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diff --git a/old/10827-h/10827-h.htm b/old/10827-h/10827-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9370073 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10827-h/10827-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,14932 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, by Niccolo Machiavelli</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + +body { margin-left: 20%; + margin-right: 20%; + text-align: justify; } + +h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 {text-align: center; font-style: normal; font-weight: +normal; line-height: 1.5; margin-top: .5em; margin-bottom: .5em;} + +h1 {font-size: 300%; + margin-top: 0.6em; + margin-bottom: 0.6em; + letter-spacing: 0.12em; + word-spacing: 0.2em; + text-indent: 0em;} +h2 {font-size: 150%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 1em;} +h3 {font-size: 130%; margin-top: 1em;} +h4 {font-size: 120%;} +h5 {font-size: 110%;} + +.no-break {page-break-before: avoid;} /* for epubs */ + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always; margin-top: 4em;} + +hr {width: 80%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} + +p {text-indent: 1em; + margin-top: 0.25em; + margin-bottom: 0.25em; } + +p.poem {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-size: 90%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.footnote {font-size: 90%; + text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +sup { vertical-align: top; font-size: 0.6em; } + +a:link {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:visited {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:hover {color:red} + +</style> + +</head> + +<body> + +<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, by Niccolo Machiavelli</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Niccolo Machiavelli</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: January 25, 2004 [eBook #10827]<br /> +[Most recently updated: July 5, 2021]</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Ted Garvin, Jayam Subramanian and PG Distributed Proofreaders</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST DECADE OF TITUS LIVIUS ***</div> + +<h1>Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius</h1> + +<h2 class="no-break">by Niccolo Machiavelli</h2> + +<h5>CITIZEN AND SECRETARY OF FLORENCE</h5> + +<h4>TRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN BY</h4> + +<h5>NINIAN HILL THOMSON, M.A.</h5> + +<p> +LONDON KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO., 1, PATERNOSTER SQUARE 1883 +</p> + +<hr /> + +<h5>TO PROFESSOR PASQUALE VILLARI.</h5> + +<h5>DEAR PROFESSOR VILLARI,</h5> + +<p> +Permit me to inscribe your name on a translation of Machiavelli’s +Discourses which I had your encouragement to undertake, and in which I have +done my best to preserve something of the flavour of the original. Yours +faithfully, +</p> + +<h5>NINIAN HILL THOMSON.</h5> + +<p> +FLORENCE, May 17, 1883. +</p> + +<h4>BOOK I.</h4> + +<h5>PREFACE</h5> + +<h5>CHAPTER</h5> + +<p> +I. Of the beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular of that of Rome +</p> + +<p> +II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman +Commonwealth belonged +</p> + +<p> +III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the +People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect +</p> + +<p> +IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made Rome free +and powerful +</p> + +<p> +V. Whether the guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the +Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire power, or they +who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of commotions +</p> + +<p> +VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have +composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate +</p> + +<p> +VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to accuse +</p> + +<p> +VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is +useful +</p> + +<p> +IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old +institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man +</p> + +<p> +X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits +praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame +</p> + +<p> +XI. Of the Religion of the Romans +</p> + +<p> +XII. That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy, +through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined +</p> + +<p> +XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to their +City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults +</p> + +<p> +XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and made a +prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced to disregard +them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished +</p> + +<p> +XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had recourse +to Religion +</p> + +<p> +XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it +become free, can hardly preserve that freedom +</p> + +<p> +XVII. That a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it +</p> + +<p> +XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or +not existing may be created +</p> + +<p> +XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one +weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second +</p> + +<p> +XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: +and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant +Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended +</p> + +<p> +XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without +a National Army +</p> + +<p> +XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the +three Alban Curiatii +</p> + +<p> +XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not forth +our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful +</p> + +<p> +XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments for their +Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds +</p> + +<p> +XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must retain at +least the semblance of old ways +</p> + +<p> +XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken possession, +ought to make everything new +</p> + +<p> +XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad +</p> + +<p> +XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their citizens +than were the Athenians +</p> + +<p> +XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful +</p> + +<p> +XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude; and how a +Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it +</p> + +<p> +XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for +misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their +ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all +</p> + +<p> +XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until they are +forced to yield them +</p> + +<p> +XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to +temporize with it than to meet it with violence +</p> + +<p> +XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman +Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the free +suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for +themselves that are pernicious to a State +</p> + +<p> +XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by +the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the liberties of +that Republic +</p> + +<p> +XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth should +not disdain the lower +</p> + +<p> +XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great +source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to ancient usage +with stringent retrospective effect +</p> + +<p> +XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course +they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice +</p> + +<p> +XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different Nations +</p> + +<p> +XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be +noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes may lead to +the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth +</p> + +<p> +XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a +haughty bearing from a humble +</p> + +<p> +XLII. How easily men become corrupted +</p> + +<p> +XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute Soldiers +</p> + +<p> +XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should not +with the same breath threaten and ask leave +</p> + +<p> +XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not to +observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity in a City +is most hurtful to the Governor +</p> + +<p> +XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at first to +escape injury, and then to injure others +</p> + +<p> +XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in particulars they +judge truly +</p> + +<p> +XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or wicked +person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless +and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good +</p> + +<p> +XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom, have had +difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their freedom, Cities which +at the first have been in subjection will find this almost impossible +</p> + +<p> +L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the +Government of a City to a stay +</p> + +<p> +LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done by +choice +</p> + +<p> +LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a +State, there is no safer method, nor less open to objection, than to forestall +him in those ways whereby he seeks to advance himself +</p> + +<p> +LIII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often desire what +would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave promises easily move them +</p> + +<p> +LIV. Of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain an +excited Multitude +</p> + +<p> +LV. That the Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the +People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible where equality +prevails, and a Republic where it does not +</p> + +<p> +LVI. That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country, signs +are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them +</p> + +<p> +LVII. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak +</p> + +<p> +LVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince +</p> + +<p> +LIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we make with +Commonwealths or those we make with Princes +</p> + +<p> +LX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given +without respect to Age +</p> + +<h5>BOOK II.</h5> + +<h5>PREFACE</h5> + +<p> +I. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or to +Fortune +</p> + +<p> +II. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these were in +defending their Freedom +</p> + +<p> +III. That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round about her, +and by readily admitting Strangers to the rights of Citizenship +</p> + +<p> +IV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their power +</p> + +<p> +V. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and +Pestilences, obliterate the memory of the past +</p> + +<p> +VI. Of the methods followed by the Romans in making War +</p> + +<p> +VII. Of the quantity of land assigned by the Romans to each colonist +</p> + +<p> +VIII. Why certain Nations leave their ancestral seats and overflow the +Countries of others +</p> + +<p> +IX. Of the Causes which commonly give rise to wars between States +</p> + +<p> +X. That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War +</p> + +<p> +XI. That it were unwise to ally yourself with a Prince who has reputation +rather than strength +</p> + +<p> +XII. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await +it +</p> + +<p> +XIII. That Men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by Fraud than by Force +</p> + +<p> +XIV. That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility +</p> + +<p> +XV. That weak States are always dubious in their resolves; and that tardy +resolves are always hurtful +</p> + +<p> +XVI. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient +Warfare +</p> + +<p> +XVII. What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to Artillery; +and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be just +</p> + +<p> +XVIII. That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient warfare +should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse +</p> + +<p> +XIX. That conquests made by ill governed States and such as follow not the +valiant methods of the Romans, lend rather to their ruin than to their +aggrandizement +</p> + +<p> +XX. Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to Auxiliary or +Mercenary Arms +</p> + +<p> +XXI. That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Prætor; nor +there, until four hundred years after they began to make war +</p> + +<p> +XXII. That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss +</p> + +<p> +XXIII. That in chastising their Subjects when circumstances required it the +Romans always avoided half measures +</p> + +<p> +XXIV. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more harm than good +</p> + +<p> +XXV. That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think to get +possession of it through its divisions +</p> + +<p> +XXVI. That Taunts and Abuse breed hatred against him who uses them, without +yielding him any advantage +</p> + +<p> +XXVII. That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have obtained a +victory; for, commonly, when they are not, their victory turns to defeat +</p> + +<p> +XXVIII. That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or private, +is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth +</p> + +<p> +XXIX. That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have them +hinder her designs +</p> + +<p> +XXX. That really powerful Princes and Commonwealths do not buy Friendships with +money, but with their valour and the fame of their prowess +</p> + +<p> +XXXI. Of the danger of trusting banished men +</p> + +<p> +XXXII. In how many ways the Romans gained possession of Towns +</p> + +<p> +XXXIII. That the Romans entrusted the Captains of their Armies with the fullest +Powers +</p> + +<h5>BOOK III.</h5> + +<p> +I. For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought back to +its beginnings +</p> + +<p> +II. That on occasion it is wise to feign folly +</p> + +<p> +III. That to preserve a newly acquired freedom we must slay the Sons of Brutus +</p> + +<p> +IV. That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live whom he has +deprived of it +</p> + +<p> +V. How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom +</p> + +<p> +VI. Of Conspiracies +</p> + +<p> +VII. Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from Servitude to +Freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at other times reek with +blood +</p> + +<p> +VIII. That he who would effect changes in a Commonwealth, must give heed to its +character and condition +</p> + +<p> +IX. That to enjoy constant good fortune we must change with the times +</p> + +<p> +X. That a Captain cannot escape battle when his Enemy forces it on him at all +hazards +</p> + +<p> +XI. That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than they, will +prevail if he can withstand their first onset +</p> + +<p> +XII. A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his own +Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity +</p> + +<p> +XIII. Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army, or to a +valiant Army with a weak Captain +</p> + +<p> +XIV. Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unexpected Sights or +Sounds +</p> + +<p> +XV. That one and not many should head an Army; and why it is disadvantageous to +have more leaders than one +</p> + +<p> +XVI. That in times of difficulty true Worth is sought after whereas in quiet +times it is not the most deserving but those who are recommended by wealth or +connection who are most in favour +</p> + +<p> +XVII. That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an important +Office or Command +</p> + +<p> +XVIII. That it is the highest quality of a Captain to be able to forestall the +designs of his adversary +</p> + +<p> +XIX. Whether indulgence or severity be more necessary for controlling a +Multitude +</p> + +<p> +XX. How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii than all the might +of the Roman Arms +</p> + +<p> +XXI. How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that taken by +Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the other achieved in Spain +</p> + +<p> +XXII. That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the gentleness of Valerius +Corvinus won for both the same Glory +</p> + +<p> +XXIII. Why Camillus was banished from Rome +</p> + +<p> +XXIV. That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude +</p> + +<p> +XXV. Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman Citizens +</p> + +<p> +XXVI. How women are a cause of the ruin of States +</p> + +<p> +XXVII. How a divided City may be reunited; and how it is a false opinion that +to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept divided +</p> + +<p> +XXVIII. That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens are about; since +often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a semblance of generous deeds +</p> + +<p> +XXIX. That the faults of a People are due to its Prince +</p> + +<p> +XXX. That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to render signal +service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy. How a City should +prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy +</p> + +<p> +XXXI That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through every change the +same spirit and bearing +</p> + +<p> +XXXII. Of the methods which some have used to make Peace impossible +</p> + +<p> +XXXIII. That to insure victory in battle, you must inspire your soldiers with +confidence in one another and in you +</p> + +<p> +XXXIV. By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a Republic are led +to favour a fellow-citizen: and whether the Magistracies are bestowed with +better judgment by a People or by a Prince +</p> + +<p> +XXXV. Of the danger incurred in being the first to recommend new measures; and +that the more unusual the measures, the greater the danger +</p> + +<p> +XXXVI. Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls, that at the +beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards less than Women +</p> + +<p> +XXXVII. Whether a general engagement should be preceded by skirmishes; and how, +avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new Enemy +</p> + +<p> +XXXVIII. Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers can confide +</p> + +<p> +XXXIX. That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places +</p> + +<p> +XL. That Fraud is fair in War +</p> + +<p> +XLI. That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by Dishonour, and in +either way is well defended +</p> + +<p> +XLII. That Promises made on compulsion are not to be observed +</p> + +<p> +XLIII. That Men born in the same Province retain through all times nearly the +same character +</p> + +<p> +XLIV. That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and Daring often succeed +</p> + +<p> +XLV. Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the enemy’s +attack, or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset +</p> + +<p> +XLVI. How the Characteristics of Families come to be perpetuated +</p> + +<p> +XLVII. That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to forget private +wrongs +</p> + +<p> +XLVIII. That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave blunder we should +suspect some fraud to lurk behind +</p> + +<p> +XLIX. That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has constant need of new +Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius Fabius received the +surname of Maximus +</p> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h4>NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI</h4> + +<h5>TO</h5> + +<h5>ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI AND COSIMO RUCELLAI</h5> + +<h5>HEALTH.</h5> + +<p> +I send you a gift, which if it answers ill the obligations I owe you, is at any +rate the greatest which Niccolò Machiavelli has it in his power to offer. For +in it I have expressed whatever I have learned, or have observed for myself +during a long experience and constant study of human affairs. And since neither +you nor any other can expect more at my hands, you cannot complain if I have +not given you more. +</p> + +<p> +You may indeed lament the poverty of my wit, since what I have to say is but +poorly said; and tax the weakness of my judgment, which on many points may have +erred in its conclusions. But granting all this, I know not which of us is less +beholden to the other: I to you, who have forced me to write what of myself I +never should have written; or you to me, who have written what can give you no +content. +</p> + +<p> +Take this, however, in the spirit in which all that comes from a friend should +be taken, in respect whereof we always look more to the intention of the giver +than to the quality of the gift. And, believe me, that in one thing only I find +satisfaction, namely, in knowing that while in many matters I may have made +mistakes, at least I have not been mistaken in choosing you before all others +as the persons to whom I dedicate these Discourses; both because I seem to +myself, in doing so, to have shown a little gratitude for kindness received, +and at the same time to have departed from the hackneyed custom which leads +many authors to inscribe their works to some Prince, and blinded by hopes of +favour or reward, to praise him as possessed of every virtue; whereas with more +reason they might reproach him as contaminated with every shameful vice. +</p> + +<p> +To avoid which error I have chosen, not those who are but those who from their +infinite merits deserve to be Princes; not such persons as have it in their +power to load me with honours, wealth, and preferment, but such as though they +lack the power, have all the will to do so. For men, if they would judge +justly, should esteem those who are, and not those whose means enable them to +be generous; and in like manner those who know how to govern kingdoms, rather +than those who possess the government without such knowledge. For Historians +award higher praise to Hiero of Syracuse when in a private station than to +Perseus the Macedonian when a King affirming that while the former lacked +nothing that a Prince should have save the name, the latter had nothing of the +King but the kingdom. +</p> + +<p> +Make the most, therefore, of this good or this evil, as you may esteem it, +which you have brought upon yourselves; and should you persist in the mistake +of thinking my opinions worthy your attention, I shall not fail to proceed with +the rest of the History in the manner promised in my Preface. <i>Farewell</i>. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>DISCOURSES</h2> + +<h5>ON THE FIRST DECADE OF</h5> + +<h5>TITUS LIVIUS.</h5> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK I.</h2> + +<hr /> + +<h5>PREFACE.</h5> + +<p> +Albeit the jealous temper of mankind, ever more disposed to censure than to +praise the work of others, has constantly made the pursuit of new methods and +systems no less perilous than the search after unknown lands and seas; +nevertheless, prompted by that desire which nature has implanted in me, +fearlessly to undertake whatsoever I think offers a common benefit to all, I +enter on a path which, being hitherto untrodden by any, though it involve me in +trouble and fatigue, may yet win me thanks from those who judge my efforts in a +friendly spirit. And although my feeble discernment, my slender experience of +current affairs, and imperfect knowledge of ancient events, render these +efforts of mine defective and of no great utility, they may at least open the +way to some other, who, with better parts and sounder reasoning and judgment, +shall carry out my design; whereby, if I gain no credit, at all events I ought +to incur no blame. +</p> + +<p> +When I see antiquity held in such reverence, that to omit other instances, the +mere fragment of some ancient statue is often bought at a great price, in order +that the purchaser may keep it by him to adorn his house, or to have it copied +by those who take delight in this art; and how these, again, strive with all +their skill to imitate it in their various works; and when, on the other hand, +I find those noble labours which history shows to have been wrought on behalf +of the monarchies and republics of old times, by kings, captains, citizens, +lawgivers, and others who have toiled for the good of their country, rather +admired than followed, nay, so absolutely renounced by every one that not a +trace of that antique worth is now left among us, I cannot but at once marvel +and grieve; at this inconsistency; and all the more because I perceive that, in +civil disputes between citizens, and in the bodily disorders into which men +fall, recourse is always had to the decisions and remedies, pronounced or +prescribed by the ancients. +</p> + +<p> +For the civil law is no more than the opinions delivered by the ancient +jurisconsults, which, being reduced to a system, teach the jurisconsults of our +own times how to determine; while the healing art is simply the recorded +experience of the old physicians, on which our modern physicians found their +practice. And yet, in giving laws to a commonwealth, in maintaining States and +governing kingdoms, in organizing armies and conducting wars, in dealing with +subject nations, and in extending a State’s dominions, we find no prince, +no republic, no captain, and no citizen who resorts to the example of the +ancients. +</p> + +<p> +This I persuade myself is due, not so much to the feebleness to which the +present methods of education have brought the world, or to the injury which a +pervading apathy has wrought in many provinces and cities of Christendom, as to +the want of a right intelligence of History, which renders men incapable in +reading it to extract its true meaning or to relish its flavour. Whence it +happens that by far the greater number of those who read History, take pleasure +in following the variety of incidents which it presents, without a thought to +imitate them; judging such imitation to be not only difficult but impossible; +as though the heavens, the sun, the elements, and man himself were no longer +the same as they formerly were as regards motion, order, and power. +</p> + +<p> +Desiring to rescue men from this error, I have thought fit to note down with +respect to all those books of Titus Livius which have escaped the malignity of +Time, whatever seems to me essential to a right understanding of ancient and +modern affairs; so that any who shall read these remarks of mine, may reap from +them that profit for the sake of which a knowledge of History is to be sought. +And although the task be arduous, still, with the help of those at whose +instance I assumed the burthen, I hope to carry it forward so far, that another +shall have no long way to go to bring it to its destination. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER I.—<i>Of the Beginnings of Cities in general, and in +particular of that of Rome.</i></h2> + +<p> +No one who reads how the city of Rome had its beginning, who were its founders, +and what its ordinances and laws, will marvel that so much excellence was +maintained in it through many ages, or that it grew afterwards to be so great +an Empire. +</p> + +<p> +And, first, as touching its origin, I say, that all cities have been founded +either by the people of the country in which they stand, or by strangers. +Cities have their origins in the former of these two ways when the inhabitants +of a country find that they cannot live securely if they live dispersed in many +and small societies, each of them unable, whether from its situation or its +slender numbers, to stand alone against the attacks of its enemies; on whose +approach there is no time left to unite for defence without abandoning many +strongholds, and thus becoming an easy prey to the invader. To escape which +dangers, whether of their own motion or at the instance of some of greater +authority among them, they restrict themselves to dwell together in certain +places, which they think will be more convenient to live in and easier to +defend. +</p> + +<p> +Among many cities taking their origin in this way were Athens and Venice; the +former of which, for reasons like those just now mentioned, was built by a +scattered population under the direction of Theseus. To escape the wars which, +on the decay of the Roman Empire daily renewed in Italy by the arrival of fresh +hordes of Barbarians, numerous refugees, sheltering in certain little islands +in a corner of the Adriatic Sea, gave beginning to Venice; where, without any +recognized leader to direct them, they agreed to live together under such laws +as they thought best suited to maintain them. And by reason of the prolonged +tranquility which their position secured, they being protected by the narrow +sea and by the circumstance that the tribes who then harassed Italy had no +ships wherewith to molest them, they were able from very small beginnings to +attain to that greatness they now enjoy. +</p> + +<p> +In the second case, namely of a city being founded by strangers, the settlers +are either wholly independent, or they are controlled by others, as where +colonies are sent forth either by a prince or by a republic, to relieve their +countries of an excessive population, or to defend newly acquired territories +which it is sought to secure at small cost. Of this sort many cities were +settled by the Romans, and in all parts of their dominions. It may also happen +that such cities are founded by a prince merely to add to his renown, without +any intention on his part to dwell there, as Alexandria was built by Alexander +the Great. Cities like these, not having had their beginning in freedom, seldom +make such progress as to rank among the chief towns of kingdoms. +</p> + +<p> +The city of Florence belongs to that class of towns which has not been +independent from the first; for whether we ascribe its origin to the soldiers +of Sylla, or, as some have conjectured, to the mountaineers of Fiesole (who, +emboldened by the long peace which prevailed throughout the world during the +reign of Octavianus, came down to occupy the plain on the banks of the Arno), +in either case, it was founded under the auspices of Rome nor could, at first, +make other progress than was permitted by the grace of the sovereign State. +</p> + +<p> +The origin of cities may be said to be independent when a people, either by +themselves or under some prince, are constrained by famine, pestilence, or war +to leave their native land and seek a new habitation. Settlers of this sort +either establish themselves in cities which they find ready to their hand in +the countries of which they take possession, as did Moses; or they build new +ones, as did Æneas. It is in this last case that the merits of a founder and +the good fortune of the city founded are best seen; and this good fortune will +be more or less remarkable according to the greater or less capacity of him who +gives the city its beginning. +</p> + +<p> +The capacity of a founder is known in two ways: by his choice of a site, or by +the laws which he frames. And since men act either of necessity or from choice, +and merit may seem greater where choice is more restricted, we have to consider +whether it may not be well to choose a sterile district as the site of a new +city, in order that the inhabitants, being constrained to industry, and less +corrupted by ease, may live in closer union, finding less cause for division in +the poverty of their land; as was the case in Ragusa, and in many other cities +built in similar situations. Such a choice were certainly the wisest and the +most advantageous, could men be content to enjoy what is their own without +seeking to lord it over others. But since to be safe they must be strong, they +are compelled avoid these barren districts, and to plant themselves in more +fertile regions; where, the fruitfulness of the soil enabling them to increase +and multiply, they may defend themselves against any who attack them, and +overthrow any who would withstand their power. +</p> + +<p> +And as for that languor which the situation might breed, care must be had that +hardships which the site does not enforce, shall be enforced by the laws; and +that the example of those wise nations be imitated, who, inhabiting most +fruitful and delightful countries, and such as were likely to rear a listless +and effeminate race, unfit for all manly exercises, in order to obviate the +mischief wrought by the amenity and relaxing influence of the soil and climate, +subjected all who were to serve as soldiers to the severest training; whence it +came that better soldiers were raised in these countries than in others by +nature rugged and barren. Such, of old, was the kingdom of the Egyptians, +which, though of all lands the most bountiful, yet, by the severe training +which its laws enforced, produced most valiant soldiers, who, had their names +not been lost in antiquity, might be thought to deserve more praise than +Alexander the Great and many besides, whose memory is still fresh in +men’s minds. And even in recent times, any one contemplating the kingdom +of the Soldan, and the military order of the Mamelukes before they were +destroyed by Selim the Grand Turk, must have seen how carefully they trained +their soldiers in every kind of warlike exercise; showing thereby how much they +dreaded that indolence to which their genial soil and climate might have +disposed them, unless neutralized by strenuous laws. I say, then, that it is a +prudent choice to found your city in a fertile region when the effects of that +fertility are duly balanced by the restraint of the laws. +</p> + +<p> +When Alexander the Great thought to add to his renown by founding a city, +Dinocrates the architect came and showed him how he might build it on Mount +Athos, which not only offered a strong position, but could be handled that the +city built there might present a semblance of the human form, which would be a +thing strange and striking, and worthy of so great a monarch. But on Alexander +asking how the inhabitants were to live, Dinocrates answered that he had not +thought of that. Whereupon, Alexander laughed, and leaving Mount Athos as it +stood, built Alexandria; where, the fruitfulness of the soil, and the vicinity +of the Nile and the sea, might attract many to take up their abode. +</p> + +<p> +To him, therefore, who inquires into the origin of Rome, if he assign its +beginning to Æneas, it will seem to be of those cities which were founded by +strangers if to Romulus, then of those founded by the natives of the country. +But in whichever class we place it, it will be seen to have had its beginning +in freedom, and not in subjection to another State. It will be seen, too, as +hereafter shall be noted, how strict was the discipline which the laws +instituted by Romulus, Numa, and its other founders made compulsory upon it; so +that neither its fertility, the proximity of the sea, the number of its +victories, nor the extent of its dominion, could for many centuries corrupt it, +but, on the contrary, maintained it replete with such virtues as were never +matched in any other commonwealth. +</p> + +<p> +And because the things done by Rome, and which Titus Livius has celebrated, +were effected at home or abroad by public or by private wisdom, I shall begin +by treating, and noting the consequences of those things done at home in +accordance with the public voice, which seem most to merit attention; and to +this object the whole of this first Book or first Part of my Discourses, shall +be directed. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER II.—Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them +the Roman Commonwealth belonged.</h2> + +<p> +I forego all discussion concerning those cities which at the outset have been +dependent upon others, and shall speak only of those which from their earliest +beginnings have stood entirely clear of all foreign control, being governed +from the first as pleased themselves, whether as republics or as princedoms. +</p> + +<p> +These as they have had different origins, so likewise have had different laws +and institutions. For to some at their very first commencement, or not long +after, laws have been given by a single legislator, and all at one time; like +those given by Lycurgus to the Spartans; while to others they have been given +at different times, as need rose or accident determined; as in the case of +Rome. That republic, indeed, may be called happy, whose lot has been to have a +founder so prudent as to provide for it laws under which it can continue to +live securely, without need to amend them; as we find Sparta preserving hers +for eight hundred years, without deterioration and without any dangerous +disturbance. On the other hand, some measure of unhappiness attaches to the +State which, not having yielded itself once for all into the hands of a single +wise legislator, is obliged to recast its institutions for itself; and of such +States, by far the most unhappy is that which is furthest removed from a sound +system of government, by which I mean that its institutions lie wholly outside +the path which might lead it to a true and perfect end. For it is scarcely +possible that a State in this position can ever, by any chance, set itself to +rights, whereas another whose institutions are imperfect, if it have made a +good beginning and such as admits of its amendment, may in the course of events +arrive at perfection. It is certain, however, that such States can never be +reformed without great risk; for, as a rule, men will accept no new law +altering the institutions of their State, unless the necessity for such a +change be demonstrated; and since this necessity cannot arise without danger, +the State may easily be overthrown before the new order of things is +established. In proof whereof we may instance the republic of Florence, which +was reformed in the year 1502, in consequence of the affair of Arezzo, but was +ruined in 1512, in consequence of the affair of Prato. +</p> + +<p> +Desiring, therefore, to discuss the nature of the government of Rome, and to +ascertain the accidental circumstances which brought it to its perfection, I +say, as has been said before by many who have written of Governments, that of +these there are three forms, known by the names Monarchy, Aristocracy, and +Democracy, and that those who give its institutions to a State have recourse to +one or other of these three, according as it suits their purpose. Other, and, +as many have thought, wiser teachers, will have it, that there are altogether +six forms of government, three of them utterly bad, the other three good in +themselves, but so readily corrupted that they too are apt to become hurtful. +The good are the three above named; the bad, three others dependent upon these, +and each so like that to which it is related, that it is easy to pass +imperceptibly from the one to the other. For a Monarchy readily becomes a +Tyranny, an Aristocracy an Oligarchy, while a Democracy tends to degenerate +into Anarchy. So that if the founder of a State should establish any one of +these three forms of Government, he establishes it for a short time only, since +no precaution he may take can prevent it from sliding into its contrary, by +reason of the close resemblance which, in this case, the virtue bears to the +vice. +</p> + +<p> +These diversities in the form of Government spring up among men by chance. For +in the beginning of the world, its inhabitants, being few in number, for a time +lived scattered after the fashion of beasts; but afterwards, as they increased +and multiplied, gathered themselves into societies, and, the better to protect +themselves, began to seek who among them was the strongest and of the highest +courage, to whom, making him their head, they tendered obedience. Next arose +the knowledge of such things as are honourable and good, as opposed to those +which are bad and shameful. For observing that when a man wronged his +benefactor, hatred was universally felt for the one and sympathy for the other, +and that the ungrateful were blamed, while those who showed gratitude were +honoured, and reflecting that the wrongs they saw done to others might be done +to themselves, to escape these they resorted to making laws and fixing +punishments against any who should transgress them; and in this way grew the +recognition of Justice. Whence it came that afterwards, in choosing their +rulers, men no longer looked about for the strongest, but for him who was the +most prudent and the most just. +</p> + +<p> +But, presently, when sovereignty grew to be hereditary and no longer elective, +hereditary sovereigns began to degenerate from their ancestors, and, quitting +worthy courses, took up the notion that princes had nothing to do but to +surpass the rest of the world in sumptuous display and wantonness, and whatever +else ministers to pleasure so that the prince coming to be hated, and therefore +to feel fear, and passing from fear to infliction of injuries, a tyranny soon +sprang up. Forthwith there began movements to overthrow the prince, and plots +and conspiracies against him undertaken not by those who were weak, or afraid +for themselves, but by such as being conspicuous for their birth, courage, +wealth, and station, could not tolerate the shameful life of the tyrant. The +multitude, following the lead of these powerful men, took up arms against the +prince and, he being got rid of, obeyed these others as their liberators; who, +on their part, holding in hatred the name of sole ruler, formed themselves into +a government and at first, while the recollection of past tyranny was still +fresh, observed the laws they themselves made, and postponing personal +advantage to the common welfare, administered affairs both publicly and +privately with the utmost diligence and zeal. But this government passing, +afterwards, to their descendants who, never having been taught in the school of +Adversity, knew nothing of the vicissitudes of Fortune, these not choosing to +rest content with mere civil equality, but abandoning themselves to avarice, +ambition, and lust, converted, without respect to civil rights what had been a +government of the best into a government of the few; and so very soon met with +the same fate as the tyrant. +</p> + +<p> +For the multitude loathing its rulers, lent itself to any who ventured, in +whatever way, to attack them; when some one man speedily arose who with the aid +of the people overthrew them. But the recollection of the tyrant and of the +wrongs suffered at his hands being still fresh in the minds of the people, who +therefore felt no desire to restore the monarchy, they had recourse to a +popular government, which they established on such a footing that neither king +nor nobles had any place in it. And because all governments inspire respect at +the first, this government also lasted for a while, but not for long, and +seldom after the generation which brought it into existence had died out. For, +suddenly, liberty passed into license, wherein neither private worth nor public +authority was respected, but, every one living as he liked, a thousand wrongs +were done daily. Whereupon, whether driven by necessity, or on the suggestion +of some wiser man among them and to escape anarchy, the people reverted to a +monarchy, from which, step by step, in the manner and for the causes already +assigned, they came round once more to license. For this is the circle +revolving within which all States are and have been governed; although in the +same State the same forms of Government rarely repeat themselves, because +hardly any State can have such vitality as to pass through such a cycle more +than once, and still together. For it may be expected that in some sea of +disaster, when a State must always be wanting prudent counsels and in strength, +it will become subject to some neighbouring and better-governed State; though +assuming this not to happen, it might well pass for an indefinite period from +one of these forms of government to another. +</p> + +<p> +I say, then, that all these six forms of government are pernicious—the +three good kinds, from their brief duration the three bad, from their inherent +badness. Wise legislators therefore, knowing these defects, and avoiding each +of these forms in its simplicity, have made choice of a form which shares in +the qualities of all the first three, and which they judge to be more stable +and lasting than any of these separately. For where we have a monarchy, an +aristocracy, and a democracy existing together in the same city, each of the +three serves as a check upon the other. +</p> + +<p> +Among those who have earned special praise by devising a constitution of this +nature, was Lycurgus, who so framed the laws of Sparta as to assign their +proper functions to kings, nobles, and commons; and in this way established a +government, which, to his great glory and to the peace and tranquility of his +country, lasted for more than eight hundred years. The contrary, however, +happened in the case of Solon; who by the turn he gave to the institutions of +Athens, created there a purely democratic government, of such brief duration, +that he himself lived to witness the beginning of the despotism of Pisistratus. +And although, forty years later, the heirs of Pisistratus were driven out, and +Athens recovered her freedom, nevertheless because she reverted to the same +form government as had been established by Solon, she could maintain it for +only a hundred years more; for though to preserve it, many ordinances were +passed for repressing the ambition of the great and the turbulence of the +people, against which Solon had not provided, still, since neither the +monarchic nor the aristocratic element was given a place in her constitution, +Athens, as compared with Sparta, had but a short life. +</p> + +<p> +But let us now turn to Rome, which city, although she had no Lycurgus to give +her from the first such a constitution as would preserve her long in freedom, +through a series of accidents, caused by the contests between the commons and +the senate, obtained by chance what the foresight of her founders failed to +provide. So that Fortune, if she bestowed not her first favours on Rome, +bestowed her second; because, although the original institutions of this city +were defective, still they lay not outside the true path which could bring them +to perfection. For Romulus and the other kings made many and good laws, and +such as were not incompatible with freedom; but because they sought to found a +kingdom and not a commonwealth, when the city became free many things were +found wanting which in the interest of liberty it was necessary to supply, +since these kings had not supplied them. And although the kings of Rome lost +their sovereignty, in the manner and for the causes mentioned above, +nevertheless those who drove them out, by at once creating two consuls to take +their place, preserved in Rome the regal authority while banishing from it the +regal throne, so that as both senate and consuls were included in that +republic, it in fact possessed two of the elements above enumerated, to wit, +the monarchic and the aristocratic. +</p> + +<p> +It then only remained to assign its place to the popular element, and the Roman +nobles growing insolent from causes which shall be noticed hereafter, the +commons against them, when, not to lose the whole of their power, they were +forced to concede a share to the people; while with the share which remained, +the senate and consuls retained so much authority that they still held their +own place in the republic. In this way the tribunes of the people came to be +created, after whose creation the stability of the State was much augmented, +since each the three forms of government had now its due influence allowed it. +And such was the good fortune of Rome that although her government passed from +the kings to the nobles, and from these to the people, by the steps and for the +reasons noticed above, still the entire authority of the kingly element was not +sacrificed to strengthen the authority of the nobles, nor were the nobles +divested of their authority to bestow it on the commons; but three, blending +together, made up a perfect State; which perfection, as shall be fully shown in +the next two Chapters, was reached through the dissensions of the commons and +the senate. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER III.—Of the Accidents which led in Rome to the creation of +Tribunes of the People; whereby the Republic was made more perfect.</h2> + +<p> +They who lay the foundations of a State and furnish it with laws must, as is +shown by all who have treated of civil government, and by examples of which +history is full, assume that ‘all men are bad, and will always, when they +have free field, give loose to their evil inclinations; and that if these for a +while remain hidden, it is owing to some secret cause, which, from our having +no contrary experience, we do not recognize at once, but which is afterwards +revealed by Time, of whom we speak as the father of all truth. +</p> + +<p> +In Rome, after the expulsion of the Tarquins, it seemed as though the closest +union prevailed between the senate and the commons, and that the nobles, laying +aside their natural arrogance, had learned so to sympathize with the people as +to have become supportable by all, even of the humblest rank. This +dissimulation remained undetected, and its causes concealed, while the Tarquins +lived; for the nobles dreading the Tarquins, and fearing that the people, if +they used them ill, might take part against them, treated them with kindness. +But no sooner were the Tarquins got rid of, and the nobles thus relieved of +their fears, when they began to spit forth against the commons all the venom +which before they had kept in their breasts, offending and insulting them in +every way they could; confirming what I have observed already, that men never +behave well unless compelled, and that whenever they are free to act as they +please, and are under no restraint everything falls at once into confusion and +disorder. Wherefore it has been said that as poverty and hunger are needed to +make men industrious, so laws are needed to make them good. When we do well +without laws, laws are not needed; but when good customs are absent, laws are +at once required. +</p> + +<p> +On the extinction of the Tarquins, therefore, the dread of whom had kept the +nobles in check, some new safeguard had to be contrived, which should effect +the same result as had been effected by the Tarquins while they lived. +Accordingly, after much uproar and confusion, and much danger of violence +ensuing between the commons and the nobles, to insure the safety of the former, +tribunes were created, and were invested with such station and authority as +always afterwards enabled them to stand between the people and the senate, and +to resist the insolence of the nobles. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER IV.—That the Dissensions between the Senate and Commons of +Rome, made Rome free and powerful.</h2> + +<p> +Touching those tumults which prevailed in Rome from the extinction of the +Tarquins to the creation of the tribunes the discussion of which I have no wish +to avoid, and as to certain other matters of a like nature, I desire to say +something in opposition to the opinion of many who assert that Rome was a +turbulent city, and had fallen into utter disorder, that had not her good +fortune and military prowess made amends for other defects, she would have been +inferior to every other republic. +</p> + +<p> +I cannot indeed deny that the good fortune and the armies of Rome were the +causes of her empire; yet it certainly seems to me that those holding this +opinion fail to perceive, that in a State where there are good soldiers there +must be good order, and, generally speaking, good fortune. And looking to the +other circumstances of this city, I affirm that those who condemn these +dissensions between the nobles and the commons, condemn what was the prime +cause of Rome becoming free; and give more heed to the tumult and uproar +wherewith these dissensions were attended, than to the good results which +followed from them; not reflecting that while in every republic there are two +conflicting factions, that of the people and that of the nobles, it is in this +conflict that all laws favourable to freedom have their origin, as may readily +be seen to have been the case in Rome. For from the time of the Tarquins to +that of the Gracchi, a period of over three hundred years, the tumults in Rome +seldom gave occasion to punishment by exile, and very seldom to bloodshed. So +that we cannot truly declare those tumults to have been disastrous, or that +republic to have been disorderly, which during all that time, on account of her +internal broils, banished no more than eight or ten of her citizens, put very +few to death, and rarely inflicted money penalties. Nor can we reasonably +pronounce that city ill-governed wherein we find so many instances of virtue; +for virtuous actions have their origin in right training, right training in +wise laws, and wise laws in these very tumults which many would thoughtlessly +condemn. For he who looks well to the results of these tumults will find that +they did not lead to banishments, nor to violence hurtful to the common good, +but to laws and ordinances beneficial to the public liberty. And should any +object that the behaviour of the Romans was extravagant and outrageous; that +for the assembled people to be heard shouting against the senate, the senate +against the people; for the whole commons to be seen rushing wildly through the +streets, closing their shops, and quitting the town, were things which might +well affright him even who only reads of them; it may be answered, that the +inhabitants of all cities, more especially of cities which seek to make use of +the people in matters of importance, have their own ways of giving expression +to their wishes; among which the city of Rome had the custom, that when its +people sought to have a law passed they followed one or another of those +courses mentioned above, or else refused to be enrolled as soldiers when, to +pacify them, something of their demands had to be conceded. But the demands of +a free people are hurtful to freedom, since they originate either in being +oppressed, or in the fear that they are about to be so. When this fear is +groundless, it finds its remedy in public meetings, wherein some worthy person +may come forward and show the people by argument that they are deceiving +themselves. For though they be ignorant, the people are not therefore, as +Cicero says, incapable of being taught the truth, but are readily convinced +when it is told them by one in whose honesty they can trust. +</p> + +<p> +We should, therefore, be careful how we censure the government of Rome, and +should reflect that all the great results effected by that republic, could not +have come about without good cause. And if the popular tumults led the creation +of the tribunes, they merit all praise; since these magistrates not only gave +its due influence to the popular voice in the government, but also acted as the +guardians of Roman freedom, as shall be clearly shown in the following Chapter. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER V.—<i>Whether the Guardianship of public Freedom is safer in +the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to +acquire Power or they who seek to maintain it are the greater cause of +Commotions.</i></h2> + +<p> +Of the provisions made by wise founders of republics, one of the most necessary +is for the creation of a guardianship of liberty; for according as this is +placed in good or bad hands, the freedom of the State will be more or less +lasting. And because in every republic we find the two parties of nobles and +commons, the question arises, to which of these two this guardianship can most +safely be entrusted. Among the Lacedæmonians of old, as now with the Venetians, +it was placed in the hands of the nobles, but with the Romans it was vested in +the commons. We have, therefore, to determine which of these States made the +wiser choice. If we look to reasons, something is to be said on both sides of +the question; though were we to look to results, we should have to pronounce in +favour of the nobles, inasmuch as the liberty of Sparta and Venice has had a +longer life than that of Rome. +</p> + +<p> +As touching reasons, it may be pleaded for the Roman method, that they are most +fit to have charge of a thing, who least desire to pervert it to their own +ends. And, doubtless, if we examine the aims which the nobles and the commons +respectively set before them, we shall find in the former a great desire to +dominate, in the latter merely a desire not to be dominated over, and hence a +greater attachment to freedom, since they have less to gain than the others by +destroying it. Wherefore, when the commons are put forward as the defenders of +liberty, they may be expected to take better care of it, and, as they have no +desire to tamper with it themselves, to be less apt to suffer others to do so. +</p> + +<p> +On the other hand, he who defends the method followed by the Spartans and +Venetians, may urge, that by confiding this guardianship to the nobles, two +desirable ends are served: first, that from being allowed to retain in their +own hands a weapon which makes them the stronger party in the State, the +ambition of this class is more fully satisfied; and, second, that an authority +is withdrawn from the unstable multitude which as used by them is likely to +lead to endless disputes and tumults, and to drive the nobles into dangerous +and desperate courses. In instance whereof might be cited the case of Rome +itself, wherein the tribunes of the people being vested with this authority, +not content to have one consul a plebeian, insisted on having both; and +afterwards laid claim to the censorship, the prætorship and all the other +magistracies in the city. Nor was this enough for them, but, carried away by +the same factious spirit, they began after a time to pay court to such men as +they thought able to attack the nobility, and so gave occasion to the rise of +Marius and the overthrow of Rome. +</p> + +<p> +Wherefore one who weighs both sides of the question well, might hesitate which +party he should choose as the guardian of public liberty, being uncertain which +class is more mischievous in a commonwealth, that which would acquire what it +has not, or that which would keep the authority which it has already. But, on +the whole, on a careful balance of arguments we may sum up thus:—Either +we have to deal with a republic eager like Rome to extend its power, or with +one content merely to maintain itself; in the former case it is necessary to do +in all things as Rome did; in the latter, for the reasons and in the manner to +be shown in the following Chapter, we may imitate Venice and Sparta. +</p> + +<p> +But reverting to the question which class of citizens is more mischievous in a +republic, those who seek to acquire or those who fear to lose what they have +acquired already, I note that when Marcus Menenius and Marcus Fulvius, both of +them men of plebeian birth, were made the one dictator, the other master of the +knights, that they might inquire into certain plots against Rome contrived in +Capua, they had at the same time authority given them by the people to +investigate whether, in Rome itself, irregular and corrupt practices had been +used to obtain the consulship and other honours of the city. The nobles +suspecting that the powers thus conferred were to be turned against them, +everywhere gave out that if honours had been sought by any by irregular and +unworthy means, it was not by them, but by the plebeians, who, with neither +birth nor merit to recommend them, had need to resort to corruption. And more +particularly they accused the dictator himself. And so telling was the effect +of these charges, that Menenius, after haranguing the people and complaining to +them of the calumnies circulated against him, laid down his dictatorship, and +submitted himself to whatever judgment might be passed upon him. When his cause +came to be tried he was acquitted; but at the hearing it was much debated, +whether he who would retain power or he who would acquire it, is the more +dangerous citizen; the desires of both being likely to lead to the greatest +disorders. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless, I believe that, as a rule, disorders are more commonly occasioned +by those seeking to preserve power, because in them the fear of loss breeds the +same passions as are felt by those seeking to acquire; since men never think +they hold what they have securely, unless when they are gaining something new +from others. It is also to be said that their position enables them to operate +changes with less effort and greater efficacy. Further, it may be added, that +their corrupt and insolent behaviour inflames the minds of those who have +nothing, with the desire to have; either for the sake of punishing their +adversaries by despoiling them, or to obtain for themselves a share of those +riches and honours which they see the others abuse. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER VI.—<i>Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a +Government as would have composed the Differences between the Commons and the +Senate.</i></h2> + +<p> +I have spoken above of the effects produced in Rome by the controversies +between the commons and the senate. Now, as these lasted down to the time of +the Gracchi, when they brought about the overthrow of freedom, some may think +it matter for regret that Rome should not have achieved the great things she +did, without being torn by such disputes. Wherefore, it seems to me worth while +to consider whether the government of Rome could ever have been constituted in +such a way as to prevent like controversies. +</p> + +<p> +In making this inquiry we must first look to those republics which have enjoyed +freedom for a great while, undisturbed by any violent contentions or tumults, +and see what their government was, and whether it would have been possible to +introduce it into Rome. Of such republics we have an example in ancient times +in Sparta, in modern times in Venice, of both which States I have already made +mention. Sparta created for herself a government consisting of a king and a +limited senate. Venice has made no distinction in the titles of her rulers, all +qualified to take part in her government being classed under the one +designation of “Gentlemen,” an arrangement due rather to chance +than to the foresight of those who gave this State its constitution. For many +persons, from causes already noticed, seeking shelter on these rocks on which +Venice now stands, after they had so multiplied that if they were to continue +to live together it became necessary for them to frame laws, established a form +of government; and assembling often in their councils to consult for the +interests of their city, when it seemed to them that their numbers were +sufficient for political existence, they closed the entrance to civil rights +against all who came afterwards to live there, not allowing them to take any +part in the management of affairs. And when in course of time there came to be +many citizens excluded from the government, to add to the importance of the +governing body, they named these “Gentlemen” (<i>gentiluomini</i>), +the others “Plebeians” (<i>popolani</i>). And this distinction +could grow up and maintain itself without causing disturbance; for as at the +time of its origin, whosoever then lived in Venice was made one of the +governing body, none had reason to complain; while those who came to live there +afterwards, finding the government in a completed form, had neither ground nor +opportunity to object. No ground, because nothing was taken from them; and no +opportunity, because those in authority kept them under control, and never +employed them in affairs in which they could acquire importance. Besides which, +they who came later to dwell in Venice were not so numerous as to destroy all +proportion between the governors and the governed; the number of the +“Gentlemen” being as great as, or greater than that of the +“Plebeians.” For these reasons, therefore, it was possible for +Venice to make her constitution what it is, and to maintain it without +divisions. +</p> + +<p> +Sparta, again, being governed, as I have said, by a king and a limited senate, +was able to maintain herself for the long period she did, because, from the +country being thinly inhabited and further influx of population forbidden, and +from the laws of Lycurgus (the observance whereof removed all ground of +disturbance) being held in high esteem, the citizens were able to continue long +in unity. For Lycurgus having by his laws established in Sparta great equality +as to property, but less equality as to rank, there prevailed there an equal +poverty; and the commons were less ambitious, because the offices of the State, +which were held to their exclusion, were confined to a few; and because the +nobles never by harsh treatment aroused in them any desire to usurp these +offices. And this was due to the Spartan kings, who, being appointed to that +dignity for life, and placed in the midst of this nobility, had no stronger +support to their authority than in defending the people against injustice. +Whence it resulted that as the people neither feared nor coveted the power +which they did not possess, the conflicts which might have arisen between them +and the nobles were escaped, together with the causes which would have led to +them; and in this way they were able to live long united. But of this unity in +Sparta there were two chief causes: one, the fewness of its inhabitants, which +allowed of their being governed by a few; the other, that by denying foreigners +admission into their country, the people had less occasion to become corrupted, +and never so increased in numbers as to prove troublesome to their few rulers. +</p> + +<p> +Weighing all which circumstances, we see that to have kept Rome in the same +tranquility wherein these republics were kept, one of two courses must have +been followed by her legislators; for either, like the Venetians, they must +have refrained from employing the commons in war, or else, like the Spartans, +they must have closed their country to foreigners. Whereas, in both +particulars, they did the opposite, arming the commons and increasing their +number, and thus affording endless occasions for disorder. And had the Roman +commonwealth grown to be more tranquil, this inconvenience would have resulted, +that it must at the same time have grown weaker, since the road would have been +closed to that greatness to which it came, for in removing the causes of her +tumults, Rome must have interfered with the causes of her growth. +</p> + +<p> +And he who looks carefully into the matter will find, that in all human +affairs, we cannot rid ourselves of one inconvenience without running into +another. So that if you would have your people numerous and warlike, to the end +that with their aid you may establish a great empire, you will have them of +such a sort as you cannot afterwards control at your pleasure; while should you +keep them few and unwarlike, to the end that you may govern them easily, you +will be unable, should you extend your dominions, to preserve them, and will +become so contemptible as to be the prey of any who attack you. For which +reason in all our deliberations we ought to consider where we are likely to +encounter least inconvenience, and accept that as the course to be preferred, +since we shall never find any line of action entirely free from disadvantage. +</p> + +<p> +Rome might, therefore, following the example of Sparta, have created a king for +life and a senate of limited numbers, but desiring to become a great empire, +she could not, like Sparta, have restricted the number of her citizens. So that +to have created a king for life and a limited senate had been of little service +to her. +</p> + +<p> +Were any one, therefore, about to found a wholly new republic, he would have to +consider whether he desired it to increase as Rome did in territory and +dominion, or to continue within narrow limits. In the former case he would have +to shape its constitution as nearly as possible on the pattern of the Roman, +leaving room for dissensions and popular tumults, for without a great and +warlike population no republic can ever increase, or increasing maintain +itself. In the second case he might give his republic a constitution like that +of Venice or Sparta; but since extension is the ruin of such republics, the +legislator would have to provide in every possible way against the State which +he had founded making any additions to its territories. For these, when +superimposed upon a feeble republic, are sure to be fatal to it: as we see to +have been the case with Sparta and Venice, the former of which, after +subjugating nearly all Greece, on sustaining a trifling reverse, betrayed the +insufficiency of her foundations, for when, after the revolt of Thebes under +Pelopidas, other cities also rebelled, the Spartan kingdom was utterly +overthrown. Venice in like manner, after gaining possession of a great portion +of Italy (most of it not by her arms but by her wealth and subtlety), when her +strength was put to the proof, lost all in one pitched battle. +</p> + +<p> +I can well believe, then, that to found a republic which shall long endure, the +best plan may be to give it internal institutions like those of Sparta or +Venice; placing it in a naturally strong situation, and so fortifying it that +none can expect to get the better of it easily, yet, at the same time, not +making it so great as to be formidable to its neighbours; since by taking these +precautions, it might long enjoy its independence. For there are two causes +which lead to wars being made against a republic; one, your desire to be its +master, the other the fear lest it should master you; both of which dangers the +precaution indicated will go far to remove. For if, as we are to assume, this +republic be well prepared for defence, and consequently difficult of attack, it +will seldom or never happen that any one will form the design to attack it, and +while it keeps within its own boundaries, and is seen from experience not to be +influenced by ambition, no one will be led, out of fear for himself, to make +war upon it, more particularly when its laws and constitution forbid its +extension. And were it possible to maintain things in this equilibrium, I +veritably believe that herein would be found the true form of political life, +and the true tranquility of a republic. But all human affairs being in +movement, and incapable of remaining as they are, they must either rise or +fall; and to many conclusions to which we are not led by reason, we are brought +by necessity. So that when we have given institutions to a State on the footing +that it is to maintain itself without enlargement, should necessity require its +enlargement, its foundations will be cut from below it, and its downfall +quickly ensue. On the other hand, were a republic so favoured by Heaven as to +lie under no necessity of making war, the result of this ease would be to make +it effeminate and divided which two evils together, and each by itself, would +insure its ruin. And since it is impossible, as I believe, to bring about an +equilibrium, or to adhere strictly to the mean path, we must, in arranging our +republic, consider what is the more honourable course for it to take, and so +contrive that even if necessity compel its enlargement, it may be able to keep +what it gains. +</p> + +<p> +But returning to the point first raised, I believe it necessary for us to +follow the method of the Romans and not that of the other republics, for I know +of no middle way. We must, consequently, put up with those dissensions which +arise between commons and senate, looking on them as evils which cannot be +escaped if we would arrive at the greatness of Rome. +</p> + +<p> +In connection with the arguments here used to prove that the authority of the +tribunes was essential in Rome to the guardianship of freedom, we may naturally +go on to show what advantages result to a republic from the power of +impeachment; which, together with others, was conferred upon the tribunes; a +subject to be noticed in the following Chapter. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER VII.—<i>That to preserve Liberty in a State there must exist +the Right to accuse.</i></h2> + +<p> +To those set forward in a commonwealth as guardians of public freedom, no more +useful or necessary authority can be given than the power to accuse, either +before the people, or before some council or tribunal, those citizens who in +any way have offended against the liberty of their country. +</p> + +<p> +A law of this kind has two effects most beneficial to a State: <i>first,</i> +that the citizens from fear of being accused, do not engage in attempts hurtful +to the State, or doing so, are put down at once and without respect of persons: +and <i>next,</i> that a vent is given for the escape of all those evil humours +which, from whatever cause, gather in cities against particular citizens; for +unless an outlet be duly provided for these by the laws, they flow into +irregular channels and overwhelm the State. There is nothing, therefore, which +contributes so much to the stability and permanence of a State, as to take care +that the fermentation of these disturbing humours be supplied by operation of +law with a recognized outlet. This might be shown by many examples, but by none +so clearly as by that of Coriolanus related by Livius, where he tells us, that +at a time when the Roman nobles were angry with the plebeians (thinking that +the appointment of tribunes for their protection had made them too powerful), +it happened that Rome was visited by a grievous famine, to meet which the +senate sent to Sicily for corn. But Coriolanus, hating the commons, sought to +persuade the senate that now was the time to punish them, and to deprive them +of the authority which they had usurped to the prejudice of the nobles, by +withholding the distribution of corn, and so suffering them to perish of +hunger. Which advice of his coming to the ears of the people, kindled them to +such fury against him, that they would have slain him as he left the Senate +House, had not the tribunes cited him to appear and answer before them to a +formal charge. +</p> + +<p> +In respect of this incident I repeat what I have just now said, how useful and +necessary it is for republics to provide by their laws a channel by which the +displeasure of the multitude against a single citizen may find a vent. For when +none such is regularly provided, recourse will be had to irregular channels, +and these will assuredly lead to much worse results. For when a citizen is +borne down by the operation of the ordinary laws, even though he be wronged, +little or no disturbance is occasioned to the state: the injury he suffers not +being wrought by private violence, nor by foreign force, which are the causes +of the overthrow of free institutions, but by public authority and in +accordance with public ordinances, which, having definite limits set them, are +not likely to pass beyond these so as to endanger the commonwealth. For proof +of which I am content to rest on this old example of Coriolanus, since all may +see what a disaster it would have been for Rome had he been violently put to +death by the people. For, as between citizen and citizen, a wrong would have +been done affording ground for fear, fear would have sought defence, defence +have led to faction, faction to divisions in the State, and these to its ruin. +But the matter being taken up by those whose office it was to deal with it, all +the evils which must have followed had it been left in private hands were +escaped. +</p> + +<p> +In Florence, on the other hand, and in our own days, we have seen what violent +commotions follow when the people cannot show their displeasure against +particular citizens in a form recognized by the laws, in the instance of +Francesco Valori, at one time looked upon as the foremost citizen of our +republic. But many thinking him ambitious, and likely from his high spirit and +daring to overstep the limits of civil freedom, and there being no way to +oppose him save by setting up an adverse faction, the result was, that, +apprehending irregular attacks, he sought to gain partisans for his support; +while his opponents, on their side, having no course open to them of which the +laws approved, resorted to courses of which the laws did not approve, and, at +last, to open violence. And as his influence had to be attacked by unlawful +methods, these were attended by injury not to him only, but to many other noble +citizens; whereas, could he have been met by constitutional restraints, his +power might have been broken without injury to any save himself. I might also +cite from our Florentine history the fall of Piero Soderini, which had no other +cause than there not being in our republic any law under which powerful and +ambitious citizens can be impeached. For to form a tribunal by which a powerful +citizen is to be tried, eight judges only are not enough; the judges must be +numerous, because a few will always do the will of a few. But had there been +proper methods for obtaining redress, either the people would have impeached +Piero if he was guilty, and thus have given vent to their displeasure without +calling in the Spanish army; or if he was innocent, would not have ventured, +through fear of being accused themselves, to have taken proceedings against +him. So that in either case the bitter spirit which was the cause of all the +disorder would have had an end. Wherefore, when we find one of the parties in a +State calling in a foreign power, we may safely conclude that it is because the +defective laws of that State provide no escape for those malignant humours +which are natural to men; which can best be done by arranging for an +impeachment before a sufficient number of judges, and by giving countenance to +this procedure. This was so well contrived in Rome that in spite of the +perpetual struggle maintained between the commons and the senate, neither the +senate nor the commons, nor any single citizen, ever sought redress at the +hands of a foreign power; for having a remedy at home, there was no need to +seek one abroad. +</p> + +<p> +Although the examples above cited be proof sufficient of what I affirm, I +desire to adduce one other, recorded by Titus Livius in his history, where he +relates that a sister of Aruns having been violated by a Lucumo of Clusium, the +chief of the Etruscan towns, Aruns being unable, from the interest of her +ravisher, to avenge her, betook himself to the Gauls who ruled in the province +we now name Lombardy, and besought them to come with an armed force to Clusium; +showing them how with advantage to themselves they might avenge his wrongs. +Now, had Aruns seen that he could have had redress through the laws of his +country, he never would have resorted to these Barbarians for help. +</p> + +<p> +But as the right to accuse is beneficial in a republic, so calumny, on the +other hand, is useless and hurtful, as in the following Chapter I shall proceed +to show. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER VIII.—<i>That Calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the +power to accuse is useful.</i></h2> + +<p> +Such were the services rendered to Rome by Furius Camillus in rescuing her from +the oppression of the Gauls, that no Roman, however high his degree or station, +held it derogatory to yield place to him, save only Manlius Capitolinus, who +could not brook such glory and distinction being given to another. For he +thought that in saving the Capitol, he had himself done as much as Camillus to +preserve Rome, and that in respect of his other warlike achievements he was no +whit behind him. So that, bursting with jealousy, and unable to remain at rest +by reason of the other’s renown, and seeing no way to sow discord among +the Fathers, he set himself to spread abroad sinister reports among the +commons; throwing out, among other charges, that the treasure collected to be +given to the Gauls, but which, afterwards, was withheld, had been embezzled by +certain citizens, and if recovered might be turned to public uses in relieving +the people from taxes or from private debts. These assertions so prevailed with +the commons that they began to hold meetings and to raise what tumults they +liked throughout the city. But this displeasing the senate, and the matter +appearing to them grave and dangerous, they appointed a dictator to inquire +into it, and to restrain the attacks of Manlius. The dictator, forthwith, +caused Manlius to be cited before him; and these two were thus brought face to +face in the presence of the whole city, the dictator surrounded by the nobles, +and Manlius by the commons. The latter, being desired to say with whom the +treasure of which he had spoken was to be found, since the senate were as +anxious to know this as the commons, made no direct reply, but answered +evasively that it was needless to tell them what they already knew. Whereupon +the dictator ordered him to prison. +</p> + +<p> +In this passage we are taught how hateful a thing is calumny in all free +States, as, indeed, in every society, and how we must neglect no means which +may serve to check it. And there can be no more effectual means for checking +calumny than by affording ample facilities for impeachment, which is as useful +in a commonwealth as the other is pernicious. And between them there is this +difference, that calumny needs neither witness, nor circumstantial proof to +establish it, so that any man may be calumniated by any other; but not +impeached; since impeachment demands that there be substantive charges made, +and trustworthy evidence to support them. Again, it is before the magistrates, +the people, or the courts of justice that men are impeached; but in the streets +and market places that they are calumniated. Calumny, therefore, is most rife +in that State wherein impeachment is least practised, and the laws least favour +it. For which reasons the legislator should so shape the laws of his State that +it shall be possible therein to impeach any of its citizens without fear or +favour; and, after duly providing for this, should visit calumniators with the +sharpest punishments. Those punished will have no cause to complain, since it +was in their power to have impeached openly where they have secretly +calumniated. Where this is not seen to, grave disorders will always ensue. For +calumnies sting without disabling; and those who are stung being more moved by +hatred of their detractors than by fear of the things they say against them, +seek revenge. +</p> + +<p> +This matter, as we have said, was well arranged for in Rome, but has always +been badly regulated in our city of Florence. And as the Roman ordinances with +regard to it were productive of much good, so the want of them in Florence has +bred much mischief. For any one reading the history of our city may perceive, +how many calumnies have at all times been aimed against those of its citizens +who have taken a leading part in its affairs. Thus, of one it would be said +that he had plundered the public treasury, of another, that he had failed in +some enterprise because he had been bribed; of a third, that this or the other +disaster had originated in his ambition. Hence hatred sprung up on every side, +and hatred growing to division, these led to factions, and these again to ruin. +But had there existed in Florence some procedure whereby citizens might have +been impeached, and calumniators punished, numberless disorders which have +taken there would have been prevented. For citizens who were impeached, whether +condemned or acquitted, would have had no power to injure the State; and they +would have been impeached far seldomer than they have been calumniated; for +calumny, as I have said already, is an easier matter than impeachment. +</p> + +<p> +Some, indeed, have made use of calumny as a means for raising themselves to +power, and have found their advantage in traducing eminent citizens who +withstood their designs; for by taking the part of the people, and confirming +them in their ill-opinion of these great men, they made them their friends. Of +this, though I could give many instances, I shall content myself with one. At +the siege of Lucca the Florentine army was commanded by Messer Giovanni +Guicciardini, as its commissary, through whose bad generalship or ill-fortune +the town was not taken. But whatever the cause of this failure, Messer Giovanni +had the blame; and the rumour ran that he had been bribed by the people of +Lucca. Which calumny being fostered by his enemies, brought Messer Giovanni to +very verge of despair; and though to clear himself he would willingly have +given himself up to the Captain of Justice he found he could not, there being +no provision in the laws of the republic which allowed of his doing so. Hence +arose the bitterest hostility between the friends of Messer Giovanni, who were +mostly of the old nobility (<i>grandi</i>), and those who sought to reform the +government of Florence; and from this and the like causes, the affair grew to +such dimensions as to bring about the downfall of our republic. +</p> + +<p> +Manlius Capitolinus, then, was a calumniator, not an accuser; and in their +treatment of him the Romans showed how calumniators should be dealt with; by +which I mean, that they should be forced to become accusers; and if their +accusation be proved true, should be rewarded, or at least not punished, but if +proved false should be punished as Manlius was. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER IX.—<i>That to give new Institutions to a Commonwealth, or to +reconstruct old Institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one +Man</i>.</h2> + +<p> +It may perhaps be thought that I should not have got so far into the history of +Rome, without some mention of those who gave that city its institutions, and +saying something of these institutions themselves, so far as they relate to +religion and war. As I have no wish to keep those who would know my views on +these matters in suspense, I say at once, that to many it might seem of evil +omen that the founder of a civil government like Romulus, should first have +slain his brother, and afterwards have consented to the death of Titus Tatius +the Sabine, whom he had chosen to be his colleague in the kingship; since his +countrymen, if moved by ambition and lust of power to inflict like injuries on +any who opposed their designs, might plead the example of their prince. This +view would be a reasonable one were we to disregard the object which led +Romulus to put those men to death. But we must take it as a rule to which there +are very few if any exceptions, that no commonwealth or kingdom ever has +salutary institutions given it from the first or has its institutions recast in +an entirely new mould, unless by a single person. On the contrary, it must be +from one man that it receives its institutions at first, and upon one man that +all similar reconstruction must depend. For this reason the wise founder of a +commonwealth who seeks to benefit not himself only, or the line of his +descendants, but his State and country, must endeavour to acquire an absolute +and undivided authority. And none who is wise will ever blame any action, +however extraordinary and irregular, which serves to lay the foundation of a +kingdom or to establish a republic. For although the act condemn the doer, the +end may justify him; and when, as in the case of Romulus, the end is good, it +will always excuse the means; since it is he who does violence with intent to +injure, not he who does it with the design to secure tranquility, who merits +blame. Such a person ought however to be so prudent and moderate as to avoid +transmitting the absolute authority he acquires, as an inheritance to another; +for as men are, by nature, more prone to evil than to good, a successor may +turn to ambitious ends the power which his predecessor has used to promote +worthy ends. Moreover, though it be one man that must give a State its +institutions, once given they are not so likely to last long resting for +support on the shoulders of one man only, as when entrusted to the care of +many, and when it is the business of many to maintain them. For though the +multitude be unfit to set a State in order, since they cannot, by reason of the +divisions which prevail among them, agree wherein the true well-being of the +State lies, yet when they have once been taught the truth, they never will +consent to abandon it. And that Romulus, though he put his brother to death, is +yet of those who are to be pardoned, since what he did was done for the common +good and not from personal ambition, is shown by his at once creating a senate, +with whom he took counsel, and in accordance with whose voice he determined. +And whosoever shall well examine the authority which Romulus reserved to +himself, will find that he reserved nothing beyond the command of the army when +war was resolved on, and the right to assemble the senate. This is seen later, +on Rome becoming free by the expulsion of the Tarquins, when the Romans altered +none of their ancient institutions save in appointing two consuls for a year +instead of a king for life; for this proves that all the original institutions +of that city were more in conformity with a free and constitutional government, +than with an absolute and despotic one. +</p> + +<p> +In support of what has been said above, I might cite innumerable instances, as +of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms and commonwealths, +who, from the full powers given them, were enabled to shape their laws to the +public advantage; but passing over these examples, as of common notoriety, I +take one, not indeed so famous, but which merits the attention of all who +desire to frame wise laws. Agis, King of Sparta, desiring to bring back his +countrymen to those limits within which the laws of Lycurgus had held them, +because he thought that, from having somewhat deviated from them, his city had +lost much of its ancient virtue and, consequently much of its strength and +power, was, at the very outset of his attempts, slain by the Spartan Ephori, as +one who sought to make himself a tyrant. But Cleomenes coming after him in the +kingdom, and, on reading the notes and writings which he found of Agis wherein +his designs and intentions were explained, being stirred by the same desire, +perceived that he could not confer this benefit on his country unless he +obtained sole power. For he saw that the ambition of others made it impossible +for him to do what was useful for many against the will of a few. Wherefore, +finding fit occasion, he caused the Ephori and all others likely to throw +obstacles in his way, to be put to death; after which, he completely renewed +the laws of Lycurgus. And the result of his measures would have been to give +fresh life to Sparta, and to gain for himself a renown not inferior to that of +Lycurgus, had it not been for the power of the Macedonians and the weakness of +the other Greek States. For while engaged with these reforms, he was attacked +by the Macedonians, and being by himself no match for them, and having none to +whom he could turn for help, he was overpowered; and his plans, though wise and +praiseworthy, were never brought to perfection. +</p> + +<p> +All which circumstances considered, I conclude that he who gives new +institutions to a State must stand alone; and that for the deaths of Remus and +Tatius, Romulus is to be excused rather than blamed. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER X.—<i>That in proportion as the Founder of a Kingdom or +Commonwealth merits Praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves Blame.</i></h2> + +<p> +Of all who are praised they are praised the most, who are the authors and +founders of religions. After whom come the founders of kingdoms and +commonwealths. Next to these, they have the greatest name who as commanders of +armies have added to their own dominions or those of their country. After +these, again, are ranked men of letters, who being of various shades of merit +are celebrated each in his degree. To all others, whose number is infinite, is +ascribed that measure of praise to which his profession or occupation entitles +him. And, conversely, all who contribute to the overthrow of religion, or to +the ruin of kingdoms and commonwealths, all who are foes to letters and to the +arts which confer honour and benefit on the human race (among whom I reckon the +impious, the cruel, the ignorant, the indolent, the base and the worthless), +are held in infamy and detestation. +</p> + +<p> +No one, whether he be wise or foolish, bad or good, if asked to choose between +these two kinds of men, will ever be found to withhold praise from what +deserves praise, or blame from what is to be blamed. And yet almost all, +deceived by a false good and a false glory, allow themselves either ignorantly +or wilfully to follow in the footsteps such as deserve blame rather than +praise; and, have it in their power to establish, to their lasting renown, a +commonwealth or kingdom, turn aside to create a tyranny without a thought how +much they thereby lose in name, fame, security, tranquility, and peace of mind; +and into how much infamy, scorn, danger, and disquiet they run. But were they +to read history, and turn to profit the lessons of the past, it seems +impossible that those living in a republic as private citizens, should not +prefer, in their native city, to play the part of Scipio rather of Cæsar; or +that those who by good fortune or merit have risen to be rulers, should not +seek rather to resemble Agesilaus, Timoleon, and Dion, than to Nabis, Phalaris +and Dionysius; since they would see how the latter are loaded with infamy, +while the former have been extolled beyond bounds. They would see, too, how +Timoleon and others like him, had as great authority in their country as +Dionysius or Phalaris in theirs, while enjoying far greater security. Nor let +any one finding Cæsar celebrated by a crowd of writers, be misled by his glory; +for those who praise him have been corrupted by his good fortune, and overawed +by the greatness of that empire which, being governed in his name, would not +suffer any to speak their minds openly concerning him. But let him who desires +to know how historians would have written of Cæsar had they been free to +declare their thoughts mark what they say of Catiline, than whom Cæsar is more +hateful, in proportion as he who does is more to be condemned than he who only +desires to do evil. Let him see also what praises they lavish upon Brutus, +because being unable, out of respect for his power, to reproach Cæsar, they +magnify his enemy. And if he who has become prince in any State will but +reflect, how, after Rome was made an empire, far greater praise was earned +those emperors who lived within the laws, and worthily, than by those who lived +in the contrary way, he will see that Titus, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus +and Marcus had no need of prætorian cohorts, or of countless legions to guard +them, but were defended by their own good lives, the good-will of their +subjects, and the attachment of the senate. In like manner he will perceive in +the case of Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, and ever so many more of those evil +emperors, that all the armies of the east and of the west were of no avail to +protect them from the enemies whom their bad and depraved lives raised up +against them. And were the history of these emperors rightly studied, it would +be a sufficient lesson to any prince how to distinguish the paths which lead to +honour and safety from those which end in shame and insecurity. For of the +twenty-six emperors from Cæsar to Maximinus, sixteen came to a violent, ten +only to a natural death; and though one or two of those who died by violence +may have been good princes, as Galba or Pertinax, they met their fate in +consequence of that corruption which their predecessors had left behind in the +army. And if among those who died a natural death, there be found some bad +emperors, like Severus, it is to be ascribed to their signal good fortune and +to their great abilities, advantages seldom found united in the same man. From +the study of this history we may also learn how a good government is to be +established; for while all the emperors who succeeded to the throne by birth, +except Titus, were bad, all were good who succeeded by adoption; as in the case +of the five from Nerva to Marcus. But so soon as the empire fell once more to +the heirs by birth, its ruin recommenced. +</p> + +<p> +Let a prince therefore look to that period which extends from Nerva to Marcus, +and contrast it with that which went before and that which came after, and then +let him say in which of them he would wish to have been born or to have +reigned. For during these times in which good men governed, he will see the +prince secure in the midst of happy subjects, and the whole world filled with +peace and justice. He will find the senate maintaining its authority, the +magistrates enjoying their honours, rich citizens their wealth, rank and merit +held in respect, ease and content everywhere prevailing, rancour, licence, +corruption and ambition everywhere quenched, and that golden age restored in +which every one might hold and support what opinions he pleased. He will see, +in short, the world triumphing, the sovereign honoured and revered, the people +animated with love, and rejoicing in their security. But should he turn to +examine the times of the other emperors, he will find them wasted by battles, +torn by seditions, cruel alike in war and peace; many princes perishing by the +sword; many wars foreign and domestic; Italy overwhelmed with unheard-of +disasters; her towns destroyed and plundered; Rome burned; the Capitol razed to +the ground by Roman citizens; the ancient temples desolated; the ceremonies of +religion corrupted; the cities rank with adultery; the seas covered with exiles +and the islands polluted with blood. He will see outrage follow outrage; rank, +riches, honours, and, above all, virtue imputed as mortal crimes; informers +rewarded; slaves bribed to betray their masters, freedmen their patrons, and +those who were without enemies brought to destruction by their friends; and +then he will know the true nature of the debt which Rome, Italy, and the world +owe to Cæsar; and if he possess a spark of human feeling, will turn from the +example of those evil times, and kindle with a consuming passion to imitate +those which were good. +</p> + +<p> +And in truth the prince who seeks for worldly glory should desire to be the +ruler of a corrupt city; not that, like Cæsar, he may destroy it, but that, +like Romulus, he may restore it; since man cannot hope for, nor Heaven offer +any better opportunity of fame. Were it indeed necessary in giving a +constitution to a State to forfeit its sovereignty, the prince who, to retain +his station, should withhold a constitution, might plead excuse; but for him +who in giving a constitution can still retain his sovereignty, no excuse is to +be made. +</p> + +<p> +Let those therefore to whom Heaven has afforded this opportunity, remember that +two courses lie open to them; one which will render them secure while they live +and glorious when they die; another which exposes them to continual +difficulties in life, and condemns them to eternal infamy after death. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XI.—<i>Of the Religion of the Romans.</i></h2> + +<p> +Though Rome had Romulus for her first founder, and as a daughter owed him her +being and nurture, nevertheless, when the institutions of Romulus were seen by +Heaven to be insufficient for so great a State, the Roman senate were moved to +choose Numa Pompilius as his successor, that he might look to all matters which +Romulus had neglected. He finding the people fierce and turbulent, and desiring +with the help of the peaceful arts to bring them to order and obedience, called +in the aid of religion as essential to the maintenance of civil society, and +gave it such a form, that for many ages God was nowhere so much feared as in +that republic. The effect of this was to render easy any enterprise in which +the senate or great men of Rome thought fit to engage. And whosoever pays heed +to an infinity of actions performed, sometimes by the Roman people +collectively, often by single citizens, will see, that esteeming the power of +God beyond that of man, they dreaded far more to violate their oath than to +transgress the laws; as is clearly shown by the examples of Scipio and of +Manlius Torquatus. For after the defeat of the Romans by Hannibal at Cannæ, +many citizens meeting together, resolved, in their terror and dismay, to +abandon Italy and seek refuge in Sicily. But Scipio, getting word of this, went +among them, and menacing them with his naked sword, made them swear never to +abandon their country. Again, when Lucius Manlius was accused by the tribune +Marcus Pomponius, before the day fixed for trial, Titus Manlius, afterwards +named Torquatus, son to Lucius, went to seek this Marcus, and threatening him +with death if he did not withdraw the charge against his father, compelled him +to swear compliance; and he, through fear, having sworn, kept his oath. In the +first of these two instances, therefore, citizens whom love of their country +and its laws could not have retained in Italy, were kept there by the oath +forced upon them; and in the second, the tribune Marcus, to keep his oath, laid +aside the hatred he bore the father, and overlooked the injury done him by the +son, and his own dishonour. And this from no other cause than the religion +which Numa had impressed upon this city. +</p> + +<p> +And it will be plain to any one who carefully studies Roman History, how much +religion helped in disciplining the army, in uniting the people, in keeping +good men good, and putting bad men to shame; so that had it to be decided to +which prince, Romulus or Numa, Rome owed the greater debt, I think the balance +must turn in favour of Numa; for when religion is once established you may +readily bring in arms; but where you have arms without religion it is not easy +afterwards to bring in religion. We see, too, that while Romulus in order to +create a senate, and to establish his other ordinances civil and military, +needed no support from Divine authority, this was very necessary to Numa, who +feigned to have intercourse with a Nymph by whose advice he was guided in +counselling the people. And this, because desiring to introduce in Rome new and +untried institutions, he feared that his own authority might not effect his +end. Nor, indeed, has any attempt ever been made to introduce unusual laws +among a people, without resorting to Divine authority, since without such +sanction they never would have been accepted. For the wise recognize many +things to be good which do not bear such reasons on the face of them as command +their acceptance by others; wherefore, wise men who would obviate these +difficulties, have recourse to Divine aid. Thus did Lycurgus, thus Solon, and +thus have done many besides who have had the same end in view. +</p> + +<p> +The Romans, accordingly, admiring the prudence and virtues of Numa, assented to +all the measures which he recommended. This, however, is to be said, that the +circumstance of these times being deeply tinctured with religious feeling, and +of the men with whom he had to deal being rude and ignorant, gave Numa better +facility to carry out his plans, as enabling him to mould his subjects readily +to any new impression. And, doubtless, he who should seek at the present day to +form a new commonwealth, would find the task easier among a race of simple +mountaineers, than among the dwellers in cities where society is corrupt; as +the sculptor can more easily carve a fair statue from a rough block, than from +the block which has been badly shaped out by another. But taking all this into +account, I maintain that the religion introduced by Numa was one of the chief +causes of the prosperity of Rome, since it gave rise to good ordinances, which +in turn brought with them good fortune, and with good fortune, happy issues to +whatsoever was undertaken. +</p> + +<p> +And as the observance of the ordinances of religion is the cause of the +greatness of a State, so their neglect is the occasion of its decline; since a +kingdom without the fear of God must either fall to pieces, or must be +maintained by the fear of some prince who supplies that influence not supplied +by religion. But since the lives of princes are short, the life of this prince, +also, and with it his influence, must soon come to an end; whence it happens +that a kingdom which rests wholly on the qualities of its prince, lasts for a +brief time only; because these qualities, terminating with his life, are rarely +renewed in his successor. For as Dante wisely says:— +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“Seldom through the boughs<br /> +Doth human worth renew itself; for such<br /> +The will of Him who gives it, that to Him<br /> +We may ascribe it.”<a href="#fn1" name="fnref1" id="fnref1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn1" id="fn1"></a> <a href="#fnref1">[1]</a> +Rade volta risurge per li rami<br/> +L’umana probitate: e questo vuole<br/> +Quei che la dà, perchè da lui si chiami.<br/> + <i>Purg</i>. vii. 121-123.] +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that the safety of a commonwealth or kingdom lies, not +in its having a ruler who governs it prudently while he lives, but in having +one who so orders things, that when he dies, the State may still maintain +itself. And though it be easier to impose new institutions or a new faith on +rude and simple men, it is not therefore impossible to persuade their adoption +by men who are civilized, and who do not think themselves rude. The people of +Florence do not esteem themselves rude or ignorant, and yet were persuaded by +the Friar Girolamo Savonarola that he spoke with God. Whether in this he said +truth or no, I take not on me to pronounce, since of so great a man we must +speak with reverence; but this I do say, that very many believed him without +having witnessed anything extraordinary to warrant their belief; his life, his +doctrines, the matter whereof he treated, being sufficient to enlist their +faith. +</p> + +<p> +Let no man, therefore, lose heart from thinking that he cannot do what others +have done before him; for, as I said in my Preface, men are born, and live, and +die, always in accordance with the same rules. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XII.—That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; +and that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been +ruined.</h2> + +<p> +Princes and commonwealths that would save themselves from growing corrupted, +should before all things keep uncorrupted the rites and ceremonies of religion, +and always hold them in reverence; since we can have no surer sign of the decay +of a province than to see Divine worship held therein in contempt. This is +easily understood when it is seen on what foundation that religion rests in +which a man is born. For every religion has its root in certain fundamental +ordinances peculiar to itself. +</p> + +<p> +The religion of the Gentiles had its beginning in the responses of the oracles +and in the prognostics of the augurs and soothsayers. All their other +ceremonies and observances depended upon these; because men naturally believed +that the God who could forecast their future weal or woe, could also bring them +to pass. Wherefore the temples, the prayers, the sacrifices, and all the other +rites of their worship, had their origin in this, that the oracles of Delos, of +Dodona, and others celebrated in antiquity, held the world admiring and devout. +But, afterwards, when these oracles began to shape their answers to suit the +interests of powerful men, and their impostures to be seen through by the +multitude, men grew incredulous and ready to overturn every sacred institution. +For which reason, the rulers of kingdoms and commonwealths should maintain the +foundations of the faith which they hold; since thus it will be easy for them +to keep their country religious, and, consequently, virtuous and united. To +which end they should countenance and further whatsoever tells in favour of +religion, even should they think it untrue; and the wiser they are, and the +better they are acquainted with natural causes, the more ought they to do so. +It is from this course having been followed by the wise, that the miracles +celebrated even in false religions, have come to be held in repute; for from +whatever source they spring, discreet men will extol them, whose authority +afterwards gives them currency everywhere. +</p> + +<p> +These miracles were common enough in Rome, and among others this was believed, +that when the Roman soldiers were sacking the city of Veii, certain of them +entered the temple of Juno and spoke to the statue of the goddess, saying, +“<i>Wilt thou come with us to Rome?</i>” when to some it seemed +that she inclined her head in assent, and to others that they heard her answer, +“<i>Yea</i>.” For these men being filled with religious awe (which +Titus Livius shows us by the circumstance that, in entering the temple, they +entered devoutly, reverently, and without tumult), persuaded themselves they +heard that answer to their question, which, perhaps, they had formed beforehand +in their minds. But their faith and belief were wholly approved of and +confirmed by Camillus and by the other chief men of the city. +</p> + +<p> +Had religion been maintained among the princes of Christendom on the footing on +which it was established by its Founder, the Christian States and republics had +been far more united and far more prosperous than they now are; nor can we have +surer proof of its decay than in witnessing how those countries which are the +nearest neighbours of the Roman Church, the head of our faith, have less +devoutness than any others; so that any one who considers its earliest +beginnings and observes how widely different is its present practice, might +well believe its ruin or its chastisement to be close at hand. +</p> + +<p> +But since some are of opinion that the welfare of Italy depends upon the Church +of Rome, I desire to put forward certain arguments which occur to me against +that view, and shall adduce two very strong ones, which, to my mind, admit of +no answer. The first is, that, through the ill example of the Roman Court, the +country has lost all religious feeling and devoutness, a loss which draws after +it infinite mischiefs and disorders; for as the presence of religion implies +every excellence, so the contrary is involved in its absence. To the Church, +therefore, and to the priests, we Italians owe this first debt, that through +them we have become wicked and irreligious. And a still greater debt we owe +them for what is the immediate cause of our ruin, namely, that by the Church +our country is kept divided. For no country was ever united or prosperous which +did not yield obedience to some one prince or commonwealth, as has been the +case with France and Spain. And the Church is the sole cause why Italy stands +on a different footing, and is subject to no one king or commonwealth. For +though she holds here her seat, and exerts her temporal authority, she has +never yet gained strength and courage to seize upon the entire country, or make +herself supreme; yet never has been so weak that when in fear of losing her +temporal dominion, she could not call in some foreign potentate to aid her +against any Italian State by which she was overmatched. Of which we find many +instances, both in early times, as when by the intervention of Charles the +Great she drove the Lombards, who had made themselves masters of nearly the +whole country, out of Italy; and also in recent times, as when, with the help +of France, she first stripped the Venetians of their territories, and then, +with the help of the Swiss, expelled the French. +</p> + +<p> +The Church, therefore, never being powerful enough herself to take possession +of the entire country, while, at the same time, preventing any one else from +doing so, has made it impossible to bring Italy under one head; and has been +the cause of her always living subject to many princes or rulers, by whom she +has been brought to such division and weakness as to have become a prey, not to +Barbarian kings only, but to any who have thought fit to attack her. For this, +I say, we Italians have none to thank but the Church. And were any man powerful +enough to transplant the Court of Rome, with all the authority it now wields +over the rest of Italy, into the territories of the Swiss (the only people who +at this day, both as regards religion and military discipline, live like the +ancients,) he would have clear proof of the truth of what I affirm, and would +find that the corrupt manners of that Court had, in a little while, wrought +greater mischief in these territories than any other disaster which could ever +befall them. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIII.—<i>Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving +Institutions to their City, in carrying out their Enterprises, and in quelling +Tumults.</i></h2> + +<p> +Here it seems to me not out of place to cite instances of the Romans seeking +assistance from religion in reforming their institutions and in carrying out +their warlike designs. And although many such are related by Titus Livius, I +content myself with mentioning the following only: The Romans having appointed +tribunes with consular powers, all of them, save one, plebeians, it so chanced +that in that very year they were visited by plague and famine, accompanied by +many strange portents. Taking occasion from this, the nobles, at the next +creation of tribunes, gave out that the gods were angry with Rome for lowering +the majesty of her government, nor could be appeased but by the choice of +tribunes being restored to a fair footing. Whereupon the people, smitten with +religious awe, chose all the tribunes from the nobles. Again, at the siege of +Veii, we find the Roman commanders making use of religion to keep the minds of +their men well disposed towards that enterprise. For when, in the last year of +the siege, the soldiers, disgusted with their protracted service, began to +clamour to be led back to Rome, on the Alban lake suddenly rising to an +uncommon height, it was found that the oracles at Delphi and elsewhere had +foretold that Veii should fall that year in which the Alban lake overflowed. +The hope of near victory thus excited in the minds of the soldiers, led them to +put up with the weariness of the war, and to continue in arms; until, on +Camillus being named dictator, Veii was taken after a ten years’ siege. +In these cases, therefore, we see religion, wisely used, assist in the +reduction of this city, and in restoring the tribuneship to the nobles; neither +of which ends could well have been effected without it. +</p> + +<p> +One other example bearing on the same subject I must not omit. Constant +disturbances were occasioned in Rome by the tribune Terentillus, who, for +reasons to be noticed in their place, sought to pass a certain law. The nobles, +in their efforts to baffle him, had recourse to religion, which they sought to +turn to account in two ways. For first they caused the Sibylline books to be +searched, and a feigned answer returned, that in that year the city ran great +risk of losing its freedom through civil discord; which fraud, although exposed +by the tribunes, nevertheless aroused such alarm in the minds of the commons +that they slackened in their support of their leaders. Their other contrivance +was as follows: A certain Appius Herdonius, at the head of a band of slaves and +outlaws, to the number of four thousand, having seized the Capitol by night, an +alarm was spread that were the Equians and Volscians, those perpetual enemies +of the Roman name, then to attack the city, they might succeed in taking it. +And when, in spite of this, the tribunes stubbornly persisted in their efforts +to pass the law, declaring the act of Herdonius to be a device of the nobles +and no real danger. Publius Rubetius, a citizen of weight and authority, came +forth from the Senate House, and in words partly friendly and partly menacing, +showed them the peril in which the city stood, and that their demands were +unseasonable; and spoke to such effect that the commons bound themselves by +oath to stand by the consul; in fulfilment of which engagement they aided the +consul, Publius Valerius, to carry the Capitol by assault. But Valerius being +slain in the attack, Titus Quintius was at once appointed in his place, who, to +leave the people no breathing time, nor suffer their thoughts to revert to the +Terentillian law, ordered them to quit Rome and march against the Volscians; +declaring them bound to follow him by virtue of the oath they had sworn not to +desert the consul. And though the tribunes withstood him, contending that the +oath had been sworn to the dead consul and not to Quintius, yet the people +under the influence of religious awe, chose rather to obey the consul than +believe the tribunes. And Titus Livius commends their behaviour when he says: +“<i>That neglect of the gods which now prevails, had not then made its +way nor was it then the practice for every man to interpret his oath, or the +laws, to suit his private ends</i>.” The tribunes accordingly, fearing to +lose their entire ascendency, consented to obey the consul, and to refrain for +a year from moving in the matter of the Terentillian law; while the consuls, on +their part, undertook that for a year the commons should not be called forth to +war. And thus, with the help of religion, the senate were able to overcome a +difficulty which they never could have overcome without it. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIV.—<i>That the Romans interpreted the Auspices to meet the +occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the Rites of Religion even when +forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they +punished.</i></h2> + +<p> +Auguries were not only, as we have shown above, a main foundation of the old +religion of the Gentiles, but were also the cause of the prosperity of the +Roman commonwealth. Accordingly, the Romans gave more heed to these than to any +other of their observances; resorting to them in their consular comitia; in +undertaking new enterprises; in calling out their armies; in going into battle; +and, in short, in every business of importance, whether civil or military. Nor +would they ever set forth on any warlike expedition, until they had satisfied +their soldiers that the gods had promised them victory. +</p> + +<p> +Among other means of declaring the auguries, they had in their armies a class +of soothsayers, named by them <i>pullarii</i>, whom, when they desired to give +battle, they would ask to take the auspices, which they did by observing the +behaviour of fowls. If the fowls pecked, the engagement was begun with a +favourable omen. If they refused, battle was declined. Nevertheless, when it +was plain on the face of it that a certain course had to be taken, they would +take it at all hazards, even though the auspices were adverse; contriving, +however, to manage matters so adroitly as not to appear to throw any slight on +religion; as was done by the consul Papirius in the great battle he fought with +the Samnites wherein that nation was finally broken and overthrown. For +Papirius being encamped over against the Samnites, and perceiving that if he +fought, victory was certain, and consequently being eager to engage, desired +the omens to be taken. The fowls refused to peck; but the chief soothsayer +observing the eagerness of the soldiers to fight and the confidence felt both +by them and by their captain, not to deprive the army of such an opportunity of +glory, reported to the consul that the auspices were favourable. Whereupon +Papirius began to array his army for battle. But some among the soothsayers +having divulged to certain of the soldiers that the fowls had not pecked, this +was told to Spurius Papirius, the nephew of the consul, who reporting it to his +uncle, the latter straightway bade him mind his own business, for that so far +as he himself and the army were concerned, the auspices were fair; and if the +soothsayer had lied, the consequences were on his head. And that the event +might accord with the prognostics, he commanded his officers to place the +soothsayers in front of the battle. It so chanced that as they advanced against +the enemy, the chief soothsayer was killed by a spear thrown by a Roman +soldier; which, the consul hearing of, said, “<i>All goes well, and as +the Gods would have it, for by the death of this liar the army is purged of +blame and absolved from whatever displeasure these may have conceived against +it</i>.” And contriving, in this way to make his designs tally with the +auspices, he joined battle, without the army knowing that the ordinances of +religion had in any degree been disregarded. +</p> + +<p> +But an opposite course was taken by Appius Pulcher, in Sicily, in the first +Carthaginian war. For desiring to join battle, he bade the soothsayers take the +auspices, and on their announcing that the fowls refused to feed, he answered, +“<i>Let us see, then, whether they will drink,</i>” and, so saying, +caused them to be thrown into the sea. After which he fought and was defeated. +For this he was condemned at Rome, while Papirius was honoured; not so much +because the one had gained while the other had lost a battle, as because in +their treatment of the auspices the one had behaved discreetly, the other with +rashness. And, in truth, the sole object of this system of taking the auspices +was to insure the army joining battle with that confidence of success which +constantly leads to victory; a device followed not by the Romans only, but by +foreign nations as well; of which I shall give an example in the following +Chapter. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XV.—<i>How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken +Fortunes, had recourse to Religion.</i></h2> + +<p> +The Samnites, who before had met with many defeats at the hands of the Romans, +were at last decisively routed by them in Etruria, where their armies were cut +to pieces and their commanders slain. And because their allies also, such as +the Etruscans, the Umbrians, and the Gauls, were likewise vanquished, they +“<i>could now no longer</i>” as Livius tells us, “<i>either +trust to their own strength or to foreign aid; yet, for all that, would not +cease from hostilities, nor resign themselves to forfeit the liberty which they +had unsuccessfully defended, preferring new defeats to an inglorious +submission.</i>” They resolved, therefore, to make a final effort; and as +they knew that victory was only to be secured by inspiring their soldiers with +a stubborn courage, to which end nothing could help so much as religion, at the +instance of their high priest, Ovius Paccius, they revived an ancient +sacrificial rite performed by them in the manner following. After offering +solemn sacrifice they caused all the captains of their armies, standing between +the slain victims and the smoking altars, to swear never to abandon the war. +They then summoned the common soldiers, one by one, and before the same altars, +and surrounded by a ring of many centurions with drawn swords, first bound them +by oath never to reveal what they might see or hear; and then, after +imprecating the Divine wrath, and reciting the most terrible incantations, made +them vow and swear to the gods, as they would not have a curse light on their +race and offspring, to follow wherever their captains led, never to turn back +from battle, and to put any they saw turn back to death. Some who in their +terror declined to swear, were forthwith slain by the centurions. The rest, +warned by their cruel fate, complied. Assembling thereafter to the number of +forty thousand, one-half of whom, to render their appearance of unusual +splendour were clad in white, with plumes and crests over their helmets, they +took up their ground in the neighbourhood of Aquilonia. But Papirius, being +sent against them, bade his soldiers be of good cheer, telling them +“<i>that feathers made no wounds, and that a Roman spear would pierce a +painted shield;</i>” and to lessen the effect which the oath taken by the +Samnites had upon the minds of the Romans, he said that such an oath must +rather distract than strengthen those bound by it, since they had to fear, at +once, their enemies, their comrades, and their Gods. In the battle which +ensued, the Samnites were routed, any firmness lent them by religion or by the +oath they had sworn, being balanced by the Roman valour, and the terror +inspired by past defeats. Still we see that, in their own judgment, they had no +other refuge to which to turn, nor other remedy for restoring their broken +hopes; and this is strong testimony to the spirit which religion rightly used +can arouse. +</p> + +<p> +Some of the incidents which I have now been considering may be thought to +relate rather to the foreign than to the domestic affairs of Rome, which last +alone form the proper subject of this Book; nevertheless since the matter +connects itself with one of the most important institutions of the Roman +republic, I have thought it convenient to notice it here, so as not to divide +the subject and be obliged to return to it hereafter. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVI.—<i>That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if +by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that Freedom.</i></h2> + +<p> +Should a people accustomed to live under a prince by any accident become free, +as did the Romans on the expulsion of the Tarquins, we know from numberless +instances recorded in ancient history, how hard it will be for it to maintain +that freedom. And this is no more than we might expect. For a people in such +circumstances may be likened to the wild animal which, though destined by +nature to roam at large in the woods, has been reared in the cage and in +constant confinement and which, should it chance to be set free in the open +country, being unused to find its own food, and unfamiliar with the coverts +where it might lie concealed, falls a prey to the first who seeks to recapture +it. Even thus it fares with the people which has been accustomed to be governed +by others; since ignorant how to act by itself either for attack or defence, +and neither knowing foreign princes nor being known of them, it is speedily +brought back under the yoke, and often under a heavier yoke than that from +which it has just freed its neck. These difficulties will be met with, even +where the great body of the citizens has not become wholly corrupted; but where +the corruption is complete, freedom, as shall presently be shown, is not merely +fleeting but impossible. Wherefore my remarks are to be taken as applying to +those States only wherein corruption has as yet made no great progress, and in +which there is more that is sound than unsound. +</p> + +<p> +To the difficulties above noticed, another has to be added, which is, that a +State in becoming free makes for itself bitter enemies but not warm friends. +All become its bitter enemies who, drawing their support from the wealth of the +tyrant, flourished under his government. For these men, when the causes which +made them powerful are withdrawn, can no longer live contented, but are one and +all impelled to attempt the restoration of the tyranny in hopes of regaining +their former importance. On the other hand, as I have said, the State which +becomes free does not gain for itself warm friends. For a free government +bestows its honours and rewards in accordance with certain fixed rules, and on +considerations of merit, without which none is honoured or rewarded. But when a +man obtains only those honours or rewards which he seems to himself to deserve, +he will never admit that he is under any obligation to those who bestow them. +Moreover the common benefits that all derive from a free government, which +consist in the power to enjoy what is our own, openly and undisturbed, in +having to feel no anxiety for the honour of wife or child, nor any fear for +personal safety, are hardly recognized by men while they still possess them, +since none will ever confess obligation to him who merely refrains from injury. +For these reasons, I repeat, a State which has recently become free, is likely +to have bitter enemies and no warm friends. +</p> + +<p> +Now, to meet these difficulties and their attendant disorders, there is no more +potent, effectual, wholesome, and necessary remedy than <i>to slay the sons of +Brutus</i>. They, as the historian tells us, were along with other young Romans +led to conspire against their country, simply because the unusual privileges +which they had enjoyed under the kings, were withheld under the consuls; so +that to them it seemed as though the freedom of the people implied their +servitude. Any one, therefore, who undertakes to control a people, either as +their prince or as the head of a commonwealth, and does not make sure work with +all who are hostile to his new institutions, founds a government which cannot +last long. Undoubtedly those princes are to be reckoned unhappy, who, to secure +their position, are forced to advance by unusual and irregular paths, and with +the people for their enemies. For while he who has to deal with a few +adversaries only, can easily and without much or serious difficulty secure +himself, he who has an entire people against him can never feel safe and the +greater the severity he uses the weaker his authority becomes; so that his best +course is to strive to make the people his friends. +</p> + +<p> +But since these views may seem to conflict with what I have said above, +treating there of a republic and here of a prince, that I may not have to +return to the subject again, I will in this place discuss it briefly. Speaking, +then of those princes who have become the tyrants of their country, I say that +the prince who seeks to gain over an unfriendly people should first of all +examine what it is the people really desire, and he will always find that they +desire two things: first, to be revenged upon those who are the cause of their +servitude; and second, to regain their freedom. The first of these desires the +prince can gratify wholly, the second in part. As regards the former, we have +an instance exactly in point. Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea, being in exile, it +so happened that on a feud arising between the commons and the nobles of that +city, the latter, perceiving they were weaker than their adversaries, began to +look with favour on Clearchus, and conspiring with him, in opposition to the +popular voice recalled him to Heraclea and deprived the people of their +freedom. Clearchus finding himself thus placed between the arrogance of the +nobles, whom he could in no way either satisfy or correct, and the fury of the +people, who could not put up with the loss of their freedom, resolved to rid +himself at a stroke from the harassment of the nobles and recommend himself to +the people. Wherefore, watching his opportunity, he caused all the nobles to be +put to death, and thus, to the extreme delight of the people, satisfied one of +those desires by which they are possessed, namely, the desire for vengeance. +</p> + +<p> +As for the other desire of the people, namely, to recover their freedom, the +prince, since he never can content them in this, should examine what the causes +are which make them long to be free; and he will find a very few of them +desiring freedom that they may obtain power, but all the rest, whose number is +countless, only desiring it that they may live securely. For in all republics, +whatever the form of their government, barely forty or fifty citizens have any +place in the direction of affairs; who, from their number being so small, can +easily be reckoned with, either by making away with them, or by allowing them +such a share of honours as, looking to their position, may reasonably content +them. All those others whose sole aim it is to live safely, are well contented +where the prince enacts such laws and ordinances as provide for the general +security, while they establish his own authority; and when he does this, and +the people see that nothing induces him to violate these laws, they soon begin +to live happily and without anxiety. Of this we have an example in the kingdom +of France, which enjoys perfect security from this cause alone, that its kings +are bound to compliance with an infinity of laws upon which the well-being of +the whole people depends. And he who gave this State its constitution allowed +its kings to do as they pleased as regards arms and money; but provided that as +regards everything else they should not interfere save as the laws might +direct. Those rulers, therefore, who omit to provide sufficiently for the +safety of their government at the outset, must, like the Romans, do so on the +first occasion which offers; and whoever lets the occasion slip, will repent +too late of not having acted as he should. The Romans, however, being still +uncorrupted at the time when they recovered their freedom, were able, after +slaying the sons of Brutus and getting rid of the Tarquins, to maintain it with +all those safeguards and remedies which we have elsewhere considered. But had +they already become corrupted, no remedy could have been found, either in Rome +or out of it, by which their freedom could have been secured; as I shall show +in the following Chapter. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVII.—<i>That a corrupt People obtaining Freedom can hardly +preserve it.</i></h2> + +<p> +I believe that if her kings had not been expelled, Rome must very soon have +become a weak and inconsiderable State. For seeing to what a pitch of +corruption these kings had come, we may conjecture that if two or three more +like reigns had followed, and the taint spread from the head to the members, so +soon as the latter became infected, cure would have been hopeless. But from the +head being removed while the trunk was still sound, it was not difficult for +the Romans to return to a free and constitutional government. +</p> + +<p> +It may be assumed, however, as most certain, that a corrupted city living under +a prince can never recover its freedom, even were the prince and all his line +to be exterminated. For in such a city it must necessarily happen that one +prince will be replaced by another, and that things will never settle down +until a new lord be established; unless, indeed, the combined goodness and +valour of some one citizen should maintain freedom, which, even then, will +endure only for his lifetime; as happened twice in Syracuse, first under the +rule of Dion, and again under that of Timoleon, whose virtues while they lived +kept their city free, but on whose death it fell once more under a tyranny. +</p> + +<p> +But the strongest example that can be given is that of Rome, which on the +expulsion of the Tarquins was able at once to seize on liberty and to maintain +it; yet, on the deaths of Cæsar, Caligula, and Nero, and on the extinction of +the Julian line, was not only unable to establish her freedom, but did not even +venture a step in that direction. Results so opposite arising in one and the +same city can only be accounted for by this, that in the time of the Tarquins +the Roman people were not yet corrupted, but in these later times had become +utterly corrupt. For on the first occasion, nothing more was needed to prepare +and determine them to shake off their kings, than that they should be bound by +oath to suffer no king ever again to reign in Rome; whereas, afterwards, the +authority and austere virtue of Brutus, backed by all the legions of the East, +could not rouse them to maintain their hold of that freedom, which he, +following in the footsteps of the first Brutus, had won for them; and this +because of the corruption wherewith the people had been infected by the Marian +faction, whereof Cæsar becoming head, was able so to blind the multitude that +it saw not the yoke under which it was about to lay its neck. +</p> + +<p> +Though this example of Rome be more complete than any other, I desire to +instance likewise, to the same effect, certain peoples well known in our own +days; and I maintain that no change, however grave or violent, could ever +restore freedom to Naples or Milan, because in these States the entire body of +the people has grown corrupted. And so we find that Milan, although desirous to +return to a free form of government, on the death of Filippo Visconti, had +neither the force nor the skill needed to preserve it. +</p> + +<p> +Most fortunate, therefore, was it for Rome that her kings grew corrupt soon, so +as to be driven out before the taint of their corruption had reached the vitals +of the city. For it was because these were sound that the endless commotions +which took place in Rome, so far from being hurtful, were, from their object +being good, beneficial to the commonwealth. From which we may draw this +inference, that where the body of the people is still sound, tumults and other +like disorders do little hurt, but that where it has become corrupted, laws, +however well devised, are of no advantage, unless imposed by some one whose +paramount authority causes them to be observed until the community be once more +restored to a sound and healthy condition. +</p> + +<p> +Whether this has ever happened I know not, nor whether it ever can happen. For +we see, as I have said a little way back, that a city which owing to its +pervading corruption has once begun to decline, if it is to recover at all, +must be saved not by the excellence of the people collectively, but of some one +man then living among them, on whose death it at once relapses into its former +plight; as happened with Thebes, in which the virtue of Epaminondas made it +possible while he lived to preserve the form of a free Government, but which +fell again on his death into its old disorders; the reason being that hardly +any ruler lives so long as to have time to accustom to right methods a city +which has long been accustomed to wrong. Wherefore, unless things be put on a +sound footing by some one ruler who lives to a very advanced age, or by two +virtuous rulers succeeding one another, the city upon their death at once falls +back into ruin; or, if it be preserved, must be so by incurring great risks, +and at the cost of much blood. For the corruption I speak of, is wholly +incompatible with a free government, because it results from an inequality +which pervades the State and can only be removed by employing unusual and very +violent remedies, such as few are willing or know how to employ, as in another +place I shall more fully explain. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVIII.—<i>How a Free Government existing in a corrupt City +may be preserved, or not existing may be created.</i></h2> + +<p> +I think it neither out of place, nor inconsistent with what has been said +above, to consider whether a free government existing in a corrupt city can be +maintained, or, not existing, can be introduced. And on this head I say that it +is very difficult to bring about either of these results, and next to +impossible to lay down rules as to how it may be done; because the measures to +be taken must vary with the degree of corruption which prevails. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless, since it is well to reason things out, I will not pass this +matter by, but will assume, in the first place, the case of a very corrupt +city, and then take the case of one in which corruption has reached a still +greater height; but where corruption is universal, no laws or institutions will +ever have force to restrain it. Because as good customs stand in need of good +laws for their support, so laws, that they may be respected, stand in need of +good customs. Moreover, the laws and institutions established in a republic at +its beginning, when men were good, are no longer suitable when they have become +bad; but while the laws of a city are altered to suit its circumstances, its +institutions rarely or never change; whence it results that the introduction of +new laws is of no avail, because the institutions, remaining unchanged, corrupt +them. +</p> + +<p> +And to make this plainer, I say that in Rome it was first of all the +institutions of the State, and next the laws as enforced by the magistrates, +which kept the citizens under control. The institutions of the State consisted +in the authority of the people, the senate, the tribunes, and the consuls; in +the methods of choosing and appointing magistrates; and in the arrangements for +passing laws. These institutions changed little, if at all, with circumstances. +But the laws by which the people were controlled, as for instance the law +relating to adultery, the sumptuary laws, the law as to canvassing at +elections, and many others, were altered as the citizens grew more and more +corrupted. Hence, the institutions of the State remaining the same although +from the corruption of the people no longer suitable, amendments in the laws +could not keep men good, though they might have proved very useful if at the +time when they were made the institutions had likewise been reformed. +</p> + +<p> +That its original institutions are no longer adapted to a city that has become +corrupted, is plainly seen in two matters of great moment, I mean in the +appointment of magistrates and in the passing of laws. For the Roman people +conferred the consulship and other great offices of their State on none save +those who sought them; which was a good institution at first, because then none +sought these offices save those who thought themselves worthy of them, and to +be rejected was held disgraceful; so that, to be deemed worthy, all were on +their best behaviour. But in a corrupted city this institution grew to be most +mischievous. For it was no longer those of greatest worth, but those who had +most influence, who sought the magistracies; while all who were without +influence, however deserving, refrained through fear. This untoward result was +not reached all at once, but like other similar results, by gradual steps. For +after subduing Africa and Asia, and reducing nearly the whole of Greece to +submission, the Romans became perfectly assured of their freedom, and seemed to +themselves no longer to have any enemy whom they had cause to fear. But this +security and the weakness of their adversaries led them in conferring the +consulship, no longer to look to merit, but only to favour, selecting for the +office those who knew best how to pay court to them, not those who knew best +how to vanquish their enemies. And afterwards, instead of selecting those who +were best liked, they came to select those who had most influence; and in this +way, from the imperfection of their institutions, good men came to be wholly +excluded. +</p> + +<p> +Again, as to making laws, any of the tribunes and certain others of the +magistrates were entitled to submit laws to the people; but before these were +passed it was open to every citizen to speak either for or against them. This +was a good system so long as the citizens were good, since it is always well +that every man should be able to propose what he thinks may be of use to his +country, and that all should be allowed to express their views with regard to +his proposal; so that the people, having heard all, may resolve on what is +best. But when the people grew depraved, this became a very mischievous +institution; for then it was only the powerful who proposed laws, and these not +in the interest of public freedom but of their own authority; and because, +through fear, none durst speak against the laws they proposed, the people were +either deceived or forced into voting their own destruction. +</p> + +<p> +In order, therefore, that Rome after she had become corrupted might still +preserve her freedom, it was necessary that, as in the course of events she had +made new laws, so likewise she should frame new institutions, since different +institutions and ordinances are needed in a corrupt State from those which suit +a State which is not corrupted; for where the matter is wholly dissimilar, the +form cannot be similar. +</p> + +<p> +But since old institutions must either be reformed all at once, as soon as they +are seen to be no longer expedient, or else gradually, as the imperfection of +each is recognized, I say that each of these two courses is all but impossible. +For to effect a gradual reform requires a sagacious man who can discern +mischief while it is still remote and in the germ. But it may well happen that +no such person is found in a city; or that, if found, he is unable to persuade +others of what he is himself persuaded. For men used to live in one way are +loath to leave it for another, especially when they are not brought face to +face with the evil against which they should guard, and only have it indicated +to them by conjecture. And as for a sudden reform of institutions which are +seen by all to be no longer good, I say that defects which are easily discerned +are not easily corrected, because for their correction it is not enough to use +ordinary means, these being in themselves insufficient; but recourse must be +had to extraordinary means, such as violence and arms; and, as a preliminary, +you must become prince of the city, and be able to deal with it at your +pleasure. But since the restoration of a State to new political life +presupposes a good man, and to become prince of a city by violence presupposes +a bad man, it can, consequently, very seldom happen that, although the end be +good, a good man will be found ready to become a prince by evil ways, or that a +bad man having become a prince will be disposed to act virtuously, or think of +turning to good account his ill-acquired authority. +</p> + +<p> +From all these causes comes the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, which +a corrupted city finds in maintaining an existing free government, or in +establishing a new one. So that had we to establish or maintain a government in +that city, it would be necessary to give it a monarchical, rather than a +popular form, in order that men too arrogant to be restrained by the laws, +might in some measure be kept in check by a power almost absolute; since to +attempt to make them good otherwise would be a very cruel or a wholly futile +endeavour. This, as I have said, was the method followed by Cleomenes; and if +he, that he might stand alone, put to death the Ephori; and if Romulus, with a +like object, put to death his brother and Titus Tatius the Sabine, and if both +afterwards made good use of the authority they thus acquired, it is +nevertheless to be remembered that it was because neither Cleomenes nor Romulus +had to deal with so corrupt a people as that of which I am now speaking, that +they were able to effect their ends and to give a fair colour to their acts. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIX.—<i>After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain +himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second.</i></h2> + +<p> +When we contemplate the excellent qualities of Romulus, Numa, and Tullus, the +first three kings of Rome, and note the methods which they followed, we +recognize the extreme good fortune of that city in having her first king fierce +and warlike, her second peaceful and religious, and her third, like the first, +of a high spirit and more disposed to war than to peace. For it was essential +for Rome that almost at the outset of her career, a ruler should be found to +lay the foundations of her civil life; but, after that had been done, it was +necessary that her rulers should return to the virtues of Romulus, since +otherwise the city must have grown feeble, and become a prey to her neighbours. +</p> + +<p> +And here we may note that a prince who succeeds to another of superior valour, +may reign on by virtue of his predecessor’s merits, and reap the fruits +of his labours; but if he live to a great age, or if he be followed by another +who is wanting in the qualities of the first, that then the kingdom must +necessarily dwindle. Conversely, when two consecutive princes are of rare +excellence, we commonly find them achieving results which win for them enduring +renown. David, for example, not only surpassed in learning and judgment, but +was so valiant in arms that, after conquering and subduing all his neighbours, +he left to his young son Solomon a tranquil State, which the latter, though +unskilled in the arts of war, could maintain by the arts of peace, and thus +happily enjoy the inheritance of his father’s valour. But Solomon could +not transmit this inheritance to his son Rehoboam, who neither resembling his +grandfather in valour, nor his father in good fortune, with difficulty made +good his right to a sixth part of the kingdom. In like manner Bajazet, sultan +of the Turks, though a man of peace rather than of war, was able to enjoy the +labours of Mahomet his father, who, like David, having subdued his neighbours, +left his son a kingdom so safely established that it could easily be retained +by him by peaceful arts. But had Selim, son to Bajazet, been like his father, +and not like his grandfather, the Turkish monarchy must have been overthrown; +as it is, he seems likely to outdo the fame of his grandsire. +</p> + +<p> +I affirm it to be proved by these examples, that after a valiant prince a +feeble prince may maintain himself; but that no kingdom can stand when two +feeble princes follow in succession, unless, as in the case of France, it be +supported by its ancient ordinances. By feeble princes, I mean such as are not +valiant in war. And, to put the matter shortly, it may be said, that the great +valour of Romulus left Numa a period of many years within which to govern Rome +by peaceful arts; that after Numa came Tullus, who renewed by his courage the +fame of Romulus; and that he in turn was succeeded by Ancus, a prince so gifted +by nature that he could equally avail himself of the methods of peace or war; +who setting himself at first to pursue the former, when he found that his +neighbours judged him to be effeminate, and therefore held him in slight +esteem, understood that to preserve Rome he must resort to arms and resemble +Romulus rather than Numa. From whose example every ruler of a State may learn +that a prince like Numa will hold or lose his power according as fortune and +circumstances befriend him; but that the prince who resembles Romulus, and like +him is fortified with foresight and arms, will hold his State whatever befall, +unless deprived of it by some stubborn and irresistible force. For we may +reckon with certainty that if Rome had not had for her third king one who knew +how to restore her credit by deeds of valour, she could not, or at any rate not +without great difficulty, have afterwards held her ground, nor could ever have +achieved the great exploits she did. +</p> + +<p> +And for these reasons Rome, while she lived under her kings, was in constant +danger of destruction through a king who might be weak or bad. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XX.—<i>That the consecutive Reigns of two valiant Princes +produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a +Succession of valiant Rulers by whom their Power and Growth are rapidly +extended</i>.</h2> + +<p> +When Rome had driven out her kings, she was freed from those dangers to which, +as I have said, she was exposed by the possible succession of a weak or wicked +prince. For the chief share in the government then devolved upon the consuls, +who took their authority not by inheritance, nor yet by craft or by ambitious +violence, but by the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens, and were always +men of signal worth; by whose valour and good fortune Rome being constantly +aided, was able to reach the height of her greatness in the same number of +years as she had lived under her kings. And since we find that two successive +reigns of valiant princes, as of Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander, +suffice to conquer the world, this ought to be still easier for a commonwealth, +which has it in its power to choose, not two excellent rulers only, but an +endless number in succession. And in every well ordered commonwealth provision +will be made for a succession of this sort. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXI.—<i>That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a +Commonwealth to be without a national Army</i>.</h2> + +<p> +Those princes and republics of the present day who lack forces of their own, +whether for attack or defence, should take shame to themselves, and should be +convinced by the example of Tullus, that their deficiency does not arise from +want of men fit for warlike enterprises, but from their own fault in not +knowing how to make their subjects good soldiers. For after Rome had been at +peace for forty years, Tullus, succeeding to the kingdom, found not a single +Roman who had ever been in battle. Nevertheless when he made up his mind to +enter on a war, it never occurred to him to have recourse to the Samnites, or +the Etruscans, or to any other of the neighbouring nations accustomed to arms, +but he resolved, like the prudent prince he was, to rely on his own countrymen. +And such was his ability that, under his rule, the people very soon became +admirable soldiers. For nothing is more true than that where a country, having +men, lacks soldiers, it results from some fault in its ruler, and not from any +defect in the situation or climate. Of this we have a very recent instance. +Every one knows, how, only the other day, the King of England invaded the realm +of France with an army raised wholly from among his own people, although from +his country having been at peace for thirty years, he had neither men nor +officers who had ever looked an enemy in the face. Nevertheless, he did not +hesitate with such troops as he had, to attack a kingdom well provided with +officers and excellent soldiers who had been constantly under arms in the +Italian wars. And this was possible through the prudence of the English king +and the wise ordinances of his kingdom, which never in time of peace relaxes +its warlike discipline. So too, in old times, Pelopidas and Epaminondas the +Thebans, after they had freed Thebes from her tyrants, and rescued her from +thraldom to Sparta, finding themselves in a city used to servitude and +surrounded by an effeminate people, scrupled not, so great was their courage, +to furnish these with arms, and go forth with them to meet and to conquer the +Spartan forces on the field. And he who relates this, observes, that these two +captains very soon showed that warriors are not bred in Lacedæmon alone, but in +every country where men are found, if only some one arise among them who knows +how to direct them to arms; as we see Tullus knew how to direct the Romans. Nor +could Virgil better express this opinion, or show by fitter words that he was +convinced of its truth than, when he says:— +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“To arms shall Tullus rouse<br/> +His sluggish warriors.”<a href="#fn2" name="fnref2" id="fnref2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn2" id="fn2"></a> <a href="#fnref2">[2]</a> +Residesque movebit<br/> +Tullus in arma viros. <i>Virg. Aen</i>. vi. +814. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXII.—<i>What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman +Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii</i>.</h2> + +<p> +It was agreed between Tullus king of Rome, and Metius king of Alba, that the +nation whose champions were victorious in combat should rule over the other. +The three Alban Curiatii were slain; one of the Roman Horatii survived. +Whereupon the Alban king with all his people became subject to the Romans. The +surviving Horatius returning victorious to Rome, and meeting his sister, wife +to one of the dead Curiatii, bewailing the death of her husband, slew her; and +being tried for this crime, was, after much contention, liberated, rather on +the entreaties of his father than for his own deserts. +</p> + +<p> +Herein three points are to be noted. <i>First</i>, that we should never peril +our whole fortunes on the success of only a part of our forces. <i>Second</i>, +that in a well-governed State, merit should never be allowed to balance crime. +And <i>third</i>, that those are never wise covenants which we cannot or should +not expect to be observed. Now, for a State to be enslaved is so terrible a +calamity that it ought never to have been supposed possible that either of +these kings or nations would rest content under a slavery resulting from the +defeat of three only of their number. And so it appeared to Metius; for +although on the victory of the Roman champions, he at once confessed himself +vanquished, and promised obedience; nevertheless, in the very first expedition +which he and Tullus undertook jointly against the people of Veii, we find him +seeking to circumvent the Roman, as though perceiving too late the rash part he +had played. +</p> + +<p> +This is enough to say of the third point which I noted as deserving attention. +Of the other two I shall speak in the next two Chapters. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIII.—<i>That we should never hazard our whole Fortunes +where we put not forth our entire Strength; for which reason to guard a Defile +is often hurtful</i>.</h2> + +<p> +It was never judged a prudent course to peril your whole fortunes where you put +not forth your whole strength; as may happen in more ways than one. One of +these ways was that taken by Tullus and Metius, when each staked the existence +of his country and the credit of his army on the valour and good fortune of +three only of his soldiers, that being an utterly insignificant fraction of the +force at his disposal. For neither of these kings reflected that all the +labours of their predecessors in framing such institutions for their States, as +might, with the aid of the citizens themselves, maintain them long in freedom, +were rendered futile, when the power to ruin all was left in the hands of so +small a number. No rasher step, therefore, could have been taken, than was +taken by these kings. +</p> + +<p> +A like risk is almost always incurred by those who, on the approach of an +enemy, resolve to defend some place of strength, or to guard the defiles by +which their country is entered. For unless room be found in this place of +strength for almost all your army, the attempt to hold it will almost always +prove hurtful. If you can find room, it will be right to defend your strong +places; but if these be difficult of access, and you cannot there keep your +entire force together, the effort to defend is mischievous. I come to this +conclusion from observing the example of those who, although their territories +be enclosed by mountains and precipices, have not, on being attacked by +powerful enemies, attempted to fight on the mountains or in the defiles, but +have advanced beyond them to meet their foes; or, if unwilling to advance, have +awaited attack behind their mountains, on level and not on broken ground. The +reason of which is, as I have above explained, that many men cannot be +assembled in these strong places for their defence; partly because a large +number of men cannot long subsist there, and partly because such places being +narrow and confined, afford room for a few only; so that no enemy can there be +withstood, who comes in force to the attack; which he can easily do, his design +being to pass on and not to make a stay; whereas he who stands on the defensive +cannot do so in force, because, from not knowing when the enemy may enter the +confined and sterile tracts of which I speak, he may have to lodge himself +there for a long time. But should you lose some pass which you had reckoned on +holding, and on the defence of which your country and army have relied, there +commonly follows such panic among your people and among the troops which remain +to you, that you are vanquished without opportunity given for any display of +valour, and lose everything without bringing all your resources into play. +</p> + +<p> +Every one has heard with what difficulty Hannibal crossed the Alps which divide +France from Lombardy, and afterwards those which separate Lombardy from +Tuscany. Nevertheless the Romans awaited him, in the first instance on the +banks of the Ticino, in the second on the plain of Arezzo, preferring to be +defeated on ground which at least gave them a chance of victory, to leading +their army into mountain fastnesses where it was likely to be destroyed by the +mere difficulties of the ground. And any who read history with attention will +find, that very few capable commanders have attempted to hold passes of this +nature, as well for the reasons already given, as because to close them all +were impossible. For mountains, like plains, are traversed not only by +well-known and frequented roads, but also by many by-ways, which, though +unknown to strangers, are familiar to the people of the country, under whose +guidance you may always, and in spite of any opposition, be easily conducted to +whatever point you please. Of this we have a recent instance in the events of +the year 1515. For when Francis I. of France resolved on invading Italy in +order to recover the province of Lombardy, those hostile to his attempt looked +mainly to the Swiss, who it was hoped would stop him in passing through their +mountains. But this hope was disappointed by the event. For leaving on one side +two or three defiles which were guarded by the Swiss, the king advanced by +another unknown pass, and was in Italy and upon his enemies before they knew. +Whereupon they fled terror-stricken into Milan; while the whole population of +Lombardy, finding themselves deceived in their expectation that the French +would be detained in the mountains, went over to their side. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIV.—<i>That well-ordered States always provide Rewards and +Punishments for their Citizens; and never set off Deserts against +Misdeeds</i>.</h2> + +<p> +The valour of Horatius in vanquishing the Curiatii deserved the highest reward. +But in slaying his sister he had been guilty of a heinous crime. And so +displeasing to the Romans was an outrage of this nature, that although his +services were so great and so recent, they brought him to trial for his life. +To one looking at it carelessly, this might seem an instance of popular +ingratitude, but he who considers the matter more closely, and examines with +sounder judgment what the ordinances of a State should be, will rather blame +the Roman people for acquitting Horatius than for putting him on his trial. And +this because no well-ordered State ever strikes a balance between the services +of its citizens and their misdeeds; but appointing rewards for good actions and +punishment for bad, when it has rewarded a man for acting well, will +afterwards, should he act ill, chastise him, without regard to his former +deserts. When these ordinances are duly observed, a city will live long in +freedom, but when they are neglected, it must soon come to ruin. For when a +citizen has rendered some splendid service to his country, if to the +distinction which his action in itself confers, were added an over-weening +confidence that any crime he might thenceforth commit would pass unpunished, he +would soon become so arrogant that no civil bonds could restrain him. +</p> + +<p> +Still, while we would have punishment terrible to wrongdoers, it is essential +that good actions should be rewarded, as we see to have been the case in Rome. +For even where a republic is poor, and has but little to give, it ought not to +withhold that little; since a gift, however small, bestowed as a reward for +services however great, will always be esteemed most honourable and precious by +him who receives it. The story of Horatius Cocles and that of Mutius Scævola +are well known: how the one withstood the enemy on the bridge while it was +being cut down, and the other thrust his hand into the fire in punishment of +the mistake made when he sought the life of Porsenna the Etruscan king. To each +of these two, in requital of their splendid deeds, two ploughgates only of the +public land were given. Another famous story is that of Manlius Capitolinus, to +whom, for having saved the Capitol from the besieging Gauls, a small measure of +meal was given by each of those who were shut up with him during the siege. +Which recompense, in proportion to the wealth of the citizens of Rome at that +time, was thought ample; so that afterwards, when Manlius, moved by jealousy +and malice, sought to arouse sedition in Rome, and to gain over the people to +his cause, they without regard to his past services threw him headlong from +that Capitol in saving which he had formerly gained so great a renown. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXV.—<i>That he who would reform the Institutions of a free +State, must retain at least the semblance of old Ways.</i></h2> + +<p> +Whoever takes upon him to reform the government of a city, must, if his +measures are to be well received and carried out with general approval, +preserve at least the semblance of existing methods, so as not to appear to the +people to have made any change in the old order of things; although, in truth, +the new ordinances differ altogether from those which they replace. For when +this is attended to, the mass of mankind accept what seems as what is; nay, are +often touched more nearly by appearances than by realities. +</p> + +<p> +This tendency being recognized by the Romans at the very outset of their civil +freedom, when they appointed two consuls in place of a single king, they would +not permit the consuls to have more than twelve lictors, in order that the old +number of the king’s attendants might not be exceeded. Again, there being +solemnized every year in Rome a sacrificial rite which could only be performed +by the king in person, that the people might not be led by the absence of the +king to remark the want of any ancient observance, a priest was appointed for +the due celebration of this rite, to whom was given the name of <i>Rex +sacrificulus</i>, and who was placed under the orders of the chief priest. In +this way the people were contented, and had no occasion from any defect in the +solemnities to desire the return of their kings. Like precautions should be +used by all who would put an end to the old government of a city and substitute +new and free institutions. For since novelty disturbs men’s minds, we +should seek in the changes we make to preserve as far as possible what is +ancient, so that if the new magistrates differ from the old in number, in +authority, or in the duration of their office, they shall at least retain the +old names. +</p> + +<p> +This, I say, should be seen to by him who would establish a constitutional +government, whether in the form of a commonwealth or of a kingdom. But he who +would create an absolute government of the kind which political writers term a +tyranny, must renew everything, as shall be explained in the following Chapter. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXVI.—<i>A new Prince in a City or Province of which he has +taken Possession, ought to make Everything new.</i></h2> + +<p> +Whosoever becomes prince of a city or State, more especially if his position be +so insecure that he cannot resort to constitutional government either in the +form of a republic or a monarchy, will find that the best way to preserve his +princedom is to renew the whole institutions of that State; that is to say, to +create new magistracies with new names, confer new powers, and employ new men, +and like David when he became king, exalt the humble and depress the great, +“<i>filling the hungry with good things, and sending the rich empty +away</i>.” Moreover, he must pull down existing towns and rebuild them, +removing their inhabitants from one place to another; and, in short, leave +nothing in the country as he found it; so that there shall be neither rank, nor +condition, nor honour, nor wealth which its possessor can refer to any but to +him. And he must take example from Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander, +who by means such as these, from being a petty prince became monarch of all +Greece; and of whom it was written that he shifted men from province to +province as a shepherd moves his flocks from one pasture to another. +</p> + +<p> +These indeed are most cruel expedients, contrary not merely to every Christian, +but to every civilized rule of conduct, and such as every man should shun, +choosing rather to lead a private life than to be a king on terms so hurtful to +mankind. But he who will not keep to the fair path of virtue, must to maintain +himself enter this path of evil. Men, however, not knowing how to be wholly +good or wholly bad, choose for themselves certain middle ways, which of all +others are the most pernicious, as shall be shown by an instance in the +following Chapter. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXVII.—<i>That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or +wholly bad</i>.</h2> + +<p> +When in the year 1505, Pope Julius II. went to Bologna to expel from that city +the family of the Bentivogli, who had been princes there for over a hundred +years, it was also in his mind, as a part of the general design he had planned +against all those lords who had usurped Church lands, to remove Giovanpagolo +Baglioni, tyrant of Perugia. And coming to Perugia with this intention and +resolve, of which all men knew, he would not wait to enter the town with a +force sufficient for his protection, but entered it unattended by troops, +although Giovanpagolo was there with a great company of soldiers whom he had +assembled for his defence. And thus, urged on by that impetuosity which stamped +all his actions, accompanied only by his body-guard, he committed himself into +the hands of his enemy, whom he forthwith carried away with him, leaving a +governor behind to hold the town for the Church. All prudent men who were with +the Pope remarked on his temerity, and on the pusillanimity of Giovanpagolo; +nor could they conjecture why the latter had not, to his eternal glory, availed +himself of this opportunity for crushing his enemy, and at the same time +enriching himself with plunder, the Pope being attended by the whole College of +Cardinals with all their luxurious equipage. For it could not be supposed that +he was withheld by any promptings of goodness or scruples of conscience; +because in the breast of a profligate living in incest with his sister, and who +to obtain the princedom had put his nephews and kinsmen to death, no virtuous +impulse could prevail. So that the only inference to be drawn was, that men +know not how to be splendidly wicked or wholly good, and shrink in consequence +from such crimes as are stamped with an inherent greatness or disclose a +nobility of nature. For which reason Giovanpagolo, who thought nothing of +incurring the guilt of incest, or of murdering his kinsmen, could not, or more +truly durst not, avail himself of a fair occasion to do a deed which all would +have admired; which would have won for him a deathless fame as the first to +teach the prelates how little those who live and reign as they do are to be +esteemed; and which would have displayed a greatness far transcending any +infamy or danger that could attach to it. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXVIII.—<i>Whence it came that the Romans were less +ungrateful to their Citizens than were the Athenians</i>.</h2> + +<p> +In the histories of all republics we meet with instances of some sort of +ingratitude to their great citizens, but fewer in the history of Rome than of +Athens, or indeed of any other republic. Searching for the cause of this, I am +persuaded that, so far as regards Rome and Athens, it was due to the Romans +having had less occasion than the Athenians to look upon their fellow-citizens +with suspicion. For, from the expulsion of her kings down to the times of Sylla +and Marius, the liberty of Rome was never subverted by any one of her citizens; +so that there never was in that city grave cause for distrusting any man, and +in consequence making him the victim of inconsiderate injustice. The reverse +was notoriously the case with Athens; for that city, having, at a time when she +was most flourishing, been deprived of her freedom by Pisistratus under a false +show of good-will, remembering, after she regained her liberty, her former +bondage and all the wrongs she had endured, became the relentless chastiser, +not of offences only on the part of her citizens, but even of the shadow of an +offence. Hence the banishment and death of so many excellent men, and hence the +law of ostracism, and all those other violent measures which from time to time +during the history of that city were directed against her foremost citizens. +For this is most true which is asserted by the writers on civil government, +that a people which has recovered its freedom, bites more fiercely than one +which has always preserved it. +</p> + +<p> +And any who shall weigh well what has been said, will not condemn Athens in +this matter, nor commend Rome, but refer all to the necessity arising out of +the different conditions prevailing in the two States. For careful reflection +will show that had Rome been deprived of her freedom as Athens was, she would +not have been a whit more tender to her citizens. This we may reasonably infer +from remarking what, after the expulsion of the kings, befell Collatinus and +Publius Valerius; the former of whom, though he had taken part in the +liberation of Rome, was sent into exile for no other reason than that he bore +the name of Tarquin; while the sole ground of suspicion against the latter, and +what almost led to his banishment, was his having built a house upon the Cælian +hill. Seeing how harsh and suspicious Rome was in these two instances, we may +surmise that she would have shown the same ingratitude as Athens, had she, like +Athens, been wronged by her citizens at an early stage of her growth, and +before she had attained to the fulness of her strength. +</p> + +<p> +That I may not have to return to this question of ingratitude, I shall say all +that remains to be said about it in my next Chapter. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIX.—<i>Whether a People or a Prince is the more +ungrateful.</i></h2> + +<p> +In connection with what has been said above, it seems proper to consider +whether more notable instances of ingratitude are supplied by princes or +peoples. And, to go to the root of the matter, I affirm that this vice of +ingratitude has its source either in avarice or in suspicion. For a prince or +people when they have sent forth a captain on some important enterprise, by +succeeding in which he earns a great name, are bound in return to reward him; +and if moved by avarice and covetousness they fail to do so, or if, instead of +rewarding, they wrong and disgrace him, they commit an error which is not only +without excuse, but brings with it undying infamy. And, in fact, we find many +princes who have sinned in this way, for the cause given by Cornelius Tacitus +when he says, that “<i>men are readier to pay back injuries than +benefits, since to requite a benefit is felt to be a burthen, to return an +injury a gain</i>.”<a href="#fn3" name="fnref3" id="fnref3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn3" id="fn3"></a> <a href="#fnref3">[3]</a> +Proclivius est injuriæ quam beneficio vicem exsolvere, quia gratia oneri, ultio +in quastu habetur. <i>Tacit. Hist.</i> iv. 2. +</p> + +<p> +When, however, reward is withheld, or, to speak more correctly, where offence +is given, not from avarice but from suspicion, the prince or people may deserve +some excuse; and we read of many instances of ingratitude proceeding from this +cause. For the captain who by his valour has won new dominions for his prince, +since while overcoming his enemies, he at the same time covers himself with +glory and enriches his soldiers, must needs acquire such credit with his own +followers, and with the enemy, and also with the subjects of his prince, as +cannot be wholly agreeable to the master who sent him forth. And since men are +by nature ambitious as well as jealous, and none loves to set a limit to his +fortunes, the suspicion which at once lays hold of the prince when he sees his +captain victorious, is sure to be inflamed by some arrogant act or word of the +captain himself. So that the prince will be unable to think of anything but how +to secure himself; and to this end will contrive how he may put his captain to +death, or at any rate deprive him of the credit he has gained with the army and +among the people; doing all he can to show that the victory was not won by his +valour, but by good fortune, or by the cowardice of the enemy, or by the skill +and prudence of those commanders who were with him at this or the other battle. +</p> + +<p> +After Vespasian, who was then in Judæa, had been proclaimed emperor by his +army, Antonius Primus, who commanded another army in Illyria, adopted his +cause, and marching into Italy against Vitellius who had been proclaimed +emperor in Rome, courageously defeated two armies under that prince, and +occupied Rome; so that Mutianus, who was sent thither by Vespasian, found +everything done to his hand, and all difficulties surmounted by the valour of +Antonius. But all the reward which Antonius had for his pains, was, that +Mutianus forthwith deprived him of his command of the army, and by degrees +diminished his authority in Rome till none was left him. Thereupon Antonius +went to join Vespasian, who was still in Asia; by whom he was so coldly +received and so little considered, that in despair he put himself to death. And +of cases like this, history is full. Every man living at the present hour knows +with what zeal and courage Gonsalvo of Cordova, while conducting the war in +Naples against the French, conquered and subdued that kingdom for his master +Ferdinand of Aragon; and how his services were requited by Ferdinand coming +from Aragon to Naples, and first of all depriving him of the command of the +army, afterwards of the fortresses, and finally carrying him back with him to +Spain, where soon after he died in disgrace. +</p> + +<p> +This jealousy, then, is so natural to princes, that they cannot guard +themselves against it, nor show gratitude to those who serving under their +standard have gained great victories and made great conquests on their behalf. +And if it be impossible for princes to free their minds from such suspicions, +there is nothing strange or surprising that a people should be unable to do so. +For as a city living under free institutions has two ends always before it, +namely to acquire liberty and to preserve it, it must of necessity be led by +its excessive passion for liberty to make mistakes in the pursuit of both these +objects. Of the mistakes it commits in the effort to acquire liberty, I shall +speak, hereafter, in the proper place. Of mistakes committed in the endeavour +to preserve liberty are to be noted, the injuring those citizens who ought to +be rewarded, and the suspecting those who should be trusted. Now, although in a +State which has grown corrupt these errors occasion great evils, and commonly +lead to a tyranny, as happened in Rome when Cæsar took by force what +ingratitude had denied him, they are nevertheless the cause of much good in the +republic which has not been corrupted, since they prolong the duration of its +free institutions, and make men, through fear of punishment, better and less +ambitious. Of all peoples possessed of great power, the Romans, for the reasons +I have given, have undoubtedly been the least ungrateful, since we have no +other instance of their ingratitude to cite, save that of Scipio. For both +Coriolanus and Camillus were banished on account of the wrongs which they +inflicted on the commons; and though the former was not forgiven because he +constantly retained ill will against the people, the latter was not only +recalled, but for the rest of his life honoured as a prince. But the +ingratitude shown towards Scipio arose from the suspicion wherewith the +citizens came to regard him, which they had not felt in the case of the others, +and which was occasioned by the greatness of the enemy whom he had overthrown, +the fame he had won by prevailing in so dangerous and protracted a war, the +suddenness of his victories, and, finally, the favour which his youth, together +with his prudence and his other memorable qualities had gained for him. These +qualities were, in truth, so remarkable that the very magistrates, not to speak +of others, stood in awe of his authority, a circumstance displeasing to prudent +citizens, as before unheard of in Rome. In short, his whole bearing and +character were so much out of the common, that even the elder Cato, so +celebrated for his austere virtue, was the first to declare against him, saying +that no city could be deemed free which contained a citizen who was feared by +the magistrates. And since, in this instance, the Romans followed the opinion +of Cato, they merit that excuse which, as I have said already, should be +extended to the prince or people who are ungrateful through suspicion. +</p> + +<p> +In conclusion it is to be said that while this vice of ingratitude has its +origin either in avarice or in suspicion, commonwealths are rarely led into it +by avarice, and far seldomer than princes by suspicion, having, as shall +presently be shown, far less reason than princes for suspecting. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXX.—<i>How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of +Ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by +it.</i></h2> + +<p> +That he may not be tormented by suspicion, nor show ungrateful, a prince should +go himself on his wars as the Roman emperors did at first, as the Turk does +now, and, in short, as all valiant princes have done and do. For when it is the +prince himself who conquers, the glory and the gain are all his own; but when +he is absent, since the glory is another’s, it will seem to the prince +that he profits nothing by the gain, unless that glory be quenched which he +knew not how to win for himself; and when he thus becomes ungrateful and +unjust, doubtless his loss is greater than his gain. To the prince, therefore, +who, either through indolence or from want of foresight, sends forth a captain +to conduct his wars while he himself remains inactive at home, I have no advice +to offer which he does not already know. But I would counsel the captain whom +he sends, since I am sure that he can never escape the attacks of ingratitude, +to follow one or other of two courses, and either quit his command at once +after a victory, and place himself in the hands of his prince, while carefully +abstaining from every vainglorious or ambitious act, so that the prince, being +relieved from all suspicion, may be disposed to reward, or at any rate not to +injure him; or else, should he think it inexpedient for him to act in this way, +to take boldly the contrary course, and fearlessly to follow out all such +measures as he thinks will secure for himself, and not for his prince, whatever +he has gained; conciliating the good-will of his soldiers and fellow-citizens, +forming new friendships with neighbouring potentates, placing his own adherents +in fortified towns, corrupting the chief officers of his army and getting rid +of those whom he fails to corrupt, and by all similar means endeavouring to +punish his master for the ingratitude which he looks for at his hands. These +are the only two courses open; but since, as I said before, men know not how to +be wholly good or wholly bad, it will never happen that after a victory a +captain will quit his army and conduct himself modestly, nor yet that he will +venture to use those hardy methods which have in them some strain of greatness; +and so, remaining undecided, he will be crushed while he still wavers and +doubts. +</p> + +<p> +A commonwealth desiring to avoid the vice of ingratitude is, as compared with a +prince, at this disadvantage, that while a prince can go himself on his +expeditions, the commonwealth must send some one of its citizens. As a remedy, +I would recommend that course being adopted which was followed by the Roman +republic in order to be less ungrateful than others, having its origin in the +nature of the Roman government. For the whole city, nobles and commons alike, +taking part in her wars, there were always found in Rome at every stage of her +history, so many valiant and successful soldiers, that by reason of their +number, and from one acting as a check upon another, the nation had never +ground to be jealous of any one man among them; while they, on their part, +lived uprightly, and were careful to betray no sign of ambition, nor give the +people the least cause to distrust them as ambitious; so that he obtained most +glory from his dictatorship who was first to lay it down. Which conduct, as it +excited no suspicion, could occasion no ingratitude. +</p> + +<p> +We see, then, that the commonwealth which would have no cause to be ungrateful, +must act as Rome did; and that the citizen who would escape ingratitude, must +observe those precautions which were observed by Roman citizens. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXI.—<i>That the Roman Captains were never punished with +extreme severity for Misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely +through their Ignorance or Want of Judgment, were not punished at all</i>.</h2> + +<p> +The Romans were not only, as has been said above, less ungrateful than other +republics, but were also more lenient and more considerate than others in +punishing the captains of their armies. For if these erred of set purpose, they +chastised them with gentleness; while if they erred through ignorance, so far +from punishing, they even honoured and rewarded them. And this conduct was well +considered. For as they judged it of the utmost moment, that those in command +of their armies should, in all they had to do, have their minds undisturbed and +free from external anxieties, they would not add further difficulty and danger +to a task in itself both dangerous and difficult, lest none should ever be +found to act with valour. For supposing them to be sending forth an army +against Philip of Macedon in Greece or against Hannibal in Italy, or against +any other enemy at whose hands they had already sustained reverses, the captain +in command of that expedition would be weighted with all the grave and +important cares which attend such enterprises. But if to all these cares, had +been added the example of Roman generals crucified or otherwise put to death +for having lost battles, it would have been impossible for a commander +surrounded by so many causes for anxiety to have acted with vigour and +decision. For which reason, and because they thought that to such persons the +mere ignominy of defeat was in itself punishment enough, they would not +dishearten their generals by inflicting on them any heavier penalty. +</p> + +<p> +Of errors committed not through ignorance, the following is an instance. +Sergius and Virginius were engaged in the siege of Veii, each being in command +of a division of the army, and while Sergius was set to guard against the +approach of the Etruscans, it fell to Virginius to watch the town. But Sergius +being attacked by the Faliscans and other tribes, chose rather to be defeated +and routed than ask aid from Virginius, who, on his part, awaiting the +humiliation of his rival, was willing to see his country dishonoured and an +army destroyed, sooner than go unasked to his relief. This was notable +misconduct, and likely, unless both offenders were punished, to bring discredit +on the Roman name. But whereas another republic would have punished these men +with death, the Romans were content to inflict only a money fine: not because +the offence did not in itself deserve severe handling, but because they were +unwilling, for the reasons already given, to depart in this instance from their +ancient practice. +</p> + +<p> +Of errors committed through ignorance we have no better example than in the +case of Varro, through whose rashness the Romans were defeated by Hannibal at +Cannæ, where the republic well-nigh lost its liberty. But because he had acted +through ignorance and with no evil design, they not only refrained from +punishing him, but even treated him with distinction; the whole senate going +forth to meet him on his return to Rome, and as they could not thank him for +having fought, thanking him for having come back, and for not having despaired +of the fortunes his country. +</p> + +<p> +Again, when Papirius Cursor would have had Fabius put to death, because, +contrary to his orders, he had fought with the Samnites, among the reasons +pleaded by the father of Fabius against the persistency of the dictator, he +urged that never on the occasion of the defeat of any of their captains had the +Romans done what Papirius desired them to do on the occasion of a victory. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXII.—<i>That a Prince or Commonwealth should not delay +conferring Benefits until they are themselves in difficulties.</i></h2> + +<p> +The Romans found it for their advantage to be generous to the commons at a +season of danger, when Porsenna came to attack Rome and restore the Tarquins. +For the senate, apprehending that the people might choose rather to take back +their kings than to support a war, secured their adherence by relieving them of +the duty on salt and of all their other burthens; saying that “<i>the +poor did enough for the common welfare in rearing their offspring.</i>” +In return for which indulgence the commons were content to undergo war, siege, +and famine. Let no one however, relying on this example, delay conciliating the +people till danger has actually come; or, if he do, let him not hope to have +the same good fortune as the Romans. For the mass of the people will consider +that they have to thank not him, but his enemies, and that there is ground to +fear that when the danger has passed away, he will take back what he gave under +compulsion, and, therefore, that to him they lie under no obligation. And the +reason why the course followed by the Romans succeeded, was that the State was +still new and unsettled. Besides which, the people knew that laws had already +been passed in their favour, as, for instance, the law allowing an appeal to +the tribunes, and could therefore persuade themselves that the benefits granted +them proceeded from the good-will entertained towards them by the senate, and +were not due merely to the approach of an enemy. Moreover, the memory of their +kings, by whom they had in many ways been wronged and ill-treated, was still +fresh in their minds. But since like conditions seldom recur, it can only +rarely happen that like remedies are useful. Wherefore, all, whether princes or +republics, who hold the reins of government, ought to think beforehand of the +adverse times which may await them, and of what help they may then stand in +need; and ought so to live with their people as they would think right were +they suffering under any calamity. And, whosoever, whether prince or republic, +but prince more especially, behaves otherwise, and believes that after the +event and when danger is upon him he will be able to win men over by benefits, +deceives himself, and will not merely fail to maintain his place, but will even +precipitate his downfall. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXIII.—<i>When a Mischief has grown up in, or against a +State, it is safer to temporize with than to meet it with Violence</i>.</h2> + +<p> +As Rome grew in fame, power, and dominion, her neighbours, who at first had +taken no heed to the injury which this new republic might do them, began too +late to see their mistake, and desiring to remedy what should have been +remedied before, combined against her to the number of forty nations. Whereupon +the Romans, resorting to a method usual with them in seasons of peril, +appointed a dictator; that is, gave power to one man to decide without advice, +and carry out his resolves without appeal. Which expedient, as it then enabled +them to overcome the dangers by which they were threatened, so always +afterwards proved most serviceable, when, at any time during the growth of +their power, difficulties arose to embarrass their republic. +</p> + +<p> +In connection with this league against Rome we have first to note, that when a +mischief which springs up either in or against a republic, and whether +occasioned by internal or external causes, has grown to such proportions that +it begins to fill the whole community with alarm, it is a far safer course to +temporize with it than to attempt to quell it by violence. For commonly those +who make this attempt only add fuel to the flame, and hasten the impending +ruin. Such disorders arise in a republic more often from internal causes than +external, either through some citizen being suffered to acquire undue +influence, or from the corruption of some institution of that republic, which +had once been the life and sinew of its freedom; and from this corruption being +allowed to gain such head that the attempt to check it is more dangerous than +to let it be. And it is all the harder to recognize these disorders in their +beginning, because it seems natural to men to look with favour on the +beginnings of things. Favour of this sort, more than by anything else, is +attracted by those actions which seem to have in them a quality of greatness, +or which are performed by the young. For when in a republic some young man is +seen to come forward endowed with rare excellence, the eyes of all the citizens +are at once turned upon him, and all, without distinction, concur to do him +honour; so that if he have one spark of ambition, the advantages which he has +from nature, together with those he takes from this favourable disposition of +men’s minds, raise him to such a pitch of power, that when the citizens +at last see their mistake it is almost impossible for them to correct it; and +when they do what they can to oppose his influence the only result is to extend +it. Of this I might cite numerous examples, but shall content myself with one +relating to our own city. +</p> + +<p> +Cosimo de’ Medici, to whom the house of the Medici in Florence owes the +origin of its fortunes, acquired so great a name from the favour wherewith his +own prudence and the blindness of others invested him, that coming to be held +in awe by the government, his fellow-citizens deemed it dangerous to offend +him, but still more dangerous to let him alone. Nicolò da Uzzano, his +cotemporary, who was accounted well versed in all civil affairs, but who had +made a first mistake in not discerning the dangers which might grow from the +rising influence of Cosimo, would never while he lived, permit a second mistake +to be made in attempting to crush him; judging that such an attempt would be +the ruin of the State, as in truth it proved after his death. For some who +survived him, disregarding his counsels, combined against Cosimo and banished +him from Florence. And so it came about that the partisans of Cosimo, angry at +the wrong done him, soon afterwards recalled him and made him prince of the +republic, a dignity he never would have reached but for this open opposition. +The very same thing happened in Rome in the case of Cæsar. For his services +having gained him the good-will of Pompey and other citizens, their favour was +presently turned to fear, as Cicero testifies where he says that “it was +late that Pompey began to fear Cæsar.” This fear led men to think of +remedies, and the remedies to which they resorted accelerated the destruction +of the republic. +</p> + +<p> +I say, then, that since it is difficult to recognize these disorders in their +beginning, because of the false impressions which things produce at the first, +it is a wiser course when they become known, to temporize with them than to +oppose them; for when you temporize, either they die out of themselves, or at +any rate the injury they do is deferred. And the prince who would suppress such +disorders or oppose himself to their force and onset, must always be on his +guard, lest he help where he would hinder, retard when he would advance, and +drown the plant he thinks to water. He must therefore study well the symptoms +of the disease; and, if he believe himself equal to the cure, grapple with it +fearlessly; if not, he must let it be, and not attempt to treat it in any way. +For, otherwise, it will fare with him as it fared with those neighbours of +Rome, for whom it would have been safer, after that city had grown to be so +great, to have sought to soothe and restrain her by peaceful arts, than to +provoke her by open war to contrive new means of attack and new methods of +defence. For this league had no other effect than to make the Romans more +united and resolute than before, and to bethink themselves of new expedients +whereby their power was still more rapidly advanced; among which was the +creation of a dictator; for this innovation not only enabled them to surmount +the dangers which then threatened them, but was afterwards the means of +escaping infinite calamities into which, without it, the republic must have +fallen. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXIV.—<i>That the authority of the Dictator did good and not +harm to the Roman Republic: and that it is not those Powers which are given by +the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for +themselves, that are pernicious to a State.</i></h2> + +<p> +Those citizens who first devised a dictatorship for Rome have been blamed by +certain writers, as though this had been the cause of the tyranny afterwards +established there. For these authors allege that the first tyrant of Rome +governed it with the title of Dictator, and that, but for the existence of the +office, Cæsar could never have cloaked his usurpation under a constitutional +name. He who first took up this opinion had not well considered the matter, and +his conclusion has been accepted without good ground. For it was not the name +nor office of Dictator which brought Rome to servitude, but the influence which +certain of her citizens were able to assume from the prolongation of their term +of power; so that even had the name of Dictator been wanting in Rome, some +other had been found to serve their ends, since power may readily give titles, +but not titles power. We find, accordingly, that while the dictatorship was +conferred in conformity with public ordinances, and not through personal +influence, it was constantly beneficial to the city. For it is the magistracies +created and the powers usurped in unconstitutional ways that hurt a republic, +not those which conform to ordinary rule; so that in Rome, through the whole +period of her history, we never find a dictator who acted otherwise than well +for the republic. For which there were the plainest reasons. In the first +place, to enable a citizen to work harm and to acquire undue authority, many +circumstances must be present which never can be present in a State which is +not corrupted. For such a citizen must be exceedingly rich, and must have many +retainers and partisans, whom he cannot have where the laws are strictly +observed, and who, if he had them, would occasion so much alarm, that the free +suffrage of the people would seldom be in his favour. In the second place, the +dictator was not created for life, but for a fixed term, and only to meet the +emergency for which he was appointed. Power was indeed given him to determine +by himself what measures the exigency demanded; to do what he had to do without +consultation; and to punish without appeal. But he had no authority to do +anything to the prejudice of the State, as it would have been to deprive the +senate or the people of their privileges, to subvert the ancient institutions +of the city, or introduce new. So that taking into account the brief time for +which his office lasted, its limited authority, and the circumstance that the +Roman people were still uncorrupted, it was impossible for him to overstep the +just limits of his power so as to injure the city; and in fact we find that he +was always useful to it. +</p> + +<p> +And, in truth, among the institutions of Rome, this of the dictatorship +deserves our special admiration, and to be linked with the chief causes of her +greatness; for without some such safeguard a city can hardly pass unharmed +through extraordinary dangers. Because as the ordinary institutions of a +commonwealth work but slowly, no council and no magistrate having authority to +act in everything alone, but in most matters one standing in need of the other, +and time being required to reconcile their differences, the remedies which they +provide are most dangerous when they have to be applied in cases which do not +brook delay. For which reason, every republic ought to have some resource of +this nature provided by its constitution; as we find that the Republic of +Venice, one of the best of those now existing, has in cases of urgent danger +reserved authority to a few of her citizens, if agreed among themselves, to +determine without further consultation what course is to be followed. When a +republic is not provided with some safeguard such as this, either it must be +ruined by observing constitutional forms, or else, to save it, these must be +broken through. But in a republic nothing should be left to be effected by +irregular methods, because, although for the time the irregularity may be +useful, the example will nevertheless be pernicious, as giving rise to a +practice of violating the laws for good ends, under colour of which they may +afterwards be violated for ends which are not good. For which reason, that can +never become a perfect republic wherein every contingency has not been foreseen +and provided for by the laws, and the method of dealing with it defined. To sum +up, therefore, I say that those republics which cannot in sudden emergencies +resort either to a dictator or to some similar authority, will, when the danger +is serious, always be undone. +</p> + +<p> +We may note, moreover, how prudently the Romans, in introducing this new +office, contrived the conditions under which it was to be exercised. For +perceiving that the appointment of a dictator involved something of humiliation +for the consuls, who, from being the heads of the State, were reduced to render +obedience like every one else, and anticipating that this might give offence, +they determined that the power to appoint should rest with the consuls, +thinking that when the occasion came when Rome should have need of this regal +authority, they would have the consuls acting willingly and feeling the less +aggrieved from the appointment being in their own hands. For those wounds or +other injuries which a man inflicts upon himself by choice, and of his own free +will, pain him far less than those inflicted by another. Nevertheless, in the +later days of the republic the Romans were wont to entrust this power to a +consul instead of to a dictator, using the formula, <i>Videat</i> CONSUL <i>ne +quid respublica detrimenti capiat</i>. +</p> + +<p> +But to return to the matter in hand, I say briefly, that when the neighbours of +Rome sought to crush her, they led her to take measures not merely for her +readier defence, but such as enabled her to attack them with a stronger force, +with better skill, and with an undivided command. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXV—<i>Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although +brought about by the free and open Suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the +Liberties of that Republic</i></h2> + +<p> +The fact of those ten citizens who were chosen by the Roman people to make laws +for Rome, in time becoming her tyrants and depriving her of her freedom, may +seem contrary to what I have said above, namely that it is the authority which +is violently usurped, and not that conferred by the free suffrages of the +people which is injurious to a republic. Here, however, we have to take into +account both the mode in which, and the term for which authority is given. +Where authority is unrestricted and is conferred for a long term, meaning by +that for a year or more, it is always attended with danger, and its results +will be good or bad according as the men are good or bad to whom it is +committed. Now when we compare the authority of the Ten with that possessed by +the dictator, we see that the power placed in the hands of the former was out +of all proportion greater than that entrusted to the latter. For when a +dictator was appointed there still remained the tribunes, the consuls, and the +senate, all of them invested with authority of which the dictator could not +deprive them. For even if he could have taken his consulship from one man, or +his status as a senator from another, he could not abolish the senatorial rank +nor pass new laws. So that the senate, the consuls, and the tribunes continuing +to exist with undiminished authority were a check upon him and kept him in the +right road. But on the creation of the Ten, the opposite of all this took +place. For on their appointment, consuls and tribunes were swept away, and +express powers were given to the new magistrates to make laws and do whatever +else they thought fit, with the entire authority of the whole Roman people. So +that finding themselves alone without consuls or tribunes to control them, and +with no appeal against them to the people, and thus there being none to keep a +watch upon them, and further being stimulated by the ambition of Appius, in the +second year of their office they began to wax insolent. +</p> + +<p> +Let it be noted, therefore, that when it is said that authority given by the +public vote is never hurtful to any commonwealth, it is assumed that the people +will never be led to confer that authority without due limitations, or for +other than a reasonable term. Should they, however either from being deceived +or otherwise blinded, be induced to bestow authority imprudently, as the Romans +bestowed it on the Ten, it will always fare with them as with the Romans. And +this may readily be understood on reflecting what causes operated to keep the +dictator good, what to make the Ten bad, and by observing how those republics +which have been accounted well governed, have acted when conferring authority +for an extended period, as the Spartans on their kings and the Venetians on +their doges; for it will be seen that in both these instances the authority was +controlled by checks which made it impossible for it to be abused. But where an +uncontrolled authority is given, no security is afforded by the circumstance +that the body of the people is not corrupted; for in the briefest possible time +absolute authority will make a people corrupt, and obtain for itself friends +and partisans. Nor will it be any hindrance to him in whom such authority is +vested, that he is poor and without connections, for wealth and every other +advantage will quickly follow, as shall be shown more fully when we discuss the +appointment of the Ten. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXVI.—<i>That Citizens who have held the higher Offices of a +Commonwealth should not disdain the lower</i>.</h2> + +<p> +Under the consuls M. Fabius and Cn. Manlius, the Romans had a memorable victory +in a battle fought with the Veientines and the Etruscans, in which Q. Fabius, +brother of the consul, who had himself been consul the year before, was slain. +This event may lead us to remark how well the methods followed by the city of +Rome were suited to increase her power, and how great a mistake is made by +other republics in departing from them. For, eager as the Romans were in the +pursuit of glory, they never esteemed it a dishonour to obey one whom before +they had commanded, or to find themselves serving in the ranks of an army which +once they had led. This usage, however, is opposed to the ideas, the rules, and +the practice which prevail at the present day, as, for instance, in Venice, +where the notion still obtains that a citizen who has filled a great office +should be ashamed to accept a less; and where the State itself permits him to +decline it. This course, assuming it to lend lustre to individual citizens, is +plainly to the disadvantage of the community, which has reason to hope more +from, and to trust more to, the citizen who descends from a high office to fill +a lower, than him who rises from a low office to fill a high one; for in the +latter no confidence can reasonably be placed, unless he be seen to have others +about him of such credit and worth that it may be hoped their wise counsels and +influence will correct his inexperience. But had the usage which prevails in +Venice and in other modern commonwealths and kingdoms, prevailed in Rome +whereby he who had once been consul was never afterwards to go with the army +except as consul, numberless results must have followed detrimental to the free +institutions of that city; as well from the mistakes which the inexperience of +new men would have occasioned, as because from their ambition having a freer +course, and from their having none near them in whose presence they might fear +to do amiss, they would have grown less scrupulous; and in this way the public +service must have suffered grave harm. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXVII.—<i>Of the Mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: +and how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a Law +opposed to ancient Usage and with stringent retrospective Effect.</i></h2> + +<p> +It has been said by ancient writers that to be pinched by adversity or pampered +by prosperity is the common lot of men, and that in whichever way they are +acted upon the result is the same. For when no longer urged to war on one +another by necessity, they are urged by ambition, which has such dominion in +their hearts that it never leaves them to whatsoever heights they climb. For +nature has so ordered it that while they desire everything, it is impossible +for them to have everything, and thus their desires being always in excess of +their capacity to gratify them, they remain constantly dissatisfied and +discontented. And hence the vicissitudes in human affairs. For some seeking to +enlarge their possessions, and some to keep what they have got, wars and +enmities ensue, from which result the ruin of one country and the growth of +another. +</p> + +<p> +I am led to these reflections from observing that the commons of Rome were not +content to secure themselves against the nobles by the creation of tribunes, a +measure to which they were driven by necessity, but after effecting this, +forthwith entered upon an ambitious contest with the nobles, seeking to share +with them what all men most esteem, namely, their honours and their wealth. +Hence was bred that disorder from which sprang the feuds relating to the +Agrarian Laws, and which led in the end to the downfall of the Roman republic. +And although it should be the object of every well-governed commonwealth to +make the State rich and keep individual citizens poor it must be allowed that +in the matter of this law the city of Rome was to blame; whether for having +passed it at first in such a shape as to require it to be continually recast; +or for having postponed it so long that its retrospective effect was the +occasion of tumult; or else, because, although rightly framed at first, it had +come in its operation to be perverted. But in whatever way it happened, so it +was, that this law was never spoken of in Rome without the whole city being +convulsed. +</p> + +<p> +The law itself embraced two principal provisions. By one it was enacted that no +citizen should possess more than a fixed number of acres of land; by the other +that all lands taken from the enemy should be distributed among the whole +people. A twofold blow was thus aimed at the nobles; since all who possessed +more land than the law allowed, as most of the nobles did, fell to be deprived +of it; while by dividing the lands of the enemy among the whole people, the +road to wealth was closed. These two grounds of offence being given to a +powerful class, to whom it appeared that by resisting the law they did a +service to the State, the whole city, as I have said, was thrown into an uproar +on the mere mention of its name. The nobles indeed sought to temporize, and to +prevail by patience and address; sometimes calling out the army, sometimes +opposing another tribune to the one who was promoting the law, and sometimes +coming to a compromise by sending a colony into the lands which were to be +divided; as was done in the case of the territory of Antium, whither, on a +dispute concerning the law having arisen, settlers were sent from Rome, and the +land made over to them. In speaking of which colony Titus Livius makes the +notable remark, that hardly any one in Rome could be got to take part in it, so +much readier were the commons to indulge in covetous schemes at home, than to +realize them by leaving it. +</p> + +<p> +The ill humour engendered by this contest continued to prevail until the Romans +began to carry their arms into the remoter parts of Italy and to countries +beyond its shores; after which it seemed for a time to slumber—and this, +because the lands held by the enemies of Rome, out of sight of her citizens and +too remote to be conveniently cultivated, came to be less desired. Whereupon +the Romans grew less eager to punish their enemies by dividing their lands, and +were content, when they deprived any city of its territory, to send colonists +to occupy it. For causes such as these, the measure remained in abeyance down +to the time of the Gracchi; but being by them revived, finally overthrew the +liberty of Rome. For as it found the power of its adversaries doubled, such a +flame of hatred was kindled between commons and senate, that, regardless of all +civil restraints, they resorted to arms and bloodshed. And as the public +magistrates were powerless to provide a remedy, each of the two factions having +no longer any hopes from them, resolved to do what it could for itself, and to +set up a chief for its own protection. On reaching this stage of tumult and +disorder, the commons lent their influence to Marius, making him four times +consul; whose authority, lasting thus long, and with very brief intervals, +became so firmly rooted that he was able to make himself consul other three +times. Against this scourge, the nobles, lacking other defence, set themselves +to favour Sylla, and placing him at the head of their faction, entered on the +civil wars; wherein, after much blood had been spilt, and after many changes of +fortune, they got the better of their adversaries. But afterwards, in the time +of Cæsar and Pompey, the distemper broke out afresh; for Cæsar heading the +Marian party, and Pompey, that of Sylla, and war ensuing, the victory remained +with Cæsar, who was the first tyrant in Rome; after whose time that city was +never again free. Such, therefore, was the beginning and such the end of the +Agrarian Law. +</p> + +<p> +But since it has elsewhere been said that the struggle between the commons and +senate of Rome preserved her liberties, as giving rise to laws favourable to +freedom, it might seem that the consequences of the Agrarian Law are opposed to +that view. I am not, however, led to alter my opinion on this account; for I +maintain that the ambition of the great is so pernicious that unless controlled +and counteracted in a variety of ways, it will always reduce a city to speedy +ruin. So that if the controversy over the Agrarian Laws took three hundred +years to bring Rome to slavery, she would in all likelihood have been brought +to slavery in a far shorter time, had not the commons, by means of this law, +and by other demands, constantly restrained the ambition of the nobles. +</p> + +<p> +We may also learn from this contest how much more men value wealth than +honours; for in the matter of honours, the Roman nobles always gave way to the +commons without any extraordinary resistance; but when it came to be a question +of property, so stubborn were they in its defence, that the commons to effect +their ends had to resort to those irregular methods which have been described +above. Of which irregularities the prime movers were the Gracchi, whose motives +are more to be commended than their measures; since to pass a law with +stringent retrospective effect, in order to remove an abuse of long standing in +a republic, is an unwise step, and one which, as I have already shown at +length, can have no other result than to accelerate the mischief to which the +abuse leads; whereas, if you temporize, either the abuse develops more slowly, +or else, in course of time, and before it comes to a head, dies out of itself. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXVIII.—<i>That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; +and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than +Choice.</i></h2> + +<p> +A terrible pestilence breaking out in Rome seemed to the Equians and Volscians +to offer a fit opportunity for crushing her. The two nations, therefore, +assembling a great army, attacked the Latins and Hernicians and laid waste +their country. Whereupon the Latins and Hernicians were forced to make their +case known to the Romans, and to ask to be defended by them. The Romans, who +were sorely afflicted by the pestilence, answered that they must look to their +own defence, and with their own forces, since Rome was in no position to +succour them. +</p> + +<p> +Here we recognize the prudence and magnanimity of the Roman senate, and how at +all times, and in all changes of fortune, they assumed the responsibility of +determining the course their country should take; and were not ashamed, when +necessary, to decide on a course contrary to that which was usual with them, or +which they had decided to follow on some other occasion. I say this because on +other occasions this same senate had forbidden these nations to defend +themselves; and a less prudent assembly might have thought it lowered their +credit to withdraw that prohibition. But the Roman senate always took a sound +view of things, and always accepted the least hurtful course as the best. So +that, although it was distasteful to them not to be able to defend their +subjects, and equally distasteful—both for the reasons given, and for +others which may be understood—that their subjects should take up arms in +their absence, nevertheless knowing that these must have recourse to arms in +any case, since the enemy was upon them, they took an honourable course in +deciding that what had to be done should be done with their leave, lest men +driven to disobey by necessity should come afterwards to disobey from choice. +And although this may seem the course which every republic ought reasonably to +follow, nevertheless weak and badly-advised republics cannot make up their +minds to follow it, not knowing how to do themselves honour in like +extremities. +</p> + +<p> +After Duke Valentino had taken Faenza and forced Bologna to yield to his terms, +desiring to return to Rome through Tuscany, he sent one of his people to +Florence to ask leave for himself and his army to pass. A council was held in +Florence to consider how this request should be dealt with, but no one was +favourable to the leave asked for being granted. Wherein the Roman method was +not followed. For as the Duke had a very strong force with him, while the +Florentines were so bare of troops that they could not have prevented his +passage, it would have been far more for their credit that he should seem to +pass with their consent, than that he should pass in spite of them; because, +while discredit had to be incurred either way, they would have incurred less by +acceding to his demand. +</p> + +<p> +But of all courses the worst for a weak State is to be irresolute; for then +whatever it does will seem to be done under compulsion, so that if by chance it +should do anything well, this will be set down to necessity and not to +prudence. Of this I shall cite two other instances happening in our own times, +and in our own country. In the year 1500, King Louis of France, after +recovering Milan, being desirous to restore Pisa to the Florentines, so as to +obtain payment from them of the fifty thousand ducats which they had promised +him on the restitution being completed, sent troops to Pisa under M. Beaumont, +in whom, though a Frenchman, the Florentines put much trust. Beaumont +accordingly took up his position with his forces between Cascina and Pisa, to +be in readiness to attack the town. After he had been there for some days +making arrangements for the assault, envoys came to him from Pisa offering to +surrender their city to the French if a promise were given in the king’s +name, not to hand it over to the Florentines until four months had run. This +condition was absolutely rejected by the Florentines, and the siege being +proceeded with, they were forced to retire with disgrace. Now the proposal of +the Pisans was rejected by the Florentines for no other reason than that they +distrusted the good faith of the King, into whose hands their weakness obliged +them to commit themselves, and did not reflect how much more it was for their +interest that, by obtaining entrance into Pisa, he should have it in his power +to restore the town to them, or, failing to restore it, should at once disclose +his designs, than that remaining outside he should put them off with promises +for which they had to pay. It would therefore have been a far better course for +the Florentines to have agreed to Beaumont taking possession on whatever terms. +</p> + +<p> +This was seen afterwards by experience in the year 1502, when, on the revolt of +Arezzo, M. Imbalt was sent by the King of France with French troops to assist +the Florentines. For when he got near Arezzo, and began to negotiate with the +Aretines, who, like the Pisans, were willing to surrender their town on terms, +the acceptance of these terms was strongly disapproved in Florence; which +Imbalt learning, and thinking that the Florentines were acting with little +sense, he took the entire settlement of conditions into his own hands, and, +without consulting the Florentine commissioners, concluded an arrangement to +his own satisfaction, in execution of which he entered Arezzo with his army. +And he let the Florentines know that he thought them fools and ignorant of the +ways of the world; since if they desired to have Arezzo, they could signify +their wishes to the King, who would be much better able to give it them when he +had his soldiers inside, than when he had them outside the town. Nevertheless, +in Florence they never ceased to blame and abuse M. Imbalt, until at last they +came to see that if Beaumont had acted in the same way, they would have got +possession Of Pisa as well as of Arezzo. +</p> + +<p> +Applying what has been said to the matter in hand, we find that irresolute +republics, unless upon compulsion, never follow wise courses; for wherever +there is room for doubt, their weakness will not suffer them to come to any +resolve; so that unless their doubts be overcome by some superior force which +impels them forward, they remain always in suspense. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXIX.—<i>That often the same Accidents are seen to befall +different Nations.</i></h2> + +<p> +Any one comparing the present with the past will soon perceive that in all +cities and in all nations there prevail the same desires and passions as always +have prevailed; for which reason it should be an easy matter for him who +carefully examines past events, to foresee those which are about to happen in +any republic, and to apply such remedies as the ancients have used in like +cases; or finding none which have been used by them, to strike out new ones, +such as they might have used in similar circumstances. But these lessons being +neglected or not understood by readers, or, if understood by them, being +unknown to rulers, it follows that the same disorders are common to all times. +</p> + +<p> +In the year 1494 the Republic of Florence, having lost a portion of its +territories, including Pisa and other towns, was forced to make war against +those who had taken possession of them, who being powerful, it followed that +great sums were spent on these wars to little purpose. This large expenditure +had to be met by heavy taxes which gave occasion to numberless complaints on +the part of the people; and inasmuch as the war was conducted by a council of +ten citizens, who were styled “the Ten of the War,” the multitude +began to regard these with displeasure, as though they were the cause of the +war and of the consequent expenditure; and at last persuaded themselves that if +they got rid of this magistracy there would be an end to the war. Wherefore +when the magistracy of “the Ten” should have been renewed, the +people did not renew it, but, suffering it to lapse, entrusted their affairs to +the “Signory.” This course was most pernicious, since not only did +it fail to put an end to the war, as the people expected it would, but by +setting aside men who had conducted it with prudence, led to such mishaps that +not Pisa only, but Arezzo also, and many other towns besides were lost to +Florence. Whereupon, the people recognizing their mistake, and that the evil +was in the disease and not in the physician, reinstated the magistracy of the +Ten. +</p> + +<p> +Similar dissatisfaction grew up in Rome against the consular authority. For the +people seeing one war follow another, and that they were never allowed to rest, +when they should have ascribed this to the ambition of neighbouring nations who +desired their overthrow, ascribed it to the ambition of the nobles, who, as +they believed, being unable to wreak their hatred against them within the city, +where they were protected by the power of the tribunes, sought to lead them +outside the city, where they were under the authority of the consuls, that they +might crush them where they were without help. In which belief they thought it +necessary either to get rid of the consuls altogether, or so to restrict their +powers as to leave them no authority over the people, either in the city or out +of it. +</p> + +<p> +The first who attempted to pass a law to this effect was the tribune +Terentillus, who proposed that a committee of five should be named to consider +and regulate the power of the consuls. This roused the anger of the nobles, to +whom it seemed that the greatness of their authority was about to set for ever, +and that no part would be left them in the administration of the republic. +Such, however, was the obstinacy of the tribunes, that they succeeded in +abolishing the consular title, nor were satisfied until, after other changes, +it was resolved that, in room of consuls, tribunes should be appointed with +consular powers; so much greater was their hatred of the name than of the +thing. For a long time matters remained on this footing; till eventually, the +commons, discovering their mistake, resumed the appointment of consuls in the +same way as the Florentines reverted to “the Ten of the War.” +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XL.—<i>Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what +therein is to be noted. Wherein among other Matters is shown how the same +Causes may lead to the Safety or to the Ruin of a Commonwealth.</i></h2> + +<p> +It being my desire to treat fully of those disorders which arose in Rome on the +creation of the decemvirate, I think it not amiss first of all to relate what +took place at the time of that creation, and then to discuss those +circumstances attending it which seem most to deserve notice. These are +numerous, and should be well considered, both by those who would maintain the +liberties of a commonwealth and by those who would subvert them. For in the +course of our inquiry it will be seen that many mistakes prejudicial to freedom +were made by the senate and people, and that many were likewise made by Appius, +the chief decemvir, prejudicial to that tyranny which it was his aim to +establish in Rome. +</p> + +<p> +After much controversy and wrangling between the commons and the nobles as to +the framing of new laws by which the freedom of Rome might be better secured, +Spurius Posthumius and two other citizens were, by general consent, despatched +to Athens to procure copies of the laws which Solon had drawn up for the +Athenians, to the end that these might serve as a groundwork for the laws of +Rome. On their return, the next step was to depute certain persons to examine +these laws and to draft the new code. For which purpose a commission consisting +of ten members, among whom was Appius Claudius, a crafty and ambitious citizen, +was appointed for a year; and that the commissioners in framing their laws +might act without fear or favour, all the other magistracies, and in particular +the consulate and tribuneship, were suspended, and the appeal to the people +discontinued; so that the decemvirs came to be absolute in Rome. Very soon the +whole authority of the commissioners came to be centred in Appius, owing to the +favour in which he was held by the commons. For although before he had been +regarded as the cruel persecutor of the people, he now showed himself so +conciliatory in his bearing that men wondered at the sudden change in his +character and disposition. +</p> + +<p> +This set of commissioners, then, behaved discreetly, being attended by no more +than twelve lictors, walking in front of that decemvir whom the rest put +forward as their chief; and though vested with absolute authority, yet when a +Roman citizen had to be tried for murder, they cited him before the people and +caused him to be judged by them. Their laws they wrote upon ten tables, but +before signing them they exposed them publicly, that every one might read and +consider them, and if any defect were discovered in them, it might be corrected +before they were finally passed. At this juncture Appius caused it to be +notified throughout the city that were two other tables added to these ten, the +laws would be complete; hoping that under this belief the people would consent +to continue the decemvirate for another year. This consent the people willingly +gave, partly to prevent the consuls being reinstated, and partly because they +thought they could hold their ground without the aid of the tribunes, who, as +has already been said, were the judges in criminal cases. +</p> + +<p> +On it being resolved to reappoint the decemvirate, all the nobles set to +canvass for the office, Appius among the foremost; and such cordiality did he +display towards the commons while seeking their votes, that the other +candidates, “<i>unable to persuade themselves that so much affability on +the part of so proud a man was wholly disinterested,</i>” began to +suspect him; but fearing to oppose him openly, sought to circumvent him, by +putting him forward, though the youngest of them all, to declare to the people +the names of the proposed decemvirs; thinking that he would not venture to name +himself, that being an unusual course in Rome, and held discreditable. +“<i>But what they meant as a hindrance, he turned to account,</i>” +by proposing, to the surprise and displeasure of the whole nobility, his own +name first, and then nominating nine others on whose support he thought he +could depend. +</p> + +<p> +The new appointments, which were to last for a year, having been made, Appius +soon let both commons and nobles know the mistake they had committed, for +throwing off the mask, he allowed his innate arrogance to appear, and speedily +infected his colleagues with the same spirit; who, to overawe the people and +the senate, instead of twelve lictors, appointed one hundred and twenty. For a +time their measures were directed against high and low alike; but presently +they began to intrigue with the senate, and to attack the commons; and if any +of the latter, on being harshly used by one decemvir, ventured to appeal to +another, he was worse handled on the appeal than in the first instance. The +commons, on discovering their error, began in their despair to turn their eyes +towards the nobles, “<i>and to look for a breeze of freedom from that +very quarter whence fearing slavery they had brought the republic to its +present straits.</i>” To the nobles the sufferings of the commons were +not displeasing, from the hope “<i>that disgusted with the existing state +of affairs, they too might come to desire the restoration of the +consuls.</i>” +</p> + +<p> +When the year for which the decemvirs were appointed at last came to an end, +the two additional tables of the law were ready, but had not yet been +published. This was made a pretext by them for prolonging their magistracy, +which they took measures to retain by force, gathering round them for this +purpose a retinue of young noblemen, whom they enriched with the goods of those +citizens whom they had condemned. “<i>Corrupted by which gifts, these +youths came to prefer selfish licence to public freedom.</i>” +</p> + +<p> +It happened that at this time the Sabines and Volscians began to stir up a war +against Rome, and it was during the alarm thereby occasioned that the decemvirs +were first made aware how weak was their position. For without the senate they +could take no warlike measures, while by assembling the senate they seemed to +put an end to their own authority. Nevertheless, being driven to it by +necessity, they took this latter course. When the senate met, many of the +senators, but particularly Valerius and Horatius, inveighed against the +insolence of the decemvirs, whose power would forthwith have been cut short, +had not the senate through jealousy of the commons declined to exercise their +authority. For they thought that were the decemvirs to lay down office of their +own free will, tribunes might not be reappointed. Wherefore they decided for +war, and sent forth the armies under command of certain of the decemvirs. But +Appius remaining behind to govern the city, it so fell out that he became +enamoured of Virginia, and that when he sought to lay violent hands upon her, +Virginius, her father, to save her from dishonour, slew her. Thereupon followed +tumults in Rome, and mutiny among the soldiers, who, making common cause with +the rest of the plebeians, betook themselves to the Sacred Hill, and there +remained until the decemvirs laid down their office; when tribunes and consuls +being once more appointed, Rome was restored to her ancient freedom. +</p> + +<p> +In these events we note, first of all, that the pernicious step of creating +this tyranny in Rome was due to the same causes which commonly give rise to +tyrannies in cities; namely, the excessive love of the people for liberty, and +the passionate eagerness of the nobles to govern. For when they cannot agree to +pass some measure favourable to freedom, one faction or the other sets itself +to support some one man, and a tyranny at once springs up. Both parties in Rome +consented to the creation of the decemvirs, and to their exercising +unrestricted powers, from the desire which the one had to put an end to the +consular name, and the other to abolish the authority of the tribunes. When, on +the appointment of the decemvirate, it seemed to the commons that Appius had +become favourable to their cause, and was ready to attack the nobles, they +inclined to support him. But when a people is led to commit this error of +lending its support to some one man, in order that he may attack those whom it +holds in hatred, if he only be prudent he will inevitably become the tyrant of +that city. For he will wait until, with the support of the people, he can deal +a fatal blow to the nobles, and will never set himself to oppress the people +until the nobles have been rooted out. But when that time comes, the people, +although they recognize their servitude, will have none to whom they can turn +for help. +</p> + +<p> +Had this method, which has been followed by all who have successfully +established tyrannies in republics, been followed by Appius, his power would +have been more stable and lasting; whereas, taking the directly opposite +course, he could not have acted more unwisely than he did. For in his eagerness +to grasp the tyranny, he made himself obnoxious to those who were in fact +conferring it, and who could have maintained him in it; and he destroyed those +who were his friends, while he sought friendship from those from whom he could +not have it. For although it be the desire of the nobles to tyrannize, that +section of them which finds itself outside the tyranny is always hostile to the +tyrant, who can never succeed in gaining over the entire body of the nobles by +reason of their greed and ambition; for no tyrant can ever have honours or +wealth enough to satisfy them all. +</p> + +<p> +In abandoning the people, therefore, and siding with the nobles, Appius +committed a manifest mistake, as well for the reasons above given, as because +to hold a thing by force, he who uses force must needs be stronger than he +against whom it is used. Whence it happens that those tyrants who have the mass +of the people for their friends and the nobles for their enemies, are more +secure than those who have the people for their enemies and the nobles for +their friends; because in the former case their authority has the stronger +support. For with such support a ruler can maintain himself by the internal +strength of his State, as did Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, when attacked by the +Romans and by the whole of Greece; for making sure work with the nobles, who +were few in number, and having the people on his side, he was able with their +assistance to defend himself; which he could not have done had they been +against him. But in the case of a city, wherein the tyrant has few friends, its +internal strength will not avail him for its defence, and he will have to seek +aid from without in one of three shapes. For either he must hire foreign guards +to defend his person; or he must arm the peasantry, so that they may play the +part which ought to be played by the citizens; or he must league with powerful +neighbours for his defence. He who follows these methods and observes them +well, may contrive to save himself, though he has the people for his enemy. But +Appius could not follow the plan of gaining over the peasantry, since in Rome +they and the people were one. And what he might have done he knew not how to +do, and so was ruined at the very outset. +</p> + +<p> +In creating the decemvirate, therefore, both the senate and the people made +grave mistakes. For although, as already explained, when speaking of the +dictatorship, it is those magistrates who make themselves, and not those made +by the votes of the people, that are hurtful to freedom; nevertheless the +people, in creating magistrates ought to take such precautions as will make it +difficult for these to become bad. But the Romans when they ought to have set a +check on the decemvirs in order to keep them good, dispensed with it, making +them the sole magistrates of Rome, and setting aside all others; and this from +the excessive desire of the senate to get rid of the tribunes, and of the +commons to get rid of the consuls; by which objects both were so blinded as to +fall into all the disorders which ensued. For, as King Ferrando was wont to +say, men often behave like certain of the smaller birds, which are so intent on +the prey to which nature incites them, that they discern not the eagle hovering +overhead for their destruction. +</p> + +<p> +In this Discourse then the mistakes made by the Roman people in their efforts +to preserve their freedom and the mistakes made by Appius in his endeavour to +obtain the tyranny, have, as I proposed at the outset, been plainly shown. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLI.—<i>That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to +severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble.</i></h2> + +<p> +Among the crafty devices used by Appius to aid him in maintaining his +authority, this, of suddenly passing from one character to the other extreme, +was of no small prejudice to him. For his fraud in pretending to the commons to +be well disposed towards them, was happily contrived; as were also the means he +took to bring about the reappointment of the decemvirate. Most skilful, too, +was his audacity in nominating himself contrary to the expectation of the +nobles, and in proposing colleagues on whom he could depend to carry out his +ends. But, as I have said already, it was not happily contrived that, after +doing all this, he should suddenly turn round, and from being the friend, +reveal himself the enemy of the people; haughty instead of humane; cruel +instead of kindly; and make this change so rapidly as to leave himself no +shadow of excuse, but compel all to recognize the doubleness of his nature. For +he who has once seemed good, should he afterwards choose, for his own ends, to +become bad, ought to change by slow degrees, and as opportunity serves; so that +before his altered nature strip him of old favour, he may have gained for +himself an equal share of new, and thus his influence suffer no diminution. For +otherwise, being at once unmasked and friendless, he is undone: +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLII.—<i>How easily Men become corrupted.</i></h2> + +<p> +In this matter of the decemvirate we may likewise note the ease wherewith men +become corrupted, and how completely, although born good and well brought up, +they change their nature. For we see how favourably disposed the youths whom +Appius gathered round him became towards his tyranny, in return for the +trifling benefits which they drew from it; and how Quintus Fabius, one of the +second decemvirate and a most worthy man, blinded by a little ambition, and +misled by the evil counsels of Appius, abandoning his fair fame, betook himself +to most unworthy courses, and grew like his master. +</p> + +<p> +Careful consideration of this should make those who frame laws for +commonwealths and kingdoms more alive to the necessity of placing restraints on +men’s evil appetites, and depriving them of all hope of doing wrong with +impunity. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLIII.—<i>That Men fighting in their own Cause make good and +resolute Soldiers.</i></h2> + +<p> +From what has been touched upon above, we are also led to remark how wide is +the difference between an army which, having no ground for discontent, fights +in its own cause, and one which, being discontented, fights to satisfy the +ambition of others. For whereas the Romans were always victorious under the +consuls, under the decemvirs they were always defeated. This helps us to +understand why it is that mercenary troops are worthless; namely, that they +have no incitement to keep them true to you beyond the pittance which you pay +them, which neither is nor can be a sufficient motive for such fidelity and +devotion as would make them willing to die in your behalf. But in those armies +in which there exists not such an attachment towards him for whom they fight as +makes them devoted to his cause, there never will be valour enough to withstand +an enemy if only he be a little brave. And since such attachment and devotion +cannot be looked for from any save your own subjects, you must, if you would +preserve your dominions, or maintain your commonwealth or kingdom, arm the +natives of your country; as we see to have been done by all those who have +achieved great things in war. +</p> + +<p> +Under the decemvirs the ancient valour of the Roman soldiers had in no degree +abated; yet, because they were no longer animated by the same good will, they +did not exert themselves as they were wont. But so soon as the decemvirate came +to an end, and the soldiers began once more to fight as free men, the old +spirit was reawakened, and, as a consequence, their enterprises, according to +former usage, were brought to a successful close. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLIV.—<i>That the Multitude is helpless without a Head: and +that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave.</i></h2> + +<p> +When Virginia died by her father’s hand, the commons of Rome withdrew +under arms to the Sacred Hill. Whereupon the senate sent messengers to demand +by what sanction they had deserted their commanders and assembled there in +arms. And in such reverence was the authority of the senate held, that the +commons, lacking leaders, durst make no reply. “Not,” says Titus +Livius, “that they were at a loss what to answer, but because they had +none to answer for them;” words which clearly show how helpless a thing +is the multitude when without a head. +</p> + +<p> +This defect was perceived by Virginius, at whose instance twenty military +tribunes were appointed by the commons to be their spokesmen with the senate, +and to negotiate terms; who, having asked that Valerius and Horatius might be +sent to them, to whom their wishes would be made known, these declined to go +until the decemvirs had laid down their office. When this was done, and +Valerius and Horatius came to the hill where the commons were assembled, the +latter demanded that tribunes of the people should be appointed; that in future +there should be an appeal to the people from the magistrates of whatever +degree; and that all the decemvirs should be given up to them to be burned +alive. Valerius and Horatius approved the first two demands, but rejected the +last as inhuman; telling the commons that “they were rushing into that +very cruelty which they themselves had condemned in others;” and +counselling them to say nothing about the decemvirs, but to be satisfied to +regain their own power and authority; since thus the way would be open to them +for obtaining every redress. +</p> + +<p> +Here we see plainly how foolish and unwise it is to ask a thing and with the +same breath to say, “I desire this that I may inflict an injury.” +For we should never declare our intention beforehand, but watch for every +opportunity to carry it out. So that it is enough to ask another for his +weapons, without adding, “With these I purpose to destroy you;” for +when once you have secured his weapons, you can use them afterwards as you +please. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLV.—<i>That it is of evil example, especially in the Maker +of a Law, not to observe the Law when made: and that daily to renew acts of +injustice in a City is most hurtful to the Governor.</i></h2> + +<p> +Terms having been adjusted, and the old order of things restored in Rome, +Virginius cited Appius to defend himself before the people; and on his +appearing attended by many of the nobles, ordered him to be led to prison. +Whereupon Appius began to cry out and appeal to the people. But Virginius told +him that he was unworthy to be allowed that appeal which he had himself done +away with, or to have that people whom he had wronged for his protectors. +Appius rejoined, that the people should not set at nought that right of appeal +which they themselves had insisted on with so much zeal. Nevertheless, he was +dragged to prison, and before the day of trial slew himself. Now, though the +wicked life of Appius merited every punishment, still it was impolitic to +violate the laws, more particularly a law which had only just been passed; for +nothing, I think, is of worse example in a republic, than to make a law and not +to keep it; and most of all, when he who breaks is he that made it. +</p> + +<p> +After the year 1494, the city of Florence reformed its government with the help +of the Friar Girolamo Savonarola, whose writings declare his learning, his +wisdom, and the excellence of his heart. Among other ordinances for the safety +of the citizens, he caused a law to be passed, allowing an appeal to the people +from the sentences pronounced by “the Eight” and by the +“Signory” in trials for State offences; a law he had long contended +for, and carried at last with great difficulty. It so happened that a very +short time after it was passed, five citizens were condemned to death by the +“Signory” for State offences, and that when they sought to appeal +to the people they were not permitted to do so, and the law was violated. This, +more than any other mischance, helped to lessen the credit of the Friar; since +if his law of appeal was salutary, he should have caused it to be observed; if +useless, he ought not to have promoted it. And his inconsistency was the more +remarked, because in all the sermons which he preached after the law was +broken, he never either blamed or excused the person who had broken it, as +though unwilling to condemn, while unable to justify what suited his purposes. +This, as betraying the ambitious and partial turn of his mind, took from his +reputation and exposed him to much obloquy. +</p> + +<p> +Another thing which greatly hurts a government is to keep alive bitter feelings +in men’s minds by often renewed attacks on individuals, as was done in +Rome after the decemvirate was put an end to. For each of the decemvirs, and +other citizens besides, were at different times accused and condemned, so that +the greatest alarm was spread through the whole body of the nobles, who came to +believe that these prosecutions would never cease until their entire order was +exterminated. And this must have led to grave mischief had not Marcus Duilius +the tribune provided against it, by an edict which forbade every one, for the +period of a year, citing or accusing any Roman citizen, an ordinance which had +the effect of reassuring the whole nobility. Here we see how hurtful it is for +a prince or commonwealth to keep the minds of their subjects in constant alarm +and suspense by continually renewed punishments and violence. And, in truth, no +course can be more pernicious. For men who are in fear for their safety will +seize on every opportunity for securing themselves against the dangers which +surround them, and will grow at once more daring, and less scrupulous in +resorting to new courses. For these reasons we should either altogether avoid +inflicting injury, or should inflict every injury at a stroke, and then seek to +reassure men’s minds and suffer them to settle down and rest. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLVI.—<i>That Men climb from one step of Ambition to another, +seeking at first to escape Injury and then to injure others.</i></h2> + +<p> +As the commons of Rome on recovering their freedom were restored to their +former position—nay, to one still stronger since many new laws had been +passed which confirmed and extended their authority,—it might reasonably +have been hoped that Rome would for a time remain at rest. The event, however, +showed the contrary, for from day to day there arose in that city new tumults +and fresh dissensions. And since the causes which brought this about have been +most judiciously set forth by Titus Livius, it seems to me much to the purpose +to cite his own words when he says, that “whenever either the commons or +the nobles were humble, the others grew haughty; so that if the commons kept +within due bounds, the young nobles began to inflict injuries upon them, +against which the tribunes, who were themselves made the objects of outrage, +were little able to give redress; while the nobles on their part, although they +could not close their eyes to the ill behaviour of their young men, were yet +well pleased that if excesses were to be committed, they should be committed by +their own faction, and not by the commons. Thus the desire to secure its own +liberty prompted each faction to make itself strong enough to oppress the +other. For this is the common course of things, that in seeking to escape cause +for fear, men come to give others cause to be afraid by inflicting on them +those wrongs from which they strive to relieve themselves; as though the choice +lay between injuring and being injured.” +</p> + +<p> +Herein, among other things, we perceive in what ways commonwealths are +overthrown, and how men climb from one ambition to another; and recognize the +truth of those words which Sallust puts in the mouth of Cæsar, that +“<i>all ill actions have their origin in fair beginnings.</i>”<a href="#fn4" name="fnref4" id="fnref4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +For, as I have said already, the ambitious citizen in a commonwealth seeks at +the outset to secure himself against injury, not only at the hands of private +persons, but also of the magistrates; to effect which he endeavours to gain +himself friends. These he obtains by means honourable in appearance, either by +supplying them with money or protecting them against the powerful. And because +such conduct seems praiseworthy, every one is readily deceived by it, and +consequently no remedy is applied. Pursuing these methods without hindrance, +this man presently comes to be so powerful that private citizens begin to fear +him, and the magistrates to treat him with respect. But when he has advanced +thus far on the road to power without encountering opposition, he has reached a +point at which it is most dangerous to cope with him; it being dangerous, as I +have before explained, to contend with a disorder which has already made +progress in a city. Nevertheless, when he has brought things to this pass, you +must either endeavour to crush him, at the risk of immediate ruin, or else, +unless death or some like accident interpose, you incur inevitable slavery by +letting him alone. For when, as I have said, it has come to this that the +citizens and even the magistrates fear to offend him and his friends, little +further effort will afterwards be needed to enable him to proscribe and ruin +whom he pleases. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn4" id="fn4"></a> <a href="#fnref4">[4]</a> +Quod omnia mala exempla ex bonis initiis orta sunt. (Sall. Cat. 51.) +</p> + +<p> +A republic ought, therefore, to provide by its ordinances that none of its +citizens shall, under colour of doing good, have it in their power to do evil, +but shall be suffered to acquire such influence only as may aid and not injure +freedom. How this may be done, shall presently be explained. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLVII.—<i>That though Men deceive themselves in Generalities, +in Particulars they judge truly.</i></h2> + +<p> +The commons of Rome having, as I have said, grown disgusted with the consular +name, and desiring either that men of plebeian birth should be admitted to the +office or its authority be restricted, the nobles, to prevent its degradation +in either of these two ways, proposed a middle course, whereby four tribunes, +who might either be plebeians or nobles, were to be created with consular +authority. This compromise satisfied the commons, who thought they would thus +get rid of the consulship, and secure the highest offices of the State for +their own order. But here a circumstance happened worth noting. When the four +tribunes came to be chosen, the people, who had it in their power to choose all +from the commons, chose all from the nobles. With respect to which election +Titus Livius observes, that “<i>the result showed that the people when +declaring their honest judgment after controversy was over, were governed by a +different spirit from that which had inspired them while contending for their +liberties and for a share in public honours</i>.” The reason for this I +believe to be, that men deceive themselves more readily in generals than in +particulars. To the commons of Rome it seemed, in the abstract, that they had +every right to be admitted to the consulship, since their party in the city was +the more numerous, since they bore the greater share of danger in their wars, +and since it was they who by their valour kept Rome free and made her powerful. +And because it appeared to them, as I have said, that their desire was a +reasonable one, they were resolved to satisfy it at all hazards. But when they +had to form a particular judgment on the men of their own party, they +recognized their defects, and decided that individually no one of them was +deserving of what, collectively, they seemed entitled to; and being ashamed of +them, turned to bestow their honours on those who deserved them. Of which +decision Titus Livius, speaking with due admiration, says, “<i>Where +shall we now find in any one man, that modesty, moderation, and magnanimity +which were then common to the entire people?</i>” +</p> + +<p> +As confirming what I have said, I shall cite another noteworthy incident, which +occurred in Capua after the rout of the Romans by Hannibal at Cannæ. For all +Italy being convulsed by that defeat, Capua too was threatened with civil +tumult, through the hatred which prevailed between her people and senate. But +Pacuvius Calavius, who at this time filled the office of chief magistrate, +perceiving the danger, took upon himself to reconcile the contending factions. +With this object he assembled the Senate and pointed out to them the hatred in +which they were held by the people, and the risk they ran of being put to death +by them, and of the city, now that the Romans were in distress, being given up +to Hannibal. But he added that, were they to consent to leave the matter with +him, he thought he could contrive to reconcile them; in the meanwhile, however, +he must shut them up in the palace, that, by putting it in the power of the +people to punish them, he might secure their safety. +</p> + +<p> +The senate consenting to this proposal, he shut them up in the palace, and +summoning the people to a public meeting, told them the time had at last come +for them to trample on the insolence of the nobles, and requite the wrongs +suffered at their hands; for he had them all safe under bolt and bar; but, as +he supposed they did not wish the city to remain without rulers, it was fit, +before putting the old senators to death, they should appoint others in their +room. Wherefore he had thrown the names of all the old senators into a bag, and +would now proceed to draw them out one by one, and as they were drawn would +cause them to be put to death, so soon as a successor was found for each. When +the first name he drew was declared, there arose a great uproar among the +people, all crying out against the cruelty, pride, and arrogance of that +senator whose name it was. But on Pacuvius desiring them to propose a +substitute, the meeting was quieted, and after a brief pause one of the commons +was nominated. No sooner, however, was his name mentioned than one began to +whistle, another to laugh, some jeering at him in one way and some in another. +And the same thing happening in every case, each and all of those nominated +were judged unworthy of senatorial rank. Whereupon Pacuvius, profiting by the +opportunity, said, “Since you are agreed that the city would be badly off +without a senate, but are not agreed whom to appoint in the room of the old +senators, it will, perhaps, be well for you to be reconciled to them; for the +fear into which they have been thrown must have so subdued them, that you are +sure to find in them that affability which hitherto you have looked for in +vain.” This proposal being agreed to, a reconciliation followed between +the two orders; the commons having seen their error so soon as they were +obliged to come to particulars. +</p> + +<p> +A people therefore is apt to err in judging of things and their accidents in +the abstract, but on becoming acquainted with particulars, speedily discovers +its mistakes. In the year 1494, when her greatest citizens were banished from +Florence, and no regular government any longer existed there, but a spirit of +licence prevailed, and matters went continually from bad to worse, many +Florentines perceiving the decay of their city, and discerning no other cause +for it, blamed the ambition of this or the other powerful citizen, who, they +thought, was fomenting these disorders with a view to establish a government to +his own liking, and to rob them of their liberties. Those who thought thus, +would hang about the arcades and public squares, maligning many citizens, and +giving it to be understood that if ever they found themselves in the Signory, +they would expose the designs of these citizens and have them punished. From +time to time it happened that one or another of those who used this language +rose to be of the chief magistracy, and so soon as he obtained this +advancement, and saw things nearer, became aware whence the disorders I have +spoken of really came, the dangers attending them, and the difficulty in +dealing with them; and recognizing that they were the growth of the times, and +not occasioned by particular men, suddenly altered his views and conduct; a +nearer knowledge of facts freeing him from the false impressions he had been +led into on a general view of affairs. But those who had heard him speak as a +private citizen, when they saw him remain inactive after he was made a +magistrate, believed that this arose not from his having obtained any better +knowledge of things, but from his having been cajoled or corrupted by the +great. And this happening with many men and often, it came to be a proverb +among the people, that “<i>men had one mind in the market-place, another +in the palace.</i>” +</p> + +<p> +Reflecting on what has been said, we see how quickly men’s eyes may be +opened, if knowing that they deceive themselves in generalities, we can find a +way to make them pass to particulars; as Pacuvius did in the case of the +Capuans, and the senate in the case of Rome. Nor do I believe that any prudent +man need shrink from the judgment of the people in questions relating to +particulars, as, for instance, in the distribution of honours and dignities. +For in such matters only, the people are either never mistaken, or at any rate +far seldomer than a small number of persons would be, were the distribution +entrusted to them. +</p> + +<p> +It seems to me, however, not out of place to notice in the following Chapter, a +method employed by the Roman senate to enlighten the people in making this +distribution. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLVIII.—<i>He who would not have an Office bestowed on some +worthless or wicked Person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is +utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble +and good.</i></h2> + +<p> +Whenever the senate saw a likelihood of the tribunes with consular powers being +chosen exclusively from the commons, it took one or other of two +ways,—either by causing the office to be solicited by the most +distinguished among the citizens; or else, to confess the truth, by bribing +some base and ignoble fellow to fasten himself on to those other plebeians of +better quality who were seeking the office, and become a candidate conjointly +with them. The latter device made the people ashamed to give, the former +ashamed to refuse. +</p> + +<p> +This confirms what I said in my last Chapter, as to the people deceiving +themselves in generalities but not in particulars. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLIX.—<i>That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning +in Freedom, have had difficulty in framing such Laws as would preserve their +Freedom, Cities which at the first have been in Subjection will find this +almost impossible.</i></h2> + +<p> +How hard it is in founding a commonwealth to provide it with all the laws +needed to maintain its freedom, is well seen from the history of the Roman +Republic. For although ordinances were given it first by Romulus, then by Numa, +afterwards by Tullus Hostilius and Servius, and lastly by the Ten created for +the express purpose, nevertheless, in the actual government of Rome new needs +were continually developed, to meet which, new ordinances had constantly to be +devised; as in the creation of the censors, who were one of the chief means by +which Rome was kept free during the whole period of her constitutional +government. For as the censors became the arbiters of morals in Rome, it was +very much owing to them that the progress of the Romans towards corruption was +retarded. And though, at the first creation of the office, a mistake was +doubtless made in fixing its term at five years, this was corrected not long +after by the wisdom of the dictator Mamercus, who passed a law reducing it to +eighteen months; a change which the censors then in office took in such ill +part, that they deprived Mamercus of his rank as a senator. This step was much +blamed both by the commons and the Fathers; still, as our History does not +record that Mamercus obtained any redress, we must infer either that the +Historian has omitted something, or that on this head the laws of Rome were +defective; since it is never well that the laws of a commonwealth should suffer +a citizen to incur irremediable wrong because he promotes a measure favourable +to freedom. +</p> + +<p> +But returning to the matter under consideration, we have, in connection with +the creation of this new office, to note, that if those cities which, as was +the case with Rome, have had their beginning in freedom, and have by themselves +maintained that freedom, have experienced great difficulty in framing good laws +for the preservation of their liberties, it is little to be wondered at that +cities which at the first were dependent, should find it not difficult merely +but impossible so to shape their ordinances as to enable them to live free and +undisturbed. This difficulty we see to have arisen in the case of Florence, +which, being subject at first to the power of Rome and subsequently to that of +other rulers, remained long in servitude, taking no thought for herself; and +even afterwards, when she could breathe more freely and began to frame her own +laws, these, since they were blended with ancient ordinances which were bad, +could not themselves be good; and thus for the two hundred years of which we +have trustworthy record, our city has gone on patching her institutions, +without ever possessing a government in respect of which she could truly be +termed a commonwealth. +</p> + +<p> +The difficulties which have been felt in Florence are the same as have been +felt in all cities which have had a like origin; and although, repeatedly, by +the free and public votes of her citizens, ample authority has been given to a +few of their number to reform her constitution, no alteration of general +utility has ever been introduced, but only such as forwarded the interests of +the party to which those commissioned to make changes belonged. This, instead +of order, has occasioned the greatest disorder in our city. +</p> + +<p> +But to come to particulars, I say, that among other matters which have to be +considered by the founder of a commonwealth, is the question into whose hands +should be committed the power of life and death over its citizens’ This +was well seen to in Rome, where, as a rule, there was a right of appeal to the +people, but where, on any urgent case arising in which it might have been +dangerous to delay the execution of a judicial sentence, recourse could be had +to a dictator with powers to execute justice at once; a remedy, however, never +resorted to save in cases of extremity. But Florence, and other cities having a +like origin, committed this power into the hands of a foreigner, whom they +styled Captain, and as he was open to be corrupted by powerful citizens this +was a pernicious course. Altering this arrangement afterwards in consequence of +changes in their government, they appointed eight citizens to discharge the +office of Captain. But this, for a reason already mentioned, namely that a few +will always be governed by the will of a few and these the most powerful, was a +change from bad to worse. +</p> + +<p> +The city of Venice has guarded herself against a like danger. For in Venice ten +citizens are appointed with power to punish any man without appeal; and +because, although possessing the requisite authority, this number might not be +sufficient to insure the punishment of the powerful, in addition to their +council of Ten, they have also constituted a council of Forty, and have further +provided that the council of the “<i>Pregai</i>,” which is their +supreme council, shall have authority to chastise powerful offenders. So that, +unless an accuser be wanting, a tribunal is never wanting in Venice to keep +powerful citizens in check. +</p> + +<p> +But when we see how in Rome, with ordinances of her own imposing, and with so +many and so wise legislators, fresh occasion arose from day to day for framing +new laws favourable to freedom, it is not to be wondered at that, in other +cities less happy in their beginnings, difficulties should have sprung up which +no ordinances could remedy. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER L.—<i>That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have +power to bring the Government of a City to a stay.</i></h2> + +<p> +T.Q. CINCINNATUS and Cn. Julius Mento being consuls of Rome, and being at +variance with one another, brought the whole business of the city to a stay; +which the senate perceiving, were moved to create a dictator to do what, by +reason of their differences, the consuls would not. But though opposed to one +another in everything else, the consuls were of one mind in resisting the +appointment of a dictator; so that the senate had no remedy left them but to +seek the help of the tribunes, who, supported by their authority, forced the +consuls to yield. +</p> + +<p> +Here we have to note, first, the usefulness of the tribunes’ authority in +checking the ambitious designs, not only of the nobles against the commons, but +also of one section of the nobles against another; and next, that in no city +ought things ever to be so ordered that it rests with a few to decide on +matters, which, if the ordinary business of the State is to proceed at all, +must be carried out. Wherefore, if you grant authority to a council to +distribute honours and offices, or to a magistrate to administer any branch of +public business, you must either impose an obligation that the duty confided +shall be performed, or ordain that, on failure to perform, another may and +shall do what has to be done. Otherwise such an arrangement will be found +defective and dangerous; as would have been the case in Rome, had it not been +possible to oppose the authority of the tribunes to the obstinacy of the +consuls. +</p> + +<p> +In the Venetian Republic, the great council distributes honours and offices. +But more than once it has happened that the council, whether from ill-humour or +from being badly advised, has declined to appoint successors either to the +magistrates of the city or to those administering the government abroad. This +gave rise to the greatest confusion and disorder; for, on a sudden, both the +city itself and the subject provinces found themselves deprived of their lawful +governors; nor could any redress be had until the majority of the council were +pacified or undeceived. And this disorder must have brought the city to a bad +end, had not provision been made against its recurrence by certain of the wiser +citizens, who, finding a fit opportunity, passed a law that no magistracy, +whether within or without the city, should ever be deemed to have been vacated +until it was filled up by the appointment of a successor. In this way the +council was deprived of its facilities for stopping public business to the +danger of the State. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER LI.—<i>What a Prince or Republic does of Necessity, should +seem to be done by Choice</i>.</h2> + +<p> +In all their actions, even in those which are matters of necessity rather than +choice, prudent men will endeavour so to conduct themselves as to conciliate +good-will. This species of prudence was well exercised by the Roman senate when +they resolved to grant pay from the public purse to soldiers on active service, +who, before, had served at their own charges. For perceiving that under the old +system they could maintain no war of any duration, and, consequently, could not +undertake a siege or lead an army to any distance from home, and finding it +necessary to be able to do both, they decided on granting the pay I have spoken +of. But this, which they could not help doing, they did in such a way as to +earn the thanks of the people, by whom the concession was so well received that +all Rome was intoxicated with delight. For it seemed to them a boon beyond any +they could have ventured to hope for, or have dreamed of demanding. And +although the tribunes sought to make light of the benefit, by showing the +people that their burthens would be increased rather than diminished by it, +since taxes would have to be imposed out of which the soldier’s stipend +might be paid, they could not persuade them to regard the measure otherwise +than with gratitude; which was further increased by the manner in which the +senate distributed the taxes, imposing on the nobles all the heavier and +greater, and those which had to be paid first. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER LII.—<i>That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is +growing too powerful in a State, there is no safer Method, or less open to +objection, than to forestall him in those Ways whereby he seeks to advance +himself</i>.</h2> + +<p> +It has been seen in the preceding chapter how much credit the nobles gained +with the commons by a show of good-will towards them, not only in providing for +their military pay, but also in adjusting taxation. Had the senate constantly +adhered to methods like these, they would have put an end to all disturbances +in Rome, and have deprived the tribunes of the credit they had with the people, +and of the influence thence arising. For in truth, in a commonwealth, and +especially in one which has become corrupted, there is no better, or easier, or +less objectionable way of opposing the ambition of any citizen, than to +anticipate him in those paths by which he is seen to be advancing to the ends +he has in view. This plan, had it been followed by the enemies of Cosimo +de’ Medici, would have proved a far more useful course for them than to +banish him from Florence; since if those citizens who opposed him had adopted +his methods for gaining over the people, they would have succeeded, without +violence or tumult, in taking his most effective weapon from his hands. +</p> + +<p> +The influence acquired in Florence by Piero Soderini was entirely due to his +skill in securing the affections of the people, since in this way he obtained +among them a name for loving the liberties of the commonwealth. And truly, for +those citizens who envied his greatness it would have been both easier and more +honourable, and at the same time far less dangerous and hurtful to the State, +to forestall him in those measures by which he was growing powerful, than to +oppose him in such a manner that his overthrow must bring with it the ruin of +the entire republic. For had they, as they might easily have done, deprived him +of the weapons which made him formidable, they could then have withstood him in +all the councils, and in all public deliberations, without either being +suspected or feared. And should any rejoin that, if the citizens who hated +Piero Soderini committed an error in not being beforehand with him in those +ways whereby he came to have influence with the people, Piero himself erred in +like manner, in not anticipating his enemies in those methods whereby they grew +formidable to him; I answer that Piero is to be excused, both because it would +have been difficult for him to have so acted, and because for him such a course +would not have been honourable. For the paths wherein his danger lay were those +which favoured the Medici, and it was by these that his enemies attacked him, +and in the end overthrew him. But these paths Piero could not pursue without +dishonour, since he could not, if he was to preserve his fair fame, have joined +in destroying that liberty which he had been put forward to defend. Moreover, +since favours to the Medicean party could not have been rendered secretly and +once for all, they would have been most dangerous for Piero, who, had he shown +himself friendly to the Medici, must have become suspected and hated by the +people; in which case his enemies would have had still better opportunities +than before for his destruction. +</p> + +<p> +Men ought therefore to look to the risks and dangers of any course which lies +before them, nor engage in it when it is plain that the dangers outweigh the +advantages, even though they be advised by others that it is the most expedient +way to take. Should they act otherwise, it will fare with them as with Tullius, +who, in seeking to diminish the power of Marcus Antonius, added to it. For +Antonius, who had been declared an enemy by the senate, having got together a +strong force, mostly made up of veterans who had shared the fortunes of Cæsar, +Tullius counselled the senate to invest Octavianus with full authority, and to +send him against Antonius with the consuls and the army; affirming, that so +soon as those veterans who had served with Cæsar saw the face of him who was +Cæsar’s nephew and had assumed his name, they would rally to his side and +desert Antonius, who might easily be crushed when thus left bare of support. +</p> + +<p> +But the reverse of all this happened. For Antonius persuaded Octavianus to take +part with him, and to throw over Tullius and the senate. And this brought about +the ruin of the senate, a result which might easily have been foreseen. For +remembering the influence of that great captain, who, after overthrowing all +opponents, had seized on sovereign power in Rome, the senate should have turned +a deaf ear to the persuasions of Tullius, nor ever have believed it possible +that from Cæsar’s heir, or from soldiers who had followed Cæsar, they +could look for anything that consisted with the name of Freedom. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER LIII.—<i>That the People, deceived by a false show of +Advantage, often desire what would be their Ruin; and that large Hopes and +brave Promises easily move them</i>.</h2> + +<p> +When Veii fell, the commons of Rome took up the notion that it would be to the +advantage of their city were half their number to go and dwell there. For they +argued that as Veii lay in a fertile country and was a well-built city, a +moiety of the Roman people might in this way be enriched; while, by reason of +its vicinity to Rome, the management of civil affairs would in no degree be +affected. To the senate, however, and the wiser among the citizens, the scheme +appeared so rash and mischievous that they publicly declared they would die +sooner than consent to it. The controversy continuing, the commons grew so +inflamed against the senate that violence and bloodshed must have ensued; had +not the senate for their protection put forward certain old and esteemed +citizens, respect for whom restrained the populace and put a stop to their +violence. +</p> + +<p> +Two points are here to be noted. First, that a people deceived by a false show +of advantage will often labour for its own destruction; and, unless convinced +by some one whom it trusts, that the course on which it is bent is pernicious, +and that some other is to be preferred, will bring infinite danger and injury +upon the State. And should it so happen, as sometimes is the case, that from +having been deceived before, either by men or by events, there is none in whom +the people trust, their ruin is inevitable. As to which Dante, in his treatise +“De Monarchia,” observes that the people will often raise the cry, +“<i>Flourish our death and perish our life</i>.”<a href="#fn5" name="fnref5" id="fnref5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +From which distrust it arises that often in republics the right course is not +followed; as when Venice, as has been related, on being attacked by many +enemies, could not, until her ruin was complete, resolve to make friends with +any one of them by restoring those territories she had taken from them, on +account of which war had been declared and a league of princes formed against +her. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn5" id="fn5"></a> <a href="#fnref5">[5]</a> +“Viva la sua morte e muoia la sua vita.” The quotation does +<i>not</i> seem to be from the “De Monarchia.” +</p> + +<p> +In considering what courses it is easy, and what it is difficult to persuade a +people to follow, this distinction may be drawn: Either what you would persuade +them to, presents on the face of it a semblance of gain or loss, or it seems a +spirited course or a base one. When any proposal submitted to the people holds +out promise of advantage, or seems to them a spirited course to take, though +loss lie hid behind, nay, though the ruin of their country be involved in it, +they will always be easily led to adopt it; whereas it will always be difficult +to persuade the adoption of such courses as wear the appearance of disgrace or +loss, even though safety and advantage be bound up with them. The truth of what +I say is confirmed by numberless examples both Roman and foreign, modern and +ancient. Hence grew the ill opinion entertained in Rome of Fabius Maximus, who +could never persuade the people that it behoved them to proceed warily in their +conflict with Hannibal, and withstand his onset without fighting. For this the +people thought a base course, not discerning the advantage resulting from it, +which Fabius could by no argument make plain to them. And so blinded are men in +favour of what seems a spirited course, that although the Romans had already +committed the blunder of permitting Varro, master of the knights to Fabius, to +join battle contrary to the latter’s desire, whereby the army must have +been destroyed had not Fabius by his prudence saved it, this lesson was not +enough; for afterwards they appointed this Varro to be consul, for no other +reason than that he gave out, in the streets and market-places, that he would +make an end of Hannibal as soon as leave was given him to do so. Whence came +the battle and defeat of Cannæ, and well-nigh the destruction of Rome. +</p> + +<p> +Another example taken from Roman history may be cited to the same effect. After +Hannibal had maintained himself for eight or ten years in Italy, during which +time the whole country had been deluged with Roman blood, a certain Marcus +Centenius Penula, a man of mean origin, but who had held some post in the army, +came forward and proposed to the senate that were leave given him to raise a +force of volunteers in any part of Italy he pleased, he would speedily deliver +Hannibal into their hands, alive or dead. To the senate this man’s offer +seemed a rash one; but reflecting that were they to refuse it, and were the +people afterwards to hear that it had been made, tumults, ill will, and +resentment against them would result, they granted the permission asked; +choosing rather to risk the lives of all who might follow Penula, than to +excite fresh discontent on the part of the people, to whom they knew that such +a proposal would be welcome, and that it would be very hard to dissuade them +from it. And so this adventurer, marching forth with an undisciplined and +disorderly rabble to meet Hannibal, was, with all his followers, defeated and +slain in the very first encounter. +</p> + +<p> +In Greece, likewise, and in the city of Athens, that most grave and prudent +statesman, Nicias, could not convince the people that the proposal to go and +attack Sicily was disadvantageous; and the expedition being resolved on, +contrary to his advice and to the wishes of the wiser among the citizens, +resulted in the overthrow of the Athenian power. Scipio, on being appointed +consul, asked that the province of Africa might be awarded to him, promising +that he would utterly efface Carthage; and when the senate, on the advice of +Fabius, refused his request, he threatened to submit the matter to the people +as very well knowing that to the people such proposals are always acceptable. +</p> + +<p> +I might cite other instances to the same effect from the history of our own +city, as when Messer Ercole Bentivoglio and Antonio Giacomini, being in joint +command of the Florentine armies, after defeating Bartolommeo d’Alviano +at San Vincenzo, proceeded to invest Pisa. For this enterprise was resolved on +by the people in consequence of the brave promises of Messer Ercole; and though +many wise citizens disapproved of it, they could do nothing to prevent it, +being carried away by the popular will, which took its rise in the assurances +of their captain. +</p> + +<p> +I say, then, that there is no readier way to bring about the ruin of a +republic, when the power is in the hands of the people, than to suggest daring +courses for their adoption. For wherever the people have a voice, such +proposals will always be well received, nor will those persons who are opposed +to them be able to apply any remedy. And as this occasions the ruin of States, +it likewise, and even more frequently, occasions the private ruin of those to +whom the execution of these proposals is committed; because the people +anticipating victory, do not when there comes defeat ascribe it to the short +means or ill fortune of the commander, but to his cowardice and incapacity; and +commonly either put him to death, or imprison or banish him; as was done in the +case of numberless Carthaginian generals and of many Athenian, no successes +they might previously have obtained availing them anything; for all past +services are cancelled by a present loss. And so it happened with our Antonio +Giacomini, who not succeeding as the people had expected, and as he had +promised, in taking Pisa, fell into such discredit with the people, that +notwithstanding his countless past services, his life was spared rather by the +compassion of those in authority than through any movement of the citizens in +his behalf. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER LIV.—<i>Of the boundless Authority which a great Man may use +to restrain an excited Multitude</i>.</h2> + +<p> +The next noteworthy point in the passage referred to in the foregoing Chapter +is, that nothing tends so much to restrain an excited multitude as the +reverence felt for some grave person, clothed with authority, who stands +forward to oppose them. For not without reason has Virgil said— +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“If then, by chance, some reverend chief appear,<br/> +Known for his deeds and for his virtues dear,<br/> +Silent they wait his words and bend a listening ear.”<a href="#fn6" name="fnref6" id="fnref6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn6" id="fn6"></a> <a href="#fnref6">[6]</a> +Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem<br/> +Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant.<br/> + <i>Virg. Aen.</i>, I. 154. +</p> + +<p> +He therefore who commands an army or governs a city wherein tumult shall have +broken out, ought to assume the noblest and bravest bearing he can, and clothe +himself with all the ensigns of his station, that he may make himself more +revered. It is not many years since Florence was divided into two factions, the +<i>Frateschi</i> and <i>Arrabbiati</i>, as they were named, and these coming to +open violence, the <i>Frateschi</i>, among whom was Pagolo Antonio Soderini, a +citizen of great reputation in these days, were worsted. In the course of these +disturbances the people coming with arms in their hands to plunder the house of +Soderini, his brother Messer Francesco, then bishop of Volterra and now +cardinal, who happened to be dwelling there, so soon as he heard the uproar and +saw the crowd, putting on his best apparel and over it his episcopal robes, +went forth to meet the armed multitude, and by his words and mien brought them +to a stay; and for many days his behaviour was commended by the whole city. The +inference from all which is, that there is no surer or more necessary restraint +on the violence of an unruly multitude, than the presence of some one whose +character and bearing command respect. +</p> + +<p> +But to return once more to the passage we are considering, we see how +stubbornly the people clung to this scheme of transplanting themselves to Veii, +thinking it for their advantage, and not discerning the mischief really +involved in it; so that in addition to the many dissensions which it +occasioned, actual violence must have followed, had not the senate with the aid +of certain grave and reverend citizens repressed the popular fury. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER LV.—<i>That Government is easily carried on in a City wherein +the body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible +where Equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not</i>.</h2> + +<p> +Though what we have to fear or hope from cities that have grown corrupted has +already been discussed, still I think it not out of place to notice a +resolution passed by the senate touching the vow which Camillus made to Apollo +of a tenth of the spoil taken from the Veientines. For this spoil having fallen +into the hands of the people, the senate, being unable by other means to get +any account of it, passed an edict that every man should publicly offer one +tenth part of what he had taken. And although this edict was not carried out, +from the senate having afterwards followed a different course, whereby, to the +content of the people, the claim of Apollo was otherwise satisfied, we +nevertheless see from their having entertained such a proposal, how completely +the senate trusted to the honesty of the people, when they assumed that no one +would withhold any part of what the edict commanded him to give; on the other +hand, we see that it never occurred to the people that they might evade the law +by giving less than was due, their only thought being to free themselves from +the law by openly manifesting their displeasure. This example, together with +many others already noticed, shows how much virtue and how profound a feeling +of religion prevailed among the Roman people, and how much good was to be +expected from them. And, in truth, in the country where virtue like this does +not exist, no good can be looked for, as we should look for it in vain in +provinces which at the present day are seen to be corrupted; as Italy is beyond +all others, though, in some degree, France and Spain are similarly tainted. In +which last two countries, if we see not so many disorders spring up as we see +daily springing up in Italy, this is not so much due to the superior virtue of +their inhabitants (who, to say truth, fall far short of our countrymen), as to +their being governed by a king who keeps them united, not merely by his +personal qualities, but also by the laws and ordinances of the realm which are +still maintained with vigour. In Germany, however, we do see signal excellence +and a devout religious spirit prevail among the people, giving rise to the many +free States which there maintain themselves, with such strict observance of +their laws that none, either within or without their walls, dare encroach on +them. +</p> + +<p> +That among this last-named people a great share of the ancient excellence does +in truth still flourish, I shall show by an example similar to that which I +have above related of the senate and people of Rome. It is customary with the +German Free States when they have to expend any large sum of money on the +public account, for their magistrates or councils having authority given them +in that behalf, to impose a rate of one or two in the hundred on every +man’s estate; which rate being fixed, every man, in conformity with the +laws of the city, presents himself before the collectors of the impost, and +having first made oath to pay the amount justly due, throws into a chest +provided for the purpose what he conscientiously believes it fair for him to +pay, of which payment none is witness save himself. From this fact it may be +gathered what honesty and religion still prevail among this people. For we must +assume that each pays his just share, since otherwise the impost would not +yield the sum which, with reference to former imposts, it was estimated to +yield; whereby the fraud would be detected, and thereupon some other method for +raising money have to be resorted to. +</p> + +<p> +At the present time this virtue is the more to be admired, because it seems to +have survived in this province only. That it has survived there may be ascribed +to two circumstances: <i>first</i>, that the natives have little communication +with their neighbours, neither visiting them in their countries nor being +visited by them; being content to use such commodities, and subsist on such +food, and to wear garments of such materials as their own land supplies; so +that all occasion for intercourse, and every cause of corruption is removed. +For living after this fashion, they have not learned the manners of the French, +the Italians, or the Spaniards, which three nations together are the corruption +of the world. The <i>second</i> cause is, that these republics in which a free +and pure government is maintained will not suffer any of their citizens either +to be, or to live as gentlemen; but on the contrary, while preserving a strict +equality among themselves, are bitterly hostile to all those gentlemen and +lords who dwell in their neighbourhood; so that if by chance any of these fall +into their hands, they put them to death, as the chief promoters of corruption +and the origin of all disorders. +</p> + +<p> +But to make plain what I mean when I speak of <i>gentlemen</i>, I say that +those are so to be styled who live in opulence and idleness on the revenues of +their estates, without concerning themselves with the cultivation of these +estates, or incurring any other fatigue for their support. Such persons are +very mischievous in every republic or country. But even more mischievous are +they who, besides the estates I have spoken of, are lords of strongholds and +castles, and have vassals and retainers who render them obedience. Of these two +classes of men the kingdom of Naples, the country round Rome, Romagna, and +Lombardy are full; and hence it happens that in these provinces no commonwealth +or free form of government has ever existed; because men of this sort are the +sworn foes to all free institutions. +</p> + +<p> +And since to plant a commonwealth in provinces which are in this condition were +impossible, if these are to be reformed at all, it can only be by some one man +who is able there to establish a kingdom; the reason being that when the body +of the people is grown so corrupted that the laws are powerless to control it, +there must in addition to the laws be introduced a stronger force, to wit, the +regal, which by its absolute and unrestricted authority may curb the excessive +ambition and corruption of the great. This opinion may be supported by the +example of Tuscany, in which within a narrow compass of territory there have +long existed the three republics of Florence, Lucca, and Siena, while the other +cities of that province, although to a certain extent dependent, still show by +their spirit and by their institutions that they preserve, or at any rate +desire to preserve, their freedom: and this because there are in Tuscany no +lords possessed of strongholds, and few or no gentlemen, but so complete an +equality prevails, that a prudent statesman, well acquainted with the history +of the free States of antiquity, might easily introduce free institutions. +Such, however, has been the unhappiness of this our country, that, up to the +present hour, it has never produced any man with the power and knowledge which +would have enabled him to act in this way. +</p> + +<p> +From what has been said, it follows, that he who would found a commonwealth in +a country wherein there are many gentlemen, cannot do so unless he first gets +rid of them; and that he who would found a monarchy or princedom in a country +wherein great equality prevails, will never succeed, unless he raise above the +level of that equality many persons of a restless and ambitious temperament, +whom he must make gentlemen not in name merely but in reality, by conferring on +them castles and lands, supplying them with riches, and providing them with +retainers; that with these gentlemen around him, and with their help, he may +maintain his power, while they through him may gratify their ambition; all +others being constrained to endure a yoke, which force and force alone imposes +on them. For when in this way there comes to be a proportion between him who +uses force and him against whom it is used, each stands fixed in his own +station. +</p> + +<p> +But to found a commonwealth in a country suited for a kingdom, or a kingdom in +a country suited to be a commonwealth, requires so rare a combination of +intelligence and power, that though many engage in the attempt, few are found +to succeed. For the greatness of the undertaking quickly daunts them, and so +obstructs their advance they break down at the very outset. The case of the +Venetian Republic, wherein none save gentlemen are permitted to hold any public +office, does, doubtless, seem opposed to this opinion of mine that where there +are gentlemen it is impossible to found a commonwealth. But it may be answered +that the case of Venice is not in truth an instance to the contrary; since the +gentlemen of Venice are gentlemen rather in name than in reality, inasmuch as +they draw no great revenues from lands, their wealth consisting chiefly in +merchandise and chattels, and not one of them possessing a castle or enjoying +any feudal authority. For in Venice this name of gentleman is a title of honour +and dignity, and does not depend on any of those circumstances in respect of +which the name is given in other States. But as in other States the different +ranks and classes are divided under different names, so in Venice we have the +division into gentlemen (<i>gentiluomini</i>) and plebeians (<i>popolani</i>), +it being understood that the former hold, or have the right to hold all +situations of honour, from which the latter are entirely excluded. And in +Venice this occasions no disturbance, for reasons which I have already +explained. +</p> + +<p> +Let a commonwealth, then, be constituted in the country where a great equality +is found or has been made; and, conversely, let a princedom be constituted +where great inequality prevails. Otherwise what is constituted will be +discordant in itself, and without stability. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER LVI.—<i>That when great Calamities are about to befall a City +or Country, Signs are seen to presage, and Seers arise who foretell +them</i>.</h2> + +<p> +Whence it happens I know not, but it is seen from examples both ancient and +recent, that no grave calamity has ever befallen any city or country which has +not been foretold by vision, by augury, by portent, or by some other +Heaven-sent sign. And not to travel too far afield for evidence of this, every +one knows that long before the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII. of France, +his coming was foretold by the friar Girolamo Savonarola; and how, throughout +the whole of Tuscany, the rumour ran that over Arezzo horsemen had been seen +fighting in the air. And who is there who has not heard that before the death +of the elder Lorenzo de’ Medici, the highest pinnacle of the cathedral +was rent by a thunderbolt, to the great injury of the building? Or who, again, +but knows that shortly before Piero Soderini, whom the people of Florence had +made gonfalonier for life, was deprived of his office and banished, the palace +itself was struck by lightning? +</p> + +<p> +Other instances might be cited, which, not to be tedious, I shall omit, and +mention only a circumstance which Titus Livius tells us preceded the invasion +of the Gauls. For he relates how a certain plebeian named Marcus Ceditius +reported to the senate that as he passed by night along the Via Nova, he heard +a voice louder than mortal, bidding him warn the magistrates that the Gauls +were on their way to Rome. +</p> + +<p> +The causes of such manifestations ought, I think, to be inquired into and +explained by some one who has a knowledge, which I have not, of causes natural +and supernatural. It may, however, be, as certain wise men say, that the air is +filled with intelligent beings, to whom it is given to forecast future events; +who, taking pity upon men, warn them beforehand by these signs to prepare for +what awaits them. Be this as it may, certain it is that such warnings are +given, and that always after them new and strange disasters befall nations. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER LVII.—<i>That the People are strong collectively, but +individually weak</i>.</h2> + +<p> +After the ruin brought on their country by the invasion of the Gauls, many of +the Romans went to dwell in Veii, in opposition to the edicts and commands of +the senate, who, to correct this mischief, publicly ordained that within a time +fixed, and under penalties stated, all should return to live in Rome. The +persons against whom these proclamations were directed at first derided them; +but, when the time came for them to be obeyed, all obeyed them. And Titus +Livius observes that, “<i>although bold enough collectively, each +separately, fearing to be punished, made his submission</i>.” And indeed +the temper of the multitude in such cases, cannot be better described than in +this passage. For often a people will be open-mouthed in condemning the decrees +of their prince, but afterwards, when they have to look punishment in the face, +putting no trust in one another, they hasten to comply. Wherefore, if you be in +a position to keep the people well-disposed towards you when they already are +so, or to prevent them injuring you in case they be ill-disposed, it is clearly +of little moment whether the feelings with which they profess to regard you, be +favourable or no. This applies to all unfriendliness on the part of a people, +whencesoever it proceed, excepting only the resentment felt by them on being +deprived either of liberty, or of a prince whom they love and who still +survives. For the hostile temper produced by these two causes is more to be +feared than any beside, and demands measures of extreme severity to correct it. +The other untoward humours of the multitude, should there be no powerful chief +to foster them, are easily dealt with; because, while on the one hand there is +nothing more terrible than an uncontrolled and headless mob, on the other, +there is nothing feebler. For though it be furnished with arms it is easily +subdued, if you have some place of strength wherein to shelter from its first +onset. For when its first fury has somewhat abated, and each man sees that he +has to return to his own house, all begin to lose heart and to take thought how +to insure their personal safety, whether by flight or by submission. For which +reason a multitude stirred in this way, if it would avoid dangers such as I +speak of, must at once appoint a head from among its own numbers, who may +control it, keep it united, and provide for its defence; as did the commons of +Rome when, after the death of Virginia, they quitted the city, and for their +protection created twenty tribunes from among themselves. Unless this be done, +what Titus Livius has observed in the passage cited, will always prove true, +namely, that a multitude is strong while it holds together, but so soon as each +of those who compose it begins to think of his own private danger, it becomes +weak and contemptible. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER LVIII.—<i>That a People is wiser and more constant than a +Prince</i></h2> + +<p> +That “<i>nothing is more fickle and inconstant than the +multitude</i>” is affirmed not by Titus Livius only, but by all other +historians, in whose chronicles of human actions we often find the multitude +condemning some citizen to death, and afterwards lamenting him and grieving +greatly for his loss, as the Romans grieved and lamented for Manlius +Capitolinus, whom they had themselves condemned to die. In relating which +circumstance our author observes “<i>In a short time the people, having +no longer cause to fear him, began to deplore his death</i>” And +elsewhere, when speaking of what took place in Syracuse after the murder of +Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero, he says, “<i>It is the nature of the +multitude to be an abject slave, or a domineering master</i>” +</p> + +<p> +It may be that in attempting to defend a cause, which, as I have said, all +writers are agreed to condemn, I take upon me a task so hard and difficult that +I shall either have to relinquish it with shame or pursue it with opprobrium. +Be that as it may, I neither do, nor ever shall judge it a fault, to support +opinion by arguments, where it is not sought to impose them by violence or +authority I maintain, then, that this infirmity with which historians tax the +multitude, may with equal reason be charged against every individual man, but +most of all against princes, since all who are not controlled by the laws, will +commit the very same faults as are committed by an uncontrolled multitude. +Proof whereof were easy, since of all the many princes existing, or who have +existed, few indeed are or have been either wise or good. +</p> + +<p> +I speak of such princes as have had it in their power to break the reins by +which they are controlled, among whom I do not reckon those kings who reigned +in Egypt in the most remote antiquity when that country was governed in +conformity with its laws; nor do I include those kings who reigned in Sparta, +nor those who in our own times reign in France, which kingdom, more than any +other whereof we have knowledge at the present day, is under the government of +its laws. For kings who live, as these do, subject to constitutional restraint, +are not to be counted when we have to consider each man’s proper nature, +and to see whether he resembles the multitude. For to draw a comparison with +such princes as these, we must take the case of a multitude controlled as they +are, and regulated by the laws, when we shall find it to possess the same +virtues which we see in them, and neither conducting itself as an abject slave +nor as a domineering master. +</p> + +<p> +Such was the people of Rome, who, while the commonwealth continued uncorrupted, +never either served abjectly nor domineered haughtily; but, on the contrary, by +means of their magistrates and their ordinances, maintained their place, and +when forced to put forth their strength against some powerful citizen, as in +the case of Manlius, the decemvirs, and others who sought to oppress them, did +so; but when it was necessary for the public welfare to yield obedience to the +dictator or consuls, obeyed. And if the Roman people mourned the loss of the +dead Manlius, it is no wonder; for they mourned his virtues, which had been of +such a sort that their memory stirred the regret of all, and would have had +power to produce the same feelings even in a prince; all writers being agreed +that excellence is praised and admired even by its enemies. But if Manlius when +he was so greatly mourned, could have risen once more from the dead, the Roman +people would have pronounced the same sentence against him which they +pronounced when they led him forth from the prison-house, and straightway +condemned him to die. And in like manner we see that princes, accounted wise, +have put men to death, and afterwards greatly lamented them, as Alexander +mourned for Clitus and others of his friends, and Herod for Mariamne. +</p> + +<p> +But what our historian says of the multitude, he says not of a multitude which +like the people of Rome is controlled by the laws, but of an uncontrolled +multitude like the Syracusans, who were guilty of all these crimes which +infuriated and ungoverned men commit, and which were equally committed by +Alexander and Herod in the cases mentioned. Wherefore the nature of a multitude +is no more to be blamed than the nature of princes, since both equally err when +they can do so without regard to consequences. Of which many instances, besides +those already given, might be cited from the history of the Roman emperors, and +of other princes and tyrants, in whose lives we find such inconstancy and +fickleness, as we might look in vain for in a people. +</p> + +<p> +I maintain, therefore, contrary to the common opinion which avers that a people +when they have the management of affairs are changeable, fickle, and +ungrateful, that these faults exist not in them otherwise than as they exist in +individual princes; so that were any to accuse both princes and peoples, the +charge might be true, but that to make exception in favour of princes is a +mistake; for a people in command, if it be duly restrained, will have the same +prudence and the same gratitude as a prince has, or even more, however wise he +may be reckoned; and a prince on the other hand, if freed from the control of +the laws, will be more ungrateful, fickle, and short-sighted than a people. And +further, I say that any difference in their methods of acting results not from +any difference in their nature, that being the same in both, or, if there be +advantage on either side, the advantage resting with the people, but from their +having more or less respect for the laws under which each lives. And whosoever +attentively considers the history of the Roman people, may see that for four +hundred years they never relaxed in their hatred of the regal name, and were +constantly devoted to the glory and welfare of their country, and will find +numberless proofs given by them of their consistency in both particulars. And +should any allege against me the ingratitude they showed to Scipio, I reply by +what has already been said at length on that head, where I proved that peoples +are less ungrateful than princes. But as for prudence and stability of purpose, +I affirm that a people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment +than a prince. Nor is it without reason that the voice of the people has been +likened to the voice of God; for we see that wide-spread beliefs fulfil +themselves, and bring about marvellous results, so as to have the appearance of +presaging by some occult quality either weal or woe. Again, as to the justice +of their opinions on public affairs, seldom find that after hearing two +speakers of equal ability urging them in opposite directions, they do not adopt +the sounder view, or are unable to decide on the truth of what they hear. And +if, as I have said, a people errs in adopting courses which appear to it bold +and advantageous, princes will likewise err when their passions are touched, as +is far oftener the case with them than with a people. +</p> + +<p> +We see, too, that in the choice of magistrates a people will choose far more +honestly than a prince; so that while you shall never persuade a people that it +is advantageous to confer dignities on the infamous and profligate, a prince +may readily, and in a thousand ways, be drawn to do so. Again, it may be seen +that a people, when once they have come to hold a thing in abhorrence, remain +for many ages of the same mind; which we do not find happen with princes. For +the truth of both of which assertions the Roman people are my sufficient +witness, who, in the course of so many hundred years, and in so many elections +of consuls and tribunes, never made four appointments of which they had reason +to repent; and, as I have said, so detested the name of king, that no +obligation they might be under to any citizen who affected that name, could +shield him from the appointed penalty. +</p> + +<p> +Further, we find that those cities wherein the government is in the hands of +the people, in a very short space of time, make marvellous progress, far +exceeding that made by cities which have been always ruled by princes; as Rome +grew after the expulsion of her kings, and Athens after she freed herself from +Pisistratus; and this we can ascribe to no other cause than that the rule of a +people is better than the rule of a prince. +</p> + +<p> +Nor would I have it thought that anything our historian may have affirmed in +the passage cited, or elsewhere, controverts these my opinions. For if all the +glories and all the defects both of peoples and of princes be carefully +weighed, it will appear that both for goodness and for glory a people is to be +preferred. And if princes surpass peoples in the work of legislation, in +shaping civil institutions, in moulding statutes, and framing new ordinances, +so far do the latter surpass the former in maintaining what has once been +established, as to merit no less praise than they. +</p> + +<p> +And to state the sum of the whole matter shortly, I say that popular +governments have endured for long periods in the same way as the governments of +princes, and that both have need to be regulated by the laws; because the +prince who can do what he pleases is a madman, and the people which can do as +it pleases is never wise. If, then, we assume the case of a prince bound, and +of a people chained down by the laws, greater virtue will appear in the people +than in the prince; while if we assume the case of each of them freed from all +control, it will be seen that the people commits fewer errors than the prince, +and less serious errors, and such as admit of readier cure. For a turbulent and +unruly people may be spoken to by a good man, and readily brought back to good +ways; but none can speak to a wicked prince, nor any remedy be found against +him but by the sword. And from this we may infer which of the two suffers from +the worse disease; for if the disease of the people may be healed by words, +while that of the prince must be dealt with by the sword, there is none but +will judge that evil to be the greater which demands the more violent remedy. +</p> + +<p> +When a people is absolutely uncontrolled, it is not so much the follies which +it commits or the evil which it actually does that excites alarm, as the +mischief which may thence result, since in such disorders it becomes possible +for a tyrant to spring up. But with a wicked prince the contrary is the case; +for we dread present ill, and place our hopes in the future, persuading +ourselves that the evil life of the prince may bring about our freedom. So that +there is this distinction between the two, that with the one we fear what is, +with the other what is likely to be. Again, the cruelties of a people are +turned against him who it fears will encroach upon the common rights, but the +cruelties of the prince against those who he fears may assert those rights. +</p> + +<p> +The prejudice which is entertained against the people arises from this, that +any man may speak ill of them openly and fearlessly, even when the government +is in their hands; whereas princes are always spoken of with a thousand +reserves and a constant eye to consequences. +</p> + +<p> +But since the subject suggests it, it seems to me not out of place to consider +what alliances we can most trust, whether those made with commonwealths or +those made with princes. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER LIX.—<i>To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust; +whether those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with +Princes</i>.</h2> + +<p> +Since leagues and alliances are every day entered into by one prince with +another, or by one commonwealth with another, and as conventions and treaties +are concluded in like manner between princes and commonwealths, it seems to me +proper to inquire whether the faith of a commonwealth or that of a prince is +the more stable and the safer to count on. All things considered, I am disposed +to believe that in most cases they are alike, though in some they differ. Of +one thing, however, I am convinced, namely, that engagements made under duress +will never be observed either by prince or by commonwealth; and that if menaced +with the loss of their territories, both the one and the other will break faith +with you and treat you with ingratitude. Demetrius, who was named the +“City-taker,” had conferred numberless benefits upon the Athenians; +but when, afterwards, on being defeated by his enemies, he sought shelter in +Athens, as being a friendly city and under obligations to him, it was refused +him; a circumstance which grieved him far more than the loss of his soldiers +and army had done. Pompey, in like manner, when routed by Cæsar in Thessaly, +fled for refuge to Ptolemy in Egypt, who formerly had been restored by him to +his kingdom; by whom he was put to death. In both these instances the same +causes were at work, although the inhumanity and the wrong inflicted were less +in the case of the commonwealth than of the prince. Still, wherever there is +fear, the want of faith will be the same. +</p> + +<p> +And even if there be found a commonwealth or prince who, in order to keep +faith, will submit to be ruined, this is seen to result from a like cause. For, +as to the prince, it may easily happen that he is friend to a powerful +sovereign, whom, though he be at the time without means to defend him, he may +presently hope to see restored to his dominions; or it may be that having +linked his fortunes with another’s, he despairs of finding either faith +or friendship from the enemies of his ally, as was the case with those +Neapolitan princes who espoused the interests of France. As to commonwealths, +an instance similar to that of the princes last named, is that of Saguntum in +Spain, which awaited ruin in adhering to the fortunes of Rome. A like course +was also followed by Florence when, in the year 1512, she stood steadfastly by +the cause of the French. And taking everything into account, I believe that in +cases of urgency, we shall find a certain degree of stability sooner in +commonwealths than in princes. For though commonwealths be like-minded with +princes, and influenced by the same passions, the circumstance that their +movements must be slower, makes it harder for them to resolve than it is for a +prince, for which reason they will be less ready to break faith. +</p> + +<p> +And since leagues and alliances are broken for the sake of certain advantages, +in this respect also, commonwealths observe their engagements far more +faithfully than princes; for abundant examples might be cited of a very slight +advantage having caused a prince to break faith, and of a very great advantage +having failed to induce a commonwealth to do so. Of this we have an instance in +the proposal made to the Athenians by Themistocles, when he told them at a +public meeting that he had certain advice to offer which would prove of great +advantage to their city, but the nature of which he could not disclose to them, +lest it should become generally known, when the opportunity for acting upon it +would be lost. Whereupon the Athenians named Aristides to receive his +communication, and to act upon it as he thought fit. To him, accordingly, +Themistocles showed how the navy of united Greece, for the safety of which the +Athenians stood pledged, was so situated that they might either gain it over or +destroy it, and thus make themselves absolute masters of the whole country. +Aristides reporting to the Athenians that the course proposed by Themistocles +was extremely advantageous but extremely dishonourable, the people utterly +refused to entertain it. But Philip of Macedon would not have so acted, nor any +of those other princes who have sought and found more profit in breaking faith +than in any other way. +</p> + +<p> +As to engagements broken off on the pretext that they have not been observed by +the other side, I say nothing, since that is a matter of everyday occurrence, +and I am speaking here only of those engagements which are broken off on +extraordinary grounds; but in this respect, likewise, I believe that +commonwealths offend less than princes, and are therefore more to be trusted. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER LX.—<i>That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in +Rome were given without respect to Age</i>.</h2> + +<p> +It is seen in the course of the Roman history that, after the consulship was +thrown open to the commons, the republic conceded this dignity to all its +citizens, without distinction either of age or blood; nay, that in this matter +respect for age was never made a ground for preference among the Romans, whose +constant aim it was to discover excellence whether existing in old or young. To +this we have the testimony of Valerius Corvinus, himself made consul in his +twenty-fourth year, who, in addressing his soldiers, said of the consulship +that it was “<i>the reward not of birth but of desert</i>.” +</p> + +<p> +Whether the course thus followed by the Romans was well judged or not, is a +question on which much might be said. The concession as to blood, however, was +made under necessity, and as I have observed on another occasion, the same +necessity which obtained in Rome, will be found to obtain in every other city +which desires to achieve the results which Rome achieved. For you cannot +subject men to hardships unless you hold out rewards, nor can you without +danger deprive them of those rewards whereof you have held out hopes. It was +consequently necessary to extend, betimes, to the commons the hope of obtaining +the consulship, on which hope they fed themselves for a while, without actually +realizing it. But afterwards the hope alone was not enough, and it had to be +satisfied. For while cities which do not employ men of plebeian birth in any of +those undertakings wherein glory is to be gained, as we have seen was the case +with Venice, may treat these men as they please, those other cities which +desire to do as Rome did, cannot make this distinction. And if there is to be +no distinction in respect of blood, nothing can be pleaded for a distinction in +respect of age. On the contrary, that distinction must of necessity cease to be +observed. For where a young man is appointed to a post which requires the +prudence which are is supposed to bring, it must be, since the choice rests +with the people, that he is thus advanced in consideration of some noble action +which he has performed; but when a young man is of such excellence as to have +made a name for himself by some signal achievement, it were much to the +detriment of his city were it unable at once to make use of him, but had to +wait until he had grown old, and had lost, with youth, that alacrity and vigour +by which his country might have profited; as Rome profited by the services of +Valerius Corvinus, of Scipio, of Pompey, and of many others who triumphed while +yet very young. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK II.</h2> + +<hr /> + +<h5>PREFACE.</h5> + +<p> +Men do always, but not always with reason, commend the past and condemn the +present, and are so much the partisans of what has been, as not merely to cry +up those times which are known to them only from the records left by +historians, but also, when they grow old, to extol the days in which they +remember their youth to have been spent. And although this preference of theirs +be in most instances a mistaken one, I can see that there are many causes to +account for it; chief of which I take to be that in respect of things long gone +by we perceive not the whole truth, those circumstances that would detract from +the credit of the past being for the most part hidden from us, while all that +gives it lustre is magnified and embellished. For the generality of writers +render this tribute to the good fortune of conquerors, that to make their +achievements seem more splendid, they not merely exaggerate the great things +they have done, but also lend such a colour to the actions of their enemies, +that any one born afterwards, whether in the conquering or in the conquered +country, has cause to marvel at these men and these times, and is constrained +to praise and love them beyond all others. +</p> + +<p> +Again, men being moved to hatred either by fear or envy, these two most +powerful causes of dislike are cancelled in respect of things which are past, +because what is past can neither do us hurt, nor afford occasion for envy. The +contrary, however, is the case with the things we see, and in which we take +part; for in these, from our complete acquaintance with them, no part of them +being hidden from us, we recognize, along with much that is good, much that +displeases us, and so are forced to pronounce them far inferior to the old, +although in truth they deserve far greater praise and admiration. I speak not, +here, of what relates to the arts, which have such distinction inherent in +them, that time can give or take from them but little of the glory which they +merit of themselves. I speak of the lives and manners of men, touching which +the grounds for judging are not so clear. +</p> + +<p> +I repeat, then, that it is true that this habit of blaming and praising +obtains, but not always true that it is wrong applied. For sometimes it will +happen that this judgment is just; because, as human affairs are in constant +movement, it must be that they either rise or fall. Wherefore, we may see a +city or province furnished with free institutions by some great and wise +founder, flourish for a while through his merits, and advance steadily on the +path of improvement. Any one born therein at that time would be in the wrong to +praise the past more than the present, and his error would be occasioned by the +causes already noticed. But any one born afterwards in that city or province +when the time has come for it to fall away from its former felicity, would not +be mistaken in praising the past. +</p> + +<p> +When I consider how this happens, I am persuaded that the world, remaining +continually the same, has in it a constant quantity of good and evil; but that +this good and this evil shift about from one country to another, as we know +that in ancient times empire shifted from one nation to another, according as +the manners of these nations changed, the world, as a whole, continuing as +before, and the only difference being that, whereas at first Assyria was made +the seat of its excellence, this was afterwards placed in Media, then in +Persia, until at last it was transferred to Italy and Rome. And although after +the Roman Empire, none has followed which has endured, or in which the world +has centred its whole excellence, we nevertheless find that excellence diffused +among many valiant nations, the kingdom of the Franks, for example, that of the +Turks, that of the Soldan, and the States of Germany at the present day; and +shared at an earlier time by that sect of the Saracens who performed so many +great achievements and gained so wide a dominion, after destroying the Roman +Empire in the East. +</p> + +<p> +In all these countries, therefore, after the decline of the Roman power, and +among all these races, there existed, and in some part of them there yet +exists, that excellence which alone is to be desired and justly to be praised. +Wherefore, if any man being born in one of these countries should exalt past +times over present, he might be mistaken; but any who, living at the present +day in Italy or Greece, has not in Italy become an ultramontane or in Greece a +Turk, has reason to complain of his own times, and to commend those others, in +which there were many things which made them admirable; whereas, now, no regard +being had to religion, to laws, or to arms, but all being tarnished with every +sort of shame, there is nothing to redeem the age from the last extremity of +wretchedness, ignominy, and disgrace. And the vices of our age are the more +odious in that they are practised by those who sit on the judgment seat, govern +the State, and demand public reverence. +</p> + +<p> +But, returning to the matter in hand, it may be said, that if the judgment of +men be at fault in pronouncing whether the present age or the past is the +better in respect of things whereof, by reason of their antiquity, they cannot +have the same perfect knowledge which they have of their own times, it ought +not to be at fault in old men when they compare the days of their youth with +those of their maturity, both of which have been alike seen and known by them. +This were indeed true, if men at all periods of their lives judged of things in +the same way, and were constantly influenced by the same desires; but since +they alter, the times, although they alter not, cannot but seem different to +those who have other desires, other pleasures, and other ways of viewing things +in their old age from those they had in their youth. For since, when they grow +old, men lose in bodily strength but gain in wisdom and discernment, it must +needs be that those things which in their youth seemed to them tolerable and +good, should in their old age appear intolerable and evil. And whereas they +should ascribe this to their judgment, they lay the blame upon the times. +</p> + +<p> +But, further, since the desires of men are insatiable, Nature prompting them to +desire all things and Fortune permitting them to enjoy but few, there results a +constant discontent in their minds, and a loathing of what they possess, +prompting them to find fault with the present, praise the past, and long for +the future, even though they be not moved thereto by any reasonable cause. +</p> + +<p> +I know not, therefore, whether I may not deserve to be reckoned in the number +of those who thus deceive themselves, if, in these Discourses of mine, I render +excessive praise to the ancient times of the Romans while I censure our own. +And, indeed, were not the excellence which then prevailed and the corruption +which prevails now clearer than the sun, I should proceed more guardedly in +what I have to say, from fear lest in accusing others I should myself fall into +this self-deception. But since the thing is so plain that every one sees it, I +shall be bold to speak freely all I think, both of old times and of new, in +order that the minds of the young who happen to read these my writings, may be +led to shun modern examples, and be prepared to follow those set by antiquity +whenever chance affords the opportunity. For it is the duty of every good man +to teach others those wholesome lessons which the malice of Time or of Fortune +has not permitted him to put in practice; to the end, that out of many who have +the knowledge, some one better loved by Heaven may be found able to carry them +out. +</p> + +<p> +Having spoken, then, in the foregoing Book of the various methods followed by +the Romans in regulating the domestic affairs of their city, in this I shall +speak of what was done by them to spread their Empire. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER I.—<i>Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due +to Valour or to Fortune</i>.</h2> + +<p> +Many authors, and among others that most grave historian Plutarch, have thought +that in acquiring their empire the Romans were more beholden to their good +fortune than to their valour; and besides other reasons which they give for +this opinion, they affirm it to be proved by the admission of the Romans +themselves, since their having erected more temples to Fortune than to any +other deity, shows that it was to her that they ascribed their success. It +would seem, too, that Titus Livius was of the same mind, since he very seldom +puts a speech into the mouth of any Roman in which he discourses of valour, +wherein he does not also make mention of Fortune. This, however, is an opinion +with which I can in no way concur, and which, I take it, cannot be made good. +For if no commonwealth has ever been found to grow like the Roman, it is +because none was ever found so well fitted by its institutions to make that +growth. For by the valour of her armies she spread her empire, while by her +conduct of affairs, and by other methods peculiar to herself and devised by her +first founder, she was able to keep what she acquired, as shall be fully shown +in many of the following Discourses. +</p> + +<p> +The writers to whom I have referred assert that it was owing to their good +fortune and not to their prudence that the Romans never had two great wars on +their hands at once; as, for instance, that they waged no wars with the Latins +until they had not merely overcome the Samnites, but undertook in their defence +the war on which they then entered; nor ever fought with the Etruscans until +they had subjugated the Latins, and had almost worn out the Samnites by +frequent defeats; whereas, had any two of these powers, while yet fresh and +unexhausted, united together, it may easily be believed that the ruin of the +Roman Republic must have followed. But to whatsoever cause we ascribe it, it +never so chanced that the Romans engaged in two great wars at the same time. On +the contrary, it always seemed as though on the breaking out of one war, +another was extinguished; or that on the termination of one, another broke out. +And this we may plainly see from the order in which their wars succeeded one +another. +</p> + +<p> +For, omitting those waged by them before their city was taken by the Gauls, we +find that during their struggle with the Equians and the Volscians, and while +these two nations continued strong, no others rose against them. On these being +subdued, there broke out the war with the Samnites; and although before the +close of that contest the Latin nations had begun to rebel against Rome, +nevertheless, when their rebellion came to a head, the Samnites were in league +with Rome, and helped her with their army to quell the presumption of the +rebels; on whose defeat the war with Samnium was renewed. +</p> + +<p> +When the strength of Samnium had been drained by repeated reverses, there +followed the war with the Etruscans; which ended, the Samnites were once more +stirred to activity by the coming of Pyrrhus into Italy. When he, too, had been +defeated, and sent back to Greece, Rome entered on her first war with the +Carthaginians; which was no sooner over than all the Gallic nations on both +sides of the Alps combined against the Romans, by whom, in the battle fought +between Populonia and Pisa, where now stands the fortress of San Vincenzo, they +were at last routed with tremendous slaughter. +</p> + +<p> +This war ended, for twenty years together the Romans were engaged in no contest +of importance, their only adversaries being the Ligurians, and the remnant of +the Gallic tribes who occupied Lombardy; and on this footing things continued +down to the second Carthaginian war, which for sixteen years kept the whole of +Italy in a blaze. This too being brought to a most glorious termination, there +followed the Macedonian war, at the close of which succeeded the war with +Antiochus and Asia. These subdued, there remained not in the whole world, king +or people who either singly or together could withstand the power of Rome. +</p> + +<p> +But even before this last victory, any one observing the order of these wars, +and the method in which they were conducted, must have recognized not only the +good fortune of the Romans, but also their extraordinary valour and prudence. +And were any one to search for the causes of this good fortune, he would have +little difficulty in finding them, since nothing is more certain than that when +a potentate has attained so great a reputation that every neighbouring prince +or people is afraid to engage him single-handed, and stands in awe of him, none +will ever venture to attack him, unless driven to do so by necessity; so that +it will almost rest on his will to make war as he likes on any of his +neighbours, while he studiously maintains peace with the rest; who, on their +part, whether through fear of his power, or deceived by the methods he takes to +dull their vigilance, are easily kept quiet. Distant powers, in the mean time, +who have no intercourse with either, treat the matter as too remote to concern +them in any way; and abiding in this error until the conflagration approaches +their own doors, on its arrival have no resource for its extinction, save in +their own strength, which, as their enemy has by that time become exceedingly +powerful, no longer suffices. +</p> + +<p> +I forbear to relate how the Samnites stood looking on while the Romans were +subjugating the Equians and the Volscians; and, to avoid being prolix, shall +content myself with the single instance of the Carthaginians, who, at the time +when the Romans were contending with the Samnites and Etruscans, were possessed +of great power and held in high repute, being already masters of the whole of +Africa together with Sicily and Sardinia, besides occupying territory in +various parts of Spain. And because their empire was so great, and at such a +distance from the Roman frontier, they were never led to think of attacking the +Romans or of lending assistance to the Etruscans or Samnites. On the contrary, +they behaved towards the Romans as men behave towards those whom they see +prosper, rather taking their part and courting their friendship. Nor did they +discover their mistake until the Romans, after subduing all the intervening +nations, began to assail their power both in Spain and Sicily. What happened in +the case of the Carthaginians, happened also in the case of the Gauls, of +Philip of Macedon, and of Antiochus, each of whom, while Rome was engaged with +another of them, believed that other would have the advantage, and that there +would be time enough to provide for their own safety, whether by making peace +or war. It seems to me, therefore, that the same good fortune which, in this +respect, attended the Romans, might be shared by all princes acting as they +did, and of a valour equal to theirs. +</p> + +<p> +As bearing on this point, it might have been proper for me to show what methods +were followed by the Romans in entering the territories of other nations, had I +not already spoken of this at length in my <i>Treatise on Princedoms</i>, +wherein the whole subject is discussed. Here it is enough to say briefly, that +in a new province they always sought for some friend who should be to them as a +ladder whereby to climb, a door through which to pass, or an instrument +wherewith to keep their hold. Thus we see them effect their entrance into +Samnium through the Capuans, into Etruria through the Camertines, into Sicily +through the Mamertines, into Spain through the Saguntans, into Africa through +Massinissa, into Greece through the Etolians, into Asia through Eumenes and +other princes, into Gaul through the Massilians and Eduans; and, in like +manner, never without similar assistance in their efforts whether to acquire +provinces or to keep them. +</p> + +<p> +The nations who carefully attend to this precaution will be seen to stand in +less need of Fortune’s help than others who neglect it. But that all may +clearly understand how much more the Romans were aided by valour than by +Fortune in acquiring their empire, I shall in the following Chapter consider +the character of those nations with whom they had to contend, and show how +stubborn these were in defending their freedom. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER II.—<i>With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how +stubborn these were in defending their Freedom.</i></h2> + +<p> +In subduing the countries round about them, and certain of the more distant +provinces, nothing gave the Romans so much trouble, as the love which in those +days many nations bore to freedom, defending it with such obstinacy as could +not have been overcome save by a surpassing valour. For we know by numberless +instances, what perils these nations were ready to face in their efforts to +maintain or recover their freedom, and what vengeance they took against those +who deprived them of it. We know, too, from history, what hurt a people or city +suffers from servitude. And though, at the present day, there is but one +province which can be said to contain within it free cities, we find that +formerly these abounded everywhere. For we learn that in the ancient times of +which I speak, from the mountains which divide Tuscany from Lombardy down to +the extreme point of Italy, there dwelt numerous free nations, such as the +Etruscans, the Romans, and the Samnites, besides many others in other parts of +the Peninsula. Nor do we ever read of there being any kings over them, except +those who reigned in Rome, and Porsenna, king of Etruria. How the line of this +last-named prince came to be extinguished, history does not inform us; but it +is clear that at the time when the Romans went to besiege Veii, Etruria was +free, and so greatly rejoiced in her freedom, and so detested the regal name, +that when the Veientines, who for their defence had created a king in Veii, +sought aid from the Etruscans against Rome, these, after much deliberation +resolved to lend them no help while they continued to live under a king; +judging it useless to defend a country given over to servitude by its +inhabitants. +</p> + +<p> +It is easy to understand whence this love of liberty arises among nations, for +we know by experience that States have never signally increased, either as to +dominion or wealth, except where they have lived under a free government. And +truly it is strange to think to what a pitch of greatness Athens came during +the hundred years after she had freed herself from the despotism of +Pisistratus; and far stranger to contemplate the marvellous growth which Rome +made after freeing herself from her kings. The cause, however, is not far to +seek, since it is the well-being, not of individuals, but of the community +which makes a State great; and, without question, this universal well-being is +nowhere secured save in a republic. For a republic will do whatsoever makes for +its interest; and though its measures prove hurtful to this man or to that, +there are so many whom they benefit, that these are able to carry them out, in +spite of the resistance of the few whom they injure. +</p> + +<p> +But the contrary happens in the case of a prince; for, as a rule, what helps +him hurts the State, and what helps the State hurts him; so that whenever a +tyranny springs up in a city which has lived free, the least evil which can +befall that city is to make no further progress, nor ever increase in power or +wealth; but in most cases, if not in all, it will be its fate to go back. Or +should there chance to arise in it some able tyrant who extends his dominions +by his valour and skill in arms, the advantage which results is to himself +only, and not to the State; since he can bestow no honours on those of the +citizens over whom he tyrannizes who have shown themselves good and valiant, +lest afterwards he should have cause to fear them. Nor can he make those cities +which he acquires, subject or tributary to the city over which he rules; +because to make this city powerful is not for his interest, which lies in +keeping it so divided that each town and province may separately recognize him +alone as its master. In this way he only, and not his country, is the gainer by +his conquests. And if any one desire to have this view confirmed by numberless +other proofs, let him look into Xenophon’s treatise <i>De Tirannide</i>. +</p> + +<p> +No wonder, then, that the nations of antiquity pursued tyrants with such +relentless hatred, and so passionately loved freedom that its very name was +dear to them, as was seen when Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero the Syracusan, was +put to death in Syracuse. For when word of his death reached the army, which +lay encamped not far off, at first it was greatly moved, and eager to take up +arms against the murderers. But on hearing the cry of liberty shouted in the +streets of Syracuse, quieted at once by the name, it laid aside its resentment +against those who had slain the tyrant, and fell to consider how a free +government might be provided for the city. +</p> + +<p> +Nor is it to be wondered at that the ancient nations took terrible vengeance on +those who deprived them of their freedom; of which, though there be many +instances, I mean only to cite one which happened in the city of Corcyra at the +time of the Peloponnesian war. For Greece being divided into two factions, one +of which sided with the Athenians, the other with the Spartans, it resulted +that many of its cities were divided against themselves, some of the citizens +seeking the friendship of Sparta and some of Athens. In the aforesaid city of +Corcyra, the nobles getting the upper hand, deprived the commons of their +freedom; these, however, recovering themselves with the help of the Athenians, +laid hold of the entire body of the nobles, and cast them into a prison large +enough to contain them all, whence they brought them forth by eight or ten at a +time, pretending that they were to be sent to different places into banishment, +whereas, in fact, they put them to death with many circumstances of cruelty. +Those who were left, learning what was going on, resolved to do their utmost to +escape this ignominious death, and arming themselves with what weapons they +could find, defended the door of their prison against all who sought to enter; +till the people, hearing the tumult and rushing in haste to the prison, dragged +down the roof, and smothered the prisoners in the ruins. Many other horrible +and atrocious cruelties likewise perpetrated in Greece, show it to be true that +a lost freedom is avenged with more ferocity than a threatened freedom is +defended. +</p> + +<p> +When I consider whence it happened that the nations of antiquity were so much +more zealous in their love of liberty than those of the present day, I am led +to believe that it arose from the same cause which makes the present generation +of men less vigorous and daring than those of ancient times, namely the +difference of the training of the present day from that of earlier ages; and +this, again, arises from the different character of the religions then and now +prevailing. For our religion, having revealed to us the truth and the true +path, teaches us to make little account of worldly glory; whereas, the +Gentiles, greatly esteeming it, and placing therein their highest good, +displayed a greater fierceness in their actions. +</p> + +<p> +This we may gather from many of their customs, beginning with their sacrificial +rites, which were of much magnificence as compared with the simplicity of our +worship, though that be not without a certain dignity of its own, refined +rather than splendid, and far removed from any tincture of ferocity or +violence. In the religious ceremonies of the ancients neither pomp nor +splendour were wanting; but to these was joined the ordinance of sacrifice, +giving occasion to much bloodshed and cruelty. For in its celebration many +beasts were slaughtered, and this being a cruel spectacle imparted a cruel +temper to the worshippers. Moreover, under the old religions none obtained +divine honours save those who were loaded with worldly glory, such as captains +of armies and rulers of cities; whereas our religion glorifies men of a humble +and contemplative, rather than of an active life. Accordingly, while the +highest good of the old religions consisted in magnanimity, bodily strength, +and all those other qualities which make men brave, our religion places it in +humility, lowliness, and contempt for the things of this world; or if it ever +calls upon us to be brave, it is that we should be brave to suffer rather than +to do. +</p> + +<p> +This manner of life, therefore, seems to have made the world feebler, and to +have given it over as a prey to wicked men to deal with as they please; since +the mass of mankind, in the hope of being received into Paradise, think more +how to bear injuries than how to avenge them. But should it seem that the world +has grown effeminate and Heaven laid aside her arms, this assuredly results +from the baseness of those who have interpreted our religion to accord with +indolence and ease rather than with valour. For were we to remember that +religion permits the exaltation and defence of our country, we would see it to +be our duty to love and honour it, and would strive to be able and ready to +defend it. +</p> + +<p> +This training, therefore, and these most false interpretations are the causes +why, in the world of the present day, we find no longer the numerous +commonwealths which were found of old; and in consequence, that we see not now +among the nations that love of freedom which prevailed then; though, at the +same time, I am persuaded that one cause of this change has been, that the +Roman Empire by its arms and power put an end to all the free States and free +institutions of antiquity. For although the power of Rome fell afterwards into +decay, these States could never recover their strength or resume their former +mode of government, save in a very few districts of the Empire. +</p> + +<p> +But, be this as it may, certain it is that in every country of the world, even +the least considerable, the Romans found a league of well-armed republics, most +resolute in the defence of their freedom, whom it is clear they never could +have subdued had they not been endowed with the rarest and most astonishing +valour. To cite a single instance, I shall take the case of the Samnites who, +strange as it may now seem, were on the admission of Titus Livius himself, so +powerful and so steadfast in arms, as to be able to withstand the Romans down +to the consulship of Papirius Cursor, son to the first Papirius, a period of +six and forty years, in spite of numerous defeats, the loss of many of their +towns, and the great slaughter which overtook them everywhere throughout their +country. And this is the more remarkable when we see that country, which once +contained so many noble cities, and supported so great a population, now almost +uninhabited; and reflect that it formerly enjoyed a government and possessed +resources making its conquest impossible to less than Roman valour. +</p> + +<p> +There is no difficulty, therefore, in determining whence that ancient greatness +and this modern decay have arisen, since they can be traced to the free life +formerly prevailing and to the servitude which prevails now. For all countries +and provinces which enjoy complete freedom, make, as I have said, most rapid +progress. Because, from marriage being less restricted in these countries, and +more sought after, we find there a greater population; every man being disposed +to beget as many children as he thinks he can rear, when he has no anxiety lest +they should be deprived of their patrimony, and knows not only that they are +born to freedom and not to slavery, but that they may rise by their merit to be +the first men of their country. In such States, accordingly, we see wealth +multiply, both that which comes from agriculture and that which comes from +manufactures. For all love to gather riches and to add to their possessions +when their enjoyment of them is not likely to be disturbed. And hence it +happens that the citizens of such States vie with one another in whatever tends +to promote public or private well-being; in both of which, consequently, there +is a wonderful growth. +</p> + +<p> +But the contrary of all this takes place in those countries which live in +servitude, and the more oppressive their servitude, the more they fall short of +the good which all desire. And the hardest of all hard servitudes is that +wherein one commonwealth is subjected to another. First, because it is more +lasting, and there is less hope to escape from it; and, second, because every +commonwealth seeks to add to its own strength by weakening and enfeebling all +beside. A prince who gets the better of you will not treat you after this +fashion, unless he be a barbarian like those eastern despots who lay countries +waste and destroy the labours of civilization; but if influenced by the +ordinary promptings of humanity, will, as a rule, regard all his subject States +with equal favour, and suffer them to pursue their usual employments, and +retain almost all their ancient institutions, so that if they flourish not as +free States might, they do not dwindle as States that are enslaved; by which I +mean enslaved by a stranger, for of that other slavery to which they may be +reduced by one of their own citizens, I have already spoken. +</p> + +<p> +Whoever, therefore, shall well consider what has been said above, will not be +astonished at the power possessed by the Samnites while they were still free, +nor at the weakness into which they fell when they were subjugated. Of which +change in their fortunes Livius often reminds us, and particularly in +connection with the war with Hannibal, where he relates that the Samnites, +being ill-treated by a Roman legion quartered at Nola, sent legates to Hannibal +to ask his aid; who in laying their case before him told him, that with their +own soldiers and captains they had fought single handed against the Romans for +a hundred years, and had more than once withstood two consuls and two consular +armies; but had now fallen so low, that they were scarce able to defend +themselves against one poor legion. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER III.—<i>That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which +lay round about her, and by readily admitting strangers to the rights of +Citizenship.</i></h2> + +<p> +“Crescit interea Roma Albæ ruinis”—<i>Meanwhile Rome grows on +the ruins of Alba</i>. They who would have their city become a great empire, +must endeavour by every means to fill it with inhabitants; for without a +numerous population no city can ever succeed in growing powerful. This may be +effected in two ways, by gentleness or by force. By gentleness, when you offer +a safe and open path to all strangers who may wish to come and dwell in your +city, so as to encourage them to come there of their own accord; by force, when +after destroying neighbouring towns, you transplant their inhabitants to live +in yours. Both of these methods were practised by Rome, and with such success, +that in the time of her sixth king there dwelt within her walls eighty thousand +citizens fit to bear arms. For the Romans loved to follow the methods of the +skilful husbandman, who, to insure a plant growing big and yielding and +maturing its fruit, cuts off the first shoots it sends out, that the strength +remaining in the stem, it may in due season put forth new and more vigorous and +more fruitful branches. And that this was a right and a necessary course for +Rome to take for establishing and extending her empire, is proved by the +example of Sparta and Athens, which, although exceedingly well-armed States, +and regulated by excellent laws, never reached the same greatness as the Roman +Republic; though the latter, to all appearance, was more turbulent and +disorderly than they, and, so far as laws went, not so perfectly governed. For +this we can offer no other explanation than that already given. For by +augmenting the numbers of her citizens in both the ways named, Rome was soon +able to place two hundred and eighty thousand men under arms; while neither +Sparta nor Athens could ever muster more than twenty thousand; and this, not +because the situation of these countries was less advantageous than that of +Rome, but simply from the difference in the methods they followed. +</p> + +<p> +For Lycurgus, the founder of the Spartan Republic, thinking nothing so likely +to relax his laws as an admixture of new citizens, did all he could to prevent +intercourse with strangers; with which object, besides refusing these the right +to marry, the right of citizenship, and all such other social rights as induce +men to become members of a community, he ordained that in this republic of his +the only money current should be of leather, so that none might be tempted to +repair thither to trade or to carry on any art. +</p> + +<p> +Under such circumstances the number of the inhabitants of that State could +never much increase. For as all our actions imitate nature, and it is neither +natural nor possible that a puny stem should carry a great branch, so a small +republic cannot assume control over cities or countries stronger than herself; +or, doing so, will resemble the tree whose boughs being greater than its trunk, +are supported with difficulty, and snapped by every gust of wind. As it proved +with Sparta. For after she had spread her dominion over all the cities of +Greece, no sooner did Thebes rebel than all the others rebelled likewise, and +the trunk was left stripped of its boughs. But this could not have happened +with Rome, whose stem was mighty enough to bear any branch with ease. +</p> + +<p> +It was, therefore, by adding to her population, and by, adopting certain other +methods presently to be noticed, that Rome became so great and powerful. And +this is well expressed by Titus Livius, in the words, “<i>Crescit interea +Roma Albae ruinis</i>.” +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER IV.—<i>That Commonwealths have followed three Methods for +extending their Power</i>.</h2> + +<p> +Any one who has read ancient history with attention, must have observed that +three methods have been used by republics for extending their power. One of +these, followed by the old Etruscans, is to form a confederation of many +States, wherein none has precedence over the rest in authority or rank, and +each allows the others to share its acquisitions; as do the States of the Swiss +League in our days, and as the Achaians and Etolians did in Greece in earlier +times. And because the Etruscans were opposed to the Romans in many wars, that +I may give a clearer notion of this method of theirs, I shall enlarge a little +in my account of the Etruscan people. +</p> + +<p> +In Italy, before the Romans became supreme, the Etruscans were very powerful, +both by sea and land; and although we have no separate history of their +affairs, we have some slight records left us of them, and some indications of +their greatness. We know, for instance, that they planted a colony, to which +they gave the name of Hadria, on the coast of the upper sea; which colony +became so renowned that it lent its name to the sea itself, which to this day +by the Latins is called the Hadriatic. We know, too, that their arms were +obeyed from the Tiber to the foot of the mountains which enclose the greater +part of the Italian peninsula; although, two hundred years before Rome grew to +any great strength, they had lost their supremacy in the province now known as +Lombardy, of which the French had possessed themselves. For that people, +whether driven by necessity, or attracted by the excellence of the fruits, and +still more of the wine of Italy, came there under their chief, Bellovesus; and +after defeating and expelling the inhabitants of the country, settled +themselves therein, and there built many cities; calling the district Gallia, +after the name they then bore: and this territory they retained until they were +subdued by the Romans. +</p> + +<p> +These Etruscans, therefore, living with one another on a footing of complete +equality, when they sought to extend their power, followed that first method of +which I have just now spoken. Their State was made up of twelve cities, among +which were Chiusi, Veii, Friuli, Arezzo, Volterra, and the like, and their +government was conducted in the form of a league. They could not, however, +extend their conquests beyond Italy; while even within the limits of Italy, +much territory remained unoccupied by them for reasons presently to be noticed. +</p> + +<p> +The second method is to provide yourself with allies or companions, taking +heed, however, to retain in your own hands the chief command, the seat of +government, and the titular supremacy. This was the method followed by the +Romans. +</p> + +<p> +The third method is to hold other States in direct subjection to you, and not +merely associated with you as companions; and this was the plan pursued by the +Spartans and Athenians. +</p> + +<p> +Of these three methods, the last is wholly useless, as was seen in the case of +the two States named, which came to ruin from no other cause than that they had +acquired a dominion greater than they could maintain. For to undertake to +govern cities by force, especially such cities as have been used to live in +freedom, is a difficult and arduous task, in which you never can succeed +without an army and that a great one. But to have such an army you must needs +have associates who will help to swell the numbers of your own citizens. And +because Athens and Sparta neglected this precaution, whatever they did was done +in vain; whereas Rome, which offers an instance of the second of the methods we +are considering, by attending to this precaution reached a power that had no +limit. And as she alone has lived in this way, so she alone has attained to +this pitch of power. For joining with herself many States throughout Italy as +her companions, who in most respects lived with her on a footing of equality, +while, as has been noted, always reserving to herself the seat of empire and +the titular command, it came about that these States, without being aware of +it, by their own efforts, and with their own blood, wrought out their own +enslavement. +</p> + +<p> +For when Rome began to send armies out of Italy, for the purpose of reducing +foreign kingdoms to provinces, and of subjugating nations who, being used to +live under kings, were not impatient of her yoke, and who, receiving Roman +governors, and having been conquered by armies bearing the Roman name, +recognized no masters save the Romans, those companions of Rome who dwelt in +Italy suddenly found themselves surrounded by Roman subjects, and weighed down +by the greatness of the Roman power; and when at last they came to perceive the +mistake in which they had been living, it was too late to remedy it, so vast +was the authority which Rome had then obtained over foreign countries, and so +great the resources which she possessed within herself; having by this time +grown to be the mightiest and best-armed of States. So that although these her +companions sought to avenge their wrongs by conspiring against her, they were +soon defeated in the attempt, and remained in a worse plight than before, since +they too became subjects and no longer associates. This method, then, as I have +said, was followed by the Romans alone; but no other plan can be pursued by a +republic which desires to extend its power; experience having shown none other +so safe and certain. +</p> + +<p> +The method which consists in forming leagues, of which I have spoken above as +having been adopted by the Etruscans, the Achaians, and the Etolians of old, +and in our own days by the Swiss, is the next best after that followed by the +Romans, for as in this way there can be no great extension of power, two +advantages result: first, that you do not readily involve yourself in war; and, +second, that you can easily preserve any little acquisition which you may make. +The reason why you cannot greatly extend your power is, that as your league is +made up of separate States with distinct seats of government, it is difficult +for these to consult and resolve in concert. The same causes make these States +careless to enlarge their territories; because acquisitions which have to be +shared among many communities are less thought of than those made by a single +republic which looks to enjoy them all to itself. Again, since leagues govern +through general councils, they must needs be slower in resolving than a nation +dwelling within one frontier. +</p> + +<p> +Moreover, we find from experience that this method has certain fixed limits +beyond which there is no instance of its ever having passed; by which I mean +that some twelve or fourteen communities may league themselves together, but +will never seek to pass beyond that limit: for after associating themselves in +such numbers as seem to them to secure their safety against all besides, they +desire no further extension of their power, partly because no necessity compels +them to extend, and partly because, for the reasons already given, they would +find no profit in extending. For were they to seek extension they would have to +follow one of two courses: either continuing to admit new members to their +league, whose number must lead to confusion; or else making subjects, a course +which they will avoid since they will see difficulty in making them, and no +great good in having them. Wherefore, when their number has so increased that +their safety seems secured, they have recourse to two expedients: either +receiving other States under their protection and engaging for their defence +(in which way they obtain money from various quarters which they can easily +distribute among themselves); or else hiring themselves out as soldiers to +foreign States, and drawing pay from this or the other prince who employs them +to carry out his enterprises; as we see done by the Swiss at the present day, +and as we read was done in ancient times by certain of those nations whom we +have named above. To which we have a witness in Titus Livius, who relates that +when Philip of Macedon came to treat with Titus Quintius Flamininus, and while +terms were being discussed in the presence of a certain Etolian captain, this +man coming to words with Philip, the latter taunted him with greed and bad +faith; telling him that the Etolians were not ashamed to draw pay from one +side, and then send their men to serve on the other; so that often the banner +of Etolia might be seen displayed in two hostile camps. +</p> + +<p> +We see, therefore, that the method of proceeding by leagues has always been of +the same character, and has led always to the same results. We see, likewise, +that the method which proceeds by reducing States to direct subjection has +constantly proved a weak one, and produced insignificant gains; and that +whenever these gains have passed a certain limit, ruin has ensued. And if the +latter of these two methods be of little utility among armed States, among +those that are unarmed, as is now the case with the republics of Italy, it is +worse than useless. We may conclude, therefore, that the true method was that +followed by the Romans; which is the more remarkable as we find none who +adopted it before they did, and none who have followed it since. As for +leagues, I know of no nations who have had recourse to them in recent times +except the Swiss and the Suevians. +</p> + +<p> +But to bring my remarks on this head to an end, I affirm that all the various +methods followed by the Romans in conducting their affairs, whether foreign or +domestic, so far from being imitated in our day, have been held of no account, +some pronouncing them to be mere fables, some thinking them impracticable, +others out of place and unprofitable; and so, abiding in this ignorance, we +rest a prey to all who have chosen to invade our country. But should it seem +difficult to tread in the footsteps of the Romans, it ought not to appear so +hard, especially for us Tuscans, to imitate the Tuscans of antiquity, who if, +from the causes already assigned, they failed to establish an empire like that +of Rome, succeeded in acquiring in Italy that degree of power which their +method of acting allowed, and which they long preserved in security, with the +greatest renown in arms and government, and the highest reputation for manners +and religion. This power and this glory of theirs were first impaired by the +Gauls, and afterwards extinguished by the Romans, and so utterly extinguished, +that of the Etruscan Empire, so splendid two thousand years ago, we have at the +present day barely a record. This it is which has led me to inquire whence this +oblivion of things arises, a question of which I shall treat in the following +Chapter. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER V.—<i>That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of +Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the Memory of the Past</i>.</h2> + +<p> +To those philosophers who will have it that the world has existed from all +eternity, it were, I think, a good answer, that if what they say be true we +ought to have record of a longer period than five thousand years; did it not +appear that the memory of past times is blotted out by a variety of causes, +some referable to men, and some to Heaven. +</p> + +<p> +Among the causes which have a human origin are the changes in sects and +tongues; because when a new sect, that is to say a new religion, comes up, its +first endeavour, in order to give itself reputation, is to efface the old; and +should it so happen that the founders of the new religion speak another tongue, +this may readily be effected. This we know from observing the methods which +Christianity has followed in dealing with the religion of the Gentiles, for we +find that it has abolished all the rites and ordinances of that worship, and +obliterated every trace of the ancient belief. True, it has not succeeded in +utterly blotting out our knowledge of things done by the famous men who held +that belief; and this because the propagators of the new faith, retaining the +Latin tongue, were constrained to use it in writing the new law; for could they +have written this in a new tongue, we may infer, having regard to their other +persecutions, that no record whatever would have survived to us of past events. +For any one who reads of the methods followed by Saint Gregory and the other +heads of the Christian religion, will perceive with what animosity they pursued +all ancient memorials; burning the works of poets and historians; breaking +images; and destroying whatsoever else afforded any trace of antiquity. So that +if to this persecution a new language had been joined, it must soon have been +found that everything was forgotten. +</p> + +<p> +We may believe, therefore, that what Christianity has sought to effect against +the sect of the Gentiles, was actually effected by that sect against the +religion which preceded theirs; and that, from the repeated changes of belief +which have taken place in the course of five or six thousand years, the memory +of what happened at a remote date has perished, or, if any trace of it remain, +has come to be regarded as a fable to which no credit is due; like the +Chronicle of Diodorus Siculus, which, professing to give an account of the +events of forty or fifty thousand years, is held, and I believe justly, a lying +tale. +</p> + +<p> +As for the causes of oblivion which we may refer to Heaven, they are those +which make havoc of the human race, and reduce the population of certain parts +of the world to a very small number. This happens by plague, famine, or flood, +of which three the last is the most hurtful, as well because it is the most +universal, as because those saved are generally rude and ignorant mountaineers, +who possessing no knowledge of antiquity themselves, can impart none to those +who come after them. Or if among the survivors there chance to be one possessed +of such knowledge, to give himself consequence and credit, he will conceal and +pervert it to suit his private ends, so that to his posterity there will remain +only so much as he may have been pleased to communicate, and no more. +</p> + +<p> +That these floods, plagues, and famines do in fact happen, I see no reason to +doubt, both because we find all histories full of them, and recognize their +effect in this oblivion of the past, and also because it is reasonable that +such things should happen. For as when much superfluous matter has gathered in +simple bodies, nature makes repeated efforts to remove and purge it away, +thereby promoting the health of these bodies, so likewise as regards that +composite body the human race, when every province of the world so teems with +inhabitants that they can neither subsist where they are nor remove elsewhere, +every region being equally crowded and over-peopled, and when human craft and +wickedness have reached their highest pitch, it must needs come about that the +world will purge herself in one or another of these three ways, to the end that +men, becoming few and contrite, may amend their lives and live with more +convenience. +</p> + +<p> +Etruria, then, as has been said above, was at one time powerful, abounding in +piety and valour, practising her own customs, and speaking her own tongue; but +all this was effaced by the power of Rome, so that, as I have observed already, +nothing is left of her but the memory of a name. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER VI.—<i>Of the Methods followed by the Romans in making +War</i>.</h2> + +<p> +Having treated of the methods followed by the Romans for increasing their +power, we shall now go on to consider those which they used in making war; and +in all they did we shall find how wisely they turned aside from the common path +in order to render their progress to supreme greatness easy. +</p> + +<p> +Whosoever makes war, whether from policy or ambition, means to acquire and to +hold what he acquires, and to carry on the war he has undertaken in such a +manner that it shall enrich and not impoverish his native country and State. It +is necessary, therefore, whether for acquiring or holding, to consider how cost +may be avoided, and everything done most advantageously for the public welfare. +But whoever would effect all this, must take the course and follow the methods +of the Romans; which consisted, first of all, in making their wars, as the +French say, <i>great and short</i>. For entering the field with strong armies, +they brought to a speedy conclusion whatever wars they had with the Latins, the +Samnites, or the Etruscans. +</p> + +<p> +And if we take note of all the wars in which they were engaged, from the +foundation of their city down to the siege of Veii, all will be seen to have +been quickly ended some in twenty, some in ten, and some in no more than six +days. And this was their wont: So soon as war was declared they would go forth +with their armies to meet the enemy and at once deliver battle. The enemy, on +being routed, to save their country from pillage, very soon came to terms, when +the Romans would take from them certain portions of their territory. These they +either assigned to particular persons, or made the seat of a colony, which +being settled on the confines of the conquered country served as a defence to +the Roman frontier, to the advantage both of the colonists who had these lands +given them, and of the Roman people whose borders were thus guarded at no +expense to themselves. And no other system of defence could have been at once +so safe, so strong, and so effectual. For while the enemy were not actually in +the field, this guard was sufficient; and when they came out in force to +overwhelm the colony, the Romans also went forth in strength and gave them +battle; and getting the better of them, imposed harder terms than before, and +so returned home. And in this way they came gradually to establish their name +abroad, and to add to their power. +</p> + +<p> +These methods they continued to employ until they changed their system of +warfare, which they did during the siege of Veii; when to enable them to carry +on a prolonged war, they passed a law for the payment of their soldiers, whom, +up to that time they had not paid, nor needed to pay, because till then their +wars had been of brief duration. Nevertheless, while allowing pay to their +soldiers that they might thus wage longer wars, and keep their armies longer in +the field when employed on distant enterprises, they never departed from their +old plan of bringing their campaigns to as speedy an end as place and +circumstances allowed, nor ever ceased to plant colonies. +</p> + +<p> +Their custom of terminating their wars with despatch, besides being natural to +the Romans, was strengthened by the ambition of their consuls, who, being +appointed for twelve months only, six of which they had to spend in the city, +were eager to bring their wars to an end as rapidly as they could, that they +might enjoy the honours of a triumph. The usage of planting colonies was +recommended by the great advantage and convenience which resulted from it. In +dealing with the spoils of warfare their practice, no doubt, in a measure +changed, so that in this respect they were not afterwards so liberal as they +were at first; partly, because liberality did not seem so necessary when their +soldiers were in receipt of pay; and, partly, because the spoils themselves +being greater than before, they thought by their help so to enrich the public +treasury as to be able to carry on their wars without taxing the city; and, in +fact, by pursuing this course the public revenues were soon greatly augmented. +The methods thus followed by the Romans in dividing plunder and in planting +colonies had, accordingly, this result, that whereas other less prudent princes +and republics are impoverished by war, Rome was enriched by it; nay, so far was +the system carried, that no consul could hope for a triumph unless he brought +back with him for the public treasury much gold and silver and spoils of every +kind. +</p> + +<p> +By methods such as these, at one time bringing their wars to a rapid conclusion +by invasion and actual defeat, at another wearing out an enemy by protracted +hostilities, and again by concluding peace on advantageous terms, the Romans +continually grew richer and more powerful. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER VII.—<i>Of the Quantity of Land assigned by the Romans to +each Colonist</i>.</h2> + +<p> +It would, I think, be difficult to fix with certainty how much land the Romans +allotted to each colonist, for my belief is that they gave more or less +according to the character of the country to which they sent them. We may, +however, be sure that in every instance, and to whatever country they were +sent, the quantity of land assigned was not very large: first, because, these +colonists being sent to guard the newly acquired country, by giving little land +it became possible to send more men; and second because, as the Romans lived +frugally at home, it is unreasonable to suppose that they should wish their +countrymen to be too well off abroad. And Titus Livius tells us that on the +capture of Veii, the Romans sent thither a colony, allotting to each colonist +three jugera and seven unciae of land, which, according to our measurement +would be something under two acres. +</p> + +<p> +Besides the above reasons, the Romans may likely enough have thought that it +was not so much the quantity of the land allotted as its careful cultivation +that would make it suffice. It is very necessary, however, that every colony +should have common pasturage where all may send their cattle to graze, as well +as woods where they may cut fuel; for without such conveniences no colony can +maintain itself. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER VIII.—<i>Why certain Nations leave their ancestral Seats and +overflow the Countries of others</i>.</h2> + +<p> +Having spoken above of the methods followed by the Romans in making war, and +related how the Etruscans were attacked by the Gauls, it seems to me not +foreign to these topics to explain that of wars there are two kinds. One kind +of war has its origin in the ambition of princes or republics who seek to +extend their dominions. Such were the wars waged by Alexander the Great, and by +the Romans, and such are those which we see every day carried on by one +potentate against another. Wars of this sort have their dangers, but do not +utterly extirpate the inhabitants of a country; what the conqueror seeks being +merely the submission of the conquered people, whom, generally speaking, he +suffers to retain their laws, and always their houses and goods. +</p> + +<p> +The other species of war is when an entire people, with all the families of +which it is made up, being driven out by famine or defeat, removes from its +former seat, and goes in search of a new abode and a new country, not simply +with the view to establish dominion over it, but to possess it as its own, and +to expel or exterminate the former inhabitants. Of this most terrible and cruel +species of warfare Sallust speaks at the end of his history of the war with +Jugurtha, where in mentioning that after the defeat of Jugurtha the movement of +the Gauls into Italy began to be noticed, he observes that “<i>in the +wars of the Romans with other nations the struggle was for mastery; but that +always in their wars with the Gauls the struggle on both sides was for +life</i>.” For a prince or commonwealth, when attacking another State, +will be content to rid themselves of those only who are at the head of affairs; +but an entire people, set in motion in the manner described, must destroy all +who oppose them, since their object is to subsist on that whereon those whom +they invade have hitherto subsisted. +</p> + +<p> +The Romans had to pass through three of these desperate wars; the first being +that in which their city was actually captured by those Gauls who, as already +mentioned, had previously taken Lombardy from the Etruscans and made it their +seat, and for whose invasion Titus Livius has assigned two causes. First, that +they were attracted, as I have said before, by the fruitful soil and by the +wine of Italy which they had not in Gaul; second, that their population having +multiplied so greatly that they could no longer find wherewithal to live on at +home, the princes of their land decided that certain of their number should go +forth to seek a new abode; and so deciding, chose as leaders of those who were +to go, two Gaulish chiefs, Bellovesus and Siccovesus; the former of whom came +into Italy while the latter passed into Spain. From the immigration under +Bellovesus resulted the occupation of Lombardy, and, subsequently, the first +war of the Gauls with Rome. At a later date, and after the close of the first +war with Carthage, came the second Gallic invasion, when more than two hundred +thousand Gauls perished in battle between Piombino and Pisa. The third of these +wars broke out on the descent into Italy of the Todi and Cimbri, who, after +defeating several Roman armies, were themselves defeated by Marius. +</p> + +<p> +In these three most dangerous contests the arms of Rome prevailed; but no +ordinary valour was needed for their success. For we see afterwards, when the +spirit of the Romans had declined, and their armies had lost their former +excellence, their supremacy was overthrown by men of the same race, that is to +say by the Goths, the Vandals, and others like them, who spread themselves over +the whole of the Western Empire. +</p> + +<p> +Nations such as these, quit, as I have said, their native land, when forced by +famine, or by defeat in domestic wars, to seek a new habitation elsewhere. When +those thus driven forth are in large numbers, they violently invade the +territories of other nations, slaughtering the inhabitants, seizing on their +possessions, founding new kingdoms, and giving new names to provinces; as was +done by Moses, and by those tribes who overran the Roman Empire. For the new +names which we find in Italy and elsewhere, have no other origin than in their +having been given by these new occupants; as when the countries formerly known +as Gallia Cisalpina and Gallia Transalpina took the names of Lombardy and +France, from the Lombards and the Franks who settled themselves there. In the +same way Sclavonia was formerly known as Illyria, Hungary as Pannonia, and +England as Britain; while many other provinces which it would be tedious to +enumerate, have similarly changed their designations; as when the name Judæa +was given by Moses to that part of Syria of which he took possession. +</p> + +<p> +And since I have said above that nations such as those I have been describing, +are often driven by wars from their ancestral homes, and forced to seek a new +country elsewhere, I shall cite the instance of the Maurusians, a people who +anciently dwelt in Syria, but hearing of the inroad of the Hebrews, and +thinking themselves unable to resist them, chose rather to seek safety in +flight than to perish with their country in a vain effort to defend it. For +which reason, removing with their families, they went to Africa, where, after +driving out the native inhabitants, they took up their abode; and although they +could not defend their own country, were able to possess themselves of a +country belonging to others. And Procopius, who writes the history of the war +which Belisarius conducted against those Vandals who seized on Africa, relates, +that on certain pillars standing in places where the Maurusians once dwelt, he +had read inscriptions in these words: “<i>We Maurusians who fled before +Joshua, the robber, the son of Nun</i>;”<a href="#fn7" name="fnref7" id="fnref7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> +giving us to know the cause of their quitting Syria. Be this as it may, nations +thus driven forth by a supreme necessity, are, if they be in great number, in +the highest degree dangerous, and cannot be successfully withstood except by a +people who excel in arms. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn7" id="fn7"></a> <a href="#fnref7">[7]</a> +Nos Maurusii qui fugimus a facie Jesu latronis filii Navæ. <i>Procop. Hist. +Bell. Vand. II.</i> +</p> + +<p> +When those constrained to abandon their homes are not in large numbers, they +are not so dangerous as the nations of whom I have been speaking, since they +cannot use the same violence, but must trust to their address to procure them a +habitation; and, after procuring it, must live with their neighbours as friends +and companions, as we find Æneas, Dido, the Massilians, and others like them to +have lived; all of whom contrived to maintain themselves in the districts in +which they settled, by securing the good will of the neighbouring nations. +</p> + +<p> +Almost all the great emigrations of nations have been and continue to be from +the cold and barren region of Scythia, because from the population there being +excessive, and the soil ill able to support them, they are forced to quit their +home, many causes operating to drive them forth and none to keep them back. And +if, for the last five hundred years, it has not happened that any of these +nations has actually overrun another country, there are various reasons to +account for it. First, the great clearance which that region made of its +inhabitants during the decline of the Roman Empire, when more than thirty +nations issued from it in succession; and next, the circumstance that the +countries of Germany and Hungary, whence also these nations came, are now so +much improved that men can live there in comfort, and consequently are not +constrained to shift their habitations. Besides which, since these countries +are occupied by a very warlike race, they serve as a sort of bulwark to keep +back the neighbouring Scythians, who for this reason do not venture to attack +them, nor attempt to force a passage. Nevertheless, movements on a great scale +have oftentimes been begun by the Tartars, and been at once withstood by the +Hungarians and Poles, whose frequent boast it is, that but for them, Italy and +the Church would more than once have felt the weight of the Tartar arms. +</p> + +<p> +Of the nations of whom I have been speaking, I shall now say no more. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER IX.—<i>Of the Causes which commonly give rise to Wars between +States</i>.</h2> + +<p> +The occasion which led to war between the Romans and Samnites, who for long had +been in league with one another, is of common occurrence in all powerful +States, being either brought about by accident, or else purposely contrived by +some one who would set war a-foot. As between the Romans and the Samnites, the +occasion of war was accidental. For in making war upon the Sidicinians and +afterwards on the Campanians, the Samnites had no thought of involving +themselves with the Romans. But the Campanians being overpowered, and, contrary +to the expectation of Romans and Samnites alike, resorting to Rome for aid, the +Romans, on whose protection they threw themselves, were forced to succour them +as dependants, and to accept a war which, it seemed to them, they could not +with honour decline. For though they might have thought it unreasonable to be +called on to defend the Campanians as friends against their own friends the +Samnites, it seemed to them shameful not to defend them as subjects, or as a +people who had placed themselves under their protection. For they reasoned that +to decline their defence would close the gate against all others who at any +future time might desire to submit themselves to their power. And, accordingly, +since glory and empire, and not peace, were the ends which they always had in +view, it became impossible for them to refuse this protectorship. +</p> + +<p> +A similar circumstance gave rise to the first war with the Carthaginians, +namely the protectorate assumed by the Romans of the citizens of Messina in +Sicily, and this likewise came about by chance. But the second war with +Carthage was not the result of chance. For Hannibal the Carthaginian general +attacked the Saguntans, who were the friends of Rome in Spain, not from any +desire to injure them, but in order to set the arms of Rome in motion, and so +gain an opportunity of engaging the Romans in a war, and passing on into Italy. +This method of picking a quarrel is constantly resorted to by powerful States +when they are bound by scruples of honour or like considerations. For if I +desire to make war on a prince with whom I am under an ancient and binding +treaty, I shall find some colour or pretext for attacking the friend of that +prince, very well knowing that when I attack his friend, either the prince will +resent it, when my scheme for engaging him in war will be realized; or that, +should he not resent it, his weakness or baseness in not defending one who is +under his protection will be made apparent; either of which alternatives will +discredit him, and further my designs. +</p> + +<p> +We are to note, therefore, in connection with this submission of the +Campanians, what has just now been said as to provoking another power to war; +and also the remedy open to a State which, being unequal to its own defence, is +prepared to go all lengths to ruin its assailant,—that remedy being to +give itself up unreservedly to some one whom it selects for its defender; as +the Campanians gave themselves up to the Romans, and as the Florentines gave +themselves up to King Robert of Naples, who, after refusing to defend them as +his friends against Castruccio of Lucca by whom they were hard pressed, +defended them as his subjects. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER X.—<i>That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the +Sinews of War</i>.</h2> + +<p> +Since any man may begin a war at his pleasure, but cannot at his pleasure bring +it to a close, a prince before he engages in any warlike enterprise ought to +measure his strength and govern himself accordingly. But he must be prudent +enough not to deceive himself as to his strength, which he will always do, if +he measure it by money, by advantage of position, or by the good-will of his +subjects, while he is unprovided with an army of his own. These are things +which may swell your strength but do not constitute it, being in themselves +null and of no avail without an army on which you can depend. +</p> + +<p> +Without such an army no amount of money will meet your wants, the natural +strength of your country will not protect you, and the fidelity and attachment +of your subjects will not endure, since it is impossible that they should +continue true to you when you cannot defend them. Lakes, and mountains, and the +most inaccessible strongholds, where valiant defenders are wanting, become no +better than the level plain; and money, so far from being a safeguard, is more +likely to leave you a prey to your enemy; since nothing can be falser than the +vulgar opinion which affirms it to be the sinews of war. +</p> + +<p> +This opinion is put forward by Quintus Curtius, where, in speaking of the war +between Antipater the Macedonian and the King of Sparta, he relates that the +latter, from want of money, was constrained to give battle and was defeated; +whereas, could he have put off fighting for a few days the news of +Alexander’s death would have reached Greece, and he might have had a +victory without a battle. But lacking money, and fearing that on that account +his soldiers might desert him, he was forced to hazard an engagement. It was +for this reason that Quintus Curtius declared money to be the sinews of war, a +maxim every day cited and acted upon by princes less wise than they should be. +For building upon this, they think it enough for their defence to have laid up +great treasures; not reflecting that were great treasures all that is needed +for victory, Darius of old had conquered Alexander, the Greeks the Romans, and +in our own times Charles of Burgundy the Swiss; while the pope and the +Florentines together would have had little difficulty in defeating Francesco +Maria, nephew of Pope Julius II., in the recent war of Urbino; and yet, in +every one of these instances, the victory remained with him who held the sinews +of war to consist, not in money, but in good soldiers. +</p> + +<p> +Croesus, king of Lydia, after showing Solon the Athenian much besides, at last +displayed to him the boundless riches of his treasure-house, and asked him what +he thought of his power. Whereupon Solon answered that he thought him no whit +more powerful in respect of these treasures, for as war is made with iron and +not with gold, another coming with more iron might carry off his gold. After +the death of Alexander the Great a tribe of Gauls, passing through Greece on +their way into Asia, sent envoys to the King of Macedonia to treat for terms of +accord; when the king, to dismay them by a display of his resources, showed +them great store of gold and silver. But these barbarians, when they saw all +this wealth, in their greed to possess it, though before they had looked on +peace as settled, broke off negotiations; and thus the king was ruined by those +very treasures he had amassed for his defence. In like manner, not many years +ago, the Venetians, with a full treasury, lost their whole dominions without +deriving the least advantage from their wealth. +</p> + +<p> +I maintain, therefore, that it is not gold, as is vulgarly supposed, that is +the sinews of war, but good soldiers; or while gold by itself will not gain you +good soldiers, good soldiers may readily get you gold. Had the Romans chosen to +make war with gold rather than with iron all the treasures of the earth would +not have sufficed them having regard to the greatness of their enterprises and +the difficulties they had to overcome in carrying them out. But making their +wars with iron they never felt any want of gold; for those who stood in fear of +them brought gold into their camp. +</p> + +<p> +And supposing it true that the Spartan king was forced by lack of money to risk +the chances of a battle, it only fared with him in respect of money as it has +often fared with others from other causes; since we see that where an army is +in such straits for want of victual that it must either fight or perish by +famine, it will always fight, as being the more honourable course and that on +which fortune may in some way smile. So, too, it has often happened that a +captain, seeing his enemy about to be reinforced, has been obliged either to +trust to fortune and at once deliver battle, or else, waiting till the +reinforcement is complete, to fight then, whether he will or no, and at +whatever disadvantage. We find also, as in the case of Hasdrubal when beset, in +the March of Ancona, at once by Claudius Nero and by the other Roman consul, +that a captain, when he must either fight or fly, will always fight, since it +will seem to him that by this course, however hazardous, he has at least a +chance of victory, while by the other his ruin is certain. +</p> + +<p> +There are many circumstances, therefore, which may force a captain to give +battle contrary to his intention, among which the want of money may sometimes +be one. But this is no ground for pronouncing money to be the sinews of war, +any more than those other things from the want of which men are reduced to the +same necessity. Once more, therefore, I repeat that not gold but good soldiers +constitute the sinews of war. Money, indeed, is most necessary in a secondary +place; but this necessity good soldiers will always be able to supply, since it +is as impossible that good soldiers should lack money, as that money by itself +should secure good soldiers. And that what I say is true is shown by countless +passages in history. When Pericles persuaded the Athenians to declare war +against the whole Peloponnesus, assuring them that their dexterity, aided by +their wealth, was sure to bring them off victorious, the Athenians, though for +a while they prospered in this war, in the end were overpowered, the prudent +counsels and good soldiers of Sparta proving more than a match for the +dexterity and wealth of Athens. But, indeed, there can be no better witness to +the truth of my contention than Titus Livius himself. For in that passage of +his history wherein he discusses whether if Alexander the Great had invaded +Italy, he would have succeeded in vanquishing the Romans, three things are +noted by him as essential to success in war; to wit, many and good soldiers, +prudent captains, and favourable fortune; and after examining whether the +Romans or Alexander would have had the advantage in each of these three +particulars, he arrives at his conclusion without any mention of money. +</p> + +<p> +The Campanians, therefore, when asked by the Sidicinians to arm in their +behalf, must have measured their strength by wealth and not by soldiers; for +after declaring in their favour and suffering two defeats, to save themselves +they were obliged to become tributary to Rome. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XI.—<i>That it were unwise to ally yourself a Prince who has +Reputation rather than Strength.</i></h2> + +<p> +To mark the mistake made by the Sidicinians in trusting to the protection of +the Campanians, and by the Campanians in supposing themselves able to protect +the Sidicinians, Titus Livius could not have expressed himself in apter words +than by saying, that “<i>the Campanians rather lent their name to the +Sidicinians than furnished any substantial aid towards their +defence.</i>” +</p> + +<p> +Here we have to note that alliances with princes who from dwelling at a +distance have no facility, or who from their own embarrassments, or from other +causes, have no ability to render aid, afford rather reputation than protection +to those who put their trust in them. As was the case in our own times with the +Florentines, when, in the year 1479, they were attacked by the Pope and the +King of Naples. For being friends of the French king they drew from that +friendship more reputation than help. The same would be the case with that +prince who should engage in any enterprise in reliance on the Emperor +Maximilian, his being one of those friendships which, in the words of our +historian, <i>nomen magis quam praesidium adferunt</i>. +</p> + +<p> +On this occasion, therefore, the Campanians were misled by imagining themselves +stronger than they really were. For often, from defect of judgment, men take +upon them to defend others, when they have neither skill nor ability to defend +themselves. Of which we have a further instance in the Tarentines, who, when +the Roman and Samnite armies were already drawn up against one another for +battle, sent messengers to the Roman consul to acquaint him that they desired +peace between the two nations, and would themselves declare war against +whichsoever of the two first began hostilities. The consul, laughing at their +threats, in the presence of the messengers, ordered the signal for battle to +sound, and bade his army advance to meet the enemy; showing the Tarentines by +acts rather than words what answer he thought their message deserved. +</p> + +<p> +Having spoken in the present Chapter of unwise courses followed by princes for +defending others, I shall speak in the next, of the methods they follow in +defending themselves. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XII.—<i>Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to +anticipate or to await it.</i></h2> + +<p> +I have often heard it disputed by men well versed in military affairs, whether, +when there are two princes of nearly equal strength, and the bolder of the two +proclaims war upon the other, it is better for that other to await attack +within his own frontier, or to march into the enemy’s country and fight +him there; and I have heard reasons given in favour of each of these courses. +</p> + +<p> +They who maintain that an enemy should be attacked in his own country, cite the +advice given by Croesus to Cyrus, when the latter had come to the frontiers of +the Massagetæ to make war on that people. For word being sent by Tomyris their +queen that Cyrus might, at his pleasure, either enter her dominions, where she +would await him, or else allow her to come and meet him; and the matter being +debated, Croesus, contrary to the opinion of other advisers, counselled Cyrus +to go forward and meet the queen, urging that were he to defeat her at a +distance from her kingdom, he might not be able to take it from her, since she +would have time to repair her strength; whereas, were he to defeat her within +her own dominions, he could follow her up on her flight, and, without giving +her time to recover herself, deprive her of her State. They cite also the +advice given by Hannibal to Antiochus, when the latter was meditating a war on +the Romans. For Hannibal told him that the Romans could not be vanquished +except in Italy, where an invader might turn to account the arms and resources +of their friends, whereas any one making war upon them out of Italy, and +leaving that country in their hands, would leave them an unfailing source +whence to draw whatever reinforcement they might need; and finally, he told +him, that the Romans might more easily be deprived of Rome than of their +empire, and of Italy more easily than of any of their other provinces. They +likewise instance Agathocles, who, being unequal to support a war at home, +invaded the Carthaginians, by whom he was being attacked, and reduced them to +sue for peace. They also cite Scipio, who to shift the war from Italy, carried +it into Africa. +</p> + +<p> +Those who hold a contrary opinion contend that to have your enemy at a +disadvantage you must get him away from his home, alleging the case of the +Athenians, who while they carried on the war at their convenience in their own +territory, retained their superiority; but when they quitted that territory, +and went with their armies to Sicily, lost their freedom. They cite also the +fable of the poets wherein it is figured that Antæus, king of Libya, being +assailed by the Egyptian Hercules, could not be overcome while he awaited his +adversary within the bounds of his own kingdom; but so soon as he was withdrawn +from these by the craft of Hercules, lost his kingdom and his life. Whence the +fable runs that Antæus, being son to the goddess Earth, when thrown to the +ground drew fresh strength from the Earth, his mother; and that Hercules, +perceiving this, held him up away from the Earth. +</p> + +<p> +Recent opinions are likewise cited as favouring this view. Every one knows how +Ferrando, king of Naples, was in his day accounted a most wise prince; and how +two years before his death there came a rumour that Charles VIII of France was +meditating an attack upon him; and how, after making great preparations for his +defence, he sickened; and being on the point of death, among other counsels +left his son Alfonso this advice, that nothing in the world should tempt him to +pass out of his own territory, but to await the enemy within his frontier, and +with his forces unimpaired; a warning disregarded by Alfonso, who sent into +Romagna an army, which he lost, and with it his whole dominions, without a +battle. +</p> + +<p> +Other arguments on both sides of the question in addition to those already +noticed, are as follows: He who attacks shows higher courage than he who stands +on his defence, and this gives his army greater confidence. Moreover, by +attacking your enemy you deprive him of many opportunities for using his +resources, since he can receive no aid from subjects who have been stripped of +their possessions; and when an enemy is at his gates, a prince must be careful +how he levies money and imposes taxes; so that, as Hannibal said, the springs +which enable a country to support a war come to be dried up. Again, the +soldiers of an invader, finding themselves in a foreign land, are under a +stronger necessity to fight, and necessity, as has often been said, is the +parent of valour. +</p> + +<p> +On the other hand, it may be argued that there are many advantages to be gained +by awaiting the attack of your enemy. For without putting yourself much about, +you may harass him by intercepting his supplies, whether of victual or of +whatsoever else an army stands in need: from your better knowledge of the +country you can impede his movements; and because men muster more willingly to +defend their homes than to go on distant expeditions, you can meet him with +more numerous forces, if defeated you can more easily repair your strength, +because the bulk of your army, finding shelter at hand, will be able to save +itself, and your reserves will have no distance to come. In this way you can +use your whole strength without risking your entire fortunes; whereas, in +leaving your country, you risk your entire fortunes, without putting forth your +whole strength. Nay, we find that to weaken an adversary still further, some +have suffered him to make a march of several days into their country, and then +to capture certain of their towns, that by leaving garrisons in these, he might +reduce the numbers of his army, and so be attacked at greater disadvantage. +</p> + +<p> +But now to speak my own mind on the matter, I think we should make this +distinction. Either you have your country strongly defended, as the Romans had +and the Swiss have theirs, or, like the Carthaginians of old and the King of +France and the Italians at the present day, you have it undefended. In the +latter case you must keep the enemy at a distance from your country, for as +your strength lies not in men but in money, whenever the supply of money is cut +off you are undone, and nothing so soon cuts off this supply as a war of +invasion. Of which we have example in the Carthaginians, who, while their +country was free from invasion, were able by means of their great revenues to +carry on war in Italy against the Romans, but when they were invaded could not +defend themselves even against Agathocles. The Florentines, in like manner, +could make no head against Castruccio, lord of Lucca, when he attacked them in +their own country; and to obtain protection, were compelled to yield themselves +up to King Robert of Naples. And yet, after Castruccio’s death, these +same Florentines were bold enough to attack the Duke of Milan in his own +country, and strong enough to strip him of his dominions. Such valour did they +display in distant wars, such weakness in those that were near. +</p> + +<p> +But when a country is armed as Rome was and Switzerland now is, the closer you +press it, the harder it is to subdue; because such States can assemble a +stronger force to resist attack than for attacking others. Nor does the great +authority of Hannibal move me in this instance, since resentment and his own +advantage might lead him to speak as he spoke to Antiochus. For had the Romans +suffered in Gaul, and within the same space of time, those three defeats at the +hands of Hannibal which they suffered in Italy, it must have made an end of +them; since they could not have turned the remnants of their armies to account +as they did in Italy, not having the same opportunity for repairing their +strength; nor could they have met their enemy with such numerous armies. For we +never find them sending forth a force of more than fifty thousand men for the +invasion of any province; whereas, in defending their own country against the +inroad of the Gauls at the end of the first Carthaginian war, we hear of them +bringing some eighteen hundred thousand men into the field; and their failure +to vanquish the Gauls in Lombardy as they had vanquished those in Tuscany arose +from their inability to lead a great force so far against a numerous enemy, or +to encounter him with the same advantages. In Germany the Cimbrians routed a +Roman army who had there no means to repair their disaster; but when they came +into Italy, the Romans could collect their whole strength, and destroy them. +Out of their native country, whence they can bring no more than thirty or forty +thousand men, the Swiss may readily be defeated; but in their own country, +where they can assemble a hundred thousand, they are well-nigh invincible. +</p> + +<p> +In conclusion, therefore, I repeat that the prince who has his people armed and +trained for war, should always await a great and dangerous war at home, and +never go forth to meet it. But that he whose subjects are unarmed, and whose +country is not habituated to war, should always carry the war to as great a +distance as he can from home. For in this way each will defend himself in the +best manner his means admit. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIII.—<i>That Men rise from humble to high Fortunes rather by +Fraud than by Force.</i></h2> + +<p> +I hold it as most certain that men seldom if ever rise to great place from +small beginnings without using fraud or force, unless, indeed, they be given, +or take by inheritance the place to which some other has already come. Force, +however, will never suffice by itself to effect this end, while fraud often +will, as any one may plainly see who reads the lives of Philip of Macedon, +Agathocles of Sicily, and many others like them, who from the lowest or, at any +rate, from very low beginnings, rose either to sovereignty or to the highest +command. +</p> + +<p> +This necessity for using deceit is taught by Xenophon in his life of Cyrus; for +the very first expedition on which Cyrus is sent, against the King of Armenia, +is seen to teem with fraud; and it is by fraud, and not by force, that he is +represented as having acquired his kingdom; so that the only inference to be +drawn from his conduct, as Xenophon describes it, is, that the prince who would +accomplish great things must have learned how to deceive. Xenophon, moreover, +represents his hero as deceiving his maternal grandsire Cyaxares, king of the +Medians, in a variety of ways; giving it to be understood that without such +deceit he could not have reached the greatness to which he came. Nor do I +believe that any man born to humble fortunes can be shown to have attained +great station, by sheer and open force, whereas this has often been effected by +mere fraud, such as that used by Giovanni Galeazzo to deprive his uncle Bernabo +of the State and government of Lombardy. +</p> + +<p> +The same arts which princes are constrained to use at the outset of their +career, must also be used by commonwealths, until they have grown powerful +enough to dispense with them and trust to strength alone. And because Rome at +all times, whether from chance or choice, followed all such methods as are +necessary to attain greatness, in this also she was not behindhand. And, to +begin with, she could have used no greater fraud than was involved in her +method above noticed, of making for herself companions; since under this name +she made for herself subjects, for such the Latins and the other surrounding +nations, in fact, became. For availing herself at first of their arms to subdue +neighbouring countries and gain herself reputation as a State, her power was so +much increased by these conquests that there was none whom she could not +overcome. But the Latins never knew that they were enslaved until they saw the +Samnites twice routed and forced to make terms. This success, while it added +greatly to the fame of the Romans among princes at a distance, who were thereby +made familiar with the Roman name though not with the Roman arms, bred at the +same time jealousy and distrust among those who, like the Latins, both saw and +felt these arms; and such were the effects of this jealousy and distrust, that +not the Latins only but all the Roman colonies in Latium, along with the +Campanians whom a little while before the Romans had defended leagued +themselves together against the authority of Rome. This war was set on foot by +the Latins in the manner in which, as I have already explained, most wars are +begun, not by directly attacking the Romans, but by defending the Sidicinians +against the Samnites who were making war upon them with the permission of the +Romans. And that it was from their having found out the crafty policy of the +Romans that the Latins were led to take this step, is plain from the words +which Titus Livius puts in the mouth of Annius Setinus the Latin prætor, who, +in addressing the Latin council, is made to say, “<i>For if even now we +can put up with slavery under the disguise of an equal alliance, etc</i>” +</p> + +<p> +We see, therefore, that the Romans, from the time they first began to extend +their power, were not unfamiliar with the art of deceiving, an art always +necessary for those who would mount to great heights from low beginnings; and +which is the less to be condemned when, as in the case of the Romans, it is +skilfully concealed. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIV.—<i>That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride +by Humility.</i></h2> + +<p> +You shall often find that humility is not merely of no service to you, but is +even hurtful, especially when used in dealing with insolent men, who, through +envy or other like cause, have conceived hatred against you. Proof whereof is +supplied by our historian where he explains the causes of this war between the +Romans and the Latins. For on the Samnites complaining to the Romans that the +Latins had attacked them, the Romans, desiring not to give the Latins ground of +offence, would not forbid them proceeding with the war. But the endeavour to +avoid giving offence to the Latins only served to increase their confidence, +and led them the sooner to declare their hostility. Of which we have evidence +in the language used by the same Latin Prætor, Annius Setinus, at the aforesaid +council, when he said:—“<i>You have tried their patience by +refusing them, soldiers. Who doubts but that they are offended? Still they have +put up with the affront. They have heard that we are assembling an army against +their allies the Samnites; and yet they have not stirred from their city. +Whence this astonishing forbearance, but from their knowing our strength and +their own weakness</i>?” Which words give us clearly to understand how +much the patience of the Romans increased the arrogance of the Latins. +</p> + +<p> +A prince, therefore, should never stoop from his dignity, nor should he if he +would have credit for any concession make it voluntarily, unless he be able or +believe himself able to withhold it. For almost always when matters have come +to such a pass that you cannot give way with credit it is better that a thing +be taken from you by force than yielded through fear of force. For if you yield +through fear and to escape war, the chances are that you do not escape it; +since he to whom, out of manifest cowardice you make this concession, will not +rest content, but will endeavour to wring further concessions from you, and +making less account of you, will only be the more kindled against you. At the +same time you will find your friends less zealous on your behalf, since to them +you will appear either weak or cowardly. But if, so soon as the designs of your +enemy are disclosed, you at once prepare to resist though your strength be +inferior to his, he will begin to think more of you, other neighbouring princes +will think more; and many will be willing to assist you, on seeing you take up +arms, who, had you relinquished hope and abandoned yourself to despair, would +never have stirred a finger to save you. +</p> + +<p> +The above is to be understood as applying where you have a single adversary +only; but should you have several, it will always be a prudent course, even +after war has been declared, to restore to some one of their number something +you have of his, so as to regain his friendship and detach him from the others +who have leagued themselves against you. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XV.—That weak States are always dubious in their Resolves; +and that tardy Resolves are always hurtful.</h2> + +<p> +Touching this very matter, and with regard to these earliest beginnings of war +between the Latins and the Romans, it may be noted, that in all our +deliberations it behoves us to come quickly to a definite resolve, and not to +remain always in dubiety and suspense. This is plainly seen in connection with +the council convened by the Latins when they thought to separate themselves +from the Romans. For the Romans suspecting the hostile humour wherewith the +Latins were infected, in order to learn how things really stood, and see +whether they could not win back the malcontents without recourse to arms, gave +them to know that they must send eight of their citizens to Rome, as they had +occasion to consult with them. On receiving which message the Latins, knowing +that they had done many things contrary to the wishes of the Romans, called a +council to determine who of their number should be sent, and to instruct them +what they were to say. But Annius, their prætor, being present in the council +when these matters were being discussed, told them “<i>that he thought it +of far greater moment for them to consider what they were to do than what they +were to say; for when their resolves were formed, it would be easy to clothe +them in fit words</i>.” This, in truth, was sound advice and such as +every prince and republic should lay to heart. Because, where there is doubt +and uncertainty as to what we may decide on doing, we know not how to suit our +words to our conduct; whereas, with our minds made up, and the course we are to +follow fixed, it is an easy matter to find words to declare our resolves. I +have noticed this point the more readily, because I have often found such +uncertainty hinder the public business of our own republic, to its detriment +and discredit. And in all matters of difficulty, wherein courage is needed for +resolving, this uncertainty will always be met with, whenever those who have to +deliberate and decide are weak. +</p> + +<p> +Not less mischievous than doubtful resolves are those which are late and tardy, +especially when they have to be made in behalf of a friend. For from their +lateness they help none, and hurt ourselves. Tardy resolves are due to want of +spirit or want of strength, or to the perversity of those who have to +determine, who being moved by a secret desire to overthrow the government, or +to carry out some selfish purpose of their own, suffer no decision to be come +to, but only thwart and hinder. Whereas, good citizens, even when they see the +popular mind to be bent on dangerous courses, will never oppose the adoption of +a fixed plan, more particularly in matters which do not brook delay. +</p> + +<p> +After Hieronymus, the Syracusan tyrant, was put to death, there being at that +time a great war between the Romans and the Carthaginians, the citizens of +Syracuse fell to disputing among themselves with which nation they should take +part; and so fierce grew the controversy between the partisans of the two +alliances, that no course could be agreed on, and they took part with neither; +until Apollonides, one of the foremost of the Syracusan citizens, told them in +a speech replete with wisdom, that neither those who inclined to hold by the +Romans, nor those who chose rather to side with the Carthaginians, were +deserving of blame; but that what was utterly to be condemned was doubt and +delay in taking one side or other; for from such uncertainty he clearly foresaw +the ruin of their republic; whereas, by taking a decided course, whatever it +might be, some good might come. Now Titus Livius could not show more clearly +than he does in this passage, the mischief which results from resting in +suspense. He shows it, likewise, in the case of the Lavinians, of whom he +relates, that being urged by the Latins to aid them against Rome, they were so +long in making up their minds, that when the army which they at last sent to +succour the Latins was issuing from their gates, word came that the Latins were +defeated. Whereupon Millionius, their prætor, said, “<i>With the Romans +this short march will cost us dear</i>.” But had the Lavinians resolved +at once either to grant aid or to refuse it, taking a latter course they would +not have given offence to the Romans, taking the former, and rendering timely +help, they and the Latins together might have had a victory. But by delay they +stood to lose in every way, as the event showed. +</p> + +<p> +This example, had it been remembered by the Florentines, might have saved them +from all that loss and vexation which they underwent at the hands of the +French, at the time King Louis XII. of France came into Italy against Lodovico, +duke of Milan. For when Louis first proposed to pass through Tuscany he met +with no objection from the Florentines, whose envoys at his court arranged with +him that they should stand neutral, while the king, on his arrival in Italy, +was to maintain their government and take them under his protection; a +month’s time being allowed the republic to ratify these terms. But +certain persons, who, in their folly, favoured the cause of Lodovico, delayed +this ratification until the king was already on the eve of victory; when the +Florentines suddenly becoming eager to ratify, the king would not accept their +ratification, perceiving their consent to be given under constraint and not of +their own good-will. This cost the city of Florence dear, and went near to lose +her freedom, whereof she was afterwards deprived on another like occasion. And +the course taken by the Florentines was the more to be blamed in that it was of +no sort of service to Duke Lodovico, who, had he been victorious, would have +shown the Florentines many more signs of his displeasure than did the king. +</p> + +<p> +Although the hurt which results to republics from weakness of this sort has +already been discussed in another Chapter, nevertheless, since an opportunity +offered for touching upon it again, I have willingly availed myself of it, +because to me it seems a matter of which republics like ours should take +special heed. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVI.—<i>That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the +methods of ancient Warfare.</i></h2> + +<p> +In all their wars with other nations, the most momentous battle ever fought by +the Romans, was that which they fought with the Latins when Torquatus and +Decius were consuls. For it may well be believed that as by the loss of that +battle the Latins became subject to the Romans, so the Romans had they not +prevailed must have become subject to the Latins. And Titus Livius is of this +opinion, since he represents the armies as exactly equal in every respect, in +discipline and in valour, in numbers and in obstinacy, the only difference he +draws being, that of the two armies the Romans had the more capable commanders. +We find, however, two circumstances occurring in the conduct of this battle, +the like of which never happened before, and seldom since, namely, that to give +steadiness to the minds of their soldiers, and render them obedient to the word +of command and resolute to fight, one of the consuls put himself, and the other +his son, to death. +</p> + +<p> +The equality which Titus Livius declares to have prevailed in these two armies, +arose from this, that having long served together they used the same language, +discipline, and arms; that in disposing their men for battle they followed the +same system; and that the divisions and officers of their armies bore the same +names. It was necessary, therefore, that as they were of equal strength and +valour, something extraordinary should take place to render the courage of the +one army more stubborn and unflinching than that of the other, it being on this +stubbornness, as I have already said, that victory depends. For while this +temper is maintained in the minds of the combatants they will never turn their +backs on their foe. And that it might endure longer in the minds of the Romans +than of the Latins, partly chance, and partly the valour of the consuls caused +it to fall out that Torquatus slew his son, and Decius died by his own hand. +</p> + +<p> +In pointing out this equality of strength, Titus Livius takes occasion to +explain the whole system followed by the Romans in the ordering of their armies +and in disposing them for battle; and as he has treated the subject at length, +I need not go over the same ground, and shall touch only on what I judge in it +most to deserve attention, but, being overlooked by all the captains of our +times, has led to disorder in many armies and in many battles. +</p> + +<p> +From this passage of Titus Livius, then, we learn that the Roman army had three +principal divisions, or battalions as we might now call them, of which they +named the first <i>hastati</i>, the second <i>principes</i>, and the third +<i>triarii</i>, to each of which cavalry were attached. In arraying an army for +battle they set the <i>hastati</i> in front. Directly behind them, in the +second rank, they placed the <i>principes</i>; and in the third rank of the +same column, the <i>triarii</i>. The cavalry of each of these three divisions +they disposed to the right and left of the division to which it belonged; and +to these companies of horse, from their form and position, they gave the name +wings (<i>alæ</i>), from their appearing like the two wings of the main body of +the army. The first division, the <i>hastati</i>, which was in front, they drew +up in close order to enable it to withstand and repulse the enemy. The second +division, the <i>principes</i>, since it was not to be engaged from the +beginning, but was meant to succour the first in case that were driven in, was +not formed in close order but kept in open file, so that it might receive the +other into its ranks whenever it was broken and forced to retire. The third +division, that, namely, of the <i>triarii</i>, had its ranks still more open +than those of the second, so that, if occasion required, it might receive the +first two divisions of the <i>hastati</i> and <i>principes</i>. These +divisions, therefore, being drawn up in this order, the engagement began, and +if the <i>hastati</i> were overpowered and driven back, they retired within the +loose ranks of the <i>principes</i>, when both these divisions, being thus +united into one, renewed the conflict. If these, again, were routed and forced +back, they retreated within the open ranks of the <i>triarii</i>, and all three +divisions, forming into one, once more renewed the fight, in which, if they +were overpowered, since they had no further means of recruiting their strength, +they lost the battle. And because whenever this last division, of the +<i>triarii</i>, had to be employed, the army was in jeopardy, there arose the +proverb, “<i>Res redacta est ad triarios</i>,” equivalent to our +expression of <i>playing a last stake</i>. +</p> + +<p> +The captains of our day, as they have abandoned all the other customs of +antiquity, and pay no heed to any part of the ancient discipline, so also have +discarded this method of disposing their men, though it was one of no small +utility. For to insure the defeat of a commander who so arranges his forces as +to be able thrice during an engagement to renew his strength, Fortune must +thrice declare against him, and he must be matched with an adversary able three +times over to defeat him; whereas he whose sole chance of success lies in his +surviving the first onset, as is the case with all the armies of Christendom at +the present day, may easily be vanquished, since any slight mishap, and the +least failure in the steadiness of his men, may deprive him of victory. +</p> + +<p> +And what takes from our armies the capacity to renew their strength is, that +provision is now no longer made for one division being received into the ranks +of another, which happens because at present an army is arranged for battle in +one or other of two imperfect methods. For either its divisions are placed side +by side, so as to form a line of great width but of no depth or solidity; or +if, to strengthen it, it be drawn up in columns after the fashion of the Roman +armies, should the front line be broken, no provision having been made for its +being received by the second, it is thrown into complete disorder, and both +divisions fall to pieces. For if the front line be driven back, it jostles the +second, if the second line endeavour to advance, the first stands in its way: +and thus, the first driving against the second, and the second against the +third, such confusion follows that often the most trifling accident will cause +the ruin of an entire army. +</p> + +<p> +At the battle of Ravenna, where M. de Foix, the French commander, was slain, +although according to modern notions this was a well-fought field, both the +French and the Spanish armies were drawn up in the first of the faulty methods +above described; that is to say, each army advanced with the whole of its +battalions side by side, so that each presented a single front much wider than +deep; this being always the plan followed by modern armies when, as at Ravenna, +the ground is open. For knowing the disorder they fall into on retreat, forming +themselves in a single line, they endeavour, as I have said, as much as +possible to escape confusion by extending their front. But where the ground +confines them they fall at once into the disorder spoken of, without an effort +to prevent it. +</p> + +<p> +Troops traversing an enemy’s country, whether to pillage or carry out any +other operation of war, are liable to fall into the same disorder; and at S. +Regolo in the Pisan territory, and at other places where the Florentines were +beaten by the Pisans during the war which followed on the revolt of Pisa after +the coming of Charles of France into Italy, our defeat was due to no other +cause than the behaviour of our own cavalry, who being posted in front, and +being repulsed by the enemy, fell back on the infantry and threw them into +confusion, whereupon the whole army took to flight; and Messer Ciriaco del +Borgo, the veteran leader of the Florentine foot, has often declared in my +presence that he had never been routed by any cavalry save those who were +fighting on his side. For which reason the Swiss, who are the greatest +proficients in modern warfare, when serving with the French, make it their +first care to place themselves on their flank, so that the cavalry of their +friends, if repulsed, may not throw them into disorder. +</p> + +<p> +But although these matters seem easy to understand and not difficult to put in +practice, none has yet been found among the commanders of our times, who +attempted to imitate the ancients or to correct the moderns. For although these +also have a tripartite division of their armies into van-guard, main-body, and +rear-guard, the only use they make of it is in giving orders when their men are +in quarters; whereas on active service it rarely happens that all divisions are +not equally exposed to the same onset. +</p> + +<p> +And because many, to excuse their ignorance, will have it that the destructive +fire of artillery forbids our employing at the present day many of the tactics +used by the ancients, I will discuss this question in the following Chapter, +and examine whether artillery does in fact prevent us from using the valiant +methods of antiquity. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVII.—<i>What importance the Armies of the present day should +allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be +just.</i></h2> + +<p> +Looking to the number of pitched battles, or what are termed by the French +<i>journées</i>, and by the Italians <i>fatti d’arme</i>, fought by the +Romans at divers times, I am led further to examine the generally received +opinion, that had artillery been in use in their day, the Romans would not have +been allowed, or at least not with the same ease, to subjugate provinces and +make other nations their tributaries, and could never have spread their power +in the astonishing way they did. For it is said that by reason of these +fire-arms men can no longer use or display their personal valour as they could +of old; that there is greater difficulty now than there was in former times in +joining battle; that the tactics followed then cannot be followed now; and that +in time all warfare must resolve itself into a question of artillery. +</p> + +<p> +Judging it not out of place to inquire whether these opinions are sound, and +how far artillery has added to or taken from the strength of armies, and +whether its use lessens or increases the opportunities for a good captain to +behave valiantly, I shall at once address myself to the first of the averments +noticed above, namely, that the armies of the ancient Romans could not have +made the conquests they did, had artillery then been in use. +</p> + +<p> +To this I answer by saying that, since war is made for purposes either of +offence or defence, we have first to see in which of these two kinds of warfare +artillery gives the greater advantage or inflicts the greater hurt. Now, though +something might be said both ways, I nevertheless believe that artillery is +beyond comparison more hurtful to him who stands on the defensive than to him +who attacks. For he who defends himself must either do so in a town or in a +fortified camp. If within a town, either the town will be a small one, as +fortified towns commonly are, or it will be a great one. In the former case, he +who is on the defensive is at once undone. For such is the shock of artillery +that there is no wall so strong that in a few days it will not batter down, +when, unless those within have ample room to withdraw behind covering works and +trenches, they must be beaten; it being impossible for them to resist the +assault of an enemy who forces an entrance through the breaches in their walls. +Nor will any artillery a defender may have be of any service to him; since it +is an established axiom that where men are able to advance in numbers and +rapidly, artillery is powerless to check them. +</p> + +<p> +For this reason, in storming towns the furious assaults of the northern nations +prove irresistible, whereas the attacks of our Italian troops, who do not rush +on in force, but advance to the assault in small knots of skirmishers +(<i>scaramouches</i>, as they are fitly named), may easily be withstood. Those +who advance in such loose order, and with so little spirit, against a breach +covered by artillery, advance to certain destruction, and as against them +artillery is useful. But when the assailants swarm to the breach so massed +together that one pushes on another, unless they be brought to a stand by +ditches and earthworks, they penetrate everywhere, and no artillery has any +effect to keep them back; and though some must fall, yet not so many as to +prevent a victory. +</p> + +<p> +The frequent success of the northern nations in storming towns, and more +particularly the recovery of Brescia by the French, is proof sufficient of the +truth of what I say. For the town of Brescia rising against the French while +the citadel still held out, the Venetians, to meet any attack which might be +made from the citadel upon the town, ranged guns along the whole line of road +which led from the one to the other, planting them in front, and in flank, and +wherever else they could be brought to bear. Of all which M. de Foix making no +account, dismounted with his men-at-arms from horseback, and, advancing with +them on foot through the midst of the batteries, took the town; nor do we learn +that he sustained any considerable loss from the enemy’s fire. So that, +as I have said, he who has to defend himself in a small town, when his walls +are battered down and he has no room to retire behind other works, and has only +his artillery to trust to, is at once undone. +</p> + +<p> +But even where the town you defend is a great one, so that you have room to +fall back behind new works, artillery is still, by a long way, more useful for +the assailant than for the defender. For to enable your artillery to do any +hurt to those without, you must raise yourself with it above the level of the +ground, since, if you remain on the level, the enemy, by erecting any low mound +or earth-work, can so secure himself that it will be impossible for you to +touch him. But in raising yourself above the level of the ground, whether by +extending yourself along the gallery of the walls, or otherwise, you are +exposed to two disadvantages; for, first, you cannot there bring into position +guns of the same size or range as he who is without can bring to bear against +you, since it is impossible to work large guns in a confined space; and, +secondly, although you should succeed in getting your guns into position, you +cannot construct such strong and solid works for their protection as those can +who are outside, and on level ground, and who have all the room and every other +advantage which they could desire. It is consequently impossible for him who +defends a town to maintain his guns in position at any considerable height, +when those who are outside have much and powerful artillery; while, if he place +it lower, it becomes, as has been explained, to a great extent useless. So that +in the end the defence of the city has to be effected, as in ancient times, by +hand to hand fighting, or else by means of the smaller kinds of fire-arms, from +which if the defender derive some slight advantage, it is balanced by the +injury he sustains from the great artillery of his enemy, whereby the walls of +the city are battered down and almost buried in their ditches; so that when it +comes once more to an encounter at close quarters, by reason of his walls being +demolished and his ditches filled up, the defender is now at a far greater +disadvantage than he was formerly. Wherefore I repeat that these arms are +infinitely more useful for him who attacks a town than for him who defends it. +</p> + +<p> +As to the remaining method, which consists in your taking up your position in +an entrenched camp, where you need not fight unless you please, and unless you +have the advantage, I say that this method commonly affords you no greater +facility for avoiding an engagement than the ancients had; nay, that sometimes, +owing to the use of artillery, you are worse off than they were. For if the +enemy fall suddenly upon you, and have some slight advantage (as may readily be +the case from his being on higher ground, or from your works on his arrival +being still incomplete so that you are not wholly sheltered by them), +forthwith, and without your being able to prevent him, he dislodges you, and +you are forced to quit your defences and deliver battle: as happened to the +Spaniards at the battle of Ravenna. For having posted themselves between the +river Ronco and an earthwork, from their not having carried this work high +enough, and from the French having a slight advantage of ground, they were +forced by the fire of the latter to quit their entrenchments come to an +engagement. +</p> + +<p> +But assuming the ground you have chosen for your camp to be, as it always +should, higher than that occupied by the enemy, and your works to be complete +and sufficient, so that from your position and preparations the enemy dare not +attack you, recourse will then be had to the very same methods as were resorted +to in ancient times when an army was so posted that it could not be assailed; +that is to say, your country will be wasted, cities friendly to you besieged or +stormed, and your supplies intercepted; until you are forced, at last, of +necessity to quit your camp and to fight a pitched battle, in which, as will +presently appear, artillery will be of little service to you. +</p> + +<p> +If we consider, therefore, for what ends the Romans made wars, and that attack +and not defence was the object of almost all their campaigns, it will be clear, +if what I have said be true, that they would have had still greater advantage, +and might have achieved their conquests with even greater ease, had artillery +been in use in their times. +</p> + +<p> +And as to the second complaint, that by reason of artillery men can no longer +display their valour as they could in ancient days, I admit it to be true that +when they have to expose themselves a few at a time, men run more risks now +than formerly; as when they have to scale a town or perform some similar +exploit, in which they are not massed together but must advance singly and one +behind another. It is true, also, that Captains and commanders of armies are +subjected to a greater risk of being killed now than of old, since they an be +reached everywhere by the enemy’s fire; and it is no protection to them +to be with those of their men who are furthest from the enemy, or to be +surrounded by the bravest of their guards. Still, we do not often find either +of these two dangers occasioning extraordinary loss. For towns strongly +fortified are not attacked by escalade, nor will the assailing army advance +against them in weak numbers; but will endeavour, as in ancient times, to +reduce them by regular siege. And even in the case of towns attacked by storm, +the dangers are not so very much greater now than they were formerly; for in +those old days also, the defenders of towns were not without warlike engines, +which if less terrible in their operation, had, so far as killing goes, much +the same effect. And as for the deaths of captains and leaders of companies, it +may be said that during the last twenty-four years of war in Italy, we have had +fewer instances of such deaths than might be found in a period of ten years of +ancient warfare. For excepting the Count Lodovico della Mirandola, who fell at +Ferrara, when the Venetians a few years ago attacked that city, and the Duke de +Nemours, slain at Cirignuola, we have no instance of any commander being killed +by artillery. For, at Ravenna, M. de Foix died by steel and not by shot. +Wherefore I say that if men no longer perform deeds of individual prowess, it +results not so much from the use of artillery, as from the faulty discipline +and weakness of our armies, which being collectively without valour cannot +display it in particular instances. +</p> + +<p> +As to the third assertion, that armies can no longer be brought to engage one +another, and that war will soon come to be carried on wholly with artillery, I +maintain that this allegation is utterly untrue, and will always be so held by +those who are willing in handling their troops to follow the usages of ancient +valour. For whosoever would have a good army must train it, either by real or +by mimic warfare, to approach the enemy, to come within sword-thrust, and to +grapple with him; and must rely more on foot soldiers than on horse, for +reasons presently to be explained. But when you trust to your foot-soldiers, +and to the methods already indicated, artillery becomes powerless to harm you. +For foot-soldiers, in approaching an enemy, can with more ease escape the fire +of his artillery than in ancient times they could have avoided a charge of +elephants or of scythed chariots, or any other of those strange contrivances +which had to be encountered by the Romans, and against which they always +devised some remedy. And, certainly, as against artillery, their remedy would +have been easier, by as much as the time during which artillery can do hurt is +shorter than the time during which elephants and chariots could. For by these +you were thrown into disorder after battle joined, whereas artillery harasses +you only before you engage; a danger which infantry can easily escape, either +by advancing so as to be covered by the inequalities of the ground, or by lying +down while the firing continues; nay, we find from experience that even these +precautions may be dispensed with, especially as against great artillery, which +can hardly be levelled with such precision that its fire shall not either pass +over your head from the range being too high, or fall short from its being too +low. +</p> + +<p> +So soon, however, as the engagement is begun, it is perfectly clear that +neither small nor great artillery can harm you any longer; since, if the enemy +have his artillerymen in front, you take them; if in rear, they will injure him +before they injure you; and if in flank, they can never fire so effectively as +to prevent your closing, with the result already explained. Nor does this admit +of much dispute, since we have proof of it in the case of the Swiss at Novara, +in the year 1513, when, with neither guns nor cavalry, they advanced against +the French army, who had fortified themselves with artillery behind +entrenchments, and routed them without suffering the slightest check from their +fire. In further explanation whereof it is to be noted, that to work artillery +effectively it should be protected by walls, by ditches, or by earth-works; and +that whenever, from being left without such protection it has to be defended by +men, as happens in pitched battles and engagements in the open field, it is +either taken or otherwise becomes useless. Nor can it be employed on the flank +of an army, save in the manner in which the ancients made use of their warlike +engines, which they moved out from their columns that they might be worked +without inconvenience, but withdrew within them when driven back by cavalry or +other troops. He who looks for any further advantage from artillery does not +rightly understand its nature, and trusts to what is most likely to deceive +him. For although the Turk, using artillery, has gained victories over the +Soldan and the Sofi, the only advantage he has had from it has been the terror +into which the horses of the enemy, unused to such sounds, are thrown by the +roar of the guns. +</p> + +<p> +And now, to bring these remarks to a conclusion, I say briefly that, employed +by an army wherein there is some strain of the ancient valour, artillery is +useful; but employed otherwise, against a brave adversary, is utterly useless. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVIII.—<i>That the authority of the Romans and the example of +ancient Warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than +Horse.</i></h2> + +<p> +By many arguments and instances it can be clearly established that in their +military enterprises the Romans set far more store on their infantry than on +their cavalry, and trusted to the former to carry out all the chief objects +which their armies were meant to effect. Among many other examples of this, we +may notice the great battle which they fought with the Latins near the lake +Regillus, where to steady their wavering ranks they made their horsemen +dismount, and renewing the combat on foot obtained a victory. Here we see +plainly that the Romans had more confidence in themselves when they fought on +foot than when they fought on horseback. The same expedient was resorted to by +them in many of their other battles, and always in their sorest need they found +it their surest stay. +</p> + +<p> +Nor are we to condemn the practice in deference to the opinion of Hannibal, +who, at the battle of Cannæ, on seeing the consuls make the horsemen dismount, +said scoffingly, “<i>Better still had they delivered their knights to me +in chains.</i>” For though this saying came from the mouth of a most +excellent soldier, still, if we are to regard authority, we ought rather to +follow the authority of a commonwealth like Rome, and of the many great +captains who served her, than that of Hannibal alone. But, apart from +authority, there are manifest reasons to bear out what I say. For a man may go +on foot into many places where a horse cannot go; men can be taught to keep +rank, and if thrown into disorder to recover form; whereas, it is difficult to +keep horses in line, and impossible if once they be thrown into disorder to +reform them. Moreover we find that with horses as with men, some have little +courage and some much; and that often a spirited horse is ridden by a +faint-hearted rider, or a dull horse by a courageous rider, and that in +whatever way such disparity is caused, confusion and disorder result. Again, +infantry, when drawn up in column, can easily break and is not easily broken by +cavalry. This is vouched, not only by many ancient and many modern instances, +but also by the authority of those who lay down rules for the government of +States, who show that at first wars were carried on by mounted soldiers, +because the methods for arraying infantry were not yet understood, but that so +soon as these were discovered, the superiority of foot over horse was at once +recognized. In saying this, I would not have it supposed that horsemen are not +of the greatest use in armies, whether for purposes of observation, for +harrying and laying waste the enemy’s country, for pursuing a retreating +foe or helping to repulse his cavalry. But the substance and sinew of an army, +and that part of it which ought constantly to be most considered, should always +be the infantry. And among sins of the Italian princes who have made their +country the slave of foreigners, there is none worse than that they have held +these arms in contempt, and turned their whole attention to mounted troops. +</p> + +<p> +This error is due to the craft of our captains and to the ignorance of our +rulers. For the control of the armies of Italy for the last five and twenty +years resting in the hands of men, who, as having no lands of their own, may be +looked on as mere soldiers of fortune, these fell forthwith on contriving how +they might maintain their credit by being supplied with the arms which the +princes of the country were without. And as they had no subjects of their own +of whom they could make use, and could not obtain constant employment and pay +for a large number of foot-soldiers, and as a small number would have given +them no importance, they had recourse to horsemen. For a <i>condottiere</i> +drawing pay for two or three hundred horsemen was maintained by them in the +highest credit, and yet the cost was not too great to be met by the princes who +employed him. And to effect their object with more ease, and increase their +credit still further, these adventurers would allow no merit or favour to be +due to foot-soldiers, but claimed all for their horsemen. And to such a length +was this bad system carried, that in the very greatest army only the smallest +sprinkling of infantry was to be found. This, together with many other ill +practices which accompanied it, has so weakened the militia of Italy, that the +country has easily been trampled upon by all the nations of the North. +</p> + +<p> +That it is a mistake to make more account of cavalry than of infantry, may be +still more clearly seen from another example taken from Roman history. The +Romans being engaged on the siege of Sora, a troop of horse a sally from the +town to attack their camp; when the Roman master of the knights advancing with +his own horsemen to give them battle, it so chanced that, at the very first +onset, the leaders on both sides were slain. Both parties being thus left +without commanders, and the combat, nevertheless, continuing, the Romans +thinking thereby to have the advantage of their adversaries, alighted from +horseback, obliging the enemy’s cavalry, in order to defend themselves, +to do the like. The result was that the Romans had the victory. Now there could +be no stronger instance than this to show the superiority of foot over horse. +For while in other battles the Roman cavalry were made by their consuls to +dismount in order to succour their infantry who were in distress and in need of +such aid, on this occasion they dismounted, not to succour their infantry, nor +to encounter an enemy contending on foot, but because they saw that though they +could not prevail against the enemy fighting as horsemen against horsemen, on +foot they readily might. And from this I conclude that foot-soldiers, if +rightly handled, can hardly be beaten except by other soldiers fighting on +foot. +</p> + +<p> +With very few cavalry, but with a considerable force of infantry, the Roman +commanders, Crassus and Marcus Antonius, each for many days together overran +the territories of the Parthians, although opposed by the countless horsemen of +that nation. Crassus, indeed, with the greater part of his army, was left there +dead, and Antonius only saved himself by his valour; but even in the +extremities to which the Romans were then brought, see how greatly superior +foot-soldiers are to horse. For though fighting in an open country, far from +the sea-coast, and cut off from his supplies, Antonius proved himself a valiant +soldier in the judgment even of the Parthians themselves, the whole strength of +whose cavalry never ventured to attack the columns of his army. And though +Crassus perished there, any one who reads attentively the account of his +expedition must see that he was rather outwitted than defeated, and that even +when his condition was desperate, the Parthians durst not close with him, but +effected his destruction by hanging continually on the flanks of his army, and +intercepting his supplies, while cajoling him with promises which they never +kept. +</p> + +<p> +It might, I grant, be harder to demonstrate this great superiority of foot over +horse, had we not very many modern examples affording the clearest proof of it. +For instance, at the battle of Novara, of which we have already spoken, nine +thousand Swiss foot were seen to attack ten thousand cavalry together with an +equal number of infantry, and to defeat them; the cavalry being powerless to +injure them, while of the infantry, who were mostly Gascons, and badly +disciplined, they made no account. On another occasion we have seen twenty-six +thousand Swiss march on Milan to attack Francis I. of France, who had with him +twenty thousand men-at-arms, forty thousand foot, and a hundred pieces of +artillery; and although they were not victorious as at Novara, they +nevertheless fought valiantly for two days together, and, in the end, though +beaten, were able to bring off half their number. With foot-soldiers only +Marcus Attilius Regulus ventured to oppose himself, not to cavalry merely, but +to elephants; and if the attempt failed it does not follow that he was not +justified by the valour of his men in believing them equal to surmount this +danger. +</p> + +<p> +I repeat, therefore, that to prevail against well-disciplined infantry, you +must meet them with infantry disciplined still better, and that otherwise you +advance to certain destruction. In the time of Filippo Visconti, Duke of Milan, +some sixteen thousand Swiss made a descent on Lombardy, whereupon the Duke, who +at that time had Il Carmagnola as his captain, sent him with six thousand +men-at-arms and a slender following of foot-soldiers to meet them. Not knowing +their manner of fighting, Carmagnola fell upon them with his horsemen, +expecting to put them at once to rout; but finding them immovable, after losing +many of his men he withdrew. But, being a most wise captain, and skilful in +devising new remedies to meet unwonted dangers, after reinforcing his company +he again advanced to the attack; and when about to engage made all his +men-at-arms dismount, and placing them in front of his foot-soldiers, fell once +more upon the Swiss, who could then no longer withstand him. For his men, being +on foot and well armed, easily penetrated the Swiss ranks without hurt to +themselves; and getting among them, had no difficulty in cutting them down, so +that of the entire army of the Swiss those only escaped who were spared by his +humanity. +</p> + +<p> +Of this difference in the efficiency of these two kinds of troops, many I +believe are aware; but such is the unhappiness and perversity of the times in +which we live, that neither ancient nor modern examples, nor even the +consciousness of error, can move our present princes to amend their ways, or +convince them that to restore credit to the arms of a State or province, it is +necessary to revive this branch of their militia also, to keep it near them, to +make much of it, and to give it life, that in return, it may give back life and +reputation to them. But as they have departed from all those other methods +already spoken of, so have they departed from this, and with this result, that +to them the acquisition of territory is rather a loss than a gain, as presently +shall be shown. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIX.—<i>That Acquisitions made by ill-governed States and +such as follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, tend rather to their Ruin +than to their Aggrandizement</i>.</h2> + +<p> +To these false opinions, founded on the pernicious example first set by the +present corrupt age, we owe it, that no man thinks of departing from the +methods which are in use. It had been impossible, for instance, some thirty +years ago, to persuade an Italian that ten thousand foot-soldiers could, on +plain ground, attack ten thousand cavalry together with an equal number of +infantry; and not merely attack, but defeat them; as we saw done by the Swiss +at that battle of Novara, to which I have already referred so often. For +although history abounds in similar examples, none would have believed them, +or, believing them, would have said that nowadays men are so much better armed, +that a squadron of cavalry could shatter a rock, to say nothing of a column of +infantry. With such false pleas would they have belied their judgment, taking +no account that with a very scanty force of foot-soldiers, Lucullus routed a +hundred and fifty thousand of the cavalry of Tigranes, among whom were a body +of horsemen very nearly resembling our own men-at-arms. Now, however, this +error is demonstrated by the example of the northern nations. +</p> + +<p> +And since what history teaches as to the superiority of foot-soldiers is thus +proved to be true, men ought likewise to believe that the other methods +practised by the ancients are in like manner salutary and useful. And were this +once accepted, both princes and commonwealths would make fewer blunders than +they do, would be stronger to resist sudden attack, and would no longer place +their sole hope of safety in flight; while those who take in hand to provide a +State with new institutions would know better what direction to give them, +whether in the way of extending or merely of preserving; and would see that to +augment the numbers of their citizens, to assume other States as companions +rather than reduce them to subjection, to send out colonies for the defence of +acquired territories, to hold their spoils at the credit of the common stock, +to overcome enemies by inroads and pitched battles rather than by sieges, to +enrich the public purse, keep down private wealth, and zealously, to maintain +all military exercises, are the true ways to aggrandize a State and to extend +its empire. Or if these methods for adding to their power are not to their +mind, let them remember that acquisitions made in any other way are the ruin of +republics, and so set bounds to their ambition, wisely regulating the internal +government of their country by suitable laws and ordinances, forbidding +extension, and looking only to defence, and taking heed that their defences are +in good order, as do those republics of Germany which live and for long have +lived, in freedom. +</p> + +<p> +And yet, as I have said on another occasion, when speaking of the difference +between the methods suitable for acquiring and those suitable for maintaining, +it is impossible for a republic to remain long in the peaceful enjoyment of +freedom within a restricted frontier. For should it forbear from molesting +others, others are not likely to refrain from molesting it; whence must grow at +once the desire and the necessity to make acquisitions; or should no enemies be +found abroad, they will be found at home, for this seems to be incidental to +all great States. And if the free States of Germany are, and have long been +able to maintain themselves on their present footing, this arises from certain +conditions peculiar to that country, and to be found nowhere else, without +which these communities could not go on living as they do. +</p> + +<p> +The district of Germany of which I speak was formerly subject to the Roman +Empire, in the same way as France and Spain; but on the decline of the Empire, +and when its very name came to be limited to this one province, its more +powerful cities taking advantage of the weakness and necessities of the +Emperors, began to free themselves by buying from them their liberty, subject +to the payment of a trifling yearly tribute; until, gradually, all the cities +which held directly from the Emperor, and were not subject to any intermediate +lord, had, in like manner, purchased their freedom. While this went on, it so +happened that certain communities subject to the Duke of Austria, among which +were Friburg, the people of Schweitz, and the like, rose in rebellion against +him, and meeting at the outset with good success, by degrees acquired such +accession of strength that so far from returning under the Austrian yoke, they +are become formidable to all their neighbours These are the States which we now +name Swiss. +</p> + +<p> +Germany is, consequently, divided between the Swiss, the communities which take +the name of Free Towns, the Princes, and the Emperor; and the reason why, amid +so many conflicting interests, wars do not break out, or breaking out are of +short continuance, is the reverence in which all hold this symbol of the +Imperial authority. For although the Emperor be without strength of his own, he +has nevertheless such credit with all these others that he alone can keep them +united, and, interposing as mediator, can speedily repress by his influence any +dissensions among them. +</p> + +<p> +The greatest and most protracted wars which have taken place in this country +have been those between the Swiss and the Duke of Austria; and although for +many years past the Empire and the dukedom of Austria have been united in the +same man, he has always failed to subdue the stubbornness of the Swiss, who are +never to be brought to terms save by force. Nor has the rest of Germany lent +the Emperor much assistance in his wars with the Swiss, the Free Towns being +little disposed to attack others whose desire is to live as they themselves do, +in freedom; while the Princes of the Empire either are so poor that they +cannot, or from jealousy of the power of the Emperor will not, take part with +him against them. +</p> + +<p> +These communities, therefore, abide contented within their narrow confines, +because, having regard to the Imperial authority, they have no occasion to +desire greater; and are at the same time obliged to live in unity within their +walls, because an enemy is always at hand, and ready to take advantage of their +divisions to effect an entrance. But were the circumstances of the country +other than they are these communities would be forced to make attempts to +extend their dominions, and be constrained to relinquish their present peaceful +mode of life. And since the same conditions are not found elsewhere, other +nations cannot adopt this way of living, but are compelled to extend their +power either by means of leagues, or else by the methods used by the Romans; +and any one who should act otherwise would find not safety but rather death and +destruction. For since in a thousand ways, and from causes innumerable, +conquests are surrounded with dangers, it may well happen that in adding to our +dominions, we add nothing to our strength; but whosoever increases not his +strength while he adds to his dominions, must needs be ruined. He who is +impoverished by his wars, even should he come off victorious, can add nothing +to his strength, since he spends more than he gains, as the Venetians and +Florentines have done. For Venice has been far feebler since she acquired +Lombardy, and Florence since she acquired Tuscany, than when the one was +content to be mistress of the seas, and the other of the lands lying within six +miles from her walls. And this from their eagerness to acquire without knowing +what way to take. For which ignorance these States are the more to be blamed in +proportion as there is less to excuse them; since they had seen what methods +were used by the Romans, and could have followed in their footsteps; whereas +the Romans, without any example set them, were able by their own prudence to +shape a course for themselves. +</p> + +<p> +But even to well-governed States, their conquests may chance to occasion much +harm; as when some city or province is acquired abounding in luxury and +delights, by whose manners the conqueror becomes infected; as happened first to +the Romans, and afterwards to Hannibal on taking possession of Capua. And had +Capua been at such a distance from Rome that a ready remedy could not have been +applied to the disorders of the soldiery, or had Rome herself been in any +degree tainted with corruption, this acquisition had certainly proved her ruin. +To which Titus Livius bears witness when he says, “<i>Most mischievous at +this time to our military discipline was Capua; for ministering to all +delights, she turned away the corrupted minds of our soldiers from the +remembrance of their country</i>.” And, truly, cities and provinces like +this, avenge themselves on their conquerors without blood or blow; since by +infecting them with their own evil customs they prepare them for defeat at the +hands of any assailant. Nor could the subject have been better handled than by +Juvenal, where he says in his Satires, that into the hearts of the Romans, +through their conquests in foreign lands, foreign manners found their way; and +in place of frugality and other admirable virtues— +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“Came luxury more mortal than the sword,<br/> +And settling down, avenged a vanquished world.”<a href="#fn8" name="fnref8" id="fnref8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn8" id="fn8"></a> <a href="#fnref8">[8]</a> +Sævior armis<br/> +Luxuria occubuit victumque ulciscitur orbem.<br/> + <i>Juv. Sat</i>. vi. 292. +</p> + +<p> +And if their conquests were like to be fatal to the Romans at a time when they +were still animated by great virtue and prudence, how must it fare with those +who follow methods altogether different from theirs, and who, to crown their +other errors of which we have already said enough, resort to auxiliary and +mercenary arms, bringing upon themselves those dangers whereof mention shall be +made in the Chapter following. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XX.—<i>Of the Dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who +resort to Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms</i>.</h2> + +<p> +Had I not already, in another treatise, enlarged on the inutility of mercenary +and auxiliary, and on the usefulness of national arms, I should dwell on these +matters in the present Discourse more at length than it is my design to do. For +having given the subject very full consideration elsewhere, here I would be +brief. Still when I find Titus Livius supplying a complete example of what we +have to look for from auxiliaries, by whom I mean troops sent to our assistance +by some other prince or ruler, paid by him and under officers by him appointed, +it is not fit that I should pass it by in silence. +</p> + +<p> +It is related, then, by our historian, that the Romans, after defeating on two +different occasions armies of the Samnites with forces sent by them to succour +the Capuans, whom they thus relieved from the war which the Samnites Were +waging against them, being desirious to return to Rome, left behind two legions +to defend the Capuans, that the latter might not, from being altogether +deprived of their protection, once more become a prey to the Samnites. But +these two legions, rotting in idleness began to take such delight therein, that +forgetful of their country and the reverence due to the senate, they resolved +to seize by violence the city they had been left to guard by their valour. For +to them it seemed that the citizens of Capua were unworthy to enjoy advantages +which they knew not how to defend. The Romans, however, getting timely notice +of this design, at once met and defeated it, in the manner to be more fully +noticed when I come to treat of conspiracies. +</p> + +<p> +Once more then, I repeat, that of all the various kinds of troops, auxiliaries +are the most pernicious, because the prince or republic resorting to them for +aid has no authority over them, the only person who possesses such authority +being he who sends them. For, as I have said, auxiliary troops are those sent +to your assistance by some other potentate, under his own flag, under his own +officers, and in his own pay, as were the legions sent by the Romans to Capua. +Such troops, if victorious, will for the most part plunder him by whom, as well +as him against whom, they are hired to fight; and this they do, sometimes at +the instigation of the potentate who sends them, sometimes for ambitious ends +of their own. It was not the purpose of the Romans to violate the league and +treaty which they had made with Capua; but to their soldiers it seemed so easy +a matter to master the Capuans, that they were readily led into this plot for +depriving them of their town and territories. Many other examples might be +given to the same effect, but it is enough to mention besides this instance, +that of the people of Regium, who were deprived of their city and of their +lives by another Roman legion sent for their protection. +</p> + +<p> +Princes and republics, therefore, should resort to any other expedient for the +defence of their States sooner than call in hired auxiliaries, when they have +to rest their entire hopes of safety on them; since any accord or terms, +however hard, which you may make with your enemy, will be carefully studied and +current events well considered, it will be seen that for one who has succeeded +with such assistance, hundreds have been betrayed. Nor, in truth, can any +better opportunity for usurping a city or province present itself to an +ambitious prince or commonwealth, than to be asked to send an army for its +defence. On the other hand, he who is so greedy of conquest as to summon such +help, not for purposes of defence but in order to attack others, seeks to have +what he can never hold and is most likely to be taken from him by the very +person who helps him to gain it. Yet such is the perversity of men that, to +gratify the desire of the moment, they shut their eyes to those ills which must +speedily ensue and are no more moved by example in this matter than in all +those others of which I have spoken; for were they moved by these examples they +would see that the more disposed they are to deal generously with their +neighbours, and the more averse they are to usurp authority over them, the +readier will these be to throw themselves into their arms; as will at once +appear from the case of the Capuans. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXI.—<i>That Capua was the first City to which the Romans +sent a Prætor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make +War.</i></h2> + +<p> +The great difference between the methods followed by the ancient Romans in +adding to their dominions, and those used for that purpose by the States of the +present time, has now been sufficiently discussed. It has been seen, too how in +dealing with the cities which they did not think fit to destroy, and even with +those which had made their submission not as companions but as subjects, it was +customary with the Romans to permit them to live on under their own laws, +without imposing any outward sign of dependence, merely binding them to certain +conditions, or complying with which they were maintained in their former +dignity and importance. We know, further, that the same methods continued to be +followed by the Romans until they passed beyond the confines of Italy, and +began to reduce foreign kingdoms and States to provinces: as plainly appears in +the fact that Capua was the first city to which they sent a prætor, and him +from no motive of ambition, but at the request of the Capuans themselves who, +living at variance with one another, thought it necessary to have a Roman +citizen in their town who might restore unity and good order among them. +Influenced by this example, and urged by the same need, the people of Antium +were the next to ask that they too might have a prætor given them; touching +which request and in connection with which new method of governing, Titus +Livius observes, “<i>that not the arms only but also the laws of Rome now +began to exert an influence;</i>” showing how much the course thus +followed by the Romans promoted the growth of their authority. +</p> + +<p> +For those cities, more especially, which have been used to freedom or to be +governed by their own citizens, rest far better satisfied with a government +which they do not see, even though it involve something of oppression, than +with one which standing constantly before their eyes, seems every day to +reproach them with the disgrace of servitude. And to the prince there is +another advantage in this method of government, namely, that as the judges and +magistrates who administer the laws civil and criminal within these cities, are +not under his control, no decision of theirs can throw responsibility or +discredit upon him; so that he thus escapes many occasions of calumny and +hatred. Of the truth whereof, besides the ancient instances which might be +noted, we have a recent example here in Italy. For Genoa, as every one knows, +has many times been occupied by the French king, who always, until lately, sent +thither a French governor to rule in his name. Recently, however, not from +choice but of necessity, he has permitted the town to be self-governed under a +Genoese ruler; and any one who had to decide which of these two methods of +governing gives the greater security to the king’s authority and the +greater content to the people themselves, would assuredly have to pronounce in +favour of the latter. +</p> + +<p> +Men, moreover, in proportion as they see you averse to usurp authority over +them, grow the readier to surrender themselves into your hands; and fear you +less on the score of their freedom, when they find you acting towards them with +consideration and kindness. It was the display of these qualities that moved +the Capuans to ask the Romans for a prætor; for had the Romans betrayed the +least eagerness to send them one, they would at once have conceived jealousy +and grown estranged. +</p> + +<p> +But why turn for examples to Capua and Rome, when we have them close at hand in +Tuscany and Florence? Who is there but knows what a time it is since the city +of Pistoja submitted of her own accord to the Florentine supremacy? Who, again, +but knows the animosity which down to the present day exists between Florence +and the cities of Pisa, Lucca, and Siena? This difference of feeling does not +arise from the citizens of Pistoja valuing their freedom less than the citizens +of these other towns or thinking themselves inferior to them, but from the +Florentines having always acted towards the former as brothers, towards the +latter as foes. This it was that led the Pistojans to come voluntarily under +our authority while the others have done and do all in their power to escape +it. For there seems no reason to doubt, that if Florence, instead of +exasperating these neighbours of hers, had sought to win them over, either by +entering into league with them or by lending them assistance, she would at this +hour have been mistress of Tuscany. Not that I would be understood to maintain +that recourse is never to be had to force and to arms, but that these are only +to be used in the last resort, and when all other remedies are unavailing. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXII.—<i>That in matters of moment Men often judge +amiss.</i></h2> + +<p> +How falsely men often judge of things, they who are present at their +deliberations have constant occasion to know. For in many matters, unless these +deliberations be guided by men of great parts, the conclusions come to are +certain to be wrong. And because in corrupt republics, and especially in quiet +times, either through jealousy or from other like causes, men of great ability +are often obliged to stand aloof, it follows that measures not good in +themselves are by a common error judged to be good, or are promoted by those +who seek public favour rather than the public advantage. Mistakes of this sort +are found out afterwards in seasons of adversity, when recourse must be had to +those persons who in peaceful times had been, as it were, forgotten, as shall +hereafter in its proper place be more fully explained. Cases, moreover, arise +in which those who have little experience of affairs are sure to be misled, +from the matters with which they have to deal being attended by many deceptive +appearances such as lead men to believe whatsoever they are minded to believe. +</p> + +<p> +These remarks I make with reference to the false hopes which the Latins, after +being defeated by the Romans, were led to form on the persuasion of their +prætor Numitius, and also with reference to what was believed by many a few +years ago, when Francis, king of France, came to recover Milan from the Swiss. +For Francis of Angoulême, succeeding on the death of Louis XII. to the throne +of France, and desiring to recover for that realm the Duchy of Milan, on which, +some years before, the Swiss had seized at the instance of Pope Julius, sought +for allies in Italy to second him in his attempt; and besides the Venetians, +who had already been gained over by King Louis, endeavoured to secure the aid +of the Florentines and Pope Leo X.; thinking that were he to succeed in getting +these others to take part with him, his enterprise would be easier. For the +forces of the Spanish king were then in Lombardy, and the army of the Emperor +at Verona. +</p> + +<p> +Pope Leo, however, did not fall in with the wishes of Francis, being, it is +said, persuaded by his advisers that his best course was to stand neutral. For +they urged that it was not for the advantage of the Church to have powerful +strangers, whether French or Swiss, in Italy; but that to restore the country +to its ancient freedom, it must be delivered from the yoke of both. And since +to conquer both, whether singly or together, was impossible, it was to be +desired that the one should overthrow the other, after which the Church with +her friends might fall upon the victor. And it was averred that no better +opportunity for carrying out this design could ever be found than then +presented itself; for both the French and the Swiss were in the field; while +the Pope had his troops in readiness to appear on the Lombard frontier and in +the vicinity of the two armies, where, under colour of watching his own +interests, he could easily keep them until the opposed hosts came to an +engagement; when, as both armies were full of courage, their encounter might be +expected to be a bloody one, and likely to leave the victor so weakened that it +would be easy for the Pope to attack and defeat him; and so, to his own great +glory, remain master of Lombardy and supreme throughout Italy. +</p> + +<p> +How baseless this expectation was, was seen from the event. For the Swiss being +routed after a protracted combat, the troops of the Pope and Spain, so far from +venturing to attack the conqueror, prepared for flight; nor would flight have +saved them, had not the humanity or indifference of the king withheld him from +pursuing his victory, and disposed him to make terms with the Church. +</p> + +<p> +The arguments put forward by the Pope’s advisers had a certain show of +reason in their favour, which looked at from a distance seemed plausible +enough; but were in reality wholly contrary to truth; since it rarely happens +that the captain who wins a victory loses any great number of his men, his loss +being in battle only, and not in flight. For in the heat of battle, while men +stand face to face, but few fall, chiefly because such combats do not last +long; and even when they do last, and many of the victorious army are slain, so +splendid is the reputation which attends a victory, and so great the terror it +inspires, as far to outweigh any loss the victor suffers by the slaughter of +his soldiers; so that an enemy who, trusting to find him weakened, should then +venture to attack him, would soon be taught his mistake, unless strong enough +to give him battle at any time, before his victory as well as after. For in +that case he might, as fortune and valour should determine, either win or lose; +though, even then, the army which had first fought and won would have an +advantage. And this we know for a truth from what befell the Latins in +consequence of the mistake made by Numitius their prætor, and their blindness +in believing him. For when they had already suffered defeat at the hands of the +Romans, Numitius caused it to be proclaimed throughout the whole country of +Latium, that now was the time to fall upon the enemy, exhausted by a struggle +in which they were victorious only in name, while in reality suffering all +those ills which attend defeat, and who might easily be crushed by any fresh +force brought against them. Whereupon the Latins believed him, and getting +together a new army, were forthwith routed with such loss as always awaits +those who listen to like counsels. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIII.—<i>That in chastising their Subjects when +circumstances required it the Romans always avoided half-measures.</i></h2> + +<p> +“Such <i>was now the state of affairs in Latium, that peace and war +seemed alike intolerable</i>.” No worse calamity can befall a prince or +commonwealth than to be reduced to such straits that they can neither accept +peace nor support war; as is the case with those whom it would ruin to conclude +peace on the terms offered, while war obliges them either to yield themselves a +spoil to their allies, or remain a prey to their foes. To this grievous +alternative are men led by evil counsels and unwise courses, and, as already +said, from not rightly measuring their strength. For the commonwealth or prince +who has rightly measured his strength, can hardly be brought so low as were the +Latins, who made war with the Romans when they should have made terms, and made +terms when they should have made war, and so mismanaged everything that the +friendship and the enmity of Rome were alike fatal. Whence it came that, in the +first place, they were defeated and broken by Manlius Torquatus, and afterwards +utterly subdued by Camillus; who, when he had forced them to surrender at +discretion to the Roman arms, and had placed garrisons in all their towns, and +taken hostages from all, returned to Rome and reported to the senate that the +whole of Latium now lay at their mercy. +</p> + +<p> +And because the sentence then passed by the senate is memorable, and worthy to +be studied by princes that it may be imitated by them on like occasion, I shall +cite the exact words which Livius puts into the mouth of Camillus, as +confirming what I have already said touching the methods used by the Romans to +extend their power, and as showing how in chastising their subjects they always +avoided half-measures and took a decided course. For government consists in +nothing else than in so controlling your subjects that it shall neither be in +their power nor for their interest to harm you. And this is effected either by +making such sure work with them as puts it out of their power to do you injury, +or else by so loading them with benefits that it would be folly in them to seek +to alter their condition. All which is implied first in the measures proposed +by Camillus, and next in the resolutions passed on these proposals by the +senate. The words of Camillus were as follows: “<i>The immortal gods have +made you so entirely masters in the matter you are now considering, that</i> +<i>it lies with you to pronounce whether Latium shall or shall not longer +exist. So far as the Latins are concerned, you can secure a lasting peace +either by clemency or by severity. Would you deal harshly with those whom you +have conquered and who have given themselves into your hands, you can blot out +the whole Latin nation. Would you, after the fashion of our ancestors, increase +the strength of Rome by admitting the vanquished to the rights of citizenship, +here you have opportunity to do so, and with the greatest glory to yourselves. +That, assuredly, is the strongest government which they rejoice in who obey it. +Now, then, is your time, while the minds of all are bent on what is about to +happen, to obtain an ascendency over them, either by punishment or by +benefits.</i>” +</p> + +<p> +Upon this motion the senate resolved, in accordance with the advice given by +the consul, to take the case of each city separately, and either destroy +utterly or else treat with tenderness all the more important of the Latin +towns. To those cities they dealt with leniently, they granted exemptions and +privileges, conferring upon them the rights of citizenship, and securing their +welfare in every particular. The others they razed to the ground, and planting +colonies in their room, either removed the inhabitants to Rome, or so scattered +and dispersed them that neither by arms nor by counsels was it ever again in +their power to inflict hurt. For, as I have said already, the Romans never, in +matters of moment, resorted to half-measures. And the sentence which they then +pronounced should be a pattern for all rulers, and ought to have been followed +by the Florentines when, in the year 1502, Arezzo and all the Val di Chiana +rose in revolt. For had they followed it, they would have established their +authority on a surer footing, and added much to the greatness of their city by +securing for it those lands which are needed to supply it with the necessaries +of life. But pursuing that half-hearted policy which is most mischievous in +executing justice, some of the Aretines they outlawed, some they condemned to +death, and all they deprived of their dignities and ancient importance in their +town, while leaving the town itself untouched. And if in the councils then held +any Florentine recommended that Arezzo should be dismantled, they who thought +themselves wiser than their fellows objected, that to do so would be little to +the honour of our republic, since it would look as though she lacked strength +to hold it. Reasons like this are of a sort which seem sound, but are not +really so; for, by the same rule, no parricide should be put to death, nor any +other malefactor, however atrocious his crimes; because, forsooth, it would be +discreditable to the ruler to appear unequal to the control of a single +criminal. They who hold such opinions fail to see that when men individually, +or entire cities collectively, offend against the State, the prince for his own +safety, and as a warning to others, has no alternative but to make an end of +them; and that true honour lies in being able and in knowing how to chastise +such offenders, and not in incurring endless dangers in the effort to retain +them. For the prince who does not chastise offenders in a way that puts it out +of their power to offend again, is accounted unwise or worthless. +</p> + +<p> +How necessary it was for the Romans to execute Justice against the Latins, is +further seen from the course took with the men of Privernum. And here the text +of Livius suggests two points for our attention: first, as already noted, that +a subjugated people is either to be caressed or crushed; and second, how much +it is for our advantage to maintain a manly bearing, and to speak the truth +fearlessly in the presence of the wise. For the senate being met to determine +the fate of the citizens of Privernum, who after rebelling had been reduced to +submission by the Roman arms, certain of these citizens were sent by their +countrymen to plead for pardon. When these had come into the presence of the +senate, one of them was asked by a senator, “<i>What punishment he +thought his fellow citizens deserved?</i>” To which he of Privernum +answered, “<i>Such punishment as they deserve who deem themselves worthy +of freedom.</i>” “<i>But,</i>” said the consul, +“<i>should we remit your punishment, what sort of peace can we hope to +have with you?</i>” To which the other replied, “<i>If granted on +fair terms, a firm and lasting peace; if on unfair, a peace of brief +duration.</i>” Upon this, though many of the senators were displeased, +the wiser among them declared “<i>that they had heard the voice of +freedom and manhood, and would never believe that the man or people who so +spoke ought to remain longer than was needful in a position which gave them +cause for shame; since that was a safe peace which was accepted willingly; +whereas good faith could not be looked for where it was sought to impose +servitude.</i>” So saying, they decided that the people of Privernum +should be admitted to Roman citizenship, with all the rights and privileges +thereto appertaining; declaring that “<i>men whose only thought was for +freedom, were indeed worthy to be Romans.</i>” So pleasing was this true +and high answer to generous minds, while any other must have seemed at once +false and shameful. And they who judge otherwise of men, and of those men, +especially, who have been used to be free, or so to think themselves, are +mistaken; and are led through their mistake to adopt courses unprofitable for +themselves and affording no content to others. Whence, the frequent rebellions +and the downfall of States. +</p> + +<p> +But, returning to our subject, I conclude, as well from this instance of +Privernum, as from the measures followed with the Latins, that when we have to +pass sentence upon powerful States accustomed to live in freedom, we must +either destroy them utterly, or else treat them with much indulgence; and that +any other course we may take with them will be unprofitable. But most carefully +should we avoid, as of all courses the most pernicious, such half-measures as +were followed by the Samnites when they had the Romans shut up in the Caudine +Forks, and would not listen to the counsels of the old man who urged them +either to send their captives away with every honourable attention, or else put +them all to death; but adopted a middle course, and after disarming them and +making them pass under the yoke, suffered them to depart at once disgraced and +angered. And no long time after, they found to their sorrow that the old +man’s warning was true, and that the course they had themselves chosen +was calamitous; as shall, hereafter, in its place be shown. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIV.—<i>That, commonly, Fortresses do much more Harm than +Good</i></h2> + +<p> +To the wise men of our day it may seem an oversight on the part of the Romans, +that, when they sought to protect themselves against the men of Latium and +Privernum, it never occurred to them to build strongholds in their cities to be +a curb upon them, and insure their fidelity, especially when we remember the +Florentine saying which these same wise men often quote, to the effect that +Pisa and other like cities must be held by fortresses Doubtless, had those old +Romans been like-minded with our modern sages, they would not have neglected to +build themselves fortresses, but because they far surpassed them in courage, +sense, and vigour, they refrained. And while Rome retained her freedom, and +adhered to her own wise ordinances and wholesome usages, she never built a +single fortress with the view to hold any city or province, though, sometimes, +she may have suffered those to stand which she found already built. +</p> + +<p> +Looking, therefore, to the course followed by the Romans in this particular, +and to that adopted by our modern rulers, it seems proper to consider whether +or not it is advisable to build fortresses, and whether they are more likely to +help or to hurt him who builds them In the first place, then, we are to +remember that fortresses are built either as a defence against foreign foes or +against subjects In the former case, I pronounce them unnecessary, in the +latter mischievous. And to state the reasons why in the latter case they are +mischievous, I say that when princes or republics are afraid of their subjects +and in fear lest they rebel, this must proceed from knowing that their subjects +hate them, which hatred in its turn results from their own ill conduct, and +that again from their thinking themselves able to rule their subjects by mere +force, or from their governing with little prudence. Now one of the causes +which lead them to suppose that they can rule by mere force, is this very +circumstance of their people having these fortresses on their backs So that the +conduct which breeds hatred is itself mainly occasioned by these princes or +republics being possessed of fortresses, which, if this be true, are really far +more hurtful than useful First, because, as has been said already, they render +a ruler bolder and more violent in his bearing towards his subjects, and, next, +because they do not in reality afford him that security which he believes them +to give For all those methods of violence and coercion which may be used to +keep a people under, resolve themselves into two; since either like the Romans +you must always have it in your power to bring a strong army into the field, or +else you must dissipate, destroy, and disunite the subject people, and so +divide and scatter them that they can never again combine to injure you For +should you merely strip them of their wealth, <i>spoliatis arma supersunt</i>, +arms still remain to them, or if you deprive them of their weapons, <i>furor +arma ministrat</i>, rage will supply them, if you put their chiefs to death and +continue to maltreat the rest, heads will renew themselves like those Hydra; +while, if you build fortresses, these may serve in time of peace to make you +bolder in outraging your subjects, but in time of war they will prove wholly +useless, since they will be attacked at once by foes both foreign and domestic, +whom together it will be impossible for you to resist. And if ever fortresses +were useless they are so at the present day, by reason of the invention of +artillery, against the fury of which, as I have shown already, a petty fortress +which affords no room for retreat behind fresh works, cannot be defended. +</p> + +<p> +But to go deeper into the matter, I say, either you are a prince seeking by +means of these fortresses to hold the people of your city in check; or you are +a prince, or it may be a republic, desirous to control some city which you have +gained in war. To the prince I would say, that, for the reasons already given, +nothing can be more unserviceable than a fortress as a restraint upon your +subjects, since it only makes you the readier to oppress them, and less +scrupulous how you do so; while it is this very oppression which moves them to +destroy you, and so kindles their hatred, that the fortress, which is the cause +of all the mischief, is powerless to protect you. A wise and good prince, +therefore, that he may continue good, and give no occasion or encouragement to +his descendants to become evil, will never build a fortress, to the end that +neither he nor they may ever be led to trust to it rather than to the good-will +of their subjects. And if Francesco Sforza, who was accounted a wise ruler, on +becoming Duke of Milan erected a fortress in that city, I say that herein he +was unwise, and that the event has shown the building of this fortress to have +been hurtful and not helpful to his heirs. For thinking that by its aid they +could behave as badly as they liked to their citizens and subjects, and yet be +secure, they refrained from no sort of violence or oppression, until, becoming +beyond measure odious, they lost their State as soon as an enemy attacked it. +Nor was this fortress, which in peace had occasioned them much hurt, any +defence or of any service them in war. For had they being without it, through +thoughtlessness, treated their subjects inhumanely, they must soon have +discovered and withdrawn from their danger; and might, thereafter, with no +other help than that of attached subjects, have withstood the attacks of the +French far more successfully than they could with their fortress, but with +subjects whom they had estranged. +</p> + +<p> +And, in truth, fortresses are unserviceable in every way, since they may be +lost either by the treachery of those to whom you commit their defence, or by +the overwhelming strength of an assailant, or else by famine. And where you +seek to recover a State which you have lost, and in which only the fortress +remains to you, if that fortress is to be of any service or assistance to you, +you must have an army wherewith to attack the enemy who has driven you out. But +with such an army you might succeed in recovering your State as readily without +a fortress as with one; nay, perhaps, even more readily, since your subjects, +had you not used them ill, from the overweening confidence your fortress gave +you, might then have felt better disposed towards you. And the event shows that +in times of adversity this very fortress of Milan has been of no advantage +whatever, either to the Sforzas or to the French; but, on the contrary, has +brought ruin on both, because, trusting to it, they did not turn their thoughts +to nobler methods for preserving that State. Guido Ubaldo, duke of Urbino and +son to Duke Federigo, who in his day was a warrior of much renown, but who was +driven from his dominions by Cesare Borgia, son to Pope Alexander VI., when +afterwards, by a sudden stroke of good fortune, he was restored to the dukedom +caused all the fortresses of the country to be dismantled, judging them to be +hurtful. For as he was beloved by his subjects, so far as they were concerned +he had no need for fortresses; while, as against foreign enemies, he saw he +could not defend them, since this would have required an army kept constantly +in the field. For which reasons he made them be razed to the ground. +</p> + +<p> +When Pope Julius II. had driven the Bentivogli from Bologna, after erecting a +citadel in that town, he caused the people to be cruelly oppressed by his +governor; whereupon, the people rebelled, and he forthwith lost the citadel; so +that his citadel, and the oppressions to which it led, were of less service to +him than different behaviour on his part had been. When Niccolo da Castello, +the ancestor of the Vitelli, returned to his country out of exile, he +straightway pulled down the two fortresses built there by Pope Sixtus IV., +perceiving that it was not by fortresses, but by the good-will of the people, +that he could be maintained in his government. +</p> + +<p> +But the most recent, and in all respects most noteworthy instance, and that +which best demonstrates the futility of building, and the advantage of +destroying fortresses, is what happened only the other day in Genoa. Every one +knows how, in 1507, Genoa rose in rebellion against Louis XII. of France, who +came in person and with all his forces to recover it; and after recovering it +built there a citadel stronger than any before known, being, both from its +position and from every other circumstance, most inaccessible to attack. For +standing on the extremity of a hill, named by the Genoese Codefa, which juts +out into the sea, it commanded the whole harbour and the greater part of the +town. But, afterwards, in the year 1512, when the French were driven out of +Italy, the Genoese, in spite of this citadel, again rebelled, and Ottaviano +Fregoso assuming the government, after the greatest efforts, continued over a +period of sixteen months, at last succeeded in reducing the citadel by famine. +By all it was believed that he would retain it as a rock of refuge in case of +any reverse of fortune, and by some he was advised to do so; but he, being a +truly wise ruler, and knowing well that it is by the attachment of their +subjects and not by the strength of their fortifications that princes are +maintained in their governments, dismantled this citadel; and founding his +authority, not upon material defences, but on his own valour and prudence, kept +and still keeps it. And whereas, formerly, a force of a thousand foot-soldiers +could effect a change in the government of Genoa, the enemies of Ottaviano have +assailed him with ten thousand, without being able to harm him. +</p> + +<p> +Here, then, we see that, while to dismantle this fortress occasioned Ottaviano +no loss, its construction gave the French king no sort of advantage. For when +he could come into Italy with an army, he could recover Genoa, though he had no +citadel there; but when he could not come with an army, it was not in his power +to hold the city by means of the citadel. Moreover it was costly for the king +to build, and shameful for him to lose this fortress; while for Ottaviano it +was glorious to take, and advantageous to destroy it. +</p> + +<p> +Let us turn now to those republics which build fortresses not within their own +territories, but in towns whereof they have taken possession. And if the above +example of France and Genoa suffice not to show the futility of this course, +that of Florence and Pisa ought, I think, to be conclusive. For in erecting +fortresses to hold Pisa, the Florentines failed to perceive that a city which +had always been openly hostile to them, which had lived in freedom, and which +could cloak rebellion under the name of liberty, must, if it were to be +retained at all, be retained by those methods which were used by the Romans, +and either be made a companion or be destroyed. Of how little service these +Pisan fortresses were, was seen on the coming of Charles VIII. of France into +Italy, to whom, whether through the treachery of their defenders or from fear +of worse evils, they were at once delivered up; whereas, had there been no +fortresses in Pisa, the Florentines would not have looked to them as the means +whereby the town was to be held; the king could not by their assistance have +taken the town from the Florentines; and the methods whereby it had previously +been preserved might, in all likelihood, have continued sufficient to preserve +it; and, at any rate, had served that end no worse than the fortresses. +</p> + +<p> +These, then, are the conclusions to which I come, namely, that fortresses built +to hold your own country under are hurtful, and that those built to retain +acquired territories are useless; and I am content to rely on the example of +the Romans, who in the towns they sought to hold by the strong hand, rather +pulled down fortresses than built them. And if any, to controvert these views +of mine, were to cite the case of Tarentum in ancient times, or of Brescia in +recent, as towns which when they rebelled were recovered by means of their +citadels; I answer, that for the recovery of Tarentum, Fabius Maximus was sent +at the end of a year with an army strong enough to retake it even had there +been no fortress there; and that although he availed himself of the fortress +for the recovery of the town, he might, without it, have resorted to other +means which would have brought about the same result. Nor do I see of what +service a citadel can be said to be, when to recover the city you must employ a +consular army under a Fabius Maximus. But that the Romans would, in any case, +have recovered Tarentum, is plain from what happened at Capua, where there was +no citadel, and which they retook, simply by the valour of their soldiers. +</p> + +<p> +Again, as regards Brescia, I say that the circumstances attending the revolt of +that town were such as occur but seldom, namely, that the citadel remaining in +your hands after the defection of the city, you should happen to have a great +army nigh at hand, as the French had theirs on this occasion. For M. de Foix +being in command of the king’s forces at Bologna, on hearing of the loss +of Brescia, marched thither without an hour’s delay, and reaching Brescia +in three days, retook the town with the help of the citadel. But here, again, +we see that, to be of any service, the citadel of Brescia had to be succoured +by a de Foix, and by that French army which in three days’ time marched +to its relief. So that this instance cannot be considered conclusive as against +others of a contrary tendency. For, in the course of recent wars, many +fortresses have been taken and retaken, with the same variety of fortune with +which open country has been acquired or lost; and this not only in Lombardy, +but also in Romagna, in the kingdom of Naples, and in all parts of Italy. +</p> + +<p> +And, further, touching the erection of fortresses as a defence against foreign +enemies, I say that such defences are not needed by the prince or people who +possess a good army; while for those who do not possess a good army, they are +useless. For good armies without fortresses are in themselves a sufficient +defence: whereas, fortresses without good armies avail nothing. And this we see +in the case of those nations which have been thought to excel both in their +government and otherwise, as, for instance, the Romans and the Spartans. For +while the Romans would build no fortresses, the Spartans not merely abstained +from building them, but would not even suffer their cities to be enclosed with +walls; desiring to be protected by their own valour only, and by no other +defence. So that when a Spartan was asked by an Athenian what he thought of the +walls of Athens, he answered “that they were fine walls if meant to hold +women only.” +</p> + +<p> +If a prince who has a good army has likewise, on the sea-front of his +dominions, some fortress strong enough to keep an enemy in check for a few +days, until he gets his forces together, this, though not necessary, may +sometimes be for his advantage. But for a prince who is without a strong army +to have fortresses erected throughout his territories, or upon his frontier, is +either useless or hurtful, since they may readily be lost and then turned +against him; or, supposing them so strong that the enemy is unable to take them +by assault, he may leave them behind, and so render them wholly unprofitable. +For a brave army, unless stoutly met, enters an enemy’s country without +regard to the towns or fortified places it leaves in its rear, as we read of +happening in ancient times, and have seen done by Francesco Maria della Rovere, +who no long while ago, when he marched against Urbino, made little of leaving +ten hostile cities behind him. +</p> + +<p> +The prince, therefore, who can bring together a strong army can do without +building fortresses, while he who has not a strong army ought not to build +them, but should carefully strengthen the city wherein he dwells, and keep it +well stored with supplies, and its inhabitants well affected, so that he may +resist attack till an accord be agreed on, or he be relieved by foreign aid. +All other expedients are costly in time of peace, and in war useless. +</p> + +<p> +Whoever carefully weighs all that has now been said will perceive, that the +Romans, as they were most prudent in all their other methods, so also showed +their wisdom in the measures they took with the men of Latium and Privernum, +when, without ever thinking of fortresses, they sought security in bolder and +more sagacious courses. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXV.—<i>That he who attacks a City divided against itself, +must not think to get possession of it through its Divisions.</i></h2> + +<p> +Violent dissensions breaking out in Rome between the commons and the nobles, it +appeared to the Veientines and Etruscans that now was their time to deal a +fatal blow to the Roman supremacy. Accordingly, they assembled an army and +invaded the territories of Rome. The senate sent Caius Manlius and Marcus +Fabius to meet them, whose forces encamping close by the Veientines, the latter +ceased not to reproach and vilify the Roman name with every sort of taunt and +abuse, and so incensed the Romans by their unmeasured insolence that, from +being divided they became reconciled, and giving the enemy battle, broke and +defeated them. Here, again, we see, what has already been noted, how prone men +are to adopt wrong courses, and how often they miss their object when they +think to secure it. The Veientines imagined that they could conquer the Romans +by attacking them while they were at feud among themselves; but this very +attack reunited the Romans and brought ruin on their assailants. For the causes +of division in a commonwealth are, for the most part, ease and tranquillity, +while the causes of union are fear and war. Wherefore, had the Veientines been +wise, the more divided they saw Rome to be, the more should they have sought to +avoid war with her, and endeavoured to gain an advantage over her by peaceful +arts. And the best way to effect this in a divided city lies in gaining the +confidence of both factions, and in mediating between them as arbiter so long +as they do not come to blows; but when they resort to open violence, then to +render some tardy aid to the weaker side, so as to plunge them deeper in +hostilities, wherein both may exhaust their forces without being led by your +putting forth an excess of strength to suspect you of a desire to ruin them and +remain their master. Where this is well managed, it will almost always happen +that you succeed in effecting the object you propose to yourself. +</p> + +<p> +The city of Pistoja, as I have said already in connection with another matter, +was won over to the Florentine republic by no other artifice than this. For the +town being split by factions, the Florentines, by now favouring one side and +now the other, without incurring the suspicions of either, brought both to such +extremities that, wearied out with their harassed life, they threw themselves +at last of their own accord into the arms of Florence. The city of Siena, +again, has never made any change in her government which has had the support of +the Florentines, save when that support has been slight and insignificant; for +whenever the interference of Florence has been marked and decided, it has had +the effect of uniting all parties in support of things as they stood. +</p> + +<p> +One other instance I shall add to those already given. Oftener than once +Filippo Visconti, duke of Milan, relying on their divisions, set wars on foot +against the Florentines, and always without success; so that, in lamenting over +these failures, he was wont to complain that the mad humours of the Florentines +had cost him two millions of gold, without his having anything to show for it. +The Veientines and Etruscans, therefore, as I have said already, were misled by +false hopes, and in the end were routed by the Romans in a single pitched +battle; and any who should look hereafter to prevail on like grounds and by +similar means against a divided people, will always find themselves deceived. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXVI.—<i>That Taunts and Abuse breed Hatred against him who +uses them, without yielding him any Advantage.</i></h2> + +<p> +To abstain from threats and injurious language, is, methinks, one of the wisest +precautions a man can use. For abuse and menace take nothing from the strength +of an adversary; the latter only making him more cautious, while the former +inflames his hatred against you, and leads him to consider more diligently how +he may cause you hurt. +</p> + +<p> +This is seen from the example of the Veientines, of whom I spoke in the last +Chapter, who, to the injury of war against the Romans, added those verbal +injuries from which all prudent commanders should compel their soldiers to +refrain. For these are injuries which stir and kindle your enemy to vengeance, +and yet, as has been said, in no way disable him from doing you hurt; so that, +in truth, they are weapons which wound those who use them. Of this we find a +notable instance in Asia, in connection with the siege of Amida. For Gabade, +the Persian general, after besieging this town for a great while, wearied out +at last by its protracted defence, determined on withdrawing his army; and had +actually begun to strike his camp, when the whole inhabitants of the place, +elated by their success, came out upon the walls to taunt and upbraid their +enemies with their cowardice and meanness of spirit, and to load them with +every kind of abuse. Stung by these insults, Gabade, changing his resolution, +renewed the siege with such fury that in a few days he stormed and sacked the +town. And the very same thing befell the Veientines, who, not content, as we +have seen, to make war on the Romans with arms, must needs assail them with +foul reproaches, advancing to the palisade of their camp to revile them, and +molesting them more with their tongues than with their swords, until the Roman +soldiers, who at first were most unwilling to fight, forced the consuls to lead +them to the attack. Whereupon, the Veientines, like those others of whom +mention has just now been made, had to pay the penalty of their insolence. +</p> + +<p> +Wise captains of armies, therefore, and prudent governors of cities, should +take all fit precautions to prevent such insults and reproaches from being used +by their soldiers and subjects, either amongst themselves or against an enemy. +For when directed against an enemy they lead to the mischiefs above noticed, +while still worse consequences may follow from our not preventing them among +ourselves by such measures as sensible rulers have always taken for that +purpose. +</p> + +<p> +The legions who were left behind for the protection of Capua having, as shall +in its place be told, conspired against the Capuans, their conspiracy led to a +mutiny, which was presently suppressed by Valerius Corvinus; when, as one of +the conditions on which the mutineers made their submission, it was declared +that whosoever should thereafter upbraid any soldier of these legions with +having taken part in this mutiny, should be visited with the severest +punishment. So likewise, when Tiberius Gracchus was appointed, during the war +with Hannibal, to command a body of slaves, whom the Romans in their straits +for soldiers had furnished with arms, one of his first acts was to pass an +order making it death for any to reproach his men with their servile origin. So +mischievous a thing did the Romans esteem it to use insulting words to others, +or to taunt them with their shame. Whether this be done in sport or earnest, +nothing vexes men more, or rouses them to fiercer indignation; “<i>for +the biting jest which flavours too much of truth, leaves always behind it a +rankling memory.</i>”<a href="#fn9" name="fnref9" id="fnref9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn9" id="fn9"></a> <a href="#fnref9">[9]</a> +Nam facetiæ asperæ, quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem sui memoriam +relinquunt. <i>Tacit. An.</i> xv. 68. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXVII.—<i>That prudent Princes and Republics should be +content to have obtained a Victory; for, commonly, when they are not, +theft-Victory turns to Defeat.</i></h2> + +<p> +The use of dishonouring language towards an enemy is mostly caused by an +insolent humour, bred by victory or the false hope of it, whereby men are +oftentimes led not only to speak, but also to act amiss. For such false hopes, +when they gain an entry into men’s minds, cause them to overrun their +goal, and to miss opportunities for securing a certain good, on the chance of +obtaining some thing better, but uncertain. And this, being a matter that +deserves attention, because in deceiving themselves men often injure their +country, I desire to illustrate it by particular instances, ancient and recent, +since mere argument might not place it in so clear a light. +</p> + +<p> +After routing the Romans at Cannæ, Hannibal sent messengers to Carthage to +announce his victory, and to ask support. A debate arising in the Carthaginian +senate as to what was to be done, Hanno, an aged and wise citizen, advised that +they should prudently take advantage of their victory to make peace with the +Romans, while as conquerors they might have it on favourable terms, and not +wait to make it after a defeat; since it should be their object to show the +Romans that they were strong enough to fight them, but not to peril the victory +they had won in the hope of winning a greater. This advice was not followed by +the Carthaginian senate, but its wisdom was well seen later, when the +opportunity to act upon it was gone. +</p> + +<p> +When the whole East had been overrun by Alexander of Macedon, the citizens of +Tyre (then at the height of its renown, and very strong from being built, like +Venice, in the sea), recognizing his greatness, sent ambassadors to him to say +that they desired to be his good servants, and to yield him all obedience, yet +could not consent to receive either him or his soldiers within their walls. +Whereupon, Alexander, displeased that a single city should venture to close its +gates against him to whom all the rest of the world had thrown theirs open, +repulsed the Tyrians, and rejecting their overtures set to work to besiege +their town. But as it stood on the water, and was well stored with victual and +all other munitions needed for its defence, after four months had gone, +Alexander, perceiving that he was wasting more time in an inglorious attempt to +reduce this one city than had sufficed for most of his other conquests, +resolved to offer terms to the Tyrians, and to make them those concessions +which they themselves had asked. But they, puffed up by their success, not +merely refused the terms offered, but put to death the envoy sent to propose +them. Enraged by this, Alexander renewed the siege, and with such vigour, that +he took and destroyed the city, and either slew or made slaves of its +inhabitants. +</p> + +<p> +In the year 1512, a Spanish army entered the Florentine territory, with the +object of restoring the Medici to Florence, and of levying a subsidy from the +town; having been summoned thither by certain of the citizens, who had promised +them that so soon as they appeared within the Florentine confines they would +arm in their behalf. But when the Spaniards had come into the plain of the +Arno, and none declared in their favour, being in sore need of supplies, they +offered to make terms. This offer the people of Florence in their pride +rejected, and so gave occasion for the sack of Prato and the overthrow of the +Florentine Republic. +</p> + +<p> +A prince, therefore, who is attacked by an enemy much more powerful than +himself, can make no greater mistake than to refuse to treat, especially when +overtures are made to him; for however poor the terms offered may be, they are +sure to contain some conditions advantageous for him who accepts them, and +which he may construe as a partial success. For which reason it ought to have +been enough for the citizens of Tyre that Alexander was brought to accept terms +which he had at first rejected; and they should have esteemed it a sufficient +triumph that, by their resistance in arms, they had forced so great a warrior +to bow to their will. And, in like manner, it should have been a sufficient +victory for the Florentines that the Spaniards had in part yielded to their +wishes, and abated something of their own demands, the purport of which was to +change the government of Florence, to sever her from her allegiance to France, +and, further, to obtain money from her. For if of these three objects the +Spaniards had succeeded in securing the last two, while the Florentines +maintained the integrity of their government, a fair share of honour and +contentment would have fallen to each. And while preserving their political +existence, the Florentines should have made small account of the other two +conditions; nor ought they, even with the possibility and almost certainty of +greater advantages before them, to have left matters in any degree to the +arbitration of Fortune, by pushing things to extremes, and incurring risks +which no prudent man should incur, unless compelled by necessity. +</p> + +<p> +Hannibal, when recalled by the Carthaginians from Italy, where for sixteen +years he had covered himself with glory, to the defence of his native country, +found on his arrival that Hasdrubal and Syphax had been defeated, the kingdom +of Numidia lost, and Carthage confined within the limits of her walls, and left +without other resource save in him and his army. Perceiving, therefore, that +this was the last stake his country had to play, and not choosing to hazard it +until he had tried every other expedient, he felt no shame to sue for peace, +judging that in peace rather than in war lay the best hope of safety for his +country. But, when peace was refused him, no fear of defeat deterred him from +battle, being resolved either to conquer, if conquer he might, or if he must +fall, to fall gloriously. Now, if a commander so valiant as Hannibal, at the +head of an unconquered army, was willing to sue for peace rather than appeal to +battle when he saw that by defeat his country must be enslaved, what course +ought to be followed by another commander, less valiant and with less +experience than he? But men labour under this infirmity, that they know not +where to set bounds to their hopes, and building on these without otherwise +measuring their strength, rush headlong on destruction. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXVIII.—<i>That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether +public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth</i>.</h2> + +<p> +Certain Gauls coming to attack Etruria, and more particularly Clusium its chief +city, the citizens of Clusium sought aid from Rome; whereupon the Romans sent +the three Fabii, as envoys to these Gauls, to notify to them, in the name of +the Roman people, that they must refrain from making war on the Etruscans. From +what befell the Romans in connection with this embassy, we see clearly how far +men may be carried in resenting an affront. For these envoys arriving at the +very moment when the Gauls and Etruscans were about to join battle, being +readier at deeds than words, took part with the Etruscans and fought in their +foremost ranks. Whence it came that the Gauls recognizing the Roman envoys, +turned against the Romans all the hatred which before they had felt for the +Etruscans; and grew still more incensed when on making complaint to the Roman +senate, through their ambassador, of the wrong done them, and demanding that +the Fabii should be given up to them in atonement for their offence, not merely +were the offenders not given up or punished in any way, but, on the contrary, +when the comitia met were created tribunes with consular powers. But when the +Gauls found these men honoured who deserved to be chastised, they concluded +that what had happened had been done by way of slight and insult to them, and, +burning with fury and resentment, hastened forward to attack Rome, which they +took with the exception of the Capitol. +</p> + +<p> +Now this disaster overtook the Romans entirely from their disregard of justice. +For their envoys, who had violated the law of nations, and had therefore +deserved punishment, they had on the contrary treated with honour. And this +should make us reflect, how carefully all princes and commonwealths ought to +refrain from committing like wrongs, not only against communities, but also +against particular men. For if a man be deeply wronged, either by a private +hand or by a public officer, and be not avenged to his satisfaction, if he live +in a republic, he will seek to avenge himself, though in doing so he bring ruin +on his country; or if he live under a prince, and be of a resolute and haughty +spirit, he will never rest until he has wreaked his resentment against the +prince, though he knows it may cost him dear. Whereof we have no finer or truer +example than in the death of Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander. For +Pausanias, a handsome and high-born youth belonging to Philip’s court, +having been most foully and cruelly dishonoured by Attalus, one of the foremost +men of the royal household, repeatedly complained to Philip of the outrage; who +for a while put him off with promises of vengeance, but in the end, so far from +avenging him, promoted Attalus to be governor of the province of Greece. +Whereupon, Pausanias, seeing his enemy honoured and not punished, turned all +his resentment from him who had outraged, against him who had not avenged him, +and on the morning of the day fixed for the marriage of Philip’s daughter +to Alexander of Epirus, while Philip walked between the two Alexanders, his son +and his son-in-law, towards the temple to celebrate the nuptials, he slew him. +</p> + +<p> +This instance nearly resembles that of the Roman envoys; and offers a warning +to all rulers never to think so lightly of any man as to suppose, that when +wrong upon wrong has been done him, he will not bethink himself of revenge, +however great the danger he runs, or the punishment he thereby brings upon +himself. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIX.—<i>That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she +would not have them hinder her Designs.</i></h2> + +<p> +If we note well the course of human affairs, we shall often find things come +about and accidents befall, against which it seems to be the will of Heaven +that men should not provide. And if this were the case even in Rome, so +renowned for her valour, religion, and wise ordinances, we need not wonder if +it be far more common in other cities and provinces wherein these safeguards +are wanting. +</p> + +<p> +Having here a notable opportunity to show how Heaven influences men’s +actions, Titus Livius turns it to account, and treats the subject at large and +in pregnant words, where he says, that since it was Heaven’s will, for +ends of its own, that the Romans should feel its power, it first of all caused +these Fabii, who were sent as envoys to the Gauls, to act amiss, and then by +their misconduct stirred up the Gauls to make war on Rome; and, lastly, so +ordered matters that nothing worthy of their name was done by the Romans to +withstand their attack. For it was fore-ordained by Heaven that Camillus, who +alone could supply the remedy to so mighty an evil, should be banished to +Ardea; and again, that the citizens, who had often created a dictator to meet +attacks of the Volscians and other neighbouring hostile nations, should fail to +do so when the Gauls were marching upon Rome. Moreover, the army which the +Romans got together was but a weak one, since they used no signal effort to +make it strong; nay, were so dilatory in arming that they were barely in time +to meet the enemy at the river Allia, though no more than ten miles distant +from Rome. Here, again, the Roman tribunes pitched their camp without observing +any of the usual precautions, attending neither to the choice of ground, nor to +surround themselves with trench or Palisade, nor to avail themselves of any +other aid, human or Divine. In ordering their army for battle, moreover, +disposed it in weak columns, and these far apart: so that neither men nor +officers accomplished anything worthy of the Roman discipline. The battle was +bloodless for the Romans fled before they were attacked; most of them +retreating to Veii, the rest to Rome, where, without turning aside to visit +their homes, they made straight for the Capitol. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile, the senate, so far from bethinking themselves how they might defend +the city, did not even attend to closing the gates; and while some of them made +their escape from Rome, others entered the Capitol along with those who sought +shelter there. It was only in the defence of the Capitol that any method was +observed, measures being taken to prevent it being crowded with useless +numbers, and all the victual which could be got, being brought into it to +enable it to stand a siege. Of the women, the children, and the men whose years +unfitted them for service, the most part fled for refuge to the neighbouring +towns, the rest remained in Rome a prey to the invaders; so that no one who had +heard of the achievements of the Romans in past years, on being told of what +took place on this occasion, could have believed that it was of the same people +that things so contrary were related. +</p> + +<p> +Wherefore, Titus Livius, after setting forth all these disorders, concludes +with the words, “<i>So far does Fortune darken men’s minds when she +would not have her ascendency gainsaid.</i>” Nor could any juster +observation be made. And hence it is that those who experience the extremes +whether of good or of evil fortune, are, commonly, little deserving either of +praise or blame; since it is apparent that it is from Heaven having afforded +them, or denied them opportunities for acting worthily, that they have been +brought to their greatness or to their undoing. Fortune, doubtless, when she +seeks to effect great ends, will often choose as her instrument a man of such +sense and worth that he can recognize the opportunities which she holds out to +him; and, in like manner, when she desires to bring about great calamities, +will put forward such men as will of themselves contribute to that result. And +all who stand in her way, she either removes by death, or deprives of the means +of effecting good. And it is well seen in the passage we are considering, how +Fortune, to aggrandize Rome, and raise her to the height she reached, judged it +necessary, as shall be more fully shown in the following Book, to humble her; +yet would not have her utterly undone. For which reason we find her causing +Camillus to be banished, but not put to death; suffering Rome to be taken, but +not the Capitol; and bringing it to pass that, while the Romans took no wise +precaution for the defence of their city, they neglected none in defending +their citadel. That Rome might be taken, Fortune caused the mass of the army, +after the rout at the Allia, to direct its flight to Veii, thus withdrawing the +means wherewith the city might have been defended; but while thus disposing +matters, she at the same time prepared all the needful steps for its recovery, +in bringing an almost entire Roman array to Veii, and Camillus to Ardea, so +that a great force might be assembled for the rescue of their country, under a +captain in no way compromised by previous reverses, but, on the contrary, in +the enjoyment of an untarnished renown. I might cite many modern instances to +confirm these opinions, but since enough has been said to convince any fair +mind, I pass them over. But once more I repeat what, from all history, may be +seen to be most true, that men may aid Fortune, but not withstand her; may +interweave their threads with her web, but cannot break it But, for all that, +they must never lose heart, since not knowing what their end is to be, and +moving towards it by cross-roads and untravelled paths, they have always room +for hope, and ought never to abandon it, whatsoever befalls, and into +whatsoever straits they come. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXX.—<i>That really powerful Princes and, Commonwealths do +not buy Friendships with Money, but with their Valour and the Fame of their +Prowess</i>.</h2> + +<p> +When besieged in the Capitol, the Romans although expecting succour from Veii +and from Camillus, nevertheless, being straitened by famine, entered into an +agreement to buy off the Gauls with gold But at the very moment when, in +pursuance of this agreement, the gold was being weighed out, Camillus came up +with his army. This, says our historian, was contrived by Fortune, +“<i>that the Romans might not live thereafter as men ransomed for a +price,</i>” and the matter is noteworthy, not only with reference to this +particular occasion, but also as it bears on the methods generally followed by +this republic. For we never find Rome seeking to acquire towns, or to purchase +peace with money, but always confiding in her own warlike valour, which could +not, I believe, be said of any other republic. +</p> + +<p> +Now, one of the tests whereby to gauge the strength of any State, is to observe +on what terms it lives with its neighbours: for when it so carries itself that, +to secure its friendship, its neighbours pay it tribute, this is a sure sign of +its strength, but when its neighbours, though of less reputation, receive +payments from it, this is a clear proof of its weakness In the course of the +Roman history we read how the Massilians, the Eduans, the Rhodians, Hiero of +Syracuse, the Kings Eumenes and Massinissa, all of them neighbours to the Roman +frontiers, in order to secure the friendship of Rome, submitted to imposts and +tribute whenever Rome had need of them, asking no return save her protection. +But with a weak State we find the reverse of all this happening And, to begin +with our own republic of Florence, we know that in times past, when she was at +the height of her renown, there was never a lordling of Romagna who had not a +subsidy from her, to say nothing of what she paid to the Perugians, to the +Castellans, and to all her other neighbours But had our city been armed and +strong, the direct contrary would have been the case, for, to obtain her +protection, all would have poured money into her lap, not seeking to sell their +friendship but to purchase hers. +</p> + +<p> +Nor are the Florentines the only people who have lived on this dishonourable +footing The Venetians have done the same, nay, the King of France himself, for +all his great dominions, lives tributary to the Swiss and to the King of +England; and this because the French king and the others named, with a view to +escape dangers rather imaginary than real, have disarmed their subjects; +seeking to reap a present gain by wringing money from them, rather than follow +a course which would secure their own safety and the lasting welfare of their +country. Which ill-practices of theirs, though they quiet things for a time, +must in the end exhaust their resources, and give rise in seasons of danger to +incurable mischief and disorder. It would be tedious to count up how often in +the course of their wars, the Florentines, the Venetians, and the kingdom of +France have had to ransom themselves from their enemies, and to submit to an +ignominy to which, once only, the Romans were very near being subjected. It +would be tedious, too, to recite how many towns have been bought by the +Florentines and by the Venetians, which, afterwards, have only been a trouble +to them, from their not knowing how to defend with iron what they had won with +gold. While the Romans continued free they adhered to this more generous and +noble method, but when they came under the emperors, and these, again, began to +deteriorate, and to love the shade rather than the sunshine, they also took to +purchasing peace, now from the Parthians, now from the Germans, and at other +times from other neighbouring nations. And this was the beginning of the +decline of their great empire. +</p> + +<p> +Such are the evils that befall when you withhold arms from your subjects; and +this course is attended by the still greater disadvantage, that the closer an +enemy presses you the weaker he finds you. For any one who follows the evil +methods of which I speak, must, in order to support troops whom he thinks can +be trusted to keep off his enemies, be very exacting in his dealings with those +of his subjects who dwell in the heart of his dominions; since, to widen the +interval between himself and his enemies, he must subsidize those princes and +peoples who adjoin his frontiers. States maintained on this footing may make a +little resistance on their confines; but when these are passed by the enemy no +further defence remains. Those who pursue such methods as these seem not to +perceive that they are opposed to reason and common sense. For the heart and +vital parts of the body, not the extremities, are those which we should keep +guarded, since we may live on without the latter, but must die if the former be +hurt. But the States of which I speak, leaving the heart undefended, defend +only the hands and feet. The mischief which has thus been, and is at this day +wrought in Florence is plain enough to see. For so soon as an enemy penetrates +within her frontiers, and approaches her heart, all is over with her. And the +same was witnessed a few years ago in the case of the Venetians, whose city, +had it not been girdled by the sea, must then have found its end. In France, +indeed, a like result has not been seen so often, she being so great a kingdom +as to have few enemies mightier than herself. Nevertheless, when the English +invaded France in the year 1513, the whole kingdom tottered; and the King +himself, as well as every one else, had to own that a single defeat might have +cost him his dominions. +</p> + +<p> +But with the Romans the reverse of all this took place. For the nearer an enemy +approached Rome, the more completely he found her armed for resistance; and +accordingly we see that on the occasion of Hannibal’s invasion of Italy, +the Romans, after three defeats, and after the slaughter of so many of their +captains and soldiers, were still able, not merely to withstand the invader, +but even, in the end, to come off victorious. This we may ascribe to the heart +being well guarded, while the extremities were but little heeded. For the +strength of Rome rested on the Roman people themselves, on the Latin league, on +the confederate towns of Italy, and on her colonies, from all of which sources +she drew so numerous an army, as enabled her to subdue the whole world and to +keep it in subjection. +</p> + +<p> +The truth of what I say may be further seen from the question put by Hanno the +Carthaginian to the messengers sent to Carthage by Hannibal after his victory +at Cannæ. For when these were vaunting the achievements of Hannibal, they were +asked by Hanno whether any one had come forward on behalf of the Romans to +propose terms of peace, and whether any town of the Latin league or of the +colonized districts had revolted from the Romans. And when to both inquiries +the envoys answered, “No,” Hanno observed that the war was no +nearer an end than on the day it was begun. +</p> + +<p> +We can understand, therefore, as well from what has now been said, as from what +I have often said before, how great a difference there is between the methods +followed by the republics of the present times, and those followed by the +republics of antiquity; and why it is that we see every day astounding losses +alternate with extraordinary gains. For where men are weak, Fortune shows +herself strong; and because she changes, States and Governments change with +her; and will continue to change, until some one arise, who, following +reverently the example of the ancients, shall so control her, that she shall +not have opportunity with every revolution of the sun to display anew the +greatness of her power. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXI.—<i>Of the Danger of trusting banished Men.</i></h2> + +<p> +The danger of trusting those who are in exile from their own country, being one +to which the rulers of States are often exposed, may, I think, be fitly +considered in these Discourses; and I notice it the more willingly, because I +am able to illustrate it by a memorable instance which Titus Livius, though +with another purpose, relates in his history. When Alexander the Great passed +with his army into Asia, his brother-in-law and uncle, Alexander of Epirus, +came with another army into Italy, being invited thither by the banished +Lucanians, who gave him to believe that, with their aid, he might get +possession of the whole of that country. But when, confiding in the promises of +these exiles, and fed by the hopes they held out to him, he came into Italy, +they put him to death, their fellow-citizens having offered to restore them to +their country upon this condition. It behoves us, therefore, to remember how +empty are the promises, and how doubtful the faith, of men in banishment from +their native land. For as to their faith, it may be assumed that whenever they +can effect their return by other means than yours, notwithstanding any +covenants they may have made with you, they will throw you over, and take part +with their countrymen. And as for the empty promises and delusive hopes which +they set before you, so extreme is their desire to return home that they +naturally believe many things which are untrue, and designedly misrepresent +many others; so that between their beliefs and what they say they believe, they +fill you with false impressions, on which if you build, your labour is in vain, +and you are led to engage in enterprises from which nothing but ruin can +result. +</p> + +<p> +To this instance of Alexander I shall add only one other, that, namely, of +Themistocles the Athenian, who, being proclaimed a traitor, fled into Asia to +Darius, to whom he made such lavish promises if he would only attack Greece, +that he induced him to undertake the enterprise. But afterwards, when he could +not fulfil what he had promised, either from shame, or through fear of +punishment, he poisoned himself. But, if such a mistake as this was made by a +man like Themistocles, we may reckon that mistakes still greater will be made +by those who, being of a feebler nature, suffer themselves to be more +completely swayed by their feelings and wishes Wherefore, let a prince be +careful how he embarks in any enterprise on the representations of an exile; +for otherwise, he is likely either to be put to shame, or to incur the gravest +calamities. +</p> + +<p> +Because towns are sometimes, though seldom, taken by craft, through secret +practices had with their inhabitants, I think it not out of place to discuss +the matter in the following Chapter, wherein I shall likewise show in how many +ways the Romans were wont to make such acquisitions. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXII.—<i>In how many Ways the Romans gained Possession of +Towns.</i></h2> + +<p> +Turning their thoughts wholly to arms, the Romans always conducted their +military enterprises in the most advantageous way, both as to cost and every +other circumstance of war. For which reason they avoided attempting towns by +siege, judging the expense and inconvenience of this method of carrying on war +greatly to outweigh any advantage to be gained by it. Accordingly, they thought +it better and more for their interest to reduce towns in any other way than +this; and in all those years during which they were constantly engaged in wars +we find very few instances of their proceeding by siege. +</p> + +<p> +For the capture of towns, therefore, they trusted either to assault or to +surrender. Assaults were effected either by open force, or by force and +stratagem combined. When a town was assailed by open force, the walls were +stormed without being breached, and the assailants were said “<i>aggredi +urbem corona,</i>” because they encircled the city with their entire +strength and kept up an attack on all sides. In this way they often succeeded +in carrying towns, and even great towns, at a first onset, as when Scipio took +new Carthage in Spain. But when they failed to carry a town by storm, they set +themselves to breach the walls with battering rams and other warlike engines; +or they dug mines so as to obtain an entrance within the walls, this being the +method followed in taking Veii; or else, to be on a level with the defenders, +they erected towers of timber or threw up mounds of earth against the outside +of the walls so as to reach the top. +</p> + +<p> +Of these methods of attack, the first, wherein the city was entirely +surrounded, exposed the defenders to more sudden perils and left them more +doubtful remedies. For while it was necessary for them to have a sufficient +force at all points, it might happen that the forces at their disposal were not +numerous enough to be everywhere at once, or to relieve one another. Or if +their numbers were sufficient, they might not all be equally resolute in +standing their ground, and their failure at any one point involved a general +defeat. Consequently, as I have said, this method of attack was often +successful. But when it did not succeed at the first, it was rarely renewed, +being a method dangerous to the attacking army, which having to secure itself +along an extended line, was left everywhere too weak to resist a sally made +from the town; nay, of itself, was apt to fall into confusion and disorder. +This method of attack, therefore, could be attempted once only and by way of +surprise. +</p> + +<p> +Against breaches in the walls the defence was, as at the present day, to throw +up new works; while mines were met by counter-mines, in which the enemy were +either withstood at the point of the sword, or baffled by some other warlike +contrivance; as by filling casks with feathers, which, being set on fire and +placed in the mine, choked out the assailants by their smoke and stench. Where +towers were employed for the attack, the defenders sought to destroy them with +fire; and where mounds of earth were thrown up against the walls, they would +dig holes at the base of the wall against which the mound rested, and carry off +the earth which the enemy were heaping up; which, being removed from within as +fast as it was thrown up from without, the mound made no progress. +</p> + +<p> +None of these methods of attack can long be persisted in and the assailant, if +unsuccessful, must either strike his camp and seek victory in some other +direction, as Scipio did when he invaded Africa and, after failing in the +attempt to storm Utica, withdrew from his attack on that town and turned his +strength against the Carthaginian army in the field; or else recourse must be +had to regular siege, as by the Romans at Veii, Capua, Carthage, Jerusalem, and +divers other cities which they reduced in this way. +</p> + +<p> +The capture of towns by stratagem combined with force is effected, as by the +Romans at Palæopolis, through a secret understanding with some within the +walls. Many attempts of this sort have been made, both by the Romans and by +others, but few successfully, because the least hindrance disarranges the plan +of action, and because such hindrances are very likely to occur. For either the +plot is discovered before it can be carried out, as it readily may, whether +from treachery on the part of those to whom it has been communicated, or from +the difficulties which attend its inception, the preliminary arrangements +having to be made with the enemy and with persons with whom it is not +permitted, save under some pretext or other, to hold intercourse; or if it be +not discovered while it is being contrived, a thousand difficulties will still +be met with in its execution. For if you arrive either before or after the +appointed time, all is ruined. The faintest sound, as of the cackling of the +geese in the Capitol, the least departure from some ordinary routine, the most +trifling mistake or error, mars the whole enterprise. Add to which, the +darkness of night lends further terror to the perils of such undertakings; +while the great majority of those engaged in them, having no knowledge of the +district or places into which they are brought, are bewildered and disconcerted +by the least mishap, and put to flight by every imaginary danger. In secret +nocturnal enterprises of this sort, no man was ever more successful than Aratus +of Sicyon, although in any encounter by day there never was a more arrant +coward. This we must suppose due rather to some special and occult quality +inherent in the man, than to success being naturally to be looked for in the +like attempts. Such enterprises, accordingly, are often planned, but few are +put into execution, and fewer still with success. +</p> + +<p> +When cities are acquired by surrender, the surrender is either voluntary or +under compulsion; voluntary, when the citizens appeal to you for protection +against some threatened danger from without, as Capua submitted to the Romans; +or where they are moved by a desire to be better governed, and are attracted by +the good government which he to whom they surrender is seen exercising over +others who have placed themselves in his hands; as was the case with the +Rhodians, the Massilians, and others who for like causes gave themselves up to +the Roman people. Compulsory surrenders take place, either as the result of a +protracted siege, like those we have spoken of above; or from the country being +continually wasted by incursions, forays, and similar severities, to escape +which a city makes its submission. +</p> + +<p> +Of the methods which have been noticed, the Romans, in preference to all +others, used this last; and for four hundred and fifty years made it their aim +to wear out their neighbours by invasion and by defeat in the open field, while +endeavouring, as I have elsewhere said, to establish their influence over them +by treaties and conventions. It was to this method of warfare therefore that +they always mainly trusted, because, after trying all others, they found none +so free from inconvenience and disadvantage—the procedure by siege +involving expense and delay, that by assault, difficulty and danger, and that +by secret practice, uncertainty and doubt. They found, likewise, that while in +subduing one obstinate city by siege many years might be wasted, a kingdom +might be gained in a single day by the defeat of a hostile army in the field. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXIII.—<i>That the Romans intrusted the Captains of their +Armies with the fullest Powers.</i></h2> + +<p> +In reading this History of Titus Livius with a view to profit by it, I think +that all the methods of conduct followed by the Roman people and senate merit +attention. And among other things fit to be considered, it should be noted, +with how ample an authority they sent forth their consuls, their dictators, and +the other captains of their armies, all of whom we find clothed with the +fullest powers: no other prerogative being reserved to itself by the senate +save that of declaring war and making peace, while everything else was left to +the discretion and determination of the consul. For so soon as the people and +senate had resolved on war, for instance on a war against the Latins, they +threw all further responsibility upon the consul, who might fight or decline +battle as he pleased, and attack this or the other city as he thought fit. +</p> + +<p> +That this was so, is seen in many instances, and especially from what happened +during an expedition made against the Etruscans. For the consul Fabius having +routed that people near Sutrium, and thinking to pass onward through the +Ciminian forest into Etruria, so far from seeking the advice of the senate, +gave them no hint whatever of his design, although for its execution the war +had to be carried into a new, difficult, and dangerous country. We have further +witness to the same effect, in the action taken in respect of this enterprise +by the senate, who being informed of the victory obtained by Fabius, and +apprehending that he might decide to pass onward through the aforesaid forest, +and deeming it inexpedient that he should incur risk by attempting this +invasion, sent two messengers to warn him not to enter Etruria. These +messengers, however, did not come up with the consul until he had already made +his way into that country and gained a second victory; when, instead of +opposing his further advance, they returned to Rome to announce his good +fortune and the glory which he had won. +</p> + +<p> +Whoever, therefore, shall well consider the character of the authority whereof +I speak, will see that it was most wisely accorded; since had it been the wish +of the senate that a consul, in conducting a war, should proceed step by step +as they might direct him, this must have made him at once less cautious and +more dilatory; because the credit of victory would not then have seemed to be +wholly his own, but shared by the senate on whose advice he acted. Besides +which, the senate must have taken upon itself the task of advising on matters +which it could not possibly understand; for although it might contain among its +members all who were most versed in military affairs, still, since these men +were not on the spot, and were ignorant of many particulars which, if they were +to give sound advice, it was necessary for them to know, they must in advising +have made numberless mistakes. For these reasons they desired that the consul +should act on his own responsibility, and that the honours of success should be +wholly his; judging that the love of fame would act on him at once as a spur +and as a curb, making him do whatever he had to do well. +</p> + +<p> +This matter I have the rather dwelt upon because I observe that our modern +republics, such as the Venetian and the Florentine, view it in a different +light; so that when their captains, commissaries, or <i>provedditori</i> have a +single gun to place in position, the authorities at home must be informed and +consulted; a course deserving the same approval as is due to all those other +methods of theirs, which, one with another, have brought Italy to her present +condition. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK III.</h2> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER I.—<i>For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often +be brought back to its Beginnings.</i></h2> + +<p> +Doubtless, all the things of this world have a limit set to their duration; yet +those of them the bodies whereof have not been suffered to grow disordered, but +have been so cared for that either no change at all has been wrought in them, +or, if any, a change for the better and not for the worse, will run that course +which Heaven has in a general way appointed them. And since I am now speaking +of mixed bodies, for States and Sects are so to be regarded, I say that for +them these are wholesome changes which bring them back to their first +beginnings. +</p> + +<p> +Those States consequently stand surest and endure longest which, either by the +operation of their institutions can renew themselves, or come to be renewed by +accident apart from any design. Nothing, however, can be clearer than that +unless thus renewed these bodies do not last. Now the way to renew them is, as +I have said, to bring them back to their beginnings, since all beginnings of +sects, commonwealths, or kingdoms must needs have in them a certain excellence, +by virtue of which they gain their first reputation and make their first +growth. But because in progress of time this excellence becomes corrupted, +unless something be done to restore it to what it was at first, these bodies +necessarily decay; for as the physicians tell us in speaking of the human body, +“<i>Something or other is daily added which sooner or later will require +treatment.</i>”<a href="#fn10" name="fnref10" id="fnref10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn10" id="fn10"></a> <a href="#fnref10">[10]</a> +“Quod quotidie aggregatur aliquid quod quandoque indiget +curatione.” +</p> + +<p> +As regards commonwealths, this return to the point of departure is brought +about either by extrinsic accident or by intrinsic foresight. As to the first, +we have seen how it was necessary that Rome should be taken by the Gauls, that +being thus in a manner reborn, she might recover life and vigour, and resume +the observances of religion and justice which she had suffered to grow rusted +by neglect. This is well seen from those passages of Livius wherein he tells us +that when the Roman army was ‘sent forth against the Gauls, and again +when tribunes were created with consular authority, no religious rites whatever +were celebrated, and wherein he further relates how the Romans not only failed +to punish the three Fabii, who contrary to the law of nations had fought +against the Gauls, but even clothed them with honour. For, from these +instances, we may well infer that the rest of the wise ordinances instituted by +Romulus, and the other prudent kings, had begun to be held of less account than +they deserved, and less than was essential for the maintenance of good +government. +</p> + +<p> +And therefore it was that Rome was visited by this calamity from without, to +the end that all her ordinances might be reformed, and the people taught that +it behoved them not only to maintain religion and justice, but also to esteem +their worthy citizens, and to prize their virtues beyond any advantages of +which they themselves might seem to have been deprived at their instance. And +this, we find, was just the effect produced. For no sooner was the city +retaken, than all the ordinances of the old religion were at once restored; the +Fabii, who had fought in violation of the law of nations, were punished; and +the worth and excellence of Camillus so fully recognized, that the senate and +the whole people, laying all jealousies aside, once more committed to him the +entire charge of public affairs. +</p> + +<p> +It is necessary then, as I have said already, that where men dwell together in +a regulated society, they be often reminded of those ordinances in conformity +with which they ought to live, either by something inherent in these, or else +by some external accident. A reminder is given in the former of these two ways, +either by the passing of some law whereby the members of the society are +brought to an account; or else by some man of rare worth arising among them, +whose virtuous life and example have the same effect as a law. In a +Commonwealth, accordingly, this end is served either by the virtues of some one +of its citizens, or by the operation of its institutions. +</p> + +<p> +The institutions whereby the Roman Commonwealth was led back to its starting +point, were the tribuneship of the people and the censorship, together with all +those laws which were passed to check the insolence and ambition of its +citizens. Such institutions, however, require fresh life to be infused into +them by the worth of some one man who fearlessly devotes himself to give them +effect in opposition to the power of those who set them at defiance. +</p> + +<p> +Of the laws being thus reinforced in Rome, before its capture by the Gauls, we +have notable examples in the deaths of the sons of Brutus, of the Decemvirs, +and of Manlius Frumentarius; and after its capture, in the deaths of Manlius +Capitolinus, and of the son of Manlius Torquatus in the prosecution of his +master of the knights by Papirius Cursor, and in the impeachment of the +Scipios. Such examples as these, being signal and extraordinary, had the +effect, whenever they took place, of bringing men back to the true standard of +right; but when they came to be of rarer occurrence, they left men more leisure +to grow corrupted, and were attended by greater danger and disturbance. +Wherefore, between one and another of these vindications of the laws, no more +than ten years, at most, ought to intervene; because after that time men begin +to change their manners and to disregard the laws; and if nothing occur to +recall the idea of punishment, and unless fear resume its hold on their minds, +so many offenders suddenly spring up together that it is impossible to punish +them without danger. And to this purport it used to be said by those who ruled +Florence from the year 1434 to 1494, that their government could hardly be +maintained unless it was renewed every five years; by which they meant that it +was necessary for them to arouse the same terror and alarm in men’s +minds, as they inspired when they first assumed the government, and when all +who offended against their authority were signally chastised. For when the +recollection of such chastisement has died out, men are emboldened to engage in +new designs, and to speak ill of their rulers; for which the only remedy is to +restore things to what they were at first. +</p> + +<p> +A republic may, likewise, be brought back to its original form, without +recourse to ordinances for enforcing justice, by the mere virtues of a single +citizen, by reason that these virtues are of such influence and authority that +good men love to imitate them, and bad men are ashamed to depart from them. +Those to whom Rome owed most for services of this sort, were Horatius Cocles, +Mutius Scævola, the two Decii, Atilius Regulus, and divers others, whose rare +excellence and generous example wrought for their city almost the same results +as might have been effected by ordinances and laws. And if to these instances +of individual worth had been added, every ten years, some signal enforcement of +justice, it would have been impossible for Rome ever to have grown corrupted. +But when both of these incitements to virtuous behavior began to recur less +frequently, corruption spread, and after the time of Atilius Regulus, no like +example was again witnessed. For though the two Catos came later, so great an +interval had elapsed before the elder Cato appeared, and again, so long a +period intervened between him and the younger, and these two, moreover, stood +so much alone, that it was impossible for them, by their influence, to work any +important change; more especially for the younger, who found Rome so much +corrupted that he could do nothing to improve his fellow-citizens. +</p> + +<p> +This is enough to say concerning commonwealths, but as regards sects, we see +from the instance of our own religion that here too a like renewal is needed. +For had not this religion of ours been brought back to its original condition +by Saint Francis and Saint Dominick, it must soon have been utterly +extinguished. They, however, by their voluntary poverty, and by their imitation +of the life of Christ, rekindled in the minds of men the dying flame of faith; +and by the efficacious rules which they established averted from our Church +that ruin which the ill lives of its prelates and heads must otherwise have +brought upon it. For living in poverty, and gaining great authority with the +people by confessing them and preaching to them, they got them to believe that +it is evil to speak ill even of what is evil; and that it is good to be +obedient to rulers, who, if they do amiss, may be left to the judgment of God. +By which teaching these rulers are encouraged to behave as badly as they can, +having no fear of punishments which they neither see nor credit. Nevertheless, +it is this renewal which has maintained, and still maintains, our religion. +</p> + +<p> +Kingdoms also stand in need of a like renewal, and to have their laws restored +to their former force; and we see how, by attending to this, the kingdom of +France has profited. For that kingdom, more than any other, lies under the +control of its laws and ordinances, which are maintained by its parliaments, +and more especially by the parliament of Paris, from which last they derive +fresh vigour whenever they have to be enforced against any prince of the realm; +for this assembly pronounces sentence even against the king himself. Heretofore +this parliament has maintained its name as the fearless champion of the laws +against the nobles of the land; but should it ever at any future time suffer +wrongs to pass unpunished, and should offences multiply, either these will have +to be corrected with great disturbance to the State, or the kingdom itself must +fall to pieces. +</p> + +<p> +This, then, is our conclusion—that nothing is so necessary in any +society, be it a religious sect, a kingdom, or a commonwealth, as to restore to +it that reputation which it had at first, and to see that it is provided either +with wholesome laws, or with good men whose actions may effect the same ends, +without need to resort to external force. For although this last may sometimes, +as in the case of Rome, afford an efficacious remedy, it is too hazardous a +remedy to make us ever wish to employ it. +</p> + +<p> +And that all may understand how much the actions of particular citizens helped +to make Rome great, and how many admirable results they wrought in that city, I +shall now proceed to set them forth and examine them; with which survey this +Third Book of mine, and last division of the First Decade of Titus Livius, +shall be brought to a close. But, although great and notable actions were done +by the Roman kings, nevertheless, since history has treated of these at much +length, here I shall pass them over, and say no more about these princes, save +as regards certain things done by them with an eye to their private interest. I +shall begin, therefore, with Brutus, the father of Roman freedom. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER II.—<i>That on occasion it is wise to feign Folly.</i></h2> + +<p> +Never did any man by the most splendid achievements gain for himself so great a +name for wisdom and prudence as is justly due to Junius Brutus for feigning to +be a fool. And although Titus Livius mentions one cause only as having led him +to assume this part, namely, that he might live more securely and look after +his patrimony; yet on considering his behavior we may believe that in +counterfeiting folly it was also his object to escape notice, and so find +better convenience to overthrow the kings, and to free his country whenever an +occasion offered. That this was in his mind is seen first of all from the +interpretation he gave to the oracle of Apollo, when, to render the gods +favourable to his designs, he pretended to stumble, and secretly kissed his +mother earth; and, again, from this, that on the death of Lucretia, though her +father, her husband, and others of her kinsmen were present, he was the first +to draw the dagger from her wound, and bind the bystanders by oath never more +to suffer king to reign in Rome. +</p> + +<p> +From his example all who are discontented with their prince are taught, first +of all, to measure, and to weigh their strength, and if they find themselves +strong enough to disclose their hostility and proclaim open war, then to take +that course as at once the nobler and less dangerous; but, if too weak to make +open war, then sedulously to court the favour of the prince, using to that end +all such methods as they may judge needful, adapting themselves to his +pleasures, and showing delight in whatever they see him delight in. Such an +intimacy, in the first place, enables you to live securely, and permits you, +without incurring any risk, to share the happy fortunes of the prince, while it +affords you every facility for carrying out your plans. Some, no doubt, will +tell you that you should not stand so near the prince as to be involved in his +downfall; nor yet at such a distance that when he falls you shall be too far +off to use the occasion for rising on his ruin. But although this mean course, +could we only follow it, were certainly the best, yet, since I believe it to be +impracticable, we must resort to the methods above indicated, and either keep +altogether aloof, or else cleave closely to the prince. Whosoever does +otherwise, if he be of great station, lives in constant peril; nor will it +avail him to say, “I concern myself with nothing; I covet neither honours +nor preferment; my sole wish is to live a quiet and peaceful life.” For +such excuses, though they be listened to, are not accepted; nor can any man of +great position, however much and sincerely he desire it, elect to live this +life of tranquillity since his professions will not be believed; so that +although he might be contented to be let alone, others will not suffer him to +be so. Wherefore, like Brutus, men must feign folly; and to play the part +effectively, and so as to please their prince, must say, do, see, and praise +things contrary to their inclinations. +</p> + +<p> +But now, having spoken of the prudence shown by Brutus when he sought to +recover the freedom of Rome, let us next speak of the severity which he used to +maintain it. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER III.—<i>That to preserve a newly acquired Freedom we must +slay the Sons of Brutus.</i></h2> + +<p> +The severity used by Brutus in preserving for Rome the freedom he had won for +her, was not less necessary than useful. The spectacle of a father sitting on +the judgment, and not merely sentencing his own sons to death, but being +himself present at their execution, affords an example rare in history. But +those who study the records of ancient times will understand, that after a +change in the form of a government, whether it be from a commonwealth to a +tyranny or from a tyranny to a commonwealth, those who are hostile to the new +order of things must always be visited with signal punishment. So that he who +sets up as a tyrant and slays not Brutus, and he who creates a free government +and slays not the sons of Brutus, can never maintain himself long. But since I +have elsewhere treated of this matter at large, I shall merely refer to what +has there been said concerning it, and shall cite here one instance only, +happening in our own days, and memorable in the history of our country. +</p> + +<p> +I speak of Piero Soderini, who thought by his patience and goodness to overcome +the very same temper which prompted the sons of Brutus to revert to the old +government, and who failed in the endeavour. For although his sagacity should +have taught him the necessity, while chance and the ambition of those who +attacked him furnished him with the opportunity of making an end of them, he +never could resolve to strike the blow; and not merely believed himself able to +subdue disaffection by patience and kindness, and to mitigate the enmity of +particular men by the rewards he held out to them, but also persuaded himself, +and often declared in the presence of his friends, that he could not confront +opposition openly, nor crush his adversaries, without assuming extraordinary +powers and passing laws destructive of civil equality; which measures, although +not afterward used by him for tyrannical ends, would so alarm the community, +that after his death they would never again consent to appoint a Gonfalonier +for life, an office which he judged it essential both to maintain and +strengthen. Now although these scruples of his were wise and good, we ought +never out of regard for what is good, to suffer an evil to run its course, +since it may well happen that the evil will prevail over the good. And Piero +should have believed that as his acts and intentions were to be judged by +results, he might, if he lived and if fortune befriended him, have made it +clear to all, that what he did was done to preserve his country, and not from +personal ambition; and he might have so contrived matters that no successor of +his could ever turn to bad ends the means which he had used for good ends. But +he was misled by a preconceived opinion, and failed to understand that ill-will +is not to be vanquished by time nor propitiated by favours. And, so, from not +knowing how to resemble Brutus, he lost power, and fame, and was driven an +exile from his country. +</p> + +<p> +That it is as hard a matter to preserve a princedom as it is to preserve a +commonwealth, will be shown in the Chapter following. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER IV.—<i>That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while +those live whom he has deprived of it.</i></h2> + +<p> +From what befell the elder Tarquin at the hands of the sons of Ancus, and +Servius Tullius at the hands of Tarquin the Proud, we see what an arduous and +perilous course it is to strip a king of his kingdom and yet suffer him to live +on, hoping to conciliate him by benefits. We see, too, how the elder Tarquin +was ruined by his belief that he held the kingdom by a just title, since it had +been given him by the people and confirmed to him by the senate, never +suspecting that the sons of Ancus would be so stirred by resentment that it +would be impossible to content them with what contented all the rest of Rome. +Servius Tullius again, was ruined through believing that he could conciliate +the sons of Ancus by loading them with favours. +</p> + +<p> +By the fate of the first of these kings every prince may be warned that he can +never live securely in his princedom so long as those from whom he has taken it +survive; while the fate of the second should remind all rulers that old +injuries are not to be healed by subsequent benefits, and least of all when the +new benefit is less in degree than the injury suffered. And, truly, Servius was +wanting in wisdom when he imagined that the sons of Tarquin would contentedly +resign themselves to be the sons-in-law of one whom they thought should be +their subject. For the desire to reign is so prevailing a passion, that it +penetrates the minds not only of those who are rightful heirs, but also of +those who are not; as happened with the wife of the younger Tarquin, who was +daughter to Servius, but who, possessed by this madness, and setting at naught +all filial duty, incited her husband to take her father’s kingdom, and +with it his life; so much nobler did she esteem it to be a queen than the +daughter of a king. But while the elder Tarquin and Servius Tullius lost the +kingdom from not knowing how to secure themselves against those whom they had +deprived of it, the younger Tarquin lost it from not observing the ordinances +of the old kings, as shall be shown in the following Chapter. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER V.—<i>How an Hereditary King may come to lose his +Kingdom.</i></h2> + +<p> +Tarquin the Proud, when he had put Servius Tullius to death, inasmuch as the +latter left no heirs, took secure possession of the kingdom, having nothing to +fear from any of those dangers which had stood in the way of his predecessors. +And although the means whereby he made himself king were hateful and monstrous, +nevertheless, had he adhered to the ancient ordinances of the earlier kings, he +might have been endured, nor would he have aroused both senate and people to +combine against him and deprive him of his government. It was not, therefore, +because his son Sextus violated Lucretia that Tarquin was driven out, but +because he himself had violated the laws of the kingdom, and governed as a +tyrant, stripping the senate of all authority, and bringing everything under +his own control. For all business which formerly had been transacted in public, +and with the sanction of the senate, he caused to be transacted in his palace, +on his own responsibility, and to the displeasure of every one else, and so +very soon deprived Rome of whatever freedom she had enjoyed under her other +kings. +</p> + +<p> +Nor was it enough for him to have the Fathers his enemies, but he must needs +also kindle the commons against him, wearing them out with mere mechanic +labours, very different from the enterprises in which they had been employed by +his predecessors; so that when Rome overflowed with instances of his cruelty +and pride, he had already disposed the minds of all the citizens to rebel +whenever they found the opportunity. Wherefore, had not occasion offered in the +violence done to Lucretia, some other had soon been found to bring about the +same result. But had Tarquin lived like the other kings, when Sextus his son +committed that outrage, Brutus and Collatinus would have had recourse to him to +punish the offender, and not to the commons of Rome. And hence let princes +learn that from the hour they first violate those laws, customs, and usages +under which men have lived for a great while, they begin to weaken the +foundations of their authority. And should they, after they have been stripped +of that authority, ever grow wise enough to see how easily princedoms are +preserved by those who are content to follow prudent counsels, the sense of +their loss will grieve them far more, and condemn them to a worse punishment +than any they suffer at the hands of others. For it is far easier to be loved +by good men than by bad, and to obey the laws than to seek to control them. +</p> + +<p> +And to learn what means they must use to retain their authority, they have only +to take example by the conduct of good princes, such as Timoleon of Corinth, +Aratus of Sicyone, and the like, in whose lives they will find such security +and content, both on the side of the ruler and the ruled, as ought to stir them +with the desire to imitate them, which, for the reasons already given, it is +easy for them to do. For men, when they are well governed, ask no more, nor +look for further freedom; as was the case with the peoples governed by the two +whom I have named, whom they constrained to continue their rulers while they +lived, though both of them sought repeatedly to return to private life. +</p> + +<p> +But because, in this and the two preceding Chapters, I have noticed the +ill-will which arose against the kings, the plots contrived by the sons of +Brutus against their country, and those directed against the elder Tarquin and +Servius Tullius, it seems to me not out of place to discourse of these matters +more at length in the following Chapter, as deserving the attention both of +princes and private citizens. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER VI.—<i>Of Conspiracies.</i></h2> + +<p> +It were an omission not to say something on the subject of conspiracies, these +being a source of much danger both to princes and to private men. For we see +that many more princes have lost their lives and states through these than in +open warfare; power to wage open war upon a prince being conceded to few, +whereas power to conspire against him is denied to none. On the other hand, +since conspiracies are attended at every stage by difficulties and dangers, no +more hazardous or desperate undertakings can be engaged in by any private +citizen; whence it comes that while many conspiracies are planned, few effect +their object. Wherefore, to put princes on their guard against these dangers, +and to make subjects more cautious how they take part in them, and rather learn +to live content under whatever government fortune has assigned them, I shall +treat of them at length, without omitting any noteworthy circumstance which may +serve for the instruction of either. Though, indeed, this is a golden sentence +Of Cornelius Tacitus, wherein he says that “<i>the past should have our +reverence, the present our obedience, and that we should wish for good princes, +but put up with any.</i>”<a href="#fn11" name="fnref11" id="fnref11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> +For assuredly whosoever does otherwise is likely to bring ruin both on himself +and on his country. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn11" id="fn11"></a> <a href="#fnref11">[11]</a> +<i>Tac. Hist.</i> iv. 8. +</p> + +<p> +But, to go deeper into the matter, we have first of all to examine against whom +conspiracies are directed; and we shall find that men conspire either against +their country or their prince; and it is of these two kinds of conspiracy that +at present I desire to speak. For of conspiracies which have for their object +the surrender of cities to enemies who are besieging them, and of all others +contrived for like ends, I have already said enough. +</p> + +<p> +First, then, I shall treat of those conspiracies which are directed against a +prince, and begin by inquiring into their causes, which are manifold, but of +which one is more momentous than all the rest; I mean, the being hated by the +whole community. For it may reasonably be assumed, that when a prince has drawn +upon himself this universal hatred, he must also have given special offence to +particular men, which they will be eager to avenge. And this eagerness will be +augmented by the feeling of general ill-will which the prince is seen to have +incurred. A prince ought, therefore, to avoid this load of public hatred. How +he is to do so I need not stop here to explain, having discussed the matter +already in another place; but if he can guard against this, offence given to +particular men will expose him to but few attacks. One reason being, that there +are few men who think so much of an injury done them as to run great risks to +revenge it; another, that assuming them to have both the disposition and the +courage to avenge themselves, they are restrained by the universal favour which +they see entertained towards the prince. +</p> + +<p> +Injuries are either to a man’s life, to his property, or to his honour. +As regards the first, they who threaten injuries to life incur more danger than +they who actually inflict them; or rather, while great danger is incurred in +threatening, none at all is incurred from inflicting such injuries. For the +dead are past thinking of revenge; and those who survive, for the most part +leave such thoughts to the dead. But he whose life is threatened, finding +himself forced by necessity either to do or suffer, becomes a man most +dangerous to the prince, as shall be fully explained hereafter. +</p> + +<p> +After menaces to life, injuries to property and honour stir men more than any +others, and of these a Prince has most to beware. For he can never strip a man +so bare of his possessions as not to leave him some weapon wherewith to redress +his wrongs, nor ever so far dishonour him as to quell the stubborn spirit which +prompts revenge. Of all dishonours those done to the women of a household are +the worst; after which come such personal indignities as nerved the arm of +Pausanias against Philip of Macedon, and of many another against other princes; +and, in our own days, it was no other reason that moved Giulio Belanti to +conspire against Pandolfo, lord of Siena, than that Pandolfo, who had given him +his daughter to wife, afterwards took her from him, as presently shall be told. +Chief among the causes which led the Pazzi to conspire against the Medici, was +the law passed by the latter depriving them of the inheritance of Giovanni +Bonromei. +</p> + +<p> +Another most powerful motive to conspire against a prince is the desire men +feel to free their country from a usurper. This it was which impelled Brutus +and Cassius to conspire against Cæsar, and countless others against such +tyrants as Phalaris, Dionysius, and the like. Against this humour no tyrant can +guard, except by laying down his tyranny; which as none will do, few escape an +unhappy end. Whence the verses of Juvenal:— +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“Few tyrants die a peaceful death, and few<br/> +The kings who visit Proserpine’s dread lord,<br/> +Unscathed by wounds and blood.”<a href="#fn12" name="fnref12" id="fnref12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn12" id="fn12"></a> <a href="#fnref12">[12]</a> +Ad generum Cereris sine caede et vulnere pauci<br/> +Descendunt reges, et sicca morte tiranni.<br/> + <i>Juv. Sat.</i> x. 112. +</p> + +<p> +Great, as I have said already, are the dangers which men run in conspiring; for +at all times they are in peril, whether in contriving, in executing, or after +execution. And since in conspiracies either many are engaged, or one only (for +although it cannot properly be said of <i>one</i> man that he <i>conspires</i>, +there may exist in him the fixed resolve to put the prince to death), it is +only the solitary plotter who escapes the first of these three stages of +danger. For he runs no risk before executing his design, since as he imparts it +to none, there is none to bring it to the ear of the prince. A deliberate +resolve like this may be conceived by a person in any rank of life, high or +low, base or noble, and whether or no he be the familiar of his prince. For +every one must, at some time or other, have leave to speak to the prince, and +whoever has this leave has opportunity to accomplish his design. Pausanias, of +whom we have made mention so often, slew Philip of Macedon as he walked between +his son and his son-in-law to the temple, surrounded by a thousand armed +guards. Pausanias indeed was noble, and known to the prince, but Ferdinand of +Spain was stabbed in the neck by a poor and miserable Spaniard; and though the +wound was not mortal, it sufficed to show that neither courage nor opportunity +were wanting to the would-be-assassin. A Dervish, or Turkish priest, drew his +scimitar on Bajazet, father of the Sultan now reigning, and if he did not wound +him, it was from no lack either of daring or of opportunity. And I believe that +there are many who in their minds desire the deed, no punishment or danger +attending the mere wish, though there be but few who dare do it. For since few +or none who venture, escape death, few are willing to go forward to certain +destruction. +</p> + +<p> +But to pass from these solitary attempts to those in which several are engaged, +I affirm it to be shown by history that all such plots have been contrived by +men of great station, or by those who have been on terms of close intimacy with +the prince, since no others, not being downright madmen, would ever think of +conspiring. For men of humble rank, and such as are not the intimates of their +prince, are neither fed by the hopes nor possessed of the opportunities +essential for such attempts. Because, in the first place, men of low degree +will never find any to keep faith with them, none being moved to join in their +schemes by those expectations which encourage men to run great risks; +wherefore, so soon as their design has been imparted to two or three, they are +betrayed and ruined. Or, assuming them fortunate enough to have no traitor of +their number, they will be so hampered in the execution of their plot by the +want of easy access to the prince, that they are sure to perish in the mere +attempt. For if even men of great position, who have ready access to the +prince, succumb to the difficulties which I shall presently notice, those +difficulties must be infinitely increased in the case of men who are without +these advantages. And because when life and property are at stake men are not +utterly reckless, on perceiving themselves to be weak they grow cautious, and +though cursing the tyrant in their hearts, are content to endure him, and to +wait until some one of higher station than they, comes forward to redress their +wrongs. So that should we ever find these weaklings attempting anything, we may +commend their courage rather than their prudence. +</p> + +<p> +We see, however, that the great majority of conspirators have been persons of +position and the familiars of their prince, and that their plots have been as +often the consequence of excessive indulgence as of excessive injury; as when +Perennius conspired against Commodus, Plautianus against Severus, and Sejanus +against Tiberius; all of whom had been raised by their masters to such wealth, +honours, and dignities, that nothing seemed wanting to their authority save the +imperial name. That they might not lack this also, they fell to conspiring +against their prince; but in every instance their conspiracies had the end +which their ingratitude deserved. +</p> + +<p> +The only instance in recent times of such attempts succeeding, is the +conspiracy of Jacopo IV. d’Appiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti, lord +of Pisa. For Jacopo, who had been bred and brought up by Piero, and loaded by +him with honours, deprived him of his State. Similar to this, in our own days, +was the conspiracy of Coppola against King Ferdinand of Aragon. For Coppola had +reached such a pitch of power that he seemed to himself to have everything but +sovereignty; in seeking to obtain which he lost his life; though if any plot +entered into by a man of great position could be expected to succeed, this +certainly might, being contrived, as we may say, by another king, and by one +who had the amplest opportunities for its accomplishment. But that lust of +power which blinds men to dangers darkened the minds of those to whom the +execution of the scheme was committed; who, had they only known how to add +prudence to their villainy, could hardly have missed their aim. +</p> + +<p> +The prince, therefore, who would guard himself against plots, ought more to +fear those men to whom he has been too indulgent, than those to whom he has +done great wrongs. For the latter lack opportunities which the former have in +abundance; and the moving cause is equally strong in both, lust of power being +at least as strong a passion as lust of revenge. Wherefore, a prince should +entrust his friends with so much authority only as leaves a certain interval +between his position and theirs; that between the two something be still left +them to desire. Otherwise it will be strange if he do not fare like those +princes who have been named above. +</p> + +<p> +But to return from this digression, I say, that having shown it to be necessary +that conspirators should be men of great station, and such as have ready access +to the prince, we have next to consider what have been the results of their +plots, and to trace the causes which have made them succeed or fail. Now, as I +have said already, we find that conspiracies are attended by danger at three +stages: before during, and after their execution; for which reason very few of +them have had a happy issue; it being next to impossible to surmount all these +different dangers successfully. And to begin with those which are incurred +beforehand, and which are graver than all the rest, I say that he must be both +very prudent and very fortunate who, when contriving a conspiracy, does not +suffer his secret to be discovered. +</p> + +<p> +Conspiracies are discovered either by disclosures made, or by conjecture. +Disclosures are made through the treachery or folly of those to whom you +communicate your design. Treachery is to be looked for, because you can impart +your plans only to such persons as you believe ready to face death on your +behalf, or to those who are discontented with the prince. Of men whom you can +trust thus implicitly, one or two may be found; but when you have to open your +designs to many, they cannot all be of this nature; and their goodwill towards +you must be extreme if they are not daunted by the danger and by fear of +punishment. Moreover men commonly deceive themselves in respect of the love +which they imagine others bear them, nor can ever be sure of it until they have +put it to the proof. But to make proof of it in a matter like this is very +perilous; and even if you have proved it already, and found it true in some +other dangerous trial, you cannot assume that there will be the same fidelity +here, since this far transcends every other kind of danger. Again, if you gauge +a man’s fidelity by his discontent with the prince, you may easily +deceive yourself; for so soon as you have taken this discontented man into your +confidence, you have supplied him with the means whereby he may become +contented; so that either his hatred of the prince must be great indeed, or +your influence over him extraordinary, if it keep him faithful. Hence it comes +that so many conspiracies have been discovered and crushed in their earliest +stage, and that when the secret is preserved among many accomplices for any +length of time, it is looked on as a miracle; as in the case of the conspiracy +of Piso against Nero, and, in our own days, in that of the Pazzi against +Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici; which last, though more than fifty +persons were privy to it, was not discovered until it came to be carried out. +</p> + +<p> +Conspiracies are disclosed through the imprudence of a conspirator when he +talks so indiscreetly that some servant, or other person not in the plot, +overhears him; as happened with the sons of Brutus, who, when treating with the +envoys of Tarquin, were overheard by a slave, who became their accuser; or else +through your own weakness in imparting your secret to some woman or boy whom +you love, or to some other such light person; as when Dymnus, who was one of +those who conspired with Philotas against Alexander the Great, revealed the +plot to Nicomachus, a youth whom he loved, who at once told Cebalinus, and +Cebalinus the king. +</p> + +<p> +Of discoveries by conjecture we have an instance in the conspiracy of Piso +against Nero; for Scaevinus, one of the conspirators, the day before he was to +kill Nero, made his will, liberated all his slaves and gave them money, and +bade Milichus, his freedman, sharpen his old rusty dagger, and have bandages +ready for binding up wounds. From all which preparations Milichus conjecturing +what work was in hand, accused Scaevinus before Nero; whereupon Scaevinus was +arrested, and with him Natalis, another of the conspirators, who the day before +had been seen to speak with him for a long time in private; and when the two +differed in their account of what then passed between them, they were put to +the torture and forced to confess the truth. In this way the conspiracy was +brought to light, to the ruin of all concerned. +</p> + +<p> +Against these causes of the discovery of conspiracies it is impossible so to +guard as that either through treachery, want of caution, or levity, the secret +shall not be found out, whenever more than three or four persons are privy to +it. And whenever more than one conspirator is arrested, the plot is certain to +be detected, because no two persons can perfectly agree in a false account of +what has passed between them. If only one be taken, should he be a man of +resolute courage, he may refuse to implicate his comrades; but they on their +part must have no less courage, to stay quiet where they are, and not betray +themselves by flight; for if courage be absent anywhere, whether in him who is +taken or in those still at large, the conspiracy is revealed. And what is +related by Titus Livius as having happened in the conspiracy against +Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, is most extraordinary, namely, that on the +capture of one of the conspirators, named Theodorus, he, with great fortitude, +withheld the names of all his accomplices, and accused friends of the tyrant; +while his companions, on their part, trusted so completely in his courage, that +not one of them quitted Syracuse or showed any sign of fear. +</p> + +<p> +All these dangers, therefore, which attend the contrivance of a plot, must be +passed through before you come to its execution; or if you would escape them, +you must observe the following precautions: Your first and surest, nay, to say +truth, your only safeguard, is to leave your accomplices no time to accuse you; +for which reason you must impart the affair to them, only at the moment when +you mean it to be carried out, and not before. Those who have followed this +course have wholly escaped the preliminary dangers of conspiracies, and, +generally speaking, the others also; indeed, I may say that they have all +succeeded, and that it is open to every prudent man to act as they did. It will +be enough to give two instances of plots effected in this way. Nelematus, +unable to endure the tyranny of Aristotimus, despot of Epirus, assembling many +of his friends and kinsmen in his house, exhorted them to free their country; +and when some of them asked for time to consider and mature their plans, he +bade his slaves close the doors, and told those assembled that unless they +swore to go at once and do as he directed he would make them over to +Aristotimus as prisoners. Alarmed by his threats, they bound themselves by a +solemn oath, and going forth at once and without delay, successfully carried +out his bidding. A certain Magus having fraudulently usurped the throne of +Persia; Ortanes, a grandee of that realm, discovering the fraud, disclosed it +to six others of the chief nobility, telling them that it behoved them to free +the kingdom from the tyranny of this impostor. And when some among them asked +for time, Darius, who was one of the six summoned by Ortanes, stood up and +said, “Either we go at once to do this deed, or I go to the Magus to +accuse you all.” Whereupon, all rising together, without time given to +any to change his mind, they went forth and succeeded in effecting their end. +Not unlike these instances was the plan taken by the Etolians to rid themselves +of Nabis, the Spartan tyrant, to whom, under pretence of succouring him, they +sent Alasamenes, their fellow-citizen, with two hundred foot soldiers and +thirty horsemen. For they imparted their real design to Alasamenes only, +charging the rest, under pain of exile, to obey him in whatever he commanded. +Alasamenes repaired to Sparta, and never divulged his commission till the time +came for executing it; and so succeeded in putting Nabis to death. +</p> + +<p> +It was, therefore, by the precautions they observed, that the persons of whom I +have just now spoken escaped all those perils that attend the contrivance of +conspiracies; and any following their example may expect the like good fortune. +And that all may learn to do as they did I shall notice the case of Piso, of +which mention has before been made. By reason of his rank, his reputation, and +the intimate terms on which he lived with Nero, who trusted him without +reserve, and would often come to his garden to sup with him, Piso was able to +gain the friendship of many persons of spirit and courage, and well fitted in +every way to take part in his plot against the emperor, which, under these +circumstances, might easily have been carried out. For when Nero came to his +garden, Piso could readily have communicated his design to those friends of +his, and with suitable words have encouraged them to do what, in fact, they +would not have had time to withdraw from, and was certain to succeed. And were +we to examine all similar attempts, it would be seen that there are few which +might not have been effected in the manner shown. But since most men are very +ignorant of practical affairs, they commit the gravest blunders, especially in +matters which lie, as this does, a little way out of the beaten track. +</p> + +<p> +Wherefore, the contriver of a plot ought never, if he can help it, to +communicate his design until the moment when it is to be executed; or if he +must communicate it, then to some one man only, with whom he has long been +intimate, and whom he knows to be moved by the same feelings as himself. To +find one such person is far easier than to find several, and, at the same time, +involves less risk; for though this one man play you false, you are not left +altogether without resource, as you are when your accomplices are numerous. For +I have heard it shrewdly said that to one man you may impart anything, since, +unless you have been led to commit yourself by writing, your denial will go as +far as his assertion. Shun writing, therefore, as you would a rock, for there +is nothing so damning as a letter under your own hand. +</p> + +<p> +Plautianus, desiring to procure the deaths of the Emperor Severus and his son +Caracalla, intrusted the business to the tribune Saturninus, who, being more +disposed to betray than obey Plautianus, but at the same time afraid that, if +it came to laying a charge, Plautianus might be believed sooner than he, asked +him for a written authority, that his commission might be credited. Blinded by +ambition, Plautianus complied, and forthwith was accused by Saturninus and +found guilty; whereas, but for that written warrant, together with other +corroborating proofs, he must have escaped by his bold denial of the charge. +Against the testimony of a single witness, you have thus some defence, unless +convicted by your own handwriting, or by other circumstantial proof against +which you must guard. A woman, named Epicharis, who had formerly been a +mistress of Nero, was privy to Piso’s conspiracy, and thinking it might +be useful to have the help of a certain captain of triremes whom Nero had among +his body-guards, she acquainted him with the plot, but not with the names of +the plotters. This fellow, turning traitor, and accusing Epicharis to Nero, so +stoutly did she deny the charge, that Nero, confounded by her effrontery, let +her go. +</p> + +<p> +In imparting a plot to a single person there are, therefore, two risks: one, +that he may come forward of his own accord to accuse you; the other, that if +arrested on suspicion, or on some proof of his guilt, he may, on being +convicted, in the hope to escape punishment, betray you. But in neither of +these dangers are you left without a defence; since you may meet the one by +ascribing the charge to the malice of your accuser, and the other by alleging +that the witness his been forced by torture to say what is untrue. The wisest +course, however, is to impart your design to none, but to act like those who +have been mentioned above; or if you impart it, then to one only: for although +even in this course there be a certain degree of danger, it is far less than +when many are admitted to your confidence. +</p> + +<p> +A case nearly resembling that just now noticed, is where an emergency, so +urgent as to leave you no time to provide otherwise for your safety, constrains +you to do to a prince what you see him minded to do to you. A necessity of this +sort leads almost always to the end desired, as two instances may suffice to +show. Among the closest friends and intimates of the Emperor Commodus, were two +captains of the pretorian guards, Letus and Electus, while among the most +favoured of his distresses was a certain Martia. But because these three often +reproved him for his manner of living, as disgraceful to himself and to his +station, he resolved to rid himself of them; and so wrote their names, along +with those of certain others whom he meant should be put to death the next +night, in a list which he placed under the pillow of his bed. But on his going +to bathe, a boy, who was a favourite of his, while playing about his room and +on his bed, found the list, and coming out of the chamber with it in his hand, +was met by Martia, who took it from him, and on reading it and finding what it +contained, sent for Letus and Electus. And all three recognizing the danger in +which they stood, resolved to be beforehand with the tyrant, and losing no +time, murdered him that very night. +</p> + +<p> +The Emperor Caracalla, being with his armies in Mesopotamia, had with him +Macrinus, who was more of a statesman than a soldier, as his prefect. But +because princes who are not themselves good are always afraid lest others treat +them as they deserve, Caracalla wrote to his friend Maternianus in Rome to +learn from the astrologers whether any man had ambitious designs upon the +empire, and to send him word. Maternianus, accordingly, wrote back that such +designs were entertained by Macrinus. But this letter, ere it reached the +emperor, fell into the hands of Macrinus, who, seeing when he read it that he +must either put Caracalla to death before further letters arrived from Rome, or +else die himself, committed the business to a centurion, named Martialis, whom +he trusted, and whose brother had been slain by Caracalla a few days before, +who succeeded in killing the emperor. +</p> + +<p> +We see, therefore, that an urgency which leaves no room for delay has almost +the same results as the method already noticed as followed by Nelematus of +Epirus. We see, too, what I remarked almost at the outset of this Discourse, +that the threats of princes expose them to greater danger than the wrongs they +actually inflict, and lead to more active conspiracies: and, therefore, that a +prince should be careful not to threaten; since men are either to be treated +kindly or else got rid of, but never brought to such a pass that they have to +choose between slaying and being slain. +</p> + +<p> +As to the dangers attending the execution of plots, these result either from +some change made in the plan, or from a failure in courage on the part of him +who is to carry it out; or else from some mistake he falls into through want of +foresight, or from his not giving the affair its finishing stroke, as when some +are left alive whom it was meant to put to death. Now, nothing causes so much +disturbance and hindrance in human affairs, as to be forced, at a +moment’s notice and without time allowed for reflection, to vary your +plan of action and adopt a different one from that fixed on at the first. And +if such changes cause confusion anywhere, it is in matters appertaining to war, +and in enterprises of the kind we are now speaking of; for in such affairs as +these, there is nothing so essential as that men be prepared to do the exact +thing intrusted to them. But when men have for many days together turned their +whole thoughts to doing a thing in a certain way and in a certain order, and +the way and order are suddenly altered, it is impossible but that they should +be disconcerted and the whole scheme ruined. For which reason, it is far better +to do everything in accordance with the preconcerted plan, though it be seen to +be attended with some disadvantages, than, in order to escape these, to involve +yourself in an infinity of dangers. And this will happen when you depart from +your original design without time given to form a new one. For when time is +given you may manage as you please. +</p> + +<p> +The conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici is +well known. The scheme agreed on was to give a banquet to the Cardinal S. +Giorgio, at which the brothers should be put to death. To each of the +conspirators a part was assigned: to one the murder, to another the seizure of +the palace, while a third was to ride through the streets and call on the +people to free themselves. But it so chanced that at a time when the Pazzi, the +Medici, and the Cardinal were all assembled in the cathedral church of Florence +to hear High Mass, it became known that Giuliano would not be present at the +banquet; whereupon the conspirators, laying their heads together, resolved to +do in church what they were to have done elsewhere. This, however, deranged the +whole scheme. For Giovambattista of Montesecco, would have no hand in the +murder if it was to be done in a church; and the whole distribution of parts +had in consequence to be changed; when, as those to whom the new parts were +assigned had no time allowed them to nerve their minds to their new tasks, they +managed matters so badly that they were overpowered in their attempt. +</p> + +<p> +Courage fails a conspirator either from his own poorness of spirit, or from his +being overcome by some feeling of reverence. For such majesty and awe attend +the person of a prince, that it may well happen that he softens or dismays his +executioners. When Caius Marius was taken by the people of Minturnum, the slave +sent in to slay him, overawed by the bearing of the man, and by the memories +which his name called up, became unnerved, and powerless to perform his office. +And if this influence was exercised by one who was a prisoner, and in chains, +and overwhelmed by adverse fortune, how much more must reverence be inspired by +a prince who is free and uncontrolled, surrounded by his retinue and by all the +pomp and splendour of his station; whose dignity confounds, and whose +graciousness conciliates. +</p> + +<p> +Certain persons conspiring against Sitalces, king of Thrace, fixed a day for +his murder, and assembled at the place appointed, whither the king had already +come. Yet none of them raised a hand to harm him, and all departed without +attempting anything against him or knowing why they refrained; each blaming the +others. And more than once the same folly was repeated, until the plot getting +wind, they were taken and punished for what they might have done, yet durst not +do. +</p> + +<p> +Two brothers of Alfonso, Duke of Ferrara, conspired against him, employing as +their tool a certain priest named Giennes, a singing-man in the service of the +Duke. He, at their request, repeatedly brought the Duke into their company, so +that they had full opportunity to make away with him. Yet neither of them ever +ventured to strike the blow; till at last, their scheme being discovered, they +paid the penalty of their combined cowardice and temerity. Such irresolution +can only have arisen from their being overawed by the majesty of the prince, or +touched by his graciousness. +</p> + +<p> +In the execution of conspiracies, therefore, errors and mishaps arise from a +failure of prudence or courage to which all are subject, when, losing +self-control, they are led in their bewilderment to do and say what they ought +not. That men are thus confounded, and thrown off their balance, could not be +better shown than in the words of Titus Livius, where he describes the +behaviour of Alasamenes the Etolian, at the time when he resolved on the death +of Nabis the Spartan, of whom I have spoken before. For when the time to act +came, and he had disclosed to his followers what they had to do, Livius +represents him as “<i>collecting his thoughts which had grown confused by +dwelling on so desperate an enterprise</i>.” For it is impossible for any +one, though of the most steadfast temper and used to the sight of death and to +handle deadly weapons, not to be perturbed at such a moment. For which reason +we should on such occasions choose for our tools those who have had experience +in similar affairs, and trust no others though reputed of the truest courage. +For in these grave undertakings, no one who is without such experience, however +bold and resolute, is to be trusted. +</p> + +<p> +The confusion of which I speak may either cause you to drop your weapon from +your hand, or to use words which will have the same results. Quintianus being +commanded by Lucilla, sister of Commodus, to slay him, lay in wait for him at +the entrance of the amphitheatre, and rushing upon him with a drawn dagger, +cried out, “<i>The senate sends you this</i>;” which words caused +him to be seized before his blow descended. In like manner Messer Antonio of +Volterra, who as we have elsewhere seen was told off to kill Lorenzo de’ +Medici, exclaimed as he approached him, “<i>Ah traitor!</i>” and +this exclamation proved the salvation of Lorenzo and the ruin of that +conspiracy. +</p> + +<p> +For the reasons now given, a conspiracy against a single ruler may readily +break down in its execution; but a conspiracy against two rulers is not only +difficult, but so hazardous that its success is almost hopeless. For to effect +like actions, at the same time, in different places, is well-nigh impossible; +nor can they be effected at different times, if you would not have one +counteract another. So that if conspiracy against a single ruler be imprudent +and dangerous, to conspire against two, is in the last degree fool-hardy and +desperate. And were it not for the respect in which I hold the historian, I +could not credit as possible what Herodian relates of Plautianus, namely, that +he committed to the centurion Saturninus the task of slaying single-handed both +Severus and Caracalla, they dwelling in different places; for the thing is so +opposed to reason that on no other authority could I be induced to accept it as +true. +</p> + +<p> +Certain young Athenians conspired against Diocles and Hippias, tyrants of +Athens. Diocles they slew; but Hippias, making his escape, avenged him. Chion +and Leonidas of Heraclea, disciples of Plato, conspired against the despots +Clearchus and Satirus. Clearchus fell, but Satirus survived and avenged him. +The Pazzi, of whom we have spoken so often, succeeded in murdering Giuliano +only. From such conspiracies, therefore, as are directed against more heads +than one, all should abstain; for no good is to be got from them, whether for +ourselves, for our country, or for any one else. On the contrary, when those +conspired against escape, they become harsher and more unsufferable than +before, as, in the examples given, Florence, Athens, and Heraclea had cause to +know. True it is that the conspiracy contrived by Pelopidas for the liberation +of his country, had to encounter every conceivable hindrance, and yet had the +happiest end. For Pelopidas had to deal, not with two tyrants only, but with +ten; and so far from having their confidence, could not, being an outlaw, even +approach them. And yet he succeeded in coming to Thebes, in putting the tyrants +to death, and in freeing his country. But whatever he did was done with the aid +of one of the counsellors of the tyrants, a certain Charon, through whom he had +all facilities for executing his design. Let none, however, take this case as a +pattern; for that it was in truth a desperate attempt, and its success a +marvel, was and is the opinion of all historians, who speak of it as a thing +altogether extraordinary and unexampled. +</p> + +<p> +The execution of a plot may be frustrated by some groundless alarm or +unforeseen mischance occurring at the very moment when the scheme is to be +carried out. On the morning on which Brutus and his confederates were to slay +Cæsar, it so happened that Cæsar talked for a great while with Cneus Pompilius +Lenas, one of the conspirators; which some of the others observing, were in +terror that Pompilius was divulging the conspiracy to Cæsar; whose life they +would therefore have attempted then and there, without waiting his arrival in +the senate house, had they not been reassured by seeing that when the +conference ended he showed no sign of unusual emotion. False alarms of this +sort are to be taken into account and allowed for, all the more that they are +easily raised. For he who has not a clear conscience is apt to assume that +others are speaking of him. A word used with a wholly different purpose, may +throw his mind off its balance and lead him to fancy that reference is intended +to the matter he is engaged on, and cause him either to betray the conspiracy +by flight, or to derange its execution by anticipating the time fixed. And the +more there are privy to the conspiracy, the likelier is this to happen. +</p> + +<p> +As to the mischances which may befall, since these are unforeseen, they can +only be instanced by examples which may make men more cautious. Giulio Belanti +of Siena, of whom I have spoken before, from the hate he bore Pandolfo +Petrucci, who had given him his daughter to wife and afterwards taken her from +him, resolved to murder him, and thus chose his time. Almost every day Pandolfo +went to visit a sick kinsman, passing the house of Giulio on the way, who, +remarking this, took measures to have his accomplices ready in his house to +kill Pandolfo as he passed. Wherefore, placing the rest armed within the +doorway, one he stationed at a window to give the signal of Pandolfo’s +approach. It so happened however, that as he came nigh the house, and after the +look-out had given the signal, Pandolfo fell in with a friend who stopped him +to converse; when some of those with him, going on in advance, saw and heard +the gleam and clash of weapons, and so discovered the ambuscade; whereby +Pandolfo was saved, while Giulio with his companions had to fly from Siena. +This plot accordingly was marred, and Giulio’s schemes baulked, in +consequence of a chance meeting. Against such accidents, since they are out of +the common course of things, no provision can be made. Still it is very +necessary to take into account all that may happen, and devise what remedies +you can. +</p> + +<p> +It now only remains for us to consider those dangers which follow after the +execution of a plot. These in fact resolve themselves into one, namely, that +some should survive who will avenge the death of the murdered prince. The part +of avenger is likely to be assumed by a son, a brother, or other kinsman of the +deceased, who in the ordinary course of events might have looked to succeed to +the princedom. And such persons are suffered to live, either from inadvertence, +or from some of the causes noted already, as when Giovann’ Andrea of +Lampognano, with the help of his companions, put to death the Duke of Milan. +For the son and two brothers of the Duke, who survived him, were able to avenge +his death. In cases like this, indeed, the conspirators may be held excused, +since there is nothing they can do to help themselves. But when from +carelessness and want of due caution some one is allowed to live whose death +ought to have been secured, there is no excuse. Certain conspirators, after +murdering the lord, Count Girolamo of Forli, made prisoners of his wife and of +his children who were still very young. By thinking they could not be safe +unless they got possession of the citadel, which the governor refused to +surrender, they obtained a promise from Madonna Caterina, for so the Countess +was named, that on their permitting her to enter the citadel she would cause it +to be given up to them, her children in the mean time remaining with them as +hostages. On which undertaking they suffered her to enter the citadel. But no +sooner had she got inside than she fell to upbraid them from the walls with the +murder of her husband, and to threaten them with every kind of vengeance; and +to show them how little store she set upon her children, told them scoffingly +that she knew how others could be got. In the end, the rebels having no leader +to advise them, and perceiving too late the error into which they had been +betrayed, had to pay the penalty of their rashness by perpetual banishment. +</p> + +<p> +But of all the dangers which may follow on the execution of a plot, none is so +much or so justly to be feared as that the people should be well affected to +the prince whom you have put to death. For against this danger conspirators +have no resource which can ensure their safety. Of this we have example in the +case of Cæsar, who as he had the love of the Roman people was by them avenged; +for they it was who, by driving out the conspirators from Rome, were the cause +that all of them, at different times and in different places, came to violent +ends. +</p> + +<p> +Conspiracies against their country are less danger for those who take part in +them than conspiracies against princes; since there is less risk beforehand, +and though there be the same danger in their execution, there is none +afterwards. Beforehand, the risks are few, because a citizen may use means for +obtaining power without betraying his wishes or designs to any; and unless his +course be arrested, his designs are likely enough to succeed; nay, though laws +be passed to restrain him, he may strike out a new path. This is to be +understood of a commonwealth which has to some degree become corrupted; for in +one wherein there is no taint of corruption, there being no soil in which evil +seed can grow, such designs will never suggest themselves to any citizen. +</p> + +<p> +In a commonwealth, therefore, a citizen may by many means and in many ways +aspire to the princedom without risking destruction, both because republics are +slower than princes are to take alarm, are less suspicious and consequently +less cautious, and because they look with greater reverence upon their great +citizens, who are in this way rendered bolder and more reckless in attacking +them. Any one who has read Sallust’s account of the conspiracy of +Catiline, must remember how, when that conspiracy was discovered, Catiline not +only remained in Rome, but even made his appearance in the senatehouse, where +he was suffered to address the senate in the most insulting terms,—so +scrupulous was that city in protecting the liberty of all its citizens. Nay, +even after he had left Rome and placed himself at the head of his army, +Lentulus and his other accomplices would not have been imprisoned, had not +letters been found upon them clearly establishing their guilt. Hanno, the +foremost citizen of Carthage, aspiring to absolute power, on the occasion of +the marriage of a daughter contrived a plot for administering poison to the +whole senate and so making himself prince. The scheme being discovered, the +senate took no steps against him beyond passing a law to limit the expense of +banquets and marriage ceremonies. So great was the respect they paid to his +quality. +</p> + +<p> +True, the <i>execution</i> of a plot against your country is attended with +greater difficulty and danger, since it seldom happens that, in conspiring +against so many, your own resources are sufficient by themselves; for it is not +every one who, like Cæsar, Agathocles, or Cleomenes, is at the head of an army, +so as to be able at a stroke, and by open force to make himself master of his +country. To such as these, doubtless, the path is safe and easy enough; but +others who have not such an assembled force ready at their command, must effect +their ends either by stratagem and fraud, or with the help of foreign troops. +Of such stratagems and frauds we have an instance in the case of Pisistratus +the Athenian, who after defeating the Megarians and thereby gaining the favour +of his fellow-citizens, showed himself to them one morning covered with wounds +and blood, declaring that he had been thus outraged through the jealousy of the +nobles, and asking that he might have an armed guard assigned for his +protection. With the authority which this lent him, he easily rose to such a +pitch of power as to become tyrant of Athens. In like manner Pandolfo Petrucci, +on his return with the other exiles to Siena, was appointed the command of the +public guard, as a mere office of routine which others had declined. Very soon, +however, this armed force gave him so much importance that he became the +supreme ruler of the State. And many others have followed other plans and +methods, and in the course of time, and without incurring danger, have achieved +their aim. +</p> + +<p> +Conspirators against their country, whether trusting to their own forces or to +foreign aid, have had more or less success in proportion as they have been +favoured by Fortune. Catiline, of whom we spoke just now, was overthrown. +Hanno, who has also been mentioned, failing to accomplish his object by poison, +armed his partisans to the number of many thousands; but both he and they came +to an ill end. On the other hand, certain citizens of Thebes conspiring to +become its tyrants, summoned a Spartan army to their assistance, and usurped +the absolute control of the city. In short, if we examine all the conspiracies +which men have engaged in against their country, we shall find that few or none +have been quelled in their inception, but that all have either succeeded, or +have broken down in their execution. Once executed, they entail no further +risks beyond those implied in the nature of a princedom. For the man who +becomes a tyrant incurs all the natural and ordinary dangers in which a tyranny +involves him, and has no remedies against them save those of which I have +already spoken. +</p> + +<p> +This is all that occurs to me to say on the subject of conspiracies. If I have +noticed those which have been carried out with the sword rather than those +wherein poison has been the instrument, it is because, generally speaking, the +method of proceeding is the same in both. It is true, nevertheless, that +conspiracies which are to be carried out by poison are, by reason of their +uncertainty, attended by greater danger. For since fewer opportunities offer +for their execution, you must have an understanding with persons who can +command opportunities. But it is dangerous to have to depend on others. Again, +many causes may hinder a poisoned draught from proving mortal; as when the +murderers of Commodus, on his vomiting the poison given him, had to strangle +him. +</p> + +<p> +Princes, then, have no worse enemy than conspiracy, for when a conspiracy is +formed against them, it either carries them off, or discredits them: since, if +it succeeds, they die; while, if it be discovered, and the conspirators be put +to death themselves, it will always be believed that the whole affair has been +trumped up by the prince that he might glut his greed and cruelty with the +goods and blood of those whom he has made away with. Let me not, however, +forget to warn the prince or commonwealth against whom a conspiracy is +directed, that on getting word of it, and before taking any steps to punish it, +they endeavour, as far as they can, to ascertain its character, and after +carefully weighing the strength of the conspirators with their own, on finding +it preponderate, never suffer their knowledge of the plot to appear until they +are ready with a force sufficient to crush it. For otherwise, to disclose their +knowledge will only give the signal for their destruction. They must strive +therefore to seem unconscious of what is going on; for conspirators who see +themselves detected are driven forward by necessity and will stick at nothing. +Of this precaution we have an example in Roman history, when the officers of +the two legions, who, as has already been mentioned, were left behind to defend +the Capuans from the Samnites, conspired together against the Capuans. For on +rumours of this conspiracy reaching Rome, Rutilius the new consul was charged +to see to it; who, not to excite the suspicions of the conspirators, publicly +gave out that by order of the senate the Capuan legions were continued in their +station. The conspirators believing this, and thinking they would have ample +time to execute their plans, made no effort to hasten matters, but remained at +their ease, until they found that the consul was moving one of the two legions +to a distance from the other. This arousing their suspicion, led them to +disclose their designs and endeavour to carry them out. +</p> + +<p> +Now, we could have no more instructive example than this in whatever way we +look at it. For it shows how slow men are to move in those matters wherein time +seems of little importance, and how active they become when necessity urges +them. Nor can a prince or commonwealth desiring for their own ends to retard +the execution of a conspiracy, use any more effectual means to do so, than by +artfully holding out to the conspirators some special opportunity as likely +soon to present itself; awaiting which, and believing they have time and to +spare for what they have to do, they will afford that prince or commonwealth +all the leisure needed to prepare for their punishment. Whosoever neglects +these precautions hastens his own destruction, as happened with the Duke of +Athens, and with Guglielmo de’ Pazzi. For the Duke, who had made himself +tyrant of Florence, on learning that he was being conspired against, without +further inquiry into the matter, caused one of the conspirators to be seized; +whereupon the rest at once armed themselves and deprived him of his government. +Guglielmo, again, being commissary in the Val di Chiana in the year 1501, and +learning that a conspiracy was being hatched in Arezzo to take the town from +the Florentines and give it over to the Vitelli, repaired thither with all +haste; and without providing himself with the necessary forces or giving a +thought to the strength of the conspirators, on the advice of the bishop, his +son, had one of them arrested. Which becoming known to the others, they +forthwith rushed to arms, and taking the town from the Florentines, made +Guglielmo their prisoner. Where, however, conspiracies are weak, they may and +should be put down without scruple or hesitation. +</p> + +<p> +Two methods, somewhat opposed to one another, which have occasionally been +followed in dealing with conspiracies, are in no way to be commended. One of +these was that adopted by the Duke of Athens, of whom I have just now spoken, +who to have it thought that he confided in the goodwill of the Florentines, +caused a certain man who gave information of a plot against him, to be put to +death. The other was that followed by Dion the Syracusan, who, to sound the +intentions of one whom he suspected, arranged with Calippus, whom he trusted, +to pretend to get up a conspiracy against him. Neither of these tyrants reaped +any advantage from the course he followed. For the one discouraged informers +and gave heart to those who were disposed to conspire, the other prepared an +easy road to his own death, or rather was prime mover in a conspiracy against +himself. As the event showed. For Calippus having free leave to plot against +Dion, plotted to such effect, that he deprived him at once of his State and +life. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER VII.—<i>Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and +from Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without Bloodshed, but at other +times reek with Blood</i>.</h2> + +<p> +Since we find from history that in the countless changes which have been made +from freedom to servitude and from servitude to freedom, sometimes an infinite +multitude have perished, while at others not a soul has suffered (as when Rome +made her change from kings to consuls, on which occasion none was banished save +Tarquin, and no harm was done to any other), it may perhaps be asked, how it +happens that of these revolutions, some have been attended by bloodshed and +others not. +</p> + +<p> +The answer I take to be this. The government which suffers change either has or +has not had its beginning in violence. And since the government which has its +beginning in violence must start by inflicting injuries on many, it must needs +happen that on its downfall those who were injured will desire to avenge +themselves; from which desire for vengeance the slaughter and death of many +will result. But when a government originates with, and derives its authority +from the whole community, there is no reason why the community, if it withdraw +that authority, should seek to injure any except the prince from whom it +withdraws it. Now the government of Rome was of this nature, and the expulsion +of the Tarquins took place in this way. Of a like character was the government +of the Medici in Florence, and, accordingly, upon their overthrow in the year +1494, no injury was done to any save themselves. +</p> + +<p> +In such cases, therefore, the changes I speak of do not occasion any very great +danger. But the changes wrought by men who have wrongs to revenge, are always +of a most dangerous kind, and such, to say the least, as may well cause dismay +in the minds of those who read of them. But since history abounds with +instances of such changes I need say no more about them. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER VIII.—<i>That he who would effect Changes in a Commonwealth, +must give heed to its Character and Condition</i></h2> + +<p> +I have said before that a bad citizen cannot work grave mischief in a +commonwealth which has not become corrupted. This opinion is not only supported +by the arguments already advanced, but is further confirmed by the examples of +Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus. For Spurius, being ambitious, and +desiring to obtain extraordinary authority in Rome, and to win over the people +by loading them with benefits (as, for instance, by selling them those lands +which the Romans had taken from the Hernici,) his designs were seen through by +the senate, and laid him under such suspicion, that when in haranguing the +people he offered them the money realized by the sale of the grain brought from +Sicily at the public expense, they would have none of it, believing that he +offered it as the price of their freedom. Now, had the people been corrupted, +they would not have refused this bribe, but would have opened rather than +closed the way to the tyranny. +</p> + +<p> +The example of Manlius is still more striking. For in his case we see what +excellent gifts both of mind and body, and what splendid services to his +country were afterwards cancelled by that shameful eagerness to reign which we +find bred in him by his jealousy of the honours paid Camillus. For so darkened +did his mind become, that without reflecting what were the institutions to +which Rome was accustomed, or testing the material he had to work on, when he +would have seen that it was still unfit to be moulded to evil ends, he set +himself to stir up tumults against the senate and against the laws of his +country. +</p> + +<p> +And herein we recognize the excellence of this city of Rome, and of the +materials whereof it was composed. For although the nobles were wont to stand +up stoutly for one another, not one of them stirred to succour Manlius, and not +one of his kinsfolk made any effort on his behalf, so that although it was +customary, in the case of other accused persons, for their friends to put on +black and sordid raiment, with all the other outward signs of grief, in order +to excite pity for the accused, none was seen to do any of these things for +Manlius. Even the tribunes of the people, though constantly ready to promote +whatever courses seemed to favour the popular cause, and the more vehemently +the more they seemed to make against the nobles, in this instance sided with +the nobles to put down the common enemy. Nay the very people themselves, keenly +alive to their own interests, and well disposed towards any attempt to damage +the nobles, though they showed Manlius many proofs of their regard, +nevertheless, when he was cited by the tribunes to appear before them and +submit his cause for their decision, assumed the part of judges and not of +defenders, and without scruple or hesitation sentenced him to die. Wherefore, I +think, that there is no example in the whole Roman history which serves so well +as this to demonstrate the virtues of all ranks in that republic. For not a man +in the whole city bestirred himself to shield a citizen endowed with every +great quality, and who, both publicly and privately, had done so much that +deserved praise. But in all, the love of country outweighed every other +thought, and all looked less to his past deserts than to the dangers which his +present conduct threatened; from which to relieve themselves they put him to +death. “<i>Such</i>,” says Livius, “<i>was the fate of a man +worthy our admiration had he not been born in a free State</i>.” +</p> + +<p> +And here two points should be noted. The first, that glory is to be sought by +different methods in a corrupt city, and in one which still preserves its +freedom. The second, which hardly differs from the first, that in their +actions, and especially in matters of moment, men must have regard to times and +circumstances and adapt themselves thereto. For those persons who from an +unwise choice, or from natural inclination, run counter to the times will for +the most part live unhappily, and find all they undertake issue in failure; +whereas those who accommodate themselves to the times are fortunate and +successful. And from the passage cited we may plainly infer, that had Manlius +lived in the days of Marius and Sylla, when the body of the State had become +corrupted, so that he could have impressed it with the stamp of his ambition, +he might have had the same success as they had, and as those others had who +after them aspired to absolute power; and, conversely, that if Sylla and Marius +had lived in the days of Manlius, they must have broken down at the very +beginning of their attempts. +</p> + +<p> +For one man, by mischievous arts and measures, may easily prepare the ground +for the universal corruption of a city; but no one man in his lifetime can +carry that corruption so far, as himself to reap the harvest; or granting that +one man’s life might be long enough for this purpose, it would be +impossible for him, having regard to the ordinary habits of men, who grow +impatient and cannot long forego the gratification of their desires, to wait +until the corruption was complete. Moreover, men deceive themselves in respect +of their own affairs, and most of all in respect of those on which they are +most bent; so that either from impatience or from self-deception, they rush +upon undertakings for which the time is not ripe, and so come to an ill end. +Wherefore to obtain absolute authority in a commonwealth and to destroy its +liberties, you must find the body of the State already corrupted, and corrupted +by a gradual wasting continued from generation to generation; which, indeed, +takes place necessarily, unless, as has been already explained, the State be +often reinforced by good examples, or brought back to its first beginnings by +wise laws. +</p> + +<p> +Manlius, therefore, would have been a rare and renowned man had he been born in +a corrupt city; and from his example we see that citizens seeking to introduce +changes in the form of their government, whether in favour of liberty or +despotism, ought to consider what materials they have to deal with, and then +judge of the difficulty of their task. For it is no less arduous and dangerous +to attempt to free a people disposed to live in servitude, than to enslave a +people who desire to live free. +</p> + +<p> +And because it has been said above, that in their actions men must take into +account the character of the times in which they live, and guide themselves +accordingly, I shall treat this point more fully in the following Chapter. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER IX.—<i>That to enjoy constant good Fortune we must change +with the Times.</i></h2> + +<p> +I have repeatedly noted that the good or bad fortune of men depends on whether +their methods of acting accord with the character of the times. For we see that +in what they do some men act impulsively, others warily and with caution. And +because, from inability to preserve the just mean, they in both of these ways +overstep the true limit, they commit mistakes in one direction or the other. +He, however, will make fewest mistakes, and may expect to prosper most, who, +while following the course to which nature inclines him, finds, as I have said, +his method of acting in accordance with the times in which he lives. +</p> + +<p> +All know that in his command of the Roman armies, Fabius Maximus displayed a +prudence and caution very different from the audacity and hardihood natural to +his countrymen; and it was his good fortune that his methods suited with the +times. For Hannibal coming into Italy in all the flush of youth and recent +success, having already by two defeats stripped Rome of her best soldiers and +filled her with dismay, nothing could have been more fortunate for that +republic than to find a general able, by his deliberateness and caution, to +keep the enemy at bay. Nor, on the other hand, could Fabius have fallen upon +times better suited to the methods which he used, and by which he crowned +himself with glory. That he acted in accordance with his natural bent, and not +from a reasoned choice, we may gather from this, that when Scipio, to bring the +war to an end, proposed to pass with his army into Africa, Fabius, unable to +depart from his characteristic methods and habits, strenuously opposed him; so +that had it rested with him, Hannibal might never have left Italy. For he +perceived not that the times had changed, and that with them it was necessary +to change the methods of prosecuting the war. Had Fabius, therefore, been King +of Rome, he might well have caused the war to end unhappily, not knowing how to +accommodate his methods to the change in the times. As it was, he lived in a +commonwealth in which there were many citizens, and many different +dispositions; and which as it produced a Fabius, excellent at a time when it +was necessary to protract hostilities, so also, afterwards gave birth to a +Scipio, at a time suited to bring them to a successful close. +</p> + +<p> +And hence it comes that a commonwealth endures longer, and has a more sustained +good fortune than a princedom, because from the diversity in the characters of +its citizens, it can adapt itself better than a prince can to the diversity of +times. For, as I have said before, a man accustomed to follow one method, will +never alter it; whence it must needs happen that when times change so as no +longer to accord with his method, he will be ruined. Piero Soderini, of whom I +have already spoken, was guided in all his actions by patience and gentleness, +and he and his country prospered while the times were in harmony with these +methods. But, afterwards, when a time came when it behoved him to have done +with patience and gentleness, he knew not how to drop them, and was ruined +together with his country. Pope Julius II., throughout the whole of his +pontificate, was governed by impulse and passion, and because the times were in +perfect accord, all his undertakings prospered. But had other times come +requiring other qualities, he could not have escaped destruction, since he +could not have changed his methods nor his habitual line of conduct. +</p> + +<p> +As to why such changes are impossible, two reasons may be given. One is that we +cannot act in opposition to the bent of our nature. The other, that when a man +has been very successful while following a particular method, he can never be +convinced that it is for his advantage to try some other. And hence it results +that a man’s fortunes vary, because times change and he does not change +with them. So, too, with commonwealths, which, as we have already shown at +length, are ruined from not altering their institutions to suit the times. And +commonwealths are slower to change than princes are, changes costing them more +effort; because occasions must be waited for which shall stir the whole +community, and it is not enough that a single citizen alters his method of +acting. +</p> + +<p> +But since I have made mention of Fabius Maximus who wore out Hannibal by +keeping him at bay, I think it opportune to consider in the following Chapter +whether a general who desires to engage his enemy at all risks, can be +prevented by that enemy from doing so. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER X.—<i>That a Captain cannot escape Battle when his Enemy +forces it on him at all risks.</i></h2> + +<p> +“<i>Cneius Sulpitius when appointed dictator against the Gauls, being +unwilling to tempt Fortune by attacking an enemy whom delay and a +disadvantageous position would every day render weaker, protracted the +war.</i>” +</p> + +<p> +When a mistake is made of a sort that all or most men are likely to fall into, +I think it not amiss to mark it again and again with disapproval. Wherefore, +although I have already shown repeatedly how in affairs of moment the actions +of the moderns conform not to those of antiquity, still it seems to me not +superfluous, in this place, to say the same thing once more. For if in any +particular the moderns have deviated from the methods of the ancients, it is +especially in their methods of warfare, wherein not one of those rules formerly +so much esteemed is now attended to. And this because both princes and +commonwealths have devolved the charge of such matters upon others, and, to +escape danger, have kept aloof from all military service; so that although one +or another of the princes of our times may occasionally be seen present in +person with his army, we are not therefore to expect from him any further +praiseworthy behaviour. For even where such personages take part in any warlike +enterprise, they do so out of ostentation and from no nobler motive; though +doubtless from sometimes seeing their soldiers face to face, and from retaining +to themselves the title of command, they are likely to make fewer blunders than +we find made by republics, and most of all by the republics of Italy, which +though altogether dependent upon others, and themselves utterly ignorant of +everything relating to warfare, do yet, that they may figure as the commanders +of their armies, take upon them to direct their movements, and in doing so +commit countless mistakes; some of which have been considered elsewhere but one +is of such importance as to deserve notice here. +</p> + +<p> +When these sluggard princes or effeminate republics send forth any of their +Captains, it seems to them that the wisest instruction they can give him is to +charge him on no account to give battle, but, on the contrary, to do what he +can to avoid fighting. Wherein they imagine themselves to imitate the prudence +of Fabius Maximus, who by protracting the war with Hannibal, saved the Roman +commonwealth; not perceiving that in most instances such advice to a captain is +either useless or hurtful. For the truth of the matter is, that a captain who +would keep the field, cannot decline battle when his adversary forces it on him +at all hazards. So that the instruction to avoid battle is but tantamount to +saying, “You shall engage when it pleases your enemy, and not when it +suits yourself.” For if you would keep the field and yet avoid battle, +the only safe course is to interpose a distance of at least fifty miles between +you and your enemy, and afterwards to maintain so vigilant a look-out, that +should he advance you will have time to make your retreat. Another method is to +shut yourself up in some town. But both of these methods are extremely +disadvantageous. For by following the former, you leave your country a prey to +the enemy, and a valiant prince would far sooner risk the chances of battle +than prolong a war in a manner so disastrous to his subjects; while by adopting +the latter method, and shutting yourself up in a town with your army, there is +manifest danger of your being besieged, and presently reduced by famine and +forced to surrender. Wherefore it is most mischievous to seek to avoid battle +in either of these two ways. +</p> + +<p> +To intrench yourself in a strong position, as Fabius was wont to do, is a good +method when your army is so formidable that the enemy dare not advance to +attack you in your intrenchments; yet it cannot truly be said that Fabius +avoided battle, but rather that he sought to give battle where he could do so +with advantage. For had Hannibal desired to fight, Fabius would have waited for +him and fought him. But Hannibal never dared to engage him on his own ground. +So that an engagement was avoided as much by Hannibal as by Fabius, since if +either had been minded to fight at all hazards the other would have been +constrained to take one of three courses, that is to say, one or other of the +two just now mentioned, or else to retreat. The truth of this is confirmed by +numberless examples, and more particularly by what happened in the war waged by +the Romans against Philip of Macedon, the father of Perseus. For Philip being +invaded by the Romans, resolved not to give them battle; and to avoid battle, +sought at first to do as Fabius had done in Italy, posting himself on the +summit of a hill, where he intrenched himself strongly, thinking that the +Romans would not venture to attack him there. But they advancing and attacking +him in his intrenchments, drove him from his position; when, unable to make +further resistance, he fled with the greater part of his army, and was only +saved from utter destruction by the difficulty of the ground, which made it +impossible for the Romans to pursue him. +</p> + +<p> +Philip, therefore, who had no mind to fight, encamping too near the Romans, was +forced to fly; and learning from this experience that to escape fighting it was +not enough for him to intrench himself on a hill, yet not choosing to shut +himself up in a walled town, he was constrained to take the other alternative +of keeping at a distance of many miles from the Roman legions. Accordingly, +when the Romans entered one province, he betook himself to another, and when +they left a province he entered it. But perceiving that by protracting the war +in this way, his condition grew constantly worse, while his subjects suffered +grievously, now from his own troops, at another time from those of the enemy, +he at last resolved to hazard battle, and so came to a regular engagement with +the Romans. +</p> + +<p> +It is for your interest, therefore, not to fight, when you possess the same +advantages as Fabius, or as Cneius Sulpitius had; in other words, when your +army is so formidable in itself that the enemy dare not attack you in your +intrenchments, and although he has got within your territory has yet gained no +footing there, and suffers in consequence from the want of necessary supplies. +In such circumstances delay is useful, for the reasons assigned by Titus Livius +when speaking of Sulpitius. In no other circumstances, however, can an +engagement be avoided without dishonour or danger. For to retire as Philip did, +is nothing else than defeat; and the disgrace is greater in proportion as your +valour has been less put to the proof. And if Philip was lucky enough to +escape, another, not similarly favoured by the nature of the ground, might not +have the same good fortune. +</p> + +<p> +That Hannibal was not a master in the arts of warfare there is none will +venture to maintain. Wherefore, when he had to encounter Scipio in Africa, it +may be assumed that had he seen any advantage in prolonging the war he would +have done so; and, possibly, being a skilful captain and in command of a +valiant army, he might have been able to do what Fabius did in Italy. But since +he took not that course, we may infer that he was moved by sufficient reasons. +For the captain who has got an army together, and perceives that from want of +money or friends he cannot maintain it long, must be a mere madman if he do not +at once, and before his army melts away, try the fortunes of battle; since he +is certain to lose by delay, while by fighting he may chance to succeed. And +there is this also to be kept in view, that we must strive, even if we be +defeated, to gain glory; and that more glory is to be won in being beaten by +force, than in a defeat from any other cause. And this we may suppose to have +weighed with Hannibal. On the other hand, supposing Hannibal to have declined +battle, Scipio, even if he had lacked courage to follow him up and attack him +in his intrenched camp, would not have suffered thereby; for as he had defeated +Syphax, and got possession of many of the African towns, he could have rested +where he was in the same security and with the same convenience as if he had +been in Italy. But this was not the case with Hannibal when he had to encounter +Fabius, nor with the Gauls when they were opposed to Sulpitius. +</p> + +<p> +Least of all can he decline battle who invades with his army the country of +another; for seeking to enter his enemy’s country, he must fight whenever +the enemy comes forward to meet him; and is under still greater necessity to +fight, if he undertake the siege of any town. As happened in our own day with +Duke Charles of Burgundy, who, when beleaguering Morat, a town of the Swiss, +was by them attacked and routed; or as happened with the French army encamped +against Novara, which was in like manner defeated by the Swiss. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XI.—<i>That one who has to contend with many, though he be +weaker than they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset.</i></h2> + +<p> +The power exercised in Rome by the tribunes of the people was great, and, as I +have repeatedly explained, was necessary, since otherwise there would have been +no check on the ambition of the nobles, and the commonwealth must have grown +corrupted far sooner than it did. But because, as I have said elsewhere, there +is in everything a latent evil peculiar to it, giving rise to new mischances, +it becomes necessary to provide against these by new ordinances. The authority +of the tribunes, therefore, being insolently asserted so as to become +formidable to the nobility and to the entire city, disorders dangerous to the +liberty of the State must thence have resulted, had not a method been devised +by Appius Claudius for controlling the ambition of the tribunes. This was, to +secure that there should always be one of their number timid, or venal, or else +a lover of the general good, who could be influenced to oppose the rest +whenever these sought to pass any measure contrary to the wishes of the senate. +This remedy was a great restraint on the excessive authority of the tribunes, +and on many occasions proved serviceable to Rome. +</p> + +<p> +I am led by this circumstance to remark, that when many powerful persons are +united against one, who, although no match for the others collectively, is also +powerful, the chances are more in favour of this single and less I powerful +person, than of the many who together are much stronger. For setting aside an +infinity of accidents which can be turned to better account by one than by +many, it will always happen that, by exercising a little dexterity, the one +will be able to divide the many, and weaken the force which was strong while it +was united. In proof whereof, I shall not refer to ancient examples, though +many such might be cited, but content myself with certain modern instances +taken from the events of our own times. +</p> + +<p> +In the year 1484, all Italy combined against the Venetians, who finding their +position desperate, and being unable to keep their army any longer in the +field, bribed Signer Lodovico, who then governed Milan, and so succeeded in +effecting a settlement, whereby they not only recovered the towns they had +lost, but also obtained for themselves a part of the territories of Ferrara; so +that those were by peace the gainers, who in war had been the losers. Not many +years ago the whole world was banded together against France; but before the +war came to a close, Spain breaking with the confederates and entering into a +separate treaty with France, the other members of the league also, were +presently forced to make terms. +</p> + +<p> +Wherefore we may always assume when we see a war set on foot by many against +one, that this one, if he have strength to withstand the first shock, and can +temporize and wait his opportunity, is certain to prevail. But unless he can do +this he runs a thousand dangers: as did the Venetians in the year 1508, who, +could they have temporized with the French, and so got time to conciliate some +of those who had combined against them, might have escaped the ruin which then +overtook them. But not possessing such a strong army as would have enabled them +to temporize with their enemies, and consequently not having the time needed +for gaining any to their side, they were undone. Yet we know that the Pope, as +soon as he had obtained what he wanted, made friends with them, and that Spain +did the like; and that both the one and the other of these powers would gladly +have saved the Lombard territory for themselves, nor would, if they could have +helped it, have left it to France, so as to augment her influence in Italy. +</p> + +<p> +The Venetians, therefore, should have given up a part to save the rest; and had +they done so at a time when the surrender would not have seemed to be made +under compulsion, and before any step had been taken in the direction of war, +it would have been a most prudent course; although discreditable and probably +of little avail after war had been begun. But until the war broke out, few of +the Venetian citizens recognized the danger, fewer still the remedy, and none +ventured to prescribe it. +</p> + +<p> +But to return to the point whence we started, I say that the same safeguard for +their country which the Roman senate found against the ambition of the tribunes +in their number, is within the reach of the prince who is attacked by many +adversaries, if he only know to use prudently those methods which promote +division. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XII.—<i>A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it +necessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that +necessity.</i></h2> + +<p> +Elsewhere I have noted how greatly men are governed in what they do by +Necessity, and how much of their renown is due to her guidance, so that it has +even been said by some philosophers, that the hands and tongues of men, the two +noblest instruments of their fame, would never have worked to perfection, nor +have brought their labours to that pitch of excellence we see them to have +reached, had they not been impelled by this cause. The captains of antiquity, +therefore, knowing the virtues of this necessity, and seeing the steadfast +courage which it gave their soldiers in battle, spared no effort to bring their +armies under its influence, while using all their address to loosen its hold +upon their enemies. For which reason, they would often leave open to an +adversary some way which they might have closed, and close against their own +men some way they might have left open. +</p> + +<p> +Whosoever, therefore, would have a city defend itself stubbornly, or an army +fight resolutely in the field, must before all things endeavour to impress the +minds of those whom he commands with the belief that no other course is open to +them. In like manner a prudent captain who undertakes the attack of a city, +will measure the ease or difficulty of his enterprise, by knowing and +considering the nature of the necessity which compels the inhabitants to defend +it; and where he finds that necessity to be strong, he may infer that his task +will be difficult, but if otherwise, that it will be easy. +</p> + +<p> +And hence it happens that cities are harder to be recovered after a revolt than +to be taken for the first time. Because on a first attack, having no occasion +to fear punishment, since they have given no ground of offence, they readily +surrender; but when they have revolted, they know that they have given ground +of offence, and, fearing punishment, are not so easily brought under. A like +stubbornness grows from the natural hostility with which princes or republics +who are neighbours regard one another; which again is caused by the desire to +dominate over those who live near, or from jealousy of their power. This is +more particularly the case with republics, as in Tuscany for example; for +contention and rivalry have always made, and always will make it extremely hard +for one republic to bring another into subjection. And for this reason any one +who considers attentively who are the neighbours of Florence, and who of +Venice, will not marvel so much as some have done, that Florence should have +spent more than Venice on her wars and gained less; since this results entirely +from the Venetians finding their neighbouring towns less obstinate in their +resistance than the Florentines theirs. For all the towns in the neighbourhood +of Venice have been used to live under princes and not in freedom; and those +who are used to servitude commonly think little of changing masters, nay are +often eager for the change. In this way Venice, though she has had more +powerful neighbours than Florence, has been able, from finding their towns less +stubborn, to subdue them more easily than the latter, surrounded exclusively by +free cities, has had it in her power to do. +</p> + +<p> +But, to return to the matter in hand, the captain who attacks a town should use +what care he can, not to drive the defenders to extremities, lest he render +them stubborn; but when they fear punishment should promise them pardon, and +when they fear for their freedom should assure them that he has no designs +against the common welfare, but only against a few ambitious men in their city; +for such assurances have often smoothed the way to the surrender of towns. And +although pretexts of this sort are easily seen through, especially by the wise, +the mass of the people are often beguiled by them, because desiring present +tranquillity, they shut their eyes to the snares hidden behind these specious +promises. By means such as these, therefore, cities innumerable have been +brought into subjection, as recently was the case with Florence. The ruin of +Crassus and his army was similarly caused: for although he himself saw through +the empty promises of the Parthians, as meant only to blind the Roman soldiers +to the necessity of defending themselves, yet he could not keep his men +steadfast, they, as we clearly gather in reading the life of this captain, +being deceived by the offers of peace held out to them by their enemies. +</p> + +<p> +On the other hand, when the Samnites, who, at the instance of a few ambitious +men, and in violation of the terms of the truce made with them, had overrun and +pillaged lands belonging to the allies of Rome, afterwards sent envoys to Rome +to implore peace, offering to restore whatever they had taken, and to surrender +the authors of these injuries and outrages as prisoners, and these offers were +rejected by the Romans, and the envoys returned to Samnium bringing with them +no hope of an adjustment, Claudius Pontius, who then commanded the army of the +Samnites, showed them in a remarkable speech, that the Romans desired war at +all hazards, and declared that, although for the sake of his country he wished +for peace, necessity constrained him to prepare for war; telling them +“<i>that was a just war which could not be escaped, and those arms sacred +in which lay their only hopes.</i>” And building on this necessity, he +raised in the minds of his soldiers a confident expectation of success. That I +may not have to revert to this matter again, it will be convenient to notice +here those examples from Roman history which most merit attention. When Caius +Manilius was in command of the legions encamped against Veii, a division of the +Veientine army having got within the Roman intrenchments, Manilius ran forward +with a company of his men to defend them, and, to prevent the escape of the +Veientines, guarded all the approaches to the camp. The Veientines finding +themselves thus shut in, began to fight with such fury that they slew Manilius, +and would have destroyed all the rest of the Roman army, had not the prudence +of one of the tribunes opened a way for the Veientines to retreat. Here we see +that so long as necessity compelled, the Veientines fought most fiercely, but +on finding a path opened for escape, preferred flight to combat. On another +occasion when the Volscians and Equians passed with their armies across the +Roman frontier, the consuls were sent out to oppose them, and an engagement +ensued. It so happened that when the combat was at its height, the army of the +Volscians, commanded by Vectius Mescius, suddenly found themselves shut in +between their own camp, which a division of the Romans had occupied, and the +body of the Roman army; when seeing that they must either perish or cut a way +for themselves with their swords, Vectius said to them, “<i>Come on, my +men, here is no wall or rampart to be scaled: we fight man with man; in valour +we are their equals, and necessity, that last and mightiest weapon, gives us +the advantage.</i>” Here, then, necessity is spoken of by Titus Livius as +<i>the last and mightiest weapon</i>. +</p> + +<p> +Camillus, the wisest and most prudent of all the Roman commanders, when he had +got within the town of Veii with his army, to make its surrender easier and not +to drive its inhabitants to desperation, called out to his men, so that the +Veientines might hear, to spare all whom they found unarmed. Whereupon the +defenders throwing away their weapons, the town was taken almost without +bloodshed. And this device was afterwards followed by many other captains. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIII.—<i>Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with +a weak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain.</i></h2> + +<p> +Coriolanus being banished from Rome betook himself to the Volscians, and when +he had got together an army wherewith to avenge himself on his countrymen, came +back to Rome; yet, again withdrew, not constrained to retire by the might of +the Roman arms, but out of reverence for his mother. From this incident, says +Titus Livius, we may learn that the spread of the Roman power was due more to +the valour of her captains than of her soldiers. For before this the Volscians +had always been routed, and only grew successful when Coriolanus became their +captain. +</p> + +<p> +But though Livius be of this opinion, there are many passages in his history to +show that the Roman soldiers, even when left without leaders, often performed +astonishing feats of valour, nay, sometimes maintained better discipline and +fought with greater spirit after their consuls were slain than they had before. +For example, the army under the Scipios in Spain, after its two leaders had +fallen, was able by its valour not merely to secure its own safety, but to +overcome the enemy and preserve the province for the Roman Republic. So that to +state the case fairly, we find many instances in which the valour of the +soldiers alone gained the day, as well as many in which success was wholly due +to the excellence of the captain. From which it may be inferred that the one +stands in need of the other. +</p> + +<p> +And here the question suggests itself: which is the more formidable, a good +army badly led, or a good captain commanding an indifferent army; though, were +we to adopt the opinion of Cæsar on this head, we ought lightly to esteem both. +For when Cæsar went to Spain against Afranius and Petreius, who were there in +command of a strong army, he made little account of them, saying, +“<i>that he went to fight an army without a captain</i>,” +indicating thereby the weakness of these generals. And, conversely, when he +went to encounter Pompeius in Thessaly, he said, “<i>I go against a +captain without an army</i>.”<a href="#fn13" name="fnref13" id="fnref13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn13" id="fn13"></a> <a href="#fnref13">[13]</a> +Professus ante inter suos, ire se ad exercitum sine duce, et inde reversurum +ad ducem sine exercitu. (<i>Suet. in Vita J. Caes.</i>) +</p> + +<p> +A further question may also be raised, whether it is easier for a good captain +to make a good army, or for a good army to make a good captain. As to this it +might be thought there was barely room for doubt, since it ought to be far +easier for many who are good to find one who is good or teach him to become so, +than for one who is good to find or make many good. Lucullus when sent against +Mithridates was wholly without experience in war: but his brave army, which was +provided with many excellent officers, speedily taught him to be a good +captain. On the other hand, when the Romans, being badly off for soldiers, +armed a number of slaves and gave them over to be drilled by Sempronius +Gracchus, he in a short time made them into a serviceable army. So too, as I +have already mentioned, Pelopidas and Epaminondas after rescuing Thebes, their +native city, from Spartan thraldom, in a short time made such valiant soldiers +of the Theban peasantry, as to be able with their aid not only to withstand, +but even to defeat the Spartan armies. So that the question may seem to be +equally balanced, excellence on one side generally finding excellence on the +other. +</p> + +<p> +A good army, however, when left without a good leader, as the Macedonian army +was on the death of Alexander, or as those veterans were who had fought in the +civil wars, is apt to grow restless and turbulent. Wherefore I am convinced +that it is better to trust to the captain who has time allowed him to +discipline his men, and means wherewith to equip them, than to a tumultuary +host with a chance leader of its own choosing. But twofold is the merit and +twofold the glory of those captains who not only have had to subdue their +enemies, but also before encountering them to organize and discipline their +forces. This, however, is a task requiring qualities so seldom combined, that +were many of those captains who now enjoy a great name with the world, called +on to perform it, they would be much less thought of than they are. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIV.—<i>Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and +unexpected Sights or Sounds.</i></h2> + +<p> +That the disorder occasioned by strange and unexpected sights or sounds may +have momentous consequences in combat, might be shown by many instances, but by +none better than by what befell in the battle fought between the Romans and the +Volscians, when Quintius, the Roman general, seeing one wing of his army begin +to waver, shouted aloud to his men to stand firm, for the other wing was +already victorious. Which words of his giving confidence to his own troops and +striking the enemy with dismay won him the battle. But if a cry like this, +produce great effect on a well disciplined army, far greater must be its effect +on one which is ill disciplined and disorderly. For by such a wind the whole +mass will be moved, as I shall show by a well-known instance happening in our +own times. +</p> + +<p> +A few years ago the city of Perugia was split into the two factions of the +Baglioni and the Oddi, the former holding the government, the latter being in +exile. The Oddeschi, however, with the help of friends, having got together an +armed force which they lodged in villages of their own near Perugia, obtained, +by the favour of some of their party, an entrance into the city by night, and +moving forward without discovery, came as far as the public square. And as all +the streets of Perugia are barred with chains drawn across them at their +corners, the Oddeschi had in front of them a man who carried an iron hammer +wherewith to break the fastenings of the chains so that horsemen might pass. +When the only chain remaining unbroken was that which closed the public square, +the alarm having now been given, the hammerman was so impeded by the crowd +pressing behind him that he could not raise his arm to strike freely. +Whereupon, to get more room for his work, he called aloud to the others to +stand back; and the word back passing from rank to rank those furthest off +began to run, and, presently, the others also, with such precipitancy, that +they fell into utter disorder. In this way, and from this trifling +circumstance, the attempt of the Oddeschi came to nothing. +</p> + +<p> +Here we may note that discipline is needed in an army, not so much to enable it +to fight according to a settled order, as that it may not be thrown into +confusion by every insignificant accident. For a tumultuary host is useless in +war, simply because every word, or cry, or sound, may throw it into a panic and +cause it to fly. Wherefore it behoves a good captain to provide that certain +fixed persons shall receive his orders and pass them on to the rest, and to +accustom his soldiers to look to these persons, and to them only, to be +informed what his orders are. For whenever this precaution is neglected the +gravest mishaps are constantly seen to ensue. +</p> + +<p> +As regards strange and unexpected sights, every captain should endeavour while +his army is actually engaged with the enemy, to effect some such feint or +diversion as will encourage his own men and dismay his adversary since this of +all things that can happen is the likeliest to ensure victory. In evidence +whereof we may cite the example of Cneius Sulpitius, the Roman dictator, who, +when about to give battle to the Gauls, after arming his sutlers and camp +followers, mounted them on mules and other beasts of burden, furnished them +with spears and banners to look like cavalry, and placing them behind a hill, +ordered them on a given signal, when the fight was at the hottest, to appear +and show themselves to the enemy. All which being carried out as he had +arranged, threw the Gauls into such alarm, that they lost the battle. +</p> + +<p> +A good captain, therefore, has two things to see to: first, to contrive how by +some sudden surprise he may throw his enemy into confusion; and next, to be +prepared should the enemy use a like stratagem against him to discover and +defeat it; as the stratagem of Semiramis was defeated by the King of India. For +Semiramis seeing that this king had elephants in great numbers, to dismay him +by showing that she, too, was well supplied, caused the skins of many oxen and +buffaloes to be sewn together in the shape of elephants and placed upon camels +and sent to the front. But the trick being detected by the king, turned out not +only useless but hurtful to its contriver. In a battle which the Dictator +Mamercus fought against the people of Fidenae, the latter, to strike terror +into the minds of the Romans, contrived that while the combat raged a number of +soldiers should issue from Fidenae bearing lances tipped with fire, thinking +that the Romans, disturbed by so strange a sight, would be thrown into +confusion. +</p> + +<p> +We are to note, however, with regard to such contrivances, that if they are to +serve any useful end, they should <i>be</i> formidable as well as <i>seem</i> +so; for when they menace a real danger, their weak points are not so soon +discerned. When they have more of pretence than reality, it will be well either +to dispense with them altogether, or resorting to them, to keep them, like the +muleteers of Sulpitius, in the background, so that they be not too readily +found out. For any weakness inherent in them is soon discovered if they be +brought near, when, as happened with the elephants of Semiramis and the fiery +spears of the men of Fidenae, they do harm rather than good. For although by +this last-mentioned device the Romans at the first were somewhat disconcerted, +so soon as the dictator came up and began to chide them, asking if they were +not ashamed to fly like bees from smoke, and calling on them to turn on their +enemy, and “<i>with her own flames efface that Fidenae whom their +benefits could not conciliate</i>,” they took courage; so that the device +proved of no service to its contrivers, who were vanquished in the battle. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XV.—<i>That one and not many should head an Army: and why it +is harmful to have more Leaders than one.</i></h2> + +<p> +The men of Fidenae rising against the colonists whom the Romans had settled +among them, and putting them to the sword, the Romans to avenge the insult +appointed four tribunes with consular powers: one of whom they retained to see +to the defence of Rome, while the other three were sent against the Fidenati +and the Veientines. But these three falling out among themselves, and being +divided in their counsels, returned from their mission with discredit though +not with loss. Of which discredit they were themselves the cause. That they +sustained no loss was due to the valour of their soldiers But the senate +perceiving the source of the mischief, to the end that one man might put to +rights what three had thrown into confusion, resorted to the appointment of a +dictator. +</p> + +<p> +Here we see the disadvantage of having several leaders in one army or in a town +which has to defend itself. And the case could not be put in clearer words than +by Titus Livius, where he says, “<i>The three tribunes with consular +authority gave proof how hurtful it is in war to have many leaders; for each +forming a different opinion, and each abiding by his own, they threw +opportunities in the way of their enemies.</i>” And though this example +suffice by itself to show the disadvantage in war of divided commands, to make +the matter still plainer I shall cite two further instances, one ancient and +one modern. +</p> + +<p> +In the year 1500, Louis XII. of France, after recovering Milan, sent troops to +restore Pisa to the Florentines, Giovambattista Ridolfi and Luca +d’Antonio Albizzi going with them as commissaries. Now, because +Giovambattista had a great name, and was older than Luca, the latter left the +whole management of everything to him; and although he did not show his +jealousy of him by opposing him, he betrayed it by his silence, and by being so +careless and indifferent about everything, that he gave no help in the business +of the siege either by word or deed, just as though he had been a person of no +account. But when, in consequence of an accident, Giovambattista had to return +to Florence, all this was changed; for Luca, remaining in sole charge, behaved +with the greatest courage, prudence, and zeal, all which qualities had been +hidden while he held a joint command. Further to bear me out I shall again +borrow the words of Titus Livius, who, in relating how when Quintius and +Agrippa his colleague were sent by the Romans against the Equians, Agrippa +contrived that the conduct of the war should rest with Quintius, observes, +“<i>Most wholesome is it that in affairs of great moment, supreme +authority be vested in one man.</i>” Very different, however, is the +course followed by the republics and princes of our own days, who, thinking to +be better served, are used to appoint several captains or commissioners to fill +one command; a practice giving rise to so much confusion, that were we seeking +for the causes of the overthrow of the French and Italian armies in recent +times, we should find this to be the most active of any. +</p> + +<p> +Rightly, therefore, may we conclude that in sending forth an army upon service, +it is wiser to entrust it to one man of ordinary prudence, than to two of great +parts but with a divided command. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVI.—<i>That in Times of Difficulty true Worth is sought +after; whereas in quiet Times it is not the most deserving, but those who are +recommended by Wealth or Connection who are most in favour.</i></h2> + +<p> +It always has happened and always will, that the great and admirable men of a +republic are neglected in peaceful times; because at such seasons many citizens +are found, who, envying the reputation these men have justly earned, seek to be +regarded not merely as their equals but as their superiors. Touching this there +is a notable passage in Thucydides, the Greek historian, where he tells how the +republic of Athens coming victorious out of the Peloponessian war, wherein she +had bridled the pride of Sparta, and brought almost the whole of Greece under +her authority, was encouraged by the greatness of her renown to propose to +herself the conquest of Sicily. In Athens this scheme was much debated, +Alcibiades and certain others who had the public welfare very little in their +thoughts, but who hoped that the enterprise, were they placed in command, might +minister to their fame, recommending that it should be undertaken. Nicias, on +the other hand, one of the best esteemed of the Athenian citizens, was against +it, and in addressing the people, gave it as the strongest reason for trusting +his advice, that in advising them not to engage in this war, he urged what was +not for his own advantage; for he knew that while Athens remained at peace +numberless citizens were ready to take precedence of him: whereas, were war +declared, he was certain that none would rank before him or even be looked upon +as his equal. +</p> + +<p> +Here we see that in tranquil times republics are subject to the infirmity of +lightly esteeming their worthiest citizens. And this offends these persons for +two reasons: first, because they are not given the place they deserve; and +second, because they see unworthy men and of abilities inferior to their own, +as much or more considered than they. Injustice such as this has caused the +ruin of many republics. For citizens who find themselves undeservedly slighted, +and perceive the cause to be that the times are tranquil and not troubled, will +strive to change the times by stirring up wars hurtful to the public welfare. +When I look for remedies for this state of things, I find two: first, to keep +the citizens poor, so that wealth without worth shall corrupt neither them nor +others; second, to be so prepared for war as always to be ready to make war; +for then there will always be a need for worthy citizens, as was the case in +Rome in early times. For as Rome constantly kept her armies in the field, there +was constant opportunity for men to display their valour, nor was it possible +to deprive a deserving man of his post and give it to another who was not +deserving. Or if ever this were done by inadvertency, or by way of experiment, +there forthwith resulted such disorder and danger, that the city at once +retraced its steps and reverted to the true path. But other republics which are +not regulated on the same plan, and make war only when driven to it by +necessity, cannot help committing this injustice, nay, will constantly run into +it, when, if the great citizen who finds himself slighted be vindictive, and +have some credit and following in the city, disorder will always ensue. And +though Rome escaped this danger for a time, she too, as has elsewhere been +said, having no longer, after she had conquered Carthage and Antiochus, any +fear of war, came to think she might commit her armies to whom she would, +making less account of the valour of her captains than of those other qualities +which gain favour with the people. Accordingly we find Paulus Emilius rejected +oftener than once when he sought the consulship; nor, in fact, obtaining it +until the Macedonian war broke out, which, being judged a formidable business, +was by the voice of the whole city committed to his management. After the year +1494 our city of Florence was involved in a series of wars, in conducting which +none of our citizens had any success until chance threw the command into the +hands of one who showed us how an army should be led. This was Antonio +Giacomini, and so long as there were dangerous wars on foot, all rivalry on the +part of other citizens was suspended; and whenever a captain or commissary had +to be appointed he was unopposed. But when a war came to be undertaken, as to +the issue of which no misgivings were felt, and which promised both honour and +preferment, so numerous were the competitors for command, that three +commissaries having to be chosen to conduct the siege of Pisa, Antonio was left +out; and though it cannot with certainty be shown that any harm resulted to our +republic from his not having been sent on this enterprise, we may reasonably +conjecture that such was indeed the case. For as the people of Pisa were then +without means either for subsistence or defence, it may be believed that had +Antonio been there he would have reduced them to such extremities as would have +forced them to surrender at discretion to the Florentines. But Pisa being +besieged by captains who knew neither how to blockade nor how to storm it, held +out so long, that the Florentines, who should have reduced it by force, were +obliged to buy its submission. Neglect like this might well move Antonio to +resentment; and he must needs have been both very patient and very forgiving if +he felt no desire to revenge himself when he could, by the ruin of the city or +by injuries to individual citizens. But a republic should beware not to rouse +such feelings, as I shall show in the following Chapter. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVII.—<i>That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him +to fill an important Office or Command.</i></h2> + +<p> +A republic should think twice before appointing to an important command a +citizen who has sustained notable wrong at the hands of his fellow-citizens. +Claudius Nero, quitting the army with which he was opposing Hannibal, went with +a part of his forces into the March of Ancona, designing to join the other +consul there, and after joining him to attack Hasdrubal before he came up with +his brother. Now Claudius had previously commanded against Hasdrubal in Spain, +and after driving him with his army into such a position that it seemed he must +either fight at a disadvantage or perish by famine, had been outwitted by his +adversary, who, while diverting his attention with proposals of terms, +contrived to slip through his hands and rob him of the opportunity for +effecting his destruction. This becoming known in Rome brought Claudius into so +much discredit both with the senate and people, that to his great mortification +and displeasure, he was slightingly spoken of by the whole city. But being +afterwards made consul and sent to oppose Hannibal, he took the course +mentioned above, which was in itself so hazardous that all Rome was filled with +doubt and anxiety until tidings came of Hasdrubal’s defeat. When +subsequently asked why he had played so dangerous a game, wherein without +urgent necessity he had staked the very existence of Rome, Claudius answered, +he had done so because he knew that were he to succeed he would recover +whatever credit he had lost in Spain; while if he failed, and his attempt had +an untoward issue, he would be revenged on that city and On those citizens who +had so ungratefully and indiscreetly wronged him. +</p> + +<p> +But if resentment for an offence like this so deeply moved a Roman citizen at a +time when Rome was still uncorrupted, we should consider how it may act on the +citizen of a State not constituted as Rome then was. And because there is no +certain remedy we can apply to such disorders when they arise in republics, it +follows that it is impossible to establish a republic which shall endure +always; since in a thousand unforeseen ways ruin may overtake it. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XVIII.—<i>That it is the highest Quality of a Captain to be +able to forestall the designs of his Adversary.</i></h2> + +<p> +It was a saying of Epaminondas the Theban that nothing was so useful and +necessary for a commander as to be able to see through the intentions and +designs of his adversary. And because it is hard to come at this knowledge +directly, the more credit is due to him who reaches it by conjecture. Yet +sometimes it is easier to fathom an enemy’s designs than to construe his +actions; and not so much those actions which are done at a distance from us, as +those done in our presence and under our very eyes. For instance, it has often +happened that when a battle has lasted till nightfall, the winner has believed +himself the loser, and the loser has believed himself the winner and that this +mistake has led him who made it to follow a course hurtful to himself. It was +from a mistake of this sort, that Brutus and Cassius lost the battle of +Philippi. For though Brutus was victorious with his wing of the army Cassius, +whose wing was beaten, believed the entire army to be defeated, and under this +belief gave way to despair and slew himself. So too, in our own days, in the +battle fought by Francis, king of France, with the Swiss at Santa Cecilia in +Lombardy, when night fell, those of the Swiss who remained unbroken, not +knowing that the rest had been routed and slain, thought they had the victory; +and so believing would not retreat, but, remaining on the field, renewed the +combat the following morning to their great disadvantage. Nor were they the +only sufferers from their mistake, since the armies of the Pope and of Spain +were also misled by it, and well-nigh brought to destruction. For on the false +report of a victory they crossed the Po, and had they only advanced a little +further must have been made prisoners by the victorious French. +</p> + +<p> +An instance is recorded of a like mistake having been made in the camps both of +the Romans and of the Equians. For the Consul Sempronius being in command +against the Equians, and giving the enemy battle, the engagement lasted with +varying success till nightfall, when as both armies had suffered what was +almost a defeat, neither returned to their camp, but each drew off to the +neighboring hills where they thought they would be safer. The Romans separated +into two divisions, one of which with the consul, the other with the centurion +Tempanius by whose valour the army had that day been saved from utter rout. At +daybreak the consul, without waiting for further tidings of the enemy, made +straight for Rome; and the Equians, in like manner, withdrew to their own +country. For as each supposed the other to be victorious, neither thought much +of leaving their camp to be plundered by the enemy. It so chanced, however, +that Tempanius, who was himself retreating with the second division of the +Roman army, fell in with certain wounded Equians, from whom he learned that +their commanders had fled, abandoning their camp; on hearing which, he at once +returned to the Roman camp and secured it, and then, after sacking the camp of +the Equians, went back victorious to Rome. His success, as we see, turned +entirely on his being the first to be informed of the enemy’s condition. +And here we are to note that it may often happen that both the one and the +other of two opposed armies shall fall into the same disorder, and be reduced +to the same straits; in which case, that which soonest detects the +other’s distress is sure to come off best. +</p> + +<p> +I shall give an instance of this which occurred recently in our own country. In +the year 1498, when the Florentines had a great army in the territory of Pisa +and had closely invested the town, the Venetians, who had undertaken its +protection, seeing no other way to save it, resolved to make a diversion in its +favour by attacking the territories of the Florentines in another quarter. +Wherefore, having assembled a strong force, they entered Tuscany by the Val di +Lamona, and seizing on the village of Marradi, besieged the stronghold of +Castiglione which stands on the height above it. Getting word of this, the +Florentines sought to relieve Marradi, without weakening the army which lay +round Pisa. They accordingly raised a new levy of foot-soldiers, and equipped a +fresh squadron of horse, which they despatched to Marradi under the joint +command of Jacopo IV. d’Appiano, lord of Piombino, and Count Rinuccio of +Marciano. These troops taking up their position on the hill above Marradi, the +Venetians withdrew from the investment of Castiglione and lodged themselves in +the village. But when the two armies had confronted one another for several +days, both began to suffer sorely from want of victuals and other necessaries, +and neither of them daring to attack the other, or knowing to what extremities +the other was reduced, both simultaneously resolved to strike their camps the +following morning, and to retreat, the Venetians towards Berzighella and +Faenza, the Florentines towards Casaglia and the Mugello. But at daybreak, when +both armies had begun to remove their baggage, it so happened that an old +woman, whose years and poverty permitted her to pass unnoticed, leaving the +village of Marradi, came to the Florentine camp, where were certain of her +kinsfolk whom she desired to visit. Learning from her that the Venetians were +in retreat, the Florentine commanders took courage, and changing their plan, +went in pursuit of the enemy as though they had dislodged them, sending word to +Florence that they had repulsed the Venetians and gained a victory. But in +truth this victory was wholly due to their having notice of the enemy’s +movements before the latter had notice of theirs. For had that notice been +given to the Venetians first, it would have wrought against us the same results +as it actually wrought for us. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XIX.—<i>Whether Indulgence or Severity be more necessary for +controlling a Multitude.</i></h2> + +<p> +The Roman Republic was distracted by the feuds of the nobles and commons. +Nevertheless, on war breaking out, Quintius and Appius Claudius were sent forth +in command of Roman armies. From his harshness and severity to his soldiers, +Appius was so ill obeyed by them, that after sustaining what almost amounted to +a defeat, he had to resign his command. Quintius, on the contrary, by kindly +and humane treatment, kept his men obedient and returned victorious to Rome. +From this it might seem that to govern a large body of men, it is better to be +humane than haughty, and kindly rather than severe. +</p> + +<p> +And yet Cornelius Tacitus, with whom many other authors are agreed, pronounces +a contrary opinion where he says, “<i>In governing a multitude it avails +more to punish than to be compliant.</i>”<a href="#fn14" name="fnref14" id="fnref14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> +If it be asked how these opposite views can be reconciled, I answer that you +exercise authority either over men used to regard you as their equal, or over +men who have always been subject to you. When those over whom you exercise +authority are your equals, you cannot trust wholly to punishment or to that +severity of which Tacitus speaks. And since in Rome itself the commons had +equal weight with the nobles, none appointed their captain for a time only, +could control them by using harshness and severity. Accordingly we find that +those Roman captains who gained the love of their soldiers and were considerate +of them, often achieved greater results than those who made themselves feared +by them in an unusual degree, unless, like Manlius Torquatus, these last were +endowed with consummate valour. But he who has to govern subjects such as those +of whom Tacitus speaks, to prevent their growing insolent and trampling upon +him by reason of his too great easiness, must resort to punishment rather than +to compliance. Still, to escape hatred, punishment should be moderate in +degree, for to make himself hated is never for the interest of any prince. And +to escape hatred, a prince has chiefly to guard against tampering with the +property of any of his subjects; for where nothing is to be gained by it, no +prince will desire to shed blood, unless, as seldom happens, constrained to do +so by necessity. But where advantage is to be gained thereby, blood will always +flow, and neither the desire to shed it, nor causes for shedding it will ever +be wanting, as I have fully shown when discussing this subject in another +treatise. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn14" id="fn14"></a> <a href="#fnref14">[14]</a> +“In multitudine regenda plus poena quam obsequium valet.” But +compare Annals, III. 55, “Obsequium inde in principem et æmulandi amoi +validioi quam poena ex legibus et metus.” +</p> + +<p> +Quintius therefore was more deserving of praise than Appius. Nevertheless the +opinion of Tacitus, duly restricted and not understood as applying to a case +like that of Appius, merits approval. But since I have spoken of punishment and +indulgence, it seems not out of place to show how a single act of humanity +availed more than arms with the citizens of Falerii. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XX.—<i>How one humane act availed more with the men of +Falerii, than all the might of the Roman Arms.</i></h2> + +<p> +When the besieging army of the Romans lay round Falerii, the master of a school +wherein the best-born youths of the city were taught, thinking to curry favour +with Camillus and the Romans, came forth from the town with these boys, on +pretence of giving them exercise, and bringing them into the camp where +Camillus was, presented them to him, saying, “<i>To ransom these that +city would yield itself into your hands.</i>” Camillus, however, not only +rejected this offer, but causing the schoolmaster to be stripped and his hands +tied behind him, gave each of the boys a scourge, and bade them lead the fellow +back to the town scourging him as they went. When the citizens of Falerii heard +of this, so much were they pleased with the humanity and integrity of Camillus, +that they resolved to surrender their town to him without further defence. +</p> + +<p> +This authentic instance may lead us to believe that a humane and kindly action +may sometimes touch men’s minds more nearly than a harsh and cruel one; +and that those cities and provinces into which the instruments and engines of +war, with every other violence to which men resort, have failed to force a way, +may be thrown open to a single act of tenderness, mercy, chastity, or +generosity. Whereof history supplies us with many examples besides the one +which I have just now noticed. For we find that when the arms of Rome were +powerless to drive Pyrrhus out of Italy, he was moved to depart by the +generosity of Fabritius in disclosing to him the proposal which his slave had +made the Romans to poison him. Again, we read how Scipio gained less reputation +in Spain by the capture of New Carthage, than by his virtue in restoring a +young and beautiful wife unviolated to her husband; the fame of which action +won him the love of the whole province. We see, too, how much this generous +temper is esteemed by a people in its great men; and how much it is praised by +historians and by those who write the lives of princes, as well as by those who +lay down rules of human conduct. Among whom Xenophon has taken great pains to +show what honours, and victories, and how fair a fame accrued to Cyrus from his +being kindly and gracious, without taint of pride, or cruelty, or luxury, or +any other of those vices which cast a stain upon men’s lives. +</p> + +<p> +And yet when we note that Hannibal, by methods wholly opposite to these, +achieved splendid victories and a great renown, I think I am bound to say +something in my next Chapter as to how this happened. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXI.—<i>How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course +contrary to that taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the +other achieved in Spain.</i></h2> + +<p> +Some, I suspect, may marvel to find a captain, taking a contrary course, +nevertheless arrive at the same ends as those who have pursued the methods +above spoken of; since it must seem as though success did not depend on the +causes I have named; nay, that if glory and fame are to be won in other ways, +these causes neither add to our strength nor advance our fortunes. Wherefore, +to make my meaning plain, and not to part company with the men of whom I have +been speaking, I say, that as, on the one hand, we see Scipio enter Spain, and +by his humane and generous conduct at once secure the good-will of the +province, and the admiration and reverence of its inhabitants, so on the other +hand, we see Hannibal enter Italy, and by methods wholly opposite, to wit, by +violence and rapine, by cruelty and treachery of every kind, effect in that +country the very same results. For all the States of Italy revolted in his +favour, and all the Italian nations ranged themselves on his side. +</p> + +<p> +When we seek to know why this was, several reasons present themselves, the +first being that men so passionately love change, that, commonly speaking, +those who are well off are as eager for it as those who are badly off: for as +already has been said with truth, men are pampered by prosperity, soured by +adversity. This love of change, therefore, makes them open the door to any one +who puts himself at the head of new movements in their country, and if he be a +foreigner they adopt his cause, if a fellow-countryman they gather round him +and become his partisans and supporters; so that whatever methods he may there +use, he will succeed in making great progress. Moreover, men being moved by two +chief passions, love and fear, he who makes himself feared commands with no +less authority than he who makes himself loved; nay, as a rule, is followed and +obeyed more implicitly than the other. It matters little, however, which of +these two ways a captain chooses to follow, provided he be of transcendent +valour, and has thereby won for himself a great name For when, like Hannibal or +Scipio, a man is very valiant, this quality will cloak any error he may commit +in seeking either to be too much loved or too much feared. Yet from each of +these two tendencies, grave mischiefs, and such as lead to the ruin of a +prince, may arise. For he who would be greatly loved, if he swerve ever so +little from the right road, becomes contemptible; while he who would be greatly +feared, if he go a jot too far, incurs hatred. And since it is impossible, our +nature not allowing it, to adhere to the exact mean, it is essential that any +excess should be balanced by an exceeding valour, as it was in Hannibal and +Scipio. And yet we find that even they, while they were exalted by the methods +they followed, were also injured by them. How they were exalted has been shown. +The injury which Scipio suffered was, that in Spain his soldiers, in concert +with certain of his allies, rose against him, for no other reason than that +they stood in no fear of him. For men are so restless, that if ever so small a +door be opened to their ambition, they forthwith forget all the love they have +borne their prince in return for his graciousness and goodness, as did these +soldiers and allies of Scipio; when, to correct the mischief, he was forced to +use something of a cruelty foreign to his nature. +</p> + +<p> +As to Hannibal, we cannot point to any particular instance wherein his cruelty +or want of faith are seen to have been directly hurtful to him; but we may well +believe that Naples and other towns which remained loyal to the Roman people, +did so by reason of the dread which his character inspired. This, however, is +abundantly clear, that his inhumanity made him more detested by the Romans than +any other enemy they ever had; so that while to Pyrrhus, in Italy with his +army, they gave up the traitor who offered to poison him, Hannibal, even when +disarmed and a fugitive, they never forgave, until they had compassed his +death. +</p> + +<p> +To Hannibal, therefore, from his being accounted impious, perfidious, and +cruel, these disadvantages resulted; but, on the other hand, there accrued to +him one great gain, noticed with admiration by all historians, namely, that in +his army, although made up of men of every race and country, no dissensions +ever broke out among the soldiers themselves, nor any mutiny against their +leader. This we can only ascribe to the awe which his character inspired, which +together with the great name his valour had won for him, had the effect of +keeping his soldiers quiet and united. I repeat, therefore, that it is of +little moment which method a captain may follow if he be endowed with such +valour as will bear him out in the course which he adopts. For, as I have said, +there are disadvantages incident to both methods unless corrected by +extraordinary valour. +</p> + +<p> +And now, since I have spoken of Scipio and Hannibal, the former of whom by +praiseworthy, the latter by odious qualities, effected the same results, I must +not, I think, omit to notice the characters of two Roman citizens, who by +different, yet both by honourable methods, obtained a like glory. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>Chapter XXII.—<i>That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the +gentleness of Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory.</i></h2> + +<p> +There lived in Rome, at the same time, two excellent captains, Manlius +Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus, equal in their triumphs and in their renown, +and in the valour which in obtaining these they had displayed against the +enemy; but who in the conduct of their armies and treatment of their soldiers, +followed very different methods. For Manlius, in his command, resorted to every +kind of severity, never sparing his men fatigue, nor remitting punishment; +while Valerius, on the contrary, treated them with all kindness and +consideration, and was easy and familiar in his intercourse with them. So that +while the one, to secure the obedience of his soldiers, put his own son to +death, the other never dealt harshly with any man. Yet, for all this diversity +in their modes of acting, each had the same success against the enemy, and each +obtained the same advantages both for the republic and for himself. For no +soldier of theirs ever flinched in battle, or rose in mutiny against them, or +in any particular opposed their will; though the commands of Manlius were of +such severity that any order of excessive rigour came to be spoken of as a +<i>Manlian order</i>. +</p> + +<p> +Here, then, we have to consider first of all why Manlius was obliged to use +such severity; next, why Valerius could behave so humanely; thirdly, how it was +that these opposite methods had the same results; and lastly, which of the two +methods it is better and more useful for us to follow. Now, if we well examine +the character of Manlius from the moment when Titus Livius first begins to make +mention of him, we shall find him to have been endowed with a rare vigour both +of mind and body, dutiful in his behaviour to his father and to his country, +and most reverent to his superiors. All which we see in his slaying the Gaul, +in his defence of his father against the tribune, and in the words in which, +before going forth to fight the Gaul, he addressed the consul, when he said, +“<i>Although assured of victory, never will I without thy bidding engage +an enemy.</i>” But when such a man as this attains to command, he looks +to find all others like himself; his dauntless spirit prompts him to engage in +daring enterprises, and to insist on their being carried out. And this is +certain, that where things hard to execute are ordered to be done, the order +must be enforced with sternness, since, otherwise, it will be disobeyed. +</p> + +<p> +And here be it noted that if you would be obeyed you must know how to command, +and that they alone have this knowledge who have measured their power to +enforce, with the willingness of others to yield obedience; and who issue their +orders when they find these conditions combining, but, otherwise, abstain. +Wherefore, a wise man was wont to say that to hold a republic by force, there +must be a proportion between him who uses the force and him against whom it is +used; and that while this proportion obtains the force will operate; but that +when he who suffers is stronger than he who uses the force, we may expect to +see it brought to an end at any moment. +</p> + +<p> +But returning to the matter in hand, I say that to command things hard of +execution, requires hardness in him who gives the command, and that a man of +this temper and who issues such commands, cannot look to enforce them by +gentleness. He who is not of such a temper must be careful not to impose tasks +of extraordinary difficulty, but may use his natural gentleness in imposing +such as are ordinary. For common punishments are not imputed to the prince, but +to the laws and ordinances which he has to administer. +</p> + +<p> +We must believe, therefore, that Manlius was constrained to act with severity +by the unusual character of the commands which his natural disposition prompted +him to issue. Such commands are useful in a republic, as restoring its +ordinances to their original efficacy and excellence. And were a republic, as I +have before observed, fortunate enough to come frequently under the influence +of men who, by their example, reinforce its laws, and not only retard its +progress towards corruption, but bring it back to its first perfection, it +might endure for ever. +</p> + +<p> +Manlius, therefore, was of those who by the severity of their commands +maintained the military discipline of Rome; urged thereto, in the first place, +by his natural temper, and next by the desire that whatever he was minded to +command should be done. Valerius, on the other hand, could afford to act +humanely, because for him it was enough if all were done which in a Roman army +it was customary to do. And, since the customs of that army were good customs, +they sufficed to gain him honour, while at the same time their maintenance cost +him no effort, nor threw on him the burthen of punishing transgressors; as well +because there were none who trangressed, as because had there been any, they +would, as I have said, have imputed their punishment to the ordinary rules of +discipline, and not to the severity of their commander. In this way Valerius +had room to exercise that humane disposition which enabled him at once to gain +influence over his soldiers and to content them. Hence it was that both these +captains obtaining the same obedience, could, while following different +methods, arrive at the same ends. Those, however, who seek to imitate them may +chance to fall into the errors of which I have already spoken, in connection +with Hannibal and Scipio, as breeding contempt or hatred, and which are only to +be corrected by the presence of extraordinary valour, and not otherwise. +</p> + +<p> +It rests now to determine which of these two methods is the more to be +commended. This, I take it, is matter of dispute, since both methods have their +advocates. Those writers, however, who have laid down rules for the conduct of +princes, describe a character approaching more nearly to that of Valerius than +to that of Manlius; and Xenophon, whom I have already cited, while giving many +instances of the humanity of Cyrus, conforms closely to what Livius tells us of +Valerius. For Valerius being made consul against the Samnites, on the eve of +battle spoke to his men with the same kindliness with which he always treated +them; and Livius, after telling us what he said, remarks of him: +“<i>Never was there a leader more familiar with his men; cheerfully +sharing with the meanest among them every hardship and fatigue. Even in the +military games, wherein those of the same rank were wont to make trial of their +strength or swiftness, he would good-naturedly take a part, nor disdain any +adversary who offered; meeting victory or defeat with an unruffled temper and +an unchanged countenance. When called on to act, his bounty and generosity +never fell short. When he had to speak, he was as mindful of the feelings of +others as of his own dignity. And, what more than anything else secures the +popular favour, he maintained when exercising his magistracies the same bearing +he had worn in seeking them.</i>” +</p> + +<p> +Of Manlius also, Titus Livius speaks in like honourable terms, pointing out +that his severity in putting his son to death brought the Roman army to that +pitch of discipline which enabled it to prevail against the Latins, nay, he +goes so far in his praises that after describing the whole order of the battle, +comparing the strength of both armies, and showing all the dangers the Romans +ran, and the difficulties they had to surmount, he winds up by saying, that it +was the valour of Manlius which alone gained for them this great victory, and +that whichever side had Manlius for its leader must have won the day. So that +weighing all that the historians tell us of these two captains, it might be +difficult to decide between them. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless, not to leave the question entirely open, I say, that for a +citizen living under a republic, I think the conduct of Manlius more deserving +of praise and less dangerous in its consequences. For methods like his tend +only to the public good and in no way subserve private ends. He who shows +himself harsh and stern at all times and to all men alike, and is seen to care +only for the common welfare, will never gain himself partisans, since this is +not the way to win personal friends, to whom, as I said before, the name of +partisans is given. For a republic, therefore, no line of conduct could be more +useful or more to be desired than this, because in following it the public +interest is not neglected, and no room is given to suspect personal ambition. +</p> + +<p> +But the contrary holds as to the methods followed by Valerius. For though the +public service they render be the same, misgivings must needs arise that the +personal good-will which, in the course of a prolonged command, a captain +obtains from his soldiers, may lead to consequences fatal to the public +liberty. And if this was not found to happen in the case of Valerius, it was +because the minds of the Roman people were not yet corrupted, and because they +had never remained for a long time and continuously under his command. +</p> + +<p> +Had we, however, like Xenophon, to consider what is most for the interest of a +prince, we should have to give up Manlius and hold by Valerius; for, +undoubtedly, a prince should strive to gain the love of his soldiers and +subjects, as well as their obedience. The latter he can secure by discipline +and by his reputation for valour. But for the former he will be indebted to his +affability, kindliness, gentleness, and all those other like qualities which +were possessed by Valerius, and which are described by Xenophon as existing in +Cyrus. That a prince should be personally loved and have his army wholly +devoted to him is consistent with the character of his government; but that +this should happen to a person of private station does not consist with his +position as a citizen who has to live in conformity with the laws and in +subordination to the magistrates. We read in the early annals of the Venetian +Republic, that once, on the return of the fleet, a dispute broke out between +the sailors and the people, resulting in tumults and armed violence which +neither the efforts of the public officers, the respect felt for particular +citizens, nor the authority of the magistrates could quell. But on a certain +gentleman, who the year before had been in command of these sailors, showing +himself among them, straightway, from the love they bore him, they submitted to +his authority and withdrew from the fray. Which deference on their part aroused +such jealousy and suspicion in the minds of the Venetian senators that very +soon after they got rid of this gentleman, either by death or exile. +</p> + +<p> +The sum of the matter, therefore, is, that the methods followed by Valerius are +useful in a prince, but pernicious in a private citizen, both for his country +and for himself, for his country, because such methods pave the way to a +tyranny; for himself, because his fellow-citizens, growing suspicious of his +conduct, are constrained to protect themselves to his hurt. And conversely, I +maintain, that the methods of Manlius, while hurtful in a prince are useful in +a citizen, and in the highest degree for his country; and, moreover, seldom +give offence, unless the hatred caused by his severity be augmented by the +jealousy which the fame of his other virtues inspires: a matter now to be +considered in connection with the banishment of Camillas. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIII.—<i>Why Camillus was banished from Rome.</i></h2> + +<p> +It has been shown above how methods like those of Valerius are hurtful to the +citizen who employs them and to his country, while methods like those of +Manlius are advantageous for a man’s country, though sometimes they be +hurtful to the man himself. This is well seen in the example of Camillus, whose +bearing more nearly resembled that of Manlius than that of Valerius, so that +Titus Livius, in speaking of him, says, “<i>His virtues were at once +hated and admired by his soldiers.</i>” What gained him their admiration +was his care for their safety, his prudence, his magnanimity, and the good +order he maintained in conducting and commanding them. What made him hated was +his being more stern to punish than bountiful to reward; and Livius instances +the following circumstances as giving rise to this hatred. First, his having +applied the money got by the sale of the goods of the Veientines to public +purposes, and not divided it along with the rest of the spoils. Second, his +having, on the occasion of his triumph, caused his chariot to be drawn by four +white horses, seeking in his pride, men said, to make himself the equal of the +sun god. And, third, his having vowed to Apollo a tenth of the Veientine +plunder, which, if he was to fulfil his vow, he had to recover from his +soldiers, into whose hands it had already come. +</p> + +<p> +Herein we may well and readily discern what causes tend to make a prince +hateful to his people; the chief whereof is the depriving them of some +advantage. And this is a matter of much importance. For when a man is deprived +of what is in itself useful, he never forgets it, and every trifling occasion +recalls it to his mind; and because such occasions recur daily, he is every day +reminded of his loss. Another error which we are here taught to guard against, +is the appearing haughty and proud, than which nothing is more distasteful to a +people, and most of all to a free people; for although such pride and +haughtiness do them no hurt, they nevertheless hold in detestation any who +display these qualities. Every show of pride, therefore, a prince should shun +as he would a rock, since to invite hatred without resulting advantage were +utterly rash and futile. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIV.—<i>That prolonged Commands brought Rome to +Servitude</i>.</h2> + +<p> +If we well examine the course of Roman history, we shall find two causes +leading to the break-up of that republic: one, the dissensions which arose in +connection with the agrarian laws; the other, the prolongation of commands. For +had these matters been rightly understood from the first, and due remedies +applied, the freedom of Rome had been far more lasting, and, possibly, less +disturbed. And although, as touching the prolongation of commands, we never +find any tumult breaking out in Rome on that account, we do in fact discern how +much harm was done to the city by the ascendency which certain of its citizens +thereby gained. This mischief indeed would not have arisen, if other citizens +whose period of office was extended had been as good and wise as Lucius +Quintius, whose virtue affords a notable example. For terms of accord having +been settled between the senate and commons of Rome, the latter, thinking their +tribunes well able to withstand the ambition of the nobles, prolonged their +authority for a year. Whereupon, the senate, not to be outdone by the commons, +proposed, out of rivalry, to extend the consulship of Quintius. He, however, +refused absolutely to lend himself to their designs, and insisted on their +appointing new consuls, telling them that they should seek to discredit evil +examples, not add to them by setting worse. Had this prudence and virtue of his +been shared by all the citizens of Rome, the practice of prolonging the terms +of civil offices would not have been suffered to establish itself, nor have led +to the kindred practice of extending the term of military commands, which in +progress of time effected the ruin of their republic. +</p> + +<p> +The first military commander whose term was extended, was Publius Philo; for +when his consulship was about to expire, he being then engaged in the siege of +Palæopolis, the senate, seeing he had the victory in his hands, would not +displace him by a successor, but appointed him <i>Proconsul</i>, which office +he was the first to hold. Now, although in thus acting the senate did what they +thought best for the public good, nevertheless it was this act of theirs that +in time brought Rome to slavery. For the further the Romans carried their arms, +the more necessary it seemed to them to grant similar extensions of command, +and the oftener they, in fact, did so. This gave rise to two disadvantages: +first that a smaller number of men were trained to command; second, that by the +long continuance of his command a captain gained so much influence and +ascendency over his soldiers that in time they came to hold the senate of no +account, and looked only to him. This it was, that enabled Sylla and Marius to +find adherents ready to follow them even to the public detriment, and enabled +Cæsar to overthrow the liberties of his country; whereas, had the Romans never +prolonged the period of authority, whether civil or military, though they might +have taken longer to build up their empire, they certainly had been later in +incurring servitude. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXV.—_Of the poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman +Citizens.</h2> + +<p> +Elsewhere I have shown that no ordinance is of such advantage to a +commonwealth, as one which enforces poverty on its citizens. And although it +does not appear what particular law it was that had this operation in Rome +(especially since we know the agrarian law to have been stubbornly resisted), +we find, as a fact, that four hundred years after the city was founded, great +poverty still prevailed there; and may assume that nothing helped so much to +produce this result as the knowledge that the path to honours and preferment +was closed to none, and that merit was sought after wheresoever it was to be +found; for this manner of conferring honours made riches the less courted. In +proof whereof I shall cite one instance only. +</p> + +<p> +When the consul Minutius was beset in his camp by the Equians, the Roman people +were filled with such alarm lest their army should be destroyed, that they +appointed a dictator, always their last stay in seasons of peril. Their choice +fell on Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, who at the time was living on his small +farm of little more than four acres, which he tilled with his own hand. The +story is nobly told by Titus Livius where he says: “<i>This is worth +listening to by those who contemn all things human as compared with riches, and +think that glory and excellence can have no place unless accompanied by lavish +wealth.</i>” Cincinnatus, then, was ploughing in his little field, when +there arrived from Rome the messengers sent by the senate to tell him he had +been made dictator, and inform him of the dangers which threatened the +Republic. Putting on his gown, he hastened to Rome, and getting together an +army, marched to deliver Minutius. But when he had defeated and spoiled the +enemy, and released Minutius, he would not suffer the army he had rescued to +participate in the spoils, saying, “<i>I will not have you share in the +plunder of those to whom you had so nearly fallen a prey.</i>” Minutius +he deprived of his consulship, and reduced to be a subaltern, in which rank he +bade him remain till he had learned how to command. And before this he had made +Lucius Tarquininus, although forced by his poverty to serve on foot, his master +of the knights. +</p> + +<p> +Here, then, we see what honour was paid in Rome to poverty, and how four acres +of land sufficed to support so good and great a man as Cincinnatus. We find the +same Poverty still prevailing in the time of Marcus Regulus, who when serving +with the army in Africa sought leave of senate to return home that he might +look after his farm which his labourers had suffered to run to waste. Here +again we learn two things worthy our attention: first, the poverty of these men +and their contentment under it, and how their sole study was to gain renown +from war, leaving all its advantages to the State. For had they thought of +enriching themselves by war, it had given them little concern that their fields +were running to waste Further, we have to remark the magnanimity of these +citizens, who when placed at the head of armies surpassed all princes in the +loftiness of their spirit, who cared neither for king nor for commonwealth, and +whom nothing could daunt or dismay; but who, on returning to private life, +became once more so humble, so frugal, so careful of their slender means, and +so submissive to the magistrates and reverential to their superiors, that it +might seem impossible for the human mind to undergo so violent a change. +</p> + +<p> +This poverty prevailed down to the days of Paulus Emilius, almost the last +happy days for this republic wherein a citizen, while enriching Rome by his +triumphs, himself remained poor. And yet so greatly was poverty still esteemed +at this time, that when Paulus, in conferring rewards on those who had behaved +well in the war, presented his own son-in-law with a silver cup, it was the +first vessel of silver ever seen in his house. +</p> + +<p> +I might run on to a great length pointing out how much better are the fruits of +poverty than those of riches, and how poverty has brought cities, provinces, +and nations to honour, while riches have wrought their ruin, had not this +subject been often treated by others. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXVI.—<i>How Women are a cause of the ruin of +States.</i></h2> + +<p> +A feud broke out in Ardea touching the marriage of an heiress, whose hand was +sought at the same time by two suitors, the one of plebeian, the other of noble +birth. For her father being dead, her guardian wished her to wed the plebeian, +her mother the noble. And so hot grew the dispute that resort was had to arms, +the whole nobility siding with their fellow-noble, and all the plebeians with +the plebeian. The latter faction being worsted, left the town, and sent to the +Volscians for help; whereupon, the nobles sought help from Rome. The Volscians +were first in the field, and on their arrival encamped round Ardea. The Romans, +coming up later, shut in the Volscians between themselves and the town, and, +reducing them by famine, forced them to surrender at discretion. They then +entered Ardea, and putting all the ringleaders in this dispute to the sword, +composed the disorders of the city. +</p> + +<p> +In connection with this affair there are several points to be noted. And in the +first place we see how women have been the occasion of many divisions and +calamities in States, and have wrought great harm to rulers; as when, according +to our historian, the violence done to Lucretia drove the Tarquins from their +kingdom, and that done to Virginia broke the power of the decemvirs. And among +the chief causes which Aristotle assigns for the downfall of tyrants are the +wrongs done by them to their subjects in respect of their women, whether by +adultery, rape, or other like injury to their honour, as has been sufficiently +noticed in the Chapter wherein we treated “<i>of Conspiracies</i>” +</p> + +<p> +I say, then, that neither absolute princes nor the rulers of free States should +underrate the importance of matter, but take heed to the disorders which it may +breed and provide against them while remedies can still be used without +discredit to themselves or to their governments And this should have been done +by the rulers of Ardea who by suffering the rivalry between their citizens to +come to a head, promoted their divisions, and when they sought to reunite them +had to summon foreign help, than which nothing sooner leads to servitude. +</p> + +<p> +But now let us turn to another subject which merits attention, namely, the +means whereby divided cities may be reunited; and of this I propose to speak in +the following Chapter. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXVII.—<i>How a divided City may be reunited, and how it is a +false opinion that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept +divided.</i></h2> + +<p> +From the example of the Roman consuls who reconciled the citizens of Ardea, we +are taught the method whereby the feuds of a divided city may be composed, +namely, by putting the ringleaders of the disturbances to death; and that no +other remedy should be used. Three courses, indeed, are open to you, since you +may either put to death, as these consuls did, or banish, or bind the citizens +to live at peace with one another, taking security for their good behaviour. Of +which three ways the last is the most hurtful, the most uncertain, and the +least effectual; because when much blood has been shed, or other like outrage +done, it cannot be that a peace imposed on compulsion should endure between men +who are every day brought face to face with one another; for since fresh cause +of contention may at any moment result from their meeting, it will be +impossible for them to refrain from mutual injury. Of this we could have no +better instance than in the city of Pistoja. +</p> + +<p> +Fifteen years ago this city was divided between the Panciatichi and +Cancellieri, as indeed it still continues, the only difference being that then +they were in arms, whereas, now, they have laid them aside. After much +controversy and wrangling, these factions would presently proceed to bloodshed, +to pulling down houses, plundering property, and all the other violent courses +usual in divided cities. The Florentines, with whom it lay to compose these +feuds, strove for a long time to do so by using the third of the methods +mentioned; but when this only led to increased tumult and disorder, losing +patience, they decided to try the second method and get rid of the ringleaders +of both factions by imprisoning some and banishing others. In this way a sort +of settlement was arrived at, which continues in operation up to the present +hour. There can be no question, however, that the first of the methods named +would have been the surest. But because extreme measures have in them an +element of greatness and nobility, a weak republic, so far from knowing how to +use this first method, can with difficulty be brought to employ even the +second. This, as I said at the beginning, is the kind of blunder made by the +princes of our times when they have to decide on matters of moment, from their +not considering how those men acted who in ancient days had to determine under +like conditions. For the weakness of the present race of men (the result of +their enfeebling education and their ignorance of affairs), makes them regard +the methods followed by the ancients as partly inhuman and partly +impracticable. Accordingly, they have their own newfangled ways of looking at +things, wholly at variance with the true, as when the sages of our city, some +time since, pronounced that <i>Pistoja was to be held by feuds and Pisa by +fortresses</i>, not perceiving how useless each of these methods is in itself. +</p> + +<p> +Having spoken of fortresses already at some length, I shall not further refer +to them here, but shall consider the futility of trying to hold subject cities +by keeping them divided. In the first place, it is impossible for the ruling +power, whether prince or republic, to be friends with both factions. For +wherever there is division, it is human nature to take a side, and to favour +one party more than another. But if one party in a subject city be unfriendly +to you, the consequence will be that you will lose that city so soon as you are +involved in war, since it is impossible for you to hold a city where you have +enemies both within and without. Should the ruling power be a republic, there +is nothing so likely to corrupt its citizens and sow dissension among them, as +having to control a divided city. For as each faction in that city will seek +support and endeavour to make friends in a variety of corrupt ways, two very +serious evils will result: first, that the governed city will never be +contented with its governors, since there can be no good government where you +often change its form, adapting yourself to the humours now of one party and +now of another; and next, that the factious spirit of the subject city is +certain to infect your own republic. To which Biondo testifies, when, in +speaking of the citizens of Florence and Pistoja, he says, “<i>In seeking +to unite Pistoja the Florentines themselves fell out</i>.”<a href="#fn15" name="fnref15" id="fnref15"><sup>[15]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn15" id="fn15"></a> <a href="#fnref15">[15]</a> +<i>Flav. Blondri Hist.</i>, dec. ii. lib. 9. Basle ed. 1559, p. 337 +</p> + +<p> +It is easy, therefore, to understand how much mischief attends on such +divisions. In the year 1501, when we lost Arezzo, and when all the Val di +Tevere and Val di Chiana were occupied by the Vitelli and by Duke Valentino, a +certain M. de Lant was sent by the King of France to cause the whole of the +lost towns to be restored to the Florentines; who finding in all these towns +men who came to him claiming to be of the party of the <i>Marzocco</i>,<a href="#fn16" name="fnref16" id="fnref16"><sup>[16]</sup></a> +greatly blamed this distinction, observing, that if in France any of the +king’s subjects were to say that he was of the king’s party, he +would be punished; since the expression would imply that there was a party +hostile to the king, whereas it was his majesty’s desire that all his +subjects should be his friends and live united without any distinction of +party. But all these mistaken methods and opinions originate in the weakness of +rulers, who, seeing that they cannot hold their States by their own strength +and valour, have recourse to like devices; which, if now and then in tranquil +times they prove of some slight assistance to them, in times of danger are +shown to be worthless. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn16" id="fn16"></a> <a href="#fnref16">[16]</a> +The heraldic Lion of Florence. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXVIII.—<i>That a Republic must keep an eye on what its +Citizens are about; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a +semblance of generous deeds.</i> </h2> + +<p> +The granaries of Rome not sufficing to meet a famine with which the city was +visited, a certain Spurius Melius, a very wealthy citizen for these days, +privately laid in a supply of corn wherewith to feed the people at his own +expense; gaining thereby such general favour with the commons, that the senate, +apprehending that his bounty might have dangerous consequences, in order to +crush him before he grew too powerful, appointed a dictator to deal with him +and caused him to be put to death. +</p> + +<p> +Here we have to note that actions which seem good in themselves and unlikely to +occasion harm to any one, very often become hurtful, nay, unless corrected in +time, most dangerous for a republic. And to treat the matter with greater +fulness, I say, that while a republic can never maintain itself long, or manage +its affairs to advantage, without citizens of good reputation, on the other +hand the credit enjoyed by particular citizens often leads to the establishment +of a tyranny. For which reasons, and that things may take a safe course, it +should be so arranged that a citizen shall have credit only for such behaviour +as benefits, and not for such as injures the State and its liberties. We must +therefore examine by what ways credit is acquired. These, briefly, are two, +public or secret. Public, when a citizen gains a great name by advising well or +by acting still better for the common advantage. To credit of this sort we +should open a wide door, holding out rewards both for good counsels and for +good actions, so that he who renders such services may be at once honoured and +satisfied. Reputation acquired honestly and openly by such means as these can +never be dangerous. But credit acquired by secret practices, which is the other +method spoken of, is most perilous and prejudicial. Of such secret practices +may be instanced, acts of kindness done to this or the other citizen in lending +him money, in assisting him to marry his daughters, in defending him against +the magistrates, and in conferring such other private favours as gain men +devoted adherents, and encourage them after they have obtained such support, to +corrupt the institutions of the State and to violate its laws. +</p> + +<p> +A well-governed republic, therefore, ought, as I have said, to throw wide the +door to all who seek public favour by open courses, and to close it against any +who would ingratiate themselves by underhand means. And this we find was done +in Rome. For the Roman republic, as a reward to any citizen who served it well, +ordained triumphs and all the other honours which it had to bestow; while +against those who sought to aggrandize themselves by secret intrigues, it +ordained accusations and impeachment; and when, from the people being blinded +by a false show of benevolence, these proved insufficient, it provided for a +dictator, who with regal authority might bring to bounds any who had strayed +beyond them, as instanced in the case of Spurius Melius. And if conduct like +his be ever suffered to pass unchastised, it may well be the ruin of a +republic, for men when they have such examples set them are not easily led back +into the right path. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXIX.—<i>That the Faults of a People are due to its +Prince.</i></h2> + +<p> +Let no prince complain of the faults committed by a people under his control; +since these must be ascribed either to his negligence, or to his being himself +blemished by similar defects. And were any one to consider what peoples in our +own times have been most given to robbery and other like offences, he would +find that they have only copied their rulers, who have themselves been of a +like nature. Romagna, before those lords who ruled it were driven out by Pope +Alexander VI., was a nursery of all the worst crimes, the slightest occasion +giving rise to wholesale rapine and murder. This resulted from the wickedness +of these lords, and not, as they asserted, from the evil disposition of their +subjects. For these princes being poor, yet choosing to live as though they +were rich, were forced to resort to cruelties innumerable and practised in +divers ways; and among other shameful devices contrived by them to extort +money, they would pass laws prohibiting certain acts, and then be the first to +give occasion for breaking them; nor would they chastise offenders until they +saw many involved in the same offence; when they fell to punishing, not from +any zeal for the laws which they had made, but out of greed to realize the +penalty. Whence flowed many mischiefs, and more particularly this, that the +people being impoverished, but not corrected, sought to make good their +injuries at the expense of others weaker than themselves. And thus there sprang +up all those evils spoken of above, whereof the prince is the true cause. +</p> + +<p> +The truth of what I say is confirmed by Titus Livius where he relates how the +Roman envoys, who were conveying the spoils of the Veientines as an offering to +Apollo, were seized and brought on shore by the corsairs of the Lipari islands +in Sicily; when Timasitheus, the prince of these islands, on learning the +nature of the offering, its destination, and by whom sent, though himself of +Lipari, behaved as a Roman might, showing his people what sacrilege it would be +to intercept such a gift, and speaking to such purpose that by general consent +the envoys were suffered to proceed upon their voyage, taking all their +possessions with them. With reference to which incident the historian observes: +“<i>The multitude, who always take their colour from their ruler, were +filled by Timasitheus with a religious awe.</i>” And to like purport we +find it said by Lorenzo de’ Medici:— +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“A prince’s acts his people imitate;<br/> +For on their lord the eyes of all men wait.”<a href="#fn17" name="fnref17" id="fnref17"><sup>[17]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn17" id="fn17"></a> <a href="#fnref17">[17]</a> +E quel che fa il signer, fanno poi molti;<br/> + Chè nel signer son tutti gli occhi volti.<br/> +(<i>La Rappresentazione di San Giovanni e Paolo.</i>) +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXX.—<i>That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to +render signal service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy. How a +City should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy.</i></h2> + +<p> +When the Roman senate learned that all Etruria was assembled in arms to march +against Rome, and that the Latins and Hernicians, who before had been the +friends of the Romans, had ranged themselves with the Volscians the ancient +enemies of the Roman name, they foresaw that a perilous contest awaited them. +But because Camillus was at that time tribune with consular authority they +thought all might be managed without the appointment of a dictator, provided +the other tribunes, his colleagues would agree to his assuming the sole +direction of affairs. This they willingly did; “<i>nor</i>,” says +Titus Livius, “<i>did they account anything as taken from their own +dignity which was added to his.</i>” +</p> + +<p> +On receiving their promise of obedience, Camillus gave orders that three armies +should be enrolled. Of the first, which was to be directed against the +Etruscans, he himself assumed command. The command of the second, which he +meant to remain near Rome and meet any movement of the Latins and Hernicians, +he gave to Quintius Servilius. The third army, which he designed for the +protection of the city, and the defence of the gates and Curia, he entrusted to +Lucius Quintius. And he further directed, that Horatius, one of his colleagues, +should furnish supplies of arms, and corn, and of all else needful in time of +war. Finally he put forward his colleague Cornelius to preside in the senate +and public council, that from day to day he might advise what should be done. +For in those times these tribunes were ready either to command or obey as the +welfare of their country might require. +</p> + +<p> +We may gather from this passage how a brave and prudent man should act, how +much good he may effect, and how serviceable he may be to his country, when by +the force of his character and worth he succeeds in extinguishing envy. For +this often disables men from acting to the best advantage, not permitting them +to obtain that authority which it is essential they should have in matters of +importance. Now, envy may be extinguished in one or other of two ways: first, +by the approach of some flagrant danger, whereby seeing themselves like to be +overwhelmed, all forego their own private ambition and lend a willing obedience +to him who counts on his valour to rescue them. As in the case of Camillas, who +from having given many proofs of surpassing ability, and from having been three +times dictator and always exercised the office for the public good and not for +his private advantage, had brought men to fear nothing from his advancement; +while his fame and reputation made it no shame for them to recognize him as +their superior. Wisely, therefore, does Titus Livius use concerning him the +words which I have cited. +</p> + +<p> +The other way in which envy may be extinguished, is by the death, whether by +violence or in the ordinary course of nature, of those who have been your +rivals in the pursuit of fame or power, and who seeing you better esteemed than +themselves, could never acquiesce in your superiority or put up with it in +patience. For when these men have been brought up in a corrupt city, where +their training is little likely to improve them, nothing that can happen will +induce them to withdraw their pretensions; nay, to have their own way and +satisfy their perverse humour, they will be content to look on while their +country is ruined. For envy such as this there is no cure save by the death of +those of whom it has taken possession. And when fortune so befriends a great +man that his rivals are removed from his path by a natural death, his glory is +established without scandal or offence, since he is then able to display his +great qualities unhindered. But when fortune is not thus propitious to him, he +must contrive other means to rid himself of rivals, and must do so successfully +before he can accomplish anything. Any one who reads with intelligence the +lessons of Holy Writ, will remember how Moses, to give effect to his laws and +ordinances, was constrained to put to death an endless number of those who out +of mere envy withstood his designs. The necessity of this course was well +understood by the Friar Girolamo Savonarola, and by the Gonfalonier Piero +Soderini. But the former could not comply with it, because, as a friar, he +himself lacked the needful authority; while those of his followers who might +have exercised that authority, did not rightly comprehend his teaching. This, +however, was no fault of his; for his sermons are full of invectives and +attacks against “<i>the wise of this world</i>,” that being the +name he gave to envious rivals and to all who opposed his reforms. As for Piero +Soderini, he was possessed by the belief that in time and with favourable +fortune he could allay envy by gentleness-and by benefits conferred on +particular men; for as he was still in the prime of life, and in the fresh +enjoyment of that good-will which his character and opinions had gained for +him, he thought to get the better of all who out of jealousy opposed him, +without giving occasion for tumult, violence, or disorder; not knowing how time +stays not, worth suffices not, fortune shifts, and malice will not be won over +by any benefit Wherefore, because they could not or knew not how to vanquish +this envy, the two whom I have named came to their downfall. +</p> + +<p> +Another point to be noted in the passage we are considering, is the careful +provision made by Camillus for the safety of Rome both within and without the +city. And, truly, not without reason do wise historians, like our author, set +forth certain events with much minuteness and detail, to the end that those who +come after may learn how to protect themselves in like dangers. Further, we +have to note that there is no more hazardous or less useful defence than one +conducted without method or system. This is shown in Camillus causing a third +army to be enrolled that it might be left in Rome for the protection of the +city. Many persons, doubtless, both then and now, would esteem this precaution +superfluous, thinking that as the Romans were a warlike people and constantly +under arms, there could be no occasion for a special levy, and that it was time +enough to arm when the need came. But Camillus, and any other equally prudent +captain would be of the same mind, judged otherwise, not permitting the +multitude to take up arms unless they were to be bound by the rules and +discipline of military service. Let him, therefore, who is called on to defend +a city, taking example by Camillus, before all things avoid placing arms in the +hands of an undisciplined multitude, but first of all select and enroll those +whom he proposes to arm, so that they may be wholly governed by him as to where +they shall assemble and whither they shall march; and then let him direct those +who are not enrolled, to abide every man in his own house for its defence. +Whosoever observes this method in a city which is attacked, will be able to +defend it with ease; but whosoever disregards it, and follows not the example +of Camillus, shall never succeed. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXI.—<i>That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve +through every change the same Spirit and Bearing.</i></h2> + +<p> +Among other high sayings which our historian ascribes to Camillus, as showing +of what stuff a truly great man should be made, he puts in his mouth the words, +“<i>My courage came not with my dictatorship nor went with my +exile;</i>” for by these words we are taught that a great man is +constantly the same through all vicissitudes of Fortune; so that although she +change, now exalting, now depressing, he remains unchanged, and retains always +a mind so unmoved, and in such complete accordance with his nature as declares +to all that over him Fortune has no dominion. +</p> + +<p> +Very different is the behaviour of those weak-minded mortals who, puffed up and +intoxicated with their success, ascribe all their felicity to virtues which +they never knew, and thus grow hateful and insupportable to all around them. +Whence also the changes in their fortunes. For whenever they have to look +adversity in the face, they suddenly pass to the other extreme, becoming abject +and base. And thus it happens that feeble-minded princes, when they fall into +difficulties, think rather of flight than of defence, because, having made bad +use of their prosperity, they are wholly unprepared to defend themselves. +</p> + +<p> +The same merits and defects which I say are found in individual men, are +likewise found in republics, whereof we have example in the case of Rome and of +Venice. For no reverse of fortune ever broke the spirit of the Roman people, +nor did any success ever unduly elate them; as we see plainly after their +defeat at Cannæ, and after the victory they had over Antiochus. For the defeat +at Cannæ, although most momentous, being the third they had met with, no whit +daunted them; so that they continued to send forth armies, refused to ransom +prisoners as contrary to their custom, and despatched no envoy to Hannibal or +to Carthage to sue for peace; but without ever looking back on past +humiliations, thought always of war, though in such straits for soldiers that +they had to arm their old men and slaves. Which facts being made known to Hanno +the Carthaginian, he, as I have already related, warned the Carthaginian senate +not to lay too much stress upon their victory. Here, therefore, we see that in +times of adversity the Romans were neither cast down nor dismayed. On the other +hand, no prosperity ever made them arrogant. Before fighting the battle wherein +he was finally routed, Antiochus sent messengers to Scipio to treat for an +accord; when Scipio offered peace on condition that he withdrew at once into +Syria, leaving all his other dominions to be dealt with by the Romans as they +thought fit. Antiochus refusing these terms, fought and was defeated, and again +sent envoys to Scipio, enjoining them to accept whatever conditions the victor +might be pleased to impose. But Scipio proposed no different terms from those +he had offered before saying that “<i>the Romans, as they lost not heart +on defeat, so waxed not insolent with success.</i>” +</p> + +<p> +The contrary of all this is seen in the behaviour of the Venetians, who +thinking their good fortune due to valour of which they were devoid, in their +pride addressed the French king as “Son of St. Mark;” and making no +account of the Church, and no longer restricting their ambition to the limits +of Italy, came to dream of founding an empire like the Roman. But afterwards, +when their good fortune deserted them, and they met at Vailà a half-defeat at +the hands of the French king, they lost their whole dominions, not altogether +from revolt, but mainly by a base and abject surrender to the Pope and the King +of Spain. Nay, so low did they stoop as to send ambassadors to the Emperor +offering to become his tributaries, and to write letters to the Pope, full of +submission and servility, in order to move his compassion. To such abasement +were they brought in four days’ time by what was in reality only a +half-defeat. For on their flight after the battle of Vailà only about a half of +their forces were engaged, and one of their two provedditori escaped to Verona +with five and twenty thousand men, horse and foot. So that had there been a +spark of valour in Venice, or any soundness in her military system, she might +easily have renewed her armies, and again confronting fortune have stood +prepared either to conquer, or, if she must fall, to fall more gloriously; and +at any rate might have obtained for herself more honourable terms. But a +pusillanimous spirit, occasioned by the defects of her ordinances in so far as +they relate to war, caused her to lose at once her courage and her dominions. +And so will it always happen with those who behave like the Venetians. For when +men grow insolent in good fortune, and abject inn evil, the fault lies in +themselves and in the character of their training, which, when slight and +frivolous, assimilates them to itself; but when otherwise, makes them of +another temper, and giving them better acquaintance with the world, causes them +to be less disheartened by misfortunes and less elated by success. +</p> + +<p> +And while this is true of individual men, it holds good also of a concourse of +men living together in one republic, who will arrive at that measure of +perfection which the institutions of their State permit. And although I have +already said on another occasion that a good militia is the foundation of all +States, and where that is wanting there can neither be good laws, nor aught +else that is good, it seems to me not superfluous to say the same again; +because in reading this history of Titus Livius the necessity of such a +foundation is made apparent in every page. It is likewise shown that no army +can be good unless it be thoroughly trained and exercised, and that this can +only be the case with an army raised from your own subjects. For as a State is +not and cannot always be at war, you must have opportunity to train your army +in times of peace; but this, having regard to the cost, you can only have in +respect of your own subjects. +</p> + +<p> +When Camillus, as already related, went forth to meet the Etruscans, his +soldiers on seeing the great army of their enemy, were filled with fear, +thinking themselves too to withstand its onset. This untoward disposition being +reported to Camillus, he showed himself to his men and by visiting their tents, +and conversing with this and the other among them, was able to remove their +misgivings; and, finally, without other word of command, he bade them +“<i>each do his part as he had learned and been accustomed</i>.” +Now, any one who well considers the methods followed by Camillus, and the words +spoken by him to encourage his soldiers to face their enemy, will perceive that +these words and methods could never have been used with an army which had not +been trained and disciplined in time of peace as well as of war. For no captain +can trust to untrained soldiers or look for good service at their hands; nay, +though he were another Hannibal, with such troops his defeat were certain. For, +as a captain cannot be present everywhere while a battle is being fought, +unless he have taken all measures beforehand to render his men of the same +temper as himself, and have made sure that they perfectly understand his orders +and arrangements, he will inevitably be destroyed. +</p> + +<p> +When a city therefore is armed and trained as Rome was, and when its citizens +have daily opportunity, both singly and together, to make trial of their valour +and learn what fortune can effect, it will always happen, that at all times, +and whether circumstances be adverse or favourable, they will remain of +unaltered courage and preserve the same noble bearing. But when its citizens +are unpractised in arms, and trust not to their own valour but wholly to the +arbitration of Fortune, they will change their temper as she changes, and offer +always the same example of behaviour as was given by the Venetians. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXII.—<i>Of the methods which some have used to make Peace +impossible</i>.</h2> + +<p> +The towns of Cære and Velitræ, two of her own colonies, revolted from Rome in +expectation of being protected by the Latins. But the Latins being routed and +all hopes of help from that quarter at an end, many of the townsmen recommended +that envoys should be sent to Rome to make their peace with the senate. This +proposal, however, was defeated by those who had been the prime movers of the +revolt, who, fearing that the whole punishment might fall on their heads, to +put a stop to any talk of an adjustment, incited the multitude to take up arms +and make a foray into the Roman territory. +</p> + +<p> +And, in truth, when it is desired that a prince or people should banish from +their minds every thought of reconciliation, there is no surer or more +effectual plan than to incite them to inflict grave wrong on him with whom you +would not have them be reconciled; for, then, the fear of that punishment which +they will seem to themselves to have deserved, will always keep them apart. At +the close of the first war waged by the Romans against Carthage, the soldiers +who had served under the Carthaginians in Sardinia and Sicily, upon peace being +proclaimed, returned to Africa; where, being dissatisfied with their pay, they +mutinied against the Carthaginians, and choosing two of their number, Mato and +Spendio, to be their leaders, seized and sacked many towns subject to Carthage. +The Carthaginians, being loath to use force until they had tried all other +methods for bringing them to reason, sent Hasdrubal, their fellow-citizen, to +mediate with them, thinking that from formerly having commanded them he might +be able to exercise some influence over them. But on his arrival, Spendio and +Mato, to extinguish any hope these mutineers might have had of making peace +with Carthage, and so leave them no alternative but war, persuaded them that +their best course was to put Hasdrubal, with all the other Carthaginian +citizens whom they had taken prisoners, to death. Whereupon, they not only put +them to death, but first subjected them to an infinity of tortures; crowning +their wickedness by a proclamation to the effect that every Carthaginian who +might thereafter fall into their hands should meet a like fate. This advice, +therefore, and its consummation had the effect of rendering these mutineers +relentless and inveterate in their hostility to the Carthaginians. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXIII.—<i>That to insure victory in battle you must inspire +your Men with confidence in one another and in you.</i></h2> + +<p> +To insure an army being victorious in battle you must inspire it with the +conviction that it is certain to prevail. The causes which give it this +confidence are its being well armed and disciplined, and the soldiers knowing +one another. These conditions are only to be found united in soldiers born and +bred in the same country. +</p> + +<p> +It is likewise essential that the army should think so well of its captain as +to trust implicitly to his prudence; which it will always do if it see him +careful of its welfare, attentive to discipline, brave in battle, and otherwise +supporting well and honourably the dignity of his position. These conditions he +fulfils when, while punishing faults, he does not needlessly harass his men, +keeps his word with them, shows them that the path to victory is easy, and +conceals from them, or makes light of things which seen from a distance might +appear to threaten danger. The observance of these precautions will give an +army great confidence, and such confidence leads to victory. +</p> + +<p> +This confidence the Romans were wont to inspire in the minds of their soldiers +by the aid of religion; and accordingly their consuls were appointed, their +armies were enrolled, their soldiers marched forth, and their battles were +begun, only when the auguries and auspices were favourable; and without +attending to all these observances no prudent captain would ever engage in +combat; knowing that unless his soldiers were first assured that the gods were +on their side, he might readily suffer defeat. But if any consul or other +leader ever joined battle contrary to the auspices, the Romans would punish +him, as they did Claudius Pulcher. +</p> + +<p> +The truth of what I affirm is plainly seen from the whole course of the Roman +history, but is more particularly established by the words which Livius puts +into the mouth of Appius Claudius, who, when complaining to the people of the +insolence of the tribunes, and taxing them with having caused the corruption of +the auspices and other rites of religion, is made to say, “<i>And now +they would strip even religion of its authority. For what matters it, they will +tell you, that the fowls refuse to peck, or come slowly from the coop, or that +a cock has crowed? These are small matters doubtless; but it was by not +contemning such small matters as these, that our forefathers built up this +great republic.</i>” And, indeed, in these small matters lies a power +which keeps men united and of good courage, which is of itself the chief +condition of success. +</p> + +<p> +But the observances of religion must be accompanied by valour, for otherwise +they can nothing avail. The men of Praneste, leading forth their army against +the Romans, took up their position near the river Allia, on the very spot where +the Romans had been routed by the Gauls, selecting this ground that it might +inspire their own side with confidence, and dishearten their enemies with the +unhappy memories which it recalled But although, for the reasons already noted, +this was a course which promised success, the result nevertheless showed that +true valour is not to be daunted by trifling disadvantages. And this the +historian well expresses by the words he puts in the mouth of the dictator as +spoken to his master of the knights “<i>See how these fellows, in +encamping on the banks of the Allia, have chosen their ground in reliance upon +fortune. Do you, therefore, relying on discipline and valour, fall upon then +centre.</i>” For true valour, tight discipline, and the feeling of +security gained by repeated victories, are not to be counteracted by things of +no real moment, dismayed by empty terrors, or quelled by a solitary mishap. As +was well seen when the two Manlii, being consuls in command against the +Volscians, rashly allowed a part of their army to go out foraging, and both +those who went out and those who stayed behind found themselves attacked at the +same moment For from this danger they were saved by the courage of the +soldiers, and not by the foresight of the consuls. With regard to which +occurrence Titus Livius observes, “<i>Even without a leader the steadfast +valour of the soldiers was maintained.</i>” +</p> + +<p> +Here I must not omit to notice the device practised by Fabius to give his army +confidence, when he led it for the first time into Etruria. For judging such +encouragement to be especially needed by his men, since they were entering an +unknown country to encounter a new foe, he addressed them before they joined +battle, and, after reciting many reasons for expecting a victory, told them, +that “<i>he could have mentioned other favourable circumstances making +victory certain, had it not been dangerous to disclose them.</i>” And as +this device was dexterously used it merits imitation. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXIV.—<i>By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens +of a Republic are led to favour a Fellow-citizen: and-whether the Magistracies +are bestowed with better judgment by a People or by a Prince.</i></h2> + +<p> +I have elsewhere related how Titus Manlius, afterwards named Torquatus, rescued +his father from the charge laid against him by Marcus Pomponius, tribune of the +people. And though the means he took to effect this were somewhat violent and +irregular, so pleasing to everyone were his filial piety and affection, that +not only did he escape rebuke, but when military tribunes had to be appointed +his name was second on the list of those chosen. To explain his good fortune, +it will, I think, be useful to consider what are the methods followed by the +citizens of a republic in estimating the character of those on whom they bestow +honours, so as to see whether what I have already said on this head be true, +namely, that a people is more discriminating in awarding honours than a prince. +</p> + +<p> +I say, then, that in conferring honours and offices, the people, when it has no +knowledge of a man from his public career, follows the estimate given of him by +the general voice, and by common report; or else is guided by some +prepossession or preconceived opinion which it has adopted concerning him. Such +impressions are formed either from consideration of a man’s descent (it +being assumed, until the contrary appears, that where his ancestors have been +great and distinguished citizens their descendant will resemble them), or else +from regard to his manners and habits; and nothing can be more in his favour +than that he frequents the company of the grave and virtuous, and such as are +generally reputed wise. For as we can have no better clue to a man’s +character than the company he keeps, he who frequents worthy company deservedly +obtains a good name, since there can hardly fail to be some similarity between +himself and his associates. Sometimes, however, the popular estimate of a man +is founded on some remarkable and noteworthy action, though not of public +moment, in which he has acquitted himself well. And of all the three causes +which create a prepossession in a man’s favour, none is so effectual as +this last. For the presumption that he will resemble his ancestors and kinsmen +is so often misleading, that men are slow to trust and quick to discard it, +unless confirmed by the personal worth of him of whom they are judging. +</p> + +<p> +The criterion of character afforded by a man’s manners and conversation +is a safer guide than the presumption of inherited excellence, but is far +inferior to that afforded by his actions; for until he has given actual proof +of his worth, his credit is built on mere opinion, which may readily change. +But this third mode of judging, which originates in and rests upon his actions, +at once gives him a name which can only be destroyed by his afterwards doing +many actions of a contrary nature. Those therefore who live in a republic +should conform to this third criterion, and endeavour, as did many of the Roman +youth, to make their start in life with some extraordinary achievement, either +by promoting a law conducive to the general well-being, or by accusing some +powerful citizen as a transgressor of the laws, or by performing some similar +new and notable action which cannot fail to be much spoken of. +</p> + +<p> +Actions like this are necessary not only to lay a foundation for your fame, but +also to maintain and extend it. To which end, they must continually be renewed, +as we find done by Titus Manlius throughout the whole course of his life. For +after winning his earliest renown by his bold and singular defence of his +father, when some years had passed he fought his famous duel with the Gaul, +from whom, when he had slain him, he took the twisted golden collar which gave +him the name of Torquatus. Nor was this the last of his remarkable actions, for +at a later period, when he was of ripe years, he caused his own son to be put +to death, because he had fought without leave, although successfully. Which +three actions gained for him at the time a greater name, and have made him more +renowned through after ages than all his triumphs and victories, though of +these he had as large a share as fell to the lot of any other Roman. The +explanation of which is, that while in his victories Manlius had many who +resembled him, in these particular actions he stood almost or entirely alone. +</p> + +<p> +So, too, with the elder Scipio, all whose victories together did not obtain for +him so much reputation, as did his rescue, while he was yet young, of his +father at the Ticino, and his undaunted bearing after the rout at Cannæ, when +with his naked sword he constrained a number of the Roman youth to swear never +to abandon their country, as some among them had before been minded to do. It +was these two actions, therefore, which laid the foundation of his future fame +and paved the way for his triumphs in Spain and Africa. And the fair esteem in +which men held him, was still further heightened when in Spain he restored a +daughter to her father, a wife to her husband. +</p> + +<p> +Nor is it only the citizen who seeks reputation as leading to civil honours, +who must act in this way; the prince who would maintain his credit in his +princedom must do likewise; since nothing helps so much to make a prince +esteemed as to give signal proofs of his worth, whether by words or by deeds +which tend to promote the public good, and show him to be so magnanimous, +generous, and just, that he may well pass into a proverb among his subjects. +But to return to the point whence I digressed, I say that if a people, when +they first confer honours on a fellow-citizen, rest their judgment on any one +of the three circumstances above-mentioned, they build on a reasonable +foundation; but, when many instances of noble conduct have made a man +favourably known, that the foundation is still better, since then there is +hardly room for mistake. I speak merely of those honours which are bestowed on +a man at the outset of his career, before he has come to be known by continued +proof, or is found to have passed from one kind of conduct to another and +dissimilar kind, and I maintain that in such cases, so far as erroneous +judgments or corrupt motives are concerned, a people will always commit fewer +mistakes than a prince. +</p> + +<p> +But since a people may happen to be deceived as regards the character, +reputation, and actions of a man, thinking them better or greater than in truth +they are, an error a prince is less likely to fall into from his being informed +and warned by his advisers, in order that the people may not lack similar +advice, wise founders of republics have provided, that when the highest +dignities of the State, to which it would be dangerous to appoint incapable +men, have to be filled up, and it appears that some incapable man is the object +of the popular choice, it shall be lawful and accounted honourable for any +citizen to declare in the public assemblies the defects of the favoured +candidate, that the people, being made acquainted therewith, may be better able +to judge of his fitness. That this was the practice in Rome we have proof in +the speech made by Fabius Maximus to the people during the second Punic war, +when in the appointment of consuls public favour leaned towards Titus +Ottacilius. For Fabius judging him unequal to the duties of the consulship at +such a crisis, spoke against him and pointed out his insufficiency, and so +prevented his appointment, turning the popular favour towards another who +deserved it more. +</p> + +<p> +In the choice of its magistrates, therefore, a people judges of those among +whom it has to choose, in accordance with the surest indications it can get; +and when it can be advised as princes are, makes fewer mistakes than they. But +the citizen who would make a beginning by gaining the good-will of the people, +must, to obtain it, perform, like Titus Manlius, some noteworthy action. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXV.—<i>Of the Danger incurred in being the first to +recommend new Measures; and that the more unusual the Measures the greater the +Danger</i>.</h2> + +<p> +How perilous a thing it is to put one’s self at the head of changes +whereby many are affected, how difficult to guide and bring them to perfection, +and when perfected to maintain them, were too wide and arduous a subject to be +treated here. Wherefore I reserve it for a fitter occasion, and shall now speak +only of those dangers which are incurred by the citizens of a republic or by +the counsellors of a prince in being the first to promote some grave and +important measure in such manner that the whole responsibility attending it +rests with them. For as men judge of things by their results, any evil which +ensues from such measures will be imputed to their author. And although if good +ensue he will be applauded, nevertheless in matters of this kind, what a man +may gain is as nothing to what he may lose. +</p> + +<p> +Selim, the present sultan, or Grand Turk as he is called, being in readiness, +as some who come from his country relate, to set forth on an expedition against +Egypt and Syria, was urged by one of his bashaws whom he had stationed on the +confines of Persia, to make war upon the Sofi. In compliance with which advice +he went on this new enterprise with a vast army. But coming to a great plain, +wherein were many deserts and few streams, and encountering the same +difficulties as in ancient times had proved the ruin of many Roman armies, he +suffered so much from pestilence and famine, that, although victorious in +battle, he lost a great part of his men. This so enraged him against the bashaw +on whose advice he had acted, that he forthwith put him to death. +</p> + +<p> +In like manner, we read of many citizens who having strenuously promoted +various measures were banished when these turned out badly. Certain citizens of +Rome, for instance, were very active in forwarding a law allowing the +appointment of a plebeian to be consul. This law passing, it so happened that +the first plebeian consul who went forth with the armies was routed; and had it +not been that the party in whose behalf the law was made was extremely +powerful, its promoters would have fared badly. It is plain therefore that the +counsellors whether of a republic or of a prince stand in this dilemma, that if +they do not conscientiously advise whatsoever they think advantageous for their +city or prince, they fail in their duty; if they do advise it, they risk their +places and their lives; all men being subject to this infirmity of judging +advice by the event. +</p> + +<p> +When I consider in what way this reproach or this danger may best be escaped, I +find no other remedy to recommend than that in giving advice you proceed +discreetly not identifying yourself in a special manner with the measure you +would see carried out, but offering your opinion without heat, and supporting +it temperately and modestly, so that if the prince or city follow it, they +shall do so of their own good-will, and not seem to be dragged into it by your +importunity. When you act thus, neither prince nor people can reasonably bear +you a grudge in respect of the advice given by you, since that advice was not +adopted contrary to the general opinion. For your danger lies in many having +opposed you, who afterwards, should your advice prove hurtful, combine to ruin +you. And although in taking this course you fall short of the glory which is +earned by him who stands alone against many in urging some measure which +succeeds, you have nevertheless two advantages to make up for it: first, that +you escape danger; and second, that when you have temperately stated your +views, and when, in consequence of opposition, your advice has not been taken, +should other counsels prevail and mischief come of them, your credit will be +vastly enhanced. And although credit gained at the cost of misfortune to your +prince or city cannot be matter of rejoicing, still it is something to be taken +into account. +</p> + +<p> +On this head, then, I know of no other advice to offer. For that you should be +silent and express no opinion at all, were a course hurtful for your prince or +city, and which would not absolve you from danger, since you would soon grow to +be suspected, when it might fare with you as with the friend of Perseus the +Macedonian king. For Perseus being defeated by Paulus Emilius, and making his +escape with a few companions, it happened that one of them, in reviewing the +past, began to point out to the king many mistakes which he had made and which +had been his ruin. Whereupon Perseus turning upon him said, “<i>Traitor, +hast thou waited till now when there is no remedy to tell me these +things</i>?” and so saying, slew him with his own hand. Such was the +penalty incurred by one who was silent when he should have spoken, and who +spoke when he should have been silent; and who found no escape from danger in +having refrained from giving advice. Wherefore, I believe, that the course +which I have recommended should be observed and followed. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXVI.—<i>Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the +Gauls, that at the beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards +less than Women</i>.</h2> + +<p> +The bravery of the Gaul who on the banks of the Anio challenged any among the +Romans to fight with him, and the combat that thereupon ensued between him and +Titus Manlius, remind me of what Titus Livius oftener than once observes in his +history, that “<i>at the beginning of a fray the Gauls are more than men, +but ere it is ended show themselves less than women</i>.” +</p> + +<p> +Touching the cause of this, many are content to believe that such is their +nature, which, indeed, I take to be true; but we are not, therefore, to assume +that the natural temper which makes them brave at the outset, may not be so +trained and regulated as to keep them brave to the end. And, to prove this, I +say, that armies are of three kinds. In one of these you have discipline with +bravery and valour as its consequence. Such was the Roman army, which is shown +by all historians to have maintained excellent discipline as the result of +constant military training. And because in a well-disciplined army none must do +anything save by rule, we find that in the Roman army, from which as it +conquered the world all others should take example, none either eat, or slept, +or bought, or sold, or did anything else, whether in his military or in his +private capacity, without orders from the consul. Those armies which do +otherwise are not true armies, and if ever they have any success, it is owing +to the fury and impetuosity of their onset and not to trained and steady +valour. But of this impetuosity and fury, trained valour, when occasion +requires, will make use; nor will any danger daunt it or cause it to lose +heart, its courage being kept alive by its discipline, and its confidence fed +by the hope of victory which never fails it while that discipline is +maintained. +</p> + +<p> +But the contrary happens with armies of the second sort, those, namely, which +have impetuosity without discipline, as was the case with the Gauls whose +courage in a protracted conflict gradually wore away; so that unless they +succeeded in their first attack, the impetuosity to which they trusted, having +no support from disciplined valour, soon cooled; when, as they had nothing else +to depend on, their efforts ceased. The Romans, on the other hand, being less +disquieted in danger by reason of their perfect discipline, and never losing +hope, fought steadily and stubbornly to the last, and with the same courage at +the end as at the outset; nay, growing heated by the conflict, only became the +fiercer the longer it was continued. +</p> + +<p> +In armies of the third sort both natural spirit and trained valour are wanting; +and to this class belong the Italian armies of our own times, of which it may +be affirmed that they are absolutely worthless, never obtaining a victory, save +when, by some accident, the enemy they encounter takes to flight. But since we +have daily proofs of this absence of valour, it were needless to set forth +particular instances of it. +</p> + +<p> +That all, however, may know on the testimony of Titus Livius what methods a +good army should take, and what are taken by a bad army, I shall cite the words +he represents Papirius Cursor to have used when urging that Fabius, his master +of the knights, should be punished for disobedience, and denouncing the +consequences which would ensue were he absolved, saying:—“_Let +neither God nor man be held in reverence; let the orders of captains and the +Divine auspices be alike disregarded; let a vagrant soldiery range without +leave through the country of friend or foe; reckless of their military oath, +let them disband at their pleasure; let them forsake their deserted standards, +and neither rally nor disperse at the word of command; let them fight when they +choose, by day or by night, with or without advantage of ground, with or +without the bidding of their leader, neither maintaining their ranks <i>nor +observing the order of battle; and let our armies, from being a solemn and +consecrated company, grow to resemble some dark and fortuitous gathering of +cut-throats.</i>” With this passage before us, it is easy to pronounce +whether the armies of our times be “<i>a dark and fortuitous +gathering</i>,” or “<i>a solemn and consecrated company</i>;” +nay, how far they fall short of anything worthy to be called an army, +possessing neither the impetuous but disciplined valour of the Romans, nor even +the mere undisciplined impetuosity of the Gauls. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXVII.—<i>Whether a general engagement should be preceded by +skirmishes; and how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new +Enemy.</i></h2> + +<p> +Besides all the other difficulties which hinder men from bringing anything to +its utmost perfection, it appears, as I have already observed, that in close +vicinity to every good is found also an evil, so apt to grow up along with it +that it is hardly possible to have the one without accepting the other. This we +see in all human affairs, and the result is, that unless fortune aid us to +overcome this natural and common disadvantage, we never arrive at any +excellence. I am reminded of this by the combat between Titus Manlius and the +Gaul, concerning which Livius writes that it “<i>determined the issue of +the entire war; since the Gauls, abandoning their camp, hastily withdrew to the +country about Tivoli, whence they presently passed into Campania.</i>” +</p> + +<p> +It may be said, therefore, on the one hand, that a prudent captain ought +absolutely to refrain from all those operations which, while of trifling moment +in themselves, may possibly produce an ill effect on his army. Now, to engage +in a combat wherein you risk your whole fortunes without putting forth your +entire strength, is, as I observed before, when condemning the defence of a +country by guarding its defiles, an utterly foolhardy course. On the other +hand, it is to be said that a prudent captain, when he has to meet a new and +redoubtable adversary, ought, before coming to a general engagement, to +accustom his men by skirmishes and passages of arms, to the quality of their +enemy; that they may learn to know him, and how to deal with him, and so free +themselves from the feeling of dread which his name and fame inspire. +</p> + +<p> +This for a captain is a matter of the very greatest importance, and one which +it might be almost fatal for him to neglect, since to risk a pitched battle +without first giving your soldiers such opportunities to know their enemy and +shake off their fear of him, is to rush on certain destruction. When Valerius +Corvinus was sent by the Romans with their armies against the Samnites, these +being new adversaries with whom up to that time they had not measured their +strength, Titus Livius tells us that before giving battle he made his men make +trial of the enemy in several unimportant skirmishes, “<i>lest they +should be dismayed by a new foe and a new method of warfare.</i>” +Nevertheless, there is very great danger that, if your soldiers get the worst +in these encounters, their alarm and self-distrust may be increased, and a +result follow contrary to that intended, namely, that you dispirit where you +meant to reassure. +</p> + +<p> +This, therefore, is one of those cases in which the evil lies so nigh the good, +and both are so mixed up together that you may readily lay hold of the one when +you think to grasp the other. And with regard to this I say, that a good +captain should do what he can that nothing happen which might discourage his +men, nor is there anything so likely to discourage them as to begin with a +defeat. For which reason skirmishes are, as a rule, to be avoided, and only to +be allowed where you fight to great advantage and with a certainty of victory. +In like manner, no attempt should be made to defend the passes leading into +your country unless your whole army can co-operate; nor are any towns to be +defended save those whose loss necessarily involves your ruin. And as to those +towns which you do defend, you must so arrange, both in respect of the garrison +within and the army without, that in the event of a siege your whole forces can +be employed. All other towns you must leave undefended. For, provided your army +be kept together, you do not, in losing what you voluntarily abandon, forfeit +your military reputation, or sacrifice your hopes of final success. But when +you lose what it was your purpose, and what all know it was your purpose to +hold, you suffer a real loss and injury, and, like the Gauls on the defeat of +their champion, you are ruined by a mishap of no moment in itself. +</p> + +<p> +Philip of Macedon, the father of Perseus, a great soldier in his day, and of a +great name, on being invaded by the Romans, laid waste and relinquished much of +his territory which he thought he could not defend; rightly judging it more +hurtful to his reputation to lose territory after an attempt to defend it, than +to abandon it to the enemy as something he cared little to retain. So, +likewise, after the battle of Cannæ, when their affairs were at their worst, +the Romans refused aid to many subject and protected States, charging them to +defend themselves as best they could. And this is a better course than to +undertake to defend and then to fail; for by refusing to defend, you lose only +your friend; whereas in failing, you not only lose your friend, but weaken +yourself. +</p> + +<p> +But to return to the matter in hand, I affirm, that even when a captain is +constrained by inexperience of his enemy to make trial of him by means of +skirmishes, he ought first to see that he has so much the advantage that he +runs no risk of defeat; or else, and this is his better course, he must do as +Marius did when sent against the Cimbrians, a very courageous people who were +laying Italy waste, and by their fierceness and numbers, and from the fact of +their having already routed a Roman army, spreading terror wherever they came. +For before fighting a decisive battle, Marius judged it necessary to do +something to lessen the dread in which these enemies were held by his army; and +being a prudent commander, he, on several occasions, posted his men at points +where the Cimbrians must pass, that seeing and growing familiar with their +appearance, while themselves in safety and within the shelter of their +intrenched camp, and finding them to be a mere disorderly rabble, encumbered +with baggage, and either without weapons, or with none that were formidable, +they might at last assume courage and grow eager to engage them in battle. The +part thus prudently taken by Marius, should be carefully imitated by others who +would escape the dangers above spoken of and not have to betake themselves like +the Gauls to a disgraceful flight, on sustaining some trifling defeat. +</p> + +<p> +But since in this Discourse I have referred by name to Valerius Corvinus, in my +next Chapter I shall cite his words to show what manner of man a captain ought +to be. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXVIII.—<i>Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his +Soldiers can confide.</i></h2> + +<p> +Valerius Corvinus, as I have said already, was sent in command of an army +against the Samnites, who were then new enemies to Rome. Wherefore, to reassure +his soldiers and familiarize them with their adversaries, he made them engage +with them in various unimportant passages of arms. But not thinking this +enough, he resolved before delivering battle to address his men, and by +reminding them of their valour and his own, to make it plain how little they +should esteem such enemies. And from the words which Titus Livius puts in his +mouth we may gather what manner of man the captain ought to be in whom an army +will put its trust. For he makes him say:—“<i>Bear ye also this in +mind under whose conduct and auspices you are about to fight, and whether he +whom you are to obey be great only in exhorting, bold only in words, and all +unpractised in arms; or whether he be one who himself knows how to use his +spear, to march before the eagles, and play his part in the thickest of the +fight. Soldiers! I would have you follow my deeds and not my words, and look to +me for example rather than for commands; for with this right hand I have won +for myself three consulships, and an unsurpassed renown.</i>” Which words +rightly understood give every one to know what he must do to merit a +captain’s rank. And if any man obtain it by other means, he will soon +discover that advancement due to chance or intrigue rather takes away than +brings reputation, since it is men who give lustre to titles and not titles to +men. +</p> + +<p> +From what has been said it will likewise be understood that if great captains +when matched against an unfamiliar foe have had to resort to unusual methods +for reassuring the minds even of veteran soldiers, much more will it be +necessary for them to use all their address when in command of a raw and +untried army which has never before looked an enemy in the face. For if an +unfamiliar adversary inspire terror even in a veteran army, how much greater +must be the terror which any army will inspire in the minds of untrained men. +And yet we often find all these difficulties overcome by the supreme prudence +of a great captain like the Roman Gracchus or the Theban Epaminondas, of whom I +have before spoken, who with untried troops defeated the most practised +veterans. And the method they are said to have followed was to train their men +for some months in mimic warfare, so as to accustom them to discipline and +obedience, after which they employed them with complete confidence on actual +service. +</p> + +<p> +No man, therefore, of warlike genius, need despair of creating a good army if +only he have the men; for the prince who has many subjects and yet lacks +soldiers, has only to thank his own inertness and want of foresight, and must +not complain of the cowardice of his people. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XXXIX.—<i>That a Captain should have good knowledge of +Places.</i></h2> + +<p> +Among other qualifications essential in a good captain is a knowledge, both +general and particular, of places and countries, for without such knowledge it +is impossible for him to carry out any enterprise in the best way. And while +practice is needed for perfection in every art, in this it is needed in the +highest degree. Such practice, or particular knowledge as it may be termed, is +sooner acquired in the chase than in any other exercise; and, accordingly, we +find it said by ancient historians that those heroes who, in their day, ruled +the world, were bred in the woods and trained to the chase; for this exercise +not merely gives the knowledge I speak of, but teaches countless other lessons +needful in war. And Xenophon in his life of Cyrus tells us, that Cyrus, on his +expedition against the King of Armenia, when assigning to each of his followers +the part he was to perform, reminded them that the enterprise on which they +were engaged, differed little from one of those hunting expeditions on which +they had gone so often in his company; likening those who were to lie in ambush +in the mountains, to the men sent to spread the toils on the hill-tops; and +those who were to overrun the plain, to the beaters whose business it is to +start the game from its lair that it may be driven into the toils. Now, this is +related to show how, in the opinion of Xenophon, the chase is a mimic +representation of war, and therefore to be esteemed by the great as useful and +honourable. +</p> + +<p> +Nor can that knowledge of countries which I have spoken of as necessary in a +commander, be obtained in any convenient way except by the chase. For he who +joins therein gains a special acquaintance with the character of the country in +which it is followed; and he who has made himself specially familiar with one +district, will afterwards readily understand the character of any strange +country into which he comes. For all countries, and the districts of which they +are made up, have a certain resemblance to one another, so that from a +knowledge of one we can pass easily to the knowledge of another. He therefore +who is without such practical acquaintance with some one country, can only with +difficulty, and after a long time, obtain a knowledge of another, while he who +possesses it can take in at a glance how this plain spreads, how that mountain +slopes, whither that valley winds, and all other like particulars in respect of +which he has already acquired a certain familiarity. +</p> + +<p> +The truth of what I affirm is shown by Titus Livius in the case of Publius +Decius, who, being military tribune in the army which the consul Cornelius led +against the Samnites, when the consul advanced into a defile where the Roman +army were like to be shut in by the enemy, perceiving the great danger they +ran, and noting, as Livius relates, a hill which rose by a steep ascent and +overhung the enemy’s camp, and which, though hard of access for +heavy-armed troops, presented little difficulty to troops lightly armed, turned +to the consul and said:—“<i>Seest thou, Aulus Cornelius, yonder +height over above the enemy, which they have been blind enough to neglect? +There, were we manfully to seize it, might we find the citadel of our hopes and +of our safety.</i>” Whereupon, he was sent by the consul with three +thousand men to secure the height, and so saved the Roman army. And as it was +part of his plan to make his own escape and carry off his men safely under +shelter of night, Livius represents him as saying to his +soldiers:—“<i>Come with me, that, while daylight still serves, we +may learn where the enemy have posted their guards, and by what exit we may +issue hence.</i>” Accordingly, putting on the cloak of a common soldier, +lest the enemy should observe that an officer was making his rounds he surveyed +their camp in all directions. +</p> + +<p> +Now any one who carefully studies the whole of this passage, must perceive how +useful and necessary it is for a captain to know the nature of places, which +knowledge had Decius not possessed he could not have decided that it would be +for the advantage of the Roman army to occupy this hill; nor could he have +judged from a distance whether the hill was accessible or no; and when he +reached the summit and desired to return to the consul, since he was surrounded +on all sides by the enemy, he never could have distinguished the path it was +safe for him to take, from those guarded by the foe. For all which reasons it +was absolutely essential that Decius should have that thorough knowledge which +enabled him by gaining possession of this hill to save the Roman army, and to +discover a path whereby, in the event of his being attacked, he and his +followers might escape. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XL.—<i>That Fraud is fair in War.</i></h2> + +<p> +Although in all other affairs it be hateful to use fraud, in the operations of +war it is praiseworthy and glorious; so that he who gets the better of his +enemy by fraud, is as much extolled as he who prevails by force. This appears +in the judgments passed by such as have written of the lives of great warriors, +who praise Hannibal and those other captains who have been most noted for +acting in this way. But since we may read of many instances of such frauds, I +shall not cite them here. This, however, I desire to say, that I would not have +it understood that any fraud is glorious which leads you to break your plighted +word, or to depart from covenants to which you have agreed; for though to do so +may sometimes gain you territory and power, it can never, as I have said +elsewhere, gain you glory. +</p> + +<p> +The fraud, then, which I here speak of is that employed against an enemy who +places no trust in you, and is wholly directed to military operations, such as +the stratagem of Hannibal at the Lake of Thrasymene, when he feigned flight in +order to draw the Roman consul and his army into an ambuscade; or when to +escape from the hands of Fabius Maximus he fastened lights to the horns of his +oxen. Similar to the above was the deceit practised by Pontius the Samnite +commander to inveigle the Roman army into the Caudine Forks. For after he had +drawn up his forces behind the hills, he sent out a number of his soldiers, +disguised as herdsmen, to drive great herds of cattle across the plain; who +being captured by the Romans, and interrogated as to where the Samnite army +was, all of them, as they had been taught by Pontius, agreed in saying that it +had gone to besiege Nocera: which being believed by the consuls, led them to +advance within the Caudine Valley, where no sooner were they come than they +were beset by the Samnites. And the victory thus won by a fraud would have been +most glorious for Pontius had he but taken the advice of his father Herennius, +who urged that the Romans should either be set at liberty unconditionally, or +all be put to death; but that a mean course “<i>which neither gains +friends nor gets rid of foes</i>” should be avoided. And this was sound +advice, for, as has already been shown, in affairs of moment a mean course is +always hurtful. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLI.—<i>That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by +Dishonour; and in either way is well defended.</i></h2> + +<p> +The consuls together with the whole Roman army fell, as I have related, into +the hands of the Samnites, who imposed on them the most ignominious terms, +insisting that they should be stripped of their arms, and pass under the yoke +before they were allowed to return to Rome. The consuls being astounded by the +harshness of these conditions and the whole army overwhelmed with dismay, +Lucius Lentulus, the Roman lieutenant, stood forward and said, that in his +opinion they ought to decline no course whereby their country might be saved; +and that as the very existence of Rome depended on the preservation of her +army, that army must be saved at any sacrifice, for whether the means be +honourable or ignominious, all is well done that is done for the defence of our +country. And he said that were her army preserved, Rome, in course of time, +might wipe out the disgrace; but if her army were destroyed, however gloriously +it might perish, Rome and her freedom would perish with it. In the event his +counsel was followed. +</p> + +<p> +Now this incident deserves to be noted and pondered over by every citizen who +is called on to advise his country; for when the entire safety of our country +is at stake, no consideration of what is just or unjust, merciful or cruel, +praiseworthy or shameful, must intervene. On the contrary, every other +consideration being set aside, that course alone must be taken which preserves +the existence of the country and maintains its liberty. And this course we find +followed by the people of France, both in their words and in their actions, +with the view of supporting the dignity of their king and the integrity of +their kingdom; for there is no remark they listen to with more impatience than +that this or the other course is disgraceful to the king. For their king, they +say, can incur no disgrace by any resolve he may take, whether it turn out well +or ill; and whether it succeed or fail, all maintain that he has acted as a +king should. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLII.—<i>That Promises made on Compulsion are not to be +observed.</i></h2> + +<p> +When, after being subjected to this disgrace, the consuls returned to Rome with +their disarmed legions, Spurius Posthumius, himself one of the consuls, was the +first to contend in the senate that the terms made in the Caudine Valley were +not to be observed. For he argued that the Roman people were not bound by them, +though he himself doubtless was, together with all the others who had promised +peace; wherefore, if the people desired to set themselves free from every +engagement, he and all the rest who had given this promise must be made over as +prisoners into the hands of the Samnites. And so steadfastly did he hold to +this opinion, that the senate were content to adopt it, and sending him and the +rest as prisoners back to Samnium, protested to the Samnites that the peace was +not binding. And so kind was Fortune to Posthumius on this occasion, that the +Samnites would not keep him as a prisoner, and that on his return to Rome, +notwithstanding his defeat, he was held in higher honour by the Romans than the +victorious Pontius by his countrymen. +</p> + +<p> +Here two points are to be noted; first, that glory may be won by any action; +for although, commonly, it follow upon victory, it may also follow on defeat, +if this defeat be seen to have happened through no fault of yours, or if, +directly after, you perform some valiant action which cancels it. The other +point to be noted is that there is no disgrace in not observing promises wrung +from you by force; for promises thus extorted when they affect the public +welfare will always be broken so soon as the pressure under which they were +made is withdrawn, and that, too, without shame on the part of him who breaks +them; of which we read many instances in history, and find them constantly +occurring at the present day. Nay, as between princes, not only are such +compulsory promises broken when the force which extorted them is removed, but +all other promises as well, are in like manner disregarded when the causes +which led to them no longer operate. +</p> + +<p> +Whether this is a thing to be commended or no, and whether such methods ought +or ought not to be followed by princes, has already been considered by me in my +“<i>Treatise of the Prince</i>” wherefore I say no more on that +subject here. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLIII.—<i>That Men born in the same Province retain through +all Times nearly the same Character.</i></h2> + +<p> +The wise are wont to say, and not without reason or at random, that he who +would forecast what is about to happen should look to what has been; since all +human events, whether present or to come, have their exact counterpart in the +past. And this, because these events are brought about by men, whose passions +and dispositions remaining in all ages the same naturally give rise to the same +effects; although, doubtless, the operation of these causes takes a higher +form, now in one province, and now in another, according to the character of +the training wherein the inhabitants of these provinces acquire their way of +life. +</p> + +<p> +Another aid towards judging of the future by the past, is to observe how the +same nation long retains the same customs, remaining constantly covetous or +deceitful, or similarly stamped by some one vice or virtue. Any one reading the +past history of our city of Florence, and noting what has recently befallen it, +will find the French and German nations overflowing with avarice, pride, +cruelty, and perfidy, all of which four vices have at divers times wrought much +harm to our city. As an instance of their perfidy, every one knows how often +payments of money were made to Charles VIII. of France, in return for which he +engaged to restore the fortresses of Pisa, yet never did restore them, +manifesting thereby his bad faith and grasping avarice. Or, to pass from these +very recent events, all may have heard of what happened in the war in which the +Florentines were involved with the Visconti, dukes of Milan, when Florence, +being left without other resource, resolved to invite the emperor into Italy, +that she might be assisted by his name and power in her struggle with Lombardy. +The emperor promised to come with a strong army to take part against the +Visconti and to protect Florence from them, on condition that the Florentines +paid him a hundred thousand ducats on his setting out, and another hundred +thousand on his arrival in Italy; to which terms the Florentines agreed. But +although he then received payment of the first instalment and, afterwards, on +reaching Verona, of the second, he turned back from the expedition without +effecting anything, alleging as his excuse that he was stopped by certain +persons who had failed to fulfil their engagements. But if Florence had not +been urged by passion or overcome by necessity, or had she read of and +understood the ancient usages of the barbarians, she would neither on this, nor +on many other occasions, have been deceived by them, seeing that these nations +have always been of the same character, and have always, in all circumstances, +and with all men alike, used the same methods. For in ancient times we find +them behaving after the same fashion to the Etruscans, who, when overpowered by +the Romans, by whom they had been repeatedly routed and put to flight, +perceiving that they could not stand without help, entered into a compact with +the Gauls dwelling in the parts of Italy south of the Alps, to pay them a +certain sum if they would unite with them in a campaign against the Romans. But +the Gauls, after taking their money, refused to arm on their behalf, alleging +that they had not been paid to make war on the enemies of the Etruscans, but +only to refrain from pillaging their lands. And thus the people of Etruria, +through the avarice and perfidy of the Gauls, were at once defrauded of their +money and disappointed of the help which they had counted on obtaining. +</p> + +<p> +From which two instances of the Etruscans in ancient times and of the +Florentines in recent, we may see that barbaric races have constantly followed +the same methods, and may easily draw our conclusions as to how far princes +should trust them. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLIV.—<i>That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and +Daring often succeed.</i></h2> + +<p> +When attacked by the Romans, the Samnites as they could not without help stand +against them in the field, resolved to leave garrisons in the towns of Samnium, +and to pass with their main army into Etruria, that country being then at truce +with Rome, and thus ascertain whether their actual presence in arms might not +move the Etruscans to renew hostilities against Rome, which they had refused to +renew when invited through envoys. During the negotiations which, on this +occasion, passed between the two nations, the Samnites in explaining the chief +causes that led them to take up arms, used the memorable +words—“<i>they had risen because peace is a heavier burthen for +slaves than war for freemen</i>” In the end, partly by their persuasions, +and partly by the presence of their army, they induced the Etruscans to join +forces with them. +</p> + +<p> +Here we are to note that when a prince would obtain something from another, he +ought, if the occasion allow, to leave him no time to deliberate, but should so +contrive that the other may see the need of resolving at once; as he will, if +he perceive that refusal or delay in complying with what is asked of him, will +draw upon him a sudden and dangerous resentment. +</p> + +<p> +This method we have seen employed with good effect in our own times by Pope +Julius II. in dealing with France, and by M. de Foix, the general of the French +king, in dealing with the Marquis of Mantua. For Pope Julius desiring to expel +the Bentivogli from Bologna, and thinking that for this purpose he needed the +help of French troops, and to have the Venetians neutral, after sounding both +and receiving from both hesitating and ambiguous answers, determined to make +both fall in with his views, by giving them no time to oppose him; and so, +setting forth from Rome with as strong a force as he could get together, he +marched on Bologna, sending word to the Venetians that they must stand aloof, +and to the King of France to send him troops. The result was that in the brief +time allowed them, neither of the two powers could make up their mind to thwart +him; and knowing that refusal or delay would be violently resented by the Pope, +they yielded to his demands, the king sending him soldiers and the Venetians +maintaining neutrality. +</p> + +<p> +M. de Foix, again, being with the king’s army in Bologna when word came +that Brescia had risen, could not rest till he had recovered that town. But, to +get there he had to choose between two routes, one long and circuitous leading +through the territories of the king, the other short and direct. In taking the +latter route, however, not only would he have to pass through the dominions of +the Marquis of Mantua, but also to make his way into these through the lakes +and marshes wherewith that country abounds, by following an embanked road, +closed and guarded by the marquis with forts and other defensive works. +Resolving, nevertheless, to take the shortest road at all hazards, he waited +till his men were already on their march before signifying to the marquis that +he desired leave to pass through his country, so that no time might be left him +to deliberate. Taken aback by the unexpected demand, the marquis gave the leave +sought, which he never would have given had De Foix acted with less +impetuosity. For he was in league with the Venetians and with the Pope, and had +a son in the hands of the latter; all which circumstances would have afforded +him fair pretexts for refusal. But carried away by the suddenness and urgency +of the demand, he yielded. And in like manner the Etruscans yielded to the +instances of the Samnites, the presence of whose army decided them to renew +hostilities which before they had declined to renew. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLV.—<i>Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the +Enemy’s attack, or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset.</i></h2> + +<p> +Decius and Fabius, the Roman consuls, were each of them in command of a +separate army, one directed against the Samnites, the other against the +Etruscans: and as both delivered battle, we have to pronounce, in respect of +the two engagements, which commander followed the better method. Decius +attacked his enemy at once with the utmost fury and with his whole strength. +Fabius was content, at first, merely to maintain his ground; for judging that +more was to be gained by a later attack, he reserved his forces for a final +effort, when the ardour of the enemy had cooled and his energy spent itself. +The event showed Fabius to be more successful in his tactics than Decius, who +being exhausted by his first onset, and seeing his ranks begin to waver, to +secure by death the glory he could no longer hope from victory, followed the +example set him by his father, and sacrificed himself to save the Roman +legions. Word whereof being brought to Fabius, he, to gain, while he yet lived, +as much honour as the other had earned by his death, pushed forward all the +troops he had reserved for his final effort, and so obtained an unexampled +victory. Whence we see that of the two methods, that of Fabius was the safer +and the more deserving our imitation. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLVI.—<i>How the Characteristics of Families come to be +perpetuated.</i></h2> + +<p> +Manners and institutions differing in different cities, seem here to produce a +harder and there a softer race; and a like difference may also be discerned in +the character of different families in the same city. And while this holds good +of all cities, we have many instances of it in reading the history of Rome. For +we find the Manlii always stern and stubborn; the Valerii kindly and courteous; +the Claudii haughty and ambitious; and many families besides similarly +distinguished from one another by their peculiar qualities. +</p> + +<p> +These qualities we cannot refer wholly to the <i>blood</i>, for that must +change as a result of repeated intermarriages, but must ascribe rather to the +different training and education given in different families. For much turns on +whether a child of tender years hears a thing well or ill spoken of, since this +must needs make an impression on him whereby his whole conduct in after life +will be influenced. Were it otherwise we should not have found the whole family +of the Claudii moved by the desires and stirred by the passions which Titus +Livius notes in many of them, and more especially in one holding the office of +censor, who, when his colleague laid down his magistracy, as the law +prescribed, at the end of eighteen months, would not resign, maintaining that +he was entitled to hold the office for five years in accordance with the +original law by which the censorship was regulated. And although his refusal +gave occasion to much controversy, and bred great tumult and disturbance, no +means could be found to depose him from his office, which he persisted in +retaining in opposition to the will of the entire commons and a majority of the +senate. And any who shall read the speech made against him by Publius +Sempronius, tribune of the people, will find therein all the Claudian insolence +exposed, and will recognize the docility and good temper shown by the body of +the citizens in respecting the laws and institutions of their country. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLVII.—<i>That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen +to forget private Wrongs.</i></h2> + +<p> +While commanding as consul against the Samnites, Manlius was wounded in a +skirmish. His army being thereby endangered, the senate judged it expedient to +send Papirius Cursor as dictator to supply his place. But as it was necessary +that the dictator should be nominated by Fabius, the other consul, who was with +the army in Etruria, and as a doubt was felt that he might refuse to nominate +Papirius, who was his enemy, the senate sent two messengers to entreat him to +lay aside private animosity, and make the nomination which the public interest +required. Moved by love of his country Fabius did as he was asked, although by +his silence, and by many other signs, he gave it to be known that compliance +was distasteful. From his conduct at this juncture all who would be thought +good citizens should take example. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLVIII.—<i>That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave +blunder, we should suspect some fraud to lurk behind.</i></h2> + +<p> +The consul having gone to Rome to perform certain ceremonial rites, and Fulvius +being left in charge of the Roman army in Etruria, the Etruscans, to see +whether they could not circumvent the new commander, planting an ambush not far +from the Roman camp, sent forward soldiers disguised as shepherds driving large +flocks of sheep so as to pass in sight of the Roman army. These pretended +shepherds coming close to the wall of his camp, Fulvius, marvelling at what +appeared to him unaccountable audacity, hit upon a device whereby the artifice +of the Etruscans was detected and their design defeated. +</p> + +<p> +Here it seems proper to note that the captain of an army ought not to build on +what seems a manifest blunder on the part of an enemy; for as men are unlikely +to act with conspicuous want of caution, it will commonly be found that this +blunder is cover to a fraud. And yet, so blinded are men’s minds by their +eagerness for victory, that they look only to what appears on the surface. +</p> + +<p> +After defeating the Romans on the Allia, the Gauls, hastening on to Rome, found +the gates of the city left open and unguarded. But fearing some stratagem, and +being unable to believe that the Romans could be so foolish and cowardly as to +abandon their city, they waited during the whole of that day and the following +night outside the gates, without daring to enter. In the year 1508, when the +Florentines Avere engaged in besieging Pisa, Alfonso del Mutolo, a citizen of +that town, happening to be taken prisoner, was released on his promise to +procure the surrender to the Florentines of one of the gates of the city. +Afterwards, on pretence of arranging for the execution of this surrender, he +came repeatedly to confer with those whom the Florentine commissaries had +deputed to treat with him, coming not secretly but openly, and accompanied by +other citizens of Pisa, whom he caused to stand aside while he conversed with +the Florentines. From all which circumstances his duplicity might have been +suspected, since, had he meant to do as he had engaged, it was most unlikely +that he should be negotiating so openly. But the desire to recover possession +of Pisa so blinded the Florentines that they allowed themselves to be conducted +under his guidance to the Lucca Gate, where, through his treachery, but to +their own disgrace, they lost a large number of their men and officers. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>CHAPTER XLIX.—<i>That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has +constant need of new Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius +Fabius received the surname of Maximus.</i></h2> + +<p> +It must happen, as I have already said, in every great city, that disorders +needing the care of the physician continually spring up; and the graver these +disorders are, the greater will be the skill needed for their treatment. And if +ever in any city, most assuredly in Rome, we see these disorders assume strange +and unexpected shapes. As when it appeared that all the Roman wives had +conspired to murder their husbands, many of them being found to have actually +administered poison, and many others to have drugs in readiness for the +purpose. +</p> + +<p> +Of like nature was the conspiracy of the Bacchanals, discovered at the time of +the Macedonian war, wherein many thousands, both men and women, were +implicated, and which, had it not been found out, or had the Romans not been +accustomed to deal with large bodies of offenders, must have proved perilous +for their city. And, indeed, if the greatness of the Roman Republic were not +declared by countless other signs, as well as by the manner in which it caused +its laws to be observed, it might be seen in the character of the punishments +which it inflicted against wrong-doers. For in vindicating justice, it would +not scruple or hesitate to put a whole legion to death, to depopulate an entire +city, or send eight or ten thousand men at a time into banishment, subject to +the most stringent conditions, which had to be observed, not by one of these +exiles only, but by all. As in the case of those soldiers who fought +unsuccessfully at Cannæ, who were banished to Sicily, subject to the condition +that they should not harbour in towns, and should all eat standing. +</p> + +<p> +But the most formidable of all their punishments was that whereby one man out +of every ten in an entire army was chosen by lot to be put to death. For +correcting a great body of men no more effectual means could be devised; +because, when a multitude have offended and the ringleaders are not known, all +cannot be punished, their number being too great; while to punish some only, +and leave the rest unpunished, were unjust to those punished and an +encouragement to those passed over to offend again. But where you put to death +a tenth chosen by lot, where all equally deserve death, he who is punished will +blame his unlucky fortune, while he who escapes will be afraid that another +time the lot may be his, and for that reason will be careful how he repeats his +offence. The poisoners and the Bacchanals, therefore, were punished as their +crimes deserved. +</p> + +<p> +Although disorders like these occasion mischievous results in a commonwealth, +still they are not fatal, since almost always there is time to correct them. +But no time is given in the case of disorders in the State itself, which unless +they be treated by some wise citizen, will always bring a city to destruction. +From the readiness wherewith the Romans conferred the right of citizenship on +foreigners, there came to be so many new citizens in Rome, and possessed of so +large a share of the suffrage, that the government itself began to alter, +forsaking those courses which it was accustomed to follow, and growing +estranged from the men to whom it had before looked for guidance. Which being +observed by Quintius Fabius when censor, he caused all those new citizens to be +classed in four <i>Tribes</i>, that being reduced within this narrow limit they +might not have it in their power to corrupt the entire State. And this was a +wisely contrived measure, for, without introducing any violent change, it +supplied a convenient remedy, and one so acceptable to the republic as to gain +for Fabius the well-deserved name of Maximus. +</p> + +<h5>THE END.</h5> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST DECADE OF TITUS LIVIUS ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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