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We have written this book to set forth the +causes of the present war, and the principles which we believe to +be at stake. We have some experience in the handling of historic +evidence, and we have endeavoured to treat this subject +historically. Our fifth chapter, which to many readers will be the +most interesting, is founded upon first-hand evidence—the +documents contained in the British White Book (Parliamentary Paper, +Cd. 7467; hereafter cited as <i>Correspondence respecting the +European Crisis</i>), and the German White Book, which is an +official apology, supplemented by documents. The German White Book, +as being difficult of access, we have printed <i>in extenso</i>. It +exists in two versions, a German and an English, both published for +the German Government. We have reproduced the English version +without correcting the solecisms of spelling and expression. From +the English White Book we have reprinted, in the second appendix, a +small selection of the more significant documents; many more are +quoted in the body of our work.</p> +<p>Our thanks are due to Sir H. Erle Richards, Chichele Professor +of International Law and Diplomacy; and to Mr. W.G.S. Adams, +Gladstone Professor of Political Theory and Institutions, for +valuable suggestions and assistance.</p> +<p>The sole responsibility for the book rests, however, with those +who sign this Preface.</p> +<p>Any profits arising from the sale of this work will be sent to +the Belgian Relief Fund, as a mark of sympathy and respect for the +Belgian nation, and especially for the University of Louvain.</p> +<p>E. BARKER<br /> +H. W. C. DAVIS<br /> +C. R. L. FLETCHER<br /> +ARTHUR HASSALL<br /> +L. G. WICKHAM LEGG<br /> +F. MORGAN</p> +<p><i>Preface to Second Edition</i>.</p> +<p>By the courtesy of His Excellency the Russian Ambassador we are +now able to print in an appendix (No. VI) those documents contained +in the Russian Orange Book which have not been already published in +the German and the British White Books. In the light of the +evidence afforded by the Russian Orange Book, we have modified one +or two sentences in this edition.</p> +<p>21 <i>September</i>, 1914.</p> +<hr /> +<a name="TOC" id="TOC"><!-- TOC --></a> +<h2>CONTENTS</h2> +<p><a href="#RULE4_1">TABLE OF DATES</a></p> +<p><a href="#CH1">CHAPTER I</a></p> +<p>THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG</p> +<p>Belgian neutrality—The origin of Belgium—England and +the smaller Powers—The Treaty of 1839—Belgium's +independence and neutrality.—The neutrality of the Grand +Duchy of Luxemburg—Its origin—The Treaty of +1867—The collective guarantee.—The strategic importance +of Belgium—German plans long suspected.</p> +<p><a href="#CH2">CHAPTER II</a></p> +<p>THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE 1871</p> +<p>Introduction—The Triple Alliance—Bismarck's +dismissal—French colonial advance—-Germany's demands +for compensations—The Anglo-French agreement concerning +Morocco—German objections—England and Russia—The +Agadir incident—Anglo-French exchange of notes—Disputes +in the Balkans—The 'Boulanger Law' of 1886—Count +Caprivi's law of 1893—Franco-Russian +<i>entente</i>—German military preparations—France's +response—Russia's reorganization—England's Army and +Navy.</p> +<p>Note. <i>Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco</i>.</p> +<p><a href="#CH3">CHAPTER III</a></p> +<p>THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY</p> +<p>Estrangement of Russia and Germany—Austria and the +Balkans—German penetration through the Balkans—Servia +and Russia—Germany and the Slavs—Russia and +England.</p> +<p><a href="#CH4">CHAPTER IV</a></p> +<p>CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS OF 1914</p> +<p>Diary of the Events leading to the War.</p> +<p><a href="#CH5">CHAPTER V</a></p> +<p>NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS</p> +<p>Dramatis personae. §1. <i>Germany's attitude to Russia and +Austria</i>—Presentation of the Austrian Note to +Servia—Germany shields Austria—Conduct of Germany +considered—Sir Edward Grey proposes mediation, and then a +Conference of Four Powers—Germany's objections to a +'Conference'—Direct conversations between the +Powers—Austria invited to suspend military +action—Mobilization; on whom does responsibility +lie?—War inevitable. §2. <i>Germany's attitude to +France</i>—Germany accuses France of military +preparations—Germany invades France. §3. <i>The question +of British neutrality</i>—Possibility of England being +involved—Germany warned—German 'bid for British +neutrality'—England's refusal—France agrees, and +Germany refuses, to respect Belgian neutrality—Prince +Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey—Neutrality of Luxemburg +violated—Germany demands a free passage through +Belgium—Sir Edward Grey protests—Belgium +invaded—England's ultimatum—The Imperial Chancellor +urges necessity of Germany's action. §4. <i>England and +Servia</i>—Sir Edward Grey realizes Russia's interest in +Servia—He is only concerned for the peace of Europe—He +urges mediation—He proposes a Conference. §5. <i>Great +Britain declines 'solidarity' with Russia and +France</i>—Proposals by MM. Sazonof and +Poincaré—England's refusal—Was it +wise?—The Austrian <i>dossier</i>. §6. <i>Italy's +comments on the situation</i>—Significance of Italy's +position—Italy's endeavours to prevent war—Italy's +declaration of neutrality.</p> +<p>Note. <i>Abstract of Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and +Servians reply</i>.</p> +<p><a href="#CH6">CHAPTER VI</a></p> +<p>THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE</p> +<p>The principles of <i>raison d'etat</i> and the rule of +law—Treitschke's teaching—The results of this +philosophy—Contempt for public law—The glorification of +war—The philosophy pagan—Its adoption by Prussian +soldiers and Government—A plea for Prussia—England +fights for law.</p> +<p><a href="#EPI">EPILOGUE</a></p> +<p>APPENDIXES</p> +<p><a href="#RULE4_2">I. THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK</a></p> +<p><a href="#RULE4_3">II. EXTRACTS FROM SIR EDWARD GREY'S +CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN CRISIS</a></p> +<p><a href="#RULE4_4">III. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS +MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC +RELATIONS WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT</a></p> +<p><a href="#RULE4_5">IV. THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO</a></p> +<p><a href="#RULE4_6">V. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS +MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC +RELATIONS WITH THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT</a></p> +<p><a href="#RULE4_7">VI. EXTRACTS FROM THE RUSSIAN ORANGE +BOOK</a></p> +<hr /> +<a name="RULE4_1" id="RULE4_1"><!-- RULE4 1 --></a> +<h2>CHIEF DATES</h2> +<pre> +1648 Jan. The Treaty of Munster. + Oct. The Treaty of Westphalia. +1713 April. The Treaty of Utrecht. +1772 First Partition of Poland. +1783 William of Nassau becomes Grand Duke of Luxemburg. +1788 July. The Triple Alliance of England, Holland, and Prussia. +1789 The French Revolution begins. +1792 Nov. 6. Battle of Jemappes. French Conquest of the Austrian + Netherlands and Liège. + Nov. 19. French decree offering 'freedom to all nations'. + Dec. 15. Compulsory freedom declared. +1793 Jan. Second Partition of Poland. + Feb. 1. Declaration of War by France against England and Holland. +1795 Third Partition of Poland. +1801 Feb. 9. The Treaty of Luneville. France guarantees the + independence of Holland (then called 'Batavian Republic'). +1802 Mar. 27. The Treaty of Amiens. +1803 Mar. 13. Napoleon's famous interview with Lord Whitworth. + May 12. Declaration of War by England against France. +1814 Mar. 1. The Treaty of Chaumont. + May 30. The First Peace of Paris. + Sept. 29. Opening of the Congress of Vienna. +1815 Mar-June. The Hundred Days. + May 31. Belgium and Luxemburg placed under the Prince of Orange as + King of the United Netherlands. + Nov. 20. The Second Peace of Paris. +1830 Revolutions in France (July) and in Belgium (Aug.). +1830-1878 Servia autonomous. +1831 Nov. 15. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium guaranteed by + England, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia. +1839 April 19. Final recognition of the Independence and Neutrality of + Belgium by the above-named Powers. +1867 May 11. European guarantee of the Neutrality of Luxemburg. + Declaration by Lord Stanley and Lord Clarendon. +1870 Aug. 9. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium again guaranteed + by Germany and France. +1871 May 10. The Treaty of Frankfort. +1872 The <i>Dreikaiserbund</i>; Alliance of Russia, Germany, and + Austria. +1875 Threatened attack on France by Germany prevented by + Russia and England. +1878 The Treaty of Berlin. + Proclamation of Servian Independence under King Milan. +1879 Secret Treaty between Germany and Austria. +1883 Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy. +1885 Formation of United Bulgaria. + War between Bulgaria and Servia. +1886 Peace between Bulgaria and Servia. +1890 Fall of Bismarck. Cession of Heligoland to Germany. +1891 Beginning of an understanding between Russia and France. +1893 Caprivi's Army Act. +1896 Germany begins to show aggressive tendencies in the field + of Colonial Expansion. + Treaty between England and France regarding their interests + in Indo-China. + Definite Alliance between Russia and France. +1898 Reconquest of the Sudan. + Tsar's rescript for an International Peace Conference. +1899 Anglo-French Agreement respecting Tripoli. + June. First Peace Conference at the Hague. + New German Army Act. +1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance. + The Peace of Vereeniging closes the South African War. +1903 Revolution in Belgrade. +1904 April. The Treaty of London between England and France + with regard to North Africa. +1905 Mar. Visit of the German Emperor to Tangier. + June. Germany demands the dismissal of M. Delcassé. + Aug. The Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan. + Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. + German Army Act. + Sept. France agrees to the holding of the Algeeiras + Conference. +1907 Agreement between Russia and England concerning Persia, + Afghanistan, and Tibet. + June-Oct. Second Peace Conference at the Hague. +1908 Young Turk Revolution in Constantinople. + Oct. Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. + German Navy Law. +1909 Mar. Servia declares she will no longer protest against the + annexation of Bosnia by Austria. +1909 Mr. Asquith's speech on necessity for increasing the Navy. +1910 The Potsdam interview between the Tsar and the Kaiser. +1911 European Crisis over the question of Morocco, followed by a + closer Anglo-French <i>entente</i>. + German Army Act. +1912 Sensational German Army Bill. + War in the Balkans. + Nov. 26. German Navy construction estimates £11,416,700. + Dec. 29. Peace Conference of Balkan States with Turkey broken off. +1913 Jan. 17. M. Poincaré elected French President. + Jan. 23. The Young Turkish Party overthrow the Government at + Constantinople. + May 26. Peace made between Turkey and the Balkan States. + May 28. The New German Army Bill passes the Budget Committee of + the Reichstag. + June 20. Universal military service in Belgium. + June 26. Conference between the French President, the French + Foreign Minister, and Sir Edward Grey. + June 30. Bulgaria is attacked by Servia and Greece. + New German Army Bill. + July. Roumania attacks Bulgaria. + The Turks re-occupy Adrianople. + New Russian Army Bill. + French Army Bill. + Aug. 6. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and + Roumania. + Sept. 22. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria and Turkey. + Oct. 20. Servia at Austria's demand abandons Albania. + Austrian War Fund increased. +1914 Attacks by the German Press upon France and Russia. +</pre> +<hr /> +<a name="CH1" id="CH1"><!-- CH1 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER I</h2> +<center>THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG</center> +<h3>I</h3> +<p>The kingdom of Belgium is a comparatively new creation, but the +idea of a Belgian nation is older than the kingdom. Historically +and geographically the kingdom has no doubt an artificial +character; its boundaries have been determined by the Great Powers +and cut across the ancient provinces of the Netherlands. And it +must be added that its population is heterogeneous both in race and +language. These facts, however, in no sense diminish the legal +rights of Belgium as a nation. She is a sovereign state by the same +charter as Italy or Greece; and for the convenience of Europe she +has been solemnly declared a neutral state, endowed with special +privileges but burdened with corresponding obligations. While those +privileges were maintained—and they have been rigidly +maintained for more than eighty years—the Belgian people +punctually fulfilled their obligations; and, because they have +declined to betray Europe by becoming the dependant of a powerful +neighbour, or by participating in the violation of European public +law, their country is a wilderness of smoking ruins.</p> +<p>In the tremendous and all but crushing ordeal of August, 1914, +Belgium has proved that she possesses other titles to existence and +respect than those afforded by treaties, by the mutual jealousies +of neighbours, or by the doctrines of international law. She has +more than satisfied the tests which distinguish the true from the +fictitious nationality. Those who have hitherto known Belgium only +as a hive of manufacturing and mining industry, or as a land of +historic memories and monuments, are now recognizing, with some +shame for their past blindness, the moral and spiritual qualities +which her people have developed under the aegis of a European +guarantee. It is now beyond dispute that, if Belgium were +obliterated from the map of Europe, the world would be the poorer +and Europe put to shame. The proofs which Belgium has given of her +nationality will never be forgotten while liberty has any value or +patriotism any meaning among men. We cannot do less than echo the +general sentiment of admiration for a constancy to national ideals +which has left Belgium at the mercy of Huns less forgivable than +those of Attila. But the case against her oppressor is not to be +founded solely or mainly on her peculiar merits. In a special sense +it rests upon the legal rights and duties with which she has been +invested for the convenience of her neighbours and for the welfare +of the European state system. It was in their interest, rather than +her own, that the Great Powers made her a sovereign independent +state. As such she is entitled, equally with England or with +Germany, to immunity from unprovoked attack. But the Powers which +made her a sovereign state, also, and for the same reasons of +convenience, made her a neutral state. She was therefore debarred +from consulting her own safety by making alliances upon what terms +she would. She could not lawfully join either of the two armed +camps into which Europe has fallen since the year 1907. And, if she +had been as contemptible as she is actually the reverse, she would +still be entitled to expect from England and from every other of +her guarantors the utmost assistance it is in their power to give. +In fighting for Belgium we fight for the law of nations; that is, +ultimately, for the peace of all nations and for the right of the +weaker to exist.</p> +<hr /> +<p>The provinces which now constitute the kingdom of +Belgium—with the exception of the bishopric of Liège, +which was until 1795 an ecclesiastical principality—were +known in the seventeenth century as the Spanish, in the eighteenth +as the Austrian, Netherlands. They received the first of these +names when they returned to the allegiance of Philip II, after a +short participation in the revolt to which Holland owes her +national existence. When the independence of Holland was finally +recognized by Spain (1648), the Spanish Netherlands were subjected +to the first of the artificial restrictions which Europe has seen +fit to impose upon them. The Dutch monopoly of navigation in the +Scheldt was admitted by the Treaty of Münster (1648), and +Antwerp was thus precluded from developing into a rival of +Amsterdam. In the age of Louis XIV the Spanish Netherlands were +constantly attacked by France, who acquired at one time or another +the chief towns of Artois and Hainault, including some which have +lately come into prominence in the great war, such as Lille, +Valenciennes, Cambray, and Maubeuge. The bulk, however, of the +Spanish Netherlands passed at the Treaty of Utrecht to Austria, +then the chief rival of France on the Continent. They passed with +the reservation that certain fortresses on their southern border +were to be garrisoned jointly by the Dutch and the Austrians as a +barrier against French aggression. This arrangement was overthrown +at the French Revolution. The French annexed the Austrian +Netherlands and Liège in November, 1792; and immediately +afterwards threw down a gauntlet to England by opening to all +nations the navigation of the Scheldt. This, and the threatened +French attack on Holland, her ally, drew England into conflict with +the Revolution; for, first, Antwerp in French hands and as an open +port would be a dangerous menace; and secondly, the French had +announced a new and anarchic doctrine hostile to all standing +treaties: 'Our reasons are that the river takes its rise in France +and that a nation which has obtained its liberty cannot recognize a +system of feudalism, much less adhere to it'.[<a href= +"#note-1">1</a>] The answer of William Pitt, which in effect +declared war upon the Revolution, contains a memorable statement of +the attitude towards public law which England held then, as she +holds it to-day: 'With regard to the Scheldt France can have no +right to annul existing stipulations, unless she also have the +right to set aside equally the other treaties between all Powers of +Europe and all the other rights of England and her allies.... +England will never consent that France shall arrogate the power of +annulling at her pleasure and under the pretence of a pretended +natural right, of which she makes herself the only judge, the +political system of Europe, established by solemn treaties and +guaranteed by the consent of all the Powers'.[<a href= +"#note-2">2</a>]</p> +<p>This was not our attitude in the case of Belgium only. It was an +attitude which we adopted with regard to all the minor Powers of +Western Europe when they were threatened by Napoleon. On precisely +the same grounds England defended in 1803 the independence of +Holland, a commercial rival if an old political ally, and of +Switzerland, where she had no immediate interests to protect. By +the Treaty of Lunéville (February, 1801) France and Austria +had mutually guaranteed the independence of the Batavian Republic +and the right of the Dutch to adopt whatever form of government +seemed good to them. In defiance of these stipulations Napoleon +maintained a garrison in Holland, and forced upon her a new +Constitution which had been prepared in Paris (November, 1801). +Identical stipulations had been made for the Helvetian Republic and +had been similarly violated. Early in 1803 England demanded that +the French should evacuate Holland and Switzerland: to which +Napoleon replied that 'Switzerland and Holland are mere trifles'. +His interview with the English Ambassador on March 13, 1803, has +many points of resemblance with the now famous interview of August +4, 1914, between Sir Edward Goschen and Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. +The First Consul then, like the Imperial Chancellor to-day, was +unable, or professed himself unable, to understand why Great +Britain should insist upon the observance of treaties.</p> +<p>To return to Belgium. It became apparent in the Napoleonic Wars +that Belgium and Holland were individually too weak to protect +themselves or the German people against an aggressive French +Government. The allies therefore, in the year 1813, handed over to +Holland the Austrian Netherlands and the bishopric of Liège +in order 'to put Holland in a position to resist attack until the +Powers could come to its aid'. This arrangement was ratified at the +Treaty of Chaumont (1814). As there was no government or visible +unity in the Belgian provinces after the retirement of the French, +the union with Holland, originally suggested by Lord Castlereagh, +seemed reasonable enough. It gave the Belgians the great privilege +of freely navigating the Scheldt. It was confirmed at the Congress +of Vienna, and the new kingdom of the United Netherlands was +declared neutral by the common consent of the Powers.</p> +<p>But the events of the years 1815-1830 proved conclusively that +this union was unsatisfactory to the Belgian population. The +Belgians complained that they were not allowed their just share of +influence and representation in the legislature or executive. They +resented the attempt to impose the Dutch language and Dutch +Liberalism upon them. They rose in revolt, expelled the Dutch +officials and garrisons, and drew up for themselves a monarchical +and parliamentary constitution. Their aspirations aroused much +sympathy both in England and in France. These two countries induced +the other Great Powers (Austria, Prussia, Russia) to recognize the +new kingdom as an independent neutral state. This recognition was +embodied in the Treaty of the Twenty-Four Articles signed at London +in October, 1831; and it was not too generous to the aspirations of +Belgian nationality. Since the Belgians had been defeated in the +field by Holland and had only been rescued by a French army, they +were obliged to surrender their claims upon Maestricht, parts of +Luxemburg, and parts of Limburg. Some time elapsed before this +settlement was recognized by Holland. But at length this last +guarantee was obtained; and the Treaty of London, 1839, finally +established the international status of Belgium. Under this treaty +both her independence and her neutrality were definitely guaranteed +by England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.</p> +<p>We have recently been told by the Imperial Chancellor that the +Treaty of 1839 is nothing but 'a scrap of paper'. It is therefore +desirable to point out that Bismarck made full use of it in 1870 to +prevent England from supporting the cause of France. It was with +this object that he published the proposal alleged to have been +made to him by the French representative, Benedetti, in 1866, that +Prussia should help France to acquire Belgium as a solace for +Prussian annexations in Northern Germany. Then, as now, England +insisted upon the Treaty of 1839. The result was that, on the +instance of Lord Granville, Germany and France entered into an +identic treaty with Great Britain (Aug. 1870) to the effect that, +if either belligerent violated Belgian territory, Great Britain +would co-operate with the other for the defence of it. The treaty +was most strictly construed. After the battle of Sedan (Sept. 1870) +the German Government applied to Belgium for leave to transport the +German wounded across Belgian territory. France protested that this +would be a breach of neutrality and Belgium refused.</p> +<p>Such is the history of the process by which Belgium has acquired +her special status. As an independent state she is bound by the +elementary principle of the law of nations, that a neutral state is +bound to refuse to grant a right of passage to a belligerent. This +is a well-established rule, and was formally affirmed by the Great +Powers at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. The fifth Article of +the Convention [<a href="#note-3">3</a>] then drawn up respecting +the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land +runs as follows:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'A neutral power ought not to allow on its +territory any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4'.</p> +<p>Of the Articles thus specified the most important is No. +2:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'Belligerents are forbidden to move across +the territory of a neutral power troops or convoys, either of +munitions of war or supplies'.</p> +<p>By the Treaty of London the existence of Belgium is contingent +upon her perpetual neutrality:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'ARTICLE VII. Belgium within the limits +specified in Articles I, II, and IV shall form an independent and +perpetually neutral state. It shall be bound to observe such +neutrality towards all other states'.[<a href="#note-4">4</a>]</p> +<p>It is unnecessary to elaborate further the point of law. That, +it seems, has been admitted by the Imperial Chancellor before the +German Reichstag. What is necessary to remember is that, in regard +to Belgium, Germany has assumed the position which the Government +of the French Revolution adopted towards the question of the +Scheldt, and which Napoleon adopted towards the guaranteed +neutrality of Switzerland and Holland. Now, as then, England has +special interests at stake. The consequences of the oppression or +the extinction of the smaller nationalities are bound to excite +peculiar alarm in England. In particular she cannot forget how she +would be menaced by the establishment of a militarist state in +Belgium. But since in England's case the dangers and uncertainties +of a state of things in which Might is treated as Right are +particularly apparent, it is only to be expected that she should +insist with special emphasis upon the sanctity of treaties, a +sanctity which in the long run is as necessary to the strongest +nation as to the weakest. If treaties count for nothing, no nation +is secure so long as any imaginable combination of Powers can meet +it in battle or diplomacy on equal terms; and the stronger nations +must perforce fight one another to the death for the privilege of +enslaving civilization. Whether the progress of such a competition +would be a trifling evil, whether the success of any one among such +competitors would conduce to the higher interests of humanity, +impartial onlookers may debate if they please. England has answered +both these questions with an unhesitating negative.</p> +<h3>II</h3> +<p>Under existing treaty law the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg stands +for all practical purposes in the same legal position as its +northern neighbour; and the ruler of Luxemburg has protested +against the German invasion[<a href="#note-5">5</a>] of her +territory no less emphatically than King Albert, though with less +power of giving expression in action to her just resentment. If the +defence of Belgium has appealed more forcibly to the ordinary +Englishman, it is because he is more familiar with the past history +of Belgium and sees more clearly in her case the ultimate issues +that are involved in the German violation of her rights. As the +following narrative will show, the neutrality of Luxemburg was +guaranteed in the interests and at the instance of the Prussian +state, as a protection against French aggression. The legal case +could not be clearer, and it might perhaps be asked why the attack +on Luxemburg, which preceded that on Belgium, was not treated by +this country as a <i>casus belli</i>. England's attitude towards +Luxemburg is that which she has consistently adopted towards those +smaller states of Europe which lie outside the reach of naval +power. It is an attitude which she has maintained in the case of +Servia even more clearly than in that of Luxemburg. England holds +herself bound to exert her influence in procuring for the smaller +states of Europe equitable treatment from their more powerful +neighbours. But the duty of insisting upon equitable treatment +falls first upon those Powers whose situation enables them to +support a protest by effective action. Just as Servia is the +special concern of Russia, so Luxemburg must look to France in the +first instance for protection against Germany, to Germany if she is +assailed from the French side. In either case we should hold +ourselves bound to exercise our influence, but not as principals. +Any other course would be impossibly quixotic, and would only have +the effect of destroying our power to help the states within our +reach.</p> +<hr /> +<p>The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was a revival of an ancient state +which had lost its existence during the French Revolution. Although +it was placed under the rule of the King of the Netherlands, a +descendant of its former sovereign, it was not incorporated in his +kingdom, but retained its own identity and gave to its ruler the +secondary title of Grand Duke of Luxemburg. The position it +occupied after 1815 was in some ways anomalous; for lying as it did +between the Meuse and the Rhine, and possessing in the town of +Luxemburg a fortress whose natural strength some competent critics +reckoned as second only to that of Gibraltar among the fortresses +of Europe, it was considered to be an indispensable link in the +chain of defences of Germany against French aggression. Not being +able to trust the Dutch to hold this great fortress against the +French, the Congress of Vienna laid down as a principle that all +land between the Meuse and the Rhine must be held by Prussian +troops on behalf of the newly formed Germanic Confederation. Thus +Luxemburg was held by Prussian troops on behalf of this foreign +confederation, and over this garrison the only right allowed to the +Grand Duke, the sovereign of the country, was that of nominating +the governor.</p> +<p>This strange state of affairs was not modified by the Belgian +Revolution of 1830; for though more than half the Grand Duchy threw +in its lot with Belgium to form the modern province of Belgian +Luxemburg, the Grand Duchy, confined to its modern limits, still +contained the great fortress with its garrison of Prussian troops. +It is not surprising that, under these circumstances, the Grand +Duchy joined the Prussian <i>Zollverein</i>, and so drew nearer to +Germany, in spite of the independent character of its inhabitants, +who have strenuously resisted any attempt at absorption into +Germany. France naturally continued to cast envious eyes upon the +small state with the powerful citadel, but no opportunity presented +itself for reopening the question until 1866.</p> +<p>In that year Napoleon III had anticipated that the war between +Prussia and Italy on one side and Austria and the small German +states on the other would be long and exhausting, and would end in +France imposing peace on the weary combatants with considerable +territorial advantage to herself. His anticipation was entirely +falsified; the war lasted only seven weeks and Prussia emerged +victorious and immensely strengthened by the absorption of several +German states and by the formation of the North German +Confederation under her leadership. This, the first shattering blow +which the French Emperor's diplomatic schemes had received, led him +to demand compensation for the growth of Prussian power, and one of +his proposals was the cession of Luxemburg to France.</p> +<p>This suggestion had some legal plausibility quite apart from the +question of the balance of power. For the Prussian garrison held +Luxemburg in the name of the German Confederation, which had been +destroyed by the war of 1866; and, the authority to which the +garrison owed its existence being gone, it was only logical that +the garrison should go too. After much demur Count Bismarck +acknowledged the justice of the argument (April, 1867), but it did +not by any means follow that the French should therefore take the +place vacated by the Prussians. At the same time the fortress could +not be left in the hands of a weak Power as a temptation for +powerful and unscrupulous neighbours. The question of Luxemburg was +therefore the subject discussed at a Congress held in London in the +following May.</p> +<p>Here the Prussians showed themselves extremely politic and +reasonable. Realizing that, with the advance of artillery, the +great rock-fortress no longer had the military value of earlier +days, they not only raised no objections to the evacuation of +Luxemburg by their troops, but in the Congress it was they who +proposed that the territory of the Grand Duchy should be +neutralized 'under the collective guarantee of the +Powers'.[<a href="#note-6">6</a>] A treaty was therefore drawn up +on May 11, 1867, of which the second article ran as +follows:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the +Limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th +April, 1839, under the Guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, +Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall henceforth form a +perpetually Neutral State.</p> +<p class="blockquote">'It shall be bound to observe the same +Neutrality towards all other States.</p> +<p class="blockquote">'The High Contracting Parties engage to +respect the principle of Neutrality stipulated by the present +Article.</p> +<p class="blockquote">'That principle is and remains placed under +the sanction of the collective Guarantee of the Powers signing as +Parties to the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which +is itself a Neutral State'.[<a href="#note-7">7</a>]</p> +<p>The third article provided for the demolition of the +fortifications of Luxemburg and its conversion into an open town, +the fourth for its evacuation by the Prussian garrison, and the +fifth forbade the restoration of the fortifications.</p> +<p>Such then was the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of +Luxemburg, which was proposed, it may be observed, by Prussia +herself; but, until the treaty was broken by the very Power which +had proposed the neutrality, only one incident need be noted in the +history of the country, namely, the part it played in the war of +1870-1. On December 3, 1870, Count Bismarck issued from Versailles +a circular to the Prussian Ambassadors, calling attention to the +fact that both the French and the Luxemburgers had violated the +neutrality of the Grand Duchy, mainly by giving facilities for +French soldiers to return to France. Precautions were taken by the +Prussian Government on the frontier to prevent such abuses +occurring in the future, and as no violation of the neutrality of +Luxemburg was committed by the Prussians, the neutral co-guarantors +were satisfied with the Prussian attitude, and the subject dropped. +At the end of the war, M. Thiers vainly attempted to obtain +Luxemburg as compensation for the loss of Metz.</p> +<p>In accordance with the Family Compact of 1783, the Grand Duchy +passed on the death of the late King of Holland to Prince William +of Nassau, on whose death the present Grand Duchess succeeded to +her father's throne.</p> +<p>There is one point in the Treaty of 1867 which calls for special +comment. The neutrality of the Grand Duchy is 'placed under the +collective guarantee of the Powers signing'. The phrase originally +proposed by Count Bismarck was 'the formal and individual guarantee +of the Powers,' and it was altered at the instance of the English +Foreign Minister, Lord Stanley. The phrase actually adopted was +suggested by the Russian diplomat, Baron Brunnow, and was accepted +both by England and by Prussia. Lord Stanley's objection had been +based upon the fear that England might incur an unlimited liability +to assist Luxemburg single-handed if all other Powers failed to +meet their obligations. In other words, Luxemburg might have been +used as the infallible means of dragging us into every and any war +which might arise between Germany and France. From that danger we +were protected by Lord Stanley's objection; as the case stands the +treaty gives us, in his own words, 'a right to make war, but would +not necessarily impose the obligation,' should Luxemburg be +attacked. To this doctrine a reference will be found in the British +White Paper (No. 148), where Sir Edward Grey informs M. Cambon of +'the doctrine' concerning Luxemburg, 'laid down by Lord Derby and +Lord Clarendon in 1867'. It may also be observed that two of the +co-guarantors of the Treaty of 1867, namely Italy and Holland, have +also not thought it necessary to make the violation of Luxemburg a +<i>casus belli</i>.</p> +<h3>III</h3> +<p>It is evident to all who study closely the map of France that +her eastern frontier falls into two sharply contrasted divisions, +the north-eastern which reaches from the sea to the valley of the +Sambre, and the south-eastern which extends from that river to, and +along the Swiss boundary. The former is flat country, easy for +military operations; the latter is mountainous, intersected with +many deep valleys. After the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the French +set to work to rectify artificially the strategical weakness of +their frontier; and in a chain of fortresses behind the Vosges +Mountains they erected a rampart which has the reputation of being +impregnable. This is the line Belfort, Épinal, Toul, Verdun. +A German attack launched upon this line without violating neutral +territory would have to be frontal, for on the north the line is +covered by the neutral states of Belgium and Luxemburg, while on +the south, although the gap between the Vosges and the Swiss +frontier apparently gives a chance of out-flanking the French +defences, the fortress of Belfort, which was never reduced even in +the war of 1870-1, was considered too formidable an obstacle +against which to launch an invading army. A rapid advance on Paris +was therefore deemed impossible if respect were to be paid to the +neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, and it was for this purely +military reason that Germany has to-day violated her promises to +regard the neutrality of these states. This was frankly admitted by +Herr von Jagow to Sir Edward Goschen: 'if they had gone by the more +southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of +roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through +without formidable opposition entailing great loss of +time'.[<a href="#note-8">8</a>]</p> +<p>In the case of Belgium a very easy road was afforded into French +territory up the Valley of the Meuse, past Liège and thence +into France past Namur and through what is known as the Gap of +Namur. A German army could debouch into France through this gap the +more easily inasmuch as the French, relying on the neutrality of +these two states, had not strongly fortified the frontier from the +sea to Maubeuge. Moreover, as the country to the west of the Sambre +was very easy country for manoeuvring and furnished with good roads +and railways, it was reckoned that the formidable French lines to +the south could be turned in this manner, and the German army could +march upon Paris from the north-east.</p> +<p>As to Luxemburg, plainly it could not in such a scheme remain +neutral. It would lie between the two wings of the German army, and +controlling as it did the roads to Brussels, Metz, and +Aix-la-Chapelle, it could not be allowed to cause such +inconvenience as to prevent easy communication between one portion +of the German army and another.</p> +<p>That such a plan was contemplated by the Germans has been for +some years past a matter of common knowledge in England; and it has +been also a matter of common opinion that the attempt to execute +this plan would involve the active resistance of the British +forces, to whom the duty was supposed to have been assigned of +acting on the left flank of the French opposing the entry of the +Germans from Belgian territory. The plea therefore that has been +put forward that the British have now dealt the Germans 'a felon's +blow' can only be put forward by persons who are either ignorant or +heedless of what has been a matter of casual conversation all over +England these last three years; and Sir Edward Grey himself was so +convinced that the German Government knew what the consequences of +a violation of Belgian neutrality would be that he informed Sir +Francis Bertie on July 31st that the 'German Government do not +expect our neutrality'.[<a href="#note-9">9</a>] There has been no +secret about it whatever. It is incredible that the excitement and +surprise of the Imperial Chancellor on the receipt of the ultimatum +of August 4th should have been genuine, seeing that it involves +miscalculation or misinformation entirely incompatible with what we +know of the thoroughness of German methods. At the time of the +Agadir crisis the military situation was the same, and the German +War Office knew quite well what our part would then have been. +Surprise at such action on our part in 1914 is little else than +comedy, and can only have been expressed in order to throw the +blame of German aggression on to the shoulders of Great +Britain.</p> +<p>This argument that Great Britain has taken the aggressive falls +to the ground entirely when it is confronted with the hard facts of +chronology. Far from attacking the Germans, we were so anxious to +keep the peace that we were actually three days late in our +mobilization to join the French on their left wing; and had it not +been for the defence offered by Liège, our scruples would +have gravely imperilled the common cause. For it was not until we +were certain that Germany had committed what was tantamount to an +act of war against us, by invading the neutral state of Belgium, +that we delivered the ultimatum which led to the war.</p> +<p>Notes:</p> +<p><a name="note-1" id="note-1"><!-- Note Anchor 1 --></a>[Footnote +1: Cam. Mod. Hist. viii 301.]</p> +<p><a name="note-2" id="note-2"><!-- Note Anchor 2 --></a>[Footnote +2: Ibid. 304.]</p> +<p><a name="note-3" id="note-3"><!-- Note Anchor 3 --></a>[Footnote +3: Printed by A. Pearce Higgins, <i>The Hague Peace +Conferences</i>, pp. 281-9.]</p> +<p><a name="note-4" id="note-4"><!-- Note Anchor 4 --></a>[Footnote +4: The entire treaty will be found in Hertslet, <i>Map of Europe by +Treaty</i>, vol. ii, pp. 979-98.]</p> +<p><a name="note-5" id="note-5"><!-- Note Anchor 5 --></a>[Footnote +5: <i>Correspondence respecting the European Crisis</i>, (Cd. +7467), No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, Aug. +2.]</p> +<p><a name="note-6" id="note-6"><!-- Note Anchor 6 --></a>[Footnote +6: Edward Hertslet, <i>The Map of Europe by Treaty</i>, vol. iii, +p. 1806, no. 406. 'Proposal of <i>Prussia</i> of Collective +Guarantee by Powers of Neutrality of <i>Luxemburg</i>, London, 7th +May, 1867.']</p> +<p><a name="note-7" id="note-7"><!-- Note Anchor 7 --></a>[Footnote +7: Hertslet, <i>ut sup.</i>, vol. iii, p. 1803. The High +Contracting Powers were Great Britain, Austria, France, Belgium, +Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia.]</p> +<p><a name="note-8" id="note-8"><!-- Note Anchor 8 --></a>[Footnote +8: <i>Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin respecting +the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German Government</i> +(Cd. 7445), Miscellaneous, no. 8, 1914.]</p> +<p><a name="note-9" id="note-9"><!-- Note Anchor 9 --></a>[Footnote +9: <i>Correspondence respecting the European Crisis</i>, p. 62, no. +116. July 31, 1914. See also <i>infra</i> <a href="#ch5sec3">pp. +82</a> <i>et seqq</i>.]</p> +<hr /> +<a name="CH2" id="CH2"><!-- CH2 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER II</h2> +<center>THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE +1871</center> +<p>Even at the risk of being tedious it is essential that we should +sketch in outline the events which have produced the present +grouping of belligerent states, and the long-drawn-out preparations +which have equipped them for conflict on this colossal scale. To +understand why Austria-Hungary and Germany have thrown down the +glove to France and Russia, why England has intervened not only as +the protector of Belgium, but also as the friend of France, we must +go back to the situation created by the Franco-German War. Starting +from that point, we must notice in order the formation of the +Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, of the +Dual Alliance between France and Russia, of the Anglo-French and +the Anglo-Russian understandings. The Triple Alliance has been the +grand cause of the present situation; not because such a grouping +of the Central European Powers was objectionable, but because it +has inspired over-confidence in the two leading allies; because +they have traded upon the prestige of their league to press their +claims East and West with an intolerable disregard for the law of +nations. Above all it was the threatening attitude of Germany +towards her Western neighbours that drove England forward step by +step in a policy of precautions which, she hoped, would avert a +European conflagration, and which her rivals have attempted to +represent as stages in a Machiavellian design to ruin Germany's +well-being. These precautions, so obviously necessary that they +were continued and expanded by the most pacific Government which +England has seen since Mr. Gladstone's retirement, have taken two +forms: that of diplomatic understandings, and that of naval +preparations. Whichever form they have taken, they have been +adopted in response to definite provocations, and to threats which +it was impossible to overlook. They have been strictly and +jealously measured by the magnitude of the peril immediately in +view. In her diplomacy England has given no blank cheques; in her +armaments she has cut down expenditure to the minimum that, with +reasonable good fortune, might enable her to defend this country +and English sea-borne trade against any probable combination of +hostile Powers.</p> +<p>Let us consider (1) the development of the diplomatic situation +since 1870, (2) the so-called race of armaments since 1886.</p> +<p>The Treaty of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), in which France +submitted to the demands of the new-born German Empire, opened a +fresh era of European diplomacy and international competition. The +German Empire became at once, and has ever since remained, the +predominant Power in Western Europe. The public opinion of this new +Germany has been captured to no small extent by the views of such +aggressive patriots as Treitschke, who openly avowed that 'the +greatness and good of the world is to be found in the predominance +there of German culture, of the German mind, in a word of the +German character'. The school of Treitschke looked for the +establishment of a German world-empire, and held that the essential +preliminary to this scheme would be the overthrow of France and +England. But until 1890, that is to say so long as Prince Bismarck +remained Chancellor, no such ambitious programme was adopted by the +German Government. Bismarck was content to strengthen the position +of the Empire and to sow disunion among her actual or suspected +enemies. In 1872 he brought about a friendly understanding with +Austria and Russia, the other two great Powers of Eastern Europe, +the so-called <i>Dreikaiserbündnis</i>, which was designed to +perpetuate the <i>status quo</i>. But the friendship with Russia +quickly cooled; it received a sharp set-back in 1875, when the Tsar +Alexander II came forward rather ostentatiously to save France from +the alleged hostile designs of Germany; it was certainly not +improved when Bismarck in his turn mediated between Russia and her +opponents at the Congress of Berlin (1878). On the other hand, a +common interest in the Eastern Question drew closer the bonds +between Germany and Austria. The latter felt herself directly +menaced by the Balkan policy of Russia; the former was not prepared +to see her southern neighbour despoiled of territory. Hence in 1879 +was initiated that closer union between Germany and Austria which +has been so largely responsible for the present situation. The +Treaty of 1879, which was kept secret until 1887, was purely +defensive in its character; but the terms showed that Russia was +the enemy whom both the contracting Powers chiefly feared. Neither +was bound to active measures unless the other should be attacked by +Russia, or any Power which had Russian support. In 1882 the +alliance of the two great German Powers was joined by Italy—a +surprising development which can only be explained on the ground of +Italy's feeling that she could not hope for security at home, or +for colonial expansion in the Mediterranean, so long as she +remained in isolation. The Triple Alliance so constituted had a +frail appearance, and it was hardly to be expected that Italy would +receive strong support from partners in comparison with whose +resources her own were insignificant. But the Triple Alliance has +endured to the present day, the most permanent feature of the +diplomatic system of the last thirty-two years. Whether the results +have been commensurate with the sacrifices of sentiment and +ambition which Italy has made, it is for Italy to judge. On the +whole she has been a sleeping partner in the Alliance; its prestige +has served almost exclusively for the promotion of Austrian and +German aims; and one of its results has been to make Austria a +formidable rival of Italy in the Adriatic.</p> +<p>Meanwhile the remaining Great Powers of Europe had continued, as +Prince Bismarck hoped, to pursue their separate paths, though +England was on friendly terms with France and had, equally with +Russia, laboured to avert a second Franco-German War in 1875. After +1882 the English occupation of Egypt constituted for some years a +standing grievance in the eyes of France. The persistent advance of +Russia in Asia had in like manner been a source of growing +apprehension to England since 1868; and, for a long time after the +Treaty of Berlin, English statesmen were on the watch to check the +growth of Russian influence in the Balkans. But common interests of +very different kinds were tending to unite these three Powers, not +in any stable alliance, even for mutual defence, but in a string of +compacts concluded for particular objects.</p> +<p>One of these interests was connected with a feeling that the +policy of the principal partners in the Triple Alliance, +particularly that of Germany, had become incalculable and was only +consistent in periodic outbursts of self-assertiveness, behind +which could be discerned a steady determination to accumulate +armaments which should be strong enough to intimidate any possible +competitor. The growth of this feeling dates from the dismissal of +Prince Bismarck by the present Kaiser. Bismarck had sedulously +courted the friendship of Russia, even after 1882. He entered in +fact into a defensive agreement with Russia against Austria. While +he increased the war strength of the army, he openly announced that +Germany would always stand on the defensive; and he addressed a +warning to the Reichstag against the 'offensive-defensive' policy +which was even then in the air, though it was still far from its +triumph:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'If I were to say to you, "We are threatened +by France and Russia; it is better for us to fight at once; an +offensive war is more advantageous to us," and ask for a credit of +a hundred millions, I do not know whether you would grant +it—I hope not.'[<a href="#note-10">10</a>]</p> +<p>But Bismarck's retirement (1890) left the conduct of German +policy in less cautious hands. The defensive alliance with Russia +was allowed to lapse; friction between the two Powers increased, +and as the result Germany found herself confronted with the Dual +Alliance of France and Russia, which gradually developed, during +the years 1891-6, from a friendly understanding into a formal +contract for mutual defence. There is no doubt that this alliance +afforded France a protection against that unprovoked attack upon +her eastern frontier which she has never ceased to dread since +1875; and it has yet to be proved that she ever abused the new +strength which this alliance gave her.</p> +<p>It is only in the field of colonial expansion that she has shown +aggressive tendencies since 1896; and even here the members of the +Triple Alliance have never shown serious cause for a belief that +France has invaded their lawful spheres of interest. Her advance in +Morocco was permitted by Italy and Spain; her vast dominion in +French West Africa has been recognized by treaties with Germany and +England; in East Africa she has Madagascar, of which her possession +has never been disputed by any European Power; her growing +interests in Indo-China have impinged only upon an English sphere +of interest and were peacefully defined by an Anglo-French +Agreement of 1896. France has been the competitor, to some extent +the successful competitor, of Germany in West Africa, where she +partially envelops the Cameroons and Togoland. But the German +Government has never ventured to state the French colonial methods +as a <i>casus belli</i>. That the German people have viewed with +jealousy the growth of French power in Africa is a notorious fact. +Quite recently, on the eve of the present war, we were formally +given to understand that Germany, in any war with France, might +annex French colonies[<a href="#note-11">11</a>]; and it is easy to +see how such an object would reconcile the divergent policies of +the German military and naval experts.</p> +<p>Up to the eve of the present war Great Britain has consistently +refused to believe that Germany would be mad enough or dishonest +enough to enter on a war of aggression for the dismemberment of +colonial empires. German diplomacy in the past few weeks has rudely +shattered this conviction. But up to the year 1914 the worst which +was generally anticipated was that she would pursue in the future +on a great scale the policy, which she has hitherto pursued on a +small scale, of claiming so-called 'compensations' when other +Powers succeeded in developing their colonial spheres, and of +invoking imaginary 'interests' as a reason why the efforts of +explorers and diplomatists should not be allowed to yield to France +their natural fruits of increased colonial trade. It is not our +business to impugn or to defend the partition of Africa, or the +methods by which it has been brought about. But it is vital to our +subject that we should describe the methods by which Germany has +endeavoured to intimidate France at various stages of the African +question. The trouble arose out of a Moroccan Agreement between +England and France, which was the first definite proof that these +two Powers were drifting into relations closer than that of +ordinary friendship.</p> +<p>In 1904 England and France settled their old quarrel about +Egypt. France recognized the English occupation of Egypt; England, +on her side, promised not to impede the extension of French +influence in Morocco. It was agreed that neither in Egypt nor in +Morocco should there be a political revolution; and that in both +countries the customs tariff should make no distinction between one +nation and another. This compact was accompanied by a settlement of +the old disputes about French fishing rights in Newfoundland, and +of more recent difficulties concerning the frontiers between French +and English possessions in West Africa.[<a href="#note-12">12</a>] +The whole group formed a step in a general policy, on both sides, +of healing local controversies which had little meaning except as +instruments of diplomatic warfare. The agreement regarding Egypt +and Morocco is distinguished from that concerning West Africa and +Newfoundland in so far as it recognizes the possibility of +objections on the part of other Powers. It promised mutual support +in the case of such objections; but not the support of armed force, +only that of diplomatic influence.</p> +<p>At the moment of these agreements Count Bülow told the +Reichstag that Germany had no objection, as her interests were in +no way imperilled by them. Later, however, Germany chose to regard +the Moroccan settlement as an injury or an insult or both. In the +following year the Kaiser made a speech at Tangier (March, 1905) in +which he asserted that he would uphold the important commercial and +industrial interests of Germany in Morocco, and that he would never +allow any other Power to step between him and the free sovereign of +a free country. It was subsequently announced in the German Press +that Germany had no objection to the Anglo-French Agreement in +itself, but objected to not having been consulted before it was +arranged. This complaint was met, on the part of France, by the +retirement of M. Delcassé, her Minister of Foreign Affairs, +and by her assent to an International Conference regarding Morocco. +The Conference met at Algeciras, and German pretensions were +satisfied by an international Agreement.[<a href="#note-13">13</a>] +It is to be observed that in this Conference the original claims of +Germany were opposed, not only by Russia, from whom she could +hardly expect sympathy, but even by Italy, her own ally. When +Germany had finally assented to the Agreement, her Chancellor, in +flat contradiction with his previous utterance 'that German +interests were in no way imperilled by it', announced that Germany +had been compelled to intervene by her economic interests, by the +prestige of German policy, and by the dignity of the German +Empire.</p> +<p>The plain fact was that Germany, soon after the conclusion of +the Anglo-French agreements, had found herself suddenly delivered +from her preoccupations on the side of Russia, and had seized the +opportunity to assert herself in the West while Russia was involved +in the most critical stage of her struggle with Japan. But this war +came to an end before the Convention of Algeciras had begun; and +Russia, even in the hour of defeat and internal revolutions, was +still too formidable to be overridden, when she ranged herself +beside her Western ally.</p> +<p>Of the part which England played in the Moroccan dispute there +are different versions. What is certain is that she gave France her +diplomatic support. But the German Chancellor officially +acknowledged, when all was over, that England's share in the +Anglo-French Agreement had been perfectly correct, and that Germany +bore England no ill-will for effecting a <i>rapprochement</i> with +France. Still there remained a strong impression, not only in +England and France, that there had been on Germany's part a +deliberate intention to test the strength of the Anglo-French +understanding and, if possible, to show France that England was a +broken reed.</p> +<p>It is not surprising that under these circumstances England has +taken, since 1906, the precaution of freeing herself from any +embarrassments in which she had previously been involved with other +Powers. In 1905 she had shown her goodwill to Russia by exercising +her influence to moderate the terms of the settlement with Japan. +This was a wise step, consonant alike with English +treaty-obligations to Japan and with the interests of European +civilization. It led naturally to an amicable agreement with Russia +(1907) concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, the three +countries which touch the northern borders of our Indian Empire. It +cannot be too strongly emphasized that this agreement was of a +local character, exactly as was that with France; that our friendly +understandings with France and with Russia were entirely separate; +and that neither related to the prosecution of a common policy in +Europe; unless indeed the name of a policy could be given to the +precaution, which was from time to time adopted, of permitting +consultations between the French and English military experts. It +was understood that these consultations committed neither country +to a policy of common action.[<a href="#note-14">14</a>] England +was drifting from her old attitude of 'splendid isolation'; but she +had as yet no desire to involve herself, even for defensive +purposes, in such a formal and permanent alliance as that which had +been contracted by Germany, Austria, and Italy.</p> +<p>But her hand was forced by Germany in 1911. Again the question +of Morocco was made to supply a pretext for attacking our +friendship with France. The German occupation of Agadir had, and +could have, only one meaning. It was 'fastening a quarrel on France +on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between +France and us'.[<a href="#note-15">15</a>] The attack failed in its +object. War was averted by the prompt action of the British +Government. Mr. Asquith[<a href="#note-16">16</a>] announced that +Great Britain, in discussing the Moroccan question, would have +regard to British interests, which might be more directly involved +than had hitherto been the case, and also to our treaty obligations +with France. Somewhat later Mr. Asquith announced that if the +negotiations between France and Germany did not reach a +satisfactory settlement, Great Britain would become an active party +to the discussion.[<a href="#note-17">17</a>] The nature of British +interests were appropriately defined by Mr. Lloyd George in a +Guildhall speech as consisting in the peace of the world, the +maintenance of national honour, and the security of international +trade.[<a href="#note-18">18</a>] The last phrase was a significant +reference to the fact that Agadir, though valueless for commercial +purposes, might be invaluable to any Power which desired to molest +the South Atlantic trade routes. No one doubted then, or doubts +to-day, that England stood in 1911 on the brink of a war which she +had done nothing to provoke.</p> +<p>The situation was saved in 1911 by the solidarity of England and +France. Two Powers, which in the past had been separated by a +multitude of prejudices and conflicting ambitions, felt at last +that both were exposed to a common danger of the most serious +character. Hence a new phase in the Anglo-French <i>entente</i>, +which was cemented, not by a treaty, but by the interchange of +letters between the English Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Sir +Edward Grey) and the French Ambassador in London (M. Paul Cambon). +On November 22, 1912, Sir Edward Grey[<a href="#note-19">19</a>] +reminded M. Cambon of a remark which the latter had made, 'that if +either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack +by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it +could in that event depend on the armed assistance of the other.' +Sir Edward Grey continued:—'I agree that if either Government +had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, +or something that threatened the general peace, it should +immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should +act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if +so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If +these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs +would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments +would then decide what effect should be given to them.'</p> +<p>M. Cambon replied on the following day that he was authorized to +accept the arrangement which Sir E. Grey had offered.[<a href= +"#note-20">20</a>]</p> +<p>The agreement, it will be seen, was of an elastic nature. +Neither party was bound to co-operate, even diplomatically, with +the other. The undertaking was to discuss any threatening +situation, and to take common measures if both agreed to the +necessity; there was an admission that the agreement might result +in the conduct of a joint defensive war upon a common plan. Such an +understanding between two sovereign states could be resented only +by a Power which designed to attack one of them without clear +provocation.</p> +<p>The date at which these notes were interchanged is certainly +significant. In November, 1912, the Balkan Allies were advancing on +Constantinople, and already the spoils of the Balkan War were in +dispute. Servia incurred the hostility of Austria-Hungary by +demanding Albania and Adriatic ports; and the Dual Monarchy +announced that it could never accept this arrangement. Behind +Servia Austrian statesmen suspected the influence of Russia; it +was, they said, a scheme for bringing Russia down to a sea which +Austria regarded as her own preserve. Austria mobilized her army, +and a war could hardly have been avoided but for the mediation of +Germany and England. If England had entertained the malignant +designs with which she is credited in some German circles, nothing +would have been easier for her than to fan the flames, and to bring +Russia down upon the Triple Alliance. The notes show how different +from this were the aims of Sir Edward Grey. He evidently foresaw +that a war between Austria and Russia would result in a German +attack upon France. Not content with giving France assurance of +support, he laboured to remove the root of the evil. A congress to +settle the Balkan disputes was held at London in December, 1912; +and it persuaded Servia to accept a reasonable compromise, by which +she obtained commercial access to the Adriatic, but no port. This +for the moment pacified Austria and averted the world-war. To whom +the solution was due we know from the lips of German statesmen. The +German Chancellor subsequently (April 7, 1913) told the +Reichstag:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'A state of tension had for months existed +between Austria-Hungary and Russia which was only prevented from +developing into war by the moderation of the Powers.... Europe will +feel grateful to the English Minister of Foreign Affairs for the +extraordinary ability and spirit of conciliation with which he +conducted the discussion of the Ambassadors in London, and which +constantly enabled him to bridge over differences.'</p> +<p>The Chancellor concluded by saying: 'We at any rate shall never +stir up such a war'—a promise or a prophecy which has been +singularly falsified.</p> +<p>It is no easy matter to understand the line of conduct which +Germany has adopted towards the great Slavonic Power on her flank. +Since Bismarck left the helm, she has sometimes steered in the +direction of subservience, and sometimes has displayed the most +audacious insolence. Periodically, it is to be supposed, her rulers +have felt that in the long run the momentum of a Russian attack +would be irresistible; at other times, particularly after the +Russo-Japanese War, they have treated Russia, as the Elizabethans +treated Spain, as 'a colossus stuffed with clouts.' But rightly or +wrongly they appear to have assumed that sooner or later there must +come a general Armageddon, in which the central feature would be a +duel of the Teuton with the Slav; and in German military circles +there was undoubtedly a conviction that the epic conflict had best +come sooner and not later. How long this idea has influenced German +policy we do not pretend to say. But it has certainly contributed +to her unenviable prominence in the 'race of armaments' which all +thinking men have condemned as an insupportable, tax upon Western +civilization, and which has aggravated all the evils that it was +intended to avert.</p> +<p>The beginning of the evil was perhaps due to France; but, if so, +it was to a France which viewed with just alarm the enormous +strides in population and wealth made by Germany since 1871. The +'Boulanger Law' of 1886 raised the peace footing of the French army +above 500,000 men, at a time when that of Germany was 427,000, and +that of Russia 550,000. Bismarck replied by the comparatively +moderate measure of adding 41,000 to the German peace establishment +for seven years; and it is significant of the difference between +then and now that he only carried his Bill after a dissolution of +one Reichstag and a forcible appeal to its successor.</p> +<p>France must soon have repented of the indiscretion to which she +had been tempted by a military adventurer. With a population +comparatively small and rapidly approaching the stationary phase it +was impossible that she could long maintain such a race. In 1893 +Count Caprivi's law, carried like that of Bismarck after a stiff +struggle with the Reichstag, raised the peace establishment to +479,000 men. Count Caprivi at the same time reduced the period of +compulsory service from three years to two; but while this reform +lightened the burden on the individual conscript, it meant a great +increase in the number of those who passed through military +training, and an enormous increase of the war strength. The +Franco-Russian <i>entente</i> of 1896 was a sign that France began +to feel herself beaten in the race for supremacy and reduced to the +defensive. In 1899 the German peace strength was raised to 495,000 +for the next six years; in 1905 to 505,000. On the second of these +occasions the German Government justified its policy by pointing +out that the French war strength was still superior to that of +Germany, and would become still stronger if France should change +the period of service from three years to two. The German law was +announced in 1904; it had the natural effect. The French Senate not +only passed the new law early in 1905, but also swept away the +changes which the Lower House had introduced to lighten the burden +of annual training upon territorial reserves. France found her +justification in the Moroccan episode of the previous year.</p> +<p>This was not unreasonable; but since that date France has been +heavily punished for a step which might be taken to indicate that +<i>Revanche</i> was still a feature of her foreign policy. Since +1886 her utmost efforts have only succeeded in raising her peace +establishment to 545,000 (including a body of 28,000 colonial +troops stationed in France), and her total war strength to +4,000,000. In the same period the peace establishment of Germany +was raised to over 800,000, and her total war strength of fully +trained men to something like 5,400,000. It is obvious from these +figures that a policy of isolation has long ceased to be possible +to France; and that an alliance with Russia has been her only +possible method of counterbalancing the numerical superiority of +the German army, which is certainly not less well equipped or +organized than that of France.</p> +<p>This Russian alliance of France has been the only step in her +continental policy which could be challenged as tending to +overthrow the European balance. Undoubtedly it is France's prime +offence in German eyes; and her colonial policy has only been +attacked as a pretext for picking a quarrel and forcing on a +decisive trial of strength before the growth of Russian resources +should have made her ally impregnable.</p> +<p>Let us now look at the German military preparations from a +German point of view. The increases of the last twenty years in +military expenditure and in fighting strength have been openly +discussed in the Reichstag; and the debates have usually run on the +same lines, because the Government up to 1912 pursued a consistent +policy, framed for some years ahead and embodied in an Army Act. +The underlying principle of these Army Acts (1893, 1899, 1905, +1911) was to maintain a fairly constant ratio between the peace +strength and the population. But the war strength was +disproportionately increased by the Caprivi Army Act of 1893, which +reduced the period of compulsory service from three years to two. +The hardly-veiled intention of the German War Staff was to increase +its war resources as rapidly as was consistent with the +long-sufferance of those who served and those who paid the bill. It +was taken as axiomatic that an increasing population ought to be +protected by an increasing army. National defence was of course +alleged as the prime consideration; and if these preparations were +really required by growing danger on the two main frontiers of +Germany, no German could do otherwise than approve the policy, no +foreign Power could feel itself legitimately aggrieved.</p> +<p>Unfortunately it has been a maxim of German policy in recent +years that national independence means the power of taking the +aggressive in any case where national interests or +<i>amour-propre</i> may prompt it. The increase of the German army, +either in numbers or in technical efficiency, seems to be regularly +followed by masterful strokes of diplomacy in which the 'mailed +fist' is plainly shown to other continental Powers. Thus in 1909, +at the close of a quinquennium of military re-equipment, which had +raised her annual army budget from £27,000,000 to +£41,000,000, Germany countenanced the Austrian annexation of +Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and plainly told the authorities at St. +Petersburg that any military action against Austria would bring +Russia into a state of war with Germany. It was a startling step; +<i>radix malorum</i> we may call it, so far as the later +development of the continental situation is concerned. Russia +withdrew from the impending conflict in 1909, but it is improbable +that she has ever forgiven the matter or the manner of the German +ultimatum.</p> +<p>In 1911 followed the episode of Agadir, which was clearly an +attempt to 'force a quarrel on France.' But in 1911 Germany +realized that her military calculations had been insufficient, if +she wished to continue these unamiable diplomatic manners. It was +not a question of self-preservation; it was a question, as the +German Chancellor told the Reichstag, of showing the world that +'Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed aside.' Hence the +sensational Army Bill of 1912, necessitated, as the Government told +the Reichstag, by the events of 1911. The Russian peril could +hardly be described as imminent. The Prussian Minister of War said +publicly in 1911 that 'there was no Government which either desired +or was seeking to bring about a war with Germany.' Russia had +recently taken steps which, at Berlin, perhaps, were read as signs +of weakness, but elsewhere were hailed as proofs of her desire for +general peace. M. Isvolsky, the supposed champion of Balkan ideals, +had retired from office; his successor, M. Sazonof, had accompanied +the Czar to the Potsdam interview (1910); the outstanding disputes +of Germany and Russia over their Persian interests had been settled +by agreement in 1911.</p> +<p>But the German Army Bill of 1912 was followed by Russia's +intervention in the Balkans to secure for Servia at least +commercial access to the Adriatic. This compromise, ostensibly +promoted and belauded by German statesmanship, only increased the +determination of the German Government to 'hold the ring' in the +Balkans, to claim for Austria the right of settling her own +differences with Servia as she would, and to deny Russia any +interest in the matter. In 1913 came the supreme effort of the +German General Staff: an Army Act for raising the peace strength by +instalments until it reached 870,000, and for the eventual +provision of a war strength of 5,400,000 men. This enormous +increase was recommended 'by the unanimous judgement of the +military authorities' as being 'necessary to secure the future of +Germany.' The Chancellor warned the Reichstag that, although +relations were friendly with Russia, they had to face the +possibilities involved in the Pan-Slavist movement; while in Russia +itself they had to reckon with a marvellous economic development +and an unprecedented reorganization of the army. There was also a +reference to the new law for a return to three years' service which +France was introducing to improve the efficiency of her peace +establishment. But it was obvious that Russia was the main +preoccupation. Germany had forced the pace both in the +aggrandizement of her military strength and in the methods of her +diplomatic intercourse. Suddenly she found herself on the brink of +an abyss. She had gone too far; she had provoked into the +competition of armaments a Power as far superior to Germany in her +reserves of men as Germany thought herself superior to France. It +was not too late for Germany to pause. On her future behaviour +towards other Powers it depended whether the Bill of 1913 should be +taken as an insurance against risks, or as a challenge to all +possible opponents.</p> +<p>The other Powers shaped their policy in accordance with +Germany's example. In France, on March 4, the Supreme Council of +War, having learned the outline of the German programme, decided to +increase the effective fighting force by a return to the rule of +three years' service. Before the German Bill had passed (June 30), +the French Prime Minister announced (May 15) that he would of his +own authority keep with the colours those who were completing their +second year's service in the autumn. The French Army Bill, when +finally passed (July 16), lowered the age limit for commencing +service from twenty-one to twenty, and brought the new rule into +force at once. A few weeks earlier (June 20) Belgium introduced +universal military service in place of her former lenient system. +In Russia a secret session of the Duma was held (July 8) to pass a +new Army Budget, and the term of service was raised from three to +three and a quarter years. Austria alone provided for no great +increase in the numerical strength of her army; but budgeted +(October 30) for extraordinary naval and military expenditure, to +the extent of £28,000,000, to be incurred in the first six +months of 1914. Thus on all sides the alarm was raised, and special +preparations were put in hand, long before the crisis of 1914 +actually arrived. It was Germany that had sounded the tocsin; and +it is difficult to believe that some startling <i>coup</i> was not +even then being planned by the leaders of her military party.</p> +<p>We have been told that, whatever the appearance of things might +be, it was Russia who drove Germany to the extraordinary +preparations of 1913; that Germany was arming simply in +self-defence against a Slavonic Crusade. What are the facts? +Economically Russia, as a state, is in a stronger position than the +German Empire. In 1912 we were told that for the past five years +the revenue of Russia had exceeded expenditure by an average sum of +£20,000,000 per annum. The revenue of Russia in 1913 was over +£324,000,000; she has budgeted for £78,000,000 of +military expenditure in 1914, of which some £15,000,000 is +emergency expenditure. The total revenue of the German Empire in +1913 was £184,000,000; she has budgeted for a military +expenditure in 1914 of £60,000,000. To adopt the usual German +tests of comparison, Russia has a population of 173 millions to be +defended on three land-frontiers, while Germany has a population of +65 millions to be defended on only two. The military efforts of +Russia, therefore, have been made on a scale relatively smaller +than those of Germany.</p> +<p>We must, however, add some further considerations which have +been urged by German military critics; the alleged facts we cannot +test, but we state them for what they may be worth. The +reorganization of the Russian army in recent years has resulted, so +we are told, in the grouping of enormously increased forces upon +the western frontier. The western fortresses also have been +equipped on an unparalleled scale. New roads and railways have been +constructed to accelerate the mobilization of the war strength; +and, above all, strategic railways have been pushed towards the +western frontier. Thus, it is argued, Russia has in effect gone +behind the Potsdam Agreement of 1910, by which she withdrew her +armies to a fixed distance behind the Russo-German frontier. We +confess that, in all this, while there may have been cause for +watchfulness on the part of Germany, we can see no valid cause for +war, nothing that of necessity implies more than an intention, on +the part of Russia, not to be brow-beaten in the future as she was +in 1909 and 1912.</p> +<p>These military developments did not escape English notice. They +excited endless speculation about the great war of the future, and +the part which this country might be asked to bear in it. Few, +however, seriously supposed that we should commit ourselves to a +share in the fighting upon land. The problem most usually discussed +in this connexion was that of preparation to resist a sudden +invasion from abroad. Was it possible to avoid compulsory service? +Was the Territorial Force large enough and efficient enough to +defend the country if the Expeditionary Force had gone abroad? +Great Britain was infinitely better equipped for land warfare in +August, 1914, than she had ever been in the nineteenth century. But +her Expeditionary Force was a recent creation, and had been planned +for the defence of India and the Colonies. In practice the country +had clung to the 'Blue Water' policy, of trusting the national +fortunes entirely to the Navy. The orthodox theory was that so long +as the Navy was kept at the 'Two Power' standard, no considerable +invasion of the British Isles was possible.</p> +<p>But from 1898 the programmes of the German Navy Laws constituted +a growing menace to the 'Two Power' standard, which had been laid +down as our official principle in 1889, when France and Russia were +our chief European rivals at sea. That France or Russia would +combine with Germany to challenge our naval supremacy was +improbable; but other states were beginning to build on a larger +scale, and this multiplied the possible number of hostile +combinations. That Germany should wish for a strong fleet was only +natural. It was needed to defend her foreign trade, her colonial +interests, and her own seaports. That Germany should lay down a +definite programme for six years ahead, and that the programme +should become more extensive at each revision, was no necessary +proof of malice. But this country received a shock in 1900, when +the programme of 1898 was unexpectedly and drastically revised, so +that the German Navy was practically doubled. England was at that +moment involved in the South African War, and it was hard to see +against whom the new fleet could be used, if not against England. +This was pointed out from time to time by the Socialist opposition +in the Reichstag. The orthodox official reply was that Germany must +be so strong at sea that the strongest naval Power should not be +able to challenge her with any confidence. But the feeling of the +semi-official Navy League was known to be violently hostile to +England; and it was obvious that the German navy owed its +popularity to the alarmist propaganda of that league.</p> +<p>It was impossible for English statesmen to avoid the suspicion +that, on the sea as on land, the Germans meant by liberty the right +to unlimited self-assertion. Common prudence dictated close +attention to the German Navy Laws; especially as they proved +capable of unexpected acceleration. The 'Two Power' standard, under +the stress of German competition, became increasingly difficult to +maintain, and English Liberals were inclined to denounce it as +wasteful of money. But, when a Liberal Government tried the +experiment of economizing on the Navy (1906-8), there was no +corresponding reduction in the German programme. The German Naval +Law of 1906 raised the amount of the naval estimates by one-third; +and German ministers blandly waved aside as impracticable a +proposal for a mutual limitation of armaments.</p> +<p>In 1909 this country discovered that in capital +ships—which now began to be considered the decisive factor in +naval warfare—Germany would actually be the superior by 1914 +unless special measures were taken. The British Government was +awakened to the new situation (it arose from the German Naval Law +of 1908), and returned unwillingly to the path of increasing +expenditure. The Prime Minister said that we regretted the race in +naval expenditure and were not animated by anti-German feeling; but +we could not afford to let our supremacy at sea be imperilled, +since our national security depended on it (March 16, 1909). The +'Two Power' standard was dropped, and the Triple Alliance became +the object of special attention at the Admiralty. The First Lord +said on March 13, 1911, that we should make our navy superior to +any foreign navy and to any <i>probable</i> combination which we +might have to meet single-handed. In practice this meant a policy +of developing, in the matter of Dreadnoughts, a superiority of +sixty per cent, over the German navy; this, it was officially +explained in 1912, had been for some years past the actual +Admiralty standard of new construction (Mr. Winston Churchill, +March 18, 1912).</p> +<p>But even this programme had to be stiffened when the year 1912 +saw a new German Navy Bill which involved an increased expenditure +of £1,000,000 annually for six years, and had the effect of +putting nearly four-fifths of the German navy in a position of +immediate readiness for war. Earlier in the year the British +Government had announced that, if the German policy of construction +were accelerated, we should add to our programme double the number +which Germany put in hand; but if Germany relaxed her preparations +we should make a fully proportionate reduction. The German Bill +came as an answer to this declaration; and it was followed in this +country by supplementary estimates on naval account, amounting to +nearly a million pounds; and this was announced to be 'the first +and smallest instalment of the extra expenditure entailed by the +new German law.' The new British policy was maintained in 1913 and +in 1914, though in 1913 the First Lord of the Admiralty made a +public offer of a 'naval holiday,' a suspension of new construction +by mutual consent. The Imperial Chancellor responded only by +suggesting that the proposal was entirely unofficial, by asking for +concrete proposals, and by saying that the idea constituted a great +progress; and his naval estimates in 1913 were half a million +higher than those of 1912.</p> +<p>From these facts, viewed in their chronological order, it is +clear that on sea as on land Germany has set the pace. Thirty years +ago the German navy did not enter into England's naval +calculations. For the last six years, if not for a longer period, +it has been the one navy which our Admiralty felt the necessity of +watching from year to year, and indeed from month to month. It is +the first time for more than a hundred years that we have had to +face the problem of 'a powerful homogeneous navy under one +government and concentrated within easy distance of our +shores.'</p> +<p>On German principles we should long ago have adopted the +'offensive-defensive.' We have been at least as seriously menaced +by Germany at sea as Germany has been menaced by Russia upon land. +But we can confidently say that in the period of rivalry our fleet +has never been used as a threat, or turned to the purposes of an +aggressive colonial policy. Rightly or wrongly, we have refused to +make possible intentions a case for an ultimatum. We have held by +the position that only a breach of public law would justify us in +abandoning our efforts for the peace of Europe.</p> +<hr /> +<a name="ch2note" id="ch2note"></a> +<h3>NOTE</h3> +<p><i>Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco</i>.</p> +<p>In April, 1904, England and France concluded an agreement for +the delimitation of their interests on the Mediterranean littoral +of North Africa. The agreement included five secret Articles which +were not published until November, 1911. The purport of the +Articles which were published at the time was as follows. By the +first Article England stated that she had not the intention of +changing the political state of Egypt; and France declared that she +would not impede the action of England in Egypt by demanding that a +term should be fixed for the British occupation or in any other +way. By the second Article France declared that she had not the +intention of changing the political state of Morocco; and England +recognized that it appertained to France, as the Power conterminous +with Morocco, to watch the tranquillity of this country and to +assist it in all administrative, economic, financial, and military +reforms which it required, France promised to respect the customary +and treaty rights of England in Morocco; and by the third Article +England made a corresponding promise to France in respect of Egypt. +By the fourth Article the two Governments undertook to maintain +'the principle of commercial liberty' in Egypt and Morocco, by not +lending themselves in either country to inequality in the +establishment of Customs-duties or of other taxes or of railway +rates. The sixth and seventh Articles were inserted to ensure the +free passage of the Suez Canal and of the Straits of Gibraltar. The +eighth declared that both Governments took into friendly +consideration the interests of Spain in Morocco, and that France +would make some arrangements with the Spanish Monarchy. The ninth +Article declared that each Government would lend its diplomatic +support to the other in executing the clauses relative to Egypt and +Morocco.[<a href="#note-21">21</a>] Of the secret Articles two +(Nos. 3 and 4) related to Spain, defining the territory which she +was to receive 'whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority +over it,' and providing that the Anglo-French agreement would hold +good even if Spain declined this arrangement. Article 1 stipulated +that, if either Government found itself constrained, by the force +of circumstances, to modify its policy in respect to Egypt or +Morocco, nevertheless the fourth, sixth, and seventh Articles of +the public declaration would remain intact; that is, each would +under all circumstances maintain the principle of 'commercial +liberty,' and would permit the free passage of the Suez Canal and +the Straits of Gibraltar. In Article 2 England, while disclaiming +any intention to alter the system of Capitulations or the judicial +organization of Egypt, reserved the right to reform the Egyptian +legislative system on the model of other civilized countries; and +France agreed on condition that she should not be impeded from +making similar reforms in Morocco. The fifth Article related to the +Egyptian national debt.</p> +<p>Notes:</p> +<p><a name="note-10" id="note-10"> +<!-- Note Anchor 10 --></a>[Footnote 10: Quoted from Headlam's +<i>Bismarck</i>, p. 444.]</p> +<p><a name="note-11" id="note-11"> +<!-- Note Anchor 11 --></a>[Footnote 11: <i>Correspondence +respecting the European Crisis</i> (Cd. 7467), No. 85. Sir E. +Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914. See <i>infra</i>, <a href= +"#RULE4_3">Appendix II</a>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-12" id="note-12"> +<!-- Note Anchor 12 --></a>[Footnote 12: For these agreements see +<i>The Times</i>, April 12, 1904, and November 25, 1911. See +<a href="#ch2note">note</a> at end of this chapter.]</p> +<p><a name="note-13" id="note-13"> +<!-- Note Anchor 13 --></a>[Footnote 13: White Paper, Morocco No. 1 +(1906).]</p> +<p><a name="note-14" id="note-14"> +<!-- Note Anchor 14 --></a>[Footnote 14: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +105 (Enclosure 1). Sir E. Grey to M. Cambon, November 22, 1912. See +<a href="#RULE4_3">Appendix II</a>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-15" id="note-15"> +<!-- Note Anchor 15 --></a>[Footnote 15: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29, 1914.]</p> +<p><a name="note-16" id="note-16"> +<!-- Note Anchor 16 --></a>[Footnote 16: <i>Times</i>, July 7, +1911.]</p> +<p><a name="note-17" id="note-17"> +<!-- Note Anchor 17 --></a>[Footnote 17: <i>Times</i>, July 27, +1911.]</p> +<p><a name="note-18" id="note-18"> +<!-- Note Anchor 18 --></a>[Footnote 18: <i>Times</i>, July 22, +1911.]</p> +<p><a name="note-19" id="note-19"> +<!-- Note Anchor 19 --></a>[Footnote 19: <i>Correspondence</i>, p. +57 (Enclosure 1 in No. 105). See <a href="#RULE4_3">Appendix +II</a>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-20" id="note-20"> +<!-- Note Anchor 20 --></a>[Footnote 20: <i>Ibid</i>. p. 57 +(Enclosure 2 in No. 105).]</p> +<p><a name="note-21" id="note-21"> +<!-- Note Anchor 21 --></a>[Footnote 21: <i>Times</i>, April 12, +1904.]</p> +<hr /> +<a name="CH3" id="CH3"><!-- CH3 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER III</h2> +<center>THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY</center> +<p>Until the year 1890 Russia and Germany had been in close touch. +Dynastic connexions united the two imperial houses; and the common +policy of repression of Polish nationality—the fatal legacy +of the days of Frederic the Great and Catharine II—united the +two empires. National sentiment in Russia was, however, always +anti-German; and as early as 1885 Balkan affairs began to draw the +Russian Government away from Germany. In 1890 Bismarck fell; and +under William II German policy left the Russian connexion, and in +close touch with Austria embarked on Balkan adventures which ran +counter to Russian aims, while Russia on her side turned to new +allies.</p> +<p>The new direction of Russian policy, which has brought the aims +of the Russian Government into close accord with the desires of +national Slav sentiment, was determined by Balkan conditions. +Bismarck had cherished no Balkan ambitions: he had been content to +play the part of an 'honest broker' at the Congress of Berlin, and +he had spoken of the Bulgarian affair of 1885 as 'not worth the +bones of a Pomeranian grenadier.' William II apparently thought +otherwise. At any rate Germany seems to have conducted, for many +years past, a policy of establishing her influence, along with that +of Austria, through South-Eastern Europe. And it is this policy +which is the <i>fons et origo</i> of the present struggle; for it +is a policy which is not and cannot be tolerated by Russia, so long +as Russia is true to her own Slav blood and to the traditions of +centuries.</p> +<a name="occupation" id="occupation"></a> +<p>After Austria had finally lost Italy, as she did in 1866, she +turned for compensation to the Balkans. If Venetia was lost, it +seemed some recompense when in 1878 Austria occupied Bosnia and the +Herzegovina. Hence she could expand southwards—ultimately +perhaps to Salonica. Servia, which might have objected, was a +vassal kingdom, the protégé of Austria, under the +dynasty of the Obrenovitch. As Austria might hope to follow the +line to Salonica,[<a href="#note-22">22</a>] so Germany, before the +end of the nineteenth century, seems to have conceived of a +parallel line of penetration, which would carry her influence +through Constantinople, through Konieh, to Bagdad. She has extended +her political and economic influence among the small Slav states +and in Turkey. In 1898 the King of Roumania (a Hohenzollern by +descent) conceded direct communication through his territories +between Berlin and Constantinople: in 1899 a German company +obtained a concession for the Bagdad railway from Konieh to the +head of the Persian Gulf. In a word, Germany began to stand in the +way of the Russian traditions of ousting the Turk and ruling in +Constantinople: she began to buttress the Turk, to train his army, +to exploit his country, and to seek to oust Russia generally from +South-Eastern Europe.</p> +<p>In 1903 the progress of Austria and Germany received a check. A +blood-stained revolution at Belgrade ousted the pro-Austrian +Obrenovitch, and put in its place the rival family of the +Karageorgevitch. Under the new dynasty Servia escaped from Austrian +tutelage, and became an independent focus of Slav life in close +touch with Russia. The change was illustrated in 1908, when Austria +took advantage of the revolution in Turkey, led by the Young Turks, +to annex formally the occupied territories of Bosnia and the +Herzegovina. Servia, which had hoped to gain these territories, +once a part of the old Servian kingdom, was mortally offended, and +would have gone to war with Austria, if Russia, her champion under +the new dynasty, could only have given her support. But Russia, +still weak after the Japanese war, could not do so; Russia, on the +contrary, had to suffer the humiliation of giving a pledge to the +Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that she would not support +Servia. That humiliation Russia has not forgotten. She has saved +money, she has reorganized her army, she has done everything in her +power to gain security for the future. And now that Austria has +sought utterly to humiliate Servia on the unproved charge +(unproved, in the sense that no legal proof was offered)[<a href= +"#note-23">23</a>] of complicity in the murder of the Archduke +Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Russia has risked war rather than +surrender her protection of a Slav kingdom. Slav sentiment +imperatively demanded action in favour of Servia: no government +could refuse to listen to the demand. The stake for Russia is not +merely the integrity of Servia: it is her prestige among the Slav +peoples, of which she is head; and behind all lies the question +whether South-Eastern Europe shall be under Teutonic control, and +lost to Russian influence.</p> +<p>Germany has not only threatened Slav life in South-Eastern +Europe: she has irritated Slav feeling on her own Eastern frontier. +The vitality and the increase of the Slavs in Eastern Germany has +excited deep German alarm. The German Government has therefore of +late years pursued a policy of repression towards its own Slav +subjects, the Poles, forbidding the use of the Polish language, and +expropriating Polish landowners in order to plant a German garrison +in the East. Teutonism is really alarmed at the superior birth-rate +and physical vigour of the Slavs; but Russia has not loved Teutonic +policy, and there has been an extensive boycott of German goods in +Russian Poland. The promise made by the Tsar, since the beginning +of the war, that he would re-create the old Poland, and give it +autonomy, shows how far Russia has travelled from the days, not so +far distant in point of time, when it was her policy to repress the +Poles in conjunction with Germany; and it has made the breach +between Germany and Russia final and irreparable.</p> +<p>It is thus obvious that Germany is vitally opposed to the great +Slav Empire in South-Eastern Europe and on her own eastern borders. +But why, it may be asked, should Russian policy be linked with +English? Is there any bond of union except the negative bond of +common opposition to Germany? There is. For one thing England and +Russia have sought to pursue a common cause—that of +international arbitration and of disarmament. If neither has +succeeded, it has been something of a bond between the two that +both have attempted to succeed. But there are other and more vital +factors. England, which in 1854-6 opposed and fought Russia for the +sake of the integrity of Turkey, has no wish to fight Russia for +the sake of a Germanized Turkey. On the contrary, the interest of +England in maintaining independence in the South-East of Europe now +coincides with that of Russia. Above all, the new constitutional +Russia of the Duma is Anglophil.</p> +<p class="blockquote">'The political ideals both of Cadets and +Octobrists were learnt chiefly from England, the study of whose +constitutional history had aroused in Russia an enthusiasm hardly +intelligible to a present-day Englishman. All three Dumas ... were +remarkably friendly to England, and England supplied the staple of +the precedents and parallels for quotation.'[<a href= +"#note-24">24</a>]</p> +<p>In a word, the beginnings of Russian constitutionalism not only +coincided in time with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, but +owed much to the inspiration of England.</p> +<p>Notes:</p> +<p><a name="note-22" id="note-22"> +<!-- Note Anchor 22 --></a>[Footnote 22: Count Aehrenthal, foreign +minister of Austria (1906-1912), started the scheme of the Novi +Bazar railway to connect the railways of Bosnia with the (then) +Turkish line to Salonica. See also <i>Correspondence</i>, No. 19, +Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 25: 'There is reliable information +that Austria intends to seize the Salonica railway.']</p> +<p><a name="note-23" id="note-23"> +<!-- Note Anchor 23 --></a>[Footnote 23: For a summary of so-called +proofs, see <a href="#RULE4_5">Appendix IV</a>, <i>infra</i>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-24" id="note-24"> +<!-- Note Anchor 24 --></a>[Footnote 24: <i>Camb. Mod. Hist</i>. +xii. 379.]</p> +<hr /> +<a name="CH4" id="CH4"><!-- CH4 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER IV</h2> +<center>CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS</center> +<p>The following sketch of events from June 28 to August 4, 1914, +is merely intended as an introduction to the analytical and far +more detailed account of the negotiations and declarations of those +days which the reader will find below (<a href="#CH5">Chap. V</a>). +Here we confine the narrative to a plain statement of the +successive stages in the crisis, neither discussing the motives of +the several Powers involved, nor distinguishing the fine shades of +difference in the various proposals which were made by would-be +mediators.</p> +<p>The crisis of 1914 began with an unforeseen development in the +old quarrel of Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Servian +question. On June 28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent of +the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and his wife, the Duchess of +Hohenberg, paid a visit of ceremony to the town of Serajevo, in +Bosnia, the administrative centre of the Austrian provinces of +Bosnia and the Herzegovina. In entering the town, the Archduke and +the Duchess narrowly escaped being killed by a bomb which was +thrown at their carriage. Later in the day they were shot by +assassins armed with Browning pistols. The crime was apparently +planned by political conspirators who resented the Austrian +annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina (<i>supra</i>, <a href= +"#occupation">p. 54</a>), and who desired that these provinces +should be united to Servia.</p> +<p>The Austrian Government, having instituted an inquiry, came to +the conclusion that the bombs of the conspirators had been obtained +from a Servian arsenal; that the crime had been planned in +Belgrade, the Servian capital, with the help of a Servian +staff-officer who provided the pistols; that the criminals and +their weapons had been conveyed from Servia into Bosnia by officers +of Servian frontier-posts and by Servian customs-officials. At the +moment the Austrian Government published no proof of these +conclusions,[<a href="#note-25">25</a>] but, on July 23, forwarded +them to the Servian Government in a formal note containing certain +demands which, it was intimated, must be satisfactorily answered by +Servia within forty-eight hours.[<a href="#note-26">26</a>] This +ultimatum included a form of apology to be published on a specified +date by the Servian Government, and ten engagements which the +Servian Government were to give the Austro-Hungarian Government. +The extraordinary nature of some of these engagements is explained +in the <a href="#CH5">next chapter</a> (pp. 103-7).</p> +<p>On July 24 this note was communicated by Austria-Hungary to the +other Powers of Europe,[<a href="#note-27">27</a>] and on July 25 +it was published in a German paper, the <i>Norddeutsche Allgemeine +Zeitung</i>. It was therefore intended to be a public warning to +Servia. On July 24 the German Government told the Powers that it +approved the Austrian note, as being necessitated by the +'Great-Servian' propaganda, which aimed at the incorporation in the +Servian monarchy of the southern Slav provinces belonging to +Austria-Hungary; that Austria, if she wished to remain a Great +Power, could not avoid pressing the demands contained in the note, +even, if necessary, by military measures; and that the question was +one which concerned no Powers except Austria-Hungary and +Servia.[<a href="#note-28">28</a>]</p> +<p>Russia did not agree that the Austrian note was directed against +Servia alone. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs +told the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria's +conduct was provocative and immoral; that some of her demands were +impossible of acceptance; that Austria would never have taken such +action unless Germany had first been consulted; that if Austria +began military measures against Servia, Russia would probably +mobilize. The Russian Minister hoped that England would proclaim +its solidarity with France and Russia on the subject of the +Austrian note; doubtless Servia could accept some of the Austrian +demands.[<a href="#note-29">29</a>] To the Austro-Hungarian +Government the Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day, +July 24, that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her reply was +quite insufficient, if the Powers were to help in smoothing the +situation; and he urged that Austria-Hungary should publish the +proofs of the charges against Servia.[<a href="#note-30">30</a>] On +July 25 Russia told England[<a href="#note-31">31</a>] that Servia +would punish those proved to be guilty, but would not accept all +the demands of Austria; that no independent state could do so. If +Servia appealed to arbitration, as seemed possible, Russia was, she +said, prepared to leave the arbitration in the hands of England, +France, Germany, and Italy—the four Powers whom Sir Edward +Grey had suggested as possible mediators.</p> +<p>On the day on which Russia made this suggestion, July 25, the +Servian Government replied to the Austrian note, conceding part of +the Austrian demands, and announcing its readiness to accept, on +the other points, the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal or of the +Great Powers. The Austrian Government found the Servian note +unsatisfactory, and criticized its details in an official +memorandum.[<a href="#note-32">32</a>] The Austro-Hungarian +Minister left Belgrade on July 25; on July 26 a part of the +Austro-Hungarian army was mobilized; and on July 28 Austria-Hungary +declared war on Servia.</p> +<p>Sir Edward Grey had from the first declined to 'announce +England's solidarity' with Russia and France on the Servian +question. On and after July 26 he was taking active steps to bring +about the mediation, between Austria-Hungary and Servia, of four +Powers (Italy, Germany, France, England). To this mediation Russia +had already agreed, July 25; and Italy and France were ready to +co-operate with England.[<a href="#note-33">33</a>] Germany, +however, made difficulties on the ground that anything like formal +intervention would be impracticable, unless both Austria and Russia +consented to it.[<a href="#note-34">34</a>] Russia had already +(July 25) prepared the ukase ordering mobilization,[<a href= +"#note-35">35</a>] but had not yet issued it; on July 27 the +Russian Foreign Minister announced his readiness to make the +Servian question the subject of direct conversations with +Vienna.[<a href="#note-36">36</a>] This offer was at first declined +by the Austro-Hungarian Government, but subsequently accepted; and +conversations were actually in progress between the representatives +of the two Powers as late as August 1.[<a href= +"#note-37">37</a>]</p> +<p>No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the fact that, on +July 28, the Russian Government warned Germany of the mobilization +of the southern military districts of Russia, to be publicly +proclaimed on July 29.[<a href="#note-38">38</a>] Austria replied +to this intimation by offering assurances that she would respect +the integrity and independence of Servia;[<a href= +"#note-39">39</a>] these assurances, considered inadequate by the +Russian Government, seem to have been the subject of the last +conversations between Russia and Austria-Hungary.</p> +<p>Russia persisted that Germany was the real obstacle to a +friendly settlement; and this conviction was not affected by the +appeals for peace which the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar on July +28, July 29, and July 31.[<a href="#note-40">40</a>] On July 29 +Germany told England that the Russian mobilization was alarming, +and that France was also making military preparations;[<a href= +"#note-41">41</a>] at the same time Germany threatened to proclaim +'imminent state of war' (<i>drohende Kriegsgefahr</i>) as a counter +measure to the French preparations;[<a href="#note-42">42</a>] +German military preparations, by July 30, had in fact gone far +beyond the preliminary stage which she thus indicated.[<a href= +"#note-43">43</a>] Germany had already warned England, France, and +Russia that, if Russia mobilized, this would mean German +mobilization against both France and Russia.[<a href= +"#note-44">44</a>] But on July 27, Russia had explained that her +mobilization would in no sense be directed against Germany, and +would only take place if Austrian forces crossed the Servian +frontier.[<a href="#note-45">45</a>] On July 29, the day on which +Russia actually mobilized the southern districts, Russia once more +asked Germany to participate in the 'quadruple conference' now +proposed by England, for the purpose of mediating between Austria +and Servia. This proposal was declined by the German Ambassador at +St. Petersburg.[<a href="#note-46">46</a>] Germany in fact +believed, or professed to believe, that the Russian mobilization, +though not proclaimed, was already far advanced.[<a href= +"#note-47">47</a>]</p> +<p>On July 30 Austria, although her conversations with Russia were +still in progress, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The next day, +July 31, Russia ordered general mobilization; on August 1 France +and Germany each took the like step; Germany presented an ultimatum +to Russia, demanding that Russian mobilization should cease, and +another ultimatum to France asking what course she would take in +the event of war between Germany and Russia.</p> +<p>Before these decisive steps of July 30-August 1, and while Sir +Edward Grey was still engaged in efforts of mediation, Germany made +overtures to England, with the object of securing England's +neutrality in the event of a war between Germany and France. On +July 29 Germany offered, as the price of English neutrality, to +give assurances that, if victorious, she would make no territorial +acquisitions at the expense of France; but refused to give a +similar assurance respecting French colonies, or to promise to +respect Belgian neutrality.[<a href="#note-48">48</a>] These +proposals were refused by England on July 30.[<a href= +"#note-49">49</a>] On August 1 the German Ambassador unofficially +asked England to remain neutral on condition that Germany would not +violate Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey replied that England's +hands were still free, and that he could not promise neutrality on +that condition alone.[<a href="#note-50">50</a>]</p> +<p>Meanwhile, on July 30, Sir Edward Grey was told by France that +she would not remain neutral in a war between Germany and +Russia.[<a href="#note-51">51</a>] On July 31 the English Cabinet, +being asked by France to declare definitely on her side, replied +that England could give no pledge at present.[<a href= +"#note-52">52</a>] On the same day England asked France and Germany +to engage to respect Belgian neutrality. France assented, Germany +evaded giving a reply.[<a href="#note-53">53</a>] But, on August 2, +German forces entered the neutral state of Luxemburg; and England +promised to defend the French coasts and shipping if attacked by +the German fleet in the Channel, or through the North Sea.[<a href= +"#note-54">54</a>] On August 4 the King of the Belgians telegraphed +to King George announcing that Germany had demanded passage for her +troops through Belgian territory, and appealing to England for +help.[<a href="#note-55">55</a>] On the same day, August 4, England +sent an ultimatum to Germany asking for assurance, before midnight, +that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality.[<a href= +"#note-56">56</a>] This demand was taken at Berlin as equivalent to +a declaration of war by England against Germany.</p> +<center>DIARY OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR</center> +<p>June 28. Assassination at Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz +Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg.</p> +<p>July 6. The Kaiser leaves Kiel for a cruise in Northern +waters.</p> +<p>July 9. Results of Austro-Hungarian investigation into the +Servian crime laid before the Emperor.</p> +<p>July 13, 14. Serious disclosures about condition of French +army.</p> +<p>July 13, 14, 15, 16. Heavy selling of Canadian Pacific Railway +Shares, especially by Berlin operators.</p> +<p>July 16. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, speaking in the +Hungarian Chamber, describes war as a sad <i>ultima ratio</i>, 'but +every state and nation must be able and willing to make war if it +wishes to exist as a state and a nation.'</p> +<p>The <i>Times</i> leading article 'Austria-Hungary and Servia' is +commented on in Berlin as an 'English warning to Servia.'</p> +<p>July 19. The King summons a conference to discuss the Home-Rule +problem.</p> +<p>July 21. The <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i> warns Austria-Hungary of +the folly of its campaign against Servia.</p> +<p>July 23. Thursday. Austria presents her Note to Servia giving +her 48 hours in which to accept.</p> +<p>July 24. Friday. Russian Cabinet Council held. The +Austro-Hungarian demands considered as an indirect challenge to +Russia.—Strike at St. Petersburg.</p> +<p>Failure of the conference on Home Rule.</p> +<p>July 25. Saturday. Servian reply; considered unsatisfactory by +Austria-Hungary, whose Minister and Legation-staff leave +Belgrade.</p> +<p>Russian Ambassador at Vienna instructed to request extension of +time-limit allowed to Servia.</p> +<p>Sir E. Grey suggests that the four other Powers should mediate +at Vienna and St. Petersburg.—Serious riot in Dublin.</p> +<p>July 26. Sunday. Sir E. Grey proposes that the French, Italian, +and German Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately +for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent +complications.</p> +<p>Partial mobilization of Austro-Hungarian army ordered.</p> +<p>Russian Foreign Minister warns German Ambassador that Russia +cannot remain indifferent to the fate of Servia.</p> +<p>Sir E. Goschen says the Kaiser is returning to-night.</p> +<p>July 27. Monday. France and Italy accept proposal of a +conference. German Secretary of State refuses the proposal of a +'conference.'</p> +<p>Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes direct +conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.</p> +<p>British Fleet kept assembled after manoeuvres.</p> +<p>Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons makes a statement concerning +the attitude of Great Britain.</p> +<p>The <i>Times</i> Berlin correspondent reports that the Kaiser +returned this afternoon from Kiel to Potsdam.</p> +<p>July 28. Tuesday. Austria-Hungary declares war on Servia.</p> +<p>Russia says the key of the situation is to be found at +Berlin.</p> +<p>Austria declines any suggestion of negotiations on basis of the +Servian reply.</p> +<p>The Kaiser telegraphs to the Tsar.</p> +<p>July 29. Wednesday. Russian mobilization in the four military +districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.</p> +<p>Germany offers, in return for British neutrality, to promise +territorial integrity of France, but will not extend the same +assurance for French colonies.</p> +<p>Sir E. Grey warns the German Ambassador that we should not +necessarily stand aside, if all the efforts to maintain the peace +failed.</p> +<p>Austria at last realizes that Russia will not remain +indifferent.</p> +<p>The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser; the latter replies.</p> +<p>July 30. Thursday. Bombardment of Belgrade by Austro-Hungarian +forces.</p> +<p>The Prime Minister speaks in the House of Commons on the gravity +of the situation, and postpones discussion of the Home Rule +Amending Bill.</p> +<p>The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser.</p> +<p>July 31. Friday. General Russian mobilization ordered.</p> +<p>Sir E. Grey asks France and Germany whether they will respect +neutrality of Belgium.</p> +<p>France promises to respect Belgian neutrality; Germany is +doubtful whether any answer will be returned to this request.</p> +<p>Austria declares its readiness to discuss the substance of its +ultimatum to Servia.</p> +<p>Fresh telegrams pass between the Kaiser and the Tsar.</p> +<p>Germany presents ultimatum to Russia demanding that her +mobilization should cease within 12 hours.</p> +<p>Germany presents an ultimatum to France asking her to define her +attitude in case of a Russo-German war.</p> +<p>English bankers confer with the Government about the financial +situation.</p> +<p>Aug. 1. Saturday. Sir E. Grey protests against detention of +English ships at Hamburg.</p> +<p>Orders issued for general mobilization of French army.</p> +<p>Orders issued for general mobilization of German army.</p> +<p>Aug. 2. Sunday. Germans invade Luxemburg.</p> +<p>Sir E. Grey gives France an assurance that the English fleet +will protect the North Coast of France against the German +fleet.</p> +<p>Germans enter French territory near Cirey.</p> +<p>Aug. 3. Monday. Italy declares itself neutral, as the other +members of the Triple Alliance are not engaged in a defensive +war.</p> +<p>Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium.</p> +<p>Sir E. Grey makes an important speech in the House of +Commons.</p> +<p>Aug. 4. Tuesday. Germans enter Belgian territory.</p> +<p>Britain presents an ultimatum to Germany demanding an answer by +midnight.</p> +<p>The Prime Minister makes a speech in the House of Commons, +practically announcing war against Germany and explaining the +British position.</p> +<p>Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.</p> +<p>Aug. 11. The French Ambassador at Vienna demands his +passport.</p> +<p>Aug. 12. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.</p> +<p>Notes:</p> +<p><a name="note-25" id="note-25"> +<!-- Note Anchor 25 --></a>[Footnote 25: Extracts are printed in +the German version of the German White Book (pp. 28-31) from an +Austrian official publication of July 27. We print the extracts +(the original not being accessible in this country) in <a href= +"#RULE4_5">Appendix IV</a>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-26" id="note-26"> +<!-- Note Anchor 26 --></a>[Footnote 26: Full text <i>infra</i> in +Appendix I (German White Book, pp. 18-23); more correctly in +<i>Correspondence respecting the European Crisis</i>, No. 4, Count +Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, July 24; but the differences between +the two versions are immaterial for our present purpose.]</p> +<p><a name="note-27" id="note-27"> +<!-- Note Anchor 27 --></a>[Footnote 27: See the communication to +England in <i>Correspondence</i>, No. 4.]</p> +<p><a name="note-28" id="note-28"> +<!-- Note Anchor 28 --></a>[Footnote 28: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +9, Note communicated by the German Ambassador, July 24.]</p> +<p><a name="note-29" id="note-29"> +<!-- Note Anchor 29 --></a>[Footnote 29: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +6, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]</p> +<p><a name="note-30" id="note-30"> +<!-- Note Anchor 30 --></a>[Footnote 30: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +13, Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.]</p> +<p><a name="note-31" id="note-31"> +<!-- Note Anchor 31 --></a>[Footnote 31: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +17, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 25.]</p> +<p><a name="note-32" id="note-32"> +<!-- Note Anchor 32 --></a>[Footnote 32: For text of Servian note +see <i>infra</i> Appendix I (German White Book, pp. 23-32). The +Austrian comments also are given there.]</p> +<p><a name="note-33" id="note-33"> +<!-- Note Anchor 33 --></a>[Footnote 33: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +42, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 27; <i>ibid</i>. No. 49, Sir +E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]</p> +<p><a name="note-34" id="note-34"> +<!-- Note Anchor 34 --></a>[Footnote 34: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]</p> +<p><a name="note-35" id="note-35"> +<!-- Note Anchor 35 --></a>[Footnote 35: German White Book, p. 46 +(<i>infra</i> in <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>). The Tsar to +His Majesty, July 30.]</p> +<p><a name="note-36" id="note-36"> +<!-- Note Anchor 36 --></a>[Footnote 36: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey.]</p> +<p><a name="note-37" id="note-37"> +<!-- Note Anchor 37 --></a>[Footnote 37: Austria declined +conversations on July 28 (<i>Correspondence</i>, No. 93); but for +conversations of July 31 see <i>Correspondence</i>, No. III; of +August I, see <a href="#RULE4_6">Appendix V</a>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-38" id="note-38"> +<!-- Note Anchor 38 --></a>[Footnote 38: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +70 (I). M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, July 28.]</p> +<p><a name="note-39" id="note-39"> +<!-- Note Anchor 39 --></a>[Footnote 39: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]</p> +<p><a name="note-40" id="note-40"> +<!-- Note Anchor 40 --></a>[Footnote 40: German White Book, pp. 43, +45 (in <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>, <i>infra</i>).]</p> +<p><a name="note-41" id="note-41"> +<!-- Note Anchor 41 --></a>[Footnote 41: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-42" id="note-42"> +<!-- Note Anchor 42 --></a>[Footnote 42: German White Book, p. 42, +Exhibit 17 (<i>infra</i>, <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>).]</p> +<p><a name="note-43" id="note-43"> +<!-- Note Anchor 43 --></a>[Footnote 43: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +105 (Enclosure 3), July 30.]</p> +<p><a name="note-44" id="note-44"> +<!-- Note Anchor 44 --></a>[Footnote 44: German White Book, p. 7; +the date of the warning seems to be July 27.]</p> +<p><a name="note-45" id="note-45"> +<!-- Note Anchor 45 --></a>[Footnote 45: German White Book, p. 40, +Exhibit II.]</p> +<p><a name="note-46" id="note-46"> +<!-- Note Anchor 46 --></a>[Footnote 46: <i>Ibid</i>. p. 9.]</p> +<p><a name="note-47" id="note-47"> +<!-- Note Anchor 47 --></a>[Footnote 47: <i>Ibid</i>. p. 10.]</p> +<p><a name="note-48" id="note-48"> +<!-- Note Anchor 48 --></a>[Footnote 48: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-49" id="note-49"> +<!-- Note Anchor 49 --></a>[Footnote 49: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 101. Sir +E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.]</p> +<p><a name="note-50" id="note-50"> +<!-- Note Anchor 50 --></a>[Footnote 50: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 1.]</p> +<p><a name="note-51" id="note-51"> +<!-- Note Anchor 51 --></a>[Footnote 51: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 105. Sir +E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 30.]</p> +<p><a name="note-52" id="note-52"> +<!-- Note Anchor 52 --></a>[Footnote 52: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 119. Sir +E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]</p> +<p><a name="note-53" id="note-53"> +<!-- Note Anchor 53 --></a>[Footnote 53: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 114, 120, +122.]</p> +<p><a name="note-54" id="note-54"> +<!-- Note Anchor 54 --></a>[Footnote 54: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 148. Sir +E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Aug. 2.]</p> +<p><a name="note-55" id="note-55"> +<!-- Note Anchor 55 --></a>[Footnote 55: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 153. Sir +E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4.]</p> +<p><a name="note-56" id="note-56"> +<!-- Note Anchor 56 --></a>[Footnote 56: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 159. Sir +E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4]</p> +<hr /> +<a name="CH5" id="CH5"><!-- CH5 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER V</h2> +<center>NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS</center> +<p>For purposes of reference the following list of <i>dramatis +personae</i> may be useful:—</p> +<p>GREAT BRITAIN: King George V, <i>succ</i>. 1910.<br /> +<i>Foreign Secretary</i>: Sir Edward Grey.<br /> +<i>Ambassadors from France</i>: M. Paul Cambon.<br /> +<i>Russia</i>: Count Benckendorff.<br /> +<i>Germany</i>: Prince Lichnowsky.<br /> +<i>Austria</i>: Count Albert Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein.<br /> +<i>Belgium</i>: Count A. de Lalaing (<i>Minister</i>).</p> +<p>RUSSIA: Emperor Nicholas II, <i>succ</i>. 1894.<br /> +<i>Foreign Secretary</i>: M. Sazonof.<br /> +<i>Ambassadors from Great Britain</i>: Sir George Buchanan.<br /> +<i>France</i>: M. Paléologue.<br /> +<i>Germany</i>: Count Pourtalès.<br /> +<i>Austria</i>: Friedrich Count Szápáry.</p> +<p>FRANCE: Raymond Poincaré, <i>President, elected</i> +1913.<br /> +<i>Premier</i>: M. Viviani.<br /> +<i>Acting Foreign Secretary</i>: M. Doumergue.<br /> +<i>Ambassadors from Great Britain</i>: Sir Francis Bertie.<br /> +<i>Russia</i>: M. Isvolsky.<br /> +M. Sevastopoulo (<i>Charge d'Affaires</i>).<br /> +<i>Germany</i>: Baron von Schoen.<br /> +<i>Austria</i>: Count Scézsen.</p> +<p>GERMANY: Emperor William II, <i>succ</i>. 1888.<br /> +<i>Imperial Chancellor</i>: Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.<br /> +<i>Foreign Secretary</i>: Herr von Jagow.<br /> +<i>Ambassadors from Great Britain</i>: Sir Edward Goschen.<br /> +Sir Horace Rumbold (<i>Councillor</i>).<br /> +<i>Russia:</i> M. Swerbeiev.<br /> +M. Bronewsky (<i>Charge d'Affaires</i>).<br /> +<i>France:</i> M. Jules Cambon.<br /> +<i>Austria</i>: Count Ladislaus Szögyény-Marich.</p> +<p>AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Emperor Francis Joseph, <i>succ</i>. +1848.<br /> +<i>Foreign Secretary</i>: Count Berchtold.<br /> +<i>Ambassadors from Great Britain</i>: Sir Maurice de Bunsen.<br /> +<i>Russia</i>: M. Schebesco.<br /> +M. Kondachev (<i>Charge d'Affaires</i>).<br /> +<i>France</i>: M. Crozier.<br /> +<i>Germany</i>: Herr von Tschirscky-und-Bögendorff.</p> +<p>ITALY: King Victor Emmanuel III, <i>succ</i>. 1900.<br /> +<i>Foreign Secretary</i>: Marquis di San Giuliano.<br /> +<i>Ambassador from Great Britain</i>: Sir Rennell Rodd.</p> +<p>BELGIUM: King Albert, <i>succ</i>. 1909.<br /> +<i>Minister of Great Britain</i>: Sir Francis Villiers.</p> +<p>SERVIA: King Peter, <i>succ</i>. 1903.<br /> +<i>Minister of Great Britain</i>: C.L. des Graz.<br /> +D.M. Crackanthorpe (<i>First Secretary</i>).<br /> +<i>Russian Chargé d'Affaires</i>: M. Strandtmann.</p> +<h3>I</h3> +<center><i>Germany's attitude to Austria and Russia</i>.</center> +<p>From the very beginning of the conversations between the Powers +on the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo, +and on the Austrian note to Servia, the German Government took up +the attitude that it was a 'matter for settlement between Servia +and Austria alone.'[<a href="#note-57">57</a>] Subsequently in +their White Book they endeavoured to show that the Servian +agitation was part of Russian propagandism.[<a href= +"#note-58">58</a>] In the negotiations, the cardinal point of their +observations is that Russia is not to interfere in this matter, +although M. Paul Cambon pointed out that 'Russia would be compelled +by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked +Servia'.[<a href="#note-59">59</a>]</p> +<p>After the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, Germany +continued to maintain the position that the crisis could be +localized, and to reject Sir Horace Rumbold's suggestion that 'in +taking military action in Servia, Austria would dangerously excite +public opinion in Russia'.[<a href="#note-60">60</a>]</p> +<p>At Vienna Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, was +very frankly told by the German Ambassador that Germany was +shielding Austria in the Servian business:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'As for Germany, she knew very well what she +was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.... Servian +concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that +they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of +Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had +ordered mobilization and retirement of Government from +Belgrade.'[<a href="#note-61">61</a>]</p> +<p>M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, seems to have divined +this policy of Germany pretty soon:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'My interviews with the German Ambassador +confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of +the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, +who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, +appear to be exercising no influence upon their ally.... There is +no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at +Berlin.'[<a href="#note-62">62</a>]</p> +<p>When at the beginning of August the crisis had led to war, it is +interesting to observe the opinions expressed by high and +well-informed officials about German diplomacy. M. Sazonof summed +up his opinion thus:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'The policy of Austria had throughout been +tortuous and immoral, and she thought she could treat Russia with +defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the +policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, +and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did +not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was +that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been +postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have +been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna +and St. Petersburg; the former was a violent Russophobe who had +urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that +Russia would never go to war.'[<a href="#note-63">63</a>]</p> +<p>And Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the same day wrote that he agreed +with his Russian colleague that</p> +<p class="blockquote">'the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war +from the first, and his strong personal bias probably coloured his +action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German +Government also desired war from the first.'[<a href= +"#note-64">64</a>]</p> +<p>Sir Maurice does not actually endorse this opinion concerning +the attitude of the German Government, but there can be no doubt +that this general attitude was most pernicious to the cause of +European peace, and that if the German Government had desired war +they could scarcely have acted more efficiently towards that end. +No diplomatic pressure was put upon Vienna, which under the aegis +of Berlin was allowed to go to any lengths against Servia. Over and +over again the German diplomats were told that Russia was deeply +interested in Servia, but they would not listen. As late as July +28th the German Chancellor himself refused 'to discuss the Servian +note', adding that 'Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, +was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with +which Russia had nothing to do'.[<a href="#note-65">65</a>] Next +day the German Ambassador at Vienna was continuing 'to feign +surprise that Servian affairs could be of such interest to +Russia'.[<a href="#note-66">66</a>] But in their White Book, in +order to blacken the character of Russia, the Germans remark that +they 'were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of +Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia into the +field'.[<a href="#note-67">67</a>] Both stories cannot be true: the +German Government have, not for the last time in the history of +these negotiations, to choose between ineptitude and guilt; the +ineptitude of not recognizing an obvious fact, and the guilt of +deliberately allowing Austria to act in such a way that Russia was +bound to come into the field.</p> +<a name="failedproposal" id="failedproposal"></a> +<p>When Austria presented her ultimatum, Sir Edward Grey did all he +could to obtain the good offices of Russia for a conciliatory reply +by Servia, and to persuade the German Government to use influence +with Austria so that she should take a friendly attitude to Servia. +On the day of the presentation of the Austrian note he proposed to +Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, the co-operation of the +four Powers, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, in favour +of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg, and when the Austrians +rejected the Servian reply he took the important step of proposing +that the French, Italian, and German Ambassadors should meet him in +conference immediately 'for the purpose of discovering an issue +which would prevent complications'.[<a href="#note-68">68</a>] The +proposal was accepted with alacrity by the French and Italian +Governments. The German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr von +Jagow, on the other hand, was unable or unwilling to understand the +proposal, and Sir Edward Goschen seems to have been unable to +impress its real character upon the Government of Berlin. For Herr +von Jagow, on receipt of the proposal, informed the British +Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, that the conference suggested</p> +<p class="blockquote">'would practically amount to a court of +arbitration and could not in his opinion be called together except +at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall +in with it.'</p> +<p>Sir Edward Goschen not unnaturally pointed out that</p> +<p class="blockquote">'the idea had nothing to do with arbitration, +but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly +interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a +dangerous situation'.[<a href="#note-69">69</a>]</p> +<p>Herr von Jagow spoke in the same sense to the French and Italian +Ambassadors, who discussed the matter with their British colleague. +Some doubt seems to have arisen in their minds as to the sincerity +of the German Secretary of State's loudly expressed desire for +peace; but, giving him the benefit of the doubt, they concluded +that the objection must be to the 'form of the proposal'. +'Perhaps', added Sir Edward Goschen, 'he himself could be induced +to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with +us.'[<a href="#note-70">70</a>] The next day the same idea was +pressed by Sir Edward Grey upon Prince Lichnowsky:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'The whole idea of mediation or mediating +influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that +Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable.'[<a href= +"#note-71">71</a>]</p> +<p>But owing to German dilatoriness in this matter, events had by +then gone so far that the very gravest questions had arisen for +this country.</p> +<p>With the refusal of the German Government to propose a form of +mediation acceptable to themselves before graver events had +occurred, the first period of the negotiation comes to an end. The +responsibility of rejecting a conference, which, by staving off the +evil day, might have preserved the peace of Europe, falls solely on +the shoulders of Germany. The reasons advanced by Herr von Jagow +were erroneous, and though Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial +Chancellor, was more conciliatory and sympathetic, it may be noted +that the German White Book[<a href="#note-72">72</a>] continues to +misrepresent Sir Edward Grey's proposal as a conference on the +particular question of the Austro-Servian dispute, and not on the +general situation of Europe.</p> +<p>In the period that follows come spasmodic attempts at +negotiation by direct conversations between the parties concerned, +with no advantage, but rather with the growth of mutual suspicion. +Down to August 1st both Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof were busy +trying to find some formula which might be accepted as a basis for +postponing hostilities between the Great Powers. And here it may be +well to point out that Prince Lichnowsky seems to have been left in +the dark by his chiefs. On July 24th, the day after the Austrian +note was presented, he was so little acquainted with the true state +of affairs, that speaking privately he told Sir Edward Grey 'that a +reply favourable on some points must be sent at once by Servia, so +that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to +Austria'.[<a href="#note-73">73</a>] And in the matter of the +conference, on the very day that Herr von Jagow was making his +excuses against entering the proposed conference, Prince Lichnowsky +informed Sir Edward Grey, that the German Government accepted in +principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, +reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if +attacked.[<a href="#note-74">74</a>] The mutual incompatibility of +the two voices of Germany was pointed out from Rome, where the +Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, attempted a +reconciliation between them, on information received from Berlin, +that 'the difficulty was rather the "conference" than the +principle'.[<a href="#note-75">75</a>] But we may ask whether Herr +von Jagow's reply to Sir Edward Goschen does not really show that +the whole principle of a conference was objected to, seeing that he +said that such a 'conference was not practicable', and that 'it +would be best to await the outcome of the exchange of views between +the Austrian and Russian Governments'.[<a href="#note-76">76</a>] +But, if it was not the principle that was objected to, but only the +form, where are we? We can do nothing else but assume that the +German Government objected to the terms employed by Sir Edward +Grey, and that for the sake of a mere quibble they wasted time +until other events made the catastrophe inevitable. Impartiality +will have to judge whether such action was deliberate or not; +whether in this case also it is crime or folly which has to be laid +at the door of the German Government.</p> +<p>The proposed conference having been rejected by Germany, an +attempt was then made by several Powers to invite Austria to +suspend military action. Although Count Mensdorff, the Austrian +Ambassador in London, had made on July 25th a distinction between +military preparations and military operations, and had urged that +his Government had only the former then in view, it was reported +two days later from Rome that there were great doubts 'whether +Germany would be willing to invite Austria to suspend military +action pending the conference'. Even if she had been willing to do +so, it is very doubtful whether, in view of the Austrian +declaration of war against Servia on July 28th, and the +simultaneous Austrian decree for general mobilization, the position +of Europe could have been improved, for on July 29th that +declaration was followed by news of the Russian mobilization of the +southern districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.[<a href= +"#note-77">77</a>]</p> +<p>Now the German Secretary of State had argued that 'if Russia +mobilized against Germany, latter would have to follow suit'. On +being asked what he meant by 'mobilizing against Germany', he said +that</p> +<p class="blockquote">'if Russia mobilized in the South, Germany +would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in the north, Germany +would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so +complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her +mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not +to be taken by surprise.'[<a href="#note-78">78</a>]</p> +<p>This was on July 27th, and it cannot be said to have been +unreasonable. But when on July 29th Russia mobilized the southern +districts no grounds for German mobilization had yet been provided. +No secret was made about this mobilization by the Russian +Ambassador at Berlin,[<a href="#note-79">79</a>] but it is perhaps +as well to point out here the remark made by Sir George Buchanan, +the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, about the language used +by his German colleague concerning the mobilization of the four +southern districts: 'He accused the Russian Government of +endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, +when I referred to all that had recently been done by Austria, that +he could not discuss such matters.'[<a href="#note-80">80</a>] It +would perhaps be rash to assume that the German Ambassador, Count +Pourtalès, used such language to his home Government, for +there is no evidence of it in the German White Book. What +dispatches appear there from the German Embassy at St. Petersburg +are refreshingly honest. The military attaché says, 'I deem +it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa'. +He adds: 'it is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable +elsewhere'.[<a href="#note-81">81</a>]</p> +<p>There was therefore, according to the evidence produced by the +Germans themselves, no mobilization 'against Germany'. The only +thing that looks at all like hostile action is contained in the +news sent by the Imperial German Consul at Kovno on July 27th, that +a 'state of war' (<i>Kriegszustand</i>) had been proclaimed in that +district. But this is a very different thing from mobilization; it +was almost bound to follow in the northern provinces of the Empire +as the result of mobilization elsewhere. At any rate the Consul at +Kovno announced it on July 27th before any Russian mobilization at +all had taken place, and the fact that Germany did not instantly +mobilize shows that at the end of July that Government did not +consider <i>Kriegszustand</i> in Kovno to be equivalent to +'mobilization against Germany'.</p> +<p>Opinion in Berlin seems to have been that Russia would not make +war. Perhaps there was no real fear that Russia would take an +aggressive attitude, for many people believed that 'Russia neither +wanted, nor was in a position to make war'.[<a href= +"#note-82">82</a>] This attitude of mind was known and deplored in +Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano said 'there seemed to be a +difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in +earnest'.[<a href="#note-83">83</a>] Such an opinion seems to have +been shared by Count Pourtalês, who on July 29 reported that +the German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian +integrity would be respected by Austria. This was held to be +insufficient, as Servia might thus become an Austrian vassal, and +there would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such +a state of affairs. The next day the Russian Minister for Foreign +Affairs told the British and French Ambassadors 'that absolute +proof was in the possession of the Russian Government that Germany +was making military and naval preparations against +Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of +Finland'.[<a href="#note-84">84</a>]</p> +<p>After this, is it difficult to see how German statesmen regarded +the situation? Russia, in their eyes, was playing a game of bluff, +and strong measures against her were in the interest of Germany. +But, though under no illusion as to German preparations, M. Sazonof +offered on July 30 to stop all military preparations if Austria +'would eliminate from her ultimatum to Servia points which violate +the principle of the sovereignty of Servia'.[<a href= +"#note-85">85</a>] 'Preparations for general mobilization will be +proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria,' wrote Sir +George Buchanan.[<a href="#note-86">86</a>] The next day he +reported to Sir Edward Grey that all attempts to obtain the consent +of Austria to mediation had failed, and that she was moving troops +against Russia as well as against Servia.[<a href= +"#note-87">87</a>]</p> +<p>Face to face therefore with war against another Power, Russia +ordered a general mobilization.[<a href="#note-88">88</a>] This was +answered on the same day by a proclamation of <i>Kriegsgefahr</i> +at Berlin, 'as it can only be against Germany that Russian general +mobilization is directed'.[<a href="#note-89">89</a>]</p> +<p>Thus on Friday, July 31st, the situation had come to be this, +that Russia, feeling herself threatened by the military +preparations of Austria and Germany, decided to issue orders for a +general mobilization.[<a href="#note-90">90</a>] Meanwhile Sir +Edward Grey still clung to the hope that mediation with a view to +safeguarding Austrian interests as against Servia might yet be +accepted.[<a href="#note-91">91</a>] But his efforts were useless, +for Germany had launched an ultimatum (July 31) to Russia, +demanding demobilization. As Sir Edward Goschen pointed out, the +demand was made 'even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking +them to demobilize in the south as well'.[<a href= +"#note-92">92</a>] The only explanation actually vouchsafed was +that this had been asked to prevent Russia pleading that all her +mobilization was only directed against Austria. Such a quibble, +when such interests are at stake, seems to call for severe +comment.</p> +<p>War between the three empires seemed now inevitable, for though +the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor had exchanged +telegrams each imploring the other to find a way out of the +difficulty, and each saying that matters had gone so far that +neither could grant the other's demands,[<a href="#note-93">93</a>] +the officials at Berlin were now taking up the position that +'Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything'.[<a href= +"#note-94">94</a>] This attitude is as inexplicable as it proved +disastrous. For it appears that on July 31 Austria and Russia were +ready to resume conversations. The Austrians, apparently alarmed at +the prospect of a general war, were ready to discuss the substance +of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and Russia announced that +under certain conditions 'she would undertake to preserve her +waiting attitude'.[<a href="#note-95">95</a>] Having issued her +ultimatum to Russia, Germany naturally mobilized, but what kind of +diplomacy is this in which, with the principals both ready to +negotiate, a third party issues an ultimatum couched in such terms +that a proud country can give but one answer?</p> +<p>The sequence of events seems to be as follows. Austria mobilized +against Servia. Russia, rightly or wrongly, took this as a threat +to herself, and mobilized all her southern forces against Austria. +Then Germany threatened to mobilize unless Russia ceased her +military preparations—an inexcusable step, which increased +Russia's apprehensions of a general war, and made a general Russian +mobilization inevitable.[<a href="#note-96">96</a>] If Russia was +the first to mobilize, she took this step in consequence of German +threats. We repeat that in spite of the three empires taking this +action, discussion was still possible between Russia and +Austria,[<a href="#note-97">97</a>] and might have had good +results. In fact, the situation was not irretrievable, if Germany +had not rendered it so by issuing her ultimatum to Russia. Once +again we may ask, was this crime or folly?</p> +<h3>II</h3> +<center><i>Germany's attitude to France.</i></center> +<p>We must now turn our eyes to the West of Europe, and observe the +diplomacy of Germany with regard to France and Great Britain. On +the 27th of July we are told that the German Government received +'the first intimation concerning the preparatory measures taken by +France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to +its garrison'.[<a href="#note-98">98</a>] Will it be believed that, +except for the assertion 'of rapidly progressing preparations of +France, both on water and on land',[<a href="#note-99">99</a>] this +is the only shred of evidence that the Germans have produced to +prove the aggressive intentions of France? And it may be worth +while to point out that on July 29, when the German White Book says +that Berlin heard of the 'rapidly progressing preparations of +France', the French Ambassador at Berlin informed the Secretary of +State that 'they had done nothing more than the German Government +had done, namely, recalled the officers on leave'.[<a href= +"#note-100">100</a>]</p> +<p>The very next day the French Government had 'reliable +information that the German troops are concentrated round +Thionville and Metz ready for war',[<a href="#note-101">101</a>] +and before July 30th German patrols twice penetrated into French +territory.[<a href="#note-102">102</a>] With great forbearance the +French Government withdrew its troops ten kilometres from the +frontier; and, although German reservists had been recalled from +abroad 'by tens of thousands', the French Government had not called +out a single reservist. Well might the French Minister for Foreign +Affairs say 'Germany has done it'.[<a href="#note-103">103</a>]</p> +<p>Having thus invaded France before July 30th, the German +Government presented an ultimatum (July 31) demanding what were the +French intentions, and on August 1st the French Government replied +that it would consult its own interests.[<a href= +"#note-104">104</a>]</p> +<a name="ch5sec3" id="ch5sec3"></a> +<h3>III</h3> +<center><i>The Question of British Neutrality</i>.</center> +<p>Even then, nothing had happened to bring this country into the +quarrel. If Germany were making war primarily on Russia, and France +were only involved as the auxiliary of Russia, Germany would have +acted rapidly against Russia, and would have stood on the defensive +against France; and England would not have been dragged into +war.[<a href="#note-105">105</a>] The question of British +neutrality first appears in the British White Book on July 25th, +when Sir Edward Grey, in a note to Sir George Buchanan, said: 'if +war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us +into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it'.[<a href= +"#note-106">106</a>] Two days later he wrote again:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'I have been told by the Russian Ambassador +that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any +event we would stand aside ... This impression ought, as I have +pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the +First Fleet ... not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But ... my +reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than +diplomatic action was promised.'[<a href="#note-107">107</a>]</p> +<p>On the 29th the question of our neutrality was seriously +discussed at both the Courts of St. James and Berlin independently. +Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with Prince Lichnowsky, told him +'he did not wish the Ambassador to be misled ... into thinking we +should stand aside'. Developing this, Sir Edward Grey solemnly +warned the German Ambassador that</p> +<p class="blockquote">'there was no question of our intervening if +Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved, but +if the issue did become such that we thought British interests +required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the +decision would have to be very rapid.... But ... I did not wish to +be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our +conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that +we should not take action.'[<a href="#note-108">108</a>]</p> +<p>Before the news of this had reached Berlin the Imperial +Chancellor had made his notorious 'bid for British neutrality' on +July 29:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'He said it was clear, so far as he was able +to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that +Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed +in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object +at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain +were certain, every assurance would be given to the British +Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial +acquisitions at the expense of France, should they prove victorious +in any war that might ensue.</p> +<p class="blockquote">'I questioned his Excellency about the French +colonies, and he said he was unable to give a similar undertaking +in that respect. As regards Holland ... so long as Germany's +adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the +Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an +assurance that she would do likewise. It depended on the action of +France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in +Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be +respected if she had not sided against Germany.'[<a href= +"#note-109">109</a>]</p> +<p>This request was at once repudiated (July 30) by the British +Government:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'His Majesty's Government cannot for one +moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind +themselves to neutrality on such terms.</p> +<p class="blockquote">'What he asks us in effect is to engage to +stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so +long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the +colonies.</p> +<p class="blockquote">'From the material point of view the proposal +is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe +being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position +as a Great Power and become subordinate to German policy.</p> +<p class="blockquote">'Altogether apart from that, it would be a +disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of +France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would +never recover.</p> +<p class="blockquote">'The Chancellor also in effect asks us to +bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the +neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain +either.[<a href="#note-110">110</a>]</p> +<p>He continued by saying that Great Britain must keep her hands +absolutely free and hinted at some scheme for preventing +anti-German aggression by the Powers of the Triple +<i>Entente</i>:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and +the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to +promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by +which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy +would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and +ourselves, jointly or separately ... The idea has hitherto been too +Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this +crisis ... be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and +reaction which will follow will make possible some more definite +rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible +hitherto.'</p> +<p>Thus two points were made clear: we were seriously concerned +that France should not be crushed, and that the neutrality of +Belgium should not be violated. It is interesting to note how this +extremely serious warning was received by Dr. von +Bethmann-Hollweg:—'His Excellency was so taken up with the +news of the Russian measures along the frontier ... that he +received your communication without a comment.'[<a href= +"#note-111">111</a>]</p> +<p>But the text of the reply was left with him, so that he could +scarcely complain that no warning had been given to him.</p> +<p>With the data at our disposal, it is not possible to make any +deduction as to the effect which this warning had upon Berlin; but +it may be remarked that at Rome that day, the Marquis di San +Giuliano told Sir Rennell Rodd that he had</p> +<p class="blockquote">'good reason to believe that Germany was now +disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed +convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most +anxious to avoid issue with us.'[<a href="#note-112">112</a>]</p> +<p>As this telegraphic dispatch was not received till the next day, +it is not impossible that the Italian Minister gave this +information to Sir Rennell Rodd late in the day, after having +received news from Berlin sent under the impression made by Sir +Edward Grey's warning.</p> +<p>Such an impression, if it ever existed, must have been of short +duration, for when the British Government demanded both of France +and Germany whether they were 'prepared to engage to respect +neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates +it',[<a href="#note-113">113</a>] the French gave an unequivocal +promise the same day,[<a href="#note-114">114</a>] while the German +answer is a striking contrast:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'I have seen Secretary of State, who informs +me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he +can possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought +any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount +of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was +therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at +all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.</p> +<p class="blockquote">'It appears from what he said that German +Government considers that certain hostile acts have already been +committed in Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a +consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo +already.'[<a href="#note-115">115</a>]</p> +<p>It was now clear that a violation of Belgian neutrality was a +contingency that would have to be faced, and Prince Lichnowsky was +warned the next day that 'the neutrality of Belgium affected +feeling in this country', and he was asked to obtain an assurance +from the German Government similar to that given by +France:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'If there were a violation of the neutrality +of Belgium by one combatant, while the other respected it, it would +be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this +country.'[<a href="#note-116">116</a>]</p> +<p>The Ambassador then, on his own personal responsibility and +without authority from his Government, tried to exact a promise +that Great Britain would remain neutral 'if Germany gave a promise +not to violate Belgian neutrality', but Sir Edward Grey was bound +to refuse such an offer, seeing that it left out of account all +question of an attack on France and her colonies, about which it +had been stated already that there could be no bargaining. Even the +guarantee of the integrity of France and her colonies was +suggested, but again Sir Edward Grey was bound to refuse, for the +reasons he gave to Sir Edward Goschen in rejecting what is now +known as Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's 'infamous proposal', namely, +that France without actually losing territory might be so crushed +as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to +German policy. And if there should be still any doubt about Sir +Edward Grey's policy at this moment, we would refer to his +statement in the House of Commons on August 27.[<a href= +"#note-117">117</a>] The important points are that the offers of +August 1 were made on the sole responsibility of Prince Lichnowsky, +and without authority from his Government; that the Cabinet on +August 2 carefully discussed the conditions on which we might +remain neutral, and that, on August 3, so far was the German +Ambassador from guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium that he +actually had to ask Sir Edward Grey 'not to make the neutrality of +Belgium one of our conditions'. Whatever Prince Lichnowsky may have +said privately on August 1, the one fact certain is that two days +later the German Government were making no concessions on that +point; on the contrary they were asking us to withdraw from a +position we had taken up on July 30, four days before.</p> +<p>One more effort to preserve peace in Western Europe seems to +have been made by Sir Edward Grey. On the telephone he asked Prince +Lichnowsky whether, if France remained neutral, Germany would +promise not to attack her. The impression seems to have prevailed +in Berlin that this was an offer to guarantee French neutrality by +the force of British arms, and the German Emperor in his telegram +to the King gave evidence of the relief His Imperial Majesty felt +at the prospect that the good relations between the two countries +would be maintained. Unfortunately for such hopes, France had never +been consulted in the matter, nor was there ever any idea of +coercing France into neutrality, and even the original proposal had +to be abandoned on consideration as unpractical.[<a href= +"#note-118">118</a>]</p> +<p>Events now marched rapidly. While the Cabinet in London were +still discussing whether a violation of Belgian neutrality would be +an occasion for war, the news came of the violation of that of +Luxemburg. Sir Edward Grey informed M. Cambon[<a href= +"#note-119">119</a>] that Lord Stanley and Lord Clarendon in 1867 +had agreed to a 'collective guarantee' by which it was not intended +that every Power was bound single-handed to fight any Government +which violated Luxemburg. Although this gross disregard by the +Germans of their solemn pledge did not entail the same consequences +as the subsequent violation of Belgian neutrality, it is equally +reprehensible from the point of view of international law, and the +more cowardly in proportion as this state is weaker than Belgium. +Against this intrusion Luxemburg protested, but, unlike Belgium, +she did not appeal to the Powers.[<a href="#note-120">120</a>]</p> +<p>Two days later, August 4th, the King of the Belgians appealed to +the King for 'diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity of +Belgium'.[<a href="#note-121">121</a>] The German Government had +issued an ultimatum to the Belgian, asking for</p> +<p class="blockquote">'a free passage through Belgian territory, +and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the +kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening +in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was +requested within twelve hours'.[<a href="#note-122">122</a>]</p> +<p>Sir Edward Grey instructed the British Ambassador to protest +against this violation of a treaty to which Germany in common with +ourselves was a party, and to ask an assurance that the demand made +upon Belgium would not be proceeded with. At the same time the +Belgian Government was told to resist German aggression by all the +means in its power, as Great Britain was prepared to join France +and Russia to maintain the independence and integrity of +Belgium.[<a href="#note-123">123</a>] On receipt of the protest of +Sir Edward Grey, it would seem that Herr von Jagow made one more +desperate effort to bid for British neutrality: 'Germany will, +under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory': to pass +through Belgium was necessary because the 'German army could not be +exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned +according to absolutely unimpeachable information'. It was for +Germany 'a question of life and death to prevent French +advance'.[<a href="#note-124">124</a>] But matters had gone too +far: that day (August 4) the Germans violated Belgian territory at +Gemmenich, and thereupon the British demand to Germany to respect +Belgian neutrality, issued earlier in the day, was converted into +an ultimatum:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'We hear that Germany has addressed note to +Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government +will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the +measures considered indispensable.</p> +<p class="blockquote">'We are also informed that Belgian territory +has been violated at Gemmenich.</p> +<p class="blockquote">'In these circumstances, and in view of the +fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting +Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made +simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, +and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this +morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are +instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's +Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold +the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which +Germany is as much a party as ourselves.'[<a href= +"#note-125">125</a>]</p> +<p>The effect at Berlin was remarkable. Every sign was given of +disappointment and resentment at such a step being taken, and the +'harangue' of the Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen, and his +astonishment at the value laid by Great Britain upon the 'scrap of +paper' of 1839 would seem, when coupled with Herr von Jagow's +desperate bid for neutrality at the last moment, to show that the +German Government had counted on the neutrality of this country and +had been deeply disappointed. If these outbursts and attempts at +the eleventh hour to bargain for our neutrality were genuine +efforts to keep the peace between Great Britain and Germany, it is +our belief that their origin must be found in the highest authority +in the German Empire, whom we believe, in spite of petty signs of +spitefulness exhibited since the war broke out, to have been +sincerely and honestly working in favour of European peace, against +obstacles little dreamt of by our countrymen. But certain signs are +not wanting that, in the lower ranks of the German hierarchy, war +with this country had been decided on, and that Sir Edward Grey was +not far wrong when he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie on July 31, 'I +believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive +factor in situation. German Government do not expect our +neutrality.'[<a href="#note-126">126</a>] On what other grounds +than that orders had been sent out from Berlin can the fact be +explained that the German Customs authorities, three days before +the declaration of war, began detaining British ships,[<a href= +"#note-127">127</a>] and compulsorily unloading cargoes of sugar +from British vessels? In the former case, indeed, the ships were +ordered to be released; in the latter case, of which the complaint +was made twenty-four hours later, the reply to inquiries was the +ominous statement that 'no information was to be had'.[<a href= +"#note-128">128</a>]</p> +<p>This, however, is a digression from the main question. History +will doubtless attribute the outbreak of war between ourselves and +Germany to the development of the Belgian question, and, we are +confident, will judge that had it not been for the gratuitous +attack made on a neutral country by Germany, war with Great Britain +would not have ensued on August 4, 1914. The excuses put forward by +the German Government for this wanton outrage on international +agreements are instructive. In conversation with Sir Edward +Goschen, neither Herr von Jagow nor the Chancellor urged that the +French had violated the neutrality; the argument is purely and +simply that the route by way of the Vosges is difficult, time is +everything, and it is a matter of life and death to Germany to +crush France as quickly as possible, in order that she may be able +to meet the Russians before they reach the German frontier. This +excuse does not seem to have been very satisfactory even to those +who put it forward, though it was indubitably the real reason; so +vice paid homage to virtue, and Herr von Jagow urged to Prince +Lichnowsky that he had 'absolutely unimpeachable information' that +the German army was exposed to French attack across Belgium. On the +other hand, the Chancellor, as late as August 4th, seems to have +known nothing of any such action by France; at any rate he made no +mention of it in his speech to the Reichstag:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'We are now in a state of necessity, and +necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and +perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to +the dictates of international law. It is true that the French +Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to +respect the neutrality of Belgium, as long as her opponent respects +it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. France +could wait but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank +upon the Lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were +compelled to override the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian +Governments. The wrong—I speak openly—that we are +committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military +goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are +threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only +have one thought—how he is to hack his way through.'[<a href= +"#note-129">129</a>]</p> +<p>In this double-faced position of the German Government, we have +an example either of unsurpassed wickedness or of insurpassable +folly. The violation of Belgium must have been designed either in +order to bring us into the quarrel, or on the supposition that, in +spite of treaties and warnings, we should yet remain neutral. Yet +the foolishness of such a calculation is as nothing to that which +prompted the excuse that Germany had to violate Belgian neutrality +because the French were going to do so, or had done so. In such a +case undoubtedly the wisest course for Germany would have been to +allow the French to earn the reward of their own folly and be +attacked not only by Belgium but also by Great Britain, to whom not +five days before they had solemnly promised to observe the +neutrality, and whom such a gross violation of the French word must +indubitably have kept neutral, if it did not throw her on to the +side of Germany. In regard to Belgium the Germans have indeed put +forward the plea that the French had already violated its +neutrality before war was declared. This plea has been like a +snowball. It began with the ineffective accusation that the French +were at Givet, a town in French territory, and that this +constituted an attack on Germany, though how the presence of the +French in a town of their own could be called a violation of their +neighbour's neutrality it is difficult to see. From that it has +gradually grown into a more formidable story of the French +supplying a garrison to Liège. There can be little doubt +that all these attempts by Herr von Jagow to claim that the French +violated Belgian neutrality are another illustration of Swift's +dictum to the effect that 'as universal a practice as lying is, and +as easy a one as it seems', it is astonishing that it has been +brought to so little perfection, 'even by those who are most +celebrated in that faculty'.[<a href="#note-130">130</a>]</p> +<h3>IV</h3> +<center><i>England and Servia</i>.</center> +<p>We have seen what attitude was taken by Germany in the crisis +which followed upon the Serajevo murders and more definitely upon +the presentation of the Austrian note. It is equally important, and +to English readers at least more interesting, to realize what +attitude was taken by England. Sir Edward Grey throughout +maintained the position, which he was so justly praised for +adopting in 1912, that England had no direct interest in Balkan +disputes, but that it was her bounden duty to prevent a European +conflagration. He quickly saw, what Germany would not see, that +Russia was so much interested in Servia, for both political and +religious reasons, that any attempt by the Austro-Hungarian +Government to coerce Servia, to interfere with her territorial +integrity or independence as a sovereign state, would inevitably +rouse Russia to military action. For Russia had greater interests +in the security of Servia than Great Britain had in the security of +Belgium. In each case the Great Power was bound by honour and +self-interest alike to interfere to protect the smaller Power, but +Russia was also bound to Servia by racial and religious bonds. This +being so, Sir Edward Grey set himself, not as the German White Book +says[<a href="#note-131">131</a>] to localize the conflict, but to +prevent if possible a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia +which would inevitably involve Russia and probably other European +powers. He stated his policy with the greatest clearness in the +House of Commons on July 27th, but he had already acted on the +lines of the policy which he then explained. On July 24th he told +Count Mensdorff that he would concern himself</p> +<p class="blockquote">'with the matter simply and solely from the +point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute +between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's +Government[<a href="#note-132">132</a>].'</p> +<p>In similar language, but more fully, on the same day he told the +German Ambassador:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'If the presentation of this ultimatum to +Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need +not concern ourselves about it; but if Russia took the view of the +Austrian ultimatum which it seemed to me that any Power interested +in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the +terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating +influence[<a href="#note-133">133</a>].'</p> +<p>Sir Edward Grey at once urged that the four Powers, Germany, +Italy, France, and Great Britain, should act together in the +interests of peace at the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna. And +he went further and tried to induce Servia to 'express concern and +regret' and to 'give Austria the fullest satisfaction', 'if it is +proved that Servian officials, however subordinate, were +accomplices in the murders at Serajevo[<a href= +"#note-134">134</a>].' Further than that no British Foreign +Minister could go; Sir George Buchanan correctly explained the +situation to M. Sazonof when he laid stress on the need of the +sanction of British public opinion[<a href="#note-135">135</a>]. +Sir Edward Grey re-echoed this when he wrote:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'I do not consider that public opinion here +would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. +If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues +may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent +it.'[<a href="#note-136">136</a>]</p> +<p>However, matters were moving rapidly: the Servian reply[<a href= +"#note-137">137</a>] was presented on July 25; it was considered +unsatisfactory by the Austro-Hungarian Government, and the +Minister, with the Legation-staff, withdrew from Belgrade. Next day +Sir Edward Grey proposed that a conference of Germany, Italy, +France, and Great Britain should meet in London immediately 'for +the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent +complications', and 'that all active military operations should be +suspended pending results of conference'.[<a href= +"#note-138">138</a>] This proposal failed, as has been explained in +earlier pages (<a href="#failedproposal">pp. 71-3</a>), and on July +28th Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. Sir Edward Grey +remained firm to his original attitude of non-intervention, and +told M. Cambon that 'the dispute between Austria and Servia was not +one in which we felt called to take a hand'.[<a href= +"#note-139">139</a>] And on the same day he declined to discuss +with Count Mensdorff 'the merits of the question between Austria +and Servia'.[<a href="#note-140">140</a>]</p> +<p>No one can doubt that Sir Edward Grey's attitude was +diplomatically correct and consistent. It was also inspired by a +genuine desire for peace, and stands out in sharp contrast with the +'equivocal and double-faced' policy of Germany, and with the +obstinacy of Austria in refusing to permit the Powers to mediate; +for it was with truth that M. Sazonof remarked that</p> +<p class="blockquote">'a refusal to prolong the term of the +ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the +Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in +contradiction to the very basis of international +relations.'[<a href="#note-141">141</a>]</p> +<h3>V</h3> +<center><i>Great Britain declines 'Solidarity' with Russia and +France</i>.</center> +<p>There is however another question which involves the whole +foreign policy of Great Britain. Could Sir Edward Grey have +prevented the war by boldly declaring at once that England would +support Russia and France, if necessary by armed force? It was a +policy urged on him from several quarters, and it is possible that +such action might have been successful. It is to Sir Edward Grey's +credit that he quietly but firmly refused to take so hazardous and +unprecedented a step. Let us examine these proposals briefly. As +early as July 24th M. Sazonof 'hoped that His Majesty's Government +would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and +France.[<a href="#note-142">142</a>]' The French Ambassador at St. +Petersburg joined in the request, and M. Sazonof pointed out +that</p> +<p class="blockquote">'we would sooner or later be dragged into war +if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we +did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with +France[<a href="#note-143">143</a>].'</p> +<p>On July 30th the President of the French Republic expressed his +conviction that</p> +<p class="blockquote">'peace between the Powers is in the hands of +Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England +would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between +France and Germany, as a result of the present differences between +Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at +once modify her attitude[<a href="#note-144">144</a>].'</p> +<p>Even more important was the opinion of the Italian Minister for +Foreign Affairs, whose country was a member of the Triple +Alliance:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'As Germany was really anxious for good +relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would +act with Russia and France, he thought it would have a great +effect.'[<a href="#note-145">145</a>]</p> +<p>Such opinions must, and do, carry great weight, but Sir Edward +Grey and the British Ambassadors were equally firm in withstanding +them. Sir George Buchanan at once told M. Sazonof that he</p> +<p class="blockquote">'saw no reason to expect any declaration of +solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an +unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France +by force of arms'.[<a href="#note-146">146</a>]</p> +<p>On July 27th he met the proposal more directly by pointing out +that, so far from such a policy conducing to the maintenance of +peace, it would merely offend the pride of the Germans and stiffen +them in their present attitude.[<a href="#note-147">147</a>] Two +days later Sir Edward Grey pointed out to M. Cambon that</p> +<p class="blockquote">'even if the question became one between +Austria and Russia, we should not feel called upon to take a hand +in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or +Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea +had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan +question'.[<a href="#note-148">148</a>]</p> +<p>That is one answer to the proposal, an answer based on history +and on Britain's foreign policy in past years. Sir Edward Grey had +another answer. It was to the effect that Germany could not, and +ought to have known she could not, rely on our neutrality. For when +the Russian Ambassador told him that an impression prevailed in +German and Austrian circles that in any event England would stand +aside, he pointed out that</p> +<p class="blockquote">'this impression ought to be dispelled by the +orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as +it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre +leave'.[<a href="#note-149">149</a>]</p> +<p>The situation continued to develop unfavourably for the cause of +peace owing to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, and the +consequent mobilizations in Russia, Germany, and France. On July +31st Sir Edward Grey said:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'I believe it to be quite untrue that our +attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government +do not expect our neutrality.'[<a href="#note-150">150</a>]</p> +<p>It is not quite clear that Sir Edward Grey's belief was +justified. England's attitude may have been an important factor in +the situation, but still in our opinion Sir Edward Grey was not +only right in refusing to commit England to a new Continental +policy, but could not, with due observance of constitutional +usages, have taken any other course. Again, it is doubtful whether +the German Government did or did not rely on our neutrality. The +German Chancellor and the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs +later affected great surprise at our action. Germany, however, as +we have shown above (<a href="#ch5sec3">p. 82</a>), had been +plainly warned by Sir Edward Grey on July 29th[<a href= +"#note-151">151</a>] that she could not rely on our remaining +neutral under all circumstances.</p> +<p>Whether Sir Edward Grey was right or wrong in his estimate of +Germany's prudence is a small matter; what is important is that his +action was throughout perfectly straightforward and consistent. And +unquestionably he had a very difficult part to play. The near East +was like a blazing rick surrounded by farm buildings; Germany was, +if not stirring up the conflagration, certainly not attempting to +pour water on the flames, while Austria, possibly—and even +probably[<a href="#note-152">152</a>] with Germany's knowledge, +would allow no one to make the attempt.</p> +<p>It would have aided the Austrian cause more effectively in +Europe and elsewhere, if the Government had communicated[<a href= +"#note-153">153</a>] 'the <i>dossier</i> elucidating the Servian +intrigues and the connexion between these intrigues and the murder +of 28th June', which it said it held at the disposal of the British +Government.[<a href="#note-154">154</a>] For even Count Mensdorff +'admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be +satisfactory'.[<a href="#note-155">155</a>]</p> +<p>To judge whether the Servian reply was satisfactory, it was, and +is, necessary to examine the evidence on which the Austro-Hungarian +Government based the accusations formulated in its note of July +23rd. But even assuming that the Austrian charges were true, as the +German White Book says they are,[<a href="#note-156">156</a>] it is +only a stronger reason for allowing the Powers to examine this +evidence; and it does not explain the persistent refusal,[<a href= +"#note-157">157</a>] until July 31st,[<a href="#note-158">158</a>] +to permit any negotiations on the basis of the Servian reply.</p> +<p>Such being the situation, it is very difficult to see what more +Sir Edward Grey could have done to prevent the outbreak of war +between Austria-Hungary and Servia, which did inevitably, as he +foresaw from the first, drag in other nations. He urged Servia to +moderation and even to submission; he tried to induce the four +Powers to mediate jointly at St. Petersburg and Vienna; he proposed +a conference of the four Powers to prevent further complications; +he did everything in his power to restrain Russia from immediate +armed support of Servia; he declined to join Russia and France in +eventual military action; and even up to the violation of the +neutrality of Belgium he still strove to avert the horrors of war +from Europe.</p> +<h3>VI</h3> +<center><i>Italy's comments on the situation</i>.</center> +<p>We have already shown (<a href="#CH2">Chap. II</a>) how Italy +became a member of the Triple Alliance, and how, in spite of its +apparent frailty and of the somewhat divergent aims of its members, +that alliance has endured for thirty-two years. It remains to +consider what policy Italy adopted in the critical situation +created by the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, +and to appreciate the significance of that policy. It is supremely +significant that Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, was +not consulted about the terms of the Austrian note to Servia; that +she worked persistently side by side with England in endeavouring +to prevent an outbreak of war, and, when that failed, to induce the +states actually at war, or on the brink of war, to suspend all +military operations in order to give diplomatic intervention an +opportunity; and it is equally significant that, when the great war +broke out, Italy remained neutral, in spite of the pressure from +her allies and the tempting bait of a share of the spoil, which, it +is said, is even now being offered to her.[<a href= +"#note-159">159</a>] This is but a bald description of Italy's +policy, but it can be substantiated in detail from official +documents. As early as July 25th the Italian Ambassador in a +conversation with Sir Edward Grey 'made no secret of the fact that +Italy was desirous to see war avoided',[<a href= +"#note-160">160</a>] and he cordially approved the idea of +mediation by the four Powers. Two days later Italy again approved +the proposed conference of four to be held immediately in London. +The Italian Foreign Minister promised to recommend most strongly to +the German Government the idea of asking Russia, Austria, and +Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the +conference, and went even further in undertaking to ask what +procedure Germany thought most likely to be successful at +Vienna.[<a href="#note-161">161</a>] He thought it very doubtful +whether Germany would consent to ask Austria to suspend military +operations, but made a further suggestion that</p> +<p class="blockquote">'Servia may be induced to accept note in its +entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the +conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded +to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone'.[<a href= +"#note-162">162</a>]</p> +<p>Next day the Marquis di San Giuliano called attention to a point +in Servia's reply to Austria which might form a starting-point for +mediation.[<a href="#note-163">163</a>] On July 29th he tried to +get over Germany's objection to the idea of a 'Conference' by +suggesting adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in +London.[<a href="#note-164">164</a>] Next day he added to this the +practical suggestion that</p> +<p class="blockquote">'Germany might invite Austria to state +exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a +guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence, nor +annex territory.... We might, on the other hand, ascertain from +Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of +these two countries, discussions could be commenced at +once.'[<a href="#note-165">165</a>]</p> +<p>Moreover the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, in the hope of +pacifying Russia, made the useful suggestion that Austria +should</p> +<p class="blockquote">'convert into a binding engagement to Europe +the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect +that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia, nor +to acquire Servian territory'.[<a href="#note-166">166</a>]</p> +<p>All efforts to preserve peace proved futile; Germany delivered +her ultimatum to France and to Russia. Then arose the question, +what was Italy to do? The answer to this was given by the Italian +Foreign Minister:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'The war undertaken by Austria, and the +consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German +Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in +conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple +Alliance; in such circumstances Italy would remain +neutral.'[<a href="#note-167">167</a>]</p> +<p>The German White Book says 'Russia began the war on us'[<a href= +"#note-168">168</a>] and 'France opened hostilities'[<a href= +"#note-169">169</a>]; if these statements were true, Italy would +have been obliged, if she were to remain faithful to her +engagements, to take part in the war side by side with her +colleagues of the Triple Alliance. Impartial readers can draw their +own conclusions.</p> +<hr /> +<a name="ch5note" id="ch5note"></a> +<h3>NOTE</h3> +<center><i>Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servia's +reply</i>.</center> +<p>On July 23rd the Austro-Hungarian Government presented an +ultimatum to Servia, demanding unconditional acceptance within 48 +hours, an ultimatum which the <i>Temps</i> next day described as +'unprecedented in its arrogance and in the extravagance of its +demands'. Of it Sir Edward Grey said:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'I had never before seen one State address to +another independent State a document of so formidable a character. +Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of +Servia's independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed +that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right +to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers +of Servia.'[<a href="#note-170">170</a>]</p> +<p>It may be true, as the Austrian Ambassador explained,[<a href= +"#note-171">171</a>] that the Austro-Hungarian Government did not +intend this step to be regarded as an ultimatum, but as a +<i>démarche</i> with a time-limit.</p> +<p>In this extraordinary document[<a href="#note-172">172</a>] the +Austro-Hungarian Government demanded:—</p> +<p>A. That Servia should publish on the front page of its 'Official +Gazette', and in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army, and should +communicate to the Army as the order of the day a declaration</p> +<p>(1) condemning Serb propaganda against Austria-Hungary;</p> +<p>(2) regretting that Servian officers and functionaries +participated in the propaganda;</p> +<p>(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against persons +who may be guilty of such machinations.</p> +<p>B. That Servia should undertake</p> +<p>(1) to suppress any publication inciting to hatred and contempt +of Austria-Hungary;</p> +<p>(2) to dissolve the society styled Narodna Odbrana and similar +societies and to confiscate their means of propaganda;</p> +<p>(3) to eliminate from public instruction in Servia all teachers +and all methods of instruction responsible for fomenting opinion +against Austria-Hungary;</p> +<p>(4) to remove from the military service and from the +administration all officers and functionaries guilty of such +propaganda, whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government +reserved to itself the right of communicating;</p> +<p>(5) to accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of +Austria-Hungary in the suppression of the subversive anti-Austrian +movement;</p> +<p>(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the +Serajevo plot, with the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian +delegates;</p> +<p>(7) to proceed immediately to the arrest of Major Voija +Tankositch and of Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State +employé, who have been compromised by the results of the +inquiry at Serajevo;</p> +<p>(8) to stop co-operation of Servian authorities in illicit +traffic in arms and explosives, and to dismiss and punish those +officials who helped the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime;</p> +<p>(9) to explain the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian +officials, at home and abroad, after the Serajevo crime.</p> +<p>On July 25th the Servian reply[<a href="#note-173">173</a>] was +presented to the Austro-Hungarian Government. Even to a reader with +Austrian sympathies this reply seems to go a long way towards +meeting the demands. The Servian Government agreed</p> +<p>A. that Servia should, as demanded, publish a declaration</p> +<p>(1) condemning all propaganda which may be directed against +Austria-Hungary;</p> +<p>(2) regretting that, according to the communication from the +Imperial and Royal Government, Servian officers and officials +participated in the propaganda;</p> +<p>(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against all +persons who are guilty of such acts.</p> +<p>B. That Servia would undertake</p> +<p>(1) to introduce a provision into the press law providing for +the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of +Austria-Hungary and to introduce an amendment to the Constitution +providing for the confiscation of such publications;</p> +<p>(2) to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and similar societies;</p> +<p>(3) to remove at once from their public educational +establishments all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda, +whenever the Austro-Hungarian Government furnish them with facts +and proofs of this propaganda;</p> +<p>(4) to remove from military service all such persons as the +judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed +against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary;</p> +<p>(5) though they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of +the demand, to accept the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian +officials so far as is consistent with the principle of +international law, with criminal procedure and with good +neighbourly relations;</p> +<p>(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the +Serajevo plot; but they cannot admit the co-operation of +Austro-Hungarian officials, as it would be a violation of the +Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure;</p> +<p>(7) On this they remark that Major Tankositch was arrested as +soon as the note was presented, and that it has not been possible +to arrest Ciganovitch, who is an Austro-Hungarian subject, but had +been employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways;</p> +<p>(8) to reinforce and extend the measures for preventing illicit +traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier;</p> +<p>(9) to give explanations of the remarks made by Servian +officials, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian Government have +communicated the passages and as soon as they have shown that the +remarks were actually made by the said officials.</p> +<p>The Austro-Hungarian Government regarded this reply as +unsatisfactory and inadequate; they withdrew their Minister from +Belgrade the same evening, and on July 28th declared war on Servia. +Meanwhile they published a long official explanation[<a href= +"#note-174">174</a>] of the grounds on which the Servian reply was +considered inadequate; in it they criticized and found +unsatisfactory every single article of the reply, except that to +demand No. 8. It is not worth while to analyze the whole of this; +one sample may be sufficient. Sir Edward Grey commented on demand +No. 5 and pointed out[<a href="#note-175">175</a>] that it</p> +<p class="blockquote">'would be hardly consistent with the +maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty, if it were to +mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be +invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority +within the frontiers of Servia.'</p> +<p>Obviously he was in doubt about the meaning and scope of this +demand, and the next was equally vague. The Servian reply to these +two demands was necessarily guarded: yet the Austro-Hungarian +Government treated this as deliberate misrepresentation:—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'The international law, as well as the +criminal law, has nothing to do with this question; it is purely a +matter of the nature of state police which is to be solved by way +of a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is +therefore incomprehensible, and on account of its vague general +form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties.</p> +<p class="blockquote">...</p> +<p class="blockquote">'If the Servian Government misunderstands us +here, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the +difference between "enquête judiciaire" and simple police +researches. As it desired to escape from every control of the +investigation which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly +undesirable results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse +in a plausible manner the co-operation of our officials (precedents +for such police intervention exist in great number), it tries to +justify its refusal by showing up our demands as +impossible.'[<a href="#note-176">176</a>]</p> +<p>It would have been fairer to Servia to assume that there had +been a genuine misunderstanding, and that the explanation here +given by Austria might prove satisfactory to Servia, as the Italian +Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested.[<a href= +"#note-177">177</a>] The persistent refusal of Austria-Hungary to +permit any discussion on the basis of the Servian reply goes far to +justify Sir Maurice de Bunsen's impression</p> +<p class="blockquote">'that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn +up as to make war inevitable, that their Government are fully +resolved to have war with Servia, that they consider their position +as a Great Power to be at stake, and that until punishment has been +administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to +proposals of mediation'.[<a href="#note-178">178</a>]</p> +<p>Notes:</p> +<p><a name="note-57" id="note-57"> +<!-- Note Anchor 57 --></a>[Footnote 57: <i>Correspondence +respecting the European Crisis</i>, No. 2. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. +Grey, July 22, 1914.]</p> +<p><a name="note-58" id="note-58"> +<!-- Note Anchor 58 --></a>[Footnote 58: German White Book, p. +4.]</p> +<p><a name="note-59" id="note-59"> +<!-- Note Anchor 59 --></a>[Footnote 59: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24.]</p> +<p><a name="note-60" id="note-60"> +<!-- Note Anchor 60 --></a>[Footnote 60: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey, July 25.]</p> +<p><a name="note-61" id="note-61"> +<!-- Note Anchor 61 --></a>[Footnote 61: Ibid. No. 32. Sir M. de +Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 26. See also German White Book, p. +5.]</p> +<p><a name="note-62" id="note-62"> +<!-- Note Anchor 62 --></a>[Footnote 62: Ibid. No. 54. M. Sazonof +to Count Benckendorff, July 15/28, 1914 (communicated by Count +Benckendorff, July 28).]</p> +<p><a name="note-63" id="note-63"> +<!-- Note Anchor 63 --></a>[Footnote 63: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, August 1.]</p> +<p><a name="note-64" id="note-64"> +<!-- Note Anchor 64 --></a>[Footnote 64: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 141. Sir +M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, August 1.]</p> +<p><a name="note-65" id="note-65"> +<!-- Note Anchor 65 --></a>[Footnote 65: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 71. Sir +E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]</p> +<p><a name="note-66" id="note-66"> +<!-- Note Anchor 66 --></a>[Footnote 66: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-67" id="note-67"> +<!-- Note Anchor 67 --></a>[Footnote 67: German White Book, p. 4 +(see <i>infra</i> <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>).]</p> +<p><a name="note-68" id="note-68"> +<!-- Note Anchor 68 --></a>[Footnote 68: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 36. Sir +E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd, July +26.]</p> +<p><a name="note-69" id="note-69"> +<!-- Note Anchor 69 --></a>[Footnote 69: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]</p> +<p><a name="note-70" id="note-70"> +<!-- Note Anchor 70 --></a>[Footnote 70: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 60. Sir +E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]</p> +<p><a name="note-71" id="note-71"> +<!-- Note Anchor 71 --></a>[Footnote 71: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 84. Sir +E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-72" id="note-72"> +<!-- Note Anchor 72 --></a>[Footnote 72: p. 8 and Exhibit 12 (see +<i>infra</i> <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>).]</p> +<p><a name="note-73" id="note-73"> +<!-- Note Anchor 73 --></a>[Footnote 73: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +11. Sir E. Grey to Sir II. Rumbold, July 24.]</p> +<p><a name="note-74" id="note-74"> +<!-- Note Anchor 74 --></a>[Footnote 74: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +46. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 27.]</p> +<p><a name="note-75" id="note-75"> +<!-- Note Anchor 75 --></a>[Footnote 75: Ibid. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd +to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-76" id="note-76"> +<!-- Note Anchor 76 --></a>[Footnote 76: Ibid. No. 43. Sir E. +Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]</p> +<p><a name="note-77" id="note-77"> +<!-- Note Anchor 77 --></a>[Footnote 77: Although the German White +Book attempts to make out that Russia mobilized on July 26th, it +produces no evidence more satisfactory than the information of the +German Imperial attaché in Russia, whose account of the +Russian military preparations supports only in part the allegations +made at Berlin. See German White Book, Exhibits 6 and 7; also +<i>Correspondence</i>, No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July +29. For the Austrian decree of general mobilization, see the +Russian Orange Book No. 47 (<i>infra</i> in <a href= +"#RULE4_7">Appendix VI</a>).]</p> +<p><a name="note-78" id="note-78"> +<!-- Note Anchor 78 --></a>[Footnote 78: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]</p> +<p><a name="note-79" id="note-79"> +<!-- Note Anchor 79 --></a>[Footnote 79: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 76. The +same to the same, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-80" id="note-80"> +<!-- Note Anchor 80 --></a>[Footnote 80: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +78. Sir George Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914.]</p> +<p><a name="note-81" id="note-81"> +<!-- Note Anchor 81 --></a>[Footnote 81: German White Book, p. 38, +and Exhibit No. 7, July 26.]</p> +<p><a name="note-82" id="note-82"> +<!-- Note Anchor 82 --></a>[Footnote 82: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28. See also quotation in +<i>Times</i> of July 29, p. 8, col. 2, from the +<i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i>: 'The fighting power of Russia is +usually over-estimated, and numbers are far less decisive than +<i>moral</i>, the higher command, armaments.... All military +preparations for war, of whatever sort, have been taken with that +attention to detail and that order which marks Germany. It can +therefore be said, without exaggeration, that Germany can face the +advent of grave events with complete calm, trusting to God and her +own might.']</p> +<p><a name="note-83" id="note-83"> +<!-- Note Anchor 83 --></a>[Footnote 83: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-84" id="note-84"> +<!-- Note Anchor 84 --></a>[Footnote 84: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 97. Sir +G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30. Cf. Russian Orange Book, Nos. +61, 62 (<i>infra</i> in <a href="#RULE4_7">Appendix VI</a>).]</p> +<p><a name="note-85" id="note-85"> +<!-- Note Anchor 85 --></a>[Footnote 85: <i>Ibid</i>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-86" id="note-86"> +<!-- Note Anchor 86 --></a>[Footnote 86: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]</p> +<p><a name="note-87" id="note-87"> +<!-- Note Anchor 87 --></a>[Footnote 87: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 113. Sir +G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]</p> +<p><a name="note-88" id="note-88"> +<!-- Note Anchor 88 --></a>[Footnote 88: <i>Ibid</i>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-89" id="note-89"> +<!-- Note Anchor 89 --></a>[Footnote 89: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 112. Sir +E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]</p> +<p><a name="note-90" id="note-90"> +<!-- Note Anchor 90 --></a>[Footnote 90: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 113, +<i>ut sup</i>. On August 1 <i>The Times</i> published a +semi-official telegram from Berlin, dated Eydtkuhnen, July 31, that +'the second and third Russian cavalry divisions are on the frontier +between Wirballen, Augustof, and Allenstein'.]</p> +<p><a name="note-91" id="note-91"> +<!-- Note Anchor 91 --></a>[Footnote 91: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 111. Sir +E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 31.]</p> +<p><a name="note-92" id="note-92"> +<!-- Note Anchor 92 --></a>[Footnote 92: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 121. Sir +E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]</p> +<p><a name="note-93" id="note-93"> +<!-- Note Anchor 93 --></a>[Footnote 93: See German White Book, pp. +12 and 13, and Exhibits 20, 21, 22, 23, 23a (see <i>infra</i> +<a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>).]</p> +<p><a name="note-94" id="note-94"> +<!-- Note Anchor 94 --></a>[Footnote 94: <i>Correspondence</i>, No. +121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]</p> +<p><a name="note-95" id="note-95"> +<!-- Note Anchor 95 --></a>[Footnote 95: <i>Ibid</i>. Nos. 131, +133, 135.]</p> +<p><a name="note-96" id="note-96"> +<!-- Note Anchor 96 --></a>[Footnote 96: Russian Orange Book, No. +58 (<i>infra</i> Appendix VI).]</p> +<p><a name="note-97" id="note-97"> +<!-- Note Anchor 97 --></a>[Footnote 97: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 133. Sir +E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1, encloses a telegram of July +31, to the effect that 'The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared +the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the +Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his +satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should +take place in London with the participation of the Great +Powers.']</p> +<p><a name="note-98" id="note-98"> +<!-- Note Anchor 98 --></a>[Footnote 98: German White Book, p. +8.]</p> +<p><a name="note-99" id="note-99"> +<!-- Note Anchor 99 --></a>[Footnote 99: <i>Ibid</i>. p. 9, Exhibit +No. 17.]</p> +<p><a name="note-100" id="note-100"> +<!-- Note Anchor 100 --></a>[Footnote 100: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29: 'His Excellency +denied German Government had done this. Nevertheless it is +true.']</p> +<p><a name="note-101" id="note-101"> +<!-- Note Anchor 101 --></a>[Footnote 101: Ibid. No. 99. Sir F. +Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]</p> +<p><a name="note-102" id="note-102"> +<!-- Note Anchor 102 --></a>[Footnote 102: <i>Correspondence</i>. +Enclosure 3 in No. 105. French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. +Cambon.]</p> +<p><a name="note-103" id="note-103"> +<!-- Note Anchor 103 --></a>[Footnote 103: <i>Ibid</i>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-104" id="note-104"> +<!-- Note Anchor 104 --></a>[Footnote 104: German White Book, p. 48 +(see <i>infra</i>, <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>).]</p> +<p><a name="note-105" id="note-105"> +<!-- Note Anchor 105 --></a>[Footnote 105: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, Aug. 1.]</p> +<p><a name="note-106" id="note-106"> +<!-- Note Anchor 106 --></a>[Footnote 106: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25.]</p> +<p><a name="note-107" id="note-107"> +<!-- Note Anchor 107 --></a>[Footnote 107: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 27.]</p> +<p><a name="note-108" id="note-108"> +<!-- Note Anchor 108 --></a>[Footnote 108: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 89. Sir +E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-109" id="note-109"> +<!-- Note Anchor 109 --></a>[Footnote 109: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29 (received July +29).]</p> +<p><a name="note-110" id="note-110"> +<!-- Note Anchor 110 --></a>[Footnote 110: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 101. +Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.]</p> +<p><a name="note-111" id="note-111"> +<!-- Note Anchor 111 --></a>[Footnote 111: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]</p> +<p><a name="note-112" id="note-112"> +<!-- Note Anchor 112 --></a>[Footnote 112: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 106. +Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]</p> +<p><a name="note-113" id="note-113"> +<!-- Note Anchor 113 --></a>[Footnote 113: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 114. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir E. Goschen, July +31.]</p> +<p><a name="note-114" id="note-114"> +<!-- Note Anchor 114 --></a>[Footnote 114: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 125. +Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]</p> +<p><a name="note-115" id="note-115"> +<!-- Note Anchor 115 --></a>[Footnote 115: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 122. +Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. It may be observed that by +the Hague Convention of 1907, Belgium was bound to impose this +embargo after the ultimatum of Germany to Russia (Art. 2).]</p> +<p><a name="note-116" id="note-116"> +<!-- Note Anchor 116 --></a>[Footnote 116: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1.]</p> +<p><a name="note-117" id="note-117"> +<!-- Note Anchor 117 --></a>[Footnote 117: <i>The Times</i>, August +28, 1914, p. 9, cols. 5 and 6.]</p> +<p><a name="note-118" id="note-118"> +<!-- Note Anchor 118 --></a>[Footnote 118: See <i>The Times</i>, +August 27, 1914. The Imperial Chancellor telegraphed to Prince +Lichnowsky: 'Germany is ready to take up the English proposal if +England guarantees with her forces the absolute neutrality of +France in a Russo-German conflict.... We promise that the French +frontier shall not be passed by our troops before 7 p.m. on Monday, +August 3, if England's consent is given in the meantime.']</p> +<p><a name="note-119" id="note-119"> +<!-- Note Anchor 119 --></a>[Footnote 119: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 2.]</p> +<p><a name="note-120" id="note-120"> +<!-- Note Anchor 120 --></a>[Footnote 120: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, August +2.]</p> +<p><a name="note-121" id="note-121"> +<!-- Note Anchor 121 --></a>[Footnote 121: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 153. +Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 4.]</p> +<p><a name="note-122" id="note-122"> +<!-- Note Anchor 122 --></a>[Footnote 122: <i>Ibid</i>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-123" id="note-123"> +<!-- Note Anchor 123 --></a>[Footnote 123: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 155. +Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Villiers, August 4.]</p> +<p><a name="note-124" id="note-124"> +<!-- Note Anchor 124 --></a>[Footnote 124: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, August +4.]</p> +<p><a name="note-125" id="note-125"> +<!-- Note Anchor 125 --></a>[Footnote 125: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 159. +Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 4.]</p> +<p><a name="note-126" id="note-126"> +<!-- Note Anchor 126 --></a>[Footnote 126: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 116, July 31.]</p> +<p><a name="note-127" id="note-127"> +<!-- Note Anchor 127 --></a>[Footnote 127: <i>Ibid</i>. Nos. 130, +143, 145.]</p> +<p><a name="note-128" id="note-128"> +<!-- Note Anchor 128 --></a>[Footnote 128: <i>Ibid</i>. Nos. 149, +150, August 2 and 3.]</p> +<p><a name="note-129" id="note-129"> +<!-- Note Anchor 129 --></a>[Footnote 129: <i>The Times</i>, August +11, p. 5, col. 1.]</p> +<p><a name="note-130" id="note-130"> +<!-- Note Anchor 130 --></a>[Footnote 130: <i>Thoughts on Various +Subjects, Moral and Diverting</i> (October, 1706).]</p> +<p><a name="note-131" id="note-131"> +<!-- Note Anchor 131 --></a>[Footnote 131: p. 6.]</p> +<p><a name="note-132" id="note-132"> +<!-- Note Anchor 132 --></a>[Footnote 132: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24.]</p> +<p><a name="note-133" id="note-133"> +<!-- Note Anchor 133 --></a>[Footnote 133: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 10. Sir +E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24. Cf. No. 24, Sir E. Grey to Sir +G. Buchanan, July 25: 'The sudden, brusque, and peremptory +character of the Austrian <i>démarche</i> makes it almost +inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will +have mobilized against each other.']</p> +<p><a name="note-134" id="note-134"> +<!-- Note Anchor 134 --></a>[Footnote 134: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 12. Sir +E. Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, July 24.]</p> +<p><a name="note-135" id="note-135"> +<!-- Note Anchor 135 --></a>[Footnote 135: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 6. Sir +G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24: 'I said ... direct British +interests in Servia were <i>nil</i>, and a war on behalf of that +country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.']</p> +<p><a name="note-136" id="note-136"> +<!-- Note Anchor 136 --></a>[Footnote 136: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25.]</p> +<p><a name="note-137" id="note-137"> +<!-- Note Anchor 137 --></a>[Footnote 137: See <a href= +"#ch5note">note</a> at the end of this chapter.]</p> +<p><a name="note-138" id="note-138"> +<!-- Note Anchor 138 --></a>[Footnote 138: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 26.]</p> +<p><a name="note-139" id="note-139"> +<!-- Note Anchor 139 --></a>[Footnote 139: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 87. Sir +E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-140" id="note-140"> +<!-- Note Anchor 140 --></a>[Footnote 140: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 91. Sir +E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-141" id="note-141"> +<!-- Note Anchor 141 --></a>[Footnote 141: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 13. +Note communicated to Sir E. Grey by the Russian Ambassador, July +25.]</p> +<p><a name="note-142" id="note-142"> +<!-- Note Anchor 142 --></a>[Footnote 142: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]</p> +<p><a name="note-143" id="note-143"> +<!-- Note Anchor 143 --></a>[Footnote 143: <i>Ibid</i>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-144" id="note-144"> +<!-- Note Anchor 144 --></a>[Footnote 144: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 99. Sir +F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30. Cf. No. 119, Sir E. Grey to Sir +F. Bertie, July 31.]</p> +<p><a name="note-145" id="note-145"> +<!-- Note Anchor 145 --></a>[Footnote 145: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-146" id="note-146"> +<!-- Note Anchor 146 --></a>[Footnote 146: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 6. Sir +G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]</p> +<p><a name="note-147" id="note-147"> +<!-- Note Anchor 147 --></a>[Footnote 147: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 44. Sir +G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 27: 'Their (sc. the German) +attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could +only induce her (sc. Germany) to use her influence at Vienna to +avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was +anxious to preserve peace.']</p> +<p><a name="note-148" id="note-148"> +<!-- Note Anchor 148 --></a>[Footnote 148: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 87. Sir +E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-149" id="note-149"> +<!-- Note Anchor 149 --></a>[Footnote 149: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 27.]</p> +<p><a name="note-150" id="note-150"> +<!-- Note Anchor 150 --></a>[Footnote 150: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 116. +Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]</p> +<p><a name="note-151" id="note-151"> +<!-- Note Anchor 151 --></a>[Footnote 151: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 89. Sir +E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-152" id="note-152"> +<!-- Note Anchor 152 --></a>[Footnote 152: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 95. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30: 'Although I am +not able to verify it, I have private information that the German +Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before +it was despatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know +from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of +it.']</p> +<p><a name="note-153" id="note-153"> +<!-- Note Anchor 153 --></a>[Footnote 153: But see <a href= +"#RULE4_5">Appendix IV</a>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-154" id="note-154"> +<!-- Note Anchor 154 --></a>[Footnote 154: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 4, p. 8.]</p> +<p><a name="note-155" id="note-155"> +<!-- Note Anchor 155 --></a>[Footnote 155: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 48. Sir +E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 27.]</p> +<p><a name="note-156" id="note-156"> +<!-- Note Anchor 156 --></a>[Footnote 156: pp. 3 to 5 and Exhibits +1 and 2 (see <i>infra</i> <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>).]</p> +<p><a name="note-157" id="note-157"> +<!-- Note Anchor 157 --></a>[Footnote 157: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 61, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 28; No. 78, Sir G. +Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29; No. 96, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir +E. Grey, July 30.]</p> +<p><a name="note-158" id="note-158"> +<!-- Note Anchor 158 --></a>[Footnote 158: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 110, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 31; No. 137, Sir E. +Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, August 1.]</p> +<p><a name="note-159" id="note-159"> +<!-- Note Anchor 159 --></a>[Footnote 159: <i>The Times</i>, +September 3, p. 7. For Italy's ignorance of the contents of the +Austrian note, see <a href="#RULE4_6">App. V</a>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-160" id="note-160"> +<!-- Note Anchor 160 --></a>[Footnote 160: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 29. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 25.]</p> +<p><a name="note-161" id="note-161"> +<!-- Note Anchor 161 --></a>[Footnote 161: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 49. Sir +E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]</p> +<p><a name="note-162" id="note-162"> +<!-- Note Anchor 162 --></a>[Footnote 162: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 57. Sir +R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 27. Cf. No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir +E. Grey, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-163" id="note-163"> +<!-- Note Anchor 163 --></a>[Footnote 163: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28. Cf. <i>supra</i>, p. +99.]</p> +<p><a name="note-164" id="note-164"> +<!-- Note Anchor 164 --></a>[Footnote 164: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 80. Sir +R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. Cf. No. 92, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. +Rodd, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-165" id="note-165"> +<!-- Note Anchor 165 --></a>[Footnote 165: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 106. +Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]</p> +<p><a name="note-166" id="note-166"> +<!-- Note Anchor 166 --></a>[Footnote 166: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 79. Sir +M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p> +<p><a name="note-167" id="note-167"> +<!-- Note Anchor 167 --></a>[Footnote 167: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 152. +Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 3.]</p> +<p><a name="note-168" id="note-168"> +<!-- Note Anchor 168 --></a>[Footnote 168: p. 15 (see <a href= +"#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a> <i>infra</i>).]</p> +<p><a name="note-169" id="note-169"> +<!-- Note Anchor 169 --></a>[Footnote 169: p. 16 +(<i>ibid.</i>).]</p> +<p><a name="note-170" id="note-170"> +<!-- Note Anchor 170 --></a>[Footnote 170: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24. The text is also +given in the German White Book (pp. 18-23), which will be found in +<a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-171" id="note-171"> +<!-- Note Anchor 171 --></a>[Footnote 171: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 14. Sir +E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 25.]</p> +<p><a name="note-172" id="note-172"> +<!-- Note Anchor 172 --></a>[Footnote 172: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 4. +Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24.]</p> +<p><a name="note-173" id="note-173"> +<!-- Note Anchor 173 --></a>[Footnote 173: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 39. Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27. See also +German White Book (pp. 23-32), <i>infra</i> in <a href= +"#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-174" id="note-174"> +<!-- Note Anchor 174 --></a>[Footnote 174: German White Book, pp. +24 <i>et sqq</i>.; see <i>infra</i> <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix +I</a>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-175" id="note-175"> +<!-- Note Anchor 175 --></a>[Footnote 175: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24.]</p> +<p><a name="note-176" id="note-176"> +<!-- Note Anchor 176 --></a>[Footnote 176: German White Book, pp. +29 <i>et sqq</i>.; see <i>infra</i> <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix +I</a>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-177" id="note-177"> +<!-- Note Anchor 177 --></a>[Footnote 177: <i>Correspondence</i>, +No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]</p> +<p><a name="note-178" id="note-178"> +<!-- Note Anchor 178 --></a>[Footnote 178: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 41. Sir +M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]</p> +<hr /> +<a name="CH6" id="CH6"><!-- CH6 --></a> +<h2>CHAPTER VI</h2> +<center>THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE</center> +<p>The war in which England is now engaged with Germany is +fundamentally a war between two different principles—that of +<i>raison d'état</i>, and that of the rule of law. The +antagonism between these two principles appeared in our own +internal history as far back as the seventeenth century, when the +Stuarts championed the theory of state-necessity and the practice +of a prerogative free to act outside and above the law in order to +meet the demands of state-necessity, and when Parliament defended +the rule of law and sought to include the Crown under that law. The +same antagonism now appears externally in a struggle between two +nations, one of which claims a prerogative to act outside and above +the public law of Europe in order to secure the 'safety' of its own +state, while the other stands for the rule of public law. The one +regards international covenants to which it has pledged its own +word as 'scraps of paper' when they stand in the way of <i>salus +populi</i>; the other regards the maintenance of such covenants as +a grave and inevitable obligation.</p> +<p>Taught by Treitschke, whom they regard as their great national +historian, and whose lectures on <i>Politik</i> have become a +gospel, the Germans of to-day assume as an ultimate end and a final +standard what they regard as the national German state.[<a href= +"#note-179">179</a>] 'The state', says Treitschke, 'is the highest +thing in the external society of man: above it there is nothing at +all in the history of the world.' There is here no room for comity +of nations; for a <i>societas totius humani generis</i>; for +international law in any true sense. What really exists is the +exclusive state—<i>der geschlossene Staat</i>—and in +another sense than that of Fichte. This state is rigorously +national: it excludes all foreign words from its vocabulary, and it +would fain exclude all foreign articles from its shores in order to +found a real 'national' economy such as List preached. Further, in +the teaching of Treitschke this exclusive state is, 'as Machiavelli +first clearly saw', essentially power: <i>der Staat ist Macht</i>. +It may be defined as 'the public might for defence and offence'. As +the highest duty of the individual is self-perfection, the highest +duty of the state is self-preservation; and self-preservation means +power. 'To care for its power is the highest moral duty of the +state.' 'Of all political weaknesses that of feebleness is the most +abominable and despicable: it is the sin against the Holy Spirit of +Politics.' This may seem the mere worship of might, and it is in +effect nothing else than the mere worship of might; but we should +misrepresent Treitschke if we did not add that power is not +conceived by him as mere or bare power. The power of the state is +precious and ultimate because the state is a vehicle of culture: +the armed sword of the German state is precious because that state +is the <i>colporteur</i> of German culture. And thus Treitschke +holds that Machiavelli, the great apostle of might, is only wrong +in so far as he failed to see that might must justify itself by +having a content, that is to say, by being used to spread the +highest moral culture. It is naturally assumed by German +nationalists that this is German culture.</p> +<p>Two results flow from this philosophy, one negative, the other +positive. The negative result is the repudiation of any idea of the +final character of international obligation; the other is the +praise of the glory of war.</p> +<p><i>Salus populi suprema lex</i>; and to it all international +'law' so called must bend. The absolute sovereignty of the state is +necessary for its absolute power; and that absolute sovereignty +cannot be bound by <i>any</i> obligation, even of its own making. +Every treaty or promise made by a state, Treitschke holds, is to be +understood as limited by the proviso <i>rebus sic stantibus</i>. 'A +state cannot bind its will for the future over against other +states.' International treaties are no absolute limitation, but a +voluntary self-limitation of the state, and only for such time as +the state may find to be convenient. The state has no judge set +over it, and any 'legal' obligation it may incur is in the last +resort subject to its own decision—in other words, to its own +repudiation.[<a href="#note-180">180</a>] That the end justifies +the means (in other words, that the maintenance of the German +Empire as it stands justifies the violation of an international +obligation) 'has a certain truth'. 'It is ridiculous to advise a +state which is in competition with other states to start by taking +the catechism into its hands.' All these hints of his master were +adopted and expanded by Bernhardi, the faithful disciple of +Treitschke, whose Berlin lectures were attended in the last quarter +of the nineteenth century by soldiers and officials as well as by +students. There is no such thing, Bernhardi feels, as universal +international law. 'Each nation evolves its own conception of Right +(<i>Recht</i>): none can say that one nation has a better +conception than another.' 'No self-respecting nation would +sacrifice its own conception of Right' to any international rule: +'by so doing it would renounce its own highest ideals.' The ardent +nationalism which will reject foreign words and foreign wares will +reject international law as something 'foreign'. Again, Bernhardi +makes play with the proviso <i>rebus sic stantibus</i>; and this, +curiously enough, he does in reference to Belgium. Things are +altered in Belgium, and therefore the plighted word of Germany may +no longer be binding. 'When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one +contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable +region of Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of +such territory is not <i>ipso facto</i> a breach of +neutrality.'[<a href="#note-181">181</a>]</p> +<p>But it is the glorification of war—war aggressive as well +as war defensive—which is the most striking result of the +doctrine of the all-sufficing, all-embracing national state. In the +index to Treitschke's <i>Politik</i>, under the word War, one reads +the following headings—'its sanctity'; 'to be conceived as an +ordinance set by God'; 'is the most powerful maker of nations'; 'is +politics <i>par excellence</i>'. Two functions, says Treitschke, +the state exists to discharge; and these are to administer law, and +to make war. Of the two war, since it is politics <i>par +excellence</i>, would appear to be the greater. War cannot be +thought or wished out of the world: it is the only medicine for a +sick nation. When we are sunk in the selfish individualism of +peace, war comes to make us realize that we are members one of +another. 'Therein lies the majesty of war, that the petty +individual altogether vanishes before the great thought of the +state.' War alone makes us realize the social organism to which we +belong: 'it is political idealism which demands war.' And again, +'what a perversion of morality it were, if one struck out of +humanity heroism'(<i>Heldentum</i>)—as if <i>Heldentum</i> +could not exist in peace! 'But the living God will see to it that +war shall always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity.'</p> +<p>Thus the idealization of the state as power results in the +idealization of war. As we have seen that the state must be 'power' +in order to preserve itself at all, we now find that it must be a +war-state to preserve itself from 'sickness'. If it does not fight, +individualism will triumph over the social organism; heroism will +perish out of the world. Hence Bernhardi writes: 'the maintenance +of peace never can or may be the goal of a policy'. War, +war—the 'strong medicine', the teacher of heroism, and, as +Bernhardi adds to Treitschke, the inevitable biological law, the +force that spreads the finest culture—war is the law of +humanity. And this war is offensive as well as +defensive—primarily, indeed, offensive. For the growing +nation must preserve all its new members in its bosom: it must not +let them slip away by emigration to foreign soils. It must +therefore find for itself colonies; and since the world is already +largely occupied, it must find them by conquest from other +powers.[<a href="#note-182">182</a>] Treitschke already cried the +watchwords—'Colonies!' 'Sea-power to gain colonies!' +Treitschke already designated England as the object of German +attack, and began to instil in Germany a hatred of England. England +blocked the way to the growth of Germany from a European into a +World-power; Germany, to preserve intact for German culture the +surplus of the growing population, must be a World-power or perish. +And besides, England was a 'sick' state—a sham, an +hypocrisy.[<a href="#note-183">183</a>]</p> +<p>The whole philosophy seems paganism, or rather barbarism, with a +moral veneer. It seems barbarism, because it brings us back to the +good old days when mere might was right. Bernhardi, speaking of the +right of conquest of new territory inherent in a growing people, +tells us that in such cases 'might is at once the supreme right, +and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament +of war', which gives a 'biologically just decision'! And he +expresses wonder and surprise at those who think that 'the weak +nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and +vigorous nation'. In a word, then, might is right. The doctrine has +in itself a rude barbaric simplicity: what is utterly revolting in +the neo-Germanic presentment is its moral veneer—the talk of +war as the fruit of 'political idealism' and the expression of the +'social organism': the talk of 'historical development' as +invalidating supposed 'rights' like the neutrality of Belgium; +above all, the talk of power as 'the vehicle of the highest +culture'. Treitschke, a stern Protestant, seeks to reconcile the +doctrine with Christianity; but the doctrine is all the same pagan. +It is the worship of brute force disguised as <i>Heldentum</i>, and +of vicious cunning disguised as political morality: it is a mixture +of Nietzsche[<a href="#note-184">184</a>] and of Machiavelli. It is +a doctrine of the omnipotence of the super-nation, which 'to +maintain its state', as Machiavelli said, 'will go to work against +faith and charity and humanity and religion', and which will stride +ruthlessly to war when 'the day' comes. And when it goes to war, +all the veneer of culture goes. 'Have a care', Mommsen once said, +'lest in this state, which has been at once a power in arms and a +power in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish, and nothing +but the pure military state should remain.' Mommsen's warning has +come true in August, 1914. By their fruits ye shall know them. The +fruits of <i>Heldentum</i> are Louvain smoking in ashes to the +sky.</p> +<p>It has seemed worth while to describe this philosophy of life, +because it is not only the philosophy of a professor like +Treitschke, but also that of a soldier like Bernhardi; and not only +so, but it is the philosophy of the Prussian Government. Even the +Imperial Chancellor himself used this doctrine (with some qualms, +it is true) to justify Germany in 'hewing its way' through Belgium. +Let us only remember, in justice to a great people, that it is not +really the doctrine of Germany, but rather the doctrine of Prussia +(though Treitschke will tell us that Germany is 'just merely an +extended Prussia'). And let us remember, in extenuation of Prussia, +that she has suffered from two things—geographical pressure +springing from her mid-European situation, and an evil tradition of +ruthless conquest perpetuated by her Hohenzollern rulers since the +days of the Great Elector, and especially since Frederic the Great. +Geographical pressure on all sides has made Prussia feel herself in +a state of chronic strangulation; and a man who feels strangled +will struggle ruthlessly for breath. To get breathing space, to +secure frontiers which would ease an intolerable pressure, Frederic +the Great could seize Silesia in time of peace in spite of his +father's guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and could suggest the +partition of Poland. Frontier pressure thus led to ruthless +conquest irrespective of rights; and that tradition has sunk deep. +It has been easier for England, an island state in the West exempt +from pressure, to think in other terms: it has been possible for +Russia, secure in the East, to think, and to think nobly (as the +present Tsar has done), of international obligation. Nor is it an +accident that sees England and Russia united in the common cause of +Europe to-day—that sees both championing the cause of small +nations, one in the East, the other in the West.[<a href= +"#note-185">185</a>]</p> +<p>But in whatever way we may excuse Prussia we must fight Prussia; +and we fight it in the noblest cause for which men can fight. That +cause is the public law of Europe, as a sure shield and buckler of +all nations, great and small, and especially the small. To the +doctrine of the almightiness of the state—to the doctrine +that all means are justified which are, or seem, necessary to its +self-preservation, we oppose the doctrine of a European society, or +at least a European comity of nations, within which all states +stand; we oppose the doctrine of a public law of Europe, by which +all states are bound to respect the covenants they have made. We +will not and cannot tolerate the view that nations are 'in the +state and posture of gladiators' in their relations one with +another; we stand for the reign of law.</p> +<p>Our cause, as one would expect from a people that has fought out +its own internal struggles under the forms of law, is a legal +cause. We are a people in whose blood the cause of law is the vital +element. It is no new thing in our history that we should fight for +that cause. When England and Revolutionary France went to war in +1793, the cause, on the side of England, was a legal cause. We +fought for the public law of Europe, as it had stood since the +Peace of Westphalia in 1648. We did not fight in 1870, because +neither France nor Germany had infringed the public law of Europe +by attacking the neutrality of Belgium, but we were ready to fight +if they did. A fine cartoon in <i>Punch</i>, of August, 1870, shows +armed England encouraging Belgium, who stands ready with spear and +shield, with the words—'Trust me! Let us hope that they won't +trouble you, dear friend. But if they do——' To-day they +have; and England has drawn her sword. How could she have done +otherwise, with those traditions of law so deep in all Anglo-Saxon +blood—traditions as real and as vital to Anglo-Saxon America +as to Anglo-Saxon England; traditions which are the fundamental +basis of Anglo-Saxon public life all the world over? America once +fought and beat England, in long-forgotten days, on the ground of +law. That very ground of law—that law-abidingness which is as +deeply engrained in the men of Massachusetts to-day as it is in any +Britisher—is a bond of sympathy between the two in this great +struggle of the nations.</p> +<p>To Germans our defence of public law may seem part of the moral +hypocrisy of which in their view we are full. What we are doing, +they feel, is to strike at Germany, our competitor for +'world-empire', with its dangerous navy, while Germany is engaged +in a life and death struggle with France and Russia. We too, they +feel, are Machiavellians; but we have put on what Machiavelli +called 'the mantle of superstition', the pretence of morality and +law, to cover our craft. It is true that we are fighting for our +own interest. But what is our interest? We are fighting for Right, +because Right is our supreme interest. The new German political +theory enunciates that 'our interest is our right'. The +old—the very old—English political theory is, 'The +Right is our interest'. It is true that we have everything to gain +by defending the cause of international law. Should that prevent us +from defending that cause? What do we not lose of precious lives in +the defence?</p> +<p>This is the case of England. England stands for the idea of a +public law of Europe, and for the small nations which it protects. +She stands for her own preservation, which is menaced when public +law is broken, and the 'ages' slow-bought gain' imperilled.</p> +<p>(Treitschke's <i>Politik</i>, lectures delivered in Berlin +during the years 1875 to 1895, was published in two volumes in +1899. General Bernhardi's book, <i>Deutschland und der nächste +Krieg</i>, was published in 1911, and has been translated into +English under the title <i>Germany and the Next War</i>. See also +J.A. Cramb, <i>England and Germany</i>, 1914.)</p> +<p>Notes:</p> +<p><a name="note-179" id="note-179"> +<!-- Note Anchor 179 --></a>[Footnote 179: The unity of the German +state is in no small measure a matter of artificial +Prussianization. Of this Prussianization Treitschke was the great +advocate, though he was himself ultimately of Slavonic origin, and +immediately of Saxon birth.]</p> +<p><a name="note-180" id="note-180"> +<!-- Note Anchor 180 --></a>[Footnote 180: We are reminded of the +famous sentence in <i>The Prince</i>:—<i>Dove non è +giudizio da richiamare si guarda al fine</i>.]</p> +<p><a name="note-181" id="note-181"> +<!-- Note Anchor 181 --></a>[Footnote 181: Bernhardi adds: 'The +conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to the +essential nature of the state, which can only attain its highest +moral aims in competition with other states.' It would seem to +follow that by violating the neutrality of Belgium Germany is +helping that country to attain its highest moral aims. The +suggestion that Belgium is no longer a neutral Power was not +adopted by the German Government before the war, nor by Dr. von +Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech to the Reichstag on the Belgian +question (see <i>supra</i>, p. 91).]</p> +<p><a name="note-182" id="note-182"> +<!-- Note Anchor 182 --></a>[Footnote 182: It was significant that +Germany, while offering to England at the end of July a guarantee +of the integrity of the soil of France, would not offer any +guarantee of the integrity of French colonies (<i>supra</i>, +<a href="#ch5sec3">p. 82</a>).]</p> +<p><a name="note-183" id="note-183"> +<!-- Note Anchor 183 --></a>[Footnote 183: Nothing has here been +said, though much might be said, of the distortion of history and +ethnology by German nationalism, or Pan-Germanism. It is well known +that the Pan-Germans regard England as Teutonic, and destined to be +gathered into the German fold. In these last few weeks we have been +reproached as a people for being traitors to our 'Teutonic' blood. +Better be traitors to blood than to plain duty; but as a matter of +fact our mixed blood has many other strains than the Teutonic. On +the aims of the Pan-Germanists readers may with profit consult a +book by Paul Vergnet, <i>La France en danger</i> (Oct. 1913).]</p> +<p><a name="note-184" id="note-184"> +<!-- Note Anchor 184 --></a>[Footnote 184: In fairness to Nietzsche +it should be said that in his later years he revolted against the +Prussian military system.]</p> +<p><a name="note-185" id="note-185"> +<!-- Note Anchor 185 --></a>[Footnote 185: German professors have +recently reproached England for being allied with 'Muscovite +barbarism'. Is Russia so barbarous, whose sovereign convened the +first Peace Conference? Have not England and Russia striven +together in peace (as they now strive together in war) for a great +common cause? The German White Book, which seeks to fasten on +Russia the blame of the present war, is oblivious of all that has +happened in these matters since 1898. The reader may with advantage +refer, on this subject, to a pamphlet by Professor Vinogradoff, +<i>Russia: the Psychology of a Nation</i> (Oxford, 1914).]</p> +<hr /> +<a name="EPI" id="EPI"><!-- EPI --></a> +<h2>EPILOGUE</h2> +<p>In conclusion something must be said of the process by which our +understanding with France, still so elastic in 1912 and 1913, +became the solid alliance which now, on sea and land alike, +confronts the German forces. England gave France no positive +engagements until the eleventh hour; it may be argued that England +gave them far too late, and that the war might never have occurred +if England had been less obstinately and judicially pacific. But +the English case for the delay is clear. We hesitated to throw in +our lot with France, because France would not stand neutral while +Germany made war on Russia. We shrank from the incalculable +entanglements which seemed to lie before us if we allied ourselves +with a power which was so committed. Why, we were asking ourselves, +should we fight the battles of Russia in the Balkans?</p> +<p>We were perhaps too cautious in suspecting that France might +contemplate this policy. She could not define beforehand the limits +which she would observe in defending Russia's cause. But she knew, +as we now know, that a war with Russia meant, to German statesmen, +only a pretext for a new attack on France, even more deadly in +intention than that of 1870. France could not do without the help +of Russia. How then could she afford to forfeit Russia's friendship +by declaring, at Germany's command, that she would do nothing to +help Russia?</p> +<p>This loyalty to the Dual Alliance left France during the last +days before the war in a cruel dilemma. Russia, however well +disposed, could not help her ally in the first weeks of a war; and +for France these were the critical weeks, the weeks upon which her +own fate must depend. She appealed urgently to England for +support.</p> +<p>But, even on July 31st, the English Cabinet replied that it +could make no definite engagement. This answer, it is true, had +been foreshadowed in earlier communications. Sir Edward Grey had +made it abundantly clear that there could be no prospect of common +action unless France were exposed to 'an unprovoked attack', and no +certainty of such action even in that case. But France had staked +everything upon the justice of her cause. She had felt that her +pacific intentions were clear to all the world; and that England +could not, with any self-respect, refuse assistance. The French +mobilization had been delayed until July 31st, to convince the +British Cabinet of French good faith; and the French fleet had been +left in the Mediterranean to guard the interests of England no less +than those of France. We can imagine how bitter was the +disappointment with which France received the English answer of +July 31st.</p> +<p>But we were loyal to our obligations as we understood them. If +our answers to France were guarded, our answers to the German +overtures of July 29th and August 1st show that we were fighting +the battle of France with diplomatic weapons. On August 2nd we went +still further, by undertaking to defend the French coasts and +shipping, if the German fleet should come into the Channel or +through the North Sea. To justify our position of reserve from July +31st to August 4th we may quote what Mr. Asquith said the other day +(September 4th):—</p> +<p class="blockquote">'No one who has not been in that position can +realize the strength, the energy, and the persistence with which we +laboured for peace. We persevered by every expedient that diplomacy +could suggest, straining almost to breaking-point our most +cherished friendships and obligations.'</p> +<p>Those efforts failed. We know to-day that mediation had never +any prospects of success, because Germany had resolved that it +should not succeed. Ought we to have known this from the first? It +is easy to be wise after the event. But in England we have Cabinet +government and we have Parliamentary government. Before an English +minister can act, in a matter of national importance, no matter how +positive his own convictions may be, he must convince his +colleagues, and they must feel certain of convincing a democracy +which is essentially pacific, cautious, slow to move. Nothing short +of the German attack on Belgium would have convinced the ordinary +Englishman that German statesmanship had degenerated into piracy. +That proof was given us on August 4th; and on that day we sent our +ultimatum to Berlin.</p> +<p>To-day all England is convinced; and we are fighting back to +back with the French for their national existence and our own. Our +own, because England's existence depends not only on her sea-power, +but upon the maintenance of European state-law. The military spirit +which we have described above (<a href="#CH6">Chap. VI</a>) +tramples upon the rights of nations because it sees a foe in every +equal; because it regards the prosperity of a neighbour as a +national misfortune; because it holds that national greatness is +only to be realized in the act of destroying or absorbing other +nationalities. To those who are not yet visibly assailed, and who +possibly believe themselves secure, we can only give the warning: +<i>Tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet</i>.</p> +<p>Of the issue England is not afraid. The most unfavourable issue +would find her still convinced that she has taken the only course +compatible with honour and with public law. Military anarchism +shall be destroyed if England, France, and Russia can destroy it. +On this object England and France have staked their last ship and +their last soldier. But, it may be asked, what state-system do we +hope to establish, if and when we are successful in this great +crusade?</p> +<p>What England not only desires but needs, and needs imperatively, +is, first, the restitution to Belgium of her former status and +whatever else can be restored of all that she has sacrificed. This +is the indispensable preliminary to any form of settlement. The +next essential is an adequate guarantee to France that she shall +never experience such another invasion as we have seen in August, +1914; without a France which is prosperous, secure, and +independent, European civilization would be irreparably maimed and +stunted. The third essential, as essential as the other two, is the +conservation of those other nations which can only exist on +sufferance so long as <i>Realpolitik</i> is practised with +impunity.</p> +<p>To minor nationalities it should be clear that England is their +friend, and cannot choose but stand their friend. Three times in +her history she has made war upon a would-be despot of the +Continent, treating the 'Balance of Power' as a principle for which +no sacrifice could be too great. In these struggles she assisted +the small Powers, less from altruism than because their interest +was her own. She supported Holland against Philip II of Spain and +against Louis XIV; against Napoleon she supported not Holland only, +but also Portugal and, to the best of her power, Switzerland and +Piedmont.</p> +<p>We do not argue—it would be absurd to argue—that +England has always been free from reproach in her dealings with the +smaller states. Holland may well remember the naval conflicts of +the seventeenth century and the English Navigation Laws. But +Holland should also remember that, in the seventeenth century, +England was not yet a great Power; Holland and England fought as +rivals and on equal terms, in a feud which subsequent alliances +have healed, over a policy which England has long since renounced +as mischievous and futile. On Denmark we inflicted a great wrong in +1807; it can only be extenuated by the fact, which Denmark knows +now though she did not know it then, that Napoleon had conspired +with Russia to seize the Danish fleet and use it against England. +Denmark, indeed, has better cause to complain that we gave her no +assistance in 1864. That mistake—for it was a mistake of +weakness, not deliberate treachery—has brought its own +nemesis. We are still paying for that particular mistake, and we +are not likely to forget the lesson. The case of Schleswig-Holstein +shows how the losses of such a state as Denmark may react on such a +state as England.</p> +<p>England cannot afford that her weaker neighbours should become +less prosperous or less independent than they are. So far as the +long arm of naval power reaches, England is bound to give them +whatever help she can. From motives of self-preservation, if on no +other ground, she could not tolerate their subordination to such a +power as Germany aspires to found. Her quarrel is not with the +German people, but with the political system for which the German +Empire, in its present temper, stands. That system England is bound +to resist, no matter by what power it is adopted.</p> +<p>English sympathies and English traditions are here at one with +English interests. England is proud to recollect how she befriended +struggling nationalities in the nineteenth century. She did not +support Greece and Italy for the sake of any help that they could +give her. The goodwill of England to Holland, to Switzerland, to +the Scandinavian states, is largely based upon their achievements +in science and art and literature. They have proved that they can +serve the higher interests of humanity. They have contributed to +the growth of that common civilization which links together the +small powers and the great with bonds more sacred and more durable +than those of race, of government, of material interest. In this +fraternity each nation has a duty to the rest. If we have harped on +England's interest, it must not for a moment be supposed that we +have forgotten England's duty. But England stands to-day in this +fortunate position, that her duty and her interest combine to impel +her in the same direction.</p> +<hr /> +<a name="RULE4_2" id="RULE4_2"><!-- RULE4 2 --></a> +<h2>APPENDIX I</h2> +<center>GERMANY'S REASONS FOR WAR WITH RUSSIA</center> +<p>How Russia and her Ruler betrayed Germany's confidence and +thereby made the European War.</p> +<p>WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.</p> +<p>Druck und Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin.</p> +<p>Foreign Office,<br /> +Berlin, August 1914.</p> +<p>On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, +Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, +were assassinated by a member of a band of servian conspirators. +The investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian +authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the +life of the Arch-Duke and successor to the throne was prepared and +abetted in Belgrade with the cooperation of Servian officials, and +executed with arms from the Servian State arsenal. This crime must +have opened the eyes of the entire civilized world, not only in +regard to the aims of the Servian policies directed against the +conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but +also concerning the criminal means which the pan-Serb propaganda in +Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these +aims.</p> +<p>The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing and +final separation of the south-easterly districts from the +Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Servia. This +direction of Servias policy has not been altered in the least in +spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of Servia in which it +vouchsafed a change in these policies toward Austria-Hungary as +well as the cultivation of good and neighborly relations.</p> +<p>In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 +years Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war.</p> +<p>It could only do this because it believed itself supported in +its intentions by Russia.</p> +<p>Russia soon after the events brought about by the Turkish +revolution of 1908, endeavored to found a union of the Balcan +states under Russian patronage and directed against the existence +of Turkey. This union which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey +from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the +question of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were +not dismayed over this failure. According to the idea of the +Russian statesmen a new Balcan union under Russian patronage should +be called into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now +dislodged from the Balcan, but against the existence of the +Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should cede +to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during +the last Balcan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina +which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in +with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia +with the aid of French propaganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and +the Herzegovina.</p> +<p>Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was +not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation +of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the +border. The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this +conception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were +able to agree with our allys estimate of the situation, and assure +him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in +Servia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet +with our approval.</p> +<p>We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of +Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, +and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with +our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests +of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a +yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our +assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as +our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb +agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France +to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of +Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian +sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the +position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened +Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism would be no +longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have +confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more +menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbors. We, +therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action +towards Servia but have not participated in her preparations.</p> +<p>Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Government +a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at +Sarajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but +actively supported by the Servian Government, was explained, and in +which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a +punishment of the guilty, was requested. At the same time +Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the +accomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrian +officials in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and +the final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against +Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of +48 hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.</p> +<p>The Servian Government started the mobilization of its army one +day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note.</p> +<p>As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a +reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of +Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavor through +procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just +demands of the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic +relations with Servia without indulging in further negotiations or +accepting further Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she +had sufficiently experienced.</p> +<p>From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with +Servia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by +declaring war.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibits 1 & 2.]</p> +<p>From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that +there were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone, which it +would have to settle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts +toward the localizing of the war, and toward convincing the other +powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable +self-defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically +took the position that no civilized country possessed the right to +stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and +political crime, and to shield the Servians against their just +punishment. In this sense we instructed our representatives with +the foreign powers.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 3.]</p> +<p>Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to +the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Servia +implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but +that Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a +continued friendly behavior of Servia towards the monarchy. +Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of +power in the Balcan.</p> +<p>In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, +and aimed at, a localization of the conflict, both the French and +the English Governments promised an action in the same direction. +But these endeavors did not succeed in preventing the interposition +of Russia in the Austro-Servian disagreement.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibits 4 & 5.]</p> +<p>The Russian Government submitted an official communiqué +on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain +indifferent in the Servio-Austrian conflict. The same was declared +by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the +German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, in the afternoon of July +26th. The German Government declared again, through its Ambassador +at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest +and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the official +explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim +territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of +the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9.]</p> +<p>The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached +Berlin in the evening.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibits 10, 10a, 10b.]</p> +<p>The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were +instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian +mobilization. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also +directed to make the following declaration to the Russian +Government:</p> +<p class="blockquote">"Preparatory military measures by Russia will +force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the +army.</p> +<p class="blockquote">"But mobilization means war.</p> +<p class="blockquote">"As we know the obligations of France towards +Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and +France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a +European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of +the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford +to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the +desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as +Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be +easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for +an understanding."</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 11.]</p> +<p>On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinow, gave +the German military attaché his word of honor that no order +to mobilize had been issued, merely preparations were being made, +but not a horse mustered, nor reserves called in. If +Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the military +districts directed towards Austria, i.e. Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, +Kazan, would be mobilized, under no circumstances those situated on +the German frontier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon +inquiry into the object of the mobilization against +Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging +his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military +attaché then pointed to these mobilization measures against +Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany.</p> +<p>In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came +at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the +German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the +state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and +the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.</p> +<p>On July 27th, the first information was received concerning +preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued +the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison.</p> +<p>In the meantime we had endeavored to localize the conflict by +most emphatic steps.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 12.]</p> +<p>On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit +the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference +of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his +chairmanship. We declared in regard to this proposal that we could +not, however much we approved the idea, participate in such a +conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Servia +before a European tribunal.</p> +<p>France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it +foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 13.]</p> +<p>Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to +the Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely +Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between +Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring +about an understanding between these two powers.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibits 15 & 16.]</p> +<p>We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the +conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's +to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that +either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a +basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government +remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too +late, the hostilities having already been opened.</p> +<p>In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we +advised Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the +dignity of the monarchy.</p> +<p>Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the +military preparations of Russia and France.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 17.]</p> +<p>On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official +notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized. +At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly +progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on +land.</p> +<p>On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an +interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he +reported by telegraph, as follows:</p> +<p class="blockquote">"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I +should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference +to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands +which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise +to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia +had decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange +of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. +Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to +Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for +with regard to Servia, i.e. an infraction of sovereignty. +Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests +by disclaiming any territorial aspiration,—a great concession +on the part of a state engaged in war—should therefore be +permitted to attend to its affair with Servia alone. There would be +time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance +towards the sovereignty of Servia.</p> +<p class="blockquote">"I added very solemnly that at this moment +the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a +general European conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the +Secretary the magnitude of this danger.</p> +<p class="blockquote">"It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from +the idea that Servia could not now be deserted by Russia".</p> +<p>On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburg +wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the +General Staff of the Russian army:</p> +<p class="blockquote">"The Chief of the General Staff has asked me +to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His +Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate +once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had +informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing and +gave me his word of honor in the most solemn manner that nowhere +there had been a mobilization, viz. calling in of a single man or +horse up to the present time, i.e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He +could not assume a guaranty for the future, but he could emphasize +that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty +desired no mobilization.</p> +<p class="blockquote">"As, however, I had received here many pieces +of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different +parts of the country also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the +general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his +officers word of honor he replied that such news was wrong, but +that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been +given.</p> +<p class="blockquote">"I must consider this conversation as an +attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto +taken in view of the abundant and positive information about the +calling in of reserves."</p> +<p>In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its +threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out +that Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. +Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was +therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into +such conversation with Sasonow. Count Szápáry was +empowered to explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia +though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any +suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sasonow +all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian +relations.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 19.]</p> +<p>Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and +supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the +possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as +late as the 30th of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, +as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her +conditions in Servia, i.e. after her march into Servia. We thought +that Russia would accept this basis.</p> +<p>During the interval from July 29th to July 31st there appeared +renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of +mobilization. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier +and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of +the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian +mobilization was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all +such measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg +on word of honor.</p> +<p>Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the +Anglo-German mediation whose tendencies and basis must have been +known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been received in +Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilization.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibits 18, 20, 21, 22, 23.]</p> +<p>During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the +Kaiser, and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His +Majesty called the attention of the Czar to the menacing character +of the Russian mobilization during the continuance of his own +mediating activities.</p> +<p>On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His +Majesty the Kaiser:</p> +<p class="blockquote">"I thank You cordially for Your mediation +which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is +technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations +which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is +far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between +Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no +provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide +with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success +of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and +the peace of Europe.</p> +<p class="blockquote">"Your cordially devoted</p> +<p class="blockquote">"Nicolas."</p> +<p>This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by +H.M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m.:</p> +<p class="blockquote">"Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your +request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your +Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action +was taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my ally +Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my +mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have +continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious +preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The +responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures +of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my +efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I +who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens +the entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand to avert it. No +one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might well have +awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and +Your country, bequeathed to me by my grand-father on his deathbed, +has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia +while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. +The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides +to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and +Austria-Hungary."</p> +<p>Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization +of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and +already ordered during the afternoon of the 31st of July, was in +full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 +o'clock that same afternoon.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 24.]</p> +<p>After the Russian general mobilization became known in Berlin, +the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the +afternoon of July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that +Germany declared the state of war as counter-measure against the +general mobilization of the Russian army and navy which must be +followed by mobilization if Russia did not cease its military +measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and +notified Germany thereof.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]</p> +<p>At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed +to demand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours, +whether it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.</p> +<p>The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilization, +menacing the security of our country, the laborious action at +mediation of the European cabinets. The Russian mobilization in +regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never +allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its +continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war.</p> +<p>The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to +M. Sasonow on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight.</p> +<p>The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us.</p> +<p>Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar +telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser, as follows:</p> +<p class="blockquote">"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend +that You are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from You +the same guaranty which I have given You, viz., that these measures +do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the +welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so +dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our +long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect +with full confidence Your urgent reply."</p> +<p>To this H.M. the Kaiser replied:</p> +<p class="blockquote">"I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown +yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may +yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no +telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your +Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An +immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the +sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am +unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your +telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order +Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest +violation of our frontiers."</p> +<p>As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the +receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the +mobilization of the entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 +p.m.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]</p> +<p>The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in +the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply +within the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered +ourselves in a state of war after the refusal of our demands. +However, before a confirmation of the execution of this order had +been received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August +1st, i.e., the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Czar, +cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and +marched into German territory.</p> +<p>Thus Russia began the war against us.</p> +<p>Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to +the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m.</p> +<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 27.]</p> +<p>The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory +reply on August 1st at 1. p.m. which gave no clear idea of the +position of France, as he limited himself to the explanation that +France would do that which her interests demanded. A few hours +later, at 5 p.m., the mobilization of the entire French army and +navy was ordered.</p> +<p>On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities.</p> +<center>THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.</center> +<center>THE NOTE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERVIA.</center> +<p>Presented July 23rd in Belgrade.</p> +<p>"On March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Minister to the Court of +Vienna made the following statement, by order of his +Government:</p> +<p>"Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the +situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt +herself to the decisions which the powers are going to arrive at in +reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the +councils of the powers, Servia binds herself to cease the attitude +of protest and resistence which she has assumed since last October, +relative to the annexation, and she binds herself further to change +the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, +in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly +relations.</p> +<p>"The history of the last years, and especially the painful +events of June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a +subversive movement in Servia whose aim it is to separate certain +territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This movement, +which developed under the eyes of the Servian Government, has found +expression subsequently beyond the territory of the kingdom, in +acts of terrorism, a series of assassinations and murders.</p> +<p>"Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in the +declaration of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has +done nothing to suppress this movement. She suffered the criminal +doings of the various societies and associations directed against +the monarchy, the unbridled language of the press, the +glorification of the originators of assassinations, the +participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues; +she suffered the unwholesome propaganda in public education, and +lastly permitted all manifestations which would mislead the Servian +people into hatred of the monarchy and into contempt for its +institutions.</p> +<p>"This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government made +itself guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the events of +June 28th demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences +of such sufferance.</p> +<p>"<i>It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the +criminal authors of the outrage of June 28th, that the murder at +Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the +arms and bombs with which they were equipped, from Servian officers +and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, +lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms to +Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Servian frontier +officials.</i></p> +<p>"The cited results of the investigation do not permit the +Imperial and Royal Government to observe any longer the attitude of +waiting, which it has assumed for years towards those agitations +which have their centre in Belgrade, and which from there radiate +into the territory of the monarchy. These results, on the contrary, +impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate +intrigues which constitute a permanent menace for the peace of the +monarchy.</p> +<p>"In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal +Government is forced to demand official assurance from the Servian +Government that it condemns the propaganda directed against +Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety of the machinations whose aim it +is to separate parts from the monarchy which belong to it, and that +she binds herself to suppress with all means this criminal and +terrorizing propaganda.</p> +<p>"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the +Royal Servian Government will publish on the first page of its +official organ of July 26th, 1914, the following declaration:</p> +<p>"The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed +against Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety of those machinations +whose aim it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy +territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the +ghastly consequences of these criminal actions.</p> +<p>"The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers and +officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and +have thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which +the Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its +declaration of March 31st, 1909.</p> +<p>"The Royal Government which disapproves and rejects every +thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations of the +inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty +to call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and +officials, and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it +will hence-forward proceed with the utmost severity against any +persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and suppress which it +will make every effort."</p> +<p>"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the +cognizance of the Royal Army through an order of H.M. the King, and +it is to be published in the official organ of the Army.</p> +<p>"The Royal Servian Government binds itself, in addition, as +follows:</p> +<p>"1. to suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and +contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and whose general +tendency is directed against the latters territorial integrity;</p> +<p>"2. to proceed at once with the dissolution of the society +Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda, +and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and +associations in Servia which occupy themselves with the propaganda +against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the +necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may not +continue their activities under another name or in another +form;</p> +<p>"3. without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in +Servia, so far as the corps of instructors, as well as the means of +instruction are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to +foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;</p> +<p>"4. to remove from military service and the administration in +general all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda +against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of +the material which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses +against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right +to communicate to the Royal Government;</p> +<p>"5. to consent that in Servia officials of the Imperial and +Royal Government co-operate in the suppression of a movement +directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy;</p> +<p>"6. to commence a judicial investigation against the +participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian +territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and Royal +Government will participate in the examinations;</p> +<p>"7. to proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja +Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Servian State officials, +who have been compromised through the result of the +investigation;</p> +<p>"8. to prevent through effective measures the participation of +the Servian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives +across the frontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and +Loznica, who assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in +crossing the frontier;</p> +<p>"9. to give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in +regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries +in Servia and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their +official position, to express themselves in interviews in a hostile +manner against Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28th;</p> +<p>"10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the +Royal Government at the latest until Saturday 25th inst., at 6 p.m. +A memoir concerning the results of the investigations at Sarajevo, +so far as they concern points 7. and 8. is enclosed with this +note."</p> +<p>ENCLOSURE.</p> +<p>The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and +accomplices in the Court of Sarajevo, on account of the +assassination on June 28th has, so far, yielded the following +results:</p> +<p>1. The plan to murder Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand during his stay +in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko, +Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with +the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.</p> +<p>2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by +the criminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major Tankosic, +and presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade.</p> +<p>3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of +the Servian Army in Kragujevac.</p> +<p>4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic +instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gave +instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez in +a forest near the target practice field of Topshider—(outside +Belgrade).</p> +<p>5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia and +Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the smuggling of +their arms, a secret system of transportation was organized by +Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia +and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz +(Rade Popowic) and of Loznica, as well as by the custom house +official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica with the aid of several other +persons.</p> +<center>THE SERVIAN ANSWER.</center> +<p>Presented at Vienna, July 25th, 1914.<br /> +(With Austria's commentaries in italics.)</p> +<p>The Royal Government has received the communication of the +Imperial and Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and is convinced +that its reply will dissipate any misunderstanding which threatens +to destroy the friendly and neighborly relations between the +Austrian monarchy and the kingdom of Servia.</p> +<p>The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere there have been +renewed protests against the great neighborly monarchy like those +which at one time were expressed in the Skuptschina, as well as in +the declaration and actions of the responsible representatives of +the state at that time, and which were terminated by the Servian +declaration of March 31st 1909; furthermore that since that time +neither the different corporations of the kingdom, nor the +officials have made an attempt to alter the political and judicial +condition created in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The Royal +Government states that the I. and R. Government has made no +protestation in this sense excepting in the case of a text book, in +regard to which the I. and R. Government has received an entirely +satisfactory explanation. Servia has given during the time of the +Balcan crisis in numerous cases evidence of her pacific and +moderate policy, and it is only owing to Servia and the sacrifices +which she has brought in the interest of the peace of Europe that +this peace has been preserved.</p> +<p><i>The Royal Servian Government limits itself to establishing +that since the declaration of March 31st 1909, there has been no +attempt on the part of the Servian Government to alter the position +of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.</i></p> +<p><i>With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note, +as we have not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken +anything official in this direction. Our gravamen is that in spite +of the obligation assumed in the cited note, she has omitted to +suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of +the monarchy.</i></p> +<p><i>Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the +entire direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and +neighborly relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and not +only not to interfere with the possession of Bosnia.</i></p> +<p>The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions +of a private character, as for instance newspaper articles and the +peaceable work of societies, expressions which are of very common +appearance in other countries, and which ordinarily are not under +the control of the state. This, all the less, as the Royal +Government has shown great courtesy in the solution of a whole +series of questions which have arisen between Servia and +Austria-Hungary, whereby it has succeeded to solve the greater +number thereof, in favor of the progress of both countries.</p> +<p><i>The assertion of the Royal Servian Government that the +expressions of the press and the activity of Servian associations +possess a private character and thus escape governmental control, +stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern states and +even the most liberal of press and society laws, which nearly +everywhere subject the press and the societies to a certain control +of the state. This is also provided for by the Servian +institutions. The rebuke against the Servian Government consists in +the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise its press and its +societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be hostile to +the monarchy.</i></p> +<p>The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised by the +assertions that citizens of Servia had participated in the +preparations of the outrage in Sarajevo. The Government expected to +be invited to cooperate in the investigation of the crime, and it +was ready in order to prove its complete correctness, to proceed +against all persons in regard to whom it would receive +information.</p> +<p><i>This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government was +accurately informed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite +personalities and not only in the position, but also obliged by its +own laws to institute investigations spontaneously. The Servian +Government has done nothing in this direction.</i></p> +<p>According to the wishes of the I. and R. Government, the Royal +Government is prepared to surrender to the court, without regard to +position and rank, every Servian citizen, for whose participation +in the crime of Sarajevo it should have received proof. It binds +itself particularly on the first page of the official organ of the +26th of July to publish the following enunciation:</p> +<p>"The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda which +should be directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e. the entirety of +such activities as aim towards the separation of certain +territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it regrets +sincerely the lamentable consequences of these criminal +machinations."</p> +<p><i>The Austrian demand reads</i>:</p> +<p>"<i>The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda against +Austria-Hungary</i>...."</p> +<p><i>The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which +has been made by the Royal Servian Government, is meant to imply +that a propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, +and that it is not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and +the Servian Government reserves itself the supterfuge for later +occasions that it had not disavowed by this declaration the +existing propaganda, nor recognized the same as hostile to the +monarchy, whence it could deduce further that it is not obliged to +suppress in the future a propaganda similar to the present +one</i>.</p> +<p>The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication +of the I. and R. Government certain Servian officers and +functionaries have participated in the propaganda just referred to, +and that these have therefore endangered the amicable relations for +the observation of which the Royal Government had solemnly obliged +itself through the declaration of March 31st, 1909.</p> +<p>The Government ... identical with the demanded text.</p> +<p><i>The formula as demanded by Austria reads</i>:</p> +<p>"<i>The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and +functionaries ... have participated</i>...."</p> +<p><i>Also with this formula and the further addition "according to +the declaration of the I. and R. Government", the Servian +Government pursues the object, already indicated above, to preserve +a free hand for the future</i>.</p> +<p>The Royal Government binds itself further:</p> +<p>1. During the next regular meeting of the Skuptschina to embody +in the press laws a clause, to wit, that the incitement to hatred +of, and contempt for, the monarchy is to be must severely punished, +as well as every publication whose general tendency is directed +against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.</p> +<p>It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the +constitution to embody an amendment into Art. 22 of the +constitutional law which permits the confiscation of such +publications as is at present impossible according to the clear +definition of Art. 22 of the constitution.</p> +<p><i>Austria had demanded</i>:</p> +<p><i>1. To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and +contempt for the monarchy, and whose tendency is directed against +the territorial integrity of the monarchy.</i></p> +<p><i>We wanted to bring about the obligation for Servia to take +care that such attacks of the press would cease in the +future.</i></p> +<p><i>Instead Servia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as +means towards this end, viz.:</i></p> +<p><i>a) A law according to which the expressions of the press +hostile to the monarchy can be individually punished, a matter, +which is immaterial to us, all the more so, as the individual +prosecution of press intrigues is very rarely possible and as, with +a lax enforcement of such laws, the few cases of this nature would +not be punished. The proposition, therefore, does not meet our +demand in any way, and it offers not the least guarantee for the +desired success.</i></p> +<p><i>b) An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which would +permit confiscation, a proposal, which does not satisfy us, as the +existence of such a law in Servia is of no use to us. For we want +the obligation of the Government to enforce it and that has not +been promised us.</i></p> +<p><i>These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and +evasive as we are not told within what time these laws will be +passed, and as in the event of the notpassing of these laws by the +Skuptschina everything would remain as it is, excepting the event +of a possible resignation of the Government.</i></p> +<p>2. The Government possesses no proofs and the note of the I. and +R. Government does not submit them that the society Narodna Odbrana +and other similar societies have committed, up to the present, any +criminal actions of this manner through anyone of their members. +Notwithstanding this, the Royal Government will accept the demand +of the I. and R. Government and dissolve the society Narodna +Odbrana, as well as every society which should act against +Austria-Hungary.</p> +<p><i>The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated +societies hostile to the monarchy fills the entire public life of +Servia; it is therefore an entirely inacceptable reserve if the +Servian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it. Aside +from this, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we have asked +besides:</i></p> +<p>"<i>To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies to +prevent the reformation of the dissolved societies under another +name and in another form.</i>"</p> +<p><i>In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly +silent, so that through this semi-concession there is offered us no +guarantee for putting an end to the agitation of the associations +hostile to the Monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana.</i></p> +<p>3. The Royal Servian Government binds itself without delay to +eliminate from the public instruction in Servia anything which +might further the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary +provided the I. and R. Government furnishes actual proofs.</p> +<p><i>Also in this case the Servian Government first demands proofs +for a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public instruction +of Servia while it must know that the text books introduced in the +Servian schools contain objectionable matter in this direction and +that a large portion of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna +Odbrana and affiliated societies.</i></p> +<p><i>Furthermore, the Servian Government has not fulfilled a part +of our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the +addition desired by us: "as far as the body of instructors is +concerned, as well as the means of instruction"—a sentence +which shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the Monarchy is +to be found in the Servian schools</i>.</p> +<p>4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those officers +and officials from the military and civil services in regard to +whom it has been proved by judicial investigation that they have +been guilty of actions against the territorial integrity of the +monarchy; it expects that the I. and R. Government communicate to +it for the purpose of starting the investigation the names of these +officers and officials, and the facts with which they have been +charged.</p> +<p><i>By promising the dismissal from the military and civil +services of those officers and officials who are found guilty by +judicial procedure, the Servian Government limits its assent to +those cases, in which these persons have been charged with a crime +according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand the removal +of such officers and officials as indulge in a propaganda hostile +to the Monarchy, which is generally not punishable in Servia, our +demands have not been fulfilled in this point</i>.</p> +<p>5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear about the +sense and the scope of that demand of the I. and R. Government +which concerns the obligation on the part of the Royal Servian +Government to permit the cooperation of officials of the I. and R. +Government on Servian territory, but it declares that it is willing +to accept every cooperation which does not run counter to +international law and criminal law, as well as to the friendly and +neighborly relations.</p> +<p><i>The international law, as well as the criminal law, has +nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the +nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special +agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is therefore +incomprehensible and on account of its vague general form it would +lead to unbridgeable difficulties</i>.</p> +<p>6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of +course to begin an investigation against all those persons who have +participated in the outrage of June 28th and who are in its +territory. As far as the cooperation in this investigation of +specially delegated officials of the I. and R. Government is +concerned, this cannot be accepted, as this is a violation of the +constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in some cases the +result of the investigation might be communicated to the +Austro-Hungarian officials.</p> +<p><i>The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable</i>:</p> +<p><i>1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants +in the outrage</i>.</p> +<p><i>2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in the +examinations ("Recherche" in contrast with "enquête +judiciaire").</i></p> +<p><i>3. It did not occur to us to let I. and R. Government +officials participate in the Servian court procedure; they were to +cooperate only in the police researches which had to furnish and +fix the material for the investigation.</i></p> +<p><i>If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is +done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference +between "enquête judiciaire" and simple police researches. As +it desired to escape from every control of the investigation which +would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results +for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible +manner the cooperation of our officials (precedents for such police +intervention exist in great number) it tries to justify its refusal +by showing up our demands as impossible</i>.</p> +<p>7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of the day on +which the note was received the arrest of Major Voislar Tankosic. +However, as far as Milan Ciganowic is concerned who is a citizen of +the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who has been employed till June +28th with the Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to +locate him, wherefor a warrant has been issued against him.</p> +<p>The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, as soon as +possible, for the purpose of conducting the investigation, the +existing grounds for suspicion and the proofs of guilt, obtained in +the investigation at Sarajevo.</p> +<p><i>This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, +Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three +days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that +Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it +is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Servian service on +June 28th. In the second place, we add that the prefect of police +at Belgrade who had himself caused the departure of this Ciganowic +and who knew his whereabout, declared in an interview that a man by +the name of Milan Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade</i>.</p> +<p>8. The Servian Government will amplify and render more severe +the existing measures against the suppression of smuggling of arms +and explosives.</p> +<p>It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once against, +and punish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the +line Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who have permitted +the perpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier.</p> +<p>9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations about the +expressions which its officials in Servia and abroad have made in +interviews after the outrage and which, according to the assertion +of the I. and R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon +as the I. and R. Government points out in detail where those +expressions were made and succeeds in proving that those +expressions have actually been made by the functionaries concerned, +the Royal Government itself will take care that the necessary +evidences and proofs are collected therefor.</p> +<p><i>The Royal Servian Government must be aware of the interviews +in question. If it demands of the I. and R. Government that it +should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews and if +it reserves for itself the right of a formal investigation, it +shows that it is not its intention seriously to fulfill the +demand.</i></p> +<p>10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. Government, +so far as this has not been already done by the present note, of +the execution of the measures in question as soon as one of those +measures has been ordered and put into execution.</p> +<p>The Royal Servian Government believes it to be to the common +interest not to rush the solution of this affair and it is +therefore, in case the I. and R. Government should not consider +itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to accept a +peaceable solution, be it by referring the decision of this +question to the International Court at the Hague or by leaving it +to the decision of the Great Powers who have participated in the +working out of the declaration given by the Servian Government on +March 31st 1909.</p> +<p><i>The Servian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for +time.</i></p> +<center>EXHIBIT I.</center> +<p>The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and +St. Petersburg, on Juli 23rd 1914.</p> +<p>The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning +the circumstances under which the Assassination of the Austrian +successor to the throne and his consort took place, disclose +clearly the aims which the pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and +the means which it utilizes for their realization. Through the +published facts the last doubt must disappear that the center of +action of the efforts for the separation of the south slavic +provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with +the Servian Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it displays +its activity with the connivance of members of the Government and +of the Army.</p> +<p>The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. +In a specially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself +during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint +and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic +intercession of the powers is it to be ascribed that the +provocations to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on +the part of Servia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of +future well-behaviour which the Servian Government gave at that +time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit +sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has +meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; at its door is to be +laid the latest crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has +become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity nor +with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view +any longer idly the doings across the border through which the +safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently +threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the +demands of the Austro-Hungarian government can be viewed only as +justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion +as well as by the government in Servia does not preclude the fear +that the Servian government will decline to meet these demands and +that it will allow itself to be carried away into a provocative +attitude toward Austria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the +Austro-Hungarian government, unless it renounced definitely its +position as a great power, but to press its demands with the +Servian government and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to +military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be +left with it.</p> +<p>I have the honor to request you to express yourself in the sense +indicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (Sir +Edward Grey) (M. Sasonow) and therewith give special emphasis to +the view that in this question there is concerned an affair which +should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the +limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavor of the powers +to insure. We anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict +because every intercession of another power on account of the +various treaty-alliances would precipitate inconceivable +consequences.</p> +<p>I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about +the course of your interview.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 2.</center> +<p>The Chancellor to the Governments of Germany. Confidential. +Berlin, July 28, 1914.</p> +<p>You will make the following report to the Government to which +you are accredited:</p> +<p>In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published +in its note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must +disappear that the outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor +to the throne has fallen a victim, was prepared in Servia, to say +the least with the connivance of members of the Servian government +and army. It is a product of the pan-Serb intrigues which for a +series of years have become a source of permanent disturbance for +the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe.</p> +<p>The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the +Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and +moderation of the Austro-Hungarian government and the energetic +intercession of the powers is it to be ascribed that the +provocations to which Austria-Hungary was exposed at that time, did +not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour, +which the Servian government gave at that time, it has not kept. +Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official +Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to increase +in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with its +dignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the +Austro-Hungarian government persisted to view idly any longer the +intrigues beyond the frontier, through which the safety and the +integrity of the monarchy are permanently threatened. With this +state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the +Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable.</p> +<p>The reply of the Servian government to the demands which the +Austro-Hungarian government put on the 23rd inst. through its +representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in +Servia are not inclined to cease their former policies and +agitation. There will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian +government than to press its demands, if need be through military +action, unless it renounces for good its position as a great +power.</p> +<p>Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of +course and a task of Russia's to actively become a party to Servia +in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the +European conflagration which would result from a similar step by +Russia, the "Nowoje Wremja" believes itself justified in making +Germany responsible in so far as it does not induce Austria-Hungary +to yield.</p> +<p>The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not +Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia, +but it is Servia which, through unscrupulous favor toward pan-Serb +aspirations, even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, +threatens the same in her existence and creates conditions, which +eventually found expression in the wanton outrage at Sarajevo. If +Russia believes that it must champion the cause of Servia in this +matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must +realize that it makes the Serb activities its own, to undermine the +conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and that +thus it bears the sole responsibility if out of the Austro-Servian +affair, which all other great powers desire to localize, there +arises a European war. This responsibility of Russia's is evident +and it weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially +declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire +Servian territory or to touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom, +but only desires peace against the Servian intrigues threatening +its existence.</p> +<p>The attitude of the Imperial government in this question is +clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in +Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction of the +Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the +triple alliance with a complete isolation of the German Empire in +consequence. Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of +Austria-Hungary. The duty, if at all possible, to guard Europe +against a universal war, points to the support by ourselves of +those endeavors which aim at the localization of the conflict, +faithful to the course of those policies which we have carried out +successfully for forty-four years in the interest of the +preservation of the peace of Europe.</p> +<p>Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of +Russia the fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to +our duty as allies, the neighbor-monarchy with all the power at our +command. We shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in +the clear consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity +which war will bring upon the peoples of Europe.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 3.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor +on July 24th 1914.</p> +<p>Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Chargé +d'affaires in order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially +Austria-Hungary's point of view toward Servia. After recapitulation +of the historical development of the past few years, he emphasized +that the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest toward Servia. +Austria-Hungary would not claim Servian territory. It insisted +merely that this step was meant as a definite means of checking the +Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstance, Austria-Hungary +must have a guaranty for continued amicable relations with Servia. +It was far from him to intend to bring about a change in the +balance of powers in the Balcan. The Charge d'affaires who had +received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the discussion +of the Secretary "ad referendum" with the promise to submit it +immediately to Sasonow.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 4.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the +Chancellor on July 24th 1914.</p> +<p>I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged +interview with Sasonow. The Secretary (Sasonow) indulged in +unmeasured accusations toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much +agitated. He declared most positively that Russia could not permit +under any circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be +settled alone between the parties concerned.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 5.</center> +<p>The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. +Telegram of July 26th 1914.</p> +<p>The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview with +Sasonow this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression +as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that +Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace +at last at her frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 6.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the +Chancellor on July 25th 1914.</p> +<p>Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary aide +de camp to the Czar).</p> +<p>The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly +interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. +The manoeuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised +to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At +headquarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of +Austria. I have the impression that complete preparations for +mobilization against Austria are being made.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 7.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the +Chancellor on July 26th 1914.</p> +<p>The military attaché requests the following message to be +sent to the general staff:</p> +<p>I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev +and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable +elsewhere.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 8.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor on +July 27th 1914.</p> +<p>Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.</p> +<p>(Note that the official translator means +<i>Kriegszustand</i>.)</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 9.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on +July 27th 1914.</p> +<p>Have learned reliably that French XIVth corps has discontinued +manoeuvres.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 10.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London. +Urgent. July 26th 1914.</p> +<p>Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and +solemnly that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that +it will not touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires +to establish peaceful conditions. According to news received here, +the call for several classes of the reserves is expected +immediately which is equivalent to mobilization.[<a href= +"#note-186">186</a>] If this news proves correct, we shall be +forced to contermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our +desire to localize the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe +remains unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg +with all possible emphasis.</p> +<p><a name="note-186" id="note-186"> +<!-- Note Anchor 186 --></a>[Footnote 186: The German text inserts +<i>auch gegen uns</i>, i.e. also against us.]</p> +<p>EXHIBIT 10a.</p> +<p>Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador +at Paris. July 26th 1914.</p> +<p>After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no +intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of +the Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war +rests solely with Russia which has to bear the entire +responsibility. We depend upon France with which we are at one in +the desire for the preservation of the peace of Europe that it will +exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favour of peace.</p> +<p>EXHIBIT 10b.</p> +<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. +Petersburg on July 26th, 1914.</p> +<p>After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial +dis-interestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance +of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely +upon Russia. We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps +which will threaten seriously the peace of Europe.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 11.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the +Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.</p> +<p>Military Attaché reports a conversation with the +Secretary of War:</p> +<p>Sasonow has requested the latter to enlighten me on the +situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word of honor that +no order to mobilize has as yet been issued. Though general +preparations are being made, no reserves were called and no horses +mustered. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, such military +districts as are directed toward Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, +Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under no circumstances those on +the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with +Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of +mobilization against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred +to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the +friendly intentions, but considered mobilization even against +Austria as very menacing.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 12.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London +on July 27th, 1914.</p> +<p>We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to +hold a quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to +place our ally in his dispute with Servia before a European +tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an +Austro-Russian conflict.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 13.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London +on July 25th, 1914.</p> +<p>The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an +Austro-Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. +We do not wish to interpose in the former any more than England, +and as heretofore we take the position that this question must be +localized by virtue of all powers refraining from intervention. It +is therefore our hope that Russia will refrain from any action in +view of her responsibility and the seriousness of the situation. We +are prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite +apart from our known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia +and Austria jointly with the other powers.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 14.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. +Petersburg on July 28th, 1914.</p> +<p>We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to elucidate in St. +Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in +a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The +declaration of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in +this matter.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 15.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London +on July 27th, 1914.</p> +<p>We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the +sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides +to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonow for a direct parley +with Vienna.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 16.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor +on July 28th, 1914.</p> +<p>Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his +thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He +states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Servia +and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears +belated.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 17.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris +on July 29th, 1914.</p> +<p>News received here regarding French preparations of war +multiplies from hour to hour. I request that You call the attention +of the French Government to this and accentuate that such measures +would call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to +proclaim threatening state of war (drohende Kriegsgefahr), and +while this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilization, +yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the +preservation of peace.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 18.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburg to H. M. the +Kaiser on July 30th, 1914.</p> +<p>Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday, after causing Your +Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas: Thank +God that a telegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told me +the telegram has made a deep impression upon the Czar but as the +mobilization against Austria had already been ordered and Sasonow +had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to +retreat, His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I +then told him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay +at the door of premature mobilization against Austria-Hungary which +after all was involved merely in a local war with Servia, for +Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested upon +Russia which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no +intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilized +against Servia and not against Russia and there was no ground for +an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in +Germany one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that "she +could not desert her brethren in Servia", after the horrible crime +of Sarajevo. I told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's +army were to be mobilized.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 19.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on +July 31st, 1914.</p> +<p>We have continued to negotiate between Russia and +Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between His +Majesty the Kaiser and His Majesty the Czar, as well as in +conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilization of +Russia all our efforts have been greatly handicapped if they have +not become impossible. In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is +taking such far-reaching measures against us that the situation is +becoming continually more menacing.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 20.</center> +<p>I. His Majesty to the Czar.</p> +<p>July 28th, 10.45 p.m.</p> +<p>I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which +is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The +inscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Servia, +has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand +has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder +their own King and his consort, still dominates that country. +Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, +and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all +those who are responsible for this horrible murder, shall suffer +their deserved punishment.</p> +<p>On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty +encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public +opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both +for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to +induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory +understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support +me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet +arise.</p> +<p>Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin</p> +<p>signed: Wilhelm.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 21.</center> +<p>II. The Czar to His Majesty.</p> +<p>Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 p.m.</p> +<p>I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I +ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared +against a weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully +share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to +resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to +take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a +European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship +to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going too +far.</p> +<p>signed: Nicolas.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 22.</center> +<p>III. His Majesty to the Czar.</p> +<p>July 29th, 6.30 p.m.</p> +<p>I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the +conservation of peace. However: I cannot—as I told You in my +first telegram—consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an +"ignominious war". Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the +promises of Servia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely +unreliable.</p> +<p>According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be +considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises +of Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I +am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian cabinet that +Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of +Servia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for +Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without +drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I +believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable +between Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which—as +I have already telegraphed You—my Government endeavors to aid +with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, +which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would +accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would +undermine my position as mediator which—upon Your appeal to +my friendship and aid—I willingly accepted.</p> +<p>signed: Wilhelm.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 23.</center> +<p>IV. His Majesty to the Czar.</p> +<p>July 30th, 1 a.m.</p> +<p>My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your +Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a +mobilization; I have told You the same in my last telegram. +Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Servia, and only a part +of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case according to Your +advice and that of Your Government, mobilizes against +Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which You have +entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon +Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The +entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders, You have +to bear the responsibility for war or peace.</p> +<p>signed: Wilhelm.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 23a.</center> +<p>V. The Czar to His Majesty.</p> +<p>Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1.20 p.m.</p> +<p>I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending +to-night Tatisheft (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with +instructions. The military measures now taking form were decided +upon five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the +preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these +measures will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator +which I appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon +Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.</p> +<p>Nicolas.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 24.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. +Petersburg on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.</p> +<p>In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up +to this hour made no preparations for mobilization, Russia has +mobilized her entire army and navy, hence also against us. On +account of these Russian measures we have been forced, for the +safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war, +which does not yet imply mobilization. Mobilization, however, is +bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war +against us and against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours and notifies +us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at once to +M. Sasonow and wire hour of communication.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 25.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris +on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.</p> +<p>Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and fleet, +therefore also against us in spite of our still pending mediation. +We have therefore declared the threatening state of war which is +bound to be followed by mobilization unless Russia stops within 12 +hours all measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilization +inevitably implies war. Please ask French Government whether it +intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made +in 18 hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed +necessary.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 26.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. +Petersburg on August 1st, 12.52 p.m. Urgent.</p> +<p>If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our +demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 +o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement:</p> +<p>"Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès +les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution +pacifique. Se rendant à un désir que lui en avail +été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur +de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec +l'Angleterre était appliqué à accomplir un +rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et +de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le +résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la +totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer.</p> +<p>"A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par +aucun préparatif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, +l'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et +imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût +manqué de parer à ce péril il aurait compromis +la securité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par +conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de +s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de +toutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes +militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à +cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus, que son +action était dirigée contre l'Allemande, j'ai +l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir à +Votre Excellence ce qui suit:</p> +<p>"Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, an nom de +l'Empire relève le défi et Se considère en +état de guerre avec la Russie."</p> +<p>Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this +instruction by Russian time.</p> +<p>Please ask for Your passports and turn over protection and +affairs to the American Embassy.</p> +<center>EXHIBIT 27.</center> +<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor +on August 1st 1.05 p. m.</p> +<p>Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain +neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister +declared that France would do that which her interests +dictated.</p> +<hr /> +<a name="RULE4_3" id="RULE4_3"><!-- RULE4 3 --></a> +<h2>APPENDIX II</h2> +<center>EXTRACTS FROM SIR EDWARD GREY'S CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING +THE EUROPEAN CRISIS</center> +<p><i>For the complete Correspondence see White Paper Miscellaneous +No. 6 (1914) (Cd. 7467), presented to both Houses of Parliament by +Command of His Majesty, August 1914</i></p> +<p>No. 13.</p> +<p><i>Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.</i></p> +<p>(Translation.)</p> +<p>M. Sazionof telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires +at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914:</p> +<p>"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day +after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period +to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take +any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that +have arisen.</p> +<p>"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and +fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action +followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be +above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply +should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness +to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the +Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should +equally allow them sufficient time to study them.</p> +<p>"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the +Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to +offer advice to the Servian Government.</p> +<p>"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render +nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to +the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of +international relations.</p> +<p>"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the +Cabinet at Vienna.</p> +<p>"M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will +adhere to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir +E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the +British Ambassador at Vienna."</p> +<p>No. 17.</p> +<p><i>Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July</i> +25.)</p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>St. Petersburgh, July</i> 25, 1914.</p> +<p>I Saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning....</p> +<p>The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite +ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be +guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept +the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for +Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the +Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians +attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, +and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at +the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was +in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the +question placed on an international footing, as the obligations +taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian +ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.</p> +<p>If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite +ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of +England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his +opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to +arbitration.</p> +<p>On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not +precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your +influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia +had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it +was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against +Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present <i>status quo</i> in +the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not +believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was +decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia +there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would +flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. I said that +England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to +better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were +disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she +were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said +that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon +our neutrality.</p> +<p>I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for +Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany +would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to +carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His +Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush +Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she +feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks +of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate +a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could +regard the situation as desperate.</p> +<p>No. 18.</p> +<p><i>Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July +25.)</i></p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Berlin, July 25, 1914.</i></p> +<p>Your telegram of the 24th July acted on.</p> +<p>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a +telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he +immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to +Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an +extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. +Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at +Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances +there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. +Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary +had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that +Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, +and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that +Servian Government could not swallow certain of the +Austro-Hungarian demands.</p> +<p>Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation +was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at +Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of +seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, +exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it +was not to be feared that, in taking military action against +Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. +He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be +localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's +papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his +optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given +the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted +was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such +a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became +threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as +to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and +St. Petersburgh.</p> +<p>Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note +left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very +earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the +contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.</p> +<p>No. 41.</p> +<p><i>Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July +27.)</i></p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Vienna, July</i> 27, 1914.</p> +<p>I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the +Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the +Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; +that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war +with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to +be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to +Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of +mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of +war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would +undoubtedly be a great disappointment.</p> +<p>I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send +me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the +hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to +avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a +way out even now.</p> +<p>No. 43.</p> +<p><i>Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July +27.)</i></p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Berlin, July</i> 27, 1914.</p> +<p>Your telegram of 26th July.</p> +<p>Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would +practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his +opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and +Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, +desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. +I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with +arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not +directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a +dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference +as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just +received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on +the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. +He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a +satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing +anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between +the Austrian and Russian Governments.</p> +<p>In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said +that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if +Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. +I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said +that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, +but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and +Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be +difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would +therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.</p> +<p>Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh +had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general +situation.</p> +<p>No. 56.</p> +<p><i>Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July +28.)</i></p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Vienna, July</i> 27, 1914.</p> +<p>The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest +conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-secretary of State for +Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. +Petersburgh, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian +Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure +him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible +to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as +she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the +annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would +be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied +that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken +place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors. +The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep +the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take +place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce +the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, +and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should +suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of +a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign +Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. +Petersburgh. The former had agreed that much of the +Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and +in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the +guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to +Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian +Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh +should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with +the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to +advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an +independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion +to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.</p> +<p>No. 62.</p> +<p><i>Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July +28.)</i></p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Vienna, July 28</i>, 1914.</p> +<p>I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of +your telegram of 27th July to Berlin. I avoided the word +"mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech,[<a href= +"#note-187">187</a>] which he had just read to me, you had hopes +that conversations in London between the four Powers less +interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian +Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual +hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian +reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; +that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during +which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that +Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister +for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion +could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be +declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, +as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee +that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must +be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. +I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not +now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to +complications threatening the peace of Europe.</p> +<p>In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, +if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should +sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of +sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had +against Servia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put +first her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first +instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the +question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said +he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose +operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial +aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.</p> +<p><a name="note-187" id="note-187"> +<!-- Note Anchor 187 --></a>[Footnote 187: "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. +107, Columns 931, 932, 933.]</p> +<a name="numb-85" id="numb-85"></a> +<p>No. 85.</p> +<p><i>Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July +29.)</i></p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Berlin, July</i> 29, 1914.</p> +<p>I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency +had just returned from Potsdam.</p> +<p>He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European +conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to +Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued +efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following +strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so +far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed +British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow +France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, +was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality +of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to +the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no +territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove +victorious in any war that might ensue.</p> +<p>I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he +said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that +respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so +long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and +neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His +Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It +depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be +forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian +integrity would be respected if she had not sided against +Germany.</p> +<p>His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been +Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to +bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these +assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so +much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between +England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment +too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British +neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly +produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his +desire.</p> +<p>In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request +would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that +at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any +course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to +retain full liberty.</p> +<p>Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I +communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day to his +Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.</p> +<p>No. 87.</p> +<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie</i>.</p> +<p>Sir, <i>Foreign Office, July</i> 29, 1914.</p> +<p>After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to +be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day +that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our +conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand +aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now +making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. +Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public +opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite +different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to +Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one +in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared +that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a +quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special +agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute +between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to +take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and +Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It +would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a +struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been +to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany +became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our +minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to +consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which +was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and +interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and +we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. +I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were +taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to +warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it +would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into +supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a +contingency that I still hoped might not arise.</p> +<p>M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. +He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle +for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to +intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France +become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of +Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. +He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no +criticism upon it.</p> +<p>He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a +demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany +attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; +she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.</p> +<p>I am, &c.</p> +<p>E. GREY.</p> +<p>No. 89.</p> +<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen</i>.</p> +<p>Sir, <i>Foreign Office, July</i> 29, 1914.</p> +<p>After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the +European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite +private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The +situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at +present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. +But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue +might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and +I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our +conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking +that we should stand aside.</p> +<p>He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I +meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?</p> +<p>I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything +that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying +that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be +no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even +if France was not involved. But we knew very well that, if the +issue did become such that we thought British interests required us +to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would +have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to +be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would +continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as +closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. +But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue +spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I +did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly +tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into +supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, +if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have +been different.</p> +<p>The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; +indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given +in Berlin as his view of the situation.</p> +<p>I am, &c.</p> +<p>E. GREY.</p> +<p>No. 98.</p> +<p><i>Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July +30.)</i></p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Berlin, July</i> 30, 1914.</p> +<p>Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of +Prince Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with +you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be +willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian +troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions +from there. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears +Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased +difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised +against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against +Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting +Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading +her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an +act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that +European peace may be preserved.</p> +<p>He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position +in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he +hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on +leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and +not before, visit of French Ambassador yesterday—Imperial +Government had done nothing special in way of military +preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for +it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to +mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did +not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.</p> +<p>His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince +Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with +regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he +thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had +spoken.</p> +<p>He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very +late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of +course, not have spoken to me in way he had done.</p> +<p>No. 101.</p> +<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen</i>.</p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Foreign Office, July</i> 30, 1914.</p> +<p>Your telegram of 29th July.[<a href="#note-188">188</a>]</p> +<p>His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the +Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to +neutrality on such terms.</p> +<p>What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French +colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not +take French territory as distinct from the colonies.</p> +<p>From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, +for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from +her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, +and become subordinate to German policy.</p> +<p>Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to +make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace +from which the good name of this country would never recover.</p> +<p>The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever +obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of +Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.</p> +<p>Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the +prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England +and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us +for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act +as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable +and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor +contemplates.</p> +<p>You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add +most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations +between England and Germany is that they should continue to work +together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this +object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I +believe, be <i>ipso facto</i> improved and strengthened. For that +object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all +sincerity and good-will.</p> +<p>And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, +and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to +promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by +which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy +would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and +ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked +for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, +Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly +improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the +subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much +more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, +be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which +will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement +between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.</p> +<p><a name="note-188" id="note-188"> +<!-- Note Anchor 188 --></a>[Footnote 188: See <a href= +"#numb-85">No. 85</a>.]</p> +<p>Enclosure 1 in No. 105.</p> +<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon</i>.</p> +<p>My dear Ambassador, <i>Foreign Office, November 22</i>, +1912.</p> +<p>From time to time in recent years the French and British naval +and military experts have consulted together. It has always been +understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of +either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to +assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation +between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an +engagement that commits either Government to action in a +contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The +disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets +respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement +to co-operate in war.</p> +<p>You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had +grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it +might become essential to know whether it could in that event +depend upon the armed assistance of the other.</p> +<p>I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an +unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened +the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other +whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression +and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be +prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the +plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into +consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect +should be given to them.</p> +<p>Yours, &c.</p> +<p>E. GREY.</p> +<p>No. 119.</p> +<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie</i>.</p> +<p>Sir, <i>Foreign Office, July</i> 31, 1914.</p> +<p>M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to +Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in +Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether +we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and +that, it we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and +France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.</p> +<p>I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left +Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had +refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had +not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I +had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German +Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we +should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as +taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to +show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we +would stand aside.</p> +<p>M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said +yesterday.</p> +<p>I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet +to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. +Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could +not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did +not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or +obligations of this country were involved. Further developments +might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament +to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation +of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, +but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we +proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, +Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the +neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both +France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an +engagement that she would not be the first to violate the +neutrality of Belgium.</p> +<p>M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if +Germany made an attack on her.</p> +<p>I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as +things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.</p> +<p>M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected +proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to +England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We +should then be in a very diminished position with regard to +Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an +enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be +repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his +question to the Cabinet again.</p> +<p>I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as +there was some new development, but at the present moment the only +answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite +engagement.</p> +<p>I am, &c.</p> +<p>E. GREY.</p> +<a name="numb-122" id="numb-122"></a> +<p>No. 122.</p> +<p><i>Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August +1.)</i></p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Berlin, July</i> 31, 1914.</p> +<p>Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July +to Sir F. Bertie.</p> +<p>I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must +consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly +answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they +might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of +campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very +doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His +Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.</p> +<p>It appears from what he said that German Government consider +that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. +As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for +Germany had been placed under an embargo already.</p> +<p>I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the +matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer +seems to me remote.</p> +<p>In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that +Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you +by the French Government.</p> +<p>No. 123.</p> +<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen</i>.</p> +<p>Sir, <i>Foreign Office, August</i> 1, 1914.</p> +<p>I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply[<a href= +"#note-189">189</a>] of the German Government with regard to the +neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because +the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If +Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which +had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve +anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a +violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the +other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain +public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing +this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell +him this I gave him a memorandum of it.</p> +<p>He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate +Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.</p> +<p>I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, +and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could +say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public +opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very +strongly to Public opinion here. I did not think that we could give +a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.</p> +<p>The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate +conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that +the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.</p> +<p>I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to +remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must +keep our hands free.</p> +<p>I am, &c.</p> +<p>E. GREY.</p> +<p><a name="note-189" id="note-189"> +<!-- Note Anchor 189 --></a>[Footnote 189: See <a href= +"#numb-122">No. 122</a>.]</p> +<p>No. 133.</p> +<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen</i>.</p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Foreign Office, August</i> 1, 1914.</p> +<p>M. De Etter came to-day to communicate the contents of a +telegram from M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as +follows:—</p> +<p>"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his +Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to +Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said +it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London +with the participation of the Great Powers.</p> +<p>"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the +direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be +thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should +meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on +Servian territory."</p> +<p>(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)</p> +<p>No. 134.</p> +<p><i>Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August +1.)</i></p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Paris, August</i> 1, 1914.</p> +<p>President of the Republic has informed me that German Government +were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was +only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in +Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; +that, although the measures which the German Government have +already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so +designated; that a French general mobilisation will become +necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight +hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that +the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German +frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds +for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German +troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and +have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, +the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his +conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving +the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly +pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not +quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.</p> +<p>No. 148.</p> +<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie</i>.</p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Foreign Office, August</i> 2, 1914.</p> +<p>After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following +memorandum:—</p> +<p>"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet +comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake +hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British +fleet will give all the protection in its power.</p> +<p>"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His +Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must +not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action +until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes +place."</p> +<p>I pointed out that we had very large questions and most +difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they +could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily +if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was +essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been +concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their +dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We +therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did +not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took +the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that +would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean +fleet.</p> +<p>M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him +the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord +Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the +violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more +important matter; we were considering what statement we should make +in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare +violation of Belgian neutrality to be a <i>casus belli</i>. I told +him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.</p> +<p>No. 153.</p> +<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen</i>.</p> +<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Foreign Office, August</i> 4, 1914.</p> +<p>The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the +King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the +following terms:—</p> +<p>"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship +and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England +in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I +make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your +Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."</p> +<p>His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German +Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing +friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian +territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity +of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, +threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An +answer was requested within twelve hours.</p> +<p>We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this +as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.</p> +<p>His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this +violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with +themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon +Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be +respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.</p> +<hr /> +<a name="RULE4_4" id="RULE4_4"><!-- RULE4 4 --></a> +<h2>APPENDIX III</h2> +<p>Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at +Berlin respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the +German Government.</p> +<p>(Cd. 7445.)</p> +<p><i>Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey</i>.</p> +<p>Sir, <i>London, August</i> 8, 1914.</p> +<p>In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram +of the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that +afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, +whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating +Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was +sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of +the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian +neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went +into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to +take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the +quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with +their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as +early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as +if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have +hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the +fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition +entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant +time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the +German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, +while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I +pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this <i>fait accompli</i> of the +violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily +understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him +whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible +consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, +for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to +draw back.</p> +<p>During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the +same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein +contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and +informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government +could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would +proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and +stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports +and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government +would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the +neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which +Germany was as much a party as themselves.</p> +<p>Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no +other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, +namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely +necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. +I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, +pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His +Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in +view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it +were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should +be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even +twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that +in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview +took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued +Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of +his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to +make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to +get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in +Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, +but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in +view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not +possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.</p> +<p>I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as +it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of +seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very +agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for +about 20 minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's +Government was terrible to a degree; just for a +word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been +disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going +to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to +be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been +rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to +which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to +office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was +unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was +fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain +responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I +protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the +same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for +strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to +advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I +would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of +"life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should +keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's +neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, +or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great +Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will +that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of +that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear +of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking +solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently +overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear +reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further +argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain +joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the +last moment he and his Government had been working with us and +supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and +Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two +nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between +them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for +years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace +between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us +face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, +we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our +separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily +understand that no one regretted this more than I.</p> +<p>After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy +and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram +was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 +P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never +despatched.[<a href="#note-190">190</a>]</p> +<p><a name="note-190" id="note-190"> +<!-- Note Anchor 190 --></a>[Footnote 190: This telegram never +reached the Foreign Office.]</p> +<hr /> +<a name="RULE4_5" id="RULE4_5"><!-- RULE4 5 --></a> +<h2>APPENDIX IV</h2> +<center>THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO<br /> +SELECTIONS FROM THE AUSTRIAN <i>dossier</i> OF THE CRIME</center> +<p>The following document is contained in the German Version of the +German White Book (pp. 28-31); and though it adds little to our +knowledge of the Austrian case against Servia, it deserves to be +reprinted, as it is omitted altogether in the official version in +English of the German White Book. The authorship of the document is +uncertain. It has the appearance of an extract from a German +newspaper.</p> +<p>Aus dem österreich-ungarischen Material.</p> +<p>Wien, 27. Juli. Das in der österreichisch-ungarischen +Zirkularnote an die auswärtigen Botschaften in Angelegenheit +des serbischen Konflikts erwähnte Dossier wird heute +veröffentlicht.</p> +<p>In diesem Memoire wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die von Serbien +ausgegangene Bewegung, die sich zum Ziele gesetzt hat, die +südlichen Teile Oesterreich-Ungarns von der Monarchie +loszureiszen, um sie mit Serbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu +verbinden, weit zurückgreist. Diese in ihren Endzielen stets +gleichbleibende und nur in ihren Mitteln und an Intensität +wechselnde Propaganda erreichte zur Zeit der Unnerionskrise ihren +Höhepunft und trat damals ossen mit ihren Tendenzen hervor. +Während einerjeits die gesamte serbische Bresse zum Kampfe +gegen die Monarchie ausrief, bildeten sich—von anderen +Propagandamitteln abgesehen—Ussoziationen, die diese +Kämpfe vorbereiteten, unter denen die Harodna Odbrana an +Bedeutung hervorragte. Aus einem revolutionären Komitee +hervorgegangen, fonstituierte sich diese vom Belgrader +Auswärtigen Amte völlig abhängige Organisation unter +Leitung von Staatsmännern und Offizieren, darunter dem General +Tantovic und dem ehemaligen Minister Ivanovic. Auch Major Oja +Jantovic und Milan Pribicevic gehören zu diesen Gründern. +Dieser Berein hatte sich die Bildung und Ausrüstung von +Freischaren für den bevorstehenden Krieg gegen die +öfterreichisch-ungarische Monarchie zum Ziele gesetzt. In +einer dem Memoire angefügten Anlage wird ein Auszug aus dem +vom Zentralausschusse der Narodna Odbrana herausgegebenen +Vereinsorgane gleichen Namens veröffentlicht, worin in +mehreren Artikeln die Tätigfelt und Ziele dieses Vereins +ausführlich dargelegt werden. Es heißt darin, daß +zu der Hauptaufgabe der Narodna Odbrana die Verbindung mit ihren +nahen und ferneren Brüdern jenseits der Grenze und unseren +übrigen Freunden in der Welt gehören.</p> +<p><i>Oesterreich ist als erster und größter Feind +bezeichnet</i>. Wie die Narodna Odbrana die Notwendigkeit des +Kampfes mit Oesterreich predigt, predigt sie eine heilige Wahrheit +unserer nationalen Lage. Das Schlußkapitel enthält einen +Apell an die Regierung und das Volk Serbiens, sich mit allen +Mitteln für den Kampf vorzubereiten, den die Annexion +vorangezeigt hat.</p> +<p>Das Memoire schildert nach einer Aussage eines von der Narodna +Odbrana angeworbenen Komitatschis die damalige Tätigkeit der +Narodna Odbrana, die eine von zwei Hauptleuten, darunter Jankovic, +geleitete <i>Schule zur Ausbildung von Banden</i> unterhielt, +Schulen, welche von General Jankovic und von Hauptmann Milan +Pribicevic regelmäßig inspiziert wurden. Weiter wurden +die Komitatschis im <i>Schießen und Bombenwerfen, im +Minenlegen, Sprengen von Eisenbahnbrücken</i> usw. +unterrichtet. Nach der feierlichen Erklärung der Serbischen +Regierung vom Jahre 1909 schien auch das Ende dieser Organisation +gekommen zu sein. Diese Erwartungen haben sich aber nicht nur nicht +erfüllt, sondern die Propaganda wurde durch die serbische +Presse fortgesetzt. Das Memoire führt als Beispiel die Art und +Weise an, wie das Attentat gegen den bosnischen Landeschef +Varesanin publizistisch verwertet wurde, indem der Attentäter +als serbischer Nationalheld gefeiert und seine Tat verherrlicht +wurde. Diese Blätter wurden nicht nur in Serbien verbreitet, +sondern auch auf wohlorganisierten Schleichwegen in die Monarchie +hineingeschmuggelt.</p> +<p>Unter der gleichen Leitung wie bei ihrer Gründung wurde die +Narodna Odbrana neuerlich der zentralpunkt einer Agitation welcher +der <i>Schützenbund mit 762 Vereinen, ein Sokolbund mit 3500 +Mitgliedern, und verschiedene andere Vereine +angehörten</i>.</p> +<p>Im Kleide eines Kulturvereins auftretend, dem nur die geistige +und die füörperliche Entwickelung der Bevölkerung +Serbiens sowie deren materielle Kräftigung am Herzen liegt, +enthullt die Narodna Oobrana ihr wahres reorganisiertes Programm in +vorzitiertem Auszug aus ihrem Vereinsorgan, in welchem "die heilige +Wahrheit" gepredigt wird, dass es eine unerlässliche +Notwendigkeit ist, gegen Oesterreich, seinen ersten grössten +Feind, diesen Ausrottungskampf mit Gewehr und Kanone zu +führen, und das Volk mit allen Mitteln auf den Kampf +vorzubereiten, zur Befreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete, in denen +viele Millionen unterjochter Brüder schmachten. Die in dem +Memoire zitierten Aufrufe und Reden ähnlichen Charakters +beleuchten die vielseitige auswärtige Tätigkeit der +Narodna Oobrana und ihrer affilierten Vereine, die in +Vortragsreifen, in der Teilnahme an Festen von bosnischen Vereinen, +bei denen offen Mitglieder für die erwähnte serbische +Vereinigung geworben wurden, besteht. Gegenwärtig ist noch die +Untersuchung darüber im Zuge, dass die Sokolvereine Serbiens +analoge Vereinigungen der Monarchie bestimmten, sich mit ihnen in +einem bisher geheim gehaltenen Verbande zu vereinigen. Durch +Vertrauensmänner und Missionäre wurde die Aufwiegelung in +die Kreise Erwachsener und der urteilslosen Jugend gebracht. So +wurden von Milan Pribicewitsch ehmalige honvedoffiziere und ein +Gendarmerieleutnant zum Verlassen des Heeresdienstes in der +Monarchie unter bedenklichen Umständen verleitet. In den +Schulen der Lehrerbildungsanstalten wurde eine weitgehende +Agitation entwickelt. Der gewünschte Krieg gegen die Monarchie +wurde militärisch auch insofern vorbereitet, als serbische +Emissäre im Falle des Ausbruchs der Feindseligkeiten mit der +Zerstörung von Transportmitteln usw., der Anfachung von +Revolten und Paniken betraut wurden. Alles dies wird in einer +besonderen Beilage belegt.</p> +<p>Das Memoire schildert ferner den Zusammenhang zwischen dieser +Tätigkeit der Narodna Oobrana und den affilierten +Organisationen mit den Attentaten gegen den Königlichen +Kommissär in Agram Cuvaj im Juli 1912, dem Attentat von Dojcic +in Agram 1913 gegen Sterlecz und dem missglückten Attentat +Schäfers am 20. Mai im Aramer Theater. Es verbreitet sich +hierauf über den Zusammenhang des Attentats auf den +Thronfolger und dessen Gemahlin, über die Art, wie sich die +Jungen schon in der Schule an dem Gedanken der Narodna Dobrana +vergifteten und wie sich die Attentäter mit Hilfe von +Pribicewic und Dacic die Werkzeuge zu dem Attentat verschafften, +wobei insbesondere die Rolle des Majors Tankofte dargelegt wird, +der die Mordwassën lieferte, wie auch die Rolle eines gewissen +Ciganovic, eines gewesenen Komitatschi und jetzigen Beamten der +serbischen Eisenbahndirektion Belgrad, der schon 1909 als +Zögling der Bandenschule der damaligen Narodna Odbrana +austauchte. Ferner wird die Art dargelegt, wie Bomben und Waffen +unbemerkt nach Bosnien eingeschmuggelt wurden, die keinen Zweifel +darüber lässt, dass dies ein wohl voerberiteter und +für die geheimnisvollen Zwecke der Narodna oft begangener +Schleichweg war.</p> +<p>Eine Beilage enthält einen Auszug aus den Akten des +Kreisgerichts in Serajewo über die Untersuchung des Attentats +gegen den Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und dessen Gemahlin. Danach +sind Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic und Papovic +geständig, in Gemeinschaft mit dem flüchtigen Mehmedbasic +ein Komplott zur Erwordung des Erzherzogs gebildet und ihm zu +diesen Zweck aufgelauert zu haben. Cabrinovic ist geständig, +die Bombe geworfen und Gabrilo Princip das Attentat mit der +Browningpistole ausgeführt zu haben. Beide Täter gaben +zu, bei der Verübung der Tat die Absicht des Mordes gehabt zu +haben. Die weiteren Teile der Anlage enthalten weitere Angaben der +Beschuldigten vor dem Untersuchungsrichter über Entstehung des +Komplotts, Herkunft der Bomben, welche fabrikmässig +hergestellt wurden, für millitärische Zwecke bestimmt +waren und ihrer Originalpackung nach aus dem serbischen Waffenlager +aus Kragujevac stammten. Endlich gibt die Beilage Auskunft +über den Transport der drei Attentäter und der Waffen von +Serbien nach Bosnien. Aus dem weiteren Zeugenprotokoll ergibt sich, +dass ein Angehöriger der Monarchie einige Tage vor dem +Attentat dem österreichisch-ungarischen Konsulat in Belgrad +Meldung von der Vermutung erstatten wollte, dass ein Plan zur +Verübung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog während dessen +Anwesenheit in Bosnien bestehe. Dieser Mann soll nun durch +Belgrader Polizeiorgane, welche ihn unmittelbar vor Betreten des +Konsulats aus nichtigen Gründen verhafteten, an der Erstattung +der Meldung verhindert worden sein. Weiter gehe aus dem +Zeugenprotokoll hervor, dass die betreffenden Polizeiorgane von dem +geplanten Attentat Kenntnis gehabt hätten. Da diese Angaben +noch nicht nachgeprüft sind, kann über deren +Stichhaltigkeit vorläufig noch kein Urteil gefällt +werden. In der Beilage zum Memoire heisst es: Vor dem Empfangssaal +des serbischen Kriegsministeriums befinden sich an der Wand vier +allegorische Bilder, von denen drei Darstellungen serbischer +Kriegserfolge sind, während das vierte die Verwirklichung der +monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiens versinnbildlicht. Ueber +einer Landschaft, die teils Gebirge (Bosnien), teils Ebene +(Südungarn) darstellt, geht die Zora, die Morgenröte der +serbischen Hoffnungen, auf. Im Vordergrunde steht eine bewaffnete +Frauengestalt, auf deren Schilde die Namen aller "noch zu +befreienden Provinzen": Bosnien, Herzegowina, Wojwodina, Gyrmien, +Dalmatien usw. stehen.</p> +<hr /> +<a name="RULE4_6" id="RULE4_6"><!-- RULE4 6 --></a> +<h2>APPENDIX V</h2> +<p>Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at +Vienna respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the +Austro-Hungarian Government.</p> +<p>(Cd. 7596)</p> +<p><i>Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey</i>.</p> +<p><i>London, September</i> 1, 1914.</p> +<p>Sir,</p> +<p>The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up +to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, +to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now +to add a few comments.</p> +<p>The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note +to Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the +Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tchinsky, who must have been aware of +the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my +colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and +23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with +Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign +Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of +warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian +Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was +being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a +self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of +these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that +very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be +published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the +other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to +confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and +the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.</p> +<p>So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was +preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of +absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days +when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed +that Duc Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which +was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the +Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count +Berchtold during this critical time. In point of fact his +Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no +indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, +and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July +the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you +the following day. It is true that during all this time the "Neue +Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using +language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The +official "Fremdenblatt", however, was more cautious, and till the +note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was +that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in +grave European complications.</p> +<p>On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By +common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral +acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on +the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it +had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen +disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as +it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been +rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations at Belgrade, +Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the +streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the +morning.</p> +<p>The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the +most part of organised processions through the principal streets +ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make +hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated +by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the +principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people +at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities +of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war +with Servia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of +Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was +adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the +determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the +provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much +disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia +during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with +the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with +little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, +and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate +and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country +certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of +subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at +her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been +attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of +a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great +Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, +that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should +place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or +prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity +which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of +Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German +Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This +feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt +the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should +have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the +acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful +compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of +Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the +future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian +Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. +Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration +of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against +Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, +and Russia again responded with results which have passed into +history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's +Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White +Paper on the European Crisis[<a href="#note-191">191</a>]. On the +28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could +that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House +of Commons on the previous day should be accepted as offering an +honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His +Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, +but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day +declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the conference +which you had suggested should take place between the less +interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a +matter which must be settled directly between the two parties +immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear +with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared +they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British +lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate +grievances against Servia, and pointed out that, whereas Austria +seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His +Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily +from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. +In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.</p> +<p>His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect +of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would +have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that +Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency +remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he +had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement +which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London +during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the +permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly +artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to +harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency +maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but +left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the +Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of +Servia.</p> +<p>The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the +endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the +interest of peace. Herr von Tchirsky abstained from inviting my +co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in +carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of +knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian +Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the +Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count +Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the +Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szápáry +with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful +conversations which had there been taking place between the latter +and M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days +later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially +mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a +perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance +of the conversations at St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the +tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between +Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed +almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. +Schebeko that Count Szápáry had at last conceded the +main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would +consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia +which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian +independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this +proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual +invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that +she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is +shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count +Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" +on compromise nor cut off the conversations.[<a href= +"#note-192">192</a>] M. Schebeko to the end was working hard for +peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count +Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count +Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too +much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, +but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, +and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any +reasonable compromise.</p> +<p>Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna +were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous +ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany +intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to +St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which +only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on +the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay +might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest +calamities in history.</p> +<p>Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko +had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually +be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This +only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the +foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at +St. Petersburgh had been instructed to notify the Russian +Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the +Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced +hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself +also at war with Russia."</p> +<p>M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the +Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th September. He had urgently +requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he +might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead +to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.</p> +<p>M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. +On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport +on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against +France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On +the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold the +categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to +Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further +one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only +had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, +but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into +Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops +employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count +Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, +under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's +departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his +Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue +made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled +before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people +that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the +President of the Republic had been assassinated.</p> +<p>The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in +Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the +5th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, +and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the +4th April, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German +ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of +these days transpired. The "Neue Freie Presse" was violently +insulting towards England. The "Fremdenblatt" was not offensive, +but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper +to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His +Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the +war.</p> +<p>The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in +Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.</p> +<p>On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction +of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war +with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not +yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire +me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication +to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time +that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to +commit any act of war against us without the notice required by +diplomatic usage.</p> +<p>On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to +receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been +compelled to inform Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French +Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and +Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who +was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had +sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a +direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with +France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram +stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a +state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of +the 12th August.</p> +<p>After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who +accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that +his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests +in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of +relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His +Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold received me at +midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not +seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram +from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been brought +to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy +which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which +were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In +point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at +war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had +been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had +forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless +argument...</p> +<p><a name="note-191" id="note-191"> +<!-- Note Anchor 191 --></a>[Footnote 191: "Miscellaneous, No. 6 +(1914)."]</p> +<p><a name="note-192" id="note-192"> +<!-- Note Anchor 192 --></a>[Footnote 192: See No. 137, +"Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."]</p> +<hr /> +<a name="RULE4_7" id="RULE4_7"><!-- RULE4 7 --></a> +<h2>APPENDIX VI</h2> +<center>EXTRACTS FROM THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK</center> +<p><i>Recueil de Documents Diplomatiques</i>:</p> +<p><i>Négociations ayant précédé la +guerre</i></p> +<p><i>10/23 Juillet—24 Juillet/6 Août 1914</i></p> +<p>PREFATORY NOTE TO APPENDIX VI</p> +<p>This important collection of documents, which has only reached +us since the publication of our first edition, confirms the +conclusion, which we had deduced from other evidence in our fifth +chapter (<i>supra</i>, <a href="#CH5">pp. 66-107</a>), that Germany +consistently placed obstacles in the way of any proposals for a +peaceful settlement, and this in spite of the willingness of all +the other Powers, including Austria-Hungary and Russia, to continue +discussion of the Servian question. That the crisis took Russia by +surprise seems evident from the fact that her ambassadors +accredited to France, Berlin, and Vienna were not at their posts +when friction began with Russia. (<i>Infra</i>, Nos. 4, 7, 8.)</p> +<p>The Russian evidence shows that, on July 29, Germany threatened +to mobilize if Russia did not desist from military preparations. +This threat was viewed by M. Sazonof as an additional reason for +taking all precautions; 'since we cannot accede to Germany's +desire, the only course open to us is to accelerate our own +preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable.' +(<i>Infra</i>, No. 58.) The reader will also notice the curious +fact that on July 30 the decree mobilizing the German army and navy +was published, only to be immediately withdrawn; and that the +German Government explained that the publication had been premature +and accidental. (<i>Infra</i>, Nos. 61, 62.) We know from the +British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i>, No. 99, Sir F. Bertie to +Sir E. Grey, July 30) that, on July 30, Germany showed signs of +weakening in her attitude to Russia.</p> +<p>It will be noted that war between Austria-Hungary and Russia was +not officially declared until August 6, five days after Germany had +declared war on Russia. (<i>Infra</i>, No. 79.)</p> +<p>In Nos. 36 and 46 will be found some curious details of the +methods employed by Austria-Hungary and Germany to delay the +publication of the Servian reply to Austria-Hungary.</p> +<p>MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES.</p> +<p>RECUEIL</p> +<p>DE DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES.</p> +<p>Négociations ayant précédé la +guerre.</p> +<p>10/23 Juillet—24 Juillet/6 Août 1914.</p> +<p>Petrograde, Imprimerie de l'Etat. 1914.</p> +<p>No. 1.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p>(<i>Télégramme</i>).</p> +<p>Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Le Ministre d'Autriche vient de transmettre, à 6 heures +du soir, an Ministre des Finances Patchou, qui remplace Pachitch, +une note ultimative de son Gouvernement fixant un délai de +48 heures pour l'acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a +ajouté verbalement que pour le cas où la note ne +serait pas acceptée intégralement dans un +délai de 48 heures, il avait l'ordre de quitter Belgrade +avec le personnel de la Légation. Pachitch et les autres +Ministres qui se trouvent en tournée électorale ont +été rappelés et sont attendus à +Belgrade demain Vendredi à 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui +m'a communiqué le contenu de la note, sollicite l'aide de la +Russie et déclare qu'aucun Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra +accepter les demandes de l'Autriche.</p> +<p>(Signé) Strandtman.</p> +<p>No. 2.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i></p> +<p>Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Texte de la note qui a été transmise aujourd'hui +par le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie an gouvernement Serbe:...</p> +<p>(<i>For this note, see German White Book, pp. 18-22</i> (supra +<i>in Appendix I.</i>))</p> +<p>Un mémoire concernant les résultats de +l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des +fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est +annexé à cette note'.[<a href= +"#note-193">193</a>]</p> +<p>(Signé) Strandtman.</p> +<p><a name="note-193" id="note-193"> +<!-- Note Anchor 193 --></a>[Footnote 193: This memorandum is in +the German White Book, pp. 22-3 (<i>supra</i>, <a href= +"#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>), and not reproduced in the Russian +Orange Book.]</p> +<p>No. 3.</p> +<p>Note Verbale transmise personnellement par l'Ambassadeur +d'Autriche-Hongrie à St.-Pétersbourg au Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères le 11/24 Juillet 1914 à 10 heures +du matin.</p> +<p>Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est trouvé +dans la nécessité de remettre le Jeudi 10/23 du mois +courant, par l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal +à Belgrade, la note suivante an Gouvernement Royal de +Serbie:</p> +<p>(Suit le texte de la note).</p> +<p>Voir document No. 2.</p> +<p>No. 4.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères au Chargé +d'affaires en Autriche-Hongrie.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i></p> +<p>St.-Pétersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères +d'Autriche-Hongrie ce qui suit....</p> +<p>(This communication is printed in the British White Book +(<i>Correspondence</i>, No. 13); see p. 177 <i>supra</i> for the +text in English.)</p> +<p>Communiqué à Londres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p>No. 5.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux +Représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur en Angleterre, +en Allemagne, en Italie et en France.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i></p> +<p>St.-Pétersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Me réfère à mon télégramme +à Koudachew d'aujourd'hui; nous espérons que le +Gouvernement auprès duquel. Vous êtes +accrédité partagera notre point de vue et prescrira +d'urgence à son Représentant à Vienne de se +prononcer dans le même sens.</p> +<p>Communiqué à Belgrade.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p>No. 6.</p> +<p>Télégramme de Son Altesse Royale le Prince +Régent de Serbie à Sa Majesté l'Empereur.</p> +<p>Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a remis hier soir au +Gouvernement serbe une note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo. +Consciente de ses devoirs internationaux, la Serbie dès les +premiers jours de l'horrible crime a déclaré qu'elle +le condamnait et qu'elle était prête à ouvrir +une enquête sur son territoire si la complicité de +certains de ses sujets était prouvée au cours du +procès instruit par les autorités Austro-hongroises. +Cependant les demandes contenues dans la note Austro-hongroise sont +inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa +dignité comme Etat indépendant. Ainsi on nous demande +sur un ton péremptoire une déclaration du +gouvernement dans l'officiel et un ordre du souverain à +l'armée, où nous réprimerions l'esprit hostile +contre l'Autriche en nous faisant à nous mêmes des +reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menées +perfides.—On nous impose ensuite l'admission des +fonctionnaires austro-hongrois en Serbie pour participer avec les +nôtres à l'instruction et pour surveiller +l'exécution des autres conditions indiquées dans la +note. Nous avons reçu un délai de 48 heures pour +accepter le tout, faute de quoi la Légation +d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prêts +à accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont +compatibles avec la situation d'un Etat indépendant, ainsi +que celles dont l'acception nous sera conseillée par Votre +Majesté; toutes les personnes dont la participation à +l'attentat sera démontrée seront +sévèrement punis par nous. Certaines parmi ces +demandes ne pourraient être exécutées sans des +changements de notre législation, ce qui exige du temps. On +nous a donné un délai trop court. Nous pouvons +être attaqués après l'expiration du +délai par l'armée austro-hongroise qui se concentre +sur notre frontière. Il nous est impossible de nous +défendre et nous supplions Votre Majesté de nous +donner Son aide le plus tôt possible. La bienveillance +précieuse de Votre Majesté qui s'est +manifestée tant de fois à notre égard nous +fait espérer fermement que cette fois encore notre appel +sera entendu par Son généreux coeur slave.</p> +<p>En ces moments difficiles l'interprète les sentiments du +peuple serbe qui supplie Votre Majesté de vouloir bien +s'intéresser au sort du Royaume de Serbie.</p> +<p>(Signé) Alexandre.</p> +<p>No. 7.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i></p> +<p>Berlin, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Tous les journaux du matin, même ceux, rares, qui +reconnaissent l'impossibilité pour la Serbie d'accepter les +conditions posées, accueillent avec une grande sympathie le +ton énergique adopté par l'Autriche. L'officieux +«Local-Anzeiger» est particulièrement agressif; +il qualifie de superflus les recours éventuels de la Serbie +à St. Pétersbourg, à Paris, à +Athènes et à Bucarest, et termine en disant que le +peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la +situation dans la péninsule Balcanique va enfin +s'éclaircir.</p> +<p>(Signé) Bronewsky.</p> +<p>No. 8.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Paris, le 11/24 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>La copie de la note officiellement remise à Belgrade a +été communiquée par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche +an Gouvernement Français. Plus tard l'Ambassadeur +d'Allemagne a visité le Ministre et lui a lu une +communication reproduisant les arguments autrichiens et indiquant +qu'en cas de refus de la part de la Serbie, l'Autriche serait +obligée de recourir à une pression et, en cas de +besoin, à des mesures militaires; la communication se +terminait par la remarque qu'à l'avis de l'Allemagne cette +question devrait être résolue directement entre +l'Autriche et la Serbie et qu'il était de +l'intérêt des Puissances de circonscrire l'affaire en +l'abandonnant aux Parties intéressées. Le +Gérant du Département Politique, qui assistait +à l'entretien, demanda à l'Ambassadeur s'il fallait +considérer l'action autrichienne comme un ultimatum—en +d'autres termes, si, dans le cas où la Serbie ne se +soumettrait pas entièrement aux demandes autrichiennes, les +hostilités étaient inévitables? L'ambassadeur +évita une réponse directe en alléguant +l'absence d'instructions.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sevastopoulo.</p> +<p>No. 9.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Pachitch est rentré à Belgrade. Il a l'intention +de donner dans le délai fixé, c'est à dire +demain Samedi à 6 heures du soir, une réponse +à l'Autriche indiquant les points acceptables et +inacceptables. On adressera aujourd'hui même aux Puissances +la prière de défendre l'indépendance de la +Serbie. Ensuite, ajouta Pachitch, si la guerre est +inévitable—nous ferons la guerre.</p> +<p>(Signé) Strandtman.</p> +<p>No. 10.</p> +<p>Communiqué du Gouvernement Impérial.</p> +<p>St.-Pétersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Les derniers événements et l'envoi par +l'Autriche-Hongrie d'un ultimatum à la Serbie +préoccupent le Gouvernement Impérial an plus haut +degré. Le Gouvernement suit attentivement l'évolution +du conflit serbo-autrichien qui ne peut pas laisser la Russie +indifférente.</p> +<p>No. 11.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Le comte Berchtold se trouve à Ischl. Vu +l'impossibilité d'y arriver à temps, je lui ai +télégraphié notre proposition de prolonger le +délai de l'ultimatum et l'ai répétée +verbalement au Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m'a promis de la +communiquer à temps au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères, mais a ajouté qu'il pouvait +prédire avec assurance un refus catégorique.</p> +<p>(Signé) Koudachew.</p> +<p>No. 12.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie an Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Suite à mon télégramme d'aujourd'hui. Viens +de recevoir de Macchio la réponse négative du +Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois à notre proposition de +prolonger le délai de la note.</p> +<p>(Signé) Koudachew.</p> +<p>No. 13.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Reçu avec retard le 14—27 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Je transmets la réponse que le Président du +Conseil des Ministres Serbe a remis an ministre Austro-Hongrois +à Belgrade aujourd'hui avant l'expiration du délai de +l'ultimatum....</p> +<p>(The text of the reply will be found in the British White Book +(<i>Correspondence</i>, No. 39) and also in the German White Book, +pp. 23-32 (supra, Appendix I.).)</p> +<p>No. 14.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des +affaires Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Berlin, le 12/25 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Ai reçu Votre télégramme du 11/24 Juillet. +Ai communiqué son contenu an Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères. Il me dit que le Gouvernement Anglais l'a +également prié de conseiller à Vienne la +prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum; il a communiqué +cette démarche télégraphiquement à +Vienne, il va en faire autant pour notre démarche, mais il +craint qu'à la suite de l'absence de Berchtold parti pour +Ischl, et vu le manque de temps, ses télégrammes ne +restent sans résultats; il a, en outre, des doutes sur +l'opportunité pour l'Autriche de céder an dernier +moment et il se demande si cela ne pouvait pas augmenter +l'assurance de la Serbie. J'ai répondu qu'une grande +Puissance comme l'Autriche pourrait céder sans porter +atteinte à son prestige et ai fait valoir tous les arguments +conformes, cependant je n'ai pu obtenir des promesses plus +précises. Même lorsque je laissais entendre qu'il +fallait agir à Vienne pour éviter la +possibilité de conséquences redoutables, le Ministre +des Affaires Etrangères répondait chaque fois +négativement.</p> +<p>(Signé) Bronewsky.</p> +<p>No. 15.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p>(<i>Télégramme</i>). Paris, le 12/25 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Ai reçu le télégramme du 11/24 Juillet +concernant la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum +autrichien et ai fait la communication prescrite. Le +Représentant de France à Vienne a été +muni d'instructions conformes.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sevastopoulo.</p> +<p>No. 16.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p>(<i>Télégramme</i>). Londres, le 12/25 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Reçu télégramme du 11 Juillet. Grey a +prescrit à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne +d'appuyer notre démarche concernant la prolongation du +délai de l'ultimatum. Il m'a dit en même temps que +l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche était venu le voir et avait +expliqué qu'on ne devrait pas attribuer à la note +autrichienne le caractère d'un ultimatum; il faudrait la +considérer comme une démarche qui, en cas d'absence +de réponse ou en cas de réponse insuffisante au terme +fixé, aurait comme suite la rupture des relations +diplomatiques et le départ immédiat de Belgrade du +Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, sans entrainer cependant le +commencement immédiat des hostilités.—Grey a +ajouté qu'à la suite de cette explication il a +indiqué à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne +que dans le cas où il serait trop tard pour soulever la +question de la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum, celle +de l'arrêt des hostilités pourrait peut-être +servir de base à la discussion.</p> +<p>(Signé) Benckendorff.</p> +<p>No. 17.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à +l'Ambassadeur à Londres.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> St.-Pétersbourg, le +12/25 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Dans le cas d'une nouvelle aggravation de la situation, pouvant +provoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions conformes, +nous comptons que l'Angleterre ne tardera pas de se ranger +nettement du côté de la Russie et de la France, en vue +de maintenir l'équilibre européen, en faveur duquel +elle est intervenue constamment dans le passé et qui serait +sans aucun doute compromis dans le cas du triomphe de +l'Autriche.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p>No. 18.</p> +<p>Note verbale remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne au Ministre +des Affaires Etrangères le 12/25 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Il nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle +répandue par quelques journaux d'après laquelle la +démarche du Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie à +Belgrade aurait été faite à l'instigation de +l'Allemagne est absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement Allemand n'a pas +eu connaissance du texte de la note Autrichienne avant qu'elle ait +été remise et n'a exercé aucune influence sur +son contenu. C'est à tort qu'on attribue à +l'Allemagne une attitude comminatoire.</p> +<p>L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allié de +l'Autriche les revendications à son avis légitimes du +Cabinet de Vienne contre la Serbie.</p> +<p>Avant tout elle désire comme elle l'a déjà +déclaré dès le commencement du +différend Austro-Serbe que ce conflit reste +localisé.</p> +<p>No. 19.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'affaires en France an Ministre des affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme)</i> Paris, le 12/25 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Me réfère à mon télégramme du +11/24 Juillet.</p> +<p>Aujourd'hui un journal du matin a publié, sous une forme +pas entièrement exacte, les déclarations d'hier de +l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, en les faisant suivre de commentaires +qui attribuent à cette démarche le caractère +d'une menace. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, très +impressionné par ces divulgations, a visité +aujourd'hui le Gérant du Département Politique pour +lui dire que ses paroles n'avaient nullement eu le caractère +de menace qu'on leur attribue. Il a déclaré que +l'Autriche avait présenté sa note à la Serbie +sans entente précise avec Berlin, mais que cependant +l'Allemagne approuvait le point de vue de l'Autriche et que +certainement 'la flèche une fois partie' (ce sont là +ses propres paroles), l'Allemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que +par ses devoirs d'alliée.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sevastopoulo.</p> +<p>No. 20.</p> +<p>L'ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Londres, le 12/25 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Grey m'a dit que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne lui a +déclaré que le Gouvernement Allemand n'avait pas +été informé du texte de la note autrichienne, +mais qu'il soutenait entièrement la démarche +autrichienne. L'Ambassadeur a demandé en même temps si +l'Angleterre pouvait consentir à agir à St. +Pétersbourg dans un esprit de conciliation. Grey a +répondu que cela était complètement +impossible. Le Ministre a ajouté que tant que les +complications n'existaient qu'entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, les +intérêts Anglais n'étaient engagés +qu'indirectement, mais qu'il devait prévoir que la +mobilisation autrichienne aurait comme suite la mobilisation de la +Russie et que dès ce moment on se trouverait en +présence d'une situation à laquelle seraient +intéressées toutes les Puissances. L'Angleterre se +réservait pour ce cas une complète liberté +d'action.</p> +<p>(Signé) Benckendorff.</p> +<p>No. 21.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Malgré le caractère extrêmement conciliant +de la réponse serbe à l'ultimatum, le Ministre +d'Autriche vient d'informer, à 6-1/2 du soir, le +Gouvernement Serbe par note, que n'ayant pas reçu an +délai fixé une réponse satisfaisante il quitte +Belgrade avec tout le personnel de la Légation. La +Scoupchtina est convoquée à Nich pour le 14/27 +Juillet. Le Gouvernement Serbe et le Corps Diplomatique partent ce +soir pour la même ville.</p> +<p>(Signé) Strandtman.</p> +<p>No. 22.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Londres, le 12/25 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Grey a dit à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qu'à son +avis la mobilisation autrichienne devait entraîner la +mobilisation de la Russie, qu'alors surgirait le danger aigu d'une +guerre générale et qu'il ne voyait qu'un seul moyen +pour une solution pacifique: qu'en présence des +mobilisations autrichienne et russe, l'Allemagne, la France, +l'Italie et l'Angleterre s'abstiennent d'une mobilisation +immédiate et proposent tout d'abord leurs bons offices. Grey +m'a dit que ce plan nécessitait avant tout l'agrément +de l'Allemagne et l'engagement de cette Puissance de ne pas +mobiliser. En conséquence il a adressé tout d'abord +à Berlin une question à ce sujet.</p> +<p>(Signé) Benckendorff.</p> +<p>No. 23.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à +l'Ambassadeur en Italie.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> St. Pétersbourg, le +13/26 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>L'Italie pourrait jouer un rôle de tout premier ordre en +faveur du maintien de la paix, en exerçant l'influence +nécessaire sur l'Autriche et en adoptant une attitude +nettement défavorable au conflit, car ce dernier ne saurait +être localisé. Il est désirable que vous +exprimiez la conviction qu'il est impossible pour la Russie de ne +pas venir en aide à la Serbie.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p>No. 24.</p> +<p>Le Gérant du Consulat à Prague au Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Prague, le 13/26 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>La mobilisation a été +décrétée.</p> +<p>(Signé) Kazansky.</p> +<p>No. 25.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à +l'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> St. Pétersbourg, le +13/26 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>J'ai eu aujourd'hui un long entretien sur un ton amical avec +l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. Après avoir examiné +avec lui les 10 demandes adressées à la Serbie, j'ai +fait observer qu'à part la forme peu habile sous laquelle +elles sont présentées, quelques-unes parmi elles sont +absolument inexécutables, même dans le cas où +le gouvernement Serbe déclarerait les vouloir accepter. +Ainsi, par exemple, les points 1 et 2 ne pourraient être +exécutés sans un remaniement des lois serbes sur la +presse et sur les associations, pour lequel le consentement de la +Scoupchtina pourrait être difficilement obtenu; quant +à l'exécution des points 4 et 5, elle pourrait +produire des conséquences fort dangereuses et même +faire naître le danger d'actes de terrorisme dirigés +contre les membres de la Maison Royale et contre Pachitch, ce qui +ne saurait entrer dans les vues de l'Autriche. En ce qui regarde +les autres points, il me semble, qu'avec certains changements dans +les détails, il ne serait pas difficile de trouver un +terrain d'entente si les accusations y contenues étaient +confirmées par des preuves suffisantes.</p> +<p>Dans l'intérêt de la conservation de la paix qui, +aux dires de Szápáry, est précieuse à +l'Autriche au même degré qu'à toutes les +Puissances, il serait nécessaire de mettre au plus tôt +possible une fin à la situation tendue du moment. Dans ce +but il me semblerait très désirable que l'Ambassadeur +d'Autriche-Hongrie fût autorisé d'entrer avec moi dans +un échange de vues privé aux fins d'un remaniement en +commun de quelques articles de la note autrichienne du 10/23 +Juillet. Ce procédé permettrait peut-être de +trouver une formule qui fût acceptable pour la Serbie, tout +en donnant satisfaction à l'Autriche quant au fond de ses +demandes. Veuillez avoir une explication prudente et amicale dans +le sens de ce télégramme avec le Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères. Communiqué aux Ambassadeurs en +Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre et en Italie.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p>No. 26.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à +l'Ambassadeur en Allemagne.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> St. Pétersbourg, le +13/26 Juillet.</p> +<p>Veuillez communiquer le contenu de mon télégramme +à Vienne d'aujourd'hui au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères Allemand et lui exprimer l'espoir, que de son +côté il trouvera possible de conseiller à +Vienne d'aller au-devant de notre proposition.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p>No. 27.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Paris, le 13/26 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Le Directeur du Département Politique m'informe, que lors +de la communication qu'il a faite à l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche +du contenu de la réponse serbe à l'ultimatum, +l'Ambassadeur n'a pas caché son étonnement de ce +qu'elle n'ait pas donné satisfaction à Giesl. +L'attitude conciliante de la Serbie doit, selon l'avis du Directeur +du Département Politique, produire la meilleure impression +en Europe.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sevastopoulo.</p> +<p>No. 28.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p>(<i>Télégramme</i>). Paris, le 13/26 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a de nouveau rendu visite +au Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères +et lui a fait les déclarations suivantes:</p> +<p>«L'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie +qu'elle ne recherche pas des acquisitions territoriales et qu'elle +ne menace pas l'intégrité de la Serbie. Son but +unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquillité. Par +conséquent il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la +guerre. L'Allemagne se sent solidaire avec la France dans le +désir ardent de conserver la paix et espère fermement +que la France usera de son influence à Pétersbourg +dans un sens modérateur». Le Ministre fit observer que +l'Allemagne pourrait de son côté entreprendre des +démarches analogues à Vienne, surtout en +présence de l'esprit de conciliation dont a fait preuve la +Serbie. L'Ambassadeur répondit que cela n'était pas +possible, vu la résolution prise de ne pas s'immiscer dans +le conflit austro-serbe. Alors le Ministre demanda, si les quatre +Puissances—l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la +France—ne pouvaient pas entreprendre des démarches +à St. Pétersbourg et à Vienne, puisque +l'affaire se réduisait en somme à un conflit entre la +Russie et l'Autriche. L'Ambassadeur allégua l'absence +d'instructions. Finalement le Ministre refusa d'adhérer +à la proposition allemande.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sevastopoulo.</p> +<p>No. 29.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p>(<i>Télégramme</i>). Paris, le 13/28 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Le Directeur du Département Politique a +déclaré qu'à son avis personnel, les +démarches successives allemandes à Paris ont pour but +d'intimider la France et d'amener son intervention à St. +Pétersbourg.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sevastopoulo.</p> +<p>No. 30.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères.</p> +<p>(<i>Télégramme</i>). Berlin, le 13/26 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Après la réception à Berlin de la nouvelle +de la mobilisation de l'armée autrichienne contre la Serbie +une grande foule, composée, aux dires des journaux, en +partie d'éléments autrichiens, se livra à une +série de bruyantes manifestations en faveur de l'Autriche. A +une heure avancée de la soirée les manifestants se +massèrent à plusieurs reprises devant le palais de +l'Ambassade Impériale en poussant des cris hostiles à +la Russie; la police était presque absente et ne prenait +aucune mesure.</p> +<p>(Signé) Bronewsky.</p> +<p>No. 31.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme)</i>.</p> +<p>Londres, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Ai reçu votre télégramme du 13-26 Juillet. +Prie me télégraphier si, à Votre avis, Vos +pourparlers directs avec le cabinet de Vienne s'accordent avec le +projet de Grey concernant la médiation des 4 Gouvernements. +Ayant appris de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à St. +Pétersbourg que Vous étiez disposé à +accepter cette combinaison, Grey a décidé de la +transformer en une proposition officielle qu'il a faite hier soir +à Berlin, à Paris et à Rome.</p> +<p>(Signé) Benckendorff.</p> +<p>No. 32.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en +France et en Angleterre.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme)</i>.</p> +<p>St. Pétersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>(Printed in the British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i>, No. +53.).)</p> +<p>No. 33.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en +France, en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie et en +Italie.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme)</i>.</p> +<p>St. Pétersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Ai pris connaissance de la réponse transmise par le +Gouvernement Serbe au Baron Giesl. Elle dépasse toutes nos +prévisions par sa modération et son désir de +donner la plus complète satisfaction à l'Autriche. +Nous ne voyons pas quelles pourraient être encore les +demandes de l'Autriche, à moins que le Cabinet de Vienne ne +cherche un prétexte pour une guerre avec la Serbie.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p>No. 34.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme)</i>.</p> +<p>Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a conféré aujourd'hui de +nouveau longuement sur la situation avec le Directeur du +Département Politique. L'Ambassadeur a beaucoup +insisté sur l'exclusion de toute possibilité d'une +médiation ou d'une conférence.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sevastopoulo.</p> +<p>No. 35.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Paris, le 14/27 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Ai conféré avec le Gérant du +Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, en présence +de Berthelot, immédiatement après mon retour à +Paris. Tous les deux m'out confirmé les détails +concernant les démarches de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que +Sevastopoulo Vous a communiqués dans ses +télégrammes. Ce matin le Baron de Schoen a +confirmé par écrit sa déclaration d'hier, +savoir: 1) l'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie +qu'elle ne recherche pas d'acquisitions et n'attente pas à +l'intégrité de la Serbie. Son unique but est +d'assurer sa propre tranquillité. 2) Par conséquent +il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la guerre. 3) +L'Allemagne et la France, complètement solidaires dans +l'ardent désir de ne pas rompre la paix, doivent agir sur la +Russie dans un sens modérateur. Le Baron de Schoen a +spécialement souligné l'expression de la +solidarité entre l'Allemagne et la France. D'après la +conviction du Ministre de la Justice, les démarches susdites +de l'Allemagne out pour but évident de désunir la +Russie et la France, d'entraîner le Gouvernement +Français dans la voie des représentations à +St. Pétersbourg et de compromettre ainsi notre allié +à nos yeux; enfin, en cas de guerre, d'en rejeter la +responsabilité non sur l'Allemagne, qui emploie soi-disant +tous ses efforts pour le maintien de la paix, mais sur la Russie et +la France.</p> +<p>(Signé) Iswolsky.</p> +<p>No. 36.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Paris, le 14/27 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Il ressort de vos télégrammes du 13/26 Juillet que +vous ne connaissiez pas encore la réponse du Gouvernement +Serbe. Le télégramme par lequel cette nouvelle m'a +été communiquée de Belgrade a +été également en route pendant 20 heures. Le +télégramme du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères +Français expédié avant-hier, au triple tarif, +à onze heures du matin, et contenant l'ordre d'appuyer notre +démarche, n'est parvenu à sa destination qu'à +6 heures. Il n'y a aucun doute que ce télégramme +n'ait été retenu intentionnellement par le +télégraphe autrichien.</p> +<p>(Signé) Iswolsky.</p> +<p>No. 37.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Paris, le 14/27 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>D'ordre de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a +communiqué au Gérant du Ministère des Affaires +Etrangères que la réponse de la Serbie a +été jugée insuffisante à Vienne et que +demain, mardi, l'Autriche procéderait à des 'actions +énergiques' don't le but serait de forcer la Serbie de lui +donner les garanties nécessaires. Le Ministre ayant +demandé en quoi consisteraient ces actions, l'Ambassadeur +répondit qu'il n'avait pas de renseignements exacts à +ce sujet, mais qu'il pouvait s'agir d'un passage da la +frontière serbe, d'un ultimatum et même d'une +déclaration de guerre.</p> +<p>(Signé) Iswolsky.</p> +<p>No. 38.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>J'ai prié le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères +d'appuyer à Vienne votre proposition tendant à +autoriser Szápáry d'élaborer, par la voie d'un +échange de vues privé avec Vous, une rédaction +des demandes austro-hongroises acceptable pour les deux parties. +Jagow a répondu qu'il était an courant de cette +proposition et qu'il partageait l'avis de Pourtalès que, +puisque Szápáry avait commencé cette +conversation, il pourrait aussi bien la continuer. Il +télégraphiera dans ce sens à l'Ambassadeur +d'Allemagne à Vienne. Je l'ai prié de conseiller +d'une façon plus pressante à Vienne de s'engager dans +cette voie de conciliation; Jagow a répondu qu'il ne pouvait +pas conseiller à l'Autriche de céder.</p> +<p>(Signé) Bronewsky.</p> +<p>No. 39.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Aujourd'hui, avant ma visite au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères, ce dernier avait reçu celle de +l'Ambassadeur de France qui avait tenté de lui faire +accepter la proposition anglaise relative à une action en +faveur de la paix, action qui serait exercée +simultanément à St.-Pétersbourg et à +Vienne par l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la France. Cambon +a proposé que ces Puissances donnent à Vienne un +conseil dans les termes suivants: «S'abstenir de tout acte +qui pourrait aggraver la situation de l'heure actuelle». En +adoptant cette formule voilée on éviterait de +mentionner la nécessité de s'abstenir d'une invasion +de la Serbie. Jagow a opposé à cette proposition un +refus catégorique, et cela malgré les instances de +l'Ambassadeur qui a fait valoir, comme un bon côte de la +proposition, le groupement mixte des Puissances grâce auquel +on évitait l'opposition de l'Alliance à l'Entente, ce +dont s'était si souvent plaint Jagow lui-même.</p> +<p>(Signé) Bronewsky.</p> +<p>No. 40.</p> +<p>Télégramme de Sa Majesté Impériale +l'Empereur à Son Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de +Serbie en date du 14/27 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Votre Altesse Royale en s'adressant à Moi dans un moment +particulièrement difficile ne s'est pas trompée sur +les sentiments qui M'animent à Son égard et sur Ma +sympathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe.</p> +<p>Ma plus sérieuse attention est attirée par la +situation actuelle et Mon Gouvernement s'applique de toutes ses +forces à aplanir les présentes difficultés. Je +ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le Gouvernement Royal ne +veuillent faciliter cette tâche en ne négligeant rien +pour arriver à une solution qui permette de prévenir +les horreurs d'une nouvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la +dignité de la Serbie.</p> +<p>Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'éviter une effusion de +sang, tous nos efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, +malgré Notre plus sincère désir, Nous ne +réussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut être +assurée qu'en aucun cas la Russie ne se +désintéressera du sort de la Serbie.</p> +<p>(Signé) Nicolas.</p> +<p>No. 41.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p>(<i>Télégramme</i>). Vienne, le 14/17 juillet +1914.[<a href="#note-194">194</a>]</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères est absent. Pendant +un entretien prolongé, que j'ai eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio, +j'ai, en termes tout à fait amicaux, attiré son +attention sur l'impression défavorable qu'a produite en +Russie la présentation par l'Autriche à la Serbie de +demandes absolument inacceptables pour chaque état +indépendant, bien que petit. J'ai ajouté que ce +procédé, qui pourrait amener des complications les +moins désirables, a provoqué en Russie une profonde +surprise et une réprobation générale. Il faut +supposer que l'Autriche, sous l'influence des assurances du +Représentant Allemand à Vienne, lequel pendant toute +cette crise a joué un rôle d'instigateur, a +compté sur la probabilité de la localisation de son +conflit avec la Serbie et sur la possibilité de porter +à cette dernière impunément un coup grave. La +déclaration du Gouvernement Impérial concernant +l'impossibilité pour la Russie de rester indifférente +en présence d'un tel procédé a provoqué +ici une grande impression.</p> +<p>(Signé) Schébéko.</p> +<p><a name="note-194" id="note-194"> +<!-- Note Anchor 194 --></a>[Footnote 194: Evidently the date July +17 is a misprint for July 27.]</p> +<p>No. 42.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p>(<i>Télégramme</i>). Londres, le 14/17 Juillet +1914.[<a href="#note-195">195</a>]</p> +<p>Grey vient de répondre à l'Ambassadeur +d'Allemagne, qui était venu le questionner sur la +possibilité d'une action à St.-Pétersbourg, +que cette action devrait se produire à Vienne et que le +cabinet de Berlin serait le mieux qualifié pour l'exercer. +Grey a fait observer en même temps que la réponse +serbe à la note autrichienne dépassait par sa +modération et son esprit de conciliation tout ce à +quoi on pouvait s'attendre. Grey a ajouté qu'il en concluait +que la Russie avait conseillé à Belgrade de donner +une réponse modérée et qu'il pensait que la +réponse serbe pouvait servir de base à une solution +pacifique et acceptable de la question.</p> +<p>Dans ces conditions, a continué Grey, si l'Autriche +malgré cette réponse commençait les +hostilités, elle prouverait son intention d'anéantir +la Serbie. La question placée sur ce terrain produirait une +situation qui pourrait amener une guerre dans laquelle seraient +impliquées toutes les Puissances.</p> +<p>Grey a enfin déclaré que le Gouvernement Anglais +était bien sincèrement disposé à +collaborer avec le gouvernement Allemand tant qu'il s'agirait de la +conservation de la paix; mais que pour le cas contraire +l'Angleterre se réservait une pleine liberté +d'action.</p> +<p>(Signé) Benckendorff.</p> +<p><a name="note-195" id="note-195"> +<!-- Note Anchor 195 --></a>[Footnote 195: Evidently the date July +17 is a misprint for July 27.]</p> +<p>No. 43.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à +l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre.</p> +<p>(<i>Télégramme</i>). St.-Pétersbourg, le +15/28 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>(Printed in the British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i>, No. +54.).)</p> +<p>No. 44.</p> +<p>Le Consul général à Fiume au Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Fiume, le 15/28 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>L'état de siège a été +proclamé en Slavonie, en Croatie et à Fiume et en +même temps les réservistes de toutes les +catégories ont été mobilisés.</p> +<p>(Signé) Salviati.</p> +<p>No. 45.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>(Printed in the British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i>, No. +93 (I)).)</p> +<p>No. 46.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Berlin, le 15/28 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Le Bureau Wolff n'a pas publié le texte de la note +responsive serbe qui lui avait été communiqué. +Jusqu'à ce moment cette note n'a paru in extenso dans aucun +des journaux locaux, qui selon toute évidence ne veulent pas +lui donner place dans leurs colonnes, se rendant compte de l'effet +calmant que cette publication produirait sur les lecteurs +allemands.</p> +<p>(Signé) Bronewsky.</p> +<p>No. 47.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet, +1914.</p> +<p>Le décret sur la mobilisation générale a +été signé.</p> +<p>(Signé) Schébéko.</p> +<p>No. 48.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à +l'Ambassadeur à Londres.[<a href="#note-196">196</a>]</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> St.-Pétersbourg, le +15/28 Juillet, 1914.</p> +<p>En présence des hostilités entre +l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie il est nécessaire que +l'Angleterre entreprenne d'urgence une action médiatrice et +que l'action militaire de l'Autriche contre la Serbie soit +immédiatement suspendue. Autrement la médiation ne +servira que de prétexte pour tirer en longueur la solution +de la question et donnera entre temps à l'Autriche la +possibilité d'écraser complètement la Serbie +et d'occuper une situation dominante dans les Balcans.</p> +<p>Communiqué à Paris, Berlin, Vienne et Rome.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p><a name="note-196" id="note-196"> +<!-- Note Anchor 196 --></a>[Footnote 196: An English (abbreviated) +version of this telegram is given in the British White Book +(<i>Correspondence</i>, No. 70 (2)).]</p> +<p>No. 49.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères au Chargé +d'Affaires en Allemagne.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> St.-Pétersbourg, le +16/29 Juillet, 1914.</p> +<p>(Printed in the British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i>, No. +93 (2)).)</p> +<p>No. 50.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en +Angleterre et en France.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> St.-Pétersbourg, le +16/29 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>(Printed in the British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i>, No. +93 (3)).)</p> +<p>No. 51.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Berlin, le 16/29 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Sur ma question s'il avait une réponse de Vienne +relativement à Votre proposition de pourparlers +privés à St.-Pétersbourg, le Secrétaire +d'Etat a répondu négativement.</p> +<p>Il déclare qu'il lui est fort difficile d'agir sur +Vienne, surtout ouvertement. Parlant à Cambon, il a +même ajouté qu'en cas d'une pression trop +évidente l'Autriche se hâterait de mettre l'Allemagne +en présence d'un fait accompli.</p> +<p>Le Secrétaire d'Etat dit qu'il a reçu aujourd'hui +un télégramme de Pourtalès d'où il +constate que plus que les premiers jours Vous êtes +disposé à trouver un compromis acceptable pour tous. +J'ai répliqué que probablement Vous avez +été dès le commencement en faveur d'un +compromis, bien entendu à la condition qu'il soit acceptable +non seulement pour l'Autriche, mais également pour nous. Il +m'a dit ensuite qu'il paraissait que nous avions commencé +à mobiliser sur la frontière autrichienne et qu'il +craignait que ceci rendrait plus difficile pour l'Autriche la +possibilité de s'entendre avec nous, d'autant plus que +l'Autriche ne mobilisait que contre la Serbie et ne faisait pas de +préparatifs sur notre frontière. J'ai répondu +que, d'après les renseignements dont je disposais, +l'Autriche mobilisait également sur notre frontière +et que par conséquent nous devions prendre des mesures +analogues. J'ai ajouté que les mesures que nous avons +peut-être prises de notre côté n'étaient +nullement dirigées contre l'Allemagne.</p> +<p>(Signé) Bronewsky.</p> +<p>No. 52.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Nich, le 16/29 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Aujourd'hui le Ministre de Bulgarie, an nom de son Gouvernement, +a déclaré à Pachiteh que la Bulgarie +observerait la neutralité.</p> +<p>(Signé) Strandtman.</p> +<p>No. 53.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Paris, le 16/29 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>A l'occasion de l'arrivée du Président de la +République Français le Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères avait préparé un court +exposé de la situation politique actuelle, à pen +près dans les termes suivants: L'Autriche, craignant la +décomposition intérieure, s'est emparée du +prétexte de l'assassinat de l'Archiduc pour essayer +d'obtenir des garanties qui pourront revêtir la forme de +l'occupation des communications militaires serbes ou même du +territoire serbe. L'Allemagne soutient l'Autriche. Le maintien de +la paix dépend de la seule Russie, parce qu'il s'agit d'une +affaire qui doit être «localisée» entre +l'Autriche et la Serbie, c'est à dire de la punition de la +politique précédente de la Serbie et des garanties +pour l'avenir. De ceci l'Allemagne conclue qu'il faut exercer une +action modératrice à Pétersbourg. Ce sophisme +a été réfuté à Paris comme +à Londres. A Paris, le Baron de Schoen a en vain +tâché d'entraîner la France à une action +solidaire avec l'Allemagne sur la Russie en faveur du maintien de +la paix. Les mêmes tentatives out été faites +à Londres. Dans les deux capitales il a été +répondu que l'action devrait être exercée +à Vienne, car les demandes excessives de l'Autriche, son +refus de discuter les rares réserves de la Serbie, et la +déclaration de guerre menacent de provoquer la guerre +générale. La France et l'Angleterre ne peuvent +exercer une action modératrice sur la Russie, laquelle +jusqu'ici a fait preuve de la plus grande modération, +surtout en conseillant à la Serbie d'accepter ce qui +était possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'hui +l'Allemagne paraît renoncer à l'idée d'une +action sur la Russie seule et incline vers une action +médiatrice à Pétersbourg et à Vienne, +mais en même temps l'Allemagne comme l'Autriche tâchent +de faire traîner l'affaire. L'Allemagne s'oppose à la +Conférence sans indiquer aucune autre manière d'agir +pratique. L'Autriche mène des pourparlers manifestement +dilatoires à Pétersbourg. En même temps elle +prend des mesures actives, et si ces mesures sont +tolérées, ses prétentions augmenteront +proportionnellement. Il est très désirable que la +Russie prête tout son appui an projet de médiation que +présentera Sir E. Grey. Dans le cas contraire l'Autriche, +sous prétexte de «garantie», pourra, en fait, +changer le status territorial de l'Europe orientale.</p> +<p>(Signé) Iswolsky.</p> +<p>No. 54.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Londres, le 10/29 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Ai communiqué le contenu de Vos télégrammes +du 15/28 Juillet à Grey. Il a déclaré +aujourd'hui à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que les pourparlers +directs entre la Russie et l'Autriche avaient échoué, +et que les correspondants des journaux mandaient de +St.-Pétersbourg que la Russie mobilisait contre l'Autriche +à la suite de la mobilisation de cette dernière. Grey +dit qu'en principe le Gouvernement Allemand s'est +déclaré en faveur de la médiation, mais qu'il +rencontre des difficultés quant à la forme. Grey a +insisté pour que le Gouvernement Allemand indiquât la +forme laquelle à l'avis de l'Allemagne pourrait permettre +aux 4 Puissances d'exercer leur médiation pour éviter +la guerre; vu le consentement de la France, de l'Italie et de +l'Angleterre la médiation pourrait avoir lieu seulement dans +le cas où l'Allemagne consentirait à se ranger du +côté de la paix.</p> +<p>(Signé) Benckendorff.</p> +<p>No. 55.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Paris, le 16/29 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Viviani vient de me confirmer l'entière résolution +du Gouvernement Français d'agir d'accord avec nous. Cette +résolution est soutenue par les cercles les plus +étendus et par les partis, y compris les +radicaux-socialistes, qui viennent de lui présenter une +déclaration exprimant la confiance absolue et les +dispositions patriotiques du groupe. Dès son arrivée +à Paris, Viviani a télégraphié +d'urgence à Londres que vu la cessation des pourparlers +directs entre Pétersbourg et Vienne il était +nécessaire que le Cabinet de Londres renouvelât le +plus tôt possible sous telle ou autre forme sa proposition +concernant la médiation des Puissances. Avant moi Viviani a +reçu aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui lui a +renouvelé l'assurance des tendances pacifiques de +l'Allemagne. Viviani ayant fait observer que si l'Allemagne +désirait la paix elle devrait se hâter +d'adhérer à la proposition de médiation +anglaise, le Baron Schoen a répondu que les mots +«conférence» ou «arbitrage» +effrayaient l'Autriche. Viviani a répliqué qu'il ne +s'agissait pas de mots et qu'il serait facile de trouver une autre +forme de médiation. D'après l'avis du Baron de +Schoen, pour le succès des négociations entre les +Puissances il serait nécessaire de savoir ce que l'Autriche +compterait demander à la Serbie. Viviani a répondu +que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facilement s'en +enquérir auprès de l'Autriche, mais qu'en attendant +la note responsive serbe pourrait servir de base à la +discussion; il a ajouté que la France désirait +sincèrement la paix, mais qu'elle était en même +temps résolue d'agir en pleine harmonie avec ses +alliés et amis, et que lui, le Baron de Schoen, avait pu se +convaincre que cette résolution rencontrait la plus vive +approbation du pays.</p> +<p>(Signé) Iswolsky.</p> +<p>No. 56.</p> +<p>Télégramme de son Altesse Royale le Prince +Alexandre de Serbie à sa Majesté l'Empereur.</p> +<p>Profondément touché par le +télégramme que Votre Majesté a bien voulu +M'adresser hier, Je M'empresse de La remercier de tout mon coeur. +Je prie Votre Majesté d'être persuadée que la +cordiale sympathie, dont Votre Majesté est animée +envers Mon pays, nous est particulièrement précieuse +et remplit notre âme de l'espoir que l'avenir de la Serbie +est assuré étant devenu l'objet de la Haute +sollicitude de Votre Majesté. Ces moments pénibles ne +peuvent que raffermir les liens de l'attachement profond qui +unissent la Serbie à la sainte Russie slave, et les +sentiments de reconnaissance éternelle pour l'aide et la +protection de Votre Majesté seront conservés +pieusement dans l'âme de tous les Serbes.</p> +<p>(Signé) Alexandre,</p> +<p>No. 57.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Nich, le 16/29 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>J'ai communiqué à Pachitch le texte du +télégramme responsif de Sa Majesté l'Empereur +an Prince Alexandre. Pachitch après l'avoir lu, se signa et +dit: «Seigneur! Le Tzar est grand et clément»! +Ensuite il m'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir l'émotion qui +l'avait gagné. L'héritier est attendu à Nich +dans la nuit.</p> +<p>(Signé) Strandtman.</p> +<p>No. 58.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à +l'Ambassadeur en France.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> St. Pétersbourg, le +10/29 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a communiqué la +résolution prise par son gouvernement de mobiliser, si la +Russie ne cessait pas ses préparatifs militaires. Or, nous +n'avons commencé ces derniers qu'à la suite de la +mobilisation à laquelle avait déjà +procédé l'Autriche et vu l'absence évidente +chez cette dernière du désir d'accepter un mode +quelconque d'une solution pacifique de son conflit avec la +Serbie.</p> +<p>Puisque nous ne pouvons pas accéder au désir de +l'Allemagne, il ne nous reste que d'accélérer nos +propres armements et de compter avec l'inévitabilité +probable de la guerre.—Veuillez en avertir le Gouvernement +Français et lui exprimer en même temps notre +sincère reconnaissance pour la déclaration que +l'Ambassadeur de France m'a faite en son nom en disant que nous +pouvons compter entièrement sur l'appui de notre +alliée de France. Dans les circonstances actuelles cette +déclaration nous est particulièrement +précieuse. Communiqué aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, +Autriche-Hongrie, Italie, Allemagne.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p>No. 59.</p> +<p>Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Nich, le 17/30 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Le Prince-Régent a publié hier un manifeste +signé par tous les Ministres à l'occasion de la +déclaration de la guerre par l'Autriche à la Serbie. +Le manifeste se termine par les paroles suivantes: +«Défendez de toutes vos forces vos foyers et la +Serbie». Lors de l'ouverture solennelle de la Scouptchina, le +Régent lut en son nom le discours du trône, an +début duquel il indiqua que le lieu de la convocation +démontrait l'importance des évènements +actuels. Suit l'exposé des faits des derniers +jours—l'ultimatum autrichien, la réponse serbe, les +efforts du gouvernement Royal de faire tout ce qui était +compatible avec la dignité de l'Etat pour éviter la +guerre et enfin l'agression armée du voisin plus puissant +contre la Serbie, aux côtés de laquelle se tient le +Monténégro. En passant à l'examen de +l'attitude des Puissances en présence du conflit, le Prince +insista tout d'abord sur les sentiments dont est animée la +Russie et sur la Toute Gracieuse Communication de sa Majesté +l'Empereur disant que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera la +Serbie. A chaque mention du nom de Sa Majesté +Impériale et de la Russie un «jivio» formidable +et fébrile secouait la salle des séances. Les marques +de sympathie de la part de la France et de l'Angleterre furent +aussi relevées séparément et +provoquèrent des «jivio» d'approbation de la +part des députés. Le discours du trône se +termine par la déclaration d'ouverture de la Scouptchina et +par l'expression du voeu que toutes les mesures soient prises pour +faciliter la tâche du Gouvernement.</p> +<p>(Signé) Strandtman.</p> +<p>No. 60.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en +Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre, et en +Italie.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> St. Pétersbourg, le +17/30 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui vient de me quitter m'a +demandé si nous ne pouvions pas nous contenter de la +promesse que l'Autriche pourrait donner—de ne pas porter +atteinte à l'intégrité du Royaume de +Serbie—et indiquer à quelles conditions nous pourrions +encore consentir à suspendre nos armements; je lui ai +dicté, pour être transmise d'urgence à Berlin, +la déclaration suivante: «Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant +que la question austro-serbe a assumé le caractère +d'une question européenne, se déclare prête +à éliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent +atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage +à cesser ses préparatifs militaires.»</p> +<p>Veuillez télégraphier d'urgence quelle sera +l'attitude du Gouvernement Allemand en présence de cette +nouvelle preuve de notre désir de faire le possible pour la +solution pacifique de la question, car nous ne pouvons pas admettre +que de semblables pourparlers ne servent qu'à faire gagner +du temps à l'Allemagne et à l'Autriche pour leurs +préparatifs militaires.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p>No. 61.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>J'apprends que le décret de mobilisation de +l'armée et de la flotte allemandes vient d'être +promulgué.</p> +<p>(Signé) Swerbéew.</p> +<p>No. 62.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient de me +téléphoner pour me communiquer que la nouvelle +lancée tout à l'heure de la mobilisation de +l'armée et de la flotte allemandes est fausse; que les +feuillets des journaux étaient imprimés d'avance en +prévision de toutes éventualités, et mis en +vente à l'heure de l'après-midi, mais que maintenant +ils sont confisqués,</p> +<p>(Signé) Swerbéew.</p> +<p>No. 63.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Ai reçu Votre télégramme du 16-29 Juillet +et ai transmis le texte de Votre proposition au Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères que je viens de voir; il m'a dit qu'il +avait reçu un télégramme identique de +l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à St.-Pétersbourg et m'a +déclaré ensuite qu'il trouvait notre proposition +inacceptable pour l'Autriche.</p> +<p>(Signé) Swerbéew.</p> +<p>No. 64.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Londres, le 17/30 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Ai communiqué le contenu de Vos télégrammes +du 16 et 17 Juillet à Grey lequel considère la +situation comme très sérieuse, mais désire +continuer les pourparlers. J'ai fait observer à Grey que +depuis que Vous lui aviez fait la proposition d'accepter tout ce +qu'il proposerait en faveur du maintien de la paix, pourvu que +l'Autriche ne pût profiter de ces atermoiements pour +écraser la Serbie, la situation dans laquelle Vous vous +trouviez s'était apparemment modifiée. A cette +époque nos rapports avec l'Allemagne n'étaient pas +compromis. Après la déclaration de l'Ambassadeur +d'Allemagne à St.-Pétersbourg concernant la +mobilisation allemande, ces rapports avaient changé et sa +demande avait reçu de Votre part la seule réponse que +pouvait donner une grande Puissance. Lorsque l'Ambassadeur +d'Allemagne était revenu auprès de Vous et +s'était enquis de Vos conditions, Vous les aviez +formulées dans des circonstances tout-à-fait +spéciales. J'ai en même temps de nouveau +insisté auprès de Grey sur la nécessité +de prendre en considération la situation nouvelle +créée par la faute de l'Allemagne à la suite +de l'action de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. Grey a répondu +qu'il le comprenait et qu'il tiendrait compte de ces arguments.</p> +<p>(Signé) Benckendorff.</p> +<p>No. 65.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Londres, le 17/30 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demandé à Grey pour +quelle raison l'Angleterre prenait des mesures militaires sur terre +et sur mer. Grey a répondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un +caractère agressif, mais que la situation était telle +que chaque Puissance devait se préparer.</p> +<p>(Signé) Benckendorff.</p> +<p>No. 66.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Vienne, le 18/31 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Malgré la mobilisation générale je continue +à échanger des vues avec le Comte Berchtold et ses +collaborateurs. Tous insistent sur l'absence chez l'Autriche +d'intentions agressives quelconques contre la Russie et de +visées de conquête à l'égard de la +Serbie, mais tous insistent également sur la +nécessité pour l'Autriche de poursuivre jusqu'an bout +l'action commencée et de donner à la Serbie une +leçon sérieuse qui pourrait constituer une certaine +garantie pour l'avenir.</p> +<p>(Signé) Schébéko.</p> +<p>No. 67.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en +Allemagne, Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre et en +Italie.[<a href="#note-197">197</a>]</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> St. Pétersbourg, le +18/31 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>Me réfère à mon télégramme du +17/30 Juillet. D'ordre de son gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur +d'Angleterre m'a transmis le désir du Cabinet de Londres +d'introduire quelques modifications dans la formule que j'ai +proposée hier à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. J'ai +répondu que j'acceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci-dessous +je vous transmets la formule modifiée en +conséquence.</p> +<p>'Si l'Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses +armées sur le territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le +conflit austro-serbe à assumé le caractère +d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet +que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie +pourrait accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser +porter atteinte à ses droits d'Etat souverain et à +son indépendance,—la Russie s'engage à +conserver son attitude expectante.'</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p><a name="note-197" id="note-197"> +<!-- Note Anchor 197 --></a>[Footnote 197: The second paragraph is +printed in the British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i> No. +132).]</p> +<p>No. 68.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Berlin, le 18/31 Juillet +1914.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient de me dire que +nos pourparlers, qui étaient déjà difficiles +à la suite de la mobilisation contre l'Autriche, le +deviennent encore davantage en présence des graves mesures +militaires que nous prenons contre l'Allemagne; des nouvelles y +relatives sont, d'après lui, reçues ici de tous les +côtés et devront provoquer inévitablement des +mesures analogues de la part de l'Allemagne. A cela j'ai +répondu que, d'après des renseignements sûrs +dont je disposais et qui étaient confirmés par tous +nos compatriotes arrivant à Berlin, la prise contre nous des +mesures susdites se poursuivait également en Allemagne avec +grande activité. Malgré cela, le Ministre des +Affaires Etrangères affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappeler +les officiers de leurs congés et les troupes des champs de +manoeuvres.</p> +<p>(Signé) Swerbéew.</p> +<p>No. 69.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à +l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> St.-Pétersbourg, le +18/31 Juillet 1914.</p> +<p>J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre de transmettre +à Grey l'expression de ma plus sincère reconnaissance +pour le ton amical et ferme dont il a usé pendant les +pourparlers avec l'Allemagne et l'Autriche, grâce à +quoi l'espoir de trouver une issue pacifique de la situation +actuelle n'est pas encore perdu.</p> +<p>Je l'ai aussi prié de dire au Ministre Anglais que je +pensais que ce n'était qu'à Londres que les +pourparlers auraient encore quelques chances d'un succès +quelconque, en facilitant à l'Autriche la +nécessité d'un compromis.</p> +<p>Communiqué à l'Ambassadeur en France.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p>No. 70.</p> +<p>Télégramme secret aux Représentants de Sa +Majesté l'Empereur à l'étranger.</p> +<p>(<i>Télégramme</i>). Le 19 Juillet/1 Août +1914.</p> +<p>A minuit l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a déclaré, +d'ordre de son Gouvernement, que si dans les 12 heures, +c'est-à-dire à midi, Samedi, nous ne commencions pas +la démobilisation, non seulement à l'égard de +l'Allemagne, mais aussi à l'égard de l'Autriche, le +Gouvernement Allemand serait forcé de donner l'ordre de +mobilisation. A ma question si c'était la guerre, +l'Ambassadeur a répondu par la négative, mais en +ajoutant que nous étions fort près d'elle.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p>No. 71.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Londres, 19 Juillet/1 +Août 1914.</p> +<p>Grey m'a dit qu'il a télégraphié à +Berlin qu'à son avis la dernière formule +acceptée par le Gouvernement Russe constitue la base de +négociations qui présente le plus de chances pour une +solution pacifique du conflict. Il a exprimé en même +temps l'espoir qu'aucune grande Puissance ne commencerait les +hostilités avant l'examen de cette formule.</p> +<p>(Signé) Benckendorff.</p> +<p>No. 72.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur eu Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p>(<i>Télégramme</i>). Londres, le 19 Juillet/1 +Août 1914.</p> +<p>Le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne a posé aux +Gouvernements Français et Allemand la question s'ils +respecteraient la neutralité de la Belgique.</p> +<p>La France a répondu dans I'affirmative, tandis que le +Gouvernement Allemand a déclaré ne pouvoir +répondre à cette question catégoriquement.</p> +<p>(Signé) Benckendorff.</p> +<p>No. 73.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 +Août 1914.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a visité hier Viviani et lui a +déclare que l'Autriche non seulement n'avait pas le dessein +de porter atteinte à l'intégrité territoriale +de la Serbie, mais était prête à discuter avec +les autres Puissances le fond de son conflit avec la Serbie. Le +Gouvernement Français est très +préoccupé par les préparatifs militaires +extraordinaires de l'Allemagne sur la frontière +française, car il est convaincu que sous le voile du +«Kriegszustand» se produit une véritable +mobilisation.</p> +<p>(Signé) Iswolsky.</p> +<p>No. 74.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 +Août 1914.</p> +<p>A la réception ici du télégramme de +l'Ambassadeur de France à St.-Petersbourg contenant la +communication que Vous a faite l'Ambassadeur Allemand concernant la +résolution de l'Allemagne de décréter +aujourd'hui la mobilisation générale, le +Président de la République a signé le +décret de mobilisation. Dans les rues on procède +à l'affichage des listes d'appel des réservistes. +L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne vient de rendre visite à Viviani, +mais ne lui a fait aucune nouvelle communication, en +alléguant l'impossibilité de déchiffrer les +télégrammes qu'il a reçus. Viviani l'a +informé de la signature du décret de mobilisation en +réponse à la mobilisation allemande et lui a fait +part de son étonnement de ce que l'Allemagne eût pris +une telle mesure à un moment où se poursuivait encore +un échange de vues amical entre la Russie, l'Autriche et les +Puissances; il a ajouté que la mobilisation ne +préjugeait pas nécessairement la guerre et que +l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne pourrait rester à Paris comme +l'Ambassadeur de Russie est resté à Vienne et celui +d'Autriche à St.-Pétersbourg.</p> +<p>(Signé) Iswolsky.</p> +<p>No. 75.</p> +<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères.</p> +<p><i>(Télégramme).</i> Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 +Août 1914.</p> +<p>Je tiens du Président que pendant les dernières +journées l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a assuré avec force +le Président du Conseil des Ministres et lui même, que +l'Autriche nous aurait déclaré être prête +à respecter non seulement l'intégrité +territoriale de la Serbie, mais aussi ses droits souverains, mais +que nous aurions intentionnellement fait le silence sur cette +déclaration. J'ai opposé un démenti +catégorique à cela.</p> +<p>(Signé) Iswolsky.</p> +<p>No. 76.</p> +<p>Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à +St.-Pétersbourg le 19 Juillet 1914 à 7 h. 10 du +soir.</p> +<p>Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès +les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution +pacifique. Se rendant à un désir qui lui en avait +été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur +de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec +l'Angleterre s'était appliqué à accomplir un +rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et +de St.-Pétersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le +résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la +totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite de +cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun +présage militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire +Allemand s'est trouvé vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et +imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût +manqué de parer à ce péril, il aurait +compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de +l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit +forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté +l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation +desdits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire +droit à (n'ayant pas cru devoir répondre +à[<a href="#note-198">198</a>]) cette demande et ayant +manifesté par ce refus (cette attitude [<a href= +"#note-198">198</a>]) que son action était dirigée +contre I'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de +faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui suit:</p> +<p>Sa Majesté l'Empereur Mon Auguste Souverain au nom de +l'Empire, relevant le défi se considère en +état de guerre avec la Russie.</p> +<p>St.-Pétersbourg, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.</p> +<p>(Signé) F. Pourtalès.</p> +<p><a name="note-198" id="note-198"> +<!-- Note Anchor 198 --></a>[Footnote 198: Les mots placés +entre parenthèses se trouvent dans l'original. Il faut +supposer que deux variantes avaient été +préparées d'avance et que par erreur elles out +été insérées toutes les deux dans la +note.]</p> +<p>No. 77.</p> +<p>Communiqué du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères +concernant les événements des derniers jours.</p> +<p>Le 20 Juillet/2 Août 1914.</p> +<p>Un exposé défigurant les événements +des derniers jours ayant paru dans la presse +étrangère, le Ministère des Affaires +Etrangères croit de son devoir de publier l'aperçu +suivant des pourparlers diplomatiques pendant le temps +susvisé.</p> +<p>Le 10/23 Juillet a.c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à +Belgrade présenta an Ministre Président Serbe une +note où le Gouvernement Serbe était accusé +d'avoir favorisé le mouvement panserbe qui avait abouti +à l'assassinat de l'héritier du trône +austro-hongrois. En conséquence l'Autriche-Hongrie demandait +au Gouvernement Serbe non seulement de condamner sous une forme +solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi de prendre, sous le +contrôle de l'Autriche-Hongrie, une série de mesures +tendant à la découverte du complot, à la +punition des sujets serbes y ayant participé et à la +prévention dans l'avenir de tout attentat sur le sol du +Royaume. Un délai de 48 heures fut fixé au +Gouvernement Serbe pour la réponse à la susdite +note.</p> +<p>Le Gouvernement Impérial, auquel l'Ambassadeur +d'Autriche-Hongrie à St.-Pétersbourg avait +communiqué le texte de la note 17 heures après sa +remise à Belgrade, ayant pris connaissance des demandes y +contenues, dut s'apercevoir que quelques-unes parmi elles +étaient inexécutables quant an fond, tandis que +d'autres étaient présentées sous une forme +incompatible avec la dignité d'un Etat indépendant. +Trouvant inadmissibles la diminution de la dignité de la +Serbie contenue dans ces demandes, ainsi que la tendance de +l'Autriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa prépondérance dans +les Balcans démontrée par ces mêmes exigences, +le Gouvernement Russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale +à l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait désirable de +soumettre à un nouvel examen les points contenus dans la +note austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois ne crut +possible de consentir à une discussion de la note. L'action +modératrice des autres Puissances à Vienne ne fut non +plus couronnée de succès.</p> +<p>Malgré que la Serbie eût reprouvé le crime +et se fût montrée prête à donner +satisfaction à l'Autriche dans une mesure qui dépassa +les prévisions non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi des +autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade +jugea la réponse serbe insuffisante et quitta cette +ville.</p> +<p>Reconnaissant le caractère exagéré des +demandes présentées par l'Autriche, la Russie avait +déclaré encore auparavant qu'il lui serait impossible +de rester indifférente, sans se refuser toutefois à +employer tous ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui +fût acceptable pour l'Autriche et ménageât son +amour-propre de grande puissance. En même temps la Russie +établit fermement qu'elle admettait une solution pacifique +de la question seulement dans une mesure qui n'impliquerait pas la +diminution de la dignité de la Serbie comme Etat +indépendant. Malheureusement tous les efforts +déployés par le Gouvernement Impérial dans +cette direction restèrent sans effet. Le Gouvernement +Austro-Hongrois, après s'être dérobé +à toute intervention conciliatrice des Puissances dans son +conflit avec la Serbie, procéda à la mobilisation, +déclara officiellement la guerre à la Serbie, et le +jour suivant Belgrade fut bombardée. Le manifeste qui a +accompagné la déclaration de guerre accuse +ouvertement la Serbie d'avoir préparé et +exécuté le crime de Seraïewo. Une pareille +accusation d'un crime de droit commun lancée contre tout un +peuple et tout un État attira à la Serbie par son +inanité évidente les larges sympathies des cercles de +la société européenne.</p> +<p>A la suite de cette manière d'agir du Gouvernement +Austro-Hongrois, malgré la déclaration de la Russie +qu'elle ne pourrait rester indifférente au sort de la +Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial jugea nécessaire +d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militaires de Kiew, +d'Odessa, de Moscou et de Kazan. Une telle décision +s'imposait parce que depuis la date de la remise de la note +austro-hongroise au Gouvernement Serbe et les premières +démarches de la Russie cinq jours s'étaient +écoulés, et cependant le Cabinet de Vienne n'avait +fait aucun pas pour aller au-devant de nos efforts pacifiques; au +contraire, la mobilisation de la moitié de l'armée +austro-hongroise avait été +décrétée.</p> +<p>Le Gouvernement Allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises +par la Russie; il lui fut en même temps expliqué +qu'elles n'étaient que la conséquence des armements +autrichiens et nullement dirigées contre l'Allemagne. En +même temps, le Gouvernement Impérial déclara +que la Russie était prête à continuer les +pourparlers en vue d'une solution pacifique du conflit, soit par la +voie de négociations directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne, +soit en suivant la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne, par la voie +d'une Conférence des quatre Grandes Puissances non +intéressées directement, voire l'Angleterre, la +France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie.</p> +<p>Cependant cette tentative de la Russie échoua +également. L'Autriche-Hongrie déclina un +échange de vues ultérieur avec nous, et le Cabinet de +Vienne se déroba à la participation à la +Conférence des Puissances projetée.</p> +<p>Néanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en +faveur de la paix. Répondant à la question de +l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, à quelles conditions nous +consentirions encore à suspendre nos armements, le Ministre +des Affaires Etrangères déclara que ces conditions +seraient la reconnaissance par l'Autriche-Hongrie que la question +Austro-Serbe avait revêtu le caractère d'une question +européenne, et la déclaration de cette même +Puissance qu'elle consentait à ne pas insister sur des +demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie.</p> +<p>La proposition de la Russie fut jugée par l'Allemagne +inacceptable pour l'Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanément on +reçut à St.-Pétersbourg la nouvelle de la +proclamation de la mobilisation générale par +l'Autriche-Hongrie.</p> +<p>En même temps les hostilités continuaient sur le +territoire Serbe et Belgrade fut bombardée derechef.</p> +<p>L'insuccès de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea +d'élargir les mesures de précaution militaires.</p> +<p>Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adressé une question +à ce sujet, il lui fut répondu que la Russie +était forcée de commencer ses armements pour se +prémunir contre toutes éventualités.</p> +<p>Tout en prenant cette mesure de précaution, la Russie +n'en discontinuait pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une +issue de cette situation et déclara être prête +à accepter tout moyen de solution du conflit qui +comporterait l'observation des conditions posées par +nous.</p> +<p>Malgré cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement +Allemand, le 18/31 Juillet, adressa au Gouvernement Russe la +demande d'avoir à suspendre ses mesures militaires à +midi du 19 Juillet/ 1 Août, en menaçant, dans le cas +contraire, de procéder à une mobilisation +générale.</p> +<p>Le lendemain, 19 Juillet/1 Août, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne +transmit au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, an nom de son +Gouvernement, la déclaration de guerre.</p> +<p>No. 78.</p> +<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux +Représentants de S. M. I'Empereur à +l'étranger.</p> +<p>(<i>Télégramme</i>). St.-Pétersbourg, le 20 +Juillet/2 Août 1914.</p> +<p>Il est absolument clair que l'Allemagne s'efforce dès +à présent de rejeter sur nous la +responsabilité de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a +été provoquée par l'énorme +responsabilité que nous aurions assumée, si nous +n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de précaution à +un moment où l'Autriche, se bornant à des pourparlers +d'un caractère dilatoire, bombardait Belgrade et +procédait à une mobilisation +générale.</p> +<p>Sa Majesté l'Empereur s'était engagé +vis-à-vis de l'Empereur d'Allemagne par sa parole à +n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que dureraient les +pourparlers avec l'Autriche. Après une telle garantie et +après toutes les preuves de l'amour de la Russie pour la +paix, l'Allemagne ne pouvait ni avait le droit de douter de notre +déclaration que nous accepterions avec joie toute issue +pacifique compatible avec la dignité et +l'indépendance de la Serbie. Une autre issue, tout en +étant complètement incompatible avec notre propre +dignité, aurait certainement ébranlé +l'équilibre Européen assurant +l'hégémonie de l'Allemagne. Ce caractère +Européen, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plus +important que le prétexte qui l'a créé. Par sa +décision de nous déclarer la guerre à un +moment où se poursuivaient les négociations entre les +Puissances, l'Allemagne a assumé une lourde +responsabilité.</p> +<p>(Signé) Sazonow.</p> +<p>No. 79.</p> +<p>Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à +St.-Pétersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères +le 24 Juillet à 6 h. du soir.</p> +<p>D'ordre de son Gouvernement le soussigné Ambassadeur +d'Autriche-Hongrie a l'honneur de notifier à Son Excellence +Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Russie ce +qui suit:</p> +<p>«Vu l'attitude menaçante prise par la Russie dans +le conflit entre la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise et la Serbie et en +présence du fait qu'en suite de ce conflit la Russie, +d'après une communication du Cabinet de Berlin, a cru devoir +ouvrir les hostilités contre l'Allemagne et que celle-ci se +trouve par conséquent en état de guerre avec ladite +Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considère également +en état de guerre avec la Russie à partir du +présent moment.</p> +<p>(Signé) Szápáry. St.-Pétersbourg. 6 +Août/24 Juillet 1914.</p> +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10809 ***</div> +</body> +</html> |