<p>The mission of Pragmatism is to bring Philosophy into relation to real +Life and Action. So far from regarding Thought as a self-centred, +self-enclosed activity, Pragmatism insists upon replacing it in its +context among the other functions of life, and in measuring its value by +its effect upon them. So far, again, from regarding the abstract +intellect as a vast Juggernaut machine which absorbs and crushes the +individual thinker, it treats him individually as having his own +constitution, <i>raison d'être,</i> and intrinsic interest, and credits him +with a power to make new truths and to enrich the resources of thought. +Each thinker has before him an individual situation, a system of aims +and values, a stock of knowledge and of means from which he must select +what is relevant to his ends, and so cannot escape in any judgment from +the responsibilities of a personal decision.</p> + +<p>Thus, for Pragmatism <i>every thought is an act</i> with a person behind it, +who is responsible for launching it into the world of fact. The result +of this change of attitude is immediate. In the first place, as has been +shown in Chapter V., by bringing thought face to face with the whole +experience upon which it claims to work, we are enabled to find a +tangible rule for evaluating its assertions and distinguishing truth +from error. And, secondly, by recognizing that the mind is not an +apparatus which functions in a vacuum, but is a constituent of an +individual organism, we see that thinking always depends upon a purpose; +for it is the purpose of an inquiry which gives reflection its cue, and +determines its scope and (most essential of all) its meaning.</p> + +<p>We are thus led from the narrower logical question, 'What constitutes +the "truth" of a statement?' to a wider outlook, from which we can +survey the place of knowing in human life at large. This may be called +the transition from Pragmatism to Humanism. This last word was +introduced into philosophic terminology by Dr. Schiller in order to +describe his general philosophical position as distinct from the +original question of the theory of knowledge, which had been treated by +James under the name of Pragmatism.</p> + +<p>To the Humanist the best definition of life is one which displays it as +throughout purposive, as a rational pursuit of ends. This raises the +question of the validity of valuations. Valuation is a widespread human +practice. In their most general aspect we classify all objects as 'good' +and 'bad,' according as they are ends to be pursued or avoided, or means +which further or frustrate the pursuit of ends. This general antithesis +between the 'good' and the 'bad' has numerous specific forms, applicable +to different departments of human activity. Thus, in conduct, actions +are judged 'good' or 'evil' and 'right' or 'wrong'; in thinking, ideas +are 'true' or 'false,' and 'relevant' or 'irrelevant'; for art, objects +are 'beautiful' or 'ugly,' and so forth, for the modes of valuation in +life are innumerable. Any one of these adjectives either denotes value +or censures lack of worth, and each gets its meaning by reference to the +specific purpose, moral, aesthetic, or intellectual, it appeals to. The +<i>summum bonum</i>, or supreme good, will then be the ideal of the +harmonious satisfaction of all purposes.</p> + +<p>What, then, from the standpoint of Humanism, is the function of +'truth-values' in our life? They indicate a relation to the cognitive +end. What is this end? Surely not self-sufficing? A truth that is merely +true in itself has no interest for human life, and no human mind has an +interest in discovering and affirming it. Truth, therefore, cannot +stand aloof from life. It must somehow subserve our vital purposes. But +how shall it do this? Only by becoming applicable to the reality we have +to live with, by becoming useful for the changes we desire to effect in +it. Whoever will not admit this, and renders truth inapplicable, does in +fact render it unmeaning.</p> + +<p>The fact that thought essentially refers to a 'reality' external to it +in no way diminishes its purposive character. Whether the mind is +idealizing an aspect of reality (as in mathematics) or abstracting, +classifying, and predicting (as in science), it is always the fact that +a particular kind of reality is needed for some serious or trivial +purpose which guides the operations of the thinker. A mind which craved +to embrace all or 'any' reality need not <i>think</i>; it would do better to +float without discrimination upon the flux of change. This procedure +would be so absolutely antithetical to human knowing that it seems a +wanton paradox on that account to treat it as the final goal of +knowledge.</p> + +<p>Actually, of course, the philosophers who claim to be devoted to pure +theory follow no such course. They deliberately choose their ideal of +what is worth knowing—<i>e.g.</i>, 'God,' or 'the unity of all things,' or +'the laws of the universe'—and, disregarding all other existences, +they pursue the kind of reality they desire because of its religious or +moral or aesthetic value. For there could be no greater mistake than to +suppose that the common antithesis between 'reality' and the 'un-real' +usually means the same thing as the distinction between what 'exists' +and what is absolutely non-existent. On the contrary, it is usually a +judgment of value. We may say that the 'haunted' house is real and the +'ghost' is not; but as an hallucination the ghost is real enough. Utopia +is unreal for the politician, but exists as an ideal for the theorist. +The Platonist treats our physical world of sight and touch, which we +think the most real of all, as a mere illusion compared to the 'Ideas' +of his metaphysical world. The thinker who declares he wants to know all +about 'reality' does not mean that he wishes to investigate <i>everything</i> +which in any sense exists, but that he wishes to know what <i>he</i> +considers <i>best worth knowing</i>—and this, of course, implies a personal +valuation, a purged and expurgated extract, which will not offend his +taste. So all philosophies are, in fact, selective. Even the more +conscientious rationalists show very little anxiety to include in their +intellectual scheme a knowledge of their opponents' opinions—indeed, +they seem to think that the existence of such facts may be made +dependent wholly on their will to recognize them. An exposition of +Pragmatism is for them a 'reality' which does not count: it is not worth +knowing about. And this is only natural, after all. For 'reality,' the +object of the mind's search, is always a selection, conceived after the +likeness of the heart's desire, the product of a human purpose.</p> + +<p>To recognize this is to appreciate the wisdom of Humanism's refusal to +treat the world, for good or bad, as a given and completed whole. For +not only is what we call the real world always a selection from a larger +whole from which we have ventured to exclude great masses of +irrelevance, but every day brings fresh experience, and may bring fresh +enlightenment. And since man has always an interest in improving his +condition, is it not futile to forbid him to re-make his world as beat +he can? Why prematurely claim to have reached finality, when unexpected +novelties may shatter any system before it is even completed? Our world +is plastic, it is most 'really' what we can make of it, and the process +of our making is not ended. Whether a decree of Fate has fixed any +ultimate limits to our efforts we have no means of knowing, and no +occasion to assume. Is not our wisest course, then, to persist in +trying? It is bad method ever to despair of knowing what we need.</p> + +<p>For good or ill, the world with which the Humanist contends is always a +world that reveals itself to him. Reality, as it is assumed, presumed, +or guessed to be 'in itself,' apart from our experience of it, is +cancelled from his reckonings. For he cannot discover how he (or anyone) +can get any 'knowledge' or 'intuition' which transcends all human +faculties. The theories of metaphysicians on these lofty themes he +regards as personal postulates which, in so far as they cannot be +subjected to the pragmatic method, must remain open questions. Human +experience does not warrant such gratuitous demands. It confirms neither +the rigid system of unchanging fact which realism postulates (seeing +that the only facts that science speaks of are ever changing in its +progress), nor finds its problems, conflicts, and errors credible as a +reflexion of any Universal Mind, unless Idealism ultimately repudiates +the sanity of its Absolute.</p> + +<p>The superiority of Humanism, then, lies in this, that it does not +discourage human enterprise by assuming that the real is completely +rigid and eternally achieved without regard to human effort. In the +drama that unrolls reality, every man, it teaches, has a duty and a +power to play his humble but essential part. Humanism is neither an +Optimism nor a Pessimism—both of which must consistently, in their +extreme form, deny that reality can be improved—but concedes to man the +right and duty to improve the world. It impresses us with the necessity +of acting, it vindicates the procedure of acting on our hopes, it shows +us how we may correct our errors, and so gives reasons for our faith in +the possibility of Progress.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="BIBLIOGRAPHY"></a><h2>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h2> + + +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">WILLIAM JAMES:</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>The Principles of Psychology</i>, 1890.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy,</i> 1897.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>The Varieties of Religious Experience</i>, 1902.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking,</i> 1907.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>A Pluralistic Universe</i>, 1909.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>The Meaning of Truth</i>, 1909.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Some Problems of Philosophy</i>, 1911.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Radical Empiricism</i>, 1912.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">F.C.S. SCHILLER:</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Riddles of the Sphinx</i>, 1891 (revised edition, 1910).</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Axioms as Postulates</i> (in <i>Personal Idealism</i>, ed. Henry</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">Sturt, 1902).</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Humanism: Philosophical Essays</i>, 1903.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Studies in Humanism</i>, 1907.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Formal Logic, a Scientific and Social Problem</i>, 1912.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">HENRY STURT:</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Idola Theatri, a Criticism of Oxford Thought and Thinkers from the</i></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;"><i>Standpoint of Personal Idealism</i>, 1906.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">J. DEWEY AND OTHERS:</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Studies in Logical Theory</i>, 1903.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">J. DEWEY:</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>The Influence of Darwinism, and Other Essays</i>, 1910.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">H.V. KNOX:</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>The Evolution of Truth</i>. Quarterly Review, No. 419. April, 1909.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">A.W. MOORE:</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Pragmatism and its Critics</i>, 1911.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;"></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">A. SIDGWICK:</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>The Application of Logic</i>, 1910.</span><br> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10970 ***</div> +</body> +</html> |