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diff --git a/10739-0.txt b/10739-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..85cf8e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/10739-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3165 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10739 *** + +THE ESSAYS + +OF + +ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER + +TRANSLATED BY + +T. BAILEY SAUNDERS, M.A. + + + + +ON HUMAN NATURE. + + + + +CONTENTS. + + HUMAN NATURE + GOVERNMENT + FREE-WILL AND FATALISM + CHARACTER + MORAL INSTINCT + ETHICAL REFLECTIONS + + + + +TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. + +The following essays are drawn from the chapters entitled _Zur Ethik_ +and _Zur Rechtslehre und Politik_ which are to be found both in +Schopenhauer's _Parerga_ and in his posthumous writings. As in my +previous volumes, so also in this, I have omitted a few passages which +appeared to me to be either antiquated or no longer of any general +interest. For convenience' sake I have divided the original chapters +into sections, which I have had to name; and I have also had to invent +a title which should express their real scope. The reader will find +that it is not so much _Ethics_ and _Politics_ that are here treated, +as human nature itself in various aspects. + +T.B.S. + + + + +HUMAN NATURE. + + +Truths of the physical order may possess much external significance, +but internal significance they have none. The latter is the privilege +of intellectual and moral truths, which are concerned with the +objectivation of the will in its highest stages, whereas physical +truths are concerned with it in its lowest. + +For example, if we could establish the truth of what up till now is +only a conjecture, namely, that it is the action of the sun which +produces thermoelectricity at the equator; that this produces +terrestrial magnetism; and that this magnetism, again, is the cause of +the _aurora borealis_, these would be truths externally of great, but +internally of little, significance. On the other hand, examples +of internal significance are furnished by all great and true +philosophical systems; by the catastrophe of every good tragedy; nay, +even by the observation of human conduct in the extreme manifestations +of its morality and immorality, of its good and its evil character. +For all these are expressions of that reality which takes outward +shape as the world, and which, in the highest stages of its +objectivation, proclaims its innermost nature. + +To say that the world has only a physical and not a moral significance +is the greatest and most pernicious of all errors, the fundamental +blunder, the real perversity of mind and temper; and, at bottom, it +is doubtless the tendency which faith personifies as Anti-Christ. +Nevertheless, in spite of all religions--and they are systems which +one and all maintain the opposite, and seek to establish it in their +mythical way--this fundamental error never becomes quite extinct, but +raises its head from time to time afresh, until universal indignation +compels it to hide itself once more. + +Yet, however certain we may feel of the moral significance of life +and the world, to explain and illustrate it, and to resolve the +contradiction between this significance and the world as it is, form +a task of great difficulty; so great, indeed, as to make it possible +that it has remained for me to exhibit the true and only genuine +and sound basis of morality everywhere and at all times effective, +together with the results to which it leads. The actual facts of +morality are too much on my side for me to fear that my theory can +ever be replaced or upset by any other. + +However, so long as even my ethical system continues to be ignored by +the professorial world, it is Kant's moral principle that prevails in +the universities. Among its various forms the one which is most in +favour at present is "the dignity of man." I have already exposed +the absurdity of this doctrine in my treatise on the _Foundation of +Morality_.[1] Therefore I will only say here that if the question were +asked on what the alleged dignity of man rests, it would not be long +before the answer was made that it rests upon his morality. In other +words, his morality rests upon his dignity, and his dignity rests upon +his morality. + +[Footnote 1: § 8.] + +But apart from this circular argument it seems to me that the idea of +dignity can be applied only in an ironical sense to a being whose will +is so sinful, whose intellect is so limited, whose body is so weak and +perishable as man's. How shall a man be proud, when his conception +is a crime, his birth a penalty, his life a labour, and death a +necessity!-- + + _Quid superbit homo? cujus conceptio culpa, + Nasci poena, labor vita, necesse mori_! + +Therefore, in opposition to the above-mentioned form of the Kantian +principle, I should be inclined to lay down the following rule: When +you come into contact with a man, no matter whom, do not attempt an +objective appreciation of him according to his worth and dignity. Do +not consider his bad will, or his narrow understanding and perverse +ideas; as the former may easily lead you to hate and the latter to +despise him; but fix your attention only upon his sufferings, his +needs, his anxieties, his pains. Then you will always feel your +kinship with him; you will sympathise with him; and instead of hatred +or contempt you will experience the commiseration that alone is the +peace to which the Gospel calls us. The way to keep down hatred and +contempt is certainly not to look for a man's alleged "dignity," but, +on the contrary, to regard him as an object of pity. + +The Buddhists, as the result of the more profound views which they +entertain on ethical and metaphysical subjects, start from the +cardinal vices and not the cardinal virtues; since the virtues make +their appearance only as the contraries or negations of the vices. +According to Schmidt's _History of the Eastern Mongolians_ the +cardinal vices in the Buddhist scheme are four: Lust, Indolence, +Anger, and Avarice. But probably instead of Indolence, we should read +Pride; for so it stands in the _Lettres édifiantes et curieuses_,[1] +where Envy, or Hatred, is added as a fifth. I am confirmed in +correcting the statement of the excellent Schmidt by the fact that my +rendering agrees with the doctrine of the Sufis, who are certainly +under the influence of the Brahmins and Buddhists. The Sufis also +maintain that there are four cardinal vices, and they arrange them in +very striking pairs, so that Lust appears in connection with Avarice, +and Anger with Pride. The four cardinal virtues opposed to them would +be Chastity and Generosity, together with Gentleness and Humility. + +[Footnote 1: Edit, of 1819, vol. vi., p. 372.] + +When we compare these profound ideas of morality, as they are +entertained by oriental nations, with the celebrated cardinal virtues +of Plato, which have been recapitulated again and again--Justice, +Valour, Temperance, and Wisdom--it is plain that the latter are not +based on any clear, leading idea, but are chosen on grounds that are +superficial and, in part, obviously false. Virtues must be qualities +of the will, but Wisdom is chiefly an attribute of the Intellect. +[Greek: Sophrosynae], which Cicero translates _Temperantia_, is a very +indefinite and ambiguous word, and it admits, therefore, of a variety +of applications: it may mean discretion, or abstinence, or keeping a +level head. Courage is not a virtue at all; although sometimes it is a +servant or instrument of virtue; but it is just as ready to become +the servant of the greatest villainy. It is really a quality of +temperament. Even Geulinx (in the preface to this _Ethics_) condemned +the Platonic virtues and put the following in their place: Diligence, +Obedience, Justice and Humility; which are obviously bad. The Chinese +distinguish five cardinal virtues: Sympathy, Justice, Propriety, +Wisdom, and Sincerity. The virtues of Christianity are theological, +not cardinal: Faith, Love, and Hope. + +Fundamental disposition towards others, assuming the character either +of Envy or of Sympathy, is the point at which the moral virtues and +vices of mankind first diverge. These two diametrically opposite +qualities exist in every man; for they spring from the inevitable +comparison which he draws between his own lot and that of others. +According as the result of this comparison affects his individual +character does the one or the other of these qualities become the +source and principle of all his action. Envy builds the wall between +_Thee_ and _Me_ thicker and stronger; Sympathy makes it slight and +transparent; nay, sometimes it pulls down the wall altogether; and +then the distinction between self and not-self vanishes. + +Valour, which has been mentioned as a virtue, or rather the Courage +on which it is based (for valour is only courage in war), deserves a +closer examination. The ancients reckoned Courage among the virtues, +and cowardice among the vices; but there is no corresponding idea in +the Christian scheme, which makes for charity and patience, and in its +teaching forbids all enmity or even resistance. The result is that +with the moderns Courage is no longer a virtue. Nevertheless it must +be admitted that cowardice does not seem to be very compatible with +any nobility of character--if only for the reason that it betrays an +overgreat apprehension about one's own person. + +Courage, however, may also be explained as a readiness to meet ills +that threaten at the moment, in order to avoid greater ills that +lie in the future; whereas cowardice does the contrary. But this +readiness is of the same quality as _patience_, for patience consists +in the clear consciousness that greater evils than those which are +present, and that any violent attempt to flee from or guard against +the ills we have may bring the others upon us. Courage, then, would +be a kind of patience; and since it is patience that enables us to +practise forbearance and self control, Courage is, through the medium +of patience, at least akin to virtue. + +But perhaps Courage admits of being considered from a higher point of +view. The fear of death may in every case be traced to a deficiency +in that natural philosophy--natural, and therefore resting on mere +feeling--which gives a man the assurance that he exists in everything +outside him just as much as in his own person; so that the death of +his person can do him little harm. But it is just this very assurance +that would give a man heroic Courage; and therefore, as the reader +will recollect from my _Ethics_, Courage comes from the same source as +the virtues of Justice and Humanity. This is, I admit, to take a very +high view of the matter; but apart from it I cannot well explain why +cowardice seems contemptible, and personal courage a noble and sublime +thing; for no lower point of view enables me to see why a finite +individual who is everything to himself--nay, who is himself even +the very fundamental condition of the existence of the rest of the +world--should not put his own preservation above every other aim. It +is, then, an insufficient explanation of Courage to make it rest +only on utility, to give it an empirical and not a transcendental +character. It may have been for some such reason that Calderon once +uttered a sceptical but remarkable opinion in regard to Courage, nay, +actually denied its reality; and put his denial into the mouth of a +wise old minister, addressing his young sovereign. "Although," he +observed, "natural fear is operative in all alike, a man may be brave +in not letting it be seen; and it is this that constitutes Courage": + + _Que aunque el natural temor + En todos obra igualmente, + No mostrarle es ser valiente + Y esto es lo que hace el valor_.[1] + +[Footnote 1: _La Hija del Aire_, ii., 2.] + +In regard to the difference which I have mentioned between the +ancients and the moderns in their estimate of Courage as a virtue, +it must be remembered that by Virtue, _virtus_, [Greek: aretae], the +ancients understood every excellence or quality that was praiseworthy +in itself, it might be moral or intellectual, or possibly only +physical. But when Christianity demonstrated that the fundamental +tendency of life was moral, it was moral superiority alone than +henceforth attached to the notion of Virtue. Meanwhile the earlier +usage still survived in the elder Latinists, and also in Italian +writers, as is proved by the well-known meaning of the word +_virtuoso_. The special attention of students should be drawn to this +wider range of the idea of Virtue amongst the ancients, as otherwise +it might easily be a source of secret perplexity. I may recommend two +passages preserved for us by Stobaeus, which will serve this purpose. +One of them is apparently from the Pythagorean philosopher Metopos, in +which the fitness of every bodily member is declared to be a virtue. +The other pronounces that the virtue of a shoemaker is to make good +shoes. This may also serve to explain why it is that in the ancient +scheme of ethics virtues and vices are mentioned which find no place +in ours. + +As the place of Courage amongst the virtues is a matter of doubt, +so is that of Avarice amongst the vices. It must not, however, be +confounded with greed, which is the most immediate meaning of the +Latin word _avaritia_. Let us then draw up and examine the arguments +_pro et contra_ in regard to Avarice, and leave the final judgment to +be formed by every man for himself. + +On the one hand it is argued that it is not Avarice which is a vice, +but extravagance, its opposite. Extravagance springs from a brutish +limitation to the present moment, in comparison with which the future, +existing as it does only in thought, is as nothing. It rests upon the +illusion that sensual pleasures possess a positive or real value. +Accordingly, future need and misery is the price at which the +spendthrift purchases pleasures that are empty, fleeting, and often no +more than imaginary; or else feeds his vain, stupid self-conceit on +the bows and scrapes of parasites who laugh at him in secret, or on +the gaze of the mob and those who envy his magnificence. We should, +therefore, shun the spendthrift as though he had the plague, and on +discovering his vice break with him betimes, in order that later on, +when the consequences of his extravagance ensue, we may neither have +to help to bear them, nor, on the other hand, have to play the part of +the friends of Timon of Athens. + +At the same time it is not to be expected that he who foolishly +squanders his own fortune will leave another man's intact, if it +should chance to be committed to his keeping; nay, _sui profusus_ and +_alieni appetens_ are by Sallust very rightly conjoined. Hence it is +that extravagance leads not only to impoverishment but also to crime; +and crime amongst the moneyed classes is almost always the result of +extravagance. It is accordingly with justice that the _Koran_ declares +all spendthrifts to be "brothers of Satan." + +But it is superfluity that Avarice brings in its train, and when was +superfluity ever unwelcome? That must be a good vice which has good +consequences. Avarice proceeds upon the principle that all pleasure is +only negative in its operation and that the happiness which consists +of a series of pleasures is a chimaera; that, on the contrary, it +is pains which are positive and extremely real. Accordingly, the +avaricious man foregoes the former in order that he may be the +better preserved from the latter, and thus it is that _bear and +forbear_--_sustine et abstine_--is his maxim. And because he knows, +further, how inexhaustible are the possibilities of misfortune, +and how innumerable the paths of danger, he increases the means of +avoiding them, in order, if possible, to surround himself with a +triple wall of protection. Who, then, can say where precaution against +disaster begins to be exaggerated? He alone who knows where the +malignity of fate reaches its limit. And even if precaution were +exaggerated it is an error which at the most would hurt the man who +took it, and not others. If he will never need the treasures which he +lays up for himself, they will one day benefit others whom nature +has made less careful. That until then he withdraws the money +from circulation is no misfortune; for money is not an article of +consumption: it only represents the good things which a man may +actually possess, and is not one itself. Coins are only counters; +their value is what they represent; and what they represent cannot be +withdrawn from circulation. Moreover, by holding back the money, +the value of the remainder which is in circulation is enhanced by +precisely the same amount. Even though it be the case, as is said, +that many a miser comes in the end to love money itself for its own +sake, it is equally certain that many a spendthrift, on the other +hand, loves spending and squandering for no better reason. Friendship +with a miser is not only without danger, but it is profitable, because +of the great advantages it can bring. For it is doubtless those who +are nearest and dearest to the miser who on his death will reap +the fruits of the self-control which he exercised; but even in his +lifetime, too, something may be expected of him in cases of great +need. At any rate one can always hope for more from him than from the +spendthrift, who has lost his all and is himself helpless and in debt. +_Mas da el duro que el desnudo_, says a Spanish proverb; the man who +has a hard heart will give more than the man who has an empty purse. +The upshot of all this is that Avarice is not a vice. + +On the other side, it may be said that Avarice is the quintessence of +all vices. When physical pleasures seduce a man from the right path, +it is his sensual nature--the animal part of him--which is at fault. +He is carried away by its attractions, and, overcome by the impression +of the moment, he acts without thinking of the consequences. When, +on the other hand, he is brought by age or bodily weakness to the +condition in which the vices that he could never abandon end by +abandoning him, and his capacity for physical pleasure dies--if he +turns to Avarice, the intellectual desire survives the sensual. Money, +which represents all the good things of this world, and is these good +things in the abstract, now becomes the dry trunk overgrown with all +the dead lusts of the flesh, which are egoism in the abstract. They +come to life again in the love of the Mammon. The transient pleasure +of the senses has become a deliberate and calculated lust of money, +which, like that to which it is directed, is symbolical in its nature, +and, like it, indestructible. + +This obstinate love of the pleasures of the world--a love which, as it +were, outlives itself; this utterly incorrigible sin, this refined +and sublimated desire of the flesh, is the abstract form in which all +lusts are concentrated, and to which it stands like a general idea to +individual particulars. Accordingly, Avarice is the vice of age, just +as extravagance is the vice of youth. + +This _disputatio in utramque partem_--this debate for and against--is +certainly calculated to drive us into accepting the _juste milieu_ +morality of Aristotle; a conclusion that is also supported by the +following consideration. + +Every human perfection is allied to a defect into which it threatens +to pass; but it is also true that every defect is allied to a +perfection. Hence it is that if, as often happens, we make a mistake +about a man, it is because at the beginning of our acquaintance with +him we confound his defects with the kinds of perfection to which they +are allied. The cautious man seems to us a coward; the economical man, +a miser; the spendthrift seems liberal; the rude fellow, downright and +sincere; the foolhardy person looks as if he were going to work with a +noble self-confidence; and so on in many other cases. + + * * * * * + +No one can live among men without feeling drawn again and again to the +tempting supposition that moral baseness and intellectual incapacity +are closely connected, as though they both sprang direct from one +source. That that, however, is not so, I have shown in detail.[1] That +it seems to be so is merely due to the fact that both are so often +found together; and the circumstance is to be explained by the very +frequent occurrence of each of them, so that it may easily happen for +both to be compelled to live under one roof. At the same time it is +not to be denied that they play into each other's hands to their +mutual benefit; and it is this that produces the very unedifying +spectacle which only too many men exhibit, and that makes the world to +go as it goes. A man who is unintelligent is very likely to show his +perfidy, villainy and malice; whereas a clever man understands how +to conceal these qualities. And how often, on the other hand, does +a perversity of heart prevent a man from seeing truths which his +intelligence is quite capable of grasping! + +[Footnote 1: In my chief work, vol. ii., ch. xix,] + +Nevertheless, let no one boast. Just as every man, though he be the +greatest genius, has very definite limitations in some one sphere of +knowledge, and thus attests his common origin with the essentially +perverse and stupid mass of mankind, so also has every man something +in his nature which is positively evil. Even the best, nay the +noblest, character will sometimes surprise us by isolated traits of +depravity; as though it were to acknowledge his kinship with the human +race, in which villainy--nay, cruelty--is to be found in that degree. +For it was just in virtue of this evil in him, this bad principle, +that of necessity he became a man. And for the same reason the world +in general is what my clear mirror of it has shown it to be. + +But in spite of all this the difference even between one man and +another is incalculably great, and many a one would be horrified to +see another as he really is. Oh, for some Asmodeus of morality, to +make not only roofs and walls transparent to his favourites, but +also to lift the veil of dissimulation, fraud, hypocrisy, pretence, +falsehood and deception, which is spread over all things! to show how +little true honesty there is in the world, and how often, even where +it is least to be expected, behind all the exterior outwork of virtue, +secretly and in the innermost recesses, unrighteousness sits at the +helm! It is just on this account that so many men of the better kind +have four-footed friends: for, to be sure, how is a man to get relief +from the endless dissimulation, falsity and malice of mankind, if +there were no dogs into whose honest faces he can look without +distrust? + +For what is our civilised world but a big masquerade? where you meet +knights, priests, soldiers, men of learning, barristers, clergymen, +philosophers, and I don't know what all! But they are not what they +pretend to be; they are only masks, and, as a rule, behind the masks +you will find moneymakers. One man, I suppose, puts on the mask of +law, which he has borrowed for the purpose from a barrister, only in +order to be able to give another man a sound drubbing; a second has +chosen the mask of patriotism and the public welfare with a similar +intent; a third takes religion or purity of doctrine. For all sorts +of purposes men have often put on the mask of philosophy, and even +of philanthropy, and I know not what besides. Women have a smaller +choice. As a rule they avail themselves of the mask of morality, +modesty, domesticity, and humility. Then there are general masks, +without any particular character attaching to them like dominoes. They +may be met with everywhere; and of this sort is the strict rectitude, +the courtesy, the sincere sympathy, the smiling friendship, that +people profess. The whole of these masks as a rule are merely, as I +have said, a disguise for some industry, commerce, or speculation. It +is merchants alone who in this respect constitute any honest class. +They are the only people who give themselves out to be what they are; +and therefore they go about without any mask at all, and consequently +take a humble rank. + +It is very necessary that a man should be apprised early in life that +it is a masquerade in which he finds himself. For otherwise there are +many things which he will fail to understand and put up with, nay, at +which he will be completely puzzled, and that man longest of all whose +heart is made of better clay-- + + _Et meliore luto finxit praecordia Titan.[1]_ + +[Footnote 1: Juvenal, _Sat_. 14, 34] + +Such for instance is the favour that villainy finds; the neglect that +merit, even the rarest and the greatest, suffers at the hands of those +of the same profession; the hatred of truth and great capacity; the +ignorance of scholars in their own province; and the fact that true +wares are almost always despised and the merely specious ones in +request. Therefore let even the young be instructed betimes that in +this masquerade the apples are of wax, the flowers of silk, the fish +of pasteboard, and that all things--yes, all things--are toys and +trifles; and that of two men whom he may see earnestly engaged in +business, one is supplying spurious goods and the other paying for +them in false coin. + +But there are more serious reflections to be made, and worse things to +be recorded. Man is at bottom a savage, horrible beast. We know it, +if only in the business of taming and restraining him which we call +civilisation. Hence it is that we are terrified if now and then his +nature breaks out. Wherever and whenever the locks and chains of law +and order fall off and give place to anarchy, he shows himself for +what he is. But it is unnecessary to wait for anarchy in order to gain +enlightenment on this subject. A hundred records, old and new, produce +the conviction that in his unrelenting cruelty man is in no way +inferior to the tiger and the hyaena. A forcible example is supplied +by a publication of the year 1841 entitled _Slavery and the Internal +Slave Trade in the United States of North America: being replies to +questions transmitted by the British Anti-slavery Society to the +American Anti-slavery Society_.[1] This book constitutes one of the +heaviest indictments against the human race. No one can put it down +with a feeling of horror, and few without tears. For whatever the +reader may have ever heard, or imagined, or dreamt, of the unhappy +condition of slavery, or indeed of human cruelty in general, it will +seem small to him when he reads of the way in which those devils +in human form, those bigoted, church-going, strictly Sabbatarian +rascals--and in particular the Anglican priests among them--treated +their innocent black brothers, who by wrong and violence had got into +their diabolical clutches. + +[Footnote 1: _Translator's 'Note_.--If Schopenhauer were writing +to-day, he would with equal truth point to the miseries of the African +trade. I have slightly abridged this passage, as some of the evils +against which he protested no longer exist.] + +Other examples are furnished by Tshudi's _Travels in Peru_, in the +description which he gives of the treatment of the Peruvian soldiers +at the hands of their officers; and by Macleod's _Travels in Eastern +Africa_, where the author tells of the cold-blooded and truly devilish +cruelty with which the Portuguese in Mozambique treat their slaves. +But we need not go for examples to the New World, that obverse side of +our planet. In the year 1848 it was brought to life that in England, +not in one, but apparently in a hundred cases within a brief period, a +husband had poisoned his wife or _vice versâ_, or both had joined in +poisoning their children, or in torturing them slowly to death by +starving and ill-treating them, with no other object than to get the +money for burying them which they had insured in the Burial Clubs +against their death. For this purpose a child was often insured in +several, even in as many as twenty clubs at once.[1] + +[Footnote 1: Cf. _The Times_, 20th, 22nd and 23rd Sept., 1848, and +also 12th Dec., 1853.] + +Details of this character belong, indeed, to the blackest pages in the +criminal records of humanity. But, when all is said, it is the +inward and innate character of man, this god _par excellence_ of the +Pantheists, from which they and everything like them proceed. In every +man there dwells, first and foremost, a colossal egoism, which breaks +the bounds of right and justice with the greatest freedom, as everyday +life shows on a small scale, and as history on every page of it on a +large. Does not the recognised need of a balance of power in Europe, +with the anxious way in which it is preserved, demonstrate that man +is a beast of prey, who no sooner sees a weaker man near him than he +falls upon him without fail? and does not the same hold good of the +affairs of ordinary life? + +But to the boundless egoism of our nature there is joined more or +less in every human breast a fund of hatred, anger, envy, rancour and +malice, accumulated like the venom in a serpent's tooth, and waiting +only for an opportunity of venting itself, and then, like a demon +unchained, of storming and raging. If a man has no great occasion for +breaking out, he will end by taking advantage of the smallest, and by +working it up into something great by the aid of his imagination; for, +however small it may be, it is enough to rouse his anger-- + + _Quantulacunque adeo est occasio, sufficit irae[1]_-- + +[Footnote 1: Juvenal, _Sat_. 13, 183.] + +and then he will carry it as far as he can and may. We see this in +daily life, where such outbursts are well known under the name of +"venting one's gall on something." It will also have been observed +that if such outbursts meet with no opposition the subject of them +feels decidedly the better for them afterwards. That anger is +not without its pleasure is a truth that was recorded even by +Aristotle;[1] and he quotes a passage from Homer, who declares anger +to be sweeter than honey. But not in anger alone--in hatred too, which +stands to anger like a chronic to an acute disease, a man may indulge +with the greatest delight: + +[Footnote 1: _Rhet_., i., 11; ii., 2.] + + _Now hatred is by far the longest pleasure, + Men love in haste, but they detest at leisure_[1] + +[Footnote 1: Byron _Don Juan_, c. xiii, 6.] + +Gobineau in his work _Les Races Humaines_ has called man _l'animal +méchant par excellence_. People take this very ill, because they feel +that it hits them; but he is quite right, for man is the only animal +which causes pain to others without any further purpose than just to +cause it. Other animals never do it except to satisfy their hunger, or +in the rage of combat. If it is said against the tiger that he kills +more than eats, he strangles his prey only for the purpose of eating +it; and if he cannot eat it, the only explanation is, as the French +phrase has it, that _ses yeux sont plus grands que son estomac_. No +animal ever torments another for the mere purpose of tormenting, but +man does it, and it is this that constitutes the diabolical feature in +his character which is so much worse than the merely animal. I have +already spoken of the matter in its broad aspect; but it is manifest +even in small things, and every reader has a daily opportunity +of observing it. For instance, if two little dogs are playing +together--and what a genial and charming sight it is--and a child of +three or four years joins them, it is almost inevitable for it to +begin hitting them with a whip or stick, and thereby show itself, even +at that age, _l'animal méchant par excellence_. The love of teasing +and playing tricks, which is common enough, may be traced to the same +source. For instance, if a man has expressed his annoyance at any +interruption or other petty inconvenience, there will be no lack of +people who for that very reason will bring it about: _animal méchant +par excellence_! This is so certain that a man should be careful not +to express any annoyance at small evils. On the other hand he should +also be careful not to express his pleasure at any trifle, for, if +he does so, men will act like the jailer who, when he found that his +prisoner had performed the laborious task of taming a spider, and took +a pleasure in watching it, immediately crushed it under his foot: +_l'animal méchant par excellence_! This is why all animals are +instinctively afraid of the sight, or even of the track of a man, that +_animal méchant par excellence_! nor does their instinct them false; +for it is man alone who hunts game for which he has no use and which +does him no harm. + +It is a fact, then, that in the heart of every man there lies a wild +beast which only waits for an opportunity to storm and rage, in its +desire to inflict pain on others, or, if they stand in his way, to +kill them. It is this which is the source of all the lust of war and +battle. In trying to tame and to some extent hold it in check, the +intelligence, its appointed keeper, has always enough to do. People +may, if they please, call it the radical evil of human nature--a +name which will at least serve those with whom a word stands for an +explanation. I say, however, that it is the will to live, which, more +and more embittered by the constant sufferings of existence, seeks to +alleviate its own torment by causing torment in others. But in this +way a man gradually develops in himself real cruelty and malice. The +observation may also be added that as, according to Kant, matter +subsists only through the antagonism of the powers of expansion and +contraction, so human society subsists only by the antagonism of +hatred, or anger, and fear. For there is a moment in the life of +all of us when the malignity of our nature might perhaps make us +murderers, if it were not accompanied by a due admixture of fear to +keep it within bounds; and this fear, again, would make a man the +sport and laughing stock of every boy, if anger were not lying ready +in him, and keeping watch. + +But it is _Schadenfreude_, a mischievous delight in the misfortunes of +others, which remains the worst trait in human nature. It is a feeling +which is closely akin to cruelty, and differs from it, to say the +truth, only as theory from practice. In general, it may be said of it +that it takes the place which pity ought to take--pity which is its +opposite, and the true source of all real justice and charity. + +_Envy_ is also opposed to pity, but in another sense; envy, that is +to say, is produced by a cause directly antagonistic to that which +produces the delight in mischief. The opposition between pity and envy +on the one hand, and pity and the delight in mischief on the other, +rests, in the main, on the occasions which call them forth. In the +case of envy it is only as a direct effect of the cause which excites +it that we feel it at all. That is just the reason why envy, although +it is a reprehensible feeling, still admits of some excuse, and is, +in general, a very human quality; whereas the delight in mischief is +diabolical, and its taunts are the laughter of hell. + +The delight in mischief, as I have said, takes the place which pity +ought to take. Envy, on the contrary, finds a place only where there +is no inducement to pity, or rather an inducement to its opposite; and +it is just as this opposite that envy arises in the human breast; and +so far, therefore, it may still be reckoned a human sentiment. Nay, I +am afraid that no one will be found to be entirely free from it. For +that a man should feel his own lack of things more bitterly at the +sight of another's delight in the enjoyment of them, is natural; nay, +it is inevitable; but this should not rouse his hatred of the man who +is happier than himself. It is just this hatred, however, in which +true envy consists. Least of all should a man be envious, when it is a +question, not of the gifts of fortune, or chance, or another's favour, +but of the gifts of nature; because everything that is innate in a man +rests on a metaphysical basis, and possesses justification of a higher +kind; it is, so to speak, given him by Divine grace. But, unhappily, +it is just in the case of personal advantages that envy is most +irreconcilable. Thus it is that intelligence, or even genius, cannot +get on in the world without begging pardon for its existence, wherever +it is not in a position to be able, proudly and boldly, to despise the +world. + +In other words, if envy is aroused only by wealth, rank, or power, +it is often kept down by egoism, which perceives that, on occasion, +assistance, enjoyment, support, protection, advancement, and so +on, may be hoped for from the object of envy or that at least by +intercourse with him a man may himself win honour from the reflected +light of his superiority; and here, too, there is the hope of one day +attaining all those advantages himself. On the other hand, in the envy +that is directed to natural gifts and personal advantages, like beauty +in women, or intelligence in men, there is no consolation or hope of +one kind or the other; so that nothing remains but to indulge a +bitter and irreconcilable hatred of the person who possesses these +privileges; and hence the only remaining desire is to take vengeance +on him. + +But here the envious man finds himself in an unfortunate position; for +all his blows fall powerless as soon as it is known that they come +from him. Accordingly he hides his feelings as carefully as if they +were secret sins, and so becomes an inexhaustible inventor of tricks +and artifices and devices for concealing and masking his procedure, +in order that, unperceived, he may wound the object of his envy. For +instance, with an air of the utmost unconcern he will ignore the +advantages which are eating his heart out; he will neither see them, +nor know them, nor have observed or even heard of them, and thus make +himself a master in the art of dissimulation. With great cunning he +will completely overlook the man whose brilliant qualities are gnawing +at his heart, and act as though he were quite an unimportant person; +he will take no notice of him, and, on occasion, will have even quite +forgotten his existence. But at the same time he will before all +things endeavour by secret machination carefully to deprive those +advantages of any opportunity of showing themselves and becoming +known. Then out of his dark corner he will attack these qualities with +censure, mockery, ridicule and calumny, like the toad which spurts +its poison from a hole. No less will he enthusiastically praise +unimportant people, or even indifferent or bad performances in the +same sphere. In short, he will becomes a Proteas in stratagem, in +order to wound others without showing himself. But what is the use +of it? The trained eye recognises him in spite of it all. He betrays +himself, if by nothing else, by the way in which he timidly avoids +and flies from the object of his envy, who stands the more completely +alone, the more brilliant he is; and this is the reason why pretty +girls have no friends of their own sex. He betrays himself, too, by +the causeless hatred which he shows--a hatred which finds vent in a +violent explosion at any circumstance however trivial, though it is +often only the product of his imagination. How many such men there are +in the world may be recognised by the universal praise of modesty, +that is, of a virtue invented on behalf of dull and commonplace +people. Nevertheless, it is a virtue which, by exhibiting the +necessity for dealing considerately with the wretched plight of these +people, is just what calls attention to it. + +For our self-consciousness and our pride there can be nothing more +flattering than the sight of envy lurking in its retreat and plotting +its schemes; but never let a man forget that where there is envy there +is hatred, and let him be careful not to make a false friend out of +any envious person. Therefore it is important to our safety to lay +envy bare; and a man should study to discover its tricks, as it is +everywhere to be found and always goes about _incognito_; or as I +have said, like a venomous toad it lurks in dark corners. It deserves +neither quarter nor sympathy; but as we can never reconcile it let our +rule of conduct be to scorn it with a good heart, and as our happiness +and glory is torture to it we may rejoice in its sufferings: + + _Den Neid wirst nimmer du versöhnen; + So magst du ihn getrost verhöhnen. + Dein Glück, dein Ruhm ist ihm ein Leiden: + Magst drum an seiner Quaal dich weiden_. + +We have been taking a look at the _depravity_ of man, and it is a +sight which may well fill us with horror. But now we must cast our +eyes on the _misery_ of his existence; and when we have done so, and +are horrified by that too, we must look back again at his depravity. +We shall then find that they hold the balance to each other. We shall +perceive the eternal justice of things; for we shall recognise that +the world is itself the Last Judgment on it, and we shall begin to +understand why it is that everything that lives must pay the penalty +of its existence, first in living and then in dying. Thus the evil +of the penalty accords with the evil of the sin--_malum poenae_ with +_malum culpae_. From the same point of view we lose our indignation at +that intellectual incapacity of the great majority of mankind which in +life so often disgusts us. In this _Sansara_, as the Buddhists call +it, human misery, human depravity and human folly correspond with one +another perfectly, and they are of like magnitude. But if, on some +special inducement, we direct our gaze to one of them, and survey it +in particular, it seems to exceed the other two. This, however, is an +illusion, and merely the effect of their colossal range. + +All things proclaim this _Sansara_; more than all else, the world of +mankind; in which, from a moral point of view, villainy and baseness, +and from an intellectual point of view, incapacity and stupidity, +prevail to a horrifying extent. Nevertheless, there appear in +it, although very spasmodically, and always as a fresh surprise, +manifestations of honesty, of goodness, nay, even of nobility; and +also of great intelligence, of the thinking mind of genius. They never +quite vanish, but like single points of light gleam upon us out of the +great dark mass. We must accept them as a pledge that this _Sansara_ +contains a good and redeeming principle, which is capable of breaking +through and of filling and freeing the whole of it. + + * * * * * + +The readers of my _Ethics_ know that with me the ultimate foundation +of morality is the truth which in the _Vedas_ and the _Vedanta_ +receives its expression in the established, mystical formula, _Tat +twam asi (This is thyself_), which is spoken with reference to every +living thing, be it man or beast, and is called the _Mahavakya_, the +great word. + +Actions which proceed in accordance with this principle, such as those +of the philanthropist, may indeed be regarded as the beginning of +mysticism. Every benefit rendered with a pure intention proclaims that +the man who exercises it acts in direct conflict with the world of +appearance; for he recognises himself as identical with another +individual, who exists in complete separation from him. Accordingly, +all disinterested kindness is inexplicable; it is a mystery; and hence +in order to explain it a man has to resort to all sorts of fictions. +When Kant had demolished all other arguments for theism, he admitted +one only, that it gave the best interpretation and solution of such +mysterious actions, and of all others like them. He therefore allowed +it to stand as a presumption unsusceptible indeed of theoretical +proof, but valid from a practical point of view. I may, however, +express my doubts whether he was quite serious about it. For to make +morality rest on theism is really to reduce morality to egoism; +although the English, it is true, as also the lowest classes of +society with us, do not perceive the possibility of any other +foundation for it. + +The above-mentioned recognition of a man's own true being in +another individual objectively presented to him, is exhibited in a +particularly beautiful and clear way in the cases in which a man, +already destined to death beyond any hope of rescue, gives himself up +to the welfare of others with great solicitude and zeal, and tries to +save them. Of this kind is the well-known story of a servant who was +bitten in a courtyard at night by a mad dog. In the belief that she +was beyond hope, she seized the dog and dragged it into a stable, +which she then locked, so that no one else might be bitten. Then again +there is the incident in Naples, which Tischbein has immortalised in +one of his _aquarelles_. A son, fleeing from the lava which is rapidly +streaming toward the sea, is carrying his aged father on his back. +When there is only a narrow strip of land left between the devouring +elements, the father bids the son put him down, so that the son may +save himself by flight, as otherwise both will be lost. The son obeys, +and as he goes casts a glance of farewell on his father. This is the +moment depicted. The historical circumstance which Scott represents +in his masterly way in _The Heart of Midlothian_, chap, ii., is of a +precisely similar kind; where, of two delinquents condemned to death, +the one who by his awkwardness caused the capture of the other happily +sets him free in the chapel by overpowering the guard after the +execution-sermon, without at the same time making any attempt on his +own behalf. Nay, in the same category must also be placed the scene +which is represented in a common engraving, which may perhaps be +objectionable to western readers--I mean the one in which a soldier, +kneeling to be shot, is trying by waving a cloth to frighten away his +dog who wants to come to him. + +In all these cases we see an individual in the face of his own +immediate and certain destruction no longer thinking of saving +himself, so that he may direct the whole of his efforts to saving some +one else. How could there be a clearer expression of the consciousness +that what is being destroyed is only a phenomenon, and that the +destruction itself is only a phenomenon; that, on the other hand, the +real being of the man who meets his death is untouched by that event, +and lives on in the other man, in whom even now, as his action +betrays, he so clearly perceives it to exist? For if this were not so, +and it was his real being which was about to be annihilated, how could +that being spend its last efforts in showing such an ardent sympathy +in the welfare and continued existence of another? + +There are two different ways in which a man may become conscious +of his own existence. On the one hand, he may have an empirical +perception of it, as it manifests itself externally--something so +small that it approaches vanishing point; set in a world which, as +regards time and space, is infinite; one only of the thousand millions +of human creatures who run about on this planet for a very brief +period and are renewed every thirty years. On the other hand, by going +down into the depths of his own nature, a man may become conscious +that he is all in all; that, in fact, he is the only real being; and +that, in addition, this real being perceives itself again in others, +who present themselves from without, as though they formed a mirror of +himself. + +Of these two ways in which a man may come to know what he is, the +first grasps the phenomenon alone, the mere product of _the principle +of individuation_; whereas the second makes a man immediately +conscious that he is _the thing-in-itself_. This is a doctrine in +which, as regards the first way, I have Kant, and as regards both, I +have the _Vedas_, to support me. + +There is, it is true, a simple objection to the second method. It may +be said to assume that one and the same being can exist in different +places at the same time, and yet be complete in each of them. +Although, from an empirical point of view, this is the most palpable +impossibility--nay, absurdity--it is nevertheless perfectly true +of the thing-in-itself. The impossibility and the absurdity of it, +empirically, are only due to the forms which phenomena assume, +in accordance with the principle of individuation. For the +thing-in-itself, the will to live, exists whole and undivided in every +being, even in the smallest, as completely as in the sum-total of all +things that ever were or are or will be. This is why every being, even +the smallest, says to itself, So long as I am safe, let the world +perish--_dum ego salvus sim, pereat mundus_. And, in truth, even if +only one individual were left in the world, and all the rest were to +perish, the one that remained would still possess the whole self-being +of the world, uninjured and undiminished, and would laugh at the +destruction of the world as an illusion. This conclusion _per +impossible_ may be balanced by the counter-conclusion, which is on all +fours with it, that if that last individual were to be annihilated in +and with him the whole world would be destroyed. It was in this sense +that the mystic Angelas Silesius[1] declared that God could not live +for a moment without him, and that if he were to be annihilated God +must of necessity give up the ghost: + + _Ich weiss dass ohne mich Gott nicht ein Nu kann leben; + Werd' ich zunicht, er muss von Noth den Geist aufgeben_. + +[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--Angelus Silesius, see _Counsels and +Maxims_, p. 39, note.] + +But the empirical point of view also to some extent enables us to +perceive that it is true, or at least possible, that our self can +exist in other beings whose consciousness is separated and different +from our own. That this is so is shown by the experience of +somnambulists. Although the identity of their ego is preserved +throughout, they know nothing, when they awake, of all that a moment +before they themselves said, did or suffered. So entirely is the +individual consciousness a phenomenon that even in the same ego two +consciousnesses can arise of which the one knows nothing of the other. + + + + +GOVERNMENT. + + +It is a characteristic failing of the Germans to look in the clouds +for what lies at their feet. An excellent example of this is furnished +by the treatment which the idea of _Natural Right_ has received at +the hands of professors of philosophy. When they are called upon +to explain those simple relations of human life which make up the +substance of this right, such as Right and Wrong, Property, State, +Punishment and so on, they have recourse to the most extravagant, +abstract, remote and meaningless conceptions, and out of them build a +Tower of Babel reaching to the clouds, and taking this or that form +according to the special whim of the professor for the time being. The +clearest and simplest relations of life, such as affect us directly, +are thus made quite unintelligible, to the great detriment of the +young people who are educated in such a school. These relations +themselves are perfectly simple and easily understood--as the reader +may convince himself if he will turn to the account which I have given +of them in the _Foundation of Morality_, § 17, and in my chief work, +bk. i., § 62. But at the sound of certain words, like Right, Freedom, +the Good, Being--this nugatory infinitive of the cupola--and many +others of the same sort, the German's head begins to swim, and falling +straightway into a kind of delirium he launches forth into high-flown +phrases which have no meaning whatever. He takes the most remote and +empty conceptions, and strings them together artificially, instead of +fixing his eyes on the facts, and looking at things and relations as +they really are. It is these things and relations which supply the +ideas of Right and Freedom, and give them the only true meaning that +they possess. + +The man who starts from the preconceived opinion that the conception +of Right must be a positive one, and then attempts to define it, will +fail; for he is trying to grasp a shadow, to pursue a spectre, to +search for what does not exist. The conception of Right is a negative +one, like the conception of Freedom; its content is mere negation. +It is the conception of Wrong which is positive; Wrong has the same +significance as _injury_--_laesio_--in the widest sense of the term. +An injury may be done either to a man's person or to his property or +to his honour; and accordingly a man's rights are easy to define: +every one has a right to do anything that injures no one else. + +To have a right to do or claim a thing means nothing more than to be +able to do or take or vise it without thereby injuring any one else. +_Simplex sigillum veri_. This definition shows how senseless many +questions are; for instance, the question whether we have the right to +take our own life, As far as concerns the personal claims which others +may possibly have upon us, they are subject to the condition that we +are alive, and fall to the ground when we die. To demand of a man, who +does not care to live any longer for himself, that he should live +on as a mere machine for the advantage of others is an extravagant +pretension. + +Although men's powers differ, their rights are alike. Their rights do +not rest upon their powers, because Right is of a moral complexion; +they rest on the fact that the same will to live shows itself in +every man at the same stage of its manifestation. This, however, only +applies to that original and abstract Right, which a man possesses as +a man. The property, and also the honour, which a man acquires for +himself by the exercise of his powers, depend on the measure and kind +of power which he possesses, and so lend his Right a wider sphere of +application. Here, then, equality comes to an end. The man who is +better equipped, or more active, increases by adding to his gains, not +his Right, but the number of the things to which it extends. + +In my chief work[1] I have proved that the State in its essence is +merely an institution existing for the purpose of protecting its +members against outward attack or inward dissension. It follows from +this that the ultimate ground on which the State is necessary is the +acknowledged lack of Right in the human race. If Right were there, no +one would think of a State; for no one would have any fear that his +rights would be impaired; and a mere union against the attacks of wild +beasts or the elements would have very little analogy with what we +mean by a State. From this point of view it is easy to see how dull +and stupid are the philosophasters who in pompous phrases represent +that the State is the supreme end and flower of human existence. Such +a view is the apotheosis of Philistinism. + +[Footnote 1: 1 Bk. ii., ch. xlvii.] + +If it were Right that ruled in the world, a man would have done enough +in building his house, and would need no other protection than the +right of possessing it, which would be obvious. But since Wrong is the +order of the day, it is requisite that the man who has built his house +should also be able to protect it. Otherwise his Right is _de +facto_ incomplete; the aggressor, that is to say, has the right of +might--_Faustrecht_; and this is just the conception of Right +which Spinoza entertains. He recognises no other. His words are: +_unusquisque tantum juris habet quantum potentia valet_;[1] each man +has as much right as he has power. And again: _uniuscujusque jus +potentia ejus definitur_; each man's right is determined by his +power.[2] Hobbes seems to have started this conception of Right,[3] +and he adds the strange comment that the Right of the good Lord to all +things rests on nothing but His omnipotence. + +[Footnote 1: _Tract. Theol. Pol_., ch. ii., § 8.] + +[Footnote 2: _Ethics_, IV., xxxvii., 1.] + +[Footnote 3: Particularly in a passage in the _De Cive_, I, § 14.] + +Now this is a conception of Right which, both in theory and in +practice, no longer prevails in the civic world; but in the world +in general, though abolished in theory, it continues to apply in +practice. The consequences of neglecting it may be seen in the case +of China. Threatened by rebellion within and foes without, this great +empire is in a defenceless state, and has to pay the penalty of having +cultivated only the arts of peace and ignored the arts of war. + +There is a certain analogy between the operations of nature and those +of man which is a peculiar but not fortuitous character, and is based +on the identity of the will in both. When the herbivorous animals had +taken their place in the organic world, beasts of prey made their +appearance--necessarily a late appearance--in each species, and +proceeded to live upon them. Just in the same way, as soon as by +honest toil and in the sweat of their faces men have won from the +ground what is needed for the support of their societies, a number of +individuals are sure to arise in some of these societies, who, instead +of cultivating the earth and living on its produce, prefer to take +their lives in their hands and risk health and freedom by falling upon +those who are in possession of what they have honestly earned, and by +appropriating the fruits of their labour. These are the beasts of +prey in the human race; they are the conquering peoples whom we find +everywhere in history, from the most ancient to the most recent times. +Their varying fortunes, as at one moment they succeed and at another +fail, make up the general elements of the history of the world. Hence +Voltaire was perfectly right when he said that the aim of all war is +robbery. That those who engage in it are ashamed of their doings is +clear by the fact that governments loudly protest their reluctance to +appeal to arms except for purposes of self-defence. Instead of trying +to excuse themselves by telling public and official lies, which are +almost more revolting than war itself, they should take their stand, +as bold as brass, on Macchiavelli's doctrine. The gist of it may be +stated to be this: that whereas between one individual and another, +and so far as concerns the law and morality of their relations, +the principle, _Don't do to others what you wouldn't like done to +yourself_, certainly applies, it is the converse of this principle +which is appropriate in the case of nations and in politics: _What you +wouldn't like done to yourself do to others_. If you do not want to +be put under a foreign yoke, take time by the forelock, and put your +neighbour under it himself; whenever, that is to say, his weakness +offers you the opportunity. For if you let the opportunity pass, it +will desert one day to the enemy's camp and offer itself there. Then +your enemy will put you under his yoke; and your failure to grasp the +opportunity may be paid for, not by the generation which was guilty of +it, but by the next. This Macchiavellian principle is always a much +more decent cloak for the lust of robbery than the rags of very +obvious lies in a speech from the head of the State; lies, too, of a +description which recalls the well-known story of the rabbit attacking +the dog. Every State looks upon its neighbours as at bottom a horde of +robbers, who will fall upon it as soon as they have the opportunity. + + * * * * * + +Between the serf, the farmer, the tenant, and the mortgagee, the +difference is rather one of form than of substance. Whether the +peasant belongs to me, or the land on which he has to get a living; +whether the bird is mine, or its food, the tree or its fruit, is a +matter of little moment; for, as Shakespeare makes Shylock say: + + _You take my life + When you do take the means whereby I live_. + +The free peasant has, indeed, the advantage that he can go off and +seek his fortune in the wide world; whereas the serf who is attached +to the soil, _glebae adscriptus_, has an advantage which is perhaps +still greater, that when failure of crops or illness, old age or +incapacity, render him helpless, his master must look after him, and +so he sleeps well at night; whereas, if the crops fail, his master +tosses about on his bed trying to think how he is to procure bread for +his men. As long ago as Menander it was said that it is better to +be the slave of a good master than to live miserably as a freeman. +Another advantage possessed by the free is that if they have any +talents they can improve their position; but the same advantage is not +wholly withheld from the slave. If he proves himself useful to his +master by the exercise of any skill, he is treated accordingly; just +as in ancient Rome mechanics, foremen of workshops, architects, nay, +even doctors, were generally slaves. + +Slavery and poverty, then, are only two forms, I might almost say only +two names, of the same thing, the essence of which is that a man's +physical powers are employed, in the main, not for himself but for +others; and this leads partly to his being over-loaded with work, and +partly to his getting a scanty satisfaction for his needs. For Nature +has given a man only as much physical power as will suffice, if he +exerts it in moderation, to gain a sustenance from the earth. No great +superfluity of power is his. If, then, a not inconsiderable number of +men are relieved from the common burden of sustaining the existence +of the human race, the burden of the remainder is augmented, and they +suffer. This is the chief source of the evil which under the name of +slavery, or under the name of the proletariat, has always oppressed +the great majority of the human race. + +But the more remote cause of it is luxury. In order, it may be said, +that some few persons may have what is unnecessary, superfluous, +and the product of refinement--nay, in order that they may satisfy +artificial needs--a great part of the existing powers of mankind +has to be devoted to this object, and therefore withdrawn from the +production of what is necessary and indispensable. Instead of building +cottages for themselves, thousands of men build mansions for a few. +Instead of weaving coarse materials for themselves and their families, +they make fine cloths, silk, or even lace, for the rich, and in +general manufacture a thousand objects of luxury for their pleasure. A +great part of the urban population consists of workmen who make these +articles of luxury; and for them and those who give them work the +peasants have to plough and sow and look after the flocks as well +as for themselves, and thus have more labour than Nature originally +imposed upon them. Moreover, the urban population devotes a great deal +of physical strength, and a great deal of land, to such things as +wine, silk, tobacco, hops, asparagus and so on, instead of to corn, +potatoes and cattle-breeding. Further, a number of men are withdrawn +from agriculture and employed in ship-building and seafaring, in order +that sugar, coffee, tea and other goods may be imported. In short, +a large part of the powers of the human race is taken away from the +production of what is necessary, in order to bring what is superfluous +and unnecessary within the reach of a few. As long therefore as luxury +exists, there must be a corresponding amount of over-work and misery, +whether it takes the name of poverty or of slavery. The fundamental +difference between the two is that slavery originates in violence, +and poverty in craft. The whole unnatural condition of society--the +universal struggle to escape from misery, the sea-trade attended with +so much loss of life, the complicated interests of commerce, and +finally the wars to which it all gives rise--is due, only and alone, +to luxury, which gives no happiness even to those who enjoy it, nay, +makes them ill and bad-tempered. Accordingly it looks as if the most +effective way of alleviating human misery would be to diminish luxury, +or even abolish it altogether. + +There is unquestionably much truth in this train of thought. But the +conclusion at which it arrives is refuted by an argument possessing +this advantage over it--that it is confirmed by the testimony of +experience. A certain amount of work is devoted to purposes of luxury. +What the human race loses in this way in the _muscular power_ which +would otherwise be available for the necessities of existence is +gradually made up to it a thousandfold by the _nervous power_, which, +in a chemical sense, is thereby released. And since the intelligence +and sensibility which are thus promoted are on a higher level than the +muscular irritability which they supplant, so the achievements of mind +exceed those of the body a thousandfold. One wise counsel is worth the +work of many hands: + + [Greek: Hos en sophon bouleuma tas pollon cheiras nika.] + +A nation of nothing but peasants would do little in the way of +discovery and invention; but idle hands make active heads. Science and +the Arts are themselves the children of luxury, and they discharge +their debt to it. The work which they do is to perfect technology in +all its branches, mechanical, chemical and physical; an art which in +our days has brought machinery to a pitch never dreamt of before, and +in particular has, by steam and electricity, accomplished things the +like of which would, in earlier ages, have been ascribed to the agency +of the devil. In manufactures of all kinds, and to some extent in +agriculture, machines now do a thousand times more than could ever +have been done by the hands of all the well-to-do, educated, and +professional classes, and could ever have been attained if all luxury +had been abolished and every one had returned to the life of a +peasant. It is by no means the rich alone, but all classes, who derive +benefit from these industries. Things which in former days hardly +any one could afford are now cheap and abundant, and even the lowest +classes are much better off in point of comfort. In the Middle Ages a +King of England once borrowed a pair of silk stockings from one of his +lords, so that he might wear them in giving an audience to the French +ambassador. Even Queen Elizabeth was greatly pleased and astonished to +receive a pair as a New Year's present; to-day every shopman has them. +Fifty years ago ladies wore the kind of calico gowns which servants +wear now. If mechanical science continues to progress at the same +rate for any length of time, it may end by saving human labour almost +entirely, just as horses are even now being largely superseded by +machines. For it is possible to conceive that intellectual culture +might in some degree become general in the human race; and this would +be impossible as long as bodily labour was incumbent on any great part +of it. Muscular irritability and nervous sensibility are always and +everywhere, both generally and particularly, in antagonism; for the +simple reason that it is one and the same vital power which underlies +both. Further, since the arts have a softening effect on character, it +is possible that quarrels great and small, wars and duels, will vanish +from the world; just as both have become much rarer occurrences. +However, it is not my object here to write a _Utopia_. + +But apart from all this the arguments used above in favour of the +abolition of luxury and the uniform distribution of all bodily labour +are open to the objection that the great mass of mankind, always and +everywhere, cannot do without leaders, guides and counsellors, in +one shape or another, according to the matter in question; judges, +governors, generals, officials, priests, doctors, men of learning, +philosophers, and so on, are all a necessity. Their common task is to +lead the race for the greater part so incapable and perverse, through +the labyrinth of life, of which each of them according to his position +and capacity has obtained a general view, be his range wide or narrow. +That these guides of the race should be permanently relieved of all +bodily labour as well as of all vulgar need and discomfort; nay, +that in proportion to their much greater achievements they should +necessarily own and enjoy more than the common man, is natural and +reasonable. Great merchants should also be included in the same +privileged class, whenever they make far-sighted preparations for +national needs. + +The question of the sovereignty of the people is at bottom the same +as the question whether any man can have an original right to rule +a people against its will. How that proposition can be reasonably +maintained I do not see. The people, it must be admitted, is +sovereign; but it is a sovereign who is always a minor. It must have +permanent guardians, and it can never exercise its rights itself, +without creating dangers of which no one can foresee the end; +especially as like all minors, it is very apt to become the sport of +designing sharpers, in the shape of what are called demagogues. + +Voltaire remarks that the first man to become a king was a successful +soldier. It is certainly the case that all princes were originally +victorious leaders of armies, and for a long time it was as such that +they bore sway. On the rise of standing armies princes began to regard +their people as a means of sustaining themselves and their soldiers, +and treated them, accordingly, as though they were a herd of cattle, +which had to be tended in order that it might provide wool, milk, and +meat. The why and wherefore of all this, as I shall presently show in +detail, is the fact that originally it was not right, but might, that +ruled in the world. Might has the advantage of having been the first +in the field. That is why it is impossible to do away with it and +abolish it altogether; it must always have its place; and all that a +man can wish or ask is that it should be found on the side of right +and associated with it. Accordingly says the prince to his subjects: +"I rule you in virtue of the power which I possess. But, on the other +hand, it excludes that of any one else, and I shall suffer none but +my own, whether it comes from without, or arises within by one of you +trying to oppress another. In this way, then, you are protected." The +arrangement was carried out; and just because it was carried out the +old idea of kingship developed with time and progress into quite a +different idea, and put the other one in the background, where it may +still be seen, now and then, flitting about like a spectre. Its place +has been taken by the idea of the king as father of his people, as +the firm and unshakable pillar which alone supports and maintains the +whole organisation of law and order, and consequently the rights +of every man.[1] But a king can accomplish this only by inborn +prerogative which reserves authority to him and to him alone--an +authority which is supreme, indubitable, and beyond all attack, nay, +to which every one renders instinctive obedience. Hence the king is +rightly said to rule "by the grace of God." He is always the most +useful person in the State, and his services are never too dearly +repaid by any Civil List, however heavy. + +[Footnote 1: We read in Stobaeus, _Florilegium_, ch. xliv., 41, of a +Persian custom, by which, whenever a king died, there was a five days' +anarchy, in order that people might perceive the advantage of having +kings and laws.] + +But even as late a writer as Macchiavelli was so decidedly imbued with +the earlier or mediaeval conception of the position of a prince that +he treats it as a matter which is self-evident: he never discusses it, +but tacitly takes it as the presupposition and basis of his advice. +It may be said generally that his book is merely the theoretical +statement and consistent and systematic exposition of the practice +prevailing in his time. It is the novel statement of it in a complete +theoretical form that lends it such a poignant interest. The same +thing, I may remark in passing, applies to the immortal little work of +La Rochefaucauld, who, however, takes private and not public life for +his theme, and offers, not advice, but observations. The title of this +fine little book is open, perhaps, to some objection: the contents are +not, as a rule, either _maxims_ or _reflections_, but _aperçus_; +and that is what they should be called. There is much, too, in +Macchiavelli that will be found also to apply to private life. + +Right in itself is powerless; in nature it is Might that rules. To +enlist might on the side of right, so that by means of it right +may rule, is the problem of statesmanship. And it is indeed a hard +problem, as will be obvious if we remember that almost every human +breast is the seat of an egoism which has no limits, and is usually +associated with an accumulated store of hatred and malice; so that +at the very start feelings of enmity largely prevail over those of +friendship. We have also to bear in mind that it is many millions of +individuals so constituted who have to be kept in the bonds of law +and order, peace and tranquillity; whereas originally every one had +a right to say to every one else: _I am just as good as you are_! A +consideration of all this must fill us with surprise that on the whole +the world pursues its way so peacefully and quietly, and with so much +law and order as we see to exist. It is the machinery of State which +alone accomplishes it. For it is physical power alone which has any +direct action on men; constituted as they generally are, it is for +physical power alone that they have any feeling or respect. + +If a man would convince himself by experience that this is the case, +he need do nothing but remove all compulsion from his fellows, and try +to govern them by clearly and forcibly representing to them what +is reasonable, right, and fair, though at the same time it may be +contrary to their interests. He would be laughed to scorn; and as +things go that is the only answer he would get. It would soon be +obvious to him that moral force alone is powerless. It is, then, +physical force alone which is capable of securing respect. Now this +force ultimately resides in the masses, where it is associated with +ignorance, stupidity and injustice. Accordingly the main aim of +statesmanship in these difficult circumstances is to put physical +force in subjection to mental force--to intellectual superiority, and +thus to make it serviceable. But if this aim is not itself accompanied +by justice and good intentions the result of the business, if it +succeeds, is that the State so erected consists of knaves and fools, +the deceivers and the deceived. That this is the case is made +gradually evident by the progress of intelligence amongst the masses, +however much it may be repressed; and it leads to revolution. But +if, contrarily, intelligence is accompanied by justice and good +intentions, there arises a State as perfect as the character of human +affairs will allow. It is very much to the purpose if justice and +good intentions not only exist, but are also demonstrable and openly +exhibited, and can be called to account publicly, and be subject to +control. Care must be taken, however, lest the resulting participation +of many persons in the work of government should affect the unity of +the State, and inflict a loss of strength and concentration on the +power by which its home and foreign affairs have to be administered. +This is what almost always happens in republics. To produce a +constitution which should satisfy all these demands would accordingly +be the highest aim of statesmanship. But, as a matter of fact, +statesmanship has to consider other things as well. It has to reckon +with the people as they exist, and their national peculiarities. This +is the raw material on which it has to work, and the ingredients of +that material will always exercise a great effect on the completed +scheme. + +Statesmanship will have achieved a good deal if it so far attains its +object as to reduce wrong and injustice in the community to a minimum. +To banish them altogether, and to leave no trace of them, is merely +the ideal to be aimed at; and it is only approximately that it can be +reached. If they disappear in one direction, they creep in again in +another; for wrong and injustice lie deeply rooted in human nature. +Attempts have been made to attain the desired aim by artificial +constitutions and systematic codes of law; but they are not in +complete touch with the facts--they remain an asymptote, for the +simple reason that hard and fast conceptions never embrace all +possible cases, and cannot be made to meet individual instances. Such +conceptions resemble the stones of a mosaic rather than the delicate +shading in a picture. Nay, more: all experiments in this matter are +attended with danger; because the material in question, namely, the +human race, is the most difficult of all material to handle. It is +almost as dangerous as an explosive. + +No doubt it is true that in the machinery of the State the freedom +of the press performs the same function as a safety-valve in other +machinery; for it enables all discontent to find a voice; nay, in +doing so, the discontent exhausts itself if it has not much substance; +and if it has, there is an advantage in recognising it betimes +and applying the remedy. This is much better than to repress the +discontent, and let it simmer and ferment, and go on increasing until +it ends in an explosion. On the other hand, the freedom of the press +may be regarded as a permission to sell poison--poison for the heart +and the mind. There is no idea so foolish but that it cannot be put +into the heads of the ignorant and incapable multitude, especially if +the idea holds out some prospect of any gain or advantage. And when a +man has got hold of any such idea what is there that he will not do? +I am, therefore, very much afraid that the danger of a free press +outweighs its utility, particularly where the law offers a way of +redressing wrongs. In any case, however, the freedom of the press +should be governed by a very strict prohibition of all and every +anonymity. + +Generally, indeed, it may be maintained that right is of a nature +analogous to that of certain chemical substances, which cannot be +exhibited in a pure and isolated condition, but at the most only with +a small admixture of some other substance, which serves as a vehicle +for them, or gives them the necessary consistency; such as fluorine, +or even alcohol, or prussic acid. Pursuing the analogy we may say that +right, if it is to gain a footing in the world and really prevail, +must of necessity be supplemented by a small amount of arbitrary +force, in order that, notwithstanding its merely ideal and therefore +ethereal nature, it may be able to work and subsist in the real and +material world, and not evaporate and vanish into the clouds, as +it does in Hesoid. Birth-right of every description, all heritable +privileges, every form of national religion, and so on, may be +regarded as the necessary chemical base or alloy; inasmuch as it is +only when right has some such firm and actual foundation that it can +be enforced and consistently vindicated. They form for right a sort of +[Greek: os moi pou sto]--a fulcrum for supporting its lever. + +Linnaeus adopted a vegetable system of an artificial and arbitrary +character. It cannot be replaced by a natural one, no matter how +reasonable the change might be, or how often it has been attempted to +make it, because no other system could ever yield the same certainty +and stability of definition. Just in the same way the artificial and +arbitrary basis on which, as has been shown, the constitution of +a State rests, can never be replaced by a purely natural basis. A +natural basis would aim at doing away with the conditions that have +been mentioned: in the place of the privileges of birth it would put +those of personal merit; in the place of the national religion, the +results of rationalistic inquiry, and so on. However agreeable to +reason this might all prove, the change could not be made; because a +natural basis would lack that certainty and fixity of definition which +alone secures the stability of the commonwealth. A constitution which +embodied abstract right alone would be an excellent thing for natures +other than human, but since the great majority of men are extremely +egoistic, unjust, inconsiderate, deceitful, and sometimes even +malicious; since in addition they are endowed with very scanty +intelligence there arises the necessity for a power that shall be +concentrated in one man, a power that shall be above all law and +right, and be completely irresponsible, nay, to which everything shall +yield as to something that is regarded as a creature of a higher +kind, a ruler by the grace of God. It is only thus that men can be +permanently held in check and governed. + +The United States of North America exhibit the attempt to proceed +without any such arbitrary basis; that is to say, to allow abstract +right to prevail pure and unalloyed. But the result is not attractive. +For with all the material prosperity of the country what do we find? +The prevailing sentiment is a base Utilitarianism with its inevitable +companion, ignorance; and it is this that has paved the way for a +union of stupid Anglican bigotry, foolish prejudice, coarse brutality, +and a childish veneration of women. Even worse things are the order of +the day: most iniquitous oppression of the black freemen, lynch law, +frequent assassination often committed with entire impunity, duels of +a savagery elsewhere unknown, now and then open scorn of all law and +justice, repudiation of public debts, abominable political rascality +towards a neighbouring State, followed by a mercenary raid on its rich +territory,--afterwards sought to be excused, on the part of the chief +authority of the State, by lies which every one in the country knew to +be such and laughed at--an ever-increasing ochlocracy, and finally +all the disastrous influence which this abnegation of justice in high +quarters must have exercised on private morals. This specimen of a +pure constitution on the obverse side of the planet says very little +for republics in general, but still less for the imitations of it in +Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru. + +A peculiar disadvantage attaching to republics--and one that might +not be looked for--is that in this form of government it must be more +difficult for men of ability to attain high position and exercise +direct political influence than in the case of monarchies. For always +and everywhere and under all circumstances there is a conspiracy, or +instinctive alliance, against such men on the part of all the stupid, +the weak, and the commonplace; they look upon such men as their +natural enemies, and they are firmly held together by a common fear of +them. There is always a numerous host of the stupid and the weak, +and in a republican constitution it is easy for them to suppress and +exclude the men of ability, so that they may not be outflanked by +them. They are fifty to one; and here all have equal rights at the +start. + +In a monarchy, on the other hand, this natural and universal league of +the stupid against those who are possessed of intellectual advantages +is a one-sided affair; it exists only from below, for in a monarchy +talent and intelligence receive a natural advocacy and support from +above. In the first place, the position of the monarch himself is +much too high and too firm for him to stand in fear of any sort of +competition. In the next place, he serves the State more by his will +than by his intelligence; for no intelligence could ever be equal +to all the demands that would in his case be made upon it. He is +therefore compelled to be always availing himself of other men's +intelligence. Seeing that his own interests are securely bound up with +those of his country; that they are inseparable from them and one with +them, he will naturally give the preference to the best men, because +they are his most serviceable instruments, and he will bestow his +favour upon them--as soon, that is, as he can find them; which is not +so difficult, if only an honest search be made. Just in the same +way even ministers of State have too much advantage over rising +politicians to need to regard them with jealousy; and accordingly for +analogous reasons they are glad to single out distinguished men and +set them to work, in order to make use of their powers for themselves. +It is in this way that intelligence has always under a monarchical +government a much better chance against its irreconcilable and +ever-present foe, stupidity; and the advantage which it gains is very +great. + +In general, the monarchical form of government is that which is +natural to man; just as it is natural to bees and ants, to a flight of +cranes, a herd of wandering elephants, a pack of wolves seeking prey +in common, and many other animals, all of which place one of their +number at the head of the business in hand. Every business in which +men engage, if it is attended with danger--every campaign, every +ship at sea--must also be subject to the authority of one commander; +everywhere it is one will that must lead. Even the animal organism is +constructed on a monarchical principle: it is the brain alone which +guides and governs, and exercises the hegemony. Although heart, lungs, +and stomach contribute much more to the continued existence of the +whole body, these philistines cannot on that account be allowed to +guide and lead. That is a business which belongs solely to the brain; +government must proceed from one central point. Even the solar system +is monarchical. On the other hand, a republic is as unnatural as it +is unfavourable to the higher intellectual life and the arts and +sciences. Accordingly we find that everywhere in the world, and at all +times, nations, whether civilised or savage, or occupying a position +between the two, are always under monarchical government. The rule of +many as Homer said, is not a good thing: let there be one ruler, one +king; + + [Greek: Ouk agathon polykoiraniae-eis koiranos esto + Eis basoleus.] [1] + +[Footnote 1: _Iliad_, ii., 204.] + +How would it be possible that, everywhere and at all times, we should +see many millions of people, nay, even hundreds of millions, become +the willing and obedient subjects of one man, sometimes even one +woman, and provisionally, even, of a child, unless there were a +monarchical instinct in men which drove them to it as the form of +government best suited to them? This arrangement is not the product +of reflection. Everywhere one man is king, and for the most part his +dignity is hereditary. He is, as it were, the personification, the +monogram, of the whole people, which attains an individuality in him. +In this sense he can rightly say: _l'etat c'est moi_. It is precisely +for this reason that in Shakespeare's historical plays the kings +of England and France mutually address each other as _France_ and +_England_, and the Duke of Austria goes by the name of his country. It +is as though the kings regarded themselves as the incarnation of their +nationalities. It is all in accordance with human nature; and for this +very reason the hereditary monarch cannot separate his own welfare and +that of his family from the welfare of his country; as, on the other +hand, mostly happens when the monarch is elected, as, for instance, in +the States of the Church.[1] The Chinese can conceive of a monarchical +government only; what a republic is they utterly fail to understand. +When a Dutch legation was in China in the year 1658, it was obliged to +represent that the Prince of Orange was their king, as otherwise the +Chinese would have been inclined to take Holland for a nest of pirates +living without any lord or master.[2] Stobaeus, in a chapter in his +_Florilegium_, at the head of which he wrote _That monarchy is best_, +collected the best of the passages in which the ancients explained +the advantages of that form of government. In a word, republics are +unnatural and artificial; they are the product of reflection. Hence it +is that they occur only as rare exceptions in the whole history of +the world. There were the small Greek republics, the Roman and the +Carthaginian; but they were all rendered possible by the fact that +five-sixths, perhaps even seven-eighths, of the population consisted +of slaves. In the year 1840, even in the United States, there were +three million slaves to a population of sixteen millions. Then, again, +the duration of the republics of antiquity, compared with that of +monarchies, was very short. Republics are very easy to found, and +very difficult to maintain, while with monarchies it is exactly the +reverse. If it is Utopian schemes that are wanted, I say this: the +only solution of the problem would be a despotism of the wise and the +noble, of the true aristocracy and the genuine nobility, brought about +by the method of generation--that is, by the marriage of the noblest +men with the cleverest and most intellectual women. This is my Utopia, +my Republic of Plato. + +[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--The reader will recollect that +Schopenhauer was writing long before the Papal territories were +absorbed into the kingdom of Italy.] + +[Footnote 2: See Jean Nieuhoff, _L'Ambassade de la Compagnie Orientale +des Provinces Unies vers L'Empereur de la Chine_, traduit par Jean le +Charpentier à Leyde, 1665; ch. 45.] + +Constitutional kings are undoubtedly in much the same position as +the gods of Epicurus, who sit upon high in undisturbed bliss and +tranquillity, and do not meddle with human affairs. Just now they are +the fashion. In every German duodecimo-principality a parody of the +English constitution is set up, quite complete, from Upper and +Lower Houses down to the Habeas Corpus Act and trial by jury. These +institutions, which proceed from English character and English +circumstances, and presuppose both, are natural and suitable to the +English people. It is just as natural to the German people to be split +up into a number of different stocks, under a similar number of ruling +Princes, with an Emperor over them all, who maintains peace at home, +and represents the unity of the State board. It is an arrangement +which has proceeded from German character and German circumstances. +I am of opinion that if Germany is not to meet with the same fate as +Italy, it must restore the imperial crown, which was done away with +by its arch-enemy, the first Napoleon; and it must restore it as +effectively as possible. [1] For German unity depends on it, and +without the imperial crown it will always be merely nominal, or +precarious. But as we no longer live in the days of Günther of +Schwarzburg, when the choice of Emperor was a serious business, the +imperial crown ought to go alternately to Prussia and to Austria, for +the life of the wearer. In any case, the absolute sovereignty of the +small States is illusory. Napoleon I. did for Germany what Otto the +Great did for Italy: he divided it into small, independent States, on +the principle, _divide et impera_. + +[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--Here, again, it is hardly necessary +to say that Schopenhauer, who died in 1860, and wrote this passage at +least some years previously, cannot be referring to any of the +events which culminated in 1870. The whole passage forms a striking +illustration of his political sagacity.] + +The English show their great intelligence, amongst other ways, by +clinging to their ancient institutions, customs and usages, and by +holding them sacred, even at the risk of carrying this tenacity too +far, and making it ridiculous. They hold them sacred for the simple +reason that those institutions and customs are not the invention of an +idle head, but have grown up gradually by the force of circumstance +and the wisdom of life itself, and are therefore suited to them as a +nation. On the other hand, the German Michel[1] allows himself to be +persuaded by his schoolmaster that he must go about in an English +dress-coat, and that nothing else will do. Accordingly he has bullied +his father into giving it to him; and with his awkward manners this +ungainly creature presents in it a sufficiently ridiculous figure. But +the dress-coat will some day be too tight for him and incommode him. +It will not be very long before he feels it in trial by jury. This +institution arose in the most barbarous period of the Middle Ages--the +times of Alfred the Great, when the ability to read and write exempted +a man from the penalty of death. It is the worst of all criminal +procedures. Instead of judges, well versed in law and of great +experience, who have grown grey in daily unravelling the tricks and +wiles of thieves, murderers and rascals of all sorts, and so are well +able to get at the bottom of things, it is gossiping tailors and +tanners who sit in judgment; it is their coarse, crude, unpractised, +and awkward intelligence, incapable of any sustained attention, that +is called upon to find out the truth from a tissue of lies and deceit. +All the time, moreover, they are thinking of their cloth and their +leather, and longing to be at home; and they have absolutely no clear +notion at all of the distinction between probability and certainty. It +is with this sort of a calculus of probabilities in their stupid heads +that they confidently undertake to seal a man's doom. + +[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--It may be well to explain that +"Michel" is sometimes used by the Germans as a nickname of their +nation, corresponding to "John Bull" as a nickname of the English. +Flügel in his German-English Dictionary declares that _der deutsche +Michel_ represents the German nation as an honest, blunt, unsuspicious +fellow, who easily allows himself to be imposed upon, even, he adds, +with a touch of patriotism, "by those who are greatly his inferiors in +point of strength and real worth."] + +The same remark is applicable to them which Dr. Johnson made of a +court-martial in which he had little confidence, summoned to decide a +very important case. He said that perhaps there was not a member of +it who, in the whole course of his life, had ever spent an hour by +himself in balancing probabilities.[1] Can any one imagine that the +tailor and the tanner would be impartial judges? What! the vicious +multitude impartial! as if partiality were not ten times more to be +feared from men of the same class as the accused than from judges who +knew nothing of him personally, lived in another sphere altogether, +were irremovable, and conscious of the dignity of their office. But +to let a jury decide on crimes against the State and its head, or on +misdemeanours of the press, is in a very real sense to set the fox to +keep the geese. + +[Footnote 1: Boswell's _Johnson_, 1780, set. 71.] + +Everywhere and at all times there has been much discontent with +governments, laws and public regulations; for the most part, however, +because men are always ready to make institutions responsible for the +misery inseparable from human existence itself; which is, to speak +mythically, the curse that was laid on Adam, and through him on the +whole race. But never has that delusion been proclaimed in a more +mendacious and impudent manner than by the demagogues of the +_Jetstzeit_--of the day we live in. As enemies of Christianity, they +are, of course, optimists: to them the world is its own end and +object, and accordingly in itself, that is to say, in its own natural +constitution, it is arranged on the most excellent principles, and +forms a regular habitation of bliss. The enormous and glaring evils of +the world they attribute wholly to governments: if governments, they +think, were to do their duty, there would be a heaven upon earth; in +other words, all men could eat, drink, propagate and die, free from +trouble and want. This is what they mean when they talk of the world +being "its own end and object"; this is the goal of that "perpetual +progress of the human race," and the other fine things which they are +never tired of proclaiming. + +Formerly it was _faith_ which was the chief support of the throne; +nowadays it is _credit_. The Pope himself is scarcely more concerned +to retain the confidence of the faithful than to make his creditors +believe in his own good faith. If in times past it was the guilty debt +of the world which was lamented, now it is the financial debts of the +world which arouse dismay. Formerly it was the Last Day which was +prophesied; now it is the [Greek: seisachtheia] the great repudiation, +the universal bankruptcy of the nations, which will one day happen; +although the prophet, in this as in the other case, entertains a firm +hope that he will not live to see it himself. + +From an ethical and a rational point of view, the _right of +possession_ rests upon an incomparably better foundation than the +_right of birth_; nevertheless, the right of possession is allied with +the right of birth and has come to be part and parcel of it, so that +it would hardly be possible to abolish the right of birth without +endangering the right of possession. The reason of this is that most +of what a man possesses he inherited, and therefore holds by a kind of +right of birth; just as the old nobility bear the names only of their +hereditary estates, and by the use of those names do no more than give +expression to the fact that they own the estates. Accordingly all +owners of property, if instead of being envious they were wise, ought +also to support the maintenance of the rights of birth. + +The existence of a nobility has, then, a double advantage: it helps to +maintain on the one hand the rights of possession, and on the other +the right of birth belonging to the king. For the king is the first +nobleman in the country, and, as a general rule, he treats the +nobility as his humble relations, and regards them quite otherwise +than the commoners, however trusty and well-beloved. It is quite +natural, too, that he should have more confidence in those whose +ancestors were mostly the first ministers, and always the immediate +associates, of his own. A nobleman, therefore, appeals with reason +to the name he bears, when on the occurrence of anything to rouse +distrust he repeats his assurance of fidelity and service to the king. +A man's character, as my readers are aware, assuredly comes to him +from his father. It is a narrow-minded and ridiculous thing not to +consider whose son a man is. + + + + +FREE-WILL AND FATALISM. + + +No thoughtful man can have any doubt, after the conclusions reached in +my prize-essay on _Moral Freedom_, that such freedom is to be sought, +not anywhere in nature, but outside of it. The only freedom that +exists is of a metaphysical character. In the physical world freedom +is an impossibility. Accordingly, while our several actions are in no +wise free, every man's individual character is to be regarded as a +free act. He is such and such a man, because once for all it is his +will to be that man. For the will itself, and in itself, and also in +so far as it is manifest in an individual, and accordingly constitutes +the original and fundamental desires of that individual, is +independent of all knowledge, because it is antecedent to such +knowledge. All that it receives from knowledge is the series of +motives by which it successively develops its nature and makes itself +cognisable or visible; but the will itself, as something that lies +beyond time, and so long as it exists at all, never changes. Therefore +every man, being what he is and placed in the circumstances which +for the moment obtain, but which on their part also arise by strict +necessity, can absolutely never do anything else than just what at +that moment he does do. Accordingly, the whole course of a man's life, +in all its incidents great and small, is as necessarily predetermined +as the course of a clock. + +The main reason of this is that the kind of metaphysical free act +which I have described tends to become a knowing consciousness--a +perceptive intuition, which is subject to the forms of space and time. +By means of those forms the unity and indivisibility of the act are +represented as drawn asunder into a series of states and events, +which are subject to the Principle of Sufficient Reason in its four +forms--and it is this that is meant by _necessity_. But the result of +it all assumes a moral complexion. It amounts to this, that by what we +do we know what we are, and by what we suffer we know what we deserve. + +Further, it follows from this that a man's _individuality_ does not +rest upon the principle of individuation alone, and therefore is not +altogether phenomenal in its nature. On the contrary, it has its roots +in the thing-in-itself, in the will which is the essence of each +individual. The character of this individual is itself individual. But +how deep the roots of individuality extend is one of the questions +which I do not undertake to answer. + +In this connection it deserves to be mentioned that even Plato, in his +own way, represented the individuality of a man as a free act.[1] He +represented him as coming into the world with a given tendency, which +was the result of the feelings and character already attaching to +him in accordance with the doctrine of metempsychosis. The Brahmin +philosophers also express the unalterable fixity of innate character +in a mystical fashion. They say that Brahma, when a man is produced, +engraves his doings and sufferings in written characters on his skull, +and that his life must take shape in accordance therewith. They point +to the jagged edges in the sutures of the skull-bones as evidence of +this writing; and the purport of it, they say, depends on his previous +life and actions. The same view appears to underlie the Christian, or +rather, the Pauline, dogma of Predestination. + +[Footnote 1: _Phaedrus_ and _Laws, bk_. x.] + +But this truth, which is universally confirmed by experience, is +attended with another result. All genuine merit, moral as well as +intellectual, is not merely physical or empirical in its origin, +but metaphysical; that is to say, it is given _a priori_ and not _a +posteriori_; in other words, it lies innate and is not acquired, +and therefore its source is not a mere phenomenon, but the +thing-in-itself. Hence it is that every man achieves only that which +is irrevocably established in his nature, or is born with him. +Intellectual capacity needs, it is true, to be developed just as many +natural products need to be cultivated in order that we may enjoy or +use them; but just as in the case of a natural product no cultivation +can take the place of original material, neither can it do so in the +case of intellect. That is the reason why qualities which are merely +acquired, or learned, or enforced--that is, qualities _a posteriori_, +whether moral or intellectual--are not real or genuine, but +superficial only, and possessed of no value. This is a conclusion of +true metaphysics, and experience teaches the same lesson to all who +can look below the surface. Nay, it is proved by the great importance +which we all attach to such innate characteristics as physiognomy and +external appearance, in the case of a man who is at all distinguished; +and that is why we are so curious to see him. Superficial people, to +be sure,--and, for very good reasons, commonplace people too,--will be +of the opposite opinion; for if anything fails them they will thus be +enabled to console themselves by thinking that it is still to come. + +The world, then, is not merely a battlefield where victory and defeat +receive their due recompense in a future state. No! the world is +itself the Last Judgment on it. Every man carries with him the reward +and the disgrace that he deserves; and this is no other than the +doctrine of the Brahmins and Buddhists as it is taught in the theory +of metempsychosis. + +The question has been raised, What two men would do, who lived a +solitary life in the wilds and met each other for the first time. +Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Rousseau have given different answers. +Pufendorf believed that they would approach each other as friends; +Hobbes, on the contrary, as enemies; Rousseau, that they would pass +each other by In silence. All three are both right and wrong. This +is just a case in which the incalculable difference that there is in +innate moral disposition between one individual and another would make +its appearance. The difference is so strong that the question here +raised might be regarded as the standard and measure of it. For there +are men in whom the sight of another man at once rouses a feeling of +enmity, since their inmost nature exclaims at once: That is not me! +There are, others in whom the sight awakens immediate sympathy; their +inmost nature says: _That is me over again_! Between the two there +are countless degrees. That in this most important matter we are so +totally different is a great problem, nay, a mystery. + +In regard to this _a priori_ nature of moral character there is matter +for varied reflection in a work by Bastholm, a Danish writer, entitled +_Historical Contributions to the Knowledge of Man in the Savage +State_. He is struck by the fact that intellectual culture and moral +excellence are shown to be entirely independent of each other, +inasmuch as one is often found without the other. The reason of this, +as we shall find, is simply that moral excellence in no wise springs +from reflection, which is developed by intellectual culture, but +from the will itself, the constitution of which is innate and not +susceptible in itself of any improvement by means of education. +Bastholm represents most nations as very vicious and immoral; and on +the other hand he reports that excellent traits of character are found +amongst some savage peoples; as, for instance, amongst the Orotchyses, +the inhabitants of the island Savu, the Tunguses, and the Pelew +islanders. He thus attempts to solve the problem, How it is that some +tribes are so remarkably good, when their neighbours are all bad, + +It seems to me that the difficulty may be explained as follows: Moral +qualities, as we know, are heritable, and an isolated tribe, such as +is described, might take its rise in some one family, and ultimately +in a single ancestor who happened to be a good man, and then maintain +its purity. Is it not the case, for instance, that on many unpleasant +occasions, such as repudiation of public debts, filibustering raids +and so on, the English have often reminded the North Americans of +their descent from English penal colonists? It is a reproach, however, +which can apply only to a small part of the population. + +It is marvellous how _every man's individuality_ (that is to say, the +union of a definite character with a definite intellect) accurately +determines all his actions and thoughts down to the most unimportant +details, as though it were a dye which pervaded them; and how, in +consequence, one man's whole course of life, in other words, his inner +and outer history, turns out so absolutely different from another's. +As a botanist knows a plant in its entirety from a single leaf; as +Cuvier from a single bone constructed the whole animal, so an accurate +knowledge of a man's whole character may be attained from a single +characteristic act; that is to say, he himself may to some extent +be constructed from it, even though the act in question is of very +trifling consequence. Nay, that is the most perfect test of all, for +in a matter of importance people are on their guard; in trifles +they follow their natural bent without much reflection. That is +why Seneca's remark, that even the smallest things may be taken as +evidence of character, is so true: _argumenta morum ex minimis quoque +licet capere_.[1] If a man shows by his absolutely unscrupulous and +selfish behaviour in small things that a sentiment of justice is +foreign to his disposition, he should not be trusted with a penny +unless on due security. For who will believe that the man who every +day shows that he is unjust in all matters other than those which +concern property, and whose boundless selfishness everywhere protrudes +through the small affairs of ordinary life which are subject to +no scrutiny, like a dirty shirt through the holes of a ragged +jacket--who, I ask, will believe that such a man will act honourably +in matters of _meum_ and _tuum_ without any other incentive but that +of justice? The man who has no conscience in small things will be a +scoundrel in big things. If we neglect small traits of character, +we have only ourselves to blame if we afterwards learn to our +disadvantage what this character is in the great affairs of life. On +the same principle, we ought to break with so-called friends even in +matters of trifling moment, if they show a character that is malicious +or bad or vulgar, so that we may avoid the bad turn which only waits +for an opportunity of being done us. The same thing applies to +servants. Let it always be our maxim: Better alone than amongst +traitors. + +[Footnote 1: _Ep_., 52.] + +Of a truth the first and foremost step in all knowledge of mankind is +the conviction that a man's conduct, taken as a whole, and in all its +essential particulars, is not governed by his reason or by any of the +resolutions which he may make in virtue of it. No man becomes this or +that by wishing to be it, however earnestly. His acts proceed from his +innate and unalterable character, and they are more immediately and +particularly determined by motives. A man's conduct, therefore, is the +necessary product of both character and motive. It may be illustrated +by the course of a planet, which is the result of the combined effect +of the tangential energy with which it is endowed, and the centripetal +energy which operates from the sun. In this simile the former energy +represents character, and the latter the influence of motive. It is +almost more than a mere simile. The tangential energy which properly +speaking is the source of the planet's motion, whilst on the +other hand the motion is kept in check by gravitation, is, from a +metaphysical point of view, the will manifesting itself in that body. + +To grasp this fact is to see that we really never form anything more +than a conjecture of what we shall do under circumstances which are +still to happen; although we often take our conjecture for a resolve. +When, for instance, in pursuance of a proposal, a man with the +greatest sincerity, and even eagerness, accepts an engagement to do +this or that on the occurrence of a certain future event, it is by +no means certain that he will fulfil the engagement; unless he is so +constituted that the promise which he gives, in itself and as such, is +always and everywhere a motive sufficient for him, by acting upon him, +through considerations of honour, like some external compulsion. But +above and beyond this, what he will do on the occurrence of that event +may be foretold from true and accurate knowledge of his character and +the external circumstances under the influence of which he will fall; +and it may with complete certainty be foretold from this alone. Nay, +it is a very easy prophecy if he has been already seen in a like +position; for he will inevitably do the same thing a second time, +provided that on the first occasion he had a true and complete +knowledge of the facts of the case. For, as I have often remarked, a +final cause does not impel a man by being real, but by being known; +_causa finalis non movet secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse +cognitum_.[1] Whatever he failed to recognise or understand the first +time could have no influence upon his will; just as an electric +current stops when some isolating body hinders the action of the +conductor. This unalterable nature of character, and the consequent +necessity of our actions, are made very clear to a man who has not, +on any given occasion, behaved as he ought to have done, by showing +a lack either of resolution or endurance or courage, or some other +quality demanded at the moment. Afterwards he recognises what it is +that he ought to have done; and, sincerely repenting of his incorrect +behaviour, he thinks to himself, _If the opportunity were offered to +me again, I should act differently_. It is offered once more; the same +occasion recurs; and to his great astonishment he does precisely the +same thing over again.[2] + +[Footnote 1: Suarez, _Disp. Metaph_., xxiii.; §§7 and 8.] + +[Footnote 2: Cf. _World as Will_, ii., pp. 251 ff. _sqq_. (third +edition).] + +The best examples of the truth in question are in every way furnished +by Shakespeare's plays. It is a truth with which he was thoroughly +imbued, and his intuitive wisdom expressed it in a concrete shape on +every page. I shall here, however, give an instance of it in a case in +which he makes it remarkably clear, without exhibiting any design or +affectation in the matter; for he was a real artist and never set +out from general ideas. His method was obviously to work up to the +psychological truth which he grasped directly and intuitively, +regardless of the fact that few would notice or understand it, and +without the smallest idea that some dull and shallow fellows in +Germany would one day proclaim far and wide that he wrote his works to +illustrate moral commonplaces. I allude to the character of the Earl +of Northumberland, whom we find in three plays in succession, although +he does not take a leading part in any one of them; nay, he appears +only in a few scenes distributed over fifteen acts. Consequently, if +the reader is not very attentive, a character exhibited at such great +intervals, and its moral identity, may easily escape his notice, even +though it has by no means escaped the poet's. He makes the earl appear +everywhere with a noble and knightly grace, and talk in language +suitable to it; nay, he sometimes puts very beautiful and even +elevated passages, into his mouth. At the same time he is very far +from writing after the manner of Schiller, who was fond of painting +the devil black, and whose moral approval or disapproval of the +characters which he presented could be heard in their own words. With +Shakespeare, and also with Goethe, every character, as long as he is +on the stage and speaking, seems to be absolutely in the right, even +though it were the devil himself. In this respect let the reader +compare Duke Alba as he appears in Goethe with the same character in +Schiller. + +We make the acquaintance of the Earl of Northumberland in the play of +_Richard II_., where he is the first to hatch a plot against the King +in favour of Bolingbroke, afterwards Henry IV., to whom he even offers +some personal flattery (Act II., Sc. 3). In the following act he +suffers a reprimand because, in speaking of the King he talks of him +as "Richard," without more ado, but protests that he did it only for +brevity's sake. A little later his insidious words induce the King to +surrender. In the following act, when the King renounces the crown, +Northumberland treats him with such harshness and contempt that the +unlucky monarch is quite broken, and losing all patience once more +exclaims to him: _Fiend, thou torment'st me ere I come to hell_! At +the close, Northumberland announces to the new King that he has sent +the heads of the former King's adherents to London. + +In the following tragedy, _Henry IV_., he hatches a plot against the +new King in just the same way. In the fourth act we see the rebels +united, making preparations for the decisive battle on the morrow, and +only waiting impatiently for Northumberland and his division. At last +there arrives a letter from him, saying that he is ill, and that he +cannot entrust his force to any one else; but that nevertheless the +others should go forward with courage and make a brave fight. They +do so, but, greatly weakened by his absence, they are completely +defeated; most of their leaders are captured, and his own son, the +valorous Hotspur, falls by the hand of the Prince of Wales. + +Again, in the following play, the _Second Part of Henry IV_., we see +him reduced to a state of the fiercest wrath by the death of his son, +and maddened by the thirst for revenge. Accordingly he kindles another +rebellion, and the heads of it assemble once more. In the fourth act, +just as they are about to give battle, and are only waiting for him to +join them, there comes a letter saying that he cannot collect a proper +force, and will therefore seek safety for the present in Scotland; +that, nevertheless, he heartily wishes their heroic undertaking the +best success. Thereupon they surrender to the King under a treaty +which is not kept, and so perish. + +So far is character from being the work of reasoned choice and +consideration that in any action the intellect has nothing to do but +to present motives to the will. Thereafter it looks on as a mere +spectator and witness at the course which life takes, in accordance +with the influence of motive on the given character. All the incidents +of life occur, strictly speaking, with the same necessity as the +movement of a clock. On this point let me refer to my prize-essay on +_The Freedom of the Will_. I have there explained the true meaning and +origin of the persistent illusion that the will is entirely free in +every single action; and I have indicated the cause to which it is +due. I will only add here the following teleological explanation of +this natural illusion. + +Since every single action of a man's life seems to possess the freedom +and originality which in truth only belong to his character as he +apprehends it, and the mere apprehension of it by his intellect is +what constitutes his career; and since what is original in every +single action seems to the empirical consciousness to be always being +performed anew, a man thus receives in the course of his career the +strongest possible moral lesson. Then, and not before, he becomes +thoroughly conscious of all the bad sides of his character. Conscience +accompanies every act with the comment: _You should act differently_, +although its true sense is: _You could be other than you are_. As the +result of this immutability of character on the one hand, and, on the +other, of the strict necessity which attends all the circumstances in +which character is successively placed, every man's course of life +is precisely determined from Alpha right through to Omega. But, +nevertheless, one man's course of life turns out immeasurably happier, +nobler and more worthy than another's, whether it be regarded from a +subjective or an objective point of view, and unless we are to exclude +all ideas of justice, we are led to the doctrine which is well +accepted in Brahmanism and Buddhism, that the subjective conditions in +which, as well as the objective conditions under which, every man is +born, are the moral consequences of a previous existence. + +Macchiavelli, who seems to have taken no interest whatever in +philosophical speculations, is drawn by the keen subtlety of his very +unique understanding into the following observation, which possesses +a really deep meaning. It shows that he had an intuitive knowledge of +the entire necessity with which, characters and motives being given, +all actions take place. He makes it at the beginning of the prologue +to his comedy _Clitia_. _If_, he says, _the same men were to recur +in the world in the way that the same circumstances recur, a hundred +years would never elapse without our finding ourselves together once +more, and doing the same things as we are doing now--Se nel mondo +tornassino i medesimi uomini, como tornano i medesimi casi, non +passarebbono mai cento anni che noi non ci trovassimo un altra volta +insieme, a fare le medesime cose che hora_. He seems however to have +been drawn into the remark by a reminiscence of what Augustine says in +his _De Civitate Dei_, bk. xii., ch. xiii. + +Again, Fate, or the [Greek: eimarmenae] of the ancients, is nothing +but the conscious certainty that all that happens is fast bound by a +chain of causes, and therefore takes place with a strict necessity; +that the future is already ordained with absolute certainty and can +undergo as little alteration as the past. In the fatalistic myths of +the ancients all that can be regarded as fabulous is the prediction +of the future; that is, if we refuse to consider the possibility of +magnetic clairvoyance and second sight. Instead of trying to explain +away the fundamental truth of Fatalism by superficial twaddle and +foolish evasion, a man should attempt to get a clear knowledge and +comprehension of it; for it is demonstrably true, and it helps us in a +very important way to an understanding of the mysterious riddle of +our life. Predestination and Fatalism do not differ in the main. They +differ only in this, that with Predestination the given character and +external determination of human action proceed from a rational Being, +and with Fatalism from an irrational one. But in either case the +result is the same: that happens which must happen. + +On the other hand the conception of _Moral Freedom_ is inseparable +from that of _Originality_. A man may be said, but he cannot be +conceived, to be the work of another, and at the same time be free in +respect of his desires and acts. He who called him into existence out +of nothing in the same process created and determined his nature--in +other words, the whole of his qualities. For no one can create without +creating a something, that is to say, a being determined throughout +and in all its qualities. But all that a man says and does necessarily +proceeds from the qualities so determined; for it is only the +qualities themselves set in motion. It is only some external impulse +that they require to make their appearance. As a man is, so must he +act; and praise or blame attaches, not to his separate acts, but to +his nature and being. + +That is the reason why Theism and the moral responsibility of man are +incompatible; because responsibility always reverts to the creator of +man and it is there that it has its centre. Vain attempts have been +made to make a bridge from one of these incompatibles to the other by +means of the conception of moral freedom; but it always breaks down +again. What is _free_ must also be _original_. If our will is _free_, +our will is also _the original element_, and conversely. Pre-Kantian +dogmatism tried to separate these two predicaments. It was thereby +compelled to assume two kinds of freedom, one cosmological, of the +first cause, and the other moral and theological, of human will. These +are represented in Kant by the third as well as the fourth antimony of +freedom. + +On the other hand, in my philosophy the plain recognition of the +strictly necessary character of all action is in accordance with the +doctrine that what manifests itself even in the organic and irrational +world is _will_. If this were not so, the necessity under which +irrational beings obviously act would place their action in conflict +with will; if, I mean, there were really such a thing as the freedom +of individual action, and this were not as strictly necessitated as +every other kind of action. But, as I have just shown, it is this same +doctrine of the necessary character of all acts of will which makes it +needful to regard a man's existence and being as itself the work of +his freedom, and consequently of his will. The will, therefore, must +be self-existent; it must possess so-called _a-se-ity_. Under the +opposite supposition all responsibility, as I have shown, would be at +an end, and the moral like the physical world would be a mere machine, +set in motion for the amusement of its manufacturer placed somewhere +outside of it. So it is that truths hang together, and mutually +advance and complete one another; whereas error gets jostled at every +corner. + +What kind of influence it is that _moral instruction_ may exercise +on conduct, and what are the limits of that influence, are questions +which I have sufficiently examined in the twentieth section of my +treatise on the _Foundation of Morality_. In all essential particulars +an analogous influence is exercised by _example_, which, however, has +a more powerful effect than doctrine, and therefore it deserves a +brief analysis. + +In the main, example works either by restraining a man or by +encouraging him. It has the former effect when it determines him to +leave undone what he wanted to do. He sees, I mean, that other people +do not do it; and from this he judges, in general, that it is not +expedient; that it may endanger his person, or his property, or his +honour. + +He rests content, and gladly finds himself relieved from examining +into the matter for himself. Or he may see that another man, who has +not refrained, has incurred evil consequences from doing it; this is +example of the deterrent kind. The example which encourages a man +works in a twofold manner. It either induces him to do what he would +be glad to leave undone, if he were not afraid lest the omission might +in some way endanger him, or injure him in others' opinion; or else it +encourages him to do what he is glad to do, but has hitherto refrained +from doing from fear of danger or shame; this is example of the +seductive kind. Finally, example may bring a man to do what he would +have otherwise never thought of doing. It is obvious that in this last +case example works in the main only on the intellect; its effect on +the will is secondary, and if it has any such effect, it is by the +interposition of the man's own judgment, or by reliance on the person +who presented the example. + +The whole influence of example--and it is very strong--rests on the +fact that a man has, as a rule, too little judgment of his own, and +often too little knowledge, o explore his own way for himself, and +that he is glad, therefore, to tread in the footsteps of some one +else. Accordingly, the more deficient he is in either of these +qualities, the more is he open to the influence of example; and we +find, in fact, that most men's guiding star is the example of others; +that their whole course of life, in great things and in small, comes +in the end to be mere imitation; and that not even in the pettiest +matters do they act according to their own judgment. Imitation and +custom are the spring of almost all human action. The cause of it +is that men fight shy of all and any sort of reflection, and very +properly mistrust their own discernment. At the same time this +remarkably strong imitative instinct in man is a proof of his kinship +with apes. + +But the kind of effect which example exercises depends upon a man's +character, and thus it is that the same example may possibly seduce +one man and deter another. An easy opportunity of observing this is +afforded in the case of certain social impertinences which come into +vogue and gradually spread. The first time that a man notices anything +of the kind, he may say to himself: _For shame! how can he do it! how +selfish and inconsiderate of him! really, I shall take care never to +do anything like that_. But twenty others will think: _Aha! if he does +that, I may do it too_. + +As regards morality, example, like doctrine, may, it is true, promote +civil or legal amelioration, but not that inward amendment which is, +strictly speaking, the only kind of moral amelioration. For example +always works as a personal motive alone, and assumes, therefore, +that a man is susceptible to this sort of motive. But it is just the +predominating sensitiveness of a character to this or that sort of +motive that determines whether its morality is true and real; though, +of whatever kind it is, it is always innate. In general it may be said +that example operates as a means of promoting the good and the bad +qualities of a character, but it does not create them; and so it +is that Seneca's maxim, _velle non discitur_--_will cannot be +learned_--also holds good here. But the innateness of all truly moral +qualities, of the good as of the bad, is a doctrine that consorts +better with the metempsychosis of the Brahmins and Buddhists, +according to which a man's good and bad deeds follow him from one +existence to another like his shadow, than with Judaism. For Judaism +requires a man to come into the world as a moral blank, so that, in +virtue of an inconceivable free will, directed to objects which +are neither to be sought nor avoided--_liberum arbitrium +indifferentiae_--and consequently as the result of reasoned +consideration, he may choose whether he is to be an angel or a devil, +or anything else that may lie between the two. Though I am well aware +what the Jewish scheme is, I pay no attention to it; for my standard +is truth. I am no professor of philosophy, and therefore I do not find +my vocation in establishing the fundamental ideas of Judaism at any +cost, even though they for ever bar the way to all and every kind of +philosophical knowledge. _Liberum arbitrium indifferentiae_ under +the name of _moral freedom_ is a charming doll for professors of +philosophy to dandle; and we must leave it to those intelligent, +honourable and upright gentlemen. + + + + +CHARACTER. + + +Men who aspire to a happy, a brilliant and a long life, instead of to +a virtuous one, are like foolish actors who want to be always having +the great parts,--the parts that are marked by splendour and triumph. +They fail to see that the important thing is not _what_ or _how much_, +but _how_ they act. + +Since _a man does not alter_, and his _moral character_ remains +absolutely the same all through his life; since he must play out the +part which he has received, without the least deviation from the +character; since neither experience, nor philosophy, nor religion +can effect any improvement in him, the question arises, What is the +meaning of life at all? To what purpose is it played, this farce +in which everything that is essential is irrevocably fixed and +determined? + +It is played that a man may come to understand himself, that he may +see what it is that he seeks and has sought to be; what he wants, and +what, therefore, he is. _This is a knowledge which must be imparted +to him from without_. Life is to man, in other words, to will, what +chemical re-agents are to the body: it is only by life that a man +reveals what he is, and it is only in so far as he reveals himself +that he exists at all. Life is the manifestation of character, of the +something that we understand by that word; and it is not in life, but +outside of it, and outside time, that character undergoes alteration, +as a result of the self-knowledge which life gives. Life is only +the mirror into which a man gazes not in order that he may get a +reflection of himself, but that he may come to understand himself by +that reflection; that he may see _what_ it is that the mirror shows. +Life is the proof sheet, in which the compositors' errors are brought +to light. How they become visible, and whether the type is large or +small, are matters of no consequence. Neither in the externals of life +nor in the course of history is there any significance; for as it is +all one whether an error occurs in the large type or in the small, so +it is all one, as regards the essence of the matter, whether an evil +disposition is mirrored as a conqueror of the world or a common +swindler or ill-natured egoist. In one case he is seen of all men; in +the other, perhaps only of himself; but that he should see himself is +what signifies. + +Therefore if egoism has a firm hold of a man and masters him, whether +it be in the form of joy, or triumph, or lust, or hope, or frantic +grief, or annoyance, or anger, or fear, or suspicion, or passion of +any kind--he is in the devil's clutches and how he got into them does +not matter. What is needful is that he should make haste to get out of +them; and here, again, it does not matter how. + +I have described _character_ as _theoretically_ an act of will lying +beyond time, of which life in time, or _character in action_, is the +development. For matters of practical life we all possess the one as +well as the other; for we are constituted of them both. Character +modifies our life more than we think, and it is to a certain extent +true that every man is the architect of his own fortune. No doubt it +seems as if our lot were assigned to us almost entirely from without, +and imparted to us in something of the same way in which a melody +outside us reaches the ear. But on looking back over our past, we see +at once that our life consists of mere variations on one and the same +theme, namely, our character, and that the same fundamental bass +sounds through it all. This is an experience which a man can and must +make in and by himself. + +Not only a man's life, but his intellect too, may be possessed of a +clear and definite character, so far as his intellect is applied to +matters of theory. It is not every man, however, who has an intellect +of this kind; for any such definite individuality as I mean is +genius--an original view of the world, which presupposes an absolutely +exceptional individuality, which is the essence of genius. A man's +intellectual character is the theme on which all his works are +variations. In an essay which I wrote in Weimar I called it the knack +by which every genius produces his works, however various. This +intellectual character determines the physiognomy of men of +genius--what I might call _the theoretical physiognomy_--and gives it +that distinguished expression which is chiefly seen in the eyes and +the forehead. In the case of ordinary men the physiognomy presents no +more than a weak analogy with the physiognomy of genius. On the other +hand, all men possess _the practical physiognomy_, the stamp of will, +of practical character, of moral disposition; and it shows itself +chiefly in the mouth. + +Since character, so far as we understand its nature, is above and +beyond time, it cannot undergo any change under the influence of life. +But although it must necessarily remain the same always, it requires +time to unfold itself and show the very diverse aspects which it may +possess. For character consists of two factors: one, the will-to-live +itself, blind impulse, so-called impetuosity; the other, the restraint +which the will acquires when it comes to understand the world; and the +world, again, is itself will. A man may begin by following the craving +of desire, until he comes to see how hollow and unreal a thing is +life, how deceitful are its pleasures, what horrible aspects it +possesses; and this it is that makes people hermits, penitents, +Magdalenes. Nevertheless it is to be observed that no such change +from a life of great indulgence in pleasure to one of resignation is +possible, except to the man who of his own accord renounces pleasure. +A really bad life cannot be changed into a virtuous one. The most +beautiful soul, before it comes to know life from its horrible side, +may eagerly drink the sweets of life and remain innocent. But it +cannot commit a bad action; it cannot cause others suffering to do +a pleasure to itself, for in that case it would see clearly what +it would be doing; and whatever be its youth and inexperience it +perceives the sufferings of others as clearly as its own pleasures. +That is why one bad action is a guarantee that numberless others will +be committed as soon as circumstances give occasion for them. Somebody +once remarked to me, with entire justice, that every man had something +very good and humane in his disposition, and also something very bad +and malignant; and that according as he was moved one or the other of +them made its appearance. The sight of others' suffering arouses, not +only in different men, but in one and the same man, at one moment an +inexhaustible sympathy, at another a certain satisfaction; and this +satisfaction may increase until it becomes the cruellest delight in +pain. I observe in myself that at one moment I regard all mankind with +heartfelt pity, at another with the greatest indifference, on occasion +with hatred, nay, with a positive enjoyment of their pain. + +All this shows very clearly that we are possessed of two different, +nay, absolutely contradictory, ways of regarding the world: one +according to the principle of individuation, which exhibits all +creatures as entire strangers to us, as definitely not ourselves. We +can have no feelings for them but those of indifference, envy, hatred, +and delight that they suffer. The other way of regarding the world +is in accordance with what I may call the +_Tat-twam-asi_--_this-is-thyself_ principle. All creatures are +exhibited as identical with ourselves; and so it is pity and love +which the sight of them arouses. + +The one method separates individuals by impassable barriers; the other +removes the barrier and brings the individuals together. The one makes +us feel, in regard to every man, _that is what I am_; the other, +_that is not what I am_. But it is remarkable that while the sight of +another's suffering makes us feel our identity with him, and arouses +our pity, this is not so with the sight of another's happiness. Then +we almost always feel some envy; and even though we may have no such +feeling in certain cases,--as, for instance, when our friends are +happy,--yet the interest which we take in their happiness is of a weak +description, and cannot compare with the sympathy which we feel with +their suffering. Is this because we recognise all happiness to be a +delusion, or an impediment to true welfare? No! I am inclined to think +that it is because the sight of the pleasure, or the possessions, +which are denied to us, arouses envy; that is to say, the wish that +we, and not the other, had that pleasure or those possessions. + +It is only the first way of looking at the world which is founded on +any demonstrable reason. The other is, as it were, the gate out of +this world; it has no attestation beyond itself, unless it be the very +abstract and difficult proof which my doctrine supplies. Why the first +way predominates in one man, and the second in another--though perhaps +it does not exclusively predominate in any man; why the one or the +other emerges according as the will is moved--these are deep problems. +The paths of night and day are close together: + + [Greek: Engus gar nuktos de kai aematos eisi keleuthoi.] + +It is a fact that there is a great and original difference between +one empirical character and another; and it is a difference which, +at bottom, rests upon the relation of the individual's will to his +intellectual faculty. This relation is finally determined by the +degree of will in his father and of intellect in his mother; and the +union of father and mother is for the most part an affair of chance. +This would all mean a revolting injustice in the nature of the +world, if it were not that the difference between parents and son is +phenomenal only and all chance is, at bottom, necessity. + +As regards the freedom of the will, if it were the case that the will +manifested itself in a single act alone, it would be a free act. But +the will manifests itself in a course of life, that is to say, in a +series of acts. Every one of these acts, therefore, is determined as +a part of a complete whole, and cannot happen otherwise than it does +happen. On the other hand, the whole series is free; it is simply the +manifestation of an individualised will. + +If a man feels inclined to commit a bad action and refrains, he is +kept back either (1) by fear of punishment or vengeance; or (2) by +superstition in other words, fear of punishment in a future life; or +(3) by the feeling of sympathy, including general charity; or (4) by +the feeling of honour, in other words, the fear of shame; or (5) by +the feeling of justice, that is, an objective attachment to fidelity +and good-faith, coupled with a resolve to hold them sacred, because +they are the foundation of all free intercourse between man and +man, and therefore often of advantage to himself as well. This last +thought, not indeed as a thought, but as a mere feeling, influences +people very frequently. It is this that often compels a man of honour, +when some great but unjust advantage is offered him, to reject it with +contempt and proudly exclaim: _I am an honourable man_! For otherwise +how should a poor man, confronted with the property which chance or +even some worse agency has bestowed on the rich, whose very existence +it is that makes him poor, feel so much sincere respect for this +property, that he refuses to touch it even in his need; and although +he has a prospect of escaping punishment, what other thought is it +that can be at the bottom of such a man's honesty? He is resolved not +to separate himself from the great community of honourable people +who have the earth in possession, and whose laws are recognised +everywhere. He knows that a single dishonest act will ostracise and +proscribe him from that society for ever. No! a man will spend money +on any soil that yields him good fruit, and he will make sacrifices +for it. + +With a good action,--that, every action in which a man's own advantage +is ostensibly subordinated to another's,--the motive is either (1) +self-interest, kept in the background; or (2) superstition, in other +words, self-interest in the form of reward in another life; or (3) +sympathy; or (4) the desire to lend a helping hand, in other words, +attachment to the maxim that we should assist one another in need, and +the wish to maintain this maxim, in view of the presumption that some +day we ourselves may find it serve our turn. For what Kant calls a +good action done from motives of duty and for the sake of duty, there +is, as will be seen, no room at all. Kant himself declares it to be +doubtful whether an action was ever determined by pure motives of duty +alone. I affirm most certainly that no action was ever so done; it is +mere babble; there is nothing in it that could really act as a motive +to any man. When he shelters himself behind verbiage of that sort, he +is always actuated by one of the four motives which I have described. +Among these it is obviously sympathy alone which is quite genuine and +sincere. + +_Good_ and _bad_ apply to character only _à potiori_; that is to say, +we prefer the good to the bad; but, absolutely, there is no such +distinction. The difference arises at the point which lies between +subordinating one's own advantage to that of another, and not +subordinating it. If a man keeps to the exact middle, he is _just_. +But most men go an inch in their regard for others' welfare to twenty +yards in regard for their own. + +The source of _good_ and of _bad character_, so far as we have any +real knowledge of it, lies in this, that with the bad character the +thought of the external world, and especially of the living creatures +in it, is accompanied--all the more, the greater the resemblance +between them and the individual self--by a constant feeling of _not I, +not I, not I_. + +Contrarily, with the good character (both being assumed to exist in +a high degree) the same thought has for its accompaniment, like a +fundamental bass, a constant feeling of _I, I, I_. From this spring +benevolence and a disposition to help all men, and at the same time a +cheerful, confident and tranquil frame of mind, the opposite of that +which accompanies the bad character. + +The difference, however, is only phenomenal, although it is a +difference which is radical. But now we come to _the hardest of all +problems_: How is it that, while the will, as the thing-in-itself, is +identical, and from a metaphysical point of view one and the same +in all its manifestations, there is nevertheless such an enormous +difference between one character and another?--the malicious, +diabolical wickedness of the one, and set off against it, the goodness +of the other, showing all the more conspicuously. How is it that we +get a Tiberius, a Caligula, a Carcalla, a Domitian, a Nero; and on the +other hand, the Antonines, Titus, Hadrian, Nerva? How is it that among +the animals, nay, in a higher species, in individual animals, there is +a like difference?--the malignity of the cat most strongly developed +in the tiger; the spite of the monkey; on the other hand, goodness, +fidelity and love in the dog and the elephant. It is obvious that the +principle of wickedness in the brute is the same as in man. + +We may to some extent modify the difficulty of the problem by +observing that the whole difference is in the end only one of degree. +In every living creature, the fundamental propensities and instincts +all exist, but they exist in very different degrees and proportions. +This, however, is not enough to explain the facts. + +We must fall back upon the intellect and its relation to the will; it +is the only explanation that remains. A man's intellect, however, by +no means stands in any direct and obvious relation with the goodness +of his character. We may, it is true, discriminate between two kinds +of intellect: between understanding, as the apprehension of relation +in accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and cognition, +a faculty akin to genius, which acts more directly, is independent of +this law, and passes beyond the Principle of Individuation. The latter +is the faculty which apprehends Ideas, and it is the faculty which +has to do with morality. But even this explanation leaves much to +be desired. _Fine minds are seldom fine souls_ was the correct +observation of Jean Paul; although they are never the contrary. Lord +Bacon, who, to be sure, was less a fine soul than a fine mind, was a +scoundrel. + +I have declared space and time to be part of the Principle of +Individuation, as it is only space and time that make the multiplicity +of similar objects a possibility. But multiplicity itself also admits +of variety; multiplicity and diversity are not only quantitative, but +also qualitative. How is it that there is such a thing as qualitative +diversity, especially in ethical matters? Or have I fallen into an +error the opposite of that in which Leibnitz fell with his _identitas +indiscernibilium_? + +The chief cause of intellectual diversity is to be found in the +brain and nervous system. This is a fact which somewhat lessens the +obscurity of the subject. With the brutes the intellect and the brain +are strictly adapted to their aims and needs. With man alone there +is now and then, by way of exception, a superfluity, which, if it is +abundant, may yield genius. But ethical diversity, it seems, proceeds +immediately from the will. Otherwise ethical character would not be +above and beyond time, as it is only in the individual that intellect +and will are united. The will is above and beyond time, and eternal; +and character is innate; that is to say, it is sprung from the same +eternity, and therefore it does not admit of any but a transcendental +explanation. + +Perhaps some one will come after me who will throw light into this +dark abyss. + + + + +MORAL INSTINCT. + + +An act done by instinct differs from every other kind of act in that +an understanding of its object does not precede it but follows upon +it. Instinct is therefore a rule of action given _à priori_. We may be +unaware of the object to which it is directed, as no understanding of +it is necessary to its attainment. On the other hand, if an act is +done by an exercise of reason or intelligence, it proceeds according +to a rule which the understanding has itself devised for the purpose +of carrying out a preconceived aim. Hence it is that action according +to rule may miss its aim, while instinct is infallible. + +On the _à priori_ character of instinct we may compare what Plato says +in the _Philebus_. With Plato instinct is a reminiscence of something +which a man has never actually experienced in his lifetime; in the +same way as, in the _Phaedo_ and elsewhere, everything that a man +learns is regarded as a reminiscence. He has no other word to express +the _à priori_ element in all experience. + +There are, then, three things that are _à priori_: + +(1) Theoretical Reason, in other words, the conditions which make all +experience possible. + +(2) Instinct, or the rule by which an object promoting the life of the +senses may, though unknown, be attained. + +(3) The Moral Law, or the rule by which an action takes place without +any object. + +Accordingly rational or intelligent action proceeds by a rule laid +down in accordance with the object as it is understood. Instinctive +action proceeds by a rule without an understanding of the object of +it. Moral action proceeds by a rule without any object at all. + +_Theoretical Reason_ is the aggregate of rules in accordance +with which all my knowledge--that is to say, the whole world of +experience--necessarily proceeds. In the same manner _Instinct_ is the +aggregate of rules in accordance with which all my action necessarily +proceeds if it meets with no obstruction. Hence it seems to me that +Instinct may most appropriately be called _practical reason_, for like +theoretical reason it determines the _must_ of all experience. + +The so-called moral law, on the other hand, is only one aspect of _the +better consciousness_, the aspect which it presents from the point of +view of instinct. This better consciousness is something lying beyond +all experience, that is, beyond all reason, whether of the theoretical +or the practical kind, and has nothing to do with it; whilst it is in +virtue of the mysterious union of it and reason in the same individual +that the better consciousness comes into conflict with reason, leaving +the individual to choose between the two. + +In any conflict between the better consciousness and reason, if the +individual decides for reason, should it be theoretical reason, he +becomes a narrow, pedantic philistine; should it be practical, a +rascal. + +If he decides for the better consciousness, we can make no further +positive affirmation about him, for if we were to do so, we should +find ourselves in the realm of reason; and as it is only what takes +place within this realm that we can speak of at all it follows that we +cannot speak of the better consciousness except in negative terms. + +This shows us how it is that reason is hindered and obstructed; +that _theoretical reason_ is suppressed in favour of _genius_, and +_practical reason_ in favour of _virtue_. Now the better consciousness +is neither theoretical nor practical; for these are distinctions that +only apply to reason. But if the individual is in the act of choosing, +the better consciousness appears to him in the aspect which it assumes +in vanquishing and overcoming the practical reason (or instinct, to +use the common word). It appears to him as an imperative command, an +_ought_. It so appears to him, I say; in other words, that is the +shape which it takes for the theoretical reason which renders +all things into objects and ideas. But in so far as the better +consciousness desires to vanquish and overcome the theoretical reason, +it takes no shape at all; on the simple ground that, as it comes +into play, the theoretical reason is suppressed and becomes the mere +servant of the better consciousness. That is why genius can never give +any account of its own works. + +In the morality of action, the legal principle that both sides are to +be heard must not be allowed to apply; in other words, the claims of +self and the senses must not be urged. Nay, on the contrary, as soon +as the pure will has found expression, the case is closed; _nec +audienda altera pars_. + +The lower animals are not endowed with moral freedom. Probably this is +not because they show no trace of the better consciousness which in us +is manifested as morality, or nothing analogous to it; for, if that +were so, the lower animals, which are in so many respects like +ourselves in outward appearance that we regard man as a species of +animal, would possess some _raison d'être_ entirely different from our +own, and actually be, in their essential and inmost nature, something +quite other than ourselves. This is a contention which is obviously +refuted by the thoroughly malignant and inherently vicious character +of certain animals, such as the crocodile, the hyaena, the scorpion, +the snake, and the gentle, affectionate and contented character of +others, such as the dog. Here, as in the case of men, the character, +as it is manifested, must rest upon something that is above and beyond +time. For, as Jacob Böhme says,[1] _there is a power in every animal +which is indestructible, and the spirit of the world draws it into +itself, against the final separation at the Last Judgment_. Therefore +we cannot call the lower animals free, and the reason why we cannot +do so is that they are wanting in a faculty which is profoundly +subordinate to the better consciousness in its highest phase, I mean +reason. Reason is the faculty of supreme comprehension, the idea of +totality. How reason manifests itself in the theoretical sphere Kant +has shown, and it does the same in the practical: it makes us capable +of observing and surveying the whole of our life, thought, and action, +in continual connection, and therefore of acting according to general +maxims, whether those maxims originate in the understanding as +prudential rules, or in the better consciousness as moral laws. + +[Footnote 1: _Epistles_, 56.] + +If any desire or passion is aroused in us, we, and in the same way the +lower animals, are for the moment filled with this desire; we are all +anger, all lust, all fear; and in such moments neither the better +consciousness can speak, nor the understanding consider the +consequences. But in our case reason allows us even at that moment +to see our actions and our life as an unbroken chain,--a chain +which connects our earlier resolutions, or, it may be, the future +consequences of our action, with the moment of passion which now fills +our whole consciousness. It shows us the identity of our person, even +when that person is exposed to influences of the most varied kind, and +thereby we are enabled to act according to maxims. The lower animal +is wanting in this faculty; the passion which seizes it completely +dominates it, and can be checked only by another passion--anger, for +instance, or lust, by fear; even though the vision that terrifies does +not appeal to the senses, but is present in the animal only as a dim +memory and imagination. Men, therefore, may be called irrational, if, +like the lower animals, they allow themselves to be determined by the +moment. + +So far, however, is reason from being the source of morality that it +is reason alone which makes us capable of being rascals, which the +lower animals cannot be. It is reason which enables us to form an evil +resolution and to keep it when the provocation to evil is removed; it +enables us, for example, to nurse vengeance. Although at the moment +that we have an opportunity of fulfilling our resolution the better +consciousness may manifest itself as love or charity, it is by force +of reason, in pursuance of some evil maxim, that we act against it. +Thus Goethe says that a man may use his reason only for the purpose of +being more bestial than any beast: + + _Er hat Vernunft, doch braucht er sie allein + Um theirischer als jedes Thier zu sein_. + +For not only do we, like the beasts, satisfy the desires of the +moment, but we refine upon them and stimulate them in order to prepare +the desire for the satisfaction. + +Whenever we think that we perceive a trace of reason in the lower +animals, it fills us with surprise. Now our surprise is not excited by +the good and affectionate disposition which some of them exhibit--we +recognise that as something other than reason--but by some action in +them which seems to be determined not by the impression of the moment, +but by a resolution previously made and kept. Elephants, for instance, +are reported to have taken premeditated revenge for insults long after +they were suffered; lions, to have requited benefits on an opportunity +tardily offered. The truth of such stories has, however, no bearing at +all on the question, What do we mean by reason? But they enable us to +decide whether in the lower animals there is any trace of anything +that we can call reason. + +Kant not only declares that all our moral sentiments originate in +reason, but he lays down that reason, _in my sense of the word_, is +a condition of moral action; as he holds that for an action to be +virtuous and meritorious it must be done in accordance with maxims, +and not spring from a resolve taken under some momentary impression. +But in both contentions he is wrong. If I resolve to take vengeance on +some one, and when an opportunity offers, the better consciousness in +the form of love and humanity speaks its word, and I am influenced by +it rather than by my evil resolution, this is a virtuous act, for it +is a manifestation of the better consciousness. It is possible to +conceive of a very virtuous man in whom the better consciousness is +so continuously active that it is never silent, and never allows his +passions to get a complete hold of him. By such consciousness he is +subject to a direct control, instead of being guided indirectly, +through the medium of reason, by means of maxims and moral principles. +That is why a man may have weak reasoning powers and a weak +understanding and yet have a high sense of morality and be eminently +good; for the most important element in a man depends as little on +intellectual as it does on physical strength. Jesus says, _Blessed +are the poor in spirit_. And Jacob Böhme has the excellent and noble +observation: _Whoso lies quietly in his own will, like a child in the +womb, and lets himself be led and guided by that inner principle from +which he is sprung, is the noblest and richest on earth_.[1] + +[Footnote 1: _Epistles_, 37.] + + + + +ETHICAL REFLECTIONS. + + +The philosophers of the ancient world united in a single conception +a great many things that had no connection with one another. Of this +every dialogue of Plato's furnishes abundant examples. The greatest +and worst confusion of this kind is that between ethics and politics. +The State and the Kingdom of God, or the Moral Law, are so entirely +different in their character that the former is a parody of the +latter, a bitter mockery at the absence of it. Compared with the Moral +Law the State is a crutch instead of a limb, an automaton instead of a +man. + + * * * * * + +The _principle of honour_ stands in close connection with human +freedom. It is, as it were, an abuse of that freedom. Instead of +using his freedom to fulfil the moral law, a man employs his power +of voluntarily undergoing any feeling of pain, of overcoming any +momentary impression, in order that he may assert his self-will, +whatever be the object to which he directs it. As he thereby shows +that, unlike the lower animals, he has thoughts which go beyond the +welfare of his body and whatever makes for that welfare, it has come +about that the principle of honour is often confused with virtue. They +are regarded as if they were twins. But wrongly; for although the +principle of honour is something which distinguishes man from the +lower animals, it is not, in itself, anything that raises him above +them. Taken as an end and aim, it is as dark a delusion as any other +aim that springs from self. Used as a means, or casually, it may be +productive of good; but even that is good which is vain and frivolous. +It is the misuse of freedom, the employment of it as a weapon for +overcoming the world of feeling, that makes man so infinitely more +terrible than the lower animals; for they do only what momentary +instinct bids them; while man acts by ideas, and his ideas may entail +universal ruin before they are satisfied. + +There is another circumstance which helps to promote the notion that +honour and virtue are connected. A man who can do what he wants to do +shows that he can also do it if what he wants to do is a virtuous act. +But that those of our actions which we are ourselves obliged to regard +with contempt are also regarded with contempt by other people serves +more than anything that I have here mentioned to establish the +connection. Thus it often happens that a man who is not afraid of the +one kind of contempt is unwilling to undergo the other. But when we +are called upon to choose between our own approval and the world's +censure, as may occur in complicated and mistaken circumstances, what +becomes of the principle of honour then? + +Two characteristic examples of the principle of honour are to be found +in Shakespeare's _Henry VI_., Part II., Act IV., Sc. 1. A pirate is +anxious to murder his captive instead of accepting, like others, a +ransom for him; because in taking his captive he lost an eye, and +his own honour and that of his forefathers would in his opinion be +stained, if he were to allow his revenge to be bought off as though he +were a mere trader. The prisoner, on the other hand, who is the Duke +of Suffolk, prefers to have his head grace a pole than to uncover it +to such a low fellow as a pirate, by approaching him to ask for mercy. + +Just as civic honour--in other words, the opinion that we deserve to +be trusted--is the palladium of those whose endeavour it is to make +their way in the world on the path of honourable business, so knightly +honour--in other words, the opinion that we are men to be feared--is +the palladium of those who aim at going through life on the path +of violence; and so it was that knightly honour arose among the +robber-knights and other knights of the Middle Ages. + + * * * * * + +A theoretical philosopher is one who can supply in the shape of ideas +for the reason, a copy of the presentations of experience; just as +what the painter sees he can reproduce on canvas; the sculptor, in +marble; the poet, in pictures for the imagination, though they are +pictures which he supplies only in sowing the ideas from which they +sprang. + +A so-called practical philosopher, on the other hand, is one who, +contrarily, deduces his action from ideas. The theoretical philosopher +transforms life into ideas. The practical philosopher transforms ideas +into life; he acts, therefore, in a thoroughly reasonable manner; he +is consistent, regular, deliberate; he is never hasty or passionate; +he never allows himself to be influenced by the impression of the +moment. + +And indeed, when we find ourselves among those full presentations of +experience, or real objects, to which the body belongs--since the body +is only an objectified will, the shape which the will assumes in the +material world--it is difficult to let our bodies be guided, not by +those presentations, but by a mere image of them, by cold, colourless +ideas, which are related to experience as the shadow of Orcus to life; +and yet this is the only way in which we can avoid doing things of +which we may have to repent. + +The theoretical philosopher enriches the domain of reason by adding to +it; the practical philosopher draws upon it, and makes it serve him. + + * * * * * + +According to Kant the truth of experience is only a hypothetical +truth. If the suppositions which underlie all the intimations of +experience--subject, object, time, space and causality--were removed, +none of those intimations would contain a word of truth. In other +words, experience is only a phenomenon; it is not knowledge of the +thing-in-itself. + +If we find something in our own conduct at which we are secretly +pleased, although we cannot reconcile it with experience, seeing that +if we were to follow the guidance of experience we should have to +do precisely the opposite, we must not allow this to put us out; +otherwise we should be ascribing an authority to experience which +it does not deserve, for all that it teaches rests upon a mere +supposition. This is the general tendency of the Kantian Ethics. + + * * * * * + +Innocence is in its very nature stupid. It is stupid because the aim +of life (I use the expression only figuratively, and I could just +as well speak of the essence of life, or of the world) is to gain a +knowledge of our own bad will, so that our will may become an object +for us, and that we may undergo an inward conversion. Our body is +itself our will objectified; it is one of the first and foremost of +objects, and the deeds that we accomplish for the sake of the body +show us the evil inherent in our will. In the state of innocence, +where there is no evil because there is no experience, man is, as +it were, only an apparatus for living, and the object for which the +apparatus exists is not yet disclosed. An empty form of life like +this, a stage untenanted, is in itself, like the so-called real world, +null and void; and as it can attain a meaning only by action, by +error, by knowledge, by the convulsions of the will, it wears a +character of insipid stupidity. A golden age of innocence, a fools' +paradise, is a notion that is stupid and unmeaning, and for that +very reason in no way worthy of any respect. The first criminal and +murderer, Cain, who acquired a knowledge of guilt, and through +guilt acquired a knowledge of virtue by repentance, and so came to +understand the meaning of life, is a tragical figure more significant, +and almost more respectable, than all the innocent fools in the world +put together. + + * * * * * + +If I had to write about _modesty_ I should say: I know the esteemed +public for which I have the honour to write far too well to dare to +give utterance to my opinion about this virtue. Personally I am quite +content to be modest and to apply myself to this virtue with +the utmost possible circumspection. But one thing I shall never +admit--that I have ever required modesty of any man, and any statement +to that effect I repel as a slander. + +The paltry character of most men compels the few who have any merit +or genius to behave as though they did not know their own value, and +consequently did not know other people's want of value; for it is +only on this condition that the mob acquiesces in tolerating merit. A +virtue has been made out of this necessity, and it is called modesty. +It is a piece of hypocrisy, to be excused only because other people +are so paltry that they must be treated with indulgence. + + * * * * * + +Human misery may affect us in two ways, and we may be in one of two +opposite moods in regard to it. + +In one of them, this misery is immediately present to us. We feel it +in our own person, in our own will which, imbued with violent desires, +is everywhere broken, and this is the process which constitutes +suffering. The result is that the will increases in violence, as +is shown in all cases of passion and emotion; and this increasing +violence comes to a stop only when the will turns and gives way to +complete resignation, in other words, is redeemed. The man who is +entirely dominated by this mood will regard any prosperity which he +may see in others with envy, and any suffering with no sympathy. + +In the opposite mood human misery is present to us only as a fact +of knowledge, that is to say, indirectly. We are mainly engaged in +looking at the sufferings of others, and our attention is withdrawn +from our own. It is in their person that we become aware of human +misery; we are filled with sympathy; and the result of this mood is +general benevolence, philanthropy. All envy vanishes, and instead +of feeling it, we are rejoiced when we see one of our tormented +fellow-creatures experience any pleasure or relief. + +After the same fashion we may be in one of two opposite moods in +regard to human baseness and depravity. In the one we perceive this +baseness indirectly, in others. Out of this mood arise indignation, +hatred, and contempt of mankind. In the other we perceive it directly, +in ourselves. Out of it there arises humiliation, nay, contrition. + +In order to judge the moral value of a man, it is very important to +observe which of these four moods predominate in him. They go in +pairs, one out of each division. In very excellent characters the +second mood of each division will predominate. + + * * * * * + +The categorical imperative, or absolute command, is a contradiction. +Every command is conditional. What is unconditional and necessary is a +_must_, such as is presented by the laws of nature. + +It is quite true that the moral law is entirely conditional. There +is a world and a view of life in which it has neither validity nor +significance. That world is, properly speaking, the real world in +which, as individuals, we live; for every regard paid to morality is a +denial of that world and of our individual life in it. It is a view +of the world, however, which does not go beyond the principle of +sufficient reason; and the opposite view proceeds by the intuition of +Ideas. + + * * * * * + +If a man is under the influence of two opposite but very strong +motives, A and B, and I am greatly concerned that he should choose A, +but still more that he should never be untrue to his choice, and by +changing his mind betray me, or the like, it will not do for me to say +anything that might hinder the motive B from having its full effect +upon him, and only emphasise A; for then I should never be able to +reckon on his decision. What I have to do is, rather, to put both +motives before him at the same time, in as vivid and clear a way as +possible, so that they may work upon him with their whole force. The +choice that he then makes is the decision of his inmost nature, and +stands firm to all eternity. In saying _I will do this_, he has said +_I must do this_. I have got at his will, and I can rely upon its +working as steadily as one of the forces of nature. It is as certain +as fire kindles and water wets that he will act according to the +motive which has proved to be stronger for him. Insight and knowledge +may be attained and lost again; they may be changed, or improved, or +destroyed; but will cannot be changed. That is why _I apprehend, I +perceive, I see_, is subject to alteration and uncertainty; _I will_, +pronounced on a right apprehension of motive, is as firm as nature +itself. The difficulty, however, lies in getting at a right +apprehension. A man's apprehension of motive may change, or be +corrected or perverted; and on the other hand, his circumstances may +undergo an alteration. + + * * * * * + +A man should exercise an almost boundless toleration and placability, +because if he is capricious enough to refuse to forgive a single +individual for the meanness or evil that lies at his door, it is doing +the rest of the world a quite unmerited honour. + +But at the same time the man who is every one's friend is no one's +friend. It is quite obvious what sort of friendship it is which we +hold out to the human race, and to which it is open to almost every +man to return, no matter what he may have done. + + * * * * * + +With the ancients _friendship_ was one of the chief elements in +morality. But friendship is only limitation and partiality; it is +the restriction to one individual of what is the due of all mankind, +namely, the recognition that a man's own nature and that of mankind +are identical. At most it is a compromise between this recognition and +selfishness. + + * * * * * + +A lie always has its origin in the desire to extend the dominion of +one's own will over other individuals, and to deny their will in order +the better to affirm one's own. Consequently a lie is in its very +nature the product of injustice, malevolence and villainy. That is why +truth, sincerity, candour and rectitude are at once recognised and +valued as praiseworthy and noble qualities; because we presume that +the man who exhibits them entertains no sentiments of injustice or +malice, and therefore stands in no need of concealing such sentiments. +He who is open cherishes nothing that is bad. + + * * * * * + +There is a certain kind of courage which springs from the same source +as good-nature. What I mean is that the good-natured man is almost as +clearly conscious that he exists in other individuals as in himself. I +have often shown how this feeling gives rise to good-nature. It +also gives rise to courage, for the simple reason that the man who +possesses this feeling cares less for his own individual existence, +as he lives almost as much in the general existence of all creatures. +Accordingly he is little concerned for his own life and its +belongings. This is by no means the sole source of courage for it is +a phenomenon due to various causes. But it is the noblest kind of +courage, as is shown by the fact that in its origin it is associated +with great gentleness and patience. Men of this kind are usually +irresistible to women. + + * * * * * + +All general rules and precepts fail, because they proceed from the +false assumption that men are constituted wholly, or almost wholly, +alike; an assumption which the philosophy of Helvetius expressly +makes. Whereas the truth is that the original difference between +individuals in intellect and morality is immeasurable. + + * * * * * + +The question as to whether morality is something real is the question +whether a well-grounded counter-principle to egoism actually exists. + +As egoism restricts concern for welfare to a single individual, +_viz_., the man's own self, the counter-principle would have to extend +it to all other individuals. + + * * * * * + +It is only because the will is above and beyond time that the stings +of conscience are ineradicable, and do not, like other pains, +gradually wear away. No! an evil deed weighs on the conscience years +afterwards as heavily as if it had been freshly committed. + + * * * * * + +Character is innate, and conduct is merely its manifestation; the +occasion for great misdeeds comes seldom; strong counter-motives keep +us back; our disposition is revealed to ourselves by our desires, +thoughts, emotions, when it remains unknown to others. Reflecting on +all this, we might suppose it possible for a man to possess, in some +sort, an innate evil conscience, without ever having done anything +very bad. + + * * * * * + +_Don't do to others what you wouldn't like done to yourself_. This is, +perhaps, one of those arguments that prove, or rather ask, too much. +For a prisoner might address it to a judge. + + * * * * * + +Stupid people are generally malicious, for the very same reason as the +ugly and the deformed. + +Similarly, genius and sanctity are akin. However simple-minded a saint +may be, he will nevertheless have a dash of genius in him; and however +many errors of temperament, or of actual character, a genius may +possess, he will still exhibit a certain nobility of disposition by +which he shows his kinship with the saint. + + * * * * * + +The great difference between Law without and Law within, between +the State and the Kingdom of God, is very clear. It is the State's +business to see that _every one should have justice done to him_; +it regards men as passive beings, and therefore takes no account of +anything but their actions. The Moral Law, on the other hand, is +concerned that _every one should do justice_; it regards men as +active, and looks to the will rather than the deed. To prove that this +is the true distinction let the reader consider what would happen if +he were to say, conversely, that it is the State's business that every +one should do justice, and the business of the Moral Law that every +one should have justice done to him. The absurdity is obvious. + +As an example of the distinction, let me take the case of a debtor and +a creditor disputing about a debt which the former denies. A lawyer +and a moralist are present, and show a lively interest in the matter. +Both desire that the dispute should end in the same way, although what +they want is by no means the same. The lawyer says, _I want this man +to get back what belongs to him_; and the moralist, _I want that man +to do his duty_. + +It is with the will alone that morality is concerned. Whether external +force hinders or fails to hinder the will from working does not in the +least matter. For morality the external world is real only in so far +as it is able or unable to lead and influence the will. As soon as +the will is determined, that is, as soon as a resolve is taken, the +external world and its events are of no further moment and +practical do not exist. For if the events of the world had any +such reality--that is to say, if they possessed a significance in +themselves, or any other than that derived from the will which is +affected by them--what a grievance it would be that all these events +lie in the realm of chance and error! It is, however, just this which +proves that the important thing is not what happens, but what is +willed. Accordingly, let the incidents of life be left to the play of +chance and error, to demonstrate to man that he is as chaff before the +wind. + +The State concerns itself only with the incidents--with what happens; +nothing else has any reality for it. I may dwell upon thoughts of +murder and poison as much as I please: the State does not forbid me, +so long as the axe and rope control my will, and prevent it from +becoming action. + +Ethics asks: What are the duties towards others which justice imposes +upon us? in other words, What must I render? The Law of Nature asks: +What need I not submit to from others? that is, What must I suffer? +The question is put, not that I may do no injustice, but that I +may not do more than every man must do if he is to safeguard his +existence, and than every man will approve being done, in order that +he may be treated in the same way himself; and, further, that I may +not do more than society will permit me to do. The same answer will +serve for both questions, just as the same straight line can be drawn +from either of two opposite directions, namely, by opposing forces; +or, again, as the angle can give the sine, or the sine the angle. + +It has been said that the historian is an inverted prophet. In the +same way it may be said that a teacher of law is an inverted moralist +(_viz_., a teacher of the duties of justice), or that politics are +inverted ethics, if we exclude the thought that ethics also teaches +the duty of benevolence, magnanimity, love, and so on. The State is +the Gordian knot that is cut instead of being untied; it is Columbus' +egg which is made to stand by being broken instead of balanced, as +though the business in question were to make it stand rather than to +balance it. In this respect the State is like the man who thinks that +he can produce fine weather by making the barometer go up. + + * * * * * + +The pseudo-philosophers of our age tell us that it is the object of +the State to promote the moral aims of mankind. This is not true; +it is rather the contrary which is true. The aim for which mankind +exists--the expression is parabolic--is not that a man should act in +such and such a manner; for all _opera operata_, things that have +actually been done, are in themselves matters of indifference. No! the +aim is that the Will, of which every man is a complete specimen--nay, +is the very Will itself--should turn whither it needs to turn; that +the man himself (the union of Thought and Will) should perceive what +this will is, and what horrors it contains; that he should show the +reflection of himself in his own deeds, in the abomination of them. +The State, which is wholly concerned with the general welfare, checks +the manifestation of the bad will, but in no wise checks the will +itself; the attempt would be impossible. It is because the State +checks the manifestation of his will that a man very seldom sees the +whole abomination of his nature in the mirror of his deeds. Or does +the reader actually suppose there are no people in the world as bad as +Robespierre, Napoleon, or other murderers? Does he fail to see that +there are many who would act like them if only they could? + +Many a criminal dies more quietly on the scaffold than many a +non-criminal in the arms of his family. The one has perceived what his +will is and has discarded it. The other has not been able to discard +it, because he has never been able to perceive what it is. The aim +of the State is to produce a fool's paradise, and this is in direct +conflict with the true aim of life, namely, to attain a knowledge of +what the will, in its horrible nature, really is. + + * * * * * + +Napoleon was not really worse than many, not to say most, men. He was +possessed of the very ordinary egoism that seeks its welfare at the +expense of others. What distinguished him was merely the greater power +he had of satisfying his will, and greater intelligence, reason and +courage; added to which, chance gave him a favourable scope for his +operations. By means of all this he did for his egoism what a thousand +other men would like to do for theirs, but cannot. Every feeble lad +who by little acts of villainy gains a small advantage for himself by +putting others to some disadvantage, although it may be equally small, +is just as bad as Napoleon. + +Those who fancy that retribution comes after death would demand that +Napoleon should by unutterable torments pay the penalty for all the +numberless calamities that he caused. But he is no more culpable than +all those who possess the same will, unaccompanied by the same power. + +The circumstance that in his case this extraordinary power was added +allowed him to reveal the whole wickedness of the human will; and the +sufferings of his age, as the necessary obverse of the medal, reveal +the misery which is inextricably bound up with this bad will. It is +the general manipulation of this will that constitutes the world. But +it is precisely that it should be understood how inextricably the will +to live is bound up with, and is really one and the same as, this +unspeakable misery, that is the world's aim and purpose; and it is an +aim and purpose which the appearance of Napoleon did much to assist. +Not to be an unmeaning fools' paradise but a tragedy, in which the +will to live understands itself and yields--that is the object for +which the world exists. Napoleon is only an enormous mirror of the +will to live. + +The difference between the man who causes suffering and the man who +suffers it, is only phenomenal. It is all a will to live, identical +with great suffering; and it is only by understanding this that the +will can mend and end. + + * * * * * + +What chiefly distinguishes ancient from modern times is that in +ancient times, to use Napoleon's expression, it was affairs that +reigned: _les paroles aux choses_. In modern times this is not so. +What I mean is that in ancient times the character of public life, +of the State, and of Religion, as well as of private life, was a +strenuous affirmation of the will to live. In modern times it is a +denial of this will, for such is the character of Christianity. But +now while on the one hand that denial has suffered some abatement even +in public opinion, because it is too repugnant to human character, on +the other what is publicly denied is secretly affirmed. Hence it is +that we see half measures and falsehood everywhere; and that is why +modern times look so small beside antiquity. + + * * * * * + +The structure of human society is like a pendulum swinging between two +impulses, two evils in polar opposition, _despotism_ and _anarchy_. +The further it gets from the one, the nearer it approaches the other. +From this the reader might hit on the thought that if it were exactly +midway between the two, it would be right. Far from it. For these +two evils are by no means equally bad and dangerous. The former is +incomparably less to be feared; its ills exist in the main only as +possibilities, and if they come at all it is only one among millions +that they touch. But, with anarchy, possibility and actuality are +inseparable; its blows fall on every man every day. Therefore every +constitution should be a nearer approach to a despotism than to +anarchy; nay, it must contain a small possibility of despotism. + + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Essays Of Arthur Schopenhauer +by Arthur Schopenhauer + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10739 *** |