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diff --git a/10739-h/10739-h.htm b/10739-h/10739-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..72b4d48 --- /dev/null +++ b/10739-h/10739-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,3383 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <meta content="pg2html (binary v0.17)" name="linkgenerator" /> + <title> + The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer: on Human Nature., by Arthur + Schopenhauer + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .75em; margin-bottom: .75em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 5%; margin-right: 5%; text-align: justify; font-size: 80%; font-style: italic;} + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + .xx-small {font-size: 60%;} + .x-small {font-size: 75%;} + .small {font-size: 85%;} + .large {font-size: 115%;} + .x-large {font-size: 130%;} + .indent5 { margin-left: 5%;} + .indent10 { margin-left: 10%;} + .indent15 { margin-left: 15%;} + .indent20 { margin-left: 20%;} + .indent25 { margin-left: 25%;} + .indent30 { margin-left: 30%;} + .indent35 { margin-left: 35%;} + .indent40 { margin-left: 40%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {position: absolute; right: 1%; font-size: 0.6em; + font-variant: normal; font-style: normal; + text-align: right; background-color: #FFFACD; + border: 1px solid; padding: 0.3em;text-indent: 0em;} + .side { float: left; font-size: 75%; width: 15%; padding-left: 0.8em; + border-left: dashed thin; text-align: left; + text-indent: 0; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; + font-weight: bold; color: black; background: #eeeeee; border: solid 1px;} + .head { float: left; font-size: 90%; width: 98%; padding-left: 0.8em; + border-left: dashed thin; text-align: center; + text-indent: 0; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; + font-weight: bold; color: black; background: #eeeeee; border: solid 1px;} + p.pfirst, p.noindent {text-indent: 0} + span.dropcap { float: left; margin: 0 0.1em 0 0; line-height: 0.8 } + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} +</style> + </head> + <body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10739 ***</div> + <div style="height: 8em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h1> + THE ESSAYS OF<br /> ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER:<br /><br /> ON HUMAN NATURE. + </h1> + <h2> + By Arthur Schopenhauer + </h2> + <h3> + Translated By T. Bailey Saunders + </h3> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <p> + <b>CONTENTS</b> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0001"> TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> HUMAN NATURE. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0003"> GOVERNMENT. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0004"> FREE-WILL AND FATALISM. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0005"> CHARACTER. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0006"> MORAL INSTINCT. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0007"> ETHICAL REFLECTIONS. </a> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0001" id="link2H_4_0001"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. + </h2> + <p> + The following essays are drawn from the chapters entitled <i>Zur Ethik</i> + and <i>Zur Rechtslehre und Politik</i> which are to be found both in + Schopenhauer's <i>Parerga</i> and in his posthumous writings. As in my + previous volumes, so also in this, I have omitted a few passages which + appeared to me to be either antiquated or no longer of any general + interest. For convenience' sake I have divided the original chapters into + sections, which I have had to name; and I have also had to invent a title + which should express their real scope. The reader will find that it is not + so much <i>Ethics</i> and <i>Politics</i> that are here treated, as human + nature itself in various aspects. + </p> + <h3> + T.B.S. + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h1> + HUMAN NATURE. + </h1> + <p> + Truths of the physical order may possess much external significance, but + internal significance they have none. The latter is the privilege of + intellectual and moral truths, which are concerned with the objectivation + of the will in its highest stages, whereas physical truths are concerned + with it in its lowest. + </p> + <p> + For example, if we could establish the truth of what up till now is only a + conjecture, namely, that it is the action of the sun which produces + thermoelectricity at the equator; that this produces terrestrial + magnetism; and that this magnetism, again, is the cause of the <i>aurora + borealis</i>, these would be truths externally of great, but internally of + little, significance. On the other hand, examples of internal significance + are furnished by all great and true philosophical systems; by the + catastrophe of every good tragedy; nay, even by the observation of human + conduct in the extreme manifestations of its morality and immorality, of + its good and its evil character. For all these are expressions of that + reality which takes outward shape as the world, and which, in the highest + stages of its objectivation, proclaims its innermost nature. + </p> + <p> + To say that the world has only a physical and not a moral significance is + the greatest and most pernicious of all errors, the fundamental blunder, + the real perversity of mind and temper; and, at bottom, it is doubtless + the tendency which faith personifies as Anti-Christ. Nevertheless, in + spite of all religions—and they are systems which one and all + maintain the opposite, and seek to establish it in their mythical way—this + fundamental error never becomes quite extinct, but raises its head from + time to time afresh, until universal indignation compels it to hide itself + once more. + </p> + <p> + Yet, however certain we may feel of the moral significance of life and the + world, to explain and illustrate it, and to resolve the contradiction + between this significance and the world as it is, form a task of great + difficulty; so great, indeed, as to make it possible that it has remained + for me to exhibit the true and only genuine and sound basis of morality + everywhere and at all times effective, together with the results to which + it leads. The actual facts of morality are too much on my side for me to + fear that my theory can ever be replaced or upset by any other. + </p> + <p> + However, so long as even my ethical system continues to be ignored by the + professorial world, it is Kant's moral principle that prevails in the + universities. Among its various forms the one which is most in favour at + present is "the dignity of man." I have already exposed the absurdity of + this doctrine in my treatise on the <i>Foundation of Morality</i>.{1} + Therefore I will only say here that if the question were asked on what the + alleged dignity of man rests, it would not be long before the answer was + made that it rests upon his morality. In other words, his morality rests + upon his dignity, and his dignity rests upon his morality. + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: § 8.} + </p> + <p> + But apart from this circular argument it seems to me that the idea of + dignity can be applied only in an ironical sense to a being whose will is + so sinful, whose intellect is so limited, whose body is so weak and + perishable as man's. How shall a man be proud, when his conception is a + crime, his birth a penalty, his life a labour, and death a necessity!— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + <i>Quid superbit homo? cujus conceptio culpa, + Nasci poena, labor vita, necesse mori</i>! +</pre> + <p> + Therefore, in opposition to the above-mentioned form of the Kantian + principle, I should be inclined to lay down the following rule: When you + come into contact with a man, no matter whom, do not attempt an objective + appreciation of him according to his worth and dignity. Do not consider + his bad will, or his narrow understanding and perverse ideas; as the + former may easily lead you to hate and the latter to despise him; but fix + your attention only upon his sufferings, his needs, his anxieties, his + pains. Then you will always feel your kinship with him; you will + sympathise with him; and instead of hatred or contempt you will experience + the commiseration that alone is the peace to which the Gospel calls us. + The way to keep down hatred and contempt is certainly not to look for a + man's alleged "dignity," but, on the contrary, to regard him as an object + of pity. + </p> + <p> + The Buddhists, as the result of the more profound views which they + entertain on ethical and metaphysical subjects, start from the cardinal + vices and not the cardinal virtues; since the virtues make their + appearance only as the contraries or negations of the vices. According to + Schmidt's <i>History of the Eastern Mongolians</i> the cardinal vices in + the Buddhist scheme are four: Lust, Indolence, Anger, and Avarice. But + probably instead of Indolence, we should read Pride; for so it stands in + the <i>Lettres édifiantes et curieuses</i>,{1} where Envy, or Hatred, is + added as a fifth. I am confirmed in correcting the statement of the + excellent Schmidt by the fact that my rendering agrees with the doctrine + of the Sufis, who are certainly under the influence of the Brahmins and + Buddhists. The Sufis also maintain that there are four cardinal vices, and + they arrange them in very striking pairs, so that Lust appears in + connection with Avarice, and Anger with Pride. The four cardinal virtues + opposed to them would be Chastity and Generosity, together with Gentleness + and Humility. + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: Edit, of 1819, vol. vi., p. 372.} + </p> + <p> + When we compare these profound ideas of morality, as they are entertained + by oriental nations, with the celebrated cardinal virtues of Plato, which + have been recapitulated again and again—Justice, Valour, Temperance, + and Wisdom—it is plain that the latter are not based on any clear, + leading idea, but are chosen on grounds that are superficial and, in part, + obviously false. Virtues must be qualities of the will, but Wisdom is + chiefly an attribute of the Intellect. {Greek: Sophrosynae}, which Cicero + translates <i>Temperantia</i>, is a very indefinite and ambiguous word, + and it admits, therefore, of a variety of applications: it may mean + discretion, or abstinence, or keeping a level head. Courage is not a + virtue at all; although sometimes it is a servant or instrument of virtue; + but it is just as ready to become the servant of the greatest villainy. It + is really a quality of temperament. Even Geulinx (in the preface to this + <i>Ethics</i>) condemned the Platonic virtues and put the following in + their place: Diligence, Obedience, Justice and Humility; which are + obviously bad. The Chinese distinguish five cardinal virtues: Sympathy, + Justice, Propriety, Wisdom, and Sincerity. The virtues of Christianity are + theological, not cardinal: Faith, Love, and Hope. + </p> + <p> + Fundamental disposition towards others, assuming the character either of + Envy or of Sympathy, is the point at which the moral virtues and vices of + mankind first diverge. These two diametrically opposite qualities exist in + every man; for they spring from the inevitable comparison which he draws + between his own lot and that of others. According as the result of this + comparison affects his individual character does the one or the other of + these qualities become the source and principle of all his action. Envy + builds the wall between <i>Thee</i> and <i>Me</i> thicker and stronger; + Sympathy makes it slight and transparent; nay, sometimes it pulls down the + wall altogether; and then the distinction between self and not-self + vanishes. + </p> + <p> + Valour, which has been mentioned as a virtue, or rather the Courage on + which it is based (for valour is only courage in war), deserves a closer + examination. The ancients reckoned Courage among the virtues, and + cowardice among the vices; but there is no corresponding idea in the + Christian scheme, which makes for charity and patience, and in its + teaching forbids all enmity or even resistance. The result is that with + the moderns Courage is no longer a virtue. Nevertheless it must be + admitted that cowardice does not seem to be very compatible with any + nobility of character—if only for the reason that it betrays an + overgreat apprehension about one's own person. + </p> + <p> + Courage, however, may also be explained as a readiness to meet ills that + threaten at the moment, in order to avoid greater ills that lie in the + future; whereas cowardice does the contrary. But this readiness is of the + same quality as <i>patience</i>, for patience consists in the clear + consciousness that greater evils than those which are present, and that + any violent attempt to flee from or guard against the ills we have may + bring the others upon us. Courage, then, would be a kind of patience; and + since it is patience that enables us to practise forbearance and self + control, Courage is, through the medium of patience, at least akin to + virtue. + </p> + <p> + But perhaps Courage admits of being considered from a higher point of + view. The fear of death may in every case be traced to a deficiency in + that natural philosophy—natural, and therefore resting on mere + feeling—which gives a man the assurance that he exists in everything + outside him just as much as in his own person; so that the death of his + person can do him little harm. But it is just this very assurance that + would give a man heroic Courage; and therefore, as the reader will + recollect from my <i>Ethics</i>, Courage comes from the same source as the + virtues of Justice and Humanity. This is, I admit, to take a very high + view of the matter; but apart from it I cannot well explain why cowardice + seems contemptible, and personal courage a noble and sublime thing; for no + lower point of view enables me to see why a finite individual who is + everything to himself—nay, who is himself even the very fundamental + condition of the existence of the rest of the world—should not put + his own preservation above every other aim. It is, then, an insufficient + explanation of Courage to make it rest only on utility, to give it an + empirical and not a transcendental character. It may have been for some + such reason that Calderon once uttered a sceptical but remarkable opinion + in regard to Courage, nay, actually denied its reality; and put his denial + into the mouth of a wise old minister, addressing his young sovereign. + "Although," he observed, "natural fear is operative in all alike, a man + may be brave in not letting it be seen; and it is this that constitutes + Courage": + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + <i>Que aunque el natural temor + En todos obra igualmente, + No mostrarle es ser valiente + Y esto es lo que hace el valor</i>.{1} +</pre> + <p> + {Footnote 1: <i>La Hija del Aire</i>, ii., 2.} + </p> + <p> + In regard to the difference which I have mentioned between the ancients + and the moderns in their estimate of Courage as a virtue, it must be + remembered that by Virtue, <i>virtus</i>, {Greek: aretae}, the ancients + understood every excellence or quality that was praiseworthy in itself, it + might be moral or intellectual, or possibly only physical. But when + Christianity demonstrated that the fundamental tendency of life was moral, + it was moral superiority alone than henceforth attached to the notion of + Virtue. Meanwhile the earlier usage still survived in the elder Latinists, + and also in Italian writers, as is proved by the well-known meaning of the + word <i>virtuoso</i>. The special attention of students should be drawn to + this wider range of the idea of Virtue amongst the ancients, as otherwise + it might easily be a source of secret perplexity. I may recommend two + passages preserved for us by Stobaeus, which will serve this purpose. One + of them is apparently from the Pythagorean philosopher Metopos, in which + the fitness of every bodily member is declared to be a virtue. The other + pronounces that the virtue of a shoemaker is to make good shoes. This may + also serve to explain why it is that in the ancient scheme of ethics + virtues and vices are mentioned which find no place in ours. + </p> + <p> + As the place of Courage amongst the virtues is a matter of doubt, so is + that of Avarice amongst the vices. It must not, however, be confounded + with greed, which is the most immediate meaning of the Latin word <i>avaritia</i>. + Let us then draw up and examine the arguments <i>pro et contra</i> in + regard to Avarice, and leave the final judgment to be formed by every man + for himself. + </p> + <p> + On the one hand it is argued that it is not Avarice which is a vice, but + extravagance, its opposite. Extravagance springs from a brutish limitation + to the present moment, in comparison with which the future, existing as it + does only in thought, is as nothing. It rests upon the illusion that + sensual pleasures possess a positive or real value. Accordingly, future + need and misery is the price at which the spendthrift purchases pleasures + that are empty, fleeting, and often no more than imaginary; or else feeds + his vain, stupid self-conceit on the bows and scrapes of parasites who + laugh at him in secret, or on the gaze of the mob and those who envy his + magnificence. We should, therefore, shun the spendthrift as though he had + the plague, and on discovering his vice break with him betimes, in order + that later on, when the consequences of his extravagance ensue, we may + neither have to help to bear them, nor, on the other hand, have to play + the part of the friends of Timon of Athens. + </p> + <p> + At the same time it is not to be expected that he who foolishly squanders + his own fortune will leave another man's intact, if it should chance to be + committed to his keeping; nay, <i>sui profusus</i> and <i>alieni appetens</i> + are by Sallust very rightly conjoined. Hence it is that extravagance leads + not only to impoverishment but also to crime; and crime amongst the + moneyed classes is almost always the result of extravagance. It is + accordingly with justice that the <i>Koran</i> declares all spendthrifts + to be "brothers of Satan." + </p> + <p> + But it is superfluity that Avarice brings in its train, and when was + superfluity ever unwelcome? That must be a good vice which has good + consequences. Avarice proceeds upon the principle that all pleasure is + only negative in its operation and that the happiness which consists of a + series of pleasures is a chimaera; that, on the contrary, it is pains + which are positive and extremely real. Accordingly, the avaricious man + foregoes the former in order that he may be the better preserved from the + latter, and thus it is that <i>bear and forbear</i>—<i>sustine et + abstine</i>—is his maxim. And because he knows, further, how + inexhaustible are the possibilities of misfortune, and how innumerable the + paths of danger, he increases the means of avoiding them, in order, if + possible, to surround himself with a triple wall of protection. Who, then, + can say where precaution against disaster begins to be exaggerated? He + alone who knows where the malignity of fate reaches its limit. And even if + precaution were exaggerated it is an error which at the most would hurt + the man who took it, and not others. If he will never need the treasures + which he lays up for himself, they will one day benefit others whom nature + has made less careful. That until then he withdraws the money from + circulation is no misfortune; for money is not an article of consumption: + it only represents the good things which a man may actually possess, and + is not one itself. Coins are only counters; their value is what they + represent; and what they represent cannot be withdrawn from circulation. + Moreover, by holding back the money, the value of the remainder which is + in circulation is enhanced by precisely the same amount. Even though it be + the case, as is said, that many a miser comes in the end to love money + itself for its own sake, it is equally certain that many a spendthrift, on + the other hand, loves spending and squandering for no better reason. + Friendship with a miser is not only without danger, but it is profitable, + because of the great advantages it can bring. For it is doubtless those + who are nearest and dearest to the miser who on his death will reap the + fruits of the self-control which he exercised; but even in his lifetime, + too, something may be expected of him in cases of great need. At any rate + one can always hope for more from him than from the spendthrift, who has + lost his all and is himself helpless and in debt. <i>Mas da el duro que el + desnudo</i>, says a Spanish proverb; the man who has a hard heart will + give more than the man who has an empty purse. The upshot of all this is + that Avarice is not a vice. + </p> + <p> + On the other side, it may be said that Avarice is the quintessence of all + vices. When physical pleasures seduce a man from the right path, it is his + sensual nature—the animal part of him—which is at fault. He is + carried away by its attractions, and, overcome by the impression of the + moment, he acts without thinking of the consequences. When, on the other + hand, he is brought by age or bodily weakness to the condition in which + the vices that he could never abandon end by abandoning him, and his + capacity for physical pleasure dies—if he turns to Avarice, the + intellectual desire survives the sensual. Money, which represents all the + good things of this world, and is these good things in the abstract, now + becomes the dry trunk overgrown with all the dead lusts of the flesh, + which are egoism in the abstract. They come to life again in the love of + the Mammon. The transient pleasure of the senses has become a deliberate + and calculated lust of money, which, like that to which it is directed, is + symbolical in its nature, and, like it, indestructible. + </p> + <p> + This obstinate love of the pleasures of the world—a love which, as + it were, outlives itself; this utterly incorrigible sin, this refined and + sublimated desire of the flesh, is the abstract form in which all lusts + are concentrated, and to which it stands like a general idea to individual + particulars. Accordingly, Avarice is the vice of age, just as extravagance + is the vice of youth. + </p> + <p> + This <i>disputatio in utramque partem</i>—this debate for and + against—is certainly calculated to drive us into accepting the <i>juste + milieu</i> morality of Aristotle; a conclusion that is also supported by + the following consideration. + </p> + <p> + Every human perfection is allied to a defect into which it threatens to + pass; but it is also true that every defect is allied to a perfection. + Hence it is that if, as often happens, we make a mistake about a man, it + is because at the beginning of our acquaintance with him we confound his + defects with the kinds of perfection to which they are allied. The + cautious man seems to us a coward; the economical man, a miser; the + spendthrift seems liberal; the rude fellow, downright and sincere; the + foolhardy person looks as if he were going to work with a noble + self-confidence; and so on in many other cases. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + No one can live among men without feeling drawn again and again to the + tempting supposition that moral baseness and intellectual incapacity are + closely connected, as though they both sprang direct from one source. That + that, however, is not so, I have shown in detail.{1} That it seems to be + so is merely due to the fact that both are so often found together; and + the circumstance is to be explained by the very frequent occurrence of + each of them, so that it may easily happen for both to be compelled to + live under one roof. At the same time it is not to be denied that they + play into each other's hands to their mutual benefit; and it is this that + produces the very unedifying spectacle which only too many men exhibit, + and that makes the world to go as it goes. A man who is unintelligent is + very likely to show his perfidy, villainy and malice; whereas a clever man + understands how to conceal these qualities. And how often, on the other + hand, does a perversity of heart prevent a man from seeing truths which + his intelligence is quite capable of grasping! + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: In my chief work, vol. ii., ch. xix,} + </p> + <p> + Nevertheless, let no one boast. Just as every man, though he be the + greatest genius, has very definite limitations in some one sphere of + knowledge, and thus attests his common origin with the essentially + perverse and stupid mass of mankind, so also has every man something in + his nature which is positively evil. Even the best, nay the noblest, + character will sometimes surprise us by isolated traits of depravity; as + though it were to acknowledge his kinship with the human race, in which + villainy—nay, cruelty—is to be found in that degree. For it + was just in virtue of this evil in him, this bad principle, that of + necessity he became a man. And for the same reason the world in general is + what my clear mirror of it has shown it to be. + </p> + <p> + But in spite of all this the difference even between one man and another + is incalculably great, and many a one would be horrified to see another as + he really is. Oh, for some Asmodeus of morality, to make not only roofs + and walls transparent to his favourites, but also to lift the veil of + dissimulation, fraud, hypocrisy, pretence, falsehood and deception, which + is spread over all things! to show how little true honesty there is in the + world, and how often, even where it is least to be expected, behind all + the exterior outwork of virtue, secretly and in the innermost recesses, + unrighteousness sits at the helm! It is just on this account that so many + men of the better kind have four-footed friends: for, to be sure, how is a + man to get relief from the endless dissimulation, falsity and malice of + mankind, if there were no dogs into whose honest faces he can look without + distrust? + </p> + <p> + For what is our civilised world but a big masquerade? where you meet + knights, priests, soldiers, men of learning, barristers, clergymen, + philosophers, and I don't know what all! But they are not what they + pretend to be; they are only masks, and, as a rule, behind the masks you + will find moneymakers. One man, I suppose, puts on the mask of law, which + he has borrowed for the purpose from a barrister, only in order to be able + to give another man a sound drubbing; a second has chosen the mask of + patriotism and the public welfare with a similar intent; a third takes + religion or purity of doctrine. For all sorts of purposes men have often + put on the mask of philosophy, and even of philanthropy, and I know not + what besides. Women have a smaller choice. As a rule they avail themselves + of the mask of morality, modesty, domesticity, and humility. Then there + are general masks, without any particular character attaching to them like + dominoes. They may be met with everywhere; and of this sort is the strict + rectitude, the courtesy, the sincere sympathy, the smiling friendship, + that people profess. The whole of these masks as a rule are merely, as I + have said, a disguise for some industry, commerce, or speculation. It is + merchants alone who in this respect constitute any honest class. They are + the only people who give themselves out to be what they are; and therefore + they go about without any mask at all, and consequently take a humble + rank. + </p> + <p> + It is very necessary that a man should be apprised early in life that it + is a masquerade in which he finds himself. For otherwise there are many + things which he will fail to understand and put up with, nay, at which he + will be completely puzzled, and that man longest of all whose heart is + made of better clay— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + <i>Et meliore luto finxit praecordia Titan.{1}</i> +</pre> + <p> + {Footnote 1: Juvenal, <i>Sat</i>. 14, 34} + </p> + <p> + Such for instance is the favour that villainy finds; the neglect that + merit, even the rarest and the greatest, suffers at the hands of those of + the same profession; the hatred of truth and great capacity; the ignorance + of scholars in their own province; and the fact that true wares are almost + always despised and the merely specious ones in request. Therefore let + even the young be instructed betimes that in this masquerade the apples + are of wax, the flowers of silk, the fish of pasteboard, and that all + things—yes, all things—are toys and trifles; and that of two + men whom he may see earnestly engaged in business, one is supplying + spurious goods and the other paying for them in false coin. + </p> + <p> + But there are more serious reflections to be made, and worse things to be + recorded. Man is at bottom a savage, horrible beast. We know it, if only + in the business of taming and restraining him which we call civilisation. + Hence it is that we are terrified if now and then his nature breaks out. + Wherever and whenever the locks and chains of law and order fall off and + give place to anarchy, he shows himself for what he is. But it is + unnecessary to wait for anarchy in order to gain enlightenment on this + subject. A hundred records, old and new, produce the conviction that in + his unrelenting cruelty man is in no way inferior to the tiger and the + hyaena. A forcible example is supplied by a publication of the year 1841 + entitled <i>Slavery and the Internal Slave Trade in the United States of + North America: being replies to questions transmitted by the British + Anti-slavery Society to the American Anti-slavery Society</i>.{1} This + book constitutes one of the heaviest indictments against the human race. + No one can put it down with a feeling of horror, and few without tears. + For whatever the reader may have ever heard, or imagined, or dreamt, of + the unhappy condition of slavery, or indeed of human cruelty in general, + it will seem small to him when he reads of the way in which those devils + in human form, those bigoted, church-going, strictly Sabbatarian rascals—and + in particular the Anglican priests among them—treated their innocent + black brothers, who by wrong and violence had got into their diabolical + clutches. + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's 'Note</i>.—If Schopenhauer were writing + to-day, he would with equal truth point to the miseries of the African + trade. I have slightly abridged this passage, as some of the evils against + which he protested no longer exist.} + </p> + <p> + Other examples are furnished by Tshudi's <i>Travels in Peru</i>, in the + description which he gives of the treatment of the Peruvian soldiers at + the hands of their officers; and by Macleod's <i>Travels in Eastern Africa</i>, + where the author tells of the cold-blooded and truly devilish cruelty with + which the Portuguese in Mozambique treat their slaves. But we need not go + for examples to the New World, that obverse side of our planet. In the + year 1848 it was brought to life that in England, not in one, but + apparently in a hundred cases within a brief period, a husband had + poisoned his wife or <i>vice versâ</i>, or both had joined in poisoning + their children, or in torturing them slowly to death by starving and + ill-treating them, with no other object than to get the money for burying + them which they had insured in the Burial Clubs against their death. For + this purpose a child was often insured in several, even in as many as + twenty clubs at once.{1} + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: Cf. <i>The Times</i>, 20th, 22nd and 23rd Sept., 1848, and + also 12th Dec., 1853.} + </p> + <p> + Details of this character belong, indeed, to the blackest pages in the + criminal records of humanity. But, when all is said, it is the inward and + innate character of man, this god <i>par excellence</i> of the Pantheists, + from which they and everything like them proceed. In every man there + dwells, first and foremost, a colossal egoism, which breaks the bounds of + right and justice with the greatest freedom, as everyday life shows on a + small scale, and as history on every page of it on a large. Does not the + recognised need of a balance of power in Europe, with the anxious way in + which it is preserved, demonstrate that man is a beast of prey, who no + sooner sees a weaker man near him than he falls upon him without fail? and + does not the same hold good of the affairs of ordinary life? + </p> + <p> + But to the boundless egoism of our nature there is joined more or less in + every human breast a fund of hatred, anger, envy, rancour and malice, + accumulated like the venom in a serpent's tooth, and waiting only for an + opportunity of venting itself, and then, like a demon unchained, of + storming and raging. If a man has no great occasion for breaking out, he + will end by taking advantage of the smallest, and by working it up into + something great by the aid of his imagination; for, however small it may + be, it is enough to rouse his anger— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + <i>Quantulacunque adeo est occasio, sufficit irae{1}</i>— +</pre> + <p> + {Footnote 1: Juvenal, <i>Sat</i>. 13, 183.} + </p> + <p> + and then he will carry it as far as he can and may. We see this in daily + life, where such outbursts are well known under the name of "venting one's + gall on something." It will also have been observed that if such outbursts + meet with no opposition the subject of them feels decidedly the better for + them afterwards. That anger is not without its pleasure is a truth that + was recorded even by Aristotle;{1} and he quotes a passage from Homer, who + declares anger to be sweeter than honey. But not in anger alone—in + hatred too, which stands to anger like a chronic to an acute disease, a + man may indulge with the greatest delight: + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: <i>Rhet</i>., i., 11; ii., 2.} + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + <i>Now hatred is by far the longest pleasure, + Men love in haste, but they detest at leisure</i>{1} +</pre> + <p> + {Footnote 1: Byron <i>Don Juan</i>, c. xiii, 6.} + </p> + <p> + Gobineau in his work <i>Les Races Humaines</i> has called man <i>l'animal + méchant par excellence</i>. People take this very ill, because they feel + that it hits them; but he is quite right, for man is the only animal which + causes pain to others without any further purpose than just to cause it. + Other animals never do it except to satisfy their hunger, or in the rage + of combat. If it is said against the tiger that he kills more than eats, + he strangles his prey only for the purpose of eating it; and if he cannot + eat it, the only explanation is, as the French phrase has it, that <i>ses + yeux sont plus grands que son estomac</i>. No animal ever torments another + for the mere purpose of tormenting, but man does it, and it is this that + constitutes the diabolical feature in his character which is so much worse + than the merely animal. I have already spoken of the matter in its broad + aspect; but it is manifest even in small things, and every reader has a + daily opportunity of observing it. For instance, if two little dogs are + playing together—and what a genial and charming sight it is—and + a child of three or four years joins them, it is almost inevitable for it + to begin hitting them with a whip or stick, and thereby show itself, even + at that age, <i>l'animal méchant par excellence</i>. The love of teasing + and playing tricks, which is common enough, may be traced to the same + source. For instance, if a man has expressed his annoyance at any + interruption or other petty inconvenience, there will be no lack of people + who for that very reason will bring it about: <i>animal méchant par + excellence</i>! This is so certain that a man should be careful not to + express any annoyance at small evils. On the other hand he should also be + careful not to express his pleasure at any trifle, for, if he does so, men + will act like the jailer who, when he found that his prisoner had + performed the laborious task of taming a spider, and took a pleasure in + watching it, immediately crushed it under his foot: <i>l'animal méchant + par excellence</i>! This is why all animals are instinctively afraid of + the sight, or even of the track of a man, that <i>animal méchant par + excellence</i>! nor does their instinct them false; for it is man alone + who hunts game for which he has no use and which does him no harm. + </p> + <p> + It is a fact, then, that in the heart of every man there lies a wild beast + which only waits for an opportunity to storm and rage, in its desire to + inflict pain on others, or, if they stand in his way, to kill them. It is + this which is the source of all the lust of war and battle. In trying to + tame and to some extent hold it in check, the intelligence, its appointed + keeper, has always enough to do. People may, if they please, call it the + radical evil of human nature—a name which will at least serve those + with whom a word stands for an explanation. I say, however, that it is the + will to live, which, more and more embittered by the constant sufferings + of existence, seeks to alleviate its own torment by causing torment in + others. But in this way a man gradually develops in himself real cruelty + and malice. The observation may also be added that as, according to Kant, + matter subsists only through the antagonism of the powers of expansion and + contraction, so human society subsists only by the antagonism of hatred, + or anger, and fear. For there is a moment in the life of all of us when + the malignity of our nature might perhaps make us murderers, if it were + not accompanied by a due admixture of fear to keep it within bounds; and + this fear, again, would make a man the sport and laughing stock of every + boy, if anger were not lying ready in him, and keeping watch. + </p> + <p> + But it is <i>Schadenfreude</i>, a mischievous delight in the misfortunes + of others, which remains the worst trait in human nature. It is a feeling + which is closely akin to cruelty, and differs from it, to say the truth, + only as theory from practice. In general, it may be said of it that it + takes the place which pity ought to take—pity which is its opposite, + and the true source of all real justice and charity. + </p> + <p> + <i>Envy</i> is also opposed to pity, but in another sense; envy, that is + to say, is produced by a cause directly antagonistic to that which + produces the delight in mischief. The opposition between pity and envy on + the one hand, and pity and the delight in mischief on the other, rests, in + the main, on the occasions which call them forth. In the case of envy it + is only as a direct effect of the cause which excites it that we feel it + at all. That is just the reason why envy, although it is a reprehensible + feeling, still admits of some excuse, and is, in general, a very human + quality; whereas the delight in mischief is diabolical, and its taunts are + the laughter of hell. + </p> + <p> + The delight in mischief, as I have said, takes the place which pity ought + to take. Envy, on the contrary, finds a place only where there is no + inducement to pity, or rather an inducement to its opposite; and it is + just as this opposite that envy arises in the human breast; and so far, + therefore, it may still be reckoned a human sentiment. Nay, I am afraid + that no one will be found to be entirely free from it. For that a man + should feel his own lack of things more bitterly at the sight of another's + delight in the enjoyment of them, is natural; nay, it is inevitable; but + this should not rouse his hatred of the man who is happier than himself. + It is just this hatred, however, in which true envy consists. Least of all + should a man be envious, when it is a question, not of the gifts of + fortune, or chance, or another's favour, but of the gifts of nature; + because everything that is innate in a man rests on a metaphysical basis, + and possesses justification of a higher kind; it is, so to speak, given + him by Divine grace. But, unhappily, it is just in the case of personal + advantages that envy is most irreconcilable. Thus it is that intelligence, + or even genius, cannot get on in the world without begging pardon for its + existence, wherever it is not in a position to be able, proudly and + boldly, to despise the world. + </p> + <p> + In other words, if envy is aroused only by wealth, rank, or power, it is + often kept down by egoism, which perceives that, on occasion, assistance, + enjoyment, support, protection, advancement, and so on, may be hoped for + from the object of envy or that at least by intercourse with him a man may + himself win honour from the reflected light of his superiority; and here, + too, there is the hope of one day attaining all those advantages himself. + On the other hand, in the envy that is directed to natural gifts and + personal advantages, like beauty in women, or intelligence in men, there + is no consolation or hope of one kind or the other; so that nothing + remains but to indulge a bitter and irreconcilable hatred of the person + who possesses these privileges; and hence the only remaining desire is to + take vengeance on him. + </p> + <p> + But here the envious man finds himself in an unfortunate position; for all + his blows fall powerless as soon as it is known that they come from him. + Accordingly he hides his feelings as carefully as if they were secret + sins, and so becomes an inexhaustible inventor of tricks and artifices and + devices for concealing and masking his procedure, in order that, + unperceived, he may wound the object of his envy. For instance, with an + air of the utmost unconcern he will ignore the advantages which are eating + his heart out; he will neither see them, nor know them, nor have observed + or even heard of them, and thus make himself a master in the art of + dissimulation. With great cunning he will completely overlook the man + whose brilliant qualities are gnawing at his heart, and act as though he + were quite an unimportant person; he will take no notice of him, and, on + occasion, will have even quite forgotten his existence. But at the same + time he will before all things endeavour by secret machination carefully + to deprive those advantages of any opportunity of showing themselves and + becoming known. Then out of his dark corner he will attack these qualities + with censure, mockery, ridicule and calumny, like the toad which spurts + its poison from a hole. No less will he enthusiastically praise + unimportant people, or even indifferent or bad performances in the same + sphere. In short, he will becomes a Proteas in stratagem, in order to + wound others without showing himself. But what is the use of it? The + trained eye recognises him in spite of it all. He betrays himself, if by + nothing else, by the way in which he timidly avoids and flies from the + object of his envy, who stands the more completely alone, the more + brilliant he is; and this is the reason why pretty girls have no friends + of their own sex. He betrays himself, too, by the causeless hatred which + he shows—a hatred which finds vent in a violent explosion at any + circumstance however trivial, though it is often only the product of his + imagination. How many such men there are in the world may be recognised by + the universal praise of modesty, that is, of a virtue invented on behalf + of dull and commonplace people. Nevertheless, it is a virtue which, by + exhibiting the necessity for dealing considerately with the wretched + plight of these people, is just what calls attention to it. + </p> + <p> + For our self-consciousness and our pride there can be nothing more + flattering than the sight of envy lurking in its retreat and plotting its + schemes; but never let a man forget that where there is envy there is + hatred, and let him be careful not to make a false friend out of any + envious person. Therefore it is important to our safety to lay envy bare; + and a man should study to discover its tricks, as it is everywhere to be + found and always goes about <i>incognito</i>; or as I have said, like a + venomous toad it lurks in dark corners. It deserves neither quarter nor + sympathy; but as we can never reconcile it let our rule of conduct be to + scorn it with a good heart, and as our happiness and glory is torture to + it we may rejoice in its sufferings: + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + <i>Den Neid wirst nimmer du versöhnen; + So magst du ihn getrost verhöhnen. + Dein Glück, dein Ruhm ist ihm ein Leiden: + Magst drum an seiner Quaal dich weiden</i>. +</pre> + <p> + We have been taking a look at the <i>depravity</i> of man, and it is a + sight which may well fill us with horror. But now we must cast our eyes on + the <i>misery</i> of his existence; and when we have done so, and are + horrified by that too, we must look back again at his depravity. We shall + then find that they hold the balance to each other. We shall perceive the + eternal justice of things; for we shall recognise that the world is itself + the Last Judgment on it, and we shall begin to understand why it is that + everything that lives must pay the penalty of its existence, first in + living and then in dying. Thus the evil of the penalty accords with the + evil of the sin—<i>malum poenae</i> with <i>malum culpae</i>. From + the same point of view we lose our indignation at that intellectual + incapacity of the great majority of mankind which in life so often + disgusts us. In this <i>Sansara</i>, as the Buddhists call it, human + misery, human depravity and human folly correspond with one another + perfectly, and they are of like magnitude. But if, on some special + inducement, we direct our gaze to one of them, and survey it in + particular, it seems to exceed the other two. This, however, is an + illusion, and merely the effect of their colossal range. + </p> + <p> + All things proclaim this <i>Sansara</i>; more than all else, the world of + mankind; in which, from a moral point of view, villainy and baseness, and + from an intellectual point of view, incapacity and stupidity, prevail to a + horrifying extent. Nevertheless, there appear in it, although very + spasmodically, and always as a fresh surprise, manifestations of honesty, + of goodness, nay, even of nobility; and also of great intelligence, of the + thinking mind of genius. They never quite vanish, but like single points + of light gleam upon us out of the great dark mass. We must accept them as + a pledge that this <i>Sansara</i> contains a good and redeeming principle, + which is capable of breaking through and of filling and freeing the whole + of it. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + The readers of my <i>Ethics</i> know that with me the ultimate foundation + of morality is the truth which in the <i>Vedas</i> and the <i>Vedanta</i> + receives its expression in the established, mystical formula, <i>Tat twam + asi (This is thyself</i>), which is spoken with reference to every living + thing, be it man or beast, and is called the <i>Mahavakya</i>, the great + word. + </p> + <p> + Actions which proceed in accordance with this principle, such as those of + the philanthropist, may indeed be regarded as the beginning of mysticism. + Every benefit rendered with a pure intention proclaims that the man who + exercises it acts in direct conflict with the world of appearance; for he + recognises himself as identical with another individual, who exists in + complete separation from him. Accordingly, all disinterested kindness is + inexplicable; it is a mystery; and hence in order to explain it a man has + to resort to all sorts of fictions. When Kant had demolished all other + arguments for theism, he admitted one only, that it gave the best + interpretation and solution of such mysterious actions, and of all others + like them. He therefore allowed it to stand as a presumption unsusceptible + indeed of theoretical proof, but valid from a practical point of view. I + may, however, express my doubts whether he was quite serious about it. For + to make morality rest on theism is really to reduce morality to egoism; + although the English, it is true, as also the lowest classes of society + with us, do not perceive the possibility of any other foundation for it. + </p> + <p> + The above-mentioned recognition of a man's own true being in another + individual objectively presented to him, is exhibited in a particularly + beautiful and clear way in the cases in which a man, already destined to + death beyond any hope of rescue, gives himself up to the welfare of others + with great solicitude and zeal, and tries to save them. Of this kind is + the well-known story of a servant who was bitten in a courtyard at night + by a mad dog. In the belief that she was beyond hope, she seized the dog + and dragged it into a stable, which she then locked, so that no one else + might be bitten. Then again there is the incident in Naples, which + Tischbein has immortalised in one of his <i>aquarelles</i>. A son, fleeing + from the lava which is rapidly streaming toward the sea, is carrying his + aged father on his back. When there is only a narrow strip of land left + between the devouring elements, the father bids the son put him down, so + that the son may save himself by flight, as otherwise both will be lost. + The son obeys, and as he goes casts a glance of farewell on his father. + This is the moment depicted. The historical circumstance which Scott + represents in his masterly way in <i>The Heart of Midlothian</i>, chap, + ii., is of a precisely similar kind; where, of two delinquents condemned + to death, the one who by his awkwardness caused the capture of the other + happily sets him free in the chapel by overpowering the guard after the + execution-sermon, without at the same time making any attempt on his own + behalf. Nay, in the same category must also be placed the scene which is + represented in a common engraving, which may perhaps be objectionable to + western readers—I mean the one in which a soldier, kneeling to be + shot, is trying by waving a cloth to frighten away his dog who wants to + come to him. + </p> + <p> + In all these cases we see an individual in the face of his own immediate + and certain destruction no longer thinking of saving himself, so that he + may direct the whole of his efforts to saving some one else. How could + there be a clearer expression of the consciousness that what is being + destroyed is only a phenomenon, and that the destruction itself is only a + phenomenon; that, on the other hand, the real being of the man who meets + his death is untouched by that event, and lives on in the other man, in + whom even now, as his action betrays, he so clearly perceives it to exist? + For if this were not so, and it was his real being which was about to be + annihilated, how could that being spend its last efforts in showing such + an ardent sympathy in the welfare and continued existence of another? + </p> + <p> + There are two different ways in which a man may become conscious of his + own existence. On the one hand, he may have an empirical perception of it, + as it manifests itself externally—something so small that it + approaches vanishing point; set in a world which, as regards time and + space, is infinite; one only of the thousand millions of human creatures + who run about on this planet for a very brief period and are renewed every + thirty years. On the other hand, by going down into the depths of his own + nature, a man may become conscious that he is all in all; that, in fact, + he is the only real being; and that, in addition, this real being + perceives itself again in others, who present themselves from without, as + though they formed a mirror of himself. + </p> + <p> + Of these two ways in which a man may come to know what he is, the first + grasps the phenomenon alone, the mere product of <i>the principle of + individuation</i>; whereas the second makes a man immediately conscious + that he is <i>the thing-in-itself</i>. This is a doctrine in which, as + regards the first way, I have Kant, and as regards both, I have the <i>Vedas</i>, + to support me. + </p> + <p> + There is, it is true, a simple objection to the second method. It may be + said to assume that one and the same being can exist in different places + at the same time, and yet be complete in each of them. Although, from an + empirical point of view, this is the most palpable impossibility—nay, + absurdity—it is nevertheless perfectly true of the thing-in-itself. + The impossibility and the absurdity of it, empirically, are only due to + the forms which phenomena assume, in accordance with the principle of + individuation. For the thing-in-itself, the will to live, exists whole and + undivided in every being, even in the smallest, as completely as in the + sum-total of all things that ever were or are or will be. This is why + every being, even the smallest, says to itself, So long as I am safe, let + the world perish—<i>dum ego salvus sim, pereat mundus</i>. And, in + truth, even if only one individual were left in the world, and all the + rest were to perish, the one that remained would still possess the whole + self-being of the world, uninjured and undiminished, and would laugh at + the destruction of the world as an illusion. This conclusion <i>per + impossible</i> may be balanced by the counter-conclusion, which is on all + fours with it, that if that last individual were to be annihilated in and + with him the whole world would be destroyed. It was in this sense that the + mystic Angelas Silesius{1} declared that God could not live for a moment + without him, and that if he were to be annihilated God must of necessity + give up the ghost: + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + <i>Ich weiss dass ohne mich Gott nicht ein Nu kann leben; + Werd' ich zunicht, er muss von Noth den Geist aufgeben</i>. +</pre> + <p> + {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's Note</i>.—Angelus Silesius, see <i>Counsels + and Maxims</i>, p. 39, note.} + </p> + <p> + But the empirical point of view also to some extent enables us to perceive + that it is true, or at least possible, that our self can exist in other + beings whose consciousness is separated and different from our own. That + this is so is shown by the experience of somnambulists. Although the + identity of their ego is preserved throughout, they know nothing, when + they awake, of all that a moment before they themselves said, did or + suffered. So entirely is the individual consciousness a phenomenon that + even in the same ego two consciousnesses can arise of which the one knows + nothing of the other. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + GOVERNMENT. + </h2> + <p> + It is a characteristic failing of the Germans to look in the clouds for + what lies at their feet. An excellent example of this is furnished by the + treatment which the idea of <i>Natural Right</i> has received at the hands + of professors of philosophy. When they are called upon to explain those + simple relations of human life which make up the substance of this right, + such as Right and Wrong, Property, State, Punishment and so on, they have + recourse to the most extravagant, abstract, remote and meaningless + conceptions, and out of them build a Tower of Babel reaching to the + clouds, and taking this or that form according to the special whim of the + professor for the time being. The clearest and simplest relations of life, + such as affect us directly, are thus made quite unintelligible, to the + great detriment of the young people who are educated in such a school. + These relations themselves are perfectly simple and easily understood—as + the reader may convince himself if he will turn to the account which I + have given of them in the <i>Foundation of Morality</i>, § 17, and in my + chief work, bk. i., § 62. But at the sound of certain words, like Right, + Freedom, the Good, Being—this nugatory infinitive of the cupola—and + many others of the same sort, the German's head begins to swim, and + falling straightway into a kind of delirium he launches forth into + high-flown phrases which have no meaning whatever. He takes the most + remote and empty conceptions, and strings them together artificially, + instead of fixing his eyes on the facts, and looking at things and + relations as they really are. It is these things and relations which + supply the ideas of Right and Freedom, and give them the only true meaning + that they possess. + </p> + <p> + The man who starts from the preconceived opinion that the conception of + Right must be a positive one, and then attempts to define it, will fail; + for he is trying to grasp a shadow, to pursue a spectre, to search for + what does not exist. The conception of Right is a negative one, like the + conception of Freedom; its content is mere negation. It is the conception + of Wrong which is positive; Wrong has the same significance as <i>injury</i>—<i>laesio</i>—in + the widest sense of the term. An injury may be done either to a man's + person or to his property or to his honour; and accordingly a man's rights + are easy to define: every one has a right to do anything that injures no + one else. + </p> + <p> + To have a right to do or claim a thing means nothing more than to be able + to do or take or vise it without thereby injuring any one else. <i>Simplex + sigillum veri</i>. This definition shows how senseless many questions are; + for instance, the question whether we have the right to take our own life, + As far as concerns the personal claims which others may possibly have upon + us, they are subject to the condition that we are alive, and fall to the + ground when we die. To demand of a man, who does not care to live any + longer for himself, that he should live on as a mere machine for the + advantage of others is an extravagant pretension. + </p> + <p> + Although men's powers differ, their rights are alike. Their rights do not + rest upon their powers, because Right is of a moral complexion; they rest + on the fact that the same will to live shows itself in every man at the + same stage of its manifestation. This, however, only applies to that + original and abstract Right, which a man possesses as a man. The property, + and also the honour, which a man acquires for himself by the exercise of + his powers, depend on the measure and kind of power which he possesses, + and so lend his Right a wider sphere of application. Here, then, equality + comes to an end. The man who is better equipped, or more active, increases + by adding to his gains, not his Right, but the number of the things to + which it extends. + </p> + <p> + In my chief work{1} I have proved that the State in its essence is merely + an institution existing for the purpose of protecting its members against + outward attack or inward dissension. It follows from this that the + ultimate ground on which the State is necessary is the acknowledged lack + of Right in the human race. If Right were there, no one would think of a + State; for no one would have any fear that his rights would be impaired; + and a mere union against the attacks of wild beasts or the elements would + have very little analogy with what we mean by a State. From this point of + view it is easy to see how dull and stupid are the philosophasters who in + pompous phrases represent that the State is the supreme end and flower of + human existence. Such a view is the apotheosis of Philistinism. + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: 1 Bk. ii., ch. xlvii.} + </p> + <p> + If it were Right that ruled in the world, a man would have done enough in + building his house, and would need no other protection than the right of + possessing it, which would be obvious. But since Wrong is the order of the + day, it is requisite that the man who has built his house should also be + able to protect it. Otherwise his Right is <i>de facto</i> incomplete; the + aggressor, that is to say, has the right of might—<i>Faustrecht</i>; + and this is just the conception of Right which Spinoza entertains. He + recognises no other. His words are: <i>unusquisque tantum juris habet + quantum potentia valet</i>;{1} each man has as much right as he has power. + And again: <i>uniuscujusque jus potentia ejus definitur</i>; each man's + right is determined by his power.{2} Hobbes seems to have started this + conception of Right,{3} and he adds the strange comment that the Right of + the good Lord to all things rests on nothing but His omnipotence. + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: <i>Tract. Theol. Pol</i>., ch. ii., § 8.} + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 2: <i>Ethics</i>, IV., xxxvii., 1.} + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 3: Particularly in a passage in the <i>De Cive</i>, I, § 14.} + </p> + <p> + Now this is a conception of Right which, both in theory and in practice, + no longer prevails in the civic world; but in the world in general, though + abolished in theory, it continues to apply in practice. The consequences + of neglecting it may be seen in the case of China. Threatened by rebellion + within and foes without, this great empire is in a defenceless state, and + has to pay the penalty of having cultivated only the arts of peace and + ignored the arts of war. + </p> + <p> + There is a certain analogy between the operations of nature and those of + man which is a peculiar but not fortuitous character, and is based on the + identity of the will in both. When the herbivorous animals had taken their + place in the organic world, beasts of prey made their appearance—necessarily + a late appearance—in each species, and proceeded to live upon them. + Just in the same way, as soon as by honest toil and in the sweat of their + faces men have won from the ground what is needed for the support of their + societies, a number of individuals are sure to arise in some of these + societies, who, instead of cultivating the earth and living on its + produce, prefer to take their lives in their hands and risk health and + freedom by falling upon those who are in possession of what they have + honestly earned, and by appropriating the fruits of their labour. These + are the beasts of prey in the human race; they are the conquering peoples + whom we find everywhere in history, from the most ancient to the most + recent times. Their varying fortunes, as at one moment they succeed and at + another fail, make up the general elements of the history of the world. + Hence Voltaire was perfectly right when he said that the aim of all war is + robbery. That those who engage in it are ashamed of their doings is clear + by the fact that governments loudly protest their reluctance to appeal to + arms except for purposes of self-defence. Instead of trying to excuse + themselves by telling public and official lies, which are almost more + revolting than war itself, they should take their stand, as bold as brass, + on Macchiavelli's doctrine. The gist of it may be stated to be this: that + whereas between one individual and another, and so far as concerns the law + and morality of their relations, the principle, <i>Don't do to others what + you wouldn't like done to yourself</i>, certainly applies, it is the + converse of this principle which is appropriate in the case of nations and + in politics: <i>What you wouldn't like done to yourself do to others</i>. + If you do not want to be put under a foreign yoke, take time by the + forelock, and put your neighbour under it himself; whenever, that is to + say, his weakness offers you the opportunity. For if you let the + opportunity pass, it will desert one day to the enemy's camp and offer + itself there. Then your enemy will put you under his yoke; and your + failure to grasp the opportunity may be paid for, not by the generation + which was guilty of it, but by the next. This Macchiavellian principle is + always a much more decent cloak for the lust of robbery than the rags of + very obvious lies in a speech from the head of the State; lies, too, of a + description which recalls the well-known story of the rabbit attacking the + dog. Every State looks upon its neighbours as at bottom a horde of + robbers, who will fall upon it as soon as they have the opportunity. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + Between the serf, the farmer, the tenant, and the mortgagee, the + difference is rather one of form than of substance. Whether the peasant + belongs to me, or the land on which he has to get a living; whether the + bird is mine, or its food, the tree or its fruit, is a matter of little + moment; for, as Shakespeare makes Shylock say: + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + <i>You take my life + When you do take the means whereby I live</i>. +</pre> + <p> + The free peasant has, indeed, the advantage that he can go off and seek + his fortune in the wide world; whereas the serf who is attached to the + soil, <i>glebae adscriptus</i>, has an advantage which is perhaps still + greater, that when failure of crops or illness, old age or incapacity, + render him helpless, his master must look after him, and so he sleeps well + at night; whereas, if the crops fail, his master tosses about on his bed + trying to think how he is to procure bread for his men. As long ago as + Menander it was said that it is better to be the slave of a good master + than to live miserably as a freeman. Another advantage possessed by the + free is that if they have any talents they can improve their position; but + the same advantage is not wholly withheld from the slave. If he proves + himself useful to his master by the exercise of any skill, he is treated + accordingly; just as in ancient Rome mechanics, foremen of workshops, + architects, nay, even doctors, were generally slaves. + </p> + <p> + Slavery and poverty, then, are only two forms, I might almost say only two + names, of the same thing, the essence of which is that a man's physical + powers are employed, in the main, not for himself but for others; and this + leads partly to his being over-loaded with work, and partly to his getting + a scanty satisfaction for his needs. For Nature has given a man only as + much physical power as will suffice, if he exerts it in moderation, to + gain a sustenance from the earth. No great superfluity of power is his. + If, then, a not inconsiderable number of men are relieved from the common + burden of sustaining the existence of the human race, the burden of the + remainder is augmented, and they suffer. This is the chief source of the + evil which under the name of slavery, or under the name of the + proletariat, has always oppressed the great majority of the human race. + </p> + <p> + But the more remote cause of it is luxury. In order, it may be said, that + some few persons may have what is unnecessary, superfluous, and the + product of refinement—nay, in order that they may satisfy artificial + needs—a great part of the existing powers of mankind has to be + devoted to this object, and therefore withdrawn from the production of + what is necessary and indispensable. Instead of building cottages for + themselves, thousands of men build mansions for a few. Instead of weaving + coarse materials for themselves and their families, they make fine cloths, + silk, or even lace, for the rich, and in general manufacture a thousand + objects of luxury for their pleasure. A great part of the urban population + consists of workmen who make these articles of luxury; and for them and + those who give them work the peasants have to plough and sow and look + after the flocks as well as for themselves, and thus have more labour than + Nature originally imposed upon them. Moreover, the urban population + devotes a great deal of physical strength, and a great deal of land, to + such things as wine, silk, tobacco, hops, asparagus and so on, instead of + to corn, potatoes and cattle-breeding. Further, a number of men are + withdrawn from agriculture and employed in ship-building and seafaring, in + order that sugar, coffee, tea and other goods may be imported. In short, a + large part of the powers of the human race is taken away from the + production of what is necessary, in order to bring what is superfluous and + unnecessary within the reach of a few. As long therefore as luxury exists, + there must be a corresponding amount of over-work and misery, whether it + takes the name of poverty or of slavery. The fundamental difference + between the two is that slavery originates in violence, and poverty in + craft. The whole unnatural condition of society—the universal + struggle to escape from misery, the sea-trade attended with so much loss + of life, the complicated interests of commerce, and finally the wars to + which it all gives rise—is due, only and alone, to luxury, which + gives no happiness even to those who enjoy it, nay, makes them ill and + bad-tempered. Accordingly it looks as if the most effective way of + alleviating human misery would be to diminish luxury, or even abolish it + altogether. + </p> + <p> + There is unquestionably much truth in this train of thought. But the + conclusion at which it arrives is refuted by an argument possessing this + advantage over it—that it is confirmed by the testimony of + experience. A certain amount of work is devoted to purposes of luxury. + What the human race loses in this way in the <i>muscular power</i> which + would otherwise be available for the necessities of existence is gradually + made up to it a thousandfold by the <i>nervous power</i>, which, in a + chemical sense, is thereby released. And since the intelligence and + sensibility which are thus promoted are on a higher level than the + muscular irritability which they supplant, so the achievements of mind + exceed those of the body a thousandfold. One wise counsel is worth the + work of many hands: + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + {Greek: Hos en sophon bouleuma tas pollon cheiras nika.} +</pre> + <p> + A nation of nothing but peasants would do little in the way of discovery + and invention; but idle hands make active heads. Science and the Arts are + themselves the children of luxury, and they discharge their debt to it. + The work which they do is to perfect technology in all its branches, + mechanical, chemical and physical; an art which in our days has brought + machinery to a pitch never dreamt of before, and in particular has, by + steam and electricity, accomplished things the like of which would, in + earlier ages, have been ascribed to the agency of the devil. In + manufactures of all kinds, and to some extent in agriculture, machines now + do a thousand times more than could ever have been done by the hands of + all the well-to-do, educated, and professional classes, and could ever + have been attained if all luxury had been abolished and every one had + returned to the life of a peasant. It is by no means the rich alone, but + all classes, who derive benefit from these industries. Things which in + former days hardly any one could afford are now cheap and abundant, and + even the lowest classes are much better off in point of comfort. In the + Middle Ages a King of England once borrowed a pair of silk stockings from + one of his lords, so that he might wear them in giving an audience to the + French ambassador. Even Queen Elizabeth was greatly pleased and astonished + to receive a pair as a New Year's present; to-day every shopman has them. + Fifty years ago ladies wore the kind of calico gowns which servants wear + now. If mechanical science continues to progress at the same rate for any + length of time, it may end by saving human labour almost entirely, just as + horses are even now being largely superseded by machines. For it is + possible to conceive that intellectual culture might in some degree become + general in the human race; and this would be impossible as long as bodily + labour was incumbent on any great part of it. Muscular irritability and + nervous sensibility are always and everywhere, both generally and + particularly, in antagonism; for the simple reason that it is one and the + same vital power which underlies both. Further, since the arts have a + softening effect on character, it is possible that quarrels great and + small, wars and duels, will vanish from the world; just as both have + become much rarer occurrences. However, it is not my object here to write + a <i>Utopia</i>. + </p> + <p> + But apart from all this the arguments used above in favour of the + abolition of luxury and the uniform distribution of all bodily labour are + open to the objection that the great mass of mankind, always and + everywhere, cannot do without leaders, guides and counsellors, in one + shape or another, according to the matter in question; judges, governors, + generals, officials, priests, doctors, men of learning, philosophers, and + so on, are all a necessity. Their common task is to lead the race for the + greater part so incapable and perverse, through the labyrinth of life, of + which each of them according to his position and capacity has obtained a + general view, be his range wide or narrow. That these guides of the race + should be permanently relieved of all bodily labour as well as of all + vulgar need and discomfort; nay, that in proportion to their much greater + achievements they should necessarily own and enjoy more than the common + man, is natural and reasonable. Great merchants should also be included in + the same privileged class, whenever they make far-sighted preparations for + national needs. + </p> + <p> + The question of the sovereignty of the people is at bottom the same as the + question whether any man can have an original right to rule a people + against its will. How that proposition can be reasonably maintained I do + not see. The people, it must be admitted, is sovereign; but it is a + sovereign who is always a minor. It must have permanent guardians, and it + can never exercise its rights itself, without creating dangers of which no + one can foresee the end; especially as like all minors, it is very apt to + become the sport of designing sharpers, in the shape of what are called + demagogues. + </p> + <p> + Voltaire remarks that the first man to become a king was a successful + soldier. It is certainly the case that all princes were originally + victorious leaders of armies, and for a long time it was as such that they + bore sway. On the rise of standing armies princes began to regard their + people as a means of sustaining themselves and their soldiers, and treated + them, accordingly, as though they were a herd of cattle, which had to be + tended in order that it might provide wool, milk, and meat. The why and + wherefore of all this, as I shall presently show in detail, is the fact + that originally it was not right, but might, that ruled in the world. + Might has the advantage of having been the first in the field. That is why + it is impossible to do away with it and abolish it altogether; it must + always have its place; and all that a man can wish or ask is that it + should be found on the side of right and associated with it. Accordingly + says the prince to his subjects: "I rule you in virtue of the power which + I possess. But, on the other hand, it excludes that of any one else, and I + shall suffer none but my own, whether it comes from without, or arises + within by one of you trying to oppress another. In this way, then, you are + protected." The arrangement was carried out; and just because it was + carried out the old idea of kingship developed with time and progress into + quite a different idea, and put the other one in the background, where it + may still be seen, now and then, flitting about like a spectre. Its place + has been taken by the idea of the king as father of his people, as the + firm and unshakable pillar which alone supports and maintains the whole + organisation of law and order, and consequently the rights of every + man.{1} But a king can accomplish this only by inborn prerogative which + reserves authority to him and to him alone—an authority which is + supreme, indubitable, and beyond all attack, nay, to which every one + renders instinctive obedience. Hence the king is rightly said to rule "by + the grace of God." He is always the most useful person in the State, and + his services are never too dearly repaid by any Civil List, however heavy. + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: We read in Stobaeus, <i>Florilegium</i>, ch. xliv., 41, of a + Persian custom, by which, whenever a king died, there was a five days' + anarchy, in order that people might perceive the advantage of having kings + and laws.} + </p> + <p> + But even as late a writer as Macchiavelli was so decidedly imbued with the + earlier or mediaeval conception of the position of a prince that he treats + it as a matter which is self-evident: he never discusses it, but tacitly + takes it as the presupposition and basis of his advice. It may be said + generally that his book is merely the theoretical statement and consistent + and systematic exposition of the practice prevailing in his time. It is + the novel statement of it in a complete theoretical form that lends it + such a poignant interest. The same thing, I may remark in passing, applies + to the immortal little work of La Rochefaucauld, who, however, takes + private and not public life for his theme, and offers, not advice, but + observations. The title of this fine little book is open, perhaps, to some + objection: the contents are not, as a rule, either <i>maxims</i> or <i>reflections</i>, + but <i>aperçus</i>; and that is what they should be called. There is much, + too, in Macchiavelli that will be found also to apply to private life. + </p> + <p> + Right in itself is powerless; in nature it is Might that rules. To enlist + might on the side of right, so that by means of it right may rule, is the + problem of statesmanship. And it is indeed a hard problem, as will be + obvious if we remember that almost every human breast is the seat of an + egoism which has no limits, and is usually associated with an accumulated + store of hatred and malice; so that at the very start feelings of enmity + largely prevail over those of friendship. We have also to bear in mind + that it is many millions of individuals so constituted who have to be kept + in the bonds of law and order, peace and tranquillity; whereas originally + every one had a right to say to every one else: <i>I am just as good as + you are</i>! A consideration of all this must fill us with surprise that + on the whole the world pursues its way so peacefully and quietly, and with + so much law and order as we see to exist. It is the machinery of State + which alone accomplishes it. For it is physical power alone which has any + direct action on men; constituted as they generally are, it is for + physical power alone that they have any feeling or respect. + </p> + <p> + If a man would convince himself by experience that this is the case, he + need do nothing but remove all compulsion from his fellows, and try to + govern them by clearly and forcibly representing to them what is + reasonable, right, and fair, though at the same time it may be contrary to + their interests. He would be laughed to scorn; and as things go that is + the only answer he would get. It would soon be obvious to him that moral + force alone is powerless. It is, then, physical force alone which is + capable of securing respect. Now this force ultimately resides in the + masses, where it is associated with ignorance, stupidity and injustice. + Accordingly the main aim of statesmanship in these difficult circumstances + is to put physical force in subjection to mental force—to + intellectual superiority, and thus to make it serviceable. But if this aim + is not itself accompanied by justice and good intentions the result of the + business, if it succeeds, is that the State so erected consists of knaves + and fools, the deceivers and the deceived. That this is the case is made + gradually evident by the progress of intelligence amongst the masses, + however much it may be repressed; and it leads to revolution. But if, + contrarily, intelligence is accompanied by justice and good intentions, + there arises a State as perfect as the character of human affairs will + allow. It is very much to the purpose if justice and good intentions not + only exist, but are also demonstrable and openly exhibited, and can be + called to account publicly, and be subject to control. Care must be taken, + however, lest the resulting participation of many persons in the work of + government should affect the unity of the State, and inflict a loss of + strength and concentration on the power by which its home and foreign + affairs have to be administered. This is what almost always happens in + republics. To produce a constitution which should satisfy all these + demands would accordingly be the highest aim of statesmanship. But, as a + matter of fact, statesmanship has to consider other things as well. It has + to reckon with the people as they exist, and their national peculiarities. + This is the raw material on which it has to work, and the ingredients of + that material will always exercise a great effect on the completed scheme. + </p> + <p> + Statesmanship will have achieved a good deal if it so far attains its + object as to reduce wrong and injustice in the community to a minimum. To + banish them altogether, and to leave no trace of them, is merely the ideal + to be aimed at; and it is only approximately that it can be reached. If + they disappear in one direction, they creep in again in another; for wrong + and injustice lie deeply rooted in human nature. Attempts have been made + to attain the desired aim by artificial constitutions and systematic codes + of law; but they are not in complete touch with the facts—they + remain an asymptote, for the simple reason that hard and fast conceptions + never embrace all possible cases, and cannot be made to meet individual + instances. Such conceptions resemble the stones of a mosaic rather than + the delicate shading in a picture. Nay, more: all experiments in this + matter are attended with danger; because the material in question, namely, + the human race, is the most difficult of all material to handle. It is + almost as dangerous as an explosive. + </p> + <p> + No doubt it is true that in the machinery of the State the freedom of the + press performs the same function as a safety-valve in other machinery; for + it enables all discontent to find a voice; nay, in doing so, the + discontent exhausts itself if it has not much substance; and if it has, + there is an advantage in recognising it betimes and applying the remedy. + This is much better than to repress the discontent, and let it simmer and + ferment, and go on increasing until it ends in an explosion. On the other + hand, the freedom of the press may be regarded as a permission to sell + poison—poison for the heart and the mind. There is no idea so + foolish but that it cannot be put into the heads of the ignorant and + incapable multitude, especially if the idea holds out some prospect of any + gain or advantage. And when a man has got hold of any such idea what is + there that he will not do? I am, therefore, very much afraid that the + danger of a free press outweighs its utility, particularly where the law + offers a way of redressing wrongs. In any case, however, the freedom of + the press should be governed by a very strict prohibition of all and every + anonymity. + </p> + <p> + Generally, indeed, it may be maintained that right is of a nature + analogous to that of certain chemical substances, which cannot be + exhibited in a pure and isolated condition, but at the most only with a + small admixture of some other substance, which serves as a vehicle for + them, or gives them the necessary consistency; such as fluorine, or even + alcohol, or prussic acid. Pursuing the analogy we may say that right, if + it is to gain a footing in the world and really prevail, must of necessity + be supplemented by a small amount of arbitrary force, in order that, + notwithstanding its merely ideal and therefore ethereal nature, it may be + able to work and subsist in the real and material world, and not evaporate + and vanish into the clouds, as it does in Hesoid. Birth-right of every + description, all heritable privileges, every form of national religion, + and so on, may be regarded as the necessary chemical base or alloy; + inasmuch as it is only when right has some such firm and actual foundation + that it can be enforced and consistently vindicated. They form for right a + sort of {Greek: os moi pou sto}—a fulcrum for supporting its lever. + </p> + <p> + Linnaeus adopted a vegetable system of an artificial and arbitrary + character. It cannot be replaced by a natural one, no matter how + reasonable the change might be, or how often it has been attempted to make + it, because no other system could ever yield the same certainty and + stability of definition. Just in the same way the artificial and arbitrary + basis on which, as has been shown, the constitution of a State rests, can + never be replaced by a purely natural basis. A natural basis would aim at + doing away with the conditions that have been mentioned: in the place of + the privileges of birth it would put those of personal merit; in the place + of the national religion, the results of rationalistic inquiry, and so on. + However agreeable to reason this might all prove, the change could not be + made; because a natural basis would lack that certainty and fixity of + definition which alone secures the stability of the commonwealth. A + constitution which embodied abstract right alone would be an excellent + thing for natures other than human, but since the great majority of men + are extremely egoistic, unjust, inconsiderate, deceitful, and sometimes + even malicious; since in addition they are endowed with very scanty + intelligence there arises the necessity for a power that shall be + concentrated in one man, a power that shall be above all law and right, + and be completely irresponsible, nay, to which everything shall yield as + to something that is regarded as a creature of a higher kind, a ruler by + the grace of God. It is only thus that men can be permanently held in + check and governed. + </p> + <p> + The United States of North America exhibit the attempt to proceed without + any such arbitrary basis; that is to say, to allow abstract right to + prevail pure and unalloyed. But the result is not attractive. For with all + the material prosperity of the country what do we find? The prevailing + sentiment is a base Utilitarianism with its inevitable companion, + ignorance; and it is this that has paved the way for a union of stupid + Anglican bigotry, foolish prejudice, coarse brutality, and a childish + veneration of women. Even worse things are the order of the day: most + iniquitous oppression of the black freemen, lynch law, frequent + assassination often committed with entire impunity, duels of a savagery + elsewhere unknown, now and then open scorn of all law and justice, + repudiation of public debts, abominable political rascality towards a + neighbouring State, followed by a mercenary raid on its rich territory,—afterwards + sought to be excused, on the part of the chief authority of the State, by + lies which every one in the country knew to be such and laughed at—an + ever-increasing ochlocracy, and finally all the disastrous influence which + this abnegation of justice in high quarters must have exercised on private + morals. This specimen of a pure constitution on the obverse side of the + planet says very little for republics in general, but still less for the + imitations of it in Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru. + </p> + <p> + A peculiar disadvantage attaching to republics—and one that might + not be looked for—is that in this form of government it must be more + difficult for men of ability to attain high position and exercise direct + political influence than in the case of monarchies. For always and + everywhere and under all circumstances there is a conspiracy, or + instinctive alliance, against such men on the part of all the stupid, the + weak, and the commonplace; they look upon such men as their natural + enemies, and they are firmly held together by a common fear of them. There + is always a numerous host of the stupid and the weak, and in a republican + constitution it is easy for them to suppress and exclude the men of + ability, so that they may not be outflanked by them. They are fifty to + one; and here all have equal rights at the start. + </p> + <p> + In a monarchy, on the other hand, this natural and universal league of the + stupid against those who are possessed of intellectual advantages is a + one-sided affair; it exists only from below, for in a monarchy talent and + intelligence receive a natural advocacy and support from above. In the + first place, the position of the monarch himself is much too high and too + firm for him to stand in fear of any sort of competition. In the next + place, he serves the State more by his will than by his intelligence; for + no intelligence could ever be equal to all the demands that would in his + case be made upon it. He is therefore compelled to be always availing + himself of other men's intelligence. Seeing that his own interests are + securely bound up with those of his country; that they are inseparable + from them and one with them, he will naturally give the preference to the + best men, because they are his most serviceable instruments, and he will + bestow his favour upon them—as soon, that is, as he can find them; + which is not so difficult, if only an honest search be made. Just in the + same way even ministers of State have too much advantage over rising + politicians to need to regard them with jealousy; and accordingly for + analogous reasons they are glad to single out distinguished men and set + them to work, in order to make use of their powers for themselves. It is + in this way that intelligence has always under a monarchical government a + much better chance against its irreconcilable and ever-present foe, + stupidity; and the advantage which it gains is very great. + </p> + <p> + In general, the monarchical form of government is that which is natural to + man; just as it is natural to bees and ants, to a flight of cranes, a herd + of wandering elephants, a pack of wolves seeking prey in common, and many + other animals, all of which place one of their number at the head of the + business in hand. Every business in which men engage, if it is attended + with danger—every campaign, every ship at sea—must also be + subject to the authority of one commander; everywhere it is one will that + must lead. Even the animal organism is constructed on a monarchical + principle: it is the brain alone which guides and governs, and exercises + the hegemony. Although heart, lungs, and stomach contribute much more to + the continued existence of the whole body, these philistines cannot on + that account be allowed to guide and lead. That is a business which + belongs solely to the brain; government must proceed from one central + point. Even the solar system is monarchical. On the other hand, a republic + is as unnatural as it is unfavourable to the higher intellectual life and + the arts and sciences. Accordingly we find that everywhere in the world, + and at all times, nations, whether civilised or savage, or occupying a + position between the two, are always under monarchical government. The + rule of many as Homer said, is not a good thing: let there be one ruler, + one king; + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + {Greek: Ouk agathon polykoiraniae-eis koiranos esto + Eis basoleus.} {1} +</pre> + <p> + {Footnote 1: <i>Iliad</i>, ii., 204.} + </p> + <p> + How would it be possible that, everywhere and at all times, we should see + many millions of people, nay, even hundreds of millions, become the + willing and obedient subjects of one man, sometimes even one woman, and + provisionally, even, of a child, unless there were a monarchical instinct + in men which drove them to it as the form of government best suited to + them? This arrangement is not the product of reflection. Everywhere one + man is king, and for the most part his dignity is hereditary. He is, as it + were, the personification, the monogram, of the whole people, which + attains an individuality in him. In this sense he can rightly say: <i>l'etat + c'est moi</i>. It is precisely for this reason that in Shakespeare's + historical plays the kings of England and France mutually address each + other as <i>France</i> and <i>England</i>, and the Duke of Austria goes by + the name of his country. It is as though the kings regarded themselves as + the incarnation of their nationalities. It is all in accordance with human + nature; and for this very reason the hereditary monarch cannot separate + his own welfare and that of his family from the welfare of his country; + as, on the other hand, mostly happens when the monarch is elected, as, for + instance, in the States of the Church.{1} The Chinese can conceive of a + monarchical government only; what a republic is they utterly fail to + understand. When a Dutch legation was in China in the year 1658, it was + obliged to represent that the Prince of Orange was their king, as + otherwise the Chinese would have been inclined to take Holland for a nest + of pirates living without any lord or master.{2} Stobaeus, in a chapter in + his <i>Florilegium</i>, at the head of which he wrote <i>That monarchy is + best</i>, collected the best of the passages in which the ancients + explained the advantages of that form of government. In a word, republics + are unnatural and artificial; they are the product of reflection. Hence it + is that they occur only as rare exceptions in the whole history of the + world. There were the small Greek republics, the Roman and the + Carthaginian; but they were all rendered possible by the fact that + five-sixths, perhaps even seven-eighths, of the population consisted of + slaves. In the year 1840, even in the United States, there were three + million slaves to a population of sixteen millions. Then, again, the + duration of the republics of antiquity, compared with that of monarchies, + was very short. Republics are very easy to found, and very difficult to + maintain, while with monarchies it is exactly the reverse. If it is + Utopian schemes that are wanted, I say this: the only solution of the + problem would be a despotism of the wise and the noble, of the true + aristocracy and the genuine nobility, brought about by the method of + generation—that is, by the marriage of the noblest men with the + cleverest and most intellectual women. This is my Utopia, my Republic of + Plato. + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's Note</i>.—The reader will recollect + that Schopenhauer was writing long before the Papal territories were + absorbed into the kingdom of Italy.} + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 2: See Jean Nieuhoff, <i>L'Ambassade de la Compagnie Orientale + des Provinces Unies vers L'Empereur de la Chine</i>, traduit par Jean le + Charpentier à Leyde, 1665; ch. 45.} + </p> + <p> + Constitutional kings are undoubtedly in much the same position as the gods + of Epicurus, who sit upon high in undisturbed bliss and tranquillity, and + do not meddle with human affairs. Just now they are the fashion. In every + German duodecimo-principality a parody of the English constitution is set + up, quite complete, from Upper and Lower Houses down to the Habeas Corpus + Act and trial by jury. These institutions, which proceed from English + character and English circumstances, and presuppose both, are natural and + suitable to the English people. It is just as natural to the German people + to be split up into a number of different stocks, under a similar number + of ruling Princes, with an Emperor over them all, who maintains peace at + home, and represents the unity of the State board. It is an arrangement + which has proceeded from German character and German circumstances. I am + of opinion that if Germany is not to meet with the same fate as Italy, it + must restore the imperial crown, which was done away with by its + arch-enemy, the first Napoleon; and it must restore it as effectively as + possible. {1} For German unity depends on it, and without the imperial + crown it will always be merely nominal, or precarious. But as we no longer + live in the days of Günther of Schwarzburg, when the choice of Emperor was + a serious business, the imperial crown ought to go alternately to Prussia + and to Austria, for the life of the wearer. In any case, the absolute + sovereignty of the small States is illusory. Napoleon I. did for Germany + what Otto the Great did for Italy: he divided it into small, independent + States, on the principle, <i>divide et impera</i>. + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's Note</i>.—Here, again, it is hardly + necessary to say that Schopenhauer, who died in 1860, and wrote this + passage at least some years previously, cannot be referring to any of the + events which culminated in 1870. The whole passage forms a striking + illustration of his political sagacity.} + </p> + <p> + The English show their great intelligence, amongst other ways, by clinging + to their ancient institutions, customs and usages, and by holding them + sacred, even at the risk of carrying this tenacity too far, and making it + ridiculous. They hold them sacred for the simple reason that those + institutions and customs are not the invention of an idle head, but have + grown up gradually by the force of circumstance and the wisdom of life + itself, and are therefore suited to them as a nation. On the other hand, + the German Michel{1} allows himself to be persuaded by his schoolmaster + that he must go about in an English dress-coat, and that nothing else will + do. Accordingly he has bullied his father into giving it to him; and with + his awkward manners this ungainly creature presents in it a sufficiently + ridiculous figure. But the dress-coat will some day be too tight for him + and incommode him. It will not be very long before he feels it in trial by + jury. This institution arose in the most barbarous period of the Middle + Ages—the times of Alfred the Great, when the ability to read and + write exempted a man from the penalty of death. It is the worst of all + criminal procedures. Instead of judges, well versed in law and of great + experience, who have grown grey in daily unravelling the tricks and wiles + of thieves, murderers and rascals of all sorts, and so are well able to + get at the bottom of things, it is gossiping tailors and tanners who sit + in judgment; it is their coarse, crude, unpractised, and awkward + intelligence, incapable of any sustained attention, that is called upon to + find out the truth from a tissue of lies and deceit. All the time, + moreover, they are thinking of their cloth and their leather, and longing + to be at home; and they have absolutely no clear notion at all of the + distinction between probability and certainty. It is with this sort of a + calculus of probabilities in their stupid heads that they confidently + undertake to seal a man's doom. + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: <i>Translator's Note</i>.—It may be well to explain + that "Michel" is sometimes used by the Germans as a nickname of their + nation, corresponding to "John Bull" as a nickname of the English. Flügel + in his German-English Dictionary declares that <i>der deutsche Michel</i> + represents the German nation as an honest, blunt, unsuspicious fellow, who + easily allows himself to be imposed upon, even, he adds, with a touch of + patriotism, "by those who are greatly his inferiors in point of strength + and real worth."} + </p> + <p> + The same remark is applicable to them which Dr. Johnson made of a + court-martial in which he had little confidence, summoned to decide a very + important case. He said that perhaps there was not a member of it who, in + the whole course of his life, had ever spent an hour by himself in + balancing probabilities.{1} Can any one imagine that the tailor and the + tanner would be impartial judges? What! the vicious multitude impartial! + as if partiality were not ten times more to be feared from men of the same + class as the accused than from judges who knew nothing of him personally, + lived in another sphere altogether, were irremovable, and conscious of the + dignity of their office. But to let a jury decide on crimes against the + State and its head, or on misdemeanours of the press, is in a very real + sense to set the fox to keep the geese. + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: Boswell's <i>Johnson</i>, 1780, set. 71.} + </p> + <p> + Everywhere and at all times there has been much discontent with + governments, laws and public regulations; for the most part, however, + because men are always ready to make institutions responsible for the + misery inseparable from human existence itself; which is, to speak + mythically, the curse that was laid on Adam, and through him on the whole + race. But never has that delusion been proclaimed in a more mendacious and + impudent manner than by the demagogues of the <i>Jetstzeit</i>—of + the day we live in. As enemies of Christianity, they are, of course, + optimists: to them the world is its own end and object, and accordingly in + itself, that is to say, in its own natural constitution, it is arranged on + the most excellent principles, and forms a regular habitation of bliss. + The enormous and glaring evils of the world they attribute wholly to + governments: if governments, they think, were to do their duty, there + would be a heaven upon earth; in other words, all men could eat, drink, + propagate and die, free from trouble and want. This is what they mean when + they talk of the world being "its own end and object"; this is the goal of + that "perpetual progress of the human race," and the other fine things + which they are never tired of proclaiming. + </p> + <p> + Formerly it was <i>faith</i> which was the chief support of the throne; + nowadays it is <i>credit</i>. The Pope himself is scarcely more concerned + to retain the confidence of the faithful than to make his creditors + believe in his own good faith. If in times past it was the guilty debt of + the world which was lamented, now it is the financial debts of the world + which arouse dismay. Formerly it was the Last Day which was prophesied; + now it is the {Greek: seisachtheia} the great repudiation, the universal + bankruptcy of the nations, which will one day happen; although the + prophet, in this as in the other case, entertains a firm hope that he will + not live to see it himself. + </p> + <p> + From an ethical and a rational point of view, the <i>right of possession</i> + rests upon an incomparably better foundation than the <i>right of birth</i>; + nevertheless, the right of possession is allied with the right of birth + and has come to be part and parcel of it, so that it would hardly be + possible to abolish the right of birth without endangering the right of + possession. The reason of this is that most of what a man possesses he + inherited, and therefore holds by a kind of right of birth; just as the + old nobility bear the names only of their hereditary estates, and by the + use of those names do no more than give expression to the fact that they + own the estates. Accordingly all owners of property, if instead of being + envious they were wise, ought also to support the maintenance of the + rights of birth. + </p> + <p> + The existence of a nobility has, then, a double advantage: it helps to + maintain on the one hand the rights of possession, and on the other the + right of birth belonging to the king. For the king is the first nobleman + in the country, and, as a general rule, he treats the nobility as his + humble relations, and regards them quite otherwise than the commoners, + however trusty and well-beloved. It is quite natural, too, that he should + have more confidence in those whose ancestors were mostly the first + ministers, and always the immediate associates, of his own. A nobleman, + therefore, appeals with reason to the name he bears, when on the + occurrence of anything to rouse distrust he repeats his assurance of + fidelity and service to the king. A man's character, as my readers are + aware, assuredly comes to him from his father. It is a narrow-minded and + ridiculous thing not to consider whose son a man is. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0004" id="link2H_4_0004"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + FREE-WILL AND FATALISM. + </h2> + <p> + No thoughtful man can have any doubt, after the conclusions reached in my + prize-essay on <i>Moral Freedom</i>, that such freedom is to be sought, + not anywhere in nature, but outside of it. The only freedom that exists is + of a metaphysical character. In the physical world freedom is an + impossibility. Accordingly, while our several actions are in no wise free, + every man's individual character is to be regarded as a free act. He is + such and such a man, because once for all it is his will to be that man. + For the will itself, and in itself, and also in so far as it is manifest + in an individual, and accordingly constitutes the original and fundamental + desires of that individual, is independent of all knowledge, because it is + antecedent to such knowledge. All that it receives from knowledge is the + series of motives by which it successively develops its nature and makes + itself cognisable or visible; but the will itself, as something that lies + beyond time, and so long as it exists at all, never changes. Therefore + every man, being what he is and placed in the circumstances which for the + moment obtain, but which on their part also arise by strict necessity, can + absolutely never do anything else than just what at that moment he does + do. Accordingly, the whole course of a man's life, in all its incidents + great and small, is as necessarily predetermined as the course of a clock. + </p> + <p> + The main reason of this is that the kind of metaphysical free act which I + have described tends to become a knowing consciousness—a perceptive + intuition, which is subject to the forms of space and time. By means of + those forms the unity and indivisibility of the act are represented as + drawn asunder into a series of states and events, which are subject to the + Principle of Sufficient Reason in its four forms—and it is this that + is meant by <i>necessity</i>. But the result of it all assumes a moral + complexion. It amounts to this, that by what we do we know what we are, + and by what we suffer we know what we deserve. + </p> + <p> + Further, it follows from this that a man's <i>individuality</i> does not + rest upon the principle of individuation alone, and therefore is not + altogether phenomenal in its nature. On the contrary, it has its roots in + the thing-in-itself, in the will which is the essence of each individual. + The character of this individual is itself individual. But how deep the + roots of individuality extend is one of the questions which I do not + undertake to answer. + </p> + <p> + In this connection it deserves to be mentioned that even Plato, in his own + way, represented the individuality of a man as a free act.{1} He + represented him as coming into the world with a given tendency, which was + the result of the feelings and character already attaching to him in + accordance with the doctrine of metempsychosis. The Brahmin philosophers + also express the unalterable fixity of innate character in a mystical + fashion. They say that Brahma, when a man is produced, engraves his doings + and sufferings in written characters on his skull, and that his life must + take shape in accordance therewith. They point to the jagged edges in the + sutures of the skull-bones as evidence of this writing; and the purport of + it, they say, depends on his previous life and actions. The same view + appears to underlie the Christian, or rather, the Pauline, dogma of + Predestination. + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: <i>Phaedrus</i> and <i>Laws, bk</i>. x.} + </p> + <p> + But this truth, which is universally confirmed by experience, is attended + with another result. All genuine merit, moral as well as intellectual, is + not merely physical or empirical in its origin, but metaphysical; that is + to say, it is given <i>a priori</i> and not <i>a posteriori</i>; in other + words, it lies innate and is not acquired, and therefore its source is not + a mere phenomenon, but the thing-in-itself. Hence it is that every man + achieves only that which is irrevocably established in his nature, or is + born with him. Intellectual capacity needs, it is true, to be developed + just as many natural products need to be cultivated in order that we may + enjoy or use them; but just as in the case of a natural product no + cultivation can take the place of original material, neither can it do so + in the case of intellect. That is the reason why qualities which are + merely acquired, or learned, or enforced—that is, qualities <i>a + posteriori</i>, whether moral or intellectual—are not real or + genuine, but superficial only, and possessed of no value. This is a + conclusion of true metaphysics, and experience teaches the same lesson to + all who can look below the surface. Nay, it is proved by the great + importance which we all attach to such innate characteristics as + physiognomy and external appearance, in the case of a man who is at all + distinguished; and that is why we are so curious to see him. Superficial + people, to be sure,—and, for very good reasons, commonplace people + too,—will be of the opposite opinion; for if anything fails them + they will thus be enabled to console themselves by thinking that it is + still to come. + </p> + <p> + The world, then, is not merely a battlefield where victory and defeat + receive their due recompense in a future state. No! the world is itself + the Last Judgment on it. Every man carries with him the reward and the + disgrace that he deserves; and this is no other than the doctrine of the + Brahmins and Buddhists as it is taught in the theory of metempsychosis. + </p> + <p> + The question has been raised, What two men would do, who lived a solitary + life in the wilds and met each other for the first time. Hobbes, + Pufendorf, and Rousseau have given different answers. Pufendorf believed + that they would approach each other as friends; Hobbes, on the contrary, + as enemies; Rousseau, that they would pass each other by In silence. All + three are both right and wrong. This is just a case in which the + incalculable difference that there is in innate moral disposition between + one individual and another would make its appearance. The difference is so + strong that the question here raised might be regarded as the standard and + measure of it. For there are men in whom the sight of another man at once + rouses a feeling of enmity, since their inmost nature exclaims at once: + That is not me! There are, others in whom the sight awakens immediate + sympathy; their inmost nature says: <i>That is me over again</i>! Between + the two there are countless degrees. That in this most important matter we + are so totally different is a great problem, nay, a mystery. + </p> + <p> + In regard to this <i>a priori</i> nature of moral character there is + matter for varied reflection in a work by Bastholm, a Danish writer, + entitled <i>Historical Contributions to the Knowledge of Man in the Savage + State</i>. He is struck by the fact that intellectual culture and moral + excellence are shown to be entirely independent of each other, inasmuch as + one is often found without the other. The reason of this, as we shall + find, is simply that moral excellence in no wise springs from reflection, + which is developed by intellectual culture, but from the will itself, the + constitution of which is innate and not susceptible in itself of any + improvement by means of education. Bastholm represents most nations as + very vicious and immoral; and on the other hand he reports that excellent + traits of character are found amongst some savage peoples; as, for + instance, amongst the Orotchyses, the inhabitants of the island Savu, the + Tunguses, and the Pelew islanders. He thus attempts to solve the problem, + How it is that some tribes are so remarkably good, when their neighbours + are all bad, + </p> + <p> + It seems to me that the difficulty may be explained as follows: Moral + qualities, as we know, are heritable, and an isolated tribe, such as is + described, might take its rise in some one family, and ultimately in a + single ancestor who happened to be a good man, and then maintain its + purity. Is it not the case, for instance, that on many unpleasant + occasions, such as repudiation of public debts, filibustering raids and so + on, the English have often reminded the North Americans of their descent + from English penal colonists? It is a reproach, however, which can apply + only to a small part of the population. + </p> + <p> + It is marvellous how <i>every man's individuality</i> (that is to say, the + union of a definite character with a definite intellect) accurately + determines all his actions and thoughts down to the most unimportant + details, as though it were a dye which pervaded them; and how, in + consequence, one man's whole course of life, in other words, his inner and + outer history, turns out so absolutely different from another's. As a + botanist knows a plant in its entirety from a single leaf; as Cuvier from + a single bone constructed the whole animal, so an accurate knowledge of a + man's whole character may be attained from a single characteristic act; + that is to say, he himself may to some extent be constructed from it, even + though the act in question is of very trifling consequence. Nay, that is + the most perfect test of all, for in a matter of importance people are on + their guard; in trifles they follow their natural bent without much + reflection. That is why Seneca's remark, that even the smallest things may + be taken as evidence of character, is so true: <i>argumenta morum ex + minimis quoque licet capere</i>.{1} If a man shows by his absolutely + unscrupulous and selfish behaviour in small things that a sentiment of + justice is foreign to his disposition, he should not be trusted with a + penny unless on due security. For who will believe that the man who every + day shows that he is unjust in all matters other than those which concern + property, and whose boundless selfishness everywhere protrudes through the + small affairs of ordinary life which are subject to no scrutiny, like a + dirty shirt through the holes of a ragged jacket—who, I ask, will + believe that such a man will act honourably in matters of <i>meum</i> and + <i>tuum</i> without any other incentive but that of justice? The man who + has no conscience in small things will be a scoundrel in big things. If we + neglect small traits of character, we have only ourselves to blame if we + afterwards learn to our disadvantage what this character is in the great + affairs of life. On the same principle, we ought to break with so-called + friends even in matters of trifling moment, if they show a character that + is malicious or bad or vulgar, so that we may avoid the bad turn which + only waits for an opportunity of being done us. The same thing applies to + servants. Let it always be our maxim: Better alone than amongst traitors. + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: <i>Ep</i>., 52.} + </p> + <p> + Of a truth the first and foremost step in all knowledge of mankind is the + conviction that a man's conduct, taken as a whole, and in all its + essential particulars, is not governed by his reason or by any of the + resolutions which he may make in virtue of it. No man becomes this or that + by wishing to be it, however earnestly. His acts proceed from his innate + and unalterable character, and they are more immediately and particularly + determined by motives. A man's conduct, therefore, is the necessary + product of both character and motive. It may be illustrated by the course + of a planet, which is the result of the combined effect of the tangential + energy with which it is endowed, and the centripetal energy which operates + from the sun. In this simile the former energy represents character, and + the latter the influence of motive. It is almost more than a mere simile. + The tangential energy which properly speaking is the source of the + planet's motion, whilst on the other hand the motion is kept in check by + gravitation, is, from a metaphysical point of view, the will manifesting + itself in that body. + </p> + <p> + To grasp this fact is to see that we really never form anything more than + a conjecture of what we shall do under circumstances which are still to + happen; although we often take our conjecture for a resolve. When, for + instance, in pursuance of a proposal, a man with the greatest sincerity, + and even eagerness, accepts an engagement to do this or that on the + occurrence of a certain future event, it is by no means certain that he + will fulfil the engagement; unless he is so constituted that the promise + which he gives, in itself and as such, is always and everywhere a motive + sufficient for him, by acting upon him, through considerations of honour, + like some external compulsion. But above and beyond this, what he will do + on the occurrence of that event may be foretold from true and accurate + knowledge of his character and the external circumstances under the + influence of which he will fall; and it may with complete certainty be + foretold from this alone. Nay, it is a very easy prophecy if he has been + already seen in a like position; for he will inevitably do the same thing + a second time, provided that on the first occasion he had a true and + complete knowledge of the facts of the case. For, as I have often + remarked, a final cause does not impel a man by being real, but by being + known; <i>causa finalis non movet secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum + esse cognitum</i>.{1} Whatever he failed to recognise or understand the + first time could have no influence upon his will; just as an electric + current stops when some isolating body hinders the action of the + conductor. This unalterable nature of character, and the consequent + necessity of our actions, are made very clear to a man who has not, on any + given occasion, behaved as he ought to have done, by showing a lack either + of resolution or endurance or courage, or some other quality demanded at + the moment. Afterwards he recognises what it is that he ought to have + done; and, sincerely repenting of his incorrect behaviour, he thinks to + himself, <i>If the opportunity were offered to me again, I should act + differently</i>. It is offered once more; the same occasion recurs; and to + his great astonishment he does precisely the same thing over again.{2} + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: Suarez, <i>Disp. Metaph</i>., xxiii.; §§7 and 8.} + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 2: Cf. <i>World as Will</i>, ii., pp. 251 ff. <i>sqq</i>. (third + edition).} + </p> + <p> + The best examples of the truth in question are in every way furnished by + Shakespeare's plays. It is a truth with which he was thoroughly imbued, + and his intuitive wisdom expressed it in a concrete shape on every page. I + shall here, however, give an instance of it in a case in which he makes it + remarkably clear, without exhibiting any design or affectation in the + matter; for he was a real artist and never set out from general ideas. His + method was obviously to work up to the psychological truth which he + grasped directly and intuitively, regardless of the fact that few would + notice or understand it, and without the smallest idea that some dull and + shallow fellows in Germany would one day proclaim far and wide that he + wrote his works to illustrate moral commonplaces. I allude to the + character of the Earl of Northumberland, whom we find in three plays in + succession, although he does not take a leading part in any one of them; + nay, he appears only in a few scenes distributed over fifteen acts. + Consequently, if the reader is not very attentive, a character exhibited + at such great intervals, and its moral identity, may easily escape his + notice, even though it has by no means escaped the poet's. He makes the + earl appear everywhere with a noble and knightly grace, and talk in + language suitable to it; nay, he sometimes puts very beautiful and even + elevated passages, into his mouth. At the same time he is very far from + writing after the manner of Schiller, who was fond of painting the devil + black, and whose moral approval or disapproval of the characters which he + presented could be heard in their own words. With Shakespeare, and also + with Goethe, every character, as long as he is on the stage and speaking, + seems to be absolutely in the right, even though it were the devil + himself. In this respect let the reader compare Duke Alba as he appears in + Goethe with the same character in Schiller. + </p> + <p> + We make the acquaintance of the Earl of Northumberland in the play of <i>Richard + II</i>., where he is the first to hatch a plot against the King in favour + of Bolingbroke, afterwards Henry IV., to whom he even offers some personal + flattery (Act II., Sc. 3). In the following act he suffers a reprimand + because, in speaking of the King he talks of him as "Richard," without + more ado, but protests that he did it only for brevity's sake. A little + later his insidious words induce the King to surrender. In the following + act, when the King renounces the crown, Northumberland treats him with + such harshness and contempt that the unlucky monarch is quite broken, and + losing all patience once more exclaims to him: <i>Fiend, thou torment'st + me ere I come to hell</i>! At the close, Northumberland announces to the + new King that he has sent the heads of the former King's adherents to + London. + </p> + <p> + In the following tragedy, <i>Henry IV</i>., he hatches a plot against the + new King in just the same way. In the fourth act we see the rebels united, + making preparations for the decisive battle on the morrow, and only + waiting impatiently for Northumberland and his division. At last there + arrives a letter from him, saying that he is ill, and that he cannot + entrust his force to any one else; but that nevertheless the others should + go forward with courage and make a brave fight. They do so, but, greatly + weakened by his absence, they are completely defeated; most of their + leaders are captured, and his own son, the valorous Hotspur, falls by the + hand of the Prince of Wales. + </p> + <p> + Again, in the following play, the <i>Second Part of Henry IV</i>., we see + him reduced to a state of the fiercest wrath by the death of his son, and + maddened by the thirst for revenge. Accordingly he kindles another + rebellion, and the heads of it assemble once more. In the fourth act, just + as they are about to give battle, and are only waiting for him to join + them, there comes a letter saying that he cannot collect a proper force, + and will therefore seek safety for the present in Scotland; that, + nevertheless, he heartily wishes their heroic undertaking the best + success. Thereupon they surrender to the King under a treaty which is not + kept, and so perish. + </p> + <p> + So far is character from being the work of reasoned choice and + consideration that in any action the intellect has nothing to do but to + present motives to the will. Thereafter it looks on as a mere spectator + and witness at the course which life takes, in accordance with the + influence of motive on the given character. All the incidents of life + occur, strictly speaking, with the same necessity as the movement of a + clock. On this point let me refer to my prize-essay on <i>The Freedom of + the Will</i>. I have there explained the true meaning and origin of the + persistent illusion that the will is entirely free in every single action; + and I have indicated the cause to which it is due. I will only add here + the following teleological explanation of this natural illusion. + </p> + <p> + Since every single action of a man's life seems to possess the freedom and + originality which in truth only belong to his character as he apprehends + it, and the mere apprehension of it by his intellect is what constitutes + his career; and since what is original in every single action seems to the + empirical consciousness to be always being performed anew, a man thus + receives in the course of his career the strongest possible moral lesson. + Then, and not before, he becomes thoroughly conscious of all the bad sides + of his character. Conscience accompanies every act with the comment: <i>You + should act differently</i>, although its true sense is: <i>You could be + other than you are</i>. As the result of this immutability of character on + the one hand, and, on the other, of the strict necessity which attends all + the circumstances in which character is successively placed, every man's + course of life is precisely determined from Alpha right through to Omega. + But, nevertheless, one man's course of life turns out immeasurably + happier, nobler and more worthy than another's, whether it be regarded + from a subjective or an objective point of view, and unless we are to + exclude all ideas of justice, we are led to the doctrine which is well + accepted in Brahmanism and Buddhism, that the subjective conditions in + which, as well as the objective conditions under which, every man is born, + are the moral consequences of a previous existence. + </p> + <p> + Macchiavelli, who seems to have taken no interest whatever in + philosophical speculations, is drawn by the keen subtlety of his very + unique understanding into the following observation, which possesses a + really deep meaning. It shows that he had an intuitive knowledge of the + entire necessity with which, characters and motives being given, all + actions take place. He makes it at the beginning of the prologue to his + comedy <i>Clitia</i>. <i>If</i>, he says, <i>the same men were to recur in + the world in the way that the same circumstances recur, a hundred years + would never elapse without our finding ourselves together once more, and + doing the same things as we are doing now—Se nel mondo tornassino i + medesimi uomini, como tornano i medesimi casi, non passarebbono mai cento + anni che noi non ci trovassimo un altra volta insieme, a fare le medesime + cose che hora</i>. He seems however to have been drawn into the remark by + a reminiscence of what Augustine says in his <i>De Civitate Dei</i>, bk. + xii., ch. xiii. + </p> + <p> + Again, Fate, or the {Greek: eimarmenae} of the ancients, is nothing but + the conscious certainty that all that happens is fast bound by a chain of + causes, and therefore takes place with a strict necessity; that the future + is already ordained with absolute certainty and can undergo as little + alteration as the past. In the fatalistic myths of the ancients all that + can be regarded as fabulous is the prediction of the future; that is, if + we refuse to consider the possibility of magnetic clairvoyance and second + sight. Instead of trying to explain away the fundamental truth of Fatalism + by superficial twaddle and foolish evasion, a man should attempt to get a + clear knowledge and comprehension of it; for it is demonstrably true, and + it helps us in a very important way to an understanding of the mysterious + riddle of our life. Predestination and Fatalism do not differ in the main. + They differ only in this, that with Predestination the given character and + external determination of human action proceed from a rational Being, and + with Fatalism from an irrational one. But in either case the result is the + same: that happens which must happen. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand the conception of <i>Moral Freedom</i> is inseparable + from that of <i>Originality</i>. A man may be said, but he cannot be + conceived, to be the work of another, and at the same time be free in + respect of his desires and acts. He who called him into existence out of + nothing in the same process created and determined his nature—in + other words, the whole of his qualities. For no one can create without + creating a something, that is to say, a being determined throughout and in + all its qualities. But all that a man says and does necessarily proceeds + from the qualities so determined; for it is only the qualities themselves + set in motion. It is only some external impulse that they require to make + their appearance. As a man is, so must he act; and praise or blame + attaches, not to his separate acts, but to his nature and being. + </p> + <p> + That is the reason why Theism and the moral responsibility of man are + incompatible; because responsibility always reverts to the creator of man + and it is there that it has its centre. Vain attempts have been made to + make a bridge from one of these incompatibles to the other by means of the + conception of moral freedom; but it always breaks down again. What is <i>free</i> + must also be <i>original</i>. If our will is <i>free</i>, our will is also + <i>the original element</i>, and conversely. Pre-Kantian dogmatism tried + to separate these two predicaments. It was thereby compelled to assume two + kinds of freedom, one cosmological, of the first cause, and the other + moral and theological, of human will. These are represented in Kant by the + third as well as the fourth antimony of freedom. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, in my philosophy the plain recognition of the strictly + necessary character of all action is in accordance with the doctrine that + what manifests itself even in the organic and irrational world is <i>will</i>. + If this were not so, the necessity under which irrational beings obviously + act would place their action in conflict with will; if, I mean, there were + really such a thing as the freedom of individual action, and this were not + as strictly necessitated as every other kind of action. But, as I have + just shown, it is this same doctrine of the necessary character of all + acts of will which makes it needful to regard a man's existence and being + as itself the work of his freedom, and consequently of his will. The will, + therefore, must be self-existent; it must possess so-called <i>a-se-ity</i>. + Under the opposite supposition all responsibility, as I have shown, would + be at an end, and the moral like the physical world would be a mere + machine, set in motion for the amusement of its manufacturer placed + somewhere outside of it. So it is that truths hang together, and mutually + advance and complete one another; whereas error gets jostled at every + corner. + </p> + <p> + What kind of influence it is that <i>moral instruction</i> may exercise on + conduct, and what are the limits of that influence, are questions which I + have sufficiently examined in the twentieth section of my treatise on the + <i>Foundation of Morality</i>. In all essential particulars an analogous + influence is exercised by <i>example</i>, which, however, has a more + powerful effect than doctrine, and therefore it deserves a brief analysis. + </p> + <p> + In the main, example works either by restraining a man or by encouraging + him. It has the former effect when it determines him to leave undone what + he wanted to do. He sees, I mean, that other people do not do it; and from + this he judges, in general, that it is not expedient; that it may endanger + his person, or his property, or his honour. + </p> + <p> + He rests content, and gladly finds himself relieved from examining into + the matter for himself. Or he may see that another man, who has not + refrained, has incurred evil consequences from doing it; this is example + of the deterrent kind. The example which encourages a man works in a + twofold manner. It either induces him to do what he would be glad to leave + undone, if he were not afraid lest the omission might in some way endanger + him, or injure him in others' opinion; or else it encourages him to do + what he is glad to do, but has hitherto refrained from doing from fear of + danger or shame; this is example of the seductive kind. Finally, example + may bring a man to do what he would have otherwise never thought of doing. + It is obvious that in this last case example works in the main only on the + intellect; its effect on the will is secondary, and if it has any such + effect, it is by the interposition of the man's own judgment, or by + reliance on the person who presented the example. + </p> + <p> + The whole influence of example—and it is very strong—rests on + the fact that a man has, as a rule, too little judgment of his own, and + often too little knowledge, o explore his own way for himself, and that he + is glad, therefore, to tread in the footsteps of some one else. + Accordingly, the more deficient he is in either of these qualities, the + more is he open to the influence of example; and we find, in fact, that + most men's guiding star is the example of others; that their whole course + of life, in great things and in small, comes in the end to be mere + imitation; and that not even in the pettiest matters do they act according + to their own judgment. Imitation and custom are the spring of almost all + human action. The cause of it is that men fight shy of all and any sort of + reflection, and very properly mistrust their own discernment. At the same + time this remarkably strong imitative instinct in man is a proof of his + kinship with apes. + </p> + <p> + But the kind of effect which example exercises depends upon a man's + character, and thus it is that the same example may possibly seduce one + man and deter another. An easy opportunity of observing this is afforded + in the case of certain social impertinences which come into vogue and + gradually spread. The first time that a man notices anything of the kind, + he may say to himself: <i>For shame! how can he do it! how selfish and + inconsiderate of him! really, I shall take care never to do anything like + that</i>. But twenty others will think: <i>Aha! if he does that, I may do + it too</i>. + </p> + <p> + As regards morality, example, like doctrine, may, it is true, promote + civil or legal amelioration, but not that inward amendment which is, + strictly speaking, the only kind of moral amelioration. For example always + works as a personal motive alone, and assumes, therefore, that a man is + susceptible to this sort of motive. But it is just the predominating + sensitiveness of a character to this or that sort of motive that + determines whether its morality is true and real; though, of whatever kind + it is, it is always innate. In general it may be said that example + operates as a means of promoting the good and the bad qualities of a + character, but it does not create them; and so it is that Seneca's maxim, + <i>velle non discitur</i>—<i>will cannot be learned</i>—also + holds good here. But the innateness of all truly moral qualities, of the + good as of the bad, is a doctrine that consorts better with the + metempsychosis of the Brahmins and Buddhists, according to which a man's + good and bad deeds follow him from one existence to another like his + shadow, than with Judaism. For Judaism requires a man to come into the + world as a moral blank, so that, in virtue of an inconceivable free will, + directed to objects which are neither to be sought nor avoided—<i>liberum + arbitrium indifferentiae</i>—and consequently as the result of + reasoned consideration, he may choose whether he is to be an angel or a + devil, or anything else that may lie between the two. Though I am well + aware what the Jewish scheme is, I pay no attention to it; for my standard + is truth. I am no professor of philosophy, and therefore I do not find my + vocation in establishing the fundamental ideas of Judaism at any cost, + even though they for ever bar the way to all and every kind of + philosophical knowledge. <i>Liberum arbitrium indifferentiae</i> under the + name of <i>moral freedom</i> is a charming doll for professors of + philosophy to dandle; and we must leave it to those intelligent, + honourable and upright gentlemen. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0005" id="link2H_4_0005"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHARACTER. + </h2> + <p> + Men who aspire to a happy, a brilliant and a long life, instead of to a + virtuous one, are like foolish actors who want to be always having the + great parts,—the parts that are marked by splendour and triumph. + They fail to see that the important thing is not <i>what</i> or <i>how + much</i>, but <i>how</i> they act. + </p> + <p> + Since <i>a man does not alter</i>, and his <i>moral character</i> remains + absolutely the same all through his life; since he must play out the part + which he has received, without the least deviation from the character; + since neither experience, nor philosophy, nor religion can effect any + improvement in him, the question arises, What is the meaning of life at + all? To what purpose is it played, this farce in which everything that is + essential is irrevocably fixed and determined? + </p> + <p> + It is played that a man may come to understand himself, that he may see + what it is that he seeks and has sought to be; what he wants, and what, + therefore, he is. <i>This is a knowledge which must be imparted to him + from without</i>. Life is to man, in other words, to will, what chemical + re-agents are to the body: it is only by life that a man reveals what he + is, and it is only in so far as he reveals himself that he exists at all. + Life is the manifestation of character, of the something that we + understand by that word; and it is not in life, but outside of it, and + outside time, that character undergoes alteration, as a result of the + self-knowledge which life gives. Life is only the mirror into which a man + gazes not in order that he may get a reflection of himself, but that he + may come to understand himself by that reflection; that he may see <i>what</i> + it is that the mirror shows. Life is the proof sheet, in which the + compositors' errors are brought to light. How they become visible, and + whether the type is large or small, are matters of no consequence. Neither + in the externals of life nor in the course of history is there any + significance; for as it is all one whether an error occurs in the large + type or in the small, so it is all one, as regards the essence of the + matter, whether an evil disposition is mirrored as a conqueror of the + world or a common swindler or ill-natured egoist. In one case he is seen + of all men; in the other, perhaps only of himself; but that he should see + himself is what signifies. + </p> + <p> + Therefore if egoism has a firm hold of a man and masters him, whether it + be in the form of joy, or triumph, or lust, or hope, or frantic grief, or + annoyance, or anger, or fear, or suspicion, or passion of any kind—he + is in the devil's clutches and how he got into them does not matter. What + is needful is that he should make haste to get out of them; and here, + again, it does not matter how. + </p> + <p> + I have described <i>character</i> as <i>theoretically</i> an act of will + lying beyond time, of which life in time, or <i>character in action</i>, + is the development. For matters of practical life we all possess the one + as well as the other; for we are constituted of them both. Character + modifies our life more than we think, and it is to a certain extent true + that every man is the architect of his own fortune. No doubt it seems as + if our lot were assigned to us almost entirely from without, and imparted + to us in something of the same way in which a melody outside us reaches + the ear. But on looking back over our past, we see at once that our life + consists of mere variations on one and the same theme, namely, our + character, and that the same fundamental bass sounds through it all. This + is an experience which a man can and must make in and by himself. + </p> + <p> + Not only a man's life, but his intellect too, may be possessed of a clear + and definite character, so far as his intellect is applied to matters of + theory. It is not every man, however, who has an intellect of this kind; + for any such definite individuality as I mean is genius—an original + view of the world, which presupposes an absolutely exceptional + individuality, which is the essence of genius. A man's intellectual + character is the theme on which all his works are variations. In an essay + which I wrote in Weimar I called it the knack by which every genius + produces his works, however various. This intellectual character + determines the physiognomy of men of genius—what I might call <i>the + theoretical physiognomy</i>—and gives it that distinguished + expression which is chiefly seen in the eyes and the forehead. In the case + of ordinary men the physiognomy presents no more than a weak analogy with + the physiognomy of genius. On the other hand, all men possess <i>the + practical physiognomy</i>, the stamp of will, of practical character, of + moral disposition; and it shows itself chiefly in the mouth. + </p> + <p> + Since character, so far as we understand its nature, is above and beyond + time, it cannot undergo any change under the influence of life. But + although it must necessarily remain the same always, it requires time to + unfold itself and show the very diverse aspects which it may possess. For + character consists of two factors: one, the will-to-live itself, blind + impulse, so-called impetuosity; the other, the restraint which the will + acquires when it comes to understand the world; and the world, again, is + itself will. A man may begin by following the craving of desire, until he + comes to see how hollow and unreal a thing is life, how deceitful are its + pleasures, what horrible aspects it possesses; and this it is that makes + people hermits, penitents, Magdalenes. Nevertheless it is to be observed + that no such change from a life of great indulgence in pleasure to one of + resignation is possible, except to the man who of his own accord renounces + pleasure. A really bad life cannot be changed into a virtuous one. The + most beautiful soul, before it comes to know life from its horrible side, + may eagerly drink the sweets of life and remain innocent. But it cannot + commit a bad action; it cannot cause others suffering to do a pleasure to + itself, for in that case it would see clearly what it would be doing; and + whatever be its youth and inexperience it perceives the sufferings of + others as clearly as its own pleasures. That is why one bad action is a + guarantee that numberless others will be committed as soon as + circumstances give occasion for them. Somebody once remarked to me, with + entire justice, that every man had something very good and humane in his + disposition, and also something very bad and malignant; and that according + as he was moved one or the other of them made its appearance. The sight of + others' suffering arouses, not only in different men, but in one and the + same man, at one moment an inexhaustible sympathy, at another a certain + satisfaction; and this satisfaction may increase until it becomes the + cruellest delight in pain. I observe in myself that at one moment I regard + all mankind with heartfelt pity, at another with the greatest + indifference, on occasion with hatred, nay, with a positive enjoyment of + their pain. + </p> + <p> + All this shows very clearly that we are possessed of two different, nay, + absolutely contradictory, ways of regarding the world: one according to + the principle of individuation, which exhibits all creatures as entire + strangers to us, as definitely not ourselves. We can have no feelings for + them but those of indifference, envy, hatred, and delight that they + suffer. The other way of regarding the world is in accordance with what I + may call the <i>Tat-twam-asi</i>—<i>this-is-thyself</i> principle. + All creatures are exhibited as identical with ourselves; and so it is pity + and love which the sight of them arouses. + </p> + <p> + The one method separates individuals by impassable barriers; the other + removes the barrier and brings the individuals together. The one makes us + feel, in regard to every man, <i>that is what I am</i>; the other, <i>that + is not what I am</i>. But it is remarkable that while the sight of + another's suffering makes us feel our identity with him, and arouses our + pity, this is not so with the sight of another's happiness. Then we almost + always feel some envy; and even though we may have no such feeling in + certain cases,—as, for instance, when our friends are happy,—yet + the interest which we take in their happiness is of a weak description, + and cannot compare with the sympathy which we feel with their suffering. + Is this because we recognise all happiness to be a delusion, or an + impediment to true welfare? No! I am inclined to think that it is because + the sight of the pleasure, or the possessions, which are denied to us, + arouses envy; that is to say, the wish that we, and not the other, had + that pleasure or those possessions. + </p> + <p> + It is only the first way of looking at the world which is founded on any + demonstrable reason. The other is, as it were, the gate out of this world; + it has no attestation beyond itself, unless it be the very abstract and + difficult proof which my doctrine supplies. Why the first way predominates + in one man, and the second in another—though perhaps it does not + exclusively predominate in any man; why the one or the other emerges + according as the will is moved—these are deep problems. The paths of + night and day are close together: + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + {Greek: Engus gar nuktos de kai aematos eisi keleuthoi.} +</pre> + <p> + It is a fact that there is a great and original difference between one + empirical character and another; and it is a difference which, at bottom, + rests upon the relation of the individual's will to his intellectual + faculty. This relation is finally determined by the degree of will in his + father and of intellect in his mother; and the union of father and mother + is for the most part an affair of chance. This would all mean a revolting + injustice in the nature of the world, if it were not that the difference + between parents and son is phenomenal only and all chance is, at bottom, + necessity. + </p> + <p> + As regards the freedom of the will, if it were the case that the will + manifested itself in a single act alone, it would be a free act. But the + will manifests itself in a course of life, that is to say, in a series of + acts. Every one of these acts, therefore, is determined as a part of a + complete whole, and cannot happen otherwise than it does happen. On the + other hand, the whole series is free; it is simply the manifestation of an + individualised will. + </p> + <p> + If a man feels inclined to commit a bad action and refrains, he is kept + back either (1) by fear of punishment or vengeance; or (2) by superstition + in other words, fear of punishment in a future life; or (3) by the feeling + of sympathy, including general charity; or (4) by the feeling of honour, + in other words, the fear of shame; or (5) by the feeling of justice, that + is, an objective attachment to fidelity and good-faith, coupled with a + resolve to hold them sacred, because they are the foundation of all free + intercourse between man and man, and therefore often of advantage to + himself as well. This last thought, not indeed as a thought, but as a mere + feeling, influences people very frequently. It is this that often compels + a man of honour, when some great but unjust advantage is offered him, to + reject it with contempt and proudly exclaim: <i>I am an honourable man</i>! + For otherwise how should a poor man, confronted with the property which + chance or even some worse agency has bestowed on the rich, whose very + existence it is that makes him poor, feel so much sincere respect for this + property, that he refuses to touch it even in his need; and although he + has a prospect of escaping punishment, what other thought is it that can + be at the bottom of such a man's honesty? He is resolved not to separate + himself from the great community of honourable people who have the earth + in possession, and whose laws are recognised everywhere. He knows that a + single dishonest act will ostracise and proscribe him from that society + for ever. No! a man will spend money on any soil that yields him good + fruit, and he will make sacrifices for it. + </p> + <p> + With a good action,—that, every action in which a man's own + advantage is ostensibly subordinated to another's,—the motive is + either (1) self-interest, kept in the background; or (2) superstition, in + other words, self-interest in the form of reward in another life; or (3) + sympathy; or (4) the desire to lend a helping hand, in other words, + attachment to the maxim that we should assist one another in need, and the + wish to maintain this maxim, in view of the presumption that some day we + ourselves may find it serve our turn. For what Kant calls a good action + done from motives of duty and for the sake of duty, there is, as will be + seen, no room at all. Kant himself declares it to be doubtful whether an + action was ever determined by pure motives of duty alone. I affirm most + certainly that no action was ever so done; it is mere babble; there is + nothing in it that could really act as a motive to any man. When he + shelters himself behind verbiage of that sort, he is always actuated by + one of the four motives which I have described. Among these it is + obviously sympathy alone which is quite genuine and sincere. + </p> + <p> + <i>Good</i> and <i>bad</i> apply to character only <i>à potiori</i>; that + is to say, we prefer the good to the bad; but, absolutely, there is no + such distinction. The difference arises at the point which lies between + subordinating one's own advantage to that of another, and not + subordinating it. If a man keeps to the exact middle, he is <i>just</i>. + But most men go an inch in their regard for others' welfare to twenty + yards in regard for their own. + </p> + <p> + The source of <i>good</i> and of <i>bad character</i>, so far as we have + any real knowledge of it, lies in this, that with the bad character the + thought of the external world, and especially of the living creatures in + it, is accompanied—all the more, the greater the resemblance between + them and the individual self—by a constant feeling of <i>not I, not + I, not I</i>. + </p> + <p> + Contrarily, with the good character (both being assumed to exist in a high + degree) the same thought has for its accompaniment, like a fundamental + bass, a constant feeling of <i>I, I, I</i>. From this spring benevolence + and a disposition to help all men, and at the same time a cheerful, + confident and tranquil frame of mind, the opposite of that which + accompanies the bad character. + </p> + <p> + The difference, however, is only phenomenal, although it is a difference + which is radical. But now we come to <i>the hardest of all problems</i>: + How is it that, while the will, as the thing-in-itself, is identical, and + from a metaphysical point of view one and the same in all its + manifestations, there is nevertheless such an enormous difference between + one character and another?—the malicious, diabolical wickedness of + the one, and set off against it, the goodness of the other, showing all + the more conspicuously. How is it that we get a Tiberius, a Caligula, a + Carcalla, a Domitian, a Nero; and on the other hand, the Antonines, Titus, + Hadrian, Nerva? How is it that among the animals, nay, in a higher + species, in individual animals, there is a like difference?—the + malignity of the cat most strongly developed in the tiger; the spite of + the monkey; on the other hand, goodness, fidelity and love in the dog and + the elephant. It is obvious that the principle of wickedness in the brute + is the same as in man. + </p> + <p> + We may to some extent modify the difficulty of the problem by observing + that the whole difference is in the end only one of degree. In every + living creature, the fundamental propensities and instincts all exist, but + they exist in very different degrees and proportions. This, however, is + not enough to explain the facts. + </p> + <p> + We must fall back upon the intellect and its relation to the will; it is + the only explanation that remains. A man's intellect, however, by no means + stands in any direct and obvious relation with the goodness of his + character. We may, it is true, discriminate between two kinds of + intellect: between understanding, as the apprehension of relation in + accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and cognition, a + faculty akin to genius, which acts more directly, is independent of this + law, and passes beyond the Principle of Individuation. The latter is the + faculty which apprehends Ideas, and it is the faculty which has to do with + morality. But even this explanation leaves much to be desired. <i>Fine + minds are seldom fine souls</i> was the correct observation of Jean Paul; + although they are never the contrary. Lord Bacon, who, to be sure, was + less a fine soul than a fine mind, was a scoundrel. + </p> + <p> + I have declared space and time to be part of the Principle of + Individuation, as it is only space and time that make the multiplicity of + similar objects a possibility. But multiplicity itself also admits of + variety; multiplicity and diversity are not only quantitative, but also + qualitative. How is it that there is such a thing as qualitative + diversity, especially in ethical matters? Or have I fallen into an error + the opposite of that in which Leibnitz fell with his <i>identitas + indiscernibilium</i>? + </p> + <p> + The chief cause of intellectual diversity is to be found in the brain and + nervous system. This is a fact which somewhat lessens the obscurity of the + subject. With the brutes the intellect and the brain are strictly adapted + to their aims and needs. With man alone there is now and then, by way of + exception, a superfluity, which, if it is abundant, may yield genius. But + ethical diversity, it seems, proceeds immediately from the will. Otherwise + ethical character would not be above and beyond time, as it is only in the + individual that intellect and will are united. The will is above and + beyond time, and eternal; and character is innate; that is to say, it is + sprung from the same eternity, and therefore it does not admit of any but + a transcendental explanation. + </p> + <p> + Perhaps some one will come after me who will throw light into this dark + abyss. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0006" id="link2H_4_0006"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + MORAL INSTINCT. + </h2> + <p> + An act done by instinct differs from every other kind of act in that an + understanding of its object does not precede it but follows upon it. + Instinct is therefore a rule of action given <i>à priori</i>. We may be + unaware of the object to which it is directed, as no understanding of it + is necessary to its attainment. On the other hand, if an act is done by an + exercise of reason or intelligence, it proceeds according to a rule which + the understanding has itself devised for the purpose of carrying out a + preconceived aim. Hence it is that action according to rule may miss its + aim, while instinct is infallible. + </p> + <p> + On the <i>à priori</i> character of instinct we may compare what Plato + says in the <i>Philebus</i>. With Plato instinct is a reminiscence of + something which a man has never actually experienced in his lifetime; in + the same way as, in the <i>Phaedo</i> and elsewhere, everything that a man + learns is regarded as a reminiscence. He has no other word to express the + <i>à priori</i> element in all experience. + </p> + <p> + There are, then, three things that are <i>à priori</i>: + </p> + <p> + (1) Theoretical Reason, in other words, the conditions which make all + experience possible. + </p> + <p> + (2) Instinct, or the rule by which an object promoting the life of the + senses may, though unknown, be attained. + </p> + <p> + (3) The Moral Law, or the rule by which an action takes place without any + object. + </p> + <p> + Accordingly rational or intelligent action proceeds by a rule laid down in + accordance with the object as it is understood. Instinctive action + proceeds by a rule without an understanding of the object of it. Moral + action proceeds by a rule without any object at all. + </p> + <p> + <i>Theoretical Reason</i> is the aggregate of rules in accordance with + which all my knowledge—that is to say, the whole world of experience—necessarily + proceeds. In the same manner <i>Instinct</i> is the aggregate of rules in + accordance with which all my action necessarily proceeds if it meets with + no obstruction. Hence it seems to me that Instinct may most appropriately + be called <i>practical reason</i>, for like theoretical reason it + determines the <i>must</i> of all experience. + </p> + <p> + The so-called moral law, on the other hand, is only one aspect of <i>the + better consciousness</i>, the aspect which it presents from the point of + view of instinct. This better consciousness is something lying beyond all + experience, that is, beyond all reason, whether of the theoretical or the + practical kind, and has nothing to do with it; whilst it is in virtue of + the mysterious union of it and reason in the same individual that the + better consciousness comes into conflict with reason, leaving the + individual to choose between the two. + </p> + <p> + In any conflict between the better consciousness and reason, if the + individual decides for reason, should it be theoretical reason, he becomes + a narrow, pedantic philistine; should it be practical, a rascal. + </p> + <p> + If he decides for the better consciousness, we can make no further + positive affirmation about him, for if we were to do so, we should find + ourselves in the realm of reason; and as it is only what takes place + within this realm that we can speak of at all it follows that we cannot + speak of the better consciousness except in negative terms. + </p> + <p> + This shows us how it is that reason is hindered and obstructed; that <i>theoretical + reason</i> is suppressed in favour of <i>genius</i>, and <i>practical + reason</i> in favour of <i>virtue</i>. Now the better consciousness is + neither theoretical nor practical; for these are distinctions that only + apply to reason. But if the individual is in the act of choosing, the + better consciousness appears to him in the aspect which it assumes in + vanquishing and overcoming the practical reason (or instinct, to use the + common word). It appears to him as an imperative command, an <i>ought</i>. + It so appears to him, I say; in other words, that is the shape which it + takes for the theoretical reason which renders all things into objects and + ideas. But in so far as the better consciousness desires to vanquish and + overcome the theoretical reason, it takes no shape at all; on the simple + ground that, as it comes into play, the theoretical reason is suppressed + and becomes the mere servant of the better consciousness. That is why + genius can never give any account of its own works. + </p> + <p> + In the morality of action, the legal principle that both sides are to be + heard must not be allowed to apply; in other words, the claims of self and + the senses must not be urged. Nay, on the contrary, as soon as the pure + will has found expression, the case is closed; <i>nec audienda altera pars</i>. + </p> + <p> + The lower animals are not endowed with moral freedom. Probably this is not + because they show no trace of the better consciousness which in us is + manifested as morality, or nothing analogous to it; for, if that were so, + the lower animals, which are in so many respects like ourselves in outward + appearance that we regard man as a species of animal, would possess some + <i>raison d'être</i> entirely different from our own, and actually be, in + their essential and inmost nature, something quite other than ourselves. + This is a contention which is obviously refuted by the thoroughly + malignant and inherently vicious character of certain animals, such as the + crocodile, the hyaena, the scorpion, the snake, and the gentle, + affectionate and contented character of others, such as the dog. Here, as + in the case of men, the character, as it is manifested, must rest upon + something that is above and beyond time. For, as Jacob Böhme says,{1} <i>there + is a power in every animal which is indestructible, and the spirit of the + world draws it into itself, against the final separation at the Last + Judgment</i>. Therefore we cannot call the lower animals free, and the + reason why we cannot do so is that they are wanting in a faculty which is + profoundly subordinate to the better consciousness in its highest phase, I + mean reason. Reason is the faculty of supreme comprehension, the idea of + totality. How reason manifests itself in the theoretical sphere Kant has + shown, and it does the same in the practical: it makes us capable of + observing and surveying the whole of our life, thought, and action, in + continual connection, and therefore of acting according to general maxims, + whether those maxims originate in the understanding as prudential rules, + or in the better consciousness as moral laws. + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: <i>Epistles</i>, 56.} + </p> + <p> + If any desire or passion is aroused in us, we, and in the same way the + lower animals, are for the moment filled with this desire; we are all + anger, all lust, all fear; and in such moments neither the better + consciousness can speak, nor the understanding consider the consequences. + But in our case reason allows us even at that moment to see our actions + and our life as an unbroken chain,—a chain which connects our + earlier resolutions, or, it may be, the future consequences of our action, + with the moment of passion which now fills our whole consciousness. It + shows us the identity of our person, even when that person is exposed to + influences of the most varied kind, and thereby we are enabled to act + according to maxims. The lower animal is wanting in this faculty; the + passion which seizes it completely dominates it, and can be checked only + by another passion—anger, for instance, or lust, by fear; even + though the vision that terrifies does not appeal to the senses, but is + present in the animal only as a dim memory and imagination. Men, + therefore, may be called irrational, if, like the lower animals, they + allow themselves to be determined by the moment. + </p> + <p> + So far, however, is reason from being the source of morality that it is + reason alone which makes us capable of being rascals, which the lower + animals cannot be. It is reason which enables us to form an evil + resolution and to keep it when the provocation to evil is removed; it + enables us, for example, to nurse vengeance. Although at the moment that + we have an opportunity of fulfilling our resolution the better + consciousness may manifest itself as love or charity, it is by force of + reason, in pursuance of some evil maxim, that we act against it. Thus + Goethe says that a man may use his reason only for the purpose of being + more bestial than any beast: + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + <i>Er hat Vernunft, doch braucht er sie allein + Um theirischer als jedes Thier zu sein</i>. +</pre> + <p> + For not only do we, like the beasts, satisfy the desires of the moment, + but we refine upon them and stimulate them in order to prepare the desire + for the satisfaction. + </p> + <p> + Whenever we think that we perceive a trace of reason in the lower animals, + it fills us with surprise. Now our surprise is not excited by the good and + affectionate disposition which some of them exhibit—we recognise + that as something other than reason—but by some action in them which + seems to be determined not by the impression of the moment, but by a + resolution previously made and kept. Elephants, for instance, are reported + to have taken premeditated revenge for insults long after they were + suffered; lions, to have requited benefits on an opportunity tardily + offered. The truth of such stories has, however, no bearing at all on the + question, What do we mean by reason? But they enable us to decide whether + in the lower animals there is any trace of anything that we can call + reason. + </p> + <p> + Kant not only declares that all our moral sentiments originate in reason, + but he lays down that reason, <i>in my sense of the word</i>, is a + condition of moral action; as he holds that for an action to be virtuous + and meritorious it must be done in accordance with maxims, and not spring + from a resolve taken under some momentary impression. But in both + contentions he is wrong. If I resolve to take vengeance on some one, and + when an opportunity offers, the better consciousness in the form of love + and humanity speaks its word, and I am influenced by it rather than by my + evil resolution, this is a virtuous act, for it is a manifestation of the + better consciousness. It is possible to conceive of a very virtuous man in + whom the better consciousness is so continuously active that it is never + silent, and never allows his passions to get a complete hold of him. By + such consciousness he is subject to a direct control, instead of being + guided indirectly, through the medium of reason, by means of maxims and + moral principles. That is why a man may have weak reasoning powers and a + weak understanding and yet have a high sense of morality and be eminently + good; for the most important element in a man depends as little on + intellectual as it does on physical strength. Jesus says, <i>Blessed are + the poor in spirit</i>. And Jacob Böhme has the excellent and noble + observation: <i>Whoso lies quietly in his own will, like a child in the + womb, and lets himself be led and guided by that inner principle from + which he is sprung, is the noblest and richest on earth</i>.{1} + </p> + <p> + {Footnote 1: <i>Epistles</i>, 37.} + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0007" id="link2H_4_0007"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + ETHICAL REFLECTIONS. + </h2> + <p> + The philosophers of the ancient world united in a single conception a + great many things that had no connection with one another. Of this every + dialogue of Plato's furnishes abundant examples. The greatest and worst + confusion of this kind is that between ethics and politics. The State and + the Kingdom of God, or the Moral Law, are so entirely different in their + character that the former is a parody of the latter, a bitter mockery at + the absence of it. Compared with the Moral Law the State is a crutch + instead of a limb, an automaton instead of a man. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + The <i>principle of honour</i> stands in close connection with human + freedom. It is, as it were, an abuse of that freedom. Instead of using his + freedom to fulfil the moral law, a man employs his power of voluntarily + undergoing any feeling of pain, of overcoming any momentary impression, in + order that he may assert his self-will, whatever be the object to which he + directs it. As he thereby shows that, unlike the lower animals, he has + thoughts which go beyond the welfare of his body and whatever makes for + that welfare, it has come about that the principle of honour is often + confused with virtue. They are regarded as if they were twins. But + wrongly; for although the principle of honour is something which + distinguishes man from the lower animals, it is not, in itself, anything + that raises him above them. Taken as an end and aim, it is as dark a + delusion as any other aim that springs from self. Used as a means, or + casually, it may be productive of good; but even that is good which is + vain and frivolous. It is the misuse of freedom, the employment of it as a + weapon for overcoming the world of feeling, that makes man so infinitely + more terrible than the lower animals; for they do only what momentary + instinct bids them; while man acts by ideas, and his ideas may entail + universal ruin before they are satisfied. + </p> + <p> + There is another circumstance which helps to promote the notion that + honour and virtue are connected. A man who can do what he wants to do + shows that he can also do it if what he wants to do is a virtuous act. But + that those of our actions which we are ourselves obliged to regard with + contempt are also regarded with contempt by other people serves more than + anything that I have here mentioned to establish the connection. Thus it + often happens that a man who is not afraid of the one kind of contempt is + unwilling to undergo the other. But when we are called upon to choose + between our own approval and the world's censure, as may occur in + complicated and mistaken circumstances, what becomes of the principle of + honour then? + </p> + <p> + Two characteristic examples of the principle of honour are to be found in + Shakespeare's <i>Henry VI</i>., Part II., Act IV., Sc. 1. A pirate is + anxious to murder his captive instead of accepting, like others, a ransom + for him; because in taking his captive he lost an eye, and his own honour + and that of his forefathers would in his opinion be stained, if he were to + allow his revenge to be bought off as though he were a mere trader. The + prisoner, on the other hand, who is the Duke of Suffolk, prefers to have + his head grace a pole than to uncover it to such a low fellow as a pirate, + by approaching him to ask for mercy. + </p> + <p> + Just as civic honour—in other words, the opinion that we deserve to + be trusted—is the palladium of those whose endeavour it is to make + their way in the world on the path of honourable business, so knightly + honour—in other words, the opinion that we are men to be feared—is + the palladium of those who aim at going through life on the path of + violence; and so it was that knightly honour arose among the + robber-knights and other knights of the Middle Ages. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + A theoretical philosopher is one who can supply in the shape of ideas for + the reason, a copy of the presentations of experience; just as what the + painter sees he can reproduce on canvas; the sculptor, in marble; the + poet, in pictures for the imagination, though they are pictures which he + supplies only in sowing the ideas from which they sprang. + </p> + <p> + A so-called practical philosopher, on the other hand, is one who, + contrarily, deduces his action from ideas. The theoretical philosopher + transforms life into ideas. The practical philosopher transforms ideas + into life; he acts, therefore, in a thoroughly reasonable manner; he is + consistent, regular, deliberate; he is never hasty or passionate; he never + allows himself to be influenced by the impression of the moment. + </p> + <p> + And indeed, when we find ourselves among those full presentations of + experience, or real objects, to which the body belongs—since the + body is only an objectified will, the shape which the will assumes in the + material world—it is difficult to let our bodies be guided, not by + those presentations, but by a mere image of them, by cold, colourless + ideas, which are related to experience as the shadow of Orcus to life; and + yet this is the only way in which we can avoid doing things of which we + may have to repent. + </p> + <p> + The theoretical philosopher enriches the domain of reason by adding to it; + the practical philosopher draws upon it, and makes it serve him. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + According to Kant the truth of experience is only a hypothetical truth. If + the suppositions which underlie all the intimations of experience—subject, + object, time, space and causality—were removed, none of those + intimations would contain a word of truth. In other words, experience is + only a phenomenon; it is not knowledge of the thing-in-itself. + </p> + <p> + If we find something in our own conduct at which we are secretly pleased, + although we cannot reconcile it with experience, seeing that if we were to + follow the guidance of experience we should have to do precisely the + opposite, we must not allow this to put us out; otherwise we should be + ascribing an authority to experience which it does not deserve, for all + that it teaches rests upon a mere supposition. This is the general + tendency of the Kantian Ethics. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + Innocence is in its very nature stupid. It is stupid because the aim of + life (I use the expression only figuratively, and I could just as well + speak of the essence of life, or of the world) is to gain a knowledge of + our own bad will, so that our will may become an object for us, and that + we may undergo an inward conversion. Our body is itself our will + objectified; it is one of the first and foremost of objects, and the deeds + that we accomplish for the sake of the body show us the evil inherent in + our will. In the state of innocence, where there is no evil because there + is no experience, man is, as it were, only an apparatus for living, and + the object for which the apparatus exists is not yet disclosed. An empty + form of life like this, a stage untenanted, is in itself, like the + so-called real world, null and void; and as it can attain a meaning only + by action, by error, by knowledge, by the convulsions of the will, it + wears a character of insipid stupidity. A golden age of innocence, a + fools' paradise, is a notion that is stupid and unmeaning, and for that + very reason in no way worthy of any respect. The first criminal and + murderer, Cain, who acquired a knowledge of guilt, and through guilt + acquired a knowledge of virtue by repentance, and so came to understand + the meaning of life, is a tragical figure more significant, and almost + more respectable, than all the innocent fools in the world put together. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + If I had to write about <i>modesty</i> I should say: I know the esteemed + public for which I have the honour to write far too well to dare to give + utterance to my opinion about this virtue. Personally I am quite content + to be modest and to apply myself to this virtue with the utmost possible + circumspection. But one thing I shall never admit—that I have ever + required modesty of any man, and any statement to that effect I repel as a + slander. + </p> + <p> + The paltry character of most men compels the few who have any merit or + genius to behave as though they did not know their own value, and + consequently did not know other people's want of value; for it is only on + this condition that the mob acquiesces in tolerating merit. A virtue has + been made out of this necessity, and it is called modesty. It is a piece + of hypocrisy, to be excused only because other people are so paltry that + they must be treated with indulgence. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + Human misery may affect us in two ways, and we may be in one of two + opposite moods in regard to it. + </p> + <p> + In one of them, this misery is immediately present to us. We feel it in + our own person, in our own will which, imbued with violent desires, is + everywhere broken, and this is the process which constitutes suffering. + The result is that the will increases in violence, as is shown in all + cases of passion and emotion; and this increasing violence comes to a stop + only when the will turns and gives way to complete resignation, in other + words, is redeemed. The man who is entirely dominated by this mood will + regard any prosperity which he may see in others with envy, and any + suffering with no sympathy. + </p> + <p> + In the opposite mood human misery is present to us only as a fact of + knowledge, that is to say, indirectly. We are mainly engaged in looking at + the sufferings of others, and our attention is withdrawn from our own. It + is in their person that we become aware of human misery; we are filled + with sympathy; and the result of this mood is general benevolence, + philanthropy. All envy vanishes, and instead of feeling it, we are + rejoiced when we see one of our tormented fellow-creatures experience any + pleasure or relief. + </p> + <p> + After the same fashion we may be in one of two opposite moods in regard to + human baseness and depravity. In the one we perceive this baseness + indirectly, in others. Out of this mood arise indignation, hatred, and + contempt of mankind. In the other we perceive it directly, in ourselves. + Out of it there arises humiliation, nay, contrition. + </p> + <p> + In order to judge the moral value of a man, it is very important to + observe which of these four moods predominate in him. They go in pairs, + one out of each division. In very excellent characters the second mood of + each division will predominate. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + The categorical imperative, or absolute command, is a contradiction. Every + command is conditional. What is unconditional and necessary is a <i>must</i>, + such as is presented by the laws of nature. + </p> + <p> + It is quite true that the moral law is entirely conditional. There is a + world and a view of life in which it has neither validity nor + significance. That world is, properly speaking, the real world in which, + as individuals, we live; for every regard paid to morality is a denial of + that world and of our individual life in it. It is a view of the world, + however, which does not go beyond the principle of sufficient reason; and + the opposite view proceeds by the intuition of Ideas. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + If a man is under the influence of two opposite but very strong motives, A + and B, and I am greatly concerned that he should choose A, but still more + that he should never be untrue to his choice, and by changing his mind + betray me, or the like, it will not do for me to say anything that might + hinder the motive B from having its full effect upon him, and only + emphasise A; for then I should never be able to reckon on his decision. + What I have to do is, rather, to put both motives before him at the same + time, in as vivid and clear a way as possible, so that they may work upon + him with their whole force. The choice that he then makes is the decision + of his inmost nature, and stands firm to all eternity. In saying <i>I will + do this</i>, he has said <i>I must do this</i>. I have got at his will, + and I can rely upon its working as steadily as one of the forces of + nature. It is as certain as fire kindles and water wets that he will act + according to the motive which has proved to be stronger for him. Insight + and knowledge may be attained and lost again; they may be changed, or + improved, or destroyed; but will cannot be changed. That is why <i>I + apprehend, I perceive, I see</i>, is subject to alteration and + uncertainty; <i>I will</i>, pronounced on a right apprehension of motive, + is as firm as nature itself. The difficulty, however, lies in getting at a + right apprehension. A man's apprehension of motive may change, or be + corrected or perverted; and on the other hand, his circumstances may + undergo an alteration. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + A man should exercise an almost boundless toleration and placability, + because if he is capricious enough to refuse to forgive a single + individual for the meanness or evil that lies at his door, it is doing the + rest of the world a quite unmerited honour. + </p> + <p> + But at the same time the man who is every one's friend is no one's friend. + It is quite obvious what sort of friendship it is which we hold out to the + human race, and to which it is open to almost every man to return, no + matter what he may have done. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + With the ancients <i>friendship</i> was one of the chief elements in + morality. But friendship is only limitation and partiality; it is the + restriction to one individual of what is the due of all mankind, namely, + the recognition that a man's own nature and that of mankind are identical. + At most it is a compromise between this recognition and selfishness. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + A lie always has its origin in the desire to extend the dominion of one's + own will over other individuals, and to deny their will in order the + better to affirm one's own. Consequently a lie is in its very nature the + product of injustice, malevolence and villainy. That is why truth, + sincerity, candour and rectitude are at once recognised and valued as + praiseworthy and noble qualities; because we presume that the man who + exhibits them entertains no sentiments of injustice or malice, and + therefore stands in no need of concealing such sentiments. He who is open + cherishes nothing that is bad. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + There is a certain kind of courage which springs from the same source as + good-nature. What I mean is that the good-natured man is almost as clearly + conscious that he exists in other individuals as in himself. I have often + shown how this feeling gives rise to good-nature. It also gives rise to + courage, for the simple reason that the man who possesses this feeling + cares less for his own individual existence, as he lives almost as much in + the general existence of all creatures. Accordingly he is little concerned + for his own life and its belongings. This is by no means the sole source + of courage for it is a phenomenon due to various causes. But it is the + noblest kind of courage, as is shown by the fact that in its origin it is + associated with great gentleness and patience. Men of this kind are + usually irresistible to women. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + All general rules and precepts fail, because they proceed from the false + assumption that men are constituted wholly, or almost wholly, alike; an + assumption which the philosophy of Helvetius expressly makes. Whereas the + truth is that the original difference between individuals in intellect and + morality is immeasurable. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + The question as to whether morality is something real is the question + whether a well-grounded counter-principle to egoism actually exists. + </p> + <p> + As egoism restricts concern for welfare to a single individual, <i>viz</i>., + the man's own self, the counter-principle would have to extend it to all + other individuals. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + It is only because the will is above and beyond time that the stings of + conscience are ineradicable, and do not, like other pains, gradually wear + away. No! an evil deed weighs on the conscience years afterwards as + heavily as if it had been freshly committed. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + Character is innate, and conduct is merely its manifestation; the occasion + for great misdeeds comes seldom; strong counter-motives keep us back; our + disposition is revealed to ourselves by our desires, thoughts, emotions, + when it remains unknown to others. Reflecting on all this, we might + suppose it possible for a man to possess, in some sort, an innate evil + conscience, without ever having done anything very bad. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <i>Don't do to others what you wouldn't like done to yourself</i>. This + is, perhaps, one of those arguments that prove, or rather ask, too much. + For a prisoner might address it to a judge. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + Stupid people are generally malicious, for the very same reason as the + ugly and the deformed. + </p> + <p> + Similarly, genius and sanctity are akin. However simple-minded a saint may + be, he will nevertheless have a dash of genius in him; and however many + errors of temperament, or of actual character, a genius may possess, he + will still exhibit a certain nobility of disposition by which he shows his + kinship with the saint. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + The great difference between Law without and Law within, between the State + and the Kingdom of God, is very clear. It is the State's business to see + that <i>every one should have justice done to him</i>; it regards men as + passive beings, and therefore takes no account of anything but their + actions. The Moral Law, on the other hand, is concerned that <i>every one + should do justice</i>; it regards men as active, and looks to the will + rather than the deed. To prove that this is the true distinction let the + reader consider what would happen if he were to say, conversely, that it + is the State's business that every one should do justice, and the business + of the Moral Law that every one should have justice done to him. The + absurdity is obvious. + </p> + <p> + As an example of the distinction, let me take the case of a debtor and a + creditor disputing about a debt which the former denies. A lawyer and a + moralist are present, and show a lively interest in the matter. Both + desire that the dispute should end in the same way, although what they + want is by no means the same. The lawyer says, <i>I want this man to get + back what belongs to him</i>; and the moralist, <i>I want that man to do + his duty</i>. + </p> + <p> + It is with the will alone that morality is concerned. Whether external + force hinders or fails to hinder the will from working does not in the + least matter. For morality the external world is real only in so far as it + is able or unable to lead and influence the will. As soon as the will is + determined, that is, as soon as a resolve is taken, the external world and + its events are of no further moment and practical do not exist. For if the + events of the world had any such reality—that is to say, if they + possessed a significance in themselves, or any other than that derived + from the will which is affected by them—what a grievance it would be + that all these events lie in the realm of chance and error! It is, + however, just this which proves that the important thing is not what + happens, but what is willed. Accordingly, let the incidents of life be + left to the play of chance and error, to demonstrate to man that he is as + chaff before the wind. + </p> + <p> + The State concerns itself only with the incidents—with what happens; + nothing else has any reality for it. I may dwell upon thoughts of murder + and poison as much as I please: the State does not forbid me, so long as + the axe and rope control my will, and prevent it from becoming action. + </p> + <p> + Ethics asks: What are the duties towards others which justice imposes upon + us? in other words, What must I render? The Law of Nature asks: What need + I not submit to from others? that is, What must I suffer? The question is + put, not that I may do no injustice, but that I may not do more than every + man must do if he is to safeguard his existence, and than every man will + approve being done, in order that he may be treated in the same way + himself; and, further, that I may not do more than society will permit me + to do. The same answer will serve for both questions, just as the same + straight line can be drawn from either of two opposite directions, namely, + by opposing forces; or, again, as the angle can give the sine, or the sine + the angle. + </p> + <p> + It has been said that the historian is an inverted prophet. In the same + way it may be said that a teacher of law is an inverted moralist (<i>viz</i>., + a teacher of the duties of justice), or that politics are inverted ethics, + if we exclude the thought that ethics also teaches the duty of + benevolence, magnanimity, love, and so on. The State is the Gordian knot + that is cut instead of being untied; it is Columbus' egg which is made to + stand by being broken instead of balanced, as though the business in + question were to make it stand rather than to balance it. In this respect + the State is like the man who thinks that he can produce fine weather by + making the barometer go up. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + The pseudo-philosophers of our age tell us that it is the object of the + State to promote the moral aims of mankind. This is not true; it is rather + the contrary which is true. The aim for which mankind exists—the + expression is parabolic—is not that a man should act in such and + such a manner; for all <i>opera operata</i>, things that have actually + been done, are in themselves matters of indifference. No! the aim is that + the Will, of which every man is a complete specimen—nay, is the very + Will itself—should turn whither it needs to turn; that the man + himself (the union of Thought and Will) should perceive what this will is, + and what horrors it contains; that he should show the reflection of + himself in his own deeds, in the abomination of them. The State, which is + wholly concerned with the general welfare, checks the manifestation of the + bad will, but in no wise checks the will itself; the attempt would be + impossible. It is because the State checks the manifestation of his will + that a man very seldom sees the whole abomination of his nature in the + mirror of his deeds. Or does the reader actually suppose there are no + people in the world as bad as Robespierre, Napoleon, or other murderers? + Does he fail to see that there are many who would act like them if only + they could? + </p> + <p> + Many a criminal dies more quietly on the scaffold than many a non-criminal + in the arms of his family. The one has perceived what his will is and has + discarded it. The other has not been able to discard it, because he has + never been able to perceive what it is. The aim of the State is to produce + a fool's paradise, and this is in direct conflict with the true aim of + life, namely, to attain a knowledge of what the will, in its horrible + nature, really is. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + Napoleon was not really worse than many, not to say most, men. He was + possessed of the very ordinary egoism that seeks its welfare at the + expense of others. What distinguished him was merely the greater power he + had of satisfying his will, and greater intelligence, reason and courage; + added to which, chance gave him a favourable scope for his operations. By + means of all this he did for his egoism what a thousand other men would + like to do for theirs, but cannot. Every feeble lad who by little acts of + villainy gains a small advantage for himself by putting others to some + disadvantage, although it may be equally small, is just as bad as + Napoleon. + </p> + <p> + Those who fancy that retribution comes after death would demand that + Napoleon should by unutterable torments pay the penalty for all the + numberless calamities that he caused. But he is no more culpable than all + those who possess the same will, unaccompanied by the same power. + </p> + <p> + The circumstance that in his case this extraordinary power was added + allowed him to reveal the whole wickedness of the human will; and the + sufferings of his age, as the necessary obverse of the medal, reveal the + misery which is inextricably bound up with this bad will. It is the + general manipulation of this will that constitutes the world. But it is + precisely that it should be understood how inextricably the will to live + is bound up with, and is really one and the same as, this unspeakable + misery, that is the world's aim and purpose; and it is an aim and purpose + which the appearance of Napoleon did much to assist. Not to be an + unmeaning fools' paradise but a tragedy, in which the will to live + understands itself and yields—that is the object for which the world + exists. Napoleon is only an enormous mirror of the will to live. + </p> + <p> + The difference between the man who causes suffering and the man who + suffers it, is only phenomenal. It is all a will to live, identical with + great suffering; and it is only by understanding this that the will can + mend and end. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + What chiefly distinguishes ancient from modern times is that in ancient + times, to use Napoleon's expression, it was affairs that reigned: <i>les + paroles aux choses</i>. In modern times this is not so. What I mean is + that in ancient times the character of public life, of the State, and of + Religion, as well as of private life, was a strenuous affirmation of the + will to live. In modern times it is a denial of this will, for such is the + character of Christianity. But now while on the one hand that denial has + suffered some abatement even in public opinion, because it is too + repugnant to human character, on the other what is publicly denied is + secretly affirmed. Hence it is that we see half measures and falsehood + everywhere; and that is why modern times look so small beside antiquity. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + The structure of human society is like a pendulum swinging between two + impulses, two evils in polar opposition, <i>despotism</i> and <i>anarchy</i>. + The further it gets from the one, the nearer it approaches the other. From + this the reader might hit on the thought that if it were exactly midway + between the two, it would be right. Far from it. For these two evils are + by no means equally bad and dangerous. The former is incomparably less to + be feared; its ills exist in the main only as possibilities, and if they + come at all it is only one among millions that they touch. But, with + anarchy, possibility and actuality are inseparable; its blows fall on + every man every day. Therefore every constitution should be a nearer + approach to a despotism than to anarchy; nay, it must contain a small + possibility of despotism. + </p> + <div style="height: 6em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10739 ***</div> +</body> +</html> |